Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-02-21

dispatch Of May - in these words: 1.-The
department looks to you to ascertain the
fact OF the presence OF the enemy and that
the enemy, II IN the harbor at Santiago,
does not leave without decisive action"
Commenting on this the admiral says:
In obedience TO the above order and
without any further order or instruction
from any one i did ascertain the fact that
the enemy was at Santiago. and the enemy
did not leave without decisive conflict"
The Battle of July 3.
Detailing the events connected with the
battle of July 3, he says that at S:45 OF
that day Admiral Sampson made signal
from his flagship. Disregard movements
of commander-in-chief" and steamed east
ward to Siboney. This" SAYS Admiral
Schley, left me the senior officer present
and necessarily clothed me with the respon-
sibility Of the command"
Continuing, he declares that when the
enemys vessels came out of the harbor sig
nal was made from the Brooklyn this
hagship) TO the fleet TO clear ship for ac-
ton" Then followed the signal CLOSE
action" and this by the signal THE enemy
escaping to westward" Following the APP
pearance of the Spanish fleet there was a
general inward movement of the American
vessels, closing in and engaging it,
Explaining the movements Of the vessels
on both fleets he says the Spanish fleet was
coming westward under high speed and
changing course more to westward
blOu6ht the DIpOhlA II meaning eastward 10
meet 1t, into a position where she would
nave IIanketed the fire OF the eastern Ves-
sells OF our force now changing their courses
to the westward and between them and the
Spanish vessels" instant decision, he con-
tinues, was therefore necessary to avoid
interfering in any way or cutting of any
OF the hre of our vessels as would have
occurred II she had turned toward the
Spanish fleet now approaching the Brook
Ign. Turning outward left the enemys
ships unmasked by the Brooklyn and eX-
posed them TO the concentrated fire of our
squadron. The result of this maneuver was
that i'll thirty minutes from the opening of
the combat four of the enemy's vessels
were on fire and riddled with projeCtiies
All the vessels of the enemy's fleet
were a little forward the BroOklyns beam
when they turned toward the beach on fire
AT the final capture of the Colon at 1.i5
pm. the Brooklyn was nearest, the Oregon
next and then the Texas and Vixen. The
New York arrived at 2:23 pm, and the
commander-in-chief assumed command of
the squadron. Signals were made from the
Brooklyn to the squadron until all signal
halyards were shot away, and then by the
Meyers army code.
In conclusion, Admiral schley contends
that the turn of the Brooklyn in the battle
of the 3D. was 1.-The crucial and deciding
feature of the combat and of decided adj
vantage" Furthermore he says il is a mis-
take to say that lie vessels distance from
the enemy was increased to the extent OF
800 yards. and adds: Though this may not
be of record, ii is fact nevertheless" He
NatSS NlAc ldNA lAdN the NiidTlS OF the BOARD
of navigators shows that the Brooklyn was
nearest when 1t emerged from the harbcr.
nearest at every stage of the battle and
nearest the Colon when II surrendered and
gives many confirmatory details Of his riag-
ship s active and effective participation in
the battle
He says he made no report Of his ma
neuver in his report OF the battle. as its
effect upon the battle was never a ques-
ton with him. His last paragraph reads:
On May 81 l received a telegram from the
q F-ln al ono aafsTfV
upon my success in locating and blockading
the enemy's fleet at Santiago. If II was
worthy of commentator at that time am
at loss to understand how il could have
grown into reprehensible conduct, as sug-
gested by Admiral Sampson in his letter Of
July 10. 1S9S some six weeks later"