The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-11-26
WEN OF A NAVAL EXPERT.
CAPT. MAHAN, L. s. NJ. CONTRIB
UTES TO LONDON TINES.
In the First Article of n Series ON
..The VAR on the Sea md Its
Lessons" the Eminent Authority
Excites Lively Interest Abroad.

NEW YORK, Nov ga special to the
World from London says:
Capt Mahan, of the United States navy.
publishes in the Times the first Of four ar
ticIes on 1.-The War on the Sea and us
Lessons" Admitting the risk Of passing
final judgment on events still recent. capt.
Mahan argues that in the rapid drive OF
lie rapid, rough, yet stin working
decision must be formed from the new
experiences. The material, he says. Is not
vet available 10 give complete story OF
the operations, nor Is ii the time for final
decisions, but 1t is sufficient 10 suggest
a general direction 10 thought
He recalls that the American naval plans
were hampered by the fact that the war
was undertaken primarily 20 drive Spain
out Of Cuba IL more general apprecia-
ton Of the situation had been adopted and
the United States had taken account OF the
injury they had sustained by the Ubiquitous
character OF SPANS rule IN her colonies.
and had declared war on those grounds. the
objective American operations would have
been differently chosen. 50 as not merely 10
help Cuba, but TO compel Spain
Ia ad0pf such terms as the
United States might demand. In such
case the reduction Of Porto Rico would
have been Americas first object, In order
10 throw Spain back on her home territory
TO support her operations in Cuba. Porto
Rico would have been an lnsurmountable
obstacle If retained IN a strong enemy's
hands to American operations In Cuba, aud
an equally valuable base tx wrested from
him.
Capt. Mahan insists weightily on the
great Importance of the Independence OF
Porto Rico.
In estimating the fighting strength OF the
American and Spanish fleets. the navy de-
partnlent held unwaveringiy that merely
possible success justified a risk. unless II
would leave a promise ~ diminishing the
enemys naval force. and so deciding the
control OF the seas upon which the issue
OF the war depended
He attaches immense importance TO the
bringing Of the oregon from the Pacific 20
the Atlantic. because II showed the grip
the American fleet had on Cervera' q squat
ron and the consequent power 20 move an
army 10 Santiago without fear.
He pays Il high tribute TO Sampson for
HIS successful bottling OF CerVega's squad
ron a. Santiago, 81 operation fraught with
difficulties doubts, uncertainties. and more
akin TO the wiring down OF champagne In
unbrea kab bic bonds than the mere showing
Of q cork into n bottle.
As 70 Canara's move 70 ire Philippines
Il ne hal persevered, though the American
feet vas quite safe. IL might have neces-
Stated a temporary abandonment of Ma
Mia Bag.
lie shsn enters into technical conzid-
Grafton ~ the moneutouS problem whether
the individual size OF ships or their num-
her - the aim Of naval powers. lie comes
u the conclusion that, other things being
equal. numbers mean an Increase az Of
feuslve power.
The article has excited the nve1les, H.
teres; n official circles. where owing 10
rs fec1nicality- it Is principally read