The daily morning journal and courier., 1899-12-09
A GERMAN VIEW OF ENGLAND'S
 BIG TASK

| A GERMAN VIEW OF ENGLAIND
 BIG TASK.
 A German officer, writing to the Lon
 don Times, says:
 Aided by a thorough personal knowl
 edge of the military conditions existen
 in England, and that to an extent per
 haps possessed by very few non-Britisl
 officers, notwithstanding the latter
 proneness to most exhaustive criticism
 l am naturally following your militar. 1 operations in the Transvaal with tn
 greatest interest. So much the more
 as circumstances have, during the pas
 few years, afforded me an accurate in
 sight into the affairs of South Africa | Several points occur to me from nnili. 1 tary side which I am persuaded are no ! sufficiently taken into account in Eng
 land.
 I take it as granted that you suffi ciently understand at home the immenst
 gravity of the war as regards the con
 tinuance of the British empire at Welt. reich, and that you are consequently l resolved on victory, cost what 1t may in time, life, or money sacrifice. Assum- ing the foregoing there can be no doubt that England, with it's exhaustless sources of power, will be able to achieve it's end, even should the whole of South ern Africa rise rebelliously against hei might. The other and the real ques- tion is however, whether England is not again, IS has so often previously occurred, undertaking her opponent and proceeding against the foe with too few forces, and this am convinced is the case in the present issue, notwithstand- ing the extent of the forces which at first sight seems to be in employment. One is apt to overlook that just as lit- tie as the conditions of the South Af- rica to to-day can be contrasted with those of a decade ago. Much less is the military power of the Boers in 1899, with their Mauser rifles, their quick firing guns, and strategical science compar- able with that displayed by them in 1881 and 1SS9 when those aids were wholly wanting.
 Again it appears that England is wholly deceived as regards the num- Der of efficient combatants at the dis posal of the Transvaal and Orange Free
 
 praise their number at 35, GOO to 40,000 men, when it actually amounts to at least 60,000. This body of armed effic- ent opponents you expect to defeat with a force of, all told, including the Cape and Natal Volunteers, say, at/the most favorable estimate, S0C00 men. I use the words most favorable with the full est possible consideration, as in the case of Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafe- king being taken before the British re- liefs can raise the sieges of those places the numbers quoted will be very ma terially diminished. From these SO,00O troops have to be deducted those reouir- ed for keeping open the requisite base lines as well as the forces necessary for. risings in the Cape Colony and in Natal and those needed for garrison duty in the chief centres. I am of opinion, one which is freely shared by my brother staff officers, that not less than 4O,O00 to 5O,00O will be absorbed by such considerations and necessities, leaving no more than 35,000 or 40,0O0 for active military operations. It has fur ther to be taken into account that the of the men are unused to the and that an unusual percent age of sickness may therefore be ex- pected; that the local geography is a sealed book to most. and that an us- lsual number of reserve men have been reworked into the military condition necessary for such a campaign.
 do not consider that our German view is unjustifed, viz: How can England expect to crush a force of at east 50000 Boers with an army comprs- ng at the outside 10000 men avai able or offence? Consider that these 50,OoO | 3oers are acclimatlzed, they know every vard of the country, and all it's capaci- | ies for traps for the brayest most | European troops. They | hoot admirably, they are manoeuvred l with astonishing strategical ability al- eady revealed in the trifing operations hitherto carried out; they can ignore questions of food and encampment to
 degree out of the question with Brit sh fed troops, and they are contending or their rotten oligarchy with the cour- ge of despair, which has, however. cen heightened by success of a certain ature up to the present. They have ound time during their advance south Q put their rear route in an able state defence; they have spies innumerable t their service in every quarter of the perations, and, moreover, are assisted y the code telegrams which foreign representatives and Powers are still al- ,wed to exchange, and which these Powers are persstentlv ahus- lg; they are in Possession of vast ac- of food, weapons, and am- lunition to an extent which still enable lem to prolong the war for an indef- ite period. Finally, Pretoria has been >rtlfied in such an able manner that n almost insignificant defensive force i'll be able to hold the place, while the ain army can be devoted to other lty, Taking all the foregoing into le account, the conclusion has to be | rived at that if England means to me out victorious she will have to be presented in South Africa by an inn ensely increased numerical force, at " rate one quite beyond the propor- ons of anything as yet conceived by e nublip