The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-12-02
A REPORT FROM Sampson
On the Blockade of Port
of Santiago.
LENGTHY CRITICISMS

by the Admiral of the Conduct of Hos
tilitfes by Others-He Makes Great
Complaint Against General Shafter.
He Urges the Army TO Make a Way
for Entrance of the Fleet-shaHer's
RepIy-SampsOn'sC Complaint that He
wasno. Made Party to the Surrender
Washington, November 30.-The ma
Wy department today made public
report from Admiral Sampson cover
ing the operations Of the United States
blockading fleet off Santiago after the
destruction of Cervera's squadron. The
report begins with a dispatch dated On
the flagship New York July 18th, and
winds up with one from the same flag
ship, dated Guantanamo, August 4th.
In the first report Admiral Samps On
tells of the demonstration made against
Aguadores by the Michigan troops un-
der Duffield, the point of which was
that as soon as the ships took part in
the firing the Spaniards disappeared.
He says that the bonbardment of San
tiagO on July End served no particular
end, because Shafter's attack had been
postponed. He quoted dispatches from
himself to Shafter, stating that it
was impossible to force an entrance to
the harbor until the mines had been
removed and that work could be ac-
complished only after the troops had
taken the forts. Shafter replied that
he could not tell when he could take
the batteries. If they were as difficult
as those against which he was pitted
it would take some time and a great
loss Of life. Says he: Il am at a loss
to see why the navy cannot work un-
der destructive fire as we'll as the
army. My loss yesterday was over 500
men. By all means keep up the fire
on everything in sight until demolish-
ed. [ expect, however, with time and
sufficient men to capture the forts
along the bay
An hour later, on the same day, July
End, Shafter again appealed to Samp-
son to force the harbor entrance i'm
mediately so as to avoid future loss
among his men, already very heavy.
You can operate with less loss of life
than / can,' he said. In reply, on the
same day, Admiral Sampson pointed
out that the channel of the harbor was
we'll streWn with mines which would
certainly result in the sinking of one
or more of his ships if he attempted to
enter the harbor and that by sinking
one the harbOr would be blocked
against the entrance of the others. He
had hoped that Shafter would take the
batteries from the rear, so that he
might drag for the torpedoes, but if
it was Skaters earnest desire that he
should force the entrance he would
prepare to undertake it, thinking, how
ever, that the position of both army
and navy would be made more difficult
if they failed in the attempt. Sampson
said: "It is not SO much the loss of
the mer as it is the loss of ships which
has until now deferred me from max
ing a direct attack upon the ships
within the port
After the battle with Cervera's fleet
Shafter renewed his request that
Sampson force an entrance. saying his
present position had cost his 1000 men
and he should not wish to lose anv
more. Sampson, in his comment, says
this shows a complete misapprehen
sion Of the circumstances. He alleges
that the sinking of the Mercedes would
obstruct the larger American ships and
that extensive shore batteries were
known to exist. His chief of staff had
indicated to Shafter the points that
should be carried before attention was
paid to the city and the taking of
these points would have insured the
destruction of the mines and the en-
trance o. the American fleet.
Shafter mad cordially consented to
this and Sampson did not know why
the plan was changed unless the troops
had been advanced too far to divert
He expresses the belief that an ad-
herence to the original plan would have
resulted in the much quicker surrender
of the Spanish troops and less loss of
life, except to the navy. which would
have borne the brunt of attack
Sampson tells how he contemplated
bringing up the marine battalion from
Guantanamo. landing them at the foot
of Morro to assist in assault or to take
the west battery and had no doubt Of
the success of his plan. He arranged
to visit Shafter to talk this over, but
being i'll was obliged to send his chief
of staff Captain Chadwick. They
reached an agreement to lombard
Santiago from the sea for twenty-four
hours with the heavy guns and if that
failed to bring the enemy to terms then
to assault Socapa battery with the ma
r1nes and Cubans and force an en-
trance to the harbor with some of the
smaller ships. Thus says Sarapson.
Il have been surprised to see publish
ed i'm the papers any statement of re-
fusal on my part to endeavor to force
my way into the harbor and cannot
understand and. in case the newspaper
reports be a truthful statement of
what was sent by himself General
Skaters sending any report of this
kind.
Il here, moreover would animadvert
upon the apparently extraordinary
openness with which every detail Of
of the army has been published. The
unwisdom of such procedure is too
manifest for discussion.
THE navy has been placed in such
an insidious and ia lse position before
the country through the very unwise
publication Of General Skaters tele-
grams that I think this matter should