The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1900-02-20

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HGA oxs|tHb generals during
Y the campaign
which ended in Austerlitz and opened
the gates of Vienna to the victorious
French. One of the most ambitious
French historians of the campaigns
of Napoleon sees in his military career
nothing but succession of terrible
military blunders. Every chapter, aft
er telling what Napoleon did, goes on
to show what ought to have been done.
In the same way Grant violated the
art of war at Vicksburg by making a
circuitous march to the rear of the
enemy's position, operating without
true military base and secure lines of
communication and with an active enc
my having free access to his rear while
his army was engaged in front. Sher-
man said that he feared the result all
the time, but was afraid to protest,
and that he didn't have any faith in
the outcome until the army was lined
up in front of the Confederate works
with guns bearing upon them. Then
light dawned upon him. Had Grant
died in the latter part Of May or early
in June. 1863, the Vicksburg campaign
would have ended in a grand fizzle and
would stand in history as belonging to
the kind to be let alone. But nothing
succeeds like success, and the cam
paign stands out as a marvel of gen.
eralship. Napoleon really made new
art of war. His amateur methods
overturned the rules laid down in
books and themselves became new
rules He was trained in the schools;
but, genius that he was, he made war
for the purpose of winning battles, not
merely to play a stilted game. and he
invented puzzles which the enemy
could not solve.
Napoleon's Marengo campaign was
notable instance of his audacious con-
tempt for the rules of the military art.
He conveyed his army by critical ma
neuvers to the heart of the enemy's
territory in the rear of his lines and
was in a position to be crushed should
his foe prove wary. In fact, he was
practically defeated at the close of the
afternoon of the day of Marengo. Op-
portunely DesaiX's division came to
the field from an expedition off on the
flank which Napoleon's critics say was
needless and came near leading to dis
aster This fresh command was hurled
against the Austrians, who were con-
1ident that the French were routed,
and the tables were turned in a twin
king.
The most sharply criticised of
Grants battles was that of Shiloh, and
Marengo and Shiloh belong in the
same category as far as actual tactics
go. At one stage of each of these bat
ties the ultimate victors We're whipped.
But they didn't give up as whipped,
and therein lay the innovation of the
victorious commanders. 1t is a mill
tary saying that good general knows
when he is whipped. He should also
know when he is not whipped, al
though the rules of the game might
say that it was time to quit. Generals
like Napoleon, Grant and Lee have ey-
cry advantage over real amateurs in
that they are schooled in the art of
war, the same art as their opponents,
and hence may lay guesses as to what
the enemy will do. In Stonewall Jack
sons time Lee often violated one of
the simplest and most imperative rules
OF the military art. That is the one
which forbids the dividing of forces in
the face of the enemy. He did this at
Antietam and lost the campaign. At
charlottesville he did the same thing
and won rousing victory. At An
tletam 1t was done by reason of over
confidence brought on by an easy vic
tory at Manassas three weeks before
AT Charlottesville the situation was
desperate, and Lee threw all upon one
hazard. Fortune favored him and tho
RUE SUN STANDS paramount in military
DOCKS and has been quoted against the
British again and again during the war
in South Africa.
StonewaH Jackson was an innovation.
md, although well schooled in the art
OF war, he broke the rules oftener than
lny other general of modern times
who came off with an enviable reputa-
ton. AT Port Republic and Cross KEYS.
IN the Shenandoah valley he was in
grave danger of being crushed by two
opposing armies, and he fought two
separate battles the same day. dividing
his troops and reinforcing one division
from the other as occasion demanded.
II has always been held that Jackson
was fortunate in having inferior gen
erals opposed to him, but even in that
case he must be given credit for know
ing II and taking advantage of it. His
opponents at Port Republic and Cross
Keys were men of military expert
ence, ana the one who was deceived
the most had had exactly the same
school training in war as Jackson
Soldiers like Dom Paul Kruger Ion.
bert and Cronje may be set down as
N