The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-10-11

advocacy Of such an alliance by the German
Admiral has much significance. 1t shows
that Continental students OF the conditions
OF naval warfare are beginning to recog-
nize what has been for some time clear to
far-sighted Englishmen, that no coalition
against England would have much chance
OF success which did not include the United
States. It is true that the naval forces OF
France. Russia and Germany. combined,
would considerably surpass England's
fleet as regards the number OF warships
and the weight Of armament. In the mind
OF experts, however, there Is grave doubt
respecting the comparative naval efficiency
OF the three powers first named In respect
Of seamanship and gunnery. There is
lurking apprehension, based on the exploits
Of British seamen in the past, that a British
squadron might win even against great
odds. 1t is this misgiving which makes
American cooperation seem highly desir-
able Every educated naval officer on the
Continent Is, OF course familiar with our
naval achievements during our last war
with England, and, although these
involved no encounters OF great sea-
going fleets, but were performed either
by hotillas on the Lakes or by
single frgates on the ocean, they at least
proved that American sailors and American
gunners are fully able to cope, man to
man, with British opponents. 1ncompara-
bly, deeper has been the impression made
by the victories at Cavits and of Santiago,
which, unlike most naval battles recorded
in history, resulted in the humiliation OF
one combatant, while the other experienced
little or no loss The American Navy such
az it will be in 1910, would supply an ines
Unable nucleus around which the allied
fleets could rally. One great naval victory
on our part over England would supply our
coadjutors with a confidence which they
now lack. We should have demonstrated
that British warships are not invincible.
This, however, Is not the only ground on
which the adhesion OF the United States is
perceived to be Indispensable to the SUCCESS
OF an alliance against England. Ours is the
only country upon earth which could starve
Great Britain into submission, for we alone
possess the power to cut off the supplies OF
American and Canadian grain on which her
people mainly rely for their subsistence.
This would be true even II Englands fleet
were able to control the sea. In vain
would her purveyors OF food staples tax to
the utmost tho export resources Of
India, Australasia, Argentina and Chilli
We omit Russia because, according to the
hypothesis, it would be party to the hos
tile coalition, but even the surplus grain Of
Russia would not fll the tremendous gap
which our enmity would leave between
England's necessities and her attainable
supplies. Knowing as we do how small ls
the store OF grain on hand in England at
any given hour, we may safely affirm
that the pressure OF famine would be felt
within thirty days, and that it would
Increase until England succumbed.
To this fact intelligent Englishmen have
become OF late even more keenly alive than
are Continental observers 1t Is their COM
prehension Of Great Britain's dependence
on American food supplies that explains
Lord SALIsBURY's reconsideration OF his
original refusal to submit the boundary OF
British Guiana to arbitration, and also ex-
plains his population in 1893 Of England's
former policy with relation to Cuba. Rear
Admiral VALoIs has simply discovered
to-day what was plain enough to sagacious
Englishmen four years ago.