New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-12-22

One large shell penetrated the hreroom. putting
OUT of action one mansT Tendcred useless The
starboard bow gun ana w9ne d.Gd H Yror, another
shell The broadside guns continued firms unu
there only gun and one seaman Irin@ ~,
Ing Out Of control the hull. smokepipe and mast
rddled with Shot or confused o., w ~ ,r ~, among
whom were seven officers: gave the order 10 sifS
Explode T@''''' INV
The story o. the loss of the Castillo was sub
santally the account of the loss Of all the other
Spanish ships and Admiral Montojo sums up his
report with this statement:
The ineficoncy 0. the vessels which composed
my little squadron the lack Of all classes of the
personnel especially master gUnners and seamefi
runners the inaptiiude Of some Of the provisional
machinis.s the scarcity Of rapd-hre cannon the
etronR Of the enemy, and the unperiectes1,
character OF the greater part Of our vessels. al
contributed to make much more decided the sacri-
flee which We made for our country; ahG 10 pa pa
vent the possibility of the horrors OF homnsiG
rnent of the city OF Manila. with the CONVICTION
thai with The scarcity OF our force asanio he and
could expect loss Of all our ships. our casual
ties. including those Of the arsenal amounted 70
81 killed and wounded.
FEARED 4 TRAP FOR THE MONADNOCK.
An evidence Of the strategy exhibited by the
Navy Department in sending reinforcemenis TO
Dewey is shown in n dispatch OF June q inform
ing him Of the coming Of the Monadnock- Probably
with view to preventing the monitor from falling
into trap she not dispatched directly TO
Manila. but ordered to point COO miles due
east from Cape Engano. where she was TO meet
one OF Dewey's ships
Apparently the first suggestion of the organiza-
ton Of the Flying Squadron which was 70 divert
Admiral Camara's squadron from its voyage 10
Manila came from Dewey for in dispatch Of
June q he "In my judgment. If the coast OF
Spain was threatened the squadron of the enemy
will have 10 return" And that was exactly what
happened a month later the Admiral pays high
compliment 10 the British consul at Manila. Raw
son Walker. who for three months had been dis
charging the duties of United States Consul in
Manila and rendering the Admiral great assistance
IMPORTANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The AdmiraIs estimate Of the Importance Of the
Philippine Islands is set out in the following tele
gram. sent in answer TO an inquiry on the subject
from the Government
Manila, August 90 1898.
Referring to the departments telegram of
August H. important islands are Colon. Luzon.
Panay. Cebu Negros and Leyte Others. owing
"a tie nature OF the inhabitants; have small
may be neglected. especially isles of southern
group. Luzon is IN all respects the most desirable
ports. Manila is furthest north. Produces all Of
the good tobacco. Friendly natives Civilization
rich minerals Population. $4,000. Subic Bay best
ha1bor for cC2ps puTR9sSSs and maS
command of bay and city Of Manila with arsenal at
G ,sNy popaaeS os cd e and a W e
waited Iloo second commecal port centre OF
sugar trade so9 gdo barber S sbu b fT
commercial port. a good ha dor desirable no coal
.a sSe" senh has sa BEEN g nS on cebn EngS
cor?sny trust 1t may no, be necessary 10 order
leave here while matters remain in present critical
condition DEWEY.
PLAN FOR CAPTURING HAVANA.
Naturally the report Of the operations Of the
North Atlantic feet comprises the larger part Of
the volume. Most 81 the facts have already ap
peared but in the beginning there is a most in
ieresting exchange II letters between Secretary
Long and Admiral Sampson showing that even
before the outbreak Of the Admiral had
worked out complete plan for the immediate re-
ducton Of Havana with his squadron, un-
supported. and was only prevented from carrying
on, that plan By orders from the Department
which wished to protect the big ironclads. Secre-
tary Long addressed 10 Admiral Sampson April
a confidential letter telling him that in the event
OF hostili,ies The Department wished him 10 do all
in his power 10 destroy the Spanish vessels in
West Indian waters. He says.
The Department, does not wish the vessels of your
squadron be exposed 10 the fire Of the batteries
At Havana Santiago or other strongly fortified
ports IN Cuha unless ne more Formidable spanish
In this the Department would suggest that "A
rigid blockade and The employment of our torpedo
boats would accomplish the desired object
The reasons given by Secretary Long for this
order were that there would be no United States
troops available to occupy the captured towns until
October. and that the lack Of docking facilities
made It particularly desirable tina, vessels should
not be crippled before the capture or destruction OF
SPANS most formidable ships.
PROTEST FROM ADMIRAL SAMPSON.
How strongly Admiral Sampson endeavored to Sc
cure reversal of this decision appears in the fol-
lowing letter, which has never hetpr" peen pun
nshed
United States FLAGSHIP N New-YeTk First irish Bats
My Dear Mr. Secretary: have received your
confidential letter Of April G. : sympathize with
possibly serious loss while the enemys feet is still
Intact. Al the same time, / regard II as very i'm
As host,lities commence Havana is wei defended
by three or four batteries TO the eastward OF the
on the western side Of the entrance there are
three basiss Ine guns oay"s m the
batteries face seward and those 10 the west OF
hatteries with heavy traverscs between the guns
The guns and the people VINO serve them are quite
These batteries are well calculated 10 keep off a
fee, from seward which approaches to within
not think they arr well placed to resist an attack
Cor sn do s ssRoe wfTe the
will be exposed = n flank fire. or 10 the fire of our
,s,s shps oSa have fu eee Even under these
circumstances the ships must have such heavy
whelmed by it's volume. Before the Puritan asd
the Amphitrite arrived was not entirely sangune
~ the success of such attack. Since their ar
rival YESTERDAY | have little doubt Of its success.
Although the monitors are weak In secondary IRE.
cxDected 10 put cruiser with heavy secondary
ore in The interval between each two OF them IN
this way do not think the Spanisrds would he able
70 Are They would be driven away from thelr guns
and kent away. while the fire Of the ships would
90 iniure the guns mounts that they would DC
unserIIcea BILE Although the deferces west or the
sn,rsnce are stronger than those east the rst have
The advantage 10 that al, the proJectles wnle u
rIss the batteries Will fall In the city ana furnsh
an Additional inducement for the surrender Of me
city. 49,, >,.hoa 60 ,b.
muandine officers OF ships provided that y o9r
ehips were rot numerous enough or me Spd''aIo
nrnvsd better than | expected they were, az once
70 hsul on and substitute for the direct attack a
close blockade OF the port. which was 10 De *
.spdad east aod west 20 adjoining ports as quickly
as possible Hav!ns seneed the western batteries
4, would quite able TO sngM o ne . nv;
four hours IN advance. -, . ,,,,
see Inc force o. your reasoning VA We rpe