The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1900-08-28
CAMPAIGN Is NOW on
Continued From Fir.. o..

Continued From First Page.
| that history, but an outline 90 ~ u4
important and determining circumstances
will suffice as q basis Of Judgement f'--oe'
Fortunately, it is possible re diIn y.
the prominent features from leeS iIor6r
tant and merely incidentai oco'r. ntIpos-
1t is indeed remarkable to what az az.
tent Jugglery of words is-nada 70 a. a. s,,h
stantial service in the present Re e
| programme. For example in Danam ri6olIA
| 1897, the president, referring 70 ar go
gestion Of possible seizure of Cuba
aggression" but when he came aftar-
wards to the execution of sreciselv g s,,ch
a policy against the Philippine Islands
ne necidred II IN ms Proclamation to be
Constitution Of the United States
FORBIDS SLAVERY UNDER oITR
FLAG,
| but President Schurman, Of tho phNin-
pine commission, when called upon.to de-
reno the act OF thefpresident In negoti-
atlng a treaty with tres sultan of SaIu.
whereby slavery is recognized and pro
| tected, thought he avoided the dIfficultv
presented by the apparent conflict be-
4 tween the presidents treaty and the Con
sutuuon OF the United States by saving
That the slavery complained of in the
SuIa islands was really not slavery at
bondage"
No; the Filipinos were our allies. Not
| only do the facts prove this but we re
not entirely without official recognition
OF the relation. Among the experts that
| gave testimony before our peace commits
sion at Paris, pending the negotiation of
the treaty which closed the war with
| Spain, was Commander r. B. bradford
| who has been in the naval service of the
| United States for nearly forty years SEN
| ator Frye, member of the commission.
asked asked the witness the following question:
Suppose the United States, in the prog
ress of the war, found the leader of TIE
present Philippine rebellion an exile from
MS country in Hong Kong and sent for
him and brought him to the islands in
! an American ship, and then furnished
| 1900 or 5000 stands of arms and allowed
MIN TO purchase as many more stands of
arms in Hong Kong, and accepted his
aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of
nation, in the eyes of the world would
we appear to be to surrender Agunaldo
ana MS insurgents to Spain a. to. be dealt
! Bradford answered; I'VE become respon-
| sible for everything he has done. He is
| our ally, and we are bound to protect
him. 1t will be the judgment of history.
| and 1T ought to be the Judgment of every
! patriotic, thoughtful American citizen,
! that if the FHipinos were so much our
| allies that we could not in honor turn
! Spain, they were also our allies suffi-
| GENTLY to be protected against the asser-
| ton upon our part of the very claim to
| govern them against their will and with
| out their consent, which was asserted by
Spain, and which we assisted them to re-
| sist.
Gen. Charles A King of Milwaukee,
shortly after his return home from the
| Philippines made the following state
ment: '"The Americans here do not real
lie the truth that n1ne-tenths of the peo-
pie in the Philippines can read and
write. You see the people are all Catho-
| lies and their children are educated in
the parochial schools. They have a good
common school education, There is no
culture eXCeD1inR among the higher
| classes, of course, but there is fair edu-
cation everywhere, and many people have
ability. The men in power whom | have
met are gentlemen, many OF them scholars,
educated abroad accomplished in man
ners, perfect in courtesy. broad-minded
and ripe in Judgment. There is no rea-
not have the self-goVernrnent which they
so passiona tely desire, so far as their in
diyidual ability to carry it on goes
Admiral Dewey himself in letter
dated Aug 20. 1S99 to. the peace commits
sioneFs in Paris, said In a telegram
sent to the department on June %, I ex-
| pressed the opinion that these people
are far superior in their intelligence and
more
CAPABLE OF SELF GOVERNMENT
than the natIvns Of uba. and am fa-
miHar with both races Further inter-
course with them has confirmed me III
| this opinion.
| 1t is Impossible to determine the exact
| time at which the authorities at Wash
! ington decided to take forcible possession
! of the Philippine Islands. It is clear that
Rod after the battle of Manila bay had
no knowledge of such an intention. Gen.
| Anderson, who took command OF our
| land forces in the islands about the first
of July, 1895, says in an article in the
! North American Review for February,
! 1900: Il was the first to tell Admiral
Dewey that there was any disposition
| on the part of the American people to
| hold the Philippines if they were cap
tured. There will be but little dissent
from the proposition that If he came to
| obvious considerations of justice and
| fairness required that the Filipinos be
speedily acquainted with it. Yet they
were permitted to indulge all the illusion
! of hope from our supposed friendliness
4 to their plans of independence with
! which their proclamations had made us
| familiar. ConcealiHg in his mind the
design of his government to seize the
! Islands and subjugate their people wncn
| the convenient opportunity should ar
rive, Gen. Anderson could thus address
| Aguinaldo in his letter of July l. 1893:
General: l. have the honor to inform
| you that the United States of America,
whose land forces I have the honor to
| command in this vicinity, being at war
| sympathy and most friendly sentiments
for the native people of the Philippine
! islands. For these reasons l desire to
have the most anieable relations with
| you, and to have you and your people CO.
operate with us in the military operations
against the Spanish forces"
| Under the circumstances what possible
meaning could this language from our
| commanding general have. except that
which the eonfding and grateful Fiji
| pinos at once put upon It? They were
| fighting for independence They had pro-
| claimed their object to the ears of the
world We knew it. They knew that
we knew it.
1t was not long before feeling Of re-
| CT inf ORC nm hptWppn the American
and Filipino commanders. Gradually
| their. communica tons became less fire.
| quent, more formal and not SO cordial as
| at first. IT would appear as If prepara-
| lions were making for the break which
our designs must sooner or later pro-
| duce. Upon the arrival of Gen. Merritt,
| who succeeded Gen. Anderson as com
| handing officer, the Fflipinos were made
! Familiar intercourse was discouraged
! Requests became more ike commands.
| Reinforcements continued to be landed In
| places suitable to our convenience with
/ out paying much respect to the re11on-
strances of the insurgent government. AS
the time approached for the simulated
| attack on the city of Manila, the Fill
pinos were maneuvred out or the
| trenches they had held so long and their
places were taken by American soldiers.
| When the city capitulated 1t was the IN
tention to deprive not only Aguinaldo,
but his troops, of all participation In the
in the honor of oecupying ;, It.
Yet at the loss of many lives
the Filipinos took several of the
suburbs, and, despite our arrangements
| entered the CITY proper. After the fall
| of Manila the Filipinos were compelled to
| retire from the city and TO occupy lines
| constantly more and more remote
pine archipelago, and to subdue. it II
necessary by force of arms, was bluntly