The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1900-03-09

tue III our DOrQer states like
that in 1861. Besides the Beers cover
their positions and movements by a
Gordon of mounted videttes which the
British vanguard cannot penetrate. So
to all intents and purposes the British
are at a disadvantage in gaining infor-
matioA and are compelled to move in
the dark.
up to the present time the Boer tao.
tics and strategy have been most ex-
cellent and we'll adapted to the nature
of the country and the immediate end
in view. The Beers wish to keep the
field of operations on British soil for
other than sentimental reasons. AS l
have already noted, the Transvaal is
honeycombed with British, while Natal
man more Dutch than loyal British.
Therefore, having the initiative, the
Beers Immediately struck out to seize
British points of value, to cover long
reaches of British territory and compel
the armies of England to seek to recov
err their own. OF course the British had
no expectation of this outcome when
IlSS puS1Sa l1C11 MSS1luLNS W lAC
straining point. They hoped to take
the initiative and draw the Boer forces
into regions less favorable for them.
Herein the Beers have shown the
shrewdness of the Dutch race. They
took the initiative and have kept it
with remarkable tenacity of purpose
n patience withal.
oRulIDl'S nhvinlIS rAaOI1pcn yvhn11L hn
found that his natural route from Dur
ban to I4adysmith by way of Colenso
was impossible for any force, however
formidable, was fanking. That al
tentative is all very well with an enc
my having a base to cover in the rear
of his fighting line. A hostile move
ment against his base or against his
line of communication from the front
back to his base compels him to turn
about and defend his vital point. The
Beers seem to care nothing for a base
nor for lines of communication. They
are not tied up in that manner, hence
are at all times as mobile as a flying
column and can face either point of
the compass on short notice and fight.
Brave and well led the Beers have
shown themselves to be. Add to this
their thorough knowledge of the topog-
raphy of the country, their enthusiasm
and their thorough equipment and
proficiency with arms, and they consti-
tute an army difficult to cope with so
long as they can keep the war IN de-
fensiye lines. This they may do in
definitely by falling back from one line
to another. giving the al the nature
foot of ground must be won at heavy
cost of time and blood. With well
laid trenches and barbed wire obstruc-
tons, backed up by long range guns
skillfully handled, the Beers can make
their tens of thousands the equivalent
Of hundreds of thousands of assailants.
This argues for a war indefinitely pro-
longed. But the defenders always
have the advantage, as witness the
contest of 100000 against 100000
600 people in the civil war, or, to
speak of troops in the field, 100000
against more than 100000.
"One new feature of war l have no.
ticed in the apparent weakness of the
10y ~
British assaulting columns. The dis
patches tell of the deeds and losses of
regiments and in one or two cases of
brigades. There have been no mass
ing of divisions, as might be expected
in IN army of 10000 to 10000, as with
Butler on the Tugela. 1t really looks
at this distance as though the assaults
were made by handfuls. depending on
dash rather than brute strength. If
this method succeeds, it will be a
startling novelty in the tactics of as
sault. And l confess to a great curiosi-
ty as to the losses Of the Beers. When
they become known authoritatiyely, 1
am inclined to think that military men
will have an instructive morsel to
think over. Personally l am not thrill
ed by the losses sustained by the Brit
ish in their assaults. They are heavy
considering how little has been gained
by them. But in the civil war we did
not hold up in our attacks or send to
headquarters special dispatches mourn
ing over the casualties when they fell
within so per cent. as they invariably
have in South Africa, and the highest
percentages have been confined to a