New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-10-12
WITT TIE ARMY DID.

One of the most serious grounds Of complaint
in the current criticism Of Army operations has
been the want Of adequate supplies Immediately
after the landing near Santiago. The testimony
given on Monday clears away in large measure
the responsibility OF the Army Department for
that misfortune II shows that there were pres
cnt off the landing transports bearing great
quantity Of rations IN excellent condition. hut
that the landing of the supplies was greatly de-
layed by the heavy surf 1t had been shown al
ready that the refusal of many captains of char
tered transports to obey the orders of Army Off
GERS had been fruitful cause Of difficulty such
captains insisting upon running far out TO sea to
escape possible fire from Spanish guns or attacks
from Spanish torpedo or other boats. and they
stood of; so far that il was Il long and weary jon
TO get ont 10 them by boat orders which they
were remarkably slow to obey. The landing OF
provisions by the few small boats available
through the heavy surf was wellnigh impracti-
cable The criticism that proper wharves should
have been provided by the engineers has the less
weight because there was ut the point OF landing
q railroad wharf for the iron works, which 1t
was found wellngh impractcable TO Use on ac-
count of the height of the surf and 1t proved en-
tremely difficult; even for the troops TO land. and
far more difficult 10 unload heavy cases Of sup
plies. from boats rising and falling a long dis
lance with tho waves.
These things were naturally unknown TO many
at the front. and were misrepresented by others
whose sole business there was 10 find excuses
for complaint. The larger question. whether the
point of landing was well chosen. Is also In part
met by the fact that the state Of the weather and
the unusually heavy surf could not have been
forpspcn Willie there existed at the inlet where
the landing was made n wharf already built Ivy
which cargoes had been regularly loaded on sea
going vessels No such accommodation. TO sim
liar probability of safe landing even in rough
weather appears 10 be found n; other points
hear Santiago which were not commanded by
Spanish dcfences. 1t does not follow that every
preparation was made that could have been
made. IneXperience in handling such an expe
dition and In preparing 10 land Il at point i'm
perfectly known would render some errors un
nvodabe. Rut the complaints widely made
for many weeks are now shown 10 have been in
a large degree at least unfounded.
1t is Just as well to remember that the land
ing of n considerable army or stormy coast
without n hGrbor and In a locality practically
unknown was regarded ny foreign military crit
les tho spot as IN astonishing feat. The
swift advance which followed did so 1S:OniSh
the Spanish that. il heavy storms had not pre-
vented the movement Of ammunition and sup
plies. Santiago might probably have been taken
with much less delay and loss less exposure and
less subsequent disease than were actually in
vOlved. Yet all obstacles were overcome and
the key Of Eastern Cuba was captured. an army
forced TO surrender nearly as large as the at
lacking fOrcc. and all with loss of life smaller
than has often resulted in ngagements not of
the first Importance For n nation just begin
ming 10 move troops after thirty-three years Of
absolute incxperience for officers and men, the
achievement will not be considered by impartial
critics unworthy Of this country.
In all the criticisms of the war this element Of
long nexperience must he allowed large infu
encc \ few officers Of high rank had seen ser
vice thirty-three years earlier. and had grown
Old since then. Transporting regiment or two
across a friendly country by rail to que out
breaks of savages is no preparation whatever
for the handling II An army of two hundred and
fifty thousand men. and transporting part of it
by sea to hostile coasts. The men in nearly
every department were almost all necessarily
without experience in any such work The Regu-
lars themselves finely disciplined and ready for
any kind of Indian fighting. knew nothing Of ex
petitions by sea- The volunteer company and
regimental officers were necessarily almost all
without experience in any kind Of fighting, or
even in such camping as actual field service
Quircd. Most Of the higher officers OF every
class were equally destitute of experience. They
al had much TO learn. and learned much. but
while learning performed work enough to put
an end to large hostile armies OF veterans and
regulars holding well-fortlfed positions. The
work. for men never tried in real war; deserves
something else than ceDsure.