Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1898-10-12
REPLY OF Gen. ALGER.
Secretary of War Responds to the
War Conduct InvestiCa.
tors Questions.
FIRST PLAN OF CAMPAIGN III CUBA

Given Up Because OF Danger to the Troops
by sickness-Cervera's Squadron "a Big
Factor I'm the Arraneements-Samp
Report to SantiaSos Weaknesses
lection OF Tampa q Rendezvous for
Troops, and OF Other Southern Camps.
Washington, Oct 1.-THE following in
Secretary Ayers reply to the questions
Of the war investigating commission.
addressed to Major General Granville
IL Dodge, and dated Oct. 6:
Sir: have the honor herewith to
hand you information desired from the
secretary of war. as referred to in your
letter of Sept. q, 1898. Very respect
fully, r. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War"
The Information document takes up
acquisitions asked by the commission one
after the other and replies to them, as
follows:
First Plan OF Campaign.
l. Plan of campaign decided upon i'm
mediately after the declaration of war.
Was it decided to move at once on Ha-
vaHa or that the campaign should be
postponed until autumn?
Answer-Immediate blockade by the
navy of the important ports of Cuba, as
ton. The holding Of troops at points
nearest to Cuba to be available in any
emergency which might arise, and es-
pecially to be ready for prompt assist
ance in case the. operations of the navy
should make the use of land forces nee
essary or desirable Early in May a
plan was partially matured to land
force at Mariel, a point about twenty
six miles west OF Havana, reports hav-
ing been received that in its immediate
vicinity were high grounds, well watered
and suited for camping troops, prepa-
ratory for q movement upon Havana
later, il ii was deemed advisable: the
thought being that possibly an assault
might be made upon the forces defend
Ing that city before the rainy season
set in.
Plans Very Materially Changed.
Orders were issued to that effect on
May 9. but subsequently plans were
changed on account of further informa-
ton that there would be great danger to
the health of the troops in that vicinity;
and also on account of the uncertainty
of the movements of the enemy's fleet.
It was then determined to keep the
forces in the United States at points
as near Cuba as possible for immediate
eInbarkation should an emergency de-
mand 1t. The Santiago campaign proved
to be that emergency. 1t should be
added further that il was believed aft
er consultation with medical authori- |
ties, that troops camping in southern
states during the summer would be- |
come somewhat acclimated for their SER
vices IN Cuba. |
Cervera Made Change Necessary.
2 When was the Santiago campaign |
upon? |
AHswer-The Santiago campaign was
made necessary by the presence OF Ad- |
miral Cervera's fleet in Santiago har- |
Dor, but had previously been contem- |
plated as one point on the coast where. /
q reconnaissance in force was to be /
made to ascertain the strength of the
enemy in the different locations in east /
ern Cuba. The immediate destruction |
of Admiral Cervera's fleet was neces-
sary; and to enable the navy to accom-
plish this the military force under Ma /
jor General Shafter was directed to /
move at once on the city and province /
OF Santiago. This movement was has
tened by reason of a telegram received /
from Admiral Sampson on June stat
ing that he had bombarded forts at /
Santiago on June and silenced works /
quickly. and il 10000 men were there |
city and fleet could be captured within /
forty-eight hours. 1t is proper to state /
that after the date of this message the /
Spanish garrison was largely reinforced. |
The opinion of Admiral Sampson was |
correct at the time. The troops |
sailed from Tampa on June Il, 1898, |
with 1888 officers and men.