Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-10-24
REPREHENSIBLE ACTIONS OF THE
.FIGHTING COMMODORE,
Admiral Sampson Compelled to In
sist Upon the FulfiIlment of His
Orders by the Commander
of the BIockadinE
Squadron.

made up largely of official dispatches and
the movements of the fleet, with eXpiana-
tons and comment by the admiral. The
report is dated August >, on the flagship
New York, and begins with a statement
of the determination reached by the navy
department to send a squadron to the
Windward passage for the purpose of OBJ
servation, because of information received
of the sailing. April 49, of Admiral Ger
vera's squadron from the Cape Verde ISL
ands. On the voyage eastward from the
naval base at Key West, which began
May A, Admiral Sampson reports there
was experienced endless trouble and delay
because of the ineffciency of the two mon
itors accompanying the other ships and
which had to be taken in tow. Their coal
supply was so small that it was at once
evident that they must either frequently
coal or be towed. The admiral says:
Had the sea been rough, or had the en-
emy appeared at this juncture, the squad
ron would have been in a much better
condition for an engagement had the mon
itors been elsewhere. Subsequently, when
engaging the batteries of San Juan, ii
was evident that their shooting was very
bad. Owing to the quick rolling of these
vessels, even in very moderate sea, they
were unable to fire with any degree of
accuracy"
Among the kilograms received by the ad-
miral from the department at Washington
when off Cape Haytien was the follow
ing:
Washington, D. c.. May 6, 1898.
do not risk or cripple your vessels
against Notifications as to prevent from
soon afterwards successfully fighting Span
ish fleet composed of Pelayo. Carlos ".
Oquendo, Yizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal
Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats If
they should appear on this side. LONG,"
On May there was consultation on
board the flagship, and the admiral says
that he decided to stand on to the east
ward as far as San Juan, Porto Rico, on
the chance of finding the Spanish squadron
in that port, where, if they were not sue
cessful in destroying it, it could at least
be blockaded and held. The squadron ar
rived off San Juan on the morning of the
18th and the bombardment of the place
ensued. Regarding his action at this place
the admiral says: 1T was clear to my
own mind that the squadron would not
have any great difficulty in forcing the
surrender of the place, but the fact that
We sSould be held several days in complet-
ing arrangements for holding it; that part
of our force would have to be left to
await the arri&al@of troops to garrison it,;
that the movements of the Spanish squad
ron, our main objective, were still un-
known; that the flying squadron was still
north, and not in a position to render any
aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural object
i've point, was thus open to entry by such a
force as his, while we were a thousand
miles distant, made our immediate move
ment toward Havana imperative.
II thus reluctantly gave up the project
against San Juan and stood westward for
Havana
Several kilograms are here presented,
based on reports that Cervera's squadron
had returner to Cadiz. and they had in view
ure to do SO and occupy the place being as
sured in the event of Admiral Cervera'S S
failure TO cross the Atlantic.
Shortly after news was received that the
Spanish fleet had appeared of Curacao,
West Indies, and the squadron under or
ders from the department proceeded to
ron under Commodore tnow Admiral)
Schley had already been ordered,
Arrangements were then hurriedly, made
and the flying squadron, augmented by the
other vessels under Commodore Schley,
was sent off Cfenfuegos, where 1t was be-
lieved the enemy would go. in which case
capture him. Sampson was gwen the
choice either of the command of the block
aiding squadron off Havana or at Cienfue-
goa Schiey in either case TO remain with
his own squadron.
From messages received by the ad-
miral from the department about May 20
United States that the Spanish fleet was
at Santiago; so the department advised
sampson to send word Immediately TO
Schley to proceed to that place, leaving
one small vessel off Cienfuegos.
On May q instructions were gotten by
Sampson for Commodore Schley and sent
TO him via Marblehead, regarding the pos
sibility Of the Spanish fleet being at SAM
tiago. They are in part as follows:
u. S. Flagship l- New & York 1 First 81 Rate. Rate
'Sir-Spanish squadron probably at Sam
tiago de Cuba-four ships and three tor
pedo boat destroyers. II you are satisfied
with all haste, but cautiously. to Santiago
de Cuba, and if the enemy is there block
ade him in port. You will probably fnd it
necessary to establish communication with
some Of the NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. or oth-
ers-to learn definitely that the ships are
in port, it being impossible to see into it
from the outside"
The admiral said he felt much concerned
as TO the delivery of these orders and sent
u duplicate by the Hawk with an additional
memorandum. The admiral suggested that
Gore Schley before daylight of May %. TO
mask the real direction he should take as
Spanish squadron whichever direction it
takes"
The admiral off Havana gives copies of
orders of battle which were to be followed
in the event that Cervera left Santiago on
the approach of Schley's fleet from Glen
fCegos and attempted to cruise around the
coast to Havana. in which case the Ha-
v2na squadron would attempt to intercept
him by going east about 200 miles beyond
the junction of Santaren and Nicholas
channels. Strict orders We're given for
screening lights and TO see that none WAS
accidentally shown. The squadron was to
cruise generally to the eastward in the day
and westward during the night.
IN one of his dispatches the admiral COM
plains that his movements are grea ly
hampered by monitors, constitu ing the
principal force under his command. On
dore Schley expressed the belief that the
Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 9th
the admiral sent word to Schley, directing
him to proceed with all possible speed TO
Santiago because of information received
that the Spaniards were there. The same
time orderS were sent to have the collier
Sterling dispatched to Santiago. with an
expression OF opinion that the commodore
should use it to obstruct the channel at
its narrowest part leading into the harbor.
The details of the plan were left to the
had the utmost confidence in his ability
to carry this plan to a successful conclu-
sion and earnestly wished him good luck"
Sampson apparently. fslt certain of the
urged that the harbor must be blockaded
at all hazards. Schey in the meantime
had proceeded to Santiago. although it APP
pears not the same day admiral Sampson
expected. At one time Commodore SchIey
contemplated going to Key West with the
SQUADRON, but this was abandoned. the re-
pairs to his collier having been Temporal
riiy repaired, and, the necessity for a trip
10 Key West being avoided. Santiago was
then blockaded. The admired conera ulaed
the commodore on his success and directed
him to maintain close blockade at all
hazards and especially at night.
Then follow kilograms from Schley