The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1899-08-04
the COOPER CASE
The Attorney-General Is
Sustained.
Supreme Court Says He 4 ammo, be
Held to Account for Official
Legal Acts.

professional conduct and malpractice
brought against Attorney General
Cooper by A. S. Humphreys, member
Of the bar, the Supreme Court yester-
day handed down its decision, the gist
Of which may be gathered from the
syllabus, in which the Court says:
Charges against the respondent as a
member of the bar held not sustained
by the evidence.
The acts proved to have been done
by the respondent were done by him
in his capacity as Attorney General
and were not of such nature as
would justify proceedings against him
as a member of the bar.
The Attorney General cannot be held
to account by the Court for his Official
acts done within his legal power.
Justice Frear, voicing the unanimous
decision of the Court and after review
ing the evidence introduced in which
considerable latitude was allowed,
says:
In view of the high official position
of the respondent and the grave nature
Of the charges preferred, this case has
assumed considerable prominence and
has been given much attention by
counsel.
Much has been said in regard to the
conduct of the complainant, especially
in Mt Inv mi inc ist ~ <,f
ticles for the newspapers. His coun-
sci comedies that he was not justified
in pursuing such course after having
gone, through counsel to the court and
after the court had issued an order to
show cause. We shall not comment
upon his conduct in this or other re-
spects, but turn our attention to the
respondent in the case.
AS already said, the complaint was
carefully drawn with view to show
ing malpractice and unprofessional
conduct on the part of the respondent
as a member of the bar. But so far as
appears, he acted throughout as Attor-
ney General. No doubt a member of
the bar may perform acts In some 9TH
er official capacity or even in private
capacity Of such disgraceful, immoral
or criminal character as to show him
to be unfit to continue longer men,
Der Of the profession, and for such con-
duct he may be held to account by the
Court, even to the extent of disbar-
ment. But IL Is not cOntended that the
respondent in this case was guilty Of
misconduct involving moral turpitude,
or, perhaps, any acts Of a character 80
disgraceful as, II not done in his pro-
fessiOnal capacity, would warrant ac-
ton by the Court against him in his
professional capacity. II counsel do
intend to 60 SO far as to make such
a contention as that last mentioned.
we must hold that the facts do not
bear them out. 1t Is indeed not entire
ly clear just what the theory of coun-
sci for complainant is. An attempt is
made to show the respondent guilty of
misconduct as a member of the bar,
and yet in spite OF all efforts to ad-
here to such a theory, it has been
found impossible in both the testimony
and the arguments to avoid showing
conduct, whatever its character, by the
respondent solely as Attorney General.
There are, as already stated, two
charges. The first is that the respond
ent retained and intended to retain
control of both sides of the case. If
by this Is meant that he retained con-
troll of the defense through Mr.. Weber,
as well as of the prosecution through
Mr.. Humphreys, one answer to 1t Is
that the undisputed evidence shows
that such was not the case. Mr.. Web
err did not appear for the Attorney
Generals department. He appeared
for the Finance Department. This was
distinctly understood and announced
on every proper occasion. The action
of the respondent in connection with
Mr.. Weber, so far as his control OF the
case was concerned, was precisely
what 1t would have been IL he had at
the instance of the Minister of Finance
requested an outside attorney to ap-
pear for the Finance Department. And
what little he did in this connection
he did, not as a member of the bar, but
as Attorney General.
The second charge Is that he
abridged the professional rights of the
complainant by not permitting him to
raise a question as to Mr.. Weber's ap-
pearance. Here again the respondent
acted solely as Attorney General. This
Is so manifest as not to require COM
ment. No doubt it was eXasperating
and perhaps humiliating to the COM
plainant to have this restraint put
upon him. but that the respondent In
so doing acted solely as Attorney Gen
eral and moreover within his legal
powers there can be no question.
In expressing these views we do not
intend to express approval OF the At
torney Generals conduct. Neither do
we intend to express disapproyal. We
do not feel called upon to enter upon
a discussion OF all the side issues and
minor points commented upon In ar
gument or to attempt discourse upon
morality or professional ethics, such
AS some Of the arguments seem to In
yite. All We can say In this case Is
that the acts OF the respondent were
the acts OF the Attorney General; that
they are not Of such u nature as, when
done aside from his capacity as an at
torney-at-law, would justify action
against him IN his professional capac-
ityi that the Attorney General is a
member Of coordinate department of