The evening times., 1898-10-25
CREDIT where IT is DUE
Claim that the Signal Corps
Discovered Cervera's Fleet.
GENERAL GREELY'S REPORT
Colonel Allen, He Says. Reported the
Location Of the Spanish ships the
Day They Reached SantiasO-Shaf-
ter Criticized for Failure TO Rec
oEnize the Signal Men.

The report of Gen. A. w. Greely, chief
signal officer of the army, was not given
out for publication today, as certain ad-
ditions will have to be made to complete
the paper. 1t was, however, submitted
10 Secretary Alger this afternoon.
The report viii lay much stress upon
the work Of the signal officers in locating
cervera's feet in the harbor of Santiago.
Gen. Greely says there have been many
inaccurate statements made concerning
the finding Of the Spanish ships. He
thinks the honor should belong to the ar
my which performed the important work,
and TO use the generals words: The
truth should be told in the interest of his
tory
The report will state, il is said, that the
arrival of Cervera's squadron at San
tiago was first reported by Col James
Allen, and later verified, independently.
by Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Maxfeld, both
officers Of the Signal Corps. The block
aiding OF Cervera's squadron was due TO
the concerted action Of the President and
Secretary Of the Navy, based on reports
and Representations made personally 10
them by the chief signal officer of the
army.
Admiral CerVera entered the harbor of
Santiago with his squadron on May I9.
That very day Col. Allen telegraphed in
cipher 10 the chief signal officer: Five
Spanish vessels arrived al Santiago de
Cuba. Have notified admiral commanding
(Sampson). The Spanish flagship arriv-
ed al Santiago de Cuba. The admiral
NCerNera) hastily wired Madrid. On
The following morning he ADDED this in
formation: 'Pelayo and four cruisers in
Santiago. No destroyers or torpedo
boats arrived there"
This information was communicated i'm
mediately 20 the President, and by his or
ders TO the Secretary of the Navy who,
being impressed by the assurance of the
chief signal officer of the army as 10
the entire reliability Of this report, prov
ed himself equal TO the emergency, and
on that day gave such prompt and ef-
feotlve orders as resulted in the blockade
OF Santiago and the ultimate destruction
OF CerVera' : feet.
Col. Allen furnished cipher reports al
most daily from Santiago sources. CT
pher messages on May % stated correctly
mat Admiral Schley was on that day at
Cienfuegos and Cervera was at Santiago.
Meanwhile the navy had been unable TO
verify the fact of Cervera's presence at
Santiago. and a result the correctness
Of the information furnished by the sig
nal corps was sharply questioned The
chief signal officer, being informed that
the whole campaign was conducted on
his representations, was asked to verify
his information from other sources If
possible.
Prompt action was taken by the chief
signal officer, who adopted such lines of
operations that thereafter there was
scarcely day when he was not In pos
session of Information Of some kind or
other coming over one or more of the six
cables leading out of Santiago. Lieut.
Col. MaNfield, then in charge of the tele-
graphic censorship in New York, carried
out special instructions Of the chief sig
nal officer so successfully that he was
able in twenty-four hours to confirm
from a separate and absolutely certain
source the fact that Ceryera was still in
Santiago. This confirmation received
from Lieut.. Col MaXfeld greatly reliev-
ed the intense anxiety Of the chief signal
officer, which, however, was not fully
dissipated until the eleventh day after
the entrance Of Cervera's squadron in
Santiago, when its presence was con-
firmed from naval sources
Col. Allen was aided by corps of Sc
cret service men in Santiago, which Gen.
Greely had stationed there. Among his
assistants were telegraph operators also.
From one of these operators was obtain
ed the information that the Spanish war
ships had reached Santiago.
That part of the report which refers to
the signaling at Santiago criticises Gen.
Shafter. The Fifth Army Corps was not
supplied with field telegraph train, the
major general of the corps having de-
clined to have one.
This further criticism is made upon Gen.
6hafter:
Concerning this telegraphic and tele-
phonic service which did not fall within
the plans of the major general command
ing the Fifth Army Corps, and for which
he made no provision, the chief signal Of
ficer of the army feels il incumbent upon
him TO point out its absolute military ne
cessfty and value, and TO indicate the ex-
traordinary risk which any general COM
manding a detached army especially one
serving on a foreign soil, assumes when
he leaves himself unprovided with teie-
graphic telephone facilities.
Gen. Greedy is displeased because the
Signal Corps failed to receive from Maj.
Gen. Shafter in his original report even a
notice that it participated in the Santi-
ago campaign. 1t is hoped, he says, that
this resulted from the natural wish of the
commanding general of the Fifth Corps
10 defend other departments from unwar-
ranted criticisms leveled at them and not
with the distinct purposes of discriminat-
ing against a corps tnat mas so lar eS-
capped adverse comment.
In the Manila campaign the work of
Lieut. Col. Thompson is praised As the
army moved forward the Signal Corps
carried into the advanced trenches its
telegraph lines and repaired under fire,
whereby communication was maintained
throughout the campaign. When the final
assault came one company of the Signal
Corps ran the field telegraph line up the
open beach and established an advanced
station under fire of the enemys second
line.
Lieut.. Col. r. f. Thompson and five 9TH
ed officers Of the Signal Corps were bre-
Veted for gallant and distinguished serv-
fee, and eleven enlisted men were raised
for rewards of gallantry and distinguished
conduct.
After the occupancy of Manila Lieut..
Col. Thompson repaired the Manila-Hong
kong cable, and reopened il to use four
days in advance of the expected time,
which was supposed to depend on the ar
rival of the English cable ship then en-
route from Singapore.