The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-11-01
Our Present Attitude Toward China.

Should the Continental nations attempt
to secure equivalents for England's pros
pectivc conquest OF the Boer republics, II ia
probable enough that compensation would
be sought in China where Russia. Germany
and France. a. well as England. have ac-
quired a foothold. and where Italy has
striven to gain one. Nor Is there much
doubt that, II the three naval powers which
imposed the revision OF the Shimonosekl
Treaty were to he backed by the United
States. Japan would maintain a neutral
position, In which event England could
scarcely, strong as IL her fleet In Chinese
waters, make head against the coalition.
According to q report, however. which we
believe to be- well founded, our State
Department has intmated to Continental
governments that 1t should view with re-
greet any arrangements for the further
partition Of Chinese territory, 40 long as
England, one OF the chief parties in interest.
should be occupied In South Africa
Such an intimation does not commit the
Administration TO cooperation with Great
Britain for the fulfiment OF any definite
programme. 1t does not even commit us 10
an acceptance Of the "open door" policy.
although the prospective benefits derivable
from such policy by American commerce
are unmistakable. We simply say that,
whatever may be ultimately deemed the
hest mode Of solving the Chinese problem,
the solution ought not 10 be undertaken at
time when the country which has n
larger share OF the Chinese trade than all OF
its competitors put together. and which.
nevertheless, is pledged to assure to all OF
Chinas purveyors equal opportunities OF
access, is too much engaged elsewhere to
give the subject undivided attention This
is unquestlonably true. A solution OF the
Chinese problem, TO which England should
not be- a party. would he like the play o,
Hamlet with Hamlet left out.
Yet, however reasonable and equitable
would be an American protest against any
further partition Of China Mt the present
iuncture, does anybody suppose that heed
would he paid to 1t, IL orr strategical posi-
tion in the Far East were the same which
we occupied before May. 1895? II ourveto
now has weight enough to avert an inter-
national combination from which England
would be excluded. IL is because our rela-
ton to the eastern shore of the Pacific has
been revoutioniz"d In the interval. We
have been suddenly transformed into
Pacific power Of the first class. As owners
Of the Philippines. and especially. ms occu-
piers OF tn" great seaport OF Manila, we
hold an unsurpassed coign OF vantage on
the flank Of the most frcqucnted route to
China, an unrivalled fucrum on which NAV
lie worked the lever OF naval and military
strength. Moreover, the naval and tho
military force is ready for application. II
Is probable that, in respect Of efficiency, our
war fleet in Chinese waters is now second
to that Of England only. while, IA regards
the number ~ disciplined soldiers NJ hand.
We are rxcclled only by Japan. having far
more than France or England and probably
mor' than Russia could quickly assemble
for the defence ~ Port Arthur. That Is
why our Government can speak in regard
to the affairs OF China with an authority
In the future of the Middle Kingdom would
not he inclined to disregard.
IT has long been recognized by those ac-
quainted with the stato 81 things in the
Far East that the retention OF the Philip
pines ia Indispensable II We are to Obtain n
share Of China's prospective trade commen-
surate with our productive capacity. II
we did not possess those islands, our sun
port would be OF comparatively little value
to any OF the powers interested in the fate
OF the Middle Kingdom. Consequently our
interests would be overlooked in adjust
ments OF boundaries and Of commercial
rights. Now that we own the Philippines,
however. our assistance, or even our nell
trality, has become a matter Of vital mo-
ment to all the powers which have acquired
fragments Of China. or which hope to do 80.
1t is thoroughly understood that hereafter
We must be reckoned with, and that no ex-
tension Of tho process OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
to China's seacoast to which We refuse to
be party can be looked upon as final