The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1899-02-21

coVery was. the admiral saws the result
OF a determination to satisfy himself fully
before leaving for the west. On the s1st
ne made a reconnaissance Ito develop the
eieihys s position and incidentally TO in
1ure or destroy if possible. the Colon
mcored we'll up in the harbor."
Carried Out His Orders.
Admiral Schley quotes the departments
dispatch of May 19 in these words:
The department looks to YOU to ascer-
tam the fact of the presence of the enemy
ana that ~ enemy, if in the harbor at
santiago does not leave without decisive
action
Commenting on this. the admiral says:
In obedience to the above order, and
without any further order or instruction
from any one, l did ascertain the fact
that the enemy was at Santiago and the
enemy did not leave without decisive con-
flict"
Detailing the events connected with the
battle of July 3. he says that at S:45
O'Clock of that day Admiral Sampson
made signal from his flagship Disregard
movements of the comma ander-in-ch hief,"
and steamed eastward TO Siboney.
This" says Admiral Schiey, "left me
the senior officer present and necessarily
clothed me with the responsibility of the
command
Continuing, he declares that when the
enemy's vessels came out of the harbor
signal was made from the Brooklyn (his
flagship to the fleet to Clear ship for
action" Then followed the signal CLOSE
action and this by the signal THE en-
envy escaping to westward"
Following the appearance of the Spanish
there was a general inward movement of
the American vessels, closing in and en-
gaging it.
Explaining the movements of the vessels
of both fleets he says the Spanish fleet
was coming westward under high speed
and changing course more to westward
brought the Brooklyn heading eastward
TO meet it, into a position where she would
have blanketed the fire of the eastern YES
sells of our force now changing their
courses to the westward, and between them
and the Spanish vessels"
Instant Decision Necessary.
Instant decision" he continues, was,
therefore, necessary to avoid interfering
in any way or cutting off any of the fire
of our vessels, as would have occurred had
she turned toward the Spanish fleet now
approaching the Brooklyn. Turning west
ward left the enemy's ships unmasked by
the Brooklyn and exposed to the concen-
trated fire of our squadron The result of
tillS illdlOSdNtl was Nldl III tlllINy iiltluleS
from the opening of the combat four of
the enemy's vessels were on fire and rid
died with projectiles.
At the final capture of the Colon
at 1:15 p M, the Brooklyn was nearest,
the Oregon next and then the Texas and
Vixen. The New York arrived at 2:2S p.
m, and the commander-in-chief assumed
command of the squadron. Signals were
made from the Brooklyn to the squadron
until all signal halyards were shot away,
and then by the Myers army code"
In conclusion, Admiral Schley contends
that the turn of the Brooklyn in the bat
tie of July was 1.-The crucial and decd-
ing feature of the combat and of decided
advantage
Furthermore, he says, it is mistake to
say that the vessels distance from the
enemy was increased to the extent of 800
yards, and adds:
Though this may not be of record, it
is a fact. nevertheless"
Charts All Uphold Him.
He cites the fact that the charts of the
board of navisators show that the Brook
lyn was nearest when it emerged from
the harbor, nearest at every stage of the
battle and nearest the Colon when it sur
rendered, and gives many confirmatory
details of his flagship's action aud effec-
tive participation in the battle.
He says he made no report of his ma
neuyer in his report of the battle, as its
effect upon the battle was a question with
him. His last paragraph reads:
"On May 81 / received a telegram from
the ommander-in-chief congratuiating
me upon my success in locating and block
aiding the enemy's fleet at Santiago If
il was worthy of commentator at that
time, / am at a loss so understand how
IL could have grown into reprehensible