Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1900-04-25
ROBERTS SCORES BULLER

London. April 1.-THE War Office
tonight published in the Gazette a
dispatch from Lord Roberts. dated Feb
ruary 10, submitting General Buffers
dispatches describing the Spion Kop
and other operations from January II
to January "a. Lord Roberts deals
severely with General Warren and
some others. Even General Butler does
not escape. Lord Roberts complains
that the plan of operations is not
clearly described in the dispatches.
After sketching General Buffers inten-
tions, as communicated to Sir Charles
Warren who commanded the whole
force, Lord Roberts points out that
General Warren seems to have con-
cluded after consultation with his OIL
GERS that the thanking movement order
ed by General Butler was impractical
BILE, and therefore so changed the plan
Of advance as to necessitate the cap
ture and retention of Spion Kop. Lord
Roberts continues:
"As Warren considered 1t impossible
to make the wide thanking movement
which was recommended, If not lctu-
ally prescribed, in the secret instruc-
tions, he should forthwith have ac-
quainted Butler with the course he pro-
posed to adopt. There is nothing 10
show whether he did so or not. But
it is only fair to Warren to point ont
that Butler appears throughout to have
been aware of what was happening.
Regarding the withdrawal from
Spion Kop, the retention of which had
become essential to the relief of Lady
smith, Lord Roberts says:
81 regret to he unable to concur with
Butler in thinking Thornycroft exer-
cised wise discretion in ordering the
troops to retire. | am of the opinion
that ThornyCrOft's assumption of re-
sponsibility and authority was wholly
ineXcusable. During the night the
enemys fire could not have been for
mi.able, and ii would not have taken
more than two or three hours for
Thornycroft to communicate by mes
senger with Major General Coke or
Warren. Coke appears to have left
Spion Kop at $3.50 p. m, for the pur-
pose of consulting with Warren. Up
to that time the idea of withdrawal had
not been entertained. Yet almost i'm
mediately after Coke's departure
Thornycroft issued the order, without
reference to superior authority. which
upset the whole plan of operations and
rendered unavailing the sacrifices made
to carry it into effect. On the other
hand, 1t is only right to say that
Thornycroft appears to have behaved
in very gallant manner throughout
the day.
1T is to be regretted that Warren
did not himself visit Spion Kop in the
afternoon or evening, knowing, as he
did, that the state of affairs was very
critical and that the loss of the posi-
ton would involve the failure of the
operations. He consequently was
Obliged to summon Coke to his head
quarters, and the command at Spion
Kop thus devolved on Thornycroft, I'M
known to Coke, who was under the i'm
preston that the command devolved
upon Colonel Hill as senior officer.
Omissions or mistakes OF this nature
may be trifling in themselves, yet they
may exercise an important influence
over the course of events, and believe
Butler was justified in remarking
There was a want of organization and
system which acted most unfavorably
on the defense
"The attempt to relieve Ladysmith
was well devised, and agree with Bull
Ter in thinking 1t ought to have sue
ceeded. That IL failed may in some
measure have been due to the Difficult
ties of the ground and the commanding
positions held by the enemy, and prob
ably also to. errors Of judgment and
want Of administrative capacity on the
part of Warren. But whatever faults
Warren may have committed, the fall
ure must also be attributed to the dis
inclination Of the officer in the supreme
command to assert his authority and
see that what he thought best was
done and also to the unwarrantable
and needless assumption Of response
bi..,y by a subordinate officer"
The dispatch concludes:
"The gratifying feature Of these dis
patches Is the admirable behavior OF
the troops throughout the oDeration."