The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-07-09
III

In one respect CTOmWellB career rs SOluleT
stands apart from the careers Of other famous
Generals In modern times. He was a civilian
by training and inclination until the pressure
of events forced him to draw the sword. In
the American civil war those who rose to the
greatest eminence as commanders-Grant.
Sherman. Lee. and Jackson--were all soldiers
by education. though some Of them had tenn
porarily exchanged the sword for the pen.
Cromwell. on the other hand. was not a SOL
der by education. Nevertheless. he gained
his victories by sound military methods.
Great successes have been sometimes
achieved BY undsciplined mobs excited
by intense enthusiasm or by an over
towering desire for revenge. Cromwell's
armies were no mobs. Stern fanatics as were
his TROOPERS and his Ironsides infantry. their
victories were won not by superior enthusiasm.
but by superior organization and military
training. 1t is nevertheless true that Crom-
we'll lived in what Col. Baldock would call the
renaissance period Of the art of war. When
wars were undertaken principally to satisfy
the ambition Of princes there was little popu-
lar sentiment involved As the feudal system
had declined the forces OF tho European poten-
tates had become more and more armies OF
mercenaries. fighting merely for pay and
plumber. With the new ideas. however.
Of religious and civil liberty. which sprang
from the revival OF secular learning In
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
popular sentiment was again aroused. Whole
nations caught the enthusiasm for an ideal:
every man felt that there was something worth
fighting for. Wars were no longer left entirely
to mercenary soldiers Burghers and peas
ants sprang to arms and fought for religion or
freedom. With the new class OF men in the
ranks came ultimately a new system OF war;
fare. The mercenary soldier living by war,
nnoyht 70 rrf1n Tha hpr rhnr al
the other hand. craving for peace. and looking
on war only as necessary evil longed to fin
ish it quickly Hence the former loved dilatory
campaigns, the strategy OF positions and
leaguers. and. above ALL long sieges. with tho
prospect OF rich plumber at the end. The lat
ter. on the contrary longed for a decisive battle
and speedy release from the burden OF bear
Ing arms
Yet 1t was but slowly that the old customs
changed. They had been crystallzed by pro-
fessional soldiers into series OF dogmas and
maxims. These maxims stereotyped every
thing connected with a military force and It's
operations. Around the Kings of Europe stood
professional armies led by soldiers trained in
the traditional school. Tilly and Wallenstein
were Generals Of that type. William the Silent
and Gustavus Adolphus were the first to avail
themselves of the new spirit and to adapt their
strategy and tactics to its needs. Neither even
OF these two developed to It's fullest extent the
new system OF war Both had been trained to
arms from childhood under instructors OF the
old school. The physical features OF the Low
Countries almost compelled tho revolted
Netherlanders to practice a strategy of
defensive positions of opened sluice gates
and of strong walled cities. In his
championship Of Professionalism Gustavus
Adolphus commanded heterogeneous armies
and ipfpD1pl the tarritOrieS NJ wilalv ana
allies Thus. while his strategy was bold and
far-reaching and the improvements he effected
In tactics rendered to increased oblity and in
creased decisiveness In battle he still often re-
sorted to the old system OF fortified position
and OF operations calculated to defer action
With Cromwell the conditions were different.
Unfettered by prejudices. the outcome of early
training. endowed with marvellous military
talents. teaching himself practically the art of
war in the field beginning at almost the lowest
subaItern position and working steadily but
rapidly up to the supreme command he
grasped thoroughly the new conditions. and
stood forth as the first great representative Of
the modern methods NJ war. His was, In truth
the strategy OF Napoleon and Won Moltke, tho
strategy which. neglecting fortresses and the
means Of artificial defence as OF secondary i'm
portance. strikes first at the enemy in the field
The soldier Of the old school sought how to
avoid defeat; the modern leader seeks to crush
his enemy.
We have seen that Cromwell was, In the be-
ginning. cavalry officer. In HIS day. notwith-
standing what had been accomplished by the
Swiss pkemen and by the Spanish infantry,
cavalry was still the principal arm. The fate
of q battle generally hung on the issue OF
charge This. although cavalry had. OF all
arms. suffered most since the introduction OF
Gunpowder through the capitalization OF tao
tics brought about by the professional soldier.
1t had lost to large extent mobility. initia-
tive and dash. and was apt to show itself afraid
OF the fintlock muskets with which part OF the
infantry was armed More and more II had as
| simulated its tactics to those OF the dragon or
mounted iniantryman. Gustavus Adolphus in
deed. had done much to improve the mobility OF
his cavalry and had taught his troopers to fire
without hating and then charge in with the
sword. Rupert and Cromwell carried tho i'm
provement much further. In his earlier engage
ments. no doubt. Cromwes success was due
rather to the care with which he had selected
organized and disciplined his men than to
ksuperior tactical skill We have seen that in
| his first engagement the opposing parties
| faced each other for half an hour. waiting for
| the fire of the dragons to throw the enemy's
| ranks into confusion. Learning from expe-
| rience. Cromwell abandoned the old system of
| delay, ana tnencelOItn cnafgSl as soon as the
formation was complete. His subsequent sue
cess at Gairsborough should be attributed to
his prompttude in charging and to the skill
| full way In which he handled his reserves
| Whenever he commanded the Parliamentary
cavalry at Marston. Naseby or Langport. he
was always tho first to charge and the
| last to exhaust his reserves, 1t has been
said Of cavalry fight that the COM
mander who can throw last fresh. unused
| squadron into the fight will almost certainly
| win. On this principle Cromwell acted. He
| never let 60 his last reserve until the last of
| his enemy's squadrOns had been broken and
| dispersed. However successful a charge had
| brrn, he always rallied his troopers before
! launching them In pursuit Especially note
| worthy In this respect Is his action after Dun
| bar and at Langport His pursuits were fierce
| and carried far and supported 10y adequately
! strong bodies, So as to crush any attempt Of
| the enemy to reform. His was. in fine that
| com hnation OF nerve decision and military
| insight which makes great cavalry leader.