New-York tribune., 1898-11-24

ordinary annual reports OF Bureau officers Is that OF
Captain Crownrshiold Chief Of the Bureau OF
Navigation of the Navy Department, which has
tust been made public. Not only the head OF
ms Bureau a member Of the War Strategy Board,
t,, he was responsible for the execution OF the
rans formed by that Board. and for the move
rnent Of every ship and the assignment Of every
on!cer. Consequently no Bureau officer has equa!
opportunty 10 know the moving purposes and ex-
a. history OF the The report is absolutely
free from personalities; there is criticism OF any
officer nor any recommendation that might be re-
gar5ed invidous and discriminating. But the
report confined TO the statement OF hard facts.
with a few important recommendations for the
irnrovement Of tho service.
The war history begins with the simple state
mont OF certain precautionary orders that were
issued. and attention cannot fail 70 be attracted
10 the remarkable foresight exhibited in the prep
eration OF the Official orders. They begin with
an order dated January II. directing the com
nanier Of the European Station to retain in ser
vice men whose enlistmcnts were about 10 expire.
end those following provide for the successful ex-
tr.caton OF the European Squadron from the
danger to which # was thought to be exposed
the outbreak OF the They show how the
South Atlantic Squadron was brought up TO rein
force Sampson; how the Oregon started on her
famous race around South America: how stores
and ammunition forwarded TO the squadrons,
and finally they wind up with the famous laconic
order TO Dewey. OF pril "a:
War has commenced between the United States
end SPAIN proceed at once TO the Philippine
against Spanish fleet You must capture vessels or
destroy. Use utmost endeavors
These orders show that four months before
Cervera's fleet reached this side the whole North
Atlantic feet ready for any emergency. within
striking distance OF OF the two points from
which attack might come.
Trained gunners to the number OF forty five who
had just been graduated from the Amphtrite were
placed on the vessels of the fleet and rendered
o1 Of As he
quality Of these men Captain Crowninshield cites
the destruction OF three gunbcats by the little
Scorpion. in Manzano Harbor. July IS. Of
which the commanding officer reports: "Orders
were given to obtain the range with two OF the
G-pounders after which the first shell from the
6-inch gun blew her up apparently having struck
her boilers"
SPLENDID AMERICAN GUNNERY.
Captain Crowninshleld says:
The completeness Of our naval victory during the
war and almost absolute immunity from injury
70 general c"ncnsion thai our gunngry h2d much
to 90 WIN the mater As a mai1gr r, or Iact an al
Of hits smaller. If is true. than that which has
three cordtions In the first place the demoli-
ton Of the enemys ships has usually been SO com
hits were ohli,erated by subsequent fires and ex-
plosons in the second place. the ranges NJ which
the ccmlats nave taken place have usually been
80 much greater than those used IN target practice
from g. 10 ~ per cent IN the percentage Of hits
end finally the iatc z fro was much higher In the
heen endoayoring before the war to increase the
rate OF TARGET 5re anq when All ms is considcred
have been remarkably high In fact II appears'
5narksmarshiD was 50 far superior that at range
at which the Spanish guns and gunners were IN
tna before the range was or coqd be reduced the
their crews domoralizcd.
IMPORTANCE OF SEA POWER
Captain Crowninshiod declares that tho experience
O. the war has been another demonstration Of the
fnnortance 10 the Nation Of sea power He says
tia, from the first the only apprehension felt in
this country was on account OF the Spanish Navy
l. was Ccrvera's ships that were feared-the coun-
trv da not fear the Spanish Army. and would not
have feared II "if II had been three times as
powerful unless it had been supported by navy
powerful enough tc hav" formed an efficient
yov and brought e. 10 this coast. on the contrary
Tho Spanish Navy. even without the Spanish Army
would have been n menace. though II had consisted
Of only ono frst-cass cruiser. Until that cruiser
had been hlockaded. captured or destroyed any
UNPROTECTED point on our coast and all our sea-
borne commerce would have been at its mercy
ard no army. however efficient could have pro-
tcoted US from H. II required navy for this
work and an effective navy"
Touching on the combined operations OF the
Army and Navy the report says that happily all
points Of difference which arose between the com
nanders during the. campaign were satisfactorily
eoved by victory one Garng defect of the sys-
TEN Of Joint operations was found. however, in
the matter Of transporting and conveying troops.
and II IS recommended that. to secure smoother
handling Of such n campaign. the Navy be by law
charged VIII the transport service.
INCREASE OF THE FORCE URGED
The NAVIGATION Bureau recommends that Con-
gro, authorize the increase Of the naval force 10
p, 00 for general service and ESQ apprentices, and
eu argument Is made 10 show the absolute neces-
ety Of some such increase unless the reserves on
tie receiving ships are TO be reduced below the
barcc- f-an evn that closely approached
during the war To carry out the recommendation
Tho report he conrnends the passage Of House b.A
NJ 10 na which also carries with it an increase
Of u,netv-nine in the number OF line and engineer
officers and Of one hundred warrant machinists' all
IIe rerort does not enlarge on the necessities
Of the service in regard TO personnel. 'aP.a.II
Crowuinsheld believing tHat the pepaitttiret ana
T1'rrrs. are 10th so well acquainted with the re-
o.ireInents Of This detail Of naval olg"n!za,uq3n on
tr4, he statement Of the Bureau needs VIII be
~ lie volunteer officers II is said ihai ,t - ren
6ered valuable service IN the Wa, blt that ~
o.. ,o,'ar he ffr elLal n professional attah-
,rsrfs Of their brothers Of the regular es1aDI,n1
met FOR lack Of the exhaustive TRAINING ''"P"N
l. the latter
THE NAVAL MILITIA.
.,u,,o 60 mid 10 the good work Of the Naval
1utia in manning the coast defence stations ana
-. vessels Of the auxiliary naval force ana tW-
,is,,r material for crews Of the auxiliary NeSSis
serving with the regular fleet But Tor crews
ahaa-g sri, IN active service they furnished noun
ine more flau material ard in The ordinary Tou''o
no.t OF them would have been 'Ils zee. t.,or,,tiv ~.
mo and nothing higher Al la" IN sV nc tXcoDtions
6r..ec anI even the officers, VIZ" ,,'.,,i,c.ors
CatfaiD 0rowulushicld docs not ~ish u pe u''t t,,
st00d as undertaking the ZcaI oI VI 80. n, tbe
snpy dGires 10 poin' Si.,ity 9gi % was experienced
g. mastering the men in. the DeiaIt III ' ,'s9on-