The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-08-07

soundron was fully accomplished. and each Inc
diyidual bore we'll his part in 1.-THE Commo-
dore In command OF the Second Division, the
Coptains OF ships, their officers and men. The
fire of the battleshlps was powerful and destruc-
tive and the resistance OF the Spanish SQUAD
ron was, In great part, broken almost before
thoy had got beyond the range OF their W
forts" II higher praise IL expected, the only
reply that can DO made is that 1t is. historically.
rarely given. When individual men arc named,
unless some conspicuous and unusual deed
compels It, those passed over feel slightedi
while, II each who has done his duty is individ-
unlly named. oil distinctive effect Is lost Those
who doubt may examine the dispatches OF men
like Nelson and Farragut.
It would be improper to conclude without
saving that there Is not the slightest proof that
Commodore Schley Is in the least responsible
for tho malicious attempts made to depress Ad-
miral Sampson with o view to exalt the second
in command. On the contrary, when they came
TO his ears he telegraphed to the Navy DepArS-
ment Ton July 10Y his modification =" at the fact.
handsomely attributlng the victory to the force
under the command Of the commandments
chief OF the North Atlantic station; ito him
the honor is due More than this, there is no
occasion for him to say. nor need he have said
anything but for the obligation forced upon
him by tho indiscreet and unEenerous clamor
VI lilObo bONilib ""
he might we'll pray to be saved.
So far as precedents may properly influence
opinion In q matter OF this kind, 1t is Interest,"
ing MS we'll rs instructive to notice two other
instances in the career OF Nelson, Tor he was
usually q second in command and was prone to
come to the front, as at Copenhagen, not by the
absence OF his superior. but by his own initia-
tive. At Cape st. Vincent, Nelson-not being
second. but third or fourth-of his own motion.
A. NrIaee fnpk n atan hnrinR the course
OF the battle which was a leading cause OF iS
success, and threw upon his W shin the
largest single share in the whole fighting
Nevertheless. although for this he received am"
pie recognition, official as well as public. the
| greater reward by far was rightly adjudged to
his chief. whose ship was much less exposed
but to whose previous dispositions and action
it was owing that Nelson had the opportunity
he 80 well improved.
At the Nile, Nelson, in seniority Of flag rank
upon the station. was again only third or
| fourth. but he was in sole ommand of II large
detachment, 1000 miles away from his nearest
superior. The battle therefore was fought
| solely "ofr his own bat = the decision to fight,
the methods, and the actual fighting, were all
his own. Nevertheless. although the COM
mander-in-c chief was absent in a very full
sense Of the word. the fact that Nelson was not
q commander-in-chief was held. unjustly I
think, to diminish his claim 20 reward. The
reward. quite inadequate to the achievement,
was the highest. " wrote the First Lord OF the
Admiralty. that has ever been conferred upon
an officer Of your standing who was not a COM
mander-in -chief.' This decision. therefore.
was based on precedent, and throws light on
British practice and opinion-and in naval mat
tiers no nation has had a wider experiments
to the relative responsibilities and claims Of
commanders-in in chief and flag officers junior to
them. A. T.. MAHAN.
Captain tRetiredl u. =. Navy.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8.