The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-08-07

We hsVo given only . few Of the opinions con-
corning beauty and art which are quoted By
TolstoI. and these themselves are far nom ex-
haustinR what has been written on the sub
jeot. To what. asks the author. do these delni-
lions amount Leaving out the unsatisfactory
attempts to formulate DEFINITE notions, all Of
them lead to two fundamental conceptions.
The lrst u that beauty In something having
an indepandent existence. that IL 10 one Of the
manifestations OF the absolutely perfect, OF the
idea, OF the spirit, Of the will. or OF God; the
other conception IL that beauty 10 . kind OF
pleasure received By us not having personal
advantage for Its object. On the one hand.
beauty 10 viewed a. something mystical and
yery elevatinE. but unfortunately, at the same
time. very indefinite. and consequently en-
bracinG philosophy. religion and life itself or. on
the other hand. beauty 10 simply q certain kind
of disintArasted pleasure received by us. This
latter conception OF beauty. although it seems
clear, II also inexRct. for. Rs 10 aoknowledRed
By some Of Rants followers, II includes the
pleasure derived from drink. from food. or
from touching q delicate ekin. II 10 true that
the nearer We got to our own time the moro does
an experimental definition come to the front.
and this has recently assumeda physiological
form. But such experimental definitions have
had very little success. and. By the majority Of
the highly educated public. as well as Of artists
and tho learned. o conception Of beauty is held
which agrees with the definitions contained in
most OF the 9sthetio treatises. that Is to say.
which regards beauty either as something mys-
tical or metaphysical. or as o specialkind OF en-
joyment. Tolstol. on the other hand. maintains
that, In order to define any human activity. It
is necessary to understand it's significance and
Importance. In order to do this, It In pri-
marily needful to examine that activity In
itself. In It's dependence on Its CAUSES
and in connection with its effects. and
not merely In relation to the pleasure
we can get from Il. II We say that the aim Of
any activity 10 merely our pleasure. and define
it solely by that pleasure, our definition will.
evidently. DO q false one. Should We. for IN
stance. consider the food question. It not
occur to any one to af1rm that the importance
OF food consists in the pleasure we receive from
eating It. Every one understands that tho sat
~isfaction of our palate cannot serve as q basis
for our definition Of the merits Of food. In the
same way beauty. or that which pleases us. can
in no sense serve as the basis for the definition
OF art; nor can q series OF objects which AFFORD
us pleasure serve as the model OF what art
should be. Just as people who conceive the
aim and purpose Of food to be pleasure cannot
recognize the real meaning OF eating. so people
who consider the aim OF art to be pleasure can
not realize It's true meaning and Dur
pose. because they attribute to an activ-
ity. the meaning of which lies in con-
nection with other phenomona of life. the false
and exceptional aim Of pleasure. People come
to understand that the meaning Of eating lies
in the nourishment Of the body only whom they
cease to consider that the object OF that activity
is pleasure. 1t is the Same with regard to art.
People will come to understand the meaning Of
art only when they cease to consider that the
aim OF that activity is beauty. or. in other
words. that which plcRses. Tho acknowledge
ment OF beauty-that Is. Of o certain kind Of
pleasure received from art-ns being the aim of |
art, not only fails to assist US IN finding a deh-
milton Of what art is. but. On the contrary, by
transferring the question into metaphysical.
psychological and physiological regions. !ren-
ders such definition impossible.