The San Francisco call., 1898-06-08

making to put the troops into Cuba at afternoon it is believed, although no official advices to that effect were at hand, that the troops have actually been embarking at Tampa to-day and may get away tonight. The reason for this belief is found in the admission by officials that the troops have been under orders to embark for some time past.
 The difficulty that presented itself was the absence of absolutely necessary supplies, which, in most cases, were stored away in some of the thousands of freight cars which blocked the rail- road tracks many miles out from Tam pa. The orders that went forward yes terday were of a character to cause speedy braking of the deadlock, and if the troops now have their supplies, which is believed to be the case, there Is no reason why they should not sail at once for Santiago.
 By the newspaper reports of the breach Sampson has made in the coast defenses there, there is every reason to believe that little difficulty will be
 
 troops, particularly if marines are al- ready ashore to guard the landing.
 A suspicion is entertained in some quarters that Sampson was hastened in his movements at Santiago by the news of the intended departure of the troops from Tampa, and made this attack in order that the navy might have the honor of effecting the occupation of Cuban soil. It is likely that the first troops of the regular army to take up a position ashore will be the Engineer Battalion, although they are so badly hampered by the heavy siege trains they carry that they must be greatly delayed in making a landing. These guns, by the way, have given infinite trouble, for the transports that were hastily chartered were so lightly con- structed as to require a great deal of strengthening before the great masses of steel could be safely placed on them.
 The extent of Sampsons attack on the Santiago defenses has brought out one fact very clearly namely, that he has practically unlimited power as to the time and character of an attack, and that he is unhampered by restric- l ture of his orders has never been made public, but naval official in position to know what they are said that Ad- miral Sampson had greater power con- ferred upon him than had ever been given to any commander.
 It was for him to decide on the time for an attack and the place and man her of it's execution. He may attack before troops arrive, or, in his discre- tion, may act without the cooperation of troops. Or, if circumstances war rant, he may refrain from any opera tions. In short, it is said that Admiral Sampson is complete master of the tac- tical and strategic operations by the naval forces off Santiago. This is in line with the policy approved by the highest naval authorities.
 Captain Mahan, member of the War Board, brings out in his standard work on Sea Power that 1t is for the naval commander-in- chief to organize and direct his offensive or defensive op- erations. In referring to the brilliant lessons afforded by Nelson, Rodney, Farragut and other great commanders he gives them credit for working out and executing the splendid campaigns under their direction without crders or restraint from outside authority. The only reservation made in this general principle is that the center of the Gov ernment shapes general policies, and the naval campaign is directed toward the execution of this general purpose of the Government.
 In the present case the authorities here have laid down the general ends to be attained in Cuba and Porto Rico. and the War Board has supplemented this with every bit of information which could assist the commander-in- chief. But beyond this Admiral Samp- sons authority is practically without limit. Under these circumstances the naval authorities here have no means of knowing when a battle Is to be ex- ecuted, or what the line of action is to be.