The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-20
DsssEnnation to Send Fifty Thou
sand Troops into Cnba.
3fn1oe1 S,0eers $50 NsIsssvy R-H-
Dsvss 5Assa - Win neSssse ~
L~osl . mSssh - Psa 1Eyspe Vet
saseess IN ceaAsasss - a~fsfevee
80 0egssoss-smssfsr Expeaisssa
WSm nsve Nseh Sssses.

NEW YORK. Nsy ia special - the
Iimss from TssasExteE ssys. TIE Plans
81 the invasion OF cnba b. tire United
States forces remain unchanged. TIE
esussys performances CT tire SPANISH
eqssdren haze eslSyed tie execution Of =
part Of tbe programme. bat IL has been
Altered In no snpsrfsnf particular Ths
determination TO dispatch 20 the island ~
soon - practical an army Of not lees
than ne.eeb m@n competent 20 meet ara
cope With The forces Of Blanco sssn stands
But tbs time has rot yet come wssa IL
= prsctiesais 10 co this for the simple
feAsgp that tbs army Ia not ready 10 be
cent 70 Cuba The is.svs regulars Eassea
~ Tampa srs prepared 70 90 at any time.
The majority OF volunteers gathered at
Tampa, New 0r.saDs. Mobile aud Chick
Amsuga are not prepared 10 60 anywhere,
and viii rot be until they arg uniformed.
armed and equipped. and have SONS
training 10 the srt Of war. All Of snis viii
take iiue- The best Judgment Of military
experas is that ~ will require not ism
than . month usaJsr the most favera1.s
circumstances 10 put Ss,eos volunteers ia
condition 10 reinforce the regulars for the
army Of Cuban invasion
II II thought by many trained officers
nat more time than that ought 10 lie and
= liksiy to be taken. IL II reeesiectsd that
Gen. Scott spent SIX months sraiss.ng and
drilling his army before he Invaded Mex
leo. and IL Is not consended that the In
vss.on OF Cuba In any less formidable an
undertaking than the conquest OF Mexico.
The insiorions experience Of Baa Run IL
. favor!te illustration Of the unwisdom
~ putting recruits TO the serious business
Of war too soon.
Thete IL ore portion OF the Cuban pro-
sramnle. however. which my not De de-
laysd much longer. That Is the Dispatch
Ing Of an expedition. made up almost, IL
not ehi:rely. OF regulars from the Tampa
camp 10 make landing on the Cuban
coast. tnsor up Notifications and clear
the way for the coming Of tbs army prop
er Later on.
II II no; settled that this will be done.
but st-onE arguments are being used ia
favor o: ire project II u urged that we
went Into titis war largely IN order 20 save
the reconeeatrsdes from starving. bat
that ~ q rtvai; OF oaf present plan OF
campaign Te are making their starvation
sure and are rendering IL unlikely that
the insurgents vii. suffer something akin
TO the same fate. A move toward these
people IL. IL II urged. commanded by every
c2nside.ation of humanity. even II IL be
sseat risk. A force Of 900 regulars ianss-
ed al an available spot on the coast of
Caba would. IL Is eontended. be able to
DO sornsth.ns toward relieving this suffer
Ing by establishing a depot OF supplies
" 'ei could he dfawa on BY the lnsur-
ssris. Further. IL Is argued in favor Oh
TIE seizure of landing piacc without de-
lay. that the undertaking il becoming
more difficult every day. ard that the reg
uiars could Dot be better employed than
In providing Notifications TO protect the
debafkation of the army when Il ~ ready
to move.
TIE longss ths occupation Of landing
place Is delayed, IL Is pointed o1t. the
more time Bianca has for throwing up
fortshcat.ous and mounting batteries along
the coast. which Will cause trouble when
the real inyas:ou begins.
The advocates Of this movement believe
Il would pe easy for a force of the strength
mentioned TO hold It's own wiih the pro-
lection that the bloekadag squadron
could afford
There Is no prospect. however. that even
q preliminary movement os th,s nature
IL Likely TO be undertaken immediately.
Fer the present. az lsass. su military
movements viii await thu result of tAe
maneaserlng OF she sauadrens In West
Indian waters.