, 1898-11-02
TRANCE AND FASHODA.
AN IMPARTIAL VIEW OF
TIE QUESTION.
BY Lionel DecIe.
lDniIu Teleqraph. 4th Oct. J

have followed with the utmost attention
The comments of the British and French
papers on the probable, or, rather. possible
consequences Of the occupation Of FaslNd0
bv Major Marchand, and have been chiefly
impressed by the fact that, OH both sides OF
the Channel, the question has been dealt
with from a mere STANDPOINT OF rational
amour-propre, its practical side beng entire
" disregnrded. Although a Flenchman, |
lave never hesitated TO openly express M
ouinion on African matters with absolute
impartiality; and l will now endeayour to
examine this question III the same spirit.
The majority of the French Writers seem
10 consider the occupation of Fashoda as a
matter Of vital Importance to France, as the
retention of this post on the Nile would
nrevent Great Britain from carrying out
her dream of a Translation Empire ex-
tending from the Cape to Cairo. Such an
ohioct seems to me unworthy of a great
nation like France. 1t would be like a child
irving to snatch away a cake from one OF
his playmates merely to keep it'and let 1t
rot afterwards; it is only necessary to look
ut the map Of Africa to understand what l
mean. From the nearest French seaport on
the West Coast of Africa to Fashoda the
distance is 5000 miles, and from 1.-The lust
navioable point on the Ubhangi River, 1,6OU
miles of most dificult country have to he
crossed before Fashoda can be reached.
From the East Coast Of Africa (where France
onlv possesses q small strip of territory near
Diibuti), the distance to Fashoda is over
I 600 miles, two-thirds Of which belong to
Abyssinia, q country to which France has
never laid claim; therefore from a military
point Of view, France would only have ac-
cess TO Fashoda from the West Coast, all
reinforcements, ammunition, md Supplies lav-
inc 10 be sent 5000 miles across country.
Reckoning the cost of transported The usY@l
rate paid for porterage oil over the interior
of Africa, this would mean a cost OF at
least $500 per ton" for carriage OF goods
to Fashoda. France would, therefore, ind
it materially impossible to maintain a force
sufficient to effeotually protect trade, and TO
hold in hand troublesome tribes. 1T IS also
likelv that the remnants OF the Nhali1as
followers would take advantage OF the sltua'
ton. and use this territory to renew their
rast agitations md thus prove a great dam
Ger to the whole SOudan. But even sup
1osinp that France should I've willing to
sDend the immense sums which a partial &C.
ennation Of Southern Kordofan would entail,
Witt benefit could she derive from it? All
tina trade is geographically-if l may use the
wcrd-bound to FOLLOWED Nile. 1t is, there.
Sore evident that FaShoda can be of no use
whatever TO France. and the desire to retain
il merely in order to get in the way of Great
Britain is. as ! have just snid. unworthy OF a
oreat nation like France, and it Il even against
her own interest; from a commercial point OF
view she has everything to gain by fne open
mo ont of the SOudsn to trade. NO man IN
his tight senses can help acknowledging that
tie British alvu9ee towards the heart OF
Africa has been q triumphul march of civil
zation oyer barbnrism; to the North the Sir