The Newberry herald and news. (Newberry, S.C.) 1884-1903, 1899-05-19

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animation Of the opinion in that case
will show that the justice rendering
It, used language referring not only
to dogs, bat to domestic fowls and
animals other than cattle.
1t is true that in the course of tho
opinion in tho Jumison case tho
learned Justice who delivered it,
made use of the following language:
dogs arc not property in such sense
as makes them assets belonging to
the estate Of deceased person, and
arc never nv"ntoried and appraised,
however numerous or valuable, nor
are they subject to levy and sale, SO
lar as we are informcd." But this
was only said arguendo. No qucs.
ton OF levy and sale was before tho
court and while the Justice was ono
distinguished for his lourning, such
a casua! ro:Nrrk cannot be held to
havo been tho deliberate decision of
II o court.
THE CONSTITUTION on DOGS
Tho constitution Of the State (civil
code, section 5SS3) authorizes tho
general assembly to impose Il tax
upon such domestic animals, as, from
their nature and habits, arc destruct
I'VE OF other property. by the use of
the expression "other property" it is
evident that these animals wcro
treated as property by the fnrda-
mental law Of tho State.
Farther, dogs are by tho statute
law Of the State the subject of lar
ceny. Penal code, Sec. ISL. Seton
3S22 Of the civil code provides for
liability on the part Of 'the owner"
Of dog for damage done by it un.
der certain circumstances.
Iii the case Of Patton V. Tho State,
80 Ga. III, it was held that a penal
Statute then under consideration did
not apply to the injurins or killing
of animals of any kind; and therefore
did not apply to the dog. The opin.
ion in that case is both interesting
/ nd instructive, but it did not under
take to decide that dog was not
property; and this was distinctly SO
declared in the case of Graham v,
Smith, 100 Ga. 434. On page 1876,
referring to the case Of Patton v.
Tho State, ii Is said Hn tho Inter
case, however, the ruling was based
on the construction that the subjects
of that particular statute wore nnni,
mate property In tho case last
cited it was held that, "The owner
of dog has such a property in It as
will enable him to maintain an action
of trovcr for its recovery in case OF
tho wrongful conversion" In the
we'll considered opinion it is express
~ d' clarod thnt a dog is property.
1t seems to me that tho principles
there enunci;.,rd control this case.
PROPERTY WAS SUBJECT.
Let it be remembered that in
trover case the plaintiff has the op.
tion of taking verdict for tho prop.
erty, or money verdict. If he
should take money vorl'ct, surely
tho law did not contemplate that he
should sit in court with lis judgment
and ii. ia, in his pocket, and watch
the defendant carry the dog away,
because, although he could recover
Judgment for its value, he could not
realize it by levy.
In the case of Wilcox v. The State,
lOl Ga. SOB, it was distinctly held
that the words "domostic animals"
included dogs.
1t may further be noted that this
was II claim case IN which tho claim
ant made affidavit that tho property
levied 90 was not subject to levy, but
was the property Of the claimant
1t would he a startling idea that 1,
man could make an affidavit that the
thing levied on was property, was
his property, was recoverable by him
as such under the levy, and yet that
the levy was void because tho prop.
erty was dog; or in other words,
that it was property subject to claim
bat not to ]ovy.
VI pom consideration of tho whole
case L am of tho opinion that the