The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-28
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
Some of the Difficulties Encountered
by the Americana.

by the Americans.
Copyright, 1898. by the Associated Press)
BEFORE SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July
| 14.-Probably few European military critics
| will appreciate the arduous nature of the
| campaign so successfully terminated to-day
by the surrender of all the Spanish forces
east of Santiago and the virtual abandon
| ment of this province by Spain.
| In continental Europe, during all the wars
| since the Napoleonic day, it has been possi-
| bile to drive armies by forced marches over
| long distances and to keep supplies up with
| the advance. 1t will be hard, therefore, for
| European observers to understand the OBJ
| stacles that had to be overcome in advanc-
| ing an army of 16. 900 men ten miles into the
| interior from the south coast of this prov
| ince
| One word tells the story-roads. The roads
here are simply paths through the dense
| tropical forest, paths along which half
| dozen ordinary OK teams haul numbering
| carts once day in comparative dry wealth.
| er. There are no bridges, and in wet
weather, when the streams are raging tor
rents. these paths are almost impossible to
men on horseback, absolutely so to vehicles
Of all descriptions. Thus it was that all
| these roads along which the troops were
moved had really to be built before single
| wagon train could get through. The
| bridges thrown across the streams were re-
peatedly swept away by high water. Several
| times communication was almost entirely
interrupted and the army had to fall back
on pack trains. Indeed. the base of supplies
was seriously threatened. 1t is fact that
during the four days before the surrender
| it was possible to get only one light battery
| OF the six brought by General Randolph to
| the front, while not a single one OF the siege
| General Smarter
| yond Siboney. In Europe, where the roads
are good, none of these difficulties exist.
| There Is another vital difference in the ma
| ture of the country itself. Over the fields
of operation in the Austro-PruSSian war or
1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 It
was possible, in almost every engagement
| to maneuver an army corps by platoonS
| and battalons. Here the men were obliged
| to advance in single file and into the open
| and at tho famous assault on San Juan
| hill, one column marched out of the road
into. the open in the face. OF the murderous
trenches and deployed for the charge on
| open ground. No finer exhibition of nerve
charge across seven hundred yards of open
| territory against an enemy entrenched upon
the crest of a hill. But our men never
AS a matter of fact, it is one of the un-
written secrets of the battle of July !, that
the plans made the night previous did not
| contemplate an assault upon the works OF
| the enemy before Santiago. Two divisions,
those Of General Wheeler and General 4 ent,
were to remain in column on the main DAD
| to Santiago to reinforce General LaWton,
whose division was to assault Ell Caney on
| the extreme right, while GrimeS'S battery
| made diversion on the left. But when the
| Spanish guns began to drop Shrapnel shell
over the road on which our column rested
! and when word came that General Lawton
| was successful at Ell Caney, it became
necessary for Wheelers and Kents d.
vision either to advance, retreat or remain
| quiet under the storm of shell that was
! bursting over their heads. In the clrcum-
stances it was less dangerous to advance
! where they were and, with a general inn
pulse to get where they could return the the
! enemies fire, the advance regiments, the
| Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, moved out.
! The others followed.
There is a question whether any specific
! general command to charge was ever given.
| Regimental and company commanders SIM
| ply led their way herocaly forward up the
| hill. The hill was taken. the American flag
| planted on it's crest and the enemy driven
| pell-mell into his inner line of entrench-
! ments beyond. Our men were too much ex-
hausted to follow up their victory, though
| it has since been asserted that had the
pursuit been continued that afternoon the
| dered that night But men who had left
| their comrades upon the field behind them
courage have their limitations.
| So terrific had been the slaughter of our
men, so per cent. of whom were then under
| though comparatively few knew 1T, that on
the night of July officers OF high rank,
|
er, who was in command at the front, Gen.
Shafter being still aboard his ship,
and Tbav ap prsdicted an n awful disaster
hold to tn the position we had earned so dear.
| the Confederacy said NO He spoke reas-
| surfing words to those who came with dire
forebodings. I'VE are in an uncomfortable ne
more uncomfortable than we: Pass that
word down the line General Wheeler even
sent back dispatch to Ger Geqerai smarter bainr
| brought to bear upon him. Il presume the
| same influences are being brought to bear
| do. American prestige would suffer ire
trievably if we gave in an inch we must
| stand firm
| pointment throughout this campaign, even
/ TO their warmest friends. They have been
everywhere except where the PAT ragea l
| near the cornmissary. So perSistently nave
they hung about the supply stations that
| they have come to be known and described
| In language more forcible than eloquent as
the mango-bellied degenerates.
During the various actions since the army
| landed only seven Cubans so far as known
have been wounded. At FL Caney when the
pack train brought up supplies Tor the
starving refugees; me Cunans aS crowded
| rations not as a privilege but as right.
Captain Brice, who was in charge, was
compelled TO knock down two Cuban Off
GERS Even as sources Of information the
Cubans have proved unreliable. They could
not be trusted. The more our commanding
| officers see of the Cubans the less they APP
| pear 10 think of them, either as soldiers or
| as men. Among the officers there are, in
deed some noble hearted individuals, not
ably General Garcia. who stands head and
shoulders above the rest, but the rank and
file are without discipline or any idea of
military duty The vast majority seem al
| ready 10 believe that this land OF milk and
honey is theirs 70 enjoy, not to fight for.
They are willing to let us feed them and
achieve their liberty. for which they appear
to be ill-fitted and ill-equipped, mentally
and morally. Poll the United States troops
! in the province of Santiago de Cuba to-day
| and ninety-nine out of every hundred will
| say in almost so many words, I'VE have
| bought a gold brick in Cuba libre.' . The
Cuban leaders are vain and jealous and IL
| they were given self-government the
| chances are that those who failed TO get
places of prominence and profit would in the
course OF a month start revolution against
| those who had Jared better than they.
CUBAN TROOPS MOVED.