The Portland daily press., 1898-12-22

Admiral Montijo's Report of the Bat
tie of Manila--Desyey's Opinion of
the Philippines--sampson Pleaded
To Be Givena Chance To Strike
Spain In West indies.
Washington, December 2l.-The official
reports OF all commanding officers of the
navy during the war have been compiled
and published by the navy department.
While treating of events that nave already
figured in published official reports, the
documents still contain many minor re-
ports that throw sidelights on interesting
phases of the war. In the brief record
of the proceedings of the naval board an
unknown hero is brought to light in the
person of Ensign Il. H. Ward, who, at
the beginning of the war, was on duty in
the navigating bureau, alternating with
Lieut.. Whittlessy, in the heavy duties of
assistant to the chief of the bureau. He
volunteered for secret service duty. and
his exploits. about which nothing has
been said in the past, may well be placed
on record besides those of Lieut.. Rowan
in Cuba and Lieut.. Whitney in Porto
Rico, Within week after the deGiara-
ton of war, Ensign Ward disguised him.
self and went straight into the heart of
i the enemy's country, making his head
quarters at Cadiz, the principal Spanish
naval station, and informing the navy
| department. here OF the actual strength
| of the Spanish naval vessels and their
moyem ents. Then we went to the West
Indies and reported everything that was
going on there of Importance to the
| American navy. Next he went in dis
k,n tod
| as spy. By adroitness he managed to
secure his release and, escaping from San
Juan, cabled the navy department. full
| account of the state Of the defenses there
| and the preparations making for the re-
ception of the Spanish squadron under
Cervera. All this time even the officials
of the navy department were under the
| impression that Mr.. Ward was engaged
| in installing system of coast signals on
| the New England coast.
| While Ward was in Porto Rico, Ensign
| Buck, another attache of the navigation
| bureau, was on the shores of the Medi-
terranean in disguise, watching every
| Camara, which started for the Philips
pines, but turned back. OF the strategy
| board itself, it is said that 1T was part OF
| it's duty to keep informed of all of the
movements, resources and plans OF the.
Spanish naval forces through secret
|
| was thus informed Of all important
| movements.
At times however, information was
| conflicting and decisions had to be made
as to which report was 5rue..
| Under the head of precautionary orders
appears in the volume, instructions to all
| the United States ships abroad to stock
| their bunkers with the best coal obtains
l able and to keep them full. Admira
| Dewey was told, long before the declara
| tion of war on February 25: I'm che
event of war with Spain your duty will
| be to see that the Spanish squadron does
not leave the Asiatic coast and then
offensive operations in tho Philippines.
Keep Olympia until further orders. "
| The latter order is explained by the
| fact that the flagship had been ordered
back to tie United States for an over
hauling Admiral Howell, then in the
Mediterranean with his squadron, was
| told to wait in neutral waters for orders
and the ships in the South Atlantic were
| instructed to move northwari so as TO
not exotic suspicion. The reports OF the
! famous naval battle at Cavite include one
| from Consul General Wildman, rather
unusual thing in reports of strictly
naval character, but fully justified by its
picturesqueness and trenchan5 description
| of Dewey's victory. Following it is a re-
port to his government on the same en-
gagement by Admiral Mon;ijo, the COM
mander-in- -chief of the ill-fated Spanish
| fleet. The admiral depicts the bad condi-
| tion of the Spanish feet and defenses. He
says that the cruiser Castillo was lncap-
4 able of manoeuyring on account of her
| bad condition, while the defenses at the
entraoe to Subig bay were very back :
ward. With much disgust he found that
| the guns which should have been
mounted, were delayed a month and a
| half and he was no less disgusted TO find
| that reliance was had for the defense of
perly placed. Finding Subig Bay de-
| fenseless, the Spanish squadron repaired
/ to the bay of Manila, to battlo under less
unfay orable conditions. The admiral
avoided the city, not wishing to draw
fire upon it, and prepared his feet for
| action, painting his vessels dark gray
and having the fires spread and springs
on the cables. He says that the forces OF
Dewey's vessels. leaving out transports,
amounted to 81, 410 tons; 49, 290 horse
power, 16S guns, many rapid fire; ,75O
iuen, and an average OF velocity OF IL
miles. Against this the power of his
| only five effective ships was lO.lll
| tons; II 200 horse power; 76 guns, very
short of rapid fire; 1875 men and maxi
mum speed ~ miles. The admiral
describes in vivid language the terrible
effect of the American onslaught on the
Spanish vessels.
| He says:
The Americans fired most rapidly.
There came upon us numerous pro-
iectiles, as the three cruisers at the end OF
the line devoted themselves almost exclu-
siyely 60 lighting the Christiana, my
flag ship. A short time after the action
commenced one shell exploded in the
forecastle and put out OF action all those
who served the four rapid tire cannon.
= Meantime another she'll ex-
ploded in the poop deck, setting fire to
the crews bags. At 7.30 one shell de-
stroyed completely the steering gear.
IS Another destroy ed the miz-
zen ,sbringing down my flag and ensign.
Another shell exploded on the poop anu