Hutchinson gazette. [volume] (Hutchinson, Kan.) 1895-1902, 1898-10-27
SIMPSONS REPORT TOL0NG
Conduct Of Fleet Prior to Battle
Of Santiago

West Indies for about two months
prior TO the destruction OF Admiral
Oervera's ships on July Q, II Is made
up largely of official dispatches and
the movements OF the feet, with ex-
plantations and comment by the ad-
mirAl, The report 10 dated August 0,
on the flagship New York, and begins
with u statement Of the determine
ton reached by the navy depart
ment TO send squadron to tho
Windward passage for the purpose Of
observation, because OF information re-
ceived Of the sailing, April 20, OF Ad-
miral Cervera's squadron from tho Cape
Verde islands, On the voyage east
ward from the naval base at Key West,
which began May 4, Admiral Sampfon
reports there was experienced endless
trouble and delay because Of tho inef-
flciency of the two monitors accom-
panying the other ships and which had
TO be taken in tow. Their coal supply
was 80 small that II was at once evil
dent that they must either frequently
coal or be towed. The admiral says;
"Had the sea been rongh, or had the
enemy appeared at this juncture, the
squadron would have been In n much
better condition for an engagement
had the monitors been elsewhere Sub
sequontly, when engaging the batter
les of San Juan, II was evident that
their shooting was very bad Owing
TO the quick rolling of these vessels,
even in q very moderate sea, they were
unable to fire with any degree Of ac-
suracy."
July 2 the following was received
from General Shafter:
"Terrible fight yesterday, but my
line is now strongly intrenched about
three-fourths Of q mile from town.
urge that you make effort Immediately
TO force the entrance to avoid future
losses among my men, which are al
ready very heavy. You can now oper-
ate with less loss of life than can.
Please telephone answer"
A reply was telephoned General
Shafter from Admiral Sampson
through Lieutenant Stanton, which
said the admiral had bombarded the
forts ut the entrance of Santiago and
also Punta Gorda battery, inside,
Bilencing their fire, and asked whether
he (Shafter) wanted further firing on
the admiral's part. Tho explanation
was made that it was impossible to
force an entrance until the channel
was cleared Of mines--a work of some
time after the forts were taken posses
sion OF by the troops. To this General
Shafter replied;
1T is impossible for me TO say when
/ can take batteries Mt entrance of har-
Dor. II they are as difficult TO take as
those which we have been pitted
against, it will be some time and en-
tail great loss of life. am at loss
to see why the navy cannot work UNI
der destructive fro as we'll as the
army. My loss yesterday was over 500
men. BY all means keep up FIRE on
everything in sight of you until de-
molished. ] expect, however, in time
and with sufficient men to capture the
forts along the bay"
Admiral Sampson then says:
II wrote General Shafter the follow
ing letter and began making prepar-
atiOns to countermine, and, with the
object of arranging an attack upon the
batteries at the entrance, visit was
arranged to General Shafter, 80 that
the matter might be thoroughly dis
GUESSED and combined action take place.
I had in view the employment of the
marines for an assault on either the
Morro or Soeapa battery, while at the
same time assaulting the defenses ut
the entrance with the feet.
My Dear General:--I have your
note of this morning-just received at
1890
"'An officer of my STAFF has already
reported to you tho firing which we did
this morning, but must say in addi-
tion to what he told you that the forts
which we silenced are not the forts
which would give you any ilconven-
fence In capturing the city, rs they
cannot fire except to seaward. They
cannot even prevent our entrance
into the harbor of Santiago. Our
trouble from the first has been that
the channel to the harbor Is we'll
strewn with observation mines, which
would certainly result In the sinking
Of one or more Of our ships II we at
tempted to enter the harbor, and by
the sinking of ship the object of the
to enter the harbor would be
defeated by the preventing Of further
progress on our part.
1t was my hope that an attack on
your part on these shore batteries,
from the rear, would leave us at liberty
to drag the channel for torpedoes.
IF 1t is your earnest desire that we
should force the entrance, will at
once prepare to undertake it. Think,
however, that our position and yours
would be made more difficult If, as is
possible, we fail in our attempt.
"'This work, which is unfamiliar to |
us, will require considerable time. 1t
is not so much the loss of men as IL Is |
the loss of ships which has deferred !
me from making direct attack upon
the ships within the port. Very truly.
TO CALL CUBANS TO ORDER.