The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-06-07

and bring into ac+t2n The Spanish vessels
SaFal officers aRve no theess - % afavaGeg
a. - Ehe rez@3rs sgnpell1ag tnH eeggE-zs.
Followed by ssnps9sg. cs9zer .raz faa< he
conEiG3ed after careful exssnazatso s.
tie charts ard aztav5Fa bic conditions
iaa, 81 w9ssd be inadvsszble 20 AXE battle
ssaIps through . channel wa<re there xss
net one chance 81 ter tras they could pass
safely. The difficulties tnst such an TN
aertssing would lryciFe are Shown by the
Charts, which indicate but gwenty-four
f@&i OF water IN ore paint OF the channel!
Or sbouE two feet less than would be
necessary FOR sAe Iowa ana Maszachu-
Eetts
Cervera's vessels draw less by two or
three feet than the heaviest % tire Amer
lean SHIPS. aut even hts vessels nQsc have
had little water beneath their bottoms
as they passed in. with ali chances
OF escape againz; him, either by removing
the wreck and successfully securing h
channel 20 the sea. . general feeling gx-
lists among nsYaI officers that some bold
and glnnoss daring exploit. as that OF Cen
structor Hoosca. w2l be attempted by the
admiral rather than 10 submit or resort 20
blowing up ts.s vessels without having an
opportunity TO FIRE single pro5ecille a ar
American vessel.
While admitting that the destruction OF
the collier IN the harbor OF Santiago
naval situation IN Cuban waters. officials
Of the navy department are not prepared
70 Issue Instructions 10 Admiral Sampson
fer the dstacameslt OF a Main section b.
h.s feet until ne has been heard from in
detail. Now that the Spanish admiral IL
no longer TO De regarded as 4 dangerous
factor ia the transportation OF large
bodies OF troops by TO Porto Rico and
Santiago. the war department lis prepar-
ing to take immediate steps for forward
lng several transports 10 both places. and
d safe escort is 10 D. afforded them by the
ships now 4 part OF the osocAading fleets
of Havana. with other Vessels that are
to be relieved from any further duty AT
Santiago.
The army Is relieved OF the necessity
now OF waiting further OF the navy 10
provide necessary vcsselS 10 convoy the
merchant ships. and large movement IS
now expected 10 begin.
Constructor Hobsons action in obstruct-
ing the eDnel so that possibility Of es-
cape by the Spanish deet 81 now remote,
removed possibilities, the most eoHserva-
tive officers agree, Of another great sea
fight between the American and Spanish
forces.
Until last Thursday both Admiral sanp-
son and Commodore Schley are under
stood 10 have been OF the opinion that the
heavy oattleships and armored cruisers
BY exercise Of caution and under the
guidance of skilled pilots familiar with
the waters. could be taken between the
fortificatious and up into the harb0r. bu:
were convinced on representations made
later that no battIsship could possibly get
around the turn al she narrowest point OF
the channel where there was barely
enough water for the lighter vessels or
the Spanish feet.
Reluctantly, therefore. they abandoned
al
uat.l Admiral SIMPSONS message vas re-
ce!ved that the department knew what
steps had been taken 10 Aoad light the
Spanish feet.
Admiral SIMPSONS programme having
been developed. the next course OF pro
cedure executed by him il yet 10 be pre-
sensed Notwithstanding the fact that the
Merrimac's wreck prevents the passage of
ships in or out OF Santiago, the policy OF
the navy department VII not be TO with
draw all the heavy fighting vessels now
bIockad.ag and leave loop through which
Cervera might escape and make his way
10 Martinique. where possibly he could
secure sufficient coal 10 enable him TO
reach some home port. Several Of the
heavily aruored vessels. including two OF
the battleships and the New York are ex-
pected 70 be withdrawn FOR service IN COM
pseting the destruction Of what remains
OF the defenses Of Poroto Rico or 10 the
landing OF American troops for seizure
and occupation OF that port. 4 suitable
squadron wiz be left in front OF Santiago.
where IL viii remain unqucs,.onably until
the United States Is in actual possession
Or the city.
The most substantial evidence has been
given 10 naval officials since the arrival
o. Cervega In the West Indies OF the
value Of such a feet Of heavily armored
cruisers. ard the urgent necessity that he
4 rsas-, - a..
dicons Of fhis formidable type OF ship.
Secretary Long Is understood 70 have rec
oznizsd that had the navy half a dozen
ships of the Brooklyn and New York type
CeTeera's squadron could have been caugat
ara defeated ana tina, IL would never have
reached Santiago with a feet Of these
saIps moving around south OF Cuba Tor IT,
Every one o. Admira. Cervera's vessels Is
90 the highest type Of armored cruisers.
ard more formidable than either Of the
American vessels on account Of the heavy
protection afforded rs sides The New
York and the Brooklyn have the speed oe
CerveYa'S ships, but 40 other vessels of
the American feet are 50 fast ana at thu
same time so well armoretf Because Of
the protection OF she Spanish vessels it
becomes necessary In send battieshiys or
mentors in whatever fleet was ordered 10
leok after them: hus with six ships OF The
arnIored cruiser type the experts agree
that tho enemy shoulua have been hunted
down ard captured or destroyed without
The assistance Of ba,tleShips The next
arn1ored cruisers built fer the nav, the
constructors say. should De heavily arru-
crea ard have doub.e TIE thickness a. che
plates 81 those around the sides of the New
York and the Brooklyn Constructor
HtcheoFn IS one % the strong advocates ~
this type OF warsAip and believes that tho
next programme should include several %
them.