The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-08-04

ing public attention to the fact
that trouble in the Philippines
began at just about the time when
Dewey ceased to be commander-in-
chief at Manila This circumstance
should receive the most careful consid-
GRAFTON; it will be remembered that the
relations between Dewey and Aguin-
aldo were cordial They were virtually
allies. Dewey aided Aguinaldo and
Aguinaldo helped Dewey.
The truth is-we ought all honestly
to admit it-that for some months after
the battle of Manila Aguinaldo practic-
ally had things all his own way on land.
He fought battle after battle with the
Spaniards, beating them almost every
time and finally driving them into the
defenses of Manila, where they were
held in state of siege by the Filipino
forces 1t was twenty-five days after
Dewey's victory before the first soldiers
left San Francisco for the Philippines,
and even then the force which started
numbered only about twenty five hun
dred men.
Nearly forty days more were consum-
ed in the long sea voyage, and when
! General Anderson arrived his COM
! mand was so small that it was power
| less for offensive operations Expedi-
| ton after expedition followed; finally
! General Merritt went. When he arrived
at Manila and took chief command, the
real trouble began. He haughtily
crowded Aguinaldo to the background
refusing him any part or lot in the as
saut upon Manila
Let us be fair and deal with the facts
| as they are. Aguinaldo was allowed to
fight the Spanish army in the field
| drive it into Manila, and maintain the
! siege until, after several months of de-
lay, which many people believe to have
| been wholly inexcusable, we found our
selves with a force strong enough to
| act without him. Then he was sum-
| marily told to keep hands off-the
American army no longer needed his
| cooperation.
1t may be that this course was wise
Possibly, if the Filipinos had taken
| part in the assault they would have
| committed excuses that might have re-
Elected discredit upon our arms. Still.
| it was natural for the Fflipinos to re-
sent this treatment and to feel that
having done the hard work in the field,
| they should be permitted to share the
| glory of the final victory. Right then
and there friction began; but there was
| no serious trouble until after the treaty
| of Paris had been ratified and Presi-
dent McKinley's proclamation had an
nounced to the world that we claimed
| the islands by conquest and purchase,
| in disregard of what the natives might
| desire.
| We are not now discussing the right
or wrong of this action-we merely re-
| cite the facts. Thereupon the Fihpinos
| attacked the American army. Perhaps
it was unwise for them to do that
| Possibly they were not justified in Their
| action. But they had been notified
that they were to be held in subjec-
tion, and summarily punished if they
failed to pay heed to such rules as
| might be prescribed by the conqueror;
it takes wide stretch of the magma
ton to think of an American army that
would not have fought under the same
circumstances.
This brings US back to the original
proposition: AS long as Dewey's policy
of kindness and Cancellation was pur-
sued there was no trouble-as soon as
it was changed and a harsher one sub
stituted. we had friction, followed by
actual war. Hence the question: Was
Dewey right or was he wrong? If he
was right, then the policy that was sub
stituted for his was just as surely
| wrong-indeed, it was the substantial
cause Of the deplorable war in which
we are engaged. If the change Of policy
was wrong. who is responsible for it?