Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1900-09-10

result from the hopes raised by our op-.
ponents In the minds of the Fflipinos
mat with their success at the polls in
November there will be a withdrawal
of ouT army from the archipelago, the
complete Independence of the Tagalogic
people recognized, and the powers of
government over an other peoples of The
archipelago conferred upon the Tagalog
leaders.
The effect of a belief in the minds OF
the insurgents that this will be done has
already prolonged the rebellion, and in
creases the necessity for the cOntinu-
ances or a large army, Is now delaying
the establishment of peace and civil
government in the islands, and has in
fluenced many of the insurgents against
accepting the liberal terms of amnesty
offered by Gen. Macarthur under my
direction. But for these false hopes a
had in our military establishment in the
Philippines. and the realization of a sta
(ble government would be at han
THE TAGALOG MINORITY.
We are asked to t~ransfer our sover-
eighty to a small minority in the islands
without consulting the majority, and
abandoning the largest portion of the
population, which has been loyal, to the
cruelties of the guerilla insurgent bands.
More than this. we are asked to protect
this minority in establishing a govern
ment, n to this end repress all oppo-
sition Of tn majority. We are required
to set up a stable government In the
interests of those who have assailed u
sovereignty, and fired upon our soldiers,
and then maintain at any cost or sacri-
flee against it's enemy within and against
those having ambitious designs without.
This would require an army and navy
far larger than Is now maintained IN the
Philippines, and still more in excess of
wha will be necessary with the full
recognition of our sovereignty. A mill
tary support of authority not our own
+ as thus proposed is the very essence of
militarism which our opponents in their
platform oppose, but which by their pol
icy would of necessity be established IN
it's most offensive form.
The American people will not make
the murderers of our soldiers the agents
of republics to onvey the blessings of
liberty and order in the Philippines. They
will not make them the builders of the
new commonwealth. Such a course
would be a betrayal of our sacred obi
CATIONS to the peaceful Filipinos, and
. would place at the mercy of dangerous
adventurers the lives and property or
| the natives and foreigners. 1T would
Of such atrocities as were secretly plan
ned TO be executed on February ~, lS99,
in the city of Manila, when only the Wig
| ilance of our army prevented the attempt
to assassinate our soldiers and all for-
eigners and pillage and destroy it's sur
~roundings.
PRINCIPAL OR SURETY? -
In short, the proposition of those OPP
/ posed to us is to continue all the obi
| cations in the Philippines which now
| rest upon the government, only chang-
ing the relation from principal, when
now exists, to that {. surety. Our re-
sponsibility is to remain, but our power
is to be diminished. Our obligation is to
be no less, but our title is ITO be sur
rendered to another power which is WIN
o,& ov,>arinrao nr f.o lining or fne aDl.
lty to maintain a stable government at
home, and absolutely helpless to perform
it's international obligations. To TINS we
rare opposed. We should not yield our
title while our obligatlons ias.: III tne
! language of our platform. our autnor-
ity should be less tina our responsloil-
ity., and our responsibility is 10 es-
. tablish our authority in all islands
PROTECTORATE IMPRACT1CABLE.
No government can so certainly pre-
! serve the peace, restore the puD1c oruer
. and establish law justice and stable con-
ditions as ours. Neither congress nor
the executive can stablish a stable gov
ernment in these islands, except under
our right of sovereignty under our au-
thority and our flag. This we are doing.
We could not do it as a protectorate SO
completely or so successfully as we are
doing it now. AS the sovereign power,
we can initiate action and shape means
to ends, and guide the Filipinos to self
development and self-government. AS a
/ protectorate power, we could not initiate
action. but would be compelled to fol-
low and uphold a people with no ca
we can keep both ourselves and the
Filipinos from being involved in IAN
gerous complications: in the other we
cannot protect even the Fflipinos until
after their trouble had come. Besides,
If we cannot establish any government
: 80 o,-n or,o Vyifhn11f tho consent nf fhe
governed, as our opponents contend,
then we could not establish a stable gov
eminent for them or make ours a pro-
tectorate without the like consent. and
neither the majority of the people nor
the minority have invited us to assume
it. We could not maintain a protectorate
even with the consent of the governed,
without giving p~rovocation for conflicts
and possibly costly wars. Our rights In
the Philippines are now free from out
side interference, n will continue so
in our present relations. They would not
thus be free in any other relation. We
will not give up our own to guarantee
another sovereignty. Our title is good.
Our peace commissioners believed they
were receiving a good title when they
concluded the treaty. The executive be-
lieved it was a good title when he sub
mitted it to the senate of the United
, States for it's ratification. The senate
believed it a good title when they gave
it their constitutional consent, and con-
gress seems not to have doubted it's COM
pleteness when they appropriated the
$40, 600, 900 provided by the treaty. If any
who favored its ratification believed it
gave us a bad title, they were not sim
cere. Our title is practically identical
with that under which we hold our ter
ritory acquired since the beginning Of
the government, and under which we
have exercised full sovereigntE and es-
tablished a government for the inhab-
itants. It is worthy of note that no one
outside of the United States disputes
the fullness and integrity of the cession.