Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1900-03-01
BoER FIGHTING TACTICS.
OUR OFFICERS THINK THE BRITISH
ARMY IS OBSOLETE.

Belief that American Soldiers Would
Have Done Better Than the English
Have Secret Of 6oer Success Value
Of Artillery.
All officers of the United States army
In Washington are watching the war In
South Africa with great interest. In
deed, much more attention Is paid To
1t than to the fighting in Luzon, which
which they regard as having reached
a guerilla stage. The attention which
our officers give to the Transvaal war
Is directed to the general feature Of the
tactics, and they speculate as to how
our commands would have acted in
similar circumstances. General Cor
bin has been quoted ms saying that
American soldiers would have succeed
ed better than the English because of
their experience on the frontier with
hostile Indian tribes. This view, how
ever, is not generally supported, as
Indian warriors are not regarded as
on plane with Beers. Perhaps the ar
tilery officers are following the South
African war more eagerly than the
others because they find in 1t proof Of
some Of their long-standing argu-
ments. One of them said recently to
the correspondent Of the New York
Post:
The situation to-day is just what
might have been expected The Brit
ish system is obsolete and inefficient,
while the Beers have for years been
arming, preparing and drilling for this
contest. Ten years ago General JOu-
bert established war college ut Pre-
toria. We hear talk about the Beers
as lot of herders and farmers. How
ever that may be, their commanders
are trained and superior officers. And
all their tactics have been directed to-
wards this struggle with England, the
ground examined, and the very battle
fields surveyed. Spion Kop was plan
ned years ago, and the day of the bat
tie witnessed simply the consumma-
ton Of the plan. That fight and every
other one has shown the extraordinary
strength which artillery has come to
y
instead of infantry, the backbone of
the army. White lost regiment be-
cause his mules stampeded with the
batteries, Butler was beaten ut Tugela
river when his cannon were captured,
and Warren lost Spion Kop because he
could not bring his artillery up to that
place, and the Beers guns were direct
ed at his army. With the rapid-fire
guns now in use, the size Of the in
fantry force opposing them, unless 1t
Is of overwhelming proportions, is Of
small Importance. One such weapon ~
worth scores, and perhaps hundreds, of
men. And when l read of n solid
column Of troops ordered to march up
to the mouths of these Boer six-inch
rapid-fre guns, call the order simply
murder. The British plainly have not
the modern artillery which the Beers
possess. The difference between the
two forces in this one respect, indie
pendent of all tactical plumbers and
other features of appropriateness, is
sufficient to account for the present
situation. We must believe that the
British must eventually win, but they
will do so only when they bring their
best guns and gunners to the front and
pour into the field great army"
''The artillery did not have chance
at Santiago" was suggested.
"By no means. Not single COM
handing officer there was an artillery
man. The infantry was relied upon
to do the work which the artillery
would have done much more quickly
and with less loss Of life. This was
because Shafter had never had eX-
perience with anything but infantry.
Take the capture of Ell Caney, for ex-
ample-a fight In which the artillery
did some good work. The capture at
eleven o'clock ought to have occurred
at nine. Two hours in some contests
would mean the difference between de-
feat and victory, and that two hours
was due to the fact that the General
in command, an infantry officer, direct
ed our battery work instead of leav-
ing it to the artillery officer in charge
of the guns. But that experience at
deal, for in the Philippine war their
officers have been given practically in
dependent commands. with astonish-
ing results. In one campaign the bat
terry was taken up to Il position only
thirty yards from the enemy-a thing
never heard of beforehand brilliant
victory was the result. That achieve
ment attracted the attention of the en-
tire military world. One Of our Off
GERS was questioned concerning it by
the War Office I'm London when he call
ed there last summer. The incident
shows what can be done by giving the
artillerymen the direction of their own
work, an opportunity they ought to
have had long ago. OF course, we ar
tillerymen are prone to exaggerate the
importance of our arm of the service,
but you must remember that no other
arm has made such astonishing devel-
opment in late years, and the new ma
chimes can be directed and operated
only by trained men.
lone great defect in our army sys-
tenn Is that man is kept in subordi-
nate position all his life, and when the
chance comes for distinction he Is Of
ten too old. l know Of first lieuten-
ants who are grandfathers. That could
be remedied by more thorough inspec-
ton of the individual men, and their
promotion regardless of time of service
or any other consideration except abil-