Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-07-04

the strength Of the confederate forcs
threatening washington was placed at 3d.
CO., while the strength of the federal forces
was estimated to be 1856, and it is stated
that the federal forces had no artillery ex-
cept the guns in the forts around the city.
The 1855 men composing the federal forces
were made up as follows: Provisional bril-
gade, Col. Price, $500; I'd District Regi-
ment, Col. Alexander, $50; 18th Veteran
Reserve, Col. Farnsworth, $50; quarter.
masters employees, 1900; detachment OF
It'll Michigan Cavalry, Major Darling, AGO,
the force being stationed from the right of
Fort Stevans to F'drt Totten. From Fort
Stevens left to Ford De Russey troops of
Gen. Wright and Gen. McCook were inter-
mixed, as follows I'd Vermont 232; Sd
Vermont 212; 147th Ohio, 100 days men,
465; 9th Veteran Reserve Corps, $50; 18TH
Ohio. 1s4 Between Forts Stevens and
guns, 121, and between Forts Stevens and
De Russey, section>fst Maine Battery, two
guns, 112
At dawn Of the 18th of July McCook re-
ports that none Of the confederates could
be seen. Going forward in person, he
found a few stragglers; also a hospital at
Sligo, containing about seventy confeder-
ates, who We're too seriously wounded to
be moved. Not less than 200 prisoners
were taken, he states, and although he
was unable to accurately give the number
of confederates killed and wounded, he
thinks they were no less than the loss on
the federal side, which was $50 killed and
wounded
Thanks to Wright and Meigs.
In making acknowledgment of the serv-
ices rendered by the officers and men under
him, Gen. McCook said his thanks were
due Gen. Wright for his earnest co-opera-
ton in every duty, and to Gen. Meigs for
his willing and untiring discharge of duty.
II regret he wrote officially a few days
later, that I cannot at this distant point
recall the names Of the commanders of de-
tachments who reported to me, but l may
hazard the remark that there never was
before a command so heterogeneous, yet
so orderly. The hale and hearty soldier,
the invalid. the convalescent the wounded
and the quartermaster's employees, side by
side, each working with a singleness of
purpose and willing to discharge any duty
imposed upon him.
General Robert E. Lee thus explained the
purpose Of Earlys movement upon the
national capital in a letter he wrote July
10, 1864, to the Secretary of War Of the
confederate states:
Finding that it would be necessary to
detach some troops to repel the force I'M
der General Hunter, which was threatening
Lynchburg, I resolved to send one that
would be adequate to accomplish that pur-
pose effectually, and, if possible, strike a
decisive blow. At the same time General
Early was instructed, If his success justi-
fled it, and the enemy retreated down the
valley, to pursue him, and If opportunity
offered, to follow him into Maryland.
Purpose of the Raid.
SIT was believed the valley could then be
effectually freed from the presence of the
enemy, and it was hoped that, by threaten
ing Washington and Baltimore, General
Grant would be compelled either to weaken
himself so much for their protection as to
afford US an opportunity to attack him, or
that he might be induced to attack US. At
ter the retreat of General Hunter toward
western Virginia his pursuit by General
Early was attended with great difficulty,
owing to the obstacles in the way of sup
plying our troops. At the same time, the
presence of General Hunters forces in the
kanawha valley endangered important in
terests in southwestern Virginia. 1t was
thought the readiest way to draw him from
that region would be to push down the val
ley and enter Maryland and at the same
time it was. hopSd that the other advan-
tages of such an Invasion before alluded to
might be secured. In addition to these con-
siderations, there were other collateral re-
suits, such as obtaining military stores and
supplies that weEe deemed Of sufficient i'm
portance to warrant the attempt