The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-02-06
NO AMERICAN AUTHORITY.
Army Officer Explains Situation in
Manila Before Attack.
Chicago Inter Ocean.

Chicago Inter Ocean.
Those best informed on the Philippine sit
uation, both correspondents and army Off
GERS, are agreed on one point, and that is
that at no time since the signing of the
treaty in Paris has it been safe for armed
Americans to enter the territory in possess
sion of the Insurgents. 1.-The Filipinos may
not have been officially recognized by our
government" said a prominent army officer
in Chicago yesterday, but the fact remains
that we have educated them to the belief
that they were our ally by not int rfering
with their movements. They do not respect
us because we did not exercise our authority.
After the battle of Manila, am told,
they fixed their lines to suit themselves.
They secured control Of the water works at
Cavite, and also of the railroads, and even
began the collection of taxes. They import
ed guns and ammunitior, and the fact was
known by all. They even mistreated and
starved the Spanish prisoners, insisting
meanwhile that the Americans had no right
TO question their actions. For these and
other reasons the Filipinos have come to be-
lieVe that the Americans fear them. and
they have become brave because of this
American nOninterferenCe with them.
Il think Frank d. Miller, the special cor
respondent, has about sized up our situation
in the current issue of Harper's Weekly
when he says: We have paid dearly enough
for submitting to be beSieged by them in Ma
Mia, where every egg and every quart of
milk and all market produce was fixed in
price by the inSurgent tax collectors, and
where the fresh articles of diet, an urgent
necessity III the hospitals, were often impos-
Slple TO OBTAIN because the insurgents inter
Tered with the market men and robbed the
peasants so much at the octrOi that it did
not pay them to bring produce to the town.
But still more to be regretted has been the
humiliation of our soldiers. who have pa
tently endured a situation which would
have been impossible in any other army,
and all because no one was willing to take
rights as successful belligerents. The whole
history of the capture and occupation Of
Manila has yet to be told. 1t would prob
ABLY be lnJudicfous at this moment to pub
llsh many facts IN detail. but the secret of
so far as the establishing of our authority
goes-has been due to the unwillingness of
any one to assume any responsibility.
When Admiral Dewey landed Aguinaldo
and his immediate following at Cavite, and
practically made them a present of the
place with the captured Spanish arsenal"
says Mr.. Miller, they naturally considered
this act as a tangible proof of recognition
as a necessary ally. During the siege of
Manila Aguinaldo was very persistent in
demanding some status as an ally, or at
least some consideration as a possible CO.
operating factor in the capture of the town,
but no formal notice was ever taken of his
demands, nor was his force ever co-operated
with in the investment of the town. unless
our occupation of a portion Of the insurgent
lines be called cooperation. The insurgents
resented being totally ignored In an official
way, and at the same time being made use
Of to hold the miles of swamp around the
tOwn-eVen the lines in front of the camp
of American troops at Jambo. They were
not informed of the plan TO capture the
town by the combined action of the land
and sea forces, but of course followed us
into Manila on the day Of the surrender.
No effort was made by our troops to occupy
the Spanish works on the line of the de-
lenses, and the insurgents took possession
of them all, with the single exception of the
fort San Antonio Abad, which had been
'bombarded by the fleet. They fixed their
lines wherever they saw fit, without any
protest from the American authorities, and
in Malate held a strip of territory which
completely separated one part of our lines
from the other, so that they held an UNI
interrupted zone entirely around the town,
from Malabon on the north to Malate on the
south. They then proceeded to establish an
octroi and to collect taxes at the markets
and various other places. The held the
water works, and only allowed the water to
he turned on after much delay, as a special
favor which might at any time be ~rescinded.
They controlled the railway and the Pasig
river above the town. The trains were per-
mitted to run only on condition that no for
cation was allowed on the Pasig except by
written permission of Aguinaldo.
They turned the Spanish works from de-
fensiVe to offensive positions. They made
little attempt to conceal the fact that they
were importing rifles and Maxim guns and
they recruited actively and drilled with
great diligence in all the suburbs of the
town. In CaVite they continued to Starve
to death the Spanish prisoners within the
AtA4No - tAA ~ 0tAA u SllANk that
we had nothing to do with their prisoners,
and went so far as to march away those
whom General Merritt had ordered to be
served with rations. The fate of part of
this lot is, by the way, we'll known, but
nothing has ever been heard of the re-
mainder. The result of all this has been
to develop in the minds of the natives a
well-grounded notion that the Americans
are afraid of the Filipinos, for on every oc-
casiOn where a show of firmness would have
had a most salutary effect, we have backed
down in a very ignominious fashion. The
affair of the water works is a notable illus
tratiOn of our methods.
Oh Aug. II two companies of the First
Colorado Regimen were sent out to take
possession of the pumping station of the
water works, about five miles outside the
town. A small outpost of the insurgent
army disputed the passage of this detach-
ment, and while the officer in command was
making up his mind whether it was adj
visable to force his way through the insur-
gent lines a message came from headquar-
ters for the expedition to return to town.
Later on, when General Otis insisted that
the insurgents should evacuate the suburbs
of the town, this same insurgent force. haV-
ing had experience with American methods,
refused 10 leave their positions, and actually
held them for days after the date of the
ultimatum, and only evacuated the DISPUTED
territory at the repeated orders from the
revolutionary headquarters at MaIolos. A
hundred other cases might easily be cited
where we have made a very poor showing
in the eyes of the natives, who have no no.
ton Of respect for any one which is not
based on the consciousness of superior phys