The Morris County chronicle. [volume] (Morristown, N.J.) 1877-1915, 1899-07-28

not enough to say that the blockade was
arranged by Sampson. Schley had
made blockade before Sampson super
seeded him off Santiago, and Cervera's
fleet was destroyed as it was because
Sampson replaced Schley's blockade with
something radically different. To giorify
Schley as the Hero of Santiago" because
accidentally he was the ranking officer
in the firing line, is under the circum-
stances, absurdity as well as injustice.
For the destruction of Cervera's fleet the
American public would owe more to
Sampson if he had never even seen the
Spanish smoke than to Schley on the
Brooklyn.
Schley's blockade was modelled on his
signal to his squadron, supposed to be go
ing to blockade Santiago, to rendezvous
twenty-five miles south of that place. y
The best it ever became was an aimless
sort of steaming about, far from the
harbor. and often on one side or the
other OF it. For an enemy trying to gel
out it was a blockade only in name,
here is the log of the Marblehead for
May %;
Began blockading Santiago de Cuba be-
tween to p. m. Position at s D. M, Santiago
de Cuba Lighthouse. N. N, E., ten miles dis
tant.''
The Brooklyn at that time was fur
Their out. SIMPSONS blockade was an
immovable semicircle of ships which,
when the enemy finally came out of
Santiago harbor, were less than three
miles from the entrance. Schley report
ed of the Santiago batteries, after a
bombardment, with two of the Spanish
ships in plain sight at the harbor mouth,
that they were heavy batteries heavy
calibre, long range" Sampson notified
his fleet almost on arrival that the bat
teries were not considered dangerous
for battleships" and closed in. The log
of the Colon, published in the Appendix
to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau
of Navigation, explains, with this re-
peated entry. how the Spaniards were
forced to make trial to escape by day, in
stead of by night
''Enemy's searchlights trained on mouth of
harbor all night,
Not only the order of battle but the
order for battle was issued long before
the conflict came, and with promptness
every captain acted upon it as it had
come from Sampson. The battle as
OOAlCJ Gays 0RCdho AOA AL0OA1' L AC
Americans closed as one ship, and the
Spaniards, with one exception were shot
ashore in little over an hour because
Schley's blockade of wandering far from
the harbor had been replaced by Samp-
sons close Gordon of ships never out of
gunshot from Moro.
The one order of note which Schley gave
throughout the contest affected his ship
only, the Brooklyn; and made the loop of
which his explanation and the contra
dieting facts are now familiar to the pub
lie. Even if Schley had adopted the
theory advanced by his friends whom his
falsehood has precluded from venturing
to defend him, and had said that with a
thin-armored ship it was proper for him
to retire by the way which would not
bring him nearer to the enemy he would
have been little better off as fleet CON-
mander What sort of commander is
it, commodore or captain, who with the
enemy's course of escape perfectly de-
fined and the rest of the fleet wheeling
into column in pursuit with the regular
ity of parade, thoughtlessly takes his
ship where instant decision" as Schley
himself has it, is necessary to extricate
her from the calamity of stopping his
own fleets fire? What naval academy
teaches that the way to win is not to get
in front of your own guns? What
scheme of awards honors commander g
request for laurels based on his not max
ing fool of himself in action.
Capt. Philips account of the battle of
Santiago in the Century has shown thar
the movement against which Hodgson
warned Schley caused the engines of the
Texas to be reversed and Philip stopped
in his course. In short, to say that
Schley did not prevent the destruction
Of Cervera is fairer than to say that he
is entitled to the honors of it.
AS one point after another of Schley's
incompetence, or worse, has been dis
played, as the insignificance of his actual
personal relation to the Santiago battle
has been shown, and as the duplicity
with which he has endeavored to hold
the hopors unworthily lavished upon
him has been revealed, the Schley press
has reiterated as final evidence for him
that 1.-THE Brooklyn's fire was terrible,
and the Brooklyn was the American
ship oftenest hit"
Unconsciously they treat him, not as
commander of the fleet, but as the Cap
tain of ship. 1t is we'll for Capt. Cook
that the management Of the Brooklyn
has not been laid to him.
The role being played to the public by
Schley will, of course, continue. Ad-
ulation is too sweet to man of Schley's
moral makeup to be repealed, even when
undeserved, and the mania on which
Schley has lived is not to be cured in a
day. But eventually the American
people must realize fully the fustian and
falseness in Schley's character, see the
baselessness of their insults to Secretary
Long, and hang their heads in shame at
having baked so many men of the navy
of their rights and most cruelty wronged
the faithful, able and victorious COM
mander of the Atlantic feet in the Span
ish war, Admiral Sampson.
81