Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-04-11

OF the insurgents to the mother country
and then only on such terms as Spain her
self might see fit to grant. The war con-
tirued unabated. The resistance of the in
surgents was in no wise diminished
Ihe efforts of Spain were increased, both
by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba
ana by the addition to the horrors of the
STRIFE OF new and inhuman phase hap
PLY unprecedented in the modern history
or civilized Christian peoples. The policy
OF devastation and concentration, inaugu-
rated by the Captain Generals bando of
October p, 1896, in the province of Pinar
del Rio was thence extended to embrace
all of the islands to which the power of
the Spanish arms was able to reach by oo
cupation or by military operations The
peasantry, including all dwelling in the
open agricultural interior, were driven into
the garrison towns or isolated places held
by the troops.
Ihs raising and movement of provisions
OF all kids were interdicted. The fields
were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and
nred, mills destroyed and, in short, every
thing that could desolate the land and rem
der 1T unfit for human habitation or sup
of the contending parties and executed by
all the powers at THAR disposal.
By the time the present administration
took office year ago, reconcentration-so
calied-had been made effective over ths
better part Of the four central and west
ern provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Ha-
vana and Pinar del Rio
The agricultural population, to the esti-
mated number Of 100000 or more was
herded within the towns and their immedi-
ate vicinage, deprived of the means Of sup
port, rendered destitute Of shelter, left
poorly clad, and exposed to the most un-
sanitary conditions. AS the scarcity of food
increased with the devastation of the de-
populated areas Of production, destitution
and want became misery and starvation.
Month by month the death rate increased
In an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, ac-
| cording to conservative estimates from Off
cial Spanish sources, the mortality among
the reconcentradoes, from starvation and
the diseases thereto incident, exceeded so
per centum of their total number.
No practical relief was accorded to the
destitute. The overburde1ed towns, al
ready suffering from the general dearth,
could give no aid. So-called zones of cul-
| tivation'' established within the immediate
| area Of effective military control about the
| cities and fortified camps proved illusory
| ds d TeineuS IoT Tie SuuSriuS. Inc unIOr-
| tunates. being for the most part women
| and children, with aged and helpless men,
| enfeebled by disease and hunger could not
| have titled the soil, without tools, seed or
| shelter, for their own support or for the
/ supply of the cities. Recommendation,
| adopted avowedly as a war measure in
| cr6er to cut Off the resources Of the insur-
| gents. worked its predestined result. As
| / said in my message of last December it
vas not civilized warfare; it was extermI-
| nation. The only peace 1t could beget was
| that of the wilderness and the grave.
Meanwhile. the military situation in the
| island had undergone noticeable change
The extraordinary activity that character.
| lied the second year of the war, when the
insurgents invaded even the hitherto un
harmed fields of Pinor del Rio and carried
havoc and destruction up to the walls o
the city of Havana itself, had relapsei
into a dogged struggle in the central and
eastern provinces. The Spanish arms re-
gained measure Of control In Pinar> de
Rio and parts Of Havana, but. under thu
existing conditions OF the rural country
without immediate improvement of theIl
productive situation Even thus parHaih
restricted the revolutionfsts held their owr
and their conquest and submission, pu
forward by Spain as the essential and sol.
basis OF peace, seemed as far distant as a
the outset.
A Grave Problem OF Duty.
In this state Of affairs. ray sdministra