Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-04-26
A DARING EXPLOIT
Lieut.. Fremont's Landing Of Marines
In Cuba.
IMPORTANT INFORMATION GAINED
Uncertainty as to the Course of the
Spanish Navy.
Mt INFORMATION GAINED
OUR SHIPS ON LOOKOUT

| The details of Lieut.. Frenon:'s daring
exploi. with the torpedo boat Porter have
| been re ceived by an official who visited the
| White House today. The story printed In
the mornings papers was censored b. the
| governments agents at Key West. and all
| the facts did not come out. Lieut.. Ere
| mont ran his boat in under the guns OF the
Matanzas batteries and landed a company
of marines in Cuba. The pilot who guided
| the Porter was the same man who sue
| ceeded IN landing so many filibusterins ex
petitions in Cuba The point selected for
the landing was the same one at which the
| War Department intends to land Its first
force OF 5000 infantry. cavalry and ar.il-
lery. The pilot. On reaching shore, was in
| trusted with dispatches to deliver 10 Gen.
Gomez acquainting him with the plans of
the approaching expedition and directing
him to hold his forces III readiness 20 CO.
operate with those of the United States.
Capt. Sampson has characterized the cxpc
| dition Of Lieut.. Fremont as "a daring ca
ploit.''
| News at the Department.
| The Navy Department also. it is under
| stood, has received dispatches relating TO
| the landing of Lieutenant Fremont from
| the torpedo boat Porter for Il short time
| In Cuba with relation to the landing of
munitions of war and supplies for the c.;-
| tablshrlent of the base of supplies. II
| is known that the Information secured by
Lieutenant Fremont is OF great Importance,
but whether it shows the plans for il
| junction with Gomez army have been sue
cessfuly managed or not is not disclosed.
! 1t is believed, however, that the inform2-
| ton was satisfactory. 1t is probleuatical
as to how maly troops Gomez can assem-
| ble and upon that depends largely the i'm
mediate operations in Cuba. 1t is not the
| Intention CT the President to begin a for
| midable invasion of Cuba until after there
! has been q test of strength between the
American and the Spanish fleets, until
| it has been established that Spain does net
| intend to send her feet to American waters.
Plan Unchanged.
It is believed that the information secur-
! ed by Lieutenant Fremont was not of a
| character to change in any way the plan Of
| landing five thousand troops somewhere on
| the coast of Cuba to establish a base Of
] supplies. On the. contrary, it is supposed
| that a thorough understanding has been
| arrived at with the commander Of the Gu
| ban forces with respect to the establish
ment Of the base Of supplies. The Amert-
| can troops landed in Cuba will not be there
| for any aggressive movement, but will be
| strong enough to maintain themselves in
| the position which they will occupy. The
| authorities on which the administration
relies chiefly for advice with respect to
| operations on the island regard a force Of
| five thousand men as ample for this pur-
| jose, and this force will carry munitions
of war and provisions for a large army, SO
bot -rl,o f,fI 70 ,lr<
| junction with them and Sampson's fleet
| should be called away from blockade duty
to meet the Spanish fleet on the high seas
| the force would be strong enough to de-
| fend itself against attack, and would be so
| well provis:ored as not to suffer from being
| cut off from communication, even for a
| long time. If the plans work out satfs-
! factorily and Gomez can provide a suffl-
! cIent force the Cuban army will be well
| supplied and equipped for such aggressive
movements may be deemed advisable
| for them to make.
Objections to a Large Invasion Force.
There are some authorities here who urge
very strongly the immediate invasion of
| Cuba by large force, but serious objec-
! ticns arc raised to this and it is not con-
| temp!ated in the present plans. The plan
>
| nitely decided upon, and the President is
still in consultation with the Secretary of
War. Gen. Miles and Gen. SchofelI on the
subject. The reason that the President and
Secretary Of War do no. intend an invasion
at this time by a large army, in addition
TO the danger from disease, is that If the
two Spanish fleets, that at St. Vincent,
Cape Verde and the Cadiz fleet, should join
and proceed at once to attack any of our
ports or to give battle to our fleets. it might
result in cutting our army in Cuba of from
communication for time and subjecting it
to practically blockade in Cuba, such as
Havana is now undergoing. II by any mis-
chance our fleet should suffer reverses, a
large army in Cuba would be placed at
great disadvantage. 1t is regarded as desir-
able. therefore, that military operations in
Cuba should be confided chiefly to Gomez's
forces until the naval operations have led
to some definite result.
Uncertainty of Spanish Navy.
The department here, it is said, is left
largely to surmise for a conclusion as to
the course which will be pursued by the
Spanish navy. It is regarded as definitely
settled that the Spanish feet at St. Vincent
Cape yerds Islands. will not remain there,
and that the Cadiz fleet is on Its way either
u 10TH q JCnct1Ou Win the 81. vincent
fleet at the Canaries or on an Independent
expedition to our northern coast.
Our own vessels have been SO distributed
as to meet either of these movements. If
the two Spanish fleets are Joined in an ng-
gressive movement they can be met, it is
said, by the Hampton Roads feet and q
large part OF SIMPSONS feet at any point
toward which their movements are direct
cd. A small part Of Sampson's fleet couIi
maintain the blockade now established in
Cuba, II the entire Spanish fleet were be-
ing engaged by our feet, SO that they could
not attack the blockade. The interpreta-
ton put upon the movements Of the Min
neapolis and Columbia in our northern wa
ters is that they are on the lookout for the
Cadiz fleet. should 1t proceed at once to
American waters without forming q Juno
ton with the feet from st. Vincent. II It
should develop that this course has been
followed by ths Spanish, Schley's feet