Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-12-01
A SAMPSON REPORT.
Operations Of Fleet OF Santiago
After Sch|ey's Victory
THE QUARREL WITH SHAFTER
Why the Admiral Failed to Force the
HarbOr, as Desired.
MATTER OF THE CAPiTULATION.
Admira1s Chagrin at Being Prevent
ed from Becoming One of the Par
ties to Whom Torai surrendercd-
Claim tO Spanish Shipping.
NATTER OF THE CAPiTULATION.
Admira1's Chagrin ut Being Prevent
Claim to Spanish Shipping.

WASHINGTON. November S0.-The
Navy Department to-day made public a
report from Admiral Sampson, coverine
the operations Of the United States block
aiding fleet off Santiago after the destruc-
| tion Of Cervera's squadron.
The report begins with dispatch dated
| on the flagship New York. July 18th, and
| winds up with one from the same flag
| ship. dated Guantanamo, August 4th. II
the first report Admiral Sampson tells
OF the demonstration made against Aqua
dores by the Michigan troops under
Duffield the point of which was that as
soon the ships took part in the firing the
Spaniards disappeared. He says hat tha
bombardment OF Santiago on the I'd @,
July served no particular end because
Skaters attack had been postponed. lie
quoted dispatches from himself TO Shat
ter, stating that 1t was impossible to force
an entrance to the harbor until the
mines had been removed, and that the
work could be accomplished only after
the troops had taken the forts. Shafter
replied that he could not tell when he
could take the batteries. If they were
as difficult as those against winch ae
was pitted it would take some time ana
great loss Of life. 81 am at a loss"
he said, "to see why the navy cannot
work under destructive fire, as well
as the army. My loss yesterday was over
five hundred men. by all means keep
up the fire on everything i'm sight until
demolished. l expect, however, with time
and sufficient men, to capture the forts
along the bay"
An hour later on the same day (July
2O. Shafter again appealed to Sampson
to force the harbor entrance Immediately,
80 as to avoid future loss among the men,
already very heavy. "You can operate
with less loss OF life than | can" he said
DANGER FROM MINES.
In reply, on the same day. Sampson
pointed out that the channel of the har-
Dor was well strewn with mines which
would certainly result i'm the sinking of
one or more OF his ships if he attempted
TO enter the harbor and that by the sink
ing OF one the harbor would be blocked
against the entrance Of the others. He
had hoped that Shafter would take the
batteries from the rear, so that he
might drag for the torpedoes. but if it
was Skaters earnest desire that he
should force the entrance, he would pre-
pare 10 undertake It, thinking, however.
that the position of both army and navy
would be made more difficult If they fall
ed IN the attempt.
Sampson said: 1T is not so much the
loss Of men, as it is the loss of ships
which has until now deferred me from
making a direct attack upon the ships
within tire port"
After the battle with Cerveras fleet,
Shafter renewed his request that Samp-
son force an entrance, saying his present
position had cost him a thousand men,
and he did not wish 10 lose any more.
SHAFTER MISAPPREHENSION
Sampson, in comment says this shows
a complete misapprehension of the cir
cumstances. He alleges that the sinking
of the Mercedes would obstruct the en-
trance of the larger American ships, and !
that extensive shore batteries were known !
10 exist His chief-Of-staff had indicated |
to Shafter the points that should be cap |
tured before any attention was paid TO |
the city, and the taking of these points /
would have ensured the destruction Of |
the mines and the entrance OF the Ameri- |
can fleet.
Shafter had cordially consented 10 this, |
md Sampson did not know why the plan
vas changed, unless the troops had been
idvanced too far to be diverted. He eX-
presses the belief that an adherence to
he original plan would have resulted
N a much quicker surrender of the Span
sh troops. and less loss of life, except 10
he navy. which would have borne the
,rInt of the attack
SAMPSONIAN PLAN.
Sampson tells how he contemplated
ringing up the marine battalion from
landing them at the foot OF
Zorro 10 assist in the ASSAULT or TO take
he West Battery, and had no doubt OF
he success of his plan. He arranged 10
isit Shafter 10 talk this over. but being
Il was Obliged to send his chief OF stan,
'aptain Chadwick They reached an ar
sngement TO lombard Santiago from the
ea for twenty-four hours with the heavy
uns. and If that failed TO bring the enemy
a terms then to assault Socapa battery
,itb the marines and Cubans, and force
N entrance to the harbor with some Of
no smaller ships. Thus says Sampson,
I have bean surprised to see published
, tho papers a statement Of refusal on
~, mart 10 endeavor To force my way
Ito .he harbor and cannot understand,
, ase the newspaper report be truth
n statement OF what was sent by him,
eneral Shafter sending any report or this
ind !
.I here, moreover, would animadNert
non the apparently extraordinary open
ess with which every detail of hope
Tort. or suggestion on the part OF the
my has been published. The unwisdom 4,
T such procedure Is too manifest for dis
issiOn"
FOR COUNTER
MINING. I
the Admiral says: Il think
,at the falsity Of the suggestion that the
,vy was unwilling To cooperate IN
rcing an entrance TO Santiago Is already {
,hiciently shown. | would, however, I
Id to show the goodwill Of the navy '
nj my desire and understanding that in
Sc the enemy failed TO come to terms s
rough bombardment the harbor en- !
ance should be forced. that in the 4
eanwhile all preparations were COM
cted for counter-mining. mines having
on removed for this purpose from the
esolute to Ihe collier Lebanon. Lieuten- I
rs Roy Smith and +. e. Capehart,
bo are mining experts, being placed I,