The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-06-08

Useless lessons"
II In pretty well established that war
IL not fruitful in practical instruction.
Mankind mas been engaged In the
nesv for some thousands of years. Tao
tics and methods have changed with
the change Of conditions and especially
OF weapons. Now and then there arises
some great captain. the vigor OF whose
genius develops new modes OF attack
and defence new articles and refine
ments of strategy These become In
stantly. however. the property OF the
whole world ia the next engagement
thsy no longer dismay ana demoralIze
those against whom they are directed.
because the proper counter action has
been studied and is applied Except in
the simplest and most obvious partiou-
lars. the 'lessone' OF wurfare are most
ly futile.
Here are some wiseacres who are al
ready telling us exactly what the South
African war has taught the military
world. and their wisdom appears 20 be
the essenoe OF foolishness. These are
their Important conclusions" Frontal
attacks In close order on formation are
latest patterns OF small arms and artll-
icry: effective scouting IL Indispensable.
and there should be ample cavalry
and artillery" How wonderful! But Il
Is incomplete. Even the civilian could
supplement The list. thus Soldiers
should not march without clothing;
airy, ammunition should not be soaked
an water b~fore using. and II In desir-
able to bring into the ield more men
than the enemy can muster. This pros
ing is the talks OF CANADIANS
About the only conclusion in the least
new which foilowa the Boer war,
and Il is one thai could have
been drawn as readily before a
shot had been nred. L. the great
advantage that the Improvement in
small arms gives TO a defensive force
occupying a fortified position Akin 10
this ie the newly recognized value OF
an effectively organised conmlssart.t.
The Post -Tutolligencer has pointed on,
that II WINS a defcri IN that particular
which forced the British 20 those ilsas.
trous frontal attacks. and that when
this was rcneSiied, the superiority OF
numbers asserted itself II was dis.
advantage In the organ sat ION " for
ward movements ana lack OF MOBILITY,
cens~quea, Ipon u r'at made the first
stage Of this war so dlncrcu, from the
last. Law THAI out. and there are no
lessons worth speaking of hu, the
extremely an0ient o0r which was sum
nazized famously IN tho expression
God Is on the SIDE Of the heaviest bat.
talsonz"
Tue world Is isosinw ccn,anuy fer
morals Ca, 10 not present thcmsel, 90
60 forward the art 81 war After tho
f"NN A"aa W. NHiW kt4I lE
Tnany authorities that the batt.r~hlp
WIS the only really cTs-iivc engine ~
tas navy. The same deduction has been
drawn rrosn she destguctsc, az cer,.sr,,.,
Heet- Yet shs vetdes, la,rnAu can nm
deTstand talat * Ccryera. Vita his sv, Il,
ana powerful cruisers. ha3 teen Ia.
Tending tho cCAst ot Spain against AT
tack. or even IL he hsd hai g .-.tiirg
station 81 that he couli ha>- sxept
down along cur northern o,uSts tas,.a1
az running for the Yves, ladies'. the 70.
sIt utSfst have been quite different.
And ID man who values his reputation
to-day wal decide onhand the relative
merits az the two classes II ships. or
even pass upon the practical value o..
this now somewhat d.scredited togpsl o
haat
The laws Of success and failure IN
warfare are reasonably simple. orai-
npAay me most elective snaeA:ns- conn