The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1899-02-18

| lFhtlOn OF tflc WIT department curing IN
continuance OF the war with Spain tina
complete grasp OF the situation which wa
essential 10 the highest efficiency and dis
9P d f he ARMY ThG spIan OF IA
heads OF bureaus for not having acted will
foresight In preparing their various de
| pdrtments for active war before war wa
actually declared, because II has appeare'
that the national defense fund PROVIDE
by The act OF March o. 1888. was not mad
available for use, except for the navy an,
for coast defenses and the expenditures in
cideht thereto. until after the declaration
with reference 10 the adjutant general
department, the report says: There have
been very few complaints aga inst this de
partment. The records and testimon,
show that II has been prompt IN It's worl
and has added greatly TO the efficiency OF
the army.
The comml5s ion find that the inspector
generals department was not as efficient
az II ought TO have been. The organiza'
lion In the field was ample, and the in
spSctor5 made reports to the commanding
officers TO whom they had been assigned
Those reports were often not acted upon
and were not forwarded to the war de-
psrtnent.
Was Not Prepared for War.
1T Will be observed that the declaration
| OF war threw upon the quartermasters
department an amount of labor and re-
| sponsibility for which IL was neither
| Physlcally nor financially prepared. The
| department mas reported that on Apffl !,
| 1873, IL was amply provided with all neces-
sary clothing and equipage supplies for
lhree months for the army as then organ
ized. II appears that within few weeks
II became necessary TO provide for clothing
ana equipping an army OF more than $50, eco
m,en. so soon as funds were available, so
soon as war was inevita BILE. so soon as law
pefmltted the quartermaster's depart
ment undertook this enormous work. That
the quartermaster general threw the en-
ergy OF his department into his work when
FUNDS were available was evident, and that
nus ms oillcers labored faithfully in their eff
iorts 10 aid him. is plain to those who have
carefully studied their work.
some of the Complaints.
I'm spite OF every effort there were occa-
slonS where troops suffered from poor tent
age or lack or tentage and absence of straw
Tor bedding, where clothing was scarce
ana troops suffered discomfort for lack of
shoes, shirts and other articles of apparel.
AT Santiago the deficiency at the front APP
pears to have been caused rather from lack
OF transportation from the coast than from
lack OF clothing and tentage, Il supply OF
which was on the transports. Great-com-
plant was made of lack of transportation
Facilities at the camp at Montauk Point,
N. Y. Many complaints were made In ref
erence to unnecessary delays and lack of
promptness on the part of the quartermas-
ter's department In moving regiments and
in the care OF the sick and conVaescents
returning home either with their regiments
or alone, Great complaint was made of the
railroad congestion at Tampa and the alb
solute lack of ability to bring order out of
chaos at that place during the early part
Of the period of its occupancy by troops
The major general commanding has stated
that supplies for 10000 men for 80 days were
ordered there, and the confusion on the
railroad when he reached Tampa was very
great Loo cars being sidetracked, some OF
them as FAR back as Columbia, $. G.
LncIS of Executive Ability.
at Is stated that in the hurry and rush
attending the commencement of this work
the contents of cars were unknown at
Tampa; that bills of lading We're not for
warded, and that II seemed impossible for
time to determine where absolutely neces-
sary articles were located. Col. Bird, of the
quartcrmaSters department, testihes that
this was corrected later on, when the con-
tents of cars Were clearly marked upon
them and bills of lading promptly forward
ed The condition Of the railroad conges-
Tampa was occupied by troops seems un-
paralleled, showing an almost ineXcusable
lack of executive ability on the part of
those charged with the loading, unloading
and handling of the trains. Col. Bird and
Gen. Humphrey testify that there were
very poor facilities for transferring troops
and supplies arriving at Tampa via the
Florida Central railroad to the Plant sys-
tenn, leading direct to Port Tampa. Order
was finally brought out of chaos the cars
unloaded, the congestion overcome and a
vast amount of supplies of every character
delivered at this immense encampment.
water Transportation.
With reference to the vessels used to
transport troops to Cuba, the report says
eft was shown by evidence that their ca
pacity had been largely oyerrated and II
out great discomfort ana danger, more
than 5000 instead Of 10000, men, with their
equipments. artillery, ammunition, sub
slstence. medical supplies and 2,2gj animals
for voyage of 1000 miles.
THE quartermaster's department ought
to have been able TO more thoroughly
equip these vessels, and surely IL should
have been more certain of their carrying
capacity. sufficient number of vessels
for transporting. 25,Oo0 men, with the re-
quircd lighters for their Decentralization,
should have been promptly furnished, even
had such action rendered necessary the
seizure OF every steamer on the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts sailing under the American
flag.
Land transportation.
lowing to the lack of necessary trans
ports the means of land transportation dur
ing the Santiago campaign was painfully
deficient. The testlmaay shows that the
transports arrived off the south coast of
Cuba near Santiago on June 81; that the
pack trains were landed on June %: that
the first wagons were landed on June 25,
and that the landing of the latter was con-
tinucd more rapidly than they could be
set up on shore, and that In fact some
of those that were landed were never set
up at all. Gen. Chaffee testifes that on
July |. at the battle OF FL Cancy. ten days
after the arrival Of the fleet there were
no ambulances or wagons available and
that the roads were so horrible that they
could not reach the front.
ct Is plainly evident that this army of
1900 men disembarked in the face of an
enemy In n hostile country, and rapidly
thrown forward against a well-armed
force, was painfully deficient In land trans
portation. but in spite OF the absence OF this
almost absolutely necessary portion OF the
equipment of a well-trained command 1t
drove the enemy before It, captured their
outposts, pushed them behind their main
defenses, drove their feet from Santiago
bay to absolute destruction a II faced the
navy of our country, and finally. after most
gallant fighting under a tropical sun,
amidst most adverse conditions, captured
n strongly fortified city and received as
prisoners of war over $4,000 Spanish SOL
diers.
Subsistence.
or the department under charge OF Gen.
says: "The commission has carefully in
vestlgated the subject OF the condition,
quality and quantity of the food supplied
to the army. Almost without exception IL
has been shown by the testimony taken
that wherever the troops were ordered,
whether to the various camps In the United
States or in Porto Rico, Cuba and Manila,
the rations prescribed by law were on the
transports and at the camps with the sol
dlerS. So far as we have been able TO as
certain there was but one occasion. that of
a day, in front of Santiago when the troops
were seriously short OF rations; these had
been supplied. but thrown aside when the
men went into action: the condition OF
ed prompt reissue. At times the vegetable
ration was rot of good quality, the pota-
toes aud onions being spoiled. Condemned
nv "A Df vegetables