The weekly register. [volume] (Point Pleasant, Va. [W. Va.]) 1862-1909, 1898-06-01
0oGENT REASONS FOR SAME.
Favorable Conditions for the Plan
Noted BIZ authorities.
CUBAN INVASION POSTPONED.
win the spanish rieet corised Up Al
Santiago and With the Enemy's
Troops Isolated, the Under
taking l. Regarded Quite
Feasibls MOVE
n Feasible Move

Washington, May 26.-Extraordinary
activity in the war and navy depart
ments which was not limited to the
higher officials, but included every in
d1viduaI in both services. gave every
indications of important and immediate
Developments in the conduct of the
war while an unusual exhibition of
secrecy served to strengthen the i'm
preston that prompt and energetic ac-
ton along the whole line in the West
indies had become question of hours
rather than days.
Rumors too definite to be ignored,
but impossible of official authorization,
explained the remarkable hurry and
hustle as due to the Presidents deter
mination to have Porto Rico occupied
by American soldiers without further
delay. and that the troops which had
been concentrated at gulf ports for the
invasion of Cuba were to embark inn
mediately ON the 20 transports which
had been secured, and, under convoy
of Admiral SIMPSONS squadron, be
sent at once to seize San Juan de Porto
Rico, and establish permanent col
onial government in the island similar
to that which General Merritt is charg-
ed with creating in the Philippines.
However startling the reports, its
pIausibility soon received corrobora-
tive strength through the reluctance
of every high official to deny it, while
many senators and other prominent
civilians having influential relations
with those carrying on the war not
only affirmed the existence of the sug-
for its sudden adoption by the authori-
ties.
1t was said that the events of the
last few days in Cuba, eliminating in
the useIessness to Spain of Cervera's
feet securely "corked up" at Santiago,
and the destruction OF untrammelled
cable communication between the col
onies and Madrid gave every assur
resistance to the inevitable, and that
the United States government had
awakened to the necessity of actually
possessing Porto Rico before the end
came.
With the Spanish military forces at
Havana effectually isolated and with
out even remote hopes of reinforce
ments, with Spain's naval force this
lyzed, and with the Madrid government
already lettering in its insecurity of
policy, the opportunity for dealing a
crushing blow through the seizure of
Porto Rico was hardly to be resisted.
The unsanitary condition of Cuba,
the strength of the army there and
many other causes which operated to
delay the invasion of that island with
4l,o Of Cd acyI1-
lars which it mas been possible to con-
centrate at Tampa in a single month,
wholly disappears as factors of delay
in the Porto Rican project.
The military authorities expressed
supreme confidence in their ability to
sweep the Spaniards from Porto Rico
with the men now at their command.
while still reluctant to attempt the
greater task of establishing position
in Cuba with the same force.
With the 10000 we'll equipped and
seasoned regular troops gathered at
Tampa, New Orleans and Mobile, and
the fleet of transports already loading,
many of them in fact ready to sail
from those points, satisfactory assur-
ances were given to the president that
there would be no possibility of a re-
verse at San Juan de Porto Rico after
the heavy batteries had been reduced
by SIMPSONS ships.
The authorities have agreed upon a
strength of about 5000 men to carry
out the responsibilities which it had
become evident that the government
had already incurred.
The division of this aggregate force
had been determined upon at the cab
net meeting in practically the follow
ing proportions: Philippine occupa-
ton, $4,000; Porto Rican occupation,
Is, 600; Cuba, 100000: reserve and
home defense, 125 900.