The San Francisco call., 1898-02-08
Call Office, Riggs House,

q Washington, Feb. 27. 2 . Speaker Reed denies emphat- 9 o ically that he now favors Ha- 9 q waiian annexation and Is ready 9 e to put the Morgan annexation 9 e bill through the House prompt 2 q ly if the Senate fails to ratify 2 q the treaty. He says the story 2 q to that effect is an invention Of 2 Q the annexationists and with 9 q malice aforethought. He has not 2 . changed his position, but is still 2 q opposed to Hawaiian annexation 9 . in any form. q It is evident that the treaty 9 . is not likely to be ratified and D . that it will be difficult, if not in- 2 q possible, to get annexation by 2 . legislation. The Senate will hold 9 q the matter up, at least until O q President Dole leaves San Fran D q cisco for Honolulu, so as to en- D . able him to be in Hawaii before D . the news of the adverse action 9 q can reach there, lest there should o q be disturbances there. 0
 It is understood that our representa- lives at Honolulu have been given dis cretion to raise the American flag and declare a protectorate if disturbances occur, and if the annexation scheme fails the islands may be seized in this way.
 The alleged change of attitude on the part of the Speaker toward the Ha- waiian question is the chief subject of gossip in Washington to-day. AS cur rent report has it Reed has undergone a change of heart on the question of annexation generally. There is no good reason to believe this. What has been interpreted as a reversal of opin- ion Is probably only change of ad- ministrative tactics. For months the Sneaker has been holding the House in check to keep it from running away with itself All this time he has been hoping against hope for change of sentiment, believing that the House was simply smitten now as it has been smitten before with madness, cpl demic among the masses of the people. But he has become convinced that the check-rein is no longer self-depend- ence The administration having com- mitted itself to Hawaiian annexation and the rank and file of their constit- uents having either actively espoused the idea or at least aSSented to 1t, re- ports from parts of the country which seemed least likely to favor any ac- ouisition of outside territory have an- nounced to the Speaker that they would certainly have to vote to annex Hawaii if the question should ever come before the House. So the proba- bility is that if the Senate fails to rat ify the treaty and the Morgan joint resolution is pressed in its place, the Speaker will permit the House to reach a speedy vote. In other words, he will bow to the inevitable and get trouble some subject permanently out of the track of the necessary appropriation bills, and thus further his plan of early adjournment and long and hot cam- paign for control of the next House.
 The opponents of annexation still cherish the hope that if the Morgan resolution is substituted for the treaty, the House may insist upon amending it out of shape. They think that am- bilious members will try to improve the phraseology or introduce new ele- ments for the sake of having their names figure in historya as Wilmot's and Gadsden's and others have figured, and that if the Morgan resolution should go back to the Senate seriously disflg- ured it might be lost In the wrangle between the two houses which would follow.
 This Is a frail fabric of hope, how ever. The more imminent danger is that the news of the Speakers moro moderate attitude will produce an ef- feet upon the Senate in favor of ratify- @rao{x, Coroo If fha Conotora