Akron daily Democrat. [volume] (Akron, Ohio) 1892-1902, 1900-03-30

1H4hTI III II ito fighting old
+: !; ]; !: J: :: !: :: = !, !: !:
| lHM battles over un-
| NuYNMD HIN less the subject
MM MHM has some bear
M VI HNllI ling upon mat
| IW Il uG u tiers Of today.
u --had the good
fortune to find the general in a talka-
tive mood when Butler was trying to
make headway for the relief OF Lady
smith, and he discussed with clearness
and emphasis the situation In South
! Africa.
Yes, / am intensely interested in
the military operations" said he when
asked to express his views upon the
strategy, generalship and modern
methods as developed in the course Of
the Anglo Boer contest. But first Of
all let me say that / do not criticise
any campaign or general. / look upon
the conflict as an impartial military
observer.
'At first thought it might be urged
that Butler and Methuen should have
flanked the enemy and not attacked
him In strong positions. This may be
done In two ways under favorable cir
cumstances-that is to say, tactically
upon the local field of operations as at
the crossing of the Tugela Mt Colenso
or on Modder river. In broader way
an enemy may be flanked strategically.
A movement by the British into the
Orange Free State or the Transvaal by
a route remote from the Boer positions
would be a stroke of strategy and
would compel the enemy to leave the
Tugela and the Modder and hasten to
the protection Of their own capitals
and bases. But other than purely mill
tary considerations have constrained
the British generals to accept the in
itiative of their enemy and fight him in
I positions of his own choosing.
"The tactics Of fanking instead Of
making direct frontal attacks have not
been possible because of the mobility
of the Beers If the British reach the
flank of Boer line at nightfall, in the
morning 1t has moved miles farther on.
1t is here today and there tomorrow.
In conditions likertho fIanking Is out
of the question, and look for nothing
else for long time to come. The Brit
ish army must follow the roads, and
there Is no doubt but the Beers will
fortify all the passes of roads In the
comparatively level regions Of the Or
ange Free State and the Transvaal
ahead of the invading army. Probably
they have done so already and will
make warfare in the open as difficult
for the British as 1t has proved to be in
mountainous regions.
"As l have said, will not criticise,
for l cannot know what orders were
given to Butler and to Methuen. Me-
thuen's movements to the Modder riv-
er, although highly disastrous, seem
to have been the proper ones. His en-
emy fell back on his approach, and
he was in duty bound to follow. AS
for Butler, l may say that l was pre-
pared to believe without evidence that
after he had tested the Boer strength
on the Tugela at Colenso he was anx-
ious to shift the scene Of operations to
O region more favorable for the assail-
ants, But moral and political consid-
erations force the British to continue
operations on large scale in northern
Natal. Should Ladysmith fall l do not
look for an abandonment of the line OF
the Tugela by England. That line
must be held by a powerful force or all
northern Natal will go over to the
; Boer cause, Natal and Cape Colony
, are filed with Dutch, and the British
t army must remain among them to
keep them from thinking their race is
, dominant In South Africa.
"But England will try again and
again for the succor of Ladysmith
She cannot ford to let it go even II II
, has 10 strategic Importance, for its
, downfall under the menace of BoeI
Y guns would be the saddest humiliation
the British arms and people have SUI.
fered since the surrender OF Burgoyne
at Saratoga, and the nation is smartina
, over that defeat to this day. The fall
of Ladysmith means the wiping out OF
gallant army Of 10000 men under
land has sent to the field. General
Whites defense of Ladysmith, hamper
ed as he seems to have been by orders
, from London, Is brilliant triumph fol-
! him as n leader and for the men under
} bis command.
~ have noted the absence of recon
poissances by British leaders, and this
is n fatal error II due to oversight You
can Judge how 1t strikes me when
. say that was trained under General
Hooker, leader who was always pok
Ing around to see what the enemy was
, doing and how he stood along the
front. was but obeying my masters
teaching when | sent out Berdan's
sharpshooters into the woods at Get
tysbrrg and developed Longstreet's
sic and plan Of attack hours before
the blow came on my front. But thai
is off the subject The British. ever
when operating in Natal and Cape Col
, ony, on British soil, are in the midst OF
enomies. The best guides to he found
and the general public who must be de
pended upon for particulars as tc
roads, elevations, water courses ant
the like will give misleading informa
tion whenever they dare to and vii
. even risk the rope in order to hurt theil
Enatuial enemies. the British. We fount
: the situation in our border states iik
TINT in 1861. Resides the Beers cove