The San Francisco call., 1899-11-03

the admiral
It had been reported to the commodore as
early as March l by the United States Consul
at Manila and others that the Filpinos had
broken out in insurrection against the Spanish
March g Nh f Wams Gnf had Of and %e Ge
thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal
to us in case of war"
Upon the arrival of the SQUADRON at Manila
II was found that there was no insurrection to
speak OF; and it was accordingly decided TO al
low Aguinaldo to to Cavite on board the
McCulloch. He arrived with thirteen Of his
stan on May 1e and Immediately came on board
me olympia to call on the commander-in-h hiet.
after which he was allowed to land at Cavite
ana organize an army. This was done with the
purpose OF strengthening the United States
alliance of any kind was entered into with
AguinaIdo nor was any promise OF independ-
ehce mace TO MIN. then or at any other time.
me commissions report then rapidly
sketches events now historical. It tells In
substance how the F'ilipinos attacked the
spanish and how General Anderson ar
moved from Cavite to Bakoor. Says the
commission: Now for the first time rose
the idea OF national independence. Aguin-
aldo issued proclamation in which he
TOOK the responsibility of promising 1t to
MS people on behalf of the American Gov
ernment, although he admitted freely in
private conversation with members of his
cabinet that neither Admiral Dewey nor
any other American had made him any
such promise"
The report states that Aguinaldo wished
at Paranaque, but was deferred by lack
OF arms and ammunition. From that point
on tnere was a growing friction between
the FflipinoS and the American troops.
There was no conference" says the re-
port, between the officers of the Fflipinos
and our officers with view to operating
operation of any kind. There
never was any preconcerted operations or
any combined movement by the United
States and Filipinos against the Span
lard"
Reference is made to Agulnaldo's de-
mand that he be allowed to loot Manila
and TAX the arms of the Spaniards. The
latter demand Is said to confirm the state
Tnent that he intended to get possession of
the arms TO attack the Americans Fur
ther evidence of the hostile intentions Of
tion of popular clubs which later on
furnished local militia to attack the
Americans. The DEGREES of the Filipino
Congress are also cited, as we'll as the
making Of bolis (knives) in every shop In
Manila 1t is shown that a consid-
cradle element in the Filipino Con-
Kinley a request not to abandon the Phil
ippines (at this stage the Paris conference
was discussing the future of the Philip
pines). The President was also to be
asked his desire as TO the form of govern
ment he wished to establish. But all this
time Aguinaldo was preparing for war
ana delaying these messages, ana II was
understood that the attack would come
on the first act by the American forces
which would afford preteIt.
A brief chapter tells of the lack Of sue
cesses attending the effort made at this
time by General Merritt, through a COM
mission, to arrive at a mutual under
standing with Aguinaldo, as to the inten-
tions purposes and desires of the Filipino
people. This brings the story up to the
outbreak on the evening of the 4th of
February, with the attack upon the
the Nebraskan sentinel. The commission,
in concluding this chapter, says:
After the landing of troops Aguinaldo
made up his mind that 1t would be necessary
OF the treaty of peace at Paris this determine
ton was strengthened. He did not only openly
declare that he intended to fight the Americans.
but he excited everybody, and especially the
military, by claiming independence and It is
doubtful whether he had the power to check
control the army at the time hostiities broke
out Deporable as war is the one in which
now engaged was unavoidable We
were attacked by a bold adventurous and en-
thusiastic army. No alternative left to us
except ignominious retreat. 1t Is not to be
conceived that any American could have
sanctioned the surrender of Manila to the in
surgents. Our obligations to other nations and
to the friendly FiIipinos and to ourselves and
flag demand that force should be met
with force. Whatever the future Of the Philip
pines may be there is no course open to
now except the prosecution OF the war until
the insurgents are reduced to submission. The
commission is Of the opinion that there has
been time since the destruction of the Span
ish squadron by Admiral Dewey when It was
islands either with honor to ourselves with
safety to the inhabitants.
The commission then takes the condi-
tion Of the country at the time Of their
arrival, comparing 1t with conditions ex-
listing at the time they left 1t short time
ago. A vivid picture is given of the an
archy existing among the inhabitants in
and about Manila during the early spring.
The situation In the city says the
commission was bad. Incendiary fires
occurred daily: The streets were almost
deserted Half the native population had
fed and most Of the remainder were shut
in their houses Business was at a stand
still. Insurgent troops everywhere faced
our lines and the sound Of rifle firing was
of terror prevailed. Filipinos who have
favored Americans feared assassination.
and few had the courage to come out
openly for US. Fortunately, there were
among this number some of the best men
of the city"
The report then speaks Of the issuance
of the commissions proclamation and the
good effects 1t had on public sentiment.
The natives, accustomed to Spanish prom
ises, urged the commission that acts in
stead of promises should be given them.
AS a result native law courts were estab-
lished, and this greatly aided in the resto-
ration Of public confidence. The flow Of
population soon began to set toward the
city. Natives who had fed from their
homes returned AS showing the limited
scope Of the rebellion the commission
states:
We learned that the strong anti-Amercan
feeling confined to the Tagalo provinces,
namely Manila Cavite, Laguna Batangas
Morong Bulucan, Nueva EcijR, Principe In
fanta and Zambales. 1t was strongest in the
first six named ard hardly existed In the last
four The population of these provinces Is es-
timated to be about 1500, 600, but It should not
be supposed that even in the six provinces i'm
mediately adjacent to Manila the people were
united in their opposition TO us. Even here
there strong conservative element con-
sistlng Of people OF wealth and intelligence
opposed to the war.
Under the heading THE Rebellion Not
a National Movement" the report treats
of the rebellion out of the provinces of
LuZon. where II Is stated the uprising was
viewed al first with indifference and later
with fear Throughout the archipelago at
large there was trouble only at those
points to which Tagalos had been sent in
considerable numbers. The machinery of
the insurgent government served only
for plundering the people under the pre-
text Of levying war contributions, while
many of the insurgent officials were rap
idly accommodating wealth.
AS to the state of affairs when the COM
mission left, the report says:
Before the commission left the Philippines
nearly all the inhabitants have returned to
these ruined villages. Many of the houses had
been rebuilt Fields that had lain fallow for
three years green with growing crops
Municipal governments had been established
and the people, protected by our troops were
enjoying peace security and a degree OF par