Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-02-10
mept on his part to account to her for
1t. Affirmed in part. Reversed in part
ASHBURG ". e. r. LIZ p. co.
Supreme Court of North Carolina,
December %. 1899.


Supreme Court of North Carolina,
December %, 1899.
THE ORDINARY CARE REQUIRED
BY THE LAW TO BE TAKEN BY
A PERSON is THE SAME FOR A
WOMAN AS A MAN. IT IS NEGLI-
GBNCE TO START A STREET CAR
UNTILA PASSENGER ABOUT TO
GET OFF HAS DONE so.
THE STANDING BY A PASSENGER
IN a DANGEROUS POSITION IS
CONTRADICTORY NEGLIGENCE IT
BY DUE CARE HE COULD HAVE
AVOIDED TAKING SUCH POSI-
TIoN.
This was an action to recover for in
jurles caused Mrs. Asbury by a fall
while alighting from a street car, al
legged to have arisen from the starting
of the car. There was verdict and
Judgment for the PLAINTIFF in the lower
court, and the company appealed.
The court says:
Ii TINS court were permitted to criti-
else the verdicts Of juries. we might
have something to say concerning the
one delivered in this case; but that is
forbidden ground to us, and we can
only review the instructions of law Civ
en- In the court below upon the evil
dence. His honor made no mistake in
the law laid down to the jury for their
guidance. The charge was fair to both
SIDES, and 1t was full and very clear.
Inc defendant further complains under
that head because his honor did not ex-
pain what due care" meant. to the
jury, and also did not tell the Jury what
act Of the defendants servants or what
omission to act. in the particular case.
would be negligence. But his honor told
the jury in his charge that due care"
meant such care as an ordinarily pru-
dent man, placed in circumstances
like or similar to those In which the
person whose conduct is in question
was placed, would USE; and in refer
ence to the exception that his honor did
not tell the jury what act of the de-
fendants servants. or what omission to
act. In the particular case, would be
negligence. we find in the charge that
ms honor instructed the jury that: ct
Is the duty of the employees of n street
car company in charge of a car. when
they stop car for passengers to get
Off, not TO start the car until they see
that passengers who have arisen from
their seats TO get off have gotten off;
and a failure in the performance of this
duty is negligence on the part OF the
company. And he further INSTRUCTED
the jury that: "If the jury find from
the evidence that the employees of the
defendant in charge of the car in cues
ton stopped the same for the feme
plaintiff TO get off at the place she re-
quested that after they stopped the
car the feme plaintiff arose from her
seat to get off the car, and that, after
she arose from her seat to get off. the
said employees did not cause the car to
start or move, and did not, through
any want of due care, permit the same
to move until she was entirely off the
car. then the jury will answer the first
issue, No."
Under the head of "due care" the de-
PENDANT contended further, that when
his honor laid down the rule of "the
prudent man. in reference to the CON
duct of the feme plaintiff at the time
of her injury. he committed error. The
argument was that the definition Of
due care" was misleading. las the
care to be exercised by woman. when
she is placed In a dangerous position.
would be greater than that required OF
man surrounded by the same circum-
stances; that she is supposed to be less
able to take care OF herself than is a
man. and the danger to her will there
fore be greater that. when this is the
case Chat is. when the danger is great
err. the law requires greater degree
of care to be exercised in avoiding it,,
And the case of High y. Railroad Co.
was cited as an authority for that DO
siton. The woman there was injured
by an engine while walking on windy
day. She was wearing bonnet, which
prevented her from hearing well: and
this court held that that gave her no
greater privilege that she should other
wise enjoy as license, but on the CON
trary, should have made her more
watchful There is nothing in that de-
cision which even squints toward a
holding that n woman is not bound by
the rule of 'tthe prudent man. but or
dinarily by a stricter rule.
There remains for consideration the