The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-12-01
A CONFLICT OF OPINIONS
AS TO THE BEST METHOD OF CAP
TURING THE CUBAN STRONGHOLD.
Shafter Wanted Navy TO Risk Disaster
by Forcing Channel, and Sampson
Desired the Forts Taken.

squadron. Inc report D6SllS Will d us
patch dated 1.-THE Flagship New York.
July 49, and winds up with one from the
same flagship, dated Guantanamo, Aug. 4.
In the first report Admiral Sampson tells
of the demonstration made against Aqua
dores by the Michigan troops, under Duff
field, the point of which was that as soon
as the ships took part in the firing the
spaniards disappeared. He says tn the
bombardment of Santiago on the :" = July
served no particular end because Skaters
attack had been postponed. He quotes dis
patches from himself to Shafter
stating that it was impossible to
force an entrance to the harbor
until the mines had been removed and
that the work could be accomplished only
after the troops had taken the forts. Shat
ter replied that he could not tell when he
could take the batteries. If they were as
difficult as those against which he was
pitted it would take some time and entail
a great loss of life. Says he: II am at
loss to see why the navy cannot work UNI
der q destructive fire as well as the army.
My loss yesterday was over five hundred
men, BY all means keep up the fire on ev-
erything in sight until demolished. l expect,
however, with time and sufficient men, to
capture the forts along the bay"
An hour later on the same day, July 2,
Shafter again appealed to Sampson to i'm
mediately force the harbor entrance, so as
to avoid future loss among his men, al
ready very heavy. Says he: You can oper-
ate with less loss Of life than L can" In
reply, ON the same day, Admiral Sampson
pointed out that the channel of the harbor
was we'll strewn with mines which would
certainly result in the sinking of one or
more of his ships if he attempted to enter
the harbor, and that by sinking one the
harbor would be blocked against the en-
trance of the others He had hoped that
Shafter would take the batteries from the
rear so that he might drag Tor the torpe-
does, but if it was Skaters earnest desire
that he should force the entrance he would
prepare to undertake it, thinking, however,
that the position of both army and navy
would be made more difficult if they failed
in the attempt. He promised to use the
mines at Guantanamo to countermlne those
at Santiago, which would consume consid-
cradle time. Says Sampson: 1T is not so
much the loss of men as it is the loss or
ships which have, until now, deferred me
from making direct attack on the ships
within the port
A MISAPPREHENSION.
After the battle with CerVera S Meet SnaI-
ter renewed his request that Sampson force
an entrance, saying his present position has
cost him a thousand men and he did not
wish to lose any more. Sampson, in COM
ment. says this shows a complete misap-
prehension of the circumstances. He al
leges that the sinking of the Mercedes
would obstruct the entrance of the larger
American ships, and that extensive shore
CT
of staff had indicated to Shafter the points
that should be carried before any attention
was paid to the city, and the taking Of these
points would have insured the destruction
of the mines and the entrance of the Amer
lean fleet. Shafter had cordially consnted
to this, and Sampson did not know why the
plan was changed unless the troops had
been advanced too far to divert He ex-
presses the belief that an adherence to the
original plan would have resulted in the
much quicker surrender of the Spanish
troops and less loss of life, except the navy,
which would have borne the brunt Of at
tack.
Sampson tells how he contemplated bring
ing UP the marine battalion from Guanta-
namo and landing them at the foot of MORO
to assist in assault or to take the west bat
terry and had no doubt of success of his
plan He arranged to visit Shafter and talk
this over, but being i'll was obliged to send
Chief of Staff Captain Chadwick They
reached an agreement to lombard Santiago
from the sea for twenty-four hours with
the heavy guns, and if that failed to bring
the enemy to terms then to assault the So
capa battery with the marines and Cubans
and force an entrance to the harbor with
some of the smaller ships. Thus says Samp-
son: 81 have thus been surprised to see pub
lished in the papers any statement OF re-
fusal on my part to endeavor to force my
way into the harbor, and cannot under
stand-in case the newspaper report be
truthful statement OF what was sent by
kim-Goneral Skaters sending any report
of this kind. l here, moreover, would an
imadvert upon the apparently extraordinary
openness with which every detail of hope,
effort or suggestion on the part of the army
has been published. The unwisdom Of such
procedure is too manifest for discussion.
After referring to the existence of what
he terms an indefinite truce at that time,
Sampson quotes a message from Shafter
dated July 10, asking him to begin firing on
the city according to programme, but to be
careful to put his shots well to the west
ward, near the bay, to avoid disastrous
moral erect Oh MS SOlClSTS, anu luS dUIulEdl
says that reports from army headquarters
shows that shells were fired with great eff
feet. starting several fires in the city, and
only few falling in the water. He quotes
d dispatch of Skaters to this effect.
LEFT TO SIMPSONS DISCRETION.
Admiral Sampson also quotes a dispatch
from Secretary Long saying that the secre-
tary of war desires Sampson to force the
harhor; that he wishes to do all that is rea-
sonable to bring about the surrender, and
then leaves the matter to Simpsons dis
erection. except that the United States ar
mored vessels must not be risked." The ad-
rniral says: Il take this TO be continual
ton of the preceding matter, to which l
have referred. l think that the falsity of
the suggestion that the navy was unwilling
TO cooperate in forcing an entrance to San
tiago is already sufficiently shown, partieu-
larry by the minutes of the arrangement
shown in Paragraph 9. l would. however
add, to show the good will of the navy and
my desire and understanding that in case
the enemy failed to come TO terms through
bombardment the harbor entrance should
be forced, that, in the meanwhile, all prep
arat.ons were completed for countermining
the mines having been removed for this pur-
pose from the Resolute TO the collier Leba-
non by Lieutenants Roy Smith and T.. +.
Capehsrt who are mining experts, placed
aboard the Lebanon, and everything ar
ranged for action whenever desired. The
only reasons for post ponement came from
me general commanding the army. The