The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1900-03-11
SAYS THESUPREME COURT
BUT WITH THE OPINION JUDGE
CLARK DOES NO AGREE.
LAW EXTENDS ONLY TO CONvEYANCES
Until the Last General Assembly Two Sections
of Our Code CIassed Married Women
With Idiots, Lunatics, In
fants and Conyicts."

An important and interesting case was
North Carolina in regard to the power OF
married woman to sign contract with
out her husbands consent.
1t was the case of jennings vs.. Hinton,
sent up from Pasquotank county. di-
gest of this opinion, written by Judge
Furches, has already been printed in
of Judge Clark, which also makes mighty
interesting reading, has never been pub
lished.
The facts in the case are these: On
June %, 1884, Benz. F. Jennings, of Eli
Zabeth City, took out an insurance policy
on his life for $4,000, for the benefit of
his wife, Sarah E. Jennings. On April
20, 1897, the plaintiff, Sarah E. Jennings,
executed and delivered to the defendant,
J. l.. Hinton, an assignment of her inter-
est in the insurance policy. This assign
ment was witnessed by her husband,
Benjamin f. Jennings, who has since
died. -
The only point in the case is this-was
this an assignment by the wife, with
the written assent of her husband" as
provided by Article X section g. of the
Constitution of this State?
The Supreme court holds that it was;
that the wife could not convey the policy
without the husbands written assent, but
that this written assent" was given by
the husband when he signed the paper as
a witness-as it was not a transaction
that required a subscribing witness for
any purpose unless it was to meet this
requirement
Judge Clark in course of his concurrng
opinion thus interestingly comments on
these facts and the law governing them:
Il concur that if written assent was re-
qured in this instance, the appending by
the husband of his signature as witness,
was sufficient assent, both by reason of
the thing and upon all the precedentS.
But | concur in the result for the further
reason that the transfer of the policy by
the wife was valid without the written
assent of her husband.
THE Constitution, Article X, section e,
says the property of the wife shall be
and remain her sole and separate estate
and pronertv as if she were mar
ried.' The only exception to that broad
provision is that the husband is given
merely o. veto upon her 'conveyances.' He
is not required to join in them, for he has
no interest in her property CManning V.
Manning 70 ~ c., 293), and of course
can pass none This veto power does not
extend to devises and bequests, nor TO
auy other disposition of her property,
save in those cases which under the law
must be made by conveyance, l. e.,
deeds and mortgages of realty and such
mortgages of personally as are made by
deed.
ITO hold that the husbands veto power,
by reason Of the requirement OF his VIII
ten assent, extends to all gifts, sales,
transfers and assignments of her personal
property, oral or written, is to make the
veto as broad as the enfranchisement. II
is to say that her property shall remain
hers, as before marriage, but that IN no
case whatever shall she own it as If she
had remained single. 1t would be to re-
uuire the husbands written assent in
cases where no writing would be necessa-
ry on the part of the wife. There is no
possible construction of this provision
which would require the husbands writ
ten assent to the wife's endorsement OF
a check, or the gift of an old calico dress
or a pair of second hand shoes-in short,
a negation of the broad enfranchislng
clause which guarantees a married woman
as full ownership of her property as if
she had remained single. save for the
veto given the husband upon her con
yevances' The statutes and the decisions
point out what are conveyances, and by