The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-12-05
CERvERA WARNED SAGASTA.
Spanish Government Ordered Fleet to
Cuba Against Protests.
(Kansas City star.)

(Aansas City Starr
Cervera's warning to the Spanish
government against opposing the navy
of Spain to that of the United States,
printed in La EDoca of Madrid, Nov.
5, is reprinted by the office of naval in
teligence. The letters are dated from
before the war up to May 5.
Cervera writes: u ask myself if it is
right for me to keep silent. and thereby
make myself an accomplice in adven-
lures which will surely cause the total
ruin Of Spain. And for what purpose?
To defend an island which was ours,
but belongs to us no more, because,
even if we should not lose it by right
of war, we have lost it in fact, and with
all its wealth and an enormous num-
Der of young men, victims of the eli
mate and bullets in the defense of
what is now no more than romantic
ideal
Furthermore, I believe that this
opinion of mine should be known to the
queen, and by the whole council of min
listers. l have deemed it my duty to
express my opinions to the proper au-
thorities clearly and without beating
about the bush. Now let orders be
given to me; I will carry them out with
energy and decision. L am ready for
the worst
Cervera says Spain had neglected her
navy, and he shows it was imprudent
for her to attempt war against a su-
perior naval power. Taking up some OF
the vessels in detail in q letter written
in January, he shows how the Vizcaya
carried defective guns; how the Carlos
V was a failure because of lack OF
power; and how the Catalina, begun
more than eight years before, was still
incomplete. He predicted that. d con-
fiict would be disastrous to Spain.
o 9 @
In a letter written in February, the
admiral speaks of the Colon as having
no guns, of other vessels being defect
i've, of the inability of the fleet to coal
at Cadiz, of their being obliged to go
with half rations, and, finally, of their
having no charts of the American seas.
He says that the eight principal vessels
on the Havana station are worn out,
and that, taking things as they are, the
Spanish naval force, compared with
that of the United States. is in proper
ton of one to three. In such conditions
any campaign, he writes, except an
offensive one, would be disastrous. All
that could be done in an effective. way
would be to make some raids with
few fast vessels.
The admiral points to the futility of
attempting to blockade the United
States ports, and asks how the Spanish
navy would repair even should they win
a great victory, without resources. 1t
would be foolish to deny that what we
may reasonably expect is defeat, which
may be glorious, but, all the same, de-
feat which would cause us to lose the
island in the worst possible manner.
$ Only in case we could count on
some powerful ally could we aspire to
obtain satisfactory results"
The admiral refers to the Spanish
Pacific force as not able to afford even
a shadow of resistance to the American
naval force Further on he speaks of
the war as at last in sight, and laments
the incomplete state of the Spanish
vessels. But, after ALL he says he is
glad the end is coming, and is prepared
to do his duty. He is on record as pro-
testing against the idea of sending the
torpedo boat fiotina to Cuba, pointing
out that a naval defeat for Spain would
precipitate the loss of Cuba.
He speaks of the surprise and aston
ishment experienced by all the officers
of his squadron on receiving orders
from Spain to sail from Cape de Verde
for Cuba. inasmuch as they had united
in pointing out the condition of the
ships The admiral says: With an
easy conscience / go to the sacrifice,
but cannot understand that decision
of the the navy general officers against
my opinions"
The last letter in the series is one
from Admiral Villamil of Cervera'
squadron. who was killed at Santiago,
addressed directly to Sagasta, pointing
ont that the sacrifice of the Spanish
naval forces will be as certain as 1t viii
be useless and fruitless for the termi-
nation of the war.