The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-03-11
OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD SPAIN.
A Clear and Concise Statement of the Sit
uatio and What the Probable Results
Will be, Based upon tue Finding of
Certain Facts
washington Post.)

accident, the Maine ncident is ended.
Thu disaster in itself, however, is not
the beginning nor the end of the
trouble which may involve the United
States in difficulty. There is the stu
alton in Cuba yet to be settled.
But if the catastrophe was planned
not, of course, with the criminal knowl-
edge Of the Spanish government. for
that must be regarded as an unw1ar-
rantable hypothesis until it is proved
otherwise by indubitable evidence
there are three factors o be considered.
Any Of hese contains the elt----lts Of
war. They can brifiy stated.
/. A question of veracity between
the United States and Spain as TO the
cause OF the disaster.
2. A dispute over the payment Of an
indemnity.
3. The necessity Of Intervening to
prevent the further continuance of
suffering, starvation, and death in
Cuba.
Naturally, the first Of these win be
The question of veracity. 1t is already
evident that the Spanish government
IS preparing to meet the anticipated
ulCI III our court WIFI ID ulSchdlIIlSI.
The moment that the sworn officers of
the United tates decide-shOuld they
50 decide-that the explosion was not
accidental, and perhaps before they re-
port, Spain VIII assert that her own
divers and officers have discovered a
different state of affairs. She will
claim that our naVal officers, to shield
themselves from the consequence of
their own incOmpetency ca~relesSneSs,
and Tack of discipline, have thrown the
responsibility upon Spain. She will
protest against being cum guilty by
an ex parte board. I'M diplomatic
terms, but none the less emphatic, she
will brand our court of inquiry as a
court of liars.
What is the United States then to do?
Are we to impung the motives and
characters Of our own men by agreeing
to Spain'S contention, and allowing
their carefully prepared verdict to be
appealed to some other tribunal?
Hardly. 1t might he diplomacy, but it
is not in cOnSOnance with the present
spirit of the American people. The
latter have been patient and fOrebear-
ing. They stand ready to accept with
out protest any verdict, relying upon
the honesty and integrity of the board;
they Will expect Spain to do likewise.
Only one course, Therefore, could be pur-
sued SHOULD Spain insinuaite an unfair
conclusion. The United States would
insist that the verdict must stand as rem
dered, and be then prepared to defend
eur officers in the court of last resort.
This would mean war.
Spain might, however, agree with us
that the explosion was not accidental,
with the further qualification thai she
was in no wise particeps criminis. I'm
that case a, new situation would arise.
The extent of Spain's responsibility,
H0 fhnA .1vunyof t~f % ~ 20 ~ ron1 nvn1nriA,
being shown, would apparently be
great. If there were no submarine
mines in the harbOr of Havana, the
wreck was caused by a floating mine or
"a torpedo. 1t must then be born in
mine that agents of destruction large
enough to blow up a battle-ship are
not vest-pocket affairs. They cannot
be easily secreted nor struggled into a
harbor alive with all character of craft.
Governments, not individuals, purchase
tOrpedOeS and possess the appliances
for their successful operation. In the
popular mind, ait least, the burden of
proof will be upon Spain to demon
surate that the destruction of the
Maine was the work of an Irresponsible
individual person. Should she offer to
produce this evidence, the administra-
tion might be compelled to afford her
sufficient time to make her promise
good.
The probability is, however, that
Spain will insist that an internal acct
lent occurred and refuse to
ledge any responsibility. Her attitude
will certainly not deter the president
from demanding an indemnity. Spain is
responsible, not criminally, but morally
and legally, for amy assault upon the
Maine from exterior sources while she
was lying in the friendly harbor of
Havana Preparation Will be asked.
w. ~ IL a
other serious complication. UndOuDt-
eddy the holder of Spanish bonds would
De only too glad to furnish the $40, 000,-
900 which will probably be the amount
decided upon by this government.
BondhOlders, while powerful, are not
o~nnipotent. They will not be able to
control the angry, excited and thor
OuShly anti-American pOpulace of
Spain. The adherents of Don Carlos,
the republicans who are seeking to ac-
COmplish the overthrow of the dynasty,
the radicals who are anxious to foment
trouble on any preteNt-all these ele-
ments would combine to make Madrid,
Barcelona, and other Spanish cities the
scenes of bloody riots and wild disorder.
The protest against surrender to the
despised and hated Yankees would be
violent. 1t would awe the government.
(which, unless it is strangely unlike
other governments, Will prefer to fight
and retain power than be overthrOWn
in the effort to preserve peace. Thus
the demand for indemnity, unless that
demand is complied with, means war.
The United States must enforce its I'LL
t1fnatum with a movement OF the fleet
upon Havana
Neither cam this government afford
! to enter upon a prolonged diplomatic
correspondence. IT'S demand upon
Spain will be in the nature of an ulti-
natum.
They Go these things better in Eng
hand. Tw~enty-four hours is generally
hong enough, in the estimation Of Brit
ish authorities, to bring mat ters to a
focus. Occasionally they allow a week.
This was the case, it Will be remem-
bereG, In the MasOn-S1idell incident.
Captain Wilkes had taken these two
commissioners from the Trent and had