The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-08-04

New York Herald: How would Grant
| have prosecuted the Cuban war? Read
the record. His own matchless account
of his campaigns tells the story.
When possible conflict with Eng
land was once discussed with friends,
Grant said:
| Il would instantly strike from De-
troft and other strategic poiats. If
Sheridan failed to capture Canada in
! so days. L would cashier him from the
army"
| McKinley's revolt against his board
of strategy recalls Grants experiences.
| From the day he took command at
] Cairo. the greatest fight of mis- life was
not against the confederates, but
against Halleck and his strategists.
Grants maxim was, Forward No lest
| for the enemy
Who could imagine Grant allowing
Blanco. in Cuba, two months for rein
| fCrcements and fort building2 For three
! years the insurgents had landed exDe-
ditions on Cuban soil in spite of Spain
and her 100000 troops. When the Unit
ed States government appeared on the
scene her crack battleshio was blown
up IN a twinkle. Then reluctant war
was declared. And now, after months
fleet are necessary, because Spain was
given time to prepare in Cuba.
So it was in Grants day. The same
old gang of strategists opposed Grants
advance at every point, until public
clamor forced the government to let
Grant proceed. Even Fremont opposed
bin. Grants first important act was
to capture Paducah, KY, a strategic
point on the Ohio river above Cairo.
iNiv hoy
pathizers IL manufacturing sentiment
against Grant for the act. General
Badeau, in his war history, says that
for two months after taking paducah
Grant was kept strictly subordinate by
Fremont. AID allowed to make no
movement of importance. Grant re-
Pc &tediy suggested capturing Column
bus, an important position on the Mis-
sissippi, 20 miles below Cairo. In Sep
TENDER, 1861. he asked permission 10
take the place. His application was un-
noticed. Finally he was allowed to
make a demonstration, only. down the
Mississippi toward Belmont and other
points All the world knows how he
captured the town. General Badeau
says: This battle confirmed Grant in
the belief on which he always after
ward acted-that when neither party is
well disciplined there'is nothing to gain
in the matter of discipline. The enemy
organizes and improves as rapidly as
yourself. and all the advantages, of
prompt movement are lost.
After Belmont, for which he was crit
icised by the critics and applauded by
the country, he captured Fort McHenry
(for which Halleck first thanked FoOte)
then took Donelson of his own motion,
and no reference had previously been
made to the act. While Halleck was
writing about the necessity of using
picks and shovels and reinforcements,
Grant captured DonelSon, with 1000
prisoners. 1t was the first great victory
of the war.
Even this glorious achievement did
not please the experts. 1t was not done
according to the rules of strategy. They
wanted the strOnghOlds taken in a GER
tain way. On the 10Th, the day after
the surrender of Donelson, General
Halleck's chief of staff cautioned Grant
not to be too rash. Halleck's first dis
patch ran: Don't let gunboats go
higher up than GAINESVILLE. Even they
must limit their operations to destroy
ing bridges and railroads; then re-
turn Immediately to Cairo, leaving one
boat at Fort DonelsOn."
Despite Halleck and the strategists,
the country recognized Grants genius
and the senate instantly confirmed his
appointment by Lincoln and Stanton
as major general of volunteers.
Secretary Stanton, who was also
fighting the strategists, held views
similar to Grants. Four days after the
capture of Denelson he wrote:
I'VE may we'll rejoice at the recent
victories, for they teach us that battles
are only to be won now, and by us, in
the same and only manner that they
were ever by any people or in any age
since the days Of Johsua, by boldly pur-
suing and striking the foe. What, under
the blessings of Providence, conceive
to be the true organization OF victory
and military combination to end this
war was declared in a few words by
General Grants message to General
Buckner: 1 propose to move imme-
diately on your works.
And what was the secret power of
Grants mighty force? To General
Sherman he wrote in his reply to his
letter of congratulation over the fall
of DonelsOn:
II hope you will earn for yourself
that promotion which you are kind
enough to say belongs to me. 1 care
nothing for promotion. so long as our
arms are successful and no political APP
pOintments are made"
On the day after the capture of Don
elsOn Grant wanted to follow up the
great advantages gained. He was anx-
ious to push forward toward Nashville.
Halleck and his strategists not only
opposed, but Grant was insulted. de-
graded and relieved from his command /
They didn't like, his style of campaign. |
Grant was the. Dewev of his day. He /
believed in victory first. explanations
later.
On Feb. q, General c. F. Smith by !
Grants direction. occupied GAINESVILLE, .
30 miles up the river from Fort Donel- |
son. and Grant so informed General |
Cullum and proposed to capture Nash !
Vile. ]
Grant says in his memoirs, written |
1t Mount McGregor, as calmly and I
1ispassfonately he reviewed the events |
Of his life;
after the fall of Fort Donel- !
son the way was open to the national /
forces all over the southwest. without !
much resistance. If one general who /
would have taken the responsibility |
had been in command of all the troops |
west of the Alleghenies he could have
TO Chattanooga, Corinth,
Memphis and Vicksburg with the
roops we then had, and as volunteer
ng was going on rapidly over the !
north, there would soon have been
'orce enough at all these centers 10
operate Extensively against any body
# the enemy that might be found near
hem.
Rapid movements and the acquisi-
ion of rebellious' territory would have
promoted volunteering. SO that rein
orcements could have been had as
asst as transportation was obtained 10
AIRY them to their destination.