The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1899-07-02

AZ the m0c8-Fexeo ana 0ep1of1pSe Cou-
tsoyersy - 70 the relative merits Of
sampson and echIey were to Be submitted
70 . vote Of the naval ofllcers who have
visited Puget sound the verdict would b
. quick and practically unanimous on.
and II would - something nke this:
'-Tbs chiaf credit for the light ~ 9antl-
ago. - tar - leadership = concerned.
belongs 10 0ampoon.~
Perhaps most ~ the voters would say
"Bfily 0ampeon.' for that - the sobsj-
gust By Witch nest nsvy men speak, 81
cases. perhaps In III. The verdict would
be Qualinsd by saying that there was no
mtsntion q detracting from the merit o.
Admiral ochley. whose reputation for couf-
age and e1lc1ency = unQueotfonAd and
whose part In one Of the greatest naval
battles Of modern times vas ccnspicu-
Gus one Then some Of the voters would
add an expression Of regret that the quar-
rel had ever arisen But they would cloee
With the resume that Sampson was easily
0rst: that the planning OF tho battle WAS
his: that he bore himself In all respects
Is he should have done; and that his cnly
misfortune was that Of not being actually
shos at.
Ali this 10 gathered. not from the opin-
lon OF one man, but OF many. II is =
sort OF consensue Of opinion among the
oflicers who have visited Puget sound ct
various times since tho war with Spain.
Thay are the hardest people in the world
TO Interview. When : reporter comes In
contact with them he finds them approach
able. genial and hosp.t able. But whatever
they have to say In regard to the navy or
Its personnel Or tn history, 10 said In con-
ddence and not for publication. Capt.
Terry Of the Iowa pretty well summed up
their sentiments on the subjsct OF taking
for the public when he laughingiy aaId at
that too much OF that had been done AZ
ready.
But Ii Is easy to gather q good deal IN
. general way without violating conf
dence. From this generaIixing process
arises the statement that naval men think
highly Of both Sampson and Schley: but
they place higher estimate On Sampson.
They VIII tell you, some Of them. men
who were on the scene Of action at Santi-
ago. that there is vast difference between
the yellow Journal accounts Of the battle
and what actually did occur. They will
tell you OF that esteem in which he Is held
throughout the navy. Some OF his warmest
admirers contend that while fortune threw
q great opportunity In Dewey's way and he
availed himself OF II TO his own glory and
that Of the navy yet Sampson IN the ahier
man OF the TWO. Tney VIII point you 10 MS
strong administration - superintendent OF
the naval academy at Annapolis and Of his
valued services - chief OF the bureau OF
ordnance at Washington.
They answer the criticism thai sampson
was very little on the sea by saying that he
was too valuable . man to be spared for
sea duty In time Of peace. and by pointing
70 the promptneao with which he was as
signed ct the cali 10 arms They deny the
charge that his preferment was q matter OF
political influence, ana those who knew
him well at the national capital ny that
he does not hobnob with politicians. Men
who served under him viii tell you what
q "bang-up' captain he waa.
In connection with their opinion comes Q
little story from San Francisco. Just be-
fore war was declared with Spain. AZ a
little dinner . group Of navy men had gath
cred They were OF different branches. To-
calities and Gradea The question sprang
up a. TO the proper man to be put at the
head of the navy In case OF war: the an
swer came from ALL sampson" There was
not q dissenting. voice.
II IL an open secret among navy men that
prior TO the time when the department or
derrh n 'spacinc blockade" in Cuban waters.
Sampson had laid all his plans. down 70 the
minutest detail OF vessels and OF men. for
the prompt bombardment OF Havana and
there are many who believe that IL his
plans had been followed the war would have
ended then and there.