The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1900-09-07

attacK on the spanish INES. 1eIl Merrltt
states that on his arrival Aghinaldo failed
to can on him or to offer to cooperate
with him in the capture of the city, and
that for these reasons the preparations
for the attack on the city were pressed
and military operations conducted without
reference to the situation of the insurgent
forces"
Gen. Merritt adds that 1.-The wisdom for
this course was subsequently fully estab-
lished.''
Dewey, in a message to the secretary
of the navy on July 26, states:
''Merritts most difficult problem will be
how to deal with the insurgents under
Aguinaldo who has become aggressive
and even threatening towards our army"
CAPTURE OF MANILA.
Aug. Is Manila was captured by the
military and naval forces of the United
States without the cooperation of the in
surgents, who, as soon as our forces had
effected the capture, became eager to
enter the city for the purpose of looting
1t. In a memorandum submitted by Agui-
naldo's commissioners to Gen. Anderson
it is stated:
1.-The sacrifices that we have made in
contribution I'd the siege and capture of
Manila being notorious, it is just that
We should have a part of the booty of
war"
On the 10Th of August the protocol of
peace was signed, which suspended all
hostilities. This tethered our forces to
the city, bay and harbor of Manila pend
ing negotiations for a final treaty or
peace. In the meantime, the Spaniards
he limit fota
barred from going beyond Manila, Agui-
naldo proceeded with his insurrectionary
programme, and seemed especially to
prepare himself for hostility against the
United States.
His claim that abs olute independ-
ence, or independence with a pro-
tectorate, had been promised the
FiIipfnOs by our authorities I'm the
East IL denied by Admiral Dewey,
Generals Merritt and Anderson and
by COnsuIs Pratt and WiIdman, the
only parties through whom he
claims that such promises were
made.
AS early as May 26. Secretary Long
wired Dewey:
ut is desirable. as far as possible and
consistent for your success and safety,
not to have political alliances with the
that would incur liability to MAINTAIN their
cause in the future"
To this Dewey replied:
81 have entered into no alliance
with the Insurgents or with any fac
ton"
On the 22d of July, Gen. Anderson
wrote Aguinaldo, among other things, as
follows:
81 observe that your excellency has an
nounced yourself as a dictator, and pro-
claimed martial law. AS 1 am here SIM
ply in military capacity, have no au-
thority to recognize this assumption.
And so far as can ascertain your
independent status has not been rec
ognized by any foreign power"
On July 81, Gen. Anderson reported to
the acknowledgements:
"Since I wrote last Agninaldo has put
in operation an elaborate system of mill
tary government under his assumed au-
thority as dictator and has prohibited any
supplies being given us except by his
order. . His assumption of civil
authority have ignored and let him
know verbally that could and would not
recognize it, while I did not recognize
him as a military leader"
There is nothing in the records,
except AguinaldO's bold statement
disclOses or tends to disclose that
Independence, in any form, was
promised by our government, Or its
Representatives, to the FiIipInOs.
Our forces had considerable trouble in
keeping Aguinaldo and the insurgents
outside of Manila. 1t was not until Sept.
10 that they finally withdrew from the
suburbs. and as to one point, not until
Oct. 25. Under the terms of the protocol
our forces held Manila in trust, pending
the negotiations for the final treaty of
peace, and had no right to surrender the
city. or any part thereof, to the inslir-
gents who claimed to be the enemies of
Spain, or to any other power.
Pending the negotiations for a final
peace, it was the duty of our forces to
protect life and property in Manila And
it would have been a gross breach Of
faith to permit the insurgents to enter
the city for purposes of booty or ocier-
wise. Reluctantly and after much nego-
tiation. the insurgents retired from the
city and suburbs, but they maintained
their army in force and kept up a state of
siege against our forces along the entire
outskirts, as though we. and not the
Spaniards, were their er lies.
MORE TREACHERY.
In the early part of December, Gen.
Rios, the commander of the Spanish
forces at Iloilo, in the island of Panay-
a city next in Importance to Manila-ex-
pressed a desire to evacuate the city and
turn it over to the United States forces,
and the merchants and business people
of the city were very anxious to have our
forces occupy the place so as to afford
them adequate protection. In view Of the
protocol, Gen. Otis was not inclined to act
till he had received authority from Wash
ington. This authority was not given
until Dec. %. AS soon as it was given,
Gen. Otis took steps to send an expedition
to Iloilo, but before it arrived, on Dec.
"a, Gen. Rios had evacuated the place
in favor of the insurgents, who at once
took possession, at the instance of Agui-
naldo and gathered considerable force
to oppose the landing of our forces and
to bring on an open war for the purpose
of influencing the Tagals in Luzon.
This action of Rios and this move
of the insurgents was NO doubt
planned and inspired by AgulnaIdO,
who had been in negotiation with
the spaniards.
On the 25th day Of October Aguinaldo
had sent letter, subscribed by him
self, in cipher, to Gen Rios, suggesting
cooperation between them against our