The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-01-29
MONDAY. JANUARY %, 1900.
RuIIer,s Waterloo.

aStcr and retreat is open to the criticism
that il is neither complete nor entirely
frank. We must remember that it was
probably constructed under conditions ca
blcd from London. and after the War Of
fee had all the material facts in its pos
session. There is too much Of information
vital TO any understanding of the situation
omitted from the despatch to impress the
military reader at least with the idea that
the full extent of the reverse has yet been
narrated. Butler reports that Warren's
division has been Withdrawn from the left,
crossing richards Drift without the loss
81 man or a pound of stores. He also
sa-s that he had decided on the morning
II ne 25th 10 move the forces" south of
the Tugela River. As yet we are in the
dark as 70 what may have happened to
DundOnald and Clery on Warren's left at
Acton Homes, or to LyttIeton at Potgie-
ter's Drift The latter was in action on
Wednesday. and two hundred and odd cas-
ualies have been reported from his bril-
Sade. II would. therefore, appear proba-
BILE that unsuccessful fighting at points
other than Warren's front has been de-
terminng factor in the retreat. A late
dispatch today justifes the fear that Dun
donald and Clery have been cut of
General Buffers remarks on the Spion
koP disaster are not particularly satisfac-
tory and are not calculated 70 enhance his
own or General Warren's military rcputa.
lion. He states that the perimeter of Spion
Hop was too large to hold. and that the
water supply on the mountain which War,
zen bad been given to understand was am
pie. proved TO be deficient in this extra,
ordinary dry season" Neither Of these
generals can wei be held cxcusabie for lack
OF definite knowledge on the points named
i'm view OF the conditions under which the
assault on Spion Hop was recommended by
Warren and approved by his superior.
The attempt CALAMITY made By Warren
20 break the Boer front on the line Of low
kopics northwest Of SpiOu Kop. support
ed by o GaBking movement OF Dundonald
and Clery by Acton Homes. had failed. as
IL is said. for want Of sufficient force TO
extend the British line so far around the
Boer right, operating from the river base
Warren concluded that he could not crush
JOUbert's extreme right by thanking. in the
circumstance. That being assumed as
correct view the only alternatives were
an attack in front TO secure a position
which would command and break the Boer
line. as 90 Spion KO3. or retreat The
former was chosen. and perhaps in prin-
ciplc properly so; but. since it was the last
card in the British hand in the long and
well-c0nceived turning movement against
Jouberts right 10 should not have been
played without the most careful consider
alton. Retreat might have been mortify-
inr. but il would not have been as much
so as retreat after rePulse and a terrible
slaughter. which the result showed to be
utterly useless.
In Buffers report. as given out by TIE
War Office the name Of the officer VINO
succeeded to command on the summit OF
Spion Fop after Brigadler General Wood
ga-e was wounded. is Withheld. As likely
As not he viii be made a scapegoat in TIE
matter. though it is possible enough that
he was greatly 10 blame for ordering the
abandonment OF the position. Neyer,he-
less. j. is quite the habit to place the
Jaat can be done, and, whatever tho Brit
ish military authorities may think or dc IN
The premises. history viii hardly acuuit
either Butler or Warren I'm this instance
Both appear to have been at fault in over
looking precautionary measures which any
American field officer would have consid-
cred mandatory quite as matter OF
course. Their preliminary movements
while, apparently. tactically correct. were
accomplished with ponderous deliberation.
and DC not appear to have resulted in
useful knowledge OF the Beers positions.
dispositions, or emplacemcnts. in spite &C.
ali the reported scouting Of Dundonald and
slirmishiug of Clery What really seems
10 have happened was that failure to act
quickly and dccisively on Joubert's extreme
right. and in force. gave him time 10
thoroughly cntrench, and, with artillery
brought up from Peters Station. to cover
his exposed flank, and make it impregna-
BE 60 attack by any force at Buffers
disposal.
So far We are left in the dark as TO
whether Butler has formed a new line
from ZuuckIes. holding Potgieter's Drift
Mount Alice, and zwarls Kop. and Spring
field or is falling back to his old Cheveley-
Weenen line. In either case. he is proba-
bly, engaged again and is fighting a retir
ing battle. An ominous feature of the
situation as affecting the defeated British
army is contained in a cablegram which
reached here Two hours ago. and which
states that in the lighting on Wednesday
the ammunition section Of the infantry
gave out This may mean that the trans
port service was dllatory. or it may raea,
something worse.
Judging from the reports. the fate OF La
dysmith is scaled by this last disaster to
the relieving column. Sir George White by
this time must be nearly out Of ammuni-
lion, and his command greatly weakened
by exposure. fatigue, disease. and losses.
The defeat Of Butler will in a few DAYS
place Joubert in a position to deliver an
other assault on the town. and the chances
are thar rather than expose his gallant