The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-02-13

tempt to choose defensible positions or to
collect the forces, and in Natal I'M
sanitary acknowledgements held in
force because ii was the Aldershot of
South Africa and a portion of the garri-
son was diverted to Glencoe for the pro-
lection of a coal mine. The headquarters
STAFF may not have been responsible for
the first lines Of colonial defense, but 1t
must be held accountable for the strategic
blunder of shutting up Sir George Whites
garrison in Ladysrnith instead Of directing
him TO retreat, fighting at the Tugela and
then at the Mool river and keeping his
communications open with the sea II this
had been done he would have received re-
Inducements by the middle Of November.
and the Siege and the fall Of Ladysmith
would have been avoided.
Sir Redvers Butler left England with his
plan OF campaign clearly outlined. His
army corps was to march through the
Free State, and Sir George White vas to
hold the enemy In check by remaining
quiet in Ladysmith. Lord woseley, dur
ing the FIRST month of the war had one
comment to repeat to his friends. and that
vas: White has only to stay still and
wait for Butler to begin his march"
Buffers specuIations Futile.
These were Aldershot conceptions, based
upon peace training without reference to
the realities of military defense and actual
warfare with the Beers. Sir Redvers Bull
Ter abandoned his plan of campaign when
he reached South Africa. substituted
march to Modder river for the Bloemton-
tein-Pretoria parade and after dragging
the bulk of the army corps and Warrens
division into Natal. put 200 men out of
action In two unsuccessful attempts for
the relief of Ladysmith.
Like a sham Fight.
Lord Methuens attack upon Magersfon-
tein, In which the Highland brigade adj
vanced in column formation, was planned
as sham night would have been on Sails
bury plain. without thought OF an actual
hostile force anywhere in the field.
Col Longs recklessness in carrying his
guns beyond the reach OF his supporting
infantry was sham battle maneuver
which would have brought upon him a
reprimand even al AIdershot There have
been feint attacks. reconnaissance in
force. column formations and drill book
tactics from the beginning to the end OF
the campaign. and the generals have new
er seemed to realize that they we're not
maneueering on Salisbury plain, but were
leading men under fire in battle with the
Beers.
Comparison With American Generals
1T is impossible for Americans who re-
member the training of their own civil
war to think of soldiers like Grant and
Lee attacking strongly intrenched posi-
tons and conducting turning movements
after the manner OF Lord Methuen and
Gen. Butler. They would not have fought
three battles without scouting or recon
noissance, as Lord Methuen did, and then
have flung their army against strong
position like Magersfontein In a frontal
attack. where the resistance was greatest,
without an attempt at maneuvering; and
IL defeated they would not have remained
Idle In camp for weeks waiting for rein
forcements which were not In reserve
They would not have retreated from CO.
lens0 or Spion kop after single futile
attack. but would have dug their way up
to the enemy's positions. making closer
gaps day by day. and gradually envelop-
ing them and rendering them untenable
The British stan has allowed the Dutch
to do all the maneuvering and all the
digging, and to choose every battlefield
and defensive position; and when there Is
an impasss 1t orders the troops back to
camp to play football and cricket until
there are relnforcements for another
ship that has brought reproach on Eng
land and created crisis in the fortunes
OF the empire.