The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1900-09-09
Interpretation of Statutes, PIP. 6 and

Interpretation of Statutes, PIP. and
a. But one other:
1T is only when the language Is
ambiguous that the courts are called
on to construe or interpret.
The general principle on which we
have insisted, that the meaning OF
written law is to be found in its terms
and that we are not at liberty to re-
sort to extrinsic facts and circum-
stances to ascertain what the trainers
might have intended, has frequently
been declared TO apply to the CONSTR
tuition of the United States.
This last quotation is from Sedg-
wick who goes on and quotes ChleI
Justice Marshall as condemning the
principle that lin any case the PLAIN
meaning of provision not contra
dicted by any other provision IN the
same instrument, is to be dlsregafded
because we believe the trainers OF the
instrument could not intend what
they say"
that inst as we settle this question
of ambiguity, so we decide as to
whether or not we must follow Dr..
Briggs and others in their long tramp
after the personal opinions of some of
the members of the Westminster AS
semblv. or admit as evidence those
unguarded expressions of individual
preachers or writer's found in all
times and in all churches.
1T is the purpose of this paper to
maintain that the Confessions teach
ing as to the salvation of Elect in
fants dying in infancy" is not ann
biguous: consequently, that the Con-
fession itself is its own best and eX-
elusive authority of construction.
The whole teaching referred to is
short, and Isl embraced in one PROPOSE
ton as follows:
ELECT infants, dying in infancy, are
regenerated and saved by onrist
through the Spirit, Who worketh
when and where and how He pleas
eth
Please bear in mind that the sole
question is as to the ambiguity of this
proposition. just as it lies in Chapter
X, Section of the Westminster Con-
fession of Faith.
Before moving forward to positive
definition of ambiguity, it is import
ant to point out some things which
are not included within it, and, there
fore, cannot be adduced as proving its
existence.
II. EXAMINATIONS.
J. The mere fact that a proposition
has been misunderstood would not ne
cessarily prove its ambiguity. The
question might so be raised but could
not so be settled. The causes of mis-
understanding are very numerous and
each instance of it would need 10 be
examined, in order to be classed as
proceeding from the man or the mat
ter; whether from inattention, indol-
ence, bigotry, prejudice, unconscious
partiZanship, educational bias, pop
ular misrepresentation; and so on, al
most without limit.
3 The fact that a proposition has
to be studied in order to be compre-
hended, by no means proves its ambi-
guilty.. All can recall how blank some
of the propositions, and even the de-
finitions, of mathematics seemed
when the mind first tried to grapple
them. But the propositions were dis
tinctly true. nevertheless; accurate IN
expression, fixed and definite in signi-
fcation.
3. Closely related to this is the uni
versally admitted principle that the
use of technical or scientific language,
or the language of art, by no means
necessitates ambiguity. Theological
terms NAV embody an affirmation as
unambiguous as any ever written. 1T
is with these terms as with all others:
the ambiguity in sense and in parti-
cular use, must be proved, not as
sumed.
4. a word phrase. clause, or PROPOSE
ton, is not proved ambiguous merely
by the fact that its opposite or con-
trasted meaning may enter into the
mind. and be entertained by IT. BY a
law of mental association, the phrase
"a white man" may suggest "a black
man. but it would lie wofully incon-
elusive to say that the first phrase is
therefore ambiguous. The thing that
suggests the idea in the second phrase
is, not the ambiguity, but the very
definiteness of the idea in the first.
5. Equally inconclusive is the no.
ton that a clause, of two phrases, IS
proved ambiguous by the fact that
the mind can conceive and entertain
two contrasts, one for the idea of
each phrase. The possibility of the
two contrasts in the clause Elect in
fants, dying in infancy elect
infants" as one, and infants not dy-
ing III Infancy. DIS lIlc OtucI--NOuNi
not prove any ambiguity in the
original positive clause.
The question is as to what this
clause has here expressed as in mind.
If some curious soul should spring
the eXtraneous question, which of
these two contrasts do you include as
the meaning of your language? the
Confession would very promptly and
properly answer: / have said not one
SYLLABLE about either and you have no
right to infer from my language that
/ have any design to include either as
part of my teaching in this clause.
There is no more ambiguity in the
clause. ELECT infants. dying in in
fancy than in the clause. ripe APP
pies hanging on tree" What would
be thought of one who would profess
that he could not tell the meaning of
this clause because, forsooth, he ayow-
ed himself in doubt as to whether
you intended to put mot" before
the word ripe or before the word
''hanging?' How quickly would you
retort: Ny kind friend, who told you
that l intended toN put it any
where? | am talking about ''ripe
apples, hanging on a tree; and you
know what | mean we'll enough: the