Vilas County news. [volume] (Eagle River, Vilas County, Wis.) 1896-1927, 1899-02-27

Washington, Feb. 21.-Rear Admiral
Schley, having been granted permits
sion to answer the charges made
against him in a communication re-
Gently sent to the senate, yesterday
handed to the committee on naval at
fairs his statement in which he dis
GAINS any purpose Of controversy
with the navy department. The adj
miral says his orders from Sampson
on May 18th were to blockade Glen
fuegos, which he proceeded to do On
his arrival he sent Commander Nc
Gala, OF the Marblehead, ashore to es-
tablish relations with the insurgents,
the result of which was made known to
him at $40, May "a. Then, for the
first time he learned definitely that the
! Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.
/ Within two hours he started for San
tiago. What possible ground for
criticism he says, adverse to me
there can be in all of this | do not see
| was on the spot acting under or
ders which gave me entire discretion
and yet clothed me with the response
bility of going to Santiago, only after
| was satisfied that the fleet was not at
Cienfuegos." He quotes from dis
patch of Sampson, May Goth, in which
the latter says Schley should "hold his
fleet off Cienfuegos." His slow
progress toward Santiago he attributes
to the Eagle, which he states
was part of the force which
Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
him and he had no right to abandon
| her. He had been ordered to proceed
cautiously" If, however, he had
known the Spanish fleet was in Santi-
ago, no consideration for the Eagle Or
anything else would have prevented
| him from getting there at the earliest
| possible moment, with the larger yes
| sells, but weather and sea made it i'm
possible to do better than he did
| Speaking Of the "retrograde move
ments" which the secretary, adapting
the language of Admiral Sampson
| characteriZes as "reprehensible con
| duct" Schley say that in his 81 years
| Of service, "never was such language
USED to characterize conduct Of mine
! and I see no reason for it now"
Continuing, he declared that when
| the enemy's vessels came out of the
| narbOr of Santiago, the signal was
made from the Brooklyn (his flagship
to the fleet to "clear for action" Then
| followed the signal "close action and
by the signal the enemy is escaping to
| the westward" Following the appear
ance Of the Spanish fleet Lnere was a
| general inward movement Of the Amer
lean vessels closing in and engaging.
At the final capture of the Colon at
1:15 p. M, the Brooklyn was nearest,
| the Oregon next, and then came the
Texas and the Wien. The New YORK
arrived at 2:23 p. m, and the com
mander-in- chief assumed command of
| the squadron. The signals were made
| from the Brooklyn to the squadron un-
til all the signal halyards were shot
away and then by the Meyers army
code.
In conclusion Schley contends that
the turn of the Brooklyn in the battle
of July Sd was "the crucial and decid-
| ing feature of the combat and of decid
ed advantage" Furthermore, he says,
| it is mistake to say that the vessels
distance from the enemy was increased
to the extent of 800 yards, and adds:
Though this may not be of record it
is a fact nevertheless" He cites the
fact that charts of the board of navi
gators show that the Brooklyn was
the nearest when the Spanish vessels
emerged from the harbor,
the nearest at every stage of
the battle and nearest the Colon when
it surrendered, and gives many con-
frmatory details of his fagship's ac-
tive and effective participation in the
battle. He says that he made no re-
port of his vancouver in his report of
the battle, as it's effect upon the battle
was never question with him.
His last paragraph reads: MAY 31st,
I received a telegram from the COM
mander-in-chief congratulating me up
on my success in locating and block
aiding the enemy's fleet at Santiago. If
it was worthy Of commentator at that
time am at a loss to understand how
it could have grown into 'reprehensible
conduct as suggested by Sampson in
his letter of July 10, some six weeks
later"