The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-10


islands, therefore, are of great value
to them. To us, on the other hand, ISL
ands are generally only valuable when
they furnish good harbors. You will
remember the great hurricane when a
British man-of-war escaped and when
German and an American man-of-
war were driven ashore. Well, in these
circumstances, we are glad to accept a
renunciation of the treaty claims and
rights of Germany over another island,
Tonga, where there is an admirable
harbor.
I'VE took the harbor and Germany
took the territory, in which, for many
reasons, thc Germans are interested.
Il believe we have arrived at a re-
markable phenomenon-an agreement
which is agreeably pleasant and ad-
vantageous to both powers, but this is
interesting particularly because it in
dicates at the present moment our re-
lations with the German people are all
we could desire.
THE great subject that interests al,
of us undoubtedly is this war, adorned
with so many splendid feats of hero
ism and skill, but saddened by many
losses. have great difficulty in deal
ing with the war, and if attempted to
deal with the future, should be under
taxing task in prophecy from which
the hard1eSt would Shrink. If [ speak
at all 1T may rather be to deprecate
criticisms and statements which I
think unfounded, than to attempt to
pass Judgment on what still depends
upon the future for it's full determine
tion.
Respecting the feeling expressed
twice or thrice, that the want of troops
is due to want of action on the part
OF the home government, I would point
out that there have been two or three
voices. Two or three months ago. we
We're told by the most authoritative
voice outside the government that there
was no need for military preparations.
Since then we have been blamed be-
cause there were no military prepara-
tons. But neither of these was at all
relevant to the events which have taken
place. 1t is often said. especially
abroad. that we are strong nation at
tacking weak one but so long as the
principal part of our forces is separated
oy an interval of five or six weeks from
the field of action it would rather be
true to say that we are weak nation
hghting strong nation. Elements Of
distance are very essential in this mat
ter.
1t would have been nothing to the
purpose for issuing proclamations for
the reserves some weeks earlier. For
what was the cause of the war and
what was the cause of the uAimatum?
1t was not because Of any demand we
had made 1t so happens that the mo-
ment the ultimatum was issued we had
Withdrawn our demands and there were
no demands before the Transvaal gov
efnment. 1t was because We had taken
measures to increase the amount of our
forces in South Africa. But If that had
been done few months sooner exactly
the same result would have taken place
The moment you should show signs of
raising your force to an equality with
1os,F Fnt,1
the ultimatum would have been issued
and war begun. nN
1t IS not therefore right to say that
there was not adequate military prepa-
rations. The evil dates farther back
II dates to the unfortunate arrange
ments in 1881 and 1884 by which we de-
hberately permitted community Oh
viously hostile to enjoy the unbounded,
unlimited right of accommodating muni-
lions OF war against lis. Year after
year an accumulation c. munitions Of
war accumulated which could only be
directed against u.s. Hampered by
these arrangements, it was impossible
we could avoid the interval cf trial and
danger necessary 70 intervene between
the moment when war was declared
ana the moment when our forces could
accept the contest and appear upon the
field.
That interval has nearly passed. Our
troops are beginning I, arriye. Foreign
nations have complimented us upon the
calmness with when we have received
the intelligence OF occasional checks.
Whatever strategy there might be, we
are We'll aware that the beginning of
our conflict with the 15oecs nlust be
marked by retir ,ElunI of our trCops
from positions they are not strong
enough to occupy. 1t is necessary that
we should wait for sufficient reinforce
ments. I do not attempt to forecast the
future. l only say that my faith in the
British soldier Is unbounded and [ am
deeply eratified to feel that he is in the
vigorous, sagacious hands of General
Butler.
Regarding the future, 7 will onlv
deprecate some very strange assertions
that | so occasionally see in the con-
tlnental press Now I beg to assure
you this, gentlemen, that her majesty's
cabinet has not had farthing from
the IransVaal or from any other gold
fields There Is the Yukon, about which
there is no contest. If there had been
any chance of our gaining advantages
therein the Yukon gold fields should
have yielded something, but l appeal
70 my friend Lord Hamilton to know
II the cabinet ever received a farthng
from them. daughter.) I go further. |
England as a whole would have had no
advantage from the possession of gold
mines except as her government con-
ferred the blessing of good administra-
ton upon those engaged in the indus
try. All industry breeds commerce and |
all commerce has produced is to the
advantage of England, and all indus
tries and commerce flourish better un-
der her government than any other
regime in the world But that is the
limit of our interest.
What We desire is equal rights be-
fore all men of all races and security
for our fellow subjects and our empire.
The hour for asking by what means
these results can be obtained is not
yet come, but these are the objects
and the only objects we seek We do
not allow any other consideration to
cross our path. ] have seen it sug-
gested that other powers will interfere
with this country and in some form or
other dictate to those who are con-
cerned in it as to what its upshot had
been. DON'T let any man think it is
in that fashion the conflict will be con-
nluded. We shall have to carry it
through ourselves, and the interference
at n a1cN