The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1900-01-04
MONTOJO'S CASE.
Spanish Admiral Declares Ma
val and Military Officers
COunseIed Against the War
With the United States.
SAYS DEWEY Boosted
Americans Were Busfnesslike
and Fully Prepared.
First Publication Of the Adj
miral's Statement.
IRON the Brooklyn EagIe.1

published for the first time, add a new
page to the history of the Spanish
American war. In his defense, Admiral
Nfontojo shows that in January, 1898,
Spain was in full possession of the plans
of the Americans, and was informed of
what would happen in case war was de-
clared with America He also says that
Lieutenant Sobral, the Spanish naval
attache at Washington, constantly kept
the Spanish government informed Of
developments in America and of what
preparations were being made for war
with Spain. in consequence of which,
the lieutenant was branded as a spy in
time of peace and had to leave this
country.
He also states that information Of the
Spanish plans was obtained by the
Americans in the same way at Madrid;
that the war was begun in opposition to
the advice of the military and naval
commanders, and he charges that while
his government was well Informed, It
made no move to prepare for the con-
4iict
Admiral Montojo makes the sensa-
tional statement that the proJect1leS
of the Americans were charged with
inhammable cloth. and he makes
point of the retreat of Admiral Dewey,
after the destruction of the fleet. when
he had it in his hands to at once de-
eide the question of the day
Admiral Montojo also states that it
was settled in his mind that the war
would end disastrously to Spain when
Cervera was ordered to leave the Cape
Verde Islands, and that from that time
he was without hope and made up his
mind to die.
The admiral says: 'This court was
called upon to decide who was respon-
sible for the loss of naval battle which
had been fought on the other side of the
ocean, and that, too, in opposition to
the advice and opinion of the admiral
and captains who engaged in that bat
tie This battle was fought as a result
of a direct command of those officials
who We're responsible for the war and
who reserved to themselves the dlrec-
ton of the same. 1t would not have
hurt us to have lost all of our naval
and military forces in Cuba and the
Philippines, nor if we had lost the An
titles and the Magellan Archipelago,
and we need not have accepted those
shameful conditions of peace, if our
government had provided a suitable
navy, if we had been in possession of
modern ships, modern guns, torpedoeS
and other equipments that go to make
up a strong navy, for herein lies the
true strength of any nation
THE ISSUE WAS ON THE SEA.
1.-THE only place where this war could
have been decided, and here 1t really
was decided, was on the sea, as was
publicly and energetica1ly stated by
Admiral Cervera and his captains in
that memorable junta of April 20, 1898.
For this reason, the war was really
| ended on April %, 1885, which was the
date that the squadron of Admiral Ger
vert left the Cape Verde Islands, by an
| imperative order from the government,
which order divided our naval force in
to two squadrons, sending to the An
titles a nucleus immensely inferior to
the naval force of the enemy and leav-
ing here the other in no condition for
defense This act was the real cause OF
the end of the war and of its disas-
trous end for Spain. 1t was this act
that gave the enemy the advantage
over US and was the direct cause of the
humiliating peace terms we had to ac-
cept. 1t is this act that the people
want explained, and with the people
join the entire army and navy IN the
demand for a satisfactory explanation
of this imperative official order, which,
| I repeat, was responsible for our defeat,
| in that 1t left US unable to defend our
| selves against the assault of the enc
my"
the conditions existing at Manila and
! Cavite, declaring that the government
at Madrid had furnished but few of the
necessary munitions of war, and that
| neither place was in any way fitted to
| withstand the bombardment of modern
naval guns. II can prove" he says,
fsthat although years passed without
the government doing anything for the
| in all these years the army and navy
| commanders had petitioned for some
! thing to be done, still Sc days before
the declaration of war no ordnance
| was sent to Subig, nothing done for the
| defense of the mouth of the bay and
even after that the only thing sent for
| defense was four cannon OF Is centime-
ters of 1885 which even at that date
were antiquated. The initial velocity
! of our cannon was $40 centimeters,
| against the smallest cannon of the enc
! my, which was $50 meters, and the enc
my had many of these on Its shipS
| CHARGES DISHONORABLE WAR
FARE
ct will mention a message sent on
| May l to the government, which mes
sage stated the following: The Amer
/ lean prOjectiles contain in the interior
! charges of inf1ammable green cloth, in
| violation of the rights of men in hon.
| orable warfare This gives another in
! sight into the methods against which
| we had to contend.
| 7 was ordered to close the smaller
entrance of Subig with ships expressly
! sunk for that purpose, and to close the
! larger mouth Of the bay with torpedoes,
| which should have been sent, as they
| We're sent, to Cuba, but which never
| reached US in the Philippines In order
| to give an idea of our miserable Situa-
ton I may mention that We had only
! II torpedoes for the defense of 1000 me-
| tiers Of space, and that the cable which
| we obtained in Hong Kong was only
| enough for five torpedoes, and there
fore only five torpedoes could be placed.
| ITO consider Cavite as a military
| stronghold is ridiculous. because it is
situated at the corner of the bay, which
| has two openings, one of which is 300
| meters in depth and 1900 in width, and
| which is practically indefensible, either
with artillery or with torpedoes, and
for this reason, when it is once block
AIDED, it is converted from a port of
refuge into a horrible trap. The arsenal
is the advance guard of the forts and
impedes the fire of the forts, by receiv-
ing directly and without defense the
fire of the enemy, and ships of more
than eighteen feet had to remain away