The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1899-12-20

to raise any question as to the in
validity Of the contract under which the
money was paid to it. With the money
jingling in their pockets they would be
absolutely estopped, upon every princi-
pie of common justice, from casting a
single speck upon the binding force of
the contract which had been entered
into with the county, and upon which
1T had received the money. The rule
works equally the other way, and we
are satisfied that this plaintiff is estop-
ped from securing a return of the mon
ey. There is no claim that the county
was defrauded. There is no claim that
the benefits accruing to the county
were not equal to the expenditure made.
In this transaction the county was the
agent of the public and by the trans
action the public have secured an ex-
elusive right of way over the bridge
of defendant as long as that bridge
shall remain. 1t may be said that the
easement of right of way over the
bridge, with the annexed covenant to
keep in repair, is far more valuable
than a perfect title to the bridge itself,
for the public have all the benefits OF
the bridge without any of the burdens
accompanying it's ownership.
Many legal complications arise in the
building of a bridge across a stream
forming the boundary line between two
counties. Neither county is able to
deal with the question alone. 1t appears
that the consent of both is required. 1t
is extremely doubtful If the statutes
bearing upon the course to be followed
by Boards of Supervisors in building
bridges within the county are applicable
to the building of bridges oyer streams
dividing two counties. Legislation up
on the question is lacking, and what
little there is is most indefinite.
Possibly in this case the law was not
carried out Possibly the defendants,
aside from any question of estoppel or
ratification could not have recovered
either installment of the $4,000 to be
paid. But still the all-important fact
remains that these parties entered into
the contract in the utmost good faith.
The advice of the law officer of the
county was taken, and he advised that
the contract was lawful one and was
sufficiently evidenced the work con-
tracted for was done; the money was
paid for the work; the party paying
the money received full value for 1t,
and still enjoys the benefits received
from the contract. Under such circum-
stances a plain example of estoppel is
before us. and by reason of that estop-
pei the plaintiff is forever barred from
recovering back the money involved in
this litigation.
If a party contract to erect bridge,
or a poorhouse, or a courthouse for
county at a reasonable price, and the
structure is erected, the contract price
paid, and possession of the structure
taken, we believe in an action by the
county for the return of the money,
based upon the invalidity of the con-
tract, no court would be found to de-
clare that in equity and good conscience
the money should be returned. And
this, too, notwithstanding the widest
departure from the statute may have
been practiced in the making of the
contract. The case at bar in principle
differs but little from the illustration
given.
There is nothing so sacred about a
municipality that an estoppel may not
be raised against it by it's acts. In
equity and good conscience, like indf
viduals, it is equally bound to treat its
neighbors fairly and justly. In City of
Los Angeles VS.. Cohen Q01 Cal, 373,
this court, in order to do Justice, held
that the acts of the city were such as
to estop the public" from questioning