Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-11-13
that no Englishman would be willing to

that he cannot conceal from himself that
Notwithstanding the numerous authorities
he consulted. many Of his pages viii be
found excessively dull TO the civilian.
But In this every thoughtful reader. civil
Ian or not. will take issue with him. His
admiration OF Jackson. while not warp
ing his Judgment and dlyerting him from
his main purpOse--a study of Jackson as
a strategist-grows with the progress OF
his labor; and while his style Is not al
ways of the smoothest he avoids the
often tiresome detail Of Kingake and
rises TO enthusiastic description. When
our author is on the battlefield the sol
der instinct and the soldier blood get the
better OF the professor OF Military Art
and History" and casting aside his field
glasses, he throws himself into the thick
est Of the Fight. Still he never loses
sight OF the meaning and the significance
Of each movement IN It's tactical bearing
In respect TO working out the precon-
ceived game of strategy.
We shall not undertake TO follow Colo
mel Henderson I'm anything like detail. He
follows Jackson from tho cradle 10 the
grave. We can only deal with the key
note of his work. which he sounds in
these words: =" 'Stonewalr Jackson's mill
tary career was not all hard fighting;
nor was 1t on the battlefield alone that
his supreme ability for war was made
! more occupied by strategy-that is, by
combinations made out Of sight OF the
enemy-than by tactics-that is, manoeu-
vres executed in the enemy's presence
The more distinct value of the work is
In the authors treatment and estimate
OF Jackson as an example or self poise
| under the most trying conditions, and as
a master OF strategy in all the term I'M
plies. And his estimate may be best
| OraCrpd from of tho most striking
passages from the volumes touching these
points.
In summarizing after his description Of
Second Manassas, Colonel Henderson
| saws:
so long as the victories Of Napoleon
are remembered the name of his lieuten-
ant will always be a synonym for heroic
valor. But the yalOr of Ney was of
different type from that of Jackson.
Neys valor was animal, Jackson's was
moral, and between tho two there is
vast distinction Before the enemy, when
| his danger was tangible, Ney had few
| rivals. But when his enemy was unseen
and his designs were doubtful, his reso-
| utions vanished He was without conf
/ dence i'm his own resources. He could not
act without direct orders. and he dreaded
responsibility. At Bautzen his timidity
ruined Napoleon's combinations; in the
campaign Of Leipsic he showed himself
| incapable Of independent command and
| he cannot be acquitted of hesitation at
| Quatre Bras.
ut was in the same circumstances that
| Neys courage invariably gave way that
| Jackson's courage shone with the bright
| est lustre. 1t might appear that he had
| little cause for fear in the campaign OF
| the Second Manassas; that he had only
| to follow his instructions, and that II he
| had failed his failure would nave been
visited upon Lee The instructions which
he received, however. were not positive
but contingent on events"
We quote again:
ct is not difficult to imagine how n
general like Ney, placed in Jackson's
situation. would have trimmed and hest
tated: how, in his march TO Manassas,
when he had crossed the mountains and
left the gap behind him., he would have
sent out reconnOissances in all directions,
hating his troops until he learned the
coast was clear. how he would nave
forced his weary troops northward when
the enemy's approach was reported; how.
had he reached Sudley Springs, he would
have Rugged the shelter Of the woods
and let Kings Division pass unmolested,
and, finally. when Pope's columns con-
verged on his position, have fallen back
on Thoroughfare or Aide. Nor would
he here been greatly to blame. Unless
gifted with that moral fortitude which
Napoleon ranks higher than genius or
experience, no general would have sue
ceeded i'm carrying Lees design 10 sue
cessful issue. In his unhesitating march
to Manassas Junction, in his deliberate
sOiourn for four and twenty hours
astride his enemy's communications, in
his daring chalknge to Pope's whole
army at Grovet9 jackson displayed the
indomitable c2 e Characteristic of
the greatest q
"As suggest the first volume, it
is too oftex boxed, by those who
study the of campaigns that
war is th< D. of uncertainty. The
reader h hole theatre Of war
displayI Inn. He notes the ex-
act dr the opposing forces at
EACH campaign and, with
this IS eye, he condemns or
apr m of the commanders.
in the defeated general
hf gees much to blame;
successful general
But his judgment
Frue foundation He
that the information
Is not at the disposal
Uses and, until he real
GENERALS, to n greater or
iust have been cropping in
will neither make just al
be errors of the one nor
Kenus of the other"
Der the suggestive cap
4 of War" our author
\ lhe most favorable cir
cumSfan general is surrounded by
= an attn e which has been most
aptly nal |the fog of war. his en-
.barrassmd fare intensified tenfold when
yhe commands a portion OF a divided
army. Under ordinary conditions, a
general IS Bot least, fully informed Of
the disposition OF his own forces. But,
when. between too widely separated col
umns powerful enemy, capable of
crushing each In turn, interyenes: when
the movements of that enemy are veil
ed In obscurity: when anxiety has taken
possession of the troops. and the soldiers
of either column, striving hopelessly to
penetrate the gloom, reflect on the fate
that may have oyertaken their COM
rades. on the obstacles that may delay
them, on the misunderstanding that
may have occurred-it is at such cri-
sis that the courage of their leader Is
put TO the severest test.
His situation has been compared To a
man entering dark room full Of assail-
ants. never knowing when or whence d
blow may be struck against him. The
illustration is inadequate. Not only has
he to contend with the promptings Of his
own instincts, but he has TO contend
with the instincts ard 10 sustain the
resolution OF his whole army. 1t is not
from the enemy that he has most TO
fear. A time comes in all protracted
tfope urben fha nef.yauS energy of