The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1899-04-28

| forty-five, Kellehmann forty-five, Reille
| forty-four, Vandamme fortyIfour, Rapr
forty-three, Clausel forty-three, Suchet
Pajol forty-three, Gerard forty-two, Drouot
| forty-one Exelmans forty. All these men
who had so often led their soldiers to
victory, had no longer their old faith in
the success of the French arms. They
knew we'll what formidable ornaments
were preparing against the Emperor. Di-
vision reigned in the general staff; dis
cipline suffered from the effects Of general
suspicion; the soldiers believed only in the
Emperor, they all wanted to be passed in
review by him. They believed that they
alone had brought Napoleon back to the
Tuileries. The army of 1915. sensitive, I'M
disciplined, distressing its chiefs, troubled
10y the fear of treason, but ardent for
vengence, was capable of the most heroic
efferts. Never" says NJ. Houssaye, did
Napoleon have in his hand a more dan
gerous or more fragile weapon"
Napoleon had made his plan Of campaign
early, long before the breaking out of hos
tilities; it was based on that of the Allies,
which was known to him. Six armies were
to cross the French frontier-four from
Maubeuge to Bale; the three others by
way of the Alps. Napoleon decided to
concentrate an army of 10000 men on the
northern frontier to fight separately the
English and the Prussians, and then to
deal with his other enemies. 1t was neces-
sary for him to operate so as to hinder the
junction Of Wellington and Butcher. The
Allies did understand his movements of
concentration. On the 18th of June, when
Napoleon had already a foot in Belgium,
Wellington wrote a long letter to the Gar
in which he said that he would assume the
offensive at the end Of the month. Blu
cher, few days before. wrote to his wife
from Namur: I'VE shall soon be IN France
We might easily stay a year longer here,
for Napoleon will not attack US" 1 will
not follow NJ. Houssaye into all the par
ticulars of the campaign. After Cnarleroi
was taken. Napoleon and Ney had an in
terview. The Emperor told Ney TO take
command OF the First and second corps,
to follow the enemy on the road to Brus-
sells, and to take position at a cross road
called Quartre-Bras. Ney, prudent for the
first time in his life took position only at
some distance from Quartre-Bras never
theless, Napoleon had succeeded in estab-
fishing himself in the centre Of the enemy 5
position.
After Byron, after Thackeray. NJ. Hous-
save gives us a description Of the eve Of
Waterloo at Brussels. He is rather severe
on Wellington. At the ball of the Duchess
OF Richmond, Wellington was very gay;
he entered the room only toward mid
night:
This whole day he obstinately kept his
troops dispursed at four, eight, ten. fif-
teen leagues from each other, by which he
fattered himself to have repaired his grave
fault were pitibIe. If mis- orders had been
executed, a gap Of four leagues would have
been opened between Nivelles and the Dyle
a gap through which Ney could have ad-
vanced half way to Brussels without fir
ing a gun, or have fallen IN the rear OF
the Prussian army and caused its utter
destruction. Fortunately for the Allies,
some Of the subordinates OF Wellington
took 1t upon themselves 10 act without
awaitina his orders, and others intelligent
" disobeyed those which. after so much
time lost, he decided 20 give.
I leave 1t to military judges to weigh
the value Of these remarks NJ Hous-
save, on the other hand. defends the En-
peror against the imputauons Of theor-
etical s-rategists ike Charras (who wrote,
during his exile under the Second En-
pre-. minute account Of the battle Of Wat
erlool. who denuunce Napoleon's indeci-
sion and torp0r Of mind during the cam
raign. Lord Wolseley has lately made
similar criticisms. but. II ne judge OF Ma
poleon's state OF mind by the incessan,
orders he gave during those momeatous
days, Il Is difficult 70 admit that his in
telligence was impaired
we.Iington's and Bluoher's meeting near
the village OF Brye must have been very
impressive. Il took place before the bat
tie % LiEny. which ended n the defeat
and retreat u the Pr1ssian army During
the battle. Napoleon cent Eine dispatches
% Marshal Ney. with whose hep ne hoped
TO anniniste completely the army -
Butcher. but Ney was no more the ssnas
man" said Napoleon AZ s. Helena: he
had become TOO prudent, and had neglect
81 70 occupy the p,o<st5o1 a Quarsrs-Brss;
his divisions we're dsspur@eG. and ~hen
Napoleon himself determined - attack
Quart-e-Bras. ne had % dght real battle
agains- Wellington TIE ssati5e wss lost
BY him. o. rather ended without any Re-
suit; as in ire evening ne EngTsa and re
French resumed nearly the same positions
th4y had IT the morning. WITH the ii1s--
ence only fhat ire EagsSa we-s uow n
force 81 pos tscus where before they rad
only detacE-neutS- Wien Wellington hard
az the oesass q Ere F-asSans a. L1Env Ard
:heir retreat CT the Ware. re determined