Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1898-04-16
WHERE SPANIARDS ARE WEAK
They Know Little Of the Handling Of Heav'
Modern Artillery.


New York, April ia dispatch to
the Times from Washington says:
1t Is expected that the forces that will
be used in Cuba will consist of caval-
ry, infantry and light artillery. Heavy
artillery could hardly be used in the
wet season and besides 1t would not
be necessary In operations against the
Spaniards. Consul General Lee, 1t is
understood. advises the use of these
branches of the service for the cam
paign in Cuba. He Is of the opinion
that the army can successfully conduct
operations in the island during the wet
weather if ii has cavalry and light
batteries. Rapid fire guns and plenty
OF them will be depended on very large
ly to do the lighting.
1t is reported by all observers OF the
military methods OF the Spaniards that
their Infantry at once forms hollow
square upon the approach or cavalry.
This military formation has been in
practice for century and the Span
iards have not learned any other way
to repei cavalry work. Military ex-
perts say that when an army is so
formed IL can be decimated by rapid
fire guns and destroyed If it does not
soon break such formation. The cav
airy will be used to force the Span
iards into position, to get them at bay.
as 1t were, and the infantry and light
artillery will then attack with rapid
fire guns.
1t is said that the Spanish forces
Cuba are poorly armed, They have a
fairly good rifle. the Mauser. but are
inadequately supplied with ammuni-
ton, and most of the troops being
young boys. do not know how to use
their guns. In rapid fire guns they
are very deficient. Artillery is their
weakest point and they cannot now
| supply the deficiency. Even Havana
| is defended by Anticipated cannon.
with the exception of six fine new
Krupp guns. which. however, have
been allowed to rust on their carriages
and the artillcrists do not know any
| thing about their use.
AT Matanzas they have four guns
| OF the same kind-heavy 10 and L.
| inch cannon--but there are no car
riages for them and they are perfectly
useless. 1t is said there Is only one ord
nance officer of the army, Ordrineau.
who understands the handling of such
| guns.
Gen. Lee, II is understood, advised the
| war department that few good regi-
ments would be sufficient for the first
movements in Cuba. He relies very
| strongly upon the efficiency of the army
| under Gen. Gomez and Gen. Garcia,
| which would naturally be our allies in
| war. He reports that the revolutions
| lists have an effective army of 10000
troops which they could increase to
100000 almost any time If the arms for
| them were found. Gomez has kept his
/ army In Its present number because Ii
was too difficult to maintain a large
| army In that country after Its repeated
| devastation. and because 10000 men was
| enough to keep up the war and crush
Spain slowly. on the other hand, the
Spaniards have. he says not more than
| 81. 900 to $4,000 effective troops. If the
revolutionists are armed and a small
| but well disciplined and seasoned army
| from this country is landed in the island
| he thinks the Spanish will have no
chance for successful resistance.
Another element in the war that Gen.
Lee, 1t is Understood. commented on. is
| that Spain's troops In Cuba are depend
| ing upon this country for food supplies.
| The island can he entirely shut off from
food blythe action OF the United States.
1t is estimated that Havana would suf-
| fer as much as II It were actually be
sieged II we should prevent our ships
| from carrying anything for the Span
iards, and the Spanish ships from Sc
curing supplies from our ports Ha-
vana, 1t is said by consuls and all who
| have studied the condition OF affairs on
the island, is absolutely with'lt food.
| 1t Is said, indeed, that none of the
opinisii dTHllFS mas amy store OF pro-
| visions, and that Havana Is worse of
| than any other place. An attacking
| force that merely contents itself with
shutting off the food supply would soon
| reduce them to submission.
| II is very probable that one of the
nlans of the military authorities is Ia
make effective allies of the Cubans by
| arming them and thus turning a good
fighting force of n hundred thousand
| men against the spaniards. II is said
| that arrangements are already mnde
looking to this end and insu'ing the
| immediate cooperation of the Ameri-
| can and Cuban forces.
The landing on tho island would viz
| tually be on the western end and on the
| northern coast while this would place
the army at considerable distance
| from the Cuban forces under Gomez. II
| has advantages that more than offset
this apparent separation of the allies
| A union could soon he effected and the
| revolutionists. freed from any restraint
along the military lines In the east
| would soon sweep on Havana province
and unite with the Americans. The fleet
would also aid In the junction OF the
| forces at any point that would be flxed