Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-10-26


ance to appellee of Il sum sufficient to
pay reasonable counsel fees for repre-
senting her in this court.
Inc measure of appellants liability 10
pay the expenses Of appcllees defence
depends upon his ability to meet such
expenses and in the absence of any
lhing In the record to guide us in the
matter. we must hold the allowance al
ready made to be sufficient.
LAMAR ". ALLEN.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
July 20. $780,
RELATIONSHIPS CANNOT BE
PROVED BY GENERAL REPUTE
IN THE COMMUNITY.
THERE is IN GEORGIA NO con-
srITuTIoNAL RIGHT TO y TRIAL
BY JURY IN AN EQUITY CASE.
The question in this suit was as to
the person who was the brother OF the
tcstator.
the court says:
AS q matter of fact, there was but
one question to be deiermined,-that is,
who was the brother OF Richard La
m0r.- and a reference of any part Of
the facts necessarily required re-
ference of the entire case We cannot
cay that the judge erred in concluding
W
to an auditor. An examination OF this
record satisfies us that this was a case
in which reference to an auditor was
peculiarly appropriate. No jury could
have dealt with the mass of conflicting
testimony I'm as satisfactory way is the
same Was dealt with by the Intelligent
and able auditor to whom the case was
referred,
During the investigation before the
auditor, counsel for the plaintiffs asked
witness the following question:
what was the general reputation in
Augusta rs to tho rela tonship between
Dick Lamar and Pompcy Lamar?" OBJ
lection was made to this question on
the ground that matters of pedigree
could not be proven by general reputa-
lion in The community. The auditor
sustained the objection, and an excep-
ton to this ruling was overruled by the
judge. Iteia tionship may he proven by
evidence OF what is the general repute
on the subject in the family. But we
know OF no law which authorizes evil
dence OF The general repute in the COM
munity where the person lives or has
lived to establish mis- relationship to
any person.
II was insisted here that the PLAINTIFF;
had constitutional right TO have their
exceptions OF fact submitted To the de-
termination Of a jury. 1t was conceded
by counsel that the case OF IIearn v.
Lard was TO the contrary: and per-
mission was asked to review this de-
c;Sinn, which we declined to give. The
decision in that case was followed i'm
the case of Bemis V. Packing Co. At
tention is called in the opinion in the
case last cited to the fact that the de-
oision I'm the case of Mahan v. Caven-
der, a Ga. lis, although by a majority
OF the court only, holding that the right
to trial by jury in equity cases was
statutory only. had stood for more than
II years. and that the general assembly
mad not In the meantime seen proper
TO give the right OF trial by Jury in
such cases, the legislation on the sub
1ect being in the other direction, and
also to the fact that the decision in II
Ga. had been followed and approved bv
n full bench In the case of Hearn V.
Laird. We, however, declined. In
Bemis v. Packing Co. to review the
case of Hearn V. Laird, and reanirmcd
by unanimous bench the ruling made
in that case. The ruling in Mahan y
Lavender may have been erroneous
but we believe 1t was correctly decided
In any event, ii has been n precedent
for this court. and has been recognized
as authority by the legislature in deal
Ing with this question: and we decline
TO overrule the decisions following tho
same, and now say that this question
must be considered as settled so far
rs the decisions Of this court are con-
cerned, at least so long as il remains
rs at present constituted. Affirmed