New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-05-29
SCHLEY'S FLEET AT SANTIAGO.
IT ARRIVED OFF THAT PORT ON WEpNEs-
DAY MORNING
Copyright: iss. Tie Associated Press

DAY MORNING
o-opvrisht: ISIS The Associated Press
Kov West Nav 2S. $50 a. NIT is now al
mos, certain that Commodore Schley mas the
Spanish fleet bottled up in the harbor OF SAN
tiago Dc Cuba There is 50 little DOUBT ABOUT
this that the naval campaign Is proceeding on
the assumption that Admiral Cervera IS inca
nable Of doing any harm. Within few days
the exact conditions az Santiago de Cuoa VIII
he known without a shadow of doubt
In spite Of assertions 70 the contrary Com
modore Schey was not absolutely sure OF hs
game when he last communicated with near
Admiral Sampson. and tina Commodore VIII no.
,aks active steps TO block up the entrance OF
Santiago Harbor until ne is perfectly ceiFain
tha, Admiral cervara's ships are inside How
ever. he may have done this already as MS
las, communication. forwarded on Thursday
reached Rear-Admral Sampson only yesterday
The Commodore stayed three days a. Cienfue-
Cos He slgnalled to his ships. i heliev" the
Spanish feet Is IN the harbor." on this belief
\ message was sent 10 the American Admiral.
The details OF how Commodore Schley found
ont tina, he was mistaken are not yet known.
AT any rate acting on the Admirars instruc-
tions the Commodore then moved east, arriving
outside Santiago de Cuba on Wednesday morn
ing Nav % The topography Of Cienfuegos and
Santiago de Cuba s almost identical Both
harbors are about six miles long. with narrow
entrances about three hundred yards vide. and
protected by high land. whole fleet could
lie in the inner harbor OF either place and be
invisible from the outside After his experience
ar Cienfuegos It Is probable that Commodore
Schlev was conservative in deciding whether
or not he had caugh: Admiral Cervera. From
the tone Of his dispatches II is evident that the
Commodore soon gained much secondhand ana
external evidence which pointed TO Admiral
Cervera's presence in the inner harbor. Before
this dispatch is published IT Is likely that Com
modore Schley will have sent some vessel INTO
the entrance OF the harbor Of Santiago de CUBA
or obtained from trustworthy source ashore
information TO the exact number of ana the
names Of the Spanish warships sheltered by the
hills about that place.
Contrary 10 the generally expressed opinion.
the harbor OF Santiago de Cuba is poorly pro-
tected Like Havana and San Juan de Porto
Rico. It has its MORO Castle. which IS even
better target than are those Of Havana and San
Juan The only danger TO be feared is from
the mines which have been laid in the channel
or Santiago de Cuba since war was declared
Countermining would probably render these
mines harmless should K prove desirable for
Commodore Schley's ships - enter the harhor
Such a step. however, is unlikely
In this connection IT may be noted that since
tho beginning Of the naval operations the moral
effect OF mines has been great. and this con-
dition promises 70 continue. 4 prominent naval
authority said 10 a correspondent ~ the Asso-
ciated Press.
The moral effect OF torpedoes and mines Will
prove far superior TO their actual effect. In fact
so great is their moral force that doubt
whether their powers or execution VIII nave an
opportunity to he judged in this war.