The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-05-26

erals. The colonels. lieutenant colonels
majors. captains and lieutenants are ap-
pointed by the governors of the various
sites, as the law provides that "All regi-
mental and company officers shall be
appointed by the governors of the states
in which their respective organizations
are raised"
1t was stated at the war department
that the details for the work of organ
izing this new force would not be active
ly taken up for the present. Just now
the adjutant generals office Is enga ged
in completing the enlistment of the 1885,
900 volunteers under the first call. 1t
will take some time to complete this
work and not until then will the work
of organizing the volunteers under the
second call begin.
Reports were current to-day that an
army of invasion was about to start for
Cuba and Porto Rico. 1t was based on
the conjecture which has been current
of late, but officials in authority gave IL
no Endorsement, as IL was manifestly
contrary to the policy to give any ad-
vance information of such move, even
If it were contemplated. The report
that General Miles and his staff would
leave tonight was specifically denied,
although il is probable the command
ing general will leave for the South at
an early day.
AZ lit tlOSt VI the bdy dl tilt navy
department the situation as to the
fleets. both American and Spanish. was
precisely as IL was this morning. so
far as the officials know, the only
notable difference being an apparent
strengthening of the confidence of the
officials i'm their belief that Cervera's
squadron is lying in the Santiago har-
Dor. In this hope and belief. the Off
cials found great comfort, knowing the
abilities of the American naval COM
manders in Cuban waters to keep the
Spanish admiral bottled up in this mar
row neck harbor until he shall surren-
der or be starved out. If Cervera is
actually at bay. the officials feel not
the slightest apprehension of any relief
coming to him from the outside in the
shape of another Spanish squadron
from Cadiz. The reason for this be-
lief is their unquestioned ability to hold
Cervera In check with only a few ves-
sels-perhaps of monitors and torpedo
boats-thus. leaving the remainder of
the big armored fleet and a great num-
Der of unarmored serviceable craft to
take care of any reinforcements that
might attempt to come from Spain to
Cervera's aid. The force could be
spared for this service without endan-
gering the integrity of the blockade at
Havana or permitting the escape of
Cervera.
ht htNS VI lht arrival the
Oregon in American waters was a
source of unalloyed satisfaction to all
naval officers. Apprehension as to the
safety Of the Oregon disappeared when
the vessel reached Barbados and re-
ported her arrival to the navy de-
partment, but there was always a
chance that she might suffer from acci-
dent or hostile attack in the short dis
tance remaining on her homeward
journey.
Within the past few weeks. or. in
fact. ever since the determination was
positively reached TO invade Cuba be-
fore the dry season next fall. there has
been published intimations that the
delay. or what appeared TO be the de-
lay. in beginning the invasion was at
tributed TO the navy. 1t can be stated
on the highest authority that the i'm
preston thus created IL wholly unjust
TO the navy and without warrant in
fact. and that there never was a NOM
ent. even when SIMPSONS forces were
at Porto Rico. when the navy was not
prepared on instant notice TO aid the
army in effecting a landing in Cuba
Nor. on the othtr hand. has the army
been at fault in this matter. IL was al
first. as is now well known, proposed
to throw a sms II force of men or SOL
diers, about 10 300. into Cuba immedi-