The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-05-25
Moving the Army.

their apparent slowness in moving the
army forces to the scene Of action,
which, in their minds, is Cuba. To
these uninformed persons the problem
reduces itself to the procurement Of a
sufficient number of steamers to carry
$4,000 men, the embarkation Of these
men, their transportation to Cuba, and
their debarkation. This in itself is
an undertaking Of considerable magni-
tude and not to be accomplished by
merely shouting "On to Cuba" But
the simple act Of marching the men
aboard the ships and steaming away
to Cuba is only small part Of what
has to be done. The troops must first
be carried to the point of embarkation,
and their subsistence must be provid-
ed for.
Major Henry G.. Sharpe, Of the COM
missary department of our army, in
his unique little book entitled "The
Art of Subsisting Armies in War"
defines the transport Of troops as
"that branch of the military organi
zation which provides for the mobility
Of an army and enables it to move at
any moment in any required direction,
complete in all that it needs, both for
its subsistence and it's efficiency" 1t
is in the final clause of the definition
that the vital spot is to be found.
The army must not move unless it is
complete in all that it needs. Troops
never embark without carrying every
thing needed to enable them to act the
moment they disembark.
The question Of supplies alone is
most serious one, especially when the
army is to operate at any distance from
the main land base across body of
water which must be protected as well
as crossed. The coyness Of Spain's
feet makes it improbable that We shall
be compelled at any time to protect
the Florida Straits, but they will never
cease to be the weak link in the chain
for any army operating in Cuba. At
the very outset arises the problem Of
conveying troops and stores across
them. An army corps Of 10000 men
and $4,000 animals must have about
26O tons of subsistence each day. A
steamer of 1000 tons capacity will
feed them less than four days.
Major Sharpe says that "a rough
calculation Of the tonnage required to
transport the troops and necessary
supplies is to allow Z tons for horse
and 10 tons for horse and rider, and
from 2 to 2 1-3 tons per man. A
l,5OO-ton steamer will carry about $50
men, without horses. But it must
be remembered that the army cannot
take the field without its wagon train,
its field bakery column, and its ambu-
lances. The size of the wagon train
depends upon the distance from it's
base of supplies at which the army is
to operate.
IF the earmy of invasion in Cuba is to
move away from the first seaport which
it captures, it must have sufficient
wagon train ready to land when the
men land. Now, a six-horse army
wagon, according to the authority al
ready quoted, "Will carry about 1000
pounds, and the supply for each man
per day, medical stores, ammunition
and food included, may be placed at
four pounds per man. Such a wagon
will supply 800 men for one day, but
if the army is days march from its
base, it will only supply 250 men, for
it must go back empty and refill at the
base y For an army Of $4,000 men
two days away from its base of sup
plies, 400 wagons would be required.
Transportation by water affords good
deal Of relief, but there is the histori-
cal fact that while the army Of the
Potomac, in its first operations on the
peniusular, was supplied by way of
the Potomac river, it nevertheless re-
quircd about 10 wagons for every
/ 600 men.
Nothing will relieve an army Of the
necessity of considerable wagon train
Those who think the movement of our
army slow should bear in mind that It
is assembling from all parts Of the
country, and that great portion Of it
is composed Of militia organizations
which have not been equipped with a
wagon department The task of mob
ilizing our forces is gigantic, and if
the invasion Of Cuba actually begins
next week we may rest assured that
the methods by which the end is
achieved will be found recorded in the
future military text books of Euro