The people's journal. (Pickens, S.C.) 1891-1903, 1899-03-23
AN INSURANCE DECISION.
The Supreme Court Declares What
fs the Liability of a Mutual In
suranCe COmpany,

surance Company.
The Supreme Court has rendered an
Important decision In an insurance
case, the opinion being giving given
by Justice Pope. The case came ur
from Sumter County, but tho company
ts the Mutual Insurance Company OF
Greenville, whose attorney is Hon.
Joseph A. Mccullough. Mrs. Iona e
Joye brought suit for reco very Of 81, ,O0O
face value Of policy on property de.
stroyed by fire. In the policy it is
stated that this being Il mutual insur-
ance company, the policyholders should
be governed by the bylaws of the con-
Germ. Mrs. Joye allowed an assessment
be reinstated her property was dc.
stroyed by fire. One of tho bylaws
stated that in such q case the loss must
| net be paid. The supreme court sus-
| tanned the circuit court, which decided
! against Mrs. Joye.
The opinion of the court was rem
dered by Associate Justice Pope, and
was concurred in by the entire court.
After stating the case and the objec-
tions to the ruling of the circuit court,
the supreme court goes on to say:
I'VE have examined the case with
great care. for while q contract for in
surance Ia nothing but o contract be-
tween parties, in it's last analysis, still
1t involves very nice caro- in giving q
proper construction, because OF stipu-
In general terms such contract. Here,
for instance, the policy of the company
makes reference to bylaws and the ap-
plfcation of the insured for such insur-
ance, although such bylaws and appli-
cations are not recited in the policy.
Hence In order to determine what the
contract between the parties actually
may be reference Of necessity must be
had to those papers.
"As the title given by law to the de-
fendant Is what is known as q mutual
insurance company, to distinguish it
from what Is known as the old line or
stock insurance companies, Of course
one Of the features of the former is that
persons whose lives or property are in
sured by 1t are members of the insur-
ance companies, with q liability to con-
tribute for embership therein, and q
plan of assessment OF the members to
cover expenses and losses.
Nov what is the particular contract
here in question 1t Is that the plain
tiff agreed in her application for insur-
ance to be bound by the bylaws which
the defendant was by it's charter
authorized to prescribe. The very
policy issued sets forth: That the
amount Of loss is to be determined as
per charter and bylaws Of this com.
pany., BY tho written application of
the plaintiff for membership an insnr-
ance she stipulates: 1t is agreed that
thero Is no contract OF insurance until
the application is accepted and the
policy or certificate is issued, subject
to the conditions and stipulations
therein contained.' The I'd section sof
proved December %, 1884, is in these
words: Such insurance to be for loss by
ire, wind or lightning, upon such terms
as may be fixed by the bylaw Of said
corporation Section of the bylaws
makes 1t the duty Of the secretary to
notify policyholders of assessments.
Section II provides that losses shall be
paid by Pre- rata assessment. Section
Ia provides that property insured shall
be liable to assessment until the policy
is cancelled. Section 10 Is in these
words: All assessments must be paid
within thirty days after written notice
is mailed. If not paid the policy shall
be suspended, and be liable to assess
ment until cancelled. Suspended poll
c!es shall be reinstated without extra
cost by assured paying back assess-
ments, provided that the property be
pended
NOV, Ia this case at bar, the plain
tiff herself introduced testimony show
ing that two assessments were unpaid,
to wit: One issued in December, 1896,
and one issued 9th January, 1897; that
the secretary of the association notified
her that her policy was suspended for
failure to pay assessments on the 9th
of February, 1897. That hor property
was destroyed by fire on the 18th Of
March, 1893, and that she did not for
ward the money for the assessments
past due until after the fire. So that
by her own testimony she showed that
she had violated her contract, which
violation, by the terms Of said contract,
vitiated her policy.
"But she attempts to show a waiver,
by reason OF her loss having been ad-
overlooking the fact that sho had stip-
ulated in her proof of loss that tho
furnishing Of this blank to assured, or
making up proofs by adiuster for COM
pany, Ia not to beconsidered as a waiver
of any of the rights Of the company
Again, 1T was suggested that the
president Of the company, by his letter
to her dated April %, 1888, had stated
that her claim would be paid and there
by there was a waiver Of the right to
regard her policy as vitiated by her
own act OF failing to pay tho assess
ments before the loss by fire.
ut 1s quite true ouch q letter was
written, but 1t was followed by one
some time afterwards denying all
liability: There was no proof that any
change In the condition Of plaintiff had
been the result of the first letter of tn
president
'"rhe result Of Our reflections upon
the matters set out In the brief covered
by the three exceptions is that wo are
unable to sec any reversible error in
the order for non-suit.
"It is the judgment of this court
that the Judgment of the circuit court
be affirmed."
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