Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1900-02-13
CONTROL OF NORTH PACIFIC
Americans Should Act With This
Ed in View.
Construction Of Nicaragua Canal Az Important
Factor Of The Plan President Of
Naval Var College Talks.

New York, IAN. 29.--"COmmand If
the sea on our North Pacific coast ana
tie wafer, of the western basin of the
| North Pacific should be in our hands
in peace and war time. This can only
be effected by readiness of a proper and
| sufficient naval force, either on the
spot or to be furnished from the At
lantic through an untrammeled canal.
III addition to this, and ready for com
bining, should be the available forces
normally attached to the Philippines
and the waters about China, Japan and
Korea. In other words, the Pacific
ocean from Samoa northward should
be within our control"
These observations are made by Cap
tain c. II. Stockton, president of the
Naval War College, in an article in the
proceedings Of the Naval Institute deal
ing with the commercial, naval and po-
litical conditions of an inter-oceanic
canal across the Central American
isthmus. Referring to the Clayton Bull
wer treaty, Captain Stockton says:
1T Is safe to say that IL is practically
the opinion of all Americans that this
treaty should either be abrogated or
very materially modified.
The change of conditions since the
signing of this treaty, due to our West
Indian acquisitions, and more especial
~ to the great developments of on
Pacific coast and territory. should
cause Great Britain to see the desirah-
ility. If not the necessity of this action.
The proposition for canal cxclu-
sively owned and controlled by the
United States in war and peace means
the direct or indirect purchase or con-
struction of the canal by the Govern
ment of the United States. In time of
war it would mean navy of suficient
size and strength to maintain the canal
open against an exterior attack from
any power or alliance of powers with
the force they can spare from Euro
pean waters.
The first thing that presents itself
in connection with the canal ana the
naval profession is the necessity for a
strong naval force for the United
States. separated, us the canal and
its immediate adjacent territory Ia.
from the territory of the United States
by Mexico, the approaches to the canal
require naval protection in order to
give us the status here that Great Brit.
ain enjoys at Suez. Nothing could
conduce more to the safety and pro.
lection of these canals and the bcnch-
cent flow of commerce therein than tho
control of the SueZ canal by Great
Britain and the control of the Amcli-
can canal by the United States.
1T has been said that the changes
forced upon us by the canal would be
so great that 1t would be better for us
If no canal were to be built. 90 not
believe II to be so, but Ii does not mat
ter: the canal is inevitable aud its
eventual opening is but question OF
time. The competition of great ship
canal, aided to greater or less degree
by us, will cause still greatrr re
moval from our policy of isolation
from the affairs of the great powers of
the world. The great commerce com
ing from European maritime countries.
passing on its way to and from the
canal near our gulf territory ana West
Indian possessions, will reveal to Eu-
"opean countries the importance Ut
heir West Indian colonies. II will
BRING these colonies in even closer re-
atoms to us than they have been
irawn of late years, creating and re-
living through them many questions |
n which we will have either joint or
ntagonistic interests with their home |
Governments"
In connection with the construction |
II the canal Captain Stockton reviews
he naval situation In the Pacific.
"A predominance. both maritime and
avail in the North Pacific ocean," he
eclares. us an essential matter for
he United States in regard to the in
er-oceanic canal. AS the want OF such
avail predominance in the Caribbean
'ould deny us access to the canal on
hat side in war time, so similar
'ant of predominance in the Pacific
Ill prevent our ships gaining access
D the canal from those waters. The
maritime predominance in the North
acific, though contested, is still ours.
nd to this should be added the naval
redominance, which, II 1t does not
recede the maritime predominance,
iould at least accompany IT,"