The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1898-03-26

shown by the few isolated instances in
which money had induced insurgents
TO present themselves.
On the other hand, Gomez said he
was constantly receiving reinforce
ments, and gave several specific cases.
He stated that, in the eastern part OF
the island. the insurgents had received
1900 recruits since autonomy was pro-
posed Other evidences Of their re-
newed strength We're given. Perhaps
the best evidence OF this is that the
insurgents occupy a large portion OF
Santa Clara Province unmolested. The
Spanish troops make no effort TO pene-
trate the country where the insurgents
camps are located. The. present meth
Cd of warfare. Gomez said, would be
kept up until Spain withdrew. He
still counts on the climate as more
potent means of destroying the Span
ish armies than the weapons Of the in
surgents. For the Spanish soldiers he
uttered the most kindly sentiments,
saying that when peace came it was
his hope that they would remain in
Cuba and help in its recuperation To
the Spanish property on the
island he reiterated his previous dec
iarations that they would be protected
in their property and would have moth
| ing to fear under a Cuban Government.
Gomez spoke incidentally of interna-
! tional Spanish politics, but without any
idea that it's Cuban policy would be
materially changed by what happens in
Spain. He thought Senior de LONE had
| been willing to have his letter pub
lished that he might return to the
| peninsula as a martyr. De Lone
| Gomez described as an G5ie, but
scheming and unscrupuloCs nan, who
| saw the advantage of getting away be-
fore the end came. It IS his belief
! that De LONE will seek to form new
| party out of the dissatisfied Conserva-
| tive and Liberal element. Anti-Am-
| erican sentiment would be the basis of
! this organization.
| General Gomez said that when recog-
! milton was accorded there would be no
| trouble in finding the civil Govern
ment of Cuba. He would quickly con-
! duct the proper persons from his head
| quarters to it.
| His refusal to entertain any suggeS-
/ ton of SPANS sovereignty over Cuba
makes the detailed opinion of the lat
! est programme of the radical AutonO-
| mists, backed by the BlancO Gov
| eminent, unnecessary. His personal
| sympathy was extended to the AM
| erican people for the Maine disaster,
| without assuming to influence the
! policy which the Administration should
| follow.
| Next to his hopes that the United
| States would not become engaged in
| war with Spain, the significance of
what he says lies in his belief that She
ultimate solution of the Cuban prob
/ lem is indemnity to Spain for indepen-
! dence. That proposition may be I'M
| popular in the United States, but it
commends itself to the Commander-in =
| Chief of the 1nsurgent forces, whose
! genius made the success of the revolu-
! ton possible. In December when
! Blanco's prospective mii.tary cam
/ paign and the concession of autonomy
! were unknown factors, Gomez held
! this view. In March, when the failure
of that military campaign and the col
! lapse of the new political system have
! left Spanish sovereignty paralyzed. he
| reiterates his conviction. Members of
| the Government in Havana, who ten
days ago professed hope in the ne
| gotiatiCns with Gomez, now know that
| 10 prospects exist. Some are again
turning to war with the United States
as the only means of letting Cuba go;
others are more conservative, talk
with moderation about the Maine re-
port and deprecate the war spirit. Ali
seem to believe that the Maine dis
aster Will not in itself lead to HOSTILE
| ties.