The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-09-25

her efforts were directed to winning
over the great Muscovite empire.
The task was no easy one, and diplo-
macy of every kind was required.
What chiefly made Russia wary of
the advances of the French nation was
the fact that she still doubted the eff
fectiVeness of the French defenseS. The
great maneuverS of the east had
seemed almost a challenge to Germany.
Germany answered by erecting new
fortified works in the neighborhood of
Belfort, and German military experts
declared that the French territory was
now at the mercy of the kaiser's forces.
The eastern maneuvers OF the French
army held in 1898 were attended by a
special delegation of superior officers of
the Russian army. The French author
tiles felt that these men had been sent
to study the efficiency of the forces
which the republic could oppose to the
attacking Germans, and that on their
report depended the fate of the pro-
jected Franco-RUSSian alliance.
These men must be won over at any
cost, and to this effect instructions
were forwarded to General de Miribel.
The latter was a man of great intel
lectual acumen and of keen knowledge
of human nature His second in COM
mand, as chief of staff, was Colonel
Bosdeffre, man he had chosen him
self, somewhat to the surprise of those
who knew the character of both men.
Boisdeffre had the reputation of a POM
pous individual of no personal initiative
or brilliant parts, and was considered a
fanatic from several points of view
But De Miribel knew the man he
wanted. Boisdeffre had high party in
fiuence, and, besides, he was Industrious
and obedient, and in this respect an
excellent lieutenant. An officer of tall
ent and originality, coming after De
Miribel would be likely to alter the
military plans and to adopt new fea-
lures, to which he could attach his own
name. Boisdeffre, OH the contrary,
/ lacking in originality, would De sure to
| adhere to the plans of a predecessor
whom he admired, and would thus save
the country the risks that too many
military organizers usually provoke.
But De Miribel had no very high
| opinion of Boisdeffre's discretion or di-
plomatic ability, and so when the chief
/ was devising the means of winning over
/ the Russian military deputation, the
/ second in command was left in abso-
/ lutte ignorance.
There was one staff officer a relative
! ly young man, on whom the chief
placed the greatest reliance. This was
! Captain Alfred Dreyfus. His patriot
ism, his industrious habits, his zeal for
| the honor and reputation of the French
army, were all known to Count de
| Miribel. This young officer was the
only person who possessed to any con-
| siderable extent the confidence of the
| commander, and he was the only one
! the latter now acquainted with the
arrangement for treating with the Rus
! sian experts. De Miribel said in eff
! feet:
/ Captain Dreyfus, 1 have instructions
! from Paris to convince these Russian
officers, by any means that 1 can de-
lrrfe- @fN
! OF our troops in case of war with Ger
many. l wish you to help me out in
this matter. My design is to lay before
these men Synoptical sketch of our
plans, with details on the strength and
position of our artillery, and the
strength of our fortresses and noun
| tain batteries. 1t is you who must
communicate this information. You
will have to act with great discretion,
| taking no one into your confidence
To this Dreyfus replied: My gen.
eral, pardon me if 1 speak plainly; but
would it not seem that an action of
this kind, the communicating of our
secret documents, had the appearance
almost OF treason, the very shadow or
suspicion of which a soldier must avoid
as he would the fangs of a serpent?"
De Mirabeis response TO this was:
| Your ScrunleS do you honor but
there IS no motive for them here. You
| know the plans are all of my making
and are in my keeping and at my abso-
lutte discretion. Suppose these Russians
should desire to use against us this in
! formation we are communicating to
them. With a few strokes of the pen
l can so alter the plans as to render
that information absolutely vaiueleSS.
Captain, you need have no scruple.
take on myself all the responsibility in
| this matter You are merely Obeying
my commands. Co, make your ar
rangementS to carry out my orders"
Captain Dreyfus insists that this YER
sion of what passed between him and
his superior on this occasion is abSo-
lutely correct. The Italian ambassador
was convinced by his investigation that
it was true, and the attendant circum-
stances certainly give it a strong ap-
Dearance of probability.
The intelligence bureau, which de-
peEdS on the staff commander, is an
deliberately organized concern. Part of
its functions is to arrange, not merely
a system of espionage, but also a meth
cd of deceiVing foreign spies. Thus,
when the identity, say of a German or
Italian SPY is known in France, the
war office, If it can find no good evil
dence for expelling him, sends out one
of its own eTniSsaries, who, acting the
role OF the traitor, communicates a
small amount of true information on
|
much false information on points of
vital interest. This part, at the east
ern maneuverS in question, was being
played by Captain (since major) Ester
hazy, commissioned employee in the
war office.
The man was born for the role. OF
foreign extraction, cynical, poor in
purse, spendthrift in habits, he was
just the person to create the impression
of being an INSCRIPTIONS man and a
traitor on occasion. This is why the
French war Office used him for this pur-
pose.
But while the French war office was
employing him as a feigned traitor, Es-
terhazy was a real and veritable traitor
with all the earnestness of his pervert-
ed soul.
1t is well, therefore, to note the exact
position of affairs in the mater of es-
rionage at these points. Captain Drey-
fus was, by order of the chief of staff,
arranging to submit some private infor-
nation to q deDutatiOn Of Russian Of
ficers. This he was doing as an upright
man, conscious of acting honestly. Cap
tain Esterhazy was employed to meet
the representatives of Germany and
Italy, and TO sell them all the false in
formation he could. Instead of doing
this he took both attaches into his con-
fdence, informed them of the work he
was employed to do, and proposed, in
consideration of a large sum of money,
to worm out a great deal of correct in
telligence and communicate it to them.
The work of neither man could be
done on the maneuvering field by day.
1t was rather in private, and at night,
that the negotiations could alone be
carried out The military reDresenta-