New-York tribune., 1899-03-26
THE CAMPAIGN ~ ITZON.

The news from Manila itself IS more to the
purpose than that about Manila from else
where. If General Otis. having any such plan
as dispatches describe about operations near
Manila eight or ten days hence" should have
submitted il TO press reporters or 10 officers
who are capable of disclosing It. he would have
been considerably less sensible than people
have supposed. The story printed here on Sat
urday could be back in Manila on Sunday in
cipher dispatches, or if stopped by censorship
would reach the insurgents from Hong Kong
within six days. II was therefore al the out
set altogether probable that the General had not
communicated such plan to anybody; unless.
indeed, as ruse This probability appears to
be strengthened to certainty by the news
which came to hand before the ink of the for
mer story was dry, telling that instead of wait
ing eight or ten days the American commander
is now pushing things" in particularly ener-
getlc and effective manner The idea that the
capture Of AGuinado Is the chief end sought
by the General seems TO be the germ of the
story about the plan Of campaign" To land
an army north Of Malolos, push 1t southwark
and catch the insurgent force between that
army and the intrenchments on the Pasig River
seems nice Dan on paper, particularly if the
aforesaid paper has on It the Iaguna de Bal
extending far northward beyond Manila as
some maps have But if the lake does not thus
extend. il does not and there IS no hindrance
whatever on the eastward TO the escape Of
rebel forces TO the hills movement Of that
description would not be particularly likely to
catch anybody. As for Agunado personally.
his gift for running away is probably well de-
veloped. Men who talk effusvely as he does
are not often within reach of bullets Accord
ing 70 some reports he is only tool His own
declaration that he could not carry out an
agreement with Admiral Dewey because he
was forced by his followers TO act otherwise
may have truth in II. But whether he IS the
real leader of the rebels OF only a mouthplece.
he might be much more useful elsewhere than
In captivity. Once dscredltcd by complete
failure and disastrous defeat. and obliged 10
handle force away from any seaport and off
in the mountains. without regular supplies or
ammunition Aguinaldo is Just the kind Of o
leader 10 make an insurrcctionary movement
go to pieces as speedily and completely as pos
sible
The plans which General Otis did not com
municate 10 any reporter hut which are now
being disclosed on the field of triumphant bat
tie. seem 10 have for their natural object the
dispersion Of the rebel force and the driving Of
It back from the SeacoaSt TO where II can Oh
tain no further supplies of arms and ammuni-
ton. Once disodgcd from communication with
other countries which have guns and cartridges
TO sell. the So-callrd army would soon he
come Of no consequence TO anybody and # IL
should retire 10 the vicinity Of northern ports
OF the island II would be far away from
Manila that il would be pOwcrlcSS for mischief
until the United States authorities were ready
10 attend 10 il. Once driven away from the
seacoast near Manila Bay. the Tagal rioters
will become less important than the Indian
tribes which General LawtOn has hunted down
with so much success
The dispatches from Manila and the map
which we print elsewhere this morning show
pretty clearly what is being done The former
movement, 20 Pasig and the head Of the lake
divided the rebel force into two parts which
cannot be reunited. BY far the more important