Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1899-12-14
CEVERAS own STORY.

oouiirhi O6TNerd ODtdlUeu from tn6
Queen Regent, late in August, per-
mission to publish the official cor
relating to the operations
OF the Spanish squadron under his
command. The result is volume of
more than 200 pages, u copy OF which
has just reached us. II contains many
dispatches which have been published
before, but some which are entirely
new. and in particular several letters
which dassed between Admiral Cervera
and the Minister OF Marine before the
war broke out, which are not only new
but of the deepest interest. The whole
is now offered as the Apologize of the
gallant old sailor. With a proud
humility, OF once dignified and pathetic,
he lnys before his fellow countrymen
and the world the proof that, whoever
Numbered, whoever was the victim of
wild illusions, he was not; hut that,
his head was as clear, his
foresight asn keen, as his heart was
stout.
From the very beginning going back
as far as the letters of 1896 '97-- Ger
Vera's constant warning to the Minister
Of Marine was. do everything in
reason or honor to satisfy the United
States, for, IL war breaks out, we shall
BIO overwhelmed. Minister BeImejo
was incredulous. A good part of the
American navy was in the Pacific. Yes,
replied clear sighted Ceryera, on March
18th, 1898, but what does that mean ex-
cept the immediate crushing of our
feeble naval forces in the Philippines?
All, rejoined the Minister, hut you
do not take into the account the
superiority of our homogeneous, edu.
Gated, and disciplined crews in com
bat with the mercenary levies of the
United States. AS to that, answered
Cervera, sadly, you have only to re-
member what happened to our ancestors
at Trafalgar But surely, urged Ber-
mejo, with your swift ships you can
ravage the Atlantic Coast, and speedily
bring the enemy to terms. Are you
crazy? was Cerveras despairing com
ment.
So the correspondence went on
through all those weary weeks of watt
ing for the war. The men in charge OF
the fleet Ceryeia and all his captains
solemnly warned the government that
their campaign must be defensive, or
it would necessarily be disastrous. But
at the same time Blaneo was urgently
telegraphing from Cuba, and Macias
from Porto Rico, that the squadron
must be sent, or all would be lost
Thus pulled about the government was
al its yiis' end, and finally cslled the
famous tlnnncii oi Wsi o the ~ ~ -
admiesls snd "a ptain. in Mad id. mhich
decided that Ceryera must sail ifnm
Cape Verde and fling himself OH the
foe. That was about what his orders
to, for he was utterly unable
then or later to get intelligible in
from the Minister of Marine.
His orders were simply 10 sail for the
Antilles, calling ut some neutral port
for information, and then going to Porto
Rico or Cuba, as he might think best,
and doing there whatever bis skill,
and ceurage'f might sug-
pest. Was ever hapless officer sent
more bunglinyly TO the fate which ha
knew 10 be as certain as the sunrise!
Yet Cervera get sail with his crippled
ships as piavely and cheerfully as if
going to assured victory. He said that
II the admirals oyerruled him, one of
them really ought to relieve him, but
he was not the man to shrink from
duty, and with proud moriturus
salute to the Spanish government and
people, he put TO sea.
Ceryera fully intended to go to Porto
Rico after calling at Fort dc France.
His statement to that effect is a tribute
to the shrewdness of our own naval
who sent Sampson to that
island to meet him. But ut Martinique
Cerpera heard that Sampson WA await
ms him: lie himself had 70 90 IN Cn.a
"c;e fdi coui; and thsn. .iy a goed ,iea
ri mdk algn casual as he him self
go into Santiago unobseryed
10 Ceryeta ut Martinique the following
extraordinary telegram was sent By the
Minister of Marine:
Madrid, May IL, 1898. Since yonr
sailing the situation has changed.
four instructions are amplified SO that
il you judge that tho squadron cannot
operate to advantage whore you are,
You may return to Spain, choosing your
own route and port of call, though
this would preferably be Cadiz.
Acsnow edge receipt aud advise of
your decision
Ceryafa did not aclinow ledge receipt.
because he never saw the disparch iii
he got back to Spain. He sailed before
it was delivered. But as an>indication
of the state Of mind of the Spanish
and of it's fitness to carry
on war, il neods no commerr In this
respect, however, it was surpassed, ii
such thing were possible, by the sug-
gestion made by the Minister OF War
on June I'd, that Ceryera should run
the blockade at Santiago, and 60 to
Manila to smash Dewey, afterwards
t1rpit,n ~ fiusoh oF Gap,,sao
The late official correspondence has
vera was never deceived about the ruin
Of his ships if he tried TO take them
out. lie wished to blow them nm in
the harbor and land his men to assist
in The defence of the place. But he
was under Blanco's srders, and that
officer Insisted, as we know, upon the
Admiral's going out to have Coo OF
his men killed, in a spirit of sheer
vanity, y as Ceryera calihd il. One in
cidental point is cleared up in these
dispatches. Admiral Sampson has said
that he never knew why his ships were
not fired on at night when standing in
close to the harhor's mouth with their
searchlights. The reason is that the
Spanish had not the guns or ammuni-
tion to do Vt. Cervera asked Gen.
Linares to open on the American ships
at night, but that officer had to inform
him that he had no artillery mounted
that could do 1t. And the ammunition
on shore was as defective as il was Oh
Where is hoasting? This is tho ques-
tion we we'll may ask after this full
revelation Of the weakness of the foe
We conquered at Santiago. The only
boast the Spaniards have made is that
they showed the world they knew how
to die. .Neverdiid men go more clear
eyed to death for rheir country than
Ceraera and his comrades. What he