The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-09-15

| Washington, Sept. 14.-General Shat
ter's report of the compaign which ter
minated in the fall Of Santiago has
been made public. He briefly recounts
the organization of the expedition and
its embarkation, and then devotes the
main body of the report to the active
! operations about Santiago.
General Shafter says the expedition
was undertaken in compliance with
the Geographic instructions of May 80
I from headquarters of the army, In
which it was stated: Admiral Schley
reports that two cruisers and two tor
pedo boats have been seen in the har-
Dor of Santiago. Go with your force to
capture garrison at Santiago and as
sist in capturing harbor and fleet
After reciting the delay at Tampa,
due to inadequate facilities, General
Shafter says that on June he received
orders to sail without delay, but with
not less than 10000 men. After some
transports had already reached the
! lower bay, Geographic instructions
were received from the secretary of
war, directing that the sailing of the
expedition be delayed, waiting further
orders. This delay was occasioned by
the navy reporting that a Spanish war
vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas
channel. The ships in the lower bay
were Immediately recalled. The expe-
dition sailed on June Il, with SIS Off
GERS and 1902 men.
General Shafter briefly covers the
| trip and landing and his first meeting
with General Garcia, adding: During
the interview General Garcia offered
the services of his troops, comprising
A M a
zeraderos, and about 5000 under Gen
tEral. Castillo, at the little town of Gu
4 jababo. a few miles east of Baiquiri-
I accepted his offer, impreSSing it
upon him that could exercise no mill
tary control over him, except such as
he would coneede, and as long as he
served underline I would furnish him
rations and ammunition.
PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
After comforting with Admiral Samp-
son and General Garcia, the plans of
the campaign were outlined by General
Shafter
The Decentralization was to commence
on the 22nd at Baiquiri, with feints by
the Cubans on Cabanas. and by the
navy at various shore points in order
to mislead the enemy as to the place
of landing.
General Shafter says: These move
ments committed me to approach San
tiago from the east over narrow road,
in some places not better than a trail,
running from Baiquiri through Siboney
and Seyilla, and making attack from
that quarter. This, in my opinion, was
the only feasible plan, and subsequent
information and results confirmed my
judgment"
The report continues: TT was not
until nearly two weeks after the army
landed that it was possible to place
on shore three days supplies in excess
of that required for the daily consump-
ton. On June 80 I reconnoitered the
country about Santiago and made my
plan of attack. From a high hill from
which the city was in plain view, 1
could see the San Juan hill and the
country about Ell Caney. The roads
were very poor. and, indeed, little bet
ter than bridlepaths until the San Juan
river and Ell Caney were reached
PLAN OF BATTLE.
General Shafter explained at meet
ing of generals his plan of battle, which
follows: 'Lawton's division, assisted
by Capron's light battery, was ordered
to move out during the afternoon to-
wards Ell Caney to begin the attack
there early the next morning After
carrying Ell Caney, Lawton was to
move by the Caney road toward San
toego, and take a position on the right
of the line. Wheelers division of dis
mounted cavalry, and Kent's division
of infantry were directed on the San
tiago road. the head of the column rest
ing near Ell Poso, toward which heights
Grimes battery moved on the after
noon of the 30th. with orders to take
possession there early on the next
morning, and at the proper time pre-
fI.,oxr fO,-
er and Kent on San Juan hill. The
attack at this point was to be delayed
until Lawton's. guns were heard at FL
Caney and his infantry fire showed he
had become well engaged
INADEQUATE PREPARATIONS.
'"The preparations were far from
what 1 desired them to be, but we were
in a sicl1ly climate; our supplies had to
be brought forward by a1narrow wa
gon road, which the trains might at
any time render impossible, fear was
entertained that a storm might drive
the vessels containing our supplies to
sea, thus parting us from our base of
supplies and lastly it was reported
that General Rando with 5000 rein
forcements for the enemy was en- route
from ManZanillo and might be expect
ed in a few days. Under these circum-
stances | determined to give battle
without delay.
SAN JUAN FIGHT.
In describing the attack upon San
Juan hill. General Shafter says:
In the meantime Kent's division, with
the exception of two regiments of Haw-
kins' brigade, being thus, uncovered,
moved rapidly to the front from the
forks previously mentioned in the road,
utilizing both trails. but more espee-
tally the one to the left and crossing
the creek. formed for attack in the
front of San Juan hill. During this
formation, the Second brigade suffered
severely. While personally superin-
tending this movement, it's gallant
commander, Colonel Wikoff was killed.
The command of the brigade then de-
volved upon Lieutenant Colonel Worth,
Thirteenth infantry, who was soon Sc
verely wounded and next upon Lieu
tenant Colonel Liscum, Twenty-fourth
infantry who. five minutes later also