The Topeka state journal., 1899-11-03

ION the same day Commodore Dewey
telegraphed Mr.. Pratt: Tell Aguinaldo
come soon as possible The necessity
for haste being due to the fact that
the squadron had been notified by the
Hong Kong government to leave those
waters by the following day. The
squadron left Hong Kong on the morn
ing of the 25th and Mrs Bay on the
9th. Aguinaldo did not leave Singa-
pore until the 26th, and so did not ar
rive in Hong Kong in time to have a
conference with the admiral
1T had been reported to the commo-
dore as early as March 1, by the United
States consul at Manila and others,
that the F'ilipinOs had broken out into
instruction against the Spanish au-
thOrity in the vicinity of Manila and on
March 80, Mr. Williams had tele-
graphed, five thousand rebels armed
in camp near city. Loyal to US in case
of war.
Manila it was found that there was no
insurrectfon to speak of, and it was
accordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo
to come to CaVite on board the Nc
CullOch.' He arrived with thirteen OF
his staff on Nay 19, and Immediately
came on board the Olympia to call
on the chief, after
which he was allowed to land at Cavite
and organize an army. This was done
with the purpose of strengthening the
United States forces and weakening
those of the army. No alliance of any
kind was entered into with AguinaldO,
nor was any promise of independence
made to him then or at any other time
The commission report then rapidly
sketches events now historical 1t tells
in substance how the FilipinOS attack
ed the Spanish and how General Ander-
son arrived and AguinaldO at his re-
quest removed from Cavite to BacOOr.
Says the commission:
Now for the first time rose the idea
of national Independence. AguinaldO is
sued proclamation in which he took
the responsibility of promising it to his
people on behalf of the American gov
ernment, although he admitted freely
in private conversation with members
of his cabinet that neither Admiral
Dewey nor any other American had
made any such promise"
The report states that Aguina1dO
wished to attack the Americans when
they landed at Paranaque, but was de-
TERED by lack of arms and ANN unition-
From that point on there was a grow
ing friction between the Filipinos and
the American troops
There were no conferences" says
the report, between the officers of the
E1l1plnOS and our officers with view
to operating against the Spaniards, nor
was there cooperation of any kind.
! There never was any preconcerted op-
eraUOns or any combined movement
by the United States and FihpinOs
against the Spaniards.''
Reference is made to Aguinaldo's de-
mand that he be allowed to loot Ma
Mia and take the arms of the Span
iards. The latter demand is said to
confirm the statement that he intended
10 get possession OF the arms TO attack
( the Americans. Further evidence of
the hostile intentions of the F'ilipinos
was found in the organization of pop
! ular clubs" which later on furnished
local militia to attack the Ameri-
cans.
The DEGREES of the Filipino congress
are also cited as we'll as the making of
bOlis (knives) in every shop in Manila
1t IS shown that a considerable element
in the Filipino congress wished to ad-
uress TO Presldent Mckinley a request
not to abandon the FilipinOs Cat this
stage the Paris conference was discuss
ing the future of the Philippines.
The president was also to be asked
his desire as to the form of govern
ment he wished to establish. But all
this time, AguinaldO was preparing for
war and delaying these messages. and
1t was understood that the attack would
come upon the first act by the Ameri-
can forces which would afford a pre-
text.
A brief chapter then tells of the lack
OF success attending the effort made
at this time by General Merritt through
a commission to arrive at a mutual
understanding with Aguinaldo as to the
intentions, purposes and desires of the
Filipino people. This brings the story
up to the outbreak on the evening of
the 4th of February, with the attack
upon the American troops following the
action of the Nebraskan sentinel
Ihe commission, in concluding this
chapter, says:
After the landing Of our troops
AgulnaIdo made up his mind that it
would De necessary to fight the Anerf-
cans and after the making of the treaty
OF peace at Paris this determination
was strengthened. He did not openly
declare that he intended to fight the
Americans but he excited evervbOdv
and especially the military bv claiming
independence and it is doubtful whether
he had the power to check or control
the army at the time hostilities broke
out
Deplorable as war is. the one in
Whlch We are now engaged was In-
aVoldable by US. We were ATTACKED Nv
DoIo' adventurous and enthusiastic
army No alternative was left to ms
except 1gnOminiOus retreat It is NOT
70 pc conceived of that any American
would nave sanctioned the surrender
OF Manila to the insurgents. Our obIi-
galonS to other nations, and to the
friendly F11pinos, and to ourselves and
our nag demand that force should he
met by force. Whatever the future of
the Philippines may be there is no
course open to US now, except the prose-
cutlon OF the war until the insurgents
are reduced to submission. The com
mission is of the opinion that there has
Deen no time since the destruction of
the Spanish squadron by Admiral
Dewey when it was possible to with
draw our forces from the islands either
with honor to ourselves or with safety
to the inhabitants"
The commission then takes rp the
conditions of the country at the time of
lnelr arrival, comparing it with condf-
t1ons existing at the time they left a
snort time ago. A vivid picture is given
habitants, in and about Manila. 'sThe
situation in the city" says the COM
mission, was bad. Incendiarv fires oc-
CURED daily. The streets were almost
deserted Half of the native population
had fed, and most of the remainder
were shut in their houses. Business
was at standstill. Insurgent troops
everywhere faced our lines and the
sound n ra VT-ac