Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-09-18
Use of Public Property.

N'N44tE' Inc cantor was lHdcDtcd 10 APP
pellees, and agreed that they might use
part OF said room. Action OF ejectment
and verdict for appcllees, which lower
court refused TO set aside
Held: The question involved was care
fully considered in Allegheny County VS..
farish. S3 va, 6l5. 1t was therein held
mat the inhabitants Of a municipal cor
poration or county are It's corporators.
and the officers but the public agents OF
the corporation whose duties are pre-
scribed by statute or charter, which all
persons not only may. but are bound 10
know. Contracts not authorized by char
ter or statute. and therefore not within
the scope OF the powers of the corpora
ton, are void. Lands acquired for court
house, jail, &c, being acquired under a
special power and for special purposes
only the county is Of necessity confined
in its use Of the land to the purposes for
which authority to acquire was given,
subject to the restrictions imposed.
The County Judge had no authority to
authorize or assent to a lease to the de-
PENDANTS Of the room to be used for
storage, and the fee-smple owner had
the right to recover possession.
Question of Release.
Lynchburg Perpetual Building and Loan
Company VS.. Fellers and ais. Affirmed
in part. Reversed in part. Opinion by
Buchanan, j.
In February, 1891, Huff gave deed of
trust on a lot in Roanoke TO secure 5000
borrowed of appellant. Shortly after he
sold part Of the lot to trustees OF a
church for $500, OF which 500 cash and
assumption of his debt TO appellant. About
same time he sold another part or the
lot TO StriclSler, one of said trustees, In
November OF the same year Fellers
bought another portion Of the lot from
HUFF. The trustees. after three monthly
payments of 1924 each upon the debt Sc
cured by the deed, notified Huff that they
could and would not proceed further.
Some time between November, 1881. and
November, 1893, the exact date not APP
pearing, Huff and the church trustees
agreed to rescind their contract. No re-
conveyance was made, but his deed TO
them, never recorded, was destroyed.
Prior TO November 26. 1882. HUFF agreed
to sell to the trustees portion or the
lot embraced in the rescinded contract
the trustees requiring, as a condition pre-
cedent, the release Of the lot from the
lien of the deed. The lien was released
by appellants as to that portion NoVem-
Der 18th, and on the 18th HUFF conveyed
to the trustees. A large part OF appel
lants' debt is unpaid. What property is
liable, and i'm what order?
FELI.ERss CONTENTION.
Fellers contended that his lot was alb
solutely released by reason OF the re-
session of the contract between Hun
and the trustees, by which contract the
latter had assumed payment OF the debt
secured by the deed, and that TINS re-
session was with the assent or the APP
2ellees.
Held: 1. The burden Of proving such as
sent was on Fellers He had purchased
with knowledge Of the lien, and he must
show that appellant, with notice Oh MS
equities had done some act TO MS pre-
iudice. The evidence does show That APP
Dellants had notice of Felers's purchase.
ha N
when appellants executed the release OF
November 1892 But ii does not snow
that appellant was a party 10 OF khS"
OF the rescission Of the contract or july
1891. by which the trustees OF the churcn
assumed the payment OF the debt secured
by the deed.
The lower court. therefore, erred in
holding that the Fellers property was
absolutely released. 1t was only dis
charged from an amount of the trust
debt eoual 10 the value of the parcel re-
leased so far as proceeds of that parcel
had not been applied to the lien. The IN
Jury to Felers was the difference between
the value of the property released and
what was actually paid out OF lts pro-
ceeds upon the lien.
THE STRICKLER LOT LIABLE
2 If Fellers's lot will not pay out that
norton Of appellants debt chargeable
upou II. as stated. the Stricken lot viii
be liable being next In order or dnens-
ton II will also be Chargeable with that
portion of the debt of appellant from
which Fellers was discharged by the re-
lease of the church lot. The general rule
is the inverse order of alienation in case
of release of parcel primarily liable, Dut
this effect of the release may be obYiated
by the conduct OF the parties 70 pc al
fected Pom. Eg. Jur., sec. l2ZO. StrlcK-
ler's conduct precludes him from claiming
the benefit of the general rule. lie was
one of the trustees of the church when
the purchase was first made, when that
contract was rescinded, when they made
their second purchase on condition OF
release Of the deed, and when that re-
lease was made. He was an active parti-
cipant with fun knowledge of all the
facts Appellant had no notice of his
rights when it released its lien, even NJ II
notice could affect the question. Inc
registry of his deed was not notice.
While this court has never passed upon
that question it is settled that registry
by a subsequent purchaser Is no notce
10 PARTIES who acquired their rights De
fore the deed is registered. The policy OF
the registry laws is not 10 affect holders
of antecedent rights, but only such per-
sons as have TO search the records 10
protect their own interests.
Decree affirmed as TO amount due APP
neIlant. and directs sale of lot still owned
by Huff TO be first sold; reversed IN All
other respects.
statute of Frauds.
Liberty Savings Bank VS.. Otteryiew Land
Company. Affirmed. Opinion by Harrl-
son, j.
suit TO wind up insolvent land com
many and apply assets. The amended ana
supDlemental bill brings the stockholders
before the court, and asks a decree
against them for balance due upon shares
of stock held by each Appellees answer
under oath, and deny that they maue
any contract in writing TO take stock, or
authorized any one TO do so, ana plead
The statute of limitations applicable 10
verbal contracts. This puts burden upon
APPELLANT TO prove contract IN WIllHib,
and there is no evidence That any one OF
them ever made such a contract Ihelr
ZINES appear on the books of the COM
many. and the evidence tends TO prove
that they are owners Of the stock charged
10 them. But it is not a question OF OWL
srship. but whether the cohlraCt 10 re
come owner was verbal or written. NO
oyi@fnal lists are produced. and the cVi-
dence all tends 10 show That the SUP
ecrintions appearing on the books were
based on verbal contracts. ana that "P-
Dellees made no contract III WIl'iIt. ,o
The right of action accrued June ~
1900 The amended and supplemental Dill
roakine the stockholders parties, ana aSh,
mo a decree against them was not Hieu
IN March 81. 1s97-mOre than three years
and the right TO recover Is barred IN eN-
nress terms. Code, sec. zsZo
Priority of Judgment.
New South Building and Loan Assocld-
/ ton VS.. Reed. Reversed IN part Opih-
ion by Harrison, j. soa
a deed of trust was dated and recorded
AnriI M 1898. Two Judgments liens on
~ nronerty conveyed in the deed, were
ohtained in the Circuit Court dhe term
of which began April 10. 1881 AFTER the
recordation of the deed. " A.
tIeld. The judgments relate back 10
che first day Of the term, and have priori-
~ over the deed of trust recorded during
nc Term. code, sec. 1861; Hickman VS..