The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-16
Dean Worcester Defends Annex.
alton of the Philippines.
1T COULDN'T BE AVOIDED
The Americans Have Many Friends
Among the Filipinos-A Small Fac
ton In Arms-A Beginning
in Autonomy.


sion, spoke at Central Music hall to-
night upon the Philippine Question"
The address, which was delivered un-
der the auspices of the Hamilton club,
a local republican organization, was re-
ceived with every manifestation of ap-
proval. Mr.. Worcester followed in the
the main the line Of argument regard
ing the retention Of the Philippines
which has been published in the re-
port of the Philippine commission. His
address in part was as follows:
Professor Worcester said at the outs
set that the issues raised by the Phil-
ippine question, directly or Indirectly,
We're more important. more far-reach-
ing in their consequence than any 9TH
er nation has been called upon to meet
since its birth. He deprecated the idea
of those willing to make party politics
of questions which involve the well be-
ing and the future destiny Of millions
of their fellow beings. Proceeding, he
said
IF all the accusations brought by
those who declaim against our social.
ed crime in the Philippines are true,
we have indeed committed great
transgresson against the people of the
island. | propose TO take up some OF
the alleged facts often quoted in sup
port of these serious charges and scrut-
inize them somewhat closely. I shall
try to make my examination wholly
dispassionate.'
Professor Worcester then took up va
rious arguments presented against the
American policy in the Philippines and
quoting from senate documents, from
the proclamatons of Aguinaldo and
from mass of official evidence, most of
which has been made public, answered
the severe criticisms. He also stated
that a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet
testified before the commission to he
fact that even after his proclamation Of
June IS he freely admitted that no
American had ever promised him inda-
pendence for his people.
Professor Worcester said, after citing
much evidence:
Il believe I have shown that there
was no true cooperation between our
land forces and the Filipinos except in
the fact that we fought common zoe.
each in his own way. / may add that
we required no help in taking the city:
1t lay completely at the mercy Or
DeWey's guns and soldiers were ex-i
pected to occupy it, not to take 1T. Fhe
fighting of Aug. Is was perfunctory and
designed only to save the honor OF the
Spanish troops After the fall of the
city, Aguinaldo modestly demanded or
General Merritt the royal palace aor
himself and, in addition. the princ1paf
churches, a share in public funds ana,
most important of all, the arms and
ammunition surrendered by the Span
ish troops, which he had long planned
to possess. 1t is needless to say tnaI
his requests We're refused"
Speaking of the efforts to avoid cons
hict, Professor Worcester says:
II am often asked the question:
Might not all this have been ayoided
if, even after the fall of Manila, the
Americans had come to an understands
/ l;,Ht,, ,@cp M
be able to say to you that such at
tempts were made General Otis, who
did not believe that the insursent Lead
ers were plotting trouble. had repeatett
interviews with one and another Oh
them
After detailing the fruitless negotia-
tions and citing from General OTIS let
ters, Professor Worcester said:
"The prime cause of the failure OF
these final negotiations lay in the fact
that Filipino commanders were unable
| to formulate any definite statement OF
| their own desire. They did say that
| they desired independence under
| United States protection. but discussion
made it evident first that they did not
| know what they meant by these words
! and second, that they We're not agreed
among themselves even as to the gem
eral demand
At another point the speaker said:
the United States did infinitely mora
than Aguinaldos army toward driving
out and destroying Spanish power in
the Philippines. If our claim to SOW
ereignty was shadowy, what shall we
say as to the claim of tribe repre-
senting less than one-siXth of the popu-
lation of the islands and exercising jur-
isdction over but small portion of the
Philippine territory?'
The speaker denounced as false state
ments that the Americans had no
friends among the Filipinos and de-
clared we had many good, true friends
among the leading Filipinos. He pro-
ceeded:
Il heard it said that if only a frac-
ton of the Filipino population is in
arms against us, and that the great
majority of the people are ready to
accept American sovereignty, why is
it that we are compelled to send great
army to the islands? l answer, first.
because we are waging the most hu-
name war in history. If it was simply
a matter of killing, we should not need
so large an army. Two regiments or
troops could &c where they chose in the
islands of Luzcn to-day and kill to their
hearts content without serious risk.
It is because we are attempting to pro-
tect the peaceable inhabitants from the
depredations of the laWless that we need
| so large a force.
FINALLY. a word as to the way out.
! Is it conceivable that we should with
draw our troops, abandoning our
friends to the vengeance of our ene-
mics and the people at large to civil
war and anarchy? There is but one
answer to this question. Our troops
must stay until armed resistance has
ceased and public confidence has been
fully restored. The day will come.
sooner or later when native soldiers un-
a Am officers
of their own, will do a large share of
the work that remains TO be done.
In the matter of autonomy, we have
already made a safe beginning and the
experiments in municipal and provincial
governments which are even now in
progress will eventually furnish safe
basis for congressional action.
Il have great faith in them. I be-
Continued on Page Ten,