Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-09-26
A TaHal Pose.

1t is reported in England that Aguinaldo
intends shortly to release all the American
prisoners now in his hands, for the purpose
of impressing the world with his generosity
and hight indedness. 1t is fairly credible.
The Oriental Washington has heretofore
shown a disposition to play to the Euro
pean galleries He is record with
proclamation which is virtually an appeal
for foreign recognition and aid. He has
been encouraged by his American friends
to believe that if he can continue the strife
long enough he will be helped by some am
bilious power such as Germany, or perhaps
Japan. Having been deuded into this be-
lief it is but a short step for him to think
that he can pose a humane patriot in
search of independence for his people. I'M
willing to infiict hardships upon his oppres-
sors and eager to raise the standard of
warfare.
From this distance and this point of view
1t is clear how futile are such plays. There
can be but one ambition in it ALTO secure
the active Intervention Of one of the pow
ers and the checking of the United States
by foreign force. Perhaps Aguinado re-
CARDS the case Of Cuba as precedent upon
which foreign ally might intervene to
help him. There is. of course, vast diff
ference between the cases, but Aguinaldo
cannot appreciate it, nor can some of his
theory-blinded American allies. Spain had
the very best chance for good government
in Cuba. She had the people under COM
plete subjugation, had infused a large per-
centage of Spanish blood into the body
polite. and had created great Spanish
colonial machine. 1t is a matter of history
how abjectly she failed to take advantage
of the favoring conditions. The ten years
war gave her ample warning, and she ig
nored it. She seemed to go deliberately
about the work of alternating the sympa-
thieS of the people.
The United States interviewed between
Spain and her oppressed people because of
this long record of failure. There was
every justification for the belief that the
government at Madrid could do nothing in
Cuba for the betterment of conditions there
if it were so inclined. 1t required no
sophistry to warrant the war Of 1898. Our
nearness and consequent suffering from the
hopeless insuar strife alone sufced to win
dictate the policy of interference Every
consideration of humanity called for it.
No power on earth has today a shadow
| of right to intervene in the Philippines. No
power is being harmed as was the United
| States by the Cuban war. No power can
| come forward with clean hands and declare
! that the war in LuZon is cruel, or unneces-
sary, or useessly and incompetently pro-
longed. The United States has had yet
no opportunity to make good its Offering
of stable and popular government. There
| has been failure to accord the people
| that degree of independence which Ameri-
| can sovereignty means There have been
| no cruel war measures. No reconcentrado
| proclamatiors have been issued No false
| promises of autonomous government have
! been held out to the natives. No thefts
| have been committed under cover of the
! insuIar administration. At no point can the
| vestige of parallel be found between the
| situation in Luzon and that which led to
| the war with Spain.
| Intervention in the Philippines by another
| power would be a deliberate challenge for a
| conflict which would be quickly met 1t
| would be inspired by no motives of human
/ ity or love for Aguinado, but by greed of
| territory. Should it avail should the United
| States succumb to it, the native claims for
| sovereignty would be brushed aside and the
| islands would be absorbed by the mediator.
| with even harder task upon his hands
| than that which now confronts the United
| States.