The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-10-26
ENDING WITH GERVERA
SIMPSONS Official Report on
the Siege of Santiago.
WORKING WITH SKATER
Why the Navy Was Helpless
on the Offensive.

Washington, D. c.. Oct. 2.--The navy
department has made public that portion
of Admiral SIMPSONS report covering the
conduct of the feet under his command in
its operations in the West Indies for abou,
two months prior to the destruction OF
Admiral Ceryera's ships on July 3. 1t is
made up largely OF official dispatches and
the movements OF the feet, with expIana-
! tons and comment by the admiral
The report is dated August 3, on the
nagship New York and begins with a
statement Of the determination reached
j by the navy department 10 send a squad
/ ron TO the Windward passage for the pur-
! pose of observation because of informa-
ton received Of the sailing April % OF
Admiral Cervera's squadron from the
! Cape Verde islands.
On the voyage eastward from the naval
/ base al Key West, which began May
/ 4. Admiral Sampson reports there was
experienced endless trouble and delay, be-
cause OF the inefficiency of the two mont
tors accompanying the other ships. and
| which had 10 be taken in tow. Their coal
! supply was so small that II was at once
evident that they must either frequently
coal or be towed. The admiral says:
Had the sea been rough, or had the
enemy appeared at this juncture. the
squadron would have been in a much bet
ter position for an engagement had the
monitors been elsewhere. Subsequently,
when engaging the batteries of San Juan
| il was evident that their shooting was
very bad. Owing 10 the quick rolling of
these vessels. even in a very moderate sea
they were unable to fire with any degree
OF accuracy"
Among the kilograms received by the
admiral from the department at Washing
ton when off Cape Haytien was the fol-
lowing:
Washington, D. c., May 6.-Do not risk
or cripple your vessels against fortifca-
tions as TO prevent from soon afterward
successfully fighting Spanish fleet, COM
posed OF Pelayo. Carlos V, OQuendo. Viz
caya. Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon. four
deep sea torpedo boats, if they should
appear on this side. LONG.
On May there was a consultation on
board the flagship and the admiral says
that he decided to stand on to the east
ward as far as San Juan, Porto Rico,
On the chance of finding the Spanish
squadron in that port, where if they were
not successful in destroying il, it could
be at least blockaded and held.
The squadron arrived off San Juan on
the morning of the 18th and the lombard
ment of the place ensued. Regarding his
action at this place the admiral says: '1t
was clear to my own mind that the squad
ron would not have any great difficulty
in forcing the surrender of the place. but
the fact that we should be held several
days in completing arrangements for hold
ing it; that part of our force would have
to be left TO await the arrival of troops
to garrison it; that the movements of the
Spanish squadron, our main objective,
were stili unknown; that the flying squad
ron was still north, and not il a posi-
ton TO render any aid; that Havana, Ger
vera's natural objective. was thus open
to entry blu such a force as his, while we
were LOCO miles distant. made our imme-
date movement toward Havana impera-
tive.
II thus reluctantly gave up the pro-
ject against San Juan and stood west
ward for Havana"
Several kilograms are here presented
based on reports that Cervera's squad
ron had returned to Cadiz, and they had
in view ito return and capture San Juan,
the leisure to do so, and occupy the place,
being assured in the event of Admiral
Cervera's failure to cross the Atlantic"
Shortly news was received that the
Spanish feet had appeared off Curacao,
West Indies, and a squadron under orders
West, TO which place the flying squadron
under Commodore (now adm1raD Schley
had already been ordered.
Arrangements were then hurriedly made
and the flying squadron. augmented by
the other vessels, uuder Commodore
Schley. was sent off Cienfugos, where il
was believed the enemy would go N case
an effort was made TO engage and cap
ture him Sampson was given the choice
either Of the command of the blockading /
squadron of Havana or at Cienfugos, !
Schley in either case TO remain with his |
own squadron.
From messages received by the admiral |
from the department about May %. it ap- /
pears that reports had reached the Uni /
ted States that the Spanish feet was al I
Santiago. so the department advised 4
Sampson to send Immediately word 20 4
Schley 10 proceed 10 that place, leaving 4
one small vessel of Cienfugos.
On May o. Instructions were gotten by j
Sampson for Commodore Schley and sent F.
10 him via Marblehead regarding the pos I
sibility of the Spanish ieet' being at ASH
tiago. They are in part as follows:
L. s. Flagship New York. First Pate
Key West Fla, May H--Sir: Spanish /
squadron probably AT Santiago de Cuba
four ships and three torpedo boat de-
stroyers II YOU are satisfied that they
are not at Ci=nfugOs. proceed with all
dispatch. but cautiously. 70 Santiago de
Cuba. and II the enemy is there. block
ade him ir port You VIII probably find
r necessary 10 establish communication
With some Of the Observation-Disclosures
Dr. others-to learn definitely that he
ships are n port, It beng impossible 10
see into L from the outside
The admiral said he feit much con-
,erned as e, the delivery Of these orders,
and sent a duplicate BY the Hawk. with
an additional memorandum The admiral
annual Sales over 20 .ooo, 900 sores