The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-07-15

l
SCHLEY meant that it should be his own,
oil the same.
After thirteen-inch shot from the Ore
gon had bagged the Colon, SCHLEY, begin
ming the role OF conqueror in full, gener-
ously hoisted the signal. Thanks for
! your splendid assistance!" To SAMP-
SONS ship, which never had been out Of
sight OF the combat, and had just passed
| by the Spanish wrecks, SCHLEY set the
| signal, eve have won q great victory"
| That night he tried to send to the Sccre-
tary OF the Navy report OF the affair,
| Independent OF SAMPsoN's; and though In
| his official report to SAMPSON, July 6, he
| congratulated the latter most sincerely
| upon this great victory to the squadron
under your command" he showed by his
| gratuitous and since oft-repeated express
| sion, Tho victory seems big enough for all
| OF us, that SAMPSON was to have share OF
1t only through SCHLEYs magnanimlty.
We come now to the battle To under
stand that it will be necessary to examine
the preparations for 1t on which Immediately
rests the fact that the battle was offered
| In daylight and that it was practically
over In less than an hour. To apportion
the credit properly between SAMPSON and
SCHLEY it is not enough to say that the
blockade was arranged by SAMPSON.
SCHLEY had made blockade before SAMP-
son superseded him off Santiago and GER
yERAs fleet was destroyed as 1t was because
SAMPSON replaced SCHhEY's blockade with
something radically different. To glorfy
SCHLEY "a the Hero of Santiago" because
accidentally he was the ranking officer in
the firing line Is, under the circumstances,
absurdity as well as injustice. For the
destruction of CERvERA's fleet the Amcri-
can public would owe more to SAMPSON IL he
had never oven seen the Spanish smoke
than to SCHLEy on the Brooklyn.
ScHLEY's blockade was modelled on his
signal to his squadron, supposed to be go
Ing to blockade Santiago, to rendezvous
twenty-five miles south OF that place"
The best it ever became was an aimless
sort OF steaming about, far from the har-
Dor. and often on ono side or the other OF 1t.
For an enemy trying to get out it was a
blockade only in name. Here is the log OF
the Marblehcad for May %:
Began hlockadinR Santiago de Cuba between 8
TO p. N. Position at 4 p NJ; Santiago de Cuba
Lighthouse. n. n. f. ten miles distant"
The Brooklyn at that time was further
out. SAMPsoN's blockade was an immov-
able semicircle of ships which, when the
enemy finally came out OF Santiago harbor,
were less than three miles from the en-
trance. SCHLEY reported of the Santiago
batteries, after q hombardment, with two
OF the Spanish ships lying anchored in
plain sight at the harbor mouth, that they
were heavy batteries, heavy calibre, long
range" SAMPSON notified his fleet almost
on arrival that the batteries were not con-
sidcrcd dangerous for battleships and
closed in. The log OF the Colon, published
in the Appendix to the Report Of the Chief
OF the Bureau of Navigation, explains with
this repeated entry. how the Spaniards
were forced to make trial to escape by day,
instead Of by night:
"Enemy soarchlights trained on mouth of harhor
all night"
Not only the order of battle, but the order
for battle WIS issued long bcfor" the conflict
came, and with promptncss every Captain
acted upon it as it had come from SAMPSON.
Tho battle. as SCHLEY says, "speaks for
itself" The Americans closed as one ship
and the Spaniards. with one exception, We're
shot ashore in a little over an hour because
SCHLEYs blockade Of wandering far from
the harhor had been replaced by SIMPSONS
c'ose Gordon of ships never out of gun
shot from MORO.
The one order OF noto which SCHLEY
gave throughout the contest affected his
ship only, the Brooklyn, and made the
loop Of which his explanation and the
c0ntradctinS facts are now familiar to
the public. Event SCHLEY had adopted the
theory advanced by his friends, whom his
falsehood has procluded from vcuturing to
defend him. and had said that with thin.
armored ship it was proper for him to re-
tire by the way which would not bring him
nearer to the enemy he would have been
little better OF as fleet commander What
sort of commander is it. Commodore or
Captain, who with the enemy's course of es-
cape perfectly defined and the rest of the fleet
wheeling into column in pursuit with tho
regularity Of parade, thoughtlessly takes
his ship where instant decision" as
SCHLEY himself has it, Is necessary TO
eXtricatc her from the calamity of stop
ping his own fleets fire? What naval
academy teaches that the way to win is
not to get in front OF your own guns ?
What scheme OF awards honors a conf
mandcr's request for laurels based on his
not making a fool OF himself in action
Capt. PHILIPS account Of tho battle OF
Santiago In the Century has shown that tho
movement against which HoDGsoN warned
SCHLEY caused tho engines OF the Texas to
DO reversed and PHILIP stopped in his
course. In short, to say that SCHIEY did
not prevent the destruction of CERvERA is
Cot t, tbnth ,j Ia -, a..
honOrs of it.
A one point after anothcrof SCHnEY'sin-
competence. or worse, has been displayed,
as the insiGnilcance OF his actual personal
relation to the Santiago battle has been
shown, and as tho duplicity with which he
has endeavored to hold the honors I'M
worthiy lavishod upon him has been re-
vealed, tho Schley press has reiterated as
final evidence for him that 1.-THE Brooklyns
fire was terrible, and the Brooklyn was tho