Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-07-11
MODERN FIELD TACTICS.
Considered I'm Connection with INV
Percentage of officers Slain.

number of officers among the killed and
wounded at Santiago. In the first oiiiciai
/ list ten of the seventeen killed were ON
GERS, and the percentage among Inc
wounded is hardly less.
| No battle in any part OF the world, pro-
badly. could have furnished better test
of the new tactics, made necessary by the
| Improvement in firearms. There were the
rough ground and the long-range maya
| zine rifles and there also were the train
| ed soldiers. One Of the main OBJECTS OF
| these tactcs-or drill regulations as
| they are called, except when they are ap-
piled on the battle-field-is TO preserve
| tho officers uninjured as long as posi-
| bic. More reliance is now placed on the
! intelligence of the privates, and pdrucu-
| larly Of the non-commissioned oihcers,
! than in the old days OF NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
der formation. Conduct that would nave
| fastened the name of coward" upon an
| officer in the civil war is, in sense,
made compulsory to-day; that is. while
he is still TO inspire his men by example
when occasion demands, he is for the
most part to maintain a fixed position
| with relation TO his subordinates, and Is
| TO keep behind shelter If he can. Thus
| all movements can be intelligenty d.
rected-a knowledge of which fact is more
| encouraging TO the men than the physical
| presence of the officer at their elbows.
| The non-commissioned officers have i'm
| mediate charge Of the men, and oppor-
| tunities are open to them such as never
were dreamed Of in the old days. An
eminent English writer said, at the time
/ the new regulations were adopted In his
army, that in actual warfare, after the
men, the non-commissioned officers would
I tf 1tLf fa4Tnn ~ 10
the captains next, and so on; which is as
| it should be.
To illustrate the idea OF the present
battle formation. take one company alone.
The principle is the same for the battal-
| ion, regiment, &c. In each company there
| are four sections each under the inn
| mediate command Of sergeant. The
| sections are divided into squads, which
| are under the immediate command Of
corporals. At the beginning of the forma-
| ton, for the offensive, one OF these sec
| tons Is designated as the reserve, an
| other as the support, and two as the firing
line, or in any other proportion as may
| seem best The first lieutenant commands
the reserve, the second the firing line.
and the captains post is near the sup
| port, with a bugler beside him, 10 give
| signals; also, the first sergeant and any
| who may be designated to carry mes
sages. If he quits that post for moment,
he leaves word where he can be found.
A few scouts are sent forward first.
| After they have gone $50 feet, the firing
line advances the sections gradually
separating and widening the intervals be-
tween them till they subdivide into
| squads, and the squads in turn separate
into skirmishers, who are about 6 feet
apart when on the firing line proper. The
support at the outset is about 80 yards
behind the first line, ready to deploy and
| advance to the skirmishers, and the re-
serve keeps about 100 yards in the rear
| of the support ready for flank attacks or
TO reinforce the first line. Every man Is
taught TO take advantage of rocks,
bushes, and the like for cover. One OBJ
ject Is 10 get as near as possible without
being discovered, then to locate the enc
my's fire. and 10 deceive him as 10 the
strength of the attacking party. The
wide intervals save the men from being
moved down by the enemy.
The firing begins at an order from the
captain. The skirmishers halt when they
fire. Gradually now, as they advance,
they close in toward the centre TO make
room for the support on the TANKS. The
support meanwhile draws nearer till il
joins the first line. Then there is a rush
forward. The lieutenant giving the in
structions while the men are lying down
or are behind cover. commands: "Ad-
vance by PUSHES; third section, fire two
(or three volleys; second section, for
ward" The sergeant of the third section
gives the commands for the volleys. AS
soon as the first is fired and under partial
cover of its smoke the chief of the second
section orders his men forward al double
time. When they have gone about fifteen
yards, or TO cover if there is any, he
causes them to lie down and fire two OIL
three volleys. On the first volley the third
section rushes forward fifteen feet in adj
vance of the line OF the second section
and fires The second section advances
as before, and so il is continued. When
all the men are on the line. each lieuten-
ant takes position behind his own platoon
and the captain is IN the rear of the GEN.
ire. Having chosen a suitable position
from which to make the assault, the cap
tain commands: Rapid fire!" The lieu
tenants thereupon order the men to fix
bayonets and to lay down the sights OF
their pieces, after which they give the
commands for the firing. To charge, the
captain signals TO cease firing and com
mands: ITO the charge. march, The
men rise and advance in double time
When they are about thirty yards from
the enemy he commands. Charger
our tactics differ from those of Ihe
English army in only one important par
ticular. With the former, when II is
necessary TO advance support and reserve
and prepare for the charge, the first line
falls back and the others deployed pass
10 the front through the intervals in the
retiring first line. The theory there is
that the first line may be too exhausted
to go on to the charge. With our army
the first line remains at the front. the re,
serve Joining IL in the intervals and on
the TANKS.
The exact details of the fight at Santiago
are awaited with interest by students
| of modern warfare. Rough ground Ions
range of the Spanish guns, rapid fire-al
these things were reckoned with when the
new regulations were drafted. OF course
there were those who said that with any
kind of formation three men out of five
would be killed in an engagement where
modern weapons were used. and IL +
true that there can be no very safe place
on the field nowadays for either officers
or men. With what we know at present
of this fight, only one thing can account
for the disproportiouately large loss oil
officers-which indeed, may not be born,
out by the FINAL returns-and that is thai
their dash" constrained them 10 rusf
onward and expose themselves without
regard to what they had learned in theii
books and on their drill grounds. II II
shall turn out that the engagement wa:
fought tactically, faith in the new regu
lations may be somewhat shaken.
The Churches Getting Ready.
|