The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-09-15
REPORT OF CUBAN CAMPAIGN
Continued from First Page.

| L am CREAMY indebted to Gen. Wheeler,
| who, as previously stated returned from
| the sick list to duty during the afternoon.
| His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made
| Itself felt on this part of the battlefield
| and the information he furnished to me
| at various stages of the battle proved to
| be most useful.
my own health was impaired by over
| exertion in the sun and intense heat of
| the day before, which prevented me from
| participating as actively in the battles as
| | desired; but from high hill near my
| headquarters, l had a general view of the
| battlefield extending from Ell Caney on
| the right to the left of our lines on San
Juan hill"
Gen. Shafter follows in detail the move
| ments of the troops, and the intrenchins
| done during the night He says: Gen
| Duffield with the Thirty-third Michigan
| attacked Aguadores, as ordered. but was
unable to accomplish more than to de-
| tain the Spaniards in that vicinity
| ION the morning of the Sd the battle
was renewed but the enemy seemed to
| have expended his energy in the assault
/ of the previous night, and the firing along
the lines was desultory until stopped by
| my sending the following letter within the
| Spanish lines"
Gen shafter then gives the dispatches
| passing between him and Gen. ToraI al
ready published.
He proceeds: 1.-THE cessation of firing
about noon on the Sd practically terminal
ed the battle of Santiago; all that oc-
CURED after this time may properly be
| treated under the head of the siege, which
| follows
ut is doubtful If we had more than u 900
| men on the firing line on July l. when the
| battle was fiercest, and when the import
| ant and strong positions of Ell Caney and
| San Juan were captured A few Cubans as
| sisted in the attack on Ell Caney and
| fought valiantly. but their numbers were
| too small TO materially change the strength
| as indicated above. The enemy confronted
| us with numbers about equal to our own
| they fought obstinately in strong and in
| trenched positions, and the results obtained
| clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of
the company officers and men, and the
| benefits derived from the careful training
| and instruction given in the company in
| recent years in rife practice and other bat
| tie exercises. Our losses in these battles
were % officers and 2OS men killed, and 81
officers and 1903 men wounded missing
| 70. The missing with few exceptions re-
| ported later"
Cen Shafter says the arrival of Gen.
Escario at Santiago was not anticipated,
as Gen. Garcia had been sent to intercept
| him.
After speaking of Admiral Cervera's sor-
| tie and the destruction of his fleet, Gen.
| ish commander to surrender.
ION the same date 1 informed Admiral
| Sampson that if he would force his way
into the harbor the city would surrender
without any further sacrifice of life. Com.
| modore Watson replied that Admiral Samp-
son was temporarily absent, but that in his
| CWatsons) opinion, the navy should not
enter the harbor.'
1.-THE strength of the enemy's position
| was such l did not wish to assault If it
could be avoided. The examination of the
enemys works after the surrender fully
| justified the wisdom of the course adopted.
| The Entertainments could only have been
carried with very great loss of life.
July 70 1 informed the Spanish COM
mander that Maj. Gen. Miles, commander
in-chief of the American army, had just
arrived in my camp and requested him TO
grant us a personal interview on the fol-
lowing day. He replied he would be pleas
ed to meet us. The interview took place
on the 18th, and 1 informed him his sur
render only could be considered, and that
as he was without hope of escape he had
no right to continue the fight"
Gen. Shafter then gives the details of
the final surrender, his entry TO the city
and the raising of the American flag. In
closing, he says
Before closing my report l wish to
dwell upon the, natural obstacles had to
encounter and which no foresight could
have overcome or obviated The rocky and
precipitous coast afforded no sheltered
landing places, the roads were mere bridle-
paths, the effect of the tropical sun and
rains upon unacclimated troops was dead
w. and a dread of strange and unknown
| diseases had its effect on the army.
1.-THE supply or quartermaster and COM
missary stores during the campaign was
abundant, and, Notwithstanding the diff
fcultes in landing and transporting the
rations, the troops on the firing line were
at all times supplied with its coarser com
ponents, namely, of bread, meat, sugar and
coffee
/ There was no lack of transportation.
for at no time up to the surrender could
all the wagons had be used
"In reference to the sick and wounded
/ have to say they received every atten-
tion that it was possible to give them
The medical officers, without exception,
worked night and day to alleviate the suf-
fering which was no greater than invari-
ably accompanies a campaign. 1t would
have been better If we had had more anu
| balances. but as many were taken as was
thought necessary, judging from previous
campaigns.
"The discipline Of the command was
superb. and 1 wish to invite attention 20
the fact that not an officer was brought
to trial by court martial, and, as far as
I know. no enlisted men. This speaks
volumes for an army of this size and in
a campaign of such duration"
Gen. Shafter recommends for promotion
ana brevets the following officers:
Col John f. Weston.
Mai. S. w. Groesbeck.
Mai. c. G. Starr
Mai. Leon Roudiez.
Mai. H. ]. Gallagher.
Maj. r. II. Noble.
Capt. Brice.
Capt. i. II. Plummer.
capt. j. c. Gilmore
Capt W. II. McKittrick.
Capt. w. II. Johnson.
Lieut.. Col E. j. McClernand.