The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-03-12
GREAT NAVY NEEDED.
CAPT. MAHAN DISCUSSES MONROE
DOCTRINE AND CANAL.
Magazine Article Touching what
Must BE Done IL the Doctrine Is
Pushed to "A Conclusion I'm Con-
nection with Panama Isthmus.

NEW YORK, March lin a paper on
the Monroe doctrine and our duty, which
he has written for the forthcoming issue
of Leslie's Weekly Capt A. T. Mahan
says
The settlement and growth of our Pa
cific coast, the increasing commercial con-
sequence Of the Pacific coast, and the ques-
tons arising about China. It's future gov
eminent and its trade, makes II neces-
sary TO connect our Atlantic ana Cur
seaboard with the Pacific by canal across
the isthmus, establishing thereby consee-
utive water communication between the
two, as well as shortening the access from
our Eastern shores 10 Asia The isthmus
comes the greatest of our Internal IN
terests. Scarcely secondary to them Is
the Caribbean sea. because all sea roteIs
to the isthmus run through 1t and II con-
tains many strong positions, the acqulsl-
ton OF which. by a formidable European
state, would endanger our shipping-mer-
camille and naval alike-passing between
our Atlantic ports and the Pacific. by the
canal. .,,.
and especially European-5ecause the most
active-are interested likewise In using
that canal. and for the support Of their
interests In gaining positions. To their 90
ing so we oppose the Monroe doctrine.
Therefore, II we intend 10 make good the
afhrmations Of the latter, we must be pre-
pared to resist. forcibly II need be, any at
tempt to obtain adjacent territory or ports
which may serve as stations for navy
hostile to ourselves 1t IS natural that
European nations should wish such pos
has been lately rumored. should wish the
Danish islands-St. Thomas, etc. Her
right 10 buy them is as good, In interna-
tional law. as ours; the Monroe doctrine
depends upon legal rights not upon the
moral right of our Indispensable interests,
and derives its support from the fact that
it Is not worth while to incur our en-
nifty. pushed. perhaps to the extent of
war.
Now. the one provocation for war in
n maritime region like the Caribbean. Is a
navy large enough 10 be effective. Ports
are quite secondary, They are necessary
TO navy, which needs local base of OPP
especially in the Caribbean, because con-
ditions there are so backward as 10 give
no local resources. Positions held there
no only must be fortified, but everything
to support shipping must be imported and
a steady stream OF supply maintained. This
can only be done by the navy keeping the
sea open. which, at the same time, secures
our other merchant shipping
ITO do these things which Ia called con-
trolling the sea, the navy should strictly
be superior to any which can be brought
against IT, but this extreme conclusion is
qualified by other circumstances, such as
our nearness TO the Caribbean sea, our ma
tional power through our great resources,
the dangers through which our possible
opponents may be exposed In other quar-
ters and from other enemies. We cannot,
In the near future, expect 10 have a navy
nearly as large as that which Great Brit
ain must keep. but II Is easily within our
means to rival that of France and Ger
many the only European states other than
Great Britain, which might lead them to
dispute the Monroe doctrine
Reflection upon this condition will indi-
cate the size OF our own war feet and
as to the wisdom of cultivating those cor
dial relations to which Great Britain has
invited u.s. when our interests and insti-
tutions advise and the existence OF which
put II out OF the power or wish of any
other state to quarrel with us about tho
Monroe doctrine 1t is to the interest of
Great Britain that we should take naval
charge OF the American isthmus provided
she can feel sure that we will do IL ef-
fectively, or that our preparations and our
deeds viii answer TO the words OF WASH
ington and Monroe"