New-York tribune., 1899-07-15

Account OF the War In the United ,t sSa'oS ScoS. A.
man nias Ropes IL. D. With. Maps and p Plans. ns.
Part II. The Campaigns OF 1857 o''AV'' w.
XII AIS. G. p Putnams Sons
In this volume DR.. Ropes's STORY OK the O'V''
War" Is brought down to the end OF the year
1880 the last month of which marked by
the disastrous battle OF Fredericksburg As
military history Il is admirable throughout
The style is clear and concise; fnessent'aI oe-
tails are not allowed to block the course OF 'hs
narrative; the strategical problems OF oa'''-
paigns and the important tactical ep'soue' VI
battles are discussed with lucidity ana IoFee'
and the criticism Of the generalsnip oispiayeo'
though always positive and often severe 's' Oh
the whole justified by the facts.
The discussion Of the battle OF shiloh ana OK
the operations Of the Western armies that pre-
ceded and followed 1t, with which the Voiuihe
onens Is particularly skilful and illuminating.
TO follow 1t In detail is impossible; but the gen
.ral conclusion reached is that the record OF the
Federal campaign in the West is. on the "ho'e'
one of defective strategy and neglected oppoi-
tunjtjes Especially interesting are the authors
estimates of the performances Of the more not
ed commanders. Toward Buell., whose course
has met with much hostile criticism ana VINO
finally fell under the displeasure or the authoii
ties at Washington, his attitude Is aH"os'
wholly favorable. He credits him not only
with the military capacity which mas seiooi''
been denied him, but also with pralseworthy
discharge Of his duties In fact, he fnos IN 'he
failure TO place Buell. in supreme command anu
10 adopt his plans the chief cause OF the reia-
tive failure Of the campaign. Had Buell." he
writes (p. 414) at the 1rst-that ls' on NoNeii'-
Der |. 1s61-been placed in chief command IN
the West 1t is not too much 10 say that the
Confederate Army of the West would have
ceased 70 exist before June l, 1867, and that
thereafter a regiment of Union troops couio
have marched without opposition from Nash-
willie to Chattanooga and KnoXVllle. But Gil
cumstances obliged him to take course the
necessity of which could not be made apparent
TO the strenuous and excitabe pohucal leaueis
,n tho West or TO the unmilitary minds of the
President and the Secretary OF war Hallech'
on the other hand. comes in for unsparing anu
almost UNMARRIED condemnation. He had no eN-
perience in the field and, what was OF more
Importance had little natural aptitude Tor mill
tary affairs being. in addition, careless ihuo-
lent and inexact to a degree hardly to be cred
tied Nor does Grant fare much better except
with regard to his brilliant achievements at
r,orts Henry and Donelson. The capture of the
latter stronghold though highly creditable. was
NOT one of those tasks which call for the nigh
sst and rarest qualities of generaship, and IN
these the field Of Shiloh, according to Dr.
Ropes showed him. at that time at least 10
be essentially lacking. The whole arrange
ment" of the troops at Pittsburg Landing was
manifestly faulty. and indicated great reckless
ness on the part of General Grant, VINO was
oerfactlv aware that the enemy in very consid-
erable force-estmated at from hfty thousdhd
TO eighty thousa nd men-were AZ no great dls-
tance" No adequate precautions were taken.
and all the well known maXims OF war. ap-
plicable to such a position were aosoiuteiy uii-
needed"
With the forces at the Landing IN an unfavor-
able position for defence. and awaiting BuelIs
advance. the obvious thing for the Confeder-
etes 70 do "was to strike Grant before Buell.
couId arrive This seemed and was really
nerfectlv feasible thing TO do. The wonder is
that IL should never have occurred either 10
Halleck or Grant that the Confederate gener-
ais TO whom the facts were perfectly known,
would he sure 10 make the attempt" When the
irnnending blow was struck and the Union
ARMY surprised and thrown into CONFUSION
Grant was found to be unable TO assume the
entire control and direction of a great battle
having neither the ability nor the experience
for such a task" He at no time made any
atteupt to unite the disconnected portions Of
his army and establish line Of battle and'
"in fact. he can hardly be said to have under
taken 10 perform on this day Sunday the
functions Of the commander of an army. Ihe
Union Army was saved from annihilation by
the ability and courage Of It's division COM
manders. Quite emphatic is the condemna-
ton of Halleck and Grant for their failure 10
pursue the Confederates after they had been
repulsed with the aid of Buells troops. NO
better opportunity than this was ever presented
10 Federal general during the war. Ihe
enemy was utterly disorganized and demoral-
lied" and lit is not difficult to conjecture what
vould have been the result of vigorous pur-
suit II made by Grant at the head OF forty ou-
sand troops. most OF them fresh. "hich fortune
had placed at his disposal What Grants army
was actually doing at this time, so far as could
ne seen by Confederate officer sent out with
q flag Of truce was thus reported to Beaure-
cards chief of staff: He 1.-THE officer] says that
es far as he could observe they 1.-THE Federals]
seemed to be buryng the dead looking after
the wounded, and putting their camp to rights
Grants excuse that he did not feel disposed To
order Buell. to pursue because he had been the
latter's senior in rank for only few weeks is
dismissed as "of no weight whatsoever" This
is severe indictment, but II is one that seems
10 us to be supported by the facts. Grants
military career was. as a whole. so great that
his errors at Shiloh can detract but little from
his renown, but they errors all the same
Hallecks failure TO attack the Confederates
and his dispersion Of his forces formed the con-
Guiding error of the Spring Campaign. 1T was
possible to follow up the army Of Beauregard IN
June, 1862, as closely as. in April 1865, Grant
and Meade followed up the army Of Lee. But
Haleck was blind to the lessons OF the
great masters in the art Of war. He utterly
failed to see that, with an army twice as large
as that Of his opponent as his army now was
1t was within his power TO crush the Confeder
ate cause in the West"
The most important military event of 1856.
was of course, the Peninsular Campaign. In II
the citadel Of the Confederacy was directly at