The record-union., 1898-05-24

cerned with the SPECIFIC ana detained
plans for the execution OF the objects
prescribed by strategy It is the right
arm exercising the brain thought; IT is
primarily and solely the function and
mission of the fleet commander. who
should be left untrammeled by all save
a general accordance with the primal
| scheme, in order to wed the perform
ance to the precept. Some of the most
famous strategists were landsmen, 1g-
norant Of the sea, but every great tac-
tician has been, first of all, seaman
skilled in the knowledge and practice
of his calling, a sailor Injured TO the
dangers and chances of the ocean and
an intelligent student, highly special
lied and developed in the direction of
! his environment.
Many of the rules of tactics are de-
pendent upon weapons and motive
power, and necessarily vary somewhat,
if not to the degree claimed, with the
changes in each.
Throughout tactical history" again
declares Captain Taylor, I'VE see oft
! repeated this effort 20 neutralize long
| discipline and training by some new
| device. A century before Ecnomus
the enemies of the Athenians, hopeless
| of emulating their skill in handling
| fleets, determined to build the strong
est possible prOws, beaks and catheads
on their galleys, and then to steer to
meet the opposing ships prov to PROV
| and crush them by greater weight. This
was the tactical answer of the strong
! brave and unframed to the thorough
| drill and study of their opponents. The
| cOrvus was the reply of Roman Valor
| to Carthaginian skill in naval tactics.
Fire ships had their place in their day,
and at present the torpedo may be
called the tactical reply of weak naV1es
to the overwhelming numbers of i'm
| preghable irOncads that the great pow
| ers can put afoat.
These mechanical devices with
which to counterbalance and overthrow
careful training and study have always
| been popular. They fascinate the i'm
agination by suggesting a short cut
| to success without all the labor of drill
and preparation. 1t is pleasanter to
many people to believe that the needle
gun won the KoniggratZ campaign than
that it was the long and laborious
training of the Prussians, and the
| needle gun was but secondary and
auxiliary to their complete preparation
and knowledge of the business of war.
We often hear that this or that in
vention-a torpedo, or a submarine boat
or a balloon-has revOlutionized naval
warfare, and sometimes even officers of
experience are touched with the craze;
but naval warfare goes on very much
| as usual. Bravery, discipline and tao
! tical training. the study of war-upon
ha bo fot Of oil
depended, and upon them will it always
depend"
Strategy first of all entails general
examination of the theater of war, and
the strategic values of the different To-
calities included within it's limits.
Among the literary aids at once
brought down to date are the war
charts, for in them and the accompa-
nying plans are condensed a multitude
of details, each important in the tacti-
cal defense of the various positions.
They are the fruits of thorough exam
nations of the different localities.
whether bases or points to be defend
ed or attacked. They take the places
of numerous orders and instructions
and are equally valuable to the STRAIT
egy board and to the Commanders-in-
Chief busy with the tactical disposi-
ton of their fleets. For whatever may
be the latter's plan, it is probable that
most of the details shown upon the
war charts will apply to the situation.
We have seen the enormous value of
scouting during the past fortnight, in
the absence of any accurate infOrma-
ton relating to the squadron of ar
mored cruisers and torpedo destroyers
which on their departure from the
Cape de Verde Islands, shaped a wes-
terly course-and then disappeared.
These of course, had to be reckoned
with for though they did no tangible
harm in their presumed transit, yet
they filled so perfectly the role of a
fleet in being that we were forced to
weaken our blockade of the Cuban
cast and dispatch our heaviest availa-
BILE ships to meet them. 1t may be
well, as the phrase is in doubt and
may be in common use to define a
fleet in being" and, as n1cst accurate,
the definition of Commander VAIN
wright will be taken. A fleet in be-
ing Means he declares, "a fleet rela-
lively inferior to the enemy, which is
neither cowed, crushed nor effectually
masked and is still able to observe and
threaten interference with an enemy S
plans of territorial attack, coast block
ade or other extended operations" This
seems to fit nicely the work of our
will O. the wisp adversaries.
When the general plans Of the cam
paign have been selected and commu-
nicated to the various Commanders-in-
Chief, the energizing of the ideas and
the success Of the intentions should
be left to them Here then, is where
the tactical dispositions are determined.
AS emphasized before, tactics is dis
| tinctively the method of attack or de-
| fense, and the direction in the pres
ence or in the immediate neighborhoOd
| of the enemy of evolutions upon which
| such attack or defense depends. 1t
does not mean the mere performance of
| evolutions, and herein the capacity and
genius of the Commander-in-Chief will
be shown. Where the fleets are equal
in force, the best maneuvered and most
skillfully handled will surely conquer,
and where the inferiority is marked su-
perior tactical requirements may more
than establish an equality.-A Naval
officer in New York Herald.
The Rev. Leighton Leigh, the Eng
lish curate who has abandoned his pull
pit to go on the stage, says he did so
because it was impossible to maintain
himself and family on $12 a week.
|