Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-08-31
COURT DECISIONS.
sDlGESTED BY W. B. MARTIN
EXCLUSIVELY FOR
vlRcINlAM- PILOT.
Votes Of Cases Recently Decided
Which Are Of Interest to
Our People.
NEWDERRY ". BANK OF
PRINCETON.

PRINCETON.
supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
July 5, 1900.
WHEN A GARNIsHMENr PRO
CEEDING HAS BEEN INSTI-
sTUTED TO SUBJECT MONEY
DUE BY A vENDEE, BUT NO
= JUDGMENT RENDERED, AND
ALL THE PARTIES ARE
BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT
IN A SUBSEQUENT INEFFECT-
UAL SUIT TO IMPEACH THE
D DEED TO THE VENDEE FOR
FRAUD. AND VENDEE ADMITS
HIS LIABILITY AS STATED IN
& THE GARNISHMENT PROCEED
ING. THE COURT SHOULD EN-
TER A DECREE FOR THE
AMOUNT AND END THE CON-
TRoVERSY.
The court says:
The trial court further found, as is
evident from Its decree, and in that
view we concur. that the record does
not Show that the grantee had actual
hnowiedge OF the grantors unlawful
,ntent. Although the grantee did not
nave such knowledge, he may have
made his purchase under such cir
cumstances as will prevent him from
Deing deemed bona fide purchaser.
III he had knowledge OF facts and cir
cumstances which were naturally and
Justly calculated to excite suspicion
IN the mind of person of ordinary
care ana prudence and which would
naturally prompt him to pause and
inquire before consummating the
transaction and such inquiry would
nave necessarily led to discovery OF
the Iact with notice OF which he is
sought to be charged he will be con-
ssiidered to be affected with such no.
tice. whether he made inquiry or not.
but while the fact of notice may be
inferred from circumstances as well
as proved by direct evidence. vet the
PROOF must be such as to affect the
conscience of the purchaser and must
De SO strong and clear as to fix upon
him the imputation of mala fdes
without discussing in detail the
other suspicious circumstances con-
nected with the grantees purchase,
II Is sufficient to say that when ali
the circumstances relied on to show
that the grantee was guilty of bad
faith In making his purchase without
making further inquiry, are consid-
cred In the light of all the facts dis
closed by the record, and especially
or the facts that the grantee paid and
the property and did not know that
the makers of the note upon which
his grantor was endorser were insolv-
ent. but thought them fully able to
pay their debts, the imputation of bad
faith4has not been fixed upon the
grantee with that degree of strength
and clearness which Is required in
making out q case OF fraud.
We are therefore of opinion that the
court erred in holding that the
grantee was affected by the fraudu-
lent intent OF the grantor and decree
ing against him on that ground; but
as 1t appears from the record that be-
fore the grantee had paid the pur-
chase money bonds made payable to
the grantor's wife he had notice of
the appellee's claim and In n gar
nishee proceeding sued out by the ap-
pellee. answered that he still owed said
bonds and was willing to pay them to
whomsoever the court might order:
and 1t further appearing that no
judgment was rendered against him
In that case. and that all the parties
in interest were before the court IL
ought to have entered a decree
against the grantee in favor OF appel
lee for the amount of those bonds
with interest thereon from the time
they became due and payable and
thus put an end to the controversy.
This court will reverse the decree
complained of so far as 1t held that
the appellant was affected by the
fraud of the grantor and decreed
against him on that ground for the
and will enter such decree as the trial
court ought to have entered with
costs to the appellant as the party
substantially prevailing. Reversed.