The herald., 1898-05-15

concentrated IN tn6 iron rule go on from
the moment the first skirmisher starts.
Even with an avowed inferiority of arti
lery, it will usually be best to continue the
onward march, SO as to draw off the
enemy's artillery from ones own guns
and divide their attention while ones own
batteries refit. Infantry should keep on
forging ahead and refrain from firing, for
the absence of range knowledge and disci-
pline make it of little value. They enter
on the fire fight at a disadvantage, the
enemy having only one line of view, with
the reserves under cover, while the at
lacking infantry have several lines liable
to catch stray bullets.
To halt and fire standing up presents
a vulnerable target with small fire ac-
curacy on ones own part; to lie down
makes it difficult to get up again. While
formerly the fear of death had to be over
come to enable a man to close in per-
sonal combat with his foe, discipline has
now to exert all its resources to carry
him to a place where he can effectually
shoot and where he is still long way
from closing with his enemy. Until that
vantage ground has been gained and fire
power has borne down the courage of the
enemy, a general cannot hope for victory
The two nations wiz most experience both
insist on the power of fire with an en-
phasis which is Enthusiastically evidenced in
regulations and maneuvers-great rows of
guns wedged in between thick shooting
lines of infantry and a complete indif-
ference as to the exposure of men and
horses in the final phases of the fight.
Although some may think such tactics
theatrical and unreal they are the DELHI
crate outcome of vast experience and
show THAT every yard in front must carry
as many shooting machines, guns or rifles
as can possibly be got there BY reducing
normal intervals losses are increased, but
these considerations are thrown to the
winds at foreign maneuvers, to obtain
superiority of fire, so as to break into the
enemy's line at all cost. 1t seems more
essential to keep men under control than
to avoid loss.
Nowhere so much as in Cuba will it be
necessary to obtain the greatest benefit
from the formation of the ground for
clever generalship. Small, flexible columns
and formati tons should be the rule They
retain the power of rapidly moving to the
front and opening fire in single and double
rank, and facilitate formation to flank
to meet cavalry and change of direction in
the advance. Whether or not they are
less vulnerable to artillery. fire than an
extended line is a question to be decided
by experiment and experience in active
service. A line is certainly easy to range
upon, although a wel-burst shell would
not be so disastrous as it would be even
in front of a.lght column.
I consider it a mistake to mask the ar
tillery fire by the generals own infantry,
as he is thus robbed of very valuable sup
port in the crucial stages of the attack, as
was the case at Woerth. with the Eleventh
and Fifth German corps. I regard X as
dangerous to mass infantry behind guns.
thereby exposing them to the fire of shells
intended for their batteries, and also the
danger of working at an unreasonaby
close distance in front of their guns and
risking losses through the premature
bursting of shrapnel. These are matters
to which no attention is given in maneu-
vers, but they will find place in active
service. The point in the defense where a
breach is intended should be communicated