The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-08-24
CALLED DOWN BY SIMPSON
EwclSSa NAVAL AUTHORITY SAID
WAN TAUGHT 10 LEssONA
Important Points Have Been
Learned FrOn Late War. Espe-
eaaaly Exsausioa Of WooawOrk-

BOSTON. Aug. 9.-rn Al interview with
q Boston Journal reporter on Tire. train
from Washington today. Rear Admiral
sampson said. after being reminded that
Admiral Colonb, the English naval au-
thors,y. had said TIA; this war had taught
TO lessons In naval architecture or naval
strategy:
II ne said that was the comment, ne
doesn't know what he Il talking about. for
the war has taught great many things.
Fer one thing. 1t has shown the necessity
OF making ships OF war fireproof. Ii wont
suffice merely TO make the wood tireproo{.
In my opinion. for there are objections 10
the proceSs as X involves unnecessary ex-
without woodwork at all, and there Is no
good reason why this cannot be done.
After the way in which the woodwork OF
the Spanish ships caught fire. causing the
destruction Of the ships. there can be no
question about the Importance OF this
''The ,roub,e with coiomb may be that
he has always been An advocate OF torpedo
boats. We are not likely to hear 50 much
about torpedo boats as We used 10 hear
before the war;" 1t was suggested.
,ns, o b net; a. the sam. anna. tine II
have never had really fair test. They
have always been faulty In construction,
necessary Qualities having been sacrificed
a torpedo boat should have a speed OF
more than twenty-four or twenty-five
miles an hour, but II has been thought SD
important to have them speedy that they
have been made too light, and in some in
stances they are little better than egg
shells The torpedo boat has its uses, bur
ideas.
1T won't do. either. to draw too hasty
conclusion from the way in which the
Gloucester. which was Q converted yacht,
did up the Furor and the Pluton. The
Gloucester was hastily transformed into
a torpedo boat destroyer. 1t is true, but II
is not a small boat by any means
How about the big gunsf The eight
done most Of the execution, both az Ma
Mia and at Santiago. and a great many
people seem to think the guns OF higher
caIher are not OF so much account in
battle"
The big guns Will always be needed.
There is work which they can do and
which Is out OF the question for the smaller
eight-inch guns and. the rapid-fire guns
did great execution. but this was because
they could strike the Spanish below the
portions Of the spanish ships were exposed
to their fire. At Manila the Spanish ships
were not heavily arnnored az all.
When It comes to piercing heavy armcr.
action. The armor-p piercing capacity of a
gun is almost exactly proportioned 10 its
ealieer. For instance, an eight-inch gun
gun, twelve-inch armor, and so on. Yes,
the big guns are needed.
Then there Is the question Of smokeless
powder. Our ships ought to be supplied
with smokeless powder for several reasons
First, the most important is the great ad-
vantage In velocity. With ordinary pow
der the velocity is something like a.l00;
with sfnokeless powder it Is nearly $500.
Ships using black powder are at a disad-
vantage. too. from the fac; tina: when one
gun has been discharged the gun next 70
1t mus wait until the smoke has cleared
before the target can be sighted. These
are among the reasons why smokeless
powder IN to be preferred to any other"
Admiral Sampson expressed doub. az to
whether it would be advisable to raise the
Cristobal Colon. He was afraid Ii was
now too late TO accomplish anything In
that direction. and he described the pecu-
liar position In which the ship lay. making
IT seemingly impossible to handle her. al
though she was practically un!ujured by
our fire. He commented upon the excel
lent physical condition OF the men aboard
the fleet. and the astonishing exemption
from disease as we'll as wounds He had
just been Informed that out Of 12.e00 men
on the feet there have been only twenty
casualties throughout the war
But" he remarked, simply. I'VE know
how TO take care of our men Ia the navy.
You see. We are always on war footing.
That U.s. today we handle ourselves in time
OF peace with - much exacfness and dis
cipline az In time Of war; Our target prae-
tfce In time or peace h carried out with
as much care snd precision al * we had
the enemy constantly In sight. In the
same way we are 30 accustomed to the dis
tribution OF supplies and the care Of the
sick from long training In peace that when
WAT comes we are ready for anything The
men on most of the ships I'm the fleet had
been for six months without going ashore
until we reached New York Saturday. and
they have borre up under the strain Of a
snonotonous existence on shipboard and