New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-08-26

ro DEPRIVE THE INDIANA OF AMI
CREDIT. HE SAYS.
v,shinston, Aus. 25-Admiral Sampson has
,,ruarded to the Navy Department the follow
W. ~. letters which have passed between himself
. "ns captain Taylor of the battle-ship Indiana:
T. S S Indiana
Guantanamo. Bay. Cuba. August s. 1895
ADMIRAL: The report OF Commodore Schley
.hs battle Of July 8. published gives credit in
.ss seventh paragraph to four ships and mentions
ty name their captains. Philip. Evans. Clark and
Cook and adds The dense smoke OF the combat
.hu, out from my view the Indiana and the
coucester but these vessels were closer to
YOUR flagship. doubt their part in the conflict
rss under your immediate observation"
In Your report, as published. you make but
eight mention OF the Indiana. stating that the
Iowa and the Indiana. having done good work. and
not having the speed OF the other ships were di-
rec;ed by me- etc.
g. The result Of these reports IS that the cap
,e,ns Of an the vessels OF the line Of battle
cept the Indiana have received personal mention in
the Official report before the Department while the
two smaller vessels have distinctive mention either
from the Commander-in-Ch Chief the second in
command.
4 II the official record should Re referred TO in
the future Il Will appear from It's general tone
that the Indiana less deserving than all OF
her consorts Leaving out my personal interest
in the matter II is right that | should consider
the officers and crew of the ship; and l speak for
them ls well as for myself when submit to you.
Admiral that the above combination Of the report
will place the ship. in the opinion Of the Depart
ment and the country markedly below all the
other vessels OF your squadron. respectfully sub
nit sir that rhis Is injustice 10 the Indiana ana
her officers and crew.
3 can say without dsparagement Of any other
vessel. that during the first hour Of the hght'
the Indianas gun fire contributed 10 the de-
structon OF the Oquerdo and the Tereca more than
that OF any other single vessel Of our squadron eX
cept one. and equals hers. ! do not know why the
second In command failed TO observe the Indiana
during this period Of our hottest fight. I the
Brooklyn quite plainly.
G. An examination OF these reports with ref
erence to the Indiana will. believe convince you.
sir that they DO produce the effect Of putting the
Indiana below all other vessels Of the squadron
II II be your opinion sir that this is the case and
that all the vessels. from the Brooklyn TO the
Vixen rendered services much more valuabls
than the Indiana the published report OF the
Commander-in-C Chief and the second in command.
taken together would indicate. then must accept
II FOR myself and for the ship; H. on the contrary
that be not your opinion. urge respectfully that
such steps be taken TO remedy this injustice as
may seem wise TO you. Very respectfully,
II. c. TAYLOR
Captain United States Navy Commanding.
To the Commander-in-Ch!ef United States Naval
Force. North Atlantic Station.
To this letter Admiral Sampson sent the fol-
lowing reply
L. S S New-Yorl,
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba August 8 1898.
Sir: am greatly obliged that you have called my
attention what appears 10 have been injustice
10 your ship officers and crew for the part which
they took IN the action of July ;. and also for the
very proper manner IN which you have presented
Il. think however. that you will agree with me
that. N submitting such report 70 the Secretary
OF the Navy where so many officers are Vtahy
interested and Justly proud OF their ship. II is no
easy task TO do without apparently bestowng
praise unjustly II requires very careful considera-
ton Of report from every point Of view to avoid
misunderstanding.
.. The position OF the ships OF the squadron must
Re carefully considered to fully appreciate what
was possible for each vessel 10 accomplish under
the circumstances In which she was placed. Those
that were 10 the westward OF the escaping enemy
were certainly better placed for stopping the
enemy, and also better placed for delivering their
FIRE than the vessels TO the eastward. which was
the blockading station OF the Indiana.
3 No distribution OF the feet could completely
predict and provide against every variation OF such
sortie nor do consider that any commanding
officer deserved either credit or blame because the
ship under his command faster or slower than
another ship or carried heavier or lighter battery
but rather that the commanding officer was blame
worthy when he failed put his ship In the proper
place for destroying the enemy, just IN pfopoTuoH
10 the advantage which he possessed In speed bat
tery or position his neighbors.
4 Each commanding officer. In my opinion. was
personally responsible for the good use which he
made OF the tools with which he had TO work /
certainly DID not intend 10 criticse you nor TO
besiow less praise upon the Indiana than was be-
slowed upon any other ship Of the squadron
5 The fact that the commanding officer OF the
Indiana was signaled 10 return 20 blockade at the
mouth Of the harbor, after she had so gallanuy
contributed 70 the destruction Of the Spanish ships,
only a necessary precaution which the Com
mander- In Chief felt obliged 10 take 10 prevent
disaster TO the large number Of transports which
left In that vicinity when the fleet started IN
pursuit Of the enemy. There were still some armed
vessels remaining In the rarbOr Of Santiago-at
least two and we did not know then how many
more-which could have come out in the absence OF
the feet and produced great havoc among the
troop ships which defencecss in the absence
OF an armed vessel -,
This explanation together with your letter, Will
be 20 the Department. with the request that IL
ma be attached 20 and form part OF the original
report Very respectfully. w T. SAMPSON.
Admiral, L. s. y. COmmander-in-Ch Chief United
States Naval Force North Atlantic station.
To the Commanding officer L. 5. S. Indiana. Guam