The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1898-12-22
Young Ensisns Kept the Department In.
formed Of the Enemy's Movements
MONTfJO's ACCOUNT OF DFwtYS VICTORY
Of the American Attack--srmpson
wanted to lombard Havana.

reached the public. the documents stiil
co.lain many minor reports that throw
sldelghts on Interesting phases OF the war.
Almost in the beginning In the brief record
OF the proceedings OF the naval war board,
an unknown hero is brought to ligat ii
the peison OF Ensign ii. H. Ward, who ~
the beginning OF the wsr was ON dny in
the nayigaS,on bureau alternating with
L.eutensnS Wbit;ltsey in the heavy duties
oil assistant To The chief OF the que II.
tic volunteered Tor tL. secret service auty,
and his exploits, OF when nothing mas been
said IN SAe past. may be well patel ON
record beside those OF Leuaensat howan
in Cuba ana Lieutenant Wh. taeg in ltorl,
itico. Within week after the declaration
OF Wat Ensign Ward disguised himsct u. q
went straight in;o the near, OF he ua-
mys counSry making his headquarters "
Cadiz, the pu.ncipal spanish naval s;aio
and Informing the navy depart nent Gere
Of the actual strength OF the Spanish naval
vesselG AND their movements. Then lie
went to the West Indies and lerortel
every thing that Wits going ON there OF M
por!ancc TO the American nasy. Next h
went again fnto the enemys country IN
disguise. this dine 10 PoEo Rico, whero
he was arrested as O suspect and a SPY.
by adnoitncss he managed 10 secure his
release, and escaping from San Juan cahlod
the navy department run account OF the
state of the defenses there ana The prepa-
rations making tor The recec'tion OF the
Spanish squadron undcr Cerycra.
All this tue the officials Of the revy
department were under the Impression that
Mir Ward was engaged IN insIlllag sys-
tenn of coast signals On The Now Eab,and
coast.
While Ward was IN "orto REQ Ensign
Buck, another attnchc of the navisa ion
bureau. was OH he shores OF NE Mcatt-
eyranean In disguise Watching every move
ment of the squadrSn OF ADMIRAL Camarn.
watch started for tne Philippines, tat
turned back. On the strategy board Itself
IL is said Il was part uf liz duty 20 Keep
Informed OF all the movements, resources
ana plans Of the S.Mnish nasal ft'Tes
through secret agents, ana 1t is row knowl
that the navy was mus iatoaned OF nll
important movements.
Tho repor,s OF the famous naval hattie
of Cavlte includes one from United States
Consul Williams. n rather ituusual Thing
in report OF a strictly naval chsractef
hu, fully justified by its picturesque and
untechu,cal description OF Dewey great
victory Following II Is II report To his
government OF tho Same cngaSement by
the commander 10 chief Of the Inflated
Spanish ailniral Montejo. The admiral de
sciibes In vivid language the terrible ef-
feet of the American onslaught on the
Spanish vessel' llo says:
The Americans tired most rapidly
There camo upon us numerous projectllci
as the three cruisers nj the end of the
lire devoted themselves almost entirely 10
fight the Christina. my flagship. short
I lane after tho action commenced one shell |
exploded In the forecastle and put out
of action all those who served the four
rapid Are cannon.
Meantime another shell exploded In tho
Han, No, nsA h,tN
AT 1880 one shell destroyed completely |
the steering gear.
Another destroyed the mi22en mast, |
bringing down my flag and ensign Another
cheli exploded on the poop and pu, out |
of action Miro men. fresh shell exploded |
IN the officers cabin, covering the hospital
with blood and destroying the wounded |
who were being treated there.
l"Arotber exploded In tho ammunition /
room. ! had TO food the magazine VIII n
chs cartridges began to explode. Ons large
she'll penetrated the Are room, putting out /
of action one maRtcr gunner aud twe've
men serving tho guns. Another rendered
useless the starboard bow gun ard while
the fire Increased astern another lire |
started forward from another she'll The
broasSde guns continued firing until there
were only one gun and one seaman re-
unhurt for serving. The ship b.
irg out OF control, the hull. smoke pipe !
and masis riddled with shot, or confused
with the cries OF the wounded, half OF the
crew out OF action. among whom were
seven Officers, ] gave tho order 10 sink and
the ship before the magazines
should explode
The story of the loss OF the Castillo was
the story OF the loss OF all
the other Spanish ships.
Apparently the first suggestion OF the
organization OF tho flying squadron which
was to divert Admiral Camaras squadron
from his voyage to Manila. came from
Dewey, for In dispatch OF June ~ he
tays.
I'm my judgment il The coast OF Spain
was threatened the squadron OF the enemy
Will haye to return"
AND that was exactly what happened
Very naturally the report OF the opern-
tIons OF the North Atlantic fleet comprises
the larger part OF the printed body. Most |
OF the facts have already appeared, but In |
the beginning there Is d most interesting |
interchange between Secretary Long and
Admiral Sampson, showing that even be-
fore the outbreak Of the war the admiral |
had worked out complete plan for the
immediate reduction o! Havana with his
own squadron. unsupported, and was only 1
prevented fran carrying out that plan by
orders from the department, which wished
to protect the big ironclads.
Secretary Long addressed Sampson April (
6 confidential letter, telling him that in
the event OF bostiiit.es (for this was before
the outbreak OF the war; the department |
wished HIN 10 do all In his power TO de-
stToy the Spanish war vessels in this West
Indian waters.
He says: THE department docs not /
wish the vessels OF your squadron 20 be cx-
posed to the fire OF the batteries at Ha-
vana, Santiago or other strongly fortified
ports In Cuba unless more formidable
Spanish vessels should take refuge in those
harborg. Even In this case the departm mt
w,nld suggest that rigid blockade and the
employment of our torpedo boats would ac-
compl4zh the desired object"
The reasons set Out by Secretary Long
for this instruction were that there would
be no United States troops Available 20
occupy the captured towns until October
AMI that the lack OF docking faciItles
made II particularly desirable that our
vessels should not be crippled before tho
capture or destruction Of SPANS most for.
micable vessels.
In a letter dated April 0 Admiral Sanip.
son endesvored 10 secure reversal Of the
decision. He sympathized with
al that the secretary said about guarding
the big ships against a possible serious
loss while the enemy's fleet was still In
tact but at the same time he regarded II
az very important 10 strike quickly and
strike hard as soon as hostiiities COM