The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-10-10
is |NOPERAT|VE AND V0|O
Statute Providing for Special
School Elections.
IT is TOO AMBIGUOUS
Will Shorten the School Year in Many
Parts OF the State-The County
Surveyor Bill Hold to Be
Constitutional.

! Special Dispatch to the Standard.
Helena, Oct. 1.-TWO decisions of vital
| Importance were announced by the su-
! preme court to-day. Both construed laws
| that have furnished food for much dis
| cussion since their enactment. ....
| The court in an exhaustive opinion de-
clared void and imperative the statute
providing for special elections in school
districts for the purpose of voting money
for the maintenance of schools.
The other opinion, by Associate Justice
Pigott. holds that the law passed by the
last legislature taking from county sur
| veyors the duties and emoluments of
general road supervisors and placing this
| work upon district road supervisors APP
pointed by the commissioners, should
stand.
The result of the first decision will be
that school districts that did not raise
sufficient funds to maintain the schools
by means of the levy made by the coun-
ty commissioners will not be able to hold
special elections to raise the balance re-
CURED, as has been customary, and in
| many instances short terms will have
to be taught. The other decision pre-
drawing the s. per day allowed them as
general supervisors of roads, under the
act of 1897.
The decision in the special school tax
| case grew out of the refusal Of the Great
| Northern railway to pay special school
| taxes voted in seven districts Of Tlathead
| county in 1897. County Treasurer Hill
| burn commenced action against the
| road. The company demurred, setting up
| that the statute under which the assess
ment was levied was imperative and
| void. The lower court sustained the de-
| murrer as to two of the districts, but
| overruled it as to the other five. The COM
| pany then appealed. The case was ar
| gued before the supreme court recently
| and to-days decision resulted. At the
| outset of this decision the supreme court
admits that if the contention of the rail-
road that the statute under which special
elections were held is incapable of being
| executed, and therefore valid assess
| ment can be made is sustained. the result
| will be that not only the taxes involved
! herein will be declared invalid. but also
! that no school district in the state can
| hereafter vote any special tax in aid OF
| its own schools until new legislation can
! be enacted granting the power and pro-
| vldng the method by which it can be
! done. For the statute in question con-
| tains the only provision we have on the
subject.
|
| points out how conflicting and ambiguous
| are parts of it and of succeeding stat
utes as to the form of ballot, showing the
amount of tax to be raised, and pointing
out other Inconsistencies. says:
at can be readily seen that, under the
| provisions of the section under consid-
! Grafton, as it stood in the compiled stat
utes. no limit was fixed beyond which
| the trustees could not go in determining
the amount of money needed, or to re-
| strain the voters in giving their consent
| In the transfer of the provision torthe
| code of 1898 attempt was made to i'm
| pose Il limit in both these particulars
| The intention to do this is manifested by
| the form of resolution to be determined
upon by the board in its deliberations, and
also by the form of ballot required. The
notice required by the old provision re-
mains the same in the new, but is not in
| conformity with the theory of the pro-
| vision just mentioned. 1t does conform,
| however. TO the theory of the old statute.
| which makes the rate found hereunder
! mandatory. The rate under the theory
of the other provision of the new act was
| evidently designed to be fixed by the
| board upon considering the matter furth-
! err at a time subsequent to the date of
| the election. For these provisions can
not be construed to contemplate any
other method of fixing the rate.
In any event, they are inconsistent
| with the provision for fixing the rate as it
| row stands, because they do not furnish
any dividend into which the sum or
amount of the taxable property in the DIS
| trict may be caused to enter in order to
| find the quotient rate. No amount is
| voted which can be used as such dvi-
| dend. The vote must be upon the limit.
| If it be said that the terms amount and
| rate refer to the same thing, and that
the board in the resolution adopted should
| fix the amount as well as the rate, and
| i,sa ho r9t notice n
elusive answer is that the words have
| totally different significance. The former
| means a sum or total, the aggregate.
| while the latter means a fixed measure
| of estimation. These are clearly the sig
| nifications given to these terms as used
| in the statute. Putting the rate limit in
| the notice would not avoid the difficulty,
| because the voter would still not vote on
the amount. The amount could not be in.
serted in the ballot, because that would
| not be permissible, the statute using
mandatory terms in providing for the
| form of this.
Eve therefore have in this section of
the statute, the manifest intention of
| which Is to authorize school districts to
| lew special taxes for school purposes,
| two conflicting theories, with no means
| provided sufficient or adequate to carry
| either into execution. We are therefore
constrained to the conclusion that it is
| imperative and void AS stated in the
| foregoing part or TINS OPINION, we are
mindful of the fact that the courts must
| endeavor to SO interpret a statute that it
will stand.
Eve are also mindful of another
| ourement none the less binding upon us,
that we cannot usurp the power apper-
tanning to the legislature coordinate
branch of the government, and legislate
where it has not done so. So, if an act
of the legislature is so vague and I'M
certain in its terms to convey no
meaning. or if the means for carrying out
its provisions are not adequate effect
i've; or if it IS so conflicting and incon-
sistent in it's provisions that it cannot be
executed, it is incumbent upon the courts
to declare it void and imperative"
The court in conclusion. cites other rea-
sons that, because of the conflicting char
acter of the statute, ii is imperative.
The decision rendered by Justice Pigott
liz regard to the law passed by the last
| legislature repeating the law Of the pre-