The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1900-03-22
cRIrICIsMs OF TEE BosR WAR.
European Military Papers on the CampaiEu
In south Africa.

Some Of the British military criticism Of the
Boer war makes In reading for its Just
and generous appreciation Of the merits OF their
aiversarieS, IN, London Arny and Nary Ga
trfr In particular. Speaking Of the Cronic sur
render 4, says
All that could have been done by man was
done by HIM I, avert disaster. The retreat iron
Kimberley WAS carried out In "A mast 'rly manner
The Resistance In the bsd 81 the Modder was he
roic. and continued for days, when a trained and
disciple | forp would not have held out for as
many ~AsL The resourcefnlness 81 the defenc,
was ma s~nificent. nevertheless, on the ami
vcrsary Of IN" day when nineteen years ago 400
British soldiers were defeated through military
and political laundering, 1000 Beers under a
brilliant General surrender u the British"
In II, revi.w Of the Ell rt " IN, British artillery
fire against the Boer positions II does not hest
tate 10 express the belief that the enormous losses
TO the Bo,rS that figured so largely in the official
dispatches. had no existence except In the mag
nation. Modern weapons Of precision favor
defensive tactics enormously, in proof Of which
1t quotes the successful resistance Of Mafeking
and Kimberley. The smallness Of Gen. Cronie's
, force illustrates the same lesson. 1t was only
| overcome by a combination of sup Nor strategy
and tactics, large masses Of men, and greater
moDulty. " the numD'r5 ol the BOer army
were something Of n surprise, their smallncss
is explained by the probable dispersion o' the
greater part " the Free STATE force, which would
also account for the larger number OF the prison
ers having been Transyaalers.
The German Mdtdv Wochsnb'dn, which de
votes an article u the Boer war IN relation To
European armies, lays great stress upon the very
special conditions that prayail In the present
theatre Of operations, and arrives at the impor.
tdnt conclusion that the existing conception OF
the attack must b. greatly modified. In its opin.
ion the modern weapons make q successful frontal
attack practically impossible. and II doubts
whether IL is possible even % gain an ascendancy
over the defending artillery. From the affairs
Of Magerstontain and OF Colens,, Spion hop
and Naal krantl, the Wochsnbidft arrives AT the
conclusion that the morale Of the Beers Was not
broken by the heavy fire u which they were sub
iect'd. In Germany the first phase Of an attack
has consisted in dominating the enemy's gun
iire followed by an attempt a. demorali1e the de
Tending line by heavy shelling, in order ~ give
the attacking infantry a fairly favorable chance,
This view Of the attack IL thinks no longer ten
able, since modern weapons have given some.
thing like absolute ascendancy ~ the tactlcal
defensive. at the SANE time II does not think that
the defensive can ultimately prevail. II blames
the Beers severely for not having made prepare
tons u assume the offensive, for lack OF which
they lost more than one chance OF infictlflR
important Losses on tine British after preliminary
defeat.
Col. dc Nillebois Mareuil, the French officer
who is with the Boer staff, speaks highly Of the
Beers As artillerists, especially 81 their wonderful
capacity for approaching distances, Their cool.
ness under fire. ~alertness. and the restraint dis
played in never firing until the decisive moment
extor his warmest admiration. They belong,
he says, TO a species of military elite long since
disappeared" Among the subordinate Com
manders ha places Gen. Rotha in a leading place,
hish opinion Of Gems Cnnie, Lucas Meyer and
Delarey.