The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1898-04-13

| sanus vi nVes nave already been saved
The necessity for a change in the con-
dition of the reconcentrados is recoe-
nized by the Spanish government. with
| in a few days past the orders OF General
Weyler have been revoked, the reconcen-
| trados, 1t is said, to be permitted to re-
turn to their homes and aided to resume
the self-supporting pursuits of peace.
| pubic WORKS nave been ordered to give
| them employment and a sum of 5000 900
has been appropriated
The war in Cuba is of such nature that
| snort OF suDJugation or determination
| final military victory for either side
| seems impracticable. The alternative lies
In the physical exhaustion of one or the
| other party, perhaps both--a condition
| which in effect ended the 10 years war
by the truce of Zanjon. The prospect of
such a protection and conclusion of the
present strife is a contingency hardly
to be contemplated with equanimity nv
the civilized world and least of all by the
United States affected and injured as we
are, deeply and intimately, by its very
existence. Realizing this, it appeared
to be my duty in a spirit of true friendl-
ness, no less to Spain than t. Cubans,
who have SO much to lose by the prolon-
about an immediate termination of the
war. TO this end, l submitted on the
2ith of last month, as a result of
much representation and correspondence
through the United States minister at
Madrid, propositions to the Spanish gov
eminent looking to an armistlCe until
oct. for the negotiation of peace with
the good offices of the president.
In addition | asked the immediate rev.
ocation of the order of RECOMMENDATION
so as to permit the people to return to
their farms and to the needy to be re-
lieved with provisions and supplies from
the United States, cooperating with the
Spanish authorities SO as to afford full
relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet was
received on the night of the 31st ult.
1t offers, as the means to bring about
peace in Cuba, to confide the prepare
ton thereof to the insular parliament,
inasmuch as the concurrence of that
body would be necessary to reach a
final result, it being, however, under
stood that the powers reserved by the
constitution to the central government
are not lessened or diminished, AS the
Cuban parliament does not meN until the
4th of May next, the Spanish government
would not object for it's part, to accept
at once a suspension of hostilties il
asked for by the insurgents from the
general in-chief to whom it would per-
tain in such case, to determine the dura-
ton and conditions of the armistice.
The propositions submitted by General
Woodford and reply of the Spanish gov
eminent We're both in the form of brief
memoranda, the texts of which are be-
fore a "a cIJh CT IN ial " int no Ia
guage given above. The function of the
Cuban parliament in the matter of pre-
pairing" peace and the manner of it's
doing so are not expressed in the Span
ish memorandum; but from General
Woodfords explanatory reports of pre-
liminary discussions preceding the final
conference it is understood that the
Spanish government stands ready to
give the insular congress full powers to
settle the terms of peace with the insurg-
ents-Whether by direct negotiation or
indirectly by means of legislation does
not appear With this last overture in
the direction of immediate peace and its
disappointing reception by Spain the ex-
ecutive was brought to the end of his
effort.
In my annual message of December
last l said: "Of the untried measures !
there remain only recognition of the in |
surgents as belligerents: recognition of
the independence of Cuba; neutral in |
PREVENTION.
TO END the war by imposing a rational |
compromise between the contestants !
ana intervention in favor of one or the |
other party. | speak not of forcible an |
neXation, for that cannot be thought Of |
That by our code of morality would be
criminal aggression"
Thereupon, | reviewed these alterna- |
tives, in the light of President Grants !
measured words uttered in 1875, when |
after seven years of sanguinary, de-
structive and cruel hostilities in Cuba. |
he reached the conclusion that the rec |
ognition of the independence of Cuba |
was impracticable and indefensible; |
and that the recognition of belligerency |
was not warranted by the facts accord |
ing to the tests of public law. | COM |
mented especially upon the latter aspect |
Oh the question, pointing out the inoon-
Veniences and positive dangers of a rec
ognition of belligerence. which, while
adding to the already onerous burdens Of
neutrality within our own Jurisdiction,
could not in any way extend our influ-
ence or effective offices In the territory
OF hostlities. Nothing has since &C.
Cured to change my view in this regard.
and 1 recognize as fully now as then
that the issuance OF proclamation of
neutrality, by which process the So
called recognition Of belligerency Is pub
lished, could, of Itself and unattended
by other action, accomplish nothing to-
ward the one end for which we labor.
the instant paciflcation of Cuba and tho
cessation of the misery that afIiicts thu
island.
Turning to the question of recognizing
at this time the independence of the
present insurgent government in Cuba,
we find safe presidents in our history