Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1899-02-13

ance in the whole document concerns
the discipline and efficiencyof the army:
For many years divided authority and
responsibility in the war department
has produced friction, for which in the
interest of the service a remedy, if pos
sible should be applied The constitu-
tion makes the president commander
in-chief of the army, and ne. cannot
transfer that authority to any other
person. The president must have the
same power of selection of his general
in chief as he has of the secretary of
war; without this there can be no
guaranty that he will give, or the sec
retary of war will place. in the general
in-chief that confidence which is neces-
sary to perfect harmony"
OF the inspector general the commits
sion says: THE commission finds that
the inspector generals department was
not as efficient as it ought to have been.
There seems to have been a question
as to the authority by which inspections
were to be ordered. On at least one
occasion the secretary of war instructed
the major general commanding the
army to inspect certain camps. The
major general did not act upon such in
structions, stating it to be his place to
order inspections"
OF the quartermaster's department
the report says: ION March l, with the
possibility of war with Spain, the quar-
termaster's department found Itself
charged with varied, numerous and i'm
portant duties; its appropriation was
small facing the probability of a large
army being soon organized for field
service.
'.At Santiago the deficiency at the
front appears to have been caused
rather from lack Of transportation from
the coast than from lack CT clothing.
tvuIage, a supply OF which was on the
transports. The condition of railroad
congestion during the early portion o;
the time Tampa was occupied by the
troops seems to have been unparalleled,
showing an almost ineXcusable lack of
executive ability on the part of those
charged with loading. unloading, and
handling of trains.
THE testimony shows that the first
call upon the quartermasterer's depart
ment in Cuba was for ships to trans
port 5000 men to Cuba; that soon after
the call was increased and a demand
made for steamers to transport q, 900.
Upon loading these vessels concentrated
at the port of Tampa it was found that
their capacity had been largely over
rated, and it was impossible to carry
upon them, without great discomfort
and danger, more than 16,CG0 men with
their equipments, etc. Even with this
reduction the vessels appear to have
been crowded. The quartermaster's
department ought to have been able to
more thoroughly equip these vessels.
surely it should have been more certain
of their carrying capacity.
"A sufficient number of vessels for
transporting $4,000 men, with the re-
quired lighters for their Decentralization,
should have been promptly furnished,
even had such action rendered necessary
the seizure of every steamer on the At
lantic and gulf coasts sailing under the
American flag. Failure to provide q
full and sufficient number of lighters FOR
Decentralization of the troops, supplies
and artillery caused delay, anxiety, an
noyance, danger. Had there been seri-
GUS storms, or had the landing been op-
posed by vigilant, well-trained force
of the enemy the result might have
been far different. The delay in some
instances in securing. medical supplies
at Santiago seems to- have been par
TALLY due to carelesshess in loading
them on the transports"