Decorah public opinion. (Decorah, Winneshiek County [Iowa]) 1895-1928, 1898-10-26
SAMPSON HEARD FROM
Naval Operations in Cuban Wat.
ers Reviewed.
HAD ALL CONFIDENCE IN sCHLEY.

The Admiral and Major General Shafter
Concerning the Proposed Capture of
Santiago The General Wanted sampson
% Enter the Harbor While Cervera Was
There-why 1t Was Not Carried Out.
Washington, Oct. A.-The navy de-
partment has made public that portion
OF Admiral SIMPSONS report covering
the conduct of the fleet under his COM
mand in its operations in the West In
dies for about two months prior to the
destruction of Admiral Cervera's ships
ON July 8. 1t is made up largely Of off,
cial dispatches and the movements of
the fleet, with. explanations and COM
ments by the admiral.
Public interest will center in that por-
tion of the report giving the correspond
ence between Admiral Sampson and
General Shafter relative to plans for
capturing Santiago, now made public
for the first time. On June so the ad-
miral received a communication from
General Shafter announcing that he ex-
pected to attack Santiago the following
morning, and asking that Sampson
lombard the forts at Aguadores in sup
port of regiment of infantry and
make such demonstrations as he
thought proper at the harbor's mouth,
so as to keep as many of the enemy
there, as possible. This request was
compiled with. and on July General
Shafter asked that the admiral keep
On July the following was received
from General Shafter:
Terrible fight yesterday. but my
nne is now strongly intrenched about
fhree-fourths Of a mile from town.
urge that you make effort Immediately
10 force the entrance to avoid future
losses among my men, which are al
ready very heavy. You can now OPP
crate with less loss Of life than I can.
Please telephone answer"
Need of Removing Harbor Mines.
A reply was telephoned, saying the
admiral had bombarded the forts at the
entrance of Santiago, and also Punta
Gorda battery inside, silencing their
IRE, and asking whether he (Shafter)
wanted further firing on the admiral's
part. The explanation was made that
1t was impossible to force an entrance
until the channel was cleared of mines
Ia work of some time after the forts
were taken possession Of by the troops.
TO this General Shafter replied:
'1t is impossible for me to say when
/ can take batteries at entrance Of har-
Dor. If they are as difficult to take as
those which we have been pitted
against it will be some time and at
great loss of life. I am at a loss to see
why the navy cannot work under
destructive fire as well as the army.
My loss yesterday was over 500 men.
BY all means keep UP fire on every
thing in sight of you until demolished.
I EXPECT, however, in time, and with
sufficient men, to capture the forts
along the bay
Admiral Sampson then says: IT wrote
General Shafter the following letter
and began making preparations to
countermine, and, with the object of
arranging an attack upon the batteries
Mt the entrance. a visit was arranged
TO General Shafter so that the matter
might be thoroughly discussed and COM
b3ned action take place. had in view
the employment of the marines for an
assault on either the MORO or Socapa
battery, while at the same time assault
ing the defenses at the entrance with
the feet
Feared for Ships, Not Men.
The letter referred to follows: IT
have your note of this morning-just
received at 1880. An officer of my
staff has already reported to you the
dring which we did this morning, but /
must say in addition to what he told
you that the forts which we silenced
were not the forts which would give
you any inconvenience in capturing the
city, as they cannot fire except to sea-
ward. They cannot even prevent our
entrance into the harbor of Santiago.
Our trouble from the first has been
that the channel to the harbor is well
strewn with observation mines, which
would certainly result in the sinking
OF one or more of our ships if we at
tempted to enter the harbor, and by
the sinking of a ship the object Of the
attempt to enter the harbor would be
defeated by the preventing Of further
progress on our part.
1T was my hope that an attack on
your part on these shore batteries, from
the rear, would leave us at liberty to
drag the channel for torpedoes If it
is your earnest desire that we should
lOfCt an eItrdHCe L Will at once pre-
pare to undertake it, / think, how
ever, that our position and yours would
be made more difficult If, as is possible,
we fail in our attempt. We have in
our outfit at Guantanamo forty coun-
ter-mining mines, which 1 will bring
here with as little delay as possible,
and If we can succeed in freeing the en-
trance of mines by their use will en-
ter the harbor. This work. which is
unfamiliar to us, will require consider
able time. 1t is not so much the loss
of men as II is the loss of ships which
has until now deferred me from max
ing direct attack upon the ships
within the port"
Other Features of the Report.
Other features of the report are
statements that the slowness of the
monitors and their inability to ma
neuver in a rough sea caused consider
able delay as well as anxiety; that
Secretary Long had instructed Admiral
Sampson to take no chances in attacks
upon Notifications while Cervera's feet
was afioat; that the details of the bot
tling-up process at Santiago were left
at the start TO Commodore Schley, Ad-
miral Sampson expressing "the utmost
confidence in his ability 10 carry this
plan TO a successful conclusion" and
finally that all ships in the blockading
SQUADRON off Santiago were ordered to