The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-01-29
BRITISH ,GENERALSHIP

Any attempt to generaIize upon the sit
uation of South Africa on the basis of what
was known concerning it in London yes
terday morning would be worse than use
less. At that time positively nothing re-
liabl- was known by the press or public
in regard to whatever may have happened
in Natal since Sir Charles Warren vas
compelled to abandon Spion KOp on last
Wednesday night 1t may suit the pur-
poses of the British War Office to release
! some news of some sort this morning; in
which case our latest cable dispatches will
bring it to the eyes of Times readers;
| but at this writing it does not appear that
| anybody in America has any safe ground
upon which to found opinions of I mill
tary sort.
That the War Office has much and proba-
bly, important intelligence OF the move
ments on Buffers line there is little room
to doubt. That up to yesterday it was
of depressing character all England be-
lieved The British people were compelled
to suffer suspense and anxiety for the fate
OF their army and their relatives in it, and
were not IN the best humor with their
authorities and field generals in conse-
quence
As to the latter there seems to be a
great deal of excuse for unfavorable criti-
cism. The revelations contained in Bull
ler's reports of the fighting at Coenso,
and Methuen's of the battle of Modder
River, are not calculated to inspire re-
newed confidence in British generalship.
Butler states that at Coleuso Colonel Long,
chief of artillery, disobeyed orders and
ran away from his infantry supports into
an area at close range which had not been
previously secuted Hence the loss of the
sixteen guns. and, according to Butler. the
impossibllity of crossing the Tugela at
that point and time. Lord Methuen ad-
mits that, at Modder River. he assumed
that the Beers were fighting retiring
action" and did not look for serious re-
sistance short of Spytfontein. where his
information located them in force and en-
trenched Spytfontein, it will be remem
bered. is so close to Kimberley that even
u temporary success in turning Cronje's
right flank might easily bring the be-
leagucred garrison into engagement with
the Boer right in reverse. and for that
reason we should think IL would have 0c-
CURED to Lord Methpen to expect a battle
nearer the river Indeed this considera-
ton seemed so obvious that after the
fight at Gras Pan. We ventured the predic-
ton that cronje would repeat the tactics |
of General Thomas at Franklin and Nash !
Vile. by doing all the damage he could !
to Methuen at the crossing, and then re-
firing to an entrenched position at place |
named Metgrs Station. On our war map. |
since identified as Magarsfontein.
With all the lessons of the campaign be-
fore him. Methuen seems still loyal to his
old gods. In the narrative of his move
ment toward Kimberley he defends the /
principle of frontal attack. He states that
the Beers have such superior mobility that
they can change front in fifteen minutes:
so that, by the time a thanking attack can
an argument can only hold good within
such narrow field limitations as to be
unworthy of consideration in
connection with operations larger than
those of n small br tgade. It's general fall
lacy ought 10 be apparent TO the kettle
drum of country band. Except in the
cases of fortified towns. IL is not usual to
find an enemy who has been sought out
and pressed with vigor. with his front.
flank. and rear all equally defended. 1t
will be admitted that in the Magarsfontein
instance Cronie had time to prepare his
ground quite thoroughly. Methuen was
not even aware that he was there but ex-
pected to meet him at Spytfonten. What
would the British general have done had
he known the reception in store for him?
Perhaps he would have blundered on Just
the same. But we are very greatly mis-
taken IT, in his place. Miles or Lawton
DR. Longstreet would not have crossed the
Modder to the east of the point he Sc
Iected and fanked Cronie by the veldt
at Jacobsdal. The whole Boer
force could get there as soon as or sooner
than Methuen, but it would have been
forced to engage him in the open, and
would not have had time or opportunity to
construct such defences as he butted his
head against at Maearsfontein with his
avorite frontal attack.
As stated above. it is not safe to indulge
n theories or surmises about the situa-
ion on the Tugela, while the suggestions
Contained in hints from the British au-
horities and reports from Boer sources
ire almost irresistible temptations to do
20 When the curtain rises on the events
u the past week as It surely must within I
day or so. there will be plenty to think
md write about.