Staunton spectator and vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1896-1916, 1898-05-26
WAR;,

Wv kE A.
No developments of interest have
transpired during the week there has
been no naval battle so far as heard
from on going to press, but if the
Spaniards can be overtaken there will
surely be one. The Spanish fleet mus
now be short of coal.
There are no coaling depots in the
West Indian Islands open to the Span
ish ships, except for their most tenn
porary needs. The British islands
Jamaica, Barbados, and others, are
closed against them by the decree max
ing coal contraband of war. The
Dutch islands will give them no furth
er coal relief, as a result of negotiation
with the Dutch authorities, following
the coaling Of the Spanish ships a.
Curacao. The Danish island of st
Thomas is similarly closed against
them. Guadaloope and other French
islands have the same restrictions al
Martinique.
Haytian ports are closed to them by
strict treaty provision between Hayt
and the United States, which the
Haytian authorities will see is moi
waived in the present case. Sante
Domingo ports are similarly protected
against the chance Of recoaling by
Admiral Ger vera's fleet.
In short, the Spanish admiral Is now
inside the Caribbean sea with his orr
ginal stock of coal used up. with scan'
additions already we'll exhausted, and
with no coaling depots in sight for q
complete recoaling. This. in nava
parlance, would starve the ships be.
fore long.
It can be stated positively that the
climatic difficulties in the way of 9
campaign in Cuba in the wet season
are not by any means the main inf1u
ences in preventing an immediate be
ginning of the military campaign. Oh
course, the military strategists are moi
deaf to the earnest representations OF
people who are familia with the con
ditions in Cuba at this season of the
year, such as were made by Lieut.
Rowan. 1t is believed, however, thai
these are not regarded as insurmount-
able obstacles to the beginning of the
campaign at least, for with the observ
ance of the strictest sanitary precau
tioLs, such as are almost unknown il
the Spanish army, the choice of salu
brious camping grounds and the exer
else of prudence in feeding and caring
for the troops generally, the Officer
are confident that they can take them
through wet season in Cuba with
little more mortality than would bs
experienced in some of the Southern
States under like conditions. The fac
that the roads are well-nigh impass
able after the middle of June may
defer the actual prosecution of the
campaign. but will not prevent itl
initiation and the employment of The
time when heavy troops and artillery
cannot be moved in disciplining ant
| acclimating the forces and in slowly
tightening the lines around Havana
But there are other and very serious
objections from q military point o.
view to an immediate beginning o
the campaign, and these are being 81
strongly urged upon the administra
ton that, it is believed, they will pre-
vail, and that the movement OF the
transports across the Florida strait
will be delayed for a few weeks a.
least, unless there is a radical changt
| in existing conditions. The very frs
and strongest objection to an imme
date movement is the presence of the
Spanish feet in the neighborhood O.
| Cuba. Little Importance is attached
| by the military men to any operation
that might be conducted by this flee
against our own squadrOns or agains
our seaport towns. The first are amply
able to take care of themselves. while
any seaport of enough strategic i'm
portance to be mark for hostile at
tack is very much better fortified thar
the public is aware of.
| The danger point is the possibility
of successful attack upon the trool
transports. So far the government hal
secured thirty of these vessels, Will
an average capacity of about 500 sol
diers. The project of the military
| authorities is to send not less thai
%, 900 troops in four expeditions. max
| ing total of 100000 troops to be land
, ed in Cuba. Less than $4,000 coulC
not be sent safely at once for the rea
son that the force will be scarcely abb
to hold it's own when landed agains
the Spanish troops, which. thanks te
the telegraph and railroad communi
cation along the blockade lines Of
Cuba, can be assembled at very few
hours notice at any point selected fol
the debarkation of thhe American
troops. Therefore it will be necessary
to increase the transport force by
about 100 per cent, for some of those
already secured are destined for the
Philippine expedition. This number
of ships cannot be secured without
consuming some time.
Even when they have been collected
the boats must make four separate
trips back and forth from Cuba to
transport the 100, 900 troops which are
believed to be absolutely required for
a successful campaign. To persons
without naval experience it is hard to
convey the extreme danger of move
ment requiring four separate trips b.
fifty absolutely unprotected merchant
ships crowded with soldiers in the
presence of a hostile fleet, whose exact
whereabout are not known.
1t is a question whether the entire
combined force of Sampson and Schley
could guarantee safe conduct for the
troops under such circumstances, for
if the commanders of the swift Span
ish cruisers and torpedo boats are
willing to incur the risk they would
have every chance in their favor OF
destroying number of the transports
with all their troops. If one of the
cruisers should succeed in passing
through the lines Of the conveying
warships in the midst Of the fleet OF
transports, they would be in a meas
ure protected by their very victims,
the transports, from the fire of our
warships, and the possibilities of in
fiicting g. tremendous blow upon us
would be very large. All of this has
been fully considered by the military
authorities, and they are consequently
looking to the navy to drive off or
destroy the hostile fleet before the sol
diers are called upon to cross into
Cuba.
Another and very serious cause o!
n aloy is tho in cr,,r,Ix, ~,