The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-10-20
LATE LEGAL DECISIONS.

The question whether physicians should
be compelled to report cases Of consump-
ton to the health ofncer, under a statui.
requiring them to give notice to such ON
Ger Of any person known to them to be
infected with smallpox, cholera. diphthe-
| Na scarlet fever. or any other disease dan
eerous to the public health. was before
| the Supreme Court Of Michigan. The case
wa test one. and it was agreed by coun-
sci or the respective parties that the only
question involved was whether consump-
tion IL covered by the statute. The court
held tlat the question whether consump-
ton Is disease dangerous to the public
health was to be determined on evidence,
and should have been submitted to the
jury. In the opinion the court said: THE
position o; defendants counsel as stated
In the brief Is that the general clause,
Or any other disease dangerous to the
public health was intended to include
other diseases Of the same degree OF in
Righteousness Of danger to life, though not
specincaily naming them: that the general
clause would include yellow fever. leprosy,
ouoonic plague. and typhus fever For, IL
| is SAID, 1t Is common knowledge that these
diseases partake Of the same violent decree
OF infectiousness as those mentioned in the
statute. The rule Is correctly stated that
where statute, after enumerating specific
! cases, uses general term to cover Others
the latter are understood to be Of the
same general character. sort, or kind as
those specified. This rule has been fire.
quentIy recognized In this State, but 1t
does not determine this case, for the rea-
son that II consumption is disease dan
gerous to the public health 1t is OF the
rho ne Ii
those specifically enumerated In the sense
In which the Legislature characterized
those diseases. i. e., diseases dangerous
to the public health. II there were a dis
tinct dividing line OF danger of which the
courts might take judicial notice a differ
emit view might be held. but there is no
sucn line. The court cannot judicially
know what are the varying degrees OF
tnfectiousness Of different Diseases"
Where garnishee fails to answer with
IN the time prescribed, the general rule
Is that the plaintiff Is entitled to have a
Judgment against the garnishee; but in
case where. within three days after the
piaintin mad obtained judgment against
the defendant. the garnishce filed an an
swer denying any Indebtedness to the de-
iendant. and set forth therein good and
sumcfent reasons for not answering in
due time, which reasons showed that the
garnishee was guilty of no laches but
acted in good faith, and therefore was in
Justice and right entitled to an oppor-
tunity to answer, IL was error to strike
the answer from the record and enter a
Judgment against the garnishee. In their
opinion the court said in part: ut is nor
the object of the law to make one man
pay the debt Of another. The purpose of
the garnishment law is to impound prop
erty belonging to debtor in the hands of
a third person. and while such third per-
son must promptly respond to the call OF
the plaintiff 10 answer. il he is prevented
from doing so on the day named, by ac-
cident, mistake or any unavoidable cir
cumstances for which the law will have
regard. but does appear and file his an
swer in time for the plaintiff to reap the
reward OF his diligence. and without put
ting the plaintiff to any unnecessary de-
lay, in the absence Of bad faith or collu-
sion, and where the garnishee has en-
deavored to prevent any delay by prompt
ly filing an answer as soon as the circum-
stances will admit. there is no equitable
reason why the answer should not be al
lowed to stand, and the rights of the par
ties determined on the merits as they
shall be made to appear by investigation
Judge Ross. Of a United States Circuit
Court in California. holds that a munich
pal corporation may lawfully. in the ex-
ercise Of general police powers dsIegited
to 1T by its charter. regulate the hei hit CT
biilboards maintained therein, wi hin
reasonable limits. and city ordnance
limiting the height of such structures t,
six feet from the ground or sidewalk is
not so unreasonable as to Justify a court
in holding it void as in violation of con-
to
matter Of common knowledge said judge
Ross. land. therefore. within the notice
of the court, that these 'billb-ards' ar.
usually. il not invariably. cheap AMI
fimsy affairs. constructed of wood and
erected on vacant lots of land along or
near to the streets. in order to catch tn,
eye OF the passer-by. Such structures.
II Of sufficient height. may be very ad-
lily blown over by wind or shaken down
by an earthquake. and in such event i'd
pending upon their height and proximity
to the public thoroughfare) may very
easily cause injury to persons standing
or passing thereon. Moreover the vi vs.
in and about city. if beautiful and IN
obstructed, constitute one CT its chief at
fractions. and in that way add to the
comfort and well-being of it's pc pl..
Billboards for advertising purposes.
erected to any great height would I'M
doubtedly be subject to all of these. as
well as other objections. and such struc-
lures are therefore plainly within the
regulating power Of the governing body
of the city,
An action for damages against the
United States for an injury caused by the
incompetence Of a person in charge of
the elevator in postoffice building can
not be maintained. holds Judge Thomas
of the United States Circuit Court in New
York. The plaintiff sought to recover
under the Tucker act. which permits re-
covery against the United States for
claims founded upon any contract, express
or implied. with the Government of the
United States, or for damages in cases
not sounding in tort. But Judge Thomas
held that, although the United States ex-
tended license to the public to use its
elevator in the postoffice building. no con-
tract either express or implied. arose
therefrom. I'm the present case" said
Judge Thomas, 1.-The license to enter and
use the elevator is implied: hence 1t
would be asserted that there was an i'm
piled contract to enter. Here. again, the
suggestion is to imply a contract for the
purpose of raising duty, when the law
already imposes the duty without impli-
cation of contractual relation. More
over the courts and systematic writer's
have not classed with contracts mere
permission to do or forbear the doing of
an act but have rather regarded such
license as authority to do something that