The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-02-06

ever ne saw III.
Our relations with Aguinaldo's insurgents
were never really friendly after Dewey's battle
in Manila Bay. Shortly after the battle AEuj-
naldo went to Cavite from Hong Kong. and,
with the consent Of our Government, began
raising an army and surrounding Manila. He
was nominally aiding our forces, but his only
idea was to drive Spaniards and Americans
both out of the islands and establish himself.
He was willing to aid us so long ns we we're
driving out the Spaniards. On june IL he
formed an independent government. with him
self as It's head. When Gen. Merritt arrived in
the Philippines the insurgents held many
points in the islands.
THE Filipinos. or insurgent forces. at war
with Spain" wrote Gen. Merritt. in his report
OF Aug. 81. had. previous to the arrival of the
land forces. been waginG a desultory warfare
with the Spanish for several months. and we're,
at tho time Of my arrival. in considerable force.
variously stimated and never accurately ascer-
tanned. probably not far from l.. men
Aguinaldo added more recruits to his army
while the American forces were preparing to
take Manila. He was not Officially recognized
by our Government.
As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me upon
my arrival. nor offer his services as a subordi-
nate military leader, and as my instructions
from the President fully contem plated the oc-
vi tAo iallu W 'iS hillV illu
forces. and stated that the powers Of military
occupation are absolute and supreme and i'm
mediately operate upon the political condition
Of the inhabitants" reported Gen. Merritt.
Il did not consider it wise TO hold any direct
communication with the insurgent leader until
l should be in possession of the city Of Manila,
especially as l would not until then be in n po-
sition to issue a proclamation and enforce my
authority in the event that his pretensions
should clash with my designs"
AGuinaldo recognized Gen. Merritt's au-
thority as Military Governor of Manila and its
suburbs after the capture OF the town. but his
own Government claimed the rest of the Philip
pine territory. The Aguinaldo republic was
formally announced to the foreign powers and
Felipe Agoncillo was sent to Washington as
the agent Of the insurgent Government. He
and Senior Lopez went to Paris and stayed
there for two months. trying to get an audience
with the Peace Commissioners Agonciilo did
not deny that the Filipinos were receiving
shipments of arms. and that Aguinaldo would
resist any American inter vention in the affairs
Of the insurgent Government.
Trouble was brewing in Iloilo. in the island
OF Panay. $50 miles from Manila. while the
Peace Commission was sitting. Gen. Otis
cabled in November that danger was threaten
ing there and that it looked as though the in
surgents would overpower the Spanish gar
rison under Gen. Rios. Orders were sent from
Washington to Gen. Otis to take Iloilo. Col.
Potter was sent to lloilo on a fast ship. leaving
Manila on the day before Christmas. The
American officer arrived thirty-nine hours too
late. the Spanish commander having evacuated
the place. leaving the insurgents free to enter.
Aguinaldo's flag was flying. Gen. Miller was
sent to lloilo with the Eighteenth Infantry. the
Iowa and a battery of artillery. The
three transports were conveyed by the Balti-
more and Callao. The insurgents refused to
allow the American forces TO land and threat
ened to shoot any American who came ashore.
American troops remained aboard the
transports.
The Filipinos. thought that the Americans
were afraid Of them. aud they became bolder.
non-aggressive attitude OF our forces. they
thought. was due to fear. In the current NUN
Der OF HdJprJ"S Weekly. Frank ID. MilIet. writ
ing from London. thus refers TO the Filipinos'
regard for our troops
II is a mistake 10 suppose that the attitude
OF the Filipino insurgents has changed since
the Paris treaty defined the Philippine ques-
ton i has been practically the same ever
since the capture OF Manila. for at no time since
then could armed United States troops have en-
tered the territory in the possession of the iusur-
gents without provoking open hostility. %
uD u lllIfupS are not 10 De so mucn blamed Tor
their assumption Of authority or for their eN-
10 be recognized as an independent
government. We ourselves have educated
them up 20 these ideas by II policy Of non
interference with them in any of their perform.
ances. however much they were opposed to our
and however degrading they were
to our dignity as Il military force. We hav"
only ourselves to call to account for whatever
loss OF life may result from the present sitIa-
ton in tho islands OF Luzon and Panay. " . -
They the Filipinos, after the fall Of Manila
proceeded to establish an octroi and TO collect
taxes at the markets and various other places.
They held the water works. and only allowed
The water to be turned on after much delay
and as a special favor, which might nj any time
be rescinded. They controlled the railway and
The Pasig River above the town. The trains
were permitted to run only on condition that
no foreign troops should hc carried, and no
was allowed on tho Pasig except by
permission Of Aguinaldo. They turned
The Spanish works from defensive to offensive
positions.
They made little ATTEMPT to conceal tho
Tact that they were importinE rifles and Maxim
guns. and they recruited actively. and drilled
with great diligence in all the suburbs OF the !
In Cavitc they continued to starve 10
death the spanish forces within the linesoG our
pwn guard and insisted that VIZ had nothing To
10 with their prisoners. and went so far as 10
away those whom Gen. Merritt had
To Ice served with ~rations. The result
u all this has been 10 devotion in the minds of
he natives a well-grounded notion that the
are afraid Of the tilipinos. for on
eVery occasion when a show of nrmness would
nave had u most salutarv effect we have backed
in a very ignoIninious fashion"
hgohclllo ana Lopez returned here from