St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1900-01-31
WAR IN THE TRANSYAAL.

ing movement, and of his announcement
that there would be no turning back"
At the very moment when DR.. Leyds
Is being received as an honored gu s
in the highest circles on the continent
Great Britain has to face the worst
disaster in a campaign thus far disas-
trous. Open talk is heard of the alb
solute necessity Of abandoning Lady
smith to its fate, while Lord Roberts
reverts to the original plan of an advance
over the Orange river upon Bloemton-
tein.
The following is the text of General
Buffers dispatch, dated Spearman
camp, Saturday, Jan. q, 6:10 p. m:
"On Jan. 20 Warren drove the enemy
and obtained possession of the southern
crests of the high tabeland extending
from the line of Action Homes and
Honger's Poort to the western Lady
smith hills. From then to jan Is he re-
manned in close contact with the enemy.
THE enemy held a strong position on
range of small kopjes stretching from
northwest to southwest across the
plateau from Action Homes, through
Spion Kop to the left bank of the Tu~
gela. The actual position held was per.
fectly tenable but did not lend itself to |
an advance, as the southern slopes were
so steep that Warren could not get an |
effective artillery position and water
supply was difficulty.
ION Jan. % 1 assented to his attacking
Spion Kop, large hill, indeed noun
tain, which was evidently the key of the |
position, but was far more accessible
from the north than from the south.
ION the night of Jan. 23 he attacked
Spion Kop, but found it very'dificult to
hold, as its perimeter was too large. and
water, which he had been led to believe
existed, in this extraordinarily dry
season, was found very deficient.
THE crests were held all that day
against severe attacks and a heavy
shell fire. Our men fought with great
gallantry; would especially mention the
conduct of the Second Cameron Indians
and the Third Kings Rifles, who sup
ported the attack on the mountain from
the steepest side and in each case fought
their way to the top, and the Second
Lancashire fusiliers and Second Middle
sex, who magnifcently maintained the
best traditions of the British army
the trying day of Jan. "a,
and Thornycroft's mounted infantry.
who fought throughout the day equally
we'll alongside of them.
General Woodgate, who was in COM
nand at the summit having been
the officer who succeeded him
decided on the night of Jan "a to aban-
Ion the position and did so before dawn
Ian. rs.
Il reached Warren's camp at a. m.
N Jan. % and decided that a second at c
ack upon Spion Kop was useless, and 7
hat the enemy's right was too strong to c
How me to force it, V
Accordingly, l decided to withdraw a
he force to the south of the Tugela. At C
a, m. we commenced withdrawing the a
ain and by s a. M, Jan. 27 Saturday, a
'arren's force was concentrated south a
the Tugela without the loss of a maH "
: a pound of stores. 81
The fact that the force could with e.
raw from actual touch--in some cases n
he lines were less than 1000 yards apart
with the enemy in the manner il did is
think, sufficient evidence of the morale
the troops, and that we were per- -,
lifted to withdraw our cumbrous OK a,
40 mule transport across the river, IS l.,
ards broad, with 20-foot banks and a -,
Try SWIFT current, unmolested, Is. n
ink, proof that the enemy has been -
ught to respect our soldiers fighting :
overs. ~
The war office does not give any idea -,
the casualties in taking and holding ~
oion kop, but a report from the Boer :,
near Ladysmith, via
Marquee, says that 1900 British
lad were left on the battlefield. This
lmber is thought to include the wound
|. The report also says that General
uller had been down with fever, but -
ad recovered "
If Boer reports are to be accepted, "the V
abandonment Of Spion Kop was due to w
lie inability of the British to resist the ~
Ger attack, the Beers carrying the first ~
'enches and taking $50 prisoners" W
The STANDARD and other papers reflect /,
he anxiety of the public to learn how "
luch truth there is in the Boer accounts
the fighting at Spion Kop. General
uller's obscurity In his dispatches is
lther bitterly criticised as we'll as the o.
vident fact that the censor is not only b
cavity delaying, but is cutting all i'm IL
ortant matters from the newspaper dis j.
atches. a
To judge with any accuracy Of the ex- I
ent of the disaster is virtually impos- s
ible. 1t appears that General Butler =
lad altogether five brigades, wholly or b
PARTLY engaged, General Coke's, General o
General Harris, General
Noodgate's and General Lyttleton's,
md the 270 casualties already announced
n Lyttletons brigade are thus ex- I
blamed. z
Much mystery still surrounds the re- q
reat. 1t is possible that General Butler A
has withdrawn his whole forces, but il is a
assumed that Lyttleton's |,
brigade and Lord Dundonald's cavalry C
ind other troops are still on the north o
9ide of the Tugela. n
General Buffers confidence that the
Beers did not modest his retreat because
they had been taught to respect the
lighting powers Of the British soldier is
not shared in London. 1t is thought
rather that the Beers had some other 9
plan in store or did not wish to waste
heir men.
H. ] Norris who has been the steno. .
grapher at Shelburne Farms for two {
years, has accepted similar position {
with Burlington firm.
eFus