The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1900-07-21

I I
The pay of all the soldiers was in ar
rears, and the majority fought sullenly
only on compulsion, and from the very
| first pitched battle at Ping-yang,. in Ko-
rea, where the Chinese lost 49, 900 men,
| to the last engagement at Niuchuang,
| the Japanese had them constantly on
the run The Chinese did not win a
single victory, and yet both the off,
GERS and the rank and file fought with
consummate bravery-up to a certain
point. In the first fight the finest body
of troops Lii Hung Chang possessed, his
5000 trained Mantchoos, stood their
ground against overwhelming odds and
fought till every man was slain Sew
eral commanders, both of land and ma
val forces, were beheaded for coward
ice, and several others committed sui
eide in anticipation of such rate De-
falling them. 1t cannot be denied thar
the Chinese have courage, but it is OF q
very peculiar kind.
1t is more than doubtful if the Chi
nese learned anything of value from
their dear bought experience in the
Carbohydrates war. 1t is said that
the court at Picking did not know that
it's armies were defeated until the last
battle was fought, and yet the war had
lasted more than six months. After 1t
was over one of the most learned menu
bers of the court argued that since the
like had been so ineffective in the hands
of the Chinese and Mantchoo soldiery,
they should all be armed with the an
tique jingalls, BOWS and arrows, with
which they had conquered their enc
mics of old"
The Chinese navy was practically de-
stroyed or captured during the late
war and now numbers hardly more
than 100 vessels of all classes. The
army, however, was not appreciably re-
duced, for the gaps in it's ranks were
quickly filed by drafts from the surplus
millions of China's population. Some
spasmodic attempts have been made to
bring it up to European standards, by
the introduction of foreign officers and
tactics, by the purchase abroad of inn
mense supplies of ammunition, guns
and armament of all descriptions. But
it is one thing to lead a horse to water
and quite another to make it drink.
There are great arsenalS, as at Shang-
hal and Nankin, naval and military
academies, factories for the manufac-
ture of black and smokeless powder.
There are European instructors in milf
tary and naval tactics, students who
have studied abroad and hundreds of
cadets who are studying at home under
foreign and native professors; yet, de-
spite all this, there is something in the
Chinese character that absolutely pre-
cludes the ACQUISITION or retention of
technical information necessary to ma
val military success. The Chinese
engineer may learn how to run the en-
gines of a warship and the gunner how
to calculate the range of a cannon, but
the chances are that the former will
ram a vessel of his own instead of the
enemy's fleet and the latter be unable
to hit anywhere near the object of his
aim.
The Chinese army is numerically vast
and imposing. First of all, there are
the Eight Banners" containing some
300. 900 men, mainly descendants of the
Mantchoo fighters and conquerors, the
entire force subdivided into three
groups of Mantchoos. Mongols and Chi
nese. With them the profession OF war
is hereditary, and from their ranks are
drawn the Tigers and the imperial
guard, while perhaps 10000 are scatter
ed in garrison along the Manchurian
frontier.
The great national army, called the
lying Ping or the Green Flags" is
also known as the Five Camps" be-
cause split into five distinct parts.
further subdivided into Is corps, one for
each province, at the orders of the gov
ernor general or viceroy. On paper this
army has strength of 100000 men,
with about one-third available in time
of war. But only a small portion u
armed with modern weapons and has
Added to these are the "mercenary
troops'' which can be called out if need
ed, and the Monaghan cavalry, to the
number of about 100000 nominal, but
not more than 10000 actual. The total
figures show land army of about 300,-
900 men on a peace footing and of up
ward of LOCO, 900 on a war basis. But
as a whole, the army is ineffective, ac-
cording to Lord Beresford, who has
made a study of it, lacking cohesion,
unity and discipline, and chiefly armed
with weapons long since obsolete.
The drill is hardly more than mere
physical exercise; there is no adequate
equipment of medical service, transport
commissariat.
There is no coherent body of men en-
titled to the name of an army, the en-
tire force is so divided into separate
groups or camps scattered throughout
the various provinces. The finest corps
is that known as the Tien-tsin contin-
gent, the pet of Lii Hung Chang, which
is equipped with repeating rifles, Krupp
guns and all modern accessories, be-
sides having had the benefit of superior
drill and Cat least on paper better pay
about "a per month, against less than
half that amount received by soldiers
in the Banner army.
1t has been declared that the Tartar
soldier never surrenders, even in the
face of absolute and overwhelming de-
feat; that he Will Kill his wife and chill
dren and burn himself alive in his
home, leaving nothing but q heap Of
ashes for the victors. 1t is a capital
offense for a Chinese soldier or officer
to fail in any important mission in
trusted to him, so that if an officer, OUT
side of his salary and awards, is sure
of thing officially from imperial
sources it is promotion or decapitation.
In conclusion, while the Chinese army
dah Ia ut n
cial glance, still, as has been shown in
the preceding columns, it's organic
weakness more than compensates for
its vast numerical superiority over the