The herald., 1898-11-11
Associated Press Special Wire

by direction of Secretary Alger. The key
note of the report is found in one OF the
opening sentences, where it is said:
Military operations during the year have
been extraordinary, unusual and extensive,
O statement which is fully borne out by the
long recital of important events which Gen
eral Miles shows have made the military his
tory of the year 1898, the most remarkable
since the end of the civil war;.
In point of interest, the document di-
vides naturally into four chapters, for while
brief allusion is made to such matters as the
military expeditions to Alaska, interest nat
urally centers in the portion which treats
of the war with Spain.
THE. WAR WITH SPAIN
Under this general head the report deals
with the plans of campaign, of war prepara-
tions, with the Santiago campaign, with
General Miles operations in Porto Rico, and
lastly with the important changes in exist
ING. organization, which. are,' in General
Miles opinion, necessary to make the army
an effective weapon for the defense of the
country. There is an entire absence of any
evidence of direct criticism, though certain
sentences in the report are italicized in an
apparent desire to justify previously eA-
pressed plans of details of the campaigns;
and where it deals with events the docu-
ment is largely made up of quotations of
official dispatches.
THE EARLY PROBLEMS
Treating of the war, General Miles
begins with statement OF the unprepared-
ness of the country, showing how the vast
equipment left by the million soldiers of the
civil war has been dissipated, or had become
obsolete, until the tentage, transportation
and camp equipage was insufficient for any
important military operations. General
Miles says that in the beginning the war
problem was purely naval one, and that
he was convinced that should our navy
prove superior, the position OF the Spanish
army in Cuba would be rendered untenable,
with a minimum loss of life and treasure to
the United States. He says:
"There were two most serious obstacles
to be avoided-one was putting an army in
Cuba before our navy controlled Cuban
waters; and the other was putting an army
on the island at time when a large number
of men must die from the diseases that
have prevailed in that country, according
to all statistics, for the last 100 years"
Orders are referred to for the sending of
the regulars to New Orleans, Tampa and
NlODlle 10 DeSlu tHe luNdSlOH Ol SuDu, LOT
the gathering of troops at Chickamauga, and
for the movement of seventy thousand
troops on Cuba, "but none of these move
ments on Cuba materalized," he says. "The
want of proper equipment and ammunition
rendered the movement impracticable."
At this point there is brief depression,
where, in paragraph, General Miles refers
to General Merritt's Philippine expedition
nod okol
being successful in every way.
General Miles then pays an eloquent
tribute to the brilliant exploits of Lieuten-
ants Rowan and Whitney, who secretly ex-
plored Cuba and Porto Rico, and ascertained
the military situations.
SHAFTER'S EXPEDITION
He resumes the report with an account OF
the dispatch of General Skaters expedition,
saying: Il desired to go with this com
mand." His request on this point as tele-
graphed from headquarters at Tampa was
as follows:
"This enterprise is so important that [
desire to go with this army corps, or to i'm
mediately organize another, and with it to
join this and capture position No .. Now
that the military is about to be used,
l believe it should be continued with every
energy, making the most judicious DISPOSE
tion of it to accomplish the desired results"
He also stated This expedition has been
delayed through no fault of any one con.
nected with it. 1t contains the principal
part of the army which, for intelligence and
efficiency, is not excelled by any body of
troops on earth"
The telegram was dated June 5, and the
day following Secretary Alger telegraphed
in reply:
''The president wants to know the earliest
moment you can have an expeditionary
force ready to 90 to Porto Rico large enough
to take and hold that island without force
under General Shafter."
General Miles responded: 'In ten days"
PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
June 9th General Miles submitted to the
secretary OF war written plan of campaign.
Briefly stated, the points We're: That pro-
vision be made for the reception of at least
thirty thousand Spanish prisoners. That
after capturing Santiago some deep water
ports be taken on the north coast of Cuba
That Nuevitas be captured, and that with
$1,000 cavalry and some light artillery and
small body of infantry an advance be
made INTO Puerto Principe, in the interior,
with the troops, and thence move toward
Havana. This move would occupy the
time until September 80; the troops would
be in the most healthy part of Cuba during
the rainy season, and the prisoners could be
employed in road making. Should Span
ish force be advanced to Villa Clara, the
entire United States army could be thrown
between that point and Havana; the Span
ish army could be divided and beaten in de-
tail. Should that plan be rejected, then,
alter capturing Santiago the entire force
should be removed to the western end of the
island, and campaign made against IIa-
vana.
AN ORDER FROM ALGER
General Miles next recites an order to
himself from Secretary Alger ''to organize
an expedition for operations against the
enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico
From the order dated June 26, it appears
that an expedition was to be organized un-
der the immediate command of General
Brooke for such movement The command
under Shafter, or such part as could be
spared from the work in hand was to ioin
the foregoing expedition, and. reads the
order, "You will command the forces thus
united in person."
General Miles at this point mentions
project he had conceived at that time for the