The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-10-24

above telegram was sent, the ADMIRAL
explains, with reference to the proposed
detachment OF some OF our heavy shipa
for service abroad (the proposed expedl-
tion 20 the Spanish coasD. A dispatch
from Secretary Long shows that this
expedition was to consist Of the Iowa,
Oregon, Newark. Yosemite, Yankee and
Dixie, and they were TO so to the
Azores for orders en- route to Tangiers,
Morocco. The collierD were TO join the
deet at the Azores.
On June 80, the admiral received a
communication from Major General
Shaftef announcing that he expected to
attack Santiago the following morning
and asking that he (Sampson) bonn
bard the forts at AguadoreS IN support
OF regiment Of infantry aud make
such demonstrations as he thought pro-
per at the harborB mouth, so as TO keep
as many Of the enemy there as possible.
This request was complied with and on
July General shafter asked that the
admiral keep up his fight on the Santi-
ago water front, on July 3 the follow
ingSwas received from General Shatter:
Terrible fight yesterday, but my
line Is now strongly intrenched about
three-fOurths OF mile from town.
urge that Vou make EFFORT Immediately
TO force the entrance TO avoid future
losses among my men, which are al
ready very heavy. You can now oper-
ate with less loss of life than can.
Please telephone answer"
A reply was telephoned General Shaf-
ter from Admiral Sampson through
lieutenant Stanton, which said the
admiral had bombarded the forts at tho
entrance OF Santiago and also Punta
Gorda battery inside, sllencing their
fire and asked whether he CShafter)
wanted further firing on the admiraPs
part. The explanation was made that
It was impossible to force an entrance
until the channel was cleared OF mines
"a work Of some time after the forts
were taken possession OF by the troops.
To this General shafter replied:
ut is impossible for me to say when
I can take batteries at entrance Of
harbor. II they are as dlfncult to take
as those which we have been pitted
against It will be some time and a great
loss Of life. am at loss to see why
the navy cannot work a destructive fire
aB we'll as the army. My loss yesterday
was over ave hundred men. By all
means keep up FIRE on everything In
sight OF you until demolished. expect,
however, In time and with sufficient
men. to capture the forts along the
bay"
samp,an,s Lottsft to shaftsr.
Admiral sampson then Says: "1 wrote
General shatter the following letter. and
began making preparations to counter
mine, and, with the object Of arranging
an attack upon the batteries at the en-
aae ao.aH 10 GannRnI
ShAfter, so that the matter might be
thoroughly discussed, and combined ac-
tion take place. 1 had In view the em-
pIoyment Of the Marines for an assault
on either the MOrro or SocapG bait
terry, while at the same time assaulting
the defenses at the entrance with the
feet,
d'United States Flagship New York,
First, Rate. OF. Santiago ds--9Ueat
July 2, 1898.
AMY DEAR GENERAL-I have
your note OF this morhing-just receiY-
ed at 1880.
"IAn oficer of my stan has already
reported to you the firing which we did
this morning but must say In addi-
tlon to what he told you that the forts
which we silenced were not the forts
which would give you any inconveni-
ence in capturing the city as they can
not fre except to seaward. They can
not even prevent our entrance into the
harbor OF Santiago Our trouble from
the first has been that the channel to
the harbor IS well strewn with obser-
walton mines which would certainly re-
suit in the sinking Of one or more OF our
ships II we attempted to enter the har-
Dor and by the sinking OF a ship the
object OF the attempt to enter the har-
bor would be defeated by the prevent
Ing OF further progress on our part.
1T was my hope that an attack upon
your part Of the shore batteries, from
the rear, would leave US at liberty to
drag the channel for torpedoes.
"If It is your earnest desire that We
should force our entrance. l will at
once prepare to undertake It. think,
however, that our position and yours
would be made more difficult II, as Is
possible, we fall in our attempt.
1--WE have in our outfit at Guanta-
namo forty counternlning mines, which
1 will bring here with as little delay as
possible and II we can succeed in free
ing the entrance Of mines by their use,
/ will enter the harbor.
"sThls work, which Is unfamiliar to
US Will require considerable time.
"It Is not so much the loss Of men as
Il IS the loss Of ships which has until
now deferred me from making a direct
attack upon the ships within the port.
Very truly,
W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral United States Navy.
Commander-in-C Chief United States
Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
Major General W. r, Shafter. u. S. v.
July 3rd.-The sorte OF Admiral Ger
vera's squadron and Its destruction has
been made the subject Of separate pa
per and need not be repeated here.
This event closes the purely naval
campaign, crowninE with complete sue
cess the anxious work OF almost ex-
actly two months"
II IS apparent from the following dis
patch from Acting Secretary Allen to
the commanding officer OF the fleet and
which appears in the correspondence
that the department felt some appre-
henslon regarding the movements and
designs OF the Austrian gunboat Maria
Teresa, which appeared in the West In
dies during the war.
WASHINGTON, June 1s.
Austrian Eunboat Maria Teresa In
West indies Is thought to regulate to
visit various blockndes to see II effec-
tive. Upon the arrival OF our troops
send without delay as many rs consider
necessary OF the convoy TO Commodore
No. 10, on ClenfueGos, Cuba, and as
there is some similarity between Aus
trlan and Spanish flags caution your
ships against possible mistakes"
The apprehension by the department
at one time OF the possibility OF the cs
cape OF the SpnnlPrds from Santiago
via ManZanIllo. Cuba. Is shown in the
following dispatch to Sampson:
WASHINGTON, D. c.