Evening star., 1898-11-11

quest ample protection while at sea at all
times for this command from the navy
This enterprise Is SO important that l de-
sire to go with this army corps, or to I'M
mediately organize another and go with 1t
to join this and capture position NO. z.
Now that the military is about to De USED
l believe that 1t should be continued with
disposition Of it to accomplish the desired
result. MILES,
major General Commanding Army.
June the following telegram was re-
Washington, D. c., June 6, 1898.
Major General Miles, Tampa, Fla:
The President wants to know the earliest
moment you can have an expeditionary
force ready to go to Porto Rico large
enough to take and hold that island with
out the force under General Shafter.
r. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
And reply sent that such an expedition
could be ready in ten days.
"It was found that many of the steamers
were not suitable for transport service,
they having been built entirely for freight
steamers and not equipped for properly
conveying troops and munitions of war.
The accumulation of the large amount Of
supplies and war material for the 10000
men above mentioned at Tampa had crowd
ed that place, and, owing to the absence of
depots and facilities for handling that
amount of material, occaSioned great de-
lay in properly equfppfng the expedition
intended for Santiago. 1t was, however,
supplied, and orders given for the proper
embarkation of the troops eoo nv which were
ready to sail June 8, 1898. The movement
was, however. suspended, owing to the
report received that Spanish war vessels
had been seen in the Nicholas channel.
The expedition, consisting of 500 officers
and 1885 men, finally sailed on June IA,
leaving some 10000 troops that were ex-
pected to move with this expedition, but
which could not do so, owing to insufficient
transportation.
The following dispatch was received
June Is:
WASHINGTON, D. c., June IT, 1898.
Maj. Gen. Miles. Tampa, Fla:
Important business requires your pres
ence here; report at once. Answer
r. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Miles Plan of Campaign.
On June "a, 1898, I submitted plan of
campaign. as follows:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. c., June "a. 1893.
Sir. 1 have the honor to submit the fol-
lowing:
With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it
is expected we will have several thousand
Spanish prisoners; and with the capture of
the second objective position porto Rico),
now under consideration, it is expected we
will add to the number making, ii is hoped,
in the aggregate at least $1,000 prisoners.
After the capture of the position next
after Santiago de Cuba, it would be- in my
judgment advisable to take some deep
water harborS on the northern coast of
Cuba, which would be available, not only
for our army, but also for the navy, as safe
ports for our transports, supply ships and
naval vessels between Key West and Porto
Rico. 1t is also important that we should
select some point at which to disembark
our mounted troops and light artillery, with
which our government is well supplied. We
will have in a few weeks upward of 15,G00
"a rV
lery and a small body of infantry, will
make a most formidable army corps with
which to conduct a campaign in the lnte-
rior of Cuba.
The most available point, it appears to
me. would be the harbor of Neuvitas, which
has 2S12 feet of water. From there the
command could move to Porto Principe,
one of the principal cities in the Island OF
Cuba. Using that as base, it could move
through the rolling country, which is re-
ported to be free from yellow fever, to
Poron and Taguayabon, and thence to villa
Clara; or, by a more Southerly route, from
Porto Principe to Ciego de Avilla. thence
to Spritus and thence to Villa Clara. A
road could be built at the rate of five miles
per day that army corps marches; also
would find two railroads between Porto
Principe and Villa Clara.
To move mounted troops over from Flor
ida to Cuba and make this march would
undoubtedly consume the time up to nearly
the goth of September.
This army corps would also have the as
sistance of all the available forces of Gar
cia and Gomez, and would by that time
be occupying practically two-thirds of the
Island of Cuba.
If no serious force was encountered this
army corps would continue its march to
the south side of Havana. If a large force
of Spanish troops, sufficient to check its
march, was moved to the vicinity of Villa
Clara, then the entire army with which
we purpose to invade Cuba would be moved
between the forces at Villa Clara and
Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and
defeating them in detail.
l make this suggestion having three
advantages: First, we could employ at rea-
sOnaUie compensation such prisoners de-
sired occupation in road building; second
we could move into the interior of Cuba
our large cavalry command without serious
moiestdtion; third, We could be operating
during the rainy or sickly season in the
most healthful parts of Cuba, practically
free from yellow fever, and at the same
time be occupying large portion of the
enemys territory.
If this proposition does not meet with
favor, then, after the capture of Santiago
de Cuba and other places to the east, we
could move the entire force to the west of
Havana and conduct the campaign from
the deep harbors on that coast. NV judg-
ment however is decidedly in favor of the
first plan of campaign.
Before reaching Villa Clara we would un-
doubtedly have upwards of $4,000 prisoners,
and if We could, by judicious, humane treat
ment use them in a way that would be ad-
vantageous to themselves as well as to our
interests, | think it would be advisable
There would be one great danger in moving
them to our own territory and establishing
a large camp of prisoners, and that is,
that they would bring the germs of disease
with them and spread them among our own
people, as many Americans would have to
be employed on the ships and railroads. to-
gether with the guards necessary to con-
troll them Very respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Major General COMMANDING
The Secretary of War.
Ahe main features Of the above plan of
campaign were submitted In my letters of
May 20 and q.
Campaign Against Porto Rico.
The following order was received to or
ganize an expedition for operation against
the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico:
Washington, D. c., June 70, 1893.
Sir: BY direction of the President an ex-
pedition will be organized with the least
possible delay, under the immediate COM
mand of Maj. Gen. Brooke, United States
army, consisting of three divisions taken
from the troops best equipped in the 1st
and Sd Army Corps and two divisions from
the 4th Army Corps, for movement and
operation against the enemy in Cuba and
Porto Rico. The command under Mai. Gen