The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-08-21

here that, under these conditions, rely
ing on hearsay evidence merely, It Is
impossible for a general to make intel
llgent plans, and that the fact that we
have been fioundering about in the
wilderness for months without accom-
Dllshing anything is the result Of the
efforts of one man 70 manage the
wholesale as we'll as the retail depart
ment. without allowing any freedom OF
action to those officers who, from their
positions on the line. must have bet
ter knowledge of the details OF the
campaign"
The third reason given by the cor
respondent Of Harper's Weekly for the
failure of the American army OF occu'
patton to accomplish more in Luaon
than has been accomplished thus far
is that q definite and consistent policy
has been lacking. BY way OF spccifi-
cation he cites the fact that Pasig, the
second largest town in Luzon, was
looted and burned; the villages for
miles along the southern shore of La
guna dc Ray were laid waste. Then"
says he, "came n period when some
times n towr was burned and some
times it was not. no plan being appar-
emily followed. About half the towns
that were destroyed along the railroad
to Malolos were burned by us, the 9TH
or half by the insurgents. The height
of the ridiculous was reached when
Malolos was captured. Here the ut
most care was taken by our officers 10
protect property; brigadier-general
rode into town and declaimed dramati-
cally that the honor of the United
states required that our conduct should
contrast with that of the insurgents.
The latter burned and pillaged, While
we protected property and the rights
of the people. The Spaniards were es-
pecally hated by the natives because
they burned and pillaged in their war
with the insurgents. We have waged
a harsh and a philanthropic war at the
same time. This policy, or, rather
lack of policy would bewilder a civil
lied people; it is not likely to give
the natives that confidence which it Is
our endeavor to create"
Another and perhaps even a more
serious error, now everywhere recog-
nized as such, was the failure to hold
captured territory. When General An
derscn first took Pasig in December"
says Mr.. Bass, 1.-The presidente for
mally surrendered the town. General
Anderson was ordered to withdraw be-
cause his line was too long for the
~ I,fe n
The insurgents came back to Pasig,
and their first act was to hang the
presidente for treason in surrenderins
to the Americans. Presidentes do not
surrender towns to us any more. When
we returned to Pasig we found the
place we'll fortified, and we suffered
some loss in retaking it. This process
might go on indefinitely. The Maca-
bebes are our best, and. 1 believe. our
only, friends on Luzon island, and yet,
after we had entered the town OF
| Macabebe, where we were received
with enthusiasm, our forces, withdraw
ing, allowed the insurgents to burn
the town. This latter episode was not
only a violation of one of the most com
mon rules of conduct-'stand by your
friends; it was the grossest mistake in
policy. In every town we now take,
those inhabitants (and they are very
few who remain behind beg us to
leave q garrison when we depart, be-
cause If we do not, the insurgents on
returning will treat them as enemies
of their country. If there happen to
be any natives inclined to be non-com-
bative and to remain in their homes,
| they become very shy about making
| friends with the Americans"
Excuses for these mistakes abound,
| The problem was a new one; the ter
ritory and the people were unfamiliar;
| our governments ultimate intentions
were undefined every difficulty of war
making in general existed here in eH-
| traordinary emphasis and many unique
difficulties were met that had to be
solved through experience. 1t is not
necessary nor prudent now to stop lone
| to quarrel over the question of respon-
| sibilty. The future is the point. Pre-
parations making to meet it satisfy
| the country in respect to men and
| guns; but where there is so much
specific criticism of the commanding
officer it would be well, one would
think, TO make sure that the new
| forces about to be landed at Manila
shall be wisely handled. The need eX,
lists for general at Manila in whom
both army and people would have deer
confidence In time this is quite likely
we think. to result in the assignment tC
active command of the major genera
nominally commanding, Nelson A
Miles, or some other officer consid
cred to be his equal in executive mill
| tary ability.