New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-10-26
SIGNS POINT TO FURTHER
COMPLICATIONS.
LATEST PHASES OF THE TRANSVAAL
WAR-THE RETREAT FROM GLEN
COE-MR. CHAMBERLAIN TO
THE FRONT AGAIN.
IBY CABLE To THE TRIBuNr.l


huous proportions Of the army dispatched under
General Butler to the Cape with the activity
that prevails. point to expectation Of possible
serious complications with foreign Powers
Russia and France are the Powers indicated
To have a British fleet in readiness and to dis
patch n large force to the Cape under COM
manding officer and staff who would direct
British arms In event Of a European war must
be regarded as an extremely wise and prudent
move on the part Of the Government The
Persian Gulf is the point where it is most likely
that any active complications will centre. in
event OF war the Suez Canal would inevitably
be blocked even with great fleets to keep it
open. The Cape is Englands natural route and
halfway house to India and Persia Sir George
Grey's energy in sending troops from the Cape
to India and good fortune in having them to
send involved Britain's salvation at most
crucial point in the Indian Mutlny
I have strong reason to believe that If the
secret history Of the present crisis could be told
fl would be found that the Foreign offices OF
Great Britain and Germany have never been on
more friendly terms This fact must be taken
into account by those seeking to forecast the
future. Those most intimate with the high Of
ncials Of both countries state that the petulant
behavior of section Of the German press
toward England. while resented by the German
Foreign Office is derded by the governing
classes Of both countries. Germany and Eng
land are acting together and hope to carry
the moral support Of America with them. Mean
while the Channel fleet is bound for Gibraltar
and the remarkable activity at the dockyarls
points 10 the mobilization Of another dying
squadron wherever it may be needed. and 1t VIII
NOT be a demonstration OF naval force against
Germany this time.
Every dav eight thousand or nine thousand
troops 20 out to the Cape. but the entire army
corps will not be ahoat this week
GENERAL YULE's RETREAT.
Th, usual phrases are used by the military
writer's here 10 disguise the real nature or Gen
eral Yules movement from Glencoe 1t Is de-
scribed as a scientific change Of base Drii'lan'
! Strategic mannuvre reconnaissance IN ioice
Of the enemy's position. and a prudent measure
Of military concentration. II was, in reallty' d
well conducted retreat from a position when
was occupied for political rather than military
reasons. and which became untenao!e wheh
two British garrisons forty miles apart were
rnonaced by a greatly superior force. 9liliial
unscentihc tactics based on political consldeid-
tions have involved the defence Of Mafeking on
the western border. when military reasons are
valid for a concentration Of forces at Kimberley
General Yules retreat leaves the Boers IN un-
DISPUTED possession of the upper triangle OF
for trfn lqf
a third artillery duel. to boast that they have
driven hack the British and broken up the first
limo of defence The British wounded have
been left in their hands and they must also
have secured possession Of a considerable guam
inv of supplies and military stores at Glencoe
Thu. Boers without winning a single battle or
etirn,ish can claim the credit Of having forced
yule IN retreat. and there is logic enough in the
sitnafion 10 Justify a feeling Of elation. The
british troops on the contrary. can justly COM
ulain that their brilliant victories have been
clouded and impaired by the original strategic
blunder of separating the garrisons for the sake
Of protecting the Dundee coal fields.
Generals Yule's and Whites columns we're
,,fthfn three miles of each other and virtually
I'm touch at O'Clock yesterday, according to a
War Office bulletin issued late in the evening.
Rlnors OF great battle were senced by this
official report. since General White knew noth-
ing Of an engagement
\ less satisfactory part of General Whites
earlier dispatch. from a military point Of view.
was not so much the list OF casualties in the
third battle. which was comparatively small.
the capture by the enemy OF squadron OF the
18th Hussars including the colonel of the regi-
nent In the zeal of their pursuit Of the flying
enemy the Hussars rode too fast and far, and
became cnmeshed IN the Boer lines. 80 fear is
entertained for the safety of the prisoners, as
the greatest care and kindness have been shown
for the Boer prisoners 10y the British who even
Permitted armed Beers to enter their lines
seeking friends, after night had fallen on
tlandsiaaste Escaped prisoners from the Boer
lines testify TO the perfect kindness Of their
treatment Both sides We'd in tending the
wounded after the battle without respect 10
the uniform
THINK THE BOER ATTACK FAILED.
The general feeling OF army officers is that
the Boer attack has failed and that British
valor and skill have triumphed. The Boer
strategy IS considered excellent 1T IS good /
enough" a prominent official OF the Foreign !
OnIce remarked 20 me to-day with significant |
look "to have come from Berlin" But In the |
execution Jouhert and his star are no match
for British generals. An officer on the Head
quarters STAFF compared them in conversation
10 a railway company with an admirably clear
and workmanlike time table. but inability TO
see their trains come up 10 time This Is no re-
Fiction on the fighting quality Of the men. whose
behavior in the field is warmly admired wher-
ever Englishmen discuss the war
Some compensation for the retreat may be
found for the English side in the fact that Cen
eral Joubert Will remain In the field and
tinue 10 conduct the warfare on modern meth
ods instead Of reverting 10 guerilla tactics. as
might have been done II a second assault upon
Glencoe had been repulsed with heavy losses.
He viii be no match for General Butler when
the army corps is ready FOR an active campaign