New-York tribune., 1900-08-15
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES.
COUNTRY WELL FORMED FOR DEFENCE
BY CHINESE FORCES
tBT TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNE ]

that were made public were received az the war
Department at late hour to-day from the
theatre of military operations in North China
and some anxiety felt on that account. 1t
was said by officials that the latest official
! dispatch received from Major General Chaffee
was that received yesterday afternoon. which
was dated at Ho-Si-Wu on August TO- and sim
ply announced his arrival at that place on Au-
gust 8 press dispatch published here this
| afternoon puts the advance Of the international
forces ten miles beyond Ho-st-Wu.
The next Chinese town Of considerable size
beyond that place is Ma-Tow. which, according
to the War Department map, is about twelve
miles beyond Ho-Si-Wu. and is unfortihed
village. The road between Ho-si-wu and Ma
Tow is marked deep and bad" the military
chart which is based the United States
photographic charts of the Pei-Ho and on the
excellent German map of China by Breitschneid-
er. At Chan-Chin- Ying, two miles beyond Ma
Tow, the road diverges from the river. At
distance Of four and a half miles beyond Ma
Tow is situated tie first Chinese military watch
| tower.
Three and one-half miles beyond the first
| watch tower and one mile short Of Ching CHA
Wan is the Chinese village Of Ho-Koo-C -Chwang.
where Chinese works will be found, probably
| consisting Of earthwork fortihcations, COM
manding Ching -Chia-Wan. which appears to be
! the largest town along the cart road between
! Tien-Tsin and Tung-Chow. which is four miles
| beyond Ching -Chia-Wan. Besides its walls,
| which are not considered strong defences
against modern artillery, Tung- Chow, which has
| a population of two hundred thousand or more
is protected by forts and batteries. Three forts
| situated from three-f -fourths Of a mile to one
! mile south Of the town command both the
! road and river approaches to the city from
! the south. and must be reduced or carried oy
/ storm before the expeditionary force can at
! tack the town itself. There are also two river
| batteries at the ferry Of the Pei-Ho. on
! the southeastern side Of the town, which com
| nand the river approaches to it, and which, If
| supplied with modern artillery, might give con-
| siderable trouble TO an attacking column ad-
/ vancing by the road. which is about one and
| one-haIf miles distant. At distance OF about
| half a mile east Of the river batteries at the
| Pei-Ho ferry is a Chinese fortified village
MAY MEET STRONG RESISTANCE
! These are all the land detences OF Pek1ng
| against q hostile advance from the south by
| river or road or both so far as indicated oY
| the official maps and charts Nothing appears
| to be known officially here Of the strength OF
| these fortihcations. Some information on that
| subject might have been conveyed by the dis
patch which was received from Minister Conger
to-day and not made public. The fortihcations
seem to be advantageousIy situated for defence
| and II supplied with modern guns served by
brave and efficient troops, might hold out for
several DAYS against the expeditionary force
| OF course. by flank movement Tung-Chow
| could be avoided and left in the rear but that
would leave the line OF communication and sup
! ply from Tien-Tsin open TO attack of the
! enemy, It is probable that the commanders Of
| the international forces will prefer to capture
! and occupy Tung-Chow before they advance
nearer TO Pekng. especially as 1t contains i'm
r1ense stores Of rice and other food supplies for
| the Of the latter city
AS TO the probability that the Chinese may
/ make or may have already made a strong
stand al Tung-Chow it may be pointed out that
! their position at Tung-Chow would be the
/ verse of what ii was at Tien-Tstn. There they
/ we're about eighty miles from their base at
| Pekdng. while at Tung-C Chow they would be only
twelve miles away, with an easy line either OF
| fight or defence between them and Peking
! They might make a more stubborn resistance
/ almost within sight Of the Imperial capital
! knowing it TO be in imminent danger, than they
! did eighty miles away, when Chinese com
nander and no Chinese soldier believed il pos
sible that the foreign devils after the repuIse
! OF Vice-Adm1ral Seymours column, would at
/ tempt an advance 10 Peklng. Again, the enemy
! might and probably would be able to muster a
stronger and better disciplined force at Tung
| CHOW than they did or could do at Tien- -Tsin.
/ SUPPLIES AT TUNG-CHow.
It is also believed that Tung-Cho is the main
storehouse Of food supplies for Peking with its
population of nearly one million and for that
reason alone the Chinese would be Ioath to sur
! render it 1t is also to be considered that the
| International forces before Tung- Chow will be
| eighty miles distant from their Tien-Tsin base
and one hundred and ten miles from Ia LI1 in
| stead OF thirty and the enemy might also take
! that fact into consideration as an fn1porrant
| element in their favor.
/ In advancing from Tung-Chow toward Pexfng
one nank or the expeditionary column will be
protected TO some extent by the Ta-Tung- -Ho, a
small sluggish stream, navigable only for pole
ooaCs or roWooats. The road formerly a
gooo one paved with big granite blocks, six feet
long by TWO feet wide and thick, but IL is now in
such bad repair that the wheel traffic all has
70 pass along either side of il. A little engi-
neering skill and good deal of labor would
| quickly convert the granite blocks into strong
lines Of defence al suitable points along the
| twelve miles OF roadway between Tung-Chow
| and the capital
The adjacent country is reported 10 be inter
| sected by many sunken roads, which would af-
ford good cover Tor infantry, and enable it TO do
| good deal Of damage to an advancing foe es-
| pectaly II the defenders should use snokeiess
| powder
| In view Of the foregoing facts there appears
| TO De abundant reason for the anxiety felt by
Army officers to-day to hear from General Chat
| fee in regard to the progress Of the column
PROJECTILEs FOR AsIATIC SQUADRON.
SEVEN CARLOADS TO BE HURRIED WEST
FROM NORFOLK
| Norfolk, Va. Aug. IA (speciaD What is reeardad
| as Of the most important orders received Al
| the Norfolk Navy Yard since the close Of the snan
ish was the to-day. directing the sending at
| once to Ogden, Utah. Of seven carloads of shells
powder and projectiles It is reported the dest
! Of the ammunition is San Francisco and from there
II is 10 be forwarded 10 the American warships in
Chinese waters. The across the continent
| must be made in seven days. which is considered