The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-10-09
THE LESSONS OF THE WAR
CAUSE OF MISTAKES AS SEEN FROM
AN OFFICERS STANDPOINT.
System Must BE Changed and Respon-
sibility Go with Authorization
ditions, Not Men, to blame.

Lieut.. John H. Parker, in Review of Re-
views.
The United States has not had an army
since 1866. Fragments Of regiments it has
lad, and in some cases whole regiments
There has been no such thing as a brigade.
division or corps. The isolated fragments
were splendid, but there was no opportunity
to study the problems of organization and
supply on d large scale in a practical way.
The usual routine of business gradually be-
came such that not a wheel was turned in
the Quartermaster's department, or a nail
driven without express permission, previous
ly obtained, from the quartermaster general
at Washington. The ordinary repairs, for
example, to public property were required
to be estimated for from three months to
a year in advance. If any energetic officer
ventured to disobey this rule, his energy
was forthwith diverted into channels of Off
cial explanation of his unappIoved action,
and it took vast deal Of energy to prevent
the money cost Of such expenditure of ma
terial from being charged against the luck
less wight who dared to disregard the Off
cial routine.
In the commssary department there was
a similar system, and the same remarks
apply to all the other staff departments of
a bureaucracy with everything c, rtralized.
because the whole army for thirty years
had been administered as one body, with
out the subdivisions into organizations
which are inevitable in wartime
War became a reality with great sudden
ness Those who have grown gray in the
service and whose capacity, honesty. and
industry have never been nor cannot be
impeached found themselves confronted
with the problem of handling nearly 300 900
men, and they had no authority to change
the system of supply and transportation.
The minutest acts of officers of these de-
partments were regulated by laws of Con-
gress. enacted with view to the small regu-
lar force and with no provisions or modi-
fications for war. In authorizing the forma-
ton of large volunteer armies Congress did
not authorize any change in the system OF
administration or make any emergency pro-
vision AS before, every detail of supply
and transportation had to be authorized
from the central head. Is it any wonder
that under such extraordinary circum-
tenn designed FOR peace and $4,000 men
weakened in some respects when the at
tempt was made to apply it to 100000?
THE GREAT WONDER.
The great wonder is that it did the work
as we'll as it did: and that it did accomplish
the work, after a fashion, was due to the
superhuman exertfons of the chief officers
of the supply departments and their able as
sistants. These men and their subordinates
knew no rest. They were untiring and zeal
Gus. On their own responsibility they cut
the red tape to the very smallest limit COM
patible with proper care of government
property. Instead of regular returns and
acquisitions, the merest form of lead-pencil
memorandum or recipe was sufficient to
obtain the needed supplies whenever they
were available, This much was absolutely
necessary, for these officers were personally
responsible for every dollars worth of sup
plies and had to protect themselves in some
before their accounts are finally settled, I'M
less some provision be made by law for
their relief. These remarks apply only to
conditions after we landed in Cuba.
1t can therefore be stated once for all
that there Was some suffering in Cuba
among our soldiers, and that this suffering
was caused largely by the conditions under
which the campaign was conducted. Some
of it might possibly have been averted if
Congress had seen cent, At to lodge degree Of
ministrative officers, but this was not done.
The system vas a faulty one. made doubly
hard by the hard conditions of the cam
The lesson o be derived is that we must
change the ystem in certain particulars.
We must Vef in officers of the supply de-
partmentS IN amount of discretionary
power commensurate with the responsible
tiles they are called upon to face. This
means of course, decentraliza ton. If we
are to organize an army of 5000 or 100. 900
men, large enough to be organized into
permanent.units, then each of these units
must be cmplete in itself for purposes of
ordinary administration.
If an ofcer is capable of being brigade
Quartermster commissary. or surgeon, for
example, then invest him with sufficient dis
cretiOnay authority to meet emergencies,
accept hs certificate that such emery encies
exist md if he does not accomplish the
GpSirodreSulfS Dllf in nfhdP vvh0
will
Let ach regiment. brigade and division be
as narly Independent as practicable and
then require of its responsible officers eff
cienV. If it fails to come up to the stand
ardsubstitute officers who can do the work.
If ney fail through neglect punish them
A GENERAL MUST COMMAND.
fhe board of strategy as an inception
vas fine thing. It's logical sequence is a
general staff, such as may be found in other
countries. charged with the problems of or
ganization. mobilization and strategic dis
position of all the forces of the United
States. But such body as this would have
no more to do with the details of rations,
transporta ton and tentage than with the
tactical maneuvers upon the battlefield. In
these the general commanding must be SUI
preme. He must be thoroughly supported,
never interfered with, and held accountable
Tor results. His subordinate should know
no other or higher authority than his; a
decision or order from him must be final
and should clear the subordinate of all re-
spOnsibility except that of prompt COM
pliance
This idea is the exact converse of the
principle of bureaucracy. Under the latter
the most competent general may be ham,
pered or even disabled by the opposition,
ignorance or indifference of some Subordi-
nate official of a bureau thousand miles
away who is not accountable to him, but
10 a bureau chief equally opposed to or
ignorant of the plans of the general. The
benefit of the proposed change of system
ought to be FULLY apparent
there can be no doubt in the minds of
those who know all the facts that most of
the hardshps and sufferings that the
troops had to endure were unavoidable I'M
der the conditions The supply departments
labOred heroicaly-after the emergency
was upon them. But they were tied by the
bonds Of preinposed conditions.
The corps that went to Santiago was vir-
tually the regular army. Every regiment
that went 20 Tampa went there ready for
service. Their equipment was just as COM
plete on April 26 as it was on June s. They
wore the same clothing to Cuba that they
had brought from Sheridan. Assinniboine
and Sherman. They brought with them
their wagons and mules. their tents and
camp eGuipage. There should have been no
problems 10 solve in regard to them, and
vet there were many. Owing to delays in
the supply departments they wore winter
ciothing Tor their service III the tOrrid zone,
and drew summer clothing there just in
time to return TO the bracing breeZes of
MOntaUk where in their enfSehled cOndi-