Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1899-04-03

battle with speed 81 from 10 to ~
knots at most, and the CristObal Colon,
which is the fastest ship and was to
run 20 knots, hardly attained speed
Of 1885, Under these circumstances, in
every way unfavorable for the Spanish,
whose crews were insufficiently train
ed and physically and morally ener-
waited by long inactivity, and whose
ships were inferior in number. speed
and fighting efficiency. it is no wonder
that the victory of the Americans was
easy and paid for with insignificant sac
rifices.
There was
ONLY ONE CHANCE
for the success of the sortie. 1t should
have been made at night, in scattered
formation. After personal investiga-
ton of the locality, it is my opinion
that it is entirely practicable for feet
to leave Santiago harbor at night. The
wreck of the Merrimac did not consti-
tute an obstruction. 1t is true that
Admiral SIMPSONS report on the night
blockade states that the 1ightships were
lying from one to two miles from Nor
70 Castle, according to the state OF the
atmosphere, and that they lighted up
the channel for half mile inside. Even
the best searchlight, however, does not
reach farther than one mile. There
fore, the illumination could not have
been very effective. Moreover, the
shore batteries, by opening fire upon
the lightships, could have compelled
them to change their positions, but
strange to say, this was never done.
The dark nights at the time of the new
moon, about the middle of June, would
have been best suited for the enterprise.
IF the fleet did not dare attempt
night sortie and was nevertheless COM
PEELED to leave the harbor in obedience
to orders. then the ships should have
been headed straight at the enemy. All
weapons, including the torpedo and the
ram should have been used. A bold
attack in close formation was the only
chance of success against the superior
hostile fighting forces who would
hardly have found time to form their
lines
THE LESSONS.
Commander jacobson derives from the
battle briefly stated are:
Abolition of all woodwork; no I'M
protected torpedo tubes; protection for
all gun crews against shell fire; pro-
lection of the fire extinguishing appar-
atus against shell fire; smokeless pow
der; greatest possible simplicity in the
service of the guns; greatest possible
rapidity of fire; good speed of vessels
under normal conditions. and thor
ough training of the crews in in all
branches of the service.
Commander jacobson also gives
some of his observations of the Porto
Rican campaign, but these contain
nothing Of special moment except an
account of the attack of the Spanish
torpedo boat Terror and the gunboat
Isabel III upon the st. Paul outside OF
San Juan harbor June 2,1S9S, concern
ing which many conflicting accounts
have been published. This was the
only attempt made during the war TO
torpedo one of our vessels. Command
er Jacobson gives the following ac-
count Of the occurrence which he o.
tanned from the commander of the Ter
rOr:
"At a. m. on June %, the lookout
at the fort signalled a suspicious YES
sci. The commander gave orders for
the Isabel II to go out to reconnoiter,
and for the Terror to be
READY FOR ACTION.
By 1880 the vessel had come closer and
the Isabel II. went out. Upon sighting
her the hostile cruiser Immediately
hoisted her flag and waited. The Is
abel II. opened fire on the foe The
destroyer then received orders to go
out and assist the Isabel. The Terror,
which had been left by her fleet at Mar
Unique, had not been able to recover
her guns and ammunition, which dur
ing the voyage had been transferred to
the Maria Teresa in order to make
room for coal. The Terror, therefore,
had no other weapons than her torpe-
does and two 57-millimatere guns, with
little ammunition. The Isabel fought
the st. Paul at range of from 10000
to 10000 metres. AS the utmost range
of our guns was only 1900 meters, we
could not assist the Isabel by going
closer to her. l therefore gave orders
to head the Terror east so as not to in
terfere with the Isabel firing north on
the enemy. When we were sufficient
ly clear of her and had the open sea
before US, l headed
STRAIGHT FOR THE ST. PAUL
at a speed of from 20 to q knots.
"The enemy, who hitherto had been
firing on the Isabel, now directed upon
me the well aimed rapid fire of both her
batteries, the lower one of which ap-
peared to have eight, the upper one
ten or twelve guns. At 1000 metres we
opened fire with our guns in order to
keep up the spirit of the crew during
the long interval between the begin
ming of the hail of projectiles and the
launching of the torpedo. Our fire was
very accurate; at the first shot We saw
the shell explode on the stern. Several
other shots also hit their target, and
our men were wild with joy. We had
approached to within 1900 metres and
were about to launch the torpedo when
the Terror commenced to veer to star
board. | had the helm shifted to port,
but the ship kept on turning. Then |
ordered the post engines stopped, and
still the ship continued to turn to star
board. | then learned that shell had
exploded on deck and destroyed the
leads to the steering gear and tele-
graph, so that the vessel followed the
movements CT the screw and was I'M
manageable. A hand steering gear was
at once put in operation; but as we
passed the enemy at such
close range, several projectiles hit
us, one of them passing through
the port side into the engine room
where it burst. The engine room be-