The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-29
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In regard to the Confederate invasion OF
Maryland. which presently followed. the opin-
ion is expressed that Gen. Lees forces were by
no means in a fit state to undertake such a
movement. This assertion is based upon evil
dence furnished by Lee himself. THE army"
so wrote that officer to President Davis on
Sept. 3. lis not properly equipped for an inva-
sion of an cEemy's territory. 1t lacks much Of
the material of war. is feeble in transporta-
ton. the animals being much reduced. while
the men are poorly provided with clothes. and.
in thousands Of instances. destitute OF Shoes
The Confederate troops. however. were in high
spirits. and full of confidence in their com
mander. for which reason Lee decided to take
advantage Of the favorable elements in the
military situation and to cross the Poto-
mac. 1t is recognized that one OF the
reasons which NAV well have weighed with
Gen. Lee in favor of this course of action was
the hope tina: the presence of the Confederate
army in Maryland might arouse the people
of that State. or a large part Of them. at
any rate. TO rise against the United States and
declare their State Independent of the Union.
such an uprising could hardly fail to hamper
the movements OF the Federal armies, and to
diminish their available strength for actual
combat. 1t is pronounced. however. a mistake
to suppose that the invasion OF the North was
undertaken solely or mainly for the effect
which 1t was urmised it might produce
on the people Of Maryland. Apart from any
political change In the attitude Of that popula-
ton, it seemed eminently desirable to exhibit
the spectacle OF a Confederate army freely
traversing the soil OF the States which remained
in the Union. The effect which this might
have on Northern sentiment. and. also.
on foreign opinion. in the direction
Of indicating the impossibility OF tho
North's accomplishing the tremendous task
Of subjugating the South. was likely to be OF
very great con sequence. The party in the
North which had always believed in this i'm
possibility! would certainly have its belief for
titled when an invasion OF the North was sub
stituted for an invasion Of the South: and the
chance OF foreign interference to stop n war. in
which it should seem plain that the North had
no reasonable chance of achieving such a de-
cisive and overwhelming victory as alone
would Justify a continuance OF the struggle,
could not but be materially increased.
Mr.. Ropes's comments on the battle OF
Sharpsburg, or Of Antietam. will be found on
pages 376-379 This was. undoubtedly. one OF
the bloodiest battles OF the war. and the author
deems it likely that more men were Killed and
wounded on Sept, II. 1862. than on any other
single day in the whole war. The Confederate
loss Is here computed at probably 5000 men
or more: that OF the Union army. at l2.4lO.
EhCn Slue lOSt ABOUT OIe-luhTIeTO OF the trOOn9
actually engaged. for the Confederate infantry.
in which occurred nearly all the casualties.
did not exceed 81 200 men. or thereabouts."
while the First. Second, Ninth and Twelfth
Corps. which were the only troops put In by
Mcclellan. numbered about 10000 men"
Mr.. Ropes insists. however, that to get a cor
rect idea of tie management of the battle. allthe
troops within reach on both sides should be in
cluded. Adding the Confederate cavalry and ar
total of 1920 men; and. adding the Fifth and
Sixth Corps. and the cavalry and artillery. to |
the 5000 Federal troops already enumerated.
we arrive at a total Of about 10000 men. The
battle OF Sharpsburg. consequently. was in
every light most creditable to Gen. Lee and his
army, whether we regard his 81. 200 infantry as
contending with the Federal 10000 infantry.
or whether we admire his intrepidity in stand |
ing to fight an army Of 10000 with less than
10000 men. not all of whom. in fact. were with
him at the commencement of the action" OF
Gen. Lees management OF the battle our au-
thor has nothing but praise 10 utter. Neither
does he thin! that any troops have more fully
justified the reliance placed upon them by their
leader than the Army Of Northern Virginia
at Sharpsburg. We are reminded that Lee
intended to try his men again. Urged
by both Longstreet and Jackson TO recross
the Potomac on the night Of Sept. II. he re-
fused. and. instead. endeavored to arrange for |
an attack on the Federal right wing the next
day. This turned out TO be absolutely imprac-
tlcable. and the Confederate army had to con- |