The times., 1899-07-19
THE TRUTH FROM MANILA.
story of the Peace Negotiations That
Failed in June
DION 10 Ncw Yerk Evening -


gouations have come TO naughi and tight-
ing mas been resumed. This is simply what
the best-informed people here fully ex-
pected.
There never has existed here that optim-
ISM In regard to the speedy termination OF
the war and the genuine character of oc-
casional negotiations for peace. that has
been breathed in the official despatches ard
from them absorbed by the people at home
copies OF nome papers now al hand show
that the general impression in the Unitsa
States after the fall OF Calumpit in April
was that the war was practically at an
end. and the rebsls were hum5ly suing for
peace; but such was by no means the case.
though 1t is possible that such a belief
was legitimate conclusion from the tenor
of the official dispatches from Manila. In
my opinion a wrong impression has been
conveyed in these dispatches from the be-
ginning. The seriousness of the outbreak
has been minimized, and our successes in
arms exaggerated.
AS TO the idea that gained ground in
America in April. that the war was prac-
tically over, it no doubt received its first
impulse in the Napoleonic despatch sent to
Washington Immediately after the capture
OF Maloios, in which the enemy's army was
reported as routed. disorganized, and flee
ing. and the disheartened insurgents as re-
49, hAh6 ~ iuCiA AOlLto Dg luOuadutlS
1t was true that the enemy had been de-
feated and his former stronghold captured.
but 1t was not true that his army was dis
persed. nor that the insurgents were re-
turning to their homes. The Philippine
Army retreated to still stronger position,
following its declared policy of retiring
before our advance. after inflieting as
much damage upon us as possible, and had
to be driven out of this new position with
much desperate fighting, and with still
greater losses to our forces than were en-
countered at Malolos.
AS TO the alleged return of the insur-
gentssto their homes. it was based solely
upon the fact that old men. women, and
children were struggling through our lines,
because threatened with starvation If they
remained on the other side. The able
bodied men who were doing the fighting
remained to fight, and were all the better
equipped for that purpose by being rid OF
these encumbering refugees.
With such an erroneous impression OF
the actual situation here, it is no wonder
that the people of the United States put
faith in the genuine character of the peace
negotiations that were opened up by the
Fflipinos after their disastrous defeat at
Calumpit, and that the Adjutant General
of the Army should feel so certain in the
matter as-to give an interview to the press
in which be stated in the most positive
terms that the war was practically over.
and that. based upon such information as
this, the press of the United States should
indulge in congratulatory editorials
No such condition of mind existed in
Manila, not even at military headquarters.
whence emanated the despatch upon which
such erroneous Impressions were based. It
was generally understood that the FIRST
commission sent in by the Filipinos bad
come for the double purpose of procuring
a suspension of operations to enable them
to get their forces together In better con-
dition for war. and to make 1t appear that
the Filipinos were seeking peace on honor
able terms, and the United States was
refusing to grant it, thus laying a founda-
tion for continuing their appeals to foreign
countries for aid.
At that time they asked for a suspension
of hostilities for thirty days, in order that
they might call their Congress together
to discuss the question of peace. That these
thirty days were not necessary for this
purpose is proved. when it IS known that
their Congress had been previously sum
moned TO assemble at San Isidro on the 5th
OF May. only few days subsequent to the
time of these negotiations. Thirty days
however. would have enabled them to ..om-
DItlt new anu IOTIlUeatlOlS,
and also would have practically exhausted
all of what yet remained of good cam
paigning weather and truce of that kind
would have left them in better shape than
they had been at any previous period sub
sequent to the fall of Malabon. 1t was
very properly rejected by General Otis,
who. l am satisfied had no confidence in
the sincerity of the negotiations from the
start; certainly few others did
The greatest source of error on the part
OF our people is ignorance of the Filipino
character, and from this the officials at
Washington are By no means exempt. All
they have learned in their negotiations
with Spain as to duplicity and insincerity
they must apply TO the Filipino and then
add to 1t 100 per cent. There is nothing
whatever truthful or sincere about a Fill
ipino. By instinct and training he is uii-
truthful, tricky, and treacherous. The only
thing to be depended upon in negotiating
with him is to assume as a certainty that
what he says is not true. and that the rea-
sons he assigns for his conduct are not the
real ones.
This, of course, makes a very unsubstan-
tial basis for negotiations, but it is the
only basis possible with the Filipino. No
one is more thoroughly convinced OF this
fact than General Hughes. who was chair
man OF the commission carrying on nego-
tiatiCns with Aguinaldo's representatives
Immediately prior to the attack upon Ma
Mia His opinion of the leaders of this in
surrection, based upon his personal con-
tact with them. when expressed without
the restraint of military etiquette is not
suitable for reduction TO cold type. and
this is shared by every officer who has
come in contact with them officially. or
who has been here long enough to learn
oh fnr,a ON II = Ill
the opinion of all foreign residents. of
whatsoever nationality, who has resided in
this country any length Of time.
The first step toward peace were taken
Immediately after the fall of Malolos by Il
number of the prominent citizens OF Ma
nila who had not been active promoters
of the insurrection. These were wealthy
FilipinOs chiefly of the Spanish Mestizo
type. 1t must be remembered that the most
active promoters of the insurrection are
the Chinese MestiZos, the wealthiest class
in the islands. who expect in case of their
success TO become the ruling spirit in a
strictly military and oligarchcal govern
ment. These Manila citizens formed an as
sociation whose object was to induce the
insurgents to lay down their arms and ac-
cept a form of government based upon the
proclamation issued at that time by the
American Commission, who had been ap-
pointed by the President. 1t was NOTHING
more nor less than an organization Of
these men in Manila who found that peace
under American rule was a better propO-
sition for them financially than war, or
even peace under the rule of the Chinese
Mestizo. 1t did not in any way indicate
weakness on the part of the insurgents in
the field Indeed. so little confidence did
thev themselves have in their success that
their delegation dared not go within the
insurgent lines to urge their ideas upon the
rebel leaders. One prominent citizen had
been summarily beheaded by order OF
Aguinaldo.
Whatever we may think of the capacity