The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-17
Worcester's Special Plea.


evening in Chicago by Dean c.
Worcester of the Philippine
commission, III favor of the atiminfstra-
TONS policy in those islands, reads too
much like special plea to carry
great deal of weight. In sober truth it
scarcely touches thae substance of the
issue at all, being made UP from be-
ginning to end of technical bubbles
such as usually characterize the argu-
ments Of special pleader with a weak
case. A few sample points from his
address will serve to illustrate his line
Of argument"
He states that mo American ever
promised Aguinaldo independence for
his people" A man who will seriously
make such a statement as an "argu-
ment" in favor of forcible annexation,
certainly will never win distinction as
logician, whatever he may accomplish
on other lines. The claim that we can
deny to a people the right of self
government merely because we never
promised it to them, is not only puerile
as a piece of reasoning, but it shows
no just conception Of the difference be-
tween right and wrong
The failure on the part Of President
Mckinley to give the F'ilipinos any
assurance that there was even a pos
sibility of independence for them, at
any time, however remote in the future,
is the fatal vice in his policy What
Dean c. Worcester invokes as a de-
Tense, is the very wrong that is com
planned of. Moreover the point is wholly
without merit for the further rea-
son that no American except the presi-
dent was in position to make any such
promise. 1t may be said that even he
did not have authority to do SO, but
he certainly had as much authority to
assure the Filipinos that their rights
should be regarded as he had to de-
clare that they were our subjects by
conquest and purchase"
Then Mr.. Worcester gravely assures
us that there was no true cooperation.
between our forces and the Filipinos
except in the fact that we fought a
common foe Just what distinction he
seeks to make between a true" CO.;
operation, and a "co-operatien'' with
out the prefix is not clear; but 1t is
clear that Aguinaldo went to the
islands at the instance of Admiral
Dewey, that Dewey furnished him with
arms, aided and encouraged him in the
| raising of his army, acted in concert
with him in just about every warlike
! move that was made, and treated him
both as an ally and a friend-all Of
| which appears from Dewey's own state
ments, official and otherwise. What
| more should have been done in order to
make the cooperation a true one,
| when it is ascertained, will doubtless
prove an interesting addition to the law
of military and naval cooperation.
But Mr.. Worcester does concede that
| Aguinaldo was in the field with an
| army, and that we were fight
| ing a common foe" Having done
this it was incumbent upon him
| to explain how it happens that
| when the common foe" was de-
feated the fruits of the victory all be-
longed to the United States even to the
extent of subiugating the natives who
| had aided conspicuously in defeating
"the common foe
We are told further that we needed
no help in taking Manila-that Dewey's
guns had the city at their mercy
Grant that, but how about the Spanish
army that Aguinaldo had penned up in
the city? Could Deweys guns have
driven them into the defenses of Manila
and prevented them from escaping,
without the aid of Aguinaldo's army?
1t was months after Dewey's victory
before We had an army at Manila
strong enough to take the offensive
against the Spaniards, and all this time
it was the native army that was doing
the fighting.
In his reply to the alleged claim that
the war could have been averted by
negotiation Mr. Worcester is unfair
and misleading. 1t was never denied
that there We're negotiations with the
Filipinos, but what was offered to
them? Was it the turkey or the owl?
The negotiations consisted simply of
| a refusal to recognize the Fllipinos ms