The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1898-12-01
Operations of SIMPSONS
Squadron Off Santiago.
THE ADMIRAL'S REPORT
SHAFTER'S APPEALS TO FORCE
THE HARBOR ENTRANCE.
Misunderstood THE eIRcUMSTANt Es
So Sampson Declared, Who Also Said it Was
not so Much Loss of Life that Deferred
Him as Loss Of his Ships by
Exploding Mines.

Exploding Mines.
Washington, Nov 30.-Tno Navy De-
partment today made public Il report
from Admiral Sampson covering the op
erations of the United States blockading
feet off Santiago after the destruction
CT Cervera's Sqra,r0n. The report be-
sns with a dispatch dated on the flag
ship New York, July 10th, and winds
up with one from the same flagship.
dated Guantanamo, August 18th. In
the first report Admiral Sampson tells
of the demonstration made against
Aguadores by the Michigan troops UNI
der Unffield, the point of which WAS
that AS soon as the ships TOOK part II
the firing the Spaniards Disappeared. Tie
says that the bombardment of Santiago
on the second of July served no partica-
lar end because Skaters attack had
been postponed. He quoted dispatches
from himself ana Shafter stating that
it was impossible to force an entrance
to the harbor until the mines had been
removed and that work could be- accom-
plished only after the troops had taken
the forts. Shafter replied that he could
not tell when he could take the ba;
teries. If they We're as difficult rs
those against which he was nilted it
would take some time and great loss
of life. Says he:
Il am ut a loss to see why the navy
cannot work under Il destructive fire
rs well as the army. My loss yesterday
was over 800 men. By all means keep
up the fire ON everything in sight untA
demolished. l. expect, however, with
time and sufficient men, to capture the
forts along the bay"
An hour later, on the same day. July
ID, Shafter again appealed to Sampson
to force the harbor entrance immediate
~ so as to avoid further loss among his
men, already very heavy. You can
operate with less loss of life than | can,
he said. In reply, on the same day,
Admiral Sampson pointed out that the
channel of the harbor was well strewn
with mines which would certainly re-
suit in the sinking of one or more of
his ships if he attempted to enter the
harbor and that by sinking one the har-
Dor would be blocked against the en-
trance of the others He had hoped that
Shafter would take the batteries from
the rear so that he might drag for the
torpedoes, but if it was Skaters earn
est desire that he should force the en-
trance he would prepare to undertake it.
thinking, however, that the position of
both army and navy would be made
more difficult if they failed in the at
tempt.
Sampson said:
1T is not so much the loss of the
men as it is the loss of ships which has
until now deferred me from making
direct attack upon the ships within the
port"
After the battle with Cervera's feet
Shafter renewed his request that Samp-
son force an entrance, saying his pres
ent position had cost him a thousand
men and he did not wish TO lose any
more. Sampson, in comment, says this
shows Il complete misrepresentation Of the
circumstances. He alleges that the
sinking of the Mercedes would obstruct
the entrance of the larger American
ships and that extensive shore batteries
We're known TO exist. His chief of
staff had indicated to Shafter the points
that should be carried before any atten-
ton was paid TO the city and the taking
Of these points would have insured the
destruction of the mines and the en-
trance Of the American fleet.
THE PLANS OF SAMPSON.
Shafter had cordially consented TO this,
and Sampson did not know why the plan
was changed unless the troops had been
advanced too far to divert. He expresses
the belief that an adherence to the origi-
nal plan would have resulted in the much
quicker surrender of the Spanish troops
andsless loss of life except to the navy,
which would have borne the brunt of at
tack. Sampson tells how he contemplated
bringing up the marine battalion from
Guantanamo, landing them at the foot Of
Moro TO assist in assault or to take the
west battery and had no doubt Of the
success Of his plan. He arranged to visit
Shafter to talk this over, but being i'll
was obliged to send his chief of staff,
Captain Chadwick They reached an ar
rangement to lombard Santiago from the
sea for twenty-four hours with the heavy
guns and if that failed to bring the
enemy to terms then to assault Soeapa
battery with the marines and Cubans and
force an entrance 10 the harbor with
some of the smaller ships Thus, says
Sampson. Il have been surprised to see
published in the papers any statement
or REFUSAL on my part 10 eUueaNor W
force my way into the harbor and can
not understand lin case the newspaper
report be a truthful statement Of what
was sent by him-General Sha teI's send
ing any report Of this kind.
Il here, moreover, would animadyert
upon the apparently extraordinary open
ness with which every detail Of hope, ef-
fort, or suggestion on the part of the
hoe f.ttEttghn1 Tho iSs
dom of such procedure is too manifest
for, discussion" Continuing the Admiral
says:
II think that the falsity 0f the sugges-
ton that the navy was unwilling to CO.
operate in forcing al entrance to Santa
go is already sufficiently shown. ] would.
add, to show the good viii Of the navy
and my desire and understanding thar
u L. 11nI fn ilnI Ia NM IL