Fair play., 1899-02-11
AN INTERMITTENT POLICY.
Of the Rep"bic"h Ao'
ministratiOn In Critical sit-
uatlOns.

"shall republicans stand by Mckin-
lev 2" asks an expansionist party organ.
They probably ought to as gen
eral party proposition; but the
best republicans, us well as the
best democrats, have preferred to
consider the Philippine question
from broader standpoint. Par
ties ure essential in government, but
they do not necessarily enter into every
phase of public affairs. There are or
gans which are blindIy insisting on
the most extreme course with reference
to the new "acquisition" in the orient,
merely because they think it is the
policy of the administration, and they
do not feel at liberty to have thoughts
of their own. President Mckinley may
surprise them some day. In several
important instances in his public life
he has not been so welded to a senti-
ment or a principle that he has rot
been able to make U radical und sudden
| switch.
It is very well understood that the
| administration occupies Il radically diff
fcrent position from the one it as
sumed when the peace commissioners
| went to Paris. Senator Hoar knows
personally that which he has failed to
gain official knowledge OF. The resoiu-
| ton which he offered some time since,
and which was adopted by the senate,
asking for certain information about
ftott nbal 80,
| the usual terms. IT recognized the
| right commonly accorded to the eX-
| ecutive department to decline to COM
municate anything which it mig hit look
| upon rs Incompatible with the public
interest. What Hear evidently de-
sired to bring out was the fact that
| the peace commissioners on behalf of
| the United States were originally au-
| thorized to demand only coaling sta
tion on the island of Luzon. This and
nothing more. The executive depart
| ment has taken doubtful advantage of
its prerogativc to refuse this informa-
ton. Its assumption that publication
| Of the matter would be Incompatible
with the public interest is farfetched.
1t simply does not want to be exposed
in its swift changes.
The policy Of requiring only coaIing
station rapidly grew into treaty
which contemplated the permanent ac-
QUESTION of the whole Philippine arch
| ipelago, and the cola shoulder TO the
libertyseeking Filipinos. Some of the
| friends of the treaty, and even some
of its trainers. have been driven to the
claim that the ratification of the treaty
leaves the future of the islands broadly
open: that ii would not be in the slight
est detriment 10 the idea of extending
to the people of the islands the OPP
portunty to organize government of
their own.
| That may be the purpose now, but 1t
was not at the tine the treaty was
| framed The article relating TO the
control of the Philippines is different
from that providing for the case OF
Cuba. Why were they not made alike :.
| WHY were the advocates OF the treaty )
put in the position of making COM
plicated, and mere or less pctiifogging
argument to show that independent
government is possible under the third
article? Why was the matter not put
in plain terms?
The difference was that congress had
promised that the war should no; be
one for the acquisition OF Cuba. We
made TO such promise as TO the Philip
pines, reasoned the administration,
Morally. it argued. the cases are the
same, but technically we are free to
grab a slice of the orient, and let US
do so 10 make ourselves popular with
the people. Expansion is h'rPrevaient
cry. and we will get into the swim
Now the administration is not so sure
that expansion is popular, and it is
"hedging."
The serious matter now before the
people. or before any party, is not @:
"standing by Mckinley but of pur'
suing the right course.-Cincinnati En-,
Quirer.