Evening star., 1898-04-14
THE MAINE DISASTER
CONTINUED from Third Pag.)


ties indicated" He said that torpedo mines
are planted at exactly known points, and
thare would have been no difficulty at all
for peosie on shore to know the exact To-
cation of the ship, and that she was. over
a mine. He said he was not surprised that
there were no dead fish the next day. "A
boy can expioce a little dynamite on the
surface OF the water and stir UP quite a
number Of dead fish If there are any fish
there" he said: ard again, during my
work in Mobile bay, which is a fine fish
producing water. in three or four weeks
work Eever saw one dead fish" He went
on then to relate several experiences con-
firming this opinion.
Capt. Siesbee's Evidence.
Captain Sigshee. in command of the
Maine at the time of the disaster. was ex-
amined on the 31st of March. He repeated
his opinion that the Maine was destroyed
by mine either temporary or permanent.
He thought it had been very large mine,
tut In his opinion, no larger than could be
planted near the vessel at any time In
broad daylight, and under direct vision
with the means available in Havana for
that purpose. He thought twelve men,
having mutual confidence and preserving
secrecy, could have planted it, and that it
could have been done while the ordinary
discipline ana watchfulness was observed
on the ship. A ship moored at a harbor
would swing around to a given point where
a mine might be located and when it should
reach that point the mine would be ex
plcded. He thought it could have been
painted from a scow between decks. There
we're. he said lot of idle army officers in
Havana, and while he would not charge
them with anything, he thought it not out
of place to speak of the possibilities of the
case. Captain Sigsbee said he had shown
a sketch involving these theories to Cap
tain Sampson, who had also commanded a
torpedo station, and had asked of him If q
vessel could drop mine like the one he
had described instantly, and that Captain
Sampson and other officers had replied
that it could, and that twelve men could
do it, That" said Captain Sigsbee, sis the
real reason l asked to have the Montgoni-
cry taken away. If they were going to do
anything to blow us up l wanted to have
i. done with IA smaller vessel. They had
no vigilance whatever, and no guard over
US or cur vessels Their vigilance was
great where their own vessels were con-
cerned Their boats were coming and go
ing all the time and they generally refused
to answer when we hailed them. When
Cudent manner
In reply to a question, Capt. Sigsbee said
he thought il possible that the explosion
could have occurred without the knowl-
edge Of the higher officials" Continuing.
he said that it WAS curious fact that the
officers of The deck said the vessel had
never SWUNG before in the particular dlrec-
ton in which it swung on the night OF the
explosion, ard. continuing, he said: The
Maine is lying now in about the position
she would have taken to play on the Span
ish batteries Now, if a mine had been
planted there 1 assume 1t would have been
planted in just that place. If only one had
been planted it would have been just
there"
In reply to question as to what ex-
animation the Spanish boards made of the
accident Capt Sigsbee said: They had
not done anything for a week; had not
been down at all Our people laughed at
them. They did very little work on the
wreck; it was absurd as compared with
cur work.
Capt Sigsbee said the keel plate
driven up about thirty feet from its nor
nal place by the explosion.
Asked why he had advised that no war
vessels be sent to Havana after the ex-
plosion. Capt. Sigsbee replied: I'm the first
place. there was great deal Of excite
ment, and / wanted to work along without
men-of-war to allay the excitement in the
city, and in the next place, if there were
any more mines l did not want any more
war vessels blown up. Up to that time 1
had strongly recommended that the In
diana be sent there just to show them that
the Maine was not the only vessel in the
Lazy, nor the most powerful After that
time l had no more confidence in the peo-
pie. Treachery mad been shown u.s. and
there was no special care for US; they had
not attempted to protect us, as We did the
Vizcaya i'll New York
Commander BradfOrd's Views.
Commander Bradford, torpedo expert, on
duty at the torpedo station at Newport,
r. l., VINO was before the committee on the
30th of March, was asked by Senator Nor
gan to state briefly the danger from the
Spanish fiotilla of torpedo boats and tor
pedo boat destroyers, and replied:
Il not impressed much as many
rcval officers with the dangerous charac-
ter of torpedo boats and torpedo boat de-
stroyers They are frail craft, because
everything is sacrificed to speed. and
weights are kept down for that reason, and
very thin plates used in their construction,
very slight frames, and they are easily de-
ranged. l may say that they are boays OF
possibilities rather than PROBABILITIES.
Under certain conditions they are, no
ccubt very formidable. Their chief value
in my opinion, is in preventing blockadcs,
ii in ports that are attempted to be block
AIDED. They choose their own time of at
tack, and, of course, the most favorable
time. They are previously groomed up for
the occasion, everything in readiness. and
they slip out to vessel outside, and try to
get in their work. At sea, with squad
rcn, they are so liable to accident and
often deranged that the chances. OF being
effective, in my opinion, are slight. uE-
deTstand that the present f1otilla, crossing
from Spain, mas been dismantlel. That is
to say, the torpedo tubes and guns carried
on the upper deck have been taken. off ard
are being brought over by the conveying
steamer, which is converted cruiser. That
ACIDS TO their seaworthinass anG stability.
With those of. they are completely help
less. shorn of any power.
THE destroyers are supposed 10 be capa-
BILE of ramming the small boats and de-
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