The evening times., 1898-05-10
Views Of a Correspondent as to
the Situation.
AVERTCA MUST END THE WAR
Gon:ex DeclnI es Tint He Could.Wf
Sunicient Arms, Alone Accomplish
Victory, But I'm the Meantime Star
vatibn Would BE the Direst Foe.
The Cuban Leaders Ambitious.

erals camp May 4, having been with th'
Cuban armies for about six months
talking with all the leaders and learning
from actual observation the real condi
tions that exist in their various locations
This correspondent, Mr.. Fred. o. Som
erford, was well fitted for his task, as ht
has been a resident of Cuba for sever
years and speaks the language fiuently.
The insurgents have now about $50
men in the vicinity of Gomez's camp-that
is, within radius of 30 miles," says Som.
erford THE best troops east of the Ju-
caro-Moron trocha are the division COM
manded by General Gonzalez. He has S0t
infantry. who are well armed and well
disciplined. One company is armed with
Mauser rifles, which were captured from
the Spanish. For these rifles there is but
a small supply of ammunition. The other
companies are armed with the long Rem
ington. which throws q bullet of .is cali
Der. This is the weapon in common use
among the insurgents. They prefer 1t to
the Mauser in spite of the latters repeat
ing property.
''Gomez's immediate command con-
sists of a bodyguard of $50 cavalry and 10
infantry, under command of Major Joseph
Desrampes. Desrampes is an American
iioi .Nt" oTltsiES ana Il SOOu art1lleriSf,
This force of $500 is all that are in fight
Ing shape just at present, but if there
were arms and equipments it could be
swelled TO probably 81, 600. Gomez told me
he wanted 10000 guns to equip an army
large enough to drive the Spanish from
the island. He wants long Remingtons or
eprlngheids FOR the infantry and carbines
OF the same character for the cavalry.
beleVe II arms are sent to Cuba for
Inc insurgents they hot
Springfield rifles, of which our Govern
meht has large quantity in, its arse
nais- 1t is simple and effective gun
Inc cubans are not accustomed to nor
have they the experience and facilities
to care for complicated repeating weap-
ons Twenty thousand machetes-weap-
ons of wonderful effectiveness in Cuban
hands-are also needed.
Gomez says he can raise 10 600 men in
Santa Clara province alone. The recruits
will be mostly rancheros, whose occupa-
ton has been practically destroyed by the
Spanish and who are eager for revenge
Gomez is great believer in the effective
ness of cavalry. lie wants to organize his
new army on the basis of 600 cavalry in
Santa Clara province, 800 in Matanzas
province. 500 in Havana province, and 600
in Pinar del Rio. In Puerte Principe
province the insurgents are now cavalry.
''Garcia's force in Santiago de Cuba is
all infantry. In the reorganization they
should be compelled to remain infantry.
They are drilled as such. and never hav-
ing had horses are accustomed to making
long marches on foot. Gomez regards ar
ti!lery as very important, but the Cubans
have none. They have the greatest con-
tempt fer the Spanish artillerymen. and
assert that not a Cuban has been in
jured in the entire war by the Spanish
field pieces.
ITO my mind says Comerford, the
food question presents an almost insur-
mounts able obstacle to the scheme to utii-
ize the insurgents to drive Blanco from,
the island. even if there were no others.
Gomez's .:my in its present shape is to-
tally inadequate to undertake such Il
task 1t is scattered over the entire ISL
and. This disposition is made absolutely
necessary in order that the men may not
starve. Gomez cannot mobilize even such
forces as he has until food supplies have
been sent into the island by the United
States to say nothing of an army of any
considerable size modified. His army
would starve. even if not crushed by
Blanco.
Gomez is willy old man. and. / think
not without future political aspirations
in the government which will be formed
at the close of the war. He does not
want the United States TO land an army
in Cuba, except it be a regiment of ar
tillery to operate in conjunction with
him. Gomez knows that an American
army will defeat Blanco, take Havana,
and practically end the war within a
month after IL lands on Cuban soil. He
also knows that the assistance he could
afford in such campaign would be un-
important and insignificant except as an
adviser regarding the country to the
He realizes that the insurgents would |
'ut but sorry figure in the rapid opera |
ions sure 10 follow an American invas- |
on, unless months pass while they are |
'eing armed and drilled into military hab-
IL other than those of guerril- |
as. Knowing all this, Gomez |
loes not want to be robbed |
# the credit of defeating Spain and end
ng the war. He does not wish history
o record the fact that he had to have
to crush Blanco and free Cuba
In a party which left Gomez camp a
ew days before l did was William d.
smith. We came into Key West togeth-
r. Smith is the bearer of sealed COM
from Gomez to Gonzales |
luesada, T. Estrada Palma President
ickinley and Gen. Miles. In these let
ers Gomez urges the President and Gen
files not to attempt to land any United
states troops in Cuba during the Sum-
hei. sldiiiiS lIidi great IoSS OI lie from
isease would result. Gomez also as
ures the President that if provided with
rms and food, in cooperation with a
he can easily defeat Blanco and
AXE Havana without a single American
xposing his life TO the ravages of yell
Nv fever and smallpox.
Il suppose these communications will be
egarded at Washington as entitled to |
reat consideration. In my opinion a pol
nm |
iomez will rise like a ghost to confront
he American people afterward. If Co
leZ really believes that he can deal with |
,lanco and end the war he is mistaken
rue. with the active sympathy and sup
ort Of the United States and the assist
nee of the fleet there is no doubt that
e can eventually win. But l firmly be-
eve that such a warfare would not be
nded a year from now.
'1t will be months, even under the most
avorable conditions, before Gomez can
ut an army In the field capable of meet
1g Blanco in open battle and defeating
i'm. Even the veterans of Gomez and
iarcia's divisions are not good soldiers
S Americans reckon soldiers. They are
God guerrillas, but have no knowledge of
cal military service. Neither have their
Ulcers. / do not believe the insurgents
an II any numbers successfully attack
fortified town, such as Matanzas or Ha-
ana. In the open field the Spanish will
efeat them.
Now, about climatic danger. The
reater part of such talk is nonsense.
elieye mortality from disease in an
merican army in Cuba in any season will
e less than among the Cubans. 1 say | ,
mis- after seven years residence on the
land and more than year with the in
1rgents. The heat in Cuba now and for !
vo months to- come is not nearly so Sc ,