The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-07-13

London, July 1.-THE Madrid cor
respondent of the Daily Mail says: Sc
nor Sagasta, being asked as to whether
decision had ben made regarding
peace, replied: mo. But what rene
dy can there be but to make peace?"
The ministerialists insist that the
regular army in Cuba does not object
TO conclusion of peace. but that the
10000 volunteers are determined to con-
tinue the war.
London, July 13.-The Madrid cor
respondent of the Times says: The
crisis hangs fire. The ministers still
meet in council, and the difficulties of
retirement seem even greater than the
difficulties of remaining in Office. The
conservatives are not prepared to ac-
cept Office, and it is hard to imagine a
liberal cabinet without an undisputed
liberal leader. The logical conclusion
is that Senior Sagasta must accept the
responsibility of deciding whether or
not to open peace negotiations.
What is required is that he should
make up his mind on that essential
point. If he reSOlutely adopts a peace
policy, nearly all his colleagues will
support him, and for those who do not
substitutes can be found If. on the
contrary, he decides to continue the
struggle, he must largely remodel the
cabinet For the moment he appears
to hesitate between the. two courses,
perceiving clearly, no doubt, by the
light of his long experience Of political
life, the danger of both.
On the one hand, general public opin-
ions seems now directly in favor Of
peace. Nearly all the influential papers
recognize that the supplies in Cuba
are not nearly so great as was sup
posed; that Porto Rico could not long
resist a formidable attack; that since
America has now obtained undisputed
command of the sea, Spain can no long
er assist her colonies in their efforts
against a powerful invader, and that
she will obtain better conditions now
than when her powers of resistance are
completely exhausted On the other
hand, military circles still favor hold
ing out and are beginning to use very
violent war language. The three chief
military organs all publish articles re-
gardins resistance TO the UttermOst,
and employing against the partisans Of
peace terms of invective which 1 re-
frain from reproducing. If they repre-
sent faithfully the general state of feel
ing in the army, l can understand at
least one of the reasons why Senior Sa-
gasta hesitateS 10 adopt a reSOlute
peace policy.
In the course of his long political life
OdSdSld IDS IN tt uiAuGt iii Minus VI
recommendation repreSsive abSOlut-
ism to anarchial repUblicanism, and he
has taken an active part in more than
one revolution. No man is more cap
able of guaging accurately the real
of any current or public
opinion and of weighing accurately in
ternal against external dangers. His
hesitation, however, cannot continue
much longer, for a majority of his col
daoiSi1T1 ha-
ing taken without further delay.
FAR-sIGHTED sPANIARD.
The newspapers today quote long ex-
tracts from an important work on
Cuba, published by General POlavieja,
who spent 20 years there; rising from
the rank of a sub-lieutenant to be cap
tain general, besides filing with dis
tinction several important civil posts,
including the governor generalship. It
is rather surprising to find from his
that his political views
differed radically from those of official
circles in Madrid At a comparatively
early period, General PClavieja arrived
at the conclusion that Cuba could not
remain permanently a Spanish colony
When this conviction ripened, he wrote
endless letters to private and official
friends, urging the necessity of making
timely preparations for an amicable
In 1879, when governor of
Puerto Principe, he wrote General
Blanco. explaining that the Cubans
would never abandon their efforts for
and that the United
States would never relax its schemes
for annexation. He argued, therefore,
that Spain ought to prepare to grant
in order to avoid being
elected violently, with loss to the ma
tional interests and stain to the ma
ton.
When he became governor general,
perceiving that the ever
growing danger of an American at
tack, urged the government to build
six cruisers and 20 floating batteries for
the protection of the Cuban coast. His
policy, in short, was to grant friendly
independence as soon as possible but
so long as Spain retained the island,
to be strong enough to suppress insur-
rection and to resist foreign invasion
NO ONE WILL ACCEPT.
Madrid July u (via Bayonne, France,
July 12).-All the Spanish ministers
have handed their designations to the
premier, Senior Sagasta, who has eX-
planned the situation to the queen re-
gent. But the difficulty is that nobody
Is willing to accept the premiership.
Marshal Martinez de Campos would
accept it, but he does not command a
in the chamber of deputies.
While the military party urges war,
1 large proportion of the civil pOpula-
lion is desirouS of peace.
1t is pointed out, however, that if
he United States insists upon the ces-
sion Of Porto Rico and the Philippine
the general feeling will be in
favor of a continuation of the HOSTILE
les, many SpaniardS believing that the
situation in Cuba viii enable Spain to
1rolong the struggle.
The government issued today loan
If 500. 000. 900 pesetas in treasury bonds
1t per cent. of which amount the Bank
If Spain takes 100000, O00 pesetas.
AN HONORABLE PEACE"
Paris. July 12.-The officials OF the
Spanish embassy here communicated