The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-12-23
Of Commanding Officers of the Navy During
thesSpanish War Made Public.
UNKNOWN HERO OF THE NAVY
Heart of
Station Cadiz and Keeps
Navy Department Posted to the Movements of
he Spanish Navy..Admiral MonteJos Report
Government of the Battle of Manila
Dewey's Importance of Philippines.

Washington, December 21.-The Off
cial reports of all commanding officers
of the navy during the war, have been
compiled and published by the navy
department. While treating events
that have already figured in official re-
ports that have reached the public the
documents still contain many minor
reports that throw side lights on in
teresting phases Of the war. Almost in
the beginning in the brief record of
the proceedings Of the naval war board,
an unknown hero is brought to light
in the person. Of Ensign H. H. Ward,
who at the beginning of the war was
on duty in the navigation bureau, with
Lieutenant Whitlesy on the heavy du-
ties of assistant chief Of the bureau.
He volunteered for secret service duty
and his exploits, about which nothing
has been said in the past, will be plac-
ed on record beside those of Lieuten-
ant Rowan in Cuba, and Lieutenant
Whitney, in Porto Rico. Within a,
week after the declaration of war, En-
sign Ward disguised himself and went
right into the heart of the enemy's
country, making his headquarters in
Cadiz, the principal Spanish naval sta
ton, and informing the navy depart
ment here of the actual strength OF the
Spanish naval vessels and their move
ments. Then he went to the West In
dies and reported everything that was
going on there of Importance to the
American navy. Next, he went again
into the enemy's country in disguise,
this time to Porto Rico, where he was
arrested as a suspicious character and
a spy. By adroitnesS he managed to
secure his release and escaping from
San Juan cabled the navy department
a full statement of the defenses there,
and the preparations making for the
reception of the Spanish squadron un-
der Cervera. All this time the officials
of the navy department were under the
impression that Mr.. Ward was engaged
in installing a system of coast signals
on the New England coast.
While Ward was in Porto Rico En-
sign Buck, another attachee of the
navigation bureau, was on the shores
of the Mediterranean in disguise
watching every movement OF the
squadron of Admiral Camara, which
started for the Philippines, but turn
ed back.
OF the strategy board itself it is said
that it was part of it's duty to keep in
formed of all of the movements and
plans of the Spanish naval forces
through secret agents and it is known
that the navy was thus informed OF
all important movements. At times,
however, information was conflicting
and decisions had to be made as to
which report was true.
The reports of the famous naval bat
tile of Cavite include one from United
States Consul Williams, rather un-
usual thing in report OF a naval char
acter, but fully justified by it's pictu-
rescue and untechnicaa description OF
Dewey's great victory. Following it is
report to his government on the same
engagement by the commander-in-chiet
of the ill-fa'ted Spanish fleet, Montejo
The admiral depicts the bad condition
eof the Spanish fleet. He said that the
cruiser Castillo was incapable of ma.
neuveriEg on account of her bad con.
dition, while the defenses at the en-
trance to Subig bay were very back
ward. With much disgust he found
that the guns which should have beer
mounted We're delayed month and g
half, and he was no less disgusted te
find that reliance was had for the de.
fense of the port upon a few torpedoes
not properly placed. Fiuding Subis
bay defencelesx. the Spanish squadron
repaired to the bay OF Ma. uila 10 NEE
battle under less unfavor able condi.
tionS- The admiral avoided. the CITY
not wishing to draw fire upo n 1T, ane
prepared his fleet for action, painting
his vessels dark gray and ha wing th'
fires spread and springs on the cables
He says that the force of Dewey Ies.
sells, leaving out transports, amt hnntec
to q ,410 tons, 1920 horse power. JIG:
guns (many rapid-ire), 1850 men jane
an average of seventeen miles. AgsVnss
this the power of his only five effec tive
ships was 1O,110 tons, II, 200 horse DC wv.
er, rs guns (very short of rapid-fir e).
1875 crew and a maximum speed 01
twelve miles. The admiral describes
vivid language the terrible effect of
the American onslaught on the Span
ish vessels. He says: 1.-THE Americans
us numerous projectiles, as the three
cruisers to the end of the line devoted
themselves almost entirely to fight the
Christina, my flagship. A short time
after the action commenced one shell
exploded in the forecastle and put out
of action all of those who served the
four rapid.fire cannons; meantime an
other shell exploded in the orlcp. set
ting fire to the crews bags. At 7:3o
o'clock one shell destroyed compfetely
the steering gear. Another destro ,ved
the mizzen. bringing down my flag and
ensign Another shell exploded on the
poop and put out Of action nine men.
A fresh shell exploded in the officers
cabin, covering the hospital with blood.
destroying the wounded who were be-
Ing treated there. Another exploded in
the ammunition room. / had to flood
the magazines when the cartridges be-
gan to explode. One large shell pene-
trated the fire room, putting out of ac-
ton one master gunner and twelve men
serving the guns. Another rendered
useless the starboard bow gun, and