The record-union., 1899-11-03

amount of supervision over the AFFAIRS
of our new municipalities proved nee
essary, as the officials were timid ana
slow to comprehend their new duties.
At many of the elections the voters
went about asking who they would
vote for" and it was only with great
| difficulty that they were persuaded to
exercise the right of free suffrage.
The. commission sums up the situation
at the time of their departure as fol-
lows:
When we left Manila a large volume
of business was being done, and the
streets were so crowded as to be hard
ly safe. The native population was
quiet and orderly, and all fear of an
uprising had long since passed. An
efficient corps of native policemen was
on duty. A system of public schools
in which English was taught has been
advocated by the commission and es-
tablished by General Otis. Some 5000
scholars were in attendance.
I'm the Tagalo province of Luzon,
where the anti-American feeling has
been strongest, public sentiment had
| greatly changed, as evidenced by the
fact that the Military Governor of
4 Balaganas had offered to surrender his
/ troops and his province if we would
only send a small force there. The
Biools in Southern Luzon had risen
against their Tagalo masters The Mac
| abebeeS were clamoring for an oppor-
tunity to fight in our ranks, and native
| soldiers and scouts were also serving
under General Lawton. Stories of the
corruption of insurgent officers were
becoming daily more common, and the
disintegration of the enemy's forces
was steadily progressing. The hope of
assistance from outside sources seemed
to be all that held them together
| Having given so much attention to
| the island of Luzon, the commission
then takes in details the conditions in
the other islands. On this point it is
stated that the rebellion is essentially
Tagalo, and when it ends in Luzon it
must end throughout the archipelago.
The situation elsewhere than in Luzon
is summed up as follows:
''The only island, apart from Luzon,
where serious trouble threatens is Pa
nay, to which a considerable force OF
Tagalo soldiers were sent before an
| outbreak of hostilities Many of the
Visayans of this island are opposed
to Tagalos, however, and it is not be-
lieved that the latter can make a for
| mldabie resistance. In Samar, Leyte
| and Masbate the Tagalo invaders are
numerically few and are disliked by
the natives of these islands, whom they
have oppressed. We were assured that
2O0 men would suffice to restore order
| in MandOrO. BObOl was asking for
| troops, the Calamianes Islanders had
| sent word they would welcome us.
There can be no resistance in Palawan.
Satisfactory relations had already been
established with the warlike Moros,
| whose Sultan had previously been con-
cillated by member of the commits
sion, and in Mindano this tribe had
even taken up our cause and attacked
| the insurgents, of whom there are very
lew in the island. In Cebu we have
| only to reckon with the lawless ele-
ment, which has never been formidable
there"
Special attention is given to the ISL
and of Negros, as this seemed a field
well adapted to the extension of an
American system. Here the natives
had adopted a local form of govern
ment, including a congress, and had
raised the American flag. They be-
lleyed themselves capable of managing
their own affairs, and asked for a bat
talon OF troops to hold in check a
mountainous band of fanatics The bat
talon was furnished, but the people
proved unable to carry out their pro-
gram, owing to i'll feeling among their
own officials. The Americans remain
ed popular. At the request Of General
Otis a new and smplified scheme of
government for the island, giving the
people a large voice in their affairs,
but placing an American in full control.
was put into operation. 1t brought
about satisfaction, and public order is
better in the island to-day than at any
time during the last twenty years.
Summing the failure of the native
form of government and the success
OF the American control, the commits
sion says:
THE fiat failure of this attempt to
establish an Independent native gov
ernment in Negros, conducted as it was
under the most favorable circumstances.
makes it apparent that here, as well as
in the less favored provinces. a large
amount of American control is at pres
ent absolutely essential to a success
full administration of public affairs"
Aguinaldo and his various commits
slons are set forth in detail. These
commissioners were assured of the
beneficent purposes of the United States
and the Presidents readiness to grant
the F'ilipinos as large measure of home
rule and as ample liberty as was con-
sistent with the ends of government.
subject only to the recognition of the
sovereignty of the United StatesAa
point which, being established. the com
mission invariably refused even to dis
cuss.''
The commission adds that nothing
meof the negotiations, as Aguinaldos
enissaries We're without powers. and
merely came and came again for in
formation. Courteous reception was
accorded the insurgent commissions.
and earnest appeals made to stop fur
ther bloodshed, all witnessing "the
spirit OF patient conciliation," exhibited
by the American commission in endea-
voring to reach an amicable adjust
ment with the insurgents as well as
the obduracy of Aguinaldo
The report sums up the result of these
fruitless exchanges as follows
No better proof could be furnished
That the primary object of his sstrue-
gle is not, as is pretended, the liberty
OF the Filipino peoples, but the contin-
uance of his own arbitrary and des-
potic power. In any event, the Ameri-
can people may feel confident that no
effort was omitted by the commission
n