New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-02-21
SCHLEY DEFENDS HIMSELF.
AN ANSWER To THE CHARGES OF REP
REHENSIBLE CONDUCT"
STATEMENT AS TO HIS ACTIONS BEFORE
AND IN THE DESTRUCTION OF GER
vERAs FLEET SENT TO THE
SENATE NAVAL COM
AfITTEE

the charges made against him in the communi-
cation recently sent 10 the Senate. to-day
handed t. tho Committee on Naval Affairs
statement in which he disclaims any purpose Of
controversy with the Navy Department The
letter Of the Department. he says. so far as II
relates to him. can be summarized under the
following heads
The delay oN Ciensuegos; the alleged slow
progress toward Santiago de Cuba from Glen.
fuegos the retrograde movements on May 70
and -. the battle Of Santiago and the de-
structOn ~ Cervera fleet.
The Admiral SAYS that his orders from Sanp-
son on May 10 were 10 blockade Cienfuegos
which ne proceeded to do. He had no knowl-
edge that there We're any insurgents about Glen
fuegos who were friendly until the Marbehead
arrived on the oath Even had he possessed
this knowledge on May % the surf would have
prevented communication on his arrival he
sent Commander McCalla Of the Marblehead
ashore 10 establish relations with the insur-
gents the result of which was made known 10
him at $40 o'clock on MAY "a Then for the
first time no learned definitely that the Spanish
fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Within two hours
he started for Santiago.
CAN SEE no GROUND FOR CRITICISM
What possible ground for a criticism" he
saws "averse IN me there can he in all this
do not see ! was on the spot. acting under or
ders which gave me entire discretion. and yet
clothed me with the responsibility OF going 10
Santiago only after was satisfied that the fleet
was not at Cienfuegos"
lie quotes from the dispatch 81 Sampson Of
MAY % in which the latter says schley should
hold his fleet Of Cientuegos II the Spanish
ships have put into Santiago they must come
either n Havana or Cienruegos 20 deliyer the
munitions OF war which they are said 70 bring
for use in Cuba I am therefore OF the opinion
that the hest chance 20 capture these ships VIII
he 10 hold the two points Cenfuegos and Ha-
vana. with all the force can muster. II later
il should develop that these vessels are at san
tlago we can then assemble off that port the
shi-- best suited FOR the purpose and completely
blockade H. Until We then receive more posi-
tive Information we shall continue TO hold Ha-
vana and Cientuegos"
Admiral schley adds This letter Is not PRINT
ed either in the appendix or executive docu-
rnents but received It on the I'D ana II
shows that was expected 10 hold my squadron
IF Cenfuegos"
AS 10 the slow progress toward Santiago on
account of the Eagle ne says that she was a
mart ~ the force which Admiral Sampson had
seen fl 10 send him. and ne had no right %
ahandon her The weather also was rough. ana
not much better speed could have been kept up.
BE mad been ordered to proceed cautiously.
7, however ne had known that the Spanish
fleet was in Santiago. no consideration for the
raqle or ANYTHING else would have prevented
hin, from getting there at the earliest possible
-,ornent with the larger vessels; but the weather
and sea made It impossible TO Do better than
M did.
ACTED ON HIS BEST JUDGMENT.
e,eak,np ~ the "retrograde movements "
which the Secretary. adopting the language OF
Admiral Sampson. characterizes as "reprehens-
,ble conduct" Admiral Schley says that in
sorty-two years service never was such Ian
auaae used to characterize conduct Of mine ana
see no reason for it now" He adds
..o.tro IN accordance with my hest Judgment
! IN ,iev. Of the circumstances. without certain
/ L,ou.ladge Of the wherea bouts ~ that spanish
feet after having been Informed 10y the scouts
! commanded by such officers a. Slgspee Jt"7H
and Wise that although thrS na' IT.,
| "a Santiago for a week they had seen nothhs
/ ~ II and knew nothing Of Its movements or us
! whereabouts since II had left Curac"a' a4Ie.
| having been assured ny Sgsnee that hr dll ho'
! believe II was I'm Santiago and by me emphauo
| declaration Of the pilot. NuneZ and knowing as
| tha sea and weather then We're IL would he I'M
/ r.-sinle ~ coal my squadron of the port ]
| T.oulad IL best % take m" dcllou hi.-s 'A'
| onal result OF which was the location or the
/ euernv's fleet IN Santiago Harhor
Admiral Schley speaks OF the dlftcuIV o.
doing anything with the insurgents and refers
| ~ the manner In which Lieutenant blue look
rhroe DAYS 70 secure information
NEVER REBUKED BY SAMPSON
AZ ~ the battle Of Santiago. Admiral Schley
saws the facts Of that contest speak for them
.,l,.os He quotes from his official report %
Admiral Sampson. in which he congratulated
The commander Of the squadron. and said the
victory seems big enough for all OF us. he
asks the committee to contrast his reports and
those Of Sampson containing references 70 MIN
self and continues
As 10 all this criticism Of my course prior To
| ,ha discovery n me on May % of CerVera 8
fleet whether from Admiral sampson or me De
ua~rmeut. none ~ II mas ever ueeh mao" ~
either 20 me-. and ! never neard wore OF IT
80, ar, ono until after the battle with that
0e4t although more than five weeks mad passed
sirca the alleged "repreh"nsihie conduct hao
occurred Although Admiral sampson used thls
langlale 70 the Secretary concerning me on
III la dust one week after the battle ne ha-
never TO this day IN any manner or 70 any - -
tint intimated 20 me any disappearing OF
,,,da fo me any criticism Of my conduct ot the
Ewing Squadron
Admiral Schley then submits long detailed
,o,ornent of the facts he summarizes In the
foregoing. which is in reply 10 request by
Chairman Hale Of the Naval Committee. II gives
+ho dianatches and orders received by Schley,
aud describes the condition in which the ships
had ~ coal as well rs the sailing for Santiago.
H. also refers 10 the doubts that arose as 10
,be nresence Of the Spanish feet in Santiago.
aeter no had arrived off that port. Captain
siqsbee stated verbally that he had been close
into the port several times and there were no
Indications that the enemy was present and he
doubted It's arrival there.
DIFFICULTIES OF COALING.
The commanding officer ~ the Harvard re
norted that he did not have coal enough to reach
any home base and could not steam beyond
twenty four or thirty hours. which. the Ad-
niral SAYS forced him to send the Harvard 10
Kingston The Yale and the Minneapolis could
roach Key West. and the St Paul could remain