The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-26
China's Immense Hosts Have No
Directing Commander.
THEY ARE GOOD FIGHTERS
Arms Are OF Primitive Pattern Useless
in Warfare-Ships OF War Man
aged With Disregard OF
Nautical Rules.

which are enlisted in case of need and
again dismissed. No such thing exists
as a centralized command Of these
bodies, says Berlin correspondent of
the London Times.
The Manchu troops are in general the
descendants of the Manchus and of
those mongrels and Chinese who in the
seventeenth century overthrow the
Ming dynasty and established the
present one upon the throne. They
still constitute the chief support of
the Tatsing dynasty and are divided
eight differently colored flags. Their
strength may be reckoned at about
100000 men. Originally they were kept
IN Pekin as a body guard, but the vice.
weaken the central authority, managed
to break up this force under the pre-
text that they wished the imperial
power to have representatives in the
provinces. According to other accounts
the detachments were sent them from
the beginning in order to enable them
to keep control of the conquered terri
tories. These troops are quartered in
parts of the town especially walled in,
the so-called Tartar quarters. The OBJ
legation to military service is hered-
tary among them, and originally, in
additions to concessions of land, they
received high pay and portions Of rice
from the court. Even now every Man
chu receives salary from the emperor,
but it is so small that it does not SUI
flee for his own maintenance, much
less for that of his family. However.
the military duties are not fulfilled
very conscientiously and the soldiers
have plenty of time to devote to other
occupations.
The provincial troops, with their
green banners, are recruited entirely
from the Chinese population. They are
under the control of the viceroys and
governors and are enlisted voluntarily.
They constitute the garrisons of the
most important towns and are entrust-
ed with watch, police and inspection
duties They number about 100000 or
100000 men. A small number Of these
troops stand in close relation to the
governor and act as his bodyguard.
The only control the central govern
ment has over the provincial troops is
that it settles the amount of the an
nual estimates and appoints the su-
perior officers.
Judged by our conceptions, the Chi
nese troops are to all intents and pur-
poses quite unframed, badly armed,
and thus useless. Moreover, they lack
a centralized command. The so-called
'brayes"' are still to be counted as
among the best. They are better armed
and provided for. Some of them have
been through course of European
drill and their officers have been train
ed in military schools. The duty of ar
ranging for the commissariat and arm
ament of the troops is entrusted to the
generals and the superintendent OF
the camps. These maintain, as rule,
only a small portion of the regulation
strength, fraud which is connived at
by the superior officers, who divide the
profitywi them Occasionally camp
broken up, but it still appears in the ac-
counts. The wages which are paid are
generally insufficient and the soldiers
endeavor to supplement their means by
private work and robbery. Chinese Of
ficers regard the post of superintendent
of a camp as a speculation. Cheat
ing is universal. The accouterment
and training of the soldiers are different
in every province. The attempts at re
organizat ton after European models
which have been bade by some govern
ors have made no progress. The body
of troops formed at Wusung has fallen
back into Chinese hands
Demoralized Navy.
What has been said of the military
forces applies to certain degree to the
navy, although the officers here are
better trained, and in some instances
honorably anxious to do good work
The purchase of modern ships of war
and torpedo boats is being carried on
as rapidly as means will allow, but
there is lack of officers capable of
tanning an undivided control over them.
1t must be added that neither the land
nor the sea forces are sufficiently sup
ported. There is a lack of roads, rail-
ways and modern Notifications. The
so-called fortresses are mostly built
with Sloping walls of clay, scarcely
foot thick at the top. Forts built ac-
cording to European notions are only
to be met with at a few places on the
coast. OF those in the north, the fort
resses which, in conjunction with the
fleet, were designed to defend the
entrance into the Gulf of Peehi-li,
have passed into the possession of the
European powers. Port Arthur and
Talien-wan now belong to Russia, Wei
hai-wei to England and Kiao-Chau to
Germany. This renders illusory the
Notifications at Tsin-chu in the neigh
borlood of Ta-len-wan, and of Chi
fuan, the northeast point of the Shan
tung peninsula. There remain to be
mentioned the forts which protect the
coasts of the Gulf of Leao-tong and of
the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. OF these, In-hu.
on the Lanho river, has to protect
Mukden. The most important chain
in the link of Notifications defending
the approach to Pekin is Taku, at the
mouth of the Peiho river 1t is in
tended to protect the barrier of the
river and there is a line of forts
tending from Taku to Tien-Tsin and
The camp of the northern army. OF
the fortifications of the Yans-tse river
the Tort at WuSunT mas recently fallen
into complete decay. The Nan sh-tang
and the modern Szetzlin battery still
remain. AT kiau-yong, too, there are
few modern batteries existing side
by side with the ancient ones, and the
same is true of Tsn-Kiang. Further
mp the river the batteries at Marking
are the only fortified tons OF any i'm
portance.
Iortresses Are Useless.
To the more important fortresses of
the southern coast of China belong the
Notifications of Tsin-Hai, which guard
the entrance 10 Hang-Chau, and those
of Fu-Chau at the mouth OF the river
Min, which consist Of five forts built
by French engineers. Farther south we
find line fartresses of Annoy and Swat
eau, and opposite Hongkong the group
IF forts at Canton. These last con-
sist of three zones, intended, in connec-
ion with mines and torpadnes. 10 nro-