The Portland daily press., 1898-10-24

West Indies, and the squadron under
orders from the department., proceeded to
Key West to which place the flying
squadron under Commodore (now Admir-
all Sohley, had already been ordered. Ar
rangements were then hurriedly made
and the flying sqnadIon, augmented by
other vessels under Commodore Schley,
was sent off Cienfuegos, where it was
believed the enemy would go, in which
case an effort was to be made to engage
and capture him. Sampson was given
the choice ither Of the command OF
blockading squadron of Havana. or at
Cienfuegos, Schley In either case to re-
main with his own squadron. From
messages received ty the Admiral from
the department. about May 20, it appears
that reports had reached the United States
that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago;
SO the department advised Sampson to
send immediate word to Schley to proceed
to that place, leaving one small vessel off
Cienfuegos.
On May 81, instructions were written by
Sampson for Commodore Schley and sent
to him via the Marblehead, regarding
the possibility of the Spanish fleet teing
at Santiago. They are in part as follows:
"Spanish squadron probably at Santa
go de Cuba-four ships and three topredo
boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that
they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with
all despatch. but cautiously to Santiago
de Cuba, and if the enemy is there block
ade him in port. You will probably find
it necessary to establish communication
with some of the nhabitants-fshernen
ships are in port, it being impossible to
see it from the outside.
The Admiral said he felt much con.
cerned as to the delivery Of these orders
and sent a duplicatesby the Hawk, with
an additional memorandum. The Ad-
miral suggested that. if the information
did not reach Commodore Sohley before
daylight of May 80, he mask the real
direction he should take as much as pos
sible. He adds:
"Follow the Spanish squadron which
ever direction they take"
4A0 A0AlIul, uuOA OA 41ov0AR3 6AfSo
copies of orders of battles which were to
be followed in the event that Cervera left
Santiago on the approach of Schley's tleet
from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise
around the coast of Havana, in which case
the Havana squadron would attempt to
intercept him by going east about 200
miles beyond the junction of Santoron
and Nicholas Strict orders were given for
screening all lights and to see that none
were accidentally shown. The squadron
was to cruise gently to the eastward in
the day and westward during the night.
In one of his dispatches the Admiral
complains that his movements are great
ly hampered by monitors constituting
the principal force under his command.
On May 23. as shown BY the report, Com
modore Schley expressed the belief that
the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On
the 9th the Admiral sent word to Schley,
directing him to proceed with all possi-
BILE speed to Santiago because of infor-
nation received that the Spaniards were
there, The same time orders were sent to
have the collier Sterling despatched to
Santiago, with an expression of opinion
that the commodore should use 1t to
obstruct the channel at it's narrowest
part leading into the harbor. The details
of the plan were left to the commodore's S
Judgment as he (Sampson) had 1.-THE ut
most confidence in his ability to carry
this plan to successful conclusion and
earnestly wished him good luck"
Sampson apparently felt certain of the
presence of the Spanish at Santiago. and
urged that the harbor must be blockaded
at all hazards. Sohley in the meantime