The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-06-09
AT SANTIAGO.
ITS WORK At Ell CANEY, Ell POSO
AND SAN JUAN HILL.
Its Accurate Fire Upon the Blockhouse-
Some Mistakes Discussed - Why tho

Some Mistakes Discussed - why tho
Batteries Could Not Accomplish More.
In tho forthcoming Journal OF the Artillery
Association" Capt. G. d. Parkhurst. command
ing Light Battery I. Second United States
Artillery. gives account OF the work Of
the artillery battalion in Gen. Skaters Cuban
campaign. It is the most detailed story that
has yet appeared on this subject and is specially
directed to defending the light batteries from
some unjust criticisms.
To the Santiago expedition were assigned
Light Batteries tCapron's) and X jBests) OF
the First Artillery and A tGrimes'sj and +
Parkhurst'sl OF the Second. tho battalion be-
ing commanded by Major Dillenba of the
Second. 1t landed at Baiquiri. and the march
thence to Seville was hard on account not only
OF the heat, but the vile roads. There were
many green horses, and these made terrible
work with their baking for the trained ones
There were also some green drivers who were
worse than useless. The men did not sit upon
the timber chests with arms folded, as light
artillery is sometimes depicted. but trudgcd
through the mud like infantry and in addition
had to work hard to help the stalled teams
Turning to the artillery in battle. one OF the
complaints against it was the slowness of its
fire. But Capt. Parkhurst points ont that the
hurried preparations for the expedition al
lowed only four guns and four caissons to each
battery. instead Of six guns and nine caissons.
and hence there was shortage in the avail
able ammunition that required care in its e1-
pendture OF Capron's battery at Ell Caney.
nevertheless. the official report SAYS that it
Opened fire under personal orders of the
Major General in command. about 3 Is o'clock
A. NJ. and continued its fire against specified
objectves internationally throughout the. day
commander" Capt. ParkhurSt adds:
Here we then have a battery in action for i've
D@'S hour n and t f n 1 the onrmoo an" or To1
tota! Of six hours and nifty iNc minutes 1t was OF
aud had the fire been maintained steadily at the
normal rate us ammunition must have been eX-
any comment needed as To why the. fire was
slow. leaving out of the question all consil.
Another clement which contributes to the slowness
Of Are under certain conditions is the presence Of
strong wind is blowing in the right direction the
but with n" Wind and fcavy atmosphcre T the ST Tni
of smoke often shuts ont the objective for minutes
at time and prevents proper observation and ann
ing the range and effective fire.
The writer evidently thinks It would have
early part Of the battle at Fl Caney. two Of the
batteries. his own and Bests. However, dur
ward, and an interesting account is given of
what followed. On the arrival OF Best's and
Parkhurst's batteries at Fl Peso Hill, Best
was not then in action, but was busy rcpensh-
ing the gun-limber chests with ammunition.
caiHson mbers the caissons Being at the the foot
Of the hiI Eant. Grimehs report IN fact. says
woud a0on tho four Tr s TGn on
their actual contents. lGS rounds
AS soon as, the two batteries were in posi-
| tion. and while some brush was being cut
| away from in front Of Parkhursts guns to per-
nit Of clear aiming the cpemy's position was
| in our front was san Juan Hill. with its block
| house and long, trench coming down the
6pe t sho h rGciy ,oT" @nr our n%on
actly; at its lower end at the top of quite "A
high stocp, hlufr-like elevation. appeared to
| be some trenches perpendicular to the main
trench. and also to our line of fire. Our
infantry line could be seen in the form of a
large srmicircIe in tho open field at the foot OF
this buil and the general slope Of he hill. evil
| IDENTITY engaging the Spanish blockhouso and
TRENCHES, from which. q heavy and rapid fire OF
fire couI be detected
| This was all seen in less time than it takes
| to tell it.and Immediately the guns were loaded
| and laid N these trenches and tho bockhouse
for an objective. The range, was passed on
yards a and we waited bests first shot to SEQ
| how it held up. 1t was seen to strike and eX-
plode IN the trench. near the top of the hlutr,
| and orders were at once given for an elevation
of 400 yards for farkhurst's first gun; this
shell also struck and exploded in the long
trench 2,4I5 was the elevation for the neNt
gun; this shell struck and exploded in the
| long trench: $500 was for the third gum this
shell hit the bockhouse. as was shown hy tho
| air; the fourth shot was also at LOCO yards
| and also hit the bockhouse.
| In tho meantime Bcst's battery had landed
| three more shells. all Just whore he wanted
them, and the one round OF the two batteries
| was done The range of the Objective was now
determined beyond a doubt. ana The batteries
| could, have pounded the bIockhouso and
trenches by the hour thereafter"
| However. by that time our infantry was
swalmng up the nil, over the trenches and
around the hlockhousc. so that tho order
| Cease firing" was given. But Capt Park
hurst asks whether those eight artillery shots
may not have been delivered lust at a critical
moment no Hhsprciaiiy snce none on the intantIy
had the punging effect OF the artillery shells
| II is further argued that the moral effect on
| tended must presumably have been great So
| that those eight deadly artillery shots NAV
| properly be- regarded as q factor in the flight Oi
| the Spanards.
~ course with the infantry among the