The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-04

that the minimum strength OF the United
States land forces that would be essential
islands 10000 men; for garrison OF Llzon
Island, 5000 men; for garrison OF Mania
alone 1900 men. These estimates were
based ON the assumption that for q cOnsld-
cradle period, at least, after the expulsion
or the SpanlardS, all the native leaders
would exhibit their gratitude to the Amer
leans Dy heartily supporting the new order
of things.
From the best information that could be
obtained regarding the habits and charac-
tertStics of the Philippine natives. General
Miles and General Merritt, as well as the
other army officers who discussed the mat
ter, were convinced that whether the Amer
lean occupation was to be for one year or
hve years, standing force equal TO that
given above would be indispensable. They
agreed that while such force might have
little to do most of the time. as was the
case with army garrisons several years ago
IN the Tar West, the natives could no more
be relied on to continue their peaceful pur-
suits for any great length of time than the
American Indians in former days, and that,
with smaller garr1SonS, an uprising might
lead to a disaster which would horrify the
United States. AS consequence of these
deliberations and conclusions regarding the
acquisition of the entire Philippine group
the attention of the authorities was then
concentrated on the probability OF the re-
tentfon OF the Island or Luzon alone ana
after debating the matter and digesting
vast amount of information about that ISL
and, the officers and officials were unani-
mouSly or the opinion that IL would De lnuls-
Greet in the extreme to attempt to controL
the three million inhabitants of Luzon with
less than $1,000 men.
Further study of the conditions at Manila.
having due regard TO the continuance there
of Admiral Dewey's squadron. resulted in
the authorities discovering nothing 70 war
rant any modification of the strength OF the
proposed garrison of that city, which was
considered a most conservative estimate,
and the fact that General Merritt's COM
mand was fixed at 25,0O0 men is taken to in
dictate that this government a month ago
did not seriously contemplate the occupa-
ton of more territory by the army than that
included in the cfty of Manila, while the
navy with it's ships and marines maintained
possession of Cavite and Manila bay. Even
the latter proposition, however, is now SUBJ
jected to material modification by the au-
dacity of Aguinaldo, and little short or MS
death or capture is apt to clear up the COM
plications.
1T is feared the crisis at Manila is already
at hand and that General August may at
any moment be compelled to surrender the
city to General Merritt, whether the latter
is ready to receive 1t or not Under such
circumstances, it is certain that General
Merritt would be promptly compelled to ac-
cept the serious responsibility OF protecting
property in the city from the insurgents at
whatever hazards, and the incongruouS
spectacle may yet be presented of Amer
lean and Spanish troops there cooperating
against a common enemy, supported by the
combined forces from the foreign fleets
which have gathered in the harbor.