The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1900-08-17

Thfye would be no objection to money
payment, but there probably would be to
a cession OF territory. The great neces-
sity for prompt action may, however,
cause all objections to be over-ruled.
In regard to the use of the navies of
the powers, their effectiveness depends
upon Two things-the use of their ships
and their capacity to furnish men for du-
~ ashore. Active opera tions will be en-
urely on land. Gunboats of light draught
win be useful in river work, not only on
the Peiho, but near treaty ports in other
parts of China where protection may be
ueeded.i The larger ships, particularly
the battleships, will be useless except to
furnish landing parties. The United
States navy has near the scene of action
five gunboats whose draught will enable
them TO be of service in navigable inland
waters.
THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
II is not certain within what limits act
i've operations on shore VIII be confined.
China is not a homogeneous nation. AS
"a rule, the people of one province know
little of and care little for what is oc-
CURING in distant province. Each Is
governed by viceroy or governor. who,
though appointed by the central govern
ment, Is almost entirely Independent of
II. and Is practically king within his
owE dominions. He raises and maintains
an army of the kind and of the size he
wishes and that he is able to pay for.
This Is illustrated by the dispatches from
China, which report the consuls at the
treaty ports negotiating directly with
the viceroys I'm regard to the safety of
foreigners. Ii Hung Chang at Canton
has disregarded orders he received to
lPscceed TO Peking and remains in his
province to maintain order there Up TO
the present time the troubles have been
confined to the province of Chihli,' In
which Pekins and Tien-Tsin are situat-
ed. and the province of Shantung. The
latter embraces the peninsula of the
SO me name. on the coast of which are sit
luated the British port Wei-hai- Wei
the German port Kiao-Chow, and the
treaty port Chefoo. If the troubles con.
tirue to be confined to these pr. yinces
the theater of operations will be much
restricted. Tien-Tsin will probably lie ths
base of operations and Peking the OBJ
jcctfve. Any opposing armed forces fy-
ing between the two cities must be dis.
posed of and Peking taken. With Pc.
king IN the hands Of the powers. the res
of the work Will be matter for diplo
matists.
II is considered by weII-informed peo
pile that force of 5000 or 10000 men will
be ample. The number required will vary
with the composition of the force. A com
ality. would be much more efficient thar
a composite force of the same strength
made UP of the contingents furnished b,
the powers. no matter how good tn
quality of each contingent might be. His
tory teaches that in the operations o
allies, friction. jealousies and uIversity o
purpoSe obtain. If the relief force is Z
De camposite army, under a single head
ithr =. Is Of command and staff shoul
lls 4qreeH a Qgrppmnnf q
Representatives of the powers: otherwis
there viii inevitably be friction and de
, lays when the time comes to begin activ
operations.
A HARD CAMPAIGN AHEAD.
The question of the organization an
ccnposition of the army being settled. til
. only remaining question is the characts
of the operations and the difficulties 10 /
; overcome. This is the worst time OF tn
. year for military operations in that n
: gicn. The rainy season Is about begin
!. ming. The country is low and fiat ar
!, has no metaled roads. The Peiho rive
!, with its branches, is shallow and tort
: Gus. In the rainy season ii ovcrflows /
!. hanks. and. as there is nothing to ind
- cate the channel. its value for transpo
= te tion of troops and supplies is smal
:. The principal difficulties to be overcon
!, are, therefore. those connected wi
transportation and supply. AS the colun
. advances. detachments must be left
/" keep open communications and hold Z
- places taken. ON arriving before Pelil
:, q siege might be necessary. The city
:, surrounded by a wall forty feet thic
faced inside and out with brick a
: stone from one to two feet thick, a
- this In turn by a moat fifty feet wide.
- far space. about one hundred feet wiz
- lies between the wall and moat. Peki
"A Is dependent for its supplies from I
"a outside. 1t has immense granaries, t
these are outside the walls and could
- captured. II the Chinese contemplate
termined resistance and their operatio
- src conducted with ability. the capture
- the city would be no easy matter,
80 time before an investment could be ma
~, lccuid be employed in provisioning
- walled city.