The Portland daily press., 1899-04-03

OF gun and torpedo TARGET practice, the
inadequate education of the commanders
OF the ships and torpedo boat destroyers.
1t is mainly due to these deficiencies that
the defeat was haseened and the Ameri-
can ships sustained 80 few losses.
The training OF the engine personnel
was ALSO totally unreliable, which is
not surprising In view of the fact that
the Spanish ships, as rule. were not
sent out on extensive cruises. The bot
toms of the Spanish ships had not been
cleaned for long time, and NJ they had
month and half they were considerably
fouied. thus the cruisers Maria Teresa,
Oqusndo and Vizoaya which in all tbs
official books were credited with Is 55
knots speed went into the battle with a
speed of from 10 TO IL knots at most and
the Cristobal Colon. which is the latest
ship and was to run 20 knots hardly at
tained q speed of 1875.
Under these circumstances, in every
way unfavorabIe for the Spanish, whose
crews were ipsufiiciently trained and
physically and morally enervated by
long inactivity, whose ships were inferior
in speed, number and fighting efficiency,
1t is no wonder that the victory of the
Americans was easy and raid for with In
significant sacrifices
Thers was only one chance for the sue
cess of the sortie. 1t should have been
made at night In scattered formation.
After personal Investigation of the
locality. 1t is my opinion that 1t is entire
ly practicable for fleet to leave Santiago
harbor at night. The wrsck OF the Merri-
mao did not constitute an obstruoti on.
1t is true that ADMIRAL Sampson's report
on the night blockade states that the
llRhtships were lying from one to two
miles from MORO castle, according to
the state Of the atmosphere and that they
lighted up the channel for half mile In
side. Even the best searchlight, however,
does not reach farther than one mile.
Therefore the illumination could not
have been very effective. Moreover, the
shore bat eries opening fire upon the
lightships could have compelled them to
change their lositions; but range to
say, this was ne or done. The dark
nights at the time Of the new moon about
the middle Of June would have been best
suited for the enterprise.
If the feet did not dare attempt night
s0rtie and was nevertheless compelled to
leave the hsrbor in obedience to orders,
then the ships should have been headed
straight at the enemy. All weapons, In
cludIng the torpedo and the ram should
have been used A bold attack in close
formation was the only chance Of success
against the superior hostile fighting
forces who would have hardly have found
time to form their lines.
The lessons Commander jacobson de-
rives from the battle briefly stated are:
Abolition of all woodwork; no unpro-
tected torpedo tubes; protection for gun
crews against she'll fire; smokeless
powder; greatest possible rapidity OF nre;
good speed of vessels under normal con-
ditions, and thorough training of the
crews In all branches Of the service.
Commander jacobson also gives some
Of his observations of the Porto Rican
but these contain nothing OF
special moment except an account OF the
attack of the Spanish torp edo boat Terror
and the Runboat Isabel ii. upon the ST.
Paul outside of San Juan barbor on June
-, 1898. concerning which many conflict
ing accounts have been published. This
was the only attempt made during the
war to torpedo one of our vessels. Com.
jacobson gives the following ac-
count of the occurrence which he obtained
from the commander of the Terror.
AT . a. m. June 20, the lockout at the
fort signalied u suspicious vessel. The
com mander gave orders for the Isabel
IL. to go out to reconnoitre and for the
Terror TO be ready for action. BY Il. 80
the vessel had come closer and the Isauel
Ii. went out. Upon sighting her the
hostile cruiser hoisted her Gag and
waited. The Isabel II. opened fire on the
foe The destroyer then received orders to
GO out and assist the Isabel. The Terror
which had been left by her fleet at Marti-
nique had not 5een able to recover her
guns and ammunition, which during the
voyage had been transferred to the Maria
Teresa in order to make room for coal.
The Terror, therefore, had no other
" eapons than her torpedoes and two 81
milimeter guns with little ammunition.
Ihe Isabel fought the St Paul at n
distance Of from l0,0U0 to 1900 metres.
AS the utmost range of our guns was
only 1000 metres we could not assist the
Isabel by going close to her. therefore
gave orders to head the Terror east so as
not to int rfere with the Isabel firing
north on the enemy. When we were
sufficiently clear of her and had the open
sea before us | headed straight for the st.
Paul at Il speed of from 20 TO 2l knots.
tIhe enemy who had hitherto been
firing on the Isabel now directed upon us
the well aimed rapid fire guns of both her
batteries, the lower one of which appeared
to have eight and the upper one ten to
twelve guns At 1000 metres We opened
tire with our guns in order 10 keep up the
sp rlrs Of the crew during the long inter-
val between the beginning OF the hail of
projections and the launching of the
torpedo. Our tire was accurate At the
first shot we saw ths shell explode on the
stern. Several other shots also hit their
target and the men were filled with joy.
We had approached to within 1900 metros
and Were about TO launch the torpedo
when the Terror commenced to veor to
the starboari. i had the helm shifted to
port but the ship kept on turning. Then
ordered the port engine stopped and
still the ship continued to turn to star
board. then learned that shell had ex.
ploded on deck and destroyed the leads to
the steering gear and telegraph SO that
the vessel followed the movements OF the
screw and was unnlanageabie. The hand
steering gear was at once put into opera
tion but as we passed the enemy at suoh
close range several projectiles hit us, one
Of them passing throu gh the port side In
to the engine room where it burst. The
engine room became flooded and the en-
gine appeared disabled. We just managed
to steam into the harbor.
From an inspection of the Terror says
jacobson, 1t appears that The
fatal shell ranging obliquely downward,
had passsd through the ships Side, torn
cff a steam guage. killed three men and
struck the lower edge of the main steam
pipe, tearing off its covering. This had
detected the shell aud it had passed out
the starboard side 1t was
the hole made by the projectile
in passing out that the engine room had
been flooded up to the lower steam cyIin