Arizona republican. [volume] (Phoenix, Ariz.) 1890-1930, 1899-11-10
Review Of Trade for Half Of a
Week.
THE CLOSE MONEY MARKET
10 Was Easier for Time But TIqh-
tened Last nonday-Bsnkers do
Not Believe There Will Be q Per-
manenf Change for the Better
Before fhe Beginning OF Inc New
Year.

New York, Nov. O. (SpeciaL)--In
Wall street the speculative market has
been waiting on the money market
The week opened with a feeling that
lending had taken a turn towards ease
a moderate gain in the surplus re-
serves of the banks was construed as
hopeful symptom and Mondays buy
ing was active and buoyant; but, when
buyers came to make up their loans
they found a very different money
market from what Saturdays bank ex-
hibit had led them to expect Instead
of relief. there was a return to strin-
gency as sharp as anything expert
enced within the last two months. No
body seemed more surprised at the
! turn money had taken than the bank
ers themselves; who. while attributing
something to the preparations for in
terest settlements on November /, yet
very generally agreed that the strin-
gency is not yet broken and that no
marked elements of relief are yet in
sight The interior currency move
ment is still against the banks, and
whilst the demand from the west per-
haps shows some abatement the re-
quirements of the south are increasing.
Banking opinion very generally in
clines to the conclusion that the fall
return to ease will be much later this
season than in ordinary years. From
ers doing an interior business are ex-
pecting little lending below per cent
between now and the first of January.
Unusual causes are at work in the
money market, the breadth and force
of which it is not easy to measure.
Something more than the movements
incident to this crop season have to be
calculated upon. Credit operations
have been radically influenced by the
industrial revolution incidental to the
great trust creations of the last ten
months. Since January 1 corporations
with a total of no less than s., 2,OOO, ,OOO.-
900 of capital issues have been or
ganized. These transformations have
been attended with immense tempo
rary dislocations of capital. The nego-
tiations have involved large loans des-
tined to run until the new issues have
been distributed and until the under
writers have effected their liquidations.
participated to but a very small extent
in these operations; but many of the
trust companies, private bankers and
other financial institutions have prob
ably made advances to the extent of
hundreds of millions of dollars; with
the consequence that these credit re-
sources are largely withheld from the
uses to which they ordinarily contrib
ute at this season of the year. In ad-
dition to this special employment of
credit the demand for the ordinary
purposes of business has far surpassed
all precedent. The extraordinary de-
velopment in our manufactures, our
farming, our mining and our exports
has placed an extraordinary pressure
upon the credit resources of the cour-
try. There is a limit to the extent to
which this sudden vast expansion of
our credit requirements can De prompt
ly responded to. 1t is not merely that
we have no power to expand our cur
rency proportionately to these en-
larged wants. Restriction falls equally
upon the much larger class of credit
operations that are carried on without
the employment of money-the ordi-
nary loans and discounts of the banks,
which are placed under sharp limita-
tions by the banking laws. The ability
Of the banks to lend is regulated by the
amount of lawful money they can con-
troll as reserve against their deposits:
and yet the activity of the retail trade
and the increased requirements for
payment of wages are keeping the
greenbacks and gold in active citcula-
ton outside the banks. Had We an
elastic bank currency system, which
would enable the banks to distribute
their notes under conditions like these,
instead of paying out their reserve
money, We should have a two-fold
source of relief which We have not
now-in the first place, a larger re-
source of retail circulation and, il the
next place. a larger ability of the banks
to discount. 1t thus appears that the
prevailing stringency is due. more than
anything else, to the legal restrictions
upon banking operations and to the
Continued on Eighth Page.)