The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1899-01-31

WASHINGTON, Jan. 80. = The Presi
dent to-day sent to the Senate corre-
spondence on file in the State Department
bearing upon the peace treaty and it was
read in to-day's executive session.
In submitting the papers the President
sent a brief message saying that he
transmitted them in accordance with the
resolution. The reading consumed the
entire executive session. lasting from
to $780, except few minutes at the close.
The principal interest among the Sena-
tors attached to the Presidents instruc-
lions is to insist upon the cession of the
island of Luzon and after that in the de-
cision to take the entire group of islands
This latter development appears from the
correspondence to be a growth, and the
suggestion was made by the Commits
sioners to the President as. the result Of
occurrences at Paris, after the arrival
there of the Commissioners. In his dis
patch concerning Luzon he said there was
but one alternative: The United States
must either take the island and assume
sovereignty or return 1t to Spain and OF
the two courses he preferred the former.
Spain was from the first unwilling to
cede any of the Philippines, and she made
special objection to letting go of Luzon
alone. The Commissioners, with the eX-
ception of Senator Gray, urged that to
take LuZon and leave the other islands
of the archipelago in the hands of the
Spaniards would be to invite innumerable
complications with other nations, and eS-
pecially with Europe and Spain.
Much stress was laid upon the probable
ity of future trouble with Spain. With
LuZon under American administration
there would be a vast improvement. they
wrote, andy the other islanders would
soon grow more and more rebellious, and
with Spains oppressive methods of gov
eminent, we would soon again find that
We had another Cuba at another door.
Furthermore, there would be constant fl
clustering and we should find ourselves
spending millions to preserve a state of
neutrality, just as we, did in the case of
Cuba prior to our declaration of war on
account of that island.
General Merritts testimony on this
point was cited, and was made the reason
for much of the argument in favor of
does not appear to have at any
time given explicit instructions to con-
summate the bargain by taking all the
Philippines, but rather, after hearing Il
to the discretion of the Commissioners
The entire controversy was practically
over the Philippines and the question of
assuming responsibility for the payment
of the Spanish bonds for which the Gu
ban revenues were pledged.
The SpaniardS from the first insisted
upon an indemnity for the Philippines,
and the correspondence shows that after
things proceeded much more smoothly
and were soon brought to aclose.
The American commissioners appear to
have been of one mind as to the wisdom
of taking over all the Philippines, with
the exception of Senator Gray, who, not
withstanding he signed the treaty, held
quiring these islands. In one notable dis
patch he pleaded zealously against the
policy as unpatriotic. un-American and
inconsistent with probity and good states
manship.
After brief debate the Senate refused
to print the correspondence.