Daily inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1881-1901, 1899-04-28
In the Army Explained by the
Surgeon General.
WORK WAS DONE IN A RUSH
And of Course Some incompetent
Surgeons Were Appointed--
Men We're Also to Blame

ndl1lllloIS, MID, <ApIi .-opConihS I
a banquet last night in celebration of the
centennial anniversary of the Maryland
medical and chirurigical faculty, Sur
geon General Sternberg, u. S. A, said:
1T is patent that the medical depart
ment of the United States army failed
under the great stress put upo it, but
the reasons for this failure are obvious.
When 1 was made surgeon general of the
army, six years ago, my first fight with
congress was to keep all the surgeons we
hen had. Congress wanted to cut down
the corps. The force was insufficient.
When the war came we had not only this
insufficient number, but there We're u
vacancies among the surgeons. The
places had to be filled and in some cases
we were compelled to call in very young
men.
THE army was increased suddenly
from q, 1000 to 200, 900 men. Everything
had to be done in the greatest hurry. 1t
was an emergency. The troops wanted to
be mustered in quickly. 1t was the duty
of the medical department to equip them
for light marching order. We could not
overload the wagons with bottles of tine
lures and syringes and fluid extracts.
They would have proved altogether too
cumbersome. We had to equip the men
for active field work. 1t was an unframed
army; officers n men alike were rushed
to Chickamauga. This lac to be done
by the men on the spot-the surgeons of
the regiment. In many cases these men
had to learn thef first principles. The en-
listed men themselves were new and apt
to be careless. 1t is the history of new
levieS of troops everywhere.
1T has been a great disappointment to
me that things turned out as they did and
that typhoid fever appeared. 1 issued a
sanitary circular showing how it could
be avoided and giving rules of health to
be followed by the soldier in the field.
No attention was paid to it. You know
how hard it is even in cities for the
health officers to prevent epidemics of
typhoid fever and smallpox. But I wish
to say, that, Notwithstanding the criti-
cisms' that have been made during the
war, there has been less sickness than in
any war that I know of.
Under the use of aseptic dressings for
wound there LAY been fewer bad cases
and fewer capital operations. Not only
is this true at Santiago, but at Manila.
The wounds of the men healed quickly.
But there is one blot which can be traced
to the enlarged medical department.
There were three surgeons to each regl-
ment. At one time l had 500 acting as
sistant surgeons under me. Most of them
We're unknown to me personally. They
had to be taken in rapidly on the recon-
mendation of professional men. All lack
ed experience. Some of the very best
surgeons and physicians in the country
did not prove good for taking care of
sick men in the field. You canno have
camp sanitation without discipline. In
nearly every one of our camps, typhoid
fever ragged. l still believe in sanitation
as a preventive of the disease and in my
opinion, doctors do not pay enough at
tention to disinfectiOn.
Another thing that was a source of
worry to me was hat the doctors hest
tated to diagnose anything as typhoid UNI
til it was too late and a camp epidemic
had started. When you diagnose a case
of typhoid as malaria and dose it with
quinine, you SOW the seeds of typhoid
throughout the camp. l know of many
cases of men who We're held in regimental
hospitals owing to a mistaken diagnosis
and who later came to the division hos
pital with typhoid. 1t was unfortunate,
but it was owing to the hurry, the ineX-
perience of the surgeon and to the care
essness of the officers and men them
Selves