The San Francisco call., 1898-08-26
IND|ANA'S PART IN THE BATTLE -BattIeship Overlooked
 in the Reports. CAPTAIN TAYLOR COMPLAINS 
 CAUSES SAMPSON TO MAKE
 DUE RECOGNITION. Interesting Correspondence to Be Added to the Records Relating
 to the Destruction of " Cervera's Fleet.
CAPTAIN TAYLOR COMPLAINS
CAUSES SAMPSON TO MAKE
 DUE RECOGNITION.
Special Dispatch to The Call.

WASHINGTON, Aug 25.-Admiral :. Sampson has forwarded to the Navy Department the following letters, which have passed between himself and Cap tain Taylor of the battleship Indiana: '. s. s. INDIANA, GUANTANAMO Bay. Aug. ., 1SsS.--Admiral: The report of Commodore Achley on the battle of July as published gives credit in the seventh paragraph to four ships and men tons by name their aptainS-Philip, Evans, Clark and Cook-and adds: The dense smoke of the combat shut out from
 my view the Indiana and Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your nag ship, no doubt their part in the confnct was under your immediate observation. In your report as published you make but slight mention of the Indiana, stating that the Iowa and Indiana having done
 good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me- etc,
 The result of these reports Is that the captains of all the vessels of the line of battle except the Indiana have received personal mention in the official report be- fore, the department. while the two mention, either from the commander-in- chief or the second in command.
 In the official records should they be referred to in the future, it will appear : from it's general tone that the Indiana was less deserving than all her coltsorts Leaving out my personal interest in the matter, 1t is right that I shpul con sideI the officers and crew of the snip, and I speak for them as well as for my self when l submit to you. admiral, that
 the above combination of reports will
 place the ship, in the opinion Of the de- partment and the country, markedly be- low all the other vessels of your squad ron. l respectfully submit, sir, that this is, injustice to the Indiana and her ofh- cers and crew.
 :: l can say without Encouragement of any other vessel that, during the first hour of the fight, the Indiana'S $ gun fire contrib uted to the destruction of the Oquendo and the Teresa more than that of any : single vessel of your squadron, except : one, and equals her. l do not know why the second in command failed to observe the Indiana during this period of our hot test action. l saw the Brooklyn quite plainly.
 ;. An examination of these reports with reference to the Indiana will, l believe, convince you sir, that they do produce the .. effect Of putting the Indiana below all the other vessels of the squadron. If it be your opinion. sir, that this is the case, and that all the vessels from the Brooklyn
 to the Vixen rendered service as much more valuable than the Indiana as the published report of the commander-in- chief and the second in command, taken together, would indicate, then I must ac- ' cept II Tor myself and the ship; if on the contrary, that be not your opinion. l urge
 respectfully that such steps be taken to remedy this injustice as may seem wise II. C. TAYLOR.
 Tn t,o G6I9Ia GGaPtain d D. S N N,s C0mn4msndNng Force, North Atlantic Station. '. s. s. NEW YORK, Guantanamo Bay. Aug. S.-Sir: l am greatly obliged that you have called my attention to what ap- pears to have been an injustice to your they took in the action of July ,, and also Tor the very proper manner in which you have presented It.. I think, however, that tn submitting such a report to the Secre- taTy of the Navy, where so many officers - are Vitally interested and justly proud Of their ship. it is no easy task to do becs :: pnjustly. It requires very careful con sheraton of the report from every point : of view to avoid misunderstanding The position of the ships of the suuad- : ron must be carefully considered to fully appreciate what it was possible for each vessel to accomplish under the circun- stances in which she was placed Those that were to the westward of the escap- /; ing enemy were certainly better placed . placed for delivering their fire than the : vessels to the eastward, which was the blOckading station of the Indiana :: No distribution of the fleet could com pletely predict and provide against every variation of such a sortie nor do I con ;.sfder that any commanding officer de- served either credit or blame because the ship under his command was faster or slower than another ship. or carried a : heavier or lighter battery; but rather that . the commanding officer was blameworthv : when he failed to put his ship in the : proper place for destroying the enemy. just in proportion to the advantage which :he' possessed in speed. battery or posi- :tion over his neighbors.
 $'. Each commanding officer, in my opinion, was personally responsible for the good :use which he made of the tools with which he had to work. l certainly did mot intend to criticize you or to bestow less praise on the Indiana than was be- slowed upon any other ship of ,.4e squad ron.
 :, The fact that the commanding officer Of the Indiana was Signaled to return to blockade at the mouth of the harbor. " after he had so gallantly contributed to the destruction of the Spanish ships, was 0nly a necessary precaution which the commander in chief felt obliged to take ito prevent disaster to the large number of transports which were left in that vi- :cfnity' when the fleet started in pursuit : of the enemy. There were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of know then how many more-which could have come out in the absence of the fleet and produced great havoc among the absence of an armed vessel.
 This explanation, together with your letter. will be sent to the department. with the request that 1t may be attached to and form a part of the original re- port. Very respectfully,
 W. T. SAMPSON,
 Rear Admiral U. S. N
 Commander in Chief United States Naval
 Forces. North Atlantic Squadron The Commanding Officer United States .. steamship Indiana, Guantanamo Bay