The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1899-09-27
As to General Otis.

The charges and complaints against
Otis, in which there appears to be no
abatement, may be 30 far sustained by
the facts of his administration as to de-
mand his suppression by more eff
cient military commander and wiser
administrator. Apparently the public
is not in possession of the inner facts
that would enable them to settle this
question on its merits. Clamor that
turns out to be unreasonable is often
raised against commander. If Presi-
dent Lincoln had yielded to the min
gled tide of vehement denunciation
and outrageous charges which at one
time assailed General Grant, the Union
armies might have lost the great COM
mander who led them to the final con-
quest of the rebellion. But this proves
nothing in the case of General Otis.
1t is certainly of supreme Importance
that soldier OF the highest compe.
tency for successful command shall
be at the head of the new army that is
rendezvousing at Manila. 1t would be
crime to place the splendid forces
mastering for the restoration of order
in the Philippines under an officer
whose ability there is reason to doubt,
or who is manifestly incompetent to
subdue the instruction. If there is
doubt as to General OTIS efficiency, or
if he has been at fault in directing mill
tary operations, or in the administra-
ton Of civil affairs, the government
ought to know this and to act accord
ingly. Many men and newspapers are
swift to accuse and condemn the gen.
eral, but here is what high official of
the war department is reported as say
ing:
The statement was made that when Sec
rotary Root entered upon his Office as exec
utive head of the war department he
shared the opinion that had been expressed
by some newspapers and individuals to the
effect that Ger eral Otis was hardly the Of
ficer for the place he occupied, and that the
new secretary believed a change would
probably soon have to be made in the chief
command OF the American troops in the
Philippines. Secretary Root set to work
independently to read all the reports sent
to the war department by General Otis,
and he soon came to the conclusion that
Otis had a strong and intelligent grasp on
the situation and that he had done the very
best that could be done under the circum-
stances. He believed then that it was
largely due to the direct efforts OF General
Otis, exerted with the greatest prudence
and tact, that the American army was not
| reduced at one time last summer to about
4 200 men-a force 80 small that the Ameri.
can position before the insurgents In vari-
GUS parts Of the island OF Luzon would
have become threatening or worse. The
secretary appreciated the fact that General
Otis accomplished this by persuading the
volunteer regiments to remain contentedly
in the service until regular and other
troops from the United States could be
started to take their places. Roots con-
viction regarding Otis's permanent fitness
for his position was further strengthened
by confidential reports received from Gen.
erals Schwan and Young, who had care
fully studied the situation at first hand.
The official said that the Administration
had the greatest confidence for the future,
that it was the belief of the President and
the secretary of war that single battle with
any considerable force OF the insurgents in
favorable situation would bring the re-
bellion to close almost as promptly as 1t
broke out. The great decisive blow would
probably not be struck until all the troops
destined for the Philippines should reach
the islands. AS soon as the winter cam
paign opens the fighting will be carried on
| along different lines. Under this policy,
heretofore untried in the Philippines cam
paign, the insurgent movement would be
brought to such close as would be salts
factory to the great majority OF the Amer
lean people.
An English WOman's View.