The times., 1899-02-26
I 14!:|-i||| ] 1!|(l ) t|(:t|t11 !


around the depot. until the Of their ar ,
rival had reached the proper authorities. and .
they had found the time TO point out place ON
the map Of Tampa. which they all lad. where
the regiment should 20 and camp. and yet, 10
a lay man. and even 10 the average army otii-
Ger. 1t would il this could have been
done in five minutes 10y man of ordinary IN
trlligrnCt; and. indeed there seems no reason
why il should not have been arranged before
the arrival Of the regiment. and an officer de
tailed to lead the troops to their camp the
moment the detTained.
There were S.OG0 thrown into Florida he
fore a single ration came. and Florida III the
summer time is not land oyertowing with milk
and honey. The condition Of the quaslcflhas-
ier's department in Tampa At this time can Ony
he described confusion worse coniound'd Inns
condition OF affairs in a great measure
il not wholly. due to disagreeahie incident
which ] would gladly leave uninontioned ala IL
furnish a striking illustration OF the most
dangerous weakness OF the army-did IT not point
out the first great abuse that will have TO he
remedied, if the reconstrUttcn al our army u
To I've carried out. However lntcllgentlN we
may set about the task, shall never possess
an army Of which can ho wholly proud. and
upon which we rely III any emergency. unti
the corps of officers is protected against the m
tcrtcrencc of political leaders and their haneiul
influences. which are almost exclusively CAer-
,ised in securing the promotion oi oihCars VINO
upon the face of their records shonld "c "l"p'
ped, and in protecting them from the tohse,
queucrs Of their driinquencies. or what would
be the consequences in any honestly administered
army service the world ever.
The work of transporting. of housing ana "i
feeding this host OF that was beng poured
into Tampa would have taxed the resources ci
the most capable and devoted officers. who had
had experience and had shown executive am'lty'
that could be attached 10 the qiarteiInaster
department To perform the most important du-
ties that the crisis cntailod. But, n matter
I OF fact, a very important part OF these duties
assigned to 4 major IN thr army who' cur
ing his stay Tampa, was never observed TO
ir9u- sDlp
had a great pull fully appreciated, both
by his srIperiors and his subordinate officers, ana
all sides his weakness was treated with ihueh
consideration Friendly representations were
made 10 him. tempting inducements were held
out TO him 10 sober up. and 4 week was gwen
him to do il in. which was certainly liberal,
while Young lieutcnaiitS We're taken from thelF
regiments where. owing TO the influx oi raw re-
cruits. they could i'll be spared, to perform his
duties; hut all TO no pnrpose-the major would
not sober mp. Perhaps lie could not tinaHF ne
WAS attacked 10y delirium tremens, and ran Gay
and night like maniac up and down the cor
I ridors of the hotel Insulting assaulting every
man or woman he met with. Only then 1t was
decided that the major had gone a little too
far even for a man with such a powerful
/ pull he placed III arrest, and two Off
! cers were detailed to make formal report upon
/ his condition. In few DAYS there came from
Washington telegram. ordering the major TO
/ report at the War Department at once
The major q good fellow, If was said
! 10y those who had had the opportunity, which
J W,, never enjoyed. OF seeing him in his own
mind and some sympathy was expressed for
/ his unfortunate plight, though it seemed TO me
! perhaps ! was preIudccd-that the soldiers who
! were going unGad and who were improperly
Z fed because Of his criminal neglect of duty were
/ more worthy OF sympathy than he y few days
= passed and when were expecting 10 hear
I that thanks to his ''pulI'' the major had es-
capped i court martial. and had been allowed TO
, resign from the service he had disgraced, we
| read in the ''OficiIl Gazette" OF the army that
7 Ft. huI ltplp ,1..,! q IA
upfeer army and ordered to assume even more
responsible duties than those which he had failed
to perform in Tampa!
This is a savory record for one of the
most important branches OF the United
States Government
In regard to the engagement at La Guasi-
ma MIR. Bonsal's view is different from
that of most other correspondents. He
says:
The whole responsibility for this escapade, of
which the best that be said is that it did
not end as disastrously il might well have
done rests with Major General Wheeler.
do not believe there is anyone who appre-
ciatcs more fully than do the aggressive quail
ties which made Fighting joe Wheeler one Of
the most popular leaders in the army, and no one
can possibly entertain higher opinion than do
of the services he subsequently, rendered IN the
course Of the campaign; yet ] am free TO admit
that in my judgment. il would have been better
i4r for the army 10 have forEone all those advan-
tages, and ior the commanding general TO have
| relieved General Wheeler from his command, IN
consequence Of his assumption Of authority
| which not vested in him, and for direct
disobetliencc 10 The orders which he had re-
ceiyed and had accepted. The result OF this
laXness that subsequently no order car
! rcd with II any assurance that 1t would bt
Obeyed.
Again, he says that in this engagement
there was a sort of race between th'
~
Cavalry, the volunteers being determined
TO show that they could render as efficien
I service as the regulars. II is his opinion
that the Rough Riders did not altogethe
! succeed in this and that the honors o
the day in great measure fall to the Tent
Cavalry.
Further. in treating of the council o
+ war before Santiago when there wa
doubt whether 10 retreat or to advance
j. he says that when vote was taken amoni
the four generals under Shafter the vot
I stocd as follows, the generals voting il
: the following order:
J. Lawton against retreat,
I Bates against retreat.
j. Kent FOR retreat.
I Wheeler against retreat.
. It has been stated that on this occasion
i , Wheeler was the leader in opposing an.
e movement TO retreat. but Bonsal's state
.
!, given last and that. although he had beel
e in favor Of abandoning the position som
q hours earlier. and had urged that action ol
Kent he now saw that his vote would max
If tie, and therefore gave it with the ma
n jority. Kent explained his vote by sayin
in that his brigade commanders were in favo
d of retreat.
This is rather an important side light o
10 the campaign. There is no animosit
y against General Wheeler in Mr.. Bonsal'
- narrative. however. and in an earle
er chapter ne gives most charming charaC
y ter sketch of the generals arrival at Tam
he pa. II is rather too long for quotation
he but as piece Of descriptive writing II
nj one of the most attractive and artist
lg things in the book. There are also sketche
li of Lawton, Chaffec, and Shafter OF th
~ latter warrior Mr.. Bonsal seems to enter
= tain an opinion somewhat more charitabl
than that which has been expressed b
re several others, and on two or three point
in he takes open issue with Richard Hardin
ce Davis regarding the character of this gen
5, eral. Regarding Davis statement tha
al Shafter was always in the rear Mr.. Bons;
ey pertinently enquiries il the commandin
general was expected 10 do duty as a scou
~ OF the inadequacy OF the hospital serviC
d and the suffering OF the wounded after II
Of battles of the campaign, Mr.. Bonsai give
ID many graphic and terrible pictures. Pc
.e' haps the most noteworthy of these is Il
IL chapter dealing with the battlefield of s.
re ile Juan, which has been widely quoted in u
sir newspapers since its first appearance
si- "MeClures Magazine" The Commissal
III. Department is also depicted in no very 4
d. tractive colors by his unsparing brus
we Ne teIIs of the soldiers whose lives cou
ad - -, sa,,o1 h;, errgical onara,;on
~ had there been proper diet for them du
rc, ing their conyalescence, but who were le
,at TO die because under the hard condition
I'D there was not one chance in thousal
wo that they would recover, and others nee