The Columbus journal., 1898-05-11
CAMPAIGN TO BE SHORT
Plans Of the War Department
Are Made Public.
B1e FOOD SUPPLY FOR soLDIEEs

Prsvisssas Dssag Asas Ese Asetlisaag
anA Feeding Many Theososds - Hso
Outside sf Tie UsieeA stases-WesAlag-
ess 00slsls Ese werryi.s Abesl Anss-
Ssaa Tlesss sr Vessels.
WASHINGTON, Nay l0.-Theee h The
best authority for the statement that
yesterday having passed without report
from Admiral Sampson. the navy d.
partmeut does not expect to hear from
him within several days. Tho author.
ity for this statement il fully acquainted
with Admiral Sampson's plans and Tho
remark w0uld seem to indicate that tho
admiral, having failed to find the
enemy at the place expected. had turned
bis attention to the alternative project.
What this il cannot be asosrtained. Il
h evident. howevee, that the depart
ment il under no apprehension - 70
the safety Of the Amefican 0eee nor
Of any vessel OF the feet.
The war department. yesterday cav
fit to crafty the universal desire and
inform the country through the press
Just where the various state volunteer
organisations are to be concentrated. II
is the first time that any Official state
ment has been made as TO the points Of.
concentration themselves. Tho oeder
as published BY the department h
thought in some quarters to warrant
the assumption that it contemplates .
speedy movement of the United States
military forces upon Cuba and in much
greater force than was originally
planned. The war department officials
refuse to sey anything on this point.
but there is every evidence that they
EXPECT . short, sharp. conclusive and
immediate campaign, such - could not
be waged by 5000 or 10000 soldiers.
System of MsbilisinG.
! It Is also to be noted that preparations
made by the quartermaster's depart
ment and tho ecommissary' . department.
90 far as it disclosed BY actual orders.
indicate that provision il being made
for mobilizing and transporting and
feeding many Thousands OF men out
side Of tho United States.
With . view to systematixing tho
great work of mobilizing the forces and
putting them in service, tho war de-
partment has planned . scheme which.
it is believed. win very much hasten
the work Of getting the men together
and equipping chem, while avoiding
any congestion of the railroad txafIRo
euch as Is always to be apprehended In
cases of war. Instead Of allowing Ill
the troops called for from . particular
state to be assembled and broken in at
the rendezvous. tho department. b In.
structing its mastering officers TO com.
plete the organization OF regiments -
rapidly q possible and q soon - one II
organized to report the fact to the de-
partment. when that regiment win b
ordered at once TO the point selected
for concentration. In this way the
government viii b relieved greatly I'm
the distribution Of stores, which win
be called for only - fast - they are
needed.
Feeoo Fer Cuba. SERVES.
1t IL the expectation that the first
regiments organized and reported from
the states win be sent to Chattanooga,
thence going to Cuba via Mobile,
Tampa. New Orleans and Galveston,
for expeditions win be dispatched from
each of these ports. The governor Of .
state viii have no hand in the designa-
ton Of the regiments to 90 to particular
concentration camps. The destination
viii depend upon the promptness with
which the volunteers are organized and
are ready for transportation. Probably
about 0ne.third Of the entire levy
called for BY the president. or about
"a, QUO troops, win constitute the force
10 be sent south to take part in the Arst
Cuban service. following the regular
army forces. These troops viii be the
first 10 receive their equipment. When
they are organized, equipped and con.
centrated the government win be ready
to equip the second contingent, namely,
the forces about equal to another third
of the total call which viii be assigned
to the defences Of the coaet and harboes,
tho regular United Statas
troops Withdrawn from those posts.
When these are equipped the govern
ment viii turn its attention to The
third class, comprising the last third of
the lz5, 900 volunteers called for. Il il
the sincere hope OF tho war department
that il win not be called upon 10 fully
equip these troops before hostiljties are
ct an end. but tho work Of preparation
il proceeding On the contrary assump.
k;on T1,ia thSru3 d1v3siOn ~iIl rrs,oki