The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-02-04
HIS GREATEST FAILURE.
Napoleon and the Campaign to the
Russian Capital.


Such a book as Hereford Georges INA
poleon's Invasion of Russia" is the more
interesting at just this time on account of
the wars that are being waged and the
comparisons it is possible to draw. Those
who remember the preparations made for
the carrying on of the campaign against
Santiago de Cuba or the city of Manila, or
the raising of the sixty thousand troops
now in the Philippines, or can turn from
those efforts TO note the size Of the armies
Great Britain is forced to put in the field
in South Africa as the result of the Beers
higher military efficiency. will read of Ma
poleon's invasion of Russia with renewed
respect for his qualities as an organizer,
leader and general
1t was as early as the beginning of 1911
that the French Emperor saw that war
could not be delayed for any great length
Of time, and that Russia must be humbled
If he were to carry out his most treasured
ideas of empire. 1t is then that he is found
making his preparations for what Mr..
George calls, not only Napoleon's great
est military enterprise" but 1.-The greatest
In authentic history" At the beginning of
the next year, 1872, he disclosed his pur-
pose more clearly, entering into a treaty
with Austria which provided for that
powers furnishing a contingent. Prussia
and the Rhenish confederation were mere
ly directed to provide auxiliaries, without
the formality of a treaty, so low had what
is now the German empire fallen In the
world.
The total force. French and allies. which
entered into this stupendous undertaking,
crossing the continent of Europe to attack
the Russian in his capital, was stupendous,
including 1,2i2 cannon, 96,519 cavalry, 119,
902 horses, and 33,479 foot soldiers, This
does not include the artillerymen, the en-
gineers and the more highly specialized
and staff, which swells the enormous expe-
ditiop into one not far from $4,000 souls.
In abrupt contrast to this host is set the
Russian army for defense, which at the
outset numbered few, If any, more than
213,000 men, increased afterward by $4,000
men from Finland and Moldavia. But ii
is not to be forgotten that Russia was OPP
Grating within her own lines, on her own
soil, and in the midst of a population IA
natically patriotic.
1t was a passive rather than an active
defense which Russia adopted, following
the example which Spain had set in such
desperate resistances as the two at Sara
gossa, and avoiding an open and decisive
engagement in the field as far as possible
These measures would not have proved ef-
ficient had not the Napoleonic armies been
fairly overwhelmed by their own magni-
tude. The great Frenchman would not adj
NIT that anything impossible, and ii
would seem that he needed the lesson to
be taught him. His commissary failed al
most abjectly-and that is the one depend
ence of an army in the field. 1t provided
few supplies, and there were none to be
had in Russia.
Even after Moscow was destroyed
whether by intention or accident is beside
the purpose-no greater disaster might
have come upon the French IL they had
understood what lay before them. But all
from the emperor down, seemed to be in q
dream. The spoils from the Russian capita
were enormous and most valuable; yet al
the silver and precious fabrics in the worlt
would not allay the pangs of hunger mol
warm the frozen bodies of the troops which
burdened themselves with them at the cosI
of their provisions. The winter, contrary
to the usual impression, was more thar
ordinarily late in falling. AT the outset ne
armies of any size threatened their free
passage from the Muscovite dominion. The
overwhelmed the French were almost al
due to the corrupter Of persons and nation:
alike-greed.
BY way of final warning to those whit
seek to add empire to possessions right
fully held an analysis of the battles OF
Velutino and Borodino shows Napoleon Il
have been almost at his worst in those en-
gagements, displaying few or none of those
great qualities for military success which
made him the genius he unQuestionably
was. Mr.. George will not allow that he
was suffering from temporary indiSp0Sitior
such as his admirers like to attribute al
his mistakes to, but holds that Napoleon
here, like Homer in his poems, was really
nodding-failing to bring his great powers
of mind to bear upon the events stirring be-
fore him.