The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-05-26


MED, although It is probable the COM
manding General will leave for the south
at an early day.
THE OPPOSING FLEETS.
At tho close Of the day at the Navy Dc
partment the situation as TO the heets'
both American and Spanish, was precisely
as Il was this morning Sc FAR as the OF
nclals' knew, the only notable difference
being an apparent strengthening OF the
confidence Of the officials I'm their bciiet
that Ccrvera's squadron IS lying in the
Santiago harbOr In this hope ana Delel
the officials found great comfort, know
ing the abilities OF the American naFal
commanders I'm Cuban waters to keep the
Spanish admiral bottled up IN his mar
row-necked harbor until he shall sur
render or be starved out. II Cervera is
actually at bay the officials feel not the
slightest apprehension Of any relief COM
ing to him from the outside I'm the shape
of another Spanish squadron from Cadiz.
The reason for this IS their unquestioned
ability to hold Cervera I'm check with only
a few vessels-perhaps a couple Of mon
tors and torpedo boats-thus leaving the
remainder OF the big armored fleet 70
take care Of any achievements that
might attempt to come from spain 10
Cervcra's aid. The force that could be
spared for this service without endan-
gering the integrity Of the blockade at
Havana or permitting the escape Of Ger
vera would be much larger than the en-
tire Spanish naval force now In Spanish
waters capable Of crossing the Atlantic.
Within the past few weeks or In fact
ever since the determination was posi-
lively reached TO invade cuba before
the dry season next fall there have been
published limitations that the delay or
what appeared TO be the delay I'm begin
ming the invasion was attributable to the
navy
THE NAVY is READY.
It can be stated on the highest author
fly that the impression thus created Is
wholly unjust 90 tho navy. and without
warrant IN fact The naval officers, one
and an, take special pride In the degree
of readiness I'm which the navy was
found at the outbreak Of hostliues and
there never has been a moment even
when SIMPSONS forces were at Porto
Rico. when the navy was not prepared
on instant orders TO aid the army
Neither was the army 20 be 40 fault In
this matter. 10 was at first proposed 20
throw small force Of men, about 10000,
into Cuba Immediately, and allow the re-
mainder OF the army OF occupation 70
wait until next fall before going over.
There were various reasons for abandon
ing this plan. such as the discovery OF
the insufficient support that could be rem
dored the American force by the insur-
gents: the fact was brought out with APP
Railing force that 90 delay the campaign
meant the absolute determination Of the
starving recOncentrados. and there were
beside other reasons for making haste.
These considerations caused a complete
change in the army plans, and that In
volved delay. To equip an army of l00-
600 men in thirty days and put them In
condition to fight trained veteran sol-
diers on their own soil was no small UNI
dertaking. so that I'm the opinion Of some
Of tho highest Officers of the admins
tration there IS no reasonable grounds for
pressing the criticism that there is or has
been undue delay IN beginning the milf
tary campaign. either on the part Of the
army or navy
accommodation has been made that
contracts be awarded for supplying the
armor for three batt4ships under con-
struction as follows: To the Carnegie
Company. 1.153 tons for the Illinois and
255S16 tons for the Wisconsin. Bethel
hem, 1,f05 tons for the Illinois. and 255S
tons for the Alabama, all at 500 per ton.