The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-02-24
THE CHANCES OF WAR.
Important Factors In Our Rela-
tons With Spain.
THE POLICY OF THE PRESIDENT.
II His Hand Is Not Forced, He Hopes to
Secure the Independence Of Cuba With
out Going to War, but Accidents May
Precipitate Hostilities.

out Going tn War, but Accidents May /
Precipitate HostiIities.
WASHINGTON. Feb 24.-ISpecal. What
of the future? Is it to btNHr with Spaing |
This Is the question which every one in |
Washington has been asking during the
last two weeks-weeks filled with excite
ment over the De LONE incident and the
destruction Of the battleship Maine. No
| one is able to answer in satisfactory man.
ner In the problem are three great fac
| tors and only one of these are we here
| able to analyze and forecast. The three
| factors which are to determine the issue of
| war or peace between the United States
| and Spain are:
First.-The president Of the United
States.
Second.-The government at Madrid.
Third. Accidents or crimes, such as
the loss of the Maine, which may drive the
two nations to war.
The attitude and probable action of the
president we can understand and predict.
His policy toward Spain is not secret.
have more than once explained 1t in these
dispatches, but in these times of rumor
and anxiety 1t is well to speak plainly to
avert possible misunderstanding.
Cuban Independence.
|
alone so that he may carry out his pro-
gramme without Interference, he will
press steadily, but firmly forward toward
the virtual independence of Cuba under
American protection.
The president believes the day is not far
{ distant when Spain herself will be willing
to accept the assistance of the United
} States in putting an end to the war In
: | Cuba and in restoring peace and prosper
ity to that unhappy island. He believes
Z that when this time comes joint commits
sion may be appointed by the United
5 States and Spain to recommend future
government for the island and that If the
! matter can once be brought to stage OF
I direct negotiation the United States can,
Z as the stronger power, do virtually what II
likes.
President Mckinley believes, am TOLD
by members of his cabinet, that wher
Spain realizes she cannot suppress the re
bellion and that Cuba Is lost to her sh'
will prefer settlement of the question II
this manner to further vain effort to re
! tain the colony, which to her, apart from
: pride's sake, is no longer worth having
T. since at best it can only be ruled by tn
J. costly method of absolute military domino
IL ton For If she goes on as she has beef
/ going during the last three years she VIII
not only bankrupt herself, but lose Cub
p in the end by recognition of the independ
a. ence of the island by the United States an
x, other nations On the other hand, II Spai
a. accepts the inevitable, she may for tim
I'd retain nominal sovereignty as balm
lg her pride and get a war indemnity besides
rs The PRESIDENT If left to his own II
Mt sources, will not wait for Spain to az
knowledge defeat and to ask for the assis
ance of the United States in restorin
peace. He intends to press upon spain th
a. method of settling the trouble. Already 1
has prepared the ground for this step, an
=. if such complications as the Maine dlsast'
Ut had not interviewed he would neverthele
Oh have pressed very hard upon Spain In tn
W direction. 1t was the presidents purpos
II l am reliably informed, to make such d
ne mand of Spain during the next thr
ct months. The probabilities are he will sti
nd do it. and recent events are likely to haste
he rather than to retard his action.
as What Spain May DO.
What Spain will do when the preside
makes this demand Is a problem unsolve
The president has some grounds for belle
ing that Spain will accept and that Z
active negotiation may be entered upon
he friendly spirit. There are obvious a
u yantages to Spain in doing the best she q
ay, rather than to stand out and be compel
ly, IN do much worse Probably the state
eb- nublic feeling in Spain would determi
~; the result. If the masses rejected the pre-
~, ositiop of the United States and shout
led for war, the government, in order to ga
nc, itself, would be compelled to comply.
80, In every consideration of what spa
sea may do it must be borne In mind that
SEQ rule of the present royal family Is In ds
rv ger from plot or revolution, ana that
esh | save the throne, even at the terrible c.
elk, of war, must be the first object OF
ur- ministers of state.
10 There are substantial reasons why
non president may not wish to bring on cri
Ia with Spain during the next few mont
His plan probably is to consume &c
mart of the summer in diplomatic neRot
o., lions. leading up to crisis next fall.
Sor war were to come soon, it would have
for disadvantage for the United States, Il
red, orr troops from the north would be CO
and pelled to go into Cuba during the hot Q
rainy season, beginning in April, wi
! me yellow and other fevers and dysent
2 az would carry them off by the thousands
to IL War Comes.
90. Every one understands that If war col
3, % % the United States will take possession
Lis Cuba. 1t might be disastrous II we W
ers, forced into military campaign dur
the unhealthy season. In the fall or
the ter we could occupy Cuba with half
SS.o9 loss of life that we should suffer In \
and June.
But the third factor In the situati
=, chance. may prove stronger than the pr
ON dent or tno so'ei - Ar
Y. another catastrophe like that to the Ma
S. occur or any similar thing which stirs
$. 30 resentment of the American people, an
iers, would probably be impossible to restl
,,lme congress. Our congress is, after all,
o and war making power of our governm,
SER: and II it once gets out Of control and
very action it may solve the whole problem
a single stroke.
Just now the disposition OF congress
o. ,ears To be TO stand by the president
ele- the mystery of the Maine Is cleared
I,,,r Upon that very much depends:
'uy' WALTER WELLMAl