The Anaconda standard., 1899-09-06
SEPTEMBER 6, 1899.
TWELVE PAGES.


minister to Siam has done a
great deal of writing upon the
Philippine situation. and probably no
man has contributed more than he to
strengthen the purely commercial idea
upon which is grounded the principal
defense of Mr.. McKinley's policy with
respect to the islands. In the July
number of the Review of Reviews Mr.
Barrett discusses the situation there
at length, and, in a large measure.
segregates himself from the cold ques-
tion of how many dollars are to be
gained. Evidently he intends to be
fair, and he so far succeeds as to leave
himself very little ground to stand
upon for an argument in favor of the
forcible subjugation of the natives.
Describing a visit to the islands be-
fore the war; he says that he was
deeply impressed by their great re-
sources, fertility and wealth. and. to
quote literally, "above all things by
the hospitality, generosity and good ma
ture of the people whether / came
across them in the towns or back in the
country. ! never carried any
molested and invariably left my native
hosts, even when most primitive in
habits and education, as my good
friends" After referring to the Malay
habit of running amuck,' which he
says prevails in the Philippines, as
among other Malay peoples, he says
that such incidents are very rare"
Then he prooaadS ta daSariba u,,ip-
aldo's departure from Hong Kong and
his subsequent operations in the ISL
ands Mr.. Barrett says: After his ar
rival at Cavite he organized with Won
derful rapidity a provisional govern
ment, and in a short time had an army
which was capturing Spanish outposts
with the frequency of trained regulars.
Within thirty days after his arrival he
had taken over 1000 prisoners and
had practically gained control of all
the country of Luzon outside of Ma
Mia, leaving that city to our mercy.
During the latter part of May and all
of June before the arrival of our troops,
his relations with our forces We're most
agreeable. There seemed to be no
friction. There was perfect understand
ing between Admiral Dewey and him
self, although the former was careful
to avoid formal recognition"
Then Mr.. Barrett goes on to say that
the people expected independence
That they saw the government set up
by Aguinaldo actually working under
the guns of our ships, which was suf-
ficient evidence to them of our ap-
proval. Next he describes the Filipino
government as follows: by the mid
die of October he-Agunaldo-had as
sembled at Malolos a congress of 100
men who would compare in behavior,
manner, dress and education with the
average men Of the better classes of
other Asiatic nations, possibly includ-
ing the japanese" He says that they
conducted themselves with great de-
corum and showed a knowledge of de-
bate and parliamentary law that would
not compare unfavorably with the Jap
anese parliament" The army of
Aguinaldo, according to Mr.. Barrett.
was the marvel of his achievements"
and the description given of it leaves
no doubt of Aguinaldo's ability as
military organizer.
Up to this point Mr.. Barrett has
shown, first, the general good Charac
ter of the people; second, that Aguin-
aldo was virtually the ally of Dewey,
although without formal recognition"
which, as everybody knows, a naval
officer has no right to give; third, the
valuable character of the service rem
dered by Aguinaldo; fourth, the high
character of the native government:
fifth. the ability of the Filipino leader,
both as civil and military organizer.
and, sixth, that the people fully ex-
.pected independence, and had evidence
satisfactory to them that We intended
10 give it to them.
After all this, Mr.. Barrett coolly pro-
ceeds 10 argue that the responsibility
for the war and its continuance rests
with those who delayed the ratifca-