New-York tribune., 1900-12-13
THE TREATY AND THE CANAL.

Amid all the pother about treaties, doctrines
and what not il is well TO bear in mind few
essential facts The first of these is that the
United States wants, or its ruling party has
from time TO time thought it wanted, canal
under its own direction and control, across the
Central American isthmus. In behalf of
canal the Clayton -Bulwer Treaty was negotiated
half century ago. Instead of promoting, how
ever, this instrument prevented the construction
of the canal. and remains to-day. in the estima-
ton at least of the controlling elements Of the
ruling party, the chief obstacle 10 it. This
treaty should, then, be either modified or abb
rogated If the canal is to be built; or otherwise
Senators should distinctly and primarily con
slider and declare themselves upon the PROPOSE
ton that il has already been abrOgated by Brit
ish violations For if il is indisputably still in
force and binding valid treaty is no more 10
be disregarded than an act of Congress or an
article of the Constitution. 1t is not only law,
but il is law in which the honor Of the Govern
ment and of the Nation is peculiarly involved.
To get around This obstacle, therefore, and 10
facilitate the construction of the canal, the so
called Hay-Pauncefote Treaty has been nego-
tiated Under il the canal could be promptly
constructed. under the management and control
OF the United States, in accord with National
honor and international comfy.
The objection is made 10 this latter treaty,
however, that it is in conflict with the Monroe
Doctrine 1t is even declared. with apparent
sOlemnity and by those who presumably know
the difference between the Monroe Doctrine and
the Binomial Theorem, that the ratification Of
the treaty would mean the abrogation and
death Of the Doctrine. But since for fifty
years, or about two-thirds of its whole period
OF existence, the Monroe Doctrine has been
confronted with the still more deadly Clayton
Bulwer Treaty, and yet survives in unim-
paired vigor, we are inclined TO regard that
view Of the case as unduly pessimistic Indeed,
il is difficult 10 see what material connection
there is between the treaty and the Doctrine, or
in what respect our naturalization of the canal
would impair the efficiency Of our warning
against European aggressiOns upon American
States. If the United States can demand the
open door for all the world in China without
going beyond its legitimate sphere it does seem
that il might grant an open highway to that
open door without relnquishing single ota OF
its legitimate rights within its own sphere Ger
tainly Great Britain has been able to make the
Suez Canal a neutral highway without losing
her grip upon Egypt.
But, it is further objected, this treaty gives us
no right TO fortify the canal, but. on the con-
trary, binds US not TO do so. 1t is true that
some men Of real light and leading, such as
the late Senator Davis have thought we ought
10 fortify, or TO be able 10 fortify the canal
Whether this be or not, il seems clear at
any rate that such a view Overlools the great
factor Of sea power. This objection would have
carried greater weight few years ago. before
we had n Navy and before we got possession of
Porto Rico, for then any Of a dozen other Pow
ers, while respecting the neutrality of the canal
could have deprived us of all use of it, whil1
using IL themselves, by the simple expedient of
keeping our ships away from it, This latter is
however, what no nation. with one possible
exception, could do now. but what. on the con-
trary. the United States itself is well prepared
10 DO against any antagonist. That any Euro
| pean Power with no naval station on this side
/ Of the Atlantic should send q fleet over TO pass
| by our fortresses at Porto Rico 10 wrest from
our Navy the control of the Caribbean Sea. and
thus TO make use of the canal to our disadvan-
tage, is simply beyond the consideration of
those who are not dreamers of wild dreams. To
revert 10 the example of Suez. Great Rritain,s
only fortihcations Of that canal are at Malta
| ana In her Mediterranean fleet What Malta
ana the Mediterranean feet are 10 Suez that
would Porto Rico and our Caribbean feet be 10
Nicaragua Or, in the final analysis. it might
be recalled that treaties are automatically abro-
gated by declaration of war.
AS for the Monroe Doctrine this Nation is
not sitting mp o. nights for fear lest il shall he
stolen or destroyed by some wicked buccaneer
II has stood the strain and stress of tbree-onar-
tiers or a century, and is not likely 10 succnnb
row. treaty or no treaty canal or no canal As
ior the preservation of the canal for our own
use ana the exclusion Of an enemy from, :. -
'ime OF war. the judgment of Captain Maban
commands respect He saws thar "tha srs+
condition, without which all others arc ~ ~
aNall' Is our own strength, demonstrated IN,
Meet available for immediate action there of
power great enough 10 make IL evidently inox
pedient. politically, for the greatest navy 70
contest our predOminance in the CaribbeoD -.
such feet we are now rapidly ACQUIRING and
iohg before the isthmian canal can be built n
VIII oe suinclent 10 maintain indisputabIv the
control Of the Caribbean Sea. II is with sroh =
meet with Porto Rico for it's base. that the canal
y 10 De best guarded To let a hostile snuadron
pass Porto Rico and navigate the Caribbean nm
disturbed hoping TO repel il with some land hat
'eiles al Greytown, would be much like Iettin,,
one pass Sandy Hook and come up tbrougb Tho
''"S ana the Aarrows. hoping TO stoD II with tho
guns OF Castle William. IN ''-e
Inc question may finally come 10 this form
~hether we shall let the Clayton -Bulvrer Treat,'
Staha unmodihed and probably coptipna a.
through the past half century N y,oit g. -
'Ahai' rshan IN a straightforward way make the