The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-06-04
hRMy MAY HAVE BEEN
SENT 70 PORTO RICO.
Schley and Sampson Can Cope
With Cervera'g Fleet.
This Fact Clearly Proved by the
Accommodating Hons Inn ans mt -
Trsop. Now sailing for santiago
May Invade the other Istan nd.
Leaving Cuba I'm Care of the Navy
sruciaf Hattie of the War IL Near.

NEW YORK. Juns IA Tribune sp@-
Ca fr3ra Washington aays.
Tho contingency. clearly seer era pro-
videa for IL th@ orders seat 20 Major Gen
Enafisr last SUNDAY. which mlgRt render
superfiro1Is the beginning Of extended
army operations 81 the vicinity % santi-
axo, has now acquired Important proper
tioBs is view ~ he extremely Formidable
naval concentration when = reported of
the southera coast Of Cuba. sna there
has been a consequent Improvement In
the prospects Of an immediate INVASION OF
Porto Rice with the likelihood Of the &C.
eupation Of san Iuan itself before the
middle OF June.
Army officers In Washington beiiYe that
The reported arrival Of Sampson off sanu-
ago. and the presence there OF the peer
4ess oregog. s'gnalize the confidence Of
The naval commanders that Csryeras
squadron may be destroyed without de-
bending on assistance ashore. and that
quickly following TIE accommodating
eklrmlsa OF the Iowa. the Massachusetts,
and New Orleans. a decisive engagement
sxould be- undertaken. Should this con-
Slctlon prove weil founded. the troops
tow on the way 20 Mole st. Nicholas will
Got 30 south through the Windward pas
cage, bat wiz continue their easterly
roairse past Cape lIaytien. and promptly
begin the vigorous campaign which has
been mapped out for the seizure OF Porto
Rico
Since ihe departure oil Gen Miles from
Washington the probability that the army
Cooperation would he imperative at
Santiago has materially diminished. par
t!eulary since the effectiveness OF COM
fnodore sehiey's commualeaj lions with the
Insurgents ashore became fang known ana
eleafly appreciated IS he officials here,
how charged solely W.;h supporting actual
operations Of fleets and armies,
The commodore certainty that he had
Ceryera securely in the harbor. ard his
sequest Ter naval rather than military re-
enforcement. haze given rise to Enques-
tlonIug assurances on the part Of the high
ust authorities that Ne can safely be trust
Cd to carry out tbs. responsibilities which
asye been imposed on him.
lis demonstration that the Santiago bat
ssrIes were lnslSniticlrt - Gesroe that
removed them from serious confederation
rs essential elements .u the defense %
ah1t hasta{. although theoretical STRAIT
egists have iabUgiousv nguged ont thar
naval guns c0Ul1 B5t oe sufficiently che
waited 10 reach them, ana MS casting grave
doubts on the efficiency Of the alleged
tline-iiwlds VIII which the rh4auei udd
eeen preauued % be protected has la
10 a change ~ opiutJu, and 10 is the iu3-
PRECISION If naval ofiicers here Nno prob
ably reflect thc opinions ot the naval
commanders on ~" sCe8r. that ash attack
on tha Span.sh squadron inside tae havbcr
would be gt+n4td with scarcely grVtter
hazards than an engasement with II IN
abe open sea ana wish Infinitely ifnpraV ed
caances q accomplishing its cutiru de-
feat.
Ia view OF the extreme latitude allowed
20 fleet commanders whose discretion -
pfsc;caliy unlimited bv var boards or
other officials distant from tbs, front. Il
IS evident that uo one in Washington. OF
whatever exalted authority. can predict
the character of tna neXt report from the
CulIf,s.sfai eup4drnua.
Ungnestiouahly 70 them the crucial bat
e.. Of the var is imminent unless all signs
fa1, aud IL may BE q matter 80 hours
rather than days. before the receipt ~
news az an occurrence. whlch may ter
inmate the Nar. uf [n any event draw
the line sbsrpiy fog th- e2itsse of an sue
rest1inS QfaY Atoms.