Reporter and farmer. [volume] (Webster, Day County, Dakota [S.D.]) 188?-1946, 1900-02-08
CASE DECISION
Following Is the Full Text OF
Decision In the South DakO-
ia Railroad Rate Case AS
Handed Down by the Z. S.
Supreme Court.
THE OPINION,

Cd THE OPINION.
Mr.. Justice Brewer delivered the
opinion of the court.
Few cases are more difficult or per-
picking than those which involve an
inquiry whether the rates prescribed
by a state legislature for the carriage
of passengers and freight are unrea-
sonable. And yet this difficulty affords
no excuse for a failure to examine and
solve the questions involved. 1t has
often been said that this is a govern
nent of laws and not of men; and by
this court, in Yick Wo ". Hopkins,
Q18 u. S. $4,000: when we con-
slider the nature and the theory OF our
institutions of government, the prin-
ciples upon which they are supposed
to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to
leave room for the play and action OF
purely personal and arbitrary power.
When we recall that, as estimated,
over ten thousand millions of dollars
are invested in railroad property, the
proposition that such a vast amount OF
~porperty is beyond the protecting
clause of the Constitution, that the
owners may be deprived of 1t by the
arbitrary enactment of any legislature,
State or nation, without any right OF
appeal to the courts, is one which can
not for a moment be tolerated. Diff
ficult as are the questions involved in
these cases, burdensome as the labor
is which they cast upon the courts, no
tribunal can hesitate to respond to the
duty of inquiry and protection cast up
Oh it by the Constitution. CRailroad
Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307; Dow
V. Beidelman, 125 U. S. $50; Georgia
Railroad &c Banking Co. V. Smith, 12S
U s. ia; Chicago, Milwaukee & st.
Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota,
1874 U. s. 418; Chicago e. Grand Trunk
Railway Company v. Wellman, l43 U.
S. 339; Reagan v. Farmers Loan d
Trust Co, 154 U. S. 362; st. Louis &
San Francisco Railway Company, v.
Gill, 156 u. S. 649; Covington &c. Turn
pike v. Sanford, 164 u. s. 578; Smyth
". Ames, 169 U. S. 1861
LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
1t is often said that the legislature
is presumed to act with full knowl-
edge of the facts upon which it's leg s.
lation is based. This Is undoubtedly
true, but when it is assumed from that
that it's judgment upon those facts Is
not subject to investigation, the infer
ence is carried too far. Doubtless
upon mere questions of policy it's con
illusions are beyond judicial consider
alton. Courts may not inquire wheth-
er any given act Is wise or unwise, and
all xIrhAn nRanh nnf frnnTnnnEno ttNnn
vested rights may the courts inter-
vene. A single illustration will make
this clear: 1t Is within the competen-
cy of the legislature to determine when
and what property shall be taken for
public uses. That question is n OF
policy over which the courts have no
supervision; but If after determining
that certain property shall be taken
for public uses the legislature proceeds
further, and declares that only a GER
tain price shall be paid for it, then the
owner may challenge the validity of
that part of the act, may contend that
his property is taken without due
compensation; and the legislative de-
termination Of value does not pre-
clude an investigation in the proper
judicial tribunals. The same principle
applies when vested rights OF property
are disturbed by a legislative enact
ment In respect to rates.
In approaching the consideration of
a case of this kind we start with the
presumption that the act of the legis-
lature Is valid, and upon any company
seeking to challenge it's validity rests
the burden Of proving that it infringes
the constitutional guarantee of pro-
lection to property. The case must be
a clear one in behalf of the railroad
company or the legislation of the
state must be upheld.
Such being unquestionably the law,
1t is obviously of the utmost import
ance that the facts shall be clearly and
accurately found and distinctly stated
by the trial court, and that those facts
shall sustain the conclusion reached.
NOT SUFFICIENT.
We are of opinion that neither the
findings made by the court, nor such
facts as are stated in its opinion, are
sufficient to warrant a conclusion up
ON tho n11nnfinn yrAAtA.