The Portland daily press., 1898-09-15
SHAFTER'S REPORT.


before entering battle, orderlles, etc., 1t IS
doubtful if we had more than 1000 men
neroest and when the important ana
strong positions of Ell Caney and San
Juan were captured.
"a few Oubans assisted in the attack
at Ell Caney and fought va1liently, put
their mum bers were too small to maternal
" change the strength as indicated ABOVE.
The enemy confronted us with nulhpers
about equal to our own; they fough6 Oh,
stinately in strong and intrenched
positions and the results obtained clear
Iy indicate the Intrepid galIantry OF inc
company officers and men ana 1ne Dene
instruction given in the company In re-
cent years, in rifle practice and other
battle exercises. Our losses In these
battles were % officers and 2GS men killed
and 81 officers and 1908 men wounded,
missing TO- Inc missing WIFI 10" Ga.
General Shafter says the arrival OF
General Escario at Santiago was not an
ticipated. He says:
fst4eneral Garcia with between four and
five thousand Cubsns was instructed with
the duty of watching for and intercept
inc the reinforcements. This, however,
he failed TO do, and Escario passed into
uhe city along on my extreme right near
the bay"
After speaking of Admiral Cervera's
sortie and the destruction of his neet
General Shafter says he again called ON
the Spanish commander to surrender.
"On the same date I informed Admiral
Sampson that if he would force his way
into the harbor the city would surrender
without any further Sacrifices of life.
Commodore Watson replied that Ad-
miral Sampson was temporarily absent,
but that in his (Watsons') opinion, the
navy should not enter the harbor.
'sIhe strength of the enemy's position
was such I did not wish to assault IL 1t
could be avoided. An examination Of the
enemys works, made after the surrender,
fully justified the wisdom of the course
adopted. The intrenchments could only
have been carried with great loss OF life. !"
General Shafter gives the varying EFFORTS
towards securing surrender anu MS re-
opening the engagement on the tenth,
when the truce ended. On Gne lltn 1ne
surrender was again demanded.
ssBy this date the sickness in the army
was increasing very rapidly, as a result of
exposure in the trenches to the intense
heat of the sun and the heavy rains.
Moreover the dews in Cuba are almost
equal to rains. The weakness OF the
.,rops was becoming SO apparent. l was
anxious to bring the siege to an end but
in common with most of the officers of
the army, did not think an assault
would be justiiable, especially, as the
enemy seemed to be acting in good faith
in their preliminary preparations to sur
render.
July -, 1 informed the Spanish COM
mander that Major General Miles, COM
mander-in-c chief of the American army,
had Just arrived in my camp, and re.
uuested him to grant US personal inter
view on the following day. He replied ne
would be pleased to meet us. The inter
view took place on the 18th, and in
formed MIN his surrender only could be
considered and that as he was w1thout
h0pe of escape he had no right to continue
To fight.
General Shafter then gives the details
of the final surrender, his entry into the
city and the raising of the American flag.
In closing he says:
'Before closing my report wish to
dwell upon the natural obstacles l had to
encounter and which no foresight could
have oven come or obVlatea. Inc ROCKY
and precipitious coast afforded no
sheltered landing places. the roads were
mere bride paths, the. effect of Pie
tropical sun and rains uponsun -aecl1mateo
troops was deadly, and the dread OF
strange and unknown diseases had its
effect on the army.
sEs At Daiquiri, the landing of the troops
and stores was made at a small wooden
wharf which the Spaniards tried to burn
but unsUccessfully, and the animals were
pushed into the water and guided to
a sandy beach about 30 yards in extent
the beach and at a small wharf erected
by the engineers. had neither the time
nor the men to spare to construct perma-
nent wharVes.
SIN spite of the fact that had nearly
1000 men continuously at work on the
roads, they were at time impossible Tor
wagons.
1.-THE San Juan and Aguadores rivers
would often suddenly rise SO as to pre-
vent the passage OF wagons and then the
eight pack trains with the command
had to be depended on victualling my
army as well as the 10000 refugees, who
could not, in the interests of humanity,
be left to starve while we mad rations
'Often for days nothing could be moved
except in pack trains. After the great
physical strain and exposure OF July
and 2, the malarial and other fevers
command and on July 4th the yellow
fever appeared at Siboney. Though
efforts were made to keep this fact from
the army, it soon became known.
1.-THE supply OF quartermaster and
commissary stores during the campaign
was abundant, and notwithstanding the
difficulties in landing and transporting
the rations, the troops on the firing line
were at all time supplied with its coarser
components namely, OF bread, meat, sugar
and coffee. There was no lack OF trans
portation, for at no time up to the sur
render could all the wagons had be
used as
sin reference to the sick and wounded
I have to say that they receiyeds every
attention that it was possible to give
them.
1.-THE medical officers, without excep-
ton. worked night and day to alleviate
the suffering which was no greater than
invariably accompanies eampaign- 1t
would have been better if we had more
amDulances, but as many were taken as
was thought necessary Judging from
previous campaigns. la
"The discipline of the command was
superb, and / wish to invite attention to
the facs that not an officer was brought
to trial by court martial and. as far as l
know, TO enlisted men. This speaks vol
umes for an army of this size and in
campaign of such duration.
''ln conclusion 1 desire to express to
the members of my staff my thanks
for their efficient performances of all tbs
duties required OF them and the good
Judgment and bravery displayed on all