The Honolulu republican. [volume] (Honolulu, T.H.) 1900-1902, 1900-07-22

oaf OF Ihlr2- but let as Er1erS1aE
what Is meant by partition OF China
With reference 20 that phrase, Chin.
means the Chinese seaboard This. A.
ter many years OF hard hghung, tn
European powers may succeed IN part
ing among them. and. IL Imperialism
is to be the fixed policy OF the Unite
States, we may get our share of th'
spoil But the Chinese seaboard IS no
China. which asian inland empire
would still exist and have to be reek'
oned with 1t may be alIowed-on pa
per-this province to this power and
that to that; but conquered and occu-
pied, no. That's a military impossible
! ity All the armies that Europe, Amer
lea and Japan can bring TO the task are
inadequate TO its accomplishment.
Without conquest and occupation, how
is it to be governed?
Our people-even those Of them self
charged with the duty of leading public
opinion in the way that ii should GO
have the vaguest possible conception
OF the stupendous factors involved in
this problem OF conquering China in
any other sense than capturing Picking
and debating terms of peace" TO Of
Tending rulers OF whose existence the
real China Is hardly aware Picking is
easily accessible: it is within a few
days march Of the coast European
arms subdued. sacked and occupied it
forty years ago. Probably it is posi-
BILE TO do so again, though evidently il
is not to be done tomorrow nor the
day after. To-day we are doing well in
keeping our precarious foothold in
Tientsin, while the blood of our peo-
pie Is drying in the streets Of Picking
But capture of a capital is a military
event, not always political, as we prov
ed in 1864 and the Afrikanders are
proving now. II depends on what has
preceded the capture; or when-that is
to say, during what stage of the war
II is accomplished,
From Shanghai TO Kashgar the Chi
nese Empire has length of $500 miles,
from Tonquin to the Siberian border a
breadth of 1000, This immense terri
tory is virtually without railways and
of it without prae-
ticable military roads. It ia inhabited
by 40o.000,000 OF people whom, for
military purposes must be accounted
hostile. A half of it is virtually un-
known. undiscovered, blank on the
map. Fancy such an army as can be
transported from the other side OF the
world attempting to invade, subdue
and occupy country like that, Fancy
trying to maintain lines of communica-
ton and supply tby wagoa) as long as
from New York to Salt Lake City,
through hostile country, where prov
inces Of the size OF our States have 30
000. 900 OF population. fierce. fanatioal,
knowing nothing Of the fear Of death.
They would not need to meet US In the
field. They could afford to part right
and left for the passage OF our troops.
And that is the only partition Of Chi
ma" that is presently possible.
There are two great rivers in China,
well up into the heart of
China proper-the southeastern one
third OF The empire. Their valleys, ma
are the most denseiy populated
parts Of the country. Doubtless Euro
pean troops could advance up and
along them, using them as lines of
supply. But with what difficulty the
advance would be made and how pre-
carious the lines of supply would be no
man OF military knowledge needs to
be told. The difficulties overcome and
the lines secured, we should occupy and
govern as much Of the contiguous
country as could be covered by the fire
Of our gunboats.
To subdue and occupy China the in
rader must do what Kitchener did
when invading the Soudan; they must
build railways as fast as they advance,
But Kitchener's advance was across
level deserts. where engineering diff
culties cut but small figure. Nor had
be any very great problem in the main
tenance of his line against the scatter
ing nomads In his rear. He could de-
pend on his climate. too. and had no
fear of .'washouts' and foundations.
Moreover. the distance to be traversed
was comparatively short Yet that
lasted a dozen years. Cam
paigns similarly conducted in China
viii require a century. Neither this
generation nor the next can hope TO
see the partition OF China effected by
Caucasian arms. AS military proposal
lt is altogether out of consideration.
Yet the existence OF the Chinese En-
pire as political integer is menace
&c Europe and European civilization.
There is ground OF hope IN the fact
IL il is fact-thas the great southern
Viceroys are giving slack allegiance.
IL any. to whomsoever may be In au-
thority at Pekfn. in the probability.
that is TO say, of China being parted
among the Chinese Our knowledge OF
the Chinese character hardly justifies
even this small hope: II is By no means
clear thas the Viceroys-even Il Hung
not plotting expulsion and
Of foreigners on their oEn
or Ia accord with the authori-
" which they profess to serve.
The legations are gone. OF all our
people in Pekin not-a man woman OF
child is living. For this hideous crime
China must answer, and every eonsid-
Grafton of patriotism. self-respect and
expediency requires that We uiske com
mon cause with the other powers In ex-
acting full redress. That accomplish
ed. and such protection as is possible