The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-07
NEED OF A STANDING ARMY.

NEED OF A STANDING ARMY.
The prejudice which has existed in
this country against the maintenance OF
q standing army is likely to be consider
ably modified by the events OF the past
few and the succeeding weeks We
have presumed too much upon our isola-
ton, forgetting the wisdom Of the faith
ers Of the country, which foresaw that
IL we were to become great CONNER
ciai nation We must be prepared to pro-
tece Its messengers IN the high seas
and compel respect for our rights by
such force as should keep jealous for
eign powers from molesting Us at home.
Two considerations have governed us
In our policy Of reducing the standing
army to minimum. Economy has led
us into the mistake In our estimates OF
what q minimum should BE- Another
consideration was that a large standing
army was a menace to republican in
situations. We have also been mistaken
as TO the magnitude Of an army which
made by any professional soldier Of the
requirements OF standing army In time
of peace has exceeded 10000 men. or
about one in seven hundred OF the popu-
Iation. We have gone to the extreme Of
keeping II somewhere about 1000 1t Is
not likely that we shall soon again be
involved in war. so that 5000 WELL
equipped men would probably answer
all purposes. The notion that such .
force as this could be used to overawe
the people Is not worth considering.
Our experience In the civil war. even
If we ignored that Of other countries,
should have impressed upon US more
forcibly the necessity Of the auxiliary
force represented in the constitution by
the militia and in actual practice by the
National Guard OF the respective states.
Neglecting that. we find ourselves today
with an enormous force Of volunteers
who are to a great extent unframed
and undisciplined. Willing as the men
are to shoulder musket and go to the
front, 1t would be little short Of murder
to perrnit them to face the advantages
possessed by modern arms and disci-
plined troops. The necessity for train
ing Is even greater in the case OF Off
GERS. Although the National Guard has
the advantage OF being led by some
splendid material, there Is a vast differ
ence between the experience Of the drill
ground and that acquired on the battle
field. In time OF peace officers OF the
regular army cannot learn much Of &C
tual warfare. but by devoting their
whole time and attention to the details
OF organization they are better quail
fed to handle large bodies OF men.
They must be accustomed to the hard
ships, the vicissitudes and the quick
emergencies of war. It is out OF the
question that men employed in CONNER
cial and professional pursuits can as
readily qualify themselves IS men who
take up soldering for a lifelong ayoca-
ton.
One OF the great difficulties OF the
war department just now Is TO bring the
volunteer service into ready adjustment
with army regulations. The drilling is
different, the use OF firearms is restricted
and not in sympathy with the changing
methods Of modern warfare. even the
formation OF troops differs; and sill these
things are now presenting obstacles TO
that prompt and symmetrical mobiliza-
ton which the sudden call necessitates.
without going to the extreme pre-
sented by most European powers, we
shall have TO revise our ideas OF mill
tary defense; and a good time 20 do
that will be az the close OF the war.
while the subject is fresh in the minds
OF the people and prejudices growing
through long period OF peace have