The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-04-03

In the event of war with Spain,
doubtless one of the first moves made
by the forces of the United States
would be the occupation Of Cuba, thus
removing any possibility of a land at
tack upon the southern states made by
way of the Spanish possession
With this idea in view, the matter
has already been discussed at some
length, for the strength of Havana, to
which the attention of our army would
naturally be given from the first, is
such that siege of some duration
would probably be required, and such
delay would of necessity be of great
advantage TO Spain in allowing it to
transport troops either to this country
or some part Of the island, in which
case an attack upon both the fore and
rear of our forces might result dis
aStrously. Havana, as is well known,
is protected by several forts, that of
Moro being considered almost impreg-
nable and often referred to as the Glib
raitar of America.
With these obstacles to overcome. the
Cuban campaign would of necessity be
conducted with rapidity, if it is to be
successful. The maSsing of the naval
forces before Havana to prey upon that
city, while the army directed its atten-
ton to the rear, is looked upon by mill
tary men with most favor, but the de-
tails of such a plan have not yet been
exploited.
Recently. in an interview with an
army official, which was published in
the Republic at the time. he said that
in his belief the best method to be pur-
sued in an attack upon Havana would
be to follow the plan of Lord Abe
marie. who. in 1862, laid siege to the
city and captured it in about two
months. Of course, no such amount of
time could be allowed for the capitula-
ton Of the city in these times, but by
following in outline the same plans.
with the improved armament possessed
by both the army and navy, it is
thought that the taking of the city
could be accomplished within a much
shorter space of time.
Lord Albemarle's capture of Havana
is still regarded as a. remarkable mill
tary operation, and of it the Annual
Register GondOn, 1870, says:
at was, without question, in itself
the most considerable, and in it's conse-
quences the most decisive. conquest
made since the beginning of the war;
and because in no operation were the
courage. steadiness and perseverance of
the British troops and the conduct of
their leaders more conspicuous. 1t was
class; it was equal to the greatest ma
val victory by its effect on the enemy's
marine; and in plumber it equaled the
produce Of a national subsidy"
At the time of the taking of Havana
by the British, England was engaged
in what is known as the seven years
war. conflict which lasted from 1855
until 1852. At the time of the Cuban
campaign, Great Britain was allied
with the kingdom of Portugal, and
Prussia was also friendly, although it
had withdrawn from active part in the
war some few months before, when a
truce was declared between that coun-
try and Russia, which had previously
allied itself with France and Spain. In
the early part of 1852 Spain demanded
the alliance of Portugal, and on this
declaration of neutrality at once threw
her troops across the border. England
retaliated by taking the part OF Spain's
neighbor, and, as both sides had by
seven years of fighting become anxious
for cessation of hostilities, England
decided upon a decisive action, which
was none other than the possession of
the Spanish colonies.
1t being determined to commence
with the capture of Havana, such COM
manders were chosen as could be safely
intrusted with so weighty an undertake
ing. Lord Albemarle was selected to
command the expedition, and his two