The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1898-03-02

NEW YORK, March 1.-The Herald S
Washington correspondent telegraphs:
1t is not the present intention of the
administration to make any move in
regard to the general Cuban question
until all the facts in regard to the
Maine disaster have been received and
acted upon. This statement was made
to me by a high official of the State
Department in reply to a question as
to numerous reports in circulation
about intervention policies, time limits
given for success of autonomy, etc
Since the Maine disaster occurred it
has been the purpose of the President
to regard it as an entirely distinct mat
ter from the question as to the atti-
tude of the United States toward the
Cuban insurrection. What the Pres
ident's next step will be depends large
~ on the conditions existing when the
Maine matter is settled. It is not
true, as reported, that he has served
notice upon Spain that war in Cuba
must end by specified date. In his
annual message to Congress he care
fully avoiding mentioning any time,
and in notes which have since gone to
the Madrid authorities no specific date
has been named.
In his communication to Congress he
stated that 1.-The near future" would
demonstrate the success or failure of
autonomy.
There is little doubt that the admin
istration now considers it failure, but
1t has not said so officially either to
Spain or to Congress. Cuban CORE
spondence giving reports of consular
nf n CTllho which will indicate the
failure of autonomy, is to be with
held from Congress until an official re-
port has been received regarding the
cause of the Maine disaster.
In editing this correspondence the
State Department authorities have
been careful to strike out any express
sions Of opinion from consular officers
regarding the failure of autonomy. and
it would appear that the admins
tration is not at the present time pre-
pared to officially declare itself in re-
gard to the progress of autonomy in
Cuba or its future plans toward
restoring peace in that island.
In his message to Congress the Pres
ident said "Of the untried n cures
there remain only: The recognition OF
insurgents as belligerents; the recogni-
-IlOn Ol- TIE lluSpGIdelICS VI SuOls
trail intervention to end the war by i'm
posing a rational compromise between
the contestants; and Intervention in
favor of one or the other party.
Having stated that he regarded the
recognition of the insurgents as bel
ligerents under existing conditions as
impossible, 1t is therefore assumed
that the Presidents next move will be
in the line of one of the three follow
ing propositions. In this connection a
high official of the Government gave
me his views to-day in regard to the
question of neutral intervention and
the way in which he believed it should
be done. His views have the approval
of at least one member of the Cabinet
and have been called to the attention
of the President. He said: ut is as
sumed that the existing conditions will
not be permitted TO continue indefinite
ly in Cuba and that they can be ter
minated only by the active intervention
of the United States. This has been
proposed in but one way-requiring
Spain to desist from further attempt to
subdue the instruction. l should ap-
proach the problem from the other end
and require the insurgents 10 accept
autonomy; at least to try the expert
ment.
1T should seek the concurrence of
Spain in this method and insist
upon any notifications of her plan of
autonomy which seem essential to
give Cubans genuine free government.
] should then send a commissioner to
the Cuban camp and say to them in
effect: This struggle must stop here
and now. We recognize that you have
the right to revolt, but in all this time
you have not tablished a government,
and considerations of humanity and in
terests of the United States demand
that the struggle should cease. Spain
has admitted the right of sovereignty
and ownership of the SOIL and what she
offers you is a great gain-more than
many revolutions have accomplished;
accept it at once and try the expert
ment; we insist on its being fairly
made, and at the worst, after period
or rest and recuperation, you can, If
driven to 1t, revolt again; but the
United States Will not permit you to
continue this attempt longer
THE advantages of this method
seem to me to be: First. that it avoids
war which intervention from the.
other end would necessitate, and not
only the frightful losses it would in
volve, ~unprepared as we are,
but the ranking and permanent
hostility of Spain which
successful war would bring. Second, 1t
would give the desired results much
more promptly than the other. Third,
it would raise no question of our being
compelled to take possession of the
island. which an unqualified success of
the itlsurrection would undoubtedly do
and which we ought to avoid.
Finally, to use a homely illustra-
ton, If a man wants to stop dog