The times., 1899-06-13
TUESDAY, JUNE 10. 1899.
The Crisis nj Manila.


months General Otis is not able to more
than defend his restricted line. which only
includes Manila and its suburbs. His men
are compelled to be constantly in the
trenches. There are not enough of them
for even single relief. All must remain
constantly on duty. exposed to bullets and
sunstroke by day and a peppering shower
of bullets by night as they lie on their
q soaked blankets.
What have We to show for the Alger-
ian campaign. which began with the out
break and attempted massacre of Manila
in February, and has continued ever since?
Once. what with our flying columns and
the country they made too hot for the
rebels to hold, We had line all around
from Malolos to Cavite Now we have
nothing but Manila and its environs, and
our position in the capital city itself is
rendered precarious by the friendly Ia
gals encouraged to come in by DENLY and
his confederates in the Peace Commits
sion.
We are assailed at the Manila water
works. only five miles west of the city.
position which must be held at all haz-
ards. That is our most advanced station.
We have abandoned the country on
the north, and if our outposts in that
direction extend as far as Caloocan. it is
the limit. On the south we are fighting
10 clear the line to Paranaque, which is
less than three miles from our headquar-
tiers. Cavite. our naval station, is cut of
from US on the land side, and, instead Of
an active campaign against the mutineers.
Otis is sustaining siege. Even the mes
sages given out by the War Department
justify this analysis of the situation.
Yet the Algerian War Office declares
that all Otis wants is thirty thou
sand men. He had that or nearly that
number in his dry weather operations.
Where are the numerous places with IN
prOaOuneeable names that he took with
slaughter between February and Maye
Why did he not hold them when taken?
If he could not hold them, where was the
justification for the loss of American lives
inYolved2 Today, according to the testi-
nony Of Commander Ford. just home from
the Philippines, we occupy a smaller area
Of territory than We did in August, 1881
We cannot blame Otis, who has done what
ever general could do, considering the
inadequate means placed at his disposal.
We know that he might have accomplished
more than he has but for the interference
Of Denby and his associated meddling
Peace Commissioners. But that is past.
and Z terrible situation confronts Mr.. Me-
Kinley and his Administration. 1t Is not
only evident that the little force of Otis
VIII be worn out by the tactics of the Ia
gals, and finally massacred. unless prompt
aid is sent. but that every minute wasted
by the war authorities increasingly tends
10 build up the public opinion that sick
ening tragedy and disaster to our arms IS
what is expected as a prelude TO q retreat
from the Philippines
Otherwise, why does the Commander-in-
Chief hesitate TO call out the provisional
army 1t can easily be answered that he
is afraid to while Russell A. Alger is re-
tained at the head OF the War Department.
But, while that is reason. it is not excuse.
Mr. Mckinley knows that with Alger oyt
OF the way. the country would give him
half Z million volunteers, If that we're
needfuL With Alger in the Cabinet, OF
course. any cali for volunteers would be
politically dangerous.
But even then. why should President
Mckinley hesitate? Are not our interests
in our new Pacific possessions, and the
lives and honor OF our officers and soldiers
in the Philippines not to mention the
helpless women and children in Manila,
worth the sacrifice of Russell A. Alger ?
From strictly Administration point Of
view. perhaps they are not. Mr. McKin-
ley has discouraged his friends by seeming
TO draw the mantle OF his great position
over many inefioients. and many crimes
and criminals. but he will have to make
his position clear in this respect. if ne ex-
poets to save anything OF his public credit
and popularity.
He knows that the campaign in the
Philippines has been a failure. and that the
failure is considerably due to DENLY and
Deuby's doddering schOolmaster assocIatesi
He is perfectly aware that the position OF
Otis, hemmed in and compelled TO defend
an almost impracticsble line, with a small
body of troops, is untenahse. and that re-
lief must come speedily or our devoted
little force will be wiped out. But, never
theless. he hesitates and eyades the issue