The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-06-21

tertained at either the war or navy de-
partments that General Skaters military
expedition has arrived safely off Santiago
by this time AS matter Of fact, 1t is
believed that the first Of the transport:
arrived near the blockading feet Satur-
day night. According to the plans ar
ranged for the debarkation the fleet OF
| troops was to lie in a safe place until
Sampson mad cleared the way FOR land
ing. The selection of the landing place
has been left entirely to the judgment
! Of Admiral Sampson and General Shafter,
the military commander, and the first
business upon the arrival of the trans
port feet off Santiago would be a war
council between Admiral Sampson and
some Of his naval captains on the one
hand and Major General Shafter and his
staff on the other the purpose being to
settle all the details of the debarkation.
! Meanwhile the fleet of transports would
| lie out at sea at least ten miles beyond
the blockading squadron in order to be
entirely safe from attack by Spanish tor
pedo boats. These craft are dangerous
enough to full fledged warships but a
| transports would be absolutely helpless
/ against their attack, so that the strictest
| possible watch must be kept by the con-
voys until the troops are landed, the
present being the most critical moment
in the whole operation.
The work of debarking the troops is not
to be one of hours, but rather days, &C
cording TO the opinion of army officers. A
great deal depends on the point selected
for landing. 1t was thought that Aguad-
ores, east Of MORO Castle, would be a
likely landing place, in view of the fact
that it has a wharf which would be ex-
tremely useful for landing the heavy sup
plies and ordnance of the siege train.
1t is reported now, however, that this
wharf has been commanded by Spanish
batteries, which have been so placed as to
give an enfilading fire upon it. If this is
so, then the batteries must be first 81
fenced by the fleet, less there would not
only be loss of life among the troops hut
the wharf might be destroyed by the
Spanish shells. If the landing is made at
this wharf, no less than two days, it is
Is7tAAAAflSNbs Will DC OOAiSuL4cu III StlAlll5
the expedition ashore, as only one ship
can lie there at time and there is an
enormous quantity of ammunition and
stores to be taken ashore. If the landing
is made on the beach it will be tedious
and time-cOnsuming operation, although
it will be possible in that case to pro-
coed simultaneously from all the ships.
The army officials feel confident that
General Shafter will make an effort to
open up cable communication as soon as
he has landed a force, and they are ex-
pecting a cablegram almost any moment
announcing the fact that he has succeed
ed. Some surprise is expressed that this
French cable has not already been re-
opened, as the cable steamer was at Mole
St. Nicholas the middle of last week with
all necessary material and men for re
pairing the breaks and opening up The
station
The naval officials have known that
supplies of all kinds with the exception
of raw material have been reaching Ha-
vana from the south by the way of Bata-
bano and the short line of railway con-
meeting that town with Havana. They
are not, however. very deeply concerned
at this fact, as it is not believed TO be
the main purpose of the campaign to
cause the surrende rof the capital
through the starvation of its inhabitants
If this program were attempted with
any degree of success it would mean the
determination Of the very element in Ha-
vana which the government is disposed to
protect. namely the civilians, for with
out doubt there would be a repetition in
Havana on a smaller scale of what is
going on in Santiago. namely all of the
food supplies siezed by the military ana
the civilians left 10 starve BatabanO is |
not a blockaded harbor and this disposes |
one Of the weaknesses Of the blockade |
plan, as il leaves open a good seaport, /
connected directly with Havana The
place was not included in the 5lockaie /
line for two reasons. in the first pla.e /
the navy did not nave a sufiicIe4t aum- |
Der Of ships TO extend the blockade lines !
without running a great risk OF having |
the blockade declared Ineffective. In the |
second place, owing 10 SHALLOW water. |
large ocean craft, such as would bring /
troops. munitions Of wa and other val |
liable material from SPAN could not get |
into the port which thus became less a |
factor for harm in the working out of the
plans II brought from Spain in large !
ships these supplies would have 10 be
'rans-shipped at some neishoorIns port
to coasting vessels Of lighter craft and
with the means OF information within as
control our naval authorities have no
doubt Of their ability 10 cut Off promptly
any such coasters. Nevertheless, in view