The National tribune., 1900-12-06

ascertaining the strength and i9sition of
the different corps of tiles army, and in
| bringing up the cavalry from the rear He
| also carefully inquired into the strength
| and position Of the cneIfg, sd far as
/ known.
On this same day Lee, with two of his
| three corps, Longstreets and Hills, was
at Chambersburg; Ewell, with two of his
| divisions, was at Carlisle, and Early, with
| the Third Division. was Mt York, Pa. In
| regard to the object of this campaign,
| Maj -Gen. a. \. Humphreys, Chief of En-
gineers, U. s. A, in his grafton on the
| death of Gen. Meade delivered at the
Academy of Music, Philadelphia, Nov. IS,
1872 says:
Let us see what Lee says rs to the
object of his presence at these points, more
than 200 miles away from Fredericksburg,
Va. In his official report of his operations
written a month after the battle of Gettys-
burg, he states that the Army of the POto-
mac occupied such position opposite Fred
erickSburg that it could not be attacked
| with advantage, and that by his moving
| northward through the great Valley of
Virginia the corresponding movements of
the Army of the Potomac would probably
offer n fair opportunity to strike a success
| full blow ut that army; that such move
ment would diSarrange our plan of cam
paign for the Summer and consume our
time, and that in addition to these advan-
tages it was hoped that other valuable re-
suits might be attained by military sue
cess. Actuated, he says, by these and
other important considerations that may
hereafter be presented, the movement be-
gan.
These other important considerations
have never yet been presented. The cam
paign having failed, it is not to be expect
ed that its great object will ever be any
more distinctly acknowledged. Let us see
further what he says in his report. The
absence of his cavalry, which was making
a raid around the Army of the Potomac,
doing no harm to it. rendered it impossible
for him Che says to obtain accurate in
formation of the movements of our army,
and he did not know whether it had cross
ed the Potomac. Preparations, he states.
were now made Ton the 2Sth and 18th of
June) to advance upon Harrisburg. This
sentence, / think, reveals the great object
of his campaign. 1t was the capture of
this city, Philadelphia"
LEES ADVANCE TO GETTYSBURG.
On the night of the Doth, Lee learned
the position of the Army of the Potomac,
and that Gen. Meade had succeeded to
the command of it. He at once counter
manded the order for the movement on
Harrisburg, and ordered the concentration
of his army at Gettysburg. On the morn
ing of the same day sGen. Meade put his
army in motion for Harrisburg, expecting
to compel Lee to turn and give battle. On
the Both the Army of the Potomac was
moving on the roads to Gettysburg, but
being entirely ignorant of the character of
the ground about that town, Gen. Meade
issued n precautionary order of instruc-
tons to the corps commanders, not to be
executed unless specially ordered at a sub
sequent time, for the concentration of his
forces on Pipe Clay Creek. some 16 d les
1T
on Manchester, and the left on Midd!eburg.
This order evinced that foresight that
proved his great ability as commander.
The same day Gen. Reynolds, with the
First and Eleventh Corps, was ordered to
move on the morning of July ] to Gettys-
burg, and report whether the position af
forded a good field of battle. Gen. Hum
phreys. then commanding the Second Div
ision of the Third Corps, was also request
ed to examine the ground in the vicinity of
Emmitsburg, to ascertain whether it af
fordcd a good position for battle.
Reynolds saw the advantage Of the po-
sition at Gettysburg, and sacrificed his life
to hold it, and here was fought the great
battle of the war. Reynolds fight for po-
sition and the retirement of his column
through Gettysburg to the strong position
south of the town, is generally known as
the first days fight The whole army was
concentrated to this position during the
night. and the next dag, the I'd. the hard
est fighting OF the three days OF battle took
place. Sickes, Unauthorized, advanced his
corps, the Third, to the Peach Orchard
line, about 400 yards in front Of the
Round Tops, the left of Meade's intended
line of battle, was attacked by Long
streets Corps and part of Hills Corps,
and after desperate and long-continued
struggle was driven back with heavy loss;
but Meade's old division, the Pa. Reserves,
arrived inst tinn tp tho RonpH
Tops, the key of his position. A fierce
and bloody struggle ensued, but the enemy
was driven back beyond the wheat field
and half of the ground lost by Sickles re-
covered. The third day opened with an
advance Of our right under Slocum, who
retook ground he had lost and rested upon
it. About , p. m. the enemy opened
heavy fire from 10 guns, which was re-
spOnded to by an equal number upon our
side, and at o'clock Picketts column of
assault emerged from behind the batteries
and swept swiftly toward the Union lines,
and was repulsed with fearful slaughter
Upon the rcpulse of the enemy Meade
ordered an advance from the left, and Nc
Candless' Brigade of Pa. Reserves cap
tured one gun of q battery. and raiding
along their lines, capturing 300 prisoners,
the flag of the 18th Ga. and recovering a
gun, 3,23S muskets, and three caissOns
REPORT of Lieut. Harding. Division Ord
nance Officer, Pa. Reserves.)
COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF TWO
ARMIES.
The losses of both armies were very
large. The returns show for the Army of
the Potomac: Killed, 3,063: wounded,
ii, 492; missing, 5,435-t0tal 22.99O: and
for the Army of Northern Virginia. Killed
1882; wounded, 1906; missing, 515O-
total 2O,44S. But the returns for the lat
ter army are not complete; some com
mands are not reported, and in others the
regimental show larger losses than do the
brigade returns, from which the foregoing
numbers are compiled. The total loss of
Lees army during the Gettysburg cam
paign in June and July was probably not
less than 10000.
As TO the comparative strength of the
two armies on the field of battle there is
no satisfactory data. The last Confeder-
ate return was for May 81, showing pres
ent for duty under arms" 59,4S4 infantry.
The morning report of the Army of the
Potomac for June 80 shows present for
duty, equipped" 77,20S infantry. Neither
return is worth much, except as a basis
for guessing; the long marches, followed
by the forced ones of July / and = OF our
army left thousands of stragglers on the
road, and the totals are Of little import
ance Besides, the Confederate returns
included only the men bearing arms, while
the Union returns included all detailed
men with the army. The whole number