The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1899-06-19


Miles was subjected 20 BY criticism up
on his conduct OF the war. his account
of II is exceedingly moderate In tone
and modest In statement. II 10 quite
evident. however, that he intends before
completing the series Of papers he il
writing for the North American Review.
to make 1t very clear that he was the
active commander in the Cuban cam
paign, and that he IL entitled to credit
for such success as was achieved.
A very interesting chapter h that
which deals with the orders and plans
relative to the capture Of Santiago. 1t
begins with a letter from Mai. Gen.
Shafter to the secretary OF war. telling
him that the town was well invested
on two sides. bat with q very thin line.
He found Ii OF such a character and the
defenses so strong that It would be i'm
possible to carry by storm with his
force. He wrote that he was urging Ad-
miral Sampson to attempt TO force the
entrance to the hAfbor On the very
same day Cervera's feet sailed out OF
the harbor Gen. Miles says that the
Spanish admiral did not intend 1t az a
challenge to battle. because he knew
the odds against him were overwhelm-
ing. A very. significant sentence occurs
In reference to this matter. which indi-
Gates Gen Miles leaning toward the
Sampson side Of a famous eontro-
versy. He says that the Spaniasds
chose most favorable moment to
make his dash for life, ~ he could have
seen the flagship of the mighty feet
which enyironed him steam majesticai-
~ toward the east, Is Admiral Sampson
had gone to meet Gen. Shafter TO con-
fer with him about making drive into
the harbor. leaving Admiral Schley
temporarily In command. The DISPOSE
ton of the vessels OF our fieet had been
well planned" This is the only allusion
to the rivalry between the two admirals.
and the military commander gives TO
the naval commander credit for having
devised the means by which success was
obtained.
II becomes evident that Gen. Miles
would have rather favored not making
an attack upon Santiago after the fleet
was destroyed. In the first place. 1t
IA .a Ia
he then had. and in the second place, he
regarded the capture of Porto Rico as
of much more Importance He does not
say so, but he would no doubt have been
content to invest Santiago, cutting Of
all supplies. and practically starving the
city into yielding. II is TO the credit Of
Miles that he publishes his request for
2eooo more troops. because the work
was accomplished without those rein
forcements. The request was made up
on the representations OF Gen Shafter.
Miles left Washington on July Z, and by
the l4th the surrender Of the Spaniarcs
was practically insured. This shows
that Shafter must have been doing
execution to the enemy before Miles ar
rived. because the additional reinforce
made very material difference and
Miles was not on the island long enough
10 have added very much TO what Shat
ter had already under way. Full credit
Is given TO the men under Shafter .or
tbs In valor. but the bravery OF the Gu
ban insurgents Is extolled with no less
emphasis
Very aeiicateiy done Is the prescnta-
tion OF the difference II opinion between
Secretary Alger and Gen. Miles He re-
quests the secretary Of war TO forward
a communication to the president In
order TO dispossess his mind Of what
must se MISREPRESENTATION" This let
ter was sent. as NJ explains. on learning
that no one of the four propositions he
had made was definitely determined up-
on to Porto Rico. the capture of which
place he regarded as OF great lnpoY-
,snce. Il being 'the gateway In the
spanish possessions on the Western
hemisphere. Gen Miles shows himself
Ia Ne an exg,ansioniss to some extent. he
cause he advises the government not
only 10 take Porto Rico. but 10 keer II.
The remainder ~ the letters cannot
fall II BE- 80 interest. but he has pasxes.
the crucial peant. and cleared up the
matter as to which there has been cen
siderable doubt In the public mind.