Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-05-30
TO CALL FOR TROOPS
Otis viii Need Soldiers When the
Volunteers Leave,
An ARMY OF 10000 MEN WANTED
No immediate Prospect of Peace
in the Philippines.
VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT

| Although not officially admitted, 1t is
generally known I'm inner circles that lead
ing officers Of the administration. Including
! the President and his principal advisers in
| the War Department. are seriously CON
| sidering the question OF another call for
| volunteers to aid In the suppression of the
| Instruction IN the Philippines Latest Off
cial advices from Manila indicate that there
are very small prospects OF an early sub
| mission to the Sovereignty Of the United
| States on the part OF Aguinaldo and his
| numerous misguided followers. The rainy
| season has begun I'm earnest in the arch
| lpelago and has compelled the withdrawal
| Of the American troops to their inner lines.
| which action. it is said. has encouraged the
| insurgents to the belief that Gen. otis is
| discouraged and will undertake no more
| aggressive steps until he has received large
| reinfOrcements from the United States
| Meanwhile the Filipinos have withdrawn
| TO their remaining strongholds in the IN
| terror. and are employing their time To
| strengt hening their position with q view to
| resistance as long as possible. Active field
| operations are practically impossible dur
ing the rainy season, and II is said that
Gen. Otis viii conttne his tactics in the near
| future to retaining his position and hold
| ing the enemy in check.
The rainy season usually continues about
| three months. and is not expected 10 ter
nitrate sufficiently for resumption Of
active military operations by unaccAmated
troops before the end OF August
| Will Lose Services of the Volunteers.
During this enforced period Of compare
| tive idleness Gen. Otis will lose the vaiua-
! bic assistance Of nearly all of the volunt ,er
| troops which have heretofore been thu
| mainstay OF his army. and their places will
| b. partly supplied by regular troops now
| on their way 10 the Philippines. These
| regulars being mostly raw recruits and un-
acclmated. will hardly be as efficient az
| first as the veteran volunteers who have
| had the experience of a years campaign Of
| constant and severe lighting. The home
| movement Of the volunteers will begin IN "A
| day or two. and IT is stated at the War de-
partment that the last of them Will have
| ieft Manila by the end Of June or early I'm
! July.
| 1t has been determined 10 allow the vol
unteers serving in the Philippines TO decide
whether they shall be mustered out At san
| Francisco or return to their respective
| states as organizations and be mustered
| out there. Secretary Alger is preparing Il
dispatch 20 General Otis giving in detail
| the allowances for travel pay and rations
| 20 the respective states. ana this informa-
| ton Is 10 be submitted by him to the regi-
ments in order that they can decide with
| all the facts before them, whether they
| prefer to be mustered out at San Francisco
or to go to their homes as organizations
TO two months extra pay on muster out.
Secretary Alger has received cablegram
| from General OTIS in response to his in
quiries. announcing that a majority of the
Oregon regiment Of volunteers at Manila
had elected to return by steamer directly
| TO Portland Ore. The Washington reti-
ment decided TO come first to san Fran
1 cisco. In consequence. the Oregon troops
| Will lose SO per man mileage.
| Few Volunteers VIII Re-enIi..
The efforts of the War Department to
| induce the volunteers in the Philippines
| to re-enliSt have been successful only to a
| very small degree. Notwithsta nding the
offer to allow such of these mon who re-
enlist travel pay amounting 10 nearly $3.50
In each case, 1t is reported that not more
than enough men to organize two fun
regiments nave been secured out Of the en-
tire eighteen volunteer regiments now in
the Philippines When the volunteers who
are coming home have left the archipelago.
and all the regulars destined To that coun-
try, including those still in the United
States preparing for the voyage. have
| reached there, General Otis will have
army Of about 23,pp men. This number
includes also the volunteers who have in
dicated Willingness to re-enlist in the
service.
Military experts who have given the sub
ject much thought and study are practl-
cally agreed that an army of the size ind-
Gated is not sufficient for the enforcement
of the sovereignty Of the United States
within a reasonable space Of time, ana
that the only possible way to conquer the
insurgents within the next few months Il
to place in the field an efficient army of At
least 10000. An army Of that size com
manded by an able and aggressive officer
will, il is contended, speedily accomplish
the defeat Of any force that Aguinaldo or
any Of his associates could organize.
The Presidents View.
1t is said that the President and his ad-
visers have reluctantly concluded that
force is the only possible way of bringing
the Filipinos TO terms. and that there is
now small likelihood Of tho peaceful sur
render Of the insurgents as q result Of
pending negotiations with the peace COM
mission, at any rate not before the md Of
the rainy season. These considerations
have about satisfied the officers Of the adj
ministration that a decided and Immediate
reinforcement of General Otis army is alb
solutely essential to q successful prosecu-
ton Of the present policy. As there are no
more regular troops available for service In
the Philippines without impairing the
strength of the military forces in Cuba.
Porto Rico and other places, the Presidents
only recourse, in case he decides 10 in
crease the army in the Philippines is by a
call for volunteers.
Under the law he has authority to recruit
3JUU volunteers in case Of necessity, but
the impression now prevails the War
Department that he will not now take fun
advantage or his discretion in that regard.
In military circles, where the matter has
been under serious discussion for several
days past, the opinion prevails that a call
for volunteers is inevitable, but that the
President will conclude that 2O.ODO addi-
tional men at the utmost will be sufficient
for the enforcement of the present policy
of the government in the Philippines.