Phillipsburg herald. [volume] (Phillipsburg, Kan.) 1882-1905, 1898-12-01
THE NAVIGATION BUREAU.

1
UN ----------
Capt. crowInAhisld Makes Valuable no.
port on the Work of tho Departments
During the Recent War;
Washington, Nov. 24-Far out OF
the ordinary annual report of the
bureau officers Is that of Capt. Crown.
lnshield, chief of the bureau OF naviga-
ton, navy department, which has Just
been made pablo. Not only was the
head Of this bureau member of the
war or strategy board, as it came to be-
known, but he was responsible for the
execution of the plans formed by that
board and for the movement Of every
ship and the assignment of every Of
ficer. Consequently no bureau officer
had equal opportunity to know the
moving purposes and exact history OF
the war. The report Is absolutely free
from personalities; there is no refer
ence whatever TO the Sampson-Schley
controversy; no criticism of any Off
Ger nor any commentator that might
be regarded as invidious and discrimi-
mating. But the report is confined 60
the statement of hard facts with few
important recommendations for the
betterment of the naval service.
The war history begins with the
simple statement of certain precau-
tionary orders that were issued, but
even in the absence OF comment at
tention cannot fail to be attracted to
the remarkable foresight exhibited in
the preparation of the official orders.
They begin with an order dated Janu-
airy II last directing the commander
Of the European stations to retain in
service men whose enlistments were
about to expire and those following,
provide for the successful extrication
of the European squadron from the
danger to which 1t was exposed upon
the outbreak of the war, show how
the south Atlantic squadron was
brought up to reinforce Sampson,
how the Oregon started on her
famous race around South America,
how the stores and ammunition were
forwarded to the squadrons and finally
they wind up with the famous laconic
order to Dewey of April "a, war has
commenced between the United States
and Spain, proceed at once to the Phil
ippine islands. Commence operations
at once, particularly against Spanish
fleet. You must capture vessels or de-
stroy. Use utmost endeavors." These
orders show that four months before
Cervera's feet reached this side our
whole north Atlantic feet was ready
for any emergency within striking dis
tance of one of the two points from
which attack might come. Trained
gnnnefs to the number of as who had
just graduated from the course on the
Amphitrite were placed on the vessels
of The feet and rendered good ac-
count of themselves. Capt. Crownin-
shield says:
The completeness OF our naval victory dur
ing the war and the almost absolute immunity
from injury which our ships and crews enjoyed
naturally led to general conclusion that our
gunnery had much to do with the matter AS
q matter Of fact all reports bear out this con-
true than that which has been obtained at tar
get practice, was modified by three conditions;
In the first place the demolition of the enemy's
ships has usually been so complete that 1t is
certain that the marks Of many hits |
were oblterated by subsequent fires
and explosions; in the second place the |
ranges at which the combats have taken place |
have usually been so much greater than those |
lsed in target practice that this difference will
recount for reduction of from 30 to 80 per cent |
n hits and, finally, the rata of fire was
much higher in the battles than at target prac-
ice. The bureau had been endeavoring before
he war 10 increase the rate of target fire and |
when all this is considered it will be found that
he hits per gun per man" have been remark
IDLY high. In fast 1t appears that the expert
nee OF each combat was that our marksman-
hip was so far superior that, at a range at
which the Spanish guns and gunners were in
Effective, our guns and gunners were so effect
We that before the range was or could be re-
luced, the Spanish ships were either seriously
rippled or their crews demoralized
The navigation bureau recommends
hat congress authorize the increase
# the naval force to 10000 men for
General service and 1900 apprentices
nd an argument is made to show the
bsolute necessity of some such increase
nless the reserves on the receiving
hips are to be reduced below the dan
er point an evil that>was very close
y approached during the last war;