The Jasper weekly courier. [volume] (Jasper, Ind.) 1858-1922, 1898-05-20
WILL MODIFY THEIR PLANS.
Eject Of the Appea of tho spanish
Flying squadron in East
Indian Waters.

less than l,OoO miles from Havana,
caused the dispatch of the flying squad
ron under Commodore Schley and the
delay of the army of invasion of Cuba.
IL is to the navy that the government
again looks for "a battle that may end
the conflict.
The news of the Spanish fleet re-
vealed at once the possibility of quick
move on the part of the Spanish fleet
that would cut the line of communica-
tion by water between Cuba and Key
West, exposing TO great peril any
American landing force that might be
caught between "A superior Spanish
army in Cuba and the sea patrolled by
Spanish cruisers.
Ii became necessary, therefore, to
defer the departure of the military ex.
petition from Florida until the Spanish
fleet is met and crushed or driven from
West Indian waters
Orders flew quick and fast from both
the war and navy departments. The
first checked the movement on Florida,
setting in from all parts of the eoun-
try, and diverted the troops toward the
concentration camp at Chicbamauga.
The navy department wired Samp-
son information of the approach of the
Spanish fleet and directions what
10 do, and another order flashed
to schley, who has been eat
ing out his heart at Hampton
roads in his eagerness to get
into the fray. to start with his vessels
ut the earliest possible moment. The
commodore took no chance of a cancel
lation of these highly desirable orders,
but at 3:45 o'clock had put himself be-
yond the reach of any telegraphic re-
call. What is expected of him cannot
be disclosed at the.navy department.
and naturally is purely matter of
conjecture. SIMPSONS fleet is strong
the Spanish dying squadron
if he can ever catch il out of the reach
of fortifications His fleet. however,
is lacking in speed rs compared To the
Spanish vessels. and cooperation on
the part of our flying squadron would
add very much to the chance of corner
ing the >paniards and forcing the fight,
which is believed to be necessary To
the success of the Cuban campaign.
Some one suggested at the navy de-
partment that the Spanish fleet when
last heard from was at point not very
much more distant from the great cit
les of the Atlantic seaports than from
Havana, but if the Spanish admiral
contemplatcs movement In the former
direction he probably will run full into
Schley.
Much regret is expressed among
naval officers at the delays experienced
in communicating with Sampson, and
il is not learned yet at the navy de-
partment whether the admiral has
actually received up to this moment
the important advices as to the move
ments of the Spanish fleet that have
been dispatched TO him. Doubt on
this score is founded on the experience
the department has had already with
the cables received yesterday from the
West Indies.
1t was stated positively at the close
of Office hours that no word had come
during the day from Admiral Samp-
son, rave the one telegram sent out
yoste rday morning regarding the at
tack an the forts at San Juan. 1t can
be stated that there is good ground for
the belief that the admiral has achieved
all that was expected of him or that
was necessary to carry out the plans
of the strategy board. The pur-
pose was to destroy San Juan
as a fortified base that might
form harbor of refuge for
the Spanish fleet. and according to the
admiral's report this has been prac-
tically accomplished. II was neither
necessary nor material that san Juan
itself be occupied, all that was essen
tial being that the Spanish fleet should
find no more protection there than it
would in any harbor without substan-
tial defenses. and if the Spanish squad
ron should have the temerity now to
enter San Juan harbor, they will fall
easy victims To SIMPSONS battlcships
and monitors.
Capt. O'Neil, chief of the bureau of
ordnance. was with Secretary Long
several times during the day, giving
him information as to the amount of
ammunition Admiral Sampson has on
board. 1t is the opinion of the bureau
officials that the bombardment of
san Juan did not materially de-
pletc SIMPSONS stock of powder, shot
and shell. There is no doubt, how
ever, that il made considerable inroad
upon it, as it is said that a continuous
fire for three hours that the ships were
in action would have completely ex-
hausted the entire stock. There is no
possibility, however, of such a
continuous fire, and the officials
feel satisfied that Sampson has
at least half of his ammunition and
perhaps more still on board. Every
ship in his fleet was stocked to its
fullest capacity with powder, shot and
shell. The division which sheled San
Juan had 90 rounds of the large size
projectiles for the IL and l3-inch guns.