Washington sentinel., 1898-11-26
The Defence Of New York.
Written for the WASHINGTON SENTINEL :
WEST STEEVER.

sIbility from the sea, is Dow the cause o
the great difficulty in preventing the
enemy from bombarding the city from
distance or forcing an entrance into its
magnificent harbor. These two con-
tingencies naturally divide the subject
into two distinct branches, an outer
and inner line Of defence, with an army
OF observation 10 cover points OF disem-
barkation. which might be attempted by
the land forces of the enemy, and which
would naturally also constitute third
branch of the enquiry. These detences
should be imprOvised to prevent q
capture by "cOup de main" and then
| each dav strengthened by a systematic
| course of development. Now the mode
Of attack can beeasly conceived. Under
cover OF the guns of the attacking heet
a picked body Of troops will be very
likely landed on Long Island and then
with the hanks covered on the Sound
and the Bay by the feet il will be easy
to cover The front Of the advancing
troops with a hail of projectiles from
the high power and rapid firing guns OF
the fleets on the two Aanks. This line
| Of fire at the decisive point would only
be seven mi es across and when reached
| BY an a vancing foe would force either
asurrender or the burning Of the cities of
New York and BROOKLYN to prevent their
occupation by the enemy. The greatest
array Of force on our side would be use.
less against a small body Of infantry in
this contracted space, combined with an
| overwhelming fleet to clear their front,
| and the defences on the New Jersey and
| Connecticut shores would have to be
evacuated after those on long Island
had been taken IN reverse. AS the
chan mel on the Sound is even Of greater
| depth than that OF the BY and both Will
admit OF the easy passage of the largest
battlesbip OF modern navy, it will be
easily perceived that this mode Of attack
is entirely easlble and such a combina'
ton or one ofIike character is in the
line of conjecture and should be antici
psted in the conception Of a proper
mode of defence. With the range of
rapid firing guns increased by using
charges OF high explosives-smokeless
powder-and the rapid development in
the greater caliber, a fraction OF within
ten inches having been attained, the
zone Of fire under consideration could
be rendered impossible for life to exist
by the concentration OF the mass OF such
guns carried b y the fleet,
Formerly an attack OF New York IN
this manner would not have been con
sidered as presenting a character so
formidable as to prevent using a covering
army from resisting the approach by the
attacking force The contracted range
Of artillery and The slowness Of the
discharge would have been important
facto in former days. All this though
has changed and the entire front OF
the advance would be covered by
a rfect hurricane of shot, before
which no defensive force could stand
In attempting thus to take New York
by coup de main" very little resist
ance need be apprehended by the enemy
in the means of defence existing at this
moment. The works on Long Island
we've planned for a state OF affairs very
different rom that existing at the present
date. Heavy arullery, and in the
employment of this term, mean to en-
brace every descripti IN except the light
field pieces used to accompany an army,
has made such enormous strides that it
has outstrlpped completely the aid which
other branches Of the service rendered
it IN former times. Formerly the heavy
artillery officer had nothing to do except
20 attend to working the guns suppl d
to him by the Ordnance, and mounted
in works erected bvt-s Engineer Corps.
As there were but few different Cahbres,
mounted on two different carriages,
casemate and baIbette, with siege NOR
tar and sea, IN use as supplementary
proiectiles relatively few IN number and
the works divided into casemate, } ar
bette and mortar batteries, the auxiliary
duty performed by tie ,ther two
branches of The service did not need any
special knowledge 10 the artillery OF that
day, as its functions were simple and
devoid of all the complex features which
distinguish its present development
These complex features are such as
require the modern heavy artillery
officer to Judge for himself and no longer
to depend on the other branches OF the
service He must make the choice OF
the particular gun requisite for the
occasion, with the particular object in
view and that from great variety OF
calibres. The mount presents equal
,a;a,..Tt., Dr ~hntra and fhDuph the
engine err constructs the empla ement,
the designation Of the spot must be left
to the artillery officer.
Now. unfortunately for us, the artillery
branch of the United States army IS not
to be depended upon TO furnish us with
the requisite number needed of heavy
artillerists. The field officers Of that
arm OF service will be needed as general
officers for the infantry and cavalry of
the covering forces. the company ficers
and men to form light batteries, and we
will have to look elsewhere for our
heavy artillersts
This was done in our late civil war,
and that example will have to be
followed in any future war, so long as
the present organization Of the artillery
CORPS Of the army exists, with its numer
1 ical inferiority, relative TO the pressing
need OF general officers and light batter
les in organizing armies Of observation
to cover the heavy batteries OF defence.
The geographical position OF New YORK
shows that three such armies OF ooser-