The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-01-18
SHIPS AND PORTS COMPARED
Captain Mahap Criticised for Not
Perceiving Relation of the Navy
in Coast Defence.

From the London Times.
There is certainly some lack of luci-
dity in Captain Mahan's recent hand
ling of the subject of coast defence,
and some confusion of thought in his
statement that "a navy is essentially
an offensive and not defensive organ
iZatiOn." As timely protest against
the theory of naval defence implied in
the term coast defence ships" this
proposition might pass muster; but
obviously for Powers such as the
United Kingdom. whose territories are
separated by sea from those of pos
sible enemies a navy is, as "NaValis'
says, primarily a defensive force. 1t
defends its own country from invasion
by pursuing attacking and destroying
the only form of hostile force that
could render invasion possible--that is,
the enemy's fleet. In other words, ii
defends by taking the offensive. It's
purpose is defensive though its meth
DDS are offensive. 1t acts on the prin-
ciplc enunciated by Farragut--"The
more you hurt the enemy the less likely
he is to hurt you" But a navy can
hurt badly-that is, it can achieve the
decisive ends Of war-on its own ele-
ment alone. 1t is as i'll qualified to at
tack coasts as ii is directly to defend
them. Indirectly it can defend them
completely by acting on vigorous Of
fensive against the organized naval
forces of it's adversary, directly it can
defend them only inadequately and
can attack them hardly at all For
oVersea operations of any moment
against hostile territory the co-opera-
nf hp ic
essential, and when that business is on
hand the army becomes the offensive
force properly so called. but only on
the condition that the navy has first
discharged it's defensive function to the
full by establishing its command of
the sea and thereby securing the COM
muniCatiOns of the army.
1t is certain, on the one hand, that
well equipped forts will rarely be at
tackled and never overcome by ships
alone, but this is no argument for pas
sve and sedentarv coast defence, be-
cause it is equally certain, on the other
hand, that no forts, however well
equipped, will prevent invasion or in
vestment by an enemy who has es-
| tabliShed an assured command of the
sea and possesses military force ade-
quate to the undertaking. Hence the
question of the sufficiently or insulfi-
cheney of coast fOrtitications cannot be
| proftably or even intellgently dis
cussed in the abstract and without re-
gard to the postulate or datum Of sea
| supremacy. This is the great truth
which Golden clearly dscerned more
| than generation ago, and which Cap
| tain Mahan seems in some degree to
| have missed, in spite of the experiences
| of the late war. For this country, at
| any rate. the problem can only be
| stated, as Golden almost alone among
| his contemporaries had the insight to
"Navalis;" "It is essential that our
navy should be able to take the often
| sive on the sea; if it cannot do so we
| perish as a great nation. Given this con-
ditiOn, what probable demands can be
| made upon passive coast defences? Our
| long history supplies the answer" The
| history of the late war supplies the
| same answer for the United States
| Cuba could never have been freed nor
| Spain defeated if the navy of the
| United States had been unable to take
| the offensive on the sea. Captain Mahan
| has done us the honor of quoting with
| approval our statement that "the mo-
| ment Admiral Cervcras fleet was de-
| stroyed the war was practically at an
| end" Surely If the naval force of the
| United States was equal to the de-
| structiOn of Admiral Cervera's fleet ii
| was a fortiori more than equal to the
protection of it's own coasts.