Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-02-01

ana such provisions have been secured and
laid by for the future. With these prepa-
rattons they await the slow months which
must drag along to demonstrate to Spain
that Blanco's military campaign Is q fall
ure and to the United States that autono-
my. having failed to end the insurrection.
the national compromise" which was fore
shadowed in the message must be consid-
cred.
Inc occasional presentation Of an insur-
gent chief will not cause the insurrection
to crumble, nor will one of the rare fights
IN the western province in which the
troops have the best Of the skirmish make
the insurgents ground their arms. On the
other side continued successes of Calixto
Garcia and the revolutionary forces in the
eastern provinces will not drive the SPAN
ish soldiers into the sea or cause them to
yield the island. The military situation
comes back to the old starting point-Spain
Is not conQuer1ng the insurrection and the
insurrection ID not strong enough to over
come the arms of Spain in the field and
force capitulation. The insurgents feel
they can keep up the struggle till Deem
Der with little risk. Blanco feels the Span
tsh soldiers will not mutiny because of
starvation. He, too. can hold on until De-
cember The only ones who cannot hold
on until December are the reconcentra-
does Most Of them have already let 20.
I know the hope has been cherished and
encouraged in the United States that this
Cuban busiress would settle itself. The
Insurgents would have saved much present
bother If they had accepted autonomy,
though in doing It the seeds of another
revolution might have been sown. The
ifo - b
created more comfortable feeling had it
looked at a black prospect squarely and
accepted the. good Offices of the United
States. Since neither of these things has
happened, the actual conditions have to be
studied and the probabilities gathered from
them. The disposition of Spain to let 10
being lacking and full credit given her
tenactty.. 1t may be a question whether
outside pressure or internal commissions
will be the means of loosening the grip.
The latter finds believers. The riot of the
army officers the volunteers and the Ha-
vana mob against autonomy gave a start
ling prssage of what might happen. Mix
those elements in the melting pot where
Spanish loyalty 10 tested and the result
might be unexpected to those most con-
cerned. A provisional government, a revo-
luton in Spain. an appeal Of the Spaniards
in Cuba for an American protectorate to
save them from the Cuban republic are
topics discussed by men who have watched
affairs for years. Against these possibili-
ties is the fact that the concessions made
to the army and the volunteers have qui-
eted those threatening forces for a time at
least. No one who witnessed the three
days rioting will venture to say that 1t
may not come again and then mean reyolu-
ton; but this prospect is not one of the
immediate future.
Eject of q Display of Naval Power.
Internal commissions may be less likely
to bring the end Of Spanish sovereignty in
the Antilles than outside pressure. I am
not In a position to weigh the relative
chances. The main point is what will hap
pen when the end comes. It must be said
again that Spain has not prepared for such
an happening. Left to herself, she will
never prepare for 1t. A reign of anarchy is
not probable. but there may be period of
anxiety. / do not pretend to know either
the Cuban or the Spanish population. A
few months dwelling among them is not
of a people The fondness Of the spaniards
for the bull fight is a puzzle. The JOY of
the Cuban in the chicken main is q study
Sometimes 1t has seemed to me that base
ball, which is becoming a popular sport,
up to the plane of a higher civilization
But that is of the more distant future. AS
to what may happen before long. I have
taken the opinions of those who have lived
Outstanding of Its people. They are mostly
Americans who were here during the ten
years war.
These persons do not seem to think that
there has been a complete change in the
nature of the Spanish-born Inhabitants
Ignorance does not undergo a complete
change within q twelvemonth. Some en-
lightenment seems to have taken place, but
1t is a faint ray Of intelligence rather than
an interior illumination. In other words,
the populace Is less likely to burst forth
In blind fury than formerly. but IL 1t should
once break forth there would be no limit to
its fury. Abstract agreements about prob
able consequences would not prevent an
outbreak IL indictments to an uprising ex-
listed; England has been fortunate in her
relations with Spain. Since the insurrec-
ton began practically none Of her subjects
has been imprisoned in the Spanish prisons.
She has not been charged with conniving at
populace has not had its mind filed with
resentment against Englishmen. But II all
these things had happened and other things
were likely to happen 1t would not be
enough to show by naval statistics that
Great Britain IS the first maritime power In
the world. The English fleet of Havana
herbor would be the only way Of demon
slratins that to part of the citys popu..
a demonstration might also be needed for
some of the army officers. These are not
my personal opinions. They are the ma
ture Judgment Of others who are better
able to Judge The Maine looks we'll in the
harbor. Since her arrival many thousand
Spanish eyes have gazed on her. 1t is the
first time that a part Of the Spanish popu-
lation has had its gaze bent ON an Amert-
can warship. The effect is good. The feet
might come and the knowledge gained from
the sight Of the Maine would enable It to
be better appreciated.
Hope OF the Commercial Classes.
In the event Of Spain letting 20 the Span.
ish commercial classes are In 4 far dif-
ferent frame Of spirit toward the United
States than they were during the tan years.
war or even during the first period OF the
present revolution. Instead OF encouraging
an anti-American demonstration their In
nuence would be used to check It. Their
hope Is the United State9, The men who N