New-York tribune., 1899-12-18
WHY BULLER FAILED IN NATAL.


WHY BULLER FAILED IN NATAL
Details of General Buffers reverse show that
there was no lack either OF gallantry or military
science on the British side. and that there was
fighting on large scale Harris brigade made
vigorous attempt to force a passage Of the
river, and was supported by Lyttletons brigade,
six out Of eight battalons suffering heavily.
This was followed by the attack Of Hndyard's
brigade upon the village Of Coenso in the d.
rection of the second ford in which the losses
were less severe. The loss Of artillery which
brought about the suspension Of this second
attempt to force the passage of the river was
due to lack Of adequate precautions for finding
out through scouts whether the way was Clear
and safe for the guns. AS Colonel Long who
was responsible for this maneuvre, has oeen
dangerously wounded, the military critics are
reserved In their structures He had been in a
half dozen campaigns and was considered enc
OF the coolest men In the artillery service Most
heroic efforts made to save the guns, and
Captain Schofeld young officer never before
under fire, succeeded in carrying off two Of
them. Lord Robertss son received his mortal
wound while heading rescue party.
Lord Dundonald's cavalry, with a portion OF
Barton's Fusiler brigade. was actively engaged
with the enemy, and repulsed attempt to
turn the right flank Of the British army All
four brigades were under fire. and the losses
distributed among all arms. Colonel
Brooke. who led the first attack upon the drift
severely wounded. and Colonel Bullock, Of
the Devon battalion captured with fifteen
or twenty officers.
VIEWS OF MILITARY MEN.
Military lay stress upon General Buffers
<Or af ha
when the battalions were eager to continue the
fight for the recovery OF the guns as convincing
proof Of the prudence Of his leadership. They
also resent the idea that the batteries were de-
liberately entrapped in broad daylight or that
General Butler was responsible in any degree
for this accident. They assert that generals In
the field exposed at home TO ignorant criti-
cism and charged with negecting precautions
for protecting their men, when they adopt ap-
proved scientific methods for saving life They
describe Buffers. Gatacres and Methuen's at
tempts to surprise the enemy by forced marches
at night in order to time an attack for day
break as not only scientific but humane, since
the object was to enable the troops to cross
dangerous fire under cover Of darkness.
They admit that such attempts are hazardous in
a campaign with the Dutch, who have resources
of their own for counter surprises, but they con-
tend that the only alternative in a direct frontal
attack is the exposure of troops to destructive
artillery and rife fire for long distances before
bayonet charges be delivered. They also
assert that the dangers Of turning movements
and man9uvring are greatly increased by the
deerstalking devices adopted by the Dutch, and
that the safest course is to keep the forces to-
gether and attack well in front, under cover or
heavy fire from the British artillery.
Foreign military attaches here consider the
criticism to which the British army is now ex-
posed from the Continental press as ignorant.
They assert that any European army would find
the Dutch allies most troublesome antagonists.
owing to their Irregular tactics, their remark
able mobility. their scientific mechanism Of war,
their trained European advisers and their splen-
did fighting powers in defensive warfare.
A farewell dinner TO the officers, surgeons and
nurses of the Maine last night at the Carlton