The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-12-20
Causes of British Disaster in South
Africa.

The main causes of the late disasters to
the British arms in South Africa are read
fly traceable to grave mistakes made early
in the campaign, and now hard to remedy.
Minor errors have marked the course OF
the operations but they were due largely
to haste and a natural desire to overcome
by extraordinary exertions the difficulties
of situation which was rendered danger
Gus by the earlier and graver errors In
training, preparation. recruitment, mate
rial, organization, strategy and tactics.
First, as regards strategy. The wedge
OF Natal. projecting as IT does into
the Bocr country, would appear at first
sight to offer tho great advantage OF en-
abllng an army always to operate on in
terror lines. With such position n COM
paratively small force is able to fall on the
fractions OF the enemy. as his separate
columns cross the passes OF the border,
and destroy them in turn. But in order
TO do this the force in the wedge must DO
at least stronger than any one OF the
cnemy's columns. The only way the
British could have taken full advantage Of
their advantageous position would have
been by concentrating their forces at
some one point just north Of Lady
smith; instead they divided them into two
forces one at Glencoe Dundee, the other at
Ladysmith. The result was when WHITE
moved out from Ladysmith to prevent the
union OF two OF the Boer columns coming
over the mountains, he had but 5000 men
available, which was much below the
strength OF either OF the Boer columns. II
the troops had been concentrated in one
place he would have had 10000 men avail
able, number which would have been far
greater than either Bocr column
In the defence OF Dundee and Ladysmth
the British showed too great a tendency to
be tied down to localities, when the only
proper course would have been to retire
before superior forces, and try to hold the
Pietermaritzburg-D railroad, 80 i'm
portant ms line Of advance. Their tenac-
fly and pluck in defending the places
referred to are to be commended as such,
but, although inspired by quite different
motive from that which induced BAzAINE
TO hold on to Metz in 1870, the ultimate
effect on the general situation was
similar. The same may be said Of tho
defence OF Maieking and Kimberley. In
stead of adding to the strength Of the
British attacking forces they weakened the
strategic plan, because there can be little
doubt that BULLERs subsequent movements
were greatly influenced by the desire to
relieve these besieged garrsons, whereas
had they retired they would now be avail
able to assist the advancing columns, in
stead Of being held in check.
Turning now to Gen. BULLER's plan Of
campaign, he seems, Mt first sight, to have
followed good strategic principles in divid-
nj fUp
Durham Estcourt, the other over Cape
Town-Orange River station, concentrating
ON the Bocr country, with Pretoria as the
ultimate objective. But, II we examine
more closely, We find that the total
strength OF his command does not
warrant any division, because neither
column is strong enough to cope with
the enemy Immediately in its front
or to keep up proper communication
between the far separated columns for
effective mutual support or combined
action. His entire force should have been
sent to Durham and concentrated on the
main Boer army in Natal, il rapid and
decisive results We're expected. OF course,
the desire to relieve the garrisons at Kim.
berlcy and Mafeking had great influence,
and no doubt the strength and ability Of the
Bocrs were greatly undcrrated bat judg.
ment and decision on such points are fac,
tors in gcnGralship and constitute the Gle,
mcnts Of strategy.
Secondly, as regards training. The best
training is, Of course, actual war, but tn,
late wars of the British have not been OF 4
character TO teach them what an active anC
wcll-traincd enemy is liable TO do on tn,
battlefield Next to actual war come fielc
exercises or manuuvrcs, and it appear
from what the British officers themseye,
say that this kind of peace training wa
inadequate, first, in that 1t did not includ,
on sufficiently large scale thanking move
mcntS by the troops representing thu
enemy; secondly, in that the manruyrc
were not conducted on scale sufficient,
extensive to make the officers famllia
with the handling of large bodies OF troop
on tn" Battlefield. The former explain