Arizona republican., 1898-09-12
CoNTRasTED CAMPAIGNS.

. CCmpar1SOn IS inevitable between the Khartoum campaign and the San tiagc campaign, not only because a common spirit animated the two branches of the Angio-Saxon race in contending with surviving forces of barbarism in the eldest continent and the newest, but because the two expa- ditions had like obstacles to overcome and overcame them in such different ways; one with deliberate preparation and scientific precision Of execution which accomplished the largest results with the greatest economy Of life, and the other with tumultuous haste and reckless dash that seemed wasteful of life at the moment, though it may be seen plainly now that it saved life in the end.
 This comparison can be made much eral Shafter's story of the campaign, il- frustrated by the events that occurred after the surrender The British iii Egypt were able to take their own time, both in preparation for the ex- petition to Khartoum and in execution of their design. The work they had to do had been waiting for them ten years, and @ year or two more would make no change in it's conditions. The enemy was isolated in the center of continent, and the intrusion of no ex- ternal force could alter suddenly the circumstances of the situation and compel readjustment to them of the plan of attack. General Kitchener was confronted with scientific miN- tary problem, to work out at his leis- ure. He did it to admiration, and his military genius was nobly seconded ty the gallantry and steadiness of hls men; but it is unreasonable to expect like performance of an army working under conditions widely different.
 In the Santiago campaign the hand Of the Americans was forced at every point, and performance was condi- tioned by circumstances which could not be fcreseen, or, being foreseen, could not be averted The expedition was rot part of the original plan Of the war, but was compelled by the acci- dent of shutting Ceryera's fleet in Santiago. This warranted hastening of plans which all the ignorant news paper clamor of "on to Havana would not have pFecipitated, and excused the dispatch of troops not completely ready for the campaign, though it does not excuse defects of organization which prevented their being ready or ready, which made the brilliant results of the campaign more costly in life than those of General Kitchener ob- tained in the Soudan.
 Finally, and this is the point at which General Shafters story throws clear light on the history of the cam- paign, the hand Of the American was most imperiously forced, after landing of the troops, by the certalnty that the entire army would be disabled by fe- yer in two CT three weeks. It was race with disease, and the army could not wait to make the campaign with scientific precision. It was deplorable that artillery and supplies could not be landed with the troops, but had the troops waited for them fever would have prostrated the army. There was nothing for the army but to do it's best without them, and its best was glori- ous. And it nov begins to be evident that glory freely accorded to the troops from the first must be shared by the commanders, who foresaw the peril of a long campaign and drove their forces ahead with calculated recklessness Of scientific preparation and grim deter mination to make their strength and daring tell before lever drained il away. It was bold game, but it won, and the triumph is as fine in it's way as General Kitcheaer's.