The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-02-19
Washington, the Soldier.

An impression has at times prevailed among
educated men. including those of the military
profession. that. as Washington had Mother
the troops. resources and knowledge. nor tho
broad range OF field service which have char
acterized modern warfare. he lacked some OF
the material dement's which develop the typi-
cal soldier. II is with the view of dispelling
this impression that Gen. Fl. B. C~ARRINGToN
has written the book entitled Washington. the
Soldier Hanson. Wolfe Il Co... He contends
in his preface that. after full allowance has
been made for changes in army and battle
formation. tactical action and armament. as
well as for the greater facilities that now exist
for the transportation Of troops and army sup
plies. it remains true that the relative effect of
all these changes upon success In war on a
grand scale hassnot been to alter seriously
those principles OF military science which have
shaped battle action and the general con-
duct OF war from the earliest period of anthem
tic military history. Among those principles arc
enumerated strategy. grand tactics. and minor
tactics. These are thus defined: Strategy is
the effecting Of those combinations which will
insure the highest possible advantage in the
employment of military force. The st rateGical
ability of Washington was memorably exhib-
tied in the campaign OF Yorktown. By grand
tactics is meant the ability to handle a
military force in the field. An illustration
Of this principle was W~ashington's achieve
ment at the battle OF Monmouth. when
he rallied tho Continental army. which he
found already in full retreat. When one
speaks of minor tactics. one refers to the in
struction OF the soldier. individuals and en-
nndsSe. in the details OF his military drills. the
use OF his weapons and the perfection OF dis
cipline. As regards this part Of a commanders
duty. the author OF this book points out that
W. Z 100. -NrA. lo-t z.-la = ~ ~ -
individual soldier. looking upon 1t as the best
dependence In the hour OF battle. Self reli-
ance. obedience to orders and confidence in
success were enjoined as the conditions
Of victory. His system OF competitive
craftsmanship. OF rife ranges and burden
tests was introduced early in his career.
and was e%nJoined upon the American levies
before the battle OF Brooklyn. and at other
times during tho war. With regard to the
difficulties Of transportation and intercommu-
%nication in Washington's day. We are reminded
that these were equally obstructive to both
parties. The slow mails and travel Of revolu-
tionary times affected both armies allke. The
British had bettHr communication by water.
but not by land; they suffered the disad-
vantage OF campaigning through an unknown
and intricate country peopled by their enemies.
In a chapter on the battle OF Monmouth: the
hiNhpl VI AiilI iboh ca l'FNc tIt u IIHI
the truth OF history requires a definite state
ment with regard to tho antecedents OF the
once ovcrcstimatod officer. Charles Lee. The
fact Is that. as n aubaltcrn in the British Army.
he had been uniformly insubordinate. and was
in discredit when he was allowed to go abroad
and fight under various flags as a military nd
venturer. He knew nothing Of handling a
large command or combined command. Be-
fore the battle OF Monmouth he had never
been under fire at the head Of Ameri-
can troops. He was Just cool enough
and brave enough at Monmouth to retreat
with his division II was saved chiefly by the
self possession OF its officers and the endur-
ance OF the rank and file. He was unequal to
the command even had he desired battle. He
did not desire II. however. To have fought n
battle with any chance OF being taken prisoner
would have exposed him to a double penalty
for treason at the hands OF Gen. Howe. He
would have placed himself in the attitude OF
defeating the "plan" for the betrayal of Amer
lean interests which hs had arranged with the
British commander. and Of thwarting the very
which he had advised.
An attempt has been made by some recent
writer's 20 revive the tradition that Washing
ton was guilty OF profanity at the battle of
Our author finds 1t hard to believe
that either Charles Lee or his witnesses would
not have testified TO profane words had thew
been spoken. for tho sake OF indicating Lee
when the latter's commission and honor were
in jeopardy, Asa matter Of fact. every witness
agreed with Lee as to the terms used: none Of
these implied profanity. Silence in this respect.
1t is submitted, should be accepted as strong
~presumptive evidence in disproval Of the
charge. An eminent American historian sought
to verify the vague tradition by the following
1T Is related that. when Lafay-
cite visited tliS country in 1903 bn ua, ,Io !
guest of Chief Justice Horn blower at Newark.
j., and that, while seated on the front porch
one evening. Lafayette remarked that the only
time when he ever heard Washington swear
when lac rebuked Lee at meeting him on
his retreat ut Monmouth" The late Justice