The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-29

~ 80 WV ~ . W
nans). Thin volume Is devoted to the event
Of 1882. including tho Peninsula campaign
the assumption Of the offensive by Lee In tn
East, the battles OF Antietam and Fredericks
burg. and tho contemporancous operations II
the West. The render who recalls the thor
ouehness OF research and the sobriety OF judg
ment which were exhibited In the first part o
this work will be interested In learning the
eoncluslons reached by Mr.. Ropes with regard
70 many questions raised by the campaigns
here discussed. questions that have provoked
much heated controversy. We shall indicate
some Of these conclusions in their order. refer
ring the reader 10 the narrative itself for most
Of the data on which they are based.
Did Gen. Grant fail to profit by the defeat OF
the Confederates on the second day OF the
battle OF Shiloh or PittsburR Landing? Mr..
Ropes's answer to this question VIII be found
on pages aO-o2. There was no reason. no
thinks, why Gen. Grant should not. promptly
and unremittinRly have followed up his beaten
antagonist. 1t is pointed out that two more
divisions OF Buell's army, those OF Wood and
Thomas. were directly in tho rear OF Grants
force part OF Woods. in fact. was in the second
days nght-addinG more than 10000 men to
the 10000 soldiers Of the Army Of the Cumber-
land. already on the field. We are also re-
minded that Lewis Wailace's division OF the
Army Of the Tennessee was in fine order: and
that. in n day or two. considerable accessions
might he expected from tho other divisions
OF the Army Of the Tennessee. 1T was"
IN fine. - case where the enemy were in
full retreat. and that, too. after having lost very
heavily In one battle and being defeated In the
second: there could have boon no doubt at all
IN the mind OF any military man that the Union
-, - sN arpn1,- ,fnpn "a nj II ~ Ivn1 Of
fresh and victorious troops. was in vastly bet
ter condition and spirits than the Confederate
army could possibly have been. A General
who was equal to the task OF seeing the facts in
the sober light Of strong probability would
have felt not only justified but obliged to act
with vigor in this state of things. But Grant
did not act ut all. He utterly failed to seize the
opportunity" Mr.. Ropes goes on to EXPRESS
the opinion that no better opportunity than
that afforded Mt shiloh was ever presented
to a Federal General during the war.
Bragg. the morning after the battle.
reported to Beauregard. the Confeder-
ate commander. that his troops were
utterly disorganized and demoralized:"
that the road was almost impassable:" that
there were no provisions and no forage"
that the artillery was being left all along the
road Breckenridge. who commanded the
rear guard. wrote that evening to Bragg: My
troops are worn out. and l don't Think can be
relied on after the first volley. There is two
days food. enough for the men, but the horses
are sinking rapidly for want of forage" Mr..
Ropes's deduction from these data runs as fol-
lows: with the Confederate army in this con-
dition. it is not difficult to conjecture what
would have been the result Of a vigorous pur-
suit. II made by Grant at tho head Of tho
10000 troops. most of them fresh. which for
tune had placed at his DISPOSAL"
What Grants army was doing at this time.
so far as could be seen BY a Confederate
officer sent out with n flag Of truce. was thus
reported to BeaureRard's chief OF staff:
HE 1.-THE officer says that. as far as no
observe. they the Federalsl seemed to
be burying dead. looking after wounded and
their camps to rights In his own
book. Gen. Grant refers to his conduct at the
time in the following words: Il wanted to
pursue. but had not the heart to order the men
who had fought desperately for two days.
lying In the mud and rain whenever not fight
ing. and l did not feel disposed to positively
order Buell.. or any part OF his command. to
pursue. Although the senior in rank at the
time. ! had been SO only a few weeks. Buell.
was. and had been for some time past.
a department commander. while / COM
manded only a district" Our authors
comment on this statement is: Grant
citil "a al'o ~ lHo " lIC tltlkI IL u
this occasion. and his excuses are OF no weight
whatever" Mr.. Ropes proceeds to show that.
as a matter OF fact, Wallace's division and the
divisions OF Buell. had undergone no hard
ships worth mentioning; on them, as Gen.
Grant we'll knew. would have fallen the fatigue
Of the pursuit. 1t is, moreover. pronounced in
excusable for Grant to mention the fact that
Buell. had been under his command only a few
weeks. when it was possible to complete the
defeat OF the enemy by ordering immediate
vigorous action. Buell.. us Grant well
knew, was the last man In the army to disobey
his military superior. Grant. In truth. does
not mean TO be understood as fearing that Buell.
would disobey him if he gave the order: he
only means to say that he felt some embarrass- |
ment. In view OF Buell's late position in the
in giving him the order. But how can
, feeling Of this kind. SO entirely opposed to
the principles of military duty. exonerate the
officer in charge from e~xerting all his official
to carry out the plan which commends
Itself to his Judgment"
1t will be remembered that. soon after tho
Gen. Halleck. the head OF tho depart
arrived at Pittsburg Landing and
assumed OF the army there. which.
before the end OF the month. was in
by endorsements to overlO0. 900 men.
What use. did Halleck make OF his resources?
Mr.. Ropes's reply will be found on pages 94-95. |
It ia not disputed that the spring campaign OF
The Western Federal army had accomplished q
great deal. but our author maintains that 1t
had not accomplished all that might Justly have
been expected. 1T was. assuredly. a great
hing to have gained control OF Kentucky
and Of western and middle Tennessee. and to
have opened the Mississippi River as far as
But the Confederate Army OF the
still remained intact. To destroy this
was now the remaining task OF Gen.
This task he had really never at
to perform. and. even now. when he
at the head OF more than 100000 excellent
troops. commanded by some OF the most skill
hui Generals in the service of the United States,
he deliberately turned aside from its accom-
Mr.. Ropes insists that it was pos
sible to follow up the army OF Beauregard in
June. 1852. as closely as. in April. 1885. Grant
and Meade followed up the army Of Lee.
however. was satisfied with what had
been done. And he was incapable OF realiz-
Ing that so long as the army OF Beauregard
left unharmed-in truth. until it should be
iestroyed-it was perfectly possible for it to as