The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-06-21
WEAK PART OF BLOCKADE
NOT ENOUGH VESSELS OFF THE
SOUTHERN COAST OF CUBA.
GunbOats and Small Cruisers to Be
Sent to the Channel Between Bata-
banO and Isle of Pines.

WASHINGTON, June 20-Public atten-
ton here to-day was divided almost evenly
between three subjects, the movements of
General Skaters army the probability of
reinforcements having reached Dewey and
the status of Hobson, the naval hero. Up
to a late hour in the afternoon neither of
the anxiously awaited messages which were
to announce the arrival of the transports
at Santiago and Manila had reached either
the War or Navy Department. 1t was not
doubted, however, that our vessels are off
Santiago. for although proceeding at less
speed than the English steamer which at
Kingston to-day reported having passed
them in the Windward passage last night,
the distance which they would be obliged
to travel from the Windward passage to
Santiago is less than that trayersed by the
British ship which came into Jamaica in
the early afternoon. If they arrived only
this morning off Santiago they could report
that fact solely by means OF dispatch boat
running over to Kingston, a twelve-hour
journey, so that direct report from the fleet
cannot be expected till late hour tonight.
According to the plans arranged for the
debarkation, the fleet of transports was to
lie in a safe place until Sampson had cleared
the way for landing. The selection of the
landing place has been left entirely to the
Judgment of Admiral Sampson and General
Shafter. the military commander, and the
first business in order on. the arrival of the
transport fleet off Santiago would be a war
council between Admiral Sampson and some
of his naval captains on the one hand and
General Shafter and his staff on the other
the purpose being to settle all the details of
10 6a1N< v1r -
of transports would lie out at sea at least
ten miles beyond the blockading squadron
in order to be entirely safe from attack by
Spanish torpedo boats. These craft are dam
gerous enough to full-fedged war ships, but
a transport would be absolutely helpless
against their attack, so the strictest pos
sible watch must be kept by the conveys
until the troops are landed, the present be-
ing the most critical moment in the whole
operation.
DEBARKATION MAY BE SLOW
The work of debarking the troops is not
to be one of hours, but rather DAYS. accord
ing to the opinion of army officers. A great
deal depends on the point selected for the
Landing. 1t was thought that Aguedores,
to the east of Moro, about six or eight
miles. would be likely landing in view of
the fact that 1t has wharf. the property
of an iIon-ore company, which would be
extremely useful for landing the heavy sup
plies and ordnance Of the siege train. 1t is
reported now, however, that this particular
wharf has been commanded by Spanish bat
teries which have been. so placed as to give
an enfilading fire upon 1t. If this be So
then the batteries must be first silenced by
the fleet else there would be not only loss
of life among the troops, but the wharf itself
might be destroyed by the Spanish bat
teries If the landing is made at this place.
not less than two days will be consumed in
getting the troops ashore, as only one ship
can lie there at time, and there is an
enormous quantity of ammunition and stores
to be taken ashore. If the landing is to be
made on the beach it will be a. tedious and
time-consumng operation, although it will
be possible. in that case, to proceed simul-
taneously from all the ships.
The army officials feel confident that Cen
Smarter will make an effort to open up cable
communication as soon as he has landed
force, and they are expecting a cablegram
almost any moment announcing the fact
that he has succeeded. Some surprise is ex-
pressed that this French cable has not al
ready been reopened, as the cable steamer
was at the Mole ST. Nicholas the middle
terial and men for repairing the breaks and
opening up the station
1t is not doubted that just about the time
Shafter appeared off Santiago the Charles
ton appeared in Manila bay leading the
three transports which bring nearly three
thousand soldiers to Dewey's assistance
That fact will not be known however Of
flcially for two or three days owing to the
distance from there to Hong-Kong the
nearest cable point 1t is questioned here
whether with this force to back him Dewey
will feel justified in assaulting Manila or
even in accepting its surrender. Either
course would involve heavy responsibilities
for the admiral, and it is extremely desir-
able that no pretext be afforded jealous
European powers for Intervention at Ma
Mia under guse of protecting the interest
of their subjects. Therefore it may be that
the admiral will wait for another ten days
until the second installment of troops
reaches Cavite. In this case he probably
will land the troops that arrive In the town
of Cavite, which is now completely under
the control of himself and the insurgents,
and employ the time in accustoming them
to Manila methods and climate.
WEAK POINT IN BLOCKADE
The Navy Department officials have long
known that all kinds of supplies. with the
exception of raw material, have been
reaching Havana from the south by way of
Batabano and the short line of railroad
connecting that town with Havana. They
are not. however. deeply concerned with
that fact, as it Is not believed TO be the
main purpose of the campaign to cause the
surrender of the capital through the star
walton OF its inhabitants. III this programme
were attempted with any degree of success
it would mean the determination of the very