The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-06-03

the war could be settled by a single
battle in the open field, or even with
the Filipinos well protected by en-
trenchments. it would be over in few
hours. Twenty thousand soldiers such
as we have in the islands would easily
defeat three times that number of ma
tives. But, unfortunately, the war can
not be ended in that summary way
so far as actual pacification is con-
cerned, it counts for little to defeat a
force of Filipinos and capture a belt of
territory, unless we have sufficient
force to hold and protect what has
been taken. Here lies the trouble.
Some time ago General Lawton,
splendid fighter, was reported as say
ing that 100000 troops were needed for
the complete conquest of the islands.
We have seen no denial from any au-
thentic source that the general made
this statement and other officers who
have participated in the Philippine
fighting have recently given opinions
which tend to confirm the view ex-
be mentioned General King, Captain
Clay and others.
Evidently somebody has blundered.
Where does the fault lie if not at the
door of the administration? At the
time when the presidents proclama-
ton was made. claiming the islands
by right of conquest, 1T was manifest
that the claim could be made good only
by force of arms. Aguinaldo was in the
field with an army estimated at thirty
thousand men. 1t was flushed with vic
tory over the Spaniards. and Aguinaldo
was full of self-confidence. 1t was as
sumed by the administration that, after
one or two defeats, the power of Aguin-
aldo would melt away and that peace
would follow. Twenty or thirty thou
sand additional troops could easily have
been sent to Manila, and the president
was authorized to enlist thirty-five
thousand more. Before the passage of
the army bill the threat of an extra
session of congress was openly made, in
the event of that body failing to re-
SpOuu 10 the president demand IOF a
permanent army of 100000 men.
Congress did authorize the president
to enlist thirty-five thousand men for
two years, besides providing for the
maintenance of the regular army upon
a war footing of sixty-two thousand
for a like period. Almost Immediately
it was announced that the thirty-five
thousand two years men would not
be enlisted; 1t was announced that they
were not required. What, then, becomes
of the eloquent arguments in favor of a
regular army of one hundred thousand?
Why are the volunteers kept marching
and fighting and dying in the Philip
pines long after their terms of enlist
ment have expired?
The answer is simple. From the first
it was assumed that Filipino resistance
was an utterly trivial matter; that, out
side of Aguinaldo and a little coterie of
adventures, everybody in the islands
was favorable ITO American sovereignty
The war with Spain was over, there
was no need Of the troops in this coun-
try, and to call out thirty-five thousand
more men for the sole purpose of con-
quering the Filipinos would have been
a recognition of power in Aguinaldo
that would have gone a long way to-
ward overthrowing the whole admins
tration theory concerning the Philippine
situation. Besides, the president had
felt the public pulse and had reached
the sage conclusion that such an addi-
ton to the army would not add to his
popularity in the next campaign. In
our judgment the fault lies with the
administration. 1t simply started on a
mission of conquest with an inadequate
force. If this be not true, how comes
it that the Filipinos are still in the field,
and full of fight?