The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-03-05

zeal than that which the Monitor Mer imac
fight signalized a generation ago in naval
warfare.
new military truism has been evolved
from the terrible experiences OF three Brit
ish armies during the past three months,
namely, that an entrenched fo:ce equipped
with modern small arms is invincible
against any frontal attack made in the
open. When this propcs ton was first
made on behalf Of the armies of Butler,
Gatacre, and Methuen. it was received
more as a charitable excuse fIom apollo
gists for British disasters than as a genu-
inc military discovery.
There is no doubt that British generals,
nearly all of them, have been guilty of
grave tactical bIunders, but there is no
doubt also that the science of war has
changed. II is a change, moreover, which
initiates against the favorite methods of
British campaigning more than against
those of any other country. 1t is change
which robs war OF half its martial glory,
a change which minimizes valor and sub
stitutes the cool, silent brainwork of a
good chess player for the charge OF light
brigade.
Not Welcome Change.
II is not welcome change for officers
or men in this country. 1t does not re-
duce the hardships of war; it increases its
drudgery and tedium and almost elimi-
mates its excitement and opportunity for
personal distinction. In a word. it will
make war and military life unpopular for
the rank and file. The ultimate effect will
probably be a distinct decline in the mar
tial spirit which is the indispensable main
stay of all armies.
The birth of this new martial era is now
chronicled in all the letters coming from
the front which are based upon sound mill
tary judgment. The event is recorded in
every instance with evident disappoint-
ment, for the writer's do not conceal their
regret that war has been stripped of the
greater part of its exhiIaration and its in
dividual and collective heroism. But the
lesson has been forced home in deadly
fashion. The writer of the letter from |
which the following extract is taken does |
not yet realize the full force of the new |
order of things, but his description of the |
modern conditions is instructive. He says: |
I'VE began by fighting in a hurry; we are |
now fighting at leisure. Neither the gen.
erals, the men, nor the public at home had |
estimate
of the difficulties which had to be over
come or of the enemy we were to en-
counter. The Boer fights with his head.
seldom with his muscles; our men fight |
with their muscles, seldom with their |
heads. You cannot get either the officers |
or the men to understand that the first
duty of a soldier is TO kill, not to be killed.
They have all come out here determined |
TO earn the Victoria Cross, or TO distinguish |
themselves by displaying conspicuous brav-
cry in the field. 1t is magnificent, but it
is not war.
Sporting Expedition.
1T is little better than a very popular
sporting expedition on an immense scale.
You have, no doubt heard frequently of
the zone of fire. and have formed your
'wn opinion of what those words signify.
will describe the situation for your ben
fit. Imagine that there is a range of high
ILLS facing you some five miles away from
where you stand. Orders are issued to ad-
rance. Presently you see ahead long
Inc OF dust, tufts of grass, and pebbles
'aised by the multitude of bullets, which
all almost as close TO each other as do
irops of rain in a shower.
1t seems humanity impossible to cross
he line without being hit, and even
should fortune enable you to do SO un-
mile or two still separates you
rom the enemy. That zone of fire is the
'nly obstacle which until now has stag
yered our men. and il is not at all TO their
iiscredit that it should. They occasionally
hesitate 10 make the rush through 1t is
ike running through shower of lead bull
cts for some twenty yards, and trusting to
uck that no drop shall touch you.
The bravest and the least brave are all |
N the same level on such an occasion and
t is indeseribably disheartening when you
lave undergone the ordeal without mis-
Jap TO find not only that the enemy is still
'ery far from you, but that further zones
u fire have 10 be crossed, that eventually
rack shots take direct aim at you, AMI
hat in the end the Beers retire before you
an get TO close quarters with them, and |
hen take up another position which has
een prepared for such an emergency.
To make matters worse, il all looks SO I
asy before the engagement begins. / can
ot believe that numbers will make much
Inference in our favor; the more men you
end TO the front the more bullets will
ave human billets. The brain will have
o win the battles. You who are at home
must not blame the generals they are
Ightng under conditions which are alto
either new. Here We do not dislike the
'oers, we have learned to respect their
English papers that they are barbarians
Who strip and ill-treat the wounded"
Julian RaIph;s Comments.
The same lesson OF change in the whole
anne OF war has been collected by Julian
Ralph for the Daily Mall from the best
military observers OF Lord Methuen's cam
align. MIR Ralph writes:
1t is easy enough for the world to cry
Haiti in its interest in us just as the
Ioers cried Halt in our progress when
re reached Magersfontein, but the Boer
ommand to US to Halt may yet be con-
idered by military scientists everywhere :
s an order given TO all armed nations TO ,
top and unlearn what they have known of
arlington Magersfontein seems likely &c
e the end Of the chapter of war as 1t was :
raeticed by the Wellingtons Wolseleys, ;
on Moltlies. and Grants. :
For frontal attack the old military
manuals declared that the attacking force
must be three times that of the defending :
orce. Today, with the new weapons, it is :
aid that ten men must attack one, but
elieve II is impossible to set the modern :
proportion correctly, since. to all intents
nd purposes, Magersfontein battlefield.
Nth its series of three trenches extending !,
twenty-five miles, is as impregnabIe TO
Infantry as Cronstadt is to attack by the ,
orpedo boats Not being military man. :
Will not preteEd to be able to set down !,
he many changes that must be made in .
oming warfare TO suit the new conditions !
y which We are confronted. i
Il can only echo some part OF what I i
ave heard from those who are rejecting o
n our experience in this war. do not
eliefe that even these students fully f
rasp the situation yet Even as the Beers :
ave shown that they have beep learning =,