The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-07-14
TWELVE PAGES.
THURSDAY. JULY IA. 1888.
At Santiago.
HE mornings news from Wash
ington IL a pretty severe shock

tngton IL a pretty severe shock
for those who feel very sure that
this country. under any hasty impulse
that selzes it. can take possession Of
Islands or mainland anywhere on the
globe, and whip, hands down. the power
or the powers that venture to protest.
The unwelcome truth is that, ever
since last spring, the war department
at Washington has been preparing for
the nrst land battle Of this war with
spain--and. up to date. It must be said,
we haven't won 1t. We have, however,
sustained a fearful loss in killed and
wounded in the attempt to take Sam
tiago. There's nothing the matter with
our sol~diers-history doesn't furnish ex-
amples of greater fortitude or Of more
exalted personal courage than have
been brought TO view in this past fort
night OF lighting. And these intrepid
soldiers on Cuban soil are entitled to the
greater honor by reason Of the fact that
they realize that they have not been
backed with reinforcements and ammu-
milton and supplies as they ought to
have been and az was faithfully prom
ised by the war department they would
be. Dissatisfaction among our troops
under shafter would be the more ex-
cusable, since they realize that the lack
at Washington is not of money but Of
MANAGEMENT.
The Standard has not at any time felt
disposed to approve the newspaper
critics Of the wars management. The
criticism. In large measure. has been i'll
timed, unjust and often unwarranted.
II has been chiefly a display Of ignor-
snce. It demanded that Havana be
taken In a week. the Spaniards driven
out OF Cuba in a fortnight. all OF SPANS
colonies subdued in three weeks and the
war ended in thirty days. This talk
was worse than silly: the wonder is that
SO many Americans listened to IT in pa
thence. Yet the situation, as In reality II
has come to be. suggests comment
which. IL IL take the nature of criticism,
cannot be deemed altogether captious or
senseless. Our army-as It should have
seen-eertainly ought to take Santiago
with comparative ease; It ought never to
have undertaken the capture with forces
manifestly insufficient and VIGOROUSLY.
as It develops. without the backing
which the professional strategists In the
presidential circle ought TO " pro-
vidsd. That 10 to say. II there Is any
reason why we should take Santiago at
all. we should nave had there a force
thai. beyond a p~eradventure, could take
IL IN a day.
All the tdings Of this morning are 70
the effect that they are going TO be dis
appointed who were telling us that thi:
country would make short work OF
Spain. The ak now is that, after WI
have taken Santiago. there will be
months Of vacation In the Cuban cam
paign. unless Spain promptly gives up
We are to pull out. allowing yellow
fever to have its run and returning Il
the investment OF Havana about mex
October. That isn't pleasant. And
even then. the public win wonder VIII,
we ever split 80 much blood in takini
Santiago. what's the good Of the sacr
ace anyhow? The critics are askin'
49, IT, a. H.~.h~r shex- tnssst fror
Santiago 10 Havana, by many miles
over a bad apasd&gerous country. tina
Il Is by free ocean sailing from Tampi
20 Havana OF course. We need a mill
tary base for our land forces on tn
island. but the critics who are urginI
the points we have just mentioned IN