, 1898-11-02
No Spanish bonds of any characte,

or amount, other than local or munich
pal bonds, will be paid or assumed by
this government. The question of the
status Of municipal obligations under
circumstances like the present is fully
settled by International law. They
must be recognized as valid and bind
irlg by the conquering power. and hence
it is assumed that the United States
will not raise any question on this
point, hut promptly consent to guar
antee their final payment.
What sun of money this government
would consent to pay to Spain cannot
even be estimated, but when the final
account is rendered, 1t is believed that
the balance due Spain will he small,
probably not exceeding $25. 900 900 or
$50, OO0. 900.
The belief still prevails among the
majority OF the cabinet hat the Span
iards will accept the terms laid down
by the United States and hat whatever
delay occurs before that result is
reached. will be chargeable only to the
purpose of the Spaniards to secure the
best possible terms; to extort the last
possible million dollars. before acced-
ing to our demands.
The possibility of disagreement Of
the commissioners and the failure OF
the conference. however, is now con-
templated with greater eQuanimity
than at an earlier stage Of the negotia-
tions. The administration has salts
fled itself that Spain is neither able
nor willing to assume hostiHties on
any scale that would make a dan
Therefore, s%upposing the Paris con-
ference fails. all that would be imposed
upon our government Is an immediate
duty to take complete military possess
sion Of the Philippines. This, 1t is be-
Eeved, could be accomplished by US
without loss CT time or life. The last
vestige of Spanish military power in
the islands is that under Colonel Rios,
commander-inchief of the Viscayas
islands, and by deputized authority, in
charge of all Spanish territory not d.
rectly within the control OF the United
States in the Philippine islands. His
force is insignificant from a military
point Of view and it is doubted II he
could hold his against the insug-
ents had the Tangals been allowed by
Admiral Dewey to make Manila the
base Of an expedition directed against
the Spanish commander.
So far as Cuba is concerned, the diff
hculty might be more serious, but even
In Cuba the Spanish military forces
are not in condition to offer a pro-
longed resistance to the American con-
quest OF the island. and with the Span
ish navy at the bottom Of the sea, they
could not Ibe reinforced by troops from
Spain. Therefore, about the worst
that could happen would be the neces-
sity imposed upon us OF struggling
along without the signature of "a treaty
OF peace burt in full possession of all
territory we desire, and that such con-
ditions can exist without damage to
material interests, is shown by the hds-
tory Of the Spanish-American repub-
lies who revolted from SPANS rule.
So far as the cabinet discussion to-
day touched upon Cuba and Porto Rico,
it was the purpose to develop
views as to the best means of collect
ing the and customs. provid-
ing some means Of equalizing the duties
which will be collected locally upon
imports from the United States, as
we'll as from other countries, and pro-
viding for the peaceful and satisfactory
government Of the cities and towns un-
til such time as congress shall have
ordered otherwise.
1t is the intention of the president
to maintain a military government in
both Cuba and Porto Rico for the time
being, but his purpose is also to
mitigate the harsher features of such
form of government SO far as lies with
in his power. For instance, there was
taken into serious consideration a view
put forth by Secretary Alger that it
would be we'll in Cuba to use the Cuban
soldiers, who seemed to be fitted for
such work as local police force or
gendarmerie, possessed, in a measure,
of 10th the power of the police and
soldier.
There are several strong arguments
forth as SUFFICIENT to justify the adop-
ton of this curse. In the first place,
| which the war department has put
honorable and profitable employment
would he given to a considerable pro-
portion OF the Cuban soldiers who
might otherwise, In the absence Of
Individual employment, drift into evil
courses or become a dissatisfied and
dangerous element in the community.
In the second place. these men being
thoroughly acquainted locally. with
places, the habits Of the Spandsh-Amer-
leans and the Language, would be much
more serviceable as police than Amer
lean soldiers. Already some Of the
evils attending the employment Of the
latter have been experienced at Manila
and Santiago. the results being some
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