Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1900-01-02
MONTOJO'S DEFENSE


OF Admiral Montojo of the Spanish
navy give a new page to the history of
the Spanish American war. 1n his de
fepse Admiral Montojo shows that iD
January, 1898, Spain was in full posses
sion OF the plans of the Americans, and
was informed of what would happen In
case war was declared with America.
He also says that Lieutenant SObral,
the Spanish naval attache at Washing
ton, constantly kept the Spanish gov
erument informed of developments In
America, and OF what preparations were
being made for war with Spain, in con-
sequence of which the lieutenant was
branded as spy in time OF peace, and
had to leave this country. The admiral
states that information of the Spanish
plans was obtained by the Americans
in the same way at Madrid; that the
war was begun in opposition ~ the ad-
vice OF the military and naval COM
manders, and charges that, while his
government was well informed, it made
no move to prepare for the conflict
Admiral Montojo makes the state
ment that the proj C lies of the Ameri-
cans were charged with infammable
cloth, and he makes point OF the re-
treat OF Admiral Dewey after the de-
struclion of the feet, when be had it
in his hands to at once decide the ques-
ton of the day. Admiral Montojo also
SAYS that it was settled ia his mind that
the war would end disastrously for
Spain when Cervera was ordered to
leave Cape Verde Islands, and that
from that time he was without hope,
a1d made up bis mind to die. The sd
miral charges in plain words that his
government, although it knew that the
war was coming, made no preparations
for proper defense and gives the lie to
Governor General Aueustin, of the
Philippines, and to those who declare
bat the Spanish sailors were asleep
when the attack began. He does not
believe that Dewey stopped fighting
only for the sake OF eating breakfast,
ssys the Americans kept out OF range
of bis inferior guns and fired on his
ships with their long range guns and
speaks of the businesslike way
the Americans had OF fighting.
He declares that only FIVE torpedoes 8
were in position at Manila when Dewey
made the attack, and that he was ab-
solutely helpless from the failure OF the
home government to come to his assist :
snee.
Cavite, be says, was trap, and Su-
big almost defenseless. Those who
we're 10 blame for the shame OF Spain,
he saws, were the officeholders at home.
"Iu conclusion" he says, II must
state that l considered the campaign
lost when Cervera's feet left Cape
Verde Islands, thus dividing our
forces; second, that the Philippines was
the only country in the world which
bad no military power, and that only
thirty-six days before the declal alton
of war was any thought taken to fortify
Subig, when it was already too late
third, that the squadron did not ad
vance on Subig because it did not 90
there to defend Subig, but to defend it.
self in Subig, and when 1 went to
Subig / notified the governor
general, and brand the statement OF
General Augustin to the contrary
as untrue; fourth, that the au-
thorities OF the Philippines we're made
aware Of the precarious position; that
Lieut.. Sobral, naval attacbe at Wash
ington, had given all the Information in
ample time, and that the Spanish gov.
ernment could have done all that was
necessary to make it impossible to over
come US, but failed TO do so; fifth, that
| took all the precautions it was posi-
BILE to take With my limited command
and material and that in selecting Cav
ite did so because there was no other
place fortified at all, and IL would have
been impossible not to sacrifice the
squsdroD; sixth, that the enemy's
squadron was discovered and fired upon
before they came within reach OF our
cannon; that we were absolutely at the
mercy Of Admiral Dewey, who, with bis
far-reaching cannon, knew that we
could do nothing; seventh, that when
the revolution began, and the Ameri'
cans brought insurgent chiefs, 1t was
plainly understood that they did moi
intend to leave, which confirmed the
advance advices from Lieutenant So
| bral