The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1900-04-18
WARREN ACTION
WAS INEXCUSABLE.
H is Abandonment Of
Spion Kop Criticised.
ROBERTS DISPATCH
Deals Quite Severely with More Than
One of the British Generals.
THE ADVANCE ON PRETORIA.
Lord Robe-ts' Force is About to Start
on Its March to the Crpital OF the
South African Republic-Brit-
ish Still Surrounded at Wep-
ener, but Aid is Being Sent
from Two Directions.

LONDON. April 1.-THE War Office
tonight publishes in the Gazette a dis
patch from Lord Roberts. dated Febru-
airy 18th, submitting General Buffers dis
patches describing the Spion Kop and
other operations from January 18th to
January 24th. Lord Roberts deals Sc
verely with General Warren and some
others. Even General Butler does not es-
! cape
Lord Roberts complains that the plan
| of operations is not clearly described in
I the dispatches. After sketchins General
| Buffers intentions, as comn1rn.eated to
| Sir Charles Warren, who commended the
whole force, Lord Roberts points out that
General Warren seems to have concluded.
| after consultation with his officers, that
| the f1anllinS movement ordered by Cen
eral Butler was fnpracticable. and. there
| fore, SO changed the Plan of advance
| as to necessitate the capture and reten-
| ton of Spion kop.
| "As Warren considered 1t impossible to
make the wide thanking movement which
| was recommended Lord Roberts con-
| tinues, IF not actually prescribed in the
| secret Instructions, ne should forthwith
! have acquainted Butler with the course
] he proposed to adopt. There is nothing
to show whether he did so or not But
/ it is only fair 10 Warren to point out
I that Butler alssa2rs throughout to have
been aware of what was happening
l Regarding the withdrawal from Spion
| Kop. the retention of which had become
/ essential to the relief OF Ladysmith, Lord
\ Roberts says:
WHOLLY 1NEXCUSABLE.
| .'I regret to be unable to concur with
| Butler In thinking Thornycroft exercised
I wise discretion in ordering the troops
| to retire. l am of the opinion that
j Thornycroft's assumption of respohsi-
| bility and authority was wholly 1EeS-
{ cusablc. During the night the enemy's
( fire could not have been formidable, and
| 1t would not have taken more than two
| or three hours for Thornycroft to COM
! muncate by messenger with Major-Gen-
7! eral Coke or Warren. Coke appears to
| have left Spion Kop at $50 2. M. for
I the purpose of consulting with Warren.
| Up to that hour the idea of withdrawing
| had not been entertained. Yet almost
| Immediately after Coke's departure
| Thornycroft issued the order, without
| reference to superior authority, which
! upset the whole plan of operations and
! rendered unavailinS the sacrifices al
| ready made to carry 1t into effect
..On the other hand, i. is only right to
state that Uhornycroft appears to have
! behaved in very gallant manner
throughout the day
WE'LL DEVISED.
! ..It is TO be regretted that Warren did
not himself visit the Spion kop In the
| afternoon or evening. knowing as he did,
| that the state of affairs was very critl-
cal and that the loss of the position would
| involve the failure of the operations. Tie
| consequently was obliged to summon
| Coke to his headquarters and the COM
Tnand of Spion kop thus devolved on
Thornycroft, unknown to Coke, who was
| under the impression that the command
| devolyed upon Colonel HILL as senior
| officer Omissions or mistakes of this
| nature may be trivial in themselves, yet
they may exercise an important influence
on the course of events, and l believe
Buller was justified in rem1rking there
| was a, want of organizatio and system
| which acted most unfavorably on the
defence The attempt to relieve Lady
smith was we'll devised and l agree with
Butler in thinking it ought to have sue
j ceeded. That it failed may in some meas
/ ure have been due to the difficulties OF
the ground and the commanding positions
! held by the enemy, and probably also TO
I errors of Judgment and want of admin
] astrative capacity on the part of Warren.
I But whatever faults Warren may have
| committed, the failure must also be at
tributed to the disinclination of the Off
/ Ger in supreme command to assert MS
| authority and see that what he thought
best was DONE and also to the unwarant-
! able and needless assumption of respon-
/ sibility by a subordinate officer
ADMIRABLE BEHAVIOR.
The dispatch concludes:
.,rhe gratifying feature of these dis
patches is the admirable behavior of the
troops throughout the operation"
General Buffers report. commenting on
/ Genera! Warren's reports of the capture
and evacuation of Spion kep. after dis
putting some of Warren's assertions. and
describing the dangerous situation occupied
by Warren's force, tells how he saw the
! force at Spion Kop had given away before
/ Warren knew of it. Butler, therefore,
telegraphed 10 Warren: Unless you put
really good, hard-fghtins man in COM
mand on top you will lose the hill. /
suggest Tl1ornycroft'
i General Butler continues: II have not
thought it necessary to order an fnvesu-
cation. If at sundown the defence of the
summit had been taken in hand. entrench-
ments laid out and the dead and wounded
removed. the whole place would have been
brought under regular military commands
and the hills would have been held, an,
! sure; but no arrangements were made.
4 Coke appears to have heen ordered away
8 iust when he would have been useful, and
4! no one succeeded him. Those on top were
ignorant of the fact that the guns were
coming up. and generally there was a
4 want of organization and system that
4 acted most unfayorably on the defence.
lIt Is admitted that all of ThOrnycrOft' $
command acted with the greatest gailantFy
Il throughout the day and really saved the
a situation. But preparations for the Sec
sond days battle should have been or
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