The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-07-10

Washington, July 9.-The great battle
expected to-day did not take place. al
though the armistice expired at noon,
with the forces on both sides at San
tiago lined up for battle. The reason
had been in correspondence by tele-
graph with his home government, was
seeking to make terms with General
Shafter by which he might save his
army from capture. He was willing to
give up Santiago without resistance if
allowed to retreat with all of his men
and arms across the island, but this
idea was not entertained for a moment
by our government. On the contrary,
every effort will be put forth to seal up
all avenues of escape from Santiago and
to compel the final surrender of the
Spanish army. To have allowed them
to make their way unmolested into the
interior would have amounted simply
to reinforcements of the garrison of Ha-
vana by these thousands of trained SOL
diers, who had proved their courage as
worthy foemen in the fighting in the
trenches. On the other hand, to COM
certainly produce an enormous moral ef-
feet, both in Havana and in Spain it
self and tend to the early conclusion of
the war.
Secretary Alger and Adjutant Gen
eral Corbin were in quick communica-
tion with General Shafter at Santiago
during the day. These officials, how
ever decline positively to give out for
publication any dispatches relating to
the negotiations that are going on be-
tween General Shafter and General
Linares, or to confirm any of the excit-
| ing rumors that were flying through the
| corridors all day. 1t was apparent from
| their manner that crisis had been
| reached so far as Spain was concerned.
| and as matters stood at the close of the
| day there was no reason to be dissat-
| isfied with the outlook, as it is known
| that General Shafter has lost nothing
| by the armistice. His men are rested,
| the commissary has improved, the roads
| have been cleared and his artillery is
now almost completely placed in most
| effective manner None of those things
existed at the beginning of the armis-
| tice. On the other hand, the Spanish
| forces have largely diminished their
| splendid stock of provisions and have
| steadily lost in confidence. AS soon as
they are convinced that they will be
! humanely treated and fed and will not
be subjected to inhumane treatment
| land the war department proposes that
| they shall be thus protected) it is said
there will be many desertions from the
| Spanish lines.
| There is the strongest indisposition on
the part of strategists to entertain fa-
| vorably the proposition said to be under
consideration at Madrid looking to an
armistice of ten days in order to con-
slider terms of peace. They believe that
| Init hos 70 1oc
and nothing to gain by accepting such
a proposition. During the time Admiral
Camara's squadron might find safe
| lodgment in some strongly fortified
coast town like Ferrol. and thus elude
| Watson's pursuit However, history
shows that the directors of successful
| armies are always averse to ceasing
military operations until unconditional
capitulation is achieved. and that ii
requires the strong hand of diplomacy
to bring about the short pause before
the final consummation of peace neces-
sary to reach a common understand
ing.
Admiral Sampson contributed moth
ing further during the day to his first
dispatch announcing the possibility OF
saving the Spanish ships Colon. Marie
Teresa and Vizcaya.
Naval officials feel that another
change may have to be made in the
| makeup of the eastern squadron, which
is to strike a blow against the Spanish
coast, as the battleship Iowa suffered
some hard knocks in the recent naval
battle with Cervera's squadron, and II
may be necessary to substitute one oi
the other battleships pending repairs or
the Iowa. No decision on the subject
has been reached thus far, as the de-
partment has not received the report
showing the exact condition of oui
ships after the battle. In the meantime
the Associated Press interview with
Captain Evans of the Iowa leads nava
officials to believe that the Iowa viii
require considerable overhauling be
fore she Is ready for trip across ths
ocean.
According to Captain Evans story OF
the battle the Iowa was struck twice
by Spanish shells and one shell explod-
ed. while the other is imbedded, unex'
| ploded near the water line OF the ship
This last shot may prove troublesome
as an unexploded shell near the water
| line is not a desirable adjunct TO a bat
tleship. From the light manner in which
| Captain Evans speaks of the damage
| Il is not regarded as very serious by
the officials, yet IL is probably enough
to keep the Iowa from accompanying
| the eastern squadron 20 the coast o.
Spain. Either the Massachusetts, ol
the Indiana viii be substituted for th'
Iowa IL IL be found necessary to make
| a change Either OF them Is as fOrmid
| able as the Iowa Their four large guni
| are ct the thirteen-inch tyne whil'