The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-10-25

not sufficiently important material to call
for different judgments in the two cases on
any such ground.
ANTITRUST ACT.
The opinion then takes up the con-
stitutionality of the antitrust act as
affecting railroads. Justice Peckham
says that it is worthy of remark that
this question was never raised or hinted
at on the argument in the former case,
and adds:
The fact that not one of the many astute
and able counsel for the transportation COM
panes in that case raised an objection of
such a conclusive character If well founded
is strong evidence that the reasons showing
the invalidity of the act construed do
not lie the surface and were not then
apparent to those counsel.
Upon the constitutionality of the act 1t
| is now earnestly contended that the contracts
in restraint of trade are not necessarily preiu-
dicial to the welfare and security Of society
! and that congress is without power to pro-
hibit generally all contracts in restraint of
! trade and that the efforts to do this iuvali-
| dates the act in question.
Justice Peckham comments on the
! fears expressed by counsel for the rail-
road association that the effect Of these
! decisions would be far reaching, rem
| dering illegal most business contracts
! or combinations, such as contracts to
maintain wages, contracts Of fncorpora-
! ton for any line of business, and part
nership contracts.
This makes quite a formidable list"
| the opinion states, ''but it will be OBJ
| served that no contracts of the nature
| described are now before the court"
The formation of corporations has
never been regarded, the opinion states,
as in the nature of contracts in re-
straint Of trade. The same is true Of
partnerships. Proceeding, the opinion
| says:
! POWER WITH CONGRESS.
| Has not congress, with regard to interstate
commerce and in the course Of regulating it.
in the case of railroad companies, the power
to say that no contract or combination shall
| be legal which shall restrain trade and COM
merce by shutting out the operation of the
! general law Of competition? We think it
! has.
The business of railroad carrier Is Of a
! public nature, and in performing it the car
rier is also performing, to certain extent, a
| function of government which requires it to
| perform the service upon equal terms to all
| This public service, that Of transportation of
| passengers and freight, is part of trade and
| commerce., and when transported between
| states, such commerce becomes what is de-
scribed as interstate, and comes to a certain
| extent under the jurisdiction of congress by
| virtue of its power to regulate commerce
| among the several states. When the grantees
| OF this public franchise are competing railroad
| companies for interstate commerce. we think
| congress is competent to forbid any agree
| ment or combination among them by means
OF which competition is to be made smoother.
| We think 1t extends at least to the prolhi
| bition OF contracts relating to Interstate COM
merce, which would extinguish all comneti-
| ton between otherwise competitive railroad
| corporations and which would in that wau
| restrain interstate trade or commerce.
| We do not think that when the grantees oP
| this public franchise are competing RAILWAYS
| seeking the transportation of men and goods
| from one state to another, that ordinary free
dom of contract in the use and management
| of their property requires the right to com.
bine as consolidated and powerful organ
ization for the purpose of sitting competition
| among themselves, and thus keeping their
rates and charges higher than they might
otherwise be under the laws of competition.
| And this is SO, even though the rates provided
| for in the agreement may for the tine he not
Continued ON Efffl, pn~a