The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1899-04-06

VIEWS OF A
GERMAN
On the Battle of
Santiago.
WHY IASllRDS MERE BEATEN
Commander Jacobsen Of tho eslr
writes . Critical ansIysis
Of the Ansls
WHY SrAAliRDS MERE BEATEN

WASHINGTON. April s.--Thc hu-
yeau 81 naval intelligence OF The
Navy department has issued tho last
OF the series % sketches OF the Span
ish-AmeFlcan war by Commander
jacobson Of the German protected
cruiser Gesr. II deals with the con-
ditlon of the spanish ships after the
hattie Of Santiago. This portion Of
the sketch contains n number OF OBJ
e~rvauons regarding the technical
effect OF our gun IRE which will tn
ssrest naval officers. The most in-
serestins observations ar~ those up
ON the strategy. or lack Of u. dis
played by cervera. The Spanish
admiral having been ordered 20
leave the harhor 20 remove the main
object of attack upon Santiago. Cam
nander jacobson says hts position
was most difficult. He did not dare
make an attempt at night. and 30
decided 60 ~ out in broad day
light.
'-rhe whole crow he SAYS. "fen a
victim 90 this fatal decision. In
structions for the sortie and the
western course were Issued. The
admiral was tUihNAN h8hNAhAAA -
the smposslbiiity ot defeating the
enemy or OF reaching another Cuban
harbor, even II he should succeed
On steannlng right through the hos
tile feet. IL Is to this feeling ~
helpIessness and impotence a.
against the American naval forces,
more than 60 anything eiss. that I
am able 60 define that the disaster
was due. The Spanish ships had
spent a month and a half In the
harbor without even attempting 20
attack the blockading feet when n
favorable opportunity presented IT.
self. or even harrassing u. The t~o
torpedo boat dextr0yers were not
used for the purpose for which they
were intended. This inactivity and
lack OF initiative must have had a
very aemorailzsnK effect on the
oflcers ard men. II we add 10 this
the certain knowiedge that the op-
poslnR forces we're much stronger.
Il viii be readily understood that the
idea OF general flight after coming
out OF the harbor entrance was the
only acceptable one. especially IN
view Of the possibility Of bleaching
the ships. thereby rendering them
unservlc cable and eventually rescu-
ing the crews.
From the very moment that this
feeling Of srnpotency took Possession
Of the Spanish and led 20 these re-
ftections. their fate. phsychoioEicaliy
speaking, was sealed. We Do not
mean to dlsparAge their tenacity In
the midst Of hostile IRE. but. on the
other hand. u Is quite natural that
the admiral. seeing that everything
was happening as he had foreseen-
vas the one who set the example
OF running his ship ashore. Al the
other commanders followed this ex-
ample.
aou the American side the siiua =
,,on was lust the reverse. Admiral
ssmpson's feet was fuzzy epnteleu
az It's power. The blockade was be-
ing conducted IN accordance win
carefully prepared plans. as we're
also the arrangements la case Of me
ensmy's escape. Frequent eneoun-
terH with the spanish forts ha1
eIveu the commanders and ereSs
tbat calm assurance In the handling
of their weapons which guarantee
success. The long blockade SER
vtce. exhaustinT and monotenohs'
hardly interrupted by any actions
on the part of the spanish. had
strung the nerves up to the highest
u5teh and everybody was anxious
for the end 70 come
aSuddenIy the enemy attempts %
eaeape. All the passions that had
-, .rnofdert1r under the sanes
break forth. The welcome opp9f-
tnnity for settling accounts with the
enemy had come a. last. ana Win
n wild rueh the American ships fs.l
on their victims"