Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1900-02-12

,ENING. FEBRUARY l2. !
hostile fleet ito be fought at sea by an
| owner Rodney, who may break the force
4 OF disaster ON land by restoring the pres.
,tge Of the British navy?
| The soldiers have done their work
with splendid fortitude and gallantry
ano the administrative departments have
supported them with untiring energy and
amazing resources of organization. The
lJene erals have failed and the military
slaH, which has been responsible for the
tcoffduct OF the war has broken down
ana brought reproach upon the nation.
II their advice was not needed i'm June
ana July, when the mobilization of the
army corps was urged by Lord Wolseley,
they We're allowed a free hand from the
opening of the war in October and have
EnefnSelveS ito blame If they have been
outmaneuvered and oult generated by
Dutch commanders who had never stud
aeo the art of war but had gone from
their cattle breeding farms to the battle
fields among the kopjes.
with their breasts covered with decor.
auOns won IN conflicts with semi -civiliz-
ed or barbarious races and their self-es-
teem inflated with the vainglorious as
sumption that they were the only Euro
pean soldiers with continuous experience
IN the science of modern warfare, British
generals have conducted the campaign in
south Africa as though it were a series
OF sham BATTLES on Salisbury plain, reg
lIlated by drill book and the formulas Of
peace training.
At the opening Of the war there was
nothing like an intelligible or reasonable
plan of military defense. There were
between $4,000 and 10000 regulars and
local ievles scattered along the western
and northwestern frontiers of Cape Col
o1y and in northern Natal Military
la Two of
forces at one or two points until rein-
agreements could arrive. In Cape Colony
there was no attempt to choose defens-
lble positions or to collect the forces, and
IN Natal an u1s'anitary sta tim-Lady-
smith-was held in force because it was
the Aldershot of South Africa and por-
ton OF the garrison was diverted to Glen
coe for the protection of coal mine.
The headquarters staff may not have
been responsible for the first lines Of col
onial defense. but It must be held ac-
cOunta'ble for the strategic blunder OF
shuttdng up Sir George Whites garrison
IN Ladysmith instead of directing him
TO retreat, fighting ait the Tugela and
them at the MoOi river and keeping his
communications open with the sea. II
this had been done he would have receiv-
ed reinforcements by the middle Of No
venlber and the siege and fall Of Lady
smith would have been avoided.
Sir Redvers Butler left England with
his plan of campaign clearly outlined.
His army corps was to march through
the Free State and Sir George White was
TO hold the enemy in check by remaining
quiet at Ladysmith. Lord Wolseley
during the first month of the war had one
Comment to repeat to his friends, and
that was: "White has only to stay still
and wait for Butler to begin his march,"
These were Aldershot conceptions based
upon peace training. without reference to
the realities of military defense and ac-
tua.ls warfare with the Beers.
SIG Redvers Butler abandoned his plan
OF campaign when he reached South At
rica, substituted a march to Modder river
for the Bloemfonte elm Pre- toria parade.
and after dragging the bulk of the army
CORPS and Warrens division into Natal
put 2, 900 men out of action in two unsuc-
cessful attempts for the relief of Lady
smith.
Lord Methuen's attack upon Magers-
fontein, in which the Highland brigade
advanced in column formation, was plan
ned as sham fight would have been ON
Salisbury plain without Thought of am
actual hostile force anywhere in the field.
Colonel Longs recklessness in carry
ing his gums beyond the reach of his
supporting infantry was a sham battle
maneuver which would have brought up.
on him a reprimarjd even at Aldershot.
There have been feint attacks recon-
noissances I'M force, column forma tions
and drill book tactics from the beginning
to the end of the campaign and the gen.
erals have never seemed to realize that !
they were not maneuvering on Sails |
bury's plain, but were heading men under |
fire in battle with the Beers.
tits impossible for Americans, who re-
member the training of their own civil |
war, to think of soldiers like Grant and /
Lee attacking strongly intrenched posi-
tions and conducting turning movements |
after the manner of Lord Methuen anu
General Butler. They would not have |
fought three battles without scouting or I
reconnaissance, as Lord Methuen did, |
and them have flung their army against |
q strong position like Magersfontein In |
a frontal attack. where the resistance
was greatest. without an attempt at
not have remained idle in camp for weeks
waiting for reinforcements which were
not In reserve. They would not have re-
treated from Colenso or Spion Kop after
a single futile attack but would have
dug their way up to the ememy's posi-
tions, maldng closer maps day by day
and gradually enveloping them and rem
der1mg them untenable The British
staff has allowed the Dutch to do all the
and all the digging and to
choose every battlefield and defensive
position and when there is am impassa
1t orders the troops back to camp to
achievements for another frontal at
tack 1t is Aldershot generalship that
has brought reproach on England and
oreated a crisis in the fortunes Of the
empire.
Brantley Is SubDOenaed.