The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-02-25
A QUESTION OF THE TIME
THE POLITICAL EFFECTS of TRANS
CONTINENTAL CANALS.
Author of sThe American Common
wealth" on Results That May Follow
in the Case Of the United States.

OF the ClaytOn-BulWer treaty or lSo0, ana
thereby opening up the way to control, by
the United States, of a transcontinental
canal from the Caribbean sea to the Pa
cific ocean, would have excited the widest
and keenest attention in England 1t is, no
doubt, true, that since the failure of the
Lesseps Panama canal scheme, European
interest in the piercing of the isthmus has
greatly tagged. People hastily assumed
that this failure meant the abandonment
of the project for long time to come, and
neither the Nicaragua scheme, which has
been so much talked of in the United
States, nor the Panama scheme revived,
on less ambitious lines than those of Les
seps, by new company. had brought the
matter back within the practical horizon of
ordinary people in Europe. Now. however.
| the fact that a diplomatic obstacle which
had stood in the way of political action by
| the United States has been removed, places
the enterprise at once upon a different
| level.
| 1t is assumed to be sign that the
| United States is seriously thinking of TAX
ing up and carrying through the enterprise
with resources which will make its COM
| pletion certain. And the results of that
they would receive, as they certainly de-
serve, the fullest attention in Europe, but
| for the preoccupation of all minds with the
South african war, and with the further
complications to which that war may pos
| sibly give rise. Things being what they
| are little is said in England about the new
| convention, and though some of our news
papers comment of the fact that no con-
| sideration has been given by the United
States for the concession by England Of
| what had been held to be a valuable right
possessed by her under the Clayton-Bulwer
| treaty, the general good will towards the
| United States and the desire to retain the
| friendship of the American people have
| contributed, along with the preoccupation
| already mentioned, to check any COM
plants that might otherwise have been
heard.
1t is, of course, not yet known in Eng
land what action the United States will be
likely to take, now that it's hands are free.
But, assuming that it decides to support
either the Nicaragua scheme or the Pana-
ma scheme, and that canal will, within
the next few years, be constructed and
placed under the control of the United
States, the consequences for all maritime
powers must be far-reac..Ing. They will
affect not only the commerce of the world,
but also its political relations.
RESULTS FROM THE SUFZ CANAL.
In thinking of these consequences ones
mind naturally turns to the Suez canal, the
only great precedent applicable, and to the
consequences for Europe and Asia which
have followed from its opening. 1t was
long supposed by Lord Palmerston as like
~ to be prejudicial to the political interests
of Britain as a power with interests both in
the Mediterranean and in India. Whether
he will prove in the long run to have been
right does not yet appear, for England has
not since the canal finished been at
war with any European power.
1t is commonly assumed that the canal
has greatly benefited Britain, because it
has undoubtedly stimulated trade with
India and because the bulk of trade is car
ried in British vessels. But there is one
point in which it has injured Britain. When
cargoes came from India and the farther
J East around the Cape of Good Hope Lon
don and Liverpool were the ports to which
they mostly came, and from London OF
Liverpool they were, unless detained fol-
consumption within the United Kingdom
reshipped to various parts of the European
continent. Now, however, the goods
destined for the countries which have ports
On the Mediterranean instead of going
through England come direct from the East
to Marseiles. Genoa, or Trieste, oil
Odessa, and England loses the gain which
she formerly had in the handling of these
goods. This is an obviously natural re-
suit of the opening of a shorter waterway
from the Mediterranean to the Orient. Blu
1t was, if not absolutely unforeseen, at any
J rate very little discussed before the openins
, of the Suez canal. The circumstances o.
, the Panama Tor Nicaragua canal are toe
} different to make close parallel possible
, But the Suez case may be cited to show
, how results which the world has not con
, templated may flow from a change in tn,
, possibilities of sea carriage.
THE SUEZ CANAL AND EGYPT.
What difference the existence of the Sue
. canal will make in case of a European wa
. We do not yet know. 1t has been formal,
I neutralized, but how the naturalization will
: work out in practice remains to be seen
One political result, however, 1t has alread,
had. a result of the highest Importance
, 1t has carried the English into Egypt, an,
from Egypt into Central Africa In 1S7
, Lord Beaconsfelds administration pur
chased a large number of shares in tn
canal company; and when troubles subse
quently arose in Egypt, troubles which ul
} timately eliminated in the military risin
!, under Arab Pasha in 1852, the possession
, | of these shares, as well as the interes
. | which England had in the keeping ope
! | and control Of the short waterway to India
: | was constantly urged as a reason why sh
, | should interfere in Egypt to support tn
!. Khedive against his own subjects, and t
. prevent him from becoming subject {
: French influences. The Intervention of 1ss:
which by the battle of Tel ell Kebir, place
Egypt under British control, would almos
certainly not have taken place but for tn
, existence Of the canal and the notion tina
, England was bound by her own interest
, to see to its safety. The occupation Q
Egypt by British troops has continued fror
1852 till to-day, has become far more pei
} manent In it's character than it was a
, first, has intensified the rivalry OF Ems
, land and France, and has led to a nom
, inally Egyptian. but practically British
!, reconquest Of the valley Of the Upper Nil,