The Jasper weekly courier. [volume] (Jasper, Ind.) 1858-1922, 1898-12-02
INTERESTING DOCUMENT.
x. ,ort of Gen. Crow ninshieid. chief OF the
bureau OF Navigation. Navy
Department..

NHlCH mas just pt'H h''N' iN"''N'
Not only was the head of this bureau
a member OF the war or strategy
board, as il came TO be known. but he
was RESPONSIBLE for the execution OF
plans formed by that board and for
the movement OF every ship and the
assignment Of every officer.
No Bureau omccr Had Equal Opportunity.
Consequently no bureau officer had
equal opport unity 60 now the moving
purposes and exact history Of the war.
The report is absolutely free from per-
sonalities there is no reference what
ever to the now happily-ended Samp-
son-Schley controversy. no criticism
OF any officer. nor commentator that
might be regarded as invidious and
discriminating. But the report is
facts. with few important recon-
mendations for the betterment of the
naval service.
The Precautionary Orders.
The war history begins with the
simple statement of certain precau-
tionarv orders that were issued. but
even in the absence of comment. at
tention can not fail 10 be attracted to
the remarkable foresight exhibited in
the preparation OF the official orders.
They begin with an order. dated Jan
uary | / last. directing the commander
of the European station to retain in
service men whose enlistment were
about TO expire. and those following,
provide for the successful extrication
of the European squadron from the
danger 10 which it was exposed upon
the out break of the war.
The south Atlantic squadron.
They show how the South Atlantic
squadron vas brought up to reinforce
sampson; how the Oregon started on
her famous race around South Ameri.
ca. how stores and ammunition were
forwarded 10 the squadrons and.
finally. they wind up with the famous
laconic order to Dewey of April 26:
War has commenced between the
United States and Spain. proceed at
once to the Philippine islands Com.
mence operations at once. particular
J., against Spanish fleet. You must
capture vessels or destroy. Use ut
most endeavcrs."
Ready for Any Emergency.
These orders show that four months
before Ccrvera's fleet reached this side
our whole North Atlantic fleet was
ready for any emergency within strik.
ing distance of one of the two points
from which attack might come.
Trained gunners. TO the number Of
-. who had Just graduated from the
course on the Amphtrite. were
placed on the vessels of the fleet and
rendered a good account of themselves.
a Case in Point.
As exhibiting the quality OF these
men, Capt. Crowninshield cites the de-
rtruction of three giinboats BY the lit.
tie Scorpion in Manzanillo harbor.
July T.. Of which the commanding
officer reports: Orders were given To
Obtain the range with two of the six
Founders. after which the first shell
from the fye-inch gun blew her up.
apparently having struck her boilers"
Good Gunnsry Counted.
Capt. Crowninshield says The
completeness OF our naval victory dur
ing the war and the almost absolute
immunity from injury which our ships
and crews enjoyed, naturally led TO a
general conclusion that our gunnery
Rad much 10 do with the matter. As
a matter Of fact all reports bear out
this conclusion"
Importance To the Nation of Sea Power
Capt. Crowninshield declares that
the experience of the war has been an
other demonstration of the impor-
tance TO the nation of sea power. lie
says that from the first the only APP
prehension felt in this country was
on account OF the Spanish navy. II
was Ccrvera's ships that we feared
We did not fear the Spanish army
would not feared it IF it had beer
three times as powerful. unless il hac
been supported by "A navy powerful
enough to have formed an etiicien
convoy and brought to this coast"
Only the spanish Navy Menace.
Or the contrary, the Spanish navy
even without the Spanish army. woul'
have been a menace, though IL had con
sisted of only one first class cruiser
Until that cruiser had been blockad
cd. captured or destroyed, any unpro
tected point on our coast and all o
our sea commerce would have been a
it's mercy. and no army, however Ell
cient. could have protected us from il
i required n navy for this work as a
effective navy.
The Combined Operations.
Touchisg upon the combined opera
irons of the army and navy, the diff
ferences which arose between the CON
manders during the campaign wcr
satisfactorily solved by victory. On
glaring effect of the system OF join
operations was found, however, in th
natter of transporting and convoyin
troops, and il is recommended that I
secure smoother handling Of such
campaign. the navy be. by law, charge
with the transport service.
OCCUPATION OF CUBA.