The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-05-20
PLANS OF INVASION.
II Will Take n Month At Least In which
10 Get the Volunteers Ready.


10 Get the Volunteers Ready.
New York, May ia special to the
Times from Washington says: The
plans for the invasion of Cuba by the
United States forces remain unchanged.
The elusive performances OF the Spanish
squadron have prevented the execution
of a part at least of the programme. but
II has been altered in no important par
ocular. The determination to dispatch
to the island as soon as practicable an
army Of not less than so, 900 men compe-
tent to meet and cope with the forces
Of Blanco still stands. But the time has
not yet come when ii is practical to do
this for the simple reason that the army
is not ready to be sent to Cuba. The
16. 900 regulars massed at Tampa are pre-
pared to go at any time. The majority
of volunteers gathered at Tampa, New
Orleans, Mobile and Chickamauga are
not prepared to go anywhere and will
not be until they are uniformed, armed,
equipped and have some training in the
art of war. All of this will take time.
The best judgment of military experts is
that 1t will require not less han a
month under the most favorable circum-
stances to put IS. 900 volunteers in con
dition to reinforce the regulars for the
army Of Cuban invasion.
1t Is thought by many raine officers
that more time than that ought to be
n is likely to he taken. 1t Is recol-
lected that General Scott spent six
months training and drilling his army
before he nvaded Mexico and 1t Is not
commended hat the invasion of Cuba IL
any less formidable an undertaking han
the conquest OF Mexico. The. inglorious
experience Of Bull Run Is a favorite IL
lustration of the unwisdom of putting
recruits to the serious business Of war
too soon.
There is one portion Of the Cuban pro-
gramme, however, which may not be
delayed much longer. That Is the dis
patching of an expedition made up al
most, IL not entirely. of regulars from
the Tampa camp to make a landing on
h Cuban coast, throw up Notifications
and clear the way for the coming of the
army proper later on.
II is no settled that this will be done,
but strong arguments are being used in
favor Of the project. 1t IL urged that we
went into this war largely in order to
save the reconcentrados from starva-
ton, but that, as a result of our present
plan Of campaign, we are making their
starvation sure and rendering 1t not un-
likely that the insurgents will suffer
something akin to the same fate. A
move owards these people, II Is urged.
In commanded by every consideration of
humanity. even II II be great risk. A
force Of 5000 regulars anded at an
available spot on the Cuban coast.
would. ii is commended, De able to do
something toward relieving this suffer
ing by establishing a depot Of supplies
which could be drawn on by the insur-
gents.
Further, ii is argued in favor OF the
seizure Of a landing place without de-
lay that the undertaking In becoming
more difficult every day and that the
regulars could not be better employed
than in providing fortifications to pro-
tect the debarkation of the army when
IL is ready to move. The longer the oc-
cupation Of a landing place Is delayed. II
Is pointed out. the more time Blanco
has for throwing up Qualifications and
mounting batteries along the coast
which will cause trouble when the real
invasion begins.
Tn advocates Of this movement be-
lieve IL would be easy for a force OF the
strength mentioned to hold Its own with
the protection that the blockadine
squadron could AFFORD.
There Is no prospect. however, that
even a preliminary movement of this
nature is likely to be undertaken imme-
diately. For the present, at least, all
military movements will await the re-
suit Of the maneuvering Of the squad
ron in the West Indian waters