The Appeal. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. ;) 1889-19??, 1899-05-27
OUR TACTICS ON THE SEA

II had assumed that Cervera would
have taken the destroyers in tow, and T
| subsequently imagined that he would
when south of Cienfuegos, have sent one
4 Of them in by night for exact Information
i Of the distribution of the United States
\ ships. all having been carefully arranged
\ Sy telegram before he quilted st. Vincent.
The blow I imagined possible had only
fbeen. left, open by what considered the
defective strategy OF the United States
\ not only generally, but specifically, as it
\ seemed to me, in the detachment of Ad-
| m1ral Sampson SO far from his base as
San Juan in Porto Rico near about the
| time when it was possible a Blow might
De struck. It did not seem to me possible
| that Cervera's objective could be other
! chan the ships. whatever their character
might be, at Key West and Havana, and
4 l could not and do not now understand
\ why the United States fleets, having ac-
cepted the defensive attitude, should not
nave concentrated at the only points
i really open to attack. The detachment of
4 Sampson to the east, and the order to
Schley to proceed to Key West, seemed
\ to me to disclose divided counsels. How
ever, notwithstanding possibilities, I
, could not help: feeling that such ex-
\ tremely dramatic occurrences We're too
rare to be believed in, and I closed one
of my forecasts with the remark that,
after all, what was to be expected was
| the cOmmonplaceME
| 1T was practically ell over when Ger
vera, after run at the rate of about
seven knots, disclosed his wherea bouts
and his want of coal at Martinique on the
18th of May. The second localfza ton at
Curacao only confirmed the hopelessness
of the case, and the entry into the DEATH
trap at Santiago after a stroll across the
! Caribbean sea at something like seven
knots speed merely completed a disas-
trous record deliberately entered upon
Il nrTa 10
j st. Vincent.
Y 1--WE learn from Cervera's squadron
/ that nations in council sanction national
! acts the stories of which read like nur-
! sery tales in point of unreason and in
4 consequence. 1t would be silly to say
J that Cerevera's proceedings teach US that
I ships must be what they seem to be in
order to succeed in any enterprise. The
real teaching is that, however absurd it
Is to say so, there are nations who have
not got so far in their schooling.
$50 soon as Cervera was localized in
the barber of Santiago, the United States
followed the practice of naval war with
the utmost closeness. Cervera was
watched and masked with the full
strength of the American fleet; and it
was almost Immediately determined that
his presence there demanded the capture
| OF the port. The moment the blockade
was set up Key West ceased to be an
efficient naval base. Though the water
off the port was OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES often
smooth enough to allow of GOLFERS be-
ing brought alongside. the necessity for
! Selling i temporary base. was at once
apparent. and Guantanamo was so dealt
with as soon possible. just as It had
| been in the old days: Key West there
and then became only Of secondary i'm.
portance to the navy. as it was not in
the line of supply from the producing
| Atlantic ports.
.tThe lesson is oh1,io,,c ncsn,o1- 1,od co+
up his base at Cavite, captured from the
enemy. and Sampson followed suit at
| Guantanamo. Our permanent bases are
only permanent in peace time, or in war
so long as the objective Of our main fleets
makes it convenient that they should use
] them. It is a mistake to suppose-"as is
so often doce-that the bases make the
fleets. The fleets make the bases, and
| it is simply q matter of convenience
| whether. the bases already made are
adopted in war.
ION the American strategy in the East
| there is nothing to be said. Dewey's oh.
jective was the Spanish fleet. He struck
at it in the usual way, destroyed it. oh.
| tanned command of the sea, and did what
| he liked afterward-all according tc
| strategical routine.
1.-THE American position in the matter
of tactics began by being exceedingly
| anomalous. The United States were fully
expecting, and spending a good deal of
money and care in defending themselves
from, a particular kind Of attack which
they themselves never dreamed of max
| ing. The Americans expected all their
coast towns to be blown about their ears
| but they never took action about blow
| ing Spanish towns about Spanish ears
except very specially and very half
! heartedly, after their army was landed
at Santiago. But the reporter, knowing
what was expected of him by the ignor
ant, took care to leave no Cuban town
unbombarded. So that I suppose-indeed
some remarkable utterances from the
other side of the Atlantic makes it Ger.
tain-that popular belief in the lombard
ment of towns by ships has been con-
firmed by the war, though the war has
only repeated the lesson of all former
wars, namely, that this is not a thing
| to be expected and that it need not be
| guarded against.
Five days after the declaration of war,
Mr. Secretary Long telegraphed to Ad-
| nllral Sampson words which briefly
summed up and adopted the long estab-
liShed practice of war in this respect:
WINE the department does not wish a
bonnbardment of forts protected by heavy
! cannon, it is within your discretion to
destroy light batteries which may pro-
tect vessels you desire to attack, if you
can do SO without exposure to heavy
guns Towns. we observe, are not in
".
They only dwell in the imagination of
the uniformed multitude. And then forti-
ficltiOns. Sampson mad actually some
idea that Havana could be carried by a
close attack in the batteries, and after
ward held by the navy alone. The wiser
,counsels of authority prevailed against
an attempt that all history pronounced a
mistake. But it is a little more remark
able that Mr.. Long should have men
toned the. possibility of silencing batter
les in order to set at the ships they, de-
Tended, because in all ages this has been
a legitimate object, and because history
has shown that batteries erected with
the object Of supporting and defending
ships very often fulfil their object. = :
"A very significant commentary on the
:, usefulness Of batteries in protecting
towns was offered by Commodore Dewey
at Manila. There were found batteries
protecting the Town, ana these batter4es
9 began to exercise their protecting power
i: BY firing On Deweys ships. -ewey re-
81 oiled by message, not by gun. If the bat
II Serics did not cease firing he would open
{ fire upon the town; and the batteries
were thenceforth silent. Really, the ex-
IRENE of paradox was reached.
n 1.-THE failure of the Cavite batteries and
the general failure of the Spanish bat
teries to contend against the American
!. guns teaches a very important lesson.
), There is no commoner belief-sometimes
: depressed in SO many words-thanr to say
:. that once a fortideation always a. forti-
: fication; that if you built and armed a
,, ship, she would become obsolete, but if
you laid out the same money on a fort
or battery that had to be ready to con-
tend with ships, that would remain. and
not become obsolete. But It there is one
lesson more clear than another to be
drawn from this war, it is that il you in
q tand 70 mt your strength into defensive