Arizona republican. [volume] (Phoenix, Ariz.) 1890-1930, 1898-06-06
TAKING AN EYE OUT.
BY Taking Porto Rico We Close One of
SPANS Sights.

| Washington June At is now an in
| disputable fact. it is said, that it will De
| several weeks before 10000 men ara
| equipped for the invasion of Cuba The
| time before this car be done is even es-
| timated at from thirty to forty days
with at least ten days more to transport
| troops.
The President it is said, sees all this
clearly and does not want to wait q
month or more without striking a blow
at Spain which may end the war. he
does not want the war prolonged II
everything was about ready for a Cuban
invasion he would know that this would
porbably end the war While the inter
val OF getting 100000 men ready for Cuba
is open for action of some sort, and II
cannot be had at sea. Porto Rico presents
itself as the field for aggressive, quick
and short work Ii is one OF Spain eyes
in the West Indies.
Ry closing that eye the enemy VIII De
all the more inclined to stop the hght De-
fore the other is damaged.
Continuing, the argument is tnat potn
army and navy are prepared for this hrst
and effective round. There are $500 sod
iers equipped and well supplied anu
transports enough to send them all 10
Porto Rico at once. Sampson can SPAR
the ships to accompany them he can
lombard San Juan. holdinS the
major part of the Spanish sol
diers there while troops can be
landed at some other other point Whlie
the weather will be hot. the soidiers Will
not suffer from diseases. as IN Cuna-
By the time the American flag is wei
fixed in Porto Rico there will be over
100. 000 soldiers ready for Cuba, Spain :
feet will probably have met defeat and
Blanco's Spaniards won't be eager to de-
fend the .'honor of Spain.
The Spanish fleet, which has So oiten
postponed plans for land operations by
the mystery of its Whereabouts, no
longer stands in the way. 1t was sai1
by a cabinet officer today 10 De certaln
that Cervera and lis for long time
phantom ships will be so well cared Tor
that they win not create fear of rum ng
into an invading party. The candid ad-
mission that Schley sent telegram the
most of which was suppressed is taken
to mean that he outlined his plans FOR
disposing of the Spaniards.
THE President is anxious to get some
relief of suffering CubanS. That is more
important to his mind than the acquisi-
ton OF territory, unless the latter VIII
hasten the end of the war. The reported
suffering appeals intensely to him and
prompts many risks to send relief The
President, it is said, may have concluded
to effect landing in Cuba with from 25,-
600 to 40, 900 men for the purpose of car
rying supplies to the afflicted, the cal
culation being that Gomez would arrive
to increase the invading force. The
force, aided by warships in the rear and
strongly fortified, would be able to resist
attack.
Blanco could not spare an army of
equal size from Havana. as he would
fear the capture of the city by sea.
The distribution of supplies would be
the greatest trouble. These could not be
sent to the starving people throughout the
island. The afflicted and diseased would
have to go to the American camp carry
ing pestilence with them and making the
undertaking dangerous. Of course, the
troops of Gomez could sally out for miles
and carry food for the hungry. but the
supplies thus sent out would be liable to
capture at all times. Spies would con-
stantly fill the American camp under
pretense of being friendly and in need of
food.
The President has gone over all phases
of the situation and is said to be lean
ing to the belief that the quickest way to
get succor to the starving is by dealing
Spain blows in other quarters and fore
ing her to succumb, thus opening Z free
road to getting supplies into Cuba.