Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-11-30
SPANISH WERE WITHOUT HOPE
ADMIRAL CERvERA's FLEET WAS
VERY BADLY SUPPLIED.
Tactics of American Squadron Were
Mystery-SinkinE of Merrimac
Not understOOd-Lieut. y'Te-
jciro Criticises Span
ish Policy.

naval Intelligence to-day issued another cf
its war series. this time the Battles and
Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba. by Lieu
tenant Jose Miller Tejeiro. the second in
command Of the naval forces of the prov
ince of Santiago de Cuba.
Captain Clover the chief of the intelli-
gence bureau. explains in an Introductory
note that the writer was an eye witness
of most of the events that he describes.
and from his position had access to Off
cial information. The style is peculiarly
interesting free from bias and has an air
of authority which will give the book a
place i'll history. though it is not an off1-
cial publication. The chief of the bureau
expresses regret that, owing TO limited
force. the bureau was obliged to omit
number of interesting chapters In the
translation.
The author began. according to his own
statement, to keep an exact diary OIL events
at Santiago from the moment of the ap-
pearance there of Cervera's fleet, realizing,
as he says, that the vessels were to nave
a most powerful influence on the war. 1t
is impossible, in limited space, to give more
than the merest outline. The publication
begins with the chapter entitled THE Two
Fleets" telling of the arrival OF Cerveras
squadron on the 18th of May, and OF the
disappointment of the people. who expect
of five. He makes comparison very care
fully and accurately of the vessels OF the
two squadrons. The lieutenant mentioned
the fact that the provisions were very
short; also that the military element OF the
province were nine or ten months in ar
rears in the payment of consignments, and
had been living ON credit for some time.
Everything was lacking; food, money,
credit and purchasing resources were ex-
hot of
true of other places in the islands. The
merchants. instead of contributing to the
welfare of the army. hid whatever they
had and raised prices. The picture lie
draws OF the conditions in the besieged
city is quite terrible.
He speaks of the difficulties of coaiing,
and shows that the fleet was very badly
supplied. Concerning the opinions as to
why the fleet did not go out, he refers to
the great joy caused by its arrival. and
then says that the ships in the harbor were
compelling the enemy to sustain with sr.
perior forces the blockade with all its diff
1iculties and dangers. 1t Was not believed
that the American ships would expose
themselves to serious disaster or would
force any one of the ports which were be-
ing blockaded
The Spanish ships did not have to give
battle in order to obtain results, and he
says lHdt, IL pTOSlslOuS ilot Dcch
ing in Santiago. and the Spanish fleet had
remained there, no one could tell to what
extremes impatience and despair might not
have carried Admiral Sampson. A diary
of the blockade is given. telling what oc-
Cured in the way of bombardmentS and
losses to the Spaniards by the American
guns. The movements of the American
fleet were puzzle to the Spaniards, as
they did not know why they remained on
watch all day and disappeared at night.
But it was supposed that the Americans
were afraid of the destroyers-
Speaking of the Merrimac, he says that
I'VE at Santiago have not succeeded in as
certaining definitely-though it is probably
known in Spain from American newspapers
that are in the habit of publishing every
thing-what was the real object that the
Merrimac had in view
The arrival of the army created consd-
cradle CONSERVATION in Santiago, and con-
siderable speculation as to where the army
would land. Provisions were still running
short, and it is stated that, If Ell Caney and
San Juan had not been taken, the Spaniards
would not have lost communication with
the cultivated region, nor would the aque-
duct have been cut. The small number Of
the Spanish forces made it impossible to
save these positions.
He speaks of the destructive work OF tine
Vesuvius whenever the bombs fell upon
any point where there were works or guns.
Speaking of the battles of Ell Caney and
San Juan he says the Americans, it must
be acknowledged, fought with truly ad-
mirable courage and spirit. While the bat
ties were going on at Ell Caney and San
Juan, the enemy sent forces against the
whole Spanish lines, for the purpose, no
doubt. of harassing and making the attack
more general. The casualties of the Span
ish side are stated to be sixty officers and
$50 men. He claimed that only $40 men de-
Tended FL Caney for ten hours. and that
go defended San Juan for four hours.
He speaks of the lively bombardment by
sea and land on the End of July. and the
scrtie of the Spanish fleet on July 3. He
speaks of the action of the Spanish ad-
miral as one of the greatest acts Of yalor.
know whether the ships had succeeded in
making their escape. but, having been in
formed they had. there was great re-
came in and informed them that the
Teresa, oquendo and the destroyers had
been lost
TO the naval battle. most OF which was
| taken from persons who were saved from
the Spanish ships.
vera are noted. The fire of the Spanish
ships was said to have been slow. while
that of the American ships was very brisk.
In discussing the disaster he says that the
| loss of the fleet had been foretoid by all
its commanders, but public opinion in the
island of Cuba required the presence of
the fleet in Cuban waters. The ships had
| not been cleaned. were short of coal. and
not in good condition to fight. The feet
received definite orders from the captain
general of Cuba to leave Santiago in spite
of Admiral Cervera's remonstrances. He
says the Spanish are proud of the disaster
of Trafalgar on account of the heroism
| of the navy, but the battle of Santiago Is
much more glorious.
The Mercedes was sunk in the narrow
part of the channel to prevent the Amer
lean feet from entering.
He then takes up the narrative or the
| from July until the surrender. which in
| cludes the bombardments on different days
| and especially those of the 10th and 11th.
| At the time of the surrender. there were
| 200 sick and wounded soldiers OF the Span
ish army. The total losses in all the attacks
| on Santiago are given as follows:
Officers killed. Is: men killed. 10i: officers
wounded, 50: men wounded. 556. prisoners
and missing, officers and nd 1 lls men; men,, not
| tie OF Santiago by saying:
Il have never been able to understand
| the reason why there was sent TO the
| island of Cuba feet that was in no man
| ner able TO cope with that of the United
| States. and which. therefore. could in no
| wise prevent the ships of the latter from
| blockading our ports and controlling the
sea: but since IL was sent. without It's
| arrival being able to prevent the loss of
| the island. which was lost, as experience
war was accepted. owing to the conditions
prevailing there. then it should have been
prevented from being destroyed. as 1t was,
| without resulting in any advantage what
ever.
larr han N