The record-union., 1899-11-03

kong on the morning of the 25th, Mrs
Bay on the 9th. Aguinaldo did not
leave Singapore until the 26th, and so
did not arrive in Hongkong in time to
have conference with the Admiral.
| 1t had been reported to the Commo-
dore as early as March 1st by the
United States Consul at Manila and
others that the Filipinos had broken
out In insurrection against the Spanish
authority in the vicinity of Manila and
on March Both, Mr.. Williams had tel
egraphed Five thousand rebels armed
In camp near city. Loyal to us in case
of war"
| Upon the arrival of the squadron at
Manila it was found that there was nc
| insurrection to speak of, and it was
accordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo
to come to Cavite on board the Nc
| Culloch. He arrived with thirteen of
his staff on May 10Th, and Immediately
came on board the Olympia to call on
the commander-in-chief, after which
he was allowed to land at Cavita and
the purpose of Strengthening the
| United States forces and weakening
those of the enemy. No alliance of
]
lido, nor was any promise of inde-
pendence made to him, then or at any
other time.
| The Commissioners report then
rapidly sketches events now historical.
1t tells in substance how the Filipinos
attacked the Spanish, and how Gen
eral Anderson arrived, and Aguinaldo,
at his request, removed from Cavite to
Bacoor. Says the commission:
Now for the first time rose the idea
of national independence. Aguinaloo
issued proclamation in which he took
the responsibility of promising it to his
people on behalf of the American Gov
ernment, although he admitted freely in
private conversation with members of
his Cabinet that neither Admir- al
| Dewey nor any other American had
made him any such promise
| The report states that Aguinaldo
wished to attack the Americans wher
they landed at Paranque, but was de-
TERED by the lack of arms and ammu-
milton. From that point on there was
a growing friction between the Fill
pinos and the American troops.
There were no conferences says the
report, between the officers of the FIJI
ipinos and our officers with a view to
operating against the Spaniards, nor
was there cooperation of any kind.
There never was any preconcerted oper-
ations or any combined movement by
the United States and Filipinos against
the Spaniards.'
| Reference is made to Aguinaldos s
demand that he be allowed to loot Ma
Mia and take the arms of the Span
iards. The latter demand is said to
confirm the statement that he intended
! to get possession of the arms to attack
the Americans. Further evidence of
the hostile intentions of the Filipinos
was found in the organization of the
Popular Club which later on furn-
ished a local militia to attack the
Americans.
The DEGREES of the Filipino Congress
are also cited, as we'll as the making of
bolos (knives) in every shop in Manila.
It is shown that considerable element
In the Filipino Congress wished to send
an address to President Mckinley a re-
quest not to abandon the Philippines
Cat this stage the Paris conference was
discussing the future Of the Philip
I pfnes). The President was also to be
asked his desire as to the form of Gov
eminent he wished to establish. But
all this time Aguinaldo was prepar-
ing for war and delaying these mes
sages, and it was understood that the
attack would come when the first act
by the American forces would afford
a pretext.
A brief chapter tells of the lack of
success attending the effort made at
this time by General Merritt through
a commission to arrive at a mutual
understanding with Aguinaldo, as to
the intentions, purposes and desires of
the Filipino people
This brings the story up to the ONT
break on the evening of the 4th of
February, the attack upon the Ameri-
can troops following the action of
the Nebraska sentinel. The Commits
sion in concluding this chapter saws.
After the landing Of our troops
Agulnaldo made up his mind that it
would be necessary to fight the Ameri-
cans, and after the making of the
treaty of peace in Paris this determine
ton was strengthened. He dia not only
openly declare that he intended to
hght the Americans, but he excited
everybody, and especially the military.
py claiming independence, and it is
doubtful whether he had the power
/ 10 check or control the army at the
time hostilities broke out.
Deplorable as war is. the one in
which we are now engaged was una
voidable. We were attacked by a. hold
adventurous and enthusiastic army No
alternative was left to US except ieno-
nlnous retreat. 1t is not to be con-
ceived that any American had sane
toned the surrender of Manila to the
insurgents Our obligations to other
nations and to the friendly Fflin,nos
ana to ourselves and our flag f1ema nd. !.
eu tnat force should be met with forca
Whatever the future of the Philipnines
may be, there is no course open to us
now except the prosecution of the war
until the insurgents are reduced to SUBJ
mission
The Commission is of the oninoin
mat there has been no time since tha
obstruction of the Spanish squadron hv
Aumiral' Dewey when it was possible to
Withdraw our forces from the islands
either with honor to ourselves or with
SAFETY to the inhabitants.
The Commission then takes nm tbo
conditions of the country at the time
Oh their arrival, comparing it with
conditions existing at the time they
ieft a short time ago. A vivid picture
IS given of the anarchy existing among
the inhabitants in and about Manila.
during the early spring