The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1899-02-07
Only Way to Handle the Filipino In
SurgentS.
VIEWS OF GEN. MERRITT
MODE OF WARFARE OF INSUR-
GENT CoMldANDERs.
Aguinaldo's Army VIII Hardly Sur
vive This Crushing Defeat-Pio
De Pillar the Most Dangerous of
All the Filipino Chiefs-Has Con-
siderable Military Ability.

New York, Feb. General Wesley
Merritt, in an interview today on the
Philippine outbreak, said:
That the attack on our lines should
have been made at night is what one
would expect from the tutelage of the
Filipinos in war-that of Spaniards.
Night attack is a favorite operation
of Spanish commanders, and during the
time that the insurgents We're besieging
Manila. before our movement against
the city actively began, the two an
tagonists used TO shoot literally at each
other in the dark, and during the day
remain inactive. Their common prac-
tice, moreover. when fighting in
trenches, is to thrust their rifles over
the top Of the brenStWCrk without eX-
posing any part of the body. and trust
to luck to hit something. The night
attack as a regular method of warfare
characterizes the art of war in a low
stage of development. Soldiers trained
in the best schools of modern military
science prefer as a rule to night their
battles in daylight. since then there IS
less chance of mistake and a greater
opportunity of working out with math-
ematical precision. The chiefs of semi
civilized forces, from the khalfta to
AguinaldO, prefer a dash in the dark,
hoping to terroriZe the enemy by the
unexpectedness of the attack
without doubt, the insurgent as
sault on Manila was preconceived and
deliberate. That it was planned by
Aguinaldo, I do not care to assert; but.
of course. the patent probability is that
it was. since he has lately seemed to
be undisputably supreme. The blow
which we have been compelled to de-
liver ought now. in my judgment. TO be
vigorously followed up. If it is, the
FilipinOS will quickly realize who is
master, and submit. Our policy up to
the time of this battle has been one
Of extreme Cancellation. based on the
hope and expectation that. ignorant as
the FilipinOs were, they might eventu-
ally be brought TO understand that we
bring them freedom and prosperity,
and not a repetition of Spanish ty-
ranny.
FORCE IS NEEDED.
Unfortunately. they are a people pc
culiarly likely to miSapprehend for
bearance and consideration. They i'm
mediately attribute them to fear or
weakness. They respect nothing ex-
cept force. for it is the only thing that
the Spanish have ever presented TO
their eyes that it was possible for
them to respect. All this the English
residents of Manila. and colOnists at
all the Oriental British ports at which
l stopped on my way home. repeatedly
told me. They predicted that the in
science and license of the FilipinOs
would infallibly grow, until we should
be forced to bring home to them the
fact that our power could not be re-
sisted. Then, il was declared, they
would abandon resistance.
The mil tary Orsa izatiOn Of the Fill
pines viii scarcely. I think. survive this
defeat-certainiy not, if we at once
strike hard again wherever they show
front Their organization. of course,
has always been exceedingly poor.
There is probably not an officer among
them who has any resDec table knOwl-
edge Of modern military science. Their
ablest soldier is Rio de Pillar, the East
Indian. and vet I doubt very much if
he has ever in his life read any of the
books of the profession His cOnse-
quence proceeds rather from his per-
sonal qualities as a fighter than from
his ability to diT0ct operations. His
force. courage, cOmbativenesS and i'm
placability inspire confidence in his
men, and TO the extent that he is thus
a natural military leader he is a dan
gsCCus, and from our point of view, a
bad man. There is no question in my
mind that even Aguinaldo has STOOD in
awe of him. It is possible that he and
his faction coerced Aguinaldo into sane
tiOning the assault. In the lattev's
communication to me he reminded me.
in excuse for his inability to accede to
once TO requests made. that he had to /
consider the wishes of his chiefs. He
mentioned no names, but it was gen
orally understood among us that he re-
feTred principally to Pho de Pillar. The !
latteT'S influence. whatever it may be- /
can be counted on as irrecOncilably /
hostile to US.
EFFECT OF DEFEAT.
L think we may expect that defent
at Manila will have q disastrous effect [
upon Aguinaldo'S authority. His Su-
premacy has been based on his notable Z
successes in Wrestling the island from 1
the hands of Spain, after we had de- /.
strOyed the Spanish fleet. and upon the I.
Importance which he has assumed in +
the eyes of his followers by reason of (
confronting us so long with an army. /
The feebleness Of his power having I
been made manifest there is every rea-
son TO suppose that his numerous rivals, /
suppressed for the time, will rise TO /
dispute his authority. When they have I
come to nothing through fractional diff |
ferenceS and possibly conflicts, they Will .
be. entirely amenable 10 our guidance [
and rule I think. They are really do /
Gle ana aflllaDle people, Without HluSn /
stern stuf-nOt pUgnaciOus and ire
as our Indians are
General Greene said: They have one
general who is man of no mean abil- +
ity as a military commander His name
is Pho de Pillar, but he is not a Fill
Pine. He is a full-blOOd Indian. Agui-
naidO showed to General Merritt that
he (AguinaldO) rather stood in awe OF
Pillar. I met this man once. He was
extremely hostile to the Americans, and
showed that he was not of the sort to
be conciliated. Another fairly able in
surgent commander was a man named
NorceI. He was a man, however, whom
we could az least treat with"
General Greene was not quite so con-
ddent as General Merritt about the re-
suit of yesterdays battle. He called
attention to the three months fighting
in 1897. when the insurgents inflicted
upon the Spanish a loss Of 500 or 400
killed, and about 1900 wounded
In ninety days" said General
Greene, III tell whether we'll have
any more trouble with the insurgents"
CONDENSED CABLEGRAMS.