The times., 1899-06-26
MONDAY. JUNE 20, 1899.
Must Face the Crisis.

On his return to Washington this week
President Mckinley will find himself
forced to face the Philippine crisis, and
exert himself 10 raise and forward re-en-
forcements 10 General Otis as quickly as
that can be accomplished. 1t is not now
doubted that our war authorities viii at
once attempt to enlist the fun number OF
troops allowed by law, although it is pos
sihle they may not presently admit the fact.
The situation in Luzon has developed such
serious phases and possibilities that even
the hesitating Commander-in-Chief at
last sees that any further dilly-dallying
might result disssjrously to his future
Moreover. his ten. Jrary escape from his
political keepers al the Capital has enabled
him 10 learn of the real popular sentiment
regarding the Philippine blunders OF the
Administration. and that there is univer-
sal and indignant demand that he send
soldiers enough to Manila to crush the
insurrection. and establish our sovereignty
and respect for our flag throughout the
archipelago.
a mysterious despatch from General Otis
on Saturday was forwarded to the Presi-
dent at Adams Mass. The New York
World" claims to know that it contained
an appeal for help. and statement that
cur present forces were threatened with
a necessity for retreat-probGbly meaning
a retreat on Manila proper. Such mes
sage may have come, but, whether it did
or rot, what the World" alleges is a
fair deduction from the conditions as they
are admitted even by the War Department.
and these admissions. notwithstanding. are
constructed TO throw as much mystery as
possible around the actual situation.
1t IS stated in Administration journals
that General Macarthur is liable to an
attack in force at San Fernando. thirty
five miles north of Manila. They add that
this will mean an attempt by Agulnaldo to
break through MacArthur's army and ad-
vance on the city, TO attack it in coniunc-
lion with the southern rebels now on
Wheaton's flank and rear at San Francisco
de Malabon. II will be remembered that
when Macarthur retreated from Candaba
to San Fernando, his reconnoitering par
ties found the mutineers massed at point
a few miles to the south of the latter, and,
OF course, between him and Manila. Since
that report reached this country nothing
has been heard of any serious fighting at or
near San Fernando. as far as the public
is informed, and it is confusing to have
the impression given out, without expla-
nation. that Aguinaldo has voluntarily
opened the road for our army toward the
city, and has moved his forces all the way
around TO MacArthur's rear. In the ab-
oF dva 70 ha
lIeye that he has done so.
Administration officials have admitted
that General Otis might be compelled to
detach a part of the Manila garrison to
help our northern columns out of a pre-
carious situation, Notwithstanding the
danger such a movement would involve. of
an insurreetion OF the DENLY "friendlies."
and an attack upon the weakened lines
around the suburbs. including the water
works. II Macarthur had Aguinaldo north
of San Fernando. and the railway open
thence to Manila, as claimed at the War
Office. it is difficult to understand why
our troops should rot find il feasible TO
retreat down the railway line without need
OF reinforcement. On this account the
alternating silence and misleading state
ments Of the authorities are calculated to
excite suspicion that the position of Mac
Arthur and his column Is much more un-
satisfactory than the country has been al
lowed TO know. and that Aguinaldo is
really between our men and the capital.
Several things point to careful prepara-
tion by the Administration to cover its
tracks and escape condemnation. in case
it should be forced to confide unpleasant
tidings TO the public. For example. in
one organ We observe an apparently in
spired note Of astonishment that General
Otis should have so long concealed the ex-
treme gravity OF the situation from the
ready to send all the re-enforcements any
body could ask. and has only been de-
TERED from providing them by the insist
ence of our commander that he would
not know what to do with more than
thirty thousand men,
II will be interesting to hear what Otis
himself may have to remark on this per-
sistent yarn of the War Department con-
eerning what Adminlstrationists are be-
ginning to call his dangerous optimism II
he ever made the representations attrib-
uted to him, though by no means gener-
ally. his acts would seem to belle them.
When II became known in Manila that the
Washington authorities had determined to
allow him no more than the number OF