The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-25
THE FIGHT OFF SANTIAGO
AN ENGLISH CRITIC WRITES OF THE
LESSONS 1T TEACHES.
Generous Praise for Our Navy, Which
Is Described as "a Very Effective
Fighting Machine.
London Spectator.


gard to the naval battle is that the Amer
lean fleet did its work splendidly. The whole
performance of Admiral Simpsons fleet
was in accordance with the best traditions
of the Anglo-Saxon navies, and every En-
glishman has read of their doing with a
flush of pride. There was the old hard
pounding such as the Elizabethan sea-dogs
used, and the same curious mixture of
steadiness and daring, GOODNESS and reckless
dash. No doubt the comparative strengths
were very different, but as one reads of
the Spanish ships tearing full speed up the
coast of Cuba, closely pursued by the re-
lentless Americans who poured in a con-
tinuous and well-directed fire, 1t is impos-
sible not to think of the armada as 1t passed
up the channel in flight brakes ships
hanging on its flank and Kidding the Span
fards' hulls with their ceaseless fire-a fire
which, as on last Sunday, always hit and
always did damage. Had, indeed, the Span
lsh ships been more numerous and larger,
and had most of the American ships been
the size of the Gloucester. the battle, after
the Spanish ships emerged, would have been
working model of the battle which began
the destruction of the armada. In a word,
the moral aspects of what was almost the
hrst and may be the last fleet action be-
tween the Spanish and the English races
were very much alike. In both cases it was
the man behind the gun who, in the last
resort, won the battle
The technical lessons of the last naval
battle will have, of course, to be fully
worked out by the naval experts, but even
the most superficial view shows one or two
Facts OF great Importance They are not
new facts exactly, but old facts with new
races, and therefore well worth considering.
The first thing that strikes one is the prac-
teal utility of passive courage, especially
at sea. One might almost as well be a
coward as man who runs headlong on his
death, careless whether he loses his own
lie, but also careless whether he kills his
and dashing they were Indifferent to
death, they might not have beaten the
Americans, but at least they would have
done an immense deal of damage to the
American fleet. Granted that Admiral Ger
vera had formed the resolve of breaking out
OF Santiago by daylight, how should he have
acted? How, that IS, could he have sold
his ships and the lives of his men dearest?
That surely should have been the question
it had been put, could the answer have been
any other than something of this kind?-
Il will order each of my ships as she gets
clear of the neck of the bottle which forms
the harbor of Santiago to choose one of the
American ships, and to fly straight at her
Ny sh h5v'g sRa dog RAM flies ths at American %an
her as furiously as possible If the Am nerI-
slaught the Spaniards can get out to sea
and escape. If, on the other hand the
American closes with her. then there will
be fierce fight, in which one or the other,
or probably both. will go to the bottom.
This will probably happen, but meantime
some of the Spanish ships will have had
time to get into the open sea- Once there,
scatter and fly is to be the order" If Ad-
miral Cervera had adopted these bold, or,
II you like, mad tactics, he would no doubt
have lost most of his ships, but then he
would have probably sunk or damaged three
or four of the American vessels, while one
or two of his own would very likely have
got away scot Free AS it was. he lost all
his ships and did no damage to the Ameri-
cans ne secured tnls really astonishing re-
the Americans, attempting to run along
the shore with the American fleet between
ran the Americans poured upon them
a storm of shot and shell. and showed
once again that he who runs away is in far
greater danger than even he who waits to
be killed but intends to sell his life as
dearly as possible. That is an oldtime les
son to be drawn from the battle off SAINT
iago. Another is equally clear, equally i'm
portant and almost equally old.
THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN.
1t is that in naval war what really mat
tiers is not the armor plating, the build of
the ship, or even the power of the engines,
but the man behind the gun. When Captain
Mahan was entertained in England at a
naval dinner, the speech of the evening
was admitted by all to have been made
by the American officer. He reminded his
hearers that strategy, and armor, and new
types of gun, and scientific lodges, and
all the rest were very good things but in
the last resort what really mattered was
the man behind the gun. That was true
IN the OLD wars, and has been proved true
both
Straight shooting is, after all, what wins
the battle. OF course, you had better have
a gun that will fire, and fire a powerful
shot at longish range, but even if you
have got it, it is perfectly useless if the
men behind j. are too excited or have had
too little practice to be able to fire it
straight, and so to hit with it, The most
deadly patent shell, fired from the newest
and most expensive and most scientific of
fired from gun of Nelson's day if it drops
in the water and does not strike the enemv's
nun or deck. In other words superiority of
gunfire is now, as in the days of old, the
chief thing to look for No doubt Won
should as we have said, give your men
as good gun to fire with as possible, but
upon the ships armor, or the range
OF her guns, or the weight of
the metal discharged, or the speed
of the engines, but upon the power. If need
be- to make the enemys hull look like
porous plaster Look at the heroic fight
made by the little Gloucester. (By the way.
- hNOPiC VI TIE Olu CITY should send
greeting and silk flag to the little shin
that has done their name such credif9
what gave the Gloucester her victory and
also allowed her to escape was her gun fire
me destroyers" she disabled, let alone the
Spanish cruisers, could have sunk her ca siIv
could they have hit her, but they failed to
40 SO, partly because of their own essential
iy bad craftsmanship and partly also be-
cause a man who is peppering you from a
revolver is always hard to hit. Being shot
at with great accuracy is apt to destroy
one aim. That our own sailors are very
nor do we doubt that their practice would
be better rather than worse in an actual
engagement Still, we hope that the Santa
go fight will make the Admiralty give still
more encouragement to the practice of
gun fire. Captains should be made to feel
that one of the chief things expected from
them is record of successful shooting.
while the really able gunners should be
marked out for special promotion and
special privileges Good firing should in
fact. be treated as an essential. There is
one more thing to be remembered. The per-
Torrance of the Gloucester shows that an
Improvised fleet, thoroughly well armed and
manned by men who can shoot may be a
far more formidable sea force than is some
times supposed. We do not wish ii to be
supposed for a moment that we desire to
trust to this fact STILL 1t is worth noting
A HINT TO THE POWERS
So much for the special lessons of the bat
tie. There remains one general conclusion
which must be mentioned The battle shows
that the American navy is a most efficient
fighting machine. We did not want to be
told that here, for we know it already and
realized of what stuff the lions whelps were
made. They did not, however. know it on