The National tribune., 1899-05-25

has been fully censured, his failure was
no greater than that of Meade on the
following day, and the latter has received
no attention. Meade's arrival with the
Second and Ninth Corps had reinforced
the Union armies TO a much greater
extent than Wise had been reinforced
by Hoke's command, which had been
brought from Buffers front on the night
of the 18th. After an event, when it
has become known what might have been
done, it is very easy to find fault and
claim that it should have been done.
Butler, in his book, however, main,
tains that if his orders had been obeyed
what should have been done would have
been done, thus virtually maintaining
that he knew what should have been
done at the proper time. After the
publication of "Butier's Book" Gen.
Smith issued his Chattanooga to Peters
burg" in reply to Butler, and he fur
nishes us some history that would have
been lost to us, but for the controversy
which he maintains.
This controversy is ably maintained
on both sides, is interesting reading, and
furnishes proof, if it were needed, to
confirm the fact that it is necessary for
armies in the field to be guarded against
the enemy within as well as the enemy
without the lines. Some of our armies
suffered more from the former than the
latter. If the commander fails to in
spire the necessary confidence and
esteem that will exact hearty obedience
to orders, or the subordinate is not
sufficiently impressed with the capacity
of his commander to yield him un-
questioned support, success will be a
very doubtful result.
GEN. SMITHS STATEMENT.
| am not disposed to take sides in
this controversy, but | am justified in
calling attention to some references In
Gen. Smiths account Of what he says of
the part that | took on the 18th of
June On pages S4 and So he says:
"Ihe cavalry under Gen. kautz was at
his suggestion and that of Gen. Butler
detached from the infantry and directed
to make an attack near the Norfolk
& Petersburg Railroad, where he was
said 10 have 'trotted over the intrench-
ments on the 9th of June. It was
hoped that he would get into the rear
of the intrenchments on our front, and
our infantry was directed not to fire
into them. But Gen. kautzs attack
failed, and at about $50 in tie after
noon the cavalry left the front and
retired behind the infantry without my
permission, so that we had no support
from them." In footnote lie invites
attention to my report.
On page 66 he states: Gas Gen.
Kautz's cavalry of from $500 to 1900
went practically on separate expedi-
ton to turn the works south of the
Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad, | had
no aid from him for the attack"
Gen. Smiths statements are hardly
just to my command, either in the orders
l had received or what | was expected
to do. 1t was not understood that |
could repeat the feat of the 9th. and
therefore | was not expected to do any
more than make believe that intended
to repeat it, for the object of drawing
away from Smiths front as much as
possible of the enemy's forces. That
this was done cannot be denied us, but
it is not conceded in any statement
which he makes with reference to our
cooperation that day. On the contrary,
he would make it appear that We were