Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-10-26
NEW FOREIGN POLICY
This Country and England to Make
Common Cause in the Orient.
STRENGTHENING ASIATIC SQUADRON
Ultimate Purpose Of Acquiring the
Philippines.
THE TRADE WITH THE EAST

The Philippine question is broadening out
so as to comprehend the whole problem of
the orient. A senator who has the conf
dence of the administration said yesterday
that IN the discussion of the in the
Philippines and contendng over what
should be done to or for the natives of that
group of islands the professors and the
politicians were but scratching over the
surface and not reaching down into the
problem with which the government is
dealing; that the Fiipinos were only an in
cident.
We are strengthening our naval force in
| a manner disproportionate with the ser
vices the conditions in the Philippines ad-
nit of it's rendering in aid of the sup
preston of the insurrection. The battle
ships and armOred vessels there and to be
sent there are of a class not especially ser
viceabe in dealing with the Philippine war.
1t is to be still further very substantially
strengthened. 1t may be necessary to re-
call the oregon for an overhauling, but If
SO the Iowa will take her place. One of
these great fighting engines will be kept In
the vicinity of Chinese waters, while the
other will be at San Francisco or cruising
off our Pacific coast.
lnlS is IN compliance with the demands OF
a broader policy than the mere subjugation
| of the Filipinos. 1t is intended to main
tain a naval force on the Asiatic station
| superior to that of any other power ex
| cept Great Britain in those waters. Rus
STA is preparing to largely increase her
| naval force In that quarter, but the British
and American squadrons viii probably be
maintained at a strength to make them, to-
gether, the equal Of all the others COM
| bined.
Threatened InrOads China.
Before the question of dealing with the
| Philippine Islands arose, while the islands
were still in the possession of Spain and 1t
was not anticipated that they would ever
become a part of the domain of the United
| States, the problem of dealing with the
| eastern question" was under considera-
| ton by the President, the Secretary of
| State and the leading men in Congress who
are familiar with International matters.
When England threatened seriously
with difficult complication in that quarter
and the partition dismemberment OF
China seemed imminent, it was being con-
sidered what part this government would
take in the impending struggle for suprem-
acy in the orient Mr. Hay, succeeding Mr..
Day as Secretary of State, entered the
State Department thoroughly imbued with
the idea of friendly cooperation with Great
Britain to maintain the common interests
of the two countries against the threatened
irroads of the other powers.
Attention was temporarily diverted from
the eastern question" by the more imme-
diate concern in the war with Spain and by
a relaxation of the tension between Great
Britain and the other powers for a breath
ing spell.
Our Interest Drawn to the Orient.
When the question came up before the
United States whether or not the cession
of the Philippines should be demanded of
Spain a condition of peace, and the
President was reluctant to have this coun-
try assume responsibility for possession so
remote from our shores, influences both in
this country and in Great Britain, which
were alive to the importance of the situa-
ton in China still to be adjusted, were
exerted to bring about the acquisition of
that group of islands by the United States,
so as to secure to an interest in the
orient which would at once compel and
enable us to participate in the adjustment
of the eastern question which must In
evitably come
The men in the Senate most familiar with
this matter talked earnestly with the Prest-
dent Of the Importance of the Philippines
to the proper protection Of our interests in
the orient, and 1t Is said that the British
| ambassador had long conference with the
President, during which he pointed out the
danger that If did not take the Philip
pines Spain would sell them to Germany,
and that a great international war might
result from this disturbance Of the balance
of power in the orient, and that a failure
an TO hnl1 I. i-l,
unfriendly to the interests Of Great Britain
| and be an abandonment of all ambition on
| our part to share in the development of
Chinese trade.
The Presidents Original Policy.
Prior to this the policy of the President,
as impaired to Mr.. Day, the head of our
| commission at Paris then negotiating
peace, was to- retain possession of but one
of the islands as a naval and commercial
station.
1t was then the impression of some of
those most eager In advocacy of an ag-
gressive foreign policy, with a participation
in the affairs of China, that the President
did not fully grasp the question, but they
were satisfied that determination TO re-
tain the Philippines would inevitably lead
to the adoption of a satisfactory policy as
to China.
Some ApDrehensiOns.
The management of the Philippine affair
since has been most unsatisfactory to
some of the most ardent of these trade ex-
panstonists inasmuch they have feared
that by the method in which the matter is
being handled the Philippine Islands were
being made the final object to be attained,
the Chinese question being lost sight Of
and our prospects of trade development In
the orient being jeopardiZed by the loss of
good swilr' and a display Of maladroitness
The comment of some has been that the
President having got the Philippines in his
| eye. could not see beyond them, and that
| the upshot Of 1t might be that our progress
| in the east might be confined to the
comparatively inconsequential acquisition
| Of that group Of islands. This apprehen-
| sion Is still entertained and some of the
| most provoked and dissatisfied critics of
| the administration on account of the con-
duct of affairs in the Philppines ara ex-