Virginian-pilot. (Norfolk, Va.) 1898-1911, 1899-09-16
COURT DECISIONS S, o
'otes Of Gases Recently Decided,
Which are of3lnterest to
Our People.
DIGESTED BY W. B. MARTIN.
tExciuslyely for virr,nian- Pllot)

tE1ciusiVeiy for VlrEinian-Pllos)
RICHMOND ". SOUTH. BELL T. 8
T. CO.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May %, 1893.
A TELEPHONE COMPANY is NOT
F ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT 4 b.
THE ACT OF CONGRESS ALLOW
ING THE USE OF POST ROADS
BY TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
This was a suit by the telephone cons
pany to restrain the City Of Richmond
from interfering with its poles, wires,
ETC.. on the streets Of said city. the COM
pany claiming the right to use the
streets without the consent of the city
under the act of Congress which allows
to telegraph companies the use of all
post roads, etc. The lower court decid-
ed In favor Of the plaintiff, and the city
appealed.
The Court says:
The principal question in this case is
whether the Circuit Court and Circuit
Court OF Appeals erred in holding that
the appellee was entitled to claim the
benefit OF the act of Congress approved
July oath, 1856. (After reciting the act
in question and referring to decisions
upon 1t. the Court contnues):~
But independently of any question
as to the extent OF the authority grant
ed to telegraph" companies by the act
of 1866. we are of opinion that the
courts below erred in holding that the
plaintiff, in respect to the particular
business 1t was conducting could in
woke the protection of the act The
plaintiffs charter it Is true, describes
It as telephone company and tele-
graph company. Still, as disclosed by
ha nt-iJ t.,
The business in which 1t was engaged
and for the protection of which against
hostile action 1t invoked the aid of the
federal Court, was the business trans
7cted by using what Is commonly called
telephone. 1t may be that IL the
telephone had been known and in use
when the act was passed. Congress
would have embraced In its provisions
companies employing Instruments for
electrically transmitting articulate
speech. But the question is not what
CONGRESS might have done In 1866. nor
Whot 1t may or ought now to do. but
what was In It's mind when enacting
me statute In question. When
therefore, the act OF 1876 speaks of tcle-
"raph compa MES 1t could have meant
only such comnanies ns employed the
means then used or embraced by ex-
sting Inventions for the purpose Of
transmittine messages merely by
7oundS of Instruments md by signs. or
WRITINGS. We now odildpe that the
oct of 1895 and the sections of the
revised Statutes in which the provi-
s'ons of Tint act have been preserved.
have no annlicnt'on to telephone COM
nan'eS whose hnsirnes is that Of eIectrl-
'ally transmitting ari'culate speech be-
fwecn different points.
TAYLOR V. TRUSTEES OF POOR.
Superior Court OF Delaware.
February, 1899.
TIE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO
BUY BREAD rs THE NET
PROFITS THE PLAINTIFF WOULD
HAVE MADE DURING THE TIME
OF TIE CONTRACT.
a CONTRACT TO FURNISH GOOD
WHEAT BREAD" PROVIDING
THAT If BUYERS sUPERIN-
TENDENT DID NOT CONSIDER IT
GOOD HE COULD CANCEL THE
CONTRACT. MAY BE CANCELLED
BY HIM WHETHER OR NOT THE
BREAD FURNISHED IS OF THE
QUALITY CONTRACTED FOR.
This was an action 60 recover from
OF a contract they had made with plain
till to buy bread of him for three
months. The plaintiff alleged that In
pursuance OF Tie contract he delivered
TO defendants good wheat bread. such
as the contract called for, as long as
they would receive the same, but was
afterwards prevented from delivering
the same by said defendants. and that
he was damaged $500. II was part of
the contract that, should the quality
OF the bread not be what the super
ntendent, in his judgment, considered
good, he should have power to cancel
the contract"
The court, charging the jury, says:
II You believe that the bid made by
the plaintiff was accepted by the de,
PENDANT without the condition or quail
lf1cation as claimed by defendant =
the measure of damages would be wha,
his net gain or profits would have been
had he been permitted to perform the
whole contract; that is furnish the
bread for the entire quarter covered by
the agreement. And, further if YOU
believe from the testimony that 1t was
made condition OF the agreement by
the defendant that defendants suDer-
intendent should have the power to
cancel the contract if the quality OF
the bread should, in the Judgment Of
said superintendent, be considered not
good, and that such condition was
made known to the plaintiff and ac
cepted or agreed to by him, and in the
exercise of such power the superin-