, 1898-08-09
TUESDAY. AUGUST 9, 1898.
LESSONS OF THE WAR.

DlSCusSlOn VI Lue leSSOnS 10 DC leiIH@
ed in the art Of war from our conflict
with Spain has already begun. From
the nature of the operations SO far,
the voices of ava experts are first to
be raised, although the splendid
achievements Of our land forces will in
time take prominent rank in interest
and instruction. But students of navai
warfare, who were somewhat disap-
pointed at the meager deductions in
construction and armament to be
drawn from the battle of Yalu, are
naturally eager to analyze the fights
in Manila bay and off Santiago in the
hope of finding something new tina,
shall be of value as guidance in future
naval architecture and tactics.
But, after all, the chief lesson which
all the experts agree in expounding is
the prime value OF the personnel of a
navy. 1t Is the men who fight the
ships. If they and their officers be not
thoroughly disciplined, perfectly train,
ed and brought to that condition in
which action is swift as thought and
execution as prompt as perception is
keen, there Is little or nothing to be
gained from heaviest ermor, greatest
guns or highest steam power. 1t is
the valor, the gunnery and the dis
cipline of the men and officers of the
United States navy that foreign critics
agree in commencing and in holding
primarily responsible for the destruc-
ton OF the W. Spanish fleets. 1t is
in these qualities, moreover, that our
navy has always excelled, and especial
ly in the quality OF craftsmanship. Its
past victories have been O often
against superior weight OF metal, by
accuracy and rapidity of fire. There
seems to be something inherent in the
American character that enables our
gun crews to throw projectiles so that
they hit.
OF other lessons which this great
republic may take to heart, such Eng,
lish experts as Admiral Sir George Ell
liot, author of Future Naval Battles
and How to Fight Them" Sir Henry
Nicholson and Captain Montagu Bur-
rows agree that it is the old one which
George Washington condensed into the
epigram. "In time Of peace. prepare for
war" Foreign opinion generally has
expressed establishment and admira-
ton at the Quickness with which our
natural enegy and have ac-
complished so much in creating and
preparing armies for action. Never
theless we do not now need to 81 away
from home to realize what a condition
OF u~npreparedness was ours, nor is it
pleasant to speculate upon what might
have happened to us had our encounter
been with a power Of stronger equip
ment and nobler character. How deep
ly this lesson may have been impress
ed upon the American mind cannot be
known until the war is over n pub
lie opinion Is brought to bear upon the
national legislature in providing for
the material increase of the regular
army, as well as for the completion of
harbor d~efenses and the continued
growth of the navy.
There are other lessons, minor but
important. Among these is the value
Of the battleship as a fighting machine
and the wisdom of uniting high speed
with heavy armament, as in the Ore
gon. The magnificent performance of
that vessel has already altered the pol
icy of our navy department in giving
special consideration to speed and
coal endurance in bids o new battle
ships. Next, perhaps, may be ranked
the importance Of %rapid-fire guns,
which have 30 proved their effective
hess In silencing opposing batteries.
Those guns were also largely instru-
mental in showing that fire is the
greatest danger on shipboard during
an engagement and that all woodwork
THAT cannot be dispensed with entirely
should be made non-infianmable. Am,
other naval lesson Is the need Of better
means of communication on ship
board. The accurate and quick trans
mission OF orders must be secured.
There Is a tendency to infer that
torpedoes. topedoboats and torpedo
boat d~estroyers have proved valueless.
Subsequent and more conservative dis
cussion may modify this opinion as to
~torpedoes, though their uncertainty Of