Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-02-21
Defends Himself From the Depart
ment'S Criticism.
HIS STAY OFF CIENFUBGOS
Justifies Himself by Referring to
instructions.
THE FIGHT OF JULY THIRD

| Rear Admiral w. S. Schley, having been
| granted permission to answer the charges
recently made against him in the communi-
| cation recently sent to the Senate, has
| handed to the committee on naval affairs
his statement, in which he disclaims any
purpose of controversy with the Navy De-
partment. The letter of the department,
| he says, so far as it relates to him. can
be summarized under the following heads:
THE delay of Cienfuegos; the alleged
slow progress toward Santiago de Cuba
| from Cienfuegos; the retrograde move
! ments on the 26th and 2Ith of May; the
battle of Santiago, and the destruction
of Csrvera's fleet
| The admiral says his orders from Samp-
| son May 10 We're to blockade Cienfuegos,
| which he proceeded to do. He had no
| knowledge that there were any insurgents
| about Cienfuegos who were friendly until
| the Marblehead arrived on the oath. Even
had he had the knowledge on the 23d of
May the surf would have prevented COM
| munication. He sent Commander McCalla
| of the Marblehead ashore to establish
| lations with the insurgents, the result of
| which was made known to him at $40
of May "a Then for the first time he
| learned definitely that the Spanish feet
was not at Cienfuegos. Within two hours
| he started for Santiago. What possible
| ground of criticism he says, adverse to
| Dlt lDeFe can De IN all lll1S i 90 not see.
| was on the spot acting under orders
which gave me entire discretion, and yet
| clothed me with the responsibility of GO
| ing to Santiago only after L was satisfied
| that the fleet was not at Cienfuegos."
| He quotes from the dispatch of Admiral
| Sampson of May 90 in which the latter
| says Schley should hold his fleet off Glen
| fuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into
Santiago, they must come either to Ha-
| vana or Cienfuegos to deliver the NUM-
tions of war which they are said to bring
| for use in Cuba. 1 therefore of the
| opinion, that the best chance to capture
| these ships will be to hold the two points,
| Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force
we can muster. If later it should develop
| that these vessels are at Santiago. we can
| then assemble off that port the ships best
suited for the purpose and completely
| blockade it. Until We, then, receive more
| positive information We shall continue to
| hold Havana and Cienfuegos.'
| Admiral Schley adds: This lstter is not
| printed either in the appendix or executive
| document c, but 1 received it on the 23d,
| and it shows that / was expected to hold
my squadron off Cienfuegos."
| As to the slow progress toward Santiago
on account of the Eagle, he states that she
was a part of the force which Admiral
! Sampson had seen fit to send him, and he
| had no right to abandon her. The weather
also was rough and not much better speed
could have been kept up. He had been
ordered to proceed cautiously" If, how
| ever, he had known that the Spanish fleet
was in Santiago no consideration for the
| Eagle or anything else would have pre-
vented him from getting there at the
| earliest possible moment with the larger
4 vessels, but the weather and sea made It
| impossible to do better than he did.
Departure From Santiago.
Speaking of 1.-The retrograde movements"
which the Secretary, adapting the language
of Admiral Sampson characterizes as rep
>rehensible conduct" Admiral Schley says
| that in forty-two years service never was
such language used to characterize conduct
| of mine, and 1 see no reason for it now"
| He adds:
Acting In accordance with my best judg-
ment, in view of the circumstances, with
out certain knowledge of the whereabouts
| of that Spanish fleet; after having been
| Informed by the scouts, commanded by
such officers as SigSbee, Jewell and Wise
| that, although they had been off Santiago
| for week, they had seen nothing of it
and knew nothing of its movements or its
| whereabouts since it had left Curacao;
| after having been assured by Sigsbee that
| he did not believe it was in Santiago, and
! by the emphatic declaration of the pilot
Nunez, and knowing that the sea and
weather then were it would be impossible
| TO coal my squadron off the port, / deemed
/ it best to take the action l did the final
result of which was the location of the
enemy's fleet in Santiago harbor.'
Admiral Schley speaks of the difficulty of
| doing anything with the insurgents, and
! refers to the manner in which Lieut. Blue
| took three days to secure information.
| As to the battle Of Santiago, Admiral
Schley says the facts of that contest speak
| for themselves He quotes from his official
| report to Sampson, in which he congratu-
| lated the commander of the squadron, and
said the victory seems big enough for all
| of u.s. He asks the committee to contrast
his reports and those of Sampson contain
! ing references to himself and continues:
| AS to all this criticism of my course prior
to the discovery by me on May - of Ger
I NKhA thnr 4
| son or the department, none of il has ever
| been made by either to me, and / never
| heard a word of it from any one until after
| the battle with that fleet, although more
| than five weeks had passed since the al
| legged 'reprehensible conduct had occurred
| Although Admiral Sampson used this lam
! guase to the Secretary concerning me on
the 10th of July Gust one week after the
| battle), he has never, to this day, in any
| manner, or to any extent, intimated to me
| any disapprobation made to me any
criticism of my conduct Of the flying squad
[ rom
| Admiral Schley then submits a long de-
| tailed statement of the facts he summarized
| IN the foregoing, which is in reply to a re-
| quest of Chairman Hale of the naval com
! mittee 1t gives the dispatches and orders
| received by Schley and describes the con-
| ditions in which the ships had to coal as
| well as the sailing for Santiago. He also
| refers to the doubts that arose as to the
| presence of the Spanish fleet in Santiago
! after lie had arrived off that port. Captain
Sigsbee stated verbally that he had been
| close into port several times and there were
| no indications that the enemy was present
| and he doubted its arrival there.
| Uncertainty About Cervera's Where
| abOuts.
The commanding officer of the Harvard
reported that he did not have coal enough
| to reach any home base and could not steam
| beyond twenty-four thirty hours which
the admiral says. forced him to send the
| Harvard to Kingston. The Yale and Min
| neapolis could reach Key West, and the
st. Paul could remain at most off the port
| for but two days. The Brooklyn, Iowa and
Massachusetts were fairly well off with
| coal, but the Texas, Marblehead and Vixen
| were considerably reduced. The projecting
| Sponsors of the Texas and Marhlehead
| made it dangerous to coal them alongside
| the collier with any swell on the open sea.
at was this situation" says the state
ment, coupled with the conclusion that the
! Spanish squadron might have touched and
| then moved west. as reported at Cienfuegos,
and reinforced by the fact that Sigsbee
had not seen them. and that the pilot Nu-
| neZ, was strongly impressed with the doubt
| that this squadron could enter the port