The evening times., 1900-01-30
BULLER's PRECARIoUs POSITION

think otherwise than that the bfltlsh
forces are by no means yet out or the
woods II seems to be settled that Dun
donald's cavalry brigade is safe with War
ren's division south of the Tugela. AS
Buffers latest message was dated at spear
mans Camp, 1t is presumed that ne mas
not yet abandoned his positions IN tue
neighborhood of Potgieter's Drift, ana this
view is further supported by the unoef
standing that Lyttleton's brigade has not
been moved. These facts or assumptions
would indicate that, at latest accounts, the
British line extended from Zunckles, the
point to which Warren probably fell back.
to Mount Alice and Zwarts Kop, and SO
on to the right held by Barton at or near 4
Cheveley.
An analysis of the new line situation i
would seem to show that the British army
is in position of imminent peril. 1t may
be assumed that, when Spion kop was at
tackled the bulk of Buffers available /
force was at and beyond Springfield. AS
far as we can judge the troops under Bar
ton, holding the right at Colenso, could not
have amounted to more than two brigades,
and there should have been another be-
tween Barton and Lyttleton to support
either might be required. AS we have
! seen, Buffers left was crushed and COM
PEELED to retreat In case that disaster
were considered reason for a general re-
treat such movement would be hndered
and hampered by the congestion OF the
transport and ammunition trains, drawn
| by oxen and mules, on the Frere and EST
court roads, only one of which might De
available east of Springfield in view OF a
possible attack on the British right from
| Colenso The British infantry with It's
unnecessarily heavy equipment is always
slow. So, even an unopposed retrogression
would not be rapid. We can hardly believe
that it would be or is being unopposed,
judging from the tactics hitherto displayed
by de Villebois Mareuil.
Buffers left being defeated and driven
back with frightful loss. and the army be-
ing encumbered with its wounded and cam
paign supplies, it would be the most natu-
raj thing in the world for de Villebois- Ma
reuil to rush every available reserve down
to Colenso and strike Barton, with view
to defeat the British right and either cut
it off from the main body, or rout II; in
either case securing command of Butler S
rear and communications. The success OF
such a movement would bag the British
commander on two difficult roads, blocked
with impedimenta OF all kinds, and render
an attack upon him in reverse an attrac-
tive operation. He could then be forced to
fight on two if not three fronts; for, with
the Boers swinging around from Colenso
to Springfield their right would be in a po-
sition, even without supporting move
J ment from Dewdrop to strike Lyttleton at
Zwarts Kop, while it is to be presumed
that some force would move around by Ac-
ton Homes and harass if it did not give
battle to Warren on the British left.
The statement, in our dispatches, thai
large bodies Of Beers have been seen NOV
ing down the road from Dewdrop to Colen-
So the short parallel to Buffers roads
to the rear aud the report that Villebois-
Mareuil had gone there TO take command
appear 10 be sufficient evidence that &
movement such as we have outlined ha:
been indeed planned by the BOer tao
! tieians, and it would be very strange IL
the circumstances If it we're not attempted
One cannot be sure in matters OF this
kind. As We have often remarked, posi-
tive knowledge of strictly local militar!
conditions is not to be had at this dis
: tance. We can be certain, however, tha
D an American general, after smashing one
( of his enemy's wings and loading him VI
- | with several thousand wounded soldiers
i in difficult country with exposed commu
S nications, would not be apt to sit dowi
a on his partial success and call it holl
b day. On such general reasoning it i
= within bounds TO conclude that anothe
. battle will be-perhaps has been-fought
= before the net results Of Buffers attemp
= To relieve Ladysmith by turning the Boe
. | right, can be determined.
II would be useless at this hour to at
= tempt to theorize about Ladysmith. Tn
e expressions of some military writer's in tn
:, London press today strike rs as littl
9 short of wild. The idea that Sir Georg
O White would think of trying to cut out b
: way Of the railway to Colenso is simpl
foolish if We know anything about tn
| conditions on lDdt IluS, NE railway, a
il has been described in reports and let
ters winds through a narrow gorge domi
mated by precipitous heights, and smal
force could barricade and hold it anywher
. against large one. 1t is possibly tru
y that White, rather than capitulate an
1t surrender his guns. ammunition, an
s stores may destroy most of them an
5 | l,,1aQ hut thorn
II mot appear to be any reason for supPosin
d that the effort would be successful
l. bringing him into juncture with his friends
p Apparently his best chance for cut-oI
20 apneared when Dundonald and .Clery wei
N around the Boer right between Acto
II Homes and Tintwa. If it were impossib
for him to take advantage of it, we cannC
see that the same movement would /
feasible now. with the British left whiT
ped and pushed back below the Tugel'
a. Probably the only advantage White conl
~ ~ gain by sortie would be the deStructio
he instead of the surrender of his aTmameI
Is and so on; but it must not be forgotte
ne that the cost in life would be terrible, an
OF the surrender in the field of a shattere
- remnant of the garrison would follow, es
Fe seems, inevitably.
In the Hands of strangers,