New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-04-15

.
] IL was absurd as compared with our work.
Asked why he had advised that no war
/ sells be sent TO Havana after the explosion. Cap
tain Slgsbee replied
In the first place. there a great deal Of ex-
element. and wanted to work along without
men-of-war and to allay the excitement in the
city; and. In the next place, II there were any
/ mines did not want any more war YES
sells blown up. Up 10 that time had strongly
recommended that the Indiana be sent there
/ Just to show them that the Maine was not the
ory vessel in the Navy. nor the most powerful
After that time / had more confidence in the
there was no special for us; they had not
( attempted to protect us as did the Vizcay a
/ in NewYork.
A TORPEDO EXPERTS TESTIMONY.
/ Commander Bradford. torpedo expert on duty
at the torpedo station at Newport, r. l., who
was before the committee on March 80 was
asked by Senator Morgan to state briefly the
danger from the Spanish hotilla Of torpedo
boats and torpedo destroyers. and replied:
l am not impressed much as many naval
officers with the dangerous character Of torpedo
boats and torpedo destroyers They are fratl
craft. because everything is sacrificed to speed:
and Wrights are kept down for that reason. ana
very thin plates used in their construction very
slight frames. and they are easily deranseo l
may say that they are boats Of possibilities
rather than Of probabilities.
Under certain conditions they are no DOUBT
very Formidable Their chief value. In my opn-
ion. is in preventing blockades. II In ports that
attempted to he blockaded They choose
their own time Of attack. and Of course the most
favorable time. They are previously groomed
up for the occasion. everything In readiness. and
they slip out TO n vessel outside and try to get
In their work At with a squadron they are
50 liable to accident and so often deranged that
the chances Of being effective. In my opinion.
are slight. understand that the present hotilla,
crossing from Spain. have been dismantled. That
is TO say. the torpedo tubes and guns carried on
the upper deck have been taken off and are be-
ing brought over by the conveying steamer,
which H. converted cruiser. That adds 70 their
seaworthiness and stability. With those off they
are completely helpless. shorn of any power.
The dcstroyers supposed to be capable OF
ramming the small boats and destroying them
that way. II within the destroying radius or a
fleet OF course they can ne used In the same way
in a blockade For instance. the port OF Ha-
vana Is about ninety miles from Key West or
Tortugas They have high speed They can slip
out at night. get in their work, and return under
cover OF darkness. and vice versa. our own
destroyers and our torpedo boats have found II
rather rough work crossing the Gulf stream be-
tween those ports.
Commander Bradford expressed the opinion
that the destruction OF the Maine was due
70 the explosion Of submarine mine Of
high explosives. He thought the ordinary tor
pedo would not be sufficiently powerful TO pro-
duce the result shown In the Maine. but he
thought the mine was sunk before the arrival
Of the Maine because OF the difficulty of locating
one after arrival
METHOD or ATTACKING HAVANA
In response to a question from Senator Mills
rs to the method Of protecting our fleet In case
We wanted to blockade Havana Commander
Bradford said
DO not know that we have any plan. but II
we approach near enough the port to lombard
# Of course the ships would be subject to bonn
hardment The most efficacous and AT the same
al ha n Gand
vessels in TO ram the fotilla. supposing IL TO be
in the harhor-liGht draught vessels would PROB
ably not strike any obstruction would say
surprise them and ram them. or course. II tney
get near enough they are subject 10 very Sc
we're fire from the secondary batteries We have
no cases on record in experiment, wherein the
DAYTIME torpedo boats have succeeded In getting
within striking distance OF well-armed ships
Senator Lodge asked Commander Bradford II
he would not think Il very important. in case
war was coming. TO dispose NJ the fotilla before
&, reached Havana to which Commander Brad
ford replied:
Il would he an important advantage. Much
depends upon the proposed campaign-what we
naval war. whether Ne are to conine ourselves
70 marine operations, or whether we are 20 land
troops on the islands Of Cuba and Porto Rico
and what the purpose Of the Government is
That orgh, TO be decided first. IN my opinion.
AMI then would decide what TO do.
Mr. Mills asked II We could land troops with
the hotllla AZ Havana, and Mr.. Bradford replied:
would not advocate IL. Warfare cannot be
carried now ms II used 10 be. where noat
could 40 IN under the fort and town and take
poeseasion The lesson Of the Maine proves that
such forts mus; be taken By attack on shore.
With such aid as the ships give. and some
place not mined must be selected 70 land. The
object 81 the Navy now ls 10 destroy what IL
can by bombardment and destroy ships The
CAPTURE ~ territory must be left 10 the Army.
ADMIRAL IRWIN WITNESS.
Admiral John Irwin. a torpedo expert ap-
pearca before the committee on April :. He
said he had bee in the harbor OF Havana as a
pilot hundreds OF times He was there a great
deal while he was employed in laying the West
India cable system. and was there much OF the
time during the rebellion from 1868 to 1871. Al
that time the Spaniards were bitterly hostile
toward The Americans. on one occasion during
that war Americans were fired on by Spaniards
I'm a cafe a number OF persons being Killed and
I.atr Of he