The herald., 1898-03-18

supply trains or for field campaign, such
as we have. Their cavalry horses are
scrubby little native ponies, weighing not
over 500 pounds. tough and hardy. but for
the most part In wretched condition, re-
minding one Of the mounts Of Don Quixote
and his squire. Some Of the officers, how
ever, have good horses. mostly American.
I think. On both sides cavalry is consid-
cred the favorite and the dangerous fight
ing arm.
SPANISH TACTICS
THE tactics of the Spanish, as described
to me by an eyewitness and participant in
some of the battles. is for the Infantry,
when threatened by insurgent cavalry.
to form hollow square and fire away ad
libitum and without ceasing until the time
comes to march back to town. 1t does not
seem to have entered the minds of either
side that good infantry force can take
care of itself and repulse everywhere an
equal number of cavalry. and there are
everywhere positions where cavalry would
be at disadvantage.
| SAW NO INSURGENTS
Having called on Governor and Cap
tain-General Blanco and received his cour-
teous call in return, could not with pro-
priety seek communication with the in
surgents. I had plenty Of offers Of safe
conduct to Gomez's camp. and was told
that if would write him. an answer would
be returned safely within teS days at most.
I saw several who visited the insurgent
camps and was sought out by an insurgent
field officer, who gave me the best informa-
tion received as to the insurgent force.
| His statements mOdpratp and waS
credibly Informed that he was entirely re-
liable. He claimed that the Cubans had
about 10000 men now in the field, some in
every province. but mostly in southeastern
provinces and Eastern Santa Clara, and
this statement was corroborated from
other good sources.
| "They have a force all the time in
Havana province itself. organized as four
small brigades and operating in small
bands. They are we'll armed, but very
poorly supplied with ammunition. They
are not allowed to carry many cartridges,
sometimes not more than one or two. The
| infantry are poorly clad. Two small squads
of prisoners which ] saw. however. one
of half dozen in the streets of Havana
and one of three on the cars. were better
clothed than the average Spanish soldier.
| by guards, was bound by the arms and
wrists by cords and they were all tied
together by a cord running along the
| line, a specimen Of the amenities of their
warfare About one-third of the Cuban
army are colored, mostly in the infantry,
| as the cavalry furnishes their own horses
A field officer, an American from a south
ern state, spoke in the highest terms of
49, co1I f1ot
| they were as good fighters and had more
endurance than the whites. could keep up
with the cavalry on a long march and
come in fresh at night.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION
"The dividing lines between the parties
are the most straight and clear-cut that
have ever come to my knowledge. The
division in our war was by means so clearly
defined. 1t is Cuban against Spanard. 1t
| is practically the entire Cuban population
| on one side and the Spanish army and the
Spanish citizens on the other. l do not
count the autonomists in this division
as they are far too inconsiderable in num-
bers to be worth counting. General
Blanco filled the civil offices with men
who had been autonomists and were, still
classed as such. But the march OF events
has satisfied most of them that the chance
| for autonomy came too late. 1t falls as
| talk of compromise would have fallen the
| last year or two of our war. If it succeeds
| 1t can only be by armed force, by the tri-
umph of the Spanish army, and the sue
cess of Spanish arms would be easier by
Weyer's policy and method. for in that
the Spanish army and people believe. There
is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in
entire good faith, that he desires to give
the Cubans fair measure of autonomy.
as Campos did at the close of the ten
years war. He has, Of course, few
personal followers, but the army and the
Spanish citizen do not want genuine au-
tonomy, for that means government by
the Cuban people. And ii is not strange
that the Cubans say it comes too late.
have never had any communication, direct
or indirect, with the Cuban junta in this
country or any of its members, nor did
l have with any of the junta which exists
| in every city and large town of Cuba. None
| of the calls i made were upon parties OF
whose sympath!es 1 had the least knowl-
edge, except that l knew some of them
were classed as autonomists. Most Of my
| informants We're business men, who had
| no sides and rarely expressed themselves.
| I had no means of guessing in advance
| what their answers would be, and was in
most cases greatly surprised at their
| frankness. 1 could not but conclude tha!
| you do not have to scratch an autonomist
very deep to find Cuban. There is soon
| to be an election, but every polling place
must be inside a fortified town. Such
elections ought to be safe for the 'ins.'
II have endeavored to state in not an
| :ntemperate mood what 1 saw and heard,
| to make no argument thereon, but leave
every one to draw his own conclusions"
THE STRONGEST APPEAL
ITO me the strongest appeal is not the
| barbarity practiced by Weyler, nor the
| loss of the Maine, if our worst fears should
prove true, terrible as both incidents are,
| but the spectacle of million and half of
| people, the entire native population of
| Cuba struggling for freedom and deliver
ance from the worst misgovernment of
which ever had knowledge. Whether our
action ought not to be influenced by any
| one OF all these things, and If so, how far,
| is another question. l am not in favor of
annexation, not because that l would ap-
| prehend any particular trouble from it. but
| because it is not a wise policy to take in
any people of foreign tongue and training
and without any strong guiding American
element. The fear that If free the people
of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so
| we'll founded as has been supposed, and the
conditions for good self government are far