Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-03-15

gotfadon or through force Its Diplomatic
agencies must. therefore, be greatly en-
iarged, strengthened and improved while
powerful navy. up to date in all points of
construction armament, general efficiency
ana readiness for instant service becomes
OF equal necessity. Our Philippine possess
SONS Will not merely emphasize the urgent
occasion for such Innovations They will
make the innovations greater and more
burdensome, while at the same time com
pelllng others which we could have dome
without The Philippines inevitably make
our navy larger than 1t would have to be
without them-they inevitably enhance the
extent and the quality and the cost of the
diplomatic establishment with which we
trrust PROVIDE ourselves But besides ag-
sraVating the weight and the expense of
the necessary burdens involved in our as
Stunning our true place among the nations.
Ihe philippines add burdens of their own
Ihere Will be no respectable government
OF the Islands until they are furnished with
a large force of highly educated and trained
administrators. The first duty of every ma
ton as already observed, is to itselfAis the
proinotlon and conservation of its own in
terests. Its position as an active member
OF the international family does not require
IL ever to lose sight of that principle But
Just weight being given to that principle.
ana us abilities and resources and opDnr-
tumtles permitting, there is no reason WHY
the United States should not act for the re-
lleI OF SUFFERING humanity and for the ad-
Ndhcement OF civilization wherever and
whenever such action would be timely and
effective. Should there, for example he a
recurrence of the Turkish massacres of Ar
menan Christians, not to stop them alone
or in concert with others. could we do so
"lihout importing our own substantial in
tefeSts, would be unworthy of US and in
consistent with our claims and aSpira tions
as great power. We certainly could no
longer shelter ourselves behind the time
fonored excuse that We are an American
power exclusively, without concern with
the affairs of the world at large.
Along with the Monroe doctrine and NON
Interference in the internal concerns of
European states-rules of policy which. gen
orally speaking. will stand unaffectedZhas
gone another which our changed interna-
uohai attitude Will undoubtedly tend to
modify. 1t has heretofore been consid
cred that anything like ar alliance between
me United States and a European power,
LOT any purpose or any time, was some
thing not to be thought of. To give a
thIng bad name, however undeservedIy is
to do much to discredit it, and there is NO
doubt that the epithet "entan giing''-almost
invariably applied-has contributed largely
TO make alliances popularity and politically
odlous Yet there may be "alliancesi,
which are not "entaLg CLING" but wholly ad
vantaseous, and without the French al
naIlce american independence, if not pre-
vented, might have been long postponed
II mas been prevalent notion that WASH
lnston was inimfcai to all alliances as such
ana left on record a solemn warning to his
countrymen against them Yet washington
clearly Disseminated between alliances that
would entangle and those that would not
and between alliances that were permanent
ana those that We're temporary We now
ma ourselves actually caught in an en-
tanstng alliance, forced there not by any
treaty or compact of any sort formal or in
FORMAL but by the stress of the fneynrahIe
IactS or the situation. 1t is an alliance that
entansles, because we might be- and should
De, friends with all the world and because
our necessary intimacy with and denen-
dence upon one of them is certain to excite
the suspicion and ill-will of other nations
sun however much better off we might
nave peen, regrets, the irrevocabIe having
happened, are often worse than useless. and
IL Is much more profitable to note such
compensatory advantages as the acff,aI sit
uanon offers In that view it is copsoIire.
70 reflect that, if we must single out an ally
from among the nations at the cost Of
aiiehatins all others, and consequently have
thrown ourselves into the arms of England
our choice Is probably uneXceptionab,e We
JOIN ourselves to that one of the great now
efs most formidable as foe and most ef
iectlVe as friend. whose people make with
our own but one family. whose internal diff
ierehces should not prevent q united front
as against the world outside; whose inf,l-
ence upon the material and spiritual con-
ditlons of the human race has n the
Whoie been elevating and benef II, and
whose example and experience cannot helm
pelng OF the utmost service in our dealing
with the difficult problems before US