The times., 1899-07-23

great tumult In Washington. The city over
flowed with the shattered and disorganized
army OF Mcdowell. The battle of Bull Run
had been fought That was on July 81,
1851 sd
John C. Nieolay. in THE Outbreak OF the
Rebellion writes as follows;
The loyal people in Washington were
rejoicing over a victory steadily reported
during the greater part of the day, when
suddenly at about o'clock, came the start
ling telegram: General MeDowelrs army
In fun retreat through Centreyille. The day
Is lost Save Washington and the remnants
Of this army
General Scott refused to credit the as
founding and unwelcome intelligence.
Nevertheless he put the Alexandria and
Arlington camps into activity, sent conf
Dental notice to Baltimore. called re-en-
forcements from Harrisburg and New York.
and suggested to General Mcclellan that he
come down the Shenandoah Valley with
such troops as might be spared from West
Virginia"
BY midnight after the battle, officers
and civilians who were fortunate enough
to have retained their horses began to ar
rive at Washington, and the apparent
PROPORTIONS OF the Federal defeat began to
increase. 1t was a gloomy night, but yet
eloomier days followed. This was Sun
day. The next day, Monday, July p, the
rain began falling in torrents and con-
tinued for thirty-six hours with slight in
termission. Through this dOwnpour the
disbanned soldiers began to flock into
Washington, tagged out. hungry and de-
jected, and having literally nowhere TO
turn their feet and rest their heads. His
tory owes page of honorable mention to
the National Capital for its unselfsh gen
erosfty on that occasion. The rich and
poor. nigh and lowly of her people, with
one quick and entirely unprompted i'm
pulse opened their doors and dealt out
food and refreshments to the footsore,
haggard and half-staryed men whom the
fortunes of war had so suddenly reduced
to the condition of tramps and fugitiyes.
BY Monday noon the extent of the dis
aster. though not yet certainly known,
could be reasonably estimated, since indi-
cattUns begaH to show that the Confeder-
ates had not entered upon the pursuit in
fierce. Work on the defences OF Washing
ton was hastened. General Mcclellan was
called TO Washington TO take command.
General Banks was sent to Harper's Ferry,
General Dix took command al Baltimore,
and General Rosecrans assumed command
in West Virginia. Mcclellan having been
reasonably successful in West Virginia,
was received at Washington with great
warmth. He went to work Immediately
10 reorganize the shattered army that had
gone to defeat under Mcdowell. He freed
Washington from stragglers, and having, It
is said, rare tact in personal intercourse,
he soon became very popular IN this city.
OF Bull Run, the Federal historian says:
ie roIi,ical acnacrs that this
battle becomes a great historical land
mark. To say that the hope and enthusi-
asm received a painful saock of huEilia-
Iion and disappointment is to use but a
mild description of the popular feeling.
This first experience of defeat or recogni-
tion of even the possibility of defeat was
iueXpressibly bitter. Impatience and over
eagerness were chastened and repressed
and the North reconciled itself TO the pain
full prospect OF a tedious civil war ali the
more readily because of the necessity of
bending every energy to immediate prep
aration on a widely extended scale.
''If the North was cast down by the re-
suit of Bull Run the South was even in
greater ratio encouraged and strengthened
Bull Run became to the unthinking a de-
monstration of Southern invincibility. To
the more cautious leaders, the event was
sufficiently fiattering to inspire them with
haps the most potent influence of the battle
was upon foreign nations who now looked
upon the Confederate States as belliger-
ent of great expectations; while foreign
speculative capital turned somewhat eager
ly 10 this new and promising field of con-
traband trade
General Johnston in regard to the battle
OF Bull Run, writes:
The Confederate army was more disor-
yaH ny hap fhaf rs he Tpff faH
States by defeat The Southern volunteers
believed that the objects of the war had
been. accomplished by their victory and
thai they had achieved all that their coun-
try required OF them. Many therefore, in
ignorance Of their military obligations left
the army, not to return. Some hastened
TO their homes TO exhibit the trophies
picked up on the field; others left their
regiments without ceremony to attend to
wounded friends. frequently accompanying
them to hospitals in distant towns. Such
were the reports OF general and staff Off
Gers and railroad officials Exaggerated
ideas OF victory prevailing among our
troops cost US more men than the Federal
Army lost by defeat"
One month after the battle there was a
conference at Manassas between Jefferson
Davis and Generals Johnston, Beauregard
and g. n. Smith for the purpose of dis
posed that there should be concentrated
at Manassas all the available forces of the
Confederate States crossing the Potomac
into Maryland at the nearest ford and
placing this army in the rear of Washing
ton. II was thought that success would
bring Maryland into the Confederacy and
transfer the war TO the northern boundary
Of that State.
Reports of the Losses.
The battle of Bull Run was not as bloody
as is generally supposed. The official re-
ports show that the loss on the Union side
was 4sI men killed. 1.Ol1 wounded. and
about I,i50 prisoners. The Confederate
loss was 3s7 killed and 1.5S2 wounded.
The first Virginia volunteers called out
by Governor Letcher were posted at Ma
nassas Junction, where railroads from
Richmond, Alexandria, and the Shenan-
doah Valley met. II is said that the stra-
tegic value of Manassas was first pointed
out by Colonel Cocks, the local comman-
der. who on May Is wrote that the column
at Manassas and that at Winchester could
readily cooperate and concentrate either
upon one point or the other.
With the mobilization OF Federal troops
around Washington al Arlington Heights
and Alexandria the importance OF Manas-
sas was enhanced.
Beauregard was sent to take command at
Manassas on June !. 1t was soon afte,
this that be proposed to the authorities al
Richmond series OF aggressive move
ments designed to capture Washington
Jefferson Davis refused TO endorse the plan
on the ground that II was based on the
improbable and inadmissible proposition
taat the enemy was TO await everywhere
Isolated and motionless. until our force.
could effect functions 10 attack them in de-
tail. Bearregard then pointed out 10 hi.
superiors that he should hold Manassas