The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1898-12-01
THE DEFEAT OF SPAIN
Predicted by cervera-He Protested Against
His Country Rushing to vanqushment.

The Navy Department has pub
lished, through the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the Views of Adj
miral Cervera regarding the Span
ish navy in the late war;" Captain
Clover, the Chief Intelligence officer,
explains that this is a reprint of a
number of letters published in La
Epoca, of Madrid, on the 5th of
the present month. The letters are
dated from before the war up to
May S. They were written by
Cervera in protest against Spain
rushing into war i'll the face of cer-
tain defeat, due to the naval
strength of the United States and
the unpreparedness of the Spanish
navy.
Cervera writes: I ask myself
if it is right for me to keep silent
and thereby make myself an accom-
plice in an adventure which will
surely cause the total ruin of Spain.
And for what purpose7 To defend
an island which was ours, but be-
longs to us no more because even
if we should not lose it by right in
the war, we have lost it in fact, and
with it all wealth and all enormous
number of young men, victims of
the climate and bullets in the de-
fense of what is now no more than
a romantic ideal. Furthermore,
believe that this opinion of mine
should be known to the Queen and
by the whole Counsel of Ministers.
l have deemed it my duty to ex-
press my opinions to the proper au-
thorities clearly and without beat
ing about the bush. Now let or
ders be given to me will carry
them out with energy and decision;
l am ready for the worst"
cERvERA PREDICTED DEFEAT.
Captain Clover says Spain had
neglected her navy, and Cervera
shows it was imprudent for her to
attempt war against superior naval
power. Taking up some of the
vessels i'll detail in a letter written
in January, he showed how the
Viscaya carried defective guns !;
how the Carlos V. was a failure be-
cause of lack of power, and how the
Cataluna. begun more than eight
years before, was still incomplete.
And then he predicts that conflict
would be disastrous to Spain. In a
letter written in February, the
admiral speaks of the Colon having
no guns, of other vessels being
defective, of the inability ofthe fleet
to coal at Cadiz, Of their being
obliged to go out with half rations,
and finally their having no charts of
the American seas. He says that
the eight principal vessels on the
Havana station are worn out, and
that, taking things as they are, the
Spanish naval force compared with
that of the United States is in the
proportion of l to 8. Under such
conditions, campaign, he writes,
would be disastrous if not an often
sive one, and all that could be done
in All offensive way would be to
make some raids with a few fast
vessels.
The admiral points to the futility
of attempting to blockade the United
States ports and asks how the Span
ish navy would repair, even should
they win great victory, without
resources. He says: cit would be
foolish to deny that what we may
reasonably expect is defeat, which
may be glorious, but, all the same,
defeat which would cause us to lose
the Island in the worst possible
manner. Only i'll case we could
count OIL some powerful ally could
we aspire to obtain satisfactory
result"
GLAD THE END WAS AT HAND.
The admiral refers to the Spanish
Pacific force as not able to afford
even a shadow of resistance to the
American naval force. Further on,
he speaks of the war as at last in
sight and laments the incomplete
state of the Spanish vessels. But,
after all, he says that he is glad the
end is coming and is prepared to do
his duty. He is on record as protest
ing against the idea of sending the
little torpedoboat flotilla to Cuba,