The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-03-06

not patent, as tho electorate was extremely linn
tied. and. il every man qualified to vote in
France under Louis Philippe had obtained q
post, the bureaucracy would not have been UNI
duly swollen; whereas, with ten million con-
stituents encouraged to regard their members
Of Parliament as dispensers OF office. tho rich
resources OF the land are strained, and citizens
are drawn away from callings which increase
the national wealth, are deferred from colonial
enterprise. and diverted from ambitious pur-
suits which elevate the standard of o nation.
III.
1t may be asked. and is asked by Englishmen,
why do not Frenchmen do away with their
centralized system and give parliamentary
government O chnnce7 Mr.. Bodley's reply is
that. IL the Napol sonic fabric Of Capitalization,
which has survived all the vicissitudes of the
century, were demolished, 1t would bring down
with 1t every institution in France amid havoc
more ruinous than that of 1889, and to build
another structure another Napoleon would be
needed. Our author does not undertake to
answer the academical inquiry whether Ma.
poloon did not plan his reconstruction on wrong
lines. and whether he would not have done bot
tor II. instead of STRENGTHENING tho central
izing features of tho old regime, he had
strewn the land with autonomic institutions.
1t Is futile to dream Of what Napoleon might
have done. especially as subsequent events iE.
dictate that autonomic institutions would not
have suited the French. while it Is certain that
the centralized system does conform to their
wants and ideas. Several proofs of this fact are
cited by our author. In tho first place. WHILE.
several times In tho century. the French have
overturned dynasties and engaged in civil war.
yet, when the fray was over and the new regime
set up. though the government Of the country
would be manned entirely with opponents Of the
previous political system, q material change
was never essayed in the essential fabric of the
Napoleonic construction. Secondly, though
t~reatises on decentralization abound in
France. they show that the boldest practical
conceptions Of reform leave tho centralized sys-
tenn untouched from an English point of view.
They recall to Mr.. Bodley's mind the schemes
for recognising the public offices at Whitehall.
which now Ministers. with ingenious zeal,
sometimes promote: Three superhuous clerks
are made to retire on full pay; three other clerks
have their salaries raised to reward their labors
thus increased. and, the next year. three new
clerks are introduced to complete tho old estab-
lishmcnt. On a gigantic scale. such are the lines
on which decentralizers in Franco would remodel
the bureaucracy. In the third place, the scant
interest taken by French citizens in such local
governing bodies as they possess proves that
the majority like to depend on the central power
for their administration Here and there a pop
~ulation. as at Bordeaux, may be inspired with
an independent municipal sentiment. and in
other localities. as at Marseilles, tho presence of
Socialists or other politicians OF vivacious man
ners at a council board may attract attention to
its superficial proceedings; but the undertaking
of projects which may possibly add to the veal
of the community. and will certainly augment
its taxation. Is generally regarded with ind1f-
ference. A fourth sign of tho suitability
of the centralized system to tho French
temperament is found herein. that not
only does it provoke no popular In
dignation, but its existence Is approved by al
most every Frenchmar OF eminence of the great
class which takes no part in politics and which
reflects tho highest credit on the nation. Philos-
ophers and artists. men Of science and mon of
business, OF views however various on social
and ecclesiastical questions, are generally
unanimous In holding that the centralized
fabric is necessary to the existence of Franco as
q tranquil country. in which art, letters.
research or riches may be pursued. Assuming,
then. that the Capitalization. created or intensi-
fed by Napoleon. could not now be dispensed
with. Mr.. Bodley finds In the incompatlbility of
parliamentary government with 1t the chief
cause of the pessimism of French politi-
cal life. People recognize that the general
outcome Of the Third Republic is unsatisfactory,
and that some of the principal elements of tho
existing political System are irremovable. man
hood suffrage being as permanently established
in France as Is tho centralized administration.
Thus the only hope Of an improved state of
things lies In the prospect OF tho voice of the
nation delegating its powers to an authoritative
hand. instead Of to parliamentary representa-
tives. Apart. however. from tho retrograde
character OF such a change. which would sadden
doctrinaires. no leader capable of touching pop
ular sympathies has shown the faintest aizn of
existence. When he arises he may be tho
bon tyran Of NJ. Remains optimist views, but on
the other hand thera 10 always tho fear
of a shallow military adventurer being
disastrouslyh hailed to rescue the land from par
liamentary anarchy. Moreover. tho most def
mite prospect of ending the present state of
things rests In the vague future which lies be-
yond the issues Of the next European conflict;
and war Is 30 dreaded by the French. in spite of
their martial temperament. that, rather than
contemplate its horrors, they would submit TO
an infinitely worse regime than tho present.
Thus. for the first time in France. since tho
Encyclopedias began to undermine the old
monarchy, no one has q substitute to propose
for tho existing political system; under every
other it's opponents soiaced themselves with the
thought that one day it could be dispensed
with; and. though this idea detracted from tho
stability of dynastieS, it also checked the do
moralizing belief that, however bad things were,
no remedy was possible.
In connection with the authors Fundamental
views. which are outlined in the introduction.