The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-08
THE BATTLE OF MANILA
TOLD BY ADMIRAL MONTE:Jo, COM
MANDER OF THE SPANISH FLEET.
Dewey Took Him Unawares-Engage-
American Squadron Was sighted.


was introduced to the admiral by Mr.. Alex
ander Mcleod, one of the oldest British
residents in the Philippines. Admiral Monte
jo is a spare man of small stature, about
sixty-five years of age, with the air of an
old Spanish grandee. He was pale and bag
gard, evidently suffering from injuries re-
ceived from an iron splinter. He speaks
English with a slight accent, and readily
assented to my proposal to interview him.
In reproducing his statement 1 have adj
hered substantially to his own words:
About o'clock on Sunday morning"
he said, 81 observed the American squad
ron coming in line straight across the bay
toward Cavite. We prepared to receive
them. A few minutes after o'clock the
engagement opened. the battery on Pont
Sangley (Cavite) firing on each ship as
she came within range. The American
ships did not reply. All the Spanish ships
were in Cavite bay at anchor-the Reina
Cristina (my flagship Castillo Don Juan de
Austria, Ulloa, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon.
Marques del Duero, and some small gun
boats. The Reina Cristina and Don Juan.
as you know, were old cruisers; the Castil-
la was a wooden cruiser, but was unable
to steam owing to the breakdown of her
engines. the Ulloa and Velasco were help
less and were undergoing repairs off the
arsenal The Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh
and Boston engaged my flagship in turn
about $50, attracted by my flag. 1 recog
nized the necessity of getting under way,
and accordingly slipped both anchors, or
dering the other ships to follow my ex-
ample
although we recognized the hopeless
ness of fighting the American ships, were
busy returning their fire. The Reina Girls
tina was hit repeatedly. Shortly after $50
o'clock | observed fire forward. Our steer
ing gear was damaged rendering the vessel
unmanageable, and we were being subjected
to a terrific hail of she'll and shot. The en-
gines were struck and we estimated that
we had seventy hits about our hull and
perstructure. The boilers were not hit, but
the pipe to the condenser was destroyed. A
part on fire A shell from the Americans
had penetrated and burst with deadly eff
feet, killing many of our men. My flag lieu
tenant said to me: The ship is in flames; it
is impossible to stay on the Cristina any
longer He signaled to the gunboat Isla de
Cuba, and and my staff transferred TO her.
hauled down. My flagship was now one
mass of flames. | ordered away all the
boats l could to save the crew. Many of
the men jumped overheard without clothing
and succeeded in reaching the shore several
hundred yards away. Only a few were
drowned tr the majority being picked Il up ply by
tain Cadarso'S son, a lieutenant on board
the Cristina, saw his father alive on deck
about to leave a shell burst overhead and
killed him. We estimate that fifty-.wo men
were killed on board the Crist'ra and about
$50 wounded. The chaplain W killed. The
assistant physician the chic engineer and
three officers were wounded. The boat
swain and chief gunner were both killed
In the Castillo only about fifteen men were
killed, but there were many wounded both
ON the Castillo and the Don Juan, on which
thirteen men were killed Altogether SO
far as we know at present. 400 men were
killed and wounded in our ships. AS soon
as l translated myself from the Reina Girls
tina to the Isla de Cuba all the shots were
directed upon the Cuba. following my flag
We sought shelter behind the pier at Ca
vite, and, recognizing the futiity of fight
ing more, prepared to diSembark and gave
orders for the evacuation of the remainder
of our ships. The Castillo had been on fire
from end to end for some time, and was of
course. already abandoned. The Ulloa was
also burning.
HIS LAST SIGNAL.
my last signal to the captains of all
vessels was: 'Scuttle and abandon your
ships This was about 1880. The Reina
Cristina Castillo, Don Juan de Austria,
Velasco and Ulloa were all destroyed in
this engagement. To prevent the guns be-
ing of use to the Americans. the captains.
on abandoning, brought away portions Of
the mechanism, and also succeeded in saw
ing all the ships papers and treasure. At
this point there was a cessation of firing.
The Boston sent ashore a boat with an
eHed W SnI the Chief Of thes sna
asked permission to destroy the vessels
completely without interference from the
shore. After consultation with me the
chief of the arsenal replied that it was
not competent on my part to give any
pledge; the ships were at his mercy and
he could do with them as he liked. While
the parleying was proceeding the Petrol
and Concord went across the bay and
fired a large number of shots into the Isle
IL Ts,11A doh LII
Bacoor, and she soon caught fire. Her cap
tain had run her ashore when the American
squadron was observed making for Cavite
bay. She never fired shot Three or four
of her crew were killed by shells carrying
over her into the brushwood beyond where
they were lying" This | learned afterward
was not correct. All the crew. including
the Scotch chief engineer, Duncan McKin-
ley, escaped alive.
In answer to questions, Admiral Montejo
said: II was wounded in the left leg by
an iron splinter, and my son, lieutenant,
wounded in the hand by a shell splin-
ter We were both wounded on the Reina
my squadron from the bridge. There was
no coming tower. The captain of the Boston
said to my chief of staff, Captain Boado:
GU have combated with us with four very
bad ships not ships. There was never
seen before drawer nghting under such
unequal conditions 1t is a great pity
that you exposed your lives in vessels not fit
for fighting. Commodore Dewey also sent
me a message by the British consul saying
that, peace or war, ne would have great
pleasure in clasping me by the hand and
congratulating me on the gallant manner
in which we fought"
HIS COMMENTS ON HIS DEFEAT.
1 asked Admiral Montejo If he wished to
comment on the conditions that contributed
to the disastrous defeat of the Spanish
squadron. He thought for a moment or
two and then said: II wish to say that
the responsibility lies with the government
in Madrid. There were no proper vessels
here. Ever since 1 assumed command here
have been requisitioning the government
for ships and torpedoes and nothing came.
1 had no torpedoes whatever l constructed
some for myself, but we did not have
proper material and the torpedoes were
very bad. My original intention was to go
TO Subic bay, Subic being a military port
sixty-five miles north of Manila and to
offer BATTLE there to the American fleet.
Cavite on the 2Sth. the day before the ar
rival of the American fleet. l would have
remained If the port had been protected
adequately with cannon and torpedoes but
as the Subic Notifications offered no pro-
lection, brought my ships back to Manila
bay. l went to Subic believing it to be pro-
tected, but, seeing ii would have taken
more than a month to make 1t even pass
ably capable of defense. / had no remedy.
the American squadron being on its Way 10
the Philippines, but to abandon Subic and
rely upon the shelter of Cavite. The min
lister of marine promised to send supplies
but they never came. i knew from the
first that my squadron would be completely
of-Way, whereas my ships were incapable
of fighting with any CHARGE of success The
American had at least 150 guns modern
and all of superior pattern. Ours were in