The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1899-04-07

AT hrst these were almost harmless
since they almost invariably brought ON
a fresh advance on the part OF those whom,
they were intended 10 intimiaate After
the battle Of Caloocan however. when the
American lire was SO long ard thin that
any further general advance became mex
pedient, the rebels made discovery which
reyoiutonized their plans and inspired
them with renewed courage. This wes
that their rifles had superior Range 10
those OF the majority OF the American
weapons. Thereafter their sha-pshooters
carefully remained out OF range of the
Springaelds carried by the volunteer regi-
ments in front Of them. but maintained a
constant and more or less effective iire
from trees. eIumps OF bamboo. rocks or
other natural points OF vantage, both by
day ani night.
A more calling situation than thai IN
which the American troops have been
placed for the past few weeks 1t would be
difficult to imagine. Constantly potted at
by an unseen foe. yet unable to silence
his fire except upon such rare occasions
as when the country was ordered cleared
and then compelled to retire TO their or
iginal lines after having done 1t. the won
der is that the men were kept in check
at all. Yet they were SO, not because
they We're 50 thoroughly disciplined as
10 accept unweleome orders uncomplain-
ingly. but because they were huoyed with
the hope that when their reinforcements,
already route arrived, general ad-
vance would be made. and then their turn
would come. That time Is near at hand.
f.ttr hat h.r ~ fyrs rcEr S.afn .l,a
eager Americans will be accomplished as
soon as they anticipate is an open ques-
ton.
If the entire rebel force could be corral
ed in any one section of the island, the
work of subduing it would be very simple
and soon accomplished without doubt.
But on the island of Luzon alone well.
equipped army of 40 men has only suc-
ceeded in clearing the country within a
radius OF five miles from Manila so far
and no one knows with any degree Of GER
tainty what there is ahead. 1t is certain,
however. that the further they penetrate
into the wilds Of the interior. the greater
will be the disadvantage to the white
troops. since swamp and jungle fighting
are the strong points of the natives. 1t
must be accomplished before the rainy
season. because. Part from the consid-
Grafton OF the health OF the troops most
of the country is absolutely impossible
from May TO October.
Among the uncertainties TO be faced IS
tha: Of the force 10 be encountered. So
far as can be ascertained the rebel army,
which has hemmed the Manilans within
the confines OF the city for SO long con-
sisted OF 5000 men, one-thlrd of whom
are armed
Mos, OF these are, OF course. Tagaios.
who are the mainstay of the rebellion. II.
as claimed. there are 31e.Ho OF these yet to
meet under climatic and territorial disad-
vantages. the problem which confronted
Kitchener al khartoum was a simple one
compared with that which Lawton has to
face on his arrival.
or course. there are tribes such as the
Ilocanes, whose hatred for the TagaIos
might render them useful allies, but the
question arises aa Ia whether Il would be
safe 10 trust them with the arms neces-
sary for the purpose. The lesson taught
by Againaldo IS not likely tn be forgotten
in a hurry. and there Is grave danger In
such experiments at this stage OF the pro-
ceedlngs
Th.re Is an of chance that In the
event OF a serious setback Aguinaldo's
forces may show the white feather In
such numbers as TO render further resist
ance useless, bat ii must be conceded that
the rebels have not shown any such dis
position SD far, They boltei at the FIRST
sign Of IN advance. L IS trsie. but partly
because they were ignorant ~ the strength
.f their own position ard partly because
their first instinct Is 10 fy from covert TO
covert when attacked In this connection
# must be horne in na,nd that their only
education IN the art of warfare was re-
ctlved in this Spanish ch3ol. and the
STANDARDS. IKE themselves. always fought
from covert when potsble. The few
brushes which our troops have had with
ths. enemy 70 date have proved conciu-
stvcly that the latter Will not Stand
flank attack. but they are quick 10 learn
ard oncc they realize that boltisg across
the open il suicidal. under the ciTcuSi-
stances. they VIII probably adopt the
wisef course ~ fighting 1t out.
Another % the uncertainties Ia the nam-
her u arms watch lbe rebels possess Tnat
they are being Supplied az frequent inter
vsiz from ~crne unknown spusce. scarcely
admits - a doubt. out III what quantities
cannot even BE conjeeturc1. tHlu few
DAYS ago 1hers was every indication TIA;
the fetels aionx our whole sroat were nsing
hone mate ammunition. bui 1ow srlokeie~s
powder - again being ase,j. and 5udgag
frem the enormous quantity ~ fsanunn.-
tson expended every fwenty-four hours
fhe.r supply must De unlimited. ~ every
yi.lass captafga 20 far. thousands -
rounds e &s8spr cartridges have been
seized hat @tig saese Is ne appreclahge dlf-
teeeHes n the amount expended from day
to day
II must also * Esrae Tsllsere.l that hitherto
she army ha@ beer aeSiH& ~ conjunction
wi.h the ravy. and TIA Isesey's shsp Aave
very rnstersaliy assisted ~ routing ne
fnerny along ;ae sho-e~ y Maniga 1ay.
While there = diSRas{t.cn an the part q
-nany se'}.ers - he#1t.e tae serg 6oue by
the etseg hvaach 81 she s~vviee. there csn
t-e ID Quest51a as 20 the effect ~ tne