The Dickinson press., 1898-06-18
SPAIN AND TIE POWERS
Current English Criticism on the
Conduct of the War.
some EUROPEAN M1sa1v1Has.

IOnouct OF tue war. ~,
BONE EUROPEAN MIsGIvINas.
What Il Heard In London Club Circles.
spain's Coveted Naval Posts Ultimate
Ownership sf Tho Philippines Will Ag-
granite the Difficulties Of . Peaceful
Settlement Rumors Of . Triple Alli-
ance With Franco and Russia.
Current comments ON the conduct Of
the war, or rather on the absence of any
we'll conceived and unvacillating plan
Of campaign, are not calculated to fiat
ter the board Of strategy at Washing.
ton. A good deal more is heard in club
circles in London than is to be read in
newspapers, the latter being unani-
nous in their anxiety to avoid any
thing likely to hurt American suscepti-
bilities. No one, Of course, expected q
display Of great military efficiency such
as can only be tho outcome Of a long
and systematic training through the
maintenance of q great standing army
such as the United States never pre-
tended to have organized, but without
which it is impossible to embark nova
days on q wqr with any promise of i'm
mediate success. The failure, however,
Of the many and fast American cruisers
to obtain timely information as to the
movements Of the Spanish feet is more
unexpected, and it establishes even
more conclusively the absolute neces-
sity of special training in modern naval
warfare. I may here mention that dur
ing the naval maneuvers carried out
yearly in British waters the admiralty
directed particular attention to this very
question of scout duty, and specialists
declare that the Spanish feet would
never have eluded the vigilance of OK
perienced British commanders
It is also noted in this connection
that the Spaniards have enjoyed an i'm
portant advantage by the very fact Of
their backwardness in journalistic an
terprise." The SO to say abject readi-
ness with which tho authorities at
Washington placed at the disposal Of
newspaper representatives the most i'm
portant campaign projects and the alb
solute disregard of public interests with
which such information was heralded
to the world at large by a section Of the
American press, come. as an 'astonishs7
ment to those who know that one of the
essential conditions Of success in mod
ern warfare is secrecy. This sort Of
coram populo strategy. is contrasted IN
favorably with the quietness and unob-
trusiveness with which Spain has been
able to concert the movements of her
fleet.
The immediate effect Of all this must
be to protract the duration of the al
Even if Admiral Cervera's fleet be now
defeated, his successful tactics and the
stout front presented by the troops in
Cuba are calculated to encourage q peo-
pie like the Spaniards to a determined
resistance. But as a prolongation Of the
struggle will certainly entail more oner-
GUS conditions Of peace and may posi-
bly, compel the United States to carry
the war into Europe by attacking some
ports in Spain it is apprehended that
serious complications will then ensue.
IF events take such a turn, the United
States, it is feared, will be forced, how
ever reluctantly, to abandon its tradi-
tional abstention from European pol
itics and embark in a course of vast
military and naval ornaments.
Nothing could show more wildly the
involved state of international relations
the world over than the ~misgivings
with which tho European powers view
the developments Of a war possessing
prima facie only o local significance
and waged between a republic uncon-
! cerned in continental affairs and q Eu-
ropean monarchy which has remained
thus far outside the alliances binding
the other great powers. The fate Of Gu
ba and Puerto Rico would in itself be
of like moment to Europe. But the
effect Of their severance from Spain on
the stability Of monarchical institutions
in that country concerns almost every
reigning house in Europe, especially
after the terrible explosion witnessed
in Italy at this very juncture. Further
more, the ultimate ownership of the
Philippines is a matter which must ag-
gravate the difficulties Of q peaceful set
Element.
These, however, are not the only per-
picking elements Of the situation. Spain
is in possession Of certain points of great
strategic Importance 81 affecting naval
mastery in the Mediterranean, and it is
feared that she may be disposed to
make, in connection with them, conces-
sions to such continental powersas may
either favor her in the prosecution Of
the war or assist her in concluding q le-
nient peace. Port Mahon, in the Bale
aric islands, is a most important naval
port, and Russia has long coveted a
~"coaling station" in that quarter.
Ceuta, thanks to modern artillery, neu.
t~ralizes Gibraltar as q key Of the Medi-
terranean, while, for the same reason,
Sierra Carbonera and Punta Carnero
could render the tenure Of Gibraltar
%precarious in time Of war. Moreover,
the predominant political and CONNER
cial influence which Spain exerts in
Marocco has, up to this, held the bal.
ance between the rival efforts of France
and England to secure o firm footing in
that country, Marocco being not the
last Of ''dying nations'' on Lord Sails
bury's list. France has always looked
upon the annexation Of Marocco as {
necessary complement of her Tunisia1
and Algerian dominions, and since tn
extension Of her possessions in western
Africa her succession to the heritage O
the tottering shereefan throne is held II
France to be a matter Of manifest des
tiny.
On the other hand, the British as un
hesitatingly believe that their presenc
at Gibraltar entails q manifest right t
the acquisition Of the opposite coast
Into this taugle Of competing interests
fresh element has just been imported b
J the arrival Of q Russian diplomatic rer
resentative at Tangier. Up to this Rul
sian affairs in Marocco were confided t
7 the Spanish legation, but the Russia
| minister, who has just been received b
the Moors with special marks of respect