The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-06-23
The Administration Will Not
Invade Porto Rico.
NO OBJECT IN 1T NOW
A General Aggressive Campaign in the
Island OF Cuba In to Be Entered
Upon ~ Soon a. Santiago
Is Captured.

garded by the highest military authori-
ties Of both the navy and army as prac-
tically removed from immediate m
sideration, and unless the death rate OF
General Skaters army from diseases
Indigenous to Cuba shall be unusually
high. the presidents desire for the pros
ecution Of a general aggressive cam
paign throughout the entire island Of
Cuba may be promptly entered upon the
Santiago is captured.
The suggestion of a Porto Rican cam
paign to precede the invasion Of Cuba
was put forth more than a month ago,
before Admiral Sampson bombarded
San Juan. and pending the uncertainty
regarding the destination of Cervera's
squadron, then several weeks at sea
from Cape Verde. The unexpected Diff
culties met with In organizing the great
volunteer army needed for the Cuban
campaign. together with the urgent
warning delivered by medical experts
against the advisability of exporting
raw. unacclimated recruits to the pes
tflential climate of Havana and the sur
rounding country, where the blockade
conditions were presumed TO be unusu-
ally favorable to a devastating scourge
OF yellow fever. together with the COM
parative salubrity Of Porto Rico and
the relatively small Spanish force hold
ing that island, worked strongly to
bring about the approval Of the scheme
to obtain control OF II as a war neces-
sity.
The desirable diplomatic point sup-
posed to be gained through actual oc-
%cupation before Spain could sue for
peace In Difference to strong pressure in
that direction. which II was well known
was being exerted at Madrid, gave no
little weight to the project. and prepa-
rations for its accomplishment went
forward so energetically that even after
Cervera had shut himself up at San
tiago. and both Commodore Schley and
Admiral Sampson had confessed hat
an attempt to eject him would prove
futile without the cooperation of the
army corps. the Porto Rican enterprise
was o abandoned, but was tempor-
arily pushed aside by the more import
ant necessity Of sending General SHAFT
ter to Santiago as ex~peditiously as pos
sible.
His fleet of transports had barely
sailed from Tampa last week before
many officials in Washington. in the alb
sence OF any countermanding OF the
original orders for mobiliz,ng the Porto
Rican expedition. again took up its de-
tails and were hurrying the prepara-
tions along on the original line, when
General Miles returned and convinced
the highest authorities that the best
OF military reasons existed for concen-
trating every sourc of the govern
ment. for the time being. at least, upon
the support OF General Shafter. whose
campaign was OF a more hazardous ma
ture than had been generally appre-
ciated.
Notwithstanding the excellent equip
ment and the trained forces which had
been provided in this army corps. the
fact that $1,000 men were to be landed
I'm a strange country. in the face of
numerous foes. whose exact strength
could only be estimated. will prove the
crucial event of the whole war. Its
success may be expected to result in
SPANS prompt realization of the flu
tility of further resistance. while a
serious reverse. even OF a temporary
character, might indefinitely prolong the
duration of hostilities.
The Illusion that the actual possess
sion of Porto Rico constituted any
valid advantage from an international
law point. was speedily dispelled by the
citation of presidents. the most recent
OF them being the acquisition by Japan
OF Formosa at the treaty of Simonoski.
although the island Vas in the possess
sion of hin at the crosse of the war.
1t was also made evident hat the
United States had absolute justiica-
tltn. WHICH COulu not De CpfTlDdttSu Dy
neutrals, for exacting the surrender OF
Porto Rico by Spain as an indemnity
against the part of the cost of the war,
especially as Ii was universally con-
coded that the government had already
the power Of eventually debating the
terms OF peace. In fact. II there existed
any responsible argument for running
the risk of sacrificing General Shafter
for the acquisition OF Porto Rico al
present an altogether negligible ele-
ment In the war. Ii Is yet to be support
ed with telling weight in the opinion
of the state department omcials and
members of the diplomatic corps in
Washington. 1t now appears to be
c~onclusively settled that no further at
tention will be paid to Porto Rico fol-
the present, unless IL develops a stra.
tegic Importance, utterly u~nrecognizet
at the present time.
The effect of General Miles strenu.
Gus representations of the urgent mill
tary exigencies which demand immedi'
ate additions to Genera Shafter'.
army are evident On all sides. The de
cision to send at least one regiment o.
volunteers on the fast auxiliary cruiser
Yale from Newport News on Thursday
to be followed by others on he Har
ward a few days later. n another
brigade from Camp Alger during tn
ensuing week. are fair instances OF tn,
success of his recommendations.
A serious problem whose solution
was determined upon by the authorities
to-day, is that of the disposition o
the vast number OF prisoners who mus
fall into American hands wheneve
Santiago tula This number 1
~variously estimated all the way from
%. 900 to 5000 men, and as the Unite'
states will not permit them To suhe
any avoidable hardships, provision ha
10 be made at once for their mainten
ance Ii has been definitely learne'
that they cannot be permitted to re
main in Cuba, and IL will therefore b
necessary to provide a large number o
transports to bring them to this coun
try where they can be more readil'
guarded. II will require a much large
fleet of transports Than that whicI
carried General Skaters army. and
considering the extreme difficult
which the wal department has alread
encountered in securing an additlona
ieet under the impression that Port
Rico was still to be occupied, IL is no