The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-01-19

of an efficient engineer personnel, and II
Is said that the navy should neither
| spare trouble nor expense in secur-
ing it.
Reference is made to the VOYAGE
across the Pacific of the monitors Mo-
nadnock and the Monterey. 1t is said
these were quite remarkable as far as
sea efficiency is concerned, but when 1t
comes to war efficiency, they had better
not be relied upon. On this point Cap
tain Mahan is quoted to the effect tina
1or harbor defense even land fortifica-
lions are better than monitors, while
at sea and in bombardment they are
too unstable for good gun practice.
me admiral says that the war did
not disclose what the results might be
OF serious battle between armor
clads and coast forts. He says the
Americans in these instances have
never gone close enough to make it
possible to note decisive results on
either side. They should not be blamed
for this. If they could obtain their OBJ
1ect without taking greater risk 1t
and they certainly did attain their OBJ
ject. The great injuries, however.
which the Americans claim to have in
fiicted at different times have subse-
quently proved to be exagserations
and decisions. The Americans had
|
when the latter found that they could
not reach the American ships they
stopped firing. whereupon it was
thought they had silenced the batteries.
After all the commandments of Santi-
ago there was but one gun dismounted
| in each of the two batteries. 1t is,
therefore, demonstrated that the ships
We're unable to seriously injure land
Notifications at great distances.
The employment of torpedo boats for
commandments, as at Cardenas, is con-
demned, and the so-called dynamite
cruiser is pronounced to be failure,
even in the estimation of the Ameri-
| cans. This is also the case of the ram
katahdin.
1t is said that the obstruction of har-
bors by mines and vessels did not come
into play. At Manila the Spanish
failed to close the Pasig river by sunken
vessels, as they tried. and the two
mines that blew up in front Of the
Olympia at the beginning of the battle
of Cavite We're not intended as regu-
lar obstruction of the channel, but were
part of a small mine field. They were
fired prematurely. The mines at Guam
tanamo bay might have caused serious
damage but their fuses were graVely
defective. The Santiago mines were an
better condition. One row was of
doubtful value, but the second row of
stroyed one or more ships if the en-
trance had been forced.
Treating of blocades. the admiral says
the Americans made no systematic eff
fort to destroy Spanish merchantmen,
and those they did capture ran into
their hands. A number of neutral yes
sells We're captured. but released. for
the American government in adjudicat-
ing their cases showed a liberality
which was quite unheard of in former
naval wars, and which probably had a
political background. AS the United
States, as well as Spain refrained from
privateering, although they are the very
countries which reserved that right at
the time of the Paris declaration, the
admiral says it may be assumed that
privateering is definitely at an end.
He describes at some length the land
ing of the Americans at Daiquiri
which. he says, was the largest effected
since the Crimean war. He says that
great deal was overlooked or incom-
plete. but the voyage and landing were
effected in the most beautiful weather.
The Americans had good luck, as they
always did. He declares that the Span
ish, by failing to obstruct the landing,
showed that they have no apprecia-
ton of military situa tons, for they need
not have paid much attention to the
Cubans. The admiral says 1.-The Span
ish ought to have known that now that
the Americans have arrived the Gu
bans would avoid danger more than
before"
He criticses severely what he de-
scribes as the lack of management gen.
orally in the landing. No one was in
command: Shafter did not trouble him
self about the landing, and Sampson
made arrangements only as far as his
WarShipS and boats were concerned
The officers of the transport steamers
behaved very badly, and the admiral
quotes an American reporter calling
them insolent, un-American, mutinous
towards. Under such circumstances 1t
was not strange that the men suffered
for ratiOnS.
The greatest lesson taught by the war
is the necessity for supplying coal for
Warships, for Cervera was shut up in
Santiago before he could finish coalng
owing to defective appliance. It win
be necessary in the future to carry coal
on swift, specially constructed Golfers.
with appliances for coaling at sea- and
in short time. How important it is to
own specially constructed transports,
the admiral says, was demonstrated in
the war, though principally by the lack
of vessels equipped for such service.
In conclusion, the admiral says that
while vessels built for special purposes
are expensive and troublesome in time
of peace, yet they are useful and furnish
relief in actual war, and provision
should be made to have vessels set
apart which can be easily equipped and
placed at the disposal of the navy.
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