Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1900-03-13
OUGHT TO FoRTIFY.

NEW 1ORK, MaTcn l5.-ln q paper on
t'The MoDyoe Doctrine and Our Navy
Captain A. T. Mahan says: S5
stThe settlement and growth Of our
Pacific coast and the questions arising
about China, its future government and
its trade make it necessary to connect
our Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with the
Pacific by canal across the isthmuss
establ blishing thereby consecutive water
communication between the two, aswen
as shortening the access from our east
ern shore to Asia. The isthmus and its
immediate surroundings thus become
the greatest Of our external interests.
Scarcely secondary to them is the Car
ibbean sea, because all sea roads to the
1sthmus run through it, and it contains
many strong positions, the acquisition
OF which by a formidable European
state would in war endanger our ship
ping, mercantile and naval alike, pass
ing between our Atlantic ports and the
Pacific by the canal. 81
Must BE Prepared to Resist.
"We must remember that other ma
tions, and especially European, because
the most active, are interested likewise
in using that canal, and for the sup
port OF their interests, in gaining posi-
tions. To their doings we oppose the
Monroe doctrine. Therefore, if we in
tend to make good the affirmations Of
the latter we must be prepared to resist,
forcibly if need be, any attempt to OBJ
tain adjacent territory or ports which
may serve as stations for navy hostile
to ourselves. & 81 5..5 z.
tNow the one preparation for war,
In maritime region like the Caribbean,
is a navy large enough to be effective.
Ports are quite secondary They are
necessary to a navy which needs a
local base of operation, but they ar,
useless without it, especially in the
Caribbean, because conditions there are
so backward as to give no local resources.
Positions held there not only must
be fortified, but everything to support
shipping must be imported, and steady
stream Of supply maintained. This can
only be done by the navy, keeping the
sea open, which at the same time se-
cured our other merchant shipping.
Must Have Strong Navy.
"To do these things, which is called
controlling the sea, the navy should
strictly be superior to any which can be
brought against it, but this extreme con
clusion is qualified by other circum-
stances, such as our nearness to the
Caribbean sea, our national power
through our great resources, the dangers
to which our possible opponents may be
exposed IN other quarters and from
other enemies. We cannot in the near
future expect to have navy nearly as
large as that which Great Britain must
keep, but it is easily within our means
to rival that of France or Germany.
Relations upon this condition will
indicate the size necessary for our war
fleet, and also the wisdom of cultivating
these cordial relations to which Great
Britain has invited us, which our inter-
ests and our institutions advise and the
existence of which will put it out of the
power or wish of any other state to
quarrel with us about the Monroe doc
trine. It is to the interest of Great
Britain that we should take naval charge
OF the American isthmus, provided she
can feel sure that we will do it effect
lively or that our preparations and our
deeds will answer to the words Of
Washington and Monroe