The record-union., 1898-12-22

miral Montejo sums his account with
this statement:
The inefficiency of the vessels which
composed my little squadron, the lack
OF all classes Of the personnel, especial
ly master gunners and seamen gun
ners; the inaptitude OF some of the
provisional machinists; the scarcity of
rapid fire cannon; the strong crews of
the enemy, and the unprotected charac-
ter OF the greater part of our vessels,
all contributed to make much more de-
cided the sacrifices which we made for
our country and to prevent the posi-
bility of the horrors of a bombardment
OF the city of Manila, with the con-
Viction that with the scarcity of our
force against the superior enemy, we
were going to certain death, and could
expect a loss of all our ships. Our
casualties including those of the ar
senal, amounted to 3S1 men killed and
wounded
An evidence of the strategy exhibited
by the Navy Department in sending re-
Inducements to Dewey is shown in a
dispatch of June 9th, informing him Of
the coming Of the Monadnock Prob
ably with view to insuring this YES
sci from falling into a trap, she was
rot dispatched directly to Manila, but
was ordered to point six hundred
miles due east from Cape Engano,
where she was to meet one of Dewey's
ships.
Very naturally the report of the oper-
ations Of the North Atlantic fleet COM
prises the largest part of the printed
hA1 No.. Ilrv
appeared, but in the very beginning
there is a most interesting exchange
Of letters between Secretary Long and
Admiral Sampson, showing that even
before the outbreak of the war the Ad-
miral had worked out a complete plan
for the immediate reduction of Havana
with his own squadron unsupported,
and was only prevented from carrying
out that plan by orders from the de-
partment, which wished to protect the
big ironclads. Secretary Long ad-
dressed Admiral Sampson on April Sth
a confidential letter telling him that in
the event Of hostilities, for this was be-
fore the outbreak of the war, the de-
partment wished him to do all in his
power to destroy the Spanish war ves-
sells in the West Indian waters. He
says:
THE department does not wish the
vessels of your squadron to be exposed
to the fire of the batteries of Havana,
Santiago or other strongly fortified ports
in Cuba, unless the more formidable
Spanish vessels should take refuge in
those harbors. Even in this case the
department would suggest that a rigid
hlnalyoda nd hn NIL 1lr1t Of
torpedo boats would accomplish the de-
sired object
The reasons sent out by Secretary
Long for this instruction were that
there would be no United States troops
available to occupy the captured towns
until October, and that the lack of dock
ing facilities made it particularly de-
sirable that our vessels should not
be crippled before the capture or de-
struction Of Spain's most formidable
vessels.
How strongly Admiral Sampson en-
deavored to secure a reversal of this
decision appears in the following let
ter:
"U. S. Flagship New York, Key West,
Fla, April 19,1S9S.-My Dear Secre-
tary: I have received your lconfidential
letter of April 9th. I sympathiZe with
all you say about guarding our big
ships against a possible loss while tie
enemy's fleet is still intact. At the
same time I regard it as very important
to strike quickly, and strike hard, as
soon as hostilities commence. Havana
is we'll defended by three or four bat
teries to the eastward of the entrance,
c -
iber On the western side of the en-
trance there are three batteries, the
guns varying in caliber from 8 to j
inch and two mortar batteries. All the
batteries face SeaWard, and those to the
west of the entrance are quite hear the
shore. All are open batteries with
heavy traverseS between the guns. The
guns and people who serve them are
quite unprotected. These batteries are
we'll calculated to keep off a fees from
seaward, which approaches to within a
moderate distance of few thousand
yards. I do not think they are we'll
placed to resist an attack (for instance,
The western batteries) from the west
ward and close in shore, where the bat
teries would be exposed to a flank fire
or to the fire of our big ships ct short
range, where the secondary batteries
would have full effect. Even under
these circumstances the ships must
have such a heavy fire that shore bat
teries would be overwhelmed by its
volume. Before the Puritan and AM
phitrite arrived I was not entirely SAN
guine of the success of such an attack.
Although the monitors are weak in
secondary fire, I expected 20 put q
cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the
intervals between each two of them.
In this way / do not think the Span
iards would be able to fire They
would be driven away from their guns
and kept away, while the file of the
ships would so injure the guns or
mounts that they would be unservice-
able. Although the defenses west of The
entrance are stronger than those east,
the first has the advantage for us that
all the projectiles which miss the bat
teries will fall in the city and furnish
an additional inducement for the sur
render of the city.
In the memorandum which I fur
nished to the commanding officers of
ships, I provide that if our ships were
not numerous enough, or the Spanish
proved better than l expected, we were
at once to haul off and substitute a l;-
rect attack, a close blockade of the
port, which was to be extended vest
and east to adjoining ports as quickly
as possible. Having silenced the west
ern batteries it would be quite practical
BILE to shell the city, which l would do
only after giving twenty-four hours
warning in advance.
'I see the force of your reasoning
that we would have no troops to occupy