The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-08-10
The Chinese situation.

The Chinese situation.
On the whole, we are inclined TO regard
the latest note of the State Department to
China as clever and timely production.
1t is the most extreme concession that the
Administration has yet made to the public
opinion that we are at war with the Chi
nese Empire 1t even justifies the infer
ence that il the Pekin Government does
not Immediately comply with the demands
il conveys, Mr.. Mckinley will at last do his
duty and call Congress together in extraor-
binary session.
Read between the lines. the note Of
Wednesday is but very little short of an
ultimatum In demanding that firing upon
the Legations shall be stopped immediate
ly, it clearly gives notice TO China that if
the siege of the British compound and any
other place or places in which foreigners
may be defending themselves is not in
stantly raised and abandoned, this country
will regard the attitude of the Chinese
Government as one of open and active hos
.ility TO the United States-which means
war.
Nat less pointed and insistent IS the
warning to the imperial authorities that.
if they intend 10 protect the Ministers and
o:her foreigners, they must cooperate
with the relief column and assist 1t
to effect their rescue. The logic Of the
note is dnanswerable. If China canEot
adequately protect the Legation people in
Pekin. where the conditions for defence
are comparatively good, her inability 10
guarantee their safety on a slow march
from the capital TO the coast, encountered
as they would be with wounded men, and
women and children, is TOO obvious 10 re-
quire more than e statement OF the TACT.
Hence the Chinese Government must not
delay in establishing an understanding
with the relief expedition, and in helping
it 10 cover the retreat of the Ministers
and other foreigners. or the conclusion viii
be reached in no time that the Empress
Dowager and her confederates are bent
upon a general massacre.
We are in no situation TO judge Of The
extent to which military operations may
promote or mar the prospects for succor.
Yesterday evening the welcome news was
received that Yangtsun had been cap
tured. This is not to be taken as indi-
cative OF an early end to the campaign,
CT of its success. Intrinsically it is en-
couraging. but between Yangtsun and
Pekin there are yet nearly sixty miles of
difficult and probably flooded country 10
overcome, and it is fair presumption
that the closer the column comes to its
final objective point the iercer will be the
opposition It must overcome.
We may be permitted TO hope that. with
Yangtsun in possession, the military stu
alton may develop sufficiently to afford Us
some knowledge of its character and de-
tails Unless the views of the interna-
fional commanders have changed, there
will be halt at Yangtsun, as it is under
stood that it is to be made the advance
base for operations against Pekia. Proba-
bly, the pressing necessity to push forward
may render the halt short one. 1t needs
to be so if the task of the expedition Is
10 be accomplished in time 10 do any good.
It is now hoped that the ability shown by
the allies to keep the peace among them
selves-at least until they have succeeded
in Furnishing the Chinese Government-Inay
have a salutary effect upon those in su-
thority in Pekin, and that the latter may
realize. their personal peril and preserve
the lives OF the legationers.
We are inclined 10 look favorably upon
the evident plan of the German Kaiser to
have his distinguished field marshal. Count
Won Waldersee. appointed to the chief com-
mand of the international forces. Emperor
Wilhelm would hardly have assigned ar
officer of the highest rank to service in
China If he had no; some understanding
with neighboring States on the subject.
AS far as the American Government ard
people are concerned, there does not seem
TO be any reason to regard the proposition
as unacceptable. There are not any atlsr
soldiers than Count von Waldersee. ard
since our Administration would never con-
sent TO allow any American soldier to " n
the laurels that might result from chief
command in a victorious war in China, ii IS
just as well that cur troops should fight
under an English or German gsneraiissimo.
The quicker the question of general com
msnd can be settled and notified to
the Chinese imperial authorities the soorer
they will come 10 realize that their schemes
TO divide the allies and to prevent them
from acting in concert have miscarried.