Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1899-06-01
orEn ATOMS AROUND MANILA.
Otis's Rcport-Causcs Leading TO the
War,

~ W." " va! Hi"ue puOilc the report OF
General OTIS, transmitting the reports Of
his subordinate officers, on the operations
around Manila up to April 10th.
General Otis begins with this statement.
Inc military operations are fairly well
presented IN the reports. and / have lille
20 auu thereto, but desire particularly 10
al at,ehllon 10 the conditions and cir
I,",hS'"nccs which resulted I'm war This
4 deem TO be essential I'm order 10 correct
we somewhat prevailing impression that
we government OF the United States Is
Itspohslblc, through deceit or wrongful
ties" ''s N"'''
TO this end he gives a short summary
OF the Philippine insurrecton against
Spaln' laying stress on the fact that
Shlai banu or the natives OF luzOn,
leaders OF the rebellion of SO against
spain were induced for q monetary con-
Slderation 20 leave the island. These men
returned 10 the vicinity OF Manila after
the destruction Of the Spanish fleet there.
being, as General Otis says, encouraged
without authority 10 attempt the organi-
zaton OF what they We're pleased to de-
nominate an independent government for
the Philippine people"
INDEPENDENCE PROCLAIMED.
Independence. General Otis says. was
proclaimed by Aguinaldo in August. and
as early as June he had warned the
united states authorities against the
landing OF it's military forces on Philip
sent, because, as he expressed it, "the
fhlippine people might consider the oc-
cupation Of Philippine territory by North
Anerlcan troopsNl violation OF their
General Otis says: "When the United
states forces landed from their transports
near ana TO the southwark OF Manila for
me purpose of attacking the city. the
hcuon mat they were acting as allies of
me insurgents and in furtherance of
ihillppine independence appears 20 have
peeh conveyed by the insurgent leaders,"
General Otis describes Aguinaldo's
ehOr,s 10 strengthen his lines in prepara-
ton for hostilites with the United states
during this time. and explains the grow n
OF the insurgent Independent movement.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH AGIrI-
NALDO.
Describing briefly the high tension that
existed AT the time, General OTIS in
Guides, in explanation of his course. some
highly important correspondence that
passed between himself apd Aguinaldo
Early in January General Otis was SIX
ed by conservative Filipinos to appoint
committee OF army officers 10 meet an
lnSurSent commission, by which peace
might be maintained. General Otis re-
FUSED to recognize any insurgent govern
ment. but was willing to negotiate with
Aguinaldo or committee appointed by
him.
The report sets out the correspondence
on this subject which passed between
named a commission consisting of three
of his leaders with General otis. with
a view TO an amicabe understanding. but
expressed surprise that Otis would not
receive the commissioners as official rep
reSentatives of the insureent government
COULD NOT RECOGNIZE FlLIPINOS.
In his reply. General Otis explained that
he was acting merely as the agent Of the
United States Government. AS such he
had no authority to recognize the Filipino
Government. and could not receive Off
cially, representatives. of that government
He expressed the earnest hope that the
commissions named by him and by Agui-
naldO would be able through conference
60 dspcl the misunderstanding which cX-
listed lie was under strict orders from
the President 10 avoid a conflict, If posi-
Bile. but he admOnished Aguinaldo that
the American troops were aware of the
Filipno's effort to prcciptate hOstilities
he pointed out that a definite policy with
reference TO the Philippines would have
to be declared by Congress. and for the
action Of Congress he hoped Aguinaldo
would wait.
General Otis says the negotiations were
barren Of practical results. The insurgcnt
members desired absolute independence.
but were unauthorized to present any
statement they could maintain.
INSURGENTS AGGRESSIVE.
In the latter part Of January the insur-
gents became aggressive interfering with
the American troops, and finally led Gen
eral Otis 10 address another letter 10
AguinaldO, calling attention 10 the arrest
by FilipinOs of some American soldiers
and a newspaper correspondent. and re-
questing an explanation, General Otiss
letter added:
Il am doing everything possible TO pre-
serve the peace and avoid all friction until
the Philippine people can be made fully
acquainted with the sentiments and inten-
tons of the American Government, when
/ am confident they will appreciate the
endeaYOrs of the United States and Will
again look upon that country as their
friend and protector, | also fully believe
that the present unrest is a result of the
Vaccinations Of evil-disposed people"
TO this letter AguinaldO sent a sar-
castle reply. but ordered the release Of
the prisoners.
OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.
General Otis next tells how the Ameri-
can soldiers were openly inSulted, and
now the insurgents had continually la
bored to strengthen their lines threaten
ing TO drive the Americans out of the
island. and how, finally. on the night of
February 9TH. the demonstration was
made which resulted i'm the killing of a
Filipino by an American sentry and the
firing on the Americans by the insurgent
troops General Otis continues as follows:
THE insurgent army had thus sue
ceeded in drawing the fire of small out
post, which they had evidently labored
with all their ingenuity TO accomplish. in
order TO justify in some way their pre-
meditated attack. 1t is not believed that
tlc tilti 4ISulStul ltdutiS NlSncu ~
open hostilites at this time, as they were
not completely prepared TO assume the
initiative. They desired two or three days
more to perfect their arrangements. but
the zeal of their army brought on the
crisis which anticipated their action.
They could not have delayed long. how
ever. for it was their object TO force an
issue before the American troops then
en- route could arrive at Manila.
TROOPS HIGHLY COMMENDED.
1.-THE movement of troops during the |
prOtTdctcd engagement which followed, |