Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-02-28
slipped ever the frontier without our knowl-
Comparing the Effectiveness.


Comparing the Effectiveness.
Setting aside the questions of personnel.
speed and coal endurance, end coming
down to the total displacement and the to-
tai muzzle energy and the total weight of
projectiles fired by all Of the regular raval
vessels on each side during a period of
three minutes, the present available force
on each side may be represented as follows:
Country. Tons dis Muzzle Weight of pro-
placement. energy jectiles in
foot-tOns. pounds.
United States. 1s4, 1872 s.s7o,s5o $751;
The term muZZle energy expresses the
impulse or destructive force with which the
shell leaves the muzzle of the gun.
In this estimate the three Spanish armor-
ed cruisers nearly finished are credited so.
and the force OF five armed merchant craft
Is also counted in, while the cruisers At
lanta, Chicago, Philadelphia AMI Charles
ten, aggregating a total displacement of
1889, the Lancaster, or any of the mar
chant navy of our own service are not
counted at all.
Our Coast Defenses.
While cur naval supremacy can not be
questioned, the command of the sea can be
maintained only by sufficient support in the
way of coast defenses, and, with the single
exception of New York harbor, it may be
seriously questioned whether any of our
fortifications are able to hold an enemy off
without the assistance of the navy. With
our long line Of seaboard reaching from
PASSPORT, Me-, all the way down to the
gulf and around to the border line of Next
to hold its legitimate position at sea and
10 give that support TO our land defenses
now demanded by their condition.
IL Is quite possible to so mine the APP
proaches TO our cities that they shall be
free from the threat of actual presence of
the enemy, but the Notifications of MANY
OF them are not enough in themselves to
prevent hostile ships from lying with COM
ParatiVe security In the offing and Smelling
destruct1veIy a NUMBER of these towns The
possible bombardinS range of even a o.
inch gun is quite twelve miles; and while
the large target offered by a city would
almost certainly invite attack the distant
marx OF moving craft would prove quite
too much for effective fire from any of orr
land batteries
1t is imperative, then, that we intercept
SPANS first coup, and prevent her secur-
ing control of Cuba and Costa RIGA, and
throw her upon the distant resources of
Spain and the coaling stations in the Ca
narles. II would not be necessary for Us
TO undertake an extensive occupation of
Cuba. BY recognizing the insurgents, we
at once become possessed virtually of
native ally and an acclimated army of oc-
cupation. and be saved to that extent the
insalubrious consequences upon our own
men.
III ehC hottSl VI peISouHel we may red-
sonably count upon that stability and cour-
age common to us as a people, and, too,
upon that wider intelligence, adaptability
and unity of purpose born OF free institu-
ticns; while in opposition we should have
to face the nervous, excitable character of
the Spaniard, hampered by a species of
educational Indifference and sloth born of
long years of national torpor, aristocratic
dominance. and a hazy, unreasoning faith
in past glory.
In the matter of instruments our modern
navy is older than that Of SPAIN while in
practice our modest squadron evolutions of
recent years place us in advance of the
Spantard, even though we are behind the
rest of the principal European navies.
Some American military aspirant has
spoken of the glory of leading an army
into Spain; but he has not well considered
the distance of those precipitous shores,
nor has he reckoned upon those exception
ally fine seacoast Gefenses actually pos
SesSed by Spain. There she is, indeed,
strong; and our navy must be several times
more numerous than it is today before
properly supported invasion could be rea-
sonably considered.