The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1900-02-26
SPANISH CAPTAINS STORY.
o,pT CONCAs' VERSION OF THE
uATTLE OF SANTIAGO HABBOR.

RATTLE or SANIlA0O hAnboh.
II. Claims That the MORO Channel
Wade IL Necessary for Each Span
isb ship TO Fight the Entire Amer
tcou FIeet-PIaces the Hits at q
Per Cent-The BattIeship Iowa Put
,he Teresa ont of Action and Not
me Oregon Nor the Indiana.
,-sshiugton, Feb. 25.-The bureau of
laval intelligence has issued fresh vol
NM. of its war notes series and probably
,a last of them which viii bear on the
h,t.e of Santiago and harbor. The pres
.r, publication is a translation from the
e,,nisb of Capt. Victor NJ. Concas Pal
aux. formerly commander Of the cruiser
Irflnta Maria Teresa and chief of staff
70 Admiral Cervera in the battle of July 3.
Like a number of previous articles from
off ers of the Spanish squadron bearing
on the same subject Capt. Concas de-
yo.es considerable space to the lack of
naval preparation in Spain prior to the
war and also to condemning the political
party in Spain which was responsible for
the Offering up the crippled squadron as
a sacridce on the altar of an historic ideal.
All this has been covered more fully in
Admiral Cervera's published defense.
The vital section of the narrative be-
gins with the exodus of the devoted squad
ron from Santiago harbor. Capt. Concas
SAYS in accordance with previous instruc-
lions the Teresa was headed toward the
Brooklyn, hoping to ram her This was
frustrated by the Brooklyn's frequently
discussed loop to starboard which Con-
cas- says brought the Texas and the
Iowa between her and the Teresa" A
foot-note inserted in the narrative at this
point reads:
THE turn was made to starboard though
il would seem reasonable for it to have
been made to port" There is nothing in
the bureaus publication to Indicate wheth-
er this foot-note is by Capt. Concas or not.
Continuing his story, Capt Concas tells
of the successive sinking of the Teresa
and the other vessels of the squadron.
He dwells strongly on a point which nc
declares all other critics have overlooked,
namely, that owing to the narrow and
tortuous channel past the Morro,the Span
ish vessels had TO come out so far apart
II
bined force of the American squadron aud
destroyed in detail, making it practically
a series of combats, each time a single
ship against a squadron. He calls atten-
ton TO the proba bility that the American
estimate of per cent. of hits, out of
the shots aimed at Cervera's fleet, is 100
low. He says the most horrible mortal
ity in every case was in the upper works,
where the shots left no marks excep,
those wiped out by fire He gays per
cent. of hits probably would not be too
high
In defense of the Spanish gunnery the
writer says that Cerveras ships fought
either bow or stern on nearly through
out the battle This reduced the number
of guns they could bring to bear. But he
points out that the Brooklyn, which was
the only vessel keeping up a parallel
broadside fight at close range for any
length of time, was struck Al times. AS
she was under fire only Of the Viscaya,
the Teresa, and for a short time of the
best guns of the Colon, Capt. Concas says
the Spaniards gave very good proof of
their ability as marksmen.
He either credits the Iowa with landing
the two u or 13-inch shells which burst
the Teresa's main steam pipe and put her
out of action when her commander
thought she had a fair chance to escape.
These shots, he says, have been claimed
both by the Oregon and the Indiana, but
he adduces cons derable evidence that
they came from the Iowa.
Another peculiar incident brought out
in the narrative and a striking example
OF Yankee luck, was that the Oregon, in
her pursuit of the Colon remained I'M
consciously in the dead angle" between
the only guns on the Colon powerfn
enough TO reach her. The Colon, it VIII
Ike remembered. did not have her big so
ton guns and in the long stern chase the
Oregon happened always TO keep just in
the spot where the upper deck guns could
not be trained on her and the Colon could
not fire without heaving to and losing
valuable time.
The author Indignantly denies that the
Colon was wrecked by her crew after she
had surrendered. He says that she was
run ashore and her sea valves opened
before her flag was hauled down. Re"
garding this incident, the writer says:
The Cristobal Colon was less fortunate
than any of the others, for, although go
ing al a speed of thirteen knots, she ran
ashore on sand; and If Admiral Sampson,
with more seamanlike spirit, had or
dered the divers to close the valves, he
could most certainly have saved the cruis-
or. but with feverish Impotence he towed
her off with his own flagship, the New
York Hardly had the ship been float
ed, when she began TO list, at which mo-
ment, with great deXterity he pushed the
Colon again with the ram OF his own
snip toward the sandy shoals; but it was
too late, and. turning over that noble
and Inflated cruiser went TO the bottom
Of the sea forever. The few Americans
and Spaniards who were still on board
hastily saved themselves"
The total mortality in the fleet reached
the awful figure of p per cent. of the
men engaged.
In closing The account of the battle the
author says: eve could never complete
his chapter if we were to relate the in
Vulnerable acts of courage; but I cannot
do less than to mention one which l saw
with my own eyes. The Maria Teresa
had already been abandoned, the flames
mounting up to the hight of the tunnels
and projectiles exploding on all sides, and
When everybody thought that no living
soul was left on the ship suddenly a man
aDpeared there calling for help. Instantly
lose Casado cried: Il viii not let that
man die and threw himself into the
water He climbed up the blood-stained
sides of The shin seized the man. carried