The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-10-03
WAR AS A PROFESSION.
One of the Many Lessons Taught by
n short War.
Philadelphia Times.


One thing most irnpresslvely taught by
our short war with Spain ~ that war is
ser.ous business and the art OF war diff
cut profession that cannot be taken up off,
hand, bat requires careful training and dill
igent preparation. The navy has furnished
the mast conspicuous example of this truth
but the army has taught it quite as i'm
preSssvely. Seacraft IL thing 30 far apart
from the life OF the average man that the
navy - beyond the ambitions of the anna
teur and thus our navy was able TO give
such an illustration OF thorough profess
sional education. organization discipline.
complete preparation at every point, as
surpassed all expectations. All recognize
BOW the Importance OF maintaining the
navy at its own high standard. No one
would propose 10 rely upon an improvised
navy IN the event Of another war
II IS 1tassi as plain that we could not rely
upon an impr0vised army. Events move
too quickly in these days OF steam and
electricity. and a small army that is ready
for instant service - worth more than
countless legion that has TO he organized
and prepared. The war WITH Spain was
Fought and won by the navy and a part OF
the regular army. with a few of the preyi-
c9siY ORGANIZED and exps rfence1 regiments
or tae states before the most OF the newly
appointed volunteer officers had learned
the rudiments OF their duties.
ct course this country need not. should
not and never Will maintain a great stand
:ng army. and in the event Of serious
foreign war Tia reliance would always he
upon us citizen soidiery. But the men who
field, bur the not less important matters
or organization. movement and mainte-
nance must be educated TO their business
beforehand. In this war the organization
or the regular army has BEEN swampei In
ths disorg aaizatiol Of a vast volunteer
army Differed by amateurs. The men are
brave enough. Tire officers we'll meaning
but they do not know. Civilians In staff
positions have nluadied the whole admin
.S;rAton, lire officers have not known how
10 take care o. their rntss. surgeons from
civil life. though Well qualified the
army surgeons fer the actual treatment OF
the sick or wounded. have known nothing
az tie arnay surgeons first business % pre-
venting sickness Or ~ that military
;horisy and method :nat makes the army
surgeon as .or-Sc soldier a doctor.
aes@ things can ne more Re arrived az by
Intuition than can the scientific conduct
Of a campaign or the direction o. a battle
ship.
II this country expects - engage in MILL
equipment. As matter az fact the ac-
tl&t equipment which w. had proved Stf-
il-ieTt ~ TINS case since the ore decisive
battle was won by only part % tins. reg
GlAr army, and bat sraat volunteer rein
torceaaea-s were required for the opera
n Nj @a engaged Il stronger force the
regular sr-ny must stiii have seen tina nG-
e-eEs ~ any effective force we could pst
trio tas rri3 and i sryst ne nU- reliance
III any military requirements growing out
Of tai- war. II reed not De large IN num-
sE~s. though The present maximum .aHst
20 increased. but rs organization Rus: De
that an army 90 asy size can always 1e
ottseersSt NJ 1n@a trained tn TIE military
profession. Anything e&sa leads 20 cGS-
Fusion. suffering aaS loss