New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-11-02
GENERAL BULLER'S PLANS.
continued from Ar>t page.


=, accounts Of tho engagement. He still de-
,...e tho mistake Of seeking to defend Dundee
"a oven Ladysmth. but states that such an
don, as 2 stampede Of mules with the am
.i,,on might have happened. with the same
,,.,s,rous circumstances. TO any commanders
~neorence 10 the suggestion that the unwise
,.<.,ce NJ Upper Natal was not voluntarily I'M
,,-.oLe, bv the British military authorities. an
o,..ol ~ the Foreign Office informs me that
~, xa,al Government made a strong appeal to
49, colonial once that this should he done.
WINS OF MILITARY CRITICS
sanitary writer's in all the morning journals
..,ss the technical questions raised NY Gen
whites report ~ tho disaster To Cartoons
,.~ and there is marked diversity OF opinion
ting tho responsibility for il and the gen
.or6uci Of Mondays operations. There is
,s,a agreement respecting the large share
.A ,ho mules had in determining the fort
- - tho day hut there is also general sus-
-. that there were Boer hands behind the
,aers which rolled down the hill and caused
,,.ai stararede There is also general assent
-, ,rorositlon that the BOer tactics were
,,.o,, and that General White was complete
=, o,,n,anoruvred 10y General Joubert having
.,,seS as an objective point for the British
we an abandoned hill where guns had been
s-.a and thus lured White on mile after mile
.Ao, Offering battle. General Joubert
s,anv opposed tho British right with COM
.,sa-aNe force and drew off the centre to
.oor, H. Meanwhile he had thrown a
cling column between the main body and
10 ,ef wing and had concentrated an over
h.r,inr force against Cartoons men. who
,,d los, their ammunition and guns These
-as,srlv nannuVres were rendered possible by
.he ~sn,arkabls mobility Of the Boer forces
..n,,h consisted mainly Of mounted infantry In
.b,s way two tatiahons. without train and bat
,erv and v!thou, guns. were hopelessly en-
,rapr4d while Whites army was led far afeld
Tho military writer's are not Of one mind re.
s,ecting the necessity for the offensive move
rrent which ended disastrousy General
white evidently had placed his men for a general
hattie although IL TUNED out hardly more than
a reconnaissance IN force for the British centre
ana right This is plain from General Whites
admission that Cartoons force instead Of coy
sring The advance Of the main body was sent
n Nicholson Mex for the purpose Of turning
ins enemys right flank Hardly any military
critic considers that General White after
ordering the evacuation Of Glencoe and conCen-
trating his army at Ladysmith justified In
isola,ing body of fifteen hundred men. He
clearly hoped 10 bring on general engage
ment and turn the enemy's flank at the right
moment Whether he was justified in hazarding
a. attack is regarded open question
Some critics say not others explain that the
enemy was closing in upon Ladysmith. and
that it was most important for him TO prevent
the interruption IF railway communication
when he VAS receiving naval guns and rein
torcemen;s. and that the attack was justified.
ONE FATAL BLUNDER.
There is entire agreement upon one point;
that : that General White did not remain in
touch with his left wing. Every military writer
contends that there was fatal lack Of
sanized communication by signalling or other
wise. and that General White ought have
known what was going on all along the line
His first dispatch proved that at ? o'clock on
Monday afternoon he knew that the mules had
starnpeded but that he had not idea that
Carleton's force was fighting for life. without
cartridges and on the point Of surrendering. five
or seven miles away. Everything indicates de-
tective scouting and lack of signalling arrange
rsnts Somebody had blundered. either Cen
era White or the staff officers under him, whom
~ nay he chivalrously shielding
Another point made by the military critics
* against Carleton. They urge that he
ought 70 have retreated after the stam-
Iede n mules when his guns and am
muniton reserves were lost and he found him
s'lt unable 10 carry out his orders, or. in any
event he ought 70 have sent back information
promptly q his position. He probably halted
In the hope ~ recovering his guns and mules
a. daylight and considered 1t his duty 10 carry
ol. instructions far as he could. This raises
anew The question Of defective scouting which
IS especially important when the enemy largely
consists ~ mounted infantry and is superior
n mobility and manpuvring power All these
points VIII Do cleared up when the war cor
respondents are allowed 10 tell the truth. The
Daily Telegraph" has already inveighed bitterly
heains, tho military authorities. who have bot
tied up Bennett Burleigh and his colleagues and
are conducting the war I'm the dark and depriv-
Ing the press # proper facilities for telling the
public what il wants 20 know. The large ex-