Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-09-27
COURT DECISIONS.
.DlGESTED BY w. B. MARTIN
EXCLUSIVELY FOR
vlRclNiAN- PILOT.
Notes Of Cases Recently Decided
Which Are of Interest to
Our People.
CARTER v. w. & w. r. r. CO.

CARTER v. w. & w. r. r. co.
h. Supreme Court of North Carolina.
May /. 1900.
UNDER CODE SECTION 1864. PRO
V1D1NG a PENALTY FOR
REFUSING TO TRANSPORT
FREIGHT. A PENALTY MAY BE
RECOVERED FOR EACH HEAD
OF CATTLE NOT CARRIED, AND
THIS PENALTY MAY BE RECON-
Erred BY ANY ONE WHO SUES
FOR 1T.
This was an action brought under
section 1864 OF the Code to recover from
the railroad company penalties
amounting to $4,000 for refusing to re-
ceive and transport n lot of cattle.
From Judgment for plaintiffs the
company appealed.
The Court says:
The statute provides in express terms
that each article refused shall consti-
tute Il separate offense; that is, IL dis
tinct violation of the law. The pen
atty attaches for such violation, and
for each and every violation thereof;
otherwise, party might violate the
law once. pay the penalty, and there
after be free from further prosecu-
ton. The law never intended to Gre
process of legal vaccination. This is.
of course. reductio ad abSurdum; but
is 1t any more so than the contention
of the defendant that contrary view
would force lis to hold that separate
penalty would attach to each nail In
a keg. and to every lump of coal i'll
car load? All laws must be reason
ably construed. and in such q manner
as to give effect to all parts thereof.
If practicable. AS this court has said
in Chappell V. Ellis. I'VE feel COM
PEELED to carry out a principle only to
it's necessary and logical results, and
not to it's furthest theoretical limit,
in disregard OF other essential princi-
PIES To say that each article"
meant simply the entire shipment Of
fered would be equivalent to saying
that it meant nothing, because it
would add nothing to the previous part
of the section. TO say further that,
even If each article constituted sep
arate offense, the statute did not in
tend separate penalty, would impose
upon the statute a construction utter
ly foreign both to its letter and spirit.
The object In providing penalty is
clearly to compel the common carrier
to perform it's duty to the public,-not
simply to the abstract public, but to
each individual. Penalties are made
cumulative, so as to make 1t, under all
circumstances, as far as practicable,
to the interest of the carrier to per-
form it's duty. Punishment and COM
pensation are essentially different. The
one aims merely to repair the Injury
done; the other, to prevent it's recur-
renee. Compensation should. under all
circumstances, exactly equal the in
jury; while punishment, TO be effective,
must exceed the injury or at least be
greater than any possible benefit which
can accrue to the offender from a vio-
lation of the law. Suppose a large
number of cattle were offered for ship
ment; it might be cheaper for the car
rier to pay a penalty of $50 than to go
to any extra expense or trouble TO
obtain the necessary cars.
AS we are of the opinion that each
head of cattle was a separate article,
in contemplation of the statute, the re-
fusal of which was n separate offense.
it follows that a separate penalty at
tached thereto. AS there were 80 head
of cattle refused, 30 separate penalties
were incurred by the defendant. Who,
then. may recover these penalties? We
think that all penalties imposed by
section 1864 OF the Code may, under
the provisions of section 1912. be re-
covered by any one who will sue for
the same. Affirmed.
BARDES. TRUSTEE. V. FIRST Ma
- TIONAL BANK OF HAWAR-
DEN, ILL.
Supreme Court of the United States.
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER SUITS BY TRUSTEE. FReB 81 tsE TO
SET ASIDE F. AU d ULENT
TRANSFERS OF THE BANKRUPT,
EXCEPT BY CONSENT.
In the above case the Supreme Court