The National tribune., 1899-08-31

AtOOl1S ASOOC1 III, IoVJs
torious at Gettysburg; for then Longstreet
could not have been sent to his assistance
and without him Gen. Bragg could not
| have fought a battle with RoSecrans at any
cess. as his evacuation of the strongholds
| of Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain
most conclusively testify.
CONFEDERATE FINANCES.
One of the strongest links in the chain
| OF eveatS which led to the final overthrow
| OF the Confe1eracy was the want o. a states
maaIike administration of its financial
affairs. The Confederate authorities de-
Veloped the war power of the South to the
maximum, but seemingly forgetful that a
monetary system of great strength was
equally essential. Pollard in speaking of
this point says, "lt may be said generally
that the result of the war WAS powerfully
influenced by the condition of the Confeder-
ate finances; as much so as by any other
cause" Money has been designated as
"the sinews of war" Then, close study
OF the financial conditions of the Confeder-
ate Government at that period is necessary,
i'll order to determine whether its system
of finances had been SO ably administered
that her money had not deprecated beyond
what would ordinarily be expected in any
nation under the pressure of such war.
Even as early as the Spring of 1863 the
worthleSSneSS of the Confederate currency
was most painfully evident. Salt had
risen from 1 cent per pound to so cents in
Confederate treasury notes. Pollard says:
with the negotiations of the 81, 900, 900
in the Spring of 1868, all financiering on
the part of the Confederate Government
ceased. After that money was manufac-
tured by machinery to meet the wants Of
the Government, and paid out as rapidly
as needed" He says again: "The priRci-
,.ll of In do fI.ltIn nf
was the distrlst of success entertained by
the classes who controlled the value of the
money"
Again. in speaking of the twin disasters
of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. he says:
when it is known that the Confederate
the news of these military disasters, 1T may
well be comprehended what occasions OF
alarm and anxiety they were.'
If these two military disasters forced
Confederate currency down 900 per cent.
the decline would have been little less from
the fall of Nicksburg, and the consequent
loss of over 3O0,0OO square miles OF terri
tory and two and half millions of popula-
ton from which to recruit and sustain
their diminished armies.
This i'm brief is the statement of their
case financially. and taken from source
strongly prejudiced in their favor. Now,
without setting up a comparative state
ment of the almost phenomenal growth OF
the financial powers of the National Gov
eminent how, / would ask, could the Con-
federate authorities present their claims to
foreign powers for intervention, with any
degree of confidence that their appeals
would be needed, with treasury totally
bankrupt and their financial system ad-
ministered by machinery.
LEES INVASION.
Lees invasion of Pennsylvania was COM
L ~c IL
army consisted of three corps numbering
about 25, 900 each, with $4,000 cavalry and
artillery in all splendidly equipped army
of about 100000 effective men. By the
9th of June his entire army was trans
ferred to Chambersburg, Pa, about 20
miles northwest of Gettysburg: Lee con-
templated an advance upon Harrisburg,
but the arrival of the advance of Meade's
army in the vicinity of Gettysburg forced
him to change his plans, as he saw the
Union commander was menacing his COM
munications with the Potomac. Retreat
to protect his communications or fight
were Lees only alternatives. He chose the
after History has recorded the result.
1t is not my province to describe the battle
of Gettysburg but to draw some conclusions
upon the supposed reversal of that victory.
What, asked Longstreet, would have
been the result had the assault on July 3
been made with 10000 troops instead OF
1s 900? In the light of what is now known
Of the situation at that critical moment, as
I will attempt to show, the result would
have been the same had Lee charged with
10000 or 10000 troops, except that the
terrible sacrifice of life on his part would
have been twice or thrice as large. The
Confederates only succeeded in touching
the Union lines at one point, and were
quickly repelled from this by only small
portion of the troops which could have been
concentrated there in Is minutes. Only
two divisions of Hancock's Corps and one
other brigade were really engaged. The
other division, together with the remnants
of Howard's Sickles' and Reynolds Corps,
which had been badly cut up the two pre-
vious days, were nea; at hand, together
with Sedgwick's Corps, which had not yet
even touched the fight, and a portion OF
Sykes troops, to the rear and left of Han
cock, behind little Round Top.
History warrants me in saying that
Meade could have concentrated over sc, 900
soldiers on the center of his line in 20 min
utes, and that position with the aid of the
artillery which swept the approaches to it,
it is safe to say, could not have been carried
by 10000 or $4,000 men had they been
hurled upon it at once. This brings me
fairly to the point of the speculation which
| started out to discuss: viz, that the Con-
federates won the battle Of Gettysburg on
July 3.
The first question to consider under that
ti1eOIy w iistI W pc VI a NfCbofy SIIdl We
take as our guide in this discussion? The
comparative conditions of the two armies
in losses, in valor of the troops and in the
strategy and military ability of the Gen.
erals and corps commanders would not
warrant one in assuming that victory at
Gettysburg for either side could be more
complete in its results than were the vic
tories heretofore or afterwards won when
the main armies of the two sections met in
deadly conflict. Then Bull Run, Chan
cellorsville, Antietam, Chickamauga, or
Missionary Ridge, as a type, would fairly
determine the full Specification of the term
victory in this discussion.
FRUITS OF VICTORY.
What were the great fruits Of victory to
the army which won any of the aboye-men-
toned battles? Pollard says of Lees vic
tory at Charlottesville: "He had won one
of the most remarkable victories on record y
What were the fruits of his victory? He
simply held the bloody ground with an ex-
hausted army, unable to take the least ad-
vantage of the alleged Decentralization of the
Union forces. Grants victory at Mission
ary Ridge was more complete than either
of the others named; still, his army was in
no condition to follow to Atlanta, or con-
tinue any offensive operations, until fully
reorganized.
In order to show Lees effective force. with
which to continuethe campaign had he won
the battle of Gettysburg i must quote from
his report to the Confederate authorities
upon his return to Virginia. After reach
ing his old quarters on the Rapidan he re-
ported to the War Department Al 900 men