The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1899-02-21
ORDERS PROMPTLY 0BEYED
WHY He DELAYED PROCEEDING
TO SANTIAGO.
Draws a Contrast Between the Re
ports of Sampson and Himself
After the Destruction of
Cervera's Fleet.
Special Dispatch to The Call.

:
mission 10 answer the charges recently
made against him in a communication
=. sent to the Senate, to-day handed TO the
Committee on Naval Affairs his state
ment. in which he disclaims any purpose
of controversy with the Navy Depart
n1ent The letter of the department, he
, saws so far as il relates to him, can be
summarized under the following heads:
The DELAY of Cienfuegos; that alleged
slow progress toward Santiago de Cuba
from CianfuegOs; the retrogade move
ments of the 26th and 9th of May; the
battle of Santiago and the destruction Of
Cervera S fleet
. The admiral says his orders from
Sampson on May 10 were to blockade
d. Cienfvegos. which he proceeded to do. He
had 10 knowledge that there were any
insurgents about Cienfuegos who were
friendly until the Marblehead arrived on
the oath. Then he sent Commander NC
Gala of the Marblehead ashore 10 estab-
lish relations with the insurgents, the re-
3:16 n M on Nav "a. Then. for the first
time. he learned definitely that the span
ish fleet was not at Cientueegosi Mlthlh
What possible ground for criticism,
he saws, adverse to me there can be in
acting under orders which gave me en-
tire discretion, and yet clothed me with
the responsibility OF going TO Santiago
only after ] was sausfed that the Meet
was not at Cienfuegos;
He quotes, from the dispa,tehe5 IS :, OF OF.
samp3R of MAY Mann, ~ N bo Tf his ' eet off
Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have
put into Santiago they must come either
p. 10 Havana or 10 Cienfuegos TO deliver
the munitions which they are said to
bring for use in Cuba.
Il am therefore of the opinion that the
best chance to capture these ships will
be to hold the two points, Clenfuegos ana
Havana with all the force We can mus
ter If later it should develop that these
oGe- ut Sar la 90 " $
p sembe off that port the ships best suited
for the purpose and completely blockade
it. Until we then receive more positive
information we shall continue TO hold l1a-
Vana and CienfuegOS.'
Admiral Schley said: This letter is not
printed either in the appendix or eXecu
tive document G. but l received it on the
23d. and it shows that l was expected 10
hold my squadron off Cienfuegos."
AS to the slow progress toward San
tiago on account of the Eagle, he states
that she was part of the force which
Admiral Sampson had seen fit to send
him, and he had no right to abandon
her The weather also was rough and not
much better speed could have been kept
up. He had been ordered to proceed
:'"oautiouSly." If, however, he had known
that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago
no consideration of the Eagle or any one
else would have prevented him from get
=. ting there at the earliest possible mo-
ment with the larger vessels. but the
70 weather and sea made it impossible to do
better than he did. Speaking OF the re
:: tary, adapting the language of Admiral
Sampson, chsraCteriZes as ''reprehenstble
conduct" Admiral Schley says that in
"forty-tWo years service never was such
language used to characterize conduct of
mine, and 1 see no reason for it now
He adds: Acting in accordance with
my best judgment, in view Of the clrcum-
{: stances, without certain knowledge of the
whereabouts Of the Spanish fleet, after
> laying been informed by the scouts COM
manded by such officers as Sigsbee,
o.. Jewell and Wise, that although they had
g. been OFF Santiago for week they had
.; seen nothing of it and knew nothing of
its movements or its whereabouts since 1t
had left Curacao, after having been as
sured by Sgsbee that he did not believe
it was in Santiago and by the emphatic
declaration of the pilot, NuneZ; and
knowing that the sea and weather
then were 1t would be impossible TO coal
my squadron off the port. l deemed it
best TO take the action did, the final re-
suit of which was the location of the en-
emy'S fleet in Santiago harbor."
AS to the battle Of Santiago Admiral
-Schley says the facts of that contest
speak for themselves. He quotes from
his official report to Sampson in which he
congratulated the commander of the
. squadron and said the victory seems big
enough for all of US: He asks the com
mittee to contrast his reports ard those
Of Sampson containing references to him
self and continues: AS to all this critf-
Cistn of my course prior TO the discovery
of Cervera's fleet with that of Admiral
Sampson or the department. none of it
. has ever been made by either of them to
/ o
one. until after the battle with that fleet,
although more than five weeks had passed
since the alleged 'reprehensble conduct
had occurred. Although Admiral Samp-
son used this language to the Secretary
concerning me on the 10th day of July
Gust one week after the battle) he has
never TO this day, in any manner or to
any, extent intimated to me any disappro-
baton or made to me any criticism of
my conduct of the flying squadron
Admiral Schley then submits long de-
tailed statement of the facts ne summar-
lied in the foregoing, which is in reply to
z. request by Chairman Hale OF the Naval
Committee. 1t gives the dispatches and
. orders received by Schley and describes
the condition in which the ships had to
coal. well as the sailing for Santiago.
90 He also refers to the doubts that arose
as to the presence Of the Spanish fleet
m Santiago after he had arrived off that
port. Captain Sigsbee stated verbally
that he had been close in to port several
times and there were no indications that
the enemy was present and he doubted
The commanding officer of the Harvard
reported that he did not have coal enough
TO reach a home base and could not steam
beyond twenty-foUr or thirty hours
which the admiral says forced him to
send the Harvard to Kingston. The Yale
and Minneapolis could reach Key West
g. and the st. Paul could remain at most OF
the ports but for two days. The Brook
'lyn, Iowa and Massachusetts were fairly
well off with COAL but the Texas, Marble
head and Vixen were considerably reduc-
ed. The projecting sponsors of the Texas
and Marblehead made it dangerous 10
coal them alongside the collier with any
swell on the open sea.
at was this situation" says the state.
ment, coupled with the conclusion that
the Spanish squadron might have touched
and then moved west as reported at Glen,
. fpegos, and reinforced by the fact that
q Sigsbee had not seen them. and that the
pilot Nunez was strongly impressed wifi
the doubt that this squadron could enter
the port. which occasioned my telegram
of May q
He then states that the chief engineers
-.of the collier, after much hard work. dis
connected the broken engines. while being
taken in tow and the weather and sea
moderating. orders were given to cast of
the tow line after about three hours
steaming west. Captain Sigsbee is quoted
as confirming the opinion to the diff.
fculty of coaling off Santiago. He gives
the details Of the absolute location of the
Spanish squadron inside the harbor or
May 20. which discovery was, the admira
saws the result of determination to sat.
isfy himself fully before leaving for the
west On the 31st ne made a reconnois
sance, ito develop the enemy's position
and incidentally TO injure or destroy Il
possible the Colon. moored well up in the
harbor The question of the presence OF
the enemy determined. he decided not Il
II