The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-03-05

From the Philadelphia Press.
I'm the event of hostiltcs with Spain
Havana would naturally be the first
objective point Of this government, ana
its reduction the first test applied to
the American navy. In the minds OF
some of the highest authorities on suCh
matters this would not be an extreme
~ difficult task. one Of them saying re-
Gently: 1T would he magnificent, but
hardly war
This view Of the situation he derived
from a most careful and exhaustive
survey ana comparison of the defenses
of the Cuban city ana the forces that
would be brought to bear against them;
u comparison that showed clearly the
superior advantages which the attack
ing force would have Calmly consid-
cred it does not seem possible that any
thing short of Il miracle, ANA miracles
are not numerous any more, could avail
the Spanards anything that would
even look like q successful defense OF
the city Knowing it's weakness and
the excellent chances of ultimate sue"
cess at cumparatively small expense
and risk. il is quite prohahl" that any
American admiral would hesitate about
turning loose on tn" city the hailstorm
of death and destruction which bonn
hardmcnt would mean.
DEFENSES or HAVANA.
First the dcrenscy of the Cuban capi-
tai must be considered. About them
much has been written aud the Maine
disaster may probably be an illustra-
ton of what can be accomplished if
the American ship will kindly anchor
at marked buoys and swing easily at
their cables awaiting attacks from un-
seen forces. The main forces that could
be brought to bear against an attack
ing squadron are the batteries of Moro
Castle. Cahanas Fortress and Punta
Fortress. These are all situated at the
entrance to the harhor and before them
lies the blue ocean. Across the city
from the Moro Castle to the outskirts
is less than four miles and while tht
inner harbor is provided with seNera
fortresses they would be of little or h'
avail against Il sea attack until the
ships had forced the straits and pro
ceeded inside to engage them.
The harbor entrance fortiticationS
are massive but old, built mostly OF
stone and earth embankments that eX'
merits say would not long withstand tn,
guns. They are defended by guns o.
tremendous size in many cases, but O
a STYLE of long ago, and generally no
much more effective than field pieces
for the kind of work demanded in ;
bombardment. Besides these there arr
several batteries of Armstrong 4
Krupp guns, modern pieces of larg
size, and designed to be very effectiv,
..Rnt. Il
t. be decidedly bad. however, inasmucl
as several of the batteries are so ar
ranged that their zone of fire is Yer!
limited. In fact, they could not b
brought to bear on any ship that di,
not try to force the straits.
NAVAL FORCES HELP.
These fortresses would he reinforce,
by all the ships that Spain could con
centrate in the harbor. which, accord
ing to those well informed, could no
be a very formidable fleet. The Span
ish navy possesses several battleship
of about 5000 tons displacement, som
half dozen cruisers partially armore
and as many more unarmored, and
large tiotilla of torpedo and gunboats
The latter two classes can be largel
eliminated Ill lnc COnSlueIdilOu Ol a
attack on Havana, first, because tn
Eunboats are not especially dangerou
TO anything but unarmed vessels, anC
second, because much of the torped
contingent could not be sent across tn
ocean.
The best naval strength which Spai
could likely muster for the defense c
Havana would consist of two battle
ships, four cruisers of the larger typ
and, perhaps, a dozen smaller Graf
irdifferently armed and not full
manned. The battleships and cruiser
are not i'm the best of condition, a
having been in service for a long Will
and being consequently foul and i
need of general overhaulng. No acct
rate estimate of the number of me
and guns that would be brought int
service can be made, but at the yer