Akron daily Democrat. [volume] (Akron, Ohio) 1892-1902, 1900-03-30

to all intents and purposes the British
are at disadvantage In gaining infor.
nation and are compelled to move in
the dark.
up to the present time the Boer tao.
tics and strategy have been most ex.
cellent and well adapted to the nature
Of the country and the immediate end |
In view. The Beers wish to keep the
field Of operations on British soil for
other than sentimental reasons. AS |
have already noted, the Transvaal Is |
honeycombed with British, while Nato!
and Cape Colony can turn out man for |
man more Dutch than loyal British |
Beers Immediately struck out to seize |
British points OF value, to cover long
reaches Of British territory and compel
the armies of England to seek to recov.
er their own. OF course the British had
no expectation of this outcome when
they pushed their demands to the
strainlng p5lni. They hoped TO take
the initiative and draw the Boer forces
into regions less favorable for them.
Herein the Beers have shown the
shrewdness of the Dutch race. They
took the initiative and have kept it
with remarkable tenaclty of purpose
and patience w!thal.
Buffers obvious recourse when lie
found that his natural route from Dur
ban to I.adysmith by way Of Colenso
was impossible for any force, however
fpr,, a nj Al
ternative is all very we'll with an enc
my having base to cover In the rear
OF his fighting line. A hostile move
ment against his base or against his
line of communication from the front
back to his base compels him to turn
about and defend his vital point. The
Beers seem to care nothing for base
nor for lines of communication. They
are not tied up in that manner, hence
are at all times as mobile as a flying
column and can face either point Of
the compass on short notice and fight.
Brave anil well led the Beers have
shown themselves to be. Add to this
their thorough knowledge of the topog-
raphy Of the country, their enthusiasm
and their thorough equipment and
proficiency with arms, and they consti-
tute an army difficult to cope with SO
long as they can keep the war on de-
! fensive lines. This they may do in
definitely by falling back from one line
to another, giving the war the nature
of a tremendous siege, where every
foot of ground must be won at heavy
! cost of time and blood. With we'll
| laid trenches and ,barbed wire obstruc-
tions, backed up by long range guns
skillfully handled, the Beers can make
their tens Of thousands the equivalent
Of hundreds of thousands of assailants.
This argues for war indefinitely pro-
longed. But the defenders always
have the advantage, as witness the
contest of 100000 against 10000
900 people in the civil war, or, to
speak of troops in the field, 100000
against more than 100000.
zone new feature of war I have no.
ticed in the apparent weakness of the
British assaulting columns. The dis
patches tell of the deeds and losses Of
regiments and In one or two cases Of
brigades. There have been no mass
ing of divisions, as might be expected
in an army of 10000 to 10000, as with
Butler on the Tugela. 1t really looks
at this distance us though the assaults
were made by handfuls, depending on
dash rather than brute strength. II
this method succeeds, 1t will be a
startling novelty in the tactics Of as
sault. And confess to great curiosi-
ty as to the losses of the Beers. When
they become known authoritatively,
am inclined to think that military men
will have an Instructive morsel to
think over. Personally am not thrill
ed by the losses sustained by the Brit
ish in their assaults. They are heavy
considering how little has been gained
by them. But In the civil war we did
not hold up in our attacks or send to
headquarters special dispatches mourn
Ing over the casualties when they fell
within so per cent, as they invariably
have in South Africa, and the highest
percentages have been confined to q