The National tribune., 1899-08-24

wrote his own initials-"J. J. Bon the
back of it. and then it was handed to me
with the order above stated. 1t did moi
take my little tar heel" mare-she was 6
Southern quarter horse" captured from
the enemy-long to reach the crossing oi
the Vaughn and Quaker roads.
CHANGE OF PROGRAM.
There found Gems. Warren, Griffin and
Ayres together and delivered Maj. Cope Is
| note to Warren in person. Warren read
it aloud and then said: Griffin. withdraw
Bartlett from his present position on the
Vaughn road. Change your division head
of column and start Chamberlain at once
up the Quaker road toward Gravelly Run;
and let Gregory follow him closely. will
send Mink, Rawles and Mitchell BATTERIES
H, 1St n. Y. l.. A, and ID, 5th, and B, 4th
U. S. Art) with your column. AS soon as
Bartlett returns send him to support Cham
berlain and Gregory. ,Cope's and Bart
let's information alters the whole situation.
There will be no fight in the direction of
Dinwiddie. The enemy is falling back
| or concentrating on the line of the White
| Oak road. He will probably fight some
where near the junction of the Quaker and
Boydton roads if we can strike him today:
would like to force him to fight to-day, II
possible, outside of his works on the White
Oak road, because in that case we can get
at him in the open; but if he gets to his
intrenched line on the White Oak road
without any preliminary shaking-up it will
be harder to dislodge him. Do the best you
can, Griffin, to make him fight on the
Quaker road before sundown to-day. Twill
go at once and hurry up the other divisions. v
Then to Gen. Ayres: "AyreS, you see the
scheme; dispose your division to support
Griffin. will keep Crawfords head of
column here until see what Griffin may
develop up the road"
This waS at Or within a few n1inlltpS of
noon. About an hour later Gen. Warren
received from Gen. Meade instructions to do
exactly what he had already done:
Now let us see what was the military or
tactical meaning that Warren drew from
Cope's reconnaissance: The original plan
contemplated a movement along the
Vaughn road to Dinwiddie Courthouse, and
Sheridan's cavalry was moving on that
place by the more Southerly road or along
Stony Creek. Dinwiddie Courthouse was
road center, and would form good base
for flanking operations against the South
side Railroad and to cut off sOutherly or
westerly retreat of Lees army.
On this account it was believed at first
that the rebels would dispute our advance
on that place, and up to noon of March 20
Gen. Meade believed that considerable
force of infantry was south OF Gravelly
Run.
Cope had reconnoitered till he found the
position at which Dinwiddie would natur-
ally be defended-the ridge beyond Cat
tail" Creek. Then by perfectly reckless
exposure and at the most daring risk of his
life he had developed the fact" as he him
self would say, that no force was there; that
no rebel troops were III that vicinity except
a few stragglers, or perhaps a scouting
party so utterly unsupported that they ran
away from a single officer accompanied
only by a single Orderly; and therefore
that such force of the enemy's infantry as
were known to be outside the intrenched
line of the White Oak road must be on the
north side of Gravelly Run and probably
intending to hold the junction of the Boyd
ton and Quaker roads.
This was what Cope would call "a scien
tific development of the position, strength
and probable intentions of the enemy"
With that information in his possession,
Warren could see that adherence to the
original program would simply waste time,
and hence the plan of action must be modi-
fled in accordance with the facts that Cope
had developed"
That the duty Of developing the facts"
involved the deliberate drawing Of the
fire" of four or five rebel soldiers. was the
merest incident, not worth mention, and
doubtless. if Maj. Cope is still living, he will
have forgotten all about it.