The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-07-12

We come now to the question whether
we should not permit the insurgents un-
der Aguinaldo to establish an autono-
nous government of their own either
wholly independent or under our protec-
tion. The idea of a protectorate should
be at once discarded. A protectorate
would impose on us all the responsible
ties of annexation, while Withholding
from us the power of upholding law and
order and of averting provocation to for
eign powers. If We are logical and far
sighted, we shall either undertake to gov
ern the archipelago as a territory, or we
shall leave 1t at the mercy of aggressors
The half-castes and Christianized Tagals,
upon whom Aguinaldo relies, could not,
without our assistance, maintain their
independence against Japan, or GERMANY
or France, for they do not control even
the whole of the island of Luzon; they
are traditional enemies of the Visayas
who inhabit the smaller islands south of
them; and they could not even pretend
to dominate the great island of Mindanao
or to prevent the Mohammedan Malays
who infest its coasts, from engaging in
the piratical expeditions which used to
be scourge to the commerce between
Hong Kong and Singapore. 1t required
vigilance and energy on the part of Spain
to put down these pirates, and their SUP
preston would out-taX the power of an
Independent government established by
the Tagal insurgents at Manila. Pre-
texts, therefore, would be necessarily af-
forded for such a demonstration as the
Germans lately made at Port -au- Prince,
and for such seizure of territory as
was effected at Kiao Chou. 1t must be
remembered that of the one hundred and
fourteen thousand square miles comprised
In the Philippines, not over n seventh was
ever actually occupied by the Spaniards,
and that, over the rest, their authority
was but nominal. What the Spaniards
could not do, we cannot expect the Ia
gals to accomplish. The establishment
of an independent Tagal government IN
Luzon would simply be an invitation to
scramble for the rest of the archipe l.
ago on the part of the great maritime
powers, which would be at no loss as we
have said, to find pretenses for aggress-
ion. After Mirdanao and the interjacent
Islands had been seized, Luzon itself
| would become the object of attack. If,
therefore, in dealing with the Tagal in
surgents we are actuated by the same
humanitarian motives which we professed
in the case of Cuba, we shall further
| their best interests by withholding from
| them the dangerous boon of political in
dependence. The duty, which we shall
| assume when we free them from the
giving them good government, under
| which the inhabitants of Luzon itself
shall gradually acquire many of the
privileges of self-rule, while the blessings
OF civilization may be rapidly extended
to the rest of the archipelago. So long
as we undertook the collective admins
tration of the islands and the policing of
| their seas, no recrudescence of piracy
would he apprehended and no pretext for
| European interference would be afforded.
| This is the solution of the problem which
| Aguinaldo himelf and every intelligent in
| surgent must heartily desire.
o.
But 1t may be said what is good for
the Tagals might be bad for the United
States. Should we not by retaining The
Philippines, definitely renounce the tra-
ditional avoidance of foreign complica-
| tions which Washington inculcated in his
Farewell Address? The answer is that
Washington was speaking TO a popula-
| tion which did not exceed four millions
| to people whose territory, even on this
| continent was cooped up by the posses