Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1900-11-16

power of Spain in the islands had been
greatly weakened, II not practically de-
stroyed, and IL the United States should
withdraw, anarchy and internecine war
would be likely TO follow. What lnterna-
tional complications and questions might
arise, involving the nation In the gravest
responsibilities, no one could foresee nor
forecast. 1t was thought unwise to with
draw or to enter upon the discharge of
this difficult duty with limitations upon
our right of sovereignty. The nation might,
and probably would, need unlimited sover-
eighty to discharge its duty creditably in
the interests of the inhabitants of the is
lands, of the nation, and of the world.
By the treaty, as submitted, Spain ceded
unlimited sovereignty. To ask Spain to
amend 1t as proposed involved: Q). Anan-
nouncement to the world that our system
of government, in the opinion of the SEN
ate as part of the treaty-making power, is
failure (2). The possibility of the rejec-
tiOn of the treaty and the continuance of
the war.
1t involved the first because the treaty
making power ie vested in the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and the power ito dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory" or dependencies, is
vested in Congress, or the House and Sen
ate. For the Senate, as a part of the
treaty-making power, to ask the ceding
m nj
tions upon her cession of the sovereignty
would clearly be an announcement by the
Senate that it did net consider 1t wise or
safe to entrust Congress with the exercise
of the full legislative power conferred by
the constitution over the inhabitants of the
Islands. This would be plain implication
that Congress was incompetent to exercise
the full powers conferred by the constitu-
tion,-an implication which some of the
senators thought the Senate, when exercis-
ing its treaty-making power, had no right
to make in regard to the legislative ability
of Congress,-that if Congress could be
trusted with the exercise of conditional
sovereignty it could with unlimited SOW
ereignty; that TO discharge the duty ac-
eeptAbly and creditably, Congress might
need to be clothed with unlimited sover-
eighty.
In the second place, such action involved
the risk of the rejection of the treaty by
Spain and the continuance of the war. If
the treaty failed the protocol also failed 1t
would then be the duty of this nation to
place Spain in the situation which she oc-
cupied when the procotol was agreed upon,
or to return the $4,000 Spanish troops
which she had transported from Manila to
Spain, and the many more which she had
transported from Cuba to Spain.
1t was urged by those who favored the
amendment that Spain would readily agree
to it. There would, however, be the risk
that she would not; but if she did, the
Senate would have announced to the world
that as part of the treaty-makiDg power
1t feared to entrust Congress with the
power to govern and legislate for the in
habltants of the islands, freely, in such
manner as might be thought wise and pru-
dent, when the conditions in the islands
were more fully known and better under
stood.
These, in brief, are some of the consd-
eratlons which led to the making and rati-
fcation Of the treaty.
JONATHAN Ross