Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1900-09-10
independence To such. let me repeat the
facts.
NO RECOGNITION.

he replied: Have acted according to
spirit of departments instruction from
the beginning, and l q entered into no
alliance with the insurgents, or with any
faction. This squadron can reduce the
defenses of Manila at any moment. but 1t
Is considered useless until the arrival of
sufficient United States forces to retain
possession"
In the report Of the first Philippine
commission submitted Nov. 2. 1899, one
kind was entered into with Aguinaldo,
nor was any promise of independence
made to him at any time"
Gen. Merritt arrived in the Philippines
IN July, 1898. n a dispatch from Ad-
miral Dewey said: Merritt arrived yes
terday. Situation critical at Manila.
Spanish may surrender at moment.
Merritt's most difficult problem will be
how to e with the insurgents under
Aguinaldo. who have become aggressive
and even threatening toward our army
Here is revealed the spirit Of the in
the protocol was signed while we were
still engaged In active var with Spain.
Even then the insurgents were threaten
ing our army. On August IS, Manila was
captured, and Of this n subsequent
events the Philippine commission says:
WANTED ARMS AND PRISONERS.
when Manila was taken on August Is,
the Filipinos took no part in the at
tack. but came forward with a view to
looting the city, and were only prevented
from doing so by our soldiers preventing
them from entering. Aguinaldo claimed
that he had the right to occupy the city;
he demanded of Gen. Merritt the palace
of Malacanan for himself, and the ces-
sion of all the churches of Manila, also
that a part of the money taken from the
Spaniards as spoils of war, hould be
given up, and above all that he should
be given the arms of the Spanish prison.
ers All these demands were refused"
Generals Merritt. Greene n Ander-
son. who were in command at the be-
ginning of our occupation, and until the
surrender Of Manila, state that there was
no alliance with the insurgents, and no
promise to them of independence. On
August Z, 1898, Gen Merritt was in
structed that there nus be no joint oc-
cupatlon OF Manila with the insurgents.
Gen. Anderson, under date of February
10. 1900. says that he was present at the
interview between Admiral Dewey and
the insurgent leader. and that in this in
terview Admira! Dewey made no prom
Use whatever. He adds: HE. Aguin-
aldo, asked me If my government was
going to recognize his government I
answered that I was there simply in a
military capacity. that I could not ac-
knowledge his government, because I
a no authority to do So"
WHAT WOULD OUR OPPONENTS
DO?
Would not u adversaries have sent
DeWey's fleet to Manila to capture and
dispatching it there, would they have
it after the destruction of the
Spanish fleet, and if the latter, whittier
would they have desired to sail? Where
could it have gone? What port in the
orient was opened to It? Do our adver-
60 rios rnn1ornn tho nvroI;%son ,,~l~r 49,
command of Gen. Merritt to strengthen
Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in
our triumph over Spain, with which ma
ton we were at ar? Was it not our
high duty to strike Spain at every vul-
nera BILE point, with which the war might
be successfully ended at the earliest pos
siole moment? And was it not our duty
to protect the lives and property who
came IN our control by the fortunes of
war? Could we have come away at any
time Nav l, 1898, and the con-
cluslon of peace. without a stain Upon our
good name; could we have com away
without dishonor at n time after the
ratification of the treaty by the Senate
OF the United States? There has been
no time since the destruction of the enc
left the Philippines?. After the treaty of
a was ratified, no power but con-
gress could surrender our sovereignty or
ALLEVIATE a foot of the territory thus ac-
CURED. The congress has not seen fit to
DO the latter. and the president has no
authority to do either, if he had been so
inclined, which he was not So long as
the sovereignty remains in us, it is the
duty of the executive, whoever he NAV
be, to uphold the sovereignty, and if it
pc attacked. to suppress it's assailants,
Would our political adversaries do less?
INSURGENTS WOULD NOT WAIT.
1t has been asserted that there would
nave been no fighting in the Philippines
II congress had declared it's purpose to
gave independence to the Tagal insur-
gnts. The insurgents did not wait for
the action of congress-; they assumed the
OFFENSIVE, they opened fire on our army.
Inose who asserted our responsibility
for the beginning of the conflict, forgot
that the treaty was being ratified by
congress, and while the Bacon resolution
was under discussion in February, 1899,
the insurgents attacked the American
army after being previously advised
that the American forces were under
orders not to open fire upon them except
IN defense. The papers found in the re-
cently captured archives of the insur-
gents demonstrate that his attack had
been carefully planned for weeks before
1t occurred. Their unprovoked assault
upon our soldiers at a time when the
senate was celebrating upon the treaty
shows that no action on our part except
the surrender and abandonment would
have prevented the fighting, and leave
no doubt in fair minds where the re-
sponsibility rests for the shedding of
american blood.
With all the exaggerated phrase-mak-
ing of this electoral contest. we are in
danger OF being diverted from the real
contention.
OUR RESPONSIBILITY COME WITH
Z TREATY.
We are in agreement with all of thoso
who supported the war WITS cpain, and
also with those who counselled the rat
idcation of the treaty of peace. Upon
these two great essentials there can be
no issue, and out of these came all of
our responsibilities. If others would