The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1899-04-03
sPANIARDs WERE WHIPPED
Before Single Shot was Fired at
our Fleet.
THEY FELT THEIR IMPOTENCE

! lHLl LII LILLE llli LNoL
Against tho Well Equipped Vessels
OF sampson's Squadron : The Mis-
take or the Spanish Admiral was in
Coming out OF the HarDor in Day
light-Lnck orTraining on Spanish
Ships = AMERICANS Conscious of
Power and Confident Of Victory.
Porto RIcan Campaign.
WASHINGTON, D. C.. April 2.-The
bureau of naval Intelligence of the
navy department has issued the last OF
the series of the sketches of the Span
ish-American war BY Commander Ja-
cobson, of the German p,otected cruiser
Geier. The last Of this interesting SER
les deals with the condition of the
Spanish ships after the battle Of Santa
SO. This portion Of the sketch contains
number OF observations regarding the
technical effect Of our gun fire which
VIII interest naval officers. The most
interesting observations to the laymen
are those upon the strategy. or lack OF
It. displayed BY Cervera. The Spanish
admiral having been ordered to leave
the harbor, to removs the main object
OF the attack upon Santiago. Com
mander jacobson Gays his position was
most difficult. He did not dare make
the attempt at night and so decided to
SO out in broad dagil.ight.
"The whole crew., he says, FELL n
victim to this fatal decision. Instruc-
tions for the sortie and the western
course were issued. The admiral was
entirely CONVINCED OF the impossibllity
OF defeating the enemy. or OF reaching
another cuban harbor; even u he should
succeed in steamlns right through the
hostile fleet. 1t is to this feeling OF help
American naval forces more than 10
anything else that l attribute the de-
feat. The Spanisf ships had spent 4
month and a half in the harbor without
ever ATTEMPTING to attack the blockade
ing fleet whea a favorable opportunity
presented II II. or even of harassing t..
The two torpedo boat destroyers were
not used for the purpose FOR which they
were intended This inactivity and
lack of in!tiative must have had q
very, dernorallzing effec. on the officers
and men. II W.. add to this the certain
knowledge that the opposing forces
were much Stronger, it will be readily
understood that the idea-of general
! flight after Coming out of the harbcr
entrance was the only acceptable one.
especially in view OF the possibility Of
beaching ana torpedo boat destroyers. 1t
Is mainly due to these deficiencies that
the defeat Was FASTENED and that the
American ships Sustained 60 few losses.
Lack Of Training.
The training OF the engine personnel
also was totally unreliable, which is not
surprsinG in view of the fact that the
Spanish ships, as rule. are not sent
out on extensive cruises. The bottoms
OF the Spanish ships had not been
cleaned for a long time. as they had
been lying In santiago harbor for q
month and a half they We're consider
ably fouled. Thus the cruisers Maria
Teresa. oquendo and Viscaya which In
all official boots are credited with 1875
knots speed, went Into the battle with a
speed OF from 10 to Il knots at most and
the Cristobal colon, which is the latest
ship and Was to run 20 knots. hardly at
I tained SPEED OF 1875. Under these cir
cumstances, In every way unfavorable
for the Spanish, whose crews were in
sufficiently trained and physically and
morally enervated by long inactivity,
whose ships were inferior in number,
speed and lighting efficiency. I, is no
wonder that the victory of the Ameri-
cans was easy and paid for with insigni-
hcant saeridces.
There was only one chance for the
Success OF the sortle. 1t should have
been made at night in scattered forma-
zion. After personal investigation OF
the locality, It Is my opinion that It Is
entirely practicable for n fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night. The wreck
Of the Merrlmac did not constitute nm
obstruction, II IS true that Admiral
sampson's report on the night blockade
states that the lightships were lying
from one TO two miles from Moro Cas-
tie, according TO the state of the at
mosphere, and that they lighted up the
channel for half a mile inside. Even
the best scarohlight, however. does not
reach farther than one mile. Therefore,
the illumination could not have been
Very effective. Moreover, the shore
batteries. By opening ilre upon the
lightships, could have compelled them
to change their Positions, but strange 10
say this was never done. The darI,
nights at the time of the new moon
about the middle OF June would have
been best suited for the enterprise, the
ships. thereby rendering them unser-
ViceaDle. and eventually rescuIng the
crews. From the very moment that this
feeling OF impotence took possession OF
the Spanish and led to the above renec-
ttons. their fate. pscychologicaIly
speaking, was sealed. We do not mean
to disparage their valor and tenacity,
In the midst of the hostile fire, but on
the other hand 1t Is quite natural that
the admiral, seeing that everything was
happening as he had foreseen, was the
one who set the example of running his
ship ashore. All the other commanders
followed this example.
Americuns Conscious orPowcr.
"on the American side the situation
was Just the reverse. Admiral Samp-
sons fleet was fully Conscious OF lis
power. The blockade was being conduct.
cd IN, accordance with carefully pre-
pared plans, us were MISC the arrange
mcnts In case Of the enemS's attempt 10
escape. FREQUENT engagements with
the Spanish forts had given command
ers ana crews that calm and assurance
in the handling OF their weapons which
sudrahtees success. The long blockade
service, exhaustlve nnd monotonous
hardly interr,ipted by any action on the
part OF the Spanish ., had strung The
nerves to the highest pitch, and every.
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