The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1899-08-21
The Philippine Situation.

war correspondents was published 1t
was announced in the name of the aG-
ministration at Washington that 1t
would be ignored. In sense this has
proved true. Specific action was not
taken either to punish those who signed
it. or to put to trial the man whom 1t
accused. General Otis was not dis
turbcd. but it is worthy of notice that
some Of the essential features of the
round robin have since been accepted
by the administration as true and steps
taken in correction. For example, Gem
eral Otis no longer favors the country
with eXuberant dispatches predicting
the immediate collapse of the insur-
rection. He no longer claims to be able
to close the war with an effe@ive force
Of 10000 men. The war department is
preparing with extraordinary energy to
put into Luzon a picked force of $1,000
men, more than double the number
asked for by Otis; and while Otis has
not been deposed it is easy to see that
Secretary Root proposes to let no mans
position stand between the government
and an early victory Otis will be af-
forded every resource and opportunity
to win in fact the victories he has so
often announced on paper; and the first
evidence of failure on his part under
these favorable circumstances will un-
doubtedly be the signal for change in
commanders. The era of buncombe in
the war department has been closed.
These thoughts suggest themselves in
connection with the very careful re-
view of Philippine conditions appear
ing in the last issue of Harper's Weekly
from the pen of its Manila correspond
ent, John +. Bass. This correspondent
is an observer of varied experience and
a man whose probity stands unchal-
lenGed. The picture which he gives aC-
counts for the recently enlarged scale
of the war department preparations
to make the approaching campaign a
decisive one in IuzOn. Mr.. Bass shows
by means of a map how small a por-
tiOn of the island is now actually held
by the American forces as a compen-
sation for the good lives and treasure
expended in the spring campaign. and
paucity Of accomplished results.
First, says he, the whole popula ton
of the island sympathizes with the in
surgents; only those natives whose i'm
mediate self-interest requires it are
friendly to us. There have been only
half dozen natives who have been in
confidential relations with the Amerl-
can authorities at Manila and most of
these Mr.. Bass suspects to be spies of
the enemy "The most important
moves of the insurgents" he continues.
have not reached the secret service
department until after they have oc-
CURED. The.attack on Tondo-the best
conceived and executed movement
made by the insurgents-fel on us
like a thunder bolt; the attack on the
railroad-an organized movement, re-
quiring some time for preparation-was
equally unexpected. The utter failure
of peace negotiations, and the fact that
none of the insurgent emissaries had
any power to treat for peace or submit
proposals, all point 40 an unwilling
ness on the part of the insurgents to
give in. Add to this the persistence
with which the insurgents carry on a
retreating fight, and come back as soon
as our troops retire, and the generally
hostile attitude of all natives. The fact
that natives take refuge within our
| lines is no refutation of this statement
| for these people come from the zone Of
| conflict, and they naturally want to
| get out of the way of the fighting. In
every part of the islands where our
| ships have gone they have found only
hostile natives, who acknowledged no
| allegiance save to the insurgent gov
| ernment. We find it of the utmost diff
Guilty to get guides to show us the way.
| Experienced native pilots on our gun
boats suddenly become ignorant of the
character of the lake the river, and
the bay, Unexpectedly forgetting the
| position of the sand bars. The half
past-eight-o'clock rule is still on in Ma
nila, and everybody must be indoors,
because the authorities are still afraid
of an uprising in the town"
The foregoing presents the difficult
|
ence to the opposition. The second
reason cited by Mr.. Bass is that our
army is ill-equipped and unwieldy in
its management. Water-buffalo carts
used as wagon trains in the pursuit of
barefooted insurgents impress him as
ridiculous, but to load the volunteers
down, with 200 rounds of ammunition
and One days rations, and to put on
their heads felt hats, in order to trot
them under a boiling sun over a coun-
try without roads, he regards as crimi-
nal. As to unwieldiness Mr.. Bass says
General Otis, whatever criticisms may
be made against him, is the imperson-
alton of industry. He directs every
department, down to the minutest de.
tails; every small bill or petition comes
before him for approval; he forms
every plan for every military move.
ment, and directs it's execution, not day
by day, but literally hour by hour
Generals and other officers have re.
peatedly told me that as things are
managed now, no commanding officers
are necessary except General Otis
Colonels of the different regiments
could do all the work now required OF
generals. Bitter are the complaints o.
all the commanding officers on thi,
point, They say that they cannot NOV,
hand or foot without orders from tn,
governor, who sits in his office from
early morning till late at night. II,
has never been out on the lines, and
venture TO say that he is the onl,