The Chanute times. [volume] (Chanute, Kan.) 1897-1913, 1898-09-09
GEN. SHAFTER ON SANTIAGO.
Says It Was a Mistake to Send an
Army to Santiago in June.
HEAT KILLED HIS SOLDIERS
Tells of tho Stupsndous Difficulties Til at
Had to BE and Were Surmountod
-Bctter That Santiago Was Not Taken
July 2.

|
eral Shafter, in which the general is
represented as saying; "At Santiago
we had to deal with things as they
are, not as they Should be. OF course
there was sickness. 1t was inevitable
in summer campaign. But nobody
was neglected. The doctors were
scarce at first, but we had boat loads
of them as soon as they could get
there. Doctors got sick like the rest.
They were overworked and exhausted
But their ability is unquestionabie.
Look at the low per centage of deaths
from wounds. 1t was never lower in
any war. Why, in the civil war lay
ON the battlefield myself until my
wounds were in horrible condition,
and that was right near by, not down
in a malarious, sub-tropical country,
far away.
''Thc men who ordered summer
campaign in feyer-nfested country
are responsible for the natural and I'M
avoidable consequences. None of our
wounded was allowed to lie on the bat
tie field as l was in the civil war.
Nothing of the kind happened. Anacs
thetics were plentiful.
'It was the heat that was so deadly,
and the rains. Right in the midst of
the most torrid heat shower would
fall. 1t would drench every body with
out cooling the air. In few minutes,
under the sun again, every man would
be steaming Men of the strongest
constitutions succumbed.
"Our first case of yellow fever de-
veloped at Ell Caney. But the army
was ripe for it and it spread like a
prairie fire Many man had yellow
fever who will never know it. And to
tell the truth it is not so dangerous as
| the calentura or heat attacks that un-
acclimated men have in the malarial
regions of Cuba. Why. it is a common
thing for mans temperature to rise
from normal to los in few hours
| That means death in most cases. 1t
can give cards and spades to yellow
fever in the game of death. Id rather
have yellow fever.
''We at the front did not wait to let
the fever have it's run. We wanted to
save life. Now the problem was to
save the most lives possible We had
| never had foreign war since 1Sl2-14.
The United States has no hospital ships
1t was not a question of using what
was best, but what we had. We used
the transports that brought the troops
down.
IF I could have had few more
weeks to equip hospital ships the con-
dition would have been better. If the
war had continued we would have
stayed right there, fever or no fever
The sudden ending of the war was UNI
expected. | made it an invariable
rule to send home twenty-five less men
on transport than she had brought
south. That was fair view TO take
Il am satisfied with the Santiago
campaign. When it is fully under
stood, all its difficulties, it will receive
just place in military history. We
were hurried off to Cuba. We landed
and could not have got our stores back
on board ship if we had wanted to-
| When the invasion was planned it
was obvious that it must be rush.
| Such it was.
And it was a succeSs-complete and
unequivocal. Many things were done,
it is true, that were forced upon us by
the eXigencies of the hour, but the
means employed, even under such
stress, proved to be wisely chosen. |
was compelled to do a great many
things that under different circum-
stances would not have been consid-
cred.
81 sized up the Spaniards correctly
For example, at San Juan l was sure
they would not come out from their
works and attack us. The FL Caney
fight had hoped would be finished at
10 a. m, but it took until o'clock,
and l rather feel now that it was for
the best. Had we taken the city of
Santiago that night only the garrison
then there would have surrendered to
us. Whereas, later, all the troops in
the region surrounding were included.
The men outside of Santiago, July 2,
could have gone to General Pando. j
knew that the war was over as soon as
Toral spoke to me about surrendering
the troops in the Eastern province. l
almost fell over.
why was your food supply short
before San Juan?"
Il had to act quickly and shove my
men right into the field because l
knew they were growing weaker and
weaker every hour. We had plenty of
rations, unloaded at the shore, but
there was only single road hub deep
in mud, over which they could be
brought to the front, and if we had a
thousand army wagons we could not
have got the provisions where they
were needed. The pack trains saved
us. They were invaluable.
Hall Caine VIII Talk.