The Grenada sentinel., 1898-11-26


4,a lines of the ordinary annual re-
mort of the bureau officers is that of
r,nt. Crowninshield, chief of the bu-
reau of navigation, navy department,
which has just been made public.
Not only was the head of this bureau
a member of the war or strategy
hoard, as it came to be known, but he
was responsible for the execution Of
nlans formed by that board and for
the movement Of every ship and the
assignment of every officer. r.F'..
No Bureau On,csr Had Equal Opportunity.
Consequently no bureau officer had
eoual opportunity to know the moving
purposes and exact history Of the war.
The report is absolutely free from per-
sonalities, there is no reference what
ever to the no whappily-ended Samp-
son-Schley controversy, no criticism
OF any officer, nor commentator that
might be regarded as invidious and
discriminating But the report is
confined to the statement of hard
facts, with few important recon-
mendations for. the betterment of the
naval service.
The Precautionary Orders.
The war history begins with the
simple statement of certain precau-
1onary orders that were issued, but
even in the absence of comment, at
tention can not fail to be attracted to
the remarkable foresight exhibited in
the preparation of the official orders.
They begin with an order, dated Jan
uary II last, directing the commander
OF the European station to retain in
service men whose enlistment were
about to expire, and those following,
provide for the successful extrication
of the European squadron from the
danger to which il was exposed upon
the outbreak of the war.
The south Atlantic Squadron.
They show how the South Atlantic
squadron was brought up to reinforce
Sampson; how the Oregon started on
her famous race around South Ameri-
ca. how stores and ammunition were
forwarded to the squadrons and.
finally, they wind up with the famous
laconic order to Dewey of April 26:
"War has commenced between the
United States and Spain. proceed at
once to the Philippine islands. Com
mence operations at once, particular
], against Spanish fleet. You must
capture vessels or destroy. Use ut
most endeavors."
Ready for Any Emergency.
These orders show that four months
before Ccrvera's feet reached this side
our whole North Atlantic feet was
ready for any emergency within strik-
ing distance of one of the two points
from which attack might come.
Trained gunners, to the number Of
45. who had just graduated from the
course On the Amphitrite, were
placed on the vessels of the fleet and
rendered = good account of themselves.
A Case In Point.
As exhibiting the quality of these
men, Capt. Crowninshield cites the de-
struction Of three gunboats by the lit
tie Scorpion in Manzanillo harbor,
July 1s. Of which the commanding
officer reports: "Orders were given to
obtain the range with two of the six
Founders, inter which the first shell
from the five-inch gun blew her up,
apparently having struck her boilers y
a,.,~A ra.n-t.~ N..rueuA
Capt. Crowninshield says: "The
completeness of our naval victory dur
ing the war and the almost absolute
immunity from injury which our ships
and crews enjoyed, naturally led to a
general conclusion that our gunnery
had much to do with the matter. As
matter Of fact all reports bear out
this conclusion"
Importance to tho Nation Of Sea Power.
Capt. Crowninshield declares that
the experience of the war has been an
other demonstration of the impor-
tunce to the nation of sea power. He
says that from the first the only ap-
prehension felt in this country was
On account of the Spanish navy. it
was Cervera's ships that we feared
we did not fear the Spanish army
would not feared it IF it had been
three times as powerful, unless it had
been supported by navy powerful
enough to have formed an efficient
convoy and brought to this coast"
Only ths spanish Navy y Menace.
Oh the contrary, the Spanish navy,
even without the Spanish army, would
have been a menace, though it had con-
sisted of only one first class cruiser.
Until that cruiser had been blockad-
cd, captured or destroyed, any unpro-
tected point on our coast and all OF
our sea commerce would have been at
its mercy, and no army, however etti'
cient, could have protected us from It,
1t required navy for this work as an
effective navy. e..
The Combined Operations.
Touching upon the combined opera
tons OF the army and navy, the diff.
ferences which arose between the com.
handlers during the campaign were
satisfactorily solved by victory. One