The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1900-03-09

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I.LAAHMl HA88kl lbut is not given.
III RsBW vi X II to fighting old
MaMAW " battles over un-
SklMMY UN less the subject
EA "a MN has some bear
l@ 81 lNlI ling upon mat
IH uY tiers of today. L
the good
fortune to find the general in a talka-
tive mood when Butler was trying to
make Roadway for the relief of Lady
smith, and he discussed with clearness
and emphasis the situation in South
Africa.
eyes, l am intensely interested in
the military operations said he when
asked to express his views upon the
strategy, generalship and modern
methods as developed in the course of
the Anglo-Boer contest. But first of
all let me say that l do not criticise
any campaign or general. | look upon
the conflict as an impartial military
observer.
"At first thought it might be urged
that Butler and Methuen should have
f1anked the enemy and not attacked
him in strong positions. This may be
done in two ways under favorable cir
cumstances-that is to say, tactically
upon the local field of operations, as at
the crossing of the Tugela at Colenso
or on Modder river. In a broader way
an enemy may be Hanked strategically.
A movement by the British into the
Orange Free State or the Transvaal by
a route remote from the Boer positions
would be a stroke Of strategy and
would compel the enemy to leave the
Tugela and the Modder and hasten to
b protection of their own capitals
and bases. But other than purely mill
tary considerations have constrained
the British generals to accept the in
i%tiative of their enemy and fight him in
positions of his own choosing.
The tactics of flanking instead of
making direct frontal attacks have not
been possible because of the mobility
Of the Beers. If the British reach the
flank of a Boer line at nightfall, in the
morning it has moved miles farther on.
1t is here today and there tomorrow.
In conditions like those thanking is out
OF the question, and l look for nothing
else for a long time to come. The Brit
ish army must follow the roads, and
there is no doubt but the Beers will
fortify all the passes of roads in the
comparatively level regions of. the Or
ange Free State and the T%ransvaal
ahead of the invading army. Probably
they have done so already and will
make warfare in the open as difficult
for the British as it has proved to be In
mountainous regions.
"As have said, l will not criticise.
for l cannot know what orders were
given to Butler and to Methuen. Me-
thuen's movements to the Modder riv-
Ell, although highly disastrous, seem
to have been the proper ones. His en-
envy fell back on his approach, and
he was In duty bound to follow. AS
for Butler, l may say that l was pre-
pared to believe without evidence that
after he had tested the Boer strength
ON the Tugela at Colenso he was anx-
ious to shift the scene of operations to
a region more favorable for the assail-
ants. But moral and political consid-
erations force the British to continue
operations on a large scale in northern
Natal. Should Ladysmith fall | do not
lcoklfor an abandonment of the line of
the Tugela by England. That liue
must be held by a powerful force or all
northern Natal will go over to the
Boer cause. Natal and Cape Colony
are filled with Dutch, and the British
army must remain among them to
keep them from thinking their race is
dominant in South Africa.
"But England will try again and
again for the succor of Ladysmith.
She cannot afford to let it go even If it
has no strategic Importance. for it's
downfall under the menace of Boer
guns would be the saddest humiliation
the British arms and people have suf-
Tered since the surrender of Burgoyne
at Saratoga, and the nation is smarting
over that defeat to this day. The fall
or Ladysmith means the wiping out Of
a gallant army of 10000 men under
one of the most intrepid generals Eng
land has sent to the field. General
Whites defense of Ladysmith, hamper
ed as he seems to have been by orders
from London, is a brilliant triumph for
him as a leader and for the men under
his command.
." have noted the absence of recon-
noissances by British leaders, and this
is a fatal error if due to oversight. You
can judge how it strikes me when l
say that | was trained under General
Hooker. a leader who was always polk
ing around to see what the enemy was
doing and how he stood along the
front. was but obeying my masters
teaching when | sent out Berdan's
sharpshooters into the woods at Get
tysburg and developed Longstreet's
line and plan of attack hours before
the blow came on my front. But that
Is OF the subject. The British. even
when operating in Natal and Cape Col
ony, on British soil. are in the midst Of
enemies. The best guides to be found
n the general public who must be de