Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-05-08
THE BATTLE GR0UND
BASES OF OPERATION OF THE HIS
PANO-AMERICAN FORCES.
CUBA AND The PHILIPPINES.
How Haiti May Lend Us a Harbor-
Sketches of the Principal West
India Islands-A Helpful and Time
Iy Article.
PHILADELPHIA Times.)

At present II seems as though the base
of naval operations between Spain and
the United States will be the West Indies
and the Philippines. Later an attack
may be made upon our coast or American
aggression may carry the hostilities to
European and African waters, but for the
present the Indies will be the centre OF
attention. 1t is interesting, therefore, to
consider the natural conditions of the
two districts which might affect the out
come OF the contest, the strategic posi-
lions open to the two countries and the
advantages and disadvantages they offer
either. Little is known Of the Philippines
by our people, while there is much in
reference TO the West Indies that Will
bear the telling.
II we begin with the Greater Antilles,
of which Cuba is the gem. and follow the
circle along the Windward Islands and
through the Leeward Islands, which to-
gether form the Lesser Antilles. we shall
touch many points that are destined 10
become of the greatest interest 70 u.s.
Spain originally held nearly all Of these
islands. Cuba and Porto Rico alone are
left TO her. She owns also three rocks
called Blanquella in the Leeward Islands,
but they are of no Importance.
with Cuba and Porto Rico as centre,
the war will spread itself among the
indies. bringing back their strategic I'M
portance, which apparently had passed
forever.
The general policy in the disposition OF
III. &c Il
predict. because the great number OF
her small torpedo-boats and destroyers
makes a nearby base Of supplies indis-
pensable. Unlike large cruisers and
battleships. these little boats must take
on coal ever other day, not only in order
10 navigate but for the purpose of pro-
tecting their boilers. Unless their coal
bunkers are filed rife bullet will pene-
trate the boilers with disastrous conse-
ousnces There were vitality grave rea-
sons why the Spanish fotilla should
reach Porto Rico before war was de-
clared They must have coal al hand for
their small boats. This question OF
coal gives the utmost importance TO all
the islands with harbors In the Antilles,
and makes every one of them possible
factor in shaping the result of this war
Besides Habana and Matanzas in Cuba.
Spain has but one fortified harbor among
the Antilles San Juan Zurrista. or ST.
Johns In Porto Rico. IL Is an excellent
harbor and could be strongly defended
by the Vlzcaya and Oquendo with the
torpedo-boats against our squadron. ST.
Johns alone could do nothing agains,
our battleships. The fortihcatons are
oid-fashioned. and the guns are useless
against iron ships.
In Southern Cuba the harbor OF San
tiago de Cuba could be defended with a
weak piece as the entrance is narrow
and deep with forts naturally strong
Inc forts are not modern however and
the Spanish Government holds but a
limited area around the city. so that the
spanish VIII probably make the main de-
h renee al Habana. and everything be made
sooserNient TO holding the capital The
great battle OF the war will doubtless be
aoush' AZ the entrance OF the harbor.
me army OF small gunboats and tor
peoo-Doats may be expected to strike
rom any OF the harbors that surround
We Caribbean. And at these places vs