The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-12-31
REFUSES THEIR REQUEST
Attorney General Declines to
Interfere.
NO CONSPIRACY IS SHOWN
Mr.. G igg Rules That the Proposed Ac.
ton Does Not Come Within the
Provisions o. the Anti
Trust Law.

Washington, Dec. 3o.-Attorney Gem
eral Griggs to-day returned to the in
terstate commerce commission the
transcript of the evidence taken at,
hearing before the commission last
week In the matter Of the new freight
classiacati ton, with a view to action
by the attorney general under the anti
trust law IL In his judgment the mat
ter should warrant the same.
In his letter to the commission, re-
ferring to the demand of the shippers
that legal action against the railroads
be taken the attorney general says:
~ GU express no opinion on the mat
ter, but properly leave me to determine
whether the facts should warrant me in
applying for an injunction to restrain
the operation of the new classification
on the ground that, in adopting it. the
railroad companies violated the anti
trust law"
Discussing the methods of the rail-
roads In establishing common CLASH
flea ton, the attorney general says:
There is an official Classification
committee, composed of some IA rail-
road officials from different sections.
This committee meets on the call of Its
chairman and upon the request of three
members. At its meetings suggested
SilhiiiSCS dlG NASh SAlebkoS'
as the committee with substantial
unanimity recommends are noted by
the chairman and incorporated into
new official classification, which Is then
submitted to each company for It's in
dividual action Some 60 railroad COM
panies thus Independently pass upon
the classification. They signify their
adoption to the chairman, who, after
the official classification has been thus
/ adopted, files 1t with the Interstate
commerce commission in compliance
with the law" @
Continuing, Attorney General Griggs
says that the legality of the method of
preparing, adopting and filing this of
fetal classification has never before
been questioned. In fact he says, the
question of legality was not raised in
the case until after the railroad Off
! Gals had refused, during the course of
| the hearing before the interstate COM
merce commission, to postpone the time
| for the new classification to take eff
| feet for so days. Furthermore, says
| the attorney general, it is apparent
| from the protests originally filed that it
| Is the changes made, and not the meth
cd of making them, which is complain
' ed Of
Taking up this question of the rea-
| condolences of the rates, Mr.. Griggs
| says:
"a railroad company may raise its
|
discriminate among its shippers, it may
| charge more for short than a long
haul. but none of these acts, however
1 unjust and wrongful, amounts to a vi
4 olation of the antitrust law. TO au-
thorize the attorney general to direct
an injunction proceeding under the law
it must be shown that there is a con-
tract, combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or com
merce among the several states. In the
first place. there is no contract, COM
/ bination or conspiracy shown. There
Is consultation by representative rail-
| road men in committee respecting sug-
gested changes in classification. There
is subsequent independent action by
| railroad companies in the adoption of
| the new classification recommended by
the committee. The testimony taken
| does not show that any railroad acted
under compulsion of comhina ton in
! adopting the official classification. 1t
must be conceded that a common clas-
siflcation by railroad companies OPP
Grating in the same territory Is a de-
sirabe thing. Will it be insisted that
railroads cannot consult respecting
freight classification. or that because
one railway company adopts a certain
classification, another cannot? The
antitrust law says there must be a
contract or combination or conspiracy.
| TITS must be shown. And 1t must be
shown that it is intended to restrain
individual action. This is not shown
in the testimony submitted.
Moreover, there must not only be a
contract, combination or conspiracy,
but 1t must be in restraint of inter-
| state commerce. AS applied to carriers,
this means a combination to suppress
competition. 1t is only by suppressing
competition and arbitrarily fixing rates
that restraint can be put upon inter-
state commerce.
! .srTytz
| ton does not fix the rates. 1t places
| articles in certain classes, but the rates
for the classes are determined by the
railroad companies outside the classifi-
cation. If railroad company main
tains the existing rates the change of
itan article from lower to a higher
class will increase the rate but from
a part that appears in this testimony
every railroad company using the
classification is at liberty at any time
to change the existing rates upon Civ
ing the notice required by the inter-
state commerce act. Moreover, ach
railroad company is free to take any
article out of the existing classifica-
ton by making commodity rate. In
other words. no suppression of conlpe-
tition, no arbitrary fixing Of rates, no
restraint of interstate commerce is
shown.
THE trans Missouri and Joint Traffic
association cases afford no precedent
for the action requested in this case.
Each of those associations was formed
by a contract, under which the compa-
MES selected a central authority to fix
and maintain rates There was an alb
solute suppression of competition. The
power of independent action was de-
stroyed. No company could change a
rate fixed by the mana gers of the assoc
, citation without subjecting itself to a
penalty. ug
IF the testimony submitted showed a
5 combination among the railroad com
: panies to restrain commerce among the
) several states I would not hesitate, to
invoke the rate provided by the anti
S trust law, but to take such action upon
r the face of the facts submitted would
1 not only be futile, but absurd. If there
be a remedy for the complaining ship
r pers. 1t lies in an appeal to your COM
g mission under the interstate commerce
law"