Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-11-13


nibal by many miles and q consular
army fell back TO the Metaurus, and
Rome was saved. Two thousand years
later Prince Frederick Charles, divided
by few marches and two Austrian
army corps from the Crown Prince. lin
gered so long upon the Iser that the SUI
premacy Of Prussia trembed I'm the ball
ance. But the character Of the Virgin
Ian soldier was OF a loftier type. Ii has
been remarked that after Jackson's
death Lee never again attempted those
great turning movements. which had
achieved his most brilliant victories.
Never again did he divide his army to
unite II again on the field OF battle. The
reason is not far TO seek. There was
now no general in the Confederate army
10 whom he dared conflde the charge OF
the detached wing. and in possessing one
such general he had been more fortunate
than Napoleon
or Jackson's love for the fray-his ami
nal courage, If you choose-Colonel Hen
derson. says:
"That he felt 10 the full the fascina-
ton Of wars tremendous game we can
hardly doubt. From the day he first
smelt powder, in Mexico. until he led
that astonishing charge through the
dark depths OF the Wilderness. his
ger and death were rife about him. With
all his gentleness, there was much Of
tho old Berseeker about Stonewall jack
Sun, not indeed the lust for blood, but
the longing to do doughtily and die
bravely, as bests becomes a man. His
nature was essentially aggressive. He
was never more to be feared than when
he was retreating. and when others
thought only OF strong. defensive posi-
lions, he looked persistently for the OPP
portunity to attack. He was endowed,
like Massena, with that rare fortitude
which seems TO increase as perils thick
en- When conquered he was as ready to
fight again as II he had been conqueror.
L'audace, raudace, ct tonjours Pau
dace' was the handspring Of all his ac-
tons. and the very sights and sounds of
stricken field were dear TO his soul.
Nothing had such power to stir his pulses
as the rebel yell.'
The last chapter Of Colonel Hender-
sons splendid and comprehensive work
Is entitled "The Soldier and the Man."
and is in the nature Of q general sum-
mary Of what the authors study of
Jackson has taught him. From it we
take the following:
And the mystery that always in
volved Jackson's movements was un-
doubtedly, the result of calculation. He
knew the effect his sudden appearances
and disappearance would have on the
morale OF the Federal generals, and he
relied as much on upsetting the mental
equilibrium Of his opponents as on con-
centrating against them superior num-
beers. Nor was his view confined 10 the
field Of battle and his immediate adver-
sary. 1T embraced the whole theatre
OF war. The motive power which ruled
the enemy's policies, as well as his
armies, was always his real objective.
From the very first he recognized the
weakness Of the Federal position-the
anxiety with which the President and
the people regarded Washington-and
on this anxiety he traded. Every blow
struck i'm the Valley campaign. from
Kernstown to Cross Keys, was struck
at Lincoln and his Cabinet; every move
ment, including the advance against
Pope on Cedar Run. was calculated with
reference to the effect it would produce
In the Federal councils: and II he con-
sistently advocated invasion Il was not
because Virginia would be relieved of the
enemy's presence. but because treaties
Of peace are only signed within sight Of
the hostile capital.
1T has been urged that the generals
whom Jackson defeated were men of in
ferior stamp. and that his capacity for
command was consequently. never fair
ly tested. Had Grant or Sheridan, it is
said, been pitted against him in the Val
ley or Sherman or Thomas on the Rap
pahann0Ck his laurels would never have
been won. The contention is fair. Gene
rails OF such calibre as Banks and FIRE.
mont, Shields and Pope, committed blum
ders which the more skifu leaders
would. undoubtedly. have avoided. and.
again, had he been pitted against n
worthy antagonist. Jackson would prob
ably have acted with less lu1acity and
greater caution. 1t is difficult to con-
ceive. however. that the fact would
either have disturbed his brain or weak
ened his resolution. Few generals, ap-
parently, have been caught I'm worse pre-
dicaments than he was-hrst, when his
ARMY was near Harpers Ferry, and Ere
mont and Shields were converging on
his rear; second. when he lay in the
woods near Groveton. with no news from
LoIgstreet. and Popes army all around
him; third. when he was marching by
the Brock road TO strike Hooker's right,
and Sickness column struck in between
himself and Lee. But It was at such
junctures as these that his self-pOsses-
sion was most complete and his Skill
most marked. The greater the peril, the
more fixed became his purpose. The
capacity or the opponent, moreover
cannot be accented as the true touch
stone Of generalship. The greatest
general said Napoleon. IS he who
makes the fewest mistakes'-i. g., he who
neither neglects an opportunity nor Of
fers one.
"Thus tested, Jackson has few superb
ors. During the whole Of the two years
he held command he never committed
single error. At Mechanicsville, and again
at Fraysers Farm, the failure to estab-
lish some method of intercommunlcation
left his column isolated. This. however,
was a failure IN staff duties, FOR which
the Confederate headquarters was more
to blame than himself. And further, how
sure and swift was the retributon which
followed a mistake committed within his
sphere OF action? What opportunity did
Jackson miss? His penetration was uner-
ring; and when, after he had marked his
prey. did he ever hesitate to swoop?
What seemed reckless audacity.' IL has
been well said by one Of the greatest OF
southern soldiers, was the essence OF
prudence. His eye had caught at glance
the entire situation, and his genius, with
marvellous CELEBRITY and accuracy, had
weighed all the chances of success or
failure. While, therefore. others We're
slowly feeling their way or employing
in detail insufficient forces. Jackson. with
out for one moment doubling his success,
hurled his army like a thunderbolt
against the opposing lines. and thus end
ed the battle al a single blow
''But If Jackson never failed to take
advantage Of his opponents blunders ii
might be said that he sometimes laid him
self open to defeat. Grant and Sheridan
had they been in the place of Shields and
Fremont. would hardly have allowed him