The Caucasian. (Clinton, N.C.) 188?-1913, 1898-04-07

according to CONS mon Law rules mere
aiders and Abettors will not be
deemed to be within the act. Il shop
Grim. Lrw, p. G5S, note
The statute in question i'm p oses
the penalty upon the person alone
! who actually commits the criminal
act. The criminal act is the
giving and taking etc. And who
is 1t that does that acti 1t
Is the common carrier. and the
common carrier is the corporation
Did A. b. Andrews give or take,
&c.' No, sir; 1t was the corporation
for which he stood. A. B. Andrews
as a private individual could not
give those rates. The railroad
| wouldn't recogniz, them. But il
was A. Z. Andrews, vice Preside ent,
that gave them. II was his official
capacity that gave them effect. 1t
was the corporation, acting through
it's servant, that actually committed
the deed, and that is the person alone
for whom tho statute provides q pun
ishment. And in that case, says
Bishops Criminal Law. mere aiders
and abettors will not be- deemed to
be within the act.
But, as a matter of law, the de-
fendants were not aiders and abet-
tors. II they we're anything at all
in the contemplation of the statute
and of general law. they were prln-
cipals; for it is we'll settled law that
"a person whose own hand does the
criminal act. either wholly or in part,
is not an accessory Bishop Grim.
Law, ]. Gol. And yet they cannot
be principals in this case, as indi-
viduals, because the statute doesn't
make them guilty of any crime.
They do not enter into the contem-
platIon of the statute at all as indi-
viduals. When the criminal act is
committed the law doesn't see A. B.
Andrews at all; 1t only sees the cor
poration which acts throughihim.
And the idea that the Individual
must be liable because the corpora
tion is made liable and he did the
act for it, will not do. 1t is diamet-
really opposed to the fundamental
idea of a corporation, which is that
it is an entity distinct from it's com
posers, so tnat it may be liable-for
debts, for instance-while its COM
posers are not. And then common
sense shows that such an idea will
not do. How is the corporation to
act except through the instrumental
ity of it's agent! An agent must do
an act before the corporation can
become liable, and if this idea were
true you could never punish a cor
poration alone.
How then are the defendants to
be excused for failing to answer the
questions propounded to them by
the Railroad COMMISSIONERS? To have
been excused from answering the
questions the defendants must have
been liable to incrlminate them
selves by their answers. To have
been liable to incriminate themselves
by their answer they must have
been criminally liable for the offe nse
committed. To have been climinally
liable for the offense committed they
must have been either principals or
accessories in the act. They were
not accessories, for their own hands
did the acts. And they were not
liable as principals, because the
statute creating the offense makes
only the corporation liable as, a
principal. In other words, the Off
Ger could not be accessory to his
own act, and he cannot be held liza
bic as principal (as distinguished
from his liability on account of aid
ing and abetting) because the stat
ute does not prescribe against him.
To apply the rule to our own case
vice President Andrews in the issu
ing of free pass does the entire
act. Whom does he aid or abet'
The railway Certainly not; th'
the railway, as before stated, does
the criminal act entirely through
the officer. If A. B. Andrews il
either principal or accessory. he is {
principal; and if so. then, as befor'
stated, there is nc punishment pre-
: scribed against any principal excep
the railway company as a comm OF
carrier. No person as an individua
can be guilty. Only common car
rier as such can violate the law.
We take it that the court did no
! stop to inquire as to whether the R
R. Commission, a court of record
needed the information for the pur
pose of "Gxing just and REASONABLE
rates." as the R. r. Commissioner
having this matter under considera
: ton must be their own judges as t.
! this. This was not case on appea
from an inferior to a superior court
where the whole matter is brough
up de move, but is an offense agains
!. court of competent jurisdiction il
!. : the nature of q contempt. Aud be
sides, no question was made on thi
point, the refusal being put solel
on the ground that they could not b
compelled to answer.
=. Again, if the officers and agents o
: railroad corporations can thus refus
! to answer questions affecting tn
!. corporation, they can refuse t
;. allow the Railroad Commissions
= to enter the eff ces and depots an
examine the books as provided i
section, and the whole act be
!, comes a dead letter, and the onl
= means of fixing rates by the CON
missioners is to take such data q
the R. R. Companies choose to fu1
: nish them, and at the option Of th
;. Il R. Companies to furnish none.
81 You might with just as good rel
} son say that a finance committee ha
: no right to examine the books of
- y defaulting sheriff. Both provision
. are made by the legislature of Mort
. Carolina. The sheriff might sa,
, my books and vouchers might ten
y to crlminate me etc., and ycu can
u have them. shelter myself benin
my constitutional privileges"
/ We further thought that the fu
~ Tho 10 M 0uDht RI ho n