Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1899-02-23

Washington, Feb. 21.-Rear Admiral
Schley, having been granted permits
sion to answer the charges made
against him in a communication re-
Gently sent to the senate, yesterday
handed to the committee on naval af-
fairs his statement in which he dis
claims any purpose of controversy
with the navy department. The adj
miral says his orders from Sampson
on May 18th were to blockade Glen
fuegos, which he proceeded to do. On
his arrival he sent Commander Nc
Gala, of the Marblehead, ashore to es
tablish relations with the insurgents,
the result of which was made known to
him at $40, May "a. Then, for the
first time he learned definitely that the
| Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.
| Within two hours he started for San
tiago. What possible ground for
criticism" he says, adverse to me
there can be in all of this I do not see.
| was on the spot acting under or
ders which gave me entire discretion
and yet clothed me with the response
bility of going to Santiago, only after
l was satisfied that the fleet was not at
Cienfuegos." He quotes from a dis
patch of Sampson, May goth, in which
the latter says Schley should hold his
fleet off Cienfuegos" His slow
progress toward Santiago he attributes
to the Eagle, which he states
was a part of the force which
Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
him and he had no right to abandon
her. He had been ordered to proceed
Cautiously" If, however, he had
| known the Spanish fleet was in Santi-
ago, no consideration for the Eagle ~
anything else would have prevented
him from getting there at the earlies;
possible moment, with the larger YES
sells, but weather and sea made it i'm
possible to do better than he did
Speaking of the "retrograde move.
ments' which the secretary, adapting
the language Of Admiral Sampson
characterizes as ''reprehensible con
duct" Schley say that in his 81 year:
of service, never was such Language
and I see no reason for it now"
Continuing, he declared that wher
the enemys vessels came out of the
harbor of Santiago, the signal was
made from the Brooklyn (his flagship
to the fleet to clear for action" Their
followed the signal "close action" anC
by the signal the enemy is escaping tx
| II -
ance of the Spanish fleet tnere was {
general inward movement of the Amer
lean vessels closing in and engaging
At the final capture of the Colon a
1:15 p. NJ, the Brooklyn was nearest
the Oregon next, and then came tn
Texas and the Wien. The New YOrl
arrived at 2:23 p. NJ, and the com
mander-in-chief assumed command 0
the squadron. The signals were mad,
from the Brooklyn to the squadron I'm
til all the signal halyards were sho
away and then by the Meyers arm!
2 code
: In conclusion Schley contends tina
the turn Of the Brooklyn in the battle
= Of July Sd was the crucial and decid
ing feature of the combat and of decid
= ed advantage" Furthermore, he says
: it is a mistake to say that the vessels
: distance from the enemy was increased
} to the extent of 500 yards, and adds
. Though this may not be of record i
is fact nevertheless. He cites the
| fact that charts of the board of navi
gators show that the Brooklyn was
the nearest when the Spanish vessels
| emerged from the harbor
the nearest at every stage o.
, the battle and nearest the Colon wheI
it surrendered, and gives many con
, firmatory details of his fagship's &C,
tive and effective participation in the
battle. He says that he made no re-
, port Of his Vancouver in his report OF
the battle, as it's effect upon the battle
was never a question with him.
His last paragraph reads: May 31st
[ received a telegram from the com
mander-in-chief cOngratulating me up
on my success in locating and block
aiding the enemy's fleet at Santiago. Il
it was worthy Of commentator at that
time l am at loss to understand how
it could have grown into 'reprehensible
conduct as suggested by Sampson in
his letter of July 10, some six weeks