Arizona republican. [volume] (Phoenix, Ariz.) 1890-1930, 1899-08-14
PHOENIX, AUGUST IA. 1899.
RECALLED HISTORY.

The Washington Post is combating
the often assumed theory that sold
iers in the field are TIE most accurate
judges of the competency of the com
manders under whom they serve. In
order to enforce its position, it brings
to recollection an interesting feature of
the late civil war. Those who were
living then viii rem ember that for
nearly year the country had the be-
lief that in the obtaining of George b.
Mcclellan to command the Army of
the Potomac almost a heaven-sent gen
eral had been found The soldiers in
that army fully shared this opinion.
The state of affairs is graphically pre-
scented in this description, which we
take from the Post:
George B. Mcclellan was The most
competent general, judged by the opin-
ions of the men under him, who had
any important command On the Union
side during our great war. Not only
the commissioned officers. but the en-
listed men, with few exceptions, be
]ieved him to be invincible, in spite Of
repeated and most disastrous failures.
They believed in him long after his
final renewal from command, but we
look in vain new in any direction for
evidence of the survival of that faith.
Impartial history viii credit him with
great skill in engineering and with ca
pacity to handle small force effec-
lively in action, but will not represent
him as a CAPABLE commander of an
army Leaving cut 'cf account the
unfortunate psnisuiar campaign, and
combining judgment TO the campaign
that eliminated at Antiatam, the hon
est historians will find McClellan's
army moving at the average rate of
six miles day over good roads
while 1900 Union troops were psnned
UP al Harper's Ferry and il, }allaI 10
surrender. When, On the afternoon CT
Sept. Is, McCleIan's army, minus
10000 stragglers - overcome by the
strain of siX-mile-a-day march
was getting into position f5r the battle
of the next day. it's spirits were en-
Unused by the sight of the $4,000 men
from Harper's Ferry, disarmed, pa
relied and going home to wait until ex-
changed. AS to the battle of Sept. II,
it was, like the whole of Gaul. "divi- |
ed into three parts ST poker on the
right, fighting his battle in the morn
ing, Sumner in the center, occupying
the middle Ci7 the C,2y Both of those |
engagements were successful in -epel- /
ling the enemy. In the aftern son
Burnside held his fight on the Union |
left. and It was far less successful. |
The COnfederates used against Burn
size many of the organizations that |
Sumner and Hooker h.sd repulsed. But |
neither Sumner nor Hooker was |
drawn upon for the support CT Burn /
rid -
splendid reserve, consisting mostly of /
regulars. AS a fitting finale to the |
series of iblundeTs, the Confederate |
army crossed the river undisturbeC, |
wlifl5 CIR great amy. rested. Even |
after all that, McClellan's men adOred |
him and believed him a second Ma
poleon.
We believe the case is not overstated
in the above. There may be added to
it that Gen. Grant, the really great
commander CT the armies, never awak-
ened anything like the enthusiasm in
his troops that did McClellen. Grant
went at his work in a business spirit,
while McC.ellen, in the lcng time ne
was waiting at Washington, gave the
soldiers plenty of the pomp and cir
cumstaree of war. They came TO be
lieve in Grant in the end because he
lo3 them TO Appomattox, but they bore
defeat under McClallen with far more
patience than they met repulses I'M
der Grant. They had, indeed, unshak-
en- admiration CT the former down to
the time of his removal from this com
mand. and it needed the retrospect of
history to dispiacc this from the minds
Of a good many people who made I'D
the public Of the nation
COST OF AN HONEST BALLOT.