The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-01-16


youngsters had annihilated each other. may
have had considerable influence in fore
stalling any criticism that would have
otherwise been forthcoming from the effete
elements of the city's population.
The lack OF protest against this robust
frolie on the Chicago prairies will natur-
ally catrse the degenerate East TO form $
own conclusions. and they are not Likely
TO be complimentary. One OF them will b.
that the elementary classics employed in
the Cook county suburbs to teach the young
idea how TO shoot are yellow covered. CO.
piously illustrated with scenes OF violence.
and sell at ten cents copy or less.
The Military Mystery of Natal.
The little that can be dedoced from
driblets of news allowed TO pass the censors
at Durham and Cape Town. is strongly
corroborative of the views We have ven
tured to take Of Sir Rcdyers Buffers flank
ing movement By way OF Potgieter's Drift;
and. in the main the military writer's Of
the London Post and Westminster Re
view" who are generally accepted in Eu-
rope as the best critics OF the operations
in South Africa. this morning have come
around to our opinion. Perhaps a MAORI
~ Of the London experts still cling TO
their original and arbitrary theory thar The
real objective OF the advance has been the
Beer left and the movement against the
right only a feint. but there is nothing in
the facts of the situation as far as they
are known or can be reasonably inferred
TO Justify such an idea.
Il appears from fragmontary hints that
whatever force left Frcre on Thursday
night, and &c Is still assumed TO have been
Sir Charles Warren's division. marched
northwest to Springfield. One report re-
ceiyed this morning distinctly states that
Warren is some miles beyond that point.
perhaps having moved around Buffers
initial position. This would agree In prin-
ciple with our tentative explanation yes
terday. Of the movement from Frere. which
was that II probably was intended to sup
port Butler by an attack on the Boer right
in front while Butler should strike IL in re-
verse The only.yariation suggested by the
exchanged roles
All the signs point to the Boer tight as
the point Of main attack Il is said that
a large force OF Beers have moved up the
Colenso- Dewdrop road. which runs paraI-
lei with the roads in the same direction
from EstcOurt and Frere. evidently with
the object Of intercepung Butler at Dew
drop. where the heaviest lighting on the
right should be. suppOsng the adysn-
tage OF the turn TO have been full
ly realized. The critics who admit
the probability Of our position. argue
that the movement OF Warren to SPRING
field instead Of 10 Weenen. If il has oc-
CURED, represents an extremely daring
battle plan. on the part of Butler. as il
involves wide separation Of the British di-
visions. II does rot look so to us On
the contrary. It seems 60 us to illustrate
the very reverse. II We were right in cur
prognosis. which there has been no ap-
parent reason to even modify. the tactics
which seem to have been adopted are the
safest to which Butler could resort
There Is cause to believe that the Free
State commandos and the Traus,aal de-
tachments which have held Joubert-s right
were severely handled. and possibly Grip
pled, IN the Sunday assault on L.advsmith.
This is indicated By evidence that since
then the Boer generaI-in-cnief has been
shortening his lines. which. being twenty
miles long were dangerously extended for
defence by any force We are permitted to
credit him with. That would make IT
more feasible to attempt a turning move
ment beyond Springfield than elsewhere.
because, as We have shown, a movement in
that direction was favored By the existence
Of highways from Estcourt and Frere. by
the reasonable possibility Of turning Jou-
bert's flank without a preliminary battle.
and by the advantage Of a position at or
near DeWdrop IN reference 20 the quickest
communication and cooperation with the
Ladysmith garrison. This w5,,id not involve
such segregation of the grand battle
units as would be produced by a feint at
Potgieter's Drift and dependence upon op-
eratious against the distant Boer left. for
decisive results. On the contrary. il is
hard to see how Buffers force could be
so well concentrated and utilized for mu-
tual support as II would be In the plan
we have regarded as the natural and
probable one Accepting the dispositions
most lately indicated, the Estcourt and
Frere divisions. the artillery. and a brig
ade or so at Colenso, with probably re-
serve division between Colenso and
Springfield, would practically be en- ech-
elon against Joubert's right. with his GEN.
tire held in play. Another division would.
Of course, be keeping the Boer left busy
at lnhlawe a task which should not
be extremely dangerous. since the Beers
would doubtless use all their available
force on the right unless they were pre-
pairing for a retreat to the passes, in which
case all calculations would be at sea But
It is plain that a moderate degree Of sue
cess on Buffers part at Dewdrop or in
that vicinity, would instantly take the
Inhlawe and Weenen end OF the line out
of Immediately serious consideration from
the viewpoint Of danger to the British
right to the east; since it would compel !
Joubert TO reconstruct his front. with his I
right resting on Dewdrop, or possibly Ae- /
ton Homes; and his line extending thence /
along the Dewdrop road southeast to Co |
lenso. When this stage had been reached |
the new BOer line would be open to ex- J