The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-04-07

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best the estimates of the cost of a war
must be in the most general terms.
as all depends upon the scale of prep
aration, the aggressiveness of the CON
tending parties, and the particular
thedter of war--whether on land or
water. And yet the essential require
ments in wsging war are readily de-
termined by those familiar with mill
tary science, and with this goes the
experience of our last war, which cost
the stupendous sum of three thousand
million collars.
There are veterans in the public sar-
vice here, such as General Hawley,
chairman of the senate committee on
military affairs; Senator Morrill,, who
framed the Morrill, tariff, which gave
the sinews of war in 1861, as well as
many army and navy bureau chiefs
skilled in the detailed cost of ordi-
nance equipment, transportation,
quartermasters' supplies and the com.
missariat, who know the cost of war
in all it's forms. They are naturally
l"ath to discuss an hypothesis of COM
ing war, and yet it was from men of
this character that the basis of these
estimates was drawn. With a view to
ish standpoint, eminent Spanish au-
thorities were consulted.
MOST COSTLY THING.
War is the most costly thing in
the world" said General Hawley,
veteran both of the field and of pub
lie life, when asked what it would cost
us to go to war with Spain. But that
is about the only certain element in it.
1t is cost so enormous as to be al
most beyond comprehension But
when it comes to enumerating the
items of cost, or to stating in advance
what given conflict will cost, that
cannot be done with any degree of
accuracy. In the first place, it de-
pends upon how many men are to be
called into service. and then the kind
of service they will have to perform
With that much known, the thing to
do Is to consult the heads of the
several bureaus of the war and navy
departments. There is a fixed cost of
rations, another cost of equipment
another of clothing, etc. BY learning
all these separate items of cost some
adequate idea might be formed of
the cost of going to war, but until
knew the number of men to be brought
into service and the scope of prepara-
tion l would hesitate in making even
rough estimate of cost. 1t is like
asking how long is a piece of string
1t depends. All that | can say is that
the cost Of war is enormous-the
greatest one item of cost known"
General Hawley mentioned the eX-
perience which the last war gave in
the measure of cost of war, and many
other military authorities base their
ideas on the practical experience which
that conflict afforded to our own peo-
pie. 1t was a lesson not only in the
assembling of men and supplies, but in
the best methods to be followed in rails
ing great sums of money for emer-
genCies.
OUR EXPERIENCE IN 1861.
When President Lincoln called on
congress for 100000 men, he also asked
for siOO, 200. This was at the rate of
$1,000 for every man called into service.
His message to congress stated also
that the sum asked was less than one
twenty-third part of the money value
owned by men who seemed ready to
devote their whole" This gives an
basis of calculating what amount of
the wealth of a country should be sum-
moned TO aid in its defense.
Secretary Chase, then at the head of
the treasury, estimated 1920, 900, 900 as
the sum required to begin the war.
This proved to be short Of the require
ments. The army appropriation bill
passed by the extra session of congress
- tl,..a
0O00 900. The navy appropriation bill
carried S560OO,OO0. These estimates and
appropriations were made, it must he
remembered, with no conception of
what the war was to be, and with an
idea that at most it would close within
six months. The first estimates of war
are usually under rather than over
what the cost proves to be.
With this experience at hand, some
general idea can be had of the cost Of
going to war at the present time. The
are much different, and
yet this is the only experience of our
own in modern warfare from which
lessons can be drawn, and if anything
the elements of cost are greater now
than then. In a war with Spain the
conflict would be essentially different
llOIH lndl between the North ana
South, in that Spain and the United
States would be fighting across an
ocean instead Of hand to hand in one
country.
NAVAL WARFARE.
This would make it essentially a
naval warfare and a war on commerce
and to that extent the elements of cost
would be different from land warfare.
But with both countries having long
lines of coast to protect, with Cuba
as field Of land conflict, the element
of providing for the cost of land war
fare would be hardly less than that of
the marine struggle. Prudence would
also dictate that the scale of prepara-
tion would take into account the pos
sibility, even probability. of Spain's
forming alliances with European DOW
ers by which her fighting strength on
land and sea would be largely aug
With these considerations existing.
the cost of going to war with Spain
at this time could not be estimated
far below the cost when the first crash
of arms came in 1861, There would
not be the need of the vast land force,
at first 100000 and fast increasing.
until the armies exceeded the tabled
forces of Xerxes, a million men being
In the field at one time But the man
- IL.