The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1899-02-21
HIS REPLY.
Schleey Defends His
Course.
ANSWERS CHARGES.
Quotes Dispatch Which Has
Never Been Published.

Washington, Feb. 20.-Rear Admiral
w. S. Schley having been granted per-
mission to answer charges made
against him in the communication re-
Gently sent to the Senate today handed
to the committee on naval affairs, his
statement in which he disclaims any
purpose of controversy with the navy
department. The letter OF the depart
ment, he says, so far as it relates to
him, can be summarized under the fol-
lowing heads: The delay off Cienfue-
COS; the alleged slow progress toward
santiago de Cuba from Cienfuegos; the
retrograde movements of the 26th and
9th of May; the battle of Santiago,
and the destruction of Cervera's fleet.
The admiral says his orders from
Sampson on May 10, were to blockade
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do.
He had no knowledge that there wee
| any insurgents about Cienfuegos who
were friendly, until the Marblehead ar
rived on the oath. Even had he had
| this knowledge on the 23d of May, the
surf would have prevented comlnunica-
ton. On his arrival he sent Com
mander McCalla of the Marblehead,
ashore to establish relations with the
| insurgents, the result of which was
made known to him at $40 of Nav "a.
Then, for the first time. he learned
definitely that the Spanish fleet was not
at Clenfuegos- Within two hours
he started for Santiago.
What possible ground of criticism :"
he says, adverse to me, there can be
in all this, do not see. was on the spot
acting under orders which gave me en-
tire discretion, and yet clothed me with
the responsibility of going to Santiago,
only after / was satisfied that the fleet
was not at Cienfuegos."
He quotes from the dispatch of
Sampson of May 20, in which the lat
ter says Schley should "hold his fleet
Off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships
have put into Santiago, they must come
either to Havana or Cienfuegos to de-
liver the munitions of war, which thew
are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am
therefore of the opinion that the best
chance to capture these ships will be
TO hold the two points, Cienfuegos and
Havana, with all the force we can mus
ter. If later it should develop that
these vessels are at Santiago we can
then assemble off that port the ships
pest suited for the purpose and com
pletely blockade 1t. Until we, then. re-
ce1ve more positive Information, we
shall continue to hold Havana. and CT
enfuegos."
Admiral Schley adds: This letter is
not printed either in the appendix or
executive documents, but I received il
ON the I'D, and it shows that was ex-
pected to hold my squadron off Glen
fuegos"
AS to the slow progress towards San
tlago on account of the Eagle. he
states that she was a part of the force
winch Admiral Sampson had seen fit
to send him, ana he had no right TO
ABANDON her The weather also was
rough, and not much better speed could
have been kept up. He had been or
! oered to proceed Cautiously" If,
| however he had known that the Snan.
ism Meet was in Santiago, no consider
alton for the Eagle or anything else
would have prevented him from get
ing there at the earliest possible mo-
nent with the larger vessels, but the
weather and surf made It impossible IN
90 better than he did.
Speaking of the "retrograde move
ments,' which the secretary. adopting
the language of Admiral SAMPSON
charaeterizes as "reprehensible CON
duct" Admiral Schley says that in AZ
years of service never was such Ian
suage used to characterize conduct OF
mine and l see no reason for it, now /"
e'NNe' <aCIiHB III accordance wifi
my pest judgment In view Of the cir
cumstances, without certain knowledge
OF the whereabouts of that Spanish
i1eet, after having been Informed bv
the scouts commanded by such officers
as Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise, that all
though they had been off Santiago for
week they had seen nothing of it
and knew nothing Of its movements or
It's whereabouts since it had left Cura-
Goa; after having been assured bv
Slgsbee that he did not believe it was
in Santiago, and by the emphatic dec
Iaration of the pilot NuneZ and know
ing, as the sea and weather then were
it would be impossible to coal NV
squadron off the port, 7 deemed it best
to Wake the action ! did, the final re-
suit of which was the location of the
enemy's fleet in Santiago harbor."
Admiral Schley speaks of the diff
Guilty of doing anything with insurg-
ents and refers to the manner In which
Lieut.. Blue took three DAYS to secure
information. AS to the battle of San
tiago Admiral Schley says the facts
of that contest speak for themselves.
He quotes from his official report TO
Sampson, in which he congratulated
the commander of the squadron and
said the victory seems big enough for
all of us" He asks the committee to
contrast his reports and those of
Sampson containing references to him
self, and continues: "As to all this
criticism of my course prior to the dis
covery by me on May 20 of Cervera's
fleet, whether from Admiral Sampson
or the department, none of ii has ever
been made by either 10 me, and ! never
heard a word of it from any one until
after the battle with that fleet, al
though more than five weeks had
passed since the alleged 'reprehensible
conduct had occurred. Although Adj
miral Sampson used this language to
the secretary concerning ME on 10th
of July Gust one week after the bat
tle) he has never to this day. in any
manner or to any extent. intimated to
me any disapprobatiJn or made to me
any criticism OF my conduct of the fly
ing squadron"
Admiral Schley then submits long
detailed statement Of the facts he sum-
married. i'm the foregoing, which is in
reply to a request by Chairman Hale
OF the naval committee.