The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-05-24

said prominent naval officer, in view of
the 1act as commanding officer of the Yale
ne mas eeen scouting for the enemys fleet
since few days before its arrival at Mar
unique. The armored cruiser is nothing
more than a swift seagoing battle ship.
Japan recognizes this fact, and is the only
nation that was quick to take advantage of
such recognition. Her lesson was learned
al falu, where her protected cruisers of
great speed and equipped with rapid-fri1g
guns drove from the scene of battle the
Chinese battle ships of slow speed and thick
armor. That the lesson was well learned
is shown by the fact that Japan irnruedi-
ately placed contracts with the Arm ugs,
or England, for the construction of At
tie ships of great speed. In order ret
the speed desired eighteen knots w the
protection and armament specified by the
Mlkados government, 1t was necessary to
of them, the Yashima and Full which are
now on their way to Japan. are of IL 400
tons displacement each. The latter ships
have a displacement of IA $50 tons each on
their trials the Yashima and Full developed
speeds of 1890 and 1872 knots, respectively.
These vessels are really the development of
the armored cruiser type. What would we
now give for such vessels under the COM
mand of Rear Admiral Sampson? Two of
them; with the New York and Brooklyn.
would be able to destroy or drive away Ad-
miral Cervera's squadron. This govern
ment in building the Iowa obtained type
in some respects similar to the armored
cruiser, but her speed is only sixteen knots.
and under present conditions is probably
but thirteen or fourteen.
once the war began we have been using
vessels for purposes for which their types
unsuited them. For instance, the Indiana
and Massachusetts are coast defense battle
ships. Yet they have been sent to sea
cruising for the enemy when they were
really intended for defensive purposes
Then, we have been employing harbor de-
fence monitors for blockading purposes and
for offensive warfare the result being to
cripple the maneuvering quality of our fleet
and handicapping Rear Admiral Sampson
seriously in his offensive and defensive OPP
erations Our ship building policy has been
all wrong. The country has gone on the
theory that defensive navy was all that
was necessary. The present war teaches
that offensive navy is absolutely re-
quired.
1.-The necessity of target practice in time
of peace is apparent when we think of the
firing of the Spaniards at Manila, at Ma
squadrons. We knew if the war began the
desira bility of employing smokeless powder
but, unfortunately, Congress failed to make
the necessary appropria ton when 1t was
recommended several years ago. and the
department had to fall back upon brown
powder.
II think Congress will now agree that
Although none of the battle ships is capable
of greater speed than sixteen knots an
hour, under their present foul conditions
they can probably not steam at a greater
rate than twelve thirteen knots. The
divers who have been sent down to Key
West from Norfolk will be able to Scrape
the propellors clean and thus increase the
speed of the ships, but they will not re-
move the barnacles off the bottoms of the
ships to any great extent. for it is impos-
sible for them to do good work under
water