Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-05-11
AFTER INVASION. WHAT.

In the New York Herald of yesterday
appears long interview with a man who
has Just returned from Cuba, where lie
spent two months with Gomez There is
much in the interview tending to confirm
the fear entertained by many that In
driving the Spanish from the island we
VIII have performed but small part
OF the work we have undertaken.
IN the fourth clause of the Cuban Joint
resolution the United States "disclaim any
disposition or intention TO exercise SOW
eregnty. jurisdiction, or control over the
said island. except for the pacifcation
thereof. and assert their determination.
when that is accomplished TO leav" the
government and control of the island to
its people
According TO the Herald's interview,
Gomez is not without political aspirations
in connection with the government to be
formed after the war. He knows that
an American army would take Habana
and bring hostiities to a close within a
month after it had effected a landing in
Cuba. He realizes. we are told, that the
insurgents will cut but sorry figure in
the rapid operations sure TO follow an
American invasion. unless months pass
while they are being armed and drilled
into military habits. other than those of
the guerrillas." He would not have his
tory record that be had TO have material
armed assistance in crushing Blanco and
freeing cuba. and, therefore, would prefer
than to supply him with arms, ammuni-
ton and provisions, and reinforce him
with regiment of artillery.
Did these observations come 10 us in
the form of an entirely new view of the
situation, we might not be inclined to at
tach much Importance to them. But such
is not the case. That it would be the am
bition of the Revolutionary leaders TO
control absolutely the government and
the fate of 'free Cuba" has been fore
Swallowed by others who have carefully
studied the Cuban question. Others have
foreseen that there was probably a more
difhcult issue involved in our task than
that of breaking the Spanish yoke.
1t is well known that there are in Cuba
thousands of non-participants in the
revolution who ardently desire absolute
Cuban Independence, yet, who, warned
by the experience of some of the Cen
trail and South American republics dread
the prospect of the Revolutionary lead
ers having full sway in the government
OF the island. In this class are en-
braced many intelligent and influential
men. and the condition contains many
elements of internal discord as among
the Cubans themselves. Therefore, ''paci-
foation" may prove a very long word
The aftermath of freeing Cuba and dis
charging our obligation to humanity may
present much more serious and perplex-
ing problems for our solution than the
majority of our people have any idea OF
al present.
After the expulsion of the Spaniards il
may still be many months before a state
of affairs can be brought about on the
island which will enable the people 10
establish a free and independent govern
ment of their own in all that that i'm
plies. In the mean time there will be dan
ser OF the annexationists turning the stu
ation TO their advantage so as to make
an excuse for a violation OF our solemn
pledge. thus discrediting us in the ewes
OF the world. Public men who would
have the United States keep faith and
who appreciate the undesirabllity az
haying Cuba as a neighbor In the Union.
cannot begin too soon TO consider earn
sstly the question. After invasion.
what? The South is equally interested
with all other sections OF the country In
considering the question from the former
standpoint, and more interested than any
other seelion-more interested. indeed
IMAM all the other sections put together
IN considering 1t from the latter stand.
point.
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Inc PRIVILEGES Of alto.