Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-07-15
book, and he and his critics pretty soon

a book and he and his critics pretty soon
got on good terms again.
The drawback to all this kind of litera-
ture Is it's want of the impartial views OF
others than the principals in the events
narrated Some one at the War Depart
ment told me once that in all the rebellion
records there is no report from elthef a
Union or a confederate general in which de-
feat is admitted though sometimes men
ton is made of retiring or drawing off. l
don't know whether the statement Is exact,
but IT reflects a well-knoWn fact. Nobody
who holds military command is going to
tell much about his own reverses, yet In
order to have proper idea OF the campaign
it is necessary to know or the de1eats as
we'll as of the victories. The Duke of Wei
lington / think it was, who used to tell
his troops that they had been whipped and
he didn't want it to happen again, but he
was a rare sort of commander l am not
SIRE hut that Caesar also tells how once
in while the enemy got the better of him,
but Caesar too, was rare sort of COM
mander, and he had forceful style of
writing as well as of fighting.
Necessity of Perspective.
It is of consequence in any kind of cam
paign to get a fair perspective. The men in
command cannot give that perspective, for
the reason that they are in the midst of the
struggle. Sometimes out of the official re-
ports made to the government and gathered
together it is possible to obtain a compre-
hensive idea of an entire campaign, but
where a commanding officer is writing for
the public he naturally leaves out many
things that are necessary to a full under
standing Unconsciousy his official reports
may be shaped so as to agree with what
he has writteri for the public. The Santi-
ago campaign Is past and the inf1iction of
further accounts of it is probably ended,
but the Philippine campaign is under way
and there is the prospect of continuous
literature on 1thiSn subject before 1T is
brought to a successful conclusion. 1t Is
simply human nature that an officer who
n &c Nfrno in hi bot
should write books or magazine or news
paper articles may not be the best man to
command troops, because he Is thinking of
what he will wrlteI
Moreover. I have formed the impression
that if the VARIOUS. commanders who were
in the Philippines. g. year ago had not con-
tributed literally to the public prints,
but had confined themselves to the more
sober realities of official reports, a better
knowledge of the, situation out there would
have been had14 Most of those articles were
written in the glamor of first success. They
had the weight of men holding high posi-
tions, and who, presumably had better
chances than. the ordinary observers to
judge of the conditions. The result was
that, they created a misleading idea of the
ease with which the situation could be met
General Lawton's reported statement on his
was the first awakening which the Ameri-
can public had. General Lawton had been
In the Santiago campaign, but he hadn't
stopped to write book about it. Appar-
entity ne dld not go out 10 the philippines
with the notion of writing book about
that campaign, either. He might have
written whole volume to show why 100 900
men were needed, or at least he might have
expanded the idea into a magazine article.
He contented himself with the Statement
which by its brevity had more effect than
an entire volume could have had That is
the kind of literary ability which should be
encouraged on the part OF the army and
navy commanders
QuestionliOf General Policy,
don't submit these observations as a