Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1900-02-16
COURT OF APPEALS.

cult Court of Louisa county.
For the frat time in several years the
fence law of Virginia was upheld and
construed by the Court of Appeals yes
terday.
In lengthy opinion Judge Harrison
dealt with the various conflicting en-
actments of The legislature.
The opinion shows that the general
fence law as given in the code of 1887
was 10 1890 re enacted 80 as to apply to
Orange county alone; in 1894 an at
tempt was made 10 re- enact the general
law by repeating the last named, and
Oh the same day it was re'enscted in
terms. At the session of 1878 a
simple law was enacted Tor AccOmac
county alone, which, however, did not
vary the general law then in force both
AS to the whole State and AccOmac
county.
The effect of these statutes, the opin
ion holds, is ID chaDle the rule OF the
common law requiring owners of stock
10 restrain them on their Own premises
and makes such owners liable only for
trespasses of stock upon lands enclosed
by lawful fence. This, however, does
not give an owner the right to drive his
animals upon the unenclosed lands OF
another, and for such willful or mali
cious trespass he would be liable as at
common law; and the court further
boIds that "lawful fence" is condi-
tiun precedent to recovery.
The opinion further holds that the
fence law of this State is not unconsti'
tutional, since it does not take private
property for public use, but simply reg
uIates its use and enjoyments; nor does
it interfere with the means OF acquiring
and possessing property.
The decree of the lower court ia a.
frmed.
Judge Harrison also delivered an
opinion in the case of Hirth vs. Hirth,
from the law and equity court OF the
city of Richmond.
The plaintiff in error insists that the
court below erred 10 overruling her de-
murrer. The declaration shows on it's
face that the promise sued on was made
by married woman during coverture,
TO assume the debt of her husband. The
ground of the demurrer is that the de-
claration does not aver that the plain.
tiff in error owned separate estate at
the time the promise sued on was en-
tered into, the contention being that
such an allegation is essential because
sbe had no power to mako the alleged
contract unless she did own separate
estate.
The opinion holds that married
woman is now. as at common, incap
able of making contract, unless she
owns separate estate at the time the
contract is made.
The demurrer Is sustained. The case
is remanded for new trial, with leave
10 defendant in error to amend her de-
claration.
JudgeBuchanan delivered the opinion
in the case of Eaves We. Vial, which is
from the Cha ncery Court OF the city of
Richmond. The case is affirmed.
IL appears that in February, 1896
the appellee, who was than leading q
very wild life, having already run
through with 81 500 ofiusurance money
which came to him from his mothers
estate. and feeling that he could not
trust himself. conveyed all OF his real
estate to his sister, the appellant, with
whom be was then living, 10 order that
il might not be wasted. The interest
conveyed was worth more thar
| "a 600. and was all the property
that he owned, except %OO OF
s4O0 in money. The conveyance. the
appellee claims, was made with tne
distinct understanding that the proper
tv was to be reconveyed to him when
no so desired. The appellant claims
that the conveyance was made oy nei
brother of his own motion and that ne
gave it absolutely to her without any
understanding or agreement tns' sue
! was to reconvey it, but she admits tha'
she had always intended TO give ni"
back all or at least q part OF II.
The opinion says: "If the respective
contentious OF the appellant and appel
lee were equally reasonable and prom
able. there might be some question at
10 whether the parole agreement set up
by the appellee had been satisfactorily
proved, but the contention of the ap'
nellant that her brother, a young man
iust beginning life, had conveyed to
her more than $4,000 worth OF proper
tv' practically stripping himself o.
aysrything he owned, without consider
lion and without any understanding
nr agreement for a reconveyance, is sc
Unreasonable and improbable, that un'
der the evidence in this case We are sat
isfied that it is not true"