The Jersey City news. (Jersey City [N.J.]) 1889-1906, 1899-04-12

1
chase.
The power to contract being express
| ly conferred the power to pay would be
necessarily implied at the date when the
purchase would be completed, and it may
not be for fifteen years hence. A present
appropriation would be manifestly useless
for it could not be used for fifteen years
| if the city did not exercise its option to
purchase before that time. Having the
power to purchase the matter of payment
need not be considered until the option Is
exercised, and then it can be considered
in relation to such laws as may be in
force at that time.
There is no fact before the Court here
| which does not show that the act of
1887, Gen. Stats, .. 660, is not applicable
the act of 1895, P. L., 1895, p. 76S, provides
for the exercise of the option under the
statute by vote of the people. If the
statute be unconstitutional then the vote
of the people will be ineffective, and the
bonds authorized to be issued under this
act cannot be used to raise the money to-
pay for the purchase. If the act be un-
constitutional then then option cannot be
exercised by the people, and the bonds
under the act of 189 will not be issued.
The option under the contract could then
and would be exercised by the municipal
authorities of the city. The act of 1889 to
which reference has been made would
then be effective for the issue of bonds
for the payment of the purchase prizes.
unless it be, that such bonds would IN
crease the bond Indebtedness beyond the
limit of fifteen per cent. of the valuation
of the city. What will be the situation
at the end of fifteen years from the date
of the contract, it cannot be done to any
such certainty as will entitle the prose-
cutors to writ on the ground that pres
ent provision is not made for the pay
ment of the purchase price upon the ex-
ercise of the option. No such present pro-
vision could be made.
1t cannot now be said that this option
will ever be exercised. The contract is a
a valid one without regard to the happen
ing of this subsequent event. The NON
happening of it does not at all avoid the
contract, for the city can exercise the
option or not as it chooses. II it never
exercises the option no funds will ever be
needed to pay for it, and the contract can
not be avoided or rendered null and void
because of contingency which may
| never happen. The contract is for supply
Of water to be paid for by appropriations
made in,the usual manner, and Of this the
prosecutors do not complain because of
the want of power to make this the ap-
preparation, and certainly they cannot
complain that an incidental right which
by the statute is intended for the further
benefit and protection of the public is ex-
tended to the city. The incidental priv
ileges may or may not be exercised, and
the contract cannot be avoided because
there is not any provision made prior to
the contract to compensate the contractor
for such Incidental right. If the option is
not exercised the price of the purchase
cannot be legally paid. All the statutes
which now provide ma6hod by which
the purchase money of the option can be
paid may. long before the time arrives
be repealed and other methods substituted
by other legislative enactments. 1t cannot
now be said that the cash will not be on
hand when tn eoption is exercised. and be-
sides the contract will stand and remain
as binding for the purposes of supply
of water from the contractor or his as
signs, as of the same validity, as if the
option had been exercised. The want of
exercise of the option to purchase in no
wise invaldates the contract to furnish to
the city an ample water supply according
to it's terms.
1t will be seen that these considerations
upon the legal aspects of this application
| lead to the conclusion that the writ OF
| certionari cannot be allowed for any OF
| the reasons which have been presented
| on this application.
| 1 may remark in quite close examin-
alton of the proceedings of the city ap-
| thorities the specifications, plans and the
| contract no other reasons than those here
| formally urged by the prosecutors, have
arisen in my judgment sufficient for the
allowance of the writ
| The discussion here of these reasons is
| to a great extent general. 1 regret the
| time has not been afforded for more
| accurate. deliberate and concise state
ment of my examination of the reasons
presented, and the legal decisions which
have been consulted, in arriving at de-
termination, but the results here stated,
however inaccurate or imperfectly stated,
are those which have been arrived at in
| a manner which justifies the denial of the
writ.
! I have not dealt with these questions at
| such length because they are matters of
| grave QeDdte, put pecduSe VI tAC iiioSAAA
tude of the undertaking and the interest
| involved, and the public Importance of
| the matter.
| The argument upon this matter took a
much wider range than required by the
| formal reasons urged for this writ.
| I cannot upon this application as now
1 presented determine upon the wisdom OF
| this contract. The matter was one re-
served to the legislative capacity in which
| the municipal authorities acted. Whether
| this contract was an abuse OF power, ana
| not founded upon reasonable or rational
| basis of fact, is not question to be dis
| cussed under the reasons and facts press
| ented nor to be determined on this appll-
| cation, for no facts are presented which
| entitle the court to enter upon such an
/ investigations Manifold evils may arise
| out of this contract. 1t may incur an
| extravagant, exorbitant or corrupt ex-
4 penditure of public moneys. 1t may be
| the result of a combination which in its
character is not justifable in law. All
4 that can be said~in this reference is that
| no facts which justify such conclusions
| in the mind of the court have been pres
I to such contentious the proof of them
/ must appear.
The act of 1883 confers ample power to
| the city authorities to enter into this
| contract, and in the absence of facts to
| the contrary the court must assume that
/ the wisdom of their action is based upon
| a reasonable and rational basis of fact
| with unless it appears that their action
is contrary to legal principles applicable
| or that their action is an abuse of the
4 power and discretion vested in them.
The Court can only adjudicate upon the
powers granted by the statute, and upon