The sun., 1898-06-16

against civilization have provoked our In.
terpositIon. The sole excuse for picking
quarrel with us at this time would be the
cynical admission that, in the situation
created at Manila by Admiral DEwEY's
victory at Cavit6, Germany percelves an
opportunity of increasing her colonial pos
sessions. We do not believe that Kaiser
WILLIAM II. ls capable Of such an avowal.
1t is by no means certain, either, that
Germany would not lose moro than she
could gain by a war with the United States.
There is no reason to doubt tho ability of
Admiral DEWEY to cope with the German
warships now in his neighborhood, and,
although eventually the number of these
may be somewhat increased, our own fleet
will be shortly reinforced by the Charles
ton. the Monterey and the Monadnock
After the destruction or capture OF the
Spanish vessels now cooped up In the
harbor of Santiago, the ships under
Admiral SAMPSON would be abundantly
able to deal with any naval force that
Germany could place in the Atlantic. We
may take for granted, therefore, that
Kaiser WILLIAM II. would not begin hos.
of allies among the maritime powers. Pre-
sumably, he might count upon Austria,
whose naval strength, however, is but
slight, and it is possible that he might be
supported by Italy, the other member Of
the Triple Alliance. 1t is, on the other
hand, highly improbable that France would
combine with her worst enemy to injure
the United States, or that Russia would re-
nounce the advantages of friendship with
this republic for tho sake Of helping Ger.
many to gain a coign Of vantage in the Phil.
ippines.
1t is certain, finally, that there are two
powers, the aid or countenance Of which
could not be secured by the German EN-
eral war, would be impelled by their own
interests to side with the United States.
We refer, of course, to Great Britain and
to Japan, which, in combination with the
United States, would be more than match
for the rest of the world at sea. The Jap
anese can entertain no kindly feeling for
Germany, seeing that the latter power COM
bined with Russia and France to compel
the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty, and
to deprive the Mikado OF that foothold on
the Chinese mainland which both Russia
and Germany have since acquired. 1t is
clearly, also, for the advantage of the Japa'
nese that. II they cannot themselves pos
sess the Philippines, those islands should
fall to the United States, which has nc
desire to despoil the Chinese Empire,
rather than to o power like Germany,
whose designs have been disclosed by the
occupation of Klao Chou. To England II
is of manifest Importance that group Of
islands which lies between Hong Kong and
Singapore should not be controlled by the
German Emperor, whose colonial aspira
| tions cannot be easily reconciled with the
maintenance and extension of England's
commercial prosperity. There is, on the
other hand, an absolute community of in
terest between England and the United
States. 80 far as the far East is concerned
In a word, we may fairly assume that, Il
the German Emperor should try to rob us
of the fruits of Admiral DEwEY's victory
we should have allies as well as he, anG
that our allies would be the stronger.
The chances are that the outcome of I
war between the United States and Ger
many would be, for the latter country, thu
loss of her colonial possessions and Of th
laboriously constructed navy upon whicl
such high hopes have been based. Such
| war would be. moreover, extremely dis
tasteful to the German people. owing t.
the increase in taxation, the rise in pric
of food staples, and the debarment Of Ger
man commodities from all markets beyon'
the sea. For these reasons we do not be
lieve that there is any probability Of an at
tempt on the part Of Germany to interfer
with our occupation of the Philippines.