The Redwood gazette. [volume] (Redwood Falls, Minn.) 1873-1940, 1900-10-03


attack On the Spanish lines. Gen. Merritt
states that on his arrival Aguinaldo failed
to call on him or to offer to cooperate
with him in the capture Of the city, and
that TOR these reasons the preparations
for the attack on the city were pressed
and military operations conducted without
reference to the situation Of the insurgent
forces
Gen. Merritt adds that 1.-THE wisdom for
this course was subsequently fully estab-
1ished.'-
Dewey, in message to the secretary
of the navy on July 26, states:
.'Merritt's most dif1cuft problem will be
how to deal with the insurgents under
Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive
and even threatening towards our army"
CAPTURE OF MANILA.
Aug. 13 Manila was captured by the
military and naval forces Of the United
States without the cooperation Of the in
surgents who. as soon as our forces had
effected the capture. became eager to
enter the city for the purpose of footing
it. In a memorandum submitted by, Agui-
naldo's commissioners to Gen. Anderson
it is stated:
1.-The sacrifices that we have made in
| contribution to the siege and capture of
Manila being notorious, it is just that
| we should have a part of the booty of
war;
On the 18th Of August the protocol of
| peace was signed, which suspended all
hostilities. This tethered our forces to
| the city, bay and harbor of Manila pend
| ing negotiations for final treaty OF
! peace. In the meantime, the Spaniards
| being helpless and the United States
barred from going beyond Manila, Agui-
naldo proceeded with his insurrectionary
/ programme, and seemed especially to
| prepare himself for hostility against the
| United States.
His claim that absolute independ-
/ ence, independence with n pro-
tectOrate. had been promised the
1 FilipinOs by oar authorities in the
East Is denied by Admiral Dewey,
Generals Merritt and Anderson and
by Consuls Pratt and Wildman, the
only parties through whom he
claims that such promises were
made.
AS early as May 26, Secretary Long
wired Dewey:
1T is desirable. as far as possible and
consistent for your success and safety,
not to have political alliances with the
insurgents, or any faction in the islands
that would incur liability to MAINTAIN their
cause in the future"
To this Dewey replied:
81 have entered into no alliance
with the insurgents or with any fac
/ ton"
On the 22d of July, Gen. Anderson
wrote Aguinaldo, among other things, as
| follows:
Il observe that your excellency has an
nounced yourself as a dictator, and pro-
claimed martial law. AS l am here SIM
ply in military capacity, l have no au-
thority to recognize this assumption.
And SO far as l can ascertain your
independent status has not been rec
ognized by any foreign power"
On July 81, Gen. Anderson reported to
the Acknowledgement:
''Since I wrote last Agninaldo has pu:
in operation an elaborate system of mill
tary government under his assumed au-
thority as dictator and has prohibited an,
supplies being given us except by his
order. -. His assumption of civi
authority l have ignored and let him
know verbally that 1 could and would not
recognize 1t, while Il did not recognize
him as military leader
There Is nothing in the records
except AguinaldO's bold statement
denied as we have seen 1T is-yvhich
discl0scs tends to disclose that
Independence, in any form, was
promised by our government, or its
representatives, to the FflipinOs.
Our forces had considerable trouble ir
keeping Aguinaldo and the insurgents
outside of Manila 1t was not until Sept
Is that they finally withdrew from the
suburbs. and as to one point not until
Oct. %. Under the terms of the protocol
our forces held Manila in trust pending
the negotiations for the final treaty OF
peace, and had no right to surrender the
city. or any part thereof, to the insur-
gents who claimed to be the enemies oi
Spain, or to any other power.
Pending the negotiations for final
peace, it was the duty of our forces to
protect life and property in Manila. And
it would have been a gross breach OF
faith to permit the insurgents to enter
the city for purposes Of booty or oseer.
wise. Reluctantly and after much nego-
tiat!on. the insurgents retired from the
city and suburbs, but they maintained
their army in force and kept up state Of
siege against our forces along the entire
outskirts, as though we, and not the
Spaniards, were their enemies.
MORE TREACHERY.
In the early part Of December, Gen.
Rios, the commander of the Spanish
forces at Iloilo in the island of Panay-
a city next in Importance to Manila-ex-
pressed a desire to evacuate the city and
turn it over to the United States forces,
and the merchants and business people
of the city We're very anxious to have our
forces occupy the place so as to afford
them adequate protection In view of the
protocol, Gen Otis was not inclined to act
till he had received authority from Wash
ington. This authority was not given
until Dec. g. AS soon as it was given,
Gen. Otis took steps to send an expedition
to Iloilo, but before it arrived, on Dec.
"a, Gen. Rios had evacuated the place
in favor of the insurgents, who at once
took possession, at the instance of Agui-
naldo, and gathered considerable force
to oppose the landing of our forces and
to bring on an open war for the purpose
of influencing the Tagals in Luzon.
This action Of Rios and this move
of the Insurgents was mo- doubt
- II In