The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-04-28
The Signal Service in the War.

One OF the most interesting reports in the
volume lately published by the War De-
partment Is the account given by Gen.
A. W.. GREELY, the Chief Signal Officer, Of
the work performed by his corps down to
Sept. 80, 1898. No part OF the army had
It's field Of operations and sphere of useful
ness SO much expanded by the Spanish
American war, for, while our military
forces. considered as a whole, were in
creased about tenfold. the Signal Corps had
to be enlarged more than twentyfold.
The approach OF the contest found the
eight available officers and fifty men OF the
Signal Corps scattered from Oregon to
Texas in the South and to New York in the
East. Theoretically there should have
been, also, a reserve force Of 454 officers
and 1 ,S16 enlisted men In the line Of the
army, from which signalists and telegra-
pliers might be drawn for campaign work.
As a matter Of fact, only seven additional
officers and about fifty partly trained men
were obtainable from the regular army,
and these had to be taken from commands
which had no hope OF service in the
field, for, when a chance to face
the enemy is offered, the line soldier is UNI
willing to leave his comrades for staff duty.
Even the act passed by Congress for the
organization OF a volunteer army failed,
through oversight. to provide for electrical
work on the part of volunteers. and the
Chief Signal Officer was obliged to ask for
special legislation. This was secured in
acts approved May 1s and July I, 1898,
which contemplated a corps comprising
1913 officers and 1,115 men. There were
never In actual service, however, at any
one time, more than 115 officers and about
1000 soldiers. 1t was provided by law
that two-thirds OF the officers and enlisted
men should be skilled electricians or teleg-
raphers. In pursuance OF the aim implied
in this condition, the original selections for
field officers were, without exception, high
ly trained officers, thoroughly skilled in the
specialties OF the corps, and the subordinate
officers chosen had been employed in cleo
trical pursuits or in similar occupations
in civil life. Some fourteen highly edu-
Gated and trained enlisted men, first
class Sergeants, were promoted to be Second
Lieutenants. These methods OF selection
reduced to a minimum the number Of ap-
pointments based on political influence.
The work performed by the Signal Corps
III tH0 odntldBO CdulpdlBH may be OIlpTe-
hended under two main heads, namely, the
Encouragement and installation Of means of
electrical communication whereby the War
Department was brought as near to the
army as though the operations had been
conducted at the distance OF 100 miles in
stead Of 800; secondly, the signal work
proper, involving communications. cleo
trical and other, between the commanding
General Of the Fifth Army Corps, his divi-
sion and brigade commanders, the trans
ports, the vessels conveying supplies and
the cooperating ships belonging to the
navy. 1t was, also, of obvious importance
to cut of the Spanish authorities in
Cuba from communication with Madrid.
This was accomplished, except in the
case OF one cable which could not
be found, either by the severing OF ca
bles, or by the enforcement OF strict mill
tary cen sorship upon all dispatches sent
over the submarine lines. As for the util-
ity OF the war balloon used at Santiago, the
Chief Signal Officer considers that this was
fully demonstrated by the official reports,
and he disclaims on the part Of the corps
any responsibility for the fact that the bal
loon was kept unused on shipboard for a
week, and was, subsequently, used on the
skirmish line, where it is said to have
caused loss to the troops by disclosing their
movements. Gen. SHAFTER, commanding
the Fifth Corps, says, In his Endorsement OF
the report OF Lieut.. Col. MAxFIELp, that