New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-08-03
APPROACHING A CRISIS.
,ppREHENSION CA USED BY
acUINALDOS DEFIANCE.
,v HIS DEATH OR CAPTURE WILL
c,rAR THE SITUATION-GRAVE
CONDITIONS TO MEET
AT MANILA
AT MANILA.
f,y TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNE ]

more so''e
...,ors will not be so protracted and tedi-
-. as was feared a week ago. In regard to
ids acouiescence in the Presidents demand
-. tho immediate evacuation Of Cuba and Porto
n,.o this feeling among Cabinet officers amounts
oonviction With regard to the Philippines,
however. grave apprehension is manifested that
r..,r may stubbornly resist the suggestion Of
commission taking advantage Of the exceed
.u,, embarrassing situation which confronts
General Merritt through the officousness Of the
,rsurpent cheftan AGuinaldo. According to
~ accounts this young mans success has com
,,e,s,v turned his head. and the influence which
80 axerts over several hundred thousand semi
civilized or almost barbarous warriors presents
. serious complication. which is causing the
authorities here no end Of worry and no little
alarm The conditions which affect the COM
,.ro,,voIv small forces under General Merritts
command between Cavite and Manila are
.hown by official reports to be even more dan
sarous than intmated in press dispatches. and
the Administration is grati1ed to see that most
n, the influential newspapers Of the country
have come 10 appreciate some of the response
Mites which would be imposed upon the Gov
.nrent II the United States found IT necessary
10 take permanent possession Of the archipelago.
This contingency was thoroughly considered
Nv the military and naval authorities early
as the middle Of May. when General Merritt
was selected 10 take army corps across the
Pacific. This was before Aguinaldo assumed
an imnudent attitude and at a time when he
was giving every assurance Of subordnation tc
Admiral Dewey. About that time the military
authorities in conference at Washington. both
General Miles and General Merritt being pres
en,. carefully studied all conceivable phases Of
the establishment OF an American protcctorate
over the Philippine group. and agreed that the
minimum strength of the United states land
forces that would be essential follows:
For garrison Of Philippine Islands. 10000 men;
for garrison Of Luzon ISLAND alone. 10000 men;
for garrison Of Manila alone. $4,000 men.
LARGE STANDING ARMY NEEDED.
These estimates were based upon the assunp-
tion that for a considerable period at least after
the expulsion Of the spaniards all the native
leaders would exhibit their gratitude To the
Americana by heartily rsupporsans'the new or
der of things. From the best information that
could be obtained regarding the habits and
characteristics Of the Philippine natives. Gen
eral Miles and General Merritt. as well as the
other Army officers who discussed the matter.
were convinced that whether the American oc-
cupation was to be for one year or five years.
a standing force equal 10 that given above
would he indjspensable They agreed that while
such force might have little TO do most Of the
time. as had been the case with army garrisons
several wears ago in the Far West. the natives
could no more be relied upon 10 continue their
peacefuI pursuits for any great length OF time
than the American Indians in former days and
that with smaller garrsons. an uprising might
lead 70 a disaster which would horrify the
United States AS consequence Of these de-
Nberations I'd conclusions regarding the ac-
ouisi,ion Of the entire Philippine group. the at
tention Of the authorities was then concentrated
upon the probability OF the retention OF the ISL
and OF Luzon alone and after debating the
matter and dIgesting a vast amount Of infor-
nation a bout that island. the officers and off,
cias were unanimously Of the opinion that 1t
would he indiscreet in the extreme 10 attempt
to control the three million inhabitants OF Luzon
with less than 10000 men
Further study Of the conditions at Manila,
having due regard TO the continuance there OF
Admiral Dewey's squadron resulted in the au-
thorities discovering nothing to warrant any
garrison Of that city. which was considered
mos, conservative estimate and the fact that
General Merritt's command was fixed at 21.0OO
men is taken to indicate that this Government
a month ago did not seriously contemplate the
occupation Of more territory by the Army than
that Included In the city of Manila. whi!e the
Navy. with it's ships and marines. maintained
possession Of Cavite and Manila Bay. Even the
latter proposition. however. is now subjected to
material modification by the audacty OF
Aguinaldo. and little short Of his death or capt
ure Is apt to clear up the complications.
CRISIS EXPECTED
IL is feared the crisis at Manila Is already at
mana and that General Augusti may at any
moment be compelled 10 surrender the city 70
"eheral Merritt whether the latter is ready TO
receive II or not. Under such circumstances IL
Is certain that General Merritt would be prompt
~ compelled TO accept the serious responsibility
VI protecting property in the city from the IN
eufsents at whatever hazards and the incon-
eieous spectacle may yet be presented OF Amerl-
"a" ana Spanish troops there cooperating
"ed'hst a common enemy. supported by the