El Paso daily herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1881-1901, 1898-10-26
The President and the Wars Man
auement.

If MIR. Mckinley rose TO great Oc-
casion in the events preceding hos
tilities, did he fail to keep good his re-
cord in the presence OF actual war?
From the hour when, through the
tubborn policy of Spain, diplomacy
| had spoken its last word, the president
not only ceased to be the advo-
cate of peace. but became the very
| EN- bodiment of the intelligent and re-
| sistless war spirit of the nation.
| Thenceforwsrd no one com planned OF
Fabian policy. AS he had exhausted
ali honorable measures for averiinR
bloodshed, even at the cost OF criticism
and m sre presentation, so now he con-
centra,ed every energy OF his nature
and all the well nigh autocrasic war
powers of the executive upon the one
task of making the conflict swiftly and
humaueIy decisive.
And here came the greatest of In sny
surprises. Too young to have reached
hig b rank or great responsibility dur
ing his service 10 the civil war, the
president was not known to have
given much attention to military af-
fairs duriog his nature life. Many,
perhaps most, when hostilities OPEN
d, expected to- see him virtually stand
aside as a civilian and relegate the
strategy of the war, the planning and
carrying out of cam Dsigns, to the
his own predisposition it WAS quickly
displaced by two discoveries: first, that
generation OF peace had failed 10 de-
velop any one military officer of aoill-
ties 80 conspicuous and character so
balanced as to entitle him TO uuques-
toned leadership such as that, for eN-
ample, which Grant exercised du' ing
the closing years of the war for the Un-
ion; second, that the diversity of view
among equally competent expert i'd
vi.ers largely discounted the value of
their counsel and compe led resort by
the president TO the unwritten maxim
of Grant: In emergencies consult your
corps commanders, then do as you
think best.
Thus from the first, and that with
out vanity or presumption, Presided
Mex inley found himself eXerc sing in
fact the authority veste d in him by the
constitution as commauder-inc chief of
the army and navy. Awaiting himself
of the best talent In DO, b breaches of
! the service, with rare sagscity or good
fortune putting the ght commander
in the right place, careful not to vio-
late the canons of the military art, he
form ulated plan of campaign, definite
and positive in its main outlines, fexi-
bic in regard TO such details and con-
| tipgencies rs no one could foresee or
ers acted acted within the lines of this
general plan of the war and executed
with magnificent energy and thorough
Less the orders emanatipg from the
white house, but transmitted through
| the regular channels of subordinate
authority
| At the very outbreak of hostilities
came striking illustration of what
has here been said. It Is a fact not
commonly known that the first dis
patch which was cabled to Commodore
Dewey within twenty-four hours
after the declaration of war, orderiu g
him to sail forthwith for Manila and
capture or destroy the Spanish fleet in
Philippine waters-an order which re-
suited in the greatest naval victory in
history, decided the struggle in the
eastern hemisphere, and changed the
dictated by the president and sent by
his direction against the ad ice OF
the entire cabinet save one member.
In the campaign of Santiago, which
finally crushed the sea-power of Spain
and humanely ended the war in tbi ty
days, 1t was the presidents energetic
Intervention which overcame the
strange inertia aod confusion that
threatened to delay the departure OF
the expeditiouary force until the
golden opportunity had passed. On
the other hand, he had already vetoed
q summer campaign against Havana
by land aod SCI /, with its needless earn.
age ard its certain disaster from CHM
ate and disease.-From The Man al
the Heinz" by Gen. A. B. Nettleton
Reviews for October.