Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-03-30

Sarah e. Jennings, the plaintiff, as
signed her interest in policy of insur-
ance which she had on the life of her
husband to the defendant Hinton, and
the husband signed said assignment as
witness. From a judgment for plain
tiff defendant appealed.
The court says:
Was this assignment by the wife
with the written assent of her huS-
band" as provided by article LOG. of
the Constitution of the State? The
court held that 1t was not and Hinton
excepted
Did the PLAINTIFF convey this policy
of insurance to the defendant with the
written assent of her husband? In
other words, was the simple fact that
the husband witnessed the written as
signment of the wife by signing his
name thereto the written assent of
the husband?" Had the husband not
signed his name to the paper, though
he may have negotiated the trade, and
received consideration therefor. the
conveyance Uhe assignment would
have been void because the husband
wrote nothing. But where the wife
signed note as the surety of the hus-
band 1t was said by the court that this
would he sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements Of law, as that the husband
and wife both signed the note. and it
must be presumed that the wife signed
the note with the assent of her hus
band. In other words. signing his name
to the paper was n writing, and his as
sent would be inferred Upon SINH
lar state of facts, where the wife sign
ed as surety the court held the same
doctrine. using this language: at is also
unnecessary that the assent of the hus-
band should be signified by separate
clause. His execution of the paper
jointly with his wife is sufficient COM
plance with the law in this respect"
Where Il husband, as the agent of his
wife. made q. written statement in the
name of his wife to obtain the purchase
of goods. and five or six days thereaf-
ter the husband made written guar
anty for the goods, II was held that the
signing of the written statement by the
husband as the agent Of the wife was
n signing by the wife. and that his
guaranty some days after was his writ
ten assent: that the guaranty was q
sufficient writing TO satisfy the law.
and his assent would be inferred.
However violent this presumption may
be. for the public good it is presumed
that all persons know the law. This
being so, both the plaintiff and her
husband knew that the wife could not
dispose of this policy of insurance
without the written assent of the hus-
band; and knowing this. the wife sign
ed the instrument "dsposing" of the
policy TO the defendant Hinton, and
the HuSDanQ WrOte MS name as a wit
ness to this DISPOSITION by the wife of
her property. But from the transact
ton we think it may be reasonably in
ferred that they had actual knowledge
that the wife could not convey the pol
Icy without the written assent of the
husband. Is it was not q transaction
that required a subscribing witness for
any purpose unless it was to meet this
requirement that it must be with the
written assent of the husband. But,
be this as 1t may, the law presumed the
knowledge. From the logic of the de-
cisions we have cited and the other
cases cited in these decisions it appears
to us that there was error in this in
struction; that the fact that it appear
ed that the husband signed as n witness
was not his written consent" This doe
-tfitie-Hfay- hatc-beetf carried right far,
but to hold that this was not the writ
ten assent OF the husband would put us
in conflict with what has been repeat
eddy held to be the law by this court
Error. New trial.