The times., 1899-11-19

Capt Severe Coruez Nuncz of the Span
Ssh artillery. Who served in Havana during
the Spanish American war. has written am
account OF the biolkadss and coast de-
fences. he offers au excuse for SPAN ap-
paIsHt!y easy defeat. and comments on tie
appalling decline Of Spain" He says IN
part:
I Is surprising how much has b1en
written in foreign countries ON the sTau-
American war during these few
months We have before Us dozens o.
American. English, French, Italian, and
German books. reviews. and p=riCdi- al, in
which writer's relate TO their hearts con-
tent The phases of our defeat. Ard in The
face Of this wonderful activity. which o-ten
iutasprets enormously the causes Of the
appalling decline Of spain. we on the othe,
hand. preserve deaJh-like silence.
This is not as it should be In the
United states. for instance. there is not
q single officer of high rank who TOOK an
active part iu the war but mas furnished,
in books or reviews. an exposition OF The
facts substauuated by documents, and he
Government in its turn. has followed the
same plan aud has published reports Of the
Army and Navy.
reigns- and thus ii is that foreign c.id-s
lack an knowledge of our claims 10 vindi-
cation which. though slight may never
theIess throw light on many things; for,
by the side of much that is bad, and for
which we are being justly censured. there
is also some good which is being ignored,
while ia should be truJhfully and conscien-
tiously set forth, so that we may not be
judged without, being heard and considered
more inefficient ana incapable than We
really are.
Cause of Disasters.
in The first place, il should be stated
that the cause OF our disasters lies much
deeper and dates much further back than
is generally believed We do not mean to
exonerate this or that branch of the Span
ish Government. nor do we wish to conine
the blame 10 any particular one. The evil
is so great thar there is enough responsi-
blity for all But it, is unjust, criminal
evs1 10 want TO throw the whole burden
OF responsibility for the catastrophcs upon
the military institutions and stul JhaJ
seems TO be the tendency.
.First-Because the Cuban war, the
source Of or pTeteXt for our ruin. was
due to causes OF a political order and even
the measures for suppressing IL and the
election Of those who We're TO bring this
about were in obedience TO considerations
Cl The highest political order
Because our principal enemy,
the United States without whose assist
ance the Cuban insuTreCtiOu would not
have existed and could not have con
.inusd. was aided by our erroneous Lolcys
which in these colonial questions went
from enc mistake 10 another without heed
Ing any warning or advice.
-Third-If there were deficiencies in the
organization Of our armed forces and in
the direction and general stragetic con-
ceurion of The war the cause must be
sought not in The army alone but higher
in the disorganized condition Of the highest
branches OF the Government in the power
whose duty il is 10 regulate and correct,
without hesitation, whatever may be detrl-
mental and 10 keep a close watch always,
SO that everyone may be made 10 do his
duty and strive for perfection.
Fourth-We went 10 war without any
support or sympathy, led on by an erro-
ueous conception Of our strength, which
may have been eXcusable in the common
people but il was ineXcusable that il was
fostered by fanatic speeches and by people
whose duty it was TO know the condition
Of our naval and military resources
Questions Naval Aspect.
LAS 10 the naval aspect OF the question.
the publication Of Cervera's letters has
confirmed abroad the opinion Of experts
The most eminent critics who comment
on our defeat, without losing sight OF the
naval responsibilities. as to whether il
was eXpedient or not for the squadron TO
enter Santiago Harbor; whether or not il
could have reached another port before il
was blockaded here. and whether that would
have been preferable whether the sOTIie
should have been ordered; whether when
ordered. il was better 10 go out at night
or IN daytime whether il was better for the
ships, on coming out to follow divergent
courses. or 10 hug the shore as they did
without losing sight Of al this, We say
the naval experts Of the world agree:
-First-That the destruction Of the
squadron was decreed from the very mo
ment that il received orders 10 leave Cape
Verde. for our naval deficiency was un-
questionable.
Second-That from that very moment
the problem ceased 10 be naval and became
q political problem, for to political mo
EiEes only can we attribute the fact tina,
a squadron which amounted TO so little
was made 10 90 ouJ and fight with one 50
powerful. This statement is corr0borated
by the following words:
TIE United state. Navy has Demonstrated Il-
Ehiity ~ carry oli much greater enterprises than
abe ~ intussted 20 IL last wear. and sti IL
eaEHof be said thst tie heet as q whole was
1e Navy has contracted = great debt Of graft.
tudf Eith the spanish GoyerHmeHt.-The Times
-Thlrd-That the main responsible,
should not be sought in the disaster itself
but in events prior to the disaster In order
70 ascertain the reasons why we had nc
feet and why the material that we did
possess was in such poor condition in spite
Of the enormous sums which the nation haC
expended upon il.
-'Fourtb-That even within the limits OF
our dedclencies and errors. having once
launched on a mad war, we should have
gone into it with madness. without consid-
eriHg means OF attack. without cOnsidera-
Lions OF any kind. making war upon com
merce 10 the greatest possible extent
From what we now know IL is cleal
that in the United States also great inde.
cision prevailed and grave errors wer,
committed, and if our ships had been dis
tribuied with more wisdom allowing IN,
Oquendo and Nizcaya 10 remain al Havana
and il our troops had been handled NOR
skulfuly, such iudecisiou and errors woul,
have become more apparent with not
litle prejudice to the enemy
As 10 the military aspect, properl
speaking on land as well as on the sea
there may be found 10 this book account
OF a number OF minor battles in which tn
enemy always retreated, perhaps in accord
auce with some system, or because it wa
found eEpedients nevertheless these bat
Hes show
-First-A desire on our part to fight
without measuring the forces and thus W
see az times troops OF infantry hghtin
from the shore with only the fire OF thei