Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1899-03-15
DEALING WITH THE FIL1PINos

From the San Francisco Call.
It is not proving TO be an easy thing
to deal out good government to the
Filipinos from the mouths of cannon
and Notwithstanding the talk of ar
early advance by General Otis's forces,
we do not believe that it will grow
easier by lapse of time. The Filipinos
are numerous people. who, for two
hur dred years, have kept up an inter.
mittent but very costly and destructive
warfare upon Spain. They are pluoky
determined and born to the climate and
soil; can easily live oil the country and
are adopts in guerrilla fighting. No
doubt if they would come out II the
open before the weather grows toe
warm and risk everything upon pitch
ed battle with General BraddoCk s.
we mean General Ois's-command, the
trouble would soon be over, but the.
strategy is too much like that OF ouy
own Indians and of people oi
Spanish descent generally to per-
NIT anything of the kind Vixen
Ois advances they will turn gueriIlas
|; neeGs no special acquaintance with
military history to know chat when
they dc much will 90 amis5. Few tasks
are so difficult IS tc conquer al army
of partisan rangers, particularly where
the woulG-be conquerors have 10 con-
tend with an unfamiliar and fever
breeding climate, as we'll as with an &C
tive, determined and numerous foe.
Napole0n's marshals were harrassed
out OF Spain oy Spanish guerrillas. In
the American Revolution the Carolinas
were held sgainst the British regulars
by the swamp foxes of Marion and
Sumter. Guerrilla warfare in Mexico
kept Maxmillion's smpire intrenched
IN cities until the United States inter-
vened. The worth OF Cuba and the
Philippines to Spain was long ago re
duced to that of the technical title OF
ownership by rowing bands of fighting
men. In our OWE civil war Colonel
Mosby, with from three hundred to
FIVE hundred rough riders, held the
field for three years within the area
occupied by the Army of the Pc
tomac, neutraliziug meanwhile the
value as active liigerents of 10000
federal troops, who were required to
protect places and properties which he
might raid. With these examples be-
fore us we cannot conclude that Gen.
Otis's campaign, with 10000 or 10000
men, can be in any sense decisive.
What can such an army do among the
jungies and swamps OF a difficult and
sickly country, when every bush snd
treetop hides Filipino marl1sman
This is a csse where people should
not be fought but plscated. The bus.
ness in hand is not for an army corps,
but for q friendly t>dy of negotiators.
Such q body, commissioned by the
Pre- ;idsnt. is now at Manila, and we
should have far more hopes OF our fu-
ture in the Philippines if it were at
tae front of our operations there
rather than behind liue Of battle.
The commission has broad powers
It's connection with the executive Is
SO close that the amicable meas
ures it may devise can be quickly
rAtifed. 1t is permitted to offer much,
vet we hear little or nothing from it.
Instead, the news comes that General
Otis is going to try and kill as many
of the armed islanders as possible and
scare the rest into submission,
The policy from the standpoint OF
expansion, is deplorable. II we take
the Filipinos over we want them to
come willingly; otherwise, fthey come
at all, they must be held down Ike the
Poles, as q subjugated people. We csn
make nothing out of 100000 su!len
and iutractable prisoners and 90 not
want TO be burdened with them. The
American people had rather let them
go than to treat them as couvicts OF
captives iu their own land, aDd they
will act up to that preference unless the
government can devise some way to
make the Filipnos willing TO become u
political part of our nationality. But
the way cannot be found under the guns
Of hostile armies.