New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-08-04
GENERAL SUMMARY.
On Board Transport Hudson.
En- Route from Santiago de Cuoa 20 20,


ryn,ess snain could display more dominance or
peculiar aggressiveress in her sea power inc apso
lute security Of the United States on iand was as
sured, and the interest OF the present eNpeni'io"
was therefore largely centred In the possloi''y
of DESTROYING Cervera's feet at Santiago and there
by removing all possibility Of aggression on inc
mart Of Spain In the broadest view OF the STU
alton the quickest way to insure peace may no"
lie in an assault upon the resources OF doihu'a"oii
Of Spain nearest to her vital lines OF commerce.
and therefore rather in the Mediterranean than
tho Caribbean Sea. But IN June. and merely 10
rsllv the Navy had It's attention centred upon
Guantanamo Bay. which II was using as Its sec
oncary base and Santiago de Cuba IN which IL
was intently watching the feet Of Cervera
There was, therefore some reason 10 erect a
landing somewhere between these two points AZ
though points at the mouth Of the har5or ana also
those west might be brought up for CONSIDERATION
o. In the one case. giving a general opportunity
for tho Navy 10 clear the torpedoes ana mines
away: and IN Cabanas Bay. on the otner manu-
might be found special advantages Tor ahoiIs
large bodies of troops in small boats But baiu'i'
having been selected. the landing could not have
he.n effected with less loss. and the movements
Of tho troops ;hereafe~ merely limited by the
speed with which supplies could be gotten from
tho vessels with the advantage OF oiooheE
Also both OF which were little more than indena-
tons on an open coast without landing facihtes.
And il was seldom. indeed that the supplies were
brought I'd to the fighting lines in any great eX-
cess of their immediate needs, ard the entire ao-
sence Of tho usual comforts and conveniences OF
even the simplest army life during the whole OF
this expedition. and sometimes OF medical es-
sentials even in tho hour OF utmost need. was one
of II. most marked features after landing. Even
the shelter tents and files abandoned. ana
all bvouacked without the wall tent General Grant
allowed brigade and division headquarters. or the
common tent he allowed companies at Nicksburg
when starting
MEANS FOR LANDING STORES INADEQUATE
The energy with which every element was driven
from first last will be sufficiently understood
when such men General Shafter and Colonels
Humphrey and Weston had the task IN hand The
Nberaty with which every necessary article was
purchased that could be found in tho market goes
without saying But the means for expediiing the
landing of stores seemed inadequate even TO the
last and Il Is understood that lighter after lighter
ordered to the Cuban coast was sunk at sea- and
the lack OF quick communication between the yes
sells or OF any launches was apparently irremedi-
able The extent 10 wlich the transports suffered
IN their ground tackles. capstans. small boats and
other paraphernalia and the dread their masters
had OF even greater loss on such a surf-beaten
roek-bound shore was constantly shown. and the
Navy appear ed 10 leave the Army al last much 10
IT'S own devices.
II was natural 10 suppose that there might well
he he ~ los T. si an adventure at least three
points "a. IN, anding place. at some inter
media. 'or.. led position Ike San Juan and in the
nnal aur IT contest but all the loss in battl.
was e. ce7;rs ted practically in the single battle
OF July "a . III. several organizations appear
content with how they played their own part and
with their immediate commanders. and look upon
the demands made upon them at least up TO
tho usual powers Of nan. and worthily met.
Great security given to the enemy by the
blockhouses. wire entanglements etc. created dur
ing the long course OF defensive construction for
the purposs Of dominating the country from the
Insurgents. and " remarkable that such ubiqui-
tous defenscs not more frequently defended
Special interest given to this battle. where our
men for the frs time faced smokeless povder In
rapid-fre Naus.r guns handled by men In invisible
rife pits. whom all fords and roads were abso-
lutely familiar objects. TO ST of our enlisted
men ell of whom we're Regulars but three rcsi-
nents-the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I'd Massachusetts
ard list New York-this was the first battle against
. civilized foe In peace our Army Is administered
rather by posts ard departments and our staff off,
GERS are dilgeni at their desks, especially in the
bureaus. Now the regiments and brgades were
recognized in campaign. where nearly every of-
Ger was performing unwonted duties. even among
the Regulars, there are some OF the usual ind
cations Of unfamiliar occupa lions
THE LACK OF ARTILLERY.
Nothing LIKE the usual proportion Of artillery was
present on the field 70 aid the other ac-
cessories before the fat. and the comments on
and results of this can come best from line officers
OF the other arms, The remarkable workmanship
OF our trained soldiers was hardly more exploited
than the gross ignorance Of our recruits The
books say that Il ought not 10 be possible 10 sac
cessfully assault in front mistaken. stIl more we'll
fortified infantry under modern conditions. Out In
this instance dismounted cavalry as we'll as It's
confrere Of the infantry arm did without boyonets
successfully assault infantry 70 ted Oh command
ing ground behind water. well .ntrcnched. valiant
and unshaken and the severity Of the task is II
dicated by the list % casualties compared VITA
the actual numbers the Immediately opposing
trenches will hold.
And when the night vas over. though successful
everywhere. had reserves atess Jndepen-
dent Brigade having been in the assault, first nj
Caney and then by night march reinforcing the
left at San Juan. as Lawton's Division also came
from Caaey TO the right at San Juan under most
urgent calls II was afterward supposed that the
gap between rish; and the Bay was closed by
Garcias forces. and the demand for the surrender
Of the Spanisrds was made prior 10 any knowledge
Of the intention OF Ccrvera escape with his feet
or Of the arrival OF the enemy's reinforcements
Sv n conjunction OF events may Indicate the
hp!Gity OF the changes In the situation.
Doubtless through kilograms and otherwise there
have been suffcient indications OF the intense
stran in the whole military situation the field II
operations which led to the consultation at the El
Posa House on the night OF July 2 and to some o.
the general officers favorirg re;rograde move
ment during the day or two prior to our intrench-
ments taking shape and the armistice being agreed
upon-whch latter remained almost unbroken until
the surrender The part pjayed I'm tho consdera-
ton OF these questions viii probably. and may as
we'll remain unrecorded. and needs merely 10 De
referred 10 here bly, II IS now evident 10 all
that It was far better stand steadfssf and per-
haps quite possible advance rather than retreat
80 near the Fourth Of July, and certainly We have
demonstrated our ability TO hold our own.
Indeed the fighting Of this Army came UP to the
highest expectations. and accomplished results be-
ycnd what II is usual 10 expect OF force so con-
stituted And CerveIa's feet and every fortlea-