The National tribune., 1900-05-17

came a further test of endurance-a long
dash over very rough, rntraveled ground,
| with here and there a ditch or hole to be
! jumped, or a siding to be passed. But
Mr.. Lincoln kept well up TO Mcclellan,
who made good time. Finally, the riding
down the lines was performed, amidst the
Haunting of standards, the beating of drums
the loud cheering of the men, and rapid
discharges of artillery, startling even the
beSt-trained horses. Lincoln sat easy
| to the end, when he wheeled his horse into
position to witness the vast columns march
| III review. Mcclellan was surprised at so
remarkable a display of horsemanship.
MIR. Lincoln was great lover of the
horse, and skilled rider. His awkward
ness of form did not show in the saddle.
He always looked well when mounted"
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LINCOLN
AND MCCLELLAN.
After the Presidents return to Washing
| ton, he began urging McClellanio 10 resume
active operations; desiring him to cross the
Potomac, and give battle to the enemy Or
| he addressed TO him the following letter,
which is notable expression of Mr.. Lin
coins views of the military problem as
| presented at that time:
"EXECUTIvE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
Oct. 13, 1862.
my DEAR SIR: You remember my
speaking to you of what called Your over
cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious
when you assume that you cannot do what
the enemy is constantly doing? Should
you not claim to be at least his equal in
prowcss, and act upon the claim?
AS understand, you telegraphed Gen.
Haqeck that you cannot subsist your army
at Winchester unless the railroad from
Harpcr'S Ferry to that point be put in work
ing order. But the enemy does now subsist
his army. at Winchester, at distance
nearly twice as great from railroad trans
portatlon as you would have to do, without
the railroad last named. He now wagons
from Culpeper Court House, which is just
about twice as far as YOU would have to do
more than half as well provided with
wagons as you are. ! certainly should be
pleased for YOU to have the advantage of
the railroad from Harpcr's Ferry to Win
chester; but it wastes all the remainder of
Autumn TO give it to you, and, in fact
ignores the question OF time, which can not
and must not be ignored.
again, one of the standard maxims of
war, as you know, IS, to operate upon the
enemy's communications as much as pos
sible, without exposing your own You
seem to act as if this applies against YOU,
y
positions with the enemy, and think you
not he would break your communication
with Richmond within the next "a hours?
You dread his going into Pennsylvania.
But if he does so in full force, he gives up
his communications to you absolutely, and
you have nothing to do but TO follow and
ruin him; if he does SO with less than full
force, fall upon and beat what is left behind
all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, |
you are now nearer Richmond than the
enemy is, by the route that you can and he
must take. Why can You not reach there
before him, unless you admit that he is more
than your equal on the march? His route
is the arc Of a circle, while yours is the
chord. The roads are as good on yours as
on his.
"You know desired, but did not order.
you to cross the Potomac below instead of
above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. |
Ny idea was, that this would at once men,
ace the enemy's communications. which | |
would seize if he would permit If he |
should move northward, l would follow
him closely, holding his communications. |
If he should prevent our Selling his COM
municahons, and move toward Richmond, |
] would press closely to him, fight him if a |
favorable opportunity should present, and |
at least try- g beat him to Richmond on the |
inside track: say try for if we never |
try, we shall never succeed. If he make n |
stand at Winchester, moving neither north |
nor south, l would fight him there, on the |
idea that if we cannot beat him when he |
bears the WaStage of coming to lis, we |
never can when We bear the wastage of |
going to him. This proposition is a simple |
truth, and is too important to be lost sight |
OF for a moment In coming to us, he |
tenders us an advantage which we should !
not waive. We should not so operate as to
merely drive HIM away. AS we must beat |
him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do
It, If at all, easier near to us than far away.
s -
is, we never can, he again being within the
intrenchments of Richmond. Recurring
10 the idea of going to Richmond on the in
side track, the facility of supplying from the
side away from the enemy is remarkable,
as it were, by thedifferent spokes of a wheel,
extending from the hub toward the rim,
and this whether you move directly by the
chord. or on the inside are. hugging the
Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line,
as You see, carries YOU by Alde, Hay
market, and Fredericksburg, and you see
how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the
Potomac by Aqua Creek, meet you at all
points from Washington. The same, only
the lines heightened a little, if you press
closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.
The gaps through the Blue Ridge under
stand to be about the following distances
from Harper's Ferry; TO wit, Vestal's, five
28; Manassas, IS; Chester, 45; and Thorn
toms, SO. | should think it preferable to
take the route nearest the enemy, disabling
him to make an important move without
your knowledge, and compelling him to
keep his forces together for dread of YOU
The gaps would enable you to attack if you
should wish. For a great part of the way
you would be practically between the
enemy and both Washington and Rich
mond, enabling us TO spare you the greatest
number of troops from here. When, at
length, running to Richmond ahead of him
enables him to move this way, if he does so.
turn and attack him in the rear. But |,
think he should be engaged long before
such point is reached. 1t is all easy if our
troops march as well as the enemy, and it
is unmanly TO say they cannot do it. This
letter is in no sense an order.
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.
McCLELLAN'S FINAL REMOVAL.
Subsequent communications from the I
President to Mcclellan showed more and
more impatience. On the 25th he teIe- {
Il have just read your dispatch
about sore-tongue and fatigued horses.
viii you pardon me- for asking what the
horses Of your army have done since the
battle OF Antietam that fatigues anything?"
And the next day, after receiving Gen.
McClellan's answer to his inquiry, he re-
sponded: Most certainly / intend no in