The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-04-28

| May he saddIed ON Her.
WASHINGTON. April 2s.-[Special T.
| Much Of the talk In political and military
circles here is as to the probable duration.
| Of our war with Spain. Opinions greatly
| vary. But in spite of the significant 90
curronces of the last week find the pre-
vailing belief to be that the war is going
| TO be short one. Naturally In naval and
military circles there is no desire to mini
mize the Importance of the work In hand.
| Our managers of war do not like to have
| 1t said that they have an easy task before
them. The greater the difficulty the great
or the honor that is to be theirs when 10 is.
| all over.
| And yet it is difficult to see how Spain.
| is going to put up stubborn resistance
Modern warmaking is so largely a matter
of money and Spain is In such desperate
| financial straits that only the pessimists
believe Spain will be able to keep il up
| for any great length of time.
find in Washington circles which are
| specially well informed belief that some
thing like this is going to happen: A war
| of a month or two months duration, in
| which Spain will try To avoid "a general
| and decisive naval engagement, but con-
triye to have sea battle or two that may
be used to please the people of the penin-
| sula with, and then a secret request by
Spain for the mediation of the powers.
| Foreign Mediation.
| Suppose Spain does induce the powers
| of Europe to offer mediation. So far as
| the world knows or the record shows, this
mediation of a neutral character will be
| offered by the powers on their own motion,
solely with desire to put an end to hos
| tilities. The United States could In dig
nifty accept such mediation, for by that
| time Ii is morally certain the United States
would have an advantage from the naval
and military point of view. Cuba is the
bone of contention, and by the time tho
| European powers conclude the opportune
moment for mediation has arrived the
| United States is pretty sure to be master
| of Cuba, either by virtue of direct military
occupation or by forcing the Spanish troops
in the island to submit through the sim
| pie process of blockade which shall starve.
them out.
As master of Cuba the United States
could very we'll afford to admit of negoti-
atoms for a settlement for then there.
could be no other settlement than one ar
rived at by Spain withdrawal from Cuba.
That is the very point the United States
aims at, and as long as that was assured
| mediation could do this country no HARM
Spain would have much to gain by medi
alton, because in this way it might bring
| the ruinous war to an end without being
forced into an abject surrender, without
being compelled to face the dreadfully HUI
initiating alternative of retiring from the
field soundly whipped and longer unable
to stand before her western foe.
| Diplomats tell me that Spain would like
nothing better than chance to drop Cuba
under the pretext that she was surrender
ing to the powers of Europe and not to
the odious yankee pigs" But, as
preliminary to this, Spanish pride and
Spanish "honor" must be satisfied by Of
fering resistance by at least enough of a war
to enable Spain to claim she had not yield
ed without "A struggle In Spain the art OF
government consists of two striking things
first, fooling the world, and, when that
fails, fooling the people of Spain. For
long time 1t has been the play of Spanish
| diplomacy to delude and hoodwink the Gu
! bans into acceptance of some sort of terms
of settlement The insurgents were too
willy and too experienced to be caught in
that trap a second time. Just as Spain has
tried to deceive the Cubans so has she
done her best TO deceive the United States
as to the progress of her efforts to "re-
form" and to ''pacify' Cuba.
Payment of Cuba's Debt.
Just at the present time the politicians
! of Spain would not dare surrender Cuba.
Such a surrender would doubtless over
turn the dynasty. 1t would cost the boy
king his throne and break the heart of his
mother the queen regent; therefore the
war. But in the opinion of the shrew0
diplomats with whom l have talked the
day is soon coming when Spanish polit-
ical leaders will hatch up scheme of In
ternational mediation under cover of
which they hope to dare to yield the Pearl
of the Antilles. In order to do this in.
such way as to make it successful-to fool
the people of Spain-the whole thing must.
be skillfully handled. Perhaps SPANS
perpetual possession of Puerto Rico and of
the Philippines will be guaranteed her
| Possibly plan may be arranged for sad
ding part of the debt upon Cuba-any
thing that will place in the hands of the
Spanish cabinet the means of appeasinR
tie people of the peninsula.
On the other hand, there are keen OBJ
servers here who believe the war is going
to be "a long one, stubbornly fought by
Spain. They think she will avoid gen
eral naval engagement and watch her
chance to attack an American city or to
| work havoc among our neets with her
swift cruisers and her flotillas of torpedo
boats, the troops now in Cuba meanwhile
keeping up a stubborn fight and trusting
to the very tactics as to warfare in the is
lard which the insurgents have so success
fully followed-tbat is to say, by retreat
| ing to the interior and giving battle only,
amid favorable surroundings.
While 1t Is possible Spain may adopt
this method there is one formidable OBJ
stacle to its success, and that is. the block
AIDE. Spain cannot escape both horns of
the dilemma. Either Cuba must be aban-
doned. left TO starve through the efficiency
of the blockade, or else she must risk n
naval engagement that might put an end
to the war because of the destruction Of
the Spanish navy. Ii is impossible for
Spain TO do both of these things for any
great length of time. She cannot avoid
naval battle and also keep up the warfare
| in Cuba.
1t is always foolish to underrate ones
adversary, and sometimes 10 is costly. But
| uuless all signs fail the United Statps Is