The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-02-11
INCIDENTS OF THE WAR
LETTER FROM AN OFFICER WHO
WAS IN THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.
why a Detachment of Did
Not Go to PretOria-The Beers
Not

CORRESPONDENTS VI IL llluAoldPOlAS
LONDON, Feb. u.-An officer who took
cart in the battle of Colenso writes to To-
Day (newspaper) describing the confusion
and slaughter that marked Buffers first
battle in the campaign. He also recounts
an incident which shows the Boer soldiers
in a pleasanter light than is often done
here. He says: About ten men of the
Connaughts and twenty of the Inniskillings
Representatives of the Green and Orange
under Colonel Thackery, found themselves
in this position and the ambulance wagons
being already in the field carrying off the
wounded, they were obliged to cease firing.
well men, said Colonel Thackery. it
Is now Pretoria for us (meaning surrender)
or shall we do the best we can?
1.-The divil of Pretoria for u.s. was the
cry of all; do the best you can and If the
worst comes, we will fight 1t out
"a Boer officer came up and said: You
seem to have lost very heavily here
YES said Colonel Thackery, laughing,
but we shall be at Pretoria for the new
year all the same
well said the Boer. IF you are. 1
promise to stand you the best bottle of
champagne in South Africa
<hAtS oOAAiO III SiicliA
cry said: Goodbye, / am going back to
camp. and intend to take my arms with
me-
Every well; I have no orders about that.
but in any case I am looking the other
way
And so they parted. 1t has been the GUS
tom in England for the purpose of melting
the passions of the people to the war pitch
to describe the Beers as little better than
savages. but many incidents like the above
prove them to be something very different.
People are too ready. to take up cries Of
treachery against their opponents on par
tial and onesided evidence. General Jou-
bert has, L believe, challenged inquiry be-
fore a court, and two incidents come under
my own notice in this battle which show
how difficult it is to deal with such matters
and how Ignorance of what is taking place
in the heat of battle, or perhaps errors of
Judgment, may be misinterpreted into
treachery. Some indignation was expressed
because one of our ambulances was struck
these ambulances had been placed
by mistake in advance of and
directly under one of our naval guns.
l understand the arrangement of the medi-
cal officers had been altered by a staff Of
ficer, but under such circumstances the
enemy were evidently satisfied in con-
tinuing their fire.
Again the parties whom L have already
mentioned as remaining in the advance
line after the order for the retire had been
given, kept up their fire long after the am
balances had advanced to the field and
were picking up the wounded. OF course,
the officers and men were ignorant of this,
but naturally also the Beers were ignorant
and threatened to retaliate. What a cry
there would have been all over Europe If
our men had been fired at and hit under
similar conditions The truth lie q haffIe-
field is not managed like an electrical ma
chine. by pressing a button. Groups and
lines of highly excited men are scattered
over miles of country and are often un-
awares of much that Is happening outside
their immediate vicinity, and, to tell the
truth, not always even there. Men are
often only partly responsible for the re-
suit of their own actions and certainly
they car be very imperfectly controlled
The officer was with the Irish Brigade,
and says: Every survivor looks back with
bitterness and indignation at the gross
folly and m-ismanagement that led to the
certain slaughter of his companions. The
brigade was marched into the very jaws Of
death in mass of quarter columns, and
without waiting for the artillery prepara-
ton. No scouts were sent forward TO dis
cover the exact position of the ford. No
skirmishers were thrown out TO cover the
advance of the main body. No attempt
was made to extend till well within the
zone of rifle fire, and till shells had already
begun to burst over their devoted heads.
Then it was found for the first time that
they had been led not only under a de-
~structive front fire from beyond the river
which barred their passage, but into the
| very midst of a deadly enfilade.
For five hours the men were allowed to
remain in this position, helpless for good,
seeing their comrades shot at every mo-
ment by their sides, yet powerless to re-
taliate. Lik the Roman sentry, they kept
| their posts to the last, but when the orders
| came to retire nearly six hundred lay on
the field. A more wanton sacrifice of life
has never been made, and there Is not an
officer or man in the brigade who is not
well aware of the facts. All men make
mistakes, but when men who are liable to
such fits of folly, and who afterward have
the hardihood to maintain them, are un-
| fitted to command, and will certainly COM
NIT the same errors again. It's little short
| of murder 70 intrust the lives of troops into
their hands. II is difficult to ~prophesy as
to the future; the great number of British
troops that are being poured into the coun-
try must In time produce some results. but
meanwhile the Boer troops are daily be-
coming more efficient and their victories
are giving them confidence. The relief of
Ladysmith is more difficult than ever, and
| the passage Of the Tugela has yet to be
effected. Another effort is shortly to be
made and ought to be successful. but un-
less the management is much more skillful
there will be another disaster and every
| thing will then be fighting for very exist
euce In Soufb Africa"