The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-01-30
THE BRITISH FAILURE In NATAL.

4
and horrible butchers bill must be paid
But the truth at last is apparent even to
! The densest Briton. and 1t is as ugly a
human incapacity and folly could nave
made it.
1t is nearly incredible that the war pre-
parations necessarily carried on by Kruger
and his associates for five years should not
have attracted greater attention than they
did from the British War Office. 1t had
what was presumed to be highly ehec-
tive Intelligence Bureau, with many orna-
mental officers. all under the direction oil
a major general. This functionary. as far
as known. was supplied with whatever
means. facilities. or men he might think he
required from time TO time. 1t was sup
I posed in British Army circles that his
watchful eye was on Pretoria. Johannes
| burg. Lourenco Marques, and all the places
and ports likely to be prolific Of information
concerning Boer operations. When the war
vas forced at last BY the Transvaal ulti-
matum. the Intelligence Bureau was able
TO make an elaborate report On the eondi-
! ton of the Boer resources in men, ami
mails, provisions, rifles, artillery and am
| munition. Less than one third OF the guns
with which Joubert took the field at the
outset were accounted for. and the War
/ Office vas not apprised that the British
| forces would have TO encounter any siege
| guns at all. The Intelligence Bureau was
/ in abject ignorance of the fact that any
had been imported into South Africa.
| Again. this important adjunct to the ser
vice knew nothing of the splendid Krupps
and Creusots bought in Europe by Dr.
Leyds. For years the arms factories OF
Germany and France had been turning out
rifles by the thousand every month, and
| continually shipping them, and all sorts of
| artillery, as well as train loads of ammuui-
ton. by way Of Cape Town and Port Eliza
beth, to Pretoria. st neither end OF this
| line of terror for England was any efficient
espionage practiced. and 1t Is doubtful IL
| any was attempted. The willy old Kruger
and his burghers had arseuals, ostensibly
of secret character, prepared expressly
| for the purpose of showing them to spies.
They were filed with Inferior and old ord
nance OF unimportant or obsolete types.
The Intelligence Bureau found and report
| cd upon all these. but never developed
sense enough to have its suspicious ex-
cited by the thousands of tons Of "agrieul-
tural machinery mining machinery
and structural IRON which moved in a
steady stream from the Cape to the Trans
| yaal from January. 1896. to October. 1859.
| So the British Army took the field biunder-
ingly, armed with short range field artil-
lery, decidedly inferior to the armament OF
| its enemy.
Mistakes were not one. but legion. The
| War Office in London was not aware that
all the Beers would be mounted; had not
the remotes. conception of their actual
numbers; did not family realize the neces-
| sity for cavalry for scouting purposes;
| hence sent mounted troops and mounts on
the slowest transports. II felt the lordly con-
tempt for 'celoniais'' that Braddock dis
played in the Pennsylvania campaign, and
that almost every British general officer
has expressed since his time. Cape troops,
frontier rough rider, and the like were not
wanted There was knowledge at head
quarters prior to the beginning of hos
;ilities that the Beers had imported an
enormous quantity of barbed wire for de-
fensive purposes. The British officers at
tached as observers to the American forces
In Cuba, had seen how the Spaniards OBJ
str acted the front flank and rear approach
es to their positions with barbed
wire entanglements: also, how our troops
went into fight armed with nippers and
made short work OF the wire. Yet the
British Army went to South Africa IN
provided with single nipper, and has very
few. II any. instruments for wire cutting
to this day.
Unpreparedness was bad enough. and 1t
was not redeemed by strategical ability or
sense. The Ladysmith-D Dundee Glencoe
line was an untenable one. even IL Sir
George White had been given twice the
force he had for its defence. He never
should have made n serious stand north OF
the Tugela River and he knew and adj
mitted it. But the Natal authorities beg
yed him to hold Ladysmith, at least to
keep the tide of war from overlooking the
lower part OF the province. He never
should have fought at Glencoe or Dundee.
Immediately upon Jouberts Invasion in
force. he should have concentrated and
fallen back on the Tugela. and, il defeated
there. made a determined retiring fight
back TO the Moot. In this way he would
have been drawing the Beers farther and
farther away from their base. and. il he
had made as good a resistance as he
has behind the entertainments and re-
doubts of Ladysmith. before he could have
been forced south OF Estcourt. Butler
would have been on the Orange Free State
veldt threatening Bloemfontein and Jou-
bert's rear. and me latter would have been
forced to evacuate Natal before now. What
has happened In the eastern field since
White allowed himself to be shut up in
I.adysmith is q fresh memary and need not
be reviewed here. Butler, too, has made
grave mistakes. bis frontal attack at
Coienso was a sad one. That. il any. was
the time for him to try the long turn
against Jouber,'s right His latest move
nent has involved him In dire disaster and
has defeated the object Of the campaign.
The report OF Dundonalds escape is ray
OF comfort for him. He will need his
cavalry badly during the next week.
Something, however. is to be said for
Butler. He went into the Ladysmith re-
lief business VIGOROUSLY in opposition to
his better judgment He was driven to
that course by interference and cutlery
from home. He believed it better strategy
to let White take his chances. and to move
into the Free State from the Cape as fast
and as powerfully as possible. That is
what he should have done. If any success
h Rri.i-l. In.