The record-union., 1898-04-18

discussed dead angles-the weak point |
of lofty batteries-disappear, for each |
hight commands every foot of the base |
Of the opposite hight. Probably the
most formidable battery in the world |
will be one whose exact position it
would not be proper to locate, but 1t
will mount five of the heaviest guns in
use almost level with the surface of
the water at such point that no ship
, can possibly pass it at any distance
much greater than half a mile. What
ship afioat could stand a 1,030-pound
12-inch armor-piercing shot at point
blank range, with an initial velocity or
more than 1000 feet a second? Here is
where that beautiful device. the Buff
gton-Crozier disappearing carriage,
comes in. At that close range no gun
could be loaded, if exposed, for the
rapid-fire guns of q fleet would search
every foot-yes, every inch-of the par
apet. but on this carriage the gun is
mounted upon long trunnions, pivoted
in their center, so that when the gun
recoils on it's carriage the trunnlons
swing back and down, bringing the gun
to the ground behind the parapet
where it is entirely covered from nre.
AS the gun goes down it raises coun-
/ terpoise weight slightly heavier than
! itself, which weight is caught automat-
| ically at its greatest elevation and
held fast When the gun is loaded
| lever trips the catch, and the weight
| descends into the we'll or pit, and up
! comes the gun all ready to fire. Then
| the only man exposed is the man who
| aims it. and he can be protected by
! heavy steel shield from the rapld-fre
guns.
In this second line the dynamite guns,
which Major Clarke seems to think may
supersede movable torpedoes, being
| themselves aerial tOr0edoes, capable
! of most accurate direction and certain
| effect. will have an ideal field of opera
! ton, every yard of water being within
their deadliest range. Here the prob
! lem of protection versus economy has
been worked out with a result Of CIV
| ing the maximum of defense for min
] imum of cost, and this is a most lmpor-
/ tant point. We must cut our coat ac-
/ cordng to our cloth, and While the steel
| turret may be the ideal mount for
| low site and the gun lift may give better
/ protection than the disappearing carrl-
| age, still while the turret costs half
million and the gun lift $22OOOO, as
against $4,000 and $50 600 our money
will be best placed in getting the largest
| number of guns, even if small chance
| of their being hit remains. We must
fbe careful about teaching the doctrine
| that we can make war without any
body being hurt. We should remember
| the degenerate days of Rome, when
the legions abandoned the plum and the
| short sword, the good weapons that
kept the war gods land, and ensconced
| themselves behind huge shields of wick
| er work, and that the first operations
of our armored vessels, after the Mer-
rimac and Monitor had sounded the
death knelI of wooden ships, were eau
! tiOus to a degree little short of absolute
| timidity In the attack on Sumter the
| New Ironsides, much our most formid-
able vessel in gun power, was hardly al
lowed to do anything, so fearful did the
authorities seem lest her armor should
be penetrated.
| 1t would be a sorry exchange If any
perfection of defense Slapped the spirit
of Paul Jones and Decatur and Perry
and Dupont.
| The third line may seem unnecessar-
lily strong. One might naturally ask
if Bonita. Lobos. Preside and Lime
| Point can't keep a fleet out, what can
| Sausalito and AlcatraZ and Angel Is
land do? But just here is the one
weak point in this otherwise almost i'm
pregnabIe scheme, the chance that
some daring foe (and he won't be
Spaniard) like Nelson or Dundonald
might take advantage of a dense fog
and the impossibiIity of keeping tor
pedoes down in the channel and run
in, thus turning the defenses of the
Gate. Then we will meet him from
Alcatraz, Angel Island, Sausalito, Fort
Scott and Cavillo. and we trust that
the last state of that foe will be worse
than the first. If he ever breaks
through this then we must turn to the
navy and ask them to back US with
| cruisers especially fitted for harbor
defense which can mount any guns
that can be forged and wear any armOr
that can be turned out. and in view
of this we must 1 say, absolutely must,
learn cooperation in it's highest
and broadest sense. We must send Off
GERS, especially artillery officers, to
work with the navy at their naval
war college, where the highest prob
lens of strategy are studied and the
ground is gone over minutely, until
every source of knowledge is exhausted.
The radicalism of youth and the con-
servatism of experience are all heard,
and from this class of theories the fit
test survives. At such an institution
each arm of the service can learn the
capabilities of the other and learn what
cooperation on the ground and not on
Paper in orders means.
We should learn from the bitter re-
ordinations between the Confederate
officers in command of the forts which
defended New Orleans and the com
men equally gallant, equally devoted
and equally efficient in their own
branches could, from mere ignorance
of what each had a right to expect from
the other so totally fail in cooperation
as to end in accusing each other prac-
tically of disoyalty We hardly tried
to co-operate-worse luck to us-with
our overpOWering naval strength. We
did try what we called a joint opera
ton in the Red River expedition, when
Banks moved by land and Porter was
to cooperate by water The only prac-
teal combination was the combination
lof the knowledge and skill of Dick Tay-
Tor with the ignorance and incompe-
tence of Banks.
Having endeavored to give an idea
of the nature and scope of the de-
fenses of San Francisco, it may not be
amiss to say word about coast de-
lenses in general.
The science of coast defense may al
most be summed up in one word. CON