The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1900-06-08

aJ as the wal on their
a&- part has been
Vel WNSM lacking in enter
EX8NAS n y sasaaaSe prise. Since an
MNNNNN ~ army travels on
WMN .NfGCSe0b. it's belly, there is
no way. in which
the enemy's game may so easily be
upset as by shutting off food supply.
The more desperate the situation of an
army in contact with the opposing
force the harder does the blow in the
rear strike home. 1t was often at
tempted in the civil war to raid the
rear of an army Just at the time it
was fighting in front and, while need
ing the supplies. could not turn to de-
fend them. Grants first overland cam
paign against Nicksburg was broken
up by a move of that kind. Hooker
attempted to turn that trick on Lee at
the battle of charlottesville. and
Grant himself tried it ON Lee with in
different success several times during
his advance against Richmond.
Military men nave all along assumed
that it must be part OF the Boer plan
to allow the British to mass heavily at
long distances from their bases and
then just when they were committed
to battle or to a forward movement
the communications in the rear would
be cut. Early in the conflict a Dutch
official in tie confidence of the South
African Beers told the writer thai the
railways in Cape Colony would surely
be cut in real of the British whenever
such a blow would certainly destroy
the British campaign.
Even when not so completely sue
cessful as the raid which turned Grant
back from his attack on Vicksburg
from the north in 1862. a vigorous dash
IN the communications of an army
puts it at great disadvantage in many
ways and at least forces its command
er to act with caution when only by
boldness a he hope to succeed. When
Sherman was slowly pushing the Con-
federates backward toward Atlanta.
he left almost as many troops behind
to guard his communications as he had
on the fighting line. The Confederate
cavalry leaders often wanted to try
their hands at breaking up Sherman's
line, but for some. reason it was not
carried out. Sherman also sent out
raiders to the heart of Georgia to de-
stroy Confederate supply stores and
factories, cut railroads and blow up
bridges. but, although this work was
pushed with energy, it did not effect
the immediate result. The south had
too many railroads feeding it's chief
points to make it possible to cripple
the army by simply destroying or
two, and raiders seldom had time al
lowed them to make a clean sweep Of
all the roads.
When Grant attempted to march
on NickSburg from the north, he de-
pended upon one railway line for sup
~plies-that is, three railroads forming
for his purposes one line of t~ransporta.
ton from his main base to the front.
The Mississippi Central, branching OF
from the Mobile and Ohio at Jackson,
Tenn, ran in the direction of his march
and carried supplies to his depot at
Holly Springs, Miss. This read was
intersected by the Memphis and
Charleston north of Holly Springs and
was fed from the extreme north by the
Mobile and Ohio. terminating at Co
lumbus, Ky. J,
General Forrest, the Confederate
king of west Tennessee, set out on a
ride to break the Mobile and Ohio and
did his work thoroughly at points
where he struck the road, but Grant
had many fleet s%quadrons under able
leaders, and Forrest was often com
pelled to fight when he wished to be
blowing up culyerts and burning
bridges. He created a panic in Grants
rear, but all the Federal cavalry was
on his track, and alone he could not
have spoiled the march to Vicksburg.
Van Dorm timed his raid upon Holly
Springs so as to strike just when the
supplies would run low on account OF
Forests work in Tennessee, for even
when a raider failed to cut the road lis
mere. presence on the line held up sup
plies for a time. Grant was at Oxford
Miss, so miles south of Holly Springs
on the way to Vicksburg. and the Con
federates were at Grenada, 30 miles
farther south. Federal scouts brought
word to headquarters that Van Dom
had started north across the 9alla
busha, and Grant sent a force to inter
cept him, but the raiders reached th'
Federal lines almost as soon as the
scouts. They dashed into Holly Spring:
at daylight, capturing its garrison o.
1900 men and destroyed all the mum
tons of war, food and forage; ais
burned up many trains. Van Dorm es
timated the value of the property de
stroyed at 81, 100000. Grant estimated
the damage in another way. He sai'
that he was cut off from communica
tions for the north for Il week, and |
was more Than W. weeks before rl
ions or forage could he issued regular
". Therefore he decided to abandon
his campaign to the interior, with Go
]u,nbus as the base, and depend upol
the Mississippi water line for supplies
He took his army back to Memphis