The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-12-01
The Army Reorganization Bill.

AH0 army Reorganization Bill.
The BIN for the reorganization OF the
army which has been prepared by the
war department for submission to con-
sress II, in its essentials. probably TIE
bill which win be passed; for 1t seems
to cover the requirements in a satisfac-
tory manner. The prime necessity in
any scheme Of army reorganization as
experience has shown, 10 the making OF
provision whereby tho strength Of the
army can. be added to. when the emer-
gency arises. In such manner as to bring
quickly into service the additional troops
necessary; prepared. In the shortest pos
siole space OF time. to enter at once upon
their duties. Obviously this cannot be
done by any scheme which proposes to
add to the strength of the army, in such
emergencies. additional regiments, hat
talions or companies with their full COM
plsmsut Of officers and mon. 1t takes
much longer time to make an efYeetivc
piece q fighting machinery. out OF full
company Of new recruits than It would
to make soldiers out Of the individual
members Of such a company. II they were
distributed among half a dozen compa-
pies Of seasoned veterans.
skeleton organization Of a REGULAR
army. with an established minimum for
its peace strength and an established
maximum for its war strength, gives
precisely the aexibility which has hereto
fore been lacking in the organization of
the regular army. This Ia what the new
army bin. as proposed by the war depart
ment. contempiates. II provides for
peace or ordinary army force In the cav
airy OF i3.oS men: with a maximum
strength OF ls.S8 In tho Infantry. the
minimum strength Is placed at M.ass. and
the maximum OF $3.50. The change from
the peace to tho war footing is only in the
number OF individuals; regimentaI battaI-
ION and company organization remain un-
affected. The increase in the artillery
force Is a permanent one. to IS 80 men,
force no more than suf,lcscnt to man
adequately the seacoast defenses already
In place, or which are Immediately to be-
constructed. The necessity OF keeping this
force at tho maximum Is obvious An ar
tlIleryman cannot be improvised; and the
intricate machinery by which the NAM
moth guns in place on the seacoast are
to Be operated cannot be handled by raw
recruits II takes time. working with
originally good material. TO make an ef-
feotive ar;illeryman. and there Is no such
primary school OF instruction for the SOL
dicrs In this arm an Is found for the In
fantry and cavalry in the state militia.
should the proposed bin pass in rs
present form. the regular army on its
peace footing win consist OF Seea men;
or. exclusive of the permanent force Of
artillery, of approximately @eo men. Of
whom probably $500 would b. available
for acid duty. In war. or when an emer-
sweised. with the minimum o. trouble and
friction. 10 Cd 10 men, the Increase being
almost entirely In the Infantry and cav
airy. To supply this additional trained
force wcyse bs a comparatively easy mat
ter froaa she yonns msn % tho National
Guard the members % which are drilled
tn the manual Of arms. IN ordinary march
irs and h&ttalion manesvers. hsys had
experience In target 9racsice. and are
more o. less familiar with the duties Of
soldier. Added as privates 20 the exist
Ing companies Of trained and seasoned
regulars. they would be Immediately e.
fcctive. and would require no long period
ef drin snd Instruction as a preliminary
to taking thu field. as would ncces-
sarsly be the case n the system which has
Teen followed hsrssosees In aadips to The