The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-12-15

The latest details OF the battle OF Magers-
fontein point to a decisive repulse oil the
British. chiefly by the Boer rihemen. their
artillery appearing to have taken no part IN
the action In the early part OF the DAY. we
hear for the first time OF the use OF barbed
wire by the Beers In front OF their entrench-
-ments as q protection against bayonet charges.
and II Is probably to this cause that the British
defeat Is to be attributed. as we read OF their
charges having failed through their inabillty TO
reach tho Door entren chments, from when the
rifemen poured their deadly hre. The same
reason would also account for the heavy loss
Of officers who would naturally be In front
leading their men In the charge. Tho failure
to carry tho Boer positions at Magersfonteln
by direct attack has been necessarily fol-
lowed by the withdrawal Of all the troops en-
gagged to the shelter OF the entrenchments at
the bridge head on tho Modder River. where
they are In less danger OF an attack by the
Beers. than OF having their communications
with the Orange River cut and OF running
short OF supplies.
On the Boer side the choice OF position and
tho tactical disposition OF their forces show
high ability In the commanders. Unhamrered
by pedantry their perfect knowledge OF the
country aud tho mobility OF their forces en-
able them to follow tho enomy's designs with
lions and. having selected point OF resistance.
to concentrate with great rapidly force equal
or superior to that with which he can attack. In
case Of defeat they move of rapidly into space.
waiting the enemy's next move to arrange the
next plan OF resistance. In other words they
arc but following instinctlvely the old
ParthiaD tactics under more favorable con-
ditions. Gen. Methuen Is being blamed
for not having reconnoitred before max
ing his attack on Monday morning. but
this ia mistaken criticism. He had passed
two days in recommending. the Saturday and
the Sunday. and In way which undoubtedly
indicated to the Beers where his main attack
would DO made. with the result that they were
fully prepared TO meet him Mt the critical
point with overwhelming superiority. The
fact that the Beers throughout the cam
paign havo been able to compel tho British
to fight on ground OF thor choosing Is part OF
the logic OF the situation. and does not neces-
sarlly reflect on the capacity OF the British
commanders. who. besides being quito mex
perlenced In the Boer methods. are tied down
to the railway lines by which alone they Gun
maintain continuous supply Of food and am
munition. To advance with too great hardi-
hood into the open country AWAY from the rail-
way line is to court disaster. while to concern
trate too large force at any one point at such
n distance as the Modder River Is from Cape
Town Is to diminish It's mobility 10 proportion
to its size. and render IL liable to be left
stranded by an alert and mobile enemy cutting
of its communications and supplies President
Kruger Ia credited with saying that the British
were lighting In the dark: a remark which
events so far arc proving to be a fairly accurate
view OF tho situation.
The total British casualties are tho heaviest
yet experienced. amounting to 1913, OF which
" were officers. The loss OF the High
land Brigade was severe in the extreme. being
three -tourths Of the whole.
A report of the relief OF Ladysmith bore on
the face OF It the stamp OF invention and was
hardly worth contradiction. the last despatchcs
from the British headquarters In Natal show
Ing that no attempt had yet been made to cross
the TuGela River.
The Magersfonteln defeat has decided the
| British Government on sending out the Sixth
| Division ut once to South Africa and organizing
| an eighth. but there appears no warrant for
the statement that general call to arms wa,
| to be made. An English correspondent belong
| ing to the volunteers referring to the general
situation. says that people in England
| were beginning to be uneasy. Very few
| regular troops were eft at home
! and there was much disquletude at all the
| volunteer ammunition having been called IN
to send to South Africa. II called out now the
volunteers would have arms but no ammunl.
| ton. and the volunteer artillery have no eifec.
| tive guns. only obsolete muzzleoaders and a
| few old breechloaders discarded By the regular
artillery