The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-03-18
A NICE DISTINCTION.
Recognition of Belligerency and
Recognition of independence.
THE BEST WAY TO HELP CUBA.
Recognition of Belligerency Would he .
Moral Heip, but = Practical Dissdvan-
tage - Recognition OF Independence
Might Bring on War with Spain.

tage Recognition OF Independence
Might Bring on War with Spain.
| WASHINGTON, March 1S.-[Special. I'm
compliance with the requests OF many
readers state the difference between a
recognition of belligerency and recogni-
tion of Independence. The difference Is a
wide one, and President Mckinley must
have had it in mind when in his message
TO congress last December he announced
his opposition to the former In the case of
Cuba and the possibility Of resort to the
latter at some future time. Recognition
of belligerenoy Is merely official declara-
| ton that a state of war exists. 1t does not
materially change the relations of the hos
tile parties one to tho other or their rela-
tons to neutral nations. 1t Is mere Of
fetal acceptance and PRONUNCIATION of a
| fact. IL we were to recognize the existence
| of a state Of war in Cuba, we would still
remain neutral. Such PRONUNCIATION would
In one way, chiefly sentimental aid the
insurgents. 1t would give them status
which they had not hitherto enjoyed and
might aid them in borrowing moncy and
in the purchase of supplies on credit.
| Effect Of Recognition Of Belligerency.
But this advantage would be moral
rather than practical. At the present time
1t is not contrary to law for citizens Of the
| United States to sell munitions Of war to
| the Cuban insurgents. 1t Is not unlawful
| to forward such supplies to Cuba unless
the expedition carrying them Is armed. A
merchant ship carrying a cargo Of guns
and cartridges for Cuba is free from seiz-
ure or even search as long as she Is upon
the high seas. The ships of Spain cannot
touch her or her cargo. But the moment
she comes within three miles Of the coast
Of Cuba, within the jurisdiction of Spain,
she loses the rights which she enjoyed on
the high seas and is subject to Spanish
law and procedure. There and there only
may she be seized, her goods conflscated
| and her crew punished for violation of
Spanish law.
1t Is In this very particular that the chief
effect Of an official recognition of belliger-
ency would be felt. The moment a state
of war In Cuba was declared by the United
States the naval vessels Of Spain would
have the right to search our ships any
where outside our own jurisdiction, or
three miles from our coasts Anywhere
upon the high seas they found ship car
rying contraband of war they could seize
her. For this reason the people who have
belligerency as an aid to the insurgents
have not acted wisely. The moral advan-
tage, as have pointed out, would be with
the insurgents, but the practical advan-
tage would be on the side of Spain. In a
nutshell, it would then be easier for the
Cubans to get money with which to buy
munitions of war; but it would be easier
for Spain to capture those supplies before
they could be placed in the hands Of the
insurgent troops
am asked why, then, tho Cuban lead
ers have favored recognition of belligerency
by this government? The answer Is O sim
pie one. Notwithstanding its practical
disadvantages to them they have favored 1t
because it would increase the probability
of war between Spain and the United
States through exercise of the right OF
search and seizure upon the high seas by
Spanish naval vessels The insurgent lead
ers in this country do not deny that this
Is SO, and they cannot be blamed for 1t.
But President Mckinley has assumed that
If war is to come between the United States
| and Spain it should not come through
accident or blunder or collision, but de-
liberately in contest over great principles.
Recognition of Independence.
Recognition of independence Is wholly
different thing. 1t eleyates the party rec
| ognized to membership of the family of ma
| tions. 1t gives them the right to send out
| and to receive diplomatic representatives.
! Itwould give the Cuban insurgent govern
ment power to borrow money, to fit out
| ships, to blockade ports, to carry en- all the
| functions of real and recognized govern
| ment. Thereafter the United States gov
| eminent would not recognize Spanish au-
| thority in Cuba but Cuban authority, not
| Sagasta and Blanco, but Alasso and Gomez.
| Any one can see what the effect of this
would be. Considering the intimate COM
mercial and political relations which Cuba
| has with this country one of two things
would inevitably follow. Spain would be
virtually compelled to abdicate authority
| in Havana and in the island, leaving the
! United States to treat with the insurgents
| as the defacto government, or she would
| have to put stop to our negotiations with
the insurgents by making war upon us.
| 1t is true that our attitude would be
that of a neutral after recognition of inde-
pendence We could transact business
with General Banco In Havana as the
military chieftain having temporary con-
| troll of that port. But 1t would have to be
business pertaining simply to the territory
under his control, and not to the island or
Cuba as a whole; for we should have al
| ready declared the government OF Cuba to
be the government of Masso and Gomez.
| For the same reason we should have no
| further business at Madrid, SO far as Cuba
Is concerned. General Woodford's bust
ness at that capital would be wholly as to
questions in the peninsula itself, or Puerto
| Rico, or the Philippines. For negotia-
lions as to Cuba, except In purely local
sense, we should have to go to Cubitas, or
wherever the capital Of the insurgents
happens to be.
Naturally such state Of affairs would
lead to almost hopeless confusion. 1t
would BIO a state of affairs intolerable to
Spain. There could be but two ways out
of 1t, and these would DO either Spanish
abdication of authority in the island or
war. Probably Spain would choose the
latter. She would be forced to 1t. But II
Is President McKinley's firm intention to
so conduct matters that IL war comes II
will be of SPANS making and not ours.
We shall keep within our rights, and IL
Spain cares to take the responsibility OF
making or declaring war, let her do 1t.
| The United States il ready for ANYTHING