The record-union., 1898-10-01

days Of hard work and hardship, and
l desire here to express agas1 n ad~
miration for the fortitude anu 3heerful
Willingness of the men of all commands
engaged in this operation.
Upon the assembly of MacArthur's s
brigade in support of Greene's, [ had
about $500 men in position to attack
and l deemed the time had come for
final action. During the time of the
night attack, I had communicated my
desire to Admiral Dewey that he
would allow his ships to open fire on
the right of the Spanish line of in
trenchments, believing that such ac-
ton would stop the night firing and
loss of life, but the Admiral had de-
clined to order it unless we were in
danger of losing our position by the
assaults of the Spanish, for the reason
that in his opinion, it would precipi-
tate general engagement, for which
he was not ready. Now, however, the
brigade of General Macarthur was in
position and the Monterey had arrived,
and under date Of August 9th, Admir-
al Dewey agreed TO my suggestion that
we should send a joint letter to the
Captain General notifying him that he
should remove from the city oil nom
combatants within forty-eight hours,
and that operations against the de-
fenses of Manila might begin at any
time after the expiration of that
period
This letter was sent August 1th, and
reply was received the same date to
the effect that the Spanish were with
out places of refuge for the increased
numbers of wounded, sick women and
children now lodged within the walls.
On the 9th a formal joint demand
for the surrender of the city was made
This demand was based upon the hope
lessness of the struggle on the part of
the Spaniards, and then every consid-
GRAFTON of humanity demanded that the
city should not be subject to lombard
ment under such circumstances. The
Captain Generals reply, of the same
date, stated that the Council of De-
fense held declared that the demand
could not be granted, but the Captain
General offered to consult his Govern
ment if we would allow him the time
strictly necessary for the communica
tions by way of Hongkong. This was
declined on our part, for the reason
that it could, in the opinion of the
Admiral and myself, lead only to a con-
tinuance of the situation, with no i'm
mediate result favorable to us, and the
necessity was apparent and very ur-
gent that decisive action should be
taken at once to compel the enemy to
give up the town in order to relieve
our troops from the trenches and
from the great exposure to unhealthy
conditions, which was unavoidable in
a bivouac during the rainy season
''The sea coast batteries in defense of
Manila are so situated that it is i'm
possible for ships to engage them with
out firing into the town, and as the
bombardment of a city filled with
women and children, sick and wound
ed, and containing a large amount of
neutral property, could only be justified
as last resort, it was agreed be-
tween Admiral Dewey and myself that
an attempt should be made to- carry
the extreme right Of the Spanish line
of intrenchments in front of the posi-
uons at that time occupied by our
troops, which, with its flank on the
seashore, was entirely open to the fire
of the navy.
BY orders issued some time previ-
ously, MacArthur's and Greene's bri-
gades were organized as the Second
Division of the Eighth Army Corps,
Brigadier General Thomas NJ Ander-
son commanding, and in anticipation
of the attack, General Anderson moved
his headquarters from Cavite to the
brigade camps, and assumed direct
command of the field Copies of the
written and verbal instructions referred
10 above, and appended hereto, were
given to the division and brigade com
manders on the 18th, and all the troops
were in position on the 18th at an early
hour in the morning.
About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet
steamed forward from Cavite, and be-
fore 10 a. m. opened a hot and accur-
ate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire
projectiles on the sea flank of the
Spanish intrenchments at the powder
magazine fort, and at the same time
the Utah batteries, in position in our
trenches near the Gale Real, began
firing with great accuracy. At 1925.
on a pre-arranged signal from our
trenches that it was believed our troops
could advance, the navy ceased firing,
and Immediately light line of skir-
mishers from the Colorado brigade
passed over our trenches and deployed
rapidly forward, another line from the
same regiment from the left flank of
our earthworks advancing swiftly up
the beach in open order. Both these
lines found the powder magazine fort
and the trenches fianking ii deserted,
but as they passed over the Spanish
works they were met by a sharp fire
from a second line, situated in the
streets of Malate, by which a number
of men were killed and wounded. among
others the soldier who pulled down the
Spanish colors still flying on the fort
and raised our own.
The works of the second line soon
gave way to the determined advance of
Greene's troops. and that officer pushed
his brigade rapidly through Malate
and over the bridges to occupy Binondo
and San Miguel, as contemplated in
his instructions. In the meantime the
brigade of General Macarthur, ad-
vancing simultaneously on the Pasay
road. encountered a very sharp fire,
coming from the blockhouses, trenches
and woods in front, positions which it
was very dtAicult TO carry, owing to
the swampy condition of the ground
on both sides of the roads, and the
heavy underground concealing the en-
emy. With much gallantry and excel
lent judgment on the part of the bril-
gade commander and the troops en-
gagged these difficulties were overcome
with a minimum loss, and Macarthur
advanced and held the bridges and the
town of Malate. as was contemplated
by his instructions.
The city of Manila was now in our
possession, excepting the walled town.