The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-03-18

| times ret more tran a-e G. s~n. The IN
| .antry ara poorly Clad. Two snail sqaads
| Of prisoners which I saw, however. one
| o. bal: dozen. = the streets Of Havana.
| and one or two On The cars. were better
| eioshe5 than the average Spanish sos3ser-
! Each ~ tbs prisoners. though surrounded
| By guayds. ~as bound by Tho arms and
| wrists By cords and they were ali tied To-
| gefher by cord running alnnS the line.
| a sleSmer az the amenities % their war
| fare. About one-talrd Of the Cuban army
! are cosores. mostly ta the infantry. as the
| cavalry furnishes their owa horses
Assonomists Are . Cipher.
The dividing lines between parties are
| the mos. straight and clear that have
ever come 20 ny knowledge. The division
| n Cur war was by 10 means 30 clearly de-
| ansd. II ID Cuban against Spaniar5. II Is
| practically the entire Cuban population on
| one side and tbs Spanish army and the
| Spanish citizens On the ether. j do not
count the AatononiSts Il this division. AS
| they are 50 far too inconsiieraAie IN num-
| aers TO be worth counting.
Gen Blaneo filed the civil offices with
| men who had been Autonomists and were
ssili Chased as such. But the snarch OF
events has satisfied most OF thsm tia.
| tbs chance for autonomy came too late. It
| falls as salk Of compromise would have
fallen the last year or tive Of oar war. Il
IL succeeds. il can only De by armed force.
by the triumph of the Spanish army. and
fn.s f.f Zvz ha
Weyler's policy and method for In that the
Spanish army aud people believe. There
Is no doubt that Gen. Blance is acting In
entire good faith: that he desires TO give
the Cnhans a fair measure OF autonomy,
as Campos did at the close OF the ten
years war. He has. of course. few per-
sonal followers bat the army and Spanish
citizens do not want genuine autonomy.
for that means government by the Cuban
people. and 1t Is not strange that the Gu
bans say It comes TOO late.
Autonomy Comes Too Late.
81 have never had any communication,
Direct or indirect. with the Cuban junta
In this country or any Of It's members,
nor did l have with any Of the juntas
which exist In every city and large town
OF Cuba. None OF the calls / made were
upon parties OF whose sympathies 1 had
the least knowledge. except that knew
that some OF them were c'assed as auton-
om.sts. Most Of my iaformants were bust
ness men, who had no sides and rarely
expressed themselves. had no means OF
guessing in advance what their answers
would be. and was in most cases greatly
surprised at their frankneSs. I inquired
in regard TO autonomy. OF men of wealth,
and men as prominent In BUSH
ness as any IN the cities OF Ha-.
merchants lawyers and autonomist offica
vana, Matanzas and Sagua-bankers. mer-
chants, lawyers and auionomist officials
some OF tam Spanish born but Cuban bred,
one prominent Engiishman. several of
then. known as Autonomists and several oe
them telling me they were still believers
in autonomy IL practicable. but without
exception they replied that 1t was TOO late
for that Some favored a United States
protetoTatc. some annexation. some free
Cuba Not one had been counted as IA
voring the instruction at first. They
were business mea and wanted peace. ou,
said it was too late for peace under Span
ish sovereignty. They characterized Wey-
ler's order in far stronger terms than ]
can, ! could not bat conclude that you do
not have to scratch an Autonomist very
deep TO find Cuban. There ts soon 10 be |
an election, bat every polling place must
be inside a fortified twon. Such elections
ought TO be safe for the insurgents
Worst Misgovernment Ever known.
II have endeavored to state in temper |
ate mood what saw ard heard TO make /
no argument thereon. bot leave every one /
10 draw his own conclusions. To me the I
strongest appeal IS not the barharty prac- /.
;iccd by Weyler. nor the loss Of the Maine. |
u our worst fears should prove true ter
ribie are both Of these incidents; but /
the spectacle Of d million ard n half CT |
people, the entire native population OF |
Cuba, struggling Ger freedom and deliver |
anee from the worst misgoyefnment OF
which / ever had knowledge.
Whether our action ought not 10 be ia |
Gaencc'i by any enc or all those things. /
and 80 how FAR, is another question. I
am not tn faler % annexation. not because |
I would apprehend any particular trouble |
from Il, bns because {: Is not A wise policy |
10 take IN any people % foreign tongue |
and training and Nnhou; any strong guild |
ing American element. The fear that If |
free. ina people q Cuba Mould 10 reyolu- |
tioosTy ia not So veil founded az has been /
supposed, and tIe conditions for coed self |
Fovern2'eat are FAR more favorable The |
large number e educated ard PATRIOTS !
men, ;;e great sacrifices they have en- |
dured. 'he peaceable temperament % the /
people whlse or biack. the wonderful pros.
peri'y .has woela come surely with pea@s |
ard good aenaa ru7s, thc large influx 81 /
Asner.eans and money would al Be strong /
factors f9s stable Institutions.
''fs'is it IS aot usy purpose at this time. |