The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-01-04
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION.

The British public has been in hard luck
so long that it may be pardoned for jump
/ ing at anything in the nature Of good news
and getting unduly excited in consequence.
/ IL giving out the reports from Colesberg,
I -he War Office seems to have rather ex-
asgeratsd the facts. which. in the light
] OF later intelligence, appear less salts
I factory than they did on the first an
nopncement. French did not take Coles
berg at all, but thinks he could il re-en-
! forced The really important thing he has
I accomplished is control of the CoIesberg
! and NoTyal's Pont bridges over the Orange
| River.
II he can hold these he will be doing an
! iaeaiculable service TO his sovereign, and
! one worth a decisive victory in battle, at
/ the lest. But the bridges are OF such vital
3 fTiPor,ance 10 the future movements OF
the British army that it will surprise us if
/ they are not retaken by an overwhelming
4 force Of Beers. Probably French could
keep them by entrenching his whole col
umn on the ground. but this he could not
afford te do. He must keep moving or MS
alert foes would soon play hob with the
railway communications ali the way from
Dordrecht TO De Aar.
Military opinion in London concurs in
, the view expressed in The Times OF yes
terday, that Colonel Pitchers raid ana
capture Of Sunnyside was in effect a re-
conhoissance in support OF n design on the
part of Lord Methnen to essay a Ranking
movement TO the west Of Megarsfontein
That he seems 10 contemplate something
O. the sort argues that he has some idea
that he can crush Cronje's right which now
cOnfrOnts him in a curve all the way 70
the Modder River. Once in the compare
lively open country toward Douglass, the
Beers would lose the advantage Of their
defensive tactics. and would have to fight
in the open or fall back on Kimberley II
would be foolish TO attempt TO analyze
the chances for a successful forward or
flank movement of Methuen's column. in
the absence OF definite knowledge regard
ing local conditions. But there is one con-
sideration which may have an important
effect on the campaigning In that and 9th
CT parts OF the field. There is a decided
weakness in the general and battle tao
cost them dearly. They do not follow up
advantages. Cronje most undoubtedly
should have pressed desperately on Ne
thuen's left after he knocked Il in pieces
az MegarsfOntein. Instead, be permitted
bis enemy 10 recuperate aud strengthen
bis lines. The same thing IS noticeable
in Natal. Joubert has lost golden oppOrlu-
mites to iafict disaster by assault upon
forces badly weakened by sanguinary re-
pulses. But the Beers. apparently. cannot
be driven to open attack. and n
this be really and completely true
their organization viii not be apt
to- hold together when they
have once been hunted out OF their
trenches. Joubert's line OF sixteen miles
in front OF Butler is too long to maintain
safely il he has not more than twenty-five
thousand troops. To be sure. there are
not more than perhaps three or four practi-
cable fords on the line, and, on these points
ne can readily mass. on account Of his
great mobility. But he would not want TO
have generals like Lee, Jackson Wheeler.
OF Phil Sheridan on the other side Of the
river, in his present circumstances. None
OF them would find any difficulty ia getting
across. II q weak spot were anywhere de-
tected. We 90 not know yet what there
may Be in Sir Redvers Butler II he is the
strategist and taciieian the situation de-
mands. there ought to be a fair prospect
OF success ahead OF him. No doubt he is
about to make a determined attempt lie
has called for small army Of stretcher-
bearers. and naturally that is taken to
mean business. II is not probable that his
first movement Will be. or viii be intended
to be, decisive. He win have TO do some
more or less heavy lighting to clear his
tanks Of the Beers before attending 10
theirs. But in these operations he viii
endeavor to improve his tactical position,
by getting control OF the hills overlooking
Colenso. the heights at and beyond Wee
men, and, on the west, the Kopjes close to |
the Boer defenees at Springfield. We a0e |
mistaken II the battle developments OF Ma. !
tai % not begin to unfold by Saturday or /,
Sunday.