The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1900-02-08

heeiS WHO were 10 olecnarge the functions
OF government for the State and conn
ties and some subdivisions OF countir,
and 10 each named office from governor n
constable, except notary public nxes y
term for which II should be held. Tao
terms ranged from six years for tho ar
peliate courts and railroad commissioners
down TO ewo years for almost every other
ofhce. II Is manifest that the conventtan
ala not destire nor intend that nuh,,,
servants of this State should hold ,heir
offices FOR great length OF time. hi, ~
was the policy OF that body thar they
should return 10 the power under viii N
they received their authority for its re-
newal at short intervals. and having an
piled this rule to all the offices named BY
'nem, save the one. 1t placed limitation
upon the action of the legislature as to
such offices as il might create. There
was no office created BY the constitution
to which the limitation could apply and IL
therefore must be held that Il was dc.
signed 10 apply TO such as might be Gre
ated by the legislative department IN the
execution Of its powers. This view Ia
sustained by the case OF State vs.. Catlin.
before cited for Il is Just as true OF
municipal corporations that the osfces
10 be created for the DISCHARGE of munl-
epal duties arc not named in the con-
stitption as 1t is OF the free schools But
II is Insisted with esrneStness and with
apparent confidence that the authority ex-
ereised by the legislature in the creation
OF the office OF school trustees, Is dir-
ferent from that which creates the ofhce
of secretary, alderman or other position
or aity. The distinction, II II exists. IL
too fine for our perception. We are not
able TO grasp IT, All authority OF the
legislature is derived from the same
source-ithe people II is sovereign pow
err, exercised by the same department, al
though applied to different subjects The
duties to be performed by both municlral
and school officers relate to the pubic IN
tereSt and we arc wholly unable to see
now there can be any such distinction as
mat winch has been urged with so much
earnestness and with no little foce
In support OF this last copteneiou I
was pressed upon this court that the
construction which has been placed upon
the constitution by the legislative depa,t-
ment OF the government as well as by
those who have been charged with the
execution Of the laws on the subject Of
public education should control and en-
ioTee upon us a construction which is at
variance with the plain, unambiguous Lei
ter OF that instrument. We recognize
the value OF contemporaneous construction
and the propricty OF following Il in all
cases where there is ambiguity or doubt as
to the meaning Of the constitution; hut
we must insist that It is not within the
province OF this court. in Difference 10 tho
construction OF another department t.
So. aside the constitution, framed BY the
people Of this State Such rule would
set the legislature above the people and
above their convention, and TO sustain it
the courts, instead of constituting ana en-
forcing the provision Of rae constitution.
must seek methods for eyading its lin
itations and denying the binding force az
It's mandates.
Upon the force to he given by courts to
con emporancous construction. Mr.. Cooley
in his work on Constitutional Limitations
says; Great Difference has been pail in
all cases to the action Of the 'eXeergive
department, where it's officers have BEEN
called upon. under the responsibilities Of
their official oaths. to inauzurate new
system. and where II is to be presumed
they have carefully and conscentfously
weighed all considerations and endeavornd
10 keep within the letter and the spirit
Of the constitution. II the question In
volved is really one OF doubt. the force Of
heif judgment, especially in view o. he
injurious consequences that may result |
from disregar1iug it, is fairly entitled to
urn the scale in the judicial mind
Where. however, No ambiguity or
ioubt appears IN the law, We think the
same rule obtains here as In o.he- caves
hat the court should confne its attention
% the law, and NOT allow eItrinslc CIR |
'umstancss TO Introduce a difficulty where
he language Is plain. To allow force 10
! practical construction in such case
would be TO suffer manifest perversions to |
iefeat the evident purpose of the law
makers. Contemporary construction
can never ahrogate the text it can
1eyer fritter away IT'S obvious sense: II |
AN never r1rrow down It's true limita-
ions; 1t can never enlarge its natural |
The duties az a court, I'M
Ter such circumstances as surround this
'ase. are clearly and fairly stated In the |
quotation. Regretting, as we do. the In |
that may follow our decision |
Ne must nevertheless halt at the bound |
Try line between fair construction and |
judicial legislation and decline TO write |
INTO the fundamental law an exception al |
'ariance with Its plain terms; the people !
must make the change, n II he changed.
The provisions of the act giving four |
'ears term to The trustees aud those pro- |
'iding for alternate elections are the |
,eart Of the sct In question Nj other |
'arts arc so dependent upon and CON
,ccted with those that TO declare the
orner void renders the act ineHe .tual |
or the accomplishment OF the purpose |
which induced its enactment. The legis-
allure evidently would not have passed |
he law without the void provisions and |
We must hold the law void as a whole. |
w. L. I. GO. VS.. Stale. So Tex. 630.1
T. J. Brown. Associate Justice
Opinion delivered February 5. 1900.