The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1899-12-20

| the title of the defendants in that ac-
ton to strip of land claimed by the
| city to be a portion of a public street
| The question Of estoppel between a
county and an Individual involves no
such grave difficulties. The doctrine of
estoppel against municipalities is uni
| versally applied.
| In the early case of Argent VS.. City
of San Francisco>e(l6 Cal, 1863, this
court said: "The. doctrine of ratifica-
| ton and estoppel is as applicable to
corporations as to individuals, and the
| former are bound by the acts Of their
agents in the same manner and to the
same extent as the latter. There is
no difference in this respect between
public and private corporations; for
| in matters of contract a public corpor-
alton is regarded merely as a legal in
dividual and treated in all respects as
a private person
1t thus appears that there is no sub
stantial difference in the application of
the doctrine as between private and
public corporations. Indeed, the whole
history of estoppel, as involved in this
case, is strongly and convincingly stat
e, in Brown VS.. City of Atchison (39
Kan, 33), in the following language:
where a contract is entered into in
good faith between a corporation, pub
lie or private and an individual per-
son. and the contract is void in whole
or in part because of want of power on
the party of the corporation to make it,
or enter into it in the manner in which
the corporation enters into it, but the
contract is not immoral, inequitable or
unjust and the contract is performed in
whole or in part by and on the part of
one Of the parties, and the other party
receives benefits by reason of such per-
Torrance over and above any equiva-
lent rendered in return, and these ben
efits are such as one party may law
fully render and the other party law
fully receive, the party receiving such
benefits will be required to do equity
toward the other party, by either re-
scinding the contract and placing the
other party in statu quo, or by account
ing to the other party for all of the
benefits received for which no equiva-
lent has been rendered in return; and
all this should be done as nearly in
accordance with the terms of the con-
tract as the law and equity will per-
nit"
In the case of the Commissioners of
Knox County VS.. Aspinwall (21 How,
u. S. $40, it is said: Citation of
authorities to this point is unnecessary,
as the whole subject has been recently
examined by this court, and the rule
clearly laid down that a corpora ton,
quite as much as an individual, is held
to careful adherence to truth in their
dealings with other parties, and can
not, by their representations or silence,
involve others in onerous engagements,
and then defeat the calculations and
claims their own conduct has superin-
duced."
From these authorities, and many
others, which can be cited, it is appar
ent that public corporations, like in
dividuals, are bound to act in coed
faith and deal justly; that they cannot
be allowed to enter into contracts in
volving others in expensive engage
ments, silently permit these contracts
to be executed, and then repudiaIe
them because the statutory steps have
not been pursued in the letting of the
contracts
This action is largely based upon
authority claimed to be found in
section g., of the County Gov
eminent Act,Y wherein it is pro-
vided: Hereafter, whenever any
Board of Supervisors shall. without
authority of law order any money pad
as salary, fees, or for other purpose,
and such money shall have been ac-