The Guthrie daily leader. [volume] (Guthrie, Okla.) 1893-1996, 1899-02-21

the Ellh. Then he sent commander Nc
Gala. Of the Marhlehead ashore to es-
tabllsh relations with the insurgents. the
result Of which was made known to him
at $40 p. m. ON MAY "a Then. for the
first time, he learned definitely that the
Spanish fleet was not al Celnfuegos. With
in two hours he started for Santiago.
What possible ground Of criticism" he
says. adverse TO me there can be in all
this, I do not see was on the spot
acting under orders which gave he en-
tire discretion and yet clothed me with
the responsibility Of going to Santiago on
ly after I wss satisfied that the fleet
was not at Cienfuegos"
QUOTES SAMPSON.
Tie quotes from the dispatch Of Samp-
son Of May 90 in which the latter says
Schley should "hold his fleet off Cienfue-
gos" II the Spanish ships have put into
Santiago, they must come either 20 Hava-
ma or to Cienfuegos 20 deliver the muni-
tions of war which ,hey are said to bring
for use I'm Cuba. I am therefore OF the
opinion that the best chance to capture
! these ships viii be to hold the two points
Cienfuegos and Havana. with all the for
ce we san muster. If later 1t should de-
we can then assembly OF that point the
ships best suited for the purpose, and
completely blockade It. Until we. then.
receive more positive information we shall
continue 10 hold Havana and Cienfuegos
Admiral Schley adds:
"This letter is not printed either I'm the
appendix or executive document c. but
I received It on the 23d and It shows that
was expected to hold my squadron on
Cenfuegos
AS to the slow progress toward Sanu-
ago on account Of the Admiral Sampson
had seen ut to send him, and he had no
right TO nbondon her. The weather also
was rough and not much better speed
could have been kept up lie had been or
dered to proceed cautiously" If however
he had known that the Spanish fleet was
I'm Santiago, no consideration OF the Eagle
or anything else would have prevented him
getting there at the earliest possible
moment with the larger vessels. but the
weather and sea made II Impossible to
do better than he did.
REPREHENsIBLE CONDUCT.
Speaking Of "the retrogade movements"
which the secretary adapting the langu-
age Of Admiral Sampson, characterizes
as "reprehenslble conduct" admiral
Schley says that in AZ years service never
was such language used to characterize
conduct of mine and / see no reason for It
now"
Headed:
Acting In accordance with my best
Judgment. in view OF the circumstances
without certain knowledge of the where
abouts Of that Spanish feet after having
been Informed by the scouts commanded
by such officers as Sigsbee. Jewell and
Wise that although they had been Of san
tiago for n week they had seen nothing Of
It and knew nothing of its movements,
or it's whereabouts since It had left Cur
acoa. after having been assured by Sigs-
bee that he did not believe it was IN
Santiago, and by the emphatic dec ara
tion of Nunce. and knowing that as the
sea and weather then were Il would bt
impossible To coal my squadron Off the
port. I deemed It best 20 take the actor
did. the final result Of which was the
lacation Of the enemys fleet in Santiago
barber"
As TO the battle OF Santiago Admira
schley says the facts speak for themselves
lie quotes from his official report Z,
l
commanded OF the squadron and said tn
victory seems big enough for all of Us.
lie asked the committee to contrast hi
reports and those OF Sampson containing
references TO himself and continues:
CERVERA's FLEET.
"As to all this criticism Of my cours
prior TO the discovery by me on May Z
| - g.
al Sampson or the department, none q
has ever been made by either 20 me;
never heard a word of 1t from any ON
), until after the battle with that feet a
though more than five weeks has passe
since the alleged 'reprehensIble conduc
had occurred. Although Sampson use
y this language TO the secretary concernir
u me on the 10th day Of July Dust one wee
after the battle) he has never, TO tn
a day I'm any answer or TO any extent, 4
. timated 10 me any disapprobation or MAJ
= any criticism of my conduct OF the hyil
3 squadron"
. Admiral schley then submits a loi
= detailed statement Of the facts he sur
3 married. in the foregoing. which Is in Z
9 ply 20 a request by Chairmen Hale.
q the naval committee. II gives the q
. patches and orders received by Schl
= and describes the conditions in which {
3 ships had TO coal. as well as the sail
. for Santiago. ne also refers 20 the doul
q that arose as to the presence OF I
D Spanish feet In Santiago after he h
= arrived OF that port. Capt. sigsbee stat
4 verbally that he had been close In 20 pi
. several times and there we're no I'm
= cations that the enemy was present a
8 he doubted It's arrival there.
. NOT COAL ENOUGH.
The commanding officer OF the IL
9 ward reported that he did not kave c
enough to reach any home base and co
. not steam beyond "A Of 80 hours, whi
80 the admiral says. forced him TO send
- Harvard TO Kingston. The Yale and N
80 neapolis could not reach Key West
4 tho 81. Paul could remain at most on
Y mort for hut two davs The Brook