The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-08
Possibility that the Cuban Debt Ones
ton VIII Be Left to the Peace
Commission for Adjustment.
NO PROGRAMME YET ADOPTED
AS TO PRELIMINARIEs THAT MUST
PRECEDE A FINAL TREATY.
Trouble Expected with the Insur-
Cease HostiIities in the Philippines.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 7.-Although as yet
without official confirmation of the report
from Paris that the Spanish government has
decided to accept the terms laid down by
the United States as essential to the nego-
tiation Of treaty of peace, the officials here
are under the conviction that the end has
come and are giving attention to the steps
to be taken next. In view of the delay in
coming to this conclusion the idea be-
ginning to prevail that the Spanish govern
ment was about to enter a plea in abate-
ment, and that the answer would again be
inconclusive. In this case the President
was disposed to deal firmly with the issues;
to give notice that our proposals were with
drawn and to let it be understood that when
Spain again sued for peace the conditions
would be more severe than those first laid
down. If the Spanish government should
embody an effort to secure any material
change in the conditions it will meet with
prompt rejection.
Some reference has been made in the dis
patches of British newspapers to desire
on the part of the Spanish government to
include in the preliminary agreement a
clause exempting 1t from liability for the
Cuban debt. The formal statement of the
points of the United States note given out
from the White House made no reference
to this subject, and it canont be known as
yet whether or not the full text shows any,
thing more But, presuming that no ref
erence whatever is made to the Cuban debt
it is possible the subject may be regarded
as one that should be treated by the peace
commissioners, who are to meet later to
frame the treaty, which, of course, will en-
body many details that are left untouched
in the main proposition, though Cabinet off,
GERS have authorized the statement that no
part of the Cuban or Porto Rico debts
would be assumed by the United States.
Based upon the Associated Press reports
of the progress being made at Madrid to-
wards returning the answer of Spain it was
calculated by the department officials that
the formal note could not be delivered to
the President before tomorrow, and that
also was the belief of the French ambas-
sador. From the length of time consumed
In its preparation, the note was believed
to be long, thus entailing the consumption
of much time in forwarding it, first to
Paris, reducing it to cipher there, trans
mitting 1t over the cable and then retrans-
lating it at the French embassy. In the
case of the last note the attaches of the en-
bassy worked nearly all night to prepare
their communication to the Spanish govern
ment though the conference with the Pres
ident closed before O'Clock in the after
noon, with the ambassador in possession of
the United States note
Should the Spanish answer be an uncon-
ditional acceptance of our terms, some ne
gotiation may be necessary to agree on the
steps to be taken to give effect to the
agreement. So far as can be learned, it has
not yet been determined how this shall be
done. There W. we no 6r.r
is military capitulation by the captain
generals of Cuba and Porto Rico, which
will Immediately place the American mill
tary or naval commanders in technical oc-
cupation of the islands and enable them to
carry out in their own way and in their own
time the embarkation of the Spanish armies
in the islands. The question as to whether
they shall be permitted to carry off their
arms is not now material as it was in
the case of the surrender of General Toral's
forces at Santiago, where, occurring in the
midst of the campaign, there was a neces-
sity for securing the moral effect of com
pelling the Spanish soldiers to lay down
their arms. Spain having succumbed it
might be urged that the United States might
grant a concession on this point to
Spanish pride without fear of having the
action attributed to fear of the conse-
quences of refusal. This would not apply,
however, to the volunteers who might elect
to remain in Cuba, as it would rot be prll-
dent to allow so large body of men to
carry arms, without restraint in the days of
reconstruction, when delicate and difficult
matters of internal policy are to be settled
and new methods applied to the government
of the islands.
The second method by which the preimi-
;obt
effected would be by protocol to be signed
by representative of the President, prob
ably Secretary Day in this case, and by NJ
Cambon, in behalf of the Spanish govern
ment. 1t was by just such an agreement as
this, known as the Cushing protocol, that
war with Spain was averted as result of
the Virginius affair. This course having the
weight of precedent, may be adopted in this
case. 1t is probable that in the Philippines
the greatest difficulty will be met in putting
the agreement into effect on account of the
attitude of the insurgents. but General Mer-
ritt is now gaining in strength daily. and
probably will be in position to meet any
emergency.
General Wade's reinforcements for Gen
Miles are going forward regardless of the
progress of peace negotiations. The agree
ment to negotiate a treaty of peace does
not necessarily carry with IT cessation of
hostilities. In the case of the Mexican war
IL was a month after the peace negotiations
began before hostilites were declared to be
closed, and if it is desirable these rein
forcements may be intercepted and returned
TO the United States after they sail The
present plans of Secretary Alger all con-
template that they shall leave the United
States, especially as it. is felt that. with the
practical field experience they will require