The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-04-16


ing squadron. composed OF the battle
ships Massachusetts and Texas. the er1lis-
ers Brooklyn. Minneapolis and Column
( bia, and. if needed. the cruisers Newark
and Montgomery and the dynamite gun
lighting ships could easily be reinforced
by two battle ships. the splendid Iowa
and the formidable Indiana now at Key
/ West, and also by Two or three cruisers
| of Captain SIMPSONS squadron, which
will not bs needed al Havana as long as
the enemy remains far 10 the eastward.
4 A general naval engagement between the
/ fleets here mentioned might be the one
I great and only battle OF the war. As TO
| the outcome Of such meeting there can
be but little doubt The United States
( should win. and win decsively. not only
on account Of superior force. but through
I better lighting qualities Of our officers and
men
! If Spain risks such a naval engagement
as his there are many who predict her
/ overwhelming defeat. the scattering Of ali
/ her ships that survive the combat. with
no port for them TO run 10 for repairs
and coal save On the far side OF the At
! lantic. and practically an end 10 the war.
The United States can not hope 10 es-
4 cape from such struggle without losses,
/ and perhaps severe losses, but that VIC
! tory would perch upon our banners there
| is small reason to doubt
A survey OF the field. both from the dip
lomattc or governmental and the naval
points Of view. therefore confirms the i'm
preston is that SPANS plan is 20 aban-
/ -
engagement IN the ocean, not too far
from the Cape Verde Islands, the coast
| of Spain or the old world ports of refuge.
and II this battle goes against her TO ap-
peal to the powers for mediation. In no
other way can SPANS extraordinary fail
ure TO provide for active operations on
| this side Of the Atlantic be explained.
| Cuba she seems TO have determined 10
abandon. Stubborn. determined resistance
does not appear 10 be a part Of her plan.
| In other words. the policy Of Madrid, as
understood here. is 10 settle the problem
after all by diplomatic negotiation, but
with naval engagement intervening be
| tween the negotiations which have been
suspended and the negotiations which are
to cOme-a naval engagement just sufii
cient to satisfy the people Of Spain and
| to clear the way for the inevitable sur
render.
Unless tho keen observers at Washing
ton, who have taken cognizance Of every
phase Of the situation, greatly err in their
estimate OF the probabilities. the war
! which now seems imminate need cause no
alarm in the United States II viii not
be very much OF storm There viii be
| of
the United States. Away from a few
military centers and naval poiats there
will be nothing 10 suggest that war is
in progress save what one reads in the
newspapers. The United States is pretty
safe against attack. and absolutely safe
against invasion
The future is always difficult to read
but so far as the signs OF this hour are
concerned the government at Madrid has
reached decision TO drop Cuba in the
easiest possible way, in the way Offering
| least danger to the dynasty and this way
appears TO be by a short war, war of
passive resistance to our intervention.and
then an international parley, under cover
of which Spain viii get out OF Cuba with /
what her leaders affect to hope viii be /
dignity and honor.
1t is well known here that Spain has /
decided that the United States must be |
the aggressor. The first shot. the first /
overt act, must come from this side. /
Spain's attitude viii be that resolutions Of /
intervention amount to nothing in her /
eyes that she Is not to be goaded into /
declaration OF war. but that she viii /
stand upon her territory and await the /
nh ton tn
evict her. II attacked she will resist. /
Probably Il is true Spanish statesmen 1
have figured out such a policy viii put a |
peculiar responsibility upon the United (
States.
This government IS not declaring war. 1
Instead OF making war our avowed pur- I
pose is to stop war. How, then. are we 4
to make a start at our task OF putting an .
end to Spanish sovereignty in Cuba? II /
we lombard Havana, If we seize other f.
ports, If we attack Spanish fleets. that Is
war Obviously the only way 10 carry 1
out the viii Of congress Is 20 make war, /
and yet war is not declared.
The suggestion has been made here that /
It is the intention OF Spain to walt un-
til attack has been made on her and then /
appeal TO the powers OF Europe without /
offering resistance. In line with such
policy as this was the decree stopping
hos,ilIties in Crete. Il may be SPANS
game to say 70 Europe:
Thu Americans profess 20 be intsrven-
ing for the purpose OF stopping war IN
Cuba. and there IS no war there. We
have ourselves stopped IT, Is Europe 20
tolerate this impertinate Interference Of
the yankees with the domee1lc efairs u
European nations which happen % have
colonies In America %
But even this viii ava1 Spain nothing
unless there are plans IN European cabI-
nets unfriendIy 20 the United States
which have a. yet in no way manifested
themselves. and there IS 90 warrant f0r
any such assumption
Events are following last upon one an
others heels. The United states ls NOV
ing rapidly. Il Is moving irreslsubly
All eyes turn now % Madrid. where a
queen regent and a government are So
dire distress. facing "a problem greater
Than any European nation has beer con
frorted WITH since the DAYS o. S~1an. TIE
siege of Paris and the commune.
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