The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-06-03
Lord Kitchener's Part.

Lord kitchenef'S Part.
While little has been heard from Lord
Kitchener since his arrival with Lord
Roberts in South Africa. 1t Is not i'm
probable that when the full history OF
the closing campaign of the present war
Is written, 1t will be found that to
Kitchener Is due an amount OF credit
out OF all proportion to what he has
thus far received. The peculiar genius
OF Lord Kitchener. displayed in the
| Egyptian campaign. upon which his rep
utation thus far rests, is his ability to
organize transport, to move troops
through difficult country, keeping them
at all times we'll fed and equipped, and
well supplied with ammunition. The
circumstances OF Roberts brilliant cam
paign in South Africa show plainly that
this peculiar genius has been actively
| at work. and has rendered the success
| of the campaign possible.
All OF the earlier reverses of the Brit
ish armies in South Africa, were due
to the deficiencies OF transport. When
the campaign started. the British army
| was divided into four columns. under
Butler Gatacre, French and Methuen.
| Each column advanced along the line
| of one OF the railroads: and through the
| deficiencies in auxiliary transport not
| one of them could attempt to operate
| away from the railroad line. The Boer
| problem of defense was reduced to the
| simplest possible terms. All necessary
| to be done was to occupy positions of
| great natural strength, Immediately
along each Of the railroad lines leading
through the Free state, Natal and
Cape Colony. and await In perfect con-
| fdence the inevitable British frontal at
tack. In the absence Of transport, aside
| from the railroads. turning movements,
which involved the traversing of any
| great scope OF country, were impossible
| to the British commanders. Hence the
successive frontal attacks upon posi-
tions of strength. where intrenched
rlfemen, In perfect safety themselves.
with ease repulsed forces greatly SUI
perior.
This. In brief. was the story OF the re-
verses of Butler, Gatacre and Methuen.
upon which their military regulations
went to wreck. French. the only one
OF the earlier British commanders In
South Africa who escaped disaster. had
the peculiar advantage that his force
consisted of cavalry and mounted Ill
fantry. with few batteries of horse
artillery. His force was mobile. he was
not OF necessity confined so rigidly to
the railroad. ami thus had an oppor-
tunlty. denied To the other commanders.
Of displaying some tactical skill. While
not accomplishing very much. he at
least escaped any disastrous defeat. He
certainly had the advantage Of the
Beers In maneuvering. and did succeed
In turning two or three small Boer
forces out Of strong positions without
heavy lighting ana with limited loss Of
life.
With the arrival Of Kitchener and
Roberts in South Africa. the situation
changed in marvellous manner and
possibly the change Vas due fully as
much 20 the perfection Of the transpor;
system organized by Kitchener a. TO
the great tactical skin and generalshlp
~ Roberts This IS shown In the initial
step ~ the campaign Of Roberts. tn,
relief - Kimberley ana each success
siye operation 81 the campaign has sur-
thor broGEAt q out The Boer army
under Cvouje. which had successfully
r-Iui-ed Methuen az M0ider river and
MaserstoHtr!n. Was turned out u a Do
sluon which never c5uld have been
carried by direct assault So soon "a
transport was provided 10y means OF
which a British column could operate
Independently q the railroad. and make
a Ions det,ur banking the Boer position.
J The whole army uuder Roberts GU;
loose frlm the railroad altogether and
reached Blocmtontein by march
: across country. feat only rendere /
possible by the perfection ct tranSpor;
system with Bloemfontein ia British
possession. the control Of the railroad
. leading south TO the cape was readily
acquired aud when il was repaired and
in working order. the auxiliary trans
port system Was again free for Use in
the campaign against the Transya al. In
: ! this the same tactics were repeated. 10