Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-02-28
SEIZURE OF CUBA
First Step to Be Taken in a War
With Spain.
DISPOSITION OF TIE NAVAL VESSELS
Preponderance of MuzzIe Energy
of the American Force.
d EFF E y Sc OF THE COAS T
d EFEN Sc OF THE COAST

Spain's reasonable policy, in case of war,
would be one of immediate naval activity;
for in that way only could she secure Cuba
and Costa Rica as bases of supply.
How far then. are we prepared to meet
or counter this stroke, and. comparatively,
of what would the immediate contending
forces consist? OF natural or artificial ad-
vantages, upon what can each count?
Involved as Spain already is in debt
of several hundred millions Of dollars on
account of Cuba. the loss of that island
as means Of redemption means national
drain of ju"t that much. That fact, per-
force of circumstances, centers the first
movements in the Antilles. AS a strategic
base. too, the island is vital to even mo-
mentary success for Spain, while Costa
Rica would prove but questionable sup
port under any condition.
With Cuba as an objective, let us see
what SPANS chances are there.
Coal for Spain's Navy.
At present, her army is fed in bulk by
food imported for that purpose, so COM
pletely have the insurgents turned the ad-
vantages of the island to their own end.
Modern ships of war are great coal con-
sumers, and their demands in that direc-
ton must be met to make the vessels eff
fective. Setting aside the coal already in
Cuba and available for the purposes of the
Spanish fleet, and leaving out of the ques-
ton for the present the harassing internal
condition of the island. it is necessary to
know only that of the coal already in Cuba
quite two-thirds of 1t came from the United
States, and also. that in case of a declara-
ton of war coal coming from any neutral
nation would be contraband and liable to
capture no matter what the flag under
which it claimed protection.
With Cuba under blockade, the next
nearest coaling stations belonging to Spain
are in the Canary Islands, distant some
thing like $500 miles, and there is not one
of her vessels able to come from there
even at the most economical speed and
still have enough coal left to make her
serviceable but for a precious short while.
By international law neutral port can
give vessels of belligerent nations coal
enough only to carry them safely to the
next nearest of their national ports, and
it is quite needless to remark that Cuban
ports. not Spanish ports, would govern
strictly the ships of Spain. In effect, then.
assuming the Spanish possession of the
island. Spain's ships would have either to
depend upon the Canary Islands OF upon
such doubtful supplies of coal as could be
smuggled into the strictly Spanish ports
of Cuba.
There can be no rational doubt as to our
recognizing the beliigerency of the insur-
gents in Cuba. in case of a declaration Of
war with Spain. In effect, that would be
to remove that surveillance against Amer
lean hlibusters so long borne by US, and
shift the burden where it really belongs
on the shoulders of Spain. With the recog-
milton OF the insurgents. their ranks would
AT once be swelled by the open adherence
of the lukewarm and disaffected SnanIsh
OF today. not to mention a considerable
number of deserters from the ranks of the
regular Spanish troops. With all the IA
possessed by the Cubans. and readily ac-
knowledged by many competent author
tiles, they are thoroughly Independent of
outside sources Of supply save for their
medicines and ammunition. and have, be-
sides, that fnestimable advantage-acclf-
nation.
Recognizing these conditions as we'll as
We do ourselves, Spain would naturally
monllize her naval forces about Cuba and.
depending upon her success in that, would
then turn her attention aggressively to
our coast.
How are we prepared to intercept her
nrst move, l. e., her rally about Cuba and
then to meet her possible second stroke
in the shape of operations against our
own seahoard?
Everything would depend upon our secur-
ing the command OF the sea, and in this
case command of the sea would first mean
the Selling of the only stragetic base near
our seacoast open to Spanish occupancy.
The Spanish vessels actually In Cuban
1000 tons each-the Vizcaya and the Girls
tobal Colon, one protected cruiser, the
Marques de la Ensenada, six unprotected
cruisers, twenty-four small gunboats and
one transport, aggregating. in all, 81 ,59S
tons displacement AS a matter of possibil-
ity. the available Spanish ships now IN
Spain may be added; and these consist OF
the battle ship Pelayo of $500 tons, the
armored cruisers Carlos and Infanta
Maria Teresa of 9,235 and 1900 tons, respec-
Tod
and tie cruisers Aragon, Lepanto and Ma
varra, amounting in all to a total displace-
ment of 1855 tons. There are "A few small
gunboats. four torpedo-boat destroyers and
about half dozen sea-going torpedo boats.
Our Ships and Where They Arc.
OF our ships at present ready We have
within easy striking distance of Havana
four battle ships-the Iowa, the Indiana
the Massachusetts and the Texas, the two
trmored cruisers. the New York and the
Brooklyn, four double-turreted monitors
The Puritan, Terror, Amphitrite and Man
tonOmoh, the protected cruisers Minneap.
oils, Columbia and Cincinnati, the unpro.
tected cruisers Montgomery, Detroit and
Marblehead and the gunboats Nashville
Castine, Wilmington, Annapolis Vicksbure
and Newport, aggregating a total displace-
ment of 104,s48 tons. In addition to this
Vcsuvius and six torpedo boats.
In the Mediterranean we have the San
Francisco Of 4,U9S tons, the Helena of 3.c
tons and the Bancroft of $50 tons, while er
route home from there We have the Machia.
of LII tons-a total of S,106 tons displace
ment. Added to the fleet now in our owr
waters, we can count upon squadron OF
l12,952 tons displacement as against a DOS
sible SO.243 tons for the Spanish
In the Philippine Islands the Spanish have
q number or small cruisers and gunbOtS nj
| which the Castillo of $500 tons displace
| ment is the only vessel of considerable.
force-the total displacement of the TWEEN
ty-One other craft amounting only to D. 40
tons Taken up as they are with the in
ternal condition Of those islands. they coult
offer but momentary trouble to our inter
ests in the orient, where we have tn,
Olympia, the Boston, the Raleigh the Pc
| trel and the Concord-a fighting force o.
1905 tons.
On our western coast We have the battle
| ship Oregon. the monitors Monadnock ant
Monterey, the cruiser Baltimore and tn,