Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-01-15
HASSPAINLOST CUBA?
Continued from First Pag,)

| Continued from First Pae,)
4 weight, but 90 long as they are not si.e
| confidence OF the civil governors hardly
| requires analysis. During several weeks
| l have been at pains to gather what may
be called the average sentiment of the in
| surgents in the field and their sympa-
| thizers and supporters at home on the Ques-
| ton OF accepting autonomy as q tempo
| rary solution Of SPANS diff1cut problem
| Position of the Insurgents.
| The question has been why autonomy
| might be accepted a prelude to indie
| pendence. peace be restored and the island
| be given chance to recuperate it's wasted
| resources. The answers have been so uni
| form that they can be told briefly. The
| revolutionists and those in sympathy with
| them do not believe that Spain will ever
| yield the island peacefully. They will not
| trust her promises of autonomy as per-
| manent political system under which Span
| ish sovereignty would be retained. Much
| less will they trust to any understanding
by which independence would come as the
| evolution of autonomy. To lay down their
| arms now and take part in the govern
| ment they say would mean another insur-
| rection in a few years. They think the
| shorter and the simpler way is to keep up
| the present struggle for independence.
| know this idea of temporary bridge over
| the chasm has been discussed in Europe
| and the United States. 1t has been pre-
1
| strongest possible light. Their rejection OF
| it is absolute. The island will not be won
| back to Spain by holding out such prom
| Use. The appointments of Cubans to office
| in that belief are futile.
| HostiIfties to BE Renewed.
| With the arts of Cancellation employed to
no purpose the Cuban problem for Spain
again resolves itself into winning back the
| island by force of arms. Autonomy is
| fn he af no of no
| bayonet. The pretense of General Blanco
| taking the field to conduct active military
| operations is renewed. The troops are I'M
| questionably in better condition than
when he arrived. because not so many of
| them are starving. But the Spanish gen
| erals cannot now dictate the kind of
| campaign which shall be waged any more
| than they have been able to dictate it
| during the last three years. The insur-
gents will continue in the line they have
| been following. They will not try to take
| Havana. In the western provinces they
| will not risk a general engagement. 1t is
| even doubtful whether Gomez will take
| chances in Santa Clara. In Santiago Ca
| lixto Garcia may successfully lombard the
| remaining towns held by the Spanish forces
| or General Pando may have better luck
| than last month and succeed in holding
| what Spain already has there. That he
can reconquer this season any portion of
| the territory controlled by the insurgents
| is not expected.
| Fate A"o1tS EreSn leN1eS.
| If the fresh levies from Spain leave the
| peninsula the latter part of February. as
| promised, they will be in Cuba just long
| enough to become seasoned food for the
| spring and summer fevers which come
| with the rains. / not writing personal
! impressions Of the military prospects The
| view given above is that held in the army
| circles. 1t is stated frankly. sometimes
| apologetically. reason for not expect
| ing favorable results from the movements
| of the troops in this campaign. The prob
| ability of winning Cuba back to Spain by
| arms does not come within the purview of
| the immediate future, and further space
| need not be given it at present. The vic
| tories of arms trumpet themselves. If the
! Spanish troops win triumphs in the field
| the effect will be seen at once.
| No Sign of InsurSent DfssensiOns.
| Another point of view is worth word.
| The question is often asked whether the
| insurrection may not have elements of
| weakness within itself. Hints are some
| times received that discussions exist among
| the leaders, that Gomez did not approve
| the selection of Bartolomae Masso as civil
| president and that other sources of friction
| have arisen. Time will show whether these
! reports have a basis. The fact which is to
| be recorded now is that If there be weak
| ness in the inner structure of the revolu-
| ton, it presents a solid front from without.
| GERS insubordinate. They oppose a passive
| disobedence, which neutraliZes his orders,
| as in the case Of extending the zones of
cultivation and putting the country people
back in their homes. The orders of Gomez
| are respected and obeyej in every insur-
| gent camp on the island. On its military
| side it is impossible TO find a trace that
| the instruction suffers from internal weak
| ness. further suggestion has been the
possibility of the death of Gomez or Calixto
| Garcia Most of the insurgent generals eX-
| pose themselves reckleSsly whenever there
is fighting. The chance of their taking of
! is an ever-present one. But it is more than
| a year since Maceo killed, and the
| instruction has not shown his loss The
| period when its success might have hinged
| on the life of one man was passed long ago.
| The prospect of Cuba being won back to
| Spain from the revolution collapsing inward
| or from the loss of one of its commanders
| has so little bearing on present circum-
| stances that it may be dismissed.
Is Spain's Collapse Approaching.
A suggestion is heard of autonomy and
| Spanish sovereignty falling inward instead
| of the insurrection. Probably this whisper
| has reached the United States. l have
| heard of inquiries whether the autonomist
| committees and officials in various places
| We're not getting ready to turn everything
! over to the insurgents. The rumors are
| sinister to the government. In some in
stances they take definite shape The in
| transigentes or loyal Spaniards have been
| CT arging that Marcos Garcia. the autono-
| mist governor of Santa Clara province was
| simply preparing the way for Gomez In
| the ten years war Marcos Garcia was a
colonel in the insurgent army under
| Gomez. He took no part IN the present
| struggle. He has replied TO the insinuation
| against him by securing the presentation
| of some leading insurgents. The alcaldes,
| or mayors, appointed by him have shown
| a determination to make the military power
| subordinate to the civil authority. Most of
| them would probably be able to continue i'm
office under the Cuban republic. Two or