Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-07-27
CUBANS AS ALLIES
Mr.. Pepper Gives His Views as to
Their Value.
THINKS THEY WILL CAUSE NO TROUBLE
New Arrivals Fomented the Diff
Guilty Between Shafter and Garcia.
EFF f ECT OF M EDDL Err S
THINKS THEY WILL CAUSE NO TROUBLE
EFFECT OF MEDDLERS

Mr.. Chas. NJ Pepper. whose letters to
The Star from Cuba before the outbreak of
hOstilities gave such graphic description
OF the horrors and tarbarities of Spanish
rule in that island, and who was with the
An erican army until after the capitulation
OF Santiago, has retL rned to Washington.
As he has probably been in closer contact
with the Cuban insurgents than any other
American, and has as good knowledge of
their struggles and Their general character,
he was asked to give his views as to the
campaign made by Gen. Shafter and also
as to the reported difficulty between the
American commander and Gen. Garcia, the
Cuban leader. MIR. Pepper said:
The Army Got There.
There is little to be said about the cam
paign which resulted in the surrender of
Santiago, because the full story has al
ready been told. Everything may not have
been conducted strictly according to the
rules of military tactics. but the army got
there iii short order. and that was what
concerned the American people After the
advance from the seacoast was begun
there never was an hour when the troops
could have been turned. The two days
hard fighting in which they took the out
posts at Caney and San Juan settled that
point. These victories were won by the
steadiness of the soldiers in the ranks.
Gen. Skaters tribute to them is recog-
milton of what every one who witnessed the
Sighting felt at the time. The galantry and
the determination of the whole army were
the irresistible influences. After the out
pests were taken and held the Spanish
commanders and the forces under their
command lost confidence in their ability to
hold the fortified positions in Santiago
itself, and began to think of captivating
Cervera's attempt to take his fleet out of
the harbor followed. and after it's destruc-
ton the Spanish soldiers in the city had no
stomach for resisting further land assaults
They had earned at Caney and San Juan
what it meant to stand out when American
troo's undertook to storm their intrench-
ments. This was what they themselves
said, and it was a powerful motive in caus-
ing the surrender.
The Cubans Allies.
There seems a disposition now to ques-
ton the effectiveness of the Cubans as
allies, and to predict that when the Span
ish forces have evacuated Santiago the
next business of the American army of &C.
cupation will be to settle the insurgents
1t might be well to await the full statement
OF the misunderstanding between General
Garcia and General Shafter before drawing
conclusions of a permanent split. There
nave been misunderstanding between the
army and the navy, and sometimes misun-
derstandings between the commanders in
the field and the authorities in Washington,
out these were cleared up without serious
consequences. Twenty thousand American
soldiers were engaged in the operations be-
fore Santiago. The Cubans numbered 900
yet it was assumed by many that they
would show up conspicuouSIy as our own
troops Garcia was blamed for letting Cen
eral Pando get into the city with 5000
Spanish reinforcements, but when it subse-
quently appeared that neither Pando nor
the reinforcements were there nothing was
said. Silly inventions and idle boastings
about Cubans massacreing Spanish prison.
ers were commented on without investiga-
ton, and when General Shafter after in
vestigation, discredited them, nothing more
was said. These are not vital matters. but
in forming judgment of the present situa-
ton they are worth remembering. The Gu
bans offered allies to the American army
the men who had for three years been
engaged in bushwhacking, guerrilla war
1are. The mass of them presented them
selves at Daiquiri and Siboney barefooted
and in their shirt tails. and most of their
shirts were ribbons of rags. They were
greedy for the rations issued, and in two
weeks they did not succeed in satisfying
a three years hunger. The American SOL
diers were also hungry during several days,
but they knew nothing of the tomorrow
habit, and they never thought of putting
off the fighting till their stomachs were
full. The Cubans, under the instructions
that had been given, were not placed in the
vanguard in taking the blockhouses and
forts, and it is unquestionabiy true that
they did not share to an appreciate extent
in those assaults. 1t was a method of
fighting of which they had no conception,
but this was not surprising. The foreign
military attaches who watched the two
days battles were frank in their own ex-
pressions of opinion whether trained Eu-
ropean soldiers could have been led or
driven against fortified position when the
artillery had failed, as it did in those in
stances, and the American troops took the
intrenchments by common impulse without
being either led or driven. AS to whether
the Cuban troops failed in anything that
was expected of them or in any duty as
signed to them the American commanders
are competent judges. General Lawton, to
whose division most of them were attach
ed, and General Shafter in their official re-
ports be trusted to do justice to their
allies.
VIII Not Cause Trouble.
However, the part the Cuban troops had
in the Santiago campaign is of lesser i'm
portance now than the part they are to
have in the future government of the city.
L do not believe that the Cubans. who for
three years kept up the fight against the
Spanish troops in the bushes and in the
mountains at such tremendous sacrifices,
will ever be a cause of trouble to the
United States 1t is because OF their en-
durance that the flag of Spain is today
disappearing from the West Indies. That
the superior force of the United States has