The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-09
Criticism of the Admiral for His Fail
ure to Destroy San Juan's Forts
Shown to Be Unjust.
CAREFUL, FAITHFUL OFFICER
WHO PLANNED TO PREVENT THE ES-
CAPE OF CERvERA'S FLEET,
And Whose Orders Resulted in the
tiOn of the Sunken Ships.


| WASHINGTON, Aug. S-The secretary of
the navy has received several letters vio-
| lently attacking Admiral Sampson. The fol-
lowing is a copy of his reply to one of
them, which he furnishes for publication:
Navy Department. Washington, Aug s.
my Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your
letter and hasten to assure you that what
you say bout Admiral Sampson is so un-
just that it can only be pardoned on the
| ground of your ignorance of the whole
| matter. You have no appreciation of the
responsibilities that have been upon Ad-
| miral Sampson, of his very superior attain
ments as an officer, and the splendid work
he has done in preparing for the naval VIC
tory which was the crowning accomplish
ment of his efforts for weeks and weeks
before Santiago.
Justice is always done in the long run.
But when you indulge in such unfounded
criticism, l cannot forbear to protest, as
should feel bound to do if you had referred
in similar terms to any other of our de-
serving officers.
"First-Adm.ral Sampson was selected for
the command of the North Atlantic squad
ron because the department, in the exer-
| else of its best Judgment with an eye single
| to the public interests, believed that he was
| especially fitted for the place Admiral
| Slcard, who held the command, having be-
| come incapacitated for duty by reason of
sickness was necessarily withdrawn by
rder of the DEPARTMENT and Sampson was
next in command These two are especially
accomplished ordnance officers having been
each at the head of the Ordnance Bureau,
and having devoted themselves to that
branch of naval science Sampson is man
| OF the very highest professional attain
| ments, solely devoted to his duty. He never
pushes himself forward, and when you ac-
| cuse him of anything of that sort you do
most cruel injustice to a man who has
never sought favor or applause in any
other way than by the simple discharge of
| his duty.
THE PORTO RICO MOVEMENT.
| Second-The movement on Porto Rico
| was not movement for it's capture. The
| department, which has very rarely inter-
| fered with the movements of admirals COM
| manding squadrons did, however, make one
| express order, and that that our battle
ships should not be exposed to the risk of
serious injury from the fire of any fort. At
that time the Spanish fleet was strong It's
whereabouts and destination were unknown
| The primal necessity was to meet and crush
| its ships and to secure for us the domina-
| ton of the sea- The Oregon had not ar
rived the Maine was destroyed, and no
naval authority would justify the unnec-
| essary risk of the destruction of any of our
| battle ships except in battle with the
enemy's ships. The movement to Porto
Rico was to meet, if possible, the fleet of
| Cervera, which was then expected. Cervera,
| I'M dNfh 1Ixy,
| San Juan, changed his destination to San
tiago Our movement to Porto Rico thus
became a reconnaissance and fulfilled it's
purpose. There was no intention at this
| time of taking Porto Rico, as the army was
not then ready to cooperate.
| Third-With regard to sending our war
| ships into the harbor of Santiago: Admiral
| Sampson was acting under the explicit or
| ders of the department not to expose his ar
mored ships to the risk of sinking by mines,
| and the wisdom of his course, believe is
universally acknowledged by naval authori-
| ties. He waited, as he should have done
| the cooperation of the army. How effect
] ually under this cooperation the result was
| accomplished is now a matter of history.
There are few more graphic scenes than
must have been presented at o'clock on
| the afternoon of the 14th of July, when
|
Santiago awaited the reply of the Spanish
commander to the demand for surrender.
SIMPSONS fleet was at the mouth of the
harbor. drawn up in line. and ready to bonn
| bard, as 1t had been for days previous, and
| the signal officer stood on the heights ready
! 20 wig-wag the signal for firing. Happily
| instead of this signal, came the good word
| that the Spanish had surrendered to this
! combined readiness for attack
ALL BY SIMPSONS ORDERS.
'Fourth-Please bear in mind the variety
and weight of the responsibilities which
wore upon Admiral Sampson for the month
prior to the great battle which destroyed
Cervera's fleet. He was commanding officer
of the whole squadron; charged with the
| blockade of the whole Cuban coast; charged
with the detail of all the movements of
ships charged with clerical correspondence
with the department and other officers. and
especially charged with preventing the es-
cape of Cervera. Remember that this man,
whom you so sweepingly accuse was devot-
ing his days and nights to these duties If
you will read the orders issued by him.
beginning with June 1, you will find that the
most thorough precautions had been taken
to prevent the escape of Cervera; that our
fleet was kept constantly in line, so far
from the entrance at night. and so far by
day; that the most rigid care with search
lights and every other appliance was taken
every night. that the commanding officer
of every vessel knew his post and his duty
in case of an attempt to escape so that,
when that attempt came, the movement to
prevent 1t. by the attack of our vessels
upon the outcoming Spaniards went on like
clockwork; as. at Chattanooga, every
movement Of that great battle was carried