The evening times., 1899-02-08
Our Philippine Policy.

1t viii annoy ana eNdSpeIatt tiS F'"'i-
oric American 10 learn that technicallties
sill hamper the Administration IN dealing
with the Filipino rebels. At first the state
ment that General Otis would receive no
instructions from Washington, but would
be allowed 10 exercise his own judgment,
was a source Of satisfaction. II was as
sumed 10 mean that h. could, if be thought
be had force enough. pursue the rebels
while they are demoralized and hammer at
them until they shall disband and submit
10 American authority. Now. however, We
are told that the President finds himself
exactly where he was before the Senate
ratified the Treaty Of Peace; that he does
not consider il operative until the Spanish
Cortes has also ratified il. II Is worthy
OF note here that a favorable vote by the
Cortes l. not essential to its validity. This
is The decision OF Premier Sagssta ana the
Spanish Peace Commissioners Merely lor
its effect on Spanish popular sentiment and
TO strengthen himself Sagasta decided 10
call the Cortes and have it endorse his
action.
The President afiirms that our title 10
sovereignty over the Philippines is not
complete and that We are still under the
protocol conditions: thar our authority is
limited to maintaining our control OF Ma
Mia and IT'S suburbs. Ii would be unfor-
tunat- if General Otis should take this
view. and We can only hope that his appar-
ent ignorance OF the Treaty is meant 20
cover pursuit and punishment OF the
enemy If he follows up the repu.se with
a vigorous advance and captures or DE-
stroys every body OF rebels he can find,
the war with Aguinaldo's army viii be
speedily brought TO an end. II, however,
he simply keeps on the defenciye and al
lows the rebels TO reform and rsoIganize,
We shall have another heavy battle or else
prolonged guerrilla warfare. The fight
OF sunday though it resulted ia a severe
loss 10 the enemy and wss d revelation of
the superior fighting qualities of the
Americans, does not end the war. AgJin-
aldo has = force OF from fifteen TO thirty
thousand men, mostly Tagaios with q few
savages from the hills. He has a sufficient
equipment OF rifles and ammunition and is
receiving new supplies. II he is allowed 10
90 undisturbed by General CTS he wal
manage TO enlist in his support the So
diers of al least three provinces who have
refused TO acknowledge his authority and
who have been disposed to welcome Amer
lean rule. II he is kept on the run, these
and others will draw further away from
him and thousands WIFI desert his cause
Il is the affirmation OF everybody who
knows anything about the varied races that
inhabiu the Philippines, that they incline
TO the winning side. They are willing TO
recognize the authority that is able TO up
hold its claims. They are impressed by
victory. Probably half of Aguinaldo's ar
my would desert him if il were known that
General Ous intends 10 follow up his vic
tory Till The last armed Filipino surren-
GerS OF falls. On the other hand, they will
fight us if we simply remain on the de-
fenciye. II is economy of life, therefore,
10 assume The aggressive with the ayowed
purpose OF Furnishing the rebels and es-
tablishng American rule. Fewer Ameri-
cans and fewer Filipinos will be sacrificed
by a succession of battles now than by a
defencive policy. We can hope that Gen
eral Otis viii understand that he has the
right and that it is his imperative duty 10
move al once against the enemy and keep
moving until there is no more enemy to
fight