The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1899-02-26

Theirs not to make reply;
Theirs not TO reason Why!n
Another difficulty was the want of tx
perlence among volunteer officers as to
when and how to make reouisitions for
articles needed and get them fHed. The
rapid mobilization of the army made il
uIIncult 10 supply what was needed and
caused scramble, in which the least ex-
perienced Jared worst There is a story
toid OF claim for salvage made by a fire
tug Tor saving government vessel from
imminent destruction. The claim was Tot
allowed because the commander of the YES
sci did not advertise for bids for sixty
DAYS before accepting assistance. OF
course, thls is a fable but it illustrates
the position of the department officers If
they take responsibilities which
oy the letter of the law, would react upon
themselves, and explains many cases of
apparent neglect or ineffcieney. Some Of
ncers recognized emergencies and met
lamentable.
In the school Of the soldier, in the drill
regulations, it says. "In the battle exer-
clses or whenever circumstances require
IL IS laid down as a principle that the eff
lective use of the weapon is not to be i'm
peded by the formalites of drill" Why
not extend the same rule to the paper
work Of the army? When mems lives are
the counters and the nations honor the
stake, 1t would be a great gain if the fet-
tiers Of official routine, forged during
long peace, could be loosened
All these causes contributed to sickness.
Line officers should have enforced sani-
tary laws as vigilantly as the medical Of
fcers, to whose province they specially be-
longed. If the two had worked harmoni-
ously together the results might have been
different. Instead, there was universal,
incessant friction, due largely TO the claim
that medical officers were independent of
all except their superiors in the medical
department. Regiments are provided by
law with surgeons and they are supposed
to be best able to treat their men. These
surgeons were often taken away against
the wishes and in a few cases without the
knowledge of the regimental commander.
Regimental hospitals were allowed to re-
tain only a limited number of patients.
All the sick went TO the division hospitals
where the methods of caring for the sick
were utterly distasteful to the volunteer.
The theory of division hospitals is that OF
city hospitals, viz: that concentration will
produce better results. But without train
ed attendants the result to the volunteer
was that he was taken away from his
comrades who might be unskillful, but
were his friends to be tended by strang-
ers. who were equally unskillful. Human
nature Is the same the world over and our
sick boys felt as did
"a soldier of the Legion dying in Alglers
There was lack of woman's nursing,
There was dearth of woman's tears;
But a comrade stood beside him
While his life blood ebbed away
And bent with plying glances
To hear what he might say
The question naturally arises, why this
| comparison between regulars and Voluh-
teers? None such existed in the civil war
In the civil war there were so few reg
ulars that no comparison could De tnaoe .
| Nearly all the regular oIncers
we're In command of volunteers and IN
some measure leavened the mass
In the. civil war there was constant
movement and fighting and men had no
! time to think about discomforts or trlals
In the winter camps and campaigns there
was sickness and suffering, but there were
| fewer newspaper correspondents ana what
they wrote about fighting was more inter-
! esting to the public than details OF olse0lse'
In the Philippines our regulars ana our
volunteers have been in the same COM
mands, and, no doubt, under the same
| discipline. The presence of danger mas
minimized sickness and complaints. In
| the recent fights both have well performed
their part.
If our volunteers at home had been in
| active warfare, the sharing OF tons ana
nerfls would have welded officers and men
| together and taught the necessity OF as
cfpline 60 preserve health and insure ef-
| foiencv. An officer who had led men in
| hattie need have no fear thereafter OF Ia
miiiarity or impotence from his followers
In many ways our late experiences re-
semble those of the English in the Cr1-
| mean war. Russell's letters to the bonN
| don Times tell the same story or suHer-
| ings in camp in trenches, in hospitals;
of money poured out like water without
! bringing relief; Of unlimited supplies
which failed to reach their destination; OF
! battles won by sheer bulldog lighting.
Such things will happen when nations
| go to war unprepareu. The British TOOK
| the lesson to heart, and in the half CEN
fury that mas elapsed such things have
not occurred again.
We must do likewise We must alter
some methods in the regulars and greatly
improve the Uoethods of the volunteers.
| We cannot be TOO enthusiastic in praise
% the training in navy and army which
| made such marksmen of our gunners and
| our rifemen and moulded men into ma
| chimes without destroying their individual
| intelligence or aggressiveness. The fight
| ing line is all right and its officers and men
| are the peers of any In the world, but
many years of fighting Indians or dwell
| ing in frontier garrisons has not broad
cred nor given experience of the world
outside of the army. If a comprehensive
attempt is made to formulate basis for
an army in the future, it is certain that
a commission to reform the volunteers
| should include in it some regular officers;
possibly it would be an advantage, if a
! commission to reform the regulars should
not be composed entirely of regulars.
While we are striving to better both or
! ganizatiops we must bear in mind what
| our position in the world is to-day and
from it estimate our needs in the future.
distance must be measured by days and
hours and not my miles. The United States
|
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