The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1900-04-15
BRITISH GENERALS SCORED.
sCATHING CRITICISM OF SOME
OFFICERS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Direct Charges of Ineompetency
Made Against Gen. Hart and Other
Commanders-War once Blamed
for Retaining Them i'm the Field

Correspondence of the Associated Press
LONDON, April "a British officer.
writing in Today. from vaalkrantz. saws.
do not know II It is az any use to
aescant always on the shortcomings of
our generals, but they are brought home
10 US so constantly by bitter experiences
mat we cannot keep them from our minds
and We cannot but resent the obstinaey Of
the war office authorities who deliberately
allow thousands OF lives TO be sacrificed
rather than remove those who in peaca
have won favor and promotion by social
influence and back stairs intrigue. and arc
really responsible for most OF our disas-
ters The general who led his brigade in
mass Of quarter column under the enc
my's guns at Colenso Is stir in command
OF mat brigade. and there has been M
voice raised in England against such stu
pendous folly. Five hundred and fifty men
We're lost on that occasion. but because the
irish brigade stood firm IL did not attract
pubic attention. The Highlanders at Ma
getstontein, under similar but less aggra-
waited circumstances suffered no greater
loss, retreated three times from the field
and all England clamored for the sITppres-
Aoh OF Inc responsible person Since then
n msu, aar, mas lost no opportunity of re-
peating MS onense: he even attributed the
IL success of the day to the fact that the
battaions were afterward extended 10 sin
gle instead OF double rank, and censure1
even greater disaster Near Spion kon he
TOOK personal command Of the York ana
Lancaster and the South Lancaster regl-
ments' and ordered a futile bayonet charge
az an enemy nearly 1850 yards away This
attracted such heavy fire that the two
regiments sought shelter and declined 10
follow their officers another yard The
Irish brigade had TO he called to the res
cue. and passed through the prostrate line
No one has any confidence In Gen Harris
leadership, and every offfcer and man from
Gen. Butler down Is aware OF his incom-
potency. Nearly half Of his brigade have
been killed and wounded neither the High
land nor any other brigade has suffered
In anything like the same proportion; the
inniskiing fusileers have only three Of the
officers who were with them three months
ago sun serving, and can now, in all mus
ter only five officers. few more battles
and the brigade will cease to exist Gen.
Harris talents NJ him well TO be a drill
sergeant-not leader of men. No lati-
tude Is given to even the most expert
enoed commander. He must always keep.
as ne says, tight grip on his brigade.
In peace and disaster In war.
As an example of the extremes to
which this policy is carried | will give one
instance among many. After the battle
or Spion kop the troops which had been
for ten days under constant fire and en-
dnred every sort OF hardship. were natur-
ally somewhat exhausted moreover. they
had had severe night march. covering
the rear of the retreating army. Gen
Butler decided II was necessary that they
should have some days rest and camp
ing ground was selected. The tents. how
ever were not pitched In the morning, and
the men lay out in the sun all day In
the afternoon Gen. Hart was OF the opir-
ion that the camp might be within the
range of the enemy's bte guns. and de-
ctded TO pitch camp a mile further back.
But instead Of pointing out the, ground to
the commanding officers and direeiing,
them 10 move their battai,ons 10 TIM
place. he formed the four regiments on a
brigade, parade. and, after some time had
been given up to covering correctly, an
elaborate brigade maneuvcr began.
The ground was broken and covered
with deep water courses, so that the dress
ing and distance was difficult 10 maintain.
Staff officers galioped from place TO place.
the men and officers were abused, halt
ed. moved to the right, moved to the left.
II was impossible TO shut ones ears 10
the muttered curses OF the men. worn out
with fatigue and want Of sleep, at this
useless show. which might possibly have
review bat which In actual warfare
strained the much-needed strength of the
soldiers. An hour and a half was oceu-
pied IN trayersing mile and half Of
ground which could easily have been COW
cred IN twenty minutes In this way men
were harssscd and worn out, at a time
for fIture efforts. in this way the hos
patnlr are filled with soldiers who have
never been hit by Bcer bullet, but whose
constitutions have been slapped by unnec-
esssry labors.
Gen Hart placed himself on a hill
with a telescope and a Dugier. and order
81 the brigade to attack position; the
bugler sounded alternately throughout the
day advance double, charge. | need
not say that this method ~ nghting re-
suited In terrible LOSE sixty Officers and
500 men ~ a terrfble total for one brig
ade nearly 30 per cent. OF tho whole. II
would be impossible TO enumerate the
yasnrtes that daily occur. but, though the
worst. I regret to say that Gen. Hart IL
not the only hrigader notorious for incom-
potency. Al least two other bfi1sa'efs
acre ,inft 10 command hut the accidents
OF war have removed one OF them. The
divisional commanders were no better.
but the war has viso made some changes
here and n would be premature 10 Judge