The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1898-10-27
NEEDS OF OUR NAVY.
CONSTRUCTOR HIcHBoRN WRITES
ON LESSONS OF THE WAR.

Oregon and Brooklyn Are the sIost Eff
fective Types. Foreign Nations Are
Likely to Model After Our Best Battle-
Ships and Cruisers.
The war has taught US what some of
us has already held, that the torpedo
boat Is not the formidable engine of
war which it has heen credited with
being. The naval battles Of the future,
as of the past, will be fought by the
most powerful engines of naval war
fare that can be constructed. The
battle-ship, in spite OF its great cost,
will continue to occupy the prominent
place. The torpedo boat will have Its
nses, but they will not be the import
aht uses of naval engagement Dur
Ing the war just closed the torpedo
boat was practically of no use at all.
lust before the outbreak Of/hostilities
there was great scare on account Of
the fotilla of torpedo-boats and tor
pedO-boat destroyers which was said
10 be on its way across the Atlantic
from the Cape Verde Islands. When
the war actually came, we heard moth
ing more about them until they We're
destroyed. In fact, torpedo-boats were
not used by either combatant, except
occasionally for dispatch boats, duty
TO which other craft might be more
advaptageouSy assigned. The Wins
low, 1t Is true, was sent into the har-
bOr Of Cardenas to reconnoiter, but
this was gunboat service and not the
work for which a torpedo-boat Is in
tended
AS Tor the Spanish boats, there was
really nothing to fear from them
Sigsbee made quick work of the Ter
ror off San Juan. although the st. Paul
which he commanded, was exactly the
kind Of vessel, unarmored, and pre-
senting a full side, that torpedoes
might be expected to infiict damage
on
The Furor and the Pluton were
among the very best and the most
modern of the destroyer class, and yet
the Gloucester, which is merely a con-
yerted yacht, defeated them both.
The war has taught US to rely on
our great battle-ships and cruisers
with absolute confidence. Hitherto
the question has been open to fair dis
cusslon in the absence Of any practical
illustration of their work in actual
warfare. But now we know what
they can do.
The two vessels which. as ships-of-
war, have given the best account of
themselves, without regard to the man
ner In which they were handled, al
though that, of course, was above crit.
iclsm with all our ships are the Ore.
gon aud Brooklyn, and these are types
OF vessels which are likely to become
more and more In vogue, not only i'll
the American navy, but in the navies
OF foreign powers. The Brooklyn, for
instance, with only four inches of ar
NOR on her sides, was far more than
match for the Viscaya, with a
twelve-inch armor belt. This type OF
vessel combines speed with efficiency
to u most desirable degree.
As for the Oregon, she combines
great strength of armament with n
reasonable amount Of speed and coal
carrying capacity In proportion
which seems to be eminently desira-
bIe. Battle-ships will be built more
and more on the Oregon plan, with
greater speed II possible, without in
reference with their effectiveness as
lighting machines.
The navy will have to be supplied
with vessels particularly adapted to
tho work for which, at the beginning
OF the war. we were compelled to buy
all sorts of vessels at all sorts Of
prices. When the war broke out we
were practically without ships suita.
BILE for auxiliary service. We had no
patrolbO0ts and hardly any dispatch
boats So that steam yachts. tugboats.
and oven ocean liners had to be bought
or chartered for the use of the navy.
The result was highly gratifying when
II Is considered with what sort of ma
terinl we had to deal. But in prepar-
ing for the possibility Of another war.
4he United States will have to build
ships especially adapted for this aux
Hilary work. Some of the ships which
wore bought for this emergency can
doubtless be made to answer the pur-
pose permanently very well. but as n
rule the auxiliary fleet ought to be
constructed from specially prepared
plans.
Perhaps the most important lesson
which we have learned is the necessity
Of making our fighting ships fireproof.
You remember that at Manila and at
Santiago the Spanish ships took fire
and they suffered as much or more
from this cause IS from the impact Of
our shells.
The war has demonstrated also the
value of the rapid-fire guns and the
eiEht-,nch guns as compared with the
guns Of larger calibre. At Santiago
the secondary batteries of the Brook
lyn and the Oregon are reported to
have been more effective than any
other portion of their armament. The
Manila and Santiago battles also have