Omaha daily bee., 1899-11-12

one part Of the composite principle would
apprehend one portion Of the object and an
other part second portion, and consequently
there would be no principle to take in the
whole object at once. The reason Is because
the parts of a material composite are dis
tinct from one another and what belongs to
one part is not communicated to another. 1t
would seem to follow, therefore, that the
cognition of composites cannot be ELECTED by
a composite principle and that only an abb
solutely simple principle can receive and
collect within itself the whole similitude
of a composite object Again, 1t is evident
that very often We experience simuNane-
ously sensations that are different and op-
posite, e. g. we see and we hear at one and
the same time and we feel heat in the hand
and cold in the foot Such an experience
requires unity and simplicity in the sensi-
tive principle Otherwise the part of the
body receiving one sensation would not and
could not feel the sensation experienced by
another part, and there would exist nothing
that could perceive, or feel both sensations
at once. 1t follows, therefore, that the hui
man soul Is simple
Intellectual cognition requires a simple
and immaterial principle. The intellect per-
ceives things that are simple and immaterial,
e. e., truth, goodness, virtue, spirit, etc. But
such simple things cannot be perceived by
composite principle. In such supposition
each part OF the composite principle would
perceive the whole thing and then
there would be as many distinct
intelligence souls as there were
parts in the principle; or each part Of
the composite principle would perceive a
part of the simple thing and from such par
tia perceptions or cogntions would result
q
possible, however, to perceive or know a
simple thing part by part. and, besides there
would exist no one principle capable of
knowing the whole thing at once. 1t fol-
lows therefore, that the perception or cog
milton of simples requires a simple and i'm
material principle
Operations of Intellect.
The intellect pronounces judgments by
which 1t declares the mutual agreement or
disagreement of notions Such judgment
requires simple principle, In order to
judge the intellect must with one simple
act take in the subject, together with the
attribute, and pronounce their relation. But
composite principle cannot with one act
| comprehend many things simultaneously,
because part OF such principle would
perceive only In part and there would be
nothing that could see the whole thing at
once, ana so make the uecldTdllon An aTBu-
ment OF the same kind Is afforded by the
reasoning process in man. In reasoning, the
principle that reasons must take in at once,
or in one glance, the conclusion, together
| with tho premises, in order to be able to
affirm or deny. Such an operation certainly
requires a simple principle. Human desire
! also requires a simple principle. Besides
tho act OF knowing, the soul exercises the
act of desiring that which 1t considers good.
| But only a simple and immaterial principle
can desire. such a principle must have at
one and the same time a knowledge and a
desire of the whole thing. Such an act can
not take place in composite substance, be-
cause each part of such substance would
possess only part OF the cogntion and the
desire and so nothing would exist that could
entertain simultaneously the whole cogni-
tion and the whole desire. Every individual
/ is conscious that il Is always one and the
game principle that acts within him, that
feels, imagines, remembers and understands.
But he never could have this consciousness
IL the soul were composite, because in such
a case the soul, or principle, would exert one
act in one particular part of itself and quite
another act In some other part. We expert
enca also that our faculties influence one
another, so much so, indeed, that II the
operation OF one faculty is unusually yehe-
ment the operations of the other faculties
become weak and slow. This fact argues