The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-22
A MOVEMENT OF DOUBTFUL WISDOM.

Washington dispatches indicate that the
sailing of Commodore Watsons squadron
for the coast of Spain has been delayed
and that the movement may not be carried
out at ALL There is reason TO believe that
the resembling Of the order would meet with
the approval Of intelligent Americans and
the best friends of the United States at
home and abroad. The original order was
made under the impulse of excitement
caused by the destruction of Cervera's fleet
and as an offset to the announcement that
Camaras fleet had started for the Philip
pine islands to attack Dewey. The victory
at Santiago released enough of our ships to
justify another expedition. and the tempta-
ton to attack the comparatively defenseless
ports of Spain was very great. Perhaps,
also. the war board was caught as many
people were at first, with the idea that the
appearance of an American fleet in Euro
pean waters and the bombardment of a few
Spanish ports would be an impressive OBJ
ject lesson for Europe. But when the spec
tacular features of the movement had
ceased to attract and it came to be SUBJ
jected to the test of cool judgment, serious
doubts as to it's wisdom arose. Leaving
aside the possibility of disaster to some of
our ships and the embarrassment of operat-
ing so far from base or coaling station,
the movement seemed to be an entire de-
parture from the original theory of the
and TO carry with it the possibility of diff
Guilty with some of the European powers.
We began the war for the sole purpose of
liberating and pacifying Cuba, and we have
enlarged its scope to embrace the expulsion
of Spain from the western hemisphere Our
invasion of the Philippines is the result of
accident, or at least of Unforeseen crcum-
stances, and it remains to be seen If 1t will
not prove a disadvantageous feature of the
war. The sending of fleet to raid the
coast of Spain could not be justified on any
ground consistent with the original cause of
war, nor on the ground of unforeseen cir
cumstances. So far from shortening the
war it would probably prolong it by excit-
ing to the utmost the stubborn fighting
qualities of the Spaniards. We could not
lombard single Spanish city without CIV
ing due notice, and nearly every power in
Europe would send ships there to protect it's
interests and subjects. The danger of Euro
pean Intervention, now entirely passed so
far our operations in this hemisphere are
concerned might be reused again by an in
vasion of European waters without any
strategic purpose in view any military
advantage beyond that of terrorizing nom
combatants in commercial cities. Our best
friends in Europe have deprecated the
movement from the beginning, and the En-
glish press was unanimous in regarding it as
unwise. Our navy has done enough already
to furnish a sufficient object lesson for
Europe, and it can be better used in prose-
cutting the war to speedy conclusion on
this side of the world than in counting un-
known dangers on the other side.
Having said this much from what seems
to the Journal the true American point Of
view, it should be added that we should not
for a moment tolerate any dictation from
cutting the war. This is war between the
United States and Spain, and as the object
of war is to cripple the enemy and bring
him to terms, the United States has a right
10 adopt any legitimate means to that end
without asking permission of the European
powers. If our military and naval authori-
ties should conclude, on mature delibera-
ton. that an expedition against the coast
of Spain would be productive of good re-
suits it should be carried out, notwithstand-
ing European protests. But the Journal
doubts the wisdom of the movement from
an American point of view.