The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1899-01-22

And when he announced neither killed nor
wounded the news soon spread through the
flagship and the men cheered vociferously.
Aside from the bad marksmanship of the
Spanish gunners there ssegned to be an
extraordinary lack of killing quality in the
shells which hit cur vessels There prob
ably was never before known such an ex-
perionce as that Of the Baltimore. A 80
pound armor- piercing shell, fired undoubt-
eddy from the Canacao battery on shore,
entered the Baltimore about two feet above
the upper deck on the starboard side, be-
tween the after 6-inch gun and the g.
FOUNDER mounted on the rail. This shell,
after piercing two thicknesses OF steel one
quarter of an inch thick, struck the deck
| and penetrated until it reached one of the
| heavy deck beams, which it cracked clear
| through. Il was then DETECTED upward,
| coming out of the wooden deck and tear
| ing its way through the steel combing OF
! the engine room skylight, again passing
| through two quarter inch plates. rs it
| had been turned sideways in rising from
| the deck the holes it made through these
| plates were about eighteen inches long by
| six inches wide-ragged, torn spots, very
| unlike the clean-cut puncttIres made by
| such a shell when entering point fore
| most. Leaving the skylight, the shell
i ranging slightly forward struck the recOil
! cylinder of the port 6-inch gun on the
! quarter deck, disabling the carriage. At
/ last II met an object strong enough 10 re-
/ sist its attack-the steer shield, which
! curved in front of the gun in a complete
/ semiclrce Following this curve, the
! shell came out on the forward side of the
carriage travelling in a direction exactly
/ opposite to its former course, until II
reached the starboard side Of the ship
| again, where 1t struck a steel veutilator
! and was finally stopped. In other words,
( this shell passed through one inch Of steel,
/ ripped up a deck broke a deck beam, and
bulged a shield about an inch out of its
original shape. II crossed the Baltimore
from starboard side to port and back again
( to the starboard side. and yet had hit none
of the many men engaged at the guns near
/ by. 1t is true it was the cause of wound
ing two officers and six men, for in its
course it exploded two 3-pOunder shells
which were lying on the deck ready for
use in the small gun on the Baltimore's
rail; but directly II injured no one, and it
is regarded as holding the record FOR &c
centric action.
Although our squadron was never
seriously troubled over the posi-
bility of encountering mines in
the bay entrance or in the bay
itself. the commodore had good reasons for
} btiItElHS tial some mines ndu Deei Ialu
In the first place the United States con
sui. when he reported to the commander
in-chief in Mrs Bay, brought news of such
activity in torpedo work by the Spaniards
that we might have been led to believe the
danger OF destruction by mines to be
greater than that to be encountered from
the guns of the enemy. That there were
mines laid in the Boca Chica we had clear
proof day or two after the battle in the
l hay no al aisYbq tba oil INN ra
went down TO Corregidor Island to capture
the Spanish troops and batteries there To-
Gated, the officer commanding the garrison
promptly hauled down the Spanish flag,
and the senior officer present went aboard
the Raleigh to surrender. The Raleigh
soon began drifting in the Boca Chica and
the Spanish commander began to clamor to
be sent ashore at once, as he had been
paroled. II was not convenient to send
him Immediately and he was Informed that
in a short time boat would be ready for
him. But this delay did not suit him at
all He wanted to leave the ship instant
ly. and his anxiety became so urgent that
1t was evident that he had special reason
for haste. When pressed to explain his de-
sire for such hasty departure. he told the
Raleighs officers that they were in mine
field and that ii was q wonder that they
had not already been blown up. In order
to draw him out, they told him that they
knew all about the mines and did not fear
them. Well, he said, they might take such
chances If they wanted to. but for his part,
as he was now prisoner, he claimed the
right TO be protected, and therefore he
begged them either to put him ashore or
take the ship cut of danger Further
questioning brought out all that he knew
1t appeared that while the channel UNI
!. doubtedly contained considerable number
of powerful contact mines-that is. mines
intended to explode when struck by ship
they had been placed with so little
knowledge of the requirements of subma-
rne warfare as TO make them harmless to
vessels. They had been dropped overheard
r and allowed to sink to the bottom in water
: about eighty Ia one hundred feet deep
The Spaniards who sank the mines did moi
: trouble themselves about the result that
might be attained they had been told Il
, put mines in the channel, and having
placed them, they felt that they had done
1 their whole duty. Or course Commodor,
. Dewey had no Information before he en-.
{ tered the bay that these mines had beer
/ laid in this foolish sipshod fashion; bu
he had such accurate knowledge o
Spanish character that he felt justified il
$ assuming that the mines need not be Sc
| riously feared. The commodore knew tina
e the passage of Corregidor Island by nigh
was fraught with all the dangers incidenta
c to modern warfare. Having considered al
:, the facts that We're obtainable, he weigh
t ed the probabilities and acted with goo,
n Extraordinarily, but not rashy.
1t has been said that Commodore Dewe
: sought to obtain the command of tn
d Asiatic station because he foresaw the op
[ portunity that was TO come to him. Il
:. one sense this is true. Dewey has Away