The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1900-05-18

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Xxx MI and it cannot
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how badly they were defeated. Cronje
Kept Methuen out of Kimberley for
months, and he accomplished this by
able tactics and good fighting.
The Beers invested heavily in the
siege of Kimberley 1t has been point
ed out that they might have struck out
for the south and checked Methuen at
Or below the Orange river. But in
that case the force used against Me
thuen would have weakened the be-
siegers of Kimberley by just so much.
Cronje handled his men in way that
stopped Methuen effectually, yet kept
his own force close to Kimberley in
case Of need.
From the newest accounts it seems
that the Beers have never sent heavy
forces far from their own soil. Butler
was held on the Tugela by few
thousand men. Methuen estimated his
enemy all the way from Belmont to
Magersfontein at 10000 to 10000, yet
when Cronje was cornered he had less
than 1000 soldiers. Cronje's move
ments up to the time of cutting loose
from the line in front of Methuen to
evade Lord Roberts trap cannot be
laid to his own door. His conduct
was in accord with the general policy
of the Boer government and was evil
IDENTIFY directed from Pretoria. AS Me-
thuen advanced northward Cronje gave
battle at points where he could dam
age the enemy most with the least loss
and risk to his own army. In military
parlance Methuen was drawn on from
point to point by a clever tactician and
crippled at every feasible place. Final
", when there was but one route Of
march toward Kimberley, Cronje drew
up his army lengthwise Of the pass,
and Methuen failed to drive him from
the first hill which guarded the flank.
1t was said by the British that the
Beers We're so badly punished at Ma
gersfontein that they were about to re-
treat and would have done so but for
Methuen's fight back to Modder river.
As the Beers have been clever at know
ing their advantages, it is more likely
that they were ready to fall back
step just to draw Methuen farther in
to the trap. Methuen didn't go far
enough at Magersfontein to get the
full punishment Cronje was prepared
to infict.
The Cronje Of the Methuen era and
the Cronje Of Lord Roberts campaign
seem like two different men. There
are two kinds of martial valor. One is
allied to stubbornness that will die
rather than yield and the other goes
with the genius which knows that war
isn't wholly a question Of fighting. 1t
: is a good general who knows when
he is whipped and acts nationally.
Cronje was outgeneraled and didn't
! know it evidently. A German officer
who was with him till the last declares
that Cronje wouldn't believe that Lord
Roberts troops were striking for his
flank. He said he thought it impossi-
BILE that the British could move SO
swiftly.
Good generalship involves not alone
meeting the enemy's actual move
ments, but anticipating his possible
movements. What the enemy Is doing
is often cover for some larger move
ments he intends doing. Cronje's de-
feat was due to his having been mob
bed by vastly superior numbers, but
he was outgeneraled before he was
mobbed.
Cronje's retreat and last campaign
recall Lees at Petersburg and Apo
mattox. Lee hoped to keep the APP
pomattox river between his front and
the enemy. But Sheridan was too
lively for him and headed him off. It
Is said that Lee DETECTED his march in
order to secure rations for his men and
IN SO doing lost days time, which
proved fatal. Cronje hoped to have
the Modder river as a barrier to cover
his retreat. He also expected to be
Joined by other forces to strengthen
him for the fight. But the British
crossed the Modder and threw their
lines around his pathway front and
rear and on his tanks.
Another criticism upon CronJe's tao
tics in the last campaign is that Of a
German officer who was with him and
says that the position in the bed Of the
river was a hole and in every way
unsuitable for defense. The artillery
could not play upon, the enemy at q
distance, and the outlooks could moi
detect British movements. Every rule
OF the military art was violated in tax
ing up for defense low position al
Paardeburg. The fight of Sunday, Feb
IS, a week before Cronje gave in
showed that the ground was a good
one for halt providing outside helI
came to his aid. He held the British
of that day, and his line was not in
closed by Roberts men. The statement
telegraphed from the front that Cronjt
had offered to surrender and then re
y called 1t was an error caused by {
wrong Interpretation of note writer
in Dutch. The note said that he would
continue the defense.
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