The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-01-28
THE BRITISH EMPIRES PERIL.


| From Harper's weskly)
The exultation and derision in the con-
tinental capitals and press over Great Brit
aims reverses in South Africa are no reve-
lation to the well-informed. but only con-
firm extended observation as TO anti
British feeling. 1t is idle to enquire why
this is so intense. or whether 1t should be
ascribed to manner. to success In govern
ment and commerce, to the longest reach
in land-grabbing. or to the alleged pre-
tence of pious interest in "civilizing" in
ferior peoples. 1t has helped to concen-
| trate critical attention upon the supposed
weak points in the fabric of British En-
| pire. presumably with the object of po-
! litical ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. There is no tell
ling what secret negotiations may be going
on in the chancelleries. 1t would seem that
| the AngloBoer war has only well be-
| gun, and that for some time yet possible
eventualities will be matter Of delightful
contemplation for hostile powers. 1t may
be assumed that the French Foreign Of
| flee expects further British reverses. and
that Russian strategists have traced with
nicer calculation the lines of advance that
would open the Persian Gulf to Russian
commerce. or make India a Russian sat
| rapy. This is an old story. but the possl-
bility OF seeing it realized will accentuate
its interest for EngIand's enemies and
cause solicitude to her friends. Continen-
tai European powers are more than inter
ested in any probable partition of the out
't-ip pr;ff gt, OF
dence OF British military power will speed
the preparation for it. The beginning Of
the end may have come, some of them
think. But has 1t come? What is the
measure Of the fighting strength of the
British Empire. and how can it be known
when power of resisting a hostile comblna-
ton has been hope'essly weakened? II. as
German military critic has recently, said.
British tactics teach nothing. and the En-
glsh soldier, as compared with his Scotch
and Irish companions In arms, is begin
ming TO show that something is wrong with
him, that state OF things may lead TO the
discovery Of unsupported defects in the
other branch of the service, and soma are
already asking whether the British Navy IS
really as strong as commonly supposed. III
So then the final breaking up may go on
apace. In the meantime. however. expert
military opinion will weigh the present
British difficulties OF campaigning in South
Africa with a care and judgment quite Ie-
moved from ready propecy, and its APP
praisement of British fighting quality and
tactics will probably leave a margin for
new military problems suggested by recent
battles, and which are too perplexing zee
to yield safe conclusions.
OF course. the naval arm has the chic;
powers OF both offence and defence. 1t
needs 10 be so. as Great Britain's chief
peril is her assailable lines of ocean COM
the difference between continuous empire
and empire dispersed over sea is vital. that
difference Is not necessarily adverse to the
defensibility of widely scattered maritime
possessions. 1t is yet to be proved wheth-
er. under present conditions of naval war
fare. the wide dispersion of British power
is not a source of strength rather than
weakness. Many maritime points to de-
fend have assured many bases from which
to attack. On the other hand. the eleven
or twelve millions OF square miles OF the
earth's land area under British rule or pro-
tectorate could be endangered by only two
formidable bases Of attack BY a large in
vadng army. without first reckoning with
the offensive power of the strongest feet
in the world. II the Government OF the
United States should ever again declare
war against Great Britain. 1t could send
an army across Canadian border-line I'M
protected for many hundreds OF miles. Or
II Russia. Drawing the difficulties OF trans
portation, should attempt an invasion Of
India by way of Afghan Turkestan and
Cabul, British naval power would be use
less in checking the Russian advance.
But it would hardly be too much to say
that both these contingencies have been
made more remote by recent readjust-
ments In international relations. These
have been less due to treaties and diplo-
macy than to an awakening to the con-
seriousness OF race among Englsh-speaking
peoples, and are aiding the moral reunion
of two great nations politically divided
and to some extent estranged for more
than a century. The attitude of continen-
tai Europe in regard to the Spanish war,
and British friendship for this country,
showed that the English speaking peoples
have been grouped as one by foreign opln-
ion, that they are supposed to stand for
the same fundamental principles, and may
be expected TO act Jointly in presence Of
common peril. This great change has dis
turbed the former balance of power in Eu-
rope, and may detach certain prudential
friendships. Notwithstanding the Triple
Alliance, Germany has never quite given
up the Bismarckian doctrine OF the ne1es
sity OF maintaining good relations with
Russia: but the Anglo-American under
standing Is well calculated to enable Ger
many TO dispense with any such necessity.
II the future of his empire points to the
sea, as the Kaiser has publicly declared.
it is not to be presumed that he will slight
the adv antage OF a friendly understanding
with a power best able to impart the Sc
cret of profitable colonizing. Germany's
present attitude in foreign affairs has TN
doubtedly been influenced by the friendly |
feeling between this country and Great |
Britain. Among the dangers asserted to
threaten the British Empire in the present /
crisis this country and Germany could not !
be included. Nor, in default of any sign
of Russian advance on India is thee spe-
cial reason for alarm from that source. In !
view of the deep absorption of Russian en- !
ergy in the building of the Trans Siberian /
Railway development of interests In Chi |
ma financial reconsideration at hnma