Gloucester County Democrat. (Woodbury, N.J.) 1878-1932, 1898-04-14


tive situation of the United States and
Texas our acknowledgment of its in
dependence at such crisis could
scarcely be regarded as consistent with
that prudent reserve with which we
have hitherto held themselves bound to
I treat all similar questions
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceed
| ed to consider the risk that there might
/ be imputed to the United States mo-
tiyes of selfish iterest in view of the
former claim on our part to the terri
tory of Texas, and of the avowed pur-
/ pose of the Texans in seeking recog-
milton of independence as an incident to
| the Incorporation of Texas in the Union,
concluding thus:
prudence, therefore, seems to dictate
! that we should still stand aIoof and
maintain our present attitude, if not
| until Mexico itself or one of the great
| foreign powers shall recognize the in
/ dependence of the new government, at
least until the lapse of time or the
| course of events shall have proved be-
yond cavil or dispute the ability of fhe
people of that country to maintain the:S
separate sovereignty and to uphold the
/ government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can
| justly complain of this course. BY
! pursuing it we are but carrying out
the long established policy of our gov
ernment a policy which has secured to
us respect and influence abroad and. in
| spired confidence at home.''
independence of Texas.
These are the words of the resolute
and patriotic Jackson. They are evil
dence that the United States, in ad-
dition to the test imposed by public law
as the condition of the recognition of
/ independence by a neutral state, to wit
that the revolted state shall "consti-
tute in fact a body polite, having
government in substance as well as in
name, possessed of the elements of
stability and forming de facto IF
left to itself, state among the ma
tions, reasonably capable of discharg-
| ing the duties of state" has imposed
for it's own government in dealing with
cases like these the further cendi-
! tion that recognition of independent
| statehood is not due to a revolted de-
| pendency until the danger of it's being
again subjugated by the parent state
has entirely passed away. This extreme
test was in fact applied in the case of
Texas.
The congress to whom President
| Jackson referred the question as one
| probably leading to war; and there
fore a proper subject for previous
understanding with that body by
whom war can alone be declared, and
by whom all the provisions for sustain
/ ing it's perils must be furnished" left
| the matter of the recognition of Texas
to the discretion of the executive, pro-
viding merely for the sending Of a dip
lomatic agent when the president
! should be satisfied that the republic
| of Texas had become ian independent
state" 1t was so recognized by Presi-
/ dent VanBuren, who commissioned a
| charge daffaires March T. 1887, after
Mexico had abandoned an attempt to
reconquer the Texan territory and
when there was at the time no bona
fide contest going on between the in
surgent province and it's former Sow
ereign.
| I said in my message of December
last: "It is to be seriously consider
ed whether the Cuban insurreetion pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of belligereney in it's fa-
vor." The same requirement must GER
| tainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing
independence is in question, for no less
| positive test can be applied to the
greater act than to the lesser; while on
the other hand the influences and con-
sequences of the struggle upon the
internal policy of the recognizing state,
which form important factors when the
recognition of belligerency is concern
ed, are secondary, if not rightly elimi-
nable factors when the real question is
whether the community claiming rec
ognition Is or is not independent be-
yond peradventure.
Opposed to Recognition.
Nor from the standpoint of ex-
pedience do I think it would be wise
or prudent for this government to rec
ognize ut the present time the inde-
pendeRce of the so-called Cuban re-
public. Such recognition is not neces-
| Gary in order to enable the United
States to intervene and pacify the ISL
and. To commit this country now to
the recognition of any particular gov
ernment in Cuba might subject us to
embarrassing conditions of interna-
tional obligation towards the organiza-
|
/ ton our conduct would be subject to
the approval or disapproval of such
government; we would be required to
submit to it's direction and to assume
| to it the mere relation of a friendly
/ ally. When it shall appear hereafter
that there is within the island gov
ernment capable of performing the du-
ties and discharging the functions of
/ a to nd
matter of fact the proper forms and at
tributes of nationality, such govern
ment can be promptly and readily rec
ognized, and the relations and interests
/ of the United States with such nation
adjusted.
There remain the alternative forms
| of intervention to end the war; either as
an impartial neutral by imposing a
rational compromise between the con-
testants, or as the active ally of the
| one party or the other.
AS to the first, it is not to be forgot
ten that during the last few months
the relation of the United States has.
! virtually been one of friendly interven-
ton in many ways, each not of itself
conclusive but all tending to the exer-
/ ton of a potential influence toward an
ultimate pacific result just and honor
/ able to all interests concerned. The
spirit Of all our acts hitherto has been
an earnest, unselfish desire for peace
and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished Ry
differences between us and Spain and
unstained by the. blood of American
citizens.
The forcible Intervention of the Uni
ted States as a neutral, to stop the war,
| according to the large dictates of hui
manity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring states
have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine con-
| flicts beyond their borders. is justifable
on rational grounds. 1t involves, how
ever hostile constraint upon both the
| parties~to the contest, as well to en-
| force a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement
Reasons for Intervention.
The grounds for such intervention
| may be briefly summarized as follows:
| First-In the cause of humanity and
to put an end to the barbarities, blood
shed, starvation and horrible miseries
now existing there, and which the par
| ties to the conflict are either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. 1t is no
answer to say this is all in another
| country, belonging to another nation,
and is therefore none of our business.