The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-01-30

no offensive operations were possible until re-
in~forcenients came. Those we knew had been
hurried toward us rs soon ~ the news OF tho
disaster OF the goth reached Washington. Burn
side was coming from Knoxville we supposed.
Hooker had been ordered from Washington by
rail, Sherman from vicksburg, and some Of
Hurlbut's troops from Memphis.
EFFEor on THE ARMY OF THE DISASTER OF
sEPT. 30.
As soon rs we felt reasonably sure that Chat
tanooga could hold out until endorsements
came, tho disaster Of tho Goth of September
became the absorbing topic Of conversation in
the Army Of the Cumberland. At headquar.
tiers, In camp, in the street, on the fortif-
cations, officers and soldiers and citizens
wrangled over the reasons for the loss OF tho
dny. By the end OF the first week after the dis
astor IA serious fermentation roigncd In the
Twentieth and Twenty-frst Army Corps. grow
ing out Of events connected with the battle.
Thore was ut once o manifest disposition to
hold McCook and Crittenden, the commanders
OF the two corps, responsible because they had
left the field of battle amid the rout Of the right
wing, and made their way to Chattanooga"
1t was not generally understood or appreci-
ated at that time that because OF Thomas's re-
peatcd calls for aid, and Rosecrans's conse.
quent alarm for his left, Crittendon had been
stripped of all his troops and had no infantry
whatever loft to command, and that McCook's
lines also had been reduced to n fragment by
similar orders from Rosecrans and by fighting. A
strong opposition to both sprang up, which my
kilograms to Mr.. Stanton Immediately after the
battle fully reflect. The Generals Of division and
Of brigade felt tho situation deeply and said that
they could no longer serve under such supe.
riors, and that, IL this was required Of them,
they must rcaipn This feeling was universal
among thea N. including men like Major Generals
Palmer and Sheridan and Brig. .Gens. Wood,
johnson, and Hazcn.
The feeling of these officers did not seem in
the least to partake OF q mutinous or disorderly
character; 1t was rather cor: cientious unwill-
ingness to risk their men and tho country's
! cause in hands which they thought to be I'M
safe. No formal representation Of this unwill-
ingncss was made TO Rosecrans, but he was
made aware of the state Of things by private
conversations with several Of the parties. The
defects Of mis- character complicated the diff
Guilty. He abounded in friendliness and appro'
bativeness, and was greatly lacking in firm
ness and stcadiness OF will. In short, he was
a temporizing man; he dreaded so heavy an al.
tentative rs was now presented, and hated TO
break with McCook and Crittcnden.
1t WIS the same In regard 10 Negley. Rose
Grams claimed that Negley had withdrawn his
division from the battle on Sunday without
orders and with his ranks undisturbed. When
this was stated to me by Rosecrans as n fact, I
said then that NeEley ought to be shot: and he
answered THAT is my opinion" He added that
no should have him punished; yet he deter
mined to do nothing more than apply to have
him relieved and ordered elsewhere.
Besides. there was n more serious obstacle to
Rosecrans's acting decisively in the fact that, IL
Crittcnden and McCook had gone to Chatta-
nooga. he had gone also. 1t might be said In
his excuse hat, Under the circumstances Of
the sudden rout, 1t was perfectly proper for the
commanding General to go to the rear to pre-
pare the next line OF defence; still Itosecrans
felt that that excuse could not entirely clear
him either in his own eyes or in those Of tho
army. In fact. it was perfectly plain that,
while the subordinate commanders would not
resign II he was retained in the chief command.
as I believe they certainly would have done II
McCook and Crittenden had not been relieved.
their respect for him as q General had received
an irreparable blow.
Tho dissatisfaction with Rosecrans seemed
to me to put the army into a very dangerous
conditions; and in writing to Mr.. Stanton on
Sept. 81 i said that, IL II was decided to change
the chief commander, I would suggest that
some Western commander Of high rank and
great prestige, like Grant, would be preferable
as Rosecrans's successor tn one who had hith-
erto commanded in tho East alone.
POPULARITY OF GEN. THOMAS.
The army, however,. had its own candidate
for Rosecrans's position. Gen. Thomas had
risen to the highest poiTt in their esteem. as he
had in that OF every enc cogniZant OF his con-
duct on that unfortunate and glorious day; and
/ saw that, should there be a change in the chief
command. there was no other man whose APP
pointment would be SO welcome. I earnestly
Mr.. Stanton that, in event of a
change, Thomas's merits be considered. He was
certainly an officer of the very highest quail
ties. soldierly and personally. He was n man
of the greatest dignity of character. He had
mere the character of George Washington than
any other man I ever knew. At the same time
he was n delightful man to be with; there was
no artificial dignity about Thomas. He was n
West Point graduate and very well educated.
He was very set in his opinions. yet he was not
impatient with anybody-a noble character.
In reply to my recommendation Of Thomas ]
received a telegram from the Secretary OF War.
saying: II wish you to go directly to see Gen.
Thomas, and say to him that his services. his
abilities. his character. his nnselfshncss have
always been most cordially appreciated by me.
and that 1t Is not my fault that he has not long
since had command OF an independent army"
"NhS ~ ON>N Nv 1890
quarters with the message. l remember that I
got there just after they had finished dinner;
the table was not cleared of, but there was no.
body In the dining room. When Gen. Thomas
came in i read to him the telegram from the
Secretary. He was too much affected by 1t to
reply Immediately. After q moment.he said:
Mr. Dana, l wish you would say to the Sec
rotary of War that ] am greatly affected by
this expression Of his condolences; that I should
have long since liked to have an Independent
command; but what / should have desired
would have been the command of an army that
/ could myself have organized, disciplined. dis.
tributed, and combined. ] wish you would
add also that l would not like to take the com.
mand ofsan nrmy where ! should be exposed to
the imputation of having intrigued or OF having
exercised any effort to supplant my previous
commander"
This was on Oct. 4. Four days later Gen.
Thomas sent q confidential friend to me, say
inc rumors had come to him that he was to be