The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-01-30
BULLERS PREGARIoUS POSITION


forces are by no means yet out of the
woods. 1t seems to be settled that Dun
dOnald's cavalry brigade is safe with War
ren's division south of the TugeIa As
Buffers latest message was dated at Spear
mans Camp, 1t is presumed that he has
not yet abandoned his positions in the
neighborhoOd of Potgieter's Drift. and this
view is further supported by the under
standing that Lyttleton.s brigade has not
been moved. These facts or assumptions
would indicate that, at latest accounts, the
British line extended from ZunckIes. the
point to which Warren probably fell back.
TO Mount Alice and Zw8rts KOp. and so
on to the right held by Barton at or near
Cheveley.
An analysis OF the new line situation
WOULD seem to show that the British army
Is in a position of imminent peril. 1t may
be assumed that. when spion Kop was at
tackled the bulk OF Buffers available
force was at and beyond Springfield. As
Tar as we can judge the troops under Bar
ton. holding the right AT Colenso, could not
have amounted TO more than two brigades.
and there should have been another be-
tween Barton and LyttletOn to support
either as might be required. AS we have
seen, Buffers left was crushed and com
PEELED to retreat In case that disaster
we're considered reason for general re
treat such a movement would be hindared
and hampered by the congestion Of the
Transport and ammunition trains. drawn
by oxen and mules. on the Frere and Est
court roads, only one of which might be
available east of Springfield in view of a
possible attack on the British right from
COlenso. The British infantry with its
unnecessarily heavy equipment is always
SLOW. So, even an unOpposed retrogression
would not be rapid We can hardly believe
that 1t would be or is being unopposed,
judging from the tactics hitherto displayed
by de Vnlebois- MareuH.
Buffers left being defeated and driven
back with frightful loss. and the army be-
ing enCUmbered with its wounded and cam
paign supplies, it would be the most natu-
raj thing in the world for de villebois- Ma
reuil TO rush every available reserve down
to Colenso and strike Barton. with a view
to defeat the British right and either cut
1t on from the main body. or rout It; in
either case securing command of Buffers
rear and communications. The success OF
such movement would bag the British
! commander on two difficult roads. blocked
With impedimenta Of all kinds. and render
an attack upon him in reverse an attrac-
| tive operation. He could then be forced to
| tight on Two II not three fronts; for. with
the BOers swinging around from CoIenso
to Springfield, their right would De in a po-
sition, even without a supporting move
ment from DewdrUp, 10 strike Lyttleron at
zwarts Kop, while it is to be presumed
/ that some force would move around BY AC-
/ ton Homes and harass if it did not give
/ battle TO Warren on the British left
/ The statement in OUT dispatches. that
/ large bodies Of Beers have been seen NOV
/ ing down the road from DeWdrop to Colen-
/ so. the short parallel 10 Buffers roads
/ TO the rear; and the report that Villebois-
Mareuil had gone there to take command
/ appear 70 be sufficient evidence that q
I movement such as We have outlined has
| been indeed planned by the BOer tao
/ ticisns and it would be very strange 10
| the circumstances II a. we're net attempted
| One cannot be sure in matters OF this
kind As We have often remarked. posi-
| tive knowledge OF strictly local military
! conditions is not to be had at this dis
/ lance We can be certain. however. tha,
| an American general, after smashing one
/ Of his enemy's wings ana loading him uu
! with several Thousand wounded soldiers,
/ in a dihicult country with exposed cOmmu-
/ nications, would not be apt 70 sit down
/ on his partial success and call it a holt
/ day. On such general reasoning it is
/ within bounds 10 conclude that another
battle will be-perhaps has been-fought
/ before the net results OF Buffers attempi
/ 20 relieve Ladysmith. by turning the Boer
/ right, can be determined.
! II would be useless at this hour TO at
/ tempt to theOrize about Ladysmith The
| expressions Of some military writer's in the
London press today strike US as little
short Of wild. The idea that Sir George
White would think Of trying to cut ont BY
way OF the railway 20 CoIenso Is simply
| foolish. If We know anything about the
conditions on that line. The railway. as
il has been described in reports and let
| tiers. winds through a narrow gorge dOmi-
| mated by precipitous heights, and a small
force could barTiCade and hold it anywhere
against a large one. It is possibly true
that White. rather than capitulate and
surrender his guns ammunition. and
stores, may destroy most Of them and
make a sortie en- masse; but there doe:
mot appear TO be any reason for suppOsinl
/ that the effort would be successful IN
bringing him into juncture with his friends
\ Apparently his best chance for eut-out
appeared when Dundonald and Clery were
around the Boer righl between Actor
Homes and Tintwa. II it were impossibl,
for him to take advantage OF Il, we esnnot
see that the same movement would bt
feasible now, with the British left whip
| ped and pushed back below the TugeIa
Probably the only advantage White could
gain by a sOTtie would be the destruction
instead OF the surrender OF his armament
| and so on; but it must not be forgotten
that the cost in life would be terrible. an6
the surrender in the field OF a shattered
remnant Of the garrison would follow. es II
seems inevitably.