The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-29

| States instructions for the government OF
/ armies in the field as follows:
Article lat. Belligerents sometimes In
ciude an armistice while their plenipoten
| tiaries are met to discuss the conditions OF
treaty of peace, but plenipotentiaries may
meet without a preliminary armistice; IN
| any abatement"
Another section of the regulations is as
| follows:
Article 142 An armistice is not a partial
| or temporary peace; it is only the suspen-
| sion Of military operations to the extent
agreed upon by the parties"
me military authorities, as well as the
| specific regulations of the United States,
hold that there is no suspension Of HOSTILE
ties prior to the agreement to suspend mill
tary operations. Even then the agreement
is binding on military commanders only
from the time they receive actual notice of
1t. In the meantime, military commanders
have the right to push forward and hold
such territory as they occupy. The need for
limiting this cessation OF hOsttlitieS is OBJ
vfous, for until a signed agreement is made
there is no knowledge of the extent of the
armistice- In the present case an armistice
might include or exclude the Philippines or
Porto RICO, as the two parties might agree,
ton to Gbate military operations In any
field of operations. After the signing OF the
Is established and all military operations
come to halt at the points designated, and
at points not designated the military opera
tons proceed. In the, present case, If the
truce is general, General Shafter, General
Miles and Admiral Dewey would simply re-
tain the positions they now occupy and a
moral obligation would be imposed not to
strengthen these positions or to make Sc
cret preparations for more effective con-
tnuance of the war hereafter. The military
authorities agree that the only qualification
for this rule is that achievements may be
sent forward, and that defensive, but not
offensive, operations may be continued. I'm
der such q rule Spain could continue her
preparation for defending the coast of
Spain even after a suspension of hostllities,
mr. of hn iTnO
could send forward reinforcements to Gen.
Miles and Admiral Dewey, but all offensive
operations would cease.
With these well-defined rules of military
procedure accepted by all nations, the as
sertion attributed to Premier Sagasta that
the mere oVertureS for a cessation of hos
tilities should in itself stop these hostilities
is regarded as unaccountable. Moreover, 1t
is looked on as showing disposition on the
part of Spain not to deal with frankneSS and
with the usual customs of international pro-
cedure, but rather to adopt methods which
will excite foreign powers and create mis-
leading prejudice against the United States.
This view is likely to seriously prejudice the
efforts of the Spanish government toward
the opening of peace negotiations here. and
to lead the people to believe that the only
method of procedure which will be clearly
understood by Spain is to push the war for
ward vigorously and without recourse to
eyasive diplomacy.
Secretary Long said to-day that so far as
he knew no cable request had been sent to
Admiral Dewey to give his views on the po-
Mtical future of the Philippines, as was
stated in some publications to-day The
secretary of the navy would be cognizant
of any inquiries of this character directed
to Admiral Dewey. Moreover, the sugges-
ton that the administration desired the adj
vice of Admiral Dewey as a preliminary to
the answer to SPANS peace proposals is re-
garded as manifestly improbable as 1t
would take four or five days for a dispatch
boat to get the governments message from
Hong Kong to Admiral Dewey at Manila,
and as much longer to get back the reply,
whereas the governments answer to Spain
proroeals will be made within the next day
or two