The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1900-02-26

Washington, Feb. 25.-The bureau Of
naval intelligence has issued a fresh
volume Of its war notes series, and
probably the last Of them which will
bear on the battle of Santiago harbor.
The present publication is a transla-
ton from the Spanish officer, Victor
COncas y Palu, former commander of
the cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, and
chief of staff to Admiral Cervera in the
battle Of July 3.
Like a number Of previous articles
from officers of the Spanish squadron
bearing on the same subject, Captain
COncas devotes considerable space TO
lack Of naval preparation in Spain prior
to the war and also to condemning the
political party in Spain which was
responsible for offering up the crippled
squadron as a sacrifice on the altar of
an historic ideal All this has been
covered more fully in Admiral Cervera' 8
published statements
The narrative begins with the exodus
Of the devoted squadron from Santiago
harbOr. Captain COncas says. in ac-
cOrdance with previous instructions. the
Teresa was headed toward the Brook
lyn, hoping TO ram her This was
frustrated by the BrOOllyn's frequent
" discussed loop" to starboard, which
COncas says brought the Texas and
Iowa between her and the Teresa.
A foot note inserted in the narrative
at this point reads: The turn was
made to starboard though it would
seem reasonable for ii to have been
made to port.
There is nothing in the bureau pub
hcation to indicate whether this foot
no "a fe hv~C raj
Sinking Of the Ships.
Continuing his story. Captain Concas
tells Of the successful sinking of the
Teresa and the other vessels of the
squadron. He dWells strongly on
point which ne declares all other critics
have overlooked, namely, that of owing
to the narrow and tOrtuous channel
past the MORO the Spanish vessels had
to come out so far apart that they were
each attacked by the combined force Of
the American squadron and destroyed
in detail, making it practically a series
of cCmbats, each time a Ship against
a squadron. He calls attention also to
the probability that the American esti-
mate Of per cent of hits out of shots
aimed at Cervera's feet is too low.
He says the most horrible mortality
in every case was in the upper-wOrks
where the SnOJS lett no marks except
those wiped out by the fire. He says
s per cent of hits probably would not
be too high.
Defends Spanish Gunnery.
In defense of the Spanish gugnery,
the writer says that CeTveTa's ships
fought either bow or stcrn-On nearly all
through the battle. This reduced the
number of guns they could bring to
bear. But, he points cut that the
Brooklyn. which was the only vessel
keeping up a parallel broadside fight
at close range for any length of time,
was struck foTty-One times. As she
was under fire only of the Viscaya and
Teresa, and for a short time the best
guns of the Colon. Captain Concas says
the Spaniards gave very good proof of
their ability as marksmen.
He credits the Iowa with landing the
two twelve or thiTteen-inch shells
which burst the TeTesa's main steam
pipe and put her out of the action when
her commander had a fair chance to
escape. The shots, he says, have been
claimed both by the Oregon and Indi-
ana, but he adduces considerable evil
dence that they came from the Iowa.
Another peculiar incident brought out
in the narrative, and a striking ex
ample of Yankee luck. was that the
Oregon. in the pursuit Of the Colon. re-