The record-union., 1898-11-21

One prominent cause of the increase
of sickness in the early camps has been
commented upon only by few of our
medical officers. These cite lhe preva-
lence of drunkenness and of venereal
disease due to the facilities and tempta-
tions afforded by the proximity of
cities to the larger camps. They hold
that If the systems of the men had not
been weakened by dissipation they.
would not have succumbed so readily
70 the other influence which affected
them.
It was typhoid fever which broke
down the strength of the commands
generally, the outbreak becoming dis
tinctly manifest in July. Sporadic cases
appeared in most of the regiments in
May and June these cases having been
brought in many instances from the
State camps. In fact, some regiments,
as the Fifteenth Minnesota, suffered
more from this disease at their State
rendezvous than any of the regiments
in the large Federal camps. 1t appears
from a general review of the sanitary
reports already filed that the preva-
lence of the disease was propOrtioned
to the insanitary camp conditions
which / have referred to. The proba-
bility of its communication to soldiers
in camps through the agency of flies
was pointed out as areason for insisting
on a sanitary policy of the strictest
character.
II is we'll known to the medical pro-
feSsion that this fever is propagated
by a contaminated water supply, and
it is now recognized that the great
prevalence of this disease in an ag-
| gravated form in the camps of the civil
war was due to the use of surface and
shallow we'll waters infected by ty-
phoid excreta. To prevent the trans
mission by the water supply I recon-
mend the use of boiled and filtered wa
ter when pure spring supply could not
be obtained and to enable an efficient
| filtration of suspected waters to be
made, field filters of approved con-
struction were issued on my recommen-
dation by the Quartermaster's de-
partment.
CARE OF SICK AND WOUNDED.
The seriously sick were to be treated
in their division field hospitals unless
their transfer to the general hospital
was advisable, under the care of the
most experienced physicians and able
surgeons on duty with each division
Medical officers left on duty with their
regiments were to exercise sanitary
supervision over the well men and to
determine whether a soldier reporting
himself sick should be sent to the hos
| pital or remain as a trivial case under
| treatment in quarters. The consolida-
| ton of the medical force by divisions,
| implying, as it did, the breaking up of
the regimental hospitals, met with
strong opposition from regimental med
ica1 officers, particularly from those
who We're not detailed for special serv-
ice at the division hospitals
THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
Long before this corps embarked for
| Cuba, its field hospitals were in condi-
ton for efficient service Subsequent
events, however, rendered valueless
these preparations of the medical de-
partment. When the command en-
barked on the transports, the baggage
wagons and mules were left behind
The ambulance trains of all the divis-
ions, with large part of the outfit of
each of the hospitals, were also left
behind. Three ambulance wagons
were taken apart and stored on one of
the vessels. These did excellent serv-
ice at San Juan and Ell Caney. Ten of
the ambulances of the third or reserve
division hospital were subsequently
shipped to Cuba, where they arrived
July I'd and were Of value n moving
the sick and wounded to the hospital
at Siboney and to the hospital ships
and transports. Of the property and
supplies carried to Cuba. a portion was
not available for service at the time it
was needed, to wit: on July 1st, I'd
and I'd, when the wounded from Ell Ca
ney and San Juan We're coming from
the front for care and treatment. This
was because, in general, no opportunity
was afforded to land the medical prop
erty. Earnest efforts were made by
medical officers to have supplies at the
front with the troops. During and
after the battles at FL Caney and San
Juan there was an insufficiency of
tents, cots, bedding and medicines due
TO the causes stated. but all the hos
pitals were we'll equipped for surgical
| work
After the capitulation of Santiago
the troops at the front broke down
rapidly under the fatigues they had
undergone and the malarial influences
10 winch they were exposed; but by
this time an ample supply of tents,
furniture, bedding, clothing and med
ical stores had reached Siboney. to-
gether with corps of trained nurses
and a force of surgeons. who were
| sent to duty at the yellow fever hos
pitals, being immune to the disease
Meanwhile to relieve the pressure in
the Held hospitals. such convalescents
| and sick as could bear the Journey
were sent to the United States on
transport vessels. This was an emer-
gency measure to relieve the hospitals
| at Siboney and permit of the transfer
| to them of the men who were sick
in regimental camps The transfer of
| troops from Santiago to Montauk was
also an emergency measure, and the
great responsibility of excluding vel
low fever infection from every trans
port rested on the medical officers
who had charge of the embarkation.
Had they failed in this duty, the ef-
feet would have been disastrous dur
ing the voyage to the men on ship
board and the risk of importing the
disease into this. country would have
been greatly increased. 1t is needless
to refer at this time to the complaints
of starvation which appeared almost
daily in the newspapers during the oc-
cupation of Camp Wikoff for it is now
generally understood that the weak
ness, prostration, anaemia and emacia-
ton of so many of the troops were the
results of malarial typhoid. and yellow
fever from which the army suffered as
a consequence of it's exposure to the
climatic influences and to infection of
Santiago and its neighbOrhOod pend-