The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1900-01-31
The situation on the TugeIa.

A late despatch from London today
states that the report OF Buffers alleged
assertion. that he had found the key Of
the road to Ladysmith aud would be in
that place within a week. does not emauate
from the War Office. and is generally dis
credited. Still Butler may have said what
has been attributed 10 him. We cannot
forget that his contemplated attack on
Spion Kop was fully advertised by the
War Office a day in advance Of the move
ment. His more recent intention. if be
entertains one. may have leaked out
through the same OTifce
Reports from the front and from Lady
smith, such as they are. DO not seem 70
require that we should modify the view Of
Buffers situation expressed in this column
yesterday. There is this, however, TO be
said in possible modification or one point:
Everyone knows that for nearly a month
past very little has trauspired concerning
the actual disposition of British Ie-en-
forcements which have arrived at the Cape.
All told. and including coloniaIs and IT.
regulars. there must be very nearly enc
hundred and twenty thousand British
Butler has generally been thought TO have
about forty thousand. But his available
force may be considerably greater than We
have had reason to suppose; in which case
there would be tactical possibilities which
. have not been counted in his favor For
example 10 is reported that Lyttletou is
. stiU holding his own az Mount Alice and
Zwsrts Kop. on the centre Of Buffers line
. from Zppckles to Cheyeley well in ad-
vance Of Potgieter's Drift. Lyttleton's po-
sitlon appears to project into the
Boer general line Of defence. and Is close
to Dewdrcp. II We could assume that
Buffers right ~ Cheveley was strong and
well supported by reserves posted 20 as
. sist it OF Lyttleton, as necessity should
arise then the danger from an attack on
that wing would be minimized. and instead
/ Of a general retreat something else might
happen. The reverse to the British left at
/ Spiou Kop necessitated its retirement be-
hind the Tugela River. Joubert then
seems to have developed a design
TO attack in force at COleusO on
/ the right wing under Barton. II
Butler felt confidence in Barton's ability
/ TO repulse such a movement. he very con-
ceivably might consider the BOer line op-
posite to his centre to be weakened, and
might conclude, while Barton should put
/ up a stiG fight at Cheveley. to push out
/ his centre. and attempt TO take Dewdrop
thus cutting Joubert's line and dividing
his forces. Such a movement il success
full, would lead to the immediate relief of
Ladysmith, the garrison OF which would
be able at once to form junction by sortie
en- masse. taking in reverse the segregated
Boer right in the Ladysmith hills toward
Acton Homes.
The feasibility of these tactics is wholly
dependent upon Buffers strength in men
and guns, and granting enough of both,
would be still more feasible If the British
army were not greatly inferior TO its an
( tagonists in point Of mobility. This dis
/ advantage. &c would seem, might be over
4 come if Buffers numerical strength were
/ sufficient to engage JoubeIt dec siyely at
/ two or three well-separatod points. As
we have said, II is all question OF men
and guns, to which we may add that per-
haps 1t is not less a question of competent
/ leadership. n characteristic that the Brit
ish army has not so far displayed to any
brilliant extent in the Natal campaign.