The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-08-17
PANDO TELLS WAR SECRETS
r1xr or Hts SPFECH or OFFENCE
RFFoRF SPAIN's COR res.

wIsu1SoToN. Aug 1B.-ten Panuos speech
nj detepce before the Cortes In secret session,
Of his action in Cuba during tho recent war,
has reached here. lie insists. in n clenr note
=, dsa,nce. that Spain should have fought
longer. and that she had reasonable hope OF
ytctorv. even at the moment when che
,ouered her flag IN surrender. Gen. Pando
aays that, As a commanding officer In the
Spanish army. he Ind made profound study
oftbe military mower OF the United States. for
,uontv Years, and to do this had maintained
n system OF espionage and inquiry through
com petent persons, in other words. spies.
among them being naval engineer officers.
paid by the Spanish Government. and several
agents whom Gen. pando had himself main
t,ined in this country at his own expense
The fear Of Intervention. during the ten years
war must I've accepted as the original cause for
this systematic effort on the part OF Spain, TO
know precisely what the military and naval
capacity Of the United states might BIO. Gen.
lando says:
"I proved that the United States did not
havo an army, aud never would have an army.
without radical change in their organic life."
Responsibility for the tactics OF Spain. after
the war had been declared by the United
states I. placed distinctly upon Cen Blanco.
ny his orders were precautions taken to evac-
nate tho garrisons OF the provinces OF San
tlaEO no luDd an u lutTiO 1TIHClpc. 80 tndt Ino
United States was able to seize upon the weak
eat points Of Cuba. without fear Of serious re-
sistancc. while the greater part Of the Spanish
strength lay waiting at Havana for an attack.
The interesting details OF the campaign in
Cuba on the part OF tho Spanish. after the
blockade are set forth by Gen. Pando. In n
manner which shows. in spite Of his bravado.
that the case was most hopeless for the be-
ieagured army from the start. 1t shows how
the Spanish volunteers were without arms or
ammunition. and how Banco was forced. by the
neglect Of his Government, to supply himself
a. hest he could with tho necessities OF war
Early in the year agencies were established
in Mexico Canada and other countries. to pro-
vide ships. provisions. ammunition and guns
In the first month OF the war the Spanish gem
era was able to buy in Canada, through Senior
Du Bose, fourteen ships with cargoes OF pro-
vision and ammunition.
Gen. Pando said in his speech:
1T has been charged against me that aban-
doned my position in front OF the enemy. In
view OF the charge. 1t might not te improper
for me to state some OF the true facts In re-
gard to the conduct OF the late Cuban war. 1
want TO say in regard to my conduct as chief OF
the general stafr in Cuba, which occupied for
a brief period. and which carried with II the
duties OF COMMUNICATIVE chief. II was my first
ambition to procure the means OF subsistence.
and to establish communication between the
different divisions OF the army; and to act I'M
der the instructions OF the Government at
Madrid. whose direction endeavored to exc
cute with the utmost exactitude. 1 have always
sought to protect my troops. so far as was pos
shle, and did everything to avoid sickness
and disease In the army.
AT last the time came when our army was
without provisions. and the suffering among
the troops became great. I saw the danger
which confronted us. and sent two cablegrams
to Havana. one directed to the Assistant Gov.
ernor- General. in which informed him that
the situation must be relieved. or the campaign
would result seriously against us. Ny other
despatch was directed TO the Assistant Chief Of
the General STAFF. | asked. not only that the
Quartermaster General be reprimanded. hut
that he be at once dismissed from the service.
At last got what provisions were necessary
for Manzanio and some other points In the
Eastern Department. All my cabegrams
which l sent to Havana referred to
supplies necessary in Santiago de Cuba. Hol-
guin. Puerto Principe. Ciego de Avila. and
other points. using Manzanillo as a basis OF
operations against the insurgents. With
great efforts obthineda sufficient number OF
ratlons. even to an abundant supply. In proof
OF this l will state that. during the second
period Of the war. that Is, with the United
States. found 1t necessary. when retired
with my forces. TO destroy more than 100000
rations in tho country communicating with
Santiago de Cuba. Manzanilo. Holguin and
Puerto Principe.
! proposed what believed was necessary to
b" done to accomplish the best effects in sub
DUNG the instruction in tho island and was
IN perfect accord with the General in Chief
until short time before tho declaration Of war
with the United States. But after that, say
II with great sorrow. there wero disagreements
between us on certain lines OF action. This
disagreement had its ince ption about the first
OF April. and arose from the different points OF
view in which We regarded the power OF our
future enemy
considered the United States as a nation
very strong In some spheres OF life. but. as mil
nary power. much inferior to Spain. | had based
TINS knowledge upon q profound study which I
had made during the past twenty years Of the
military power OF the United States. having
sent for that purpose to that country many
competent persons. including naval engineer
oihcers. and several people at my own expense.
VINO had prepared for me special data. and kept
me carefully informed OF every change and
movement in military affairs. Through in
formation furnished by these secret ennis
sarIes istated. and will stand by my state
nents that the United States had not
an army and would never have an
army, without complete and radical change
III their organic life. And their deeds have de-
monstrat"d that am right. l still stand by
my opinion and statements formulated long
ago.
The Gcncral-in- Chief gave moro impor-
rance than did to the force OF the Yankees.
perhaps more sensibly. and laid out different
pan OF action for the campaign from what l
considered would DO feasible. My plan was
based principally upon having steady COM
munication with different points OF the East
ern department. and / have my notes
and kilograms by which can prove the
Plan as having been competent one. II 1t
could have been carried out in unity OF action,
WIN al organisms working amicably together
IN the Island with the full support OF tho home
Government. l may say the Yankees van
pushed US. but their victory was not because
OF our feeblencss ms a military nation II was
because we were implicitly dlsorEanized. The
responsibility for our defeat lies with our
An Il