The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1900-04-18

changed the plan OF advance as 10 necessl-
tate the capture and retention of Spion
kop. Lord Roberts continues: "As Warren
considered il impossible to make the wide
fanking movement which was recon-
piended, If not actually prescribed IN the
secret instructions, he should, forthwith.
have acquainted Butler with the course ne
proposed TO adopt. There is nothing 10
show whether he did so or not. But II Is
only fair TO Warren to point out that Bull
Ter appears throughout to have been aware
of what was happening"
Regarding the withdrawal from Spion
kop. the retention of which had become
essential 10 the relief of Ladysmith Lord
Roberts says: "I regret to be unable TO
concur with Butler in thinking Thorny-
croft exercised wise discretion in ordering
the troops to retire. 1 am of the opinion
that Thornycroft's assumption of respon-
sibilities and authority was wholly mex
ctisable During the night the enemy's fire
could not have been formidable. and 1t
would not have taken more than three
hours for Thornycroft to communicate, by
messenger, with Major Generals Coke or
Warren. Coke appears to have left Spion
kop at $3.50 p. m, for the purpose Of con-
sulting with Warren. Up to that hour the
idea of withdrawal had not been enter
tanned. Yet. almost Immediately after
Coke's departure, Thornycroft issued the
order, without reference to superior au-
thority. which upset the whole plan of op-
erations and rendered unavailing the sacri-
fees already made to carry 1t into effect.
On the other hand, 1t is only right TO state
that Thornycroft appears to have behaved
in very gallant manner throughout the
day.
WANT OF ORGANIZATION.
'It is 10 be regretted that Warren did
not himself visit Spion kop in the after
noon or evening. knowing, as he did, that
the state of affairs was very critical and
that the loss of the position would involve
the failure of the operations. He, cOnse-
quentIy, was obliged to summon Coke to
his headquarters, and the command at
Spion kop thus devolved Thornycroft,
unknown TO Coke, who was under the i'm
preston that the command devolved upon
Colonel Hill. as senior officer Omissions
mistakes of this nature may be trifling in
themselves, yet they may exercise an i'm
portant influence over the course of events,
and 1 believe Butler was justified in
marking. There was a want of organiza-
tion and system which acted most unfa-
vorably on the defense.
THE attempt to relieve Ladysmth was
we'll devised and j agree with Butler in
thinking IL ought to have succeeded. That
Ii failed. may, in some measures. have been
due to the difficulties of the ground and
the commanding positions held by the en-
emy and probably. also. to errors of judg-
ment and want of administrative capacity
the part of Warren. But whatever
faults Warren may have committed, the
failure must also be attributed to the dis
inclination of the officer in supreme COM
mand to assert his authority and see that
what he thought best was done and also to
the unwarrantable and needless assump-
ton of responsibility by subordinate Of
fcer."
The dispatch concludes: "The gratifying
features of these dispatches is the admira-
bic behavior of the troops throughout the
operation"
General Buffers report. commenting on
General Warren's reports of the capture
| and evacuation of Spion kop after disput-
| ing the correctness of some of warren's
assertions and describing the dangerous
| situation occupied by warren's force, tells
how he saw the force at Spion kop had
given way before Warren knew of it. Bull
| Ter therefore telegraphed to Warren: "Un-
less you put a really good. hard fighting
man in command on top you will lose the
| hill. 1 suggest Thornycroft''
THORNYCROFT UPHELD.
General Butler continues: al have not
thought it necessary to order an investiga-
| ton. If at sundown the defense of the
summit had been taken in hand, intrench-
ments laid out and the dead and wounded
| removed, the whole place would have been
brought under regular military command
and the hills would have been held, 1 am
/ sure. But arrangements were made.
Coke appears to have been ordered away
| just he would have been useful, and no
one succeeded him. Those on top were
| ignorant OF the fact that the guns Were
4 coming up and generally there was a want
| of organization and system that acted most
unfavorably on the defense. 1t is admitted
that all of Thornycrofts command acted
with the greatest gallantry throughout the
| day and really saved the situation But
| preparations for the second days defense
| should have been organized during the day
and commenced at nightfall. AS this was
not done, / think Thornycroft exercised
| wise discretion"
| General Warren sets forth the fact that
| the Spion kop operations had not entered
| into his original plans, as his instructions
were to occupy the plain north of it. On
/ consultation with the commander-in-chief,
Jan. Il. however, when the question of
| retiring from attacking Spion kop was
discussed, Warren expressed his prefer
| ence for attacking. This was successfully
L he'd hx
came the order of the commander-in-chief
| to put Thornycroft in command on the
summit In the meantime Warren had
| sent General Coke up to reinforce him,
| with orders to assume command. Inef-
| fectual efforts were made to heliograph
| Thornycroft and ask whether he had as
| sumed command. Toward sunset he was
| finally enabled to get orders through and
concluded the position could be held the
| next day If guns could be provided and
| shelter obtained. Both those conditions
was about to be fulfilled when, ''in the alb
| sence of Coke, whom had ordered to come
| and report in person on The situation. the
| evacuation took place under orders given
on his own responsibility by Thornycroft
| This occurred I'm the face of the vigorous
protests of Coke's brigade major and
| others"
In conclusion General Warren said: .It
is matter for the commander-in-chief to