The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-08-22

SEATTLE. MONDAY, AUGUST ~.
WHAT SHALL We DO WITH THEM.

WHAT MALL WE DO WITH THEMs
Scarcely a month ago ex-senator Ed
munds declared that IL was premature
10 discuss specific cases" when, at In
dependence Hall, he opposed policy OF
expansion and referred iss TO the pre-
cepts of cur fathers. His generalisies
proved nothing shen and afford us 10
assistance now. Once more. In the Lam
guago OF Grover Cleveland, We are con-
tronted BY condition and not a the
Org. The preeepts OF our ancestors are
Of less value To this nation just now
than the wisdom Of contemporary
statesmen.
For obvious reasons" said ex-Sena-
tor Edmunds, II have refrained from
discussing. at this time. specific cases
Of national and International duty,
honor. or policy connected with the pres
ent war which do not exist, and which.
when they arise in the course of negosia-
tions for peace. must be disposed of in
the light of the conditions then exist
ing" The conditions which exist in
reference to these new territories now
occupied by American troops have not
materially changed within thirty days.
This Is the time to begin to discuss our
future policy with reference to cur cot.-
quests. and the Judgment Of such men
~ Mr.. Edmunds becomes valuable, il
they give us positive and not negative
advice. He Is one OF those who finds In
the writing Of our early statesmen a
warning against acquiring foreign terri
tory. ana for that reason Is opposed to
our retention of the Philippines.
Whether We wanted them or not we
and II helps very little To be told tina, It
Will be unwise To keep them.
We cannot dodge the question what
We are to de- with them. We must
either keep them or let them go. but
neither course ahsoives us from great
responsibility. We can give them back
70 Spain. We can turn them over to I.
government of Their own people. or we
can turn them adrift. There is z posi-
bic alternative left. which is 20 sci!
them or give them to another power.
but the complications that would In
nfge. ~
could be guilty Of IL In scarcely icSs
lnadmissihia 10 return them to Spain.
we can hardly ignore the claims Of Ieo-
pie resident in the islands who are not
Insurgents and leave them 10 The merry
Of vast hortes utterly Incapable II self
government. To turn them adriit and
leave them 10 be fought over isy che in
ourgents. by Spain and hy other Euro
pesn powers would ssulilfy us In the
eyes Of tho werld. Yc, we must DO
something. aud amid the ciafa0r II the
few tina; we shall not retain the islands.
as TO what we shall DO. We cannot 60
nothing. something naust DC done. what
In hes, to N donef
II 1t were NOT fog the preeelrts Of the
founders 81 this republic. there woiil<.
be but one answer ~ the question. We
would ID what all other nations would
de- under like circumstances. Having
entered apag a war ana been victorious.
We should take advantage e al, that NC
have gained ard sccep; Tia responsible
ties with Gl,e glorios 81 victory.
II may be admitted thar under any
circumstances va shall have sanse sfe,u-
bic and aosss difficulties to overcome,
bat there ia aa eoa,istieo In whi,A sAes
viii nas aTtse. Gratifying ~ ssf pro
gFssa has eeen IS - nation Il has net
been accomplished without aa;axanssssi
ntnersmevs - opinion have Agtzsn a,
every stage. IN s.sssse ~ she nsast vital
Qasssttaas * government ny sha .-e,,-
sie. itss eo4nlsy has teea divided sr:so
tvs gsess pArsgvs havsns silansetrl.-asiy
se@at,e s'sNs. and IN searSuly one raas.
y Importance have she re0ple neea
ks,es.
Tsss act u supreme Importance Ia aar