The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-04-07
A CALLING SITUATION
American Troops Are at Great
Disadvantage.
THEIR ARMS INFERIOR
Potted AT by Unseen Foes With Mausers
The Tagalos Are Savages Who
Recognize None OF the
Laws Of War.

correspondence OF the Associated Press.
Manila, March 4, per transport Arizo-
ma to San Francisco, April 6.-Although
the rupture between the American and
native forces at Manila occurred exact
~ one month ago to-day, the conquest
of the latter by the former, which has
long been conceded a necessity can
| scarcely be said to have commenced
as yet. Had the Americans been in
position to follow up their advantage
| and keep right after the flying rebels
disorganzed as they were by that first
| unexpected advance. there Is no doubt
that the question of supremacy would
have been settled by this time once
and for all time. Unfortuna tely how
| ever, large armies. such as that of the
Sth corps. are not self-supporting and
as no provisions had been made for
such an emergency as arose on the
| night of February 4. it became neces-
| sary to call hal: at the very outset
! of what promised to be a clean sweep
| to victory. While this was unavoidable,
| it was disastrous in many ways. First
| ly, because the moment that halt was
| made the moral effect of their first de-
feat was eradcated from the minds of
| the rebels, since it gave them time both
| to recover from their fright and to
frame excuses for their failure to avoid
it: secondly, it afforded an opportunity
which their leaders We're quick to take
advantage of to play upon the feelings
of the majority and enlist the syn1pa-
! thies of thousands who had carefully
! refrained from joining the rabble in
their ill-advised demands thirdly, it
allowed the rebels to rally their scat
tered forces after concentrating them in
various places to infuse new blood INTO
their ranks AS soon as it dawned up
on them that the Americans were still
on the defensive and no further ad-
vance was to be feared. the reoels as
sumed the offensive, adopting the same
\ hushwhacking tactics which had PROV
ed so successful against their old nne-
my, the Spaniards.
Changed Their Plans.
At first these were almost harmless
since they almost invariably brought
on fresh advance on the part of those
| whom they were intended to intimidate.
After the battle of Caloocan, however,
when the American line was so long
and thin that any further general ad-
vance had become eXpedient. the reb-
| els made a discovery which revolution
| lied their plans and inspired them with
renewed courage. This was that their
rifles had superior range to those of
| the majority of the American weapons.
Thereafter their sharpshooters careful
| ly remained out of range Of the Spring
fields carried by the volunteer regi-
ments in front of them, but maintained
| a constant and more or less effective
fire from trees. clumps of bamboo,
rocks or other natural points of advant-
| age. both by day and night. A more
calling situation than that in which
ha ,nyiDo frnn hoS NJ,
| for the past few weeks it would be diff
cult to imagine. Constantly potted at
| by an unseen foe. yet unable to silence
| his fire, except upon such rare occa
sions as when the country was ordered
cleared, and then compelled to retire to
their original lines after having done it,
| the wonder is that the men were kept in
| check at all. Yet they were so, not
| because they We're SO thoroughly dsc-
| plined as to accept unWelcome orders
| uncomplainingly. but because they were
buoyed with the hope that when their
| reinforcements, already en- route, ar
| rived. a general advance would be made
and then their turn would came. That
time is near at hand: but whether or
| not the task before the eager Ameri-
| cans will be accomplished soon as
they anticipate is an open question.
If the entire rebel force could be cor
| rallied in any one section of the ISL
| be very simple, and soon accomplished
| without doubt. But on the island of
| Luzon alone a we'll equipped army of
more than $4,000 men has only sue
ceeded in clearing the country within
a radius of five miles from Manila, so
! far, and no one knows with any degree
| of certainty what there is ahead. 1t
| is certain however, that the further
| they penetrate into the wilds of the
interior the greater will be the disad-
vantage to the white troops, since
| swamp and jungle fighting are the
strong points of the natives 1t is also
| certain that what is to be done must
be accomplished before the rainy sea-
| son. because apart from the consider
alton of the health of the troops most
| of the country is absolutely impasSa-
| BILE from May to October.
Force Unknown.
Among the uncertainties to be faced
| is that Of the force to be encountered.
| So far as can be ascertained the rebel
| army, which has hemmed the Manil-
ans within the confines of the city for
| so long, consisted of 10000 men, one
| third of whom We're armed.
| Most of these We're, of course, the
| Tagalos, who are the mainstay of the
| rebellion. If. as is claimed there are
| 300 900 of these yet to meet under eli
| matte and territorial disadvantages the
| problem which confronted Kitchener at
| khartoum was simple one compared
| with that which LaWton has to face on
| his arrival.
| OF course. there are tribes such as
| the Ilicoanos. whose hatred for the
| TagalOs might render them useful al
| lies, but the question arises as to
| whether it would be safe to trust them
| with the arms necessary for the pur-
pose. The lession taught by Aguin-
| aldo is one that is not likely to be
forgotten in a hurry, and there is
grave danger in such experiments at
this stage of the proceedings.
There is an off chance that in the
event of a serious setback Aguina1do's
forces may show the white feather in
such numbers as to render further re-