The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-08-17

monitlon was soon fulfilled. Being regarded
| with much GOODNESS by the Staff. 1 resigned
my position with pleasure. But the General
| in-Chief begged me to exercise still the Official
duties OF the position. and for his sake l con-
tnued to occupy it, but considered myself vir-
! tually resigned
II earnestly entreated the Gene In Chief
| to allow me to leave this post Of commanding
| the army corps and place me In command Of
one OF the forts. or order me on duty at any
point of danger where he thought could per-
| form the most effectual service In accord
| with my duties at that time obeyed oil orders
| from my Commando err in CHIEF. which wero
primarily In binding the batteries Ia Havana.
| executed the further orders given me BY the
General-in- Chief. which were to dcvise some
means for outside communication, or
running the blockade. In order to obtain
| necessary provisions for subsistence, and ma
terinls Tor continuing the war. for at that time
we were reduced to the sad plight OF seeing
our ammunition nearly exhausted. We had
asked for 10000 Remington rifles. but we had
In Havana only 1000, and scarcely twenty cart
ridges for each volunteer. A long time before
this. before the blockade. the General in Chief
had asked tho Government to send q supply OF
ammunition. but the Government had paid no
attention to this request. When 1t was evident
to us that the Government would not send us
shOSV VI uc-
cided to mako an effort to procure them In
some other manner. When the Government
did open its eyes TO our nccsssi-
ties. and made an effort to re-
lieve us. II was too late. For taking
into consideration the strong naval power OF
the Americans. md also the powerful spy sys-
tenn which they had established in every part
OF our Island. II was impossible for the supplies
to reach their destination. 1t has been proven
that several ships that were with great effort
dispatched to us. were destroyed by the Yam
KEGS. with only two or three men surviving.
Il was charged by the General-in Chief to
find out the easiest manner in which the SER
vice for obtaining our military necessities
could be realized. BY the Doth OF April I had
already established commissions in Mexico
and at other points From that time until the
9Th OF May 1 devoted all my energies upon
Canada as basis Of operation. At the lat
ter date had secured. through my
agents in Canada. fourteen ships, sta
toned at different ports in that country. fitted
out with provisions and ammunition for
our use. and ready to enter the Island OF Cuba.
The United States could not prevent their en-
try. because they were to sail under neutral
flag. and were furnished with papers. not for
the Island OF Cuba. but for other apparent des-
tinations, and therefore could enter our
island ports in safety. with small risk OF being
captured by the enemy as prizes. After had
efTectually organized this service. l asked the
Government to permit me to continue 1t. as
otherwise we were in danger OF being COM
pletely placed fncommpnicddo. and do not
know why the Yankees did not do it. And the
Government in this way would never have
been without communication with Mexico.
Canada. or any other point. and could have
better aided Cuba from those countries than
from Srain. ! had established system OF
signal communication from a pharos about
fifteen sea miles off the coast. which was not
In Spanish jurisdiction. by means OF which we
could have constant communication. and there |
fore momently keep ourselves informed
when the encmy's ships were ont OF sight and
then by signalling our ships lying in
wait, they could have slipped through |
the Channel. and once inside. within |
the labyrinth ~ Keys. It would have been |
nearly impossible to have captured any OF the |
ships and especially those OF light burden. The |
Government was perfectly satisfied with the |
fine service I had arranged. and which would |
have been successfully executed II there had |
not been precipitated the disgracefu crisis |
which resulted in the resignation OF senor |
Moret the Secretary OF the Colonies. this break
ing down oil my plans. |
Now | will disclose to you tho manner in |
which first left Cuba After having repeated |
ly asked for troops to be placed under my COM |
mand for operation In the west OF the island. |
but without avail. NOBODY paying any atten- |
ton to me- was forced at last to go to the aid |
Of Santiago de Cuba alone All these months |
had been obliged to remain In Havana !
under orde RS from the Chief. at |
a distance from the field OF danger as since |
carly in May. that place was not exposed to |
any Iattack from the enemy. We were |
convinced that the opposing forces had no |
intention of direct attempt to capture |
HAVANA but were concentrating their |
Uarlike operations on other points. The Gem |
eral-ln Chief was solicitous to secure all the |
necessary elements for continuing the war. not |
for fifteen or twenty DAYS. but from four to six |
months. 70. we were well aware thatif We could |
protract the war that length oftlme the United |
States would have been unable to resist tho |
conditions. and would have begged for peace. |
From our emissaries In that country we were |
well aware that the people were already beg
ging Mckinley to sue for a cessation OF HOSTILE |
ties At this critical point 1 was ordered to |
leave the island. delayed my departure |
because my object was to leave under |
the Spanish flag. even II It were nee
essary to do 80 In fishing boat. |
II left Cuba on the 2lst OF June. did not |
70 for the purpose OF obtaining rations. for 1t
was the duty OF the Government. through the |
Chief OF the Com mi ssary department. to fur
nation to bring back to Cuba the necessary
munitions for a further extension OF the war. |
did not unfold my scheme. either to the Sec
Rotary Of War. or the General-in- Chief. because
had acquainted them with my purpose, they
would have opposed it, and could have done
nothing.
my orders from the General-in Chief. at the |
time took my departure. were to aid Santiago
do Cuba In every possible way. but not to 20 to |
Mexico at that time. As have just said. |
left Cuba on the 21st OF June. and on tho path.
I had already made my ARRANGEMENTS to have
a ship enter Santiago de Cuba. with myself |
aboard. Naturally. under the circumstances. |
could not have ontered the city with any great |
honor to myself. because it would have been |
only As a conducting factor, and not as a mill |
tary officer. The English ship which had |
com m issioned for the purpose. as with all |
ships in similar cases. asked a guarantee OF |
its full value. And I have here messages In
L.. 49,