The times., 1898-07-27

TO certainty, total loss.
IL ] regard this complete and impor-
tant victory over the Spanish forces az
the successful finish of several weeks of
arduous and close blockade. so stringent
and effective during the night that the
enemy was deferred from making the at
tempt to escape at night. and deliberately
elected TO make the attempt in daylight.
That this was the case / was informed
by the commanding officer of the Crsto-
bal Colon.
L. 1t seems proper to briefly describe
here the manner in which this was ac-
complished. The harbOr of Santiago is
naturally easy to blockade there being
but one entrance. and that narrow one,
ana the deep water extending close up
TO the Shore-lke. presenting no difficulties
of navigation outside of the entrance.
At the time of my arrival before jhe port
June l, the moon was at its full and
there was sufficient light during the night
20 enable any movement outside of the
entrance to be detected; but with the
waning of the moon and the coming of
dark nights, there was opportunity for
tne enemy to escape or for his torpedo
J boats TO make an attack upon the block
/ 9d5ng vessels Ii was aScertained with
/ fair cOnclusiveness that the "Merrimac"
50 gailantly taken into the channel on
/ June 3, id not obstruct ii. l therefore
/ maintained the blockade as follows: To
J the battlesh!ps was assigned the duty in
turn, of lighting tha channel. Moving up
/ 10 the port. at a distance of from one to
two miles from the Moro, dependent
/ upon the condition Of the atmosphere
I they threw a searchight beam directly
up the channel and held it steadily there.
1 This lightened up the entire breadth of
the channel for half mile inside OF the
/ entrance so brilliantly that the movement
| Of small boats could be detected. Why
+ the batteries never opened fire upon the
I searchiight ship was always i matter of
surprise TO me- but they never did. Sta
toned close to the entrance of the port
We're three picket launches, and at a lit
tie distance far. her out three small
I picket vessels. usually converted yachts,
ard, whea- they were ava liable one or
I two Of our torpedo boats With this ar
I rangelnenhy4he-e was at least a certainty
] that nothing cou get out of the haT50r
/ undeteGted. After the arrival of the
4 army when the situation forced upon
! the Spanish admiral decision. our vigil
! lance increased. The night blockading
/ distance was :educed 10 two miles for ali
/ vesse's ard n bat,leship was Dlaral
I alongside searchI ght ship. with hsr
/ b1oadsde7- trained upon the charneI In
readiness 10 fire thu instant a Spanish
ship should appear The commanding Of
/ ncers nlfnL the greatest prA sc far thu
4 perfect manner in which they entered
into this plan and put II into execution.
The Massachusetts. who. according TO
routine was seTt that morning to coal at
Guar.anamo ike the othe.s had spent
weary nights upon this work. and desarv-
ed better fate than to be absent that
morning. | irclose for the information
of the Department copies of orders and
memoranda issued from time to time
relating to the manner of maintaining
the blockade.
l3. When all the work was done so well
II is difficult. to discriminate in praise
The object Of the blockade or Cervera' :
squadron was fully accomplished. and
each individual bore well his part I'm it
the commodore in command on the see
"nd division, the captains OF ships. ;oeIr
officers AID men. The fire Of tho battle
ships was powerful and destructive. and
the resistance Of the Spanish squadron
was, IN great part. broken almost before
they had got beyond the range Of their
own forts. The tine speed Or the Oregon
enabled her TO take a front position IN
the chase. and the Cristobal Colon did
not give up until the Oregon had thrown
a l5-inch shell beyond her This perfor-
nance adds 20 the already brilliant record
ot this fine battleship. and speaks highly
81 the skill and care with which he-
admirable efficiency has been maintained
-1A-.-S a Sel ice unprecedented IN the his
1 tory Of vessels Of her class The Brook
lyn's westerly biockading position gave
her an advantage in the chase. which
she maintained 10 the end and she en-
ployed her fine battery wiki telling ef-
feet The Texas and the New York were
gaining on the chase during the last
hour, and had any accident befallen the
Brooklyn or the Oregon, would have
speedily overhaule5 the Cristobai Colon.
From the moment the Spanish vessel ex-
4 hausted her first burst of speed The re-
4 suit vas never in doubt She fell in
fact far below what might reasonably
have been expected OF ner Careful meas.
urements of time and distance give her
an average speed-from the time she
cleared the harbor mouth until the time
she was run on shore a. Rio Tarquino-
+ Of 137 knots. Neither the New York
nor the Brooklyn stopped to couple up
their forward engines, but ran out the
chase with one pair getting steam. Of
course, as rapidly as possible on all boil-
erS. To stop TO couple up the forward
engines would have meant a delay of fif-
teen minutes--or four miles in the chase.
IA. Several Of the ships were struck, the
/ Brooklyn more often than the others bur
very slight material injury was done the
greatest being aboard the Iowa Our
loss was one man killed and one wound
ed, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult
1 20 explain this immunity from loss Of
, life or injury to ships in a combat wits
modern vessels of the best type: but
Spanish gunnery is poor at the best ana
the superior weight and accuracy of our
fire speedily drove the men from their
guns and silenced their fire This Is
borne cut by the statements Of prison.
ers, and by observation. The Spanish
vessels. as they dashed out of the har-
bor. were covered with the smoke from
their own guns, but this speedily dimin-
ished in volume and soon almost disaD-
peared. The fire from the rapid-fire bat
teries of the battleships appears 10 have
been remarkably destructive. An exam
ination of the stranded vessels shows that
the Almirante oquendo especially had SUI
fered terribly from this fire Her sides
are everywhere pierced and her decks
were strewn with the charred remains
Of those who had fallen.
l5 The reports of Commodore w s.
Schley and of the commanding officers
are inclosed.
= IS A board. appointed by me several
: days ago. has made a critical examina-
ton Of the stranded vessels both with
a view of reporting upon the result OF
our fire and the military features in
volYed, and of reporting upon the chance
! of saving any of them and wrecking the
remainder. The report OF the board will
be speedily forwarded.
Very respectfully. w. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral U. s. N,
, Comd r-in-Chief u. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.
The Secretary of the Navy,
, Navy Department Washington. D. C
+ COMMODORE w. S. ScHLEY.
Official Report of His Victory Owe,