The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-13
Over Methods of Europeans and the "Manana"
Policy of the Spanish Government.
The Protocol Similar in Terms to the First Note Sent
to Spain-MiIitary Commissions to Arrange for
Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico.

according to the terms laid down by Presi-
dent Mckinley. These things have already
quisi1es Cuba, cedes Porto Rico and all her
| other possessions in the West Indies cedes
one of the Ladrone islands, yields the pos
session of Manila city and harbor to the
United States pehding the negotiation and
! exchange of the ratifications of the defni-
tive treaty of peace and consents to the
appointment of a commission to agree on
said treaty and military commissions to
| arrange terms for the evacuation of Cuba
and Porto Rico. The peace commission is
to be appointed within thirty days and is
commissions are to be appointed within ten
days and are to meet in Havana and San
Juan within thirty days. Immediately after
the signing of the protocol the President
issued his proclamation reciting the fact
and declaring hostilities at an end pending
the peace negotiations.
This result is as great victory for Amer
lean diplomacy as the navy's and army's
successes on sea and land were. 1t is a
triumph at once over the devious methods
Of European diplomacy in general and
Spain's ''manana' policy in particular. 1t
was signal instance Of the advantages of
the direct and straightforward way in which
the United States conducts it's diplomacy,
and which has been in the past sneeringly
characterized by the overtrained diplomat
lists of Europe as American 'shirt-sleeve
diplomacy Spain fully expected when the
Madrid government made its first approach
to prolong the preliminary negotiations
over a period as great will now suffice
to complete the whole affair. Instead of
submitting evasive answer or tentative
propositions to Spain's request the Presi-
dent sent the terms on which this govern
ment would now agree to enter upon peace
negotiations There is no more question but
these terms are harder than Spain hoped
erous than she had real right to expect
No other nation would have let Spain or any
other antagonist off so easily having gained
the naval and military advantages the
wise in submitting, as wise in this as she
was unwise in provoking the conflict.
EUROPEAN PRESSURE.
There is good reason to believe that this
display of wisdom was not so much due to
an outburst of unexpected good sense on
Spain's part as to yielding to pressure ex-
erted on the Madrid government by other
European governments. Austria has been
Spain's friend all the time and exhausted
all her influence to foIm a coalition against
the United States before the outbreak of
The firm attitude of resistance the Presi-
dent interposed to European interference,
backed as it was so quickly after hostilities
began by Dewey's splendid and unap-
preached victory at distant Manila, where
to fail meant utter destruction caused Aus
tria and the other continental powers of
Europe to turn their attention to Spain.
There the problem soon resolved itself into
question of how to bring the war to an
end and save the existing government-that
is. maintain the Alfonsian dynasty. The
pretender, Don Carlos, stood ready to stir
his followers to insurrection at the first fa-
vorable opportunity, while the radical eIe-
ments would be glad to destroy both the
Alfonsists and the Carlists. II was by as
suring the Sagasta government that the boy
King should be maintained on the throne
that the continental powers succeeded in
bringing Sagasta to consent to take the in
itiative steps towards peace. They never
approved of the war and they liked il less
when 1t revealed the great republic of the
west as a new world power, and when II
became known to them that the United
States proposed to carry the war into Spain.
boast, but an entirely feasible proposition.
they determined to compel Spain to Weld
to the inevitable. They assured the Madrid
government of their protection. if peace
were made without delay, against internal
assaults. and accompanied this assurance
with a distinct threat to leave her to her
fate If she did not try to make peace. There
was other course left open for Sagasta.
but to sue for peace unless he wanted to