The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-01-18
Who Would Profit by the Rejection Of
= the Treaty?

There are two kinds of nti-expansionists
In the Senate namely, those who wish to
bring about the rejection of the treaty, and
those who are willing to vote for the treaty,
but are resolved thereafter to favor any
method of solving the Philippine problem
except the annexation of the islands.
The latter are much more far-sighted than
the former, for the expansionists have
nothing to lose by the rejection of the
treaty, which would simply cause us to re-
vert to a state of war, and place everything
connected with the Philippines in the con-
troll OF the President under the war powers
vested in the Executive during tho PEN
dency of a contest. Undoubtedly, the ex-
pansionists desire to see tho treaty ratified,
but that is because they deem it n good and
wise agreement, and because they believe
that the country would be Inundated in
the eyes of the world, were such an agree
meDt rejected by barely onc-third of the
Senate. They also honestly desire to put
an end, in legal fashion, to the war status,
and this can be lone in ono way only,
namely, by the conclusion of n treaty OF
pace. So far, however, as the effect Of
rejection on expansion goes, those
"a VIM 'll'F' WV 'l'hNN, 'Nlt
their opposition prove successful, would
give the President an opportunity to carry
out AN expansion policy in any way he may
see ut under the war power. They would
leave exclusively in the hands Of the Exnc,l-
t,veth treatment of the Philippines, which,
should the treaty be confirmed. at once will
piss underline control of Congress.
IL may be said that, by the rejection OF
the treaty, We should not revert ncces-
sfrllyto a state OF war, becauscth protocol
p,nNiding for an armisticc would still he
binding. We answer that the protocol was
af-recd Upon for II specific purpose, that
o" concluding II treaty OF peace, which
pprpos", in the case supposed. would
hHic failed of ruiiiimcnt. Moreover, the
protocol is voidRblc nj the option of either
party. Even if the protocol should not be
abrogated, and negotiations for n treaty
should be renewed, we should continue for
an indefinite period to occupy, in the eye
of international law. precisely the same
status which we have occupied technically
since the protocol was signed, and which
we occupy to-day. That status is one Of
war, and, so long as II shall last, all the war
powers which he has exercised hitherto will
remain in the Presidents hands. HI would
be entirely at liberty to treat the Filipinos.
for example, whose allegiance has never
been transferred legally from Spain, as pub
lie enemies of the United States. This is,
apparently, the last thing that tho ant!-cx-
prnsionists desire.
1t Is clear. then, That the auti-cNpnnsion-
lists have nothing to gain by the rejection
OF the treaty. Who, then, would profit by |
1t? Obviously, they would profit by IL who
secretly wish that the military occupation
OF Cuba shall be pr0tracted rs long MS pos
sible, In the dishonest hope that some pre-
text may arise for breaking the promise of
Congress to give that island indcpcn-
denrc. Should the treaty be confirmed,
1t is possible hat the requisite AZ
rangements for elcctinG in Cuba a Consti-
tution-making convention might be- per-
fected atan early date, SO as TO render need
less the retention of any considerable body
of United States troops in the island during
the approaching sickly season. Should all
the American troops now stationed there
have to be retained, owing to the technical
Of the state of war through
the rejection of the treaty, the responsible
ty for the mortality that may ensue will
rest upon the opponents of the treaty.
There are not wanting Others who would