The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-04-17
ANrIQuATEo METHODS.
spaniards' Tactics Are These Of . Gen.
tury Ago.

New York, April ia dispatch to
the Times from Washington avs 1t
10 expected that the forces that will be
used in Cuba will consist Of cavalry.
infantry and light artillery. Heavy ar
tillery could hardly be used in the wet
season, and besides 1t would not be
necessary in operations against the
Spaniards. Consul General Lee, 1t is
understood. advises the use Of these
branches of the service for the cam
paign in Cuba He Is of the opinion
that the army can successfully conduct
operations in the island during the wet
weather IL IL has cavalry and light bat
teries. Rapid-f1re guns n plenty of
them will be depended on very largely
to do the fighting.
II is reported by all observers of the
military methods of the Spaniards that
their infantry at once forms a hollow
quare upon the approach OF cavalry.
This military formation has been in
practice for a century and the Spani-
ards nave not learned any other way to
say that when an army Is SO formed 1t
can be decimated by rapid-fire guns
and destroyed IL ii does not soon break
such formation. The cavalry will be
used to force the Spaniards into posi-
ton to get them at bay as 1t were. and
the infantry and light artillery will then
attack with rapid-fire guns.
1t is said that the Spanish forces in
Cuba are poorly armed. They have a
fairly good rifle. the Mauser. but are
inadequately supplied with mmunitlon
and mos. OF the troops being young
boys. do not know how to use their
guns. In rapid-fire guns they are very
deficient.
Artillery is their weakest point and
they nj now supply the deficiency.
Even Havana is defended by Anticipated
cannon with the exception of six fine
nam Kr,nn 0trnc u,hirh hnwevor have
been allowed to rust on their carriages
as the artillery don't know anything
about their use. At Matanzas they have
four guns of the same kind-heavy
10 and Pinch c~annon-but there are no
carriages for them. and they are per-
fectly useless. 1t Is said there Is not
one ordnance officer of the army ord
who understands the handling OF
such uns.
General Lee, IL is understood, ADVISED
the war department that a. few good
regiments would be sufficient for the
first movement in Cuba. He relies very
strongly upon the efficiency OF the army
under General Gomez and General
Garcia, which would naturally be our
allies In war. He reports thai the revolu-
tionists ave an effective army or 4o,o0o
troops. which they could increase 10
loo, 900 almost at any time III the arms
for them were found. Gomez has kept
his army in its present number because
1t was too difficult to maintain a large
army in that after its repeated
devastation and because 10000 men was
enough to keep up the war and crush
Spain slowly. On the other hand. the
~Spaniards have. he says, not more than
5000 to $1,000 effective troops: III the
revolutionists were armed and a smaii
but well disciplined and seasoned army
from his ountry is landed in the ISL
ands he thinks the Spaniards viii ave
no chance for successful resistance.
Another element in the war that Cen
eral Lee, II is understood. commented
On. is that SPANS troops In CUBA are
depending upon this country for food
supplies. The island can be entirely
shut off from food by the action of the
United States. 1t is estimated that
Havana would suffer as much as If II
were actually besieged IL we should
prevent their ships from securing sup