The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1899-01-04
CABLES AND FLEETS.
Arguments for Governmental Ownership
of Gable Systems.
(From The london Times.l

(F'rom The London Times.)
Coal, as we have been forcibly re-
minded Of late, is dominant factor in
naval warfare, and so long as England
commands the sea--that is, so long as
the British empire lasts-wherever Brit
ish coal is stored there in time of war
British warships will concentrate from
time to time. If, therefore, all the prin-
cipal coaling stations of the navy
throughout the world were in direct
and immediate communication with one
another and with the Intelligence de-
partment at home every British war
ship afloat could be supplied ar fire.
quent intervals with all the informa-
ton in the possession OF the central
organ Of intelligence. No doubt all the
more important of our coaling stations
and naval bases are already in tele-
graphic communication with London
But the lines of communication are
none of them under the control of the
state, many of them run through for
eign territory, and there is in most
cases no duplication of route such as
would be provided in all cases under
Sir Sanford Flemings scheme. Such a
scheme would render our communica
lions unassailable except at great cost
and risk to an assailant not in com
mand Of the sea, and the nervous sys-
tenn of the empire would thus be raised
at once from the level of the mollusk
to that of the mammal. The strategic
and tactical potentiaLty of our fleets
would at the same time be heightened
to a degree hardly to be measured in
terms of concrete naval force and. at
any rate, in manner utterly unat-
tainable by any other power in the
world
The approximate cost of construction
is estimated by Sir Sanford Fleming
at from &5,000,000 to $4,000, 900. That
sum would provide about five first
class battleships or perhaps a dozen
sea-going and sea-keeping cruisers of
various classes. But time, space. and
numbers are in large measure inter
cnangeaple factors in naval combina-
tions. dozen ships in the wrong place
are worth less than single ship in
the right place at the right moment,
and the assured power to put a single
ship in the right place implies and in
wolves the power to put as many ships
as the occasion requires and the re-
sources of the country permit.
In April, 1897, eight ships from three
dlterent stations-the Mediterranean.
the EAST indies, and the Cape-were
suddenly and unexpectedly concentrat
ed under the flag of Admiral Rawson-
who has just been deservedly appoint
ed to the command of the channel
squadron-first at Durham and after
ward at Delagoa bay. This shows what
can be done where facilities for rapid
communication exist. It illustrates az
we said in February, the extraordinary
mobility Of naval force and its capacitv
for rapid and unobserved combination
But there are many regions of the seas
where no such combination could at
present be effected, or, if effected. could
remain effective, because no such fact
lities for rapid communication at pres
ent exist.
1t is true that all submarine cables
are liable to interruption by accident
and that while such as abut on foreign
territory might be closed to us in time
of war, even such as abut on our own
territory might be severed by an enter
prising foe. But the more cables there
are, and the more they are under our
own control and protection, the less
likely are these contingencies to affect
us seriously. If every British coaling
station in the world We're connected
with London and with all the others by
two cables extending in opposite direc-
tons our fleets and ships would have
the advantage of the interior position
at every poiritSlaild the attempts of an
enemy to sevef'Nthe cables would be
not less futile than precarious, so long
as our command OF the sea was main
tanned. 1t may also be urged that too
frequent communication with head