The record-union., 1899-02-06

Admiral Dewey Has cabIed to the Gov
ernmeDt.
Were the Aggressors
and Were Repulsed-The News
Came Like a Shock to the Adj
administrations and Will Probably
Result in Ratification of the
Treaty This Afternoon.

Result in Ratification Of the
Treaty This Afternoon.
/ WASHINGTON, Feb. 5.-Admiral
Dewey to-day cabled the Navy Depart
ment that hostilities had begun between
the American army and naval forces in
and about Manila and the Philippine
insurgents. The insurgents, he said,
had been the aggressors and had been
repulsed
The following is Admiral Dewey's
dispatch:
MANILA. Feb. 5.-To the Secretary
of the Navy, Washington:-Ins
here inaugurated a general engage
ment yesterday night, which has con-
tinued to-day. The American army and
navy has been generally successful In
surgents have been driven back and our
line advanced. No casualties to the
navy. DEWEY"
The news came like shock, for the
administration, though apprised that
an ugly situation prevailed in the Phil
ippines, had chung steadily to a hope
| that by tact and patience actual fight
ing might be averted and even those
public men who felt that hostilities
would follow should the treaty be rati-
| fled and the United States attempt to
occupy the islands, believed that Agui-
naldo would not force the fighting when
the treaty of peace was in its most crit
| ical stage. Some Senatorial opponents
of ratification of the treaty adhere to
their position, but the general opinion
in Washington tonight is that the
news from Manila insures the ratifica
tim of the treaty tomorrow afternoon.
The news of the beginning of another
war came from Admiral Dewey. No
word had been received from General
Otis up to nightfall.
1t seems to be Dewey's fortune al
ways to be able to report favorable
news, and like all of his messages that
/ have gone before, this cablegram told
of the success of the American forces
| in the action. 1t was with great re-
gret, however, that the administration
! learned that the insurgents had forced
the issue. 1t had hoped all along that
| they could be brought to see the adj
vantages of placing their trust in the
American people and relying upon the
President to deal justly with them. The
administration argued that with the
Philippine Commission fairly on the sea
en- route for Manila, bringing with
them MESA ges from the President and
with the peace treaty still Enacted on,
| it was not to be anticipated that they
would refuse to wait to learn the pur
poses of the American Government, but
would precipitate the long-impending
conflict
| While this was true, the officials here
and the officers in Manila had not been
| i,,1 70 he f-rir in, he
situation there and every preparation
has been made for just what occurred
last night 1t is now acknowledged that
fear of an outbreak in Luzon was the
explanation for the much recommended
on failure of General Miller to force a
landing at Iloilo, ON the island of Pa
nay; Otis felt that he wanted all of the
troops at Manila, where was located
the center of the danger. Part of
Miller's force, therefore, was returned
/ to Manila and that General was left
with one regiment of regulars and q
battalion of artillery just sufficient to
| take advantage of any detection at the
| 'front.' but not enough to force his way.
| This, rather as formal authorization
/ for he did not need the instruction,
Dewey was told to cooperate fully with
| General Otis in any measures the lat
| ter might take. 1t is believed that it
| was unknown to the insurgents, but
some of the American warships were
moved quietly into positions where they
perfectly commanded the insurgents
trenches and defences and could shell
them with effect if an outbreak &C.
Cured. This movement was effected
more than ten days ago and the adj
ministration has not felt serious appre-
hension of General Otis ability to at
least hold his own. The American po-
sition might have been generally
strengthened, it is said, by a judicious
extension of the line in certain direc-
tions and also by taking summary
measures to prevent the operations OF
the insurgents in taking up positions
and organizing forces President Nc
Kinley took the view that perhaps, un-
der a strict construction of the terms
of the protocol, which still holds good
in the absence OF the ratification of the
treaty, he lacked authority to extend
the field of occupation of the Ameri-
cans. The fact that the insurgents
themselves have been the first to break
the truce practically releases the
United States from further obligation in
this respect, so that General Otis was
unQueSt1OnaDly warranted, IN the Opln-
Jon Of the administrator officials in ex-
tending his lines as Dewey reports he
has done.
The situation is regarded here as
rather anomalous from a diplomatic
standpoint. Legally, the Filipinos are
still Spanish subjects. Therefore, If
operations continue outside of the linn
its of Manila. as laid down by the pro-
tocol, it will amount to resumption
of the war with Spain, at least tech
nically.
officials noted one little flaw in
Dewey's dispatch in which he spoke of
the American army and navy as gen
orally successful" conveying just the
lleast intination that at some points the
results were not as satisfactory as at
others 1t is inferred here that this
/ might mean, the development of weak
ness at some of the more exposed
points on the American lines. which
might be easily explained by the fact
that the attack was made at night,
perhaps in places where the insurgents
could creep closer up to the shelter of
the tropical jungle that grows nearly
up into the town of Manila. Every
lconfidence, however, is felt that General