The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1898-10-04
the obstacles i'll landing. Continuing, he

ana l deemed the TINE haG come tOr
final action. During the time Of the
night attack | had communicated my
desire to Admiral Dewey that he would
allow his ships to orcn fire on the
right of the Spanish line of intrcncll
mcnts. believing that such action would
stop the night firing and the loss of
life, but the Admiral had declined tc
order it unless we were in danger Of
losing our position by the assaults Of the
Spanish, for the reason that, in his
opinion, it would prccipitatc Il general
engagement, for which he was not ready
Now, however, the brigade Of General
Macarthur was i'll position and the
Monterey having arrived under date Of
August 9th. Admiral Dewey agreed to
my suggestion that we should send a
Joint letter to the Captain General mott
flying him that he should remove from
the city all non-combatan within Is
hours, and that operations against the
dcfcnCcS of Manila might begin at any
time after the expiration of that period.
"Ihis letter was sent August 18th. and
n reply received the same date to the
effect that the Spanish We're without
places of refuge for the increased num-
Der Of wounded. sick women and child
rcn now lodged within the walls. On
the 9th Il formal Joint demand for the
surrender of the city was sent in. The
Captain Generals reply, Of The same
date, stated that the council of de
fCnse had declared that the demand
could not be granted: but the Captain
General offered to consult his Govern
ment if we would allow him the time
strictly necessary for the communica tOns
Icy way of Hong gkong.
This was declined on our part for
the reason that it could, in the opinion
of the Admiral and myself. lead to no i'm
mediate result favorable to us. and the
necessity was urgent that decisive ac-
tiOn should be taken to compel the enemy
to give up the town, in order to relieve
our troops from the trenches and from
the great exposure to unhealthy condi-
tionS which were unavoidable in a
bivouac during the rainy season. The
scaccast batteries in defense Of Manila
are so situated that it is impossible
for ships to engage them without firing
into the town. and as the bombardment
of Il city filled with women and child
rem, sick and wounded. and containing
large amount of neutral property
could only be Justified as Il last resort
it WAS agreed between Admiral Dewey
and myself that an attempt should be
made to carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of intcrnchmentS in front
of the positions at that time occupied
by our trocrs, which with its flank or
the seashore. was entirely open to the
fire Of the navy.
1T was not my Intention to press the
assault at this point. in case the enemy
should hold il in stron" force. until after
the navy had made practicable breaches
IL the works and shaken the troops hold
ing them. which could not be done by
the army alone. owing to the absence Of
siege guns. 1t was believed, however.
as most in accordance with the principles
of civilized warfare, that the attempt
should be made TO drive the cncmy cut
of his intronchmcnts before rcsorting to
the bomhardmcnt Of the city.
BY orders issued some time previous
ly Macarthurs and Grernc's hrigades
were organized as the Second division of
the Eighth army corps. Brigadicr Gen
eral Thomas VI. Anderson commanding:
and in anticipation of tn" attack General
Anderson moved his headquarters from
Cayite to the brigade camps and assulnl-
cd direct command in the field All tn,
troops were in position on the 18th at
an early hour in the morning.
About > Il. M, on that day our fleet
steamed forward from Cavitc and before
10 4. m, opened a hot and accurate fir,
of heavy shells and rapid-firc proiecti!c>
on the sea funk of the Spanish in
trenchmcntS at the powder magazine
fort, and at the same time the Utah
batteries. in position in our trenches near
the 'Callc real began firing with great
accuray. At 1923. on n prearrange1
signal from our trenches that it was
believed our troops could advance. the
navy ceased firing. and Immediately ::
light line of SkirnShCrS from the Colo
RADIO regiment of General Grecne'S bri-
gade passed over our trenches and de
ployed rapidly forward. another line
from the same regiment from the lef:
flank Of our carthworks advancing swift
~ up the beach in open order. Both
these lines found the powder magazine
fort and the trenches thanking it de
serted. but as they passed over the
Spanish works they were met
| hy Il sharp fire from /:
second line situated in the streets OF
Malate. ny which a number of mcf
were killed and wounded. among Others
the soldier who pulled down the Spanish
colors still flying on the fort and raiseC
! our own
The works of the second line soor
| gave way to the determined advance o
Greene'S troops, and that officers pushed
his brigade rapidly through Malate ant
| over the bridges to occupy Rinondo anG
San Miguel, as contemplated in his III
| $trHctlonS. In the meantime the brigad,
Of General Macarthur. advancing sim
ultancously on the Pasay road. cncoua
tered Il very sharp fire. coming from
| the block houses, trenches. and wood
in front. positions which it was very
difficult TO carry. owing to the swampy
condition Of the ground on both sides o.
! the roads and the heavy undergrow:l
| concealing the enemy. With much ga!
| lantry and excellent Judgment on the
part of the brigade commander and tn,
troops engaged, these difficulties were
| overcome with Il minimum loss an.
| Macarthur advanced and held the bridge
| ana town of Malatc rs was contem
! plated in his Instructions.
The city Of Manila was now in on
possession, except the walled town
! but shortly after the entry Of our troop
! into NIalate a white flag was diSplaye;