Phillipsburg herald. [volume] (Phillipsburg, Kan.) 1882-1905, 1898-09-22
SHAFTER REPORTS.
Commander Of Santiago Gives De-
tailed Account of the Campaign.
Interesting Statement OF the EmbarIsatlon
and Landing OF Troops, the Fighting at
San Juan and La Gunslma and
TOraVs Final Surrender.

IGHDlndLGu III bHo lhll VI ouhbloB " Aoh
been made public:
He briefly recounts the organization OF the
expedition and It's embarkment, and then de-
votes the main body OF the report to the ac-
tive operations about Santiago Gen Shufter
says the expedition was undertaken In compll-
.nnce with telegraphlo instructions OF May 80,
from headquarters Of the army, In which II
IS which 1t was stated admiral Schley reports
that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have
been seen In the harbor Of Santiago. Go with
gour force TO capture the garrison Mt Santiago,
mud assist In capture Of harbor and fleet"
The report gives In detail the troops assem-
bled at Tampa. The cavalry was dismounted
because OF lack OF transportation for animals
and because 1t was believed mounted cavalry
could not operate efficiently near Santiago.
This Gen, Shaiter says was found TO be SUBJ
sequently correct
Gen Shafter briefly covers the tripand land-
ing and his first meeting with Gen. Garcia,
adding: During the interview Gen Garcia
offered the services Of his troops, comprising
about 4, 600 men in the vicinity OF Aserraderos
and about 5000 under Gen Castillo, at the little
town OF Cujababo a few miles east OF BaiquirL
accepted his offer impressing it upon him
chat could exercise no military control over
him except such as he would concede, and as
long as he served under me would furnish
him rations and ammunition"
CoNFERs WITH SAMPSON AND GARCIA
After comforting with Admiral Sampson and
Gen Garcia the plan OF campaign was out
lined by Gen Shnfter The decentralization
was to commence on the 22d, at Baiquiri with
feints by the Cubans on Cabanas and by the
navy at various shore points, in order to mis-
lead the enemy rs to the place OF landing. Gen,
Skater says: "These movements committed
me to approaching Santiago from the east over
n narrow road, ut first In some places not bet
ter than trail, running from Baiquiri through
Siboney and Sevilla and making attack from
that quarter This, in my Judgment, was the
only feasible plan, and subsequent information
and results confirmed my judgment
Gen. Shafter gives In detail the fighting at
La Guasima. FL Caney and San Juan hill, and
pays glowing tribute to the officers and men
for their gallantry and says; '"rhe preparations
were far from what desired them to be- but
we we're in sickly climate; our supplies had
to be brought forward by o narrow wagon road,
which the rains might at any time render inn
pRssable; fear was entertained that storm
might drive the vessels containing our supplies
to sea- thus parting us from our base Of sup
plies and, lastly, 1t was reported that Gen.
Pando, with 5000 achievements for the
enemy, was en- route from Manzanlllo. and
might be expected in few days Under these
WA'AANNs
delay
ut is doubtful II we had more than IL 600
men on the firing line on July |, when the bat
tie was fierCeSt and when the important ana
strong positions Of Ell Caney and San Juan
were captured. A few Cubans assisted in the
attack of Ell Caney and fought valiantly, but
their numbers were too small to materially
change the strength as indicated above.
The enemy confronted us with numbers
about equal to our own; they fought obstt-
nately IN strong and intrenched positions,
and the results obtained clearly indicate
the intrepid gaantry Of the company officers
and men. and the benefits derived from the
careful training and instruction given in the
company in recent years Of rifle practice and
other battle exercises Our losses in these
battles were 90 officers and 2O9 men killed and
81 officers and 1908 men wounded, missing 70.
The missing, with few exceptions, reported
later on"
After speaking Of Admiral Cervera's sortie
and the destruction Of his feet Gen. Shafter
says he again called on the Spanish commander
TO surrender. He says; ION the same date
informed Admiral Sampson that II he would
force his way into the harbor the city would
surrender without any further sacrifice Of life
Commodore Watson replied that Admiral
Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in
his (Watson's) opinion the navy should not ed
ter the harbor"
1.-THE strength Of the encmy's position was
such did not wish to assault IL it could be
avoided, An examination OF the enemy s
works, made after the surrender, fully justihes
the wisdom of the course adopted. The In
trenchments could only have been carried with
very great loss Of life" Gen. Shafter gives the
varying efforts toward securing surrender,
and his reopening the engagement on the 10th,
when the truce ended On the 18th the sur
render was again demanded.
He then gives the details OF the final sur
render, his entry into the city and the raising
of the American flag. In closing he says:
Before closing my report wish to dwell
upon the natural obstacles had to encounter
and which no foresight could have overcome
or obviated. The rocky and precipitous
coast afforded no sheltered landing places
the roads were mere bride paths the
effect of the tropical sun and rains
upon the unacclimated troops was dead
ly and o dread Of strange and un-
known diseases had its effect on the army At
Baiquiri the landing Of troops and stores was
made at small wooden wharf, which the
Spanish tried to burn, but unsuccessfully and
the animals were pushed into the water and
guided to sandy beach about 200 yards in ex-
tent
Il had neither the time nor the men to spare
the fact that had nearly 1000 men continue
ously at work on the roads, they were at times
impossible for wagons
After the great physical strain and exposure
Of July and the malarlal and other fevers
began to rapidly advance throughout the COM
mand, and on July the yellow fever appeared
at Siboney. Though efforts were made to keep
this fact from the army it soon became known.
1.-THE supply Of quartermaster and commits
Sary stores during the campaign was abundant
and Notwithstanding the difficulties In landing
and transporting the rations, the troops on the
firing line were at all times supplied with its
coarser componentS, namely oat bread meal,
sugar and coffee. There was no lack Of trans
portatton, for at no time up to the surrender
sould oil the wagons had be used.
In reference to the sick and wounded have
20 say that they received every attention that
1t was possible to give them, The medical OFF,
GERS without exception, worked night and day
TO alleviate the suffering, which was no greater
than invariably accompanies q campaign. 1t
would have been better If we had more ambu-
lances, but as many were taken as was thought
necessary, judging from previous campaigns
1.-The discipline of the command was superb,
and wish to invite your attention to the fact
that not an officer was brought to trial by
court-martial and, as far as 1 know, no enlist
ed man. This speaks volumes for an army of
this size and in campaign of such duration"
To Rid Germany OF Anarchists.
Berlin, Sept 15.-The Cologne Ga
zette, in leading editorial declares
that anarchiqts will M lonper he toll