Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1898-12-09

TO the most thoughtful, even before
the finding of the naval court, that a
crisis In our relations with Spain and
toward Cuba were at hand. so strong
was this belief that 1t needed but a
brief executive suggestion to the Con-
! gress ITO receive Immediate answer TO
the duty of making instant provision
for the possible and perhaps speedily
probable emergency of war, and the
! remarka BILE, almost unique spectacle
was presented of a unanimous vote of
both houses on the 9th of March. ap-
propriating fifty million dollars, for the
national defense and for each and every
purpose connected Herewith, TO be
expended at the discretion of the Pres
! ident."
NOT READY FOR WAR.
That this act of >-ovis:on came none
too soon was disclosed when the APP
plication of the fund was undertaken.
Our forts were practically undefended.
Our navy needed large provision for
increased ammunition and supplies and
even numbers. to cope with any sudden
attack from the navy of Spain, which
comprised modern vessels of the high
I est type of continental perfection Our
army also required enlargement of men
and munitions. The details of the hur-
RED preparation for the decided contin-
gency is told in the reports of the
secre taries of war and of the navy and
need not be repeated here. 1t is suf-
fcient to say that the outbreak of war,
when 1t did come, found our nation not
unprepared to meet the conflict.
Nor was the apprehension of coming
strife confined to our own country 1t
was felt by the contingent powers,
which on April 9Th, through their am
bassadors and ENJOYS. addressed to the
sxecutiys an ana zion Of n1R t marx
the course of this government ana peo-
pie and that further negotiations would
lead to an attempt which, while secur-
ing the maintenance OF peace, wouio
affirm all necessary guarantees for the
re-esta blishment of order in Cuba In
responding TO that presentation 1 also
shared the hope that the ENJOYS had
expressed that peace might be pre-
served in a manner to terminate the
chronic condition of disturbance In
Cuba, 50 injurious and menacing to our
interests and tranquility, as wen as
shocking to our sentiments of humani-
ty; and while appreciating the humanl-
tartan and disinterested character OF
the communication they had adopteo
on behalf of the powers, 1t had stated
the confidence Of this government on
Its part that equal appreciation Wouio
be shown for its earnest and urseinsn
endeavors to fulfill a duty of humanl-
ty by ending situation, the INDEFINITE
nrolon ga ton of which had become in
sufferable.
RECOGNITION OF CUBA.
SILL animated by the hope of a peace
full solution and obeying the dictates OF
duty, no effort was relaxed TO bring
about a speedy ending of the CUBAN
struggle Negotiations to this efeci
continued actively with the govern
mens of Spain looking to the immediate
conclusion of a six months ermistice
IN Cuba with view to erect the recos-
nition of her peoples right to indepen-
dence. Besides this, the instant revo-
cation of the order of Recommendation
was asked, 50 that the sufferers, return
ing TO their homes and aided by unit
ed American and Spanish effort, migni
be put in way to support themselves
and by orderly resumption of the we'll
nigh destroyed productive energies OF
the island, contribute to the restoration
of Its tranquility and well-being. Nego-
riatiorrs continued for some little time
at Ma dFfd, resulting in offers by the
Spanish government which could not
but be regarded as Inadequate. 1t was
proposed to confid he prepaTa ticn OF
peace TO the insular parliament, yet
to be convened under the autonomous
DEGREES of November 1897. but WITHOUT
i'm rairrnent in any wise of the conSH-
trrtional powers of the Madrid govern
mer,.. which to that end would grant
an arnlistice, If solicited by the insur-
gents. for such time as the general in
chief might see fit TO fix. How and With
what scope of discretionary powers
the insular parltsrnent was expected to
set about the 'prepara ton" of peace,
did not aperar If Ii was 20 be by ne
gctiation with the Insurgents the Issue
scented to rest on the side with body
chosen by that faction of the electors
in the districts under Spanish control.
,, ~ tr1=r r-cro nj
population holding the interior coun-
try. unrepresented In the so-cslled par
lament, and defiant at the suggestion
of suing for peace.
SPAIN IS CALLOUSNESS.
Grieved and disappointed at this
barren outcome of my sincere endeav-
ors to reach a practica BILE solution
felt 1t my duty to remit the whole
question to the Congress. In the mes
sage of April II. 1898. I annouced that
with this last overture in the direction
Of immediate peace In Cuba and its
disappointing reception by Spain. the
effort of the executive was orougnt TO
an end. again reviewed the alter1a-
tive course OF action which I had pre-
pared. concluding that the only conso-
papt with integna tional policy and COM
ma tFble with our firm-set historical ira
fiticns was intervention as a neutral TO
stop the war and check the hopeless
sacrafice of life, even though that resort
involved hostile constraint upon both
the parties to the contest. as well to en-
force truce as to guide che eventual
settlement"
INTERESTS OF HUMANITY.
The grounds justify1ng that step were
The Sr,ferest of humanity; the duty TO
protect life and property of our cdti-
zens in Cuba; the right to check Injury
10 our commerce and people through
he deva station of the island. and. most
;nrpcrtant, the need of removing AZ
once and forever the constant menace
and the burdens entailed upon our gov
ern,nens by the uncertainties and perils
of the situation caused by the unendur-
able disturbance in Cuba, l sasd: The
long trial has proved thar the object
for which Spain has waged the war
cannot be attained. The IRE of insur-
rection may flame or may shoulder
with varying seasons. but 1t has not
been and it is plain that 1t cannot be
extinguished by present methods. The