The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1899-11-21
qnE CoxPETEsCY OF OTIS.

IHb CV4tBIENNl VT Wis.,
We print elsewhere some interest
lng comments upon the state OF affairs
Il the Philippines in which the author,
11r. Albert p. Taylor, criticises General
Oefu' management Of the war. The
points made reduce themselves to the
pootulate that II Otis were strong
ODnmander he could, without much
delay. bring the fighting to an end.
FOR ourselves we confess doubt as
20 the justice OF this conclusion. Gen
esNl Otis has small army in a large
country. With from 10000 to $4,000
men-the former figure standing for
his active force during the first year s
campaign-he has operated amidst an
unfriendly population Of several mil
Hons and against guerrilla army ag-
grsgating 10000 men and capable of
indenAite and instant reinforcement A
guerrilla war is the most dimcult Of
any Tor . General, engaged In legiti-
matA, operations, to contend with.
Napoieon was fairly worried out Of
Spaia by ambushed banditti One OF
l,as Generals lost Hayti to a rabble Of
biack partisans. Spain has wasted the
lives Of million brave men and lost
. billion or more OF money during the
hast two hundred years in the vain
effort to subdue unorganized revolu-
tsonary bands in Cuba and the Philip
pines. She lost her western empire to
Guerrillas. During the American Civil
war Colonel Mosby with 500 mounted
farmers, lineal descendants OF the stout
svashbucklers of Sumpter and Marion,
ferrorixed the Union border for two
years and kept 10000 Federal troops
idly guarding points which he might
possibly attack. Mosby was too much
for Custer, Sheridan and Grant and his
little command held is ground until
after Appomattox. In the light of
these examples Of the efficacy of parti-
san warfare we cannot Justly blame
General Otis for his failure, in year
and half, to capture or destroy the
elusive native riflemen who haunt the
wide swamps and jungles OF Luzon.
Were dashing Phil Sheridan in his
piace We do not believe the showing
would be better.
There is small propriety in demand
Ing the recall Of General Otis because
of his alleged failures, though 1t would
b right enough to supplant him on
grounds Of military etiquette. 1t Is an
anomaly to have the bulk OF the United
St1tes Army, engaged In active service,
under the command OF a junior officer.
General Otis is a Brigadler of the
Regular Army and a Major-General of
Volunteers. while there are several full
Major Generals of the Regular Army
compelled to sit in offices and chafe
under derisive public sympathy Too
much OF that sort OF thing has occurred
since the trouble with Spain began.
notably the appointment Of Shaitsr.
q mere sworded tumefaction, to COM
mand at Santiago. The impartial pub
lie would welcome the assignment to
supreme duty in Luzon Of man like
Miles or Brooke, though not, We be-
Heve. on any other grounds than those
o. common fairness to General Otis
superior officers.
1t must not be forgotten, however,
that Otis has suffered no defeats In
the Philippine war. Whenever he has
net the enemy, and that has been
often. the enemy has got the worst OF
It. Were the latter willing to stake
everything on a pitched battle We
might hear of some very decisive re-
sulta To, General Otis credit; but It Is
surely not the American commanders
fault that the Tagals see their duty
differently. He Is doing all he can.
but the enemy declines to risk his
cause on the field of possible
Waterloo.