The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-05-07
WHY VIZ NEED HAWAII
OPINION OF THE NAVAL EXPERTS,

The Old Ere Of Isolation Has Passsd Away.
We Need . Great Navy, . Larger Army
and Coaiing Stations In the West Indies
and the Pacific Ocean
WASHINGTON, May 7.--tSpecial. III
anything were needed to convince the OPP
ponents of Hawaiian annexation that the
United States should take In that group
of islands as military expedient, II for
no other reason, the recent naval move
ments In the far east have afforded the ar
gument. On the coast of Asia our feet
was really compelled either 70 attack the
Philippines and there secure base OF
operations or else to cut and run for home,
many thousands Of miles away. This was
true because as soon as the nations of that
part OF the world declared their neutrality
our warships were under obligation TO
leave the barbors and to oease using
friendly ports as headquarters. The near
est United States port was away across
the Pacific ocean, while Spain had ports
at Manila, but two days steaming from
Honekopg. For this reason and not so
much from desire to capture the Philip
pines the advance upon Manila was or
dered,
If the Spanish fleet In Asiatio waters
had been stronger than ours, we should
still have been compelled to give battle or
to retire to this side Of the Pacific. Prob
ably prudence would have compelled US TO
adopt the latter course, and the meaning
of that would he that the scene OF opera
tions was transferred from near the coast
of Spanish possessions to our own coast
line. II the fortunes Of war were to 60
or n
at the mercy of the Spanish fleets, just as
Manila was left subject to the relentless
movement of Admiral Dewey's squadron.
Hawaifs Advantages.
But II the United States had naval
stronghold, with plenty Of coal and dry
docks and ample Notifications at Hawaii,
that would throw the frontier out 1000
miles from our coast line. II forced to re-
tire from the Asiatio side OF the ocean, II
still would not be necessary to come oil
the way home, with the enemy at our
heels. The halt could be made half way
over at the Hawaiians, where our fleets
would have a great advantage over the
opposition in proximity to coal base and
means of communication. IL Is figured oy
our naval experts that with Hawaii ours
and fortified and with cable line run out
to the islands the United States fleet upon
| the Pacific would be twice as strong as 1t
| is without the addition Of single ship.
| II to this were added construction OF the
| Nicaragua canal, the advantage would be
! infinitely greater. For instance, instead
| of remaining In Asiatic waters, as at pres
emit, Admiral Dewey's feet, having de-
stroyed the only floating enemy that men
aced our merchant marine, could start at
l a. tx.ro vi
I canal
AS 1t is now,>our ships would have t.
| round Cape Horn in order to re-enforct
the fleets In the Atlantic, and that is 9
long and rather dangerous voyage. o.
course it would not do to send then
through the Suez canal and the Mediter
ranean, for that would subject them tt
the danger of destruction or capture by
the Spaniards near Gibraltar In TIT
opinion of many eminent men here, of al
political parties and shades of opinion
current events are forcing the acquisition
| of Hawaii and also the construction of thu
Nicaragua canal One well known maj
put it this way
whether we like it or not, events ar
forcing the United States into such activ
ity in the world affairs as we have neve
before manifested Whether we like tn
responsibility or not, we must assume II
We shall presently have Cuba, the Philip
pines and perhaps Puerto Rico on on
hands. There will he no way to escape til
onerous duty which control of them en-
tails Complications of various sorts ma
grow out of our efforts to administer then
or to dispose of them Therefore we ar
projected into the worlds politics, an
there we must stay Inasmuch as ther
is no escaping this fat of the fates, 1t Is In
cumbent upon us to meet our responsible
ity as best we can. The old era of isols
ton and strictly mindng our own bus
ness Is at an end TO meet the respons
bilities OF the present and the future W
need great navy, o larger army, Hawa
and coaliDg and naval station at least l
| the West Indies, and a means of commun
cation through the Panama isthmus"
Naval Fights In Midocean.
3 As to Hawaii, there appears to be q
| understanding that we are to take the !
lands The men who are opposed to al
nexation upon commercial, sociologic
i and political grounds do not yield Il
main points of their contention, whiC
are strong enough. But many of the
!. are prepared to yield on account of I'll
other considerations involved and which
: have just spoken of. Action Is likely
Q be deferred for some time, till the atmo
y phere clears, but In the opinion Of Il
best observers here the result Is no long
in doubt.
One of the readers of your paper writ
: to ask me II It is true that battleships ca
,, not engage an enemy upon the high sea
a but must wait till they get In smooth W
ter. 1t all depends upon the weatbe
Battleships and other craft mountir
heavy guns are not to be operated success
fully and economically In a rolling Sc
h Commanders would not choose su,
l. weather for an engagement. Their GU
can be operated only at great inconve
fence and some risk II the ships are rollir
in the trough Of big waves. Their pr
jectiles would miss much more often thi
q they hit Inasmuch as this would be tr
J. of cruisers and torpedo boats and all flgf
a ing craft the disadvantage would be abo
the same with one fleet as with anotht
and probably neither side would force
j "a,