The record-union., 1898-04-12

stitute in fact a body polite having q
Government in substance as we'll as in
name, possessed of the elements of sta
bility and forming de facto, il left tc
itself, State among the nations, rea-
sonably capable of discharging the
duties of State), has imposed for its
own goverance in dealing with cases
like these, the further condition.. that
recognition of independent Statehood
is not due to a revolted dependency un-
til the danger ofsits being again subju-
gated by the parent State has entirely
passed away. This extreme test was in
fact applied in the case of Texas.
The Congress to whom President
Jackson referred the question rs lone
probably leading TO war" and there
fore proper subject for a previous
understanding with that body by whom
war alone can be declared. = and by
whom all the provisions sustaining its
perils must be furnished left the mat
ter Of recognition of Texas to the dis
cretion of the Executive, providing
merely for the sending of a diplomatic
agent when the President should be
satisfied that the Republic of Texas had
become IAN independent State" 1t was
so recognized by President Van Buren
who commissioned a Charge d'Affaires
March 5, 1887. after Mexico had sban-
doned an attempt to conquer th- Tex
an territory, and then there was 1T the
time no bona fide contest going on be-
tween the insurgent province and its
former sovereign
OF STATEHOOD?
/ said in my message of December
last, 1T is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes OF
Statehood, which alone could meet the
recognition of belligerency in it's ia
vor''
The same requirement must certainly
be no less seriously considered when
the graver issue of recognizing indie
pendence is in question for no less pos
tive test can be applied to the greater
act than to the lesser; while, on the
other hand, the influences and conse-
quences of the struggle upon the inter
nal policy of the recognizing State
which form important factors when the
recognition Of belligerency is concerned
are secondary, if not rightly elimina-
bic, factors in the real question wheth-
er the community claiming recognition
is or is not independent beyond perad
venture.
NOT WISE TO RECOGNIZE INDIE
PENDENCE.
Nor from the standpoint of expedi-
ence do l think it would be wise OF
prudent for this Government to recog-
dence of the so-called Cuban Republic
Such recognition is not necessary to
enable the United States to intervene
and pacify the island. To commit this
country now to recogn. ton of any par
ticular Government in Cuba might SUBJ
ject US to embarrassing conditions OF
international obligation toward the or
ganiZation so recognized. In case OF
intervention, our conduct Will be sub
ject to the approval or disapproy al Of
such Government; we would be re-
quired TO submit to it's direction and
to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally. When it shall appear
thereafter that there is within the ISL
and a Government capable of perform
ing the duties and discharging the
functions of a nation, and having as a
matter of fact the proper forms an6
attributes of nationality, such Govern
ment can be promptly and readily rec
ognized, and the relations and interests
of the United States with such nation
adjusted.
FORCIBLE INTERVENTION JUSTI
FABLE.
There remain the alternative forms
of intervention to end the war, either as
an impartial neutral by imposing a ra
tional compromise between the contes
tants, or as the active ally of the one
party or the other.
AS to the first, it is not to be forgotten
that during the last few months the re
lation Of the United States has virtually
been one of friendly Intervention il
many ways, each not of itself conciu
sive, but all tending to the exertion o
a potential influence toward an ultimate
pacific result, just and honorable to al
in this concerned. The spirit of all oul
acts hitherto has been an earnest, un
selfish desire for peace and prosperity
in Cuba, untarnished by differences be-
tween the United States and Spain, anc
unstained by the blood of American cit
liens.
The forcible intervention of the United
States as neutral to stop the war, ac
cording to the large dictates Of human
ity. and following by historical prece
dents where neighboring States have in
terfered to check the hopeless sacrifice O.
life by internecine conflicts beyond theil
borders, is justifiable on nationa
grounds. 1t involves, however, hostile
constraint upon both the parties to th'
contest, as we'll to enforce a truce as tt
guide the eventual settlement.
GROUNDS FOR INTERVENTION.
The grounds for such intervention
may be briefly summarized as follows
First, in the cause of humanity ane
to put an end to the barbarities, blood
shed, starvation and horrible miserie:
now existing there and which the par
ties to the conflict are either unable o.
unwilling to stop or mitigate. 1t Is nj
answer to say this is all in another coun
try, belonging to another nation, and i:
therefore none of our business. it Is
expressly our duty, for it is right a
our door
Second, we owe it to our citizens IL
Cuba to afford them that protection an
Indemnity for life and property which
no Government thereof will afford, ant
to that end terminate the conditions tha
deprive them of legal protection.
Third, the right to intervene may b.
justified by the very serious injury t
the commerce, trade and business of on
people and by the wanton destruction o
property and devastation of the island
Fourth, and which is of the utmos
Importance, the present condition of af
fairs in Cuba Is a constant menace Il
our peace which entails upon this Gov
ernment enormous expenses. Witt