The sun., 1898-10-05

ence on this slde Of the Atlantic. So far as
| his opinion was noticed at ALL it was
attributed to an ill-dlsRulsed sympathy
| for Spain, OF which, I'm his two ar
ticlos, there were several indications
For instance. he remarked In June that
"in Great Britain there was a sub'dominant
feeling for Spain In her poverty and inferi-
ority, when her older history was forgotten,
and only the help we [Engllshmenl gave her
to free herself was remembered" Again In
August the Admiral seemed willing to de-
preciate the unique feature Of DKwEY's
memorable achievement, which consisted
in the fact that, while all the Spanish
ships were destroyed or captured, not
one American life was lost. 1T was"
observed the British Admiral, "Quite an
ordinary occurrence in former naval wars
that the victor In duel at sea should come
Off without the loss OF a man, when she left
the defeated ship mere wreck and slaugh-
terhouse." That Is true OF combats be-
tween single ships. But never in naval his
tory before the fight at Cavite was whole
squadron annihilated without the loss Of
life on the part Of the assailant
In the North American ReUie,O it is ad-
mitted by Admiral CoLoMB that he was
"sorry" that the United States went into
the war with Spain, because he foresaw that
we should never come out OF the contest as
we went into 1t. He thinks 1t q pity that
we should have emerged from the struggle
with transmarine possessions for, thereby,
he Gays, we give hostages to fortune. That
is just what wives and children are, accord
ing to BACON, yet recognition Of the fact
has never discouraged men from marrying.
The strategic value OF Porto Rico and Cuba
with reference to the proposed Nicaragua
Canal, the strategic value OF Hawaii, Guam
and Manila, considered as coaling stations
on the trans-Paciao route, the Admiral does
not deem it worth while to discuss, because,
he says. at will be hopeless for the United
States to dream Of retaining her new pos
sessions in war with country which has a
navy superior to her own" His deduction Is
that we must go on increasing our navy
until it is stronger than Englands, which,
as We know, is constructed upon the theory
that 1t must be equal to the combined naval
forces OF two, II not three, other powers;
otherwise we must expect, in the event OF
war with England, to lose the islands which
We have recently acquired.
Obviously, the argument proves too
much; IL we could accept 1t, we should
have to acknowledge that Great Brit
ain alone should venture to own trans
marine dependencies. AS a matter Of
fact, both France and Germany have
extensive possessions beyond the seas
the Netherlands, weak as they are from
naval point Of view, have an opulent
~ to;n
the Azores, the Madeira and Cape Verde
islands, Timor. and other islands in the
Eastern Archipelago, besides territories on
the continents Of Africa and Asia; Den
mark, which is now an insignificant State,
manages to keep the island Of st. Thomas
in the Caribbean Sea- The United States
are, even now, stronger on the ocean than
any Of the countries just named
except France, and the day is not
far distant when we should encounter the
French Navy without misgiving. Even as
against England, although her naval force
In commission might be greatly superior to
ours, we might manage to mass a number
Of warships equal to the defence Of Porto
Rico or of our islands In the Pacific, be-
cause, owing to the extent and complexity
OF her colonial interests. England is never
able to concentrate more than a part Of her
naval power at q given point
The Oassandra-like warnings uttered by
Admiral CoLoMB in the North American Re
vieD will cause few Americans to regret
that we shall enter the twentieth century
with the beginnings Of a colonial empire.
They may, however. have a salutary effect,
II they bring home to US the necessity Of
30 increasing our navy that we can apply
to the defence Of our newly acquired pos
sessions a force equal to that which any Of
the maritime powers is likely to be able to
array against US in any particular quarter.