The pioneer press. (Miller, Hand County, S.D.) 1893-190?, 1900-02-08
RATE CASE DECISION
Following Is the Full Text OF
Decision In the South DakO-
ia Railroad Rate Case AS
Handed Down by the U. $.
Supreme Court.
THE OPINION.

| Mr.. Justice Brewer delivered the
| opinion of the court.
Few cases are more difficult or per-
! picking than those which involve an
! inquiry whether the rates prescribed
! by a state legislature for the carriage
| Of passengers and freight are unrea-
sonable. And yet this difficulty affords
! no excuse for failure to examine and
solve the questions involved. 1t has
often been said that this is a govern
nent of laws and not of men; and by
his court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
11S u. s. 356, 369): when we con-
slider the nature and the theory OF our
institutions of government, the prin-
ciples upon which they are supposed
TO rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to
leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power.
When we recall that, as estimated,
over ten thousand millions of dollars
are invested in railroad property, the
proposition that such vast amount OF
porperty is beyond the protecting
clause of the Constitution, that the
owners may be deprived of it by the
State or nation, without any right OF
appeal to the courts, is one which can
not for a moment be tolerated. Diff
ficult as are the questions involved in
these cases, burdensome as the labor
is which they cast upon the courts, no
tribunal can hesitate to respond to the
duty of inquiry and protection cast up
Oh it by the Constitution. (Railroad
Commission Cases, lie u. S. 30I; Dow
v. Beidelman, 125 u. S. $50; Georgia
Railroad & Banking Co. ". Smith 12s
u S. 174; Chicago, Milwaukee q St.
Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota
134 U. S. 41S; Chicago & Grand Trunk
Railway Company v. Wellman, 143 IT,.
S. 339; Reagan v. Farmers Loan d
Trust Co, 154 u. S. 1862; St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway Company, V
Gill, 1876 U. S. 649; Covington &c. Turn
pike " Sanford, 164 U. S. SIS; Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466)
LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
1t is often said that the legislature
is presumed to act with full knowl.
edge of the facts upon which its leg S.
lation is based. This is undoubtedly
true, but when it is assumed from that
that it's judgment upon those facts IL
not subject to investigation, the infer
ence is carried too far. Doubtless
upon mere questions of policy its con.
illusions are beyond judicial consider
alton. Courts may not inquire wheth
er any given act is wise or unwise, and
only when such act trespasses upor
vested rights may the courts inter
vene. A single illustration will make
this clear: 1t is within the competen:
cy of the legislature to determine When
and what property shall be taken for
public uses. That question is one oil
policy over which the courts have nc
supervision; but II after determining
that certain property shall be taker
for public uses the legislature proceeds
further, and declares that only a Ger.
tain price shall be paid for 1t, then the
owner may challenge the validity oil
that part of the act, may contend that
his property is taken without due
compensation; and the legislative de.
termination Of value does not pre-.
clude an investigation in the proper
judicial tribunals. The same principe
applies when vested rights of property
are disturbed by a legislative enact.
ment in respect to rates.
In approaching the consideration of
case of this kind We start with the
presumption that the act of the legisj
lature is valid. and upon any company
seeking to challenge its validity rests
Tie burden of proving that it infringes
the constitutional guarantee of pro,
lection to property. The case must be
clear one In behalf of the railroad
company or the legislation of the
state must be upheld
Such being unquestionably the law.
1t Is obviously of the utmost import
ance that the facts shall be clearly an6
accurately found and distinctly stated
by the trial court, and that those facts
shall sustain the conclusion reached.
NOT SUFFICIENT.
We are OF opinion that neither the
findings made by the court, nor such
facts as are stated in its opinion, are
sulhcient to warrant conclusion up
on the question whether the rates
prescribed by the defendants were un-
reasonable or not, and we are also of
opinion that the process by which the
court came to It's conclusion is not one
which can be relied upon. The court
proceeded upon the theory that COM
parfson of the actual gross receipts OF
the company from it's South Dakota To-
cal business with those which it would
have received If the rates prescribed by
the defendants had been in force was
sufficient to determine the question of
the reasonableness of those latter rates
and instituted such comparison with
respect to the four years preceding the
commencement of this suit.
Now, 1t Is obvious that the amount Of
gross receipts from any business does
not OF itself determine whether such
business Is profitable or not. The
question of expenses incurred i'm pro-
ducing those receipts must be ALWAYS
taken into account, and only by strik
Ing the balance between the two can il
be determined that the business is
profitable. The gross receipts may be
large, but IL the expenses are larger
surely the business is not profitable II
cannot be said that the rates which a