The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-09-20
WASHIEGTON BIT INOREDULOUS.
Reasons Pointed Out at the Same Time Why
AguinaIdo Should Surrender.


AEuinaldo Should Surrender.
WASHINGTON. Sept. 9.-Information was re-
ceivsd at tho War Department to-day from
Major Gen. Otis which. in the opinion Of the
more optimistic of the high officials OF the Ad-
ministration. indicates that Aguinaldo 10 pre-
pairing to surrender to tho authority OF the
United States. 1t 10 fair to say. however. that
a majority OF the officials decline to express
any opinion or are emphatic in declaring that
they have no faith in ovsrturss for peace from
tho willy Filipino leader. The advioes from
Gen. Otis were contained In the following tels-
gram dated Manila. Sept. 10:
Macarthur reports from Angeles visit of
two insurgent officers with request for per-
mission to send into our lines American
prisoners and send to Manila prominent in
surgent general officer for conference. Tho
requested interview granted and insurGsnt
officers at Angeles returned north this morn
ing with information"
While everybody is hoping that the surgent
general who will visit Gen. Otis will bring q
definite proposition for the surrender OF the
Tagalo army very few OF those In high author
ity believe that he will do so. Their idea 10
that Aguinaldo will not offer to surrender prior
to the November elections. He and his fol.
lowers have been led to believe by Americans
OF the Atkinson type that the Govern
ment's policy In the Philippines will be re-
pudiated by the people at the polls. and with
such belief prevailing In the Filipino ranks
| the prospect OF peace oyortures Is very remote
| indeed. At this time when no fighting 10 going
on there Is no occasion. II commended. for
| Aguinaldo to offer to surrender. On the other
| hand, tho more hopeful members OF the Ad-
| ministration refer to rumors that have
been current recently and are said to have
originated in the Philippines. to the effect
that the insurgent army 10 In very bad
shape. Its supplies from outside have been
almost II not entirely cut of and the waging
| OF hostities has prevented full crops from
being grown in the country whore the rebel
army is located. In these circumstances. and
| with the additional knowledge which must be
| possessed by ARuinaldo that Gen. Otis 10 being
re-enforced heavily. the optimists hold that
there Is good ground for assuming that the
meagre information contained In Gen. Otis's
despatch indicates that AGuinaldo Is willing
to mako terms for ending the uprising against
| American authority.
One thing that mystihed the officials earlier
in the day was the action Of Gen. Otis In grant
| ing permission TO a Filipino envoy to visit
Manila without knowing the object OF the
ENJOYS mission. Later. after thinking over
that phase OF the matter. the officials saw that
| Gen. Otis had acted very wisely. II somewhat
| inoonsstently. Some time ago he an
nounced that he would not receive any
moro Tagal commissioners unless they came
direct from Aguinaldo pre- pared to make terms
for the surrender Of their forces. In this case,
however. the FilipinoS played clever trick on
Gen. Otis. OF which. according to the Wow here
he was moro than willing to be made the vic
tim. Knowing that Gen. Otis would decline to
receive his commissioner unless no was pre-
pared to make terms for surrendering. Agui-
naldo. the officials say. conceived the clever
idea OF making his offer to surrender
American prisoners coincident with his
request for permission to send an envoy to
confer with Gen. Otis. II Gen. Otis had
adhered to his declaration by declining to see
the envoy unless tho latter was prepared tc
offer terms OF surrender. the insurgents would
have retained the American prisoners, The
arrangement to receive the Filipino commits
sioner ut Manila was therefore trade on