The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-12
Secretary Alger's Reply to the
Investigating Committee.
WHY CHARGES WERE MADE
admiral sampsop's Telegram. in Which
He Claimed 10000 Men Could Take
Santiago In "a Hours. Offered
IN Evidence.

noon session to an examination of Al
gers statement and the papers fur
nished by him in reply to the commits
sion's inquiries. The accompanying
papers included reports from various
bureaus OF the war department and
also various letters and kilograms bear
| ing upon the conduct Of the war. AL
ger. in the report. replies to the va
rious questions propounded by the COM
mission. but gives especial prominence
| to the plan OF the campaign and to the
changes that were made in the original
plans. He states that Tampa was chos-
| en- as the base of operations because of
/ its proximity to Havana at which
point II was originally intended that
the landing should be made. The de-
termination to make a change was due
to the developments on the southern
| coast OF Cuba and to Admiral Cervera's
course in locating his fleet in the bay
| OF Santiago. When II became quite
| certain that he was securely entrapped,
| Admiral Sampson wired the fact to the
secretary Of the navy, asking that
troops be sent Immediately. He said
that he had silenced the batteries which
Were accessible from the sea, and that
| $1,000 men could capture the town with
In IS hours. The text Of this message
is given. as was the text Of various
other kilograms showing the cause of
delay in getting the expedition off.
The report shows that General Miles
| advised in the beginning that the first
movement should be made against
Porto Rico, and that after that island
should be subjected. the American
forces should be landed on the north
coast of Cuba at some point from which
they could move conveniently either to
the east or to the west.
Secretary Alger's reply to the ques-
tions put by the commission appointed
by the president to investigate the
conduct Of the war department in the
war with Spain. was made public to-
day. The secretary replied to the sew
eral questions as follows:
Ffrst-Plan Of campaign decided
upon Immediately upon the declaration
Of war-was 1t decided at once to move
on Havana or that the campaign
should be postponed until the autumn?
Answer-Immediate blockade by the
navy OF the important ports of Cuba. as
directed by the pres dents proclama-
tion. The holding or troops at points
nearest TO Cuba to be available in any
emergency which might arise and es-
pecially to be ready for prompt assis-
tance in case the operation of the navy
should make the Use of land forces
necessary or desirable. Early in May a
plan was partially matured to land a
force at Mariel, a point about 26 miles
west OF Havana, reports having been
received that in its immediate vicinity
were high grounds, well watered and
suitable for camping troops prepara-
tory for movement upon Havana lat
er. IL 1t was deemed advisable; the
thought being that possibly an assault
might be made upon the forces de-
Tending that city before the rainy sea-
son set in. Orders were issued to move
on May 10. but subsequent plans were
changed on account OF further infor-
nation that there would be great dam
ger to the health of the troops in that
vicinity and also on account of the un-
certainty of the movements of the ene-
my's fleet. 1t was then determined to
keep the forces In the Unitd States, at
points as near Cuba as possible for
immediate embarkation should an
emergency demand it, The Santiago
campaign proved to be that emergency
IL may be further added that IL was
believed after consultation with medi- |
cal authorities that troops camping in
southern states during the summer
would become somewhat acclimated for !
their services in Cuba.
Second-When was the Santiago cam |
paign determined upon?
Answer-The Santiago campaign was |
made necessary by the presence of Ad- |
miral Cervera's feet in Santiago har- |
Dor, but 1t had previously been con-
templated as one point on the coast |
where a reconnaissance i'm force was to |
be made to ascertain the strength of |
the enemy in the different localities in |
Eastern Cuba. The immediate destruc- |
tion of Admiral Cervera's fleet was ne |
cessary and to enable the navy to ac- |
complish this, a military force under |
Major General Shafter was directed to
move at once on the city and province |
of Santiago. This movement was hast !
ened by reason OF a telegram received /
from Admiral Sampson on June Z, stat
ing that he had bombarded forts at
Santiago on June s and silenced the |
works quickly. ard IL 10000 men were
there the city and fleet could be cap
tured within As hours. tSee copies of
telegrams herewith attached, marked
A. B, c, ID, +, F. G. H. 1t is proper to
state that after the date of this mes
sage the Spanish garrison was largely
reinforced. The opinion of Admiral
sampson was doubtless correct at the
time. The troops sailed from Tampa
on June II. 1898. with 1885 officers and
men.
Third-why was Tampa selected as
the base of operations?
Answer-On account of the shipping
at that point and its compar-
ative short distace from Cuba. render
Ing any move Of the troops possible on
short notice as the progress of the
blockade or any other condition might
require.
Fourth-Why were summer camps or
ganized at Fernandina, Jacksonville
and Tampa?
Answer-All Of the early camps in the
South were selected with special regard
for the health Of the troops and their
for prompt movement by
rail and water. The camp at Fern
andina was organized on the recommen-
dation Of the major general COM
the army. The camp at Jack
sonville was selected on the recon.
of Major General Lee. COM
the 7th army corps. A per-
manent camp was never contemplated
II Tampa Troops were sent there pre-
TO embarkatlon and were kept