The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1899-01-27

sacrifice of dignity. Grover Cleveland
and Benjamin Harrison have both ap-
| peared as lawyers and argued causes
before the supreme court, when there
| as presidents, had appointed. When
someone jOked Mr.. Harrison about it,
| he said he had been promoted from the
| second to the first office in the United
States.
THE JUDGE AS A MAN
I find myself talking about the law
| yer instead of the judge, when a due re-
| spect requires that the latter should
| wondered how a man feels when he
! becomes judge, when he thinks of the
| great powers he is to WELD, and the aw-
| full responsibilities that must rest upon
| him while he sits in judgment. If per-
| lection is required anywhere, it is in
| the judicial Office, and yet, the judge is
| only human, and when off the bench he
may, perhaps. be subject to human i'm
projections. In speaking of judges and
! lawyers as distinct classes, 1 would
| not have you suppose that judges are
not, themselves, lawyers, for frequently
| they are; but the judges point of view
and the lawyers point of view are quite
different The lawyer plays for vic
| tory; the judge, if he be worthy the
! name, is seeking only to do justice be-
tween man and man according to the
law. The judge is not the court until
he takes his seat upon the bench, and
then he becomes impersonally the voice
and organ of justice, the majestic en-
bodiment of the law. Among the tradi-
lions of our profession, none is more
sacred than respect for the court, the
deferential attitude which lawyers al
ways maintain toward the bench, and
it is a happy thing that it is generally
deserved. have heard it said that
judges enjoy the adulation they receive
from lawyers when causes are on trial,
for incense is ever sweet to the nostrils
never touched a profounder depth
of human nature then when,
in the memorable meeting of
those who were to do the deed for
Julius Caesar, he makes Decius declare
to Cassius, Casca and the rest, that
men may be betrayed by f1atterers, and
adds:
''But when tell him he hates fatterers,
He says he does, being then most fiat
tered
When lawyers speak of their entire
confidence in the learning, the wisdom
and the sense of justice resting in the
! bosom of the court, they mean it all,
but, alas! the decision sometimes shocks
their faith and shows how confidence
may be misplaced. We say "Your
Honor from force of habit, but it is
perfectly true that generally speaking
the bench is governed by a high sense
of honor, and we could not give judges
a more fitting title. 1t is, however, an
open secret among lawyers that the in
fallibility of judges is only prima facie.
Our system of appeals recognizes and
presupposeS the possibility of error,
! until you get to the court of last resort,
where wisdom sits enthroned OF
course, even the highest courts are some
times wrong-they have often been
wrong in my cases-but litigation must
end somewhere, and so after we get
over our disappointment we submit,
only wishing there were another court
to which we might go. All! it is that
other court, that invisible court which
does not exist, that would make every
thing right and give US the victories we
deserve.
RELATION OH BENCH AND BAR.
1 thought when I was invited to come
here, that knowing the wrongs and
grievances which we, of the bar, have
suffered would gently touch upon
some things we can not speak of in
court. Here, as understand it, we are
all on terms of equality. Judges can not
assume lofty airs over US who are not
annointed-untiI they take their seats
on the bench tomorrow. 1 am coming
to a tender point in the relation of
bench and bar, namely, the mutual
courtesy due from each to the other
We know, for it has been ingrained in
our education, the respect due from the
bar to the bench But who has ever
told judges that they, too, owe some
thing to the ministers of justice who
present causes and interests which are
infinitely important to those who are
before the court? The administration
of justice, which is a solemn function of
government, should be carried on in a
w
yer is not respectful to the court, he
commits a grave breach of good man
nerS, but when a judge takes adVan-
tage of his position to insult and hui
initiate a lawyer, he shows how unfit
he is to sit upon the bench. In nearly
thirty years of active practice, I am
bound to say that have seen many
more inexcuSable exhibitions of bad
temper on the bench than at the bar.
I beg you not to think that am making
any complaint of judicial manners, but
L. how fr1fr
combat between lawyer and judge. The
lawyer must yield because the judge
has the last argument, which is the
Sheriff'S lock and key. A small Judge
has a tremendous advantage over
large lawyer, and sometimes he delights
in exercising it. After all is said about
respect for the judicial office, and (Which
is entirely different thing) for the
person who fills it, it should not be
forgotten that the bar is in intellect and
in knowledge, greatly superior to the
bench; because, as Uncle Chester Thorn
as used to say, There are more on
EN- The bench is taken from the bar,
and the judges were once the same or
binary kind of people that we are. Of
tentimes they go back to the bar after
serving their terms on the bench, and
then they know how much more diff
cult it is to be a good lawyers than it
is to be a good Judge The greatest liV-
ing American judge is a Kansan-DaVid
J. Brewer. He is to the bench of today
what John Marshall was in the early
er. the expounder of principles on lines
of natural reason and inherent common
sense. We all know him a judge and
love him as man. His manners on the
bench, like his manners off the bench,
are the natural outgrowth of a good,
kind and generous heart. Once after
very dry and tedious argument in a
patent case, he came down from the
bench and meeting a friend who was
of the legal profession, he told him of a
remark whispered to him by the judge
x1rI1r 70 h hill