New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-06-16

AZ the firBt Apache outbreak AFTER the thusoSH
chase did we not hasten TO turn over New-MeNeo
and Arizona TO their inhabitants? or why In years
within the memory OF most Of you when the SIOUX
and Chippewas Northwestern frontier
did not invite them 10 retain possession OF 81
Cloud. and even come down. II they liked. TO ot'
Paul and Minneapolis?
Unless ! am mistaken In regarding all these sug-
gestions unworthy TO be entertained by SELF
respecting citizens OF a powerful and sef-respecting
Nation, we have now reached two conclusions that
ought TO clear the air and simplify the problem
that remains. First. have ample constitutional
power acquire and govern new territory aoso-
lutey at will according TO our sense OF right ana
duty-whether dependencies. as colonies or as
protectorate. Second, as the legitimate ana neces-
sary consequence Of our own previous acts II mas
become National and international duty to do II
THE POLICY FOR OUR DEPENDENCIES
How shall set about II? What shall be the
policy with which, when order has been inexoraby
restored. We begin dealings with the new wards
I OF the Nation? Certainly must mark our dis
approval of the treachery and barbarities OF the
present contest. Clearly the oppression Of other
tribes by the Tagalogs must be ended or the OPP
preston OF any tribe by any other within the
sphere Of our active control. Wars between the
tribes must be discouraged and prevented We
must seek TO suppress crimes OF violence and pri-
vate vengeance. secure individual liberty protect
individual property and promote the study OF the
arts Of peace Above all. must give and enforce
justice; and for the rest, far as possible leave
them alone. By all means let us avoid fussy
meddling with their customs. manners pretudlces
and beliefs Give them order and justice. and trust
TO these win them in other regards TO our ways.
All this points directly to utilizing existing agencies
as much as possible. developing native initiative
and control IN local matters fast and as far as
we can, and ultimately giving them the greatest
degree Of self-government for which they prove
themselves fitted.
nd
listed for three hundred years, a homogeneous
native government the whole archipelago Is
obviously impossible. Its relations 20 the outside
world must necessarily be assumed by us. We
must preserve order In Philippine waters regulate
the harbors, fix and collect the duties. apporton the
revenue and supervise the expenditure. We must
enforce sanitary measures. We must retain sue"
a control Of the superior courts as shall make JUS
tce certainly attainabe. and such control oil inc
police as shall insure its enforcement. But IN al
this after the absolute authority has been es'dO-
lished, the further the natives can themselves NC
used 70 carry out details the better
Such system might not be unWlse even iO' ii
colony 10 which We had reason TO expect con-
siderable emigration Of our own people II eApe'l-
ence of q kindred nation In dealing with similar
problems counts for anything IT Is certainly wise
for a distant dependency. always to be populated
mainly In the great cities. by native races
and little likely TO be quite able to stand atone
while nevertheless We wish 10 help Il just as much
possible to that end
THE DUTY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS.
Certainly this is no bed Of fowery ease in the
dreamy orient TO which are led. No doubt
these first gmpses OF the task that lies before U.s.
as well as the warfare with distant tribes INTO
which we have been Unexpectedly plunged VIII pro-
woke for the time a certain discomfort with our
new possessions But far-reaching question
Of National policy the wise public man Is not so
greatly disturbed by what people say IN momentary
encouragement under the first temporary check.
That which really concerns him IL what people az
a later day or in a later generation might
saw Of men trusted with great duties for their coun-
try who proved unequal 10 their opportunities. ana
through some short-sighted timidity OF the moment
lost the chance OF centuries.
II "a unite true was recently reported In what
scanned an authoritative way from Washington,
that the Peace Commissioners were not entirely or
one mind at the outset and equally true that the
Anal conclusion at Washington was apparently
reached on the Commissions recommendation from
Paris As the cold fit, in the language OF one or
our censors has followed the hot At In the popular
temper ! readily take the time winch hosue
critics consider unfavorabe, for accepting my own
share OF responsibility and avowing for myself
| tbat 7 declared nv belief In the duty and policy OF
| holding the whole Philippine Archipelago in the
very first conference Of the Commissioners In the
| Presidents room at the White House. in advance
OF any instructions Of any sort. II vindcation for
What Is the duty of a public servant as TO profit
ing by opportunities 10 FOR his country what
all the rest Of the world considers material adVan-
| tages? Even II he could persuade himself that re-
iecting them Is morally and internationally ad-
| missble Is he at liberty TO commit his country
irrevocaby 10 their rejection. because they do not
| wholly please his fancy? At former negotiation
Of our own IN Paris the great desire OF the United
! States representative, as well as OF his Govern
ment. had been mainly to secure the settled OF
! partly settled country adjoining US on the SOUTH
| stretching from the Floridas TO the city OF New
| Orleans The possession Of the vast unsettled ana
! unknown Louisiana Territory west OF the Missis-
| sppi was neither sought nor thought Of sud
denly on an eventful morning IN April 1903 Taley-
rand astonished Livingston by Offering. on behalf
Of Napoleon 10 sell 10 the United States. not the
! Floridas at all. but merely Louisiana. "a raw
little semi-tropical frontier town and unexplored
| wilderness" Suppose Livingston had rejected the
! offer? or suppose Gadsden had not exceeded his
instructions in Mexico and boldly grasped the op-
| portunty that offered 10 rectify and make secure
| our Southwestern frontier
! The difficulties which az present discourage US
| are largely of our creation. II Is not for any
! Of US TO think Of attempting 10 apportion the
blame The only thing we are sure OF Is that II
was for no lack OF authority that We hesitated and
drifted TIL the Tagalogs were convinced We were
| ofraid OF them and could be driven before re-
| Inducements arrived That was the very thing
our officers had warned against-the least sisn
OF hesitation uncertainty-the very danger every
| European with knowledge Of the situation had
| dinned In our ears Everybody declared that dhl-
cultes were sure to grow on our hands In geo
metrical proportion TO our delays; and II was per-
! fecty known to the respective branches OF our
Government that while the delay went on II was
! In neglect OF a duty had voluntarily assumed.
| For the American Commissioners. with due au-
| thority distinctly offered to assume responsibility
pending the ratification OF the treaty, for the pro-
lection OF life and property and the preservation OF
order throug bout the whole archipelago The Span
! ,eh Commissioners after consultation with their
| Government refused this. but agreed that each
Power should be charged, pending the ratification
with the maintenance OF order In the places where
| &, mas established The American assent that