The times., 1898-05-01

marque and reprisals to subjects of
neutral states"
Quoting from a letter to the then
French minister of foreign affairs, the
Digest continues: What influenced
especially the English government was
the fear of America inclining against
US and lending to our enemies the CO.
! operation Of her hardy volunteers. The
| maritime population of the United.
States, their enterprising marine, might
furnish 10 Russia the elements Of a fleet
OF prlVateers, which, attracted TO its
! service by letters of marque and COW
ering the seas with network, would
harass and pursue our commerce even
in remote waters"
DR.. Snow, in his War College lee
lures. after pointing out that the Unit
ed States had in fact taken a some
what varying course toward priyateer-
ing, making treaties for it's abolition
after the Revolution, practicing il in
! 1872, refraining from doing so in the
Mexican war, then refusing to sign the
Declaration of Paris ten years later
and during the civil war putting a law
| on the statute books authorizing it,
but failing TO act under that law, said: {:
1t can be stated without hesitation
however, that the United States still
! maintain the right to issue letters of
marque and reprisal TO the fullest ex-
tent, and ii is only a question of policy
which would prevent it's exercise in
any war in which they might be en-
gagged in the future"
He remarked that the condition of
modern naval warfare had lessened the
oeslrability of privateering from the
standpoint both of a privateer and a
government. The prizes worth captur-
hn ,ta
and for this reason privateers would
necessarily be steamers also. The cost
of steamers. of their maintenance. and
the difficulty of obtaining coal abroad
would render privateering yerv ex-
penslVe and uncertain, especially as
the remuneratiYe prizes would be the
large, fast, and probably partially arm
ed merchant steamers without CONVOY
Inc dlftlculty of capturing these and of
getting them into port after CAPTURE
would render privateering a very
doubtful financial venture, especially
as without some proper adjudication
and sale. which could only be done in a
home port, the privateer would have no
recompenSe.
Moreover from a national point of
view, seafaring men thrown out of en-
pioyment in war time would be needed
in the naval service and would be
readily absorbed by the regular men-of-
war. As prlVateerS would at first of
fer hopes of piunder with short terms
of service the absorption of seafaring
men by this class of vessels would GER
tainly cause scarcity of men for ships
of war. especially as the crews of the
priVateerS would, when captured, be re-
tained as prisoners of war, and this
scarcity of Seafaring men would be-
come, instead of a temporary evil.
permanent one.
1T would be much wiser from a ma
tional policy to take vessels fit for this
Kind of work into the navy from the
merchant service and commission their
officers with acting appointments in the
Navy from the national authority as
was done during the late civil war
As to captures by a private vessel
not commissioned in any way by the
National Government DIR. Snow quot
ed Hall, an English authority, as fol-
lows: None commissioned vessels have
a right to resist when summoned to sur
render to public ships or prvateers of
the enemy. The crews. therefore
winch make such resistance have be!lfg-
erent privileges, and ii is a natural CON
sequence of the legitimateness of their
acts that if they succeed in capturing
their assailant the capture is q good
one for the purpose of changing the
ownership of the property taken and
of making the enemy prisoners of war"
New York sun.