The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1898-04-09
THE CAPTURE OF HAVANA.
The Navy Can Take II, But the
Army Must Hold II.
TRANSPORTS ARE NEEDED
Although the Army Can Place Thou
sands of Men at Miami, Tampa and
Punta Gorda, the Facilities for
Landing Them I'm Cuba Are made
quate-The Number Needed.

Key West, Fla, April eff war comes
soon the Navy must fight IL unaided.
and, practically, without the effective CO.
J operation of the land forces. This seems
to be the tactical situation, as viewed
from this point which undoubtedly will
be the s,orm-center.
With steam UP, the fleet has been
waiting now for a fortnight for the or
der that will in an instant quicken fret
full inaction into vigor, and point the
| steel prows toward Havana.
| That the first move will be to dis
patch the entire feet in these waters to
| attack Havana, seems certain. That is
| a fact accepted by naval officers here,
| who doubtless, derive their belief from
Washington. An elaborate scheme of
attack has been decided upon, even to
assigning the position and part OF every
warship. This plan has for its objec;
the reduction of the Spanish batteries
in Havana harbor, and the occupation
Of the Cuban capital.
Doubt of its complete success would be
regarded as heresy in the fleet, but re-
Gently some of the older and more ex-
perienced officers have detected a flaw in
the plan. This is the apparent lack of
preparation for the cooperation of the
Army in the first aggressive move Ac-
curate information has been obtained of
the strength and location OF the defenses
OF Havana, and no naval officer doubts
the ability of the fleet to silence the
land batteries after a few hours of bonn
bardment, but to make this victory ef-
fective the city must Immediately be &C
cupied.
This the Navy cannot do although the
Government and most of the younger Of
ficers here seem to be even now laboring
under this delusion. The Navy might
within twenty-four hours after declara-
tion Of war. silence the batteries, bonn
bard Havana and, by running a light
cruiser well into the harbor, sweep the
water front and some streets with rapid
fire guns. Ii may even land it's entire
force OF marines, consisting of few hun
dred men, but this weak force could not
maintain position beyond the locality
commanded by the fire Of the cruisers.
Gen. Blanco has now probably 80 900 SOL
diers IN and near Havana. Even after his
big batteries are silenced he can barricade
the streets and with troops and field ar
tillery easily hold the greater part of the
city against any attack except that OF an
adequate land force.
Bombardment of the city proper by the
fleet would result in immense destruction
of property and death to non-combatants
without material advantage. Our fleet he
ing at Havana, where IL would be COM
PEELED 10 stay in order to retain the adj
vantage il had gained. the southern coast
cities would be for time exposed to sud-
den blows from Spanish warships. and
even Key West might be occupied or
made temporarily useless as a base of
supplies by a daring flank movement
troops are necessary at the outset
lhey are necessary 10 promptly occupy
Havana, hold it, drive the Spanish forces
from the island and bring the war TO a
speedy termination. Naval officers here
nave been vaguely proceeding on the the
org that considerable force of infantry
and field artillery would be mobilized al
some Southern point for transmission to
Cuba AZ was not until this week when
there was daily expectation of a SUDDEN
move, that the realization OF the com
plete absence OF Army cooperation
came with force that somewhat sob
cred enthusiasm.
There Is no doubt that if Havana Is at
tackled at any time within two weeks tha
Navy must act at alone. Even II prepara-
tons have advanced to the point claimed
bN the War Department. where the en-
tire Army can be modified at n southern
point within five days. there is vet gan
of water 10 cross before 1t can assist in
an attack upon Havana
At present there are only three vessels
ih iitSt waters mat are available for
transporting troops from any Florida
port. These are the Olivette and the
Mascotte. of the Plant line and the CITY
OF Key West, now plying between here
and Miami. The Miami. sister to the City
OF Key West, has already been seized by
the Government and is being fitted as an
auxiliary cruiser The total emergency
carrying capacity of these three vessels
is not more than two thousand, which is
pitifully inadequate.
Fully ten thousand troops would be
needed to occupy Havana, and twice that
number should be at hand to make sue
cess certain. In Key West are now only
companies of artillery. Three Florida
coast terminals are within the scope OF
transportation to Cuba of large bodies of
troops-Tampa, Punta Gorda and Miami
Troops may be concentrated at these
points with all the rapidity suggested by
the confident expressions of the War De-
partment, but when they get there means
must be found to TRANSPORT them by wa
ter, means not in sight at present so far
as naval officers here know. and that the
immediate utilization of the troops I'm
concert with the fleet is not contemplated
in Washington is clearly indicated by the
fact that for a week the fleet has been on
waiting orders and these are orders to go
ii alone.