The times., 1899-06-25

races us II the chief danger of the sit
uation were TO be pointed out, l would
not say that 1t would be in the framing
oil fair and practical system of admin
istering law and order, but in possibly
providing a great field for political ap-
pointments. AS long as military govern
ment lasts this danger is avoided. AS
soon as we pass from the military TO the
civil order We will be confronted with the
gravest difficulty. If Congress, in deter
mining the laws by which the islands are
to be permanently governed, places the
| principal ns-administrative, Judi
cial, and clerical-in a permanent service
where merit, experience. aud continuation
| in the work determine mans promotion
and advancement, the solution OF the prob
lem OF good government will be soon at
tanned. In the matter of native partici-
patton | am a believer that they are ca
pable OF much larger degree of respon-
sibility than that for which they are com
monty given credit. When | consider how
well, in view of all conditions, the Sia-
mese are governing their little country
and are really making decided progress,
and when again / see how prosperous the
Malay Protected States are, judging from
my own personal study of these countries.
do not see any reason why a large PRO-
portion of the responsible positions should
not be held by the leading Filipinos.
There are group of capable, educated
men, at the head of whom is Arrelano, who
can compare very favorably with similar
group of governing men not only in Siam
and in the Malay States, but even in
Japan. Associated with Aguinaldo also
are number of men who, never fayoring
war policy in dealing with the United
States. but following him rather than de-
sert the Filipino cause, will be eventually
faithful servants of our Government. The
fact that large number of the Filipinos
have fought against us does not mean that
they may not possess some qualities of
self government, well guided. This fight
ing may have rather proved that they have
an executive capacity. a power of organi
Zation.- and a persistency OF effort for
which otherwise We would probably never
have given them credit We must re-
member also the actual government that
existed at Malolos. While in many re-
spects the Filipino management of their
affairs reminded one of child with a new
toy, yet every observer, military. naval,
or civilian, who went to MaloloS or who
in the earlier days saw the development
Of government at Cayite and Bacoor, was
impressed with the apparent order. system,
and formality with which everything was
done. These are qualities that count in
organizing government. There were at the
same time numerous tendencies to display.
superficial consideration. and insincerity of
action that showed the necessity Of
steadying hand in order to get at the true
essence of government.
The Senate's Mistake.
Here / believe we have the main infiu
ence that caused the Filpinos to hold out
with such strength and persistency. The
failure to ratify the Treaty not only gave
them time to get their army and govern
ment in splendid shape. and therefore
inspire the people throughout the islands
with the idea that they were entirely capa-
BILE of governing themselves without even
our protection, but led them to believe
that there was even a strong possibility
that they might be compelled to fight
Spain again or some other country in their
efforts TO secure their independence.
In the informal negotiations between
General Otis and Aguinaldo and in the
correspondence that passed between them
the latter took distinct advantage of
the technical point that the United States
did not have sovereignty over the islands.
Moreover. when discussing the situation
with Americans who visited Malolos,
Aguinaldo and his Cabinet Ministers
would continually state that they had to
keep their army up to full standard in
order to be prepared for any eventuality.
II the Treaty had been ratified Immediately
after the Senate met In December, Admiral
Dewey and General Otis would have been
not only supported by moral and tech
nical strength of position which the Fill
pinos could not assail, but they would have
had the main part of the dry season ahead
of them and fully two months favorable to
campaigning II fighting had followed an
early ratification, it probably would have
been quickly ended and good government
would be now established throughout the
islands II no fighting had followed, which
is more probable, viewing all conditions
in a comparative light. we would be now
congratulating ourselves upon our quick
and successful solution OF the problems
of the Philippines.
/ do not wish to appear. In considering
this point. as being too optimistic, but
when / look back to those trying days at
Manila l remember that our leading naval
and military officers continually said that
every day of delay in treaty ratification
meant an incalculable increase OF strength
in the Filipino ranks.
"The Discordant Notes mt Home"
Following up all these unhappy in
fiuences, to which our Army and Navy
had to quietly submit without turning
finger. there came the blow from behind
that did more harm than all of these local
influences combined-the agitation in
America in behalf of the Filipinos and in
opposition to the policy of our Govern
ment and OF the Army and Navy as advised
by such tried men as Admiral Dewey and
General Otis. IL is remarkable how
quickly the idea spread, not only through
the Filipino army. but among the people
in the distant interior, that the United
States was wavering in its policy, and that
it was probable that If they held out long
enough and persisted in their position We
would withdraw our army and give them
back the islands.
Every discordant note that was struck
in America was telegraphed or written
either to Hongkong or Manila and found
its way by first opportunity to the camps
of the Filipino army and to the columns
of the native press. Not satisfied, how
ever, with the circulation given by the
newspapers what was being said and done
in America was printed in circular and
pamphlet form and sent among the people
to encourage them. II the senior Senator
OF Massachusetts could have witnessed the
expression OF satisfaction depicted on the
face of every Filipino soldier when he
read the sentiments expressed by that dis
tingushed man in the halls of Congress,
and then have seen the look OF pain upon
the face OF every American soldier when
he realized that United States Senator
was inspiring the enemy opposite him,
am OF the humble opinion that he would
have experienced some feelings of regret
at the direct effect of his argument. There
is no question that the belief was preva-
lent among the Filipinos at the time the
fighting began on February 4 that If they
pf h.