Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1900-08-22

we Know Dy thlS time What reports IN
Chinese towns are worth; secondly, even
if the authentic news is four days old
and much may have happened since
then-the silence of the generals lends
color to a Shanghai statement that the
wires to Tien Tsin are cut and may also
help to explain the hurried march to the
German and Italian re-enforcements to
Pekin.
Assuming that even the sacred city and
the palace are captured, the difficulties
of the allies are by no means at an
end. Their force is, of course, more than
sufficient to repel any attack made on.
them, whether by Boxers of by imperial
troops, but when it is remembered that
they have to police the great struggling
city of Pekin, with it's million inhabitants
and to keep open the line of communica-
tion to the coast, their strength is by no
means excessive, even If 1t is sufhclent
for the work in hand.
Besides the allied generals, like Lord
Roberts in South Africa, may have ad-
yanced too fast effectually to occupy the
country behind them. The speed of their
march was rendered necessary by the
position of the legations, for IT the re-
| lief column had taken three or four days
longer on the journey it might have come
| too late Still, if the Chinese troops de-
feated at Pei Tsang and Yung Tsun
should form up again between the capl-
tai and Tien Tsin, the allies will either
| have to march back to disperse them or
to wait till that task is performed py
re-enforcements from the coast and
mea nwhile may find themselves virtually
besieged in Pekin.
The pessimists, too, are additionally
depressed by Minister Conger's testl-
mony as to the conduct of the Chinese
government, and his opinion that the
whole movement was got up by the I'M
perial authorities and that the Boxers
were a. mere pretence. On the other
Ihand, it is admitted that If the en-
press and the Manchu princes, ana par
| ticularly Tuan. have been captured, the
outlook is much more hopeful, since 1t
will be possible to find responsible chi
lnese authorities on whom new arrange
ments can be imposed. The action or
| the southern viceroys, too, shows that
tn ecampaign in the north has had an
lexcellent effect in checking the 1urtner
spread of anti foreign agitation.
| The Chinese minister here has handed
| to the foreign office for transmission to
Lord Salisbury Ii Hung Chang's note
suggesting that a plenipotentiary should
be appointed to negotiate with him. Ills
communication is couched in tone or
lcool assumption, which excites a certain
amount of indignation. The Times and
other papers had articles angrily de-
Inouncing Lii and suggesting that no no.
tice should be taken of him. The aged
lviceroy is profoundly trusted by what
may be called the Anglo-Chinese colony
the foreign office. It is urged that there
lis no proof that Ii is not playing for
Ihfs own hand, rather than genuinely en-
Ideavorng to extricate China from her
difficulties. His influence has for some
time past been overshadowed by the
violent reactionary Manchu party. and
he may now be trying to get even with
his enemies, or again, if he is volun-
Iteering his services, the powers may
negotiate with him as soon as peace Is
lpatched up and the allied contingents
withdrawn, Ii will be repudiated, as
has happened before, on the ground that
he has exceeded his authority. 1t is also
said that Ii dislikes England more than
Iany other European nation and has
more than preference for Russia.
lis therefore thought that, if possible
negotiations should take place in Pekin
and LIS intervention be dispensed with,
All this, of course, again depends on
the possibility of finding anybody in
IPekin to negotiate with.