New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-04-15
spA1Ns PLAN OF PRIvATEERINo.
SHE HOPES TO MAKE 1T CONTIGUOUS SEAT'
IRE OF THE WAR

London. April 14-There is great interest here
IN Government and commercial circles over tne
possibility OF prlvateering in the event OF war
h.,ween tho United States and Spain. Several
publications for letters Of marque have been
NADIA Mt the Spanish Embassy and at the Office
~ tho Spanish Naval Commission, but there
wore no appllcations at the United states En-
bassv II f. generally recognized that Spain In
,ends 20 make privateerng a conspicuous ele-
ment Of the campaign. II Is thought, however.
that she will conhne her energies In this olTec-
ton TO preying upon American coastwise COM
ruerce II is not believed she VIII fisk oHeholhs
the European Powers by stopping their Ameri-
can bound vessels. or by searching transatlantic
shlps FOR American goods. for II European ships
are molested the Powers Will probably ADOPT
radical preventive measures.
The prevalent opinion that the United States
Will not embark In privateering produces an
excellent impression
At the Admiralty hero It 10 suggested that
the Spanish naval scheme will not be 70 pit
feet against the American warships, but to scat
ter SPANS war vessels about the coasts and
indulge in guerilla warfare, swoopins down
upon coast towns and retreating before they are
overtaken. It Is deemed certain that this will
be SPANS policy II she abandons the hope OF
retaining Cuba and merely pursues war OF
revenge.
Many merchant vessels are being offered al
the United States embassies on tho Continent,
but no negotiations are proceeding. and II Is
said at the Embassy here that the United States
Government has no need for any more ships.
The Times in long article this morning.
discussing the naval situation and comparing
the navies Of Spain and the United States says:
The war must primarily, II not mainly. be
conducted by yea Before either combatant can
employ land forces II must have asserted and
made good its claim to superiority afoat within
the sphere OF It's operations. This can only be
done by meeting and defeating the enemys
naval forces at sea or by confnng them to a
port.
H. instead OF doing this. an attempt were made.
for example by the United States TO invade
Spanards TO send reinforcements 10 Cuba, II
might and probably would lead 70 disaster.
Within recent years the defeat OF the Italians
AT LISA and the defeat OF the Chinese at the
Yaloo have showed the accuracy OF this view
OF the situation. 1t is unlikely that President
McKinleys naval and military advisers will fall
into similar error. and doubt IS thereby
thrown upon his alleged intention OF commenc-
ing operations 10y an invasion OF Cuba or Porto
Rico. AS for the possibilities Of an American
n Spanish naval victory the strategical situation
may be smpfed. OF course, II spain should
decide not TO send her fleet across the Atlantic,
but i'm this case she virtually renqushes every
thing Although her record power
during the last three centuries is one OF almost
continuous disaster. II affords numerous ex-
amples Of heroism and gallantry on the part Of
her seamen in adverse circumstances. while the
personal bravery OF her people is beyond ques-
ton.