Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1898-09-29

war, but we will refer simply TO an inter-
estng experience which has fallen under
the notice of the Scientific American. 1t
says that during the operations Off Sam
tlago certain parts of a turret gun on
one Of our battlcships showed signs of fail
ure, and a despatch was Immediately sent
to Washington reporting the circumstan-
ces and asking that duplicate parts be
sent. Allowing for the time necessary to
secure and send these parts to Santiago,
the captain of the ship expected, to receive
them in about thirty days. AS matter
OF fact they were received in nine days
after the requisltlon Mas made. This ex-
petition was due to the fact that the ord
nance officer at New York had anticipated
occurrences of this character by shipping
to Key West and keeping in store there
q reserve of such parts of our guns as
were most liable to failure and six days
after the failure occurred the duplicate
parts had left Key West 1T may be noted
in this connection that all of our war ves-
sells, including those in Admiral Dewey's
squadron, were always we'll supplied with
ammunition as well as other necessarics.
and Admiral SIMPSONS squadron return
ed to New York with their magazines
completely filled.
This contrast is to he attributed to diff
ference in system moro than to any other
cause. our ships of war were commanded
and handled by men who were thoroughly
prepared for their duty through years of
careful discipline and experience, and who
as a rule have been required to make an
exhaustive study of existing conditions as
well as possible emergencies Our naval
commanders, for example, must
not only know all about ma
but they must have thorough
knowledge OF international law so as to
be able to act with discretion in any con-
tingency as did Admiral Dewey in dealing
with the Germans at Manila. The guns
are handled by men who are experts in
their line, and so with all other branches
of the naval service.
our land forces on the other hand. were
largely under the control of men who
were comparatively new to the business of
war, and this was particularly true OF tho
commlssary, quartermaster and medical
departments. A large proportion of the
men in the ranks knew something about
handling of guns but there their knowl
edge stopped. so far as war operations
were concerned. They did not know how
TO take care of themselves and their colo.
| nels as a rule could not tell them. The
! superior officers included not few men OF
/ experience, but these commanders cout
not expect their orders 20 he carried Out
efficiently under the direction of subor
dinatc officers of limited ability and slight
experience.
This Is undoubtedly the true eXpianHt OF
of many of the evils experienced by oul
soldiers in the war with Spain. Lack 81
knowledge rather than indifference causat
the greater part of the suffering Tn,
remedy is plain. We must have "a perma
nent army so large and so organized tina
it can absorb considerable force of vol
unteers without the necessity of placing
inexperienced and unsklled men in posi-
lions of Importance in command of on
soldiers. The people of this country nov
realize that an army must represen
training, discipline and long experience
and the navy has been their most service
able and convincing object lesson.