The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-07-09

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fused into the organization and leadership OF
| armies. Yet II was not until 1912 when he was
43 years old that Cromwell unwillingly assumed
the role of soldier
It was at the outset OF 1912 that the King and
| the Parliament made their appeal to the sword
! On Jan. -. 1912 Charles l. left whitehall to
return no more till the day OF his execution
| Military preparations now began on both sides
| Oliver Cromwell out Of his moderate fortune
subscribed $500 for the service OF the Com
monweath." He expended flOO moro on
| arms. and. during the summer. he was actively
! engaged in raising volunteers. His first ex-
| plot was to seize the magazine in the
| Castle OF Cambridge and prevent the carry
ing away of the university plate to re-
| p!enish the royal excheQuer In Septem Der
| he received a commission as captain OF
| horse from the Earl OF Essex. commander
| OF the Parliamentary Army. Cromwel's
| troop differed from most Of the Parliamentary
| cavalry. having been raised from among the
yeomen and small farmers OF Cambrdgeshire
| The troopers were apparently all personally
| known to their Captain. and had been selected
! by him as earnest. devout. God-fcaring men,
| Cromwes men have been sometimes described
| as dragons. but the author OF the book before
us believes that they were harquebusiers, or
| light cavalry. In tho first engagement be-
tween the combatants the Parliamentary
| horse. though considerably the more numer-
Gus. were badly beaten. Cromwell detected at
once the cause OF failure and pointed out the
remedy in words that historians have made fa :
| miar. Your troops" said he to his cousin
| Hampden, are most OF them old decayed
serving men and tapsters and such kind OF
fellows: while their troops are gentlemen's
sons and persons OF quality Do you think
that the spirits of such base and mean fellows
will ever be able to encounter gentlemen that
have honor and courage and resolution in
them? You must get men OF q spirit that is
| likely to go on as far as gentlemen will go. or
| else you will be beaten still" Hampden agreed
| with him. but did not know whence such men
were to be got. Cromwell knew and in the sixty
| or seventy soldiers which formed his troop he
! already possessed n nucleus of such men which
was to be expanded thereafter by his diligence
energy and wisdom into a in army. BY April. 1913
| he had got together :" six or seven troops Of
horse, such as hope will fight" with which
| on May IL. he encountered n body of Royast
cavalry and completely routed them. or this
action Gardiner says. 1.-THE whole fortune Of
| the civil war was staked in that nameess
struggle" The moral advantages gained by
| Cromwell in this action were immense 1t Is
to be noted that. in this engagement. the OPP
| posing squadrons stood facing each other "a
little above musketshot for the space OF half
an hour or more" Cromwell was still unac-
customed to the battlefield. He required ex-
perience to teach him. as all men do. but with
him experience once gained was never for
gotten. 1t is suggested that the result OF this
action taught him the supreme value OF the
initiative In a cavalry combat that is OF the
superior readiness to engage which compels
the adversary to conform his movements to
yours. to assume the defensive instead of the
offensive, At all events. he never hestated
again. but was invariably the first to charge.
OF the subsequent fight at Gainsborough. which
took place on July 2S lG43. our author says
that mo circumstances could have better dis
+played Cromwel's genius as n cavalry leader.
No problem Is more difficult to solve than how,
with sQuadrons disordcred by broken ground
to attack an enemy drawn up ready for the en- l.
counter unless 1t Is how to withdraw your
squadrons when tired out in face of fresh and
superior foe. Both these problems Cromwell
solved with success in tho course OF II couple OF
hours. His squadrons displayed a tiexiblity
and steadiness truly marvellous when the
clumsy drill OF the day Is considered"
On page 240 will be found contrasted
Cromwell and Prince Rupert, who repre-
scented two different types Of cavalry soldiers.
The latter was n light cavalryman: his troop
ers discarded all defensive armor on account OF
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rapid On the other hand. Cromwell's favorite
troops were cuirassiers. big. heavily armed
men. and. therefore, slower Both discarded
the practice OF hating to fro before charging
But. while Rupert relied for momentum and
striking power on speed. Cromwell depended on
solidarity and weight The result did not tell
concusively in favor Of one kind of cavalry or
the other in battle, For, although Cromwell de-
fcated Rupert and every other cavalry comman-
der whom he engaged, yet Rupert defeated
in his turn nearly all the other Parliamentary
leaders when in command of the same troops
The reason therefore, for the superiority of
the one over the other must be sought in tho
men themselves. 1t was undoubtedly In his
extraordinary sclf-control and In his power OF
enforcing discipline upon others that Crom-
wells superiority lay. In the midst OF the most
furious melee he never lost his head or his
control over his men as Rupert did"
Beginning as a cavalry commander. Crom-
well gradually showed himself equally quail
fled to direct infantry operations and to act as
| COMMANDMENT Chief. He took the principal
part in the reorganization of the ParlIamen"
tary army. and led it to decisive triumphs n
England. Ireland and Scotland. The campaign
OF 1851 WIS., the last which he conducted in