New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-12-27
THE TREASURY AND THE STOCK PANIC


The cause and cure of the stock panic Will
evidently be discussed and misrepresented as
much as any financial event of the last decade
not excepting President Clevelands sales or
bonds Secretary Gage refers TO the disturb
ance as fresh evidence of the inadequacy OF the
existing monetary system, but possibly fails 10
see how it may be regarded by those who may
criticise his action in n spirit not wholly
friendly For they will cite statements by the
Secretary himself, the very day before his first
interposition to relieve stringency in Wall Street
by purchase of bonds. rs conclusive proof that
this step could be justified only by interests OF
the Government, as he held that no emergency
existed in the money market which justified In
reference II there was not such an emergency
then the difficulties Of speculative interests are
scarcely evidence that the currency system was
, not adequate for public needs, and the critic
may say that the offer TO purchase bonds with
out a compelling emergency was liable 10 be
construed as an assurance that the Street could
look to the Treasury for help through purely
speculative troubles.
The historical fact is that the spectators did
not then liquidate, nor were they compelled by
The banks TO liquidate. as they have done since
Possibly both did rely. the critic may say upon
further nterposition by the Treasury, which
came when the deposits OF internal revenue re-
ceiptS in the banks were largely increased. But
this step also was either beneficial 10 the inter
csts of the Treasury or II was not. IL IL was,
then il need not be regarded as step for the re-
lief Of the money market in an eXigency justify
ing Government interposition; II II was not
then the steadily growing difficulty in the money
market had clearly rendered the step as justif
able one or two weeks earlier as II was when
actually taken. and the unfriendy critic may
say that it was in fact so timed to serve
speculative rather than public ends
The kindly disposition of the Secretary to
make such use of his powers as TO aid business
interests surely deserves no criticism. Doubt
less he believes most sincerely, as his friends DO
that the measures taken by him are entirely
proper for the Treasury, and, II so, they are not
10 be blamed merely because they incidentally
help some operators in securities and many
hanks But the point which needs attention IS
that these steps form a legitimate part, In that
case OF the monetary system which now exists
and has been so much censured II II is ade
ouate with these il has needed only earlier and
fuller use OF these powers 10 prevent the disor-
ders which they have helped to cure. II 1t is
well for public interests only to keep large
part Of the receipts from internal revenue in de-
positary banks there is no reason why any sur
plus OF revenue beyond theGovernment redemp-
lion fund and a moderate working balance
should not be thus kept at the service Of COM
merce until needed by the Treasury so that
what has been called a great defect OF the ex-
listing monetary system would appear 10 be only
a defect in the management Of the Treasury
until last week.
As matter of fact. the general business of
the country has not suffered from any monetary
stringency. The most positive testimony 10 that
effect is given by many of the leading bankers
who united to relieve the stress arising from
speculation II was eminently ut that this
remedy should be applied by the bankers them
selves, because it was by loans Of the banks that