Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-02-16
SCHOFIELD ON BOER WAR
Retired General Says the Struggle Has Only
Begun.
Importance of First Reyerscs Exag.
gerated-GeneraIs in the Field
Handicapped by Politics.

| Lieut.. Gen John M. Schofeld, retired has
| the following review of the war in South
| Africa in the New York Herald of today:
The experience of the British in South
Africa up to Near the present time has
been the natural result of lack of prepara-
| ton and previous experience and overcon-
| fidence in British prowess. They have suf-
| fered defeats in attempting to do what a
cool and fully enlightened military judg.
| ment would have decided to be impossible
The situation thus created may inevitably
| lead to further losses, especially that of the
garrison of Ladysmith. But the worst fea-
| ture of this situation is that it has forced
| upon the British general-in-chief the moral
necessity of pressing aggressive oprea-
! tons before being fully prepared for them,
and along a very difficult line, in the hope
| of raising the siege of Ladysmith before
| the garrison may be compelled to surren-
| der.
But the general estimate in England and
on the continent of Europe of the magni-
! tudc of the results already reached or nrob-
| able in the near future is out of all proper.
| ton to the facts. The British reverses so
| far have been 'ncomparably less than those
suffered from strikingly similar causes, by
the Union army in the east and by the con-
federate arms in the west during the early
| stages in the civil war in this country The
present situation hardly affords ground for
conjecture to what the ultimate result
VIII be. From the military standpoint of
| this country the war in South Africa has
only begun.
| Necessity of British Aggression.
In making a just estimate of the more
recent operations of the British forces it is
| important to bear in mind that the situa-
| ton compes their commanders to press
| aggressive operations as constantly and
| vigorously possible-frst, to prevent the
Beers from detachng large bodies of troops
| to oppose the advance along the line chosen
| by Lord Roberts, and, second to take adj
vantage of any considerable weakening of
| the Boer lines. which the other movement
| Of Lord Roberts may cause, to break
| through the Boer lines and relieve the be-
| leaguered British garrisons.
Thus it may possibly happen at any time
| in the near future that Gen. Butler may
find the Boer line at some point in his
| front 100 far weakened to resist his vigor-
| Gus assaults If not. Gen. Buffers vigo-
| rous operations and those of Gen. Mcthuen
| on the other flank must so occupy the Beers
| as to make sure Lord Roberts advance on
| an intermediate line.
| Strategic principles suggest that the Brit
ish operations in South Africa should be
| conducted on at least three lines. If a
| fourth from Delagoa bay were available 1t
| would be greatly to their advantage. Such
| a division of a superior force increases very
| greatly the probabilities of the success of
| some one of the three four grand di-
| visions, and the success of one is the sue
| cess of all.
| Example From the Civil War.
| When the Union armies of the west, after
| three years of hard fighting. were able to
| march through Georgia and the Carolinas,
destroying all the military resources of the
confederate army in Virginia, the end nee
essarily came, in spite of the fact that the
| confederate army of northern Virginia had
| been able to defend Richmond nearly four
| years. Yet the Army of the Potomac
| though it made little progress in all that
| time, performed the most heroic and diff
| cult task of all by holding the most for
| midable of the confederate armies while
| the western Union armies did their deadly
| work.
| So General Butler may yet perform the
| most important British service in South
| Africa by holding the Beers along the line
| of the Tugela river until Lord Roberts pen
| etrates into the heart of Boer territory. In
| the meantime whether the troops at Lady
| smith are able to hold out to the end or
| must surrender before they can be relieved,
| the course of General Butler must be the
| same. He must press his operations there
/ to hold the Beers while Lord Roberts adj
| vances on the other line.
| OF the Beers. the Information received in
| this country. though meager, appears to
| justify US in saying that their operations
| have been conducted with admiral BILE skill
| and courage. But success in results
| from the most powerful combination of
| Shlll, COURAGE, numbers ana ma
terial resources. long time may be
CURED to determine which side in
| great conflict this combination is most
powerful.
| Conflict Bound to BE Long.
| At the close of our civil war prominent
| confederate generals said it not until
| the end of two years that they became con-
WINGED that the Union was the more power
| full. Even then they could do nothing but
| fight on to the bitter end. So the Beers,
| much of the same military character our
| heroic southerners. fighting for their indie
pendence, must fight until they fight no
| longer, while the British, largely of our
| blood, and fighting for a great principle,
| which to them is as sacred as our devotion
| to the Union, cannot yield 50 long as they
j are superior in men and money.
| Unless our British and Dutch cousins on
| the other side of the Atlantic are degener-
| ate our own civil war must be accepted as
| fair indication of what the character of the
| conflict in South Africa must be. We can
| only hope that the ultimate result may be
as beneficial to civilization and human prog
| ress in Africa as it was in America.
| The late dispatches indicate that General
| Buffers operations have already borne le-
| gitimate fruit by enabling Lord Roberts to
| position. This should result in forcing upon
| the Beers the necessity of attacking in
| their turn troops in favorable position and
| intrenched, thus reversing the conditions
| which have heretofore existed. The result
| of such an attack must be looked for with
| keenest interest.
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