The daily morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1883-1899, 1898-05-20
the CUBAN CAMPAIGN

Sew York May s-A Times apgclnl
from Washington says;
Tho plans Tor 10, invasion ot cuba Dy
The Luuvd States forces remain un-
shauE vi. Tbs ulgalys performance Of thc
spau.sh squadron have prevented the exc
ruuon Ol part at least of tho prpgtsm,
but o. has been altered n no important
particular
rhr determination 40 dispatch 90 the
island an soon az practicable au army OF
not less than .1ull men competent To
meet and cope with the forces ot Biunco
alill stands Hui "a, time has not yrl
yumc when 10 In practical TO do this. f'r
the reason that the army Do not ready Go
bu sent 10 cuba The is.0g regulars
maHs,d at Tampa arc prepared 20 30 at
any time. The majority uf the volunteers
gathered al Tampa. Sow orleans, Mo-
BILE ana ChlckamAugA are not prepared
Go ~ anywhere and Viii not ho until thcl
arr uniformed. armed. equipped and have
some training ln The art uf was. All VI
this will lAku time. Tho best ludgmcu,
uf military experts 10 that 70 wlil re-
qu!ro not lees than o. month under the
mast favorable circumstances to put
10 go volunteers Ia condition Co reinforce
ihy regulars Tor the army OF Cuban In
Nasiun II 10 thought oy many trained
officers thar moro time than that ought
10 boz and ls likely TO be- taken IL Is
rr,ollcctrd that General Scott spent six
months training ana drilling his army
before he invaded Mexico. and Il b. not
cunicndcd that the invasion OF cuba Is
any less formidable an undertaking than
the conquest Of Mexico.
The lnRlorious experience ot Bul Run
is a fovorltc illustration of the unwisdom |
of putting recruits 10 the serious business
uf war too soon. There is one portion OF
the cuban program. however. which may |
not hc delayed much longer That Is the
dlspatchlng ot an cNpcu.aou made up |
almost, " not entirely. Of regulars from
the Tampa camp 30 make landing on
tho Cuban coast throw up fortincitons |
aud clear the way Tor the coming OF the J
army proper later on.
II Is not settled that this viii be- done, |
but strong arguments are being used In |
favor OF the project 10 is urged that We |
went into war largely Ia order To- save the |
rcconccntrados frcm starving, but that |
as a result OF our plan OF campaign We
are making their starvation sure and rem |
dcrlng II likely that the insurgents will |
suffer something akin To the sam, fate, |
move towaru these people ls u is
urged. commanded by every consideration |
ot humanity, even u tt be at great risk
A force ol 500 regulars landed 40 an
available spot ON the coast ot cuba would,
u Is couttndcd br able To do something |
toward relieving this suffering by cstab-
fishing q depot of supplies which could |
hc drawn ON by the Insurgents Further
II ls argued In favor ot the seizure of
landing place without delay that the un-
dcrtaklng Is becoming more difficult every
day, and that the regulars could not be
better employed than In providing FOR
tiAcutlons to prevent the debarkaIion Of
the army when It Is ready to move,
The longer the occupation OF a landing
place Is delayed 1t is pointed out, the more
time Rlanco has for throwing up foru-
Acatlons and mounting batteries along
the coast. which will cause trouble when
tho real invasion begins, The advocates
OF this movement believe II would be
easy for force Of the strength men,
uoncd to hold It's own with the protection
that the blockOdlng squadron could af-
ford There is no prospect, however,
that even preliminary movement OF
uus nature is likely to be undertaken
For the present, at least,
all military movements will await the
,.,,,It 80 an, ,,,,p.t,v.rinr ,f th, suuIrnn |
In West Indian waters,