Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1899-04-07
AMERICANS NOT READY FOR THE
ORIGINAL OUTBREAK.
Situation of the Troops After the First
Advance Was Most Galling-Ffl.
ipinos Well Supplied With
Ammunition From I'm.
known Source.



| exactly one month ago to-day, the conquest
OF the latter by the former. which has long
peen conceded necessity, can scarcely be
sald to have commenced as yet. Had the
Americans been in a position to follow up
thelr advantage and keep right after the
nylng rebels, disorganized as they were by
that nrst unexpected advance, there Is no
ooubt that the question Of supremacy
would have been settled by this time, once
and for all time. Unfortunately, how
ever, large armies, such as that Of the
Eighth corps. are not self-supporting, and
as no provisions had been made for such
an emergency as arose on the night OF
feoruary 4, 1t became necessary to call a
hait at the very outset of what promised
TO be clean sweep to victory.
While this was unavoidable, It was dis
astrous in many ways: Firstly, because
the moment the halt was made, the moral
erect of their first defeat was eradicated
from the minds of the rebels. since it gave
them time both to recover from their
fright and to frame excuses for their fail
ure to avoid 1t: secondly, 1t afforded an
opportunity. which their leaders were quick
TO take advantage of. to play upon the
FEELINGS of the majority and enlist the
sympathies Of thousands who had carefully
refrained from Joining the rabble in their
all-advised demands; thirdly. 1t allowed
the lebels to rally their scattered forces,
and after concentrating them in various
places to infuse new blood into their ranks.
AS soon as it dawned upon them that
the Americans were still on the defensive,
and no further advance was to be feared.
the rebels again assumed the aggressive,
adopting the same bushwhacking tactics
which had proved SO successful against
their old enemy, the Spaniards. At first
these were almost harmless. since they al
most invariably brought on a fresh ad-
vance on the part of those whom they
were intended to intimidate.
After the battle Of Caloocan, however.
when the American line was so long and
thin that any further general advance be-
came inexpedient, the rebels made q dis
covery which revolutionized their plans and
inspired them with renewed courage. This
was that their rifles had superior range
to those of the majority of the American
weapons. Thereafter. their sharpshooters
carefully remained out of range Of the
Springfields carried by the volunteer regi-
ments in front of them, but maintained a
constant and more or less effective fire
from trees, clumps Of bamboo, rocks or
other natural points of vantage, both by
day and night.
A more CALLING situation than that in
which the American troops have been
placed for the past few weeks, 1t would
be difficult to imagine. Constantly potted
at by an unseen foe. yet unable to silence
his fire, except upon such rare occasions
as when the country was ordered cleared,
and then compelled to retire to their orig
inal lines after having done it, tho wonder
is that the men were kept in check at all.
Yet they were-not because they were SO
thoroughly disciplined as to accept unwel-
Nr6or HpIo ofy,fn nr1xy I,,,x
they were buoyed with the hope that, when
their reinforcements, always en- route, ar
rived. a general advance would be made,
and then their turn would come. That time
is near at hand, but whether or not the
task before the eager Americans will be
accomplished so soon as they anticipate
is an Open question.
If the entire rebel force could be cor
raled in any one section Of the island the
work OF subduing 1t would be very simple
and soon accomplished without doubt. But
on. the island Of Luzon alone, a we'll
equipped army of over 1900 men has only
succeeded in clearing the country within q
radius Of five miles from Manila, 50 far,
and no one knows with any degree Of GER
tainty what there is ahead. 1t is certain,
however. that the further they penetrate
into the wilds of the interior. the greater
will be the disadvantage to the white
troops. since swamp and Jungle fighting
are the strong points Of the natives. It Is
also certain that what Is to be done must
be ACCOMPLISHED before the rainy season,
because, apart from the consideration Of
the health of the troops. most of the coun-
try Is absolutely impossible from May to
October.
Among the uncertainties to be faced Is
that of the force to be encountered. So
far as can be ascertained the rebel army
which hemmed the Manilians within the
confines of the city for so long consisted of
10000 men. one-third of whom were armed.
Most Of these were, of course, the Tagalos,
who are the mainstay of the rebellion If,
as claimed, there are 10000 Of these yet to
meet, under climatic and territorial disad-
vantages, the problem which confronted
Kitchener at Khartoum was a simple one
compared with that which Lawton has to
face on his arrival.
OF course, there are tribes, such as the
Ilocanos. whose hatred for the Tagalos
might render them useful allies, but the
question arises as to whether 1t would be
safe to trust them with the arms necessary
for the purpose. The lesson taught by
Aguinaldo Is one that is not likely to be
forgotten in a hurry. and there is great
danger in such experiments at this stage
of the proceedings.
There is an Off chance that in the event
of serious setback AguinaIdos forces
may show the white feather in such NUM-
bers as to render further resistance use
less, but it must be conceded that the
rebels have not shown any such DISPOSE
tion so far. They bolted at the first sight
Of advance, 1t is true, but partly because
they were ignorant Of the strength of their
position and partly because their first in
stinct is to fly from cover to cover when
attacked. In this connection it must be
borne in mind that their only education in
the art Of warfare was received in the
Spanish school. and the Spaniards, like
themselves, always fought from cover
when possible. The few brushes which
our troops have had with the enemy to
date have proved conclusively that the
latter will not stand q flank attack. but
they are quick to learn and once they real
ize that bolting across the open is suicidal
under the circumstances, they will prob.
ably adopt the wiser course Of fighting it
out.
Another of the uncertainties is the num.
ber of arms which the rebels possess, That
they are being supplied at frequent inter.
walls from some unknown source scarcely
admits Of a doubt; but in what Quantities
cannot even be conjectured. Until a few
days ago there was every indication that
the rebels along our whole front were using
homemade ammunition, but now smoke-
less powder is again being used, and judg-
ing from the enormous quantity of amrnu-
milton expended every twenty-four hours,
their supply must be unlimited. At every
vantage so far thousands of rounds nf