Arizona republican., 1898-05-03

Generdl WHSoH' CHieI or engineers
 was present at the cabinet meeting
 and explained to the president and
 his advisers the plan of effecting
 landing and of securing the base against successful assault by the
 enemy.
 What this place is cannot, for pru-
 dential reasons, be told It is known only to the president and the members of his cabinet, and a few high officers of the army and navy. It was select
 ed after most careful consideration, and is undoubtedly place of greatest strategical advantage. There is every reason to believe that the Spanish gov ernment and Gen. Blanco will be
 very much surprised when they learn the situation of the base. Not only
 will it be a central port of supplies.
 but also of operations fo. the military forces Of the United States.
 It is intended that part of the first
 consignment of arms and ammuni-
 tion will be sent to the insurgents.
 who are much hampered in their Op-
 erations against the Spanish troops 1 by lack of modern rifles and sufficient 1 cartridges. Horses are also needed by 1 the insurgent cavalry and a number
 of animals will probably go with the
 arms.
 A decided difference of opinion has developed among members Of the ad- ministration in regard to establishing
 the proposed base of supplies for the
 purpose of carrying arms and pro
 visions to the Cubans. It is the policy of the army administration generally to postpone active operations Tn the | island until early autumn. It is be- lieved that campaign there in mid summer would be more disastrous to the American cause than four or five
 campaigns in the winter season. In fact, there are chances Uf practical failure in conducting summer cam paign unless a tremendous force of troops is used, whereas by prosecu ing ! 8 vigorous campaign during the win ter the success of the American cause would be assured
 The officers who are opposed to the preliminary expedition base their oD- position on the ground that such ac- tion would precipitate a campaign in Cuba which would call for all the troops which the country expects at ! any time to use against Spain. They believe that as soon as any attempt is made to radiate inland from the Ease of supplies for the purpose of distrib uting relief to the reconcentrados or Of carrying arms and ammunition to the army of the insurgents, the Spanish
 military would vigorously oppose, the movement. Once this opposition of the Spanish forces developed, the United States would be compelled to resist it and to force the issue. In a
 very short time under these circum- stances the country would become in | volved in just such summer cam paign as the army administration is disposed to avoid
 Officials of the navy department and Of the naval strategy board are also
 opposed to the preliminary expedition i in several cases. They declare that the adequate protection of the project
 at its inception and subsequent carry ing into effect would require the ser vices of such a naval force as could not be easily spared from the ether 1 Cuban and West Indian waters If
 the base should be established within the radius of the present blockade, as i it probably would be, according to the present intention of the government,
 the point would very likely become the objeot Of naval as well as military
 attack by the Spanish. There is
 some likelihood that the land opera tions would have that point as their center and that the naval struggle
 would be chiefly confined to the waters
 of that locality This would be all
 very we'll if it were not desirable in the opinion of the administration
 generally to postpone active cam 1 paigning until after. the rainy sea- son provided Spain does rot force
 earlier action.
 Orders have been issued to the de- pot quartermaster at New York to i supply transportation for something | like 5000 men from Key West to Cuba. The chief ordnance officer at Cover nor's island was directed to get ready for immediate shipment about 50,0O0
 rifles, mostly KragJorgensons, and a
 large quantity of ammunition for the rifles.
 1 Few details in reference to these orders can be obtained, but it may be
 said that rifles and ammunition will
 reach Key West in time to accom-
 pany the force that is to be sent to i Cuba It is now known that mes senger from the war department has
 established communication with Go
 meg and that the insurgent leader is
 ready to move his army toward Ha-
 vana as soon as the rifles are delivered to him.
 The force to be sent to Cuba will be
 composed entirely of regulars, mostly infantry, with a battery or two of
 light artillery and possibly troop ot
 cavalry. The force to be sent will be
 large enough to guarantee the safe i delivery of the arms. Then Gomez
 will have a chance to show just what 1 he can do.
 LATE FROM HAVANA.