The Oskaloosa herald., 1900-11-22

sufficiently flexible to admit of some 9TH
er construction by which that intention
can be better effected, the law requires
that construction to be adopted. The
intention of an act involves consider
alton of its subject matter, and the
change in, or an addition to, the law
which it proposes; hence the supreme
importance of the rule that statute
should be construed with reference to
its general purpose and aim"
In United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wal
lace, ,482, the supreme court of the Unit
ed States says: All laws should re-
ceive a sensible construction. General
terms should be so limited in their APP
plication as not to lead to injustice and
oppression, or an absurd consequence.
1t will always, therefore, be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions
to its language which should avoid re-
suits of this character. The reason Of
the law in such cases should prevail
over the letter" These principles and
rules are abundantly sustained by numer-
GUS authorities.
Now apply them to the question in
hand. The terms of Office of all officers
with the exception of those named above.
commence on the first Monday of Janu-
airy. The first Monday of January may
be the Ist day of January, or any day
between that and the 9TH of January.
The terms extend through two years
and it is sufficiently accurate TO say that
they extend through the calendar year.
For instance, my last term term extends
through the years 1900 and 1000 1t is
generally understood by the great mass
of people that the terms expire with the
last year of the term. presume l have
said, and thought / was speaking suffi-
GENTLY accurately, that my term of Office
expires this year, that is, with 1000.
This is the last year of my term; never
in my own mind have | taken into ac-
count the few days that may intervene
between the 3Ist day of December and
the Ist day of the January following.
Such is the general understanding. To
all intents and purposes, the terms of
all officers, state. county and township,
elected in 1893 terminate or expire with
the year 1000.
In section 246 of Sutherland on Stat
utorv Construction. it is said: General
words or clauses may be restricted to
effectuate the intention or to harmonic
them with other express provisions.
Where general language construed in a
particular sense would read to an alb
surdity, it may be restricted. The par
ticular inquiry is not what is the alb
stract force of the words, or what they
may comprehend, but in what sense they
were intended to be used as they are
found in the act The sense in which
they were intended to be used furnished
the rule of Interpretation, and this is to
be collected from the context; and
narrower or more extended meaning is
to be given according to the intention
thus indicated"
USED IN POPULAR SENSE.
The sense in which the words in the
amendment above quoted were evidently
used was that those officers whose terms
of office in the popular sense; and to all
intents' and purposes, expire with the
1901, shall be extended for one year, and
not that the terms of office of those off
GERS whose terms of office to all intents
and purposes, expire with the year 1900
shall be extended one year.
In other words, the two general as
semblies, as we'll as the people who voted
for the amendment, disregarded the few
days which may intervene between the
Ist day of January and the first Monday
of January. and used the language of
said amendment in the sense that the
terms of office of officers who were elect
ed in 1899 expire December 81, 1901
Any other construction would thwart the
evident intent of the two general assem-
blies who proposed the amendment as
well as the people who voted therefor.
am clearly of the opinion that the
courts would so conStrue the said
amendment, and it ought to be so con-
strued.
Another consideration: If we look at
the amendment, we see that a change of
but one word in the fourteenth line
makes the amendment harmonious in
view of the provisions of section 1850 of
the code, and effectuates the plain, I'M
disputed intent of the amendment If
the words zone thousand nine hundred
and one" be read "on thousand nine
and two there is no difficulty
IN understanding the amendment and no
doubt exists as to its meaning. The |
question arises whether such a substitu- |
ton of words is permissible under the |
rules of Interpretation of statutes. If |
the general assembly did not use the |
clause, call other elective state, county |
and township officers whose terms of |
office would otherwise expire in the year
one thousand nine hundred and one" in
the sense which l have above explained, |
then the use of the word zone" in the |
line instead of the word |
two" was clearly mistake; possibly a
clerical error, which was not detected |
until after the amendment was adopted
COURTS MAY CORRECT MISTAKES.
The question then arises: Have the |
courts, in constituting a statute, power to |
correct plausible mistakes which are
shown to be such by the entire context |
II the statute, or the constitutional pro-
vision? The answer to this question
must be in the affirmative. | will not re
Ter to the cases which so hold A num-
Der of such are cited under section zoo
u Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
ion.
In Palms VS.. Shawano county, 81
Wis, 2II (2I N w. R., III, the SUI
oreme court of Wisconsin substituted
he word north" for the word south"
o correct an evident mistake.
In State VS.. Brandt, al Iowa, 583, the
supreme court of this state construed
he word cor" to mean "and." Numer-
,us authorities could be cited to show
hat the courts will not permit the mis-
Use or mistake in the use, or omission