Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1899-04-03
BACKBONE BROKEN
Continued from page -

eutiTely convinced OF the lInpoSSiDh'eS
Of defeating the enemy or of reaching
another Cuban harbor, even II ne
should succeed in steaming rignt
through the hostile feet. To TINS feei-
ing of helpless and impotence more
than to anything else that | attribute
the defeat. The Spanish ships had
spent q month and half IN the mar
Dor without even attempting TO al
tack the bloctading fleet when 1avor-
able opportunity presented Itself or Oh
even harrassing il. The two tropedo
boat destroyers were not used for the
purpose for which they We're intended.
This inactivity and lack of initiative
must have had a very demoraliZing ef-
feet on the officers and men. III we add
to this the certain knowledge that the
opposing forces We're much stronger il
will be readily understood that the idea
of general flight after coming out of
the harbor entrance was the only ac-
ceptable one, especially i'm view Of the
possibility of Bleaching the ships, there
by rendering them unserviceable, and
eventually rescuing the crews.
From the very moment that this
feeling of impotence took possession of
the Spanish and led to the above re-
Elections, their fate psychologically
speaking. was sealed. We do not mean
to disparage their valor and tenacity
in the midst of the hostile fires; but on
the other hand, it is quite natural that
the admiral, seen that everything was
happening as he had foreseen. was the
one who set the example of running mis-
ships ashore. All the other command
ers followed this example.
ION the American side the situation
was just the reverse. Admiral Sampson
fleet was fully conscious of ITS power,
The blockade was being conducted IN "a
cordance with carefully prepared plans,
as were also the arrangements in case of
the enemy's attempt to escape. FREQUENT
engagements with the Spanish forts had
given commanders and crews that calm
assurance in the handling of their
weapons which guarantees success. The
long blockade service, exhausting ana
Inonotonons. hardly interrupted by any
action on the part of the Spanish. had
strung the nerves to the highest pitch,
and everybody was anxious for the end
10 come. Suddenly comes the enemy :
attempt to escape. All the passions that
had been smouldering under the ashes
broke forth. The welcome opportunity
for settling accounts with the enemy had
come at last and with wild rush the
American ships fell upon their victims.
AT the beginning the American fire
owing to the extreme of personnel and
the great distances, was propably not
very effective, but when the Spanish ad
mra turned to the westward and the
other ships followed nm. the moral sn-
periority of the Americans re-asserted it.
self The commanders, calm and coll
headed had their ships follow the same
course and the Americans having every
advantage on their side, recommended
the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon
resulted in their annihilation.
II have already spoken of the lack of
training of the Spanish crews, the neg
g to- y.lr ny. "a Ia.
the inadequate education of the comman-
ders of the ships and torpedo boat de-
stroyers. 1t is mainly due 10 these de,
ffciencies that the defeat FASTENED
and that the American ships sustained
''The training of the engineer personnel
was also totally unreliable, which is not
surprising in view of the fact that the
Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent
out on extensive cruises. The bottoms
of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned
for a long time. and as they had been
lying in Santiago haroor for month ana
a half they were considerably fouled
Thus the cruisers Maria Teresa. Oquen-
do and Vzcaya, which in all the official
books are credited with lS.5 knots speed.
went into the battle with speed of
from 10 TO II knots at most, and the
Cristobal Colon. which is the latest snip
and was to run 20 knots, hardly attained
a speed of 1875 Under the circumstances,
in every way unfavorabe for the Span
ish, whose crews We're insuf1iciently
trained and physically and morally ener-
waited by long inactivity, whose ships
were inferior in number, speed and tight
ing efficiency, it is no wonder that the
victory for the Americans was easy ana
paid for with insignificant sacrifices.
There was only one chance for the
success of the sOrtfe. 1t should have been
made at night in scattered formation.
After a personal investigation of the To-
caIity it is my opinion that il is entirely
practicable for a fleet to leave Santiago
harbor at night. The wreck of the Mer-
r,s~ - ttyr. N n hG + IN
II Is true that Admiral SIMPSONS report
on the night blockade states that the
lghtships were lying from one to two
miles from MORO castle, according to the
state Of the atmosphere, and that they
lighted up the channel for half mile in
side. Even the best searchlisht. now
ever, does not reach farther than one
mile. Therefore the Illumination could
not have been very effective. Moreover,
the short batteries opening fire upon the
llghtships could have compelled them to
say, this was never done The dark
nights at the time of the moon
about the middle of June would have
been best suited for the enterprise.
"lf the fleet did not dare attempt a
night sortie and was nevertheless COM
PEELED to leave the harbor in obedience to
orders, then the ships should have been
headed straight at the enemy All
weapons, including the torpedo and the
ram should have been used. A bold at
tack in close formation was the only
chance of success against the superior
hostile fighting forces who would have
hardly found time to form their lines -
The lessons Commander jacobson de-
rives from the battle briefly stated are:
Abolition of all wood work: no unpro-
tected torpedo tubes. protection for all
gun crews against shell fire: smokeless
powder: greatest possible rapidity Of fire:
good speed of vessels under normal con-
dtions, and thorough training of the
crews in all branches of the service.
Commander Jacobson also gives some
Of his observations of the Porto Rican
campaign, but these contain nothing OF
special moment except an account of the
attack of the Spanish torpedo boat Ter
ror and the gunboat Isabel IL. upon the
st Paul outside of San Juan harbor
June - 1898. concerning which many
conflicting accounts have been published
This was the only attempt made during
the war to torpedo one of our vessels
Commander jacobson gives the following
account of the occurrence which he OBJ
tanned from the commander .! the
Terror:
LAT A. NJ, June %, the lookout at the
fort sgnaled suspicious vessel Tht
commander gave orders for the Isabel II
to go out 10 reconnoitre and for the Ter
ror to be ready for action. BY n.3O, the
vessel had come closer and the Isabel II
went out. Upon sighting her the hostile
cruiser Immediately hoisted her flag and
waited till the Isabel II. opened fire on
the foe. The destroyer then received or
ders to go out and assist the Isabel. The