The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-08-22

IT must be a matter OF profound
thankfulness to every American citizen
that this government was In a position
10 take prompt action to relieve the ie-
cations at Picking. Had II not been for
the action Of the American authorities
and the American troops, the march to
Irkins would have been delayed for
rome time. and II In more than likely
that the ieKa tons would have fallen.
with the scenes OF revolving massacre
which were anticipated. Every reader
OF tho news dispatches remembers that
many OF the commanders OF the allied
forces were strongly opposed to COM
mencing the advance at the time when
II was undertaken. They insisted that
any attempt will, forcs less than so. 900
strong was likely to prove futile, and
that another repulse OF the allies would
40 encourage the Chinese that they
would undoubtedly renew their attacks
upon the legations In force. and massa-
Gre all Of the inmates.
The administration at Washington
took precisely the opposite view. and
insisted strenuously that delay could
not be brooked. but that an advance
should be made with the force at hand:
and the American commanders let 1t
be understood that. II no others would
do so. they would attempt the relief
work singiy and alone. That some of
tho forsIgn commanders refused to take
part actively in the advance. because
they believed II was doomed TO failure,
Ia shown by the makeup OF the relief
force. which consisted solely OF Amer
leans. British. japanese and Russians.
OF each of these forces II Gan be said
that under no circumstances would
they have permitted the soldiers OF any
other nation 10 attempt any foriorn
hope which they did not share. While
great credit Ia due all OF them. u IL
within the truth 20 say that the Amer
leans were the most urgent and inslst-
ent for an immediate advance. whether
or not the active aid Of all OF the allied
powers could be secured for such a
movement
Had the trouble ~ China broken out
four years ago. how different would
have been the situation OF the United
sistss II would have been utterly with.
out power TO take any part in the relief
movement, and IN the absence OF the
American troops, such movement
would have been DELAYED for an indea-
mite time. -Four years ago the little
army Of $1,000 men was scattered all
over the United states There was
scarcely single regiment which had
Mt any time Within a dozen years been
assembled under the command OF IT'S
colonel No, transport was owned hv
the government. ara no, dollar was
available fer the transportation % 8
single soldier outside os the boundaries
Of the United states. The marine force.
en- which the nrst - the lighting fell.
was only about one-thlrd IS strong as
it 10 az present ana the collective ma
rino guard Of all % the vessels In Asia
would scarcely have done mere than
furnish the guard which ~ successfully
defended the legations from Chinese
attack.
Before thc arst American soldier
ceali have reached Picking. a would
have been necessary to assemble con
srcss In session q make provision for
earolllng an army and eausppsng a
transport service. and sor improyising =
cenmissarlat and hospital CORPS How
long that would have taken the expert
snees at the outbreak Of the Spanish
Was show. Moreover, in the condition
OF the treasury. with the Wilson bin In
operation. showing constantly recnr-
.. ring dencis every month, the raising OF
1 'the. NECESSARY funds would have been