The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1898-08-26
SAVED HIS MEN.
General Shafter Explains Why
He Parleyed
With General TOral Instead of
StOrming
THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
He Could Have Taken the Town
in a Few Hours.
But 1t Would Have Cost At
Least 5000 Lives.

New York, Aug. ga dispatch to
the Herald from Santiago says:
Prior to embarking on the steamer
Mexico, Major General Shafter con-
sented to be interviewed. During the
interview he discussed in general terms
the campaign that has just ended. The
bare prospect of returning to the United
States caused him to be brighter, more
cheerful and less harassed looking
than at any period since he embarked
at Tampa. Critics and detractors were
alike forgotten and with improved
health and evident consciousness that
whatever might be the eventual verdict
of the operations before Santiago,
difficult campaign had been brought to
a successful conclusion, he spoke with
great energy and more vigor than at
any time since the capitulation. Gen
eraI Shafter said:
I look upon the campaign just closed
as a successful one in the highest de-
gree, not only in regard to the military
operations. but more especially in re-
gard to the great results achieved.
When we decided to attack Santiago
we looked for nothing more as the inn
mediate fruit of victory than the cap
ture of the city. What has been
achieved is the capitulation of the east
ern part of the province from a line at
Jibara to the south coast, together with
the enemy's forces, amounting to al
most $4,000 men. Surely this was the
most notable achievement of the cam
paign, bearing in mind the fierce op-
position we encountered and the COM
parative smallness of our own forces.
From a military point of view,
perhaps took steps which might not be
deemed justifiable under other circum-
f1o
capabilities of my soldiers and the
moral effect of our gradually cooping
up the enemy within his own lines.
My engineers were very apprehensive
that the Spaniards might break through
on my left and cut Off Siboney. This,
from a purely military standpoint,
might have been truthfully correct, but
personally 1 had not for moment any
fear on that score. The result has, I
think, proved the correctness of my
conclusions.
Our primary object was to drive
Cervera out and next to take the town.
We had gradually driven the Spaniard
back on his lines, circling the city and
slowly advanced day by day. The
enemy began losing spirit as soon as
our guns had been placed in position
to cover the town.
when Cervera left the situation was
changed. The town was at my mercy
and had I given the, order for direct
assault, it would have been taken
within four hours. I believe that with
the forces then at my command rein
forced as they had been, I was in a
position to take the city by force.
But if I had taken a step of such
character that would have been the re-
suit. I estimate that our casualties
would have been 5000 men and the ac-
ton I took has had more brilliant real
results without heavy loss of valuable
lives.
1.-The town itself is admirably situated
for defense and the fight would have
nd bIOndxr EEUarW
house is strongly constructed of stone
and entirely different from the ordinary
frame building. Every house was a lit
tie fortress itself Had the SpaniardS,
forced by desperation, fought the battle
out in the streets our loss would have
been enormous. But from the moment
General Toral made a proposition for a
conference I knew he was determined
to give up and acted accordingly.
Personal reflections have been cast
upon me because was not on the fight
ing line. That was not the place for
a general in command of an army. 1t
must be remembered that was con-
nected by telephone with the officers at
the front and was better able to direct
operations from the position had
taken. Save for the days when i'll,
was in direct command of this cam
paign which I consider unique in Amer
lean history for it was really the first
time the United States had fought with
its regular army. The civil war was a
war of volunteers, but this campaign
was fought by our regular troops.
Il did not notice the fact at first, but
there were only three volunteer regi-
ments engaged against the Spaniards.
While the highest credit is to be given
them and they fought bravely and
well, there was the moral support of
the regulars back of it all.
Our volunteers lacked that unity,
cohesion and individual suppOr notice
able in our trained troops, but at the
same time no disparagement should be
made of the volunteer regiments in the
campaign. What they lacked otherwise
they made up for in enthusiasm and
patriotic spirit and desire to command
no better army than the one composed
of the class of volunteers under me in
the Santiago campaign.
1.-The operations of the regulars in the
campaign have proved cOnclusively
their superiority over some organiza-
tions of state militia in which the men
are partly compelled to serve by
sense of shame, but they do not show
the enthusiasm of volunteers.
There has been some question con-
cerning the transportation facilities of
the army. The facilities were all there
and the transportation equipment pro-
vided was all it should have been, but
our difficulties were enormous. There
was only one road and to have built
another would have taken two years.
The nature of the country, the weather
all these things-helped to disOrganize
this department. The use of wagons
was almost impossible
Trotter So for S3,OOO>