The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1899-11-18
THE COMPETENCY OF OILS.

We print elsewhere some interest
ing comments upon the s,aJe of affairs
in the Philippines in which the author,
Mr.. Albert =. Taylor, cri,icises Genera.
Otis management Of the war The
points made reduce themselves TO the
pos.u.ate that If OTIS were a strong
commander ne could. without much
delay. bring the fighting 10 an end.
For ourselves we confess 4 doubt as
10 the justice of this conclusion. Gen
eral Ods has a small army in a large
country With from 10000 10 $4,000
mcn-the former figure standing for
his active force during he first years
.clmEligu-he has operated amidst an
unfriendly population OF severaI mir
| lions and against a guerrilla army ag-
gregating $4,000 men and capable OF
indefinite and instant ree"f1r'o~ s~- \
guerrilla war is the most difficult OF
any for a General, engaged in legiti-
mate operations, to contend w4.a.
Napoleon was fairly worried out o.
Spain by ambushed banditti. One of
his Generals lost Hayti TO a rabble OF
black partisans. Spain has wasted the
lives of a million brave men and lost
4 billion or more OF money during the
last two hundred years in the vain
effort TO subdue unorganized revolu-
t'Onary bands in Cuba and the Philip
.vgv4 H. h1. -,
guerrillas. During the American Civil
war Colonel Mosby with 500 mounted
farmers, lineal descendants of the stout
swashbucklers of Sumpter and Marion,
terrorized the Union border for two
years and kept 10000 Federal troops
idly guarding points which he might
possibly attack. MOsby was too much
for Custer, Sheridan and Grant and his
little command held it's ground until
after AppomattoX IN the light of
these examples of the efficacy of parti-
san warfare We cannot justly blame
General Otis for his failure. in year
and half, to capture or destroy the
elusive native riflemen who haunt the
wide swamps and jungles of Luzon.
Were dashing Phil Sheridan in his
place We do not believe the showing
would be better.
There is small propriety in demand /
ing the recall of General Otis because |
of his alleged failures, though it would |
be right enough TO supplant him on ,
grounds of military etiquette. 1t is az |
anomaly to have the bulk of the United !
States Army, engaged in active service |
under the command of a junior officer. |
General Otis is Brigadier OF the |
Regular Army and Major-General of !
Volunteers, while there are several full |
OF the Regular Army
TO sit in offices and chafe
under derisive public sympathy. Too
much OF that sort OF thing has occurred
the appointment OF Shaftsr.
4 mere sworded tumetaction, 90 co.u-
mand at Santiago. The impartial pub
lie would welcome the assignment to
duty in Luzon of man like
Miles or Brooke. though not, we be-
ieve. on any other grounds than those
,: common fairness TO General Otis
superior officers.
1t must not be forgotten. however,
hat Otis has suffered no defeats in
he Philippine war. Whenever he has
net the enemy, and that has been
,ften, the enemy has got the worst of
L Were the latter willing to stake
on pitched battle We
might hear OF some very decisive re- g.,
suits TO General Otis credit; but it is
surely not the American commanders
'ault that the Tagals see their duty
differently. He is doing all he can.
,ut the enemy declines TO risk his
'ause on the field of possible
$-