Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-02-09

The Slaughter of BrftiSh at the Tagela
River.

Inc SI0u8nter OI nFtth8n oh tnG Io8cA0
River.
From the London Mail.
The story of Gen. Harris repulse on the
left flank makes painful reading. In COM
mand of the dashing Irish Brigade. he adj
vanced. without incident. to the vicinity Of
the river bank, his regiments being the
Dublin Fusiliers, Ccnnaught Rangers. In
n1skillings and Borderers. When the COM
bined force was about 800 yards from the
river small body of Beers was observed
scurrying up one of the ridges as IL in
flight. and this prompted our men to quick
e: movements. The idea that the Beers
were fleeing was, however, soon dispelled,
for just as the British forward line reached
the river bank they were fairly riddled by
bullets at a distance, 1t was estimated. of
only 800 yards The men quickly stretched
themselves on the ground to gain the little
shelter 1T afforded and return the fire. But
what were they to fire at? There was no
one visible: the smokeless powder did not
betray whence had come the deadly fusil-
iade: and our t'bhoys'' were as defenseless
as If unarmed. They had their -ifles, but
could not use them with any degree of
success. To add to their peril. one of the
enemys big guns opened fire from new
position. and began to pump shells in
among them: but our two central Al naval
guns came to the rescue and silenced the
Boer piece. at a distance, it was said, of
1850 yards. Despite this, however, the
position of the infantry remained hopeless.
A bayonet charge was out of the question,
owing to the intervening river, and few
or the men who got into the stream were
drowned by coming in contact with skill
fully devised wire entanglements.
There was no equality in the contest,
and color sergeant of the Dublins, who
was tired of being "potted' at shouted to
lis section, Fix bayonets, men. and let's
make q name for ourseIves!" and sprang
faesf IN tvs 1),,t tI,i
DARING act brought a heavy fire on him, and
he fell. seriously wounded. into the arms
or one of his men. The end was now near
however. as the order for recall was al
ready speeding its way to the heroes, who
would have submitted to retain their hope
less position rather than recede q yard
without authority.
Throughout the fighting line there were
similar experiences. with but little varia-
ton, though elsewhere the losses were not
so great. Within range of the enemys con-
cealed rife fire there was perfect zone
of death. and our men were lured into that
zone before they were aware of 1t. The
seriousness of the position realized, they
did not know where to return the fire, and,
awaiting instructions, had to submit to be
made targets of.
At about 5 o'clock when the sun was
still high in the heavens, the Beers auda-
ciously crossed the Tueela, seized our guns
and took as prisoners small bodies of men
who had been compelled to seek shelter in
different parts of the field. One party was
commanded by Col. Bullock Of the ID De-
vons. who. as he declined to meekly sur
render. was knocked down with a rifle butt
by a Boer private. All our killed were
robbed of their clothes and belongings.
but the injured were not equally mo-
Tested. After lying under the blazing sun
for several hours, they were glad to ac-
cept drink of water which their captors
brought to them. and were not sorry when
shortly afterward our ambulance men ar
rived and were permitted to carry them off,
1t is inscrutabie to the lay mind how the
enemy were allowed to carry on their de-
predattonS and to remove the guns when
they were within range of our naval bat
terry. Surely the five hundred yards space
between the cover from which the enemy
emerged and the guns could have been pep
pered till dark, when our infantry could
have guarded the home-bringing of the men
and ordnance! Or, If this were not feasible
on account of the risk Of killing our wound
ed. why should not the naval guns have
engaged the artillery of the enemy while
a powerful line Of infantry lay out OF rifle
range, prepared to strike down any force
which advanced? 1t is well known the
Beers will not openly attack US; yet they
would have been compelled to do so to get
possession of the guns
The general result can be summed UP in
sentence. Our troops were called upon to
do an impossible task, and. though they be-
haved with the utmost hcroisrn, they were
repulsed. l attribute this unfortunate re-
suit to lack of reliable information as to
the strength and movements of the enemy.
Il was well known that they commanded
an almost impregnable position, but what
uses they had made of 1t or the number or
disposition of their forces were subjects of
pure conjecture Even now no one can
give any accurate idea of the Boer strength
beyond estimating that as it was distributed
over an area of eight miles, with no doubt
certain forces for reserves. 1t must have
reached at least ten thousand.
That they must have expended consider
able labor on their Notifications and in
uenchments is proved beyond a doubt and
that they could have carried on this work
during the last month without our being
aware OF its extent is certainly not credit
able to those who had-or should nave had
their attention riveted on the obtaining
of these details
Had accurate information been forthcom-
ing, Gen. Butler would never have done
anything 50 suicidal as to attack the posi-
ton fair in the face as he did. A few miles
west of Colenso the Tugeia could have
been crossed with little difficulty; and by
leaving a sufficient force to hold The Beers
on the position subsequently, attacked there
should have been comparatively little op-
position and before the Beers had time to
intrench themselves anew we could have
BUSTED them.
Tho Beers are now apparently convinced
that there will be no further direct at
tacks. and they are vigilantly patrolling the
1ugela to prevent surprise. The destruction
OF the road bridge by us Is another indica-
llol tldt a frontal attack Is not favored,
W hat the bridge was destroyed for 1t is
impossible to imagine. Surely Butler was
not afraid lest the enemy would cross it to
attack him. But whatever the reason fer
the act, the structure held out with re-
markable tenacity under the smell fire of
the naval guns. For over an hour forty
hVe pound shells were lodging all around
1t, until 1t appeared as If it had a charmed
life, and then, when the task of striking IT
was regarded as almost hopeless one os the
end spans was carried away, and the struc-
ture was rendered useless Cor traffic. lis
demolition must have cost close to f5OOO
The average Tommy Adkins views the
future phi!o5ophically. He regrets that his
cherished dream of partaking of his Christ
mas dinner in Pretoria has not material
lied, but he is not at all discouraged by
Fridays fight. If required. he would 60
through 1t all again, but he would dearly
Ike TO be able to see his opponents If
once the enemy allows our men a fair fight
they are quite confident that they will more
than wipe of the score now standing to
the BOer credit.
Owing TO the operation of the press CEN
sorship, the fact that Gen. Butler was
personally in command was not allowed to
he published until some days after the en-
gagement. The leadership was al first
attributed to Gen. Clery. and probably II
was to shield him from the doubtful honor