The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-02-25
Our Condition OF Defence.

It is obviously necessary in view OF pos
slble hostilities that every effort should be
made to strengthen our preparations for
coast and harbor defence, and to That end
the usually slow movement of the Engineer
and Ordnance corps Of the army and of the
bureaus Of the Navy Department may be
FASTENED by public demand for greater ex-
pedition. The actual condition Of our harbor
defences, however, affords no justification
for attempts which have been made to
create an impression in the public mind at
home and abroad that this country is 30 far
defcient. in its preparations for war that
we have reason for alarm in case of hostile
attack by even tho comparatively small
Spanish Navy.
The truth Is that in a wal with Spain
the advantage would be all with us. The
Spanish Navy almost Immediately after
reachinp our coast would be in need of a
fresh coal supply, more especially for Its
largo armored vessels and battleships Of
the latest modern construction, whose coal
supply would be nearly exhausted after
the voyage across the Atlantic. War, Of
course, would begin with our attacking
and blockading Cuban ports, which would
close them for use as a base of supply for
the Spanish ships. The only assault Of
any serious consequence which they could
make Upon us, too, would be upon i'm
p6rtant harbors for whose defence our prep
aration would be adequate. Washing
ton is secure, and New York could rest
in the confidence hat any attempted at
tack would be defeated by submarine,
floating, and land defences: an enemy Of
far greater strength than Spain would not
be dangerously formidable. The smaller
monitors now laid up are armed with 15-
inch smooth bores only, an armament in
sufficient to contend with the great rifles of
more recent ironclad constructions, but
large enough to defend efficiently harbors
whose channel only allow the approach of
vessels drawing little water.
Our Asiatic squadron is available for use
against the Philippine Islands, n Spanish
possession. Our European squadron is
small. but it would give occupation in
home waters for an important part of the
Spanish Navy.
AS to land forces, our supply is practically
limitless, considering the requirements.
An easily obtained increase of the regular
army, with the National Guard or militia as
subsidiary, would give us troops enough for
immediate and probably ultimate needs.
The Cuban revolutionists, fully supplied by
us with arms, ammunition, and all material
Of war. would be powerful allies. The
Spanish fleet would be $500 miles from it's
base in Spain, with it's Cuban base closed
to it, while we should be at our base, with
Havana only n few hours away from Key
West. Our financial resources are bound
less, while Spain hovers near bankruptcy.
Under such conditions there couldb be no
other result of a war with Spain possible
than q victory for us, and it would probably
come without long delay; but, of course
war is a destructive business, and in its
course, however brief, we might suffer
damages, which, temporarily and in par.
ticular places, might seem serious, though
their real Importance as affecting the
issue Of the struggle would be insig.
n%ificant. Undoubtedly 1t is bad policy to
underrate the strength of YOU opponent,
but neither should it be overrated. The
Administration may be relied upon to use
all honorable efforts to maintain peace,
but it will not be because we have any
reason to fear Spain.