Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-02-21

Paul could remain at most off the port
FOR but two days. The Brooklyn. Iowa
and Massachusetts We're fairly well off
with coal. but the Texas. Marblehead
and Vixen were considerably reduced.
The projecting sponsor of the Texas
ana Marblehead made it dangerous to
coal them alongside the collier with
any swell on the open sea.
II was this situation says the
statement coupled with the conclu-
sion that the Spanish squadron might
have touched and then moved west,
as reported at Cienfuegos. and rein,
Forced by the fact that Sigsbee had
not seen them, and that the pilot
Nunez was strongly impressed with
the doubt that this squadron could
enter the port, which occasioned my
telegram of May 27th."
DECISIVE CONFLICT ORDERED.
Captain Sgsbee is quoted as con-
hrming the opinion as TO the difficulty
OF coaling off Santiago. He gives the
details of the absolute location of the
Spanish squadron inside the harbor on
May ~, which discovery was, the Adj
mlral Gays. tic result of a de;crmna-
ton to satisfy himself fully before
leaving for the west. on the 3Ist ne
made reconnaissance to develop the
enemy's position and incidcntly To in
1ure or destroy. if possible, the Colon
moored we'll UP in the harbor
Admiral Schlcy quotes the depart
ments dispatch of May % in these
words:
The department looks to you to as
certain the fact Of the presence of the
enemy, and that the enemy If i'm the
harbor at Santiago. does not leave
without decisive action Commenting
on this the Admiral says:
IN obedience to the above order and
without any further order or instruc-
ton from any one. I did ascertain the
fact that the enemy was at Santiago
and the enemy did not leave without n
decisive conflict ;,
CLOTHED WITH RESPONSIBILITY.
Detailing the events connected with
the battle of July Sd. he says that at
S:45 of that day Admiral Sampson made
signal from his flagship. Disregard
movements of the Commander-in-
Chief, and steamed eastward to
Siboney. This" says Admiral
Schley, left me, the senior Of
iccr present and necessarily clothed
me with the responsibility of the COM
mand. Continuing, he declares that
when the cnemy's vessels came out of
the harbor signal was made from the
brooklyn this tiagshp) To the fleet 10
clear ship for action" Then followed
the signal CLOSE action" and this by
the signal; the enemy escaping to
westward. Following the appearance
"a tHt ppsihisil lictl tIcIc WAS IL StncIdl
inward movement of the American YES
sells. closing in and engaging 1t.
MOVEMENTS OF THE VESSELS.
Explaining the movements OF the YES
sells of both fleets he says the Spanish
fIeet was coming westward under high.
speed and Changing course more TO
westward brought the Brooklyn head
ing eastward to meet it. into g. posi-
ton where she would have blanketed
the fire of the eastern vessels of our
force now changing their courses to the
westward and between them and the
Spanish vessels"
instant decision" he continues was
therefore necessary TO avoid interfering
in any way or cutting off any OF the fire
of our vessels. as would have occurred
II she had turned toward the Spanish
fleet now approaching the Brooklyn.
Turning outward left the encmy's ships
unmasked by the Brooklyn and exposed
them to the concentrated fire OF our
squadron. The result of this manoeuvre
was that I'm thirty minutes from the
opening of the combat four of the
enemy's vessels were on fire and riddled
with projcctiles.
SIMPSONS LATE ARRIVAL
At the final capture Of the Colon ut
lis %. III. the Brooklyn was nearest,
the Oregon next and then the Texas
and Vixen. The New York arrived at
2:23 p. M and the commandcrn-ch chief
assumed command of the squadron.
Signals were made from the Brooklyn
TO the squadron until all signal hal
yards We're Shot away, and then by the
Myers army code"
DECIDING FEATURE OF COMBAT.
In conclusion. Admiral Schley con-
tends that the turn of the Brooklyn
in the battle of the Sd was 1.-The crucial
and deciding feature of the combat and
of decided advantage"
Furthermore. he says it is n mis-
take to say that the vessels distance
from the enemy was increased TO the
extent Of 500 yards. and adds:
Though this may not be of record. it
is fact nevertheless" He cites the
fact that the charts of the Board of
Navgators shows that the Brooklyn
was the nearest when it emerged from
the harbor. nearest at every stage of
the battle and nearest the Colon when
it surrendered. and gives many con-
firmatory details of his nagship's ac-
tive and effective participation in the
battle.
He says he made no report of his
mcaneOuver in his report OF the bat
tie. as its effect upon the battle was
never Il question with him. His last
paragraph reads:
SAMPSON CONTRADICTS HIMSELF
ION May 81 1 received a telegram
from the commandments chief congratu-
lating me on my success in locating
and blockading the enemys fleet at
Santiago. If it was worthy of com
mendation at that time | am at n loss
to understand how 1t could have grown
into reDrehensible conduct as sur-
gcstcd by Admiral Sampson in his let
Ter of July 10, 1898, some six weeks
later"
New Secretary OF The Interior.
By Telegraph to V!-E'nian-Pilot)
.-.i.i - 4.