The Indianapolis journal., 1898-11-12

peace commission of La Production Ma
uonala, a society organized to protect the
interests of Spanish products But he also
directly represents the Spanish association
OF ship owners and brokers. and he is presi-
dent of the Spanish Colonial Bank Of Bar
celona, the institution which pays the in
terest on the so-called Cuban bonds. In the
commercial world of Spain he is not less
prominent than in he- financial affairs. The
marquis is president of the Credit Mercan-
tile, an association of Spanish coal mines,
of the largest life Insurance company in
Spain, Of the Philippines Tobacco Company,
whose fields are in the island of Luzon, of
the Compania Transatlantic of Barcelona,
which carried the greater part of Spain's
troops to Cuba, and vice president of the
Northern Railroad of Spain. Besides this,
he is honorary president Of the National
Council of Laborers' Corporations and of
certain laborers unions.
Obviously Marquis De Comillas is pro-
foundly interested in the results of the peace
negotiations. While he he's been distressed
at the immediate effect of the war upon the
undertakings Re represents, he is even more
concerned about the consequences which
might ensue upon treaty of peace en-
bodying terms that he deems oppressive to
Spain. The marquis has never held poIiti-
cal position, and thus far has declined to be
interviewed, lest his utterances be consid-
cred as in some degree those of the Spanish
government. When asked to-day to make
an exception to his rule of silence, he con-
sented on the distinct understanding that
he spoke for himself only and as a private
individual, confessing frankly that he wishes
to secure from the American people protec-
ton for the private interests he represents,
On far ha x-of7 of rxx,il1
allow of their protection. Marquis De CO.
millas said:
1T is, perhaps, presumption on my part
to assume that the American people will at
tach any Importance to what 1 say. Yet
there are circumstances, even connected
with this war, that lead me to hope 1 shall
have respectful hearing. Spaniards are
not unrindful of the noble and generous
treatment Spanish prisoners of war have re-
ceived at the hands of a victorious army
and navy at the moment of our defeat and
of subsequent generous care and treatment,
not less generous than that accorded Lieu
tenant Hobson by Admiral Cervera. They
have been touched by the courtesy and kind
ness with which the Spanish officers have
been received in America, and they almost
dare to hope for the same just and generous
treatment of Spanish financial, commercial
and industrial interests. Whatever antag
onism may have been engendered in the
minds of the American people towards the
Spaniards political enemies, l cannot be-
lieve any substantial portion of the Amer-
can people will wish to see any unnecessary
hardship inflicted on the vast number of
Spaniards whose property and incomes may
be destroyed as the result of this war.
at is not a question Of the rich only, but
Of the small merchants and manufacturers,
their employees and laborers. In the hope of
securing some better understanding of these
interests on the part of the American peo-
ple-and thus some better protection of
those interests-I feel bold enough to speak
as to my views and wishes regarding them
as affected by a treaty of peace. 1t may
prove difficult for me to get wholly clear of
political and governmental considerations
because in Spain commerce and industry are
closely allied with the government. This
condition, doubtless, will be condemned in
America, but the commercial and industrial
interests did not create the system and
could prosper only by conforming to con-
dtions existing in my country.
THE Philippine question presents very
different features from that of the West In
dies. In the Philippines Americans have no
interests of considerable Importance. The
Monroe doctrine does not apply there. In
sending Admiral Dewey's squadron to the
Malayan seas the Americans could have no
reasonable aim except to divert the atten-
tion of the Madrid government and of the
meager naval reserve forces Of Spain, a
piece of strategy which was highly effica-
cious in breaking down the material and
moral forces of Spain. But now that that
desired effect has been obtained 1 cannot
comprehend what reason the Americans
have to retain that land in their power.
Spain is suffering severely from her defeat,
after the prolonged and disasterous insur-
rection in Cuba, and she is mortally hurt
in her commerce and industries The
Americans are absolute strangers to the
Philippines and their population They are
unprovided with the immediate organization
necessary to rule that extensive and remote
territory and to exercise authority there.
The Filipinos have certain degree of cul-
ture and some rudimentary ideas as to
public administration, but as whole the
country is not yet capable of self-govern-
ment.
1.-The cession of sovereignty over the Phil
ippines to the United States would be dis
astrous to all those having business inter-
ests there, as we'll for the natives as for
the Spaniards and for Europeans cf every
nationality. Spain cannot transfer her Phil
ippine sovereignty to the United States by
a mere clause in peace treaty. The United
States would be confronted with war for
the subjugation of eight million Malayans.
This would mean the destruction of all
property in the Philippines Trade and
commerce would be paralyzed there. The
merchants and manufacturers Of Spain
would lose the markets they now enjoy,
their factories would suspend and their en-
ployes lie idle. The markets for their prod
ucts would have vanished. But the United
States would not gain these markets. At
least they would gain them only by fire
and sword.
The case of the Philippines is entirely
different from the cases of Cuba and Porto
Rico. The only obstacle which the United
States had to overcome in order to set up
their sovereignty and to render it effective
in the Antilles was the power of Spain. In
our colonies Of Oceanica there exists pop
ulation of about 100000. who have lived for
centuries identified with Spain. and an i'm
mense majority of whom would not accept
the decision of the mother country should
she transfer her sovereignty, without their