The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1900-03-17
BATTLEFIELD MARKsMANsHIP.
Why Bullets Have So Much Difficulty
in Finding Their BiIIets.
From the London Fan Mani Gazette.


in Finding Their BiIIets.
From the London Pail Mall Gazette.
The popular imagination, TO judge by
the columns of the daily press seems to
picture TO itself the Boer as a species of
superhuman automation fitted with tele-
scopic self-adjusting OPTICS capable of de-
tecting a tive-inch distinctive badge at
1000 yards, and unfailingly putting a bull
let through il the next instant. l think 1t
would conduce very materially to the
peace of mind of many households If the
fact were brought home to them that the
Boer is in reality a man of ordinary flesh
and blood like ourselves, with eyesight a
very little keener and nerves no whit
steadier than the average of our own, and
that our troops in Africa possess in their
present allotment of field artillery power
which, properly employed, can most eff
fectually reduce the steadiness of both
hand and eye of our opponents TO almost
any degree of shakiness they may desire
The truth is that the vast majority of
our countrymen have not the faintest idea
of how the mechanism of an army really
works
An army is machine built up of three
chief components, cavalry, artillery and
infantry, whose functions are to find. shat
ter, and ultimately drive out the enemy
from his chosen ground; and this task is
accomplished in the following manner:
The cavalry, by scouting, locating the en-
envy. This is an Indispensable preliminary
which can never be neglected without GER
tain punis hment. To crush an enemy you
must at least know where he stands or
whether he is moving. Yet, OBJ Gus Jas
that statement appears in this bald form,
the records of all armies, | regret to say,
particularly of our own disclose how Of
t.rl M wi u-b raS1ltS II has
often been entirely omitted. But, aSsum-
Ing in this hypothetical case that the cav
airy have duly aud efficiently performed
this duty, the artillery then gallOp out and
by concentrated hail Of projectiles pro-
Coed to break down and estloy their OPP
ponents' power of resistance, a result
which is generally obtained not so much
by the number of adversares actually
killed by the sheer nervous exhaustion
of the living, which destroys and par
alyzes all craftsmanship whatever.
Workmanship is no permanent attrib-
ute of any man, 1t varies from moment to
moment, not only from external influences,
but with the internal nervous condition of
the individual, and when once storm OF
shell bursts, over a position a state of
things is soon arrived at which renders
careful aiming lnconceivable.
Picture for a moment what 1t reg ly
means. Let US take only four batteries
concentrating their fire on front of 100
yards. Four batteries will deliver some
forty shells a minute, eac1 of Which on
bursting throws out about go bullets and
fragments, all of which will generally psss
about ten feet above or ten feet below the
line of targets aimed at, SO that on an
average each square foot of vulnerable
surface exposed will be nit once every
three minutes. man standing up eX-
| posed about five square feet, and lying
| down about two Ills chances of surviv-
| ing sLch a storm for half an hour cannot
be considered favor able, and on the pTnc-
tice ground as a rule. the dummies actu-
| ally are riddled 10 the extent this calcu-
lation indicates. On service the accuracy
| of III @ may fall considerably snort OF this,
| but there are still several other disturb
| ances 10 be reckoned with. The bursting
| shells smother the whole line i'm a cloud
| of smoke, their bullets and splinters tear
| up the ground, raising masses of dust and
| flinging pebbles and rock fragments in the
| faces of the defenders. Let us assume
| even that these are endowed with super
4 human nerve and courage, but will any
| one contend that through such an atmos'
| phere minute distinctions of dress and or
nament can be distinguished at even q
quarter of a mile or less?
Under cover of this storm the infantry
approaches, and soon their bullets are
added to the general hail. By a success
sion of rushes they work their way In
| d
fire redoubles in volume, the reserves
come up, and with one last rush the po-
sition is stormed. Cavalry and horse ar
tillery sweep round the TANKS or fight
their way through the crowds of their
own men as best they can, and the pur-
suit is pushed to the last breath of man
and horse.
This is the ideal attack to which every
leader endeavors to approximate, but one
| which they rarely succeed in attaining
The point, however, that l wish to make
| is that in a cavalry which can find, and
an artillery which can prepare the way
| a leader possesses two weapons in his
hands with which, given time enough, he
can reduce the finest craftsmanship IN
the world to the condition of pure ran
dom fire, and from this ascurious conse'
Quence results. Given a position of GER
tain front defended by weapons of q
known range and rapidity of fire, We
can calculate with fair degree of accu'
racy the losses which no attacking force
must incur in passing over the bullet
swept zone.
Some four years ago we made two cal
| culations one assuming the tactical con
ditions and armament of the Peninsula
| and the other the existing weapons anC
practice of the present day, the fire from
both being taken as delivered between
similar degrees of elevation and depres
sion The result was very curious, for
whereas, against the random fire of the
early days OF the century the attack
could not lose less than 10 per cent. of Its
forces, under The modern ones 1t was
possible to close with your enemy for a
loss of 2 per cent only, and this was the
necessary mathematical consequence OF
the improvement of the weapons in use
conclusion which 1t is impossible to es
cape from.
This result is confirmed in the most re
markabe manner by the fighting anC
losses hitherto reported from the Trans
vaal, for, to the best of my knowledge M
positions held by determined white men
equally well armed as our own, have evel
been carried with so small "a percentage
Of loss to the vlctors. The conditions o.
the ground both at Glencoe and Glands
; laagte appear to have been most unfa
vorable for our field guns firing shrap
mel only, and hence the figure Of pc
cent. is considerably exceeded, but a
r. sI,J. afx Irel,t t.,,