The evening times., 1900-01-16
The Military Mystery of Natal.

/ and sell at ten cents copy or less.
The Military Mystery of Natal
The little that can be dednced from
driblets of news allowed TO pass the censors
at Durham and Cape Town. is strongly
! corroborative of the views we have ven
F.! tured to take OF Sir Redvers Buffers flank
1 ing movement by way of Potgieter's Drift;
and in the main. the military writer's Gf
the London Post and Westminster Re
view" who are generally accepted in Eu-
rope as the best critics OF the operations
in South Africa this morning have come
around TO our opinion. Perhaps a majori-
ty of the London experts still cling to
their original and arbitrary theory that the
real objective OF the advance has been the
Beer left and the movement against the
right only fent but there is nothing in
the facts of the situation as far as they
are known or can be reasonably inferred
TO Justify such an idea
Ii appears from fragmentary hints that
whatever force left Frcre on Thursday
night. and ii is still assumed to have been
Sir Charles Warren's division marched
northwest to Springfield. One report. re-
ceiyed this morning distinctly states that
Warren is some miles beyond that point
perhaps having moved around Buffers
initial position. This would agree in prin-
ciple with our tentative explanation yes
terday. of the movement from Frere which
was that it probably was intended to sup
port Butler by an attack on the Boer right
in front while Buller should strike il in re-
verse. The y.variation suggested by the
latest story is that the ,wo generals have
exchanged roles
All the signs point to the Boer light as
the point of main attack 1t is said that
a large force OF Beers have moved up the
Colensc- -Dewdrop road which runs paral
lei with the roads in the same direction
from Estcourt and Frere. evidently with
the object OF intercepting Butler at Dew
drop. where the heaviest fighting on the
right should be, supposng the advan-
tage Of the turn to have been full
ly realized. The critics who admit
the probability of our position, argue
that the movement of Warren to Spring
field instead of to Weenen, if it has oc-
CURED. represents an extremely daring
battle plan on the part of Butler. as il
involves wide separation of the British di-
visions. 1t does rot look so to us On
the contrary. Il seems to us to illustrate
the very reverse. If We were right in cur
prognosis. which there has been no ap-
parent reason to even modify. the tactics
which seem to have been adopted are the
safest to which Butler could resort.
There is cause to believe that the Free
State commandos and the TrausNaal de-
tachments which have held Jouberts right
were severely handled, and possibly Grip
2led, in the Sunday assault on Ladysmith
This is indicated by evidence that since
then the Boer general-in-cn has been
his lines. which being twenty
miles long. were dangerously extended for
defence by any force We are permitted to
credit him with. That would make it
more feasible to attempt turning move |
ment beyond Springfield than elsewhere, |
because, as We have shown, a movement in |
that direction was favored by the existence |
of highways from Estcourt and Frere by
the reasonable possibility of turning Jou-
bert's flank without a preliminary battle, |
and by the advantage of a position at or
near DeTdrop, IN reference to the quickest
communication and cooperation with the |
Ladysmith garrison. This would not involve |
such a segregation of the grand battle |
units as would be produced by feint at !
Potgieter's Drift and dependence upon op- |
.ha laF.
decisive results. On the contrary. it is
hard to see how Buffers force could be
SO well concentrated and utilized for mu-
tual support as it would be in the plan
we have regarded as the natural and |
probable one. Accepting the dispositions
most lately indicated, the Estcourt and
Frere divisions. the artillery, and brig
ade or so at Colenso, with probably a re-
serve division between Colenso and 7
Springfield, would practically be en- ech-
elon against Joubert's right. with his CEN
tire held in play. Another division would,
Of course, be keeping the Boer left busy
at lnhlawe, a task which should not
be extremely dangerous since the Beers
would doubtless use all their available
Gree on the right, unless they were pre-
laring for a retreat to the passes, in which
'ase all calculations would be at sea. But
{ is plain that moderate degree of sue
,ess on Buffers part at Dewdrop or in
hat vicinity, would instantly take the
nhlawe and Weenen end of the line out
# Immediately serious consideration from
he viewpoint of danger to the British
light to the east since it would compel
oubert TO reconstruct his front, with his
light resting on Dewdrop, or possibly Ac-
on Homes; and his line extending thence
long the Dewdrop road southeast TO CO. ]
enso. When this stage had been reached ,
he new Boer line would be open to ex- /