The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-04-12

The Message.
There is nothing of special interest in
the Presidents Cuban message. the fun
text of which we publish this morning,
which had not already been made pubic
and discussed in the public prints before
its delivery. The substance of it is that
the condition of affairs in Cuba is so in
tolerable TO us as people, the island be-
ing at our doors. as 1t were, and such a
menace to our peace, comfort and happi-
ness that we cannot, in justice to our In
terests. permit it to continue. The Presi-
dent. therefore, asks TO be authorized TO
intervene to bring the conflict to an end.
not in the interest of either the Spaniards
or the insurgents. but to bring about peace
and the establishment of a government
that will be just 10 all the people and per-
manent To accomplish this object the
President wants authority to use the army
and navy. He closes his message with "a
supplement in which he calls attention to
the announcement that Spain has ordered
armistice in Cuba, and while he does
not recommend that this country shah
wait and see whether Spain and the in
surgents cannot settle their differences to
our satisfaction, what he says is open to
the inference that that course would be
satisfactory to him.
What is of more interest than the mes
sage is the acton which Congress is likely
to take in respect to it, If the policy out
lined by the President is pursued we shall
not, in all probability, have war. He
would use the power given him to brins
about peace in Cuba, and the chances are
that autonomy would be given a trial
such self government as Canada has. Au-
tonomy would not be satisfactory to most
of the insurgent leaders, but they might
be induced to give II a trial, especially If
they saw no chance for immediate inde-
pendence. If autonomy could not be
made a success because of the refusal of
Spain 20 deal fairly with the Cubans, or
because of the refusal of the Cubans to
accept anything less than independence,
there would be nothing left for the Presi-
dent to do but help the Cubans establish
a republic, because public sentiment
wouldn't sustain him in using force to
compel them to accept Spanish rule, how
ever mild. That might mean war between
the United States and Spain.
What Congress is going to do cannot be
predicted with any degree of certainty.
The Indications point to a debate of very
great Importance. The effort in behalf of
the recognition of Cuban independence will
be strong one. Had it been made before
are that 1t would have been successful.
Until 1t is known what course the insur-
gents are going to pursue in respect to the
armistice there will be no good ground
for either intervention or the recognition
of Cuban independence. But both Demo-
Gratis and Republicans in Congress, be-
lieving that the war sentiment in the
country is strong and wishing to make
as much political capital as possible out
of it for their respective parties, such ac-
ton may be taken as win lead to war.
Such local government as it is under
stood that Spain is now willing to grant
to Cuba would be, for this country, the
And il would be the best for the Cubans.
1t is doubtful if the Cubans under exist
ing conditions could make a success of a
republic, and If a republic should be es-
| tablished by the influence and power OF
| the United States they would be held re.
| sponsible for It's failure, if it should fail
or for its shortcomings, il it should have
a tumultuous existence. Besides, there
would grow up in this country anNannexa-
ton party, and we don't want Cuba.
The most satisfactory way out of the
present difficulty would be such a govern
ment for Cuba as Canada has, and the
chances are in favor of that sort of gov.
eminent, If the Presidents request fol
power is granted.