The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-12-07
Trom the coneressionp, Record.l

PEELED to Judge the pending bill by the
newspaper repors. because it has been
SO recently reported to the House that
there has peen no opportunity to study its
details; but as l understand them i, fixes
the minimum limit of the Regular Army
ct more than twice the number of men
that 1t contained at the beginning of the
Spanish war and gives to the President
authority 10 increase the number by &c
per cent, or to make 1t nearly four times
as large as it was at the outbreak of the
war Undoubtedly some increase is need
cd. Sufficient men should be provided TO
man our coast defences. But taking into
account every probable demand, it seems
to me that military establishment of
80 600 men should be ample for all needs
of the country upon this hemisphere.
This estimate is in harmony with the
Message OF the President, which puts the
number required for the Philippine
Islands at from IL, 600 to 60,c00. There
should undoubtedly be reform in the Or
ganization Of the army. We have had too
many officers in proportion to the number
of men, and the cost per soldier has thus
been greatly increased.
One objection to this bill is that for
minimum army OF 0.G00 substantially the
same number of commissioned officers are
provided as would be needed for the max
imum number OF nearly 100.0 GQ 1t is to
be regretted that the bill does not give us
the efficient and economical organization
in the smaller army. am unable to ac-
cept the principle which would confer
upon the Executive the discretion to null
tiply almost by two the regular standing
army of the United States; and / say this
without regard to the present Executive
who would exercise the discretion, / be-
leve as periodically and wisely as 1t
could be exercised.
The objection is one of fundamental
principle. Congress should fix the number
of men in our military establishment. The
Importance of an army in any Govern
ment. and most of all in a republican
government, is SO great that it is dan
gerous grant of power, and l believe
one that cannot be paralleled even in
the constitutional monarchies. to bestow
upon the Executive such authority in
fixing the number of the army. This eX-
traordinary discretion is not conferred for
an emergency or with any limitation as
10 time. The power is his. not for day
or year, but it will require 10 terminate
it law which must pass both houses of
Congress and be approved by the Presi-
of both houses over his veto.
II may be said that money must still
be provided by Congress to maintain the
army. But after a charge upon the pub
lie Treasury has been created by law, an
appropriation becomes merely matter of
form. In fact, soldier for whose pay an
appropriation should be denied might pro-
ceel in the Court Of Claims and recover
judgment against the Government. We
propose by this bill, therefore. to confer
upon the Executive the power to raise
the Regular Army from about $4,000 men
TO about 100000 men, and also the power
Of creating charge upon the Treasury
equal to the difference in the cost be-
tween those two armies.
1t strikes me that this is violation
OF most essential principles. Congress
should not confer such responsibility
upon the Executive; but. as the great po-
litical organ of the Government and the
direct representative of the people. it
should always maintain control in a mat
ter of such Importance.
Furthermore, l do not believe that 1t
10 necessary that Congress should au-
thorize permanent military organiza-
tion Of 100000 men. l believe that such
an organization is vastly in excess of the
permanent need of this country. do not
say that that number is too great If We
are to decide to maintain perpetually an
empire over those 1900 islands in the
tropics OF Asia. / fear we shall need them
all as long as We shall maintain our
government there.
/ am firmly convinced that the honor
and interests OF the United States de-
mand that we should make II the goal
OF American craftsmanship to extricate
ourselves from responsibility for the gov
- -
again to the historic policy discerned by
the eagle eye of Washington more than
hundred years ago, and which was
marked out by the location of this coun-
Try, by the character of our Government,
and by our obvious interests.
1t seems to me the time has arrived at
last when the question OF the ultimate re-
lstions Of this country 10 the Philippine
Archipelago should be considered and our
position as nation declared. Before the
treaty We were told that the question
could not with propriety be discussed; that
we were at war with Spain, and that a |
discussion Of that character should wait
the return Of peace. After peace had been
declared and We had bought from her the
civil war which We had at least encouraged
against her, We were fold that 1t would not
do to discuss the ultimate relations of the
Philippine Islands with us while they were
in what was called a state of rebellion
against their purchasers. We have been
told. however, with good deal OF itera-
ton by our generals and commissioners
and other civil officers, that the organized |
rehellion was broken up; that an appear
snce OF war was only kept UP by the hope |
OF political occurrence in this country |
which has not taken place.
II the question cannot with propriety be |
discussed today, IL We must wait until the |
Philippine Islands are as peaceful as Ohio /
or Massachusetts. fear that it will never
become proper for US to discuss what our
duties and our interests demand, but We
shall be thrust along to one ill-considered
step after another until our position shall
become irretrievably hxed. In my opin on
our policy in the Philippines should have
been declared at the outset and should
have been a similar policy TO that which
We declared for Cuba. Unfortunately our
course was consistent with no other theory
than that the Filipino had been fighting
simply for q change of masters, and that
the yoke Of the United States might be
substituted for the yoke of Spain. If we
had prscticed similar policy in Cuba,
which some influential gentlemen seem to
regret, who can doubt that We should have
had war in Cuba as We have one in the
Philippine Islands?
The Filipinos had an army more thor
oughiy organized than the army of Cuba
They had been treated more nearly as our
sllles, and had conducted themselves
braYeiy and efficiently in battles in which
our own soldiers were engaged Would IL
not have been beyond the bounds Of all be-
lief that We should not have had war If,
under these conditions. We purchased and
MD rnrAd In L.