New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-02-21

opinion as 10 the difficulty Of coaling on San
tago. He gives the details Of the absolute loca-
ton Of the Spanish squadron inside the harDor
on May 20 which discovery was. the Admiral
says, the result Of a determination to satisfy
himself fully before sailing for the west on the
3lst no made reconnaissance TO develop the
enemys position and incidentally to injure or
destroy II possible, the Colon, moored well up
in the harbor"
The question OF the presence Of the enemy
determined ne decided not 70 risk serious disa-
Element until reinforcements arrived.
Admiral Schey quotes the Departments dis
patch Of May ~ in these words: The Depart
ment looks % YOU 10 ascertain the fact OF the
presence Of the enemy. and that the enemy, II
in the harbor al Santiago, does not leave with
out decisive action" Commenting on this the
Admiral says
In obedience 10 the above order and without
any further order or instruction from any one,
I did ascertain the fact that the enemy was al
Santiago. and the enemy did not leave WIN
out a decisive conflict.
THE BATTLE OF JULY g.
Detailing events connected with the battle
Of July 3 ne says that $40 OF that day Ad-
miral Sampson made signal from mis- flagship
Disregard movements OF the Commander-in-
Chief" and steamed eastward to siooney'
This" says Admiral schey, left me the
senior officer present and necessarily clothed
me with the responsibility Of the command
Continuing he declares that when the enemys
vessels CAME out Of the harDor sigma "as
made from the Brooklyn this nags-lpl 20 ths
fleet 90 "clear ship for action" Then followed
the signal close action and this ny the sigma
The enemy escaping TO westward" Following
tho appearance Of the Spanish fleet. there was
| "a general nU ard movement Of the American
vessels closing in and engaging IT, Explaining
the movements OF the vessels on both fleets, ne
says the Spanish fleet was coming WESTWARD
| under high speed and changing course more
TO westward brought the Brooklyn. heading
eastward 20 meet IL. into position where she
would have bdukeled the fire Of the eastern
vessels ~ our force on changing their courses
20 the westward and between them and the
Spanish vessels Instant decision he con-
tinues. was therefore necessary 70 avoid IN
tarferng in any way or cutting off any OF the
fire ~ our vessels as would have occurred II
she had turned toward the Spanish fleet now
! approaching the Brooklyn. Turning outward
loft the enemy's ships unmasked by the Brook
! lyn and exposed them 20 the concentrated hre
Of our squadron The result Of this man6uvre
was that in thirty minutes from the opening OF
the combat four Of the enemys vessels were on
! fire and rdded with projectiles
AL the vessels Of the enemys fleet were
| li.tle forward the Brooklyn's beam when they
| turned toward the beach on fire AT the nnal
| capture % the Colon. at 10 p m, the Brook
| lvn was nearest the Oregon next. and then the
Taxas end VIXEN. The NewYork arrived at
- % B. n and the commander-tn assumed
| command OF the squadron. Signals were made
from the Brooklyn 20 the squadron until all the
signal ha,yards We're shot away, and then by
the Meyers Army code.
THE BROOKLYN'S PART IN THE FIGHT
In conclusion. Admiral schey contends that
the turn Of the Brooklyn In the battle Of the 30
was the crucial and deciding feature OF the
combat and Of decided advantage" Further
more he says It is a mistake to say that the
vessels distance from the enemy was increased
10 the extent II 500 yards, and adds: Though
this may not be Of record IT is fact neverthe-
less He cites the fact that the chart Of the
! Board Of Navigators shows that the Brooklyn
vas nearest when The enemy emerged from the
harbor nearest at every stage Of the battle. and
nearest the Colon when IL surrendered, and
gives many c0nfirmatory details OF his flagship s
action and effective participation in the battle.
He saws ne made no report OF his man6uvre
In his report Of the battle as its effect upon the
battle was never q question with him. His last
paragraUh reads as follows;
"On May 81 / received tele gram from the
Conmand-r-in-Chief congratulating me upon
/ my success IN locating and blockading the
| eneray's fleet az Santiago. II IL was worthy OF
! communication at that time. l am at q loss 20
| understand how Il could have grown into rep
! rehensible conduct suggested by Admiral
Sampson in his letter Of July 10. 1898, some six
! weeks later"