The record-union., 1899-07-20
THE OUTLOOK IN THE PHILIP
PINES.

trun, declaring that the American
forces in Luzon have been steadily
whipped and that we are in worse
plight by far than at the outset of the
war. Let US see what truth there is
in this iterated charge, and with which
the anti-expansion press is now teem-
ing in an appeal to the cowardly spirit.
When we landed troops in Luzon we
had just the ground they stood upon at
the arsenal in new Cavite. To-day we
have the city of Manila, the Capital
and chief center of commerce of the
archipelago. We have practical con-
vite, the province that has always teen
the seat and hot bed of insurrection.
We control the country between La
guna Bay and the Bay of Manila, the
rebels not being able to occupy and
hold single spot in that territory for
more than few hours at the outside.
: We control and operate the only rail-
way in Luzon as far north as San
Fernando, and we have possession Of
all the intermediate territory between
that point and Manila. We have con-
troll of the bay of Manila and of every
important port of the Philippine group.
We have established civil government
in Negros. and one or two other islands
and have set the wheels of civil gov
eminent in motion once more in Manila
and Cavite provinces.
Whoever examines the situation
closely and impartially will find that
the Insurgents cannot justly claim a
single victory, nor can it be said that
we have lost a single battle The worst
that can be said of the American forces
is that they have not, because of in
adequacy of numbers, been able to
garrison and hold all the places taken
from the insurrectionists. It is con
ceded that there is a strip Of territory
south of linus in Cavite province into
which We have not advanced, but not
because of our inability to do so when
the proper time arrives as will be seen
with the cessation of the rainy season
When. therefore, the dry and tenn
perate season sets in with October. we
will be in position and condition to oc-
cupy more territory and drive the
rebels further into the least valuable
parts of Luzon and to occupy more of
the most valuable territory of that ISL
and. The Portland "Oregonian" very
aptly compares the situation with that
which confronted the South in the win
ter of 1S64-65. 1t says:
The insurgent leaders are very much
In the same situation as Lees army
was in the winter of 1S64-65, when the
elements compelled cessation of seri-
Gus lighting until spring. Lee knew
that Sherman had reached Savannah
that he was sure to be in North Caro-
lima In March: he knew that Thomas
had utterly defeated and dispersed
Hoods army and expelled it from Ten
nessee; he knew that the South had
given him its last man and it's last dol
lar; he knew that as soon as the
weather permitted Grant and Sherman
to move, the last week in March, 1868,
he was certain to be ground between
the upper and neither milistones Of the
Union armies. His resources Of men
and money and food were exhausted,
while the resources of the enemy Were
practically ineXhaustible. So it stands
with the insurgents in Luzon to-day.
We predict, and every fact of the
situation justifies the assertion, that
when the campaigning season again
opens. Aguinaldo will be weaker and
While the American commanders will
have not less than 10000 men in SER
vice, men under command of trained
officers, mainly experienced veterans of
the. held. The commanders will be in
a position TO sweep out into the in
terror and' drive the insurgents back,
for they will be amply supplied, re-
lated to4a safe base and under the lea
dership' of such men as Otis, Chaffee,
Wheeler, Lawton, Macarthur. Young,
Wheaton, Hall, Carpenter and others
OF like character.
We will have then a cavalry force
with which the insurgents have had no
experience and with which their pony
equipped .cavalrymen cannot possibly
cope, while our artillery will have been
enlarged and equipped with still more
effective and numerous weapons Of
war. In the meantime the insurgents
will not have been encouraged nor
largely reinforced. Their sources OF
supply are fewer and the main lines
will have been cut off. They will awake
to realization of the fact that the sail
ing of the volunteers has not meant
abandonment of the struggle, but that
their places have been taken by a
much larger number of soldiers.
They will realize that they cannot
hope to recover Manila or control the
commercial ports of the archipelago.
The morale of the insurgent forces
will thus be seriously impaired, and
the dry season campaign will conse-
quently be disastrous one for them.
This is no fanciful forecast. It is a
look ahead justified by the experience
OF our army, and the exact conditions
in Luzon. 1t is fortified by the payins
Of war, and supported by the COM
monest dictates Of reason. When there