The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-02-21
ANSWERS THE CHARGES
Rear Admiral Schley Replies to
Simpsons Criticisms.
EXPLAINS HIS ACTIONS
The Hero of Santiago Can Not See Where
in His Conduct Was "Reprehen-
sble"-He Followed the Orders
of His Superior.

Washington, Feb. 20-Rear Admiral
w. S. Schley, having been ganted per-
mission to answer the charges made
against him in a communication re-
Gently sent to the senate, to-day hand
ed to the committee on naval affairs
his statement, in which he disclaims
| any purpose of controversy with the
navy department. The letter of the
| department, he says, so far as it re-
| lates to him, can be summarized as fol-
| lows:
THE delay off Cienfuegos, the
alleged slow progress toward Santiago
de Cuba from Cienfuegoes; the retro-
grade movements of the Goth and 9th
of May; the battle of Santiago and the
| destruction of Cervera's fleet"
The admiral says his orders from
Sampson on May 10 We're to blockade
| Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do.
He had no knowledge that there were
! any insurgents about Cienfuegos who
| We're friendly until the Marblehead ar
| rived on the oath. Then he sent Com
mander McCalla of the Marblehead
ashore to establish rela with the
| insurgents, the result of which was
| made known to him at $40 p. m. on
| May "a. Then, for the first time, he
learned definitely that the Spanish fleet
| was not at Cienfuegos. Within two
| hours he started for Santiago
What possible ground for criticism
| he says, adverse to me there can be in
| all this I do not see ] was on the spot,
| acting under orders which gave me en-
tire discretion and yet clothed me with
| the responsibility of going to Santiago
| only after | was satisfied that the fleet
| was not at Cienfuegos.'
| He quotes from the dispatc tch of Samp-
l. ~,
| Schley should 'hold his fleet off Glen
| fuegCs. If the Spanish ships have put
| into Santiago they must come either to
| Havana or to Cienfuegos to deliver the
| munitions Of war which they are said
| to bring for use in Cuba | am there
| fore of the opinion that the best chance
to capture these ships will be to hold
| the two points, Cienfuegos and Ha-
vana, with all the force we can mus
| ter. If later it should develop that
! these vessels are at santiago. we can
then assemble off that point the ships
best suited for the purpose and com
pletely blockade it. Until we then re-
ceive more positive information we
shall continue to hold Havana and
Cienfuegos.
Admiral Schley adds: This letter is
not printed either in the appendix or
| executive document G, but I received it
on the 23rd and it shows that 1 was ex-
pected to hold my squadron off Cienfue-
| gos."
| AS to the slow progress toward San
| tiago on account of the Eagle, he states
| that she was a part of the force which
| Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
| him and he had no right to abandon
| her. The weather also was. rough and
| not much speed could have been kept
up He had been ordered to proceed
| cautiously" If, however, he had
| known that the Spanish fleet was in
Co tiD,C iInr ini, Of haE II 10 10
! or anything else would have prevented
| him from getting there at the earliest
| possible moment with the larger vessels,
but the weather and sea made it i'm
possible to do better than he did.
Speaking of the ''retrograde move
ments,," which the secretary, adapting
the language of Admiral Sampson,
characterizes as "reprehensible con-
duct" Schley says that in AZ years ser
vice, never was such language used to
characterize conduct of mine, and I see
| no reason for it now
| He adds: Acting in accordance with
my best judgment. in view of the cir
| cumstances, without certain knowledge
| of the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet,
after having been informed by the
| scouts commanded by such officers as
Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise, that al
| though they had been off Santiago for
a week, they had seen nothing of it, and
| knew nothing of it's movements or it's
| whereabouts since it had left Curacao,
| after having been assured by Sigsbee
| that he did not believe it was in San
tiago and by the emphatic declaration
| of the pilot NuneZ. and knowing that
as the seas and weather then were it
| would be impossible to coal my squad
ron off the port, ! deemed it best to take
the action l did, the final result of
| which was the location of the enemy's
| fleet in Santiago harbor.'
As to the battle of Santiago, Admiral
Schley says the facts of the contest
| speak for themselves. He quotes from
| his official report to Sampson, in which
| he congratulated the commander of the
squadron and said the victory seems
big enough for all of us" He asks the
committee TO contrast his reports and
those of Sampson, containing references
to himself, and continues:
AS to all this criticism of my course
prior to the discovery by me on May
30 of Cervera's fleet, whether from Ad-
miral Sampson or the department. none
of it has ever been made by either of
them to me: I never heard word of
1t from any one until after the battle
with that fleet, although more than five
weeks had passed since the alleged
'reprehensible conduct had occurred.
Although Admiral Sampson used this
language to the secretary concerning
me on the 10Th day of July Cust one
week after the battleD. he has never,
to this day, in any manner or to any ex-
tent, intimated 20 me any diSapproba-
ton or mad to me any criticisms of
my conduct of the flying squadron"
Admiral Schley then submits a long
detailed statement of the facts he sum
married. in the foregoing, which is in
reply to ID request by Chairman Hale
of the naval COMMITTEES. 1t gives the
dispatches and orders received by
Schlsy and describes the conditions in
which the ships had to coal. as we'll as
the sailing for Santiago. He also re-
fers TO the doubts that arose as to the
presence of the Spanish fleet in San
tago after he had arrived off that port.
Captain Sigshee stated verbally that
he had been close into port several times
and there were no indications that the
enemy was present and he doubted its