The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-08-11
Armist1oe ana Negotiation.

As regards the e1pediency Of granting an
armistioe pending negotiations for o peace.
American precedeuts are conflicting. When
commissioners for the British Foreign Office
at Client in August, 1914, no armistice had
been arranged, and the war went on up to
and after the signing Of the treaty on Dec.
"a Of tho same year; indeed, JACK
SONS great defeat Of the British at New
Orleans did not take place until Jan.
g, 1915. In tho war with Mexico, our ex-
perience with an armistice was u~nsatis-
factory. In August, 1s47, when, as yet,
tho army under Gen. SCOTT had not mas
tered all tho defences of the Mexican capt.
tai, NICOLAS P. TRIsT. who had accom-
panied the expedition as President Folks
plenipotentiary, caused an armistice to be
granted, and commissioners to be appointed
on both sides to treat for peace. The nego-
t~iations came to nothing. and, in the follow
ing month, the armlstice was broken and
hostile operations were resumed. The en-
envy, however, had employed the interval in
r~evictualling their capital and in strength
ening their defensive works, and Gen.
SooTT had to fight the battles OF Moline del
AbOy uAho OhupuADCpoO bC1OIo U0 COulu cuLGr
the City Of Mexico.
The rules Of international law governing
IN armistice are recognized as we'll settled.
The belligerents are not at liberty to rein
force their troops stationed within the field
OF operations, but they have a right to re-
victual them, and experience has shown that
the smuggling Of ammunition under the
guise OF conveying food supplies cannot be
easily prevented. Neither can an enemy
be hindered from improving materially
the Notifications within his lines. For
these reasons. all military text books rec
ogniZe that an armistice inures to the
benefit Of the weaker party, and should be-
granted only when the prospect OF arrang-
ing an acceptable peace seems assured, and
then only for a definite period, or with the
stipulation that 1t may be terminated at
any time upon the notice Of either party.
In the case before us the prospect of the
conclusion Of a definite peace by the COM
mission is not absolutely assured, pro-
vided the Presidents plenipotentiaries firm
ly represent the wishes of a majority Of
the American people and require the ces-
sion OF all the Philippines to the United
States. Such a cession Is likely to
be opposed unanimously by the Span
ish commissioners. who, owing to the
fact that the intentions Of our Government
have not yet been signified as peremptorily
with regard to the Philippines as they nave
been with regard to the Antilles, have been
led to believe that they will be suffered to re-
tain the whole or most of the former islands.
The possible outcome, therefore, of the ne
gotlations is n deadlock, provided, of
course, their duty to the President and
the country is performed by our plenipo-
tentiaries; we use the word plenipoten-
tiaries because 1t Is customary In such
cases to vest full powers In tho commits
s~ioners, who are, therefore, competent to
bind the President. though not, of course.
to bind the Senate.
The President will recognize the import
ance OF exhibiting the utmost wariness in
the selection Of the agents to whom are
to be confided the interests OF the
country and the fame of his Admins
tration. The one thing to be dreaded
and to be guarded against, is such defec-
ton or weakness on the part OF one OF our
representatives as shall give the Spanlards
q majority OF the commission.