The times., 1899-03-19
FALL OF SAGASlA'S
LIBERAL CABINET
The Peace Treaty Had Little
to Do With 1t.
Finesse of Christina in Securing a
ReactiOnary Government.
SiIveIa and His Friends Are Ultra
montanes. Opposed to Press and
Religious Liberty.

Religious Liberty.
Madrid, March 1S-Strange as it may
seem to Americans, and even to Europeans
outside SPAIN Spaniards generally wasted
very few thoughts upon the Peace Treaty
or the adjournment of its approval in the
Cortes and of its ratification by the Crown,
when the ministerial and political crisis
was sprung upon the Parliament and upon
the country by coalition of Conservatives
of every shade, and of dissentient Liberals
who knew perfectly what they were about.
From the moment that Sagasta had decided
to convoke the Cortes, domestic politics
and considerations took precedence with
all Spanish politicians of all other ques-
tions, colonial, international, and even ma
terial
The Peace Treaty nominally, with the
financial bills and authorizations was in
dispensable to carry out the obligations of
the imperial and colonial treasures, the
liquidation of the war engagements, the
settlement of the national and colonial
debts, the reforms of budgets, taxation
tariff, and all other legislation necessary
to reorganize the country after unprece-
dented disasters, as well as a test not only
of the respective strength of the govern
ment and of the opposition parties in Par
Lament, but of the amount of confidence
one or the other enjoyed at court.
Hope in Delay.
Sagasta delayed the meeting of the Cor
tes so long because he was concerning a
scheme to repair the loss he had suffered
in October, when Senior Gamazo and about
third of the Liberal party seeded from
their nld bppnncn fhau apt1li
agree upon many points in home policy
with their chief. Sagasta fancied he could
patch up his party with men who, despite
their reactionary antecedents, in the
peninsula and in the colonies, had been
dismissed from the new Conservative party
organized by Senior Silvela and General
Polavieja, men who represented the worst
traditions of Spanish militarism and of
Spanish politics and administrations, men
who were deservedly dogs with bad
name, In country where unfortunately
neither society nor politicians are very
merciless or scrupulous about the short
comings of their rulers. 1t will suffice to
say that the new allies whose advances
Sagasta accepted were military men headed
by Romero Robledo, and Democrats who
had opposed Cuban home rule under Ca
nalejas. The willy old Liberal chief had
endeavored to create an impression that it
was expedient to gather these unruly, am
bilious, unscrupulous military and political
adventuIers into one of the great dynastic
parties lest they should enroll themselves
in the ranks Of Carlism and republican,
ism. Sagasta went step further to pro-
duce an impression at court, and he sought
to show that the moderate Republicans like
CASTELAR,, the parliamentary Republicans
like Salmeron Though shorn Of the sup
port of the masses and middie-class Demo-
Gratis, nowadays, either Socialists or radi-
cal Republicans with Iglesias and Pi y
MargilD, would aid the dynastic Liberals,
as long as the advent to Office of the Con-
servatives and Ultramontanes under Sill
vela and General Polavieja was prevented.
On these conditions, the government faced
the opposition in the Cortes, and it can
not be denied that Sagasta shared the
opinion of all Liberals, Democrats, and
Republicans, who believed the odds were
in his favor.
A Scheme of Coalition.
He was so convinced that his services to
the Crown and dynasty during the last
eighteen months entitled him TO expect
that he would retain at least the confidence
of the Queen Regent, even if he met OBJ
struction and double dealing in the Cortes
at the hands of Conservatives and dissen-
tient Liberals, that he determined to throw
arena from the outset in the debates and
division upon the bill authorizing the ces-
sion of the Philippines, which all Span
iards hold to have been excluded from the
first bill, authorizing only the cessions in
the West Indies and that of the island of
Guam, alone stipulated in the preliminary
peace protocol of August II at Washing
ton Sagasta had made this bill the crown
ing title in some sort of his government
because he had contended all along that 1t
was necessary, and in accordance with the
text and spirit of the constitution, to get
the Cortes first to authorize "cessions of
territories, renunciations of sovereignty"
with a view to save the Regent and the
dynasty from compromising and perilous
responsibility.
He felt that he was thus taking up
very strong position, because his principal
adversaries, the Conservatives of T,vela
and Polavieja and the Independent Con-
servatives of Duke Tetuan, had publicly
contended that the Crown needed no fresh
parliamentary authorization for the ces-
sion of the Philippines, as the first had ex-
plicitly covered cessions of colonial terri
tories, nor even any authorization at all
under the constitution of 1876 to negotiate
and ratify treaties He imagined that the
Crown could hardly hesitate between those
who endeavored TO let all responsibilities
of the loss of the colonies rest upon the
Cortes that had granted the authorization,
and not upon the Regent, dynasty, and in
stitutions, and the other dynastic party
that ventured to recommend that Dona
Christina should assume the responsible
ty of ratifying treaty that would be chal-
lenged equally by dynastic Liberals, Dem
ocrats, Carlists, and Republicans, on the
very plausible ground that il had included
more than the cessions of territories duly
authorized by the estates of the realm ac-
cording to the positive text of the const-
tuition.
Strange Reliance.
Sagasta seems to have hoped that the dy-
nastic opposition parties would elect to al
low him to carry the Peace Treaty through
both houses rapidly, on dynastic consider
ations. Then, if they only would allow him
to carry his ways and means bills and
financial authorizations for the same rea-
sons, he INDUCED in the Illusion that he
might afterward either suspend the sit
tings of the Cortes for several months to
liquidate and wind up all the consequences
of the war. or moot at once in the councils
of the regency the idea of reorganizing his
actual Cabinet with his allies, and recon-
structing the Liberal party with their as
sistance on completely new and more lib
eral and democratic lines, particularly on
lines decidedly opposed to a revival of ul-
tramontane and reactionary principles OF
government.
Sagasta and his would-be allies COM
mitted a great mistake in showing their
hand too freely in the press and in public
declarations, simply playing into the
hands of their adversaries at court He
and his following went needless and head
long to defeat and bitter disappointment
honarea thew did nnt uav attention IN =