The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-06-03

battle was directed by Timour in person.
The chief object in all these evolutions
was to break the eneuy's line and through
the gap thus created TO attack In hank
by an obliQue movement that part or the
enemy's troops who at the same time were
engaged in front The chief tactical evo-
luton was to turn one flank after an
other of the hostile divisions without dis
uniting the turning forces from the main
body OF Tartars.
The second movement OF the battle OF
Angora consisted Of the method OF at
tack thus described. So successfully were
all these matters OF detail executed that
about noon Timour retired to q superb
pavilion erected for him in the rear OF
hts army and sought TO while away the
hours which must elapse before his VIC
tory was complete in playing at chess
with his mobiles.
Devotees Of the royal game may be In
terested 10 know that the ordinary game
OF chess was not considered by Timour
worthy OF his gigantic intellect. In conse-
quence, he himself enlarged the scope and
difficulties of chess by constructing
board Of 14 squares and by augmenting
the chessmen TO forty-eight pieces This
new form of the game. in order to dis
tinguish II from that ordinarily played.
Timour designated as Great Chess" and
II was with this game that he amused
himself for several hours, while his lieu
tenants we're conducting the Tartar army
to victory
All through the day Of Angora II seems
clear that the Turkish Emperor Bajazet
displayed the qualities OF soldier and a
great captain. His defeat seems 10 have
been due TO the fact that his army, as an
army, was not competent TO contend with
the Tartar troops
His initial plan Of attack. and there Is
no doubt that he had a plan of this kind,
seems to have been so badly executed
that no impression Is left as to what was
his original idea for attacking the position
of Timour. 1t further seems that so flu
tile were the efforts of his troops that
the Tartars had little difficulty. not only
in repelling the assault of the Turks.
hut also themselves assumed with ease
a systematic and decisive attack. Before
this attack Il appears that the Turkish
rank and file showed symptoms OF that
decentralization consequent upon the as
semblng together of largs masses of i'm
properly disciplined troops. There is no
reason to doubt the loyalty OF the Turkish
troops or of the Turkish commanders. al
though treason Is insinuated on their part
by many historians, who prefer 10 de-
fame the Turk rather than to give glory
to the military talents and the military
system of an Asiatic barbarian.
1t In quite clear that Timour's choice
OF position in the open field, supplemented
by the skill Of his officers aria the disci-
pline and velor OF his troops. was a propo-
sition which the army of Bajazet was not
justified in attempting. It would seem that
tho grand mistake made by Bajazet and
the mistake which caused the loss of the
battle was his attempt to combat in the
open field against an army superior to his
own In number va;or and skill.
In the early afternoon the victory prac-
tically was decided Tho Turkish line OF
battle was broken in many places and the
Turkish troops attacked in front and as
sailed obliquely in flank were greatly de-
moralized. As is common in such immense
masses this demoralzatior spread rapidly.
AS the result of this the Turkish chiefs be-
gan to forsake the royal standard and to
retire from the field in all directions. Baja-
zet's own son. Soliman, heir to the throne.
partook OF the common panic and fed
from the field. followed by his troops A
large body OF Tartars. who years before
were oppressed by Timour. and had taken
refuge with the Ottomans. passed over TO
the Tartar lines and submitted to the great
mogul. Finally the rout of the Turkish
army became indescribable, and the VIC
torious Tartars pursued until the going
down Of the sun vast hordes OF fleeing men
intent only on escaping their enemies.