The age-herald., 1898-07-31
SOME LESSONS
 OF THE WAR Germany Finds Out the Value
 of Our Militia. ASTOUNDED AT ITS FEATS Tribute to Our Sailor Boys Marksman- hip-Bombardments Do Little Fam age-Torpedo Boats Discredited- Speed Versus Good Shooting.
ASTOUNDED AT ITS FEATS

From the Frankfurter Zeitung
 The course of the Spanish-American war up to date has brought many disillusions to the despisers of militia armies, and the German newspaper strategists especially, who jeered at "the militia generals going into the field in elegant dress" have be- come somewhat more cautious in their criticism since the fights of July 1 and 2 before Santiago. When we consider under what unfavorable circumstances the Ameri- can soldiers were obliged to fight, we must admit that they have exhibited an endur- ance and bravery that cannot be surpassed by any troops, no matter how well trained. Dismounted cavalrymen were employed to storm a strong position; preparation for the infantry attack by artillery fire was impossible, as there was no artillery; the men suffered from lack of food, because the difficulties of transportation; the prelimi- nary preparations for the care of the wounded were very defective. All this was known to the soldiers, who, nevertheless, advanced with undiminished courage. The positions the Americans gained on both days of battle they not only retained, but
 
 The Spanish troops, whose military quali- ties valued very highly by the oppo- nents of the militia, were stationed in ex- cellent strong positions, had with them sufficient artillery, made use of smokeless powder, were superior in number to the Americans, and were commanded by off- cers experienced in war. Why did not these European-trained troops sally out of Santiago and simply drive the Americans into the sea? Why does not Marshal Blan- co, who is said to have at his command a well armed army of at least 100000 men, accustomed to the climate and to fighting, make his superiority felt? Our newspaper strategists and despisers of militia soldiers have not yet ventured to give an answer to these questions.
 The value of troops does not depend merely on the military drill, such as is usual in Europe. There Is militia and mili- tia. popular army like the Swiss, with its full equipment ever ready for war, represents a stronger power at the begin ming of a war than the American state militia, which is not intended for foreign service and out of which, when war breaks out, an army must first be formed In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties, the Americans have set an army on foot in a few weeks which was obliged to take the field under unfavorable circumstances, and nevertheless has shown itself therein not merely equal but superior to it's we'll trained adversary.
 Almost as instructive as the comDatS on land have been the sea fights. In the first place. a former experience has been con firmed, namely, that bombardment of modern earthworks, even with guns of large calibre, does little damage. When the English sixteen years ago bombarded the Notifications of Alexandria they be- lieved they had completely destroyed them, but on landing they found out, to their as tonishment, how little harm their heavy firing had done. The Americans have now met with the same experience at Havana, at San Juan de Porto Rico and at San tago de Cuba It is not alarm over the mines but fear of the guns of Morro Castle and of La Socapa that has restrained Ad- miral Sampson up to the present from risking an entry into the harbor of San tago, although the Morro fort has been repeatedly bombarded and the newspaper reports have more than once announced that "the fort has been reduced to heap of ruinS.'
 Of an effective use of mines we have heard as little as of the use of torpedoes. In the battle between the fleets the Ameri- cans had no occasion to approach the Spaniards near enough to bring torpedoes into play, while the Spaniards were so hard pressed by the American fire that they could not even think of letting loose tor pedoes. Whenever Spanish torpedo boats have attempted to approach American ships they were either, when the attempt was made at night, discovered by the | such hail of shot that they were obliged to withdraw. or else, as in the case of Cervera's s dash, were at once shot to pieces. The two Spanish torpedo boat destroyers, Furor and Fulton, had a speed of 28 to 30 knots, and were armed with two 14- pound and two 6-pound quick-firers and a Maxim gun. As soon as they came out of Santiago harbor nevertheless, they were attacked by the armed yacht Gloucester, carrying only few 6-pounder and 3-pound- CT quick-firing guns, and rendered useless in a. short time. The Gloucester Is said to have fired 400 shots and suffered hardly any damage. The fact must be noted that in this case two torpedo boat destroyers, vessels which heretofore have been repre- scented as extremely dangerous for battie- ships were destroyed by an armed yacht of inferior speed to theirs
 Equally interesting are the observations made on the fight between battleships and cruisers. As in the battle of the Yula be- tween the Chinese and Japanese, superb orty in marksmanship decided the fight off Santiago. The Spanish vessels were in part superior in speed to the Ameri- can; the valor and discipline of the Spanish sailors are much praised by the Americans; experienced officers commanded the ships, but nevertheless they were defeated with out doing any damage worth mentioning to the enemy It is we'll known that for years the Americans have kept up indus- triously target practice, and that they ex- pected good results from this themselves. Good guns without good gunners are use- less in a fight. The Spaniards shot poorly and the Americans shot well. The result was that the Spanish vessels caught fire