Evening star., 1898-03-21
PROSPECT OF PEACE
Little Hope Of Immediate End Of Con-
flict in Cuba.
WHAT INTERVENTION NIGHT DO
Any Other Sort of Recognition
Slow of Results.
INSURGENTS GROW BoLDER
Copyright. 1898. by Charles NJ. pepper.)

Copyright, 1885, by Charles NJ. Pepper)
Special Dispatch to The Evening Star.
HAEANA. March 10, via Key West, Fla,
March 2O.-What will follow If the United
States recognizes either the belligerency of
the insurgents or the independence Of
Cuba Is attracting attention. The answer
cannot be conclusive. Viewed on the ground
here, there may be no immediate change in
the appearance Of Spain's power in the
island. but the time of the certain collapse
Will be much closer. The insurgents IN a
north could not conduct military cam
paign which would drive the Spanish
troops into the sea. That Is the extreme
limit which could be counted on before the
wet season begins.
If action should be taken by the admin
istration or by Congress as early as April
1, Gomez would know 1t at his headquar-
ters in Santa Clara province within five
days, but a fortnight would elapse before
it could be known In all the insurgent
camps. That would not give much time FOR
striking decisive blow. 1t would not pre-
vent the troops from maintaining them
selves In the garrison towns for several
months. Besides, Spain will have here its
1900 fresh recruits, who have been raised
in the peninsula, under the promise that
they would end the insurrection. AS an
offensive force against the insurgents they
would be no more effective than the 1856, 600
men who have preceded them. AS means
Of defense they might be a hindrance to
the advance of the insurgents. 1t is per-
fectly understood that Gomez has disposed
his followers so as to take prompt advan-
tage Of any action by the United States,
either by Intervention or by recognition.
Panio Flankel I'm the East.
The successful thanking. of Gen. Pando's
troops in the east mas been the first evil
dence of u carefully matured campaign.
The possession Of the country by the in
surgents in the provinces of Santiago and
Puerto Principe is complete enough for
them to withdraw portion Of their active
forces. These are moving westward and
to the crossing the Jucaro Moron trocha
in small bodies. The Spanish defenses of
that trocha are not strong enough to with
stand an attack by any large body Of in
surgents which may want to cross 1t. The
probability is that Calixto Garcia's follow
ers will want to cross in considerable num-
bers very soon after the negotiations
started by the radical autonomists Offering
''amplifed autonomy" are repudiated.
Spanish military authorities have no con-
fidence in their own ability to repulse an
attack of this kind. Several thousand In
surgents who can be spared from the east
will be moved through Puerto Principe TO
Santa Clara to take the place of those
whom Gomez has pushed westward toward
Havana.
1t should not be understood from this
that the appearance of large body OF
Insurgents within sight OF this city is
an early probability. even were the Spanish
troops able to interpose no resistance or
obstacle i'll the way.
Stretch Between Santa Clara and
Havana.
There is a stretch of country between
Santa Clara and Havana, 200 miles across.
which is almost a barren desert. No army
can march over 1t. and find subsistence.
For two weeks the insurgents have been
moving in small detachments in this direc-
ton. More of them are now within radi-
us Of eighty miles Of Havana than at any
time during the past eighteen months.
They are slowed away in the hills in such
numbers as to make the troops afraid to
risk attacking them. More will be brought
westward as fast as they can be assured of
food. When strengthened in this way they
will forage in the zones Of cultivation
which lie close to the fortified towns.
The insurgents in the province Of Pinar
del Rio, to the west of Havana, expect no
trouble in crossing the. Weyler trocha,
which is now practically abandoned. They
could make junction with forces from the
east in ten days. The siege of Havana is
not probability, but by the time the rainy
season is on the insurgents might be able
to show the world the impotence of Spain's
military strength. They are now fairly
well supplied with ammunition, with the
that fresh supplies would not be
dependent upon flibustering expeditions
The care that has heretofore been exer-
cised might not be necessary. The insur-
gents would be able to get what they need
ed If the military operations proved more
active than is usually possible at the be-
ginning Of the rainy season. In summing
up it can be said that while the insurgents
will follow the recognition Of belligerency
OF Independence by an exhibition of their
ability to succeed their immediate triumph
cannot be safely predicted.
What Might Have Been.
Had they been placed ON equal terr-s
with 6pain's army three nanths AEo,
with the winter before them in witch to
time have been close at hand That was
not done. and a false opinien should not bs
entertained that the simple recognition Of
Independence will cause the revolution to
be finished within thirty days.
Should Spain make such action q cause
of war with the United States, or should
the exercise Of the right Of search by Spain
precipitate a conflict, then the end might
be looked for within that time. In brief,
the military conditions are such that un-
less the United States recosuiEes the bel
agerents the struggle may be prolonged
several months.
No mistake on this point should be made
In Washington. Any policy that has for
Its object the early and certain restoration
of peace in Cuba should NOT be basad ON
the hope that recognition Of Cuban inde-
pendence viii In itself terminate the strux-
gle within thirty or even sixty. days. ~
CHARLES n. PEPPER.@1
Hurry Order fsr cesaent.
HAgTON. pa. March H.--Thes Alpha-s
Rnrfiand cesnsat pnn1 ox Sehifnksr..