New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-09-25

In
tiative less readily thar the other. 1t Is ton
much to expect that the formal perfection a,
imperial methods will be attained In COVER,
ments where life is continually stirred I'D firm
the bottom. The republican soldier is likely &.
be always free and easy in comparison with NJ,
imrerialist rival. Grant round shoudered ana
incapable Of keeping step, would possibly neve,
have won a generals uniform under monarch
yet he seems to have fulfilled all the REQUIRE
ments Of a strategist laid down by Prime.
Hohenohe- Ingelfingen.
II Is not to be supposed that General Porte,
analysed Grants military character with m.
Princes strategical axioms in view. The Primo
dwells on the necessity Of having the initiative
OF giving the law to the enemy, instead OF tax.
ing the law from him. Grants reply to the gen.
eral who told him what Lee was going TO do
showed his contempt for defensive strategy
1t is almost unnecessary to point out how he
anticipated Prince Hohenlohe-In geliingens prin.
cplc that national policy must be closely allied
at every point to strategy" Again, the Princes
statement, AT the outset the destruction Of the
enemy's army must form the objective; every.
thing else. the occupation Of cities or territories
is only Of secondary importance" was antic..
attention so much tn Richmond as to Lees
army. and | want all commanders to feel that
hostile armies, and not cities, are to be their
objective points" This was not the common
view Of Grants time, either in Europe or Amer.
lea. and as late as 1870 the French made pre-
csely the mistake In their plans which Grant
deprecated 1T is impossible to be too strong
for decisive battle The whole effort Of
strategy must be directed to this end, not di.
vertng more forces for secondary objects than
, are absolutely necessary" Grants practice a.
General in Chief was even broader than this
principle requires. He described the Union
armies as acting without concert, like balky
team. no two ever pulling together" The plan
which he carried out was to launch all his
armies against the COnfederacy at the same
time, to give the enemy no rest, and to ALLOW
him no opportunity TO reinforce any OF his
armies by troops which were not themselves
confronted by Union forces" The fourth axioal
u the German strategSt is that no rigid sys.
TEN must BE- adhered TO. the object should be to
choose by sound judgment the shortest path 10
he desired goal" General Porter says Of
Grant that while his plans were always well
rnatured. and much thought and investigation
were expended upon perfecting them in ad.
vance yet they were sufficiently general in their
nature to admit readily Of those changes which
often have TO he made upon the instant in con.
sequence OF some unanticipated movement Of the
eremy. some unexpected discovery in the
topography Of the field Of operations" Finally.
says Prince Hohenohe ngeliingen. Changes
in the plan OF operation lead to incalcuIabk
losses Of strength and time Unless therefore.
the enemy the elements enforce such altera.
tons they are 10 be avoided. Sudden changes
Of intention in the leader have often produced
the greatest misfortunes." Compare with this
the words OF General Porter: He never made
known his plans far in advance to any one. II
was his invariable custom to keep his movements
locked up in his own mind to avoid all posi-.
blity of their being mentioned What impressed
every one most was the sef-reliance displayed
in perfectng his plans. and his absolute faith
in their success. His calm confidence communl-
Gated itself to all who listened to him. and in
spired them with feeling akin TO that Of their
chief
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