The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1899-02-21
ADMIRAL SCHLEY
ANSWERS CHARGES.
His "Reprehensible Conduct" he
Says, Was Tardily Discovered.
His Version of Defeat of Cervera.

since the alleged 'reprehensible conduct
had occurred.
Although Admiral Sampson used THIS
language TO the secretary concerning me
on July 10, just one week after the
battle, he has never TO this day. In any
manner, or 10 any extent. intiinated 10
me any disapprobation. or made TO me
any criticism of my conduct OF the lying
squadron"
Admiral Schley then submits long
detailed statement OF the facts he sum
married. in the foregoing.
Detailing events connected with the
battle Of July 8, he says that at S:i1 OF
that day Admiral Sampson made sisnai
from his flagship disregard movements
of the conmander-in-ch and steamed
eastward To Siboney. This" says Ad-
miral Schley, left me the senior officer
present, and necessarily clothed me with
the responsibility of the command.
Continuing he declares that when the
enemy's vessels came out OF the harbor
a signal was made from the Brooklyn.
his flagship, to the feet TO clear ship
Tor action" Then followed the signal
"close action" and then the signal the
enemy escaping TO the Westward Fol-
lowing the appearance OF the Spanish
fleet, there was a general inward move
ment OF the American vessels. closing IN
and engaging IL. Explaining the move
ments OF the vessels OF both fleets. he
says the Spanish feet was coming west
ward under high speed, and changing
course more To westward brought the
Brooklyn heading eastward TO meet 1t,
into a position where she would have
blanketed the fire OF the eastern vessels
OF our force, now changing their course
to the westward, and between them the
Spanish vessels. Instant decision he
continues. was therefore necessary TO
avoid interfering I'm any way, or cutting
off any of the fire OF our vessels. as would
have occurred IL she had turned toward
the Spanish fleet. now approaching the
Brooklyn. Turning outward left the
enemy's ships unmasked by the Brook
lyn, and exposed them 10 the concen-
trated fire of our squadron. The re-
suit of this manoeuvre was that In 20
minutes from the opening of the combat
four of the enemy's vessels were on fire
and riddled with proiectiles.
All the vessels OF the eucmy's feet
were little forward OF the Brooklyn's
| beam when they turned toward the
| beach on fire. At the final capture OF
| the Colon, at 10 p. m, the Brooklyn w~s
| nearest, the Oregon next and then the
| Texas and Vixen. The New York ar
| rived at 2:25 p. m, and the commander
| in-chief assumed command of tha
| squadron. Signals were made from the
| Brooklyn to the squadron until all signal
halyards were shot away, and then 10y
( the Meyers army code"
| In conclusion Admiral Schley contends
| that the turn OF the Brooklyn i'm the bat
tie OF the 3rd was "the crucial and de-
| Gliding feature of the combat and of de-
cided advantage" Furthermore he says
it is a mistake TO say that the vessel S
distance from the enemy was increased
60 the extent of 300 yards. and adds:
Though this may not be of record. it is
! q fact nevertheless" He cites the fact
that the charts of the board Of naviga-
tors shows that the Brooklyn was near
est when il emerged from the harbor.
nearest at every stage OF battle and near
est the Colon when II surrendered and
gives many confirmatory details OF his
hagship's active and effective participa-
tlon In the battle
| He says he made no report OF his
maneuver in his report of the battle as
it's effect upon the battle was never a
question with him. His last paragraph
reads:
ION May 81 l received telegram from
the commander-in-chief congratulatinr
mo upon my success In locating and
blockading the enemy's fleet at Santiago
II IL was worthy Of communication al
that time l am at loss TO understand
how 1t could have grown into reprehen-
| sible conduct as suggested by Admira
Sampson in his letter Of July 10, 1898
some six weeks later"