Evening star., 1898-12-30
WHAT THE WAR TAUGHT
Criticism Of Its Features by Admiral Plud-
demann.
No Radical Revelation of Present
Ideas Caused, but Experience
Has Been Enriched.

"A remarkable criticism of the main fea-
| lures of the war with Spain is that made
| public by the Office of naval intelligence in
the shape of a pamphlet containing the
| comments of Rear Admiral Pluddemann of
| the German navy. His conclusions are in
teresting. In the first place, he declares
| that the war will lead to no radical revo-
| luton Of the present ideas, though 1t has
| enriched former experiences. Still 1t might
| lead to erroneous conclusions, as many
good devices did not have chance to be
tested, the weakness of the adversary max
| ing them superfiuous, and others not gooo
| did not have bad results. because they
were counterbalanced by the defects ana
mistakes on the part of the enemy OF py
other favorable circumstances.
Artillery and speed have proved 10 De
much more essential factors In Wariaie.
The superiority of the American artillery
| is we'll known. The shooting of the Amerl-
cans was very good, while that OF the
Spaniards was exceedingly bad. The ad-
miral shows that this was fortunate ioL
the Americans, because so few OF thelr
shells exploded that it was only because
of the large number of hits made that
such success was obtained. The failure OF
the shells discovered at San Juan was
most noticeable at CaVite. Afternoon Is Is
called to the explosion of an S-inch sheil
in the forward turret of the Oquehuo-
This killed the whole crew, and, 1t Is said,
would not have occurred If the turret mad
had no roof In no case mas dl ai lioi
belt been pierced.
The DANGEROUS Six-Pounders.
The greatest destruction was wrought by
the 6-pounders The admiral thinks that
we may be little overhasty IN DONG
away with the 1-pounders on their failure
TO achieve results in the battle of San
tiago, since they were constructed pfima-
rily against torpedo boats and for use at
short distances The article states that
| the American material has demonstraleu
not only its efficacy, but also as TO dura-
bility as only four guns were In heed oi
repairs at the end of the war.
| 4 strong point is made of the danger OIL
wooden decks with pitch in the Seams,
while the danger in the case OF the Spanlsn
ships was further increased Dy the idcl
that the planks did not even rest on an iron
deck ON the other hand, the Americans
had taken every precaution to remove com
bustibies both in the construction oi tne
ships and afterward before going INTO ac-
ton 1t is declared that after the Spanish
experience in the loss of all their fire ex-
tinguisher plant by American proJectlies
the old-fashion fire bucket ana tuDs hltea
with water are shown to be still indispens-
able.
The admiral alludes to the thick powder
smoke which almost smothered the Amerl-
cans and blinded them, and makes the
surprising statement that smokeless powder
would probably have had still more trouble
some effects. Though he does not explain
this remark, he probably refers to the
fumes of the smokeless powder, which are
supposed to be asphyxiating.
He says that the Spanish might have
averted the whole sad catastrophe of San
tiago by preserving and taking advantage
of their greater speed, and he points out
the great disadvantage the Americans were
under in this respect. He adds, however.
that it is doubtful whether the Spanish
ships ever actually possessed the speed OH
cially claimed for them
Value of Efficient Engineers.
The war confirmed the value of an eff
cient engineer personnel, and it Is said that
the navy should neither spare trouble nor
expense in securing it.
Efficiency of Monitors.
Reference is made to the voyage across
the Pacific of the monitors Monadnock and
the Monterey 1t is said these were quite
remarkable as far as sea efficiency is con-
cerned. but when it comes to war efficiency,
they had better not be relied upon. On
this point Capt. Mahan is quoted to the
effect that for harbor defense even land
fortifications are better than monitors,
while at sea and in bombardment they are
too unstable for good gun practice.
The admiral says that the war did not
disclose what the results might be of a
serious battle between armor clads and
coast forts. He says thu Americans in
these instances have never gone close
enough to make 1t possible to note decisive
results on either side.
The grsat injuries, however, which the
Americans claim to have inflicted a differ
ent times have subsequently proved to be
eXaggerationS and delusions. The Ameri-
cans had better guns than the Spaniards,
and when the latter found that they could
not reach the American ships they stopped
hiring, Whereupon 1t was thought they had
silenced the batteries. After all the bonn
bardments of Santiago there was but one
gun dismounted in each of the two bat
teries. 1t is, therefore, demonstrated that
the ships were unable to seriously injure
land fortifications at great distances.
Dynamite Cruiser a Failure.
The employment of torpedo boats for
commandments, as at Cardenas, is con-
demned, and the so-called dynamite cruiser
Is pronounced to be failure, even in the
estimation Of the Americans This is also
the case Of the ram Katahdin.
The admiral describes at some length the
landing Of the Americans at Daiquiri, which
he says was the largest effected s,nee the
Cr1mean war. He says that great deal
was overlooked or incomplete, but the voy-
age and landing were effected in the most
beautiful weather. The Americans had
good luck, as they always did. He declares
that the Spanish by failing to obstruct the
landing showed that they have no appre-
clatlon OF military situations, for they need
not have paid much attention to the
Cubans. The admiral says: THE Spanish
ought to have known that now that the
Americans have arrived the Cubans would
avoid danger more than before" he cr1t1-
clses severely what he describes as the lack
OF management generally In the landing
No one was in command; Shafter did not
trouble himself about the landing and
sampson made arrangements only as far as
ms Warsh1ps and boats were concerned
Ihe officers of the transport steamers be-
haved very badly, and the admiral quotes
an American reported calling them insolent
unAmer1can, mutinous towards. Under
such circumstances 1t was not strange that
the men suffered for rations
Ihe greatest lesson taught by the war
Is the necessity for supplying coal for the
Warsnips. for Cervera was shut up in San
tiago before he could finish coaitne owing
to defective appliance. 1t will be neces-
sary In the future to carry coal on sXirt