The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1898-04-23

| II litS at tnt IlDulu Vi the uulI Oh mcxlCO
100 miles south of the State of Florida and
but Is miles from the harbor of Key West
from which II Is separated by the Flori-
| da Straits. On the east the island is sep
arated from Haiti by the Windward Pas
| sage. less than so miles in width: on the
south 80 miles of the Caribbean Sea flow
! between 1t and the island of Jamaica, and
| on the west the Yucatan Channel, 15O
| miles wide, separates it from Yucatan.
! the nearest land of Central America.
The length of the coast line. exclusive
| OF many unimportant sinuosities. is 2Vo
| miles This littoral Is exceedingly foul,
| owing to the continuous lines of reefs
and shoals extending out for a couple of
/ miles from the shore.
Within these reefs are to be found a
! few possible landing places and at least
| fourteen of the harbors have deep
| enough water to float ships of any size.
They are to a great extent landlocked
/ and are entered by passing through a
narrow and sinuous channel. which at
! its inner end expands or opens out into
a basin-shaped harbod.
I These are important facts to be borne
in mind in reviewing the strategic ad-
vanteges of a country; they pertain TO
/ "the lay of the land and Indicate how
to take advantage of II. Ii is thus gath
cred that to close tn ports OF Cuba to
the entrance of an enemy and TO keep
them open as places of safety and refuge
fer friend would not be a difficult op-
Grafton.
In the defense OF the eastern end of
Cuba Spain would have TO keep the Wind
ward Passage under watch and ward.
ard to overlook the Caribbean Sea. The
eastern end of Cuba is called Cape May
ST. 1t is separated from the island Of
Haiti by the Windward Passage. about
fOrty-five miles wide. Practically all the
shipping between the eastern shores OF
the United States and lower Central
America passes through this passage.
Cape Maysi is a low, uninhabited point
of land. with port and no anchorage
nearer than Port Baracoa. twenty-five
miles away. on the northern side of the
island.
The base of operations for "A squadron
detailed to blockade the Windward Pas
sage would be Port Baracoa on the
north and Port Guantanamo on the
south. Both ports have water deep
enough to float a few deep draught men
of-war
Two sauadrons would be needed here.
one to operate from Baracoa to the north
ward and the other from Guantanamo TO
the southwark, and in order to secure the
cooperation of the two squadrons
cross country base. 50 miles in length
from sea 10 sea would be a necessity.
But. after this has been established and
the Windward Passage and the Caribbean
Sea patrolled. there yet remain the water
and channels to the northward of the
central portion Of Cuba and some distance
away from the Windward Passage. For
the ships detailed to this important duty
there must be some depot nearer the prob
able field of action than Port Baracoa-
such a port as Nipe about 70 miles dis
tant from Baracoa.
Port Nipe has deep water and is safe;
the harbor is miles long and from 3
to : miles wide. Being but IS miles from
BaTacoa, the squadron could in fi"e hours
get there to Tefit when necessary: also
the two divisions. the one in the Wind
ward Passage and the other off Nipe,
could be mobilZed in force at one or the
other point without abandoning either po-
sition.
From Nipe the bahama Channel might
be bloCkaded effectively. The limits of
the Nipe cruising ground would be l5O
miles from Lobos Island TO Crooked Is
land. and thence about 600 miles 10 Porto
Rico Should a powerful hostile squad
ron appear TO the northeaStWaTd the line
in that direction might have to be short
ened in toward Nipe and the Windward
Passage: this and the Bahama Channel
must be held at all hazards. else the east
ern end OF the island would fall, and af-
terward the western.
The least force which could hold these
passages and be prepared also to operate
to the southwark in case the enemy ap-
peared there in force, would be three big
ships (armored cTuiSers) four large cruis-
eTs eight smaller ones-swift gunboats or
seagoing torpedo boats would do as well
and as many torpedo boats as possible
at least two to each aTmored ship
The naval feet needed TO hold the sea
OF the northern and eastern sides of
Cuba should at the least consist of three
armoTed cruisers. l51 miles apart; four
large, fast protected cruisers on station
midway between the armOred cruisers;
eight small fast cruisers. or gUnboats,
between each one Of the larger ships on
the line and the base ports
Such fleet in such a disposition should
be able TO concentrate within twelve
hours at any point where IL would be
possible for the enemy TO appear in
force with the intention of trying 20
break through the line: and. further,
such a disposition of the fleet would en-
able a good portion Of it 10 pass through
the Windward and Mona passages to
head off any considerable feet of the en-
emy which might be attempting to at
tack from the southwark.
The southern squadron on the lookout
would be stationed off its base, AT Fort
Guantanamo, but this port would be en-
tirely inadequate TO meet the demands
that would be made upon it when the
large northern squadron came south and
joined It.
When this happened the port Of San
tiago de Cuba would have become the
main base of the fleet. Santiago is a
place of Importance. 1t lies five miles
back from the sea, up harbor which
can be entered only by steaming through
a very narrow, intricate and tortuOus
channel. often less than POO feet wide.
Al the northwestern end of Cuba are
the Straits of Florida. about $50 miles
wide and the Yucatan channel on the
west about 100 miles wide. To operate
in the Florida Straits the base would
have to be a line connecting Havana and
Matanzas. forty-fve miles long. The two
cities the SaIients are the most impor-
tant strategically and commercially of
the whole island.
Havana the capital. is the key to the
island. but it's defenses now are like those
of the other ports of Cuba. old and vul-
nerable mounting no guns capable of in
turing a modern armOred ship.
Havana is practically defenseless al
though it should have been made by
harbor and coast defense. not only an
impregnable base of operations. but also
a base of supplies. a secure depot, Where
men. ships. stores and reserves could
have been distributed wherever needed.
Matanzas, the other terminus of this
western base line, is much smaller
city than Havana, its population being
only 10000. The entrnce channel is four
miles long and a mile wide. defended by
three ancient batteries.
The seacoast between Matanzas and
Havana is bold. and a ship can stand
safely in TO within three miles There
fore over this base ships can run with
out danger. dag or night. For an enemy
to effect a landing would be an impossi-
bility il there were any mobile defense
at either end to hold off an enemy thai