The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1899-05-06
CERVERA'S STRATEGY.
A Statement by Capt. Clark of the
OreEOn-The AdmiraI's Best
Chanoe Of EscaDa


OreGOn-The AdmiraFs Rest
Chance of Escape.
In personal interview in answer to a
question by the editor Capt. Clark gives
in the May Century the following opinion
of the Spanish admirars strategy:
Assuming that the Spanish fleet had to
come out (and l, for one, had given up the
hope that it would do so, it Is my judg-
ment that Admiral Cervera should have
preferred night to day as the time for the
sortie, Notwithstanding the search-light
watch so rigidly maintained at the en-
trance. He could have placed as guides
to the channel, along the shore and on
the smoke stack or mast of the sunken'
Merrimac, lights screened toward the sea,
so that we could not have detected them.
His best chance would have been TO get
up his anchors and begin to move about
dusk, when he would have had light
enough to see the shore and the channel
marks, timing the movement so that he
should dash out just as darkness fell. We
could not then have closed in upon him
without great danger to ourselves The
firing would have had to be done virtually
in the dark, for the search-lights (even
supposing that others than the one regu-
larly in use had been turned on) would
soon have become ineffective on account
of the smoke and from the SCATTERING
force of the guns, which probably would
have eXtinguished them. The direction of
the enemy could thus have been masked
and as seach of our captains would have
been concerned with the risk of his shin
being rammed or torpedoed, our onslaught
would have had far different result chan
it actually had when full daylight en-
abled every commander to see what all
the others (as well as the enemy were
xUb To
1t was the difference between certainty
and uncertainty In the day time we
We're able TO choose our distance from
the enemy with relation to the danger
OF being torpedoed. AS all his ships were
supposed to be provided with Whitehead
torpedoes. l determined, unless an emer-
gency should require it, not to go inside
of half nils that being the effective
torpedo range, since our superiority in
ordnance and armor would thus have
been neutralized.
considering the courses that were omen
10 Cervera. 1 should probably. in the cir
cumstances have done as he did-head 10
the westward, keeping the fleet together in
the hope of destroying any vessel which
might be able to overtake me- CienfueRos
was his nearest and natural port. and
there he would have been in direct COM
munication with Havana by rail. and. so
viroument. If he had intended 10 go to
Havana, it would have been better to go
westward than eastward, for, though the
distance is somewhat greater the current
would have favored, and there was no
additional force to be considered like that
at Guantanamo. To have divided his fleet
part going eastward and part westward,
would have been to leave one-half TO Ad-
miral Sampson and the Other. half to Com
mOdoreeSchley.
There remained one other course. The
result of the sortie shows that he might
have stood a better chance of saving one
or two or even more of his ships by the
policy of scattering, with an ultimate rem
devious. Only three of our ships were SUI
perior in speed to his vessels, namely, the
New York, the Brooklyn and the Oregon
possibly the Texas. Even If each of these
could have selected and pursued a Spanish
ship, lit is possible that not every one
of them would have been equal to the task
of destroying her chosen antagonist. The
armored cruisers, the Brooklyn and the
New York might have found that they
had caught Tartars.' They could not have
pierced the armor of the Spanish vessels,
while the Spanish guns could readily have
pierced theirs, There were no orders to
our vessels for such separate action, for
neither Admiral Sampson nor any one else
could have anticipated such tactics. 1t is
a matter of pure conjecture, but / am in
cliued to think that the confusion resulting
from such a movement would have strong
Iy favored Cervera."