The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1900-03-17
TREATY AND CANAL.

The ArgOnAuL Calls lot LAe EtJeGA4J4
OF the Hay-Pauncefote treaty on the
ground that the clause, forbidding the
United States TO fortify the Nicaragua
canal, would expose that waterway 70
capture by a stronger naval power,
and. furthermore, that BY It's difference
to English opinion the treaty would
imply a lowering OF national self-re-
spect Specifically, the Argonaut says:
The fact remains that Great Britain
has a large navy; that the United
\ States has a small navy; that II the
/ United states builds the waterway and
does not forrify IL the canal would, in
the event OF war with Great Britain.
/ fall into her hands. Thus We would
start out with a small navy and d
I great canal. When the war was over
Great Britain would nave her great
navy, our small navy, and our great
canal In a war on our own soil,
neither Great Britain nor all the pow
ers could defeat us. But In a war over
canal separated from US by oceans,
CULTS, and seas. the strongest sea pow
er would win.
And again:
The provision which causes the
strongest opposition is that forbidding
the fertilization of the canal. II has
aroused the ire of even administration
organs. Furthermore, the genuine
American does not like Great Britain
to "allow" the United States TO build a
canal on American soil; he does not
like to have Great Britain demand"
that its neutrality be guaranteed; and
he dislikes most of all that Great Brit
ain should have anything TO say con-
corning a canal built by an American
republic on American soil and connect
ing the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of
the North American continent. 1t
looks as IL the Administration, with
It's many new-fangled doctrines, had
forgotten the Monroe doctrine.
Touching the first point we do not
believe it possible for any naval power
however strong, to capture the Nicara-
qua canal from the United States, al
though one might easily blockade it. A
small defensive squadron in Lake
Nicaragua could hold the middle OF the
canal against any ships approaching in
single file; while field batteries could
make matters warm for the enemy en-
route. While passing under the high
banks of sea level canal in a billy
country hostile ships would be exposed
to all sorts OF attacks from the shore
while IL the canal should have separate
levels, the destruction OF a single lock
would ground such vessels and make
the channel impossible. Then tor
pedoes must be considered. No naval
commander In his right mind would
thrust his vessels into such an obvious
danger-into a place where speed must
be slow. maneuvering impossible,
where the sinking of one ship must i'm
peril the rest and where the advantages
are all on the side OF the defence.
As to the second point, the appeal
to patriotic sentiment. that is obvious
claptrap. Difference to Great Britain
in the matter OF the canal is merely def
erence to a solemn treaty by which the
American Government agreed. IL the
Nicaragua canal were built, to. declare,
and. in company with Great Britain as
a joint protector to defend, the neu-
trality Of the passage. That was a
weak and pusillanimous treaty but It
is one the United States is in duty
bound to observe until 1t has been abro-
gated. AS Great Britain is not disposed
to surrender her rights in full and pro-
poses to hold on to the pledge of neu-
trality. America must either compro-
mise in the matter of Notifications. go
without the canal or break her solemn
word and insult the only European
power which befriends her, in the effort
to get the canal. Rational patriots
would prefer compromise.
And so. we suspect, would the Argo-
naut If 1t were not for the railroad en-
gagements which oblige it to 10 its
best to retard canal legislation.