Washington sentinel., 1898-04-16
In Case PrivaUeerIng Was ResOrted
To

consequence that do not adhere to
the Declaration of Paris, made in
1856, which agreed 70 abandon
privateering. The third country
is Mexico, which has little mer-
chant marine and less navy. Thus
far we have heard Of no applica
tions to our Government for letters
OF marque either from home or
foreign merchant ships. Spain's
commerce, It is true, is far inferior
to ours. When she has taken all
her merchant vessels that can be
used as auxiliary cruisers or as
armed transports there will be still
less Of it. noticeably in the trans
oceanic trade. Our Navy Depart
ment, however, has had compiled
list Of the Spanish merchant ma
rine, and it comprises over twenty
lines, including over 90 vessels.
Nearly sixty Of them are put
down as in the transatlantic trade.
although portion OF them may
run also to England or to Africa.
Over forty more trade with Eng
land and Germany or also between
coast ports. Four go to the Can
aries, eight to North Africa, and as
many more to the Balearic Isles,
while over torty are put down ex-
clusively to the coasting trade. A
very large portion OF these steam
ers are freight boats, while the
Government has already taken
some as auxiliary cruisers or trans
ports.
But while there are thus spoils
in prospect for privateers, we do
not look for much, II any, resort
by our Government to letters Of
marque. The reasons for this con-
clusion are many. To begin with,
our true policy is 20 do with the
ships OF the navy the work which
used to be intrusted to privateers.
We have not only fitted up flying
squadron, but have bought for the
navy many Of the fastest liners and
steam yachts that could be secured.
The stimulus to exertion which
comes from the moietY of the prize
belonging to the captors, after due
condemnation by court, should
be furnished, as far as possible. to
the Governments own crews.
Again, there is a great scarcity
Of seamen for our navy, and COM
missioning privateers would still
further reduce the supply. The
Government tor this if for no other
reason would find it's true policy
that Of making its regular navy
furnish the only means of taking
part in the war on the sea, and the
only method of earning prize
money. We already see a move in
this direction By its allowing short
terms Of enlistment, and even en-
listment for the voyage, to those
who continue to serve on the pur-
chased merchant ships. This gives
them an advantage like that which
attracts men to privateering. and
insures ready exchange in case of
capture. In the civil war we found
this policy advisable, ships and
crews being taken into the regular
naval service, and their officers
commissioned with appointments
as acting naval officers.
Another consideration is that
ships OF the regular navy are not
only under stricter discipline than
privateers, but have other motives
than prize money in view. Their
officers must look out for profess
sional reputation and strict obedi-
ence to orders. For this reason,
too, they cause less anxiety in re-
gard to res ?ecting the rights OF
neutrals, and that would be impor-
tant in a war with Spain, wnere so
many powerful maritime nations
would jealouslv watch any intrac-
ton Of their privileges by bellig-
erent.
A still broader consideration is
that our navy is so far superior to
Spain's that we do not need to re-
sort to privat eering, and one Of the
chiei incentives to it has always
been that country having only
small navy could obtain auxiliaries
rapidly and at a slight cost. With
that motive wanting in our case,
we may prefer to secure the COM
mendation that would certainly
come from those nations that are
bound themselves by the Declara-
ton OF Paris, in observing that
while we are not so bound, yet we
voluntarily abstain from issuing
letters of marque. We should re-
serve our righ's to privateers, but
should refrain from exercising