The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-06-16
THEN HARD MARCHING
AND PROLONGED SIEGE
Not Known Where the Troops Will
Land.
viii Not Undertake to Garry Santi-
ago By Assault-May Be a Long
Siege and Many Desperate En-
counters-Transport Are Sailing
Around the Northern Side of Cuba
Vessels Heavily Loaded-Fourth
Army Corps For Porto Rico.

New York, June 15.-The Washington
correspondent of the Times says:
1T will not be a summer afternoon
matter" said an army officer, discuss
ing the landing of Skaters army.
''The troops will be landed under cover
of the guns of the fighting ships, if a
hostile reception is accorded to them.
Their business will be to secure them
selves against ATTACK. Then the land
! ing OF their equipments will be made,
and it is bound to be tedious matter,
as it will be done by the aid of lighters.
1t is probable that it will take not less
I than three weeks to land the expedition
that was loaded on ships i'll eight days.
After we have heard about the land
! ing of This expedition we shall begin
to understand why General Miles was
| opposed to sending out $4,000 men at
once, before the war department was
satisfied that they had beeE properly
| drilled, seasoned and disciplined. With
Sc, 900 men to ship at Tampa the confu-
sion and delay would have been in
creased 1t is inevitable that there shall
be some confusion at the Cuban end of
the trip, and that confusion would have
been possibly four times greater with
three times that number of troops"
If it is definitely known whether Cen
eral Shafter will land his forces in
Guantanamo bay, the war department
does not communicate the information.
1t is suggested that the landing place
may be much nearer to Santiago. The
distance from Guantanamo to Santiago,
which is something like 80 miles, is a
prodigiouS one to be overcome by
marching in a mountainous country
without reads.
The transports viii be at hand, how
6 4 i
namo as a base. and a movement of the
troops could be made in a few days,
barring the delays that have been found
to be incidental to loading and unload
ing. A movement at Caimanero to send
10000 or $4,000 men toward Santiago
would, it is estimated, give the Span
ish at Santiago about a weeks notice
to prepare for an assault.
There is no expectation that the land
forces will begin operations at once to
attempt to carry Santiago by assault
and then to depend upon using the har-
Dor after it has been countcrmined and
the entrance cleared by blowing up the
wreck of the Merrimac. The under
taking is considered as one too greatly
dangerous TO be accomplished in short
order. Indeed, there are army men who
look for a prolonged siege of Santiago
and many desperate encounters be-
tween the troops of the United States
and Spain before a definite result is re-
ported. Still, the capture may be mat
ter of briefer time than it is imagined
by the war department officials, and
much will depend. it is admitted, upon
the view obtained by General Shafter
after he has seen the place and con-
suited with Admiral Sampson. That
first consultation may destroy all the
preconceived notions of the sangIine
and the anxious at the war department
and the White House.
There is a stronger disposition now
than heretofore to order the co-opera-
ton of the insurgents at Santiago.
They have not yet made a. very deep
impression on the army but it is ad-
mitted that they may possess many
qualifications to render them invaluable
allies in occupying the Spanish forces
while the attack is being made by Gen
eral Shafter and Admiral Sampson.