The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1899-02-06
OTIS AND DEWEY
TOO MUCH FOR
THE FILlPlNOS

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5.-Admiral
Dewey to-day cabled the Navy Depart
ment that hCstilities had begun be-
tween the American army and navy
forces in and about Manila and the
Philippine insurgents. The insurgents,
he said, had been the aggressors and
had been repulsed.
The following is the message re-
ceiVed:
MANILA, Feb. 5.-To the Secre-
tary of the Navy, Washington: In
surgents here inaugurated general
engagement yesterday night, which
has continued to-day. The American
army and navy is generally success
full. Insurgents have been driven
back and our line advanced. No cas-
ualties to the navy. DEWEY.
The news came like a shock, for the
administration though appraised that an
ugly situation prevailed in the Philip
pines, had chung steadily to hope that
by tact and patience actual fighting
might be averted, and even those pub
lie men who felt that hostilities would
follow should the treaty be ratified, and
the United States attempt to occupy
the islands, believed that Aguinaldo
would not force the fighting when the
treaty of peace was in its most critical
stage. Some Senatorial opponents of
ratification of the treaty adhere to
their position, but the general opinion
in Washington tonight Is that the
news from Manila insures the ratifica-
ton of the treaty tomorrow afternoon.
The news of the beginning of another
war came from Admiral Dewey. No
word had been received from General
Otis up to nightfall.
It seems to be Dewey's fortune al
ways to be able to report favorab BILE
news, and like all of his messages that
have gone before, this cablegram told
of the success of the American forces
in the action. 1t was with great regret,
however, that the administration
| learned that the insurgents had forced
the issue 1t had hoped all along that
they could be brought to see the ad-
vantages of placing their trust in the
American people and relying upon the
President to deal justly with them. The
administration argued that with the
Philippine Commission fairly on the sea
en- route for Manila bringing with them
messages from the President and with
the peace treaty. still Enacted on, it
was not to be expected that they would
refuse to wait to learn the purposes of
the American Government and would
precipitate the g-impending con-
flict.
While this was true, the officials here
and the officers in Manila had not been
blind to the treaty contained in the
situation there, and every preparation
has been made for just what occurred
last night. 1t is now acknowledged that
fear of an outbreak in Luzon was the
explanation for the much-commented
on failure Of General Miller to force a
landing at Iloilo, on the island Of
Panay; Otis felt that he wanted all Of
the troops at Manila, where was To-
Gated the center of the danger Part
of Miller's force, therefore, was re-
| turned to Manila and that General was
left with one regiment of regulars and
battalion of artillery, just sufficient
to take advantage of any detection of
Filipinos, but enough to force his way
ashore and hold. Rather as formal
authorization-for he did not need the
instruction-Dewey was told to CO.
operate fully with General Otis in any
measures the latter might take. 1t is
! believed that 1t was unknown to the in
surgents, but some Of the American
warships were moved quietly into posi-
| lions where they perfectly commanded