The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-02-14

the sea, would mean panic. This panic could
only DO calmed, with the effect OF proper free
dom being allowed the Admiralty, II tho public
could be assured that our mobilization for homo
defence was working smoothly, and that q large
force, at all events OF infantry with field
artillery, could DO relied upon to resist invasion.
"No one who knows tho true condition OF tho
home army. Of the militia, and Of the volunteers,
can imagine that we possess an army At at .
sudden call for any Of tho duties which 1 have
described. As I am dealing at this moment
with Invasion. let me say at once that the DIFF.
hculties OF transporting and landing q foreign
army would undoubtedly be so great that tho
possession Of our present numbers, II they wero
properly commanded and organized. would
render invasion q forlorn hopo-which no high
foreign authority thinks It to be as matters
stand. Our insular position would enable us to
resist invasion with q comparatively small army
less than our present number of men with mus
lets-if that army were well organized and com
manded. But at the present moment the volun.
teer battalions are of extraordinarily unequal
merit; thoy are terribly short OF officers; their
m is not, as a rule, so provided for AZ to
make us feel that they would be handled In the
best way. and they are entirely unsupplled with
q well-trained fold artillery, which is specially
required by young troops. The militia, I may
add, are also wholly ~unsuppllod with Geld
artillery, and tho regular army itself has o
shorter proportional supply of field artillery
than has any other army in the world"
In emphasizing tho fact that self-defence will
not suffice in the threatened struggle Sir
Charles says: Tho country has never yet fully
faced either the oxtent Of our appropriately or
the dangers Of combination against us, and the
practical impossibility Of avoiding those dam
gers except by greater sacrifice for both naval
--l Ma 49,
There is, moreover, a preference in the public
mind for sedentary modes Of defence. 1t is ad-
mitted that we are not likely to engage in Q war
with q great power forced on by our own action,
and in expressing willingness to accept such o
war forced on us by others invading our inter
ests or trampling on our honor, our people cling
to the idea that, our policy being defensive. our
weapons must be defensive, too.
II need not. perhaps, point out at length that
this Wow is absolutely opposed to unanimous
military and naval opinion and to the uniform
teaching Of history. However inoffensive and
however purely defensive our policy may be,
whom war becomes unavoidable we shall have to
carry out that war by violent measures Of of.
fence, II we are In o position to take them. and
II we arc not in that position, We shall DO at Q
great disadvantage. We already have q far
larger purely sedentary expenditure and force
than has any other power In tho world. and wo
still show q tendency to increase our fortrepses
and garrisons, as contrasted with our field
armies. 1t is necessary to protest against tho
popular doctrine upon which this popularity is
based"
Turning for a moment from the military to
the political situation. Sir Charles warns his
countrymen against relying upon tho aid of
Italy or any other ally, and emphasizes the fact
that q war against England has now become far
49, A.
mental powers. 1.-THE Triple Alliance and the |
Dual Alliance" he points out, ARE not very
solid understandings. They have ceased to cor.
respond to the real facts of the case. No war Is
less likely than o war between them; and q
world wide war In which some Of both the sup |
posed sides would take part against ourselves is
infinitely more probable than a war confined to
the continent of Europe.
cit 10 sufficient in contemplating the need for |
high national insurance to regard tho fact that |
the French Republic is every day more and moro |
oeasing to have aims at variance with the aims |
Of Germany, while Germany appears to be ~
anxious to be friendly to Franco as she admit
teddy and undoubtedly IL to DO friendly with
Russia. The trend Of continental affairs ever
since tho war scare of 1875 has boon steadily in
the direction of q solid reconciliation between
powers whose northern face extends from Brest
to Behring Sea. There is an admitted and OBJ
vious increase Of the points in which our inter
ests are brought into conflict with the common
interests of these powers; and It Is only necessa-
~ to indicate the present state of things in
China, and our loss of influence there in the last
three years. as compared with the German.
French-Russian combination. to prove the truth
OF this remark.
Everything that 10 young and vigorous in
Germany and France is turning its energy and
its attention away from tho continent of
Europe and toward colonization in Africa and
influence in the East. Tho permanent policy of
Russia, which brings her into eventual possible
conflict with ourselves. frames In well enough
with the German and French policy and colonial
competition and commercial competition, arous-
ing as they do irritation in this country, mako |
It the moro probable that powers none Of which
can be said 70 be overfriendly to ourselves. will
on a course which frees their govern
ments from any dangers. and which at the same
Tina makes us vince. The policy of Bismarck,
as repeatedly explained by himself. again holds
the feld-the policy of friendship with Russia
and reconciliation with France. Tho most pop
ular actin his own country-which the German
Emperor has committed was the sending of his
telegram about the Transvaal; and the agrees
sion against our policy in China has also been
peculiarly Emperor Williams own, and also
popular In his country.
"Mr Goschen mas SAID tnat whon stress comes
upon us we shall not DO without allies; mean.
ing. no doubt. that Italy invariably follows our
policy. and is our steady friend In time of peace.
10 full Of warnings against trusting in
time of really dangerous war to such imaginary
1t 10 no reflection upon the Italians
to suggest that they may BIO no moro ablo to act
as they might wish to act in time of war than
was Austria able to carry out her promises to
France In face OF the defects of tho French Army
by the mobilization Of July, 1870. We
before now had to direct our navy to seize. |
In time Of peace. the fleet Of an ally about to DO
coerced into hostility. and I had sooner trust 10
our own military and naval preparations than
to any alliance. except one Of those alliances
we might hope to contract in time of war
were we rs strong as our interests demand"
1t 10 not necessary to enter into the details Of
sir Charles Dilke's indictment of the British
War Department. 1t constitutes q great ma
tional scandal OF scarcely loss proportions than