The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-12-03

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The situation has been p~recarious On
account of the difficulties in supplying
my command with feed, and the ire
mendous fighting capacity shown by
the enemy from his almost impregnable
position"
physically exhausted still, but had eat
en- a little for the first time in four
days. Shafter transmits copies Of lis
demand for the surrender OF Santiago
and the reply. a refusal. of date July .,
then shows that he passed the bonn
bardment until noon OF the 5th in order
to allow the foreign consuls to remove
their people TO Ell Caney. He explains
to the secretary that great suffering
will result and he submits the matter
to the president. Tn consuls a told
Dorst that there were not to exceed
5000 troops in Santiago and that SHAFT
ter could starve them out. letting the
non-combatants come n leisurely.
The secretary replied that for hui
manity's sake he approved the post
ponement OF the ~bombardment al pro-
posed, though Shafter would be justi-
fed In carrying out the original threat.
Later in the same day General Corbin
directed Shafter to use his W judy
ment about how to take the city. only,
for manifest reason, IL should be ac-
complished as Don as possible. The
secretary also added a short telegram
saying that he had not intended to d.
rect Skaters movements. as he was
the best Judge of the situation. n the
ountry had every faith in his wisdom
Later still on July Attn the following tel
egram was dispatched:
Major GenSal shafter. Playa del
with the president and the
secretary of war am directed
to say your continued illness brings
sorrow and anxiety. In case you are
disabled General Wheeler would. OF
course. succeed the command. His ILL
ness. which we also regret. is feared 10
be so serious as to prevent his assum-
ing command. You must determine
whether your condition is such as TO
require you to ~relinquish command. If
so. n General Wheeler is disabled,
o will order the next general officer
in rank for duty to succeed you and
take up the work in hand. 1t is not ex-
pected that our forces will make any
assault until they are ready.
III. c. CORBIN, Adjt. Gen"
The response was as follows:
Camp near Santiago. July 5. Adju-
tant General. Washington: / am not at
present so much III as exhausted from
the intense strain that has been on me
for the last two months. ] am also
suffering from an attack of govt, which
prevents me from moving about. I
have, however, the whole business in my
hand and am managing II through able
staff officers. When / do have to Civ
up / will of course follow your order,
but ! hope to be better soon.
'SHAFTER. Maj. Gen. Com
on the Sd General Shafter reported
that Pando could not get into Santiago,
but on the 4th he reported Pando's en-
try with 5000 troops from Holguin and
asked about his own reinforcements.
On the 9Th CHATTER ranOrtpd that he
was returning the Spanish wounded. he
being satisfied that such a course would
sow the seeds of dissatisfaction in the
Spanish ranks. as. he says "the SOL
diers said they were fighting the church
and were going to kin them
In a telegram dated San Juan, 4th,
Shafter says:
Il regard IL as necessary that navy
force an entrance into the harbor OF
Santiago not later than the 9Th inst.
and assist in the capture OF that place.
If they do. / believe the place will sur
ender without further sacrifice of life"
A supplementary telegram declared
that IL the army was to take the place
alone 10 ZOO troops were wanted speedi-
ly. and then il was not certain on ac-
count of the stormy weather and a
surer way was through the bay.
In reply he was told on July 9Th 10y
General Corbin to confer with Sampson
at once for cooperation in taking San
tiago, and after the fullest exchange
OF views you will agree upoon the time
and place of attack
Waiting achievements.
on the afternoon of the same day
General Corbin t~elegraphed that the
secretary of war found il evident from
your several reports that you do not
consider your force strong enough to
make a successful assault upon the
Spanish army intrenched in Santiago.
This being the case. IL Is the point OF
wisdom to await achievements, the
embarkation of which you have already
been advised. You must be the judge
Of time and manner Of assault. n
president has directed that you and
Admiral Sampson have a conference
and determine upon "A course Of CO.
operation best calculated to ecure de-
sired results with least sacrifice"
The next day, Shafter was telegraph
ed:
The secretary is anxious to know
what prospects there is Of breaking
through the lines. He will be very glad
even with n delay. TO have cooperation
of the navy, thus saving many lives
July 9Th Shafter telegraphed that aft
err consultation with Sampson, the navy
was disinclined TO force entrance ex-
cept as last resort. would lombard city
for "a hours. and then try to force the
entrance with small ships. He had
made another demand for Torars sur
render. which he hoped would succeed.
He says:
"As a last resort I will try running in
transports. / don't consider my force
sufficient TO warrant an assault on the
city. of course. 1t would he crimina
to hope for the end to be gained, which
is merely the capture Of a few thousand
men, and when we are getting them by
siege"
Food Was Lacking.
Shafter was t~elegraphed that II was
reported here that his men were with
out food. He replied On the 9Th that on
the day OF the battle the men had piled
up and left their blanket and haver-
sacks and were not able TO get them
until the next night. Some of them may
have been hungry, but on the night OF
the battle pack trains delivered food
along the line. They were without to-
bacco for several DAYS and il was only