Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-07-13
WHAT CAN SPAIN DO But MAKE
PEACE: ASKS SAGASTA.
CABINET CRISIS HANGS FIRE
MINISTER'S NEARLY ALL FAVOR A
PEACE POLICY.
Will Support Sarastn IL He Seeks to
End the War-Pubiic Opinion
Favors Peace. but the Mill
tary Still Bitterly OPP
pOses 1t.

LONDON, July 1S.-The Madrid corre-
spondent of the Daily Mail says:
.'Senor Sagasta, being asked as to wheth-
er decision had been made regarding
peace. replied:
No; but what remedy can there be but
to make peace?
The ministeriaiists insist that the regu-
lar army in Cuba does not object to con-
clusion of peace but that the 10000 volun-
teers are determined to continue the war"
The Madrid correspondent Of the Times
says:
THE crisis hangs fire. The ministers still
meet in council and the difficulties of re-
tirement seem even greater than the diff
ficulties OF remaining in office. The Con-
seryatives are not prepared TO accept Office.
and it Is hard to imagine Liberal cabinet
without an undisputed Liberal leader. The
logical conclusion is that senor Sagasta
must accept the responsibility of deciding
whether or not to open peace negotiations.
What is required is that he should make
up his mind on that essential point. II he
resolutely adopts peace policy, nearly all
his colleagues will support him. and for
those who do not substitutes can be found.
H. on the contrary, he decides to continue
the struggle, he must largely remodel the
cabinet.
For the moment, he appears to hesitate
between the two courses, perceiving clearly.
no doubt. by the light of his long expert
ence OF political life, the danger of both.
"On the one hand general public opinion
seems now decidedly in favor OF peace.
Nearly all the influential papers recognize
that the supplies in Cuba are not nearly
SO great as was supposed: that Porto Rico
could not long resist a formidable attack;
that, since America has now obtained un-
| disputed command OF the sea, Spain cannot
| longer assist her colonies in their efforts
| against a powerful invader, and that she
| will obtain better conditions now than when
| her powers of resistance are completely ex-
| hausted.
''On the other hand. military circles still
| favor holding out, and are beginning 20 use
very violent war language. The three chief
| military organs all publish articles urging
resistance to the uttermost and employing
| against the partisans of peace terms of
| invective which I refrain from reproduc-
| ing. If they represent faithfully the general
state of feeling in the army, can UNDER
stand at least one Of the reasons why Sc
| nor Sagasta hesitates to adopt resolute
| peace policy.
I'm the course of his long political life,
Sagasta has lived under all kinds of gov
hrn 70
| anarchial Repubcanism; and he has taken
an active part in more than one revolution.
No man is more capable OF gaugng accu-
rately the real Importance of any current
of public opinion and of weighing accu-
rately internal against external dangers.
His hesitation, however, cannot continue
much longer, for majority of his col
leagues insist upon some decision being
taken without further delay.
"The newspapers to-day quote long ex-
tracts from an important work on Cuba
| published by General Poavieia, who spent
twenty years there, rising from the rank
| of sub-lieutenant to be captain general,
| including the governor generalship. It is
rather surprising to find from his corre-
| .spondence that his political views differed
| radically from those of official circles in
| Madrid.
AT comparatively early period Cen
| eral Polavieja arrived at the conclusion
| that Cuba could not remain permanently
| a Spanish colony. When this conviction
| ripened he wrote endless letters to private
and official friends, urging the necessity of
making timely preparations for an amica-
| BILE separation. In 1879, when governor of
Puerto Principe, he wrote General Blanco
| explaining that the Cubans would never
| abandon their efforts for independence and
| the United States would never relax its
| schemes for annexation.
| He argued, therefore, that Spain ought
to prepare to grant independence in order
| to avoid being elected violently. with loss
| 10 the national interests and stain to the
| national honor
When he had become governor general,
| Po!avieja, perceiving the ever growing dam
ger of an American attack. urged the gov
| ernment to build six cruisers and twenty
| floating batteries for the protection of the
| Cuban coast. His policy in short was to
] grantly friendly independence as soon as
! possible. but so long as Spain retained the
island, TO be strong enough to suppress in
surrection and to resist foreign INVASION