New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-07-15
THE BEGINNING or THE END.


Yesterdays work in Cuba may well have been
The beginning of the end Of our war with Spain
We do not say IT was, for nothing is more I'M
certain than war. and with no nation are the
uncertainties of war greater than with our
present antagonist. The surrender Of Santiago
however was so truly cpoch-making in the con
duct Of the war that II seems all but impossible
TINT the Spanish Government should not thus
appreciate it. and act upon it in accordance with
what all the rest Of the world sees to be sound
reason. II was a grave disaster to Spain. But
II gave and gives to Spain an unmatched oppor-
tunity to meet the inevitable on the best posi-
bic terms; an opportunity 50 advantageous that
If improved. It's results may transform this dis
aster into national blessing
1t was tho first real surrendcr in the war
That Is one Of its significant features There
was surrender in Manila Bay bnt only when
the Spanish fleet was smashed beyond all hope
of further resistance. There was surrender
the other day OF the broken hulks and stricken
survivors Of Admiral Cervera's fleet, but that,
too was only In e1tremis The Santiago garri-
son was in no such desperate plight II was
doomed. but II still had ability TO make stub
born fight against it's fate. 1t might have held
out little longer 1t might have done AS Ger
vera did. and have hurled itself against the en-
circllng lines of the American Army. Instead.
realizing that its case was hopeless II sur
rendered; and It's surrender was received win
all the courtesy and generosity the most mag
unanimous victor could show. II the conduct or
Montoto and Ccrvcra was an index Of SPANS
earlier intent TO fight to tho bitter end. may we
not hope that General Torars wiser ccurS" indi-
Gates the accession OF better cOunselS and the
inclination Of Spain TO yield 10 the Inevitable
when she can do so with honor? Certainly. just
as the way we dealt with Montojo and Ccrvera
showed how We would deal with Spain in her
obstinacy, so the way we are dealing with Toral
shows how we are prepared TO deal with her IN
her submission.
II was. moreover, the first great victory ~
the Army That is the other Significant Feat
ure Spain has been forced 10 acknowlcdG"
the defeat and destruction Of her navy. But
she has claimed that her army was still uncon-
uuered and has boasted that her two hundred
thousand men In Cuba would never yield 10 the
American invader. Even so sane and prudent
n statesman as Martnc~ de Campos has said.
this very week. that there must he no thought
Of peace until the Spanish Army has measured
its strength with orrs. Well. the Spanish Army
has done so. One corps of H. under one OF its
ablest commanders occupying strongly FORT
fed defensive position. has yielded TO an attack
ing force probably not its superior In numbers
and certainly ts inferior In place. In doing so
II was wise for 1t knew n simply overwhelming
force could soon be brought against II. Spain
will be wise to follow its example, for the same
reason Her navy has fought bravely and been
vanQuishod Her army AT Santiago fought
bravely but had al last 70 !ield. She can her
self now yield with honor.
That she Will do so is earnestly TO be hoped; for
her own sake more than for ours. For US II does
not greatly matter. Our armies are In the field,
ready and eager to serve Porto Rico ms they
have served Santiago Our fleets are ready and
eager to repeat at Sar Sebastian and Corunns.
Mt Cadiz and Cartagena. their performances at
Manila and Santiago. There IS no reason why
the United States should propose an armistice
or terms Of peace. but 1t would be TO SPANS al
vantage TO end the war at once. Perhaps AL
Is lost sava honor" But, we have hitherto
maintained, her honor is vlndicated. Now is
the time for her to seek for peace. She should
make Santiago the beginning OF the end. and
make the actual end Itself n matter OF the brief
est possible time.