The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1899-02-13

who has his confidence, and who is his
confidential adviser. Inc commanalIg
general is assigned to duty as SUCH by
the President, and under the military
laws of the United States his duties are
defined as follows:
manding general of the army, not hav-
ing been. made the subject of statutory
regulation, is determined by the order OF
posed. of the aggregate Of the several ter
ritorfal commands that have been or may
be created by the President.
THE military establishment is under or
ders from the commanding general or the
army in that which pertains TO its disci-
pline and military control; the 1s ca az
stan departments" (Par. Il. A. r., 1880
'All orders and Instructions ms rom ON the
to military operations or affecting the
military. control and discipline of the
army will be promulgated through the
commanding general" (Par. 1SS, A. r.,
Tieutenant-Gene Schofield, who has
probably had as much experience and
given the question as much thought and
study as any one in our country, says, in
substance
Recent experience has served to confirm all
the results Of my lifelong study and large
senior officer of the army on duty at wash
fngton is not that of commanding general.
position which is practically impossible but
chief of staff TO the President The title OF
eral-in-chief was a permanent one during
the entire history OF the country up TO the
When. became the commanding general. I
addressed to the President a letter in which
pointed out to him what had been the result. of
my study and experience, and saying that the
only way was to abandon m enes %niGn aa
OF being the commanding general, and 10 con-
tent myself with acting as the chief of STAFF
Of the army under the Secretary OF war and
the President. The result was that perfect har-
mony' prevailed during my time, and did not
exercise a legitimate Influence in command of
the army. this because did not claim to exer-
else anything which the law did not give me.
The President must have the same power Of
selection of his general-in-chief as he has Of
his Secretary OF War; without this there can be
no guarantee that he Will give, or that the
Secretary Of War will place in the general-in-
chief, that confidence which Is necessary TO
perfect harmony. Neither the President nor the
Secretary. Of War should have in the command
of the army an officer who is not working in
harmony with him.
The report now takes up the War
Department and its various chiefs of
subdivisions. beginning with the Sec
rotary of War.
The. records of the War Department,
which have been laid before US, show that
the Secretary of War extended to all
chiefs of bureaus cordial and full support
and promptly responded to every proper
demand made upon him by commanding
officers. No testimony has been presented
showing Intentional neglect of duty nor
any attempt to serve personal interests.
The charges made that the Secretary of
War was privately interested in the con-
tracts, purchases and other transactions
Of the War Department have been thor
oughly examined and found baseless.
, In the Judgment of the commission there
was lacking in the general administration
of the War Department during the contin-
Qance of the war with Spain that COM
plete grasp of the situation which was es-
sential to the highest efficiency and disci-
pline of the army
The commission has refrained from crit
iciZing certain of the heads of bureaus
for not having acted with foresight in
preparing their various departments for
active war. before war was actually de-
elared, because 1t has appeared that the
national defense fund provided by the
act Of March g.. 1895, was not made avail
able for use except for the navy and for
coast defenses and the expenditures
incident thereto until after the declara-
ton of war:
The report eulogizes the work of the
adjutant general, commissary general
and critfciZes the deficient work of the
inspector general for the failure of a
proper inspection of camps. The most
significant part of the report in ref
erence to the bad work of the quarter
master generals department is as fol-
lows:
Land transportation Of the command
during the Santiago campalgn-Owing to
lack Of necessary transport the means of
land transportation during the Santiago
campaign was painfully deficient. General
Shafter testified that he could carry no
more on his transports from Tampa; that
he realized that he would have very few
ambulances, but that wagons could be
used for transportation, both of the
wounded, and of supplies, while ambu-
ances could be, employed only for one
purpose. General Humphrey testified that
no more land transportation was taken,
simply because the vessels were fully
loaded.
The testimony shows that the trans
ports arrived off the south coast of Cuba
near Santiago on June q; that the pack
trains were landed on June %; that the
first wagons were landed on June %, and
that the landing of the latter was con-
tinued more rapidly than they could be
set up on shore and that, in fact some
of those that were landed were never set
up at all.
General Chaffee testifies that on July I
at the battle of Ell Caney, ten DAYS after
the arrival of the fleet, there were no am
balances or wagons available and that
the roads were so horrible that they could
not reach the front.
1t is plainly evident that this army OF
II 900 men disembarked in the face of an
enemy in a hostile country and ranidIv
thrown forward against a wei! armed
force, was painfully deficient in land
transportation, but in spite of the alb
Sence of this almost absolutely necessary
portion of the equipment of a well-trained
command, it drove the enemy before it,
capturing their outposts, pushed them be-
hind their main defenses. drove their feet
from Santiago bay to absolute destruc-
ton as it faced the navy Of our country.
and, finally, after gallant fighting under
a tropical sun, amidst most adverse con-
ditions, captured a strongly fortified city
and received as prisoners of war over
q, 900 Spanish soldiers.
Subsistence Department Brigadier-
General Charles p. Eagan, Commissary-
General, IT, S. A, in charge: The com
mission has carefully. investigated the
subject of the condition, quality and
quantity of food supplied to the army AL
most without exception it has been shown
by the testimony taken that wherever the
troops we're ordered, whether to the var
ious camps In the United States or to
Porto Rico, Cuba or Manila, the rations
prescribed by law were on the transports
and at the camps with the soldiers.
So far as we have been able to ascertain
there was but one occasion, that of a
day in front of Santiago, when the troops
were. seriously short of rations. These
had been supplied but thrown aside when
the men went into action. The condition
of the roads and lack Of transportation