The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-06-27
NOT A pLAY-DAY AFFAIR.

The general opinion seems to be that
Santiago will be forced to surrender in two
or three days. This opinion is based upon
dispatches like the following:
An immediate advance will be made, and
as soon as the military forces in pos
session of the hills back of Santiago COM
blned attack by the feet and army will be
ordered. 1t Is expected that before Satur-
day Santiago, with all its Notifications and
the strong fleet under Admiral Cervera will
have fallen, either captured or destroyed.
On its face the last part of this dispatch is
absurd. The troops did not debark until
Wednesday, and they left ship seventeen
miles from Santiago. There is but one mar
row road from Baiquirf along the coast to
Santiago. For the rest, the country is rough
beyond our conception, and covered for the
most part with a thick underground To
predict that troops, with artillery, could be
moved so as to encompass the city in forty
eight hours is an absurdity. If no resistance
should be encountered it must take several
days to cut roads through the underground
for the movement of troops and artillery.
If resistance is made. as it was on Friday,
when a serious skirmish took place, the en-
comprising of the city will take several
days, with considerable fighting. The mere
movement of an army in such a country, a
few miles, to occupy commanding positions
about the city, and to get its guns in posi-
ton, must take several days.
1t appears from General Skaters dis
patch that his advance was seven and a
half miles from Santiago on Saturday morn
ing, and that he was holding his position
there until his artillery could be brought
up. AS there is some difficulty about land
ing the siege guns, it may take several days
TO get them to the army. But, whether it
takes two days or two weeks the work will
be pushed as rapidly as it can be by the
officers having the responsibility, so that
only the thoughtless can be impatient I'M
til the artillery is where it can be used it
would be useless slaughter to hurl good men
upon fortified lines defended with artillery.
AT best some bloody fighting may be neces-
sary to carry Santiago.
We have fallen into a habit of considering
the Spanish army to be of little or no ac-
count because it has not crushed out the
Cuban instruction, and we do not now
take into consideration what it can do be-
hind strong fortifcations defended by artil-
ACAJs LII the way Oh drLlllery the spanish
at Santiago are not helpless. The four ar
mored ships shut up in the harbor have 152
guns, most of them rapid-firing, which could
be taken ashore and put into the defenses.
The ships could furnish forty machine guns,
forty one-pounders, thirty-two six-pounders
and forty five-inch rifles If these have not
been taken from the Spanish ships and put
into the defenses, it means that Cervera yet
hopes to escape.
Santiago is sure to fall sooner or later
Indeed, already short of provisions, it's army
can be starved out in a short time; but
starving out is not the policy of the war au-
thorities; nor should it be, considering the
great danger of disease. General Shafter
will proceed with energy, but, at the same
time, with military prudence.
The fall of Santiago is possibly of greater
significance than the mere capture of a
town, particularly if it comes early, since it
will impress the Spanish people with the
utter futility of prolonging the war.
This, we repeat, we may be sure of: no
day will pass that the coil about Santiago
will not be frightened until it, with Cervera's
SHIPS will fall into our hands