The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-12-22


Very naturally. the report Of tie opera
tons Of the Atlantic feet comprises ths
larger portion If t1s printed body. The
facts aaye already appeared. but In tAe
very beginning there u a nost interesting
exchange 81 letters between Secretary
Long and Admiral sampson Showing thai
even before the outbreak Of the war the
admiral had worked ous a complete plan
for the immediate reduction Of havana,
WIN hzs o@1 squadron uES0 gsg+0rtsG. ana
sas only prevented from carrying Out that
plan b. orders fT5ul the department, which
His1ed 10 pTotect the big iFonciads. Sore
tary Long addressed Adm! al Sampson
April a confl3eutial letter. telling him that
In ttsss event u 8osEiIties for tats was De-
fore the outbreak IT the war. the depart
rDHnt wished hin 20 do all in Ms power 20
destroy the Spanish vesseis " ne West
Insiiaa waters. IL says. THE depart
ment does not win the vessels OF your
squadron 70 b. exposed t. the IRE OK the
batteries At Havana. Santiago Or otler
strongly fortified ports In CUBA. unless the
more FoFn.ta4iste spanish vessels SaolitS4
"a X refH@e II flfose aarbors. Even in rIss
cake the DEPARTMENT would suggest THAI a
rigid blockade and The employment OF our
Torpedo BOATS would accomplish the de-
sired ootect."
The reasons set ont by Secretary Long
for this instruction were that tnere would
H. no United States troops available 70
occupy the captured towns until October
and that the lack u dockiig facilities made
n particularly desirable that our vessels
shoald rot II. crippled before the capture
or destrlctlou o. SPANS most formidable
vessels
How strongly Admiral Sampson endcav-
ored 70 secure reversal Of THIS decision
appears III the following letter. which has
never before been published,
United States Flagship New York.
Key West, Fla April 70.
My Dear Mr.. Secretary: I have Teceiv-
81 your confidential letter % April s.
srnlTsaf nfZe with all you say about guard
a
loss white the enemy's feet is Still intact.
\, the same time ] regard IL as very i'm
pOrtaDt In strike quickly and strike hard
soon As nostiBt!es commence Havana
s. we'll defended by three or four batteries
20 TIE eastward 10 the entrance mounting
guns Of from six 10 twclVe~inch Caliber.
on the western side of the entrance there
are three batteries, the guns varying in
CaktEer from eight 10 tweiYe-inch and two
mortar batteries. All the batteries face
se<lward. and those 10 the west OF the en-
trance quite near shore. All are open
batterfes. with heavy traversos between the
gums. The guns and people who serve them
are quite unprotected. 1'hese batteries are
ell calculated 10 keep off fleet from s--a-
ward. which approaches TO within a mod
erAtc distance OF few thousand yards I
Do not think they are well place! 20 resist
an attack tfor instance, the western bat
teT1es), from the west and close inShore.
where the batteries would be exposed to a
flank fire or 10 the fire Of our big ships at
short range. where the secondary batteries
would have fun effect.
Even under these circumstances ships
must have such heavy fire that the shore
batteries would b. 0yerwh elmcd by It's vol
un.e. Before the arrival Of ne Puritan
and Ampbitglte, / was not entirely san
euine az the success Of such an attack.
Since their arrival yesterday | have little
doubt OF It's success. Although the moni-
tors are weak 81 secondary fire. / expect.
ed to put cruiser with a heavy secondary
fire In the intervals between each two OF
them. In this way | do not think the
Spanlards would be able to fire They
would be driven away from their guns and
kept away, while the fire OF the ships would
50 ipjurp the gunS or mounts that they
wunld be unservi-eable. Although the de-
lenses west % the entrance are stronger
than those east. the first has the aavau-