Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1899-03-05

the conference held after tho close
OF the battle OF July LIST: he
expressed the opinion that Stuart and
Ewoll were not responsible for the loss of
the field, and reiterated. az his nnal con-
| clusion. the charge that Longstreet was
! responsible for the failure. because he
was $50 pcrsistently averse TO the at
tack and so 10th to take the steps neceg-
sary 10 begin it, Qdem.. December. 1871.
page. 2sl) Early's conclusion is based ap-
parenily upon the following i%nterpreta-
ton OF Hoods note: That Hoods Diyi-
sion, bringing up the rear Of Iongstreets
marching column. i'm obedience to Lees
previous command. actually arrived
at Lees headquarters in readiness
Ior Ddtlle before sunrise; that Lee
wished 20 make the attack upon
the instant, that Longstreet's on
position 10 the plan Of attack was made
while the troops wee thus at hand and
ready for orders, and that In view Of this
opposition by %Longstreet. General Lee
delayed, ana did not give %peremptory or
ders TO advance into battle until a much
later hour-about II O'Clock. Qdem., De-
cember, 1917 pages, 291-2g2)
~ this point I'm his line OF
reasoning tho thought evidently arose
IN Early's mind that his con-
c~lusi0ns were calculated TO place
A~NNF A'RNAoAlblA III EifAh .fN-
pardy. II the reason for a disastrous
delay Of several hours duration was
merely General Lees Difference to Long
streets opposing opinion. what shall be
said OF Lees capacity to carry out his
own carefully-arransed plan Of battle?
Early's mind was too clear not 10 see
this issue, and he faced it as follows:
'Ihcre is one thing very certain. and
that is that either General Lee or Gene
vol Arn.HFI.F rngrA.efIf.- fAu fln
remarkable delay that took place in maxi
ing the attack. ] choose to believe that
IL was not General Lee. for it any one
knew the value of promptness and cele-
rity in military movements. he did. IT
is equally certain that the delay which
occurred in making the attack lost US the
victory" Qdem. December. 1874. page 293)
This statement shows us that in the last
analysis the gallant old sOldier-General
Eariy-was compelled to fan back upon
his personal loyalty 10 General Lee and
his personal knowledge of Lees cOnduc
upon other battle-ields 90 find vindica-
ton for Lees management of the Con-
federate troops at Gettysburg.
The central truth, however, Of the
whole matter IS that Early misintcrprct-
Ell the fragment Of Hoods letter. ftarly's
chief premise was wrong. and his con-
clusion was. therefore. entirely wrong.
Early set forth his views in lS77-SS. Since
that time additional facts have come 10
the light 10 show that Longstreet's
troops did not arrive on Seminary Ridge
until long after sunrise on the morning
Of July -; that the difference Of opinion
between Lee and LOngstreet was not mat
ter for discussion one moment after the
coming of the infantry of the First
Corps. and that ~L.ongstreet's subsequent
delay on the right was perpetrated du-
ring Lees tour OF observation to the Con-
federate left wing.
The first instalment Of fresh evidence
concerning the time of the arrival OF
LOngstreets troops was published In the
Southern Historical Society papers for
February. 1879. I'm the form OF an address
by General Lafayette McL1ws. lie had .
delivered a similar address as early as
1913. NcLaws was in command Of the adj
vance division Of Longstrccts men as
they approached Gettysburg. By Long
streets order McLaws went into camp
the western side Of Wiiloughby Run
after II o'clock in the night that follow
ed July LIST. The head OF his column was
more than two miles from Lees head
on Seminary Ridge. McIaWs
wrote these words: Some time after :
arrival i received orders from General
TO continue the march az 4 A.
a.. but the order was afterwards coui-
% IIINAAM Will rEN
until sunrise. The march was continued
at a very early hour. and my command
the hill overlooking Gettysbufs
early in the morning. just after ar
rived General Lee sent for me, as the
head of my column was halted within
a hundred yards of where he was. and
l went at once and reported. General Lee
was sitting on a fallen tree with a map
beside him. After the usual salutaton'
81 r I . ,,- bod General WISH I
Won TO place your division across this
pointing on the map to about the
I afterwards went to- dhe Peach
orchard.
NcLaws said further that "ff the corps
had moved boldly in position by > OF =
o'clock I'm the morning, as it could nave
the attack would probably have
succeeded. Southern Historical Society
paDers. February. 1879. pages GS and 76)
another fragment Of testimony was
added i'm the following ye~ar-lS~-"heh