Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1899-03-10


similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1e,s,
and Egypt in 1882, and the only practicable
| solution seems TO be on lines somewhat SINH
lar to those adopted in those cases. the
length of our occupation would depend on
circumstances rs developed in the future,
but should be determined solely in our dis
| erection without obligation to or consultation
with other pc xers. This plan can only be
worked out by careful study by the Paris
commission, and they should have advice
and full Information. 1t (thc situa-
tom Is not understood in America and un
less properly dealt with at Paris will in
evitaby lead to future complications and
possibly war.
Thus Gen. Greene advised a protector
ate rather than annexation, and pre-
dicted that unless the situation was
worked out substantially on the lines
of Egypt, or Bosnia and Herzegovina,
war might ensue.
Gen. Charles A. Whittier of the
United States army, in his statement be-
fore the Paris peace commission, said:
To take all the islands and ignore the ma
tives would be impracticable and unwise.
Gen. Whittier favored the protectorate
system based on the lines OF the British
protectorate of the Malay peninsula.
Nowhere did ne favor annexation. And
Gen. Whittier was able to report to the
American commissioners at Paris the
feelings of Aguinaldo as late as Oct. %,
1898, when he visited the Filipino leader
at his headquarters in Malolos. This
passage gives what Gen. Whittier re-
ported at Paris in November:
! | started the talk by announcing to Aguinal'
| do that was to leave in Il few daysto appear
before the peace commission, and that had
a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos and
! admiration for their many good qualities,
! their quiet, cleanliness, temperance and great
initiative power and n possibility of learning
almost any profe .sion or business; that |
! would like to be able to present to the com
mission his and his peoples views and de
mands and what relation they expected to
hold to the United States.
Huen Canine returned and Agui-
nado reported to him everything he had
! said to us. After little talk between the
| two, Buen Canine said that he, and he was
| sure the president, was in favor of an Amerl-
/ can prOtectOratc. Buen Canine said
| could be certain that if II protectorate were
granted that they would do their best to have
/ it accepted by their people on the lines that
| have stated.
So it seems that Gen. Whittier not only
| favored Il prOtectorate, but reported in
Paris that Aguinaldo would be disposed
to accept one.
On Aug. 81, 1898, ambassador Hay
sent from London to Pres ident Mckin-
| ley private letter from Gen. Sir An
drew Clarke, whom Mr.. Hay described
as zone of the greatest living authorities
in England on all subjects connected
with the government of the islands of
the Malay peninsula" 1t was Gen.
Clarke who in 1874 pacifled the native
states of the Malay peninsula. Now in
private letter referred to. which
President Mckinley received in August,
occurred this passage
The administration of a protectorate on
the lines indicated, which in the application,
as in the instances of the Malay states. have
met with marked success, would give more
elasticity and freedom in dealing with the
very special circumstances now eX sting in
the Philippines than direct annexation
Sir Andrew advised the establishment
of Il federation of the Philippines" as
prOtectorate of the United States, to
be administered "under the advice and
guidance of the United States officers in
accordance with native man
ners and customs and religion,
Christian and Moslem."
1t should be added that the American
peace commissioners had before them
testimony from Mai. j. f. Bell, who was
commissioned by Gen. Merritt to make
special study of the Flliplnos from
military standpoint, as follows:
There is not particle CT doubt but what
Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any at
tempt of any government TO reorganize Il
colonial government here. They are cs.
pecally bitter toward the Spaniards but
equally determined not to submit any longer
g
What they would like best of all would be a
Filipino republic with an American protec- |
torate Though they would prefer protection I
from America. they would accept it from
any government save the spanish.
To sum up: Gen. Greene, Gen. Whit |
tier and Sir Andrew Clarke advised not
annexation but a prOtectorate; Gen.
Whittier and Maj Bell reported that the
Filipinos would like a prOtectorate Gen
Greene stated that any other policy
might lead to war; and Maj Bell report
ed that not to recognize their local
autonomy would surely lead to war. |
Yet the administration, straight in the |
face of that testimony, rejected the pro-
tectorate policy such as it adopted in the !
case of Cuba, and by treaty, in considera- |
ton Of the sum of $40 1000, 600 annexed |
the islands. War followed with the |
quickness of a pistol shot and still con.
tinues. OF course, it is now doubly plain |
that the protectorate policy would have |
avoided this war, or have postponed it, |
and that the annexation policy is directly |
responsible for it.
No satisfactory explanation has ever |
been given for the administrations |
course. In his Boston spec CHI the presi- |
dent simply Ignored the alternative of |
the protectorate and with considerable |
audacity claimed that either Spain had !
to keep the islands or the United States |
had to annex them as provided in the |
treaty. Harper's Weekly says:
The Philippines are to be kept, and we be- |
iieve that their retention is an important fea |
ture of the presidents new policy, in order |
that this country may seize its share of China |