The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-07-12

years experience OF Jn0 workings OF
Federal organic law that, to safeguard the
interests Of smaller States, something moro
is needed than the announcement OF gen.
eral principle, or even the establishment OF
n Senate originally based upon the theory
OF the equal representation OF the States.
We have learned that It Is scarcely posi-
BILE to create too many barriers against the
gradual subversion OF that principle and
against successive encroachments on the
part OF the central power. Not only does
our Constitution provide that each State
shall be equally represented in the Senate,
but this provision Is the only one which
cannot be so much as touched by the ma
chinery for amendment, which might sweep
away all the rest OF the instrument. But, 1t
may be said, our Senate while indestructi-
BILE, might be reduced almost to impotence
by constitutional amendments which should
stripit Of its powerto propose amendments
to bills for raising revenue and OF its
powers relating to the confirmation OF
treaties and Of Executive nominations. and
by subordinating 1t in other ways to the
popular branch OF Congress. 1t might,
for instance, be provided by constitu-
tional amendment that, after q bill emanat-
ing from the House OF Representatives had
been rejected once or twice by the Senate,
the two houses should meet in joint ses-
sion and the bill should then become law,
IL 1t received designated number Of votes.
The authors OF our Federal Constitution
took care that the rights OF the smaller
States, embodied in the Senate should not
be subsequently whitfield away. for they
made the process OF constitutional emenda-
ton exceedingly complex and difficult. For
the purpose OF comparison, we here repro
duce the article Of the Constitution relating
to the subject: Tho Congress, whenever
two-thirds OF both houses shall deem 1t
necessary, shall propose amendments to
this Constitution, or, on the application Of
the Legislatures Of tlco-thirds OF the several
States, shall call convention for proposing
amendments, which, in either case, shall
be valid, when ratified by the Legislatures
Of three ourths Of the several States, or by
conventions in three fourths thereof" A
consideration Of the words italicized will
demonstrate that constitutional amend
ment impairing the present powers OF tho
United States Senate Is, practically. impos-
sible.
Very different will be the position Of the
Senate, and Of the State rights which It
represents and Is presumed to safeguard,
under the Australian Constitution. In that
instrument, II Mr.. WIsEs exposition Of It
be exhaustive, and assuredly he would
not have overlooked feature 30 vital,
there is no provision that the equal repre-
sentatlon Of States IN the Senate shall be
exempted from the operation Of the
| nr,,aDIntnry poorbipnrp That annalitu
| therefore, which is conceded to Tas-
mania and South Australia to-day, may
| be denied to them hereafter. Not only
this, but the process OF constitutional
emendatlon will be incomparaby easier
| in the Australian Federation than 1t Is
in tho United States. Incredible as 1t
will seem to our citizens, bare majority in
either house of the Australian Parliament
may, without the consent Of tho other
house, submit a proposal for an amend
ment of the Constitution, and that pro.
posal will become n part OF the Federal
organic law. provided 1t is accepted by a
bare majority OF tho electors voting, and
also by majority OF the States. That Is
to say. when Queensland shall become a
member OF the Federation that colony, act.
ing in conjunction with New South Wales
and Victoria may, at any moment, deprive
South Australia and Tasmania OF their
equal representation in the Senate. Nor is
this all. The Australian Senate, unlike our
own, cannot propose amendments to bills
for the raising Of money or for the appro
priation Of money. 1t may return such q
bill with suggestions, which the House Of
Representatives is at liberty to reject The
Senate cannot amend any bill so as to in
crease any charge or burden on the people
In other respects 1t Is supposed to have
equal legislative power, but the equality
Is nominal, not real, as another com
parison with the United States Consti
tuition will show. II our Federal Senate
persists in rejecting a bill emanating from
the House OF Representatives, there Il
absolutely no remedy except by embOdy
ing the bill in a constitutional amendment
which Is practically unattainable. The
Australian Constitution, on the other hand
provides that IL the House of Representa-
tives shall twice pass any bill to which tn,
Senate declines to agree, both houses o
Parliament may be dissolved. and II, afte
the dissolution, no agreement shall b.
reached, Joint sitting Of both houses
shall be held II, In such joint session, tn,
bill is passed by an absolute majority, it il
to become law.
1t Is obvious that by these provisions the
equal representation OF tho States In tn,
Australian Federal Senate is destined to b,
an illusory protection Of State rights w
shall point out on another occa sion tina
the maintenance of the rights OF the smalle
States Is further threatened by the extraor
binary powers Of interference vested II
the Federal Supreme Court, and by tho in
stitution Of Ministry solely responsible t.
the majority OF the House Of Representa-
tives.