The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-09-03
THE PENALTY OF uspREpAREDSEss.

In all the wild and senseless clamor re-
garding the alleged mismanagement of the
war there has not been a word of complaint
from or charges against the navy. From
the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Ma
Mia by Admiral Dewey to that of Cervera's
fleet at Santiago by Admirals Sampson and
Schley the action of the navy was series
of uninterrupted successes rejecting the
greatest possible honor on itself and the
Nation. But for the navy the war would
still be going on with the odds against us.
Imagine,if possible, the Manila fleet and Ger
vera's fleet still afloat and our own unable
to cope with them the great victories of the
war still unrecorded and our land forces
either battling with the Spanish army and
disease in Cuba or spending the summer in
unhealthy Southern camps till such time as
they could safely go to the seat of war.
That would be the situation to-day but for
the splendid victories achieved by the navy.
General Skaters army could not have been
landed in Cuba without the cooperation of
the navy, and even if it had landed it could
not have captured Santiago without the
short. but for our naval victories, instead of
negotiating for peace on our own terms,
we should now be just fairly embarked in
the war. And these naval victories have
been achieved under the same general man.
agement and the same difficulties as those
of the army. The same President and the
same board of strategy directed the opera
of N a
tropical climate and sickly season as well
the army, Admiral Dewey being much fur
Their from base of supplies than any part
of the army. The fleets in both hemispheres
had to be supplied with food, medicines
and medical service, and I'D to the present
time there has not been a word of complaint
from any person in regard to rations or hos
pital service. In fact, although both fleets
spent the whole summer in a tropical eli
mate there was no sickness worth mention
ing in either, while the whole country is
ringing with charges of incompetence and
neglect in the management of the small
army which captured Santiago and the
much larger one which, greatly to its dis
appointment, was not able to see any active
service.
How are we to account for this difference
between the navy and the army? Why is it
that the navy, operating sin a tropical CHI
mate, achieved such magnificent results and
practically ended the war, with the loss of
only two or three men and no sickness
worth mentioning, without single COM
plant as to food supplies or medical serv-
he
conditions? 1t can only be accounted for
by the fact that the rank and file of the
navy were largely men who were trained
to the business, while those of the army
were largely new to it. The navy was main
ly composed of regulars, and the army, at
least the part of it that has furnished
grounds for complaint of volunteers. 1t
was our regular navy that did all the naval
fighting of the war, as our regular army did
most of that on land. The volunteers were
willing to fight, but they were not ready
The ships that sunk the Spanish fleets at
Manila and Santiago and that did all the
naval fighting of the war were Differed by
men who not only knew how to fight, but
how to take care of themselves, live well
health in tropical climates. If they had
been Differed and manned by raw recruits
no matter how brave ard patriotic. UNI
trained in naval matters, can anybody be-
lieve the Spanish fleets would be lying at
the bottom of the ocean to-day? Imagine
placing war ship like the Oregon or the
Texas in command of brave and patriotic
captain fresh from a law office or a count
ing room with crew of volunteers from
farms, shops and schools Instead of sink
ing the Spanish fleets they would have been
sunk themselves and there would have been
a terrible cutlery about the acknowledgement
of the navy. Yet the fault would not have
been In the men, but in the system.
The lesson is that in time of peace we
must prepare for war. 1t is training that
makes the soldier and Soldiers" means not
merely privates but officers of the company,
field, brigade, staff-all. If we had had at
the beginning of the war an adequate army
of trained soldiers trained officers, trained
commissaries, trained quartermasters and
trained men to direct them, all men who
understood their business. and who knew
that war was no holiday affair, the country
would have been spared the present humil-
lating clamor. 1t is one of the penalties of