The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1900-02-04

smuggling. This change was due largely TO the
pressure OF mercantile opinion In England upon
the Ministry: British manufacturers and mer-
chants dwelt upon the loss which British industry
would suffer II the laws became a dend-letter. The
injury done to Boston and Rhode Island by inter.
ference with the West Indian trade. and the fric-
ton involved In the searching OF vessels,
brought, home tho grievance to n wide and
/ importan class Of eolonists. Then, again, the
, proposal 70 csta blish a standing army In America
and the actual landing OF troops In Boston in
1893 wcrs keenly resented. To all CO Sses Of colo
nists a standing army was distasteiui II America
was expected to pay the cost. British officers
for the most part had hitherto made themselves
unpopular by their conduct and pretrnsions, and
4, vas felt that royal garrisons would prove harm
full to colonial simplicity, and, in case OF conflict
with royal Governors, possibly dangerous. The
mischief produced by u misa pprehension OF thu
elements Of the situation was completed by Lord
North's coerclve legislation in l774, The laws
then passed. ns Chatham and Burke coricnded,
rendered Cancellation impossible, and wero only
intelligible as an intentional prelude to Wal.
To sum up; The American Revolution is traced
by MIR Woodward TO the lack Of "A consistent
policy from 1867 inward. There might be strong
academic arguments for a system M colonial
taxation which should constitute an effective
part Of a scheme Of imperial defence, but to i'm
peril the Empire for fiO 1000 a year was not states
msnship To confess Townshcnd's finance to I've
mistaken and yet to retain its most irritating feat
ure-thr tea ~duty-worth at most 900, 600 a year
was prepos,erous. Nor was Il kingly in George
Ill. to treat n rebuff in policy AZ a personal af'ront,
while I, was the silllest bravnlo TO threaten coer-
ciDn without either the intention or the power OF
eyerting force enough TO carry IL through. As II
was. America was irretricvsbly lost, before the
war broke out. by n policy, il team I've called a pol
Icy, which WAS at onCe aimless, weak and stupid.
1t will By acknowledged that, Notwithstanding
the errors In detail 10 which We have adverted.
the author Of this book shows himself on the whole
better informed and more sensible than are most
English writers on the subject. His final atmis-
sion deserves TO be recorded, namely, that, apart
from the aid derived By Us after l778, from France.
with which Spain and Holland successfully CO.
operated, England could hardly have trlumphed
in any event. British troops, II supported by
adequate fleets, might have held important points
along the coast, but thu war proved at an early
stage. and conclusively, that the interior could
not be recovered, that New England WAS lost and
that the submission OF America, II yielded at all,
could be maintained only by an intolerahle drain
upon the resources Of the mother country We
must add that Nh. Woodward repeats the current
assertion that TO \%urncan independen"r should
ba asctibed the beginning Of a new idea OF colonial
rela tions on the part OF the British Government,
There Is no proof that such an iura VAS implanted
in the grnAratonO Of British statesmen which wit
messed our revolutionary War, or in the NEXT gen
Grafton. The truth is that hity-Saven years
elapsed hatN cen tn peace OF 1893 and the conces-
sipt OF tn frst lnstallment Of genuine sell govern.
mrnt to the Canadas. II is a strangely retarded
lesson which il take, two generations TO learn.
NJ, ", Ill.