Iowa state bystander. [volume] (Des Moines, Iowa) 1894-1916, 1898-04-15


4 n n1Stion witch la eiI1ct 81 49, ten
y0ara' war W the truce Of ZanJon. The
prospect Of such : protraction ana con-
clusi0n Of the present strife u q con-
tingsncy hardly to be contemplated with
eQuanimity by tho civilized world. ana
least OF all blythe United States, Affected
ana injured rs We are deeply and insi-
mately, by Its very existence.
.'RealizIng this, It appeared to be my du-
ty. in spirit Of true friendliness; no less
to Spain than to the Cubans who have
so much to lose by the pronunciation OF
the struggle to seek to bring about an
immediate termination Of the war. 10
this end / submitted, on the 9th ultimo.,
as a result Of much representation ana
correspondence through the United States
minister at Madrid, propositions to the
tice until Oct l. for the negotiation OF
peace with the good offices Of tho presi-
dent. aaH .v.D. |-
"rhe reply OF the Spanish authorities
was received on the night OF the 3lst
ultimo. 1t offers as the means to bring
about peace IN Cuba, to confide the prep
aration thereof to the insular department.
ginasmuch as tho concurrence Of that body
would be necessary to reach q 1ral result,
it being. however, understood that the
powers reserved by that constitution 10
the central government are not lessened
or diminished. AS the Cuban parliament
does not meet until the fourth OF May
next. the Spanish government would not
object, for its part. 10 accept at once Il
suspension of R}lostiitlcs, If asked for by
the insurgents from the general-in- chief.
to whom 1t would pertain, in such case.
to determine the duration and conditions
of the armistice From Gen. Woodford's
explanatory reports Of preliminary discus
sions preceding the final conference 1t Is
Il yJ.,t - Cvnn nc, Unv
stands ready to give the insular congress
fun powers to settle the terms OF peace
with the insurgents. whether by dlrect
negotiations or indirectly by means OF leg
-islat.on does not appear.
with the last overture in tie direction
of immediate peace and its disappointing
reception by Spain, the executive was
brought to the end of his effort.
''In my annual message Of December
last 1 said:
"'Of the untried measures there remain:
Recognition of the insurgents as bcllige:-
ents, recognition of the Independence OF
Cuba, neutral Intervention to end the war
by imposing a rational compromise be-
tween the contestants and intervention in
favor of one or the other party. | speak
not of forcible annexation. for that can
not be thought Of. That. by our code OF
morality. would be criminal aggression.
'.Thereupon I reviewed these alterna-
tives, in the light Of President Grants
measured words. uttered in 1875, when
after seven years OF sanguinary, destruc-
tive and cruel barbarities In Cuba he
reached the conclusion that the recogni-
ton of the independence of Cuba was i'm
practicable and indefenaiblc, and that the
recognition Of belliEerence was not war
ranted by the facts according to the tests
of public law. l commented especially up
on the latter aspect Of the question point
,tr,,1- S,,>1 fty
dangers OF a recognition OF bellgerency
WHICH, while adding to the already oner-
Gus burdens of neutrality within our own
Jurisdiction, could not in any way extend
our influence or effective offices in the ter
ritory of hostiitles. Nothing has since
occurred to change my view in this re-
garland l recognize as fully now as then
that the issuance Of a proclamation of
neutrality. by which process the so-called
recognition Of belligerence is published.
could, Of itself and unattended by other
action accomplish nothing toward the one
end for which we labor, the instant paci-
fication OF Cuba and the cessation of the
misery that afficts the island
Turning to the question Of recognition
at this time of the independence Of the
present insurgent government in Cuba. we
find safe precedents in our history from
al early day. They are well summed up
in President Jackson'S message to con-
gress. Dec. q, 1886. on the subject OF the
recognition of the independence Of Texas.
He said: The uniform policy and practice
OF the United States Is to avoid all inter-
ference in disputes which merely relate to
the internal government of other nations
and eventually to recognize the authority
of the prevailing party without reference
to our particular interests and views, or
to the merits Of the original controversy.
"'Rut on this, as on every other trying
occasion. safety is to be found in a rigid
adherence to principle. BY pursuing 1t.
we are but carrying out the long-estab-
lished policy of our government, a policy
which has secured to US respect and influ-
ence abroad and inspired confidence at
home.'"
The president continues:
81 do not think it would be wise or pru-
dent for this government to recognize at
the present time the independence of the
so-called Cuban republic. TO commit this
country now to the recognition of any par
ticuar government in Cuba might subject
us to embarrassing conditions Of interna-
tional obligation toward the organization
so recognized. When it shall appear here
after that there is within the island gov
eminent capable of performing the do
ties and dischargins the functions Of Il
separate nation, and having, as a matter
of fact, the proper forms and attributes
Of nationality, such government can be
promptly and readily recognized, and the
relations and interests Of the United
States with such nation adjusted.
"There remain the alternative forms Of
intervention to end the war either as all
impartial neutral by imposing rational
compromise between the contestants, or
as the active ally OF the one party OF the
other.
"rhc forcible intervention Of the Unit Ell
q
cordipg to the large dictates of humanity,
and following by many historical prece-
dents where nelghbcring states have in
terfercd to check the hopeless sacrifice Of
life by internecine conflicts beyond their
borders, is justifable on rational grounds.
1t involves" however hostlie constralnt
,..pon both parties 10 the contest as we'll
TO enforce truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
1.-The grounds for such intervention may
be briefly summarized as follows:
I'm the cause Of humanity and to put
an end 10 the barbarities, bloodshed, STAR
walton, and horrible miseries now exist
ing there, and which the parties to the
conflict are either unable or unwilling to
stop or mitigate.
1.-The right to intervene may be justille
by the very serious injury to the COM
merce, trade and business of our people
and by the wanton destruction Of proper
ty and devastation Of the island.
II have already transmitted to congress
the report of the naval court of inquiry
on the destruction OF the battleship Maine
in the harbor Of Havana during the night
of the 18th of February. The destruction
of that noble vessel has filled the nation
al heart with indispensable horror. Two
hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and
marines and two officers OF our nav.
rn-"sng in the fancied security. Of a
friendly ha,bor, have been hurled to
death, grief and want brought to their
homes. and sorrow to the nation.
The naval court Of inquiry. which. it
is needless to say, commands the UNI
qualified confidence Ct the government.
was unanimous in it's conclusion that the