The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-03-30

| the av<sti0a Is 70 huw long the ssruggae
VIII continue Is matter witch must os
fakea into earnest consideration Accept
l ing the hisssxy of ali Of the more modern
l vars a q guide. the popular impression,
| uAlcA, Indeed. finds expression in high Of
| acial carcles. is that the struggle will be
| extremely brief. and thai as an outside
estimate the whole matter will be dsta-
| nsssir settled before the end OF the pres
| ent rear. OF course. Il 10 unauesfiened nee
| essAriiy that the outcome 20 the struggle
viii be q victory for the American arms
! II would seem however thai in making
| this easimate there are some contingencies
overlooked, and that too close a reliance
| upon the anaiogies Of modern European
vars 10 likely 10 lead 10 error. As mat
| ter Of fact. however, the war which the
| United States 10 absat to enter upon with
| Spain may. ultimately, assume much the
same atrAtegic character as Inc war
| which Spain u now carrying On against
her revcited coiontsts in Cuba and the
Philippines, and IL depends almost entire
ly upon the temper Of the spanish peo-
| pie and government whether the struggle
may not be prolonged almost as II
definitely.
IL may be- assumed as beyond question
that the first tfeater of active military
operations win be Cuba and the waters
adjacent. In this portion of the war, the
United States wiiI have enormous strategic
advantages, and would have such adyan-
tages IL Spain were fully equal to the
United States in military power. Cuba Is
within striking distance of our own coast.
Temporarily and for the purpose OF a
CRUSHING blow. the entire naval force of
the United States could be concentrated In
one single attack upon Havana The base
OF supplies In our own territory is within
easy reach. coahng stations are within
ten hours steaming of the Cuban coast,
and all naval stores and ammunition can
be Eesupplied in short order as they be-
come exhausted. Our vast merchant ma
rine on the Atlantic coast can be pressed
into service for temporary use, TO trans
port as large an army as Is necessary TO
any Cuban port at which 1t may be DEEM
ed advisable to land them, aud any such
port. with the exception of Havana, could
be readily reduced and occupied by
small portion of cur naval force within
. very brief period.
On the other hand. the strategic disad-
vanta9es OF Spain are enormous. Ii she
undertakes 10 reinforce her army In Gu
ba, troops must be transported $3.50 miles
across the ocean. To avoid the risk OF
capture OF the troop ships, If any such
troops were sent. the vesse.s conveying
them would have to be conveyed BIZ a
fleet of warships equal TO any fleet which
the United States could send 10 intercept,
them--a practical impossibiity. In the
NSsSilt ueso.atSu coil,..t.oi. VI cuba, SUP
stant,aily all the SiiJpiies for the support
OF the army must be drawn from foreign
sources. and il a blockade or the Cuban
coast was enforced. as II is possible for
the United States to enforce Ii with her
present naval force and such auxiliary
vessels as may be pressed into service. i,
would be impossible for such supplies to
arrive.
II Spain sends over war vessels to re-
infarce those now ia Havana and On the
way. those vessels would arrive with their
coal bunkers exhausted and would be
practically useless until recoaled. Yet
! there Is no coal to be obtained In Cuba
save that which comes from foreign
sources. and the supplies would have TO
be obtained hy running the blockade.
The only possible manner in which Spain
could avoid the loss OF Cuba and the sur
render OF her entire army and her fleet
| Of vessels now assembled there Is by mus
tering fleet of war Vessels sufficiently
strong 10 do battle with sfld crush the
strongest fleet which We could assemble
in Atlantic waters. a remote and prac-
ticaily impossible contingency.
All this is without taking into ceusid-
GRAFTON the fact that the Spanish army
in Cuba and the Spanish population of
Havana are at present simply a garrison
In hostile country. having bu. a feeble
ateiy to maintain. Even if the United
States does not intervene. there is every
reason 10 believe that the Cuhans, I'M
aided. will achieve their independence. but
at the cost of frigh;ful suffering and death
10 hundreds of thousands of innocent non
combatants, and the prolonsatien for a
long time OF the present conditions In
Cuba, against which humanity revoits.
With active aid from the United States,
there Is no question that as far as the
Cuban theater of warfare Is concerned,
the strugeie Will be a short one, and that
ia very brief period every Spanish SOL
der on the island will be a prisoner of
war or under parole, and that Cuba will
| be independent.
| The question as TO whether this. how
| ever. will end the war. rests solely with
Spain. 1t must be remembered that the
| spanish are an arrogant and yindictive
race, and intensely patriotic. They win
| make as great sacrifices and endure as
much for their country as any people on
earth. 1t Is not extravagant hyperbole
| When the Spanish assert that they will
spend every peseia of treasure and every
| drop OF blood before they will surrender.
Supposing Spain beaten In her West
| India provinces OF Cuba and Porto Rico
| and expelled therefrom, what will follow?
| II Is not anticipated that she win attempt
| at any time TO make a serious attack upon
Il
| can aad Will do. will be TO turn loose TO
| prey upon American commerce fleet OF
armed private and public warships and
| In this she wall have the active support
| and assistance Of the commercial and mill
| tary adventures If all Europe. a license
| TO commence pira:ing has peculiar
| attraction for many people. Many q sober
| sedate aud church-soing merchant In times
| gone by has invested freely OF his savings
| 10 equip pr.vaieers. not for patriotism, but
| for gain.
III Spain EeftiGes 10 consider herself con-
ouefed when the loss Of Cuba comes and
| IL her privatesfs continue 10 keep the seas
| an ocean guerrilla warfare may continue
| for an almost indefinite period or the In
| vasian and actual conquest of Spa n Itself
/ may became military necessity to pro-
| cure final peace So long aS the Span
| ism forts remain open "a refuge 10 these
| pfiNatsers and taeig prizes so hong vii!
| prtSateering eoatinue. The exps sieasss.
/ which the United States had in the war
/ ot t:ae rebellion Ia trying 10 rug down aud
| capture the Alabama, and the wide wake
| or destruction which that vessel ief, be-
/ bind her. show rot only the enormous