The record-union., 1899-02-21
Presents a Statement to the Senate
Naval Affairs Committee
Relating to His Movements Leading Up to
Destruction Of Ceryera's Fleet.
Acted Under Instructions Of Rear
Admiral Sampson and the Navy
Department, and Had Never
Heard Of Any Criticism Of His
Actions Until After the Battle
and Destruction Of the Spanish
Warships at Santiago Harbor.

Warships at Santiago Harbor.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 20.-Rear Adj
miral Schley, having been granted per-
mission to answer the charges made
against him in communication re-
Gently sent to the Senate, to-day
handed to the Committee ON Naval
Affairs his statement, in which he dis
claims any purpose of controversy with
the Navy Department. The letter of
the department, he says, so far as it
relates to him, can be summarized I'M
DER the following heads:
The delay off Cienfuegos; the al
legged slow progress toward Santiago
de Cuba from Cienfuegos; the retro
grade movements of the 18th and 9th
of May; the battle of Santiago and the
destruction Of Cervera's fleet"
The Admiral says his orders from
Sampson on May 10Th were to blockad
Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do
He shad no knowledge that there were
any insurgents about CienfuegOs who
We're friendly until the Marblehead ar
rived on the 9th. Then he sent Com
mander McCalla of the Marbiehead
ashore to establish relations with the
Insurgents, the result of which was
made known to him at $40 p. m. on
May Oath. Then. for the first time, he
learned definitely that the Spanish fleet
was not at Cienfuegos. Within tive
hours he started for Santiago.
What possible ground for criticism,
he says, adverse, to me there can be IN
all this do not see. 1 was on the spot,
acting under orders which gave me en-
tire discretion and yet clothed me with
the responsibility of going to Santiago
only after / was satisfied that the teet
was not at Cienfuegcs.".
He quotes from the dispatch OF
Sampson of May both. in which the lat
ter says Schley Should hold his
fleet off Cienfuegos. If the Span
ish ships have put into Santi-
ago, they must come either to
Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver
the munitions of war which they are
said to bring for use in Cuba. .slii
therefore of the opinion that the best
chance to capture these ships will be
to hold the two points, Cienfuegos an1
Havana. with all the force we can
muster. If late it should develop thai
these vessels are at Santiago, We can
then assemble off that point the ships
best suited for the purpose and com
pletely blockade it. Until we, then, re-
ceive more positive Information, we
shall continue to hold Havana and
Cienfuegos'
Admiral Schley adds: This letter Is
not printed either in the appendix or
executive document C, but l receiv'd
it ON the 23d, and it shows that L was
expected to hold my squadron on Glen
fuegos."
AS to the slow progress toward SAN
tiago on account of the Eagle. ne
states that she was a part of the force
which Admiral Sampson had seen nj 10
send him, and he had no right to apan-
don her The weather, also, was rough
and not much better speed could nave
been kept up. He had been ordered TO
proceed cautiously" If, however, ne
had known that the Spanish neet was
at Santiago. no consideration OF the
Eagle or anything else would nave pre-
vented him from getting there at tne
earliest possible moment with ths
larger vessels. but the weather ana
sea made it Impossible to do better
: than he did.
Speaking of the retrograde move
ments' which the Secretary, adopting
4. the language of Admiral Sampson,
characserizes as "repreflensible con-
duct. Admiral Schley says that in
forty-two years service. never was
such language used to criticise conduct
of mine. and see no reason for it
ndy. "r~-ss ~,
Heads: 'sActfng-in accordance with
my b>st Judgment. in view ~ the cir
cumstafites, without certain know ledge
Of the whereabouts of that Spanish
feet, after having been informed by
the scouts commanded by such officers
as Sigsbee. Jewell md. Wiss, THAI al
though they had been off SsAtiago for
a week they had seen noting of 1t,
and knew nothing of its movements or
its Whereabouts after it had left Cura-
Goa. after having been assured by Sigs-
bee that he did not bel We 1T was in
Santiago. and by the empis.- &c cellar
alton of the pilot. Nunez, and Knowing
that as the sea and weather then vas
it would be impossible to coal my
squadron off the port. I deemed it best
to take the action / did. the final res alt
of which was the location of the enc
my's fleet in Santiago harbor."
As TO the battle of Santiago, Admiral
Schley says. the facts of that contest
speak for themselves He quotes from
his official report to Sampson in which
he congratulated the commander of the
squadron. and said The victory seems
big enough for all of u.s." He asks
the committee to contrast his reports
and those of Sampson containing refer
ences to himself, and continued:
AS to all this criticism of my course
prior to the discovery by me on May
18th of Cerveras fleet. whether from
Admiral Sampson or the department,
none of it has ever been made by either
of them to me; I never heard word of
It from any one until after the battle
with that fleet, although more than five
weeks had passed since the alleged
.reprehensible conduct had occurred.
Although Admiral Sampson used this
language to the Secretary concerning
- ~, +1,a 10Th dav of Jllly {iIlsf ono