The sun. (Wilmington, Del.) 1897-19??, 1898-05-26

definite information are not warranted
in disputing the point

definite information are not warranted
in dsputing the point.
But whether this opinion OF the De
|, partment is to be relied upon depends
on the information which the, Secretary
has. He does not confess that any def
mite statement has been received from
either Commodore Schley or Admira
Sampson, but indicates that his convic
tion that the Spanish fleet is at Santiago
de Cuba is based on general knowl
edge of the situation. Secretary Long
is not in the habit of announcing ar
opinion in this positive way except or
very correct information.
The question is being discussed pre-
and con, and there ts considerable specu
lation as to whether, if the Spanish fleet
is at Santiago, the entire fleet is there, OF
has been divided, and as to the number
and character of the vessels.
One interesting question is whetEc:
the fleet was accompanied by a supp, ?
ship, and whether tne purpose of enter
ing the harbor was to land supplies, il
being found impossible to land them
elsewhere, or whether the fleet was com.
PEELED to seek refuge there on account
Of the bad condition of some of the yes.
sells.
No doubt is felt that if the Spanish
fleet is actually bottled up at Santiago it
was the intention Of Admiral Cervera to
remain there until renforcements arrived
from Cadiz. For some time it has been
felt extremely probable that the Cadiz
A,at &c oo,,,i pr tn intr Taryara
The maneeuyres of the Spanish ADJ
miral have indicated that he was await
ing reinforcements, and it is believed
that the necessity of economizing his
coal supply, which he has found diff
Guilty in replenisking, compelled his
seeking a harbor of refuge where he
could enjoy comparative immunity from
attack until achievements, accompanied
by transports, should arrive to join him.
1t requi.es too great a risk for him to
attempt to reach Cienfuegos, and he was
therefore left to choose between Santiago
de Cuba and San Juan, Porto Rico. 1t
was believed by many naval authorities
that h. would try to reach San Juan, and
if it is true that he has not done this, but
is bottled UP at Santiago, his taking this
course is regarded as an evidence that he
is short of coal and provisions, and that
his vessels were not in condition to I'M
dertake the trip to San Juan.
The Spanish fleet enjoys greater i'm
munity from attack at Santiago 2e
Cuba than it would at San Juan, but
its remaining there puts an end to its
operations and renders it extremely diff
cult, if not impossible, for relief to EH
got to it by any fleet which Spain could
organize.
The best authorities say that if Ad-
miral Cervera's fleet Is at Santiago de
Cuba it need ~ longer be counted as Il
factor in the war.
1t may be the design of the Spanish to
send another fleet to attack ours at that
point while Admiral Ccrvera makes an
attack with the torpedo -destroyers under
his command, thus attempting to subject
our fleet to danger on both sides, but
this could not be successfully accom-
plished, as two vessels could prevent
any Of Admiral Cervera's fleet from
coming out of the harbor, and our fleet
in those waters is strong enough to
destroy any force that Spain could send
against 1t.
The plan of campaign being consi-
dered, based on the assumption that
Admiral Cervera's entire fleet is at
Santiago, is to keep it blockaded there
and to proceed at once with the invasion
of Cuba. This plan contemplates that as
soon as sufficient army is landed in
Cuba to hold the Spanish in check at
every point and to warrant aggressive
operations, an attack by land forces will
be made upon he town of Santiago de
Cuba, which it is said could speedily /
to surrender.
The occupation of Santiago de Cuba by
our troops and the blockading OF the en-
trance to the harbor by our fleet would
leave the Spanish fleet utterly without
support Or escape. and the Spanish Ad-
mlal would either have to surrender or
have his fleet destroyed.
The same plan contemplates the bonn
bardment of Havana and Il general attack
upon the Spanish forces at all quarters
BY following this plan of prompt and ag-
yressive action it is urged that before
another Spanish fleet could be got to
American waters we could bag" the IS
land of Cuba and Admiral Cervera's fleet
1t the same time.