The Portland daily press., 1899-02-09

and whose theme Is imperial-a grave
and authentic, and for that reason All the
more interesting review OF the history of
Prussia from 1880 tn the accession Of viii =.
liam IL; the relations borne by tho Ho.
henzoIlern kingdom to Germany and 70
Europe generally, told with apparent
franknsss. and Jet with dignited reti.
cence too rare in recent political remin-
iscences. seldom does the author
descend TO denunciation. The exceptions
are when he speaks Of the baleiui infiu-
ence OF "high-borR ladies" -meaning
the Empress Augusta, whom he accuses
Of Austrian and Roman leaninas, and
the Empress Victoria (Kaiser Frcderlck's
widow. whom he looks upon as an Eng
lishwoman or when he discusses the Rus
sian Chancellor 9ortohskoff, whose pro.
longed personal rivalry he cannot Der.
NIT himself to forget Even Won Arnim
ia treated with liberation. IL must be
admitted that no sometimes takes for
granted familiarity with German poll
tics wanting to the general reader, and
only found in the cabinets OF kings. But
we are Interested even when We do not
fully under stand-of so large Importance
are the topics-interested from page first,
on which he confesses that he left school
with the persuasion that Republic is
to the last pages, on which he declares 1t
impractical and intolsrable for Germany,
and copies with senile qualification q
jejune letter of the Emperor Frederick,
complimentary him on the completion Of
fifty years service in the German army.
Bismarck's liberal opinions were not
long heed. Though be joined the Bur-
sohensohoft at the beginning OF his uni
versity career he soon conceived an aver
sion to the extravaganza of Its political
views and what seemed to him ''its lack
Of knowledge Of the conditions of life
into existence. In this aversion he was
confirmed by tho futile Frankfort stu.
dent riots of 1888. The revolutionary
movements of 1913 deepened his distrust
of parliamentary government and
strengthened him in the belief that Ger.
mar uhity Noaiu ohiy 10 reuuIou ny ma
ton in arms under the leadership Of a
great historic house. Naturally as a
Prussian, born hater OF the Hapsburgs
be turned to the Hohenzollerns; and to
the furtherance of their fortunes devoted
all this years of his political life.
To the accomplishment of this end were
two mighty obstacles: the prsdominance
OF Austria IN Germany, resting largely
on the traditions OF the Holy Roman EN-
pire; and the meddlesomeness OF France,
reaching back 10 the Thirty Years War.
Minor obstacles were the feeling for par
liamentary government in Prussia, and
the fear entertained by the Czar that the
rise of powerful State In central Eu-
rope might prove hindranoe TO Russian
aims. The lesser obstacles he gradual y
removed from his pnth: the Parliamen-
tarians by an appeal to Prussian pride,
persusding the people that German unity
could only be achieved under a dictator
ship; and plaeating Russia by the hostile
attitude taken toward the Polish insur-
rection of 1868. The greater ones necessi =
tated that policy Of .blood and iron" TO
be forever associated with bis name, and
relentlsssly pursued by him. How he
involved Austria In the intricate quarrel
of the Duohies, outwitting the Vienna
cabinet, and how be seized the happy op.
portunity TO take France at disadvantage,
are historical readings too familiar for
repetition. Hostility to France was his
heritage. "On first Looking at the map, -
he says, "the possession OF Strasburg by
France exasperated me, and visit to the
Palatinate made me feel Ievengefal and
militant" This was in is32. while Louis
Philippe was King of the French; and
Bismarck pursued his militant revenge
until. nearly forty years later, with nom
inal Hohenzollern leadership, Stras burg
was restored TO the Fatherlaud and the
Rhine again teoame German river.
The accounts of the contest with France
and the war with Austria which assured
Prussian hegemony. make to many read
ers the most generally interesting chap
tiers in Bismarck book. 1t is illuminat-
ing to learn that France, not the Bona
parte family, was held by him response
BILE for aggression. History taught him
that the first Napoleon, SO far as conduct
toward Germany was concerned, but
trod In the footsteps of Louis XIV. Rec
election of this fact led him after the
Franco German war to deprecate Bour-
bon restoration. He believed the Repub-
lie might he peaceful. He knew that the
restored monarchy must be militant In
this connection he emphatically denies
that he sought TO force the Republic into
war in 1875 $50 far" he says. was
from entertaining any such idea at the
time, or afterwards, that l would rather
have resigned. Europe would have seen
in our proceedings a misuse Of our newly
acquired power; and We should have been
entering upon the path which led the
Second French Empire TO destruction by
a continuous policy of war and prestige. "
This lie sensible and sounds true; though
Bismarck. more by reticenoe than by
declaration, leads us to believe that some
among German generals favored ra.