The Hocking sentinel. [volume] (Logan, Ohio) 1871-1906, 1900-04-26

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That was q narrow escape for Grant
and the country"
The remark was made by gentle
man who participated in the battle of
COrinth. He was asked to explain. He
did it in this wise: Grant you know,
but without just cause, was under a
cloud for some months after the battle
of Shiloh. When l say without cause
do not mean 10 infer that there was not
surprise ut Shiloh, but I do mean to
say that probably no general Of mod
ern times. certainly no general devel-
Oped on either side during our great
war, could have fought the battle of
Shiloh better than General Grant after
Ii once began. The only just criticism
which seems to have been made con-
cerning that battle is that strong line
of works had not been thrown up day
or two before the Confederates attack
ed. Grants work Mt Shiloh was of such
character that no word uttered by su-
perior or inferior should have shaken
the confidence Secretary Stanton had in
him. But that confidence was shaken,
and history long ago told us that it was
done through the late General Henry
W. Halieck.
but to return to my story. For the
next few months General Grant was
on his good behavior. so far as Stanton
was concerned. and he occupied most
trying position. His forces were scat
tered, and in some instances against his
judgment and wishes, and he had un-
der him some officers for whom he had
the highest respect and who always
had his best wishes. but who did not
have his entire confidence.
THE latter part of September and
the early part of October. 1862, were
days of great trial to the country and to
Generals Grant and Buelk-Buell who
had to deal with Bragg in his attempt
ed invasion of the North. and Grant in
dealing with General Sterling Price.
who moved into Mississippi and formed
junction with General Van Dorm, thus
making large army, well drilled. test
ed in battle, commanded by officers
who had grown up in the old army. The
object of Price and Van Dorm was to
crush Grants scattered troops and be
in situation, later on. to cooperate
with Bragg. No one knowing the atti-
tude OF the Secretary of War and Gen
eral Hallack toward General Grant
doubts that had Van Dorm and Price
done what they set out to dO-crushed
Grant-it would have been the last of
him as commander of an important
force. But there was an overruling
providence then, as there seemed to be
all through the great struggle. General
Grant made his plans to defeat Van
Dorm and Price. They We're as perfect
as any he had made in any of his cam
paigns. Had they been executed to the
letter Van DOrn's army would have
been as effectually ruined as Hoods
was at Nashville over two years later.
"COrinth was one of the most fiercely
fought battles of the war. General
ROsecrans was in command. He had
four divisiOns-HamiltOn's Stanley's,
Davies and Mckean's-with some cav
airy, the usual amount of artillery,
all making a force of 10000. He had
been led to believe that Van Dorm had
double that number, but he had less
than 10000. On the Sd of October Rose
Grams moved his forces about three
miles from Corinth. proposing to fight
the battle outside Of the fortificatiOns
constructed the spring before. There
was a sharp contest the afternoon Of
the Sd, participated in by General Bu-
fOrd's brigade and Minnesota regi-
ment commanded by Colonel SanbOrn,
now United States District Judge for
Minnesota, residing at st. Paul
Through a mistaken idea as to the lOca-
tiOn of the enemy, General ROsecrans'
troops had been SO stationed that they
We're not within supporting distance Of
each other. That night General Rose
Grams issued an order to make a mid
night attack with the bayOnet. General
Charles s. Hamilton, who knew that
the enemy was In front of him in large
force. was Mortified at the order, and
not carry out the order until he had
had personal conference with the
commanding general"
General Hamilton, in writing of the
incident short time before his death,
said: ''My reply to his order brought
General ROsecrans to the front. He
burst out vehemently with, General
Hamilton, what do you mean by dis
Obeying my orders! 1 replied, Gen
eral, l am ready to obey Your orders,
but not until 1 have explained what
must inevitably result The night at
tack will be Ineffective because the
troops cannot keep their formation in
the brush, and in the darkness of the
forest cannot distinguish friend from
foe. Since the fight this afternoon
Davies division has fallen back toward
town. They will be the first attacked
i'm the morning My troops are too far
away to support them; am not within
supporting distance of any division,
neither can any division come 10 my
support in the event of sudden at
tack. The enemy knows that am on
his flank; he will not leave me to at
tack the town. His first movement
will be upon me; shall have to sustain
the brunt of the whole army. Our po-
sitiOn is false one You should draw
in your lines in the immediate vicinity
of town. where one division will be in
close supporting distance of another.
where Il weak point can be instantly re-
enforced. The place for this division
is where l put it this morning l can
hold the ground there. II you make
these dispositions you Will win vic
tory: if You do not You and the army
are ruined.
General Hamilton. in his paper that
has never been published, says. Gen
eral Rosecrans looked thoughtfully
down for Il moment and then, raising
his face, said, Hamilton. you are right.