New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1900-03-18
LONDON WAR NOTES.
-pATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE CAM
pAIGN-A HUMDRUM BUDGET
WITH CHEAP JAM.
London. March 7.

-hs-s are many ilusions IN England respect
= ,he strategy of the war. Sir Redvers Bull
.o- example. is generally censured for aban-
r - enc man Of campaign with which he had
80 from London; and Lord Roberts is cred
Ter saracity in returning TO II and carry
=. -, Neither the censure nor the praise
~ ii, Sounded Sir Redvers Butler set out
-o,don with a bad plan of operations,
= rel advised when he changed Il after
@ 81 At Cape Town. Lord Roberts IN his
y scented himself TO the amended plan Of his
so,assor and did not take up the original
- - operations. The strategy OF the war
= 80, better on both sides than the tactics.
q. ,e-,,sps the single exception OF the turning
-.,sr, for the relief Of Kimberley and for
. .a,+,,re Of General Cronjes army. In that
80 the strategy and the tactics were
equally good
The Beer plan OF campaign was based upon
- -.re,,a Of the British staff for concentric
z.-,,s 70 the Orange Free State from Cape
- Port Elizabeth and East London, and
- through BIoemfontein 70 Pretoria. This
-z.,-ce vas 10 be stubbornly contested by the
7,-,., allies. They began operations by send
: .,-,-,andoes over the Orange River 10 take
-asssss,ou of the Zuur Bergen and Stornber-
=, Mountains These positions in the noun
- we're 70 be held az long as possible, and
10 nm
o..,re River. where the passage was 10 be
z--,nrlv opposed by the fertilization Of the
les IN the northern bank. When the pas
,,rs Of the river had been forced the Dutch
-s-e 70 make a long running fight at the ridges
,-.,v between the rivers all the way from the
9-srgs 70 the vaal. These rivers running
4,-, east 20 west had higher ground on the
,--he-n slope and there was a unique system
= r7r,rb defence. The best line below the Vaal
.ss he commanding riGge between Venters-
80 snd Senekal with three strategic railways
bebind Il by which the Dutch commanders could
- raDidlv rnassed. Beyond the Vaal was the
birb -jdge Of the Witwatersrand, with johann
,sst,urg as its key and back OF It was Pretoria
nth IFS strong notifications Ladysrnith was
an important strategic point in this general
,Ian n defence. since its possession was essen
,isl n the operation Of the railway from Beth
Isbe-n in the Free State, TO Johannesburg, by
Esv Of Harrsmith and Laing's Mex
This was the Boer plan OF campaign when
Sir Redvers Butler arrived at Capetown Coles
berg and Stormberg had already been occupied
and ira Dutch commanders were IN strong
force among the mountains. and prepared 10
block and harass the army corps on its march
toward the orange River. They could only have
been beaten back after arduous campaigning,
and the Orange River. with It's swollen flood and
desp gorzes. would have been as impossible as
the Tugela at Colenso. The koptes on the north
ern bank were strevn with powders, and rife
men a-1ong them could have controlled the pas
SAGE of every drift. Beyond the Orange were
the Rfet the MOdder the Vet, the Zand, the
vrIech and the Vaal: and the intervening ridges
were highly favorable 10 the Dutch system OF
defence # Sir Redvers Butler had attempted
20 carry out his original scheme OF a march
through the Free State 10 Pretoria. his army
corps would probably have been blocked at the
orange River and certainly it would never
have reached Pretoria. The river system. with
i-s dominating ridges OF kopjes. offered an in
superabla obstacle 10 his progress. He would
have been forced 10 ind the keys OF command
ing lines Of stone covered hills all the way from
The stornbergen Mountains to the Witwaters-
rand and his battallons would have been worn
cut and decir1ated long before they could reach
Pretoria.
Il these circumstances Sir Redvers Butler
made 10 mistake when he abandoned his first
plan q operations and formed an entirely DIFF
fe-ent combination. In place Of the long march
from Naupoor: and Stormberg across the
Orange River 10 Bloernfontein, he substituted
an advance 10 Kimberley on one flank and relief
measures by which the permanent occupation
Of Ladysnlith could be secured BY the march
Of Lord Methuea 20 Kimberley he expected TO
turn series Of strong positions from the Zuur
Bergen Mountains 10 Blocmfontein. and by a
subsequent advance toward Mafeking he would
be enabled 70 avoid the Senekal-ventersberg
and witwatersrand lines Of defence and TO ap-
preach Pretoria by the route of the Jameson
raiders Moreover he perceived the Importance
o. LadysTnith 70 the Beers for the completion Of
TIE Interior line Of communication between
bethlehem and johannesburg by way OF the
Drakensberg Mountains and Laings Mex, and
decided that the relief OF the British garrison
mist be the first work undertaken by the bulk
o. the army corps II he had persevered in his
Afst plan Of operations he would have relieved
neither Ladysrnith Eor Kimberley, and would
have encountered stubborn defence at every
hFeF and line OF lzopjes from the mountains
aortaTard He broke up the Boer plan of cam
paign when he left General French at Arundel
with q few squadrons Of cavalry and General
G2tacre 81 Queenstown with a weak infantry
ioloe, and sent Lord Methuen toward Kimber-
ley anc himself led the relief column to Colenso
AID Ladysmith
LORD Roberts when he arrived at Cape Town
encouraged The Beers TO believe that he intend
&c TO take up General Buffers cast OF plan and
70 march from the Orange River TO Bloemfon-
'7i- They wished him 10 adopt that route and
-@ssed their forces TO meet him in that quarter;
0ll ne was too wary TO lend himself to their
strategy Ee followed General Buffers revised
I-al- and by massing fifty thousand men on
NE Modder River turned a long series Of strong
POSITIONS from the Zuur Bergen Mountains 10
Sloen1fonte!n: and when he captured General
NfonJs's army he had the opportunity for con-
@1ung on The same line and turning the Ven
.-'z3urs-Senekal hills and the witwatersrand
-'1Aialns by sending a strong column 10 Ma
mig. Lord Roberts concentrated his forces
&C GIG not send additional battalions into Ma
= o01 ." carefully RETAINED from carrying out
@s original plan Of operations. against which