The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-10-30

Americans. But all that would have been
matters had not led to the present acute STAGE
spirit among our men. Rnd even among some
OF our %oficers. which win render more DIM
Gen, Greene came. blunt. aggressive, force
full. with no particular admiration Tor the. ma
tiyes or consideration n,o oil sneiT "a vi mose III jee en-
the .BledRchammer principle, and that is a
principle. which the Filipino does not under
no usually sits down aud refuses 10 bulge.
He has more patience than a mountain and
will wear you out every time. But he can he
In his hit-and.miss fashion. without clear
understanding on our part Of the people WITH
out very much concern for the possible re.
suits. matters moved along until Gen. Merritt
Merritt probably had less genuine interest in
affairs down here than any other oflcer OF the
and endr his desire was to a the rest Of himself
there after 4. AGuinaldo did not call on him.
Gen: Merritt was pplgned and somehSw the
had refused TO SEQ Aguinaldo or have any COM
munication with him. Matters went from
was arranged. and then BEGAN the last stare OF
the difficulty. which has led to the crisis now
Meantime our officers had been going about
the city recommending and making maps OF the
Spanish positions and of the country about the
city. Everywhere tho Insurgents had been
most friendly to them and had rendered them
most valuable assistance. They had enter
tanned. our officers with simple, genuine hospi-
tally, which never failed to produce the best
y could supply. and they had hesitated at no
trouble or labor or expenditure Of time IN do
GERS who made these. expeditions and met
these people, in their homes and learned to
friends. They are the. ones who, best under
stand the situation, and they are the ones who
are most ,regretful that a conflict is among the
On the day before the surrender. of Manila,
after, Gen. Merritt had issued the order arrang-
ing the disposition OF his troops for the attack
on the. city. and relocating Anderson, the rank
ing officer after himself. to the command Of
the entrance OF the Insurgents into the city.
Previous to this Aguinaldo had expressed the
desire to march a. his troops into the h city H.
quest had been conveyed to Gen. Merritt and
ignored. Now it was answered by the order
to Aguinaido at Bakor that the insurgents
must not advance on the NEXT day. and that
permit them to enter the city.
That night Aguinaldo replied with q laconic
message, consisting of only two words. Too
participating In the attack and had issued his
orders. He would not rescind them at that
view at least, had been cooperating with the
Americans in the operations against Manila.
They had acted as our allies. whether they
compact, in. Hong Kong They had chased the
9lWiliii VIZ lI'li NhNlNt NltlO W ltllll tluu III
vested the city completely, had shut OF sup
plies from the country and now demanded a
Headers Of The Sun know what happened
on the day of the fall of Manila, They, will re-
member how, the i~nsuiEents hurried along,
them. by footpaths and trails that paralleled
the main roads taken by the Americans, and
in u few eases ahead of Uncle Sans soldiers.
In spite % our Efforts several hundred Of them
got into the suburbs, They took, possession
front They looted n fnNv hnuGnas Sp1uGhinU
open the safe of a Spanish official who lived IN
Ermita and taking $1,000 ont of it. They
and barracks and got several good positions.
In the evening a few hundred of them We're
w TSne' disa T1 d. g e'e Mere h ioreed fG baeI ogt
rounded and held In Malate. aiterward being
sent back outside our lines.
Next morning there was trouble. Gen. Mer-
ritt sent word to get the insurgents out Of the
city ut once. Gen. Anderson asked whether
staff officer who brought the message from
Gen, Merritt did not know, and so without
troops. : Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo to
withdraw his men, at. once Then the clever
the whole game. He replied that he had sent
commissioners to Gen: Anderson to discuss
before him. and Anderson9 fell into The trap'
He received the commissioners and heard
their propositions. Then the matter became
one of discussion and diplomacy and not one
Of action. Aguinaldo had got his hold and for
the time being. at least. would keep il. The
with the story of Naboth. The pro positions
which Aguinaldo's commissioner made were
ten in number, and some OF them were most
astounding. They provided:
!. That the insurgents would retire toa line run
ming, from Malate to Pace, thence down the, Pace
H trifas to a,t the P PSc c, Up the F r1sa to to the t,,,t bridge No.. Of
tne tSs t through h iSa nGI,S S Tni. L &UmIa 1 nSle 1o oIS.n
them Malate and Pace and important positions on
the east and north Of the city,
vents in Malatc, Paco and the northern suburbs.
and should have the palace of the Captain General
3. That the Filipinos should have the free nav
iGntion of the fasig for their vessels and the pro
Patria is. or has been able to lind out. but subse-
quent neGotiattons showed that it had something to
do with our protection of their ships in all waters
4. That the Filipinos share in the booty of war.
q. That the civil offices be filled entirely by North
Americans, II Gen. Merritt desired to appoint Fill
thhiT Trough il the Gom aGnh plaGSSi that afi% e Would be- SeE sisd fa
consult Gen. Merritt about suCh appointments and
10 recommend men for them whom he knew 70 be fit
9. That tho Filipinos should retain control of the
I, That the Filipino officers should be permitted
to enter the city at al, times wearing their side arms.
night OF Aug. 10 should be returned.
0. That the American troops should retire within
the lines proposed by ARulnaldo, and should not
pass beyond those lines with arms.
10. That all regulations should be in writing. and
to be binding should be confirmed by the Command
ers.in-chief of the two forces.
The last nine of these demands. were the
condition precedent which the modest young
Mr; AGuinGldo. who had come down here sub
ject TO American control. made to the with
drawal OF his forces to the line specified in the
first proposition. To, put 1t mildly, Gen. An
to which the Americans have chung ever since
with considerable pertinscity. that the city
had been surrendered to our forces and that
only the AMERICANS were responsible for the
protection, OF. life and property within its
limits; The insurgents had not been men
toned in the articles of capitulation. and Gen.
Anderson did not contemplate the sharing
with them Of the resPonslbility, d~eyolved upon
piled to the Commissioners that he had a con-
dition precedent to make. Just one. II was
that the insurgent troops should retire at
once to the line which he would draw before
there should be any further negotiations.
His line ran from the Bocano de Yistas to San
LaZaro. Cemeterio de Sampaloe. Blockhouse 5,
Blockhouse q. the. Depot des ARuas Patables,
the Spanish works beyond San Juan del Monte.
THENCE in, a straight line to Blockhouse IA. on
the ;Pineda road, thence in a straight line TO
the, beach at Mytubig. south of the Dolrorin at
Malate; But the mistake had been made in
derson's condition of withdrawal to the line