The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1899-12-03
THE MERCIFUL POLICY IN The
PHILIPPINES.

ty of the Filipino has been greatly over
rated. It is certain that had the IN
surgent commanders the skill and cum
ming Of the ordinary North American
Indian chief our handfuls of men mere
and there scattered over a wide ex-
panse of territory would not be ape
to chase the remnants of Aguinaldo 8
army and dispense his men like jack
rabbits.
Any one of our plains Indians couio
give Aguinaldo and his Generals points
and beat him in opposing the soldiers
of civilization. In a trench, from a tree
top or a church steeple the Filipino
does well enough, but routed out OF
the shelters he knows practically notn-
ing about formation: he cannot make
a flank movement; he knows very little
about skirmish lines, and he prefers to
fire and run to firing and standing and
repeating.
At no time have we had over 2O,OOO
men in fighting lines in the Philippines.
These have been distributed among
several islands; some have been doing
garrison duty, and the largest body OF
them engaged in any one advance
movement has not exceeded 5000, rank
and file. Yet Aguinaldo has been creo-
tied with 10000 men in arms; has had
as many more playing the role OF
amigos; has had the aid of women and
children, knowledge of the country, and
for a long time possession OF the
greater stretch of railway, and, above
all has had the handling Of troops
Injured to the climate and not incom-
moded by natural conditions.
There is no record of more than
5000 at any one time being put into
opposition to any of Aguinaldo's hordes
vet we have not suffered real defeat
and have been fortunate in the matter
of losses, for the list Of dead ano
wounded has not been excessive, not
even large, when war generally IL
which trained troops are engaged is
taken into account. There were more
than fifty battles in the war OF the
rebellion in which the losses in any one
of them exceeded our entire loss il the
Philippines for a year or more, anc
where not much, if any. larger bodies
of troops were engaged.
We know now that had 1t been posi-
IL 40 irS
pinos in the outset as we are now doing
Aguinaldo's campaign would have beer
closed out long ago, and the war woulc
have been over. When we read Of
General Young with bare troop OF
cavalry pursuing the great body Of
Aguinaldo's army and keeping 1t II
flight; when we learn that a dozer
mounted men with an intrepid ane
cautious leader has successfully cu
through the insurgent lines and passed
from one division to another OF ths
army, distance Of over twenty miles
without losing a man; when we f1ne
mere handfuls of marines landing an6
taking strong position from regl
ments Of the rebels and holding 1t sue
cessfully: when We know that LaWtol
and Macarthur are scattering the In
surgents right and left with a small
troops, and half Of what they hav'
worn out and many Of them sick, WI
begin to realize that the insurgent ha'
been cracked up to be very much NOR
Of q military genius than the truth
justifies. In short. General Wheeler
criticism is probably correct when n
says that the military movements hav'
been greatly exaggerated in Luzon, ant
that If a good commander had TAI
body of mounted infantry he couit
sweep from one end of the island tt
the other.
We have been handicapped by lacl
of horses; we have been crippled b!
the desire to crush the rebellion witt
the least damage possible to the PEG
pie, and the least interruption Of tn
| industries of the islands, that the in
habitants might not be confirmed II
the idea Aguinaldo has instilled int
their minds that we are bloody, mercl
| less and cruel, and are com
only to butcher or enslave then
and seize their property. Hal
the war against the insurgent
been pushed as a war of conquest, an
with the sole idea of killing off tn
rebels as quickly and in as large mum
Der as possible. the contest would hav
been closed long ago.
! 1t is to be borne in mind constantl
| that we have operated from a base
city-where there are 350,0O0 peopl
/ most unfriendly to US, thousands open
| ly hostile; city it was absolutely nee
essary to hold and guard very secure
ly 1t is to be kept in mind, also, tina
we were much retarded by the neces
sary change from volunteer to regula
| troops; that the expiration of the term
| Of enlistment of the volunteers neces
STATED the entire change of an arm
/ in the face of the enemy, thing "
think never before accomplished, an
that this process Of necessity consume
several months, and not only incon
moded us, but greatly favored the n
surgents in their aims.
When the history of the war come
| to be written in the calm Of the futur'
and with perfect impartiality. 1t WI