Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-09-30

gaining an avenue of approach to the Span
ish line lay In the fact of my Discrimination
to ask General AglIinaldo to withdraw
from the beach and the Gale Real so
that Greene could move forward. This was
overcome by instructions to General Greene
to arrange, If possible. with the insurgent
brigade commander In his immediate vicin-
ity to move to the right and allow the
American forces unobstructed control Of
the roads in their immediate front. No OBJ
lection was made, and accordingly General
Greenes brigade threw forward heavy
outpost line on the Gale Real and the
beach and constructed trench, in which
a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries
was placed.
The Spanish Attacks.
The Spanish observing this activity on
our part, made ,ery sharp attack with
infantry and artillery on the night of July
81 The behavior of our troops during this
night attack was all that could be desired.
and 1 have, in cablegrams to the War De-
partment, taken occasion to commend by
name those via deserve special mention
for good conduct in the affair. (For partlc-
uldrS of the action the appended re-
ports of the brigade commander) Our po-
sition was extended and strengthened after
this and resisted successfully repeated
night attacks our forces suffering, how
ever. considerable loss in wounded and kill
ed, while the losses of the enemy, owing
to the darkness, could not be ascertained.
The strain of the night fighting and the
heavy details for outpost duty made ii i'm
perative to reinforce Gen. Greene's troops
with Gen. MacArthur's brigade which had
arrived in transports the 31st of July.
The difficulties Of this operation can hardly
be oVereStmated. The transports were at
anchor off Cavite five miles from a point
on the beach where it was desired TO dis
embark the hen. Several squalls, accom-
panied by foods of rain, ragged day after
day. and the only way to get the troops
and supplies ashore was to load them from
the Sims side into n2tiVp lighters fca1lpl
"cascos) small steamboats,, move them
to point opposite the camp, and then dis
embark them through the surf In small
boats, or by running the lighters head-on
to the beach. The landing was finally ac-
cGmplished, after days of hard work ana
hardship; and l desire here to express
again my admiration for the fortitude and
cheerful willingness OF the men of ali COM
mancS engaged in this operation.
Upon the assembly of MacArthur's bril-
gade in support of Greenes, l had about
5000 men in position to attack, and l DEEM
ed tie time had come for final action. Dur
ing the time of the night attacks l had
communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey
that he would allow his ships to open fire
on the right of the Spanish line of intrench-
menrs, believing that such action would
stop the night firing and loss of life but the
admiral had declined to order it unless we
were in danger of losing our position by the
assaults of the Spanish for the reason that
in his opinion, 1t would precipitate a general
engagement, for which he was not ready.
NOW, however une Df1Raoe OF Gen. MaCAr-
thur was in position and the Monterey had
arrived, and under date OF August Admir-
al Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we
should send a joint letter to the captain
general notifying him that he should re-
move from the city all noncombatants
within forty-eight hours, and that opera
lions against the defenses of Manila might
begin at any time after the expiration of
that period.
Demand for Surrender.
This eft
was received the same date, to the effect
that the Spanish were without places of
refuge for the increased numbers of wound
ed, sick women, and children now lodged
within the walls. On the 9th formal joint
demand for the surrender of the city was
sent in. This demand was based upon the
hopelessness of the struggle the part of
the Spaniards, and that every considera ton
of humanity demanded that the city should
not be subjected TO bOmbardment under
such circumstances. The captain generals
reply, of same date. stated that the council
of defense had declared that the demand
could not be granted; but the captain gem
eral offered TO consult his government if we
would allow him the time strictly necessary
for the communications by way of Hong
Kong.
This was declined on our part for the
reason that it could, in the opinion of the
admiral and myself, lead only to a con-
tinuance of the situation. with no immedi-
ate result favorable to US, and the necessity
was apparent and very urgent that decisive
action should be taken at once to compel
the enemy to give up the town, in order to
relieve our troops from the trenches and
from the great exposure to unhealthy con-
dltlonS which were unavoidable in bivouac
during the rainy season. The seacoasU bat
teries in defense of Manila are SO situated
that II is impossible for ships to engage
them without firing into the town. and as
the bombardment of a city filed with
women ard children, sick and wounded
and containing a large amount of neutral
property. could only be justified as last
resort, 1t was agreed between Admiral
Dewey and myself that an attempt should
be made TO carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of Entertainments in front of
the positions at that time occupied by our
troops, which, with it's flank on the sea-
shore, was entirely open to the fire of the
navy.
1t was not my intention to press the as
sault at this point, in case the enemy should
hold ii in strong force, until after the navy
had made practicable breaches in the works
ana shaken the troops holding them, which
could not be done by the army alone, owing
10 the absence of siege guns. This is ind-
Gated fully in the orders and memorandum
of attack hereto appended. 1t was believed,
however, as most desirable, and in accord
ance with the principles of civilized war
fare. that tire attempt should be made to
drive the enemy out of his intrenchments
before resorting to the bombardment of the
city
By orders issued some time previously
MacArthur and Greene's brigades were
organized as the Second Division of the
Sth Army Cops, Brigadier General Thomas
M Anderson commanding; and In antcipa-
ton of the attack General Anderson moved
his headquarters from Cavite to the bril-
gade camps and assumed direct command
in the field Copies of the written and
verbal instructions. referred to above and
appended hereto, were given to the division
and brigade commanders the 18th, and
all the troops were in position the 18th
at an early hour in the morning.
Fired by the Fleet.
About am. on that day our fleet steamed
forward from Cavite and before 10 am.
opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy
shells and rapid-fire projectiles on the sea
flank of the Spanish Entertainments at the
powder magazine fort, and at the same
time the Utah batteries, in position in our
trenches near the Gale Real" began firing
with great accuracy. AT 1925, on a pre-
arranged signal from our trenches that 1t
was believed our troops could advance, the
navy ceased firing, and Immediately a light