The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-05-30

CorcorGn Building.
Special to The ST. Paul Globe.
WASHINGTON, May 29.-Now that
Admiral Cervera and his Spanish fleet
are securely bottled up in Santiago
bay, the naval strategists are trying to
figure out what to do with him. In
official circles little attention is given
the persistent rumors, oft repeated,
that Cervera has escaped from SANTA
go, and is now on the broad ocean, just
where not even his own government, at
Madrid, can surmise. This is not a
problem that every American need sit
up nights to solve, for the undertaking
Is committed into the hands Of two sea
warriors of exceptional competence,
who know very we'll what ought to be
done and what can be done to capture
the game.
ATTACK PERILOUS.
To attack him, however, would mani
festly be a task of great difficulty and
peril. The channel is only two or three
hundred yards wide at the mouth of the
harbor, and it is said that it has been
made still narrower by obstructions.
There are from five to nine fathoms of
water in the channel at it's narrowest
part, and no doubt mines have been
placed there by the Spaniards. The bat
teries of Morro Castle are admirably
placed to defend the channel, the fort
being placed upon hill of such altitude
that the guns of warShip might not
reach 1t even at their extreme eleva-
ton, while the guns of the fort would
rain shells upon the unprotected decks
Of the attacking fleet If the batteries
were silenced, the mines exploded, and
the passage were forced by Schley's
squadron, the doom of Cervera would
be sealed, unless he is a great deal bet
ter fighter than Montojo. There would
still be danger. however, from the two
torpedo boat destroyers, and from the
disadvantage of the formation the at
tacking ships being compelled to en-
counter the Spanish fleet singly in file
as they emerged from the narrow en-
trance.
BATTLE DESIRABLE.
The alternative to sealing Cervera up
in the harbor by sinking Instructions
or steamirg in to attack him is the
maintenance of an indefinite blockade
by a squadron strong enough to prevent
his coming out or any relieving squad
ron going in. That plan has the dis
advantage of not ending the war; The
Spaniards would have a hot and un-
healthy time of it in that pest hole,
but if they are well provided they
might endure it for months. 1t would
naturally be preferable if 1t were prac-
ticable to make an end of Cervera at
once. There would be no question rails
ed by other powers in that case, and
we should have the satisfaction of max
ing visible progress.
ATTACK HIM BY LAND.
In attacking the defenses of San Juan
Admiral Sampson learned that guns on
shipboard could not be elevated suf-
ficiently to do effective work against
Notifications situated on high hills.
This lesson has shown the government
that land attack on the Spanish war
ships in Santiago harbor may prove
more effective than an attack from the
sea by Schley's vessels. Santiago is
surrounded by high hills, and with
siege guns mounted on these the United
states troops could make it very un-
comfortable for the enemy's craft in
the water below. Cervera would be un-
able to train his high-power rifles on
the bluffs occupied by the American
forces, and would probably be oblig 1
to desert his armorclads and destroy-
ers to prevent useless waste of human
life, or else attempt to run out Of the
harbor and chance it with the SQUAD
ron under Schley. AS matters stand,
Cerveras position appears to be i'm
pregnable from the sea. If he can be
made to cross fire with the American
naval commander nothing would be
more pleasing to the authorities here
and also to Commodore Schley. Con-
fidence is felt in both military and ma
val circles that Santiago can be taken
by land force with the assistance of
Schley's ships, and its surrender would