The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-18

arm.
THE tactics of the Spanish, as described
/ to me by an eyewitness and participant III
| some or their battles, is for the infantry,
| when threatened by insurgent cavalry, TO
| fern hollow square and fire away ad libi-
| tum and without ceasing until time to
march back to towE. 1t does not seem to
have entered the minds of either side that q
| good infantry force can take care OF itself
| and repulse everywhere an equal number
| of cavalry, and there are everywhere posi-
! tons where cavalry would be at disad-
| vantage
Having called on Governor and Captain
General Blanco and received his courteous
call in return, could not, with PROPHECY;
seek communication with insurgents / had
| plenty of offers of safe conduct to Gomez
| camp and was told that If l would write
| him, an answer would be returned saIeIy
within ten days at most / saw several VINO
had visited the insurgent camps and was
sought out by. an insurgent heid oI1cer,
who gave me the best information received
as to the inSurgent force. His statements
were moderate. and / was credibly informed
that he was entirely reliable. He clauncq
that the Cubans had about thirty thousand
now in the field, some in every province, put
mostly in the two eastern provinces ana
eastern Santa Clara, and THIS statement
was corroborated from other good sources.
'They have a force all the time in Havana
province itself, organized as -FOUR sn SINAI;
brigades and operating in small bands. Rulz
was taken, tried and shot within ABOUT
mile and a half of the railroad and about
fifteen miles out of Havana on the road 10
Matanzas, the road more travelled than any
other and which I went over four times.
Arranguren was killed about three miles the
other side of the road and about the same
distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from Ha-
vana. They were well armed but very poor
ly supplied with ammunition. They are not
allowed to carry many cartridges; some
times not more than one or TWO. Inc IN
fantry are poorly clad. Two small squads
of prisoners which / saw, however one OF
half dozen in the streets or Havana ana
one of three on the cars, were better clothed
than the average Spanish soldier Each OF
these prisoners, though surrounded py
guards were bound by the arms and WrlStS
by cords and they were all tied together by
a cord running along the line, specimen
of the amenities of their warfare. About
one-third of the Cuban army are colored,
mostly in the infantry, as the eav5airy . tur
an American from Southern State, spoke
in the highest terms Of the conduct of these
fighters and had more endurance chan the
whites could keep up with the cavalry on
a long march and como in fresh at night.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION.
1.-THE dividing lines between parties are
the most straight and clear-cut that have
ever come to my knowledge. The division
in our war was by no means so clearly de-
fined. 1t is Cuban against Spaniard 1t is
practically the entire Cuban population on
one side and the Spanish army and the
Spanish citizens on the other. do not count
the autonomists in this division, as they are
so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be
worth counting. General Blanco filled the
civil offices with men who had been autono-
mists and were still classed as such. But
the march of events had satisfied most OF
them that the chance for autonomy came
too late 1t falls as talk of compromise
would have fallen the last year or two or
our War rca If 1T sue IT of t Hny Spanish ee
army, and the success of Spanish arms
would be easier by Weyer's policy and
peope fGr In ere efs donb
Blanco is actinS in entire good Ialth; tnat
he desires to give the Cubans a fair meas
close of the ten-year war He has, of course;
a few personal followers, but the army and
Spanish citizens do not want genuine au-
| tonomy, for that means government by the
| Cuban people. And it is not strange that
the. Cubans say it comes too late - :,
L have never had any communication, d.
| rect or indirect, with the Cuban Junto In
this country or any of its members, nor
did have with c any s OF e Hnt TOWN. Of
Cuba. None Of the calls / made were upon
| parties of whose sympathies / had the
| least knowledge, except that l knew some
| of them were classed as autonomists. Most
| of my infOrmantS were business men, VINO
| had no sides and rarely expressed them
| selves. / had no means of guessing in adj
| vance what their answers would be ana
| was in most cases greatly surprised at their
| frankness: inquired IN regard 10 autononi i
| of men of wealth and men as prominent in
| business as any in the cities OF Havana,
Matanzas ard Sagua bankers, merchants.
| lawyers and autonomiSt officials, some OF
| them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one
| prominent Englishman, several of them
| known as autonomiSts, and several OF them
| telling me they were still believers in au-
| tonomy if practicable, but without excep-
| ton they replied that it was too late for
| that. Some favored United states protec-
| torate some annexation, some free Cuba,
| not one has been counted favoring the in
| surrection at first. They were business men
| and wanted peace, but said it was too
| late for peace under Spanish sovereignty
! They characterized Weyler's order in far
/ stronger terms than l can. could not but
| an autonomiSt very deep to find Cuban
| There is soon to be an election, but every
| polling place must be inside fortified
| town. Such elections ought to be safe for
| the ms
| THE STRONGEST APPEAL.
| ST have endeavored to state in not intern
| perate mood what I saw and heard, to
| make no argument thereon, but leave every
| one to draw his own conclusions. To me
| the strongest appeal is not the barbarity
| practced by Weyler nor the loss of the
| Maine if our worst fears should prove true,
| terrible as are both of these incidents, but
the spectacle of million and a half people,
the entire native population of Cuba strug-
| Cling for freedom and deliverance from the
| worst disagreement of which l ever had
| knowledge. But whether our action ought
| not to be Influenced by any one or all of
| these things, and IL so, how far, is another
| question. l am not in favor of annexation,
| not because / would apprehend any partic-
| ular trouble from II, Dut because II IS HOl
| wise policy to take in any people of foreign
tongue and training, and without any
strong guiding American element. The fear
| that if free the people of Cuba would be
revolutionary is not so Well founded as has
been supposed, and the conditions for good
| Self-gOVernment are far more favorable.
| The large number of educated and patriotic
| men, the great sacrifices they have en-
| dured the peaceable. temperament of the
| people, white and black, the wonderful
| prosperity that would come surely with
| peace and good home rule, the large influx
! of Americans and English immigration and
| money would all be strong factors for sta
| BILE institutions.
But it is not my purpose at this time,
| nor do L consider it my province to suggest
any plan. L merely speak of the symptoms
as I saw them but do not undertake to pre-
| scribe. Such remedial steps as may be re-
| Quired may be safely left to an American
| President and the American people"
| Throughout the delivery of the address
there was not an interruption. With the
| closest attention every person within hear
ing listened to the statement. AT the con-
| cluSion there no demonstration either
| on the floor or in the galleries, although
senators here and there about the chamber
| turned one to another with such unusual
| remarks on the Senate floor as: "A remark
able statement" "A simple. straightforward
statement of a horrible condition of affairs, -
| "A most effective and convincing state
| ment," "A temperate and timely utterance,
| and similar comments. Mr. Proctor left the
| Senate chamber soon after he had finished
| heartily congratulated by many OF his fol
| lowers
During the piorning session the following
| bills were passed: Authorizing the Ne
| braska Kansas & Gulf Railroad to con-
struct a railway through Indian Territory;