The record-union., 1898-10-01

full Conclusion.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30-The re-
port of Major General Wesley Merritt
of the operations about Manila was
made public at the War Department to-
day. 1t is dated on board the trans
port China, August 31st. After Civ
ing briefly the story of his embarka-
ton and arrival at Manila and the
disposition of the troops there, he says:
L found General Greenes command
encamped on a strip of sandy land run
ming parallel to the shore of the bay,
and not far distant from the beach, but
owing to the great difficulties of land
ing supplies, the greater portion of the
force had shelter tents only, and We're
suffering many discomforts, the camp
being situated in a low, fiat place,
without shelter from the heat Of the
tropical sun or adequate protection
during the terrific downpour of rain sc
frequent at this season.
L was at once struck by the eXem-
plary spirit of patience, even cheerful
endurance shown by the officers and
men under such circumstances, ana
this feeling of admiration for the man
ner in which American officers, regulars
and volunteer alike, accepted the nee
essary hardships of the work they have
undertaken to do, has grown and IN
creased with every phase of the diff
cult and -rying campaign which the
troops of the Philippine expedition have
brought to such a brilliant and sue
cessful conclusion.
THE FilipinoS, or insurgent forces at
war with Spain, had, prior to the ar
rival of the American land forces, been
waging a desultory warfare with the
Spaniards for several months, and
were at the time of my arrival in con-
siderable force, yariously estimated
and never accurately ascertained, but
probably not far from 125,000 men.
These troops, we'll supplied with small
arms, with plenty of ammunition and
several field guns, had obtained posi-
tions of investment opposite the Span
ish line of detached works throughout
their entire extent
General Merritt then speaks of Aguin-
aldo's accomplishments previous to his
arrival, and continues:
General Aguinaldo did not visit me
on my arrival, nor offer his services as
a subordinate military leader, and as
my instructions from the President full
ly contemplated the occupation of the
islands by the American land force, and
stated that the powers of the military
occupant are absolute and supreme
and Immediately operate on the polit-
ical condition of the inhabitants, l did
not consider it wise to hold any direct
communication with the insurgent lead
er until l should be in possession of
the city of Manila, especially as
would not until then be in a position to
issue a proclamation and enforce my
authority in the event that his pre-
tensions should clash with my designs.
For these reasons, the preparations
for the attack on the city were pressed,
and military operations conducted
without reference to the situation of
the insurgent forces. The wisdom of
this course was subsequently fully es-
tablished by the fact that when the
troops of my command carried the
Spanish intrenchments, extending from
the sea to the Pasay road on the ex-
treme Spanish right, we were under no
obligations by prearranged plans OF
mutual attack, to turn to the right and
insurgents. but were able to move for
ward at once and occupy the city and
suburbs.
ITO return to the situation of Gen
eral Greene's brigade as l found 1t on
my arrival, it will be seen that the
difficulty in gaining an avenue of ap-
proach to the Spanish line lay in the
fact of my disinclination TO ask Cen
~ffl Il 4le
beach and the Gale Real SO that
Greene could move forward. This
was overcome by instructions to Gen
eral Greene to arrange, If possible,
with the insurgent brigade comman-
der in his immediate vicinity to move
to the right and allow the American
forces unobstructed control of the roads
in their immediate front. No objec-
tion was made, and accordingly Cen
eral Greene's brigade threw forward
heavy outpost line on the Gale Rear
and the beach, and constructed a
trench in which a portion OF the guns
of the Utah battries were placed.
The Spanish, observing this activ-
fly on our part, made a very sharp at
tack with infantry and artillery on the
night of July 31st. The behavior or our
troops during this night attack was all
that could be desired. and / nave, III
cablegrams to the War Department,
taken occasion to commend by name
those who deserve special mention for
good conduct in the affair. Our posi-
tion was extended and strengthened
after this. and resisted successfully re-
peated night attacks, with our forces
suffering. however. considerable loss
in wounded and killed. while the losses
of the enemy, owing to darkness, could
not be ascertained
THE strain Of the night fighting and
the heavy details for outpost duty made
IT imperative to reinforce General
Greene's troops with General MacAr-
thurs brigade. which had arrived in
transports on the 31st of July The
difficulties of this operation can hardly
be overesttmated The transports
were at anchor off Cavste, five miles
from a point on the beach where 1t
was desired to disembark the men. A
number of squalls. accompanied by
floods of rain, ragged day after day. and
the only way to get the troops and sup
plies ashore was to load them from the