Mineral Point tribune. (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1869-1938, 1899-04-13
SAMPSON ON CERvERA.
snanish Admirals Strategy Criticised
by the American Commander,

Not the least interesting part OF Ad-
r,iral SIMPSONS paper on The Atlantic
FLEET in the Spanish War, in the Cen
,,rv is that in which he criticises the
snanish commanders strategy
When we come to consider the STRAIT
ayv of Admiral Cervera in leaving the
tarhor il must be Said first of all that
if would have been much better, If he
rould have done SO, TO leave by night
That he could not do so is the testl-
mony of the officers of his fleet. We
know from what they said subsequent
" while they were prisoners, that
his plan had been considered by the
admiral and his officers. Two adyo-
Gated going out by night; the others
wore all in favor of the sortie by day,
The great difficulty in night attempt
VAS our dazzling searchlight. A
eearch-Hght shining direct in one 5
ewes prevents him absolutely from see
ing ANYTHING else; it is as though he
we're looking at the sun; and 1t was
that effect upon them, taken in con-
nection with the necessity OF seeing
heir way out Of the channel, thai
MADE them hesitate. This feeling was
in itself a compliment 10 the efficiency
.. ,,{, i.s =. hlacy,afe, but we did not attach
81 much importance to the dazzling Of
the enemy as to the illumination OF
The channel so that we could see ey-
eryyhing that was going on. 1t was a
continual wonder to us why they did
not are at our seach-light, which was
always within range. To be sure, ii
would have required pretty good
craftsmanship to knock it out, but Il
would have made the man who was
manipulating it quite uneasy to know
that he was the center Of the enemy
FIRE.
The enemy had no search-lights at
their defenses. All the necessary ma
chinery was in place for the establish
ueut OF one on Socapa, but they never
got so far as to complete the plant and
actually use it.
What appeared to US the most IA
,orabe chance for Ceryera was to have
been prepared to come out with a full
mead Of steam, and then to have chosen
a very cloudy, dark night, or one when
a dense rain or squall was passing
over the harbor-when 1t would DE
very difficult TO see in any circum-
stances-and guided by screened lights
placed along the channel for the pur-
pose, TO have made for the open sea.
His ships might have run out of such
storm in about an hour; so long as
the squall continued they probably
could have counted upon being inyisl-
bic to a great extent. 1t would have
been difficult to identify the particular
ships, and in the confusion and dark
ness they would probably so far have
escaped observation that they might
have been out of sight by the time the
weather cleared up or the squall had
passed There were several such
nights. and very anxious ones they
we're for us.
Dismissins the question of sortie
by night there were several things he
might have done by day: % to take
The course he did take alongshore to
the Westward (2) to take similar
course 10 the eastward; 90 to divide
bis fleet between the two courses; anu
li) to scatter through our fleet. When
hey all came out and started along
the beach, our fire was easily concen-
Ja-ed on them. 1t would have been
worse to go eastward, as he would
have had TO engage not only all the
vessels he aid, but the New York and
The vessels at Guantanamo-the Mas
sac1usetts, Newark and Marblehead
which could have been notified by tel
egraph He might have made a feint
20 go in a certain direction. Two
| hips sent in one direction would prob
ably have called out most of the
strength Of our vessels, and have given
his others a better chance than they
bad. What would have happened il
.aey had boldly attempted to dash