The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-11-30
SPANISH OFFICERS VIEWS.
THE BATTLES OF SANTIAGO As
SEEN BY THE OTHER SIDE.
Lieut.. Jose Miller Tejefro, Who
Was There at the Time. Criticiaea
the Policy Which Sent Cervern's
Over O Meet n stronger Enemy.

WASHINGTON. Nov 2a-The hu-
reau Of naval intelligence today issued
another OF its war series, this time the
Battles and capituiation Of Santiago de
Cuba, by Lieut. Jose Miller Tejairo, the
Second IN Command OF the Naval Forces
OF the Province OF Santiago de Cuba
Capt Ciewes. tire chief OF the intelli-
gence bureau explains in an Introductory
note that the writer was an eye witness OF
most OF the events that he describes and
from his position had access 10 official in
formation. The style is peculiarly inter-
esting. free from bias and has an air OF
authenticity. which viii give the book a
place in history, though i. is not an Of
fetal publication. The author began, ac-
cordinS 10 Ills own statement. To keep
an exact diary OF events at Santiago from
the moment OF the appearance there OF
Cervera's fleet. realizing, as he says, that
the vessels were to have most powerful
influence on the war. The publication be-
gins with a chapter entitled THE Two
Fleets telling OF the arrival Of Cerveras
squadron on the 18th of May and OF the
disappointment OF the people, who expect
ed no less than eight hattleships instead
OF five. The picture he draws Of condi-
tens in the beseged city IS quite terrible.
owing 10 the shortage Of food and sup
plies.
and shows that the fleet was very badly
supplied Concerning the opinions as 10
why the feet did not so out, he refers TO
the great joy caused by its arrival and
then says the ships in the harhor We're
compelling the enemy TO sustain With SUI
perior forces the blockade. with all ITS
difficulties and dangers. II was not be-
lieved that the American ships would ex-
pose themselves TO serious disaster or would
force anyone Of the ports which they were
blockadng. The Spanish ships did not
have to give battle in order TO obtain re-
suits, and he says that IL provisions mad
not been wanting IN Santiago and the Span
ism fleet had remained there. no one could
tell to what extremes Impotence and de,
spair might not have carried Admiral
Sampson. The movements OF the Ameri-
can fleet were a puzzle 10 the Spahiards
as they did not know why they remained
on watch all day and disappeared at night
But it was supposed that the Americans
were afraid Of the destroyefs. speaking
of the Merrimac. he says:
What Santiago has not succeeded IN as
certainlng definitely-though 1t IS probably
known in Spain from American newspa-
pers that are in the habit Of pubhshlng ev-
erything-is, what was the real object tnat
the Merrimac had in view.
He speaks of the destructive work or
the Nesuvns whenever the bonus zen
upon any point where there were works or
guns.
Speaking of the battles of FL Caney and
San Juan he says the Americans, IL must
be Acknowledged, fought with truly admir-
able courage and spirit. While the battles
were going on at I'll Caney and San Juan,
the enemy had sent. forces against me
doubt. Of harassing and making the attack
more general. The casualties on the Span,
ism side are stated to be sixty officers anu
533 men. He claimed that only 90 men
defended I'll Caney for ten hours. and that
255 defended San Juan for four hours. He
speaks of the lively bombardment BY sea
I'll SAn ia ~ n
Spanish fleet on the same date. He speaks
of the action of the Spanish admiral as one
of the greatest acts of valor. For some time
the Spanish did not know whether the
ships had succeeded in making their es-
cape. but having been informed that they
/ had there was great rejoicing. 1t was at
formed them that the Teresa, Oquendo and
the destroyers had been lost.
The lieutenant gives considerable space
to the naval battle. the account OF which
was taken from persons who were saved
from the Spanish ships. The GOODNESS and
courage Of Admiral Cervera are noted. The
fire Of the Spanish ships was said to have
been slow, while that Of the American ships
was very brisk. In discussing the disaster
he SAYS that the loss of the fleet had been
foretold by all its commanders. but public
opinion in the island of Cuba required the
presence of the fleet in Cuban waters The
ships had not been cleaned were short OF
coal. and not in good condition TO fight,
The ileet received definite orders from the
captain general Of Cuba 10 leave Santiago
| IN spite or Adfnlrai t'eTNeTas femOn-
strances. He SAYS the Spanish are proud
OF the disaster OF Trafalgar on account Of
the heroism OF the navy. out the battle OF
Santiago is much more glorious
The total losses in all the attacks on San
tiago ire given as follows:
Officers killed, IS: men killed 107: Officers
wounded 50; men wounded, 65G: prisoners
and missing. officers and Il6 men.
He closes ihe account Of the naval bat
tie NJ Santiago by saying:
az have never been able 10 understand the
nh w - n
Cuba feet that was IN no manner able
to cope with that Of the United States. and
which therefore could In nowise prevent
the ships OF the latter from biockading
our ports and controlling the sea: hut since
it was sent without its arrival being able
10 prevent the loss Of the island. which
was lost as experience has shown, from
owing TO the conditions prevailing there.
| then Il should have been prevented from
| being destroyed, as il was. without result
ing In any advantage whatever.
the only way Of gaining any advantage
would have been in my oDinior. the taxi
| ing advantage Of the fact that all the hos
| tie ships were IN Cobb. "a secure n Few
| ships Of great speed. more or less welt
armed II seid TO the commercial norris Or
| Is probable that American public opinion
especially Of thoSe who did NOT participate
| IL the war. would have enacted the return
&C .he SHIPS. and then the ships of the
! Spanish feet could have left Santiago I'm
perfect safety and a catastrophe would
have been avoided which has brought us
no advantage. At the sa--r time the ports
have supplied themselves with provisions
/ final