Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-12-22
sampson's Unpublished Letter.

vessels.
SampsOn's Unpublished Letter.
How strongly Admiral Sampson endeav-
| ored TO secure reversal of this decision
, appears in the following letter, which has
never before been published:
L. S. Flagship New York. First Rate:
Key West. Fla, April II, 1s9S.
My Dear Mr., Secretary:-I have received
your confidential letter of April d. | SYM
pathiZe with all you say about guarding
our big ships against possible serious loss
the same time i regard it as very import
ant to strike quickly and strlAe hard as
soon as hostilities commence. Havana IS
well defended by three or four batteries
TO the eastward of the entrance. mounting
guns of from six to twelve-inch caliber.
ON the western side OF the entrance there
caliber from eight to twelve-inch and two
mortar batteries.
to the west of the entrance are quite near
the shore. All are open batteries, with
heavy traverses between the guns The
guns and people who serve them are quite
unprotected. These batteries are well cal
culated to keep off a fleet from the east
ward, which approaches to within mod
crate distance of a few thousand yards. l
do not think they are we'll placed to resist
an attack for instance. the western bat
teries) from the westward and close in
posed to d flank fire. or to the fire of our
big ships at short range, where the second
airy batteries would have full effect:
Even under these circumstances the ships
must have such heavy fire that the men
in the batteries would be overwhelmed by
its volume. Before the Puritan and
sanguine of the success of such at
tack. Since their arrival yesterday l have
little doubt of its success.
Although the monitors are weak in sec
ondary fire. L expected to put cruiser
with heavy secondary fire in the intervals
/ do not think the spaniards ii s. would sti Vi" be
able to fire. They would be driven away
from their guns and kept away. while the
or mounts that they would be unservce-
able. Although the defenses west of the
entrances are stronger than those east.
all the proiectiles which miss the batteries
will fail in the city and furnish an addi-
tional inducement for the surrender of the
city.
In the memorandum which 1 furnished to
the commanding officers of ships l provided
that II our ships were not numerous
enough. or the Spanish proved better than
/ expected, we We're at once to haul off
and substitute for the direct attack close
blockade of the port, which was 10 be eX
tended east and west to adjoining ports
quickly as possible. Having siienced the
western batteries it would be quite practi-
cable to shell the city. which / would do
only after warning given twenty-fOur hours
in advance.
Sampson Argues in Vain.
see the force of your reasoning that
We would have no troops to occupy the
city If it did surrender, yet, Mr.. Secretary.
it will be very unfortunate, besides great
loss of time. if We must delay until the
rainy season is over. Proba bly, close
fore October. l shall do my utmost to
carry out your wishes set forth in your
letter. At the same time hope you Will
consider the plan | have here outlined. |
have discussed the matter freely with
Captains Evans. Taylor ard Chadwick. and
all unite with me that the direct attack is
sufficiently promising to warrant its trial.
There is most lively report from Cap
tain Sisshee of the engagement between
the ST. Paul, under his command. and the
Spanish torpedo boat destroyer. Terror.
which resulted in the flight of the latter
in a sinking condition into the harbor.
from sinking. Captain Folser of the New
Orleans testified to the damage done by the
shot Sv of Of the s Paul reEeatng the Iest
who examined the Terror
Schley Has His Say.
An unpublished report up to this time /.
one by Admiral Schley. dated June l. Civ
ing an account of the bombardment by his
feet of the Notifications of Santiago. the
day before Sampson arrived on the scene
The admiral says In part:
None of our vessels were struck al
though the shots fell over and around them.
! have learned from insurgent sources that
and eight men We're killed: also that n
number OF shots struck the Moro TIL.
reconnaissance developed the fact that the
Spanish vessels are in the harbOr and that
the fortihcations are well provided with
long raEge guns of large Caliber."
An interesting feature of the report is
diagrams si,osing the day and night for
nation of the American fleet at all times
and the various orders OF battle. all ar
ranged in advance against the OutcomnS
OF the Spanish fleet. There Is also included
the logs of the Spanish warships ana the
reports to Madrid of a Spanish commander
the action resulting i'll the destruction
OF their ships.
The British royal commission. which has