New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1900-03-12
MONROE DOCTRINE AND NArv
CAPTAIN MAHAN DISCUSSES THE ST,
JECT-CANAL ACROSS CENTRAL
AMERICAN ISTHMUS NEG Z.
ESSARY, HE SAYS

In a paper on The Monroe Doctrine and a..
Navy" which he has written for the fortbco.-
ing issue OF "Leslie's Weekly" Captain
Mahan says:
The settlement and growth Of our Pac,s,
Coast the increasing commercial consequer.S
OF the Pacific Ocean. and the questions arising
about China. its future government and -
trade make IL necessary TO connect chr A,
Iantfc and Gulf seabOard with the Pacific \,
a canal across the Central American isthmn.
establishing thereby consecutive water corr
munication between the two as well as short,
ening the access from cur eastern shores "a
Asia The isthmus and it's immediate surround
ings thus become the greatest OF our external
interests Scarcely secondary TO them il tn
Caribbean Sea, because all sea roads 70 the
isthmus run through IL; and II contains MANY
strong positions the acquisition Of which By a
formidable European State would in en-
danger shipping and naval
alike-passing between our Atlantic ports and
the Pacific by the canal
We must remember that other nations art
especially European. because the most active
are interested likewise In using that canal, and
for the support Of their interests, in gaining Do
sitions. To their doing so we oppose the MOn-
roe Doctrine. Therefore. IL we intend 10 make
good the affirmation of the latter must ba
prepared to resist, foTcibly if need be, any ar
tempt 10 obtain adjacent territory CT ports
which NAV serve as stations for a navy hostile
to ourselves It is natural that European nz-
tons should wish such positions; that Germany
for instance. as has lately been ruinored, should
wish the Danish isIands-St Thomas. etc. Her
right to buy them is as good IN international
law as ours, the Monroe Doctrine depends NOT
upOn legal right, but upon the moral right %
our Indispensable interests, and derives is CHEZ
support from the fact that il is not worth while
TO incur enmity, pushed perhaps 70 the sx-
tent of
Now. the one preparation for war. in a mar
time region like the Caribbean, is navy lary.
enough to be effective. Ports are quite second
arv They are necessary to navy which needs
a local base of operations. but they are useless
without it. especially in the Caribbean, becauss
conditions there are so backward as TO give 10
local resources. Positions held there not only
shipping must be imported. and STEADY stream
of supply maintained. This can only be done By
the Navy keeping the open which at tia
same time secured our other merchant chipping
To do these things. which is called controlling
the sea the Navy should strictly be superior 70
any which can be brought against it: but this
extreme conclusion is qualified by other circun-
stances, such our nearneSs 10 the Caribbean
Sea. our National power through our great -
sources the dangers to which our possible opp
other enemies We cannot in the near future
expect 10 have navy nearly as large as that
which Great Britain must keep, but il is easily
within our means to rival that OF France OF OF
Germany. the only European states other than
Great Britain whose general interests might
lead them actively 70 dispute the maintenance Of
the Monroe Doctrine
Reflection upon this condition Will indicate the
size necessary to our own war feet and also the
wisdom of cultivating those cordial relations 10
which Great Britain has invited us. which our In
terests and our institutions advise and the exist
ence of which will put it out of the power or wish
of anv other State to quarrel with US about the
Monroe Doctrine 1t is 10 the interest or Great
Britain that we should take naval charge OF the
American isthmus, provided she can feel sure
that we will do II effectively. that our prepara-
lions and our deeds will answer to the words Of
Washington and Monroe.