The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-04-17
Observations Regarding Method of
Conducting Campaign.
WHAT GEN. LEE ADVISES
KNOWLEDGE IMPAIRED TO THE
WAR DEPARTMENT.
Few Good Regiments Would Be Suf-
icient For First Movement-Our
Cuban Allies Could Be Increased
to 100000 If Arms Were Placed
In Their Hands.

New York, April 16.-A dispatch TO
the Times from Washington says:
1t is expected that the forces that will
be used in Cuba will consist of cavalry,
infantry and light artillery. Heavy ar
tillery could hardly be used in the wet
season, and besides it would not be
necessary in operations against the
Spaniards. Consul General Lee, it is
understood, advises the use of these
| branches of the service for the cam
paign in Cuba. He is of the opinion that
the army can successfully conduct oper-
| ations in the island during the wet
weather if it has cavalry and light
batteries. Rapid-fire guns and plenty
of them will be depended on very
largely to do the fighting.
SPANISH METHODS.
/, It is reported by all observers of the
military methods of the Spaniards that
their infantry at once forms a hollow
square upon the approach of cavalry.
This military formation has been in
practice for a century, and the Span
| iards have not learned any other way
to repel cavalry work. Military ex-
perts say that when an army is so
| formed it can be decimated by rapid
/ fire guns and destroyed, if it does not
soon break such formation. The cav
/ airy will be used to force the Spaniards
into position, to get them at bay, as 1t
were, and the infantry and light artil-
lery will then attack with rapid-fire
guns.
POOR SOLDIERS.
1t is said that the Spanish forces in
Cuba are poorly armed. They have a
fairly good rifle. the Mauser, but are
inadequately supplied with ammuni-
nd ~ "a haffa
young boys, do not know how to use
their guns. In rapid-fire guns they are
very deficient. Artillery is their weak
est point, and they cannot now supply
the deficiency. Even Havana is de-
Tended by antiquated cannon, with the
exception of six fine new Krupp guns,
which. however, have been allowed to
rust on their carriages. and the artil-
lists do not know anything about their
use.
At Matanzas they have four guns of
the same kind-heavy 10 and Pinch
cannon-but there are no carriages for
them, and they are perfectly useless.
1t is said there is only one ordnance
officer in the army. Ordrineau, who I'M
derstands the handling of such guns.
LEES OBSERVATIONS.
General Lee, it is understood. adj
vised the war department that a few
good regiments would be sufficient for
the first movements in Cuba. He re-
lies very strongly upon the efficiency
of the army under General Gomez and
General Garcia, which would naturally
be our allies in war. He reports that !
the revolutionists have an effective |
army of 10000 troops. which they |
could increase to 1901 900 almost any |
time if the arms for them were found. !
Gomez has kept his army in its pres !
ent number because it was too diff |
cult to maintain a large army in that |
country, after its repeated devastation. !
and because 10000 men were enough |
to keep up the war and crush Spain |
slowly. On the other hand, the Span !
iards have, he says. not more than 55.-
900 to $1,000 effective troops. If the rev.
olutionists are armed and a small, but /
well disciplined and seasoned army
from this country is landed in the is
land, he thinks the Spanish will have
no chance for successful resistance.
SHUT OFF FROM FOOD.
Another element in the war that
General Lee, it is understood. COM
mented on. is that Spain's troops in
Cuba are depending upon this country
for food supplies. The island can be
entirely shut off from food by the
action of the United States. 1t is
estimated that Havana would suffer as
much as if it We're actually besieged
if we should prevent our ships from
carrying anything for the Spaniards
and the Spanish ships from procuring
supplies from our ports. Havana, it
is said. by cOnsuls and all VINO have
studied the conditions of affairs on the
islend is absolutely without food. 1t
is said indeed, that none Of the Span
ish armies has any stores of pro-
visions and that Havana is worse off
than any other place. An attacking
force that merely contents itself with
off the food supply would
soon reduce them to submission.
CUBAN ALLIES.
1t is very probable that one of the
plans of the military authorities is to
make effective allies of the Cubans
by arming them and thus turning a
good fighting force of a hundred thou
sand men against the Spaniards. 1t
is said that arrangements are already
made looking TO this end and insuring
the immediate cooperation of the :
American and Cuban forces.
The landing on the island would vir-
tually be on the western end and on
the northern coast. While this would
place the army at a considerable dis {
lance from the Cuban forces under I
Gomez, it has advantages that more s
than offset this apparent separation S
Of the allies. a union could soon be
and the revolutionists, freed
from any restraint along the military
lines in the east, would soon sweep !
On Havana province and unite with /
the Americans. The fleet would also !
aid in the junction OF the forces at '
any point that would be fixed upon for !
such union. {
TROOPS FROM CALIFORNIA.