The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-12-22
NAVY ALMOST AS BAD.

. lOlttS dIDlltS " a certain utBIec 10 the
navy. although the officers are here
better trained, and in some instances
honorably anxious to do good work.
The purchase of modern ships Of war
and torpedo boats is being carried on
as rapidly as means will allow; but
there is a lack OF officers capable of
commanding all these ships and main
tanning an undivided control over them.
1t must be added that neither the land
nor the sea forces are sufficiently sup
ported. There is lack of roads rail.
ways and modern fortifications. The
so-called fortresses are mostly built
with soping walls of clay scarcely Il
foot thick at the top. Forts built ac-
cording to European nations are only
TO be met with at a few places on the
coast OF those in the north, the fort
resses which, in conjunction with the
! fleet, were designed to defend the en-
trance into the Gulf of Pe-chi-li have
passed into the possession of the Euro
/ epan powers. Port Arthur and Ta-lien-
= wan, and of Chi-fuan, the northeast
/ point of the Shan-tung peninsula.
! There remain to be mentioned the forts
! which protect the coasts of the Gulf
| of Leao-tong and of the Gulf of Pc
! chilli OF these, ln-hw, on the Lanho
! river, has to protect Mukden. The
> most important link in the chain of
! fortifications defending the approach to
Peking is Taku, at the mouth of the
! Peiho river. 1t is intended to protect
| the barrier of the river and there is
line of forts extending from Taku to
/ Tien-Tsin and the camp - the north
ern army. OF the fortifications Of the
Hang-tse river, the fort at Wusung
has recently fallen into complete de-
cay. The Nan-sh-tang and the mod
ern Szet2ein battery still remain. At
Kiau-yong, too. there are a few modern
batteries existing side by side with the
ancient ones, and the same is true Of
Tsin- -Kiang Further up the river the
batteries at Marking are the only for
tihcations of any Importance.
To the more important fortresses of
the southern coasts of China belong the
fortitications of Tsin- Hal, which guard
the entrance to Hang-Chau, and those
of Fu-Chau at the mouth of the River
Min, which consist of five forts built
by French engineers. Further south
. we find the fortresses of Annoy and
, Swateau, and, opposite Hong Kong, the
group of forts at Canton. These last
consist of three zones intended. in con-
nection with mines and torpedoes, to
protect Canton from attack 1t would
not be worth while to consider more
| fully the Importance of these various
fortitications. The high clay walls of
the majority of the forts, the sentry
houses, the flag poles and the high
gates offer magnificent marks Or ar
tlllery. The protected shooting places
are quite antiquated. The size of the
court-yards, with the clay huts which
they contain, facilitates the destruc-
tion of the forts. Only a few batteries
correspond to modern conceptions Bat
terles, too, are to be found which are
composed of twenty or more guns diff
lerlhg entirely from one another in size
and construction. This fact alone would
/ render it impossible for the action of
the whole battery to be directed by q
single WILL and the same effect is prO-
/ duced by the placing of a single gun
at the summit of each of the Lills at
klau-Yong and Marking. But the i'm
, portant principle that the fire of a bat.
terry should be directed from single
center is not understood by the chi
neSe, with whom it is not the officer.
but the man in charge of the gun, who
| directs the firing.
Where there are no European instruc-
tors. In the forts on the Yanp-tso N,,o
! powder is even now used for heavy
krupp guns, while on the other hand
brown prismatic powder is used for
hring salutes with Armstrong;. Tables
or charges are only to be found when
they have been fixed to the guns Gov
erings and packings are not, as a rule
Watertight. Ammunition is generaIIv
placed in damp rooms, and nobody has
any idea of the ballistic capacities OF
the guns.
COOPERATION NOT UNDERSTOOD
But even if the fortifcations were
IN better state, they would be Of
little use to China, for there is no
commander who is capable of UNDER
standing what is meant by the CO.
| operation of troops and fortiGcations
There is not even an officer who has
a clear idea of the cooperation Of
| dlllerent Kinds of troops on the fell |
OF battle, and from this Judgment 7
would not even except Lieutenant Cen
eral ln-Chang, who speaks German |
ana Is at present in command of the |
northern troops. During the many |
years l spent in China | only once |
heard of proposed combined strategic |
/ action of the troops. l refer TO the |
! plan which is reported to have been |
| drawn up by the counsel of war at |
| Peking and sanctioned by imperial |
| decree for use in case of war with n |
| European power. According to this |
! plan Lin-kun-i. the viceroy of Nan
King, would be appointed as command |
er-in-chief of the Yangtse valley with |
$4,000 men under him. The Viceroy
Cheng- Chi-Tung, in Wut-Chang,
would be entrusted with the command
of $4,000 men in the central portion Of
Hangtse. The defense of the west
would be under the control of the gov
ernors Of Hu-Pei and HUMAN with 1S,-
600 and $4,000 men respectively. The
waterways Of the Yangtse would be
protected by Admiral Huan with 40
900 men. General Ii of An-Hin would
be appointed to command the southern
fleet. | have not been able to ascer-
tain with certainty whether this plan
has any real existence. In any case
the Chinese government has not
at it's command one-tenth Of
the number of soldiers whose
disposition is thus arranged for, and
the lack Of roads would render it very
difficult to use them as proposed. And |
then, too, it must be considered that
these troops lack everything they
would need to take the field with any
chance of success leadership. dsci-
pline, training, arms, accOuterment and
cOmmiSsariat, all are wanting Even