The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-10-16


homogeneous enemy. with Generals snxioVs
to render each othor loyal support. and not
against the mutually Jealous c~ontingents OF
different powers. His marches were far longer
thar Napoleon's, the theatre Of war was not
less dificule his troops were not veterans.
but. In great part. the very rawest Of re-
cruits. The enefny's oficern and soldiers
were not inferior to hisown: their commanders
are pronounced ~ least equal In capacity to
Coli. Beauliou. and AlvinSi. while ~assuredly
tho statesmen who directed them from WASH
ington were not more purblind than tho Aulio
Council. Moreover. jackson was merely the
commander Of . detached force which might
at any moment be required At Richmond. The
risks which Napoleon freely accepted no could
not AFFORD. He dared not deliver q battle un-
leas he was certain Of success. and his one pre-
occupation was TO lose as few men a. possible.
Be this as It may. Col. Henderson maintains
that, in the secrecy OF the Confederate move
ments. the rapidity OF the marches and the
Skilful use OF typographical features. the valley
campaign bears strong traces Of the Ma
poleonic methods. Seldom has the value
Of these methods been more forcIbly
exemplined. Three times was Mcdowell
to have marched to Join Mcclellan
first. at the beginning OF April, when he was
held back by KernstoWn; second. on May %.
whom he was held back BY Front Royal and
Winchester; third. on June 20. whom he was
held back by Jackson's mysterious disappear
ance after Port Republic. Above all, the cam
paign reveals q perfect appreciation Of the sur
est means Of dealing with superior mum bers
I'm my personal intercourse with Jackson. -
writes Gen. Imboden. I'm the early part Of the
war. he often said that there were two things
never to be lost sight OF by a military command
or: Always mystlfy. mislead and surprise
the enemy II possible. and when you strike and
overcome him. never give up the pursuit as
long as your men have strength to follow. for
an army routed. II hotly pursued. becomes
panic-stricken. and can then be destroyed
By half its numbers. The other rule is.
never fight against heavy odds II by any possi-
bic mar mHpG : win ySu ,S can h1rl yoSr own force
your enemy, and crush Il. Such tactics will
win every time. and q small army may thus de-
Tory tory viii if make re e i IN nefbts; sn On re another x oS-
casion he said: To move swiftly. strike vigor-
SscrSt and of sSSsss ~ the VARY frp!s' Il TS E%iSsOr Sa i the
were the, outcome OF yackson's studies. drawn
absolutely and merely" says Lord Wolseley.
the great leaders Of former days" II he made
war by rule. It can hardly be disputed thatshis
The material results Of the Valley campaign
were by no means uncomfortable. ,Thirty-flve
b RIcSmPo Fldcn? s.S0 TST f. st : P %cps kf Ri se os
wounded. An immense Quantity OF stores was
captured and probably as much destroyed.
Nine guns were taken and over 10000 rifles.
was no more than $500 killed and wounded,
900 prisoners and 3 guns. 1t may be. added
fact that jackson, in spite Of the relatively
small force at his disposal. ordinarily had
the larger number OF men upon the field Of
of the Federal soldiers. The troops command
ed by Fremont, Shields. Banks. Saxton and
Early, were all infected with mfsoiylnp OH1-
GERS resigned and men deserted. On the least
alarm there was observed q decided tendency.
70 stampede. The Generals thought only OF re-
that his men would stand. and many OF his
soldiers declared that It was only murder" to
fight without achievements When tn such
Immediate tangible results is added the ulti-
mate strategieal effect OF the campaign, Il, can
WAS out OF all proportion to Jackson's strength.
Few Generals have done SO much with means
30 small.