Lincoln County leader. [volume] (Toledo, Lincoln County, Or.) 1893-1987, 1898-04-15

army defeated, the chief of the republic
himself captured, and all present poweI
to control the newly organized govern
ment of Texas annihilated within it's con-
fines. But, on the other hand, there Is, In
appearance at least, an immense dispar-
ity of physical force on the side of Texas.
The Mexican republic again is rallying Its
forces under a new leader and menacing
a fresh invasion to recover its lost do
main.
Upon the issue Of this threatened in
vasion, the independence OF Texas may
be considered as suspended, and were
there nothing peculiar in the relations be-
tween the United States and Texas, our
| acknowledgment OF it's independence at
such a crisis could scarcely be regarded
as consistent with the prudent reserve
with which we lave hitherto held our
selves bound to treat all similar ques-
tons"
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded
to consider the risk-that there might be
imputed to the United States motives of
selfish interests in view of the former
claim on our part to the territory of
Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the
Texans in seeking recognition of indie
%pendence as an incident to the incorpora-
ton of Texas in the Union, concluding
thus:
Prudence, therefore,, seems to dictate
that we should stand aloof and maintain
our present attitude, If not until Mexico
itself or one of the great powers shall
recognize the independence of the new
government, at least until the lapse Of
time or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability
of the people of that country to maintain
their separate sovereignty and to uphold
the government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can
justly complain of this course. By pur-
suing 1t we are but carrying out the long
established policy of our government, a
policy which has secured to us respect
and influence abroad n inspired conf
dence at home"
These are the words of Andrew Jackson.
They are evidence that the United States.
in addition to the test imposed by pub
lie law as the condition of the recognition
OF the independence of a neutral state,
to wit, that the revolted state shall "con-
stltute In fact a body polite, having a
government in substance as well as in
name, possessed of the elements of sta
oility,' and forming de facto "if left to
itselt a state among the nations, rea-
sohaply capable of ~discharging the duties
or a state, has imposed for its own gov
ernance in dealing with cases like these.
the further condition that recognition Of
an Independent state is not due to a re-
VOTED dependency until the danger of
Its being again subJugated by the parent
state has entirely passed away" This ex-
IRENE test was, in fact, applied in the
case Of Texas.
The congress to whom President Jack
son referred the question as one probably
leading to war, and therefore an appropri-
ate subject for a previous understanding
win that body by whom war can alone
pe declared, and by whom all the proyis-
IONS Tor sustaining Its perils must be fur
nlshed, left the matter of recognition Of
Iexas to the discretion of the executive,
providing merely for the sending of diplo-
llatlc agents when the president should
DE satisfied that the republic of Texas had
become an Independent state"
1t was so recognized by President Van
Duren' VINO commissioned a charge daft
talres March Z, 1887, after Mexico had
an attempt to conquer the
territory, and then there was at the
time no bona fide contest going on be-
tween the insurgent province and it's for
.er sovereign.
cuba Not Rightly a State.
l sald In my message of December last:
II is 10 be seriously considered whether
the cuban government possesses beyond
uispute the attributes of statehood, which
alone can demand the recognition of bel
llgerency, in its favor"
Inc same requirement must certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
sraver issue of recognizing independence
IN question, for no less positive test
De applied to the greater act tina to
the lesser, while on the other hand the
and consequences of the str,Ip-
gle depending upon the internal policy of
me recognizing state, which form impor-
ldnt factors when the recognition of bel
is concerned, are secondary If
not rightly eliminable factors when the
real question is whether the community
'laiming recognition is or is not independ-
beyond peradventure.
Recognition Inexpedient.
Nor from the standpoint of expedience
10 l think it would be wise or prudent
Tor this government to recognize at the
time the independence of the So
,ailed cuban republic. Such recognition
Is not necessary in order to enable the
Ohlted states to intervene and pacify the
Stand. To comm. this country now to
the recognition Of any particular govern
.nent in Cuba might subject us to en-
oarrassing conditions of interest obliga-
Ilon toward the organization so recog-
1ized. In case of Intervention, our con-
iuct Will be subject to the approval or
l~lsapproVal of such government. We
would DE required to submit to its direc-
non ana TO assume to 1t the mere rela-
,ioh OF q friendly ally. When it shall
appear hereafter that there is within
me Island a government capable of per-
forming the duties and discharging the
functions of a nation, and having. as a
matter Of fact, the proper forms and at
.Iloutes OF nationality, such government
'ah be promptly and readily recognized
the relations and interests of the
Chlted States with such nation adjusted.
Possible Alternative.
mere remain the alternative forms of
Intervention to end the war. each as an
impartial neutrality, by imposing a ra-
lohal compromise between the contest
lhts or as the active ally of the one party
ii the other. As to the first, it is not to
oe forgotten that during the last
months the attitude Of the
lhited States has virtually been one
friendly intervention in MANY WAYS
aach not of itself conclusive ~. $500