Iron County register., 1899-11-09

insrrrection to speak of, and 1t was ac
ccrclngly decided to allow Aguinaldo Il
come Ia Cavite on board the McCulloch
May Is, and Immediately came on boart
| the Olympia to call on the commander
| in-chief, after which he was allowed Il
| land at Cavite and organize an army
| This was done with the purpose OF
| strengthening the United States forces
aIIiance of ny th4se lose o1 .ne e1tera9 infS
| with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise Of
independence made to him, then or at any
| other time
First Idea OF. Independence.
The commissioners report then rapidly
sketches events now historical. 1t tells
| in substance how the FilipinoS attacked
the Spanish, and how Gen. Anderson ar
rived, and Aguinaldo, at his request
moved from Cavite to Bacoor. Says the
/ commission:
| Now for the first time rose the idea OF
a proclamation in which he took the re-
sponsibility of promising it to his people
| although he admitted freely in private
| ccnV erSatfon with members of his cabinet
tnat neltner AdmlraI Dewey nor any oth-
er American had made him any such
| promise
The report states that Aguinaldo wished
] to attack the Americans when they land
| ed at Paranaque, but was deferred by
| lack Of arms and ammunition. From that
point on there was growing trlction pc
| tween the Filipinos and the American
troops.
There were no conferences" says the
| report, between the officers of the Fill
| pinos and our officers with view to or
| Grating against the Spaniards, nor was
there cooperation of any kind.
There never was any preconcerted opera
| tions or any combined movement by the
| United States and Filipinos against the
| SpaniardS."
Reference is made to Aguinaldo's de-
| mand that he be allowed to loot Manila
/ and take the arms of the Spaniards. The
I lat n fG -lTd N a.
| ment that he intended to get possession
| of the arms to attack the Americans
of the F'ilipinos was found in the organi-
| zatiop of popular clubs" which later
on furnished a local militia to attack the
| Americans. The DEGREES of the Filipino
congress are also cited, we'll as the
! making of bolos (l<nives) in every shop
bic element in the Filipino congress wished
| to address to President Mckinley re-
quest not to abandon the Filipinos Cat this
| stage the Paris conference was discussing
| the future of the Philippines). The presi-
| dent was also to be asked his desire as to
| tablish. But all this time Aguinaldo was
preparing for war and delaying these
messages, and 1t was understood that the
attack would come upon the first act by
the American forces which would anord
a preteXt-
The War Was Unavoidable.
A brief chapter then tells of the lack
of success attending the effort made at
this time by Gen Merritt through a com
mission, to arrive at a mutual understand
ing with Aguinaldo as to the intentions.
purposes and desires of the Filipino peo-
pie. This brings the story up to the out
break on the evening of the 4th of Feb
ruary, with the attack upon the American
troops following the action of the Ne
aSkan sentinel.
The commission, in concluding this chap
ter, says:
AFTER the landing of our troops Agui-
naldo made up his mind that it would be
necessary to fight the Americans, and af-
tor the m king of the of
Paris this determination was streng tn
ened. He did not openly declare that he
excited everybody, and especially the mil
itary men, by claiming Independence, and
it is doubtful whether he had the power
to check or control the army at the time
hoStilities broke out.
''Deplorable as war is, the one in which
we are now engaged was unavoidable b.
US. We were attacked by a bold, adven-
turcus and enthusiastic army. No alter
native was left to US except ignominious
any American would have sanctioned tiis
surrender of Manila to the, insurgents.
Our obligations to other nations. and to
the friendly Filipinos, and to ourselves
and our flag demanded that force should
of the Philippines may be, there is no
course open to US now except the prose
cution of the war until the insurgents arc
reduced to submission.
1.-The commission is of the opinion that
there has been no time since the destruc-
tion of the Spanish squadron by Admiral
Dewey when it was possible to withdraw
our forces from the islands, either with
honor to ourselves or with safety to the
inhabitants.
Reign of Terror at Manila.
The commission then takes up the con-
ditions of the country at the time of their
arrival, comparing it with condition eX-
listing at the time they left a short time
ago. A vivid picture is given of the an
archy existing among the Inhabitants in
and about Manila during the early spring.
1.-The situation in the city" says the
commission, was bad. Incendiary fires
occurred daily. The streets were almost
deserted. Half of the native population
had fed, and most of the remainder were
shut in their houses. Business was at a
standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere
was frequently audible in our house. a
reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who
had favored Americans feared assassina-
ton, and few had the courage to come out
openly for US. Fortunately, there We're
among this number some of the best mon
of the city"
The report then speaks of the issuance
of the committees proclamation and the
good effect it had on public sentiment
ises. urged upon the commission that acts
instead of promises should be given them.
ished, and this greatly aided in the re-
storatfon of public confidence. The flow
OF p9pula11onn, n,, soon PECAN d 10 20 ser IoWara wars;
homes returned.
Rebellion of Limited scope.
As showing the limited scope of the re-
bellion the commission states:
I'VE learned that the strong anti-Ameri-
can feeling was confined to the Tagalog
provinces, namely: Manila, Cavite, La
Guiana, Batangas, Morong, Balgcan.
bales. 1t was strongest in the first six
named, and hardly existed in the last
is estimated to be about 100000, but It
should not be supposed that even in the
six provinces Immediately adjacent to
opposition to us. Even here there was a
strong conservative element, consisting
of people of wealth and intelligence, op-
posed to the war"
Under the head: 1.-The Rebellion Not a
of the rebellion outside of the provinces of
Luzon, where, it is stated, the uprising
was viewed at first with indifference. and
later with fear. Throughout the archipel-
those points to which armed Tagaiogs
The machinery of insurgent government"
served only for plundering the people
ger tne RLeIeaI " i9t t iiIS maa
We're rapidly accommodating wealth.
1t is stated that the insurgent admins
tration throughout the interior was worse
that in the days of Spanish rule; in many
provinces there was absolute anarchy,
and from all sides came petitions AMI
help.
In speaking of Gen. MacArthur's move
ment northward, the report tells of the
tives by telling them fearful tales con-
corning the American soldiers. The meth
cd OF procedure eminently successful at
first, In the end recoied on its authors.
Conditions When They Left.
As to the state of affairs when the
committee left, the commission says:
Before the commission left the islands
nearly all the Inhabitants had returned to
these ruined villages. Many of the houses
had been rebuilt. Fields that had lain
growing crops. Municipal governments
had been established, and the people, pro
tected by our, troops. were enjoying. peace,
nfnrff IL ,f Nf.afwN Frsz,-I