The Saint Paul globe., 1899-04-03
LACKING In MORALE
A GERMAN OFFICER EXPLAINS THE
EASY DESTRUCTION OF GER
VERA's SQUADRON
ADMIRALs FATAL BLUNDER

The Only Chance for Escape Was u
sudden Dash Mt Night and Direct
Iy Thraugh the Blocxading Fleet
The Americans Were Confident
and Eager for Battle to End
Their Long vigil.
WASHINGTON, April 2.-The bureau of
naval intelligence of the navy depart
ment has issued the last of the series OF
sketches of the Spanish-American war by
Commander Jacobson, OF the. German
protected cruiser Geier. The article deals
with the condition of the Spanish ships
after the battle of Santiago. The most
Interesting observations to the layInan
are those upon the strategy, or lack OF
it. displayed by Cervera. The Spanish
admiral, having been ordered TO leave the
harbor. to remove the main object of the
attack upon Santiago. Commander ia
cobson says his position was most difficult
He did not dare make the attempt at
night, and so decided to go out in broad
daylight. The whole feet" he says,
''fell victim to this fatal decision. Ia
structions for the sortie and the west
ern course were issued. The admiral was
entirely convinced of the impossibility Of
defeating the enemy or of reaching an
other Cuban harbor. even If he should
succeed in steaming right through the
hostile feet 1t is to this feeling OF
helplessness and impotence, as agains
the American naval forces, more than
anything else that l attribute the defeat
The Spanish ships had spent month
and a half in the harbor without even aI-
q feet
when a favorable opportunity presented
itself. or even haraSsing it. The two
torpedo boat destroyers were not used
for the purpose for which they were In
tended. This inactivity and lack of initia-
tive must have had a very demoralizing
effect on the officers and men. If we add
to this the certain knowledge that the op-
posing forces were much stronger. 1t will
be readily understood that the idea OF
general flight, after coming out of the
harbor entrance. was the only acceptable
one, especially in view of the possibility
of beaching the ships. thereby render
Ing them unserviceable and eventually
rescuing the crews.
From the very moment that this feel
ing of impotence took possession of the
Spanish and led to the above reflections
their fate. physiologically speaking, was
sealed We do not mean to disparage
their valor and tenacity In the face of
hostile fire. but. on the other hand, 1t Is
quite natural that the admiral seeing
that everything was happening he had
foreseen, was the one who set the exam
pie of running his ship ashore All the
other commanders followed this example
CONSCIOUS OF POWER.
'On the American side the stua ton
was just the reverse. Admiral Sampsons 9
fleet was fully conscious of its power
The blockade was conducted in accord
ance with carefully prepared plans. as
were also the arrangements in case of the
enemy's attempt to escape. Frequent
engagements with the Spanish forts had
given commanders and crews that calm
assurance in the handling of their weap-
ons which guarantees success The long
blockade service, eXhausting and monoto-
nous. hardly Interrupted by any action on
the part of the Spanish, had strung the
nerves to the highest pitch. and every
body was anxious for the end to come
Suddenly the enemy attempted to es-
cape. ALI the passions and emotions
that had been smouldering under delay
broke forth. The welcome opportunity
for settling accounts with the enemy
had come at last. and with q wild rush
the American ships fell upon their vic
TINS. At the beginning the American
rre, owing to the excitement of the per-
sonnel and the great distances, was prob
ably not very effective; but when the
opditiSil duIllrai turned TO westward and
the other ships followed him the moral
superiority of the Americans reasserted
Itself The commanders, calm and cool
headed, had their ships follow the same
course, and the Americans, having every
advantage on their side, recommended
the fire on the fleeing ships. which soon
resulted in their total annihilation
There was only one chance for the
success OF the sortie. 1t should have
been made at night In scattered forma-
ton. After personal investigation of
the locality, 1T is my opinion that it Is
entirely practicable for a fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night. The wreck of
the Merrimac did not constitute an OBJ
struction. 1t is true that Admiral Samp-
sons report on the night blockade states
that the light ships were lying from
one to two miles from MORO castle. ac-
cording TO the state of the atmosphere,
and that they lighted up the channel for
half mile inside. Even the best search
light, however, does not reach farther
than one mile. Therefore the ilumina-
ton could not have been very effective
Moreover the shore batteries, by open-
ing fire upon the light ships could have
compelled them to change their positions.
but strange to say this was never done
The dark nights. at the time of the
new moon, about the middle OF June
would have been best suited for the en-
terprise. If the fleet did not ATTEMPT q
night sortie and was nevertheless COM
PEELED to leave the harbor in obedience to
orders then the ships should have been
headed straight at the enemy. All Weap-
ons,. including the torpedo and the ram.
should have been used. A bold attack
In close formation was the only chance
OF success against the superior hostile
lighting forces, who would hardly have
found time to form their lines
LESSON OF BATTLE.
The lessons Commander Jacobson de-
rives from the battle briefly stated are:
Abolition of all woodwork: no unpro-
tected torpedo tubes. protection for all
gun crews against-sheH fire; protection
of the fire eXtinguishing apparatus
against shell fire: smokeless powder:
greatest possible simplicity In the service
of the guns and the greatest possible
rapidity of fire; good speed of vessels
under normal conditions and thorough
training of the crews In all branches Of