The times., 1898-07-03

Following the shock produced by yes
terday's news from the front. that prob
ably Fas many as one thousand Ameri-
can soldiers had been killed and
wounded. there was some disposition in
Washington yesterday afternoon TO take
a dissatisfied view Of the things ac-
compiished by our arms at Ell Caney
and Aguadores. This was all wrong,
as the reports must be entirely m slead-
ing if Gen Shafter has not Won a sig
nal victory. although at considerable
cost in human life, and one which i'm
plies the complete demolition of the
Spanish position and the speedy cap
ture or destruction of the Santiago gar
rison and Cervera's feet, before many
days Elsewhere we show that our
losses. while regrettable and serious.
are not greater than were to be ex-
pected under the circumstances. That
the death roll of honor is not longer is
q matter for congratulatien.
The two vital preliminaries to success,
as they were regarded by our comman-
der in the field-that is. the cutting or
OF Linares's retreat north and west
and the isolation of Aguadores and the
Morro fort from the rest Of the defen-
sive organization-have been brilliantly
accomplished as far as we can see. 1t
is possible that active operations may
have been partially suspended. await
ing the re-enforcements from Tampa
which should reach the army today. II
Il be true, as stated in press dispatch
yesterday afternoon, that Pando has
been able to come TO the aid of Linares
with six thousand fresh Spanish regu-
lars. we can easily see why Shafter
should consider il best TO wait for simi-
lar assistance.
The problem before him is not a conn
pleX one as military problems go. But
il is evident that its solution VIII not
be arrived at without overwhelming
force in guns and men. or further sac
rifices. He does not particularly want
the city OF Santiago. To take ii t--i,--e
he or the Navy shall destroy CeTyera's
squadron would be foolish. II would
only invite bombardment from the
Spanish ships in the harbor What is
needed is the reduction Of Morro Castle.
followed by the annihilation of the So
capa and Estrella batteries. so that
Sampson can creep through the chan
mel. picking up the mines on his way.
and attend TO Cervera much as Dewey
did to MontoJo in the Bay Of Manila
That done. and the possibility of evac-
uation toward Holguin or ManzaniIlo
shut off. the campaign is as good as
ended s1Crappsa1iv I
driven within his interior line Of de-
fense; and can be starved out OF
knocked out with artillery
Many Americans have grown so used
TO the ideaof infiicting enormous damage
upon the enemy without sustaining any
ourselves. that they are inclined TO
cI1ticise Gen Shafter because he was
not able TO assault a strongly in
trenchec position without anybody
being killed or hurt. They should at
once wake up TO an understanding that
war cannot be waged without the death
or wounding of many men The only
thing for the general commanding in
the field TO consider is whether or NOT
the object TO be gained is worth the
price of achievement In the case of
the first days fight before Santiago. We
are much mistaken if the results have
not justified all they cost. As far as
known. Of the troops engaged. about
one in eighteen has been hit If the
Cuban auxiiiaries have been included
ia the estimate of casualties there was
only one in ty-three-certainly not
a large proportion, considering what
had to be done.
Altogether. on the basis OF such mea-
ger information as we have to ealcu-
late from. il appears to us that the ac-
tion so far has been not only credita-
bic in the highest degree to our arms.
but has been accompanied with less
painful consequences than anybody had
a right TO anticipate