The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-07-21


ish intrenchments.
1t became Immediately necessary for |
our government to define its Philippine |
policy; but the president was not to be |
forced into inconslderate action. As to |
cuba and Porto Rico, he had made up /!
his mind, and the French ambassador |
was Informed that treaty OF peace |
could be negotiated ON the basis oC the |
surrender of Cuba to us and to the |
Cuban people, and upon the Cession OF
Porto Rico and Guam. and, rs for the |
Philippines, the president said that we |
would take and hold the bay harbor |
and city Of Manila 'ponding the cen
clusion of the treaty" and that the |
treaty should determine the control, |
disposition and government OF the |
Philippines"
A New Aspect.
In agreeing to this arrangement as
the basis of a peace conference, Spain |
made 1t her duty TO withdraw her |
FORCES from the city of Manila and |
give room for ours. But the cable from
Hong Kong was not then in working
order, and before the terms of the pro-
tocol could be communicated by Spain |
TO her forces and by us to ours, bat
Tie had occurred, and at great expense
OF blood and treasure we obtained by
force what the protocol had peacefully
conceded. This did not alter the terms
upon which the peace commissioners
We're instructed to prepare treaty, |
but it put a new face on the situation
both here and at Manila. Il had an
immediate and very obvious effect upon
the attitude of the American people
toward the future OF the islands. 1t
materially affected moreover, the po-
sition of the insurgent Tagals. 1t en-
phasized and increased our moral re-
sponsibility for the preservation Of or
der. If the terms of the peace pro-
tocol the Spaniards had quietly march !
cd out of Manila and we had quietly |
marched ill., the two forces each in its
full strength peacefully awaiting tho
conclusion of the negotiations at Paris,
we might perhaps have withdrawn
from the Philippine islands with dig
nifty and without the impairment of
international obligations. But, having
beaten the Spaniards. having scattered
their army having destroyed their au-
thority over the Philippine people, and
having forCibly placed ourselves in
their stead as government, the status
| quo became impossible of restoration,
and from that moment the withdrawal
| of the American army and navy would
have meant the abandonment of the
islands to utter anarchy, misery and
| misrule.
Policy Shaped.
This view compelled the course that
Paris, and it loudly justified the presi-
| dent in having assembled so consider
able a force at Manila. His power to
| add to the force was now gone. The
| question of the future of the Philip
| pines-whether they should belong to
| Spain or to the United States-had
passed into the hands of the peace
! commission. And, of course. neither
| country was at liberty to change the
| conditions until the peace commission
| had acted and it's action had been ap-
proved. Further expeditions of men to
| the Philippines would have been a
| plain violation of the terms of the pro-
| tocol. But if that wholly sufficient
reason had been wanting, there was
another. and this other involved the
| most trying and troublesome condition
| with which the government has had
to contend. The men then under arms
| and available for use, whether in the
Philippines or in the West Indies, had
| all been enlisted for the period of Che
| war. By the terms of their enlistment
| they were free Of every obligation to
| the government upon it's proclamation
| of peace. The president knew, better
| than any one ese that peace was as
sured. and that all his soldiers, not
| only those who stood ready to go to
the Philippines. but the twenty thou
sand then there as well, were by law
| to be mustered out of the service on
| the instant when he made official an
| nouncement that the Spanish war was
| over.
"On April 20. 1898, the joint resolu-
| tion was passed recognizing the indie
| pendence of Cuba. 1t directed the
president to employ the land and naval
! forces of the United States to accom-
| plsh the expulsion of Spain from Gu
ban soil At that time the American
| army consisted of $1,000 regulars Two
| days later the volunteer act was passed
and four days after that the law was
passed enabling the president to in
crease the regular army. But both
these measures We're distinctly de-
| clared to be war measures. Both re-
| quired that the enlistments secured
under them should terminate with the
return of peace. In these provisions
the acts were peremptory and specific.
! No discretion whatever was permitted
to the government. Under the terms
of the regular army bill, $4,000 regulars
We're added to the $1,000 who composed
the army in times Of peace With
| these and with the volunteers, the
government had a much larger force
than turned out to be necessary for
the purposes of the war with Spain;
but after the peace protocol had been
| signed, not a man of them could be
used in the Philippines more than the
force then there.
Conflict Not Foreseen.
And who could then foresee that
this force was not sufficient? A con-
f1ct with the Filpinos was not then
| anticipated Their army, it is true,
had been assembled on the outskirts
of Manila. But with respect to the
Americans it was generally supposed
| to be friendly rather than hostile
| army. It's leaders had been ardent
with the assurances of their friendship
and confidence. They had proclaimed
a republic, TO be sure and had assert
ed a government; but there was moth
ing in the attitude they then assumed
which could justify the belief that their
| guns We're going to be aimed at the flag
| which had set them free. Even had
the president been at liberty under the
terms of the peace protocol to increase
| the Philippine army, and even had the
| men, available for service there, been
ready for transportation, no wise coun-
sellor would have advised sending
them. Indeed, the very thing that
brought on the conflict with Agunaldo
| was the dispatch of a small force in
! tended to take the place Of those whose
| terms of enlistment had expired, and
who had already been brought home.
From the hour when congress as
| sembled in December the president en-
deavored to draw it's attention to the
| situation in which the government
would be left upon the proclamation
| of peace. In one message he delivered
| to the senate the treaty. In another
he warned congress that as soon as
the treaty was ratified and the ratifica-
| tions exchanged he would be compelled
! to muster out the troops at Manila.
| An army bill drawn in conformity