Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-02-28
Cubans Could Not Stand Siege of
Long Duration.
few PROVISIONS ON THE ISLAND
Divers Continue Their Work at
Scene of Wreck.
CO Z RT AT KEY EST
Copyright, 1895. by Chas. NJ. Pepper,

special tabiegram From Stan Correspondent.
HAVANA, February 26 via Port Tampa,
February 21.-Great heed is now being Civ
en- here TO military problems in the present
| tension between the United States and
| Spain. Should the threatening break
through the Maine disaster not come di-
| plomacy may happily avert it from other
causes. American intervention may be ac-
cepted by Spain as the best means Of let
| ting go of the island, in spite of the scorn-
| ful refusals that have heretofore been Civ
en-. 1t does not seem to be in the minds Of
| the officials and the officers of the army at
| present. They are planning for defense I'm
case of hostile invasion or a blockade
What the means OF defense would be is
therefore of interest in the United States
| The military problem of starving an ISL
| and already starved is not a difficult one.
Cuba with its food supply largely from the
states, shut off from that source, its people
cannot get means of subsistence for sixty
days. large part of them are used TO
| starvation. They can live on a very meager
diet much longer than people who have
been accustomed to satisfy the cravings of
| the stomach by one or two meals a day. A
blockade of the ports which shut of sup
plies from all sources would soon have it's
intended effect.
No Resources Left.
The population could measure definitely
the term of its existence. The country has
practically no resources left In the waste
| of desolation in some places, for long
stretches, there is not even grass to eat.
| Outside the immediate neighborhood of the
fortified towns and villages no food sup
| plies are raised. Where cultivation has
been possible the land has been given over
| to sugar and tobacco, without the thought
| of what was needed for consumption.
In two hundred miles ! have seen few
fields OF tomatoes, or sweet potatoes pos
| sibly dozen small fields of corn. and moth
| ing else, except cane and tobacco Even
the banana groves were neglected. Cuba
has been getting fits -four rice and corn
| meal from the United States. For the last
three months the free importation of cattle
has been permitted. They have been
brought from the states. Mexico. venezue-
la and Honduras. Except the oxen used
| on the plantations, the cattle have been for
| immediate consumption. There is no sur
plus left The demand is so great that the
cattle are killed Immediately on their ar.
rival before they are In fit state
Take the Oxen for Food
II the importation should be stopped by
4
plantations would serve for food for short
| period, then there would be no fresh meat.
| In travelling around the island | have seen
just one flock of sheep. 1t was small one
Pigs and poultry were formerly raised by
| the country people, but since these pacificos
nave been shut up in the towns pigs and
poultry have almost disappeared from the
race or the earth. The larger towns and
cities are little better off than the couu-
Try. Ihey have some salted meats and
other provisions stored away. possiblv
| enough to last fortnight But a months
Isolation would bring famine to Havana. as
well as TO the smaller cities.
The Spanish military authorities know
these things but they are less impressed
py them than would be the military au-
thorities Of any other nation. That the
remnant Of the country people should be
starved would be OF little consequence to
them- AS for the Spanish troops. these are
Already ruined starved They could
stand IL longer than most armies. Their
officers never think of the men, When
the officers themselves are put on short
rations they may be ready to sue for peace
Neglect of the Army.
1t is not likely the needs of the army in
Cuba would have much influence on the
policy Of the Spanish government in tho
event of war. With the certainty of los
Ing the island, they would not be governed
by wha, might be taking place here. The
army in Cuba has been neglected so much
that Its neglect, in the last and desperate
stages of Spain's power, would probably be
condemned. The point of all this is SIM
pie. With the roughly civilized govern
n.ent, the conditions i'm Cuba might be a
nf foreiuu IL,
war, if one were begun with Spain. Cuba
can be starved out in sixty days. but that
OF itself would not cause Spain 10 yield.
The yielding would have to come through
naval defects or through the blockade OF
Spanish rather than of Cuban ports
1t could be further said that of all classes
In Cuba the insurgents are the best able
to Withstand the shutting or of food sup
plies. In the eastern provinces which they
control the country is under cultivation,
and they have also considerable live stock
which is grazing on the ranches of the up
lands. War which withdraws the Spanish
troops TO the sea ports would enable them
to cultivate a larger area. The insurgent
camps in the woods and the hills of the
central and western part of the island are
fairly well supplied with food. The in
surgents in these provinces would suffer
hoi iuSiiiPo ifoui biockdut. buI
not to the extent that other classes of the
population, including the Spanish troops,
would suffer.
Action should BE Prompt.
Should the Island of Cuba be actually
occupied by American troops, II is desirable
that the occupancy come quickly. In two
months yellow fever viii be more potent
coast guard than the largest army defense
that Spain might raise. 1t has been the
aim of the Spanish government to delay
American Intervention until the summer
with the perennial plague was close at
hand The danger from yellow fever may
be great enough to be warning. Few
people would voluntarily come to Cuba .
this season unless they felt themselves un-
der some sort OF obligation to do 80. linz
mense bodies of American soldiers even
from the southern states viii be IN danger
II their coming ID put on until May or
June. They cannot fight this dreaded sum-
mer climate with powder and ball or with
a A. A. - =