The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1900-12-08
WHICH WILL 1T BE:

WHICH WILL HI BEs
There would not have been any occasion
to enter into the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
with England in 1850 if the United States
had not considered England's claim to
Greytown and the surrounding country
more or less valid. The object of that
treaty, as far as the United States were
concerned, was to prevent England from
constructing the canal and making it an
exclusively English concern, owned, for
titled and operated by England. Now, ac-
cording to the intent of the Monroe doc
trine, England could not do so unless she
already, at least in part, owned the terri
tory through which the canal was to
pass.
Any attempt on the part of England
to acquire territory for such a purpose
would have been a direct violation Of the
Monroe doctrine. Hence there was no
need of any treaty to guard against such
an emergency, and the natural inference
is that our government at the time con-
sidered Englands claim to the Mos
quito territory (the entire coast of Mica
ragua) more or less valid, and in order
to settle the matter agreed that the ca
nal should be, made neutral, as stipulated
by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and if
we take that view of the treaty it seems
hard to see how we could honorably go
back on it now.
In the next place, Nicaragua has never
given concessions for the construction
of anything but neutral canal, and it
is questionable whether she ever would.
And, even if she would, it is question
able whether she could, as she has made
treaties with at least four European
powers that she will never permit the
construction of anything but a neutral
canal, and they might insist on having
those treaties upheld. These four pow
ers are France, Belgium, Spain and
Great Britain
Of course, if we construct the canal
and make it neutral, as provided for by
the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, it means that
in case of war our enemy will have the
same right to use it as we ourselves, and
that is naturally a very disagreeable
prospect. The treaty makes provision
for the other European powers to join
in guaranteeing the neutrality of the
canal at all times The suggestion lately
circulated by the administration papers,
that having police control over the
canal, we could put in torpedoes and
blow up any hostile ships that might
wish to use the canal in case of war, is
not worthy of consideration.
In the first place, such action after we
had guaranteed the neutrality of the
canal, would be piece of treachery fully
equal to the blowing up of the Maine,
and in the next place, all the other pow
ers who had joined in guaranteeing the
neutrality of the canal, would be in duty
and interest bound to punish any viola
ton of it,
Now the principal reason why the peo-
pie have taken such an interest in the
canal and what made it such popular
project, was the idea that in case of war
it would give US an exclusive advantage
over the enemy and practically double
the efficiency of our navy. But if this
is to be merely a business undertaking
to the benefits of which all the world will
have an equal claim, that at once de-
prives it of all it's special interest and
makes it merely matter of dollars and
cents. great many people will feel
that we might invest nearly $2O0, COO coo
much more profitably in some other way,
say in irrigating the arid lands of the
West.
But even if we should succeed in over
coming all obstacles and make the canal
exclusively American, we wouldn't have
any bonanza, and it might prove white
elephant on our hands.
The committee on foreign relations pro-
posed to amend the Hay Pauncefote
treaty so as to give US the right in case
of war to take in regard to the canal
such measures which the United States
may find it necessary to take for secur-
ing by its own forces the defense of the
United States" Just what the effect of
this amendment would be is hard to say.
Would it mean that while the neutrality
of the canal is being guaranteed by our
selves and all the European powers we
should still have the right in case of war
to close the canal to our enemy, while
the enemy would be restrained from ats
lacking or destroying the canal by the
guarantee of neutrality given by the
other powers? But that would not be
neutrality, and thus the amendment con-
tradicts the rest of the treaty. 1t would
also be equal to asking the European
powers to fight our battles for us, and
that would hardly appeal to them 1t
would be more likely to mean that the