The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1898-04-23


their labors. In case they had TO make
port there Is Batabano, about $50 miles
distant over shoals where barely L feet
can be carried. This shallow draught
would let the gunboats in in safety. but
would effectually keep out any ship Of
a greater size.
Here. then. is indicated the base OF op-
erations that Spain should occupy in or
der TO make any effective defense or Of
fense; and i'm its consideration the sec
ond important principle of strategy, the
objective has TO a certain extent been
indicated. In the objective the attack on
an enemy's commerce is leading princt-
pie The above disposition of SPANS
fleet provides for the shutting out Of ships
from the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf Of
Mexico. All trading vessels 10 Central
America which might attempt to run in
through the passages between the south
ern Windward Islands couple Of cruis-
ers like the Alabama could prevent
If 1t be the commerce of the United
States that Spain is after. she should. i'm
addition to the watch set in the Caribbean
Sea, set one on the outer edge Of the Gulf
Stream off Cape Hatteras in the proximity
of where the southern bound ships make
off to keep out of the strength Of the Gulf
Stream current.
The other principal point where COM
merce could be intercepted would be about
l.ULb or l.ZDU niles 10 the eastward OF New
York. in a circle not over sd miles in di
ameter. To this place come all the yes
sells from Europe bound for the eastern
ports Of the United States.
1t should be remembered in war
against commerce that the attacking
power can be made to suffer in the sIme
way as the attacked. 10 has been sug-
gested above that perhaps Spain might
attempt the destruction of American
-. Al 80 Loo.
own over sea trade. for the simple reason
that the ships she would have 10 use
for the protection Of her routes would be
engaged in trying to destroy her oppO-
nent's route
Spain's merchant fleet consists Of about
$50 vessels. of which i12 are steamers of
a greater size than 10o tons OF these
there are s. Of more than 3.0U0 tons. and
81 are between 20J0 and 5000 tons. out
Of this number 81 have a speed Of over
twelve knots. and only two OF them can
do as well as sixteen knots. Nearly al
these ships are now receiving a subveI-
ton, and in time OF war they would, ali
Of them. be of necessity pressed into the
service Of Spain; thus the greater por-
ton of her commerce would be taken
away from under her flag
Other considerations involved in the
principle Of objective relate 10 the posi-
DllltieS OF SPAN B0lluGlbit4E. tlt'' 4Att'AAtA,
or invading the American coast.
Bombardment appears attractive. but
could hardly prove of any account if at
all practicable. The great cities Of the
United States cannot be reached by the
guns Of an euemy's fleet without great
peril to their fleet. A vastly superior
navy might Hazard such an objective. but
an inferior navy like Spaiu's would only
court disaster.
The landing of a force on the enemy's
shore is in the case in pOint-that OF
Spain versus the United States-a pre-
pOsterous idea. Key West might be in
vested if the Spanish fleet were on the
ground first: even then bOmbardment
might be necessary to silence the forts
guarding the entrance. But there would
not be any particular Use in having
force on shore at Key West so long as the
fleet could lie off il. There is a naval sta
tion there which might be destroyed and
some coal could be got. but To reduce the
place would require quite an eXpendi-
ture of ammunition difficult 10 replace.
and that the candle would be worth the
burning is not clear.
After this hurried review it is cOnclud-
ed that the only objective left 10 spain
is the destruction OF our commerce. es-
pecially that in the West Indies. where 1t
is greatest and where our prestige Is the
hlgneSt. MS loss ~Oulu ilAJuit u Jul II
would not help Spain: neither would il
tend in any way to shorten the war The
Alabama her depredatiOns. and her de-
srruction had no effect whatever in clos
ing hostilities between the North and the
South.
The third thing pertaining to strategy,
the line of operations, has already been
clearly indicated. II is the preservation
of Cuba by means of an offensive fleet,
acting on the defensive in so far as its
movements are concerned; that is TO say.
that this fleet must keep within touch of
its bases. though always ready and alert
to meet the enemy i'm force in these wat
ers and annihiliate him. or since that
will probably be impossible, to drive him
out For should this hostile feet be over
come then would Spains fleet be free TO
sally forth to lombard and 10 blockade
on the other hand should the Spanish
fleet be defeated, its Gordon broken
through. and its forces demOralized. then
would Havana fall, and MatanZas and
the Yucatan passage ana the Windward
passage. and Cuba would cease TO be a
Spanish possession in the West Indies.