Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-11-28
COURT DECISIONS j {
Notes of Cases Recently Decided,
Which are Of Interest to
Our People.
$1,000
D1GEsTED BY w.B MARTIN
tE1eluslvely for vlrrln,an- pilot,
D1GEsTED BY ". B. MARTIN.
IN RE AI'A1AHoN.
Supreme Court OF North Carolina,
October II, 1899.
tE1cluslvely for Pilot,

a PRISONER FOR LIFE IN THE
PENITENTIARY is NOT EN-
TITLED TO COMPUTATION FOR
GOOD BEHAVIOR; BUT IL. HIS
TERM HAS BEEN REDUCED BY
THE GOVERNOR TO A TERN OF
YEARS HE is ENTITLED TO COM
MUTATION FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR
FROM THE TIME OF SUCH RE-
DUCTION.
This was q case Of habeas corpus by
McMahon. The application was denied
and he appealed
The court says:
The petitioner was convicted of muir
der at June term. 1889, of Macon Su-
'perior Court, and sentenced to be hang
ca, ana the sentence was committed By
the Governor TO Imprisonment for life
The prisoner was received in the pen
itentiary on the Sth day OF June, 1889.
under this committed sentence, where
he mas been confined ever since that
Time. On the 18th day of August, 1899,
his sentence was further committed by
the Governor to Imprisonment in the
penitentiary for the term Of IL years,
ana he would be entitled TO his dis
charge at the end of IL years from the
date of his imprisonment, without
statutory communications. But the pris-
oher contends that chapter 457 of the
Laws Of 1899 repealed that part of chap
Ter Sf9 or the Laws OF 1855, and all that
part of section 3445 of the Code, that
gave communication to prisoners and
that under the act OF 1899 he is entitled
10 communication of five days per
month for each month he has been in
the pcnitcntiary; and, this being SO. he
was entitled TO his discharge from i'm
prlsonment OH the 18th day of Septem-
Der, 1879. the day this writ was issued.
II is admitted by respondents that, if
the petitioner is entitled to five DAYS
communication for every month since he
mas been In the penitentiary, he was
entitled to his discharge from impris-
onment on the 9TH day of September,
1899, as he contends. But respondents
deny that he is entitled to said COM
mutation, and deny that he is entitled
to be discharged from said imprtson-
ment. The petitioner contends that the
nature and grade of his offence are not
changed by either one of the acts of
communications; that the penalty or pun
ishment, only is lessened by the elem
ency or the Governor; acting under the
power conferred upon him by section
OF article OF the constitution; that the
act or 1899 Is retroactive; and that he
is entitled to five days Communication.
under this act, for every month he has
been confined in the penitentiary since
nc first entered the same Doubtless
the grade OF the crime OF which he was
convicted is not changed but the nun.
ishment Is. He is now n prisoner for a
term of years, and this satisfies the re-
quirement of the statute And there
seems to be the same reason for allow
ing communication to prisoners whose
sentences have been reduced to a term
OF years by the clemency OF the Gov
ernor as there is for extending it to
those originally imprisoned for n term
of ycars.-that they may thereby be in.
duced to be better prisoners. The view
we take OF this case compels us to dis
agree with the contention OF the no.
titioner, ana to hold that he is NOT on
titled to anything under the STATUTORY
Communication acts. and that he was NOT
entitled to anything under the origi-
nal sentence Of death: but we have to
nold that he IL entitled to more now
than ne was then,-that he is now en-
titled to the statutory Communication as
a prisoner fer years.
HARDWARE co. " IT.
MILLS.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire
WHERE a DEALER, IN SELLING,
MERCHANDISE. AGREES NOT TO
SELL TO ANY ONE ELSE IN THE
SAME CITY, WITHOUT ANY LIN1I-
TATION AS TO TIME, THE
AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE
ONLY FOR SUCH LENGTH on
TIME AS WILL GIVE THE BUYER
A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY
TO DISPOSE OF THE GOODS IN
THE USUAL COURSE OF TRADE
WITH THE EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE.
This was an action for breach OF
contract. The defendant agreed in
to sell plaintiffs GO blankets
and mot to sell plaid blankets to any
one else in New York City" This
agreement was made on March 5, 1892,
and was kept by both parties, except
that defendants sold plaid blankets to
parties other than the plaintiffs soon
after March 5. 1892. Plaintiffs after
wards bought other blankets Of defen-
dants.
The court says:
Contracts in restraint OF trade are
not favored in the law, and are not to
be extended by construction beyond the
fair and natural import of the language
used. AS the contract not to sell con-
tains no limit as to time, the reasonable
is that the parties intended
it to continue SO long as necessary to
protect the plaintiffs from competition
in the sale OF the goods purchased. If
the contract had been not to sell to
others in New York so long as the plain
tiffs would buy blankets of the defen-
dants. the case would be altogether
different from the present. Here, was
not only no agreement to purchase more
blankets. but an entire omission of the
quantity and prices of future purchases.
1t cannot be supposed the parties in