The age-herald., 1899-02-21
SCHLEY REPLIES
 TO ALLEGATIONS Concerning His Conduct During the War
 With Spain. DENIES INSTRUMENTATION uin Q.darn Gaua uis.. III Ainanalian a nu
His Orders Gave Him All Discretionary
 Powers.
THE NAVAL BATTLE AT SANTIAGO
Contends That He Was in Command During the Conflict, and That His Orders Contributed to Ad-
 miral Cervera's Defeat.

Washington, February 2O.-Rear Admiral w. s. Schley, having been granted permis- sion to answer the charges made against him by a communication to the senate, handed to the naval affairs committee his statement, in which he disclaims every pur- pose of controversy with the navy depart ment.
 The department, he says, so far as it re- lates to him, can be summarized under the following heads:
 Tine delay at Cienfuegos; the alleged slow progress toward Santiago de Cuba from Cienfuegos; the retrograde movements of the 26th and 27th of May; the battle of Santiago and the destruction of Ceryera s fleet.
 The admiral says his orders from Ad- miral Sampson on May 19 were to block ade ,Cienfuegos, which he proceeded to do. He had no knowledge that there were any insurgents about Cienfuegos who were friendly until the Marblehead arrived on the 24th. Even had he this knowledge on the 23d of May, the surf would have pre- vented communication. On his arrival, he sent Commander McCalla, of the Marble
 
 gents, the result of which was made known to him on May A. Then, for the first time, he learned definitely that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Without delay he started for Santiago.
 No Ground for Criticism
 What possible ground of criticism" he says, ''adyerse to me, there can be In all this, l. do not see. l was on the spot act ing under orders which gave me entire dis cretion and yet clothed me with the re- sponsibi ity of going to Santiago only after I was satisfied that the fleet was not at Cienfuegos."
 He quotes from the dispatch of Admiral Sampson of May 20, in which the latter says Schley should "hold his fleet off Cien- fuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must go either to Havana or to Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am therefore of the opinion that the best chance to capture the ships will be to hold the town points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can mus ter. If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we can then as- semble off that point the ships best suited for the purpose and comepletely blockade 1t. Until we then receive nor positive in- formation. we shall continue to hold Ha- vana and Cienfuegos."
 Speaking of the retrograde movement, which the secretary, adopting the language of Admiral Sampson, characterizes as rep rehensible conduct" Admiral Schley says that in forty-two years service, never was such language used in reference to conduct of mine. and I see no reason for it now.''
 Admiral Schley speaks of the difficulty of doing anything with the insurgents and refers to the manner in which Lieutenant Blue took three days to secure information. As to the battle of Santiago, Admiral Schley says the facts of that contest speak for themselves. He quotes from his of ficia1 report to Sampson, in which he con- graduated the commander of the squadron, and said:
 His Report to Sampson
 'The victory seems big enough for us all"
 He asks the committee to contrast his reports and those of Sampson containing references to himself, and continues:
 "As to all these criticisms of my course, prior to the discovery by me on May % of Cervera's fleet, whether from Admiral Sampson or the department, none of 1t has ever been made by either to me; and l never heard a word of it from any one until after the battle with that fleet al- though more than five weeks had passed since the alleged 'reprehensible conduct had occurred. Although Admiral Sampson used this language to the secretary con corning me on the 10th day of July Gust one week aftr the batte), he has never to this day, in any. manner or to any extent, intimated to me any disapprobation or any criticisms of my conduct of the flying squadron."
 The question of the presence of the enemy determined he decided not to risk serious disablement until endorsements arrived Admiral Schley quotes the depart ment's dispatch of May 29, in these words:
 "The department looks to you to ascer- tain the fact of the presence of the enemy Santiago should not leave without decis- i've action."
 He comments on this as follows:
 'In obedience to the above order and, without further order or instruction from any one, I did ascertain the fact that the enemy was at Santiago, and the enemy did not leave without decisive conflict"
 The Crucial Feature
 In conclusion, Admiral Schley contends that the turn of the Brooklyn in the battle of the 3rd was the "crucial and deciding feature of the combat and of decided ad- vantage" He says it is mistake to say that the vessels distance from the enemy was increased to the length of 200 yards, and adds:
 Though. this may not be of record, it is a fact nevertheless."
 Admiral Echley cites the fact that the board of navigators charts show that the Brooklyn was nearest when it emerged from the harbor, nearest at every stage of the battle and nearest the Colon when it surrenders and give many confirma- tory details of his fiagships report of his flagship's active and effective participation fin the battle. He says he made no report of his maneuver insflis report of the battle as it's effect upon the battle was never a question with him. His last paragraph