Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-10-28

Of the Peiho river. 1t is intended to pro-
teCt the barrier of the river, and there is a
line of forts extending from Taku to TEN
Tsin and the camp of the northern army
OF the Notifications of the Yang-tse river
the fort at Wusung has recently fallen into
complete decay. The Nan-shi-tang and the
modern SzetzeIin battery still remain. At
kiau--ong. too, there are a few modern
batteries existing side by side with the an
Cient ones. and the same is true of Tsin-
kiang. Further up the river the batteries
at Marking are the only Notifications of
any Importance.
To the more important fortresses of the
southern coasts of China belong the fortifi-
cations of Tsin-Hai, which guard the en-
trance to Hang-Chau, and those of Flu
Chau at the mouth of the River Min. which
consist Of five forts built by French engi-
neers- Further south we find the fortresses
of Annoy and Swateau, and, opposite Hong
Kong the group of forts at Canton. These
last consist of three zones intended, in
connection with mines and torpedoes, to
protect Canton from attack 1t would not
be worth while to consider more fully the
Importance of these various Notifications.
/ ne nigh clay walls of the majority of the
FORTS the sentry houses, the flag poles and
the high gates offer magnificent marks for
artillery. The protected shooting places
are quite Anticipated. The size of the court
yards. with the clay huts which they con-
tam. facilitates the destruction of the forts
Only few batteries correspond to modern
conceptions. Batteries, too are to be found
which are composed of twenty or more
guns differing entirely from one another in
SIZE and construction. This fact alone
would render it impossible for the action of
the whole battery to be directed by a single
WI ana ne same effect is produced by the
PidCIiS OF single gun at the summit of
each OF the hills at Kiau-Yong and Nam
King. But the important principle that the
ife OF battery should be directed from a
siils 'e center Is not understood by the Chi
nese with whom it Is not the officer, but
me man in charge of the gun who directs
the firing -
me g ms. too, are in a very sad state
mel tIiere are no European instructors.
IN the iorts on the fang-tse fine powder
Is even now used for heavy Krupp guns
Whlle on the other hand brown prIsmatic
powder Is used for firing salutes with Arm
strongs. Tables of charges are only to be
guns; Coverings and packings are not as
d rule, Watertight. Ammunition is gener-
ally placed in damp rooms and nobody has
any !dea of the ballistic capacities of the
guns.
Co-OperntiOn Not Understood.
But even If the Notifications We're in a
better state, they would be of little use TO
China, for there is no commander who is
capable of understanding what is meant nv
the cooperation of troops and fortified
tons There is not even an officer who has
any clear idea of the cooperation of diff
1erent kinds of troops on the field of hat
tie. and from this Judgment | would not
even except Lieut.. Gen. In-Chang who
speaks German and is at present in COM
mand of the northern troops. During the
many years l spent in China / ONLY once
heard of a proposed combined strategic ac-
uon OF the troops. | refer to the plan
which Is reported to have been drawn I'D
by the council of war at Peking and sane
TONED by imperial decree for use in case of
war with European power According to
TINS plan Lin-kun-i, the viceroy of Nan
KING. would be appointed as commander
h-che1 IN the 1angtse valley with IS 900
men under him. The Viceroy Cheng-Chi
Iung, in Wut-Chang, would be intrusted
with the command of $4,000 men in the CEN
tr4l portion Of the Iang-tSe. The defense
OF the west would be under the control of
the governors of Hu-Pei and HUMAN with
5000 and 10000 men, respectively The
waterways OF the Iang-tse would be pro-
tected by Admiral HUau with 40 600 men.
Gen. Ii of An-Hin would be appointed to
command the southern fleet. l have not
been able to ascertain with certainty wheth-
er this plan has any real existence. In
any case the Chinese government has not
at Its command One-tenth of the number of
5OIultfS whose disposition is thus arranged
for, and the lack Of roads would render it
very difficult 70 use them as proposed And
then. too, it must be considered that these
troops lack everything they would need to
take the Held with any chance of SUCCESS.
leadership, discipline, training, arms. ac-
c0utermentS and cOmmissariat, all are
wanting. Even the small corps that was
built up with such energy and success at
u-Sung IS no longer an exception to the
rule, since it has been removed to Kiau-
long, and deprived of its German instruc-
tors. The China of the present day has
IN fact, no understanding for military mat
tiers. nor has the government the money
necessary for the creation of d good army
None the less the government has recently
taken up once more the idea of reforms
which. however, are chiefly concerned with
the extension and Improvement of the
navy.
1t is net soldiers nor modern weapons of
which China has the greatest need. What
Is wanted is man with the courage and
ability To break with the old traditions, to
utilize the treasures which exist in the
country, 70 reorganiZe the administration,
20 put an end to the disagreement of the
officials, to create an efficient body of
troops under the control of one central au-
thOrity. and 10 construct roads and rail-
ways so that troops could be Immediately
dispatched wherever a display of military
power was necessary TO defend the empire.