The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1898-04-30
COMM ERCe IN WAR.
Capt. Mahan's View of the Propriety of
The Seizure of Private Merchant vessels.

(From Capt. Mahan's book THE Interest of
America i'll Sea-Power Present and Future.'O
Neither Great Britain nor merica, "
says Sir George Clarke, though he else
where qualities the statement, .'can see
in the commerce of other peoples an in
centive to attack. Why not? For what
purpose, primarily, do navies exist?
Surely not merely to fight one another,
TO gain what .Jomini calls 1.-THE sterile
glory" of lighting battles in order to win
them. II navies, as all agree, exist Tor
the protection of commerce, it inevitably
follows that in war they must aim at de-
priving their enemy of that great re-
source; nor is it easy to conceive what
broad military use they can subserve that
at oil compares with the pr election and
destruction of trade. sza.s
This Sir George, indeed, sees Tor ne else
where says, "Only on the principle OF DO
ing the utmost injury to an enemy, with
view to hasten the issue OF war, can
commerce. destroying be Justified but
he fails l think, to appreciate the full
Importance of this qualifying concession,
and neither he nor Mr.. White seems to
admit the immense Importance of COM
MISUNDERSTANDING, as such. The mis-
take of both, think. lies III not keeping
clearly in view-what both certainly I'M
derstood-tbe difference between the
cuerre- de course, which is conclusive,
and commences destroying Tor commerce
prevention) through strategic control of
the sea by powerful navies. Some ma
lions more than others, but all maritime
nations more or less, depend for their
prosperity upon it more than upon any
other single factor. Either under their
own flag or that of neutral either by
foreign trade or coasting trade, the sea Is
the greatest OF boons to such state; and
under every form its sea-borne trade is at
mercy of foe decisively superior.
If than foa ba aYnact00 that Such foe
will forego such advantage,-will insist
upon spsnding blood and money in fight
ing, or money in the vain effort of main
tanning a feet which, having nothing
to fight, also keeps it's hands off such an
obvious means of crippling the opponent
and forcing him out Of his portsS Great
Britain's navy, in the French wars, not
only protected her commerce. but also
annihilated that of the enemy; and both
conditions-not one alone-were essential
to her triumph.
1t is because Great Britain's sea power, ,
though still superior, has declined rela-
lively TO that of other States, and is no
longer supreme, that she has been in
duced to concede to neutrals the principle
that the flag covers the goods. 1t is a con-
cession wrung from relative weakness-or
nossibly from n mistaken humanitar-
ianism; but, to whatever due, it is all to
the profit of the neutral and to the loss of
the stronger belligerent. The only justi-
fication, in policy, for its yielding by the
latter, is that she can no longer as form
erly, bear the additional burden of hostil-
ity, if the neutral should ally himself to
the enemy. l have on another occasion
said that the principle that the flag COW
ers the goods is forever mountaineering
thereby that, SO far as present indications
go, no one over would be strong enough
at sea to maintain the contrary by arms.
In the same way it may be asserted
w fhort ha nf
immunity to what is unthinkingly called
the private property" of an enemy on
the sea, will never be conceded by a pa
ton or alliance confident in its own ssa
power. 1t has been the dream of the
weaker sea belligerents in all ages; and
their arguments for it, at the first glance
plausible. are very proper to urge from
their point of view. That arch robber,
the first Napoleon, who so remorselessly
and exhaustively carried the principles of
war sustaining war to its utmost logical
sequence, and even in peace scrupled not to
quarter his armies on subject countries,
maintaining them on what, after ala,
was simply private property of foreigners
even he wakes quite eloquent, and su-
perhcially most convincing, as he COM
pares the seizure of goods at sea, so fatal
to his empire, to the seizure of a wagon
travelling an inland country road.
In all these contentious there lies, be-
meath the surface plausibility, not So
much confusion of thought as failurs
to recognize an essential difference Of
conditions Even on shore the protection
of private property rests upon the simple
principle that injury is not to be wantou
that it's not to be inflicted when end to
be obtained is trivial. or largely dispropo1-
tionate to the suffering caused. For this
reason personal property not embarked
In commercial venture is respected iii
civilized maritime war. Conversely, aa
AL N la ic
means invariable, and private property
receives scant consideration when it's ap,
preparation or destruction serves. the pur
poses of an enemy. The man who trudgeS
the highway, cudgel in hand, may claim.
for his cudgel all the sacredness with
which civilization invests property; but II
he use it to break his neighbor' s head, the
respect for his property as such, quickly
disappears. Now, private property borne
upon the seas is engaged in promoting. in
the most vital manner, the strength and
resources of the nation by which it is
handled When that nation becomes bed,
ligerent, the private property, SO calleG,
borne upon the seas. is sustaining the
well being and endurance of the nation
at war, and consequently is injuring the
opponent. to an extent exceeding all othar
sources OF national power. In these days
of neutrality-suspicious., most of us are IA
miliar with the idea of the dependence of
an army upon its communications, aad
we know, vaguely perhaps, but still we
know, that to threaten or harm the COM
munications Of an army is one of TIE
most common and effective devices of
strategy. Why? Because severed from
its base an army languishes and dies, and
when threatened with such an evil it
must fight at whatever disadvantage.
Well. is it not clear that maritime com.
MERGE occupies, to the power of mari
time state the precise nourishing fame
ton that the communications of an army
supply to the army? Blows at commerce
are blows at the comm unications of the
state; they intercept it's nourishment,
they starve its life, they cut the roots OF
its power, the sinews of its war While
war remains factor sad but inevitable
factor, of our history, 1t is fond hope
that commerce can be exempt from its
operations, because in very truth blows
against commerce are the most deadly
that can be struck; nor is there any other
among the proposed uses of a navy, as
for instance the bombardmsnt of seaport
towns, which is not at once more cruel
and lacc Soiaptif1o hot