The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-10-08


has actually been done remains as much an
enigma as the nature OF the terms them
selves. All the public has upon which to
base an opinion is the guarded statement
of the Duke of Devonshire lord president
of the council at Manchester, where he de-
olared that these new demands did not i'm
peril the independence of the Transvaal, the
word Independence having absolutely oppo-
site meaning in Boer and British interpre-
tation. Hence, although the week has pro-
duced no negotiations tending TO throw light
upon the merits cf the case II is evident
that negotiations have not ceased so far as
diplomatic correspondence Is concerned. This
goes TO show that there is no cause for i'm
mediate hostilities. The pith of the whole
dispute, however, IS daily becoming clearer.
The Beers are thoroughly convinced that
their freedom is menaced, and England con-
vnced that her supremacy in South Africa
is threa tened. This constitutes an impasse,
against which pacific measures can scarcely
be effective.
ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS.
As the possibility OF war increases. Brit
ish conjecture as to the unfriendly attitude
of other European powers increases. Refer
ence is frequently made to probable Russian
aggression in Asia, while it Is thought that
France, in the event of hostilities, is sure TO
become active in northern Africa. Interfer-
ence at the seat of war itself is not con-
templated, for the apples which France and
Russia wish to pick do not grow in South
Africa. Delagoa bay is naturally closely
watched in this connection. The German
press is making capital out OF the report
that Great Britain is sacrificing her friend
ship with the United States in the Samoan
m at or In Ordp IN in we
in the settlement at Deagoa bay.
The scope of Great Britains military
preparations can scarcely be grasped by the
mere reading of individual items as they
appear from day TO day. A fair notion of
their immensely can be gained from the
semioflicial statement that for the transport
of the army corps about seventy ships, or
from two thousand to four thousand tons
burden, are required. not including a score
| or more of transports already on the way
| TO the Cape. II these vessels effectively
| disembark their cargoes Of men. horses and
| equipment within five weeks from their date
| of sailing, the programme will have full
| filed the forecasts of the most optimistio
| British military experts. II all the troops
| are able to take their places as component
| parts of the army corps by the end of No
vember they will have done. according TO
| the best available opinion, remarkably we'll.
The disembarking of General Skaters
army from its thirty-seven transports is not
| forgotten by British officers. Although the
vessels to be employed in the Cape service
| are Of considerably larger average tonnage
| than those which carried the Americans to
| Santiago de Cuba, the Admiralty. in ac-
| cordance with the existing regulations. is
| supplying them all and taking complete
| charge from waters edge to waters edge.
| This means tremendous outlay Of capital.
| Nor do the arrangements escape criticism.
| Letters begin to appear In the newspapers
! alleging favortism and declaring that some
| of the transports are ''rotten hulks." The
recent breakdown Of two vessels with troops
| on board IS cited as substantiating this
| charge, but there does not seem to be any
| serious ground for suppc9ing the Admiralty
| is aetuated by wrong motives.
TROOPS ON THE SCENE.
Although the impending army corps is a
| matter of eminent military interest. the
| troops already on the scene of probable
| action constitute no insignificant body. The
| original Cape garrison was 1900 men, and
this has been increased by 400. There are
| u 600 men at sea, on the way to the Cape
| and their arrival will make the approximate
! total of British troops in South Africa, prior
| to the arrival of the army corps. 25,0oc
| These troops do not include the irregular
| forces, the Cape Mounted Rifles, the Port
| Elizabeth and Grahamstown volunteers, the
| Natal police, the Durham Light Infantry,
| the Australian force and the regular navai
| brigade. The Cape squadron now includes
ten warships. all heavily manned, and the
| British first-class protected cruisers Terri
| BILE and Powerful will soon arrive, enabling
| the navy to land brigade of about 1000
men.
| Against this array are opposed the Trans.
| vaal and its ally, the Orange Free State
| with perhaps a sprinkling Of natives. This
| is about all that can be said regarding the
| Boer forces. They are virtually nonregu-
| lars, and attempts to estimate their fighting
| strength are hopeless, although various cal
| culations appear daily in the English news
papers, ranging from 2O,00O to 125,OOo, the
latter figure being obviously very extrava>
CANT.
volunteering under the Boer standard. espe-
cially Americans, will take in the expected
| conflict provokes much supposition and
| comment The correspondent of the St.
James Gazette at Pietermaritzburg says:
| american civil and mechanical engineers
! have been engaged by the Beers to disman>
| tie the Netherlands Railway in the event OF
| a Boer retrograde movement upon Pretoria.
| They will certainly not meet with too con-
| siderate treatment IL taken prisoners. Some,
| thing like a dozen OF these adventurous
| Yankees are professional railroad wreckers.
now living in comparative clover in Pre-
| toria."
! 1t is rumored at Portsmouth that the Ad-
miralty will organize a flying squadron for
the Cape.
| AN ACT OF WAR.
Many officers believe that President Kru-
| gers recent seizure Of gold is an act of war
| or is, at least, justifable only on the theory
| that state Of war exists The London
| manager of the Bank of the South African
Republic--the institution whose specie was
| commandered-takes this view He said to
| the representative of the Associated Press
| to-day: II do not consider the seizure of
great significance, and can scarcely blame
| President Kruger il he believes his country
| is threatened. do not expect any more
gold to come out of the Transvaal until the
crisis Is ended"
The government is much criticised by
| many Of the papers Of its own following, as
well as by the military authorities, for
| hardness in sending out the army corps
some going so far as to say that IL Majuba
| Hill repeats itself Lord Salisbury will have
only himself TO blame. The Admiralty is
| in for cbor ~