The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-03-04
SHALL BOTH COME IN =?
IF HAWAII IS ANNEXED By UNCLE
SAM
How Can He Deny Cuba the Priv
tlege of Coming Under "Old
GlOry's" PrOtectiOn-What If the
Cuban Insurgents Should Rise in
Rebellion Against Uncle SAINT

ueSe of Coming Under "Old
GlOry's" PrOtectiOn-What If the
Cuban Insurgents Should Rise In
Rebellion Against Uncle SAINT
Washington Bureau st. Paul Globe, I
Corcoran Building. (
Special to The St. Paul Globe.
WASHINGTON, March 3.-Hawaiian
annexation has been forgotten in the
overwhelming interest attaching to the
Cuban crisis brought about by the eX-
plOsion of the Maine. But while Cuba
has thus for the time being displaced
Hawaii in popular thought and in con-
gressional discussion, the two subjects
are very closely related, and to an eX-
tent 1nterdependent. If Hawaii be an
neXed, it is hard to see how Cuba like
wise can long be denied admittance to
the Union. 1t is generally taken for
granted that Spanish rule on the island
is withering away, whatever may be-
general attitude toward the insurrec-
ton. According to the best military
reports received here, Spain has long
since ceased to put forth her greatest
energies. Where her troops now on the
island number perhaps $4,000 effective
men, they have at times been not far
from 100000. Her energies are plainly
tagging and if with larger display of
force and strength she was powerless
to cope with the insurrection, it is diff
ficult to understand how anything can
be done now with her powers waning
and her resources sinking.
Cuba seems lost to Spain in fact; and
as soon as the actual severence, how
ever brought about, becomes recogn1z-
ed by treaty or in law, the question Of
American annexation is bound to come
to the front. Some element in Cuba
may be counted on to desire attach
ment with this country. and if such an
element can once get into control it's
status would be similar to that of the
Hawaiian government under President
Dole now seeking annexation. This
close resemblance between Hawaiian
situation today, and what seems des
tined to be the Cuban situation at no
very distant tomorrow, Is having an
obvious effect upon the pending annex
alton controversy. When a congress-
man is now asked If he believes in an
nexation. he will be dull indeed If
beth anneXations are not suggested to
his mind.
The nearness Of Cuba, the large
American interests on the island the
fact that she Is and always will be
u
States, her strategic position at the
mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, have
constituted an argument in favor of
her ultimate union with this country
which has never failed to appeal to a
certain element in the American re-
public since it's very foundation.
In this light, 1T wan an appropriate
coincidence by which the senate COM
mittee on foreign relations, almost 81
multaneously with the Maine explo-
sion. arrived at the conclusion that the
attempt to ratify the pending treaty
must be Abandoned, and the question
referred to the two houses Of congress
In the form of joint resolution Since
the annexation project was preached
the first question has naturally been
the possibility Of securing a tWo-third
vote In a secret session Of the senate.
After a long and stubborn fight. in
which the administration has taken a.
nave come to acknowledge that thev
the hopelessly short of the necessary
two-thirds, but claim that thew are
within three or four votes of it. The
question then goes to the two houses
IN open session, and the senate COM
ihlttee were already studying the vari
Gus annexation resolutions proposed to
see which one it was best to adont
When the explanation came AS soon
as the Cuban excitement uuiets down
this undertaking will be revived and
the country will have a chance to hear
the arguments for and against Ha-
Wallan annexation, and with the nm
oerstand1ng that the acceptance of the
PROJECT now pending must logically
mean at no distant day the acceptan noe
OF another of the same kind
Ihe prospect of Cuban annexation
raises the interesting question of what
.iilsht happen In case the insltrgent
FORCES on the island, after coming nm
Ger the authority of the United States
government, should decide that they
old not like 1t and rise in rebellion
There is no evidence that the fighting
bands in the interior of Cuba love the
government at Washington for ITS own
sake, but rather as an aid against
their present foes. They act upon the
principle that one trouble at a time
is enough, and, with the opposition to
governments in general inherent in all
tropical Americans, they are now trv-
Ing to throw off Spain. 1t might han
pen that they would object to becom-
ing part of the United States. and
still, If minority who CHANGED to he
IN power wanted annexation, agreeable
10 the Hawaiian precedent, we shouId
have to annex the island, for. as Sen
ator Morgan has well said, '.the natives
OF Alaska were not consulted to see
whether they desired to become a, part
of the United States" Why. then
should we consider the native races of
either the Hawaiian islands or Cuba
1t is evident that the native Hawaiians
90 not want to become Americans. but
they may not have vigor enough to
rise In rebellion. With the Cuban ma
tive population the case might be diff
rerent. 1T would be possible that
cllque or clgarmakers and sugar plant
ers In Havana and the other seaports
might bring about annexation against
the wish of the very forces that are
now lighting the Spaniards, and then
the next time things did not go to suit
these unrecognized forces they might
break out in rebellion.
How would the United States meet
such situation? Judging from the
experience of Spain, it is no light task
TO subdue these islanders, equipped
as they are with incalculable adyan-
tage of wide tract of impenetrable
mountain wilderness, filled with rocks
and caves, and offering almost COM
piete protection against ordinary SOL
d1ery. Public sentiment in the United
states, so soon after our criticism Of
Spain, would hardly warrant sending
an enormous army to put down such
an fnsurrection, and yet American
property interests in Havana and
other seaport towns might be such that
decline to maintain order and assert
Its sovereignty. This is one of the pos
s1bilities, one Of the troubles, that
might aff1ict us in the event of annexa-
ton. 1t is not out Of the question
that the native races of Hawaii NAV,
at some time rise in rebellion, and
nothing but the strong military au-