The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1899-10-22
Think Them Weak
Germans Criticize
English Tactics.

The Militaerisches wochenblatt of Ber-
lin is not only the organ of the German
army and Navy Journal of Washington
represents the interests OF the united
service in this country-it has also semi
official relations with the general stan
OF the army Officers of talent and pro-
minence are invited" TO US
ages prevailing in the German army, as
much as ordered-to contribute 70 ITS
columns. Hence the utterances OF the Wo-
chenblatt both editorial and otherwise.
upon military matters. are always OF i'm
portance 10 the service and frequently
Of interest 10 general readers.
The later is the case with an article on
The English Officer Corps and the War
In Transvaal." which appeared in the
last issue Of this publication. The arti-
Gle like all others thus contributed. is
not signed, but the writer evidently is
in close touch with English army mat
tiers. Inasmuch as he witnessed the re-
cent maneuvers at Aldershot il is con-
sidered not at all improbable that the
writer is the military attache Of the Ger
man embassy at the court of ST. James,
Baron Won Luettwitz. captain in the
Prussian army though this is only sur
mise.
in view of the difference between
Transvaal and England. it may be of in
terest 10 bring the officer corps Of the
English army under closer observation,
SO much the more because this officer
corps alone is to blame for the defeat in
the Transvaal campaign OF 1851" says
the writer cit viii be difficult TO find
in the whole English army. a single Eng
lish army officer who dares to deny this
fact. and official reports as well as the
Independent press express themselves
with laudable frankness on this subject.
A recapitulatioa Of the principle events of
the campaign Of 1881 will make 1t clear
TO everybody how much the English Of
f1cers were to blame for the defeats.
The campaign began with the defeat
Of an English battalion at Brunker's
Spruit. that is. half way between the
English garrison. Middelburg. and Pre-
toria. The commander of the battalion
was Colonel Anstruther. Though the
was informed that his troops would be
ambushed by Beers on the way to the
Transvaal capital, he contented himself
with the proud answer that the Ninety
fourth would know how 10 repulse an
attack. Unfortunately. ii appears that
his pride was the only military trait Of
which the commander could boast. for
it has been authoritatiyely ascertained
that not a single safeguard was provided
for the march; on the contrary. the dan
gerous expedition. which included con-
siderable train and even a number Of
women. was undertaken with careless
ness. Thus it could happen that the
troop. at distance of few hundred
yards, suddenly found a detachment Of
Beers ready for attack in its flank.
Even a, single English patrol would
have made it impossible for the Beers. 20
surprise the English in this manner The
Beers demanded OF the English com
mander to cease advance. and only upon
his refusal to disregard his order to
march upon Pretoria began the slaughter
in which the English battalion was an
initiated before II could de2loy for bat
tie.
Absolute neglect every military safe
guard, despite the knowledge of danger
to be encountered. characterizes in this
instance not only the incapacity OF the
English commander but OF all his SUI
bOrdinate officers. of whom not one
thought it necessary 70 bring his line TO
quick development ready to sustain the
fire Of the enemy.
"One would think that this defeat would
have been a lesson for the commanders
of the English troops. Far from IT. The
Beers had occupied. in a strength OF 3
o0) men. the rock ridge known as Laing's
Mex between the Majuba Mountains and
the Buffalo Hills It must have been clear
TO any intelligent commander that an al
tack upon this ridge. covered on both
hanks BY heights could be undertaken
from the front only In case a sufficient
artillery fire upon the position of the
enemy preceded and that the stormlng
to follow could be undertaken with sur
ficently superior force This insight was
lacking in General Colley Of the English
force. who confined his artillery fire to
twenty minutes and then undertook with
his entire force only about 200 men. the
general attack
The result was inevitable. The Eng
lish officers did their best 70 spur their
men 70 do the imoossibie-that Is. the
storming Of the enemy The men fell
in droves and the attack was Of course.
repulsed It was only then that General
Colley had the idea 20 attempt a turning
Of the enemy's flank and 10 climb Ma
juba Mountain during the night Prior
to this General Coley. who had 10 wait
for reinforcements. admitted in gener-
al order that no blame could attach tn
his subordinstes for this defeat but that
h. D
brave man. but a poor soldier
There was soon signs that detach-
ments Of Beers eudeavared 70 cut or he
connections IN the rear % the English
camp For this reason General Colley~
decided upon forced reconnoitering and
took in person the command Of the troops
designated for this purpose
ITO a German army officer 81 will az
pear incredible that this accommodating
again was undertaken With safeguards
which scarcely deserve the name. that
even A river which offered great obstacles
for the artillery was crossed. only % b.
confronted by an arnbuscsde from which
The troops could ne Withdrawn only with
terrible loss and after relnforcsmenfs
has arrived from camp None of the
English officers seemed 70 have prahtef
in the least by experience So far. or the
contrary. hardly hal some Insigniaceot
reinforcenents arrived when Genera
Colley scr 70 work 20 even ID 70 the de-
feats
This time ~ had more than hair fhe
English garrison climb Ma5uba Nountaia
during the uight. Only 10 nud on reach
Ing the summit that this altitude by 20
means afforded sufficient selA FOR firing
With break ~ dag n ws1t from one %
si;iou 20 the other and thus re ss1-cess-
ed-afer y. RtlI-kngNn Nar-.lanrlr .or-