The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-11-22

noon the fOllOWing statement as 10
what would be the effect OF a discon-
tinuance of the negotiations, II such
should take place:
Such action of the Spanish commits
sioners would not affect the purpose OF
the American government. Our govern
ment would still assert precisely what
IL has claimed and II would proceed to
carry these claims into execution. The
American government is now practical
would be to make this possession an
actual fact. One result would be that
IL would compel Spain later to recog-
nize what IL would refuse to acquiesce
In now. One significant effect would be
that such action would relieve this gov
ernment OF the whole question of COM
pensation for the Philippines. This
would effectually wipe out all obligation
to make any payment of moneys to the
Spanish government. No payment was
ever considered by the United States
government beyond the moderate sum.
which i will not name. but which was
specified I'm the instructions given to our
commissioners.
In some respects the rupture would
be of distinct advantage to this govern
ment. 1t would relieve IL of the feel
ing OF obligation to take certain steps.
such as the payment of money contem-
plated, and leave us free to act unham-
pered. This government has all to gain:
Spain has all to lose. Spain has signed
the protocol and is now bound by the
extent of its provisions. We would pro-
coed to execute it. Spain could offer no
material obstruction to our plan of exc
cution. Her troops already have evacu-
ated Porto Rico and none are left on
that island. The evacuation is going
on In Cuba and must be continued. for il
Is very unlikely that the Spanish gov
or ant ts.t h..
The evacuation was specified in that
document and she certainly could not
offer any forcible resistance in those
quarters.
up to this time the possession of the
Philippines has been in dispute in Paris.
Breaking of negotiations would remove
all ground for dispute. for then we
would take complete possession of the
Islands and give notice to all comers
practically. hands off, orders would
go forward to our military and naval
commanders in charge in those islands
to push forward and other islands than
that Of Luzon would be occupied.
1T would not be necessary to occupy
anything like all of them; probably
Panay, Cebu and two or three others
would be all included i'm the plan of
occupation and possession. We would
deal with the insurgents there, but 1
do not anticipate any serious difficulty
with them. Neither would the extension
OF possession throughout the main ISL
ands Of the archipelago involve any
European complications as has been
suggested. II is barely possible that
not more than 5000 additional troops
would be necessary for the purpose. and
these can be readily dispatched. Trans
ports can be gotten in hand without
much delay, and our forces could soon
be in possession of all the islands we
care to take. Meantime. the oregon and
Iowa are en- route to the Pacific, and
will be added to our forces there.
Whether the Caroifnes or any por-
tion of them will be taken / cannot
say. / seriously doubt If that will be
undertaken. There are reasons that
suggest themselves as ground for this
opinion"
AT the British, French, German and
other foreign establishments the report
from Paris that Senor Montero Rios,
president of the Spanish commissioners,
had refused to continue negotiations
was looked upon as presenting a seri-
Gus crisis until the truth was known.
Throughout diplomatic quarters the
view prevailed when the fake story was
received that Montero Rios spoke for
the commission and for Spain, and that
the only Interpretation to be put upon
his course was that Spain had deter
mined to break off the negotiations.
taking the chances of a renewal of war.
By such a course, IL was pointed out,
Spain could lose little more than she
was losing by the course of the peace
negotiations, as Cuba and Porto Rico
had already been lost, the Philippines
were demanded and the bulk of the CO.
lonial debts was left for Spain to Ii
quidate.
The leading diplomatic officials here
agreed that in this hope Spain will be
disappointed. as 1t is said the powers
.l.Afx AL.
ments to look after just now that they
will not invite a rupture with the Unit
ed States, even though they should
consider Spain's position to be right.
Even Austria and France. which are
the countries most favorably inclined to
they would not assist her. In short.
IL is the universal opinion among diplo-
matte officials here that Spain would be
left entirely TO her own resources II she
renews the war, and she would have to
fight 1t alone, just as she did in its
early stages. For the same reasons, IL
is said, there would be no Intervention.
arbitration or any other foreign move
unless this country is a party with
Spain to asking for such outside offices.
A rather pessimistic outlook Is taken
by one of the high officials here, who
believes that discontinuance of the ne
gotiations at Paris would be followed
can fleet to the coast of Spain, another
to the Philippines, and a more bitter
conflict than that heretofore waged. In
his judgment Spain has reached the
point where she Is ready to lose all
rather than voluntarily yield more. and
will contest even though American
troops advance to Madrid.
1t is universally conceded. however.
that in the end. Spain would have to
yield, as she Is practically without
navy, with a disorganized and rebel
lious army. and with prospects of in
ternal disorder.
Some of the diplomats hold that a
serious question arises as to the valid
ity of the protocol in case the peace
negot ations should fail. IL was, 1t is
said. only a preliminary step to a
treaty. and IL the treaty fails. so. too,
this preliminary step becomes nuga-
tory, except so far as IL has been car
ried into actual effect by the trans
fer of Porto Rico.