Daily new dominion. [volume] (Morgantown, W. Va.) 1897-1906, 1900-04-18
END OF BULLER near.
Must Resign Command or Be
Recalled.
ROBERTS, CRITICISM THE CAUSE.
This Is Spencer wiIkinson's Opinion.
But the General Placed Chief Blame
for spion Kop Disaster on Warren and
Thornycroft,


Thornycroft,
LONDON, April 18.-The publication
of Lord Roberts dispatches describing
the Spion kop and other operations from
Jan. II to Jan. n is severely criticised
by Mr.. Spenser Wilkinson, of The Morn
ing Post, today. He characterized it as
''ill advised" He said in part:
''The effect Of it on the army is fatal,
and must be positively demoralizing. I'M
less great changes aremade in the com
mands.
''In the publication of Lord poberts
dispatch the position Of Sir Redys RS Bull
Ter is rendered tintenable and his resig-
nation or recall is matter Of course .
LONDON, April 1S.-The war office
published in The Gazette a dispatch
from Lord Roberts, dated Feb. 10, sub.
hitting General Buffers dispatches de-
scribing the Spion kop and other opera
lions from Jan. II to Jan. a.
Lord Roberts deals severely with Cen
eral Warren and some others. Even
General Bullerdoes not escape. Lord Rob
erts complains that the plan of operations
is not clearly described in the dispatches.
After sketching General Buffers inten-
tions, as communicated to Sir Charles
Warren, who commanded the whole force
Lord Roberts points out that General
Warren seems to have concluded, after
consultation with his officers. that the thanking
movement ordered by General Butler was inn
practicable, and, therefore, so changed the
az To at4aR,
and retention Of Spion kop,
Lord Roberts continues
AS Warren considered it impossible to mako
the wide thanking movement which was rec
commended, If not actually prescribed in the
secret instructions he should forthwith, have
acquainted Butler with the course he proposed
to adopt There is nothing to show whether
he did SO or not. But it is only fair TO Warren
TO point out that Butler appears throughout
to haye been aware of what was happening"
Regarding the withdrawal from Spion kop,
tne retention OF which had become essential to
the relief of Ladysmith, Lord Roberts SAYS:
regret 10 be unable to concur with Butler
in thinking Thornyeroft exercised wise disere-
ton IN ordering the troops to retire [ am of
the opinion that Thorneycroft's assumption of
responsibility and authority was wholly inex-
cusable. During the night the enemy's fire
could not have been formidable, and it would
not have taken more than two or three hours
Tor Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger
with Major General Coke or Warren Coke an
pears to have left Spion kop at 930 D. m for
the purpose of consulting with Warren JJp to
that hour the idea of withdrawal had not been
entertained, Yet, almost Immediately after
Coke's departure, Thorneyeroft issued the or.
der without reference to superior authority
which upset the whole plan of operations and
rendered unayail1ng the sacrifices already made
to carry it into effect.
"on the other hand, it is only right to state
that Ihornycreft appears to have behaved in a
very gallant manner throughout the day.
1T is to be regretted Warren did not him.
self visit Spion kop in the afternoon or even.
ing, Knowing as he did that the state of affairs
was very critical and that the loss of the posi-.
ton would involve the failure Of the opera.
tlons. he, consequently, was obliged to sum.
mon Coke to his headquarters and the com
mand at Spion kop thus devolved on Thorney.
croft, unknown to Coke, who was under the
impression that the command devolved upon
Colonel Hill as the senior officer. Omissions or
mistakes OF this nature may be trivial in them.
selves, yet they may exercise an important in.
huenee ON the course of events, and believe
Butler was justified in remarking there WINS
want of organization and system which
acted most unfavorably on the defense
THE attempt to relieve Ladysmith was well
devised, and / agree with Butler in thinking il
ought to have succeeded. That it failed NAV
IN some measure have been due to the Difficult.
tons held by the enemy, and probably also to
errors of judgment and want of administrative
capacity on the part of Warren But what
ever faults Warren may have committed the
failure must also be attributed to the disincli.
nation of the officer in supreme command to
assert his authority and see that what he
thought best was done, and also to the unwar
rantable and needless assumption of RESPONSE
bility by subordinate officer
The dispatch concludes:
1.-THE gratifying feature of these DISPATCHES
is the admirable behavior of the troops
throughout the operation
General Butler, in his report after disDutine
the correctness of some of Warren's asser
tions, tells how he saw the force at Spion kop
had given away before Warren knew of it.
Butler therefore telegraphed to Warren:
UNLESS you put really good hard fighting
man in command on top you will lose the hill
| suggest Thorneycroft."
General Butler said at one point in part:
1T is admitted that all of Thorneycroft's
command acted with the greatest gallantry
throughout the day and really saved the situa
ton. But preparations for the second DAYS
defense should have been organized during the
day and commenced at nightfall As this was
not done, think Thorneyeroft exercised wise
discretion"
General Warren, at one point said in part
that Intellectual efforts We're made to hello
graph Thorneyeroft and ask whether he had
assumed command. Toward sunset he was
finally enabled to get orders through and con-
eluded the position could be held the next day
if guns could be provided and shelter obtained
Both those conditions We're about to be full
filed, when ''in the absence of Coke whom
had ordered to come and report in person on
the situation, the evacuation took place under
orders given on his own responsibility by
Thorneycroft This occurred in the face of
the vigorous protests of Goke's brigade major
and Others"
In conclusion General Warren said 1T is
matter for the commander-in-eiief to decide
whether there will be any inv, cation into
the question of the unauthorized evacuation
COAL STRIKE PROBABLY ENDED.