The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-08-07

| lows: New South Wales, 20; Victoria,
| %; Queensland, 10; South Australia, 7 /;
Tasmania, 8, and West Australia, 8. 1t is
obvious that whether In the House OF Rep
resentatives alone or in the two houses sit
ting conformity, the two largest colonies,
New South Wales and Victoria II com
bined, can always outvote all the other
colonies put together Nothing, therefore,
can prevent legislation tending to subor-
dlnate the interests OF the smaller to those
OF the larger colonies to the virtual efface-
ment OF State lines, and to the gradual con-
version OF a federation into highly CEN
tralized commonwealth
To the overwhelming voting power pos
scssed in the Federal Parliament by the
two largest colonies will be added the com
plete control OF the Federal Executive and
all tho means OF influencing legislation
which that control implies. The authors
OF the Australian Constitution have made
what to American onlookers seems the
fatal mistake OF adopting for their Federal
Executive tho Parliamentary instead OF the
Presidential type. In the Australian Com
monwealth tho Governor-General to he
appointed Ivy the British sovereign, will
he n nero fiGurchcad. Tho real execu-
tive power Is to bc vested in Fcd-
Crnl Executive Council, consisting OF not
moro than sovcn members, every one of
whom must he q member OF one or the
other House Of Parliament. In practice
this Cabinet will be responsible to the
House Of Representatives alone, because,
as we have shown. the Senate virtually has
only power Of suspcnsory veto. This
ntt NJ 4
with federation is unqucstionahly doomed
to failure. Sir RICHARD BAKER n delegate
from South Australia to tho convention by
which the Commonwealth bin was framed
was undoubtedly right when he declared
that "cithcr federation will destroy re-
sponsiblc government or responsible gov
eminent will destroy federation
It Is easy to foreaeo which of tho two
things will give way under the Australian
Constitution. Federation and responsible
government could CoeXSt only where all
the constituent States, without regard to
population, were equally represented in
both houses OF the Federal Legislature.
The figures that we have given above
demonstrate that, under the provisions OF
the Australian Constitution, the Cabinet
will be. Mt all times, solely accountable to
the majority OF the House of Reprcsonta-
tives furnished by New South Wales and
Victoria. so long as those two colonies shall
choose to act together.
1t may be said that, If their past relations
afford any criterion, New South Wales and
Victoria are unlikely to cooperate. It
should be borne in mind however that
hitherto these two colonies have differed
mainly because Victoria has been sturdy
champion Of protection, while New South
Wales, as rule, has been ms distinctly favor
able to free trade. Under the federative
system, all the colonies will be committed
to protectonist policy, inasmuch as the
collective revenues will he derived chiefly
from customs duties. Henceforth New
South Wales and Victoria will be no longer
separated by divergent fiscal principles,
and they will soon awaken to the fact that
confederation has given to them conformity
the power Of dominating the Australian
Continent.