Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1899-12-10

cars without artillery would be exposed
20 a iire from rifles and Maxims and even
small cannon without being able 70 do
ANYTHING In reply but waste their ammn-
hltion trying 10 get bullet through the
armor OF the railroad fort.
lhcfe are no doors TO the trucks. The
men get In by climbing over the steel
sides and once inside they are boxed in
WIN no outlet through the sides OF the
car other than the small vertical slots
through which they fire at the attack
ing force. To rush" such trains with
out artillery 10 pound them beforehand
taking.
The tactics OF amored train crews are
simple; ana had they been followed out
carefully during the recent armored train
lights In South Africa, or had the Beers
neen less wen supplied with artillery. the
new movable forts would have jumped
10 hrst place IN the estimation OF mill
eaIy men. The armored train must move
cautiously forward. the engineer keeping
sharp look out ahead for Instructions
or pltiails on the track and the men on
me forward truck standing ready with
.ne maxim gun and their rifles 20 deal
our ueath TO any enemy planted in the
pam or the train. At the first intimation
81 tne presence of a hostile force halt
shouiu be made and # the line I'm the
rear IL threatened, the train should be
run pack until the threatening force Is
encountered and scattered and the way
clear for another advance. In this man
oeuVre the amOred train has All the adj
vantage, for no matter how finely mount
ga the attacking force may be IL cannot
nope to keep pace with the train and If
!. Is necessary for the latter 10 retire
the enemy can always be kept in front
with little trouble while the maXirns and
ilhes blaze away and the men on the train
can iaugn az the efforts Of the enemy TO
These tactics Of course presuppose that
tne lurking contingents that are liable TO
sWoOp down on the lire far out Of sight
or the train crew 10 break UP and OBJ
stIuct me track so that on the return
OF the train 1t can be ambushcd have
been taken care of by the patrols OF the
force on the train. The disaster that over
came the British on the armored train
that was sent out Of Estcourt on a re-
conoittering expedition. only 10 be- parti-
ally derailed and It's occupants captured.
almost 10 man by the Beers, was due
10 oVer-conidence and lack OF the most
elementary precautions Of war. The
British should have known Of the pre-
sence OF the Beers I'm their rear soon
enough TO steam back out Of danger. Had
the British been properly supplied with
cavalry, the mobile forces OF the Beers
could not have scored this success, for
their presence would have been discover
ed and the train saved. Caution" IS the
only Watchword that Is given 10 the
driver of an armored train.
The train IS everything. for once that Is
demolished the men who fill its trucks
are worse Off than they would have been
had the train been left i'm the shops, for
the line is necessarily In the open while
the range IS known by the attacking
force, who may be hidden in an impreg-
nable position near by, where they can
kill off the train defenders at their leisure
or force them 10 surrender as at Est
court.
In the case Of the train at Mafeking
that clever officer. Colonel Baden-POweli.
who seems 10 be the man whose deeds
have brought him most prominently. TO
the front Of all the ambitious BfiusherS
In South Africa, has managed TO Keep
the line on which he moves els armored
trains free from the enemy by running
the steel forts back and forth night and
day, so quickly that the enemy never
have a chance 10 Get at the rails Tor pur-
poses Of demolition before the train Is
upon them ana they are glad to scuttle
TO safety. Such damage "a they have
done he has always quickly repaired
while the guns Of the train kept the
Beers at q safe distance.
Pursuit Of an armOred train is obvious
" an imDOssiDllity so that the capt. fe OF
or destruction of one of these Formidable
weapons should be out of the question IL
ordinary precautions are taken 4 ne
train could not OF course uaFei sWilt0I
than q shell but If warning Of the proxi-
cavalry could hope TO overtake the crew
when they run out of range.
So much attention has been gwen 10
the subject Of the armorcd tram Dy the
British that the question OF even me pesi
color to paint them has been discussed
carefully in council. it has been decided
that the drab OF the soldiers uniforms Is
the most suitable and all military trains
ave now being built in South Africa Tor
the use Of the troops there will be painted
this color The lessons learned IN the re-
cent war between the United states ana
Spain have been made use Of In the de-
signing of this new arm Of the service. 1t
will be remembered by readers or Ameri-
can newspapers that n train i'm which
was Crittenden Marriott. Cuban CORE
spondent OF the Leslie Syndicate, almost
came 10 grief while journeying along a
Cuban railroad. the forward truck being
blown up without damage 20 the trucks
that followed. In this case again the
presence Of the enemy in the vicinity or
the line should have been discovered IN
time and what might have been disos-
ter avoided IL is easily seen therefore
that when the armored trains are accom-
panied by an adequate scouting force, as
win be the case when the forward move
ment of the British is actually under way.
these movable forts Will be among the
most formidable as wei as the most IN
teresting Of the new weapons OF warfare.