The Ravalli Republican., 1898-10-19
MODERN ARMIES.
Their 1Argenesa Has Tendency to Make
Them ImmObilc.

Their 1srgenes- Has Tendency to Make
Them Imnobilc.
.are.by no means sure that aI-
mics at the end Of the nineteenth
century are not to some eatont III
the condition Of the armies Of the
last few years of the eighteenth cen
tury. No doubt the modern generals
are, or, shall we say seem, less
sleepy headed than the old bewig-
ged Austrians and P1ussians, though
! they, it must be remembered, were
in their day rechoned men of science.
But at the same time we suspect that
a good deal Of our modern military
organization has become stiff and
impractical We shall be told, no
doubt, that the Prussian army went
like clockwork in 1870, but we must
be allowed to doubt whether the
clockwork is quite as good now as
it was then, in spite of appearances.
Besides, Prussia had just tho very
force opposed to her in 1870 against
which good cloclzwork would be
sure to pleyail-a piece OF bogus
military mechanism. Whether Prus-
sia would have had as easy a victory
/ if some Frenchman had arisen capa-
BILE of organizing and using really
mobile force Of 60, 600 men is anoth-
er question. It is possible that such
a spearhead stuck into the clock
work might have done great deal
Of damage. That, however, is spec
ulation. What we do know is that
the Prussian army was a splendid
fighting organism at the end Of the
Seven Years war, and that at Jena,
some 40 years after, it proved utter
ly unable to meet Napoleon S quick,
fierce assault. ...-..-
In spite, then, of the magnificent
organization Of the present Euro
pean armies and of their vast size,
we believe it to be quite possible
that some new Alexander may arise
who will organize new method of
fighting which, for time, at any
rate, may bring all their far stretch
ed greatness to ruin. Of course such
a genius in the art Of war may new
er get to the front, but that his op-
portunity exists in the present bloat-
ed armaments we have no sort OF
doubt Yet, it will be said, how about
the big battalions? All military arl-
thorities agree that in the end, and
considering that the European ma.
tions are practically equal in cour-
age and morale, the way to win 4
battle is to confront five men of the
enemy with eight, OF, if possible
ten, men Of your own. That proves
that the big armies will always beat
the small? BY no means It is be
cause we entirely and absolutely &C
quiesce in the big battalions theory
-" Providence is on the side Of the
big battalions, was Napoleon S die
tum-that we hold that small ane
properly organized mobile armie:
will beat the huge, unwieldy armie
that the modern European strate
) gists contemplate putting into tn
field. Remember, your big battal
ions must confront the little battal
ion not on paper, but on the ground
; hence, if q body Of 10000 men cal
> be swiftly and suddenly confronte'
! with a body Of 100000, the big bat
I talions rule is on the side Of til
40, 900. The fact that the 20, 600 be
: long to an organization which ha
$ a couple Of hundred thousand me
Il behind it does not matter. Unles
S the 200, 600 men are available at til
moment they do not count.
I An extremely mobile army, read
q TO spring -rstin one direction an
9 then in another, is quite capable {
,, beating an army three OF four time
u it's size and beating it always b
= having substantial majority {
/, combatants in every actual engag'
II ment. OF course the big army ma
J. be SO splendidly organized that
$ will be quite as mobile, if not mol
10 mobile, than the small army.
II that case the small army will
4 swallowed whole. All we conte1
D. is that the hugeness Of the Europes
10 armies tends to make them INN
y bile and that, therefore, it is alwa.
III possible that some clever inventit
at In the direction of intense mobili
may give victory to small and a
parently not particularly we'll fou1
u army in other respects. .-Londs
80 Spectator.
IS
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