The herald., 1898-04-30
THE CAMPAIGN IN CUBA
COMPARATIVELY LITTLE WORK
FOR THE INFANTRY
An Officer of Rank Theories as to
What Will Take Place After
Invasion Of Cuba

The movement of infantry from this mill
tary department has aroused interest In
the possible operations of that arm of the
service should war be declared. An officer
Of rank, when questioned, discussed the
matter thus:
"All of the regular army, no doubt. much
Of the National guard, and perhaps
number of volunteers may eventually be
called upon to do duty along the sea coast
Our coast line, including the Atlantic, the
Pacific and the Gulf is so extended tnat
many thousand men will be needed TO
establish even a fringe for protection by
land forces. But on the other hand, very
few of these troops will ever catch sight of
a fighting Spaniard. The enemy would
scarcely dare land men at any point, and
the only active service of our land forces
would be in connection with the capture OF
Cuba.
TT has been suggested that while
landing in force and a formal alton
If American territory would be out OF the
question. considering Spains meager res
sources, yet swift Spanish cruiser might
run into some feebly protected point ana
land troops for a few hours of destructive
villainy Such troops, 1t is said, might
fleet heavy losses by the prompt use Of
fire and explosives, or they might exact
large ransom before retreating from the
coast These conjectureS are far from
onlforting to the residents of the smaller
oast towns or to the isolated dwellers by
he sea. It's conceivable, of course, that
hey could do but little damage and could
,imply indulge their natural love for guer-
rila warfare | think, however, that such
raids are mere imagination. Although
,ur preparations for coast defence are of
curse no. ideally complete by any means.
hey are, nevertheless, far more complete
han the public, for obvious reasons, has
vet been told Every town of Importance
5 now protected by batteries on shore, by
mines and torpedoes off shore. And our
,avy, if small, is rapidly growing. The
lumber of effective fighting ships cannot
he increased as rapidly as one could de-
Sire. But the man that worries because
We haven't a battleship for every twenty
niles off coast ought to remember that we
hall have far more fighting ships than the
nemy can send to attack u.s. and If the
,neny's ships are kept out Of mischief
wherever they chance to be. all the rest
If the coast is as safe as if the war were
being fought on Mars.
"What is necessary in order to prevent a
Spanish war vessel from finding herself
alone. like a deserted stage girl in black
GOWN is an abundance of small boats OF
high speed, boats that can maintain per-
feet line of reconnaissance and still be able
10 get out of the way promptly should the
enemy attempt to rid himself of imperti-
nent observers. Because. if there were
plenty of these small boats on our side,
no Spanish vessel could get near our
coasts without the news coming quickly
to one of our war vessels, which wou,,!
then be on hand to r"event the Spaniards
attempting to land troops or to shell the
shore.
That's no doubt the reason why the gov
ernment has bought so many fast tugs an6
Yachts within the last few weeks. These
So called dispatch boats and transports
will serve as naval pickets and will be
indispensable to the efficient maintenance
of q naval trocha.
1.-THE first shock of war will take place
without doubt, upon the sea. No troops
would probably be moved from this coun.
try until the supremacy of the sea was
definitely decided as between ourselves and
Spain. Because If Spain could defeat on,
navy she might establish blockade OF
Cuba and she might oblige any troops that
we had already sent there to share the
horrors of a reconcentrado situation infln-
itely worse than that which shocked the
world. But should the Spanish fleet be
forced from the Western hemisphere
Spain might then abandon Cuba and sue
for peace without our landing one soldier
upon the Queen of the Antilles Indeed, II
would be foolhardy for Spain to attempt
then to retain her grasp of Cuba
"Yet should thskpaniards refuse to leave
| the island after their fleet had been driver
away we would either invade in force or es-
tablish an open port for the insurgents
An invasion in force might prove a serious
| undertaking for American white troops
chiefly because of the unwholesome cli
mate.
"Should we decide to open port for thu
insurgents, the undertaking would require
merely such garrison as would keep thu
| Spaniards from recapturing the town. Th'
insurgents undoubtedly would soon open {
line of communications from their princi
pal field of operations to that port. Then
| IL the insurgents could secure along th
line unlimited supplies, ammunition ant
arms, including the latest field artillery
and. If along the same line could be SEN
in some hundreds of American officers
why, 1 imagine that the insurgents woul,
shortly control the island without til,
American troops being obliged to attemp
a regular invasion.
| 1.-THE occupancy Of port in that fashiol
would not require a large body of LAM
| troops. And as all ports in Cuba, excep
Havana, are said to be fairly free from
yellow fever, suppose our troops in an.
other port wouldn't suffer as much as on,
might imagine from disease. For, of course
no sooner would we take the port than W,
would set to work all the methods of re
cent sanitary science. Why, think evoi
Havana, old and rotten as it is. both phys
cally, morally and politically, could b,
turned into reasonably wholesome com
munity by thoroughly draining the cit,
and driving out the Weyler Spaniards''-
| st. Paul Pioneer-Press.