The times., 1898-08-15
THOSE ISLANDS.
The Elementary Principles That
Must He Considered

Tne increasing ardor of the newspapers
that advocate the keeping of the Philip
pines must be taken as an indication of
stronger tendency of the popular senti-
ment In that direction. As one journal
says. people see that we cannot abandon
them utterly; that We cannot return them
to Spain, and that 10 hold only Manila.
with other powers as close neighbors
would be to live in constant danger of
trouble. The New York Tribune takes up
one current idea, as follows: ..The sug-
gestion has been made here and there
that the Philippine islands should be di-
Vided among the five or six powers which
manifest desire to possess them Thus
only, 1t is said, the various rivals could
all be appeased. The probability seems to
be. however. that such an arrangement
would be of all most certain TO produce
trouble. The facts of geography condemn
IT, Of all important island groups and
clusters in the world. the Philippines are.
scarcely excepting Japan, the most com
pact They resemble a single great ISL
ana split into many by narrow assures
10 aHoortion them among rival powers
would be a task ii would require new
ana greater Solomon TO perform with sat
lsIactlon. To keep them under diverse
governments without ireessant wrang-
ing and friction would be a task beyond
the power of human nature TO perform.
IL might be practicable for the limited
States to confine its complete proprietor
snip and sovereignty to the one island of
Luzon. and let the rest either form a ma
liVe republic under our suzerainty or be
restored 10 Spanish administration under
proper guarantees; but that would seem
10 De about the extreme limit of division
me IDEA that all nations which wish
10 90 so should be permitted 10 seize
henpers of the group, or at least ports
LOT 10 coahng stations, is still less tenab bIe
mere would be no justification in law
ioi such conduct nor in the demands of
necessity The islands belong either to
spain or to the United States, IF 10 the
latter 1t would be a hostile act against
US ior any other power to seize any of
them IL to the former. it would not he
friendly act for any other power thus
TO meddle between this nation and thai
with which II is at war. For such act
there could be no justification in need.
Tor no power excepting the United States
needs a station there. Great Britain does
not, for she has Hong Kong and part of
Borneo and Singapore and Australia. all
within easy reach of each other France
does not. for she has Indo-China. lying
almost as near 10 New Caledonia as do
the Philippines. Germany does not. for
she has kiao-Chau and part of New
Guina and a fOothOld on Samoa. Russia
does not. for all her Pacific interests lie
further north. Japan does not. for she
has Formosa. and her interests, too. lie
north of Luzon. But we have no other
station in that quarter. and we need Cne
as a last westward stepping-stone toward
the open doors of Asiatic trade.
These are elementary principles which
will doubtless be duly considered in the
making of a final disposition of those in
teresting islands. This. too. that the dis
position viii indeed be final. If the
United States takes the islands it viii
have them for all time; if it desires TO
keep them. though. of course. il Will be
able TO ger rid of them at any time. IL
it valves its natural rights and declines
to take them. it will never have another
chance to get them. unless in a war of
conquest. such as is not 10 be looked for.
If IL takes them and finds il has made
mistake in so doing, il can correct that
mistake with ease. II it does not take
them and finds il has made a mistake in
not taking them, it cannot correct that
a.Iyes