The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1899-02-07
The Attack on American Lines Dur
ing the Night
What Might Have Been Expected From
Their Early TuteIage.
Attacks at Night a Eavorite Opera
ton Of the Spanish Command
ers, the Insurgents Falling Into
the Line of Their Former
Enemy.

6ACAAys
NEW YORK, Feb. 6.-General Wes-
ley Merritt in an interview to-day on
the Philippine outbreak, said:
That the attack on our lines should
have been made at night, is what one
would expect from the tutelage of the
Filipinos in war-that of the Spaniards.
Night attack is a favorite operation of
Spanish commanders, and during the
time that the insurgents We're besieg-
ing Manila before our movements
against the city actively began, the
two antagonists used to shoot literally
at each other in the dark and during
the day remain inactive. Their COM
mon practice, moreover, when fighting
in trenches, is to thrust their rifles over
the top of the breastwork, without ex-
posing any part of the body and trust
to luck to hit something.
THE night attack as regular meth
cd of warfare characterizes the art of
war in a low stage of development. Sol
diers trained in the best schools of
rule, to fight their battles in daylight,
Slice tIlcu tucIS II lSSS CIanNS IL Lilo-
take and a greater opportunity of
working out with mathematical pre-
cision. The chiefs of a semi-civilized
force, from the Khalifa to Aguinaldo,
prefer a dash in the dark. hoping to
terrorize the enemy by the unexpected
ness of the attack.
without doubt the insurgcnt assault
on Manila was preconceived and delib-
crate That it was planned by Asui-
naldo I do not care to assert but, OF
course the patent probability is that
it was, since he has lately seemed to
be undisputably supreme. The blow
which we have been compelled to de-
liver. ought now, in my judgment, to be
vigorously followed up. If it is. the
Filipinos will quickly realize who is
master and submit. Our policy up to
the time of this battle has been one of
extreme Cancellation, based upon the
hope and expectation that, ignorant as
the Filipinos were, they might event
ually be brought to understand that we
bring them freedom AMI prosperity, and
not a repetition of Spanish tyranny.
unfortunately, they are a people, pc
culiarly likely to misapprehend for
bearance and consideration. They i'm
mediately attribute them to fear or
weakness; they respect nothing except
force for it is the only thing that the
Spanish have ever represented to their
eyes that it was possible for them to
respect All this the English residents
at Manila, and colonists at all the ORR
entail British ports at which I stopped
on my way home, repeatedly told me.
They predicted that the insolence and
license of the Filipinos would infaliibly
grow until we should be forced to bring
home to them the fact that our Power
could not be resisted. Then it was de-
clared, they would abandon resistance.
ssThe military organization of the Fill
ipinos will scarcely, 1 think survive this
defeat-certainly not, if we at once
strike hard again whenever they show
front. Their organization. of course,
has always been exceedingly poor.
There is probably not an officer among
them who has any respectable knowl-
edge of modern military science. Their
ablest soldier is Pho de Pillar, the East
Indian, and yet I doubt very much if
he has ever in his life read any of
the books of the profession. His con-
sequence proceeds rather from his per-
sonal qualities as a fighter than from
his ability to direct operations. His
force. courage. combativenesS and i'm
placability inspire confidence in his
men. and to the extent that he is thus
a natural military leader he is dan
gerous and, from our point of view, a
bad man. There is no question in my
mind that even Aguinaldo has stood in
awe of him. 1t is even possible that
Pho de Pillar and his faction coerced
Aguinaldo into sanctioning the assault.
In the latter communications to me he
reminded me, in excuse for his inability
to accede at once to requests made,
that he had to consider the wishes of
his chiefs. He mentioned no names,
but it was generally understood among
us that he referred principally to Pho
de Pillar. The 1atter's influence, what
ever it may be, can be counted on as
irreconcilably hostile to us.
ST think we may expect that defeat
at Manila will have a disastrous effect
upon Aguinaldo's authority. His SUI
premacy has been based on his notable
successes in wrestling the island from
the hands of the Spanish, after we had
DESTROYED the Spanish fleet, and upon
the Importance which he has assumed
in the eyes of his followers by reason
of confronting US so long with an army.
The feebleness of his power having been
made manifest, there is every reason
to suppose that his numerous rivals
suppressed for the time, will rise to
disrupt his authority. When they have
come to nothing through factional diff
ferences, and possibly conflicts, they
will be entirely amenable to our guild
ance and rule, think. They are real
" docile and amiable people, without
much stern stuff-not pugnacious and
as our Indians are"
General Greene said "They have
one General who is a man of no mesn
ability as a military commander. His
name is Pho de Pillar. but he is not
Filipino. He is a fullblood Indian.
Aguinaldo showed to General Merritt
that he (Aguinaldo) rather stood in awe
Of Pillar. I met this man once. He
was extremely hostile to the Americans
and showed that he was not of the sort
to be conciliated. Another fairly able