St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1899-05-10
CERVERA'S STRATEGY.

In personal interview, in answer to G
question by the editor, Captain Clarl
gives in the May Century the following
opinion of the Spanish admiraPs STRAIT
egy
Assuming that the Spanish feet ha6
to come out land !, for one, had giver
up the hope that it would do SOL, it is
my Judgment that Admiral Cervera
should have preferred night to day as
the time for the sortie, Notwithstanding
the search-lght watch so rigidly main
tanned at the entrance. He could have
placed as guides to the channel, along
the shore, and on the smoke-stack or
mast OF the sunken Merrimac, lights
screened toward the sea, so that we
could not have detected them. His best
chance would have been to get up his
anchors and begin to move about dusk,
when he would have had light enough to
see the shore and the channel marks,
timing the movement so that He should
dash out just as darkness fell. We could
not then have closed in upon him with
out great danger to ourselves. The
firing would have had to be done virtual
~
supposing that Others than the one reg
ularly in use had been turned on) would
soon have become ineffective, on account
of the smoke and from the shattering
force Of the guns, which probably would
have extinguished them. The direction
of the enemy could thus have been
masked, and as each OF our captains
would have been concerned with the risk
of his ship being rammed or torpedoed,
our onslaught would have had far dit
lerent result than it actually had when
lull daylight enabled every commander
to see what all the Others (as well as the
enemy were doing, and exactly what
was to be done. 1t was the difference
between certainty and uncertainty. In
the daytime we were able to choose our
distance from the enemy with relation to
the danger of being torpedoed. AS all
his ships were supposed TO be provided
with Whitehead torpedoes, determined,
unless an emergency should require it,,
not to go inside of half mile, that
being the effective torpedo-range, since
our superiority in ordnance and armor
would thus have been neutralized.
Considering the courses that were
open to Cervera, | should have probably
in the circumstances, have done as he did
head to the westward, keeping the
fleet together in the hope of destroying
any vessel which might be able to over
take me. Cientuegos was his nearest
and natural port, and there he would
have been in direct communication with
Havana by rail, and, so to speak, would
have been in Spanish environment. If
he had intended to 60 to Havana, it
would have been better to 90 westward
than eastward, for, though the distance
is somewhat greater, the current would
have favored, and there was no addition
al force to be considered like that at
Guantanamo. To have divided his fleet,
part going eastward and part west
ward, would have been to leave one-half
to Admiral Sampson and the other half
to Commodore Schley.
"There remained one other course.
The result of the sortie shows that he
might have stood better chance of
saving one or two or even more of his
ships by the policy of scattering, with
an ultimate rendezvous Only three of
our ships were superior in speed to his
vessels, namely, the New York, the
Brooklyn, and the Oregon-possibly the
Texas. Even if each of these could have
selected and pursued Spanish ship, it is
possible that not every one OF them
would have been equal to the task of
destroying her chosen antagonist. The
armored cruisers, the Brooklyn and the
New York, might have found that they
had caught Tartars.' They could not
have pierced the armor of the Spanish
vessels, while the Spanish guns could
readily have pierced theirs. There were
no orders to our vessels for such separate
action, for neither Admiral Sampson nor
any one else could have anticipated such
tactics. 1t is matter of pure conjec-
ture, but am inclined to think that the
confusion resulting from such a move
ment would have strongly favored Ger
vera"