The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-07-09
and which Is so rare that Napoleon said that

W1pn tn6 IlIn6 cams lOT SIOHNcll W COHl-
mand forces OF all arms the combined au-
dacty and prudence OF his operations was no
less admirable. In the first place. he made
sure OF the weapon with which he was to fight.
study OF his quarrel with the Earl OF Man
chester leaves no doubt In our authors opinion
that he was the originator of the reorgani2a-
ton OF the Parliamentary army in the spring
Of 1915 His quarrel was not with Manchester
personally. but. as his letters. speeches and
acts prove. with the Parliamentary leaders, their
feebleness and delay. The war spirit In the
nation must be made use Of rstty local interests
aud personal jealousics must be thrown aside.
The separate armies OF individual Generals
or OF different associations must be arlalga-
mated into one united army OF the Parliament.
The war must be conducted, not In the interests
OF u few personages or OF n class. but for the
benefit OF all who supported the popular cause.
1t was for the interest OF all that the war should
be quickly finished. To that end 1t must be
prosecuted with vigor; we must. he said. cast
of all lingering proceedings. like those taken
by soldiers OF fortune beyond the sea to spin out
a war" In that sentence lay the difference be-
tween war as carried on by professional mer-
cenaries and as waged by nations under arms.
III.
The army OF the New Model became under
the Commonwealth the first national standing
army that England ever possessed. 1t was
Cromwels creation, called into existence by
his energy and perseverance. based and pat
termed upon the troops which he himself had
trained. Differing from the Continental armies
In its origin and organization. it was taught by
Cromwell to fight on new and more vigorous
method. Never forgetting the max i'm he had
propounded that all lingering proceedings
must be cast aside. he invariably struck fcrce-
ly and rapidly at foe. His was essentially an
offensive warfare. both in strategy and tao
tics. Never did he defend n Lacquer, still less
ever stand a siege. Never did he besiege a
fortress while there was an unbeaten enemy
in the field. or oil the great commanders Of
his day none understood so thoroughly as he
that the value OF a fortress depends on the sup
port 1t can give to an army in the field. II the
field army Is thoroughly routed the fate OF the
fortress is sealed. Even In his attacks ON
strong places the old rules were generally
flung aside. He seldom resorted to trench and
sap to galleries or mines. A battery OF heavy
guns. a sustained cannonade. and fierce as
sault on the breach. such was his usual method
OF dealing with fortress that refused his
summons.
Having acquired a properly organized and
we'll Disciplined army. Cromwell never hesi-
tated to use 1t with vgor and boldness BY
whomever the plan OF campaign of 1915 may
have been originally planned. 1t followed. after
the first blunders caused by parliamentary in
reference. the methods approved by Crom-
well. The blow first delivered at the King to-
ward tho north at Naseby. followed by the rapid
march south and the defeat OF Goring at Lang
port. is characteristic OF his strategy Oxford
and Bristol and other royalist fortresses lay
on either side Of that line of march. but they
were not permitted to cause days delay.
Not till both the Kings armies In the field had
been crushed was any notice taken Of the forth
fled towns. Then one after another they
fell rapidly before the strokes OF the
New Model army. At the same tmo Crom-
well. while conducting an energetic cam
paign. never lost his grasp on the gem
eral situation OF affairs. He knew when to
forbear as we'll as when to dare. He was no
reckless Hotspur driving headong against his
enemy wherever met II haste. indeed. was
Indispensable. he used It, When for instance.
in 1913. he advanced to meet Hamton's in
vadinR army, the fate Of the Parliament was
trem bling In the balance. Defeat. or even do
lay. meant the ruin OF the Independent party
Although opposed by odds Of two to one. Crom-
well. without moments hesitation. flung his
small force against his enemys flank and rear.
and compelled him to fight a decisive battle.
When. on the other hand. in 1851. Prince
Charles brought another Scottish army across
the border. Cromw ell knew that the danger was
comparatively small. Accordingly having
brought the Prince to bay by vigorous pursuit,
he deliberately waited till all avenues OF escape
were closed before advancing to the attack
Thus. too. in the Dunbar campaign. so long
as the veteran Gen. Leslie pupil Of Gustavus
Adolphus. refused him fair chance Of fighting
Cromwell restrained his impatience for battle.
The moment. however. that an opportunity
offered for closing with his enemy. no nsid-
GRAFTON Of inferior numbers checked the swift
ness and impact OF his blow
Like all great commanders. like Alexander
Caesar and Napoleon. Cromwell was we'll served
by his staff and his subordinate Generals,
simply because he knew how to select the best
men. Ireton. Jones. Lambert, Harrison and
Monk were all men Of flrst-rate military abil-
tiles. popularity in the conditions under
which the supreme command was held In the
Parliamentary armies has led some people to
believe that Cromwell owed his Successes more
to the advice OF his interiors than to his
own capacity. The COMMANDMENT Chief was
directed by the terms OF his commission to act
In accordance with the advice Of his council OF
war Experience has shown that the outcome OF
the elaboration Of a council composed Of many
individuals OF different temperaments and
views is so opposed to energetic action that the
passed into proyerb As a matter OF fact,
the operations OF Cromwel's army were Wig
press Of the working Of single H r ree ln
brain. Cromwell's influence over his Officers
Is known to have boon very great and the
truth is, probably. that he convoked council
merely for the purpose Of explaining line Of
action he had already determined upon In
the case Of Dunbar we know from contempo-
rary evidence that this was the case and that
Lsmbert was deputed to explain to his fellow
those who were at first inclined to advise t6e
esm aan Of the army which would have
1t is upon the creation and employment
OF the New Model army that Col, Badook
would rest the claim OF Cromwell to stand
among the greatest soldiers of all ages. When
the backward military organization OF Eng.
land at the outbreak Of the civil war is kept
years one man, himself an unframed civilian
at the outset, should have brought the national
forces to such a high degree of perfection No
doubt he had the assistance Of very able men,
Ply Gnt ne had also to contend with powerful and
due to soundncss OF Judgment and an iron
will that are scarcely rivalled. even among the
great names OF history Our author gives his
politicians may differ rs to tho political coniUct
OF tho Protector, soldiers can have nothing but
praise for the military engine which he
constructed. The army he created was far be-