Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1900-04-12
SLadysmith, and he includes q terrible
indictment against the useless sasrifice
of the Irish brigade, whose gallantry
excited 80 much admiration In En-

Yes writes this officer, 'Ladysmith
has been relieved at last: we have been
blundering along the line OF hills that
form that northern bank of the Tugela
for many months, attempting to pass
1t at all sorts of impossible places and
suffering heavy loss each time. That
Is an accurate description Of the ten
weeks campaign on the Tugela. No
one knew the ground or took the trou-
bile to learn 1t. AS an example of this
sublime Indifference. Gen. Butler was
not aware that Hlangwani mountain,
which commanded the crossing of the
Tugela, was on the southern side OF the
attempts. Yet he lived for weeks With
in three or four miles of the hill; and
at the battle of Colenso his right flank
extended beyond 1t. AS to strategy.
there was none. neither good nor bad.
The troops We're moved along, and
when a hill or an iiitrenchment ap-l
Speared in front they We're ordered to
take II. Sometimes they failed, some
times they succeeded; often when they
had succeeded, after terrible loss, the,
post was found to be useless and was
abandoned.
"on Friday, Feb. %, Gen. Hart was
ordered to send up the Connaught
rangers. the Inniskillings and the Dub
lins along the line OF the railway to at
tack some low hills where the river.
turned again toward the east. The op-s
GRAFTON was most difficult and danger
GUS. Six companies OF the Inniskillings
and two companies OF the Connaught
rangers formed the attacking lines, the
remainder of the rangers and half of
the Dublins We're in support; the re-
serve consisted Of the other half OF the
sDublins. In this order the Irish brig
ade re-crossed the railway and began
the attack. coming at once under se-
we're cross fire from the hills on the
right and left. It Is at such times that
tactical errors lead to such terrible loss
OF life. Some troops had. indeed, been
sent to the hills on the left, but they
were not ordered to push the attack,
and they could not from their position
even see the northern slopes; they
merely acted as sentries to prevent our
being entirely cut off. Anyone could
see that lit was madness to send an at
tacking party up the central hill, while
the fianking hill was unoccupied and
the Beers thereon were left free to
lconcentrate their fire for its defens.
But stupid as was the scheme, the
method adopted for its execution was
even worse. Gen. Hart placed himself
on a neighboring hill with telescope
and a bugler; he was completely out Of
touch with the attack and could not
know when a rest was necessary or
when an attack could profitab!y be
pressed. These matters are felt only
by the officers on the spot and 1t Is alb
lsolutely necessary to leave 1t to their
discretlon. There he stood sounding at
Intervals the advance, then the
double and then the charge. When
4 1t appeared to him that the attack was
not proceeding rapidly enough to suit
his taste, the bugle rang out again in
peremptory tones. Our artillery mean
while was shelling the trenches at the
\ top OF the hill and kept down the fire
tfrom that direction, SO that the advance
line got within 20 yards of what
seemed to them to be the top, and wait
ed for a moment to take breath under
cover of the steepness of the hill. Then
the generals bugler sounded the three
Icalls: advance double. Charge The
word was passed along the ranks, bay
lonets We're fixed. and springing to their
feet the men dashed forward with /:
cheer"