The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-01

Of Manila might begin at any time af-
ter the expiration OF that period.
This letter was sent Aug. Z and a re-
ply was received the same date 10 the
effect hat the Spanish were without
places OF refuge for the Increased num-
bers OF wounded. sick. women and chill
dren now lodged within the walls. On
the 9Th a formal joint demand for the
surrender OF the city was made. This
demand was based upon the hopeless
ness OF the struggle on the part Of the
Spaniards. n then every consideration
Of humanity demaGded that the city
should not be subjected 10 lombard
ment under such circumstances. The
captain generals reply OF same date
stated that the ounci OF defense de-
clared that the demand could not be
granted. but the captain general offered
to consult his government IL we would
allow him the time strictly necessary
for the communications by way Of
Hong Kong. This was declined on our
part for the reason n II could. in the
opinion OF the admiral and myself. lead
only to a continuance Of the situation.
with no immediate result favorable 20
us. and the necessity was apparent and
very urgent that decisive action should
be taken at once to compel the enemy 20
give up the town I'm order 10 relieve our
troops from the trenches and from the
great exposure which was unavoidable
In a bivouac during the rainy season.
The sea coast batteries in defense Of
Manila are so situate that II Is impos-
sible for ships TO engage them without
firing into the town. and as the bonn
bardment of a city filled with women
and children. sick and wounded. and
containing a large amount Of neutral
property could only be justified as a last
resort. IL was agreed between Admiral
Dewey and myself that an attempt
should be made to carry h extreme
right of the Spanish line OF entrench-
ments In front Of the posts at that lime
occupied by u troops. which, with Its
ank on the sea shore. was entirely
open TO the fire Of the
at was not my intention TO press the
assault at this point in case the enemy
should hold II in strong force until af-
ter the navy had made practicable
breaches in the works and shaken the
troops holding them. which could not
be done by the army alone. owing TO
the absence Of siege guns. This Is indi-
Gated fully In the orders and memoran-
DUN OF attack heretofore appended. II
was believed. however. as most desir-
able and In accordance with the prin-
ciples of civilized warfare that an at
tempt should be made to drive the ene-
my out of his intrenchments before re-
sorting to the bombardment of the
city.
by orders issued some time pre-
viously. MacArthur's and Greene's
brigades were organized as the second
division Of the eighth army corps.
Brig. Gen. Thomas NJ. Anderson com-
handing. and in anticipation of the at
tack General Anderson moved his head
quarters from Cavite to the brigade
camps and assumed direct command In
H. III rA-- -
verbal instructions referred to above
and appended hereto. were given TO the
division and brigadier commanders on
the 18th, and all the troops were in
position IN the 18th, at an early hour in
the morning.
about 3 a. m. on that date our fleet
steamed forward from Cavite. and be-
fore 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate
fire Of heavy shells and rapid-fire pro-
j~ectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish
intrenchments. at the powder magazine
fort N at the same time the Utah
battery. in position in our trenches
near the Gale Real, began firing with
great accuracy.
AT 1925 a. m. on a prearranged sig
nal from our trenches, that IL was be-
lieved our troops could advance. the
navy ceased firing and Immediately n
light line of skirmishers from the Colo
RADIO regiment of Greene's brigade
IdSStu over our tfencneS ana deplOved
rapidly forward, another line from the
same regiment from the left flank of
our earthwork advancing swiftly up
the beach In open order. Both these
lines found the powder magazin fort
and the trenches thanking IL deserted,
hut as they passed over the Spanish
works. they were met by a sharp fire
from a second line situated in the
streets Of Malate. by which a number
81 men we're killed and wounded.
among others the soldier who pulled
down the Spanish colors still flying on
the fort. and raised our own. The
works Of the second line soon gave way
TO the determined advance of Greene's
troops and that Officer pushed his
brigade rapidly through Malate and
oVer the bridges to occupy Binonda and
San Miguel as contemplated I'm his in
structions. In the meantime the brig
ade Of General Macarthur. advancing
simultaneously on the Pasay road, en-
~countered n very sharp fire. coming
from the block houses. trenches and
woods I'm front. positions which Il was
very difficult to carry, owing TO the
swampy condition 90 the ground on
both sides Of the road and the heavy
underground concealing the enemy.
With much gallantry and excellent
Judgment OF the part Of the brigade
commander and the troops engaged,
these difficulties were overcome with a
minimum loss and Macarthur ad-
vanced and held the bridges and the
town Of Malate. as was contemplated
by his instructions.
The city OF Manila was now In our
possession. excepting the walled town,
but shortly after the entry OF our troops
into Malate a white flag was displayed
on the walls. ~whereupon Lieutenant
Colonel c. A. Whittier. u. s. volunteers,
Of my stan. and Lieutenant Brumby.
u. s. N, representing Admiral Dewey,
were sent ashore TO communicate with
the captain general. i soon personally
followed those officers into the town,
getting at once TO the palace Of the gov
ernor general and there. after a conver-
sation with the Spanish authorities, a
preliminary agreement OF the terms OF
~capitulation were signed by the captain
general and myself. This agreement
was subsequently, Incorporated into the
formal terms OF capitulation, "a ar
ranged by the officers representing the