The San Francisco call., 1898-08-14
A UNIQUE WAR.

! JUDGED by any, or by. every, phase ot Its course
 from beginning to end, three months con o fict with Spain must be pronounced one of the most remarkable wars in the annals of history It IS unique in modern times. Only by returning to the records of the middle ages anything like paral- Tel be found to the contest and then there was none of similar nature on anything like an equal scale of magnitude and importance.
 During the whole conflict the Spaniards made hardly serious effort uphold their cause or their empire They fought bravey enough indeed when trapped at Manila and at Santiago but even in those instances the fighting was wild and badly directed One fleet we sought out in the Philippines and de stroved and another they to the West Indies ap parently for no other purpose than to have 1t de- stroyed and that being duly done they straightway sue for peace.
 If the Spanish authorities had provoked war with the United States with the sole object ot getting rid of Cuba without the humiliation of surrendering to the Cuban insurgents they could hardly have acted other than they did They fought just about enough to make record of having war with us, but no more The defense of Santiago imposed upon Us one hard battle in which our losses the heaviest ever suffered in single fight with foreign foe but with that exception we won victories as boodless as they were brilliant.
 The strategy of the Spaniards was, moreover, as extraordinary as their incapacty in battle Why should Cervera have been sent to the West Indies instead of the Philippines? Why should he have gone into Santiago and stayed there until block aded? Why should he then endeavor to escape in stead of remaining to help Toral defend the town! Why after the fleet was gone, did Toral try to hold the town which was then of no use to either him us? Why. when defense was no longer possible did he surrender over 10000 with all their arms 1n- stead of marching away to join Blanco at Havana!
 These tactics utterly confused our military authorl- ties and led in several instances to sad mistakes the part of our commanding officers. Sampson was twice caught First he supposed that Cervera would try to break the blockade Havana, and he there fore remained there and sent Schley on scouting expedition with te result that Schley had the credit of chasing the Spaniards into Santiago Then Samp- son concudedthat Cervera would stay in that harbor until forced out by the capture ot the town, so he went away one day and lost the glory of commanding the fleet on the day of battle and victory.
 Miles was even more unfortunate than Sampson. When the Santiago expedition was fitted put Miles was offered command but he believed that expedi- ton would be but small affair and that the great event of the war would be the campaign agalnst Havana He therefore scorned to command sub ordinate army and sent Shafter to take charge Now after all there is to be no Havana campaign. Shater
 has done all the fighting and gained all the glory, and General Miles has had,to console himself with com handing a iunketing expedition to Porto Rico. Is it to be wondered that he and Sampson despise the Spaniards and regard their war tactics beneath contempt?
 According to the philosophy now prevalent in the world there is reason for everything except the yer dict of petit jury It may be assumed, therefore that some reason exists for the course the Spanish Government has pursued The discovery of that reason will constitute the mystery story of historians vet to be- but for this generation will be accounted conundrum and given up.