The daily morning journal and courier., 1900-02-10
THREE MONTHS OF WAR.
4 CANDID BRITISH CRITIC ON THE
 SPOT
Points the Morals of British Reverses
 i'm south Africa.

Cape Town. Jan. 1.-Our want O.
 success hitherto has been due to va
 riety of causes, bu. the chief or these
 has undoubtedly been the lnapihty ol elderly generals to adapt themseiVes readily to new conditions. It should no 1 be forgotten, however, that these gene l rals have had great difficulties 10 con 1 tend with. A number ot battallohs l fresh landed from transports are very
 far from constituting an effectively or | ganized force. Except General French
 most of our generals have been greatly handicapped by being provided W'th
 practically nothing but infantry, ana m 1 this country infantry are tefllply nelp-
 less. Again, our commanders have al- 1 lowed themselves to be tied too tast to
 the railway, which as a rule follows the worst strategical line of advance thay could possibly be selected, and never provides any alternatives. Of course,
 the railway has done admirable work, too, and the greatest credit is due to inc officials of the Cape and Natal goVefn-
 ment railways for the raoidity ana smoothness with which the movement of troops and stores has been carried
 on Altogether one of the best features
 of this war has been the landing and
 ending up country of the troops, whi .n
 was everywhere carried out in the most
 perfect manner. It is not the fault or
 the railway if from lack of sufilcient
 wagon transport or of initiative our
 generals have clung fast to 1t wherever
 they have gone. Our troops nave not
 been mobile enough; oud artillery has
 been in some eases insufficient: our
 scouting and intelligence has, aa rule,
 bacll very defective. But so novel are
 the conditions of this war that it WAS
 impossible to expect that every contin-
 gency of it could have been provided
 against beforehand. We cannot hope to
 escape paying for experience.
 This war is practically the first war or
 any importance between forces both
 a,med with modern weapons. The shoft experience we have already had has sufficed to show that the long-range
 magazine rifle, the long-range gun, and srnokeless powder, must completely rev. olutionize the art of war as practiced
 twenty or thirty years ago. The advan-
 tage possessed by the defense has been enormously increased
 The zone of effective rifle fire has be- come so wide that 1t is impossible, ex- cept under extremely favorable circum- stances, to get the bravest troops m the world to cross 1t in the open against an intrenched enemy. The taking of T alma Hill was a splendid perform ance, but even there our troops had cover first in plantation, then behind a long stone wall, and finally-like the Roers at Majuba-under the very steepness of the hill. At Elandslaagte the Boers were completely outflanked, and outnumbered by about three to one. The proportions were somewhat s'nt- lar both at Belmont and Graspan. But at Modder river and Magergfontein all the infantry could do when 1t got with in he zone of fire from the trenches was to lie down, each man keeping be- hind such cover as he might find and staying there most of the day. At Co., lenso when once the artillery got into that zone. it was lost. The increase of range, combined with the greater rapid ty of fire, enables the line of defense to be thinned to a degree hardly realizable before. One man in trench with l box of ammunition beside him is. worth more than ten men were few years ago. While on this subject one might real quick loading and quick-f firing ri- real quick loading antd quick-firing rl- l 1e, has an enormous advantage over | the clumsy Lee -Metford, where each | cartridge is inserted separately and l which requires readjustment after each | shot. The invisibilty of modern rife | ire also protects 1t very largely against artillery. At Modder river there were | many, not only among the war cores 1ondents, who never realized that the | 3oer trenches were on the south side of he river The extent of a defensive po- ,ton has thus been greatly enlarged, l ind nothing has done the Boer com handlers greater credit than the quick less with which they have grasped this act and the courage with which they lave acted upon it. At Magersfontein en to twelve thousand Boers are hold- ng over sixteen miles of trenches: ound Ladysmith a force of similar, or ess, strength is holding an even larger ircuit
 The same change which has so great / widened the area of battle even be- ween such comparatively small forces $ are now engaged in South Africa has lsc enormously increased the value of actical mobility. The admirable skill no rapidty with which the Boers are lways able to reinforce any portion of heir fighting line that may be attacked as been one of the chief causes of their uccess, and has led our commanders lnlost invariably to over-cstimate the ulnbers of the forces opposed to them. again, with the general spreading out f a battle, the importance of the self chance and individual initiative in the fiji CTS commanding attachments, and ven in each single private soldier has cen infinitely enhanced. It is getting sss Gnd less possible for a general to cntrol the details of battle once il aa started. If he attempts to do 80 tr , ms he risk of leaving his force inac~ VI, while the other is struggling With .
 superior enemy, which has been. the asa with our troops in more than one lstnnce in this war. The value of ec dlness and intelligence in the indi- '. llual soldier is, perhaps, the most inn 1rtaut lesson of this war. Modern !, ehting demands not men who can obey 1. wort of command promptly, but self 4 liant men. men able to grasp the geli- al idea of 9 battle, to remember in , ructions and carry them out faithfully
 thc. intent io,, .ro thpr than tn the let |