The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1900-08-04
He IS SEVERELY REBDKED
ATTORNEY LARRABEE INCURs ST.
PREME COURTS DIsPLEAsURE,
AND is REPRINIANDED
HOLLAND IS ALSO REPRovED
Justice Lewis Hands Down Courts
Decision In a Bitterly Fought
Matter Arising Over Suit
for Malpractice.

Attorney Frank Larrabee, of Minneapo-
lis, in addition to losing his case before
the supreme court, is severely rebuked
for language used before a lower court
Mr.. Larrabee pays we'll for his whistle
and Judge Holland, of the Fifteenth jul
dicial district, is likewise in for a por-
ton Of the highest courts criticism. The
case has twice before been appealed to
the supreme court and this time the
court orders a new trial. The criticism
arises out of a suit of Margaret K. Mar
tin, charging Walter Courtney of Brain
erd, with malpractice. Attorney LARA
bee was Mrs. Martins attorney and at
the second trial of the court held at
Brainerd describing the supreme court s
order regarding expert testimony as rot
ten as hell itself" Attorney Butler, for
the defense, took exception to the state
ment and asked the court to direct Lar
rabee to withdraw it. This the court re-
fused to do and the supreme court says
what it thinks of Attorney Larrabee and
Judge Holland in a decision handed down
yesterday written by Justice Lewis
The court in the syllabus says:
"First-It was prejudicial in It's effect
upon the jury.
''Second-It was error for the trial Judge
to refuse to direct the attorney to with
draw it.
"Third-It was error to refuse to in
struct the jury to disregard it.
''Fourth-Evidence examined and held
that it was not error to refuse to grant
motion by defendant for judgment not
WlthS anding the verdict.
In the opinion Judge Lewis says:
1.-The language was prejudicial because
1t was employed with reference to the
law of the case on trial and was calcu-
lated to prejudice the court and jury
against the law which must, so far as
applicable, control the deliberations Of
ut was also prejudicial as tending to
discredit the integrity of this court, there
by inducing the jury to believe that a
court which they must right 1t is impos-
sibfe to dispose of it by saying that it
was an innocent criticism or mere fig
ure of speech.
Attorneys must have freedom to criti-
else and disapprove the decisions Of the
courts when arguing either before the
appellate or nisi prius tribunals, but
when the language employed for that
purpose would be condemned by common
consent as improper, or when it tends
to cast suspicion of a corrupt motive on
the court, the limitations have been
passed.
IF the words had been spoken hastily
or in the heat Of argument or from force
of habit in the use of strong language,
the opportunity to recall them was pre-
sented when informed of their serious
import by the request of the opposing
counsel. Instead of withdrawing the
statement and endeavoring to place him
attitude toward the jury, an attempt was
made to justify his action by resisting
the effort to remove It's effect.
ut is incredible that an attorney to
whom was known personally the high
character of the justices then composing
the court, should entertain an opinion
that their decisions were not established
upon basis of absolute integrity.
what then could have been the motive
in such extraordinary conduct? If it
arose from deliberate purpose to create
false sentiment for a temporary effect, or
in a reckless spirit Of conscious power in
being able to sway the court and Jury
and create a dramatic scene, in either
case the result was disastrous to the adj
ministration of Justice, and the action
indicative of false conception Of the
ethics Of the profession
at Is not our purpose to pose as crit