The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1900-03-06

be sufficient weight alter the plain meaning statute
the words of which should be taken in their usual unless
there sufficient Indicate that they intended be taken
in other
Nor it be said with reference the circumstances this
that the applicant has vested right carry his bust
against other licensees though against the Govern
Strictly speaking the question Is not between him and
other licensees but between him and the Government And of
he entitled protection in the enjoyment of whatever
vested rights other constitutional rights he has only
against other licensees against the Government also But
the be that assuming that the restriction in
question intended protect vendors of spuous liquors. the
Legislature itself recognized certain rights such vendors and
therefore be supposed have intended recognize similar
rights in vendors of light wnesand beers The contention Is
based the supposed policy the legislature interfere
with existing businesses rather than upon the law of vested rights
But the argument would far If the restriction
imposed solely for the benefit of spuous liquor licensees
it imposed, protect them in the noyment of right
carry the business or they might continue carry the
business whether light wine and beer licenses issued
not but grant them monopoly in the business and there
fore inference if any, of light wine and beer cen
would be, merely that they intended be
protected in the enjoyment of right the business
but they intended be given monopoly they
obtained their licenses wch the Legislature clearly did not
intend any inferred from general inen
protect sprtuous liquor licensees Off there such
ntenon that there general intention protect light WINE
licensees much less that there intention
protect spuOus liquor licensees III they received their
licenses after light and beer license had once been grant
ed for the locality in question.
But that the restriction imposed solely
for the benefit holders of rtuous liquor licenses! If
was have seen, merely permit them continue
the business but grant them monopoly and, have
also, monopoly in favor of those in the pirtuous
liquor business the date of the Act against subsequent pp
for either pruous liquor light wine and beer licenses
but monopoly favor of all prous liquor licensees whether
they had licenses of the subsequently obtained
against subsequent applicants for light wine and beer
licenses Such construction certainly should not be favored
Was not restriction intended rather part least,
police regulation with view to limiting the number OF
places where Intoxicating liquor might be sold at retail in
particular locality! Or perhaps may be explained follows
The Legislature by this Act authorized the issuance of light wine
and beer licenses Fee 5000, much smaller than that for
sptuou liquor license OOO in order supply the demand
nd incidentally obtain revenue) where Con account of the
high fee and small popuaon there spirtuous liquor
licenses Chat principally in the country dstrcts) and at the
time and thereby lessen prevent the illicit
faeure and sale and the of ardent
liquors. the object of the Act then would require the issuance
of light wine and beer license where there sprituou
liquor license irrespective of the time when the latter issued
hence the restriction irrespective of such time.
We seen that the statute be construed pro
bt the granting of light and beer licenses only where
sptuous liquor license existence the particular locality
the date of the Act 1t prohibits the granting of licenses of
the former class least when license of the latter class has
first been granted though after the date of the Act There
sufficient in the Justify holding that there is
restriction against granting second license of the former class
where has previously been granted before the issue of
license of the latter class holding that where light wine
license has first been granted and then sprtuous liquor
license second light wine license mis- h be granted the
holder the expiration of his first license but similar license
might not be granted different person 1t be impossible
to ascertain from the language of the restrictive clause all the in
tentons that the legislature had in imposing it, the statute
be construed according the natural and ordinary meaning of
the words used without doing violence conue it
as the plaintiff desires would require considerable stretching
not alteration of the language of the statute If the legislature
cd not express what meant and not the court the proper
body to amend the To hold plaintiff desires in this
ease would practically amendment, not consruc
tion of the statute.
further contended the restriction unconstitutional
In that 1t Is not uniform legislation but applies TO certain local
les only namely, those within miles of the place of bu
vendor The narcllar