The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1899-07-15

| the problem of comparative psychology.
L have thus far spoken as though com
parative psychology were synonymous
with animal psychology, but it is a
broader term, taking in the study of
the child. In studying the mind of any
creature it is important to study the
habits of the creature. Base the psy-
chology on the biology of the creature.
So fuller knowledge of the ordinary
habits of animals will save psycholo-
gists from error. insufficient knowledge
of habits may trip biologists as well as
psychologists. The danger to COM
parative psychologist is that he may
interpret some action without knowing
the habit of the animal. 1t is difficult
to find the psychical condition of the
animals, for we know nothing within
the minds of anything but ourselves.
A crayfish can see and hear, but we
cannot answer hastily that it sees and
hears as we do. 1t appears to me rather
preposterous to look for something as
complex as our brain in the simple
ganglia of the crayfish. We have no
more reason for supposing in our
friends a condition such as we have
than to suppose it in a crayfish, except
that our friends have a construction
nearer like our own. The identity in
plan and general functions between
man and animals is the same, and in it's
general aspect mind is essentially the
same in all orders. Two precautions
are necessary, however. A man may
be on fairly conversant terms with his
dog but he could not say how the
world looks to an ant or a crayfish. In
no case may we interpret an action as
the outcome of the exercise of a higher
psychological factor, if it car be inter
preted by one lower in the psychic
scale. This puts us on our guard
against the besetting sin of interpret
ing the action of lower animals by our
selves.
The tendency to see in animals hu-
man activities, is a remnant of the
Older idea of seeing human activities
in everything.
Consciousness and mind are things
added to regulate the nervous system
which has become too complicated to
regulate itself.
Take a microscopic animal that moves
by reflex action. The creature Is so
constructed as to behave in that way.
A robin finds worm, and the tendency
is to eat it and preserve life; later, Ii
feeds its young.
1t is important to recognize
that in our own cases our
general activities are comparable
with those of animals, but we excel
animals in pure abstract thought; but
we are less human than we think we
are
1t is the general function of the ner-
vous system for things which have
occurred together once to occur to-
gether at some other time. 1t is a qEes-
ton often raised whether we know
things as they are, when we know
them only by sensation. This one fact
remains: Our ideas grew out of contact
with real things. If our ideas are not
truly adjusted, we get them corrected
when we try to use them. Everybody
knows we learn by experience and fit
ourselves to our environment, but
everybody does not know that this FIT
ting process is what gives us power
to act. Just as soon as a course of ac-
ton has been determined on, it fits that
condition perfectly, and becomes a
habit Almost all thought naturally
has relation to action. Thought must
not be turned back to things already
organized, but must turn forward to
new activities. We all know how one
falls short of his best self when he
grows self-conscious. Consciousness
almost always brings trouble and I'M
certainty into an action which has be-
come automatic