The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-11-12
Have Everything to Lose and Nothing
to Gain by Waiting for the Ar
rival of General Butler.
WHITES CONDUCT CRITICISED
STRATEGISTs THINK HE SHOULD
HAVE RETIRED SOUTHWARK.
Brftons Wondering What Would Hap
pen IL a Continental Power At
tackled England Now.

copyrighted. 1899. by the Associated Press1
LONDON, Nov. 11.-As each day and each
week of the war draws to close without
a decisive action at Ladysmith, the proba-
bility that the Beers will risk an assault
on that garrison becomes, 1t is said. more
and more imminent. In fact, it is claimed
that the campaign seems to have reached
a stage where it is absolutely necessary
for the Beers to deliver telling stroke.
Unless they decide to do this. their only
alternative is to retire within their own
line and strengthen themselves against the
impending onslaught by superior numbers.
That the latter course will be followed
without first making determined attempt
to oust or capture General Whites force
indicates that the campaign has been care
fully planned and the main objective def
nitely fixed. Even if the Beers have al
ready discovered they have underrated Gen.
Whites capability OF resistance. it is
thought scarcely likely that they will give
up their expected prey without desperate
struggle. Not only have they tasted of the
dangerous delights of victory and reveled
in anticipation in still further conquest over
the main unit opposing them, which alone
would have great moral effect in persuading
them to risk much against Ladysmith; but
now 1t is too late for them to change the
main objective. Mobile as are the Beers,
they could scarcely transfer the body of
their forces, which are at present concen-
trated about Ladysmith, to any other vul-
nerable British point without running the
risk of encountering superior numbers
which are already pouring northward.
Moreover. any weakening of the Boer force
at Ladysmith would give General White a
splendid opportunity of attacking; and even
against overwhelming odds he has shown
no hesitancy in accepting every opening for
assuming the offensive.
The Beers must know just as well as the
British military authorities that twenty
three transports will arrive in South Africa
before Nov IS. They must also realize that
their time is short, for In the present emer-
gency, 1t is believed, General Butler will
not wait TO organize an army corps, but
will content himself with rushing to the
front every regiment he can dispose of.
Hence. news telling either of General Jou-
berSs complete rout General Whites
capitulation, II is claimed, can be expected
daily.
WILL BE SERIOUS.
1t is thought more than likely that the
engagement understood to be imminent will
prove to be the most serious encounter Of
the If victory lies with General Jou-
bert it will be month or more before
General Butler can dispute with him the
possession of Natal, for while it is still per-
fectly feasible to send reinforcements to
General White. it would, apparently, be alb
solutely impossible to assume the offensive
were General White no longer a military
factor. The destruction of the railroad
bridge over the River Tugela would greatly
retard the passage even of minor re-
Inducements, while it would much
more seriously affect the onward
march of British force of any
proportions. However, there is no reason 10
believe Ladysmith has not a good chance
to withstand the most determined Boer at
tacks. General Whites ability to hold his
own until now and the reported success
which has crowned his sorties have done
much to restore confidence I'm him.
If General Butler continues to send trans
ports to Durham and disembark troops there
General White will only have to wait about
fortnight before he is reinforced, or, at
any rate, before the reinforcements create
a diversion of the Boer forces. But it is i'm
possible to predict with any degree of ex-
actness when the troops will disembark on
account of the idiosyncrasies of the trans
ports. several of which have developed a re-
markable penchant for breaking down or
discovering, after leaving port, that their
coal, boilers or other essentials were worth
less.
Among the military critics what is most
dreaded is the possibility that General
White may succumb TO the pettiness of
personal inclinations, which, in the history
OF the world, would have so often influenced
the action of the greatest generals. On
this score the Naval and Military Record
says: 1T looks as though General White
will not be content to await the arrival of
reinforcements and the supremacy of Gen.
Butler; but the spirited soldier who held a
high command over the whole Indian army
might be pardoned for being slightly in
fuenced by private ambitions"
GENERAL WHITES MISTAKE.
Nearly all the authorities. while withhold
ing definite criticism until fuller informa-
tion is obtainable, fail 10 understand why
General White did rot fall back south of
the Tugela, thus drewing the Beers after
Kim into the arms of General Butler. 1t is
charitably supposed that the government
of Natal exercised influence over General
White, and is in no little degree responsible
for his gallant, yet, from strategic point
OF view, doubtful efforts to hold the neck Of
Natal But even then 1t is admitted that
no general has been exonerated in history
merely because he allowed his actions TO be
hampered by a civil government, to which
he was not directly responsible.
Naturally. there is a great division of
opinion on these points. One of the most
humane contributions to the controversy.
trenchant in its simplicity, comes from Ad-
miral Dowell. who writes: 'I am sailor
and do not pretend to give an opinion on