The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-04-08

South.
His account Of Stewards behavior dur
ing the agitation which preceded the dec
larstion OF war proves once more that this
statesman was a politician in every sense
OF the word, and that he played the game
Of politics as he would play chess for a
wager carefully, automatically, though
not always wisely. His support of the Tn
ion was due less to sentiment than to rea-
son. He believed disunon to be impolitic
and unwise. He objected TO secession o.
| economic rather than moral grounds. He
was not an abolitionist. His formulation
Of his principles when confronted with
the difficult problem Of taking a stand
which would neither Countenance seces-
sion nor infame Southern sentiment. was
both characteristic and consummately pol
lite Il was an archetypal compromise.
/ This was January 10. 1861. He acknowl-
( edged the force of the fugitive slave
clause but desired that it be so modified
as not to endanger the liberty Of free
! blacks or compel private citizens 10 be
| come slave-catcners. That was a sop to
/ the GarrisoniaBs. and intended to prevent
J trouble continually arising between the
claimants and protectors Of fug tives. He
/ then said that he was in favor of making
| slavery permanently free from Congress
sional control That was oil thrown upon
I troubled waters in the South. He would
favor laws TO prevent invasion OF any
State by citizens OF any other State. That
would prevent a repetition OF the Kansas
troubles. Finally, he presents a plan for
settling territorial difficulties which is
simply a stroke Of genius in its evasion
Of responsibility:
After the admission Of Kansas as a free State
! he would consent TO the consolidation of all the
territories into two States, and admit them with
out restriction as to slavery. II the night 10 make
sub divisions into several convenient States could
! be reserved. But he thought that the Const'tu-
/ ton did not permit such reservation II it were
feasible he would prefer 10 have the present diff
culues settled in regular constitution conven-
ton. when The eccentric movements OF secession
and disunion shall have ended, in whatever form
that end may come. and the angry excitement OF
/ the hour shall have subsidized then, and
not till thcn-one two, three years hence.
Thus like the chess player who stops the
threatening advance Of pawn by another
pawn. he risks nothing but places the
whole territorial problem. as far as he is
concerned. at some indefinite distance in
the future. when il will be perfectly safe to
prophesy that it will be settled somehow
already.
In his peroratlon he made deft and
effective appeal to the sentiment OF loyalty
to the Union which had the result Of con-
solidating Northern sentiment on that sub
iect. 1t may be that this appeal was In
tended as a sort OF touchstone, to rally
Southern leyalists II possible, and test the
feeling Of the whole people; but whether
this is so or not the effect that il had was
to make the North ready to resist. almost
unanimously. the secession movement.
At this time Seward may be said to have
tsen at the height of his influence, If net
& his real power; and II Is no wonder
that having shown such remarkable
skill in the management OF his followers,
and knowing political conditions from one
end to the other. he and his frieads should
have undervalued the shrewd fore sight
and calm sagacity Of Lincoln. That they
did so underestimate the tremendous pr
soEal power Of the new President there Is
now 70 reason to doubt. The doubt was.
moreover. reasonable. Lincoln was Con-
parativeIy unknown; he had not posed as
a political sage Seward ! I'D ard what s
more he had been one. Positive proof
Of LincolDs genius in dealing With men
Was in his sizing up OF Seward As NJ.
Bancroft remarks, the President saw that
the great New York Republican would he
dangerous anywhere outside OF tie C3bi-
net and therefore gave him Iba position
demarded for him, that O. Secretary Of
state. II became evident very soon that,
to use Bit OF latter-day slang. Seward
believed himself to be the whole thing
and Lincoln did not intend that he shOIld
be. This is evident from Lincoln remark
during he making up Of the Cabinet, VIII q
Seward friends had been making them
selves obtrusive. that if the slate should
break again it would break at the top /
However, on personal acquaintance and
association with the President. the SeCre- !
tary OF State. with his quick intuitive rec
ognition OF great qualities, came TO under
,s.F Ia hsa Lob,
Quincy Adams and Thurlow Weed, and |
later he wrote 10 a friend that memorable I
sentence, The President is the best Of US /
all"
The contrast between Seward and Lin
coin is wildly brought out in these chap /
tiers dealing with the early years Of the |
Administration One had talent, the other |
genius. Seward made the bluudeT that |
clever men often make, Of overestimating |
training and experience He was led by /
his political experience to believe that the |
patriotism Of the Southland by this is
meant loyalty to Southern soil and insti- |
tutions-could not overbalance consider |
ations of self-interest. He did not place /
at its true value the emotionalism in /
which he himself was deficient. He did !
not know the South. and this was prin- !
cipally because he was too sure that he /
did know il. He made the same mistake |
IN his estimate Of the common man, the !
uneducatcd and unearned but intelligent |
man Of the people. Lincoln, brought up /
shoulder TO shoulder with the people OF a |
border slave State. associating not with !
politicians, but with voters, did not make |
any such mistake. He recognized the /
gravity Of the danger and the difficulty Of /
settling il without war. Seward did not. |
The consequence was that in spite of sAe /
diplomacy Of the Secretary Of State war |
came, and it was the President who stood |
at the helm. There was just the difference (
between the two men that there is be-
tween the demagogue and the statesman.
Yet Seward was too much OF a diplomat to
be wholly a demagogue, and in dealing /
with foreign nations, in the Mason-Slidell
affair, his adroitness was mastery. He
could understand playing politics, but not
handling the mighty forces OF primitive
human nature, aroused in civil war. In
almost all his dealings with European
dplomatists he was successful and his
only error was in now and then oyeresu-
mating the influence which they might
have on the affairs of this country His
success in such work affords additional |
testimony 10 the wisdom Of Lincoln in
giving him the position of Secretary Of
State
Stewards part in reconstruction. accord
ing TO Mr.. Bancroft. was much slighter
than is generally supposed. His health was
poor he was old and broken. and the IN
wisdom Of johnson made it difficult for
any aid. however efficient to counterfeit
his mistakes. In addition TO this. Seward
was not the man 10 handle the difficult
problems of that era. He could not have
the Confederate leaders on the
one hand and the Garrisonians on the 9TH
er, any better than johnson did. The pur-
chase of Alaska was his greatest triumph,