New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-05-23
POWERS PLAN FOR SPAIN.
TO SIZE FOR PEACE AT THE FlKSI
FAVORABLE MOMENT.
,,orr .,,oSc sp,1N.s FRIENDS THAT THE
PHILIPPINES MAY YET BE SAVED
FOR HER

London. May 23-The Madrid correspondent
OF The Daily Telegraph says
zone point 81 interest In the reconstructoh oi
the Cabinet lies In the obstinate refusal OF 9ehor
roo, y Castillo ,the Spanish Ambassador to
Franco 10 accept the Foreign Secretarysh'p'
rvorv consideration has been brought 10 bear
in vain. His first reply To the PremieTs reQueS.
o,nrcsscd the conviction that the interests or
cnain would be best served by his remaining
a, Paris ecAor saeas,a answered. pointing out
that the head Of the Government was the pest
fudge OF tho interests of the Fatherland and IN
sis,inc upon the Ambassadors acceptance. TO
the surprise of everybody. the Ambassador per-
sisted I'm his refusal. and promised In personal
lnfervlew 10 prove 10 SehOr Sagasta that IL
would be n grave mistake for him 10 leave Paris'
Il am enabled 10 state that the Ambassadors
motive ror refusal was the following: Senor Sa-
castas Cabinet is. ny It's own forinaI declar'-
,lon. determined 70 carry on the war with an
possible vigor whereas Sehor Leon Castillo Is
aware that Spain's friends among the Powers
France In particular. are resolved 10 insist upon
,o- .uirr FOR peace al tho nrst favorable mo-
mon, France possesses a twofold interest In
having peacc concluded financial and political.
The former would be severely damaged II SPAN
we're utterly ruined. and the latter would suner
n the United States retained permanent posses
slon of the Philippines.
TO SAVE As MUCH As POSSIBLE
The leading idea which actuatcs the states
men responsible FOR the political scheme favored
by Senor Leon Y Castillo is that as Spain must
be worsied In the long run. 1t Is advisable 20
save as much as possible from destruction. ana
that the sooncr peace Is concluded. the more
,ol.rsble will be the terms acquiesced In by the
United States. The most important OF these
terms. in the eyes of Spain's friends and pro-
,eciors is the possession ~ the Philippines
which can be utilized for further political com
binations later on.
ITO become member OF war Cabihe''
| therefore, at the very moment when the friend
lv great Powers are resolved to press upon
Soa;n speedy peace appears imprudent To
Senior Leon Castillo. who is In possession OF
all the threads of the negotiations.
"sehor Sagastas Cabinet Is certainly desirous
~ regaining popularity with the country by
prosecuting the war to the bitter end. but 1t is
highly Improbable that having heretofore I'M
plc,ttv followed the advice Of the Continental
Powers II will refuse TO accept counsels or
peacc profered under the promise Of future
help. especially II the United States valves all
claims to the Philippines.
the Far East Is now thoroughly understood
and everything possible Will be done 10 gain
time and profit by It. Her position as n Medi-
terranean Power her influence in Morocco. her
well-discplned land and forces and. above
| all her possession of the Philippines constitute
/ the political aspect Of the question. The first
ana most important step at present, therefore.
is 10 utilize the most propitious moment for
concluding peace on the basis OF Spain's reten-
! ton OF the Philippines
SPAIN MUST ASK FOR PEACE.
| when that time has come-and II Is be-
lieved to be very near. now that the Spanish
squadron is at Sahtiago-Spsn will be asked to
propose pour parles: and friendly efforts will
be made 10 induce the United States TO rest sat
isned with Cuba's independence with an
nexation, and to abandon the 7cheme Of run
ming permanently or occupying temporarily the
Philippines. These the grave considerations
which determine Sehor Leon Castillo. who Is
party politician and usually submissive TO the
head Of his party. to insist upon remaining as
| ,1,ao oAoro DC riQ