The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-12-03

letting the non-combatants come out
leisurely.
The secretary replied that for hui
manity's sake he approved the post
ponement of the bombardment, as pro-
posed, though Shafter would be JUS
titled in carrying out the original
threat. Later in the same day General
Corbin directed Shafter to use his own
judgment about how to take the CITY,
only, for manifest reasons, it should be
accomplished as speedily as possible
The secretary also added a short. tele-
gram, saying that he had not intended
TO direct Skaters movements, as he
was the best judge of the situation,
| and the country had every faith in his
wisdom.
SKATERS ILLNESS.
Later still, on July 4. the following
telegram was dispatched:
Major General shafter, Playa del
Este, Cuba:
| after conference with the president
and the secretary of war, I am directed
| to say your continued illness brings
| sorrow and anxiety In case you are
disabled, General Wheeler would, OF
| course, succeed to command. His ILL
ness, which we also regret, is feared
! to be so serious as to prevent his as
Stunning command. You must determine
whether your condition is such as TO
require you to relinquish command If
| so, and General Wheeler is disabled,
you will order the next general officer
] in rank for duty to succeed you and
take up the work in hand. 1t is not
expected that our forces will make as
sault until they are ready
III. G.. CORBIN. Adit. Gen.
| The response was as follows:
Camp Near Santiago de Cuba,
July 5.
'Adjutant General, Washington:
I am not at present so much ill as
| exhausted from the intense strain that
! has been on me for the last two
months. I am also suffering from an,
/ attack of govt, which prevents me from
moving about. / have, however. the
whole business in my hand. and am
| managing it through staff officers.
/ When 1 do have to give up, I will, of
course, follow your order but I hope
to be better soon. SHAFTER.
Maj. Gen. Commanding"
| On the 3rd, General Shafter reported
| that Pardo could not get into Santiago,
but on the 4th he reported Pando's en-
try with 5000 troops, from Holguin, and
asked about his own achievements
On the 9th Shafter reported that he
was returning the Spanish wounded,
he being satisfied that such a course
would sow the seeds of dissatisfaction
| III the spanish ranks.
COOPERATION OF NAVY.
In telegram dated San Juan, 4th.
| Shafter says: 81 regard it as necessary
that navy force an entrance into the
! harbor of Santiago not later than the
9th inst. and assist in the capture of
that place. If they do, I believe the
place will surrender without further
sacrifice of life
+oIoo,o
that if the army was to take the place
alone, $4,000 troops We're wanted speed
lily, and then it was not certain, on ac-
count of the stormy weather, and a
surer way was through the bay.
In reply he was told on July by
General Corbin to confer with Samp-
son at once for cooperation in taking
Santiago, and, latter the fullest ex-
change of views, you will agree upon
the time and place of attack
On the afternoon of the same day,
General Corbin telegraphed that the
secretary of war found it evident, from
your several reports, that you do not
consider your force strong enough to
make a successful assault upon the
Spanish army intrenched in Santiago.
This being the case, it is the point of
wisdom to await reinforcements, the
embarkation of which you have already
been advised. You must be the Judge
of time and manner of assault. The
president has directed that you and Ad-
miral Sampson have q. conference and
determine upon a course of co-opera-
ton best calculated to secure desired
results with least sacrifice"
The next day Shafter was tele-
graphed:
The secretary of war is anxious to
know what prospect there is of break
ing through the lines. He will be very
glad, even with delay, to have CO.
operation of the navy, thus saving
many lives"
July Z Shafter telegraphed that after
consultation with Sampson, the navy
was disinclined to force entrance, ex-
cept as last resort; would lombard city
for twenty-four hours, and then try to
force an entrance with small ships. He
had made another demand for ToraPs
surrender, which he hoped would sue
coed. He says:
"As a last resort 1 will try running
in transports. I don't consider my
force sufficient to warrant an assault
on the city, though [ believe it would be
successful, but at fearful loss. OF
course. 1t would be criminal in view
of the end to be gained, which is mere
ly the capture of a few thousand men
and when we are getting them by
siege"
Shafter was telegraphed that it was
. reported here that his men were with
out food. He replied on the 9Th thai
on the day of the battle the men haG
piled up and left their blankets anG
haversacks, and were not able to ge
! them until the next night. Some o.
them may have been hungry, but on the
night of the battle pack trains deliv.
cred food along the line. They were
without tobacco for several /tys, as i
was only by great eXertion that coffee
sugar, meat and bread could be gotten
OF these the men had full rations
though coffee was lacking for twenty
four hours.
DEPARTURE OF MILES.
The next communication is not
from General Miles at army headquar
tiers at Washington, announcing his in
tention of leaving Washington on tn
following night. Two days later, Jul,
8, this dispatch was sent:
"Adjutant Generals Office, Washing
ton, July S.-Major General Shafte1
> Playa del Este, Cuba: Secretary o
war desires me to inform you that Gen
eral Miles left here at 10:40 last nigh
for Santiago, but with instructions no
in any manner to supersede you a
; commander of the forces i'll the fell
near Santiago, so long as you are abb
: for duty
(Signed) III. C. CORBIN,
"Adjutant General"
The following dispatches announc
the sailing of Miles on the Yale hi
> arrival at Sibcney and the extension
= of the line of investment. On the ST
4 General Corbin asked Shafter if he rec
commended the arr7ing of his volunteer
with Krag- Jorgensens, and the repl
was Immediately as follows:
"Adjutant General United State
: Army, Washington: Headquarter