Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-02-20
It's Influence in Shaping Affairs on
the Island.
POWER OF GEN. MAKING GOMEZ
Still the Greatest Factor in Ad-
justing Matters.
INSURGENTS ING


| tuDd1 politics Is TO nh lne PUBIC mfh0
| for while. 1t won't be annexation and
| antf-annexation politics, many supposed.
| That phase is not for the immediate future.
| 1t will come later. For the present there is
| nothing of annexation. The burning issue,
| or. as the Cubans put it, the palpitating
problem, is the payment of the insurgent
| troops. The only body whose authority to
| deal with the subject is recognized by all
| classes is the Cuban assembly. The Ques-
/ ton now is how far the assembly Will find
| itself in accord with General Maxine Co
| mez The men in the assembly who are
| opposed to Gomez put the matter the other
way and say the question is how far he will
| be in accord with the assembly but they
| are wrong. During the instruction there
| was a provisional government of the Cuban
| republic, to which Gomez, as the head of
! the army, acknowledged allegiance, and
| from which he nominaly derived his au
| thority. Nevertheless the provisional gov
eminent did what Gomez wanted done. He
| acknowledges the assembly as the repre-
! sentative of the Cuban people in peace.
| The point now to be determined is whether
he and this boCy are agreed II they elsa
gree the point will be to determine which
! has the popular support.
| Gomez Will Prevail.
| General Gomez has committed himself
to the disbandment of the fnsurgent
| troops. Some members of the assembly
have threatened to 'censure him for his
| course. 1t is probable they will think bet
| ter of the censure. Gomez and they agree
| that the $1,000, 200 from the United States
| is not enough. He is willing to take il and
begin the work of disbanding, while pro-
| Nldlng the ways and means for fuller set
| tlement, which will be a complete salts
faction of the claims of the insurgent SOL
dlers. Some of those who oppose Gomez's
influence want to take no steps until they
| can pay the larger amount-possihIy $40
I1tr &c h.,
| issue Will come. Whatever the intermedi-
| ate steps l do lot think there is any doubt
OF the ultimate outcome. Gomez will pre-
| vail, because he will have the majority of
the Cuban people back of him. He will
keep his word 10 President Mckinley At
ter that he will develop his program for the
political future of Cuba.
1t may be that this program will disa n
| point people IN the United States who
thought the military occupancy would
orit naturally INTO a protectorate. Gomezs
position IS thai Cuba is neither free nor
| independent so long it is occupied by
American troops. His announced purpose
Is to bring about a condition which will
render the pres ence of the troops unneces-
sary. The length Of time until this condi-
ton has been reached is subject to wide
dlnerence of opinion among the Cubans
themselves. They expect to see a consid-
cradle body of the troops Withdrawn during
the early Sprlrg months, but they know
that Will not end the military OCCUPANCY
Some think it will end in a year, some in
two years and others in three years Gen.
Gomez is said 10 look upon Il wear as the
period He always makes known his own
opinions, and it Is not safe to take nm
authorized reports of his views 1t is only
lately that the insurgent leaders began to
understand thai the time depended largely
on themselves. Since then they have been
less inclined to Impotence. One of the best
OF the generals has been outspoken in
saying that the United States government
ought to withdraw at once and turn every
| thing over to the Cubans Yesterday A
cuban friend met me. Have you seen
zen ne asked. | had not seen
zen - for a fortnight, and on that
occasion he was in very critical mood
with respect to the American government
w ell, said this friend, hes changed his
hilha He wants free Cuba, but he thinks
We ought to have an American protectorate
Tor twelve or fourteen years" This insur-
gent general has not changed his mind be-
cause OF outside pressure. He has not been
Influenced by considerations OF office 1t
happens that he has been interested in
some business enterprises which are t,k
ing shape And as his attention becomes
absorbed in them he frets less about tbe
pontlcal future of Cuba. He is frank and
sincere, and have no doubt that when the
Tune comes he will declare his oninions
RMS Is an individual case, and is NOT To
De taken as indicating general change
OF sentiment, yet it shows how cbanpss
may occur.
10 Disband fnsurgent TrooDs
Snow the same grasp of the situation that
General Gomez does. He recognizes that
the hrst step towards terminating the
American military occupancy is the dis
banding of the insurgent troops and their
return to peaceful pursuits He has held
lnese troops together as a mass until a
uehhlte move toward paying them was
made Every effort TO undermine his in
Huelce tailed, as it was bound to fail Now
mat proposition has been made which
can be taken as a basis for disarmament he
IS ready to begin. When the Cuban army
Is dissolved Maxine Gomez is left without
following in arms. His Willingness to
pring this state of affairs about is the best
evidence of confidence in his own strength
Ii there are others who want to dispute his
leadership they will have the opportunity
TO test their ability even terms 1t is a
common thing to hear Cubans, who dislike
GGmez, say that he is strong with the
army because he was its commander hut
that he has no following among the other
classes of the population. And insurgent
officers who have felt his dispieas,re saw
ne Is strong with the people because they
DO not know him, but that he is unpopular
win tne lnsurgent troops, whom he has
treated with harshness. The truth of it
all Is that Gomez knows the Cuban peopIe
better than they know themselves He will
only lose their confidence if he seeks to
guide them to antagonism toward the
United States.
Unea siness has been shown over the
meeting of the assembly. Some conserva-
tive Cubans dread lest it harm their cause.
Some Americans who have manifested their
interest in the welfare of the island fear
lest the irreconcilabies cause a reaction
In the friendly sentiment of the people of
the United States. I have been unable to
share either the dread the fear. II the
roth of the Havana cafes alone were to be
taken into account there might be cause for
uneaSiness. But the Havana cafe politi-
clans do not control. Ten days ago tney
had decided to discipline Maxine Gomez
and to retire him from further share in the
affairs of Cuba. In three days they began
to hear from the country. Since then they
have been content with the vague talk of
the assembly "censuring' him The coun-
try people fought both actively and passive
iy the unending combat with SPAIN No
matter what the passing spleen of the hour
may be in Havana or in Santiago, their
voice must be awaited before seeking to
determine what is the popular feeling
knowing something Of these country peo-
pie, as well of Havana, 1 have not felt
that there need be worry of the outcome
II the assembly makes mistakes Its mem
bers will in time find themselves without
popular support. The country people want
the insurgent army paid and disbanded
| They look upon 1t an army of liberation.
They have little to sacrifice, but out of
their gratitude they will sacrifice what thew