The daily morning journal and courier. [volume] (New Haven, Conn.) 1894-1907, 1899-01-09
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er rested, stood directly IN the path OF
the ambitions of Napoleon. In the one
case, the Roman navy, the defensive
force of the republic, guarded the coasts
of Italy so effectually that an immense
military undertaking ending in disaster
was imposed upon Hannibal. In the
other case, the Grand Army-the Of
fensive force of Napoleon-was abso-
lutely thwarted by the defensive force
the navy-of Great Britain. The fact
that, at Trafalgar, Nelson fought an
essentially offensive battle does not in
the least affect the definition of the pri-
mary duty of a navy in relation to a
maritime state.
The recent war, which Captain Mahan
is now discussing, exactly confirms the
previous teaching of all history from
Greek and Roman times down to the
present day. The United States navy
acted on the offensive and the long At
lantic seaboard was secure. In relation
to the great issues Of the war, however,
the army was the real offensive force,
and the United States squadron at Ma
Mia. having accomplished it's task, be-
came helpless until this offensive force
could be brought to bear upon the stu
alton. Similarly, in Cuba and Porto
Rico, the army alone could, by offensive
operations. enforce the will of the
American people upon ther antagonist
To the fal'acy which Captain Mahan
reafflrms was, in great measure, due
the losses and the sufferngs of the
troops in Cuba A nation which is in
duced to believe that navy is it's Of
fensive arm easily neglects to make
! and the
first instance of the offensive use of the
United States navy against foreign
foe instantly revealed-as might conf
IDENTIFY have been expected-grave def
ciencies in the organization and prepa-
ration of the real offensive arm.
Captain Mahan comments severely
upon the evidences of panic" afforded
by the jewellers along the Atlantic coast
| line, who believed that their lives and
property were jeopardized by a small
cruiser squadron which could, in the
| circumstances, have effected nothing.
These evidences he characterizes as
unworthy of men, unmeasured. ire
Elective, and therefore irrational; due
largely to that false gospel of peace
which breaches it for the physical COM
fort and ease Of mind attendant, and in
its argument against war strives to
smother righteous Indignation or noble
ideals by appealing to the fear of loss
casting the pearls of peace before the
swine of self-interest." There is, how
ever another and an extremely practi-
cal explanation of the causes of this
discreditable panic" which Captain
Mahan neglects to mention. A few
years ago q board ON Notifications
composed of experts, reported on the
coast-defence requirements of the Uni
ted States. This body proposed to de-
fend the ports to resist 1.-THE most for
midable ships and gravely estimated
the cost of the passive eXpedients at
925, $50 900 sterling. On San Francisco
alone, one of the most geographically
secure ports in the world, it was pro-
posed to spend more than e5,500,000
Happily only fraction of this vast ex-
penditure has been forthcoming; but
people solemnly informed that this sum
was necessary for their salvation and
fully aware that extremely little had
been done, might be excused for dis
playing unnecessary alarm. 1t is not
just to say that the panic" was alto
gether 'irrehective" There was a ra-
tional basis, and the cause is, in part at
least. to be found in some of the some
what ambiguous utterances of Captain
Mahan. fcrtificatfon is always a
symptom of and an incentive to panic |
If you rake an immense display of pas
sve defences at one port, you natural |
1y arouse alarm at less favored locai- |
ties, and in our own experiences this !
tendency has been frequently exhibited. |
| am quite unable to follow Captain |
Mahan's reasoning in regard to Iassive |
defences. 1t Is surely a patitude to |
say that you can put whatever weight |
you choose on a suitable foundation on |
shore. Qualifications" obviously, |
have almost unbounded power to bear |
weight The argument that, because |
"seaports and all entrances from the
sea are stationary, it follows naturally
that the arrangements for their defence
should, as a rule be permanent and
misses the whole point 1t |
would be more rational to assert that
wherever seaports can only be attacked
by mobile force, such force is their nat
ural defence. The whole question of
coast fostifioa MS resolves itself. for us
at least, into the following: 1t is essen
tial that our navy should be able to
ee''NS va |
not do so, we perish as a great nation
Given this condition, what probable de-
nands can be made upon passive coast
1efences? Our long history supplies
The answer.
Quoting Napoleon, Captain Mahan
Gays that "exclusiveness of purpose is
he secret of great success and of great
7perations" This vital lesson cannot
tnp of INN fIA p,-;f
sh nation. To prepare to hold the sea
With the navy and to be ready to strike
With the army--this sums up our only
safe policy. Diffusveness of purpose,
" the attempt to establish two lines OF
lefence one active and one sedentary, l
AN only lead to weakness and waste
Being convinced that Captain Mahan's
Irticle must necessarily tend to produce :
in this country | venture !
o question the views in regard to coast
lefence which, in your columns and
Elsewhere, he has propounded.- Navalis
n the London Times.