Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-05-23
.SCHWAN'S VIEWS
Result of His Observations in the
Philippines.
MOST PERSONS WEARY OF TEE War
Believes That the Collapse of the
Revolt is Permanent.
LARGER TOWNS GARRISONED

| Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan. U. s. Vol.
| unteers. who has just returned to the
| United States from long tour Of impor-
| tant service in the Philippines. has writ
ten letter to Adjt. Gen. Corbin in regard
| to the condition of affairs in the islands at
/ the time of his departure for home, April
| 16
| You know. of course says Gen.
| Schwan. that on that date april 1G and
/ for. some time previously the most. If not
/ all, of the larger towns of LuZon, and
many of those towns in the other principal
| islands, which are regarded as commercial
| and political centers within their respective
| regions, Were occupied by permanent gar
risons. You are further aware. doubtless,
| of the more or less frequent collisions be-
| tween detachments from the garrisoned
| troops and bands of outlaws infesting their
| several spheres of action; also of the in
| ferences from these conflicts unfavorabe
| to the permanent pacifcation of the Islands
| that are freely drawn in the United States
| and elsewhere. 1t may not be amiss, there
| fore to mention here some facts bearing
upon the general subject which seem at
| times to be lost sight of.
Brigandage In the Philippines.
"Brigandage prevailed to a greater or
| less extent in the Philippine Islands from
| time immemorial. In Spanish times no sus-
| tained or bona fide efforts were made for
| it's suppression. Local troops were, indeed,
| raised to put down and prevent robbery.
| but their operations were spasmodic and
superficial. and they were generally sus-
pected of being in league with the robbers
and of sharing in their plumber. During
that period of the Tagalog rebellion QS.6-
9S), when. owing to the voluntary with
drawal of Aguinado and other leaders to
Hong Kong, hostilities were generally sus-
pended. the remnants of the insurgents or
those whom the leaders could not control
Joined the 'ever-existent' robber bands. who
in consequence were enabled to carry on
guerrilla warfare against minor bodies of
Spanish troops in addition to plying their
vocation of plundering peaceable inhabi-
itants.
THE robber system, pure and simple.
was kept up while organized instruction
against the United States was carried on.
though at first it received no countenance
from the insurgent leaders, who even made
| occasional attempts to break 1t up. With
the disruption of the insurgent government
and the dispersion of the inSurgent armies,
| robber bands have been all over the islands
extensively reinforced by insurgent officers
and soldiers who returning to their
homes were disinclined to resume honest
work. and still chung to the idea of Fill
lpno republic.
Weary of War.
Excluding the savage mountain tribes
and those directly connected with the
bands above mentioned "a comparatively
small but constantly varying quantity the
Fiipinos may be roughly divided into two
classes, viz, the intelligent educated (also,
as rule. the property-owning) class, who
| form small minority, and the uneducated,
laboring or peasant class, constituting the
great mass of the people. Most men OF
| both classes honestly desire the restoration
| of peace and order under American or any
OF her kind of rule, being thoroughly weary
i of Those n he former
| most part, prefer American rule. believing
| that though mild it will be firm and. above
| all. just, and because they have no faith IN
the fitness of the Filipinos as a people TO
govern themselves. They are, however,
| afraid to cast in their lot unreserNedly
| with the Americans. fearful that the antici-
pated withdrawal of American troops may
| expose them to severe treatment at the
| hands of the insurgent leaders. who, with
even small following. seem to be able 10
| terroriZe the people, and in the past have
| shown a vindictiveness and cruelty almost
| beyond parallel. Hence, while yielding
passive obedience to. or at least refraininS
| from positively hostile acts against, the
military tAmerfcan) occupants, some OF
| them keep up relations with and contribute
| to the needs of the guerrilla bands in their
| neighborhood. promiscuously made up of
robbers and eX-inSurgents
| Many men of the lower class. while pre-
| f>rrng a quiet. humdrum life to the hard
| ships and dangers Of highwaymen and
| bushwhackers. are yet amenable to the
| persuasions or threats of the brigand chiefs
| and join quit the brigand service accord
ing to circumstances.
Hopes of Insurgent Leaders.
| "Those who actively openly seek to
| maintain brigandage as nucleus or rally
| ing point for a future rebellion are the
| military and political leaders of the late
| organized Instruction, of whom all but
| few are utterly INSCRIPTIONS and actuated
by purely selfish motives. These men real
| iZe that should the insurgent movement die
out entirely and American rule be firmly
| established they will forfeit forever posi-
| tons of influence and prominence and Will
| be RELOCATED to their former obscurity and
| perjury in private station. In the main
| they rest their hope for revival of the in
| surrection and the Recommendation of in
| surgent forces upon ID the supposed nee
| essity American troops will be under of
| abandoning many of their present positions,
| owing to the impossbility Of supplying the
| latter during the wet season, and GU upon the
| success of the democratic or anti-expanston
/ party in the coming presidential campaign
| in the United States. Their ability to hold
| the guerrilla bands together and to retain
| moral control a considerable proper
| ton of the common people is due largely
| to the astounding ignorance and credulity
| of the latter. As an illustration of this 1t
| may be mentioned that within the past two
| months brigand chief in Tayabas prov
| ince, who signed himself general of dvi-
| sion. did not hesitate to give out that the
| Filipino government was still at Tarlac;.
| that two German men-O1-War nad recently
| made a descent upon Laqnimanoc. a port
| on the south coast of Tayabas, compelling
| the American troops there to retreat into
| the mountains: that Manila full of
| German and Japanese soldiers. awaiting an
| opportunity to throw off their disguise and
| make common cause with the Filipino in
| surrectos against their American oppress-
1 orS.
| Collapse of the InsurrectiOn.
| "My conviction that the insurrection can
/ not recover from the collapse 1t has suf-
| fered is founded on the following considera-
| ton:
| The principal islands are now as never
before held with an iron grip by the mill
| tary. AS has been already pointed out, in
| Luzon, whence any rebellion must always
I derive its life-blood. all interior well as
! coast towns of importance are occupied by
| United States troops whose scouting par
| ties penetrate into the most secluded re-
! cesses within their Jurisdictions, which lat
| ter are clearly defined. These garrisOns
| are generally commanded by comparative
| ly young and remarkably energetic and
Jealous majors. holding lesser rank in the
| regulars. who are leaving nothing undone
| to perform with thoroughness the specified
| task set them. That task includes the sup