Daily new dominion. [volume] (Morgantown, W. Va.) 1897-1906, 1898-09-08


Necessary Also to Take Surrender.
Porto Ricau Campaign.
New YORK, Sept. 8.-The following
statement, emanating from General
Miles, was given to the reporters on
board of the OLDHAM on arriving yester-
day. 1t is in the form of letter, in
which General Miles is mentioned in
the third person:
While at Porto Rico and during the
voyage returning on the OLDHAM, on which
steamer were General Miles and staff, two
battalions Of the Second regiment of Wis
consin volunteers, | learned the following
facts concerning the Cuban and Porto
Rican expeditions. In the first place, let
me say that the war has closed, after be-
ing conducted largely as General Miles
stated publicly at the beginning of the
war that it would be. The statement was
publicly made, and q general order was
issued by him as commander of the Amer
lean army IN which the plan he has
str1ven TO pursue WAS foreshadowed
namely, seeking to accomplish results
with the least possible loss of life In an
interview III ne hitter part of May he
said
1.-The United States government is too
strong, too greet and too powerful to COM
nit any foolish act III connection with the
proposed invasion of Cuba
Referring TO the proposed rush to the
fever stricken city Of Havana, he said
mo officer is fit to com nand troops
who. from any motive whatever would
needlessly risk the life of single soldier,
either from disease or the bullets of the
enemy. have never sacrificed the lives
of men under my command and do not
propose to submit them to any unneces-
sary risks in tho present campaign"
IN the order issued to the army at an
early date, he directed that:
shiSery officer, of whatever grade, will,
so far as may be in his power, guard and
preserve the health and welfare of those
under his charge. He must labor dill
gently and zealously to perfect himself
and his subordinates In military drill in
strucfion and discipline, and above all he
must constantly endeavor by precept and
example to maintain the highest charac-
ter, To foster and stimulate that true sol
dierly and patriotic devotion to duty
which must characterize an effective army.
The principles thus enumerated have
been zealously observed fsom the first.
Owing to the fact that the season for
campaigning in Cuba had been exhausted
in debates and delay in congress and in
necessary preparations, General Miles was
opposed to rushing an ill-prepared, undis-
ciplined and unequipped army in a move
ment against the capital of Cuba, defend
ed by 100000 trained Spanish troops, and
in tbs position he stood practically alone
for .t.y@ral weeks Havana, Matanzas.
SAINT. 20 and few other points were
drawn on his military map as hotbeds OF
disease, destructive to an army, and
plac TO avoid, especially during the
sicsly season.
When finally called upon to submit II
plan OF campaign he did so and put it in
writing. HI substance he took the stand.
trit that every effort should be made to
equi the Cubans and thereby enable
them to harass the Spanish forces The
cry o. ION to Havana should be encour-
aged, but when the transports, loaded
with troops, We're out of sight of land
they should sail as straight as steam
power could bear them to the gate of the
Antilles and the key of the whole posi-
tion-Porto Rico-then, having seized and
occupied that island, u movement to Cuba
was to follow by means of a strong cav
ally force, which was to be organized and
equipped by August or September. He
contemplated that 10000 cavalry thrown
to the center of Cuba, cutting the Spanish
forces in two and moving west to Havana by
the time the rainy season was over and it
would be possible to manouvre an army, we
could move against that city well organized,
well equipped and well disciplined army and
complete the capture of the Spanish forces.
The enclosure Of Cervera's feet in the harbor
of Santiago changed the conditions and made
it necessary to move a military force to that
point.
General Miles, while at Tampa organiziu ;
the expedition, felt the importance of the ca
terprise SO greatly that he requested perata-
sion to accompany that expedition or to i'm
med3ateiy organize another to join it. 'fhl-
permission was not granted SO far as accom-
panying that ey.edition was concerned l,st
authority was granted to equip a second for
movement and operation against the enemy
in Cuba and Porto Rico" However. before
this expedition was equipped calls were made
for additional forces to 90 to Santiago, and
they We're immediately forwarded. On July
3, General Shafter telegraphed that his losses
had Teen greatly underestimate; that he
met with stronger resistance than he had an
ticipated, and that he was strongly consider
ing the ACCESSIBILITY of falling back to a posi-
tion five miles to the rear, and that he had
Men unable to be up during .the heat for four
days.
Under such circumstances General Miles
felegraphed General Ghafter that he would be
with him within week with strong rein.
agreements, of course, taking the troops pre-.
pared for the second expedition which had
been ordered by the president to operate
against the enemy in Cuba as well as Porto
Rico. These reinforcements were pushed