New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-05-29
CUBAN GENERALS AND PAPER ARMIES.

CUBAN GENERALS AND PAPER AhHIbH.
In Havana the selfish political schemes of
rival Cuban leaders seem once more to have
completely overreached themselves. The I'M
mediate success in preventing acceptance OF
the American proposal by former soldiers can
not help any Of the leaders directly, but Is
sure to weaken their influence with the Gu
ban people hereafter. None Of the manu-
facturers Of padded rolls were ready to give
any proof whatever that thirty thousand
men had been actually in arms against the
Spaniards at any time. Nor would they help
General Gomez or the United States authori-
ties TO purge the rolls. The apparent end to
be served was to avoid exposure Of the shame
full Misrepresentation In which good many
now seem to have participated respecting the
number Of soldiers. When 1t was planned to
have bonds issued, with n guarantee Of the
United States or otherwise, and to pay out
S3O000000 or more to the officers on account
of the future Republic of Cuba for distribution
TO the so-called army possible motives for ex-
banding rolls were not hard to imagine. Ex-
posure Of the extent to which the rolls were
thus inflated would have involved In disgrace
some men, and how many can only be In
ferred by the anxiety now shown to prevent
the soldiers from coming forward and taking
look at the rolls themselves
The opinion that a much larger number Of
men will accept the American proposal In the
other provinces Is not unreasonable. 1t was
not In the immediate province or neighbor-
hood Of Havana, where the Spanish armies
were large and always active that insurgents
ever maintained considerable forces. Those
who escaped from Havana city to join them
presumably united with forces from other
provinces. But there is also the fact that the
political generals have spent their time most
zealously In and about Havana, ever since
American occupation January 1 made IT safe
for them, In contriving with each other or
against each other and striving to influence
all the soldiers who came thither.
General refusal of the American proposal by
the Cuban soldiers, both real and imaginary
would In no way injure the position Of the
United States. But It would not have the ef-
feet which political generals desire. 1t would
not add in the least to the confidence OF the
Cuban people in them as capable and patriotic
leaders. For all know, as these leaders know,
that it was for the country a most desirable
thing to provide the men who had been in the
field with some means for procurement OF
tools or implements. or for support Of fami-
lies while beginning in peaceful employments.
Seeing that this was for the real good Of the
island, though after some doubt, General
Gomez heartily approved the measure. and yet
does not seem to have possessed the steadiness
Of purpose or the influence to carry II out. But
by peaceful and orderly inhabitants 1t was still
more strongly appreciated, because the presence
among them Of scattered bands Of armed men.
used TO war and its methods but not to steady
labor, would mean menace to all industry
and business. The men who have conspired
TO prevent a settlement so plainly for the good
Of Cuba will not be trusted as leaders by the
substantial people, It is safe to say, nor will
the soldiers themselves. when they look back
at the business, feel at all thankful to those
who ordered or persuaded them to refuse real
and tangible help for no practical end.
The worst for the political leaders. however,
is that their own people are likely TO move
quickly TO the conclusion that the rolls pre-
pared by the Military Assembly were largely
fictitious and fraudulent, made up only TO
draw money on, without respect to the num-
Der Of men IN actual service. The political
generals have only themselves and their own