Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1898-12-01

iNG HE OPERATIONS AdAI>Sl
THE CITY. AND DID NOT GET To-
GETHER EVEN AT THE CLOSE OF
THE CAMPAIGN-SAMPSO RE-
FCRT cRITICIzES SKATER AND
GIVES SOME PREVIOUSLY UN-
PUBLISHED HISTORY.
Washington, d. c., November 3d.
The Navy Department to-day made
public report from Admiral Sampson
covering the operations of the United
States blockading feet off Santiago af-
ter the destruction of Cervera's squad
ron. The report begins with dispatch
dated on the flagship New York, July
18th. and winds up with one from the
same flagship dated Guantanamo, Au-
gust 4th. In the first report Admiral
Sampson tells of the demonstration
made against Agpadores by the Mich
igan troops under Duffield, the point of
which was that as soon as the ship
took part in the firing the Spaniards
disappeared. He says that the bonn
bardment of Santiago on the second of
July served no particular end, because
Skaters attack had been postponed.
He quotes dispatches from himself to
Shafter stating that it is impossible to
force an entrance to the harbor until
the mines had been removed and that
the work could be accomplished only
after the troops had taken the forts.
Shafter replied that he could not tell
when he could take the batteries. IL
they were as difficult as those against
which he was pitted it would take some
time and a great loss of life. Says
he:
Il am at a loss to see why the
navy cannot work uuder destructive
fire as we'll as the army. My loss yes
terday was over 500 men. BY all means
keep up fire on everything in sight I'M
til demolished. | expect. however, with
time and sufficient men to capture the
forts along the bay"
An hour later on the same day, July
3D. Shafter again appealed TO sampson
to Immediately force the harbor en-
| trance so as to avoid future loss among
his men, already very heavy. Says he.
You can operate with less loss of life
! than i can.
In reply on the same day Admiral
Sampson pointed out that the channel
of the harbor was we'll strewn with
mines. which would certainly result in
| the sinking of one or more of his ships
| If he attempted to enter the harbor
and by sinking one the harbor wnnld
be blocked against the entrance of the
others. He had hoped that Shafter
would take the batteries from the rear
so that he might drag for the torpedoes.
Sampson tells how he contemplated
bringing up the marine battalion from
Guantanamo. landing them at the foot
of Moro to assist in assault or to
take the west battery and had no doubt
of success of his plan. They reached
an agreement to lombard Santiago
from the sea for "a hours with the
heavy guns and if that failed to bring
the enemy to terms then to assault
the Socapa battery with the marines
and Cubans and force an entrance to
the harbor with some of the smaller
ships. Thus says ampson: i have
in the papers any statement of refusal
on my part to endeavor to force my
way into the harbor and cannot under
stand-in case the newspaper report
be a truthful statement of what was
sent by him-Gen. Skaters sending
any report OF this kind.
Il here, moreover would animadvert
upon the apparently extraordinary
openness with which every detail of
hope. effort or suggestion. on the part
of the army has been published. The
unwisdom Of such procedure is too
manifest for discussion
In a report dated August LIST, from
Sampson to the Secretary Of the Navy.
Sampson goes over again all the cir
cumstances connected with. the joint
operations before Santiago in order,
as he says, that a more complete his
tory Of the action OF the fleet in COM
bination with the army may be at the
disposal OF the department.
Some OF the additions follow:
On July'14 Sampson sent the fol-
lowing to Secretary Long:
July IA. 1893
Published kilograms of Gen. Shafter
in Herald of July 6 reflect on the navy.
/ wish the department and the Presi-
dent to understand that the first requf-
site to opening harbor OF Santiago do
Cuba is the occupation OF forts and
intrechments at it's entrance guarding
mine fields, and that the General has
never made move to do this, although
before his army lapded he stated that
such was the primary object OF his
operations. / have been ready at any
time during the last three weeks TO 81
lence works to clear entrance OF mines
and TO enter harbor whenever the army
will do the part which the proper con-
duct ~ NOR acef0nc IN IL tn fhrou NV