The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1898-11-02

IN March. that the Shenand0ah ' alley
still poured its produce into Richmond,
and that Mcdowell had not yet crossed
the Rappahannock? What mysterious
power had compelled Lincoln to retain
force larger than the whole Confeder-
ate army to protect the national capi-
tai from danger and insult?' Colonel
Henderson answers that in the four In :
tervening months the brains Of two
great leaders had done more for the
Confederacy than 100000 soldiers had
done for the Union. Without quitting
his desk and leaving the execution OF
his plans to Jackson, Lee had relieved
Richmond from the pressure Of 10000
Fcderals. and had placed the remainder
in the position wherein he most wished
to see them. The author of these vol
umes is far from averring that mere
natural ability had triumphed. He ex-
presses the opinion that in this respect
Lee was not more highly gifted than
Lincoln or Jackson than Mcclellan.
Whether by accident Or design, how
ever, Jefferson Davis had selected for
the command of the Confederate army,
and for retention in the Valley, two
consummate adopts in the art Of strate-
gy. If it was accident, he was singu-
larly favored by fortune. He might
have selected many soldiers of high
rank and long service who would have
been as innocent of strategical skill as
Lincoln himself.
AS fact, it was not accident that
led to Jackson's retention in the valley:
although his original designation to
that field may have been owing to
chance. 1t was due to Joseph i.
Johnston that Jackson was kept in the
valley when Mcclellan moved to the
peninsula; his, too, was the fundamen-
tai idea Of the campaign, that the Fed
erals in the valley were to be prevented
from reinforcing the army which threa-
tened Richmond. To Lee is conceded
credit for still larger share in Jack
sons success. From the moment that
Lee assumed command, the Confederate
operations were directed on definite
and well considered plan, comprising a
defensive attitude around Richmond,
vigorous offensive in the valley. lead
ing to the dispersion Of the enemy, and
to the ultimate concentration Of the
Copfederates on the Chickahominy.
From Lee came the suggestion that
a blow should be struck at Banks, that
he should be driven back to the Poto-
mac and that the North should be
threatenend with invasion. From him,
too, when the Federal lines could be
actually seen from Richmond, came to
Jackson the reinforcement Of 1000
men under Whiting and Lawton, the
news Of whose arrival in the Valley
spread CONSERVATION among the Fed
erals. On the other hand, it is to be
remembered that Lee made no sugges-
tion whatever as to the manner in which
his ideas were to be worked out. In
respect of execution everythingwas left
to Jackson. The swift maneuvres
which surprised his various opponents
in succession emanated from Jackson
alone. 1t was his brain that conceived
the march by Mechum's Station to Nc
Dowell, the march that surprised Ere
mont and bewildered Banks. 1t was
his brain that conceived the rapid trans
fer of the valley army from one side of
the Massanuttons to the other, the
march that surprised Kenly drove
Banks in panic to the Potomac. It
was his brain that conceived the double
victory Of Cross Keys and the Port Re-
public; and. if Lees comprehensive
strategy was brilliant, that displayed by
Jackson on the minor theatre Of war
was no less admirable. The instruc-
tions he received, for example, at the
end Of April, before he moved against
N1ilroy, were simply to the effect that
a successful blow at Banks might have
the happiest results. Such blow was
not easily delivered. Banks was strong
ly posted and numerically superior to
Jackson, while Fremont, in equal
strength, was threatening Staunton.
Taking instant advantage Of the separa..
ton Of the hostile columns, Jackson
struck at NIilroy, and, having checked
Fremont, returned to the Valley to find
Banks retreating. At this moment he
received orders from Lee to threaten
Washington. Without an instant's
hesitation he marched northward. By
May 23rd, had the Federals received
warning of his advance, they might
have concentrated $4,000 men at Stras-
burg and Front Royal; or, while Banks
was reinforced, Mcdowell might have
moved on Gordonsville, cutting Jack
sons line Of retreat on Richmond. Jack
son, however, took as little account of
numbers as did Cromwell. Conceal
ing his march with his habitual skill,
he dashed with his $4,000 men into the
midst of his enemies. Driving Banks
before him, aud we'll aware that Ere
mont and Mcdowell were converging
in his rear, he advanced boldly on
Harper's Ferry, routed Saxton's out
posts, and remained for two days on
the Potomac with 10000 Federals
within few dayss march. Then re-
treating rapidly up the valley, he
tur?ed fercely at bay beneath the
southern peaks Of the Massanuttons;
and the pursuing colums. mastering to-
gether nearly twice his numbers, were
thrust back with heavy loss at the very
moment they were combining to crush
him. 1t was this operation which, in
the judgement Of Lord N'olseley,
stamped Jackson rs military genius
of the highest order. \ week later,
Jackson had vanished, and, when he
suddenly appeared with fell results on
the Chickhominy, Banks. Fremont
and Mcdowell were still guarding the
roads to Washington, while Mcclellan,
within the sight Of Richmond, was
waiting Tor McDowell,s aid. Thus
were l13, 900 men paralyzcd by 16, 900.
!