The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-04-21


rceived The article in the Engineer n
signed C. 8. A.. and a$s: SPANS reas-
Onahle policy. In case Of war. would be
one of Immediate naval activity. for in
that way eniy could she secure Cuba and
COsta R.ca - bases q suppsy.
A. > strategic bAse Cuba Is vital TO
even memsutary success for Spain. while
able support under any condition.
with Cuba a. an objective. let us see
what Spaln's chances are there. At pres
ent her army Ii fed in bulk by food i'm
ported for that purpose, 20 completely
have the Insurgents turned the advan-
ta.es Of the island to their own end.
Modern ships OF war are great coal coa-
sumers. and their demands in that direc-
ton must be met to make the vessels ef-
fective. Setting aside the coal already in
Cuba and available for the purposes OF
the Spanish fleet. and leaving out Of the
questioo for the present the harassing in
ternal condition Of the island. it is neces-
sary to know only that OF the coal already
In Cuba quite two-fhirds of II came from
the United States. and also that In case
Of declaration of war. coal coming from
any neutral nation would be contraband,
and liable to capture, no matter what the
Dag under which It claimed protection.
with Cuba under blockade the next
nearest coaling stations belonging 10
Spain are in the Canary islands, distant
something like 1850 miles: and there is
not one OF her vessels able to come from
there even at the most economical speed
and still have enough coal left to make 1t
serviceable but for a precious short while.
BY international law a neutral port can
give vessels Of beiiigerent nations coal
enough only 20 carry them safely to the
next nearest OF their national ports: and
Il Is quite needless to remark that Cuban
ports. not Spanish ports. would govern
strictly the ships of Spain. In effect.
then. assuming the Spanish possession Of
the island, SPANS ships would have either
to depend upon the Canary islands or up
On such doubtful supplies Of coal as could
be smuggled into the strictly Spanish
ports of Cuba.
How are we prepared to intercept her
nrst move, her rally about Cuba, and
then to meet her possible second stroke
IN the shape of operations against our
own seaboard? Everything would depend
uaon our securing the command Of the
sea; and In this case command OF the sea
would first mean the se!xinG of the only
strategic base near our seac0ast open to
Spanish occupancy.
THE Spanish vessels actually In Cuban
waters today are two armored cruisers Of
1000 tons each-the vIxcaya and the Chris
Marquis de Ia Ensenada, six unprotected
cruisers, twenty-four small gunboats and
one transport, aggregating in all 3s,5oe
tons displacement. AZ q matter Of pos
sibiiity. the available Spanish ships now
In Spain may be added: and these consist
OF the battleship Pelayo OF a,s00 tons, the
armored cruisers Carlos n and Infanta
Maria Teresa OF s.2s5 and 1000 respective
~; the protected cruiser Alfonso Kill.
he rrt fSarS r. NJ md
varre. amounting in all to total displace-
Tnent OF 42,6%6 tons. There are few small
gunboats, four torpedo boat destroyers.
and about half a dozen seagoing torpedo
boats.
I'm the Philippine islands the Spanish
have a number OF small cruisers and gun
boats. of which the Castillo. Of $500 tons
displacement, Is the only vessel OF con-
siderable force. the total displacement OF
only TO s. 800 tons. Taken up as they are
with the internal condition OF these ISL
ands they could offer but momentary
trouble 10 our interests In the Orient.
where we have the Olympia. the Boston,
the Raleigh. the Petrol ana the Concord
a fighting force OF l4,6S5 tons.
OF SPANS merchant vessels armed as
cruisers I'VE have already been accounted
for. and the nine remaining could be read
fly supplied with guns either from the
Spanish arsenais or from the well-known
gun factories of either Germany or France
and slipped over the frontier without our
knowledge.
Setting aside the questions OF person
mel. speed. ana coal endurance, and COM
Ing down 10 the total displacement and
the total muxzle energy, the total weight
OF projectiles flred by all of the regular
naval vessels on each side during period
OF three minutes. the present available
force on each side may be represented as
follows
Muxzle Weight of
Tons energy, projecti.es,
f,G oI,sa state, disR' f0 Gin ssns pounds
SPAIN a0 s.a's. si.sis .iessss s "a Is
while our naval supremacy cannot be
questioned. the command OF the sea can
be maintained only by sufiicient support
In the way OF coast defenses, and, with
the single exception OF New York harbor.
1t may be seriously questioned whether
any OF our Notifications are able e, hold
an enemy on without the assistance OF
the navy.
sit IL imperative. then, that we inter-
cept SPANS first coup and prevent her
securing control OF Cuba and Costa RIGA.
and throw her upon the distant resources
of Spain and the coaling stations In the
Canaries. 1t would not be necessary for
US to undertake an extensive occupation
OF Cuba BY recognising the insurgents
we at once become possessed virtually OF
a native ally and an acciiInatized army
Of occupation and may be saved TO that
extent the insalubrious consequences upon
our own men.
''In the matter OF personnel we may
reasonably count upon that Angio-saxon
stability and courage common TO us az a
people. and. too upon that wider inte.ii-
gence, adaptability, and unity OF pur-
pose born of free institutions; while in
opposition we should have to face the
nervous, excitab.e character OF the Span
lard. hampered by a species OF education
al indifference and sioth born of long
years OF national torpor, arissocratic DOM
nance. and a hazy. onreasoning faith In
past glory"
The Army and Navy Journal In an
editorial advises against the too hasty ac-
cepiance OF the war engines which invent
ors are Just now springing on the pubic
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