The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1899-03-01
Schley and Sampson.

Rear Admiral w. S. Schley has sent
to the Senate committee on naval af-
fairs, in response to its invitation, two
statements presenting his side of the
controversy over the nomination of
Admiral Sampson to place in the
naval list above that of Schley. One is
a general answer to the criticism of
Secretary Long and Admiral Sampson,
the other a detailed history of the
movements of the flying squadron.
Admiral Schley resents with feeling,
feeling in which he will have thousands
of sympathizers throughout the coun-
try, the language used by Admiral
Sampson and adopted by Secretary
Long, characterizipg as "reprehensi-
BILE" Schley's retrograde movements of
May 26 and 81. He publishes letter
from Admiral Sampson, dated May 20,
received May %, in which that officer
advises that Schley shall hold his squad
ron off Cenfuegos, saying, if the
Spanish ships had put into Santiago,
they must 60 either to Havana or Glen
fuegos to deliver their munitions Of
war. The best chance of capturing
these ships was in holding Havana and
Cientuegos. If later it should develop
that the Spanish vessels were at Santi-
ago, they could be blockaded there. This
was SIMPSONS plan. He was not 30
sure of the whereabouts of Cervera as
he was later when Schley had found
and cornered him.
When, later, Schley was ordered to
90 to Santiago in the belief that Ger
vera was there, and had arrived near
that post he began the retrograde
movements of May 26 and 27,-that is,
a return to Key West, round the west
end of Cuba, for the purpose of coaling
his ships,-conduct which Sampson,
when time has cleared up the doubt
and mystery that for several days
shrouded the Spanish squadron, char.
acterized as "reprehensible," and q
criticism that Secretary Long adopted
OF this movement Admiral Schley says
Acting in accordance with my best judg
ment in view of the circumstances, without
any certain knowledge of the wheresbout,
OF the Spanish feet; after having been in
formed by the scouts commanded by sucl
officers as Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise tina
they had seen nothing Of it and knew moth
ing OF its movements or Its whereabouts sine
il left Curacao; after having been assured
by Sigs bee that he did not believe it was il
Santiago, and by the emphatic declaration
OF Pilot Nunez; and knowing that as tn
sea and weather were then 1t would be i'm
possible to coal my squadron off the port,
deemed it best to take the action 1 did, tn
final result OF which was the location Of tn
enemy's fleet in Santiago harbor."
All of Schley's ships were short o
coal, and the condition OF the sea pre-
vented coaling from the golfers accom-
paying his squadron. He, however
managed, in lull in the tempestuou
seas, to partially supply his ships, agai
turned their prows toward Santiago an
instituted the measures, through con
municating with friendly Cubans 0
shore, which resulted on May 30 in oil
tanning full and positive information {
the fact that the Spanish squadron wa
in Santiago harbor. Dispatches sent
Schley by the government or by SamI
son, giving facts or beliefs respectin
the whereabouts of the Spanish ship
were received by him May 81 and Jun
l, from two to three days after he ha
found Cervera and cut off his escap
AS to all this criticism of his cours
prior TO May 20, when he found Ce