The people's journal. (Pickens, S.C.) 1891-1903, 1899-06-29
common law and the fact that dogs
were not taxed as other property In

common law and the fact that dog,
were not taxed as other property II
that State.
Likewise In the case OF State va
Doe 10 Ind. ., IL Am. Rep. 5Y9, the
court, while holding dogs not the sub
ject OF larceny, said If dogs wer,
taxed In this State as other property
1T would be strong circumstance tt
show an intent on tho part of the legia
lature to abrogate the common Law
rule and make them the subjects O.
larceny like any other personal pro
perty." In the cas- OF Mullaby vs.
People, SO N. V, 3G5, IL strong case In
support OF the Wow OF this court, tn.
court said: 1t can scarcely be sup
posed that the legislature meant to re
| gard dogs as property for the purpose
OF taxation and yet leave them withou,
protection from thieves" Sustaining
our conclusion, among others are the
following cases State w. Brown, IS
Tenn, SO, 10 Am. ltcp. 81. Hurnsby
VS.. Sampson (IowaJ 40 l.. IL A. sos, and
very aule, exhaustive note on pro
perty rights in dogs, beginning Ut
page 503.
The circuit court also erred In hold,
ing that the Intent to steal goods
and chattels charged in the first count
necessarily implies the stealing Of u
dog, because from q dog house."
The first count did not charge intent
to steal dog, but intent TO steal the
goods and chattels Of the prosecutrix X
IN said dog house. 1t is not necessary
Inference that no chattel other than u
dog could be In dog house, rs there
might have been other chattels there,
such, as for example, collar and chain,
block and ain, vessel for food and
water, =, indeed, any other chat
tel The proprietor mighs Sos fit to
place therein. The first count could
therefore, be sustained as count for
burglary without reference to the
question whether q dog is the subject
OF larceny In indictments for burg
larry with inteut to commit larceny it
Is not necessary to specify the particu-
lar goods and chattes the defendant
intended to steal. 3 Enc. Pc. aud Pr.
776. 1t Is urged against this that such
want or specification would prevont
the plea OF former acquittal or couvic-
tlon, but not 80, for slch plea is avail
able If the same burglarious breaking
and entering Is the essential ingredient
in both charges.
In reference to tho second count, we
think the circuit court correctly held
that 1T failed to charge compound
larceny. In alleging larceny from
said dog house." this count did not
allegc that the dog house was appur-
tenant to and within POO yards OF the
dwelling house. This was alleged in
the first count, but the rule is that the
sutiiciency OF each count must be deter
mined by It's own allegations without
aid from another count. State Vs.
johnson. Is S. c., 4S3. But, nevcrthe.
less, 1t was error to quash the secord
count, because 1t was good as II count
Tor simple larceny, and the court Of
general sessions has concurrent juris-
dlction In all cases Of larceny triable
by magistrate. Sec constitution, Art
D, Sec. Is, applied in reference to lar
ceny OF live stock In the case OF State
vs.. Crosby, 81 3. G. 240.
The judgment OF the circuit court ls
reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.