The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-11-05
TO BUILD UP TIE NAVY.
A VERY CONFERENCE.-THE PROGRAMME
or sHIpBUILDING PHOPOsED.

A VERY COMPhEHENbfFEF hOShA""s
or sHIPBUILDING PHOPOsED.
IA VIII Cover Fifteen Tears, spd Will
Give Va Forty-hve Bsttieships, Twenty
thre. Monitors, scvsnty-hve Cruisers Of
All Kinds and iSB Torpedo Boats and
Destroyera Yearly Expense VIII BE
$40. OoO, OO0-States Nigh, Provide ships,
AMI would BE Expected to Provide Ma
val Militia Crews for the Monitors.
The genera feeling OF the American people
can be confidently assumed to be In favor OF
srnntlne to the navy all that It can consistently
ask. There are good reasons Tor believing this
10 bs the case. For the nrst time since the
War OF 1912 the navy has been the pre-
dominant factor In our hostile onerations: In
the war with Mexico and In the Civil War the
navy was secondary to the army. and the pres
ont Ia the nrst occasion which the people have
hal in which to observe the worth OF our naval
forces supplied with an effective feet. equipped
with the best guns and armor. and institute
com parison between its deeds now and In Tor
mer times The result has been satisfactory
.y.p to those who expected the most There
Ia not an occasion to be cited whore the OFF,
GERS. men. vessels. and guns OF our new navy
did not do all that co1ld be expected OF them
whenever opportunity offered.
All those who paid attention to the opera
ton. OF the navy during the Spanish War. and
the shifts to which the Secretary OF the Navy
va, put to nnd vessels for the work to be done.
are fully convinced that We need. not only a
much larger fleet than we now possess. but
that ,uch navy should DO divided into two sep
sr,e and distinct classes. which We may call.
for DISTINGUISHING purposes. tho offensive and
and defsu.iye fleets, The lack Of a sufficient
number OF vessels for barbor defence IN the
nrst instance. and tho failure to receive what
little hal been provided. owing to the neces-
atty OF using monitors and coast defence ves-
sci. on blockading and offensive duty. demon
.tra,ed our deficiency In defensive heets. and
the lack Of efficient vessels for offensive pur-
poses even with the assistance OF the coast
defence feet. when We could not spare one
ship TO threaten the ports OF our Zoe across the
Atlantic. concusvely show our crying need OF
more vessels suited to offensive operations,
The necessity Tor larger navy is not alone
the outgrowth OF our experience during the
ate war. Before that time 1t was generally
conceded that We were not yet In such
strategical position as regards number OF
vessel, OF the various classes as would Justify
Us In ceasing to add to our fleets. The great
American habit OF procrastlnation AMI failure
20 be ready ill the day after the fair has
KEEP, Us back. but aside from those who seem
20 be lost to all sense OF patriotism In their
wild historical shrieEings about snti-imper-
ialism the worst procrastinator is now con-
Ninced that We must take time by the fore
lock and. as gu ekly as possible. get in a pos
iton 70 take care Of oUr coasts. commerce and
the additional great interests We have ass
sumeI asa result OF the war. The lessons Of
the war. the need OF providing suitable
protection FOR our foreign territories, COM
bins 10 impress seriously upon US not only
ha Wi M ait ~