The record-union., 1898-10-12


the language used in the section, he
claimed to be broad, and that prior to
the Act the present ballot system was
not in force and the printing of a
Great Register was not anticipated. He
claimed, however, that the Act of 1891
held precedence over those of 1893 and
1895, and practically repealed them.
Mr.. Devlin contended that the Leg
islature in passing county govern
ment bill, intended to make a uniform
election law for all counties, and that
the Supreme Court had held according
ly. He referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the matter Of Fresno
County, in which it was held that the
law with respect to that particular
county was unconstitutional because 1t
came under a special and not general
law. He claimed that if one part OF
the law was clearly special and local,
the other part was also clearly speclal
and local and therefore void. In other
words, if one part was special and 10
cal because it specified San Francisco,
the other portion was also void because
it excepted San Francisco.
The Constitution, Mr. Devlin said,
provided for the classification of coun-
ties, and he held that the Legislature
had no right, under the Constitution.
TO make any other classifications than
those specified in the Constitution, and
that no new class could be formed by
special Act of the Legislature. He
held that if the Act was enforced, GER
tain counties in the State would be ex-
empt from its provisions, and in them
the Boards of Supervisors would not be
ex-officio Boards of Election Comnlis-
sioners. He claimed that the Act did
not apply to San Francisco and there
fore was special legislation and uncon-
stitutionaI
Judge Johnson said that the law was
general in that it said the law should
apply to all counties, and then excepted
certain counties.
Mr.. Devlin contended that the Act
was unconstitutional, had been so held,
and that accordingly it had never been
law. He said that only law and not
business could be discussed, but called
attention to the fact that in 1896 the
contract for printing the Great Register
was awarded to D. Johnston & Co., af-
ter a San Francisco firm had abandon
ed a similar contract.
the law was unconstitutional only on
the ground that it was not uniform.
Judge Johnson said that the law was
general inasmuch as the Act provided
that it should apply to all counties
alike; a rider had been attached ex-
cepting certain counties, and if the
rider should be declared unconstitu-
tional, then the provision that it should
| apply to all counties alike would still
stand.
Mr.. DevIn contended that the Act
was passed for the purpose of making
the exceptions mentioned, and that the
intent of the legislators should be con-
sidered in arriving at judgment re-
specting the consttutionality of the
Act.
The attorney cited the primary cleo
ton law, which had been declared un-
constitutional solely because some
| acute politician had attached to it Sec
| tion 26, making it apply only to coun-
ties Of the first and second class. If,
! he said. he had been legislator. he
might have voted for the bill simply
because it was intended to apply only
to San Francisco and Los Angeles, and
not to Sacramento, and had the law
been general, applying to all, he might
have voted against 1t. He held that
the court had no right to infer that a
legislator would have voted for its
| passage as a general law.
Judge Johnson said he thought the
first portion Of the Act would stand,
being general, though the rider might
be declared unconstitutional
Mr. Devlin cited authorities to show
that the County Government Act was
the fundamental law Of the State, be-
cause it was intended to be uniform
and apply to all counties in the State
and that all Acts passed prior to 1t
We're repealed by implication. But he
claimed that the decision Of the Su-
preme Court showed that the Act was
unconstitutional in that it was special
and local. He cited decisions govern
ing repeals by implications, and said
that if it were admitted that the Act
Of 1893 intended that the Boards OF
Supervisors should advertise for print
! ing, as Election Commissioners, the
Act was repealed by the County Gov
ernment Act of 1897.
/ Attorney Clinton L. White, in open
/ ing his argument, submitted that to LET
( contracts for large sums by public Off
I cials for public purposes, without ad-
vertising for bids, would not be in ac-
( cordance with business principles, and
/ that no court ought to uphold Boards
/ of Supervisors in such acts, except un-
! der express provisions of law. It ought
/ to be presumed that Supervisors must
/ transact business on business prin.
ciples.
/ Mr.. White contended that there was
no conflict between Sections "a and 404t
/ of the Political Code, and that there
was no express provision for the repea
I of Section 4043 He contended thai
! there could be no repeal of Acts by i'm
plication. unless there was good reason
for such repeal. No such reason for re-
peal, ne said, existed In Section 81 Of
the County Government Act of 1897
and that accordingly Section 4043 o.
the Act of 1893 still held good
Mr.. White said that even if Sector
81 of the Political Code referred tx
printing the Great Register, it would bt
presumed that the only way to ge
proper and reasonable figures for doine
the work would be by advertising fol
bids for performing such work HI
said that the provision allowing tn,
| Board of Supervisors to set prices fol
doing the county printing did not ap
ply to printing the Great Register fol
the reason that it was not printed an
! nually or biennially, but only once IL
| a while. 1t had been so held by tht
courts, but the same decision also fount
| that Boards Of Supervisors should
cause 1t to be printed under their su
/ pervision, and implied that bids foi
such work should be secured by adver