The Oskaloosa herald., 1900-11-22
RI MLEY'S OPINION.
Attorney General on the Titus
Amendment.

General Remley's opinion on the de
fects in the Titus Amendment is as
follows:
Des Moines, Iowa, Nov "a, 1000
Hon. J. J. Crossley, Winterset, Iowa.
My Dear Sir: Yours of the 10th inst.
at hand, requesting my construction of
the constitutional amendment adopted at
the last election, especially with refer
ence to its effect as to extending the
office of county recorder
In regard thereto | will say that the
constitutional amendment seems to have
been drafted upon the idea that the terms
Of office begin on the first day of Janu-
airy and terminate on the 3Ist of Deem
Der of the following year, but unfotrun-
ately this is not the case. BY section 1000
of the code the terms of Office commence
on the first Monday of January after the
general election at which the officers are
elected except first, that of the govern
or and the lieutenant governor, which
commence on the second Monday of
January next following their election
Constitution article 4, section I5), and
second, the members of the house of
representatives, whose terms of office
commence on the first day of January
next after their election Constitution
article 3, section 81, and third, judges
OF the supreme ana district courts,
whose terms of Office commence on the
first day of January Constitution arti-
Gle 5, section ~. The terms of Office
of all other officers under section 1000,
commence on the first Monday of Janu-
airy next after their election.
The following clause of the consttu-
tional amendment is the one in which
the doubtful meaning arises, viz. "The
term OF Office of the judges of the SUI
preme court, which would otherwise ex-
pire in odd numbered years, and all 9TH
er elective state, county and township
officers whose terms of office would ex-
pire in the year one thousand nine hun
dred and one, and the members of the
general assembly whose successors
would otherwise be chosen at the gen.
eral election in the year one thousand
nine hundred and one are hereby extend
ed one year and until their successors
are elected and qualified" This clause,
if taken in its literal sense. disassociated
from other parts of the said amendment,
would undoubtedly extend the terms OF
office of all officers whose terms expire
the first Monday of January, 1901, for
one year, and would not extend the
terms of office of those officers whose
terms expire the first Monday of Janu-
ary 1902.
The result, however, is to my mind
the reverse of what was intended by the
f,.y1 IL
pie by whom the amendment was adopt
ted. | do not think there is any difficulty
in arriving at the intent OF the consti-
tutional amendment The purpose was
to have biennial elections and to abolish
the election heretofore held in the odd
numbered years. The constitutional
amendment does not disarrange the
terms of office of those who have been
elected in the past in the even numbered
years. In order to have all officers
elected in the same year it became nee
essary to extend the term of office of
those who were elected in the odd num-
bered years one year. This intent is, to
my mind, plainly indicated. Nor do
think there will be any disagreement
among courts, lawyers or laymen that
such was the intent of the two general
assemblies by which the proposed
amendment was submitted to the elect
ors who adopted it.
SHALL PEOPLES WILL De THwARTED.
The question thus presented is this :
Shall the misuse of a word or a few
words, or the insertion by mistake of
one word for another defeat the plain in
tent and meaning of the amendment?
Shall the literal meaning of a word or
clause be adopted which thwarts the
will of the people as expressed in the
amendment than as a whole? Are the
courts pOwerless to carry out the plain
intention of the amendment because of
mistake in one word, or the unfortun-
ate use of clause? Reason. justice and
broad sense say that each Of these ques-
tons must be answered in the negative. |
1t would be sad commentary upon the |
law and the courts to say that they |
hold to the contrary
But the law does not so hold. The !
courts are not powerless to give effect to |
the intention of the amendment. There |
is no difference in the construction or in
depreciation of a constitutional provis- !
ion and a statute. Both are interpreted |
by the same rules of construction. The |
being the fundamental law,
is by the courts presumed to have been
with more care and delibera-
ton than an, ordinary statute. But the
same rules are applied in constituting a
as are applied in constituting
a statute
In Sunderland on Statutory Construc-
ton, section 24o it is said: "The pre-
is that the law maker has def
mite purpose in every enactment, and
mas adapted and formulated the subsi-
diary provisions in harmony with that
purpose; that these are needful to ac-
,omplish il, and that, if they have the
effect, they will at least conduce
% effectuate it. That purpose is an inn
olied limitation on the sense of general
erms and touch stone for the expan-
sion of narrower terms. This intention
Affords key to the sense and scope of
minor provisions. From this assump-
ion proceeds the general rule that the
cardinal purpose or intent of the whole
,e interpreted as subsidiary and harmon
GUS. They are to be brought into har-
nony, if possible and so constructed
hat no clause, sentence or word shall be
Ioid, surperfious or Insignificant. But
where word in statute would make
he clause in which it occurs unintelli-
yible, the word may be eliminated and
he clause read without it."
Again in section 24I: Words and
.lauses in different parts of a statute