The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-06-24
CUBA AND PORTO RICO.

"A snort time ago it Semi-officially
announced that after the dispatch of the
army of invasion to Cuba the next expedi-
ton would be against Porto Rico and one
of the reasons assigned was the Importance
of occupying the latter island as a basis for
claiming and holding it permanently. The
policy seemed a wise one, but like all plans
of campaign it was subject to be changed
by events 1t is now announced that the
movement against Porto Rico has been
postponed, if not abandoned, and that the
expedition intended to have been sent
against that island will be sent to REINFORCE
our army in Cuba. Political critics of the
administration and street-corner strategists
will probably cite this as evidence of vacil-
lation and weakness in the conduct of the
war, but the reason given for the change
will command the approval of all reasonable
people. 1t is that the capture of Santiago
and the occupation of that part of Cuba is
matter of SO much Importance at this
stage of the war that it will not do to leave
any doubt of the complete success of the
movement. While there is every reason to
believe that General Skaters present force
would be equal to the work, the government
could not afford to take any risk of failure.
General Shafter has only 5000 men, and
there is possibility that the Spaniards may
be able TO oppose him with 5000. The War
Department belives there are 1900 Spanish
troops in Santiago, though report says many
more, and General Pando has 10000 about
100 miles away. If the latter could make
To Co
$4,000 seasoned Spanish troops, with the ad-
vantage of Notifications and defense works,
against our 5000 men operating in a strange
country and on the offensive. The Cuban
General Garcia is depended on to prevent
General Pando from reinforcing Santiago,
and no doubt he will do his utmost to that
end, but he may fail. The reinforcement
of Santiago is matter of so much import
ance to the Spaniards that they will prob
ably make a desperate effort to accomplish
it, and they may succeed. That done they
would be able to contest every inch of our
army's advance and perhaps make sue
cessful defense of Santiago. The mere fact
that such a thing is possible not only JUS
titles but REQUIRES the prompt REINFORCE
ment of General Shafter The successful
invasion of Porto Rico would be a poor off,
set to disaster to our army that would
perhaps enable the enemy to claim that the
first land engagement of the war had re-
suited in Spanish victory. Such thing
must be placed beyond any possibility of
happening. and the way to do that is to re-
inforce General Shafter to an extent that
will make him completely master of the sit
uation. That, evidently, is the intention of
the government, as shown by the sailing of
one expedition yesterday, to be followed
rapidly by others until General Shafter will
have about 10000 men, barring possible
losses before the re-enforcements reach him.
He may not need so many men to do what
is expected of him, but better 10000 too
many than 1000 too few.
The press dispatch regarding this change
of plan contains the following:
The illusion that the actual possession of
Porto Rico constituted any valid advantage
from an International law point was speed-
lily dispelled by the citation of presidents,
the most recent of them being the acquis-
ton by Japan of Formosa at the treaty of
Simonoseki, although the island was in pos
session of China at the close of the war.
1t was also made evident that the United
States had absolute justification, which
could not be combated by neutralS, for ex
acting the surrender of Porto Rico by Spain
an indemnity against part of the cost of
the war, especially as it was universally
conceded that this government already had
the power of eventually debating the terms
of peace.
This is the first intimation the country
has had of the policy of the government in
regard to Porto Rico, since it shows that
the State Department had been called upon
for information to whether we could
claim the island without actually conquering
and occupying it. The inference is that
while the government will doubtless carry
out its pledge of liberating Cuba for the
Cubans it intends to take Porto Rico for
itself. But the first work in hand is the ex-
pulsion of the Spaniards from Cuba. Porto
Rico will be ours when we choose to shake