The Forest Republican. [volume] (Tionesta, Pa.) 1869-1952, 1898-12-07

by whOmSOeNer wrought. Yet tne IN
stinct of justice prevailed and the ma
tion anxiously awaited the result of
the searching investigation at once set
on foot The finding of the naval
board of inquiry established that the
origin Of the explosion was externally
by a submarine mine. and only halted,
through lack OF positive testimony. to
fix the responsibility of its author
ship.
All these things carried conviction to
the most thoughtful even before the
finding Of the naval board, that a cri-
sis in our relations with Spain and to-
ward Cuba was at hand. So strong
was this belief that 1t needed but a
brief executive suggestion to the con-
gress to receive immediate answer to
the duty of making instant provision
for the possible and perhaps speedily
probable emergency OF war, and the
remarkable, almost unique, spectacle
was presented Of a unanimous vote of
both houses on the 9Th of March ap-
propriatlng $50, 600 900 for the national
defense and for each and every pur-
pose connected herewith, to be ex-
PENDED at the discretion of the Pres-
dent" That this act of provision came
none too soon was disclosed when the
application of the fund was undertake
en-. Our coasts were practically unde-
Tended. Our navy needed large pro-
vision for increased ammunition and
supplies, and even numbers to cope
with any sudden attack from the navy
of Spain which comprised modern YES
sells Of the highest type of continental
perfection. Our army also required en-
largement of men and munitions. The
details Of the hurried preparations for
\,
reports of the secretaries of war and
OF the navy, and need not be repeated
here. 1t is sufficient to say that the
outbreak of war, when it did come,
found our nation not unprepared to
meet the conflict
PREPARING FOR HOSTILITIES.
The maximum effective lighting
force of the navy during the war, sep
arated into classes, was as follows:
Four battleshps of the first class;
l battleship Of the second class; 3 arm
ored cruisers; coast defense monitors;
| l armored ram; IL protected cruisers;
unprotected cruisers; is gunboats: /
dynamite cruiser; IL torpedo boats; II
vessels of the old navy, including mon
itors. Auxiliary navy: IL auxiliary
cruisers; 2S converted yachts; p con-
verted tugs; 10 converted colliers; 10
revenue cutters; lighthouse tenders
and 10 miscellaneous vessels.
Much alarm was felt along our entire
Atlantic seaboard lest some attack
might be made by the enemy. Every
precaution was taken to prevent pos
sible injury to our great cities lying
along the coast Temporary garrsons
We're provided, drawn from the State
militia; infantry and light batteries
were drawn from the volunteer force.
/ About 1900 troops were thus employ
4 ed. The coast signal service was es-
/ tahlished for observing the approach
/ of an enemy's ships 10 the coast of
/ the United States and the life-saving
/ and lighthouse services co-operated,
/ which enabled the Navy department
to have all portions of the Atlantic
/ coast, from Maine to Texas, under OBJ
| servation.
The auxiliary navy was created un-
| der the authority of Congress and was
/ ofIicered and manned by the naval mi
! litia of the several States. This or
! ganization patrolled the coast and per-
/ formed the duty cf a second line of de-
tense
Under the direction of the chief OF
engineers, submarine mines were
placed at the most exposed points. Be-
fore the outbreak of the war, perma-
nent mining casemates and cable gal
leries had been constructed at. nearly
all important harbors. Most of the tor
| pedo material was not to be found In
the market. and had to be specially
| manufactured. Under date of April 10
district officers were directed to take
all preliminary measures, short OF
the actual attaching of the loaded
mines to the cables, and on April %
telegraphic orders were issued to place
the loaded mines in position. The ag-
gregate number of mines placed were
1,535, at the principal harbors from
Maine to California. Preparation.
We're also made for the planting o
mines at certain other harbors, hu
owing to the early destruction of tn,
Spanish fleet. these We're not placed.
The Signal Corps was promptly or
ganized and performed service of the
most difficult aad important character
It's operations during the war covered
the electrical connection of all coas
fortiications, the establishment of tel
ephonc and telegraphic facilities fol
the camps at Manila, Santiago and il
Porto Rico. There were constructed
800 miles Of lire at ten great camps
thus facilitating military movements
I from those points in a manner hereto
fore unknown in military administra
tion. Field telegraph lines were es
tablished and maintained under th'
enemy's fire at Manila, and later tn,
Manila Hongkong cable was reopened
MONEY PROVIDED BY CONGRESS
In Porto Rico cable communication.
were opened over a discontinued route
and on land the headquarters of tn,
commanding officer was kept in tele
graphic communication with the divi
sion commanders on four different line
Of operations.
There was placed in Cuban waters
completely outfitted cable ship will
war cables and cable gear, suitable
both for the destruction of communi
cations belonging to the enemy ant
the establishment of our own. Tw,
ocean cables were destroyed under tn
enemy's batteries at Santiago Th
day previous to the landing of Gen
Skaters corps at Caimanera, within
20 miles of the landing place, cab
communications were established ant
cable station opened, giving direc
communication with the government
at Washington. This service was in
valuable to the executive in directing
the operations of the army and navy
With a total force of over / 300. the los
was by disease in camp and field, off
GERS and men included, only five.
The national defense fund of $50, 900,
900 was expended in large part by tn
army and navy, and the objects 70
which it was used are fully shown Il
the reports of the several secretaries
1t was a most timely appropriation
enabling the government to strengthe
its defenses and make preparation
greatly NEEDED in case of war.
This fund haipp 20 -,