The morning news., 1899-04-03
WHY SPANISH WERE WHIPPED.
FATAL MISTAKE WAS
LEAVING HARBOH BY DAY.

of Sea Fight at SantiagO-ShOuld
Have Dashed out- by Night and
Rtuht Through Blockade Line.
inactivity and Weakness of the
snonisb Fleet Had Much to Do
with 1t.
washington. April 2.-The bureau of
naval intelligence of the navy department
has issued the last OF the series OF
sketches of the Spanish-American war by
commander jacobson of the German pro-
tected cruiser Geier.
The last of this interesting series deals
with the condition of the Spanish ships
after the battle of Santiago. This por-
ton of the sketch contains number OF
observations regarding the technical et-
foot of our gun fire which will interest
naval officers.
The most interesting observations to the
Iayman are those upon the strategy or
lack of it displayed by Cerwera.
The Spanish admiral having been Or
dered to leave the harbor to remove the
main object of the attack upon Santiago,
Commander jacobson says, his position
was most difficult. He did not dare make
the attempt at night, and so decided to
go out in broad daylight.
Victims of a Fatal Step.
'The whole crew." he says, fell a vic
tim to this fatal decision. Instructions for
the sorte and the western course were
issued. The admiral was entirely con-
yinced of the impossibility of defeating
the enemy or of reaching another Cuban
barbor even if he should succeed in
rfd ht
'sIt is to this feeling of helplessness and
imDotence as against the American naval
forces more than to anything else that l
attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had
spent a month and a half in the harbor
without even attempting TO attack the
blockading fleet when a favorable oppor
tunity presented itself, or even of har-
RAISING it, The two torpedo boat destroy
ers were not used for the purpose for
which they were intended.
Inactivity and weakness.
This inactivity and lack of initiative
must have had very demoralzing effect
on the officers and men. If we add TO
this the certain knowledge that the op-
posing forces were much stronger, it will
be readily understood that the idea of
genera. fight after coming out of the har-
bor entrance was the only acceptab BILE one,
especially in view of the possibility of
beaohlng the ships, thereby rendering them
unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the
crews. From the very moment that this
feeling of impotence took possession of the
Spanish and led to the foregoing ref1ec-
tons, their fate, pscychologically speak,
ing, was sealed. We do not mean to dis
parage their valor and tenacity in the
midst of the hostile fire; but on the other
hand, il is quite natural that the admiral
seeing that everything was happening as
he had foreseen, was the one who set the
example of running his ship ashore. All
the other commanders followed this ex-
ample.
Different with Americans.
"On the American side the situation was
just the reverse. Admiral Simpsons fleet
was fully conscious of it's power The
4 blockade was being conducted in accord
ance with carefully prepared plans, as
were also arrangements in case of the en-
emy's attempt to escape. Frequent en-
eagements with the Spanish forts had
given commanders and crews that calm
and assurance in the handling of their
weapons which guarantee success. The
1 long blockade service, exhausting and mo-
notonous, hardly interrupted by any action
on the part of the Spanish, had strung the
nerves TO the highest pitch, and everybody
was anxious for the end to come. Sud
denly the enemy attempts to escape All
4 the passions that had been smouldering
4 ing opportunity for settling accounts with
4 the enemy had come at last, and with a
! wild rush the American ships fell upon
4 their victims
He speaks of the lack of the training of
the Spanish crews, the neglect of gun and
torpedo target practice, and of the mad
equate education of the commanders of
the ships and torpedo boat destroyers and
says mat it is mainly due to these deficien-
eies that the defeat was hastened and that
the American ships sustained so few
losses. The training of the engine per-
sonneI was also totally unreliable.
should Have Been at Night.
Commander Jacobson says that there
was only one chance for the success of the
sOrtie, adding:
1T should have been made at night in
scattered formation. After a personal in
veshgation of the locality, it is my opin-
lon that it is entirely practicable for a
neet to leave Santiago harbor az night
Inc wreck of the Merrimac did not con-
sutute an obstruction. 1t is true that Ad-
mrai SIMPSONS report on the night block
ade states that the lightships were lying
from one to two miles from Moro cas-
tle according to the state of the atmos-
phere, and that they lighted up the chan
mel for half a mile inside Even the best
searchlight however does not reach far
tner than one mile. Therefore the illumi-
nation could not have been very effective.
Moreover, the shore batteries. by open-
ing fire upon the lightships, could have
compelled them to change their positions;
but strange to say this was never done.
The dark nights at the time of the new
moon about the middle of June.
would have been best suited for the en-
terprise
II the feet did not attempt a night sor-
ne and was nevertheless compelled to
leave the harbor in obedience to orders,
tnen the ships should have been headed
s.ialsht at the enemy. All weapons. in
Guiding the torpedo and the ram. should
nave been used A bold attack in close
formation was the only chance of success
against the superior hostile fighting forces.
VINO would hardly have found time to
form their lines"
lessons From the Fight.
THE laeec.r,c (.,.....o...l..