The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-08-09
NAVY DEpART1iENT,

WASHINGTON August Q, 1885 =.
MY DEAR SIR:--I am in receipt Oh
your letter and hasten TO assure YOU
that what you say about Admiral
sampson Is 80 unjust that It can only
he pardoned on the ground OF your iG-
noranoe OF the whole matter. You have
no appreciation OF the responsibilities
that have been upon Admiral sampson;
or his very superior attainments US an
officer and the splendid work he mas
done in preparing for the naval Vlctofy
which was the crownlnG accomplish
ment OF his efforts for weeks and weeks
before Santiago.
"Justlce is always done in the long
RIM. But when you Indulge In such Un-
founded criticism cannot torbeaE
10 protest. as should feel
hound TO do n you referred IN Similar
terms to any other Of our deserving
officers. go, -.
admiral Sampson was selected TOT
the command OF the North Atlantic
souadron, because the department, ~
the exercise OF It's best Judgment, with
an eve single TO the public interests, be-
Iiayed that he was especially fitted for
the place, Admiral SIcard, who had
the command, having become incapael-
tinted for duty by reason OF sickness,
was necessarily withdrawn by order Of
the department and Sampson was next
In command. These two are especially
accomplished ordnance officers, having
been ench at the head OF the ordnance
bureau and having devoted themselves
to that branch Of naval science. samp-
son Is man OF the very highest pro-
fesslonaI attalnments, solely devoted 70
his duty, He never pushes himself tor-
ward and when Tou accuse him OF
anything OF that sort you do most cruel
injury TO man who has never sought
favor or applause In any other way
than by the simple discharge OF his
duty.
Movement on Porto Rice.
1.-THE movement on Porto Rico was
not movement for its capture. The
department, which has very rarely I'M
teriered with the movements Of admir-
ais commanding squndrons, did, howev-
er, make one express order, and that
was that our battleships should not be
exposed to the risk OF serious Injury
from the fire of any fort. At that time
the Spanish fleet was strong. Its where
abouts and destination were unknown:
Tho prime necessity was to meet and
d6InInntIon OF the sen. The oregon had
moi arrived. the Maine was destroyed,
and no naval authority would Justify
the unnecessary risk OF the destruction
OF any Of our bhttleships except In bat
lie with the enomy's ships, The move
nent TO Porto Rico was TO meet, II pos
gibfe, the feet OF CeFYera, which was
then expected. Cervcra, undoubtedly
learning that our feet was nt San Juan,
changed his destination to Santiago.
our movements to Porto Rico thus be-
came n reconnaissance and fulfilled Its
purpose. There was no intention az this
time OF tnklng Porto Rico. as the army
was not then ready TO cooperate.
s-With regard to sending our ships
into the harbor Of Santiago, Admiral
Sampson was acting under the explicit
orders OF the department not TO expose
his armored chips to the risk Of sink
ing by mines. and the wisdom OF his
COURSE, / believe Is universally aeknowl-
edged by naval authorities. He walt
ed, as he should have DONE the COOP
Grafton OF the army. How enectuallY
under this co-operation the result was
accomplished, ls'now matter oil hls'
tory.
GrAphio Seshsa,
There are few more Srnphle scenes
than must have been presented at 4
o'clock on the afternoon of tho 18th OF
July, when shait6r with his troops
rendv TO assault Santiago, awaited the
repiy Of the Spanish commander to the
demands for surrender. sampson'a feet
was nt the mouth OF the harbor, drawn
up In line and ready To lombard, az II
had been for days proYlous,and tho Sig
nal ofiicer stood on the heights ready TO
wlg.Wog tho signal Tor drlng. Happily,