Washington sentinel., 1899-04-01

| L hNlC - q new anu very grave TACT II
modern politics to which we are con
vinced that Euglish politicians, anc
especially English journalists, do moi
attach sufficient importance, and that is
the powerlessness of the people against
the soldiers. There is a traditionarv
belief derived from the experience oi
the early years OF the century, that il the
people of city or OF a State are discon.
tented enough to riot, there Is danger
OF the Government being overturned,
whereas unless the Government Is weak.
or has lost the confidence fits soldiers,
there Is no danger whatever, The con.
ditions OF insurrectIonary warfare have
been changing for thirty years, and ali
the changes have tended to diminish
| popular power. In the first place,
universal service has gutted the populace
we are moi using this word in iHVfdialH.
but to exclude the older and more
conservative citizens OF its best fighting
resource, the men between rs and 27
All ofthese are either in barracks or in
the active reserves-that is, are actually
soldiers with uniforms and under discip
line, accustomed to implicit obedience,
and on the Continent taught plainly that
they may have to act against their own
relatives and friends as against external
enemies. In the second place, all the
remainder Of the physically competent,
the men between ~ and 10, have been
through the military mill, have learned
to know how powerless they are without
officers or supplies against regular
troops, and haye acquired a feeling
about officers compounded of awe and
liking which is never quite removed! A
French or Italian crowd. however furi.
GUS, will part to give a general a path,
and some years sgo an officer IN Berlin
dispersed a crowd which was threatening
soEle urban landlords by merely giving
words OF command to them from a
balcony. The artisans who were raging
below could not resist the impulse to
form" march and "hat' when they
heard the we'll known formulas. And,
in the third place, the populace has no
machinery Formerly, ii they could only
obtain mnskets, and pixies, and a little
powder from the armOrer's shops, which
somehow they always did obtain, they
could cast bullets for themselves, and
behind barricade ofpaving stones they
were like militia in a fortress, not well
drilled. but not at all easy 10 subdue,
Now a heavy battery woulG knock the
barricade to pieces, and then the
Maxims aud repeating rifles, perpetually
resupplied from stores which only
Governments have at command, would
pour out death in showers, the insur.
gents would tall in great vathes as the
Dervishes did at Omdurman, and as the
retreat into houses is open to them,
would rapidly disappear. A crowd can
no more resist a modern regiment in the
open than a cheese can resist knife.
No doubt il the people are exasperated
enough to continue firing from the
houses there will be much loss inflicted
on the troops, but experience shows that
this form OF attack maddens soldiers,
and that the resulting massacre cowes
men who, however brave. have never
fought before with women and children
screaming, clinging or flying all around
them.
This terrible superiority Of the
regular forces is greatly increased by a
moral cause OF which we have no doubt
but which it is not easy to explain.
Kings, statesmen, and, as we think,
Parliaments, have become more
remorseless in the use OF physical force.
There used to be a hesitation in
slaughter, which has passed away.
ARTILLERY was, we think, used only once
in the street battles Of the French
Revolution, and as late as 1866 Marshal
Prim was thought to have been cruel
and almost unfair in shsling a Spanish
city in insurrecti0n; bur whether
because they are irriiated by the element
Of anarchy which now mingles itself
with every insurgent crowd, or, which
is more probable, that they learned to
rely on science, the ruling men, if they
mean repression, ,repress unhesitatingly,
and by the use OF irresistible weapons.
The Communists Of PARIS were
slaughtered as il they had been Prussians
in the field and only the other day
Milan was put down, with the consent
as afterwards appeared, OF Parliament,
almost as pitilessly as il the city had
been taken by storm. We do not say
that there was crueitY-we do not know
enough OF the details tor that-but
there was no spaTing, no thought,
apparently, that those dying in heaps
were men who, however much in error,
had some claim to protection, or at least
to mercy, at the hands OF those who
swept them from the path. We believe
that this cause accounts as much as any
other for the quiescence OF Paris on the
day of NJ. Faure's funeral, The Parisians
are aquick witted people with an instinct
for things military. they knew that
enormous masses OF troops-it was said
one hundred thousand men-had been
accumulated in their capital, from the
sharp orders issued to the police they
understood that with the death OF NJ,
Faure hesitation had passed out Of the
Government and they gave up al
thought Of revolt or rIOting. They were
wise. The disahected sections OF them
had not won over the troops, a. the
Roget incident showed and If the whole
male population OF Paris had risen and
had found muskets they could not have
stood three hours against the terrible
force accumulate d for their repression.
They could only have died in heaps
without affecting the result.