The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-12-17
Tho Critical situation OF tho British
EmDire.

Writing Immediately after the defeat OF
Gen. BUTLER, the London Times said that
tho English nation has not been con-
fronted by 20 painful and anxious situa-
ton since tho Indian Mutiny." Actually.
however. England and the British Empire
must go far back Of that Indian episode to
find anything approaching parallel OF the
present situation, II, indeed, in all English
history there has been any likeness to il.
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 made mani
fest violent and widespread native dis.
content with British rule which rendered
necessary vigorous reprcssivo measures.
which were applied successfully. Tho de-
feat Of Gen. BUTLER, following In rapid
succession the similar defeats OF Gen.
GATACRE and Lord MErHURN and the earlier
reverscs OF Gen. WHITE, has been OF far
gravcr consequence. The military pres
tige OF England has received a stunning
blow. Tho standing OF the British Empire
as q fir t-class power OF the world as tine
foremost power, Is put TO n test more
severe and searching than any other IL has
been called on to endure in a century
England entered upon this war with tho
Beers without n single misgiving. and there
was mono in its army. Its confidence OF
speedy and complete victory was absolute
Gen. BULLER himself, upon leaving Eng
land for the field, loosely and vauntinglv
proclaimed his intention Of eating his
Chr stmns dinner at Pretoria. Throughout
England, and more especially in the Lon
don Stock Exchange, the contest was re-
gardod simply AZ an easy opportu-
nifty for the British army TO dem
onstrate its resistlesS power; and even
in foreign countries the moro or less
speedy victory Of England was looked
upon as almost n foregone conclusion.
1t is true that acute and wcll.informcd
military critics, in our own and other
armies, had long questioned the efficiency
Of the British military system and the
practical ability Of the British officers TO
meet the exactions OF modern war: but the
general public, more particularly the
English public itself. had formed
conception Of British military resource
and prowess which made impossible 10 It
the thought that n State like that Of the
littlo South African Republic could with
stand them for more than n fcw weeks II
they were exertcd oven to small part OF
their extent.
The conduct of the British campaign has
empty justified these military criticisms.
1t has not only not Afforded any example Of
gencralshp on the English side indicative
OF capacity to deal with present mill
tary conditions and exigenclcs, but it has
also demonstrated continuously from the
battle OF Glencoe to the defeat Of BUTLER at
the Tugela River tho incapacity the care
less training and the professional ignor-
ance OF the British officers, while on the
side of the Beers and their Free State allies
all the requirements OF such warfare have
been satisfied in n distinguished degree;
the whole military ability has been with
them. The English officers have neglected
Professionally the precautions requisite in
every war with n civilized people, and have
proceeded as II their mere approach, with
nll the pomp and circumstance OF war, was
OF Itself enough to strike confusion into
tho heart OF the stoutest foe Probably
there Is no other army in tho world in
which the officers, as mass, have given
less thought and less heed to professional
study and preparation than tho English.
KIPL1SG's stories, though written to ap-
incidentally. this deplorable negligence.
Sports and pastmcs take the place OF
arduous military manpuvrc3 and patient
study OF tho practical questions and prob
lens OF war. or course, as papers OF the
United Service Institution bear witness.
there are conspicuous exceptions known
throughout the military world but the
great run OF British officers have deceived
themselves with tho notion that their
personal bravery only rendered them
competent for their duty, though OF
course mere animal courage is n relatively
Insignificant element in war. Foreign mil
itary students visiting England have long
been surprised 10 find SO much OF probes
slonnl Ignorance among officers OF the
army; they are likely to know more about
the history OF the mess plate than about the
construction and capacity of their ordnance
and the details OF their duties.
The bitter test OF the South African war
Is simply bringing TO view the inevitable con-
sequences those pervasive defects in the
training OF British officers They are
compelled to surrender to forces OF
boer farmers, regulars yielding to vol
untccrS' Tho errors and mlscalculatiops.
the caralessness and neglect of the first
principles OF modern war, with the display
OF which they began, have been repeated
almost without variation from Glencoe to
IugeIa River, whether the commander was
WHITE or GATAcRE, METHUEN or BUI1HR,
ana always with the same disastrous con-
sequences, So far. they have learned no |
lesson. Meantime, probably inferior forces |
OF the Beers are beating them continuously
with a relatively small loss. The strategy |
OF the British campaign, with it's division |
OF the three columns. led respectively by |
dArAcRE, METHuRN and BUILnR, has proved |
80 lar defective that now It may be said