The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1900-05-02
PrshIhltisn 10 Stituh an Urwanautsd In.
vislen Of individual Liberty
THAT IS GUARANTEED EVERY CITIZEN.
The Court Does MOI, However, Apprms Of Inc
Trading Stamp Business. Nor Does Il Decide
That General Assembly Cannot ProhhnIi.

va. Benjamin Dalton. decides that
chapter Coz OF the public laws, known
as the law to prohibit the use of trad
ing stamps. declares the act not a valid
exercise OF the police power. The
court does not therefore deem IT neces-
sary to say whether the act is OBJ
noxious to the l4th amendment of the
constitution OF the United States as
being class legislation. Judge Tilling-
hast writes the lengthy opinion OF the
court In the case.
Dalton on the 18th day OF November.
1889. was arraigned before the dis
trict upon complaint and warrant
charging that on the 18th day of Oc-
tober, 1899. with force and arms Ben
tamin Dalton Of Johnston did sell 10
one Frederick w. Perkins certain ar
ticles Of merchandise. To wit: Three
there give and distribute TO said Fred
erick w. Perkins three stamps COM
monty called trading stamps, which
said stamps did then and there entitle
the said Frederick w. Perkins 10 de-
mand and receive certain articles of
merchandise from Sperry a. Hutchin-
son at their store. said Sperry & Hut
vender. of said three pieces of tobacco.
The defendant hled motion 10 quash
the complaint because the act referred
10 as the trading stamp act was un-
constitutional, as being class legislation
as the use OF the cash trading stamps
were excluded from the operation of
the law and because the law referred
to was In conflict with article 1, sec.
10 OF the constitution OF the state of
Rhode Island. This motion was over
ruled by the court in Johnston De-
fendant pleaded not guilty and the case
was certified to the appellate court up
on the question OF the constitutionality
OF the law prohibiting the use OF
STAMPS.
question IN sustainable as a valid ex-
ercise OF the police power OF the state,
and also. that the constitution OF the
United states does not limit the state
In the exercise OF such a power.
THE OPINION.
Judge Tillinghast in the opinion saws:
ut would be presumptuous for any
court to attempt 10 formulate an exact
definition OF the law The Police Pow
er of the State. Legal definitions do
not sum themselves up In single sem
tences. They are. and of necessity must
be, more or less general and elastic,
I'm order that the courts may apply
them to the infinite variety OF circum-
stances which may arise i'm the re-
lations and affairs Of mankind i'm civil
lized society. But for all practical pur-
poses, the police power of the state NAV
be shortly defined to be the power OF
the Legislature to make such regula-
tfons relating TO personal and property
rights as appertain to the public health
the public safety and the public morals.
Under these general and compre-
hensive definitions Ii is evident that the
General Assembly Is clothed with very
large powers and may exercise broad
discretion in the passage of laws per-
tanning to the internal affairs of the
state. But while the power is large II
is not without limit. and. like all other
powers OF the General Assembly must
be so exercised as not to violate the
constitutional rights Of the people.
I'VE come rnen, to the question
whether the act before us is one which
falls within the police power OF the leg
islature; for II IL Is not, IL IL clearly an
unlawful interference with private
rights. We will endeavor To test this
question by the simple process of elm
nation.
First. then, does said act look to or
in any manner concern the public
health? No one claims that II does, and
no one could for moment claim, with
any basis OF reason. that Il has or was
intended to have even tie remotest
bearing thereon. Second does the act
look to or tend to promote the public
safety? Nothing OF this sort either Is
claimed in its favor, and we fail to see
that anything could be. for II bears no
relation whatsoever thereto"
A QUESTION OF MORALS.
Having thus eliminated two of the
general grounds upon which said act
must be supported az being a valid ex-
ercise of the police power. we come To
the third and last one which raises the
question whether the act relates to or
tends to promote the public morals. The
counsel In behalf OF the state. vigor-
ously contends that IL does on the
ground that IL prohibits schemes which
are in the nature OF a lottery or gift
enterprise, and hence. whether tech
same objection. He argues substan-
TALLY that II is the element OF chance,
the hope Of getting something for moth
ing, ana the appeal TO the gambling In
stinct that constitutes the evil OF lot
terry transactions; that IL is clear that
the scheme contemplated by the &C.
and prohibited therein Is In effect n lot
terry: and that as an inducement TO pur-
chase, the promise OF n premium 10 be
given by a third person is held out and
the precise nature of the premium and
It's value are unknown at the time OF
purchasing and thus. a subtle appeal
is made TO the gambling instinct: and
moreover. that demorallzing element Is
introduced into legitimate business.
WHAT A LOTTERY II.
"If this contention is we'll founded.
the act In question Is undoubtedly
valid and legitimate exercise or the
police power. Is the method OF doing
business which is prohibited BY the
act then in the nature OF lottery A
lottery ds scheme for the distrlbu-
tion Of prizes by chances The
method OF doing business which the
act prohibits IL the giving by vender
I'm connection with the sale by him OF
any article on articles. OF any stamps
OF other DEVICE which shall entitle the
x.spSf. T., z,t,faf,, rror1- 1oy1Te ~ her usr-