The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-07-13
any deceit, malpractice, crime or mis-

any uScelt, malpractice, crime OF his
demeanor.'
'1-There is no merit in the objec-
ton that the accusation. which is for
cause named in the fifth subdivision
of 402, Is preferred by person not au-
thorized by law to inform the court of
the matters therein charged. True. 41S
of the code Of civil procedure, in pro-
viding that proceedings under the Sec
ond, third or fourth subdivisions of
4O2 may be taken by the court for mat
ters within its knowledge, or may be
taken upon information of another,
omits reference to the fifth sub-divi-
sion; yet subsequent sections, notably
420 and 42s, contemplate that accusa-
tions may be brought for the causes
mentioned in the fifth subdivision; and
in any event, the mere failure express
ly to prescribe the medium through
which the court may be informed of
conduct constituting cause sufficient
for disbarment or suspension will not
be permitted to deprive the court CT
the right to adopt some appropriate
method of enabling it to take cogniz-
ance of the offenses denounced. 1t is
not reasonable to presume that the
legislature solemnly enacted law and
then Intentionally sought to destroy its
efficiency and force by omitting to pro-
vide remedy. We think the proceed
ings under the fifth subdivision may
be instituted and maintained in the
same manner as those brought under
subdivisions 2, 3 and A.
$50 much of the accusation as
charges conspiracy to secure by the
corrupt use of money the election of
members of the legislature who would
be favorable to Clark, and also that
part of the accusation alleging that
Welcome and his co-conspiratorS paid
out large sums Of money to aid in the
election of such members, with the un-
derstanding that the money should be
used corruptly to influence the action
of the electors at the polls in voting fo:'
such members, are severally indefinite
and vague. as well as uncertain. The
motion to strike is granted as to these
averments, which are made in the first
and second paragraphs of the sixth di-
vision of the accusation; in other re-
Spects the motion is denied.
3-We are of the opinion that the
design of the legislature in enacting
the first subdivision of 402 was to make
1t incumbent upon the court to remove
an attorney and counselor upon receipt
of certified copy of the record of his
conviction in this state, subsequently
to his admission to the bar, of either a
felony or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, whether such felony or mis-
demeanor was committed while acting
in his official capacity or not (417, AIS of
of the code of civil procedure). In such
cases the court has no discretion, but
must adjudge that the name of the Of
Tending attorney be stricken from the
rolls and that he be precIuded from
practising in any of the courts of the
state (42S of the code of civil proceed
ure. in the matter of the disbarment of
John Bloor, q Montana, 49); and 1t
seems immaterial whether the felony
was perpetrated before or after his ad-
mission to practice. On the other hand,
under the section last cited (42s), IL an
attorney be found guilty of an act fall.
ing within the purview of subdivision
8, the Judgment may be either removal
or suspension, according to the gravity
of the offense charged. This sub-div-
sion does not make conviction a pre-
requisite to the removal or suspension
of the offender, nor does 1t require that
the crime or misdemeanor must be one
involving moral turpitude: neither is
its opera ton limited to offenses COM
mdtted in the state, nor Is 1t confined
to crimes or misdemeanors committed
by an attorney while acting in his Off
cMl capacity. Duelling and accept
ing or sending challenge to fght
duel are denounced as felonies
but moral turpitude is not necessarily
involved in either. Every libel is de-
clared to be misdemeanor, but not
every libel involves moral turpitude;
and so with many other offenses. 1t Is
L,
der the first subdivision of 402, disbar
an attorney upon inspection of the rec
ord of his conviction of any of the
crimes named; nor would the court, in
proceeding brought for the cause
stated in that subdivision, have the
right to examine the evidence for the
purpose of determining whether or not
the circumstances of the particular case
disclosed the presence of such turpi-
tude, for moral turpitude must inhere
in the nature of the crime, and not de-
pend upon the ethical quality of the
acts constituting such crime. But by
virtue of subdivision 5, the court is
empowered, not commanded, to remove
or suspend in such cases according to
the gravity of the offense as shown by
the proofs adduced. Subdivision I has
to do with public offenses necessarily
involving moral turpitude. of which
convictions are had in the courts of
Montana, and to none other; whereas
sub division 5 is broad enough in it's
language and sufficiently comprehen-
sive in substance to embrace all public
offenses wheresoever committed by at
torneys, and to clothe the court with
jurisdiction of an accusation imputing
to any attorney the commission of any
crime or misdemeanor wherever the
offense of itself involves or the cir
cumstances of its perpetration reveals
the facts attending it evince such gross
misconduct as exhibits his unfitness to
remain in the profession The fifth
subdivision Notwithstanding its un-
grammatical construction. seems to
have been enacted eX industria to the
end that the court may purge the bar
of those attorneys whose characters. as
illustrated by the evidence establishing
the truth of the charges preferred, lack
the attributes of morality which are an
essential to admission and which should
be required as a continuing condition of
the right to practice if bribery of a
member of the legislature is a felony
little VI. of part / of the -enal code).
If the accused be guilty of the con-
spiracy and many briberies charged
against him in this proce5 ding, it Is
manifest that he has perpetrated helm
Gus crimes, involving neral turpitude,
thereby proving his unfitness to prac-
tice the honorable profession Of the
law Whether this court will exercise
its jurisdiction in cases of crime or
misdemeanor falling within the pur-