New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-05-15
BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN.
A PROMINENT NAVAL OFFICERS CRlTl-
CISM OF ADMIRAL SAMPSON.
rBY TELEGRAPH To THE TRIBUNE.

C1SM OF ADMIRAL SAMHSON.
TBY TELEGRAPH TIE TRIBUNE.l
Washington May 1.-THE lack of naval as
well as popular enthusiasm over the official re-
port OF Rear Admiral Sampson on the three
! hours bombardment Of san Juan is In marked
contrast to the outburst which greeted Admiral
| Dewey's modest narrative Of his achievement
| at Cavit6. The latter annihilated the Spanish
| fleet in the Pacific at the same time securing
a valuable base Of operations ashore, after COM
pletely silcncing the land batteries finally land
| ing 10 give surgical aid to the Spanish wounded
as well as to his own. He carefully RETAINED,
! in spite Of the exigencies Of the occasion, from
firing a shot into the city from running any
risk OF destroying the life or property of a nom
combatant. In a single day he effectuany turned
| Spanish sovereignty over one Of that country
| richest colonies into empty pretence. devoid
Of commercial value, and esta blished his own
supremacy from an international point Of view.
though powerless from lack Of land forces 10
control the domestic government. On the other
hand a prominent naval officer. commenting on
the subject to-day, made the following state
ment:
The Spanish flag still floats over every por-
ton Of Porto Rico and beyond the batterng
down Of the historic castle at the mouth or the
harbor, resulting. Admiral sampson reports
the city adjacent to the batteries" nothing capa-
bic of producing any satisfaction to the United
States accomplished out OF the tedious Voy-
age OF nearly a thousand miles by the most Tor
midable armOr- clads Of the finest American
squadron.
DID SAMPSON EXCEED HIS ORDERS?
To naval officers the most humiliatng part Of
the affair is disclosed in the complete agreement
Of Trustworthy newspaper dispatches that Ad-
miral Sampson not only failed TO silence the bat
teries of San Juan, but withdrew In broad day
light before O'Clock in the morning, out or range
OF the enemy which continued to fire upon MIN
The monitor Terror remained half An hour AFTER
the other ships retired and suffered no injury
the guns from her stern turret continuing thelr
discharges until their projectilcs failed 10 reach
land This performance IS practlcaIly uhP'er.
dented in American naval annals: and an ON
cial explanation is eagerly sought Whcn may
tend to dispose OF our notification II was
suggested today in extenuation that per
haps Admiral Sampson had exceeded his orders
in attacking Porto Rico at all. or else he had
misunderstood them or been overcautious re-
spectng the admonition not to run any FISK or
disabling his feet In an attack upon shore pay
teries. 1t is well known that the Department
had studiousy RETAINED from permitting Al
mral Sampson TO attack Havana or any OF the
more formidable batteries on the cuban coast.
and IL Is certain that this injunction was fully
enforced last week when he was hurried from
Key West In the attempt 10 Intercept the span
ish fleet before IT entered San Juan.
IL he finally secured the consent OF tIlt var
Board to enter into a combat with shore de-
fences of a port wholly devoid OF strategic value
10 the United States at this time. II was, In all
probability. accompanied with emphatic eau
t!onary suggestions. II Is also notable coin
cidence that Captain Mahan. perhaps the leading
strategist in the world to-day. Joined the war
son reached Porto Rico, and II may have been
due to his influence that the rules adopted ior
the Cuban blockade were suddenly modified. IL
indeed they were modified at all
HAD NO sMOKELEsS POWDER.
The few apologists for the Porto Rican hasco
place the blame for the result entirely upon the
disadvantage under which the American squad
ron labored due TO the fact that it possessed no
smokele.s powder and that In such heavy can
nonading the attacking feet must have been en-
veloped in so dense cloud OF smoke that It's
gunners could not see the enemy. IT Is ex-
plained that the Spaniards used only smokelcss
powder and that It must. therefore, have been
impossible accurately 10 locate their masked
batteries. Dewey. however, managed TO succeed
ir spite Of this serious handicap, although IT
may subsequently develop that he was aided by
the wind and Sampson was not.
The disadvantage Of the Navy In possessing
no powder but that Of the old-fashioned brown
prismatic variety was well known II Admiral
Sampson. who for four years was Chief OF the
Bureau Of Naval Ordnance, and during most or
that time he engaged in developing
smokeless explosives and declined TO buy any OF
the European powders because he was convinced
that American ingenuity could devise product
Of superior qualities. Under his direction Lieu
tenant J. r. Bernadou. who had such an un-
pleasant experience on the Winslow AT Cardenas
this week, had finally secured compound which
seemed to satisfy all requirements but before
It's manufacture in large quantities was started
Bernadou detached and put in charge OF
torpedo boat construction at Baltimore The
Army is no better of than the Navy regards
powder it's store OF the recently adopted smoke
less sort being almost inhnitesimal There is not
a second-rate nation on the globe that IL In this
predicament