Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1900-11-16
THE TREATY WITH SPAIN.
Some Reasons Why 1t Was
Drawn and Ratified.

Facts, Arguments and Conclusions
Governing the Action OF the President,
the Commissioners and the Senate,
Not Before Made Public.
The war with Spain for the freedom of
Cuba received the support of all political
parties. At that time Admiral Dewey was
in the harbor of Hong Kong with his fleet.
The United States had no coaling station in
that vicinity. Great Britain, neutral Pow
er, notified him to leave the harbor with
In "a hours. This was the right and duty
of Great Britain under international law.
Admiral Dewey had not on board his YES
sells coal enough to bring them home;
much less to do any fighting on the way.
Coal is contraband of war when to be used
to carry 1t on, and could not be furnished
by neutral power except in sufficient
| quantities to bring our vessels directly
home. 1t could not be furnished for use
in an engagement II attacked by the Span
ish feet Hence Admiral Dewey was or
dered to find and destroy the Spanish fleet,
then in that vicinity. 1t was the only
order which conld be safely given. It re-
suited in the destruction of the Spanish
fleet and the occupation of Manila harbor
The situation thus developed made mani
fest to every American statesman, of what
ever political party, the necessity of a coal
ing station at Manila when the war had
been brought to a speedy and successful
termination.
BY the terms of the protocol Spain was
to rellnquish sovereignty over Cuba, and to
cede TO the United States sovereignty over
Porto Rico. The details were to be set
tied by the treaty. The fate of the Philip
pine Islands was left to be settled wholly
by the treaty. The United States was
then In occupation of Manila and its har-
Dor. One or more of the Commissioners
selected by the President to settle the
terms Of the treaty went to Paris with the
conviction that this nation should demand
and take only coaling station at Manila.
| When they came TO canvass the situation
they found these conditions: Manila was
the best, II not the only feasible point, for
coaliDg station. 1t was the centre of the
commerce of the islands, had an excellent
harbor, and was accessible to the principal
commercial points in the East. A coaling
station at this point would be surrounded
by Spanish forces and Spanish influences
on all sides, unless, as probable, Spain
should be compelled to sell the islands to
some other Power or Powers.
These questions pressed the Commission
haI l,a
come SO complicated in the abhorrent con-
ditions in Cuba, only $50 miles from its
nearest point, that it had to engage in
war for self-protection, how could it peace
ably manage coaling station 5000 miles
away, surrounded on all sides by the same
power as had held Cuba? II the Maine,
on friendly mission, with 256 officers and
men, was given but short shrift in the har-
Dor of Havana, what might not be expect
ed to happen to our war vessels when coal
ing in the harbor of Manila? 1t was diff
cult to answer these questions satisfacto-
rily.
The Commission then considered whether
the difficulties would be avoided If the is-
land of Luzon only should be taken. But
the other islands were near Luzon, and the
interests of all centered at Manila. Then
If Spain should sell, or parcel out, the is
lands among the other Powers, quite as
many uncertainties and entanglements
might be encountered. On this point the
experience of the nation at Samoa was not
encouraging.
These and other considerations finally
brought all the Commissioners to agree
and the President TO concur, that a coaling
station at that point was a necessity for
the protection of the nations, and its cltl-
zens' interests in the East; and that the
probabilities were that there would be less
trouble, fewer perplexities and entangle-
ments, If the nation took unlimited sOver-
eighty over all the islands than If it held
only coallng station with its probable
surroundings. The transfer of sovereignty
would convey much public property
belonging to Spain; hence, as in the case
when territory was ceded to this nation at
the close of the Mexican war, a money
compensation was offered.
AhOnO SOAoluoIotlOub WoIo Iully u6VelOp-
ed in the Senate when the treaty was under
consideration. All senators admitted the
necessity of coaling station in that vicin-
ity; none wished to change the terms of
the treaty with reference to Cuba and Por-
TO Rico. Some desired to amend the treaty
so that the United States should sustain
the same relations to the Philippine Islands
which, under the resolution of April 20,
1893, and the treaty, It sustained to Cuba;
or that the United States should hold and
manage the islands only for their pacifca-
tiOn-whAtever that might mean. There
were objections to such an amendment.
The conditions in Cuba and the Philippine
Islands we're unlike The people of Cuba
we're more homogeneous and in a more
hopeful condition to be pacified, or brought
under = stable and uniform government.
The many triber, languages, different de-
grees of civilization, ranging from barbar-
ism to standardization, rendered the
speedy establishment of uniform govern
ment in the Philippine Islands next to i'm
possible. The conditions there were as
abho rrent as those which had prevailed in
Cuba, and appealed to this nation on the
score of humanity even more forcibly. 1t
was conceded that their management and