The Red Cloud chief., 1898-06-03
rs SURE OF HIS GAME.
SCRLEY CERTAIN HE HAS
TRAPPED CERVERA.
"Wednesday Morning the United states
Fleet Arrived on Santiago-The Har
Dor Not SO strongly Fortified MS Go-cr-
ally supposed.

KINGSTON, Jamaica. May 3o.-Thc
United States auxiliary cruiser Har-
ward, formerly the American line
steamer New York, arrived here this
morning after having left the Amer
lean fleet at noon yesterday.
Twelve American warships are now
outside the Santiago de Cuba harbor
and Admiral Ccrvcra and the Spanish
fleet are almost certainly inside. Moth
ing certain is known as To- the COM
munication which Commodore Schlcy
has had with the shore. or as to the
number of Spanish fighting vessels
bottled up in the harbor.
1t is to bc presumed that the Harvard
has important dispatches for the naval
authorities at Washington.
KEY WEST. Fla, May 3O.-lt is now
almost certain that Commodore Schley
has the Spanish fleet bottled up in the
harbor of Santiago. There is 80 little
doubt about this that the naval cam.
paign is proceeding upon the aSsump-
ton that Admiral CCrvcra is incapable
Of doing any harm. Within Il short
time the exact conditions at Santiago
will re known without a shadow of
doubt.
In spite Of assertions to the contrary.
Commodore Schlcy was not absolutely
sure OF his game when he last COM
municatcd with Rear Admiral Samp.
son, and the commodore Will rot take
active steps to block M the entrance
of Santiago harbor until Inc is perfect
ly certain that Admiral Ccrvcra'a ships
are inside.
However. it may have done this al
ready, rs Commodore >chlcy's last COM
municatiou. forwarded Thursday. only
reached Rear Admiral Sampson ycstcr-
day.
The commodore stayed three days Mt
Ceinfucgos. lie signallcd to his ships,
II believe the Spanish fleet is in the
harbor." On this belief Il message was
sent 10 the American admiral. The
details of how Commodore Schlcy
found out hat he was mistaken are
not yet known. Al any rate, acting
upon the admiral's instructions. the
commodore moved east, arriving out.
side Santiago Wednesday morning,
May %.
The topography OF C~icnfuegos and
Santiago is almost identical. Both
harbors are about six miles long. with
narrow entrances about 800 yards
wide and protected by high land. A
whole feet could lie in the harbor of
each place and be invisible from the
outside.
After his experience at Cicnfucgos it
Il. ~r,l,.lla th,t l,,Ia,, S,I1.,.
was very conservative in deciding
whether or not he had caught Admiral
Ccrvcra. From the tone of his dis
patches il is evident that the commo-
dore soon gained much secondhand
and external evidence which pointed to
Admiral Cervera's presence in h inner
harbor. This evidence was apparently
strong enough TO make the commodore
feel certain the object of his trip had
been accomplished, but in view of his
previous experience he would not risk
a decisive statement until after ascer-
tanning the fact for himself.
Before this dispatch is published. il is
likely that Commodore Schley has sent
some vessel into the entrance of the
harbor of Santiago or has obtained
from n reliable source ashore informa-
ton as to the exact number and the
names of the Spanish warships shell
tered by the hills about that place.
Contrary to the generally expressed
opinion, Santiago harbor is poorly pro-
tected. Like Havana and San Juan de
Porto Rico it las its Moro castle,
which is even q better target than
Ahose of Havana md San Juan. The
only danger TO he feared is from the
mines which have been laid in the
channel Of Santiago since war was de-
clared. But countcrmining would
probably render these mines harmless
should It prove desirable for Commo-
dore Schley's ships to enter the harbor.
Such q step, however. is unlikely.
In this connection IL may be noted
that since the commencement OF the
naval operations the moral effect of
the mines has been great. This on
dition promises to continue and will
probably mark the naval operations to
a greater extent than ever imagined
In the past.