The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-11-06
STAFF SYSTEM BLUNDERS.
The Cause of Weakness In General
ChaRee,s Operations.

The Cause of Weakness In General
ChaHee's Operations.
SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. Elm response
to a request that be amplify his state
ments relative to the weakness of the
American staff in China. John F. Bass,
| who accompanied the relief column TO
Pekin, said:
The whole difficulty is that we have no
| general staff rotating with the line as
other nations have, no body of men whose
sole business it is to organize and pick
the personnel of an expedition like the
one to China. Our general staff is COM
posed OF the heads of different branches
OF the service. with particular, net gem
eral, duties. The system is founded on
the English pattern, which broke do IN
| in the Boer war. No especial blam>
should est on anyone.
The China expedition was organized IL
a haRhszard way. The technical positions
Of quartermaster and oommissary were
filled suddenly By line officers who hap
pened to be ON the spot. and. of course
were not prepared with clerks or equip
ment for the work. Men who We're train
ed TO the business came cut from Wash
ington only after ae necessity was past
This is always the case
The Ninth Infantry came from Manila
completely equipped. The Fourteenth Ar
tillery, cavalry and marines were without
any transportation. and what was meant
fer one regiment had TO suffice for bri-
gade. 1t was ridiculous how the soldiers
were overloaded, considering the heat,
which loo to LOG in the shade The
Importance of marching the infantry q I
night was overlooked Troops, even n
excellent condition and in a temperate
climate, should never be marched more
than fifty minutes without rest Our
troops, though, cunning debilitated from
the Philippines. marched as long as an
hour and a half al q stretch.
The rear column is always the most
trying. The American and English COM
mauders, for some reason, could not secure
any place better than the rear Of the col
umn the whole way. The marches were
made in the middle of the day, instead of
in the morning during the night. The
heat was deadly. l saw men and officers
fall on their faces in the dust after a march
was over. I have seen 90 per cent of
command drop out froIn heat exhaustion.
One day they did not begin their march
! until o'clock in the afternoon. and they
completed a whole days march by in the
evening The soldiers came in singing;
not man dropped cut. These details did
not seem 10 interest the American COM
mander.
In action a lack of homogeneity in the
STAFF was evident. At Yangtsun Colonel
Daggett received bat one order. and that
was 10 charge. Ne information was given
him about the enemy or the ground His
| men charged up conVerglng angle be
tween the river and the railroad, under
q cross fire at a thousand yards. As they
neared the apex the troops were terribly
congested. and bzt for the heTCism OF the
men there would have been great slaugh-
| ter. The Chinese position might easily
have besn fianked. Colonel Daggett in this
action as in the whole campaign, deserves
| the highest praise.
The want OF small nags attached to the
rifles as in the Japanese Army, or other
| Distinguishing mark, caused the British 10
! FIRE several shells into one of our compa-
MES killing ard woUnding several.
I'm the taking of Taku contradictory or
| ders were issued by different staff officers,
so that the line officers did not know which
way to turn. General Chaffee issued an or
der for the troops to go into camp. and not
until his attention was called TO it did he
discover that two companies were already
engaged On the wall of PekiI. He also or
dered to the rear a battalion left in sup
port, so that the two companies were left
alone. ran out of ammunition, and had TO
stop fighting
No one with any information about
Pekin was with the Americans so mat
| the British although they had done no
! fighting, passed US and and entered the
! legation first.
| The subsistence department also was
| weak, only seventy pieces of travel "a
| items being issued. Cattle abound d but
| no effort was made to secure thzr1, al
| though the British issued meat, vegeta-
| bles, and bread all the way to Pekiu.
! When I left, two weeks after Pekin was
! taken, only two sheep per company hsd
| been issued for the whole month Tie
men would often have suffered if thty
| had not foraged for themselves
General Cbaffee lacked diplomatic
/ ability, and offended the Russian ami
other officers, When Colonel Daggett.
according to his orders, fought up TO the
I last gate. General Cha flee stopped him.
| One of the staff told MT thai General
| Chaffee sent to the russians for re-en-
! forcements. AS the palace was already
! practically taken, this meant that he
| feared that he had exceeded mis- author
| ity. The Russian general is said to have
| answered: Were you sent TO Pek.a to
| relieve your minister? Are you row at
| lacking the palace? You must do il
! alone
General Chafee bluffed. but although
| the Americans had done The fighting. The
! Russians, who are masters in diplomacy
| entered the Emperor's palace first, there
| by gaining great prestige with the Chi
! nese- The Russians occupied the En-
! press palace and also The summer pal
| ace. and explained afterward that the
| fact that they held no gate to the En-
peror's palace prevented any occupation
! of it.
The Americans were assigned to the
| worst district IN Pekin- Only one i'm
| portant palace was in it, Prince Lees.
| One day the French general sent to the
| American Legation. to ask that the line
| between the French and American dis
| tricts be Strengthened General Chatfee
| and Minister Conger, without investiga-
| TinO consented losing the lace OF
which the next day the French took
1000, 600 taels in silver. and the finest
collection of Chinese porcelain in the
world"
Dentist Dies in His Office.