The daily morning journal and courier. [volume] (New Haven, Conn.) 1894-1907, 1899-09-14
MODERN ARMY MANoEuvREs.

AS the tremendous power of the fire.
arm is undoubtedly the decisive factor
in modern war, so the problem of how
that fire may be most effectively de-
veloped must be the first consideration
of those responsible for the leading and
| instruction of the troops. 1t is proba-
bly, true that the losses on future bat
tle-f1elds will hardly exceed those of
the last great campaigns-the Franco
| German and the Russo-Turkish Even
in 1877 the tactical revolution which had
been brought about by the introduction
of the breech loading rife and an i'm
proved artillery, was but imperfectly
understood The warrior instinct of
| the Turk, indeed grasped the enhanced
| value of spade and pick; but neither
| Osmanl nor Russian realized, any
more than the Germans had realized in
1870, the extent Of the notifications that
the pieces volume of fire had rendered
necessary in the methods of attack and
defence. Dense formations, an absolute
disregard of cover during the attack, an
almost unintelligent use of the rifle
and an exaggerated confidence in the
discipline We're conspicuous characteris-
tics of the battles both in France and
in Bulgaria. Napoleon'S columns at
Waterloo presented hardly more favor
able targets to Brown Bess" than did
the thick lines of the Germans to the
Chassepot, or the mobs of Russians to
the Martini. The result was the heca-
tombs Of Marsha Tour and St Privat,
of Plevna and the Shipka Pass; and,
even where victory followed, most un-
necessary waste Of life.
Yet the lesson does not seem to be
thoroughly appreciated even now. 1t is
curious to observe how, in certain Con-
tinental armies, almost dentically the
same costly tactics are preached and
practised. Discipline, resolution, num-
bers are held to be the only useful fac
tors on the battlefield. Workmanship,
individual skill and the use Of ground
receive but scant consideration. The
application of brute force, as in the
earlier wars of the century, appears to
be the ideal of the tactcian, although it
was long since conclusivey demonstra-
ted that skillful use of the fire-arm is
far more effective than mere weight of
numbers. Lack of experience has prob
ably much to do with this lack of pro-
gress. English soldiers, however, have
no such excuse Within the past TWEEN
ty years our troops have encountered
enemies who are first and foremost
most skilful refiemen; who know how
to turn the least inequality of ground to
the best account; who never offer a IA
vorable target, nor waste a cartridge.
Fortunately, their numbers are small,
and their discipline is as weak as their
organization Is defective, Nevertheless,
the losses they have inflicted have been
SO serious as to cause grave doubts
whether their methods of war are not
the most applicable to modern weap-
ons and it is beyond all question reg
ular army, of which each man pos
sessed even in small measure, the craft
and training of the Boer or the Afridi
would exact a fearful toll from troops
handled as is very generally the case at
peace manoeuvres.
Formations however are not every
thing. Nor will fine craftsmanship of
itself, win brilliant victories Men may
be taught to move upon the battlefield
so as to make the best use of their ri
fies with the least exposure of them
selves, but the problem of how fire may
be far from solution. However admira- I
BILE the training of the troops there is |
much to be done. after war has been