The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-09-07

the worthy and heroic crews whose yalor
has been praised even by their enemies.
Admitting that the squadron saw the ne
cessity OF sailing from Santiago; that it
had to do what 1t did. and that it took the
direction which it should have taken, the
result was both logical and natural.
Even II all the enemy's vessels were not
more powerful than ours In artillery and
armor. there were battleships which we did
not have; all their fighting vessels had ar
tillery machines heavier than ours, having
among guns of 2Ocm. t7.S7 inch). which we
lacked. The greater part Of their auxiliary
cruisers also had these guns SO that they
really became fighting vessels. One of our
cruisers, the Colon, had not guns larger
than 14cm. (5.5 inch). Our vessels had
80 rapid-fre guns, while the enemy had
these as the greater part Of their arma-
ment. The American vessels had their
guns protected from our fire, while ours
were exposed, except the six in the tur-
rets. Our prOjectiles were common shell:
those Of the enemy contained incendsary
materials, as was proved by those which
were not exploded In Cuba and the Philip-
pines. which were analyzed; they seem to
contain some substance of great power to
ignite and maintain fire.
The Americans nave Tor a year carried
on constant exercises in preparing for war.
and for three months there was not a day
that they did not fire all their guns We
have had but one target practice and that
over a year ago. This was limited to ex-
pending the least possible amount of ammu-
milton. Half of our vessels had not cleaned
their bottoms for a year, and all had been
anchored in Cuban waters for about two
months. The Americans are making con-
slant voyages in all seas with their ves-
sells, so that they have trained person.
mel for the machinery. We have the
greatest scarcity of machinists and hardly
any firemen at all. Our three cruisers
from Bilbao are of the years 1890 and 1891.
The majority Of the United States fighting
ships are OF the years from 1893 to last
year.
could one for moment have been in
doubt as to the result Of the battle and its
brevity? The enemy's projectiles in ter
rible quantities not only raked our batter
les, but set them on fire, and their great
number Of rapid-fire guns not only made
1t impossible to control the fire but con-
stantly increased it. Admiral Cervera and
his squadron did all that was in human
power In order to have at least one of
their ships reach another port. They
fought as long as it was possible and,
apprehending the uselessness of the sac
rifce, they ran the1r ships aground in
order that they might not fall into the
enemy's power. No other squadron in the
world under the same conditions could have
done more, and who knows whether they
could have done as much? For this they
ueScIV0 OuT duullTdLlOu ana tnaC OF our
enemies.
THE results drawn from this loss are
very palpable. In the first place, war
ships should be totally armored, at least
IN all the parts necessary for flotation Of
the engines and the whole artillery. In the
second place, warships become in q very
short time old and deficient, If not use
less. since changes arr constantly made as
progress demands. IL the third place, there
should be taken out from all the SHIPS the
wood and everything that can be. easily
burned. In the fourth place, warships
should carry their torpedoes below the
water line. In the fifth place, in order to
have squadron 1t is indispensable to have
trained personnel. navigating constantly
ard taking many exercises. If this is not
done there can be neither machinists, nor
f1remen, nor gunners. And, last, torpedo
chasers do not serve any other purpose
than that which the name indicates 1t will
be readily understood that in time of peace
any ships will serve as ours have served
us, but in time of war we should have both
battleships and small torpedo boats and
dispatch boats though weaker, should also
be fighting vessels.
Madrid, July 25, 1885,