The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-06-22

good reasons Of their own. to induce us to
retire from thls position, a. wen AZ to get
All nations to sign the declaration of Paris.
maintain. Some OF these have striven for
According to WhArton's Digest, "a main OBJ
5ect which tho two allied powers In the war
OF 1854 against Russia had in view was to
end the practice of belligerents issuing let
tiers of marque and reprisals to subjects OF
neutral states"
Quoting from letter of the then French
minister Of foreign affairs. the Digest con-
tinues: What Influenced especially the
English government was the fear of Amer
lea 1nclining against us and lending to our
enemies the cooperation of her hardy vol
unteers. The maritime population of the
United States, their enterprising marine
might furnish to Russia the elements of a
neet OF privateers which, attracted to its
service by letters Of marQue and covering
the seas with q network, would harass and
pursue our commerce even in remote
waters"
DR.. Snow. in his War College lectures.
after pointing out that the United States
mad IN fact taken a somewhat varying
course toward privateering, making treaties
for its abolition after the revolution, prac-
ttcing it in 18l2. refraining from doing so in
the Mexican war, then refusing to sign the
declaration Of Paris 10 years later, and dur
Ing the civil war putting a law on the
statute books authorizing 1t, but falling to
act under that law. said: 1T can be Stated
states still maintain the right to issue letters
OF marque and reprisal to the fullest extent.
and 1t Is only question Of policy which
would prevent it's exercise in any war in
which they might be engaged in the future. -
He remarked that the conditions Of mod
ern naval warfare had lessened the desira-
blity OF privateering from the standpoint
both OF privateer and government. The
prizes worth capturing now would be
steamers" he said. land for this reason
pr1vateers would necessarily be steamers
also. The cost of steamers, OF their main
tenance, and the difficulty Of obtaining
coal aboard would render privateering very
expensive and uncertain, especially as the
remuneraItve prizes would be the large
fast. and probably partially armed mer-
chant steamers without convoy. The DIFF
fculty Of capturing these and of getting
them Into port after capture would render
privateering very doubtful financial VEN
ture. especially as without some proper ad-
Indication and sale. which could only be
done in home port, the privateer would
have no recOmpense.
Moreover. from a national point of view
seafar1ng men thrown out of employment
in war time would be needed in the naval
service and would be readily absorbed by
the regular men-of-War AS privateers
would at first offer hopes Of plunder with
short terms of service, the absorption Of
Seafaring men by this class of vessels
Tor ships OF war. especially as the crews
of the privateers would, when captured, be
retained as prisoner, Of war, and this scar
city OF seafaring men would become, in
stead OF a temporary evil. a permanent one.
1T would be much wiser from a national
policy to take vessels fit for this kind Of
work into the navy from the merchant ser.
vice and commission their officers with
acting appointments in the navy from the
national authority. was done oslring the
late civil war"
AS to captures by a private vessel not
commissioned in any way by the national
government, DR.. Snow quoted Hail, an
English authority, as follows "Non-com-
mlss1oned vessels have right to resist
when summoned to surrender to public
ships or privateers of the enemy. The
crews, therefore, which make such resist
ance have belligerent privileges. and it Is
a natural consequence Of the legitimate
ness or their acts that if they succeed in
capturing their asaiants the capture is a
good one for the purpose of changing the
ownership of the property taken and of
making the enemy prisoners Of war"