The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-06-05

given instructions that the reports OF the
army officers who have been sharply
watching the South African military
operations be published In pamphlet form
for the benefit of the service Tactical
reports from officers who participated in
the campaign against Santiago and the
operations In the Philippines VIII also be
called to the attention of officers OF the
army.
Officers OF the army who have been fol-
lowing the war say that while the lessons
taught cannot be regarded as especially
new. the operations have substantiated
these important conclusions: The avoid
ance OF frontal attacks upon an enemy 8
position, especially In close order forma-
ton; the necessity OF having the latest
small arms and artillery; the undesirable
ity OF risking artillery. as Gen. Butler
did at Colenso: the value OF effective
scouting; the presence OF ample cavalry
and artillery.
Brig. Gen. A. w. Greedy, signal officer.
made this statement regarding the con-
illusions he had drawn as a result Of tho
war:
The South African war will do more
to preserve peace during the next twenty
years than The Hague conference or any
thing OF that character. The tremendous
efficiency of modern arms, Of precision
using smokeless powder. on ground spe-
so apparent by this war that every mill
tary student has learned the almost i'm
possibility OF capturing any dificult posi-
ton. especially by a frontal attack.
Although the individual Boer is man
OF great bravery. resourcefulness and pos
sessins soldierly qualities generally, yet
It IL to be remarked that the Transvaal
army has not captured a single position
during the entire war. On the other hand,
the British army has found It almost i'm
possible to capture any position, but has
won It's way by out-fanking the Boer
positions and rendering retreat impcra-
tive"
The British empire now has 265,o 900 sol
diers in South Africa and. according to
Capt. Reichman. the Transvaal force has
not at any timc averaged more than 5000
men.
As showing the insignihcancs I'm num-
bcra OF the Boer troops and the failure
OF the British to properly scout. Capt.
Reichman, in one of his reports. stated
that he was with a mere handful OF
Transvaaiers occupying position when a
strong detachment OF the British ad-
vanced against 1t. The Beers opened fire
and the British. after weakly returning
II, awaited further achievements. EVIL
IDENTIFY being deceived as to the strength
OF their enemy.
A report received at the war depart
ment, dated in April, shows that the
British then had q total OF bs.0s6 horses
and isa machine guns and ass guns OF all
CALDER. When Buffers troops were ad-
vancinK TO the rescue OF Ladysmfth, the
Beers, supplied with one-pounder Max
inns. greatly demoralised the British.
When Buffers force obtained Maxims
and opened FIRE on the Beers, the whole
Boer line, which had been silent except
for few shipping shots, opened ire. show
ing, according to department of'icials that,
like the British. they were demoralised
BY the Are OF guns diseharging several
hundred projectiles a minute.
The Beers. In anticipation of the war
were supplied with the latest Mausers, of
Ga man manufacture and the latest
krupp and Creusot artillery. The latter
Ia mostly made up OF siege guns which.
howev,r, are capable OF being promptly
transported and placed In position at
points which II Is desired TO defend. Those
guns have a range OF 5000 yards. while
Geu. whites forces had weapons, with the
exception OF the guns OF the navy brig
AIDES, with a range OF only 1000 ysr1s
The value of this additional range was
especially demonstrated, and one OF the
results OF the war is the practical re-
armament Of the British batteries. The
operations according to army of'iceIs, en-
phaslsed above everything the Importance
OF rapid Arc long range field artillery
The fun effect OF lyddite has not been
shown for the reason that the fuses were
defective The Beers had no high eNplo-
sives.