The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-08-16
The Crisis in the Far East.

opinion In Europe. Such a consensus
of adverse criticism is as unique as it
is significant Lord Salisbury's supine-
ness in dealing with Russia in the
east has alarmed Englshmen as they
We're never alarmed since Napoleon
threatened to invade their country.
They do not know how far he has gone,
or is likely to go, in acQuiescence in
Russia's aggressivencss and territorial
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. Englishmen are al
ready realizing that the dismember-
ment of China is n prehguration of the
dsintegration Of their own vast en-
pire. The premier's policy is inexplic-
able on the ordinary grounds of ma
tiOnai interest. His diplomacy has
been no match for Russian intrigue.
lie assures China that if she holds out
against the designs and demands of
Russia. England will support her. But
China does not hold cut. When Rus
sia makes a demand, China, after a
display of oriental procrastination
yields. She either mistrusts the abil-
ity of England to resist Russia, or,
what is more likely, Russian influence
in her government is paramount. The
emperor of China is a weakling,
fatalist without moral or physical
strength either to direct, control or
govern his vast kingdom. Nominally
omnipotent. practically Kwangsu, the
Son of Heaven, is more a clod of the
earth than a divine despot. The EN-
press dowager is the real ruler, and Ii
Hung Chang is her minister. Both
favor Russian designs as more in con-
sonance with their own avariciousness
than Great Britain's open door
How far they may go in this direc-
tion depends entirely on how far Lord
Salisbury proves pliable, and the Eng
lish people acquiescent Just at pres
ent it seems that England has allowed
the intrigues at Pekin to go as far as
she will submissively permit without
trouble. The English people do not
readily follow the sinuosities even of
their own diplomacy. But Russias c.
cupation of Manchuria, and the French
triumph in Nigera, has shaken off the
national lethargy. If Russia has for
a comparatively small matter as is in
volved in the construction of a rail-
way from Tienstien to Newchwang,
from English capitalists, Here is an
end to the sphere of British influence
in the east. But Russia has struck
nearer home. She has demanded from
the Shah of Persia the strong position
Mandeb. If the Persian is forced to
acquiesce, the Suez canal would be
practically dominated by Russia and
England's way to India blocked as ef-
fectively as if the czar was the ruler
of Port Said.
1t is reported that Lord Salisbury is
yielding to the desire of the queen,
who has no wish to sign another dec
laration of war which she forsees
would dim the last days of her long
and glorious reign. Her influence
among the crowned heads of Europe is
great. She can even hold in check the
impetuosity of the Emperor William,
who is more responsive to her counsel
than to that of any other human be-
ing. But. of course, her pacificatory
intercession has its limits. 1t is prob
able that the czar himself is not in
dividually anxious for war or farther
extension of his illimitable domnlons
Russia has never displayed much
vitality in a civilized warfare. Charles
XII. of Sweden nearly drove Peter the
Great off his throne; 1t was not Rus
sian arms that drove back the Napo-
leonic invaders; in her war with Eng
land in the Crimea Russia showed
many weak spots in her mighty frame
work; in her last war with Turkey,
she evinced more uncertainty and in
capacity than invincible strength in
dealing with "A comparatively weak an
tagonist. OF course there is France to
be reckoned with. Whether England
obtains allies or not, she will certainly
have to reckon with France in a war
with Russia.
But neither the queen nor Lord Sal
isbury can stave off a war, however
long they may help to frustrate it,
| once Englishmen have made up their
minds to fight. Upon this point Great
| Britain is acting on the principle tina,
the longer the inevitable hour Is de.
| layed, the better prepared Russia will
be to resist her on the seas and in the
| field. The Russian Siberia army con
sists of from $4,000 10 70, 900 men. Eng,
| land can meet this force on the spo
| by probably an equal number. i
| Frence should attempt to reinforce tn,
| Russians in the east, she would. o
course, have 20 disable the Englisl
fleet. The English naval power is di
yided into two great squadrons, II
European waters, known respectivel!
as the Channel squadron and tn,
Mediterranean squadron. Their re
spective names serve 20 indicate thei
positions, the one in the home waters
the other in the Mediterranean. Boil
are within striking distance Of tn
French shores. Great Britain woul
in the event of war fit out at least tw
Aying squadrons. The first would sal
directly for the Baltic; the secon
would make for the Euxine or Blacl
Sea, with view to forcing the Oar
dannelles in the process. We do no
know how far this policy would b