The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-07-28
SKATERS HARD STRUGGLE.
LACK OF ROADS ONE OF HIS GREAT
EST DRAWBACKS.

CAhSi Ellc-unty Oue HutterN
Could lie Sent Forward During the
Four Days Before the Surrender.
None OF the Siege Guns Moved he
yOnd SibOney.
Copyright. 1898, by the Associated Press
Correspondence OF the Associated Press.
Before Santiago de Cuba July H-Prob-
ably few European military critics will ap-
preciate the arduous nature of tho cam
paign SO successfully terminated to-day by
the surrender of an the Spanish forces
east Of Santiago and the virtual abandon
ment of this province by Spain. one word
tells the story-roads
The roads here are simply paths through
the dense tropical forest paths along
which half a dozen ordinary OK teams haul
numbering carts once a day in comparative
ly dry weather There are no bridges. and
in wet weather, when the streams are rag
ing torrents, these paths are almost inn
passable TO men on horseback, absolutely
so to vehicles of all descriptions.
Thus it was that all the roads along
which the troops were marched had really
TO be built before a single wagon train
could get through. The bridges thrown
across the streams were repeatedly swept
away by high water.
Several times communication was al
most entirely interrupted and the army had
to fall back on pack trains. Indeed. The
base of supplies was seriously threatened
1t is fact that during the four days be-
fore the surrender IL was possible to get
only one light battery of the six brought
by Gen. Randolph to the front while not
a single one of the siege guns brought by
Gen. Shafter got beyond Siboney.
There is another vital difference In the
nature of the country itself over the
fields in the operation in the Austro- Prus-
sian war Of 1866 and the Franco -Prussian
war of 1870 1t was possible, in almost ev-
cry engagement, TO maneuver an army
corps by platoons and battalions. Here the
men were obliged to advance in single file
on San Juan hii, one column marched out
of the road into the open in the face Of
the mur1erOus artillery and rifle fire from
the Spanish trenches and deployed for the
charge on open ground. No finer eXhibi-
tion of nerve cou4d be- required of a sol-
der than the charge across 100 yards OF
open territory against an enemy entrench-
ed upon the crest of a hill. But our men
never finched.
As matter of fact, It is one of the un-
written secrets of the battle of July that
the plans made the night previous did not
contemplate an assault upon the works Of
the enemy before Santiago Two divisions
those of Gen. Wheeler and Gen. Kent
were to remain in column on the main road
to Santiago, TO reinforce Gen. Lawton,
whose division was to assault El Caney
on the extreme right, while Grimes bat
tory made a diversion on the left. But
when the Spanish guns began to drop
shrapnel shells over the road on which our
column rested, and when word came that
Lawton was successful at El Caney il be
came necessary for Wheeler's and Kents
divisions either to advance, retreat or re-
main quiet under the storm Of shell that
was bursting over their heads.
In these circumstances, It was
less dangerous to advance and
charge the enemy's works than
to stay where they were, and with an gen
eral impulse to get where they could re-
turn the enemy's fire the advance regi-
ments, the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry,
moved out. The others followed
There is a question whether any specific
general command to charge was ever Civ
en- Regimental and company command
ers simply led their way heroicaUv for
ward up the hill. The Hill was taken, the
American flag planted on it's crest, and the
enemy driven pellmell into his inner line
of entertainments beyond
Our men were too much exhausted to
follow up their victory, though it has since
been asserted that had the pursuit been
continued that afternoon, the demoralized
Spanish would have surrendered that
night.
SO terrific had been the slaughter Of our
men-90 per cent. of whom were then un-
der fire for the first time-that the fact is
though comparatively few knew It, on the
night Of July /, officers of high rank
brave soldiers, TOO, went to Gen. Wheeler
who was in command at the front (Gen
Shafter being stil aboard his ship. ana
appealed to him TO withdraw. They pre-
dicted an awful dlaster to our arms II we
attempted to hold the position we had
earned SO dearly.
But the intrepid old cavalry leader Of
the Confederacy said: "No" He smoke
reassuring words to those who came with
dire foreboling. I'VE are In an uncom-
Portable position he said, "but the Span
iards are more uncomfortable than we
Pass that word down the line"
Gen. Wheeler even sent back a disnatcn
to Gen. Shafter, telling him Of the press
ure that was being brought to bear uDon
him. Il presume the same influences are
being brought 70 bear upon you" he wrote
in effect but II will not do. American
prestige would suffer irretrievably if we
gave In an inch We must be firm"
The Cubans have proved a sorry digan.
pointmenL throughout the campaign. even
to their warmest friends. They have haen
everywhere except where the battle RACED
but their chief and favorite station has
been near the commissary. So pcrsistertlv
have they hung about the supply stations
that they have come 10 be known and de-
scrDed in language more forcible than ele-
giant, as the mango -beliied dogenerates."
During The various actions since The
army landed only seven Cubans 80 far AZ
Is known, have been wounded. At lei Ca
ney, when the pack train brought tp sun
plies for the starving refugees the Cubans
crowded out women and children ana de-
manded rations, not as a privilege, but as
a right Capt Brice, who was IN charge.
was compelled 20 knock down two Cuban
officers
Even as a source Of information. the Gu
bans have proved unreliable. They could
not be trusted. In ninety-nine cases out
.r Ir "a N.