The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1900-09-20


q general condition OF the islands as 10
i peace and industry; business and .revc-
nue. conditions prevailing; progress Of
opportunity for education; disposition
Of the people toward the United
States; what improvement in this par.
iEticular: the present extent of the in
#surrection; how much Of the archlpela-
golis tranquil; how much is still in dis
turbed state; probable continuance Of
1 guerilla warfare, and influences oper-
sating to prolong It: how It can best be
I brought to q close; conditions and re-
s qulrements of civil government.
ROOT, Secretary Of War. Z
The Commissions Report.
MANILA, August 81, 1900.
\ Secretary of War, Washington. 3
E Replying to dispatch. commission re-
ports: 1t has for two months and
half made dlllgent inquiries into con-
ditions prevailing. Mass of people has
aptitude for education, but is ignorant.
! superstitious and credulous in. a re-
markable degree. Hostility against
Americans was originally aroused by
absurd falsehoods of INSCRIPTIONS
leaders. Distribution of troops in three
i hundred posts has by contac. largely
dlspelled hostility and steadily improv-
( ed temper OF people. This improvement.
further by abuses OF insurgents, .af-
firms that large number Of people long
for peace, and are willing to accept
government under United States. In
Z surgents not surrendering after defeat
. have divided into small guerilla bands
under general officers or become La
\ drones. Nearly oil prominent generals
and politicians and insurrectlonists ex-
5 cept Aguinaldo have since been captured
have surrendered and have taken oath
of allegiance. Policy Of leniency culml-
Mating In amnesty had marked effect to
s induce surrenders. until defining of po-
slitIcal issues in the United States re-
ported here In full, gave hope to insur-
gent officers still in arms, of changed
Z policy and stayed surrenders to await
i result Of elections. Disturbances in
! parts of island. kept up and avowed by
insurgent proclamation and orders, to
!. influence election. do not show un-
friendly attitude of majority of people
of provinces where they occur, but
only activity of small insurgent bodies
IN mountain Businesses whence they
4 les, 10 ". ~, ,,trl
tacks, or murderous ambush OF small
American squads. or to collect coutr!bu-
! tons or recruit from people terrorized
by cutting out tongues. cutting OFF
limbs. buryIns alive. murder and plum
der. Difficulty OF detection enables in
> surgents to maintain surveillance over
people-even in some garrisoned
towns.
Uncertainty of Future Policy.
Uncertainty as to future policy Of
the United States and defenselessness
Of people without arms largely prevent
them aiding Americans in suppressing
outrages. Despite these difficulties.
maintenance Of status quo makes for
, more peaceful conditions. All northern
Luzon except in Neuvaccija and Rula-
can. are substantially free from Insur-
gents. People are busy planting and
are asking for municipal organization.
Railway and telegraph lines from Ma
Mia to Dagupan. 122 miles. have not
been mo!ested for FIVE months. In ex-,
cepted provinces and parts Of provinces
Z OF southern Luzon, !nsurrecto bands
dodge from one mountain refuge to an
other and give occasional trouble. Tag
alloys alone active In leading guerrilla
warfare have succeeded in recruiting
bands among the VIsaynns In Samar,
Leyte. and parts OF Panay which MAIN
tain themselves by method described.
In Negros. Ccbu. Romblon, Mnsbatc.
slbuynn, Tablns. Bohol and other VS.
ayan islands. little disturbance exists
and civil government Is eagerly await
ed. Near Cayagan In MindInao old
Tagaiug penal settlement considerable
force OF Ladrones makes neighboring
country dangerous and disturbance cx-
lists at Surigno, but In south OF this
large sparsely settled island al Fam
voanga, Cottubatto and other. points
the country Is, tranquil. Four years OF
war and lawlcssness in parts OF Islands
have created unsettled conditions and
.unguarded American or foreigner itrav-
cling ordinary trails far from garrisons
and attracting cupldty, runs risk OF
violence even in paciiled provinces,
Native conFtabafary and militia which
should be organized ut once will end
this and the terrorism to which de-
6 fenscless people, are subjected,
~. Natives Desire, to Enlist.
Natives desire to enlist In these or
gnnlzatons. II judciously selected and
oillccred viii be sufficient force for
maintenance OF order and VIII permit
early material reduction OF United
States troops. 1t Is conceded by MI but
men TT arms and Is implied In theiT
proclamation that II election confirms
J present policy remnant OF insurrectlon
Will disappear within sixty days By sur
render OF lcadGra and FADING out OF
rank and file. Ladroncs in part n her
itagc from Spanish rule. VIII continue,
but can be suppressed by measures.
Existing resurrection organization now
: maintained "Ith greatest difficulty for
purpose stated. Effort Is TO mass
5 enough insurgents TO crush one OF our
small garrisors for political effect, but