The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-03-19
OUR TACTICS ON THE SEA.
ADMIRAL COLONIES REVIEW or THE
EAT<L LESSONS DE- THB a


The Gront Drag on Correct Naval Strategy
That the Panic Along tho Atlantic Coast
CRused-Towns No Longer Bombnrded-
What Cervera Might Hayo Done When
onr Fleet. Were Divided-Use OF Forth
tcations ms n Help to the Navy-Ths
Man Behind tho Gun-ChnnEes in tho
Conduct of Modern Naval Warfare.
IoSDos, March S-The first detailed at
temp. by British experts to eXpound the naval
lsssona derived from the Spanish-Am erican
war was made this afternoon at a meeting OF
the United Service Institution. presided over
by Rear Admiral A X. Wilson Of the British
Board Of Admiralty and attended by a large
number Of army as well as naval officers. Vice
Admiral 7 H.. Colomb. who is the leading
writer upon naval subjects in Great Britain.
was the chief speaker. He read Il most ex-
hnustive paper upon the various features OF
the recent war unon the sea. and some OF his
and conclusions will no doubt lead
to II wide discussion Of the points he raises.
Following is part Of what he said:
without question. the only safe way for tho
country possessing the superior navy is to put
its ships into touch with the ships OF the enemy
from the beginning. and never to lose touch
with them IL il can lie avoided. The sure way
OF conducting the war would therefore have
been for the United Sta rs to transfer a suf-
hcient force to the coast Of Spain at least
10 balance the forces known to have been
in Spanish ports: to send a strong
squadron 10 st. Vincent the moment II was
known that an asscmblage was to he made
there. The seizure OF Minorca as a base would
probably have been an easy operation and in
any rase it would have been morally certain
that. il this action had been'taken. nothing Of
Ro.,;,.. -, tI,a 4.h N aida ~ tha Atlnntia rDtill
have been though. Of bv Spain. Then for Cuba
md Porto Rico. landings for conquest might
have been effected at leisure. because there
would have been no Spanish naval force to in
terfe .e with them beyond what the surplus
Ameri,au force was capable o! dealing with
locally.
Yet. in suite OF these things. the eEtraordi-
nary effect which the mere sailing Of Cervera's
most ineffective squadron had upon the whole
Of the American operations shows Us how
keenly alive the American Government and
the American Navy we're 10 the risks that were
being run 10y tran sgressing tho fundamental
principles OF naval war.
But certainly the lesson we must draw Is
that the American strategy was hazardous in
s. far as il der arted from the stereotyped rules
o. naval war. The Colon and the Maria Teresa
were at st. Vincent on the llth OF April. and II
might have been certain on the 1lth that they
we're going there. There Mas plenty Of time
for the Americans to have established n watch
upon them had they been so minded. But. as
II vas, the fact that Cervera and the ships in
Spain were not under observation allowed a
sort Of panic to reign all along the Atlantic
cO,sts Of the United States. As long rs We
look at things from the side nj tho defenders.
It seems the most reasonable thing In the
world to close the harbor Of New York by sub
marine mines. batteries and what not in war
time. lest an enemy's squadron should come
inside and lombard the city.
There Is not any answer u be given to a
panic stricken populace. when there are I'M
watched squadrons about. All that can be
said is to point to eXperlence'and to what men
accustomed to command who have thought
over the matter say about 1t. The experience
is that. as in the Vile and as in the Midway. so
in Manila Bay and at Cardenas. naval COM
manders will run into considerable dangers
in order to get at ships. But towns are not
their business. If towns are to be attacked
there will he n landed army and all things reg.
ular. No naval officer with his hands free
would in war proceed into New York harbor
In order to damage New York. even IL he be-
lieved there were no batteries and no mines to
prevent him. He understands quite well that
he will do infinitely more mischief to New
York Dy lying oil the port, out of range of any
Fnns mounted in battery. and parAlyzine trade
" S,h' W 80 ~ '''i" eHN
Il think II is almost obvious that these panic
demands would not have arisen In the United
States had it been possible to tell the ci.ize MS
that the first act OF the war had got every
tie result Of allowing loose squad rons to get
into the Atlantic without any knowledge. Of
. and.. HhsFsa9 al .nt %r 9Si History. Il! !Re our pSb iiic
have denounced the Governments and the
Admirals who did not get and keen their fleets
But. as far as understand. the pressure on the
American Government was more. TO keen the
have a sense Of its defensive force.
yss;s,. r sSasd5% in,S Ta; l ISssii e the { }6,n G q jfs8
same day Schley was ordered IRON the Che ,a-
dered to proceed to Key West with all possible
despatch. This Simply shows that Schley's
cause Cervera had not been watched or To-
Gated. and that what had been hitherto done
was NO more than an Indifferent substitute for
opinion. which is liable to be reversed on a
closer examination Of the data than have beer.
able to give, | should say that. in the minds Of
those 10 authority in America. a sufficiently
clear dist!nrtion was NOT drawn between the
Of report. and of Watching tor tbs, purpose OF
hinderinR movement. The broad lesson Is. at
s SsIor ra' S,! rer & pdye Gie "a up Te +, 1,sa The ,ns %b J is
plan Of Il war. even though it is absurdly in
ferior to the forces it threatens. which no ono
oNtl lCuhiNu VI cNCh W u
feet of sailing ships, 1 do not meau 10 say
that lesson is permanent, only that we must
take it 80 on the evidence before us.
"A. word must now he said Of the strategy
which was open to Cervera. l thought that
Seryera might, having left st. Vincent, on the
2'th ct April. have found himself. with 1000
miles of coal still in his bunkers. steaming into
Key West at breaking daylight on the 18th or
18th OF May. and ready TO deal the utmost de-
s%truction by gun and by torpedo Lpon tho un-
haupy ships lying there AT that moment. !
Thought it might further lie possible to get at
some Of tho lamrr ducks off Havana. l
though; lie would certainly go. as he did. he
tween Martinique, and st. Lucia but ! consid-
cred that he would pass those islands during
darkness. ia order Mat no note Of his wherea-
bouts should appear; Il thought he would pass
south OF Jamaica and west of Cuba without be-
ing seen. thai he would in consequence come
upon the shlps at Key West CONF letely unan-
nouured. Sch!ey was then AT Charleston,
Sampson.iar east. at Porto Rico. 80 that If any
thing was To be done the scattered state of
the United States suuadrons offered as perfect
an opportunity as was ev.r likely to occur.
II had, assumed that Ceryera would have
taken the destrOyers in tow. amt ! sub
seIuentlv imagined that he would, when
south OF ,ClenfucGos; have sent one u
Of the distribution Of the United States