The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-02-03
THE LOGIC OF A SITUATION.

good deal of light on the origin of the Pres
ident's policy regarding the Philippines up
to the present time 1t has been generally
assumed that the President has been from
the beginning in favor of acquiring arc
holding the whole group of islands and that
he impressed these views on the peace CONF
missioners. 1t has even been charged that
they were instructed to demand the Philip
pines before they left for Paris. and that
so far as this part Of the negotiation was
concerned. they were the mere instruments
of the President. Recent events have shown
that this is very far from the truth and
that it does the President great injustice
First among the events alluded to was the
speech of Senator Frye, a member of the
peace commission, and. Of course, familiar
with its history and proceedings. As the
speech was delivered in executive session it
has not been published in full but its argu-
ment and main points were obtained through
the usual channels. They show eonclu-
sively that the commissioners went to Paris
with a free hand to do the best they could
and whatever was necessary for the honor
ard welfare of the country. In reply to
question relating to the Presidents instruc-
tons. Mr.. Frye said the commissioners were
in constant communication with the Presi-
dent and that the latter "had cabled them
on more than one occasion to use their best
judgment in reaching conclusions and re-
cording results" If the commissioners
were under any instructions when they left
the United States the Presidents repeated
injunction to use their best judgment in
reaching conclusions and recording results
worked a repeal of such instructions.
The speech of Senator Gray, delivered
Jan. 81, was to much the same effect. Sem
ator Gray was also a member of the peace
commission and is a Democrat. He said
that in the beginning of the negotiations he
was opposed to the acquisition of the Phil
ippines, and that he had so informed the
President and the members of the COM
mission. He said, however, that as the ne
over by the arguments of his colleagues
and the logic of the situation and that he
had finally signed the treaty and was pre-
pared to defend it as the only practical
way out of a difficult situation. The follow
ing is from the outline report of Senator
Grays speech:
Many complications had beset the COM
missioners in their work. and while he
would not retract what he had heretofore
said as to the undesirability of acquiring
distant territory as a matter of principle
still there were times when a nation as an
individual might have to choose between
evils. There was danger of many complica-
tions of an international character in case
the United States should elect to pursue a
different policy He reiterated that the uitl-
mate conclusion to take the entire Philip
pine group was that of the commissioners
rather than of the President.
Here we have the direct testimony of a
Democratic member of the commission that
the ultimate conclusion to take the entire
Philippine group was that of the commits
sioners rather than of the President. The
statement shows. further, that in the opin-
ion of Senator Gray there was no honorable
alternative for the commissioners but to do
as they did, and this, too, while the Presi-
dent was cabling them, as Senator Frye
said, to use their best judgment in reaching
conclusions and recording results.
Additional and very interesting informa-
tion regarding the course of the negotia-
ton is contained in the correspondence sent
last. The correspondence embraced cable
grams letters and reports for almost every
day the commissioners were in Paris. One
of the first cablegrams from the President
instructed the commissioners to demand the
cession of Luzon island though this was
subsequently modified by his instruction to
use their best Judgment The correspond
hot i,r50 n
what Senator Gray calls 1.-The logic of the
situation led them to demand the cession
of the whole group. Following is an extract
from the summary of the correspondence:
The principal interest among the senators
attached to the Presidents instructions to
insist on the cession of the Island of LuZon,
and after that In the decision to take the
entire group of islands. This latter develop
ment appeared from the correspondence to
be a growth, and the suggestion was made
by the commissioners to the President
the result of occurrences at Paris after the
arrival there of the commissioners.
The President does not appear to have at
any time given explicit instructions to con-
summate the bargain by taking all the
Philippines, but rather after hearing a full
explanation to have left the matter to the
discretion of the commissioners.
In the light of these facts it is plain that
the peace commissioners had no hard and
fast instructions when they left the United
States; that the Presidents original plan
and purpose was to take the Island of Luz
zon only; that as the negotiation proceeded
the commissioners saw grave objections to
this and they wired the President for in
structions; that he told them to use their
best Judgment that they were forced by the
logic of the situation to take the whole
group instead of Luzon alone; and that
some of them reached this conclusion re-
luctantly, and that it was distinctly the
conclusion of the commissioners and by
them urged upon the President as the only
practical way out of the difficulty. The
only alternative to this course would have
been to have abandoned the islands and
left them to fall back under the control of
Spain, which would have been unspeakably
disgraceful. 1t should be added that the
acquisition of the Philippines does not at
all affect the question of their ultimate dis
position.
BETTER DAYS FOR CUBA.