The Caucasian. (Clinton, N.C.) 188?-1913, 1898-04-14
The Bradfie!d Regulator Co.,
Atlanta, Go.

eighty of spain IL failed, through
the refusal Of the Spsnish govern
ment then in power 10 cDnsid'r
any form of mediation or indeed any |
plan of settlement which did not begin
with the actual submission OF The IN
surgents To the mother country, and
then only on such terms that Spain hef-
self might see fir 10 grant. The war
unsbatrd. The rrsIstanee
of the insurgents wssin nowise dimln-
ished
The effort. of Spair We're increased.
both by the dispatch of fresh levies 10
Cuba am by the addition To the hor-
rors of the strife OF new and inhumau
phase happily unprecedented IN the
modern history of civilized Christian
peoples. Tie policy OF devastation
and concentration, inaugurated by the
Captain Generals band OF October 81,
1896. in the province OF Pinar del Rio
was thence extended to embrace all of
the island to which the power OF the
Spanish arms was able to reach by &C.
cupation or by military operation.
The peasantry, including all DWELL
ing in the open agricultural inte-
riUr, were driven into the garrison
towns or isolated places held by the
trOoIs. The raising and movement
Of provisions of all kinds were inter-
dicted.
Warfare Of Devastation.
The fields were laid waste, dwellings
unroofed and fired, mills destroyed,
and in short every thing that could
desolate the land and render il unfit
for human devastation Or support wa
commanded by one or the ether Of the
contending parties. and executed by
all the powers at their disposal.
By the time the present administrs-
ton took office year ago, r.concen-
tration socalled had been made effec-
tive over the better part of the four
central and western provinces, Santa
Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and PInar
del Rio. The agricultural population,
to the estimated number OF 900 900 or
more, was herded within the towns
and their immediate vicinage deprived
Of the means of support, rendered des-
titute of shelter, left poorly clad, and
exposed to the most unsanitary con-
ditiOns. As the scarcity OF food in
creased with the devastation of the
populated areas of production, desti-
tuition and wsnt became misery and
starvation. Month by month the death
rate increased in an alarming ratio.
BY March, 1897, according TO conserv-
alive estimates from official Spanish
sources, the morality among the re-
concentrates, from starvation and the
disease thereto incident, exceed 20
per centum Of their total number. No
practical relief was accorded 10 the
destitute. The over-burdened towns.
a ready suffering from the general
dearth, could give no aid. SO called
zones Of cultivation" established
within the immediate area of effective
military control about the cities and
fortified camps proved illusory as q
remedy for the suffs ring. The un-
fortunates, heInR for the most part,
women and children, aged and help
less men, enfeebled by diseas. and
hunger. could not have titled the soil,
without tools, seed or shelter, for their
own support or for the supply Of the
cities Recommendation. adopted ayow-
eddy as war measure in order TO cut
off the resources of the insurgents.
worked its predestin-d result. AsI
said In my message Of last December.
it was not civilized warfare; il vas
determination. The only peace IL
&C uld beget was that OF the wilderness
and the grave.
Meanwhile, the military situation in
| VIC bau kOuc q
change. The extraordinary activity
that characteriz: d the second year Of
the war, when the insurgents invaded
even the hitherto nDsrmsd fields OF
Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and
destruction up TO the walls OF the city
Of Havana itself, had relapsed into q
dogged struggle in the central and
eastern provinces. The Spanish arms
regained measure of control in Pipar
del Rio and parts of Havana hut, un-
der the existing conditions OF the
rural country, without immediate i'm
provenent of their productive situa-
ton. Even thus partially resfric; ed
the reyOlutionists held their own and
their coDques: ard submission. p1t
forward by Spain rs the essential and
sole basis OF peace, seemed as far di.t-
ant as at the outset.
The message then continues in de-
tail, Of which the following 10 synop-
sis:
The President says:
Spanish measures for the relief of
these unfOrtunates proved iIIusory. ana
the Recommendation adopted, ayowedIy
as . war measure, proved not to be civ
lllzed warfare, but determination.
Alter It became evident that the
struggle would only result in ex.ermi.
nation, full military victory on sither
side seeming impossible, the President
submitting ION the 9TH ulto.) after
muce representation and CORRESPOND
ence, propositions looking 10 an armis-
tice until October LIST.
q addition, the Immediate Teyoca.
ton OF the RECOMMENDATION ::order was
demanded. together with q re quest that
the needy might be relieved BY the
United States government in co-opera-
ton with the Spanish authorities.
The reply Of Spain ION the 3lst ulti.
MOI offered - means to brings about
peace, to confde the aPrsp1.meut,
therefor to the island pariiament
Spain would agree to suspension O,
hostili'ies, il asked for By the insur.
gent General-in.Chief.
It 10 understood, the mes ,aRe say.
that the spanish government stand,
ready to give the insuisr Congress ali
power to settle tie terms OF peace.
With this last overture in the direc.
ton OF immediate peace. and its disap.
pointing reception BY Spain. the ex-
ecutive Wss brought 70 the end Of his
efforts.
; The President then proceeds 10 die.
cpss extensively the measures Yet un-
tried TO bring the contest To Q close.
He cites President Grants measured