The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-09-22
A FOREIGN OPINION

8paln-HFtll1h Naval HNA~p-ae
wen Of ouf ahlps-Polnis out sonao
Mistake o. CorvsrH.
WASHINGTON. DC, Sept. 2i.-cap-
tain Alfred Paget, British naval at
taehe, assigned to observe operations
during the recent campaign In the
west indies, 10 engaged here In as
,embllng the large mass Of material
gathered In Cuba and In supplementlng
This with the oficial date now being
supplied by the navy department. he
viii aoend most of the fall In getting
together the material for his report %
the British admiralty which should oe
an exhaustive treatment OF the naVul
branch OF the campaign with consider
able attention to the military branch,
owing to the Joint operations OF the
two branches during several stages Of
the war. and particularly In the siege OF
Santiago. -
Speaking informally to-day Of some Of
his observations, Captain Paget SAID II
had been shown quite clearly that the
naval branch of the service should nave
complete control OF all army transpor-
tation by sea. He points out that this
Is the practice the world over In the
British service all transports are under
the control Of the admiralty. When
troops are to be shipped. the war oni-
claI5 make known to the admiralty the
number OF men in the expedition, the
divisions into infantry, cavalry and ar
tIllery and the various requirements OF
the several divisions. Il then becomes
the duty Of the naval branch to provide
the transports, carry the troops, Keep:
ing the several divisions distinct and
with their proper equipment, ana pro
vide all supplies required for the Trip.
A naval officer, usually a lieutenant
commander on the retired list, is plac-
ed an command OF each transport 1t be-
ing impossible TO secure proper service
from merchant .captalns. The naval
branch also conducts all loading ana
uploadlng OF troops and supplies. THIS
being q branch in which naval oIlclals
are well Versed. 1t IS not until the
troops are on land that the army au'
thorlties assume direction OF anairs'
This practice. in general operation win
all large countries. particularly those
having colonial possessions, could ne
adopted with advantage BIZ THIS coun-
try, In Captain Pagets opinion, as
much OF the confusion In the transpor5
tatlon and landing Of the army ana
supplies was due to the inexperience OF
the merchant captains OF transports and
10 the direction OF all sea Transports
ton by the armV rather than by the
navy.
much attention to the destruction OF
Admiral Cervera's fleet, as this was the
main naval incident OF the war. He Is
securing from the navy department
complete reports OF the gunnery OF the
American ships with view OF showing
the Importance Of the man behind the
gum Captain FACETS personal view Is
that Admiral CerVera's sortie was
most fooI-hardy venture, which cannot
be Justified by naval standards, even
though ordered by the admirals super
iors According to Captain Pagets
view the most effective use Admiral
Caryera could have made OF this squad
ron was 10 have dIsmantled them OF all
the lighter guns. particularly the quick
fires, and turned over guns and men 10
General Toral for use in defending the
city. These quick fire guns, some
hundred or more, distributed along the
entertainments, and handled BY the
trained men OF the squadron, would
; have been able to sustain deadly fire
on the American advance. Captain
Paget expresses the belief that such
move would have made Santiago prac-
ttcaiiy fmpreghabie. He has no doubt
starvation and disease would have bro
ken down the Spanish defense In time
but Cervera's guns could have held the
town from a defeat by assault In
case OF a sortie from the harbor, Cap
tain Paget shares the view OF American
naval officers that the sortie should
have been made at night. II attempted
in daylight the Spanish ships should
have directed their attention to the
American transports as they furnished
4 yIInerable roInt where great havoc
could have been wrought. In any event
whether transports or our warships
were attacked, Captain Paget mnin-
tains that the Spanish policy should
have been 10 rush at our ships taking
them unaWares before steam could be
got up and taking the risk OF loss so
long as some damage was inflicted. Had
this plan been adopted. he thinks II
might have resulted in the RUNNING
and sinking OF one or more OF our ships,
Captain PaRet speaks highly OF our
new battleshlps and cruisers. particular
lg those now on the stocks, which he
has examined critically through the
plans and specifications. He says for
eign naval experts long ago recognized
that first class warships could be built
in the United States, although he does
not admit that our ships yet excel, or
even equal those OF British build. In
this connection a prominent American
naval officer recently told Captain Pa
get that the new cruiser New Orleans,
bought in England during the early
stages OF the war. was revelation 10
the authorities here, so far as her guns
and armament are concerned.