The Wichita tribune., 1898-11-26
A LARGER FORCE is NEEDED,
How tho Department Prepared For the
War Early in the Year-The Amer
lean Gunner-SugGestioas 70 the Bet
terment of the Service.

|
y 60 Bureau officer had equal oppor-
;uni-y to know the moving purposes
and cxact history of the war. The re-
port is absolutely free from personali-
les There is no reference whatever
70 the now happily ended Sampson
Hchl0y controversy; no criticism of any
officers nor any cOmmendation that
night be regarded as invidious and dis
rrlminating.
The war history begins with the
| simple statement of certain precau-
liondry orders that were issued, but
even in the absence of comment, at
tentiOn cannot fail to be attracted by
The remarkable foresight exhibited in
the preparation of the official orders.
! They begin with an order dated jan
nary II, directing the commander of
the European stations to retain in SER
vice men whose enlistments were
about to expire and those following;
they provide for the successful extri-
cation of the European squadron from
The danger to which it was e--pnsed
upon the out tbreak of the war and show
how the South Atlantic squadron was
brought up to reinforce SamrGon; how
the Oregon started on her famous race
around South America, how stores and
am:1u1ition were forwarded to the
,quadrons and finally they wind up
With the famous order to Dewey of
-pril "a:
War has commenced between the
United States and Spain, r-~cee1 at
once to tie Philippine islands. Com
nence operations at once, particularly
against Spanish fleet. You muss cap
ture vessels or destroy. Use utnlSt
before cervera's feet reached this SID
our whole North Atlantic feet vi rs
ready for any emergency within strik
ing distance of one of the two points
from which attack might come.
Trained gunners to the number of
forty-five, who had just been gradu-
ated from the course upon the Amphi-
trite, were placed upon the vessels of
the fleet and rendered a good account
of themselves AS exhibiting the
quality of these men, Captain Crown
fnshield cites the destruction of three
gunboats by the little Scorpion in
harbor July 18, of which
the commanding officer reports: Cor
ders were given to obtain the range
with two of the 6-pounders, after
which the first shell from the 5-inch
gun blew her up, apparently having
struck her boilers"
Captain Crowninshield says: 1.-THE
of our naval victory dur
ing the wGr and the almost absolute
imm' 1ity from injury which our ships
enjoyed, naturally led to n general
that our gunnery had much
to do with the matter. AS sa matter of
fact all reports bear out this conclu-
sion. The percentage of hits, smaller
it is true than that which has been
at target practice, was modi-
fed by three conditions; in the first
place the demolition of the enemy's
ships has usually been so complete
that it is certain that the marks OF
many hits were obliterated by subse-
quent fires and explosions; in the sec
ond place, the ranges at which the
combats have taken place have usually
been so much greater than those used
In target practice that this difference
will account for reduction of from 30
to 60 per cent in the percentage Of hits;
and finally the rate of fire was much
higher in the battles than at target
practice. The bureau had been en-
deavoring before the war to increase
the rate of target fire and when all
this is considered it will be found that
the hits per gun per min ute have been
high
''In fact, it appears that the expert
ence of each combat was that our
was SO far superior that,
at a range ut which the Spanish guns
and gunners we're ineffective, our gun
and punners were so effective that be-
fore the range was or could be reduced.
the Spanish were either seriously GRIP
pl ed or their crews demoralized.
Captain Crowninshield declares that
the experience of the war has been
another demonstration of the impor-
tance to the nation of sea power. lie
saws that from the first the only APP
prehension felt in this country was on
account of the Spanish navy. 1T was
ships that were feared-we
did not fear the Spanish army-would
not have feared it if it had been three
times as powerful unless it had been
supported by navy powerful enough
to have formed an efficient convoy and
brought it to this coast. On the con-
trary, the Spanish navy, even without
the Spanish army would have been
menace. though it consisted of only
one first class cruiser. Until that
cruiser had been blockaded, cap
tured or destroyed any unprotected
point on our coast and all our sea COM
merce would have been at its mercy
and no army, however efficient, could
have protected US fromit. 1t required
a navy for this work and an effective
navy"