Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1898-07-21
:rHs CAPTURED SPANISH @ oSs.
War Department Considering What to Do
with Them.


War Department Considering What to Do
with Them.
Washington, July 19.--The ordnance
branch of the War Department is con-
Hidering what to do with the large
quantity NJ arms, ammunition, fortiiic-
alton guns aud ordnance stores which
have come into the possession Of this
government through the surrender OF
Santiago. Gen. Shutter reports that
about 7, 900 Mauser rifles were turned
over the first day, and the number will
reach probably 20.0 900 when the troorH
at other points in the surrendered zone
turn in their guns.
The reports made before the surren-
der indicated that the Mausers handled
by the Spanish troops we're not IN very
good condition. The guns were all
they received, principally from the vol
unteers, left many of them rusty and
defective. Ordnance officials believe,
however, that the greater part Of the
guns can be put in first class order.
The Mnuser has calibre of seven
millimeters or .27s of an inch, while
the American gun has cHlibre Of 3
of an inch. This difference in ealibre
makes it impossible to use American
ammunition in the captured guns. The
surrender also covers large stock of
ammunition, rifle balls, &C., OF the
calibre suitable for the Mausers, so
that when the guns are repaired there
will be an ample stock of cartridges to
use 10 them. The ordnance bureau is
considering only what shall lie done
with the guns if they are utilized by
this government, al it has notningto
do with the larger question concerning
the ultimate return of the guns to the
| Spanish troops. This is general
question of governmental policy, but it
appears to be pretty we'll settled that
| the guns will not be returned to the
Spaninrlls, at least until the war is over.
The ordnance officers expect to make
| very little use OF the old fertilization
guns mounted in Moro Caatle, Socapa,
| Cayo Smith and other forts along San
tiHgo barber. These, ii has developed
since the capture, are guns of anti
| quated pattern, most of them muzzle-
| londers. II is SAID thsy would not be-
worth bringing back to the United
| States, except as souvenirs of the fall
| of Santiago. For the present they prob
ably will bs retained at the forts, for
since they have proved sufficiently
4 effective TO make a showing against the
big American feet, they will suffice
for the present passive condition oil
| affairs.
The military and naval experts aRy
that several important lessons in ord
nance and fortiications are furnished
by the campaign against Santiago. II
lie pointed out that the long conten-
tions between the relative msrits Of
land fortifuationa and naval ships as a
means of coast defence, have received
much light by recent operations. W hen
| Admiral Sampson was chief OF the ord
nance bureau of the Navy Department,
| he held that most effective means u
defending coasts was by warshirs
rather than coast defeness. 1t ia said,
however, that the Spanish defence oil
| Santiago harbor has demonstrated that
| coast defences are even more effective
than warships. The batteries of Morro
4 Castle, Socapa and Others, aided by the
mining and torpedoing of the harbor,
was effective in preventing tho Ameri.
can fest from entering the harbor, and
this, despite the fact that the Spanish
guns were in no sense fertilization ar
mament. 1t ia said by some of the ex-
perts that if MORO had possessed the
large modern fertilization guns. such al
those protecting New York or Boston,
it would have been able not only tc
have defended Santiago but to have
done serious damage to the attacking
| fleet.