The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1900-10-03
N RECENT NAvAL MANaUysEs.
4 Consideration Of the Results at NsrraEsn-
sttt From an Army Point OF View.

"N fEb" an army RUM W '''"'
Great public interest has been taken In the
recent mannuvrcs at NarrHgansett Bay. The
first pres, reports were to the enect
thai tho shiIs had not succeeded In passing
the forts. Later reports laid great stress
On the brauty u the manpuvr's and the
valuable lessons 10 be gained theretrom,
aud added that the Board Of ArDitfamcnt had
decided that the ships did pass the forts but ina
badly crippled condition, In an article IA inc
lat issue OF the Armv Gnd Navy journal II ~
stated that the BOARD " ArbitfHmcnt hus de-
cidcd that the feet were successful IN las'ing,
but no mention Is made Of he dan ages they sus-
tanned. II would be- interesting to know why
the final decision Is apparently at variance with
the results as observed on the spot, The gem
eral conditions Of the problem, AS we understood
Il. were as follows:
The manpuyres were planned ard were under
the control OF a Board Of A~rbitrainent COM
20 ed " four ,flcrrs Of the navy and one
officer OF the army The programme prepared
By ia = board n .sumrd a hostile feet TO be out
side the harbor attempting to force an entrance.
Opposing thi, was IA line OF forte. aided by a
friendly fleet weaker than the enemy and Iylnglh'
side tho harbor. The board assumed thatthe hos
tie fleet had cleared a pHssageNay through the
submarine mine field occupying the waters IN
the vicinity Of the forts. Conditions had been
prescribed regarding the stimulation oil nre.
periods Of fire from forts and ships necessary 10
destroy men-of-war. cruisers and torpedo
boats &c, and Naval and Marine Corps officers
were stationed as umpires at the forts and on
the ships.
Under these cond lions the hostile fleet at
tempted TO enter Newport harbor about Q
o'clock on Monday evening, Sept. % The ships
entrr,d In column. the s,archights OF the ships
- a. V.- "a I.- --a MT md fTttnA
belching forth flame. the sight being indescrib-
abI, grand A. the ships approached the forts
the gun- Of the latter were brought TO bear
directly upon them. and the ships were, one by
one. Obliged to acknowledge defeat by hosting
their IEnts. Four OF tbs torpedo boats at
TEMPTED 10 enter by the west channel and were
put out OF action by the guns Of Fort GreDle'
The larger ships each OF which was assumed
TO represent severa, battcships. entered by tho
eastern channel. The torpedo boats also came
in by this channel. The FIRST one was admit
ted to have been sunk By the rapld-lre
gu $ Of the forts, and hoisted It's
lights, the second was claimed by the forts TO
be sunk, but this was not admitted by the OH
GERS Of the boat; the third, owing TO the deh-
cheney Of searchlights at the forts. succeeded In
getting by and threw a torpedo at the Msssa-
chusetts, but Immediately afterward ran into
a stone wharf. the pilot having been blinded by
the action Of q search,ight on shore.
This is the first time in the history OF our
country that manpuvres OF this nature have
been carried on. and it is natural that they
should be siudlel most closely with a view 10
a-pertaining the lessons 10 he learned from
them. 1t Is to be- noticed.
FilSt That the Naval Board assumed chan
mel C,cated of mines. We. however. know Of no
instance m i-toTy OF successful counlermlnlng
against modern mines on the part oi a nret II
.-, b. yVar .,tr Aptp apHeT. did NOT run he
lisa = uSIng a WHrsu . in attempting TO force
The min dhafuofs iiher at san Juan or al Santi'
ago II may be safely assumed that there Is nc
sure way OF cou; teriuining against a lnodrrn
mine field well backed by the nre OF inou-TI
forts, and the point having been eVaded In tlt
programme the ~luanRuvres must therefore, pt
looked upon a. a simulated war game rather
than an attempt TO force a harbor under actua
Serondly-The value Of the searchlights was
conclusively shown by the ~lnanpuvres. IL wa
only by mean OF the limited number OF search
lights they possessed that the forts were en-
abled to accomplish such exc llent results. Inc
feet was thoroughly equipped win search
lights. and at times was teInporarlly spccessIu
in overpowcring the searchlights Of The forts
We assume that this will not be possible " het
the full complement OF searchlghts has Deer
'ThiTdiy-i il has been suggested that the line
OF defence at Narragansett Bay Is too FAR with
drawn. that It should be brought forward aPou
three mile. and placed at the headlands. IL i
true that this would enable the foris 10 com
mence fire earlier on the fleet; but on. the otheI
hand il would D. pfaCtlc3illN lnpo1~lule 70 eSNulF
l-h an Elective mine field on I . outer line. II
view Of the further fact that tho cities and IN
main waters To be- defended are II
lar yithdrawn from the ocean at Nara
rIns-tt BAY, " seems To us wise that tn,
forts have been built sufficiently lar bacl
from the headland- to permit them TO concen
trats tn .Ir fire upon the ships, one at a time, a
The lattor advance In column up the narroY
channel. In fact, the facility with which thi
was done in the mGnpuvres shows the wisdom
Of The selection Of the interior line for the mail
line Of defence.
Fourthly- Help from the friendly fleet Tn
mannuyras Of the second night, when the tor
pedo boats attacked a DO kading fleet wit
appear at infinitely greater advantage In. IN
daieucs than IN the attack. On the first nigh
the battleships Of the friendly fleet wer
stltionrd 40 far behind the main line O
defence as TO he OF little assistance. Draw
up as they were they simply invited IN
Iorpedo attack. Had they been brought VI
closer TO the mine field their fire would have as
sisted the forts. The conclusion 10 be drawn
that torpedo boats may be OF great value 10 n
dpfenc,i in breaking up n blockade by a hosul
feet. but that warships are needlessly eN
pen-ive for purposes OF coast defence. unIes
The channel is too wide To be defended by fort
alone. .
We believe In harmonious action between tn
army and the navy, and are glad to see, any
thing looking to this end, butit seems TO be indis
!, peusable, in order to give unQueStloned value I
hnal conclusions, that the Board OF ArbitrRmer
D in these msneuyre1 should be composed of q
: equal number Of army and navy officers. III
/, fact that this was not so at Newport. ana tina
there was no apparent friction. reflects IN
D greatest credit on all concerned. EXPERT.