The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1898-12-25
SHIPS AND FORTS.
Criticism Of Capt. Mahan for Not Perceiv.
ing Relation Of Nav, to Coast Oefences.
(From the London Times

(t'rom the London Times)
There is certainly some lack of lucid
ity in Capt. Mahan's recent handling Of
the subject of coast defense, and some
confusion of thought in his statement
that "a navy is essentially an offensive
and not defensive organization" As
timely protest against the theory Of
naval defense implied in the term
coast defense ships" this proposition
might pass muster; but obviously for
powers such as the United States and
the United Kingdom, whose territories
are separated by sea from those of
possible enemies, a navy is as ma
wallis says, primarily a defensive force.
1t defends its own country from inva-
sion by pursuing, attacking and de-
strOylng the only form of hostile forces
that could render invasion possible
that is, the enemy's fleet. In other
words, it defends by taking the often
sive Its purpose is defensive though
its methods are offensive 1t acts on
the principle enunciated by Farragut-
the more you hurt the enemy the less
! likely he is to hurt you" But navy
can hurt badly-that is it can achieve
the decisive ends of war-on its own
element alone. II is as i'll qualified TO
attack coasts as it is directly to defend
them. Indirectly it can defend them
completely by acting on a vigorous Of
fensive against the organized naval
forces of its adversary, directly it can
defend them only inadequately and can
attack them hardly at all. For over
sea operations of any moment against
hostile territory the cooperation of the
naval and military arms is essential.
and when that business is on hand
the army becomes the offensive force
properly so called, but only on the con-
dltion that the navy has first dis
charged its defensive function to the
full by establishing its command of
the sea and thereby securing the com
munications Of the army.
( IT is certain, on the one hand. that
equipped forts viii rarely be at
tackled and never overcome by sbips
alone but this is no argument for pas
slNe ana seGentary coast defense. be
cause IL is equally certain. on the other
hand. that no forts however well
equipped, Will prevent invasion or in
I VeStment by an enemy who has estah-
/ lshed an assured command of the sea
and possesses military force ADEQUATE
I 70 the Undertaking. Hence the cues
4 ton of the sufliCiency or insuAirienc1,
! of coast fortitications cannot he profif-
ably or even intelligently discussed in
the abstract and without regard to the
postulate or datum of sea supremacy
; This is the great truth which Cobden
clearly discerned more than a genera
tion ago. and which Capt. Mahan seems
/ in some degree to have missed in spite
/ Of the experiences of the late war For
! this country at any rate, the problem
can only be stated as Golden almost
alone among his contemporaries had
the insight to perceive, in the terms
propounded by "Navalis": 1T is essen
tial that our navy should be able 10
take the offensive on the sea; if it can
not do so, we perish as a great nation
Given this condition, what probable do
mands can be made upon passive coast
4 defenses? Our long history suppIies
the answer" The history of the late
war supplies the same answer for tba
United States. cuba could never have
been freed nor Snain defeated if tho
navy Of the United States had been nm
able to take the offensive on the sen
Capt. Mahan has done us the honor of
quoting With approval our statement
that tho moment Admiral Cervera, s
fleet was destroyed, the war was prac-
tically at an end Surely IL the naval
force of the United States was eousl
to the destruction of Admiral Cervera,.
fleet. it was a fortiori more than eoual
to the protection of its own coasts.