The times., 1899-05-11
THE SIGNAL CORPS
In TIE PHILIPPINES
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
Report to General Greedy.
Splendid Record Made by the Or
ganizatiOn.
The Telegraph Used to Most Excel
lent Advantage in Aiding the
Army's Movements.

General Greeley, Chief Signal officer of
the Army, has received from Lieut.. Col.
r. E. Thompson, Chief Signal Officer at
Manila, report, under date of March 4,
of the operations of the Signal Corps in
the campaign against the Filipino in
surgents, from the outbreak Of hostilities
down to the time the report was made.
The report says:
'-As previously indicated, the situation
at the beginning of February was prac-
ticaIIy that of hostile armies in contact,
our men chatting at the restraint, the in
surgents believing us held back by fear
alone, each eager to get at the other
In anticipation OF trouble, company
of signal men was assigned TO each divi-
sion Of the army. the commanding officer
of the First company reporting TO General
Anderson with charge Of lines south OF
the Pasig, and with Instructions TO main
tain communications as troops advanced,
the Eighteenth company reporting 10 Gen
eral Macarthur with similar orders Tor
the maintenance OF communications north
of the river
Several Of our outposts, notably those
of the Nebraska, Montana, Pennsylvania,
and Colorado regiments. had been pushed
SO far to the front as to suggest trouble
10 wires in case of an attack; few rock
cts were therefore placed at each, and
code prearranged.
The positions assigned the various
commands in case OF action were such as
10 encompass the city with a line OF battle,
the hanks Of which rested on the bay. At
each flank a flag station was established
for communication with the ships OF the
navy anchored OF shore in position 10 en-
flade an attacking enemy.
..Our relations with the Filipinos were SO
strained, and their hostilities so apparent,
that on several occasions the call to arms
had been sounded AT these times, the
rapid assembling of the army in position
had the practical effect of developing
shortcomings and perfecting preparations
so that. when the outbreak actually oc-
CURED, everything moved without friction
and without mishap save to the telegraph
Orders had been issued, en1oining upon
guards and patrols that tampering with
telegraph lines be not permitted In the
darkness of night. however, the long
stretches 10 advanced outposts, especially
those through thickly settled native dis
tricts-were at the mercy of the hostile
element, despite the most constant watch
fulness, and as soon as firing began the
exterior lines north of the Pasig went
down at once. II was most comforting
however to see rockets almost immedi-
ately, announcing disrupted circuit, at
tack. and ability to Withstand, from each
of the threatened positions.
ION the night OF the ith, about $50
O'Clock rife shots were heard from the
direction of Santa Mesa, suburb east
ward of town, held by the First Nebraska
The firing soon grew to such proportions
as TO leave no doubt of its meaning, anc
shortly dispatches came in stating thai
the affair began by our patrol hating al
insurgent, who refused to obey; that ;
shot was then fired at him, but, without
1fr,rr +ha CHI h.. hqn IN
blockhouse. from which point the insur-
gent guard fred at random in the direction
of our patrol, who returned the fire. A
number of scattering shots on both sides
then followed. The Nebraskans at ono,
turned out, and 1t was not long before tbs
action became general
Running the Battle Line.
"on the 5th our troops took the initia-
tive, and. advancing in all directions. rar
the battle line flush with the farthest out
post, and in many instances passing be
yond the outer telegraph station. so tha
II became necessary to carry forward tn
wires. This part of the work was exc
cuted with celerity. and at all times
after the first disheartening breakdown. /
was possible for the different commander
to transmit and receive instructions witt
speed and certainty, and the increase IL
the use OF the wire due to field operation
may be somewhat judged from the fac
that the number Of messages handled oi
the day preceding the battle was SIS, an
on February 5. the day OF the action, wa
1,120, since which time the use of tn
telegraph has steadily increased. toda,
showing the messages handled TO be ! ,2oe
with total Of &c, ,53i for the month. an
SO great dependence has come TO b
placed on this method of communication
that Instructions have been issued, per
mitting only such as have a military bear
ing to be handled on occasions when tn
rush Is greatest.
1T is questioned II an opportunity eve
offered where the telegraph could be NOR
effectively used by an army than In III
present case. Our operations thus FAR hay
been entirely on interior lines. the move
ment Of troops simply entailing the rapi
running forwsrd of light lines. In the cas-
OF the caloocan fight ian occasion on whic
an advance required the laying OF consider
able wire) telegraph Office set up at tn
extreme front was ready within a few min
utes after the forward movement ha
ceased. and the division commander an
nounced his success and the results almos
Immediately after their achievement.
During the burning of the norther
part OF the town and the invasion of Tond
on the 23d field office was cut In In th
heart OF the blazing district almost q
soon as operations for expelling the insuI
gents had become effective.
"It is possible to reach any command
depot outpost, or individual OF the arm,
from twenty-nine different telegraph OF
fees, the only delay being consequent O
the great volume of business. and the ne
cessity for precedence in order of import
ance. The greatest credit is due the sia
nal officers and men who have made tn
extensive telegraph system so perfect thi
IN case Of engagements at any part OF III
long line OF battle commanders eo-operai
with certainty. surgeons receive pronl
information and have their Ambulance
almost Immediately on the ground. ar
the supply departments send their tram
portation, ammunition. rations, etc, whe
required, without the least delay.
Credit 10 Captain Russell.
ITO Captain Russell is due the create
credit for the operations on the north. Il
front OF the line of battle OF which he w
to keep himself and commanders informe
being something over ten miles in lengt
II is not unlikely that personally he I'm
most satisfaction in the rough, dangero
work performed by himself officers, al
men under the heavy fire of the 9th.
during the advance on Caloocan; but 1t
probable that the commander whose Z
vision he served would award equal cree
for the success OF his service with the fie,
1Af.|~rN ~ :,