The state rights democrat. [volume] (Albany, Linn County, Oregon) 1865-1900, 1898-10-07
The Responsibility.
From. the Worlr.

Froo. the Worlr
On April % President Mckinley issrt d
his first call for volunteers. He called
or l25.0)0 men. On May 25 he iseued a
cali for rs, 900 ,nors.
When the fret call for l25, COO men
was issued congress bad already author.
iEed the increase OF the regular army
from 26,6l0 to 81. .0Oo.
Thus Mr. Mckinley had lS6, 900 sold
iers when he issued HE second call for
5000 volunteers. Moreover he had al
ready heard of the utter incapacity OF
the war department to am, equip, trans.
port or in any way properly to care for
the volunteers already enlisted rnier
the fret call. He issued his second cali
in the face of Gen. Schofelds declarat on
that the lack olsystem and headship in
the war department was notorious In
Washington and at the army posts and
had been the subject Of remonstrance by
him.
There never Was time in the whole
course Of the war when the services OF
40. .0C0 volunteers, Plus the 81 900 regu.
lars, were needed. Yet with three times
40 900 volunteers and 0O0 over Plus 6l :
600 regulars at his disposal, Mr.. McRin.
lev cent out his call for 5000 more, with
no preparation or apparent care for
their mobilization or use. 1t appears to
have been q case OF fright or political
aiteFthougbt. There r'vAr was Any
necessity for il. Tue i.LaI strength OF
the British army, at home, In Irdia, and
all the colonies-with a war going on In
SOudan that absorbs 1900 troops-is
but Do, 900 men. 0u, Of that plumber,
India is supplied wiih a garrison of S0,-
900 troops, and 81 900 more are stationed
10 the colonies.
Mr.. Mckinley was not content until
he bad put 261, 900 men under arms-40,. ;.
900 more than the real strength of the
British army. And this for a war against
poor, old, impotent Spain, which only
accepted the war to save her Honor"
and was eager for quitting, as the sur
render by Toral and the sham resistance
in Porto hico proved.
This misiake Of Mr.. McHinley's was
the root OF all the evil that has followed.
His idea Of turning it i,om q quick and
sharp naval war, which IL naturally was,
| to q long land war, for which there was
no necessity. was without thsdow OF
reason.
That there was no occasion for such
an array of soldiers the strength OF the
expeditions actually sent out will show
There were 10 all at Santiago 81 900
troupe, of which 1900 were regulars
and only 5000 volunteers. At Manila
including some troops still on their way,
are 1900 Of which II 900 are volunteers
and 5 900 regulars The entire number
absuTdly sent to Porto Rico against 4, ,0CC
SpaniArds wss 1000, OF which 9, 500
were regulars,
Thus only 33, 500 volunteers have been
employed in the three great expeditions
whicE helped to eonfirm the victory Eou
or made easily certain by the navy. And
Ghe navy was always ready, always
efficient, always successful, because il
was prepared for lie work with intelli-
gent foresight and was directed by com
petent men under a proper system.
1t is these vast encanIpments OF super.
auous men, badly located and shocking
ly mismanaged. that have aggravated
the hopeless incapacity and imbeciliiy
OF Secretary Alger's department, With
its added load OF Sons and SomebOdies
appointed to highly important duties fol
which they had not the slightest quali.
6catiJn. II Is this multiplication oi
political officers and superabundant regi-
ments that has added to the camp hor-
rors and made the disgrAceful and ap-
palling record OF ten times as many
deaths by disease as by the bullets oi
| all the SpsniaFds. And Tor this Mr.. Nc.
Kinley 10 primarily responsible.