New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-08-07
Two BASIC PRINCIPLES.

TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES.
The Philippine problem is coniessediF nih'-
cult one. Many dispositions of the Islands nave
been suggested, and every one involves VeNa-
tious questions which are not TO be lightly an
swcred. But whatever we may finally decide
upon-whethcr we hold permanently one city,
or one island or the whole archipelago. whether
we annex or prOteCt-there are two principles
Of action to which we should hold firmly, anu
holding firmly to them. we are likely not 10
escape responsibility. but TO assume tnat re-
sponsihility with the fewcst complications ana
with the best chance of success. The nrst is
that the United States IS the sole arbiter or the
future Of the Philippines and that no other ma
ton shall be permitted to come between us anu
Spain The other is that the Filippinas must
BE protected from any re-establishmcnt OF the
tyranny which they rose against OH our invita-
ton and with our aid
OF our right as the conqueror of Spain 10
make our own terms there can be no doup'' All
Europe knows it. and. however much GROUND
there may be TO think that Germany might he
clad 10 Interfere IT IS perfectly evident mat she
recognizes our belgerent rights and at the
worst has only been on the lookout for some eX-
cuse. which It is admitted has not been founn'
for taking Il hand and getting some concessions
for herself But the Philippines are neither TO
land nor China. and the United States mas not
started out to partition them. They are spain
excepting so far rs orr conquest mas anecleu
them. How far that right Of conquest goes
and what cessions or guarantees we may exact
because of II are questions FOR the hl'eu
States and Spain 10 determine. certainly our
defeating Spain does not give any OF the
Powers" n right to say they Will take adNah-
tage of her situation and levy on such part OK
the Philippines as we in generosity iail 10 u'-
mand as our proper indemnity. III Wouiu oe
funny indeed for those Powers to tell us we
must not be too hard on poor Spain. ana must
let them discuss her affairs in a conference ana
then proceed 10 divide her colonial possessions
among themselves. The way the Powers pro
tcct defeated nation was shown III 'nlha
when they robbed Japan of the fruits OF h'r
victory. to take possession little later lor
themselves of what they were so earnest 10
save to China. We can permit no such med
ding. 1t may not be attempted. Inc DISPOSE
ton in that direction seems TO be waning. bul
even II II should be manifested we should only
need 10 stand firm and have our way we
should not be without friends in 50 insisting on
our rights As The London Outlook says
"Encland's wisdom will consist in resisting any
"and every attempt TO compel the nitcd states
ITO do otherwise than she would with the fhll-
"ippines. England has resisted one such a.
"tempt. and she will do we'll TO persevere IN
that policy
We must be equally determined to fulfil our
obligations to the Filippinas People who OBJ
iect to the policy Of expansion, Ike Mr.. Moor
field Storey grow eloquent and pathetic over
the wrong which we should nflct on barbarian
races by subjectng them to our government
and urge that we leave them alone and refrain
from imposing our yoke upon them. calmly lg'
noripg the while that such Il course would be 10
impose the yoke of Spain upon them. Ihcy
1bjnl; the liberty of the Declaration or lndepen-
dence would be better indicated by restoring
the Tagals 10 Spanish tyranny than by attempt
ing TO give these people, who could not 'hem-
selves establish permanent state, n Just ana
reasonable government This is The out
looks" Idea Of the moral aspect Of such Little
Americanism:
tn readmit the sovereignty Of Spain would
he TO license her 10 resume the very method FOR
the subjugation Of the insurgents when was
Americas warrant for the war. To hand them
over to any other Power without the express
sanction Of the insurgents themselves would be
cleo colt stuItircation The only alternative.
then. is to apply TO them me prlviIese VIM"
the United States will secure for the Cupahs
that is 10 say. to insist on cession OF the
whole group in trust until. in the Judgment OF
the States. the Filippinas are ripe FOR sef-eoV-
eminent The acquisition Of one OF the lsiehus
for the purposes Of cOaling station is an al
mltted right IL the Washing on Government
chooses TO exercise u.
OF course to hold the Philippines. either as 4
trust or rs IN absolute possession. is serious
responsibility But the responsibility is already
ours 1t became ours the instant we landed the
insurgent leaders at Cavite and overthrow sys'
lem which we could not rc-estab!lsh II we
would We cannot restore old conditions. they
must by us I've made better or they VIII be
worse rs the result Of our acts. We may un-
dertake TO secure II stable and just government,
or we may give Spain the chance not to exer-
else the old tyranny. but TO build a new one
The unclcan spirit OF the parable who came
back 10 the house which was swept and gar
nished brought seven other spirits more wicked
than himself SO if the insurgents Of the Phil
ippines are to be reconquered their last state
will be worse than the first They might better
not lave revolted than have fallen again into
Spanish hands.