The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1898-05-05
NAVAL STRATEGY.

In the book recently published, titled
Drake and the Tudor Navy" the au-
thor of which is Julian S. Corbett, an
Interesting and fascinating account is
given. in the second volume of Admir-
al brakes characteristics as a fighting
man. At the present moment when the
United States are probably at war with
Spain, a study of the achievements of
a fighting admiral like Drake, who
fought the Spanish Armada and was
known to the Spanish people as the
Dragon, is especially interesting.
Three hundred years after his re-
markable victories over the Spaniards,
the admirals of the United States have
organized a naval campaign so far as
we can. now see. on the principles
which guided Drake in his assaults on
the Spanish power. An excellent re-
cord was kept of his strategic plans.
These would have had more value If
Queen Elizabeth had not vacillated In
her policy, and undermined him. But
schemes with marvellous success. 1t is
said by naval writer's that he antlcl-
pated the best of the modern theories
of naval attack He refused to remain
for a moment on the defensive. He
sought the eneny's sources of supply
at once. the point where he could best
conduct the movements of his fleets.
While we have no information what
ever regarding the plans of the Amer
lean fleet, the dispatches, vague as they
are. intimate that it had left Hampton
Roads on a distinct mission. 1t PROB
abIv had in view the same objective
noints that Drake had 800 years ago.
when he captured Santiago, Cartagena
and San Domingo. It would indeed De
singular coincidence in history, II
this should prove to be the case.
In the case of the Armada, Drake re-
fpsed TO remain on the defensive and
fought the Spaniards on their own
coast
Rut those were days when coal was
not the great necessity of the hghtlng
shin The winds dealt equitably with
both combatants. 1t cost nothing But
neither side could mOnopOliSe 1t, OF
store it up in ports, and make 1t Dase
of operations. AS coal becomes ne
cessity of warfare just as food and
ammunition are necessities, and, more
over it takes the place OF wind, II
seems as if brakes theory OF warfare
would be modified, after 300 years OF
advancing knowledge on the subject
But. after ali, the principles of strategy
do not change.
Should the Spanirds abandon Cuba,
and await on the soil of Spain an at
tack by the American forces, naval
men will watch with great interest the
manner in which the American vessels
NAV be supplied with coal at dis
lance of $500 miles from their bases
of coal supply. 1t is suggested that
coal transports will attend and supply
them. But if this can be done, and
there is some doubt about it, then our
own Islands will be of little value as
strategic point in the Pacific If hun
dred transports can supply with Goa
the American feet cruising off The
coast of Spain, then a hundred trans
ports may supply hostile fleet cruls
ing off the coast of California. OF wha
use then would Hawaii be as base o
supplies? Once make transports re
liable bases of supplies, and they be
come Immediately the most eft1cien
strategic points, excepting for the re
fitting of vessels.