The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1899-12-12

cality and subjects them to peculiar
rules, or imposes upon them special OBJ
legations or burdens, from which others
in the same locality or class are ex-
empt' citing Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 391.
The law cannot discriminate in favor
of one citizen to the detriment of an
other. The principle of equality per-
vades the entire Constitution.
To secure to all as perfect equality of
privilege and of burden as human wis
dom permits was the chief end sought
by the trainers of the Constitution. To
this all other purposes were incidental
and subo. dinate" Estate VS.. Pennoyer,
So Illinois, 114)
1t will thus be seen that while the
Legislature has power to regulate GER
tain classes of business and occupations
so that their operation may in no man
ner infringe the rights of others, yet
such regulation must be accomplished
in such manner as that it will grant
no privileges to few in exclusion of
all other citizens, or impose no burdens
upon certain persons, an equal share
of which must not be borne by other
citizens of the community.
But counsel for the people make a
distinction between occupations winch
in themselves are lawful and occupd-
lions which in themselves tend to cor
rupt the moralssof a community. They
argue that there are certain calllnSs
which are necessary and lawful to be
followed, and which may be confined
in their prosecution within certain des-
ignated localities, because the nature
of them is such as to injure the lives
and the health, the property, the peace
and quiet of the community, and that
legislative enactments having for their
purpose the regulation of such callings
must be so framed as to enable all
persons who so desire to enter into the
operation of such businesses within the
designated territory. On the other
hand, the claim that in cases like the
one at bar, where the occupation Is
demoralizing in it's influence and de-
basing in it's tendencies, it can be reg
ulated in any manner which may sus-
gest itself to the legislative mind, either
by prohibition. or, if in existence, sup
preston, or by combining it's exercise
within a designated territory or to q
certain set of individuals.
The first contention is no doubt true,
as has already been seen, but l am con-
strained to dissent from their entire
position upon the last-named PROPOSE
ton Their contention as to the power
of the governing body in relation to an
occupation such as is the subject OF
the ordinance in controversy is true IN
part, but, in my opinion, cannot be
maintained in it's entirety. They rely
in this position principally upon the
case of Elk part Tuttle, 81 Cal. page
$50, in which the Supreme Court passed
upon and upheld an ordinance of the
city and county of San Francisco pro-
hibiting the sale of pools on horse races
or holding money or other things as
stake upon any wagers as to the results
of such race, except within the IN
closure of a race track where such
trial or contest is to take place" 1t
will be observed from the language In
quotation marks that the San Fran
cisco ordinance made an exception of
all race tracks. 1t will be observed
from the reading of the ordinance which
is claimed here to be violated that
particular spot, or place, or track is
designated as the exception, to wit:
Agricultural Park. The court in the
Tuttle case, speaking of the right OF
the governing body of a municipality to
regulate or prohibit gambling in the
various modes in which it is practiced,
says: ''The measures needful or APP