The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-10-27
LATE LEGAL DECISIONS.

manufacturers in the State Of sugar from
beets grown in the State and authorizing
q tax 10 pay such bounties has been held
recently by the Supreme Court of that
State to be unconstitutional. as authoriz-
ing taxation for a private purpose. The
court said in part: This taxation Is for
no such purpose that IL can be upheld.
There is no power in the State to author
ize tax for private purposes. Taxes can
be levied only for public purposes to ac-
complish some government end. The Leg
islature is the mere creature OF an organ
ic law deriving all its power from the
Constitution. Its limits within that pow
er must be admitted to be plenary, except
SO far as otherwise specifically limited;
but outside those limits 1t Is as power
less as il specifically prohibited. 1t can
not take the property of A and give it to
b, nor can 1t tax 1t for the benefit Ct
b. Here is a private corporation now
calling upon the State for sum of money
to aid 1t in carrying on private busi-
ness. most OF which money. II paid. must
come out of the pockets of people who
are not engaged In that business, and who
have no interest in IL. It Is claimed by
the relator that this is not a gift to the
relator, but that 1t would not have en-
gagged in the business but for this act of
TIE -tudt -TellduCe upon inc
act 1t built plant at large expense, and
that it complied with the provisions of
the act requiring it to pay to the pro-
ducers OF beets at the rate OF 81 per ton;
and that. therefore. the honor and in
tegrity OF the State are involved. So the
honor and integrity of the State might
become involved under any other act,
however unconstitutional. which the Leg
islature might see fit to pass. What may
have brought about the passage of the
act of 1897 we need not discuss. the only
question being whether it Is within legis-
latiye power. We need not point out spe-
officially any particular provision Of the
Constitution which it violates. 1t Is void
whether it comes within any of the ex-
press provisions of the Constitution or
not. 1t Is not law, but an act which at
tempts to take the property Of one citi-
zen and turn ii over to another: to compel
one class to donate part Of its proper
ty to another" michigan Sugar Co. vs..
Auditor, So N. W. Rep. 625)
The waiver of jury for the purpose of
a trial is exhausted by that trial and the
review Of it, holds the Supreme Court of
Illinois in the case OF Osgood VS.. Skinner
Isl N E. Rep, 104I, and when the case
is remanded to the trial court both parties
are restored to the original right of trial
by jury. 1.-THE agreement to waive a. jury"
said the court. 'only binds the parties to
that mode OF trial for one trial, and it is
no longer binding when new or different
issues are formed. or on a subsequent
trial. Amendments to pleadings
may be necessary and proper after a re-
mandment and a different judge may be
presiding, to whom a party might not be
willing to submit an issue of fact. Even
at the term when a waiver Is made, it Is
within the discretion of the court to
permit withdrawal of it, and such per-
mission is ordinarily given when the OPP
posite party will not suffer-"
A county. as municipal corporation.
holds the Supreme Court of Nebraska in
the case of Clifford VS.. Hall County (s3
N. W. Rep, 661). has no such interest in
or right OF possession to the reports OF
the Supreme Court distributed to county
Judges in accordance with law as will au-
,horize it to maintain replevin proceed
ngs against one who wrongfully retains
possession of the same. In this case the
county judge Of Hall County. Neb.. at the
expiration of his term of Office. retained
possession of eighteen volumes of the
Nebraska reports, received by him in his
,fiicial capacity as county Judge during his
erm of office. The county demanded pos
session OF the books as owner thereof,
which was resisted by the defendant, and
'eplevin proceedings were thereupon in
'tituted. Certain it is" said the court,
that the county judge, as between him
ielf and all others, except the State, has
he right to the possession Of such prop
,rty and possessory title sufficient to
an action for the recovery Of
he possession from those wrongfully
same. 1t is probably also true
hat the obligation Of retiring county
Judge to turn over to his successor in
,fice. with the other property belonging
hereto. all of the Supreme Court reports
eceived during his term Of office may be
nforced by other appropriate proceedings
brought for that purpose. We are Of the
opinion. however. that the county, as
corporation. has no such in
crest In or right Of possession to the
property mentioned as will authorize it
o maintain an action in replevin for the
Of the possession.
On the trial of prosecution for as
sault, which arose from the prosecutor
having killed the defendants dog. the de-
endant offered testimony to show that
he dog was small and a pet one, ard
hat these facts aggravated the conduct
" the prosecutor in killing the dog. But
he Supreme Court of Alabama hell that
he facts proposed to be proven in regard
20 the dogs size and character were too
remote to be admissible. (Steen vs..
swadley. IS So. Rep, 500
Where In prior litigation it was decided
hat the defendant had the right to open
rst all letters addressed to the plaintiff
" two separate forms Of address. Judge
,ettes. of the New York Supreme Court,
4 the case Of Kennedy VS.. DR.. David Ken
edy CORP sc N. Y. Supp. 225). holds
nat the Postoffice Department may not
,tters addressed to plaintiff by any other
,rm of address. since the right of the
arty to letter deposited in the postofflce
a property right. of which he cannot be
eprived except by due process of law. In
lis case the plaintiff. the originator Of
roprietary remedy. sold the business and
bod will to the defendant, including the
,le right to use the names Of "Dr. David
.ennedy. of Rondout. y. V" and "Dr. d.
ennedy. of Rondout. n. y and severed
Is connection with the defendant. In pre-
ous litigation it was decided that the de-
ndant had the right under the bill of
lie to open first all letters addressed to
lie plaintiff as above. But the postmaster.
ith the approval Of the Postoffice Depart
ent. delivered to the defendant letters
dressed to the plaintiff in many other
I'D different forms. and the plaintiff there
pom brought suit to restrain the defendant
ON taking and opening any letters or
all matter addressed other than in the
vo specified forms above. The court said.
part: THE United States Government,
trough its Postoffice Department. under
kes, upon receiving the required amount
postage, to forward any letter to the
,rty whose address Is placed thereon az
~ postoffice IN The United States After