The Goodland republic. [volume] (Goodland, Kan.) 1891-1907, 1898-03-18

q the supreme court q TIE United Ss1ss1 m
EroFidsnoe vs. BLlin1s q Pitmsn. saidi
me power q legislation orsrssss On ail per-
sons and property belonging - tas BODY polltic-
ms 81 a. original principle which has rs
foundatto1 - society itseiE u 8 granted bT
an zo- the benefit Of All y resides in govern
Elsnts as part q Itself and need uos be re-
served When property q an7 description. o.
the right 70 use - IN any manner. - granted %
inolF1auais or colpo-ate parties However al
soiute the right Of an tadiFidnal- may be. Il IS
Sun 81 The nature O that righs that e must
bear portion Of the public burdens and that
portion must be determined b. the legislature.
This vital power nay Be abused. but the con
stiruttoE q the United States was not intended
% furnish the corrective for every sbuss o.
poTer which nay be committed hT the state
governments The interest wisdom and Jus
tice o. ths rspresantattre body. and its reln-
tioEs with its constituents furnish the only Sc
c1rttys Ehers there IS no express control
against unjust and excessive taxation IS wen
S. against uHHiss legislation Fenera1iy.n IN
1874 the supreme court said. IN the TWentF-
First Wallace "a the Maryland case.
State should Control the Boadz-
No one a. this day imagined that the roads
and bridges Of the country were lot entirely
subject both 70 their construction reuair and
management 70 state regulation and control
They we're al made either BY the states OF IN
der thesr authority No one iu1azined that the
state q itself owner Of she work might not exc
act any amount Whatever Of tolls OF fares OF
freight OF aufhorizs its citizens or c0rporatfons
II owners, % DO the same These are positions
which must be conceded 10 one has ever
doubted them This unlimited right OF the
state 70 charge OF 70 authorize % charge ton.
freight OF fare for TRANSFORMATION on its roads
canals and railroads arises from the simple
fact that they are its own works are constructed
under It's authority. II gives them benz
Il has discretion as 70 the amount q
that CON peusatiou- That discretion Is O le4fs-
latfTe q sovereign discretion and in rs ysrv
nature IS Unrestricted and uncontrolled The
security q The public against any abuse Of this
discretion resides IN the responsibility 70 the
public Of those who OF the time being are duly
invested with IL The state could have buIIt the
road Itself and charged any rate il chose How
does the case dfTer IN q constitutional point OF
view when it authorized its private citizens %
Dultd the roads In cur judgment there IS no
solid distinction II IS simply the exercise bv
the state Of absolute control o. its own prouer-
y 1nd preroEatiTas- % In the celebrated MUM
case the supreme court o. the United States
said, IN deciding that state can Ak maximum
rates:
1t IS insisted however. that the owner Of
property IS entitled 20 q reasonable eomuensa-
ton for its use even though Il Be clothed with
the public interest and that what IS reasonable
Is q judicial and not q legislative question As
has been already shown the practice has been
Otherwise In countries where the common
law prevails it has been customary for the
legislature 70 declare what shan be reason
able compensation. 20 TX maximum beyond
/ which any charge would be unreasonable IN
dOubtedlT IA mere private contracts relating 70
! A-4--eEe ID WHICH lle PUBIC mas no interest
I what IS reasonable must be ascertained Judi
cially, but this is because the legislature has
No control over such contract. so. too. In
matters which do AFFECT the public interests
and as to which legislative control may be ex-
erctsed II there are no statutory regulations
[ upon the subject the ca1rts may determine
what IS reasonable The controlling fact IS
the power 70 requisite az al II that exists
l the right 70 establish the maxfmun Of
charge is implied II fact The common law
rule which requires the charge to be reason
able IS Itself q regulation as 20 price To limit
the rate Of charge OF services rendered in q
public employment OF for the use OF property
in which the public has interest. only
changes the regulation which existed before
II establishes no new principle in the law, but
only gives new eject 20 an old one We know
that this IS power which may be abused but
that is no argument against its existence For
protection against abuse BY legislatures the
people must resort 70 the polls. not 70 the
courts Yet. to-day see that ChaunCeT De-
pew. uphOlding the recent decision Of his asso-
Ciats counsel on the supreme bench Of the
United States tells Us: As to what are rea-
sonable rates, the supreme court viii decide
finally"
Reverses Chief Justice Waite.
And in October, 1874 in the case OF Pick vs..
g n r Co, the supreme court Of the United
States said. Chief Justice Waite delivering the
opinion As 70 the claim that the courts must
decide what is reasonable, not the legislature
that is not new TO this case II has been fully
considered in Mum vs. Illinois Where prop
erty has been clothed with public interest the
legislature may TX a limit 70 that which shall
In law be reasonable for its use This limit
| binds the courts Is well IS the people II il
has been improperly fixed. the legislature,
not the courts, must be appealed 70 for
l change
This law. as applied 20 the maximum rate
law OF Nebraska. would say that II the charge
fixed b. the legislature OF Nebraska Is IN
reasonable and seemed improper. the supreme
court Of she United States says that IN 10 has
been Improperly hxed the legislature. not the
courts, must be appealed 20 for the change But
now comes Mr.. Chauncey Depew's associate
counsel. and in the decision Of the railroad at
torneys which was read By a justice Of the su-
/ preme court Of the United States sitting on the
| bench Of thas august tribunal. after waiting FOR
[ . long year 70 give their subsidized newspapers
time 20 prepare the public mind for the enOr-
nifty, tells Us that 1t IS time 70 reverse the de-
I cisiOns that have stood from the days o. John
Marshall and 20 say TO the CommolWealths OF
the union that they no longer have the power
70 decide what Is reasonable. that the courts
themselves have taken that into their hands
that whenever Q state legislature shall cut the
I rates OF railroad three per cent the supreme
court Of the United States shall spring 70 the
4 rescue OF the corporations that most Of its
1 members represent and inform the legislatures
! that they cant make the laws that John Mar
I shah and waite and q dozen supreme courts
have held 70 be constitutional and Just
/ ConstIsutIonality and Cnnd lions
To take up the arguments made b. the court
( in its attempt 20 justify its -ss-tiol- we ind
that the opinion 81 Justice Brewer. which IS
/ affirmed By the court vas based largely upon
the question OF unreasOnableness and compu-
tafiol made BY him that it effected q reduction
o. freight rates OF e25E per cent. which he held
I was too great q change Nov, it is admitted
on al sides that the local business Of railroad
does not not exceed 10 per cent q its entire
i business 50 that Judge Brewer places himself
{ IA position that q reduction o. - per cent
/ on 70 per cent. which would amount 60 about
I 50 per cent Of the gross business Of railroad
I IS coniscaforE-
Again. the court says that II the circuit
1 court m IS that the present coalitions q bust
/ ness is such as 60 admit the application Of the
[ statute 20 the railway companies IN question
3 without depriTinE them Of iuss CON peusatiou-
Z 6 VIII be rs duty 70 disohlFEe the Injunction
I heretofore granted aud % make whatever order
Z IS Necessary 70 remove any obstruction placed
I By the decree IN these cases IN the way OF the
[ enforcement Of the statute In ether words. the
court says that q IN thsmesntinne. By she progi-
/ Eence o. God times have been improved faster