The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-08-26
LITTLE CREDIT TO INDIANA.
CAPT. TAYLOR OBJECTS TO THE
DUPLICATION OF REPORTS.

Admiral SchIey's Report OF the
Sinking of CerVera's Flect-DOesn't
Understand Why Admiral Schley
Failed 10 see the Action of the
IndiHna-AdmirnI SIMPSONS Reply.
both Letters 10 Form Part of the
Report of The Engagement.
Washington, Aug 25.-Admiral Samp-
son has forwarded to- the navy depart
ment the following letters which have
passed between himself and Capt Taylor
Of the battleship Indiana:
United States Steamship Indiana Gu
antanamo Bay, Cuba, Aug 6-Admiral:
The report of Commodore Schley on the
battle of July Sd, as published gives cred
1t in the seventh paragraph to four ships
and mentions by name their captain. Phil
ips, Evans, Clark and Cook, ana adds: The
dense smoke of the combat shut out from
my view the Indiana and Gloucester, but
as these vessels were close to your flag
ship no doubt their part in the conflict
was under your immediate observation
''2.-In' your report as published you
make but slight mention of the Indiana,
stating the Iowa and Indiana having
done good work, and not having the speed
of the other ships, were directed by me-"
etc. etc.
49, The result OF these reports Is that
the captains of all the vessels of the line
of battle except the Indiana have received
personal mention in the official report be-
fore the department, while the smaller
vessels have also had distinctive mention
either from the commander-in-chiefo or the
second in command.
"a If the official record should be re-
ferred to in future it will appear from It's
general tone that the Indiana was less de-
serving than all of her consorts. Leav-
ing out my personal interest In the matter,
it is right that I should consider the off,
GERS and crew of the ship; and l speak for
them as well as for myself when ] submit
to you, admiral, that the above combination
of reports will place the ship in the opin-
ion of the department and the country.
markedly below all the other vessels of
your squadron. l respectfully submit sir,
that this is injustice to the Indiana and
her officers and crew.
uiSDdIdEGIDtIk
of any other vessel that during the first
hour of the fight the Indiana's gun fire
contributed to the destruction of the
Oquendo and the Teresa more than that
of any single vessel of our squadron, ex-
cept one, and equals hers. / do not know
why the second in command failed to OBJ
serve the Indiana during this period of
our hottest action. l saw the Brooklyn
quite plainly.
s. An examination of the reports with
reference to the Indiana will, 1 believe,
convince you, sir, that they do produce
the effect of putting the Indiana below all
the other vessels of the squadron If ii
be your opinion sir, that this Is the case,
and that all the vessels from the Brook
lyn to the Vixen rendered services as
much more valuable than the Indiana
than the published reports of the COM
mander-in-chief and the second in COM
mand taken together, would indicate, then
I must accept IL for myself and the ship.
If, on the contrary, that be not your oDin-
ion. / urge respectfully that such steps
be taken to remedy this injustice as may
seem wise to you. Very respectfully,
III. G. Taylor,
Captain. T. S. Navy, Commanding.
"To the Commander-in-Chief. United
States Naval Force, North Atlantic Sta
ton
United States Steamship New York,
Guantanamo Bay, Aug. 8, 1885,
Sir: 1 am greatly obliged that
you have called my attention
TO what appears to have been an injustice
to your ship officers and crew for the
part they took in the action Of July 3. l
think, however, that you win agree with
me that, in submitting such a report to
the Secretary of the Navy where so
many officers are vitally interested, and
Justly proud Of their ship, it Is no easy
task TO do so without apparently bestow-
ing praise unjustly. 1t requires very care
full consideration Of the report from every
point of view to avoid misunderstanding.
"2 The position of the ships OF
the squadron must be carefully
considered to fully appreciate what It was
possible for each vessel to accomplish un-
der the circumstances In which she was
placed. Those that were TO the westward
Of the escaping enemy were certainly bet
ter placed for stopping the enemy and also
better placed for delivering their fire than
the vessels TO the eastward, which was
the bloekading station Of the Indiana.
g. No distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide against
every variation Of such a sortie nor do ]
consider that any commanding officer de-
served either credit or blame because the
slower than another ship, or carried a
heavier or lighter battery; but rather that
the commanding officer was blame worthy
when he failed to put his ship In the prop
er place for destroying the enemy Just In
proportion TO the advantage which he pos
sessed IN speed, battery or position over
his neighbors.
a. Each commanding officer, IN my
opinion, was personally responsible for the
good use Of the tools with which he had
10 work ! certainly did not intend TO crit
icise you, nor to bcstow less praise upon
the Indiana than are bestOw6d upon other
ships of the squadron
IS. The fact that the commanding off,
Ger Of the Inoiana was signaled 20 return
20 blockade az the mouth Of the harbOr
after she had so CALAMITY contributed to
the destruction Of the Spanish ships was
only a necessary precaudon which the
commander-in-chieff felt obliged 10 take TO
prevent disaster 20 the large number Of
transports which were left Ia that vicinity
when the fleet started In pursuit Of the
enemy There were still more armed yes
oefs remaining ia the harbOr Of Santiago