The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1898-07-27

and Immediately steamed in, opening
fire upon the large ships. Anticipating
the appearance of the Pluton and Flu
rOr, the Gloucester was slowed, thereby
gaining more rapidly high pressure of
steam and when the destroyers came
out, she steamed for them at full speed
and was able to close to short range,
where her fire was accurate, deadly and
Of great volume. During this fight the
Gloucester was under the fire of the
Socapa battery. Within 20 minutes from
the time they emerged from Santiago
harbOE the careers of the Furor and
the PlutOn were ended and tWO-thirds
of their people killed. The Furor was
beached and sunk in the surf, the Plu-
ton sinking in deep water few minutes
later. The destroyers probably suffer-
ed much injury from the fire of the
secondary batteries of the battleships
Iowa, the Indiana and the Texas, yet I
think a very considerable factor in their
speedy destruction was the fire, at close
range, of the Gloucester's battery. After
rescuing the survivors of the destroyers
the Gloucester did excellent service in
landing and securing the crew of the
Infanta Maria Teresa.
s. The method of escape attempted
by the Spaniards-au steering in the.
same direction and in formatiOn--re-
moved all tactical doubts or difficulties
and made plain the duty of every Uni
ted States vessel to close in immediate
ly, engage and pursue. This was
promptly and effectively done. AS al
ready stated, the first rush of the
Spanish squadron carried 1t past
number of the blockading ships, which
could not Immediately work up to their
best speed, but they suffered heavily in
passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa
and the OquendO were probably set on
fire by shells fired during the first Is
minutes of the engagement. 1t was
afterwards learned that the Infanta
Maria Teresa'S fire main had been cut
by one of our first shots and that she
foT To Tfe-h he
large volumes of smoke arising from
their lower decks aft, these vessels
gave up both fight and flight and ran
in on the beach, the Infanta Maria Ter
esa at about 1915 a. m, at Nina Nina,
six and one-half miles from Santiago
harbOr entrance, and the Almirante
Oquendo, at about 1890 a. m, at Juan
Gonzales, seven miles from the port.
The Vizcaya.
9. The vizcaya was still under the
fire of the leading vessels. The Cristo-
bal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the
chase and soon passed beyond therange
of the guns Of the leading American
ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on
fire and at HOS turned in shore and
was beached at AserraderO. Is miles
from Santiago, burning fiercely and with
her reserves of ammunition on deck al
ready beginning to explode. When
about ten miles west of Santiago, the
Indiana had been signalled to go back
to the harbOr entrance and at Aserra-
dero the Iowa was signalled to re
sumo blOckading station" The Iowa,
assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist,
took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while
the Harvard and the Gloucester rescued
those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and
the Almirante OQuendO.
This rescue of prisoners, including the
wounded, from the burning Spanish yes
sells, was the occasion of some of the
most daring and gallant conduct of the
day. The ships were burning fore and
aft, their guns and reserve ammunition
were exploding and it was not known
at what moment the fire would reach
the main magazines. In addition to
this heavy surf was running just in
side of the Spanish ships. But no risk
deferred our officers and men until their
work of humanity was complete
There remained of the Spanish ships
only the Cristobal Colon, but she was
their best and fastest vessel. Forced |
by the situation to hug the Cuban coast /
her only chance of escape was by su-
periOr sustained speed. When the
Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was
about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn, |
and the Oregon, but her squirt was fin
ished and the American ships were now
Ign and the Oregon came the Texas, |
Vixen and New York. It was evident /
from the bridge of the New York that |
all the American ship were gradually |
overhaUling the Colon and that she had !
no chance of escape. At 1850 the |
Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire |
shells striking beyond her-and at ITO |
she gave up without firing another shot, |
hauled down her cOlors and ran ashore
at Rio Tarquino, As miles from San |
tiagO. Captain Cook of the Brooklyn !
went on board to receive the surrender. |
While his boat was along side came |
up in the New York, received his report |
and placed the Oregon in charge of the !
wreck to save her, If possible, and di- /
rected the prisoners to be transferred /
to the Resolute, which had followed the |
chase Commodore Schley, whose chief /
of staff had gone on board to receive |
the surrender, had directed that all |
their personal effects should be retain |
ed by the officers. This order did not |
modify. The Cristobal Colon was not |
in jured by our firing and probably is |
not much injured by Bleaching, though |
she ran ashore at high speed. The !
beach was so steep that she came off /
by the working of the sea, but her sea |
valves were opened and broken, treach-
am sure, after her surrender,
and despite all efforts she sank. When |
it became evident that she could not be |
kept af1Oat she was pushed by the New |
York bodily up on the beach, the New |
York's stem being placed against her |
for this purpOse-the ship being han |
died by CAPTAIN Chadwick with admir- |
able judgment-and sank in shoal wa |
ter and may be saved. Had this not |
been done she would have gone down
In deep water and would have been, to
a certainty a total loss.
Couldn't Get Out at Night.
II. I regard this complete and import
ant victory over the Spanish forces as
the successful finish of several weeks of
arduOus and close blockade, so string
emit and effective during the night that
the enemy was deferred from making
the attempt to escape at night, and de-
IiberateIy elected to make the attempt |
In daylight. That was the case, I was
by the commanding officer of
the CristObal Colon.
Il. It seems proper to briefly describe