Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1898-03-02
aeliseellansous geaaing.
TO CAPTURE CUBA.
United States Would Simply starve the
SpanIards.


+
United States Would Simply starve the
spaniards.
New York Sun.
In case of a war between the United
States and Spain the island of Cuba
would be freed from Spanish rule much
more easily than is generally imagined.
This country would not need to send
a large army to the island to fight the
Standards in the field. Neither would
it need to lombard Habaua nor attack
it in any other way. Perhaps the war
would end, as far as Cuba is concern
ed, without the Americans firing sin.
gle shot either by land or sea. Though
these statements may at first appear
astonishing, they are the merely logl-
cal conclusions to be derived from the
knowledge of the real state of affairs
in the struggling island.
The Spaniards with an army of 15O,-
900 men, of which not 10000 are reg
ular troops, all that is left of the 2OO,.
900 soldiers sent from Spain since 1895
and decimated by battle and sickness,
control only the seaports ande the
strongly fortified towns of the interior.
The country from east to west is in
the hands of the insurgents. The
eastern part of the island, including
Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe,
is held by the Cuban generals, Cnlixto
Garcia, Jesus Rabi and Lope Recio
Loynaz. There the Cubans are strong
er than in any other section of the is
land. They have in these two prov
inces 10000 men at least, armed and
with plenty of ammunition. There
they hold the Spanish columns in
constant check, and the recent defeats
of General Pando, in Santiago de Cuba,
at the entrance of the Cauto river,
and of General Jimenez Castellanos at
La Esperanza, almost within sight OF
Puerto Principe city, show conclusive
ly what the power of the Cubans is in
the east.
The central part of the island, that
is to say, the province of Santa Clara,
is controlled by General Maxine Go.
mez. The Cuban commander-in-chief
has at least 10000 men there under
his orders, with Carrillo, Monteagudo,
Alvarez and several others as subordi-
nate commanders.
There are about 5000 insurgents in
the provinces of Mantazas aud Haba-
ma. This is where the Cubans are
weakest. the Spanish fortified towns
being nearer to one another and the
Spanish army more numerous. But
nevertheless, they have strength to
keep up a very lively guerrilla war
fare, raidipg almost daily the most
important towns and making dashing
attacks on the outskirts of Habana
city itself. The recent death of their
plucky leader, General Arangurep, has
not abated their ardor. General Bet
ancourt, General Alejandro Rodriguez,
General Rafael de Cardenas, and Colo
pels Davalos, Collazo, and others are
cutting out great deal of work every
day for the Spanish and guerrillas III
the Habana and Matanzas provinces.
Pinar del Rio province, the western
extremity, is Cuban stronghold. The
Cubans there are as strong as in Santa
Clara and hold the long and impreg-
nable chain of mountains extending
through the province. They do not
allow the Spaniards to get out of their
towns. Generals Delgado and Ducasi
are the principal Cuban leaders in
that province.
The result of this situation is that the
Spaniards cannot exist on the products
of the country in any part of the is
land. The country near the towns
was laid waste by General Weyler and
the gaunt spectre of famine stalks all
over Cuba. The determination of the
peaceable inhabitants by hunger is
going on rapidly. All these facts are
too notorious to be denied at this time.
The reconcentrados, or non-combat-
ants, starve and die by thousands only
because the country, on which they
exclusively depend, is not producing
food. The insurgents keep zones of
cultivation of their own, where they
raise vegetables and store their cattle,
but they do not divide their provis-
ions with the noncombatants, nor 10
they allow vegetables to be raised or
cattle kept by any one but themselves,
because it is their policy to prevent