New-York tribune., 1900-01-20

In this volume DR.. Rhodes brings his history
down from the spring of 1862 to the reelection
OF Lincoln in November 1864. These two and
a half years cover the most interesting. though
also the most distressing, period of the Civil
war-the period in which the National Govern
ment made the real fight for its life, often ap-
parently with the odds against it. Imperilled
by incompetent leadership in the field, the hos
tity of foreign Powers which only waited for
a favorable opportunity to effect it's ruin, and
discouragement and dsaffection at home 1t
struggled on with unfiagging determination un-
til at last it's courage and the fortitude of the
Northern people were rewarded. The long
sought commanders were found, the possibility
of foreign interference disappeared, and the ap-
proach of the collapse Of the military power OF
the Confederacy became evident even to the
most sceptical. To say that DR.. Rhodes depicts
this terrible crisis in the Nations history In a
mastery way is unnecessary. His accurate
knowledge of sources his firm grasp Of essen
tias the force and lucidity of his style, and the
skill with which the actual movement OF events
IS reflected In his pages, were made clear in the
earlier portions of his work.
The central theme Of the volume is naturally,
the war ITSELF and although Dr. Rhodes does
not burden his story with military details or
technical discussions his narrative of the vari-
battles and campaigns is one Of the best
that has been written. The account of the
PeninsuIar campaign with which the volume
opens, is particularly judcious and the general
Judgment reached with regard to the operations
Of the Army of the Potomac is one which
scarcely any one will be disposed to ques-
ton. THE campaign" he says was a failure.
and the chief cause of it's failure may be
ascribed to Mcclellan" The great organizer
and drillmaster in a word lacked the moral
courage to attack his enemy even when the odds
We're overwhelmingly in his own favor. and was.
in fact, so constituted mentally that aggressive
tactics were for him we'll nigh impossible If he
did not fail, as Sherman said Of Thomas in the
Atlantic campaign, TO perceive that the war
which the North was forced to wage was essen
TALLY offensive and not defensive. he neverthe-
less conducted his movement upon Richmond
wholly in the spirit OF defence, with the in
evitable result Of disaster up to April IL
there was no time when the Union Army did
not outnumber the Confederate three to one;
moreover the Union general had the authority
of his Government to make assault. Not to
break the Confederate line of thirteen miles
which stretched from the York River to the
James error; indeed, it is true. as Joseph
z. Johnston wrote, that no but Mcclellan
could have hesitated TO attack" Again, at the
battle of Fair Oaks, had Mcclellan acted with
proper energy, the chances more than even
that he would have beaten the Confederate
Army and taken Richmond" But he did moth
ing of the sort. His native irresolution laid
fast hold Of him. He did not reach the field Of
battle Sunday until the firing had ceased and
he then gave orders that matters should remain
as they were. When Porter made his splendid
defence at Gaines Mill, McClellans absurd
overestimate of the Confederate force left in
front of his own troops-Magruders 25,000 be-
ing transformed in his imagination into 10000
caused him 70 miss a splendid opportunity to
crush his foe and condemned him to ignominous
retreat
But it is needless TO dwell upon these points
for DR.. Rhodes merely repeats the accepted YER
Dict of history. 1t is worthy of note that
he is equally ready 10 recognize the fact that
with all his defects Mcclellan was the ablest
general who had thus far risen to prominence
on the Union side One has only, DR.. Rhodes
intimates to consider the Seven Days battles
and Ant.etam to be convinced that if Mcclellan
was totally unable to the Army of the
Potomac to crush the Confederacy. it never in
his hands could have met the fate that befell it
at Fredericksburg and Charlottesville The re-
marks upon the credit which is due him for the
repulse Of Lee at Antietam are particularly
just.
Military judges crticise McClelIan's lack of
celerity after he found Lees lost order; he acted
with energy. they say, but not with the utmost
possible energy. In these judgments,
however. there is. consciously unconsciously,
a reflection Of what Frederick the Great or Ma
poleon in like would have done. But against
a Frederick, a Napoleon or the Grant or Sher-
man of 1864, Lees strategy would have been
different; he would not have invaded Maryland
nor divided his army. Instead, therefore, of
emphasizing these criticisms, let rather con-
trast the conquering host of the South as they
marched through the streets Of Frederick, full
OF pride and hope and singing THE Girl 1 Left
Behind Me-" with the horde of disordered
fugitives' fleeing before an army they had a
fortnight earlier driven Ito cover under its
homeward ramparts": let us note the change of
feeling at the North from depression before
South Mountain TO buoyancy after Antietam;
let us reflect that signal Confederate victory
in Maryland might have caused the Northern
voters at the approaching fall elections to de-
clare for the peace that Jefferson Davis would
offer them from the head of Lees victorious
army, and that without McClellan's victory the
Emancipation Proclamation would have been
postponed and might never have been issued.
In striking contrast with the defniteness with
which DR.. Rhodes pronounces judgment upon
both the East and the West his hesitatng
and inconcIusive comments on the last campaign
of the Army of the Potomac. the terrible ad-
vance through the Wilderness. He gives promi-
nence to the failure TO defeat Lee, to the ter
rible and once, at least, needless loss Of life
and 10 the disorganization and deterioration Of
the army which was conspicuous before Peters
burg. But he nowhere fully states criticises
Grants conception of the problem that
placed before him, estimates the final effect of
the method Of attrition upon the defensive power
of Lees army. or undertakes discuss the i'm
portant question whether the final triumph could
have been more quickly or cheaply secured by
the adoption of any other line of attack. In
fact the reader ii seems TO US, is left with the
feeling that Grant was, in this campaign quite
as great failure from the strategical and tacti-
cal points of view Mcclellan though this
l,1xy Fc hot Tr