The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-02-21

ton Of the Spanish squadron inside the har-
Dor on Nav %. which discovery was, the
admiral says. the result of a determination
to satisfy himself fully before leaving for
the west. On the 31st he made a recon-
n~oissance Ito develop the enemy's position
and, incidentally, to in1ure or destroy, if
possible. the Colon moored we'll up in the
harbor." The question of the presence of
the enemy determined, he decided not to
risk serious disablement until endorsements
Admiral schley quotes the departments
dispatches of May % in these words: THE
department looks to you to ascertain the
fact of the presence of the enemy. and that
the enemy. If in the harbor at Santiago.
does not leave without decisive action"
obedience to the above order and without
any further order or instruction from any
one, l did ascertain the fact that the enemy
was at Santiago, and the enemy did not
leave without a decisive conflict"
BATTLE OF JULY 3.
Detailing the events connected with the
battle of July 8, he says that at s:45 of that
day Admiral Sampson made signal from his
flagship: Disregard movemen of the
commander-in-chief," and steamed east
ward to Siboney. '"This," saws Admiral
Schley, left me the senior officer present,
and necessarily clothed me with the respon-
sibility Of the command" Continuing, he
declares that when the enemy's vessels
came out of the harbor signal was made
from the Brooklyn (his flagship to the fleet
to clear ship for action"
Then followed the signal "close action"
and this by the signal 1.-The enemy escap-
ing to w Following the appear-
ance Of the Spanish fleet there was a gen.
eral inward movement of the American YES
sells, closing in and engaging it. Explain
ing the movements OF the vessels in both
fleets, he says the Spanish fleet was coming
westward under high speed and Chang
ing course more to westward brought the
Brooklyn heading eastward to meet it in
q nnEffTnr x~hnnn nhn MOULD 49, -
the nre of the eastern vessels of our force,
now changing their courses to the west
ward, and between them and the Spanish
vessels. Instant decision he continues,
was therefore necessary to avoid interfer-
ing IN any way or cutting off any of the
IRE or our vessels, as would have occurred
II she had turned towards the Spanish fleet
now approaching the Brooklyn. Turning
outward left the enemy's ships unmarked by
the Brooklyn and exposed them to the con-
centrated fire of our squadron. The result
OF this maneuver was that in thirty min
utes from the opening of the combat four
died "0 With Hfgnn' ) ro ofss9is were on Rre ana r f6e
vessels of the enemy's fleet were a little
forward Of the B%rooklyn's beam when they
turned towards the beach on fire.
AT the final capture Of the Colon at 1:15
p. m. the Brooklyn was nearest, the Oregon
Eext and then the Texas and Vixen. The
New York arrived at 2:2S p. m. and the
commander-in-chief assumed mma Of
the squadron. Signals were made from the
brooklyn TO the squadron until all signal
nalyaros were shot away, and then by the
Myer army code"
In conclusion Admiral SchIey contends
that the turn Of the Brooklyn in the battle
OF the 80 was the crucial and deciding fea-
ture of the combat, and of decided advan-
tage." Furthermore, he says 1t is a mis-
take to say that the vessels distance from
the enemy was increased to the extent of
500 yards, and adds: Though this may not
be OF record. it is a fact, nevertheless" He
cites the fact that the charts of the board
or naVigatorS show that the Brooklyn was
nearest when it emerged from the harbor,
nearest at every stage Of the battle. and
nearest the Colon when It surrendered, and
gives many confrmatory details of his flag
ships active and effective participation In
the battle. He says he made no report of
his maneuver in his report of the battle, as
Its effect upon the battle was never a ques-
ton with him. His last paragraph reads:
"On May 81 l received a telegram from the
commander-in-chief congratulating me upon
my success in locating and blockading the
eEemy's fleet at Santiago. If it was worthy
of commentator at that time, i am at a
loss to understand how 1t could have grown
into reprehensible conduct, as suggested by
Admiral Sampson in his letter of July 10.
1898, some six weeks later"