The daily morning journal and courier., 1898-08-23

been so many appointments from civil llfe of men of political influence, or of their sons, or relatives or friends, as upon the staff,
 The Washington Post states that the staff appointments for the war, as shown by the roster, number 7S1," of which 49S were in the bureaus of the adJutant- general, inspector general, quartermaster-g general, surgeon general and commissary of subsistence-7bu- reaus, some one or more of which are responsible for the mistakes we are considering.
 The Washington Post gives the names of some of these appointees-all distinguished and very influential names. But the practice of appointing such men on the staff is all wrong.
 or all the branches of military ser Vice the staff should be composed of professionals, and no matter how many kid gloves" are appointed, the read hard work will be done poorly or otherwise by the professionals,
 But the kid glove" tends to demoral- ize the corps. Surrounded by great po- litical influence, he commands power | other than by his merit, and he is sure to absorb all the glory there Is to be | had. He necessarily discourages the professional
 For instance, what professional l would criticise such new appointees as | these: John Jacob Astor, Russell Har- rlson, son of President Harrison, Thom- as c, Catchings, son of Senator Catch ings, Warren c. Fairbanks, son of Sem | ator Fairbanks, William B. Allison, son of Senator Allison, Frederick M. | Alger, son of Secretary Alger, and ! James G. Blaine? The Post mentions | these and many others, and it is quite | likely that most of the 49S names would | show that the appointees had consider able political influence and got on the | staff by reason of such influence. I see | it stated that Colonel Hecker, the chief of the bureau of transportation, was the business partner of Secretary AL | ger in his lumber interests. What old trained professional in that bureau would venture to criticise or remon- strate with the partner of Secretary | Alger? Furthermore, the serious mis- takes we are complaining about were made by the transportation bureau | I do not doubt that Colonel Heck CT and all these other staff appointees would, in the hard school of long war, make good staff officers, but I as sert that actual war should not be made use of to teach politicians or the scores ] of friends of politicians the rudimenta- | " principles of the art of war. Such 1 course is an experiment needless cost ] ly and dangerous. Needless, because the staff can always be filled by experts and not amateurs Costly, because l apart from the financial loss, there | probably would result increased loss of | life of the bravest men in the country. 1 Dangerous, because in the presence of a | hostile army, gotten into the field un- der a competent staff the chances | would be with the enemy. It was Won | Moltke, the chief of the German staff, who won Gravelotte and Sedan rather
 than the fighting generals, Prince 1 Charles and the Crown Prince, and it
 was the absence of a competent staff | and the presence of a political staff, and not Marshal Bazaine, which caused the | sudden and overwhelming destruction
 of the French army. It was caught un-
 prepared, and the Germans, prepared to the last shoe button, never allowed
 it a moments time for preparation.
 We boast and we brag, and our posi-
 tion now is such that great conflict
 between our army and any European
 army is we'll nigh impossible but if t under our present staff system, our
 army should meet a German, French or English army of about the same size, it
 would not win the first battle, and the question would be to get time for prep
 aration to fight again. Would we get
 it? A competent, trained and perma-
 nent staff, and the staff to have the
 rank its importance deserves, this is
 an indispensable element in the mod
 ern army. As soon put man of busi-
 ness, or the man of no business, on a
 staff of lawyers, or on staff of sur
 geons, as to put him on the staff of an
 army.
 Is there any chance for thorough
 reform of the staff in our army. In my | judgment, no. G) I fear that the mili- tary teachings of the Spanish war will be very unfortunate. We whipped
 Spain to be sure, although the Santiago
 campaign came within an ace of being
 a most inglorious and disastrous fail-
 ure But there was no more real mili-
 tary glory in beating Spain than there would be in lusty young giant whip ping decrepit worn-out old rouel l Nevertheless the eagle screams, and be- cause we were prepared enough to
 whip Spain, I fear our people think we
 could at any time, on short notice, get | prepared, even with our present happy | (Continud on Fifth Page.)