The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1900-04-04
. - . 9sS-s,s-. - p ? 49, GO s.ssg. y =

Ewells and HITS divisions had pressed
forward together when The enemy retired
to Cemetery ridge the battle of Gettys-
burg would have ended on the day it be-
gan"
THE End Of July was also q day Of lost
opportunities for the Contederates. An
early attack on either flank of the enemy
could scarcely have faxed of success. His
line, three miles long. aptly described as
resembling a fishhook, with Round Top
mountain to the south. the end Of the
shank, and Cups Hill, to the north. at
the end of the curve. was a very strong
defensive position if thoroughly fortified
and manned with troops; but either end
taken by us would have rendered 1t un-
tenahle and would have enabled us TO
sweep down upon The enemy and destroy
him before he could escape 1t was evil
dent that Meade's whole army could not
all be up The fact Is that only the First,
Eleventh and part of the Third Corps
were present, the Second was distant thtr-
teen miles, and the Fifth twenty-three
miles, and the Sixth, 5000 strong, thirty
four miles. Here was an opportunity to
crush the enemy in detail and Gen. Lee
having nearly the whole OF his army with
him, was ready and anxious to avail of it,
Meade's refused right on Cups Hill if
driven in, would have placed Lees left
partly in rear OF it this, therefore, seem
ed to be the most vulnerable point. and
to commence the attack. to be followed up
by Longstreet, on HIS right; but Ewel
and HITS troops had been holly engaged
and the enemys position in front would
be very formidable II fortified during the
night which it was so Longstreet was
instructed to open the attack on the en-
emy's left as soon as possible in the morn
ing Che was expected to do so al sunrise)
while Ewel should make a demonstration
on his right, so as to prevent reinforce
ments being sent to relieve the point Of
the main attack in front of Longstreet.
Had this simple plan been carried out,
one cannot doubt that the enemyS left
positions would have fallen into our
hands; and with Little Round Top, which
Meade said rightly was the key to his
whole position, in our possession, three OF
the corps of the army of the Potomac
would have been crushed before they could
have received assistance we would have
occupied Cemetery Ridge. and the battle
of Gettysburg ended early on the second
day. But Longstreet's heart was not in
the attack; his troops were near the bat
tlefeld at day break ready and waiting,
while he went TO Gen. Lees headQuar-
tiers at day light and renewed his (my)
views against making an attack" Qong-
streets words) Every moment lost by us,
was gain to the enemy, whose distant
corps We're hurrying on to Gettysburg.
Yet Gen. Lee, not desiring TO force Long
street against his will. gain reconn otter
cd the right of the euemy's position to see
If 1t might not be better to make his main
attack there. but he found that during
the night CUPS Hill had been turned into
fort. he therefore, at IL o'clock, ordered
Longstreet to attack which order was not
obeyed, on the plea OF waiting for Law
brigade, which was on picket. The at
tack, therefore, instead of being made at
sunrise, or at IL o'c'ock was postponed to
Cka 1,
later than it should have been. By this
time Meade had strengthened his left. new
troops had arrived and what would. with
out doubt have been an easy and brilliant
success in the morning, was a cruel fail
ure in the afternoon.
Heth's division was not engaged on the
23d.
THE third day found the Army of
Northern Virginia weakened by the hard
fighting of the first day, and by the dis
iointed efforts of the second, but there
was still left in its 'incomparable South
ern Infantry" the spirit and the strength
to achieve success If a proper concert of
action could be obtaine d. Gen. Lee, there
fore decided to renew the attack-this
| time on the enemys left center-his TANKS
being now too strongly fortified and
guarded. The attack was unfortunately
| again intrusted to Longstreet, who, if he
had little heart for the second days fight
| made no concealment of the fact, that
he had none at all for a third days; and
to this cause, without seeking any other,
may be traced its failure. The weight of
evidence goes to prove that
ii was Gen. Lees intention
to have Longstreet make the
attack with his entire corps, to be sup
ported by half of HIS corps, all of IL
| NECESSARY, and should this force succeed
in penetrating the enemys line, all the
.
| Meanwhile Ewell, on our left, acting in
| concert, was to assail the enemy's right,
| so as to prevent him from reinforcing his
| center, and to assist in crushing his right
| wing.
THE artillery was to prepare the way,
| and before the smoke of the guns should
have cleared away the attacking column
was TO be started. All this required con-
| cert and prompt, spirited action. But this
| is what happened Gen. Longstreet's dis
| positions were not completed as early as
expected" Gen. r. L. Lees
be notified. his attack, which
was to have been simultaneous with that
of Longstreet, was made and repulsed
Thus the object of the diversion on the
enemy's right was defeated"
Maj. Young referred to the general i'm
preston that the brilliant charge on
Cemetery Ridge on the afternoon Of the
LQlTu Gay Ndu bttn Ildue pIdctCallY by
| Picketts division only. II had been the
| intention of Gen. Lee that the entire first
corps should make the charge with the
third 10 support IT, Longstreet, however.
| selected only Picketts division from his
corr s. to which We're added Heth's divis-
ion from Hilrs corps, two brigades from
| Penders, ard one from Anderson's Pick
| ett's was the directing division, having
| Heths division and other troops on its
| left. After much delay and uncertainty
as to whether the attack would be made
at all" Maj. Young said. "Lougstreet at
| last, with a nod Of the head started
| Pickett, and Immediately Archer's and
| Pettigrews brigades started forward" AL
| though every precautlon had been taken
TO secure concert Of action. there was
some confusion, owing 10 the crowding Of
| the troops under the cover OF the woods
and one brigade, Daviss, was left behind
lts commander soon discovered the mis-
take ana rejoiued the line with a rush.
| This brigade was on the extreme left and
suffered severely being exposed TO both
| an oblique and enhlading Ere.