The evening times., 1900-01-04
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION.

The British public has been in hard luck
so long that it may be pardoned for jump
ing at anything in the nature of good news
| and getting unduly excited in consequence.
In giving out the reports from Colesberg,
the War Office seems to have rather ex-
| aggerated the facts, which, in the light
of later intelligence. appear less salts
factory than they did on the first an
nouncement. French did not take Coles
berg at all. but thinks he could il re-en-
forced. The really important thing he has
| accomplished is control of the Colesberg
! and Norvals Pont bridges over the Orange
River
II he can hold these he will be doing an
| incalculable service to his sovereign and
one worth decisive victory in battle at
| the least. But the bridges are of such vital
! Importance to the future movements of
the British army that it will surprise US If
they are not retaken by an overwhelming
force of Beers Probably French could
keep them by entrenching his whole col
umn on the ground, but this he could not
afford to do. He must keep moving or his
alert foes would soon play hob with the
railway communications ali the way from
Dordrecht TO De Aar.
Military opinion in London concurs in
/! the view expressed in The Times of yes
| terday. that Colonel Pitchers raid and
capture of Sunnyside was in effect a re-
connoissance in support of a design on the
part of Lord Methuen to essay Ranking
movement to the west of Megarsfontein
That he seems to contemplate something
OF the sort argues that he has some idea
that he can crush Cronjes right which now
confronts him in a curve all the way TO
the Modder River. Once in the compare
lively open country toward Douglass, the
Boers would lose the advantage of their
defensive tactics, and would have to fight
in the open or fall back on Kimberley. 1t
would be foolish to attempt to analyze
the chances for successful forward or
flank movement of Methuen's column. in
the absence OF definite knowledge regard
ing local conditions. But there is one con-
sideration which may have an important
effect on the campaigning in that and 9TH
er parts of the field. There is a decided
NtdhttSS al bhS SShtinA D0'''N NN~
tics Of the Beers which may ultimately
cost them dearly. They do not follow up
advantages. Cr0nje most undoubtedly
should have pressed desperately on Ne
thuen's left after he knocked ii in pieces
at Megarsfontein. Instead, he permitted
his enemy TO recuperate aud strengthen
his lines The same thing is noticeable
IN, hac lact Golden
mites to inflict disaster by assault upon
forces badly weakened by sanguinary re-
pulses. But the Beers, apparently cannot
be driven to open attack. and II
this be really and completely true
their organization will not be apt
to- hold together when they
have once been hunted out of their
trenches. Joubert's line OF sixteen miles
in front OF Butler is too long to maintain
safely if he has not more than twenty-five
thousand troops. To be sure, there are
not more than perhaps three or four practi
cable fords on the line, and, on these points
he can readily mass, on account Of his
great mobility But he would not want to
have generals like Lee, Jackson, Wheeler,
OF Hlli Slef1udH On tue Dthtl sue VI INC
river, in his present circumstances. None
of them would find any difficulty in getting
across, il a weak spot were anywhere de-
tected. We DO not know yet what there
may be in Sir Redyers Butler. II he is the
strategist and tactician the situation de-
mands, there ought to be fair prospect
of success ahead of him. No doubt he is
about to make q determined attempt He
has called for small army of stretcher-
bearers, and naturally that is taken to
mean business Ii is not probable that his
first movement will be. or will be intended
to be. decisive. He win have to do some
more or less heavy fighting to clear his |
ilanks of the Beers before attending TO
theirs. But in these operations he will |
endeavor TO improve his tactical position, |
by getting control of the hills overlooking |
Colenso, the heights at and beyond Wee |
men, and, on the west, the Kopjes close to |
the Boer defences at Springfield. We are |
mistaken if the battle developments of Ma |
tai do not begin to unfold by Saturday or
Sunday