The daily morning journal and courier., 1899-04-20

l
 lowed I do not pretend that the spirit of the standing army alone caused the transformation of the second French re- public into the second French empire. | But it can certainly not be denied that the army again lent itself as the Wiling | torl to the schemes of the consplrators who had planned the destruction ot the republic and the erection of monarch ical government upon it's ruins.
 After the disastrous collapse of impe- rial rule in the German war, the | third French republic was proclaimed | in 1870. It has now lasted well nigh 1 tWenty-nine years. But the greatest dangers that have threatened it's exist ence came from the position in it of the standing army. One of its chiefs, Mac | Nahon, while president of the republic, l was drawn into intmgues of the monar- chist parties; another, Boulanger, plot ted revolution and usurpation, probably for his own benefit; and now, in these | latter days, in consequence of the hide ous Dreyfus affair, the administration or justice has, in the interest of the chiefs of the army, been subjected to a per- l version calculated to undermine the very foundations of legal government, and l it is to be feared ultimately to effect the total subverson of republican institu- tions. The domineering spirit of the army is such that it claims to be above discussion and criticism, assumes to dlc- l tate the decision of judicial tribunals, and actually seeks to substitute for 1 what in other countries is the crime or | lesemajeste the crime of lese-armee. At | any rate, whatever the future may 1 bring it is no exaggera ton to say that l the attitude of the army in France has dealt the reputation of republican gov ernment a staggering blew, and that all this may turn out to be only the prelude to new usurpations.
 | For the burdens European nations have to beag, tha advocates or ap1loGists of the system have a ready plea of Jus- l tfication. It is that the nation refus- 1 ing to bear these burdens would be at the mercy of it's ambitious and possibly | hostile rivals.
 And thus no sooner has one of these nations taken the slightest step to in crease the numerical strength of it's armaments or their efficiency in killing and destroying, no sooner has 1t begun to augment it's battalions, or squadrons, or batteries: no sooner has it introduced a new model of musket or of cannon; no sooner has it built a war-ship upon a new plan promising to do better eXecu- l tion, than all the others, with nervous anxiety, will follow suit, or even try to push a step further ahead And this process must be gone through again and again, whole armies must be newly armed, and whole fleets must be rebuilt, as the crack ships of yesterday have be- | come little better than old iron to-day. And all this, no matter what burden be | put upon the backs of the people, and | how the taxpayer may groan. In fact,
 these governments claim that they are not permitted under the circumstances 1 to adapt their policy concerning their armaments to what may be their own wishes or to what they might consider good for the welfare of their people, Their necessities in this respect are de- 1 terminad not by themseves, but by the performances of their neighbors and rivals.
 And so the ruinous competition goes on and on without end in sight, the Mo- | loch of militarism being unsuitable.
 So far the American people have been exempt from most of the evils springing 1 from this system. From the foundation of the government it has been the con- sistent policy of this republic, following the true democratic instinct, to adapt it's armaments to it's own needs, without permitting itself to be drawn into the vortex of rivalry with other nations. As to the maintenance of peace and or der at home, it has ordinarily depended upon the local police forces and the mili- tia. It kept a small standing army sta toned at a few military depots, at few coast-defence Notifications, or at posts in the Indian country. It kept a small navy, just sufficient for an occasional showing of the flag in foreign waters, and for doing it's part of the police of the seas. Whenever an extraordinary emergency arose, such as war with a | foreign power, or an instruction of for
 midable proportions at home, it organ ized armed forces on a larger scale by calling out volunteers, who were enlist = ed in the service of the republic. not as a regular standing army is, for doing
 whatever task might turn up, but for a
 wel-defined, specific purpose. to be dis l banded again as soon as that specific purpose was accomplished
 Such was our noImal policy during the period between the foundation of the re- public and our days. Times of war ex- cepted, the republic was, compared with
 other nations. substantially unarmed
 and, considering the condition of our coast Notifications, substantially de- fenceless. And yet it cannot be said
 that, since the war of 1912. 1t was, in consequence of its rnarmed state, at any time in serious danger of foreign aggres- sion or of serious denial of it's rights by any foreign power. Not as if all for eign nations had been our sworn friends, eager to keep us from harm in our inno- cence-for there were people enough in EuropeNand even in America who dis liked us and would not have been sorry to see this republic perish nor as if in our intercourse with foreign nations we had been over-anxious to spare other peoples feelings-for the tone of our di- plomacy was not always a model of po- l litencss. No. it was because in the main we took little interest in matters which I did not concern us. and because every | fereign power understood that consider l ing our vast resources, and the compact ness and substantial impregnability of our great continental stronghold, seri- | int hD tot tDC