Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1900-08-28
COURT DECISIONS.
DIGESTED BY W. B. MARTIN
EXCLUSIVELY FOR
vlRclNiAN-PlLOT.
Notes Of Cases Recently Decided
Which Are of Interest to
Our People.
BROWN v. STATE.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Nav II 1900

May IL, 1900.
WHEN A PASSENGER WHO IS IN
a CAR OTHER THAN THAT TO
WHICH HE HAS BEEN ASSIGN
ED, REFUSES TO LEAVE IT ON
REQUEST OF THE CONDUCTOR,
HE is LIABLE TO PROSECUTION
UNDER SECTION 52S OF THE
PENAL CODE, EVEN THOUGH
HE WAS ONLY PASSING
THROUGH THE CAR.
Brown was convicted of remaining
In car other than that to which he
hau been assigned and appealed.
The court says:
AT the trial it appeared that an ex-
curslon train. upon which both white
ana colored people were transported,
was run from Savannah to Macon.
beiore leaving Savannah, the colored
p pas were assigned to two OF the
cars composing the train. and the
white passengers to another of them.
me train was so arranged that the
car Tor the white people was placed
between the two cars provided for the
colored people. AT a point in Wash
Ihston county, Brown left the rear
car, in which colored people were rid
ing. and entered the car in which the
white passengers were seated. The
conductor, with the aid of passenger
, he called to his assistance, forci-
piy elected Brown from the car thus
entered by him, and the grand jury
subsequently indicted him for ire
malning' In that car after having been
assigned to another. AS to the facts
above recited there was practically no
controversy. 1t is inferable from the
testimony of the conductor that Brown
mad been assigned in Savannah to the
rear car set apart for people of his
race race. His contention was that. hav-
ing at somes point on the journey left
the front car and gone into the rear
car, he was proceeding to go from the
latter TO the former, and had for this
purpose only entered the intermediate
car occupied by white people, when he
was accosted by the conductor and re-
however, eveidence for the State to the
erect, that when this request was
made, Brown. with an oath refused to
leaVe the car. declaring that he had
paid his fare and had a right to ride
where pleased, and that he was there
upon elected from the car. 1t makes
no difference whether in point of fact.
Browns proper place was in the front
OF In the rear car set apart for colored
people In neither event was it lawful
lor MIN to remain" in the car pro-
vided for white people. after being re-
quested by the conductor to leave the
same. Giving the accused the full
beneht OF the theory that he entered
~ "ihtc people s car With no inten-
ton except to pass through the same.
ana would have done so If he had not
Deen interrupted, the above-recited evil
idence as to what actually occurred
When the conductor accosted him war
ranted the conclusion that he commit
ted the misdemeanor forbidden by sec
ton 52S of the Penal Code. He, II is
true, denied the correctness of that
version of the matter; but we must
deal with the case upon the assump-
ton that the jury. as 1t was their right
to do. believed the States witnesses.
IT, when requested by the conductor to
leave the white peoples car the ac-
cused had promptly proceeded to- do so.
as required, we are not prepared to say
he would have been a criminal merely
because of the fact that he had I'M
lawfully entered this car. The gist of
the offense is remaining in a car other
than the one to which a passenger
may have been assigned and the
states evidence warranted a finding
that the plaintiff in error did remain
In car other than that to which he
had been assigned. His refusal to
leave the car, accompanied by the pos-
tive assertion of n right to ride there
in. and resistance to the conductors
effort to evict him. certainly was re-
naming. and the length of time he re-
manned was,|ef- course; ir11material..
Affirmed.