The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-11-21

commented upon by only few Of our
medical officers. These cite the preva-
lence Of drunkenness due to the facili-
ties and temptations afforded by the
proximity of cities to the larger camps.
They hold that if the systems of the
men had not been weakened by dissi-
patton they would not have succumbed
so readily to the other influence which
affected them.
1t was typhoid fever which broke
down the strength of the commands
generally, the outbreak becoming dis
tinctly manifest in July. Sporadic
cases appeared in most of the regf-
ments in May and June, these cases
having been brought in many instances
from the state camps. In fact, some
regiments, as the Fifteenth Minnesota,
suffered more from this disease at
their state rendezvous than any of the
regiments in the large federal camps.
It appears from a general review of
the sanitary reports already filed that
the prevalence of the disease was pro-
portioned to the unsanitary camp con-
ditions which I have referred to.
THE seriously sick were to be treat
ed in division hospitals on the field
unless their transfer to general hos
pital was advisable-under the care Of
the most experienced physicians and
able surgeons on duty with each divis-
ion. Medical officers left on duty with
their organizations were to exercise
careful supervision over the well men,
and to determine whether a soldier re-
porting himself sick should be sent to
the hospital or remain as a trivial case
under treatment in quarters. This con.
solidation of the medical force by divis-
ions. implying as it did the breaking
up of the regimental hospitals, met
with a strong opposition from regimen
tai medical officers, particularly from
those who were not detailed for special
service at the division hospitals
IN THE FIELD.
Long before the Fifth corps en-
barked for Cuba its field hospitals were
in condition for efficient service. Sub
sequent events, however. rendered val
ueless these preparations of the medi-
cal department. When the command
embarked on the tInnsport vessels, the
baggage wagons and mules were left
behind. The ambulance trains of all
the divisions, with a large part Of the
outfit OF each of the hospitals, were
also left behind. OF the property and
supplies carried to Cuba, portion was
not available for service at the time
1t was most needed, 10 wit, on July 1,
z and 3, when the wounded from Ell Ca
ney and San Juan were coming from
the front for care and treatment. This
was because, in general, no opportunity
was AFFORDED to land the medical prop
erty. Earnest efforts were made by
medical officers to have supplies at the
front with the troops During and af-
ter the battle at FL Cnney and San
Juan there was an insufficiency of
tents, cots, bedding and medicines, due
TO the causes stated, but all the hospi-
tails were well equipped for surgical
work.
After the equalization Of Santiago.
the troops at the front broke down rap
idly under the fatigues they had I'M
dergone and the malarial influences to
which they were exposed. But by this
time an ample supply Of tents, bedding.
clothing and medical stores had reach
ed Slboney together with a corps OF
I trained nurses and "a force of sur
/ geons, those sent to duty at the yell
/ low fever hospitals being immune 10
that disease.
] The transfer of troops from SantIa-
go to Montauk Point. N. Y, was an
emergency measure, and the great re-
spcnsibility Of excluding yellow fever
( Infection from every tiansport rested
on the medical officers who had charge
Of the embarkation. Had they failed
in this duty, the effect would have been
disastrous during the voyage TO the
men confined on shipboard. and the
risk of importing the disease into this
country would have been greatly in
creased. 1t is needless to refer at this
time to the complaints of starvation
which appeared almost daily in the
newspapers during the occupation OF
Camp Wikoff, for it is now generally
understood that the weakness, prostra-
ton, anaemia and emaciation of so
! many Of the troops were the result of
malarial typhoid and yellow fever
from which the army suffered as a con-
sequence of its exposure to the CHI
matte influences and local infections of
Santiago and its neighborhood. pending
ond after the surrender Of the CITY.
Up TO Sept. 80 eleven general hospi-
tails were established and fully man
ned and equipped. These had a ca
pacity Of nearly 1909 beds. At the san
time certain post hospitals having good
accommodations were used for the
treatment OF army cases generally.
without alteration of their official
status as post hospitals.
ARMY DEATH RATE
My report presents fluctuations CON-
piled from monthly reports of sick and
wounded received from May to Sep
TENDER, inclusive and representing q
strength at present OF 1916 men.
These give full particulars of Ills
deaths, of which number $40 were oe-
ossioned by typhoid fever; 81 by ms
larial fevers. and 1913 by diarrhoea and
| cysentery. The death rates for Nav
and June, As and TO- were not in ex-
cess of those OF the army In time of
peace. In July the rate became some
what higher than that OF most well
cared for cities. 2.15 for the month. OF
the equivalent of an annual rate OF
$3.50 per thousand living In August
it became excessive, 4.0S for the month
equal TO annual rate Of 4S9e pei
thousand. In September, the influence
of the energetic measures taken In
July and August 10 improve the health
OF the army became manifest In the
| failing of Of the death rate TO 245. OF