The times., 1898-07-17
MODERN TACTICS
Surprise at the Large Number of
Officers Slain at Santiago.

what astonishes all who have made a
study of modern field tactics is the large
| number Of officers among the killed and
wounded at Santiago In the first official
list ten of the seventeen killed were Off
GERS and the percentage among the
wounded Is hardly less.
No battle in any part of the world.
probably. could have furnished a better
test of the new tactics. made necessary
by the improvement in firearms. There
were the rough ground and the long
range magazine rifles. and there also
were the trained soldiers. One Of the
main objects of these tactics-or drill
regulations as they are called. except
when they are applied on the battlefield
is to preserve the officers uninjured as
long as possible. More reliance is now
placed on the intelligence OF the privates,
and particularly Of the non-commission-
ed officers, than in the old DAYS Of shouI-
der-to-shOulder formation Conduct that
would have fastened the name OF Cow
ard upon an officer in the civil war is
In sense, made compulsory today; that
is, while he is still 70 inspire his men by
example when occasion demands he is
Tor the most part 10 maintain a fixed
position with relation 10 his subordinates.
and is 10 keep behind shelter if he can.
Thus all movements can be intellfgentIv
dlrected-a knowledge Of which fact is
more encouraging 10 the men than the
/ physical presence Of the officer at their
elbows.
The non-commissioned officers have
Immediate charge of the men, and OppOr-
tunities are open 10 them such as never
We're dreamed of in the old DAYS. An
eminent English writer said, at the time
the new regulations We're adopted in his
army, that IN actual warfare. after the
men, the n0n-cOmmissioned officers
would be most exposed. the Heutenants
next, the captains next, and SO on;
which is as it should be
To illustrate the idea Of the present
battle formation. take one company
alone. The principle is the same for the
battalion, regiment. etc. In each com
pany there are four. sections" each un-
der the immediate command of a ser
geant- The sections are divided into
squads which are under the immediate
command OF c0rpOrals At the beginning
OF the formation for the offensive one
of these sections is designated as the re-
serves, another as the support and two
as the firing line, or in any other proper
ton as may seem best. The first lieu
tenant commands the reserve the second
the firing line. and the captains post is
near the support, with a bugIer beside
him to give the signals. also the first
sergeant and any who may be desig-
mated TO carry the messages. If ne quits
that post for a moment, he leaves word
where he can be found.
A few scouts are sent forward first.
After they have gone 80 feet, the firing
line advances, the sections gradually sep
arating and widening the intervals be-
tween them till they subdivide into
squads and the squads in turn separate
Z int, Iii -g-E,1-
apart when on the firing line proper. The
support at the outset is about $50 yards
behind the first line, ready 10 deplOy
and advance 10 the skirmishers, and the
reserve keeps about 100 yards in the
rear of the support, ready for flank at
tacks or to re-enforce the first line Every
man is taught 10 take advantage OF rocks,
bushes and the ike for cover. One object
is to get as near as possible without be
ing discovered. then 10 locate the enemy's
fire and 10 deceive him as 10 the strength
of the attacking party. The wide inter-
walls save the enemy from being moved
| down by the enemy.
The firing begins at an order from the
captain. The skirmishers halt when they
/ fire Gradually now, as they advance, they
/ close in toward the center to make room
I for the support on the TANKS The sup
| port meanwhile draws nearer till il joins
i the first line. Then there is a rush for
| ward. The lieutenant giving the instruc-
! tiOns while the men are lying down or
! are behind cover, commands: Advance
| by rushes; third section, forward The
sergeant of the third section gives the
| commands for the vOIleys- As soon as
| the first is fired and under partial cover
/ of its smoke the chief OF the second sec
| ton orders his men forward at double
! time When they have gone about fifteen
| yards, or to cover if there is any he causes
/ voIleys. On the first yOlley the third sec
| ton rushes forward fifteen feet in ad-
! vance of the line of the second section
| and fires. The section section advances
! as before and so it is continued When
| all the men are on the line each lieu
/ tenant takes position behind his own
| platoon, and the captain is in the rear
| of the center Having chosen suitable
| position from which 10 make the assault.
| the captain commands: Rapid nrei'
The lieutenants thereupon order the men
| 10 fix bayonets and 10 lay down the sights
| of their pieces, after which they give the
| commands for the firing. To charge,
the captain signals TO cease firing and
| commands: ITO the charge. mareh!'
The men rise and advance in double time
When they are about thirty yards from
| the enemy. he commands: Charge
| our tactics differ from those of the
| English army in only one important par
| ticuIar. With the former, when IL IS nee
! essarv n advance support and reserve
| and prepare for the charge the first line
| falls back and the others deplOyed pass
| to the front through the intervals in the
retiring first line The theory there IS
! that the first line may be too exhausted
| 10 go on to the charge. With our army
| the first line remains at the front, the
reserve joining it in the intervals and on
| the fianks.
The exact details of the fight at San
tiagO are awaited with interest by stu
dents of modern warfare. Rough ground.
long range of the Spanish guns. rapid
fire-all these things were reckoned with
when the new regulations were drafted
OF course, there were those who said that.
with any kind of formation, three men
out of five would be killed in an engage
ment where modern weapons were used.
and il is true that there can be no very
safe place on the field nowadays for either
| officers or men, With what we know at
present of this fight, only one thing can
| account for the dispropoTtiOnately large
loss of officers-which, indeed. may not
be borne out by the final returns-and
| that is that their dash" constrained them
to rush onward and expose themselves
without regard TO what they had learned
in their books and on their drill grounds.
II it shall turn out that the engagement
was fought tactically. faith in the new
regulations may be somewhat shaken.
|
/ a MOI