The free lance. (Fredericksburg, Va.) 1885-1926, 1899-08-24
The Spaniards at Santiago.
ne New York Sun says:

that surrender had 10 be made
This subject occupied much Of the
attention Of Commander jacobsen,
Of the German cruiser Geier, in his
series Of articles in the Marine. Rund-
schau, of Berlin, an Official pubhca
tion. Extracts f.om these. articles
were made known by our Office Of
Naval Intelligence some months ago,
but translation Of the complete
articles is now issued by it in two
pamphlets.
Recognizing the daring of the
American troops in assaulting Ssnti-
ago and the bravery Of the Spaniards
in defending it, Com mander Jacob
sen yet ascrlbes the defeat of the
latter to three charges. One is that
no thought had been taken ofsupply-
ing the large cities with provisions;
and this Was the real reason why the
garrisons of Guantanamo, Baraco
and other places were voluntarily lu-
cluded in the capitulation or Santi'
ago. Again, there was gross fail
ure to concentrate soasonsbly at
Santiago the 1000 men at Gusntan.
amo and the 5000 a. Manzanillo,
when at Santiago there were only
5000 to use against her 1900 Fi'
ually, the Spanish troops had DO
field artillery and their siege artll.
lery was in great part unservlce>
able.
Developing these points, Command
er Jacobsen says that on July l. the
Spaniards had in the trenches LAO
regulars, $50 irregulars, $50 volun-
teers suo 500 sailors, total of 2 $40
igbtinq forces. There were in the
city $50 men defending the fortified
position of San Juan, 400 at the So
capa battery, 420 at the Punta Cor
da, $50 at the Moro, and about $50
on the line from Las Cruces to Aqua
dores. To hold FL Caney and San
Juan with these troops, although the
positions were well chosen and the
ground very difficult for our troops,
was an impossibilty. At best the
garrison from Moro and SOcapa
ought to have been hurried to the
point of attack, when our plans be-
came evident. On July 4,Col. Escario
reached Santiago with 5000 mep;
but that was after the battle of FL
Caney and San Juan had allowed US
to get into positions from which the
city could be bombarded. There
was no food supply for the new com
ers, our guns could not be answered,
and no course but surrender was left
to the Spanish commander.
Turning to the Naval fight, Com
mander Jacobsen says that the only
chance for Cervera's sortie would
have been to make it at night, in
scattered formation. With the four
fighting ships, two large merchant
vessels lying in the hsrbor might
have been taken out, steering diGer-
ent courses. But if the fleet did not
dare to attempt a night sortie, il
should have been headed straight at
the enemy in a bold attack in close
formation, using all weapons, IN
cludng the torpedo and the ram.
The actual in-shore course taken,
with the alternative of beachiug
prominent, was due in part, to "the
certain knowledge that the opposing
forces were much stronger" The
crews lacked training, the vessels
had not been cleaned for a long time,
and with the feet so inferior in mum
Der, speed and fighting efficiency, no
wonder our victory was easy.
AS for the Moro, Socapa aud
Punta Gorda batteries defending the
entrance, they naturally had no IL
luence at all on the naval fight. Not
to speak of their disabling during
previous bombardments, the MORO
had contained Eve muzzle loading
GA inch bronze pieces and two 8 4
inch muzzle.loading howitzers; the
Socapa battery, two Ga inch Hontoria
guns from the Reipa Mercedes, three
s 4 inch muzzls-loading howitzers,
and near by few small pieces for
covering mines; the Punta Gorda
battery, two 3.6 inch Krupps, two
6.inch howitizers and two GA
Hontorias. The FIVE guns Of the
Moro dated back from the sixteenth
and eighteenth centuries. Command
er Jacobsen thinks that the only
serviceable guns were the pair of
Hontorias in the Socsps battery, and
says he has only heard Of one hit by
the batteries of an American ship
during all the bombardments, with
one other from a Spanish howiizer.
The American officer who took pos
session of the Moro battery, finding
charges in some of the medieval
howitzers, fred them, and found that
"eyen with the greatest elevation
the range was only 800 yards. 1t is
possible that the cartridges had suf-
fered from humidity; but on the
other band it is quite as probable
that this was their greatest range:
No wonder that the Spanish could
not reach the hostile ships"
1t must be understood that Com
mander Jacobsen desires to underate
the splendor of our victories either
on land or sea. Our Navy depart
ment would not 20 to the trouble of
printing and circulating Its com.
ments, if this were their purpose.
On the contrary, ne praises the per-
sonnel of our feet and the "brilli.
ant manner" in which it performed
its task. But the points of adverse
criticism which he discovers are
chiefly on the Spanish side, and he
shows q series of failures to provide
adequate decisive resources and even
10 use some of those which we're at