The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1899-11-03
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1899.
TWELVE PAGES.
Essentially Conquest.

l Mckinley declared that it was his
purpose to put sixty-five thousand
soldiers behind the American flag in
the Philippines, to maintain the honor
and glory of the republic. This state
ment as to the number Of troops to be
sent is confirmed by Adjutant General
.Corbin in his official report on the
army.
Sixty-ffve thousand men constitute a
very large army-almost as large as
either of the opposing armies at Wat
erloo, a battle that broke the power OF
the great Napoleon and fixed the des-
TIMES of Europe for ages. There We're
very few battles fought in our civil
war in which either army numbered
sixty-five thousand men. and it is
within ten thousand of the total force
that President Lincoln at first deemed
necessary to crush the rebellion. 1t
Is probably a greater army than Eng
land had on American soil at any one
time during the revolutionary war.
To the mere size of this army which
DIT is the declared purpose of the ad-
ADMINISTRATION to send to the Philippines,
the Standard makes no objection If
no method of dealing with the Filipinos
is to be entertained save that of beat
ing them into submission by sheer
force, it is plain that every considera
ton of both civil and military policy
should dictate the employment Of an
army capable of bringing the struggle
no a speedy end. So far as this partiC-
nlar point is concerned, our adverse
comment has been that an administra-
tion relying exclusively upon force has
failed to employ an army adequate for
the work in hand, preferring rather TO
deceive the people by belittling the en-
envy and giving out gorgeously -colored
reports of decisive victories won.
Our purpose is merely to point
out the magnitude and character of the
conflict which even the fatuous admin
istration of President Mckinley now
recognizes as being before us in the
philippines. That the war is essential
~ one of conquest should now be per-
fectly manifest to all who are not viii
fully blind. The idea that the great
body of the Filipinos, and especially
the better classes, are entirely friendly,
five thousand men to successfully cope
with a few bandits and ''malcon-
tents led on by a ''bribe-taking up
start" is too preposterous to merit Sc
rious considerat ton, much less to be
4 Believed.
The language of President Mckinley
leaves no room for doubt that the war
is as completely one of conquest as
was ever waged since modern civiliza-
fion began 1t is no answer to this to
say that he purposes giving the Fill
pinos better government than they can
give themselves. Any war of conquest
anight be justified upon that plea. Its
fatal weakness lies in the fact that III
such cases the conqueror always as
surnes to decide what is good for the
conquered. Whatever may be SAID
in it's favor must be from a distinctive
ly imperialistic point of view. 1t can
not be logically defended upon any
recognized American principle.
Nor can it be upheld by the claim
80 frequently made by Mr.. McKinley's
Rpologists that he really intends u
give the Filipinos the fullest measure
pf self-government of which they are
rapable after they have been sounilS
thrashed. But why should they BE-
'thrashed'' first and given self-govern'
ment afterwards, when self-goVern
ment is literally all that they are ask
ing for? There is no point in such q
defense, because it puts President Nc
Kinley in the attitude of thrashing the
Filipinos just for the pleasure that the
dhrashing process affords him. More
over there is no basis for the defense.
Mr.. Mckinley has never said anything
from which the conclusion can be fair
ly drawn that he has any such pur-
pose.
Still, the defense has certain value.
Tt is a concession that the Fiiipinos