The sun., 1900-12-29
ygw uOONs


InNe |lNlalNu wv N''Nl''' y '''.'.''''
.r,o South African War Ihri' ~" i"p
..i,us reasons why the authors c"inWe. "a
,p tat. partlcul,r contest viii b" read
-. ,,r,Inr interest Saver wts thr IT,.
...ra., 1f soa power on the outcome "Ih-fN
w., hs,.rc,n cotnhntants NOR" decisive ana
..s,ble Not only was tho British
.t,, ,h.olu,e mistress of OCEAN Cominu-
,,i,n With the scat Of war but the Bo"rs ~
o., Trnnsvaa and the Orange fr"' Ntn'e u'u
..,,,.s.ss n slngh seaport, tn which u Tor
,r.d and successfully defended. supplies ot
ODD. and ammunition might b" o'''N'ohahF
..,,,d IA hIoCkRde runners our own
.ri,r.a IVA the civil war. aud again, Ia
. war with spain. has taught Ne that an
.,.,lutclv eNrctve blockade Il soaroely at
,rabo Soc l., II on this account alone thlt
,., r-o, ,ross of tho contest m S"uth hiiI'a
,.lId naturally bs followed 10y capt Mahah
with profound attention. The trahsporth-
ton Of huge body ottroops, u body huho"'-
- moro than 2Oo OOO men, across thr vast
,,pausc OF sea which separates th'at bi'"'i,
from Cape Town-to say nothing ot the s'h'l'
,.,,ti,.gert. despatched from remote depend
.i,lcs-constituted n unique problem III 'hc
,i-tory of naval warfare. IL Is true that an
...,. aid n hays been equally large. was
,.rt against Japan In the last quarter OF the
rirt.cuth century by Kublai Khan but the
,or,,nus nppt which conveyed II only had
g., cross the strait which separates the Coreah
,,ai.Iuud from tho Japanese Island hluslu'
Moreover. ths expedition was defeated. Inc
ann. thing may be- said OF the great armies
..o,.ssnlly despatched against Corea III the
,.t decade OF the sixteenth century oy h'ue-
,n-hi the Tykoon of Japan. These hau ohlV
,,., s,rra narrow strait to cross. and. although
,amuorarily successful. had. ultimately to
IVA withdrawn. In the Mediterranean, the
ottoman Turks managed at different dates
i,.and immense forces on the lslandot hhode'
and on the Island of Malta. OnlN one OF 'he
lryasions was successful and In both cases
the distances which had 20 be covered were
usigniilCant compared with those "h'ch
Kritish TRANSPORTS have had to traverse dur
irg the last fourteen months Inc coh'eE-
s.cs NJ a French army under Gen. Bonaparte
from Toulon to Egypt was deemed remark
,b . achievement but that was solely on act
..,l1t of ths skill or the good fortune with
,.II,b tho TRANSPORTS evaded the British Meet
,sr,yards the number of soldiers moved and
, 90 .treteh OF sea 70 be gone over. the exploit
,a.,,t for a moment be compared with mat
r.riormcd bv tho British Admiralty during
tie south African War.
Can't Mahan Is keeaiy alive 10 the slshul-
,ance OF the part taken by England ; aeH-
rovernin. colonies in the contest he points
ont that the rapdIty with. .Whlch co9oHiA'
continents were forwarded anords con-
yIucIng proof not only of tile cordlallty ol
,1a cnorcration Afforded. but OF an ahioco-
,sut attitude Of thoughtful regard Tor the
mother country and for the collective III
prrcsts OF the British Enpre. lie rec'H-
rile, that the phenomenon OF imperial fed-
Grafton thus exhibited is momentous iact
Oh or p
L, Importance is prospective rather than
D.tlal, the aggregate number OF coiohlai
,roop. turri-.ed being inconsiderabls.
rho author ol tni, volume shares the be-
lief %. many expert onlookers that grievous'
If not fatal, mistake was committed on the
rart Of tie Beers IN not concenuatlng the
whole military force Of the Orange Free state
uuon an invasion OF the Cape Colony at IN"
r.itsot Of the contest Capt. NahRn Is dis
,o,cd 10 think that the southern frontier OF
tie Oranse Free state could have been swept
clean from end to end. and that the whole
Taitroad system Of the Cape colony, indls-
Icu-able for the advance ana centfdIlzed
action of the British forces. could have been
irreparably destroyed 10y al operation elm
boayirs the most elementary conceptions
of strntcglc combination. A, II was the
railroad from Naauwport To De- Aar' ana
thence to the Oran gc River, was scarcely
u,ol.-,cd. and for working purposes re-
NAMED intact so il came 10 pass that the
opeping weeks irrevocaby decided the char
rcter and lssu" Cf the war BY the boers
own choice, interest was fixed, not upon one
or two pivotal points. but upon several OBJ
..c,ive,. all of which. save Ladysmith. were
,.,.ormined, not by their inherent, and. there
,.r, la.tif., bearing on the outcome OF tie
struggle but by questions OF conlner'hI
,tlue and OF tie somewhat accidental pres
,..rc IN them of small bodies Of British regu-
lar troops The Beers, IN word. iailed 10
r.r,cive that people ininensely INFERIOR
PHI. ljs antagonist in numbers ana IN dflH Is
.1iued to ultimate defeat. unless, at ue
,.ry beginning. while the enemy has not
set developed OF concentrated ll> loW'IN'
-gcA an advantage is gained 10y vigorous
y.lfiarivc a. shall either prevent his obtain
lls tie necessary initial positions. or shall
at least pos pone his doing =" long enough
TO affect materially the course 81 tHt war
and give room tor the chapter oi accidents
for the intervention OF the unforeseen
IRON, the ,u,.r,S"- at first gained by the
l,,ers and from the pcrsisIcncy WITH whi'h
? .ir resistance Ia, been prolonged. the de-
alotiou is .oIrtimCs drawn that regular
-,rd.o~s n.vr n.cu oycrya,ucd and that un-
o.-,.pIIr.d mil.tiamcn have not been rated
At ;neIr true worth 1t has been pronounced
ID Cau.tal me c-i' o! ,he Beers that they nave
shown themselves free from the organic inter-
topendence which TO regular troops become
"a second nature. Capt. MGhau reminds Us
'I.t the capacity for undergoing muliliold
..-dlyis,3n, f. coupled with retention OF
function by tie several parts. is characteristic
,l mo simpler and lower forms OF life. and
rrtIually disappear as evolution progresses
,n higher orders Tire Bocr operations have
not shaken his belief that in ell military per-
fo-mance Il 10 not the faculty for segregation
suat chiefly tells. but the prediSpostion to
mrued action. the habit Of mutual concert
ard reliance II is through this habit that
Concentration of purpose, subordiration 10 q
common impulse ceases to b. an onoit w
T.at concentration OF action Is the secret Of
sI,oees in war Capt Mahan has no doubt
wfatever At the same time, lie does not dis
pute the value of individual intslliGcnCe--Scli-
direction lie acknowledges that subordlna-
'Ion TO a common impulse and Intelligent
s"f-1irec'ion Crs Complementary elements of
.uo ms nest personal efficiency. 1iey should
ne regarded. however, in their due relations
and PROPORTIONS Moreover. the exception
,nuuld not be mistaken for th" rule, nor the
.tT al q 10, We pn