The record-union., 1898-05-01
SPANISH NAVAL FLEET.
Anxiety as to Destination of War
ships From Cane Verde.

gram was received here this morning
stating that the Spanish torpedo boats
Azore, Rayo and Ariete had sailed this
morning from St Vincent, Cape Verde
Islands, for the Canaries. The Azore
and the Rayo, the cable said, were
towed by the transports San Francisco
and Ciudad Cadiz.
The fact that the two torpedo boats
We're in tow of transports naval Off
GERS regarded as a sign that in the
collision which these vessels are re-
ported to have had yesterday the ma
chinery of the boats was disabled be-
yond the possibility of repair at ST.
Vincent. 1t is by no means a safe I'M
dertaking to tow a torpedo boat that
long distance between Cape Verde and
the Canares and it would not surprise
naval officers if one or more of the
little boats were missing when the re-
mainder of the small fleet arrived at
the Canaries.
Anxiety is felt as to the destination
of the more formidable part of the
Spanish fleet that has sailed westward
from Cape Verde. If they are headed
for Cuba the Navy Department call
culates that they are likely to reach
Porto Rico about May It'll. 1t is not
to be expected, however, that the ar
rival at Spanish ports would be made
public by the Spanish authorities con-
trolling the cable, and supposing that
they are not detected by any of the
United States naval vessels which will
possibly be thrown out as scouts, the
first news of the arrival of the fleet on
this side is likely to be conveyed by
some neutral vessel trading between
Porto Rico and an outside port.
The strategy involved in the Spanish
movements is rather puzzling to the
naval officers. Assuming that the four
cruisers have actually started to Cuba,
it would seem that if they arrive at
Porto Rico they would be in imminent
danger of capture or destruction at the
hands of Admiral Simpsons squadron,
which is unquestionably superior in Of
fensive In other words, the cruisers
would be situated as were the Oquendo
and Vizcaya before the outbreak of
hostilities, when they prudently fled
from the port of Havana.
1t was reported in department cir
cles to-day that the flying squadron
was about to sail from Fortress Mon
roe. The officials refused to affirm or
deny the correctness of the statement,
but it is assumed that if the report IS
true the vessels are to be used as scouts
to detect the approach of the Spanish
vessels. 1t is not expected that In
case the armored ships were sighted
by Commodore Schley an engagement
would be attempted, unless the circum-
stances were peculiarly favorable, for
he has but two armored ships in his
squadron to pit against the four heavi-
ly armored Spanish vessels. He would,
however, be able to hang on the flank
of the Spanish squadron and annoy
| them greatly while rushing ahead one
of his flyers, the Columbia or Mime
apolis, to warn Admiral Sampson and
secure reinforcements in the shape of
battleship that would insure victory
in action.
No word has yet come from the Phil
ippines, and, as already explained, even
if there has been an action between
Commodore Dewey aud the Spanish ma
val force there, the Navy Department
is scarcely in a way to hear of it for
several days. Even if the Commodore
should manage to land at Manila, he
probably will be unable to operate the
tors, and perhaps the apparatus itself
may be disabled before it falls into his
hands There is good reason to believe
that the Commodore will not directly
attack Manila in the beginning. The
report that he took aboard before leav-
ing Hongkong one of the most popu-
lar leaders of the Philippine insurgents
is regarded as evidence that the Com
|
support to maintain his footing in the
islands If this be so, he would very
likely avoid Manila, the Capital, and
seize first another port where the in
surgents are in greater strength, and
where there are no Notifications to
overcome.
While there is no doubt that one of
the objects of Commodore Dewey is
to crush the Spanish squadron in the
East Indies as the most effective meth
Cd of protecting the important trade
interests in that quarter, it is beyond
doubt part of his purpose to seize and
hold port suitable for use as a coal
ing station. The coaling station is not
only desira BILE, but is absolutely neces-
sary from a naval point of view, unless
the United States is prepared to sur
render all commerce in American bot
toms with Asia, and fully realizing this,
the naval officials will proceed with
their campaign.
Whether the station will be retained
after the war by the United States will
not now be determined. 1t is positively
asserted that, UP to this moment these
European menaces have taken no Off
cial form, and as yet no protests have
been lodged with the Department of
State If any such should be made
based on diplomatic reasons it would
not be hard for our Government point
ing to the wholesale seizures of almost
the major portion of the Chinese coast
by the European powers, to justify our
selves in seeking to obtain at least so
much of a foothold in that section of
the globe as would suffice to give our
warships safe home port in time of
stress, and afford a moderate degree of
protection to our commerce, which in
comparison with that of some of the
European powers who have been most
forward in their threats, is by no means
insignificant.
The State Department officials are
more amused than concerned by the re-
port from Madrid, originating with
Captain General Blanco that the Aus
trian and French Consuls at Matanzas
have lodged a protest against the bonn
bardment of that place by Admiral
Sampson They say in the first place
there has been no bombardment at that
place, and owing to the distance that
Matanzas lies away from the fort at
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