The times., 1899-02-26
The Cuban Campaign.

graphic and interesting account of the Gu
ban campaign yet published. The greater
part Of the book has appeared in magazine
and newspaper articles. but the material
is altogether too valuable not 10 be pre-
served in book form. No other account
of The Cuban war has been written with
quite the originality and the wealth of iu
cident. pathos, and humor which Mr.. Bon
sal has put into his story.
That it is a story and nothing else
should be understood at the beginning.
The author does not attempt to give
comprehensive view Of everything that
happened, but to describe things which he
himself saw or heard; and it appears that
he personally covered great deal of
ground. and came as near being in two
places al once as any other correspondent
on the field II is a narrative OF personal
experience with the live. intense inter
est of a well-written newspaper STORY.
Mr.. Bonsal is already well known as an
accurate and careful writer through his
books The Real Condition of Cuba" and
Morocco As 1t Is and his account of
the state Of affairs which existed in Cuba
last spring perhaps did as much as any
other one article to awaken the American
people 10 the horrors of Spanish rule In
this book he has done exactly what he
might have been expected TO do, and that
is saying great deal.
One OF the things which will strike the
reader quite early in the book is the fear
less outspokenness. without unnecessary
harshness. with which Mr.. Bonsal alta Ks
existing abuses. His view of some of the
events OF the campaign is also original
with himself II is plain that. as he him
self says. he has written without con
scious bias, and whether one agrees with
him or not he has certainly reasons for
his opinions. The book is. in brief,
story of the rank and file. of the common
soldier, whose pluck. daring, and loyaty.
as Mr.. Bonsal unhesitatingiy declares,
won the victories OF the war.
The view which this correspondent
takes of the blunders and disasters of the
Cuban campaign is simply this: Admiral
Sampson held Cervera's fleet bottled up in
Santiago harbor. He sent a message to
the Department TO the effect that he hal
bombarded and silenced the forts at the
mouth of the harbor. and with the help
OF an army OF 10000 men could take tie
city and feet. He urged on the Depart
ment the necessity OF haste, under the
plea that in case of delay the city would
be defended more strongly by guns t8ken
from the fleet. This caused the War De-
partment to order Shafter TO sail at once
from Tampa with lot less than 10000
men.
Owing TO the fact that it was not be-
leved in Tampa that the army would even
tually be sent TO Cuba. preparations had
been delayed. and the men and horses and
mules were embarked in q helter-skeiter
fashion most detrimental 10 the success Of
the expedition. In short. Mr.. Bonsal thinks
that the Fifth Army Corps was sacrificed
10 an emergency which might have been in
some measure foreseen and certainly could
have been prepared for. Curiously enough.
he does not see SIMPSONS part in the
blunder at all, but speaks of him in The
highest terms. He calls the emharkation
OF the Fifth Army Corps TO Cuba "a jump
in the dark which is without parallel in
the history Of our country and declares
that only the splendid work Of the common
soldier saved the campaign from failure.
One thing which should be mentioned as
adding strength 10 the narrative is the
fac; that most Of the book is simply 4
transcription Of notes made or the spot.
There has rarely be so singing an ar
raignmeEt Of the incompetence of War De-
pariment officials and the evils of the po-
liiical pull than the account given in
this book OF the mobilization OF the army
at Tampa Mr.. Bonsal's purpose in this
recital is not so much TO call down fire on
the head OF any one individual as to prove
the danger of the penny-wise. pound-fool-
ish policy which has for so many years
pinched and scrapcd the Army appropri-
alton pills. He says:
Az matter Of TACT. the army could not b
nnohi.ized 1t lad 10 be called into existence.
The way in which tic troops were trausporte4
from their yarions posts, and from the depot a
thicEamau=I humilating. and the condi
tion in which they arrived deploIsbIe. Man
detacimoujs Of troops which were given two o
three DAYS tTJvcl ratioI,s FIVE days on III
cars couIing from Chicl.ainauGa. and many
them wrre dctraincd so weak from hunger tia
They could not carry their packs. ] myself me
two soldiers Of the Second New ork, who a.
sIrcd me they had eaten nothing for two day
and half and were positively starving, an
ihcir appearance fully coTToJoFsted their stat,
ment- even lad ! any reason TO doubt thei
tTuthfulncss and sincerity. No officers were d.
tailed to look after the transportation, and.
course, We had raiway regiments as militar
powers hara. The conductor Of the train con
inandcd his Passengers. civil and military. a,
oortine, 10 his oUn viii. ! know oi half duze
instances where the destination Of troops
transit changed without anyone having tal
IN the trouble 10 inform the commanding OF
Ger. who arrived with his men. will say,
Atlanta. when his orders ran 10 proceed TO Tan
pa; and the War Department lad only though
St worth while 10 cogntcTmand the order throug
the train conductor, leaving the colonel Of II
regiment 10 ind out where he going as be
he might As q matter of fact upon all ti
questions arising in transit. in solving viii,
military experience might have been hepfu
the commanding officers Of the detachment wt.
never consulted. They were simply deliver,
with iheir men like 50 many bacs Of mercla
disc oE freight, and often they sternly q
dered out of their cars at place the name
which they had never heard before. and
which, ss far the information given them
their orders ran, il had never been coutemplat
that they should arrive.
In transit the regiments were separated a
iumbled un. and loaded upon different tFai
h. vi md rgfl1izf ans
possible, and Of couTsa, great and unaecessa
inconvenience was occasioned by this uti
break down Of the transportation system q
alTy troop would find itself travelling with l
horses Of another troop. and often even
troops were divided and Travelled on diferc
trains. On some occasions the horses belongi
&c the cavalry were attached 10 trains viii
only infantry soldiers were carried and they h
10 turn 10 and look after the horses as well
they could, which Vas, / believe, very poor
indeed.
Before the expedition sailed from Tampa m,
than $1,000 men had congregated there and
the immediate vicinity; in not a single ins;aT
were these trayel-worn and, in some instanc
starving, troops met st the station by ST
intelligence officer, TO show them where III
should camp. In instance met at the S
ton regiment Of the regular army, in wlicl
had friends, and after the worn-out and we.
men were dctraincd I went up with the re
mental sdiutant 10 the adjutant general
the corps, and ask where the regiment shol
camp. The adiutant general very poll
though lie seemed somewhat surprised and
lie put out that the regiment should have co
20 soon, though. d matter Of fact, they VI
three days behind the time announced for tn
arrival. lie said he didn't know where the re
ment would camp, but Tar as he was c.
eerncd they could camp anywhere they pleas
The officers ran about the town for four or
hours looking various side-lots which !
been suggested suitable camping places
am afraid, not entirely dizintcrosiod negro
but without success. When they made their
port 10 the colonel aud il was apparent Il
there was no help for il, but that the men wo
have 10 march with all their accoutfeinents