The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-06-13
Difficulties OF an
Hrbitrdtion Plan.
From the New York Sun.

HPDllFdIlOn TldU.
From the New York Sun.
m ITHOUGH the latest news from
Ih( The Hague indicates that earn
IL\ est efforts are made to arrive at
II u some definite agreement whereby
war may bs often averted through re-
course to arbitration and mediation,
we are still skeptical regarding the
practical outcome of the projects. Let
US look, first, at the plan for estab-
fishing an international board of arbl-
tration. The British and American
delegates have proposed that the sub
mission of controversies to this tri-
bunal should be, in all cases, volun-
tary on the part OF the nations inter
ested. An international court, the jur-
isdiction of which should be thus cir
cumscribed, would constitute no great
improvement upon the existing state
of things. 1t probably would have lit
tie to do; for two nations, having
agreed to settle a dispute by arbitra-
tion, would, generally, prefer to follow
the existing practice and submit it to
arbitrators appointed ad hoe, among
whom the umpire would represent a
disinterested nation. Foreseeing the
likelihood of such a preference for a
permanent tribunal, the delegates Of
Russia have proposed to assure GER
tain amount of business to the latter
body by specifying a number of con-
troversies not involving a nations
honor, dignity or territorial integrity.
as to which arbitration should be COM
mn a a CT n too
on the International tribunal.
o.
Here, again, we are confronted by
the question, what is meant by the term
compulsory? 1t is conceivable that one
of the cosignatory powers might be
led by an unfortunate experience to
doubt the impartiality of the perman-
ent international court and might, con-
sequently, refuse to submit to it even
controversy clearly belonging TO the
class of cases designated for compul-
sorry arbitration. How is the recalci-
trant power to be coerced into COM
pliance with an agreement made at
The Hague, and, subsequently, embod-
led in treaties? Will the other parties
to the agreement combine to exact
compliance by force of arms? What
we should then witness would be war,
the very thing which the peace con-
ference is aiming to avoid. History
abOundS with proofs that no nation
will permit itself to remain tied by
treaty obligations after it becomes con-
vinced that these are detrimental to
it's welfare Less than fifteen years af-
ter the Peace of Paris, concluded in
1856, Russia announced that it would
no longer be bound by it's promise to
maintain a war fleet in the Black sea.
No attempt to coerce her was made
by the oiher powers represented in the
Paris congress of the year named, and
we may be quite sure that a refusal
to conform to an agreement to submit
a certain class of cases to arbitration
would also go unpunished. 1t is,
therefore, practically useless for the
powers represented at The Hague to
declare that the arbitration of certain
specified disputes shall be compulsory.
Compulsion, if exercised, would be
war, and there is no intention of re"
sorting to that coercive agency. We
abide, then, in the opinion formerly
expressed, that the principal practi-
cal effect of the peace conference, so
far as arbitration is concerned, will
be to stimulate the public sentiment
which commends that pacific method
of settling any controversies to thu
civilized nations of the globe.
o
The mediation project brought for
ward by the American delegates was
originally advocated on the ground
that the mediating nations would per-
form the functions which are dis
charged by seconds in a duel between
individuals. The proposal is that, be-
fore two powers appeal to force, each
shall select a mediating nation, and
the two mediators shall endeaVor, as
seconds in a duel do, to arrange a paci-
fic settlement of the quarrel. Analo-
gies, although sometimes illuminative,
are apt to be delusive. Neither of the
principals in a prospective duel loses
any of his original advantages during
the delay required for a conference on
the part of the seconds. In a duel be-
tween nations on the other hand, as,
for instance, between Germany and
France, or between Germany and Rus
sia, the tremendous initial advantage
which Germany is supposed to possess
in respect of speed of mobilization
would be lost during the period allot-
ted to the efforts Of the medating
| powers. 1t is true that the plan for
mediation laid before the peace con-
ference provides that the acceptance
of mediation shall not have the result
of interrupting or retarding mobiliza-
tion. That is not the point to which
we are here directing attention. The
| point is that Germany could mobilize
he, L. half N
whereas France would require fort
night, and Russia a month to attain
| the same state Of readiness. 1t follows
| that, by the end of the month which
the mediators should haveit Is suggest
ed, for their conciliatory task, Ger
many would have forfeited the tre-
mendous advantage which she possess
ed four weeks before. 1t is obvious,
| too, that if the mediation plan were
adopted at The Hague, France or Rus
STA, If intending to make war upon
Germany, would begin by appointing
mediator for the express purpose of
| preventing it's opponent from turning
it's superior mobilizing powers TO ac-
count and thus obtaining a great start
| o
! Evidently the analogy between the
seconds in a duel and the medlating
friends of hostile nations is mislead-
ing. There are, of course, certain
things which a country not a party to
a war may do for one or other of the
combatants. 1t can, through its diplo-
matte agents, render such kind Offices
as were performed for Spain by France
during the recent war, and as were
performed for German residents In
France by the American minister al
| Paris during the war of 1870. But tc