Brookings weekly register. (Brookings, Brookings County, S.D.) 1898-1903, 1899-01-26


While the army was strung along the
Santiago road between Daiquiri and
Savilla. the region westward toward
Santiago was reconDoitered. just how
complete these reconpoisances were is a
mystery. asked the staff officers and
division generals whether it was known
beforehand that the approaches to San
Juan heights were exposed to Spanish
view and fire from their works on the
crest, particularly the road and trail at
the crossing of the San Juan river and
its tributaries. could learn nothing.
The answers were, ~ suppose that this
was known at army headquarters. "
The fact remains that on July before
the battle opened the troops found them-
selves blocked in the road and in the
beds of the streams after daylight with
in view of the Spaniards and within
range of their small arms.
1t was stated that a certain general,
who refused to commit himself on any
points likely to lead TO controversy. ex-
amined the region thoroughly and rec
ommended that trails be cut parallel to
the main road and ON both sides Of it.
General Chaffee said that the region
far south Of the road to Santiago was
examined with view to making an at
tack upon the Punta Gorda battery.
The Punta Gorda battery was the first
objective thought Of after the army set
its face toward Santiago from the east.
This was the strongest battery on the
bay and by taking it Shafter's army
would have turned Morro, and, in fact,
captured the key TO the land defenses
of the harbor. But the ground in rear
was impossible for an attack.
El Caney had been thoroughly recon-
noitered as early as June az three days
after Las Guasimas. and three days be-
fore the attack upon ID. All the partic-
.ulars as to approaches and defenses
were known at headquarters.
There was difference of opinion
around headquarters as to the impor.
tanoe Of FL Caney. General Shafter
said, I'VE did not wish to leave il as a
shelter for strong Spanish outpost on
the right flank of onr iine." when il
should move forward against the high
ground east and northeast of Santiago
General Lawton's division was to con-
stitnte the right wing OF the assaulting
force, and learned from his beadquar
ters that Lawton was unwilling to hurl
his division against the height assigned
him for capture. leaving the Spanish in
possession of Ell Caney close in his rear
1t should be said, however, that Gen.
sral Lawton believed he could take El
Caney in half an hour, and other gen
erals, more especially Wheeler and
Young, who had looked the ground
over, said about the same thing. These
opinions were based upon information
gained before El Caney had been re-en
forced and strengthened. When Lawton
came TO attack, il was another matter
Wheeler says that he asked Shafter to
let the cavalry division take Ell Caney,
but Shafter said the task had already
been given to Lawton. and he could not
change it.
On the 2Sth and 29th Of June the
whole corps moved forward from the
Savilia camp toward Santiago, bringing
up between La Redonda and Eel Poso
Ell Poso is narrow defile between
mountains. Before descending into the
defile, the troops obtained from the tops
Of the mountains on either si;.s of the
road g]impses OF Santiago and FL Caney
with their defenses and of the noun
tains and valleys intervening.
On the 30th General Shafter gave out
his order of battle, which was to carry
the San Juan and El Caney road
heights, in order to bring Santiago city
under his guns. From the highest to
the lowest the soldiers said that the
prer.-ations for this attack were far
from what they had expected, from
what they should have been, in order to
insure success and what they might
have been after few days delay build.
ing wharfs and roads and putting on
wagon trains. General Shafter says
frankly that tho preparations were not
what he desired them to be, but tho
army, composed wholly of northern
meE, was in a hot and sickly climate,
the rainy season was coming on, when
the already bad roads would be made
worse, tropical storm due at that time
might drive the navy as we'll as the sup.
ply ships far out 10 sea, and it was ex-
pected that General Pando, with s, 900
Spanish troops, would join the garrison
i'm the city. Under these conditions
Shafter decided TO force the battle at
once.
From that time on until the begin
ming Of the parley over surrender, the
elements active or threatening, the inn
petuosity of the troops, especially when
they came within sight or range of the
Spaniards, as well as the restless and
unsparing energy of Peoos Bill" Shat
ter, combined to rush the army forward
at pace only compared to that Of a
hurricane.
All this time and afterward until the
American flag fioated over Santiago the
spirit of the soldiers was: "Let us 90 at
themi Let as go at themP' This is not
to say that there was indecent haste,
that the men We're ready to rush head
long into disaster. The result shows
that men Of all ranks were prepared tn