Barre evening enterprise. (Barre, Vt.) 1898-1898, 1898-05-07
GIVE CUBANS ARMS.
IA. st ARE WHAT GENERAL GOMEZ
N-ECS, SAYS SYLVESTER SCOYEL.

Many Troops to Cuba--Our Flee: Aida
aud tho Interior Cut On, spain's Power
WIN Soon End.
No volunteer troops arc needed in
Cuba, and very few regulars will be
sufficient. 1t would'be criminal to send
so. 900 American soldiers over the gulf
stream. Not because of epidemic dis.
ease Thcre is no such a thing in the
country in Cuba. Not because of loss
of life in great engagements. There is
no necessity in having them.
Enable Gomez and Garcia to equip
the Cubans for war, and they will make
it hard and strong. Give them good
rifles They know how to use them.
Men who for three years lspvo each had
an average of ten cartridges in their
boxes, and mono to foliaw, have learned
not to waste them.
The exact military situation in Cuba
today is just the condition for Gomez
to utilize if armed and supplied. He
has at the lowest estimate 30, 200 men
who have ha.dled arms and are accus-
tom ed to Spanish fire. The enthusiastic
Cuban junta probably claims 100, 900.
The truthful Gomez put it last January
at 35, 600. There are Undoubtedly $780,
600 in Cuba available for armament.
But the estimate Of 10000 men now
ready for business only includes Cuban
soldiers, neither employees of the civil
government organizations nor "ranch-
eros The fathers and the supporters Of
families living in the woods having
failed to obey Weyler's recommendation
bando are included. They, however,
would bo most useful as they now are
as scouts, and many would undoubtedly
Join the regular forces. Fully armed,
equipped and supplied, Gomez and Gar.
clear tho island of Spanish bases for
Spanish food and of themselves compel
the quick surrender of all the Spanish
forces outside of Havana, Matanzas and
Cienfuegos These ports and their cor
rallied forces can be starved or taken at
SIMPSONS will.
This statement that 3d. COO Cubans
can easily destroy all but three Spanish
bases and capture three -fourths Of the
Spanish troops may appear absurd to
our military authorities. 1t would be
absurd if not based upon what may be
called absurd military conditions. And
that is tho term for Spanish strength
outside Of the cities mentioned. Take q
map CT Cuba and note the fact that all
Spanish supplies come first to Havana
That is Cuba's military heart. The far
tier away from that the weaker is each
spanish post in food and munitions.
Ind they are absurdly weak at their
best EXMinistor CuDaleJas admitted
last November that tho Spanish troops
were starving. There never was sur
Plus in any base except the three men
tiored. There is loss now. There will
be nothing soon. This means death to
Cuban noncom batants-our proteges-
as we'll as to Spanish military move
ments, and the island should be taken
quickly. This is what Gomez can do.
Ask him what he wants, then send Go
mez what he wants and where he wants
it, and at once.
The coast is ours. This island is like
ribbon and with easy deep approaches
to oil necessary parts Of its coast line.
Our transports could start simultane-
ously for all insurgcnt bodies. Before
the ships can be started each leader to
be supplied can be given by Gomez ofli'
cial instructions and brought to the
point Of Decentralization and unloading.
Knowing that cartridges in plenty are
soon and surely to come, Gomez can
use what ammunition he has in the to-
tai disablement Of every railroad in
Cuba. There is now no Spanish water
transportation, and with the railroads
gone the poorly supplied Spanish bases
would be absolutely isolated.
Eastern Cuba need not be considered.
Spain is weakest there. Garcia has per
haps $4,000 men. As soon as supplied
Garcia could desert eastern Cuba and
march, as only Cubans can march, due
west. His is the best disciplined consid-
cradle force in Cuba. Garcia would need
four companies of United States caval-
ry Our infantry could not wisely at
tempt to keep up with hardened Cuban
foot soldiers. have seen these march
40 miles day for seven days, and on
almost nothing but sugar cane for food.
No artillery would seem necessary tc
this eastern chief. One transport land
ing at a roint on the south coast near
est Garcia would equip him. One gov
eminent tug or torpedo boat could keep
abreast of his position aud MAINTAIN
communication between Garcia and Co.
mez and the United States government.
Gomez could march at once. He
might have 20 pieces, one troop OF cav
airy and one regiment of regular in
fantry from the states. What are called
forts in Cuba are square holes III the
ground with wooden covers. MONO has
artillery. A few are small masonry
guardhouses. The average garrison is
about 80 men. There are none of these
which cannot he quickly reduced by a
80 inch fieldpiece and no town has over
dozen of them.
Arms and munitions can he easily
landed within 40 miles of Gomaz's pres
ent position. He will need little forage
while crossing Santa Clara province.
There is excellent grazing there. Ma
tanzas has remaining much sugar cane
also. Gomez could take Sancti Spiritus,
Santa Clara and every smaller town on
his line Of march without much inter
1ering with his progress, and Garcia,
marching light, could catch him in two
weeks near Matanzas If quicker juno
tion were desired, 4arcia's men could
be put aboard transports and landed