The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1899-02-23
.SViILEY NADE REPLY.
Answered Criticisms OF Samp-
son and Long.
THE BROOKLYN IN THE BSgrLE.
why She wheeled Away and vaies Of
the Manoeuvrc His Reason For stay
ing Before Cienfnceos ard For Leavioss
Santiago TO Coal IIis ships.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2l.-Rear Admiral
W. 8. Schley. hav ng been granted per-
mission to answer this charges recestly
made against him in the oommunica-
tion recently sent to the senate, handed
to the committee on naval affairs
statement. The letter Of the depart
ment, he said. so far as it relates 10 him,
can be summarized under the following
heads;
"The delay of Cienfuegos, the al
legged slow progress toward Santiago do
Cuba from Cienfuegos; the retrogrede
movements on the 26th and sftb or
May; the battle of Santiago and the
destruction Of Cervera's fleet"
The admiral says his ordere from
Sampson ON May 10 were to blockade
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded 70 do1
On May "a, for the first time, he
learned definitely that the Spanish Beet
was not ut CIenfuegos. WithAn two
hours he started for Santiago. He
could see no ground for such oritioism. =
He quotesfrom the dispatch OF Samp-
son of May 20, in which the latter says
Schley should "hold his feet off Cien.
iuegos. II the Spanish ships have put
into SantiaRos they must come either to
Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the
munitions Of war which they are said
to bring for use in Cuba.
Admiral Schley adds: "This letter is
not printed either in the appendix or
executive document o, but l received IL
ON the 23rd and 1t shows that was ex-
pected to hold my squadron of Glen
fuegos."
AS to the slow progress toward San
tiago, on account Of the Eagle, he states
that she was part of the force which
Admiral Sampson had seen fit TO send
him and he had no right 70 abandon
her The weather also was rough and
not much better speed could have been
kept up. II the weather had allowed
and he had known the Spanish feet
was at Santiago, he would have left the
Eagle.
speaking Of "the retrograde move
ments" which the secretary, adapting
the language of Admiral Sampson,
characterized as ''reprehensible con-
duct" Admiral Schley says that in 40
years service "never was such language
used to characterize conduct of mine,
and see no reason for it now" He
adds:
"Acting in accordance with my best
Judgment, in view OF the oiroum-
stances, without certain knowledge OF
the whereabouts of that Spanish fleet,
after having been informed by the
scouss commanded by such officers as
Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise that, Though
they had been off Santiago for a week,
they had seen nothing of it and knew
nothing OF its movements or its where
abouts since it had left Curacao, after
having been assured by Sigsbee that he
did not believe it was in Santiago, and
by the emphatic declaration of the pilot
Nunez, and knowing that as the sea and
weather then were it would be impossi-
BILE TO coal my squadron OFF the port,
deemed IL best to take the action did.
the final result of which was the loca-
tion OF the enemy's fleet in Santiago
harbor."
The latter explanation he gave for his
leaving Santiago, after he reached
there.
Detailing events connected with the
battle of July 3, he said that at 8:45 Of
that day Admiral Sampson mado signal
from his flagship;
Disregard movements of the com
mander.in, chief" and steam eastward
to Siboney.
"1his," says Admiral SchIey, 'left
me the senior officer present and neces-
sarily clothed me with the RESPONSE
bility Of the command" Continuing,
he declares that when the enenay's ves-
sells came out of the harbor signal was
made from the Brooklyn (his Aagship)
to the fleet to "clear for action" Then
followed the signal "close action" and
this by the signal "the enemy is escap-
ing to westward" Following the ap-
pearance of the Spanish fleet there was
a general inward movement OF the
American vessels, closing in and en-
gaging it. Explaining the movements
OF the vessels IN both fleets. he says the
Spanish fieet was coming westward
under high speed and changing course
more to westward brought the brooklyn
heading eastward to meet it, into q
position where she would have blanketed
the fire of the eastern vessels Of our
force now changing their course &c the
westward and between them and the
Spanish vessels"
Turning outward left the enemy's
ships unmasked by the Brooklyn and
exposed them to the concentrated fire
OF the United States squadron. The
result OF this mannuvre was that in 80
minutes from the opening OF the COM
bat four OF the enemy's were ON fire
and riddled with projectiles
In conclusion Admiral Schiey con-
tends that the turn of the Brooklyn in
the battle of the Sd was 1.-The crucial
and deciding feature of the combat and
Of decided advantage"
He cites the fact that the charts Of
the board of navigators shows that the
| Brooklyn was nearest when il emerged
| from the harbor, nearest at every stage
OF the battle and nearest the Colon
whom It surrendered, and gives many
confirmatory details Of his fiagship's
active and effective participation in the
battle. He says he made no report of
his mnnmuyre in his report OF the bat.
tie, as its effect upon the battle was
never a question with him. HIS last
| paragraph reads;
"On May III / received a telegram
from tho commander in-chief congratu-
lating me upon my success in locating
and blockading the enemys feet at
Santiago. Ii it was worthy of com
mendation at that time am at q loss ia
understand how iG could have grown
INTO reprehensible conduct, as suggested
by Admiral Sampson in his letter OF
July 10, 1893, some six weeks later"