Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-06-29
BROWN v. oRANGEBuRG couN.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
April 20. 1S99
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA AUTHOR
IzE THE RECOVERY OF DAM
AGES FROM A COUNTY IN
WHICH A LYNCHING OCCURS.
WHETHER THE PARTY LYNCH
ED. WAS A PRISONER OR NOT.
This was n suit for damages by the
administrator Of Lawrence Brown, who
was lynched in Orangcburg county
The case appears from the opinion of
the court The lower court gave judg-
ment for the county and the plaintiff
appealed.
The court. after recitlng the article
or the Constitution and laws as to
lynching, says:
The intention of the constitution was
10 prevent the crime Of lynching in two
ways: (D By visiting upon the officers
or the law the penalties therein men
TONED. when prisoner lawfully In
their custody was lynched by a mob
through their negligence. permission, or
connIvance; and (2) to induce the CO.
operation OF the taxpayers In prevent
ing the lynching, In order that their
county might not become liable to the
penalty by way Of exemplary damages.
or not less than $1,000, to the legal rep
resentatives Of the person lynched The
iynching of a prisoner, and Of one not
in the custody of the law as such, Is
murder, In both cases. 1t would there
fore at least seem strange il the fran.
ers OF the constitution were careful to
provide, In the organic law of the State
a remedy for preventing the lynching
OF q prisoner and remained silent as
to the remedy in all other cases OF
lynching. The constitutional provision,
however. Is not confined to the lynch
Ing of prisoners. The words, "without
regard to the conduct of the officers"
when considered In connection with the
evil which the constitution intended to
remedy, must be construed to mean.
without reference to what has been
said In regard to the conduct OF the Off
GERS. or. In other words. without re-
ference to other provisions of the sec
tion. They were inserted for the pur-
pose OF showing that the proviso was to
be construed Independently, and with.
out regard to what preceded it. The
word provided" is omitted In the act
and this fact shows that the legls-
lature gave to the words, without re-
gard to the conduct of the officers" the
construction which this court has
placed upon them. 1T must be remem-
bered that many Of those who were
members OF the constitutional conven-
tion were likewise members of the Gen
eral Assembly when said act was pass
ed. While, of course, a. construction
placed upon the constitution by the leg
islative branch OF the government
would not be binding upon the courts
still in this case 1t is we'll WORTHY of
consideration. The act intended to
make the county liable for damages In
those cases only which fall within the
provisions of the constitution, and II
has correctly construed the constitu-
tion to make county liable for dam
ages when the person lynched was not
In the custody of the law as prisoner
This renders unnecessary the consider
alton of the interesting question wheth,
er the Legislature did not have the
power independently Of the constitu-
tional provision, to pass the act here
inbefore mentioned. It has been held
that statutes making community IL
able for damages in cases of lynching
and giving right OF recovery to the
legal representatives of the person
lynched, are valid, on the ground that
the main purpose is to impose a penalty
on the community, which is given to
the legal representatives. not because
they have been damaged, but because
the Legislature sees fit thus to dispose
OF the penalty. Such statutes are SAL
utary. as their effect is 20 render pro-
lection to human life, and make COM
munities law-abiding. But. as we have
said. our conclusion renders unneces-
sary consideration of this question.
1t is not necessary to consider the ex-
ceptions In detail, as our views dispose
OF the main question in the case. 1t Is
the judgment OF this court that the
judgment OF the Circuit Court be re-
nd hA LA Co