Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-12-20
REPORT FROM sCHLEY.
why He Temporarily
blockade Of Santiago.


time IT left Key West until the day before
the first bombardment Of the forts at the
entrance Of Santiago, or three days be
fore Admiral SIMPSONS arrival. The re-
port is as follows:
Flying Squadron,
United States Flagship Brooklyn,
on Santiago de Cuba, May 30. 1893.
Sir: / have the honor TO report that the
squadron sailed from Key West on the
morning of the 10Th instant for Cienfue-
gos, Cuba. in obedience to orders from
~Rear-Admiral Sampson. In company with
the flagship were the Massachusetts,. the
Texas. and the Scorpion. En- route passed
the Marblehead, the Nashville. and the
Wasp, communicating with the last
named vessel. OF Cape Antonio commu-
nicated with the Cincinnati and the Vesu-
vious. scouting.
.. on the morning Of the 22d instant the
squadron stood i'm for the entrance of Ct-
enfuegOs harbOr 20 r~econnOitre. and later
I'm the day passed the entrance twice
close i'm. As l had heard the firing Of
guns on the previous afternoon in the
direction Of the port, and as there was
considerable smoke observed In the har-
Dor. I was led to believe that the Span
ish squadron might have arrived there.
Tha day the Dupont Joined me with dis
patches from Admiral Sampson, direct
ing that the blockade Of Cienfuegos De
preserved, and that the Scorpion be sent
! to communicate with the Minneapolis
and. the Harvard, off Santiago. Also, on
this day the Iowa Joined the squadron.
9. A line Of blockade was established
about four miles off shore, and at night
an inShOre line was maintained, consist
ing variously Of the Scorpion, the Du-
| pont, and the Castine. the last-named yes
sci arriving on the 23d, conveying the
Merrimac.
SIMPSONS ORDERS RECEIVED.
4. Also. on the 23d instant. the Hawk ar
rived with dispatches from Admiral
Sampson directing me 70 move eastward
with the squadron to Santiago, If satisfied
that the enemy's vessels were not in Glen
fuegos. Not being satisfied at this time
that they were not there. l held my posi-
ton, being further strengthened. In my
opinion. by the fact that | was Informed
by the captain Of the British steamer
Adula that when he left Kingston a cable
gram had been received on the Thursday
preceding nv arrival off Cienfuegos
stating that the Spanish squadron had
sailed from Santiago.
3. The Iowa. the Castine, ana the Du-
pont took coal from the collier on that
day, the Iowa particularly needing ccal'
as she had sailed from Key West 10 Join
this squadron before completely coaled.
and consequently was considerably short.
G. On the 2ith instant the Marbiehead,
the Vixen, and the Eagle Joined the squad
ron. and the Marblehead and the Eagle
were Immediately sent TO Communicate
with the insurgents 10 the westward OF
Cienfuegos, and TO furnish them with am
muuition. clothing. and dynamite. Upon
afAE.NfaHE yIfnWu in Tho
course OF the afternoon. he reported 10 me
that he had obtained information that the
Spanish squadron was not i'm Cienfuegos.
DISPATCHES were at once sent by the Du-
pont to Admiral Sampson and to Com
modore Remey for the department, indi-
eating that this squadron would move to-
ward Santiago de cuba.
DANGER IN COALING THE TEXAS.
7. Great difficulty has been experienced
in coaling the Texas, on account OF her
projecting sponsors, in any seaway what
ever. and only under the most favorable
conditions can she 90 alongside a collier.
In anything more unfavoTable than abso-
lutelv smooth water there is great danger
Of injury either TO the Texas herself or
TO the collier. In this connection the ad-
vantage of a tumblehOme 10 the side Is
very marked. insuring great freedom from
accidents due to projections on the ships
side.
g After dark on the evening OF tho Path
the squadron stood TO sea 10 the east
ward. with the Brooklyn, the Massachu-
sets the Iowa. and the Texas I'm column.
noturaI order. the Marblehead, the Vixen,
and the Eagle on the outer flank, and
the collier inshore Of the battleships. The
Castine was left at Cienfuegoes to notify
the Scorpion on her return, should she
not be sighted by us, to proceed TO Key
West in company.
Q. The run to Santiago was marked by
rain and rough weather 10 such an eN-
tent that the Eagle was unable 10 Keep
IN n speed of seven and a half TO eight
ana a half knots. and fell behind so
much as to seriously delay the squadron.
which was forced TO slow 10 a speed OF
from four TO FIVE knots for her 20 regain
and hold her position. As this rough head
sea continued, with no apparent prospect
OF abating. and as the Eagles coal supply |
was becoming dangerously low, she was
sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica, for coal,
with directions TO make the best OF her
way back TO Key West.
SQUADRON STARTS WESTWARD.
10. On arriving off Santiago de Cuba
the collier Merrimac was disabled 10y me
breaking of her intermediate pressure
and the cracking Of the STUFF
fng-box. This served as a further en-
barrassment 20 the %sGuldroa and n
source of considerable anxiety. as, with !
the weather conditions thai: had prevail
Ell since leaving Cicnfuegos, IT appeared
absolutely necessary 10 abandon the posi-
ton off Santiago and seek a place where
the vessels could be cOaled and the col
lier's machinery repaired.
II. of Santiago. the 81. Paul. the Yale.
and the Minneapolis were sighted and
communicated with. The Minneapolis
reported that she had only sufficient coal
to reach/ Key West, and that her ma
was in bad condition. The coal
Of the other two scouts was also
much reduced. Arrangements were at
once made whereby the Yale was 20 tow
collier: and. as the prospect did not
seem favorable for rcplenishing the
meagre coal supply OF the other vessels,
the squadron stood 10 the westward. tow
ing the collier. The operation OF taking
the collier in tow proved 10 be quite diff
cult, owing 10 the size and weight Of the
two ships and the repeated parting OF
the two lines. Finally. however, after
t~wenty-four hours unremitting cxertions,
the GOLFERS chain cable was got 70 the
Yale and the squadron proceeded. The
st. Paul was ordered TO remain off San
-iago until her Goa supply would no long
er permit Of further delay.
RETURNS TO SANTIAGO.
70. After standing to the westward for
about three hours. or about twenty-five
miles, the conditions became less favor
lble. and the squadron stopped. The