The Appeal. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. ;) 1889-19??, 1899-05-27

Our Fleets Were Divided-Use of
Fortifcations Help to the
Navy-Changes In the Conduct OF
Modern Naval Warfare.
The first detailed attempt by British ex-
perts to expound the naval lessons de-
rived from the SpanishtAmcrica war
was made in London recently at meet
ing of the United Service institution, pre-
sided over by Rear Admiral A. X. wilson,
of the British board of admiralty, and at
tended by a large number of army as well
as naval officers. Vice Admiral r. I'll. 90
lomb who is the leading writer upon
naval subjects in Great Britain, was the
chief speaker. He read most exnaus-
tive paper upon the various features Oh
the recent war upon the sea, AMI s0)ne'
of his comments ana conclusions Will ao
couht lead to wide discussion OF the
points he raises Following is part ot
what he said, according to- a LoEoon istt.
ter in the New York san:
without question, the only sale way
TO: the country possessing the superior
navy is to put it's ships into touch with
the ships of the enemy from the begin
if it can be avoided. The sure way OF
conducting the war would. therefore, have
been for the United States to transfer
sufhclent force to the coast OF Spain at
least to balance the forces known to have
boon in Spanish ports; to send a strong
squadron to st. Vincent the moment 1t
was known that an assembage WAS to be
made there. The seizure of Minorca as a
Ease would probably have been an easy
operation; and in any case 1t would have
been morally certain that, it this action
had been taken, nothing offensive on the
other side of the Atlantic could have been
thought Of by Spain. Then for Cuba and
Porto Rico landings for conquest might
have been effected at leisure, because
there would have been no Spanish naval
force to interfere with them beyond what
the surplus American force was capable
of dealing with locally.
"Yet, III spite Of these things, the ex-
traordinary effect which the mere sailing
of Cervera's most effective squadron had
upon the whole of the American opera
tons show us how keenly alive the Amer
lean government and the American navy
were to the risks that were being run by
transgressing the fundamental principles
OF naval war.
"But certainly the lesson we must draw
is that the American strategy was haz-
ardous in SO far as it departed from the
stereOtyped rules of naval war. The
NOlOIl anu Tie NdTld Teresa were at
Vincent on the 1ith Of April, and:it might
have reen certain on the 18th that they
were going there. There was plenty of
time for the Americans to have estab-
Ished a watch upon them had they been
so minded But, as it was. the fact that
Cervera and the ships in Spain were not
under observation allowed a sort Of panic
to reign all along the Atlantic coast Of
the United States. AS long as we look t
things from the side of the defenders,
it seems the most reasonable thing in the
world to close the harhor of New York
by submarine mines, batteries and what
not in war time, lest an enemy's squad
ron should come inside and lombard the
= city.
There is not any answer to be given
to a panic-stricken ropulace when there
are unmatched SIHadrOns about. All that
can be said is to point to experience and
to what men accustomed to command
who have thought over the matter say
about it. The experience is that, as in
the Vile and as in the Midway, so in
Manila hay and at Cardenas, naval COM
manders will run into considerable dam
gers in order to get at ships. But towns
are not their business. If towns are to
be attacked there will be a landed army
and all things regular. No naval officer
with his hands free would in war pro-
coed into New York harbor in order to
damage, New York, even if he believed
there were no batteries and no mines to
prevent him. lie understands quite wen
that he will do infinitely more mischief to
New York 49, lying off the port, out of
range of any guns mounted in battery,
and paralyzing trade by checking the
exit of ships and capturing .4lose that try
to enter.
II think it is almost obvious that these
panic demands would rot have arisen in
the United States had it been possible to
tell the citizens that the first act of the
war had got every Spanish ship under OBJ
servation. They were the result of al
lowing loose squadrCns to get into the
Atlantic without :tny knowledge of their
whereabouts OF objective. In our islands,
almost all through history, the public
have denounced the Gt\ ernments and the
admirals who dill rot 90: and keep their
fleets away from home and lntouch with
the enemy But, rs far as understand,
the pressure on the American govern
ment was more to keep the navy in sight
of the population, that it might have a
sense of it's defensive force.
1.-THE position was altered the moment
Cervera's squadron vas localized. The
United States received information on
May 10 that Cervera was Off Martinique
and on the same day Schley was ordered
from the Chesapeake to Charleston, anC
next day was ordered to proceed to Key
West with all possible dispatch. This
simply shows that Schley's defensive po
sition taken UP simply because Ger
vera had not been watched or located
and that what had hitherto been done
was no more than an indifferent substl
tute for the orthodox methods. If may
express an opinion, which Is liable to De
reversed on a closer examination or tht
data than I have been able to give, i
should say that, in the minds Of those II
authority in America, sufficiently cleal
distinction was not drawn between the
Process of merely observing for the pur
pose Of report and of watching for TIT
purpose of hindering movement. Tnt
broad lesson is, at any rate, perfectly
clear. The steam feet in being has {
power OF upsetting the whole plan O.
war, even though it is absurdly inferior
to the forces it threatens, which no on
ever dreamed of assigning even TO su
perior fleet of sailing ships. do not meal
to say that lesson is permanent; onl!
that we must take it SO on the evidence
before us.
IA word must now be said OF the STRAIT
egg which was open to Cervera- though
that Cervera might, having left st. Vim
cent on April 20, have found himself
with 1000 miles of coal still Ill his bunk
ers, steaming into, Key West at breaking
daylight on May IA. or IS and ready tt
deAl tie utmost destruction by gun ant
by torpedo upon the unhappy ships lying
there at that moment. I thought it might
: further be possible to get at some OF the
lamer ducks off Havana. I thought nc
would certainly go, as he did, between
Martinique and St. Lucia; bet l consid
cred that he would pass those islands dur
Ing darkness. in order that no note OF
his whereabouts should appear. 4 though,
he would pass south of Jamaica and v es,
Of Cuba without being seen; that ne
81 would. In consequence, come upon the
ships at Key West completely unan-
Eounced. Schley was then at Charleston.