The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1898-09-23
SKATERS REPORT.
Commander Of the Santiago Cam
paign Renders an Accounting.
BATTLE FOUGHT UNDER DIFFICULTIES
He Gives Credit Tor Victory to His omcers
and Men-Nothing said of scovel Incl
dent or OF alleged Misunder-s
standing with Miles.

been made public:
He briefly recounts the organization OF the
expedition and its embarkment, and then de-
votes the main body Of the report to the nc.
1--WE operations about Santiago Gen. Shafter
says the expedition was undertaken In compli.
ance with Geographic instructions OF May 30
from headquarters OF the army. in which il
winch IL was stated Admiral Schley reports
mat two cruisers and two torpedo boats have
Deen seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with
your force to capture the garrison at Santiago
and assist In capture of harbor and feet"
The report gives in detail the troops assem-
bled at Tampa. The cavalry was dismounteo
because OF lack Of transportation for animals
ana because 1t was believed mounted cavalry
could not operate efficienty near Santiago.
This, Gen Shafter says. was found to be sub
sequently correct
Gen Shafter briefly covers the "Trip and land
ing and his first meeting with Gen Garcia
adding: During the interview Gen. Garcia
onered the services OF his troops. comprising
ABOUT 1900 men in the vicinity OF Aserraderos
ana about 1900 under Gen. Castillo. at the little
town OF Cujababo u few miles east Of BaiqulrL
accepted his OFFER, impressing IL upon him
mat could exercise no military control over
MN except such as he would concede, and as
long as he served under me l would furnish
him rations and ammunition"
CoNFERs wrTH SAMPSON AND GARCIA
After comforting with Admiral Sampson and
Gen. Garcia the plan of campaign was out
lined BY Gen. Sbafter The decentralization
was to commence on the 22d. at BaiQuiri with
TENTS by the Cubans on Cabanas and by the
navy mt various shore points, in order to mis-
lead the enemy as to the place OF landing. Gen.
Smarter says These movements committed
me to approaching Santiago from the euso over
narrow road, at first in some places not bet
ter than trail running from Baiquiri through
Siboney and Sevilla and making attack from
that quarter. This in my judgment was the
only feasible plan, and subsequent Information
and results confirmed my Judgment
Gen Shnfter gives in detail the fighting at
La Guosima, FL Caney and San Juan hill, and
pays glowing tribute to the officers and men
for their gallantry and says: "The preparations
were far from what desired them to be- but
we were in siclsly climate; our supplies had
TO be brought forward by a narrow wagon rond
which the rains might at any time render i'm
passablei fear was entertained that storm
might drive the vessels containing our supplies
10 sea, thus parting us from our base of sup
plies and lastly, It was reported that Gen
Pando, with 5000 retnforcements for the
enemy, was en- route from Manzanllo and
might be expected in n few days Under these
conditions determined TO give battle without
delay.
1T is doubtful IL we had more than 10 900
men on the firing line on July l. when the bat
tie was fiercest and when the important and
strong positions Of Ell Caney and San Juan
were captured few Cubans assisted in the
attack OF FL Caney and fought valiantly but
their numbers we're too small to materially
change the strength as indicated above.
The enemy confronted us with numbers
about equal to our own: they fought obsti-
nately In strong and intrenched positions,
and the results obtained clearly indicate
the intrepid gallantry OF the company officers
and men. and the benefits derived from the
careful training and instruction given In the
company in recent years OF rifle practice and
other battle exercises Ouf losses in these
battles were 90 officers and POS men killed and
81 officers and 1908 men wounded. missing 49,
The missing with few exceptions, reported
later on"
Gen Shafter says the arrival OF Gen Escario
at Santiago was not anticipated. He says:
Gen. Garcia with between 1000 and 3. 900 Gu
bans, was intrusted with the duty OF watching
for and intercepting the reinforcement expect
cd. This, however, he failed 10 do and Esca-
rio passed into the city on my extreme right
near the bay"
After speaking OF Admiral Cervera's sortie
and the destruction OF his feet Gen. Shafter
says he again called on the Spanish commander
TO surrender He says: "On the same date |
Informed Admiral Sampson that II he would
force his way into the harbor the city would
surrender without any further sacrifice Of life
Commodore Watson replied that Admiral
sampson was temporarily absent. but that In
his tWatson's) opinion the navy should not ed
ter the harbOr"
such did not wish to assault II II could be
avoided, An examination OF the enemy's
works made after the surrender, fully justifies !
the wisdom of the course adopted. The in
trenchments could only have been carried with /
very great loss Of life" Gen. Shafter gives the
varying efforts toward securing a surrender |
and his reopening the engagement on the 10th, |
when the truce ended On the nth the sur |
render was again demanded
He then gives the details OF the dnal sur |
render, his entry into the city and the raising |
of the American flag In closing he says:
Before closing my report / wish to dwell !
upon the natural obstacles had TO encounter |
and which no foresight could have overcome |
or obViuted. The rocky and iprecipitous /
coast afforded no sheltered landing places
the roads were mere bride paths. the |
effect OF the tropical sun and rains
upon the unacclimated troops was dead. |
ly, and dread OF strange and un- |
known diseases had It's eject on the army AT .
Baiquiri the landing OF troops and stores was
made at small wooden wharf which the
Spanish tried TO burn, but unsuccessfully, and |
the animals were pushed into the water and |
guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards In ex-
tent Al Siboney the landing was made on the
beach and AT a small wharf erected by the en-.
gineers
Il had neither the time nor the men to spare
to construct permanent wharves In spite OF
the fact that had nearly 1000 men continu.
impossible for wagons
The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would
often suddenly rise so as to prevent the pas
sage OF wagons, ana then the eight pack trains
with the command had to be depended upon
for the victualing OF my army, as well as the
3D. 900 refugees who could not in the interest OF
humanity be left 10 staryc while we had
rations OFTEN for days nothing could be moved
except on pack trains
After the great physical strain and exposure
Of July and the malarial ana other feyers
began TO rapidly advance throughout the COM
mand, and on July,4 the yellow fever appeared
NJ Siboney Though efforts were made TO keep
this fact from the army IL soon became known
THE supply Of qunrtermaSter and commits.
sary stores during the campaign was abundant
and Notwithstanding the difficulties in landing
and TRANSPORTING the rations. the troons on the
.....r ....o "ysc ~ all times supplied with ts
coarser components, namely oat bread meal
sugar and coffee There was no lack Of trans
portation for at no time up TO the surrender
could all the wagons had be used.