Evening journal., 1899-01-14
sHrPs AND roRrs coMPAREn.

There is certainly scme lack OF lu-
.cidity in Captain Mahln's recent hand
ing OF the subject OF coast defense,
and some confusion Of Thought in HIS
statemen. that "a navy is essentially
an cfrcragve and not a defensive or
ganizauon" AS a protest against
the theory of naval defense impied in
the terra east defense ships" this
proposition might pass muster; but OBJ
vcusly f,r powers such ae the Uniteo
States and the United Kingdom ,whcst
Territories are separated by sea sron'
these OF poss.bie enemies, navy ls,
as "Navalis" says, primarily a Ge-
fensive force. II defends its own coun.
try from invasion by pursuing, attack
ing and destroying the only f1rgU ol
hostile force that could render inva
sion possible that is. the enemgs Aeei.
TN other words, it defends by taking
me offensive. It's purpose lis defensive
though it's methods aer offensive. Il
acts on the principe enuneiated by
FarraguL more You hurt the en-
emy the lers likely he is to hurt you.
But a navy can. hurt badly-ihat is. Il
can achieve the decisive ends Of war
on its own elemehS alone. It is as in
qualified to attack coasts as il is di-
recly 10 defend them. Indirectly Il
can defend them completely by acting
n a vigorous offensive against the
organized naval forces of its adver-
lsary, directly II can deferd them only
inadequutely and can attack then.
hardly at all. For over-sea operations
of any mcment against hostile territory
the corporation q the naval and mid-
tary arms Is essential and when that
business is on hand the army
becomes the offensive force prop
er.y so oaNed, but only Oh
the condition that the navy has first
discharged its defensive function to
the fun by establishing its command
of the sea and Thereby securing the
COMMUNICATIONS Of the army
It is certain. on the one hand, that
well equipped forts viii rarely be at
, tackled and never overcome by ships
alone, but this is no argument for pas.
s.ve ara sedentary coeC. defense be
, cause it is equaNy certain, on the othsl
hand. that no forts however well equip
ped. will prevent invasion cr invest
ment by an enemy who has establish
ed an assured command Of the sea
, and possesses military fcrVe adequat
60 the undertaking. Hence the Ques
tion Of the sunciency or insuffic.enc.
r Of coast fortifcations cannot be profit
o ably or even intelhgentLy discussed II
the abstract and withcut regard 10 tn
pcetu-ate or datum Of sea supremacy
This is the great truth which Cobde
g clearly discerned more than a genera
d. ton ago, and which Captain Maha
, seems in some degree to have misset
IN spite Of the experience OF the lat
y war. For htscountry, a snyrate. .theprol
, lem can only be stated, as Golden a
most alone among his cc.temporariC
had the ins-ght TO perceive in "a
- terms prcpounded by "NavaAs:" 81
o Is essential that our navy should b
r. able to take the offensive on the sea
# # it cannot do so we perish as a gre'
n nation. Given this condition, wh'
r. probable demands can be made upo
passive coast defenses? Our long hi
u tory supplies the answer" The hi
/, tory of the late war supplies the san
p answer fer the United States. Cul
. could never have been freed nor spa
In defeated if the navy Of the Unite
=. States had been unable to take the o
n fensive on the sea. Captain Maha
D., mas done us the honor Of quoting VII
n approval cur statement that '-Ae nj
o. ment Admiral Cewera's feet was d
e. sroyed thewar Waspr rsctic3lly atan en-
h surely If the naval force of the Unit
~ States was equal to the distinction
Admiral Cervera's fleet it was tortio
more than equal to the protection
n its own coasta.-Londtn Times
ad