The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-03

arrive in Hong Kong in time to have a
conference with the admiral
1T had been renorted to the commo-
dore as early as March / by the United
States consul at Manila and others that
the Filipinos had broken out in insur-
rection against the Spanish authority in
the vicinity of Manila and on March 80
Mr.. Williams had telegraphed: 'Five
Thousand rebels armed in camp near
city. Loyal to us in case of war
Upon the arrival of the squadron at
Manila it was found there was no in
surrection to speak of. and it was ac-
cordingly decided to allow Asuinaldo to
come to Cavite on board the McCu-
loch. He arrived with 13 of his staff
on May 19, and Immediately came on
board the Olympia to call on the COM
mander-in-chief, after which he was al
lowed to land at Cavite and organize an
army. This was done with the purpose
of Strengthening the United States
forces and weakening those Of the
enemy. No alliance Of any kind was
entered into with Aguinaldo nor was
any promise of Independence made to
him. then or at any other time"
Aguinaldo Promises Indspsnaaac
The commissioners then rapidly
In substance how the Filipinoa at
tackled the Spanish and how General
Anderson arrived and Aguinaldo moved
from Cavite to Bacor
Now for the first time rose the idea
OF national Independence. Aguinaldo
issued a proclamation in which he took
the responsibility of promising it to mis-
people on behalf of the American gov
ernment, although he admitted freely
in privste conversation with members
Of his cabinet that neither Admiral
Dewey nor any other American had
made him any promise"
The report states that Aguinaldo
wished to attack the Americans when
they. landed at Paranaque but was
deferred BY lack Of arms and ammu-
nition From that point on there was
growing friction between the Fill
pinos and the American troops
There were no references" says the
report between the oficers of the
Fflipinos and our officers with view to
operating against the Spaniards, nor
WAS there cooperation of any kind.
There never We're any preconcerted op-
erations or any combined movement by
the United States and Filipinos against
the Spanish"
Reference is made to the request of
Aguinaldo that he be allowed to loot
Manila and take the arms Of the Span
ish The latter demand is said to con-
firm the statement that he intended to
get possession OF the arms to attack
the Americans. Further evidence OF
the hostile intentions of the Filipinos
was found in the organization of the
Popular Club" which later on furn-
ished local militia to attack the
Americans. The DEGREES Of the Fill
pino congress are also cited as well
as the making of bolos (knives) in
every shop in Manila. 1t is shown that
a considerable element In the Filipino
congress wished to address to Presi-
dent Mckinley a request not to aban
don the Philippines Cat this stage the
Paris conference was discussing the
future of the PhilippinesD The presi-
dent was also to be asked his desire as
to the form OF government he wished
established. But all this time Aguin-
aldo was preparing for war and de-
laying these messages and it was un-
derstood the attack would come upon
the first act by the American forces
which would afford a preteHt.
A brief chapter tells of the lack of
successes attending the effort made at
this time by General Merritt through
a commission to arrive st mutual un-
derstandins with Aguinaldo as to the
intention. purposes and desires Of the
Filipino people.
HIS llle otoiy up " tIiS oul-
break on the evening of Feb. 4, with
the attack upon the American troops,
following the action of the Nebraska
sentinel.
The First Attack.
The commission in concluding this
chapter, says:
After the landing of our troops Ag-
uinaldo made up his mind that it would
be necessary to fight the Americans and
after the making of the treaty Of peace
at Paris this determination was
He did not only openly
declare that he intended to fight the
but he excited everybody,
and especially the military by claiming
and it is doubtful wheth-
er he had the power to check or centrol
the army at the time hostilities broke
out. Deplorable as war in. the one in
which We are now engaged was un-
avoidable. We were attacked by q
bold. adventurous and enthusiastic
army. No alternative was left to us,
except ignominous retreat
Must Fight 1t Ont.
TT is not to be conceived that any
American had sanctioned the surrender
If Manila to the insurgents. Our obli-
cations to other nations and to the
friendly Filipinos and to ourselves and
'ur flag demand that force should be
net with force. Whatever the future !
,f the Philippines may be, there is no |
,ourse open to us now except the prose- |
sution of the war until the insurgents |
Ire reduced to submission The COM |
mission Is of the opinion that there has |
oeen no time since the destruction of |
he Spanish squadron by Admiral |
Dewey when it was possible to with
lraw our forces from the islands either
With honor to ourselves or with safety |
o the inha bitants."
The commission then takes up the
conditions of the country at the time
If its arrival. comparing it with condi-
ions existing at the time it left short |
ime ago
The report next speaks of the issu.