The Virginia enterprise. [volume] (Virginia, St. Louis County, Minn.) 1893-19??, 1898-07-29
OFFICERS BL AIlNIE SPAIN,
sortie Out Of Santiago Ordered BY
Soheming Politicians.

Sortie Out Of Santiago Ordered By
Soheming Politicians.
SACRIFICE OF SAILORS.
Mem We're Sent to Certain Death
Just to Satisfy the Popular
clamor at Madrid.
Chicago, Ill, July q. While the Off
cline to discuss the probabilities of peace
or the consequences that may follow
Watson's expedition and the invasion OF
Porto Rico, says William r. Curtis in q
letter from Annapolis to the Chicago Rec.
ord. they talk very freely OF their own ex-
perience and consider themselves as hay
Ing been sacrificed to atone for the sins
OF the ministry at Madrid. This express
sion was used by one of them in discuss
Ing the fate of their fleet. They declare
That the dispatch of their vessels from
Spain to the West Indies under the cir
c9mstances then existing was an unprec-
NAu"yC VI administrative IDLY =
for which Mr.. Moret, then minister 0f the
colonies at Madrid, was directly RESPONSE
bic, but he was supported by all Of the
members Of the cabinet except the min
lister of marine, who finally and with
great reluctance consented to issue the
necessary orders to Admiral Cervera.
They explain that public sentiment in
peninsula, as represented by the poll
ticians and the newspapers, demanded
some offensive demonstration toward the
United States. They were not satisfied
with the defensive policy of the admins.
tration. They were impatient because
In Havana, Santiago and other ports by
our blockade and because every vessel
sent to it's relief was captured as a prize
of war. They insisted that a fleet of
cruisers which was Idle at Cadiz should
be sent out to destroy our commerce, take
prizes among our shipping and blockade
) and lombard the ports of the United
States in retaliation for what our fleet
was doing in Cuba.
Unfitness of the Navy.
Admiral Cervera's officers say that
were not aware Of the unfitness of the
navy, and the ministry could not make
1t known without exposing the long con-
tlnued corruption of the marine depart-
ment and the robbery of the government
by the diversion of funds appropriated
for naval defenses. They think it posi-
BILE the true state of affairs was unknown
to some of the ministers and that per-
haps Mr.. MOret shared the delusion
The minister of marine, who was fully
aware of the situation, demonstrated, and
was sustained by prominent officers of
the navy: But he was compelled to yield,
and finally issued peremptory orders for
an expedition which every man familiar
with the navy knew was not only hope
less but suicidal
The vessels lacked arms, men and fuel,
and one OF them, the Cristobal Colon, did
not carry guns enough for a ship of one
tenth it's tonnage. When Admiral Ger
vera was asked where the guns were he
tractors" 1t is claimed that on the four
vessels---the Cristobal Colon, vizcaya,
Oquendo and Maria Teresa-there were
only SIX guns of large caliber; two each
upon the three last named.
When l asked what the government ex-
fleet one of the captains. with a sarcastic
smile, replied that Moret, who is dream
er, believed it was possible to lombard
New York, Boston, Washington, Chicago,
st. Louis, and blockade all the rest of the
cities of the United States with four half
armed men.oI-War and three torpedO-bOat
destroyers."
1--WE all protested he declared. eve
knew that the moment we left Spain we
were lost; that our destruction was mere
~ a matter Of time. We felt that we
were sent as sacrifice by the government
to satisfy public clamor and that it was a
matter of Indifference whether we were
properly armed or not. The less guns the
better. The less guns the less loss. That
is the dreadful story.
when we left Cadiz we were promised
men, coal and other supplies at st. Vim
cent, and we did receive there some stores
of food and provisions and some guns but
the torpedo-boats could not go any far
Their. Their machinery was unfit, and we
had to abandon them. They never could
have. crossed the Atlantic. They were
not built for heavy weather.
1--WE sailed from Cape Verde on April
29-four cruisers and the torpedo-boat
destroyers Furor, Terror and Pluton in
tow-making about eight knots an hour,
and were accompanied by the hospital
ship, the Alicante. We did not have suf-
fcient coal to reach Havana, but the
minister of marine promised that we
should meet two English briggs, the Re
stormel and the Twickenham, laden with
Cardiff coal, at Martinique. But they
were not there. The French authorities
refused to allow us to buy fuel, and the
only way we could get to Curacao, where
the minister of marine cabled us we
would find the Golfers, was by taking the
coal out of the bunkers of the hospital
ship. This made it impossible for her
to go any farther, and she still lies rot
ting in the harbor at Martinique, helpless
because the Frenchmen will not sell her
coal and the Spanish government cannot
send her any.
We're Helpless at Curacoa.
eve reached Curacao on May IA, ex-
pecting to find the GOLFERS, but thew we're
not there, and the Dutch authorities
would allow us to buy only sufficient coal
to take us to the nearest Spanish port.
which was Santiago. Nor would they al
low more than two of our vessels to enter
the harbor. Thus we were helpless. Our
government had betrayed u.s. We were
at the mercy of the neutrality laws, and
our. only hope was to reach the harbor of
Santiago, where we hoped to find shelter
It should be said here in explanation
that the two golfers, Restormel and
Iwickenhaln, were captured by the st.
Paul and St. Louis, respectively, and
taken to Key West as prizes. They were
in search of the Spanish feet, having
failed to make the rendezvous on the date
arranged. This fact was unknown to Ad-
miral Cervera and his officers until they
reached Annapolis, and they were greatly
relieved when they learned they had not
been betrayed by their government.
WHO would SUPPOSE" continued one of
the Spanish officers, "that the second cap
ital of Cuba. and the most prosperous
city on the island, would be empty of all
provisions and supplies when we arrived
there? So short were provisions that in
stead Of receiving stores we were ordered
by the government to take the sailors
rations from the holds of our ships and
distribute them among the soldiers. The
merchants had sold out and had not re-
placed their stock, so that hey would have
little to lose in case Of the capture of the
city y the Americans, while the com
missariat of the army. by some dreadful
acknowledgement, had made no provision
for . siege. = $3.50
Half the soldiers were sick and all Of
them were on starvation rations. During
the battles of the first days of July 1900
sick men We're carried in carriages and
carts to the trenches and made to fight
although many of them fell from exhaus-
ton: The hospitals were emptied We
sent lot of sailors from the ships to
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