The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1898-10-01

of Major General Wesley Merritt of the
operations about Manila was made
public at the War Department to-day.
1t is dated on board the transport
China, August 81. After giving briefly
the story Of his embarkation and ar
rival at Manila and the disposition of
the troops there he says:
I found General Greene's command en-
camped on strip of sandy land running
parallel to the shore of the bay and not
far distant from the beach, but, owing
to the great difficulties of landing sup
plies, the greater portion of the force mad
shelter tents only and were suffering
many discomforts, the camp being STU
ated in a low, fiat place, without shelter
from the heat of the tropical sun or ade-
quate protection during the terrific down
| was at once struck by the exemplary
spirit of patient. even cheerful, endur-
ance shown by the officers and men under
such circumstances, and this feellng. OF
admiration for the manner In which
American soldiers, volunteers and regu-
lars alike, accept the necessary hardships
of the work they have undertaken to do,
has grown and increased with every
phase of the difficult and trying campaign
which the troops of the Philippine expedi,
ton have brought to such brilliant ana
successful conclusion.
The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war
with SPAIN had, prior to the arrival OF
desultory warfare with the Spaniards for
several months, and were at the time of
my arrival in considerable force, various
ly estimated and never accurately ascer-
tanned, but probably not far from 25, 600
These troops, we'll supplied with small
arms, with plenty of ammunition and sew.
eral field guns, had obtained positions or
investment opposite the Spanish line of
detached works throughout their entire
extent.
General Merritt then speaks of what
Aguinaldo had accomplished previous
to his arrival, and continues:
General Aguinaldo did not visit me on
my arrival nor offer his services as a sub
ordinate military leader, and. as my in
Structions from the President fully con-
tempated the occupation of the islands
by the American land forces as it was
stated that the powers of the military oc-
cupant are absolute and supreme and i'm
mediately operate on the political condi-
ton of the inhabitants did not consider
it wise TO hold any direct communication
with the insurgent leader until should
be in possession of the city of Manila, es-
pecially as l would not, until then, be In
position to issue proclamation and en-
force my authority, in the event that his
pretensions should CLASH with my designs.
For these reasons the preparations for
the attack on the city were pressed and
military operations conducted without
reference to the situation of the insurgent
forces. The wisdom of this course was
subsequently fully established by the fact
that when the troops of my command car
rleQ the spanish lntrencnIQentS, extending
from the sea to the Pasay road on the
IRENE Spanish right, we were under no
obligations, by prearranged plans of mu-
tual attack to turn to the right and clear
the front still held against the insurgents,
but were able to move forward at once
and occupy the city and suburbs.
To return to the situation of General
Greene's brigade, as l found 1t on my
arrival, lit will be seen that the difficulty
in gaining an avenue of approach to the
Spanish line lay in the fact of my dis
inclination to ask General Aguinaldo TO
withdraw from the beach and Gale
Real so that Greene could move for
ward. This was overcome by instructions
to General Greene to arrange, If possible,
with the tnsurgent brigade commander in
his immediate vicinity to move to the
right and allow the American forces I'M
ebstructed control of the roads In their
immediate front. No objection was made,
and accordingly General GreeneS brigade
threw forward heavy outpost line on
the "Calle Real and the beach and con-
structed a trench in which some of the
guns Of the Utah Battery were placed
our part made very sharp attack with
infantry and artillery on the night of
July 81. The behavior of our troops dur
ing this night attack was all that could
be desired. and | have in cablegrams to
the War Department taken occasion to
cial mention for good conduct in the af-
fair. Our position was extended and
strengthened after this, and we resisted
successfully repeated night attacks, our
loss in wounded and killed, while the
losses of the enemy. owing to the dark
ness. could not be aScertainea.
The strain Of the night fighting and the
heavy details for outpost duty made 1t
imperative to reinforce General Greene's
troops with General MacArthur's brigade,
which had arrived in the transports on
the 31st of July. The difficulties of this
operation can hardly be overestimated.
The transports were at anchor off Ca
vite, five miles from point on the beach
where 1t was desired to disembark the
men. A number of squalls accompanied by
floods of rain ragged DAY after day. and
the only way to get the troops and sup
plies ashore was to load them from the
Ships side into native lighters Called
to a point opposite the camp and then dis
embark them through the surf nj small
boats or by running the Lighters head sai on
accomplished, after days of hard work
and hardship and ! desire here to ex-
press again my admiration for the forth
tude and cheerful willingness of the men
of all commands engaged In this opera
ton.
ade in support of Greenes 1 had about
$500 men In position to attack, and I
deemed the time had come for final ac
lacks / had communicated my desire to
Admiral Dewey that he would allow his
ships to open fire on the right of the
Spanish line of entertainments believing
that such action would stop the night fir
ing and loss of life, but the admiral had
declined to order IL unless we We're III
danger of losing our position by the as-
eauifs of the Spanish. for the reason that,
in his opinion, 1t would precipitaIe a gen
eral engagement, for which he was not
ready Now. however, the brigade of Cen
eral Macarthur was in position and the
Monterey had arrived, and under date of
August Admiral Dewey. agreed to my
suggestion that we should send a joint
letter to the captain general notifying
him that he should remove from the city
ali non-combatants within fortv-eight
hours and that operations against the de-
lenses of Manila might begin at any time
alCer the expiration of that period.
BY orders issued some time. previously,
MacArthur's and Greene's brigades were
Eighth Army Corps, Brigadier General
Thomas NJ. Anderson commanding. and
in anticipation of the attack General An
derson moved his headquarters from Ca
vite to the brigade camps and assumed
direct command in the field. Copies of
the written and verbal Instructions re-
ferred to above and appended hereto
were given to the division and brigade
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