The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1898-10-24
OF Simpsons
Campaign.
DISPATCHES SENT
Show the Movements of
Navy Before Santiago.

Washington, Oct 2S.-The navy de-
partment has made public that portion
of Admiral Simpsons report covering
the conduct of the fleet under his COM
mand in its operations in the West In
dies for about two months prior to the
destruction of Admiral Cerveras ships
on July 9. 1t is made up largely of
official dispatches and the movements
of the fleet. with explanations and COM
ment by the admiral The report is
4 dated Aug. on the flagship New York,
and begins with statement of deter
mination reached by the navy depart
ment to send a squadron to the Wind
ward passage for the purpose Of obser-
walton. because of information received
of the sailing on April % of Admiral
| Cerveras squadron from the Cape
Verde islands On the voyage east
ward from the naval base at Key West,
which began May 4, Admiral Sampson
reports, there was experienced endless
trouble and delay because of the ineffi
cheney of the two monitors accompany
ing the ships, and which had to be Ia
ken in tow.
Their coal supply was so small that
it was at once evident that they must
either frequently coal or be towed The
admiral says:
Had the sea been rough or had the
enemy appeared at this juncture, the
squadron would have been in a much
better position for an engagement had
the monitors been elsewhere. Subse-
quently when engaging the batteries
of San Juan, it was evident that their
shooting was very bad. Owing to the
quick rolling of these vessels even In
a very moderate sea, they were unable
to fire with any degree of accuracy
Among the kilograms received by the
admiral from the department at Wash
ington when off Cape Haytien, was the
) following:
Washington, D. c., May G.
''Do not risk or cripple your vessels
!, against Notifications so as to prevent
: from soon aftarward suceessful-
ly fighting Spanish fleet composed of
, Pelayo, Carlos V, Oauendo Vizcaya,
Maria Teresa, Crfstobal Colon, four
dsep-sea torpedo boats, if they should
appear on this side.
(signed) Long"
On May there was a consultation
on board the flagship, and the admiral
says that he decided TO stand on to the
eastward as far as San Juan Porto Rico
on the chance of finding the Spanish
squadron In that port, where il they
were not successful in destroying it. it
could be at least blockaded and held.
The squadron arrived off San Juan on
the morning of the 18th, and the bonn
bardment Of the place ensued,
Regarding his action at this place,
the admiral says:
1T was clear to my own mind that
the squadron would not have any great
difficulty in forcing the surrender of
the place, but the fact that we should
be held several days in completing ar
rangements for holding it; that part Of
our force would have to be left to await
the arrival of troops to garrison; that
the movements of the Spanish SQUAD
ron was still north and not in a position
TO render any aid: that Havana, Ger
vera's natural objective, was thus, open
TO entry by such q force as his, while
we We're thousand miles distant, made
our immediate movement toward Ha-
vana imperative. thus reluctantly
gave up the project against San Juan,
and stood westward for Havana"
Several kilograms are here presented,
based on reports that CerveraAs SQUAD
ron had returned to Cadiz and they had
IN view ITO return and capture San
Juan, the leisure to do so and occupy
the place being assured In the event Of
Admiral Ceryera's' failure to cross the
Atlantic"
Shortly after news was received that
the Spanish fleet had appeared off Gu
racao, West Indies, and the squadron
under orders from the department pro-
eeeded to Key West, to which place the
| flying squadron under Commodore (now
admiraD Schley had already been or
dered. Arrangements were then hur-
riedly made, and the flying squadron,
augmented by other vessels under Com
modore Schley, was sent of Cdenfus-
gos, where it was believed the enemy
would go, in which case an effort was
| to be made to engage and capture HIM
Sampson was given the choice either Of
the command of the blockading SQUAD
ron off Havana or at Cienfuegcs,
Schley in either case to remain with his
own squadron.
From messages received by the adj
miral from the department about Nav
| 20, it appears that reports had reached
| the United States that the Spanish
fleet was at Santiago; so the depart
ment advised Sampson to send i1nme-
date word to Schley to proceed to that
place, leaving one small vessel off Glen
/ fuegos.
! on May u instructions were written
| by Sampson for Commodore Schley,
and sent to him via the Marblehead
regarding the possibility Of the Span.
ish fleet being at Santiago. They are
! in part as follows:
Spanish squadron probably at San
| tiago de Cuba--four ships and three
| torpedo boat destroyers. If you are
satisfied that they are not at Cienfue-
gos, proceed with all dispatch, but eau
| tiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if
the enemy is there blockade him in
port. You win probably find it neces-
sary to establish communication with
some of the inhabitants-hsher or
others--to learn definitely that the
ships are in port, it being impossible TO
see into it from the outside"
Sampson apparently felt certain of
the presence OF the Spanish at SANTA
go, and urged that the harboP must he
blockaded at all hazards. Sehley, In
the meantime, had proceeded to Santa
60 although it appears not the same
day Admiral Sampson expected. At
one time Commodore Schley contemp-
lated going to Key West with the
squadron for coal, but this was aband-
oned, the repairs to his collier having
been temporarily repaired and the neces-
sity for a trip to Key West being avoid
ed Santiago was then blockaaed The
admiral congratulated the commodore
on his success, and directed him to
maintain a close blockade at all haz-