The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-09
BRIEF STORY OF THE WAR
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT WITH
SPAIN FROM ITS INCEPTION.
The InsurrectiOn in Cuba, Sinking of
the Maine and the UnbrOken Sc
ries of American Victories.

y
Spanish Cortes-in which Cuba had forty.
three representa- tives-unanimously passed a
bill brought forward by Senior Abaruza. a
Cuban, to establish in Cuba a liberal regime
which should virtually confer autonomy, or
home rule. This was in response to the de-
mands of the autonomist Cuban members of
the Cortes. They described the stagnation
Of the cane sugar industry of Cuba, which
was Frustrated by .Germanys vast exporta-
lions of cheap beet sugar, the ruin of sugar
planters, the idleness of thousands of work.
men formerly employed on the plantations
and the necessity of local self-government,
with closer economy of administration, in
view of the diminished incomes of the peo-
pie Hard times had created discomfort and
political unrest which it was expedent to
conciliate by reforming the government and
reducing its cost.
Ten days after the enactment of the re-
form law an instruction was begun in the
province of Santiago by filibusters from
New York, Hayti and other points. Their
purpose, it has been stated, was to prevent
the success of a reform which would con-
tent the people and render them indiffer-
ent to the idea of Cuba libre The filibus-
ters consisted of young Cu5ans who have
live many years abroad, naturalzed foreign
ers of Cuban origin and Adventures of vari-
Gus nationalties. Their enterprise was or
ganized and financed by junta, or commit
tee, in New York, which was helped by The
sympathy all Americans have for countries
thought to be rightly struggling to be free.
Cuban bonds, which would be valuable if
the junta succeeded, were also disposed Of
partly for the money they brought and part
~ for the cooperation they secured.
There were some 100000 agricultural labor
ers in Cuba, many of whom were Idle on
account of the low price OF sugar. Some
of these Joined the rebels The entire rebel
force has been estimated at 10000, but the
force actually under arms has perhaps
seldom exceeded 10000. Few professional
MEN or men of education joined the in
surgentS. The cities and larger towns con-
tinued loyal and the local population Or
ganized guerrilla bands aggregating, it is
said, 5000 men to withstand the forays of
the rebls. The latter, consisting chiefly of
ne groes and mixed breeds operated by de-
stroying property. They did not propose to
fight in the open, but burned crops and
buildings and dynamited railroad bridges
and trains
SO-CALLED REPUBLIC.
A republic was proclaimed and Cuebitas
was made the capital, but the civil gov
eminent was imaginary. The chief COM
nand and entire local government was in
the hands of General Gomez. He, with
Maceo and others, gradually extended the
rebel operations over the whole island,
destroying everything outside the towns.
Stealing in small bands through the bush
and travelling by night they eluded the
Spanish troops and burnt and plundered
everywhere, driving the rustics into the
already congested towns. To prevent the
rebels from living off the rustics the Span
iSh forbade agriculture in exposed dis
tricts, thus also adding to the congestion
of population in the towns. The wretched-
ness of the reconcentradoS, imputed to Gen.
eral Weyler, became the chief burden of
the cry of inhumanity raised against Span
ish rule.
BY cutting the island into several isolated
sections by means of trochas and by follow
ing up the rebel bands pertinaciousiy in the
restricted areas General Weyler had at
length by December, 1897, virtually freed the
island from all raVages except in the two
mountain country gave the insurgents i'm
penetrable retreats. The nature of the jun
gle was such that the complete extinction
of the rebel bands in Santiago was i'm
practicable so long as they received supplies
and encouragement from abroad. Their
operations were on a small scale and unim-
portant except so far as the existence of
their movement-even on a small scale-af-
forded basis for the growing disposition
at Washington to interfere to exclude Spain
from her possessions in the West Indies
In December, 1896, Congress signified its
purpose to recognize Cuba libre until Secre-
tary Olney instructed by Mr. Cleveland let
it be known that in the Presidents view
recognition was an executive function ex-
clusively and action by Congress >would be
ignored. Mr.. Clevelands position, as indi-
Gated by his representations at Madrid, was
that the plan of autonomy embodied in the
AbaruZa law of 1895 and much broadened in
the decree of February, 1897, should be given
a trial and the United States would not in
terfere until it was shown by experience
that the new home rule scheme was a sham
voiced by Mr.. Cleveland, included the idea
of interference in case peace and order
after a fair trial of the home-rule scheme
of 1897, were still as far off as ever, but Mr.
that home rule should have a fair trial. The
purpose of depriving Spain of her sovereign
ty over Cuba was disclaimed.
AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY.
With the beginning of the Mckinley adj
ministration these assurances ceased A
less patient policy was favored and the
idea of getting Spain to withdraw from
Cuba by friendly insistance was enter
tanned Congressman who wished to recog-
nize Cuba's independence were at once adj
vised that such result could be attained in
better way. Recognition was STAYED off.
Meanwhile Spain was asked to make vari-
Gus concessions, as respects the removal
of Weyler, the reconcentrados and an arm
1stice, etc. All were granted. The hope was
entertained that with Blanco favoring con-
citation, the reconcentrados provided for
and peace offered the rebels, a way would
be found for giving Cuba a government as
free as that of Canada. The retention of
a nominal sovereignty was now at length
all that Spain asked. 1t was resolved not
to concede this and on April II, 1898, Presi-
dent Mckinley asked Congress to authorize
him to intervene in Cuba with force Con-
gress assented on the 18th and an ultimatum
was sent to Spain demanding the evacuation
OF cuba. In the declaration of war it was
affirmed that the war should be in the in
tereSt of humanity and not for the ac-
QUESTION of territory.
Hostilities were precipitated by the sink
ing or the battle ship Maine in the harbor
of Havana in February. The vessel sank
after an explosion, the cause of which has
not been ascertained 1t is not known
whether it was the work of a Spanish fam
attic, animated by blind hatred of the United
States, or of Cuban patriot anxious to en-
broil Spain and Cuba. That it was caused
by any Spanish official nobody believes Our
commission of naval officers, after patient
inquiry, reported that it could not trace the
cause of the explosion. but thought it was
from without the ship Admiral Colcomb.
or the British navy, reviewing the facts
ELECTED by the inquiry, thinks the explosion
was from within and parallels the incident
with the like mysterious explosion of the
British war ship Daphne, which he nvesti-
gated. The Daphne was exploded from
within, but the cause could never be ascer-
tanned.
The explosion of the Maine. whatever the
cause, fired popular resentment against
Spain and strengthened the lingo party in
Congress till it became irresistible. There
was loud demand for revenge and Re
member the Maine! became popular cry
PREPARATION AND OPERATION.
Months before the declaration of war our
war ships were assembled in large num-
hers at Key West near Havana, and on
April %. the day after war began, Admiral
SamOS0n hePan the blOckada Of Cl1ha,,