Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1899-02-06
THE ADMINISTRATION SHOCKED.


THE ADMINISTRATION SHOCKED.
Washington, February 5.--Admiral
Dewey to-day cabled the Navy Depart
ment that hostilities had begun be-
tween the American army and naval
forces in and about Manila and the
Philippine insurgents. The insur-
gents, he said, had been the aggressors
and had been repulsed.
The news came like a shock, for the
administration, though apprised that
an ugly situation prevailed in the Phil
ippines, had clung steadily to a hope
that by tact and patience actual fight
ing might be averted, and even those
public men who felt that hostilities
would follow, should the treaty be rat
flied, and the United States attempt to
take the islands, believed that Aguin-
aldo would not force the fighting when
the treaty of peace was in its most crit
ical stage. Some senatorial opponents
of ratification of the treaty adhere to
their position, but the general opinion
in Washington tonight is that the
news from Manila insures the ratifca-
ton of the treaty to-morrow'a AFTERNOON.
The news of the
BEGINNING OF ANOTHER WAR
came from Admiral Dewey. No word
had been received from Gen. Otis up to
nightfall.
1t seems to be Dewey's fortune al
ways to be able to report favorable
news, and like all messages that have
gone before, this cablegram told of the
success of the American forces in the
action. 1t was with great regret, how
ever, that the administration learned
that the insurgents had forced the is
sue. 1t had hoped all along that they
could be brought to see the advantages
of placing their trust in the American
people, and relying upon the President
to deal justly with them. The admin
istration argued that with the Philip
pine commission fairly on the sea en-
route for Manila, bringing with them
messages from the President, and with
the peace treaty still Enacted on, it
was not to be credited that they would
refuse to wait to learn the purpose of
the American government, but would
precipitate the
LONG IMPENDING CONFLICT.
While this was true the officials here
and the officers in Manila had not been
blind to the threat contained in the
situation there and every preparation
has been made for just what occurred
last night. 1t is now acknowledged
that fear of an outbreak in Luzon was
the explanation for the much-com-
mented-on failure of Gen. Miller to
force a landing at uoilo on the island
of Plano, also for the landing of all
troops at Manila. where was located
the center of danger. Part of Miller's
force, therefore, was returned to Ma
Mia, and that General was left with
one regiment of regulars and a bat
talon of artillery, just sufficient to
take advantage of any detection in his
front, but not enough to force his way
ashore and hold his own. Then,
rather as a formal authorization, for
he did not need the instruction, Dewey
was told to cooperate fully with Gen.
Otis in any measure the latter might
take. 1t is believed that it was IN
known to the insurgents, that some of
the American warships were quietly
moved into positions where they
PERFECTLY COMMANDED
the insurgent trenches and defences,
and could shell them with effect in
case of an outbreak. This movement
was effected more than ten days ago,
and the administration has not felt
serious apprehensions of Gen. Otis's
ability at least to hold his own. The
American position might have been
greatly strengthened, it is said, by a
judicious extension of the lines in GER
tain directions, and also by taking
summary measures to prevent the OPP
erations of the insurgents in taking up
positions and organizing forces. Pres
ident Mckinley took the view that per-
haps under a strict construction of the
terms of the protocol, which still holds
good in the absence of the ratification
of the treaty, he lacked authority 10
extend the field of occupation of the