Martinsburg herald. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1881-1920, 1899-02-25

t1sb&t 49, 49,"
He might have gone further and hit off
the exact truth by the use OF a little
slang. Shafter is a "hustler;" more
than that, he is q driver. An attempt
has been made TO belittle his part in the
wal by saying that he did not lead the
army; only Showed it. The general
who lives in history as having Showed"
an army TO glorious victory will get
along very well without finely worded
eulogies. His work is his monument.
1t is useless to Judge a campaign by
its incidental mistakes. Apparent mis-
takes may contribute to success, SO
varied and uncertain are the causes of
success in war. But aside from all specu-
lation there were three crises in the
Santiago campaign when some one in
central authority took the favorable tide
at it's food and led on TO fortune. III
that man was not Shafter, it was some
one for whom be was responsible. He
is also a genius who adopts and pushes
through the ideas of another.
The three occasions when the direct
ing mind in the Santiago campaign dis
played rare and timely aggressiveness
were, first, the march from Sevilla for
ward on June 90 second, the persistent
attack on San Juan ridge, July /;
third, the decision to hold on at San
Juan ridge and demand the surrender
of Santiago. The situation of the army
on the goth of June was one to balk a
commander less bold and unconventional
than Shafter. His army was not in a
condition approaching in the smallest
degree the ideal one for a campaign of
assault and siege. The heat was trop-
ical. his men of northern habit, full
outfits and equipments were not on
land, long range guns were wanting,
ratiuns were consumed as fast as put
ashore, there were no practicable roads
to Santiago, and every military oonsid-
Grafton called for delay until the short
oomings were made good.
But delay in moving upon Santiago
would have been fatal to the army and
the cause. The army fought it's way
through the passes of the Spanish line
within two days after decision to go
forward was made. Three weeks later
it was n Santiago, but, after two weeks
of inactivity there, was hors de combat
by reason OF exposure to climatic dan
gers. 1t is plain now that delay from
July / to the end of the sickly season
or even to the flush of it would have
destroyed the personnel of the corps,
while retirement to the ships would
have been a violation of orders. These
orders called for an immediate land at
tack upon Santiago from the seacoast.
BY optimistic dispatches from Santi-
ago, Sampson had filled the administra-
ton with the idea that 10, 900 men
could take the place if the blow were
struck at once. Shafter had that num-
Der and some to spare within a days
march of the Spanish works when he
decided to go ahead and take chances
against heat, sickness, starvation and
Mauser bullets. So ended crisis No.
l.. The general who was a fighter"
said to the army, "We'l fightt"
Confusion at the army landings has
been made much Of in descriptions of
the campaign. No army of like dimen-
sions ever landed under similar condi-
tlOAS viz SObluolOH. Ou6 OlllCldl
has testified that everything was saori-
feed to get men, ammunition and ra-
tions to the front-that is to say, the
fighting outfit was "hustled" ashore
and to the danger point. At New Or
leans Andrew jackson refused to wait
for organization and thorough equip
ment to come forward, but drummed
up the "ragtag and bobtail" of the i'm
periled city armed with any form of
weapon. Only by so doing could he
march forth and wipe out Pakenham.
Lees Confederates fought the last
Petersburg and Appomattox campaign
on parohed corn-scant at that. To go
back to the Revolution, when Colonel
Moultrie was advised that the British
feet off Charleston would batter down
his unfinished fort of logs and sand in
ten minutes the old hero exclaimed,
"Then we'll fight on behind the ruins"
and hoisted the signal of defiance to
King George. With precedents like
these behind the American army in
Cuba, it could not be asked to draw
back for want of full rations or tents
or ambulances or even s inch guns.
TO go forward at all meant, "For-
ward against San Juan" The Siboney
and Santiago road was the sole route
for advance. 1t led across San Juan hill
with no alternative but to force that
pass. South Of it the country was alike
Impossible for the Americans to cross in
battle order and for the Spaniards to
march around the American left and
out the army off from the sea. To avoid
San Juan and approach Santiago by a
detour north via the Ell Caney road
would expose the Siboney line to Span
ish attack via San Juan ridge.
Quick work--a blow from the shout
der was the need of the hour. War
geniuses strike for the enemy's key
nOints under like circumstances on the