Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1898-05-02
The Length Of the War.


The war with Spain is only a little
over a week old but it is lusty infant
and II is far enough along 50 that
suruises and coniectures as to its prob
able length are in order. While the be-
lief is general that the war will be
short no close estimate can be formed
for several reasons. Before it ends
Spain must consent to surrender its
sovereignty in Cuba, and it may be un-
willing to do this even if cut off COM
pletely from Cuba, Porto Rico and the
Philippines. Its fleet may be retained
nearer home and much attention given
to privateering, which it seems will be
sanctioned at Madrid. AS long as the
crisis of the war will be ahead. Hos
tilities in any case must continue until
the privateers are called in. If driven
to its home ports Spain might hold out
obstinately and transfer to us the task
of crossing the ocean with fleet to
~
stop the war Nor can a definite idea
be given of the length OF time Havana
can resist The history of blockades
and scgeS ranges from period OF
weeks to years. Another unknown
quantity is the strength and offensive
capacity of the army of Gen. Gomez.
NJ har nd h1I
numbers and military value may have
been exaggerated. The war is one of
inflated foolishness on the part of
Spain and not unlikely to be heightened
because it is senseless. That it will be
over in a few weeks is unlikely.
The 125,000 volunteers called out will
hardly see Cuba before the late au-
tumn after the danger of yellow fever
is removed, even if they go there at all.
They will probably so into pleasant
and saIubrous camps in the South and
be thoroughly trained in company and
battalion formations. The war can not
he one of heavy marching or fighting
on land. Perhaps there are 10000 Span
ish troops in Cuba, but they are with
out lines of supply, and it is needless
TO waste strength in assauting their
fortified lines A steady pressure and
close blockade will compel their sur
render To all appearance our army in
this war will have a comparatively
easy time and will look back upon it as
in the nature of a long encampment.
But all conjecture. of course. is subject
to possible international compiled
tions. Our powerful friend in Europe is
England. The position taken by her
will discourage the disposition of Aus
tra and France to intermediate. and Of
Germany and Italy IL give Spain at
least moral support.
on the sea our navy in both oceans
may look forward to constant active
work for some time. The most import
ant point is the movements Of the
Spanish fleet during the next month.
It's only effective operation would be TO
defeat our main fleet and raise the
blockade of Havana. This would be an
exploit of Importance and gain pres
tige in Europe. But the odds against
ii are heavy, and a proper concentra-
ton of our ships should render it i'm
possible. a bombardment of any lead
ing American port is not feared, New
York is as safe from Spanish shells as
an interior city. Firing on the open
coast or a small port would
amount to nothing. Havana is
the only point worth an Of
fensiVe Spanish movement. If it can
not loosen our hold there its strategy
will be annoying. but not conclusive.
A Fabian policy for the Spanish fleet
will lengthen the war, but at the Same
time add to the firmncss and extent of
our preparations.