The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-11-30
OF SANTIAGO
The Story ~ Told by One Of the
Spanish Omcers.
SACRIFICE OF CERvERA
Lieut.. lose Miller y ueiro. IN Eye WITT
nsss Describes the Fights Around
b doomed City and the Folly
Which Sank Their Fleet

er of Its war series. this time the Bat
ties and Cap.tulation of Santiago de
Cuba" by Lieutenant Jose Miller y
Tjeiro. the second in command OF the
naval forces of the province OF Santa
go de Cuba.
Captain Clews. the chief of the intel
Iieence bureau. explains in an introduce
tory note that the writer was an eye
witness OF most of the events that lie
described, and from his position had
access to Official information. The style
Is peculiarly interesting. free from bias
and has an air of authencity which will
give the book a place in history. though
IL Is not an official publication. h
author began, according to his own
statement, to keep an exact diary OF
events at Santiago from the I'M
OF the appearance there Of Cervera's
fleet, realizing, as he says, that the
vessels were to have a most powerful
influence on the war. The publication
begins with a chapter entitled The
Two Fleets" telling of the arrival OF
Cervera's squadron on the 18th Of May
and OF the disappointment of the peo-
pie. who expected nc less than eight
battleships instead OF FIVE. The picture
he draws of the conditions in the be-
sieged city. owing to the shortage OF
Il lOOu ~ cuBBiitcs 10 Vultc ltITlDlc.
He speaks of the difficulties of coal
ing and shows that the feet was very
badly supplied. Concerning the opin-
ions rs to why the fleet did not 90
out, he refers to the great joy caused
by its arrival and then says the ships
in the harbor were compelling the en-
envy to sustain with superior forces
the blockade, with all its difficulties
and dangers. 1t was not believed that
the American ships would Expose them
selves to serious disaster or would
force any one of the ports which they
were blockading. The Spanish ships
did not have to give battle In order TO
obtain results. and he says that IL pro-
visions had not been wanting In Santa
go and the Spanish feet had remained
there, no one could tell to what ex-
tremes impotence and despair might
not carried Admiral Sampson. The
movements of the American fleet was a
puzzle to the spaniards. as they did not
know why they remained on watch all
day and disappeared at night. But il
was supposed that the Americans were
afraid of the d~estroyers. Speaking OF
the Merrimac, he says:
"What Santiagoans have not succeed
ed in ascertaining definitely-though IL
Is probably known in Spain from Amer
lean newspapers. which are in the hab-
IL of publishing everything-which was
the real object that the Merrimac had
in view"
He speaks of the destructive work
of the Vesuvius whenever the bombs
fell upon any point where there were
works or guns.
Speaking of the battle of Ell Caney
M San Juan, he say the Americans.
1t must be acknowledged, fought with
truly admirable courage and spirit.
While the battle was going on at Ell
Caney and San Juan, the enemy had
sent forces against the whole Spanish
line for the purpose. no doubt, of har-
assing and making the attack mors
general. The casualties of the Spanish
side are stated to be so officers and 5S3
men. He claimed that only $40 men
defended FL Caney for 10 hours and
tina $50 defended San Juan for four
hours. He speaks of the lively bonn
bardment by sea and land on July 3 and
the sortie of the Spanish fleet on July
3. He speaks of the action of the Span
ish admiral as one of the greatest acts
of valor For some time the Spanish
did not know whether the ships mad
succeeded in making their escape. hut
having been informed they had, there
was great rejoicing. 1t was at 6 o'clock
that the pilot came In and informed
them that the Teresa Oquendo and the
| destroyers had been lost. The lieu
tenant gives considerable space to the
naval battle, most of which was TAX
? en- from persons who were saved from
the Spanish ships. The GOODNESS and
, courage of Admiral Cervera is noted.
, The fire of the Spanish ships was sad
r to have been SLOW. while that of n
American ships were very brisk. In
discussing the disaster ne says that
the loss of the fleet had been foretold
? by all its commanders. but public cpin-
: ion in the island OF Cuba required the
, presence of the fleet in Cuban waters.
: The ships had MOI been cleaned. were
L ~A~-s - @Aa a.I not In OnnA n0nAf-
tion to fight. The feet received definite
! orders from the captain general of Cuba
. to leave Santiago in spite OF Admiral
Cervera's remonstrances. He says the
Spanish are proud OF the disaster or
Trafalgar. on account of the heroism
1. OF the navy. but the battle OF santiago
Is much more glorious.
The total losses in all the attacks on
|, Santiago are given as follows: Oficers
= killed, 16; men killed. 107: officers
wounded. So: men wounded, 556; prison.
: oners and missing, seven officers and
' 116 men.
He closes the account of the naval
battle of Santiago. saying:
II nave never been able to under
e stand the reason why there was sent TO
the island Of Cuba a fleet that was In
. no manner able to cope with that of the
, United States and which therefore
could in no wise prevent the ships of
the latter from blockading our ports
and controlling the Yea; but since II
was sent without its arrival being able
to prevent the loss OF the island. which
d was lost, as experience has SHOWN.
from the very when war was
accepted. owing to the conditions pre-
r vaiIing there. then IL should have been
prevented from being destroyed. as II
was, without resulting in any advant-
age whatever.
O The only way Of gaining n ed-
yantaxe would have been. In my opin-
a ion. taking advantage of the fact that
all the hostile ships were in Cuba. 10
send n few ships Of great speed. more OF
less well armed. to the commercial
ports Of the United States and bomoard
them 1t is probable that American
public opinion. especially OF those who