The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-09-08
ITS EVIDENCE IS ALL IN
The Montana Ore Purchasing
Company Rests It's Case.
FIERCE LEGAL BATTLES
The Defense Makes Strenuous Objection
to the Admission OF Mr.. Trerise's Tes-
timony, but Much OF 1t, How
ever, Was Got In.

The Montana Ore Purchasing COM
pany, the plaintiff in the big Pennsyl-
vania mining suit, completed putting
| in its evidence and rested it's case to-,
| ward the close of the day yesterday
| The day was passed in a keen, close
| and vigorous contest between the coun-
| sci of the respective parties over the
| admission of the evidence of ]. H.
| Trerise, the last wieness for the plain
| tiff. The forenoon was entirely de-
| voted to argument upon an objection
| raised Wednesday evening and the aft
ernoon to a struggle between the coun-
| sci over every question propounded to
the witness The arguments over the
rules OF evidence were very interest
| ing. -.
The counsel for the defendant main
tanned that the evidence of Mr.. Ire
| rise was inadmissible, but the counsel
| for the plaintiff succeeded in getting
| good deal of it in. 1t went to show
that the defendant knew, in 1895, Of
workings made by the plaintiff within
its lines; by reason of an investigation
It then had had made and that it took
no steps then against the plaintiff.
| The defendant is expected to open its
side of the case this morning.
At the opening of the case Mr. Pat
terson argued his objection to the ad-
mission of the testimony of ]. H. Trer-
| Use at once.
He said that the question presented
| had two aspects. The first question
| was whether parole evidence can be
| received to show the contents of deed;
| the second was how far corporation
is bound by the act of an officer. This
was the proposition stated in general
form.
He said that the opposition counsel
| contended that the witness was di-
| rected in 1895 by the superintendent of
| the defendant company to make sur
| veys underground; that the surveys
| showed that the plaintiff company was
mining in the defendant companys
| ground; that the defendant company
took no action, and that by reason of
| the knowledge it had then and its fail
| ure to act it is now estopped from ex-
GLIDING the plaintiff company from
| mining south of its south side line and
| more particularly west of a plane, run
| ming south from the southwest corner
of the decided ground, which would
parallel plane running in the same
| direction as the east end line of the
| Johnstown claim. The evidence the
| plaintiff sought to put in was intend
| ed to show this.
| Mr.. Patterson said that the evidence
|
| deed upon which the plaintiff company
| based it's rights, in its complaint He
| said that the deed should be construed
| by the court, and that extrinsic evil
| dence was not admissible. The plain
| tiff had not shown the ambiguity of
| the deed; there is no ambiguity of part
| les; therefore the rule applying to I'M
| ambiguous instruments should guide
| the court.
| He read "Greenleaf on Evidence"
| and other authorities to support the
general rule of law that parole testi-
| mony Is not admissible to construe an
unambiguous written instrument. The
| authorities enunciated the legal pre-
sumption that the instrument contains
| the entire agreement between the
parties, and the general principle that
no oral evidence is admissible.
Parole evidence is admissible where
the instrument is ambiguous, or to
show fraud, or to show legal incompet-
ency of a party, or explain an error.
He read 'Devery on Deeds" enunciat-
1 ing. the principle that deed, if not am
4 biguous, is to be looked to alone in de-
termining the rights it conveys The
!, deed is conclusive evidence of the
| agreement of the parties.
| II take it, your honor, that no au-
therity contradicting these principles
| can be cted.' said Mr.. Patterson.
Then, till the plaintiff can show that
| the deed is ambiguous, which the plain
| tiff has never claimed, the rights of the
| plaintiff must be confined to it,
| Mr.. Patterson took up the proposition
| of whether the act of the superinten-
| dent of the defendant company bound
| the company. He stated that it is a
| general rule of law that the only act of
| an agent binding corporation is one
performed strictly within the line of his
authority A superintendent duties
are plain and well understood. r-r
whoever heard of a superintendent
having authority to deprive a mine
corporation of its property, either by a
failure to mine in a certain part of the
mine or otherwise" asked Mr.. Patter-
son.
The only way a corporation can be
estopped from Vindicating its conveyed
rights, by suit, is by the statute of limi-
tations. a.. 20.
Then. your honor, what. do they
want? They want to introduce parole
evidence to construe AN unambiguous
deed, which is against a plain rule of
evidence. And they want to bind the
| defendant by the omission of an off,
Ger where there was no authority to SO
bind the defendant" concluded Mr.. Pat
| terson.
Judge Mediation opened his argu-
ment for the plaintiff by saying: TT
| occurs to us that the matter has been
I
think we should devote much time to
it."
After devoting some time to the stat
ing Of the principles declared by the
courts in a case known as the Walworth
case, mentioned by Mr.. Patterson in his
argument, he said that it was an ele-
mentary principle that the evidence Of
fered by the plaintiff was complement
| and material. 1t was to show the prac-
teal construction of the deed figuring in
the case followed by the parties.
They say that the deed conveys only
the ground within the boundary lines
and gives us no eXtra-lateral rights. If
we show that by their own acts they
have recognized our own right to go
outside the lines, they are estopped
from even arguing the case before the
court" said Judge Mediation.
The court here interviewed and asked
the judge what he thought of case
where a superintendent gave a third
party a license to build a tramway
across his rprpOra tion'S ground the Ii