The Bellefontaine Republican. [volume] (Bellefontaine, Logan County, Ohio) 1855-1905, 1899-04-18
THE MEN BEHIND THE GUN.
Englishmen Still Drawing Lessons
From Our Victory at Santiago.

Much has been said of the man behind
the gun, and it has been pointed out
that the Saxon, being superior to the
Latin, it was only natural that Spain
should be defeated on the sea. Very
true; and yet it seems to me one factor
in the equation has been overlooked.
Morality counts in fighting like every
thing else. Your honest man is better
man-in all things-than a rogue.
According to the testimony of one of
the officers of the Spanish fleet, the
crew of the Cristobal Colon were mainly
convicts, taken out of the jails and for
chilly put aboard the ship just before
she sailed from Spain. Is it to be sup
posed for one minute that men of this
stamp could stand up before American
sailors-sailors because they love their
work, and glory in their country?
Another Spanish officer is authority for
the statement that liquor was plenti-
| fully served to all the crews before the
ships left Santiago Harbor, and that
great many of the men were drunk.
Drunken convicts pitted against sober,
cool-headed American freemen! Is it
surprising that in sixty minutes Ger
vera's fleet was mass of twisted steel
and iron, while the American squadron
had passed through its ordeal unscath-
ed?
We have been finding explanations
for the marvellous ''hitting qualities"
of the American gunners, as demon
strated both at Manila and Santiago.
One, to me the simplest, has been over
looked. There are very few American
naval commanders who have had much
experience in fleet work. American
squadrons have rarely consisted, since
the close of the Civil War, and until the
commencement of present hostilities, of
more than three or four vessels, and
these have generally been scattered
over the station. There has been prac-
tically no opportunity for fleet evolu-
tiOns, for the intricate maneuvers which
distinguish European navies. In their
place, American commanders have
devoted their time to gun drill, to sub
|caliber and target practice, with the
one end in view of bringing their men
to the highest state of proficiency as
lgunners. Probably, in fleet tactical
revolutions the American Admiral might
be at disadvantage, but in gunnery he
has shown the world what he can do.
Another thing we have been taught
lis the uselessness of the conning-tower.
1t can not be ascertained that single
commanding officer availed himself of
the protection of his armored citadel.
The space is too narrow to permit a
Captain to see everything happening
laround him, and in action the COM
mander's vision must not be narrowed.
Perhaps ever stronger objection to
the use of the conning-tower is the
implied reflection it conveys on the
courage of the commanding officer.
The man must stand in the open, the
Captain is safe behind his steel walls
The sight of the Captain standing on
bridge or pilot house, seeing and seen
by his men, encouraging them by his
presence, sharing with them the risks,
is an inspiration, an incentive to greater
deeds. Would Nelson be the glorious
figure of history if he had been shot
while telegraphing to the engine room
from the connning-tower? Farragut,
lashed to the rigging, made even the
timidest hero; in comparative safety
behind his belted walls the inspiration
of his presence would have been lost
, London Chronicle.