The Press. (Stafford Springs, Conn.) 1883-1935, 1898-11-10
Washington Letter.

washington Nov. G, 1898.
To break off the peace negotiations is
the very thing that Spain does not desire
to do. That was made fully apparent in
the answer of the Spanish commissioners,
declining to consent to our demand for
the whole of the Philippines. Spain wish
es to get as much money as it possibly
can from US for the Philippines, and if
the negotiations are broken off it would
not get cent, while we would get the
Philippines just as surely as we would if
the treaty was regularly concluded There
are good reasons for the belief that Spain
would object most decidedly if our COM
missioners should withdraw their demand
for the Philippines, which they are not
likely to do, and substitute proposition
that the islands should be returned to
Spanish control. One of them Is that a
return to Spanish control would be a
physical impossibility, owing to the strong
insurgent army of Aguinaldo, which
would be in absolute control of the entire
group of Islands within a week after the
withdrawal of the American forces. Spain
knows that the islands are lost to her,
and ,teven if it did not expect to get d
money indemnity from us, would doubt
less prefer seeing them controlled by the
U. s. to seeing them controlled by the
insurgents. So far as can be judged by
appearances, the president and the men,
bers of his cabinet are perfectly satisfied
with the situation in Paris. In fact,
members of the cabinet have said as
much, and added their expectation that
the treaty would soon be concluded upon
our terms.
Lieut.. Hobson, who is in Washington,
could scarcely restrain his tears when he
received the news of the sinking during a
stortnaaf the Maria Teresa, the Spanish
.ais q raised, while on its way to
Many regrets have been ox-
pre by others, especially naval Off
GERS.
There is pointer in a portion of the
testimony of General Lawton that should
reasonable explanations of numerous
things connected with the campaign
against Santiago. 1t will be remembered
that it had already been stated in the
charge of the debarkation of Skaters
army that the troops never would have
been landed from the transports had the
navy not gone to the assistance of the
army officers in command. Nearly every
naval officer who has expressed an opin-
ion on the subject has declared that the
transports should be under the navy, as
they are under the British system. Col.
DENLY of the investigating committee,
who conducted the examination of Gen.
Lawton, asked whether he thought the
navy should have control of the trans
ports. mo, indeed" was his prompt
and emphatic reply. "Then you think
the army should have control of them ?"
asked Col DENLY. absolutely" was
the answer. "While they are acting to-
gether?" queried Col. DENLY. "They
won't act together" answered Gen. Law
ton ''that is where / make my point;
two men cannot command the same af-
fair Gen. Lawton's declaration that
the army and navy won't act together
may be little too sweeping, but there is
little doubt that they did fail to act to-
gether during the Santiago campaign.
Fifty-seven cannon captured at Santi-
ago have been ordered taken to the U. s..
arsenal. at Watervliet, N. Y, for exami-
nationps, This order is merely form, as