Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-05-17
DELAY CRITICISED
Feeling in Congressional Circles About
Reinforcing Dewey.
UNCERTAIN OFADMINISTRATIONPOLICY
Gen. Merritt's Appointment Made
by the President.
P ERMAN ENT OCCUPATION

In congressional circles they are getting
worked up on account of the delay in send
ing reinforcementS to Admiral Dewey at
Manila. A large number of senators and
representatives called at the War and Navy
Departments today, and most of them had
something to say about the slowness of
motions the Pacific. A great deal of
sympathy was shown also with the insist
ence attributed to Gen. Merritt that at
least 1900 regulars should constitute part
of the force sent to Manila. The expression
attributed to Gen. Merritt that he would
not go to Manila if he did not have these
regulars was not credited, however, and
Secretary Alger was quoted as saying that
there was no, doubt that the general was
misquoted for that expression.
Force to he Sent to Manila.
Men who particularly interested them
selves to urge that an efficient force should
be sent to Manila at once were told that
the matter would be taken up at the cab
met meeting today. and the opinion was ex-
pressed that some means would be found to
spare 1000 regulars to go with the force of
volunteers, and that a force of 1900 in all
would be promptly dispatched. Much criti-
cism of the War Department is being in
duged in on the ground that there is great
dilatoriness in equipping and organizing the
volunteer soldiers they are mustered IN
1t was said by some of the men in Congress
who visited the department this morning
that the Nevy Department was ready TO
carry 1000 men on the City of Pekln at
once, but that the War Department was
not yet ready to embark even that number.
In some quarters it is suggested that the
about sending large army OF
occupation to Manila is due in part to the
uncertainty of the policy of the administra-
ton as to the permanent occupation of the
Philippines.
The Monitor Monterey May Go.
1t is being urged that the coast defense
monitor Monterey, now at San Francisco,
be sent to Manila, and it is regarded as
probable that this will be done. This moni-
tor has not the coal capacity for such a
trip, but it is proposed to tow her. This
would take much time, but if she Wae once
in the harbor of Manila Admiral Dewey
could defy any force Spain could possibly
send against him. The Monterey is not a
cruising vessel, but is regarded as one of
the greatest harbor fighting machines in
the world. Her being sent to Manila would
have important significance.
If the difficulty of getting this fighting
machine to Manila were overcome it would
not be with the idea of bringing her back
again to San Francisco at the end Of a few
months or a year. If she were sent to Ma
Mia it would probably be with the inten-
ton of keeping her there permanently for
the defense of that harbor, and it would,
it is suggested, signify policy Of perma-
nent occupation of Manila if not of the en-
tire Philippine group.
Policy of Occupation.
In political circles here there is very
strong sentiment In favor of such imme-
date steps being taken by the administra-
ton will commit this government to the
occupation of the entire Philippine group
and open the way to the permanent occupa-
ton If it Is deemed desirable at the close
of the war with Spain. 1t is felt that delay
in making the occupation effective Is cal
culated to invite opposition from foreign
powers, whereas prompt action now may
make 1t possible to avoid a great deal Of
trouble.
The Appointment of Merritt.
1t is said that discussion about Gen
Merritt's going to take command of the
Philippines grows out of a question of
policy to he followed with respect to these
islands. rather than out of the mere ques-
The arrangement by which Gen. Merritt
accepted the assignment as military gov
| ernor of the Philippines. commanding the
army of occupation it is said, was made
between the President and Gen. Merritt
direct, without the War Department hav-
ing much to do with the matter, and that
Gen. Merritt was illing to accept the ap-
rontment, on the idea that an important
policy with respect to these islands would
be developed. 1t IS suspected that the dis
cussion now grows out of some doubt as to
| this policy and uncertainty as to the lati-
| tude the military governor of the islands
Will be given.
To Invade Cuba.
| 1t is said that the President has again re-
| turned to the proposition to invade Cuba
| with large army, and that the plan of in
vasion, which has been several times de-
| layed, will be speedily put into operation.
The government is said to be satisfied
| that the presence of the Spanish fleet in
| the Caribbean sea relieves much of the un-
| certainty which involved the situation be-
| fore, and that now the two American fleets
| can amply protect US in operations
against Cuba, and meet the Spanish fleet
| if it should appear to aid Blanco
| One reason given for proposing an in
| vasion at once Is that it will compel the
| Spanish fleet to appear off one of the Cuban
ports and give battle, unless Spain is pre-
pared to give UP Cuba without using tbs
| navy In the defense of the island.
| An invasion, it is believed will compel
the Spanish fleet to fight, since, being in
those waters, the Spanish admiral could not
allow the island to be invaded and Havana
to be captured without striking blow.
|