The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-11-29
CERvERA'S LAMENT


over the Condition Of spnniSh Navy.
Knew ne VvhS Going 70 Decent bnt was
Ready for tho Sacrifice.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 2s.-The navy
department to-day published through
the ofics OF naval intelligence. the
views Of Admiral Cervera regarding
the Spanish navy in the late war"
Captain Glover, the chief intelligence
oficar, explains that tliS Is a reprint Of
q number OF letters published In La
Dpoca, OF Madrid, on the 6th Of the pres
ent month. The letters are dated from
before the war up TO May S. They were
written by Cervera in protest against
Spain rushing Into war in the face Of
certain defeat, due to the naval strength
OF the nitedStates and the Tnprepared-
ness OF the Spanish navy.
Cervera writes: Il ask myself II Il is
right for me to keep silent and thereby
make myself an accomplice In adven-
lures which will surely cause the total
ruin OF Spain. And for what purpose?
To defend an island which was ours, but
belongs to us no more, because even u
we should not lose It by right OF war
we have lost It in fact, and with 1t all
young men, Victims OF the climate and
bullets In the defence of what is now no
more than romantic ideal.
Captain Glover says Spain had ne
elected her navy and Cervera shows It
was imprudent for her to attempt war
against a superior naval power Taking
up some OF the vessels in detail IN q let
ter written In January, ne shows how
the Vl7caya carried detective guns; how
the Carlos v ws1s failure because of a
lack OF power; and how the Catalina
begun more than eight years before was
still incomplete. And then he predicts
that a conflict would be disastrous to
Spain. In a letter written in February
the admiral speaks Of the Colon having
no guns; Of other vessels being detective,
OF the inability Of the fleet 70 coal at
cadts; Of their being obliged 70 so out
with half rations, and finally their hay
ing no charts Of the American seas. He
says that the eight principal vessels on
the Havana station are worn out, ana
that taking things as they are the Span
ish naval force, compared with that Of
the United States, Is In tho proportion OF
] to 8. In such conditions a campaign
he writes, would be disastrous if not an
offensive one and all that could be done
in an offensive way would be to make
some raids with few fast vessels.
The admiral points 70 the futility Of
attempting to blockade the United States
port and asks how the Spanish navy
would repair even should she win a
great victory without resources.
He says:
at would ba foolish to deny that what
we may reasonably expect 5 defeat.
which may be glorious, but all the same
defeat which would cause US 10 lose the
Island in the worst possible manner.
He speaks Of the Surprise and aston
lshment experienced by all OF the Off
GERS OF his squadron on receiving orders
from Spain to sail from Cape Verde for
Cuba, inasmuch as they had united In
pointing out the condition Of the ships.
Says the admiral:
''wlth an easy conscience I go to the
sacrifice, but cannot understand tho
decision OF the navy general of1cers
against my opinions"
The last letter In the series Is one
from Admiral Villamil OF Cervera's
squadron, addressed directly to SaSasta,
pointing out that the sacrifice OF the
Spanish naval forces will be as certain
as it win be useless and fruitless for the
termination OF the war.