The National tribune., 1899-08-31
reinforcements. and even-at the close of the

4 relnforcementS. and even-at the close OF the
battle far outnumbered Lees.
On June IL President Lincoln had issued
a proclamation calling for 100000 troops
from the nearest States-50, 900 from Penn
sylvania, 10000 from Ohio. 10000 from
Maryland, 10000 from West Virginia;
New York was also asked for 10000. 10000
of which were forwarded, but did not
arrive in time to take part in the battle. In
| fact, not a man of all these special levies
contributed in the least toward the sue
cess Of that action.
But had Lees army gained the nights at
Gettysburg. could they have held it for 20
minutes? No. Sedgwick's entire corps,
with the fragments of Howard's. Reynolds s,
/ Sykes's and Sickles's would have been
| hurled upon them; and the result would
have been even more disastrous to the Con-
| federate cause than the repulSe as recorded.
Had Meade's army been driven from the
field, he had still not less than sc, 900 veteran
| troops, and in 10 days the addition of
80, 200 to 10000 from the adjoining States
| would have put his army in a condition to
| have forced the surrender of Lee had he re-
mained or marched to the North with his
| crippled command.
| Had Lee won the victory and then dis
covered that his position was untenable,
| that he must at once retreat to Virginia,
| which would undoubtedly been the result
| the victory of the Confederate cause would
| have been as barren and unfruitful as the
| defeat, or as was the brilliant victory of
| Shiloh believe that victory by the Con-
| federates at Gettysburg, had they attempted
to maintain their position, would have been
| as disastrous to them as success at Moscow
was to Napoleon.
/ ask, what prestige could have been
| gained TO the Confederate cause with an
army of 100000 men on Pennsylvania soil,
over one-half of whom had been placed
hors du combat in gaining victory the
| fruits Of which they were unable to remain
and gather?
Lee could not possibly have continued an
| offensive campaign had he won a similar
| victory upon Southern soil without first re-
| celving heavy reinforcements of men and
| munitions of war. Then, how much more
| impossible would it have been for him to
continue the campaign from Gettysburg
| with no prospects of reinforeements and in
| the midst of an enemy's country?
A MILITARY MISTAKE
Here, l believe, is where Lee and the Con-
| federate authorities made their grand mis-
| take in contemplating the invasion of the
North. They made no preparation for SuS-
tanning him in Pennsylvania by sending
| additional troops in case he was successful,
| and they failed to take into consideration
sufficiently the exhausted condition which
their army must necessarily find itself in
after gaining what they hoped would be a
| decisive victory.
1t would seem as though they failed to
|
of two or three days with the Army of the
Potomac, neither side without immediate
| reinforcements, was able to continue offen-
| Sive operations. And, again, they failed
| to appreciate the fact that battle won on
Northern soil which they could not supple
ment by sufficient reinforcements to main
tain was an evidence of their weakness and
must in the end prejudice their case, instead
of being a fact upon which to build hopes of
| Intervention.
| The question of intervention would
naturally depend upon the showing of the
| Confederate Government that after two
years of conflict their ability to maintain
| their independence was unquestionably
demonstrated. Was it true? 1 say not
with five-eighths of their territory occupied
by the Union forces, nearly one-half their
population within Union lines. their treas
ury totally bankrupt and even with vic
torious army on Northern soil, admittedly
unable to maintain its position.
| There is one other element which have
| not invoked and that is one in which think
all are faithful and jealous believers. 1t is
| the great principle of the eternal right,
| which ever seems to hover like brooding
wing over the destinies of nations and of
| individuals.
| on the side of human sorrowS and degrada-
! ton, in the end it swings back to the side of
the elevation Of humanity, reaching toward
| the broadest and fullest civil and political
| liberty which the highest types of human
| intellect have conceived.
| How much this great principle of the final
| triumph of right over wrong may have per
yaded or controlled the mysterious evolu-
tions Of the Grand Armies of the Republic
during the conflicts of the civil war leave
for each of you to speculate upon for him.
| salf