The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-03-18

miles to the other side of the road and
was the same distance. 10 or 70 miles from
Havana They are well armed. but very
poorly Supplied with ammunition. They
are not allowed TO carry many cartridges.
sometimes not more than one or two. the
infantry are poorly clad. ywo small squa-
drons of Prisoners which / saw. however,
one of half dozen in the streets OF Ha-
YGra- ard one or two on the cars, were
better clothed than the average Spanish
SolCter- zach of the prisoners. though
surrounded by guards. was bound by the
arms and wrists by cords. and they were
all tied together by a cord running along
the lire. 4 specimen of the amenities of
their warfare About one-third of the
Cuban army are colored, mostly in the
infantry. as the cavalry furnishes their
own horses. y Held officer, an American
from southern state spoke in the high
est terms of the conduct of these colored
soldiers. that they were as good fighters
and had more endurance than the whites;
could keep up with the cavalry on long
march and come in fresh at night.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION.
THE dividing lines between parties are
the most straight and clear cut that have
ever come to my knowledge. The division
In our war was by no means so clearly
defined. 1t is Cuban against Spaniard. 1t
is practically the entire Cuban population
on one side and The Spanish army and the
Spanish citizens on the other. co not
count the autonomiSts in this division. as
they are so far too inconsiderabe in num-
nlled the civil offices with men who had
been autcnomists and were still claSSed as
SUCH But the march of events has salts
ned most OF them that the chance Tor au-
tonomy came toe late. II falls as talk of
compromise would have fallen the last
year or two of our war. If it succeeds. IL
can only be by armed force, by the tri-
umph of the Spanish army, and the sue
cess OF Spanish arms would be easier by
Weylers policy and method. for in that
the Spanish army and people believe
har fe 1AtrH hot &c
acting in entire good faith; that he de-
sires to give the Cubans Il fair measure
of autonomy. as Campos did at the close
of the ten years war. He has, of course,
a fe- personal followers, but the army
and the Spanish citizens do not want gen
uine autonomy, for that means govern
ment by the Cuban people. And ii is not
strange that the Cubans say it comes too
late.
NO TALK WITH JUNTA.
81 have never had any communication.
direct of indirect, with the Cuban Junta
in this country or any OF its members. nor
did l have with any of the 1unta Whicn
exists in every city and large town OF
Cuba None of the calls L made were
upon parties of whose sympathles l nau
the least knowledge, except that | knew
some of them were classed as autohom-
lists. Most of my informants were busi-
ness men, who had no sides and rarely
expressed themselves. L had no means
of guessing in advance what their an
greatly surprised at their frankness. l
inquired in regard to the autonomy or
men of wealth, and men as prominent In
business as any in the cities OF Havana
Matanzas and Sagua, bankers, merchants,
lawyers and autonomist officials, some or
them Spanish born, but Cuban bred, one
prominent Englishman, several OF than
known rs autonomistS and several or
them telling me they were stlll beileVers
in autonomy if practica BILE, but without
xception they replied that 1t was too
NIT tod
States protectorate, some annexation,
some free Cuba, not one had been counted
as favoring the insurrection at first. They
were business men and wanted peace, but
said it was too late for peace under Span
ish sovereignty. They characterized
Weyler's order in far stronger terms than
l can. l could not but conclude that you
do not have to scratch an autonomist
very deep to find Cuban. There is soon
to be an election. but every polling place
must be inside a fortified town. Such
elections ought to be safe for the ms.
THAT WHICH APPEALS MOST,
Il have endeavored to state in not in
temperate mood, what saw and heard, !
to make no argument thereon, but leave |
everyone to draw his own conclusions. To |
me the strongest appeal is not the barbar- ]
ity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of /
the Maine, if our worst fears should l
prove true terrible as are both of these |
Incidents, but the spectacle of million |
and q half OF people. the entire native |
population OF CuDa, struggling lot Tree
iom and deliverance from the worst mis- |
government of which | ever had knowl- |
edge. Whether our action ought not to I
be Influenced by any one or all these |
-hings, and if so. how far, is another ques-
lion. l am not in favor of annexation. !
not because l would apprehend any par
icular trouble from it, but because it is
lot wise policy to take in any people |
IF foreign tongue and training and with
out any strong guiding American ele-
nent
1.-The fear that if free. the people of
cuba would be revolutionary, is not so ;
we'll founded as has been supposed and
he conditions for good Self-government
Der and educated and patriotic men. the
sreat sacrifices they have endured. the
leaceable temperament of the people.
white or black the wonderful prosperity
hat would come surely with peace and
rood home rule the large influx of
Americans and good immigration and
money, would all be strong factors for
stable institutions.
But it is not my purpose at this time
Tor di l consider it my province to suggest
my plan, / merely speak Of the symptoms !
Is l saw them. but do not undertake to |
prescribe. Such remedial steps as may
American president and the American
people.
SENATORIAL COMMENTS.
Throughout the delivery of the address
here was not an interruption. At the |
conclusion there was no demonstration
ither on the floor or in the galleries. al
hough senators hers and there about the
hamber turned one to another with such
unusual remarks on the senate floor as:
"a remarkable statement" "a simple.
statement of a horrible
condition of affairs, and similar COM
nentS
Mr.. Proctor left the senate chamber
he ma mi baG hfc