The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-12-20

why the British are continually surprised
by tho Hawking movements OF the Boer
lines, and the latter may account for some
OF the tactical errors about to be consid-
cred.
Thirdly, let us analyze the British tactics.
In the early part OF the campaign they were
very deficient in cavalry, but light infantry.
properly trained, especially as opposed to
such sow-moving and deliberate enemies
as the Beers, should have done excellent
service on reconnaissance, notably In the
rough country in northern Natal, which is
in reality more favorable for infantry than
for cavalry scouts. But even later on, when
FRENCH had an entire cavalry division at
Naauw Poort, GATACRE was surprised In
his advance from Queenstown. VI course,
the British are under the great disadvan-
tage OF operating In country where
the natives sympathize with the enemy,
but this does not satisfactorily explain
all the deficiencies In reconnaissance work.
For example, even OH the battlefield,
patrol duty to keep up intercommunication
between the parts OF n line seems to have
been neglected, as at Nicholson's Mex,
where one column Of a small command was
allowed to get so completely separated as
to be captured, never having been informed
of the repulse OF the adjacent portions
OF the general line.
The late defeat OF Gen. BULLER's army
at Colenso appears to be another case in
point. II Is to-day considered to be no
dishonor to lose battery on the bat
tletield, provided its sacrifice is de-
manded by the general situation but from
the official report it appears that when Col.
LoNG advanced close TO the river in his
desire to be within effective range" IL
proved to be full Of the enemy" Now, the
artillery's duty was to get within effective
range, but IL is some one else's business to
see that the bank OF the river Is not full OF
the enemy before the artillery is ordered to
the front Again. imperfect reconnaissance
appears to be at the bottom OF the trouble.
Another tactical weakness seems to BIO
,, the failure to occupy positions properly.
| It is incomprehensible why Dundee Hill
| (which cost so dear to retake after tho
Beers occupied it) was not occupied in the
first place. Again, the heights command
ing Ladysmith wero given up to the Beers
almost without struggle, and the town
itself held.
II will suffice to pass in rapid review the
other elements of weakness. The system
OF voluntary recruiting has its disadvan-
| tages The British expected the army
corps recruited for South Africa to be about
| 80, 600 strong, but as IL turned out the
corps did not much exceed $4,000, IL It
reached that number.
As regards preparedness II is only neces-
gary to refer to the weak garrisons at
Kimberley and Mafeking, guarding the
important railroad from Cape Colony TO
Buluwayo, to the insignificant forces on the
: Orange River. covering the Port Elizabeth
/ Railroad and to the comparatively small
! force at the keystone in Natal at the outset
Of the campaign. At home the unreadiness
| Of the Admiralty promptly to transport the
| reenforcements was severely commented
on and the length OF time allowed for
recruiting the army corps was probably
necessitated by the lack Of a full supply OF
clothing and equipment in the storehouses.
The conditions in South Africa demanded
prompt relief, and every moment OF delay
increased the gravity Of the situation, as is
now fully apparent.
The want OF artillery material, both field
| anu siege, III SuuclenJ quantity, uuuc ltSelI
felt very early in the war But this was
not due to an actual want Of such material
at home, only to deficient organization
the lack OF chief Of artillery, who could
demand that the proper artillery guns he
sent and who could be held responsible for
not having them on hand in time. Another
deficiency in organization was the mixing
up OF the units in the two main armies, by
which one brigade OF division would be IN
one army, another in the other, SO that
CLEBYs column had parts OF four different
divisions.
The chief OF all these elements OF Brit
ish weakness is. OF course, the strategy oi
the campaign-the great superiority Of the
: Beers In strategic deployment and strate
gle advance, due to their unity OF plan and
action being everywhere manifest. The
, original inieriorty OF the British In mum
: bers is also prime cause; but each OF tn,
, other elements has had it's effect on tht
, preliminary situation and the subsequen,
= events