Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-03-08
POP IDOL IS BROKEN.
NEBRASKA MAXIMUM FREIGHT
RATE BILL KNOCKED OUT.
1T WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES
SO DECIDED.
Able Opinion Given by Justice Bar-
Ian Defining Legislative Powers
on the Subject-It Wa.
William j. Bryan's =
Case.
1T WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

opinion was handed down Dy justice Ear-
Ian, who held the Nebraska law to be con-
trary to the fourteenth amendment in that
it authorized the taking of property with
out due process of law. and was therefore
invalid. Hence the railroads won.
Justice Hurlan's opinion affirmed the
opinion OF the circuit court of appeals for
the Eighth circuit, which was against the
maximum freight rate law and favorable
to the railroads.
Justice Harlan said that the following
principles must be regarded as settled:
First-A railroad corporation is a person
within the meaning OF the fourteenth
amendment. declaring that no state shall
deprive any person OF property without
son within its Jurisdiction the equal pro-
lection of the laws.
Second-A state enactment, or regulation
made under the authority of a state en-
actment establishing such rates for the
transportation of. persons or property by
railroad, as will not admit OF the carrier
earning such compensation as, under all
the circumstances are just to 1t and TO
the public. would deprive such carrier OF
its property without ttoT PROCESS csio, OF 81 law law lame ana
and would therefore be repusnant to the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution
of the United States.
Third-While rates for transportation of
persons and property within the limits of
a state are primarily for its determination,
the question whether they are so unreason-
Gioly NV" oS " CPAk AAS VI ~
property without such compensation as the
constitution secures. and therefore, with
out due process of law. cannot be so con.
ciuslvely determined by the legislature of
the state or by regulations adopted under
its authority that the matter may not be-
come the subject of judicial inquiry.
This last proposition. Justice Harlan said.
covered the case in point. He then pro-
ceeded to make an exhaustive examination
into the effect of the enforcement of the
rates prescribed upon the business of the
diff rant NAhrQSkn 1npG ahnVinO tho rQ.
duction to amount to $3.50 per cent for the
years 1891, 1892 and 1893. The result was
to show that each of the roads involved
would for this period have conducted their
business at a loss with only one or two ex-
ceptions and those for only a short while.
The case was instituted to test the val
%islature in 1893. prescribing the maximum
rates for the transportation of freight by
railroads within the state. Thu act APP
plies specifically to freight whose transit
b sinS and ends in the state, and there was
no effort in its enactment to control inter
state freight. 1t affected all the railroads
in the state and the companies instituted
proceedings in the Nebraska circuit court
soon after the law was enacted. The object
of the bill was to secure an order restrain
ing the state officials from putting the law
into force.
The law was attacked on the ground of
its constitutionality. 1t was charged that
nasmuch as the act applied only to state
onistic to the spirit Of the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution. They con-
tended that the maximum rate fixed was
unreasonable and ruinous to the roads. 1t
was also asserted that the act interfered
NTH inferstats ee SItp The stat, h,n met
of the validity of the law and also witt the
counter charge that the case was one CT
which the federal courts could not properly
take jurisdiction.
The decision in the circuit court was de-
livered by Justice Brewer. of the supreme
1919 n ~tat~ tya ~ $50
railroad companies and held against the
validity of the law. His opinion was based
largely upon the charge of unreasonable
ness.
The case has been twice argued III the
supreme court, Hon. w. J. Bryan appear-
tn, the as 4r hes Hf the f Iueh i tor the h slat 5ee aa
manifested in the decision ever since the
case was docketed because Of the prob
would have upon legislation in other states.
In his opinion. Justice Harlan first de-
tailed the facts relating to the passage of
the act by the Nebraska legislature in
1893. and then sketched briefly its provis-
ions, saying that among others of its pro-
visions was one to fix reasonable maxi
mum freight rates on the railroads of the
state and to classify freights. He then
took UP in order the points at issue be-
tween the state and the railroad COM
panies. dealing first with the question of
one OF equity rather than of law. 1t was
contended in the argument that the rail-
roads had an adequate remedy at law be-
fore the state and supreme court and that
sitting in equity was without jurisdiction.
On this point he said: The adequacy or
i~nadequacy of a remedy at law for the pro-
lection of the rights Of one entitled upon
any ground to invoke the powers of a
federal court Is not to be conclusively de-
termined by the statutes of the particular
state in which the suit may be brought.
One who is entitled to sue in the federal
circuit court may invoke its jurisdiction in
equity whenever the established princi-
pies and rules of equity permit such a
suit in that court, and he cannot be de-
prived of that right by reason of his being
| allowed to sue at law in a state court on
the same cause of action.
THE contention that the state was the
real party in interest and that therefore
the federal courts could not take cogniZance
of it under the eleventh amendment to the
constitution was overruied, the court say
ing that the federal courts had jurisdiction
because. both of the diverse citizenship or
alienage of the parties and also on account
| of the fact that the act is attacked as con-
trary to the provisions of the federal con-
stitution."
Justice Harlan then took up the constitu-
! tional questions involved. by the four
teenth amendment" he said. lit is pro-
vided that no state shall deprive any person
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws"
meaning of this amendment is now settled.
What amounts of deprivation of property
without due process OF law, or a denial OF
the equal protection of the laws. is often
difficult to determine, especially where the
question relates 10 the property of a quasi
public corporation and the extent to which
it may be subjected to public control: But
this court. speaking by Chief Justice Waite.
has said that while a state has power to
fix the charges by railroad companies for
the transportation OF persons and property
within its own jurisdiction, unless restrain
ed by valid contract. or unless what is
done amounts to a regulation of foreign or
interstate commerce, such power is not
without limit; and that. under pretense of
regulating fares and freights. the state can
not require a railroad corporation to carry
persons or property without reward, neither
can it do that which in law amounts to the
taking of private property for pubic use
without just compensation, or without due
process of law
"The idea that any legislation. state or
federal. can conclusively determine for the
people and for the courts that what it
thorizes its agents to do. is consistent with
the fundamental law. is in opposition to
the theory of our institutions. The duty
rests upon all courts. federal and state.
to see to it that no right secured by the
supreme law of the land is impaired or de-
stroyed by legislation.
1t had been commended on behalf of the
law that the state of Nebraska could le-
gally require local freight business to be
conducted at an actual loss. if the COM
pany earned on its interstate business
enough to give it just compensation in re-
interstate and domestic; The court did not
accept this view. Justice Harlan saying:
w cannot concur in this view. In our
judgment, it must be held that the reason
scribed by a state for the transportation
of persons and property wholly within its
limits must be determined without refer
ence to the business OF an interstate char