Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-02-28
COURT DECISIONS.
DloESTED BY w. B. MARTIN.
Exclusively for virsinian-pilot.,
Notes Of Cases Recently Decided,
Which are Of Interest to
Our People.
c. AND Q. CO. v. JENNINGS.

c. AND o. co. v. JENNINGS.
Supreme CourtIof Appeals of Virginia.
February s, 1900.
THE BUILDER OF A BRIDGE
ERECTED IN A HIGHWAY FOR
HIS BENEFIT MUST KEEP 1T IN
GOOD ORDER.
THE FACT THAT A PARTY WAS
VIOLATING THE LAW WHEN IN
JURED is NOT CONTRADICTORY
NEGLIGENCE, UNLESS SUCH VI
oLATIoN WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE INJURY.
The declaration alleged that the de-
PENDANT owned q strip of land along the
James river, In the county of Fluvanna,
called Its right of way, and that at a
certain point within the corporate
limits of the town of Scottsville, there
was bridge, across which was a pub
lie highway. from Scottsville to the
county of Fluvanna, which bridge was
on the land of, and owned and operated
py. the defendant: that the erection and
maintenance of the bridge was rem
0ered necessary by the mode adopted
1or the construction of the defendants
works, and that it was the defendants
duty TO keep said bridge in good order
and repair; that 1t failed SO to do and
suffered said bridge to get out of re-
pair, and that in riding across said
bridge the plaintiffs horse put his foot
In hole therein and fell, breaking
plaintiffs leg.
There was a verdict and Judgment for
plaintiff. and defendant appealed.
The court says:
1t is further argued-th that the denIur-
rer to the declaration should have been
sustained. because 1t discloses that the
bridge, upon which it Is alleged that
plaintiffs injury was sustained, is in
public highway. and although the
erection of the bridge became neces-
6ary by reason of the mode adopted by
the j. r. & X. Co. in the construction
or It's works, 1t is presumed to be q
public bridge; that it is there by lawful
authority for the public benefit. and
therefore, the town or county in which
1t Is located is bound for its mainten-
ance and repair.
"a bridge may be free and open TO
the public. yet the person by whom it
was constructed be charged with main
tanning II In safe and convenient condi-
tion for travel. This is so where the
facts show that the bridge was erected
for private benefit. and not for public
use. In such n case, there is no pre-
sumption that the public has accepted
the bridge and relieved the person by
whom 1t was built from responsibility.
a raceway or IL canal across a highway
and built n bridge over 1t there is no
presumption OF acceptance by the pub
lie, and the builder is charged with the
duty Of keeping 1t in safe condition.
In such case. the benefit is to the build
err, for the public, but for his act could
have travelled on the solid road. WherA
however the bridge is of public utility
and Is not made necessary by the act
of the person who built it. acceptance
by the public will be presumed, and the
builder will not be responsible for keep
ing 1t in safe and fit condition."
we are of opinion that the declara-
ton in this case sets out good cause
OF action, and that the demurrer was
properly overruled.
Section 1864 OF the Code provides that
''if any person ride or drive over a
bridge faster than a walk, he shall be
fined five dollnrs;' and plaintiff adj
United that he was riding at the time
of his alleged injury 'in n slow pace.
little faster than his horse could
walk"
It is not contributory negligence per
sc for the injured party, at the time of
injury. to be engaged in violation of
law. either positive or negative.
The fact that q party injured was at
the time violating the law does not put
him out of protection of the law; he is
never put by the law at the mercy Of
others. If he is negligently injured on
the highway. he may have redress. not
withstandnG ut the time he was on the
wrong side Of the way. provided this
fact did not contribute to the injury.
Among the authorities cited in support
of this text is the case of Baker ".
Portland. in which 1t was strenuoussy
insisted that before the jury could find
for the plaintiff for an injury sustained
by him when violating city ordinance
prohibiting driving faster than six
miles an hour in the streets of Port
land. they must find that the plaintiff
was not violating the law. but the court
held that an instruction which told the
jury that If the plaintiffs were driving
at faster rate than six miles an hour
when thrown from the carriage yet If
such driving did not in any degree con-
tribute to produce the injuries COM
planned OF. it would be no bar to their
right to recover, correctly propounded
the law.
The elements of proximate cause must
be established, and will not be pre-
sumed from the fact that an ordinance
or statute has been violated, and even
where the defendant rests under the
lmputation of negligence by reason of
violation of duty imposed by an ordi-
nance or statute, the negligence. no
matter OF what 1t consists. cannot
create right of action unless It js the
Droximate cause of the injury com
planned of by the plaintiff. Affirmed
CHICAGO & e. r. co " rrIO,