The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1900-04-08

His account of Stewards behavior dur
ing the agitation which preceded the dec
| laration Of war proves once more that this
| statesman was politician in every sense
| Of the word, and that he played the game
of politics as he would play chess for
| wager, carefully, automatically, though
| not always wisely. His support of the I'm
ion was due less TO sentiment than to rea-
son. He believed disunion to be impolitic
| and unwise He objected to secession OF
| economic rather than moral grounds. He
was not an abolitionist. His formulation
Of his principles. when confronted with
the difficult problem of taking a stand
| which would neither countenance seces-
sion nor infiame Southern sentiment was
both characteristic and consummately pol
lite 1t was an archetypal compromise
This was January L. 1851 He acknoNl
! edged the force of the fugitive slave
| clause but desired that il be SO modified
as not TO endanger the liberty OF free
| blacks or compel private citizens TO be-
| come slave-catcners. That was sop to
| the GarrisoniaBs and intended to prevent
! trouble continually arising between the
| claimants and protectors of fug tives. He
| then said that he was in favor of making
slavery permanently free from Congress
| SIGNAL control. That was oil thrown upon
| troubled waters in the South. He would
favor laws 10 prevent invasion of any
State by citizens of any other State That
would prevent repetition of the Kansas
| troubles. Finally. he presents a plan for
settling territorial difficulties which is
| simply stroke of genius in its evasion
| Of responsibility:
After the admission of Kansas free State,
| he would consent to the consolidation of all the
/ territories into two States, and admit them with
ont restriction TO slavery. if the right TO make
subdivisions .nto several convenient States could
ton did not permit such reservation. II it were
feasible, he would prefer TO have the present diff
culties settled in regular constitution conven-
! ton when the eccentric movements of secession
! and ds,Inion shall have ended, in whatever form
that end may come. and the angry excitement of
! the hour shall have subsidized then, and
! not till then-one, two, three years hence
| Thus. like the chess player who stops the
! threatening advance Of pawn by another
pawn. he risks nothing. but places the
/ whole territorial problem far he is
I concerned. at some indefinite distance in
/ the future, when it will be perfectly safe to
| prophesy that it will be settled somehow
| already.
In his peroration he made deft and
| effective appeal to the sentiment of loyalty
! to the Union. which had the result of con-
solidating Northern sentiment on that sub
| iect. 1t may be that this appeal was ir-
! tended as a sort of tombstone, TO rally
| Southern loyalists If possible, and test the
| feeling of the whole people; but whether
this is so or not the effect that it had was
! to make the North ready to resist. almost
unanimously, the secession movement
at this time Seward may be said to have
teen at the height of his influence, if net
tf his real power; and Ii is no wonder
that, having shown such remarkable
skill in the management OF his followers,
and knowing political conditions from one
hi Fr;n 40. CHI \
have undervalued the shrewd fore sight
and calm sagacity Of Lincoln. That they
did so underestimate the tremendous p A.
soEal power of the new President there Is
now 70 reason 10 doubt. The doubt was.
moreover. reasonable. Eincoln was CON-
parativeIy unknown; he had not posed as
a political sage. Seward lad, ard what is
more he had been one. Positive proof
of Lincoln's genius in dealing WITH men
was in his sizing up OF Seward AS NJ.
Bancroft remarks, the President saw that
the great New York Republican would be
dangerous anywhere outside OF tie Cabi-
net, and therefore gave him The position
demanded for him, that o. Secretary Of
state. 1t became evident very soon that, I
to use a bit of latter-day slang, Seward
believed himself to be the whole thing"
and Lincoln did not intend that he should
be- This is evident from Lincoln's remark |
during the making up of the Cabinet, VIII n I
SewarTs friends had been making them |
selves obtrusive, that IF the slate should
break again it would break at the top" |
However, on personal acquaintance and |
association with the President, the Secre- !
tary of State, with his quick intuitive rec |
ogniton of great qualities came to under |
stand his chief as he had understood John |
Quincy Adams and Thurlow Weed, and |
later he wrote to a friend that moIable |
sentence, The President is the best of US |
ALL"
The contrast between Seward and Lin |
coin is wildly brought out in these chap |
ters dealing with the early years of the |
Administration. One had talent, the other |
genius. Seward made the blunder that |
clever men often make, of overestimating |
training and experience. He was led by |
his political experience to believe that the |
patriotism of the Southland by this is |
meant loyalty to Southern soil and insti- |
tutions-could not overbalance consider |
ations of self-interest. He did not place |
at its true value the emotionalism in /
which he himself was deficient He did |
not know the South and this was prin- |
cipally because he was too sure that he |
did know it. He made the same mistake |
in his estimate of the common man, the |
uneducated and unlearned but intelligent |
man of the people. Lincoln brought up |
shoulder TO shoulder with the people Of |
border slave state. aSS0cIating not with |
politicians, but with voters, did not make |
any such mistake. He recognized the |
gravity of the danger and the difficulty of |
settling il without war Seward did not. |
The consequence was that in spite of shs |
diplomacy of the Secretary of State war
came md it was the President who stood |
at the helm There was just the difference I
between the two men that there is be-
tween the demagogue and the statesman.
Yet Seward was too much OF a diplomat to |
be wholly a demagogue, and in dealing |
with foreign nations, in the Mason-Slidell |
affair, his adroitness was mastery. He |
could understand playing politics, but not |
handling the mighty forces of primitive
human nature, aroused in civil war. In |
almost all his dealings with European
dplomatists he was successful, and his
only error was in now and then oyeresti-
mating the influence which they might |
have on the affairs of this country. His
success in such work affords additional |
testimony to the wisdom of Lincoln in |
giving him the position of Secretary of |
State
Stewards part In reconstruction, accord |
ing TO Mr.. Bancroft, was much slighter |
than is generally supposed. His health was |
poor he was old and broken and the I'M
wisdom CT Johnson made 1t difficult for |
any aid however efficient, to counteract |
his mistakes. In addition to this Seward |
was not the man TO handle the difficult |
problems of that era. He could not have |
satisfied the Confederate leaders on the |
one hand and the Garrisonians on the 9TH |
err any better than johnson did. The pur
l. -