The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-04-20


sional Cuban resolution VIII bs~signed to-
morrow. The uitimainm to Spain viii be
signed at the same time. The president
early decided to make the two practically
one act by a simultaneous signature Of
each.
Two cabine: meetings were held during
the day, the frs; being a. II o'clock and
lasting nearly two hours. and the sec
ond lasting from 3 until $50 O'clock. AT
their close the announcement that ex-
was made. Both cabinet sessions were
devoted principally to discussing the ui-
timafum to be sent to Madrid AT the
morning session the president rather IA
vored allowing the Madrid government
two or even three days In which TO reply
to our demands. but since that time he
has changed his views somewhat. ana 1t
is now believed to be his purpose TO re-
quire an answer within very short time,
probably within twenty-four hours. The
reason for limiting the time to one day or
even less is said to be entirely strategic.
otherwise two or even three DAYS would
have been allowed.
A plain. straightforward Demana.
The unimasum itself. IT is believed. Is
short and to the point. 1t viii rec.se the
main features Of the resolutions passed by
congress, and demand compliance there
with
So far as could be learned. there viii not
be a meeting of the cabinet this evening or
tomorrow morning, before the president
signs the two documents. which. it is be-
Heved, unquessionably viii prscipitata
war
II is likely that the president and Assist
an. Secretary Day viii again 60 over the
message, which is abou. 10 be sent TO
Madrid. and make any changes which may
be thought desirable. leaving the final act
of signing the congressional resolutions
and the ulsimatum until tomorrow morn
ing. Ii probably will not be made public
here until notice Is received that it is In
the hands of the Spanish public. diplomat
ic etiquette requiring this.
The Cuban resolution passed by con-
grsss arrived at the White House at 1:i5
o'clock. a little over an hour having been
consumed In the formalities OF securing
the signatures OF Speaker Reed and Vice
President Hobar: 10 the resolution in open
session, and its delivery at the White
House by Representative Hager. of Iowa.
chairman OF the committee on enrolled
bills, and Representative Overssreet. OF
Indiana. Il was expected that the resoiu-
slcn would be signed Immediately after Il
had reached the president. and this was
President McKinley's inclination. but for
certain state reasons Il was deemed advls-
able that the resolution and the ultima
tum should be ssgned simultaneously.
and time Was needed TO drat. the ultima
.urn In diplomatic form.
No Infentfou Not tn Sign.
The fact that the resolution was not
immediately signed gave rise TO few
disaa.esing reports, but II soon appeared
from statements o. cabinet officers that
the president had net the slightest intsn-
ton Of Withholding his signature. and
that the delay ia attaching II was ac-
counted Tor solely by rs desire TO have a
fui! and complete plan OF operation for
me government OF the executive In the
immediate future before taking the final
aad important step Of turning the tuias
resolution into a statute.
Jnss what the plan shall be was the oc-
caSfon fer the two cabinet meetings to-
day The first sessiaa. IL anticipation OF
the reception OF the resolution, was de-
voted largely 70 questions Of snaace ard
military policy, as wesi as 10 ihe framing
oe the ulunaatgm Itself.
So FAR as can be gathered. the .nrors-
ant point al issae in regard 10 the ultt-
raatun was the question Of si-ne 70 be
allowed for a response on the part q.
Spain. TIE steaay progress os.. military
and naval preparations indicated the coz
vsctton o. tse part af the administration
that a peaceful scsasion cs the existing
6sfSsfl.ies Is ret p~onahte As 10 tire
course OF sveass IN The imaseaate fatsre.
the only pgesiietson that caa he made q
ere based on nrereients
'-yAs us.smasum." said ene member ss