Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1898-04-15

pouy would be necessary TO reaCn "a
final result, 1t being, however UNDER
stood that the powers reserved by the
constitution to the central government
are not lessened or diminished. AS the
Cuban parliament does not meet until the
4th of May next, the Spanish government
would not object, for it's part, to accept
at once a suspension of hostilities If
asked for by the insurgents from the
general in-chief to whom 1t would per-
tain in such case, to determine the dura-
ton and conditions of the armistiCe.
The propositions submitted by General
Woodford and reply of the Spanish gov
eminent were both i'm the form of brief
memoranda, the texts of which are be-
| fore me, and are substantially in the Ian
| guage given above. The function of the
| Cuban parliament in the matter of pre-
| pairing" peace and the manner OF It's
| doing so are not expressed in the Span7
| ish memorandum; but from General
| Woodford's explanatory reports of pre-
| liminary discussions preceding the final
conference 1t is understood that the
Spanish government stands ready to
| give the insuar congress full powers to
| settle the terms of peace with the insurg-
| ents-whether by direct negotiation or
indirectly by means of legislation does
not appear. With this last overture in
the direction OF immediate peace and its
| disappointing reception by Spain the cX-
ecutive was brought to the end of his
effort.
In my annual message of December
last l said; "Of the untried measures
there remain only recognition of the in
surgents as belligerents; recognition of
the Independence of Cuba; neutral in
| tervention.
to end the war by imposing rational
compromise between the contestants
and Intervention in favor of one or the
other party. l speak not of forcible an
neXation, for that cannot be thought Of.
That by our code of morality would be
criminal aggression"
Thereupon, l reviewed these altcrna-
tives, in the light of President Grants
measured words. uttered in 1875, when
after seven years of sanguiuary, de
structiVe and cruel hostilitics i'm cuba,
| he reached the conclusion that the rec
ognition of the independence Of cuba
was impractcable and inGefensible
and that the recognition OF belliBcreucy
was not warranted by the facts. accord
ing to the tests of public law. l COM
mented especially upon the latter aspect
Of the question, pointing out the incOu-
| NGlltllNtS anu IoSlblNt udl4 +lS OF a rec
ognition of belligerence, which. while
adding To the already unerous burdens Of
neutrality within our own Jurisdiction,
could not in any way extend our iuhu-
ence or effective offices in the territory
OF hostilities. Nothing has since oc-
CURED to change my view in this regard,
and l recognize as fully now as then
that the issuance Of proclamation OF
neutrality. 10y which process the 500
called recognition OF bciliEercucy is pub
lished, could. of itself and unattended
by other action, accomplish nothing toe
ward the one end for which We labor
the instant IaciiiCdtiOn Of cuba and the
cessation of the misery that atilicts the
island.
Turning to the question Of recognizing
at this time the independence Of the
present insurgent government in cuba
we find safe presidents in our history
from an early day. They are wei
summed up in President Jacksoa's mes.
sage to congress, Dec 81, 1896. on IN,
subject Of the recognition of the nde
pendence of Texas. lie said: In all tn,
contests that have arisen out Of tn,
revolution Of France. out OF the dis
putes relating to the crowns of Purtugu
= and Spain, out of the separation Of tin
American possessions of both from tn,
European governments, and out of tn
numerous and constantly uccurin-
struggles for dominion in Spanish Amer
, lea, SO wisely consistent with our jus
principles has been the action Of on
government. that we have, under tn
most critical circumstances, aVuidc,
= all censure and encountered no othe
evil than that produced by a transfer
enlargement Of good viii in thos
against whom We have, by force OF epi
dence been compelled to decide.
1t has thus made known to the worl
that the uniform policy ana Uractlc
of the United States is to avoid all in
reference in disputes which merely rc
; late to the internal government of othr
T. nations and eventually to recognize tn
4 authority of the prevailing party, with
l. out reference to our particular interest
II and views, or to the merits of the orig
inal controversy.
! But on this. as on every other tryln
L occasion, safety is to be found in a risi
t adherence to principle.
= I'm the contest between Spain and tn
u revolted colonies, We stood aluuf an
i waited not only until the ability of tn
e new states to protect themselves wa
fully established. but until the DANCE
IS of their being again subjugated had en-
d tirely passed away. Then ana not unit
e then, were they recognized. Such wa
n our course in regard to Mexico herself.
It 1T is true that with regard to TeNa
% the civil authority of Mexico has bed
: expelled, its invading army defeated, tn
lie chief of the republic himself capture
l. and all present power to control tn
d. newly organized government of TeNa
l. annihilated within its confines. But, O
3 the other hand there is, in appearance
l. at least, an immense disparity of phys
al cal force on the side of Texas. The Mex
n can republic, under another eXecutiV
E. is rallying it's forces under a new lead,
he and menacing a fresh invasion to T,
e; cover it's lost dominion.
ys Upon the issue of this threatened II
90 vasion, the independence Of Texas ms
be considered as suspended; and, wei
at their nothing peculiar in the relatiN
m situation of the United States and TeXa
5e our acknowledgment of its Independents
es at such a crisis could scarcely be regar,
he ed as consistent with that prudent +
IN serve with which we have hitherto he
ar ourselves bound to treat all simili
of questions"
he ThereupOn Andrew Jackson procee
ly ed to consider the risk that there mig
by be imputed to the United States motiv