The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-12-03


ments, in my judgment, can be accomplish
ed during the rainy season. through a
country comparatively free from yellow
IeNer, well stocked with cattle, ana having
grass sufficient for our animals While this
is being accomplished. our volunteer army
wal be prepared to land in the vicinity of
Mariel, Havana or Matanzas in sufficient
force TO complete the capture or destruc-
ton OF the Spanish forces upon the Island
OF Cuba. The advantage of this movement
VIII be that the army and navy viii act in
concert and close unison; that it does not
olVlde our navy and that it will utilize
our most available military force in the
pest way during the time of the year when
military operations are most difficult.
l believe that the entrance of the port
of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or block
AIDED by one or two monitors to better ad-
vantage than to send the army there
Where II would have to meet a strong gar
rlson, which is already there and all of
the forces that can be quickly sent there
by rail directly from Havana and Matan-
zas.
IF the above plan is approved, troops
could be ordered TO embark on the trans
ports Immediately and the purpose would
be the occupation of Spanish territory, first
by moving our troops as speedily as pos
sib}e TO Santiago de Cuba and Porto Rico,
and later to the north coast of Cuba, es-
peciaily our cavalry. This military occu-
patton 20 continue until hostilities cease.
Very respectfully, Nelson A Miles,
Major-General Commanding"
Without indicating what disposition was
made of the suggestions contained in this
dispatch, Secretary Alger goes on to briefly
explain the conditions which confronted
the american army at that moment. The
Secretary of the Navy was convinced that
Cervera was in Santiago harbor, and every
energy was bent TO concentrate a military
force near Santiago to aid in the destruc-
ton of the Spanish fleet and the capture
of the city. The great difficulty was the
want of transports; the loading facilities al
Port Tampa were imperfect and there was
great confusion caused by the large con
centration of supplies there. The railroad
facilities We're inadequate; there was fail
ure to label the cars and the postoffice was
congested so that bills of lading were de-
layed. Few of the thirty-six transports
finally gathered were fit for such service,
but they were the best that could be had,
and while they were rated at % 900 passen-
gers in capacity, even the 16 900 persons
transported was a larger number than
should have been carried. Fortunately they
arrived without serious accident, however.
The first duty for which Cen Shafter
in force about 5000 strong on the south
side of Cuba, Secretary Alger says, was
abandoned on account of the movements
of the enemy's fleet Says the secretary:
Maj. Gen. Shafter was selected to COM
mand the expedition to Santiago.
Next in order the secretary quotes dis
patches of May 81, sent at 2:30 O'clock at
night, to Gen. Shafter at Tampa directing
him to start for Santiago to land east
or west of that point in his own judg-
ment and move on to the high grounds
in such position as to destroy the garri-
son there and cover the navy as it sends
its men in small boats to remove the tor
pedoes or with the aid of the navy, cap
ture or destroy the Spanish fleet reported
to be in the harbor Gen. Shafter was TO
accomplish this with the least possible
delay, making use of the insurgents, nut
being careful not to put too much conf
dence in any person outside of his own
troops. He was ordered to cooperate
with the navy and communicate with
Sampson and Schley and upon completion
his task, unless his command had suf-
fered severe loss, was to proceed to Puerto
de Banes and await orders.
The report states that May 80 Gen. Miles
left for Tampa to assist in the embarka-
ton of troops. June 4 the secretary tele-
graphed Shafter at Tampa that Sampson
reported Cervera- safely bottled in Santa
go harbor and urged immediate aid from
his troops. Sampson reported $500 Span
ish troops as the garrison of the vicinity.
Following is the dispatch of June 5 of
Gen Miles, already published in his report,
saying that the expedition had been delay
ed through no fault of any one connected
with it and continuing: This expedition
is so important that l desire to go with
this army corps or to Immediately organ
ize another and go with It 10 join this
and capture position No 2. Now that the
military is about to be used 1 believe 1t
should be continued with every energy,
making the most judicious disposition of it
TO accomplish the desired results"
A telegram from Sampson of the 18th,
translated by the secretary to Mai. Gen.
Shafter or Maj. Gen. Miles
at Tampa declared that he
has silenced the works at San
tiago; that if 10000 men We're there the
city and fleet could be taken; that every
consideration demanded immediate army
movements, and if delayed The city would
be defended more strongly by guns taken
from the fleet Following without explana-
ton is this dispatch to Gen. Shafter at
Port Tampa from Secretary Alger, dated
the 18th:
since teIegraphing you an hour since.
with what force you have ready"
In reply Skater said he would sail the
next morning, which was as early as steam
could be gotten up. That was al p m,
end at 9:34 p. m. Miles at Tampa telegraph
ed directly to the President:
.e1rom the commanding officer, down to
the drummer boys, every one is impatient
10 go and annoyed at the delay The last
of the troops from Chickamauga arrived
this morning and have been equipped and
hurried to the steamers. Feel confident
they will all do their best to carry our
the wishes and directions of the Presi-
dent. Miles, Maj Gen. Commanding.
A dozen kilograms at this point explain
the sudden detention of the expedition ow-
ing to the report of the fictitious Spanish
squadron in Nicholas channel. In the
E w