Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1898-10-24

| difficult by a heavy sea, the heav1es
during the three weeks the fleet hat
been stationed there. owing to a stiff
blow off the coast of Jamaica.
| 1t appears that according to dis
patch to Secretary Long dated June rs
| the channel at Santiago not having
been INSTRUCTED by the sinking of the
| Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was pre-
pairing a torpedo attack in the harbor
and the destruction of the Spanish
vessels. although he regretted resort
| ing to this method because of it's diff
culties and small chance of success. He
| would not do this, he says, were the
! present force to be kept there. as it in
| sured capture which he believed
would terminate the war. The above
telegram was sent, the admiral ex-
plains, with reference to the proposed
detachment of some of our heavy ships
for service abroad (the proposed ex-
petition to the Spanish coast). A dis
patch from Secretary Long shows that
this expedition was to consist of the
Iowa, oregon, Newark, Yosemite, YEN
kee and Dixie and they We're to so to
the Azores for orders en- route to Tan
gier, Morocco. The Golfers were to
join the feet at the Azores.
On June 80. the admiral received a
communication from Maj. Gen. Shafter
announcing that he expected to attack
Santiago the following morning and
asking that he (Sampson) lombard the
forts at Aguadores in support of a regi-
ment of infantry and make such DEM
onstrations as he thought proper at
hn t,nt .hfA,.' !, ~
many of the enemy troops as possible.
The request was complied with and,
July /, Gen. Shafter asked that the ad-
miral keep up his fight on the Santi~
ago water front.
On July 2, the following was received
from Gen. Shafter: Terrible fight. yes
terday. but my line is now strongly in
trenched about three-fourths of mile
from town. ! urge that you make eff
fort Immediately to force the entrance
to avoid future losses among my men,
which are already very heavy. You
can row operate with less loss of life
than ! can. Please telephone answer
reply was telephoned Gen. Shafter
from Admiral Sampson through Lieut..
Stanton, which said the admiral had
bonbarded the forts at the entrance of
Santiago, and also Punta GorGa bat
terry inside, silencing their fire and
asked whether he (Shafter) wanted
further firing on the admiral's part
The explanation was made that it was
ispossible to force an entrance until
the channel was cleared of mines-a
work of some time after the forts were
taken possession of by troops. To this.
Gen. Shafter replied:
1T is impossible for me to say when
I can take batteries at entrance to
harbor. If they are as difficult to take
as these which we have been pitted
against, it will be some time and a
great loss OF life. l am at a loss to
see why the navy cannot work under q
destructive fire as well as the army
My loss yesterday was over 800 men.
By all means keep up fire on every
thing in sight of you until demolished.
/ expect however, in time and with
sufficient men to capture the forts
along the bay"
Admiral Sampson then says: Il wrote
Gen. Shafter the following letter and be-
gan making preparations to countermine
and with the object of arranging an at
tack upon the batteries and the entrance.
a visit was arranged to Gen. Shafter SO
that the matter might be thoroughly dis
cussed and combined action take place.
| had in view the employment OF the ma
rines for an assault either on the MORO
or Socapa battery, while at the same time
assaulting the defences at the entrance
with the fleet.
Omitted States Flagship New York,
First Rate, off Santiago de Cuba, July 2.
ISIS. $780,
My Dear General-I have your note of
officer of my staff has already. reported
to you the firing which we did. this morn
ming, but | must say in addition to what
he told you, that the forts which were
give you any Inconvenience in capturing
the city, as they cannot fire eXcent to sea-
ward They cannot even prevent cur Ell
trance into the harbor of Santiago. Our
trouble from the first has been going on
as the channel to the harbor is wei
strewn with observation mines which
or more of our ships if we attempted to
enter the harbor, and by the sinking of
ship the object of the attempt to enter
the harbor would be defeated by the pre-
venting of further progress on our part.
1t was my hope that an attack upon part
of the shore batteries from the rear would
leave us at liberty to drag the channel
for tOrpedOeS
IF ii is your earnest desire that we
should IOfce our entrance, / Will at once
prepare TO undertake it. | think, how
ever. that our position and yours would
be made more difficult if, as is possible,
we fail in our attempt.
I'VE have in our outfit at Guantanamo
10 countermining mines which / will
bring with as little delay as possible. and
if we can succeed in freeing the entrance
of mines by their use, | will enter the
harbor. This work. which is unfamiliar
20 us. will require considerable time. II
is not so much the loss of men as it is
the loss of ships which has until now de-
tered me from making a direct attack
upon the ships within the port
Very truly.
Rear Admiral T. S. N, commander-in-
chief L. S. naval force, North Atlantic
Squadron.
July 1.-The sortie of Admiral Cervera' s
squadron and its destruction has been
made the subject of a separate paper and
need not be repeated here. This event
closes the purely naval campaign, crown
ing with complete success the anxious
work of almost exactly two months.
1t is apparent from the following dis
patch from Acting Secretary Alien to the
commanding officer of the fleet and when
appears in the report, that the depart
ment felt some apprehensions regarding
the movements and designs of the Aus
trian gunboat Maria Teresa, which APP
peared in the West Indies during the war: