The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-12-14

most OF his soldiers from an extremely
dangerous position, held them together
and, though ultimately driven across the
Jerseys, quickly returned. and became the
pursuer instead OF the pursued 1t 10 true
that WASHINGTON was beaten at Chads
Ford and at Germantown. But these were
Pyrrhio victories, and HOWE was so well
convinced that he could not afford another
triumph OF the kind, that he remained
cooped up in Philadelphia thro ughout
the winter of l777-7s. Neither HOWE
nor his successor, CLINTON. had any
desire for another fight with the Americans.
and when the latter, in his flight to New
York, was overtaken by WASHINGTON at
Monmouth Court House, he must have SUI
fered an overwhelming rout, had not the
American plan of battle been thwarted by
the English renegade, CHARLES LEE. As 1t
was, CLINTON lost 1, 500 men, and acquired
n conviction that Southern cl innate would
be more favorable to his hopes than the
latitude OF the Jerseys.
From the summer OF 1878 until the
autumn Of 1881 WAsHINGToN's task, while
supervising the operations in Rhode Island
on the one hand, and those in the Carolinas
on the other, was to keep the chief British
army pent up on Manhattan Island and It's
immediate vicinity and thus Illustrate the
primary aim OF his opponents, which was
to cut tho colonies In twain. Not only was
the southwark march OF his army and OF
the French force under RoCHAMBEAU
against CORVALLIS at Yorktown con-
ceivcd by the American commander, but
the execution OF 1t was rendered possible
by his forethought and sagacity, and,
although 1t is true that CORVALLIS would
not have surrendered but for the defeat OF
an English feet by De GRAssE In the Ches-
apeake, IL was due to WASHINGTON that n
Franco-American army was there to take
advantage Of tho naval victory. 1T Is
all over" cried Lord NORTH, when
he heard OF CoRSwALLIs's surrender,
and there was not an observer on
the Continent Of Europe who failed to ap-
preciate tho Significance OF the event.
wAsHINGToN's head was not In the least
turned, nor the olearness OF his judgment
clouded What was done was done; II was
soldiers part to consider what was left to
do. He at once sent all the soldiers he
could spare to resinforce GREENE In the
Carolinas, took vigorous measures to Sc
cure naval force, and urged upon Con-
gress the necessity OF providing supplies
for the army. He wanted peace. and he be-
lieved that peace was, at last in sight, but
he was not one Of those Generals who per-
nit any relaxation OF effort until the prize
Ia actually won. His watchful attitude
after Yorktown recalls the eulogy pro-
nounccd upon tho greatest OF ancient COM
nanders: MI dctum repmtdns, 81 quid
suppressed doendum; deeming naught done
IL aught remained to do.
The services which WASHINGTON was des-
tined to render to his country did not end
when, on Dec. %. 1888, he returned his
commission OF Commander-in-Chief to Con-
gress and retired to Mount Vernon. Tho
thirteen colonies had been liberated, but
they were yet TO be consolidated They had
gained independence, but they wcre threat
ened with disintegration. A strong central
government was needed not only to recon-
clio the conflicting interests OF the North
ern, the Middle and the Southern States.
but to shield against foreign aggression
the young confederacy. hemmed in upon
the north by British territory and upon the
which. as the event was to prove. might pass
at any hour into the stronger hand OF France.
No man was more keenly alive than was
WASHINGTON to the incorrigible weakness
OF the Government established under the
Articles OF Confederation. The army under
his command had been, more than once, on
the verge OF disbandment, owing to the in
ability OF Congress to provide the needful
supplies even under the pressure OF war.
Now that peace had come, there was
scarcely pretence OF respect for the CEN
trial authority. WASHINGTON alone pos
sessed sufficient influence to persuade his
fellow citizens to accept closer approach
to perfect union. To that end, he began to
use the vast moral force which he pos
sessed, even before the treaty with Great
Britain was signed.
As early as March 4, 1888, he wrote:
1T is clearly my opinion unless Congress
have powers competent to all general pur-
poses, that the distresses we have en-
countered, the. expense we have incurred
and the blood we have split will avail us
nothing" A few weeks later he wrote:
" All my private letters have teemed with
these sentiments, and, whenever this topic
has been the subject OF conversation, I
have endeavored to dirfuse and enforce
them The circular letter which he sent
to the Governors Of the States at the
close OF the war was devoted to the
single aim Of urging the necessity OF q
better central government. similar
appeal went forth in his last address To
the army, when he declared that unless
"the powers Of the Union were increased
the honor, dignity and justice Of the Nation
would be lost forever" By these two mem
orable documents, WASHINGTON began the
work whirh led to the Constitution, and fol
four years he pursued 1t steadfastly until
the Federal Convention was convoked al
Philadelphia. He had able coadjutors In
HAMILTON and MADISON, but their persona
weight was as nothing compared with his
and 1t Is safe to say that, but for his Jealous
and persistent efforts, the Convention neve,
would have met.
WASHINGTON was unanimously chosen
to preside over that body, and, al
though he spoke but once in the Conven