The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-26
A DREADFUL SLAUGHTER
SUCH MIGHT BE THE MEETING OF
SPANISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES.
Capt. Black shows How system of Tao
ties Failed to Keep Pace with
Improved Arms.

Most officers OF the regular army have
hobbies on which they work in times Of
peace to keep apace with their profession
Captain William Black, of the United States
army. now stationed in Indianapolis as re-
cruiting officer is one of this type, and has
made the tactical changes in warfare due
to improvements in arms a subject of deep
and careful study.
He has given time and expense to his
hobby, which is that every noted improve
ment in weapons requires a corresponding
change in the formation of the troops that
use such improved arms. He has reviewed
the history of warfare carefully and kept
in touch with foreign army writer's and
thinkers on the subject taking long leaves
of absence and travelling extensively for
the purpose. He is also a graduate of the
school of application maintained in the
army to give officers as much practice as
possible in what would be their duties and
responsibilities in war. His last foreign
work was to observe the autumn maneuvers
of the German army, in the vicinity of
Stettin, North Germany, in the fall of 1895.
In these 120 600 men were engaged, under
the immediate command of the Emperor,
tria. They were the largest peace maneuv-
ers which have ever been held by any ma
ton, being made to correspond as nearly as
possible 10 the conditions of actual war.
Particular attention was given to the i'm
provements which have been made in arms
and equipments, and all their experiments
had these in view. The operations covered
over one hundred miles front along the
military science, as the three arms COM
bined, siege enterprises, ballooning, recon-
noissance minor tactics, etc. A number of
these were engaged in as a matter of rou-
tine. but after every mimic engagement of
troops-the basis of every army-the prob
able effect of the fire action was especially
extensively discussed, the subject being one
on which the best authorities are not har-
monious.
CHANGES IN FORMING LINES.
Captain Black submitted a report upon
that maneuver for which he received a
letter of thanks from General Miles. Talk
ing along the line of his hobby, the captain
said:
1.-The world has never witnessed such
changes or developments in arms, explo-
sives, etc, as have been made since the last
war of magnitude-that of 20 and u. In
this respect much ahead of that
war as that war was in advance of the in
PRODUCTION of gunpowder. To review the in
termediate changes would give some ngnt
as to what we may expect IN the future
The following, taken from history, briefly
reviews the progress in attack up to the
time of the last war; in 1870:
Wars and Dates-French army, 1869, num-
Der of ranks in the firing or first line,
twelve. French army, 1910, number Of ranks
in the firing of first line, ten. GustavuS
Adolphus, ISL, number of ranks in the fir
ing or first line, six. Louis XIV, number of
ranks in the firing of first Line; three to
in the. firing or first line, three. American
revolution, number Of ranks in the firing or
first line, two to three including general
of ranks in the firing or first line, three.
Napoleon, 1913, number of ranks in the fir-
ing of first line, two; skirmiSherS extensive
ly employed. War of secession, number of
ranks in the firing or first line, three, two
and one rank, habitually preceded by Skin
mishers; many engagements were fought
by Skirmishers alone. Franco-German war,
early part, number of ranks in the firing or
first line, one to two. Francois var
great battles by use of skirmishers alone,
without ranks moving on the field. Russo
Turkish war, same as preceding.
From the above you see that the firing
line has gradually diminished in depth from
twelve ranks to less than one, changes from
ventions in arms, chiefly in the direction of
range, rapidity and accuracy.
Our present drill regulations are in
which 1 have mentioned. 1t would be muir
der and cause almost the entire destruction
of both to place two armies In opposition on
the field of battle with the present tactical
formation and the present destructive fire
arms.
With the increased range, accuracy and
rapidity of modern fire action just what
formation to take to bring the different or
CARNATIONS of an army on the battlefield
and deliver an effective fire without rulnouS
losses is and has been the great considera-
ton in both German and French autumn
maneuvers. In other words they are not de-
cided as to the best tactical formation Tor
attack and defense under the new condi-
TONS They believe their present drill regu-
lationS are obsolete in many respects, out
tual experience in battle. In the early part
of the war of 20 and II the Germans sur
fered enormous losses by adher1ng TO the
obsolete. tactics OF Frederick the Great ~
midrange. They did not comprehend the
effectiveness of the then modern French
Chassepot. Later they adopted the plan or
advancing small bodies of sldrmishers un,
der cover and reinforcing these bodies until
'sWarmS of SkirmiShers would appear With
in effective range. Thus, you might say,
the extended order of fighting was born
on the battlefield and is now Incorporated
in the drill regulations of France, Germany
..The infantries of all nations are now
armed with small arm of about 80 cal1ber,
with twice the former range. me neId ar
munition and plenty of 1t, with schrapnel
and common shell, fearfully annihilating at
twice the former distance.
DREADFUL SLAUGHTER AT FIRST.
I'm case there should be war between
Spain and the United States under the new
conditions the first few battles would result
in great slaughter. Perhaps no one has any
adequate idea of how many men would be
killed in a battle of any magnitude at the
present day. The slaughter would continue
until experience should suggest new sys-
tenn of tactics to meet the new conditions.
The opposing armies would advance toward
each other with the idea of opening fire at
too short a range, and both armies would
suffer terribly Then, doubtless, they would
devise a system of tactics which nothing
but the terrible teacher, experience, could
suggest. | am not able to say what that
system will be, but l believe, in general, the
change in tactics will result in d careful
advancement of the army or armies pre-
ceded by large bodies of reconnoiterers.
Artillery fire will also be used more than
formerly, Entertainments will be used eX-
tensively and battles will assume more the
form of siege operations. The change will
undoubtedly call for smaller tactical units
men will not march elbow to elbow, as for
merly, and greater dependence will be
placed on individuals. Large bodies of
troops, such as divisions and corps, will
occupy a much wider front, and attacks
will be made usually more in the nature of
ft;,, Of fixrftx a.