The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1898-08-26
CAPT. TAYLOR'S PROTEST..
He Gets Little Satisfaction in samp-
sons Reply.

ment the following letters which have
passed between himself and Captain
Taylor of the battleship Indiana:
U. S. s: Indiana, Guantanamo Bay.
Aug. 6, 1898.
Admiral: The report of Commodore
Schley on the battle of July g. as pub
lished, gives credit in the seventh para
graph to four ships and mentions by
name Captains Philip, Evans, Clark
and Cook, and adds:
THE dense smoke of the combat
shut from my view the Indiana and
Gloucester, but as these vessels were
closer to your flagship no doubt their
part in the conflict was under your inn
mediate observation
In your report, as published, you
make but slight mention of the Indiana,
stating that the Iowa and Indiana,
having done good work, and not hav-
ing the speed of the other ships were
directed by me- etc, etc.
The result of these reports is that
the captains of all the vessels of the
line of battle, except the Indiana have
received personal mention in the official
report before the department, while the
two smaller vessels have also had dis
tinctive mention either from the COM
mander in chief or the second in COM
mand.
If the official record should be re-
ferred to in future it will appear from
its general tone that the Indiana was
less deserving than all her consOrts-
Leaving out my personal interest in
the matter, it is right that I should con-
slider the officers and crew of the ship;
and speak for them as well as for
myself when submit to you, admiral,
that the above combination OF reports
will place the ship, in the opinion of
the department and the country, mark
edly below all the other vessels of your
squadron. 1 respectfully submit, sir,
that this is in justice to the Indiana
and her officers and crew.
1 can say without disparagement of
any other vessel that during the first
hour of the fight the Indian9'S fire
contributed to the destruction of the
OquendO and the Teresa more than that
of any single vessel of your squadron
except one, and equaled her. do not
know why the second in command fall
ed to observe the Indiana during this
period of our hottest action. 1 saw the
Brooklyn quite plainly.
An examination of these reports with
reference to the Indiana will, I believe,
convince you, sir, that they do produce
the effect of putting the Indiana below
all other vessels of the squadron. If
it be your opinion, sir, that this is the
case, and that all the vessels from the
BROOKLYN to the Vixen rendered ser
vice as much more valuable than the
Indiana as the published report of the
chief and the second in
command, taken together, would indi-
cate, then 4 must accept 1t for myself
and the ship; if, on the contrary, that
be not your opinion, I urge respectfully
that such steps be taken to remedy this
injustice, as may seem wise to you.
Very respectfully,
H. c. TAYLOR,
Captain, U. S. N, Commanding.
To the Chief United
States Naval Force, North Atlantic
U. S. S. New York, Guantanamo Bay,
Aug. 8, 1898.
Sir:-I am greatly obliged that you
have called my attention to what ap-
pears to have been an injustice to your
ship. officers and crew, for the part
which they took in the action of July
Sd, and also for the very proper man
ner in which you have presented it. I
think however, that in submitting such
a report to the secretary of the navy,
where so many officials are vitality in
terested and justly proud of their ship
it is no easy task to do so without ap-
parently bestOwing praise unjustly. 1t
requires very careful consideration of
the report from every point of view to
avoid misunderstanding.
The position of the ships of the squad
ron must be carefully considered to full
ly appreciate what it was possible for
each vessel to accomplish under the
circumstances in which she was placed
Those that were to be westward of the
escaping enemy were certainly better
placed for stopping the enemy and al
so better placed for delivering their fire
than the vessels to the eastward, which
was the blockading station of the Indt-
ana.
No distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide against
every variation of such a sOrtie nor do
/ consider commanding
deserved either credit or blame because
the ship under his command was faster
or slower than other ships, or carried
heavier or lighter battery; but rather
that the commanding officer was blame
worthy when he failed to put his ship
in the proper place for destroying the
enemy just in proportion to the advan-
age which he possessed in speed, bat
terry or position over his neighbOr.
Each commanding officer, in my Opin-
ion was personally responsible for the
good use which he made of the tools
with which he had to work. certainly
did not intend to criticise you or to be-
stow less praise on the Indiana than
was bestowed upon any other ship ofthe
squadron.
The fact that the commanding officer
of the Indiana was 6ignalled to return
to blockade al the mouth of the harbOr
after he had so CALAMITY contributed to
the destruction of the Spanish ships
was only a necessary precaution which
the cornmander-in- chief felt obliged to
take to prevent disaster to the large
number of transports which were left
in that vicinity when the fleet started
in pursuit of the enemy. There were
still some armed vessels remaining in
the harbOr of Santiago-at least two.
and we did not know then how many
more-Which could have comes out in
the absence of the fleet and produced
great havoc among the troop ships
which were defenselesS in the absence
of an armed vessel.
This explanation, together with your
letter, will be sent to the department
with the request that it may be attach
ed to and form part of the original
W. r SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral United States Navy
COmmander-in-chief United States !
Naval Forces. North Atlantic Station.
The commanding officer q. S. S. In
DIANA Guantanamo Bay Cuba.
TO IMPROVE THE CHURCH.