The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-21

Then, for the first time, the troops went
into camps suitable for continued occupa-
ton.
TOO MUCH DISSIPATION
sOne prominent cause of the increase OF
sickness in the early camps has been COM
mented upon by only few Of our medical
officers. These cite the prevalence of drunk
enness and of venereal disease. due to the
facilities and temptations afforded by the
proximity of cities to the larger camps
They hold that if the systems of the men
had not been weakened by dissipation they
would not have succumbed so readily to
the other influence which affected them.
IL was typhoid fever which broke down
the strength of the commands generally,
the outbreak becoming distinctly manifest
IN July. Sporadic cases appeared in most
or the regiments in May and June, these
cases having been brought in many in
stances from the state camps. In fact, some
regiments-the Fifteenth Minnesota-suff-
cred more from this disease at their state
rendezvous than any of the regiments in
the large federal camps. 1t appears from
q general review of the sanitary reports
already filed that the prevalence of the
disease was proportional to the insanitary
camp conditions which ] have referred to.
The probability of it's communication to SOL
diers in camp through the agency of flies
was pointed out as reason for insisting
on sanitary police of the strictest char
acter
1T is well known to the medical profess
sion That tliis fever IS propagated by con-
1an3nated water supply. and 1T is now
Recognized that the great prevalence of this
disease IN an aggravated form in the camps
OF the civil war was due to the use of sur
lace and shallow we'll waters infected by
typhoid excreta. To prevent transmission
Dy the water supply ] recommended the
Nso cf boiled and filtered water when pure
spring supply could not be obtained, and to
eudb.O All efficient filtration of suspected
waters 10 be made field filters of approved
IN NV
mendation by the quartermaster's depart
ment.
The seriously sick were to be treated in
division field hospitals (unless their transfer
70 general hospital was advisable) under
me care OF the most experienced physicians
anG able surgeons on duty with each di-
vision. Medical officers left on duty with
their regiments were to exercise sanitary
supervision over the well men and to deter
mine whether q soldier reporting himself
SICK should be sent to hospital or remain
as trivial case under treatment in quar-
Sers This consolidation of the medical
JORGE by divisions. implying as 1t did the
breaking up of the regimeatal hospitals met
with a strong opposition from regimental
medical officers, particularly from those
who were not detailed for Special service
al the division hospitals.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
Long before this corps embarked for
Cuba its field hospitals were in condition
for efficient service. Subsequent events
however, rendered valueless these prepara-
tons of the medical department When
the command embarked on the transport
vessels, the baggage wagons and mules
were left behind. The ambulance trains of
all divisions, with large part OF the outfit
OF each of the hospitals, were also left
behind. Three ambulance wagons were tax
en- apart and stored on one of the vessels.
IneSe uld excellent service at San Juan
and tsl Caney. Ten of the ambulanoes of
me third, or reserve, divisional hospital
were subsequently shipped to Cuba, where
they arrived July 2, and were of value in
moving the sick and wounded to the hos
pltal at Siboney and to the hospital ships
and transports OF the property and sup
piles carried to Cuba a portion was not
available for service at the time it was most
needed, 10 wit, on July /, 2 and 3. when
the wounded from El Caney and San Juan
were coming from the front for care and
treatment This was because. in general,
no opportunity was afforded to land the
medical property. Earnest efforts were made
by medical officers TO have supplies at the
front with the troops. During and after the
battles at El CaneY and San Juan there
was an lnsufhciency of tents, cots. bedding
and medicines, due to the causes stated,
but all the hospitals were well equipped for
surgical work.
After the capitulation of Santiago the
troops at the front broke down rapidly
under the fatigues they had undergone ana
khe malarial influences to which they were
exposed; but by this time an ample supply
OF tents, furniture, bedding, clothing and
medical stores had reached Siboney, to-
q force Of surgeons. those sent to duty at
the yellow fever hospital being immune TO
that disease. Meanwhile, to relieve the
vaIescents and sick as could bear the
Journey home were sent to the United
States on transport vessels This was an
emergency measure to relieve the hospitals
at Siboney and permit of the transfer to
them of the men who were sick in regi-
mental camps.
''The transfer of troops from Santiago to
Montauk Point, N. y, was also an emerg-
ency measure. and the great responsibility
OF excluding yellow fever infection from
GERS who had charge of the embarkation.
Had they failed in this duty the effect
would have been disastrous during the voy-
age to the men confined on shipboard. and
the risk Of importing the disease into this
country would have been greatly increased
1T is needless to refer at this time to
the complaints OF starvation. which ap-
peared almost daily in the newspapers dur
ing the occupation of Camp Wikoff- for 1t
~ now generally understood that the weak
ness. prostration, anemia and emaciation of
30 many OF the troops were the results of
mailarial. typhoid and yellow fever. from
which the army suffered as consequence
Of its exposure to the climatic influences
Rrd local infections of Santiago and It's
heighborhoOd. pending and subsequent to
gfhe surrender of the city.
IN THE HOMIE CAMPS.
THE method of hospital organization in
these camps was practically the same. and
there vas much similarity in the conditions
Affecting them and correspondingly in their
history. Regiments reported in but few in
stances with the material and supplies for
their medical care. but they brought sick
men with them, and these required imme-
date care. Provision had to be made for
division hospitals in view of future field
service and for regimental hospitals in view
OF the immediate necessity. Chief surgeons
OF corps apd divisions began the organiZa-
ton and equipment of their field division
hospitals and ambulance companies, but
they were met at the outset by the apparent
tnpoSsibility of securing men for service as
cooks, nurses, litter bearers, ambulance
drivers, transfers, etc.
As rule, the hospitals were kept in
campaigning condition-that is, the tents
fReither framed nor fioored, until the
incr ,sed prevalence of typhoid fever at
trQaEed attention to their crowded condition,
MIN the object of their existence became
suddenly changed from a school for field
service TO a hospital for the treatment of a
local outbreak of disease. Special diet
kitchens, under the management of capable
individuals were opened at most of the hos
pitfalls. Money for this purpose was sent to
them by me from funds contributed and
placed at my disposal. Money was also sent
directly by individuals and representatives
OF aid societies, and the Red Cross commit
tees supplied quantities of ice and milk.
chickens. eggs, lemons, etc. PyjamaS, night
shirts and other articles of hospital cloth
ing were also provided by the Red Cross
and other aid societies. Subsequently the
order authorizing the Communication of the