Evening star., 1898-02-12

The Pen is Mightfe
pies in the show case. the big red sp-
! pies in the top Of the barrel. It Is possible
| to travel through sCme parts of the tc-
| bacco raising province of Pnar del Rio
| ana by shutting The eyes between stations
not know that war is going in Cuba.
During the civil war in the United States
one might have ridden clear across the
state of Ohio on the ral-oa1 1 train and not
have seen a sign oe warfare. He could
| have done it with his eyes wide open. too.
In the Eastern Privinccs.
The tendency to measure the entire geog-
raphy of Cuba by the bounds of Havana
| has helped to blind people to the existence
| of the insurrection in the eastern prov
| inces. Though it is often explained they do
not yet appreciate that except a few towns
| the insurgents control those provinces.
And until she regains control of Santiago
and of Puerto Principe, Spain's authority
| in Cuba cannot be said to be- respected,
| much less re-estabished. l do not write
! from personal observation, because l have
never been in. those provinces. But the
conditions are admitted by the Spanish
| thorities themselves, and this general
knowledge 1 have supplemented by the
statements of persons who have been in
| the eastern end of the island. In parts of
Santa Clara, in most of Puerto Principe
| and in substantially all of Santiago the
country districts and the smaller villages
are in undisputed possession of the insur-
gents They are the peaceful inhabitants,
culttvating their fields and raising cattle,
which are driven to the camps of their
brothers who are under arms.
In Santiago for six months the forces
under Calixto Garcia have been attacking
| the towns generally with success. This is
part of the policy of making the country
| unnhabitable for the Spaniards. They can
hold the cities and with large bodies of
troops they can temporarily occupy some
| portions of the country; but this tempo
rary occupancy makes no headway against
the inSurrection.
An American who has recently returned
from Garcia's command, in which he held
a commission, telling me about the
| military operations, SO called l interrupt
ed him to ask If there We're no p"eSenta-
does. Yes he replied. sometimes as
high as twenty-five a day. They are
| nuisa1 ce; we don't always know what to
do with them"
| ed that in Santiago the presentations are
| from the Spanish lines to the Insurgents.
When the latter besiege town or cut off
| its food supply a good many of the people
foreswear their allegiance to Spain and
present themselves to the insurgents.
W hole chapter could not make the desperate
situation of the Spanish authority in the
orient clearer than this single statement.
Talking Autonomy Forbidden.
| The same American told me that when
i tIie lHteHtlUH " pIOEOSS duloiOlly
! Known Garcia posted up a notice saying
| that anybody talking autonomy would be
| shot as deserter. Garcia's troops are
not regular soldiers. They are 4 loose
army of volunteer insurgents. If they,
| the people who sustain them, wanted to
| talk autonomy or to accept autonomy no
| man whom they had made their general
would be able to stop them by sticking a
few lines of writing on the bark of tree.
This American also gave me the infor-
nation that there would be little fighting
| on the part Of the insurgents for months
to come. This Is in obedience to the orders
of Gomez. which have been impressed
| the insurgent chiefs in every corner of the
island. If Spain should make a supreme
effort to save her sovereignty by a last
desperate assault with powder and bayo-
| net the insurgents are saving their strength
so as to be able to meet her. At present
the condition of the Spanish army in Cuba
is such that the supreme effort cannot be
| made. 1t is for the future, if it ever comes.
The probability is strong that the insur-
gents will continue their tactics in utter
disregard of the impatience of the business
men in the United States. Autonomy may
seem good thing to American business
men. They have been told so. Yet the in
surgents are the ones to be consulted, and
they spurn 1t, though proffered them in
purses of gold.
The insurgent campaign is conducted with
the double purpose of bankrupting Spain
and securing Intervention. Some statesmen
In Washington have thought that financial
bankruptcy must compel Spain to let go
without the United States mixing in the
affair. The cost of the to Spain Is
$S.0OO.0O0 gold monthly. That means that
a war debt of $500, 100000 has been incur
red Besides this, Spain owes her army,
the transportation companies. the munici-
palities Of the island and various private
companies $70,000,O0O. Then there is the
$20,O00.0OO of paper currency, known as
"Weyler's' scrip. Nevertheless, business
men appreciate how a bankrupt manages
he foot &c
plies to nation. They will therefore not
be SO apt to look for an early collapse
through this source of weakness as do pub
lie men unframed in business matters
Hoping for Intervention.
There remains intervention. When they
began the fight many of the insurgents
thought 1T was only a matter of a few
months before the United States would step
in and help them out. They did not fore
see how determinedly two administrations
would struggle to keep the United States
out of the muddle. Experience has taught
months, though they believe Intervention
will ultimately come. By planning a years
campaign they may be bringing it before
that time elapses. know that the major
ity of business men In the United States
object to their country meddling, as they
call It, in Cuban affairs. though as indi-
viduals they may feel sorry for the Gu
bans as the victims Of rapacious and cruel
misgovernment. But their objection comes
tco late to change the present conditions
Had the commercial interests In the time
OF James Monroe repudiated the doctrine
which has given him fame 1t might have
been different. Years later IL Secretary