The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-10
Mr.. FORTUNE INDICATED
SUPREME COURT DECIDES IN HIS FA-
vOR IN ENcAMPMENT CASE.
City Has No Claim to the Fund Held
by Commercial CIub--Judge
Rupe Reversed.

The Supreme Court yesterday rendered a
decision in favor of Eli Lilly and William
Fortune on their appeal in the case against
the city of Indianapolis, involving the pay
ment of 5000 to Mr.. Fortune on account of
Ills services as executive director of the
G. A. R. National Encampment in 1892
The Supreme Court decision was written
by Judge Jordan. and reverses the rulings
of Special Judge Rupe. who in the lower
court decided adversely to the appellants
on the pleadings.
The history of the case. as set forth in
the papers connected with it and in the
decision, makes voluminous record, but
condensed statement shows that when the
National Encampment was held in Indian
apolis, in 1893, a citizens executive board
was organized for the purpose of taking
charge of all arrangements The head of
this organization was Col. Eli Lilly, the
chairman William Fortune was elected
executive director, and was made RESPONSE
BILE for all details of management. Colonel
Lilly and Mr.. Fortune were at that time
president and secretary, respectively, of the
Commercial Club, which had been chiefly
instrumental in bringing the encampment
to Indianapolis. Colonel Lilly would accept
the craftsmanship only on the condition that
he should have the assistance of Mr.. For
tune in looking after the details of man
agement In providing for the encampment
IL became necessary to raise a large sum
of money. 1t was shown that in 1892 the
encampment at Washington had cost
$4,000, in 1891 at Detroit $4,000, in 1890 at
Boston $105,000, and it was expected that
equally satisfactory arrangements in Indi-
annapolis would cost quite as much. The
City Council was, therefore, induced to
make an appropriation of $4,000, and the
Commercial Club raised nearly $50, 900 by
special subscriptions. Out of this money
over 900 was saved and returned to the
city, and 200 was saved for the CONNER
cial Club from its subscriptions. Colonel
Lilly believed that the gratifying results
were chiefly due TO the management of the
executive director, who had conducted the
work on new plans evolved as a result of
careful study of the methods previously fol-
lowed, and who had devoted over a years
time to his duties. Although receiving
salary of $1,000 year as secretary of the
Commercial Club, he had been promised
reasonable compensation for his work as
executive director of the encamDment, and
had undertaken it with this distinct under
standing, relinquishing other employment
from which he received a considerable in
come in order that he might give to the
duties due attention. 1t was Colonel Lillys
judgment that Mr.. Fortune was entitled to
5000 for his services, and on his order as
chairman this amount was paid.
The city was subsequently influenced as
a result of agitation. to set up a claim for
the 5000 paid to Mr.. Fortune and the
$4,000 remaining in the treasury of the
Commercial Club, on the contention that
the payment to Mr.. Fortune was not
legitimate expense, and the Commercial
Club funds ought to have been used be-
fore any of the city appropriation was
drawn upon. Suit for recovery of the
money was instituted, and the case was
tried before John A. RUPEE of Richmond, as
special judge, but the rulings, which were
favorable to the club as to the $4,000 and
adverse to Lilly and Fortune as to the
$1,000, were based wholly on pleadings. The
Commercial Club then came into the case
with cross-compl,lint, claiming that if
fortune was not entitled to the $1,000, it be-
ionged to the club AMI not to the city,
COUNCIL NOT INFLUENCED.
The Supreme Court holds that the Com
mercial Club funds were not primary, but
that the city appropriation and club funds
preparation of $4,000 was made without
reference to other funds. The court says:
THE ordinance, which is made an ex-
hibit, makes no reference whatever to any
other fund that may be donated and in no
manner indicates that the money appro-
priated Hereunder must be used to supply
deficiency on the part of any other fund
which might be assigned or set apart for
the same purpose. Counsel for APP
pellee place some stress in support of the
IF fHo rNAVa1ot o& he
ments that appellants appeared before the
finance committee of the Common Council
and made statements substantially to the
effect that the city ought to make an APP
preparation, and If 1t would do so they
agreed that no part of the money so
donated would be drawn upon until the
fund contributed to the Commercial Clubs
committee on assemblages was exhausted
1T does not even appear that the Com
priating ordinance, was Informed Of these
statements. In fact it is disclosed by the
complaint that the finance committee re-
ported back to the Council without any
recommendation whatever, and for aught
appearing, the incentive which prompted
the Council to adopt it was for the reason
IT considered the money donated thereby to
the purpose in view would ultimately con-
duce to the best interests of the people
affirmed that courts will not institute an
inquiry into the motives of the legislative
department. in the enactment of laws. This
rule is as applicable to legislative acts of
the States Legislature.
1T is evident, we think. under the cir
cumstanceS in this case, the statements in
controversy are in no sense legitimately en-
titled to any consideration in support of
either of the theories advanced by the COM
plant. There are no facts which can be
said to uphold any claim or title of the APP
pellee to the $4,000. or any part thereof,
which remained unexpended in the treasury
of the Commercial Club standing to the
credit of its committee on assemblages, and
out of which the amount in controversy
under the second theory of the complaint
was carried and transferred to the treasury
of the executive committee and then paid
over to Fortune"
FORTUNE COULD CLAIM PAY.
The court holds that there was no obliga-
tion to turn over to the city the balance
of funds saved for the Commercial Club,
and says:
When the facts set out in the complaint
are read in the light of legal principles of
universal recognition, it is clear that they
do not sustain appellee's claim or title in
the first instance to the money in contro-
versy, and it therefore must fail in its de-
mand that appellants be required 10 account
TO 1t for the alleged wrongful conversion
thereof. Consequently the demurrers to the
complaint ought to have been sustained An
examination of the facts set up in the cross
complaint of the Commercial Club on the
face of the pleadings establishes its right
to the money in dispute, and shows that the
.1...w 40 80.