Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1898-08-05
CUBA.

CUBA.
With strong prospect for peace in
the near future, the question of what is
to be done with Cuba becomes Of press
ing importance. Conditions would ap
pear to be very different from what the
people supposed, or at least what
part of them supposed including con
gress. when the war began. For all are
beginning to see that annexation to the
United States is the only possible out
come of the war which would give to
Cuba and the Cubans what they have so
long needed, stable government with
freedom. The following candid editorial
upon this subject is taken from the
Boston Herald:
The United states may be very near the So
luton of the Cuban question, As far as II re
lates to the government of that island or, ut
any rate to the beginning of the end OF this
solution, The treaty of peace, If the terms
laid down by our country are accepted by
Spain, brings this subject up for immediate
adjustment Cuba ceases then to be the mill
tary prize of war operations. 1t becomes
country to act for itself through the voice of
its own people We have declared this in adj
vance, and there is neither desire nor dispo-
siton to retreat from il. 1t Is incumbent
upon our government to take early steps to
have il settled what that voice is to be, and IL
must respond to the obligation.
The conditions attending this settlement
are much changed from what il was assumed
they would be when this war was entered
upon. Then it was believed that the Cuban
insurgents were the representatives OF peo-
pie struggling for self government. 1t was
thought that all the United States had to do
was to compel Spain to TelinGuish her control
over Cuba and it would pass at once, with the
general consent of those remaining in II, INTO
the hands of those in instruction. They had
government already prepared. They had
formed a constitution and elected ofhcers I'M
der 1t. The people, it was thought would
gladly accept il as their own, and the Cuban
question would be settled. If putting the
constitution to a vote of the people was to be
a part of the proceeding, il was not to be
more than formality. There had been two
parties in contention in Cuba, Spain and the
insurgents in arms The United States had
interviewed to help the latter. This end was
accomplished, and all left now to do was to
turn the government of the island over to
them.
But all expectations OF this character have
been disappointed. 1t has turned out that our
estimate of the fitness of the insurgents to
govern, and, what is more, of their having the
confidence of the people of Cuba, is n dream
of delusion. our army had hardly set foot in
the island before this was made apparent
1t went there for purposes of rescue, it was
prompt to reach the conviction that IT had
made mistake In those it had attempted to
aid. Their numbers were insignificant; those
of them which appeared to the army only
came to destroy confidence in them and to
create disgust. This, fortunately, did not
prove that our mission to free Cuba was a
| failure. 1t only afforded evidence that we
had been mistaken i'm our estimate of the
men who represented Cuba. There was still
Cuba to be freed, but il was yet to be ascer-
| tanned what that Cuba was, and what We're
its desires regards its form of government.
The ascertaining OF this is the real Cuban
proplem now and il has already succeeded
the other. There is IA direct enough road to
its settlement, but II is not free from difficult
| ties which may arise in lis solution The first
of these may be found in the insurgents them
selves. They will, doubtless, demand their
| own government, and, If 1t is not accorded
! them by the United States, there is "a possibil-
| ity of their transferring their rebellion
against spain to rebellion against this cOun-
| try. We do not greatly apprehend that this
| will be direct action on their part, however;
our power is too formidable for them TO nope
to resist it effectively, even in guerilla war
fare There is more danger that such gov
eminent rs the Cuban population as whole
may institute under our protection may meet
with opposition at the present insurgent
hands. This may affect the conditions of the
final settlement in Cuba. The insurgents
may resist a Cuban government when they
| would not resist a government of the United
States, and thus chronic warfare may contin-
ne among them, which il may plague the
United States TO deal with, a. they would be
called upon TO do.
That brings into consideration another Gle
ment in the Cuban situation. There is doubt
less, large portion of the Cuban people who
doubt If the island is in condition to accept
the responsibilities of a separate nationality.
II il acquires freedom at all, they feel that il
would be better realized rs IA portion OF
the United States. The position of the insur
gents contributes to strengthen them in this
feeling. They will not have the Gomez gov
eminent, and from what our soldiers are re
porting, it would be wildly foolish for them
to accept it; yet, If they do not accept it. they
invite another civil conflict in the island. A
gentleman, perhaps as well informed on the
condition of affairs in Cuba as any citizen
of our own country, expressed to us the con
viction some months ago that, if ever fail
vote was taken of the Cuban people, it would
} declare for annexation to the United States
; rather than accept the Gomez government
Suppose such vote is taken, as II seem,
likely to be, and it does so declareY The Gu
ban question comes to us IN new form then
and what many win consider is an embarass
ing one.'
However this may be, 1t would be idle fo
us TO ignore IL as one OF the events that may
} be impending in the future. II is serious