Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1898-05-06

III "N-OO "ftNDOLti1S
ARE UNEXCELLED.
will be kept up and a land force. oper
ating probably from Matanzas as
base, interpose between the capital and
all Of the island to the east of it, The
small Spanish garrisons would prob
ably be at once recalled to Havana. II
not, their capture in detail would be
small affair. Havana thus cut off by
force of United States regulars and Gu
ban insurgents controlling line from
MatanZas to the south coast, some fifty
miles, would be compelled to yield
within a few months from a lack of
supplies, and the purpose of the war
would thus be accomplished with the
least possible bloodshed and but little
destruction of property. In the mean
time, pending t>e isolation Of Havana,
such reconcentrados and other nom
combatants as are still there and in
the immediate adjacent territory would
have passed through our lines to safety
in the middle and eastern portions Of
the island, and would be with all other
non-combatants on the island, accessi-
tion they could be at once furnished
with all necessary supplies, and could
at once set about raising crops and put
ting nearly all the island once more in
a fair state Of cultivation. thus bring
ing about almost Immediately that per-
manent ameioration in their condition
which is the principle object OF the
war.
The administration is. by the OBJ
ject and pecGGar circumstances of the
war, committed to winning the strug
gle with the minimum loss Of life and
destruction of property. The five or
six months of the rainy season will
shortly begin, and the mortality among
green. unseasoned troops suddenly TAX
en- from all sections of our immensely
diversified country and rushed into mi
litary life
IN TROPICAL CUBA
would necessarily be very great 70
minimize this loss Of life from sickness
the regulars will be used as far as pos
slble. They are accustomed to being
rapidly changed from one set of cli-
matte conditions to another, and are
familiar with all the methods of which
the dangers incident to different CHI
mates can be warded off. Undoubted-
Nv the loss Of life among them would
be vastly less than among the yOlun-
teers. There seems to be a general
impression that several special req
mems Of fever immunes will be at once
raised. and undoubtedly these would be
sent at once to strengthen the regulars
ho+ hut f6y of
the ordinary volunteers will ever visit
Cuba. After they have had several
months of camp life. hard drill and
strict discipline it may be intended to
send some of them over at the end Of
the rainy season., but it nov looks very
much as. if the rainy season will out
last the war, as far as Cuba is con-
cerned.
LAS to the ultimate state of the Span
ish garrison, my opinion is that when
the Spaniards are completely isolated
confined to the capital with a small
strip of adjacent territory and cut off
from all communication with the rest
of the world by land and sea, that ques-
ton will almost have solved itself.
Anyone who has paid much attention
to Spanish military enterprises of late
years, especially in Cuba, must be sat
isfied that the rank and file cannot in
their present demoralzed condition be
relied upon to confront in the open
field disciplined and high spirited sol
ders. Nothing, then, will remain for
the garrison but continue behind forti-
fications till it is ready to surrender.
Exactly when this would occur if the
= n l1rt - Nv,
not be foretold Tt will probably de-
pend somewhat upon the state Of things
in Spain and upon the influence the
present Captain General possesses over
the army. Probably even now the bulk
of this army would prefer to take
AN INFLUENTIAL PART
in arranging the future Spanish gov
eminent to remaining In Cuba. An
other factor in the question would be
the action Of the Spanish navy. 1t
would be at once forced to take defin-
lite measures to show by its movements
that it is resolved to limit it's fighting
sphere to the defensive line of the Can
aries or to boldly cross the Atlantic to
relieve the beleagured garrison.
THE former course would be to leave
us q free hand on tnlS size OF the water
and 10 serve notice of abandonment on
the garrison 1t can hardly be doubted
that an attempt i'll force to break the
blockade, trying the fate of pitched
naval battle would result in the de-
struction of the Spanish fleet In
either event the surrender would only
be fastened
1T would hardly pay, on the whole
to lombard and try TO take Havana at
once We might, and probably would
take ii if we went about it in earnest
But the risk is great. Two or three
chance shots might destroy two or three
of our immense battleships During, or
even after. the bombardment we might
strike a strong topedo or two with dis
astrous results The Spaniards in pure
rage would probably burn and loot the
town before they abandoned it. And
then we would have fifty or sixty thou
sand Spanish scattered over the entire
island instead Of cooped up in a mar
row space. Wherever they went there
would be pillage, murder and outrage.
and we should have to hunt down in
small parties through the mountains
and swamps until they We're all captur-