Evening journal. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1888-1932, 1898-11-11

be continued with every energy max
ing the most iud.c,ous disposition OF il
60 accomplish Tie desired result.
June 20 the following telegram from
Seer etary Alger was received.
The president wants to know the
earliest moment you can have expedi-
tionary force ready TO go 70 Porto Rico
large enough to take and hold island
without the force under General Shat
ter?'
1.-THE reply was sent that such an ex-
petition could be ready in ten days.
1T was found that many Of the
steamers were not suitable for trans
port service, they having been built en-
tirely for freight steamers and not
| equipped for properly conveying troops
and munitions Of war. The accumula-
ton Of the large amount OF supplies
and war material for the 10000 men
above mentioned at Tampa had crowd
ed that place and, owing to the absence
Of depots and facilities for handling
that amount Of material, occasioned
great delay in properly equipping the
expedition intended for Santiago. 1t
was. however. supplied and orders
hereto attached given for the proper
smbarkatlon Of the troops, which were
ready to sail June s. The movement
vas, however. suspended, owing to the
report received that Spanish war YES
sells had been seen In the Nicholas
channel. The expedition, consisting OF
SOB officers and 1895 men, finally sail
ed on June IL, leaving some 10000 troops
that were expected to move with this
expedition, but which could not do so
owing to insufficient transportation.
ION June 10 l received the following
dispatch from Washington, signed by
( Secretary Alger:
Important business requires your
presence here. Report at once An
swer'
ION June "a I submitted to Secretary
Alger a plan Of campaign as follows:
sir--I have the honor to submit the
/ following: with the capture OF Santiago
/ de Cuba II Is expected we will have
several thousand Spanish prisoners,
and with the capture OF the second OBJ
jective position porto Rico) now un-
der consideration, 1t is expected we Will
add to the number making, IT Is hoped,
In the aggregate at least 10000 prison
ers.
AFTER the capture of the position
next after Santiago de Cuba 1t will be-
in my judgment. advisable to take some
deep water harbors on the northern
coast OF Cuba, which would be available
not only for our army, but also for the
navy as safe ports for our transports,
supply ships and naval vessels between
Key West and Porto Rico. 1t is also
important that we should select some
point at which to dsembark our mount
cd troops and light artillery, with which
our government is well supplied. We
.asln T...a .alra tsI Of
$1,000 cavalry. This force, with the light
artillery and a small body Of infantry,
will make a most formidable army
corps with which to conduct cam
paign in the interior Of Cuba.
The most available point. II ap-
pears to me. would be the harbor OF
Nuevltas. which has 2sia feet Of water,
From there the command could move
to Puerto Principe. one of the principal
cities In the island of cuba. Using that
as a base. II could move through the
rolling country, which Is reported tS
be free from yellow fever to Poron and
Taguayabon and thence 10 villa Clara,
or. by more southerly route, from
Puerto Principe TO Ciego de Avilla
thence to Spiritus and thence to villa
Clara. A road could be built at the
rate Of five miles per day as that army
corps marches; also we would find two
railroad bases between Puerto Principe
and villa Clara.
ITO move mounted troops over from
Florida to Cuba and make this march
would undoubtedly consume the time
up to nearly the SOth Of September
"'This army corps would also have
the assistance Of all the available forces
of Garcia and Gomez and would by that
time be occupying practically two
thirds of the island of Cuba.
IF no serious force was encountered
this army corps would continue its
march to the south side Of Havana. II
a large force of Spanish troops, sufli-
cient to check its march, was moved to
the vicinity Of villa Clara, then the en-
. tire army with which we purpose to in
wade Cuba could be moved between the
forces and defeating them in detail.
~ make this suggestion as having
three advantages. First. we could en-
ploy at reasonable compensation such
prisoners as desired occupation in road
. building; second, we could move into
the interior of Cuba our large cavalry
command without serious molestationi
third. we could be operating during the
rainy or sickly season in the most
from yellow fever and at the same tim,
, be occupying a large portion Of thS
, enemy's territory.
> If this proposition does not NEE
with favor. then after the capture Of
, Santiago de Cuba and other places e
{ the east we could move the entire fore,
60 the west of Havana and conduct thu
campaign from the deep harbors OF
e. that coast. My judgment. however. Il
{ decidedly in favor OF the first plan D
@ campaign.
Z Before reaching Villa Clara W,
! would undoubtedly have upwards o
r $4,000 prisoners. and II we could, by ia
1 dicious. humane treatment, use them II
a way that would be advantageous I,
10 themselves as well as TO our interests
n / think IT would he advisable. Their
would be one great danger in MOVING
10 them TO our own territory and estab
IL fishing a large camp of prisoners, an,
o that is that they would bring the germ
o Of disease with them and spread then
. among our own people, as many Amer
q leans would have to be employed on tn
4 ships and railroads together with tn
Il guards necessary to control them