The National tribune., 1898-03-17

ment; tnat ne should nave seen IN the tact
that it required him to close up on Reynolds
evidence that it was based on mistaken in
formation, and should therefore have re-
manned where he was.
To this Wood replies that he was partially
of that opinion, but that he consulted Gen.
McCook, who was with him at the moment
and the latter advised him not to take the
responsibility of disobeying a written order,
especially as he could not know what was
passing on the part Of the field where he was
ordered to 90.
judge from intimations that have reached
me, that in writing his own report Gen.
Rosecrans will deliberately show that the blame
OF his failure in this great battle rests on the
Administration; that is, on the Secretary of
War and General in-Chief who did not fore
see Bragg would be reinforced, and who COM
PEELED him to move forward without cavalry
enough, and very inadequately prepared in
many other respects.
THE FATAL GAP IN THE LINE.
About 10 o'clock in the morning OF
Sept. 20 an Aid informed Gen. Rose
Grams that Gen. Reynolds's right was in
the air, and should be protected. 1t
appears that the Aid had not seen Gen.
Brannan's Division, which was Gre
fused" on Reynolds right. Gen. Rose
Grams, supposing that Gen. Brannan had
gone to the left to the assistance of Gen.
Thomas, sent an order to the next Di-
vision Commander on the right-Gen.
j. I. Wood-to close up on Gen. Rey-
nold,'s right and support it.
Here is the beginning of a dispute of
intense bitterness 1t is claimed on the
one hand that Gen. Wood should have
known that the order was given under
misrepresentation, and delayed its exc
cution until he could communicate with
Gen. Rosecrans, not 600 yards away.
1t is also claimed that Gen. Wood, who
had been censured by Gen. Rosecrans
some time previously about taking too
much liberty in obeying orders, had
fully understood the momentous conse-
quences of literal obedience, but had
determined upon it in spirit of pique
against his commanding officer. At all
events, he obeyed it, moved his division
out of line, around the rear of Brannan,
and to the right of Reynolds.
At that the rebels broke through the
gap left by his withdrawal, cut off the
divisions to the right, and sent them off
the field in confused flight In his re-
port of the battle Gen. Rosecrans says
A message from Gen. Thomas soon followed,
that he was heavily pressed, Capt. Kellogg,
Abide Camp, the bearer, informing me at the
same time that Gen. Brannan was out Of line
and Gen. Reynolds's right was exposed Orders
were dispatched to Gen. Wood to close up on
Reynolds, and word was sent to Gen. Thomas
that he should be supported, even if it took
away the whole corps of Crittenden and
McCOOk 4at
Gen Davis was ordered to close on Gen.
Wood, and Gen. McCook was advised of the
state of affairs and ordered to close his whole
command to the left with all dispatch.
Gen. Wood, overlooking the direction to
"close up" on Gen. Reynolds, supposed he
was to support him. by withdrawing from the
line and passing to the rear of Gen. Brannan,
who, it appears, was not out of line, but was
en- echelon. and slightly in rear of Reynolds's
right By this unfortunate mistake gap was
opened in the line-Of-battle, of which the
enemy took instant advantage, and striking
Davis in flank and rear, rs well as in front,
threw his whole division in confusion.
The same attack shattered the right brigade
of Wood before it had cleared the space. The
right of Brannan was thrown back and two
of his batteries, then in movement to a new
position, were taken in flank and thrown
back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then
on the march to the left, throwing his divis-
f,,ff n iaI.
covered until it reached ROssville.
While the enemy poured in through this
breach, long line stretching beyond Sheri-
dams right was advancing. Laiboldt's Bri-
gade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's
other two brigades, in movement toward the
left, under orders to support Thomas, made
n gallant charge against the enemy's advanc-
ing column, but were thrown into disorder by
the enemy's line advancing on their flank,
and were likewise compelled to fall back,
rallying on the Dry Valley road, and
repulsing the enemy, but they were again
compelled to yield to superior numbers and
retired westward of the Dry Valley road,
and by a circuitous route reached Rossville,
from which they advanced by the La Fayette
road to support our left.
Thus Dayis's two brigades one of Van
CleveS, and Sheridan's entire division were
driven from the field, and the remainder,
consisting OF the divisions of Baird, johnson,
Palmer Reynolds Brannan, and Wood, two
of Negley's Brigades and one of Van Cleve's
were left to sustain the conflict against the
whole power of the rebel army, which, de-
sisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated
their whole efforts to destroy them.
GEN. WOODS STORY.
Gen. 7. J.Wood, who always sustain ed
a high reputation as gallant, capable
commander, did not attempt to discuss
the angrily mooted question in his report.
He stated his action as he did others
during the battle, as straightforward
obedience to orders, leaving the respon-
sibility for results to rest upon the Com
General. He said:
The position my command then occupied
closed the gap in our lines between Sheridan's
left and Brannan's right. Although | had
not been at all seriously engaged at any time
during the morning, l was well satisfied the
enemy was in considerable force in my imme-
diate front Consequently / was extremely
vigilant. Such was the status of the battle
in my immediate vicinity when l received
the following order:
" HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THEl
CUMBERLAND, Sept. 20; 1915 a. M.
"Brig. Gen. WOOD commanding division,
etc The General commanding directs that