Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1899-05-16
HEADED FOR SANTIAGO.
Continued from PAGE 3.

captured the Key to the land defenses
of the harbor. But the ground in rear
was impossible for an attack.
Ell Caney had been thoroughly recon.
noitered as early as June ~ three days
after Las Guasimas, and three days be-
fore the attack upon it. All the partic-
ulars as to approaches and defenses
were known at headquarters.
There was difference Of opinion
around headquarters as to the impor.
lance of Ell Caney. General Shafter
said, 1--WE did not wish to leave it as
shelter for strong Spanish outpost on
the right flank of our line," when IL
should move forward against the high
ground east and northeast Of Santiago.
General Lawton's division was to con-
stitute the right wing of the assaulting
force, and learned from his headquar
tiers that Lawton was unwilling to hurl
his division against the height assigned
him for capture, leaving the Spanish in
possession of Ell Caney close In his rear.
it should be said, however, that Gen.
,ral Lawton believed he could take El
Caney in half an hour, and other gen.
erals, more especially Wheeler and
Young, who had looked the ground
over, said about the same thing. These
opinions were based upon information
gained before Ell Caney had been re.en.
forced and strengthened. When Lawton
came to attack, it was another matter.
Wheeler says that he asked Shafter to
let the cavalry division take Ell Caney,
but Shafter said the task had already
been given to Lawton, and he could not
change IL.
On the 2Sth and Goth Of June the
whole corps moved forward from the
Savilla camp toward Santiago, bringing
up between La Redonda and Ell Poso.
Ell Poso is narrow defile between
mountains. Before descending into the
defile, the troops obtained from the tops
Of the mountains on either side Of the
road glimpses Of Santiago and Ell Caney
with their defenses and Of the noun
tains and valleys intervening.
On the 30th General Shafter gave out
his order of battle, which was to carry
the San Juan and FL Caney road
heights, in order to bring Santiago city
under his guns. From the highest to
the lowest the soldiers said that the
preparations for this attack were far
from what they had expected, from
what they should have been, in order to
insure success and what they might
have been after few days delay build
ing wharfs and roads and putting on
wagon trains. General Shafter says
frankly that the preparations were not
what he desired them to be, but the
army, composed wholly Of northern
men, was in hot and sickly climate,
the rainy season was coming on, when
the already bad roads would be made
worse, tropical storm due at that time
might drive the navy as we'll as the sup
ply ships far out to sea, and it was ex-
pected that General Pando, with 5000
Spanish troops, would join the garrison
in the city. Under these conditions
Shafter decided to force the battle at
once.
From that time ON until the begin
ming of the parley over surrender, tho
elements active or threatening, the i'm
of the troops, especially when
they came within sight or range Of the
Spaniards, as we'll az the restless and
energy Of "Pecos Bill" Shat
ter, combined to rush the army forward
at pace only compared to that of a
hurricane.
All this time and afterward until the
American flag floated over Santiago the
spirit Of the soldiers was: "Let us 60 at
them Let us go at them" This is not
to say that there was indecent haste,
that the men were ready to rush head
long into disaster. The result shows
that men Of all ranks were prepared to
go at the task in the deliberate manner
set down for them in their instructions
They never for moment forgot these
instructions, line upon line and precept
upon precept, and it was their GOODNESS
and self control which saved the army
from horrible disaster and gave tia vic.
tory when the turn of hand might
have precipitated defeat.
The Spaniards said that the Ameri.
cans violated the rules Of warfare by
not retreating after receiving volley
from the enemy. This method Of fight.
ing is not set down in the American
tactics. BY going ahead in spite of and
in face of repeated volleys the we'll
trained regulars took the Spaniards by
surprise, quite as much as tho smoke
less powder and deadly accuracy Of the
Mauser amazed the Americans.
Lawton had about 8, 900 men for the
attack on Ell Caney and the FL Caney
heights before Santiago. The infantry
division Of Kent numbered about 4, 500
men and Wheeler's dismounted cavalry
about $500, making 1000 for the at
tack on San Juan heights. Both columns
were ordered to take their places on the
night Of the 30th for forward move
ment. Chaffee's brigade, 1900 strong,