Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-05-17

ming out of coal sufficient to get back to
their own possessions The islands would
| secure both our fleet and our coast.
Gen. SchoGeld's View.
CAS- Gen. Schofield stated to the commit
| tee: The most important feature of all is
! that 1t economies the naval force rather
| than Increases it. 1t is capable of absolute
| defense by shore batteries; SO that a naval
| fleet, after going there and repIenshing it's
| supplies and making what repairs are need
| ed, can go away and leave the harbor per-
! fectiy safe to the protection of the army.
The Spanish feet on the Asiatic
station was the only one of all the fleets
We could have overcome we did. OF
! course. that cannot again happen, for we
VIII not be able to pick up so weak a fell
low next time. We are liable at any time
to get into a war with nation which has
more powerful fleet than ours. and it is
OF vital Importance, therefore if we can,
TO hold the point from which they can con-
duct operations against our Pacific coast.
Especially Is that true until the Nicaragua
Canal is finished, because we cannot send
fleet around from the Atlantic to the Pa
Cific.'
The same eminent and experienced SOL
der. wnen asked whether it would be sufii-
Gent to have Pearl Ha-bCr without the
islands, said we ought to have the islands
to hold the harbOr; that if left free ana
neCtral. complications WCIld arise with for
etSn nations, who would take advantage of
weak little republic with claims for dam
ages enforced by warships, as is frequently
seen, If annexed, we would settle any dis
Pute wiki a foreign nation; that we would
be much stronger if we owned the islands
as part of our territory, and would then
also have the resources of the islands
which are SO fertile. for military supplies
that If we do not have the political control
10 L. NJ no. and y
be surrounded by a hostile people
Admiral Walker who has had long ex-
perience in the waters of the Hawaiian
Islands, emphatically confirmed the views
Of Gen Schofieli. especially that it would
cost far less 10 protect the Pacific coast
with the Hawaiian Islands than without
them; that il would be taking a point of
vantage instead of giving it to your enc
my.
Risk of Delay.
We must face the future in dealing with
this proposed annexation. 1t is impossible
for the republic of Hawaii to maintain a
permanent existence preserving in force
the influences which are now in the ascend
ant there and which are cordial and
friendly to the United States OF its mixed
population of 100000 a powerful element is
Japlnese-24 iU1-of WHOM 1922 are males
almost all of them grown men, for they are
not divided as ordinary populations are in
the usual proportions of men, women and
children. They are Il far stronger element
of physical force than the native race
which has diminished until there are now
only thirty odd thousand, of whom, by the
usual proportions of population, there are
not over 500 grown men. The native fIa-
Waiidn race can not in any contingency
control the island. 1t must fall to some
foreign people.
The japanese are intensely Japanese
retaining their allegiance to their empire
n he
japanese officials. Very many of them
served in the recent war with China. The
japanese. government not long ago demand
ed of the Hawaiian government, under
their construction of a treaty made in 1871
that the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands
should have equal privileges with all other
persons. which would include voting and
holding office. This claim was made when
a Hood of Japanese subjects, under the SUI
perViSiOn of the government of that coun-
try, of from 1909 to 2,r01 per month. were
being poured into the Hawaiian Islands
threatening a speedy change of the govern
ment into Japanese hands, and ultimately
to a Japanese possession. The demand was
resisted by the little republic and a treaty
of annexation with the United States ar
rested Ii for time
Japan protested earnestly to our gov
eminent against that treaty, but our Sec
rotary of state refused to consider it's
protest: yet the japanese government has
not withdrawn its demand on the Hawaiian
press 1t with more energy and success if
annexation to the United States is rejected
by this Congress. 1t could then in a few
months throw many thousands of japanese
subjects into the Hawaiian Islands COM
pletely overwhelming all other influences.
BY a clause in our reciprocity treaty
with the Hawaiian Islands we have the ex-
elusive right to establish and maintain a
coaIing and repair station in Pearl harbor
which ia about eight miles from the city
of Honolulu, and capable of being made
one of the best harbors in the world, easily
fortified to make il imDregnable from the
sea. 1t is the only harbor of such a char
actcr in the whole group. We have thus
far done nothing toward taking possession,
terrifying, or opening the channel into The
| harbor, so that it is at present utterly use
! less. but capable OF infinite possibilities.
The grant of this harb0r to our govern
ment is part of a Ieciplccit treaty. After
that treaty had been ratified. but before
the ratification had been exchanged, he
Hawaiian minister and the Secretary of
State of the United States exchanged notes
which declared that our rights in Pearl
harbor would cease whenever the reciproc-
ity treaty was terminated. That treaty
may he terminated upon one years notice
by either party. 1t grants advantages in
our markets to Hawaiian trade, and con-
Cedes to US not only the use of Pearl mar
Dor. but excludes any other nation from
leasing a port or landing. or having any
special privilege in the Hawaiian Islands
without the consent of the United States
with the Japanese element in the as
Cendant and the government under Jap
anese control the treaty would be prompt
! ly terminated. and with 1t our SPECIAL
rights. This would be the first step taken
by that active and powerful government
toward the complete incorporation OF the