The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-12-22

ward from another shell. The broadside
guns continued firing until there were only
one gun and one seaman remaining unhurt
for serving. The ship being out of
control. the hull, smoke pipe and mast rid
died with shot, or confused with the cries
of the wounded, half of the crews out OF
action, among whom were seven officers, l
gave the order to sink and abandon the
ship before the magazines should explode.
The story of the loss of the Castillo was
substantially the story of the loss OF all
the other Spanish ships. and Admiral Monte
jo sums up his account with this statement:
The incfficienoy of the vessels which com
posed my little squadron, the lack OF all
classes of the personnel, especially master
gunners and seamen gunners, the inaptitude
of some of the provisional machnists, the
scarcity of rapid-fro cannon, the strong
crews of the enemy and the unprotected
character of the greater part of our vessels
all contributed to make much more decided
the sacrifices which we made for our coun-
try and to prevent the possibility of the
horrors of bombardnfent of the city of
Manila, with the conviction that with the
scarcity of our force against the superior
enemy we were going to certain death and
could expect a loss of all our ships. Our
casualties, including those of the arsenal,
amounted to 3S1 men killed and wounded"
NAVAL STRATEGY.
An evidence of the strategy exhibited by
the Navy Department in sending reinforce
ments to Dewey is shown in a dispatch of
June 27 informing him of the coming of the
Monadnock. Probably with view to. in
surfing this vessel from falling into trap
she was not dispatched directly to Manila,
but was ordered to a point six hundred
miles due east from Cape Engano, where
she was to meet one of Dewey's ships.
Apparently the first suggestion of the or
ganization of the flying squadron which was
to divert Admiral Camaras squadron from
its voyage to Manila came from Dewey, for
in dispatch of June q he says: 'In my
judgment, if the coast of Spain was threat
ened the squadron of the enemy will have
to return" And that was exactly what
happened. A month later the admiral pays
high compliment to the British consul at
Manila, Mr.. Rawson Walker, who for three
months had been discharging the duties of
United States consul in Manila and render
ing the admiral great assistance.
The admiral's estimate of the Importance
of the Philippine islands is set out in the
following telegram sent in answer to an in
quiry on the subject from the government:
Manila, Aug 20.
Secretary Of the Navy, Washington:
Referring to the department telegram of
Aug. 13 important islands are Colon, Luzon,
Banay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte. Others, owing
to the nature of the Inhabitants, have a
small amount of civilization, want of cuIti-
vation. They may be neglected, especially
isles of southern group. Luzon is in all re-
spects the most desirable to retain. Con-
tains most important commercial ports.
Manila is farthest north. Produces ali of
the good tobacco. Friendly natives. Civil
ization somewhat advanced. Not yet de-
veloped. Possible rich minerals. Popula-
tion $4,000. Subig bay best harbor for coal
ing purposes and military. Water deep,
land locked, easily defended. Strategically,
command of bay and city of Manila, with
arsenal at Cavite most valuable. Panay,
Cebu, Negros thickly populated, most civil
lied and we'll cultivated Iloilo second COM
mercial port; center of sugar trade a good
harbor strategically in view of the situation;
good for defense. Cebu third commercial
port; a good harbor; very desirable. No
coal of good quality can be procured in
Philippine islands Some has been mined on
Cebu; English company. / trust 1t may not
be necessary to order me to Washington
Should regret very much to leave here while
matters remain in present critical condition.
DEWEY"
NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET.
Very naturally the report of the opera
tions Of the North Atlantic fleet comprises
the larger part of the printed body. Most
of the facts have already appeared, but in
the very beginning there is a most inter-
esting exchange of letters between Secre-
tary Long and Admiral Sampson, showing
that even before the outbreak of the war
the admiral had worked out complete
plan for the immediate reduction of Ha-
vana, with his own squadron, unsupported,
and was only prevented from carrying out
that plan by orders from the department,
which wished to protect the big ironclads.
Secretary Long addressed Admiral Samp-
son April confidential letter, telling him
that in the event of hostilties, for this was
before the outbreak of the war, the Depart
ment wished him to do all in his power to
destroy the Spanish war vessels in the West
Indies waters. He says: ''The department
does not wish the vessels of your squadron
10 be exposed to the fire of the batteries at
Havana, Santiago or other strongly forti-
fed ports in Cuba unless the more formida-
BILE Spanish vessels should take refuge in
those harbors. Even in this case the de-
partment would suggest that rigid block
ade and the employment or our torpedo
boats would accomplish the desired OBJ
ject."
The reasons set out by Secretary Long
for this instruction were that there would
be no United States troops available to oc-
cupy the captured towns until October. and
that the lack of docking facilities made it
particularly desirable that our vessels
should not be crippled before the capture
or destruction of Spain's most formidable
vessels.
WANTED TO STRIKE QUICKLY.
How strongly Admiral Sampson endeav-
ored to secure a reversal of this decision
appears in the following letter, which has
never before been published:
~. S. Flagship New York,
Key West, Fla, April 9.
my Dear Mr.. Secretary-I have received
your confidential letter of April 6. / SYM
pathize with all you say about guarding
our big ships against possible serious loss
while the enemy's fleet is still intact At
the same time L regard it as very impor-
tant to strike quickly, and strike hard, as
soon as hostilities commence. Havana is
well defended by three or four batteries
to the eastward OF the entrance. mounting
guns from six to twelve-inch caliber. On
the western side of the entrance there are
three batteries, the guns varying in caliber
from eight to twelve-inch, and two mortar
batteries. All the batteries face seaward,
and those TO the west of the entrance are
quite near the shore. All are open batter