Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-05-21

1t can be stated positively that the CHI
r1atic difficulties in the way of a campaign
IN Cuba in the wet season are not by any
means the main Influences in preventing
immediate beginning of the military
campaign. OF course, the military strate-
EISts are not deaf to the earnest represen-
tations of people who are familiar with the
conditions in Cuba at this seasol of the
year. such as were made by Lieu-. Rowan
by the way. 1t is believed however, that
these not regarded as insurmaur able
obstacles to the beginning of the campaign
at least. fer with the observance of the
strictest sanitary precautions, such as are
almost unknown in the Spanish army. the
choice of salubrious camping grounds and
the exercise of prudence in feeding and
caring fer the troops generally, the officers
are confident that they can take them
through a wet season in Cuba with little
more mortality than would be experienced
in some of the southern states under like
conditions The fact that the roads are
Wel-nlSh impossible after line middle OF
June may defer the actual prosecution of
the campaign, but Will not prevent its III
itiation and the employment of the time
when heavy troops and artillery cannot be
moved in disciplining and aceiimatins tie
forces and in slowly tightening the lines
around Havana.
Peril of the Transports,
But there are other and very serious OBJ
jections from a military point of view to
an immediate beginning Of the campaign.
and these are being SO strongly urged uron
the administration that it IS believed they
VIII prevail, and that the movemen. of the
transports across the Florida straits VIII
be delayed for few weeks q: least. un-
less there is a radical change in existing
conditions The very first and strongest
ooJection TO an immediate movement is the
presence of the Spanish fleet in the neigh
borhood of Cuba. Little Importance is at
tSched by the military men to any opera
tiCn that might be conducted by this iIeet
against our own squadrons OF against CUR
seaport towns The first ara amply aple
to take care of themselves, while any sea-
port of enough strategic importance to be
a mark for hostile attack is very rnucn
better fortified than the public IS aware of.
The danger point Is the possibility of q
successful attack upon the troop trans
ports. So far the government; has secured
thirty CT these vessels, with an average
capacity OF about JD0 soldiers. The project
OF the military authorities is 10 send not
less tEan 2J.ot0 troops in four expeditions.
Making total Of IGc.G00 troops TO be land
ed in Cuna- Less than - 900 could nor he
sent safely at once fer the reason that the
force vii! be scarcely able to hold its own
when landed against the Spanish troops.
winch, thanks To the telegraph and rail-
road communication aicEg the blockade
lines OF Cuba. can be assembled at a very
few hours notice al any point selected for
, the debarkatioI of the American troops
Therefore II will be necessary to increase
the transport force by about 100 per cent
for some of these already secured are ies-
tined for the Philippine expedition This
number of ships cannot be secured without
consuming some time.
Four Round Trips
Even when they have been collected the
boats must make four separate trips back
and forth from Cuba to transport the 100.
600 troops which are believed to be abso-
lutely required for a successful campaign
To persors without naval experience it is
hard 10 convey the extreme danger of a
movement requiring four separate trips by
fifty absolutely unprotected merchant ships
crowded with soldiers in the presence of a
hostile fleet, whose exact whereabouts are
not known.
II is a question whether the entire COM
binsd force OF Sampson and Schley could
guarantee safe conduct for the troops