Martinsburg herald. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1881-1920, 1898-01-29

Thomas to hold on at the Duck, TO post
strong force at Spring Hill and detain
Hood while the main army was getting
into position for battle at Franklin, OPP
dycke says that Schofeld should have
used the natural advantages Of the
ground to delay Hood. He cites the
case of Lee with relatively inferior
force delaying Grant for weeks in front
Of the James and Johnston delaying
Sherman between Dalton and Atlanta.
In short, he asserts that Sehofield was
outmaneuvered and outgeneraled.
With reference to the disposition Of
Wagner's division for the delay of Hood
after the bulk Of the Federal army had
passed beyond Spring Hill Opdycke is
explicit His brigade was last to leave
Spring Hill, where it warded off an at
tack early in the day. About noon he
overlook the rest Of Wagner's division
on ridge in sight Of Franklin. Wag-
ner, with the brigades Of Conrad and
Lane, had halted there under Schofeld s
orders to delay Hood. Later, under or
ders direct or implied from the same
source, Wagner moved Conrad and Lane
to a second ridge few hundred yards
in front of the center of the Twenty
third corps line on Carter's hill, at
Franklin Opdycke finally marched
back, the Confederates appearing in
force along the whole front, ready for
battle When Opdycke reached the sec
ond ridge and was shown position in
line with Conrad and Lane, he objected.
He says, "Schofeld had put them ICON
rad and Lance into position where
usefulness was impossible and where
the peril at first imminent became SO
extreme as seriously to endanger the
whole army .
Upon Opdycke's protest Wagner al
lowed him to take his brigade inside the
main works as reserve for the center
brigades of the Twenty third corps line,
which was in rear Of Conrad and Lane
and the key to the field. Hoods at
tack overwhelmed Conrad and Lane,
who fell back to the works, and there q
second break occurred, making breach
through which the enemy poured. OPP
dycke charged forward and repaired the
break. After that the battle was in the
hands of Schofield's subordinates. OPP
dycke criticises Schofeld for failure to
get into the fight himself, for remaining
twice as far from the key to his own
position as was the enemy when formed
for attack and for taking Stanley with
one division north of the Harpeth far
from the point of danger.
Schofield explains this by saying that
he went personally with SANKEY'S di-
vision north of the Harpeth to guard
against any attempt of Hood to get in
his rear, as he had done at Spring Hill
the day before.
Hood suffered a bloody repulse at
Franklin, losing 5000 men and 13 gen
erals, but in the end Sehotield, still
north of the Harpeth, ordered his troops
to retire from the front of Hood Then,
Opdycl1e thinks, was the chance to delay
Hood, and he even says that Hood could
have been driven back to the Duck riv-
er Schofield says he didn't stay at
Franklin because his ammunition was
| short, he didn't know the extent of
Hoods loss, and having formed juno
ton with Thomas re-enforeements
"why run further risk?" 1t was Thorn
as campaign for Thomas united army
to settle.
Schofeld reached Nashville Dec.
and other re-enforcements the same day.