Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1900-03-02
A TALK WITH OTIS
Continued from First Page.)

slowly but surely to an inevitable conclu
sion. In Luzon, north Of Manila, there i
no longer any organized army of insur
gents; the outlaw element of that army /
dispersed in small bands, whose offenses o
murder and robbery against their own PEG
pie are bringing them under the ban o
Filipino public sentiment and are causing
information to be lodged against them b.
the natives that their destruction o
conversion into permanent Amigos is
matter of course in reasonable period.
While l may not speak definitely Of pro
jected military movements, 1t is certain
that during the dry season the same pro
cess of dispersion and compulsory disinte
grafton which has been applied to the in
surgent forces north of Manila will be ex
tended to the entire island, including Ca
vite and adjacent provinces. where the las
considerable concentration of fighting Tag
alloys is being effected.
American People Should BE Patient.
Patience should be a prominent featur
now of the public attitude toward the mil
itary campaign. A very trying period botl
for the soldiers and the people has beer
reached. A misunderstanding of conditions
here will easily lead to unreasonable criti
cism 1t Is to be remembered that the Fill
pinos no longer face the American soldiers
If they are in danger of being corneret
they hide their arms and appear in peace
full white as the most conciliatory of ami
gos. The Spanish method was not only t.
Kill insurgents caught in arms, but to de
vastate the offending district and to shoe
down on suspicion these nominal non-com
batants. American public sentiment woult
not permit a duplication of this method
Filipinos captured while bearing arms ar
relieved of their rifles and after a periot
of detention are released. 1t does not pa,
US to keep them and care for them. Th
Filipino military need is not men, but arm
and ammunition. Tagalog armed opposi
ton seems to dissipate as our force ap
proaches. but as that force passes by o
withdraws the Filipino bandit reappears
and If our soldiers return to the starting
point instead of pushing forward he cele
brates victory. This kind of warfare il
exasperating to the soldiers and from it
apparent unproductiveness of result
arouses the Impotence of the public. Tw,
or three regiments could march anywher
in Luzon and destroy everything which
Aguinaldo could oppose TO them. Will
the real war is over the need of a larg
and vigilant army here has not passed. TIL
process of wedding out the robber band
will be slow and tedious but the result i
sure.
Native Confidence Increasing.
with an increased cavalry force, witt
steadily enlarging knowledge of the topog
raphy of the islands, with a vigorou
pushing policy on our part, and with de
crease Of Filipino sympathy for the rob
Der bands, which flying before the Ameri
cans have brutally turned their weapon
against their cOuntrymen, the pacificatiol
of the islands will be fastened Who'll
sections need only to be convinced of tn
permanence of American protection agains
the local banditti to cooperate hearth,
with us. They have been deferred, an,
are still to some extent, by the fear tina
after while the american soldiers will
be removed to some other point and tina
they will be exposed to the murderous fur,
of the cutthroats who are threatening witt
death all who show q friendly spirit towar,
Americans. The contrast between our con
duct toward the people and that of Spanish
or insurgent soldiers is appreciated ant
confidence in US is steadily increasing In
surgent leaders themselves while in tn
field have placed their families in the Sc
curity Of American protection at Manila.
Military Problems Misunderstood.
misunderstanding of the conditions here
and lack of knowledge to be obtained onl!
by presence on the ground and by a genera
view of the whole situation have caused
criticism of the apparently purposeless pol
icy of capturing and abandoning towns
many times in succession. The vital poin
of attack was not the town, but the con
centrating Ffliptnos, and not so much tn
Filipiuos themselves as the arms and am
munition which they carried. Our com
parativey small force occupying a long th
line could not afford to permit the enem,
to concentrate at any adjacent and threat
ening point, and was compelled to take tn,
initiative and to strike wherever he showed
a disposition to assemble in force. If tn,
concentration movement was prevented, i
the Fflipinos were dispersed with losse.
and arms and ammunition were captured
the action was successful, even though
through lack of garrisoning force or OF
account of the undesirabfity of its occu
patton for military purposes the village O
nipa huts at which the engagement oc
CURED was not held after the Filipinos
were chased out. With the increased force
of soldiers now in the islands it will b.
possible to garrison and hold all points OF
strategic value"
Must civil development await the com
piete destruction of the robber bands?"
Civil Government Need Not Wait.
No. The military operations have al
ready reached4the stage where their prob
lens are surpassed In Importance by thos,
of civil administration. 1t Is mueh to b.
desired that Congress should act prompt,
upon the Presidents suggestions in this re
spect. to the end that order may be evolved
from chaos. The problem Is to build up
structure republican in form upon an mad
equate and unreliable foundation. TIL
start upon substantially self-supporti;.;
municipal governments has been made ant
at many points these are cropping towar,
the light. The outline Of simple form o
LEGAL government has been framed and ru
in practical operation wherever feasible
There Is a steady, though slow, increase 81
the degree of Filipino cooperation in SUD
governments. The mass of Aguinaldo's FOL
lowers are young and Irresponsible. Prop
erty owners of intelligence already sympa
thize with the Americans, but, as 1 fav
already said. they are in many cases terror
lied nv the Ap1iinaldists who prnnisa do, r