The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-08-26
INJUSTICE TO THE INDIANA
THIS BATTLFSHIP HELPED TO
DESTROY CERVERA'S FLEET,
But the Reports of the Commanders
Do Not Indicate it-Admiral
Sampson Makes Proper Amends.

Washington, Aug. 25.-Admiral Sampson
has forwarded to the navy department the
following letters which have passed be-
tween himself and Captain Taylor of the
battleship Indiana:
United States Steamship Indiana, Gu
antanamo Bay, Aug. 6. 1SSS.-Admiral:
The report of Commodore Schley on the
battle of July 3, as published. gives credit
in the seventh paragraph to four ships,
and mentions by name their captains,
Phillip. Evans. Clark and Cook, and
adds:
The dense smoke of the combat shut
out from my view the Indiana and Giou-
ceSter, but as these vessels were closer to
your flagship, no doubt their part in the
conflict was under your immediate obSer-
walton.
In your report. as published you make
but slight mention OF the Indiana. stat
ing that the Iowa and Indiana. having
done good work and not having the speed
of the other ships. were directed by me,
etc. etc.
The result of these reports is that the
captains of all the vessels of the line of
battle except the Indiana have received
personal mention in the official report be-
fore the department. while the two small
er vessels have also had distinctive men
ton either from the commander in chief
or the second in command.
In the official record, should they be
referred TO in future, IL will appear from
its general tone that the Indiana was less
deserving than all her cOnsOrtS. Leaving
out my personal interest in the matter,
it is right that | should consider the on
GERS and crew of the ship. and / speak
for them as well as for myself when |
submit TO you, admiral, that the above
combination of reports will place the ship.
in the opinion of the department and the
country. markedly below all the other YES
sells of your squadron. I respectfully sub
nit. sir, that this is injustice to the In
diana and her officers and crew.
II can say without disparagement of
any other vessel that during the first hour
of the fight, the IndianaS gun fire con-
tributed to the destruction of the Oquen-
do and the Teresa more than that of any
single vessel in your squadron. except one.
and equals her. do not know why the
second in command failed to observe the
Indiana during this period of our hottest
action. | saw the Brooklyn quite plainly.
AN examination of these reports with
reference to the Indiana will, ! believe,
convince YOU, sir. that they dc reduce
the effect of putting the Indiana below all
the other vessels of the squadron. If ii
be your opinion sir. that this is the case.
and that all the vessels. from the Brook
Ign, to the Vixen. rendered service as
much more valuable than the Indiana as
the published report of the commander in
chief and the second in command taken
together, would indicate. then | must &C
cept it for myself and the ship; if, on the
contrary. that be not your opinion, /
urge respectfully that such steps be taken
to remedy this injustice as may seem wise
to you.
Very respectfully.
H C. TAYLOR,
Captain u S. N. Commanding.
TO the Commander in Chief United
States Naval Force North Atlantic Sta
ton
SIMPSONS RESPONSE.
United States Steamship New York.
Guantanamo Bay, Aug. s, 1S9S.-Sir: l am
greatly Obliged that - GU have caiteo i.iN
attention to what appears TO have been
crew. for the part which they took in the
action of July 3. and also for the very
proper manner in which you have. pre-
scented it. ] think. however, that in sub
hitting such a report to the secretary of
the navy, where so many officers are vi
tally interested and justly proud of their
Ships 1t is no easy task to do so without
appa rently beStOWins DralS" UnlustN .
requires very careful consideration of the
report from every point of view to avoid
misunderstanding.
1.-The position of the ships of the squad
ron must be carefully considered to fully
appreciate what it was possible for each
vessel to accomplish under the circum-
stances in which she was placed. Those
that were to the westward of the escaping
enemy were certainly better placed for
stopping the enemy and also better placed
for delivering their fire than the vessels
TO the eastward. which was the blockad-
ing station of the Indiana.
mo distribution of the feet could com
pletely predict and provide against every
variation of such sortie. nor do | con-
slider that any commanding officer de-
served either credit or blame because the
ship under his command was faster or
slower than another ship. or carried a
heavier or lighter battery but. rather.
that the commanding officer was blame
worthy when he failed to put his ship in
me proper Place for destroying the enemy.
lust in proportion to the advantage which
he possessed in speed. battery or position
over his neighbor.
Each commanding officer in my opin-
ion was personally responsible for the
which he had to work. | certainly did
rot intend to criticise you or to bestow
less praise on the Indiana than was be
slowed upon any other ship of the
squadron.
1.-THE fact that the commanding officer
of the Indiana was Signai'ad 10 ra+ufr o
blockade at the mouth of the harbpr after
he had so gallantlv contributed 10 the de-
struction of the Spanish ships was only
a necessary precaution which the COM
mander in chief felt Obliged to take to
prevent disaster to the large number of
transports which were left in that vicin-
Ity when the fleet started in pursuit of
the enemy. There were still some armed
vessels remaining in the harbor of San
uagO-at least two, and we did not know
how many more-which could have come
produced great havoc among the troop
ships. which were defenseless in the alb
sence of an armed vessel.
This explanation. together with your
the request hat 1t may be attached to and
form a part of the original report
Very respectfully:
Rear Admiral u S. Navy.
Commander IN Chief U. S. Naval Forces
North Atlantic station