The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-30
How Would Spain Regard the Defeat
OF the Treaty?

of the Treaty?
According 10 a telegram from Madrid IL
Is officially announced that the Cortes will
be convoked on Feb. 16, whether or no the
treaty OF peace shall meanwhile nave been
confirmed by the United States Senate.
Have anti-expansionist Senators reflected
upon the effect that our rejection OF the
treaty might have upon the Spanish Par
lament
The treaty provides upon its face that 1t
shall become binding when IL shall have
been confirmed by the United States Senate
and signed by the Queen Regent Of Spain.
Queen CHRISTINA, however, has been adj
vised that she should not assume the re-
sponsibility Of signing the document with
out the antecedent sanction Of the Parlia-
ment, for the existing Spanish Constitution
declares that the national territory can be
alienated only by and with the consent Of
the Cortes. A review OF the proceedings
OF that body at the session held after
the signing OF the protocol will show that
the evacuation of Cuba and the cession Of
Porto Rico and OF a port in the Ladrones
were expressly authorized, but that no au-
thority was given for the surrender Of the
Philippines, which at that time had not
been asked for. 1t is probable, therefore,
that the Queen Regents advisers are right,
and that the cession Of the Philippines will
not be constitutionally valid, unless it is
ratified by the national Legislature. Amer
leans cannot wish that any cloud should
rest upon our title to the islands, lest 1t
should be turned to account by IA Carlist or
Republican Government, which Mt any hour
may succeed the AlphOneine regime, and
which may be able to effect an alliance with
n strong naval power.
Assuming that the Cortes nave the ron
stitutional power to reject that part OF the
peace treaty by which the Philippines are
coded to the United States, we may next
inquire whether they are likely to exercise
the power. Had the treaty been promptly
ratified we could have answered the ques-
tion in the negative. When the popular
branch of the present Cortes was elected the
friends of Prime Minister SAGAsTA secured
alarge majority, and the Cabinet is report
cd to have received lately n promise Of sup
port from that faction of the Conserva-
tives which is headed by Senior RoBLEDo.
There is no doubt that Senor SAGAsTA could
have obtained a ratification Of tho treaty
thirty days ago, and it is probable that he
could obtain it in the session cOnvoked for
Feb. 10, should he be sincerely anxious to
do so. II, however, the treaty should be
rejected by our Senate, there would be no
definite proposal for SAGAsTA to submit to
the Cortes, for technically the United States
and Spain would have reverted to a state of
war, and negotiations for peace would have
a. - .. tL1 ~ ,L1-n~f
cannot be foreseen. Nor would it be for
the Premier's interest to ask ratification in
advance for any fresh specific proposal re-
lating to the Philippines, sincein the course
of the negotiations, which wou have to be
renewed, some event favorable TO Spain
might occur. such as a violent demonstra-
ton by AGUINALDo against American au-
thority, or a rebellion on the part of dis
affected Cubans, or the outbreak Of a gen
eral war in Europe, in which latter event
an alliance with Spain might become stra-
logically valuable to some OF the combat
ants.
There is no doubt that the vast majority
of Spaniards resented the cession Of the
Philippines, which was exacted by our CON-
m~issioners at Paris; that Senior SAGAsTA
collSelllcu thereto against HIS WILL anu IndG
the American Senate, by rejecting the
treaty, would furnish the Spanish Prime
Minister with n pretext for resuming his
original reluctant attitude, thus compelling
us either to recur to open hostilities, or to
enter upon new negotiations which might
be spun out for months, and leave us mean
while in an %equivocal position, detrimental
in a high degree to our industrial and COM
mcrcial interests.