The age-herald., 1898-06-11
VAN MOLKE
 ON STRATEGY

John Ehlert in the Chicago Times Herald. l Amateur strategists. editorial and other
 wise, that are now so plentiful as to prob-
 ably outnumber the United States army,
 both regular and volunteer, will be sur
 prised to learn from no less an authority
 than Helmuth von Moltke, the greatest
 strategist of modern times, and one of the
 greatest of all times, that there is no such
 thing as strategy in the sense of an applied
 science.
 There are now hundreds of editors. thou- | sands of free-lance writers and countless
 amateurs who criticise the president and
 his advisers because their conduct of the
 present war does not agree with the views
 of the self-constituted strategists.
 Aside from mere tactical movements such as company battalion formations
 as unites in infantry organizations, the uni- l forms and accoutrements of the men. the 1 style and callbre of small arms, commis-
 sary and sanitary arrangements and the
 like which as strictly military questions | are determined by the professional soldier | upon certain well-deflned principles adapt
 ed to the pending campaign, there is no | such thing as strategical principles that i can be and are of general application.
 
 A few years prior to the Franco-Prussan
 war Won Moltke, speaking of book treat | ing of Strategy" saidi
 | "I cannot conceive how anybody can
 write on Strategy; nobody can write about | it as a science. For strategy is nothing
 else but the application of sound common
 sense to warfare"
 | Won Moltke illustrated this dictum him. | self in the most pointed manner when dur 1 ing the early part of the Franco.Prussian
 war the conduct of General von Steinmetz, | as well the unexpected movements of | the French general staff, necessitated the 1 complete change in, if not the abandon | ment of, the original plan of campaign of
 the German general staff. From a mere
 roundup of the French armies at Metz
 the actuality necessitated Sedan, Orleans,
 Paris and Strassburg.
 | There are numerous expressions of Von | Moltke in his posthumous works on strat- | egy anent the discussions of practical ques- | tions relating to the science of war as pro- | pounded by him to the officers in the acad-
 emy of war. Upon one of these issues
 he said in 1878, seven years after the | Franco-Prussian war:
 | "If questions like the ones here pro- | pounded have to be answered one likes to | search for certain well-defined rules and | principles. The latter offered only by l science, and for our purpose strategy is | such science. But strategy is. not an | abstract science, which affords infiexibe | absolute truths upon which one may build | from which one may draw conclusions. The square of the hypatenuse is always equal to | the total of the square of both catheti. This | is always true, whether the rectangular tri- | angle is large or small or whether it points | to the east or west. Strategy is the ap- | plcation of common sense to warfare. | The difficulty lies in the execution of strat- 1 egy, for we are dependent in warfare upon | count ass conditions, such the climate, | the weather, fog, false reports and the like. l The best teachings for the future we gain l from our own experience, but inasmuch as | the latter will always be limited we must
 make the experenc of othrs useful to us
 by the study of the history of war" | In another of these discussions with the | young officers who sought their theoretical l education in the academy of war Von l Motke said:
 | "The principal thing in to seek for | each concrete case the most practical solu- | ton without binding ourselves to certain
 infexibe general rules. Science does not | give us any fundamental principles which | we may apply everywhere; it does not give | us any formula which will help us to sur 1 mount all obstacles. The thing in war is
 
 | and then make such dispositions as the oc- | caSion requires"
 First consider then venture," (Flrst | waegen, damn wagen) was Von Moltke's
 device upon which he always acted during | his marvellous career.
 Quite apropos in this connection is an | anecdote relating to Frederick the Great | who at one time requested his generals to | submit to him plans of campaign for a sup l nnGifitfOnS A nf panc a1a h 1 crate plans were submitted. Hans Joachim | von Zethen, the famous cavalry general. | produced a queer diagram in black ink. | It represented a big blot in the center, in- | tersected by two black lines, whose four l termini ended each in a smaller blot, thus: | The king was furious and upbraided his 1 old comrade in arms bitterly for what he l considered disrespect. In explanation Von | Zethen said
 | 'Why, your majesty am the large blot | in the center, the enemy is any one of the | four smaller bots. He can march upon | me from the right or left. from the front or | rear. If he does, I simply advance upon | any of the four lines and lick him | where I find him.
 Frederick the Great was satisfied l
 Thus von Moltke in his great campaigns | of 1886 and 1S70-1 never bound himself to | certain abstract rules. Sometimes, as in | '66. he thought it proper to have his army | march in separate organizations and to l seek junction on the day of battle. Again | he would nave in huge armies, independent | in themselves, at the outset of the war | of TO- and to whip the enemy in several | battles on the same day as on August at | Woerth and at Spicherer Heights. Some | times he had cavalry operate in independ- | ent organizations (divisons); sometimes he l had this noble branch of the service fall | in again with the brgade organizations. | In short, he always executed his idea of | strategy, "to comprehend the situation and | to act as circumstances required" | HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION. 1 From the Cincinnati Enuujrer