The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-02-17

affords ground for conjecture as to what
the ultimate result will be. From the Inii-
itary standpoint of this country the war IN
South Africa has only begun.
In making a just estimate Of the more
recent operations OF the British forces IL IS
important to bear in mind that the sitda-
ton compels their commander TO press
aggressive operations as constantly ana
vigorously possible. first to prevent the
Beers from detaching large bodies Of
troops to oppose the advance along the nae
chosen by Lord Roberts and, second, 10
take advantage OF any considerable weak
ening Of the Boer lines which the otler
movement OF Lord Roberts may cause, 20
break garrisons
Thus IL may possibly happen. at any time
IN the near future that Gen Butler may find
the Boer line at some point in his 'front.'
too far weakened TO resist his vigorous as
saults. II not. Gen Buffers vigorous OPP
erations and those of Gen. Methuen on the
other flank must so occupy the Beers as 10
make sure Lord Roberts advance on an
intermediate line.
Strategic principles suggest that the Brit
ish operations in South Africa should he
conducted on al least three lines. If
fourth, from Delagoa bay, were available IL
would be greatly to their advantage. Such
a division of a superior force increases very
greatly the probabilities Of the success Of
some one of three or four grand divisions
and the success OF one is the success OF all.
When the Union army of the West after
three years hard fighting, were able to
march through Georgia and the Caroiinas,
Confederate army in Virginia the end
necessarily came. in spite of the fact tat
the Confederate army OF Northern virginia
had been able to defend Richmond nearly
four years. Yet the Army of the Pot omac
though IL made little progress in all that
time, performed the most heroic and dffi-
cult task Of all by holding the most formid-
able Of the Confederate armies while the
Western Union armies did their deadly
work.
So Gen. Butler may yet perform the most
important British service in South Africa,
by holding the Beers along the line of the
Tugela river until Lord Roberts penetrates
into the heart OF me Boer territory. In
the meantime, whether the troops at
Ladysmith are able to- hold out to the end
or must surrender before they can be re-
the same. He must press his operations
there to hold the Beers. while Lord Rob
erts advances on the other line.
OF the Beers, the information received
in this country, though meager appears to
| justify us in saying that their operations
have been conducted with admirable skill
and courage A long time may be required
| to determine which side is most power
| full.
| Unless our British and Dutch cousins
on the other side OF the Atlantic are de-
| generate. our own civil war must be ac-
! eepted as a fair indication of what the
must be. We can only hope that the ulti-
| mate result may be as beneficial TO civili-
zaticn and human progress in Africa as
| II was In America
| The late dispatches indicate that Gen.
| Buffers operations have already borne le-
| ultimate fruit, by enabling Lord Roberts
| to make his initial move with little or no
| opposition. This should result in forcing
upon the Beers the necessity OF attacking,
| In their turn, troops In favorable position,
! and intrenched. thus reversing the condi-
| tons which have heretofore existed. The
| result of such an attack must be looked
| for with keenest interest.