The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-01-10


in command of these were criticised and
assailed in Spain 1t is characteristic of
Spain that the people at home do not sup
port but criticise their generals in the field.
The Spanish method has always been a
mixed policy of peace and war, contra
diction of terms. an impossible combina-
ton rendering Ineffective and peace
impossible. This was Compos plan. IL
IL our plan will inherit Blanco's fate and
failure.
TRUE MILITARY POLICY.
Mr.. President, that must not be our plan.
This war is like all other wars. 1t needs to
be finished before it is stopped. L pre-
pared 10 vote either to make our work
thorough or even now to abandon il.
lasting peace can be secured only by over
whelming forces in ceaseless action until
universal and absolutely final defeat is in
fiicted on the enemy. To halt before every
armed force, every guerrilla band opposing
us is dispersed or exterminated, will pro-
long hostilities and leave alive the seeds of
perpetual instruction. Even then we
should not treat. To treat at all is to adj
init that we are wrong. And any quiet so
secured will be delusive and fieeting. And
false peace will betray us; a sham truce
will curse us. 1t is not TO serve the pur-
poses OF the hour, ii is not to salve a pres
ent situation that peace should be estab
lished. 1t is for the tranquility of the
archipelago forever 1t is for an orderly
government for the Filipnos for all the flu
ture. 1t is to give this problem to poster
ity solved and settled, not veXed and in
volved- 1t is to establish the supremacy
of the American Republic over the Pacific
and throughout the East till the end of
time.
1t has been charged that our conduct of
the war has been cruel. Senators, ii has
been the reverse. l have been in our hos
he ne
carefully. tenderly cared for our own.
Within our lines they may plough and SOW
and reap and go about the affairs of peace
with absolute liberty. And yet all this
kindness was misunderstood or rather not
understood. Senators must remember that
we are not dealing with Americans or Eu-
ropeans. We are dealing with Orientals.
We are dealing with Orientals who are
Malays. We are dealing with Malays in
structed in Spanish methods. They mis-
take kindness for weakness; forbearance
for fear: 1t could not be otherwise unless
you could erase hundreds OF years of saw
agery, other hundreds of years of Oriental
ism and still other hundreds of years of
Spanish character and custom.
OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE.
Our mistake has not been cruelty; it
has been kindness. 1t has been the applica-
ton to Spanish Malays of methods appro-
pirate to New England. Every device of
mercy. every method of Cancellation has
been employed by the peace-loving Pres
ident of the American Republic to the
amazement of nations experienced i'm ORR
entail revolt Before the outbreak our mill
tary governor of the islands appointed a
commission to make some arrangement
with the natives mutually agreeable I
know the members of the commission well
General Hughes, Colonel Crowder and
General Smith-moderate, kindly, tactful
Of he
negotiation 1t was treated with contempt
We smiled at intolerable insult and in
science until the lips of every native in
Manila We're curling in ridicule for the
cowardly Americans. We refraned from all
violence until their armed braves crossed
the lines in violation of agreement Then
our sentry shot the offender, and he should
have been court-martialed had he failed
TO shoot. That shot was the most for
tunate of the war. For Aguinaldo had
planned the attack upon us for two nights
later; our sentry's shot brought this at
tack prematurely on. He had arranged for
an uprising in Manila to massacre all
Americans. the plans for which, in San
dico's handwriting, are in our possession:
this shot made that awful scheme impos-
sible. We did not strike till they attacked
us In force, without provocation; this left
us no alternative but war or evacuation.
WORK OF THE COMMISSION.
The patience of our peace-loving Presi-
III.
commission was sent to Manila, composed
of distinguished diplomat and eminent
college professors. and also General Otis
and Admiral Dewey. These men exhausted
| the expedients of peace. and always were
met with the Malays ready evasion, the
Spaniard's habitual delay. / am personal
witness that no effort was neglected by our
| commission to assure the Filipino people of
our good intentions and beneficent pur-
poses. The commission entertained the
mestiZos of Manila in a way that would
have honored the Senate of the United
States; the brown faces of the common
people Sneered. The commission treated ma
| tives, accustomed to blows, with kindest
consideration; the agents of Aguinaldo told
tales of our pusillanimity to the ignorant
rural masses. This remarkable man sent
so-called commissions, ostensibly to treat,
| but really to play with ours. His commits
sions were composed of generals in uni
form. The populace gaped in open admira-
ton when they appeared in Manila. Our
representatives OF peace talked to them, ar
gued with them, entertained Them the peo-
pie were impressed with their Importance
President Schurman even rode with them
| through the city; the masses were confirmed
| in their reverence for their brothers who
were thus honored and distinguished. Then
/ the bespangled representatives of the Ma
| lay dictator returned to their lord. and the
sole effect OF these pacific efforts was to
make 100000 natives in Manila think that
| the only way to win the respect or the
American Republic is to fight it.
| No, senator's, the friendly methods OF
peace have been thoroughly tried only &c
| make peace more difficult. The Oriental
| does not understand our attempt TO con-
| ciliate. Every effort of the commission
| which did it's work at Manila so earnestly
| and which, with Americans or Europeans
| would have so brilliantly succeeded, only
delayed the peace IL attempted to hasten
There is not now, and never was any pos
| sible course but ceaseless operations In the
| field and loyal support of the war at home
| The news that 10000 American soldier:
| have crossed the Pacific; that, If necessary
| the American Congress will make it 100,00
| or 200, 900 men; that, at any cost, we vii
| establish peace and govern the islands
| will do more to end the war than the sol
| diers themselves. But the report that we
| even discuss the withdrawal of a singl,
/ soldier at the present time, and that We
| even debate the possibility of not admins
| tering government throughout the archi
| pelago ourselves, will be misunderstood
| and misrepresented, and will blow into
| dame once more the fires our soldiers
| blood has almost quenched.
| THE BLOOD OF OUR SOLDIERS
Mr.. President, reluctantly and only from
| sense of duty am 1 forced to say tina
American opposition to the war has beer
the chief factor in prolonging it. HaC
! Aguinaldo not understood that in America
even in the American Congress. even her.
| in the Senate, he and his cause were sup
claimed the stump ard in the press of
faction in the United States. that ever,
shot his misguided followers fired into TIL