Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-05-12
SPANS EvAsIvE TACTICS.

II the news that SPANS Cape Verde
SQUADRON has arrived at Cadiz is relia-
ble-and there seems good reason to be-
lieve that it is-thc question arises, What
is the significance of the movement? 1t
may have great significance as bearing
on the duration of hostlites.
From the beginning of the trouble there
have been those who have held, and with
reason, that Spain would avoid coming
to close quarters with us on the sea- and
would. as far as possible. adopt guerilla
tactics. thereby prolonging the war 10
the utmost of her ability and taking the
chances of something's turning up in her
favor. 1t is true that she did close with
Us promptly at Manila, but she had no
other alternative there. and that engage
ment in no wise weakens the contention
as TO her evasve policy.
In explanation of the reported cOnccn-
tration of her naval forces at Cadiz, it
has been suggested that she proposes to
dispatch "a squadron through the SueZ
canal 10 the Pacific for the recapture of
the Philippines. The distance from Cadiz
TO the group via the canal route is some
$500 miles. and by steaming at the rate
OF ten knots an hour a squadron could
make Manila in about thirty-five days.
But such a venture would be exceedingly
perilous. \ comparison Of SPANS force
in Atlantic waters with ours shows that
she could hardly detach a sufficient num-
Der of ships to cope with Dewey without
practically putting her coast and the
ships that would be left at the mercy of
one of our squadrons.
on the other hand, il, as stated from
Washington the reported doubling back
of the Cape Verde squadron is to hasten
our occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico,
il does not appear that We would be able
to- spare enough ships from this side Of
the Atlantic to justify US in trying con-
illusions with the Cadiz Armada, even
should it be in our power TO force it to
Il fight. Having taken Cuba and Porto
Rico, we will not only have 10 hold them
with military forces. but unless we can
keep absolute track of the Spanish navy
we VIII also have TO guard them by
naval patrol against the contingency Of
Spanish attack by sea. just as we will
have 10 guard our own coast.
If Sampson could have met the Cape
Verde squadron there is hardly a ques-
ton that H. would have Jared little, if
my, better than did the Spanish squadron
In the Philippines result that would
probably have put the end of the war
In sight. At any rate. Sampson would
have been free handed to deal with the
iast barrier between Spain ana the ne
ressity for suing for peace. As the case
presents itself now, however, our chances
of speedily forcing the fighting TO "a
finish seem TO be on the diminishing
scale. and while there can be but one
end TO the war-that OF complete Ameri-
can triumph--it might be wise not 10
scoff AT those who predict a long-drawn-
out CONFLICT.
We hope that the pessimistic view as
to the duration OF the war may prove
unfounded. But none the less il were
well to look the situation squarely in the
face. That view is sustained by SPANS
policy up TO date. But apart from this.
evasion would be in harmony with her
policy of years standing and would be
her safest course considered not only
from tactical standpoint as confessed
by American naval experts. but i'm its re-
lation TO Spanish political conditions An
other such crushing blow o S that inflicted
uron her at Manila might not only
mean the overthrow of the dynasty. but
anarchy.