The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-10-24
WORK OF SIMPSONS FLEET.
NAVY DEPARTMENT GIVES OUT ALL
OFFICIAL REPORTS.
Little In Then which Has Not Al
ready Reached the Public, Save
Commodore Schley's Belief That
spanish Fleet Was 1t Cienfsegos.

par lIneht mas made public that portion OK
-aain1sal sdmpsoEs report covering the
CONDUCT CT the neet under his command IN
us Operation in the West Indies for abou.
sasee months Srior 10 the destruction or
| Admiral Cerysra's ships en- July g. /; Is
MADE Up largely OF Official dispatches OF
tae movements 90 the hees. with explana-
| lions and comment by the admiral. The
| .spoT, IS dated Angus, 3. on tee flagship
->s~ forA, and begins with a statement
| OF the determination reached ~ the navy
| department, 20 send d squadron to the
"indward passage Tor the purpose OF OBJ
servst!on. because of information received
| 0, the sailing Apri. q Of Admra, Cervera's
squadron from the Cape Verde islands. On
the voyage eastward frem the naval base,
| key West, which began May 4. Admiral
Sampson reports there was experienced
endless trouble and delay because OF the
inefilc-eney OF the two monitors accom-
panying the other ships. and which had
10 be taken in tow. Their coal supply was
so small that !. was at once evident that
they must either frequently coal or be
| towed. The admiral says:
had the sea been rough Or had the
enemy appeared a, this juneture the squad
ron would have been in a much better po-
s.tlon Tor an engagement had the Monitors
been elsewhere. Subsequently, when en-
| gaging the batteries Of San Juan. it was
owing TO the quick rolling Of these YES
sells. even in very moderate sea- they
We're unable 10 fire with any degree OF
accuracy.
Among the ee.egrams received by the All
mfal from lie department at Washing
ton, when on Cape Hayden, was the fol-
lowing:
Washington. d. c., May g. 1925
40 not risk or cripple your vessels
against Qualifications 10 prevent 1t
from soon afterwards successfully fighting
the Spanish feet composed of the Pelayo,
Car-os ". Oauendo. Nizcaya. Maria Teresa,
Cristobai Colon and four deep-sea torpedo
boats. II they should appear on this side"
On May there was a consultation on
board the flagship. and the admiral says
that he decided 20 stand on TO the east
ward as far as San Juan. Porto Rico, on
the chance Of finding the Spanish squad
ron at that port. where. If they We're not
successful in destroying II, i could be al
arrived off San Juan Oh the morning of
the 18th. and the bombardment of The place
ensued Regarding his action al this place
the adnira. says:
1T was clear to my mind that the
squadron would not have any great diff
Guilty in forcing the surrender of the place.
but the fact that we should be held sew
erai days in completing arrangements for
holding IL; that part OF our force would
have TO be left 10 await the arrival Of
troops TO garrison 1t; that the movements
Of the Spanish squadron, our main object
I've. were siiil unknown: that the flying
squadron was stiI north and not in
position to render any aid: that Havana,
Cervera's natural objective. was thus open
10 entry by such a force his. while we
were a thousand miles distant. made cur
immediate movement toward Havana I'm
perative.
II thus reluctantly gave UP the project
against San Juan ana stood westward for
Havana"
Several kilograms are here presented.
based on reports that Cervera's squadron
A~l a T.
view TO return and capture San Juan,
the leisure 10 do so and occupy the place
being assured in event of Admiral Ger
vera failure to cross the Atlantic. Short
" after news was received that the Span
ish feet had appeared off Curacao West
Indies. and the squadron, under orders
from the department, proceeded 10 Key
West. 10 which place the flying squadron
under Commodore fnow admiraD Schley
had already been ordered.
Arrangements were then hurriedly made
and the flying squadron. augmented by the
other vessels under Commodore Schiey,
was sent off CienfUegos where IL was be-
iieved the enemy would go. in which case
an effort was 10 be made 10 engage and
capture him. Sampson was given the
choice either Of the command Of the block
aiding squadron off Havana. or at Glen
fuegos. Schley in either case 10 remain
with his own squadron. From messages
received by the adnifal from the depart
merit about MAY -, ii appears thar re-
ports had reached the United States tha;
the Spanish fleet was al Santiago; that
the department advised Sampson TO send
immediate word to Schley to proceed 10
that placs. leaving one small vesse off
Cienfuegos on May p instructions were
gotten by Sampson for Commodore
Schiev and sent him via the Marblehead
regarding the possibility Of the spanish
feet being at Santiago. they are IN part
as follows:
United states Flagship New York. First
Rate. Key West. Fla. May -. lslS-Sir;
Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de
Cuba-four ships and three torpedo boat
destroyers. II You are satisfied they are
not a. Csenfuegos. proceed with all dis
patch. but cautiously TO Santiago De Cuba,
ard If the enemy Is there blockade hrl IN
port. You will probably find Il necessary
to establish communication with the IN
hahitants-fishermen or others 20 learn
definitely that the ships are II port il be-
Ing impossible 10 see IN from the outside"
The adn1ira, said he felt much concerned
as 10 the delivery Of these orders, and sent
a duplicate by the Hawk with an addi-
tional memorandum. The admiral sug-
gested that II the Information dd not
reach Commodore Schley before DAYLIGHT
81 May -. TO mask the real direction ne
should take much as possible. II" adds:
Follow the Spanish squadron whichever
direction they take
The admiral OF Havana gives copies %
orders OF battle which were - he followed
in the event that cerTera left Santiago on
the approach OF SFhev's feet from Glen
fuegos and attempted 70 cruise around the
squadron weHla stten1pt 20 intercept him Nv
going EAST about no miles beycnd ne
junction ~ San;arer and Nicholas chan
nels Strict orders were given for screen
ing LIGHTS ana % see that none were acCl-
dertally shown. The squadron was 80
cruisa generally 70 he eastward IN he 5av
and westward during she night II ore Z
h's dispatches the admiral complains that
his movements ara greatly haTs7ersd by
monitors constituting the principal force OF
his command.
or Nav = as shown by The report Com.
noa0re Schley expressed She belief 5rsf
the Saa1tardS were 81 C'erf0ne1s On she
2-,h Sampson ssrt word 20 Admiral Sc9iey
directing HIM - proceed with III possible
speed 10 santiago hec8usa ~ information
received TIA: ne Standards were there
The same time orders wT-e sent 20 have
The collier StA~itng , snafrhs3 20 Santiago
wlth an expression - opinion that the . III
rapdo~e should USE K - ces;ruot The chan
mel A. ia nsTrovest part leading into The
hsrbo-. T-1a details @: the oia. we~p ief, 20
he commodore : judgment as - fSa;nosorl
haa rh@ utmost confidence ~ MS ah;itfv
80 carry this p,an - successful conclusion
and earnestly wished m gooi luck Saup-
~ssn apparently fe{t certain e ;ns presence
~ the Snsu!a-js a. Santiago and urged that
the barber must p hlocked ~ al ha1areis
81 A.s< a.