Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-11-24

Gen. Nrthucn's victory over the Free
State Eurr- at Belmont X thc first definite
re~ui, of the recent enlargement of tn"
British .:rmy in South Africa. 1t marks
tn first stage in IN" ,.dvancc OF the Kim
l.rI-y relief column and rs expected TO he
frIlrwe, by another engagement at Mod
g. r. river. about thirty miles farther norih.
Ei.ri"us reports have indicated that III,
Ii,,rs have destroyed the railroad bridge Il,
iris point They are believed to he In po-
-i,inr g., defend the crossing of he river
With ef,c.- The reason for the British id
vance. however. is - urgent that il i as
s.m-l that Gen. Methunn will attack with
q. <peratiou The situation ut Kimberley i
precarinUs. although the Beers are content
irg themselves with artillery fire and IL
not attempt rushing tactics
Ia Natal the progression Of events favor
tne Roe.s. The attempt u cut around Est
,aHrt seems to have been successful con-
f~stry :" expectations. Nothing has beer
beard directly from thai place for seyera
Ts-s and it IS Surmsri that The Beers hav,
Established themselves bc. wcen there ard
Mnoi river station. which is still occupied
ny tn British. There i also reason 10 he
ii.rc that there is a force Of Beers be
tween Moot river and Pietermaritzhurs. tfo
capital Of Natal. Indeed if the British Re
l.-: column under Gen. Clery is detaiue;
much longer IN starting from Durham
ny have to fight it's way northwestward
toward Ladysmith almost from the sea
Pictermaritzbure lies only about forty miles
from Durham.
The Eoars have certainly succeeded il
providing - most complex and difficult PROB
lem for the British commanders to solve ny
striusiRg out Il series of invested cities
each with is British force cooped up with
T. 1usl unable To do more than 10 maintain
% defense. Already there are. it is non
thought. three of these in Natal at Moo
river. FstCpurt and LdaySmith. and there
i:.Hy soon h. another at Pietermarit zbure
OF course in the event of an advance from
Durham should the British arms b. success
ful it will he possible to pick up these forces
one after another and swell the total NJ I've
advancing army. But the problem IF pick
ing them mp j. Yea ia h- met.
Ia the west two large and Important cii-
les are surrounded by the EuerS thus Civ
ING a total of perhaps five crnters of Brit
iSh establishment iSolat ted and of nu pres
ems u.s. in Tie general plan Of campaign.
Everything depends, therefore. upon the "a
parity If The army now being Landed. Its
task X thTeefoId, to prevent further IN
Croao hIrsnJs into British territory. 10 ~
EsTe tie heleaguereI citiy=$ and 10 assume
-he aggressive in an invading movement
1t is clear that the British will need ii
very iafs" force To- accomplish this pro-
gram
The situation results from the carly pro-
cpitation Of hosrilities by the Beers before
the Brush We're ready To strike. Had the
declaration of war been postponed six
weeks. until the British army corps had
landed the story Of The campaign wouiI
hav- been far different. Lord Lansdownc's
comment that the conduct Of negotiations
by electricity had ouJstripped the govern
n;ents ability TO prepare for war will b.
cCme historic The episode. costly a. il is
VIII teach the British government a valrI-
able lesson in maintaining greater harmony
between is diplomatic and its w,r-ma kiu.:
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