The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1899-03-19
.SCHLEY DID NOT
ENTRAP CERVERA
The Spaniard "BOttled'
Himself.
Special Dispatch to The Call.

NEW YORK, March is. - Captain
Robley D. Evans contributes a chapter
TO W. A. NJ. Goodies book, With Samp-
son Through the War;" just issued
CAPTAIN Evans describes how the Iowa
Joined Admiral Schley off Cienfuegos
on Nav %. After saluting the commo-
dore the Iowa became one of the flying
SQUADRON and proceeded to drift leis-
urely with it, off and on. Micawber-
like. waiting for something-We hoped
the Spanish squadron-to turn up"
Summing up the much discussed
question of how Cervera was bottled,
CaDtain Evans. after telling of the dis
covarv Of the Cristobal Colon on May
% in the mouth of Santiago harbCr'
writes as follows:
We signaled to the flagship (Brooklynl
that +he Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon
was in the harbor, and the answer came
promptly, Il understand A noInehs
later a second Spanish cruiser sup 3L,oI.ed
TO be the Maria Teresa, was discovered
TO the left Of CayO Smith, ana sun ldIei
the spars of a third were seen over me el
land. The Iowa was at once cleared loL
action and everything was made ready
for battle as we felt sure the SpanlardS
meant TO fight. II they had wanted 10
escape they certainly had had every oP57
DOrtunity to do so. Later on II was 1ouilu
that Admiral Cervera had entered the
harbor of Santiago May 10, the day and
almost the hour the flying squadron lett
Key West for Cienfuegos.
It is therefore, evident that the m2neu-
vering Of the flying squadron had moth
ing 10 do with either forcing CerYeTa into
Santiago or preventing his escape there
from up to 7 .45 a. N. May g.
on June l Admiral Sampson arrived on
the New York and the Iowa ceased TO be
a vessel OF the flying squadron. The ad-
mirals plan OF blockade was substituted
for that OF Commodore Schley and the be-
ginning of the end was in sight.
In another chapter entitled "A Bat
tleship in and Out of Action" the cap
tain gives the lesson that in a general
way he deduced from the war:
First-The absolute necessity for fast
armOred cruisers capable of long sea en-
durance.
seoond-AmpIe supply of torpedo-boat
Third-The absolute necessity for proper
Golfers and supply vessels.
Fourth-The absolute necessity for
Fifth-The need of some instrument by
which the range can be accurately and
Stxth-The necessity for a more perfect
system of communication, both as re-
CARDS the ship herself and as between diff
terent ships Of the same squadron.
Seventh-NeceSsity for smokelesS 1uel.
Eighth-Ineficiency Of fire from ships
against earthworks properly constructed
Ntnth-Nec essity for two coming tow
erS, one fore and one aft
Regarding the best place from which
to fight a battleship Captain Evans
writes:
know Of no more deviIish place than
the coming tower Of a battle-ship in &C
ton.
Yet the former commander of the
Iowa is forced to admit that, taking
into consideration the tactical value OF
the captains life, the coming tower is,
after all, the best, but by no means the
most pleasant place in action. Captain
Evans stated that he believed the erect
of the rapid fire had been overestimated
by the hasty conclusions drawn from
the battle of July 3. Regarding water
supply for ships Captain Evans writes:
The effect Of using salt water in the
boilers of our battle-ships during the
late war was so injurious that II seems
to me 1t would be criminal to allow IL to
occur again We must either ha yf,5s ans in
our feet. or else, knowing the amount
necessary to make good our waste, put
in a battle-shIp a distilling plant capaDIe
of distilling the amount required