The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1899-03-29
ARTHUR ROPES. General Editor.
Captain Mahan on Captain Clark.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the emf
nent writer and authority on naval
subjects, has been contributing to
HcCMre'S Magazine series of articles
on "The War on the Sea and its Les
sons" In the March number Captain
Mahan comments at length on the
problem presented by the approach OF
the Oregon to the scene of naval ma
neuvers in the West Indies, and places
the seal of his high commentator up
on Captain Clark's management of his
ship in the long cruise from San Fran
cisco, and his plan for fighting Ger
vera's division had he encountered the
Spanish commander off the South
American coast or in West Indian
waters,
Captain Mahan, who was member
of the naval board of strategy, goes
over the difficulties the matter of pre-
scribing an exact route for the Oregon
presented, the confidence the navy de-
partment had in the ships captain and
officers, and says: "The Oregon, there
fore, was left loose end, and was con-
sidered safer so than if more closely
looked after" From the time the bat
tleship left Bahia, May 8, till she arrived
at Barbados, May IS, and from thence
turned up off Jupiter Inlet, on the
Florida coast, May "a, no one in Wash
ington knew where she was Never
theless, in view of the presence in the
Caribbean of Cervera's formidable
squadron, the Oregon continued a
most important and exposed fraction
of the national naval force" 1t was
believed, and Captain Mahan shared in
the belief, that Cervera would try to
intercept her. So great was the conf
dence of the department in the power
of the ship herself, and in her COM
mander and the officers under him, it
felt assured, to use the words of Mel
son when he was expecting to be SINH
larly outnumbered, "Before we are
destroyed, have little doubt but the
enemy will have their wings 30 COM
pletely clipped that they will be easily
overtaken." Such odds, Captain Ma
han says, was certainly not desired, but
the best having been done that could
be in the circumstances, there was rea-
sonable ground to believe that by the
time the enemy got through with the
Oregon, "they would not amount to
much as fighting squadron"
The chief engineer of the Oregon, in
all after dinner speech in New York,
soon after the cessation of hostilities,
stated that Captain Clark had explain.
ed to his officers the tactics he meant to
pursue if he fell in with the Spanish
division. On this subject Captain Ma
han writes:
"His purpose, as so explained, deserves
10 be noted for 1t assures our people, II they
need any further assurance, that in the
single ship, as in the squadrons, intelligent
skill as we'll as courage presided in the
counsels OF the officers in charge. The
probability was that the Spanish vessels,
though all reputed faster than the Oregon,
had different rates of speed, and each singly
was inferior to her in fighting force; in adj
dition to which the American ship had a
very heavy stern battery. The intention,
therefore, was, in case of meeting, to turn
the stern to the enemy and TO make run
ming fight. This not only gave a superior
ity OF fire to the Oregon, 30 long as the
relative positions lasted but it tended, Of
course, to prolong it, combining the enemies
TO their bow-fr and postponing, to the ut
most possible, the time Of their drawing
near enough to open with the broadside
rapid-fire batteries. Moreover, il the Span
ish vessels were not equally fast, and il
their rate of speed did not much exceed
that of the Oregon, both very probable con.
ditions, IL was quite possible that in the
course OF the action the leading ship would
outstrip her followers 80 much as to be en-
gagged singly, and even that two or more
might thus be successfully beaten in detail.
If it be replied that this is assuming great
deal, and attributing stupidity to the
enemy, the answer is that the result here
supposed has not infrequently followed up
on similar action, and that war is full of un
certainties; an instance again of the benefit
and comfort which some historical acquaint
ance with the experience of others impartl
10 man engaged with present perplexities
Deliberately TO incur such odds would b,
unjust6able; but when unavoidably con
ironted with them, resolution enlightened
by knowledge may dare still to hope.
An instructive instance of drawing sucl
support from the very fountain heads o
military history, in the remote and even le
gendary past, is given by Captain CLARK IL
letter replying to inquiries from the pres
emit writer: There is little to add to wha
you already know about the way hoped t,
fght Cervera's feet, II we fell in with 1t
What feared was that he would be able t.
bring his ships up within range together
supposing that the slowest was faster thai
the OREGON. Int there WAS the chanca tha