Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1899-02-11

AMERICANS AND FILlPINOS.
Review Of Relations Since the Beginning

| pulSuc q uOiO aggressive oeuVuoo W.
ward the Filipinos. Agoncillo urged
the Filipinos to attack the American
forces at once, before General Otis's
reinforcements should arrive. This
dispatch was discovered by the gov.
ernment the day after it was filed, and
that it was an indication of impending
trouble was the more certain because
news came that day from Hong Kong
that the Filipino congress at Malolos
had given Aguinaldo, as president Of
the revolutionary government, the
power 10 declare war against the
United States whenever he saw fit.
Our relations with Aguinaldo's in.
surgents were never really friendly af:
ter Dewey's battle in Manila bay
Shortly after the battle Aguinaldo
went to Cavite from Hong Kong, and,
with the consent of our government
began raising an army and surround
ing Manila. He was nominally aiding
our forces; but his only idea was to
drive Spaniards and Americans both
out of the islands and establish him.
self. He was willing to aid US 80 long
as we were driving out the Spaniards
On June l8 he formed an independent
government, with himself as its head
When General Merritt arrived in the
Philippines the insurgents held many
points in the islands.
"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces
at war with SPAIN" wrote General
Merritt, in his report of August 81
chad previous to the arrival of the
land forces, been wagiDg desultory
warfare with the Spanish for several
months, and were, at the time o1
my arrival, in considerable force, va
riously estimated and never accu'
rately ascerlained, probably not far
from 10000 men,"
Aguinaldo added more recruits to
bis army while the American forces
were preparing to take Manila. He
was not officially recognized by oui
government.
"As General Aguinaldo did not visit
me upon my arrival, nor offer his ser
vices as a subordinate military leader
and as my instructions from the presi.
dent fully contemplated the occupa'
ton of the islands by the American
land forces, and stated that the powers
of military occupation are absolute and
supreme and Immediately operate upon
the political condition of the inhabi
tants,'" reported General Merritt, 81
did not consider it wise to hold any
direct communication with the insur'
gent leader until / should be in pos
session of the city of Manila, especial
ly as I would not until then be in q
position to issue proclamation and en-
force my authority in the event that
his pretensions should clash with my
designs"
Aguinaldo recognized General Mer'
ritt's authority as military governor o.
Manila and its suburbs after the cap
ture of the town, but bis own govern.
ment claims the rest of the Philippine
territory. The Aguinaldo republic
was formally announced to the for
eign powers and Felipe Agoncillo was
sent to Washington as the agent of the
insurgent government. He and Senol
Lopez went to Paris and stayed there
for two months, trying to get an audi
dence with the, peace commissioners
Agoncillo did not deny that the Filipi
nos were receiving shipments of arms
and that Aguinaldo would resist any
American Intervention in the affairs
of the insurgent government.
Trouble was brewing in Iloilo, in the
island of Panay, $50 miles from Ma
Mia, while the peace commission was
sitting. General Otis cabled III No
yember that danger was threatening
there and that it looked as though the
insurgents would overpower the Span
ish garrison under General Rios. Or
ders were sent from Washington tc
General Otis TO take Iloilo. Colone
Potter was sent to Iloilo on fast ship
leaving Manila on the day before
Christmas. The American officer ar
rived 80 hours too late, the Spanish
commander having evacuated the
place, leaving the insurgents free te
enter. Aguinaldo's flag was flying
General Miller was sent to 1loilo with
the Eighteenth infantry, the FlfLy-hrs
Iowa and a battery of artillery. The
three transports were conveyed by The
Baltimore and Callao. The insurgents
refused to allow the American force:
to land and threatened to shoot any
American who came ashore. The
American troops remained aboard The
transports.
The Filipinos thought that the Amer
leans were afraid of them, and they
became bolder. The on-aggressivt
attitude of our forces, they thought
was due to fear. In the curl ent mum
ber of Harper's Weekly, Frank d
Millet, writing from London, thus re
fers to the Filipinos' regard for ou
troops:
"IL is a mistake to suppose that th'
attitude of the Filipino insurgents ha'
changed since the Paris treaty defined
the Philippine question it has beel
practically The same ever since tht
capture of Manila, for at no time since
then could armed United States troops
have entered the territory in the pos
session of the insurgents without pro
voking open hostility. Ih'
Filipinos are not 10 be so much blamed
for their assumption of authority O.
for their expectation to be recognized