The times., 1899-11-03
Ludysmitb Not Yet Isolated.

! Aau rHiE1B Not ct t<oAhhths
On yesterday an opinion seemed to ex-
. ist in London. apparently inspired from
/ official sources. that Sir George White
1 has elected to stay in Ladysmith and hght
it cut rather than resort TO retreat. This
+ leads US to suspect that the war Office for
I several days may have been in possession
+ of information supporting belief that re-
4 treat would be difficult if not impracticable.
Even among the English military critics
( who express confidence in Whites ability
to defend himself until help can reach him.
I it is observable that they concede the point
suggested in our editorial review of the
situation on Wednesday. that technically
speaking the Ladysmith position is not TO
be regarded as defensible by such force as
now constitutes its garrison, deficiency IN
equipment for a siege considered, in con-
, nection with other unfayorable conditions
1t is because all of these conditions do
not appear to be given full weight in Lon
don army circles that we regard criticism
of Sir George Whites advance of his left
flank, which resulted so disastrously, as
wrong in theory. All authorities seem to
agree that a fatal tactical blunder was
committed in sending Carleton with the
Fusiliers, the Gloucestershires. and the
Tenth Mountain Battery. into the enemy's
country without keeping headquarters
within touch of the detachment, at least
by scouts and signals. On the face of the
reports as published, this view is abso-
lutely justified; but we are strongly i'm
pressed with the belief that the real story
of that sad nights and days work is yet
to be told.
The theory that Sir George Whites ad
herence 10 the spirit of tactics used ex-
ceptonally in the case of warfare against
Indian tribes. led him to take the chance
Of projecting a much needed brigade of
splendid troops into a possible Boer trap,
and TO permit it TO advance into q broken
country swarming with the enemys
mounted infantry and artillery. without
tak;ng any precaution to keep in commu-
nication. or to make any provision for its
support, in the event of its being over
matched or its line Of retreat threatened,
is one not TO be assumed against an Off
Ger of high professional character, and one
whose recent experience at Dundee, Glen
coe, and Elandslaagte, if nothing more,
should preclude such carelessness. II is
much more probable that Carleton reported
his situation promptly; that White moved
his centre TO support him, but found that.
as soon as the advance had passed the
ground in front of the British lines, it had
been silently occupied by superior force
of the enemy, rendering aid impossible The
idea that a trained. trusted, and thoroughly
brave British general should violate every
principle of war tactics and deliberately
throw twelve or fifteen hundred men into
the jaws of twenty thousand, without
thought of consequences, strikes US as
hardly short of ridiculous. 1t must be re-
membered that we know little or nothing
reliable regarding the actual movements on
the day of the opening battle. What
may have been conveyed to the war office
is matter for conjecture. What has been
published is another matter, and exasper-
atingly nebulous Indeed it is generally
admitted that the truth Of the first days
operations has not been confded to the
public It may not even be in the posses
sion Of the authorities, although that per-
haps is open to reasonable doubt.
Sir George Whites chivalric ac-
ceptance Of ali the responsibility for the
calamity which befell Colonel Carleton's
column. as well as his record as a fighter
and commander. entities him TO immunity
from attack until he has a chance TO Lar-
rate all the facts OF the disaster. We can
only add the sincere hope that the gallant
generals life may be spared to give US the
full story.