Peninsula enterprise. [volume] (Accomac, Va.) 1881-1965, 1899-02-25
THU RIVAL ADMIRALS.
The Naval Controversy Growing
Out of the Spanish War.
SOHLEY'S REPLY TO CRITICISMS.

W. s. Schley having been granted per-
mission to answer the charges recently
made against him In the communication
recently sent to the senate. yesterday
handed TO the committee on naval AFFAIRS
his statement in which he diSclalmS any
purpose of controversy with the navy
department..
The admiral says his orders from
from Sampson on May 10 were to block
AIDE Cicnfucgos. which he proceeded to
do. He had no knowledge that there
were any insurgents about Cienfuegos
who were friendly until the Marblehead
arrived on the 24th. Even had he had
this knowledge on the 23d of May, the
surf would have prevented communica-
ton. On his arrival he sent Commodore
McCalla, of the Marblehead, ashore to
stabliSh relations with the insurgents,
the result of which was made known to
him at $40 on May "a Then, for the
first time, he learned definitely that the
Spanish fleet was not ut Cienfuegos.
Within two hours he started for San
tiago What possible ground of criti-
ciSm." he says. adverse to me, there
can be in all this. l do not see. was
on the spot, acting under orders which
gave ME entire discretion. and yet
clothed me with the responsibility OF
going TO Santiago only after | was salts
fled the fleet was not at Cienfuegos.
He quotes from the dispatch of Samp-
son of May 20. in which the latter says
Schley should hold his fleet off Glen
fucgos. If the Spanish ships have put
into Santiago they must come either to
70 ~
munitions of war which they are said
TO bring for use in Cuba. am. there
fore. of the opinion that the best chance
to capture these ships will be to hold the
two points. Cienfucgos and Havana,
with ali the force we can muster"
AS TO the slow progress toward San
tiago on account of the Eagle, he states
that she was part of the force which
Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
him. and he had no right TO abandon her.
The weather was rough. and not much
better speed could have been kept up.
He had been ordered to proceed eau
tiously.' If, however, he had known
that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago
no consideration for the Eagle or any
thing else would have prevented him
from getting there at the earliest pos
Sible moment.
Speaking of the retrograde move
ments,'' which the secretary. adopting
the language of Admiral Sampson. char
acterizes as ''reprehensible conduct"
Admiral Schley says that in Al years
service never was such language used
to characterize conduct of mine, and
see no reason for it now
AS to the battle of Santiago, Admiral
Schiey says the facts of that contest
speak for themselves. Quoting from his
official report 10 Sampson. in which he
congratulated the commander of the
squadron and said the victory seems
big enough for us ALL he asks the conf
mittee to contrast his reports and those
of Sampson Containing references to HIM
self He continues:
'As to all this criticism Of my course
prior to the discovery by me on May %
of Cervera's fleet. whether from Admiral
Sampson or the department. none OF it
has ever been made by either to me,
and l never heard a word of it from any
one until after the battle with that fleet.
Admiral Schley quotes the depart
ments dispatch of May % in these
words: The department looks to you to
ascertain the fact of the presence OF
the enemy, and that the enemy, if in the
harbor Of Santiago. does not leave with
out decisive action" Commenting upon
this the admiral says: In obedience to
the above order l did ascertain the fact
that the enemy was at Santiago, and the
enemy did not leave without decisive
conflict
Detailing events connected with the
battle of July he says at $40 of that
day Admiral Sampson made signal from
his flagship. Disregard movements of
commander-in-chief" and steamed east
ward to Siboney. This" says Admiral
Schley left me the senior officer pres
ent and necessarily clothed me with the
responsibility of the command" Con-
tinuing he declares that when the
enemy's vessels came out of the harbor
n signal was made from the Brooklyn
this flagship, to the fleet to ''clear ship
for action" Then followed the signal
CLOSE action and this by the signal
''the enemy is escaping westward"
He says the Spanish fleet was coming
westward under high speed. and chang
ing course more TO westward brought the
Brooklyn heading eastward to meet it,
into position where she would have
blankcted the fire of the eastern vessels
of our force. now changing their courses
to the westward. and between them and
the Spanish vessels. Instant decision
was necessary to avoid interfering il
any way or cutting off any of the fire OF
our vessels. as would have occurred if
she had turned towards the Spanish
fleet. now approaching the Brooklyn.
Turning outward left the enemy's ships
uImasked by the Brooklyn and exposed
them to the concentrated fire of our
squadron.
At the final capture Of the Colon at
1:15 p. IN. the Brooklyn was nearest, the
Oregon next and then the Texas and
Vixen. The New York arrived at 2:25
n. M, and the commander-in-chief as
sumed command Of the squadron. Sig
nails were made from the Brooklyn to
the squadron until all signal halyards
were sot away. and then by army code.
In conclusion Admiral Schlcy contends
that the turn of the Brooklyn in the
battle was the crucial and deciding
feature of the combat. and of decided
advantage
He says he made no report of his main
euver in his report of the battle, as its
effect upon the battle was never ques-
ton with him. His last paragraph reads:
Son May 81 1 received telegram from
the commandcr-in-chicf congratulating
me upon my success in locating and
blockading the enemy's fleet at San
tiago II it was worthy of commcnda-
ton at that time I am at a loss to under
stand how it could have grown into
reprchcnsible conduct, as suggested by
Admiral Sampson in his letter Of july
10, 1898, some six weeks later"
Thirty West Virginia Victims.
Cincinnati, Feb. 1G.-West Virginia