The record-union., 1898-10-30

gates of the city The troops gener-
| ally shared this view.
1t had been intended up to June oath
! that LaWtons division should take
| strong defensive position north Of ST.
honey landing, on the road to Santiago,
| that Kent's division encamp west of
| Lawton, while Wheelers division would
| hold the road from Siboney back to
Daiqueri, thus keeping up land COM
munication between these two landings.
These positions, within easy range of
| the navy guns, were to have been
maintained until all the troops, artil-
lery, transportation wagons and ami
mails, rations and ammunition were
safely landed and distributed
The Adjutant General of one of the
divisions, who was in a position to
know the inside of things, told me at
| Camp Wikoff that the affair at Las
Guasimas forced the rapid movements
of the army forward upon Ell Caney and
| San Juan HILL The capture of that
position drew the army westward to
| Savilla, where there We're excellent
camping grounds, good water, room to
deploy the divisions and to receive the
Spaniards in case of attack. 1t was
supposed by many of the general Off
GERS that the army would halt in that
camp for some time in order to get up
| artillery and put the whole outfit in
shape for an attack in the direction of
Santiago.
! In spite of the efforts of the staff de-
partments it was impossible to land
and transport supplies faster than the
men and animals al the front consum-
ed them. There was a lack of steam
launches, lighters, scows and wharfs
The army never had a three days sup
| ply of rations ahead
| There had been much marching and
countermarching to get the troops into
position, and it was very hot. Soldiers
! had no changes of clothing All they
| had with them was a roll containing a
! planket, In some cases shelter tent,
| their arms and haversacks Perspira-
| ton soaked their underclothing as
| though they had been in bath, and
| the frequent rains drenched them on
the outside. The soldiers say that while
! they would not have minded this state
of things ordinarily, yet, following their
| long voyage, it left no time for recuper-
| alton. The extreme heat and the De-
| culiar odor rising from the soil affected
their appetites, and they could not rel
lsh the coarse army rations, nor pro-
cure anything whatsoever for variety.
| Those who had recourse to the native
fruits, especially the mango, paid dear
| ly for 1t. The mango is a little larger
than a peach, shaped like a pear It's
meat is coarse, like that Of the pump
| kin; its rind like an apple, thick and
! tough. The experienced Cubans warn
| ed Americans against eating mangoes,
| as they said they contained the germs
| of fever, but as they were very cooling
| to the throat some men, especially the
volunteers, could not resist the tempta-
| ton.
While the army was strung along the
Santiago road between Daiquiri and
Savilla, the region westward toward
Santiago was reconnoitered. Just how
complete these reconnoisances We're is a
mystery. / asked the staff officers and
division Generals whether it was known
beforehand that the approaches to San
Juan nights were exposed to Spanish
view and fire from their works on the
crest, particularly the road and trail at.
the crossing of the San Juan River and
its tributaries. l could learn nothing
The answers were, II suppose that this
was known at army headquart ers."
The fact remains that on July 1st be-
fore the battle opened the troops found
themselves blocked in the road and in
the beds of the streams after daylight
within view of the SpaniardS and with
in range of their small arms.
1t was stated that certain General
who refused to commit himself on any
point likely to lead to controversy ex-
amined the region thoroughly and rec
commended that trails be cut parallel to
the main road and on both sides of it.
General Chaffee said that the region
far south of the road to Santiago was
examined with view to making an at
| tack upon the Punta Gorda battery
The Punta Gorda battery was the first
objective thought of after the army set
its face toward Santiago from the east.
This was the strongest battery on the
bay and by taking it Skaters army
would have turned MORO, and, in fact,
captured the key to the land defenses
of the harbor. But the ground in the
rear was impossible for an attack
Ell Caney had been thoroughly recon
noitered as early as June 9th, three
days after Las Guasimas, and three
days before the attack upon it. All
the particulars as to approaches and
defenses We're known at headquarters
There was a difference of opinion
| around headquarters as to the import
| ance of Ell Caney. General Shafter
said, 1--WE did not wish to leave it as
shelter for a strong Spanish outpost on
the right flank of our line" when it
should move forward against the high
| ground east and northeast of Santiago.
| General Lawton's division was to con-
stitute the right wing of the assaulting
| force. and learned from his headouar-
ters that Lawton was unwilling to hurl
his division against the hight assigned
him for capture leaving the Spanish in
possession of FL Caney close in his rear.
1t should be said, however, that Cen
eral Lawton believed he could take Ell
Caney in half an hour, and other Gen.
erals, more especially Wheeler and
Young who had looked the ground
| over, said about the same thing These
opinions are based upon information
gained before FL Caney had been rein
forced and strengthened When Lawton
came to attack. it was another matter
| Wheeler says that he asked Shafter to