The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-08-31
Gen. Shnftcr Reviews War.


Mexico, Majcr General Shaftcr con
sentcd to be interviewed. During the
interview he discussed in general
terms the campaign just ended. The
bare prospect of returning to the
United States caused him to be
brighter, more cheerful and less har-
rasscd looking than at any period
since he embarked at Tampa.
Critics and dctractors are alike for
gotten. and with improved health and
the evident consciousness that what
ever might be the eventual verdict Of
the operations before Santiago, a diff
tlcult campaign has been brought to a
successful conclusion. lie spoke with
greater energy aud more vigor than at
any time since the capitulation. Gen.
Shaftcr said
II look upon the campaign lust
closed as Il successful one in the
highest degree. not only in regard to
the military operations, but more
especially in regard to the great re-
suits achieved. When we decided TO
attack Santiago we looked for nothing
more as the immediate fruit of victory
!! than the capture of the city. What
has been achieved is the capitulation
OF the entire eastern part Of the pro
vince from line at Jibari to the
south coast together with the encmy's
forces, amounting to almost ~ 900
mer. Surely this was notable
achievement of the campaign, bearing
in mind the fierce opposition we en-
countered and the comparatively small
loss of our own forces.
perhaps took steps which might not
be deemed justiiable under other cir
cumstances, but I knew the temper
and capabilities Of my soldiers and the
moral effect of our gradually oooping
up the enemy within its own lines.
My engineers were very apprehen-
sive that the Spaniards might break
through on my left and cut off Siboney.
This, from purely military stand
point, might have been truthfully
correct, but personally, I had not for
a moment any fear on that scope. The
result, however, l think, proved the
"Our primary object was to drive
Cervera out and next to take the town.
We had gradually driven the Span
iards back on high lands circling the
city, and slowly advancing day by
day. The enemy began losing spirit
as soon as our guns had been placed
in position to cover the town.
"Whcn Cervcra left the situation
was changed. The town was at my
mercy and had / given the order for u
direct assault it would have been
taken within four hours. | believe
that with the forces then at my COM
mand, reinforced as they had been,
was in position to take the city by
force.
"But if 1 had taken q step Of such
q character what would have been the
result estimate that our casualties
would have been 1900 men, and the
action I took has had a more brilliant
result, without so heavy loss Of
valuable lives.
''The town itself is admirably stu
ated for defense, and the ight wo1ld
have been a long and bloody one.
Of stone, and entirely different from
ordinary buildings. Every house was
little fortress itself. Had the Span
iards, forced by desperation, fought
the battle cut in the streets our loss
would have been enormous. But from
the moment General Toral made a
proposition for conference, I knew
he was determined to give up, and
acted accordingly.
personal reflections have been cast
upon me because / was not on the
fighting line. That was not the place
for q general in command of an army.
Il must be remembered that l was
connected by telephone with the off :
GERS at the front and was better able
to direct operations from the position
had taken. Save for two days when
i'll, was in direct command Of this
campaign, which I consider unequaled
in American history. for it was really
the first time the United States had
fought with its regular army. The
civil war was war Of volunteers, but
this campaign was fought and won by
our regular troops.
II did not notice the fact at first,
but there WAS only three volunteer
regiments engaged against the Span
iards. While the highest credit is to
be given them and they fought bravely
and well, there was the moral sup
port of the regulars back of it ALL
"Our volunteers lacked that unity,
cohesion and individual support
noticeable in our trained troops, but
at the same time no disparagement
should be made Of the volunteer regi-
ments in the campaign. What they
lacked otherwise they made up for in
enthusiasm and patriotic spirit, aud l
uesiru ~ command no better army
than the one composed of the class
of volunteers under me in the Santi-
ago campaign.
''Thc operations of the regulars in
the campaign have proved conclusive
1v their suDeriOritv over some Orpani-