The Dickinson press., 1898-06-11
SPAIN AND THE POWERS
English Criticism on the
Conduct of the War.
ZONE EUROPEAN M1sa1v1Nes.

0f campaign, are not calculated to nat
ter the board Of strategy at Washing
ton. A good deal more is heard i'll club
circles in London than is to be read in
newspapers, the latter being unani-
nous in their anxiety to avoid any
thing likely to hurt American suscepti-
bilities. No one, of course, expected a
display Of great military efficiency such
rs car only be the outcome Of a long
and systematic training through the
maintenance Of q great standing army
such as the United States never pre-
tended to have organized, but without
which it is impossible to embark nova
days on a war with any promise, Of i'm
mediate success. The failure, however,
Of the many and fast American cruisers
to obtain timely information as to the
movements Of the Spanish fleet is more
unexpected, and it establishes wen
more conclusively the absolute neces-
sity Of special training in modern naval
warfare. / may here mention that dur
ing the naval maneuvers carried out
yearly in British waters the admiralty
directed particular attention to this very
question Of scout duty, and specialists
declare that the Spanish feet would
never have eluded the vigilance Of ex-
perienced British commanders.
It is also noted in this connection
that the Spaniards have enjoyed an i'm
portant advantage by the very fact Of
their backwardness in journalistic en-
terprise." The so to say abject readi-
ness with which the authorities at
Washington placed at the disposal Of
newspaper representatives the most i'm
portant campaign projects and the abb
solute disregard Of public interests with
which such information was heralded
to the world at large by a section of the
American press, come as an astonish-
ment to those who know that one Of the
essential conditions Of success in mod
ern warfare is secrecy. This sort Of
coram populo strategy is oontrasted un-
favorably with the quietness and unob-
t%rusiveness with which Spain has been
able to concert the movements Of her
feet.
The immediate effect Of all this must
be to protract the duration Of the war.
Even If Admiral Cervera's feet be now
defeated, his successful tactics and the
stout front presented by the troops in
Cuba are calculated to encourage q peo-
pie like the Spaniards to a determined
resistance. But as a prolongation Of the
struggle will certainly entail more oner-
GUS conditions Of peace and may posi-
bly, compel the United States to carry
the war into Europe by attacking some
r.o,~ko so 0vo$~ - $c o~rrrohonao fhot
serious complications will then Isl
If events take such a turn, the United
States, it is feared, will be forced, how
ever reluctantly, to abandon its tradi-
tional abstention from European pol
itics and embark in a course of vast
military and naval ornaments.
Nothing could show more wildly the
involved state Of international relations
the world wei than the misgivings
with which the European powers view
the developments Of a war possessing
prima faoie only q local significance
and waged between a republic unoon-
cerned in continental affairs and a Eu-
ropean monarchy which has remained
thus far outside the alliances binding
the other great powers. The fate Of Gu
ba and Puerto Rico would in itself be
Of like moment to Europe. But the
effect Of their severance from Spain on
the stability Of monarchical institutions
in that country concerns almost every
reigning house in Europe, especially
after the terrible explosion witnessed
in Italy at this very juncture. Further
more, the ultimate ownership of the
Philippines is a matter which must ag-
gravate the difficulties Of a peaceful set
Element.
These, however, are not the only per-
picking elements of the situation. Spain
is in possession Of certain points Of great
strategic importance as affecting naval
mastery in the Mediterranean, and it is
feared that she may be disposed to
make, in connection with them, conces
sions to such continental powers as may
either favor her in, the prosecution Of
the wal or assist her in concluding a le-
nient peace. Port Mahon, in the Bale
ario islands, is q most important naval
port, and Russia has long coveted a
"coaling station" in that quarter.
Ceuta, thanks to modern artillery, neu-
t~ralizes Gibraltar as a key Of the Medi-
terranean, while, for the same reason,
Sierra Carbonera and Punta Carnero
could render the tenure Of Gibraltar
precarious in time Of war. Moreover,
the predominant political and CONNER
cial influence which Spain exerts in
Marocco has, up to this, held the bal
ance between the rival efforts of France
and England to cur q firm footing in
!; that country, Marocco being not the
last of "dying nations on Lord Sails.
bury's list. France has always looked
! upon the annexation Of Marocco as q
necessary complement Of her Tunisiar
and Algerian dominions, and since thu
extension Of her possessions in western
. Africa her succession to the heritage o.
' the tottering shereefian throne is held II
. France to be q matter Of manifest des
tiny.
: On the other hand, the British as un
hesitatingly believe that their preseno
= at Gibraltar entails a manifest right t.
= the acquisition Of the opposite coast
a Into this tangle Of competing interests
h fresh element has just been imported b.
the arrival of q Russian diplomatic rep
resentative at Tangier. Up to this Rus
n sian affairs in Marocco were confided t
y the Spanish legation, but the RUSSIA
J. minister, who has just been received b
a the Moors with special marks Of respect
u is believed to have been sent for th
" purpose of furthering the policy and tn
interests Of. France in that country. g
] BUY RIGHT OUT.
Ropes and Tags Furnished Ere
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