The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1900-02-18
HER LADYSH|P SC)LDS
Editress of the AngIo-Saxon
Review Indignant
BECAUSE Of THE BLUNDERS
Committed by Their Stupid.
nesses of the War Office.

counts for British failures in South At
RIGA: 1.-THE closing months of 1899 will not
be effaced from the memory of English
men of this generation any more than the
Crimean or the Mutiny year will be for
gotten by those who lived through then.
if only as spectators. It is strange how
slowly time passes in these periods of
great national crisis. We have grown
accustomed to war already and hear of
the sailing of transports, as if they were
part of the normal incidents of life;
and yet it is barely three months since
episodes like these seemed things to read
about rather than to see with our eyes.
How many of US. even three months
since, genuinely contemplated thar cur
Christmas would be spent VITA some Ct
our best and bravest eating Their hearts
out in captivity in Pretoria or toss ng on
their beds Of pain at the Cape Town hos
pitfalls or lying stiff and cold under the
turf of Griqualand or Natal?
Zone of the fundamental errors for
which our military men in South AT ca
ought not to be adjudged more 1espCLsi-
bic than the rest of US, was tie ttter
characterization as to the strength and
warlike capacity of the enemy. II is not
merely what we did not knoy tthtI gh
the War Office should have Known and
perhaps did know how many KrrEp ard
Creusot guns and what store o. lnoeern
ammunition the forts and arsene.s CT
Pretoria containe. The Slun Ter went
mt
ment followed no doubt by the majority
of the nation, entirely moderated ard
misconceived the antagonists with whom
we have had to deal We had been rer-
sistently taught that they were fools end
towards, who neither could no, wcIlG he
able to stand up against he 'isci 2line1
troops of a civilized race.
1--WE have found that they are exceed
ingly intelligent and that thew are bran e
and tenacious though extreme ely cart Gus
fighters. If we had realized in due time
that these farmers had chiefs, or at any
rate advisers, who could give lessons to
many of our generals in strategy and tao
tics, and that the rank and file had many
of the most valuable requirements of cd
ern soldiers, we should have arranged
matters differently. But the qualities and
characters of the Beers have proved
something of a revelation to our people
and apparently to our politicians also. 1t
is rather singular, when one comes to
think about it, that it should be so. We
have not made the acquaintance of the
Dutch farmer of South Africa yesterday,
either in war or in peace. We have had
a good deal to do with him at times in
the last ninety years or so; and yet a
good many of us have hardly begun to
understand him until within the last few
weeks. One has heard any number of
persons more or less acquainted with
South Africa who would assure you that,
going to face British soldiers on the bat
tie field. They told us that he had no
stomach to fight for President Kruger
and his 'dopper" gang, and, moreover,
that he did not want to fight at all be-
cause he had too much regard for his
own skin. The belief of the South Afri-
can Englishman in the cowardice of the
Boer is curious, and in some respects I'M
accountable, but of its existence there
can be very little doubt
1T is the commonplace of public dis
cussion just now TO say that we made the
mistake of undertaking the power of the
enemy. We console ourselves, not very
effectively. by suggesting that this is our
common experience-we usually begin our
wars under some delusion. There is also
visible a tendency to explain away this
misunderstanding by putting it on the
shoulders of one or other professional
person. who might have been more accu-
rately or amply informed. Why did not
the intelligence department ascertain pre-
cisely how many guns the Beers could
put in the field? Why should not the
War Office have considered that the
heavy siege pieces from Pretoria and Jo-
hannesburg would be hoisted UP to the
ridges of the Natal hills. and so have pro-
vided our generals with the proper ord
nance to meet them What were our
strategists about TO have proposed fight
ing a nation of mounted infantry with an
army composed mainly of foot soldiers?
THESE questions must be asked. and
they will need to be answered in due
course. But It is only fair for US to all
remember that the fundamental miscal-
cuIation went below these military STRAIT
egic details, and that It was not the Mn
tstry alone which miscoace'ved the ele-
ments of the problem The country as a
whole. public speakers. the press, even
Opposition politicians who opposed the
war. did not understand the kind Of force
moral force as well as physical-with
which we had to contend.
I'VE thought we had only 10 trample
down Mr.. Kruger and his oligarchy back
ed by a contain number Of ignorant IN
willing. semi-barbarous Beers. fighting re-
luctaatly and half-heartedIy for a cause
they scarcely understood and did not like
And we assumed that under snch circum-
stances the resistance would collapse
bout as easily as that Of the Chinese
when they found themselves opposed 70
the youthful vigor and Western energy
of Japan. Would the Dutch former die
that HoIlander clerks in Pretoria might
I'LL their pockets with stolen gold? L
seemed absurd on the face Of in: and ali
the South African experts told Us that
it was absurd. and that very little taste
OF war would be enough 20 send the bur
ghers trooplng home in disgust
we have 2 way OF beginning badly. in
a somewhat negligent, desul,ory fashion
without and complete mastery Of the
problem we have taken IN hand. Their
when We hare been rendered wiser BY
some costly failures, we pun ourselves
and by great exertfons win success in the
end In this case We started OF the war
in our usual clustering. careless mood
thinking little Of the gravity Of the issues
But the shock Of the first 7eve-ses sober