The Worcester spy., 1898-10-01
In MANILA.
Report Of Gen.
Merritt.
GREAT VICTORY.
His Warm Praise of the
American Soldier.

ationS about Manila was made public
at the war department today. 1t is
dated on board the transport China
Aug. 81. After giving briefly the story
of his embarkation and his arrival al
Manila, and the disposition of the
troops there, he says;
II found Gen. Greene's commend en-
camped on strip Of sandy land run
ming parallel to the shore of the bay
and not far distant from the beach, but
owing to the great difficulties of land
ing supplies, the greater portion of the
force had shelter tents Only. and were
suffering many discomforts, the camp
being situated in low, FIAT place, with
out shelter from the heat of the tropi-
cal sun or adequate protection during
the terrific downpours Of rain so fire.
quent at this season.
Il was at once struck by the exem-
plary spirit Of patient, even cheer
I full endurance shown by the officers
and men under such circumstances,
and this feeling Of admiration for the
manner in which the American SOL
dier, volunteer and regular alike, ac-
cept the necessary herdships of the
work they have undertaken to do, has
grown and increased with every phase
of the difficult and trying campaign
which the troops of the Philippine ex-
pedition have brought to such a brill
| liant and successful conclusion.
The Filipinos, or insurgents at war
with Spain, had, prior to the arrival
of the American land forces, been wag-
| ing desultory warfare with the Span
iards for several months, and were at
the time of my arrival in considerable
force, probably not far from $4,000 men.
These troops, well supplied with small
arms, with plenty Of ammunition and
| several field guns, had obtained posi-
tions of investment opposite to the
Spanish line of the detached works
throughout their entire extent"
Gen. Merritt speaks of Aguinaldo's IS
accomplishments previous to his arrival
and continues:
AS Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me
on my arrival nor offer his services as
a subordinate military leader, and as
my instructions from the president
| fully contemplated the occupation Of
the islands by the American land forces
anG stated that the powers Of the mill
tary occupant are absolute and supreme
and Immediately operate upon the po-
litical condition of the inhabitants,' |
did not consider 1t wise to hold any
direct communication with the insur-
gent leader until / should be in possess
ion of the city of Manila, especially as
] would not until then be in a position
to issue a proclamation and enforce my
authority, in the event that his pre-
tensions should clash with my designs
For these reasons, the preparations
for the attack on the city were pressed,
and military operations conducted with
out reference to the situation Of the in
| surgent forces. The wisdom of this
course was subsequently fully estab-
lished by the fact that when the troops
of my command carried the Spanish in
| trenchments, extending from the sea to
the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish
right, we were under no obligations, by
pre- arranged plans Of mutual attack, tt
turn to the right and clear the front
still held against the insurgents, but
We're able to move forward at once and
occupy the city and suburbs.
TO return to the situation of Gen
GEeene's brigade as 1 found 1t on my
arrival, 1t will be seen that the diff
Guilty in gaining an avenue Of approach
to the Spanish line lay in the fact Oh
my dlSinclination to ask Gen. AguinaldC
to withdraw from the beach and the
Gale Real so that Greene could move
forward
This was overcome by instructions
TO Gen. Greene to arrange, If possible
with the insurgent brigade commander
In his Immediate vicinity, to move Il
the right and allow the American force,
unobstructed control of the roads il
their immediate front. No objection wa.
made, and accordingly Gen. Greene,
brigade threw forward a heavy out.
post line on the Gale Real and tn,
beach, and constructed a trench IL
which portion Of the guns of the Utal
batteries was placed.
The Spanish. observing this activity
on our part, made a very sharp attach
with infantry and artillery on the nigh
OF July 81. The behaving Of our troops
| during this night attack was all thai
could be desired, and / have, in cable.
| grams to the war department. talxer
occasion to commend by name thoss
who deserve special mention for good
| conduct in the affair Our position wa:
extended and strengthened after this
and resisted successfully repeated nigh
attacks, our forces suffering, however
/ considerable loss in wounded and kill.
ed, while the losses of the enemy, or
account of the darkness, could not be
| ascertained.
The strain of the night fighting ano
the heavy details for outpost duty
made it imperative to reinforce Gen
Greene's troops with Gen. McArthur's
brigade, which had arrived in trans.
ports on the 31st of July
The landing was finally accomplish.
ed, after days of hard work and hard.
ships
Upon the assembly Of Macarthur
brigade in support of Greene's, 1 had
about $500 men In position to attack
and l deemed the time had come fol
final action. During the time of the
night attack I had communicated my
| desire to Admiral Dewey that he would
allow his ships to open fire on the right
of the Spanish line of the entrench-
ments, believing that such action woulc
stop the night firing and loss of life
| but the admiral had declined to order
| 1t unless we were in danger of losinE
our position by the assaults of the
Spanish, for the reason that, in his
| opinion, it would participate genera
engagement. for which he was mo-
ready
Now, however, the brigade of Gen
Macarthur was In position, and ths
Monterey had arrived, and under date
of Aug. G. Admiral Dewey agreed tt
my suggestion that we should send &
| Joint letter to the captain general mott.
| flying him that he should remove from
the city all non-combatants within 4;
hours, and that operations against the
defenses of Manila might begin at any
time after the expiration Of that per.
iod.
This letter was sent Aug. 7, and ! g
reply was received the same date to the
effect that the Spanish We're without
places of refuge for the increased num-
Der of wounded, Sick women and chill
dren. now lodged within the walls. Or
the 9Th formcl joint demand for the
surrender of the city was sent in. This
demand was based upon the hopeless
ness Of the struggle on the part of the
Spaniards, and that every considera-
tion Of humanity demanded that the
city should not be subjected to bonn