The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-11-04

always urging the military men to pro |
pare for war. The Cabinet at MalOlos !
decided to send to the PRESIDE 1t of th' !
United States the propositions above |
mentioned. but Aguinaldo did not ~ sh
to do so. He first stated that ho d..
sired to translate them into TagaloE.
and afterward that he wishel TO put
them into cipher, and so delayed the
sending.
PLOT TO ATTACK OUR FORCES IN
AND OUTSIDE OF MANILA.
Danger signals now multiplied.
Aguinaldo endeavorAj to get the war
making power transferred from con-
gress to himself. lie also urged a
heavy bond issue { y secure $1,000, GOO for
the purchase of arols and amulunlj'on
Ii is now known that elaborate plons
had been perfected for simultaneous
attack by the forces within and with
out Manila. The militia within the
city numbered approximately 10000.
They We're armed for the most part
with bolos. Gen. Pho del Pillar slept in
the city every night. No definite date
had been set for the attack, but
signal by means of rockets had been
agreed upon. and II was universally
understood that it would come upon
the occurrence Of the first act on the
part of the American soldiers which
would offer a DreteXt, and in case OF
lllt ldth vi SuCll dClt III lIlt h'ul i'''t'
at all events.
Persistent attempts were made to
provoke our soldiers to fire. The in
| surgents were insOlent to our guards
and made persistent and continuous et-
| forts to push them back and advance
! the insurgent lines further into the
| city of Manila. 1t was long and try
! ing period of insult and abuse heaped
upon our soldiers, with constant sub
mission as the only means of avoiding
an open rupture. The FilipinOS had
| concluded that our soldiers were cow
| ards and boasted openly that we were
| afraid Of them. Rumors were always
! prevalent that our army would De at
tackled at once. With great tact ana
patience. the Commanding General had
| held his forces in check, and he now
| made a final effort to preserve the
| peace BY appointing a commission to
! meet a similar body appointed by
! AguinaldO and to confer with regard
! to the situation of affairs and to arrive
at mutual understanding Of the in
| tent. purposes. aims and desires of the
! Filipino people and of the people Of the
| United states" The sessions were held
| daily, the last occurring on Jan. ,, six
! days before the outbreak of hostilities.
| No substantial results were obtained;
! the Filipino commissioners being either
| unable or unwilling to give any definite
/
aims of their people" At the close Of
| the last session they were given full
assurances that no hostile act would
! be inaugurated by the United States
! troops
The critical moment had now arrived.
Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos
| who were friendly to him to seek refuge
outside the city. The Nebraska reEi-
ment at that time was in camp on the
! east line at Santa Mecca, and was
| guarding its front. For davs before
the memorable 4th of February. 1890.
| the OutDOstS i'm front of the regiment
had been openly menaced and assaulted
| by insurgent soldiers: they We're at
| tempting to push our outposts back
| and advance their line. They made
light of our sentinels and persistently
| ignored their orders.
FILIPINOs BEGIN THE WAR.
On the evening of Feb. an insurgent
officer came to the front with a detail
OF men and attempted to pass the guard
! on the San Juan bridge, our guard
| being stationed at the west end of the
bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove
them back without firing. but a few
| minutes before 9 O'Clock that evening.
a large body Of insurgent troops made
an advance on the South Dakota out
posts, which fell back rather than fire.
About the same time the insurgents
came in force to the east end of the
San Juan bridge in front of the Ne
braska regiment. For several nights
prior thereto a lieutenant in the insur-
gent army had been coming regularly
to our OutDOSt No. of the Nebrask
regiment and attempting to force the
outpost back and insisting on posting
his guard within the Nebraska lines.
and at this time and i'm the darkness he
again appeared with a detail of about
SIX men and approached Private Cray
son of COMPANY ID, First Nebraska
volunteers, the sentinel on duty at out
post No. ,. He, after halting them
three times without effect. fired killing
the lieutenant, whose men returned the
IRE and then retreatcd immediately
rockets were sent up by the FilipinOs
ana they commenced firing all along
the line.
The story OF the actual fighting has
otten been told by military men who
were engaged in il, and We do not deem
1t necessary to give n description Of
1t here. 1t is known of all men that
Immediately after the first shot the
insurgents opened fire all along their
line end continued to fire until about
midnight, and about 4 o'clock on the
morning of Feb 3, the Insurgents again
opened fir" all around the city. and
kept it up until the Americans charged
them and drove them with great
slaughter out Of their trenches
After the LANDING Of our troops AG-
uinaldo made up his mind that If would
be necessary 10 fight the Americans
and after the making Of the treaty.
of peace at Paris this determination
was strengthened IIc did not openly
declare that he intended to fight the
Americans, but he excited everybody,
and especially the military men. by
claiming independence. and it is doubt.
full whether nc had the power to check
or control the army at the time hos
| tilities broke out. DeplOrabie as war
is, the one i'm which we are now en-
gagged was unavoidable by us. We are
attacked by a bold. adventurous and
enthusiastic army. No alternative was
left to us except ignCminOus retreat.
1t is not to be conceived of that any
American would have sanctioned the
surrender Of Manila to thh insurgents,
! our obligations to other nations and
to the friendly FilipinCs. and to our
selves and our flag, demanded that
force should be met by frrce. What
ever the future of the Philippines may
be, there Is no course oDen To MS now
except to prosecute the war until the
insurgents are reduced to submission.
The commission Is Of the opinion there
had been no time since the destruction
OF the Spanish squadron by Admiral
Dewey when IL was possible to with
draw our forces from the islands either
with honor to ourselves or with safety
to the inhabitants.
CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY.
As q result of the lighting Of Feb.
4 and the insurgents We're CVerywherR
driven back and the United States
forces soon occupied a line extending
from Pasai on the south TO Caloocan
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