Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-01-20
GREGNE'S MEMORANDUM
Result of His Observations in the Philippines
Set Forth.
Effect of Evacuation by the United
States Would BE Anarchy and
Civil War.

Strong reasons for American occupation
of the Philippines are given in a memoran-
dun prepared by Maj. Gen. Greene which
formed one of the appendices of the CORE
spondence which accompanied the Presi-
dents message to Congress transmitting
the treaty of peace with Spain concluded at
Paris. Gen. Greene's memorandum relating
| TO The Philippines is follows:
IF the United States evacuate these ISL
ands anarchy and civil war will Immediate
ly ensue and lead to foreign intervention
The insurgents were furnished arms and
the moral support of the navy prior to our
arrival, and We cannot ignore obligations
either to the insurgents or to foreign ma
tons, which our own acts have imposed
upon us. The Spanish government is COM
pietely demoralized, and Spanish power is
dead beyond possibility of resurrection Spain
would be unable to govern these islands if
we surrendered them. Spaniards individual
| ~ stand in great fear of the insurgents
me Spanish government is disorganized
ana Its treasury bankrupt with a large
floating debt. The loss of property has been
great On the other hand. the Filipinos
cannot govern the country without the sup
port OF some strong nation. They acknowl-
edge this themselves, and say their desire
IS Tor independence under American pro-
lection, but they have only vague ideas as
| to what our relative positions would be
what part we should take in collecting and
expending the revenue and administering
the government.
Hatred Between Spanish and Natives
The hatred between the Spanish and ma
tives is very intense and cannot be eradi-
Gated. The natives are all Roman Catho-
lies and devoted to the church. but have
bitter hatred for monastic orders-Domini-
can, Franciscan and Recollects. They insist
that these be sent out of the country or
they will murder them. These friars own
the greater part of the land and have grown
rich by expressing the native husbandmen
ASulnaldo's army numbers 10000 20 5000
men in the vicinity of Manila who have
arms and ammunition, but no regular or
ganization. They receive no pay, and are
held together by hope of booty when they
enter Manila. IT is composed largely of
young men and boys from the surrounding
country, who have no property and moth
ing to lose in a civil war Aguinaldo has
two or three ships, and is sending armed
men to the northern portions of Luzon and
to other islands. The Spaniards there be-
ing cut off from communication with Ma
Mia and Spain. cannot be reinforced.
Inc result will be an extension of the
civil war and further destruction of prop
erty There are in Manila itself nearly 200
eoo native Filtpinos, among whom re large
numbers with more or less Spanish and
Chinese blood, who are men of character
education, ability and wealth. They hate
| the Spanish, are unfriendly toward other
nations. and look only to America for as
slstance They are not altogether in SYM
his army into Manila almost as much as
the Spaniards fear it. They say Aguinaldo
is not fitted either by ability or experience
to be the head Of native government and
doubt If he would be elected president in
an honest election. Principal foreign inter
ests here are British, and their feeling Is
unanimous in favor of American occupa-
ton. They have already forwarded a me-
mCriai TO their government asking for it
as the only way to protect life and prop
erty.
The Situation.
Altogether the situation here is somewhat
similar to Bosnia and herzegovina in 1873,
and Egypt in 1882. and the only practicable
solution seems to be on lines somewhat
similar to those adopted in those cases. The
length of our occupation would depend on
circumstances as developed in the future,
but should be determined solely in our dis
erection, without obligation to or consulta-
ton with other powers. This plan can only
be worked out by careful study by the
Paris commission, and they should have
advice and fun information from some one
who has been here during our occupation
and thoroughly understands the situation.
1t is not understood in America, and un-
less properly dealt with at Paris, will in
evitahly lead TO future complications and
possibly war.
The currency of the country is silver.
| The Mexican dollar is preferred. and worth
about AZ cents in gold, but the gold dollar
will not buy in labor or merchandise any
more than the Mexican dollar, and any at
tempt to establish a gold basis for cur
rency would ruin any business in the is
lands.
The total revenue is about siT.0o0,0oo
Mexican. derived about 81 per cent from
customs, so per cent from internal taxes
and l. per cent from state lottery and sale
of monopolieS More than two-Jhirds of
the internal revenue comes from poll tax
or cedula, which is very unpopular. The
country was self-suppOrting and free Of
debt until the instruction broke out about
two years ago, but the expenses of the civil
war have disorganized finance. There is a
bonded debt, series A, sl5, 900 600 Mexican.
held in Spain, for which the colony never
received any consideration, and another
debt. series r, same amount, which was
forced On the people here and the validity
Of which is open to question. Both debts
are secured by first liens on custom house
receipts, but this does not appear to have
been respected.