The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1900-09-02

nj 90 fight were too unwieldy, hut there was
nothing TO prevent smaller sections from hAv-
ing neocssaries nearer them, except the To-
grained habit Of the Individual not being able
20 shift for himself. lie expected TO have distrtb-
uted the necessary things at the beginning OF the
day and TO return TO his regimental transport
and get n fresh supply Of the necessary things
at the end OF the day. II was "A hopelessly
cumbersome process, but II was nobody busl-
ness to alter II. On that day A. Modder River
II was apparently nobody's business 10 have
drinking water neor the nights camp In case.
as tho event proved. the river was still disputed
at nightfall. The men were around the engines
al the nearest siding In crowds waiting 10 catch
the drip Of hot. greasy water from below the
locomotives. which we're kept with their fires
up. Orders came around to the drivers, who
were all Royal Engineers. that they would be
court-martialed II they gave water to the men.
In the morning the majority could scarcely
have gone through another days fight had II
been necessary.
A word regarding the General in command.
Lord Methuen. 4 correspondent who was
seeking the shelter OF an ant hill from some
Mauser fire had the General In a similar atti-
tude about tifty yards on his right, As the FIRE
eased on the General and the correspondent
rose 10 move to another Unrt OF the field. The
former. seeing the stranger, shouted with a
gesture Of impotence: Don't talk TO me
unless YOU have something very important to
sayl- The correspondent certainly had made
no sign of any such intention and 20 him the
Generals demeanor scarcely seemed consistent
with a firm and cool control Of his force. After
his slight wound the battle seemed left to take
care Of itself, for part ~ the Ninth Brigade,
which got across the river on the left. had the
experience Of being shelled by the artillery Of
their own side.
The story Of the Magersfortein disaster has
been told again and again, but. ~ indicating
the unwieldlness Of the troops under their
present control. II should be recalled that the
Highland Brigade had suffered $40 casualties
before the sun rose, that lts General and three
Colonies Of killed regiments fell before the
SIN rose. and vet the day was left 10 drag on
hopelcsslv and mlserably without any dlrec-
tlon until evening.
GOOD WORK sY CEN. MACDONALD.
How different was n AZ Koodoesberg two
months later with the same brigade handled
by Gen. Macdonald The purpose OF the
operations there and particularly Of the return
10 Modder River was not made known 10 any
one hut the General al the time. II proved
10 he the very important one of making a Wig
orous feint as though 10 relieve Kimberley
from the west and SO keep the Poers occupied
from their chief lager at Scholth's Mex. he
hind MaGersfontein during the critical
week when 1000 men were brought up by
Lord Roberts. lord Kitchener and Gen. French
prior to the invasion ~ the Orange Free State
and the c~avalry's relief Of Kimberley. The
holding Of Koodoesberg drift served the ad-
ditional purpose Of preventing the Beers from
raidinR the railway from the west and selling
Lord Roberts train. as was thought possible.
Tho eliminating Nuht az EppdrpSharC uaa
on Feb. :. There had been a two hours struR-
gle on the afternoon Of Feb. :. when the British
had only one man killed. so effectively we're
they concealed. and vet were not dislodged
from nNv Of the positions taken. Rut the
Wednesday, battle. two DAYS later. remains 20
my mind the most satisfactory performance
by n detached force Of infantry that I have
seen during the war. Gen. Macdonald's force
numbered barely 500 men. Te had The -four
battalions ~ the Highland Bricade-two 81
them the Black watch and the Seaforths not
much more than half their complement
since the might attack on MagerSfontein. His
only mounted troops were two sduadrons OF
the Ninth Iancers and he had one battery Of
field artillery. On the morning Of the fRht
they held the west 81 the long Koodoes-
berg hfl. about three miles from the eastern
extremity. and the drift held by the British.
Nv WV 'A 7 y wv N''Af -Nf VIZ $780,
end OF the hill. which wa reached by a grad
ual incline from northwest. At the east the
kopje was much too steep TO get a field gun up.
Rife fire from the attacking BOers began about
8 o'clock in the morning and was answered by
some Of the Seaforth Ilighlauders scattered
among the hreast-high projections they had
raised since being sent oil the previous day 10
occupy the British end Of the kopJe. Pack
pock' Pack-pock!" came the whip-crack echo
report Of Mauser fire in quicker and quicker
succession. II became q busy attack when the
Krupp gun opened soon after \ o'clock with
vigorous shrapnel across the kopje, dropping
IL where the British shelters were thought to
be. still Macdonald held his hand. Some
Of his stan-restive on FESTIVE horseS-bit
their lips and scanned their leader. who still
refused 20 give them any order. 4 Methuen
would have had his battalions marching across
the fat and through river beds toward the
Boer firing zone, and that would have been
the beginning and end of his days plan
Of operations. Meanwhile the Boer fire
cracked closer up IN the enemy. Only three
companies of the Seaforths were on the kopje
and their fire was light, for there was nothing
but their ears and the direction Of the whistling
bullets to guide their own aim, After about
an hour Of this a message came down from the
kopie that reenforcements were needed, the de-
tenders we're being hard pressed.
oh! no." said Macdonald, they don't need
that. Send them up plenty OF water, plenty
to eat. Tell them TO sit tight and hold it.
Then aside, as though thinking aloud They've
got to hold il. They can't get away"
II was not the most tender way Of regarding
ones men. But mark the result. At the end
Of the day the British had but seven killed and
something over thirty wounded. II one es-
timated from the position, the amount Of fire
directed on them. and The rrecedents OF Mod
der River and Magersfontein the British cas-
ualties should have been more than Ave times
what they were. But Macdonald was not 10
be shaken into displs ing his men, nor had
he huddled them together in hattallons. There
was a company here, another there. always In
/ touch with each other. and always under Mac
| donald's own vlgilant control. He was able
not only 10 hold the drift and his position across
| IL all day. but on the following morning, the
purpose Of the diversion having been accom-
plished. he got his men awav and back 10 Mod
dor River without a single further casualty.
There were no exceptional circumstances In
the KoodoesberG operations that they should
have been completed without a prisoner being