The daily morning journal and courier. [volume] (New Haven, Conn.) 1894-1907, 1900-09-10

Otner peoples OF the archipelago con
ferred upon the Tagalog leaders.
The effect OF a belief In the minds OF
the insurgents that this will be done
has already prolonged the rebellion and
increases the necessity for the continu-
ance of large army. 1t Is now delay
ing full peace in the archipelago and
the establishment of civil governments
and has influenced many of the insur-
gents against accepting the liberal
terms of amnesty offered by General
Macarthur under my direction. But
for these false hopes, considerable
reduction could have been had in our
military establishment in the Philip
pines, and the realization of stable
government would be already at hand.
The American people are asked by
our opponents to yield the sovereignty
of the United States in the Philippines
to small fraction of the population, a
single tribe out of eighty or more in
habiting the archipelago, a faction
which wantonly attacked the American
troops In Manila while in rlghtful pos
session under the protocol with Spain,
awaiting the ratification of the treaty
of peace by the senate, and which has
| SllCS ptSll inactive, open IeUelllOIl
against the United States. We are
asked to transfer our sovereignty to Il
small minority in the islands without
consulting the majority and to abandon
1 the largest portion of the population
which has been loyal to us, to the
cruelties of the guerilla insurgent
bands. More than this, we are asked
to protect this minority in establishing
government and to this end repress
all opposition of the majority. We are
required to set up stable government
in the interest of those who have as
sailed our sovereignty and fired upon
soldiers, and then maintain it at any
cost or sacrifice against its enemies
within and against those having ambl-
tlous designs from without.
| This would require an army and
| navy far larger than Is now maintained
| in the Philippines and still more in ex-
| cess of what will be necessary with the
full recognition of our sovereignty. A
military support of authority not our
wn as thus proposed is the very es-
sence of militarism, which our oppo-
nents In their platform oppose, but
which by their policy would of neces-
slty be established in it's most often
eive form.
The American people will not make
the murderers of our soldiers the agents
of the republic to convey the blessings
of liberty and order to the Philippines
They will not make them the builders
of the new commonwealth. Such
source would be betrayal of our sa-
cred obligations to the peaceful Fill
pines. and would place at the mercy
of dangerous Adventures the lives and
property of the natives and foreigners.
1t would make possible and easy the
commission of such atrocities as We're
secretly planned, to be executed on the
end of February, 1899, in the city of
Manila, when only the vigilance of our
army prevented the attempt to assas-
sinate our soldiers and all foreigners
and pillage and destroy the city and its
surroundings. In short, the proposition
of those opposed to us is to continue
all the obligations in the Philippines
which now rest upon the government,
only changing the relation from princi-
pal, which now exists, to that of sure
ty, Our responsibility is to remain,
but our power is to be Diminished. Our
obligation is to be no less, but our title
is to be surrendered to another power
which is without experience or training,
or the ability TO maintain stable gov
eminent at home and absolutely help
less to perform its international obliga-
tons with the rest of the world TO
this we are opposed, We should not
yield our title while our obligations
last. In the language of our platform
our authority should not be less than
our responsibility, and our present re-
sponsibility Is TO establish our author
ity in every part Of the islands.
No government can so certainly pre-
serve the peace, restore public order, |
establish law, justice and stable condi- |
tions as ours. Neither congress nor the |
executive can establish a stable gov /
eminent in these Islands except under
our right of sovereignty our author
ity, and our flag And this we are do /
ing.
We could not do 1t as a protectorate +
power so completely or so successfully /
as we are doing it now. AS the sover.
eign power we can initiate action and /
shape means to ends, and guide the
Filipinos to acknowledgment and self
government. AS a protectorate power
we could not initiate action but would
be compelled to follow and uphold a
people with no capacity yet to go alone
In the one case we can protect both
ourselves and the Filipinos from being
involved in dangerous complications; In
The other we could not protect even the
Filipinos until after their trouble had
,ome. Besides, If we cannot establish
any government Of our own without the
of the governed as our oppo-
leEts contend then we could not estab-
ish stable government for them or
make ours protectorate without the
Ike consent, and neither the majority
If the people nor a minority of the
people have invited us to assume it, |
We could not maintain a protectorate
wen with the consent of the governed
Without giving provocation for con-
lets and possibly costly wars. Our
lights in the Philippines are now free
rom outside interference and will con-
inue so in our present relation They
would not be thus free in any other re-
alton. We will not give up our own
o guarantee another sovereignty.
Our title is good. Our peace com
,issioners believed they were receiving t
good title when they concluded the Il
'eaty. The executive believed it was a b
God deal when he submitted it to the I
anate of the United States for it's rati | h