The diamond drill. (Crystal Falls, Iron County, Mich.) 1887-1996, 1899-02-18

for coast defenSeS and The expenditures IN
cIdent thereto. until after the declaration
Win reference to the adiuiant generals
department, the report says: There have
been very few complaints against this de-
partment. The records and testimony
show that IL has been prompt IA It's work
and has added greatly TO the efficiency OF
"The commIasi ion ind that the inspector
generals department was not as efficient
zion IN the ho DIVA Was Os ample and the in
spectors made reports TO the commanding
officers to whom they had been assigned
and were not forwarded to the war de-
parlnent.
Was Not Prepared for War.
at viii be observed that the declaration
OF war threw upon the quartermas ter' \
sponsibility for which IL was neither
physically nor financially prepared. The
department has reported that on April ].
1893. IL was amply provided with all neces-
sary clothing and equipage supplies for
three months for the army as then organ
lied. IL appears that within few weeks
n became necessary 10 provide for clothing
and equipping an army OF more than 10000
men, So soon as funds were available, so
soon as war was inevitable. so soon as law
permitted the quartermaster's depart
ment undertook this enormous work: That
the quartermaster general threw the en-
funds were available was evident and that
his officers labored faithfully IN their ef-
fOrtS 10 aid him. Is plain 10 those VINO nave
carefully studied their work.
Some of the Complaints.
I'm spite OF every effort there were occa-
SONS where troops suffered from poor tent
age or lack OF tentage and absence OF straw
Tor bedding, where clothing was scarce
and troops suffered discomfort for lack OF
shoes, shirts and other articles OF apparel.
Al Santiago the deficiency at the front ap-
pears to have been caused rather from lack
or transportation from the coast than from
lack OF clothing and tentage "A supply OF
which was on the transports. Great com
plant was made OF lack OF transportation
facilities AT the camp at Montauk Point
~. Y. Many complaints were made In rel :
efence to unnecessary delays ana lack OF
promptness on the part OF the quartermas,
ters department in moving regiments ana
In the care OF the sick and convalescents
returning home either with their regiments
or alone. Grrat complaint was made OF the
railroad congestion at Tampa and the alb
solute lack OF ability 10 bring order out OF
chaos Mt that place during the early part
or the period Of It's occupancy by troops;
The major general commanding has stated
mat supplies for 10000 men for 30 days were
ordered there. and the confusion on the
railroad when he reached Tampa was very
great. 1000 cars being sidetracked. some OF
them as far back as Columbia, :. Z.
Lnck Of Executive Abilisy.
1T IS stated that in the hurry and rush
attending the commencement OF this work
the contents OF cars were unknown AT
Tampa, that bills OF lading were not FOR
warded. and that IL seemed impossible for a
time TO determine where absolutely neces-
sary articles were located Col. Bird, OF the
quartermaster's department, testiites that
this was corrected later on, when the con-
tents OF cars were clearly marked upon
them and bills OF lading promptly forward
ed The condition OF the railroad conges-
ton during the early portion or the tim"
Tampa was occupied by troops seems un-
parallelcd, showing an almost inexcusable
lack OF executive ability on the part OF
those charged with the loading, unloading
and handling OF the trains. Col. Bro ana
af.hT
very poor facilities for transferring troops
and supplies arriving at Tampa via the
Florida Central railroad TO the lIahI sss-
was finally brought out OF chaos, the cars
unloaded, the congestion overcome and
vast amount OF supplies OF every character
delivered al this Immense encampnent
water transportation.
with reference to the vessels used TO
transport troops TO Cuba. the report says
sit was shown by evidence that their ca
pacity had been largely overrated and II
was Impossible 10 carry upon them. with
out great discomfort and danger, more
than 5000. instead OF $4,000. men, with their
equipments. artillery, ammunition. sub
for a voyage OF 1000 miles.
THE quartermaster's department ought
TO have been able 10 more thoroughly
equip these vessels. and surely II should
have been more certain of their carrying
capacity. sufficient number OF vessels
quired lighters for their Decentralization,
should have been promptly furnished, even
had such action rendered necessary the
seizure OF every steamer on the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts sailing under the American
haS.
Land Transportation.
owing to the lack OF necessary trans
ports the means OF land transportation dur
ing the Santiago campaign was painfully
deficient. The testimany shows that the
transports arrived of the south coast OF
Cuba near Santiago on June Il; that the
pack trains were landed on June p; that
the first wagons were landed on June -,
and that the landing OF the latter was con-
tinued more rapidly than they could be
set up on shore. and that In fact some
OF those that were landed were never set
| July I, at the battle OF III Caney, ten days
after the arrival OF the fleet there were
no ambulances or wagons available ana
| that the roads were so horrible that they
could not reach the front.
III is plainly evident that this army OF
| 1900 men disembarked In the face OF an
enemy in n hostile country, and rapidly
| thrown forward against well.armed
| force. was painfully deficient In land trans
| portation, but In spite OF the absence OF this
almost absolutely necessary portion OF the
| equipment OF well-trained command a
drove the enemy before II, captured their
outposts. pushed them behind their main
| defenses, drove their fleet from Santiago
| bay 10 absolute destruction as IL faced the
| navy OF our country, and finally after most
gallant lighting under n a tropical ssn,
| a strongiy-fortihcd city and received as
prisoners OF war over $1,000 Spanish sol
1 diers
OF the department under charge OF Gen
| Eagan as commissary general. the report
| SAYS: ''The commission has carefully In
/ yesttgated the subject OF the condition,
| quality and quantity OF the food supplied
i 10 the army. Almost without exception 4,
| has been shown by the testimony taken
4 that wherever the troops were ordered
| whether to the various camps In the United
states or In Porto Rico, Cuba and Manila
/ the rations prescribed by law were on the
/ transports and at the camps with the sol.
| dlers SO far as We have been able TO as.
| certain there was but one occasion, that oi
| a day. in front OF Santiago. when the troops
| were seriously short OF rations: these had
| been supplied. but thrown aside when the
1 men went into action. the condition OF
| roads and lack OF transporta ton prevent.
! ed prompt reissue. At times the vegetable
| ration was rot OF good quality, the pota-
| toes and onions being spoiled Condemned
by a board of survey, such vegetables were
/ destroyed and an equivalent part OF tn,
ration issued. Some trouble occurred be-
| cause such vegetables and other damaged
| food were disposed OF by the company
| without the warrant OF board OF survey
| This was done through ignorance their
officers not knowing what was necessary
! TO be done.
Refriucrnted Beef.