The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1898-04-08
FAITH IN DIPLOMACY.
The Secret of the Presidents
Cuban Policy.
4 REVIEW OF HIS PROGRAMME.

From the First He Has Believed That .
Bloodless Victory Could Be Secured In
Time and Has steadfastly Adhered to
His Policy.
WASHINGTON. April a.-TSpeoial. Now
that the Cuban crisis is SO acute, 1t Is
worth while to review the exciting events
of the past few months, especially with
reference to the policy pursued by the
United States government. In this culmi-
nation of forces it should be borne in mind
that for more than six months President
Mckinley has had definite Cuban policy,
for it is only in the light of knowledge of
that policy one is now able correctly to
Judge current developments. On account
of the careful and at. times seemingly vac
illating movements of the administration
during the excitement of the last few
weeks some people have jumped to the
conclusion that the administration had no
Cuban policy, but was simply drifting
Nong with events, playing hand at
what the foreign writer's call "opportun-
ism."
A Distinct Policy.
This not correct. When the full history
of this great International episode is writ
ten, as it will be some day, it will be found
that President Mckinley has had a dis
tinct and definite Cuban policy ever since
last July. 1t was formed just before Gen.
sral Woodford was chosen to represent this
government at Madrid. The sending of
Mr.. Calhoun of Illinois, now interstate
commerce commissioner, to Cuba on spe-
DIAL mission was part of the general
scheme. can we'll remember the great
anxiety of the president to secure the serv-
ices of Just the right man at Madrid. He
wanted q man who could win the conf
dence of the leaders of the Spanish govern
ment, who could get upon the most friend
ly personal terms with them and secure
hearing for whatever he had to say. At
the same time the president wanted man
who had in him the stern qualities which
should enable him to turn at the right
moment and enforce vigorous policy
upon the government to which he was ao-
credited.
All this indicated the nature of the pol
10y which the president had decided upon
when he set to casting about for fit man
to serve as minister to Madrid. And what
was this policy2 In few words it was, If
possible, to secure the independence, or
practically the independence, of Cuba
without war. Having adopted this policy
and laid out his plan of campaign, Presi-
dent Mckinley adhered to it through all
vicissitudes. When others abandoned hope
Of peace, he still adhered to his plans. 1t
seemed impossible to shake bis belief In
their final SUCCESS.
Independence without War.
His confidence in an ultimate triumph
of the policy of freeing Cuba without war
was largely matter of temperament with
the president. He is essentially diplo-
mat. Everything he does shows this. He
has made his success in life through pos
session of an abnormal tact and shrewd-
ness He was always peaoemaker, rare
ly warmaker. 1t was perfectly natural
for him to look the Cuban situation all
over, 10 reflect upon the difficulties of
Spain's position, the impossibility of Cuba
being worth anything to the kingdom,
the vast financial interests involved, the
hopelessness of her plan of making the
colony oontented and prosperous, and to
reach q conclusion that by skillful diplo-
macy he could induce Spain to make con-
cessions, one after another, which should
ultimately lead to the manumission of the
island from SPANS control.
An essential feature of the presidents
programme was time. In the nature of
things it would take years for the situa-
ton to develop to that stage in which it
would be ripe for final action. The presi-
dents plan was to move step by step, to
crowd Spain little further and little
further, to accustom her people and her
ruling men gradually to the idea of Amer
loan interference in their affairs In the
end there were to be threats of war and
preparations for war and alarm through
out the world, but no actual hostilities.
Spain was to weaken at the last moment
because we were to show her that we were
her friend and to point out the way to her
how she could drop Cuba without loss of
dignity or too great sacrifice of material
interests.
Playing to Spain the part of a strong,
masterful friend who was able to win her
confidence, give her help, get her out of
the trouble in which her rebellious colony
had plunged her, the president never for
q moment doubted that he would succeed
in the end. His favorite idea was to con-
vince Spain Cuba was a bankrupt estate
upon which the owner was powerless to
restore order and prosperity and that
therefore the best thing to do was to sur
render it upon terms of dignity and honor
for just equity.
An Unseen Force.
But all this time great, silent, unseen
force was entering as factor into the sit
uation. Public opinion was rising like q
great cloud among the American people.
1t rose slowly, very slowly, in the west.
At first it was not portentous, but it gath.
cred volume as the days and months passed
by. 1t darkened and became more and
more ominous, but it did not break.
Then came deafening crash. A stroke
of lightning in Havana harbor startled the
world. All the people looked about them,
and many who had not before perceived
the storm now saw it and realized it's por
tent Blacker and blacker it grew until
the heavens were obsoured by it. From
the moment the thunderbolt smashed the
Maine into atoms it grew with amas
ing rapidity. For some weeks it has been
only question of how long time would
elapse before it would break in all its
fury. Events had proved stronger than
the carefully laid plans of man as skill
full and powerful as the president Of the
United States.
After the thunderbolt at Havana the
president still stood his ground. Even
those who do not indorse his method have