New-York tribune., 1900-12-27

pp. xvi. $50 Boston: Little, Brown " 70
The American and Spanish navies in the
kpring Of 1898 were, paper, Of ABOUT eaual
strength The actual strength OF the ioi me
was however. really greater, and that oi w
latter far less than the apparent strength Al
,h., h-te. statement Of fact we have the key
note the secret and the sum of the spanish
American war at sea The luminous ana au-
thoritatfve pages OF the work before US oelp-
erateIy and judiciously prepared by one OF tne
foremost naval experts Of the world, do little
more than TO enlarge upon that statement IN all
its varied phases of cause and effect
Mr. Wilson begins his volume with a oe'dieO
consideration Of the tragic prelude 10 the war
in Havana Harbor Every pertinent fact anu
every serious suggestion concerning the de-
struction of the Maine is discussed by him eA-
haustiyeiv He is not altogether satisned Win
this Governments conduct Of the inquest anu
he does not think the evidence adouceo e''i1'
convincing In that we suppose naany IN tni'
country will agree with him The iaef Is t"a'
in every such catastrophe there are thins0
which never can he found out. IL was Simply
impossible TO get direct proof OF the cause %
the disaster. beyond, at any rate, that Whlch
was offered. Circumstantial evidence hao 10 De
accented as a basis though not the sole OASIS
~ judgement And on such grouncs Win al
his caution ana reserve. Mr.. Wilson declares
that the evidence does seem to have es'aD-
ushed the probability that the Maine was oe-
stroved by mine" We are not aware lha'
most American judgments have been more posi-
tive than that. Certainly no American couiu
repudiate more strenuously than MI "4Soi
does the Ijbellous charge that gross negligence
and lack Of discipline prevailed upon the Ahaiiie
and none could wish to pay a higher tribute
than he does 10 the order, loyalty and chiVairy
az both officers and men upon that snip ana
throughout the Navy. This is the first souno4he
NJ that keynote of contrast between the oppos-
sng navies which. as we have said, is character
istic of the book.
II was felt in the United States as well as IN
Furope that the loss of the Maine LEFT our Navy
perilously weak: no stronger than, II as strohs
as that Of SPAIN and II was on that account
that the oregon was ordered to make her long
and dangerous voyage to reinforce our Auahtic
feet On paper the United States had only
fortx-tb-ee ships. while Spain had fifty-six; and
while we had the greater number Of battleships
Spain had the greater number Of armed and
armored cruisers When, however, it came TO
actual mobilization Of the fleets a far difterent
showing was made. The United Statess ap-
parent strength Of forty-three fell to thirty
seven while Spains fell from fifty-six to
twenty-seven In the former case the loss was
scarcely Il per cent; in the latter nearly o. per
cent Stin more impressive was the showing in
respect to the real fighting shps-battleships
and armored cruisers. OF these the United
States had an apparent strength Of seven and
an actual strength of seven, while Spains ap-
parent strength Of eight was reduced to an
actual strength of four, a loss Of so per cent.
The same rule held good throughout all details
of manning, equipment and discipline Spain
had twenty-five admiras TO our eighteen and
sixty-one captains to our forty-fve Yet she
ran sadly short of men IN trying to equip Ad-
rniral Camara's squadren3 while in Navy
the actual effective strength Of the personnel
was found to be somewhat above the nominal
strength We had moreover the inestimable
advantage, unknown to Spain, of being able TO
draw to practically unlimited extent upon
Nation of expert engineers and skilled me-
ehanics for whatever increase of naval force
was needed Our ordnance was in perfect trim,
while Spain's, as appeared at Santiago, was out
of order. We had plenty of ammunition, while
Spain's supply was scanty. Our men had been
constantly drilled in target practice, thing al
most unknown to the Spaniards Mr. Wilson de-
claring that lit is probably the case that the
shooting in the American fleet is as good as or
better than in the British fleet" The Ameri-
cans officers and men. were Of the highest disci-
pline, intelligence and general efficiency, while
the Spaniards, though brave as lions were un-
trained unskilled and devoid of that mechani-
ern nav,l warfare. Finally, the United States
began the war with well matured plans of cam
paign. while Spain had no plans and those
which she adopted in emergencies were directly
opposed TO the best judgment of those who were
10 execute them. And yet the United States
Government entered the conflict with an excess
Of caution amounting to self-distrust while with
amazing faulty the Spanish Government in its
oVerplus Of self-conhdenoe. proclaimed its ex-
peetauon CT an easy victory. because of its
naVy's superior equipment and discipline!
80 much at the beginning. The subsequent in
cidents Of the invariably confirmed these
views Of the rival Powers. For the selection ot
Admiral Sampson for the chief command and
Tor the conduct of the Oregon in her famous
voyage Mr.. Wilson has only the highes; com.
mendation. At Manila the Spanish commando,
was guilty Of in6ecision and bad Judgment ir
his choice Of fighting ground. while the Ameri
can commander showed splendid daring in tn,
manner OF his entrance TO the harbor The bat
lie was military execution rather than rea
contest, because the Spanish ships were homo
lessly inferior to the American. and the Span
taros themselves unskilled, though not lackin,
valor. No such considerations can, however
MI Wilson's opinion detract from Adnira
OeNey's deserved reputation, which rests upo
he fact that he was perfectly prepared not onI
to destroy Admiral Montojo's poor fotilIs bu
also 10 meet any hostile feet that might hay
been opposed 10 him.
The Santiago campaign began with a curiou
comedy OF errors. Mr.. Wilson thinks Admire
sehley erred in judgment at Cienfuegos, but tina
he did so because he supposed the Spaniard
would do the thing that was obviously exn,
dent He did not appreciate their capacity fc
olundering On the other hard, Admiral Cerver
having committed the initial blunder of going
Santiago continued 10 bunder in neglecting Y;