The times., 1898-07-07
Let Him BE RECALLED.


The history of his career in COM
mand Of the North Atlantic Squadron
larger and more powerful fleet than
| one man ever before led in battles
a record of inertia and inefficiency
which should have compelled a change
weeks ago 1t is a contemplate story
of bureaucratic favoritism. to the great
detriment of the service, and perhaps
involving a national disaster yet to
come
Placed in a position of honor and
responsibility far above his line rank,
and given authority over his superiors
in grade and length of service, Sampson
has been a dismal failure from the
first. We need not revert at length to
his fascos at Matsnzas, Cardenas and
San Juan de Porto Rico 1t is suffi-
cient 10 remind our readers that they
made his fleet the laughing stock of
Europe and nearly destroyed the good
impression our Navy had created
abroad, through Deweys fight at Ma
Mia But these were negative and
inconsequentiaI blunders. compared
with what followed.
The brave and accomplished Schley
succeeded in bottling Cervera in San
| tiago Harbor As soon as he had done
that, he begged for permission to go in
and finish the Spanish squadron, Either
for fear that he would seize the naval
honors of the war in Western waters, or
for some other equally satisfactory
reason, this privilege was sternly de-
MED by the syndicated bureaucrats in
| Washington. They took sudden fright
and straightway sent man they could
trust to do nothing to supersede the
efficient, straightforward, militant COM
modore. They caused the command to
be given to the smooth and subservient
Sampson.
The wickedness of this movement is
now made plain. 1t is positively
known that when Schley announced his
desire and readiness to follow Cervera
| into his lair. the passage could have
been effected without the loss of a ship,
and with small if any mortality. What
| are the visible and miserable consa-
| auences of that veto upon ability, dash
and heroism? If the Flying Squadron
| had been allowed TO make the attack
the land campaign against Santiago
would have been rendered unnecessary,
and the many hundred brave Ameri-
cans who lie today in bloody graves
around the scene would be alive, hearty
and filed with the high hope of partici-
patton in the capture of Havana. Their
sad fate lies directly at the door of
| SIMPSONS incompetency or timidity, or
both.
Absent from and unconnected in any
way with the victory over Cervera, and
the destruction of his squadron, Samp-
son has tried TO seize the credit for
that grand action. He has not thought
| to redeem such reprehensibIe conduct
by doing the one thing left which might
| have crowned him with glory equal to
that of Schley! Fully conscious Of the
desperate straits to which casualties,
sickness and inadequate numbers had
| reduced the land forces undar Cen.
| Shafter, he fatty refused to cooperate
with that officer in a combined attack
upon Santiago. Assured that he could
/ run the gantlet of the batteries and
| reach the inner harbor. and that his
doing so would compel the surrender
| of the city and its garrison, Sampson
| declined to come to the assistance of
| the Army. and, as far as we are advised,
| still refuses to do so. unless, as Shafter
has cabled, under a specific order from
| Washington. Yet the discretionary
| power of action has been placed COM
| pletely in SIMPSONS hands. He knows
that with the endorsements brought
| in by Pando from Manzanillo, and prob
ably by Luque from Holguin. a success
full sortie from Santiago and a possible
defeat of the American army would
not be surprising.
Can President Mckinley find the
slightest excuse to himself or to the
American people for keeping such a
man in command one minute after an
order of removal can be served upon
him? Does he feel inclined to wreck his
| Administration to keep a single bureau
| crat. discredited and all but detested
by the country. in power? Is he afraid
| 10 make a change under the guns of
the enemy? Why should he be? The
] man above all others fitted by ability,