The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-08-26
Taylor Thinks She Did Not Get
Enough Credit.
DESTROYED THE OQUENDO
And Had Much to Do With the Sinking
OF the Teresa Sampson Says He
Had No Intention to Slight
the Indiana.

passed between himself and Captain
Taylor of the battleship Indiana:
u. S. S. Indiana. Guantanamo Bay
, Aug. 8, 1Sss.-Admiral: The report ,f
Commodore Schley on the battle of
July 3. as published. gives credit in the
seventh paragraph to four ships and
mentions by name their captains.
Philips, Evans, Clark and Cook. and
adds: The dense smoke of the combat
smut out from my view the Indiana
ana Gloucester, but as these vessels
were closer TO your flagship. no doubt
their part in the conflict was under
your immedite observation
Second-In your report, as published.
you make but slight mention of the
Indiana. stating that the Iowa and
INDIANA. having done good work and
not having the speed Of the other ships
were directed by me- etc
Third-The result of these reports is
that the captains of all the vessels of
the line of battle except the Indiana
have received personal mention i'm the
othcial report before the department
while the two smaller vessels have also
had distinctive mention, either from
in command.
"Fourth-In the official record should
they be referred to in future. ii will ap- |
pear, from it's general tone. that the |
! Indiana was less deserving than all |
her consorts. Leaving out my personal |
interest in the matter, il is right that /
i should consider the officers and crew |
OF the ship, and | speak for them as
Wen as for myself when | submit to
you, admiral, that the above combina-
ton of reports will place the ship, i'm
the opinion of the department and the
country, markedly below all the other
vessels of your squadron | respect- |
fully submit sir, that this is Injustice /
TO the Indiana and her officers and
crew.
Fifth can say without disparage-
ment of any other vessel that during
the hrst hour of the fight, the Indiana's
gun fire contributed to the destruction
OF the Oquendo and the Teresa more
than that of any single vessel of your
squadron except one. and equaled her
DO not know why the second i'm com
mand failed to observe the Indiana !
during this period Of our hottest ac-
tion. l saw the Brooklyn quite
plainly.
'Sixth-An examination of these re-
ports with reference to the Indiana will.
i belleNe convince you, sir that they
40 produce the effect Of putting the
Indiana below all the other vessels of
the squadron. If il be your opinion {
SIR that this is the case, and that ali {
the vessels from the Brooklyn to the e
lXen rendered service as much more
lished report of the commander i'm chief '
ana the second in command, taken to- b
sether would indicate then / must ac- 5
rept 1t for myself and the shin: If on a
the contrary, that be not your opinion. p
| urge respectfully that such stems be |
taken to remedy this injustice as may
seem wise 10 you. Very respect
fully, II. c. TAYLOR. q
Captain n. $. N, Commanding.
TO the Commander in Chief L. 5. Ma
val Force, North Atlantic Station"
u. s. $. New York, Guantanamo g
Bay, Aug. s, 1S98.-Sir: I am greatly c,
obliged that you have called my at -
entlon to what appears to have been an :,
INJUSTICE to your ships, officers and crew y,
or the part which they took in the ac- Il,
ion Of July 3, and also for the very r.
roper manner in which you have pre- h,
ented it. l think, however, that in sub W
llttlng such report to the secretary Of fin
he navy, where so many officers are m
ltally interested and justly proud of da
heir ship, II is no easy task TO do so oh
ythout apparently bestowing praise co
nJustly II requires very careful con- 70
Iteration Of the report from every e.
oint of view TO avoid misunderstand-
~.
"Second-The position of the ships Of
he squadron must be carefully consid- fic
ed to fully appreciate what IL was a
ossible for each vessel to accomplish Nj
nder the circumstances in which she to
as placed. These that were 10 the 1Sl
estward Of the escaping enemy were III
'rtainly better placed for stopping the tn
lemy and also better placed for deliv- er!
ing their fire than the vessels to the pc
Lstward, which was the blockadln, ia
alton of the Indiana.
Third-No distribution Of the fleet
uld completely predict and provide
'ainst every variation of such a sortie I cia
/ N ma
fcer deserved either credit or blame sea
cause the ship under his command / as
as faster or slower than another ship, but
carried a heavier or lighter battery. ant
II, rather, that the commanding Off Tn
r was blameWorthy when he failed To
L his ship in the proper place for de-
'oylng the enemy, just in proportion Z
the advantage which he possessed in the
eed, battery or position over his to-,
ghbOrs. iur
'Fourth-Each commanding officer. in one
' opinion. was personally responsible der
he good Use which he made Of the Of
)ls with which he had to work with
certainly did not intend to cr.ticlsa
"a or 10 bsst0N less praise on the In II
ma than was bestowed upon any mar
Ter ship ~ the squadron t1E
Fifth-Tha fact that the commanding 1v
Ger Of the Indiana was signaled 10 So
urn 10 blockade at the mouth of the star
rboF after H. had 50 gallantly con- dali
outed to the destruction Of the Span
ships was only necessary precau-
4 which the Clmmauder-in-chref felt 8
ICED 10 take 10 prevent disaster 70 was
large number OF transports which fr0n
re left IN that vicinity when the fleet fuEi
rted In pursuit OF the enemy There Of b
= still some armed vessels remaining from
The harb0r Of Santiago-at least Two.
We did not know how many more
ch could have come out in the ab- -,
&c Of the fleet and produced great o.
DC aiilph- ths troop ships, which Stat
= delehssI-ss' III the absence OF an IS In
.eu NessrL inter
siXth-Thls explanation, together cont