The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-12-11

noranco OF all people but their own were the
| reasons for the merciless slaughter which
| came upon the British soldiers at the battle Of
Bunker Hill. II the lesson OF that day was
| temporarily wasted upon England. 1t was be-
cause insular contempt for every other people
| upon earth. even II they be kith and kin, is hard
to overcome.
Our author Is one Of those historians who.
far from belittling the battles Of Trenton and
Princeton. on the score Of the paucity OF the
combatants., is disposed to regard the cam
paign whereof they were the pivotal points as
very remarkable. from both a military and a
political point Of view. He reminds us that.
toward the close Of December. 1776. Washing
ton found himself. after q Cries OF defeats and
after a long retreat through the Jerseys into
Pennsylvania, which. however skilfully man
aged. was still retreat. face to face with an
enemy ou~tnumbering lin in the proportion OF
six to one. Within little more than a week. in
the depth Of winter, with adwindling army OF
raw troops melting n changing under his
hand through the .pernicious system Of
short e~nlistments. he had assumed the
offensive and won two decisive victor
les. He had struck his vastly gu
perior foe twice with superior number on his
W poAs ~ tAiSH RStAs - hAAee AS
made his victory. as far as was humanity posi-
sible. sure beforehand. With a beaten army
operating against overwhelming odds he had
inflicted upon the enemy two severe defeats.
Another noteworthy fact is recalled. namely,
that. while Washington was fighting this short
campaign in New Jersey. there was in Europe
one observer OF great military genius. Looking
over the accounts Of the Trenton and Prince
ton battles. Frederick the Great is reported to
have said that they collectively represented the
greatest campaign OF the century, He was
not for a moment blinded by the small num-
bers engaged. The victor Of Rossbach did
not mean that tho campaign was great
from tho number Of soldiers involved, or
the size OF the territory conquered. but
great In its conception and as an ~illustra-
ton Of the highest skill in the art of war under
the most adverse conditions. What he had
achieved under the circumstances proved that
Washington was by nature a great soldier, and
that. after the manner of his kind. he fought best
when the tide OF fortune seemed to set most
strongly against him. He demonstrated a COM
plete mastery Of the whole military situation.
He showed that he knew exactly what he
meantto do. while his opponents were FUN bling
about. without any definite idea. except that
the Americans were beaten. and that they
must crush TIP audacious General who would
not stay beaten. His perfect knowledge OF all
the conditions. including the capacity OF the
Generals opposed to him. his celebrity Of move
ment and the power Of inspiring his men were
the causes OF Washington's success.
Attention is also directed by our author to
another side Of the campaign which proves
that Washington was a statesman as well as q
soldier. He not only saw with absolute clear
ness the whole military situation. and knew
Just what he designed to do and could do. but
kA alaN nn1ArafADl tkA noltktnaI t&.kl-- -
homo and abroad as no one else then under
stood It. During the eighteen months which
had passed since he took command. be had
dealt with Congress and all the State Govern
ments. and had gagged their strength and
their weakness. He had struggled, day after
day. with the defects OF tho army as then
constituted. The difficulties to be grap-
pied with were known to him as to no
one else; he had watched and studied
| popular feeling. and was familiar with all its
phases and currents. He had seen the first
strenuous uprising OF the people and had wit
messed the impact OF the new force which had
invaded Canada, seized Ticonderoga and driven
British armies and fleets from Boston and
Charleston. Living as he did. however. among
obstacles and facing facts. he also knew that
the first victorious rush was but q beginning;
that a reaction was sure to come. and that the
vital question was whether tho war could be
sustained through the period OF reaction until
the armed people could arise again moro So
berly. indeed. and less enthusiastically than be-
fore. but disciplined and with set purpose to win
by hard. slow. 'unfinching fighting. The period
| OF reaction had set in earlier and moro omi-
nously, perhaps. than. even Washington antici-
pated. He foresaw that II he closed the
campaign OF 1776 in defeat and retreat,
the popular spirit on which he relied
would not probably have an opportu-
nifty to revive and the American Revolution
would never see another spring. Moreover,
after the loss OF New York and the retreat up
the Hudson and the steady falling back through
New Jersey. Europe would conclude that the
moment England had really exerted herself
the rebellion had gone down before her arms.
Consequently all hopes OF foreign aid and allf-
ance would be at an end. Without a quick and
striking change In the course OF the war the
cause OF the American people was certainly lost
abroad and probably ruined at home. This was
the thought which neryed Washington to'enter
on that desperate winter campaign. He must
save the Revolution In the field before the pso-
pie and in the Cabinets of Europe. He must
ight and win. no matter what the odds.
The result showed how accurately the then
existing state OF things had been interpreted
by Washington. After Trenton and Princeton
the popular spirit revived. and the force OF the