The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-06-08
UNLIMITED POWER
VESTED IN SAMPSON.
In No Way Hampered by Instructions
From Navy Headquarters
at MnAhingtOn.

WASHINGTON, June 1.-Starting out
with strong belief that there had been
nothing in the nature of a serious engage
ment between SIMPSONS forces and the
Spanish defenses at Santiago, the navy
department officials as the day wore On
and the fun and detailed reports of the
Associated Press from its correspondents
with the fleet began 10 flow in. were com
PEELED 10 modify their views, and when
the day closed they were about ready to
admit that although without official in
formation on the subject, II was evident
that Sampson had made q strong attack
upon the Spanish forces
The one point upon which they main
tanned their confidence was that no troops
had been landed They We're prepared TO
learn that Sampson might be clearing the
way with his big guns ;or the landing OF
tha troops, or that possibly some marines
had been landing temporarily. but that
forces had been put ashore they would
not admit for the reason that no informa-
ton had reached the department of the
actual departure of the soldiers for Cuba.
II is not denied, however. that every
effort Is making to put the troops into
Cuba at the earliest possible moment, and
this afternoon. 1t is believed. although no
official advices to that effect were at hand,
that the troops have been actually embark
Ing at Tampa today. and may get away
tonight. The reason for this belief is
found in the admission by officials that
the troops have been under orders TO en-
bark for some time past. The difficulty
that presented itself was the absence Of
absolutely necessary supplies. which in
most cases were stored away In some Of
tho thousands OF freight cars which block
81 the railroad tracks many miles out
from Tampa The orders that went for
ward yesterday were OF a character TO
cause speedy breaking OF the deadlock.
and If the troops now have their sup
piles. as IS believed to be the case. there
is no reason why they should not sail at
once for Santiago.
BY the newspaper reports OF the breach
Sampson has made in the coast defenses
there, there is every reason 10 believe
that little difficulty will be found in the
actual debarkation OF the troops particu-
larry II MARINES are already asEcra to
guard tina landing.
y suspicion is entertained In some quar-
ters that Sampson was FASTENED IN his
movements at Santiago by the news 0f
The intended departure OF the troops from
Tampa and made this attack in order that
the navy might have the honor OF effect
ing the occupation of Cuban soil
Il is likely that the first troops OF the
regular army 20 take mp position ashore
VII be the engineer battalion. although
they are 81 badly hlmper~c by the heavy
siege trains they carry that they must
be greatly delayed in making Il landing
These guns. hy the way. have gwen infinite
trouble for the transports that were hast
lily chartered were SO lightly constructed
sss To require great deal If strengthening
before the great masses Of steel could be
safely placed on then.
The extent OF SIMPSONS attack on the
Santiago defenses has brought out one fact
very clearly. namely. that he has prac-
tca!!y unlimited power as 10 the time and
character OF an attack and that he IS
unhampered by Instructions from Wash
ington- The exact nature OF his orders
has never been made public, but a naval
official in position 10 know what they are
said thai Admiral Sampson had greater
power conferred upon him than had ever
been gwen 20 any commander. Il was for
him 20 decide on the time for an attack
and the pla CO ard manner of It's execution
He may attack. therefore, whenever IN
his discretion IL - necessary. or. K cir
cumsfances warrant. he may refrain from
any operations In short, X In said that
Admiral Sampson - complete master OF
tae tartfcal and strategic operations by the
naval forces u Santiago.
This = = l!us Win the nofev approved
IS the highest naval authorities Capt.
Ashsr. member - ne war board brings
out n his standard work on Sea Power"
that Il Is FOR the naval commander n
chief - organize srd drec. his offensive
Or defensive operations. In referring 10
the brilliant lessons afforded ~ Nelson.
Rodney Fa~~agut ana other great CON-
ua9dsrs, he gives them credit FOR working
ogt ara executing the splendid campaigns
under thA.- direction without orders Or re-
stratrt from outside authority
The only ressrvat.on made IN tbs gen
eral principle = thar ths center Of ,he
government shapes genera! policies along
watch a 1aXal campaign - directed toward
the execution ~ thls genera. purpose ~
the government. II IRE present case thu
authorities hers have iaid down the gen
sr1. ent2s - be attained 81 C'tba ara Port3
R.ro. ard tae var boaFa has ssfueia-yssnt@f
tais Ne every "a; OF Information
which eo2.d 2ss.ss tae command
e--sa-chies. . BIT beyond thss Admiral
oaEpsoa's authority - practically without