The daily morning journal and courier. [volume] (New Haven, Conn.) 1894-1907, 1899-02-21
SCHLEY MAKES HIS DEFENSE


Thoroughly Explains Manoeuvers OF
Squadron in Cuban Waters-Shows
That Secretary of Navy withheld a
Letter-Sampson Advised stopping al
Cienfuegos -Rebuke to Sec. Long.
Washington, Feb. 2O.-Rear Admiral
w. S. Schley, having been granted per-
mission to answer the charges made
against him in the communication re-
Gently sent to the senate, to-day handed
to the committee on naval affairs his
statement in which he disclaims any
purpose of controversy with the navy
department. The letter of the depart
ment, he says, as far as it relates to him
can be summarized under the following
heads: The delay of Cienfuegos: the
alleged slow progress toward Santiago
de Cuba from Cienfuegos; the retro
grade movements of the 26th and 9th
of May; the battle of Santiago, and the
destruction of Cervera's fleet.
The admiral says his orders from
Sampson on May 10 were to blockade
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do.
He had no knowledge that there were
any insurgents about Cienfuegos, who
were friendly, until the Marblehead ar
rived on the oath. Even had he had
this knowledge on the Esd of May the
surf would have prevented communica-
tion. On his arrival he sent Command
er McCaIla of the Marblehead ashore to
establish relations with the insurgents,
the result of which was made known
to him at $40 May IA. Then for the
first time he learned definitely that the
Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.
Within two hours he started for San
tiago. What possible ground of crit
icism," he says, adverse to me, there
can be in all this, 1 do not see. was
on the spot acting under orders which
gave me entire discretion and yet cloth
ed me with the responsibility of going
to Santiago only after / was satisfied
that the fleet was not at Cienfeugos."
He quotes from the dispatch of Samp-
son of May 20 in which the latter says
Schley should bold his fleet off Glen
fuegos. If the Spanish ships have put
into Santiago they must come either to
Havana or -Cienfnegos to deliver the
munitions of war which they are said
to bring for use in Cuba. I am there
fore of the opinion that the best chance
to capture these ships would be to hold
the two ports, Cienfuegos and Havana,
with all the ships we can muster If
later it should develop that these ves-
sells are at Santiago we can then assem-
BILE off that port tile ships best suited
for the purpose. Until we receive more
positive information we shall continue
to hold Havana and Cienfuegos."
Admiral Schley adds: This letter is
not printed either in the appendix or
executive documents, but I received il
on the 23d, and 1t shows that 1 was ex-
pected to hold my squadron off Cienfue->
gos." AS to the slow progress toward
Santiago on account of the Eagle he
states that she was a part of the force
which Admiral Sampson has seen fit to
send him and he had no right to aban-
don her. The weather was also rough
and much better speed could not have
been kept up. Speaking of the retro
grade movements which the secretary,
adopting thelanguage of Admiral Samp-
son, characterizes as "reprehensible
conduct" Admiral Schley says that in
forty-two oyears' service, "never has such
To, fn oh q otn
duct of mine, and L see no reason for it
now
He adds: acting in accordance with
my best Judgment in view of the cir
cumstances without certain knowledge
of the whereabouts of that Spanish
fleet; after having been informed by the
scouts commanded by such officers as
Sigsbee, Jewell and WISE that although
they had been off Santiago for week
they had seen nothing of it and knew
nothing of it's movement or of it's
whereabouts since 1t had left Curacao; |
after having been assured by Sigsbee |
that he did not believe that it was in
Santiago and by emphatic declaration |
of the pilot Nunez, and knowing,as he |
sea and weather were then it would be |
impossible to coal the squadron off the |
port, I deemed it best to take the ac-
tion I did, the final result of which was
the location of the enemy's fleet in San
tiago harbor." Admiral Schley speaks
of the difficulty of doing anything with
the insurgents and refers to the man
ner in which Lieutenant Blue took three
days to secure information.
As to the battle of Santiago, Admiral !
Schley says the acts of that contest
speak for themselves. He quotes from
his official report to Sampson, in which
he congratulated the commander of the
squadron and said the victory seems
big enough for all of u.s." he asks the
committee to contrast his reports and
those of Sampson containing refer
ences to himself and continuing: CAS- to
all this criticism as TO my course, TO
my discovery of Cervera's fleet none of
it has ever been made by either to me,
and I never heard a word of it from
any one until after the battle with that
fleet, although more than five weeks
had passed since the alleged 'reprehen-
sible conduct had occurred. Although
Admiral Sampson used this language to
the secretary concerning me on the
tenth of JULY, (juSt one week after the