The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-03-05

ming 10 dawn upon England ana upon Eu-
rope at large that the struggle in south
Africa is marking a revolution IN the
methods Of military warfare no less rad
zeal than that which the Monitor Mer- imac
fight signalized a generation ago in naval
warfare.
A new military truism has been evolved
from the terrible experiences OF three Brit
ish armies during the past three months,
namely. that an entrenched fo-ce equipped
with modern small arms is invlneio.e
against any frontal attack made in the
open. When this proposition was first
made on behalf Of the armies OF Bul.er,
Gatacre, and Methuen. it was received
more as charitable excuse flon apollo
gists for British disasters than as a geuu-
inc military discovery.
There is no doubt that British generals
nearly all Of them, have been guilty Of
grave tactical bIunders. but there is no
doubt also that the science of war has
changed. Il is a change. moreover which
initiates against the favorite methods Of
British campaigning more than against
those Of any other country. II is a change
which robs war OF half its martial glory,
change which minlmizes valor and sub
stitutes the ccol. silent brainwork Of a
good chess player for the charge Of a light
brigade
Not Welcome Change.
il is not welcome change for officers
or men in this country. II does not re-
duce the hardships Of war; it increases its
drudgery and tedium and almost elimi-
mates its excitement and opportunity for
personal distinction. In a word. it will
make war and military life unpopular for
the rank and file. The ultimate effect will
probably be a distinct decline in the mar
tial spirit which is the indispensable main
stay OF all armies.
The birth. OF this new martial era is now
chronicied in all the letters coming from
the front which are based upon sound mill
tary judgment The event is recorded IN
every instance with evident disappoint-
ment for The writer's do not conceal their
regret that war has been stripped Of the
greater part Of its exhilaration and its in
dlvidual and collective heroism. But the
lesson has been forced home in deadly
fashion. The writer OF the letter from
which the following extract is taken does
not vet realize the full force Of the new
order Of things but his description OF the
modern conditions is instructive. He says.
We began by fighting in a hurry; We are
now fighting at leisure. Neither the gen
erals, the men nor the public at home had
formed an approximately correct estimate
OF the difficulties which had TO be over
come or OF the enemy We were to en-
counter The Boer fights with his head,
seldom with his muscles; our men fight
with their muscles, seldom with their
heads. You cannot get either the officers
or the men to understand that the first
duty Of a soldier is TO kill not to be killed.
They have all come out here determined
TO earn the Victoria Cross. or TO distinguish
themselves by displaying conspicuous brav-
cry in the field. Il is magnificent but il
is not war
4 sporting Expedition.
1T is little better than a very popular
sporting expedition on an immense scale.
You have no doubt, heard frequently Of
the zone Of fire. and have formed your
own opinion Of what those words signify.
] will describe the situation for your ben
eft Imagine that there is a range Of high
hills facing you some FIVE miles away from
where sou stand. Orders are issued to ad-
vance. Presently you see ahead a long
line of dust, tufts Of grass. and pebbles
raised by the multitude OF bullets. which
drops Of rain in a shower.
1t seems humanity impossible to cross
the line without being hit, and, even
should fortune enable you TO do so uu
harmed a mile or two still separates you
from the enemy. That zone OF fire Is the
only obstacle which until now has stag
Eered our men. and il is not at all to their
discredit that it should. They occasionally
hesitate 10 make the rush through. II ls
like running through a shower OF lead bull
let's for some twenty yards. and trusting to
luck that no drop shall touch you.
The bravest and the least brave are all
on the same level on such an occasion. and
IL is indeseribably dishearteuing when you
have undergone the ordeal without mis-
hap 10 find not only that the enemy is still
very far from YOU, but that further zones
Of FIRE have 10 be crossed. that eventually
crack shots take direct aim at you, and
that In the end the Beers retire before you
can get 10 close quarters with them and
then take up another position which has
been prepared for such an emergency.
To make matters worse. il all looks so
easy before the engagement begins. ] can
not believe that numbers VIII make much
difference in our favor: the more men you
send to the front the more bullets will
have human billets. The brain will have
TO win the battles You who are at home
must not blame the generals. they are
lighting under conditions which are alto
gether new. Here we do not dislike The
Beers. we have learned TO respect their
courage and it anuoys us 10 read in the
English papers that they are barbariaus.
who strip and ill-treat the wounded
Julian RaIph's Comments.
The same lesson OF change in the whole
game OF war has been collected by Julian
Ralph for the Daily Nail" from the best
military observers Of Lord Methuen's cam
paign. Mr.. Ralph writes;
IT is easy enough for the world TO cry
Halt IN its interest in us. JUST as The
Beers cried Halt in our progress when
we reached Magersfontein, bat the BoeT
command 20 us to Halt may yet be con
sidered by military scientists everywhere
as an order given 10 all armed nations 20
stop and unlearn what they have known OF
darlington Nsgersfonteiu seems likely tC
be the end OF the chapter Of var as II was
pracuced by the Wellingtous. Nolseleys
Won MollSes. and Grants
For frontal attack the old military
manuals declared that the attacking force
must be three times that Of the defending
force Today, with the new weapons 10 IS
said that ten men must attack one but ]
believe Il is Impossible 10 set the modern
proportion correctly. since 10 an intents
and purposes. Magersfontein battlefield
with its series Of three trenches extending
twenty-five miles. Is as impregnahle 10
infantry az Cronstadt is TO attack By the
torpedo boats. Not being military man
I viii not pretend 10 be able to set down
the many changes that must De made ia
COM Inc s-nrfara "a cfrfF the nov. condition