The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-04-28
LITTLE DOUBT OF RESULT
AN ISLAND TO BE SEIZED AS a BASE
OF OUR OPERATIONS.
RumOrs Concerning the Movements
of the Ubiquitous Spanish Fleets
American Schooner Seized.
Special to the indianapolis Journal.

Special to the indianapolis Journal.
WASHINGTON, April J27.-What is chief
ly worrying the naval experts, among whom
are the members of the strategy board Of
the Navy Department is lack of knowledge
of the plans of the enemy. OF course, no
one expects him to make them known, but
the movements he is known to have made
puzzle them to guess what he is UP to, and
the movements he has not made puzzle
them almost as greatly. The Spanish squad
ron at Manila has left that place and gone
to sea. The supposition is that it has gone
to meet our squadron commanded by Com
modore Dewey, which left Hong-Kong
shortly after the war began. Confidence is
expressed in Deweys ability to take care of
that particular squadron, but there is an
other and more powerful Spanish squadron
afioat somewhere composed of the Carlos v,
Pelayo and several smaller ships What is
it's destination? Is it on its way to join the
fleet at Cape Verde islands? Or is it on its
way to join the Manila squadron in hope
of crushing Dewey, or who knows but the
Cadiz squadron and the Cape de Verde fleet
are both going to Asiatic waters to attack
Dewey before he could possibly be rein
forced from here or from the Pacific coast?
Suppose the Spanish plan of campaign is to
crowd all speed to the Philippines to attack
Dewey and, if successful, to raid the Pacific
coast? We would be pounding away at Cuba
and Porto Rico, and, of course, would take
them in time, but how about San Fran
cisco, Portland and the Puget sound cities,
if a Spanish fleet should suddenly appear
on the coast? These are some of the ques-
tions that are puzzling the naval experts.
The navy would ask nothing better than
to have the Spanish fleet appear in our east
ern waters and give or accept battle. The
general opinion is that that would be the
last Of that part of the Spanish navy. But
that may be the very last thing the Span
iards are thinking of doing. A shrewd fight
err never does what his enemy wants him
to do, but rather the very last thing his en-
emy is expecting him to do. So far as our,
Atlantic coast cities are concerned, they
may be regarded as safe so long, at least,
as our navy continues unconQuered and no
body expects to see it conquered. 1t is ad-
mittedly different on the Pacific, and it is
within the range of possibilities that the
Spaniards may have very unpleasant sur
prise for us on that coast. If not there,
then nowhere
A good deal of adverse criticism is heard
concerning the running of the blockade at
Cienfuegos by the Spanish steamer Mont
serrat. For the first time the public here,
including public men, appear to realize that
war, even against a weak power, is not
necessarily and always a one-sded affair.
Men whose experience runs back to the civil
war know that a blockade that cannot oc-
casionally be broken or evaded is an impos-
siblity; So too, American merchant vessels
on the sea will be captured whenever over
hauled by the war ships of the enemy.
These things are mere incidents of the war,
and will have no conclusive effect one way
or the other upon the final result. The sue
cess of the Montserrat in running into Glen
fuegos will have two effects: To encourage
other attempts at blockade-running and to
stimulate our navy to greater efforts to
make the blockade effective, that being the
only way, under international law, of max
ing a blockade binding.