Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1899-01-14
VITAL POINTS OF THE PRESENT LAW
ARE DEFECTIVE.
OVER OF RAILWAY MANAGERS
DISCRIMINATION FAVORS LARGE
SHIPPER AND CRUSHES SMALL.
4 This Country Is to Change Its The
DRY of Railway Legislation 1t
should Adopt Something
New-Necessity of Re-
vision of the Act.

WASHINGTON. Jan. 13.-The annual re-
port of the interstate commerce commission
was given out to-day. In it, the commits
sion SAYS:
In previous reports to congress. atten-
ton has been called TO the vital respects
in which the a 1T has proved defective and
inadequate. Some of its provisions were
early seen to be imperfect, while others
were so uncertain or ambiguous as to give
rise 10 proTacted litigation, resulting finally
In authoritative construction by the su-
preme court of the United States. The
commission has taken much pains to eX-
plain the various questions that have thus
been decided and the effect of these adju-
dications in defeating the purposes Of the
act. To state that the law, in its present
condition, can not be enforced is only TO
repeat what has already been said. Until
further and important legislation is enact
ed. the best efforts at regulation must be
feeble and disappointing. In our last an
nual report We not only set forth in gen.
eral terms the necessity for amending the
law. but formulated and proposed specific
amendments which appear to us positively
essential. With the renewal of these rec
concentrations, the duty of the commission
in this regard remains undischarged.
Meanwhile. the situation has become in
tolerable. both from the standpoint of the
public and the carriers. Tariffs are disre-
eeAee1s s3cS I oN~eA.
the price at which transportation can be
obtained Is fiUctuating and uncertain. Rail-
er. and shippers all the while in doubt as
to the rates secured by their competitors.
The volume of traffic is so unusual as to
frequently exceed the capacity of equip
ment, yet the contest for tonnage seems
never relaxed. Enormous sums are spent
in purchasing business, and secret rates ac-
corded far below the standard of published
benefit from these reductions. for conces-
shippers. All this augments the advantages
Of large capital, and tends to the injury
and often to the rain of smaller dealers.
These are not only matters of gravest con-
sequence to the business welfare of the
country, but they concern in no less degree
the higher interests of public morality.
1t is perfectly clear that observance Of
tarif rates is entirely within the power
of the railway managers. and that 1t would
ways as a whole It wonssS' however he
difficult and often ruinous for one railway
10 maintain rates while its competitor
makes secret concessions. and 1t is also to
be admitted that. justified or not. the re-
suits are substantially as claimed by the
carriers.
Illegal Rates.
"A large part of the railway business
Is now transacted upon Illegal rates, and
in certain quarters charging the published
rate is the exception. The results are gross
Determinations between individuals and
gross preferences between localities. which
most always favor the strong and Cypress
the weak. Probably no one thing to-day
does so much TO force out the small opera
tor and build W those trusts and monop-
olies against which law and public opinion
alike beat in vain as Determinations in
freight rates.
"A further result is that railroad business
Is carried on largely in conceded violation
OF law. This condition the present law
Is powerless to control. The criminal rem
edies have been applied and some convic-
lions have been had. but no substantial
effect has been produced and no satisfying
results can be obtained from that course.
The fact may be morally certain, but the
name, the date, the amount. cannot he
shown with the particularly and certainty
required by criminal laws.
IF unrestricted competition produces
discrimination one obvious way 10 pre-
vent such discrimination is to restrict com
petition. Whether existing conditions would
be improved by legalizing railway con-
tracts would depend upon the extent TO
which the agreements were made and ac-
tualIy enforced by the carriers. So far as
the commission can obtain
there is at present no other great nation
tween its railways, although in many cases
that method has been tried and abandoned.
But just as no other great nation to-day
cnforces competition between railways. 50
there is no other great nation to-day which
does not regulate and control railway
rates.
IF this country is to change it's theory
of railway regulation. II should adopt the
new theory in its entirety. Carriers ask
authority 10 COMBINE IN order to fix and
maintain reasonable rates. But who shall
decide what rates are reasonable? Shall it
be left to the carriers TO fix their own
rates. or should the people who grant this
extraordinary privilege reserve 10 them
selves the right to determine this ques-
ton?
1T docs not necessarily follow. there
fore. that permission should be given the
carriers to make these combinations. The
evils attendant upon restricted competition
might be greater than the benefits deriv-
ed from 1t. TIL rate should be removable
as well as stable and uniform. and hitler
to composition has been mainly relied upon
OF IL?
The conclusion of the commission in
reference to agreements of this sort. and
the degree of control over rates which
should be exercised by public authority. is
substantially as announced in its last an
nual report. The amendments there rec
commended would not invest the commission
with any different or any greater authority
that 1t was long supposed to possess; they
would simply enable the commission 10
carry out the purpose of the act as declar-
ed in its first three sections. If the pres
cnt commission Is not qualiiled to dis
charge that trust then a more competent
tribunal should be created.
Freight Pooling.
of combinations in restraint of compe-
tition are TO be permitted, the following
additional observations should be borne in
mind:
FlrSl, 10 permit OHlS n iIiniteu anu
feeble restraint would be to doom the eN-
pertinent to failure before 1t was tried; hut
II might be well 10 provide that the provis-
ion granting the privilege should expire
after a certain number of years by It's linn
ftation. Second, the contract itself and
everything done unde- II should be open Ia
public inspection. Third, 1t would probably
he TO the advantage of both the public and
the railways if the public had some voice
or representation in any organization OF
the kind under consideration. If the public
appointed one or more of the board of man.
ayers. to whom the shipper would feel free
20 submit his complaint. and who would
bring the shippers views before the asso.
citation. IL might do much To promote just
conduct and harmonious relations between