The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-06-19

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truth is. that in 1912 naval warfare had reached
that stage of development when brute strength
and animal courage had become secondary con.
alterations. Success then depended more on
tho higher discipline of tho men, tho better
training Of the guns. the intelligent use Of i'm.
proved weapons. skilful manipulation of the
sails. and the thousand and one little improve
ments ali over a ship which only an acute In.
tellect would suggest. These improvements,
together with the pluck and quick perception
that have always characterized the American
soAmen, overwhelmed the British Navy with
calamity and CONSERVATION.
In a chapter Of his second volume headed
''soA Power in the Civil War;" Mr.. Maclay
dwells on the strAtegical Importance of tho
Mississippi River system In that contest With
that miEhtiest Of all river networks in their
control, the Confedorates might we'll hope to
cut Off the Northern States from the West, and,
from this point Of view. tho Mississippi was
rightly termed the backbone Of the rebellion.
That the credit of wrestling this supremoly i'm
portant waterway from tho South belongs
almost exclusively to our maritime forces cannot
be GAinsaid. From New Orleans 10 Fort Donel-
son our navy was the dominating and almost
the only considerable factor in the stupendous
struggle. Not only in making this Sll-important
conquest, but In keeping II, In patrolling the river
night and day from end to end. thereby cutting
of the Confederates from the much-needed sup.
plies Of food which otherwise would have
been forthcoming from Texas, Louisiana, and
Arkansas, the navy bore tho brunt Of the neoes-
sary work. Neither should the fact be over
looked that on more than ono occasion our
river gunboRts saved our land forces from de-
feat. Grants army, for example, was rescued
from fONnOnfn tOna a tQa0tar at palnNOnf In 1871
by the wooden Gunboats Tyler and Lexington.
In the following year, and under very similar
circumstances. those same gunboatS saved the
national army from capture at Pittsburg Land
ing. Then again six Eunboats, the Lexington
among them, rescued Col. Harding's garrison Of
800 men when surrounded by an overwhelming
Confederate force. 1t was our gunboAts. too.
that did so much toward neutraliZing the effect
of Mergan's raid in 1868 and toward inter
cepting his retreat, the little Moose ~overtakinE
the Confederates at a ford $50 miles cast OF
Cincinnati. and compelling them to scatter in
headlong flight.
While tho struggle for the Mississippi was
going on our Government was prosecuting Of.
fectively the "dryinG-up" process on the Allan
tic and Gulf coasts, 1t is we'll known that the
South was deficient in skilled mechanics and In
manufacturing plants, but 80 long as military
supplies could be obtained abroad and cotton
could be produced with which to pay for them.
these deficiencies were comparatively i~nsiGnih-
cant. Here, again, our sea power was exerted
with telling effect. Our Western gunboats cut
off the considerable supply of cotton expected
from Texas and Arkansas. and tho s~eaEoiug
navy wrested seaport after seaport from the
South, while the harbors that could not be taken
were blookadsd. 1t is true hat many swift vessels
managed to elude tho blockade, but many were
captured, and, in just that proportion. crippled
the secessionists. while, as the war won't on,
our blockade lines were drawn closer and closer.
gradually constructing the vitality Of tho South
until she was veritably ~RaspinR. Our authors
conclusion Is that to the fair.ninded student Of
our civil war 1t must be apparent that the Con.
federacy could never have been put down but
for the aid of our maritime forces.
Never could it DO said of the navy all is quiet
along the Potomac" Within eighteen months
after war was declared Fort Donelson and Fort
Horny. Island No. 10. Fort Pillow, Memphis
and Now Orleans had all boon taken after hard
fighting, with the result that three OF the largest
States Of tho Confederaoy were isolated. On
tho seaboard. Fort Hatteras. Port Royal.
Fort Macon. and many lesser points had
boon captured by the sea forces of tho
North. while the dreaded Merrimac had been
thwarted in her farreachin9 designs. When
we come to sum up the comparative number Of
victories won by the Union Army on the one
hand and the national navy on the other, We
find that. in proportion to the number of men
engaged. there being in the navy at the utmost
only 55, 900 men. the navy is immeasurably
aheadi when it comes, however. to q proper.
tionate comparison Of killed and wounded we
discover that the navy suffered quito as much
as the army. Our naval forces. in truth. were
almost always successful, and, what Is more,
that which they took was generally kept,
whereas the sum total of defeat and victory
for our land forces Is nearly balanced, and
it is further to be noted that on land
we often lost all that previous victories
had given us. Mr.. Maclay is one of those who
think that If the issue OF the civil war had been
left to the sole determination of land forces the
result would have been extremely doubtful. 1t
is generally conceded that offensive operations
require many more men than docs defensive
work to insure any hope of success. AS q rule
the South was acting on the defensive. The
significance OF this fact was recognized by
European statesmen. England and France did
not covertly favor the South without first
weighing carefully tho chances, no matter
how much they might desire to see the
Union dismembered. After looking over
the situation they were convinced that the
South would win. for at that time they had not
counted. nor did we count. on the extraordinary
~ uit uApi O4plolJb VI u
navy, which gave such a crushing blow to the
hopes of the Confederacy. Had any one in 1851
asserted that wooden ships could run past Fort
Jackson and Fort st. Philip. or capture batteries
like those at Port Royal and Hatteras, he would
have been set down as mad. Had any ono
| propheSied that in eighteen months the North
would possess a fleet of ironclads capable of
withstanding the heaviest shot and of sinking
all the wooden ships in the world. he would
have been laughed at. 1t was the unexpected
and unparalleled evolution OF our maritime
strength that changed the attitude of France
and England after the second year of tho war.
Considering the war from another Viewpoint,
our author finds another striking illustration of
the potency of sea power in that struggle. Sup.
pose. he says. that the South had possessed an
equally effective maritime force. or equally
good facilities for building ironclads. We know
what dreadful havoc was occasioned by their
few wretchodly constructed ironelads. and. II
their performances be examined critically, We
shall be startled to discover In how many in
stances the Confederates were overcome, not by
our ships or guns, but by their own faulty cen
struction and defective armament and ma
chinery. II Ia apDallinR tn think NJ what thu