The star. (Reynoldsville, Pa.) 1892-1946, 1899-03-01
SAMPSON Congratulated SCHlEY|
FOR LOCATING THE FOE.
The Hero Of Santiago Cannot Understand Why
the Commander In Chief Should Now
Criticse His Conduct.

Admiral w. s. schley, who until this
time has remained quiet as to the part
he took In the battle OFF Santiago last
July, Is now compelled TO come to his
own defence. The charge of dis
obedience to orders has elicited from
him the following statement
The admiral says his orders from
Sampson May 10, were to blockade
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do
At 3:40 o'clock, May "a. for the first
time, he learned definitely that the
spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.
Within two hours he started for Santi-
ago.
What possible gr lund of crit sm.'
he says. adverse 10 me there can be
In all this / do not see. / was on the
spot acting under orders which gave
me entire discretion, and yet clothed
me with the responsibility of going to
Santiago only after was satisfied
that the fleet was not at Cienfuegos.'
Hequotes from the edispatch of Samp-
son of May 20, in which the latter says
Schley should "hold his fleet of Glen
fuegos. l am of the opinion that the
best chance TO capture the Spanish
ships will be to hold Cienfuegos and
Havana with the force we can mus
ter. Until we, then, receive more
positive Information we shall continue
to hold Havana and Cienfuegos."
AS to the slow progress toward San
tiago on account of the Eagle, he
states that she was part of the force
which Admiral Sampson had seen ft
TO send him, and he had no right to
abandon her.
Speaking of "the retrogade move
| ments," which the secretry adopting
the language of Admiral Sampson,
characterizes as ''reprehensible con-
duct, Admiral Schley says that in AZ
a nf otta a ~
guage used TO characterize conduct of
mine, and see no reason for 1t now.
| lie s9ys he was told by scouts COM
manded by such officers as Sigsbee,
jewell and Wise that, although they
had been off Santiago for week.
they had seen nothing of the fleet, and
knew nothing of its movements or its
whereabouts since II had left Curacao;
| after having been assured by Sigsbee
that he did not believe IL was In San
tiago, and by the emphatic declaration
| or the pilot, Nunez and knowing that
| as the sea and weather then were 1t
would be impossible to coal my squad
| ron of the port, l deemed 1t best to
take the action 1 did. the final result
| OF which was the location of the enc
my's fleet in Santiago harbor."
AS to the battle of Santiago, the ad-
miral says the facts of that contest
| speak for themselves. He asks the
committee to contrast his reports and
those OF Sampson containing refer
ences to himself and adds that
sampson has never, to this day, In
| any manner or to any extent, intim-
ated to me any disapprobation, or
made to me any criticism of my con-
duct of the flying squadron
Detailing the events connected with
the battle of July 3. he says that at
S.45 a. m. of that day Admiral Samp-
son made signal from his flagship:
| Disregard movements of the COM
mander-in- chief" and he steamed
eastward to Siboney.
This" says Admiral Schley, left
me the senior officer present, and nee
essarily clothed me with the respon-
sibility of the command" Continuing,
he declared that when the enemy's
vessels came out of the harbor signal
hagship) to the fleet to clear ship for
| action" Then followed the signal
close action" and this by the signal
the enemy escaping to westward"
| In conclusion Admiral Schley con-
tends the turn of the Brooklyn In the
battle of the Sd was ''the crucial and
| deciding feature of the combat and a
decided advantage" He cites the fact
that the charts of the board of navi-
| gators shows that the Brooklyn was
nearest when 1t emerged from the har-
Dor, nearest at every stage of the bat
tie, and nearest the Colon when It sur
| rendered. and gives many confirma-
| tory details of his fiagships active
and effective participation In the bat
tie. His last paragraph reads:
ION May 81 I received telegram
from the commandcr-in-c chief congra-
tulating me upon my success in locat-
| ing and blockading the enemy's fleet
at Santiago. If II was worthy of COM
mendation at that time, am at a loss
to understand how 1t could have
grown into reprehensible conduct, as
suggested by Admiral Sampson in his
letter of July 10, 1898, some six weeks
later"