The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1899-02-07
VIEWS OF GEN. MERRITT.
Night Attack What Might Have Been
Exnecfed from Snnnfsh Punils.

AAPC1AC0 ~ 0R
NEW YORK, Feb. 6. - General Wesley
Merritt, in an interview to-day on the Phil
ippine outbreak, said: THAT the attack on
our lines should have been made at night is
what one would expect from the tutelage of
the Filipinos in war-that of the Spaniards.
Night attack is a favorite operation of
Spanish commanders, and during the time
that the insurgents were besieging Manila,
before our movement against the city ac-
lively began, the two antagonists used to
shoot literally at each other in the dark,
and during the day remain inactive. Their
common practice, moreover, when fighting
in trenches, is TO thrust their rifles over the
top of the breastworks without exposing
any part Of the body, and trust to luck to
hit something. The night attack as a regu-
lar method Of warfare characterizes the art
of war in a low stage of development. Sol
diers trained in the best schools of modern
military science prefer, as a rule, to fight
their battles in daylight, since then there is
less chance of mistake and a greater OPP
p%Ortunity Of working out with
precision. The chiefs of semi-civilized forces,
from the Khalifa to Kguinaldo, prefer a
dash in the dark, hoping to t~erroriZe the
enemy by the uneXpectedness of attack.
without doubt the insurgent assault on
Manila was precOnceiVed and deliberate.
That it was planned by Aguinaldo L do not
NHAI " d11CANt D0hs VI NONAPN ~
probability is that 1t was, since he has late
ly seemed to be undisputedly supreme. The
blow which we have been compelled to de-
liver ought, now, in my Judgment, to be vlg-
Orously followed up. If it is the Fflipinos
will quickly realize who is master and sub
nit. Our policy up to the time of this bat
tie has been one of extreme Cancellation,
based upon the hope and expectation that
ignorant as the Fihpinos were, they might
eventually be brought TO understand that
We bring them freedom and prosperity, ana
not a repetition of Spanish tyranny.
iarly likely tn misa1nrehend forhearance
and consideration. They Immediately at
tribute them to fear or weakness; they re-
spect nothing except force, for it is the only
thing that the Spanish have ever presented
TO their eyes that it was possible for them
to respect. All this the English residents
at Manila and colonists at all the Oriental
British ports at which l stopped on my
way home repeatedly told me. They pre-
Filipinos would infallibly grow, until We
should be forced to bring home to them the
fact that our power could not be resisted.
Then, it was declared, they would abandon
resistance.
The military organization of the Fill
pinos will scarcely, L think, survive this de-
hard again wherever they show front. Their
organization, of course, has always been
exceedingly poor. There, is probably not an
officer among them who has any respectable
knowledge of modern military science.
Their ablest soldier is Pho de Pillar, the East
Indian, and yet [ doubt very much If ne
has ever in his life read any Of the books of
the profession. His consequence proceeds
rather from his personal qualities as a
fighter than from his ability to direct oper-
atoms. His force, courage, combativeness
and applicability inspire confidence in his
men, and to the extent that he is thus a
natural military leader he Is q dangerous
and, from our point of view, a bad man.
There is no question in my mind that even
Aguinaldo has stood In awe of him. 1t is
even possible that Pho de Pillar and his
faction coerced Aguinaldo into sanctioning
the assault. In the l%atter's communica-
lions TO me he reminded me, in excuse for
his inability to accede at once, that he had
to consider the wishes Of his chiefs. He
mentioned. no names, but it was generally
understood among us that he referred prin-
cipally to Pho de Pillar. The latter's in
f1uence, whatever it may be, can be counted
on as irreconcilably hostile to US.
II think we may expect that defeat at
Manila will have a disastrous effect upon
Aguinaldo's authority. His supremacy has
% Wge@ : Pase the Oh ISLAND nns from rorap the I hands Of the 6e
Spanish after we had destroyed the Spanish
fleet, and upon the Importance which he has
assumed in the eyes of his followers by
army. The feebleness of his power having
been made manifest there is every reason
to suppose that his numerous rivals, sup
pressed for the time, will rise to dispute his
authority. When they have come to moth
ing through factional differences and pos
sibly conflicts, they will be entirely amena-
BILE to our guidance and rule. l think. They
are really docile and amiable people, with
out much stern stuff-not ~pugnacious and
irreconcilable as our Indians are
General Greene said: They have one gen.
eral who is a man of no mean ability as a
military commander. His name is Pho de
Pillar, but he is not a Filipino. He is a full
blooded Indian. Aguinaido showed to Gen.
Merritt that he (Aguinaldo) rather stood in
awe of Pillar. / mel this man once. He was
extremely hostile to the Americans, and
showed that he was not of the sort to be
conciliated. Another fairly able insurgent
commander was a man named Noriel. He
was a man, however, whom we could at
least treat with" General Greene was not
quite so confident as General Merritt about
the result of yesterdays battle. He called
attention TO the three months lighting in
1897, when the insurgents inflicted upon the
Spanish a loss of three hundred or four
hundred killed and about two thousand
wounded. In ninety days said General
more trouble with the insurgents"