Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-04-12
secured to 1t by the Constitution OF the
United States. AS to the other plain
tits In error. citizens of Ohio, the judg-
ment must be reversed.
BROWN ". BROWN.
Supreme Court OF North Carolina,
February 81. 1899.

Supreme Court OF North Carolina.
February 81. 1899.
A PARENT is LIABLE IN DAM
AGES FOR INDUCING HIS MAR
RIED CHILD TO ABANDON HIS
WIFE, ONLY IF HE DID SO MA
LICIOUSLY.
IF HE DOES so WITHOUT TROOPER
INVESTIGATION, RECKLESSLY,
OR THROUGH DISHONEST MO-
TIVES, MALICE IS PRESUMED.
This was n suit against the defend
ant, who was the father of the plain
tiff's husband. for damages for causing
him to abandon his wife, the plaintiff.
There was judgment for PLAINTIFF and
defendant appealed.
The court says:
The first issue was in these words:
Did defendant ALLEVIATE the affection
of the plaintiffs husband. and cause
him TO abandon her, as alleged in the
complaint" His honor instructed the
jury that, IL they should find that the
defendant willfully caused the plain
tiff's husband to forsake and abandon
her, the jury should answer the first is
sue, yes" There was error in those
instructions. The word "wlllfully" does
not mean "maliciously." "Willfully"
implies that IAN act done in that spirit
is done knowingly and obstinately~ and
persiStently, but not necessarily ma
liciously." In Reed v. Reed, 33 n. T..
63S. where the defendant was the father
of the plaintiffs husband and the cause
or action the same as that in the case
before this court. 1t was said: 1.-The
law recognizes the right of the parent
in such cases to advise the son or
daughter; and when such ndvice is
given In good faith. and results in a
separation. the act does not give the
injured party 4 right of action. In such
q case, the motives of the parent are
presumed good until the contrary is
made to appear" 1t was further said
in that case that "these rules have been
generally applied in cases where the
suit was brought by the husband for
| the alienation ofhis -piife-aHa-we see
no reason why they should not, with
proper notifications, prevail when the
wife is the plaintiff" In Westlake "
Westlake. "a Ohio ST. 621. the plaintiff
was. as is the case in this action, the
wife Of the defendants son, and the
cause OF action like the one alleged in
the present case. The defendant there
requested the court to charge the jury
that. IF you find that the defendant
caused the separation. yet you shall
not render n verdict for the plaintiff
unless you find that the defendant ma
liciously caused the separation" The
S"uiI iCidScu W give the
and upon the appeal of the defendant
the appellate court said: This charge
ought to have been given" II the con-
duct of the defendant was unjustifahle
ana actually caused the injury COM
planned Of by the plaintiff. which was
question for the jury, malice in law
would be implied from such conduct.
and the court should have so charged -
we are OF the opinion, after having Civ
en- the matter the serious consideration
which 1t deserves, that, before n par
| ent can be held liable in damages for
advising his married child to abandon
ms wife or her husband the conduct
OF the parent should be alleged and
proved to be malicious that the wilful
advice and action of the parent in such
a case may not be necessarily ma
lcious, for the parent may be
determined and persistent and
obstinate in his purpose to cause the
separation. and yet he entirely free
from malice,-in fact. have in view the
highest good OF his child. Our opinion.
however. is that the malice necessary to
DC alleged and proved is not alone such
malice as must proceed from q malig-
nant and revengcful disposition, but
that it would be sufficient to prove. to
the satisfaction OF the jury, that the
parents action was taken without prop
er investigation of the facts. or where
the advice was given from recklessness
or dishonesty of purpose; the law pre-
suming malice from such conduct in
actions OF this nature. Error