The midland journal. (Rising Sun, Md.) 1885-1947, 1898-06-17
Hostile constraint Upon Both Parties.

message of April IL, 1898, declared
that his policy was the forcible
intervention of the United States
as a neutral to stop the war. He
said that ''it (the forcible inter
vention which he proposed) in
wolves, however, hostile constraint
upon both of the parties to the
contest, as we'll as to enforce a truce
as to guide the eventual settle
ment." The policy of Congress, as
manifested by many resolutions,
was to follow the course pursued
by Monroe, Jackson, and others,
and recognize the belligerent rights
of the Cubans, as was done in all
other cases Of Spanish American
colonies which are now independent
states. If.this had been done there
would have been no war;. The war
which has been inaugurated grew
OUT of the Presidents policy of
armed Intervention to restrain both
of the belligerents, the Spaniards
and the insurgents. We realized
from the beginning the magnitude
of the undertaking involved in the
the Presidents policy. Hostility
against all the people of Cuba for
the purpose of establishing a stable
government for them involves years
years of war, vast standing army,
and an almost unlimited expendi-
ture of money. The insurgents do
not seem to be satisfied with the
Presidents policy, as appears by
information from DR.. Capote, vice
president of the Cuban Republic.
The calamitous consequence of dis
satisfaction can be realized when
we take into consideration who are
the dissatisfied parties,
Senator Proctor gave the polit-
ical situation of Cuba careful
investigation, and the results of his
observation were stated in his
speech of March II, 1898. He said:
There are, or were before the war,
about 100000 Cubans on the island,
10000 Spaniards (Which means those
born in SPAIN, and less than half mil
lion of negroes and mixed bloods.
He further said
The dividing lines between parties are
the most straight and clear cut that have
come to my knowledge. The division in
our war was by no means so clearly
defined. 1t is Cuban against Spaniard. |
1t is practically the entire Cuban popula-
ton on one side and the Spanish army
and Spanish citizens on the other.
The side to which the insurgents
belong, according to Senator Proc
tor, includes a million of white
men, and all the negroes and mixed
bloods, against 100000 Spaniards. |
He further said:
To me the strongest appeal is not the
barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss
of the Maine, if our worst fears should
prove true, terrible as are both of these
incidents, but the spectacle of a million
and half of people, the entire native
population of Cuba, struggling for free
dom and deliverance from the worst mis-
government of which l ever had
knowledge.
Again, he said: |
The fear that if free the people of Cuba
would be revolutionary is not so we'll
founded as has been supposed, and the
conditions for good self-government are
far more favorable. The large number of
educated and patriotic men, the great
sacrifices they have endured, the peace
able temperament of the people, whites
and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that
would surely come with peace and good
home rule, the large influx of American
and English immigration and money,
would all be strong factors for stable
institutions.
1t was the paramount desire for
liberty and independence of Span
ish misrule of the great mass of the
Cuban people that enabled the in
surgents to,carry on the ten years
war, the fruits of which were lost
by Spanish perfidy, and it was the
same unconquerable love of liberty
of the Cuban people which has
enabled the insurgents to prosecute
war against all the power of Spain
with the aid of the United States
to blockade Cuban ports with their
revenue cutters for more than three
years. If there were 100000
native Cubans before the war as
stated by Senator Proctor, there
must be 100000 or /, 100000 of
them still alive. 1t seems probable
that fifty to sixty thousand soldiers
could be selected from this patriotic
population if a few millions were
spent in arming, equipping, feeding
and paying Cuban volunteers. In
that case the entire Cuban popula-
ton would be our friends and the
Spanish army would soon be COM
PEELED to surrender. Armed re-
straint against the Cuban patriots
will make them our enemies. 1t is
stated that the volunteer force of
the Spanish army in Cuba amounts
to 10000. 1t may be true that
some of them were forced to volun-
teer. There was no other place to
go, and they were persuaded by
the Spaniards that the United
States was as hostile to the Cubans
as to the Spaniards, and the I'M
fortunate part of it is, they use the