The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-23
A HARD LOT TO DEAL WITH.

The apprehensions of those who feared
we would have trouble with the Cuban in
surgents have been verified sooner than
could have been expected. 1t is just
month since General Skaters army landed
in Cuba, and the trouble has not only be-
gun, but has reached an acute stage. If all
the insurgents are like those who consti-
tuted General Garcia's following the less
we depend upon them the better, though
for obvious reasons we should not make
enemies Of them if 1t can be avoided. AS
guerrillas they might give us almost as
much trouble as they have the Spaniards,
and prove serious obstacle to the pacifica-
ton of the island. For a few days after
our forces landed they found the insurgents
useful as guides and scouts, but they soon
showed they were worthless for any real
military duty and their era of usefulness
was short-lived. Recent dispatches from
Santiago represent them as cowardly, lazy
ungrateful, thievish and generally despica-
BILE, and our sick and wounded soldiers re-
turning to the United States are practically
unanimous in the same opinion. Our sol
diers went there with the best possible dis
position toward the insurgents, believing
them to be struggling patriots fighting for
their independence and liberty as Americans
understand the terms, and they come back
completely disillusionized and convinced that
the insurgents are not worth fighting for.
This is unfortunate on every account, but
facts must be dealt with as they exist. One
important fact to be borne in mind is that
we did not go to war to establish the SUI
premacy of the insurgents in Cuba, but to
establish the independence of the people
and stable government in the island. We
must prosecute the war on our own lines
and toward our own objective points, with
or without the cooperation Of the insurg-
ents. 1t is to be regretted that General
Shafter had not used a little more tact in
dealing with General Garcia and had
avoided offending him to such an extent as
to cause an open rupture. That Santiago
should be turned over to the insurgents to
loot or to govern after their fashion was,
of course, not to be thought of for a mo-
ment. but General Shafter could, without
any sacrifice of dignity or principle. have
deferred little to the insurgent leader and
invited him to witness the formal surrender
of the Spaniards, though he had not con-
tributed to the victory. Admiral Dewey
has had quite as difficult a task in dealing
with the Philippine insurgents. and yet,
with rare tact and diplomacy, he has got
along with them for nearly three months.
Whatever General Garcia's followers may
be, he had personally shown his good will
toward the Americans, and his record as a
fighter fairly entitled him to some sort of
recognition in the ceremony of surrender.
The evidence on this point is conflicting.
A special correspondent says that General
Shafter sent an invitation to General Garcia
to attend the ceremony of raising the
American flag over Santiago, and adds:
The Cuban general showed his resentment
by sending a reply which amply confirmed
norant soldiers have followed during the
weeks of hard fighting and campaigning
which have resulted in the fall of Santiago.
He declined the invitation, said he hated the
Spaniards and added that he did not want
to be where any of them were.
On the other hand. letter is published
from General Garcia to General Shafter,
which seems to bear marks of genuineness.
that he had tried his best to cooperate
efficiently with the American forces. says:
The city of Santiago surrendered to the,
American army, and news of that impor
tant event was given to me by persons
entirely foreign to your staff. l have not
been honOred with single word from
yourself informing me about the negotia-
tons for peace or the terms of the capitu-
lation by the Spaniards. The important
ceremony Of the suW'ender of the Spanish
army and the taking possession of the city
by yourself took place later on, and only
knew of both events by public reports. /
was neither honored sir. with a kind word
from you inviting myself or any officer of
my staff TO represent the Cuban army on
that memorable occasion.
If this is true. we think General Shafter
was lacking in tact. 1t could have done
no harm to have invited General Garcia to
witness the ceremony of surrender and it
might have f1attered his vanity and pre-
vented a rupture. But the rupture has
come, so far as General Garcia is concerned,
and it may be the precursor of other diff.
culties of the same kind. The insurgents
are hard lot to deal with and likely to give
US much trouble.