The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-03-12

| some weeks in finding General Blenker's
command, which, strange as it may seem,
had actually got lost Another plan for the
campaign was at once devised by Generals
Banks and Rosecrans, but it, too, came to
naught through the neglect of others than
Rosecrans
Early in April General Rosecrans took in
hand General Blenker's forces, which were
badly demoralized. May Is, his work ended,
he reported to Washington, whence he was
sent to General Halleck at Corinth, Miss.
then the center of interest i'm the west.
Halleck finally placed Rosecrans in CON-
mand OF the right wing of the Army of the
Mississippi, shortly after which the Con-
federates evacuated Corinth and were at
once pursued by Rosecrans. No general
engagement followed, though there were
several skirmishes. June 10 General Pope
returned to Virginia, and Rosecrans was
placed in command of the Army of the Mis-
sissippi.
On the Sd of October the battle of
Corinth began. Rosecrans disposed of the
men under him to the best advantage. On
the 4th the Confederates were disastrously
defeated, their loss being 1,423 killed, $500
wounded, 2,24S prisoners, IA stands of colors,
artillery, guns, ETC. They were pursued 40
miles in force and 60 with cavalry The
pursuit should have been continued, &C.
cording TO Rosecrans, to Vicksburg, which,
he says, could then have easily been cap
tured
General Rosecrans then re-established his
headquarters at Corinth, where he remained
till Oct. 26, when, by an order dated two
days earlier, he was placed in command OF
the Army of the Cumberland. 1t is the
unanimous testimony of all survivors that
that army was at it's worst in October 1862,
and the same might be said of all the Fed
eral armies. One item is enough to show
the condition. The number of deserters
from the western armies alone was 60 900 at
the close of that year. Under the presi-
dents proclamation most of these returned
to duty later and proved themselves good
soldiers. They were simply worn out and
discouraged by the events of the summer
and fall of 1862.
1t is also the general testimony that the
arrival Of General Rosecrans seemed to
send a thrill of fresh energy through his
command Advance was soon in order, and
the battle of Murfreesboro (Stone River),
Dec. 30 and 80, 1862, made the commanding
general the hero of the nation for the time
1t is fact demonstrable by the journals Of
that date that until after the capture of
Nicksburg Rosecrans was more the popu-
lar hero than Grant.
Fatal Chickamauga.
The critics are still fighting over Chick
amauga. 1t ended General Rosecrans'
chance for honors in the war. Rosecrans
had won notable victory and had mag
nifcent army. The entire north looked for
even greater things from him than he had
already accomplished. From Jan. a. 1862,
to June % his army lay at Murfreesboro
Rosecrans explained that this was because
of the weakness of his cavalry, the scarcity
OF forage, the nature of the roads, and the
policy of holding Bragg on his front, rather
than driving him out of Tennessee only
that he might unite with Joseph +. John
ston and fall upon Grant, still struggling
before Vicksburg. A great deal of grum-
bling from Rosecrans because of lack of at
tention to his requests for more cavalry
and of fault finding on the part of the war
department followed-in fact, ''the relations
between him and his superiors became
greatly strained, so that his official destruc-
ton was but question of time and oppor-
tunity." On June 90 however, in the face
of opposition from every one of his corps
and division generals, Rosecrans began
forward movement against Bragg, and in a
campaign of nine days drove the enemy
iIoLu bWO lOTbluel pOsltiOHS anu WON IOr
the Federals the possession of middle Ten
nessee with total loss of only $50, while |
he took 1900 prisoners, six cannon and |
great quantities of stores The confidence |
of the people in Rosecrans was largely re-
stored by this brilliant campaign, but the |
relations between himself and General |
Halleck, commander in chief, and the war |
department were not less strained. Aug. |
Halleck telegraphed peremptory order to |
Rosecrans to move. Rosecrans declined to |
do so until he was quite ready. On the |
18th he was ready. His problem now was |
to cross the Tennessee and again gain pos |
session of Chattanooga. There were two |!
ways open TO him-to fight his way in or |;
flank the enemy out. He chose the latter. [
Aug. % Bragg, deceived by a singular |
activity along front of $50 miles on the |
part of the Federals, felt himself forced to |
evacuate Chattanooga, which he did, and
the Federal forces effected an unresisted
entrance Rosecrans' forces were, however,
badly scattered, and the problem that now
faced the Union commander was speedy and
effective concentration. Bragg had been
REINFORCED by Longstreet's veteran troops,
Buckner had come to his aid from Knox
vile, Walker had been sent by Joseph K.
Johnston, and militia from Georgia With
these forces at bis command Bragg de-
termined to fall upon the Federal troops
and massed his army with the design of re-
ceiving the isolated corps of Rosecrans' men
AZ they debouehed through the gaps in the
mountains and annihilate them in detail.
In this he was lot successful, and for time
1t looked as IL Rosecrans would succeed in
his plan OF concentration. But he was not
quick enough and general engagement
the battle of Chickamauga-began on Sept.
10, Bragg making the onset with perhaps
"a, 900 men. 1t is claimed that Rosecrans
had but 5000. Bragg's plan was now to
turn Rosecrans' left and then clear the way
into Chattanooga. George H. Thomas pre-
vented this: aud the day closed without /