The herald., 1898-12-22
Reveal the Names Of Heroes
Hitherto Hidden
ENSIGNS ON SECRET SERVICE DUTY
Deserving Places Beside Rowan Whitney and Hobson-Spap-
ish Admiral Monteos Report Of the Hopeless Battle
With Dewey's Fleet Off Cavite

composed my little squadron, the lack of all
classes of the personnel, especially master
eunners and seamen gunners; the inaptitude
of some of the provisional machinists, the
scarcity Of rapd-fre cannon, the strong
crews of the enemy, and the unprotected
character of the greater part of our ves-
sells, all contributed to make much more
decided the sacrifices which we made for
our country, and to prevent the possibility
of the horrors of bombartlment of the
city of Manila, with the conviction that
with the scarcity Of our force against the
superior enemy we were going to certain
death and could expect the loss of all our
ships. Our casualties, including those Of
the arsenal, amounted to 3Sl men killed and
wounded"
DEPARTMENT STRATEGY
An evidence of the strategy exhibited by
the navy department in sending reinforce
ments to Dewey is shown in a dispatch Of
June 27, informing him of the coming Of the
Monadnock. Probably with view to in
surfing this vessel from falling into trap,
she was not dispatched directly to Manila.
but was ordered to point six hundred miles
due east from Cape Engano, where she was
to meet one of Dewey's ships.
THE FLYING SQUADRON
Apparently the first suggestion Of the
organization Of the flying squadron which
was to divert Admiral Camaras squadron
from his voyage to Manila came from Dewey,
for in a dispatch of June q ne says:
"In my judgment, if the coast of Spain
was threatened, the squadron of the enemy,
will have to return"
THE NORTHERN FLEET
Very naturally the report of the opera.
, tions of the North Atlantic fleet comprises
the largest part of the printed book. Most
of the facts have already appeared, hut in
the very beginning there is a most interesting
! exchange of letters between Secretary Long
and Admiral Sampson, showing that even
before the outbreaks of the war the admiral
had worked out complete plan for the i'm
mediate reduction of Havana, with his own
| squadron, unsupported, and was only pre-
vented from carrying ont that plan by or
ders from the department, which wished
to protect the big iron-clads. Secretary
Long addressed Admiral Sampson on April
9th confidential letter, telling him that in
the event of hostilities. for this was before
the outbreak of war, the department wished
him to do all in mis- power to destroy the
Spanish war vessels in the West Indian
waters. He says:
"The department do.s not wish the yes
sells of your squadron to be exposed to the
fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago, or
other strongly fortified ports in Cuba unless
the more formidable Spanish vessels should
take refuge in those harbors. Even in this
case the department would suggest that
rigid blockade and the employment. of our
torpedo boats would accomplish the desired
object"
The reasons set ont by Secretary Long for
this instruction were that there would be
no United States troops available to occupy
| the captured towns until October, and that
the lack of docking facilities made it par
ticularly desirable that our vessels should
not be crippled before the capture and de-
struction of Spain s. most formidable vessels.
SAMPSON NOT SATISFIED
How strongly Admiral Sampson endeav.
ored to secure reversal of this decision sp.
pears in the following letter, which has
never before been published:
"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
"Key West, Fla, April 10, 1893.
"My Dear Secretary: have received your
confidential letter of April 9Th. / sympa-
thize with all you say about guarding our
big ships against possible serious loss while
the enemy's fleet is still intact At the
same time l regard it as very important
to strike quickly and strike hard as soon
as hostilities commence. Havana is well
defended by three or four batteries to the
eastward of the entrance, mounting guns Of
from six to twelve-inch caliber. On the
western side of the entrance there are three
batteries, the guns varying in caliber from
eight to twelve inches, and two mortar
batteries. All the batteries face seaward,
and those to the west of the entrance are
quite near the shore. All are open batteries,
with heavy traverses between the guns.
The guns and people who serve them are
quite unprotected. These batteries are well
calculated to keep off fleet from seaward
which approaches to within a moderated
distance of few thousand yards. l do not
think they are well placed to resist an at
tack Qor instance, the westerly from the
westward and close in shore, where the
batteries would be exposed to flank fire
or to the fire of our big ships at short range,
where the secondary batteries would have
full effect. Under these circumstances the
ships must have such a heavy fire that the
shore batteries would be overwhelmed by
it's volume. Before the Puritan and Amphi-
trite arrived | was not entirely sanguine of
the success of such an attack. Since their
arrival yesterday have little doubt of its
success.
although the monitors are weak in Sec
ondary fire, | expect to put cruiser with
heavy secondary fire in the interval between
each two of them. In this way do not
think the Spaniards would be able to fire.
They would be driven away from their guns
and kept away, while the fire of the ships
would SO injure the guns or mounts that
they would be unservceable. Although the
defenses west of the entrance are stronger
than those east, the first has the advantage,
for US, that all the projectiles which miss
the batteries will fall in the city and furnish
an additional inducement for the surrender
of the city.
''In the memorandum which | furnished
to the commanding officers of ships pro-
vide that if our ships are not numerous