The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-12-01
LATE LEGAL DECISIONS.

A contract between John Philip Sousa
and his one-time manager, David Blakely,
now deceased, was recently on appeal be-
fore the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
for construction Among other things, it
was commended by the administrative of
Blakely that under the contract, the
Blakely estate had the right to use Sou
sas name in connection with musical or
CARNATIONS. But the court held that this
would be a fraud on the public, saying:
1T is contended by the complainant that
the said name became the property of
Blakely, and upon his death passed to his
estate Apart from the absence of any
words showing that any part of the con-
tract was assignable. except under the
limitations already referred TO, the as
signment of the name "Sousa" cannot be
enforced. for the reason that its enforce
ment would be against public policy and
enable the assignee to impose upon and
deceive the public by inducing ii to attend
concerts under the impression that they
were TO be given by Sousa. when in fact,
he would have nothing whatever to do
with them. II is true that the right of
person TO use the name of another in con-
nection with a business or manufactured
article passes under an assignment and
sale of good will of the business. which in
cludes the right to the trade name. 1t has
often been held that a trade mark or a
trade name representing an article of
commerce or a local business is property
which may be disposed of. but the name
of an artist. an author a musician, or
lawyer has never been regarded as a trade
name, and. as such. salable. The value of
the names of such persons depends entire
ly upon their personal reputation, skill,
and experience. and is indissolubly con-
nected or associated with the owner
tBlakely VS.. Sousa. Il All. Rep, 2S6(
An action for damages was brought in
Massachusetts against two physicians
who. under statute providing for the
commitment of inebrlates, certified shat
the plaintiff was an inebriate ard n prop
er subject for treatment. The plaintiff
contended that the certificate was false,
and was made without due examination.
and that in consequence thereof he was
committed to the hospital for dipsoman
iacs or inebriates, and confined there
long time. on appeal the Supreme judic
ial Court held that unless actuated by
malice a physician would not be liable
for his issuance of the certificate requir-
ed by statute. and as the plaintiff did not
allege that there was any malice he could
not recover The court said that the
privilege which attaches TO parties and
witnesses in other judicial proceedings,
to parties instituting criminal proceed
ings and to cases of privileged commune
cations should attach TO examining ply
scians in cases like the present and that
so long as they act in good faith and
without malice they should be exempt
from liability. 1t is more impor-
tant that the administration of the law
in the manner provided should not be OBJ
structed by the fears of physicians that
they may render themselves liable to suit
than IT is that the person certified by
them to be insane. or dipsomaniac, or
inebriate. should have right of action
in case 1t turns out that the certificate
ought not to have been given" tNiven
VS.. Boland, IS n. E. Rep, 2s2)
An elevator boy was accustomed TO sit
on stool while running his ear. On one
of the trips the janitor of the building.
who was riding in the car, moved the
stool while the boy was standing to open
the door at one of the floors to admit a
When the boy attempted to sit
down not knowing that the stool had
been moved, he lost his balance and fell
pulling with him the lever of
the car. which he had hold of at the time
and thereby starting the elevator. The
who was about to board the
car had one or his legs injured by the
sudden starting of the car, and brought
suit for damages on the ground that
either the elevator boy or the janitor was
guilty of negligence. But the court tAIas-
sachusetts) held that neither was negli-
gent so as to bind the employers. In re-
gard to the elevator boy the court said:
THE only ground upon which the plaintiff
relies to show negligence on the part of
Hersey is that he did not look behind him
before attempting to sit down. But he
did not know that the stool had been
moved, and had no reason to suppose that
this was the case. He attempted to sit
down in the customary way and lost his
balance and clutched for something TO
him. His action was entirely an
one. To say' that under such |
there was evidence of his
negligence would be going too far" The |
court held that in moving the stool the |
ianitor did not act as the servant or agent |
IF the defendant and that the defendant |
is not liable for his act in moving the |
stool, if it we're negligent in him TO move |
It. as he was not acting in the scope OF |
mis- employment. tGibsOn VS.. Information |
al Trust Company. so n. E. Rep, 27S.)
An instruction, which after presuppos
lg the existence OF certain facts. con-