Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1898-05-23


Have TO Be Made to Transport
100000 Men-The Spanish Fleet
Also an Element in the Situation
Washington, May 22.-It can be stat
ed positively that the climatic Difficult
ties in the way of a campaign in Cuba
in the wet season are not by any means
the main influences in preventing an
immediate beginning of the military
campaign. OF course, the military
strategists are not deaf to the earnest
representations OF the people who gre
familiar with the conditions in Cubi al
this season of the year. such as were
made by Lieutenant Rowan, ~ the
way. 1t is believed, however, that these
are not regarded as insurmouD-aple OBJ
stacles to the beginning of the cam
paign at least, for with the observance
of the strictest sanitary precautions.
such as are almost unknown in the
Spanish army, the choice Of salubrious
camping grounds and the exercise OF
prudence in feeding and caring for the
troops generally, the officers are conf
dent that they can take them through
wet season in Cuba with little more
mortality than would be experienced in
some of the Southern States under like
conditions. The fact that the roads
are we'll nigh impossible after the mid
die of June may defer the actual prose-
cution OF the campaign, but will not
prevent its initiation and the employ
ment of the time when heavy troops
and artillery cannot be moved in dis
cipling and acclimating the forces and
in slowly tightening the lines around
Havana.
PERIL OF THE TRANSPORTS.
But there are others and very serious
objections from military point of view
TO an immediate beginning of the cam
paign, and these are being SO strongly
urged upon the administration that, it
is believed. they will prevail, and that
the movement OF the transports across
the Florida straits will be delayed for
few weeks at least, unless there is a
radical change in existing conditions.
The very first and strongest objection
to an immediate movement is the pres
ence Of the Spanish feet in the neigh
borhood of Cuba. Little importance is
attached by the military men to any
operation that might be conducted by
this feet against our own squadrons or
against our seaport towns. The first
are amply able TO take care Of them
selves, while any seaport OF enough
strategic importance to be mark for
hostile attack is very much better for
titled than the public is aware Of
The danger point is possibility of
successful attack upon the troop trans
ports. So far the government has Sc
cured thirty of these vessels, with an
average capacity Of about 500 soldiers.
The project Of the military authorities
is to send not less than $4,000 troops in
four expeditions, making total num-
Der of 100000 troops to be landed in
Cuba. Less than $4,000 could not be
sent safely at once for the reason that
the force will be scarcely able to hold
its own when landed against the Span
ish troops, which, thanks to the telo-
graph and railroad communication
along the blockade lines of Cuba, can
be assembled at very few hours no.
tice ct any point selected for the de-
barkation of the American troops.
Therefore it will be necessary to in
crease the transport force by about 100
per cent, for some of these already Sc
cured are destined for the Philippine
expedition. This number Of ships can
not be secured without consuming some
time
FOUR ROUND TRIPS.
Even when they have been collected
the boats must make four separate trips
back and forth from Cuba to transport
the 100, 900 trops which are believed to
be absolutely required for successful
campaign. To persons without naval
experience 1t is hard to convey the ex-
IRENE danger of a movement requiring
four separate trips by fifty absolutely
unprotected merchant ships crowded
with soldiers in the presence of a hos
tile fleet, whose exact whereabouts are
not known.
1t is question whether the entire
combined force of Sampson and Schley
could guarantee safe conduct for the
troops under such circumstances, for if
the commanders of the swift Spanish
cruisers and torpedo boats are willing
to incur the risk they would have every
chance In their favor of destroying a
number Of the transports with all their
troops. II one of the cruisers should
succeed in passing through the lines of
the conveying warships in the midst
OF the feet Of transports. they would be
in measure protected by their very
victims. the transports, from the fire of
our warships, and the possibilities of in
f1icting tremendous blow upon us
would be very large All of this has
been fully considered by the military
authorities, and they are consequently
looking to the navy to drive off or de-
stroy Admiral Cervera's fleet before the
soldiers are called upon to cross the
Florida straits