The times., 1898-08-09
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE.
What Is Involved In the Question
of the Philippines.

of the Philippines.
Considering the difficulties that seem to
be associated with the problem of how
to dispose Of the Philippines, the follow
ing from the New York Tribune is time
ly. MANY dispositions of the islands,
it says. have been suggested, and every
one involves Yexatious questions which
are not to, be lightly answered. But
whatever we, may finally decide upon
whether we hold permanently one city
or one island, or the whole archipelago,
whether We annex or protect-there are
two principles of action to which we
should hold firmly and. holding firmly
to them. we are likely not to escape re-
sponsibilfty with the fewest complications
and with the best chance of success. the
first is that the United States is the sole
arbiter of the future of the philippines
and that no other nation shall be permit
ted to come between us and Spain. The
other Is that the Philippines must be
protected from any re-establishment OF
the tyranny which they rose against on
our invitation and with our aid
"Of our right as the conqueror OF SPAN
TO make our own terms there can oe
no doubt. All Europe knows It, ano'
however much ground there may De 10
think that Germany might be glad TO IN
terfere, it is perfectly evident that she
recognizes our beliigerent rights and al
the worst has only been on the LOOKOUT
for some excuse, which 1t Is aohitteo
has been found, for taking mana ana
getting some concessions for herself bul
the Philippines are neither Polahd nor
China and the United States mas not
started out to partition them. ihey are
Spain's excepting so far as our coiqueS.
has effected them. How 1ar that ris"t
of conquest goes and what cessions or
guarantees We may exact because OF IL
are questions for the United States ana
Snain 10 determine Certainly our de-
feating Spain does not give any OF the
powers a right TO say they Will take an-
vantage of her situation and levy on such
part of the Philippines as we IN seneros-
ity fail to demand as our proper ihuehi-
nifty 1t would be funny indeed Tor those
powers to tell us we must not De TOO
hard on poor Spain, and must let them
| discuss her affairs in a conference at'd
| then proceed to divide her colonial posses
! sions among themselves. the way the
| powers protect a defeated nation was
| of the fruits of her victory 10 take pos
| session a little later for themselves or
| what they were so earnest TO save 20
| China We can permit no such mecdilnG.
4 1t may not be attempted The disposl-
| ton in that direction seems TO be waning.
| But even If 1t should be manifested we
| should only need TO stand firm and have
| our way. We should not be without
| friends in so insisting on our rights. As
L, ~l.va - wis
| dom will consist in resisting any and
every attempt to compel the United
| States to do otherwise than she would
the London Outlook says. 'England's wis
| sisted onessuch attempt, and she Will do
| we'll to persevere in that policy
I'VE must be equally determined TO ful-
! fill our obligations TO the Fiipp.nos. Peo-
pie who object TO the policy of expansion
| like Mr. Moor6eId Story, grow eloquent
! and pathetic over the wrong which we
/ should iniiict on barbarian races by sub
| jecting them to cur government and
urge that we leave them alone and re-
frain from imposing our yoke upon
them. calmly ignoring the while that
| such a course would be to impose
| the yoke of Spain upon them. They
| think he..li5erty of the Declaration OF
| independence would be better Yindicated
| by restoring the Tagals to Spanish tyr
| amy than by attempting 10 give thesf
| people, who could not themselves estab-
lish permanent state, just and reas
| enable government! This Is The Out
| looks idea of thu moral aspect of such
| Little AmerIcanism:
| '' To readmi. the sovereignty of SpaiT
| would be to license her to resume the
| very method for the Subjugation of tht
| insurgents which was Americas warran
| for the war. To hand them over to an!
| other power without the express sane
| ton of the insurgents themselves woult
| be also self-stultifcation. The only al
| tentative, then. is to apply to them tht
| privilege which the United States viii
secure for the Cubans-that is to say
| TO insist on a cession of the whole groui
in trust until, in the judgment of th'
| States, the Filippinos are ripe for self
| government. The acquisition of one o
the islands for the purpose of a coaiiny
| station is an admitted right, If the Wash
ington Government chooses TO exercis
it,
''Of course. to hold the Philippines
either as trust or as an absolute pos
session, Is serious responsibility Blu
the responsibility is already ours. /
became ours the instant we landed ou
insurgent leaders at Cavite and overthrey
a system which We could not re-establisl
if we would. We cannot restore old con
ditions. They must by US be made better
or they will be worse as the result of ou
acts. We may undertake to secure
stable and just government, or we ma,
give Spain the chance. not to exercis
the old tyranny, but to build new one
The unclean spirit of the parable VIII
came back to the house which was swep
and garnished brought seven other spirit
more wicked than himself. So If the in
surgents of the Philippines are TO be re
conquered. their last state will be wors
that the first. They might better no
have revoited than have fallen again int
Spanish hands"
/ Echoes From Camp Smith. Mont.
From the Bozeman, Mont, Chronicle)
L L. L. In rnrI