The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1900-03-12
MAHAN SAYS FORTIFY
GREAT NAVAL EXPERT WRITES
ON "MONROE DOCTRINE AND
OUR NAVY"
AS APPLIED TO THE 1sTHMUs
His Reasons for Relieving the Com
nectiOn of the Two Oceans
Should Be Under Ma
val Control.

NEW YORK, March lin a paper OH
THE Monroe Doctrine and Our Navy
which he has written for the Forthcoming
issue OF Lesliefs Weekly, Capt. A. T.
Mahan says:
Inc settlement and growth of our Pa
cthc coast and the questions arising
about China, its future government and
Its trade make it necessary TO connect
our Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with the
Pacific by a canal across the fsthmus.
establishing thereby consecutive water
communication between the two, as well
as shortening the access from our east
ern shores to Asia, The isthmus and its
immediate surroundings thus become the
greatest of our external interests
Scarcely secondary to them is the Car.
1bbean sea, because all sea roads to the
fsthmus run through it, and it contains
many strong positions, the acquisition CT
which by formidable European state
would in war endanger our shipping,
mercantile and naval alike passing be-
tween our Atlantic ports and the Pa.
cific by the canal.
We must remember that other ma
tons, and especially European, because
the most active, are interested likewise
in using that canal and for the support
OF their interests, in gaining positions.
To their doings we oppose the Monroe
doctrine. Therefore, If We intend to
make good the affirmations of the latter
we must be prepared to resist, forcibIy
If need be, any attempt to obtain ad-
Jacent territory or ports which may serve
as stations for navy hostile to our
selves.
1t is natural that European nations
should wish such positions; that Ger,
many, for instance as has been lately
| rnmored, should wish the Danish islands,
st. Thomas, etc. Her right to buy them
| is as good in international law as ours.
The Monroe doctrine depends upon legal
rights, not upon the moral rights of our
Indispensable interests, and derives its
chief support from the fact that 1t is not
| worth while to incur enmity pushed per-
haps TO the extent Of war.
Now the one preparation for war, IN
maritime region like the Caribbean, is
a navy large enough to be effective
Ports are quite secondary. They ara
| necessary to a navy which needs a local
base of operations, but they are useless
| without it, especially in the Caribbean,
because conditions there are so back
| ward as to give no local resources. Po-
sitions held there not only must be forti.
fed, but everything to support shipping
| must be imported and steady stream
of supply maintained. This can only be
| done by the navy, keeping the sea open.
| which at the same time secured our other
| merchant shipping.
''To do these things, which is called
controlling the sea, the navy should
strictly be superior to any which can be
brought against It, but this extreme con-
clusion is qualified by other circum-
stances, such as our nearness to the
Caribbean sea, our national power
through our great resources, the dangers
to which our possible opponents may be
| exposed In other quarters and from other
| enemies. We cannot in the near future
| expect to have navy nearly as large as
| that which Great Britain must keep, but
| it Is easily within our means to rival that
of France or Germany, the only
European states other than Great Brit
ain whose general interests might lead
them actively to dispute the maintenance
of the Monroe doctrine.
Reelection upon this condition will In