The Jasper weekly courier. [volume] (Jasper, Ind.) 1858-1922, 1898-04-23

At least. an immense disparity OF physical
force on the side OF Texas The Mexican re-
pubic. under another executive. Is rallying is
forces under "a new leader. and menacing .
FIRE invasion 10 recover its lost domain
Upon the issue Of this threatened invasion,
the indcpsndcnc OF Texas may be considered
as suspended. and were there nothing peculiar
in the situation OF the United states and Tex
as our acknowledgment OF It's independence at
such "A crisis cOu,d scarcely De regarded ~ con-
sistent with that prudent reserve with which
We have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat
all similar questions
President jackson Considered the Risk.
Thcreupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to
consider the risk that there might be imputed
u the United states a motive of selfish inter-
est IN view % the forsnef claim on our part 10
the territory of Texas aud OF the aNowed pur-
pose OF the Texans IN seeking recognition Of
iniepcn fence ~ an incident 20 the incorpora-
ton OF Texas Ia the Onion. concluding
Prudence, therefore seems 10 dictate that
shOull stand aloof and maintain our pres
ent attitude, u not until Mexico itself
or one OF the great foreign powers
government NJ lest until the lapse 0f time or the
course uf events should have proved beyond cavil
or dispute the ability OF the people OF that
country 20 maintain their separate Sovereignty
anu stO uphold the government constituted by
them Neither OF the contenllns parties can
justly complain Of this course By pursuing u
we are but carrying out the long-establishei
policy of our government. policy which has
secure 70 Us respect and influence abroad and
inspired confidence at home.
Condition Imposed by the Government
Upon Itself.
These are the words OF the resolute and
patriotic Jackson They are evidence that the
United states, IN addition To the test imposed
by plplc law A. the condition OF the recOgnl-
ton OF ndcpen iencc by a neutral state. tO-Nit.
that the revoltci state shall constitute in tact
a boly polite. having a government IN sub
stance as wei - in name. possessed of the eie-
ment> ot stability. and formirg &c facto. III
icy - ltNvai, s'11 an ,lE VIZ iVasn-
anly capable OF dlscaarsing the cu-
ties OF state. has Imposed for
il Eoverancc in dealing with case,
ike those the further contention that recogni-
ton ~ independent statehood l. not due 10 a
reyoltcd dependency unth the danger OF its be-
INK again suoIugated oy the parent state has
in fact applied in the case Of Texas The con-
gre>s 70 whom President Jackson referred The
question as one probably leading to war" and
therefore proper SUBJECT Tor "a previous I'M
Outstanding with that BODY by whom war can
a one be declared. ana Dy whom all the provis-
ions for sustaining it, perils must be furn shed.
left the matter Of the recognition Of Texas 10
the discretion OF the executive. providing
merely for the sending Of diplomatic agent
when the president should be satisfied that the
republic OF Texas had become IAN Independent
state II was 80 cogni1ed by President Van
Buren,. who commissioned charge afaires.
March :. 1887. after Mexico had abandoned an
attempt to reconauer the Texan territory and
then AMI there was ut the time no bona tide
contest going on between The insursent prov
lnee and its former sovereign.
Former Message Reverted To.
! said in my message OF December last: 1T
Is to be considered wnether the Cuban insur-
rection possesses beyond dispute the attributes
OF statehood. which alone can demand the rec
ignition Of belligcrency IN its favor
The same requirement must certainly be no
less considered when the sraver issue OF rccog
| nil NJ independence l. IN question: for no less
| positive test can be applied to the greater
act than 10 the lesser while, on the other hand.
| Influences Of and consequences OF the struggle
| upon the int nal policy OF the recognizing
f, stat which form important factors when the
recognition Of beiligerency Is concerned. are
| tors, wren the real question i whether
! the community claiming recognition Is or
not independent beyond pera venture
Present Recognition Inexpedient.
Nor from the standpoint Of expedience do
| think II would be wise or prudent for this gov
/ eminent to recognize at the present time the
Independence OF the so-called Cuban republic.
enable the United States to intervene ana
pacify tie island To commit this coul-
Try now to the ra.ogniIion Of
might subject as TO embarrassing conditions
International obligation toward the orEan-
cation 50 recognized. In case OF Intervention
our conduct would be subject to the approval
or disapproval OF such government we would
be required TO submit to its direction and to
assume TO it the mere relation OF a friendly
ally When II snail appear hereafter that there
is within the island government capable OF
| p'rformins the duties and dschargins the
! functions Of a separate nation. and having. as "A
matter Of fact the proper forms and attri-
butes OF nationality such government can be
/ promptly and readily co-nizeu. and the rell-
tons and interests OF tic United States with
such nation adjusted.
Alternative Forms of Intervention.
There remain the alternative forms OF inter-
vention to end the war. either an impartial
neutral by imposing a rational compromise be-
| tween the contestants. or Is the active ally OF
| the one party or the other
| AT to the trst u is not TO be forgotten that
! during the last few months the relation of the
| United States has virtually been one OF friend
~ intervention IN many ways. each
not OF Itself conclusive but all
tending 10 the exertion Of a potential
! influence toward an ultimate pacific result Just
and honorable to all interests concerned The
spirit OF all our acts hitherto has been an earn
| est. unSelfi~h desire for peace and prosperity Ia
| CUBA. untarniShed by differences between Us
AMI SPAN and unstained by the blood OF Aneri-
| The forc.bie Intervention OF the United States
| as a neutral to stop the war. according 10 the
large dictate, oi humanity. aud following matg
| historical prcccdcnt> where nelghDOrlng states
nave lntcffered 20 checN the hopeless sac
rihce life by internerne conflicts
1 beyond their borders Va 3ustlnabin on national
/ grounds II involves however hostile con-
stralnt upon both the parties 10 the contest a.
well 20 enforce a truce a. TO guide the eventual
/ settlement
Grounds of Intervention.
The grounds for such Intervention may be
briefly summarized a. follows
| First. IN toe cause OF humanity and TO put
an end 20 the barDar4tie~ bloc 4snel. starvation
| ami horrible mi~efieS now existing there. and
| which the parties To the conflict are either
l unable or unNillinE 10 stop or mitigate ~ H.
! no answer 10 say this b. all in another country
| belonging 10 another nation. aud j. therefore
/ none OF cur l~ine~~. 1t il specially our duty
| for il Is right AZ our doors.
SecOnI. We owe ~ 20 our citizens in Cuba TO
| afford them that protection ana immunity for
| life and property which no government There
/ can or Viii. afford ana To that end 70 terminate
the conditions that deprive them OF local pro-
| tccttnn.
Third. The right to intervene may be iusti-
| fed 10y the very serious injury 10 the com
| MERGE trade and business interests OF our
people and by the wanton destruction OF prop
| erly and devastation OK the island
| Fourth. And what Il OF the utmost i'm
portaucc the present condition Of an ,irS in Gu
| ia il "a constant menace 10 our peace and en-
| tails upon this government an enormous cx-
ucnse. with sucn "a conflict waged for years in
| an island 20 near ". and with which our people
! have such trade and business rclations-when
the lives and liberty OF our citizens are IN con-
| slant dread and their property destroyed and
themselves ruined wncrc our trading Nc~-
sells are liable to seizure, ana are
I seized at our very door. 10y warships
| of a foreign nation. the expeditions OF nlibus-
tering that We are pow"rle~s To prevent alto
| gcther. and the irritating questions and en-
| tang elements tnus arising all these and others
that | need not mention. with the resulting
| strnl ri relations. are constant menace to
our peace. ana compels us TO keep a semi
| war footing with a nation with which are at
| peace.