Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-07-19
BATTLE EFFECT ON SHIPS
Lessons Learned in the Great Fight With
Cervera's Vesse s
IearchIights Are AI1-POwerful -
smokeIess Powder Necessary-TOr-
redO Boats Not DanSerous-Ships
Can't Cope With Forts.

An officer on the Iowa during the recent
tight of Santiago with Cervera's ships has
written resume of the effect upon the
ships and men of the shooting during a
battle. which has been published in the
New York Commercial Advertiser, as fol-
lows:
This battle will be accepted by some
naval experts as the only one of modem
times that could be counted on for theo-
reticaI conclusions of value to the builders
Of warships. In the Yalu River the in
equality of the two sides in character caus-
ed students to hesitate about drawing
many differences from 1t. 1t is true we
have only emphasized the Yalu lessons in
many respects, but 1 think We can go
ahead with the two together, one checking
the other. to say positively that we have
learned something.
To go back d bit. the ineffectiy eneSs of a
fleet against land batteries is demonstra ted,
l think. by our bombardment Of San Juan
and Santiago. We failed to reduce their
works. We silenced them all right enough
As We gained in skill we were able to drive
the gunners away very quickly. But their
silence was only temporary, even when the
batteries were weak and the conditions all
favorable to cur ships; VIXEN our guns
numbered twenty 20 one.
Everybody knows by this time that the
batteries guarding Santiago harbor are on
the bluffs, some of them 200 feet above the
water line. This unquestIopably makes
them harder to hit, but il likewise in
creases the difficulty of their aim We
found out the difference in the latter re-
spect when the same gunners CprobabIy)
came out in the ships. The first broadside
from Cervera's squadron was much more
effective than the fire of the shore bat
teries. and this despite the fact that the
range during the bombardment was often
less than at the opening OF the sea fight,
Ia Sr4 mi rff= EraA
The ability of a watchful and efficient
fleet to ward off hostile torpedo boats has
been fully brought out Here we have
remained for months blockading a port
IN which there were always two torpedo
beats. Our ships lay sometimes as close
in as mile on the entrance. and several
attempts were made by the destroyers to
attack Is None OF them got out without
being seen and always they were driven
back. Our readiness was the thing. In
South American wars torpedo attacks have
been successful several times and the tor
pedo boats were nowhere near as swift
and powerful the Spanish DESTROYER,
Furor and Fluton- 1t is safe to say that
We have shown that IL a man-of-war is
ready al all times to open up instantly
an efficient rapid fire that snip las li-tle
or nothing TO fear from torpedo boats.
With the rapid-fire guns modern vessel
can throw storm of shell into an enemy
A torpedo boat, with her paper sides
might as we'll sink herself before starting,
so certain IS Sne OF destruction There
must be swarms of these boats to have any
prospect of success against a modern ship
of any size. even when the circumstances
are most favorable for the attack. Search-
light tactics were well brought out off the
blockade and the great service that they
can do Without the searchlights our feet
could not have kept the Spaniards penned
up Illuminating as We did. night after
night, the entrance of the harbor by swing
ing the light slowly from side to side over
all the water. nothing could have escaped
unseen By the picket boats. Then. too, the
light was Of great service in Indicating to
the crews manning the guns just where to
direct the fire Since II was an invaria BILE
rule never 10 throw the beam of search
light on one of our own vessels, there could
be no doubt left in the mind of the gun
pointer as to the hostile character of the
approaching vessel 1t eliminated all the
delay and liability Of error to which any
verbal orders are so liable.
the necessity Of a secondary fleet as it
might be called, was also shown The