The record-union., 1898-05-29

L
little doubt about this that the naval
campaign is proceeding on the assump-
ton that Admiral Cervera is incapable
OF doing any harm. Within a few
days the exact conditions at Santiago
VIII be known beyond shadow of a
doubt.
In spite of assertions to the contrary,
commodore Schley was not absolutely
sure of his game when ne last COM
municated with Rear Admiral Samp-
son, and the Commodore will not take
active steps to block up the entrance
OF Santiago harbor until he is perfect
~ certain that Admiral Cervera's ships
are inside.
The Commodore stayed three days at
Clenfuegos. He signaled to his ships,
believe the Spanish fleet is in the
harbor."
On this belief message was sent to
the American Admiral. The details of
how Commodore Schley found out that
he was mistaken are not yet known AT
any rate, acting on the Admiral's in
structions, the Commodore then moved
east, arriving outside Santiago Wednes-
day morning, May 2Jth.
The topography of Cienfuegos and
Santiago is almost Identical Both har-
| bors are about six miles long, with
narrow entrances about 300 yards wide,
and protected by high land. A whole
| fleet could lie in the harbor of either
place, and be invisible from the outside.
After his experience at Cienfugeos it
| is said that Commodore Schley was
very conservative in deciding whether
or not he had caught Admiral Cervera.
| From the tone of his dispatches it is
/ evident that the Commodore soon
| gained much secondhand and external
! evidence which pointed to Admiral
| Cervera's presence in the inner harbor.
| This evidence was apparently strong
enough to make the Commodore feel
certain the object of his trip had been
| accomplished, but in view of his pre-
vious experience he would not risk a
decisive statement until after ascertain
! ing the fact for himself.
| Contrary to the generally expressed
opinion, Santiago harbor is poorly pro-
tected. Like Havana and San Juan
| de Porto Rico, it has its MORO Cas-
/ tie, which is even a better target than
those of Havana and San Juan. The
| only danger to be feared is from the
mines which have been laid in the chan
mel of Santiago since war was declared.
But countermining would probably rem
! der these mines harmless. should it
prove desirable for Commodore Schley's
ships to enter the harbor Such a step.
! however, is unlikely.
In this connection it may be noted
! that since the commencement of the
naval operations, the moral effect of
the mines has been great. This condi-
tion promises to continue, and will prob
ably mark the naval operations to a
greater extent than ever imagined in
the past A prominent naval author
ity said to the correspondent of the AS
sociated Press: THE moral effect of
| torpedoes and mines will prove far su-
perior to their actual effect In fact,
| so great is their moral force that 1
doubt whether their powers of execution
will have an opportunity to be judged
| in this war"
The blockade of Northern Cuba con-
tinues uneeventful and is apparently
successful.
Now that the element of uncertainty
regarding the Spanish ships where
| abouts is almost entirely removed. the
| ships which were solely occupied in
| watching for the Spaniards have be-
| come an additional force for the block
ade, and without any inconvenient
| change of position Comodore Schley
has been reinforced, but his position
was clearly so strong that the rein
| forcement which he received made nc
difference to the strength of the fleet
in northern Cuban waters.
The rumors of the sailing of sec
ond Spanish squadron did not worry
Rear Admiral Sampson to the slightest
degree. His feeling on the subject were
| aptly expressed recently, when he said:
I am perfectly satisfied that we have
bagged those fellows" Qeferring to Ad-
miral Cervera's f1eeD.
Rear Admiral Sampson does not
cross his bridges until he comes to
| them, and when that time comes his
| unconquerable patience and strategic
| ability can be relied upon to see him
safely across.
For the second time since war was
declared the Admiral has been notified
that the army is ready to move. This
is good news to all the naval officers.
The two branches of the service have
been playing game of wait-the army
resting until the navy disposed of the
Spanish fleet, and the navy until able
to occupy much needed bases until the
| troops were ready for debarkation. In
| view of the fact that the Spanish fleet
was far faster than the American fleet.
and that the former had no desire for
an engagement this policy of inactiOn,
however far sighted it may be, tempo
rarily produced much natural irritation
among the naval officers
All appearances now point to the
passing away of this feeling, and hearty
| active cooperation between the army
and navy may be anticipated. BY great
/ good fortune no accident has occurred
of sufficient Importance to render any
| of our ships utterly helpless or beyond
the aid of towing during the fleets
cruising of the past months. Some ac-
cidents, however. are quite within the
| bounds Of possibility. With such ten
| der machines as torpedo boats doing
| hard duty in all kinds of weather, ac-
cidents even come into the list Ct prob
| abilities which naval commanders have
to count upon.
With a base in the enemy's territory,
| with narbor Of refuge and a coaling
station within thirty miles of the cruis-
! ing grounds, Rear Admiral Sampson s
! task, arduous at its best, will be made
a very great deal easier. But such a
base can only be obtained through CO.
| operation with the army, as the force
| of marines at the disposal of the Ad-
miral is not large enough to cope with
the possible strength that Captain Gen
| eral Blanco could concentrate on short
notice. Then, while the army is operat-
ing on shore, 1t is safe to say the ma
val gunners will not be idle
During the weeks cruise of the flag