The evening times., 1899-11-01
WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER /. 1899
The Tragedy of Lndysmith.


in the present state of knowledge con-
cerning the disaster at Ladysmth and the
present desperate situation of the British
garrison, every lover of fair play and JUS
tice should protest against tendency
which seems TO mark professional criti-
cisms in London. to make a scapeSoat of
Sir George Stewart White. He may BE-. in
deed. blamable for sending the fated i'usil-
iers. Gloucesters, and the mountain battery
into a Boer trap. The full history OF the
affair may prove that he committed a
fTightful blunder in so doing. But, on the
other hand it is by no means certain that
his action was net dictated by what ap-
peared 10 be an obvious necessity. To say
the least. his chivalric acceptance of the
whole blame entities him to immunity from
personal attack until he can fully review
and explain his tactical reasons Tor acting
as he did.
Whatever view may be taken of the in
cident. ii must be recognized that the gem
sral responsibility for the impossible Brit
ish campaign on the Natal frontier rests
with the government. Political considera-
tions Influenced the establishment OF a
veal; liEe of defence forty miles long and
extending all the way from Ladysmith to
Dundee. the latter point being defsn ed by
a ridicUlGusly small force OF o3c n.en 10
'-pTCtect" the neighboring ccal fields. We
need net stop to consider the results OF
that folly. since the two fights at Dun ee
followed by General Yule's cleve- retreat,
have fully informed us on the point. 1t
all comes back TO this-that the a-tloli-
ties in London are soaked in bl0otg til
ness for not being prepared for struggle
which they and the whole world knew 10
be inevitable and imminent.
We read the expert criticisms of military
men in London with much interest ana
some astonishment. Naturally they differ
broadly as 10 causes. effects, and possibili-
ties This is matter of course since none
of their opinions appear to be based upon
sound knowledge of the vital conditions TO
which the British general has been or is
exposed. All of them, as far as we can
see ignore a factor which to our mind is
dominating one in the situation: and that
is the peculiar difficulty of defending Lady
smith with force materially inferior to
that of the enemy. The rule which as
sumes an advantage to troops operating on
interior lines and behind entrenchmsnts, is
but slightly, and We think not at all, appli-
cable 10 the case of Ladysmith That place
itself is not to be regarded as defensible
by such a body as Sir George White com
mands, without heavy guns. and outnum-
bered two TO one at least The topography
of the position and its surroundings would
seem 10 negative any such idea. Ladysmith
occupies a fiat on the Kip River 1t is
surrounded by broken country. Detached
Kopjes flank it, and these in the circum-
stances. represent the means of defence. Ii
is also dominated by ridges from which the
town is at the mercy of guns Of long range.
Under such conditions it must be apparent
that the British commander cannot retire
within Notifications and merely depend Oh
his ability to repulse direct assaults. He
has no Notifications. II he had, he is with
out guns capable of reaching the positions
from which he would be bombarded His
tactics are rendered mandatory by his stu
alton; he cannot choose alternatives; he is
confined to one simple, desperate. and, we
fear, hopeless line of action. He must keep
his whole command ceaselessly under arms
mobile and alert. He must divide it be-
tween the covering points, and concentrate
in directions of attack We believe tina,
these tactics, which seem 10 be Sir George
Whites sole dependence, will fail, should
he elect or be compelled to fight it out. /
refusing or being unable to retreat. |
We have seen enough of Joubert's |
strategy and tactics to be convinced that il |
would not be many days before a part or |
the whole Of Whites command would be |
cut of from the Ladysmith camp, and |
forced TO suffer annihilaton or capture. All |
the supplies are at Ladysmith. The enemy
has an army large enough, with adequate
artillery, to strike White on front. fiauks |
and rear simultaneously; at each point in
numbers sufficient to compel the engage
ment OF his whole force. He would not be
able to hold out long against such condi-
tions. In the course of a week or SO, ii
no actual disaster befell in the meantime,
his command would be worn out and de-
moralized by sheer fatigue.
Still. such is the pluck, morale. and de-
votion of the British army, we must admit
a possibility that, favored by the acci-
dents OF war, Sir George White might fight
the Beers OF until the arrival of help, or
until diversion in some other direction