Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-01-25
THE U. s. BATTLE SHIP MAINE


Minister Woodford has cabled to the De-
partment of State that the government of
Spain has consented to negotiate a COM
mercial treaty with the United States on
Cuba and the peninsular. The negotia tions
VIII be conducted in Washington at time
yet to be agreed upon.
The Spanish minister. senor Dupuy de
LONE, had little to add today to the Cuban
status He expressed much satisfaction
with the present condition of affairs, all
MS advices indicating quiet at Havana and
.hopeIui outlook. The minister received
long letter from Secretary General Con-
gosto. reviewing recent events Dr. Con-
gesto wrote that the sentiment for the re-
establishment Of peace Is growing very
strong and practically universal, as every
one wants the, opportunity to work, which
Will come with a restoration of peace and
the renewal Of the many branches of in
dustry. Referring to the recent riots, DR..
Congosto states that they were made I'D
largely of boys, who were induced by a
few pennies to enter upon what they re-
garded as harmless and rather amusing
diversion A few leaders and following
OF many boys gave the occurrence an out:
ward appearance of some seriousness
which, however, DR.. Congosto says It never
had.
The minister continues to look at the
sending of the Maine to Havana as q
friendly measure wholly. without signif-
canoe upon the general condition of affairs.
It Is pointed out by Senior de LONE that
the absence of Gen. Blanco from Havana
shows conclusively that no disturbance was
apprehended and that this period of entire
quiet was regarded as opportune for the
return TO the custom Of having our ships
in Cuban waters
Understanding With Spain.
1t Is reported that there has been an un-
derstandtng between the President and
the Spanish minister for some time that
the latter would inform the President when
ever the Spanish authorities felt that there
was the least doubt of their ability to
maintain order in Havana, and that at such
time an American msin-of-war might be
sent to Have ma without danger of exciting
resentment on the part Of the Spanish gov
eminent. 1t is said that it was in consid-
Grafton Of this understanding that the
President did not send a vessel before 1t
Is uncertain whether the Spanish minister
made voluntary suggestion that the time
had come when vessel should be sent to
Havana, or whether, the matter being
pressed upon him, he merely yielded to the
arguments presented.
1t is understood. however, that the
Spanish authorities feel relieved at the
presence of an American naval vessel in
the port of Havana at this time. 1t was
recognized that there was danger of re-
sentiment being excited among the radicals
both at Madrid and at Havana by the ap-
pearance of an American vessel in the har-
Dor, but the danger and responsibility as
was SO much greater that 1t had to be
yielded to as necessity.
The apprehension felt by both the Span
ish minister and the Navy Department
that the presence Of an American vessel
might excite the pro-Spanish population in
Havana, is in itself confession of lack
OF confidence on the part Of the Spanish
authorities in their ability to maintain or
der. The precaution taken by the Secre-
tary Of the Navy to explain publicly that
the Maine would stop at Havana only on a
friendly call Is recognition of a state of
affairs in Cuba which. while demanding
watchfulness on our part, ts such as to
render anything calculated to excite the
people extremely dangefous. II this were
not the case it would not be necessary to
make these pacifying explanations.
Too Great . Responsibility.
There is another reason besides the al
legged doubt Of the Spanish authorities of
their ability to maintain order, which is
regarded as having inauee6 the President
to at once dispatch the Maine. The re-
sponsibility he assumed in Fefusing to or
der vessel to Havana swas too great to be
lightly assumed. The AemaRd came from
men Of all parties, snd the situation
seemed to demand 1t. n heshad disregard
ed hits and anything had happened which
resulted In injury to AmerAcans In Cuba,
the blame for 1t WOULD have rested direct
ly upon the President. That there was
Danger OF such thing happeaing he recog-
nized This danger. even though remote.
with the responsibility attaching, was suf
hcient to overcome the other danger of
giving offense to the Spanish people by
sending the vessel. As between two dam
gers he selected the less, an dhis action
Use sending of the Maihe to Havana is In
the interests Of the preservation of peace,
ana Is not an act OF hostility. 1t is recog-
nizeds however, that the situation Is full
Of danger. no matter which way the ad-
ministratfon turns.
At the c.Ainef Meetlns.
Strangely enough. Cufa was only an In
cidental subject at the fabinet meeting to-
day. 1t was barely touched upon. the Pres
ident making no fan statement to the cab
inet Of his action In ordering the Maine to
Havana. The entire matfsr OF the move