Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1898-10-27

y SluDuoIu IlRul, III tllO NluulCutlOu ol
their honor, at the gates of the city.
The troops generally shared this view.
1t had ben intended up to June 81
| that Lawton's division take strong de.
fensive position north of Siboney land
ing, on the road to Santiago, that kent's
division cncamp west of Law :on, while
Whceler's division would hold the road
from Siboney back to Daiqucri, thus
keeping up land communication between
these two landings. These positions
within easy range of the navy guns
were to have been maintained until all
tho troops, artillery, transportation
wagons and animals, rations and am
munition were safely landed and dis
tributed.
Tho adjutant general of ono Of tho
divisions, who was in n position to know
the inside Of things, told me at Camp
Wikoff that the affair at Las Guasimas
forced the rapid movements of the army
forward upon FL CanGy and San Juan
hill. The capture of that position drew
the army westward to Savilla, where
there were excellent camping grounds,
good water, room to deploy tho divisions
and to receive the Spaniards in case Of
attack. 1t was supposed by many of tho
general officers that the army would
halt in that camp for some time in order
TO get up artillery and put the whole
outfit in shape for an attack in the di-
reotion Of Santiago.
In spite Of the efforts of the staff de-
partnents it was impossible to land and
transport supplies faster than the men
and animals at the front consumed
! them. TEcro was lack of steam
/ launches, lighters, scows and wharfs.
Tho army never had three days supply
OF rationS ahead.
/ There had been much marching and
countermarching to get the troops into
position, and it was very hot. Soldiers
had no changes of clothing. All they
had with them was roll containing Il
blanket, III some cases shelter tent.
their arms and havcrsacks. Perspiration
soaked their urderclothing as though
they had been in bath, and tho fire.
/ quent rains drenched them on the out
( side. Tho soldiers say that while they
would not have minded this state of
things ordinarily, yet, following their
long voyage, it left no time for rocupera.
tiCn, The extreme heat and the peculiar
odor rising from the soil affected their
appetites, and they could not relish the
coarse army rations, nor procure any
thing whatsoever for variety. Those
who had recourse TO the native fruits,
especially the mango, paid dearly for it.
The mango lisa little larger than Il peach,
shaped like pear. Its meat is coaI Sc,
like that Of the pumpkins its riud like
an apple, thick and tough. The expert
cnced CubanS warned Americans against
eating mangoes, us they said they con-
tanned the germs of fever, but us they
were very cooling TO tho throat some
men, especially the volunteers, could
not resist the temptation.
While the army was strung along the
Santiago road between Daiquiri and
Savilla, the region westward toward
Santiago was reconnoitcred. just how
complete these reconuoisances We're is a
mystery. l asked tho staff officers and
division generals whether it was known
beforehand that the approaches to San
Juan heights were exposed to Spanish
view and fire from their works on the
crest, particularly the road and trail at
tho crossing of the San Juan river and
its tributaries. | could learn nothing.
The answers We're, Il suppose that this
was known ut army headquarters. "
Tho fact remains that on July before
the battle opened the troops found them
selves blocked in tho road and in the
beds Of the streams after daylight with
III view Of tho Spaniards and within
range Of their small arms.
1t was stated that certain general,
who refused to commit himself on any
points likely to lead to controversy, ex-
amined the region thoroughly and rec
commended that trails be cut parallel to
the main road and on both sides of it.
General Cbaficc said that the region
TAR south of the road to Santiago was
examined with view to making an at,
tack upon tho Punta Gorda battery.
The Punta Gorda battery was the first
objective Thought of after the army sci
its face toward Santiago from the east.
This was the strongest battery on the
bay and by taking it Skaters army
would have turned Moro, and in fact
captured tine key to the land defense.
Of the harbor. But the ground in real
was impossible for an attack.
Ell Caney had been thoroughly recon
noitered az early as Juno 81 three days
after Las Guasimas, and three days be
fore tho attack upon it. All the partic
ulars as to approaches and defense'
Were known at headquarters
There Was a difference of opinion
around headquarters as to the ilnpor
lance Of lei Caney General Shaftel
said, 1--WE did not wish to leave it as
shelter for strong Spanish outpost OF
the right flank of our line" when i
should move forward against the hig,
ground east and northeast of Santiago
General Lawton's division was to con
stitute the right wing Of the assaultin
force, and | learned from his headqual
tiers that Lawton was unwilling to hui
his division against the height assigno
him for capture, leaving tho Spanish 4
possession of Ell Caney close in his rec.
1t should be said, however, that Gel
eral Lawton believed no could take L