The record-union., 1899-04-03

weapons which guarantees success.
The long blockade service, exhausting
and monotonous, hardly interrupted by
any action on the part of the Span
ish, had strung their nerves to the
highest pitch, and everybody was anx-
ious for the end to- come. Suddenly the
enemy attempts to escape. al the
passions that had beea &noidering un-
der the ashes break forth. The welcome
opportunity for squaring accounts with
the enemy had come at last and with
a wild rush the American ships fell on
their victims. At the beginning the
American fire. under the excitement of
the personnel and the great distances,
was probably not very effective, but
when the Spanish Admiral turned to
the westward, and the other ships fol-
lowed him, the moral superiority of the
Americans showed itself. Commanders,
calm and coOl-headed, had their ships
follow the same course, and the Amer
leans, having every advantage on their
side, recommended their fire on the
fleeing ships, which soon resulted in
their total annihilation.
IT have already spoken of the lack of
training of the Spanish crews, the neg
lect of gun and torpedo target practice,
the inadequate education of the COM
manders of the ships and torpedo boat
destroyers. 1t is mainly due to these
deficiencies that the defeat was hast
ened and that the American ships sus-
tanned so few losses.
1.-The training of the engine personnel
also was totally unreliable, which is
not surprising in view of the fact that
the Spanish ships as a rule are not sent
out on extensive cruises. The bottoms
of the Spanish ships had not been
cleaned for a long time, and as they
had been lying in Santiago harbor for
a month and half, they were consid-
erably fouled. Thus the cruisers Maria
Teresa, Oquendo and ViZcaya, which
in all official books are credited with
1S.5 knots speed, went into the battle
with a speed of from 10 to u knots, at
most; and the Cristobal Colon, which
is the latest ship, and was to run ~
knots, hardly attained a speed of IL
knots. Under those circumstances, in
every way unfavorable for the Spanish,
whose crews were insufficiently trained
and physically and morally enervated
by long inactivity; whose ships were
inferior in number, speed and fighting
efficiency, it is no wonder that the vic
tory of the Americans was easy and
paid for with insignificant sacrifices
There was only one chance for the
success of the sortie 1T should have
been made at night, in scattered forma-
ton. After a personal investigation of
the locality, it is my opinion that it is
entirely practicable for a fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night.
IF the fleet did not dare attempt
night sortie, and was nevertheless com
PEELED to leave the harbor in obedience
to orders, then the ships should have
been headed straight at the enemy. All
the weapons, including the torpedo and
ram, should have been used. A bold
attack in close formation was the only
chance of success against the superior
hostile fighting forces, who would
hardly have found time to form their
lines"
The lessons Commander jacobson de-
rives from the battle, briefly stated.
are:
Abolition of all woodwork; no unpro-
tected torpedo tubes; protection for all
gun crews against she'll fire; protection
OF the fire extinguishing apparatus
against shell fire; smokeless powder:
greatest possible simplicity in the sery-
Ice OF the guns, and the greatest pos
slble rapidity of fire; good speed of YES
seis under normal conditions, and thor
ough training of the crews in all
branches of the service.
Commander Jacobson also gives some
Oh ms observations of the Porto Rican
campaign, but these contain nothing
OF special moment except an account
OF the attack of the Spanish torpedo
boat Terror and the gunboat Isabel II
upon the st. Paul outside of San Tuan
harbor June %, 1898. concernine which
many conflicting accounts have bear
published. This was the only atlourrt
made during the war to torpedo o. If
our vessels