Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-06-05

son of the wear. During this intensely
| dangerous interval they have Kept their
| soldiers carefully sheltered, not daring
| to expose them to the risks OF an active
| campaign, and the same policy has peen
| followed even by the insurgents, VINO are
men accllmated from early youth 10 the
| Cuban climate. But in spite OF thls,
| even in the so-called healthy season OF
| the year. scores of thousands or the
| Spanish soldiers have passed through the
| army hospitals to untimely graves.
What is apparently suggested by those
who, We trust, are unauthorized indlvid-
uals, is that cur soldiers should be I'M
mediately sent into Cuba, and forced
In a relatively undisciplined condition
to carry on a campaign at time OF the
war when disease will sweep their ranks
and kill them off by the thousands. The
only reason that is given for the adoption
OF this inhuman policy is the wish on the
part Of some people TO have the excite
ment Of a real war, and the pretended
wish on the part OF others to put an end
to the expenditures OF money that our
government Is now under. Those VINO
are actuated by the first OF these two
motives are pretty certainly those who
are so ignorant OF practical conditions
that their advice ought to be repudiated,
OF exposing themselves to the dangers
of disease, and are quite Indifferent as
10 whether tens OF thousands OF their
fellow-countrymen die in the hospitals
or come back in a healthy condition.
Quite a number of these advocates OF
a prompt and speedy campaign are tnosv
who, If their suggestions were carried,
out, when the records OF dealt
began to pour in, and the indignan
horror Of the American people wa
aroused, as it would be by q wantoT
and useless sacrifice OF the lives
Of our young men, would be among the
first to cry out that those who were di-
recting the army movements were Ut
terly incompetent and were. in effect.
betraying the nation.
The other ground is seemingly
plausible one. We are spending from
s.. 10000 to 10000 a day In preparing
for war, and II we can finish this war
In six or eight weeks, instead of six or
eight months, II would undoubtedly be
a great gain for the United States Trea-
sury. But II IL was thought that we
could save 500 900 or 500, 1000 10 the
American people by permitting 5000 or
60 600 Of our soldiers TO unnecessarily die
OF disease in the Cuban morasses, we be-
lieve that the vast majority OF the
American people, even includlng those
who are 10 be most heavily assessed by
the war taxes. would promptly respond
that they preferred to pay the millions
OF taxes rather than thus murder their |
fellow countrymen.
II the general invasion Is delayed un- |
til the rainy season is over; II. In the |
mean time, those volunteer regiments |
that we have at the present time and |
those that IL may be considered expedi- |
emit to later on call into service are drill |
ed and properly prepared to do |
their work; and II the blockade |
OF the Cuban ports that we have ]
established is vigorously maintained
then IL may be that. through a |
surrender OF General Blanco an In
vasion In the form of war will not be |
called for. or. II called for. our soldiers
will strike q greatly weakened and dis
tressed enemy at a time when our men
have the preparations OF discipline. at
season when they can serve with the
east danger In Cuba, and In a form
which will permit the blow. when given,
70 DO strong. direct. and crushing.