The times., 1899-10-08

lack Of phlegmatic endurance. Of stoical apathyf
The modern European feels more keenly ana y
much more excitabie and impressonabe that MS
forefathers. Upon this highly excltabe, sensitive
population you are going inlict the miseries OF
hunger and all the horrors Of war AZ the same
time you viii enormously increase their taxes,
and at the same time also you VIII expose tteiI
governing and directing classes TO more thah
defamation al the hands of the enemys sharp
shooters How long do you think your social
fabric viii remain stable under such clrcum-
stancesY
Another matter to which considerable
space is devoted is what M. Bloch consid-
ers the uselessness of a navy, despite the
fact that seapower has generally been con-
sdered the dominant factor in the destiny
of nations His views on this subject are
perhaps influenced somewhat by the po-
sition of Russia, which certainly stands
less in need OF a navy than any other
country in Europe. He does not believe
that channels of trade can be kept open
even with the strongest fleet nor does he
think that naval victory would be OF
nearly as much use as a victory by land
forces He considers that If the land army
is victorious. a naval victory would be un-
necessary, as defeat in a sea battle would
be paid for by the enemy, while II the
land forces were defeated il would not
make any difference whether the navy were
as occupying a unique position, in which
a navy is necessary to her, because so large
a proportion of her food comes from over
seas; but he is of the opinion that even
the English navy would be of compara-
lively little use in keeping the channels of
trade free if war should actually break
out. In this argument he opposes Captain
Mahan and several other authorities, but
there is certainly some force in what he
says, particularly so far as his own conn-
try is concerned. Russia could spend her
money for almost anything else more ad-
vantageously than for navy.
On the whole M. Bloch is hopeful that
war may eventually be eliminated without
in an experimental campaign. He might
have cited, although he does not, the way
in which great financiers have for seven
| ty-five years exercised control over the
politics of Europe, foreseeing the loss OF
money and of opportunity which would
/ come from a general war. or one thing he
| is absolutely certain, that the fate OF each
nation in such conflict would depend
/ more on its power TO feed itself than on
anything else; and he points out that ow-
/ ing TO this, no declaration of war is likely
| to take place in a year of bad harvest,
| because those in control of the govern
ment would see that such an action would
be simply suicidal.
After this introduction come the elab-
crate arguments and the tables OF sta
! tistics. In the fourteen chapters which
make up the main body of the book the au-
thor discusses the methods of waging war
! on land the future of naval warfare, the
| cost of wars at present and in the fu-
ture, the care of the wounded, the eco
nomic difficulties which would be encoun-
| tered by Russia Great Britain, France, and
Germany in the event of war, the effect OF
war on the vital needs of peoples, and the
ultimate destiny of militarism. These
chapters are so full an exposition of the
| subjects of which they treat that Ii would
! be impossible to give more than synop-
sis and a few details from each; and the
| synopsis has already been given in the
foregoing sketch of the Introductory chap
! ter 1t may be well, however, to touch
here and there on points elucidated in con-
nection with these various subjects, and
of especial interest to economists in this
/ country.
II is impossible TO say with positive GER
tainty just what factors in land warfare
will be eliminated in the future, but Nj
Biochs belief is that cavalry will gradu-
ally come to be useless, because of theil
greater liability to losses under Fl. e, VIII CT
will more than counteract the advantage
of their greater speed. This is rather al
important point, when the effectiveness oi
cavalry in our own Civil War is remember
ed In the war OF the future the brilliant
work of a Forrest or a Wheeler will no
count, because there will be no recon
noitering except on foot, and no cavalry
charges will be possible on account of the
losses which the attacking party would
have to suffer before reaching close quar-
ters.
Another interesting series Of speculation.
is that on the probable effect of war on sew
eral European nations This is discussed a
length. with maps and diagrams. Nj. Blocf
considers that owing to the low educational
industrial and financial level at which ;
large majority of the Russian people arr
compelled to exist, a war would produces
much suffering among them, but no grea
overturning of social conditions. In Eng
land, on the contrary, he believes that
great foreign war would result in an eco
nomic earthquake, owing to the density o
the population and its dependence on out
side supplies and on money concentrated Il
the hands of a small number OF capitalists
In Germany the effect OF such war Nigh
be the disruption OF the German Empire
owing to the upsetting Of securities an
the lowering Of wages already low. /
France, the agricultural population is no
in a position to feed itself out OF the lanc
and the rest of the population IS fairly goo
material for political agitators to handle
Although the author does not say that rev
! | olution might follow war in France, b
, certainly hints at such a result.
In the last chapter of the book, entitle
] .Militarism and Its Nemesis, M. Bloc
T points out one of the most importar
changes in military matters which tn
e nineteenth century has seen. The army {
I the present day is made up largely, not {
e | professional soldiers enlisted for Ion
e | term of service, but OF volunteers or cor
y | scripts-that is, of amateur fighters. IN
/ | majority of the soldiers of the future WI
4 be men taken directly from peaceful occt
o | pations, heads of families. and worker
h | who are needed in the economic life OF IL
o nation. This viii affect Immediately bot
the men at the front and the people
h home. The industrial and financial syi
: TEN OF things will be disorganized, an
the army will be composed of men who
some cases have no love for military lii
: and in any case have not the GOODNESS al
I resourcefulness which comes from long I;
= miliarity with the emergencies OF q
d campaign and the battlefield. The voiul
teer may be as brave and dete
; mined a fighter as the regular soldier;
u may In some cases bring to his work
vigor and fiery enthusiasm which 4
u regular has not but the chances are tha
20 in the mass, he will not do as good wo
IL as the regular, because ii is simply impo
l. sible, in the nature OF things, that
OF should learn the trade of fighting in fe
le months.
IS The only exceptions to this rule are su
lie bodies of volunteer soldiers as may
composed of picked men, used TO I
- M frr