The Weekly Tallahasseean., 1900-12-06


cd by an allegation that they
were unknown to the indicting grand
Jury and this rule applies to the de.
s1ption of property in indictments
fsr larceny,
5. Whether the allegation in an
indictment for larceny of a want of
mare perfect knowledge of the de-
seription OF the property alleged to
have been stolen is subject to enquiry
before the trial jury, need not be
censltiered IN case, where there is
no evidence that the grand jury was
IN Possession of information that
would enable them to give better
description.
The trial court should not by
any arbitrary standard direct the
jury2hereby to weigh and estimate
the testimOny Of a defendant who
takes the stand as a witness.
5. A request to charge on behalf
Of.a defendant who teStiies in his de-
fense that the jury have no right to
disregard his testimony on the
ground alone that he is the defend
ant In the case, is properly refused,
especially where. the court instructs
the jury fully as to how they should
weigh the testimony of witnesses
generally.
3. In an indictment for grand lar
ceny under statute providing that
If the property stolen is of the value
of twenty dollars or more the offense
shall be grand larceny, and if the
value is less than twenty dollars the
offense shall be petit larceny, with
punishments graduated to each Of
tense, the testimony should show
property stolen of sufficient value to
sustain the sentence imposed by the
court.
4 In identifying the property al
legged to have been stolen the evil
Hdence must substantially correspond
with the descrip ption given in the in
#dictrpent, but this may be done by
circumstantial us we'll as direct
proof.
s. Evidence held sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
T. 4. / B. B. MacDOnell, for
Plaintiff in Error William m B. La
mar Attorney General, for. the State
William II. Reynolds, as Comptrol-
-leR and John A. Pearce, as Sheriff,
Appellants, VS.: Fhee Florida Cen
.tral and Peninsular Railroad Com
pany, Appellee.-Leon county.
MABRY, j.:
l. WHEREOF an appeal in chancery,
the decree is affirmed in part and re-
Versed in part, with directions for
the entry of a proper decree, and
permission is given by the appellate
court to apply to the chancellor for
leave to file bill of revie " of a part
of the decree to be entered. the ap-
plication to the extent permitted, if
made, must be governed by the gen.
eral rules applicable to obtaining
leave and filing bills of review,
2. Where, on an appeal in chan
ceryg the decree is affirmed in part
and reversed in part, with directions
for the entry of a proper decree, and
permission be given by the appellate
court to apply to the chancellor for
leave to file a bill of review of sew
eral part of the decree to be entered,
the authority to entertain the appi-
cation is confined to the part of the
decree as to which permission is given
to apply for leave to file the bill, and
the chancellor has no jurisdiction be-
yond this.
3. The filing of 4 bill of review
on the ground of newly discovered
evidence is not a matter of right, but
leave to file the bill must first be OBJ
tanned and this rests in the sound
discretion of the court, subject to re-
view by the appellate court.
4. A bill of review on the ground
of newly discovered evidence should
a1lege that it is filed by leave of the
court; must state the former bill and
proceedings, including the final de-
cree entered, and the particulars in
which the party conceives himself
aggrieVed, and also state distinctly
and specifically the evidence alleged
to have been discovered and that it
came to the knowledge of the party
for the first time, after the final de-
cree, or too late to be used at the
hearing, and that by the exercise of
reasonable diligence it could not
have been discovered sooner; and
further, it must appear that the new
evidence is not merely cumulative or
corroborative, but must be relevant
and material and likely to produce a
different determination.
5. The allegation of the discovery
of new matter and that'it could not
l. e -zoo.IIo HE