The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-06-01

WASHINGTON. May 2S.-As a result Of
fleet under the command of Admiral Ger
vera. future naval constructors will give
the armored cruiser a prominent place in
the types in the vessels provided for de-
fensive purposes.
This. perhaps, is the best lesson taught UP
to this time by the war with Spain. Such
Is the opinion Of naval experts since Ad-
miral Cervera, with his speedy squadron,
arrived 10 days ago at Martinique 1t
marks the downfall Of the theory so strong
ly advocated by Capt G. F. Goodrich. now
in command Of the Yale, and formerly pro-
fessor of the naval war college. that the
armored cruiser had not place in modern
navies.
Capt Goodrich is now probably con-
WINGED Of the value Of armored cruisers"
said prominent naval officer, lin view Of
the fact that. as commanding officer Of the
Yale, he has been scouting for the enemys
fleet since few days before its arrival
at Martinique. The armored cruiser Is
nothing more Than a swift; sea-going bat
tleship. Japan recognizes this fact, and is
the only nation that was quick to take ad
vantage OF such recognition. Her lesson
was learned at Yalu, where her protected
cruisers OF great speed, and equipped with
rapid firing guns. drove from the scene Of
battle the Chinese battleships Of slow speed
and thick armOr.
That the lessen was well learned is
shown by the fact that Japan Immediately
placed contracts with the Armstrong;, of
England, for the construction Of six battle
ships OF great speed. In order to get the
speed desired, IL knots, with the protection
and armament specified by the Mikados
government. 1t was necessary to make these
shps Of great displacement. Two of them,
YQSh3nQ nd II WI
their way to Japan, are Of 12,4OO tons dis
placement each. The other ships have a
displacement Of IA, 805 tons each. On their
trials the Yashima and Full developed
speeds of 1875 and 1872 knots respectively.
These vessels are really the development
of the armored cruiser type. What would
we now give for such vessels under the
command of Rear Admiral Sampson? Two
of them, with the New York and Brooklyn.
would be able to destroy or drive away Ad-
miral Cervera's squadron. This government
in building the Iowa, obtained a type in
some respects similar to the armored
cruiser. but her speed is only 16 knots, and
Ii or IA.
Since the war began we have been using
vessels for purposes for which their types
unsuited them. For instance the Indiana
and Massachusetts are coast defense bat
tlesh1ps. Yet they have been sent to sea
cruising for the enemy, when they were
really intended for defensive purposes.
Then we have been employing harbor de-
tense monitors for blockading purposes and
for offensive warfare, the result being to
cripple the manoeuvering quality of our
fleet and handicapping Rear Admiral Samp-
son seriously in his offensive and defensive
operations. Our ship building policy has
been all wrong. The country has gone on
the theory that a defensive navy was all
that was necessary. The present war
teaches that an offensive navy is absolutely
required
THE necessity of target practice In time
of peace is apparent when we think Of the
firing Of the Spanish at Manila, at Matan-
zas and at San Juan upon the American
squadrons. We knew before the war began
the desirability Of employing smokeless
powder but unfortunately, congress failed
to make the necessary appropriation when
1t was recommended several years ago, and
the department had to fall back on brown
powder.
Il think congress will now agree that
docks are the crying necessity at this time
Although no battleship is capable Of greater
speed than 16 knots an hour under present
foul conditions. they can probably not steam
at a greater rate than IL or Is knots. The
divers who have been sent down to Key
West from Norfolk will be able to scrape
the propellers clean and thus Increase the
speer Of the ships, but they will not remove
the barnacles off the bottoms of the ships
to any great extent for 1t is impossible for
them to do good work under water"