Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-12-14


missioner in chancery of a court of re-
cord. The said certificate also defines
the territorial Jurisdiction OF the officer
70 be the City of Buena VISTA" and
shows necessarily that he was q COM
missioner in chancery of the Corpora
ton Court of the City of Buena Vista,
for there was not up to that time
Circuit Court for that city. Affirmed
w. u TEL. co. V. PRITCHETT.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
July %, 1890.
a WRITTEN COMMUNICATION
WHICH IN EFFECT BLACK
LISTED" A PERSON THEREIN
REFERRED TO AS A "DELIN-
QUENT" DEBTOR OF THE
WRITER. WHEN IN FACT HE
OWED HIM NOTHING. IS NOT a
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
IN AN ACTION FOR LIBEL.
This was an action for libel against
the Western Union Telegraph Com
pany. There was a Judgment for plain
tiff and defendant appealed.
The Court says:
Unques;ionably, the communication
of which the plant fl below made COM
plant gave Use to a cause of oct on. II,
as charged, the same was not in point
of fact true, and was falsely and ma
liciously made. ITO blacklist a person
i'll writing, and thus publish of and
concerning him that he is u delinquent
debtor, when In fact he owes nothing.
tends to injure his reputation. render
him odious, and expose him to public
contempt" Such publ cat on does not
come within any of the definitions of
privileged communications given in
section 3S40 of the Civil Code. AS was
pertinently said in Johnson V. Brad
street Co.: "a contract to pry into and
give informa ton concerning the busi-
ness Of another does not create such q
public or private duty, legal or moral,
us would make a false communication,
Injurious to another, privileg ed." In
the present instance, 1t appeared that
the communication in question was
made in pursuance of q private ar
rangement between the defendant and
another telegraph company, entered
into solely with a view to tn air mutual
benefit, whereby each furnished to the
other information concerning the stand
ing and credit of all persons who were
deemed by it to be of questionable re-
spons:bility in business transactions.
Counsel for the company, upon the ar
gument before us, sought to draw
dist nc ton between the present case
and those above cited, on the idea that
there was n vast difference between
conducting for pecuniary profit, what is
commonly known as a mercantile
agency" and merely entering into such
private arrangement as that above
detailed, with bona fide intentions of
merely making mutual exchange of
reliable and valuable information, nee
essary to an intelligent and profitable
prosecution of the business in which
the parties were engaged. Doubtless,
such an arrangement may be eminently
proper, II its practical operations be
not to injuriously affect third persons
not parties thereto; but. as the only
ground upon which any one could log
ically base a right to enter into an ar
rangement of THIS sort would be his
constitutional privilege of free speech.
the important qualification expressly
made by our fundamental law, to the
effect that every one assuming to eN-
ere Sc such privilege shall be 'respon-
S BILE for the abuse of that liberty" GER
tainly should not be overlooked. In a
word, while one undoubtedly has
right to impart to another information
for which the latter applies with n
view 10 us ng the same for legitimate
purpose. yet communications made un-
der such circumstances are in no proper
sense ptivil, ged, for the simple though
abundant, reason that no sound gu
ment can be advanced why they should
be so considered. 1t Is TO be noted, ia
THIS CUnncrtfvtf,- tttttt, -itfAN fffitr.s Case
supra, it appeared that the defendants
were members of a certai n merchants
association" and were not engaged in
conducting a mercantile agency. So the
point now raised has practically been
heretofore definitely settled by this
Court. Obviously, in making the COM
munication now under consideration
the defendant company was prompted
By the expectation of gain. in that IL
would In return receive like informa-
ton from the Postal Company. It was
not essential to the protection or pre-
servation of any right connected with
any matter in which either company
had an interest that they should enter
into a mutual agreement of the charac-
ter above outlined. Silence on the part
OF either could not have in any way
whatsoever affected 1t to its prejudice.
Neither was compelled to speak in or
der to protect its interest In n matter
wherein it was ever remotely concern
ed. Accordingly. the communication
complained Of cannot properly be said
to be merely one of those STATEMENTS
made with the bona fide intent on the
part of the speaker to protect his own
Interest in matter where it Is en-
cerned," which paragraph 8 OF section