The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1899-11-03

| VS. tAereIoTe, Qeclued TO allow Agu1n-
aide to come to Cavite on board the Nc
l'S Sullough. He arrived, with thirteen Of
ms stan on May 8, and Immediately
came on board the Olympia to call on
was allowed to land in the vicinity Of
| Mania, and organize an army. This was
| done on the understanding that it was to
| Strengthen the United States force, and
| harrass the enemy. No arrangement of
| any kind was entered into with Aguin-
aldo, and no promise of independence was
made TO him then or later"
AGUINALDO ARRAIGNED.
The commissions report of subsequent
events Is historical 1t tells in substance
how the Filipinos attacked the Spanish,
| and now Gen. Anderson arrived and
Aguinaldo, at his request, removed from
| Cavite to Bacoor. Says the commission:
| Now for the first time arose the Idea
of national independence. Aguinaldo is-
| sued proclamation, in which he took the
| responsibility of promising it to his peo-
ment, although he admitted freely in pri-
vate conversation with members of his
| cabinet that neither Admiral Dewey nor
| any other American had made him any
| such promises .''-s..s -slt-.-. ...l
The report states that Aguinaldo wish
| ed to attack the Americans when they
| landed at CaranaQue, but was deferred
by lack Of arms and ammunition. From
| that point on there was a growing fric-
|
| lean troops. -s,+ --.-t-.
There were no conferences" says the
| report, between the officers Of the Fill
| pinos and our officers with view to op-
Grating against the Spaniards, nor was
there cooperation of any kind"
The commission, in concluding this
| chapter, says: ~'
After the landing Of our troops Agui-
naldo made up his mind that 1t would be
| necessary to fight the Americans, and
| after the making of the treaty Of peace
| at Paris this determination was strength
| ened. He did not openly declare he In
| tended to fight the Americans but he ex-
cited the natives. and especially the
| military men, by claiming independence,
and 1t is doubtful if he was able to check
or control the army at the time hostilities
broke out. Deplorable as war Is, the one
in which we are now engaged was una
Voidable by us. Viewer attacked by
| bold, adventurous and enthusiastic army.
| No alternative was left to US except
| ignominious retreat. 1t is not to be con-
| ceived that any American would have
sanctioned the surrender of Manila to
| the insurgents. Our obligations to the
| Europeans, to the friendly F1lipinos,
and to ourselves and to our flag demand
ed that force should be met by force.
Whatever the future of the Philippines
may be, there is no course open 10 US
until the insurgents are reduced to sub
mission.
The commission is of the opinion that
there has been no time since the destruc-
ton of the Spanish squadron by Admiral
Dewey when it was possible to Withdraw
: our forces from the islands. e1thel WA
honor to ourselves or with safety to the
inhabitants.
ANARCHY IN MANILA.
The commission then takes up the con-
| ditions Of the country at the time or their
arrival, comparing 1t with condluons eA-
listing at the time they left a short time
ago. A vivid picture is given Of the an
archy existing among the Inhabitants III
and about Manila during the early spring.
THE situation in the city, says the COM
mission, was bad. Incendiary fires oc
Cured daily. The streets were almost de-
serted.t Half of the native population
had fled. and most of the remainder Were
shut In their houses. Business was at a
standstill Insurgent troops everywhere
faced our lines, and the sound of rife
fire was frequently audible in cur house.
A reign Of terror prevailed. F1Ilplnos
who had favored Americans feared as
sassinatton. and few had the courage to
come out openly for us. Fortunately,
there We're among this number some or
the best men Of the city,
The report then speaks Of the issuance
of the commissions proclamation, and the
good effect 1t had on public sentiment.
In speaking of Gen. Macarthur S move
ments northward the report tells Of the
insurgent method of intimidating the ma
tives by telling them fearful tales con-
corning the American soldiers. This
method Of procedure, emineHt]y success
full at first, in the end recoied on it's
authors
AS to the state Of affairs when the
commission left the report says:
Before the commission left the Phil
ippines nearly all the inhabitants had re-
turned to these ruined villages. Many Of
the houses had been rebuilt. Fields that
had lain falow for three years were green
with growing crops. Municipal govern
ments had been established and the peo-
pie, protected by our troops, were enjoy
ing peace, security, and a degree Of par
ticipatton in their own government pre-
Viously unknown in the history Of the
Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents
to raise recruits and money in the pro-
vince Of Bulacan proved abortive, ex-
ccpt when backed by bayonets and bull
lets, and even in such cases the natives
were applying to- us for help to resist
them
FAILURE IN NEGROS.
Special attention is given to the island
OF Negros, as this seemed a field we'll
adapted to the extension Of an American
system. Here the natives had adopted
Iccal form of government, including a
congress, and had raised the American
nag. They believed themselves capable
or managing their own affairs and asked
Tor battalion of troops to hold in check
mountainous band of fanatics. The
| battalion was furnished, but the people
| proved unable to carry out their pro-
gramme, owing to ill-feeling among their
| own othc1als. The Americans remained
popular AT the, request of Gen. Otis. a
new and simpliffed scheme Of government
Tor the island, giving the people a large
voice IN their affairs, but placing an
american IN rulI control, was put into op-
eratlon: at brought about satisfaction.
ana puollc order Is better on the island
today than at any time during the last
twenty years. Summarizing the failure
OF the native form of government and the
success Of the American control the
commission says:
THE fiat failure of this attennt 70 &c
tablish an independent native povnrn-
nent In Negros, conducted, as it was
uhoer the most favorable circumstances
makes 1t apparent that here, as well sc
IN the less favored provinces, large
amount or American control IS at nree
| ent absolutely essential to a successfu1
administration of public affairs ;,
RETENTION IS RECOMMENDED
The efforts at conciIiation with Aeui-
naldo end his various commissioners arc
get forth In detail. These commissioners
| were assured Of the beneficient purnusao
| OF the United States and the presidents
readiness to grant the Filipino neonla oe
much home rule and SIS ample liberty ae