The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-01
THE PEACE NEGOTIATION.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATION.
There is a strong peace sentiment in the
United States as well as in Spain, though
based on very different reasons. In one
case it is born of victory and in the other of
defeat. The Spanish government and peo-
pie, at least the intelligent portion of them,
desire peace because they know that Spain
is bankrupt, completely outclassed in the
struggle with the United States, defeated
already and doomed to worse defeat and
humiliation if the war continues. On the
part of the government and people of the
United States the desire for peace is based
on the fact that they have already demon
strated their prowess and superiority in
war, gained great victories and reached
point where they may fairly claim the right
to dictate terms of peace That being the
case they would prefer that the war should
come to an end in order that bloodshed may
cease, that normal conditions of business
may return and that the country may enter
upon a new era of commercial prosperity.
But the fact that there is a strong peace
sentiment in both countries does not in
sure the immediate contamination of peace.
There is also war sentiment in both coun-
tries. The Spaniards are stubborn fighters,
notorious in history for not knowing when
they are whipped, and the Americans, when
their blood is up, never stop short of com
pete victory. 1t is by no means certain
that the Spanish government will accept
without modification the terms of peace Of
fered by the President through the French
ambassador at Washington, and it is rea-
sonably certain that the President VIII not
make any material modification in the
terms. Thus there is the possibility, if not of
a deadlock, at least of considerable delay
pending the efforts of Spain to obtain better
terms and the determination OF the United
States to compel the acceptance Of those
now offered. If there is any person in the
country who thinks these terms are not Sc
we're enough he should remember where we
stood four months ago. The war was be-
gun solely for the liberation and indie
pendence of Cuba and without any idea of
expelling Spain from Porto Rico or attack
ing the Philippines. Before shot was fired
on either side the United States would will
ingly have settled the controversy on the
basis of Spain's evacuation of Cuba. Now
we demand not only that, but the evacua-
ton and surrender of Porto Rico, the as
sumption by Spain of the debts of both
islands, coaling station in the Ladrone
islands, and the disposition of the Philip
pines to be left to a joint commission.
This is a great advance on the terms we
would have demanded three months ago.
From our point of view the terms now de-
manded are not unreasonable. but from
Spanish point of view they are very hard,
and even if the government is disposed to
accept them it may not dare to incur the
risk ~of exciting a Carlist insurrection or
popular revolution.
Those who desire peace should not ex-
pect too much from the negotiation that
has been opened. AT least they should not
expect too speedy results. The war is not
likely to end in a few days. The present
negotiation may be the beginning Of the
end but the end may not be reached till
after a tiresome period of Spanish diplo-
macy seeking for delay. The fact that the
French ambassador has cabled President
McKinley's terms to Madrid does not sig
Nifty anything. He could not have done less
if the President had demanded the surren-
der of. the whole Spanish peninsula to the
United States. Nor does it make any diff
ference whether he approved the terms or
not. Probably the Spanish government does
rot desire and would not consider his opin-
ion on the subject All that M. Cambon had
to do as the special representative OF Spain
for particular purpose was first, to ascer-
tain if the United States government was
willing to enter on a negotiation for peace,
and second, to receive its terms, getting the
best possible and transmit them to Madrid.
That the reply of that government Will be
frank, categorical or conclusive. one way
or another, is not to be expected. Such
reply would not be in accordance with
Spanish character or history. 1t Will be
adroitly framed with a view of opening dis
cussion. yielding some points. reserving
others, raising new ones, and opening a
new line Of diplomatic fencing. This is not
what the American people want, and it is
safe to say President Mckinley will not
WELD He is master of the situation, and
by forcing the game can compel spain 10
accept the terms now offered without ma
teriaf modification, but it is probable that
Spanish honor will cause considerable
delay Meanwhile, the invasion or Porto
Rico will doubtless be pushed forward as
rapidly as possible, and our claim to the
island made so complete as to close the door
to any clubbing on that point.
BISMARCK.