The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1898-01-29

derstood to appreciate the depth of the
offense from the military point of view
Elsewhere there would have been sum
mary courts martial, possibly some death
sentences; assuredly a large number OF
officers cashiered and dismissed in DIS
grace. But Spanish control permits no such
vindication of military discipline. Two
hundred officers are known to have been
in tho movement, either actively or pas.
! sively. 1t is said that nearly 100 actually
took part in the rioting. A dozen arrests
were made, but they did not hold. If
one officer is punished all who were i'm
plicated will demand that they, too, be
punished. Neither Blanco nor Sagasta
dares meet this menace. Instead, strin-
gent laws are made to protect tie offend
ers from criticism. The army is disaffeot-
ed. Its pay is in arrears. 1t must be
petted, fiattered and cajoled, anything
rather than be made to feel that it is the
servant and not the master of the govern
ment. In Cuba it responds by quickly
supplanting the civil authority.
BRIBERY INCIDENTS.
How far the army will be satisfied with
the concessions made to it remains to be
determined. Probably it will not openly
antagonize the government, yet some
things will have to be changed. Much
| dissatisfaction is felt over the money
spent in ''persuading the insurgents to
to lay down their arms The mos insig-
nificant "cabecilIa or chief, on present.
ins nlmsel with dozen followers, has
received his reward, sometimes in CEN
tens, or SIS gold pieces, sometimes in sill
yer coins. These presentations OF lnsur-
gents have not been numerous enough to
make deep hole in the Spanish treasury,
but they have been a source of deep irrita
ton 10 the army. The complaint has
| been bitter, and the cause of the COM
plant must stop. The pretense of pro-
Yiding for the reconcentrados was aban-
doned before it gave rise to friction. The
/ commander in the Matanzas district,
who took the money sent him by the gov
eminent, and, instead of using it for the
reconcentrados, bought shoes for its
soldiers, reflected the feelings of other
commanders. They would have done the
same had the chance been afforded them
| AS to autonomy, it is probable that the
army will be content with the demon
stration already made against that policy,
and will not openly demand it's reversal.
The rebellious officers can let the ag1ta-
ton to that end go forward in Spain with
the moral support which their attitude
gives it. Gen. Blanco knows that the
army of which he is nominally COM
Insnder-in chief is not in sympathy with
eitF or his civil or his military policy. He
is simply the representative OF the Sagas-
ia Ministry, which is seeking to sustain
the monarchy. With the majority of the
officers in Cuba the sentiment of loyalty
to the present dynasty is not strong.
few, like Gen. Arolas, are of republican
! leaningS.
g 1t is doubtful if the members of this
class care enough of Don Carlos to en-
courage revolution which would place
Carlist on the throne. Their preference,
apparently, is for a Spanish republic.
However. the majority of the officers are
! Conservatives. Their family connections
are mostly with the Conservatives in the
Cortes They are, therefore, predisposed
to sympathiZe with the lntranslgente
Spaniards in Cuba. who, in the begin
ming, made such determined stand
against autonomy. Tho sentiment of de-
votion to the throne is not strong one
with them. They may not care to upset
it, but neither the Qdeen Regent nor
young King Alfonso inspires in them the
feeling of enthusiasm that would cause
them to make any sacrifice to save the
crown. Moreover, they have seen many
Cabinet crises, and it is hard for them to
understand that a change in ministries
now would mean more than 1t has in the
past. Whatever the consequences OF their
course, they would face it untiinohingly.
In the event of war with some other
Power. their patriotism would come out
strongly, and would atone for many OF
| their errors.
WAR WITH UNITED STATES.
Possibly majority of them think the
only way out of Spain's difficulty in Gu
ba Is through war with the United
States. Within week have heard half
a dozen give utterance to that opinion.
A Major told me he and his comrades
would welcome u conflict, because they
would have chance to distinguish them
selves, which they do not get in fighting
the insurgents. Probably neither Spain
nor the United States would go to war
Just to enable the army of either country
to distinguish itself. Yet it must be kept
in mind that the government Of Spain
is peculiarly sensitive to this military in
fiuence. Tacit admission has been made
that its army in Cuba is the dominating
political power. Since this admission
has been made the government has been
correspondingIy weakened. Henueforth
the army must be consulted in every
thing.
a