The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-04-15
THE SEMIWEEKLY MESSENGER: FRIDAY. APRIL is, 1893

and a sum of $500 900 has b1en appro-
priated for their relief.
The war in Cuba is of such a nature
that, short of subjugation or e~xterTnfn-
alton, a final military victory for either
side seems impracticabie. The alter
native lies in the physical
of the one or the other party or, per-
maps, both-a condition which in effect
ended the ten years war by the truce
Of Zanjon- The prospect of such a
p~rotrdction and conclusion OF the pres
ent strife is a contingency hardly 10 be
contemplated with ~equanimity by the
civilized world, and least OF all the
United States, affected and injured as
We are. deeply and intimately by its
/ very existence.
RealizN1g this, it appeared to be my
duty, in a spirit Of true friendliness, no
less ITO Spain than TO the Cubans who
have 50 much to lose by the prolonga-
ton OF the struggles, 70 seek to bring
about an immediate termination of the
war. To this end / submitted, on the
18th ultfmo, as a result of much repre-
s~entatfon and correspondence through
the United States minister at Madrid,
propositions to the Spanish government
looking to an armistice until October
lSt for the negotiation of peace with
The good offices of the president.
In additi n / asked the immediate
revocation of the order of re~concenrra-
dition, so as to permit the people TO re-
turn TO their farms and the needy TO be
relieved with provisions and supplies
from the United States, co-operaring
with he Spanish authorities, so as TO
afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet was
l.received on the night of the 31st ultimo.
1t oilers, as the means to bring about
peace in Cuba, to confide the prepara-
ton thereof to the insular parliament.
1nasmuch as the concurrence of that
body would be necessary to reach a
final result, it being, however, under
stood that the powers reserved by the
constitution to the central government
are not lessened or diminished. AS
the uba parliament does not meet I'm
til the 4th of May next, the Spanish
government would not object, for it's
part, ito complete atOnce a suspension of
hoStilities if asked for by the insur-
gent from the general-in-chief, TO
whom it would pertain, in such case,
to determine the duration and condi-
tiOnS' Of the armistice.
The propositions submitted by Cen
eral WOodford and the reply of the
Spanish government were both in the
form of brief memoranda, the texts of
which are before mean are subStan-
TALLY in the language above given. The
function of the Cuban parliament in the
matter OF preparing" a and the
manner of its doing so are not express
cd in the Spanish memoranda, but from
General Woodford's explanatory re-
ports of preliminary discussions pre-
ceding the final conference, it is under
stood that the Spanish government
stands ready to give the insular con-
, gress full powers to settle the terms of
peace with the NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. by
direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of Legislation, does not appear.
With this last overture i'm the direc-
ton of immediate peace, and its dis
appointing reception by Spain, the
executive was brought to the end of his
effort.
In my annual message of December
last, I said:
"Of the untried measures there re-
main only: Recognition of the insur-
gents as belligerents; recognition of the
independence of C-ba; neutra inter-
vention to end the war by imposing
a rational compromise between the CON-
testants, and intervention in favor of
one or the other party. / speak not of
fOrcIble annexation, for that cannot be
thought Of. That, by our code of mo-
rality, wou be criminal aggression"
ThereupOn / reviewed these alterna-
tives, in the light of president Grants
measured words, uttered in 1875, when
after seven years Ot Sanguinary, de-
%structive and cruel hostilities in Cuba,
he reached the conclusion that the re-
cognition of the independence CT Cuba
was impracticable and indefensible;
! and tina the recognition of belliger-
ence was not warranted by the facts
according to he tests of public law.
1 commented especially upon. the latter
aspect of the question, pointing out the
inconvenience and positive dangers of
a recognition of belligerence which,
while adding to the already OnerOus
burdens of neutrality within our own
jurisdiction, could not in n way ex-
tend our influence or effective olnces
in the territoritory of hostilities. Moth
ing has since occurred to change my
view in this regard-and / recognize
as fully now as then that the issuance
of a proclamation of neutrality, by
which process the so-called ecogn
ton of the 'belligerence is published,
could of itself and unattended by other
action, accomplish nothing toward the
one end for which we labor, the instant
pacification of Cuba and the cessation
of the misery that aff1icts the island.
THE QUESTION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE.
Turning to the question Of recognize
ing at his ti-1e the independence Of th5
present insurgent government in cuba
we find safe p-ecedents in our history
from an early day. Ihey are Wei
summed up in President Jackson'i
message to congress-, December 21st
1886, on the subject of the recognition
OF the independence of Texas. He said
In all the contests that have ariser
out of the revolution of France, out o
the disputes relating to h crowns o
Portugal and Spain, out OF the Separa
= ton of the American possessions OF botl
from the European governments, ane
out of the numerous and CONSTANT!
i. occurring struggles for dominion ii
: Spanish-America, 50 wisely consisten
: with our just principles has been tn
: action of our government that We have
l under the most critical circumstance
avoided ali censure and encountered
no other evil than that produced by
I transient estrangement of good will il
: those against whom we have been b!
a force of evidence compelled to decide
1t has thus made known to the WOrlt
that the uniform policy and practic