The daily morning journal and courier., 1898-10-24

for Two Months Prior to the Destruo-
 ton of Cervera's squadron-Origin of the Scheme That Made Hobson q Hero
 Secretary Long's Anxiety to Ascer-
 tain Positively Whether or Not Cer-
 vera Was in Santiago Harbor.
 Washington, Oct. 23-The navy de- partment has made public that portion of Admiral Sampsons report covering the conduct of the fleet under his con- niand in It's operations in the West In- dies for about two months prior .o the destruction of Admiral Cervera's ships on July 6. It is made up largely of or ficial dispatches and the moveniects of the fleet, with explanations and com ment by the admiral. The report is dated August on the flagship New York and begins with a statement of the determination reached by the navy department to send a squadron to the Windward passage for the purpose of observation because of information re- ceived of the sailing on April 29 of Ad- niral Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verde islands. On the voyage eastward from the naval base at Key West, which began May 4, Admiral Sampson reports, there was experience ed endless trouble and delay because of the 1nefticiency of the two monitors, accompanying the ships, and which had to be taken in tow. Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident that they must either frequent ly coal or be lowed. The admiral says:
 Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere. Subse- quently when engaging the batteries of San Juan it was evident that their shooting was very bad. Owing to the quick rolling of the vessels, even in a very moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any degree of accuracy" Among the telegrams received by the admiral from the department when off Cape Haytien was the following:
 Washington, D. C., May 1.
 Do not risk or cripple your vessels against Notifications as to prevent from soon af- terward successfully fighting Spanish fleet composed of Pelayo, Carlos ". Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats, if they should ap- pear on this side.
 Signed: Long"
 On May 8 there was a consultation on board the flagship, and the admiral says that he decided to stand on to the eastward as far as San Juan, Porto Rico, on the chance of finding the Spanish squadron in that port where, if they were not successful in destroy ing it, it could be at least blockaded and held. The squadron arrived off San Juan on the morning of the 18th and the bombardment of the place en- sued. Regarding his action the admiral said: Tt was clear to my mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing ar engagements for holding it; that part of
 
 the arrival of troops to garrison; that the movement of the Spanish squadron, our main objective were still unknown; that Havana, Cervera's natural objec- tive, was thus open to entry by such force as his, while we were a thou sand miles distant made our imme- diate movement toward Havana imper- ative. I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana"
 Several telegrams are here presented, based on repor, that Cervera's squad ron had returned to Cadiz and they had in view ito return and capture San Juan" Shortly after news was receiv- ed that the Spanish fleet had appeared at Curacao, West Indies, and being un- der orders from the department pro- ceeded to Key West, to which place the flying squadron under Commodore (now AdmiraD Schley had already been ordered Arrangements were then hur- riedly made and the flying squadron, augmented by other vessels under Con- modore Schley were sent off Cienfuegos. where it was believed the enemy would go, in which case an effort was to be made to engage and capture him. Sampson was given the ch oice either of the command of the blockading spuad- ron off Havana or at Cienfugos. Schley in either case was to remain with his own squadron. From messages receiv- ed by the admiral from the department about May 15 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. On May 21 instructions were written by Sampson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead, regarding the pos- l sibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago. They are in part as fol- lows:
 Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba four ships and three torpedo boat de- stroyers. If you are satisfied that they are | not at Cienfugos. proceed with all despatch 1 but cautiously to Santiago de Cuba, and if | the enemy is there blockade him in port ] You will probably find it necessary to estab- 1 fish communication with some of the inhab- itants-fishermen or otherS-to learn deti- nitely that the ships are in port. 1t being impossible to see into it from the outside. The admiral said he felt much con- | cerned as to the delivery of these or +r J1xrf fl,a