The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-05-30
Views of Henry CIews.

Henry Clews, in reviewing the situation
in Wall street last week says: THE Span
ish war is consigned to secondary place as
a factor in the stock market. No one now
has any misgivings as to the outcome of the
struggle; and hence other influences pre-
dominate, such as the unprecedentedly fa-
vorable condition of our foreign trade, the
prosperity of the railroads as indicated by
their continued large earnings. the extreme
~ favorable crop outlook and last but not
least the superabundance of money and the
constantly lower rates prevailing, the COM
petition now being with lcaners and not
with borrowers
1.-The present position of finance in this
country is a most extraordinary one. In
the midst of war the condition of the for
eign exchanges is such as to place the
money centers of Europe virtually at our
mercy. We are permitting balances due to
this country. to the amount of probably
close upon 100000, 600. to remain on tempo
rary loan. and yet are buying extraordi-
narily large amounts of our securities held
in England. Germany and Holland. Within
a year. we have drawn from Europe fully
$100,OOOOOO of gold and are in a position to
draw about an equal amount more, if our
convenience should so require. Our stock
of the yellow metal has reached the high
est total in our experience and for the first
time exceeds the holdings of any other ma
ton. In the face of a heavy military taxa
ton and in prospect of large government
borrowings. Wall street is buoyant and the
prices OF securities are steadily advancing
such concurrence of conditions indicative
of financial strength in the presence of an
important war, has hitherto hardly ever be-
fallen nation.
'"lne war prospects. continue wholly as
surfing and suggest the proba bility of it's
early successful conclusion The Spanish
fleet on this side the Atlantic is not only
placed where it cannot harm us, but where
it must ultimately fall into our hands
Should Spain send out a second fleet to re-
three squadrons would be, in all reasona BILE
probability, foredoomed. If, instead. she
sends a squadron to eject Admiral Dewey
from Manila bay her success, in a naval
sense, would be far from certain, and Cuba
and Porto Rico would fall into our hands
beyond all question. Turn which way Spain
her fleets the loss of her territory and a
humiliating unqualified surrender. Castil-
nor dare Premier Sagasta as yet confess the
unwelcome truth to his Infatuated people
But all European governments see and ac-
knoWledge the inevitable, and 1T may be
expected that the powers which most enjoy
SPANS confidence will at no distant day
exercise pressure upon the government to
accept their intervention in behalf of peace,
on conditions likely to prove acceptable to
the United States In the meantime Spain
may De expected 10 pursue a pollcy or dlla-
tory evasion of contact with our fleets, in
the hope of some turn of sheer luck befall-
ing her, and in endeavoring to create dip
lomatic situations embarrassing to the
United States. She has sought to inveigle
France into making an illegal bargain for
getting the Philippines out of our hands
but apparently France is too wary to be
caught by any such diplomatic chaff, and
all such tricks must end in demonstrating
that the European powers have too whole
some a respect for the power Of the United
States to embrol themselves for Spain
benefit When we have captured Cuba and
Porto Rico and completed acquisitions
in the Philippines, then we may negotiate
for peace, but no peace should be accepted
which leaves these acquisitions incomplete
When that has been accomplished we shall
find ourselves in the presence of a set of
new problems profoundly affecting the flu
ture relations and interests of this Re-
public"