Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-10-20
COURT DECISIONS.
sDIGESTED BY W. B. MARTIN
EXCLUSIVELY FOR
vIRctNlAN-PILo
Eotss Of Cases Recently Decided
Which Are Of Interest to
Our People.
s. B. TEL. & T. CO. v. cAss1N.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
August 8, 1900.


August 8. 1900
AN ACTION FOR THE wRoNzFr11,
DEATH OF A HUSBAND on
FATHER is NOT MAINTAINARIE
HERE. DURING HIS LIFE, HE
VOLUNTARILY SETTLED WITH
AND RELEASED THE WRONG
DoER FOR DAMAGES CAUSED
BY THE INJURY FROM WHICH
HE AFTERWARDS DIED.
george Cassin was injured by the tel
ephone company In May 1892, and he
suea, the company. While the suit was
penang the company paid him So, SUI.
taking his receipt in full settlement of
the action and also in full settlement
OF all and any claim for damages on
ms part arising out of the injury which
ne mao received. More than five years
afterwards he died. and his widow then
brought this suit for his homicide al
Ieging that his death was caused by
said injury. She too. died, and the
suit was continued In the name of the
children. From q judgment of the low
or court against 1t the company an
pealed.
The court says:
The company offered in evidence the
receipt given by Cassin in settlement OF
damages. and the court excluded it.
lsThe proposition relied on by defen-
dants in error. If correct, exactly dou-
bles the operation of a statute which
has already gone a bowshot beyond
that or any other State; for It Is claim
ed that this act gives the widow the
1uil value of the life of the husband.
even though he in his lifetime had re-
cei'ed from the defendant compensa-
ton for the injury inflicted. and that
evidence of the release cannot be intro
duced. either as bar to her recovery.
or to be considered by the jury in re-
ducing the amount OF the verdict. A
decision which would announce, to per-
sons who have settled with parties in
Jured. that the settlement, instead of
being In full, was only partial; that, II
death cnsues as a result OF the injury,
they must pay again. and this time the
ruiz value Of the life of the deceased
VIII be justly regarded a great hard
ship. and 1t will come to the widow and
children not as the grant OF a right
The right of the plaintiff to recover
In this case Notwithstanding the release
is said to grow out OF the language of
our statutes. creating two causes of
action-one for the injury, and the
other for the homicde-and that a
settlement of one is not a settlement
OF the other: 1t being urged that the
survival act OF 1889, Code, section 3S25).
when construed In connection with the
death act (Code. section 3S2S) logically
supports the theory that the two suits
may proceed concurrently. and that n
recovery for the injury would not be q
the right to maintain concurrent suits
is not involved I'm this case. What are
we to determine is the effect OF a re-
lease? The two questions are not iden-
tical. II the effect of release is to
destroy the vital principle of the cause
of action. neither single nor concurrent
suits can spring therefrom. IT. how
ever. no release has been signed, and
the injured party dies. leaving in force
live cause of action, there might arise
Ia
germ only one suit. or concurrent suits
could spring. i II release wipes out the
wrong done by the defendant, and
makes 1t as though no injury had been
suffered, then upon the death OF the
injured party there would be no cause
of action, just as though there had
been no Injury and it would not be a
question as to the right to maintain
two concurrent suits, but as to the
right to maintain any suit at all. In
Railroad Co. V. Fitzgerald, los Ga, 507
1t Is distinctly ruled that the wife and
husband are in privity, and that there
fore his declarations are admissible
against her.
The Fitzgerald case logically leads
to the conclusion that the widow is
barred by the settlement. To hold
otherwise would be to say that the
wife could be barred by what her hus-
band said, but not by what he did;
that she might be concluded by words,
but not by money; that-the evidence
of her husband. given in the suit for
his personal injuries. might be used
against her in suit for his death. but
that the more solemn judgment against
him would not conclude her II the wife
Is In privity with her husband it Is
conceded that his settlement will bind
her; but. If there is no privity between
them as to this class of cases. then.
If the husband should sue and fail to
recover, the wife. after his death, would
not be bound by that Judgment. She
may bring suit and obtain a verdict
Notwithstanding the husband failed in
his suit. So that not only is a settle
ment no bar, but neither is a verdict
against the husband bar. This would
not only make the statutes penal, but
1t would not allow the defendant to buy
his peace by paying money; nor could
he secure peace by making a successf III
defense Immediately after the injury,
when the recollection of the witnesses
is fresh, when thy ar all accessible and
when the circumstances of the injury
can be most certainly and .truthfully
portrayed. But. as in this case, five
years after the injury, upon proof, that
can oftentimes be only too easily Sc
cured, that the old injury has been the
cause of the recent death, the defend
ant is again called into court. What is
1t to do? How is 1t to perpetuate It's
evidence? How is to know whether the
suit is ever to be brought or not? How
is 1t to know whether 1t is liable or
not? It has been acquitted OF liability
to the husband, but years after it Is
sought to make It liable to the wife. In
many cases 1t would be perfectly easy
for the wife to make out prima facie
case-rely say upon the Prescriptions
against Northumberland recover against
the defendant, who was not at fault,
who has been adjudged not to be In
fault, but whose witnesses may have
died or moved away, or otherwise be-
come inaccessible. These are not i'm