The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-04-18

of hsh arms, but behind the British
aT.h. nat brushes the Boer armies an
army II occupation will have to be in
stalled. From various sources hints come
that more men than are already provided
for will have 70 be sent out.
Trying to Cut on the Beers.
Lord Roberts indicates that at least TO-
900 men are advancing to cut OF the Beers
who are investing Wepener As there are
reports from the Basuto border that firing
has been heard In the direction OF the hills
toward Dewftsdorp. Il is possible that
Gen. Chsfrsids's advanced troops are al
ready in contact with the Beers. LORD
Roberts wires that he expected to clear
the southeast section Of the Free state
east OF the railway. and then TO swing
round "a the north and to turn one after
another the Positions held by the Beers
north o. BIoen1fontein. Gen. Buler's pro-
hibitIoff Of SIS press kilograms in Natal
until further notIce Is taken 20 indicate
that 8 movement Is about to begin there.
Roberts severe CriticI~ms.
The war once tonight publishes in the
Gazette dispatch from Lord Roberts,
dated February 10. submitting Gen. Bull
and other operations from January II to
January "a Lord Roberts deals severely
with Gen. Warren and some others. Even
Gen. Butler docs not escape. Lord Rob
erts complains that the plan OF operations
is not clearly described In the dispatches.
After sketching Gen. Buffers Intentions
as communicated to Sir Charles Warren,
who commanded the whole force, Lord
Roberts points out that Gen. Warren
seems 10 have concluded, after consulta-
ton with his officers, that the thanking
movement ordered by Gen Butler was I'M
practicable. and therefore 80 changed the
plan ,of advance. as 70 necessitate the cap
tnre and retention OF Spion kop.
Lord Roberts continues
AS Warren considered It impossible to
make the wide Ranking movement which
was recommended, II not actually pre-
scribed Gins the secret instructions, he
should forth~ith have acquainted Butler
with the course he proposed TO adopt.
There IL nothing to show whsther he did
so or not But II is only fair to Warren
70 point out that Butler appears through
out TO have been aware OF what was hap
pening"
Acted without Discretion.
Regarding the withdrawal from Spion
kop, Ns. fetention of which had become
essential 3 the relief OF Ladysniith, Lord
RoiRfis snyr.
II regret 10 be unable to concur with
kBuller In thinking Thornycroft exercised
wise discretion in ordering the troops 20
retire | am of the opinion that Thorny-
crofsss assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable During
the might the enemys fire could not have
been formidable, and II would not have
taken more than two or three hours for
Thdfnycroft to communicate by messen-
ger with Major Gen Coke or Warren
Colserappears 20 have left Spion kop at
$50 -. an for the purpose OF consulting
vita Warren, Up to that hour the idea
OF Withdrawal had not been entertained,
Yet almost Immediately after Coke's de-
nni fure .Thornycroft issued the order,
sitf6wt reference 10 superior authority,
" hnh upset the whole plan of operations
and rendered unavaiiing the sacrifices
made 10 carry It into erect.
Hc Behaved Gallantiy, However.
''On the other hand II is only right to
say that Thornycroft appears to have
behaved IN very gallant manner
throughout the day.
where warren Failed.
1T II to be regretted that Warren did
not himself visit the Spion kop in the
afternoon or evening. knowing as ne
did, that the state OF affairs was very
critical and that the loss of the position
would involve the failure OF the opera
tions. He consequently was obliged TO
Coke to his headquarters. and
The command az Spion kop thus devolved
on Thornycroft unknown TO Coke, who
was under the impression that the com
mand devoived upon Col HIN as senior
nffieer. Omission or mistakes of this
nature may be trifiing IN themselves, vet
hey may exercise an important infiu-
Ancea over the course OF events and be-
ieve Butler was justified IN remarking
There was want of organization and
y stem which acted most unfavorably on
he defense
The attempt 10 relieve I.adysmith was
well sevised and : agree with Butler In
II ought 90 have succeeded
That Il failed unty In some measure have
been due Go the difficulties OF the general
and the commanding positions held by
the enemy and probably also to errors
of Judgment and want OF administrative
caphcstsS.on the part Of Warren.
Duii~r Also Bismed.
''fsstawhatevef faults Warren may have
the failure must also he at
trihuted 90 the Discrimination OF the ofn-
Ger In supreme command TO assert his
authority aud see that what ne thought
best was done. and also TO the unwar.
tanted aud needless assumption OF re-
sponsibllty hs a subordinate ofncer"
The dlapatch concludes.
s'fnrs srs,lsving feature Of these dis.
patches - the admirable behavior OF the
troops throughout she operations"
nuiier disputes warrcp'~ Report.
Gen. bailers report commenting on
Gen. Nafrens reports ~ tho capture and
eyaesAftiou OF spien kop. after disnutins
thc ssfreytRess 40 some VI Warrep's aa-
scrstens and describing the DANGEROUS
situation occupied by warrcu's forces
tells how be saw the force az spion kon
had given way before Warren knew 81 n
nu'irr Therefore teleKraphed Warren.
NhiFss ycu put . rraliy good. hard
aehtlnK man 10 command on top YOU
will fose the hll sugseat Thorny-
Croft
Want of orsanisatioa aud system.
general nudrr contiuueS, Il have not
Thought e neoce-sFy 20 order an inNezti-
Eesivn 81 - sundown the defense OF
the sUmEait Bad BEEN taken IN hand. en-
srrnehHents laid out and the dead ana
renewed. the whole place would
have beop brought under regular military