The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-04-14
The Presidents Peal Purpose.


of the policy Of rorclble intervention
along the lines suggested i'm the presi-
dents message. II is believed that he
has contributed not little to the shap-
ing of that message. In an interview
in the Chicago-Times Herald he re-
views the subject eXhaustiVely and in
a manner worthy of public ConsideIa-
tion. He first recitps the history of The
problem down to the time Of the des-
truction of the Maine, laying stress
upon the steady growth of public SYM
pathy for the insurgent cause, and he |
continues:
THE difficulties of the situation. |
though diminished by this unanimity |
of sentiment, were, however, by no |
means dispelled. What should be |
done? Should we declare war on ac- |
count Of the sinking of the Maine? |
In all fairness that could not be done, |
when our own jury of inquiry had re- |
turned verdict which did not fix upon |
the authorities of Spain any purpose |
to destroy. Considered in connection
with other facts, the Maine catas-
trophe, evidencing as it did the ina
bility of Spain to maintain order in
her own harbors is a potent argument
| in favor of the policing of the island
and its harbors by an outside power.
| But considered alone, the failure of
| proof duplicating beyond mere negli-
gence of the Spanish authorities causes
it to fall shortof a casus belli War for
vengeance or for Chastsament is never
| justifable except upon proof of the
| gravest wrong Intentionally perpeuat-
! ed. The wrong in this case was great,
| but the intention hes never been
shown. The judgment of disinterested
mankind and of history would never
justify a war under such Circum-
stances, except as a means to COM
| pei indemnity. Who would excuse a
| war by Great Britain or France
against us if one of her war ships had
gone down in the harbor of New York
under circumstances showing an eX-
ternal cause but failing to show COM
plicity on the part of our government
and especially without giving us an op-
| pOrtunity to make good the loss, so
far as such loss can be made good?
Life for life is taken only when the
loss of the first life is clearly the result
not of negligence or inattenton but of
purposed murder. The presidents poll
icy stood bravely against a war pre-
dcated upon any insufficient reason,
though it might be popular"
AT this point Judge Grosscup calls
attention to the cumulative evidence
showing the inhumanity of SPANS
rule in Cuba and cites the announced
determination of the president that it
must be stOpped-a conclusion univer-
sally approved. But how? Should
the means employed be recognition of
independence, followed by armed in
tervention, or should it be simply
armed intervention to pacify the is
land? THE former" he contends, has
almost insuperable difficulties. Rec
ognton of independence implies that
in our judgment the lnsurgent gov
ernment has already conquered it's in
dependence. In point of fact, how
ever, it has not. If it had, then
armed intervention would be un-
necessary. Recognition of indepen-
dence and armed intervention as men,
bers of the same proposal contradict
each other, Independence already
achieved needs no outside help. The
proffer Of outside help bellies the claim
that independence has already been
= achieved. A proposal so self-contra-
; dictory could not help but be regarded
by the world as insincere. 1t would
be attributed to the wish of this ma
l | tion for war rather than to the facts
} of the situation. But even a welghtier
E reason against recognition exists. Not
e even the Cuban junta claim that the
' insurgents have possession Of the
e whole of Cuba. No one ac-
a quainted with the facts claims
S that they are in control of the entire
e island Spain is still in possession Oh
t Havana and Of the western provinces
E Recognition could at most go only t
e the extent of the actual present pos.
9 sessions Of the insurgents Are there
= then, to be two flage on the island
the flag Of the republic ana III. nag OF
. the queen--the one floating over the
e east, the other waving over the cap,
y ital and the west? or. recognizing th,
e independence of the republic, which
= is in possession of the east end of IN,
= island, do we propose to make our
= selves it's allies, to conquer or 4
10 drive out the queen in the west? Tha
# would not be recognition of lndeprn
f dence; it would be an alliance, often
. sive and defensive. with the insurgen
- government, and against the Spanisl
r government; ana it might make us, un
; der the laws Of nations, responsible 70
# the conduct OF our ally"
- All these considerations, i'm III
= judges opinion, had much weight il
+, determining the executive to recon-
mend armed but neutral intervention
~ which, the judge believes, means sim
a ply that the war on the Island Of Cub
;- must close; that the people there mus
a. be permitted 10 go about their usua
N vocations, and that the order thus re
IS stored must be kept. with Uncle San
N as the policeman. If Spain resists, il
~ execution will require the naval an
is military forces of the United State
"a government. But the American mill
'r taly on the island would" he adds "b
m only the substitution Of civilized mill
l- tary rule for present barharism. !
# would, IN The nature nf things contmu