The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-12-01
WITH THE BLOCKAOERS
Operations on Santiago After the
Big Fight.
CRITICISM OF SKATER
Fat Pecos BIZ Refuse to Permit the
Navy to Take Any Part IN the
Recent Surrender Of
Santiago.


partment to-day made public a report
from Admiral Sampson covering the
operations OF the United States block
aiding fleet on Santiago after the de-
struction OF Cervera's squadron. The
report begins with dispatch dated on
the flagship New York, July Is, and
winds up with one from the same flag
ship dated Guantanamo. Aug. T. In
the first report Admiral Sampson tells
OF the demonstration made against
Aguadores by the Michigan troops un-
der Dufheld. the point Of which was
that as soon as the ship took part in
the firing the Spaniards disappeared.
He says the bombardment of Santiago
on the I'd of July served no particular
end because Skaters attack had been
prepared. He quotes dispatches from
himself to Shafter stating II 10 impos-
sible to force an entrance TO the har-
Dor until the mines had been removed.
and that work could be accomplished
only after the troops had taken the
forts. Shafter replied he could not tell
when he could take the batteries. IL
they were as difiicuit as those against
which he was pitted II would take some
time and a great loss OF life. Says he:
II am at a loss to see why the navy
cannot work under q destructive hre
as well as the army. My loss yester-
day was over 500 men. BY all means
keep up the fire on the heights until
they are demolished. I expect. how
ever. with time and suficient men to
capture the forts along the bay"
An hour later on the same day. July
2. Shafter again appealed to Sampson
to Immediately force the harbor en-
trance so as to avoid future loss. He
said: You can operate with less loss
than ! can" In reply. on the same
IAxw H. g.
that the channel of the harbor was
well strewn with mines. which would
certainly result In the sinking OF one
or more of his ships II he attempted to
enter the harbor. and that by sinking
them the harbor would be blocked
against the entrance OF others. He had
hoped Shafter would take the batteries
from the rear so he might drag for
the torpedoes. but II Il was Skaters
earnest desire that he should force the
entrance he would prepare TO underS
take u. thinking. however. the position
made more dif1culte n they failed in
the attempt. He promised TO use
mines at Guantanamo to countermine
those a. Santiago. which would con-
sumo considerable time. Says samp-
son: 1T In not so much the loss Of men
as the loss OF ships which has until
now deferred me from making a direct
attack upon the ships within the port"
Admiral Sampson says that after the
destruction OF Cerveras fleet Shafter
renewed the request that he should
force the entrance TO the harbor. and
II was arranged between them the out
side forts should be taken by marines
and Cubans after the feet had shelied
them. Then the harbor was to be
forced by the fleet. Admiral Sampson
says he does not know why the ships
were abandoned. and still believes time
and many lives might have been saved
had IL been carried out.
Thus" said Sampson. II have been
surprised 10 see published In the pa
pers any statement or refusal on my
part TO endeavor to force my way into
the harbor and cannot understand-in
case the newspaper report has been a
truthful statement OF wnat was sent
report OF this kind.
II here. moreover. would animadvert
upon the apparently extraordinarily
opinions with which every detail OF ef-
fort or suggsftion on the part Of the
army had been published. The unwis-
dom OF such proceeding is too manifest
for discussion"
Continuing. ADMIRAL Sampson said.
The navy has been placed In such
an invidious and false position before
the country through the very unwise
publication Of General Skaters teie-
grams that ] think this matter in some
way should be clear 20 the public. On
July Admiral samppon sent the fol-
lowing to Secretary Long:
July IA. 1sSs-PubQshed telegrams
Of General Shafter in the Herald Of
July reflect on the navy. I wish the
department and the president to un-
derstand the FIRST requisite towards
opening the harbor of Santiago In To
capture the forts and intrepchmenfs at
Its entrance. guarding the mine fields
and that the general has never made a
move to do this. although before his
army landed he stated such was the
primary object Of his operations. II
the general chooses to ignore the sea
approaches and to attack Santiago 20
the east and north. that 10 his affair.
but II should be clearly understood this
attack does not influence the situation
at the harbor entrance. from which his
flank Is distant not less than four miles.
! have been ready at any time during
the last three weeks to silence the
works to clear the entrance OF the
mines and to enter the harbor when
ever the army will do the part which
the proper conduct OF the war assigns
to IL. To throw my ships to certain de-
struction upon the mine fields would
be suicidal folly. and have not the
force to form a landing party strong
enough TO insure the capture Of the
forts. No Disbursements mentioned by
the paper have been brought to my no.
tice by General Shafter.'"
Admiral Shafter gives a number OF
dispatches. saying he was asked to par
ticipate in the terms OF surrender and
tried to ind out when he would send a
representative: but owing to one or two
delays no time was fixed. Sampson
comments as follows:
The foregoing shows clearly the
most absolute joint action and 1 took
II for granted that We should be Joint
sieners of any capitulations. as Is Gus
tomary In all services In such circum-
stances.
Captain Chadwick arrived at the
front at the earliest hour possible for
him to do so and informed General
Shafter of my expectancy In the mat
ter. but General Shafter peremptoriiy
refused The convention has already
been signed. and he stated as one rea-
son that nothing had been said Of the
army in my report of the fleet action