New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-07-31
NETWORK TRIBUNE ILLUSTRATED SUPPLEMENT.

lilo. fac,ne an army with muzzle-ioadihs Bun"
Wagner had been a witness OK Hooo o
Sprng HILL and he may have SUPPOSE '.
confederate general would again ATTACK VIZ"
,ho head of his column, too eager 10 "a'' ~
nroner sunnort. But Hood had other aii"' '"''
tine Wagner's division was expected " ''
tho aporov 70 retire as slowly as posSio'e' coz
~ the brigades covering the march OF 'he o'"''
oI,ernateIv But only one. owing 70 the uetei'
nation of its commander not to be caush' ~
tran GOT into the works in good order Inc o''ie'
tvyo obeved Wagner's injunction to hght hooo
whole army and rushed in disorder upon t"'
Union works when threatened with comp'e'e
s,ruction Wagner was so absorbed IN MS p'di
~ making two brgades in the open 90 "ha'
half Scboleld's army found a hard task Dehihu
reastyvorks that he directed the hle-ciosers |"
keen the men In line with fixed bayonets IL there
was any wavering. Later, when HOOP pA" y.
attack began to develop clearly. wagner oroefeu
h,s men in. But 1t was then too late TOT any
thing but a rout and a panic one queS''o" ."
a Iayman is bound to ask at this po'h'' VIM"
General Cox does not answer, Is THIS: "here
WAS Wagners place after giving his oi'isio"
sucb decisive orders? Should he have been Win
his men. or had he right to watch the results
of his battle theory from comparatively Sale
pIace within the main lines. 1t was not long un-
iii the matter was tested. Wagners men came
into the Union lines in haste and disoroer anu
with them came the rebels. now sure IN thef
minds that victory was theirs. How they were
met in the breach especially by OpdycKes DIT
gade-the portion OF Wagner's division winch
had refused to be sacriiced-and driven back 10
the outer ditch Is the most familiar part oi TIC
battle With this exception. Wagners men, aS
organized, were Of no use on that bloody aiter-
noon. though groups of them went into the line
wherever they could find place and fought I'LL
the last echo of strife died away.
The rebels having been repulsed in this man
ner from the centre of the Union line. that point
became deadly trap for them the rest OF the
day and night The fighting men got the ioea
into their heads that they must all CROWD toward
that fatal point. Even the officers were de-
ceived. Lines had overlapped in the nature OF
things as the Confederates marched toward
fertilization shorter than their own first lorna
ton But as the battle proceeded this over
lapping became horrible. 1t gave the same
appearance as IL the men were rushing In
deep columns against that continuous hori-
zontal sheet Of flame which. as night de-
scended, was seen to rest on the parapet
Of the Notifications. 1t was in vain for the offi-
GERS on Confederate right next to the river to
call their men to a charge there where it might
have been possible to cut off the retreat OF the
Iynionists. But even il it had been possible to
awaken men in such turmoil TO new thoughts
General Cox makes it clear that all contingent
cies had been foreseen on the Union side. Artll-
lery had been stationed in comparative security
on the further bank of the river. and this swept
away every body of rebels that attempted to
1oft Ia hat
might attempt to cross the river by an upper ford
before he joined battle at Franklin. In that case
he could have got between Schoield and Thomas.
The point was guarded. Again, it was an after
thought Of the Confederates that by going fur
Their to the right they could have accomplished
more than they did. But General Cox shows
that this would have taken time and that in the
same time the Union Army could have moved to
a point across the river, where it might have
chosen its own fighting ground instead of halt
ing for battle al a point where defeat meant
utter ruin 1t must be remembered that the bat
tie was not fought a spot which General
Schofeld or General Cox would have selected.
But it was fought according to the plans OF the
former and on the methods Of the latter. Scien-
tfcally it was a crucial experiment in the prob
lem of attack and defence of lieldworks in an
open country German and French experts were
not convinced by it. Hood failed where, accord
ing to the most modern Continental theories he
should have won. General Cox does not insist
on his conclusions, but he evidently thinks that
the tactics which won at Franklin are still we'll
adapted TO the peculiar characteristics of the
American soldier.
THE CAPTAIN OF THE BOURGOGNE.