Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-04-24
WAR LIKELY TO BE DECLARED.
Recon- me ndinE It-Our Right
TO Blockade Cuba.

President VIII Send In MessnEe
Recommending It-Our Right
to Blockade Cuba.
Washington. April 23-Members of the
cabinet, with only one or two exceptions.
still Relieve a war declaration is absolutely
necessary in order to fix proper status
OF this government, as such declaration
unquestionably would enlarge the scope of
the rights of this government in case Of
general conflict. and it is practically set
tied that congress will be asked to take
this step on Monday or soon thereafter.
The naval officials are anxious to have
the declaration Of war made at the earli-
est moment, in order that they may make
sure of prize money. resulting from the
sale of Spanish ships they may capture.
However. it may be stated that several
members of the cabinet are opposed to
seizure of merchant vessels which are
neither loaded with contraband of war nor
destined to supply with food the Spanish
forces in Cuba, taking the view that, al
Though the rules of war as practiced in the
past do permit the seizure Of such craft.
the action is hardly consistent with the
position taken by the United States at the
time of the Paris agreement.
The refusal of the United States to enter
the agreement to refrain from the practice
of privateerinS was largely because the
government desired to carry the principle
much further and exempt from seizure the
property Of individuals at sea Although
our government is not bound at present
by any statement made at that time, there
is belief on the part of some Of the cab
met officers that merchant vessels should
have at least the benefit of a notice Of the
outbreak of hostilities before seizure.
Meanwhile. in the opinion OF the naval au-
thorities. and the state department, no
prize money is likely to be awarded and
the Spanish vessels already captured in
advance of a declaration of war. although
this is point for judicial determination,
doubtless be speedily settled by an ad-
miralty court.
Members of tine diplomatic corps say that
no question can be raised as to the right
of the United States to declare blockade.
This being conceded. foreign powers will
accept it as binding. Speaking of the block
ade, the military attache of one of the
leading foreign establishments here said:
''The right of blockade is clearly recog
nzed, and this blockade of Cuba will be
universally respected by foreign powers.
The limited extent of the blockade is doubt
less due to the necessity Of making the
blockade effective. Unless effective. a
blockade is not binding. and with the ex-
tended seacoast surrounding Cuba It would
be very difficult, If not impossible. to main
tain effective blockade of the island. The
blockade win have the effect of stopping
all commerce. even in neutral ships. to and
from the ports covered by the presidents 8
proclamation. But at the same time it
should be understood that a neutral ship
may take her own chances of running the
blockade. In that case she acts at her
peril and she can. under no circumstances.
expect indemnity from either of the bel
ligerent powers"
This military aide. who is a recognized
the two strategic moves open to the Span
ish navy, one the other of which. he
believed would be adopted. He said: THE
first and probably the best strategic naval
move by Spain, would be to concentrate
and hold her fleet at the Cape Verde ISL
ands and the Canaries. and wait until the
American fleet came to them. They would
then have the advantage Of position. base
of supplies. and ample coal. 1t would be
waiting game but it would promise much
better results than seeking decisive naval
engagement far away from the base of
supplies and from coal. The only serious
difficulty would be that 1t would necessitate
the abandonment Of Cuba and Porto Rico.
Whether the Spaniards are willing to make
so great a sacrifice as a strategic move
Tor ultimate naval success. remains to be
seen.
If not then the Spanish navy must
choose the other strategic move of making
a dash to this side and risking everything
on the chance of decisive victory at the
outset. 1t would be a desperate move,
but if successfully executed il would prove
OF inestimable value. not only in its ma
terial results including the defense of
Cuba and Porto Rico. but also the SEN
timental influences of encouragement. in
epiring enthusiasm. But it would be a most
hazardous move, the Spanish ships
would have the Atlantic between them and
the home ports with little or no chance of
replenishing their coal supplies.
What course the Spanish stratesists
will adopt l do not know. but. all things
considered, 1t seems to me likely they
viii adopt waiting game and a retire
,ncnt of their naval forces until the
United States fleet, eager for a contest,
goes In quest OF them"
The foreign representatives are beginning