The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-07-21

LATE lz0AL DECtSIOHa
= Dsw. Al intsssseinR questiss - 10
whether Governor has the power to par
don one convicted Of violating city erdi-
sasee has Sseeatly bses decided for the
hrst time by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, The court holds that, from the
language Of the constitution comforting the
Derucning power. 1t Il clear that this
power b limited to offences againss the
avs % the State. and does not extend to
.o1Atsae g city ordinances. and that.
tnsfetore. The Governor can :sa-don only
tnose VINO are convicted Of violating Stste
laws, ana cannot pardon one convicted Of
Violating city ordinance. I'VE have been
referred to no case as precedent" aid
The court. FOR authority In Governor 10
pardon one convicted Of violating city
ordinance. and In . search made by US we
have found none. We find authority for
the general proposition that the parjoning
power OF tho State executive reaches only
TO matters in which the State il inter-
ested; but IL the precise question
IN snts case has aver been decided we hayo
not seen the decision-''
In criminal prosecution In Texas for
selling hop ale'' in visiatiou of the local
option law. defendant eonfended that thu
drink was not intoxicating. but a Juror
who was permitted by the defendant and
the Prosecuting attorney to drink nearly
quart Of the hop ale Convinced himself
that II man drank enough Of 1t 1t would
make him drunk: and he told his fellow
Jurors after the verdict had been reached
the eject the hop ale had on him. On APP
peal this was assigned as error, but the
Court OF Criminal Appeals held that II was
not prejudicfal. saying: I'm prosecutions Of
this character we do not think It proper
practice to have the 5ury drink any Of the
liquid alleged to be intoxicating. Ger
tainly It can be proved outside Of the tes
timony Of the Juror that It is intoxicating.
In view Of the fact that appellant agreed
this might be done, and that the Juror
did not mention its Intoxicating eject to
the other Jurors until after the verdict
had been rendered. and in view Of the
further fact that the evidence is con-
elusive, showing the guilt Of the appellant
beyond doubt. we do not see 1T to DIS
turb the finding OF the Jury"
The Supreme Court Of Michigan hoyy-
ever. disagrees With the Texas court. which
sara It was not proper practice fo- the
jury to sample the drink, and holes that
It was mot error to allow the jurors 10
taste the contents Of a bottle of cider
which was offered In evidence On tia
trfai. when the cider was admitted in evil
oence. the Michigan Judge said: There is
tumbier. gentlemen. If you want to taste
Of 1t, any Of you" and on appeal Ina
Supreme Court held that it would not
naye been error II the jurors had tasted 1t.
A curious damage suit against railway
company in Texas is presented in a case
In which the plaintiff contends that thu
company which maintains charitable hos
pital for its employees Is liable for the
death OF patient In the hospital, due, it
Is alleged. from the neglect of the sur
geons the company employed It appears
that the railway company has, since 1881.
maintained hospital department in con-
rectiou with its road. under the control of
its manager. intended for the better care
OF its sick and wounded employees. For
this 1t employed a chief surgeon and
others. The money or fund from which
the chief surgeon. with other employees
OF said department, and the other ex-
penses thereof, are paid, Is derived from
what Is called the hospital fund" which
is raised by . tax Of so cents per capita
per month from all its officers below the
grade OF division superintendent. This
fund 1t was shown, has never been sufn-
Client to defray the expenses OF this de-
partment; the difference being made I'D
by the company. The evidence showed
clearly that the company was not conduct
Ing this department as business, derived
no profit thersfrom, and that it was cot
designed for profit.
The negligence complained Of in this case
s alleged to have been committed By q
surgeon employed in the company's hospi-
al, in amputating the foot Of railway
.mpfoye receiving treatment in the hos
,itai. On the trial the jury rendered a YER
,ict for 5000 against the surgeon and the
'aiiway company. but On appeal the Court
II Appeals reversed this verdict. We are
.leaFly Of the OPINION said the court,
that the railway company cannot be held
liable for the negligence of the physicians
I furnishes. except upon the ground OF
want Of proper care in selecting or retain
ng them. 1t is our opinion. upon
he present record. that the department
was solely beneficial to the employees, and
vas SO intended. being conducted at loss
10 the company: and the Iatter's obliga-
ion was simply to furnish proper attention
and treatment. and this duty was PERFORM
Cd when 1t appears, as is undisputed In
his case, that 1.-THE ssrgeon) was comps-
.ent."
The question whether brakeman Of Q
-ailroad company. who. in ejecting boy
rom the train. fell upon him, fracturing
he leg Of the boy. and who then picked
linn up and kicked him. was acting within
he scope Of his authority, has been held
" the Supreme Court. Appellate division,
New York. to be question for the jury.
Fhe court said that "it was not within the
,rovince of the court to hold, as a matter
Il law, that the brakeman was not acting
within the scope Of his authority. and that,
the defendant Was not liable
Or his act In inf1icting the injury" But
be court held that it should have been left
D the jury. under the circumstances
roven. to determine this question.
When substantive litigated question in
case Is, Did husband make disclosure
I certain information to his wife, the
;apreme Court Of Kansas holds that a
bird person who overheard it made may
e permitted to testify. and that such
estinony Is not Objectionable as being
earsay in character, nor as an evasion
{ the ste .utory rule against the admission
{ the testimony of husband and wife as
0 communications between each ether.
o regard to the statutory rule referred to
be court said that II is confined to the
lass of testimony which it in terms for
ids, and that it extends to nothing be-
ond. 1T forbids husband and wife from
sstifyfng to communications made b. one
0 the other" said the court, '.but it does
ct forbid q third person VINO overheard
he conversation from stating Ii to the