The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-06-05

and Il seems as though God were not
on our side, because the election OF Senior
Camara / fear will be fatal although he
NAV have a good chief OF stan. No one
could possibly suit him. because he IS
very capricious and beside is not hard
worker: on the contrary. he is lazy and
would nay no attention 10 the advice Of
any one You will not take this for
nattery. but to-day no one but you and
Don Pasquale should have command Of
our feet and this Is the belief OF the
younger element Of the PERSONAL
Now there is no remedy and may
Cod shed his light upon him and keep
him in his hands. ] wrote 20 the Min
lister and with the confidence due TO my
special duties. i said TO him on sending a
clipping from a newspaper containing
a telegram from Cadiz speaking OF our
feet and OF its admiral, that II was not
Senior Camara, but you who should COM
mand.
This action may have made a bad I'm
preston on him, but l don't care, be-
cause If I can DO so l shall leave the
service when this war Is finished.
have been left here TO receive and
send kilograms and TO look after the spy
system which ] have organized, or / had
better say, am establishing here, because
until very little while ago, l was not
permitted TO do as 1 pleased.
We have had bad luck because they
have captured our two best spies. One in
Washington. who hanged hlmself-or else
they did il for hlm-and the other, day
before yesterday in Tampa.
The Americans are showing the most
extraordinary vigilance.
TIRED or INACTIVITY.
do not wish to remain here without
taking an active part in the war, and
desire duty in which l can take the in
itlative ana do something. l shall be ex-
tremey gratided to have ship in order
TO run the blockade or torpedo boat;
anything rather than playing second fd-
die.
However. If there is no other remedy
would go. perfectly Willingly on board
a large ship. 1 am very sorry that this
war finds me so low in rank, for IT
offers opportunities for any one VINO
wishes to work and to risk himself
cannot believe that Don Pasquale
could be in Santiago, as reported by the
American press. He entered IL on the
18th and # he had gone Immediately
TO Havana he would have met only two
monitors in front Of II. I make II out
that he entered that place only 20 coal
and for the moral effect 1T would pro-
Friday, the 2Jth-if he had gone 10 the
north and through the Providence cram
mel. he would have passed into ha-
vana right under the loses q the
Americans. who had only small cruisers;
for Schley was at sea on the night or
Thursday. Sampson on that Of Friday
and on that OF Saturday, the 22d, he
took the lower channel for the east, and
on Wednesday turned back towards
Havana.
Schleys squadron has been reinforced
by the Iowa, ana Sampson by the ore
gon. i believe that in war one has to
tempt fortune. If # had not been because
Sampson was afraid that Don Pasquale
might 60 10 Havana, and that Schley
would not be there. our fear is well
grounded that he found himself very
short of ammunition after the lombard
ment. The fact remains that Il was lOgi-
cal for him TO remain near Santiago and
Cicnfuegos and II he could not prevent
the entrance of our squadron, 10 shut II
UP, and thus close its operations as
those people over there already believed
il closed, but / cannot believe such a
stupid thing possible. ! suppose that
he went 10 the south Of Porto Rico, and
that he had ordered a cruiser or two
there TO cover the Terror, and that he
will appear at san Juan the 9th or
2Sth. lie will coal there and will rest a
day or two, and will then return TO de-
lay and annoy them and delay the in
yasion. ~ za
IN NEED OF REPAIRS.
The Vizcaya and the Sluendo al least
need TO 90 into the dry dock. / tele-
graphed 10 Don Pasquele on the morning
of the 20tla when / saw he was at San
tage, saying that the squadron was al
Key West. lie did not answer me. That
afternoon there came a notice from Ma
drid saying he had left Santiago. l con-
tinued sending messages 10 Blanco in re-
spect TO an the movements, and so FAR as
/ know. Don Pasquale has arrived al
Porto Rico. where / shall try TO COM
municate with him. II he should have
left for Martinique or Havana, having
twenty-fOur hours advantage, he would
have arrived before now.
1 am very much afraid lest they attack
Porto Rico by sea and land and put OH
the attack on Havana. They are not
going 10 do more than try TO take the lat
Ter. and they think then, II they destroy
our fleet, OF taking the war into spain,
with Havana already I'm their hdnds .
They have no confidence IN their army
but they have I'm their navy, and they are
afraid of our army and OF yellow fever
because If the men should begin 10 die
roar. as they are not like our people.
Any way we shall see when there IS
news of the fleet. / expect 1t tomorrow.
With them cleaning their huils at the
KEYS. we should be able 10 clean some
thing in three days at Porto Rico.
DELAY Is DANGEROUS.
Each day that passes Is worse for us
on account Of the almost total lack OF
preparations.
If the Cadiz squadron is 20 come 70
lombard Boston, Portland and Ions
Island, they can do it now, but after a
few months It will be too late.
think II we are 10 have any success
in this matter II will be through treating
for peace by yielding Cuba and have
them recognize the debt, if We do not
do this soon, it will be too late and we
shall lose Cuba and Porto Rico, and all
that this war has cost Us and in addi-
ton we shall be charged with the Cuban
debt for which our Treasury is respon-
sl5le.
There IS no doubt here that we cannot
continue this war in which We have moth
ing TO gain and we may lose our two col
onies and be ruined for fifty years.
BANKS NOT PATRIOTIC.
In the matter of money, there Is no
patriotism here. Proof is given by the
bank which ought 10 have bought gold
although at a premium OF 100 per cent.
and issued notes against IL in the same
or a slightly greater quantity. With 49,
10000 it has made 1900. 900. This Is
the moment OF the year at which Instead
% returning 22 or a per cent IL returns