The daily morning journal and courier. [volume] (New Haven, Conn.) 1894-1907, 1899-10-19
MODERN ARMY MANEUVRES.

that fire may be most effectively devel
oped must be the first considerable Of
those responsible for the leading anG
instruction of the troops. 1t is phoba-
bly, true that the losses on future bat
tle-fields will hardly exceed those of tt
last great campaigns-the Franco-Ger-
man and the Russo-Turkish. Even in
| 1877 the tactical revolution which had
been brought about by the introduction
| of the breech loading rifle and an I'M
proved artillery, was out imperfectly
understood. The warrior instinct of the
Turk, indeed, grasped the enhanced
value of spade and pick; but neither
| Osmanll nor Russian realized any more
| than the Germans had realized in 1870,
| the extent of the notifications that the
! pieces volume of fire had rendered ne
| cessary in the methods of attack and
| defence, Dense formations, an absolute
| disregard of cover during the attack,
an almost unintelligent use of the rifle.
and an exaggerated confidence in the
brute force of numbers sustained by
discipline were conspicuous Characters
tics of the battles both i'm France and
in Bulgaria. Napoleons columns at
Waterloo presented hardly more favor
able targets to Brown Bess'' than did
the thick lines of the Germans to the
Chassepot or the mobs of the Russians
to the Martini. The result was the
hecatombs of Mars-LaTour and ST.
Privat, of Pevna and the Shipka Pass;
and, even where victory followed a
most unnecessary waste of life.
Yet the lesson does not seem to be
thoroughly appreciated even now. 1t is
curious to observe how, in certain Con-
tinental armies, almost identically the
same costly tactics are preached and
practised. Discipline, resolution, num-
bers are held to be the only useful fac
tors on the battlefield. Marksman
ship, individual skill, and the use of
ground receive but scant consideration.
The application of brute force, as in the
earlier wars of the century, appears to
be the ideal Of the tactcian, although
1t was long since conclusively demon
strated that a skilful use of the fire.
arm is far more effective than mere
weight of numbers, Lack of expert
ence has probably much to do with this
lack of progress. English soldiers,
however, have no such excuse. Within
the past twenty years our troops have
encountered enemies who are first and
foremost most skilful rihemen; who
know how to turn the least inequality of
ground to the best account; who never
offer a favorable target nor waste
cartridge. Fortunately, their numbers
are small. and their discipline is as
weak as their organization is defective.
Nevertheless, the losses they have in
flicted have been so serious as to cause
grave doubts whether their methods of
war are not the most applicable to mod
ern weapons; and it is beyond all ques
tion regular army, of which each man
possessed even in small measure, the
craft and training of the Boer or the
Afridi, would exact fearful toll from
troops handled as Is very generally the
case at peace manoeuvres.
Formations, however are not every
thing. Nor will fine craftsmanship, of
itself win brilliant victories Men may
be taught to move upon the battlefield
so as to make the best use of their ri
fes with the least exposure of them
selves, but the problem of how fire may
be most effectively developed will still
be far from solution. However admra-
BILE the training of the troops, there is
much to be done after war has been
declared, before the rifle, the machine
gun and the quick firing field-piece can
be brought to bear in close cooperation
IN favorable ground. Prepare ton for
this decisive act of war must have be-
gun long before the field is reached or
the enemy sighted: and in such prepa
ration every arm and department of
he service must play its part The de-
of fire is not a question of
,actics--i. e., of handling men in action
alone; but it is the chief end of the
itrategist of the leader who sets the /!
army in motion, and so directs its
marches as to concentrate superior
at the point of contact.
Numbers, where skill and armament |
ire equal, must inevitably tell and it |
S the strategists business to provide
of guns and rifles on the
ield of battle and thus make the task
# the tactician-i e.. the employment |
# those weapons to the best effect
easy. Strategy, howev-
r. is complicated and difficult art.
What one brain conceives many must
xecute. and the most brilliant design
nay be brought to ruin by failure on
he part of a single subordinate. Inac-
urate information. absence of informa-
ion, or information gratuitouSly given |
o the enemy are perhaps the most
bundant sources of strategical disas-
ar; and, conversely, ample and precise
Intelligence, early warning, and close
oncealment are the most abundant
ources of success. But the collection
f information, as well as the conceal
lent of an armys movements, falls into
lany hands. A corporal of horse may
ONE into possession of facts which
lay change the whole course of a
it may depend on the subal-
orn in command of cavalry picket
neither the enemy remains in ignor-
nee of some decisive march, or wheth
he learns enough to escape disaster
nd perhaps turn the tables. Cavalry
par excellence the strategical arm;
ut unless the regiments are thoroughly |
ell trained to reconnaissance and | {
7reening duties. unless both officers
nd men know what to report and how
, report it," unless the squadrons can
liant their action to the country, the j.,
rategist has little chance of effecting
timely concentration of superior num-
1JiJ;+or,y CpTraenpo6anpp pf tho