The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1900-03-13
.SPAkiSA CAPTAINS STORY.
Captain Concas Version of the Battle
of Santiago Harbor

The bureau OF naval Intelligence mas
issued a fresh volume of its war notes
series and probably the last Of them
which will bear on the battle of San
tiago and harbor. The present nubli-
cation in a translation from he Span
ish of Captain Victor VI. Concas y
Palaux. formerly commander Of the
cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa and chief
of staff to Admiral Cervera in the bat
tie Of July 3rd.
Like a number of previous articles
from officers of the Spanish squadron
bearing on the same subject, Captain
lConcas devotes considerable space to
the lack Of naval preparation in Spain
prior to the war. and also to con-
Idemning the political party in Spain
which was responsible for the Offering
up the crippled squadron as a sacrifice
on the altar of an historic ideal. All
this has been covered more fully in
Admiral Cervera's published defense.
The vital section of the be-
gins with the exodus of the devoted
squadron from Santiago harbor. Cap
tain Concas says in accordance with
previous instructions the Teresa was
headed toward the Brooklyn, hoping
to ram her. This was frustrated by the
Brooklyn's frequently discussed loop"
to starboard which Concas says
brought the Texas and the Iowa be-
tween her and the Teresa" A foot
note inserted in the narrative at this
point reads:
The turn was made to ~starboard
though it would seem reasonable for
lit to have been made to port" There
is nothing in the bureaus publication
to indicate whether this foot note is
by Captain Concas or lot.
Continuing his story, Captain Con-
cas- tells Of the successive sinking of
the Teresa and the other vessels of the
SQUADRON. He dwellS strongly on a
point which he declares all other critics
have overlooked, namely, that owing
to the narrow and tortuous channel
past the MORO, the Spanish vessels
had to come out so far apart hat they
were each attacked by the combined
force of the American squadron and
destroyed in detail, making it practi-
lcally a series of combats, each time a
single ship against a squadron. He
to the probability that
the American estimate of 8 per cent
lof hits, out of the shots aimed at Ger
vera's fleet, is too low. He says the
most horrible mortality in every case
was in the upper works, where the
shots left no marks except those wiped
IOul ny IRE ne says D per CSHl. OI Nus
probably would lot be too high.
In defense of the Spanish gunnery
the writer says that Cervera's ships
fought either bow or stern on nearly
Throughout the battle. This reduced the
number of guns they could bring to
bear. But he points out that the Brook
liyn, which was the only vessel keeping
up a parallel %broadside fight at close
range for any length Of time, was
| Str1InR fnrfu-nnn f;ppnc o che u.o @
under fire only of the Viscaya, the
Teresa, and for a short time of the best
guns of the Colon, Captain ConcaS says
the Spaniards gave very good proof of
their ability as marksmen.
| He either credits the Iowa with land
ing the two II or 13-inch shells which
burst the Teresa's main steam pipe and
put her out of action when her COM
mander thought she had a fair chance
to escape. These shots, he says, have
been claimed both by the Oregon and
the Indiana, but he adduces considera-
BILE evidence hat they came from the
Iowa.
Another peculiar incident brought out
in the narrative and a striking exam
pie of Yankee luck, was that the Ore
gQn, in her pursuit OF the Colon re
manned unconsciously in the dead
angle" hetween the only guns on the
Colon powerful enough to reach her
The Colon, it will be remembered, did
not have her big 30-ton guns, and in
the long stern chase the Oregon hap
pened always to keep just in the spot
where the upper deck guns could not
be trained on her and the Colon could
not fire without heaving to and losing
valuable time.
The author Indignantly denies thai
the Colon was wrecked by her crew
after she lac surrendered. He says
that she was run ashore and her sea
valves opened before her flag was haul.
ed down. Regarding this incident, the
writer says:
The Cristobal Colon was less for.
%tunate than any of the others, for, al.
though going at a speed of thirteer
knots, she ran ashore on sand; and i
Admiral Sampson, with a Seamanlik,
spirit. had ordered the divers to close
the valves, he could most certainly
have saved the cruiser, but with fever
Iish impatience he towed her off will
his own flagship, the New York. Hard
ly had the ship been fioated, when sh,
began to list, at which moment, will
great deXterity, he pushed the Color
again with the ram Of his own shil
toward the sandy shoals; but it wa
too late, and, turning over, that nobl,
and Inflated cruiser went to the bot
tom of the sea forever. The few Amer
leans and Spaniards who were still OIL
board hastily saved themselves"
The total mortality in the fleet reach
led the awful figure of % per cent. o
the men engaged.
In closing the accoun of the battl
the author says: we could never com
lplete this chapter if we were to relat
the innumerable acts of courage; bu
[ cannot do less than to mention on
which l saw with my own eyes. TIL,
Maria Teresa had already been aban
lioned, the flames mounting up to tn
height of the unnels and projectile
l~exploding on all sides, and when every
body thought that no living soul wa
left OF the ship suddenly a man ap
lpeared there calling for help. Instant.
Jose Cascade cried: Il will not let tina
man die!' and threw himself into tn
water. He climbed up the blood-sta1n
ed sides of the ship, seized the man
carried him down on his shoulder, and
Swimming with him to the shore, lait
his burden on the beach. 1t was hardl!
possible to believe that that shape
less form was a man with fourteen