Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-04-18
CRITICISED ROBERTS
BULLER AND WARREN MADE
SERIOUS MISTAKES.
Publication of Old Dispatches by Lon
don War once Indicates
Changes in Command.

The London war office last night pub
ished in the Gazette dispatch from Lord
Roberts, in which he deals severely with
Gen. Warren and others for the loss OF
Spion Kop. Even Gen. Butler does not
escape
Lord Roberts reports: .As Warren con-
sidered it impossible to make the wide
flanking movement which was recon-
mended. if not actually prescribed in the
secret Instructions. he should forthwith
have acquainted Butler with the course he
proposed to adopt. There Is nothing to
show whether he did so or not. But 1t is
only fair to Warren to point out that Butler
appears throughout to have been aware of
what was happening"
Regarding the withdrawal from Spion
Kop, the retention Of which had become es-
sential to the relief of Ladysmith. Lord
Roberts says: IT regret to be unable to con-
cur with Butler in thinking Thorneycroft
exercised wise discretion in ordering the
troops to retire / am of the opinion that
Thorneycrofts assumption of responsibility
and authority was wholly inexcusable. Dur
ing the night the enemy's fire could not
have been formidable, and it would not have
taken more than two or three hours for
Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger
with Maj. Gen. Coke or Warren.
When Coke Left spfon Kop.
SUhc appears u nave left SplOn hOp at
9:3O pm. for the purpose of consulting with
Warren. Up to that hour the idea of with
drawal had not been entertained. Yet al
most Immediately after Coke's departure
Thorneycroft issued the order, without ref
the whole plan of operations and rendered
unavailing the sacrifices already made to
carry 1t into effect. On the other hand II is
only right to state that Thorneycroft ap-
In, 1l,,,S
manner throughout the day.
IT Is regretted that Warren did not him.
self visit Spion Kop in the afternoon or
EVENING, knowing. as he did, that the state
OF AFFAIRS was very critical, and that the
loss of the position would involve the fail
ure OF the operations. He consequently was
opleed to summon Coke to his headouar-
sers, and the command at Spion Kop thus
oeVolVed on Thorneycroft, unknown to
Coke, who was under the impression that
the command devolved upon Col Hin as
senior officer ~
Omissions or mistakes of this nature NAV
be trivial In themselves, vet thew NAV ever
else an important influence on the course Of
events, and l believe Butler was tustified in
Iemarklng There was a want of organiza
ton and system which acted most nnfavor-
ably on the defense
Inc attempt to relieve Ladysmith was
wen devised. and 1 agree with Butler in
tninklng 1t ought to have succeeded. But.
Whatever faults Warren NAV have conn,it
ted the failure must also he attrihntad ~
the dlslnclination of the officer in supreme
90 tiihand to assert his authority and see
maj what ne thought best was done. and
also to the understandable and needIsSs ~
sumption of responsibility by subordinata
officer ~ suooi oiLdte
Troops Behaved Calamity.
Inc dispatch concludes: THE gratifying
feature Oh these dispatches Is the admirable
pehavior of the troops throughout the on
Grafton" w
Cen Buffers report, after disputine the
correctness of some of Warren's assertions
and describing the dangerous situation oc-
upieu by W arren's force, tells how he saw
.he force at Spion kop had given way he
lore Warren knew of it. Butler therefore,
to Warren:
Mess you put really good, hard-fght
he man In command on top you will lose
me MIL. l suggest Thorneycroft"
Gen. Butler continues: If at shutdown the
iefense OF the summit had been taken In
hand, 1ntrenchments laid out and the dead
ana wounded removed, the whole place
would have been brought under regular mil
tary commands and the hills would nave
sen held, am sure. But no ARRANGEMENTS
were made.
Coke appears to have been ordered away
Just as he would have been useful, and no
7ne succeeded him. Those on top were ig-
lcrant of the fact that the guns were COM
ng up, and, generally, there was a want of
organization and system that acted most
I
nat all of Thorneycroft's command acta1
With the greatest gallantry throughout the
lay and really saved the situation But |
preparations for the second days defense |
should have been organized during the day
md commenced at nightfal AS this was |
lot done ! think that Thorneycroft exer-
Used wise discretion
British Still Surrounded.
The war office has received the following |
lispatch from Lord Roberts, dated Bloem-
ontein, Tuesday, April II: |
Our force at Wepener is still surrounded.
'ut it is reported that the enemy are at
acking in a very half hearted manner and
ire anxious about their communications, |
rearing that forces are approaching WEEP |
'ner from two directiorS-One under Gen.
Sundle, via Reddersburg, and another I'M |
Ter Gen. Brabant, with Gen. Harris brigade |
n, support. via Rockville. On the reoccu- |
'ation of Rockville, April 10 the few Boers; |
here retired. and Gen. Brabant made some |
important arrests.
violent storms of rain have somewhat |
nterfered with the march of these columns, |
tut il is hoped they will soon be able to
make their presence more decidedly felt.
Gen. Settle reports from Kenhardt, April |
4. that SD Transvaalers made a deter
mined attack the previous day on Dopas-
,Oort. held by a party of Orpen's Horse. |
)ur losses were two killed and one wound |
d. The enemy's losses must have been
leavy, as they applied to us for doctors and
n ambulance"