The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-06-08
UNLIMITED POWER
VESTED IN SAMPSON.
In No Way Hampered by Instructions
From Navy Headquarters
mt Was;.inatOn,

WASHINGTON, June 7-Starting out
with a strong belief that there had been
nothing in the nature of a serious engage
ment between SIMPSONS forces and the
Spanish defcnses al Santiago. the navy
department officials as the day wore on
and the full and detailed reports of the
Associated Press from it's correspondents
with tho fleet began TO flow in, were COM
PEELED TO modify their views, and when
the day closed they were about ready to
admit that although without official IN
formation on the subject, Ii was evident
that Sampson had made a strong attack
upon the Spanish forces.
The one point upon which they main
tanned their confidence was that no troops
had been landed. They were prepared TO
learn that Sampson might be clearing the
way with his big guns FOR the landing OF
the troops, or that possibly some marines
had been landing temporarily, but that
forces had been put ashore they would
not admit for the reason that no informa-
ton had reached the department of the
actual departure OF the soldiers for Cuba.
Ii is not denied, however, that every
effort is making 10 pat the troops into
Cuba at the earliest possible moment. and
this afternoon, ii is believed, although no
official advices TO that effect were al hand.
that the troops have been actually embark
ing at Tampa today, and may get away
tonight. The reason for this belief is
found in the admission by officials that
the troops have been under orders TO emf
bark for some time past. The difficulty
that presented itself was the absence of
absolutely necessary supplies. which IN
most cases were stored away In some OF
the thousands OF freight cars which block
Ell the railroad tracks many miles out
from Tampa, The orders that went for
ward yesterday were Of a character 10
cause speedy breaking Of the deadlock.
and II the troops now have their sup
plies. as = believed TO be the case, there
IS no reason why they should not sail at
once for Santiago
By the nc wSpaper reports of the breach
Sampson has made in the coast defsnses
there. there Is every reason to believe
that little difficulty viii he found in the
actual debarkation OF the troops particu-
larry II marines are already ashore TO
guard thu landing
y suspicion is entertained in some quar-
tiers that Sampson was FASTENED N his
movements at Santiago by the news OF
the Intended departure OF the troops from
Tampa. and made this attack in order that
the navy might have the honor OF effect
ing the occupation Of Cuban soil
II is likely that the first troops OF the
regular army TO take ufs q position ashore
WI be the engineer battalion, although
they are so badly hampcr~G by the heavy
siege trains they carry tina. they mus,
he greatly delayed In making a landing
These guns by Che way. nave gwen Infinite
trouble. for the transports that were hast
ily chartered were so lightly constructed
ga 10 require great deal Of strengthening
before the great masses OF steel could be
safely placed or then
The extent OF Sampson's attack on the
Santiago defenses has brought out one fact
very clearly. namely. tina. he has prac-
tcaIy unlimited power as 20 the tine and
character II an attack ard that he is
unhampered by Instructions from Wash
irgton. The exact nature az lTs orders
has never ben made public but naval
official tn position IN know what they are
said tbat Adm.ral Sampson had greater
power conferred upon him than had exc,
been given 20 any commander. Il was for
him 20 decide on ;he time for an attack
ard the r3aCe ard manner ~ its execution.
He may attack, therefore. whenever IN
his discretion :; IS necessary. Or. T cir
cumstarces warrant ne may refrain from
any operations. In short & is said that
Adm raj Sampson il complete master OF
t@e ;acticst and s'ra.ee . operations bv the
naval forces Of Santiago.
THIS "a IL iine with the roicy approved
by the highest naval authorities Capt
Mths-. rnenher - the war ooatd brings
cat IN his STANDARD work N SEA Power"
tna- j. - f,r the naval commander IA
chief - organize ard direct MS offensive
Or defensive operations. II referring .
ira brilliant lessons srordes By Nelson.
R7}5ey Far~sgut ard other great CON-
Ta93srs Pc gives Them credit FOR working
out ana executing me So 7dl8 campaigns
order theT 1irectiou W.thosft orders or re-
straint frsn outside authority
TIE AMY reservation made n ths gen
e-sl principle = thar ;he center 90 The
government Shapes general policies along
7iCh i -sval campaign IS directed toward
the execution ~ tAis general purpcS. %
ire government. II the prssTn; case ;Hs
authorizes here have laid down re gen
e-s. e@7s - ~ attained In ~lba arl rorro
f'~c an3 the waF boar3 has supplement-
thtS 49, every ~; ~ information
wascA coasd ASST ire Command
e~-lG-chi~f Bot >evcr1 IRIS Admiral
oAnSscns author.,yD practically without