Omaha daily bee., 1898-06-29

W. uitH WIN tft ttStNtFNfS.
\ eieNinDNNi statement he contained In
w. dispatches it1in 'up Philippines w..
ritilNs iht Insurgents This Is ID, the
unrJi ilNi IL er.ilrp W. IhD thnImin,
lneuteputi ilsiltcs ihc Iiu.flctus and
ltpit.s urtmtn rroiryti,si rhrrc Is
nu'hlue tDtt extraordinary IN this fnrt.
tul " suggests ihu russitilli, af some
itutllr M dcnilng with the insurgents
vlrn the iimp comes r,t the tnitoi
States ~ drri1u upon his lulicy I'm re-
r0tl io the Philippines. It cnnuot ",
expected that ull of these people viii br
iutinl tituruhlu ur Friendly to Amer
ltnhs lltv have hCeu more or loss
iinlrt iln Influence ur Spanish hatred vi
rtrttthlnr American aud some Of them
WI undoubtedly continue tu CHERISH this
feeling Moreover. Il Is natural that
lict should regard "A great military
rowrt Ike Germany as better able tu
give them protection than u country
that does not maintain n formidable
military establishment aud in an cmcr
srlct mltst depend upon volunteers. II
" probable that the Insurgents who de.
sire German protection understand the
possibility Of future revolutionary move.
m"iits to check ana rpprCss which there
must hc ~ hand n strong military powcr.
capable Of quick ana vigorous action,
Ihh the more intelligent of the insur-
gents should az this time feel greater
confidence in the ability of Germany to
give th"m proper protection than In tina
~ HE United States is easily under.
stoou' but n better acquaintance with
"'e miii'hrS resources of this country
may change or modify this preference.
'huucstionably, however, the matter
Is important. The insurgents cannot Ia,
lctt GU of account when our govern.
nlch' comes to consider ana definitely
determine how II shall deal with tho
! h''ppliles. These people constitute
II numerous element ana they have
zone n great deal of fighting and
lnhue many sacrifices to free themselves
from spanish rule. They nav be OK
pected tn insist upon receiving every
consideration that is due them. Indeed.
'h'S nave already shown. in setting UP
II provisional government. that they in
tenn Ia be heard in whatever Is done
after the Philippines are delivered from
spanish control. If our government
hould decline to give them the consid-
Grafton they manifcstly expect in the
shaping of new conditions there is rca-
son to apprehend that they will give us
some trouble. They would probably
nave no difficulty in finding nj
mont for this if any were needed. No
dissatisfied element in the philippiues
AFTER the war will lack fostering through
european influence. Not only will Span
ISL intrigue be put in operation there
against the United States, but II is moi
10 De doubted that there will be more
or less of this from other countries or
Europe. 1t is Il ScriouS mistake to ns.
sumo, rs some appear to do, that thp
'hitcd States. having occupied the Phil
ipplnes, VIII have nothing further 10
contend with. 1t is probable that the
most serious difficulties will present
themselves after we shall have raised
our iiag above Manila. The emulsion
OF the Spaniards does not promise To bc
very troublesome When Manila. is
taken the remaining Spanish forces to
De disposed of are not at all formidable
II may make no effort to hold the DO
Sitions they now occupy. 1t is not the
military operations that will offer any
serious difficulties. but the work of or,
Sanlzing IN administration of affairs
which viii be satisfactory to the people
whom 1t is desirable and expedient to
satisfy.
Aguinaldo has been behaving exceed
lngly well. He seems to have submitted
nhluestioningly to the requirements O,
mira Dewey and to be entirely loyol
IN his cooperation. iic has kept his fol-
lowers In good control, demonstrating
mat they can carry on war according
10 the rules of civilized warfare. But
Aguinaldo and his followers must be
tried under different conditions before
we can he certain that they are as tract
able us they now seem To be.