The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-02-21
EXPLANATION OF HIS DELAY
OFF CIENFUEGOS, SLOW PROGRESS
AND RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS.
His Conduct of the Great Battle with
Cervera's FIeet-SampsOn Criticised
for Using Harsh Terms.

committee on naval affairs his statement, in
which he disclaims any purpose Of con-
troversy with the Navy Department. The
letter of the department., he says, so far as
1t relates to him, can be summarized under
the following heads: THE delay off Glen
fuegos; the alleged slow progress toward
Santiago de Cuba from ~Cienfuegos; the
retrograde movements of the 26th and 9th
of May; the battle of Santiago and the de-
struction of Cervera's fleet"
The admiral says his orders from Samp-
son on May 10 were to blockade Cienfuegos,
which he proceeded to do. He had no knowl-
edge that there were any insurgents about
Cienfuegos who were friendly until the Mar
blehead arrived on the oath. Even had he
had this knowledge on the 23d Of May the
surf would have prevented communication.
On his arrival he sent Commander McCalla,
Of the Marblehead, ashore to establish rela-
tons with the insurgents, the result Of
which was made known to him at $40 Of
May "a. Then for the first time he learned
definitely that the Spanish fleet was not at
Cienfuegos. Within two hours he started
for Santiago. what possible ground Of
criticism" he says, adverse to me there
can be in all this I do not see. L was on
the spot acting under orders which gave me
entire discretion and yet clothed me with the
responsibility of going to Santiago only
after I was satisfied that the fleet was not
at Cienfuegos."
He quotes from the dispatch from Samp-
son of May 20, in which the latter says
Schley should hold his fleet off Cienfuegos.
If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago
they must come either to Havana or to
Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war
which they are said to bring for use in
Cuba. I am, therefore, Of the opinion that
the best chance to capture these ships will
be to hold the two pOints-Cienfuegos and
Havana-with all the force we can muster.
If later it should develop that these YES
sells are at Santiago we can then assemble
off that point the ships best suited for the
purpose and completely blockade it. Until
we, then, receive more positive information
we shall continue to hold Havana and Glen
fuegos."
Admiral Schley adds: '"This letter is not
printed either in the appendix or executive
document c, but I received it on the 23d.
and it shows that L was expected to hold
my squadron off Cienfuegos."
DID THE BEST HE COULD.
AS to the slow progress toward Santiago
on account of the Eagle, he states that she
was a part of the force which Admiral
0oA4AlSOh Aio0 0CCA III " S6llO I'LL dllo uC
had no right to abandon her. The weather
also was rough and not much better speed
could have been kept up. He had been
ordered to proceed Cautiously If, how
ever, he had known that the Spanish fleet
was in Santiago no consideration for the
Eagle or anything else would nave pre-
vented him from getting there at the earliest
possible moment with the larger vessels, but
the weather and sea made 1t impossible to
do better than he did.
Speaking of 1.-The retrograde movements"
Which the secretary, adapting the language
of Admiral Sampson, characterizes as rep
rehensible conduct" Admiral Schley says
that in forty-two years service never was
such language used to characterize conduct
OF mine and see no reason for it now"
He adds: Acting in accordance with my
best judgment, in view of the circumstances
without certain knowledge Of the where
abouts of that Spanish fleet, after having
been informed by the scouts commanded by
such officers as Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise,
that although they had been off Santiago
for a week they had seen nothing of it and
whereabouts since it had left Curacas, after
having been assured by Sigsbee that he did
not believe 1t was in Santiago and by the
emphatic declaration of the pilot Nunez,
and knowing that as the sea and weather
then were, it would be impossible to coal
my squadron off the port, l deemed 1t best
to take the action I did, the final result Of
which was the location of the enemy's fleet
in Santiago harbor."
Admiral Schley speaks of the difficulty Of
doing anything with the insurgents and re-
fers to the manner in which Lieutenant
Blue took three days to secure
AS to the battle of Santiago, Admiral
Schley says the facts of that contest speak
for themselves. He quotes from his official
report to SampSon in which he congratu-
lated the commander Of the squadron and
said the victory seems big enough for all
of u.s." He asks the committee to contrast
his reports and those of Sampson contain
ing references to himself and continues:
% A - ~ ~. 1-{AfnfcpN nf INV OJIrco nrfor
to the discovery by me on May 20 of Ger
Vera's fleet, whether from Admiral Samp-
son or the department, none of it has ever
been by either to me, and / never heard a
word Of it from any one until after the bat
tie with that fleet. although more than five
weeks had passed since the alleged repre-
hensible conduct had occurred. Although
Admiral Sampson used this language to
the secretary concerning me on the 10th day
of July Gust one week after the battle), he
has never, to this day, in any manner or to
any extent, intimated to me any disappro-
baton or made to me n criticism of my
conduct of the flying squadron"
REPLY TO HALES REQUEST.
Admiral Schley then submits a long de-
tailed statement of the facts summarized in
the foregoing. which is in reply to a request
by Chairman Hale, of the naval committee.
1t gives the dispatches and orders received
by Schley and describes the conditions in
which the ships had to coal, as we'll as the
Sailing u OdlAlid6O. H dlSO lGlGIS " Tic
doubts that arose as to the presence of the
Spanish fleet in Santiago after he had ar
rived off that port. Captain Sigsbee stated
verbally that he had been close to the port
several times and there We're no indications
that the enemy was present and he doubted
its arrival there. The commanding officer Of
the Harvard reported that he did not have
coal enough to reach any home base and
could not steam beyond twenty-four or thir-
ty hours, which, the admiral says, forced
him to send the Harvard to Kingston, The
Yale and Minneapolis could reach Key
West and the st. Paul could remain at most
off the port for but two days. The Brook
lyn. Iowa and Massachusetts were fairly
we'll off with coal, but the Texas, Marble
head and Vixen were considerably reduced.
The projecting sponsors of the Texas and
Marblehead made it dangerous to coal them
alongside the collier with any swell on the
open sea.
ut was this situation" says the state
ment. coupled with the conclusion that the
Spanish squadron might have touched and
then moved west, as reported at Cienfue-
gos, and reinforced by the fact that Sigsbee
had not seen them and that the pilot Nunez
was strongly impressed with the doubt that
this squadron could enter the port, which
occasioned my telegram of May 9th" He
then states that the chief engineer of the
the broken engine while being taken in tow,
and. the weather and sea moderating. orders
were given to cast off the tow line after
about three hours steaming west. Captain
Sigsbee Is quoted as confirming the opinion
ac m the difficulty Of coalfnR off Sanffagn