The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1898-01-24

charge upon the property shall result
from the making of the assessment in &c.
cordance with the charter and the ordi-
nances. and that no declaration of such
liability by the council TO That erect snail
be necessary. When the course OF
procedure essential to valid assessment
has been completed and the assessment
made, the personal liability OF the owner,
as we'll as the Hen, at once results. The
part OF section $50 which gives power and
makes 1t the duty of the council - pro-
vide for the carrying out of the movers
conferred, has general reference to the
powers given in all the provisions of the
title, and was doubtless intended 10 au-
thorize the adoption of such additional
rules consistent with the charter, regu-
lating details. as might be found neces-
sary TO the practical execution of the work.
1t can not be constructed as importing
a power Internationally conferred, or u
liability directly imposed by the charter
itself Thus. the charter itself makes
the assessment, when completed. lien
upon the property. this clause OF section
100 can not be construed as making an or
dinance or resolution declaring such lien
essential, And so with the power to IN
stitute suit for the sum assessed. AS he
charter makes personal liability result
from the assessment no ordinance or reso-
luton of the council beyond the taking
of the steps essential TO a valid assess
ment. is required to give rifre to such La
bility. But the ordinance in regard to
suit, considered in connection with the
provisions of the charter, clearly shows
that the city council did determine that
there should be personal liability. BY
providing in nearly the same language
as that of the charter. that suits might be
brought to collect the amount due. it eX-
ercised whatever discretion 1t had on that
question. 1t left At to the city attorney
to determine the time when suit should
be brought but not to determine whether
or not the right to sue should exist. The
time when suit should be commenced was
not a matter about which an ordinance,
or fixed rule of any kind, was necessary.
The right of action having become liked,
the proper authority could order suit
whenever 1t thought proper. The resolu-
ton of October 4. 1898. was nothing more
than a requirement that the city attorney
do what the council could have ordered
at any time after the assessment became
due 1t furnished competent authority to
the attorney TO institute suit, but added
nothing to and took nothing from the pro-
ceedings by which the city's right to sue
was created.
THE sixth special exception was that the
petition failed to alege that the assess
ment was entered by the collector in the
hook required by the ordinance, and that
the collector had given the defendant tne
thirty days notice thereon required inc
ordinance referred to is as follows: The
collector shall enter said assessment W
n hook 10 be kept In his office for that
purpose. and shall proceed to the coliec-
lion of said assessments and interest os
thew fall due, giving to the owner or own.
ers his. her or their agent, thirty ua!S
written notice that such assessmen, anu
interest will be due and payable, and ar
Tar the expiration of said period OF notice
A
tached as an exhibit 10 the petition and
was therein referred to and made a part
~ n The petition also contained THIS
ayerment: THAT the collector of the cry
~ Galveston duly notified the said appel
liant of said assessment the time when the
same was due and payapie, put tnat n.y.
withstanding such notices and that t1e
time for the payment OF said assessment
hss long since elapsed, said defendant mas
faiIad and refused, and still falls and re-
fuses 10 nav the same or any part there
Of" I, tha
assessment In the book was sohui ,i',,
nrovisiorls OF the charter SHOW. In our
nriniou, that the liability arose upon me
,,ouinr of tho assessment based lpon the
roII reouired by those provisions. and ihat
tbe entry In the book was required meleiS
for purposes OF convenience ana tne PR
eryation OF evidence. tTexas tfanspo'sa
lion Co. VS. Boyd. 81 Tex, ioo.
a. n thc allegation concerning notice
asor,sv os me court holds that, in con
na,ie with the ordinance atiaehed @ the
n nu'H and referred to, II was sufficient.
r vr,,ar r. Of The opinion that the ayer-
went rrg should have been directly and pos,
lively made that thirty days notice s,, ran
been given. and that me spee,n, I ~ n.
snouiu nays ne unquestioned evidence
asnuea such notice. It would be vain m
,,se,sss to reverse the Judgment upon io's
ground. y wi,,iams.
Affirmed .ssoc,ate Justice.
Delivered January 20 1872