The San Francisco call., 1898-12-01
Declares That the General Wanted tbe Navy to Do the Most
 Dangerous Work.
Later, When tbe Fire of tbe Fleet Caused the Surrepder of Santiago, Shofter Cloimed
 All tbe Credit.
Special Dispatch to The Call.

WASHINGTON. Nov. 30.-The Navy Department to-day made public re- port from Admiral Sampson, covering the operations of the United States blockading fleet off Santiago. He says that the bombardment of Santlago on July 2 served no particular end, because Shafter's attack had been postponed He quotes dispatches from himsef to Shafter stating that it Is impossible to force an entrance to the harpor untli the mines had been removed and that work could be accomplished only s1ter the troops had taken the forts. smarter replied that he could not tell when ne could take the batteries. If they were as difflcult as those against which he was pitted. it would take some time and a great loss of life. Said Shafter:
 am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive nrs as Weli as the army My loss yesterday was over 800 men By all means keep up fire on heights until demolished. eXpecI, however, with time and sufncfent men, to capture the forts along the pay.
 An hour later on the same day, July 2. Shafter again appealed to Sampson to immediately force the harbor en- trance so as to avoid future loss among his men. already very heavy. He says; You can operate with less loss than l can.'
 In reply on the same day Admiral Sampson pointed out that the channel of the harbor was well strewn with mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more or his shlps if he attempted to enter the harpor and that by sinking them the narpor ta1o O the entrance of the others. He had hoped that Shat- ter would take the batteries from the rear. so that he might drag for the tor pedoes, but it was Shafters earnest de- sire that he should force the entrance He would prepare to undertake IL, tnlnK- ing, however, that the position or both army and navy would be made more difficult if they failed in the attempt. He promised to use mines at Guantan- amo and to countermine those at Santi- ago which would consume considerable time Said Sampson: Tt is not so much the loss of men as the loss or ships which has until now deterred me from making direct attack upon the ships within the port.
 Admiral Sampson says that after the destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet Shafter renewed the request that he should force the entrance to the, har- bor, and it was arranged between them that the outside forts should be taken by marines and Cubans after the fleet had shelled them. Then the harbor was to be forced by the fleet. Admiral Samp- son says he does not know why this plan was abandoned and still believes time and many lives might have been saved had it been carried out. Samp- son continues:
 l have been surprised to see published in the papers any statement or refusal ort fra 1f1kar fO Ny into the harbor and cannot understand in case the newspaper reports be a truth ful statement of what was sent by hilli- General Shafter sending any report Of this kind. l here, moreover would animad- vert upon the apparently extraordinary openness with which every detail of hope, effort or suggestion on the part of the army has been published. The unwisdom of such procedure is too manifest for dis cussion- The navy has been placed in such an invidious and false position be- fore the country through the very unwise publication of General Shafter's tele- grams that I think this matter should in some way be made clear to the public.
 On July 14 Admiral Sampson sent the following to Secretary Long:
 July H, 1SSS-Published telegrams of General Shafter Herald of July 6, reflect on the navy. I wish the department and the President to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupation of forts and
 
 mine flelCs, and that the general has never made move to do this, although before his army landed he stated that such was the primary object of his op- erations. If the general chooses to ignore the sea approaches and to attack Santf- ago to the east and north that is his af- fair, but 1t should be clearly understood that this attack does not influence the situation at the harbor entrance from winch his left flank is distant not less than four miles. I have been ready at T1a mo 10 "a ct fhroa nolyc to silence works, to clear entrance of mines and to enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper conduct Of war assigns to it. To throw my ships to certain destruction upon the mine fields would be suicidal folly and I have not the force to form landing party strong enough to insure the capture of the forts No disagreements mentioned by the paper have been brought to my notice by Gen. eral Shafter.
 Admiral Sampson gives number of dispatches saying he was asked to participate in the terms of surrender send representative; but owing to one or two delays no time was fixed Samp- son comments as follows:
 The foregoing shows clearly the most absolute joint action, and< took it for granted that we should be joint sigma tories of any oapitulations, as is custom ary in all services in such circumstances Captain Chadwick arrived at the front at the earliest hour possible for him to. do so, and informed General Shafter of my ex-t pectancy in the matter; but General, Shafter peremptorily refused. The con vention had already been signed, and he stated as one reasonl that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action of July 3. There would have been as much reason for mentioning the navy in the report of the land action of July 1, when assault was made by cur army on the Spanish lines. No mention was made of the shipping on the capituIal tions, and Captain Chadwick informed would be regarded by us as property to be