The daily morning journal and courier., 1898-09-07
paign, as every one knows"

Tn ms pepew letter and inspired press ] dispatches, the secretary of war as- 1 cribed the failure to furnish the men With sufficient provisions, medicines, tents, etc, to the act of God in wreck ing the lighters. I wrote you some time ago that this was thin" that if there had been means of transportation from the shore to the soldiers at the front, the thousands of sailors on the trans ports and fleet would have got the sup | plies ashore.
 since then have been told by an off, ! ilcer in service with Sampsons fleet that the navy lighters were used by the army Also as I am writing, General Shafter first and then General Wheeler through Interviews have told us that the difficulty was entirely in want of transportation from the coast. Neither claims that the excuse of General AL ger was fact or thing that actually occurred.
 As to the spirit of the leadership, General Wheeler corroborates Dr. sem in stating that "every officer and soldier who went to Cuba regarded that he received great and special privi lege in being permitted to engage in that campaign;" and that they knew that 1t was impossible for them to have wagon transportation, which usually accompanies armies"
 But, General Wheeler to the contra ry, yet insist that the soldiers did not know that they were to be out of pro- visions, or out of medicines, because there would not be sufficient means of fri rc Nnptc ttA,a fyox, +o t,N front.
 General Wheeler proceeds to say: One reason why our army was lacking in some respects in equipment" was a telegram from Sampson that if the army got there immediately they could take the city at once" but if there was delay the Spaniard would fortify It needed no telegram from Sampson that the Spaniard would fortify. Any child would know that But here is the most explicit admis- sion that General Shafter's army went of on this campaign Hacking in equip ment," and especially lacking in the or dinary army wagon.
 The officers certainly, and the men also, were thirsting for military glory, | counting 1t "a great and special privi- lege In being permitted to engage in that campaign:" for all the world just as the officers and soldiers of the .'ef- fete monarchies'' of Europe have thirst ed for military glory but in these days the European armies do not go off on a campaign without their army wagons, as it would seem that our soldiers were crazy to do.
 FThtc ct tof n4 CAroro1 UThao1or was put out from Montauk just after the arrival there of General Shafter. It appeared in all the papers in the same words, and it supplemented what General Shafter had said the previous day. I regard it as the utterance of General Shafter himself.
 It is clear, therefore that General Shafter did not take sufficient trans portation to furnish the necessary food, tentage and medicines for his soldiers. and for this and other subordinate req sons an army, wrecked and ruined for the time at least, is the result
 I have not time to apportion the blame between General Shafter and the "staff." Let it be sufficient to say that under our system the commander of an army must of necessity be his own chief of staff Nor did the requirement. of haste" justify such want of prepa- ration, any more than a man in hur- ry to. take train for distant point should go off barefoot.
 It is not a matter yet of general com- ment, but it is true, that on the day af- ter the capture of San Juan and El Ca- ney the majority of Shafter's generals, including himself, were of the opinion that the army could not maintain It. self where it was, and should retire to point nearer to it's supplies, and that while General Shafter Che being sick in his tent al, the time some miles from the front) was considering how he should retreat and which general should conduct it. word was brought him that Cervera's fleet had just left the harbor. and it's destruction by Sampson's fleet was soon "wig-wagged" him from the mouth of the harbor.
 This changed he whole situation. It obviously meant and was followed by the surrender of the Spaniard, which was demanded by General Shafter on the afternoon of the same day, in the morning of which he had been intend- ing to retreat.
 What caused the resolution to re- treat and why was 1t abandoned when Cervera's fleet left the harbor? This matter has escaped the consideration 1t deserves, and I ask careful attention to 1t.
 CD General Shafter's army held q con- centric line. miles in length, over an ex- tremely rough country, and was re- duced to less than fifteen thousand men. It was, as he said, "a long, thin line" General Toral, with ten to twelve thousand Spaniards-better fighters than had been anticipated were inside. The offensive power of Shafters army was gone. It was ex- hausted and badly fed.
 It was deemed possible for General Toral to mass his troops. under cover of the night, at some point on that Hong, thin line" and break or turn it at dawn and the result would have been disastrous defeat to the American army. Theoretically, the position of the Hong thin line'' of Shafter's army was very dangerous, but 1t was true, as General Wheeler stated in the council of war. that the Spaniard was just as exhausted, and just as much crippled for offensive work as the American.
 G) What is more important is this: With Cervera's fleet in the harbor it was impossible for General Shafter by any immediate forward movement to