New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1899-04-03
THE BATTLE OF JULY 3.
GERMAN COMMANDERS VIEWS OF THE
FIGHT AT SANTIAGO


can war by Commander Jacobson. Of the German
protected cruiser Geer. The last Of this interest
ing series deals with the condition Of the Spanish
ships after the battle Of Santiago and contains n
number OF observations regarding the technical
effect OF the American gun fire which Will interest
naval officers The most interesting observations
to the laymen those upon the strategy or lack
OF IT. displayed by Cervera. The Spanish Admiral
having been ordered TO leave the harbor 10 remove
the main object Of the attack upon Santiago. COM
mander Jacobson says his position was most dni-
cult. He did not dare make the attempt at night
and decided TO go out in broad daylight COM
mander Jacobson says:
The whole crew fell victim to this fatal de-
cision Instructions for the sortie and the western
course were issued The Admiral was eh,le sneDnv
or Of reaching another Cuban harbor even en- nn ne
tile feet. It is to this feeling OF helplessness ana
impotence against the opposing naval forces MOI
The Spanish ships had spent month and halt III, IN
the harbor. without even attempting 10 a,1nh ,e
sented Itself even of harrasng IT, ,bs 1 'Wo
and lack of II itatve must have had very de,
add 10 this the certain knowledge that the opposing
forces much stronger 1t Will be reanly otng
out Of the harhor entrance was the only ac.ceptaS
bic one especially in view OF the t5em u4ser
yceabe and eyentuay rssc c fap me OF impotence
reflections their fate. psychoogically speaking
VAS sealed DO not 5 med aT % Of he hostile e
but the other hand it Is quite nathraI en; n ns
he had foreseen the one who set tnt ena ~,
OF running his ship ashore All the o'"''
manders followed this example
CAUSES OF AMERICAN SUCCESS.
On the American side the situation was just the
reverse. Admiral SIMPSONS feet was funy con-
scious Of it's power Tho blockade was being con-
Quoted in accordance with carefully prepared pam
also the arrangements IN case " w
enemys attempt to escape. Frequent ehsaee"'e"
with the Spanish forts had given commanders anu
crews that calm assurance in the handling OF ther
weapons which guarantees success The long nocK-
AIDE service exhaustng and monotonous hardy IN
e5rPfd 9y ANY the sc nerves S to the highest pitch
and everybody anxious for the end 10 come ne
Suddenly the enemy attempts TO escape Al me
passions that had been smoulderng under the s ae
break forth The welcome Sp99orMn i'II last and
with wild rush the American SHIPS e,, G Gpo" owing
distances. was probably not very effective; nui
the other ships followed him the moral superiority
OF the Americans reasserted Itself Inc Gonl .ti
the same course and the Americans. having every
advantage their side, recommenCsd ". III to,ai
the fleeing ships which resulted IN their total
bsve already spoken Of the lack Of training Of
,b snarish "rews The neglect of gun and torpedo
torget practice the inadequate education OF lhe
ers II Is mainly due 10 these deficiencies that the
defeat was fastened and that the American ships
sustained SO few losses.
SPANISH CRUISERS SLOW
The training of the engine personnel. also was
totally unreliable which Is not surprising, In We"
~ the fact that the Spanish ships. as a rule are
not sent out on extensive cruises. The bottoms Of
the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long
time and as they had been lying In Santiago Har-
Dor for month and a half, they were considerably
fouled Thus the cruisers Maria Teresa Oquendo
and Vizcaya. which in all official books are credited
with 1s5 knots speed went into the battle WIN a
speed Of from ten to twenty knots ut most ana me
Crstoha Colon which is the latest snip ana W"S 70
run twenty knots, hardly attained speed OF iS,o'
Under these circumstances, In every way ul Ie
able for The Spanish whoff cpT rev rorav epnr
waited by long inactivity whose ships were INFERIOR IN
ngmRer speed ana ssqF was easy
and paid for with nsignarh nj sacrifces -,
There only one chance for the success OF me
sortie II should have been made Mt night in scat
tered formation. After personal investigation OF
practicable for feet to leave Santiago Harbor At
night The wreck of the Merrimac did not consti-
tlite an obstruction. II is tpie that Admiral Samp-
sons report the night blockade states that the
Iightships lying from onr m two miles from
MORO castle according 70 the state Of the atmos
phere and that they lighted up the channel for half
a mile inside. Even the best searchiGht, however.
illumination could not have been very effective
Moreover. the shore batteries by opening fire upon
the llghtships could have compelled them 10 change
their positions but strange 10 say. this was never
done The dark nghs at Inc , nd or have I'VE b~s~
best suited for the enterprise.
POSSIBLE CHANCE FOR ESCAPE.
II the feet did not dare to attempt night sortie
and was nevertheless. compelled 10 leave the har-
Dor in obedience Of orders. then the ships should
have been headed straight at the enemy. All weap
ons including the torpedo and the ram. should have
been used 4 bold attack In close formation
the only chance Of success against the superior
hostile hghting forces, WHO would have hardly
found time 10 form their lines.
The Lessons Commander Jacobson derives from
the battle, briefly stated. arc:
Abolition Of all woodwork. no unprotected tor
Shell fire. smokeless powder: greatest possible
o' and Sorogb ranng oS G h
all branches Of the service.
Commander jacobson also gives some OF his OBJ
servatlons on the Porto Rican campaign. but these
contain nothing Of special moment except an ac-
count OF the attack OF the Spanish torpedo boat
Terror and the gunboat Isabel II the ST. Paul
outside OF San Juan Harbor June %. 1895
corning which many conflicting accounts have been
published This the only attempt made dur
ing the to torpedo one of our vessels.
FIGHT OF THE ST. PAUL AND THE TERROR
Commander Jacobson gives the following account
Of the occurrence. which he obtained from the
commander Of the Terror:
At a. m on June % the lookout at the fort
orders for The Isabel II 70 90 out to reconnetre
and for the Terror he ready for action. BY II 30
the vessel had come closer. and the Isabel n went
out. Upon sighting her. the hostile cruiser i'm
mediately hoisted her flag and waited The Isabel
II opened fire the foe. The destroyer then re-
cevod orders 10 go out and assist the Isabel The
Terror. which had been left by her feet AT Mar
tinque had beer able TO recover her guns
and ammunition which during the voyage had been
transferred to the Maria Teresa In order 10 make
for coal The Terror. therefore. had no other
weapons than her torpedoes and two 57-milllmetre
guns with little ammunition. The Isabel III
fought the ST. Paul distance Of from 1000 20
y 90 metres. AS the utmost range OF our guns
only 400 metres. we could not assist the !
ii by going closer her I therefore gave |
orders head the Terror east. not 10 inter-
fere with the Isabel firing north on the enemy; !
When sufficiently clear Of her and had |
the open before US. headed straight for the |
ST Paul at speed OF from twenty 10 tweniy-one |
knots
The enemy who hitherto had been firing on the !