Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-11-26
MABAy on THE SEA WAR.
Plans Would Have Been Different
Had We Sought Conquest.

LONDON, November 2.-Captaln Ma
han has just published the first OF a series
of four articles on THE War on the Sea
and Its Lessons
While admitting the danger OF passing
final Judgment on events still recent
CAPTAIN Mahan argues that In the drive
OF life a rapid and rough but still
working decision must be formed from
the new experiences. Material, he says,
is not yet available to give a complete
story OF the operations, nor Is the time
ripe for final decisions, but only sum-
eient TO suggest general lines OF thought.
He recalls that the American naval
plans were conditioned by the fact that
the war was undertaken primarily TO
drive Spain out OF Cuba, for IL more
general appreciation OF the situation had
been adopted and the United states
had taken account OF the injury II had
sustained by the iniqut0us character OF
spanish rule In her colonies, and had de-
cIared war on those ground, sAs oD-
iectiye American operation would nave
been differently chosen so as not meresy
10 help Cuba, but to compei spain to
sdopt such terms as the United states
might demand.
GREAT VALUE OF PORTO RICO.
In such case the reduction OF Porto
pico vould have been Americas first OBJ
feet In order 10 throw Spain back on
home territory 10 support her operations
I'm Cuba. Porto Rico would have been Al
insurmountable obstacle II retained In =
strong enemys hands TO American opera
lions In Cuba, and An equally NaIsaois
base II wrested from the enemy. Manan
insists weightily on the great military I'm
portance of Porto Rico, which Is 10 Cunas
10 the future Isthmian Canal. and the
hat
Egypt and beyond.
In estimating the respective nshuns
strength OF the American and Spanish
fleets, the Navy Department held unwa~
vermgly that no merely poesibls cucceso
Justified a risk unless II gave fair prom
Use of diminishing the enemysl naval
| force and so deciding the control OF the
sea upon which the issue OF the war CO
| pended.
He attaches immense Importance 10 tbs
! bringing OF the Oregon from the PACING
| TO the Atlantic. because IL showed the
| grip the American feet had on '-eryera'e
squadron and the consequent power to
move the army 70 Santiago without fear.
NUMBERS PREFERRED TO SIZE.
Captain Mahan pays high tribute 70 the
| commander -in-chisf for his successful
| bottliug OF Ceryere's squadron In San
| tiaeo. an operation fraught with difneul-
! ties. doubts, and uncertainties. and more
| akin 10 the wiring down OF champagne In
| unbreakabls bonds than the showing OF
| the cork into the bottle.
| AS TO Camara's move 10 the Philip
pines, II he had psrssvsred. though the
/ American feet was quite safe. u might
have necessitated temporary abandon
| ment OF Manila bay.
He then enters into technical con-
sideration of tho momsntous problem
| whether the individual size OF the shipe
| or numbers should be the aim q naval
powers. and comes TO the conclusion that
other things being equal. numbers mean
an increase OF offensive power.
The article has excited the livelisst
interest In naval circles where. owing u
its unavoidable teehnicsiiay. 1t 10 prin-
\ elpally read.