The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-24
SIMPSONS Operations in the
West Indies.
SMELLING OF SAN JUAN
The Monitors Were Worthless In Heavy
weather-Cooping Up OF Cervera
in Santiago and the Great Fight
Which Followed.

the conduct OF the feet under his COM
mand in its operations in the West In
dies for about two months prior to the
destruction OF Admiral Cervera's ships
on July 3. II is made rp largely OF
official dispatches and the movemen
OF the feet with explanations and COM
ment by the admiral.
The report is dated Aug. 3. on the
flagship New York. and begins with a
statement of the determination reached
by the navy department to send a
squadron TO the Windward passage for
the purpose OF observation. because OF
information received of the sailing
April 20 Of Admiral Cervera's squadron
from the Cape Verde islands. On the
voyage eastward from the naval base
at Key West. which began May 4. Ad-
miral Sampson reports there was ex-
perienced endless trouble and delay be-
cause OF the inefiiciency Of the two
monitors accompanying the other ships
and which had to be taken in tow.
Their coal supply was so small that IL
was at once evident that they must
either frequently coal or be towed. The
admiral says:
Had the sea been rough or had the
enemy appeared at this juncture, the
squadron would have been in a much
better position for an engagement had
tnt HOullOTf bttn eiStNneFt. CuDSe-
a~uently. when engaging the batteries of
San Juan IL vas evident that their
shooting was very bad. Owing to the
rolling of these vessels. even in a very
moderate sea, they were unable to fire
with n degree of accuracy"
Among the kilograms received by the
admiral from he navy department at
Washington when of Cape Haytien.
was the following, dated washington,
d. c.. May 6. from Secretary Long:
ID not risk or cripple your vessels
against Notifications as to prevent suc-
cessfully fighting Spanish fleet, com-
posed of Pelayo, Carlos ". Oquendo.
Viscaya. Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon.
-four deep-sea torpedo boats, IL they
should appeal on this side"
On May s there was n consultation on
board the flagship, and the admiral
saws that he decided to stand to the
eastward as far as San Juan. Porto
Rico. on the chance Of finding the Span
ish squadron at that port, where. II
they were not successful in destroying
II. II could be at least blockaded and
held. The squadron arrived OF
Juan on the morning of the 18th and
the bombardment Of the place ensued.
Regarding his action at this place. the
admiral says:
1T was clear To my mind that the
squadron would not have any great diff
ficulty in forcing the surrender of the
place. but the fact that we should be
held several DAYS in completing ar
rangements for holding II: that part of
our force would have TO be left To await
the arrival OF troops to garrison it:
that the movements of the Spanish
squadron. our main objective. were still
north and not in a position TO render
any aid: that Havana. Cervera's natu-
raj objective. was thus open to entry
by such n force as his. while we were
a thousand miles distant. made our i'm
mediate movement toward Havana Inn
perative. I thus reluctantly gave up
the project against San Juan n stood
westward for Havana"
Several teleFrams are here presented.
based on reports that Cervera's squad
ron had returned to Cadiz. and they had
in view Ito return and capture San
Juan. the leisure to do so and occupy
the place being assured in event of
Admiral Cervera's failure to cross the
Atlantic"
Shortly after news was received that
the Spanish fleet had appeared of Gu
racao. West Indies. and the squadron,
under orders from the department. pro-
ceeded to Key West. to which place the
flying squadron. under Commodore
Schley. had already been ordered.
Arrangements We're then hurriedly
made and the flying squadron, aug
mented by the other vessels under
Commodore Schley. was sent of Glen
fuegos. where II was believed the enc
my would go. In which case an effort
was TO be made to engage and capture
him. Sampson was given the choice
either OF the command OF the blockad-
ing squadron on of Havana or at
Cienfuegos, Schley In either case 10 re-
main with his own squadron. From
messages received by the admiral from
the department. o May<20th. II ap-
nenrC that ranNrtG haA rhachaH the
United States that the Spanish fleet
was at Santiago; that the department
advised Sampson TO send Immediate
word to Schley to proceed to that place.
leaving one small vessel of C~ienfuegos.
on May 2ist, instructions were gotten
by Sampson for Commodore Schley and
sent him via the Marblehead. regarding
the possibility OF the Spanish fleet be-
ing at Santiago. They are in part as
followe:
Spanish squadron probably at San
tiago de Cuba-four ships and three
torpedo boats. II YOU are satisfied
they are not at Santiago de Cuba. and
II the enemy Is there blockade him in
port. You will probably find IL neces-
sary to establish communication with
some OF the Observation-Disclosures or
others. 10 learn definitely that the ships
are in port. IL being impossible To see
from the outside"
The ADMIRAL said he felt much con-
cerned as 10 the delivery of these or
ders. and sent a duplicate by the Hawk
with an additional memorandum The
admiral suggested that II the informa-
tion did not reach Commodore Schley
before daylight of May Esd. to mask
the real direction he should take as
much as possible. He adds: Follow
the spanish squadron which ever direc-
tion they take
The admiral off Havans gives copies
OF orders Of battle which were to be
followed In the event tina Cervera left
Santiago on the approach of Schley's
fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to
cruise around the cas- to Havana in
which case the Havana squadron
would attempt 10 intercept him by go-
ing east about 100 miles beyond the
junction Of Santaren and Nicholas
channels. Strict orders were given for
screening lights n to see that none
were accidentally shown The squad
ron was To cruise generally 4 the east