The Portland daily press., 1898-12-22

asked that Il xed rations be sent, but
instead they were sent down In bulk,
without invoices or bills of ladihg, and
In many instances stores were spoiled IN
the hold and thrown away. This caused
oreat embarrassment and loss of stores
and deprived troops of food, and he as
serted. the scarcity of food largely caused
the distrsss of the troops. He had advised
against the shipping of beef to Porto
Rico, both because there was apuH9a nee
of it on the island as we'll as ms heileI
that 1t was defective. ne onaI .aos .Ta
1927 tons sent, az ssembalmed beef, ana
said the canned fresh beef, OF which lSe,
600 pounds had been shipped tnere, WAS
condemned by officers whose commands
used it,
who fixed that beef as an army
ration?''
you'll have to ask some one VINO
was in Washington. You had better ASK
the secretary of war or the commlssafy
general. Jt was sent as food. II tney
had not taken that they would have mad
to go hungry If they had sent paymas-
tiers down there as | asked we could have
bought food, but they did not do that.
Gen. Miles suggested that the food THAI
was sent to his large army was under
pretense of an experiment..
Gen. Miles stated the first plans for
sending troops to Cuba were not his as
he was opposed to sending troops there
until Cerrera's fleet was located. The
lem, and the dispatch OF troops, Ia his
Judgment, hinged on which f1eet should
DESTROY the other. He was also opposed
to sending a large force 10 places ike
Havana or Matanzas, because of the large
per eeubage of yellow fever deaths there.
He said the destruction OF Cervera's heet
settled that problem. He said he wanted
to operate with email force against the
Spanish forces by harrassing them during
the sickly season, aiding the Cubans and
not endangering the lives of his own
force. He also at first favored taking
Porto Rico to prevent the Spanish from
using that as a base of operations. Gen.
Miles gave details of the Porto Rlcan ex-
petition organizations and obstacles.
Concluding with his opinion of camp
sites. he said thatSthe tirstshe knew OF the
selection of Camp Alger, the most obJec-
tionable camp in bis mind, was when the
regiments began reaching there At
Chiekamauga he had recommended
mobilizing the regulars there and por-
tion of the volunteers, after some of the
regulars left, but he never anticipated
rs, 900 men would be sent there, and when
finding it overcroWded, had recommended
distributing of the forces elsewhere.
Gen. Wesley Merritt was the first witt
ness of the afterno DON. He began his testi-
mony by description of the operations
around Manila prior to its capture. Ow-
ing to the smailness of his force, he said,
the army was compelled 20 operate along
the sea front in cooperation with the
navy. Had there been larger American
force on hand, the city could have been
taken from the high ground inland. but
this was tactically impracticable without
leaving our base at the mercy of both
Spaniards and insurgents. The city's
defenses were good. The Spaniards had
excellent arms and plenty OF ammuni-
ton. all they lacked was "sand." The
engagement lasted not over two. hours The
army has both Spaniards and insurgents
to contend with. The insurgents were
very anxious to take part in the attack,
said Gen. Merritt. but they were not
notified when the attack would De- made,
ms / was sure the entrance of the Filipinos
into the city would mean unnecessary
bloodshed and 9 ONE looting.
Gen. Merritt said that the American
losses were not correctly stated in the
press reports. There were about f2O Off
GERS and men killed and wounded. No
accurate account of the Spanish loss was
ever obtainable. The American force,
however, captured over 1900 stands of
modern arms, and the Spanish loss was
known to be severe.
There was some discussion by the COM
mission of the relative merits OF the
Springfield and the modern small calibre
rife. This drew from Gen. Merritt, the
statement that personally he should
prefer The Springdeld with smokeless
powder to tine 'sCalibre 30'' or to the
Mauser. However, some Of the line Off
GERS would be better judges OF that than
l, he added. AS an instance OF the lack
of stopping power OF the small bore rifles,
he said one of his officers was shot
49, fI,..l in, he anil fiffhf ON
did not know it till the next morning,
Gen. Merritt said that the volunteer
were as effective and as enthusiastic as
could be desired He regarded thar as
very excellent troops. The supplies were
satisfactory at all times except as to ice
and milk for fever patients He explained
that there were apparently no milk pro-
aucIng animals in that region. There
were some small CATTLE Imported from
China, but they gave no milk to speak
of.
AS to medical supplies and hospital
conveniences, Gen. Merritt said he had
heard no complaints On entering the
city the army took possession of all the
good houses it needed and turned them
over to the medical department. The
sick and wounded were thus well pro-
yided for.
The army in the island depended upon
local stock for !. transportation. This
proved Qulte SATISFACTORY ana ne Q0ilDIeQ
the ACCESSIBILITY of importing American
horses or mules.
Asked If he had the cordial and effec-
tive support of the administration, Gen.
Merritt said:
"From the President / had the most
hearty sympathy and support and this
applies also to the various departments.
The only thing of which ! might feel ]
had right to complain was not having
soma contingent of regulars to act as
a-nucleus if they had TO be iaken from
Tampa. should have liked to have the
18th regular regiment, but was told that
| could not have it unless | furnished
something to take it's place. But made
the best could of the situation and dis
tributed my officers to aid and train first
the volunteer officers and thsn the men.
This work was done very well and was
personally thanked for this service. -
Gen. Merritt paid quite as high tri-
butte to the civiliaI s5aff officers as did
Gen. Shafter the previous day, saying:
EtThey were good officers. intelligent,
anxious to learn and to work."
THE STATE GRANGE