The evening times., 1899-06-12
MONDAY, JUNE u, 1899.
NEnt VIII the President Do:

~
1t will not be politically safe for the
President much longer to continue impress
ing the country with TIE idea that he is
playing with the Philippine situation. His
best friends, and all Americans who wish
to think well of him, are surprised and
panied at the apparent heIplessness Of his
attitude with regard TO the Tagal rebel
lion. They are particularly mortified to
think that he should have so little belief
in the intelligence of his fellow-country-
men as to imagine that a gallery play.
of ccngratulatcry cablegrarls to Otis every
time a miserable mutineer is killed, can
have the effect of binding them to c2ndi-
tions which are notoriousiy and obviously
due to the blunders OF his Administration.
and particularly to the inefficiency and is-
norance OF whoever may be his military
advisers.
Mr. Mckinley and the War Department
have been actively disingenuous concerning
our position in the Island OF Luzon. They
have represented General Otis as declar-
ing that thirty thousand troops will be all
he will need to thoroughly suppress the
insurrection. On this point it is as well
for the Commander in Chief to understand
a general public conviction that, il Otis
has done so under orders, and not of his
own yolition. 1t is beyond any question
that the consensus OF opinion, among army
and navy officers at Manila is that the Ia
gals cannot be put down, and the territory
they now occupy pacifed and held. with
less than twice the force our general has
at his command now. Every letter from
Luzon, every returning soldier, tells the
same story, and yet the Administration
lodges. evades, and does nothing, although
if Otis is to be re-enforced and enabled to
take-the offensive in the autumn. no;
single moment should be lost. for vol
unteers cannot be called from the plough
and workbench, made into soldiers, and
put in the field ten thousand miles away.
in less than three or four months, under
the most favorable conditions.
Every newspaper reader knows what
General Lawton said early in May, and
what Captain Clay asserted ten days ago.
Now Commander Ford. just home from the
Pacific fleet, says that when he left I'VE
held not quite as much ground as was ours
during the first part OF August last year.
and our lines were restricted to the sub
urbs of Manila" Remember that in The in
terim they extended all the way from Ma
lolos, eighteen or twenty miles NNW of
Manila, to Mariquina, five miles west, and
thence by Pasig, down along the west shore
of Laguna de Bay to line reaching to the
coast south OF and including Cavite, ten
miles S.S.W. Of our headquarters-in all a
military front. approximately continuous,
of forty-fve or fifty miles. How does that
area of occupation compare with what we
have to show today? We hold Manila, and,
with some difficulty, the city pumping sta
tion five miles west. Our troops have teen
withdrawn from the north and our cut
posts in that direction do not reach beyond
Caloocan. two miles from Manila, or we
are much mistaken. On the south the
rebels have been able to occupy and fortify
Paranaque, which is only three miles from
Otis headquarters. and there give us a
severe fight. Between Paranaque, the lake,
and Cavite, the Tagals swarm, and on the
land side We are cut of from our naval and
repair station completely, save as tenn
porary communication might be opened
through a sortie of the Manila garrison.
Practically, as Commander Ford states, We
have nothing to show for the whole spring
campaign but sad list Of casualties and
the possession of Manila and its immediate
suburbs.
Meanwhile, our ranks are being steadily
decimated by death, wounds, and climatic
diseases. Our soldiers are kept steadily in
the trenches without relief, for our forces |
are too small to more than defend the |
short line within which we have been COM
PEELED to withdraw. The relief of Luck
now was not q more pressing nf ne