New-York tribune., 1900-05-06
NUMBER OF THE BOERS.
A PARALLEL. DRAWN WITH GENERAL
MCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE
CIVIL VAR

service in South Africa, that the Beers have never
lad more than $50 5000 men under arms, Is
probably near the truth and confirmatory of The
Tribunes first estimates. based on the census re-
turns of the States. The persistent exaggera-
tlon of the Boer strength field by the British
commanders and correspondents. clearly unwar-
ranted 10y known facts. has yet been maintained
with such evident conviction TO become feature
of this war. Il must reminded the older gen.
Grafton of Americans of the wild stories prevalent
in the Army of the Potomac and Northern news
papers in 1912 about the overwhelming strength
of the rebel forces menacing Washington and de-
Tending Richmond.
In spite of approximately accurate knowledge
from census returns of leir military limitations
counting men, women and children-the British
generals have obstinately labored under the belief,
or so pretended that these sparsely populated
South African States had in arms upward Of 10000
men, which force has enabled them to be always
the stronger at the point of contact For moral
effect it has no doubt been a wise part of the
Beer policy exagger ate their own numbers and
proNess, just the Southern confederates did
theirs in the beginning: nevertheless the large Boer
armies which have figured in British dispatches
must have been mainly the fgments OF overwrought
imaginations. In the of things there
in all Boerland sufficient material from which
TO mobilize them; there were not, outside of Cape
Colony. Afrikanders enough in existence to form
them. counting all the lame. blind and halt British
estimates have been ridiculous
The Peninsular campaign Of 1862 against Rich
mond. undertaken the great scale that
which has characterized this British invasion,
furnishes a parallel of military obfuscation.
General George B. McCellans own Story" and
the official records of the war. all before the
world show that policy. politics and personal
ism probably had something to do with that
Generals extrayagant estimate of the strength OF
the rebel armies opposing him, but ii is equally
certain that from beginning TO end the Union COM
mander labored under the fatal hallucnation that
he was pitted against overwhelming numbers. He
could not free himself from this spectre of rebel
rnyriads which had no existence. BY it he was
hampered TO the end. 1t caused the loss of the
campaign. Mcclellan. a most brilliant officer In
some respects. afraid of his enemy; afraid to
use his own army; afraid of himself and suspi-
cious of his Government.
MCLELLAN's LACK OF CONFIDENCE.
His engineer education naturally led Mcclellan
in all cases exaggerate military obstacles, and
in like ratio the means required to overcome them
faults manifest In his wild dispatches to
President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton from the
moment he landed at Fortress Monroe. Their dis
astrous effects seen in his preliminary opera
tions as well his final movement to the James
with Lees army a his heels. There never
hour when Army Of the Potomac was not
superior TO tina; of the enemy. and in the begin
ming it outnumbered them three TO one. Two weeks
after General Mcclellan set himself about the
siege" OF Yorktown. which lasted a month. and
where he and his 10000 men should not have been
detained a day, ne wrote General Burnside that
the rebel force in and around Yorktown numbered
more than eighty thousand men In fact. York
town was defended by less than 10000 men under
the noisy General John B Magruder, whose sole
purpose was delay, give the Confederate author
ties time to assemble a great army for the defence
of Richmond. When the proper time came Magru-
der quietly withdrew. and, despite McClellans
losses in material. and all in men,
Two weeks later. having learned nothing. Nc
exaggerated: he assured Mr.. Lincoln that he
rebels had double that number. He appears to
have been shaken by the premonltion mat there
approach TO Richmond involved desperate battle
between the two opposing @ That Iowa was tS Tea
with deliberate purpose to capture the repel cap-
cipitated by the Union commander; he considerably
waited for the eny % fG s rsanS S make m amd IT
indeed was desperate battle" but only so be
crastnation caused by HIS inability to see things
they were
UNDUE MIsGIvINGs.
Feauregard tLen defending Corinth against Hal
leck a thousand miles away. McClellans
bugaboo. At time Beauregard was coming. at
another he had already arrived in Richmond amid
great excitement" with the whole Corinth army.
Of course; Beauregard never came As late as June
Magruder had opposed him at Yorktown with
on June 26 at 1Soooo Another telegram said: The
rebel force is stated at 2cO.0oo including Jackson
would be destroyed by overwhelming numbers,
share its fate This was on the eve of the Seven
Days battles. and General Mcclellan was in a
ssppTeRension sgHR Still there no odds against
him only instead of outnumbering the enemy two
10 one, the Confederate army had at last been
brought up nearly his own strength 1t was no
longer on the defensive. but ready and eager to
fight , ,,
founded fears success for the Army Of the Poto-
mac was next impossible. Yet the result of the
although. through feeble leadership ii yielded the
offensive and retrea General Mcclellan unques
bly, had It in his power through General Lees
faulty tactics to accomplish great Things for the
country and his own fame. 1t only required that
he should have had an approximate conception or
Lees actual strength, which was less than his
past understanding. he chung TO his original mis-
conception that the rebels could 'overwhelm'' him
II Mcclellan really believed this throughout. as in
dicated by his dispatches were IL not for his whim
pering protestations before the event that the Ad
Ininistration. and not he, would be responsible
Other generals besides Mcclellan have been prone
20 multiply their foes, but not to the insane extent
exceptions ard IT is singular fact that they were
the great opposing leaders. Grant and Lee.
Neither was ever very wide OF the mark In est-
mates OF the enemy strength. FROM the very out
they appeared 10 have an intuitive comprehen-
sion OF the forces with which they were dealing.
Was genius only common and conf
the enemy's numbers. bat. like Mcclellan in
other respect, constantly making the lack OF this
roads. the excuses for not getting ahead Not so
with Grant and Lee: both seemed perfectly
that the elements were exactly as obstructive TO
the enemy themselves. Before he had become a
mmanding general. IA single incident disclosed
Grant the unvarying rule that the enemy
about afraid OF him he Of them.
Ts1If bevond This extraordinary exaggeration OF
the enemys forces the parallel between our PENN
sular campaign and that of the British in South
the troops ia action. In one vital particular there
Is vast difference between The British command