The Appeal. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. ;) 1889-19??, 1900-03-10
New IDEAS IN TIE B0ER WAR;

strong guns has not proved eoua, tol
that OF the Beers (Krupp and Creuzotl
guns), either in precision or distance oil
! firing. On the other hand, the Eng.i. n l
shrapnels and grenade have proyedt
without blemish. In the case of rheI
Boer explosive missiles some fault cx-t
lists. because the most effective shrap-l
nels are hardly ever heard of and theI
smells frequently do not explode Wheth-i
er this shortcoming is due to the mattel
rial furnished by the French gun facto-f
r1es or to the handling of the guns cap 1
not be decided: at this time. The fac,S
that the Beers were able to move -leavyk
siege guns from Pretoria to the field Off
battle with surprising rapidity showsa
their practical knowledge of the require-s
ments of war. On the other hand, theH
English transported heavy naval guns,
which on account of their lyddite shelIsa
are very dangerous, many miles into theH
interior, which is also remarkab lea
achievement. The same can be said of8
the recently introduced field howitzerH
batteries, which will prove very usefu1a
to the English. because they throw their
| lyddite shells from perfectly screeneds
and invisible positions. So far. however,f
the English artillery has scarcely full!
filled its chief aim. /. E., to prepare the
field for the attack of the infantry. bet
cause the Beers appear to leave their
exposed positions during the preliminary
artillery fire and to return to cover as
soon as the infantry Of the enemy at !
tacks. The great lack of artillery on the ,
Boer side-the English have three times
as many guns-haS already been painful ;
| ly felt in the western field of battle
against Lord Methuen, so much the
| more as the Beers appear to work wiih
single guns instead of batteries, which
makes a uniform firing effect extremely
difficult.
The English cavalry has so far prob
| ably account of the unfavorable field
Of operations, particularly in Natal,
| made a very poor showing, at least so
| far as an effective clearing of the field
| is concerned. On the contrary, the Eng
| lish camp at Glencoe was completely sur
| prised by the Beers and an entire troop
of cavalry was made prisoners. At Gras-
pan the Ninth lancers had the same fate
| A fearless rif1eman like the Boer fight
| ing under cover, is, of course, the most
| difficult object of attack, against whom
| only complete surprise, as at Elangs-
| laate, can have anv success. On the 9TH
err hand. the Beers have shown, while
| fighting in the open field, by change of
positions and other tactical movements,
| a very marked respect for threatened
| cavalry attacks. Probably the entire
| lack of bayonets has much to do with
! this.
! OF war technical innovations, the ar
| mored railroad trains. heliograph signal
service and electric y searchlights have
been employed with success. Whether
wireless biography, used on a small
scale near Durham, will prove success
| full for general campaigning remains tt
/ be seen. While the apparatus works my
kind OF weather, night as well as day, it
1 is verW. sensitive cumbersome, = eyacts
great care in mounting and requires a
| co To fror To-
| probably true Of the steam ploW for the
rapid construction of trenches. Maxim
guns appear for the first time both,
| sides and are frequently used. These
i guns adapted for the firing of infantry
cartridges are particularly useful for the
| defense of small "kopjes'' because they
afford in a very contracted space almost:
! the entire firing effect of a whole COM
pany- These American guns have played
| an important part during the late
| maneuvers.
The conduct of the war shows marked
peculiarities on both sides. The sys-
| tematic and methodical advance and
| concentration Of the Beers deserves the
| most unstinted admiration. particularly
in view of the colossal distances and the
high and painless mountain ranges
! which had to be traversed. But the
| Beers have shown a particular aversion
| to open attack; their principal strength.
! seems to rest in defensive warfare. =
| White, by his exposed position at Lady
smith. which from military point OF
| view is altogether uniustifiabe; and by
his stubborn adherence to this mistake,
| overthrow the entire English plan of
| campaign. that all transportation of
| troops and several division commandos
| had to be changed and the principal field.
| of war was transferred from Cape Col
onY to Natal. He has in a measure re-
| deemed himself by his determined and
trated Joubert's plan Of campaign Why
detached columns of Beers, who as
mounted infantry have the greatest mo
| bility, did not surprise PietermaritZburg
or even Durham long before the arrival
of the English relief troops, and why
| Joubert .retreated so rapidly and so far
| before Butler is not vet clear.
! e The political motive, also at the cost
| of military success. is most surprising
on the English side in the advance Of
| Lord tMethuen upon Kimberley 1t is
pretty Indifferent from military point
| Of view whether this place falls sooner
or later. but the favorite enterprise. Of.
| Cecil Rhodes. his diamond mines and his;
| person are in danger. II Methuens adj
] vance ultimately succeeds it is merely
| the triumph Of energy, for 1t was, too
| hasty and not sufficiently prepared,
| without trains. with several thousanR
| Beers in the flank and threatening the
| English line Of retreat. Methuen' s big
losses at Moaaer River for the crossing
Of which no bridge material at all was
on land. lead to the conclusion that, ac-
| cord'ng to English nethod, he took tho
,u!i lb--, ~ 'rrrns.-Chicago Chronicle