The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-01
AND LIKELY TO REQUIRE AN ARMY
TO HOLD THEM IN CHECK.
Efforts of This Country to stop Fill
bustering-Insurgent Reported to
Have Suffered in Battle.
peclal to he Indianapolis Journal.

llulo DelnS, misplaced HAWAII IN popular
thought and in congressional discussion, the
two subjects are very closely related, and,
to an extent interdependent. If Hawaii be
annexed, it is hard to see how Cuba like
wise can long be denied admittance to the
Union. 1t is generally taken for granted
that Spanish rule on the island is wither-
ing away, whatever may be the outcome Of
the Maine inquiry or our general attitude
toward the Instruction. According to the
best military reports received here, Spain
has long since ceased to put forth her
greatest energies. Where her troops now on
the island number, perhaps, eighty thou
sand effective men, they have, at times,
been not far from 100000. Her energies are
plainly Tagging, and if, with the larger dis
play of force and strength, she was power
less to cope with the insurrection, it is diff
cult to understand how anything can be
done now with her powers waning and her
resources sinking. Cuba seems lost to Spain
in fact, and soon as the actual sever
ance, however brought about becomes rec
ognized in treaty and in law, the question of
American annexation is sure to come to the
frontA Some element in Cuba, it may be
counted on, will desire attachment with this
country, and if such an element can once
get into control, its status would be similar
to that of the Hawaiian government under
President Dole now seeking annexation.
The close resemblance between the Ha-
waiian situation to-day and what seems
destined to be the Cuban situation at
very distant tomorrow, is having an obv-
Gus effect on the pending annexation con-
troversy. When a congressman is now
asked if he believes in annexation, he will
be dull, indeed, if both annexations are not
suggested to his mind. The nearneSs of
Cuba, the large American interests upon
the island the fact that she is and always
will be commercial dependency of the
United States, her strategic position at the
mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, have consti-
tuted an argument in favor of her ultimate
union with this country which has never
failed to appeal to a certain element of the
American Republic ever since its very
foundation 's&
In the above light it was a very appro-
pirate coincidence by which the Senate
committee on foreign relations, almost
simultaneously with the Maine explosion,
arrived at the conclusion that the attempt
to ratify the pending Hawaiian treaty must
be abandoned, and the question referred to
the two houses of Congress in the form Of
IL joint resolution. Since the annexation
project was preached the first question has
naturally been the possibility of securing a
tWo-thirds vote in a secret session Of the
Senate. After long and stubborn fight in
which the administration has taken a con-
spicuous part, the anneXationists have come
to acknowledge that they are helpIessy
short of a two-thirds majority in the Sem
ate, but claim that they are within three
four votes of such a number. The question
then goes to the two houses in open ses-
sion, and the Senate committee was already
studying the various annexation resolutions
proposed to see which one it was best to
adopt when the explosion came. But as
soon as Cuba quiets down this undertaking
will be revived, and the country will haze a
chance to hear the arguments for and
against Hawaiian annexation, and with the
understanding that the acceptance of the
project now pending must logically mean at
no distant day the acceptance of another OF
the same kind.
The prospect of Cuban annexation raises
the interesting question of what might hap
pen in case the insurgent forces on the ISL
and, after coming under the authority of the
United States government, should decide
that they did not like it, and rise in re-
bellion. There is no evidence that the fight
ing bands in the interior of Cuba love the.
government at Washington for its own sake,
but rather as a weapon against their pres
ent foes. They act upon the principle of
one trouble at a time, and with the oppo-
sition to governments in general inherent in
all Central Americans, they are now trying
to throw off Spain. 1t might happen that
they would object to becoming part of the
United States. and still il a minority who
CHANGED to be in power wanted annexation
agreeable to the Hawaiian precedent, we
should have to annex the island, for as SEN
ator Morgan has well said: 1.-THE natives of
Alaska were not consulted to see whether
they desired to become part of the United
States" hence why should we consider the
native races of either the Sandwich islands
or Cuba? Tt is very evident that the native
Sandwich islanders do not want to become
Americans. but they may not have vigor
enough to rise in rebellion. With the Cuban
native population the case might be differ
ent. 1t would be possible that a clique
of cigar makers and sugar planters in Ha-
-yana and the other seaports might bring
about annexation against the wish OFF the
very forces that are now fighting the Span
iards, and then the next time things do
not go to suit these unrecognized forces,
in true Guatemalan fashion they would
break out in rebellion. How would tie
United States meet such a situation? Judg-
ing from the experience of Spain, it is 10
light task to subdue these Islanders,
equipped, as they are, with the inca.culabIe
advantage of wide tract of impenetrable
mountain wilderness, filled with rocks and
caves, and offering almost complete pro-
lection against ordinary soldiery. Public
sentiment in the United States soon after
our criticism of Spain would hardly war
rant sending an enormous army to rut
down such an insurrection, and yet Amer
lean property interests in Havana and other
seaport towns might be such that our gov
erEment could not honorably decline to
maintain order and assert its sovereignty.
This is one Of the Dossibilities-one of the
troubles that might afiiict us IN event of
annexation. 1t is not out of tlae question
that the native races of Hawaii may at
some time rise in rebellion and nothing but
the strong military authority OF the United
States government ne sufficient to keep
them in subsection. The costljness Of run
ming down the Seminole Indians IN Florida
Is a standing lesson ca tho difficulties of
contending against men who have ! wider
ness III which to hide. an0 i lnnre recent
experience with the Apache Indians ii
Arizona Il Of the same kind. II ii plain