The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-29

ter chance OF success. But. as we have shown.
the position was n worry unfavorable one for the
Union army. and even the absence of two d.
visions from the Confederate line of ibattle
would not have compensated Burnside for the
radical defects Of the situation as viewed from
the Federal point Of view"
vi.
Two chapters are allotted by Mr.. Ropesto the
resumption OF tho offensive by the Confed-
crates in the West. and to the bloody but In
decisive battle of Murfreeshorough. In the
course of his review Of the Confederate in
vasion OF Tennessee. In the summer and
autumn OF 1882. orr author raises the ques-
ton whether it would not have been wiser for
the Confederate Government to send 25.O00 or
10000 men to Virginia as soon as 1t became
plain that Halleck was not proposing to take
the offensive with viEor. say by June Is. The
opinion is propounded that such an addition
to Lees army in the Seven Days battle might.
very possibly. have given him n decisive victory
over Mcclellan. A decisive victory was a neces-
sity for the success OF the Southern cause: for.
as the United States had taken the position
that the South was in rebellion. the military
necessities Of tho Southern Confederacy were
not determined by the political attitud as
sumed by the Southern States. but were. for
all practical purposes, exactly what they would
have been If the Southern people. like the peo-
pie Of the thirteen colonies in 1910. had con-
coded that they were. strictly speaking. in re-
bellion. That is to say. the United States in
1851. like Great Britain in 1915, were not
waging war to obtain accessions OF territory. or
commercial or political advantages. but to Put
down and crush out all opposition what
ever. This attitude OF the United States
made the obtaining on the part Of
thn Snt1th ~ n CtInonGo 40 aiDnn1 and
decisive as that Of Saratoga or Yorktown an
almost necessary condition of the achievement
OF her independence. without a success Of
this magnitude IL was not to be expected that
the Southern Confederacy would either gain
recognition in Europe or convince the North
that it had undertaken an impossible task
As a matter OF fact this view OF the funda-
mental conditions OF the war seems never to
have been adopted by President Jefferson
Davis. Only once or twice were serious efforts
made to concentrate large numbers Of troops
for a particular campaign; the usual practice
in the South. as we'll as the North. was to let
each department take care of itself.
or the battle OF Murfreesborough. or Stone
River dec. 81. 1862. we read on page 431 that
few engagements ever fought have better ex-
hibited soldierly virtues. The Confederate as
saults were conducted with the utmost gal
lantry and with untiring energy. They were
met with great GOODNESS and resolution. The
recovery Of the Union army. so nearly routed.
was wonderful. and assuredly could not have
been ACCOMPLISHED had there been any waver-
ing or lack of confidence on the part OF the
high officers or any Generalization on the part
OF the soldiers. The Confederates had o right
to claim a victory, for they had taken twenty
guns and about 300 prisoners. Still.
the Federal army was. for all practical pur-
,pNsnc nc ctrnn1 nc avar Tho frrtl (, cha
Confederates were not numerous enough to
complete their victory" The Federal command
err. Gen. Rosecrans, Is here held responsible
for the fact that the Union army should have
been beaten at all, and especially that il should
have been brought so near to an actual rout.
" Had he carefully weighed the Information as
to the position of the Confederate forces which
he received on the afternoon before the battle,
and had he then carefully disposed his right
wing so as to meet the assault which it was
plain Bragg intended to make the next morn
ing. he could have saved his army from the peril
to which it so nearly succumbed. 1t may surely
be expected Of a commanding General who is
about to fight n great battle that he should ar
range his army in accordance with his own
best judgment. He has the power to do this.
and no one can doubt that it is his duty to exer-
his power. Yet Rosecrans at Murfrees-
failed to insist that his right wing
should be arranged in accordance with his
own Judgment" Mr.. Ropes thinks that he
may have been too anxious to carry out his
own plan of attack to give their due impor-
lance to those parts Of the line OF battle which
were not under his own eye. Very possibly.
did not care to override the opinion OF a
officer. such as McCook was. in regard to
he disposition of his own troops. At any rate.
he made the great mistake OF submitting his
Nwn INDIGNANT on a m ottar nf rita1 ~ ~ - -