The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-29

him. On the other hand, Halleck's efforts foi
the preservation Of the Government property
at Fredericksbure and AQUA Creek resulted
in utter failure. Both places we're abandoned
and not only were the warehouses burned BY
the Federals, but also the bridges on the rail-
roads and the wharves at AQUA Greek.
While, however. It ia undeniable that Cen.
Lees operations at this time were successful.
MIR. Ropes considers that his successes were
due much more to the ability with which he
improved the mistakes OF his antagonist
than to any advantages which he procured for
himself by the hazardous strategy which he
employed. Thus. although he was able to at
tack Pope's army at a disadvantage on Aug.
| 30, 1852, the only time when he did attack II.
this was not due to any previous movements OF
| his own. but solely to Pope's making tho mis-
take OF assaulting Jackson's position that same
| afternoon. under the impression that he was
retreatinE. and OF persisting in the assault.
after he knew that Lee was preparing to move
in force upon his left and his communications.
OF these mistakes Lee promptly availed him
self. and thus won a victory. but the
separation OF Jackson from the main body
OF the Confederate Army, three days before.
had nothing to do with the mistakes COM
mittcd by Gen. Pore on the field OF battle. As
n matter Of fact. Gen. Pope. though he had met
with no success. had not been beaten in the
battle OF Aug. 20; he could perfectly well have
taken up a defensive position for the following
day: II he had been attacked. he ought to have
boon able. with his superior numbers. to main
tain himself till reinforced and supplied. Mr..
Ropes can SEQ no reason to think that he would
not have been able to do so. Pope's defeat on
Aug. 30 is attributed exclusively to his faulty
management on the field; and. although there
can he no doubt that the assistance OF Sumner
and FRANKLIN would have been most valuable.
as, indeed. would have been that OF Banks. who
was not even to his aid. II is pro-
nounced incorrect to say that Pope was do
ieated because he did not have a sufficiently
large force under him.
1t Is evident that the author OF this book
places tho responsibility for the reverses en-
countered by the Union arms in Virginia at the
end of August. 1862. upon Halleck rather than
on Pope. In the frat place. Gen. Halleck's de-
fciences as q General-in-C Chief we're every
where painfully apparent. 1t Ia plain that he
had no definite policy Of his own. The bring
ing up of Sumner from AQUA and the posting
OF his corps along the lines Of Washington were
both suggestions of Mcclellan. Halleck con-
fessed himself ignorant OF the state of the de-
fences Of the capital. He. indeed, sent Frank
lin out ut last. and wanted to send him earlier.
but his purposes in so doing were very vaguely
and somewhat inconsistency defined. Had
ne seriously intended tnaJ franklin, as
soon as he arrived from the peninsula,
should go out to reinforce Pope. he could GER
tatnly. one would think. before Mcclellan ar
rived at Alexandria. have provided him. out OF
the stores of the capital. with all the necessary
artillery and transportation. An able and
efficient officer in his place would have decided
views on all these points. and. armed with the
powers Of a General-in-Chief. would have car
ried them out" Mr.. Ropes is not one of those
who believe that Gen. Mcclellan. as has been
so often charged. deliberately held back the
two corps OF sumner and Franklin from going
to Pope's army for fear that. with their assist
ance. Pope would gain a victory. Rather was
he afraid that these corps would be sacrificed
in a futile attempt to enable Pope to withstand
Lees army. Tho fact is recalled that on Aug.
% Mcclellan wrote to the President that either
all available forces should be used to open
communication with Pope or that he should be
left Ito get out Of his scrape." while all means
should be used 10 make Washington perfectly