The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-04-15
Incident Related by a War Corre-
~spondent That Show Either Blum
dering or Incompetency.
M-ARKsMANsHIP OF THE BoERs
INDIFFERENCE OF BRITISH COM
PANY OFFICERS TO DANGER.
wherein the Burgher Horseman Has
an Advantage Over Cavalry
men from England.
Correspondence Of the Associated Press.

Correspondence Of the Associated Press.
LONDON, April 5.-A British officer. writ
ing in To-day of Vaal Krantz. says Il
do not know IL It is OF any use TO descant
always on the shortcomings of our gem
erals, but they are brought home TO as
so constantly by bitter experiences that
we cannot keep them from our minds. and
we cannot but resent the obstinacy OF the
War Office authorities, who deliberately
allow thousands of lives to be sacrificed
rather than remove those who In peace
have won favor and promotion by social
influence and backstairs intrigue and are
really responsible for most OF our disasters.
The general who led his brigade in mass
of quarter column under the enemy's guns
at Colenso is still in command Of that bril-
gade. and there has been no voice raised in
England against such stupendous folly.
Five hundred and fifty men were lost on
that occasion. but because the Irish bril-
gade stood firm it did not attract public
attention. The Highlanders at Magersfon-
tein. under similar, but less aggravated
circumstances, suffering no greater loss. re-
treated three times from the field. and ali
England clamored for the suppression or
the responsible person. Since then General
Hart has lost no opportunity of repeating
his onense: he even attributed the il sue
cess OF the day to the fact that the bat
talions were afterward extended 20 single
instead of double rank. and censured COM
handing oIncers for having saved an even
greater disaster. Near Spion kop he took
personal command of the York and Lam
caster and the South Lancashire regiments,
and ordered a futile bayonet charge AZ an
enemy nearly 1,500 yards away. This at
tracted such heavy fre that the two rce1-
ments sought shelter and declined to fol-
low their officers another yard. The Irish
brigade had TO be called to the rescue and
passed through the PROSTATE line.
mo one has any confidence in General
mart's fr leade Gsnssa, ana su, syer SoU omssr an 10
aware of his incompetence. Nearly half OF
his brigade has been killed and woundeds
neither the Highlanders nor any other bril-
gade has suffered In anything like the
same proportion. The I~nniskilling Fusil-
iers have only three of the officers wno
were with them three months ago still
serving. and can now. in all, muster only
brigade will cease to exist General Harris
talents ut him to be a drill e-crgeant-not q
leader OF men. No latitude Is given 70
even the most experienced commanders
He must always keep, as he says. a tight
grip on his brigade, which means oiscom-
fort and annoyance in peace and disaster In
war.
"As an example of the extremes to
| which this policy is carried I will give one
instance, among many. After the battle
of Spion kop the troops, who had Deen Tor
ten days under constant nre and enaureo
| every sort of hardship. were naturally
somewhat exhausted; moreover they had
had a severe night march. covering the
rear of the retreating army. General Bull
Ter decided that IL was necessary for them
to have some rest, and a amping ground
| was selected. The tents, however. werd
not pitched In the morning. and the men
lay out In the sun all day: In the AFTER
the camp might be within range OF the en-
emy's big guns, and decided 10 pitch camp
a mile further back. Instead OF pointing
out the grounds TO the commanding od1-
| GERS and directing them to move their bat
talions to the place he formed the four
regiments on a brigade parade. and after
| some time had been given up to covering
correctly an elaborate brigade maneuveF
began. The ground was broken and COW
cred with deep watercorrses. so that this
| dressing and distance was difficult 10 main
tain. Staff officers galloped from place to
place: the men and officers were abused.
| halted, moved TO the right, moved 10 tho
left. 1t was impossible to shut ones ears
to the muttered curses OF men worn out
with fatigue and want Of sleep at this use-
| less show, which might possibly have been
very edifying at Aldershot at a royal re-
view. but which, in actual warfare.
strained the much-needed strength of the
| soldiers. An hour and a half was occupied
i'm traversing a mile and a half of ground.
which could easily have been covered in
twenty minutes. In this way men were
harassed and worn out at a time when
they should have been recovering strength
| for future efforts. In this way the hos
pitfalls are filed with soldiers who have
| never been hit by a Boer bullet. but whose
constitutions have been sapped by unnec-
essary labors.
General Hart placed himself on a hill
with a telescope and a bugler. and ordered
the brigade 10 attack a position The
bugler sounded alternately Throughout the
1 day. Advance 'Doublequick and charge
/ need not say that this method of fighting
| resulted in terrible loss; 50 officers and 1.500
men is a terrible total for one brigade.
nearly 50 per cent. OF the whole. IL would
be impossible TO enumerate the vagaries
that daily occur, but, though the worst. L
| regret to say that General Hart Is not the
only brigadier general notorious for i'm
competency. At least two others were un-
fit to command, but the accidents of war
have removed one OF them. The divisional
commanders were no better. but war has
also made some changes here, and IL would
be premature TO judge their SUCCESSORS"