The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1899-06-03
NEW BOOKS.
Brief Reviews OF Important and Interest,"
Ing New Publications.

oiyen the chief part In the edition for 1899 OF
that invaluable repertory OF information.
"Brasscy's Naval Annual" ID. Van Nostrand
Contrary The war with Spain. the chief
maritime event Of the year considered. crops
IN in all the articles. as for instance In the in
cusion Of the United States aud japan in the
"comuarntive tables" of the warshps OF the
great powers, which previously had comprised
only Great Britain France. Russia, Italy and
Germany. and in the table on page 1TS where
the fire energy per minute" OF typical battle
ships in each navy is compared. The new
features OF this issue" however. to which at
tcrtion is drawn in the preface, are the excel
lent account ofthe United States Navy by Lieu
ieuunt-C Commander W. H. Beeher OF the Intel
lircnce ONCE in which. unfortunately for n
hook OF reference. tho statement as to tho
personnel are no longer correct owing to recent
legislation in Congress. and Col. Sir George
Svlenham Clarkes article on Naval Aspects
of the Spanish American War" n careful and
friendly criticism Of the operations by thor
oughy competent authority As the Judgment
u foreign critic who is thus. as it were a
sort OF contcmporancous posterity." we quote
a number of Sir George Clarke's opinions on
points Of interest in the war. First. as to its
causes and Justification: THE rhilo-
SOPHIE historian of the future will prob
ably come to the conclusion that a great
and powerful nation cannot indefinitely
diatcy beyond its frontiers, and that the i'm
monse development OF intcrcommunication
which marked the nineteenth century had vir-
tuallr rendered the island OF Cuba contiguous
t. the United States. The declared object OF
the war committed the United States to the
restoration Of order in Cuba and thus intro
duccd special conditions which ruled the
course Of events" The acceptance as matter
Of course Of Capt Mahans theories on sea
4 .L., ,nt ,,,;tH i.l, H..
the Captains articles on the war when he diff
fers with him in opinion arc noticeable feat
urcs of Sir George Clarkes article. OF Dewey
at Manila he says:
White the action in Manila Bay was thus fore
gone conclusion, conveying only lessons of an oh
Nious character. Commodore Dewey's proceedings
On May merit the highest commentator.
In ignoring all risks and like Farragut at Mobile,
making straight for his objcctive-the encmy's
sIuadron-Commodore Dewey followed the best
naval tradition. and fully deserved his success.
The futility OF maintaining on far distant station
anaval force absolutely UNIT to meet that of pos.
sibe enemy at tho same time strikingly
demonstrated. The naval weapon OF the United
States in tho Far East ready for that weapon
can and should always be. was able to strike hard
within week of the receipt Of orders although the
nearest national port lay 1000 miles across tho
Pacific
b. the action of May /. Commodore Dewey OBJ
over the large inland waters OF Manila Bay. and a
firm footing on shore at Cavite
The naval war in the Fast practically ended with
the destruction Of the Spanish squadron but in the
difficult situation which preceded the surrender of
Manila on Aug. 10 and subsequently, Rear Admiral
Dewey showed the greatest tact and discretion.
II should be borne in mind that Sir George
Clarke uses the historians privilege of judg-
ing after the event and therefore often drops
Of ppD SiI 70 hay baan
wrong. which. however. had to be needed until
So proved as for instance. the belief that the
Spanish fleet and Spanish defences corre-
sponded in some degree at least to their status
on paper. He finds much to criticise in the
operations on the Atlantic and in the plans Of
the Naval Strategy Board. as explained in
Capt Mahan's articles. He shows from Ad-
mral Cervera's reports. the deplorable condi-
ton Of the Spanish vessels. which the United
States only found out later:
While the more instructed Spanish naval officers
expected the appearance Of American ships in
European waters, widespread fears OF formidable
descent upon the Atlantic seaboard appear to have
taken hold OF the United States-and popular out
cry which Capt. Mahan has stigmatized as
unworthy of men, unmcasured irrehective, and
therefore irrational" His defence Of the prelimi.
nary naval measures goes far to justify the outcry
which he SO unsparngly condemns. and shows that
the proceedings taken were strongly Influenced by
the theory that the Atlantic was in imminent danger.
In the Atlantic. therefore. at tho moment OF the
declaration Of war the powerful bclligerent
practically found in an attitude of passive expec-
fancy, while the weak opponent preparing for
an offensive movement into distant waters.
He does not think highly OF tho strategy in
Cuban waters nor Of SIMPSONS cruise to the
east in search Of Cervera; and thinks that IL
Cervera had steamed little faster. or had
been able to coal in reasonable time at santi-
ago. or if the St Paul had not capture e col
ler Restormel in the nick OF time. II, pre-
venting the fleets coaing at Cu.acao,
Cervera could have gotten into Havana
without trouble. OF the doinGs at San
Juan de Puerto Rico he says: 1T Is not easy to
assign a cause for this bombardment AS
gunnery practice under war conditions 1t was
doubtless useful. but tho withdrawal OF the
squadron enabled the Spaniards to claim vic
tory. and In other circumstances the moral ef-
feet thus produced might have had more i'm
portance The experience fully confirmed
that Of Alexandria. that the fire OF ships is not
able to dismount guns or seriously injure
coast batteries"
And later. on the same point. he says:
Capt Mahan has laid great stress the paray wing
effect of inadequate coast defences but the lesson Of
ewar is OF an opposite character. Judged by any
modern standard the coast detences of Cuba were mis-
erable but derately effective fleet based upon Gu
ban ports would have found them ample and they
may actually be said to have served their purpose.
How small these defences may be Santiago shows.
Towns situated on long seaboard must take their
chance. Even superior navy acting at great dis.
lance from its base will find profit in expending
ammunition upon them.
Schey. Sir George Clarke sees through and
passes over very shortly; he quotes the amaz-
ing despatch. regrettng that he cannot obey
the orders OF the department and is forced to
proceed for coal to Key West: notes his igno-
rance of Cervera's feet being at Santiago. ten
days after its arrival. and in the story Of the
baltic merely says: The Brooklyn opened
upon the Maria Theresa with n raking fire
from her port broadside. at about 800 yards,
and crcling to starboard-a movement which
must apparently have entacd difficulties on
the Texas. then heading westward-hrought
her starboard battery into action" The Ore
CONS " fine voyage" and her remarkable per-