The age-herald., 1900-12-19

property without due process of law"
 Congress Should Govern. In the course of his argument MT. liar mon conceded that Congress should govern the new territory in any way it saw fit, so long as the form of government came with in the constitution. It might be by gov ernment or governor-general, or by commission, so long as the form was not repugnant to the constitution.
 MT Harmon declared that both the Phil lippines and Porto Rico have been since the treaty of peace took effect a part of the United States. They are the property of the United States in the sense that they are held in trust for the people thereof. The trust Is an express one in that its con- F dition fixed by the constitution The builders of the Republic did not frame constitution for the original thirteen states, but for all the lands and peoples which in the bene1cent workings of Divine Provi- dence shall come under it's benign influence and control.
 Attorney General Grges. Attorney General Griggs followed. In presenting the governments side of the controversy, the attorney-general first stated the cases upon which the proceed ing is based. This was followed by gen. eral explanation and summing up of the governments position, after which came the citation of innumeTabe authorities under appropriate headings, with pertinent run
  eral contended that the United States has the power to acquire territory; that, having acquired it, 1t has the right to govern it; that administrative construction Congress sional action and judicial precedent affirm | that every port in ceded country is prop | erly regarded as foreign until laws are ex- | tended by Congress to the new possessions; l that the clause of the constitution of the | United States declaring duties uniform throughout the United States is not ap- T1i fn Tau on6 hot tn, constitution does not extend of its own force over acquired territory
 In his general contention on behalf of the United States MT. Griggs argued that his opponents were wrong from both legal and constitutional point of view. Referring to the legal aspect of the case, he asserted that the Dingley act applied to merchan- disc imported from Porto Rico and the Philippines after their cession to the Unit ed States the same as it did before, and in view of the fact that tariff laws are in rem, there is no principle of justice, much less of constitutional restriction, which forbids Congress from taxing in this way the merchandise of outlying possessions of the United States when brought into the ports of the union. He laid down estab- lished the two following propositions: Two Propositions.
 "First-That the tariff act of 1897 was in- tended by Congress to classify as foreign
 
 the United States at the time of its pas
 sage, and the subsequent cession of the Spanish islands to the United States did
 not operate to admit imports from those
 islands free of duty under that law. "Second-That the tariff act so construed and enforced violates no constitutional rule of uniformity"
 Taking up the constitution question, the attorney general declared that there was no doubt that it the intention of the Paris treaty not to make the ceded islands a part of the United States, and also that it was intended not to make the inhabi- tants of those islands citizens. The only thing that could justify a declaration that the treaty is invalid Is that 1t violates the
 constitution of the United States.
 MT. Griggs called attention to the fact that those who attack the treaty rest thei1 case upon no specific provision of he con- stitution, but rather upon principle of our government which they say forbids this na- ton to hold sovereignty over subject ter ritory which it does not make a part of It. self under the constitution
 Declaration of Independence.
 He contended that the right Of the United States to acquire territory had been assert ed in the Declaration of Independence, and said that such acquisition could be made either by conquest by treaty, by annexa- tion or by discovery. He quoted num- Der of Supreme Court decisions in support of this contention. He asserted that ''the treaty making power of the government has exercised the right to deal with the status of the inhabitants of ceded territory in eV- cry treaty of cesson from 1903 to 1898.
 MT. Griggs laid it down as a fact that administrative construction, congressional action, and judicial precedent all affirm that under our revenue laws every port in a ceded country is to be regarded as for eign one until such laws are expressly ex- tended by Congress to the new posses slons," and he gave very complete cita- ton of proceedings under these heads in support of his contention
 In this connection he quoted the clause in the Thirteenth Amendment saying that slavery shall not exist in the United States, "or any place subject to their Jurisdiction" and commenting upon 1t said: 'The clear significance of this language Is that there may be territory pertaining to and under the jurisdiction of the United States which is not a part of the United States and to which the constitution of the United States does not apply unless it be expresseiy made to apply thereto as in the case of slavery.
 The Dred Scott Case.
 The last feature of the argument was contention that the constitution does not extend of its own force oyer acquired ter ritory and in this connection the attorney general sought to refute the doctrine as laid down by Chief Justice Fancy in the Dred Scott case that the United States could not acquire territory for any other purpose than to convert IL into States or the Union.
 'eThe doctrine of ex-propria vigore ex- tension of the constitution was never heard of" he said, until it was invented and advocate by Calhoun means of fasten- ing slavery upon California and New Mexi- co beyond the power of Congress to disturb or abolish it. It was in conflict with all previous views of statesmen of all parties and opposed to the compact in the ordi- nance of 17S7 as well as to the act of Con- hIfCCl ltrrfA
 The doctrine announced in the Dred Scott decision was, said MT. Griggs. not original with Chief Justice Fancy, but was origin ated by John c. Calhoun and pronounced by him during the discussion of the Wilmot proviso of 1S47. This doctrine had been tacitly ignored and repudiated in later opinions and in Congressional action, to say nothing of the effect upon it of the result of the civil war. Indeed, said the attorney
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