The evening times., 1900-01-31
The situation on the TugeIa

A late despatch from London today
( states that the report of Buffers alleged
/ assertion. that he had found the key Of
the road to Ladysmith and would be in
! that place within week. does not emanate
from the War Office. and is generally dis
credited. Still Butler may have said what
1 has been attributed to him. We cannot
forget that his contemplated attack on
! Spion Kop was fully advertised by the
/ War Office a day in advance of the move
ment His more recent intention, if he
! entertains one. may have leaked out
/ through the same oriice.
/ Reports from the front and from Lady
smith, such as they are, do not seem to
require that we should modify the view of
Buffers situation expressed in this column
! yesterday There is this, however, TO be
said in possible modification of one point:
Everyone knows that for nearly month
past very little has transpired concerning
the actual disposition of British le-en
forcements which have arrived at the Cape
All told, and including colonials and ir-
regulars. there must be very nearly one
hundred and twenty thousand British
troops in South Africa. OF this number
Butler has generally been thought to have
about forty thousand. But his available
force may be considerably greater than We
have had reason to suppose; in which case
there would be tactical possibilities which
have not been counted in his favor. For
example, it is reported that Lyttleton is
stiu holding his own at Mount Alice and
Zwarts Kop on the centre of Buffers line
from Znnckles TO Cheveley well in ad
vance Of Potgieter's Drift. LyttletOn's po-
sition appears to project into the
Boer general line Of defence, and is close
TO Dewdrcp. II we could assume that
Buffers right At Cheveley was strong and
well supported by reserves posted to as
sist it OF Lyttleton, as necessity should
arise then the danger from an attack on
that wing would be minimiZed and instead
of a general retreat something else might
happen. The reverse to the British left at
Spion Kop necessitated its retirement be-
hind the Tugela River. Joubert then
seems to have developed a design
10 attack in force at Colenso on
the right wing under Barton. If
Butler felt confidence in Barton's ability
TO repulse such a movement he very con-
ceiyably might consider the Boer line op-
posite to his centre to be weakened aud
might conclude, while Barton should put
up a stiff fight at Cheveley. to push out
his centre, and attempt TO take Dewdrop
thus cutting Joubert's line and dividing
his forces. Such a movement if success
ful, would lead to the immediate relief of
Ladysmith. the garrison OF which would
be able al once to form junction by sortie
en- masse, taking in reverse the segregated
Boer right in the Ladysmith hills toward
Acton Homes.
The feasibility of these tactics is wholly
dependent upon Buffers strength in men
and guns, and granting enough of both,
would be still more feasible if the British
army were not greatly inferior to its an
tagonists in point of mobility. This dis !
advantage, it would seem, might be over |
come if Buffers numerical strength were /!
sufficient to engage Joubert decisively at |
two or three well-separated points. AS |
we have said, it is all a question of men |
and guns, to which we may add that per-
haps it is not less question of competent /
leadership, a characteristic that the Brit |
ish army has not so far displayed to any
brilliant extent in the Natal campaign.