Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-06-15
CHIN SE PROBLEM
One of the Most Troublesome Pre-
scented to the Administration.
PRESSURE OF CHURCH INFLUENCE
Danger Of EntangIing Alliances
Fully Realized.
THE PRES f \ L POL ~

The Chinese problem. though the scene
Of action is a long way off. is one IF the
most Troublesome that has been presented
To- the administration. one after another
since this administration began questions
difficult to settle have come up, and III
most Of them the settlement mas been
matter Of Development. the first purpose OF
tn President often being abandoned ana
new Illn. different, sometimes 'iiametri-
caIIy opposed. finally decided upon II WAS
not the intention of the President to inter-
v,ue between Spain and cuba. When M
terventIo;l and war came. and at the time
of TIN, signing of the peace protocol. tt was
not tn. desire of the President to acquire
and hold the sovereignty Of the Philippines
When it came to providing government
for Porto Rico it the policy Of the
P-csid. Mt to give that island free trade
In all these cases IL contrary policy was
diifted into. In none has 1t been policy
Of original intention"
The Church Influence.
The same may prove true with reference
to the policy of this government with rel
erence to the Chinese troubles. There is
the greatest anxiety and uncertainty in the
matter The church influences interested
in the welfare and safety of the mission
aries are being strongly exerted to induce a
operation with the foreign powers This
pressure is of character hard u with
stand. and added to it is the desire on the
part of the powers that we should take our
share of the responsibilities and burdens
imposed by the situation which compels
intervention in some form on the part OF
the powers Moreover, the great interest
shown in Chinese affairs by the administra-
ton ard the development of new American
interests in the orient through initial power
in thu. open door agreement point to cur
h.,lrir rti ha nj n he SET
the problem now presented in china
Danger of EnfnnElinE Alliances.
The other side to be considered is what
the recourse to military force in co-opera-
ton with the powers of Europe may lead to.
The uncertainty of this disinclines the adj
ministration to assume an aggressive atti-
tude. The danger of entangling alliances.
the possib ilty of differences among the
powers and conflict. the apprehension of
beng led too far when once an aggressive
step has been taken. and the practical GER
ta-nty that there could not be complete
coincidence between this government and
IN" European powers should the present
IT IubcS lead to the ACKNOWLEDGMENT of Chi
ia or its domination by foreign govern
ments. cause the administration to look
with apprehension upon the suggestion of
an active, aggressive participation in the
regulation of Chinese affairs by forceful
means. The possibilities Of the situation
are at once too great and too obscure tor
the. administration 10 look with equanimity
upon the situation At time when so
much is being said about imperialism and
foreign complications. and when the public
mind Is excited over politics. il Is felt that a
false step might prove disastrous. The ad-
miniStration. therefore. is determined to
take no step at all unless forced to it by
circumstances which cannot be controlled.
and unless there IS d change of policy. as in
the cases of Cuba the Philippines and Porto
Rico. there Is TO be no participation by this
government in the regulation of Chinese af-
fairs by the exercise of military power.
The Present Policy.
The present policy is to adhere strictly to
the mere guarding of legation and consular
premises and the protection of those who
seek asylum there. Whether this can be
adhered to in the face of the inability or
unwillingness of the Chinese government
to protect the lives of Americans not under
the legation roof IS uncertain and there is
still the perplexing uncertainty whether in
holding dloof to avoid compiled tons i'm
medately threatened We may not after ALL
become involved finally under circumst ances
TO place US at disadvantage among the
powers contending for domination. The
present determination to hold aloOf in the
matter of military operations is taken with
a realization that it may involve a disre-
gard in the future by foreign powers of
our wishes in the matter of Chinese affairs
and that We may ultimately have to decide
between absolute submission to European
domination in the orient and the resistance
OF such domination single-handed and
alone. From every point of view the stu
alton is perpleXing and are being drawn
-. fx.t,