The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1899-05-08
Will Be Necessary In Philippines
For Some Time.
MONEY FOR THE FILIPINOS
COMPENSATION FOR THEM THE
SAME AS CUBANS.
Speculation AS to Whether They
Should Be Paid and What Amount
Daring and Bravery of Ameri-
can Soldiers-Scheme to Make
States of Porto Rico and Hawaii.
fspecial Correspondencel

Especial Correspondence
Washington. d. c., May 6.-Adjutant
General Corbin said to your correspon-
dent this afternoon that the question of
recruiting volunteer army of 5000 men
had not been considered by the officials of
the war department.
Il have heard nothing about it, he
said, except from persons who want
commissions and in the newspapers
There is no reason TO doubt this en-
tirely frank statement by the adJutant
general. The administration has not been
at all DESTROYS of calling out this large
number of troops, although the military
eXigencieS of the situation have seemed
to demand an extensive increase in the
army If the purpose TO hold the Philip
pines continues d part of the admins
tration'S policy This large increase in
the army in the Philippines is essential.
whether the inSurgent war continues or
not, for whatever the course taken by
the leaders, there will probably be bands
of insurgents operating In guerilla war
fare for many years, notably in the south
ern part of the archipelago, never actu-
ally held by the SpaniardS and under the
dominion of the Mussulman sultan Sulu.
Since the inSurgent chieftains nave
asked a cessation of hostilities 1t has
been said that promises of compensation
to the Philippine soldiers as they disband
may be made, something along the line
of the arrangement made with General
Gomez in Cuba. In the case of the Fill
pinos, however, this compensation, if
paid, would take on very different color
from the sums given to the Cuban COM
mander. However little assistance Gomez
and his men may have been to the Amer
lean army in Cuba. they were ostenslbly,
at least, associated with the Americans
in the defeat of the Spaniards. 1t is
only by conceding that Aguinaldo was
really an ally of the Americans after
Dewey's battle at Manila that any ar
rangements with his lieutenants or his
men could be justly compared with that
made with Gomez. And this course
taken would be practically confession
that the failure to recognize Aguinaldo.
which led to the series of battles this
winter in the Philippines. was a serious
error on the part of our government
Money For Filipinos.
The amount of money which might be
employed in diSbanding the Philippine |
army has been estimated at about the [
same as that to be distributed among the I
followers of Gomez. AguinaldoS army, |
although more effective than that of the /
Cuban leader, is hardly as numerous The !
final estimates are that GomeZ's army /
contained something like 10000 men. 1t /
is not believed that the Philippine chief !
tain had to exceed $1,000 at any time I'M
der arms.
The propriety of the use of money, if it |
is employed in connection with the Fill !
pino negotiations, may be questioned as a /
matter of morals but there is no doubt |
that it would be along the lines of the |
dealings of England, Russia and France !
in settling controversies with OrientaI .
peoples. England has always been cred
tied with using vast funds, which have
been quite as effective her splendid /
soldiery in settling difficulties with alb
original people.
army dispersed, it may be money well
expended in saving lives of American sol
diers. and the result will probably be
gratefully received by the relatives and
friends of the regiments now in the Phil
ippines. regardless of what the final judg-
ment of the people may be as TO methods
employed in ending the war.
Daring of Our Soldiers.
No soldiers ever bore themselves with
more daring or gave more evidences of
dashing Valor than the American regu-
lars and volunteers in the Philippines.
The fact that the actual conquest and
domination of those islands would have
taken years and a largely increased army
of our soldiers or the success that at
tended their every battle with the in
With only a fraction of the
to subdue Burmah. or France to take
the small American army
has been ever victorious over an lnsur-
gent force fighting on the defensive and
fully twice the number of ef-
fectiveS that were embraced in the Amer
can army. .
ong and bitter experience in the Soudan
and the still unfinished task which France
mas in Tonquin. it will be seen that the
american SOluler mas uoue Ills Auli uNtS
n the matter of colonial expansion. and
f the propriety of the policy and its con-
-inuance shall be matters of severe con-
.roVersy in the next campaign. no sort OF
reflection upon these soldiers Will be
thought or implied. They have done their
,uli duty, whatever may be said of the
policy of expansion for which they fought
Or the administration which sent them 10
DattIe in the far-off Oriental jungles.
With the practical closing of extensive
operations in the island, the question of
=, # "a N-Tl
lnteers again comes uppermost. 1t is not
probable that they can come home any
EARLIER than has been previously suggest
ID. 1t will take about sixty days for the
to arrive for the relief of
he volunteer regiments. But the cesSa-
ion of hoStilities will, of course, operate
% render certain the return of the volun-
GERS.