The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1898-08-26
GEN. MILES TALKS
And Sharply Critioises ecu. Shafter and
the War Department.

the War Department.
The Kansas City Stars correspondent.
j. d. Whelpley, under date of Ponce.
Porto Rico. sends the following interview
with Gen. Miles,
AFTER arrived at Santiago with rein
forcements for Gen. Skater, and while +
was conducting the surrender neeotia-
lions. Adjt.-Gen. Corbn sent secret de-
spatch to Gen. Shafter assuring him that
my coming made no difference in his
command; that I did not go tofsupersede
him. This dispatch ala not see then.
Gen. Shafter did, mention it to me,
but 1t was given out for publication in
Washington. 1t might have caused great
trouble and confusion. exoeps that it was
based on an impossibility. Gen Miles
| said this to the Stars correspondent yes
terday In the course of a conversation
| touching upon the Cuban campaign. He
| said 1t firmly and with considerable sup
pressed feeling, and from the way he
| spoke 1t is evident that he will have some
thing to say on the subject when he re-
| turns home,
In explanation of what he meant, he
| continued: 81 no more superseded Gen.
Shafter than colonel suprsedes o cap
| tain. If captain was sent ahead with
| a company Of soldiers and was later on
joined by his colonel with the rest of the
regiment, the colonel would not supersede
the captain; he would simply take COM
inand of the entire force, as did at San
tiago That this fact was recognized by
the war department is shown by all subse
quent proceedings, for the dispatches
from there in regard to the surrender all
came to me, and Gen. Shafter was not
mentioned in them. The dispatches from
! and to Santiago all show this, but they
were very much mutilated and garbled
| in Washington when given to the public.
Words and sentences were left out which
cha nged the meaning and significance OF
the messages, and several very important
ones which would have thrown a clearer
light upon the situation were entirely
suppressed.
On file in Gen. Miles's headquarters is
a copy of telegram sent by Gen. Miles
! to Secretary AIger, July 81. This cable
gram was suppressed by the secretary in
Washington, and no attention was paid
to the recommendation Of Gen. Miles,
which outlined the plan now followed by
the war department, but for which they
are claiming credit. If Gen. Miles's
recommendations had been promptly
followed out and his statement Of the
condition of the army given to the public
when received, much Of the sickness and
trouble would have been avoided. This
cable reads in part as follows:-
There is not single regiment of regu.
lars or volunteers that is not Injected with
yellow fever, from one case fin the Sth
| Ohio to Sc in the SD Michigan. After
consulting with best medical authorities.
| it is my opinion that the best mode of
Kidding the troops of the fever will be as
l have directed, namely: The troops to
go up as high in the mountains RS pos
| sible, selecting fresh camps every day. II
| this does not check the spread of the
disease, the only way of saving large
portion of the command will be to put
them on transports and ship them to the
New England coast to some point deslg.
mated by the surgeon general.
| 1t was Skaters disobedience of orders
and Secretary Ayers disregard OF Gen.
Miles's recommendations that were re-
| sponsible for the terrible condition of the
Santiago army, as revealed by the appeal
| of the commanding officers at that point.
made public August 4, IA days after
| Miles's telegram. "All the time was in
Cuba. however, | was extremely anxious
to get to Porto Rico" General Miles said
later: 'sThe matter had been fully dis.
lcussed In Washington before left, and it
| was agreed that the necessity of securing
foothold upon Spanish soil was very
great. In accordance with this idea,
left Santiago rs soon as the surrender was
complete. 1t had been urged in Washing
ton that I should rendezvous my soldiers
and ships III the bay Of Nipe, on the
northern coast of Cuba, before proceeding
! to Porto Rico. l combated that idea,
and saw no reason why ! should not
rendezvous in Porto Rico to begin with.
II peace comes quickly, the wisdom OF
this Is apparent. for it would have taken
several weeks to carry out the Nipe plan
of campaign.
ga plan was then agreed upon which
provided for landing ON the north coast.
was to land at Fajado, on the northeast
corner of the island. / proceeded from
Santiago to the north side of Porto Rico,
where l was to have met the steam
lighters and tugs from the United States
sent to facilitate my landing. These did
not one of them has turned up to this
day. There is no harbor at Fajado, and,
not securing the lighters and tugs, de-
termined to change my plan anu surprise
the enemy. at the same time securing
safe landing for my forces: Another thing
that determined me in this was the fact
that the Spaniards were fully informed
as to the piars adopted in Washington,
They were given out there in minutest
detail long before l was ready to move,
and tho whole thing was thoroughly ex.
plotted before the public and the press OF
the entire world. The Spaniards were
given every chance to prepare for my
coming.
"lf you will look at the map, you will
see that Fajado is not far from San Juan
There is no barbor there, and as ad no
lighters it would have taken long time
10 land my force, great difficulty would
have been experienced in getting rein
forcements and supplies, and 1 would
have been without a practical base. In
the meantime the Spaniards could have
moved O large force from San Juan and
thrown up line of entertainments, and
we might have found ourselves much in
the position of the United States army at
Santiago shortly after it landed. The
conditions which would have resulted
would have been similar to those with
which you are familiar in Santiago.
determined, therefore, even after passing
to the north along the coast OF Porto