The record-union., 1899-03-23

tain place in the Chinese portion of the
city. The officer thereupon requested
the Indian to take some money and go
to the place where he had bought the
liquor and attempt to buy some more,
and that he (said officer) would follow
him, and if the Chinaman furnished
him the liquor, good case could be
made out against said Chinaman. This
program was carried out, and the Chin
amSn was arrested, prosecuted and con-
victed as above stated.
On a motion for a new trial before
Judge Hinkson, citing authorities to the
effect that conviction could not be
sustained where the defendant had been
induced by public officer or all agent
of the Government to commit the crime,
that very careful Judge, after examin-
ing the question thoroughly, held that
the point was well taken, granted a
new trial and discharged the defend
ant.
The case at bar bears so far as the
facts are concerned, perfect analogy
to that of The People vs. All Yum.
There is a wide distinction between re-
sorting to decoys or other such meth
DDS of experimenting persons whom Off
ceived the intent to perpetrate a crime,
and the proposition of a public officer
inducing person who had, up to thai
time, no idea of violating the law, to
commit some act denounced as public
offense by the law.
In other words, if officers obtain in
formation that certain persons are
about to break into a bank for the
mn L. h., "a,
on hand to wreck a train, or have
formed an intent to commit any other
public offense, it is their duty, as Off
GERS, to prevent the commission of such
offense and to resort to any legitimate
means which will enable them to APP
prehend and ultimately secure the con-
viction and punishment of such per-
sons.
In the case before me there was prob
ably nothing farther from the mind of
the defendant than to commit an in
fraction of the law until these agents of
the Government came there and pro-
posed TO him to do so. The intent in
this particular case was necessarily alb
sent, and could not have been formed
nor executed without the aid of these
men who, as has already been seen,
were representing the officer in this
case.
Numerous authorities can be cited
sustaining this view, among which a
leading case may be mentioned, thai of
United States VS.. Wight, SO Federal Re-
porter, JOG, in which Justice Brown,
of the United States Supreme Court,
uses the following language:
We think that no obstacle should be
thrown in the way of the detection of
crime that does not amount to a prac-
teal inducement or solicitation to COM
nit it,
Chitty Sd Grim. Law, 925, states the
doctrine as follows: IF the owner,
in order to detect a number of men in
the act of stealing, directs a servant
to appear to encourage the design, and
leads them on until the offense is COM
plete, so long as he did not induce the
original intent, but only provided for
its discovery after it was formed, the
criminality of the thieves will not be de-
stroyed.''
From the facts herein stated it will
be observed that the act of the officer
did amount to practical inducem INT
or solicitation to commit the crime"
and that 1.-The original intent was in
duced' by the act of these witnesses.
1t follows, in my opinion, that upon
both reason and authority a conviction
upon such facts should not be upheld.
1t is, as 1 have already suggested, and
which is well-established fact. the
sworn duty of public officers to prevent
and not 10 encourage crime. If public
officers are to be permitted to do this
sort of thing in cases involving only
misdemeanor penalties, by parity of
reasoning why should they not be sus-
tanned in cases of a more egregious
character and serious consequences
L am convinced that a conviction OBJ
tanned in the manner described by the
record in this case should not be sus-
tanned.
1t therefore follows that the defend
ant will be granted a'new trial, and.
inasmuch as the evidence would be the
same in case of trial de novo. the
defendant should be discharged. and
such is the order.
E. C. HART.
Judge of the Superior Court