The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-01-26
BOOKS OF THE TIME.
Gen. John VI. schofeId's Forty-Six
Years I'm the Army.

Essentially a Western man, in that he
came to Illinois when twelve years of age,
went TO West Point from that State, and
served in Western armies during the war,
Lieutenant General Schofieid's recently is
sued book ''Forty-six Years in the Army,
must be of special interest to Indiana vet
Grams. Indeed the only volunteer he speaks
OF was a private of an Indiana regiment.
One morning during the Atlanta campaign
General Schofield had risen early and in his
undeTclothing preparing his morning
additions. While he was thus engaged
soldier asked in a loud voice. Where is the
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. Indiana
Not supposing the question was addressed
TO him. the general paid no attention, but
soon he was made aware that he was the
person. intended when, in a louder tone, the
Hoosier said: Il mean you, old fellow,
there. with the red shirt. Where is the One
hundred OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES Indiana?" The
salutation evidently pleased General Scho-
field, as he sent the young soldier to the
headquarters tent and he was given break
fast and taken along until his regi-
ment was overtaken. General Schofield is
not so certain that it was the gallant One
Observation-Disclosures Indiana" that
the young soldier was seeking, but it was
some gallant Indiana regiment of high
number.
General Schofelds remarks concerning
himself at West Point do not give the i'm
preston that ne was one of those young
men who were pointed out as models of
propriety. His dement's aggregated 1876,
when 200 would have been fatal He was
once expelled without trial. but finally got
through with a much better record for
scholarship than department. AT any rate,
on graduating he was assigned to the ar
tilIery.
A year before the war broke out General
Schofield resigned to accept professorship
in Washington University, in st. Louis, but
General Scott gave him a years leave, with
the privilege of continuing in the army If
he desired. He had been but eight months
in the college when the storm arose, and
he notified the War Department that he de-
sired 20 be assigned to duty. He was di-
rected to await orders in Missouri. and in
time was assigned to duty in that dis
tracted State He had hand in the cap
ture of the State regiments and in those
courageous movements which saved St
Louis He became the adjutant general OF
General Lyon. and was with him when he
was killed. General Schofield recounts
some of the acts of General Fremont, show
ing that he had no qualifications for the
command of department. He was soon
made brigadier general, and became in
volved, as were other officers, in the squab-
bles of the factions in Missouri and Kansas.
The chapters of the book covering this
period are not pleasant reading, because
they lay bare the intrlgueS OF such men as
Lane of Kansas. He got out OF the de-
partment for time, but was finally sent
back to its command where his contentious
with the warning factions were more trying
than fighting the enemy. His removal was
urged, but President Lincoln stood by MN
until the Department of Missouri was oil
Vided into three, and General Grant asked
that he be assigned to the command or the
Department and Army OF the Onio; ne Egg, t31A
which ultimately led to his command OF the
Twenty-third Corps.
General Schofield found his little corps
in a sad conditon-half starved, haf
clothed, thinned by privation and disease
He remarks that while the men were thus
in need, the first train which arrived at
Knoxville contained three carloads of shoes
for mules that were dead. But the work
of reorganization began, supplies We're pro-
cured and the ranks were filed. The general
tells how he sought TO win the confidence
OF ms command, ana ne adns; of hI neterl
ans under fire at Dalton, heard one on
them say: It's all right, boys | like the
way the old man chaws his tobacco. " OF
course there were no troops just as good as
the Twenty-third Corps in all that General neral
Schotield has to say Y, in the, the rest OF ms Dook
a considerable portion of the book is de-
voted TO the campaign which resulted IN
avoids the details of battles. but dwellss
upon the larger movements of armies and
the plans of campaigns. he crltlelseS move soot
criticism constitutes a large part of what
he has 70 say. of that campaign called out
in part by the memoirs of General Sner-
man. He thus criticises the operations
about Dalton and Resaca:
First among the most important events
of the Atlanta campaign were the opera
lions about Dalton and Resaca. Here l
have always thought General Sherman COM
w7rft tod he mi =f4 10
(and l believe, not infrequently after
ward committed by himself and others in
the Union armies), of assigning too small
force TO the main attack upon the vital
point Of an enemys position. McPhsrson
man estimated Johnston's force at about
10000. Thomas's position in front of Rocky
face Ridge was virtually as unassailable as
that of Johnston behind it. The only weak
point Of our position was that of two di-
visions of the Twenty-third Corps on our
LETT, north of Dalton. Had these divisions
been attacked. as Sherman apprehended,
they might have suffered severely, but
would have drawn off force enough from
the enemy to increase largely the probabll-
ties of success in the attack on Johnston
rear. There was no necessity to attack
Resaca at all, and experience has shown
what terrible losses small force in a
strongly fortified position may intiict upon
very large attacking force Two or three
brigadeS could have invested ReSaca, with
the garrison il then held, while force
large enough to hold its ground against
JohnSton's whole army could have been put
upon the railroad between Resaca and Dali
ton. The result would then, in all probable
ity, have been what Sherman expected. In
deed the fate of Johnston's army might
perhaps have been decided then and there.
He discusses the march to the sea.
He does not believe that it was the best
thing to do from a military point of view
that Sherman should have kept his army
together and commanded IL until he had
annihilated Hood, which he could have done
easily, and then marched to the coast with
100000 men through North Carolina instead
of to Savannah He admits chat the move
nent was successful, but insists, with plaus-
ible arguments, that the plan he has sug-
gested would have been the better. The
devastation of Georgia, he holds, was not
a military necessity, and, If 1t Were II could
have been done by cavalry. He further
critcises General Sherman for taking so
large Il part of his army with him TO march
10 the sea leaving a really inadequate force
with General Thomas to fight Hood. Gen.
Schoheld shows that it was General Sher-
mans original purpose TO take his corps
in the march to the sea. With that perfect
candor which Sherman always invited, Il
told him., says Schotield. that Thomas
force was much too small. and urged that
/ be sent with my corps to join him.
Schoheld had marched three days toward
the sea when he was ordered back TO re-
port to General Thomas.
A considerable portion of the book Is de-
voted to the operations which resulted in
the battle of Franklin He evidently con-
siders that TO be his campaign, and is sat
isfed with the result. This portion of the
book will be very interesting to many In
diana soldiers who participated in che
movements and the battle because no other
writer has entered SO fully into the details
of the campaign He holds that the spirit