The evening herald. [volume] (Shenandoah, Pa.) 1891-1966, 1899-02-21
.SCHLEY AND SAMPSON.
The Naval Controversy Growing
Out Of the Spanish War.
GCHLBYs REPLY TO CRITICISMS

mission ., answer the charges recently
made AGAINST him iu the communication
recently sent TO the senate. yesterday
handed to the committee ON naval affairs
his statement in which he disclaims any
purpose OF controversy with the navy
department
The admiral says his orders from
from Sampson on May 10 were TO block
ade Cicnfuegos. which he proceeded TO
do. He had no knowledge that there
were any insurgents about Cienfuegos
who were friendly until the Marblehead
arrived on the 9th Even had he had
this knowledge ON the 23d of May, the
surf would have prevented communica-
tion. On his arrival he sent Commodore
McCalla, Of the Morblehead. ashore TO
establish relations with the insurgents,
the result Of which was made known TO
him at $40 ON May "a Then. for the
first time, he learned definitely that the
Spanish feet was not at Cicnfucgos
/ Within two hours he started for San
tiago. What possible ground OF criti-
cism,' he says, adverse TO me, there
can be in all this, | do not see. was
on the spot, acting under orders which
gave me entire discretion, and yet
clothed me with the responsibility Of
going to Santiago only after | was salts
fed the fleet was not at CienfuegOs."
He quotes from the dispatch Of Samp
son of May 20, in which the latter says
Schley should hold his fleet off Glen
| fuegos. If the Spanish ships have put
I into Santiago they must come either to
| Havana or ,lcnfuegos TO deliver tho
munitions Of war which they are said
/ to bring for use i'm Cuba. | am. there
/ fore, Of the opinion that the best chance
/ to capture these ships will be to hold the
| two points, Cienfucgos and Havana
/ with all the force we can muster"
| As to the slow progress toward San
/ tiago on account Of the Eagle. he states
/ that she was a part Of the force which
/ Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
/ him, and he had no right to abandon her
| The weather was rough, and not much
| better speed could have been kept mp
| He had been ordered to proceed eau
/ tiously.' If, however he had known
| that the Spanish feet was in Santiago
/ no consideration FOR the Eagle or any
/ thing else would have prevented him
/ from getting there at the earliest pos
| sible moment.
Speaking Of "the rctrograde move
ments.' which the secretary, adopting
the language of Admiral Sampson. char
acterizes as "reprehensible conduct" 3"
! Admiral Schley says that in ~ years
service never was such language used
| 10 characterize conduct of mine and
! | see no reason for it now"
/ As to the battle Of Santiago. Admiral
| Schley says the facts of that contest
speak for themselves. Quoting from his
official report to Sampson, in which he
congratulated the commander Of the
| squadron and said the victory seems
big enough for us all" he asks the com
mittee TO contrast his reports and those
of Sampson containing references to him
self. He continues:
AS to all this criticism OF my course
| prior to the discovery by me on May %
| OF Ceryera's fleet. whether from Admiral
! Sampson or the department, none Of il
| has ever been made by either TO me,
and | never heard word Of it from any
one until after the battle with that fleet
Admiral Schley quotes the depart
ment's dispatch Of May % in these
words: THE department looks to you to
ascertain the fact of the presence Of
the enemy, and that the enemy, il in the
harbor Of Santiago, does not leave with
| out decisive action" Commenting upon
this the admiral says: "In obedience to
| iilt bHbNt bIutI 1 ulu ascertain lle IdGL
that the enemy was at Santiago, and the
enemy did not leave without a decisive
conflict"
Detailing events connected with the
battle Of July he says at $40 of that
day Admiral Sampson made signal from
his flagship. Disregard movements OF
ommander-in-chief" and steamed east
ward to Siboney. This" says Admiral
/ Schley, left me the senior officer pres
ent and necessarily clothed me with the
responsibility Of the command" Con-
| tinuing he declares that when the
| enemy's vessels came out Of the harbor
signal was made from the Brooklyn
this flagship to the fleet to "clear ship
! for action" Then followed the signal
''close action" and this by the signal
'the enemy is escaping westward"
He says the Spanish fleet was coming
westward under high speed, and chang
| ing course more to westward brought the
| Brooklyn heading eastward to meet it,
into a position where she would have
| blanketed the fire of the eastern vessels
of our force, now changing their courses
| to the westward, and between them and
the Spanish vessels. Instant decision
was necessary to avoid interfering In
any way or cutting off any OF the FIRE of
| our vessels. as would have occurred il
she had turned towards the Spanish
feet, now approaching the Brooklyn.
Turning outward left the enemy's ships
unmasked by the Brooklyn and exposed
them to the concentrated fire of our
| squadron
At the final capture of the Colon at
1:15 p. m the Brooklyn was nearest, the
! Oregon next and then the Texas and
! Vixen. The New York arrived at 2:25
p. M, and the commander-in-chief as
sumed command Of the squadron Sig
nails were made from the Brooklyn to
the squadron until all signal halyards
were sot away, and then by army code.
! In conclusion Admiral Schley contends
that the turn of the Brooklyn in the
! battle was "the crucial and deciding
feature of the combat. aud Of decided
gdyantage.'
He says he made no report of his man
euyer in his report of the battle as its
effect upon the battle was never ques,
ton with him. His last paragraph reads,
"On May 81 l received a telegram from
the cOmmander-in-chief congratulating
me upon my success in locating and
blockading the enemy's fleet at San
tiago, II it was worthy of commenda-
tion at that time l am at loss to under
stand how it could have grown into