The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-04-27
Relative Strength in Land and
Naval Forces and Com
bined Wealth.

So absorbingly interesting is the pros
pect of Intervention by the government Of
the United States in settling the disturb
ances in Cuba, and the consequent HOSTILE
ties with Spain, that many happenings
throughout the rest of the world are lost
sight of or are passed by as matters OF no
concern to us.
let 1t is possible to conceive Of such TAR
reaching consequences following our action
IN interfering in the Spanish-Cuba i'm
brogliO will disturb the already excited
state of international politics throughout
the whole world In the far East Great
Britain and Japan are apparently in &C cord
In endeavoriDg TO check the growing in1u-
ence exerted by some of the European
powers toward acquiring the control of at
fairs of the great empire of China.
Fleets of war ships are gathering in
Chinese waters, and preparations are max
ing with view to be ready to meet the
contingencies of an armed conflict. No CO.
alltlonS have yet been formed between the
parties concerned, but that Japan and Eng
land would be found lighting side by side is
not chimerical idea by any means.
The two nations are friends in more than
one senSe-bOth possess somewhat similar
forms OF government, both are progressive,
both are modern in their points of view.
both to great extent are admirers and
friends of the United States and our insti-
tut1ons, and both, together with the United
VI
the world.
The United States ana Japan have for
many years been pulling along we'll to-
gether. We have admired their pluck, their
development, their quckncss, and their
success; often have they been called the
yankees of the East because of their
sterling qualities and like ourselves, they
are rather proud of the title.
Inc cordially existing between Japan
and the United States and between .hpan
and Great Britain ought also logically to
exist, therefore, between the United States
and Great Britain. This follows the corol-
larry that two things equal to the same
thing are equal to each other AS mat
ter of fact, England and America are at
bottom friends. Blood is thicker than
water, no matter how much some people
may pretend that it is not There can be
no better proof Of it than the action taken
by the powers, low that our dear land is
to grid up it's loins and set forth to do bat
tie with Spain
THE UNITED STAES. ENGLAND AND
JAPAN.
Two natiOnS-England and Japan-have
quietly, with no ostentation, permitted the
fact to be generally understood that away
down in their hearts they ARE with us
every time" What a triumvirate the three
friends would make-the United Staes,
Great Britain and Japan! On land or sea
who could stand against it? Perhaps not
Should this event of coalition come to
pass one antagonist, naturally so from taste
hab1t, religion environment and tradition,
would be found in the Latin world, compos-
ed Of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and
central and South America. Even now
these people of the same ancestry stand to-
gether in sympathy, so far as we can judge
against the policy the United States is pur-
suing toward one of their members. And
as before hintei, it is not wild flight of
imagination to conceive of such a comb-
nation of circumstances following our in
PREVENTION in Cuba and subsection of Spain,
as would lead these Latin countries to COM
bine against the United States, England
and Japan. For were the Latin race to
rise against the United States just as surely
would st. George" come to our rescue,
and Japan would quickly follow. Should
such an event happen but one conclusion,
we believe, would follow-the humiliation
of the Latin states. This belief is based on
the relative strength afioat and ashore of
the different nations Of which we have been
speaking.
Great Britain as a sea power stands SUI
preme. 1t is her policy to have her nava
force more than equal to that of any two
other naval forces combined. She not only
possesses, therefore, the most powerful flee
in the world, but she can increase this flee
by the addition Of new ships quicker thar
any other nation can 1t takes England bu
a year to lay down. build. arm and equiv
a 15,NO-tCn battle ship. France can con
struct a similar vessel in three years; 81
can we. Italy would require about foul
years, and Spain a still longer time. II
the South American republics such fightins
elements cannot be produced at all, Their,
being no shipbuilding facilities. This is alst
the case with Japan. But Japan is spending
money now, great deal of it, in having
her navy built in England. In a few years
she will be in possession of a very strong
HI ,t<,1,
every way of the fleets of some of tn
| first powers of Europe and the superior O
any squadron in Oriental waters.
The relative strength of navies depend
very largely on their strength in batteships
| This strength for the countries we hav
under consideration is, in numbers of battle
ships built and building, as follows: Grea
! Britain g.; Japan, 6; United States 10
| total, IS. France, So; Italy, 10; Spain, 3
Argentina. 1; Brazil 2; Chill, 3-total, &C
| However, this is not altogether fair to thos
countries where coast defense, held to b.
| the principal reason for formulating nava
| policy, is provided for by having a nationa
| floating force composed extremely Of coas
defense vessels.
| Then again the armOred cruiser type is no
| included in the above figures, though sue
ships are in many ways quite the equal Q
some battle ships and the superior of few
| Let us then, for purposes of comparison
| take the number of armored ships of tn
countries as our measure of relative naVa
| strength, excluding only river monitors an
obsolete vessels like the 10 old monitors nov
being distributed among our ports ito frigh
| the souls of fearful adversares." We will
| thus find, built and building, the relative ar
mOred strength to be in numbers as follows
| England, IS; Japan, 10; United States, 49,
| total, ia. France, 60; Italy, 20; Spain, Il
| Portugal, 1; Argentina, Z; Brazil, 5; Chile
total. ITO. Still another and perhaps
better way to state what may be the rela
| tive strength of naves as indicated by thei
armored fleet is to give the armored dis
placement tonnage, as we'll as the numbe
of ships, as follows:
Displace
No. ment