The record-union., 1898-08-26
Correspondence Between Captain Taylor
and Admiral Sampson.
Made Public by the Navy Depart
ment-The Admiral Explains
Why the Indiana Was Signaled
to Return to the Blockade at
the Entrance Of the Harbor.

Sampson has forwarded to the Navy
Department the following letters which
have passed between himself and Cap
tain Taylor of the battleship Indiana:
UNITED States Steamship Indiana
Guantanamo Bay, Aug. =, 1898.
Admiral: The report of Commodore
Schley ON the battle of July Sd, as
published, gives credit in the seventh
paragraph to four ships, and mentions
by name their Captains, Philip, Evans
Clark and Cook, and adds: The dense
smoke of the combat shut out from my
view the Indiana and Gloucester, but
as these vessels were closer to your
flagship, no doubt their part in the
conflict was under your immediate OBJ
servation.' rs
In your report. as published, YOU
make but slight mention of the Indi-
ana, stating that the Iowa and Indi-
ana, having done good work and moi
having the speed of the other ships
We're directed by me- ETC., etc.
The result. Of these reports is that
the Captains of all the vessels of the
line of battle except the Indiana have
received personal mention in the OH
cial report before the department
while the two smaller vessels have also
had distinctive mention, either from
the Commander-in-C Chief or the Sec
ond in command.
In the official records, should they
be referred to in the future, it would
appear from it's general tone that the
Indiana was less deserving than al
her consorts Leaving out my personal
interest in the matter, it is right that
l should consider the officers and crew
of the ship, and l speak for them as
we'll as for myself when l submit to
you, Admiral that the above com
bination of reports will place the ship,
in the opinion Of the department and
the country, markedly below all the
other vessels of your squadron. l re-
spectfully submit, sir, that this is in
Justice to the Indiana and her officers
and-crew.
Il can say without disparagemenro OF
any other vessel that during the ii:st
hour of the fight the Indiana's gun
fire contributed to the destruction OF
the Ouuendo and the Teresa more than
that of any single vessel Of your squat
ron except one, and equals her. l DO
not know why the second in command
failed to observe the Indiana during
this period of our hottest action J
saw the Brooklyn quite plainly.
AN examination &C these reports
with reference to the Indiana VIII, i
believe. convince you, sir, that they dc
nroduce the effect of putting the lnGl-
ana below all the other vessels OF tbs
SQUADRON. If it be your opinion, SIT
that this is the case, and that all tht
vessels from the Brooklyn to the vixen
able than the Indiana, as the published
renort of the Commander-in-Chi ana
the second in command, taken togeth-
or would indicate. then l must accept
II for myself and the ship; if, on the
contrary. that be not your opinion.
nrga respectfully that such steps be
taken TO remedy this injustice, as may
sea,n wise TO you. Very respectfully,
III. C. TAYLOR,
..Captain L. S. n. Commanding.
ITO the Commander-in-Ch On'te'
States naval force, North At'ahti'
Station
II. 6. s. New York,
Guantanamo Bay, August Sth.
"Sir: I am greatly obliged that yot
have called my attention 10 what ap
nears TO have been an injustice to youl
ship, officers and crew, for the par
which they took in the action or July
3d and also for the very proper man
ner in which you have presented IL.
think. however, that in submitting sucf
a report to the Secretary OF the Navy
where so many officers are vitally IN
+erested and justly proud Of their ships
n is 10 easy task to do so without ap
parently bestowing praise unjustly
requires very careful consideration O
the report from every point of view 4
avoid misunderstanding
..The positions of the ships OF Tux
enuadron must be carefully studied K
fnIlv appreciate what 1t was possible
for each vessel to accomplish unde
tba conditions in which she was placed
rrhosa that were to the westward of tn
1.oa,;,,o enemy were certainly bette
nlaced for stopping the enemy, and ais
hattar nlaced for delivering their fir
,ban the vessels to the eastward, which
,,.as The blockading station Of the Indi
ana.
mo distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide agains
every variation of such softle, no
do | consider that any commanding ON
Ger deserved either credit OF Diane De
cause the ship under his command VA
faster or slower than another shlp' o
carried a heavier or lighter battery
but rather that the commanding ON
Ger was blameworthy when ne rance
20 put his ship in the proper pace 10
DESTROYING the enemy just in proportion
to the advantage which he possessed
in speed, battery or position over III
neighbors.
Each commanding officer, in m.
opinion, was personally responsible 10
the good use which he made OF the tool
with which he had TO work. Ger
tainly did not intend to criticize yo
or to sbestow less praise on the lndian'
than was bestowed upon any other snil
of the squadron.
The fact that the commanding office
of the Indiana was signaled TO retur!
to blockade at the mouth of the harbo
after he had so gallantiy contribute
to the destruction of the Spanish ship
was only necessary precaution whicl
the commander-in-c chief felt obliged I,
take to prevent disaster to the larg