The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1900-03-11

formulated hitherto, although there has
been some vague suspicion OF the cause
OF tho complete abandonment Of Gen.
BuLLER's original plan OF campaign. which
was to relieve Gen. WHITE In Natal from
pressure and Kimberley from siege, not
directly, but Indirectly, through a prompt
advance on Bloemfontein and. through tho
Orange Fl e State. on Pretoria. Had such
n movement been carried out, no one can
doubt that the Bocr Commands ~bcsleging
Kimberley would have been recalled, and
that the Boer forces In Natal would have
been signally reduced. II not entirely with
drawn. When Gen. BULLEB landed at Cape
Town, however, he found that WHITE, In
stead OF taking up a defensive position
south OF the Tugela River. was shut up in
L%adysmith, where a vast quantity OF NUM-
tions OF war had been collected. and
that there was, practically. nothing to
prevent the Boer invaders from sweeping
the small British force at Maritzburg into
the sea. Hence, for a time, he was COM
PEELED to send every available battalion and
battery as 1t reached Cape Town to Durham.
thus diverting the stream Of reGnforcements
from the projected line OF advance on
Bloemfontein. He was still firm on one
point, however, namely, that the defence
OF Mafeking and Kimberley must be left TO
the local troops. and a division under Gen.
METHUEN was assembled at De Aar, which
was intended to advance to the Orange
River at Norvals Pont. Up to this time.
tharafnrn tha nriuipal ppny.mapt aDaIpat
Bloemfontein and Pretoria had not becn
abandoned. but simply delayed until sufl-
cient troops should be received from England
to prosecute It without weakening the force
required for the relief Of Ladysmith.
1t was, IL seems, about the middle OF
November that a messenger from kimber-
ley succeeded in evading the Boer scouts,
and brought dispatches for the British
military authorities, and also for the Gov
ernor of Cape Colony and other high off,
Gals. According to the author ofthe article
in the North American Rerieic, the military
chief in Kimberley reported that town to
DO capable Of self-defence. but Mr.. CECIL
RHODES demanded the immediate despatch
II a relief column to Kimberley before the
'lu VI tuc ulbIllu' iu biuNtIc vac
brought to bear by RHODES 1t Is impossible
at this time to say, but 1t Is a fact that
BUTLER, despite his notorious opposition
to the despatch OF any force for the reliefof
Kimberley, now suddenly ordered METHU-
EMS division to advance TO that town,
thus renounclng the original plan OF opera
lions fox an indefinite period. As a
..oS - Nv, = ypto ,NraiStapt pIia,,i,p
to this diversion Of the nucleus Of his
fighting force from tho true line OF attack,
a British Oflcer" cites the orders given TO
METHUEN, which were TO return at once,
after relieving Kimberley, to De Aar, and
thus regain his position on the general line
Of advance into the Orange Free State.
The result Of this divergence OF British
troops to a remote and unimportant part OF
the theatre Of wal was hat MEIHUEN en-
countered a severe defeat when fully twenty
miles short OF his goal, while the remaining
forces under Gen. GATACgE and Gen.
FRENCH In the north OF the Cape Colony,
were scarcely able to keep the invading
Beers in check.
Such are the grounds on which "A
British Officer" attributes the deadlock
which long prevailed in South Africa to
RHopEs's unwarrantable interference with
the strategic plans OF the British COM
mander, resulting In the misdirectlon
OF MErHUEN's division and the consequent
d~isintegration of the British forces at a criti-
cal conjuncture. 1t is true that, since Field
Marshal RoBERTs's arrival, the consequences
Of earlier mistakes have been to some
extent retrieved. but it is, nevertheless,
important to fix the responsibility for Il
change in the scheme OF campaign which
for some three months exposed the British
arms to humiliation and disaster.