The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-03-19

was almost immediatelT determined that his
presenGs there demanded the capture OF the
Key West ceased to be m efficient naval base.
Though the water of tho port was sometimes.
golfers being brought alongside. the necersfty
for Selling n temporary base was. at once ap-
soon as possible. lust as il had been in he old
days. Key West there and then became only
OF secondary importance 70 the nnyy,as ~ was
Atlantic. ports.
The lesson is obvious. Dewey had set up
and Sam pson followed suit at GUANTANAMO.
Our permanent bases are only permanent, in
they should use them 1t Is u mistake 10 sup
nose,,os 10 50 often doneLthat ne base. make
bases already made are adopted in war
is nothing TO be said. Dewey objective was
the Spanish fleet. He struck at It in the usual
S way' o GSi' di} Witt al he Hsf IikeI atteFW VI al t ac'
corling to strateGical routine.
The American position In he matter o. tao
tics began by being exceedingly anomalOuS.
The United States were fully expecting. and
spending a good deal of money and care in de;
attack which they themselves never dreamed
of making. The Americans expected all their
coast ownst to be blown about their ears; hHt
towns about Spanish ears. except very speciall"
and. very half hcartedly. after their army was
ing what was expected Of him bv the ignorant.
took care TO leave no Cuban town unborn
G m,1ka H.. No %i,t thst ! q iIa@ the ofbsr si acme ne t r.,
Atlantic make II certain-that popular belief
in the hombardment OF towns by ships has
has only repeated the lesson OF all former wars,
namely. that this is not a thing TO he expected
Five days after the declaration Of war. Mr..
Secretary, Long ,telegrephed to Admiral Samp;
nlnntal fhn lnnp. aatn lliahnI nraptioa nj war
in this respect: While the department does
not wish a bombardment Of forts protected by
destroy light batteries which may protect yes
sells you desire to attack. II you can do so with
ou, sSp pos IRE. 70 % h "nNEo gY I'M thon wGTss xS NE &c o6 p
authority. They. only dwell in the ima gina
ton Of the uniformed multitude. And then
idea that Havana could be carried by a close
attack in the batteries. and afterward held by
the navy alone. The wiser c%ounsels Of author
ity prevailed against an attempt that all his
remnarrfaTie that 'Mr. Long should have men
ordertoget at tho ships they defended. because
in all ages this has been q legitimate object.
feHiinc ships very often fulfil their OBJECT.
"A very. significant. commentary on the use
fulness OF batteries in protecting towns was
offered BY Commodore Dewey at Manila.
There were found batteries protecting the
their protecting rover by firing on Dewey's
ships. Dewey replied by message. not by gun.
II tho batteries did not cease ar,pg he would
were thenceforth silent; Really. the extreme
Of paradox was reached.
| general failure Of the Spanish batteries 20 con-
tend against the AMERICAN guns teaches a
cr heiief1sometimes expressed in 50 many
words-than. TO say that once a fertilization.
a aITa Sfms q to rim. .he would 1ar Become if E oSsG Ssilt
but il you laid ont the same money on "a fort or
battery that had to be ready to contend with
ships. that would remain. and not become OBJ
solete. But il there il one lesson more clear
than another to he drawn from this war. It Is
{ detsn q yoF ba ,PtTha II th6ps "s t 1Hns s' FrnW ob iseo
lete quite rs fast as ships do. Batteries. such
as those required at Cnyitf to DO their an;
pointed work. cannot be built and armed and
left. They are only ehips on and
Admiral Colomb expresses surprise that no
legitimate use Of torpedo boats was made on
either side in the war, and he conclude, that
the status Of the torpedo boat Is lust what it
was before the war. The Aimital adds: A.,
attack on the spanish ships at Manila bv Com
modore Dewey and that resulting from the at
his squadron. In ench OF !hese cases all the
spanish .hins we're DESTROYED. while the AMER,
S Sesta snaps na and the ss" ehsTac a. a." Of the tee d ss |
tlon would have beer news to us II they had not
been foreshadowed by the results Of the battle
Of Yalu, Admiral SAMPSON brought forward
Of the lessons q the war: Without doubt this
| was 30, DuC tn0 IA Tie o. 1tlu Udu hITpuuS Intu6
the Lesson contirmatory. and not new. This
terrible destruction had no parallel in the days
before steam and shells though we we're not
wrecks and shambles surrender to conQuerors
that had not lost a mast or a man: Slnope had
later taught what could be done in destruction
but. speaking for myself | am bound to
Santiaeo have shaken my faith in the HISTORICAL
method more than any occurrences Of modern
times. l had certainly imagined that sur;
| rAnlnr -Ntt1l rFnnnhn hAGfT md / hnh
even gone so far as TO suppose that It would be
killed and wounded that would. determine sur
here are three battles where there has been no
real surrender; and. otherwise. all destruction
comforts me bv remarkinG that the nearness
Of the shore has in each Of these cases had TO
do with the results. and that In a sea fight out
OF sight OF land the old rule might remain in
tact. There may be something In the remark.
though somen Of the Chinese ships when beaten
w sirn. d hnS th 20 q i am W AFRAID that HnsnS %e m mafti aieoH q
the barbarities Of war. The old rule certainly
waste Of life. the commander bowed to fate and
6ueror. We seem to say. now. that the fruits
Of victory must he denied to the conqueror at
all hazards and that the spirit Of the savage
sad one. Perhaps it is my feeling that turns
ms from this view and makes me think OF
Regarding the pure tactical questions in
volved. it becomes plain that Dewey quietly
took full advantage OF the superiority Of his
guns and his gunnery. and placed himself In
80 distant a position that neither ships nor bat
teries could make an adequate reply to his fire.
/ The thing was terribly businesslike on the
American side. with q pathetic parade OF quix-
otto gallantry on the other.
In the ease Of Cervera. 1t has seemed to me.
and ] think TO most Of those with whom ] have
discussed the matter. that his only chance was
to have come out of port in close order in limo
ahead, and to have made at his utmost speed
for the centre Of the American ships. Samp-
son was prepared with two orders OF battle.
single column and double column. in line ahead.
tervera's chance was that the suddrnness OF
his approach and the cOmpartneSs Of his for
nation. might have found the American fee
not fully formed. so that the fear of hitting
friends might disturb the aim Of the American
gunners and given Cervera a loophole. But the
entire failure of Spanish speed must have made
almost any plan; however well arranged. fu-
tile. In the result. as the Spanish ships came
out one by one. and turned at once to starboard
to run alongshore. thew showed no tactical aim.
and loft II to the Americans to follow them up
as in a general chase and perfectly free to use
their guns 10 the best possible effect.
Il am sure. however. that we must all feel
that the discussion Of material pros and cons
Is much complicated by II profound conviction
Il the dominating value of the man behind the