Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1900-03-12

NEW YORK, March lin a paper
on "The Monroe Doctrine and Our
Navy which he has written for the
forthcoming issue of Leslie's Weekly,
Captain A. T. Mahan says:
1.-The settlement and growth OF our
Pacific coast, the increasing CONNER
cial consequence of the Pacific coast
and the questions arising about China,
it's future government and its trade,
make it necessary to connect our At
lantic and Gulf seaboard with the Pa
cific by a canal across the Central
American Isthmus, giving thereby con-
secutive water communication be-
tween the two as we'll as shortening
the access from our western shores to
Asia. The Isthmus and its immediate
surroundings thus become the greatest
Of our external interests. Scarcely
secondary to them is the Caribbean sea,
because all sea routes to the lsthmus
run through it, and it contains many
strong positions, the acquisition OF
which by formidable European state
would in war endanger our shipping,
mercantile and naval alike, passing
through our Atlantic ports and the Pa
cific by the canal.
1--WE must remember that other ma
tions, and especially European-be-
cause the most active-are interested
likewise in using that canal, and, for
the support of their interests, in gain
ing positions. To their doing so we
oppose the Monroe doctrine. There
fore, if we intend to make good the af-
firmations of the latter, we must be
prepared to resist, forcibly if need be,
any attempt to obtain adjacent terri
tory or ports which may serve as sta
tions for navy hostile to ourselves.
1t Is natural that European nations
should wish such positions; that Ger
many, for instance, as has been lately
rumored, should wish the Danish Is
lands-St. Thomas, etc. Her right to
buy them is as good in international
law as ours; the Monroe doctrine de-
ponds not upon legal right, but upon
the moral right of our indispensable
interests, and derives it's chief support
from the fact that it is not worth
while to incur our enmity, pushed per-
haps to the extent of war.
Nov the one preparation for war,
in maritime region like the Carib-
bean, is navy large enough to be eff
fective. Ports are quite secondary
they are necessary to a navy which
needs a local base of operations; but
they are useless without it, especial
ly in the Caribbean, because condi-
lions there are so backward as to give
no local resources. Positions held
there not only must be fortified, but
everything to support shipping must
be imported, and steady stream Of
supply maintained. This can only be
done by the navy, keeping the sea OPP
en-, which at the same time secured
our other merchant shipping.
ITO do these things, which is call
ed controlling the sea, the navy should
strictly, be superior to any which can
be brought against it; but this ex-
IRENE conclusion is qualified by other
circumstances, such as our nearness
to the Caribbean sea, our national
power through our great resources,
the dangers to which our possible op-
ponents may be exposed in other quar-
tiers and from other enemies. We
cannot in the near future expect to
have navy nearly as large as that
which Great Britain must keep, but it
is easily within our means to rival
that of France, or of Germany, the
only European States, other than
Great Britain, whose general interests
might lead them actively to dispute
the maintenance of the Monroe doc
trine.
Reflection upon this condition will
indicate that size necessary to our
own war fleet, and also the wisdom
of cultivating those cordial relations
to which Great Britain has invited us,
which our interests and our institu-
lions advise and the existence of
which will put it out of the power or
wish of any other State to quarrel
with us about the Monroe doctrine.
II is to the interest Of Great Britain
that we should take naval charge of
the American Isthmus, provided, she
can feel sure that we will do it eff
fectively; that our preparations and
our deeds will answer to the words of
Washington and Monroe"