The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1900-04-26

happen "by resignation or otherwise" and which
the executive has the right to fill by executive
appointment The word ''such" is defined by
the Century Dictionary to mean
l. OF that kind; of the like kind or degree;
like; similar.
2. The same as previously mentioned or speci.
fed; not other or different
SO that when the word "such" is used before
the word vacancies in the latter part Of the
clause, it means the same kind Of vacancies men
TONED in the first part of the clause in reference
to executive appointments. II therefore appears
that there can be no vacancy flied by executive
appointment 1t is admitted that the legisla
ture fill all vacancies, no matter how created,
and it therefore follows that the governor tan
I'LL, by temporary appointment, the same kind
OF vacancies. The vacancies to be filled by ex.
ecutiNe appointment are as broad as the vacan.
cies which can be filed by election.
In other words, the constitution Of the United
States clearly intended to create a senate, and to
have a senate implies that the membership Of
that senate shall be represented in full, in every
principle Of justice to the people and protection
to the smaller states. To provide for the crea.
tion OF that senate it distinctly declared
that the senators should be chosen by the legis.
aturcs, and in order to meet every possible emcr.
gcncy of partial representation, or, perhaps, an
absence of representation the constitution created
two methods of constituting senators, namely, by
term and by temporary appointment. The for
mer was vested in the legislature OF the state
aud the latter in the governor. The powers
OF each are separately ard distinctly given; they
are independent powers. The governor has
nothing to do with oectioIs the legislature
has nothing to do with temporary appointments.
The legislature is to elect and the governor is
to fil temporarily vacancies, however occurring,
and hy these two means the self evident purpose
n ~ n = q
be acconplshed-that the senate should be kept
filed Any other Interpretation is not to carry
out, but to defeat the constitutional intent.
To argue that the constitution, which created
a senate and exercised every precaution that the
states should be fully represented, meant TO de.
prve state Of senator and take from the
governor his power Of temporary appointment,
merely because the legislature failed to elect, is
TO maintain that the trainers Of the constitution
intended TO punish not only me state which
might be involved, hut all the people of the
United States, by oi such restriction.
There might be some ground for apprehension If
the governor appointed for the balance Of the
| term, but his appointment is only at the most
for few months, temporary appointment en-
pressly provided for in order to prevent an in.
convenient chasm in the senate, the integrity Of
whose organization has been promoted and facil.
| itated by the liberal Interpretation which has
been placed upon almost every other word in
the constitution bearing upon the United States
senate. A temporary appointment by the gov.
| ernor, therefore, creates a senatorial commission
of force and validity ard authority fully equal
TO an election by the legislature In fact, as
already observed in reference to the method OF
balloting for senators, the governor is a con.
stitucnt part of the legislature of a state. II
is true that he is not included in state Constitu.
tions under the article or the legislature, but
under a separate article on the executive; but
that is because his executive functions form dis
tinct branch of our system of government and re-
quire separate article. The fact remains how.
ever, that his approval Is needed TO every act
of the two houses of the legislature.
CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.
The tendency of modern constitutional rcgua.
tions, indeed has been to increase still further
his position and influence in the extension of
| the veto power, so that its exercise has assumed
| the character OF actual legislation. A striking
illustration of this cNtclSicn is the power given
| to the governor in many states to veto an item
in an appropriation bill, instead OF being re.
strcted, heretofore, to the approval or dis.
| approval of the whole measure, thus giving the
governor more power over the disbursements of
the state than either both OF the two houses
Of the legislature. SO important is the governor
| in the coordinate branches of the legislature
| that he has generally come to he looked upon
| by the people as protection against the lcgis-
| laturc, which frequently is corrupt and con.
trollcd by corporate political influences. Where
| there many men responsibility is divided
| and one man can have concentrated upon him the
| responsibility for bad OF unpopular public acts.
| Therefore, there is no such responsibility about
| legislature as there is about an executive.
| Upon the executive is concentrated the criticism
Of the whole community for all public acts, and
! this is found TO be a wholesome restraint IN the
| interests of good government, however evlly
| disposed an executive might he.
So far has this development Of modern law
progressed that the tendency has been to restrict
legislatures by limiting their session to once in
| two or four years, and by taking from them a
| very large part of those general powers which
attach to the legislative body representing
sovereign state. Special legislation has been
| abolished As many matters as may possibly
| be performed through general laws and the in
! strumentality of courts have been reegated
thereto; while the executive, on the other hand,
| has had his power increased and extended. Par.
| ticuarly is this true in municipalities, where
| the concentration Of all patronage and power III
the hands Of a single executive and the fastening
| upon him individually Of the full responsibility
! for the administration OF municipal affairs is
modern tendency OF municipal Legislation. The
| governor Of state appoints judges, and many
| other state officers. II is argued that he may
| appoint fayorte to the senatorship. He is no
more likely to appoint a favorite to the senator
| ship than TO make any other important appoint
ment fer the same reason. As rule the gov
Cnor will represent a majority Of the people,
| and in most cases a majority of the legislature.
| II Is said that clique may bold up the logisa'
| ture in order to throw the appointment into the
| hands of the governor, but, as matter of fact,
| the power of a clique, under the act of con-
gress of 1866 providing for the election Of SEN
ators BY requiring for such election a majority
| of all the members of the legislature, is directly
| promoted by the provisions of this act
| In this connection | will state that in my
| opinion a large part OF the difficulties encoun-
| tered by legislatures in ccnliug TO an agreement
upon the question Of eleCting United States
| senator arises from that provision in the act OF
| 1866 which REQUIRES a maiC rty of the whole leg.
| islature to elect a senator. In almost every
| other branch Of our political system a plurality is
sufficient to elect A plurality Of the citizens
| elects the members Of the legislature themselves
the governor Of the state, and all other officers
| II would seem as ii plurality would be suit-
| cent TO elect senator by legislature. The
| act Of 1856 was a compromise upon the original
| intcndment Of the constitution. Il would seem
as il a senator must be chosen as a legislative
| act and It WAS consequently provided that the
| first effort 10 elect should he made by the two
houses separately lh,n the scheme Of joint
| ballot was adopted as the only practical way to
accomplish an election after each house had
Vailed 10 cast a majority for the same person in
| their separate capacities Il was necessary 70
strain the meaning OF the constitution in order
| to form a practical method Of electing senator's