The record-union., 1898-05-18
'THE MAN BEHIND THE GUNS.

In some quarters there has been man
hest a disposition to rob Dewey Of some
of the honors of his victory on three
grounds. First, that the enemy was
surprised and was not ready for battle,
not even having steam up on its ships
of war. Second, that the heavier metal
of the American gave Dewey a decided
advantage Third, that a desire to save
the city of Manila and its one hundred
and sixty thousand people from bonn
bardment restrained the Spanish COM
mander from making the fight he might
have done.
Let these matters be considered in the
light of facts and reason. First, no
naval commander such as Montejo is
ever surprised. He knew the American
fleet was on his shores. He retreated
into Manila harbor clearly for the
strategic advantages that port gave
him, the narrow sphere Of action and
the support of many land batteries. 1t
IS even believed by some skilled Off
GERS Of the navy that he purposely per
snitted the passage of the forts at the
entrance of the bay under the belief
that Dewey was entering a trap.
Second, it is true that Dewey had the
heavier metal in his batteries. and the
more modern ships, better protected
and with better ammunition, and that
he outclassed the Spanish in gun power
But he operated without a base,
against land batteries, which always
are more accurate, and he had fewer
ships and was under the known peril Of
mines and planted torpedoes, over
which the enemy had full control.
Moreover, behind the Spanish ships
were 5000 soldiers armed with long
range rifles Of a fine character and
capable of effective service against
gunnerss who on cruisers are far more
exposed than on battle ships.
Indeed it is conceded that protection
Of life on the modern cruiser is about
at the minimum compared to the pro-
lection afforded on battle ships and on
Third Montejo must have known that
Dewey would not lombard the city
without giving the customary notice to
enable non-combatants to retire Fin
ally naval history proves that the hea-
vier metal does not always win, that
sometimes it IL radical disadvantage,
and that in close quarters it is not so
effective fer rapid work as lighter
metal enabling crews to operate more
rapidly and with more deadly effect.
The truth is disclosed in the evasive
report Of Admiral Montejo when he
says: THE American ships were com
PEELED to maneuver." They were not
compelled-it was purposeful and fore
cast by the wisdom of the American
Commodore. 1t was case Of "the man
behind the guns" who always and
guns. Dewey kept moving and thus
disconnected the gunners of the land
batteries.
As to the Spaniard being without
steam up. it is too absurd for consider
alton. Such condition upon a fleet
expecting the approach of an enemy is
rnthinkable. Moreover, that excuse
coming direct from Montejo's Captains
and Lieutenants is out of joint with the
claim that trap was laid for the
American If the snare was set as
suredly theshunter was standing by the
trigger.
It is probable, however, that the
Spanish Admiral took wrong measure
ment of his opponent. He did not
dream of that night dash into the har-
{ Dor. 1t was not a rash thing. It was
scoolly calculated, well planned and was
born of the genius of the man behind
fHthe guns" No other interpretation can
possibly be put upon it. Had it not
been carried out by consummate skill
.Gn n1aneuvering the result would have
been very different. A head less steady,
T resolution less firm, courage less
determined, would have lost us the day.
Tt was not a case of chance, but cool
and deliberate calculation. Dewey
measured the men behind the guns on
the other side, and his measurement
was accurate. That is the kernel in
the nut. It was a demonstration Of the
Eruth that we produce the men needed
for handling navy and that all they
lack is sufficient naval strength. They
lack sufficient tools of the trade. The
nation viii never again permit this to
be said
As to the real strength Of the COM
batants this statement is valuable and
shows that we outclassed the Span
ish fleet, though in ships it outnum-
bered us, but with its backing of forts,
mines and gunboats the conditions were
nearly equalized. Montejo had one
steel cruiser of $500 tons, one modern
cruiser of 3,342 tons, three iron cruis-
ers of more than LOO tons each, ten
steel gunboats of about 315 tons each
exceedingly useful for inshore fighting,
as well as valuable arms in maneuver-
ing. He had, besides, several small
fry boats that could, properly handled,
be made annoying, but there is no rec
ord of their strength available.
Montejo's gun power was six 6.2-inch,
seven 6-inch, eighteen 4.7-inch, two 3.3-
inch, four 3-inch, eight 2.7-inch and
forty smaller guns and machine guns,
most, Of them rapid fire. Some Of the
gunboats were launched in 1896. None