The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1899-01-14
RAILROADS ARE DEFIANT
fragrant AND PERSISTENT
VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
No Way to Prevent Rate Discrimina-
tons In Favor of the Trusts and
Combines-Government Regula-
ton of Rates Suggested-Restrict-
ed Competition Is the Rule.

lentlon has been called to the vital
respects in which the act has proved
defective and inadequate Some of its
provisions We're early seen to be i'm
perfect, while others were so uncertain
or ambiguous as to give rise to pro-
lracted litigation, resulting finally in
authoritative construction by the Su-
preIne court Of the United States. The
commission has taken much pains to
explain the various questions that have
thus been decided and the effect of
these adJudications in defeating the
purposes of the act. To state that the
law in its present condition cannot be
enforced is only to repeat what has al
ready been said. Until further and i'm
portant legislation is enacted the best
efforts at regulation must be feeble and
disappointing. In our last annual re-
port we not only set forth in general
terms the necessity for amending the
law, but formulated and proposed the
specific amendments which appear to
US positively essential. Without the
renewal of these recommendation the
duty of the commission in this regard
remains undischarged.
Meanwhile the situation has be
come intolerable, both from the stand
point OF the public and the carriers.
Tariffs are disregarded, Determinations
constantly occur, the price at which
transportation can be obtained is fiuc-
tuatlng and uncertain. Railroad man
ayers are distruStfUi of each other and
shippers all the while in doubt as to
the rates secured by their competitors.
The volume of traffic is so unusual as
TO frequently exceed the capacity of
equipment, yet the contest for tonnage
seems never relaxed. Enormous sums
are spent in purchasing business, and
secret rates are accorded far below the
standard Of published charges. The
these reductions, for concessions are
mainly confined to the heavier ship
pers. All this augments the advantages
Of large capital and tends to the injury
and often to the ruin of smaller deal
erS.
MORALITY AND BUSINESS.
These are not only matters of grav-
est consequences to the business well
fare of The country, but they concern
in no less degree the higher interests
OF public morality. It is perfectly clear
that observance of tariff rates IS en-
tirely within the power of the railway
managers and that it would be vastly
for the advantage of the railways as a
whole. 1t would, however, be
difficult and often ruinOu5 for one
railway. to maintain rates while its
competitor makes secret concessions, /
and 1t is also to be admitted that, JUS
titled or not, the results are substan-
tally as claimed by the carriers. a
large part OF the railroad business is
now transacted upon Illegal rates and
in certain quarters charging the pub
hshed rate is the exception The re-
suits are gross determinations between |
individuals and gross preferences be-
tween localities, which most always ia !
Vor the strong and Cypress the weak. !
Probably no one thing today does so /
much to force out the smaller operator /
and build up those trusts and nonopo- !
lies, against which law and public !
opinion alike bear in vain, as discrimi- /
nations in freight rates. a further re- |
suit is that railroad business is carried I
on largely in conceded violation OF law. /
This condition the present law is pow /
erless to control: The criminal rene |
dies have been applied and some con-
victions have been had, but no sub |
stanti2l effect has been produced and /
no satisfying results can be obtained !
from that course The fact may be !
morally certain, but the name, the date |
the amount cannot be shown with the |
particularly and certainty required by |
criminal law.
REGULATION OF RATES.
'If unrestricted competition produces
discrimination, one obvious way to |
prevent such discrimination is to
restrict competition. Whether existing /
COIulllOIS Nculu De improved ny itSdl- |
izing railway contracts, would depend !
upon the extent 20 which the agree
ments were made and actually en-
forced by the carriers. So far as the /
commission can obtain inform abion, !
there is al present no other great ma
ton which endeavOrS to enforce COM
petition between its railroads, although /
IN many cases that method has been
tried and abandoned. But just as no
other great nation today enforceS COM
petition between railways, so there is
no great nation today which does not
regulate and control railway rates. If
this country is to change its theory of
railway regulation, il should adopt the
new theory in its entirety. Carriers
ask authority to combine in order to
fix and maintain reasonable rates. But
who shall decide what rates are reason
able? Shall ii be left to the carriers to
fix their own rates, o. should the Deo-
pie VINO grant this extraordinary privi-
Iege reserve TO themselves the right to
determine this question?
1t does not necessarily follow, there
fore. that permission should be given
to carriers to make these rates. The
evils attendant upon restricted COM
petition might be greater than benefits
derived from II. The rate should be
removable. IS well as stable and uni
form, and hitherto competition has
been mainly relied upon for that pur-
pose. Now, If competition is to be re-
moved, what is to take the place of it?
The conclusion of the commission in
reference to the agreement OF this sort
and the degree of control over rates
which should be exercised by public,
authority is substantially as announced
in ITS last annual report. The amend
ments there recommended would not
invest the commission with any diff
ferent or any greater authority than it
was long supposed to possess: they
would simply enable the commission to
carry out the purposes of the act, as
declared in its first three sections. II
the present commission is not qualified
to discharge their trust, then q more
competent tribunal should be created.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
IF commissions in restraint of COM
petition are to be permitted, the follow
ing additional observations should be
born in mind:
E'irst-To permit only a limited and
feeble restraint would be TO doom the
experiment 10 failure before it was
tried; bur ii might he we'll to provide
that the provision granting the privi-
lege should expire after a certain num-
Der of years by its limitations
Second-The contract itself and ev-
eIything done under it should be open
to public inspection.
Third-It would probably be TO the
advantage of both the public and the
railway L the public had some voice
or representation in some organization
of the gind under consideration. If the
nublic arD0inted one or more of the