The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-06-03

from Commodore Schley as to the engage
ment at Santiago. The officials expressed
no surprise at tflis delay and accounted for
IL on several grounds. IN che first place,
II was said that e feet commander must
wait until an engagement Is completed
before ne makes a report, and that The
press reports may give only the initial
features OF an action without waiting sor
its completion. There were intimauons
that the press reports covered only tbs
first features Of Commodore Schley'
movements and that until these move
nents were developed TO the point where
the results in view were actually achieved,
reports would not be made on incidental
phases of the general movement.
Moreover, It was pointed out thai the
feet commander must communicate with
all the commanders Of the ships making
up his fleet, in order TO learn as 10 cas-
ualties damage and all the circumstances
of the engagement. When thus informed
his report would be made deliberately and
this in turn must be translated into the
naval cipher code. When received mere
there would be another delay IN deci-
phering the code dispatch. Altogether II
was said that the care in preparing official
dispatches usually makes them about "a
hours behind the press adyicee. Il was
thought chat the absence OF exact official
information might embarrass che work
of the war board but officials said this mad
not occurred.
The official intimation that the action
OF Tuesday was only the initial phase OF a
more general movement. was strength
ened by che view that Commodore 6chiey
would hardly attempt an attack unless ne
had some definite object in view. This
object, IL was believed. was TO learn e1-
actly as to che number of Spanish ships
now within Santiago de Cuba haroor ana
also to develop the effectiveness OF the
fire OF the Spanish forts at the entrance
OF che harbor.
With these two points established BE-
yond the slightest doubt. the campaign.
military and naval, could be executed
against Santiago with much greater GER
tainty as TO results. While the navy de-
partment had been satisfied for the lasF
ten days that Admiral Cervera's entire
feet was inside Santiago harbor, Com
modore Schley had not been able 20 make
an official report establishing this fact
beyond the shadow OF a doubt. OF course,
the locating of this entire Spanish heet'
not excepting a single vessel, large or
small, was Of essential Importance to the
complete and intelligent formation OF
strategic campaign It would remove the
last element of hazard IN sending troops
from Tampa or Jacksonville, and the dan
ger of their being harassed in the rear
by some of the Spanish ships.
It was OF equal Importance that cne
present strength of shore batteries. their
location, number of guns and general ef-
fectiveness should be established. These
points could be learned only by a feint
which would have the outward appearance
Of an assault upon the Spanish defences.
When completed, 1t was felt that 1t would
serve as a basis for more complete advices
as to the actual situation of affairs at
Santiago harbor than had been available
at the navy department up TO this time.
It was in this light that Commodore
Schley's movement was regarded as I'M
portant. not so much from the destructive
results achieved as from the opportunities
It afforded for developing all the resour-
ces at the command of the Spanish ad-
roiraI