The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-04-18

we SHALL. HOPE ron TDE BEST.
The senate disagrees with the house;
and the president agrees with neither.
This Is the awkward tangie into which
the Cuban question has fallen. all over
non-essentfals. The president and con-
gress are in complete harmony upon the
main question. which ID armed interview
ton, but they are Of three opinions as
to the exact legislative process that
shall be adopted. II II true that Nc
Kinley and the house are not far apart:
but II IL also true that It took ground
Tar advanced over the recommendation
and apparent purposes Of his message.
The differences are reconciiable. They
are Of degree only. The president can
accept the house resolution and faith
fully carry out ifs directions, feeling
that they are after all In furtherance Of
his own policy.
The senate has deliberately opposed It
self to . recommendation OF the presi-
dent. It has given q political aspect to
the entire matter. The house IL Re-
publican, and il with the president The
senate Is not Republican. and Il IL
against him, It has sought to direct the
executive into the adoption of . method
obnoxious to 1t and contrary TO Its ex-
piicit announcement. The senators
are all loyal and patriotic gentlemen.
and some Of them in the course Of their
speeches thought 1t becoming to give
the country assurances Of their patriot
Ism and loyalty. They could have the
more effectually demonstrated before
the world the single-mindedness. the
unselfishness and the firm and ire
fragabie purpose Of the American peo-
pie to perform q trying and thank
less duty IL they had made q genu-
Inc effort for harmonious action between
the two houses Of congress and the
president.
The president cannot be altogether ac-
quilted of responsibility for the pres
ent muddle. He expressly placed the
Cuban question In the hands Of con-
gress. BY his argument against Cuban
recognition he invited discussion of that
phase OF the question. Results have not
fallen out as he wished or intended. II
he had not asked congress to take the
initiative. but had outlined and recon-
mended q definite policy-a policy OF
armed Intervention and aggressive ac-
ton to free Cuba - the senate
would not have dared oppose IT.
self to him. To have embarrass-
ed or handicapped him would have
been q blow at Cuban liberty and
at humanity itself and an unmerited
rebuke to the deep resentment the coun-
try cherishes for the Maine murder.
The house resolution Is satisfactory
to the country. The senate reso-
luton in itself is none the less accept
able. What the nation wants. and
wants aoNs is the cApbAslOu Oh the span
ish from Cuba Peaceful measures are
failure. TIE American people have
no confidence In Spanish promises. They
are not alarmed by the prospect of
European mediation by force. They feel
that IL the question Is not settled now.
it must be met next year or the year
after. So the earlier the better. and the
more efYecsuaily and completely the task
Is done the more satisfactory are like
~ to he the results. The expulsion of
the Spanish from Cuba, or their uncon-
disional withdrawal. Is demanded and
must be effected not only in tho name
OF civilization. but for the sake OF our
domestic peace. The question OF Cuban
independence win then take care of IT.
self.
Meanwhile, we can only wal. ana