Spirit of the age. [volume] (Woodstock, Vt.) 1845-1913, 1898-10-08
OUR FUTURE WARSHIPS.
CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR HIcHBoRN
GIVES HIS VIEWS ON THE WAR.
Most Valuable Is the p-Torpe

Copper SheAthinx shOuiu ne Sseu on
All our War Vessels.
Chief Constructor Hichborn of the
United States Navy in AL interview
has the following to say about the re-
suits of tue war with Spain and its ef-
feet on naval matters:
1.-The war has taught us what some
OF us already held, that the torpedo
boat is not the formidable engine Of
war which it has been credited with
being. The naval battles of the future,
as of the past, will be fought by the
most powerful engines OF naval war
fare that eau be constructed. The
battleship, in spite of its great cost,
will continue to occupy the prominent
place. The torpedo boat will have its
uses, but they will not be the most i'm
portant uses of naval engagement.
During the war just closed, the tor.
pelo boat was practically OF no use at
all. Just before the outbreak of hos
tilities, there was d great scare on ac-
count of the hotills of torpedo boats
and torpedo boat destroyers which was
said to he on its way across the Allan
tic from the Cape Verde Islands.
"When the war actually came, we
heard nothing more about them until
they were destroyed. In fact, torpedo
boats were not used by either combat
ant except occasionally for despatch
boats, duty to which other craft might
be more advantageously assigned. The
Winslow, it is true, was sent into the
harbor of Cardenas to reconnoitre, but
this was gunboat service, and not the
work for which torpedo boat is in
tended. As for the Spanish boats,
there was really nothing to fear from
them. Sigsbee made quick work OF
the Terror off San Juan, although the
st. Paul, which he commanded, was
exactly the kind of vessel, unarmored,
and presenting full side, that torpe-
does might be expected to infiict dam
age on. The Furor and the Pluton
were among the very best and most
modern of the destroyer class, and yet
the Gloucester, which is merely con-
verted yacht, defeated them both.
"The war has taught US to rely on
our great battleships and cruisers with
|
question has been open to fair discus
sion in the absence of any practical
illustration of their work in actual
warfare. But now we know what they
can do. The two vessels which, as
ships of war, have given the best ac-
count of themselves on their merits,
without regard to the manner in which
tliey were handed-although that, of
course, was above criticism with all
our ships-are the Oregon and Brook
lyn, and these are types of vessels
which are likely to come more and
more in vogue, not only in the Ameri-
can Navy, but in the navies of foreign
powers. The Brooklyn, for instance,
with only four inches of armor on her
sides, was far more than match for
the Vizcaya, with twelve-inch armor
belt. This type of vessel combines
speed with efficiency to most desir'
able degree.
GAS for the Oregon, she combines
great strength of armament with a
reasonable amount of speed and coal
carrying capacity in a proportion which
seems to lie eminently desirable. Bat
tleships will be built more and more
OH the Oregon plan, with greater speed,
if possible, without interfering with
their effectiveness as fighting ma
chimes.
"We can speak from actual expert
ence now on great many questions
with regard to which we could only
theorize three months ago. We know,
for instance, that dry docks are needed
large enough to receive our biggest
ships and numerous enough to prevent
the necessity of their lying long with
out repair or without having their
bottoms cleaned.
"The war has shown, too, that the
bottoms of all our shops should be
copper sheathed, 80 that they can be
kept at sea without the necessity of
too frequent docking for cleaning. AT
present not one of our important ships
is copper sbeathed. The only shenthed
vessels in the navy are the six gun
boats OF the Annapolis and Marietta
classes and the New Orleans and AL
bany, which we brought from the Bra
lillian Government at the outbreak Of
the war. With copper-sheathed bot
toms our ships would be att great ad-
vantage in long cruises, such as are
apt to be frequent now that the war
has brought into our possession far
distant colonies.
"Perhaps the most important les.
son which we have learned is the
necessity of making our fighting ships
freproof. At Manila and at Santiago
the Spanish ships took fire, and they
suffered as much or more from this
cause as from the impact of our shells.
Now it is not at all necessary that a
shell in striking ship should set fire
to it. It. is necessary to have certain
amount of woodwork in every vessel,
although so far as is practicable it is
dispensed with. There are some
things about even fighting ship for
which no satisfactory substitute for
wood has even been found. But it is
quite feasible to make such wood as
must be used fireproof by q chemical
process which has been employed. in
the woodwork of some of our gunboats.
The wood is mineralized, if you may
use that term, by being impregnated
, with phosphate OF ammonia, and after
this process has been undergone it is
impossible to burn it.
'.The war has demonstrated also
the value of the rapid-fire guns and
the eight-inch guns as compared with
, the guns of larger calibre. At Santi-
! ago the secondary batteries OF the
, Brooklyn and the Oregon are reported
!, to have been more effective than any
other portion Of their armament. The
Manila and Santiago battles also have
shown that smokeless powder is an in.
3 valuable part of u ships equipment.
"It is rather curious that no good
3 demonstration has been given during
D the war of the value of the expert.
mental craft which the Government