The record-union., 1898-12-03

Consul had notified General Garcia that
Cervera was going out at about l0
O'Clock, having told the Consul that 1t
was better TO die fighting than to blow
UP his ships in the harbor.
On the same date Shafter reports
that he had demanded the surrender
Of Santiago under threat of lombard
ment, but up to 4:30 had received no
answer. He says: The situation has
been precarious on account of difficult
ties of supplying the command with
feed, and the tremendous fighting ca
pacity shown by the enemy from his
almost impregnable position"
The next day he says that he is
physically exhausted STILL but had
eaten little for the first time in four
days.
SKATERS DEMAND FOR SUR
RENDER OF SANTIAGO.
Shafter transmits copies of his de-
mand for the surrender of Santiago,
and the reply, refusal, of date July
Sd, and then shows that he postponed
the bombardment until noon of the
9th, in order to allow the foreign Con-
suls to remove their people to FL Caney.
He explains to the Secretary that great
suffering will result, and he submits
the matter to the President The Con-
suls had told Dorst that there were not
to exceed 5000 troops in Santiago, and
that Shafter could starve them out, let
ting the on-combatants come out.
The Secretary replied that for hui
manity's sake he approved the post
ponement of the bombardment as pro-
posed, though Shafter would be justi-
fed in carrying out the original threat
Later in the same day General Corbin
directed Shafter to use his own judg-
ment about how to take the city, only,
for manifestations it should be ac-
complished as speedily as possible The
Secretary also added a short telegram,
saying that he had not intended to di-
rect Skaters movements, as he was
the best Judge of the situation, and
the country had every faith in his wis
dom.
Later still, on July 4th, the following
telegram was dispatched:
Major General Shafter Playa del Este.
CUBA: After conference with the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of War, I am di-
rected to say that your continued illness
brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you
are disabled, General Wheeler would of
course, succeed in command. His illness,
serious as to prevent his assuming COM
mand. You must determine whether your
conditlon is such as to require you to
Wheeler is disabled, you will order the
next general officer in rank for duty to
succeed you, and keep up the work in
hand. 1t Is not expected that our forces
Will make assault until they are ready
H. G. CORBIN, Adjutant General"
The response was as follows:
Camp Near Santiago de Cuba. July
6th.-Adjutant General, Washington: am
not at present so much i'll as exhausted
from the intense strain that has been
on me for theslast two months am also
scnering from an attack of gout, which
however, the whole business in my hand,
ana am managing 1t through able staff
officers: When I do have to give up, I
WlIi, OF course. follow your order, but 1
Major General Commanding"
On the Sd General Shafter reported
that Pando could not get into Santiago.
but on the 4th he reported Pando's en-
try with 5000 troops from Holguin.
and asked about his own reinforce
ments.
On the 9th Shafter reported that he
was returning the Spanish wounded, he
being satisfied that such course would
SOW the seeds of dissatisfaction in the
Spanish ranks, as, he says: THE SOL
d1ers said they were fighting the
church, and were going to kill them.'
WANTED NAVY TO FORCE EN-
TRANCE TO HARBOR.
In telegram dated San Juan. 4th.
Shafter says: "I regard it as neces-
sary that the navy force an entrance
into the harbor of Santiago not later
he f,,cA
capture of that place. If they do, I be-
lieve the place will surrender without
further sacrific of life.''
A supplementary telegram declared
that if the army was to take the place
alone $4,000 troops were wanted speed
ily and then it was not certain. on
account of the stormy weather and
sure way was through the bay.
In reply he was told on July 9Th by
General Corbin to confer with Sampson
at once for cooperation in taking San
tiago, and .after the fullest exchange
of views, he will agree upon the time
and place of attack"
In the afternoon of the same day Cen
eral Corbin telegraphed that the Secre-
tary of War found it evident from
your several reports that you do rot
consider your force strong enough to
make successful assault upon the
Spanish army intrenched in Santiago.
This being the case, it is the point of
wisdom to await reinforcements The
embarkation of which you have already
been advised. You must be the Judge
of the time and manner of assault. The
President has directed that you and Ad-l
miral Sampson have conference ard
determine upon course of cooperation
best calculated to secure desired results
with least sacrifices
The next day Shafter was telegraph
ed: 1.-THE Secretary Of War is anxious
to know what prospect there is of
breaking through the lines. He Will
be very glad, even with a delay, to
have cooperation of the navy, thus
saving many lives"
July 1th Shafter telegraphed that af-
ter consultation with Sampson the navy
was disinelined to force entrance ex-
cept as last resort but would lombard
the city for twenty-four hours, and
then try to force the entrance with
small ships.
He had made another demand for
Torars surrender. which he hoped
would succeed. He says: ''As a last
resort / will run in transports. ] don't
consider my force sufficient to warrant
an assault on the city, though I be-
lieve it would be successful, but at a
fearful loss, of course. It woul1 be
criminal to hope for the end 20 be
gained, which is merely the capture OF
few thousand men, and when we are
getting them by siege
Shafter was telegraphed that it was