Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1899-02-21
Admiral scMLeYs ANSWER.
Ne Riddles The Charges In Recent Communal.
cation 10 The Senate.

Gently sent to the Senate, today, hand
ed to the committee on naval affairs
his statement in which disclaims any
purpose of controversy with the navy
department The letter Of the depart
ment, he says, 50 far as it relates to
him. can be summarized under three
heads: The delay or Cienfuegos: the
alleged slow progress toward Santiago
de Cuba from CienfuegOs: the retro
grade movements OF the 26th and 9th
Of May; the battle Of Santiago and the
destruction of Cervera's feet
The admiral says his orders from
Sampson, May 10. were to blockade
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do.
He had no knowledge that there were
any insurgents about Cienfuegos who
were friendly, until the Marblehead
arrived. on the 24U,. Even had he had
this knowledge Of the 23d Of May the
surf would have prevented the COM
municatiOn. On his arrival he sent
Commander McCalla of the Marble
ashore to establish relations with the
insurgents, the result OF which was
made known to him at $40 of May a.
Then, for the first time, he learned de-
fnitely that the Spanish fleet was not
at Cienfuegos. Within two hours he
started for Santiago.
What possible ground of criticism"
he says. adverse to me. there can be
in all this. / do not see. | was on the
spot acting under orders which gave
me entire discretion and yet clothed me
with the responsibility of going to San
tiago only after was satisfied that the
fleet was not at Cienfuegos He
quotes from the dispatches of Samp-
! son Of May 20. in which the latter says
Schley should hold his fleet off Glen
fuegos. II the Spanish ships have put
into Santiago they must come either to
Havana or 10 cienfuegos To deliver tn Z.
munitions of war which they are said
to bring for use in Cuba. | am there
| fore of the opinion that the best chance
to capture these ships will be to hold
the two points. Cienfuegos and Ha-
vana, with all the force we can muster.
| If the later il should develop that these
vessels are at Santiago, we can then
assemble on that port the ships best
suited for the purpose and completely
| blockade it. Until we. then. receive
more positive information. we shall
continue TO hold Havana and Cienfue-
| Cos"
| Admiral Schley adds: This letter is
| not printed either in the appendix or
! executive documents but ] received it
| on the 23d and it shows that | was ex-
| pected to hold my squadron off Glen
| fuegos.''
| AS to the slow progress towards
| towards Santiago on account of the
| Eagle he states that she was a part of
the force which Admiral Sampson had
| seen fit to send him and he had no
| right TO abandon her. The weather
| also was rough and not much better
speed could have been kept up. He had
| been ordered to proceed cautiously.
| IT. however. he had known that the
| Spanish fleet was in Santiago, no con-
| s;deration for the Eagle or anything
| else would have prevented him from
| getting there at the earliest possible
| moment with the larger vessels, but
| the weather and sea made it impossible
| to do better than he did.
Speaking of the retrograde move
ments which the secretary. adopting
the language of Admiral Sampson.
characterized as - reprehensible con-
duct" Admiral Schley says that in AZ
guage used to characterize conduct of
mine and l see no reason for it now.
He adds: In accordance with my
hes. judgment. in view of the circum-
stances without certain knowledge of
the whereabouts of that Spanish fleet;
after having been informed by the
scouts commanded by such officers as
Sigsbee. Jewell and Wise. that al
49, s:s g.
week they had seen nothing of it
and knew nothing of it's movements.
or its whereabouts since it had left
Curacao; after having been assured by
Sigsbee that he did not believe it was
in Santiago by the emphatic declara-
ton of Pilit Nunez, and knowing, as
the sea and weather then were, ii
would be impossible to coal my squad
ron off the port-I deemed it best to
take the action l did. the final result
of which was the location of the enc
my's fleet in Santiago harbor.''
Admiral Schley speaks of the difficult
ty of doing anything with the insur-
gents and refers to the manner in
which Lieut.. Blue took three days to
secure information.
AS to the battle of Santiago. Admiral
Schley says the facts of that contest
speak for themselves. He quotes from
his official report to Sampson in which !
he congratulated the commander of the |
squadron and said the victory seems |
big enough for all of u.s. he asks the |
committee to contrast his reports and |
those of Sampson containing references |
to himself and continues: LAS to all |
this criticism of my course prior to the |
discovery by me, May 20. of Cervera's |
fleet, whether from Admiral Sampson
or the department. none of it has ever
been made by either to me, and l never
heard word of it from anyone until /
after the battle with the fleet. although |
more than five weeks had passed since
the alleged ''reprehensible conduct"
had occurred.
Although Admiral Sampson used
this language to the secretary concern
ing me on the 10th of July Gust one
week after the battle) he has never to
this day. in any manner. or to any ex-
tent intimated to ME any disapproba-
ton or made to me any criticism of
my conduct of the flying squadron
Admiral Schley then submits a long
detailed statement of the facts he sum-