The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1900-08-16

emphasized the fdct GnaG no part OF Gne
county was excepted from the operation of
the later act and concluded by saying that
No principle is better established than that
a subsequent act, which is inconsistent with
and repugnant to a former act operates as a
repeal of the former act, even though it does
not so provide in express terms The latest
case ON the subject is that of State VS.. North
ern Central Railway Company, As At Rep.
465. There the act of 1880 had provid-
ed that this railway company should only
pay one half of one per cent, on its gross re
ceipts and the act of 1890 which was gen
eral law, imposed a tax OF one per cent. ON
the gross receipts of all railroads, The
Court of Appeals held that the act of 1880 re
pealed that of 1880, and quoted from Appeal
Tax Court VS.. Western Maryland Il. X. Co.,
SO M. 296, that The general doctrine ON the
subject of implied repeals is that where
there are two acts on the same subject, both
are to be given effect if possible. If, how
ever, the two acts are plainly repugnant to
each other in any of their provisions the
later act, without any repeating clause, win
operate to the extent of the repugnancy as
a repeal of the first; and even where the two
acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet
If the later act covers the whole subject OF
the first and embraces new provisions show
ing that it was intended as substitute for
the first act, it will operate as a repeal OF
that act
"0ther authorities might be cited, but we
do not deem it necessary, as it seems to us
to have been the intention of the Legislature
to legislate on the whole subject Of the ap
pointment OF school commissioners for
every county in the state, without any reser-
walton, and it added new and important
provisions for minority representation, etc.
The Act of 1900, therefore in our opinion, re
pealed the Act of 1898, so far as there is con-
fiict between them, and in terms repealed
section of the latter Act, as it was q part of
Sec. of Art. n of Code of Public General
Laws, which the Act of 1900 expressly repealed
and reenactcd without making any exception
in favor of Garrett county. 1t took effect on
March the lst, 1900, and therefore the qualif1-
cation in May of the commissioners elected
under the Act of 1898 was of no effect. the
law under which they were elected having
been previously repealed. There can be no
question about the right of the Legislature
to pass such a law, although it legislates out
of office parties already elected. Andrews
vs.. Baker, 23 Nd, 627; Warfield VS.. County
Commissioners, 2s Md, "a; 10 Ency. of Law.
sep.
"A number OF technical questions were
raised by the defendants and we will briefly
refer to such as we deem necessary. We do
not understand that we are called upon in
| this case to determine whether +. A. Brown
| ing was the successor of u. G. Palmer, when
| the petition was filed. 1t is therefore i'm
material whether the Act of 1909 and section
| IS of the Act OF 1898 authorized the new
| board to elect an examiner i'll May, or
whether they should have waited until
| August, but as the Act of 1860 provided that
| their terms of office should be from the first
! Monday i'll May next succeeding their ap-
pointment. they mquestionably had the
right on and after date to organize to the
extent of electlng a president. The petition
| alleges that they did elect Mr.. Hamill.
The answer admits that Mr.. Hamin pre-
| sented himself alone at the rooms occupied
by the Board of County School Commission
ers OF Garrett county in the town OF Oakland,
and then and there pretended to make a de-
mand upon your respondent, Ulysses G. Pal
mer, for the books, money, etc, and that the
! demand was refused because Mr.. Hamill
was not his successor The answer shows
that Mr.. Palmer claimed to be the secretary
mand on him we think was sufficient under
the decision of Hooper VS.. Farnan, IS Nd. GOO
and the County Commissioners VS.. Banks, sc
| Md. 325, as he was the representative of the
old board. 1t was not necessary for the pc
titioners to go to the homes and places OF
business of the members of the old board
when their secretary was in possession of the
ONCE and property claimed. 1t would not
| ont Nf tN1a TO haxy 40 for
NAL demand in writing and to have serv,
ed it on all that could be found, but as the
object of the demand was to get possession
of the ONCE and property, we can see no rea
son why the petitioners could not make it OF
the representative of the old board who was
in possession of them.
Nor do we think that the objection raised
by the defendant that the proceeding in thu
name of the board instead of the individuals
composing it was erroneous is well taken. w,
have already said that the three parties Al
legged in the petition to be the board wer,
legally such. That being so, they had thu
right to proceed in the name OF the board t.
recover possession of the office, etc. Tit
cases of Hooper VS.. Farnan, IS Md. 600 ant
School Commissioners VS.. Goldsborough, 4
At. Rep. 1866, seem to justify the proceedin'
, in the name Of the board.
1.-The demurrer to the answer mounts III
, to the petition. The relief claimed is broad
, er than authorized. The petition not onl,
, proceeds against the members of the ol'
board, but against Mr.. Palmer and asks tha
they Jointly and severally be required to sur
+ render the office of board of county schoo
commissioners of Garrett county, and al
the property, estates, effects, money, funds
, claims and state donations which belong t
or by law vest in the board, etc. 1t is tru
, that under Section 20, all the property, funds
4 etc. are vested In the board, but by Sectio
, ", the examiner is required to give bon
which is responsible for his turning over t
9 his successor such things as are therein mef
, toned The examiner is the bonded once
p and the members of the board are not, an
! | he must account to his successor for his book
| vouchers, etc. The petitioners have tn
o right to require the defendants to surrende
y the ofiice, the furniture and other propert
| of the board, but no such things ds the exam
iner is liable to his successor for. This wa
q conceded at the argument, but the petitio
O does not distinguish between the none.
:, books, etc, to be accounted for by the exam
d insr, and the property which the board d
v such has the right to the possession Of ind'
q pendent of the examiner. Possibly tn
If might be regulated by the order of the Cour