The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1898-10-26

90 SA which had been
| EgSySE1IH1 issued at the be-
Es&GA4 Ng9nning, had
SrGSTZAE]b cen exhausted
x AW o1I,slitS5E~ before landing in
| SsSSS C u ba. The e
(WA Rmo Icramped position
ls~gl@ @lsM@g[aof the troops in
-~RwIthe ships, the
- - llong and tedious
voyage under tropical sun. sapped the
vitality and energy of the soldiers and
they were not by any means in condl-
ton to do their best Immediately on
reaching the field of action. This is no
discredit to the mettle Of the soldiers.
Human nature has limits. Had it been
possible for the army to disembark and
spread itself out over good camping
grounds with a good supply of water
and facilities for bathing, cooking, ex-
ercising and drilling, with good air, for
two or three days even, then the effects
of the voyage might have cut no figure
in the condition of the troops. But the
camping grounds where they landed at
Siboney and Daiquiri were very unfit.
Troops began spreading out toward the
heads of the streams passing through
the camps near the shore. In short
time the water became foul. The whole
region was congested with troops and
the impedimenta, and the situation was
such, in brief, that the army had no
time to take breath, or, as the saying
is, "pull itself together" for the hustling
campaign which followed.
ALI of this has most important bear
ing upon the conduct of the soldiers and
their efficiency at the time Of extreme
trial in front of the Spanish blockhouses
and trenches around Santiago. Any &C
count of the Santiago campaign which
starts with the assumption that Shat
ter's army was in the normal condition
of an army when it set out along blind
trails and through the dense jungles
which intervened between the seashore
and the heights about the city will con-
vey no adequate idea Of the suferings,
the hardships, the persistency under
difficulties, as we'll as Of the glorious
achievements and unparalleled courage
of the heroes Of Santiago. AS is already
known, General Shafter went On shore
and conferred with General Garcia. the
Cuban, at a point held by the insur-
gents, IS miles west of Moro Castle.
From Garcia and from former residents
of Santiago, who were with him on
board the transports, he learned the stu
alton east of Santiago harbor and city
and decided to land the army for opera
tions in that region. To mislead the
enemy with regard to his intentions he
secured the cooperation of our navy in
bombarding several points at once.
It was Of prime necessity to keep the
army under cover of gunboat fire while
it was landing and for some time after
ward, or at least until the forces were
we'll in hand on land and outposts es-
tablished for defense There is but one
road running into Santiago from the
east which communicates with good
landing places on the coast. Accounts
Of the condition of this road vary. Gen.
eral Shafter says that it was very mar
row and in many places not better than
trail. Other officers particularly those
connected with the artillery and trans
port department, speak Of it as an ex-
ecrable roadway. Statements tc the con-
trary have been published, claiming
that it is fair country road over which
&C., 1ryJ{h frJ1
load Of hay, that some one in authority
had hobby for pack mules, and for
that reason wagon transportation was
neglected.
The landing was effected at Daiquiri
and Siboney between June % and 25.
AS rule the troops disembarked while
the transports were from one mile and
half to two miles offshore. Some idea
Of the confusion attending the landing
may be gained from the experience of
Lieutenant Parker with his Gatling bat
terry. Parker had an order from Shafter
to land at once and get his outfit to the
front That was on the evening of June
%. The Cherokee, upon which the bat
terry made the trip from Tampa, was
warped along the iron pier at Daiquiri,
and Parker seized a government pontoon
to use in transferring his outfit to shore.
He was stopped by young officer, who
claimed to control the pontoons, and
who said that in spite Of Shafter's order
that the Gatlings get to the front at
once his pontoon should ''not be smash
ed in doing it, While this parley was
going on general officer rode up and
ordered the Cherokee to put to sea again
so that some other ships might come up
to the pier For another day the Chero-
kee with Parker's guns on board, lay
in the offing. 1t is said that at that time
the steamer Alamo had Oh board an en-
tire cargo Of pontoons, which had not
been landed. On the 25th the Gatlings
were taken off the Cherokee by a light
draft steamer and were put upon the
shore where Lieutenant Parker was
warned by the engineers that the roads
to the front were impossible. A little
later it was demonstrated that Parker's