New-York tribune., 1900-07-10
PRINCE CHIYGS CoUNTERsTRoKE

News from China continues to be uncertain
and contradictory. 1t is to be dealt with &C
cording to the laws of probabilities and then
accepted Professionally, not confidently. Other
things being equal, we may give tentative credit
to the most favorable news and believe that
which we would prefer to be true. A consider
able degree of circumstance and detail, and in
deed of proba bity, is attached to the story that
Prince Ching is leading formidable counter
revolution against Prince Tuan and his Boxers,
and is aiding the legations at Peking to hold
out against the mob. All that we know Of
Prince Ching gives color Of probability to the
tale. He is. of course, a Manchu or Tartar, and
has always been a Conservative in politics,
though he has never shown much hostility to
foreigners. But, which is much to the point, he
is an implacable rival and enemy of Prince
Tuan, having been crowded by the latter out of
the presidency of the Tsung-Ii-Yamen. Both
his personal feeling therefore, and his states
manlike appreciation of affairs would lead him
to oppose Prince Tuan. Moreover he has long
been on particularly cordial terms with Chung
Chi Tung the great Viceroy of Hoo-Nan and
Hope, who is at once one IF the ablest and
most progressive men In tne empire and the
head Of some Of the strongest military forces
A counter-revolution led by Prince Ching, there
fore, might we'll be formidable thing, sufficient
not only to protect the legations. but also to
crush the Boxers outright.
This new factor in the problem. if the news of
1t be confirmed. will undoubtedly facilitate a
satisfactory solution. 1t will not. however. OBJ
viate the necessity of action by the Powers. 1t
will not do 10 trust to Prince Ching the task of
rescuing or avenging the occupants of the lega-
tions. That is something for the Powers them
selves to take inexorably in hand And this
hO, Eoul5 +ba
of expediting rather than of retarding their
movements, as, if true it will greatly facilitate
their work. A foreign force going in as a prac
teal ally of great armed faction of the Chi
nese people would be in far different situation
from one going in against the opposition and
the hostility Of all the people. The work of res
cue would be immeasurably easier and the
sequel would be freed from its greatest embar-
rassment-what to do with the capital after it
was captured. If Prince Ching is really leading
an army for the suppression of the Boxers and
the maintenance of order and treaty obligations,
he is the man for the Powers to recognize and
to support in authority. And the more promptly
they send an effective force in to cooperate
with MIN, the better it will be for all concerned
In connection with this the remark made by
| our London correspondent about the possibility
Of sending troops from South Africa to China is
!
dwindled almost to the vanishing point. It
ought soon to be possible for Lord Roberts TO
| hold the two new provinces of the British En-
! pire in hand with much smaller force than
| that now at his disposal. In that it might
| be practicable to send three or four army corps
! from South Africa to China-men in perfect
! training for instant service. The distance is
| considerable, Of course, about seven thousand
! miles; but II is much less than the distance
! from Europe. As to whether the other Powers
would approve the sending in Of so large a
British force, there may be some question The
| same malign influences that held Japan back
might oppose Great Britain. 1t is. however for
| the sake Of human natures reputation, scarcely
credible that such opposition could be effective.
! It would be sorry ground for any Power to
! take. that a multitude of lives should be sacr-
! feed and a vast empire plunged into anarchy
| rather than that there should be intervention
| by one both Of the two Powers most entitled
! to intervene.