Freeland tribune. (Freeland, Pa.) 1888-1921, 1899-03-09
NAVAL COAL STATIONS.
OUR LATE WAR TEACHES THAT THEY
ARE ALL-lMPORTANT.

In the Acquisition, Development and
/ Fortification of Hers England Has Spent
Nearly S5OO,OOO,OO0 in Fifty Years.
Spain's Helpiessness in This Particular.
Nothing has been more clearly
taught by the war than the all-impor-
tance of coaling facilities and coal
supply to the weaker navy. The
strong navy can seize bases and an
chorages for its needs, if it does not
appropriate to its own uses the enc
my's coaling stations This is what
Admiral Dewey did at Manila. Neu-
trails are tending to increase the strin-
gency of the conditions under which
belligerents are allowed to obtain sup
plies of fuel in their ports and very
rightly so. Admiral Cervera's opera
tions in the West Indies were greatly
hampered by the fact that he found
it hard to get coal. The nominal sup
ply of his cruisers was excellent; they
all carried from 1000 to 1900 tons, and
had in theory radiuses of action of
about 10000 miles. Unfortunately,
however, theory and practice do not
always coincide, and in coal-endur-
ance less than anywhere. Instead of
being able to steam to Cuba from st.
Vincent and back again without re-
plenishing his bunkers, he was COM
PEELED to put into Curacao after COW
ering little over 5000 miles, and then
was only allowed very limited sup
ply for two of his ships. That he did
,nf nft 10
colliers in some unfrequented anchor
age, such as abound in West Indian
waters, seems extraordinary. This is
a perfectly feasible operation, and as
it was not essayed, we are bound to
conclude either that the colllers were
wanting-if so, another example of
Spanish mismanagement-or that, be-
ing weak power, Spain was afraid to
risk trouble with the South American
and Central American states. In q
war between two strong navies we may
expect to see much more disregard for
the rights of weak neutrals.
Camara's voyage to the Philippines
came to an untimely end at Suez, quite
as much because of the coal difficulty
as because his fleet was wanted for the
defence of the Spanish littoral. Had
he steamed east, he would not have
been allowed by Egypt, France, Italy,
or Turkey--the powers which hold
the shores of the Red sea--to coal on
their coasts or in their harbors. He
must have struggled as far as Colombo
or Singapore before the rules of inter
rofiannl l,,t .rn,,ll ol l.
to fill his bunkers with fuel to take
him to Manila. His helplessness
coming so close upon the voyages of
the Deutschland and Gefion, and of
the Navarin and Sissoi Veliki, to the
Far East-voyages which would have
been almost impossible had England
closed her coaling stations to these
rival powers-has not escaped notice
on the continent of Europe. France,
under the guidance of NJ. Lockroy, is
preparing to fortify and provide with
docks the chain of harbors which link
Toulon and Madagascar. Germany is
eagerly looking for points of strategic
value on the trade routes. but / great
ly fear that she will find none. Here
England is without rival. As her
sea-power has not been an ephemeral
growth, she has slowly, link by link,
forged wonderful chain, binding
India, the Yellow sea, Australia, and
the Cape to the mother-country In
the acquisition, development, and for
titication of her coaling- stations she
must have spent within the last half
century nearly $500, 900, 900. Thus it
will be seen that the power which is
to compete with her in this respect
will have to pour out money like wa
ter. 1t cannot be doubted that the
United States will equip itself with
chain of stations linking Manila and
China to the Pacific coast. Already
they possess, or can have for the ask
ing, Hawaii, the Ladrones and Caro-
lines, and Pango- Pango in Samoa In
the West Indies they will have Puerto
Rico, and Cuba. With these advanced
positions, the need for sea- going ships
and not monitors, grows. From '"The
Naval Lessons of the War;" by H. w.
Wilson, in Harper's Magazine.