Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-03-27

of russian troops available for the expe-
dttton TO India-that in Trans-Caucasia
and Cis-caIcs sia-amounts TO ABOUT lVi'-
coo men, exclusive OF the troops guarding
the frontier, OF the militia, and the gar
rlsoned artillery; its war footing peins
about 275,OoO. The troops garrisoned in
Tifils, Kutais, Poti, Elizabethpol, Batum'
and I'm the neighborhood Of the South eau
casian railway being completely moph-
lied, could reach the harbor OF Mas
novodsk in about four or five days, IN
Guiding embarkation and Decentralization
These would form the first echelon Oh the
main body of the army OF operation ioi-
lowing the vanguard formed Dy the
Trans Caspian, Bokharan, and Iurkes-
tan troops near Dushsk. Old sarakhs,
and Merv From Kransnovodsk they
could reach Dushak by rail in two OF
three days.
At the same time. this Biebertsfin
says, there must be taken into account
the strength Of the Anglo-lndian army
and of It's newly recognized troops, the
probable loss Of the Russians In SICK anu
wounded "a loss extremely dif1cult 10
repface). and the possibility or securing
the lines of operation. Many apparently
well-informed specialists reckon the brt-
ish force available for movement y"
Herat at 10000 men, and that aVaiiaoio
for defending the Indus or Britain con
fined herself therto) at lo'Oc. Inc
manning 10000 out Of 226,OOO men (aceolu-
ing to others $4,000 composing the Ahsio-
Indian army, they regard as necessary
for insuring Britain's political supremacy
and control in India, and therelore mo-
available for employment on the pat.ie
held We are of opinion, however tha'
If sufficient stores of arms ana eInifu ~,
ton were created to render possiDie 'he
speedy drilling of men, Britain wouid uli-
derstand how to enroll under her banner
a considerably larger NUMBER rum
the most warlike Indian races
with a view to meet the Russian
invading army on the Indus III
sufr1clent force TO bring about de-
cisive action. With o Hinterland, there
fore. with 29OOO0.OO0 inhabitants, from
whom two-thirds OF her Arglo-lndidh
army are already drawn, it may be pre-
sumed that Britain would appear AT the
Indus with msre than 10000 combatants'
In that case, of course. Russia must APP
near with more than 10000 men, consld-
ering her extraordinarily long line OF
connection, upon which she must leaVe
about $4,000 men. But Russia can take
her time in preparing for campaign III
which it would be serious and unpar-
donable blunder If she did not turn to ac-
count her numerical superiority TO Brl-
tain in thoroughly drilled troops. BY
continual reinforcemcnts of troops ana
weapons from the mother country, ana
by using the supplies of men available IN
India, Britain might draw up such nu-
merous formations there that she might
succeed if it were by only carrying on
| irregula, warfare, In doing considerable
| damage TO an insufiiciently strong Rus
| sian army, and even eventually in bring
| ing about its overthrow.
In concluding his article Biebertsfn
| saws: II is evident that the constantly
| and gradually approaching struggle OF
| Russia in India depends on the co-opera-
| ton Of number of factors, so that no
| one can foresee in what manner 1t VIII
! take place, nor can any conjecture be
| made as to the question whether Russia
! or Britain has the greater chance OF sue
| cess i'm such a struggle. II at the out
| set Russia could appear upon the field
! with troops stronger in number and bet
| ter drilled for a great war than Britain
! could muster, 1t must not be forgotten
| that Britain, with her immense national
! wealth. has nearly always managed III
| moments OF extreme danger 10 surprise
her adversarles by measures improyised
| for the occasion, and to win success foI
| her flag and for her policy.