The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-08-07

Lottor from cnpt. AIahan.

shown the essential differences between the
two cases. and have saved tho question AZ
Copenhagen. Nelson did not merely 10 ~
lighting. The entire conception OF the methou
of attack was his. and by him was Jorced-the
word Is not too ~strong-upon u reluevA",
commander-in-c hief. When the latter hau
yielded his consent, the separate ana ueoi-
sive attack was made by Nelson. commahu,
Ing q detachment from the main neet' oil
the movements OF which detachment, in
Guiding the positions In the order OF battle Were
prescribed by him. With the preliminary
dispositions and subsequent conduct oil TINS
detachment his commander-in-chief, ParKer'
had nothing TO do, although within signai dls,
lance. beyond making the since historic siRhal
to Withdraw from action which Nelson re-
fused to obey. 1t is to be added that. although
Parker was not formally censured-as lar. AT
least, as l know-he was recalled to England as
soon as the accounts Of the battle were received
there; Nelson being left In command In his
place. A stronger implied censure than tho
recall OF o commandment -chlef after such q
victory is difficult to imagine.
AtSantiago all the dispositions prior to action,
and for over a month before. were made by the
commander-in-ohief A number OF orders.
issued from time to time by him.. for the en-
forcement OF the close watch OF the harbor's
mouth. were published In the Washington fost
of July ~. and l presume by other journals as
well. There is very strong ground for believing
that Cervera's attempt to escape by day in
stead OF by night-the incident of his conduct
which has been most widely censured and Is
most inexplicable-was due to the fact that the
United States ships kept so close to the harbor
mouth at night that a dash like his, desperate
at best, had a better chance when the ships
were at day distance. This was 80 stated. sub
stantially. to Admiral Sampson by the Captain
OF the Colon. II SO, the merit OF this. forcing
the enemy to action under Instantaneous
conditions-and it is one of the highest achieve
ments Of military art-belongs to the COM
mander-in-chie Htras the great decisive Jed-
ture of the campaign, from start to finish. Few
naval authorities. 1 imagine. will dispute this
statement.
1t will be noted also. by comparing the report
OF Admiral Sampson, stating the disposition Of
the ships, with the report OF Capt. Cook, COM
mandlng the Brooklyn. Commodore Schley's
flagship. that the United States ships chased
and fought in the order, from left to right.
established by Sampson. There is In this no
particular merit for the latter. beyond that. in
placing the two fastest ships, Brooklyn and
New York, on the two fanks, he had made the
best provision for heading off the enemy.
which the Brooklyn SO handsomely effected. But
the fact that the ships chased as they stood
shows that 1t was unnecessary for Schley to
make q signal and In truth. from first to last. the
second in command needed to make no signal
OF a tactical character. and made none. 80 far
as is shown by his own report, or that Of the
Captain Of the ship. That Is. the second in
command exercised no special directive func-
tons OF q flag or general officer while the fight
ing lasted. In thist there was no fault, for there
was no need for signals; but the fact utterly
does away with any claim to particular merit as
cnnnnl in command without in tho laoat Inn
pairing the Commodore credit for conduct in
all possible respects gallant and oflcerlike. So
far as plan is concerned. the battle was fought
on Simpsons lines and. to quote Collingwood
before Trafalgar. II wish Nelson would stop
signalling. for we all know what we have to do."
The second in command and the Captains be-
fore Santiago all knew what they had to do.
and right nobly they all did 1t.
But the distinctive merit OF the series Of
events which issued in the naval battle Of
Santiago is that. so far as appears. Cervera was
forced to fight as he did on account of the I'M
relenting watch. through more than a whole
MOON. including its dark nights. maintained
by Admiral Sampson. The writer has bee IN
told by n naval officer whose name he has not
authority to mention. but who would be recog-
nized as one OF the most efficient OF his mature
years. and who had been of Santiago during
part Of that eventful month. that he regarded
Simpsons watch Of the harbor as the decisive
feature in the great result. This neither ig-
nores the merits of the Captains nor OF the
man behind the gun" But Captains and the
men beh ind the guns may be OF the best, the
Colonies Of the regiments and the privates OF
land warfare the same. but vain are their valor
and their skill II the commander-in-chief be
wanting In either. Better an army OF stays
led by a lion than an army OF lions led by q stag"
The phrase OF the Washington Post. meant
for a sneer. Admiral Sampson wishes the
American people to believe that " " " things
could not have happened otherwise, even II
Admiral Sampson had been seventy instead Of
seven miles away" expresses an exact truth.
With the wise and stringent methods laid down
and enforced by the Admiral. It would not in
the least have mattered. as things happened,
with such ships and such Captains, had tho
commander-in-chief and the second in COM
mand, either or both. been seventy miles away.
1t Is exactly with the fleet as with the single
ships. The merit of each Captain was not only.
nor chiefly, that he handled and fought his ship
admirably on the day Of battle. His greatest
merit was that, when he took his ship into ac-
ton. she was 30 organized and trained that.
had he himself been absent or struck dead by
the first shot. the ship would none the less have
played her full part efficiently in the fight, I'M
der her second in command.
Few things in the observation Of the writer
have been more painful than the attempt Of q
portion Of the press and OF the public to rob
Sampson OF his Just and painfully won dues.
During the night hours OF July 90. when there
Is strong reason to believe that Ceryera. despite
the full moon. wished to come out. the COM
mander-in-chief with the whole OF his force lay
close to the harbor's mouth. and the Spanish
attempt was deferred till day. when 1t might
be supposed from their usual practice
that the besieging vessels would be more
distant. and perhaps of their guard. AT
4 A. NJ, when day began TO break. the
Massachusetts. commanded by one of the
most spirited officers In the service, silently
withdrew. to coal at Guantanamo. forty miles
away, Half an hour before the enemy was dis
covered coming out, the flagship New York also
proceeded west. In doing this the commander.
in-chief, Admiral Sampson. was obeying a spe.
cihc and direct order OF the Navy Department
to confer personally with the commander-ln
| chief Df the nrmV To thia waa nU,;no 49, 4.