The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1899-01-14

can be obtained is fiuctuating and un-
certain. Railroad managers are dis
trustful OF one another and shippers all
the while in doubt as to the rates secur-
ed by their competitors
PURCHASING BUSINESS
1.-THE value of the traffic is so unusual
as to frequently exceed the capacity of
equipment, yet the contest for tonnage
are spent in purchasing business and
secret dates accorded far below the
standard OF published charges The
general public gets little benefit from
mainly confined to the heavier shippers
All this augments the advantages or
large capital and tends to the injury
and often to the ruin of smaller deal
ers These are not only matters or
gravest consequence to the business
welfare of the country but they concern
in no less degree the higher interest of
public morality
ut is perfectly clear that observance
of tariff rates is entirely within the
power of the railway managers, and
that it would be vastly for the advant-
age of the railways as a whole. 1t would
however be difficult and often ruinous
for one railway to maintain rates while
its competitors make secret concessions,
and it is also to be admitted that, JUS
titled or not, the results are suostan-
tally as claimed by the carriers.
A large part of the railway business
is now transacted upon illegal rates,
and in certain quarters charging the
published rate is the exception Inc
results are gross Determinations be-
tween individuals and gross preferences
between localities which most always
favor the strong and Cypress the weak
Probably no one thing today does SO
much to force out the small operator
and build up those trusts and monop-
olies against which law and public
opinions alike beat in vain as dlscrlH-
nations in freight rates. A further re-
suit is that railway business is carried
on largely in conceded violation Of law
This condition the present law is power
have been applied and some convictions
have been had, but no substantial effect
has been produced and no satisfying re-
suits can be obtained from that course.
The fact may be morally certain, but
the name, the date, the amount, can not
be shown with the particularly and
certainty required by criminal law.
RESTRICT COMPETITION.
eff unrestricted competition produces
discrimination. one OBVIOUS way 10 pre-
vent such discrimination is to restrict
competition. Whether existing condi-
lions would be improved by legaliZ1ng
railway contracts would depend upon
the extent to which the agreements
were made and actually enforced by the
carriers. So far as the commission can
obtain information there is at present
no other great nation which endeayors
to enforce competition between its rail-
ways although in many cases that
method has been tried and abandoned
But Just as no other great nation today
enforces competition between railways,
so there is no other great nation today
which does not regulate and control
railway rates. If this country is to
change it's theory of railway regulation,
1T should adopt the new theory in its
entirety. Carriers ask authority to
combine in order to fix and maintain
reasonable rates But who shaH decide
what rates are reasonable? Shall II be
left to the carriers to fix their own
rates, or should the people who grant
this extraordinary privilege reserve to
themselves the right to determine this
question?
1T does not necessarily follow. there
fore, that permission should be given
the carriers to make these combina-
tions. The evils attendant upon re-
stricted competition might be greater
than the benefits derived from it. The
rate should be removable as well as
stable and uniform. and hitherto COM
petition has been mainly relied upon
for that purpose. Now, if competition
is to be removed what is to take the
place of it? The conclusion of the COM
mission in reference to agreements OF
this sort and the degree of control over
rates. which should be exercised by
public authority is substantially as an
nounced in its last annual report The
amendments there recommended would
not invest the commission with any diff
ferent or greater authority than it has
long been supposed to possess They
carry out the purposes Of the act as
declared in it's first three sections. If
the present commission is not qualified
to discharge that trust then a more
competent tribunal should be created
LIMITED RESTRAINT
eff combinations in restraint of COM
petition are to be permitted, the follow
ing additional observations should be
borne in mind:
First, to permit only a limited and
feeble restraint would be to doom the
experiment to failure before it was
tried; but it might be well to provide
that the provision granting the privi-
1ege should expire after a certain num-
Der of years by its limitation Second,
the contract itself and everything done
under it should be open to public in
spection. Third, it would probably be
to the advantage of both the public and
the railways If the public had some
voice or representation in any organiza-
ton of the kind under consideration If
the public appointed one or more of the
board of managers, to whom the ship
per would feel free to submit his COM
plant and who would bring the ship
per's views before the association, it
duct and harmonious relations between
the railways and the public, and thus
prove materially beneficial in high de-
gree.
Whatever view may be taken of this
phase of the subject the necessity for a
overstated. The principles of this law as
set forth in its first three sections
are conceded to be sound and beneficial,
but at present amount to little more
than a declaration of a sentiment. Some
of the minor features of the statutes are
fairly sufficient, but the machinery for