The Washington weekly post. (Washington, D.C.) 1878-1916, 1900-01-30
VALUE OF A GOOD SOLDIER.
What He Aefsaiiy Costs the Cevernmen
He Fights For.
Prom TIE Fsii Mali Gazette.

What He Actually Costs the Governmen
He Fights For.
From tire Pail Mali Gazette
II is very difficult 70 sppraiSe the value
OF an individual soldiers life to his coun-
try. Mr.. John Bright once asserted that
any number could be had for Is. day.
but this remark only showed his ignor-
ence Of the subject. and his bitter per-
sonal animus against those 10 whom he
and his followers owed the security OF
their possessions.
Actually the average cost to the coun-
try Of the men nov fighting in South
Africa up 70 the moment they fell before
the bullet or by disease cannot well be
less than 800 pounds each. exclusive OF
the special charges involved in taking the
man to the front, feeding him from day
TO day. which. with South African trans
port charges. will probably come 10 not
less than IS. head per day. Given good
and reliable men, a skillful leader can
bring war such as Ne are now engaged
in TO a prompt and certain conclusion in a
relatively small period OF time; but how
If they be not thoroughly reliable?
II the men IN command at Dundee
Glands Laagte. Belmont. and Enslin had
not accurately gagged the lighting temper
OF their men. would they have dared 10
send them on such apparently desperate
missions as the storming Of these several
positions; and in that case how much
longer would this war have dragged itself
out. at a cost to the country and Natal
OF not less than 1000 pounds a day? Had
they tried. and the men had failed them
that is, proved nreliable-matters
would have been even worse, for every
BOer would have felt himself three times
the man he is, and perhaps nine times
the numbers on oar side would have been
needed to redress the balance. Without
however, going into Hypothetical cases, il
is possible to show by d short analysis of
two attacks, the one made by firSt-class
troops, the other by less trustworthy.
how great the advantage is, even from
financial point Of view, to possess fight
| ing men OF high average quality.
The quality of troops is measured by
| their capacity TO endure heavy punish
ment in the attack without losing their
| forward momentum. First rate, we'll dis
| ciplined men viii face 30 per cent. OF
| losses and still be under control and able
| hand and refuse to go on when only per
| cent. of their numbers have fallen. but the
! cost to the country is not in direct rela-
| ton TO the loss. neither, of course, does
| SilASii lpSS Al the ATTACK measure HtdlA-
/ ity OF the troops engaged.
| Let us take two typical cases. 4 general
! is in command of men whom his trained
| soldiers instinct tells him may be trusted
| 10 face and advance against the enemy ;
| fire in a loose formation. Even when
! brought TO a temporary halt the moral
| effect of the approach Of supports from the
! rear will bring them to their feet and on
| again. The line is formed under cover
/ the order 10 advance Is given, and the line
Ttaa ~
| seems full of swarmng bullets and men
begin TO drop, but the line does not STOP
| for either the first or second. Still, as
| man after man goes down, the cohesion
| loosens, and presently the leaders feel by
intuition that the men are slipping out OF
their control. They order a halt, and the
next moment the return fire whistles about
| the enemys ears, shrOucing his front In
dust and materially interfering with the
| steadiness of his aim. Under cover of this
| fire a supporting line can reach the same
| distance from the enemy obviously WIFI
less loss than the first, and the two united
if the support has been properly timed
| will still maintain head of momentum, sc
to speak. which will carry them in closer
and enable them to take the enemy under
a yet heavier fire. And so it goes on, the
distance between the fighting lines grow
ing ever less and the intensity of the at
lacking fire ever greater until al last IN,
fire superiority is definitely obtained anC
the way broken for the last rush with the
bayOnet.
AS far as we can gather from hitherto
| received accounts of the recent fighting
three, even two, re-enforcements hav'
suffced for all needs, and hence the 40
normally small percentage of loss We have
suffered But turn to another caSJ--witi
troops of lower capacity. Their genera
cannot trust them in open order, So h
sends them in two deep, shoulder 4
shoulder. Now, all firing in fierce actor
I haf IL CslN
| the number of hits made will vary as Ia
amount OF vulnerable area exposed, l. Q.
| if ten square feet of target catches on
bullet, so will catch fifty, and SO on. Blu
the effect on the nerves OF the survivor
is enormously intensified i'm proportion L
the number of hits; man here or ther
| bowled over out of a loose line is hardl
| noticed-half a dozen falling tOgethe
makes a far deeper impression. Becdus
| the target is denSer the line loses more
| and because il loses more 1t slips out o
| band sooner has to be nailed at a far
! Their distance from the enemy, its fire Il
return is less accurate, and T. 1t Is TO &
| forward support must be sooner at ham
TO reach il. Each fresh re-enfOrcemen
, | carries il forward for a less distance
each halt involves further time under fire
and each minute lost in the advance
steadies the enemy's fire, and increase
the losses There are therefore no les
; than eight factors, each tending 10 ad
| up the casualty list, and though none o
| them can be estimated with numerical
. eXactness, II Will be evident that thel
| product must add up considerably. lie
us take il that in a given case the prOba
, | tility that the losses will vary as the cub
| of the number OF men per yard of from
/, engaged; and a little reflection 'Eill sh0y
| that a limit is soon reached beyond Wnic
no increase in the number Of men en-
pIoyed can add to the prospects of vic
! tory. for the men fall faster than the
! can be brought forward. And this
, what has again and again actually hap
nened in war and but for the power ar
flllery confers on the men who know n0'
! to use II to reduce the steadiness of IN
troops they are assailing, as between OF
} binary conscript armies, all possioiiit
. of direct attack would cease