The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-12-22

Inducements to Dewey is shown IN q
dispatch OF June "a. informing MN OF
the coming OF the M~onadnock. frooa.
bly, with a view Z insuring this vessel
from falling into a trap. she was NOT
dispatched directly to Manila, but was
ordered to a point 500 miles due east
from Cape Engano. where she was 70
meet n Of Dewey's ships. Apparently
the first suggestion OF the organization
of the flying squadron. which was 70
divert Admiral Camara's squadron
from it's voyage to Manila, came from
Dewey. for. in a dispatch OF June -.
he says: In my Judgment. IL the coast
OF Spain was threatened. the squadron
OF the enemy will have TO return.
That was exactly what happened.
Admiral Dewey's estimate OF the I'M
portsnce of the Philippine Islands Is sci
out In the following telegram sent IN
answer to an inquiry on the supJect
from the government:
Manila, Aug. 20. 1s9s.-Secretary OF
the Navy. Washington: Referring 10
the departments telegram OF Aug. To-
important Islands are Colon, Luzoh'
Panay, Sebu. Negroes. Leyte. Othets'
owing to the nature of the inhapitahts'
have a small amount Of ci~villzatlon'
want of cultivation. They may be neg
lected. especially islands of the south-
ern group. Luzon is in all respects the
lDEN " abl, " III
important commercial ports. Manila Is
farthest north. Produces all oil the
good tobacco. Friendly natives. CIV
ilization somewhat advanced. Not yet
developed. Possible rich minerals.
Population, s25. 900. Subic bay best har-
Dor for coaling purposes and miiitarv'
Water deep, land-locked. easily defend
I'd. Strategically command of bay and
city of Manila. with arsenal at Cavlte'
most valuable. Panay. Cebu m We
gros thickly populated: most civliized
and well cultivated. Ilollo second com
| mercial port; center OF sugar trade q
good harbor strategically: In view OF
the situation good for defense. Cebu
third commercial port; a good harpof'
very desirable. No coal of good quality
can be procured i'm the Philippine ISL
ands. Some has been mined on Cebu'
English company. / trust 1t may mo- DE
necessary to order me to Washington.
Should regret very much to leave mere
while matters remain in present critical
condition. DEWEY"
Very naturally the report of the ope-
rations Of the North Atlantic fleet COM
prises the larger part of the printed
body. Most OF the facts have already
appeared, but i'm the very beginning
there is a most interesting exchange of
letters between Secretary Long n Ad-
miral Sampson, showing that even be
fore the outbreak of the war the al
miral had worked out a complete plan
for the immediate reduction of Havana
with his own squadron. unsupported
and was only prevented from carrying
out hat plan by orders from the de-
partment. which wished to protect tbs
big ironclads. Secretary Long ad'
dressed Admiral Sampson on April s a
confidential letter, telling him that IT
the event of hostilities. for this was be
fore the outbreak of the war. the de
partment wished him 10 DO all in hi:
power to destroy the Spanish war YES
sells i'm the West indian waters. IL
says:
THE department does not wish th'
vessels of your squadron to be exposed
to the fire OF the batteries at Havana
Santiago or other strongly FORTH d port
in Cuba, unless the more formidable
Spanish vessels should take refuge IN
those harbors. Even in this case tn
department would suggest that a rigi'
blockade and the employment of GU
torpedo boats would accomplish n de
sired object"
The reasons set out by Secretary LonI
for this instruction Were that Their
would he no United States troops avail
able to occupy the captured towns un
Ill October. and that the lack of dock
ing facilities made IL particularly de
sirable tina our vessels should not b
'AlIIAth btARlf NDt NalNAA " bfENi w
ton of SPANS most formidable yes
sells. How strongly Admiral Sampson
endeavored TO secure a reversal of thi
decision appears i'm the following letter
which has never before been published
~. S. Flagship New York. Key West
Fla. April 10. 1S9s.-My Dear Mr.. Sec
/, rotary: | have received your conf
, Dental letter of April 6. ! sympathiz
! with all you say about guarding on
, big ships against a possible serious los
while the enemy's fleet is still intact
? At the same time, | regard IL as yer
important To strike quickly and strik
hard as soon as hostilities commenc,
ava is well defended by three O
: four batteries to the eastward of tn
: entrance. mounting guns Of from 81
10 twelVe-inch Caliber. On the wester
I, side OF the entrance there are thre
a batteries. the guns varying i'm calibe
. from eight to twelve-inch, and tw
= mortar batteries. All the batteries fac
, seward. and those to the west of I'll
- entrance are quite near the shore. a
!. are open batteries with traverses be
: tween the guns. The guns and peopl
a who serve them are quite unprotected
. These batteries are well calculated I
keep of a feet from seward. whlc
: approaches To within a moderate dis
. lance of n few thousand yards. | d
n not think they are well placed to resi'
an attack-tor instance. the wester
v batteries)-from the westward an
close i'm shore, where the batteri,
u would be exposed tn a flank fire or
7, the fire of our big ships at short rang
u where the secondary batteries woul
n have full effect. Even under these eli
u Cumstances the ships must have sue
! a heavy fire that the hore batteri,
: would be overwhelmed by its Volum
q Before the Puritan and Amphitrite a
J. rived. | vas not entirely ~sanguine
- the success OF suCh an attack. Sim
E. their arrival yesterday, | have lit
N doubt of Its success. Although u
Ie monitors are weak i'm secondary fire,
p. expected to put a cruiser with heaN
q, secondary fire in the intervals betwec
l. each two OF them. In this way. | {
= not think the Standards will be b
a fire. They would be driven away fro
"A their guns and kept away, while n
"A fire OF the ships would so injure II
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