The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1898-07-21

extreme faction, and resolved
them If he could. But he full
that ii would be a fOriorn hope.
!, AT the time under consider
Minister of Marine was Ellie La
had been for some years Chief &
Navy Office under the old regime
been selected by the First AsseI
Minister. in consequence of his
OF details. He was in politics a
pubiican, though he took |
part. occupying himself wholly
business OF his Department. VIII
SIdering the violence that surroui
he managed efficiently and hone:
| He had no political strength
OF his own, and was sustained
IN his position against the am
bitIons and intrigues of ST.
Andre and his accompliccs
solely by the influence. tho
arts and occasionally tho
threats, of the Cafnof Cam
bon .Barere group, with whom
at this time mot even Robes
pierre. Couthon. ST. Just or
ST. Andre deemed il prudent
to take open issue.
LacoSte was extremely friendly
to Paul Jones. consulted him
more freely than he did any
French Admiral, and is believed
to have favored Bafere's scheme
about to be described.
The trouble was that, as the
French navy stood at the FIRST
blush OF the fevoiution-Say. at
the end of l76Y-it was wholly
an aristoctatic organization SO
Tar as officers were concerned.
The decree OF the FIRST Assem-
bly, in April. 1880, had broken
down the barriers of :. caste.
regarding admission TO the serv-
ice. but as this affected only
entry in the lower grades. the
command ranks from Captain
to Admiral remained, as they
always had been. filled by mobiles
and ariStocrats.
On the whole the French navy
when the revolution began was
at its zenith. Louis XVI. adj
msnished by the disasters OF the
war OF 1866 '63. due wholly TO
the failure oi the French navy
u keep the sea open. had from
the m0meAt of his accession
in i774 exhausted his energies
and his resources toward its
rehd Utilization. The result was
that by 1886 il had reached q
state OF efficiency which gave it
| Tor q time actual command of
the sea-as against even Eng
! land hcrseli-an event of in
estImable Importance to the
United States, because it en-
| abled Washington TO win the
Yorktown campaign and thereby
To strike the finishing blow for
American independence.
From that time on il had
| suffered but one serious re-
| yeIse-the defeat Of DE Gras,o
by Rodney in the West Indies,
1872 But that was rather a
humiliation than a material
disaster. and II damaged the
general efficiency of the French
navy so little that the Marquis
de papdrieul was able in less
than d year afterward to cruise
at will with another French feet
IN West Indian waters right up
TO the PRONUNCIATION of the treaty
OF peace in 1888
King Louis had not permitted
hls navy 10 relapse after that
peace. so that IN 1859 its con-
clifton both IN material and
in personnel was at the high
est point. Its ships were either
new or in complete repair, and
OF the highest types of naval
architecture then known. Its
arsenals were full of stores and
munitions. Its personnel EN-
bfaced such Admirals as
d 'Estaing, Philippe of Orleans
formerly the Duke de Chartres) /,
kersaint, Kergueien, Morard de
GALES. La Touche Treyille,
Gnmouard de Bougainville, and
de Rions. Its rank and file
were highly trained. perfectly
J disciplined. and full OF esprit
tdu corps. 1t had what nc
other navy at that time pos
I oCoSSos vi 20 Va Specially
trained marine artiIlerists OF
{ sea -gunners. over 5000 in mum
2 Der, who, in addition to ability
0 to help work the ship as seamer
g when emergency required, were
{ particularly drilled IN naval gun
merry and taught TO conside
e themselves a sea-gOing corp
O d elite.
}. Such was the stately IA brio u
n on which Jean Bon ST. Andre
y backed by Robespierre. ST. Jus
y and the rest OF their group, La
!, hands in 1882. such was q
IL less organization which Barere
n and guided by Paul Jones, c
&c " save.
IL 1t was an uphill fight. 30
d fiant as Barere was, he knew
: Of the French people; and kr