Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1900-02-12
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: Africa. and portion Of the garrison
was diverted 70 Glencoe for the protec-
ton Of a coal mine. The headquarters
stan may not have been responsible for
the first lines Of colonial defense, but II
must be held accountable for the strate-
glc blunder OF shutting up Sir George
Whites garrison in Ladysmith instead
Of directing him TO retreat lighting at
the Tugela. and then al the Moot rYer,
and keeping open bis communications
with the sea. II this had been done, he
would have received relniurcements py
the middle Of November and the siege
and fai OF Ladysmith would have been
avoided.
PARADE GEREKALSHIP.
Sir Redysrs Butler left England with
his plan Of campaign clearly outlined
His army corps was 20 march through
the Free state ana Sir George White
was To hold the enemy In check by re-
naming quiet in Ladysmith. Lord
Wolseley during the FIRST month Of the
war had one comment TO repeat TO his
friends and that was. white has only
to stay still and wait for Butler 70 be-
gin his march" These were Aldershot
conceptions based upon peace training,
without reference to the realities Of mil
itary defense and actual warfare with
the Beers Sir Redyers Butler aban-
doned his plan Of campaign when he
reached South Africa, substituted q
march 10 Modder river for the Bloem-
fonten- Pretoria parade and after drag.
cling the bulk OF the army corps and
Warrens division into Natal put 1000
men out OF action In two unsuccessful
attempts FOR the relief of Ladysmith.
Lord Methuen's attack upon Mayors
fouteln, IN which the Highland brigade
advanced In column formation, WAS
planned as q sham fight would have
been on Salisbury plain, without
thought Of an actual hostile force any
where In the field.
Col Longs recklessness in carrying
his guns beyond the reach Of his sup
porting infantry was q sham battle
maneuver which would have brought
upon him q reprimand even at Alder
shot. There have been feint attacks
reconnaissance In force, column forma-
lions and drill book tactics from the
beginning to the end Of the campaign,
and the generals have never seemed 10
realize that they were not maneuverlng
In Salisbury plain, but were leading men
under fire in battle with the Beers.
NOT LIKE GRANT AND LEE.
1t is impossible for Americans who /
remember the training % their own |
Civil war 70 think of soldiers Ike Grant /
and Lee attacking strongly intrenched /
positions and conducting turning move |
ments after the manner OF Of Lord I
Methuen and Gen. Butler. They would /
not have fought three battles without 1
scouting or reconnaissance, as Lord /
Methuen did. and then have flung their /
army against strong position like I
Magersfontein I'm frontal attack where /
the resistance was greatest. without an
attempt az maneuyering; and II defeat
ed they would not have remained idle
In camp for weeks waiting for REIN
forcements which were not In reserve.
They would not have retreated from
Colenso or Spion kop after single fu-
tile attack, but would have dug their
way up 10 the enemy's positions max
ing closer maps day by day, and grad
ually enyeloping them and rendering
them untenable.
The British stad has allowed the
Dutch TO do all the maneuvering and
all the digging and TO choose every bat
tlcfeld and defensive position, and when
there Is an impasse 1t orders the troops
back 10 camp 10 play football and crick-
ct until there are achievements for
another frontal attack. II is Aldershot
generalshlp that has brought reproach
on England and created crisis in the
fortunes Of the empire.
WILL TAKE 100000 MEN.
London, Feb. 12-Winston Churchill
sends from Frere Camp to the Morn
ing Post long review Of the situation.
He says.
Gen Butler always thought It i'm
possible 10 hold the triangle Of Natal
north OF the Tugela, but the initial mis-.
take was make owing 20 the miscalucu.
Iations o. the Boer strength. and the
fact that millions worth OF stores had
been collected at Ladysmith. From the
first he regarded the relief OF Lady
smith rs a forlorn hope. He did not
ieel justified In ordering a subordinate
10 perform such a doubtful task
THE absence OF good maps has cost
much blood. An attempt 10 thrust the
anerhy back from Brakfontein OF
Doornkloof would have cost 5000 men,
md since. al least. two brlgades must
Seep the door open behind us. too few
would have remained TO force the way
o Ladysmlth Moreover, General Bull
er remembers his army Is the only
Irmy for the defense ~ the rest Of Ma. I
al. Therefore. he decided TO withdraw 4
md try elsewhere. =
Another fierce attempt win be made j
o force the Tugela. Great Britain {
must realize the ugly fact that the re- I
ief Of Ladysmith would strain an army {
4 $1,000. and that 100000 men would b
lot be too strong The country there {
ore. must be prepared FOR heavy loss
md perhaps. FOR disappointment. y
Remembering that considerations Of ii
Ionor. more than policy. demand cease
ess effort 10 relieve Ladysmi,h. the Y
Whole army, despite disappointment 4
nd retreat. regards General Butler :,
With sympathy and trust. such as are a
eldom seen even in fortunate circum- \
tancos. a
"The security of southern Natal Il
ur important consideration. The ne a
esslty Of obtaining control ~ Delagoa n
lay f. very apparent The ingress OF s.
oreigners and war material "a cease =
,ss Surely, a settlement with Portu- :,
al would be only a question Of
ioncv' 4,
noBERTs At M0DDER RIVER. q
Modder River. Feb. io.-Lori ROBBERS (