The Guthrie daily leader. [volume] (Guthrie, Okla.) 1893-1996, 1900-04-18


no. clearly described IN tho dispatch Az
ter sketchinE General Buffers int ntions,
as communicated to Sir Charles Warren.
who commanded the whole force. Lord
R0verts points out that General Warren
seems TO have concluded. after consula-
ton with his officers that tha hanlcing
movement ordered by General Butler was
impracticable and. therefore, SO changed
the plan of advance az 70 necessitate tho
capture and retention Of spion Kop.
Lord Roberts continues
.,As warren considered It Impossible 60
make the wide Ranking movement which
was recommended II not actually pre-
scribed in the secret instructions. he
should forthwith. have acquainted Butler
with the course he proposed TO adopt
There IS nothing 90 show whether did 80
or not But It is only fair to Warren TO
point out tnst Butler appears throughout
to have been aware OF what was happen
ing
Regarding IA vi hwrawal from spion
Kop. the retenion of which had become
esseptlal to the relief Of Larysmlth Lord
ROBBERS says:
"I regret 20 be unable 10 concur with
Butler 10 thinking Thoruycroft exercised
wise discretion IN ordering the troops to
retire. / am Of the opinion that Thorny-
croft's assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable. Dur
ing the night the enomys FIRE could mot
have been formidable and it would not
have taken more that two or three hours
for Thornycroft TO communicate with
Major General Coke or Warren. Coke
appears TO have left spion Kop at $3.50
D. m, for the purpose OF consulting with
/ Warren. Up to that hous the idea of
withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet,
almost Immediately after Coke's depar-
ture, Thornycroft Is under the order,
without reference 20 superior authority,
winch upset the whole pan o. opera ions
and rendered unavailing the sacrifices al
ready made to carry ii into effect
"on the other hand II Is only right to
state that Thornycroft appears to have
behaved in a very gallant manner
throughout the day.
"It IS to be regretted that Warren did
not himself visit the ~pion Kop In the af-
ternoon or evening, knowing as he did
that the state Of ahairs was very critic
al and that the loss Of the position would
involve thew hole failure OF the opera
tions lie, consequently. was obliged TO
summon Coke TO his headquarters and the
commando at spion Kop thus deyolved on
Thornycroft, unknown to Coke who was
under the impression that the command
devolved upon Colonel Hi as senior Of
ficer. Omissions or mistakes of this ma
ture may De trining In themselves yet
they may exercise an important influence
h.s .,r =
Butler was Justified IN remarklng there
was want Of system which worked most
unfavorably on zee defense
The attempt TO sieve Lsdysmiih was
well devised and agree with Butler IN
thinking II ought to have succeeded. That
Il failed, may in some measure be due Ia
the difficu,i les of the ground ard the
command ug positions held by The enemy
and probably also go error Of Judgment
and want OF administrative capacity on
the part OF Warren. But. whatever faults
Warren may have committed. the fanur
must also be attributed TO The dislnclina-
tion Of the officer In the supreme com.
mand 20 assert his authority ana TO Sc,
whaf ne thovght best was done ana also
20 the unwarantrble and needless assump.
tion Of responsibility by a subordinate or
ficer."
1he dispatch concludes: "The crafty
Ing feature OF thcsa dispatches IS the ad
mira9le behavior Of the troops through
out the operation"
GENERAL BULIER's VERSION
nero, Butler report. comm nting OF
Z General Warrens reports OF the cap.ur,
and evacuation OF Spion kop. after dis
putting the correctness Of some Of War
rens assertions and describing the dan
gerous situation occupied by Warren
! force tells how ne saw the force at spiol
Kop had given away before Warren kney
? OF It Butler therefore telegraphed I,
warreni Unless yon put really goo,
Z hard hghunF nan on top You will lose tn
hill / suggest Thornycroft.
9 General Butler continues:
p "A have not thought a. necessary to or
der nm investigation. =. az sundown tn
b defense n ne summit had been taken Il
r hand cntrenchments la,d olt and the dea
and wounded removed, tho whole plac
Il would have bene brought under regu
e military commands and the hills woul
have been held. / am sure. But no ar
n ransemf nts We're made Coke appears q
r have been ordered away just az he wouI
= have been useful. and no one succeede
? him Those on top were ignorant Of IN
r fact that guns were coming up ana gen
$ orally there was a want OF organizatio
d and system that acted most unfavorqbl
on the defense. II Is admitted that al
L OF Ihornycrofts command acted with Ia
G greatest gaiantry throughout the dav an
3 really saved the situation But preuar ra
r u0ns for the second DAVIS defenet,,