The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1899-03-31
PEOL0NGLNG TIE uIp

washington dispatches which tell cs
general amnesty that is 10 be granted
70 he Filipiaos seem q triae ursmg-
ture. First catch your hare. The mil
itary movement planned for surround
ing the insurgent army has resulted i-
a long chase rather than 4 rounding
Up So far as the public IS informed
there is nothing whatever TO prevent
the withdrawal OF Aguinaldo and his
army northward from Malolos. though
that is the point where the opr9sing
forces were expected to meet for their
most decisive struggle. In fact l. has
been reported that the Filipino leader
himself has already Withdrawn 10 2
more distant point, and the natural as
sumption is that he intends 70 take
with him such Of his troops as he can
save
There is no intention here to crftjcige
the conduct Of the campaign, for the
natural obstacles have been sufficient
to prevent the execution Of the aanEing
movement Of flying columns, OF which
so much had been hoped. Let alone
the intense heat, the country is exceed
lngly difficult for military operations.
Much Of the way it is wholly imprac-
ticable for artillery, except for the
smallest guns; the troops have had TO
rebuild bridges that had been DESTROYED
by the enemy; capture lines of en-
trenchmenJs and rifle pits that had
been constructed with such skill as To
indicate that they had been planned
by Spanish officers or their pupils: pen
citrate dense jungles which not only
seemed barrier to further progress,
but concealed well armed and desper-
ate natives The Filipinos have suf-
fered severe losses, sometimes ftIv de-
scribed as slaughter, but they knew
their way perfectly in the Jungle.
were fleet Of foot. and have waeed
a kind Of Parthian warfare. never al
lowing their pursuers to come near
enough TO make a victory complete
and decisive by capture or annihiIation.
They have been reckless of life when
the Americans were at long range. but
have fed with something like panic at
the threat of close quarters.
1t is hoped that the capture Of Agui-
naldo's capital, Malolos, viii seriously
impair his prestige, undermine his
authority and perhaps separate large
numbers Of the people from their ale
glance to him, but Filipino character
/ is an enigma, and no man can say what
effect the loss Of their nominal capltal
would have upon the continuance of
the war The insurgents method of
warfare has suggested an alienation
/ Of determination and announcement.
There are Indications that many of
Aguinaldo's followers are tired of
fighting and ready to quit, but by one
means on another the leader continues
to keep the bulk Of his army together.
and there are no signs Of approaching
| peace. As he moves farther north, he
is getting away from the terrible guns
of Dewey's fleet and entering a coun-
try where it is supposed that he can
find many recruits among people that
as yet have had no demoralizing taste
of American warfare. The prospect of
a speedy termination of the strife is by
no means so bright as could be wished.
but the energetic campaigning of Otis
and his generals is Fastening this de-
sirable end, and 1t may come more
quickly than can be now foreseen.
Al all first ag lDtp1r clubs arI ,o foe