New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-12-24

h,o,.icr niaces Of ordnance over the most APP
,auirpIy difficult country with such remarkable
r,,,.jit, and how they are able To bring them
irto action So readily at different points. only
L prof ,ssional military man can appreciate the
ia-k involved i'm the rapid conveyance OF forty
p,u!.t.r guns over a country where roads are
il.a exception and bowder covered plains ana
bulls thc rule.
The fac; that all these questions should be
a.,,I to-day 10y the English commanders in the
n,rI and ly the War Department at home
demonstrates better than anything else the gross
iU.,ml,tcu.c If thu Intelligence Department III
London which is unable TO furnish any salts
factory answer e., them. or to afford the slight
est information OIL The subject 1t Is hardly
necessary q, point ONT that General Sir Redvers
Butler and not merely his divisional. but ike
wise his brigade commanders should have been
uorou-hly posted ca al. these points before be-
H., called uuou to encounter the foe, and that
thy H,r- seriously handicapped 10y the absence
c. any information about the matter.
LACK OF MILITARY MATS
But not only has the Intelligence Department
displayed The most incOnccyahlc ignorance IN
everything connected with the military re-
sources Of the South African republics, but 1t
actually neglected to chart the country which
is now the scene Of hostilities and Il portion OF
which at any rate. Is British territory. For II
General Gataore was defeated ten days ago. II
was largely due 70 the fact that he had no
knowledge Of the Typography of the country
through which ne was marching. that he had
no maps. and that ne entirely dependent
upon The directions or black guides, who proved
themselves altogether incompetent or else
trcachcrous and led his cxpeditonary force into
a44H
fact that during the war Of 1870 the Prussan
officers. thanks to the precautions Of the Intel
Hecncc Bureau Of the War Department at Ber-
lin were provided with the most elaborate and
perfect maps Of the encmy's country, showing
every road and even bypath and lane, whereas
the French commanders were repeatedly getting
lost even in their own country. owing to the
lack Of proper maps.
The British embarked upon this war with
the Transyaal in the belief that at the very most
the Beers would not be able TO put into the
field more than twenty-five thousand men
whereas it is shown to-day that they have under
arms at least sixty thousand men. This body
OF armed opponents England apparently expects
70 defeat with a force all told Of eighty thou
sand men, in which are comprised the Cape
and Natal volunteers. From tiei eighty thou
sand troops have TO be deducted those required
for keeping open the requisite base lines. as
well as the forces necessary for checking rsings
in the Cape Colony and in Natal, and those
needed for garrison duty in the chief centres
Not less than forty thousand are necessary
for this purpose and the number of those left
over Is further diminished by the fact that The
majority Of the men are unused to the climate
and that the percentage Of sickness is there
fore large. To the majority Of the English
soldiers and officers the local topography is
sealed book. whereas the Beers know every yard
of the country and all its capacities for traps
Finally. Pretoria has been fortified in such
able manner that It will require very large