Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-07-20
Must Rely Chiefly Upon Efforts of
Friendly Chinese.
RELIANCE ON Ii HUNG CHANG
Difficulty of a Movement of the
Allied Forces.
SECRETARY ROOTS VIEWS

The dispatch from Minister Conser re-
heFes doubt and puts the stamp Of false
| upon the many reports Of the ala ughter Of the
ioreigne-s at Pckin on oates given early in
July. The government officials here con-
cur In regarding the message a. genuine
beyond the possibility OF a doubt.
| The problem now Ia how to effect the
| rescue. The character Of the messaee from
| Sonser iisclcses the necessity for imne-
| date relief.
The opinion is expressed that the condj-
IONS existing render II necessary 10 rely
chiefly upon the friendly Chinese for both
protection and rescue. The fact that tn.
friendlies have been able TO furnish pro-
| lection SO long strengthens the hone that
they will be able to maintain It until the
| danger has passed. Chief reliance ts
placed In the arrival Of Ii Hung Chang
at Pekin in time to disperse the hostile
forces and effect the Rescue
Governments Policy Justified.
The official view Is that the fact of Con-
ger being still alive is Justification of the
policy of this government to accord credit
for good faith to the imperial government
| or China, and IT Is believed that the decla-
| ration by the United States in the circular
| letter Of July has had a good influence
upon the situation in China. 1t is felt
that the policy of refusing TO regard the
condltions In China a provocation for
declaration OF war is indicated by the
fact that the Chinese government has been
aHording protection, and the fact that this
government Is the first to get authentic
| information through from Pekin may be
regarded as recognition Of the purpose
OF the United States to be Just and II DOS
slble. friendly to the Chinese government
II relieves the situation from the disturb
ing doubt as to the sincerity Of the Chine,
government I'm it's efforts to afford protec-
ton from the Boxers and revolving troops.
though II discloses the weakness Of the
government in controlling the revolution
The dispatch shows that danger Ia ever
present and that the efficiency Of the pro-
lection that can be afforded IL a question
OF stubborn defense from day to day. The
anxiety OF the hour fe to whether our
people and those who are defending them
can hold out until Ii Hung Chang can
reach Pekin. Every possible aid is being
given by the allies to hasten his arrival
and 1t is felt that II the besieged can hold
out until he arrives their rescue viii be
e1ected, and 1t will be a matter of a short
Tune before order is In a measure restored
The Question of Rescue.
1t Is doubtful whether any movement re-
lying entirely upon the allied forces to ef-
feet the rescue could be effective and the
apprehension is felt that an attempt to do
this might only aggravate the situation,
as this government believes the firing upon
H.
ditions it would take not less than four
days of forced marching to reach Pekin
from Tien Tsin. and stubborn resistance
on the route might prClong the march in
definitely or render it impossible To a
large extent the situation is one where re-
lance must be placed in keeping a cool head
and faith in Providence The belief of the
Chinese that the United States is not only
seeking none OF their territory. but is ready
to exert its power and influence to prevent
the ACKNOWLEDGMENT of the empire is likely
to contribute more at this time toward the
safety of the foreigners than could mill
tary efforts with the very small force
available on Chinese soil
Some military authorities hold to the
opinion that very vigorous action is de-
manded at once, but this view is not gen
eral in high administration circles Those
who advocate vigorous action call attention
TO the fact that Minister Conger's dispatch
states that the legation is being besieged
by Chinese troops, which they take to
mean the troops of the Chinese government
and construe as disclosing a state of war
Under such construction, il is said, no
time should be lost in getting the allied
forces to Pekin, however small the little
foreign army may be- 1t is further sug-
gested as a probability that d force, after
the capture of the native city of Tien Tsin
was pressed forward and may now be we'll
on its way toward Pekin. However this
may be, 1t is said whatever forces there
at Tien Tsin should be at once pressed
forward at all hazard, and additional troops
should be FASTENED to China at whatever
sacrifice necessary to get them there.
This is not the administration view of the
situation however, as il appears now. Be
lieving that the conservative course of this
government has contributed to the safety
of the ministers at Pekin up to this time.
1t is felt that we should continue in such
course, while not negecting anything that
is practical to be done for the relief of the
besieged.
Secretary Roots View.
Secretary Root had talk with Secretary
Hay after the informal conference Of cabi-
net ministers, and later said that, while
everything possible will be done for the
lief of the ministers, it was question. in
the absence of complete knowledge as to
the situation and the conditions now exist
ing in Pekin. whether 1t would be advisable
to attack and cause fresh disturbance, hav-
ing the example of the firing the forts
at Taku In view, to rely upon the ef-
forts Of the friendly Chinese on the inside.
who seem to have done their part SO far
ole Secretary said that the news Of today
was the strongest vindication of the policy
of this government that could possibly be
given. Our policy announced to bring about
permanent safety and peace to China and
to preserve the stability of the Chinese
government had had its effect upon the
Chinese officials and had made the friendly
ones DESTROYS of rendering all aid possible
to our minister. Therefore, in his opinion,
he thought that the same elements would
do all in their power to aid the ministers.
and keep them safe until relief could be
sent them.
This opinion of the Secretary of War is
shared by the other cabinet officers, and
the opinion is expressed that the conditions
existing render 1t necessary for the time
being. at least. to rely chiefly upon the
friendly Chinese for both protection and
rescue. The fact that the frlendlies have
been able to furnish protection 30 long
strengthens the hope that they will be able
maintain 1t until the danger Is passed.