Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-02-25
If WE SHOULD GO TO WAR.
blockade OF Cuban Ports Would
Soon Make spaninrds Hungry.

NVuiu NC irceu from spanish rule mucn
more easily than is generally imagined.
This country would not need to send a
largo army to the island to fight the
spaniards in the field. Neither would It
need TO lombard Habaua nor attack It
In any other way. Perhaps the war
would end as far as Cuba is concerned,
without the Americans firing a single
shot either by land or sea- Though these
statements may at first appear astonish-
ing, they are merely the logical conclu-
sions TO be derived from knowledge Of
the real state of affairs In the struggling
island.
The Spanards, with an army of 10000
men, of which not 5000 are regular
troops, all that Is left of the 10000 SOL
diers sent from Spain since 1895 and de-
cimated by battle and sickness control
only the seaports and the strongly forth
fled towns In the interior The country
from east to west is in the hands Of the
insurgents. The eastern part of the
| island including Santiago de Cuba and
Puerto Principe, is held by the Cuban
| generals, Calixto Garcia Jesus Rabi. and
Lope Recio Loynaz. There the Cubans
are stronger than in any other section
! Of the island. They have In these two
provinces 5000 men at least, armed and
with plenty Of ammunition. There they
hold the Spanish column in constant
| check, and the recent defeats OF General
Pando in Santiago de Cuba at the en-
trance Of the Cauto river, and Of General
Jimenez Castellanos at La Esperanza,
almost within sight OF Puerto Principe
city. show conclusively what the power
Of the Cubans is in the east.
The central part of the island-that is
to say. the province of Santa Clara, Is
htr 10
The Cuban COMMUNICATIVE Chief has at
least 10000 men there under his orders
with Generals Carrillo. Monleagudo. AL
varez, and several others as subordinate
commanders.
There are about 5000 insurgents in the
provinces Of Matanzas and Habana. This
is where the Cubans are weakest, the
Spanish fortified towns being nearer TO
one another, and the Spanish army more
numerous. But, nevertheless, they have
strength enough to keep up very lively
guerrilla warfare, raidng almost daily
the most important towns, and making
dashing attacks on the outskirts Of Ha-
bana city itself. The recent death CT
their plucky leader General Aranguren.
has not abated their ardor. General |
Betancourt General Alexandra Rodriguez, |
General Rafael de Cardenas, and Colo |
nels Davalos. Colazo. and others are cut |
ting out great deal of work every day |
for the Spanish, and the guerrillas in |
Habana and Matanzas provinces.
Pinar del Rio province. the western ex-
tremity, is a Cuban stronghold. The |
Cubans there are as strong as in Santa |
Clara, and hold the long and impregnable
chain of mountains extending through
the province. They do not allow the
Spaniards to get out of their towns. Gene
nd Ct lo
pal Cuban leaders in that province.
ISLAND LAID WASTE.
The result of this situation is that the
Spaniards cannot exist on the products
of the country in any part OF the island.
The country near the towns was laid
waste by General Weyler. and the gaunt
spectre of famine stalks all over Cuba.
The determination of the peaceable in
habitants by hunger is going on rapidly.
All these facts are too notorious TO be
denied at this time. The reconcentradOs,
or non-combatants, starve and die by
thousands only because the country, on
which they exclusively depend, Is not
producing food. The insurgents keep
zones of cultivation of their own, where
they raise vegetables and store their cat
tie, but they do not divide their pro-
visions with the non-combatants, nor 90
/
tie kept by any one but themselves, be-
cause it is their policy TO prevent the
Spanish army from obtaining any kind
Of resources in the country.
The Spanish army, therefore, exclusive
ly depends upon the provisions imported
from abroad. Rice, beans, and flour they |
receive from Spain. Meat for the inhabi-
tants Of the seaports they obtain from
Mexico and Florida The 10000 Span
iards under arms exclusively depend upon
steamers loaded with provisions from
abroad that enter the Cuban ports.
Not a potato comes into the city of
Habana from the country. The milk is
almost all condensed. and imported from
the United States. Eggs and vegetables
are from Florida. And what is still more
important, on account of the great fnan-
cial distress in Habana, the importing
merchants do not keep a large stock of
provisions. If the imports are stopped
The entire supply Of food in Habana will
be exhausted by the 10000 inhabitants
Of the city is less than a week.
Suppose now that war is declared one
II these days. The United States, in that
case. has only to blockade the seaports
IF Cuba 10 starve out the whole Spanish
army, and that without landing a single
nan on the island. The Spaniards will
simply be compelled to surrender because
If the lack Of food.
To prevent the possibility that they
night make a desperate effort inland to
,verpower the insurgents and get their
vegetables and other provisions some
hing might be done easily, quickly, and
II once. There are many seapOrts OF
ome Importance in Cuba absolutely de-
enceless from the seaside Cardenas
or instance, in the province of Matan-
as, on the northern coast, is one of
hem. Cardenas was taken in 1919 by the
nsurgent Narciso Lopez with a handful
f Americans on board a small merchant
essel Since then no fort capable OF re-
listing a cannon-shot has been built -
here. The Americans can hold Carde NJ
as, and from there communicate with =.
he insurgents in the country. In sh ort a
me the whole Cuban army may be well pl
rmed by them and secure some cannon fc
D attack the inland towns. If without -
UGH munitions and with the immense
sk and difficulties they incur in Sc &
uring scanty supplies from the feeble '
libustering expeditions they not only -
old their own against Spain, but actual
imprison the Spaniards in their forts
nd cities, II is obvious that possessing
ar appliances which will place them, In
lis respect on the same footing as the ds
paniards themselves, they will exter- Il;
innate all the Spanish columns daring 10 -
ave their fortified places and eventual
invest them in the principal cities.
ONE DYNAMITE-GUN.
With a single dynamite-gun OF small
llibre and with the three or four thou -