Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1898-04-21

SLduCC dS wei dS III name. possessed OF the 6le-
ments of stability" and forming de facto If
left to itself, a state among the nations reason
ably capable Of discharging the du-
1is own goverance in dealing With cases
like those the further contention that recogni-
| ton OF independent statehood is not due to 3
revolted dependency until the danger of its be-
ing again subJugated by the parent state has
| in fact, applied in the case of Texas The con-
gress to whom President Jackson referred the
question as one probably leading to war and
| therefore proper subject for "a previous un-
Outstanding with that body by whom war can
| aIone be declared. and by whom all the provis-
ions for sustaining its perils must be furnished"
LETT the matter OF the recognition OF Texas to
the discretion of the executive, providing
| when the president should be satisfied that the
republic of Texas had become IAN independent
| state" 1t was so recognized by President Van
Buren,, who commissioned charge 'afaireS,
March Z, 1887. after Mexico had abandoned an
attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and
| contest going on between the insurpent prov
| ince and its former sovereign.
Former Message Reverted To.
| 1 said in my message of December last: ut
rection possesses beyond dispute the attributes
of statehood, which alone can demand the rec
| ognition of belligerency in it's favor
| The same requirement must certainly be no
| less considered when the graver issue of recog-
| nizing independence is in question, for no less
| positive test can be applied to the greater
act than to the lesser. while, on the other hand
| influences of and consequences of the struggle
| upon the inte nal policy of the recognizing
| state which form important factors when the
| recognition of belligerency Is concerned, are
| secondary If not rightly el1minable fac
| tors, when the real question is whether
the community claiming recognition is or
| not independent beyond peradVenture.
| Present Recognition Inexpedient.
| Nor from the standpoint of eXpedience do I
| think 1t would be wise or prudent for this gov
| eminent to recognize at the present time the
| independence of the So-called Cuban republic
| Sucm recognition is lot necessary in order to
| enable the United States to intervene and
| DaCifV the island. To commit this
| try now to the recognition of
any particular government in Cuba
| might subject to embarrassing conditions
| OF International obligation toward the organi-
| cation so recognized. In case of intervention
| or disapproval of such government: we would
| be required to submit to it's direction and to
| assume to 1t the mere relation of friendly
| ally. When it shall appear hereafter that there
| is within the island a government capable of
| PERFORMING the duties and discharging the
| functions of a separate nation. and having, a
| matter Of fact, the proper forms and attri
| butes of nationality. such government can be
| promptly and readily recognized. and the rela-
tions and interests of the United States with
such nation adjusted
| Alternative Forms of Intervention.
There remain the alternative forms of inter-
| vention to end the war either an impartial
neutral by imposing rational compromise be.
| the one party or the other.
| At to the first. it is not to be forgotten that
during the last few months the relation Of the
not of itself conclusive, but all
| tending to the exertion of a potential
| influence toward an ultimate pacific result just
| and honorable to all interests concerned The
spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earn
est unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in
Cuba, untarnished by differences between us
| and Spain and unstained by the blood of Ameri-
The forcible intervention OF the United States
as neutral to stop the war, according to the
| large dictates of humanity, and following many
historical presidents where neighboring states
have interfered to check the hopeless sac
| beyond their borders is justifiable national
grounds. 1t involves however hostile con-
straint upon both the parties to the contest as
well to enforce truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
Grounds of Intervention.
The grounds for such intervention may be
briefly summarized as follows:
First In the cause OF humanity and to put
an end to the barbaritieS bloodShed, starvation
and horrible miseries now existing there, and
which the parties to the conflict Their
| unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. 1t Is
| no answer to say this is all in another country,
belonging to another nation and IS therefore
none of our business. 1t is specially our duty,
for it is right at our doors.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to
afford them that protection and immunity for
life and property which no government there
can, or WILL AFFORD ana TO that END TO terminate
the conditions that deprive them OF local pro-
lection.
Third The right to intervene may be justf-
fed by the very serious injury to the COM
| merce, trade and business interests of our
people, and by the wanton destruction of prop
erty ana devastation OF JnS lSIanu.
Fourth. And what is of the utmost i'm
portRnce the present condition OF affairs in Gu
| ba is constant menace to our peace, and en-
tails upon this government an enormous ex-
penSe. With Such conflict waged for years in
an island so near us. and with which our people
have such trade and business relat1ons-when
the lives and liberty OF our citizens are in con-
slant dread and their property destroyed and
themselves ruined-where our trading YES
seized at very door, by warships
of a foreign nation. the expeditions of tiIibus-
tn oil
gether, and the irritating questions and en-
tanglements thus arising-all these and others
strained relations, are a constant menace to
our peace, and compelS US to keep on semi
war footing with nation with which we are at
peace
Destruction of the Maine.
These elements of danger and disorder already
pointed out have been strikingly illustrated
justly moved the American people.
/ have already transmitted to congress
destruction of the battleship Maine in the
harbor of Havana during the night of the 10Th
of February. The destruction of that noble
vessel has filled the national hearts with in
expreSSible horror. Two hundred and fifty
eight brave sailors and marines and two officers
of our navy repoSing IN the fancled security of
"a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death
grief and want brought to their homes and sor-
row to the nation
The naval court of inquiry which, it is need
less to say, commands the unqualified conf
dence of the government was unanimous in its
was caused by an exterior explosion, that of
Subm rine mine. 1t did not assume to place
the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.
In any event the destruction OF the Maine, by
whatever exterior cause. Is n patent and i'm
preSSive proof of a state of things in Cuba that
is intolerable. That condition is thus shown TO
be such that thesSpaniSh government can not
assure safety and security to a vessel of the
American navy in the harbor of Havana on
mission of peace and rightfully there.
Assurances Given by Spain.
Further referring in this connection to re-
cent Diplomatic correspondence, a diSpat h
from our minister to Spain of the Goth ultimo
contained the statement that the Spanish min
that Spain Will do all that the highest honor
and Justice requires in the matter of the Maine
The reply above referred to on the 3lSt ultimo.
also contained an expression of the read ness of
fereuceS which arise in this matter
which is subsequently explained by the note of
the Spanish minister at " aShlngton OF the 10th
instant as follows:
from the diversity of views between the report
of the American and Spanish boards, Spain
proposes that the fact be aScerta1ned by an i'm
partial investigation by experts. which deci-
sion Spain accepts i'll advance To this have
made no reply.
President Grant Quoted.
President Grant, in 1879 after discussing the
phases of the contest as it then appeared and
It's hopeless and apparent indefinite prolonga-
ton, said:
In such event. am of the opinion that
other nations will be compelled to assume the
responsibility which devolveS upon them and
to seriously consider the only remaining meas
ures possible mediation and intervention
Owing, perhaps, to the large expanSe Of water
sula, the contendlng parties appear
to have within themselves
depository OF common confidence, to suggest