The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-10-27
ScHLEY MISSED HIS CHANCE.
sTURBORNLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT
SIMPSONS INFORMATION.

cial Correspondence shows He
Was Slow to Find as Wen as TO
Blockade Cervcra-Sampson sent
to DispInce Him to Prevent the
Spaniards From Making Their Es-
cape.
From the New York Press.
Washington. Oct. 2i.-The most impor-
tant, in many respects sensational docu-
ment yet given out relating to the war
with Spain is the official report of Ad-
miral Sampson, giving in a color,ess rec
ord of dispatches the facts with regard to
the location and capture of Cervera's
fleet. There has been a controversy since
that extraordinary feat as to the respec-
tive credit due Commodore Schlev and the
commander-in-chlef of the naval forces.
Sampson. All that has been published of
q partisan nature seems to have had for
ito purpose the exaltatiQn Of Schley at the
expense of the department and of his
brother officer and commander. Admiral
Sampson has held his peace, and the de-
partment, responsible for its own vindi-
cation, has bided its time Now Samp-
son speaks officially.
So far as the general public is concern
81, II has continuously and persstently
been advised of the importance of Schley's
services until he was apparently the hero
of the Santiago blockade and of the bat
tie which sent the Spanish feet under
Commander Admiral Cervera, burnt and
dismantled, TO the bottom of the Atlantic
1t would seem in the circumstances that
every official dispatch and scrap Of evil
dence in SIMPSONS report tending to
throw light upon point of such historical
Importance should be given to the world
by those whose duty it is to disseminate
accurate information. Yet through some
influence, or for a purpose which should
be explained, the Associated Press has
failed to give the news and all the facts
furnished it by the Secretary of the Navy.
Az no time in the controversy over the
relative merits Of Sampson and Sehley has
there been any doubt in the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy what the outcome
would be. The confidence of Secretary
Long in the judgment and energy of Ad-
miral Sampson has never been shaken,
for the reason that the department was
In possession of the evidence TO show that
instead of being open TO criticism when
Cervera tried to escape and was potted
by the warships guarding the entrance of
Santiago harbor, Sampson had provided
for that emergency and was deserving Of
fun credit
The department has not been i'll dispos-
ed toward Schley On the contrary it
tried to give him full opportunity 10 gain
honor out of the campaign, but through
some blindness of judgment on his part
or obstinacy, Schley rejected the chances
offered TO him and persisted in avoiding
the fleet of Cervera long after he had been
officially of the position of the
Spanish ships. As the official dispatches
show, Commodore Schley persisted in re-
naming over a week at Cienfuegos when
he had been ordered to Santiago to invest
the enemy.
the cruel injustice of the criticisms
upon Admiral Sampson Immediately after
the battle of Santiago appears from q
perusal of The dispatches and letters at
last made public. The patience with
which the department has borne with the
conduct of Schley's friends
was based upon a knowledge of the uner-
ring judgment Sampson displayed after
the location of Cervera's fleet and the
of the harbor of Santiago.
Nowhere in the report OF Admiral Samp-
son Is there word criticising Schley,
neither is there anything calculated to de
tract from his gallant conduct waen fire
was opened upon the enemy, but there is
no further need Of explanation or argument
to show why the navy department put
trust in Sampson rather than in Schley
Instead of there being an attempt, rs al
legged, to discredit schley for the advantage
of Sampson. it appears the former received
the first opportunity presented to any naval
officer to distinguish himself The CORE
spondence shows that only through
Schley's failure to obey orders was The
navy departments confidence shaken in
him. and that In sheer desperat ton at
Sehley's hardness was Sampson ordered
to assume the comma nd that had been in
tended for Schley Il was the original pur-
pose that Schley should do the fighting
and that Sampson should confne himself
to the more modest work of blockade duty.
When CerVera's fleet was reported in
Santiago harbor, Capt. Sigsbee. in com
mand of the ST. Paul and Capt. Randall.
in command of the Yale, waited for davs
IN the offfng with their unarmored cruis-
ers watching the enemy and looking anx-
iously for Schley to come up.
At that time the Spaniards could have
escaped any moment, as the st. Paul
ana Yale would have been sent to The Int
tom had they permitted themselves to be
overtaken. Then, instead of being praised
Schley would have had to submit 70 a
court martial.
why the resolutions offered in the House
and Senate the day after the battle OF
santiago extending the thanks of Con
gress to Commodore Schley were never
reported for action. These resolutions. in
the incorporate zeal 10 build up Schley's
reputation at the expense of Sampson 8
even to the extent of ignoring the latter
by name, overshot the mark. They com
PEELED the department to inform the naval
committees that if the resolutions were
passed the official record would put an en-
urely different face upon the situation and
would result in the humiliation of Schley
instead of in his glorification.
The Spanish feet under Cervera was an
initiated on July g. On May u SIMPSONS
ships were bombarding San Juan after the
discovery that the Spanish vessels were
not in that port. While at Cape Haytien
on May is, Admiral Sampson received
word 20 join Schey in the Havana block
ade. He reached Key West on Nav IS.
and the next day ordered Schley to block
ade Cienfuegos. On May 10 the navy de-
partment received information by wav of
Havana that Cervera had reached San
tiago, and al once advised Admiral samn-
son to that effect He was directed to
4 fat fol Irr