The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-05-24


London. May 23-The Times this morn
ing in an article reviewing the war
takes II for granted that Admiral Ger
vera's squadron coaled I'm Venezuelan
waters from four British c%olliers. IL
suggests that the cruisers Nizcaya
and Infanta Maria Teresa risked a
disadvantage in being reported there
in consideration OF their ability TO
sen dispatches to General Blanco and
then 70 have reioined the flagship Mt
a pre-arranged rendezvous n to
have arrived at Santiago on the 18TH
The Times say even IL IL took q
longer route TO escape observation,
Admiral Cervera's force has been ex-
cessively deliberate in its movements
and his fast cruisers have not yet
shown great speed. His strategy. so
much boasted at Madrid. is not yet ap-
parent. Possibly his movements are
hampered by the torpedo boats, but
the extreme slowness of his ocean
destroyed his chance OF deal
ing az effective blow ut Key West. at
Tampa. or against the blockading
force denuded OF its most efficient ves-
sells by Admiral SIMPSONS abortive
raid on San Juan de Porto Rico.
The high speed OF the Spanish crui-
ser squadron so far has not been
turned 10 any account, and although
its arrival at Santiago de Cuba may
oIIA Ilbfai Natot Ah Ak Wv
Cuban g~arrisons that they are not
abandoned. no naval object seems tn
nave been attained. The United
States commanders now know where
the enemy Is and have had time To
concentrate superior forces and TO
cover their vulnerable points.
Discussing the problem OF n block
ade of Admiral Cervera at Santiago de
Cuba or an atN'mpt To force him 10
give battle the Times article says:
The United States commanders pos
sess ample forces, but night and the
speed of the Spanish cruisers will give
them nance to escape. The result
will be watched with much interest.
The defences OF Santiago are probably
no more effective than those OF Manila.
To take the United States cruisers into
this harbor in face OF a powerful fire
from Cervera's force would be a
risky operation. but a torpedo fotilla
If il existed in either fleet. might find
opportunities for effective employ
ment.
IF Admiral Cervera succeeds in
getting to sea and obtaining coal he
will unquestionably hamper the Cuban
blockade. although he can obtain no
direct advantage. 1t is evident that
the monitors greatly delay Admiral
Simpsons squadron. Such an incu-
bus imposes heavy disabilities upon n
modern fleet. and a fast squadron ca
pable OF pursuing the Spaniards II
they leave the port is urgently needed.
Failing such a force, there appears to
be no reason why Admira Cervera
should not steam to San Juan de Porto
Rico, coal and go to sea again before
he could be overtaken. A recent re-
port confirms the existence of a large
quantity of coal at San Juan, and If
Admiral Cervera can avail himself or
this supply and leave behind his tor
pedo craft he woul be able TO reach
Charleston or Savannah without diff
Guilty.
"A raid on either of these points
would have no important results, but
it would gravely interfere with the
operations of the blockade. Review
ing the whole field of operations. the
most important lesson is the effect
produced by the presence Of a small,
compact, high speed squadron which.
however, hitherto has been somewhat
aimlessly employed. From the mo-
ment when it was known that this
squadron had arrived off Martinique.
all the plans OF the United States
board Of strategy were disarranged.
BY undertaking a bombardment OF the
Notifications at San Juan nothing was
gained. The United States has been
handicapped by the lack OF a fast,
homogeneous squadron.
1T would be wise in the future TO
leave the direction of operations 10
naval commanders. Councils have
never proved capable directors OF war.
Their proper function is to obtain in
formation and to forward it to the ad-
mirals, who must be. as Nelson
claimed the right to be. free to act
when the fitting opportunity arrived"