The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-02-01
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.
American Omcer. Interested In IN
Co-nict.

Co-utcf.
oricers Of the army in Washington are
watching the war In South Africa with
great interest. Indeed. much more atteu-
tion is paid to il than to the fighting in
Luzon. which they regard as having reach
, ed guerrilla stage. The attention which
our army officers give to the TransvsaI war
! Is directed to the general features OF the
tactics, and they speculate as to how our
commanders woald have acted in similar
circumstances.
General Corbin has been quoted as say
ing that American soldiers would have sue
ceeded better than the English. because of
their experience on the frontier with hos
tile Indian tribes This view. however. is
not generally supported. as Indian war
riors are not regarded as on n plane with
Beers. Perhaps the artillery officers are
following the South African war more
eagerly than the others. because they find
in 1t proof OF some of their long standing
arguments. One of them, in discussing
the Boer- British war. said:
/ The situation today is what might have
been expected. The British system is OBJ
sclete and inefficient. while the Beers have
drilling for this contest. Ten years ago
General joubert established war college
ct Pretoria. We hear talk about the Beers
as lot of herders and farmers. However
that may be. their commanders are trained
and superior officers. and all their tao
tics have been directed toward this strug-
gle with England. the ground examined
and the very battlehelds surveyed.
Spion kop was planned years ago and
Friday witnessed simply the consumma-
ton OF the plan. That fight and every
other one has shown the extraordinary
! strength which artillery has come to have
in the last few years Now II is, instead
| of infantry the backbone OF the ar1nY
White lost a regiment because his mules
| stampeded with the batteries, Butler was
beaten at Tugela River when his cannon
| were captured. and Warren lost Spion Kop
because he could not bring his artillery up
to that place. and the Beers guns were
directed at his army.
with the rapid-fre guns now in use,
the size of the infantry force opposing
them, unless 1t is of overwhelming pro-
portions. Is of small Importance. One
such weapon is worth scores. perhaps hun
dreds, of men. And when I read OF
solid column of troops ordered to march
up to the mouths Of these T3oer 6-inch
rapid-fire guns l call the order simply
murder.
The British plainly have not the mod
ern artillery which the Beers possess
The difference between the two forces in
this one respect. independent Of all tacti-
cal blunders and other features of unpre-
paredness. is sufficient to account for the
present situation. We must believe that
the British will eventually win. but they
will do so only when they bring their best
guns and gunners to the front and pour
into the field great army"
The artillery did not have chance at
Santiago" was suggested. "
by no means. Not a single commanding
officer there was an artilleryman. The
infantry was relied upon to do the work
which the artillery would hare done much
more quickly and with less loss of life
This was because Shafter had never had
experience with anything but infantry
Take the capture of Ell Caney, for exam
plea fight in which the artillery did some
good work. The capture at IL o'clock
ought to have occurred at ..
Two hours in some contests would mean
the difference between defeat and victory,
and that two hours was due to the fact
that the general in command, an infantry
officer. directed our battery work instead
of leaving it to the artillery officer in
charge of the guns. But that experience
deal. for In the Philippine Instruction
their officers have been given practically
independent commands, with astonishing
results. =
in one campaign the battery was taken
up to position only thirty yards from the
enemy-a thing never heard of beforehand
a brilliant victory was the result. That
attracted the attention of the
entire military world. One of our officers
was questioned concerning it by the War
Office in London when he called there last
summer.
THE incident shows what can be done
BY giving the artillerymen the direction of
heir own work. opportunity they ought
10 have had long ago. OF course, we ar
-illerymen are prone TO exaggerate the i'm
portance of our arm of the service. but you
must remember that no other arm has
made such astonishing development In late
years, and the new machines can be d.
'eeted and operated only by trained men.
zone great defect in our army system is
hat man is kept in subordinate position
III his life. and, when the chance comes
or distinction, he is often too old. i know
# first lieutenants who are grandfathers.
That could be remedied by more thorough
Inspection of the individual men, and their
II emotion regardless Of time Of service or
ny other eonsiderationAexeept ability and
industry.
Another respect in which we are back
yard is in new inventions. Our ordnance
Ulcers have been too conservative. Take
he matter of smokeless powder. an old il
lstration. We had none when the Spanish
Jar broke out: and why? Not because our
xperts had not invented it, but because
UT ordnance officers were not satisfied and
-ere still experimenting. Yet Germany
ad equipped her army with smokeless
owder fourteen years before. and deca-
ent Spain had it three years before. and
heir powder was that which did not sat
sly our officers. We send our inventors
broad to find recognition for their weap-
ms and their ammunition.
Another defect. and one to which have
eferred incidentally, is the ignorance Of
be average officer of any arm of the SER
Ice except that in which he was trained.
he infantry colonel knows nothing of ar
illery or cavalry. and vice versa. That
ould be remedied by instituting war
temporary affair, but great
chool In which high officers would be
ompelled TO learn about all branches.
his, and the establishment OF a general
taft. both Of which are advocated by Sec
etary Root, would do much to place the
rmy on its proper footing"