The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1900-09-15

reputation, who welcome our sovereignty,
against the. designing majority, whose
first demand after the surrender OF Ma
Mia by the Spanish army was to enter
the city that they might loot 1t and de-
stroy those not In sympathy with their
selfish and treacherous designs
No Promise of Independence.
Nobody who will avail himself OF the
facts will longer hold that there was any
alliance between our soldiers and the in
surgents, or that any promise of inde-
fore their leader had reached Manila they
American army would give them arms
with which to fight the Spanish army.
they would later turn upon us, which
they did murderously and without the
shado Nv ~ fbos eu without sbe 81 h S
information, who believe that we were
in alliance with the insurgents and that
Independence. To such let me repeat the
facts. On the 26th of May. 1898, Admiral
Dewey was instructed by me to make
in the Philippines that would incur liza
bility to maintain their cause in the flu
ture, and he replied, under der date OF June
OF departments instructions from the
beginning. and 1 have entered into 40
alliance with the insurgents or with any
faction. This squadron can reduce the
defences of Manila at any moment, but
It is considered useless until the arrival
Of sufficient United States forces to re-
tain possession" In the report of the
first Philippine commission, submitted
on November ?, 1899, Admiral Dewey. one
mo alliance OF any kind was entered into
with Aguinaldo nor was any promise of
Gen. Merritt arrived in the Philippines on
July 20. 1895, and dispatch from Admiral
Dewey to the government at Washington
said: Merritt arrived yesterday Situa-
tion Is most critical at Manila The Spanish
may surrender at any moment Merritts
most difficult problem will be how to deal
NIT W n
have become aggressive and even threat
ening toward our army" Here is revealed
the spirit of the insurgents as early as July
1898, before the protocol was signed, while
we were still engaged in active war with
Spain. Even then the insurgents were
threatening our army.
On August 10 Manila was captured, and of
this and i,s subsequent. , events the phiiPpine
Mia was taken, August 10, the F'ilipinos
took no part in the attack, but came fol-
lowing In with view to looting the city,
our forces preventing them from entering.
Aguinaldo claimed that he had the right to
occupy, the city; he demanded Of Gen.
self and the cession of all the churches of
Manila; also that a part of the money
taken from the Spaniards as spoils of war
should be given up and above all that he
should be given the arms of the Spanish
prisoners. All of these demands were re-
Gems. Merritt. Greene and Anderson, who
were In command at the beginning of our
occupation ana until the surrender of Ma
Mia, state that there was no alliance with
the insurgents and no promise made to
them OF independence. on August II, 1895,
Gen. Merritt was instructed that there
must be no joint occupation of Manila with
the insurgents. Gen. Anderson under date
Of February 10, 1900, says that he was pres.
emit at the interview between Admiral
Dewey and the insurgent leader, and that
in this interview Admiral Dewey made no
uinaido) asked me IL my government was
going TO recognize his government. an
swered that was there simply in a mill
tary capacity: that could not acknowl-
edge his government because had no au-
thority to do So"
No other Course open.
Would not our adversaries have sent Dew
ey's fleet to Manila to capture and destroy
pachns Il hsfe SoSd ses or wills
drawn 1t after the destruction of the
Spanish fleet; and Il the latter whittier
Where could h It have rs gone? what port
In the orient was opened to II? Do our
adversaries condemn the expedition under
Gen. Merritt to strengthen Dewey in the
distant ocean, and assist in our tri-
umph over Spain: with which nation we
were at war? Was II not our highest
duty to strike Spain at every vulnerable
point. that the war might be successful
ly concluded at the earliest practicable
moment? And was 1t not our duty to
protect the lives and property of those
who came within our control by the for
tunes OF war? Could we have come away
at any time between May ], 1898, and
the conclusion of peace without stain
upon our good name? Could we have
come away without dishonor at any time
after the ratification of the peace treaty
by the senate OF the United States?
There has been no time since the de-
struction of the enemys fleet when we
could or should have left the Philippine
archipelago. After the treaty of peace
was ratified, no power but congress could
surrender our sovereignty ALLEVIATE a
foot of the territory thus acquired The
congress has not seen fit TO do the one
authority to do either, IL he had been so
inclined, which he was not. So long as
the sovereignty remains In us It Is the
duty OF the executive, whoever he may
be, to uphold that sovereignty. and II
Il be attacked TO suppress its assailants:
Would our political adversaries do less?
1t has been asserted that there would
have been no fighting in the Philippines
II congress had declared its purpose TO
give independence to the TaRal lnsur-
gents. The insurgents did not wait for
the action of congress. They assumed
the offensive, they opened fire on our
army. Those who assert our responsible
ity for the beginning of the conflict have
forgotten that before the treaty was rau-
fed in the senate and while 1t WAS be,
Ing debated in that body, and while the
Bacon resolution was under discussion,
on February, 4. 1899. the insurgents at
tackled the American army, after being
previously advised that the American
forces were under orders not to fire upon
found in the recentiy-captured archives
Of the Insurgents demonstrate that this
attack had been carefully planned lor
weeks before II occurred Their unpro-
voked assault upon ouYrsoldiers at Tune
when the senate was celebrating upon
the treaty shows that no action on our
part except surrender and abandonment
would have prevented the lighting and
leaves no doubt in any fair mind or
where the responsibility rests for the
shedding of American blood.
The Real Issue.
With all the exaggerated phrase-maklng
OF this electoral contest, we are In danger
of being diverted from the real contens
ton. We are in agreement with all Oh
those who supported the war with spain,
and also with those who counseled the
ratification of the treaty OF peace. upon
these two great essential steps there can
be no issue, and out of these came az
of our responsibilities. II others would
shirk the obligations imposed by the war
and the treaty, we must decline 10 ACT
further with them, and here the issue
was made. 1t Is our purpose to estabnsn
in the Philippines a goyernment suitable
TO the wants and conditions OF the In
habitants and to prepare them for SELF.
government when they are ready Tor IL
and as rapidly as they are ready for IL
That am aiming to do under my con-
stitutional authority, and will continue
TO do until congress shall determine the
political status of the inhabitants OF the
archipelago