The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-24

If the report of the court of inquiry is not
such as to call for immediate retaliation by
the United States or some act likely to pre-
cipitate ws,r Immediately the Maine Incl
dent will cease to be of overwhelming inn
portance, and the question will arise What
should the United States do next? In that
event the question will be between recogni-
ton Of the independence of Cuba, recogni-
ton of the insurgents as belligerents, direct
intervention to end the war or intervention
to put in operation general plan of relief.
In choosing between these different forms of
action the government should, and doubtless
will. keep in mind that the objective point
to be aimed at is peace in Cuba-not neces-
sarily the liberation of the island from
Spanish rule, but the ending of war, suffer-
ing and starvation.
President Mckinley is better qualified
than anybody else possibly can be to Judge
as to tho relative merits of these different
lines of action and their likelihood of bring
ing about the desired result, but they are
open to discussion. First, the case is not a
strong one for recognition of independence,
for the simple reason that the insurgents
have made SO little progress in the way OF
establishing an independent government
They have fought bravely for more than
three years, but they have not done much
more. In 1895 they issued a declaration of
independence, adopted constitution estab-
lished a republic and formed government,
but the President of the republic is not in
evidence, they have no Legislature, and the
principal officers are soldiers in the field.
The civil government of the insurgents has
cut very little figure in the war, and it's
recognition at this time as an Independent
government might be difficult to justify ex-
cept as a measure of war.
Recognition of the insurgents as beiliger-
ents would be less aggressive and more
easily justified than recognition of their in
dependence. For more than three years
they have maintained a successful warfare
against Spain and have thwarted her ut
most efforts to put them down. They have
shown better generalship and better fight
ing qualities in every way than the Span
iards, and are fairly entitled to be placed
on an equal footing as belligerents. That is
United States, and they would probably be
entirely satisfied with that degree of recog-
milton. But it is very questionable if it
would do them any good or contribute to
the ending of the war, either on the basis
of independence or any other basis.
OF the forms of Intervention named either
would be justified under existing circum-
stances and would probably result in pre-
cipitating crisis and bringing the war to
an end. There could be no question as to
tho right of the United States TO intervene
either on commercial or humanitarian
grounds to bring the war to an end, and
there is still less doubt of it's right to estab-
lish a system of relief for the starving Gu
bans which shall not be hampered and him
dered by Spanish interference as the present
one is The latter would not be interven-
ton at all, except for purely humanitarian
and phianthropic purposes, and would not
be a cause of war unless Spain chose to
herself in the wrong before the world and
would be in the position of declaring war to
prevent the relief of human suffering
The contingencies here considered are all
independent of the Maine incident, the real
bearing of which will be determined by the
report of the court of inquiry. The result
of the report may be to make the disaster
the cause of immediate and aggressive ac-
ton or to put it in the background and en-
phasize the necessity for action on one of
the lines above Indicated