The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-04-03

New York, April 2.-Spain's official
representatives in Cuba are preparing
to let go. Nothing has as yet been done
to prepare the public for the same
thing, says the Havana correspondent
of the Tribune Blanco and the palace
officials hope for a final effort to Sc
cure the Endorsement of the United
States for scheme of nominal sover-
eighty. The insurgents will not accept
that plan, even with the indorement
OF the United States.
With the certain knowledge that
nothing short of independence will pre-
vail, the chief interest is in the good
of reaching that end. A message can
be got to Gomez and an answer re-
ceived in six days. The confidential
talk in Spanish circles is now of yield
ing control by means of indemnity,
though the amount is placed much
higher than will ever be paid.
BEST OF EVIDENCE.
The most pronounced evidence that
Spain is yielding comes from the au-
economist cabinet The designations of
all the members may come at any day.
Good reasons exist for the statement
that Montero, the secretary of the
treasury, and Gown, the secretary of
udNt dlI6duN IGSlSDGu, lnOuSu
their designations may be verbal De-
malls of this fact should be taken eau
tiously. Montero is a representative
of the historic autonomists, who think
the original concessions of the original
autonomy was enough. AS head of
the treasury, he has been informed
that Spain will hereafter expect the
autonomy government to provide funds
for carrying on the war. That is
enough to secure his resignation, for
the task is an impossible one. Gown,
on his part, as chief of the radical fac
ton, undertook to accept "amplihed
autonomy" That is a failure, and
GOWN is of no further use to the Sa-
gasta ministry, except as a. scapegoat.
The appearances are that the entire
autonomist cabinet will be used as
scapegoat for the Spanish public.
BLANCO'S BANDO INEFFECTIVE.
General Blanco's bando. which per-
mits the reconcentrados to go back to
the country without entail, is valueleSs
as a practical measure. 1t might have
done some good in November. Now,
when women and children constitute
a very great majority of the reconcen-
trados, it has no real bearing on the
conditions. At first, the "bando' was
thought to be a diplomatic i,.- e to
checkmate President McKinleys policy
of forcibly succoring the reconcentra-
dos, if necessary. That may have been
one purpose, yet the issuance of the
bando is a confession that the insur-
rection cannot be put down by SPANS
arms. The return of the people in
large numbers to their homes would
give the revolution increased strength.
WAR SENTIMENT
No effort has yet been made by the
authorities to moderate the war senti
n ent of the Spanish classes in Havana.
The papers published attacks on Amerl-
cans. with the pretense of showing
how formidable is the Spanish squad
ron. The majority of the population
still think that war with the United
States is an early probability. Peace
negotiations viii have to be unfolded to
them gradually. These negotiations do
not quench the ardor of the Spanish
war party in Cuba. This is, possibly,
the least of the embarraSsments of the
home government in Madrid, however. !
It's representatives here let the martial
feeling develop itself without check. |
They even encourage the idea that
Spain could safely venture on a war |
with the United States, because the |
European powers would support her.
PROTECTORATE DESIRED.
\ small element among the Spanish |
merchants and planters knows the folly |
of this talk, but this element cannot |
come out openly and antagoniZe the war /
PARTY. The aim of the planters and |
merchants who have lost confidence in !
Spains ability to maintain her sway |
in the island, is either an American |
protectorate or annexation. Instead of
growing stronger, they become weaker
in the presence of the crisis between
the two countries, when every Spaniard /
who is not ready to undertake hostili-
ties, is looked upon with distrust. Their
influence for peace cannot be counted
on as either a check or guide to the
popular movement It is lost in the
fervor of the army officers, the volun-
teers and the populace. Some of the
autonomist leaders, too, go with the
tide. They are more bitter against the
United States than are the instransi-
gents. They hold it responsible for the
failure of autonomy, which, by force
Of circumstances, becomes their own
failure. However, autonomists, either
as leaders or as followers, are not nu-
merous enough to make their senti-
ments a factor of Importance. They
can neither carry a policy which they
favor to success, nor prevent the sue
cessful execution of a policy to which
they are opposed. The functions of the
autonomist government in the domestic
concerns of the island have been weak.
In international affairs it is a cipher.
WHAT THEY KNOW.
The Spanish classes do not need edu-
cation regarding the condition of the
revolution as do the people of Spain.
They know that the insurgents win
never sue for peace; that the only hope
of the peninsula lies in determination.
Possibly because of their superior
knowledge, the Spaniards in Cuba are
tranquil over the reports of attempted
They believe all efforts
for an armistice will fail because the .
will not accept unless it is ,
based on independence. That the Sa- /
gasta cabinet is preparing, through the
good Offices of the United States, for
the independence of Cuba is
incredible to these loyal and patriotic ,
of the mother country The {
course of Captain General Blanco and
of the authorities has not been such as !
TO prepare them for such action If
this proves to be the case, they viii not $
be easily or readily reconciled. They 1
had rather talk of war with the United
States. That is what they are doing q
while Madrid and Washington are talk I
ing peace.