The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1899-12-24

marriage gave conclusive proof of inn
beclllty and incompetency, or that only
those women who We're lacking in dis
erection married. whatever the basis, the
constitutional provision of 1868 swept
away the disabilities of married women
and guaranteed them the same rights of
property las if remaining unmarried, y
save that as to conveyances there must
be the written assent of the husband.
The fanciful doctrine of charges in
equity is a late creation of purely jul
dicial legislation, for there is not a line
OF any statute to support it, and it is i'll
direct conflict with the beneficent and
liberal provision of the Constitution. The
oft-Quoted section 1926 of The Code re-
quires only written assent of the hus-
handwriting more. To require q
charging is barking back to the time
when a married woman not only had no
control over her property but was a
chattel herself, and when Shakespeare
correctly expressed the English law as to
wives by making petruchio say:
Il will be master of what is my own;
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my
house;
My household stuff, my friend, my barn,
My horse, my OK, my ass, my anything.
The Constitution does not disable a
married woman to contract, but ON the
contrary leaves her as free to do so as
her single sister. 1t follows that when
the plaintiff endorsed the note III blank
and placed it in the stream of commerce,
anyone who bought it or loaned money
On it in the absence of fraud or collusin
4, IN Il, IA l.,
to it as against her. as fully as if she
had been a single woman or a man.
The jus disponendi is inherent in the
ownership of property and remains in
the married woman by the constitutional
provision that her property is to remain
hers as if she We're unmarried, with the.
single exception of conveyances, which
word refers to deeds and mortgages
which are the only instances in which
the law requires ''conveyances" Kelly vi
Fleming 113 \. c., 1913. This court has
held that the legislature cannot deprive
any one of the jus disponendi, which is
Il vested right protected by the United
States Constitution. Hughes " Hodges.
102 y. c. 239; Bruce V. Strickland, 81
II. G. PCT. But if it were held that the
legislature could restrict the sole owner
ship of her property guaranteed to Il
married woman by the provision of The
Code, section 1896, it is to be Observed:
"a That though that section has strange
ly enough been construed to apply to-
c0nveyances when lin its terms it applies
to contracts only. the requirement of the
husbands written assent has always
been restricted to deeds and mortgages;
and % That if it applied to personality
the husband has here given his written
assent by his letter to the Wilmington
bank. It is true such assent was sub
sequent to the endorsement of the note in
blank by the wife, but the assent need
mot be simultaneous. Bates V. Sultan,
1T y. c. 81.
Nor indeed is the endorsement in blank
of IA promssory note "a contract to af
feet her real or personal estate in the
puryiew of this action. The note is Sc
cured by mortgage and appears to be
collectible. This is not an action to
make her chargeable with its payment
when that question might arise) but an
acton 10y her to recover possession of
the note which she has endorsed, allow
ed to be put in deposit as collateral and
which is now so held with the written
assent of the husband. Nor does the
fact that the note was past due when
endorsed, cut any figure as to the plain
tiff. The doctrine of sets off in case of
paper passed after maturity applies in
favor of the maker, and not between the
payee or endorser and epGorsee.
1t can hardly be contended that the en-
dorsement of bill or note in blank is a
conveyance for if so all such endorse
mcnts are void for want of a guarantee.
But il it We're a conveyance there is as
above said the written assent of the
husband. Bates v. Sultan, supra. The
word Conveyance ordinarily refers TO
and such is its meaning in this provis-
len of the Constitution. 1t cannot mean
that married woman cannot sell a |
horse, cow, an earring, or cash check |
without the written assent of the hus-
band.
In this day, when married women own
so large q share of stocks, bonds, pro-
missory notes, drafts and checks, it is |
of far-reaching consequence to hold that
the endorsement by them Of such papers
lis invalid, especially when (as in this
case) the paper endorsed by the wife
is rendered as a collateral in a written
containing not only the writ |
ten assent of the husband, but his re-
quest that it is to be SO used. Commercial |
paper is sexless. When by proper en-
dorsement it is put into the currents of
trade, the taker of it before maturity |
should regard it as a courier without |
luggage" and not be held to inquire and
scrutiniZe whether amy of the endorsers
Were or Were not widows, wives or spin |
STEERS. And if he takes after maturity, he |
should be liable only to sets off III favor |
of the maker. Apart from the cOnsti- |
tntional rights of married women over
their property being the same as that of
single women Except as to Convey |
aEces" i. e., deeds and mortgages the |
commercial law has never before held |
the taker of commercial paper to scru-
tiniZe the sex or marital condition of |
endorsers of such paper. The endorse,
ment by married woman payee of a /
check stands ON the same footing as her
endorsement when payee of "A promis-
sorry note, so far, certainly, as emitting
the holder to receive the proceeds of the
check or note. which is the only matter
at issue here.
The recent statute, revising and codi
flying the law of negotiable instruments,
IN -Qp of 1000 IY1Nr |