Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1900-04-18

- OS W
n retention of Spion Kop. Lord Rob-
| erts continues:
LAS Warren considered it impossible
to make the wide thanking movement
| which was recommended, II not actually
prescribed in the secret Instructions, he
should forthwith have acquainted Cen
eral Butler with the course he proposed
to adopt. There is nothing to show
whether he did so or not. But 1t is only
fair to Warren to point out that Butler
appears throughout to have been aware
of what was happening"
Regarding the withdrawal from Spton
KOp, the retention of which had become
essential to the relief of Ladysmith. Lord
Roberts says:
Il regret to be unable to oncur with
Butler in thinking ~Thornycroft exercised
wise discretion in ordering the troops to
retire. l am of the opinion that ThOrny-
croft's assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable. Dur
ing the night the enemy's fire could not
have been formidable and it would not
have taken more than two or three hours
for ~ThOrnycrOft to communicate by mes
enger with Major General Coke or GEN
eral Warren. Coke appears to have left
SpiOn kOp at $3.50 p. m. for the purpose
of consulting with Warren. UP to that
hour the idea of withdrawing had not
been entertained. Yet, almost imnledi-
ately after Coke's departure, ~Thornycroft
issued the order, with reference to supe-
rior authority, which upset the whole
plan of operations and rendered naval
ing the sacrifices made to carry it into
effect.
On the other hand it is only right to
say hat Thornycroft appears to have
behaved in a very gallant manner
throughout the day.
1T is to be regretted hat Warren did
not himself visit Spion Kop in the after
moan ~. Vn,psN IDN No h. : AAnA
the state of affairs was very critical and
that the loss of the position would in
volve the failure of the operations. He
subsequently was obliged to summon
Coke to his headquarters, and the COM
mand at Spion Kop thus devolved on
Thornycroft, unknown to Coke, who was
under the impression that the command
Ger. Omission or mistakes of this nature
may be trifling in themselves. yet they
may exercise an important influence
over the course of events, and I believe
Butler was justified in remarking, There
was a want of organization and system
which acted most unfortunately on the
Defense
THE attempt to relieve Ladysmith was
we'll devised. and l agree with Butler in
thinking it ought to have succeeded.
That it failed may have in some measure
been due to the difficulties of the general
and the commanding positions held by
the enemy, and probably also to errors
OF judgment and want of administrative
capacity IN the part of Warren. But,
whatever faults Warren may have COM
mitted, the failure must also be attrib-
uted to the Discrimination of the officer IN
supreme command to assert his author
ity and see that what he thought best
was done. and also to the unWarranted
and needless assumption of responsible
lty by a subordinate officer"
The dispatch concludes:
the gratifying feature of these dis
patches is the admirable behavior of the
troops throughout the operation"
General Buffers report commenting on
Warren's reports of the capture and
evacuation of Spion Kop, after d~isputing
the correctness of some of Warren's as
sertlons and describing the dangerous
situation occupied by Warren's forces.
tells how he saw the force at Spion Kop
had given way before Warren knew of it.
Butler therefore telegraphed to Warren:
oniess you put a really good hard
nghting man in command on top you
will lose the hill. I suggest Thornycroft.''
General Butler continues: II have not
thought 1t necessary to order an i~nvesti-
cation. If at shutdown the defense Of
the summit had been taken in hand. en-
trenchments laid out and the dead and
ounde removed, the whole regular mil
ltary commands and the hills would have
been held. | am sure. But no arrange
ments were made. Coke appears to have
peen ordered away just as he would have
been useful, n no one succeeded him.
Those on top of the hill We're ignorant of
the fact that the guns We're coming up
ana generally there was want Of organi-
cation and system that acted most un-
1avorably on the defense. It is admit
TED that all of Thornycroft's command
acted with the greatest gallantry through
out the day and really saved the situa-
ton. But preparations for the second
days defense should have been
during the a and commenced at night
1all. AS this was not done. 1 think Thor
nycroft exercised discretion"
General Warren set forth the facts
tnat the Sp1on Kop operations had not
entered into his original plans, as his in
structlons were to occupy a plain north
or 1t; On consultation with the COM
mander in chief January /, however. when
the question of retiring from @attack;nn
Splon Kop was discussed, Warren ex-
pressed his preference for attacking. This
wal successfully accomplished by Cen
eral Woodgate. Then came the order nf
the commander in chief to put Thorny-
croft In command on the summit. In the
meantime Warren has sent General Coke
up to reinforce him with orders to as
sumo Intellectual efforts were
made to Telegraph Thornycroft and ask
whether he had assuced command, To-
"aiu sunset ne was nnally enabl to get
orders through and concluded the posi-
ton could be held the next day If guns
could be provided and shelter obtained.
Both those conditions were about to be
fulhlled when in the absence of Coke
whom l a ordered to come and report
IN person on the situation, the evacuation
took place under orders given on his own
responsibility by ~Thornycroft. This oc-
CURED In the face of the vigorous pro-
tests of Coke's brigade major and others"
In conclusion General Warren said: .It
IS a matter for the commander in chief
10 decide whether there should be any in
v~estigatfon into the question of the Cnau-
thOrlzed evacuation of Spion Knn"