The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-01-28

trade routes can be best commanded Each
Of the more important stations ia fitted to
be an independent centre OF naval opera
tions. It is interesting to quote here the
opinion OF VI. Lockroy. the former French
Minister of Marine. In q recently publish
ed Interview in the Figaro As the
French fleet ranks next to the British in
size. and considerably exceeds either the
Russian or Italian, the comparison will
serve double purpose. NJ Lockroy says:
The English are more than twice as
strong as we. They have nearly six hun
dred warships OF every tonnage and form.
to which they can add three OF four hun
dred steamers ready to be armed for war.
They are strong enough to confront France
and the Triple Alliance combined. The
number OF their vessels is not only vastly
more formidable than ours and their per
sonnet more numerous. but their organiza-
ton is incontestably superior to that OF all
the other fleets in the world. On
all the seas our feet finds Itself before an
English fleet double or triple in number.
and commanded by young officers. In all
the seas the English have points. d'appui
that is to say. ports where they can re-
plenish their COAL repair damages. and find
both food and munitions We have moth
ing, or alp,ost nothing. in comparison.
Today to have a feet Is nothing. II Is
uleTti} LuiuE lot SHOW. Inc IQluK ueCeS-
sary ia to have for that feet coaiing sta
tions in all parts of the world. a feet
without such stations Is, as Admiral VAL
len said. like goat tied to a stake. The
cord that holds her may be more or less
strong, but there she Is, tied" He might
have added that the more important of
these stations are also practically impreg-
nable fortresses.
In the present urgency Of competitive
world-commerce, British sea power has
greater Importance than ever before. In
the last resort the weaker navy means the
weaker maritime commerce. and there is
an eager watch TO grasp precarfous trade
from those unable to hold il. France, for
example, Is now bending renewed energy
upon the improvement Of her colonial EN-
pire into paying returns But IL she had
staked a war upon Fashoda. her army
would have been useless and her navy in
adequate. Nor could the naval power of
Russia have been an efficient aid. rs 1t
consists OF four distinct fleets. three of
which are tied up in part for local opera
tons in the Baltic. Black. and Caspian
seas. respectively. while the fourth pro-
tects Port Arthur and VladiYostol. Had
war been declared. the French colonial
empire would have been attacked at once.
No more favorable opportunity could have
been desired for the settlement of the
Newfoundland west shore difficulty by the
capture OF st. Pierre and Miquelon. Hall
fax and st. Johns Newfoundland would
have served for naval bases. Operations
could have been simultaneously directed
against Martinique and Gaudeloupe in the
West Indies. where two strongly fortified
naval stations-Kingston, jamaica and the
Island of st. Lucia-are within easy strik-
ing distance. Then, again, Madagascar
could have been attacked from the power
full naval station of Mauritius. compare
lively short distance to the east To the
southwest on the African coast Is the Brit
ish port Of Durham. New Caledonia could
have been attacked from Sydney or Bris-
bane on the east coast OF Australia. The
Asian possessions and protectorates OF
France are within reach OF Hongkong.
Singapore, and Trincomalee in Ceylon, all
fortified naval and coaling stations of the
first importance. This is not a complete
of the naval bases available
against France. Such an enumeration
would show that the whole colonial empire
OF that country would be endangered in
the event of war with Great Britain. And
the French colonial empire Is, with the ex
ception of the British, far more extensive
than any other.
In view Of these facts, what special peril
ian be said to II enace the British Empire
On account Of tn war in South Africa? An
eminent American naval designer. writing
on this topic, said recently that the whole
continent of Europe could not land one
soldier in South Africa or anywhere else
against the will of England, and that if
England wants to crush the TrausvaaI she
will do it simply and solely by virtue of
her overmastering sea power. That does
not agree with the calculations of those
who stake the integrity of the British En-
pire on recent or future reverses in this
war. As long as sea mastery remains 70
enc Of the belligerents. a steady supply of
troops and munitions Of war can be poured
into South Africa. until the last man will
ing to fight there for British supremacy
has been enrolled.
Undoubtedly the loss of imperial pres
tige viii have bad effect upon the dark
skinned populations under British rule. In
South Africa a black rising either for or
against the British would be disastrous.
but the progress of the war thus far has
not made 1t imminent. There is however,
A fanatic Moslem population among the
Hills Of northern India that has the temper
OF revolt. There is another in Central
Africa which kitchener's victories aid no.
touch. But any weakening in the allegi-
ance of subject races has been more than
by the support Of the self
governing colonies. This has been given a
heartlness that has already solved in part
the problem Of imperial unity for purposes
OF defence. and points Enthusiastically to
further consolidation of the empire. The
Australian and Canadian eontingents have
done more for that great cause than many
years of political agitation could do. From
the military as well as the naval point of
view the action OF these colonies has dis
covered for the mother country a new re-
cruiting ground-jealously guarded, of
course. by local control, yet promptly Of
fered in grave crisis of the empire. 1t
would be hard to imagine any serious Brit
Ssh war OF the future in which the prece-
lent OF loyalty will not be followed. II |
he colonies have not yet counted the cost |
IF this significant departure. they have at |
east revealed a temper that will be strenu- |
rus to fight for the maintenance of the |
whole empire That result alone balances |
he temporary loss of prestige from a few
'epulses in South Africa. IL may also help
o explain why no continental government /
,cts. although press and people may reviIe
md threaten. Probably none of them |
ieems II expedient for the present to be
more than an interested spectator OF Brit
sh armies fighting under cover OF the ma
US guns. There is no real encourage
nent for them in Magarsfontein and Co
enso. A dozen repulses of that kind would |
lot shorten the striking distance of sim
lie British ship of war.-John w. Russell. |
Primary Elections.
(From the Houston Post)
The primary election is the safest and most