The leader., 1900-06-06

facts or conditions the vitality of tn
amendment itself, its right legally t
be written and inserted into the Con
stitution depends.
As to the second proposition, we ar
= satisfied that the proposition submit
ted to the voters contained at leas
four separate amendments. The sec
tons proposed to be repealed, to-wit
sections l45, $40, 15l, 152 and 153 relat,
to separate matter. Section l45 deal
alone with the Supreme Court, as doe,
section l49. Section l53 deals will
the judges of the Circuit courts and o
the Chancery courts. Section 10
deals with the methods of film.
vacancies in the Supreme Court
Section 152 deals with Circuit anC
Chancery court districts. 1t will thu.
be seen that the sections of the Consti
tuition of 1890 sought to treat sepa
rately of the Supreme Court and
Supreme Court judges and of the
judges of the Circuit and Chancery
courts, Section IL, relating to vacan
cies in the office of circuit Judge OF
chancellors and the method of filling
them where the vacancy occurs during
the recess of the Senate was wholly
overlooked 10y the proposed amend.
ments. We are satisfied that many
voters might have been willing to vote
for the election of circuit Judge and
chancellor who would be unwilling for
the election Of supreme judges, and
that many voters might have been
willing to vote for the election of all
judges and yet wholly unwilling to
vote for party nominations by districts
of judges to be voted for over the
whole State. Whether an amendm ent
is one or many clearly must depend
upon the nature of the subject matter
covered by the amendment. If the
definite propositions are separate, one
in no manner dependent upon the
other, so that a voter may intelligently
vote for one and against the other, one
being able to stand alone, disconnected
wholly from the others, then such
amendments are many and not one,
are severable and not unit, are COM
plete each in itself and not each part
of an interdependent scheme, and such
manifestly are the amendments in this
case. a voter might have chosen to
vote for the election of circuit Judges.
and not for the election of chancellors,
and one might have chosen to vote for
the election of both circuit judge and
chancellor, and yet not for the election
of supreme judges, one might have
been willing to vote for the election of
all judges, and yet not willing to sane
ton by his vote scheme for party
nomination by district for judges to be
voted for by electors of the entire
State, such as proposed in these amend
ments, and an elector might have
exercised his choice between these
four amendments, voting for one or
more and against one or more, and in
one amendment as to the election of
circuit judge, or chancellor, or supreme
Judge might have been adopted and
the others rejected and our constitu-
tional scheme remain perfectly sym
metrical and harmonious, and 50 the
people could have adopted the amend
ments providing for the election of
all the judges and rejected the scheme
propounded for party nominations by
districts;and such action would have
been perfectly intelligent, and these
three amendments could have been
written into the Constitution without
the other. which is not essential to
any one of the three amendments.
The argument is wholly fallacious
which seeks to save this method of
submission by saying that all of the
amendments relate to the judicial de
partment of the government. If that
argument were correct, then the mere
fact that amendments, no matter how
many and no matter how absolutely
Independent each of the other relating
to the legislative department could all
be submitted as one, and so as to the
judicial department, and so as to the
executive department. Whether amend
ments are one or many, must be solved
by their inherent matter, by the con.
sideratiOn whether they are separate
and Independent each of the other so
as each can stand alone without the
other, leaving the constitutional
scheme symmetrical, harmonious and
Independent on that subject, and not
upon the mere blanketing of name
such as amendments relating to the
judicial department" or amendments
relating to the executive department
or to the legislative department.
Nothing could save these amendments
unless it be the fact that they
relate to the same general broad sub
ject of which The judicial department
could save them, and this is utterly in
the face of reason and principle.
On the third proposition we are
satisfied that the majority required by
section BIB of the Constitution of 1890
for the adoption of a pro -constitu-
tional amendment must be majority
of all the electors voting at the cleo
ton, not simply all voting on the
adoption or rejection of the constitu
tional amendments submitted. A
consideration of the history of section
273 in our Constitution demonstrates
this beyond all controversy. In the
Constitution of 1917, found in Hutch
inson's Code, page 30, this provision
reads as to this point IF it shall