The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1900-02-16
WAR HAS ONLY BEGUN.
View of General Schofeld on Situation
in South Africa.

h,
eral John NJ. Schofeld, in a dispatch to
the Herald from st. Augustine, Fla, re-
views the war in South Africa as fol-
lows:
The experience of the British in South
Africa up to near the present time has
been the natural result of lack of pre-
paration and previous experience and
over confidence in British sproWess.
They have suffered defeats in attempt
ing to do what a cool and fully en-
lfghtened military judgment would have
decided to be impossible. The situa-
ton thus created may inevitably lead to
further losses. especially that of the
garrison of Ladysmith- But the worst
feature of this situation is that it has
forced upon the British general in chief
the moral necessity of pressing agrees
sive operations before being fully pre-
pared for them, and along a very diff
ferent line, in the hope of raising the
siege of Ladysmith before the garrison
may be compelled to surrender.
But the general estimate in England
and on the continent of Europe of the
magnitude OF the results already
reached or probable in the near future
is out of all proportion to the facts.
The British reNerses SO far have been
| incomparably less than those suffered
from strikingly similar causes by the
union army in the east and by the con-
federate army in the west during the
early stages in the civil war in this
country. The present situation hardly
affords ground for conjecture as to
what the ultimate result will be. From
the military standpoint of this country,
the war in South Africa. has only begun.
In making a just estimate of the more
| recent operations of the British forces
it is important to bear in mind that
the situation compelS their commanders
to press aggressive operations as con-
stantly and vigorously as possible
first, to prevent the Beers from detach-
/ ing large bodies of troops TO oppose the
/ advance along the line chosen by Lord
Roberts; and, second, to take advantage
/ of any considerable weakening of the
! Boer lines which the other movement
| of Lord Roberts may cause, to break
/ through the Boer lines and relieve the
beIeaguered British garrisons.
Thus it may possibly happen at any
| time in the near future that General
/ Butler may find the Boer line at some
| point in his front too far weakened to
| resist his vigorous assaults. If not,
| General Buffers vigorous operations
! and those of General Methuen on the
| other flank must so occupy the Beers
as 10 make sure Lord Roberts advance
! on an intermediate line.
Strategic principles suggest that the
! British operations in South Africa
should be conducted on at least three
! lines. If a fourth from Delagoa bay
were available it would be greatly to
their advantage Such a division of a.
superior force increases very greatly
| the probabilities of the success of some
one of the three or four grand divisions,
and the SUCCESS of one is the success
of all.
When the Union arms of the west after
| three years of hard fighting were able
| to march through Georgia and the Car
| olinas, destroying all the military re-
| sources OF the confederate army in VIZ
ginia, the end necessarily came, in
| spite of the fact that the confederate
army of northern Virginia had been
able to defend Richmond nearly four
| years. Yet the army of the Potomac,
| though it made little progress in all
that time, performed the most heroic
and difficult task of all by holding the
most formidable Of the confederate
armies while the western Union armies
| did their deadly work.
| So General Butler may yet perform
the most important British service in
South Africa by holding the Beers
along the line of the Tugela river until
Lord Roberts penetrates into the heart
of Boer territory In the meantime,
whether the troops at Ladysmith are
able to hold out to the end or must
surrender before they can be relieved,
the course of General Butler must be
the same. He must press his opera
tions there to hold the Beers, while
Lord Roberts advances on the other
line.
of the Beers, the information re-
! ceiVed in this country, though meagre,
appears to justify us in saying that
with admirable skill and courage. But
success in war results from the most
powerful combination of skill, courage
endurance, numbers and material re-
sources. A long time may be required
to determine on which side in a great
conflict this combination is most pow
erful.
At the close of our civil war prom
inent confederate generals said it was
not until the end of two years that
they became convinced that the Unior
was the more powerful. Even Their
they could do nothing but fight on tC
the bitter end. So the Beers, much OF
the same military character as oul
heroic southerneFs, fighting for theH
independence, must fight until they car
fight no longer while the British. large
ly of our blood. and fighting for g
great principle, which to them IS as
! sacred as our devotion to the union
, can not yield so long as they are su
perior in men and money.
Unless our British and Dutch cousins
on the other side of the Atlantic are
! degenerate our own civil war must bt
| accepted as a fair indication of whai
the character of the conflict in Soutf
Africa must be. We can only hope tina
the ultimate result may be as beneficial
to civilization and human progress II
Africa as it was in America.
The late dispatches indicate that Gen
Buffers operations have already borns
legitimate fruit by enabling Lord Rob
ertS to make his initial move with little
or no opposition. This should result il
forcing upon the Beers the necessity
of attacking in their turn troops in fav
q orabIe position and intrenched, thu.
\ reversing the conditions which havt
! heretofore existed. The result of sucl
a an attack must be looked for will
keenest interest.
TAKE LEVELS AND CANALS