The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-05-29
CERVERA AT SANTIAGO.
No Longer Any Doubt as to the Span.
fard's Whereabouts.

No Longer Any Doubt as to the Span
fard's Whereabouts.
| Copyright 1898 by Associated Press.
Key West, Fla, May 2S.-It is now al
most certain that Commodore Schley
| has the Spaniards bottled up in the har-
| Dor of Santiago. There is so little
doubt about this that the naval cam
paign is proceeding on the assumption
that Admiral Cervera is incapable of
| doing any harm.
Within a few days the exact condi-
tions at Santiago will be known without
a shadow of doubt. In spite of asser-
tions to the contrary, Commodore
| Schley was not absolutely sure of his
game when he last communicated with
Rear Admiral Sampson, and the COM
| modore will not take active steps to
block up the entrance of Santiago har-
Dor until he is perfectly certain that
Admiral Cervera's ships are inside
However. he may have done this al
| ready, as. Commodore Schley's last
communication. forwarded on Thurs
day. only reached Admiral Sampson
yesterday.
The commodore stayed three days at
Cienfuegos. He signalled to his ships:
DeutNt spanish meet is IN tne
harbor." On this belief a message was
| sent to the American admiral. The
details of how Commodore Schley found
out that he was mistaken are not yet
known. At any rate, acting on the
| admirars Instructions, the commodore
then moved east. arriving outside San
tiago Wednesday morning. May Il.
The topography of Cienfuegos and
| Santiago Is almost identical. Both har-
hnrs a a hntIf Six miles vyi IN r.
| row entrances about 300 yards wide. and
protected by high land. A whole fleet
could lie in the harbor of either place
and be invisible from the outside.
After his experience at Cienfuegos IL
IL probable that Commodore Schley was
very conservative in deciding whether
or not he had caught Admiral Cervera
From the tone of his dispatches IL is
evident that the commodore soon gained
much secondhand and external evil
dence which pointed TO Admiral Ger
ver's presence in the inner harbor. This
evidence was apparently strong enough
to make the commodore feel certain the
object of his trip had been accom-
plished. but i'm view of his previous ex
perience he would not risk a decisive
statement until after ascertaining the
fact for himself
Before this dispatch Is published. il
Is likely that Commodore Schley has
sent some vessels into the entrance of
the harbor at Santiago. and has OBJ
tained from a reliable source ashore in
formation as to the exact number and
names Of Spanish warships sheltered by
the hills about the place.
Contrary TO the generally expressed
opinion. Santiago harbor is poorly pro-
tected. Like Havana and San Juan de
Porto Rico IL has its MORO Castle.
which is even better target than those
of Havana and San Juan. The only
danger to be feared is from the mines
which have been laid in the channel
of Santiago since war was declared.
But countermining would probably rem
der these mines harmless should IL
prove desirable for Commodore Schley's
ships to enter the harbor. Such a step.
however. Is unlikely.
In this connection IL may be noted
that since the commencement of the
naval operations the moral effect Of
the mines has been great. This condi-
tion promises to continue and will
probably mark the naval operations to