Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-09-02
COURT DECISIONS.
0lGESTED BY w. B. MARTIN
EXCLUSIVELY FOR
vIRcINiAN-PILor.
Notes of Cases Recently Decided
Which Are of Interest to
Our People.
SMITH ". POWELL.

supreme Court of Appeals Of Virginia.
July g. 1900.
NO OTHER DECREE CAN BE EN-
TERED AFTER a FINAL DE-
CREE.
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW CANNOT,
WITHOUT SPECIAL AUTHORITY
ACCEPT ANYTHING BUT MONEY
IN PAYMENT OF HIS CLIENTS
DEMAND, AND THE LATTER IS
NOT BOUND BY SUCH ACT OF
HIS ATTORNEY.
A PETITION FOR APPEAL. FROM
A DECREE OBTAINED BY DE-
FAULT CANNOT. BE ENTER
TANNED UNTIL RELIEF HAS
BEEN SOUGHT UNDER CODE
SECTION 9451 BY MOTION TO THE
LOWER COURT. IF THE TIME
ALLOWED FOR THIS MOTION
HAS ELAPSED THE DECREE is
IRREVERSIBLE.
The main question in this cause was
whether an attorney could take a note
In satisfaction of u decree made in ia
Vor of his client.
The court says:
The decree of April. 1893, having
been final decree, no other decree
could regularly have been entered in
the cause. No such objection to the
proceeding, however. is made. because
as was stated at the bar it was done
by agreement among counsel.
That Scott had no authority as at
torney to receive anything other than
money In satisfaction OF his clients
demands is not controversial, and that
being the case we do not perceive how
SCOTS conduct, assuming that the ev
idence established all for which de-
PENDANTS contend, could operate by
way of estoppel to the prejudice OF his
client. III is plain from the evidence
that he gave Scott no previous au-
thority 10 act otherwise than as his
attorney at law. 1t is equally plain
from the evidence that he never by
word or deed consented to or ratified
the acceptance of Preston's note as IA
part satisfaction of the decree in his
favor. Bat there can be no cstoppcl
here in any view, or against any one.
III is of the essence of eStoppel that the
net relied upon as such should have
been injurious and to the prejudice of
him who relies upon 1t as cstoppcl.
The defendants have not been injured
by anything said or dCne by the plain
tiff or his testator. The note which
was received was not due for n year,
and within that period every one in
tcresicd was informed OF the truth of
TIC lIidliti tIll IL lIN Dccll taken UNI
der misrepresentation of facts and
that Booth and Scott. his attorney.
had declared that the Preston note
would not be accepted. While they
would be glad If he would pay the
money which IL was intended to rep
resent. The Buckncr check injured no
body. II was not collected, ana IL 1t
had been II represented only the
amount for which Buckner was i'm
any event liable.
But II is said that the defendants
We're prevented from taking an APP
peal. Booth. we reiterate. did nothing
that estops him. He was not In any
way responsible for the failure to APP
peal, and after appcllees were inform
ed OF his position there was yet ample
time to move in the Hastings Court to
have the decree corrected, and falling
In this. to apply to the Court OF APP
peals for such relief as they might
have shown themselves entitled
We are of opinion that the Hastings
Court erred in crediting tho decree of
April %. 1893. by the amount of the
Preston note.
Appellecs seek, under Rule IN. to as
sign as error the ruling of the court
against them in that decree, by which
they were held liable MS partners or
joint obligors. The decree, as we have
seem was taken against them by de-
fault. ana by viz tu- of -7T-vtt TUT ss4Ja of
the Code this court had no iurisdic-
ton to entertain a petition for appeal
until relief had been sought under sec
tion 1851 by motion to the court in
which the decree was rendered. That
motion was never made. The time
within which it could he made has
expired. and the decree has long since
become final and irreversible. Re
VerSed