Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1898-11-04
WARSHIPS' WEAK SPOTS.
Me thods Of Attack Which Are
Most Effective.
A United States Oficcr Gives Some Inter-
estiDg Information About the Great
Z Ironclads-Onenstve and De-
4 fenstve Powers.

A war ship is vulnerable in two chief
respects-in her motive power and in
her personnel. 1t is imaginable that one
might be wholly neutralizcd without
materially injuring the other. Theques-
tion, not only of to-day, but of CEN
tury's standing, is, which is it better to
attack in order to subdue the ship? In
olden days the British habitually at
tackled the personnel, the French the
| motive power, and each was consistent;
| for the aim of the former was to insure
decisive results, and that of the latter
| 10 avoid them. Each has had its advo-
Gates, and consequently there is some
thing to be said on each side; but upon
the whole it is, think, fair to say that
experience replies, attack the men.
And the reason is much the same as
hundred years ago; not only is it impos-
sible to have the men as we'll protected
as the motive power, but the destruc-
ton of the men who handle the often
sive powers of the ship makes the mo-
tive power practically useless.
Now the weight which q ship of
given size can carry is limited, and must
be distributed among several objects, Of
which gun power is one, and the ques-
ton has to be met, how shall this gun
power be subdivided among the differ
ent classes of gun? If your aim is the
motive power you want heavy guns; for
the motive power-the engines and
boilers-are given the utmost possible
protection, by position, by the thickest
armor, by the coal stowage, The protec-
tive deck, and SO on. to pierce which
great force is required. But heavy guns
means few guns, and few guns means
few shots, and fewer shots mean
fewer hits; while of those that hit, if
they strike the protective system of the
engines, ETC., fewer still penetrate. q
truth long foreseen, yet very generally !
dropped out of sight, and which the
Yalu battle has singularly confirmed.
On the other hand, the weight of
armor required to protect the water
line adequately makes it impossible to
extend by similar means adequate pro-
lection to the battery spaces, except
only those occupied by the heavy guns,
and even where these are adequately
protected-impervious, that is. to the
from those lighter guns, tech
nically called rapid tire'-there can
be no question that their accuracy of
fire is singularly embarrassed. For that
reason it is sought to aim and fire them
from an interior position-the coming
tower, for instance-a plan of which it
is enough here to say that, except for
the heaviest guns, it is tending to fall
into disuse.
Considering the vast Importance of
securing the best practice from the
heavy guns-for am not at all arguing
against them, only against their excess
'ive number-it becomes necessary to
'eat down and keep down all the other
ire of the enemy. If success in this is
stained, q distinct and immense advan-
age is gained for the heavy guns over '
hose of the enemy; for, if the rapid G
ire guns which have established their {
scendancy cannot penetrate the tur-
cts, they can greatly annoy the men in
hem, and may enter the gun ports. {
his superiority, if maintained, must 9
esult in victory. 1t has long seemed to .
le that the mutual relations of the
eavy and rapid fire guns of the ship
ave strong analogy to field bat
sry of artillery and its infantry sup
orts, the latter at once protect and Sc
Ire the efficient service of the former.
owever that may be, the rapid fire gun
modern caliber has just now fairly
tablished it's position as to the great
It offensive power in naval warfare
lpt A. t. Mahan, in Century.