The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-11-04

widespread. II the repiy tnat cenefai
shafter and the organic press nave
studied up to Richard Harding Davis
criticisms OF the management Of h
campaign. Mr.. Davis article
appeared some weeks ago. Last week
General Skaters reply appeared. and
was echoed In the editorial olumns
Of the organs. including some of this
city.
Richard Harding Davis il a writer
and man OF high reputation
and no mean opinion of himself. IL
NAV be that this opinion Is not entirely
foundation In his ~parentage.
his associations and his literary work
From his personal observations of the
San Juan tight. he makes numerous
command of the army. Among the
salient OF them we select the fol-
lowing:
Thst the wharf at Baiquiri the first
day the troops landed was partly COW
cred with loose boards and partly bare.
so hat those landing had to step along
the open Orders. and that three weeks
later, when the correspondent saw GEN
eral Miles land there. the same loose
boards and pare girders were found.
without any improvement.
That there was no firm comand over
the CAPTAINS of transports obliging
them to bring their vessels inshore to
land supplies. These two statements
are given in explanation of the scare
ity of supplies
That during the six days when the
troops were collecting at Siboney no
exploration or reconnaissance was
made of the wooded basin between FL
Poso and San Juan hill. and that OIL
GERS were forbidden to go beyond FL
Poso. with the exception that General
Chaffee. whose rank exempted him
from this order. made a personal ex-
animation of the spot.
That five days before the attack Cen
eral Chaffee. in conversation heard by
the writer. stated the necessity of cut
ting trails through the thickest par
allel' to the Spanish lines. and from
them small trails to the open ground
in front of the Spanish entertainments.
so that our troops could deploy from
a large number of points kno to
the Spaniards. and predicted, further,
that II troops were sent To the attack
along the two trails then open. whose
locality and range were perfectly
known to the Spaniards, they would be
subject to heavy fire and severe losses
before they could reach the point of
deployment, .
That no such trails were cut. and
that instead Of being sent along two
trails 1000 troops were sent along a
single trail, which was consequently
blocked, and for n mile was under the
heavy fire of the Spanish troops. with
greater losses there thar in the actual
charge.
That the troops leading his advanc
were ordered by the general command
ing to advance to the edge of the wood,
in front Of San Juan. and there &c
await further ORDERS" which orders
never came to them.
That the troops reached that point
found themselves subject to a CALLING
fire, which, IL continued. meant exter-
mlnation, and being unable to retreat
along the trail behind Them blocked
with the troops following, charge tn
height and took the entertainments, In
violation of orders.
All these are statements bearing yer,
cogently on h intelligence or inefh
cheney of the command. A very per
tinent reply would be to show that an,
or all of them are untrue. But afte
two weeks of cogitation General SHAFT
er and his organs produce the follow
ing:
That Richard Davis Harding wante,
to be the first man to land at Baiquirl
and because that favor was refuse'
Is r~evenging himself.
The intelligent part of the public vii
very promptly perceive that the co
rent question is not whether Davi
has a grudge. but whether his state
ments are fact or the reverse. Eve
II we suppose for the sake of the argu
ment. hat a man whose record an
character are those Of a gentleman
with a good opinion of himself. o u
descend to the sort of typi
fed by Ayers feat with the Roose
welt letter. the organs that are exploit
ing this view should pause long enoug
to ask themselves this question:
How Is II. IL Davi is simply satii
flying a grudge. that other observer
like Casper Whitney Fox of Harper
Weekly, Lee OF the British army an
others. in published reports and pr
ate correspondence. ~corroborate M
only Davis statements of fact, but h
conclusion that the Santiago campaig
was won by the heroism of the lin
despite the stupidity and blunderin
OF the management?