The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-11-17
ONLY LAUGH 1t HEYIEl
American Officers Regard His Tsik
as Mere Brag.
All the Re-enforceaneutz He Gould
Have Received Could Not Haze
saved the Island tie the spanisEI.
The Problem PureIy Naval One.
Views OF shafter and Breckinr.dge

Not little amusement has been ocea-
stoned among Army officers by the bsast
OF Cen Valeriano WeyIer, the former
Captain General OF Cuba, also demon ma
ted the Cuban Butcher that had he re-
manned in command in the island he world
have driven the Americans into the sea
= despatch from San Francisco states
that when General Skaters attention
was called to NeyIer's Gtterances he was
not inclined 10 take the matter seriously,
saying that the Spanish commander had
evidently been talking for effect, as it
was vel known to every military man
that the Spaniards without a fleet could
never hope to hold Cuba against the
Americans. General Shafter further sad:
= do not care to speak Of General Ney-
Ier's record in Cuba, or whether ne has
received unjust ceRsure. ny information
on that question is second hand, as Wey--
Ter had been gone and a more conciiia
terry policy was in operation several
months before / reached Cuba 1t is
well known that the total Spanish force
in Cuba outRumbered the force landed
for the reduction of Santiago, but there
were few available to operate against
the American troops IN that part OF the
island. as they were in distant parts and
transportation facilities were poor. Tbis
is shown by the fact that the 1896
troops reported to be at HoIguin, the 400
at San Luis. and the 800 at Guantanamo
remained at those places from the dates
Of the landing of my corps. June q, p,
and % until July 10, the day upon which
the surrender was made.
Had these troops promptly moved to
the attack of the Americans, the Eaters
difficulties would have been greatly in
creased, but / do not believe thy could
have been driven into the sea. II is pos
sibIe that if these y. 600 men had CO
operated with the 5000 troops that d d
re-enforce the Santiago garrison on the
night OF July , in making a vigorous at
tack, they might have placed the Aneri
can Army on the defensive for few
days. But the ultimate capture of Santi-
ago would only have been delayed
That the fleet was necessary for the
preservation of Spanish possessions in Gu
ba was shown by the fact that immediate
~ after its destruction and the surrender
Of p. Geo Of the 150, GOO soldiers then in Gu
Ga, CNeItuTeS lot peace were DeSaAs me
island being then absolutely at the mercy
of the American land and sea forces
Il do not care to eritieise the state
ments attributed to General Tveg5.lr, as
the war with Spain is over and everything
connected with it is a matter OF history.
The successors OF General Weyler lid not
drive the army into the sea or infiict any
serious losses upon it or delay the ad-
vance. It may not be generally known,
but e is fact, that they did not saEtu- =
a single prisoner from the Americas Ar
my
Results are more conclusive than the
cries. and what General Weyler might or
might not have done is a matter 2ich ap-
pears TO me to be Of very little interest
at this time
General Breckenridge. Inspector General
OF the Army, who participated in the Gu
ban campaign. commented thus on Tey-
ley's latest edusion:
1T seems to me that fer General Wey-
Ter to offer himself as the champion of a
party IN accordance with its traditions
OF liberty and progress, and his ratiociaa-
tons about what might have been, recalls
the quotation The saddest words of
tongue or pen etc II he mad done differ
emily from what he proposed. the loss of
CUb2 10 Spain might not have been expe-
dited- It was on account of Weyler's stay
in Cuba that the United States determined
to DO what was possible in the cause OF
humanity. which he had so greatly abused.
The plan of campaign in Cuba was OF
course, that the war was one involving rhe
problem Of the dominion of the seas. and
whichever nation acquired that secured
the island as surely as a ripe ap-
pie would drop when the tree was shak-
en-. We did not prepare to take Santiago
At the solicitation of the Navy we took
that port for the sake of the feet that lay
in its harbor. The whole problem was
a naval ore, and when the Spanish fleets
at Manila and Santiago were destroyed.
and Spain was threatened at home. the
military problem was soIved-decided
The course of events. as we'll as the
military situation. decided the contest
against Spain, and one of the prominent
causes Of the loss of Cuba was the conduct
Of General WevIer