The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1898-06-03
FLEET MAY DO \
Army Nav Not BE Necessary *
Santiago de Csba.
The INVASION OF PORTO RICO
Will Be- Undertaken II This Proves
the Case.
AN ENGAGEMENTS EXPECTED
the Vessels Under Sampson
Can Dispose of Ccrvcra.

New York, June "A Tribune special
from Washington says: The contingency
clearly foreseen and provided for in
the orders sent to Major General Shafter
last Sunday--which might render super
iluous the beginning OF extended army
provisions in the vicinity of Santiago has
now reached iIrrortant proportions. in view
of tho extremely formidable naval con-
centralion reported oil the southern coast
OF Cuba, and there has been a consequent
Improvement In The prospects of an iinms-
date invasion OF Porto Rico. with the
Likelihood of the occupation of San Juan
itself during the middle OF June.
Army officers In Washington believe that
tho reported arrival of Admiral Sampson
OF Santiago and the presence there of the
peerless Oregon stsnAlize the confidence OF
the naval commanders that Cerveras
squadron may be destroyed without de-
pending on assistance ashore and that.
quickly following the reconnoiterinr skir-
mish of the Iowa, the Massachusetts and
the New orleans. decisive engagement
Will be undertaken
Since the departure OF General Milea
from Washington. the probability that
cooperation would be imperative at San
tlogo has materially diminished. particu-
larry since the effectiveness OF Commodore
sehley's communications with the insur-
gents ashore became fully known ana
clearly appreciated by the officials here.
now charged solely with ordering actual
operations of fleets and armies.
The commodorcs certainty that he hal
CerNtra securely in the harbor has given
rite to unquestionaE assurances on the
part of the highest authorities that he can
safely be trusted to carry out the RESPONSE
bilities which have been imposed on him.
His demonstration that the Santiago bat
terea were Insignificant to degres that
removed them from serious consideration
| as essential elements OF defense OF the
| harbor. although theoretical strategists had
| lahnrously figured out that naval guns
| could not be sufficiently elevated to reach
them, has east grave doubt on the effio-
iency Of the alleged mine fields with which
the channel has been presumed to b. pros
tccted and 1t is the Impression of naval
officers here. who probably reflect the
opiulons OF the naval commanders on the
scene that an attack on the Spanish squad
RIM inside the harbor would b. attained
with scarcely greater hazards than an en-
gagemeut with 1t In the open sea and with
| infinitely improved chances oil accomplish
Ing it's complete defeat.
In view OF the extreme latitude now al
| lowed to feet commanders. whose discre-
| tion Is practically unlimited by war boards
| or other officials distant from the front
| 1t is evident that no one in Washington.
| of whatever exalted authority. can predict
| the character OF tho next report from the
combined ormored squadronS
The crucial battle of the war is i'm
| minent. unless all signs fail. and 1t NAV
be a matter OF hours rather than days be-
fore the receipt Of news of an occurrence
which may terminate the war. or, in any
event, draw the line sharply for the con-
| duct OF all succeeding operations.
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