The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1899-04-03

| Washington, April 2.-The bureau Of
naval intelligence of the navy depart
ment has issued the last of the series
Of sketches of the Spanish-American
1 war by Commander jacobson of the
German protected cruiser Geier. The
last of this interesting series deals with
! the condition of the Spanish ships af-
| ter the battle of Santiago. This por-
| tlon of the sketch contains a number
! OF observations regarding the technical
| effect OF our gun fire, which will in
| terest naval officers. The most inter-
eSt1nS observations to the Iaymen are
those upon the strategy, or lack Of it,
! dlSplayed by CerVera- The Spanish
| admiral, having been ordered to leave
the harbor to remove the main object
| OF the attack on Santiago, Commander
Jacobson says his position was most
| difficult. He did not dare make the
attempt at night, and so decided to go
out in broad daylight.
| THE whole crew. he saws. "felI 2.
| victim to this fatal decision. Instruc
t1ons for the sortie and the western
| course were issued. The admiral was
entirely convinced of the impossfbilftv
OF defeating the enemy, or of reaching
| another Cuban harbOr, even if ne
EShould succeed in steanaine right
feeling of helplessness and impotence,
as against the American naval forces,
more than TO anything else, that I at
tribute the defeat. The Spanish ships
had spent a month and half in the
| harbor without even attempting to at
| tack the blOckading fleet when &. ia
Vorable opportunity presented itself OF.
even harrassing it. The two torpedo
boat deStrOyerS were not used for the.
purpose for which they were intended.
| This inactivity and lack of initiative.
must have had a very demoralizing ef-
feet on the officers and men. If we
add to this the certain knowledge that
the opposing forces were much strong
er, it will be readily understood that
the idea of general fight after coming
out OF the harbOr entrance was the
only acceptable one. especially in view
OF the possibility of beaching the ships.
thereby rendering them unServiceable.
and eventually rescuing the crew
From the very moment that this feel
ing Of impotence took possession of the
Spanish and led to the above rehec-
| tlons, their fate ipsychologicaIly speak
ing, was sealed. We do not mean to
disparage their tenacity in the midst
of the hostile fire, but, on the other
hand, it is quite natural that the ad
miral, seeing that everything was hap
pening as he had foreseen, was the one
who set the example of running his
ship ashore. All the other command
eTs followed this example.
AMERICANS CONFIDENT.
"On the American side the situation
was Just the reverse. Admiral Samp-
sons fleet was fully conscious of it's
power. The blockade was being con-
Quoted in accordance with carefully
prepared plans, as were also the ar
rangements in case Of the enemy's at
tempt to escape. Frequent engagements
with the Spanish had given command
ers and crews that calm assurance in
the handling of their weapons which
guarantees success. The long blockade
service, exhausting and monotonous.
hardly interrupted by any action on the
part of the Spanish, had strung their
nerves to the highest pitch, and every
body was anxious for the end to come.
Suddenly the enemy attempts to es-
cape. All the passions that had been
smouldering under the ashes broke
lOrtn. Inc welcome opportunity for
settling accounts with the enemy had
come at last, and with wild rush the
American ships fell on their victims
At the beginning the American fire,
owing to the excitement Of the person.
mel and the great distances, was prob
ably not very effective, but when the
Spanish admiral turned to the west
ward and the other ships fol-
lowed him the moral superior
ity of the Americans reasserted
itself. The commanders, calm and
cOol-headed, had their ships follow the,
same course. and the Americans. hav-
ing every advantage on their side. re-
commenced the fire on the fleeing ships,
which soon resulted in their total anni-
hilatiOn.
L have already spoken of the lack
OF training of the Spanish crews, the
neglect of gun and torpedo target prac-
tice, the inadequate education of the
commanders of the ships and torpedo
boat destroyers. 1t is mainly due to
these Deficiencies that the defeat was
fastened. and that the American ships
sustained so few losses.
SPANISH INFERIORITY.
"The training of the engine person
mel also was totally unreliable, which
is not surprising. in view of the fact
that the Spanish ships, as a. rule, are
not sent out on extensive cruises. The
bottoms of the Spanish ships had not
been cleaned for d long time, and as
they had been lying in Santiago harbor
for a month and half. they were con-
siderably fouled. Thus the cruis-
ers Maria Teresa. Oquendo and Viz
caya, which, in all officials books. are
credited with 1876 knots speed, went into
the battle with a sIg ed of from ten to
twelve knots an hour at most, and the
Cristobal Colon, which is the latest ship
and was to run twenty knots, hardly
attained a speed Of 1875. Under these
circumstances, in every way unfavor-
able for the Spanish. whose crews were
insufficiently trained and physically and
morally enervated By long inactivity,
whose ships were inferior in number,
speed and fighting efficiency. it is no
wonder that the victory of the Ameri-
cans was easy, and paid for with insig-
nifcant sacrifices.
There was only one chance for the
success of the sortie. 1t should have
been made at night, in scattered forma-
ton. After a. personal investigation of
the locality, it is my opinion that it is
entirely practicable for a fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night. The wreck
Of the AIarrinac did not cnnstit1Its