The Montgomery tribune. (Montgomery City, Mo.) 1892-1910, 1900-10-26

That alone would guarantee q profit
of $780, 900. The premium paid was
more than guaranteed blythe gold
premium then ruling. All through
1915 the gold premium was high.
1t got up to III in June, and in
October it was still at tf6 and a
fraction. So you can figure II for
yourself that the men who bought
those bonds were safe and sure TO
make at least $50, 900 out of the
interest on the bonds, and all their
risk in paying the IA Is premium
was more than covered by the
!, premium on gold which would be
paid,for the bonds in a few weeks.
They stood to win $50, 900, hands
down, and without turning a wheel,
but don't forget what | said a few
moments ago, that those bonds
were worth that year 1913, and 1t is
dollars to dimes that the men
who took in our bonds at less than
f15 sold them again at more than
t22 and made their profit much
more than 100000. | would be
willing to bet that their profit was
not less than 500, 600, and | have
already shown how it could not
possibly have been less than $780,
900.
II the men who made this sell-out
on behalf of Missouri got gold for
their bonds, nobody ever heard of
it, and | don't suppose they did.
II they did, 1t does not appear in
the amount paid for state bonds.
But, figuring the gold premium
into the premium on the bonds,
anybody can e that they let the
bonds go too cheap. The New
Workers could have paid a good
commission on the sale and had a
big profit left.
'OAhV ~" W Vic Inv cstlntut Vi
the proceeds of that sale in Mis-
souri, state bonds. Weare not told
the price at which these bonds
were then bought. Neither Seibert
nor Salmon tell us the price paid
for the Missouri bonds. Salmon
says thai whep he first proposed
the conversion, MISSOURI bonds
We're at Z per cent discount, but
according to Seibert's figures, who
reports that Sf,Sf3,S66, the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the government
bonds, was converted into sf,4i9,-
600 of Missouri bonds, the discount
at time of conversion, was less
than 2 per cent. They don't tell
us who they bought the bonds of,
or whether the price they paid was
above the open market price or
not. Allthese would be interesting
things to know, but [ suppose we
will have to get along without them.
And, in tryingto get along without
them, | am not going to say that a
Missouri bond was worth less than
they paid for it. II any man got a
commission let him have it. but |
will call your attention to what
Salmon says in explaining what he
terms the necessity of this con-
version.
He says that as the state bonds
were rapidly approaching maturity
it was advisable to invest the pro-
ceeds OF the government bonds in
them. The intended inference in
this remark is that the state was
in nc position to redeem its bonds
then coming due. That statement
does not agree well with Seibert's
figures, showing that, in less than
two years, state bonds had adj
yanced from 90 to 9S and a frac-
ton. Both the credit and the re-
sources of the state must have been
unimpaired to make such an adj
vance possible in that length of
time.
So If the cash forthe redemption
of the bonds was not in sight, they
could have easily been refunded at
a lower rate of interest. They were
then bearing6per centinterest and
a new issue could easily have
been iloated at 8, with the credit
of the state in the fine condition
it then was, according to the prices
paid for these state bonds. But
Salmon and the rest of them pre-
ferred to buy these bonds, not for
the purpose of stopping the accu-
mutation of interest upon them,
but for the purpose OF continuing
that interest at the same high rate
the state had been paying when