The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1900-09-07

q strong detachment to draw the fire Of
our outposts. which took up position i'm
mediately in front and within few
yards of the same. The outpost was
strengthened by few of our men, who
silently bore their taunts and abuse the
entire night. This was reported to me by
Gen. Macarthur. whom l directed to COM
municate with the officer in command Of
the insurgent troops concerned. His pre-
pared letter was shown me and approved,
and the reply received Cloth papers found
in Gen. MacArthurs report) was all that
could be desired. However, the agree
ment was ignored by the insurgents, and
on the evening of Feb. another de-
monstration was made on one of our
small outposts, which occupied retired
position at least $50 yards within the line
which had been mutually agreed upon-an
tnsurgent approaching the picket and re-
fusing to halt or answer when Challenged
The result was that our picket dis
charged his piece, when the insurgent
troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited
fire on our troops there stationed. The
insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing
the fire OF small outpost, which they
had evidently labored with all their in
genuity to accomplish, in order to justify
in some way their premeditated attack.
1t Is not believed that the chief insurgent
leaders wished to open hostilities at this
time, as they were not completely pre-
pared to assume the initiative. They
desired two or three days more to perfect
their arrangements, but the zeal of their
army brought on the crisis which anti
cipated their premeditated action. They
could not have delayed long, however,
for it was their object to force an issue
before American troops, then en- route.
could arrive in Manila
ATTACK PREMEDITATED.
Here we have a clear and concise state
ment of the events which lead up to the
attack of Feb. 4. Let it be remembered
that the treaty of peace was not yet rati-
fed and that our forces were still tethered
to Manila by the terms Of the protocol
during all this critical period, so that the
insurgents had a free hand for all hostile
purposes outside of Manila. That the at
tack on our army, on the eve of the rati-
fication Of the treaty and just before the
arrival of reinforcements, was premedi-
tated and carefully planned is confirmed
by this fact: At the time the debate was
Of the treaty there was stopping at the
Arlington hotel, in Washington, a Fill
pino commission, at the head of which
was Angoncillo, one Of Agudnaldo's prin-
cipal advisors. At midnight on the 4th
Of February, before any one in Washing
con could possibly have learned of the
attack made on our forces at Manila,
Agoncillo, with a companion. hurriedly
left his hotel and started on the first train
direct for Canada. He must have known
OF what was transpiring at Manila that
night, and feared to remain and face an
outraged government and nation. On
Feb. IL Gen. Otis sent the following dis
patch to the war department:
reported that insurgent repre-
sentative at Washington tele-
Eraphed AEuinaldo to drive out
fOrcements. The dispatch received
at HOngkonE and mailed to MaIOIOs,
which decided on attack to be made
about eth. Eagerness of insurgent
troops to engage pFecipitated bat
tie"
How we'll prepared Aguinaldo was for
hostilities is apparent from the further
fact that within an hour after the firing
began on the outposts he issued lengthy
written declaration Of war from his head
quarters at Malolos, more than twenty
five miles from Manila.
The proclamation was evidently pre-
pared in advance.
What was the condition and number of
our forces in Manila at this time? Our
whole effective force in the city was only
IL, 900 men. OF these 5000 belonged to the
provost guard, and were expected to pre-
serve order and check demonstrations
and uprisings in the city. Another 1000
was required to protect the buildings and
barracks occupied by our troops, as the
insurgents had provided themselves with
kerosene and perfected plans to burn
these buildings. This left but 10000 men
to repel the attack of Aguinaldo's army,
estimated at from 10000 to 10000, and
protected by earthworks and riflepits,
which they had been months in preparing.
The battle which ensued commenced at
8 p. m. on Feb. 4 and lasted until 5 p. m.
the next day, resulting in the complete
defeat of the insurgents. During the
progress of the battle two or three at
tempts were made to rally and employ
the secret Filipino military organizations
within the city, but such attempts were
promptly suppressed by our forces.
Aguinaldo, having been thoroughly de-
feated in his attack of Feb. 4, with his
accustomed duplicity claimed that the
attack was purely accidental. And it
has been claimed that he applied for a
cessation of hostilities through Gen.
Torres.
STATEMENT PROVED FALSE.
Gen. Otis puts complete quietus upon
this claim in the following dispatch to
the adjutant general:
Judge Torres, citizen resident of Ma
Mia, who had served as member insur-
gent commission, reported evening Feb.
3, asked If something could not be done
to stop the fighting, as establishment Of
neutral zone. I replied Aguinaldo had
commenced the fighting and must apply
for cessation; 1 had nothing to request of
the insurgent government. He asked per-
mission to send Col. Arguellez to Malolos,
and Arguellcz was passed through lines
near Caloocan next morning. He went
direct to Malolos, told Gen. Aguinaldo
and Mabini that Gen. Otis would permit
suspension hostilities upon their request
They replied a declaration of war had
been made, copy of which they fur
nished him. They said they had no OBJ
lection to suspension OF hostilities; but
beyond this general remark made no re-
Spouse, but directed him to return with
that message. Arguellez reported that he
conveyed the statement; that they had
commenced the war, and that 1t must
20 on, since they had chosen that course