The times., 1899-12-25
The situation i'm south Africn

and resign from the Ananias club as TO the
sea fight of Santiago
The Situation in south Africn
The greatest interest of the south African
situation again is centred in Ladysmith
where the conditions are evidently grow
! ing desperate. They are seen to be so,
even through the thick cloak of silence that
the censorship and the War Office seek to
3 throw over them. But. in spite of all such
efforts it transpires that the camp IS suf-
! fering from epidemics Of dysentery and
/ typhoid fever, and to this gloomy outlook
may be added a strong probability that Sir
] George White is seriously short Of ammu-
milton. Two weeks ago it was reported,
and not officially denied, that he had but
three hundred rounds left for his guns.
Since that time be has certainly been COM
pelled 10 further reduce his supply. With
out desiring to look only on the dark side
o. the picture, We must say that from all
that can be learned Of the circumstances,
+ the end at Ladysmith looks very near.
] Indications. though indefinite. are not
wanting that the desperateness Of Sir
{ George Whites situation is fully known
and appreciated by Sir Redvers Butler, and
that the latter is preparing TO make an
other attempt 10 succor the garrison.
considerable part of the Fifth division ap-
pears 10 have gone TO Natal. and by We'd
uesday We should say that Butler ought to
have not less than thirty thousand men at
his cali. Other things being equal, this
would seem a force sufficient 10 relieve
Ladysmith without doubt or delay. but.
unfortunately, il is not bare numbers alone
that can win battles in South Africa. II
Buffers artillery and cavalry were pro-
Dortionate TO his total strength, there need
be little question Of MS ability TO knock
out one OF Joubert's 1anks, and so open
door for White TO move far enough 10 CO.
operate; but, considering the peculiar con-
ditions OF topography. better and more
numerous guns, and vastly superior
mobility, all Of which count in favor Of
the Beers. the British general with fifty
thousand men would not perhaps be tacti-
Cally much stronger than JOubert is with
his twenty-five or twenty-eight thousand
With these considerations in mind, we
should not expect Sir Redvers Butler to re-
sumo the offensive for TWO or three weeks.
OF until the fresh howitzer batteries could
be detrained at Frere, but for the conjec-
tnre that such delay would be fatal 70
the Ladysmith garrison. The hope. which
is still nourished in England TO some ey-
tent. that White may YET be able to cut mis-
way out, irrespective OF what Butler may
DO. is. We fear. a foolish one The gar
rison by this time must be sadly weakened
by hardship and disease, and its chance to
get through the Boer lines. which has never
been a brilliant one for the past month.
must now be regarded practically as nil.
The only hope appears in the possibility
that Butler may be strong CT fortunate
enough to succeed in a turning movement
As TO more frontal attacks on Joubert's
centre at Colenso we cannot believe that
they viii be tried That point wears the
look Of an absolute impasse. But at some
place. in some way, unless the seriousness
OF the conditions in Lsdysmith have been
greatly exaggerated. we look for bold
movement on the part of Sir Redvers Butler
before New Year Day
There is nothing new from Lord Methuen,
who practically is interned between the
Modder and Magersfontein. If q grain Of
comfort is to be extracted from his situa-
ton or the situations Of French and Cat
acre. il is in the fact that Cronie and his
colleagues have failed TO follow up the ad-
vantages recently gained by them. These
omissions seem rather to indicate a weak
spot in the Boer tactics They can hardly
have resulted from lack of spirit among
the burghers. Heretofore we have referred
10 the fight at Majuba Hill as evidence that
the Beers Will on occasion. attack superior
numbers and under conditions unfavorable
10 assault Whatever may have been Cron-
je's reasons for not following up his crush
ing blow TO Methuen's left at Magersfon-
tein or for his subordinate's similar failure
to press his advantage at Stormberg, such
tactics, or the lack Of them have been Of
great value 10 the British, in enabling them
TO recover after TepuIse or defeat. If Eng
land had her last man in South Africa her
fighting strength being confined TO present
numbers this strictly defensive policy on
the Boer part would be correct But Jou-
bert. Cronje, and the rest have something
TO do besides awaiting attack Unless they
pursue every aAA 1IlAdtst DR. ldbL anu as zen
as gained they must be fully aware that
their tenure Of success will be a short one.
Perhaps the irregular character of the
Boer military arm is eyemplifed in the
course adopted by Kruger's commanders in
cases like those OF Mafekng and Kimber-
ley, especially the latter. Mafeking prob
ably. is not of enough value TO warrant any
important sacrifice to take it, but the same
cannot be said Of the other Now, as far
as we have been able to learn Of the condi-
tions al and near the place, considering the
strength of Cronje's command and the
number and range of his guns, Kimberley
ought TO be susceptible Of capture by
strong bombardment properly effected. fol
lowed by assault. The Boer anxiety 70 AXE
he town, and particularly 10 make pris-
oner OF Cecil Rhodes. If experienced by a
regular officer in command OF siege con-
Quoted by regular troops. he would not hesi
tate 10 pay the blood price Of the move
meat But the Beers do not seem willing