The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-04-12

lament In the matter of preparing"
peace and the manner of doing so are
not expressed in the Spanish memoran-
DUN. but from General woodford's ex-
planatory reports of the preliminary dis
cussions preceding the final conference
II is understood that the Spanish gov
ernment stands ready to give the in
sular congress full power to settle the
terms of peace with the insurgents,
whether by direct negotiation or indl-
rectly by means of legislation, does not
appear. With this last overture in the
direction of immediate peace and its
disappointing reception by Spain, the
executive was brought TO the end of his
effort.
Annexation Criminal Aggression.
In my annual message of December
last i said: "Of the untried measures.
there remain recognition of the insur-
gents as belligerents: recognition of the
independence of Cuba and Intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants. I
speak not for Cuban annexation. for
that cannot be thought Of That by
our code OF morality would be criminal
aggression" Thereupon reviewed
these alternatives in the light OF Presi-
dent Grants measured words uttered in
1875, when. after seven years Of san
ties in Cuba, he reached the conclusion
that the recognition of the independ-
ence of Cuba was impracticable and
indefenslble. and that the recognition of
belligerence. which. while adding to the
already onerous burdens of neutrality.
within our own jurisdiction. could not
In any way extend our influence or
effective offices iu the territory of hos
tilities. Nothing has since occurred to
change my view in this regard and 1
recognize as fully now as then that the
issuance of a proclamation OF neutrality.
by which process the so-called recogni-
ton. of belligerence is published, could.
of itself. and unattended by other ac-
tion, accomplish nothing toward the one
end for which we labor. the instant pa
cification OF Cuba. and the cessation OF
the misery that afflicts the island.
Turning to the question Of recognizing
at this time the independence of the
present insurgent government in Cuba
we find safe precedents i'm our history
from an early day. They are well
summed up in President Jackson's mes
sage to congress Dec. 81. 1886, on the
subject of the recognition of the inde-
pendence of Texas. He said:
Jackson's Message.
in all the contests that have arisen
out of the revolutions of France, out OF
the disputes relating to the crews of
Portugal and Spain. out OF the separa-
tion OF the American possession of both
from the European governments and
out OF the numerous and constantly re-
curing struggles for dominion in Span
ish America. so wisely as consistent
with our just principles has been the
action OF our government that we have
under the most critical circumstances
avoided all censure and encountered no
other evil than that produced by tran
silent re-estrangement OF good VIII In
those against whom we have been. by
force of evidence, compelled to decide
1T has thus been known to the world
that the uniform policy and practice
of the United States is to avoid all in
reference in disputes which merely re-
late to the internal government of other
nations and eventually to recognize the
authority of the prevailing party with
out reference To our particular interests
and views or TO the merits OF the orig
inal controversy.
But in this, as in every other occa-
sion, safety is to be found in a rigid
adherence to principles. In the contest
between Spain and the revolving colo
MES we stood aloof and waited not only
until the ability OF the new states To
protect themselves was fully estab-
lished, but until the danger of their
being again subjugated had entirely
passed away. Then. and not until then.
were they recognized. Such was our
course in regard to Mexico herself.
1T is true that with regard to Texas,
the civil authorities of Mexico had been
expelled. its invading army defeated,
the chief of the republic himself cap
tured and all present power to control
the newly organized government OF
Texas annihilated within its confines.
fR In
appearance at least. an immense dis
parity Of physical force on the side of
Texas. The Mexican republic. under an
ally. is rallying It's forces under a new
leader and menacing a fresh invasion to
recover it's lost domain. Upon the issue
of this threatened invasion. the inde-
pendence Of Texas may be considered as
suspen'ied. and were there nothing pc
culiar in the situation of the United
States and Texas. our acknowledgment
OF it's independence at such a crisis
could scarcely be regarded as consistent
with that prudent reserve with which
we have hitherto held ourselves bound
to treat all similar questions"
Thereupon Andrew jackson proceed
ed to consider the risk that there might
be imputed to the United states mo-
tives of selfish interests in view OF the
former claim on our part TO the terri
pose of the Texans in securing recogni-
tion OF Independence as an Incident TO
the Incorporation Of Texas in the union.
concluding thus:
Prudence. therefore, seems to dictate
that we should stand aloof and main
tain our present attitude. IL not until
Mexico itself or one OF the great powers
shall recognize the independence OF the
new government. at least until the lapse
Of time or the course of events shall
have proved beyond cavil or dispute the
ability Of the people of that country TO
maintain their separate sovereignty and
10 uphold the government constituted
by them Neither of the contending
parties can justly complain Of this
course. BY pursuing IL. we are but
CARRYING out the long established policy
of our government. a policy which has
secured to us respect and influence
abroad and inspired confidence al
home"