The times., 1899-06-19
MONDAY. JUNE 10, 1899.
Hunting for "A scapesoat.

Nothing could be palmer than the cur
rent evidence that our war authorities
are preparing the way for square back
down on the question OF calling out the
Provisional Army. The Washington spe-
cials which appeared in the Administra-
tion press everywhere on Sunday morn
ing. clearly show that the Administration
is alarmed at the state of public sentiment
regarding its stupidity and ineniciency in
handling the Philippine situation, and is
making a desperate attempt to let itself
down easy and, CT course. at the expense
of somebody else.
We look in vain for the calm assertions
of a week ago at the War Department.
that the force OF troops in Luzon is great
er than necessary. Our officials have gone
directly back on their recent attitude NJ
knowing it eli, and. what is equally inter-
esting, have ceased to doctor Otis reports
in certain respects. as had been their habit
up TO within few days ago. Now they
are beginning TO confess that the little
bunch of soldiers allowed for the campaign
in Luzon. after all, may not be enough.
They are willing TO concede that the Presi-
dent may very shortly change his mind
and call out the provisional Army, even
at the imminent risk of being obliged to
remove Alger from the Cabinet. The con-
temptible part of it is that the whole out
it are getting ready to make Otis a scape-
goat for their own two-faced and dodder-
ing course in the past.
Thus. they declare that. If there are not
enough men in the Philippines to whip
the rebels and restore order, no one is to
blame but Otis. He could have had just
as many soldiers at any time rs he chose
to ask for. According to the Administra
tion people Otis has vigorously insisted
all along that thirty thousand troops repre-
sented the outside limit of his desires. and
that any man beyond that would be a
costly superfuity.
The public believes all that, about as
much as it does the words daily tackled on
at the tail of official dispatches from Ma
Mia Persons familiar with the editorial
organization and methods of the War Of
fee, know that our general was never
guilty Of the idiocy OF swearing every
twenty-four hours that the backbone OF
the rebellion was broken. and that the
natives would not make any serious stand
in future" otis is not such fool as to
make such statements while, at the mo-
ment he puts his reports on the wire, he
knows that every one OF his tired troops
is working in the trenches in preparation
for the next mornings Tagal assault.
The story that Otis is responsible for
rhr lfrsffaFfov oF sbo ,,1o., army tn tbfrt,y
thousand men is equally too silly to be
accepted as truth by the American people
We will agree that under orders or vigor-
Gus hints having all the force Of orders
he may have allowed himself to be placed
in the position Of scapegoat. to which it
is apparent his pastors and masters now
wish to reduce him. But it is impossible
that, with his experience, he should ex-
pect TO conquer with thirty or thirty-three
thousand soldiers that upon which he has
been unable 10 make the least useful
impression with thirty-eight thousand,
a month ago General Lawton is re-
ported TO have said that it would
take one hundred thousand men to
pacify and police the Island of Lu-
zon. When the wounded Captain Clay
returned from the war he said it was the
opinion OF all Army officers that nothing
effective could be accomplished with less
than seventy-fye thousand. and two weeks
later Commander Ford Of the Navy came
home with the same story.
If General Otis entertains a different
opinion and believes il possible TO con-
duct successful. aggressive campaign
with a smaller force than the one he now
has. and which is insufficient to more than
keep two small flying columns in the field
and man the defences of Manila without
any relief TO the men In the trenches. then
it is time the President sent cut another
commission to his rescue, and this time
a commission de lunatico inquirendo. Nat
urally. nobody of sense is disposed 20 hold
Otis responsible for the Grass fooIlshness
loaded on his shoulders by his Algerian
control. and the coming Administration
attempt to lay the blame OF failure In
Luzon AT his door viii excite only derision
and contempt
The true reason why Mr. Mckinley has
shiyered before his manifest duty and, so
far. eyaded 1t. is too notorious TO require
much fresh comment. He has been and
still is afraid that a call for volunteers
on his part would be responded to with
an angry. universal demand for the re-
moval Of Alger. Were he TO bow to that
then Il may be inferred. from White House
phenomena observed during the last year,