The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1899-06-25

block ourselves out or the harbcr- This
disagreement was really the first between
Sampson and 6chley. and the absolute
failure OF the Merrimac expedition and
the trend OF Subsequent happenings show
ed the wisdom Of Schiey's ideas.
s'.As was proved by Commander Deiehan-
~ later. any attempt TO enter the har-
Dor by the neet would have proved dis
sstrous as II was carefully mined. and
as a decided answer to any criticism OF
Schley on this point let Il b known that
Sampson. while there for five weeks. new
er contemplated forcing the entrance but
contented himself with expenaing about
QD.ooo worth OF ammunition upon forts
that carried only two modern guns that
never were able to do any damage to the
1eet
''The question as to the relative parts
taken In the battle Of July : BY Sampson
and Schley Is not difficult to answer,
since the appearance in the Century Mag
azine OF The Stories of the Cap
tains.' These stories generally con-
cede that Sampson was not in
sight during the battle except TO the In
diana which was unable to follow the
fleeing vessels of Spain.
oanDsoa, Too. Reprehensible.
The happenings Of the twenty-four
hours before the battle VIII 20 far think.
to demonstrate that If Schley can be held
to Be 'reprehensible' for inttmating that
he might have to go back for coal, q
thing he did not do, that Sampson was
much more reprehensible for deliberately
weakening the line OF battle and deserving
the line himself when he knew that for
the drst time In several weeks extremely
suspicious movements were going on In
the harbor.
The happenings preceding the battle
viii serve as my explanation for this
strong statement. On the afternoon OF July
1t was noticed from all the ships that
the harbor. there being visible distinct vol
umes Of smoke. conceded by practical men
to be from warshipA
That Sampson himself recognized this II
evident from the fact that he sent the vix-
en- around to the different ships OF the
squadron to announce to them that he con-
sidered the movements inside to be sus-
picious. and that he desired q close watch
kept.
"At night four watch fires were noticed
on the hills to the west, and again Samp-
son notified the feet that he considered
things suspicious. and demanded close
watch during the night. The next morn
Ing at daybreak the columns OF smoke
were seen again. and 1t was noticed by
the officer on watch on the Brooklyn that
they were nearer the entrance. and 1t was
therefore surprising to everybody when.
acting under orders, the Massachusetts,
one Of the heaviest battleships Of the line,
and the Newark. protected cruiser carry
ing Commodore Watson's flag, left the line
for Guantanamo for coal.
Later Events More Surprising.
but decidedly more surprising were tho
future events. At 3 o'clock. while Capt.
Philip and Admiral Schley were discussing
the suspicious movements. through the
medium Of signal nags. Sampson suddenly
signaied: Disregard the movements Of the
commander-in-chief.' and moved away
from the lire with the New York. The New
York was the only other ship, beside the
Brooklyn. in the line with the accredited
speed Of the Spanish ships. and there were
present the Gloucester and the Vixen. two
converted yachts. either one Of which
would have made q special dispatch boat.
without Weakening the line. When the
battle call was sounded Admiral Schley
made the signal: The enemy Is escaping.
and then determining that the New York
was out Of sight, made the signal: ships
close In
with q good strong pair Of field glasses
and standing upon the exceptionally high
bridge Of the Brooklyn looked for Samp-
son and the New York. but he was out Of
sight We never saw him again until one
long hour after the surrender OF the Colon.
Lieut. Eberle. OF the Oregon. who writes
the story of that ship. story approved BY
Capt Clark, says that when the battle was
finished he looked for the New York. but
could only discern some smoke In the dis
lance. Capt Philip OF the Texas. which
was about six miles astern OF the Brooklyn
and Oregon when the Colon surrendered.
says that, believing that the New York.
sSo{l of
not see our signal OF surrender. he raised
the signal, which the New York declined to
answer.
THE Colon surrendered at lis p. m. and
the New York arrived near 1t at 2:l5. II
Capt Chadwick's story is true. that his
ship was running at the rate Of seventeen
knots. then 1t was about eighteen miles
in signal distance Of the fighting portion OF
the fleet.
Could Not See the New York.
II remember that as the Colon beached
and as the tired, naked men came from the
turrets for air. that / handed my glasses
to Lieut. Rush. on the after eight-inch
turret. and asked him II he could see the
New York He looked from his elevated
position and then said: No. II IL not in
sight and quick as Hash one Of the tur-
ret crew said: It's probably chasing a
schooner
certainly this Cf.ttclSH uuSt stanu,
that SIMPSONS attitude In taking from the
line a ship like the New York 10 take him
on an errand could be compared only 10 a
general taking a strong regiment from a
brigade in the face OF an enemy to escort
him upon an errand to the rear. 1t may
also be further related in this connection
that the much-taiked-of orders OF Samp-
son. which are alleged to have won the
flght were to Close In and sink the enc
my In the entrance II they attempt to es-
cape
The enemy was not sunk In the en-
trance Schley gave nine distinct signals
during the fight and continually direct
ed Il.
Failing to convince the general public
that Schley was not prominen- In the bat
tie OF July 3, the last atari came In the
form Of a criticism that tho Brooklyn had
been turned away from the enemy turing
the fight, and that in that movement he
displayed cowardice. At the outset let me
say that the movement OF the ship showed
the greatest good judgment. and probably
saved the cruiser from being sunk or dis
ab.ed When the enemy was sighted COM
Ing out the Brooklyn moved straight for