Martinsburg herald. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1881-1920, 1899-02-25

.sttI HULL AZ NlAV bhEaA " tLC LOAth
Of San Juan, between FL Caney and the
city, tho Spaniards were not so we'll
prepared with ~blnckhouses and trenches
as on San Juan ridge, but Ell Caney
was a strong outpost, and the long range
guns form the Spanish batteries in
town could play on the ground inter-
vening, making up in part for lack of
field defenses.
Briefly, the Spanish had a strong right
ON San Juan ridge and a weak left
with Ell Caney out of the problem. 1t
is another axiom Of war not to make a
general attack upon a position strong
on both TANKS and In the center. The
strength Of the Spanish center depended
upon their holding ON at the right.
When San Juan hill fell before the
American assault, the tactical Spanish
center to the left az far as the Ell Caney
road fell with it.
A strong position should be turned
when possible by attacking its weak
flank. But an attack upon the compare
lively weak field line ON the FL Caney
road would not have effectually turned
San Juan ridge. The tanks must be at
tackled simultaneously or else the right
and strongest CARRIED first. This is
what happened at Santiago. and the
sequel showed that the Spaniards had
prepared to launch u their right on
San Juan ridge and cut Shafter off from
his base in case they saw a chance, as
would have offered had the Ell Caney
attack involved the bulk of the Ameri-
car army. Even q stiff American line
behind San Juan could not have saved
Shafter had the Spaniards made a sortie
with the American right and center
tied up on the Ell Caney route.
There was nothing to do but plunge
ahead despite loss and confusion and
carry San Juan ridge. AS for the loss
in getting it, the proportion has been
exaggerated. 1t was comparatively light
in attack and not exceptionally heavy
in getting to work. Instances might be
cited from all wars, including the bat
ties of the civil war under the best cap.
tains, when the percentage of loss in
getting favorable positions for assault
was double that incurred in threading
the jungle to reach San Juan ridge.
1t is an aft~erthought to say that the
attack upon Ell Caney should have pre-.
coded that upon San Juan ridge by a
day. 1t was supposed that Ell Caney
would fall speedily, hence joint attack
upon both TANKS was proper. A heavy
feint to end in attack if conditions fa-
vored was called for at San Juan ridge
as a cover to Lawton's attack upon Ell
Caney village. Lawton's insistence up
on carrying Ell Caney village before at
lacking the city is open to criticism.
General Skaters explanation Of the af-
fair is that he, personally, wanted to
place a brigade in front of Ell Caney on
the southwest to cut it off from Santi-
ago and then throw three brigades I'M
der Lawton against Santiago on the
northeast. Lawton preferred General
Chaffee's plan of finishing Ell Caney be-
fore attempting Santiago. As these gen.
erals promised to carry FL Cauey by 8
a. m. July /, Shafter yielded and order
ed the San Juan attack to begin at 10
o'clock. The result is in history.
In holding on at San Juan ridge after
Lawton's failure to force the Spanish
left and rushing everything to the crest
with indomitable energy in the face of
suggestions to retreat, backed by his
ablest generals and while the troops de-
manded impossibilities in the way of
re-enforcements and rations as the sine
qua non of success in staying, Shafter
displayed mastership of the highest or
der. But when he met the crisis of a
weak and hungry line of battle, with a
dangerous river behind it and the road