The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1898-03-18

same utSIaOGe-UIIten or twenty miles
from Havana They were well armed
but very poorly supplied with ammuni-
ton. They are not allowed 10 carry many
cartridges. sometimes not more than
one or two. The infantry espe-
cially are poorly clad Two small squads
of prisoners which / saw. however. one
of half a dozen in the streets of Havana
and one of three on the cars. were better
clothed than the average Spanish soldier
Each of these prisoners. though sur
rounded by guards. was bound by the arm
and wrists by cords. and they were all
tied together by a cord running along the
line. specimen of the amenities of their
warfare. About One-third of the Cuban
army are coiored mostly In the infantry.
as the cavalry furnished their own horses.
This field officer. an American. from a
southern State. spoke in the highest
terms of the conduct of these eOlOred
soldiers. that they were as good lighters
and had more endurance than the whites
could keep up with the cavalry on a
long march and come in fresh at night.
The Political Situation
The dividing lines between parties are
the most straight and cIear-cut that have
ever come to my knowledge The divi-
sion In our war was by no means so
clearly defined 1t Is Cuban against
SDaniard. II is practically the entire
Cuban population on one side and the
Spanish army and Spanish citizens. on the
other. / do not count the AutOnOmfsts
in this division. as they are far too ineon-
siderable in numbers to be worth count
ing. Gen. Blanco filled the civil offices
with men who had been AutOnomists and
were still classed as such. But the march
of events had satisfied most of them that
the chance for autonomy came too late
IL falls as talk of compromise would have
hsa 10
If it succeeds 1t can only be by armed
force, by the triumph of the Spanish
army. and the success of Spanish arms
would be easier by Weyler's policy and
method. for in that the Spanish army and
people believe. There is no doubt that
Gen BlancO is acting in entire good faitS
that he desires to give the Cubans a
fair measure of autonomy. as CampOs did
at the close Of the ten-year war. He
has. of course. a few personal followers.
but the army and the Spanish citizens
do not want genuine autonomy. for that
means government by the Cuban people
And IL is not strange that the Cubans
say it comes too late. L have never had
any communication, direct or indirect
with the Cuban Junta in this country
or any of its members. nor did I have
with any of the juntas which exist in
every city and large town of Cuba None
of the calls L made were upon parties OF
whose sympathies 1 had the least knowl-
edge, except that / knew some of them
were classed as AutOnomists- Most OF my
infOrmants We're business men who had
no sides and rarely expressed themselves.
l had no means of guessing in advance
what their answers would be and was
in most cases greatly surprised at their
frankness. 1 inquired in regard to au-
tonOmy of men of wealth and men as
prominent in business as any in the
cities of Havana, Matanzas. and Sagua,
bankers, merchants. lawyers, and autOn-
Omist officials. some of them Spanish
born. but Cuban bred, one prominent
Englishman, several of them known as
autonomists, and several of them telling
me they were still believers in autonomy
if practicable, but without exception they
replied that IL was too late for that
Some favored d United States prOtee-
torate, some annexation, some free
Cuba; not one has been counted favor
ing the Instruction at first They were
business men and wanted peace, but
said ii was too late for peace under
Spanish sovereignty. They character
lied Weyler order in far stronger terms
than 1 can I could not but conclude
that you do not have to scratch an
autonomist very deep to find a Cuban.
There is soon 10 be an election. but
every polling place must be inside a
fortified town. Such elections ought to
be safe for ''ins.'
1 have endeavored to state in not an in
temperate mood what / saw and heard.
and TO make no argument thereon. but
leave everyone to draw his own concur
sion. To me the strongest appeal is not
the barbarity practiced by VIEWER nor
the loss of the Maine. if our worst fears
should prove true. terrible as are both
of these incidents. but the spectacle OF
q million and a half of people, the en-
tire native population of Cuba struggling
for freedom and deliverance from the
worst missovernment OF which I ever
mad knowledge. But whether our action
ought to be influenced by any one or all
these things, and If so, how far. is an
other question. l am not in favor Of an
nexatiOn. not because I would apprehend
any particular trouble from it. but be-
cause it is not wise policy 10 take in
any people of foreign tongue and train
ing and without any strong guiding
American element. The fear that if free
the people of Cuba would be revolutions
airy is not so well founded as has been
supposed and the conditions for good
self-gOvernfnent are far more favorable
The large number Of educated and pa
triOtic men, the great sacrifices they
have endured, the peaceable temDera-
ment of the people, whites and blacks.
the wonderful prosperity that would
surely come with peace and good home
rule. the large influx of Americans and
English. immigration and money. would
all be strong factors for stable iustitu-
tons
But it is not my purpose at this time
nor do l consider it my province to sug-
gest any plan / merely speak Of the
symptoms as l saw them. but do not IN
dertake 70 prescribe. Such remedial
steps as may be required may safely be
left to an American President and the
American people