The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-05-20
PLANS FOR INVASION

,,rpb. Remain ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 10
-. ~n,,patched at once 10 Prepare the
-, for tho Landing of large Farees
NEW YORK, May ia special TO
,,s Times from Washington says:
Th. plans for the invasion OF Cuba by
,.. United states forces remain un.
hanged. The elusive performances OF
n. spanish squadron have postponed
N. execution OF q part at least of the
,rnrrnmme, but It has been altered In
no important particular.
rhe determination to dispatch TO the
Island as soon as practicable an army
~, less than 10000 men competent
.. rSeet and cope With the forces OF
,,,nco still stands. But the time has
pa 90, come when K ls practicable TO
~ .hIs for the simple reason that the
w ~ ia not ready t. be sent to Cuba.
as |. ,s OOO regulars massed at Tampa
ln nrsnared 10 go anywhere ut any
a,s rhe majority OF the volunteers
su.,serInr at Tampa. New Orleans. Mo-
". and ChIckamauga : not prepar-
psV ~ 10 anywhere, and Will not be un-
e y sSsv ARC uniformed. armed. equip
" and have some training In the art
p,u uar All this will take time. The
S..t Judgment OF military experts Is
,sst il viii require not less than q
'ao,.h under the most favorable cir-
snmstances to put $4,000 volunteers In
e..SIiIon 10 reinforce the regulars for
.Ss army OF Cuban invasion.
II ia thought by many trained officers
NV, more time than that ought to and
{, likely to be taken.
rI IA recalled that General Scott spent
10, months training and drilling his
~ before he invaded Mexico, and It
" not commended that the invasion OF
r,Sa Is any less formidable undertake
S ,.s linn the conquest OF Mexico. The
...sIorIous experience OF Bull Run Is n
1Sorlte illustration OF the unwlsdom OF
"u,tinx recruits to the serious business
N war too soon.
r,ere Is one portion OF the Cuban
,,nSramme, however, which may not
:. J.layed much longer. That Is the
sI.natchlng OF an expedition, made up
almost, II not entirely, OF regulars from
,be Tampa camp to make a landing on
ina Cuban coast, throw up Notifications
and clear the way for the coming OF the
army proper later on.
II Is not settled that this will be
done. but strong arguments are being
r,.d in favor OF the project. 1t Is urged
,s,t we went into this war largely in
order 10 save the reconcentrados from
Starving, but, that as 4 result Of u
nrp.ent plnn OF campaign, we are mak-
;,r their starvation sure, and rendering
Il likely that many OF the insurgents
uIlI suffer something akin to, the same
n,,. To make some move toward re-
iI.yIng these people. Is, It Is urged, COM
n.nded by every consideration OF hu-
r,nltv. even II 1t be at great risk. A
Mrre OF 5000 regulars, landed at an
available spot on the coast OF Cuba
would. II Is contended, be able to do
s,methIng toward relieving this suffer-
ing ty establishing a depot of supplies
which could be drawn on by the insur-
gents. Further, It Is argued In favor OF
The seizure OF q landing place without
delay that the undertaking Is becom-
iag more difficult every day and that
the regulars could not be better m
ployed than In providing Notifications
10 protect the debarkatlon OF the main
srmy when II Is ready TO move.
The longer the occupation OF a land
ms place is delayed. 1t Is pointed out.
the more time Blanco has for throwing
up Notifications and mounting batteries
along the coast which will aus trou-
BE when the real invasion begins.
The advocates OF this movement be-
lleye It would be easy for a force OF
tie strength mentioned to hold its W
with the protection the blockadins
squadron could AFFORD.
There is no prospect, however, that
even q preliminary movement OF this
nature is llkely,to be undertaken imme-
dlately. For the present at least all
military movements will await the re-
suit OF the manoeuvrelng Of the squad
ron In West Indian waters.