The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-06-29
MODERN ARMIES.
Their Largeness Has n Tendency to Mako
Them Immobile.

1heir Largeness Has Tendency to Mako
Them Immobile.
We arc by no means snre that ar
mics at the end of the nineteenth
century are not to some extent in
the condition of the armies of the
last few years Of the eighteenth CEN
tury. No doubt the modern generals
are, or, shall we say seem, less
sleepy headed than the old bewig-
ged Austrians and Prussians, though
they, it must be remembered, were
in their day reckoned men of science.
But at the same time we suspect that
a good deal of our modern military
organization has become stiff a1Ri
impractical. We shall be told. no
doubt, that the Prussiun army went
like clockwork in 1870, but we must
be allowed to doubt whether the
clockwork is quite as good now as
it was then, in spite Of appearances.
Besides, Prussia had just tho very
force opposed to her in 1870 against
which good clockwork would bo
sure to prevail-a piece Of bogus
military mechanism. Whether Prus-
sia would have had as easy victory
II some Frenchinan had arisen capa-
bic of organizing and using Il really
mobile force of 0,O0O men is anoth-
er question. It is possible that such
q spoarhead stuck into tho clock
work might have done great deal
Of damage. That, however, is spec
ulation. What we do know is that
the Prussian army was splendid
fighting organism at the end of tho
Seven Years war, and that at Jena,
some 40 years after, it proved utter
ly unable to meet Napoleon's quick,
fierce assault.
In spite, then, of the magnificent
organization of the present Euro.
pean armies and of their vast size,
we believe it to bo quite possible
that some new Alexander may nriso
who will organize new method of
fighting which, for a time, at any
rate, may bring all their far stretch.
ed greatness to ruin. Of course such
genius in the art of war may new
er get to the front, but that his op-
portunity exists in the present bloat-
ed armaments we have no sort of
doubt. Yet. it will be said, how about
the big battalions9 All military au-
thorities agree that in the end, and
considering that the European ma
tions are practically equal in cour-
age and morale, the way to win a
battle is to confront five men of the
enemy with eight, or, if possible,
ten, men of your own. That proves
that the big armies will always beat
the smalla BY no means. 1t is be-
cause we entirely and absolutely ac-
Quiesce in the big battalions theory
Providence is on the side of the
big battalions. was Napoleon's die
tum-that we hold that small and
properly organized mobile armies
will beat the huge, unwieldy armies
that the modern European strate-
gists contemplate putting into the
field. Remember, your big battal.
ions must confront the little battal.
ion not on paper, but on the ground;
hence. if body Of 90, 600 men can
be swiftly and suddenly confronted
with body Of 10000. the big bat
talions rule is on the side Of the
10000. The fact that the 20, 600 be.
long to an organization which has
q couple Of hundred thousand men
bshina it does not matter. Unless
the 300. 900 men ere available at the
moment they do not count.
An extremely mobile army, ready
to spring first in one direction and
then in another. is quite capable of
beating an army three or four times
its size and beating it always by
having a substantial majority Of
combatants in every actual engage
ment. Ofcolrse the big army may
be 30 splendidly organized that it
will be quite as mobile, if not more
mobile, than the small army. In
that case the small army will be
: swallowed whole. All we contend
is that the hugeness of the European
! armies tends to make them immo-
bile and that, therefore, it is always
possible that some clever invention
in the direction Of intense mobility
may give victory to small and ap-
parently noe particularly we'll found
army in other respects.-Loodon
Spectator.
zao Dxnvess OF sho Bravo.
Holding the baby in his left arm
while he grasped his saber with his