The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-11-07
THE STAFF SYSTEM OF THs ARMY.
An Army Oficer Comments on the Adiu-
tnnt .tiencraIs Praise for Them.


tsnt.GenoraI's Praise for Them.
To THE EDITOR OF The suS--Sir: The Ad-
jutant- General OF the Army In His annual re-
port makes the following statement in regard
10 the stan OF our Army: Much has been
written OF late concerning better stah sys-
tenn. Ours may be. and doubtless IL. open TO
improvements. but II should be borne In mind
that the present organization II the result OF
years OF legislation, born Of the best thought
and labors OF our best military men. and has
stood successfully the test Of all our wars"
This 10 a bold defence OF the present stan
system. but II will hardly be accepted by the
line OF the Army. Tho experiences Of the
army In the camps established at the opening
Of the war. at Port Tampa and at Santiago. in
the muster out OF tho volunteers. and even at
the present time at the various seacoast
posts are too vivid in the minds OF those con-
cernsd to be forgotten or passed By. without q
protest against such general praise as 10 In
volved In tho above statement.
The Adjutant- Generals Department showed
the weakness OF it's organization. first. In the
lack OF INSTRUMENTATION betwcen tho
bureaus ana offices OF tho War Department
ITSELF so that. for example, ono OF the Adju-
nt-Generais would DO writing or telegraph
ing to some far-dlstant point Tor information
which had long before been furnished TO an
other Adjutant- General in the Same build
ing. but In a different offlce. This. I
am told. was not accidental but OF
constant occurrence. and Is certainly duo
To imperfect organization. Secondly. In issuing
inadequate or contradictory orders or In fall
ing to Issue orders that were necessary: exam
pies OF this point will be found In tho official
reports. In reliable newspaper reports and in
personal "reminiscences OF reputable persons.
such as those OF Capt. Bgelow. and many
cases will be fresh in the minds OF those who
participated In the Santiago cam paign or wers
IN the camps where tho troops were assembled.
as well as those on muster-out duty.
Tho complaints In regard to this subject
were constant. OF course IL 10 natural for SOL
disrs in the field to complain whom subjected
TO dscomforts. for what appear to them insufll-
Client reasons. ind II Ia also natural that some
mistakes should occur when the work OF the
Adjutant- Generals Department was suddenly
Increased enormously. but the Adjutant-
General claims that tho system stood the test
Of all our wars and am merely trying TO show
that It dii not DO SO rs well rs 1t might have
with more perfect organization and training.
The Quartermaster's Department-but IL is
not necessary TO recall the confusion 10 the
transportation Of the troops % the points Of as
sembly for our late war. In Tampa, or at Guam
tanamo or Daiguiri. Gen Merritt's and MAJOR
story's reports have some Interesting infornia-
ton On the subject Of the efficiency ot this de-
partment The former says briefly:
Il desire, in addition. to call especial alton
ton to III" following points in the report OF tho
Il. The failure o, the Quartermaster's De-
partment to make timsly provision for housing
the garrisons at new artillery posts"
Major story Gen. Merr,t's Artillery Insp.e-
tor goes NOR. into detail. lie shows that in
the spring OF IL. X artillery troops were ordered
to take station at nine new forts. in the de-
pArtment. extending from Maine to North Caro-
Although Notifications for these posts were
for one or more years under construction, yet
~ no case did the pnartermaster General an:
ticipa'c the arrival of troors 10y the building OF
quarters, barracks and storehouses. and
though the stations mentioned were occupied
autumn that even the so-called temporary
shelter" was provided.
This Temporary shelter Il n wretched make
shift for proper quarters. and on account Of
its perish1bl9 duality such quarters are very
m ,rh. 10 me dioSerhment az posts
structed at n later date"
The report continues that this year artillery
troops were ordered to four new posts. aud the
same delay in regard to housing them il now
being EXPERIENCED. IL also calls attention to
the unJu.tiiaOs neglect ~ the Quartermaster's
Department IA providing "a proper water supply
at these posts. and concludes with the follow
ing pertinent statement:
$50 far us the artillery is concerned, ] cannot
see that the 'luartermaster-G"ne ever an
ticinates their needs aud provides for them
will he required can be readily ascertained
years in advance OF the time Of occupation by
The officers Of the line at Tampa. almost
Without eXsen,iSn' cried oa, . against the
' sr t" lie SPIRITS o, ali wa. ' ~.
work OF the Quartsrnestcr's Derartment.
for AL SUPPLIES. from whatever department.
portation. and that determines whether or not
they will reach their destination in good con-
TO be- In too much Capitalization: for every
little action OF ouartermaster he must first
Quartermas'cr or the Quartermaster.I General
Indeed. tho Ouartermastess who Succeeded
best wrrs those who took respons bilities on
large scale gave orders and made purchases
nnd contracts without the proper authority
trusting TO having their action approved after
system In vogue IN tho Quartermaste- Depart-
ment. but to a violation OF IT,
Did the Subsistence Department stand sue
cessfuy the test OF all our warsg" There /.
nothing. next TO their proper clothing and
hon nmn that good , company eommanler is
the mons ratlons and mess. and in time OF war
II ison par with tho former concern: i II does
partnsnt is very efficient in time OF peace. hut
war 10 the true test OF the value Of a system.
n storm such "a has seldom gathered over the
head OF special department OF supplies or
The Ordnance Department has had its attsn-
ton called 10 it's In, PROJECTIONS in such strong
terms. especially as regards Its failure to have
that it is hardly necessary to make any further
comments, But there are a few other points.
referred 10 There was some excuse foE the he
coast a-iIIcry heavy guns not being supplied
with sufficient proJecties. for the ma
terra! ,,%as o new and recently installed
good H., condition .eNssnt a. 70 powder:
state, and Gen. John \. Rodgers had a SIN.
p:ntou' task Ia perform TO get It into my sort
Of shape at Tampa before 1t could lie taken To
Santiago; i was slow to arrive, wrong parts
were sont. the carriages did not NJ the p!rcs.
and everything went about as wrong as it
hardly q single piece could have been used.
Again; the d"paT,ment had failed 70 adopt n
i is princ'ple laid down ty our
gums OF a fort should at least equal those which
any fleet can bring to bear on IT,, But the Ord
nance Department had proyi icd none and vet
our government bought what IL could OF The
English Armstrong kind when the war opened
why did tho department not have a supply on
handt IL they have No good rapid-nre pattern
OF their own. why not rccommcn nj the best for.
eiRn pattern obtainnble and adopt /: until they
Turning 10 Major Story's report again. we
lnd that not n single artillery fire command
~ the niteu States is properly equipped. -
that IS. the equipment for position finding.
control and direction Of fire has not been sup
piled by the Ordnance Department. The act