Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-08-31

Not Ready at This Time for a War In
the Far East.


The announcement of the assurances given
by the Russian government to the United
States that Russia was cordially in favor
of the American policy of maintaining the
territorial integrity of China is not sur
prise to those familiar with Russian diplo-
matte policy. Russia proposes in the end
to take by force, where she cannot take by
other means, all that she can get in the
orient but she is not yet ready. The Trans
Siberian railway is not yet in working con-
dition for transporting large bodies of
troops, and Russia would be hopelessly cut
off from transport by sea if she invited con-
flict with such naval powers as the United
States, Great Britain and Japan. Her eco
nomic condition, moreover, would not bear
readily the strain Of great war. Specie
payments were established three years ago,
after a century of irredeemable paper, and
long strides have been made in persuading
foreign capital to enter Russia. Recent de-
velopment in manufacturing and stock spec
ulation has been so active that a serious
stock exchange panic swept the bourse of
st. Petersburg last September and serious
efforts have since been making by the min
lister of finance to restore confidence and
prevent industrial depression. Russia, in
other words, in spite of playing the highest
hand which she dares in the east, Is not
prepared for war at the present time.
The ench government is disposed to
support Russia in this position and has
reasons IF its own for refusing additional
responsi lities in the management of for
eign ter -itory and the enforcement of colo
NAL tariffs.
Question Before the Cabinet.
The vital question of the present situation,
which is being earnestly discussed by
the cabinet, is how far the United States
can afford to go in sustaining by force the
program which 1t has urged upon the pow
ers and how far these powers are sincere in
their adhesion to this program. The task
of carrying out a conservative policy will
be comparatively easy, in the opinion of
leading cabinet members. If Russia, France,
Great Britain and Japan can be counted
upon to sustain to the end the policy OF
the territorial integrity of China Each Of
the European powers and Japan are more
or less jealous of each of the others and
feel uncertain how far the others will perse-
we're in a moderate program. The United
States, without sharing this jealousy, does
share some Of the uncertainty. Present
conditions seem favorable to the execution
of the program of the United States, but
there are many contingencies which may
put a different face upon the situation.
President Mckinley knows from the in
formal communications of members of the
diplomatic corps that self-denying ordi-
nance in regard to Chinese territory adopt
ed by either of the leading powers would
not be respected by either if it was disre-
garded by any of the others.
Weighing Every Contingency.
1t is the unstable equilibrium in which
which is leading TO the careful weighing
of every contingency by the President and
his advisers. They feel bound to consider
the contingencies which might arise call
ing for a display Of force and which might
leave the United States in comparative
isolation. Even If the principle of Chinese
territorial integrity and commercial free
dom is accepted without reservation by all
there is abundant opportunity for serious
differences over details. 1t is highly de-
sirable, IL pledges are obtained from China
for more treaty ports and for freedom of
commerce in the interior, that they shall
be given a tangible character. Japan Sc
cured important pledges on these lines by
the treaty OF Shimonesek in 1895, but they
have not borne many practical results.
This fact gives point TO the demand that
the accredited representative OF the Chi
nese government in the peace negotiations
| shall have plenary power to negotiate.
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS.
No Action Before the Powers Have