The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-04-12

erto held ourselves bound 10 treat all sim-
ilar questions.
MUST he A STATE DE FAClO.
! Thereupon Andrew jackson proceeded to
(, consider the risk that there might be i'm
! ruted TO the United States motives Of
selfish interest, In view of the former
| claim on our part to the territory Of Texts
and Of the vowed purpose Of the Texans
in seeking recognition as an incident to
the Incorporation of Texas in the Union.
concluding thus:
Prudence. therefore seems to dictate
that We should stand aloof and maintain
our present attitude. il not until Mexico
recognize the Independence of the new
government. at least until the lapse OF
time or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability
Of the people OF that country to maintain
their separate sovereignty and TO uphold
the. government constituted by. them.
justly complain of this course BY pur-
suing 1t, We are but carrying out the long
established policy OF our government. q
influence abroad and inspired confidence
at home"
These are the words Of Andrew Jack
son. They are evidence that the United
States. In addition to the test imposed by
public law as the condition OF the recog-
milton OF new state, to-wit: That the re-
body polite. having a government In sub
stance as well as IN name. possessed Of
the elements of stability" and forming de
facto, 'if left to ITSELF state among the
nations. reasonably capable of discharging
the duties Of a state" has imposed for it's
own guidance in dealing with cases like
this the further case OF recognition Of
statehood not due to a revoited depend
ency until the danger of its being again
subiugated by the parent state has en-
firely passed away. This extreme test
was In fact applied in the case of Texas
The congress to whom President jack
son sent the message, one prob
ably leading to war and therefore a
proposition for a previous understanding
with that body, by whom war can alone
be declared. and by whom ali the pro-
visions for sustaining its perils must be
furnished. left the matter of the recogni-
ton OF Texas to the discretion of the ex-
ecutive. providing merely for the sending
OF diplomatic agent when the president
was satisfied that the republic OF Texas
had become an independent state
1t was so recognized by President Van
Buren,, who commissioned a charge daft
fares. March T. 1857. after Mexico had
abandoned an attempt to conquer the
Texas territory, and there was at
the time contest going on between the
insurgents Of the province and its former
sovereign.
CUBA NOT YET INDEPENDENT.
I said in my message of December last:
'it IL TO be seriously considered whether
the Cuban instruction possesses beyond
dispute the attributes OF statehood. which
alone can demand the recognition OF bell
iigerency in its fayer.''
The same requirement must certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence
Is N question. for a no less positive test
can be applied to the greater act than TO
the lesser, while, on tho other hand the
confidence and consequences of the strug-
gle upon the internal policy of the recog-
nizing state. which form important fac
tors when the recognition of heiligerency
Is concerned. are secondary. IL not rightly
eliminabie. factors when the real question
IL whether the community claiming recog-
milton is or is not independent beyond per-
adventure
Nor from the standpoint Of expederce
DO think Ii would be wise or prudent for
this government to recognize a, the pres
ent time the independence Of the so-caIIed
cuban republic. Such recognition is not
necessary in order 10 enable the United
states tn Intervene and paefy the island
10 commit this country now to the rtcog-
nttion Of any particular government in
'ana might suhiec; us 10 embarra ssing
-'NttHAt4oBs OF inteTE3 tiorai OhsiEatfDn Ia
ward the organization So recognized In
case or Intervention. our conduct will be
sahteci 10 the approval or d.sapproral OF
sach government. We would be required
20 submit 10 its direction and 10 assume TO
y the mere relation OF A friendly ally
hen i snail appear thereafter that there
L within The Island a government cana HE
OF performing he duties and slscha rging
me functions II nation and having az
; matter a fact. THE proper forms and at
Ul9affs II nationality. such government
e@n ne promptly and readily recognized
| a.d me relations ard interests OF tfas. Unit.
% states with such nation adjusted
INTERVENTION A NECESSITY.
IAeTe remain the alternative FORMS ~
.ilstrFei.ion 10 cad the war either ny
impartial neutrality py Imposing a ra
tiohai compromise between the contew-
ANS. or as ire active ally % one party
Or ,ae other As to the p.esen; casa n
Is net 10 te forgotten sAst during the Il :,
Tea nFosths the relation Of .he yrrlsAs
STATES has virtually been one OF fr;enda,
intervention n many WAYS each rot Of
iss~f conclusive. eus all tending "a the
sa@F;son Of q potential influence toaard an
5ittnazse pacific sssai, just ard honest "a
al Interests concerned Tie spirit OF All
cH- acts hitherto has been an earnest. TN
se.asa desire fer fears and prosperity In