The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-03-20
J0HNSToNE'S CLAIM DENIED.
CANNOT SHARE IN THE TRUST LEFT
BY MRS. MARSHALL.

Mother Has Only N Life Interest.
Claim of the Plaintiff Denied
in Fact, But Even if Admitted the
Court Says He Has No Right to
RecOver-Case TO Go to the SUI
preme Court.
Judge Falligant sustained the demurrers
yesterday in the suit of Florence Barclay
tombstone against C. c. Taliaferro indi-
vidually and as trustee, both as to the
suit and the amendment, and dismissed the
suit from court.
This means that in the opinion of the
court an illegitimate child has no right to
share in an estate of which his mother Is
beneficiary, the property not being her
own in fee simple title.
Judge Falligants decision dealt solely
with that legal point in the case the right
Oh an Legitimate child under the circum-
stances TO share in the trust estate, and
none of the alleged facts in the petition
were concerned in the issue before the
court
In June, 1897, Mr.. Burton Smith repre-
senting young tombstone, who then lived
perior Court. claiming that tombstone be-
ing child of Mary M. Barclay, after
ward Taliaferro, was entitled to share in
her estate, and, therefore, in the trust es-
tate left by Mary Marshall in 1874 for the
benefit of the Child or children" of Mary
NJ Barclay. The trust was formerly in
the hands of ]. ]. Waring, but C. c. Talia-
ZERO succeeded him in 1893 he being the
husband of Mary NJ, Barclay. The prop,
erty was left for the benefit of Mary NJ.
Barclay for life. and to her child or
children" after her death. 1t is said the
estate is valued at about 100000
The defendant demurred to the petition
on the ground that the plaintiff had not
peen specific in alleging himself to be the
child of Mary M. Barclay and his petit
ton was then amended by his statement
that he was her natural son born out of
wedlock in the year 1878. The plaintiff
also hled another amendment in which he
alleged that Mary M Barclay was the
daughter of Margaret Barclay, formerly
Marshall, known as Maggie Moonshine -
from the fact that as child she was left
on the steps of Mrs. Mary Marshall on q
IN THIS amendment that Margaret Barclay
was a founding and that her parents were
unknown
10 this last amendment the defense
MED a demurrer, stating it was irrele-
want, impertinent and scandalous. Mr. J.
H. Saussy of counsel for the defense stat
ed in court on the occasion of the filing
OF TINS demurrer that the defense knew
| and could prove that Margaret Barclay
Of III
Irish parents in Yamacraw
The case being in this shape, the de-
tense made denial of the claim of the
plaintiff that he was the son of Mary NJ.
| Barclay, and then demurred to the whole
| petition on the ground, that, even admit
ting the PLAINTIFFS claim, he had no right
as an Legitimate child to share in the
! trust estate under discussion.
Argument on the demurrer was had he
fore Judge Faligant on Saturday. March
IL Just a week ago The plaintiff was
represented by Messrs. Burton Smith and
Mercer q Mercer, and the defense by Hon.
F. G. duBignon and Mr.. ]. r. Saussy.
The defense set up that under Supreme
Court decisions of New York. Georgia
and other states, the term Child or chill
dren" in a legal sense meant legitimate
children, and that such was the intention
OF Mrs. Marshall when she wrote those
words in the trust deed. For this reason
it was commended that an illegitimate child
could not share in a trust estate which
was left to its mother for life and to her
child or children" after her death.
The plaintiff, in reply to this argument.
held that under the law of Georgia an IL
legitimate child could inherit property
from his mother. that law having been
made in 1854. It was argued, therefore
that when Mrs. Marshall made the trust
deed, she made it subject to the laws of
Georgia at that time, the deed being
drawn in 1874, many years after the pas
sage of the law In question
In the main these were the points ar
| gued on both sides of the case. Judge
| Falligant's decision, in sustaining the de-
| murrer and dismissing the case, means
simply that, in the opinion of the court
an ilegitimate child cannot share in a
trust estate left for the benefit of the
mother, and after her death for her child
or children. that term being construed TO
mean legitimate child or children. Judge
Falligant also sustained the demurrer to
the amendment, which stated that Mar
garet Barclay was founding, and Jis-
missed that with the original petition
Judge Falligants decision does not saw
that an illegitimate child cannot inherit
property from his mother, because .he
Georgia law distinctly provides that such
shall be the case, except, of course in the
event of a will where such child might
be dislnherited But where there is no
will left by the mother, under the Geor-
gia law an illegitimate child shares equal
ly in the estate of the mother with The
other children. But the property left I'M
der the trust deed was not Mrs Talia-
ferro's property, she having only a life
interest in it, and the court construed 1t
to be Mrs. MarshalPs intention, legally
considered, to leave it to the legitimate
child or children of Mrs. Taliaferro. These
contentious were predieated upon the as
sumption of the truth of the plaintiffs
claim, which, as a matter of fact, Is
strenuously denied by the defense
Mr.. George A. Mercer, Jr., who repre-
sents young tombstone, stated yesterday
that an appeal would be taken from the
courts decision and that the Supreme
Court win be asked to pass upon the case.
OVERS CASE PUT OFF.