The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-08-08


without official confirmation of the re-
port from Paris that the Spanish gov
ernment has decided to accept the
terms laid down by the United states
as essential to the negotiation cf a
treaty of peace. the officials here are
proceeding under the conviction Rat
the end has come and are giving atten-
tion to the steps to be taken next. In
view of the delay in coming to this con-
clusion. the idea was beginning To pre-
vail that the Spanish government was
about to enter a plea i'm abatement, and
that the answer would be again incon-
elusive. In this case the president was
disposed to deal firmly with the issues.
to give notice that our proposals were
withdrawn and TO let IL be understood
that when Spain again sued for peace
the conditions would be more severe
than those laid down. IL the Spanish
answer should embody an effort to Sc
cure any material change in. the con-
ditions IL will meet with prompt re-
lection. Some reference has been made
in the dispatches OF British newspa-
pers 10 a desire on the part of :he
Spanish government to include in the
preliminary agreement a clause eN-
empting IL from liability for the Cuban
debt. The formal statement of the
points OF the United States note given
out from the white house made no ref
erence to this subject. and 1t cannot be
known as yet whether the full text
shows anything more.
But presuming that no reference
whatever is made to the cabinet. and IL
Is possible the subject may be regard
ed as one that should be treated b. the
peace commissioners who are to meet
later 10 frame the treaty which, of
course. will embody many details that
are left untouched in the main propo-
sltion, though cabinet officers have au-
thoriZed the statement that no part of
the Cuban or Porto Rican debts would
be assumed by the United States.
Based upon the associated press re-
ports of the progress being made at
Madrid toward returning the answer
OF Spain. II was calculated by the de-
partment officials that the formal note
could not he delivered to the president
before tomorrow, and that was also
the belief Of the French ambassador
from the length of time consumed in
its preparation. The note was believed
to be long, thus entailing the consump-
tiOn OF much time in forwarding IL first
TO Paris, reducing II TO cipher there.
transmitting IL over the cable and then
re-translating II at the French en-
bassy.
In the case Of the last note. the at
taches OF the embassy worked nearly
all night To prepare their communica-
tion to the Spanish government, though
the conference with the president
closed before o'clock I'm the afternoon.
with the ambassador in possession of
the United States note.
Should the Spanish answer be an un-
conditional aPCpptaDCa NJ
some negotiations may be necessary 10
agree upon the steps TO be taken TO
give effect TO the agreement. SO far
as can be learned IL has not been de-
termined how this shall be done. There
are two ways then. The first is a mil
itary capitulatlon by the captain gener-
ais Of Cuba and Porto Rico, which will
Immediately place the American mill
tary or naval commanders in technical
occupation OF the islands and enable
them to carry out in their own way and
in their own time the eembarkation Of the
Spanish armies i'm the islands. The in
tent1on as TO whether they shall be per-
mitted to carry off their arms is not
now as material as IL was in the case
OF the surrender OF General Torals
forces at Santiago where. occurring in
the midst of the campaign. there vas a
necessity for compelling the Spanish
soldiers TO lay down their arms. Spain
having succumbed, II might be urged
that the United States might grant
concession on this point to Spanish
pride without fear Of having the action
attributed TO fear OF the consequences
OF a refusal. This would apply. howev-
er, TO the volunteers who might elect
TO remain in Cuba. as IL would not be
prudent TO allow so large a body Of men
to carry arms without restraint in the
days Of reconstruction. when delicate
and difficult matters OF international
policies are 10 be settled and new meth
DDS applied TO the government OF the
islands. The second method by which
the preliminary peace agreement mi ght
be formally effected would be a proto-
col to be signed by a representative o.
the president, Secretary Day in this
case and by NJ. Cambon for Spain
This course having the weight Of pre-
cedCnt. may be adopted I'm this case. II
Is probable that in the Philippines viii
be the difficulty in putting the agree
uent into effect on account of the atti-
tude OF the INSURGENTS. but Genera
Merritt is now gaining in strength daily
and probably viii be in a position
10 meet any emergency.
General Wade's reinforcements for
Ger nrdl Miles are going forward re-
gardless OF the progress OF the peace
negotiations. The agreement TO nego-
tlate treaty Cf peace does nOt neCes-
sdrily carry with IL a cessation OF hos
til.ties. In the case Of the Mexican war
IL was a month after the peace uego-
tidtions began before hostilitirs were
declared 20 be closed and II desirab bic
these reinforCements may he interrert-
ed and returned % the United States
after they sail The present plans OF
Secretary Alger all contemplate THAI
they shall leave the United States. es-
pac.ally as II IS felt that with the prac-
IDEAL field experience they will acquire
In Porto Rico under favorable climatic
conditions they viii make good mate
rial 20 use both there and in Cuba in
carrying out the government recon
struCtion policies.
Secretary Alger is apprehensive tat
the small wharfage resour><s OF SAINT
ago will seriously retard the execution
- the Department. orders for tha
speedy return 10 the UnlT"l states ii
N