Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1899-09-22

Tic tilIIie 10 VII. TIE TeHONdl VI utldSih6
OF a stamp, mark or brand. 1t is true the
particular character of the marks or brands
evidencing payment CT the tax or authenti-
cation of the commodity are not fixed by
the act, but this is a matter of executive
detail in the enfoSemspt of this revenue
act. rather than Of legislative action, and
by the act itself sch detail is confided to
the executive branch. just as the particular
die of our coinage.A theNform and style of
our postage and revenux stamps. legal ten
der notes and bonds ara not determined by
Congress, but are left u the respective de-
partments. By secttbn 6$leomargarine shall
be placed in packages Aamped and brand
ed e,!i, as the the eommissianer internal revenue,
treasury, shall prescribe 1t would seem,
therefore, that these regulations do not
create the crime; the crime is not the
suit OF them. But the most that can be
sald Oh them is that they call into being
the evidence of indicia, which render pos
agt. United ststea Appea i1 Cases as D. c.
were considered by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Co,umba. 1t there
said The provision of the statute now
before US for consideration is that the
commissioner of internal revenue with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treas
ury, shall provide and furnish to the deal
ers mark or brand which does not differ
III principe from a stamp without which
oleomargarine is not to be sold and which
Will evidence that the tax upon it has been
PAID, and that any person who knowingly
oHers Tor sale any oleomargarine in any
otner form than in new wooden or paper
packages with the mark or brand so to be
furnished by the commissioner shall be Ii
aple TO a prescribed penalty. This is no
more than providing that no oleomargarine
branded, so as to show that the tax upon
mas been paid. The brand is no more
thah receipt furnished by the commission
e e. or pa an evidence of payment given by him
10 the dealer: We fail to see. therefore,
now the requirement of a mark or brand
Dy the commissioner is delegation of leg
lslatiVe power to that officer any more
tnan would be requirement that he should
been paid
IN mat case it is to be noted the de-
1endant was charged with selling unstamp-
eo PACKAGES, therefore the absence of the
prescribed stamp was an essential element,
one necessary to the commission of the,
crime The court. however held: We
90 not think that the criminal liability in
ene present instance is the creation or re-
suit OF departmental official regulation
IL seems rather to fall into the category of
0Henses indicated in the case Of Caha v
United states. supra, in which Congress
mas fully declared the offense and the de-
partmental regulation has merely afforded
the opportunity for it's commission This
is IN accordance with the views expr.sscd
by the Supreme Court. In re Kolloch, 165
U. 5. 533, that court stated the relation of
tfese regulations to the crimes defined by
this statute. 1t was there said: We agree
that the courts of the United States, in de-
.ermlning what constitutes offense
against the United States, must resort to
the statutes Of the United States, enacted
IN pursuance of the Constitution. But here
the law required the packages to be mark
cd and branded; prohibited the sale Of
packages that were not, and prescribed the
punishment for sales in violation of its pro-
visions; while the regulations simply de-
scrlbed the particular marks. stamps and
n do hn
fully and completely defined by the act,
ana the designation by the commissioner
OF the particular marks and brands to be
USED was mere matter of detail. The reg
uiatlon was In execution CT, or supple
mentary to, but not in conflict with the
law itself, and was specifically authorized
in effectuation of the legislation which
created the onense. We think the act not
open to the objection urged, and that 1t is
disposed of by previous decisions-United
states V. Bailey, 8 Pet. 23S; United States
v. Eaton IA L. 8. GIT; Caha v United
States, 152 L. s. Pill The act before ne
is, on its face, an act for levying taxes
and although it may operate in so doing to
prevent deception in the sale of oleomar-
sarlne as and for butter, its primary OBJ
Ject must be assumed to be the raising Of
revenue. And, considered as a revenue act
the designation of the stamps, marks and
brands Is merely in the discharge of an ad-
mlnlstratve function and falls within the
numerous Instances of regulation needful
to the operation of the machinery of par
ucGlar laws, auth 1rity to make which has
always been recognized within the COM
potency of the Legislative power to confer
United States v. Symonds, 12O U. 8. 46: FIX
farte Reed, 100 L. S. 13; Smith V. Whitney
iIn l. 5. l6': Weyman V. Southland, 10
heat L. We concur with the
Court OF Appeals that this provision does
not differ in principle from those of the
internal revenue laws which direct the
commissioner of internal revenue to pre-
pare suitable stamps to be USED on pack
a ff of1 f,lo
change such stamps when deemed ex-
pedicnt; and to devise and regulate the
means for afixing them Rev Stat. Sec.
1872, 1895, :3445, 3446, etc
Authorities All Agree
The making of such regulations being
then an executive act, we next inouire
whether when made they have the force
of law, and whether the courts take iu-
dicial notice of their existence That such
Is the case the authorities show In United
States V. Eaton. la l.. S. GsS 1t was held
that rules and regulations duly prescribed
had the force of law. Regulations pre-
scribed by the President and by heads of
departments, under authority granted by
Congress, may be regulations prescribed by
law, so as lawfully to support acts done
under them and in accordance with them
and may thus have, in proper sense the
force of law
And in Caha V. United States, 152 L. s.
FL, II was held the court took judicial no.
tice of them. The rules and regulations
prescribed by the interior Department in
respect to contests before the land office
were not formally offered in evidence, and
1t is claimed that this omission is fatal ana
that Il verdict should have been instructed
for the defendant. But we are of opinion
that there was no necessity for a formal
Introduction in evidence Of such rules and
regulations. They are matters of which
the courts OF the United States take ju-
dicial notice. Questions Of :. kindred ma
ture have been frequently presented and
it may be laid down as u general rule de-
ducible from the cases, that wherever py
the express language of any act of Con-
gress, power IS intrusted to either of the
principal departments of government to
prescribe rules and regulations for the
transaction of business in which the public
is interested, and in respect to which they
have right to participate, and by which
they are to be controlled, the rules and
regulations prescribed in pursuance of such
authority become a mass of that body of
public records of which the courts take
judicial notice. Without attempting to no.
tice all the cases bearing upon the general
question of judicial notice, we may refer
to the following: United States " Tesch-
maker. u How. 800, 4O5; Romero v United
States, 1 Wall. 721; Armstrong " United
States, IL Wall 1884, Jones V. United States.
137 u s. 2O2; Knight v. United States Land
Association. 142 L. S. 161, 100; Jenkins v.
Collard, 145 U. s. 546.'