The Morris County chronicle. [volume] (Morristown, N.J.) 1877-1915, 1899-07-28

| that -principled statesman, Senator
Wellington, with the loss of the state
which Schley halls from, Maryland. 1t
charges the Navy Department with ma
| lice, and with sharp practice. From the
other naval men it has, as we have often
said held back all the honors of war 1t
has insulted most sterling officer and
honest man, Sampson, with charges of
positive dishonesty; and, beyond that, it
has sought to deprive him of the credit
due him as the splendidly successful
commander of q victorious navy.
In the view of straightforward parti-
sans in politics, and most of all, Of all
lovers of fair play, the Schley case, as
the medium of scarcely parelleled in
Justice to Sampson and others, demands
the fullest examination and exposure.
There must be many men whose fair
ness of mind has not been destroyed by
the hysteria of Schleyism, who will con-
scientiously review the Navy Depart
ment's report upon Schley's conduct in
the light of the revolving episode laid be-
fore the public by the Hodgson report to
Capt. Chadwick We defy any honest
minded man to 60 over Secretary Longs
statement of facts and conclusions, and
Schley's reply, delivered to the Senate,
without seeing the hollowness and the
sham of the reply and realizing the
wrong done to Sampson and to the other
men of the navy.
Let us begin then with the first count
against Schley, his inaction at Cienfuegos
when under orders to see If the Spaniards
were there, and if not, to start at once
for Santiago, where he was told the Span
iards probably were. To quote Secretary
Long, "Schley, after receipt of these or
ders, had been at Cienfuegos for thirty
hours without having taken any initia-
tive to procure this information.
knowledge that the Spaniards were else
where was got by Commander McCalla,
who, upon his arrival in the Marblehead,
said that he knew of insurgents being in
the neighborhood and would land and
speak with them.
Schley said to the Senate that even if
he had known of the insurgents the
surf would have prevented communi-
cation" Thirty pressing hours were let
pass, during which the sea permitted the
coaling of his ships, and no landing party
was called for! What psychical trans
formation came over the feet which
later, at Santiago, volunteered almost in
body to go to the almost certain death
awaiting Hobson? Had the men who
calamity responded to Sampson been all
chicken-hearts when under Schley? We
will quote Schley:
II Immediately sent Commander McCalla to
make such communication. the result of which
was made to me at $40 p. m. of May "a, and
by which learned definitely that the Spanish
feet was not at Cienfuegos. Within two hours,
at 5:15, started my fleet for Santiago de Cuba.
taWhof r1oeoih1a nd foro odv
to me there can be in all this do not see. l
was on the spot acting under orders which
gave me entire discretion and yet clothed me
with responsibility of going to Santiago only
after was satisfied that the Spanish fleet was
not at Cienfuegos."
An officers discretion" then, as to the
methods of executing an order practical
ly absolves him from performance of it..
Schley lay idle for thirty hours under
urgent orders to search Cienfuegos har-
Dor, and for excuse he puts forward his
discretion" Humbug appears in the
very first of his arguments before the
Senate.
Then follows the tangle of specious
reasoning, amounting, in the eyes of
common sense, to downright dishonesty,
concerning semi-private letter of
Simpsons which Sompson found no oc-
casion to include in his official report.
On the morning Of May % Schley receiv-
ed, by the Hawk, bundle containing
three communications of various dates.
The use he made of them to explain his
thirty hours of delay to the Senate, any
honest mind must call akin to his use Of
Hodgson's correspondence, that is to say,
crooked. The first of these was from
Sampson under date of May 10, telling
him among other things, of rumor
that the Spaniards were at Santiago
The second was personal letter beginn-
ing Dear Schley," dated May 20, dis
cussing the wisdom of his remaining at
Cienfuegos. And the third, dated May
81, was an order that, if the Spaniards
were not at Cienfuegos, Schley was to
proceed to Santiago with all dispatch, .
and if the enemy was there, to blockade
him in port. We give here passage
from Schley's defence of almost unbeliev-
able chicanery:
In addition to this, desire to call special
attention to letter (No. Z of Rear Admiral
Simpsons to me under date of May 2D In
which he incloses telegram of l9th page Il
Executive Document D Cat top), from the de-
partment. and says; After duly considering
this telegram / have decided to make no
change in the present plan, that is, that you
should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. II
the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they
must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to
deliver the munitions of war which they are
said to bring for use In Cuba. / am therefore
of the opinion that our best chance of success
In capturing these ships will be to hold the
two points, Cienfuegos and Havana. with all
the force we can muster. If later 1t should
develop that those vessels are at Santiago. we
can then assemble Off that port the ships best
suited for the purpose and completely block.
ade it, Until we then receive more positive
information we shall continue to hold Havana
and Cienfuegos.
pendix or Executive Document @. but receiv.
ed it on the 3d. and together with No. s re.
ceived the same day, 1t shows that at that
time was expected to hold my squadron of
Cienfuegos,"
On page 5 Of Schley's pamphlet under
Detailed Statement, is this further refer.
ence to the same communication:
Accompanying these instructions was the
following letter, which confused the situation
and threw grave doubts over the location OF
the Spanish feet.
The ssDear Schley" letter Schley's
press friends have made the basis of the
atrocious accusation against Sampson
that by emitting it from his report he
had deceived the Navy Department in
reference to the situation as it concerned
Schley. The extreme meanness of this
charge is plain. Even if the letter had
not been merely supplementary to pre-