Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-10-10
COURT DECISIONS.
Il! Notes s!:lttss of Cases Recently. Decided,
Which are Of lnterest 10
Our People.
DIGESTED BY W. B: MARTIN.
Exclusively for yirsinian-Piiot>
!! MEADE v. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court OF Appeals of Virginia.
September IA, 1892
IN ORDER TO CONVERT LAND IN
TO MONEY BY WILL. THE d.
N RECTIoN TO SELL 1T MUST BE
ABSOLUTE AND UNCoNDIT1ON-
4 AL. IF THE REQUEST OR CON
SENT OF PARTIES is tREQUIRED,
THERE IS NO. CONVERSION UN-
as LESS SUCH REQUEST OR CON-
SENT OCCURS.
ONE JOINT DEvISEE OR LEGATEE
HAS NO CLAIMS ON THE SHARE
OF THE OTHERS IN THE LAND
FOR HER SHARE OF THE PER-
SONAL ESTATE WHICH HAS NOT
BEEN PAID HER BY THE EX-
ECUTOR. HER REMEDY is
AGAINST THE EXECUTOR AND
HIS SURETIES.
THE OWNER OF AN UNDIVIDED
INTEREST IN LAND is NOT AZ
FECTED BY A SALE OF THE
OTHER INTERESTS BY A TRUS-
TEE. BUT MAY HAVE PARTI-
TON.
The points decided appear from the
opinion Of the court
The court says:
In the case. before us, there was no
conversion OF the land into money by
the terms of the WILL To convert land
into money, the direction to sell must
be absolute and unconditional. The
VIII or other instrument must contain
an imperative direction to sell the real
estate in order to convert 1t into money.
IL the power to sell requires for It's ex-
ecution the request or consent OF the
parties interested, there is no CONVEX
sion unless such request Is made or con-
sent given. 1t therefore follows that
the real estate Of the tcstator in the
case at bar retained It's original char
acter and passed at his death to his
devisees as land. The personal estate.
which passed into the hands of the ex-
ecutor, was ample to eQualize the APP
pellant and the other reSiduary lega-
tees. She and they were entitled to be
paid their respective shares by the ex-
ecutor, and they were entitled to equal
shares OF the land without reference
TO the division of the personal estate.
II the executor misappropriated or
wasted the personal estate, and the APP
pellant has been deprived OF her share
thereof she has her remedy against
him and his suretles for devastnvit.
There is no principle Of law or equity
which requires that any part of the
shares OF the other devisees of the
lands be surrendered by them or their
grantee to make good her share OF the
personal estate. The court did not err
In Diminishing the original bill of the
complainant. Nor did the court err in
refusing leave to file the amended bill
for partition of the tract of land. Waiv,
ing any possible objection that might
be to 1t as departure In substance
from the original bill. or to the charge
of multifariousness, 1t was not compe-
tent for the complainants to require a
stoppage of the sale under the deed OF
trust OF the interests OF the other devil
sees In the land until her share had
been laid off, on the ground that other
wise her interests might be sacrificed
by the sale. She was not legally in
terested In the sale OF their interests,
and her interest In the land could be
In no wise affected by the sale. She
could have partition of the land as we'll
after as before the sale, and it is not
perceived how she could be prejudiccd
by the sale. Practically the amended
bill was in the interest Of the grantorA
In the deed of trust and not for the ben
eft of the appellant. The court right
ly refused leave to the complainants to
file the amended bill. and lett the fe-
male complainant to have partition
made Of the land by a proper original
bill. Affirmed.
MACON D. &c S. r. co. v. MOORE.
Supreme Court Of Georgia.