New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-07-31
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN,
GENERAL Cox's CONTRIBUTION TO IT'S
HISTORY.

3l Charles Scrbner's Sons.
General Cox's book should bring future contro-
yersy over the battle Of Franklin DOWN u 'ei'
narrow limits. 1t was not an Immaculate scie"-
tinc victory. II 1t had been. every soiuier anu
officer of the winning army would nave oeen
from the first moment to the last on the spo'
where the nature of things required MN 10 oe'
ceneral SchoGeld would have had the pont0ons
which no required for an ideal military passage
of the Harpeth River instead OF being opiiseu W
turn the railroad bridge into thoroughfare io'
troops and wagons. In fact. nothing wou'u nave
been left to the ingenuity or the moment a"u
there would have been no perils to face oecauSe
the personal equation OF general or the en-
durance of a given body Of troops was put 10
too severe n test. Nothing deceves anticipation
like a battle But in this particular case the as
annojntment of the victors was an agreeable one
stratseica,lv the fight could only be an episode
In a still unfinished campaign. Practicaiiy IL
settled results When wellington told his officers
before Waterloo that he had ignored all plans Oh
retreat he meant them to understand that the
war must end on that field. But Schofeld was
Obliged to fight only that he might retreat IN
safety to the final battle field. 1t Is an open
question whether the final battle might not have
been fought at Franklin. If General Cox had
had his way, undoubtedly the Union Army
would have held its intrenchments and awaited
a Confederate attack on the second day. But
Hood might have refused to give battle, ana
might have FASTENED toward Nashville. AT MD
night his intentions for the morrow could not
have been guessed by his enemy. 1t was Scho-
fields conviction that his duty was to put ms
army into Thomass hands as soon as possible.
For that reason Franklin was left incomplete as
a battle The victors abandoned the field. The
defeated occupied it. But their triumph was an
empty one, and very short-lived.
II we do not consider that the march to Nash
vile was the real purpose of the Union Army
and that the battle was only an unavoidable cpl
sode. we shall never understand why there has
been so much controversy about the affair in
later years. The anticpations as to the battle
were pedantically epitomized beforehand by
staff officer. who called the hasty fertilization
defended by the Unonists bridge-head. The
possibilities Of bridge-head with an exposed
face about two miles in length are infinite. But
with twenty four thousand of the best fighting
men the rebels had on the outside, and ten thou
sand just as good men inside the works-to bring
the figures down to those actually engaged-the
possibility that the fight would be only Skin
mish was eliminated at the outset But it would
seem as il the incorrect anticipations-not shared
by General Schoheld, because he knew Hood. nor
by General Cox, whose business II in this
case to prepare for the worst-may have caused
the main misconception and the first error of the
battle. The main misconception. as shown in
after years was as to the actual commander on
the line during the battle. General Cox proves
by documents. as well as by the general testi-
mony Of subordinate officers that the command
was intrusted solely to him. But General STAN
ley seemed to feel at the time as If he was the
responsible man, and his report subsequently
gave the impression that he had seen the battle
through. and that he was very grateful to Cen
eral Cox for aid. OF course, this misconception
could never have arisen except out OF the change
which converted the defence Of a so-called
brdge-head covering a line OF retreat into one Of
the most stubborn and sangunary battles ever
fought. General Stanley's impression that he
was the line throughout the battle was a very
curious one. for he went away wounded after
the first rebel charge. Yet this impression coin
cded with what seems to have been the general
feeling in the Union lines at the moment when
this first charge was repulsed. General Cox
writes of Confederate officers encouraging their
men with the cry, you've got them if you only
knew it, at the moment when he was convinced
that they were beaten utterly. The actual fight
ing, and fighting of the most desperate sort
continued long time, growing every instant
more hopeless for the Confederates. Morally the
battle was won when General Stanley said it
was. His report, in the light of the cool and
carefully measured statements OF General Cox's
essay becomes a study in psychology. But 1t is
certain that if General Cox and his men had not
stayed to convince the rebels Of patent fact
the fact itself would have become fiction.
The first error Of the battle, that which msled
the Confederates in the hope OF an easy victory