The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-04-03
As SEEN BY GERMAN EYES
Effect of the Naval Fight Off
Santiago.
CERVERA'S FATAL SORTlE
Spanish Ships Rushed to Inevitable
Doom-Sally Should Have Been
Made at Night-Commander
Jacobson's Sketch.

naval Intelligence of the navy depart
ment has issued the last of the series
of sketches of the Spanish-American
war by Commander Jacobson of the
German protected cruiser Geier. The
last of this interesting series deals with
the condition of Spanish ships after the
battle of Santiago. This portion of the
sketch contains a number of observa-
tions regarding the technical effect of
our gun fire which will interest naval
officers. The most interesting obser-
vations to the laymen are those upon
the strategy, or lack of it, displayed
by Cervera. The Spanish admiral, haV-
ing been ordered to leave the harbor,
to remove the main object of attack
on Santiago, Commander Jacobson
says his position was most difficult
He did not dare make the attempt at
night, and so decided to go out in
broad daylight.
The whole crew." he says, fell
victim to this fatal decision. Instruc-
tions for the sortie and the western
course were issued. The admiral was
entirely convinced of the impossibility
of defeating the enemy or of reaching
another Cuban harbor, even if he
should succeed in steaming right
through the hostile fleet. 1t is to this
feeling of helplessness and impotence,
as against the American naval forces
more than to anything else that l at
tribute the defeat. The Spanish ships
had spent a month and a half in the
| harbor without even attempting to at
tack the blockading fleet, when a ia
Vorable opportunity presented itself
or even harassing it, The two tor
4 tpf,t Fnt-
the purpose for which they We're in
tended. This inactivity and lack of in
| itiative must have had a very demor-
| alizing effect on the officers and men
| If we add to this the certain knowledge
| that the opposing forces were much
| stronger, it will be readily understood
| that the idea of general flight after
| coming out of the harhor entrance was
| the only acceptable one, especially in
! view OF the possibility of l,eacKng the
ships, thereby rendering them unser-
viceable and eventually rescuing the
| crews. From the very moment that this
| feeling of impotence took possession of
| the Spanish and led to the above re-
| Elections their fate, psychologically
| speaking. was sealed. We do not mean
to disparage their tenacity in the midst
of the hostile fleet. but on the other
| hand it is quite natural that the ad
| miral. seeing that everything was hap
pening as he had foreseen, was the
one who set the example Of running his
ship ashore. All the other commanders
followed this example.
'On the American side the situation
| was just the reverse. Admiral Samp-
sons fleet was fully conscious of its
power. The blockade was being con-
Quoted in accordance with carefully
| prepared plans as were also the ar
rangements in case of the enemy's at
tempt to escape. Frequent engage
ments with the Spanish had given the
| commanders and crews that calm as
surance in the handling Of their weap-
ons which guarantees success The
| long blockade service, eXhauSting and
monotonous, hardly interrupted by any
| action on the part of the Spanish, had
! strung the nerves to the highest pitch
and everybody was anxious for the
end to come Suddenly the enemy at
tempted to escape. All the passions
that had been smoldering under the
ashes broke forth. The time had come
for settling accounts with the enemy,
and with a wild rush the American
ships fell on their victims. At the be
ginning the American fire, owing to the
excitement of the personnel and the
great distances. was probably not very
effective, but when the Spanish ad-
| miral turned to the westward and the
other ships followed him the moral
superiority of the Americans reas-
serted itself. The commanders. calm
and cool headed, had their ships follow
the same course. and the Americans
having every advantage on their side
| recommended the fire on the. fleeing
ships, which soon resulted in their tota
annihilation.
II have already spoken of the lack
of training of the Spanish crews. the
neglect of gun and torpedo target prac-
tce the inadequate education of the
commanders of the ships and torpedo
boat destroyers. 1t is mainly due to
these deficiencies that the defeat was
fastened. and that the American ships
sustained SO few losses.
''The training of the engine personnel
was totally unreliable, which is not sur
prising in view of the fact that the
Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent
out on extensive cruises. The bottoms
of the Spanish ships had not been
cleaned for a long time. and as they
had been lying in Santiago harbor for
a month and a half they were consid-
erably fouled Thus the cruisers Maria
Teresa. Oquendo and Nizcaya, which
in all official books are credited with
1875 knots speed, went into the battle
with speed of from 10 to II knots at
most, and the CTistobal Colon, which
is the latest ship, and was to run &c
knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.
Under these circumstances. in every
way unfavorable for the Spanish, whose
crews We're inSutticiently trained and
physically and morally enervated by
long inactivity whose ships We're in
ferior in number, speed and fighting
efficiency. it is no wonder that the vic
| tory of the Americans was easy anC
paid for with insignificant sacrifices.
| There was only one chance for the
success of the sortie. 1t should have
been made at night in scattered forma-
ton. After a personal investigation OF
the locality. it is my opinion that it is
. entirely practicable for fleet to leave
Santiago harbor al night. The wreck
of the Merrimac did not constitute al
obstruction. 1t is true that Admira
SIMPSONS report on the night block
ade states that the lightships were ~
ing from one to two miles from MolTC
castle, according to the state of the at
5 mosphere. and that they lighted up the
channel for half mile inside. Even