The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-06-29

struction by b-ombardment of SPANS
chief ports. Ever should Camara's
squadron be ordered back TO Spain from
Port Said. its fighting strength is not
considered sufficient to check the opera
tions of the nava force which the Unit
ed States could easily sen across the
Atlantic. and, Santiago having once
fallen, there would remain no reason
why the fleet chosen to-day as an ad-
vance guard in the proposed attack on
Spain should not be reinforced by a
second detachment of equal power.
Its prospective departure is regarded
here as significant Of the purpose of the
administration to push the war against
Spain with the utmost energy, and TO
bring the Spanish people as quickly and
sharply as possible to a realization of
the fruitlessness and costliness of a
protracted resistance. The naval raid
against Spain, although for some time
under consideration. promises TO be at
tended with all the suddenness that
marked Dewey's descent upon the Phil
ippines and the landing of General
Shafter at Santiago.
II the Spaniards are disposed to re-
gard the announcement made to-day
of Commodore Watson's departure in
the Newark as anything in the mature
Of a "bluff," designed to hurry Admiral
Camara back from Suez. they are
doomed to quick and bitter disappoint-
ment. for the raiding squadron will be
fairly on the way across the Atlantic
before the end OF this week, and before
the middle Of July the cities and the
shipping of the Spanish coast will be
painfully aware Of their presence.
Until Saturday last the plan which
the president has had under considera-
ton for several weeks involved the for
nation Of a fleet distinctly more for
midable and speedy than the one now
under prdarS II Included the arnnnrpd
cruisers Brooklyn and New York, of 81
knots speed; the Columbia and the Min
neapolis, of % knots; the Cincinnati and
the Newark. of 20 knots; the auxiliary
cruisers st. Paul n st. Louis, of %
knots. with the Iowa n the Oregon.
is knots, to follow as fast as possible
behind the cruisers. 1t would have
been necessary to bring several OF these
vessels north and clean them in dry
dock before starting them on their long
cruise away from an inexhaustible base
of supplies, involving a delay Of several
weeks.
The news of the American losses in
the sklrmish at La Quaslna has caused
the president to call Secretaries Long
and Alger into consultation regarding
the best way to convince the Spaniards
of the hopelessness of their stubborn
resistance to the inevitable. and within
a few hours Captain Mahan of the ma
val war board had convinced the au-
thorities that a thoroughly effective
fleet. involving all the elements essential
TO secure success, could alone be dis
patched to give the Spaniards at home
an object lesson Of the stern realities
of war.
Captain Mahan readily drew up the
plan, providing for the immediate as
sembling of the first-class battleships
Iowa and oregon, the recently modern
lied protected cruiser Newark, with the
auxiliary cruisers Yankee. Yosemite
and Dixie. accompanied by three COL
liers, which could not only compel an
abrupt cessation of SPANS
and lombard her exposed seacoast cit
les, but would prove more than a match
for any fleet that country could hastily
concentrate for offensive or defensive
purposes.
The plan was promptly approved by
the president, and Geographic orders
were sent to Commodore Joh Critten-
den Watson. until last week command
ing the north Cuban blockading squa-
dron. to proceed at once to carry the
plans into effect. The golfers are the
Scandal, Commodore Watson: the Aba
renda. Lieutenant Commander Bufford,
and the Alexander, Commander Bur
well. These vessels are 10 be loaded
with P~ocahontas coal, the Scandal
carrying 5000 ton and the other two
1000 tons each.
Unfortunately, the Abarenda and the
Alexander cannot exceed a speed of
10 knots an hour. or 1850 knots a week,
and this fixes the maximum speed Of
the squadron, although the scouts will
do considerable additional cruising,
especially after the Canaries are
reached. The most economical speed
of the Newark IL 10 knots, and at that
rate. with full bunker capacity, she can
run $500 miles. The most economical
speed of the Iowa and Oregon is 12ih
knots. productive of a radius of action
approNimating 1900 miles. and as the
distance from Santiago to Gibraltar
barely exceeds $500. all the vessels Of
Commodore Watson's squadron can
make the run without the necessity OF
coaling at sea. the three auXiliaries, the
Yankee, the Dixie and the Yosemite,
each being capable of 5000 miles
straightaway. At 10 knots an hour. or
240 a day, ii will take the squadron at
least two weeks of steady cruising in
the open ocean to cover the distance
between 81. Thomas and Cadiz.
Naval officers do not believe that any
sustained attack viii be made on the
Canaries. but that the vessels of the
fleet will lie under the lee of these ISL
ands TO replenish their bunkers and
then proceed directly to CadiZ TO bonn
bard the fortihCatlons there in the same
manner that shells were thrown into
the outer licenses of San Juan and
Santiago. Subsequent events, IL is be-
lieved, VIII depend altogether on The
attitude Of the ~Spaniards and on their
success or failure in concentrating any
considerable naval force.
In all probability a sally into the
Mediterranean by the Americans will
be necessary in the hope of inducing
Admiral Camara to risk an engagement.
If this can be brought about confidence
is expressed that the Iowa and Indi-
ana will destroy the last remnant OF
Spain's sea power and effectually eX-
anguish any delusion that the Span
iards have of being able to retain their