The times., 1898-11-29
The santiago Campaign

IL is strange tnat the critics ana tne
defenders of General Shafter, in COM
menting on his alleged defense, neglect
the main point. 1t is true that as Shaf-
ter describes it the whole expedition to
Cuba was an improvised affair, crowded
upon Inadequate transports with defec-
tive equipment; that the army flung it
self ashore the best it could and floun-
dered along toward Santiago; and that
but for Spanish inefficiency, on which
he says he counted, even the courage
and endurance of our soldiers would
not have. prevented disaster. If he and
the War Department had done all that
was possible in such circumstances,
then the things of which the American
people complain would have been una
Voidable. But while the fact that the
expedition was a very sudden af-
fair is urged as a defense of Shafter
and the War Department. nobody posi-
lively affirms that they did all they
could. On the other hand. some of the
critics do not point out the part the War
Office took in the business to the de-
struction of all efficiency except on the
lighting lire, but only complain that an
order for invasion should have been is
sued when it was.
There is no reason why the expedi-
ton should. not. have been Il brilliant
SUCCESS in every. particular. 1t was not
ill-advised and the difficulties and final
calamities We're not unavoidable. Sud
hl ,G,,t
had provided for everything and had
counted on the reasonable exertions of
the War Department to supply trans
ports enough and the means of landing
troops and supplies. There is no ground
for assuming this was not easily pos
testimony, there was nobody to see that
the best use was made of what was
provided. a single instance will serve
to show the inexcusabie negligence and
inefiiciency of General Shafter at Tam
pa, the starting point. As Colonel
Roosevelt said: There were So many
transports with known carrying capac-
ity, and so many soldiers, known by
regiments; therefore it would have been
the easiest thing in the world to assign
the different regiments to the different
transports" Nothing of the kind was
attempted. Nobody had charge The
regiments were told to get aboard some
how or stay behind. All was wild con-
fusion. Yet General Miles had issued
instructions of the most minute charac-
ter and called on the War Department
for whatever was necessary, but for
nothing that was not practicable.
The fault was not in the movement.
but in the selection of the commander,
in the failure to detail proper officers to
take charge of the different branches,
and in the failure of the War Depart
ment to comply with General Miless ad-
vice and Instructions. The reason for
this was the ambition of the Secretary
of War and the adjutant general, both
civilians without military training, to
conduct the war without the active par
ticipation of the commanding general.
Even with SO inert and slothful an
enemy as the Spaniards, the army
would have been destroyed by the foe
Detore It's camps were faNdSed by dis
ease bat-for the timely Intervention of
General Miles. 1t is wrong to condemn
a movement that was in itself admir-
able, because the man who should have
directed it. and who would have made
of it brilliant success without the loss
of So many men from disease, was de-
prived of his immediate authority by
the civilians in the War Office, who
overrode Captain Makan quite as
roughly. The excuse that the expedi-
ton was sudden affair is worthless
unless it is proved that it was the sud
denness and not incompetency and neg
lect that caused the evils that overlook
it-that the exposure. deprivation, dis
ease, suffering of all kinds, and death
were unavoidable. That has not been
proved. but on the contrary it has been
distinctly disproved by such testimony
as that of Colonel Roosevelt, General
Breckfnridges Captain Mahan. and
Others.