Evening star., 1898-12-06
THE r. y. BOOTH co.
SINKING THE MERRIMAC.
HobsOn's Story of How He Carried
Out the Work.
lieut.. II. p. Hobson in the Century.

Lieut.. II. P Hobson In the Century
Various plans We're considered. That of
feigning a chase suggested itself from the
fact that Spanish Golfers were supposed to
be on their way to Santiago. One had re-
Gently been captured by the St. Paul, and
from her it was learned that others were
soon expected. BY this method the Merr-
mac would approach by night from the
eastward; when about five miles away she
would be discovered by the blockading ves-
sells, searchights would be thrown toward
her, and fire opened, care being taken to
fire wide and throw the lights in front ard
on the sides, TO show the splash of striking
projectiles.
The Merrimac upon discovery, would
bear in toward the shore to within about
1000 yards, apparently TO seek the shelter
of batteries; she would throw pitch on the
fires to make heavy black smoke, as if
forcing TO the utmost. She would head in
toward the entrance and turn fun down
the course for entering the channel, blow
ing her whistle in blasts as of fright and
distress. The searchlight would flash
across and show Spanish flag at her
peak. On approaching, the lights would be
thrown on the entrance 20 facilitate her
navigation, but carefully avoiding resting
upon her. The shore batteries opening on
the chasing vessels would be replied to and
kept diverted. If they opened on the Mer
rimac, searchlights would be thrown in the
gunnerS faces.
However. an examination Of the chart
showed the difficulties of navigation to be
so great that no sane captain would at
tempt to take in collier at night or under
circumstances that did not admit of The
utmost deiberation. 1t was known that
tugs were used by snSlc-screw vessels of
any size on account of the turn i'll the
channel abreast EstrelIa Point. The
chances seemed TO be against the enemys
h1iD dor iN-GH joaT IN don Iil,sT
upon searchlights would entail chances Of
failure
This plan and various other plans in
vOlving the cooperation of the fleet were
discarded in favor of the simpler plan of
going in alone by moonlight, Just before
the moon should set. Surprise, under any
condition, could be only partial at best,
since a certain amount of light was ahso-
lutely necessary for navigation. The con-
ditions for surprise would be more EavOr-
able toward daybreak Moreover, Il flood
tide must be chosen, that, in case of
breaking the anchor gear, the vessel WOULD
be set into the channel and have ample
time for sinking before the ebb could tend
to throw her out, while the chances Of
being carried by the tide through the whole
length of the narrow channel into the In
ner harbor seemed improbable.
The establishment of the port" or time
of high tide was about eight hours and
quarter, so that the tide would be running
strong food the moon set. The moon
showed that it would set at Santiago about
3:30 on Thursday, June 2. We were speed
ing at about thirteen knots-the Oregon
had demonstrated her ability to maintain
that speed-and we would therefore arrive
off Santiago early Wednesday morning and
have most Of the day and night of We'd
nesday for preparations. Thursday was
| therefore set for entering, though the ad-
miral expressed the opinion that ii would
| be found impossible to complete the prep
arations in time. The special advantage
| of Thursday was that there would be an
| interval of darkness of about an hour and
| a quarter between the time of moon set
| and daybreak, while on Friday this inter-
| val would be reduced TO about half an hour.
and on Saturday day would break before
| moonset. 1t will be understood that an
| interval of darkness, though short, might
| be found Of advantage for completing the
work for making escape.
| Preparations were therefore begun at
| Cnce, the greatest amount of detail being
required for the process of sinking