Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1899-04-01
THE CAPTURE OF MALOLOs.

Malolos, the capital OF the Filipino
rebels" and the objective OF General
Otis's forward movement OF the last ten
days, has been captured, or, rather, we
should say that what Is left Of IT has
been captured. for the rebels upon
evacuating the place set fire to IT.
What next? Both from the seat Of
war and in administration circles where
great satisfaction has been expressed
at the progress Of events in the Philip
pines" It has been confidently predicted
that the fail of Maloos would mean the
practical ending of the rebellion" There
we were told Aguinaldo would make his
last stand, and would be crushed. At
Malolos was to be delivered grand
double stroke, that was TO annihiate in
greater part the rebel leaders followers
| and have the moral effect Of utterly dis
couraging the remnant.
We would that it had been written that
this optimistic vision was destined TO
materialize. But 1t seems not. Our
troops have done all that could have been
expected Of them towards bringing about
such conclusion. Notwithstanding our
misfortune in having been deprived Of the
services in the Philippines of some Of the
nome strategists, who intimate that they
could have offered Otis and the generals
under him valuable hints, these latter |
seem TO have conducted the campaign |
with ability. And certainly the enlisted
men, both regulars and volunteers, and |
the officers Immediately over them have
from all accounts, given their friends in |
this country no cause to question their
courage. Whatever may be said Of the
cause in which Mr.. Mckinley and his
imperialistic coterie have involved them,
they have reflected credit on American
arms.
But Aguinaldo was not disposed to carry
out his part Of the programme we had
formulated. And there's where the
trouble comes in. lie and his army did
lot remain in a position to be smashed.
When our forces reached the "rebel"
'apital Aguinaldo was miles away, and .
lis followers retreated without making /
my serious show Of resistance. 1t appears S
hat he determined to consult his own con-
enience rather than ours in making his ;
asst stand. So it is evident that the +
lalolos business was n miscalculation all O
round, on our part. q
And the worst of il is, there IS no cal
llating when or where the last stand
Ill be made. There is a long stretch v
railway north of Malolos on which Il
lere are several more eligible locations d
ian the "rebel' capital for a final clash :,
the open-more eligible especially in Il
lie sense that should Aguinado's organ d
ed forces be routed they would have a u
lorter cut to the bushes and jungles. =,
here they could carry on almost indie Fl
iitely a guerilla warfare, and where
oral effect wouldn't amount to a row of In
ms. That Aguinado's army will be ",
uted finally if it stays in one place long n,
ough for otis to get at it in a pitched | la
tile, there is no question, but the claim | so
at its rout will prove the paralysis Of
e vertebra Of Aguinaldoism' is, in the -, 80
Int Of SPANS experience in the Philip m
hes, sheer absurdity. Agulnaldoism- a
5twhile Filipino patritoism-is. built
Their on the jointed snake, than on the
rtebra, plan. It has the habit Of get -.
g together in very lively fashion after "
has been disjointed-a fact we fear we
e destined to realize at tremendous cost .
blood and treasure, the pouring out Of d
lich will extend through a series Of ."
lrs. Therefore, in the last analysis Of NV
2 situation and outlook, the capture Of
llolos affords in respect Of bringing the ''- =
III SlsHt niue Ut hotilng upon when ton
can felicitate ourselves. tn;