The record-union., 1899-04-03
SAMPSON ON CERvERA.
Spanish Admiral's Strategy Criti-
cised by che American.

cised by che American.
Not the least interesting part of Ad-
miral SIMPSONS paper on THE At.
lantic Fleet in the Spanish War; in
the April Century" is that in which
he criticises the Spanish commanders
strategy.
When we come to consider the strategy
of Admiral Cervera in leaving the har-
Dor, it must be said of all that it would
have been much better, if he could have
done SO, to leave by night. That he
could not do so is the testimony of Off
GERS of his fleet, We know from what
they said subsequently, while they were
prisoners, that this plan had been con-
sidersd by the Admiral and his Off
GERS Two advocated going out by
night: the others were all in favor of
the sortie by day The great difficulty
in a night attempt was our dazzling
searchlight. A searchlight shining di-
rect in ones eyes prevents him abso-
Iutely from seeing anything else; it is
as though he were looking at the sun;
and it was that effect upon them, taken
in connection with the necessity of see
ing their way out of the channel, that
made them hesitate. This feeling was
in itself a compliment to the efficiency
of the blockade, but we did not attach
so much Importance to the dazzling of
the enemy as to the illumination of the
channel so that we could see every
thing that was going on. 1t was con-
tinual wonder to us why they did not
! fire at our searchlght, which was al
ways within range. To be sure, 1t
would have required pretty good
craftsmanship to knock it out, but 1t
would have made the man who was
manipulating it quite uneasy to know
that he was the center of the enemyS
| fire.
The enemy had no searchlights at
their defenses All the necessary ma
chinery was in place for the establish
ment of one on Socapa, but they never
cot so far as to complete the plant and
actually use it.
| What appeared to us the most IA
vorable chance for Cervera was to have
been prepared to come out with full
head of steam, and them to have chosen
a very cloudy, dark night, or one when
a dense rain or squat was passing over
the harbor-when it would be very diff
| ficult to see in any circumstances-and
guided by screened lights placed along
the channel for the purpose, to have
made for the open sea. His ships
might have run out of such storm IN
| about an hour; SO long as the squat
! continued they probably could have
counted upon being invisible to a great
extent It would have been difficult
| to identify the particular ships, and III
| the confusion and darkness they would
probably so far have escaped observa7
ton that they might have been out OF
sight by the time the weather cleared
up or the squat had passed. There We're
several such nights, and very ANXIOUS
| once they were for u.s.
! Diminishing the question of sortle
by night. there We're several things ne
might have done by day: % 10 take
the course he did take alongshore to
| the westward; CD to take a similar
course to the eastward; 90 to dlvlde
| his fleet between the two courses; and
| "a to scatter our fleet When they all
came out and started along the beach,
| our fire was easily concentrated on
them. 1t would have been worse to
go eastward. as he would have had to
engage not only all the vessels he DID,
| but the New York and the vessels at
| Guantanamo-the Massachusetts, New
ark and Marblehead, which could nave
been notified by telegraph. He might
have made a feint to go in certain
direction. Two ships sent in one oil
rection would probably have called out
most of the strength of our vessels
and have given his others a better
chance than they had. What would
have happened if they had boldly at
tempted to dash through the feet can
only be a matter of speculation There
could hardly have been as much con-
centration of fire upon them. and in
the smoke and confusion some of them
might have got through. They had
simply to encounter the same kind OF
fire; at the beginning it might have
been heavier 1 suppose the result
would not have been different. If any
| one of them had succeeded in breaking
through. her speed would have given
her a chance of escape. We had only
three ships there that We're faster than
theirs. AS it was, they left the Indi-
ana and the Iowa behind in short
time and if they had been running
straight to sea these ships could have
followed them no longer than they did
the Indiana eight or ten miles, the
Iowa eighteen-so that they would
have only the same number of ships
following them, if they had got through.
The fact is, they Rugged The shore as
q, possible means of rescue in case of
disaster; they did not like to leave the
| land entirely.
HEROES OF THE RAILWAY.