The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1899-08-25

Rlancoss Chief Of "a Claims That
with Different Tactics. SPAIN Wouid
Have Dictated Peace Terms

the Spanish cortss defending his course
i Cuba and cr5ticising the government
and General Blanco Is a fine example OF
the unconquerable self-pr.de OF the
Spanish soldier in face OF defeat. A.
a personal vindicatson It Is buttressed
with facts. which sunqueStionably put
upon the Spanish home government
the grave responsibility for many dis
Iinct errors IN the war With h United
States. General Pando insists, with a
clear note Of defiance, that Spain ought
10 have fought longer. and that h had
a reasonable hope Of victory even at the
the moment when she lowered her flag
in surrender.
SPANS PERSISTENT SUSPICION.
Aside from its personal features. how
ever. the speech VIII be OF the geartes.
interest 10 Americans from the light
which it throws upon the late war, and
the revelation in regard TO SPANS per
sistent suspicion, through the past
twenty years, OF the good faith or the
United States and the apprehension or
ultimate war with this country. Gen
eral Pando says, in plain words. that,
as a commanding officer in the Spanish
army, he had mad a profound study
of the military power OF The United
States for twenty years, and 10 do this
had maintained a system OF espionage
and inquiry through competent per-
sons-in other words. ~spies-among
them being naval engineer officers paid
by the Spanish government and several
agents whom General Pando n him.
self maintained in this country at his
own expense.
The fear Of intervention during the
Ten Years war must be accepted as the
original cause for this systematic ef-
fort on the part Of Spain TO know pre-
cisely what the military and ava ca
pacity of the United states might be.
The fact Of this knowledge by Spain or
every change and movement in our mill
itary affairs Is of historic value, in ex-
PLANTATION of the defiant and raDacious
policy of Spain toward Cuba in the last
quarter Of a century. General Pando
says: Il proved that the United States
did not lave an army and never would
have an army without a radical change
in their organic life"
INCOMPETENT SPANISH OFF,
GALS.
In placing the blame for the disas-
trous outcome in Cuba upon the Span
ish cabinet, General Pando might al
most be speaking in criticism OF the
relations that existed throughout the
war between Secretary Alger and Cen
eral Miles, and eve Of the strained sit
uation which is now believed to exist
with regard to General Otis policy in
the Philippines. He says that 1.-The re-
sponsibility for he defeat OF Spain lies
not only with Spanish generals, but
with the Spanish government" He
points out the difficulty there is in the
management of a military campaign
where the chief of the army, the abso-
lutte and effective chief, is the secretary
Of war.
Mistakes must arise. diSagreements
are inevitably engendered." he says,
between the secretary of war and the
commander-in-chief." The man in the
bureau at home cannot see the situation
with the same eyes that the officer in
the field views the exigencies of the
campaign. The Spanish general declares
that he and his feilow-officers begged
for lone month more OF war;" and af-
firms that if they could have had their
request, or If their prayer had been am
swered by the home government, Spain
could ave dictated terms OF peace to
the United States.
General Pando closes as follows:
Truly, it is horrible that there
should have been such a dire misunder-
standing, but it is now a matter OF the
past. Referring once more to Santiago
De Cuba, / will state that at the time
hostilities ceased we had in the island
200, 900 men, provided with ammunition,
provisions and other necessaries OF
war, with every promise Of a victorious
campaign before us. General Blanco
has deeply regretted that the war war
not continued for a longer period. If
it a been, we would not have been
in our present sorrowful plight.
Before the signing of the protocol, I
signifed to the government that the
war could and ought to have con-
tinued; that we had sufficient means
and security to warrant success, and
that, too, after the loss Of Santiago de
Cuba The government would not ac-
cede to my earnest solicitation and
would not believe the indications op-
perfume. It would only rely Upon in
formation received through the medi-
UNI Of some person attached to the con-
sular corps, ven refusing to give Gre
dence to Information furnished by con-
suls Of the highest authority. or even
from persons of the diplomatic corps,
and above all it acted contrary to the
advice of those who had charge Of the
army OF Cuba n were familiar with
the scene OF action.
THE signing of the protocol was not
entirely applicable 10 me at the time,
and / deeply commiserated its occur
renee. / had a premonition OF It. be-
aus I had CLEANED enough out OF the
foreign press TO realize there was
something of that sort in the air. But
- an - a. A. "odld JIG 1OIlSII uCl-
ed on such a basis, with such unhappy
consequences to US.
Before the suspension OF hostilities
I notified the government, asking for
one month more OF war, and we could
impose a peace which would be favor
able to our country. / had an absolute
certainty Of 1t, and / declared IL under
my signature, but the government be-
lieved that it was necessitated to act in
a different way. And to be more concise
in coming TO this point, ] will say that
l came all the way from Havana to
Madrid to notify the government, ac-
quaint them with my scheme, and dis
| close TO them the important system
Of espionage I had established between
US and h enemy, ramifying through
out all the principal towns OF North
America. With all these elements
working in our favor, and the favoring
climatic conditions for US. / urged upon
government the certainty of vic
tory, but from crown to congress I
encountered opposition to my views,
and all seemed imbued with the i'm
preston that the only way OF obtain
ing peace was by the surrender ~