New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1900-02-25
INFLUENCE OF CANALS.
THE POLITICAL RESULTS OF TRANsCoN-
TINENTAL WATERWAYS.
By the Hon. James Bryce. NJ. P.

Author OF The American Commonwealth etc.
Copyright. 1900 by I. A MaynardJ
At any time but the present the conclusion OF
a convention varying the provisions Of the Clay
ton-BUlwer Treaty Of 1850 and thereby opening
up the way TO control by the United States Of
transcontinental canal from the Caribbean Sea
to the Pacific Ocean, would have excited the
widest and keenest attention in England II
is no doubt true that since the failure OF the De
Lesseps Panama Canal scheme European inter
est in the piercing Of the isthmus has greatly
tagged. People hastily assumed that this fall
ure meant the abandonment OF the project for
a long time TO come. and neither the Nicaraguan
scheme. which has been so much talked Of in
the United States. nor the Panama scheme re-
vived. on less ambitious lines than those OF
De Lesseps by a new company. had brought the
matter back within the practical horizon OF or
binary people in Europe. Now. however, the
fact that diplomatic obstacle which had stood
IN the way Of political action by the United
States has been removed places the enterprise
at once upon a different level.
II Is assumed 20 be a sign that the United
States Is seriously thinking Of taking up and
carrying through the enterprise with resources
which VIII make its completion certain. And
the results OF that completion must be so mo-
mentous that they would receive. they
tainIy deserve. the fullest attention in Europe
but for the preOccupatiOn OF all minds with the
South African war and with the further COM
pIications TO which that may possibly give
rise. Things being what they are. little is said
IN England about the convention; and
though some of our newspapers comment on
the fact that no consideration has been given
by the United States for the concession by
England OF what had been held to be valuable
right possessed by her under the Clayton Bull
wer Treaty, the general goodwill toward the
United States and the desire TO retain the
friendship of the American people have con-
tributeG along with the preoccupation already
mentioned to check any complaints that might
otherwise have been heard
It is Of course, not yet known in England
what action the United States will be likely to
take now that its hands are free. But assum-
ing that IT decides to support either the Mic
aFagua schema or the Panama scheme, and that
a canal WILL within the next few years be con-
structed and placed under the control OF the
United States. the consequences for all maritime
Powers must be far reaching. They VIII affect
not only the commerce Of the world. but also its
political relations
RESULTS FROM THE sUEZ CANAL.
IN thinking Of these consequences. ones mind
naturally turns to the suez Canal. the only
great precedent applicable and TO the conse-
quences for Europe and Asia which have fol-
lowed from It's opening. II was long opposed
by Lord Palmerston. as likely to be prejudictal
10 the political interests Of Britain as a Power
with interests both in the Mediterranean and in
India. Whether he will prove in the long run
TO have been right does not yet appear. for
England has not since the canal was finished
been at war with any European Power.
It IS commonly assumed that the canal has
greatly benefited Britain because it has IN
doubtedly stimulated trade with India, and be-
cause the bulk OF that trade is carried in Brit
ism vessels. But there IS point in which 1t
has injured Britain. When cargoes came from
India and the Further East around the Cape
OF Good Hope. London and Liverpool were the
ports TO which they mostly came, and from
London or Liverpool they were, unless destined
for consumption within the United Kingdom
reshipped 70 various parts OF the European
Continent. Now. however, the goods destined
for the countries which have ports on the Med
iterranean. instead OF going through England
come direct from the East Marseilles.
Genoa, Trieste. or Odessa. and England loses
the gain which she formerly had in the handling
OF these goods. This is an obviously natural
result OF the opening OF a shorter waterway
from the Mediterranean TO the Orient. But It
was. II not absolutely Unforeseen. al any rate
very little discussed before the opening OF the
SUez Canal The circumstances Of the Panama
Cor Nicaragua Canal are too different 10 make
4 close parallel possible. But the Suez case may
be cited TO show how results which the world
has not contemplated may flow from a change
IN the possibilities OF sea carriage.
THE SUEZ CANAL AND EGYPT
What difference the existence Of the Suez
Canal will make in case Of q European war we
do not yet know II has been formally neutral
lied. but how the naturalization will work out
in practice remains to be seen. One political re-
suit, however. 1t has already had-a result OF
the highest Importance. IL has carried the
English into Egypt, and from Egypt into Cen
traI Africa In 1873 Lord BeaconsheIds Ad-
ninistration purchased large number OF shares
in the canal company. and when troubles sub
seQuently arose in Egypt. troubles which u
tirnately eliminated IN the military rising under
Arab Pacha in 1852 the possession OF these
shares as well as the interest which England
had in the keeping open and control OF the short
waterway 10 India, was constantly urged as
reason why she should interfere in Egypt 10 sup
port the Khedive against his own subjects and
10 prevent him from becoming subject TO French
influences. The intervention Of 1882, which by
the battle OF Tel Ell Kebir placed Egypt under
British control would almost certainly nOs have
taken place but for the existence OF the canal
and the notion that England was bound by her
own interests 10 see 70 its safety. The Occupa-
I ton OF Egypt by British troops has continued
I from lSS2 till to-day, has become far
maneut in its character than IL was az first has
intensified the rivalry OF England and France,
and has led 10 a nOminally Egyptian. but prac-
t!cally British. reCOnQuest OF the Valley OF the
Upper Nile. But for the canal. England would
not now be at Khartoum and Fashoda and
! possibly she would not now be in Uganda. Her
! East African ambitions are all due 10 the fact
that De Lesseps pierced the isthmus OF Suez, a
result OF which neither he nor the French nor
any one else in the world had the smallest idea.
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