The evening times., 1899-12-30
The south African Situation.

mediate peril. and that Butler would hard
ly move before the arrival of Roberts and
Kitchener at Cape Town, an event expect
ed to occapsabout the eleventh of January
Assuming the truth of reports that Butler
had been REINFORCED to point of numeri-
cal supefiority over Joubert, and was again
his equal in artillery, it did not seem
probable that Butler would fail to strike
blow Of some sort before the Beers could
further entrench and emplace against him.
| Today, it will be observed that London
has veered around to this opinion, and
the British public is waiting in anxious
suspense for news of a movement on the
Tugela line. II is argued, and probably
with good-reason. that as the siege bat
teries cannot reach Frere before next We'd
nesday ioftThursday, the advance will be
postponed until then. There is some doubt
as to the extent TO which the big howitzers
may be useful, since they represent type
of ordnance news.and strange to British
| artillerists. remarkable as that statement
may appear: and there has been little or
no time to- train gnnnefs IN their use.
Howeyer,swffen they reach camp, Sir Red
vers Butler will be in as good condition
TO assume the offensive as he is likely to
| be any time during the next month, and
there is plenty of internal evidence that
he has not many days to lose if Lady
smith is TO be saved: We are firmer than
ever in the conviction that the cheerful
reports given out by the British War Of
flee. and credited to Sir George White, do
not indicate true conditions as clearly as
they are shown in casualty. lists which de-
monstrate the increased accuracy and de-
structiveness of the bombardment. and the
inroads of typhoid fever and dysentery. It
ought to be plain that every hour hence
forward must reduce the fighting force of
the garrison and render II less and less a
factor in any plan contemplating its CO.
operation with the relieving column
should the latter succeed in pushing to
within supporting distance.
The English military critics, assuming
that Butler is about to make the supreme
effort Of his life, and of the war. theorize
that he will have troops and guns enough
to hold the centre in front of Coenso with
one brigade, operating with two free di-
visions wherever he may decide to use
them. If there is any staff college strategy
worth talking about at the British head
quarters at Cheveley. it win have an ex-
cellent opportunity to produce itself In
he present state of our knowledge il is
impossible to conceive of another frontal
attack. Excluding such a movement, the
problem will be reduced to an attempt to
turn either the right or left Of the Boer
line. One unfavorable circumstance in this
connection is that the extremes of Jou-
bert's line are forty miles apart As all
Of his troops are mounted, and can move
along his, rear under cover from point 10
point. it is possible for the Beers TO
strengthen any place attacked by the Brit
ish in a very short time. The latter, on
the contrary. mostly consist of infantry,
and miles mean hours TO their heavy col
umns
Supposing that Butler should determine
TO strike Joubert's right on the Dewdrop
road In that case practically the whole
Boer army would be there. to meet him
unless he had succeeded in outwitting his
antagonist by a feint on the left Here
arrives the British trouble Joubert evi-
IDENTIFY has withdrawn the bulk of his
mounted infantry from the Tugela. To
points near Ladysmith in effect eQudis-
tant from the fianks, and capable of move
ment to the support of either very quickly |
Butler, if he attempted an attack on the |
extreme left, toward the Helpmaakar road. |
by way of feint, would quickly disclose |
his purpose. unless he should employ |
something like a full division. In that |
event, it-would take more than whole |
day to concentrate his forces on the real |
point of attack. Joubert doubtless is salts |
fed that Butler will attempt a serious
in one of the two directions to
which, apparently. he is confined. and feint
in the other. The Beers, therefore will
be likely to depend upon their entrepcb-
ments' sharpshooters, field, and machine
guns to resist the British advance. until
the real object of Butler has developed and
then the reserves will move to the point
1t is noticeable that in English army
circles there is no great amount of conf
dence insthe outcome of the expected hat
tie. Placed as the Boer army is between
Ladysmith and the Tugela. and und: tie
peculiar conditions arising from the char
acter OF the ground, its scientific defea.es
and the superior mobility of Joubert-s
forces, it is hardly TOO much to assume
that an attacking force TO be reasopabl
sure OF victory, should be fully equal TO
The defenders in artillery. and numerically
superior 10 them in the proportion of at
least two to one. Butler. even if we alloy
him thirty thousand men. has not num-
bers sufficient to permit of much subdiyi-
sion, beyond the limits of quick and effec-
i've mutual support. gap representing
half days march for heavy infantry, tie
Beers can cover with their tough ponie
N two or three hours So. il appears i'm
although it is not impossible,
hat Butler would be able so to mask his
'eal intention, as TO throw a strong bol
,f troops against point rendered com
,aratively vulnerable by the previous with
travail Of enemy's troops to some other
place apparently more heavily threatened
Ioubert's reported concentration behind his
:entre tends to show what he expects
Butler to do. There are not many alter
natives from which the latter can choose.
md the limitations of the game, as "a
is we can understand its conditions, do