The Washington weekly post., 1900-09-11

rniraI Dewey to the government at Wash
Ingt0n. said: Merritt arrived yesterday.
Situation Is most critical az Manila The
spanish may. surrender at any moment.
Aerritt's most difficult problem VIII be
how 10 deal with the insurgents Under
Aguinaldo. who have become aggressive
and evsa threatening toEard our army.
Here is revealed the spirit OF the insuIs.
ents as early as July, 1893. before ,he
protocol was signed. while we were sun
engaged In active wer with spain, Even
then the insurgents were threatening cur
army.
on August Is Manila was captured: and
Of this and subsequent events the thisp-
pine Commission says. When tse ciiF
Of Manila was taken August IL tne FIJI
pinos took no part In the attack. but
came following In with view 10 leoting
the city, and were only prevented from
doing so by our forces preventing them
from from entering. Aguinaldo claimed
that ne had the right TO occupy the city;
he demanded OF Gen. Merritt the palace
of Malacanan for himself and the cesSion
of all churches OF Manila. also that part
OF the money taken from the spsnidros
above all that he should be given the
arms of the Spanish prisoners. All these
demands were refused.
Testimsny Of the American Comma nder-.
Gems Merritt. Greene. and Anderson.
who were in command at the beginning
OF our occupation and until the surren-
der of Manila. state that there wss rs 81
liance with the insurgents and no prom
ise to them of independence. On August
IT, ISes. Gen. Merritt was instructed that
there must be no joint occupation Of Ma
Mia with the insurgents. Gen. Anderson.
under date OF February 10. 1900. says that
he was present at the interview between
Admiral Dewey and the insurgent leader,
and tha; In this interview Admiral Dewey
made no promise whatever. He adds:
He (Aguinaldo) asked me If my govern
ment was going TO recognize his govern
ment i answered that | was there sim
ply In a military capacity; that could
not acknowledge his government because
I had no authority to do So
Would not our adYerSaries have sent
Dewey's fleet 10 Manila TO capture
and destroy the Spanish sea power there,
or, dispatching II there. would they have
Withdrawn it after the destruction of the
Spanish fleet: and If the latter, whittier
would they have directed IL to sail?
Where could 1t have gone? What port
in the Orient was opened to II? DO our
adversaries condemn the expedition un-
der the command of Gen. Merritt to
|. strengthen Dewey In the distant ocean
, and assist in our triumph over Spain. with
which nation We were at war? Was Ii
, not our highest duty to strike Spain at
. every vulnerable point. that .the war
. might be successfully concluded at the
earliest practicable moment?
| And was it not our duty TO protect tn
lives and property of those who came
within our control by the fortunes Of war?
Could We have come away at any tins
between Nav /, 1898, and the conclusion
| a 0ad
name? Could we have come away without
dishonor at ally time after the ratihcation
: Of the peace treaty by the Senate of the
/ United States?
There has been no time since the de-
struetion OF the enemys fleet when we
could or should have left the Philippine
| archipelago. After the treaty of neace
was ratifiedfno power but Congress could
: surrender our sovereignty or ALLEVIATE a
foot OF the territory thus acquired. The
; Congress has not seen fit to do the one or
} the other. and the President had no au-
; thorfty 10 do either, IL he had been so IN
elined, which he was not. So long as the
= sovereignty remains in ls 1t Is the duty of
the Executive. whoever he may be, To up
hold that sovereignty and If II be at
! tackled to suppress its assailants. Would
D Our political adversaries do less?
Responsibility for Shedding of Biood.
1t has been asserted that there would
have been no fighting in the Philippines it
Congress had declared its purpose to give
independence to the Tagal insurgents The
insurgents did not wait for the action of
! Congress. They assumed the offensive
they opened fire on our army. Those who
: assert our responsibility for the beginning
OF the conflict have forgotten that before
the treaty was ratified In the Senate and
while IL was being debated in that body,
and while the Bacon -esoiution was under
discussion, on February 4, 1859. the in
2 surgents attacked the American army.
after being previously advised that the
r American forces were up orders not to
. fire upon them except 3efense. The
+ papers found in the a. emily captured
archives of the insurgents demonstrate
) that this attack had bee carefully plan
: ned for weeks Before II occurred Their
Z unprovoked assault upon our soldiers at
= time when the Senate vas celebrating
: upon the treaty shows that no action on
: our part except surrender and abandon
ment would have prevented the fighting.
. and leaves no doubt In any fair mind Of
4 where the responsibility rests for the
shedding of American blood.
With all the exagge ,ated phrase-mak-
, ing of this electoral contest, We are in
I danger OF being diverted from the real
contention.
e We are in agreement with all of those
-
g also with those who eounseled the ratifca-
: ton OF the treaty of peace. Upon these
. two great essential steps there can be no
issue, and out OF these came all of our re-
d sp0nsibi.itieS. IL others would shirk the
g obligations imposed by the war and the
I treaty, we must decline TO act further
with them, and here the Issue is made. II
/ Is our purpose 10 establish in the Philip
pines a government suitable to the wants
I and conditions OF the inhabitants and TO
4 prepare them for Sef-goyernment and TO
4 give them self-government when they are
n Ieady Tor II and as rapidly as they are
! Ieady Ior 1t. That am aiming 10 do un-
ger my constitutional authority, and VIII
d continue TO do until Congress shall de-
! termine the political status of the inhaLl-
I tants OF the archipelago.
h are our opponents against the treaty .
III so, ihey must be reminded that IL could
not nave been ratified an the Senate bur
Ior their assistance. The Senate which
n fatined the treaty and the Congress which
tion e aomnrssd ,sS ssnS'on ny large sppropria-
: : uHes OF the people OF al! parties
Would our opponents surrender 20 the
insurgents. abandon our sovereignty. or
g cede IL 10 themg III that be not their pur-
4 pose, then IL should be promptly disclatm-
. eo, Tor only evil can result from the hopes
: raised oy our oppont uts in the minds OF
!. he Fliipinos, that with their success ri
!. / the polls In November there will be a
withdrawal of our army anG cf Annerican
!, sovereignty over the archipelago, the com
: piete independence of the TagaIog peopl..
: recognized, and the powers or govern
J. ment oyer all the other peoples of the
! leaders
n raise Hopes Entertained BY Issurgenis.
d The effect of a belief In the minds OF
the insurgents that this will be done has
: already prolonged the rebellion. and IN
o ereases the necessity for the continuance
I OF large army. IL Is now delaying .ull
: peace Ia the archipelago and the estab-
: lishment OF civil governments, and has
Influenced many OF the insurgents against
= accepting the liberal terms Of amnesty
4 offered By Gen. Macarthur unGs, my d.
n reet'en. But for these false hopes a con
= siderable reduction could have been had
q in our military establishment in the Phil