The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1898-12-03
A HISTORY OF TIE WAR.
Capt. CrowniDshicId's Annual Report
In One Of ~ Most interesting md
Valuable Character.


Washington. Nov ?4-Far out OF tn,
lines OF the ordinary annua! report OF tho
bureau officers is that OF Capt. Crownin-
shield, chief OF the bureau OF navigation,
navy department.. which has Just been
made public No; only WAS the head OF hS
bureau "A member OF the war or strategy
hoard. as IL came TO be known. but he was
responsible for the execution OF the plans
formed by that board and for the move
mcut Of avery ship and the assignment of
every oLircr Consequently no bureau of
GCcr nui equal opportunity 10 know the
uoyiu; purposes and exact history OF the
war Ihn report ia absolutely free from
personalities. there Is no reference what
ever iU the now happily-CudCd Sampson
Sch.ry controversy, no criticism Of any
Officer nor any COmmcudauon that might
DC rrr.IrIcd az inyidiOUs and discriminate
iur ga; ihc report Is confined TO the state
nI,ui OF hard facts with a few important
re. lamentations for the bcttcrmcnt OF the
~, q. 7,ryice.
the war history begins with tho sim
pie statement OF certain precautionary or
d, ~ THAI were ISSUED. but even IN the abb
sui.,u Of comment attention cannot fail
To- o., attracted to the remarkable fore
rt.lG exhibited IN the preparation OF the
oil, .Y3 orders They begin with an order
dan.l January II last directing the com
mahI.r Of iHC lEurOpcan stations TO retain
~ service mon whose cnli s,mentS were
Wit, tor the successful c%tricaticn Of the
LlrtnlaH squadron from the danger TO
Which Il Wd5 exposed upon the outbreak
OF the war, show how the south Adam
IL r4uaaron was brought Up to recn-
force, SAMPSON how the Oregon started on
hjr famous race around South America
how stores ana ammunition were forward
cd TO N" s,luuGrOuS, aud una'Iy thcy ~lnd
W W3lb lho famous lacOnic order TO Dewey
OF AlrIi -: War has commenced between
The jrtad states and Spain. proceed at
onr. 20. the Philippine Islands. commence
op,"ljious at once. particularly agains,
Spanish Meet You must ~CaR turc vessels
ord Troy Use utmost cEGraNprs. These
orders show that four InGuthS before Ger
VprI's Ncut reached this Side our whole
north ACanlic fleet was ready for any
en- rgcucy within striking distance of one
Of the TWO points from which attack
mi&hl come.
'"Ihc completeness OF our naval Victories
during the war and the almost absolute
immunity from inJury which our ships
and crews enjoyed, naturally led to n gem
Cral conclusion that our gunncry had much
TO do with the matter. AZ matter OF
fact, all reports bear out this conclusion.
In fact II appears that the experience OF
each combat was that our craftsmanship
was so far superior that. at a range at
which the Spanish guns and gunncrs were
ineffective. our guns and gunnCrs were so
effective that before the range was or
could be reduced, the Spanish ships were
either seriously crippled or their crews
dcmOraliZed.", SD"
Capt CrowninshlcId declares that the ex-
pCrCnCc CT the war has been another dem
onStration OF the Importance to the ma
tiOn OF sea power. lie says that from
the first the only apprehension felt in this
country was on account OF the Spanish
navy II was Ccrvcra'3 ships that were
fearCd-wc did not fear the Spanish army
would not have feared 1t 'if 1t had been
three times as powerful. unless IT had been
supported by navy powerful enough to
have formed an efficient convoy and
brought II TO this coast. on the contrary,
the Spanish navy, even without the Span
Ash army, would have been a menace.
though 1t had consisted of only one first
class cruiser, Until that cruiser had been
bloCEadCa, captured or destroyed any un-
protected point on our coast and all of our
sea commerce would have. been at its
mercy. and no army. however efficient,
could have protected us from 1t. 1t re-
quired navy for this work. and an ef-
fcCtive navy"
Touching upon the combined operations
OF the army and navy. the reported diff
fcrcnCcs which arose between the com
mandcrs during the campaign were salts
faClOrily solved by victory. one gar-
inE defect Of the system of joint opera
tions was found. however. In the matter
OF transporting and conveying troops, and
II Is recommended that to secure smooth
er handbag of such a campaign, the navy
be by law charged with the transport
service .. ....
The navigation bureau recommends that
congress authorize the increase OF the
naval force 10 10000 mcn for general scrv-
Ice and $50 apprentices, and an argument
Is made To show absolute necessity of some
such increase, unless the reserves on the
receiving ships are to he reduced below the
danger points; and that was very closely
approached during the last war.
lie shows that difficulty was experienced
in mastering the men in, the department
having no right to call upon them, and they
having no responsibility TO the navy de-
partment. were not subject to orders.
Therefore the bureau recommends the pas
sage OF the Cummings bill which pro-
vidcs In substance for appropriations for
the naval militia on an entirely different
basis This would provide for the creation
OF national naval reserve entirely under
the control Of the department, recruited
from the sCnfarinG classes. who would be
comDCilCd 10 serve In war times under
penalty of deSertion. The men would be re-
qur,d to report once n year for drill for
which they would receive one months
pay
Another recommendation is that the sys-
tom of rewards 10y promotion be abolished.
and that medals of honor he substituted
80 that officers may be rewarded without
detrimcnt to others. Finally. the sug-
Ecstion OF the superintendent OF the coast
signal service. that this should be made a
permanent institution IL approved. AS II
viii afford a skeleton at small cost. around
which "A highly efficient service could he
promptly built up upon the outbreak OF
a war.