The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-09-10

The report of Mai. Gen. E. S. Otis
! as commander of the Division of the
Philippines. and military governor OF
the islands, giving details of the opera
lions OF the army in the archipelago from
! September l, 1893, to May ;, 1900, has been
made public by the War Department. The
document is very Yoluminous and contains
nearly 800 pages. The report covers the
! operations of the commands of General
! Macarthur, Lawton. Schwan. Wheaton,
| Hall, Hughes. Bates. Young. and J. NJ.
and J. F. Bell, as we'll as those of many
colonies who had independent commands.
The one remarkable feature of the re
| port is that while 1t describes a cam
paign OF bitter hostility and constant war
| fare. nowhere does it appear that the
| Filipinos have been crushed or that there
/ is any hope of the war coming to an END.
One third of the entire work is devoted
to captured Filipino correspondence, most
! Of which has been made public before,
while every bulletin forwarded to the
| War Department is reproduced
In the introduction OF the report, the
/ entire blame for the opening OF hostilities
| is placed with Aguinaldo. and 1t is stated
/ that the latter planned the war. General
! Otis proceeds:
War Forced on America.
| 81 desire TO correct an erroneous i'm
preston which appears to prevail to
moderate extent whether drawn from my
! former report or an incorrect knowledge OF
the then existing conditions | know not)
that war with the insurgents was initiated
| by the United States Government, or that
| the attitude or conduct of its troops in
Manila was the cause of hostilities. unless
possibly it may be held that their failure
to resent insult or punish hostile demon
stration constantly recurring in their
midst encouraged the already openly
ayowed enemy in the belief that it could
easily slaughter them within the city
which il had invested, and thereby melted
them to action.
War with the insurgents of the Phil
ippines was forced upon us and was I'M
avoidable. No nation but the United States
would have permitted an unfriendly force
of large numerical strength to throw up
entertainments and erect Notifications in
the immediate proximity of its troops. as
did the insurgents during several weeks
preceding their attack on Manila, without
considering it an act of war and adopting
proved precedent the United States would
have been fully justified in arresting these
insurgent demonstrations by demand to be
followed with the application of force if
demand was insufficient: and had that
course been adopted no wrong could have
been imputed to our Government.
The subject, however. is no longer mat.
ter for argument, as the captured insur-
gent records have set the question at rest
lore They Sha.r hat
der the advice of the Hongkong junta. pro-
ceeded from that city TO Manila harbos
with the intention OF securing as much
aid from the United States as possible,
and then. when in his opinion he might
find himself sufficiently strong, of driving
out the Americans with the sword His
course throughout was consistent with this
well-settled intention. His declaration OF
independence OF June. 1898; his capture
during the succeeding seven months of tina
slightly garriSoned Spanish posts through
out the islands by which he obtained large
quantities OF arms and ammunition: the
elimination from his so-called government
of his ablest advisers, who advocated
United States supremacy; his declared die
tatorship; the concentration of his troops
around Manila; the public demonstrations
and rejoie!ngE at his capital of Malolos
on the anticipated victory of his army
shortly before hostilities commonwealth
following each other in well-timed suc-
cession-are sufficient in themselves to
prove a predetermined definite plan of sc-
tion to place the country under Tsgalo
rule
No Oyertures for Pence.
Another erroneous impression, which. If
it has not widely prevailed results from
the. failure of a few who have endeavored
to create it. is that on the evening follow
ing the severe fighting on February 5. 1899. |
the insurgent authorities sought a confer. |
euce with a view of terminating hostill- |
ties. These false impressions may hare |
arisen In part from a hastily prepared tele- !
gram sent from Manila on that date |
stating in substance that the insurgents /
had asked for 4 temporary suspension OF |
hOstilities, but had received the reply that
having commenced war, it must continue
No proposition OF any kind came from the
insurgent authorities"
In reviewing the operations in North |
ern Luzon General Otis speaks OF the en-
ploylnent OF Maeabebes as follows:
The wisdom of employing them had |
been considered shortly after our troops !
captured Malolos, and General Macarthur !
within whose division lines they resided) |
and | concluded that they might commit |
many offences against the Tagalo inhabi- |
tants if furnished with arms and allowed |
any freedom OF movement. We therefore |
concluded to defer further consideration |
of the subject until future time. But
now that their services would prove os-
sentially valuable in the swampy jungles |
in the immediate proximity of their home |
and as they We're supplied with many
small boats with which travel therein is
only practicable. and as General Lawton |
especially desired a small force of them
to act as guides and scouts for his con-
templated northern column. 1t was deter
mined to raise two companies. each 12S |
strong. place them under charge of com
petent officers, 10 be carefully selected for |
that duty, and test their efficiency. This |
was done.
Though the Macabehes we're prone to |
rob and abuse the inhabitants and treat |
with cruelty their captives unless close |
ly watched and restrained. still their |
successes Influenced us to organize an !
additional company for service in that |
section, as those already employed there |
we're intended for use with the troops of
General LAYTON"
The sandico Letter.
The Sandico letter, which was also
captured and hitherto unpublished is, in
part. as follows: