The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1900-01-31

View on the Wur lnfAIflcds says
In consentlng to give my views OF
the military aspects OF the war in
south Africa would like Il TO be DIS
tlnctly understood that am not crid-
clsIng the ability Of the heads of the
British army. say simply what be-
Ileve the results OF the operations there
prove would have been the better
GOV these generals to have pursued.
They have learned their lessons. and I
have no doubt 1t win put them upon the
right track In the future.
Englsnd's Great Error.
Perhaps the most striking feature Of
the war Is the fact that the British
seem 10 have committed the great err
ror Of 'despisIng their enemy" the
Boers. No power whIca has ever done
this has escaped cause to regret It. and
Iconfess that am surprised the Britt
tsh should have done as they did, a
maxim as old as war itself is TO the ef.
feet. .'Do not despIse-uaderrate-- the
enemy"
The British appear to have been very
negligent In their scouting work. This
Is the next thing that surprises me. IN
comparatively unknown country,
with rough surface, a generals first
duty should be assiduous attention to
his scouting department. These scouts
should be men thoroughly trained in
that particular sort OF scouting-men
who would not allow themselves to be
deceived by mere appearances on the
surface. and who would thoroughly ex-
plore the country in advance.
on the other hard, the Beers have
paid remarkable attention to these two
things. am convinced that TO these
two pieces OF foresight on the part Of
the Beers, more than all else. must be
attributed the signal success Of their
encounters with the British.
No Fuzziwigs This Time.
For the last half century the British
have been accustomed to lighting an
unclvIlIzed roe-an enemy who were at
best exceedingly brave. many times
and quite often well equlpped--and It
was rather matter OF course that the
British drlfted into the belief that all
foes could be handled In the same gem
cral manner. It does not appear to
have occurred to the British that the
Beers had plenty OF time and opportu-
nifty to import large number OF mill
tary experts from among the minor Of
hcers Of countries secretly antagonlstic
TO Great Britain. The British did not
seem to appreciate the fact that there
were among continental army officers OF
the lower grades many an adventure
some man more than willing to fight on
the Boer side.
The British and the Beers both knew
the trouble was coming. but the Beers
seem TO have exhibited their superior
strategy in that respect at least by
making all their preparations for trou-
BILE at the proper time. The fact thay
Kruger declared war upon the British
long before the British were ready or
expectaut should have shown the Brit
ish that the Beers were prepared and
knew Il, and the British should have
handled their army with much more
caution n consequence
Not in Shape for War
1t strikes nue. that the rank and ile
Of the British army were not in Just the
proper attitude for the war with the
Transvaal 1t must be remembered
that the British have been fighting
people for the last fifty years whose
mode Of warfare compelled their enc
niles to give way when charged at the
point Of the bayonet by the brave Eng
fish soldiers. In consequence the Brit
ish rank and Tile expected as a mere
matter Of course that when they would
leap into the jaws of death. charging
the trenches of the Beers ct the point
Of the bayouet, The Beers would be
terror-sticken aud rs. The Beers not
budGe. howeyer-so much ByiHsh
bravery being In vain--it was only nat
ural that the British rank and fife
should he selzed with an instructive