The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-06-29
MODERN ARMIES.
Their Largenass Has a Tendency to Make
Thor, T,p,nO7,iIa

Their Largenass Has Tendency to Make
Them Imlnobi1e.
We arc by no means sure that ar
mics at the end of the nineteenth
century are not to some extent in
the condition of the armies Of the
last few years Of the eighteenth cen
tury. No doubt the modern generals
are, or, shall we say seem, less
sleepy headed than the old bewig-
ged Austrians and Prussians, though
they, it must be remembered, were
in their day reckoned men of science.
But at the same time we suspect that
a good deal Of our modern military
organization has become stiff and
impractical. We shall be told, no
doubt, that the Prussian army went
like clockwork in 1870, but we must
be allowed to doubt whether the
clockwork is quite as good now as
it was then, in spite Of appearances.
Besides, Prussia had just the very
force opposed to her in 1870 against
which good clockwork would be
sure to prevail-a piece of bogus
military mechanism. Whether Prus-
sia would have had as easy a victory
if some Frenchman had arisen capa-
bic of organizing and using really
mobile force of go, 900 men is anoth-
er question. 1t is possible that such
a spearhead stuck into the clock
work might have done great deal
of damage. That, however, is spec
ulation. What we do know is that
the Prussian army was splendid
fighting organism at the end of the
Seven Years war, and that at Jena,
some 40 years after, it proved utter
~ unable to meet Napoleon's quick,
fierce assault.
In spite, then, of the magnificent
organization of the present Euro
pean armies and of their vast size,
we believe it to be quite possible
that some new Alexander may arise
who will organize new method of
fighting which, for time, at any
rate, may bring all their far stretch
ed greatness to ruin. Of course such
a genius in the art of war may new
er get to the front, but that his op-
portunity exists in the present bloat-
ed armaments we have no sort of
doubt. Yet, it will be said, how about
the big battalions9 All military au-
thorities agree that in the end, and
considering that the European ma
tions are practically equal in cour-
age and morale, the way to win a
battle is to confront five men of the
enemy with eight, or, if possible,
ten, men of your own. That proves
that the big armies will always beat
the small9 By no means. 1t is be-
cause we entirely and absolutely ac-
quiesce in the big battalions theory
A-"Providence is on the side of the
big battalions, was Napoleon's die
tum-that we hold that small and
properly organized mobile armies
will beat the huge, unwieldy armies
that the modern European strate-
gists contemplate putting into the
field. Remember, your big battal-
ions must confront the little battal-
ion not on paper, but on the ground; I;
hence, if body of 10000 men can
be swiftly and Suddenly confronted
with body of 100000, the big bat
talions rule is on the side of the
1000. The fact that the 10000 be-
long to an organization which has
a couple of hundred thousand men
behind it does not matter. Unless
the 200, 900 men are available at the
moment they do not count.
An extremely mobile army, ready
to spring first in one direction and
then in another, is quite capable Of
beating an army three or four times
its size and beating it always by
having a substantial majority OF
combatants IN every actual engage
ment. Of course the big army may
be SO splendidly organized that it
will be quite as mobile, if not more
mobile, than the small army. In
that case the small army will be
swallowed whole. All we contend
sthat the hugeness of the European
armies tends to make them immo-
bile and that, therefore, it is always
possible that some clever invention
in the direction Of intense mobility
may give victory to a small and ap-
parently not particularly we'll found
army in other respects. London
Spectator.
Tho Bravest OF tho Bravo.
Ho1dino the bahv in his left arm