The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-01-25

this: Instead OF being required TO put up
bonds TO the amount Of 500 for every $50
OF notes issued, the banks are to be required
TO put up bonds at their value upon a per
cent basis to an amount equal to the notes
issued up to 70 per cent. OF their capital.
AS against the residue OF notes issued they
are to put up no security in the form of
bonds deposited, but are TO secure them
in another way which l viii now describe.
Each bank is TO put up in the hands OF the
government amount in gold equal to D
per cent. of its total circulation These de-
posts are to form one common guaranty
fund for the protection of all the notes OF
all the banks. In case of failure OF any
bank to redeem it's notes they are to be re-
deemed forthwith out of the guaranty fund ;
and the government is then TO proceed
forthwith to collect the amount from the
assets of the failed bank. including the per-
sonal liability of the stockholders, II the
other assets are insufficient, and thereby re-
imburse the guaranty fund. IL the guaranty
fund becomes impaired the controller is TO
make an assessment upon all the banks pro
rata, according to their notes in circulation,
to make up the deficiency; so that the fund
shall be constantly kept up to 5 per cent.
of all the notes outstanding in the country.
Such a security is in its essential char
acter, stronger one than government
bonds can possibly be. said a while ago
that in civilized countries society was more
than government. Government rests upon
society," not society upon government II
the Confederate government had established
a national bank system exactly like ours at
the same time we established ours, with its
notes secured by government bonds what
the end of the war? But If the Confederate
government had established a banking SyS-
TEN like that which the commission pro-
poses, entirely diSentangled in its founda-
tons and sources of strength from the gov
eminent, and resting upon the business as
sets of the country and the personal re-
spOnsibilities of the stockholders, there
would have been something left of it even
after the deSolatiOn of war There We're
banks in the South which stood alone, with
out the strength which comes from widely
extended agGnri1fiOn which
less survived the war though in crippled
condition, but whose notes had substantial
value after all the vicissitudes through
which they had passed.
We have been so long accustomed to think
of the United States bonds as the only alb
solutely and eternally good security in the
world that it is a little hard to get out or
our hearts the feeling that no ether security
can be quite so good as the basis of bank
circulation. But that is a mere habit of
feeling. The notion that our government
can never, by any possibility, fail to pay it's
Gebts. is patriotic instinct rather than an
intelligent conviction. L suppose people
have thought SO of their governments over
and over again in this world. / am not in
tending to cast any aspersions upon our
government or its bonds. l believe that we
are entitled to regard them as perfectly
good, and so far security of payment is
concerned; | regard our national bank notes
as perfectly good. But notes secured in the
way which have described will also be per-
fectly good. And between two things which
are perfectly good there is no choice of
(Here the speaker followed with de-
tailed discussion of the banking plan, its adj
Vantages in respect of elasticity of circula-
tion its desirability to bankers, especially
in the West and South, with much historical
and statistical matter.)
JUDGE 1T AS A WHOLE.
My fellow Republicans, l submit this plan
to you for your thoughtful and patient COM
sderation. Do not pronounce upon it hastily
Do not pick out a point here and a point
there for off-hand condemnation. You can
not judge it fairly except as a whole. 1t
has been put together with much palms.
taking. Every feature of it has a distinct
relation to every other one. If it is what
it seems to be; if it would lead us out of
our present unsettled, illogical and danger
Gus situation by a gradual and practicable
have peace and security, an established
standard. and sound and elastic currency
1t would be of infinite advantage to the
American people TO adopt it. We shall have
to come to it, or something like it, some
time If there is any truth in those funda-
mental principles of finance which the Re-
publican party has been defending for a
third of a century.
The thing which concerns me most at this
time is that Republicans shall interest
themselves in the subject. The people are
apt to say these are questions for our
statesmen-our senators and representatives
in Congress; we will let them decide;" the
senator's and representatives say these are
pretty delicate questions; we will wait until
we hear from the people," And so we wait
on each other until the crisis comes and
we are on the eve of disaster. Both are
wrong In a country where every man is a
sovereign by divine right in mis- own per-
son, every man ought to do the duty of "a
sovereign. He ought to read, think, have
opinions and declare them Thought is the
force that governs the world. When all the
people think the country is safe. We, the
people, can afford to think and talk with
more freedom than our representatives in
\ n,
blazing light of public observation. They
must of necessity move cautiously. They
cannot afford to make blunders We can.
If | have advanced views which further dis
cuSSiOn and consideration shall show to be
erroneous, no harm will be done. A sem
ator, speaking from his place in the Cap
In that spirit let us as Republicans take
up this subject. Our great captain, the
taken TO lay down any detailed plan. That
function does not belong to his office But
he has sounded the bugle. He has pointed
out the danger. He has said to Congress
and US in his recent message that while
may feel no immediate harm from our pres
ent currency while prosperity continues,
1.-THE danger still exists and will be ever
present menacing SO long the existing
system continues" He has reminded us
that lit is in times of adequate revenues
and business tranquility that the govern
ment should prepare for the worst" He
has told us that I'VE cannot avoid, without
serious consequences, the wise consideration
Those are his words
1T Is A FINAL MEASURE.
The secretary of the treasury, as belongs
to his Office, has dealt with the subject
more specifically. In his report to Congress
he has outlined plan which is in its most
fundamental features similar to that pro-
posed by the commission; the principal
difference being that the plan of the COM
mission provides for complete reorganiza-
ton on permanent basis, while that of
the secretary does not go so far The diff
ference is not one of principle, but one of
scope. He says himself 1.-The recommends
tons which ] make must be considered as
not being in themselves final measures, but
which, consistently pursued, will lead to
conditions ultimately desirable" The COM
missions plan is intended to be a final
measure If it were enacted as law to-day
it would set on foot a process of transition
which would go on silently and quietly until
we had passed from our present system to
a which would have in itself such
possibilities of growth and expansion that,
so far can now be for seen, there would
not need to be any other law passed upon
the subject for fifty years to come. OF
course, j am not so extravagant as to say
that such would be the case. 1t is not to
be expected that any such work can be done
perfectly that time will not disclose inn
projections in it. But in it's design and
scope the commissions plan is d complete,
with the whole subject on consistent prin-
cipleS, and leading up at last to a perma-
nent and settled system.
At the same time il can be embodied in
Independent and successive enactments,
each of which would give us its good re-
c,.lf ut he. rorfh ORC