The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-05-12
Plain Facts Stated Regarding Cuba.
For Cuba's Good and For the
Glory of Uncle Sam.
GOMEZ HAS AMBITIONS
To Whip BIanco, With American Arms and Rations,
of Course, and Wants No Yankee Troops-But
it Can't Be Done That Way.

as may be secured by forage, although
they are very scarce on the island now
The Cuban soldier expects only two meal!
day, so on this basis II will lcost oul
government comparatively little to main
tain an army of Cubans.
FOOD QUESTION IS SERIOUS.
'@To my mind this food question pre-
sents an almost insurmountable obtascl'
! to the scheme to utilize the insurgent:
to drive Blanco from the island, even Il
! there were no others. Gomez's army In
its present shape is totally inadequate
| to undertake such a task. II is scattered
/ over the entire island. This disposition
| is absolutely necessary IN order that the
men may not starve. Gomez cannot mob
| ilize even such forces as he has until
food supplies have been sent into the
island by the United States, to say moth
ing of an army of any creditable size be-
ing modified. His army would starve
even II not crushed by Blanco.
Now, 1t will be exceedingly difficult,
not to say impossible, to land provisions
in large quantities on the coast of Cuba
The small amounts Of arms and ammuni-
ton and even provisions may and are
being landed under cover OF darkness
and carried into the interior by small
bands of insurgents, but to supply even
a small army in this way is impracticable.
1t Will never, in my opinion. be accom-
plished successfully.
ssTha nfrxy ~ CD
being extremely rough and billy, while
sheltering small, surTeptitious bands. i'm
poses a natural barrier IN the way Of
concerted action along that line. Then
in a move OF any extent some opposition
from Blanco must be reckoned upon.
Unless enough United States troops are
landed with such an expedition there Is
q strong probability that It would never
be Of any use to the insurgents.
GOMEZ AGAINST INVASION.
Gomez IS willy old man. and. think,
not without future political aspirations in
the government which will be formed at
the close of the war. He does not want
the United States to land an army in
Cuba. except it be a regiment Of artil-
lery to operate in conjunction with him.
Gomez knows that an American army
will defeat Blanco, take Havana. and
practically end the war within a month
after it lands on Cuban soil. He also
knows that the assistance he could af-
ford in such a campaign would be unim-
portant and insignificant, except as an
advisor regarding the country to the COM
manders.
''Ie realizes that the insurgents would
cut but a sorry figure IN the rapid oper-
atoms sure to follow an American inva-
sion, unless months pass while they are
being armed and drilled into military
habits other than those of the guerillas
Knowing all this. Gomez does not want
to be robbed of the credit Of defeating
Spain and ending the war. He does not
wish history to record the fact that he
had to have assistance to crush Blanco
and free Cuba
"On the other hand, IL he can persuade
the administration at Washington that it
IS dangerous to land United States troops
in Cuba during the summer and that he
can defeat Blanco if provided with arms
ammunition and provisions. the future is
bright with an augmented reputation for
him. AS a victorious general Gomez may
ask and obtain any honor that free Cuba
has to bestow. I do not mean to convey
the impression that such an ambition Is
dishonorable. but it affords a clew to
Gomez's motives which should be taken
into consideration in so important mat
ter as making dispositions to end the
war.
I'm party which left Gomez's camp a
few days before did was William D.
Smith. We came into Key West together
Smith is the bearer of sealed communi-
cations from Gomez to General Quesada,
T. Estrada Palma, President Mckinley
and General Miles. In these letters Co
mez urges the president and General
Miles not to attempt TO land any United
States troops in Cuba during the sum-
mer. stating that great loss OF life from
disease would result. Gomez also as
sures the president that if provided with
arms and food. with the cooperation of
the blockade, he can easily defeat Banco
and take Havana without single Amer
lean exposing his life to the ravages Of
yellow fever and smallpox.
PLAN TO BE AVOIDED.
II suppose these communications will
be regarded at Washington as entitled 70
great consideration. In my opinion a
policy based on these recommendations of
Gomez will rise Ike a ghost to confront
the American people afterward If Co
mez really believes that he can deal with
Blanco and end the war. he Is mistaken.
True. with the active sympathy and sun
port of the United States and the assist
ance OF the feet. there is no doubt that
he can eventually win. But I firmly be-
lieve that such a warfare would not be
ended a year from now.
1T will be months even under the
most favorable conditions. before Gomez
can put an army capable Of meeting
Blanco in open battle and defeating him.
Even the veterans OF Corners and Gar
cia's divisions are not good soldiers. as
Americans reckon soldiers. They are
good gueriilas, hut have no knowledge OF /
real military service. Neither have their
officers. I do not believe that the Insurg- /
t..