The times., 1898-10-08
The Philippine Question at Paris.

The Philippine Question at Paris.
The Americanizing influence, which
Major General Wesley Merritt has al
ready exerfed upon our Peace Commits
sioners in Paris. evidently has resulted
in bringing the question of our reten-
ton or surrender of the Philippine ISL
ands TO a crisis. This is not what the
Administration has wanted, at least in
advance of the November elections;
but probably the matter has progressed
too far TO be successfully checked, and
il Will require monumental stubborn
ness and the extreme of finesse, on the
part Of the Commission. TO arrest the
manifest course of events. which is now
seen to lie in the direction of complete
possession of the archipelago by the
United States. That practically certain
solution is not yet clearly defined in the
attitude of our representatives. 1t is
plain, however. that it must be before
long. When Judge Day and his col
leagues arrived in France, it is reason
ably certain that they did not expect
to reap more of the fruits of Deweys
victory for their country, than TO Sc
tlIt- kIlt- tEAtuAlGll Ol AldilIid anu Il tO6t-
ing station. Those two points consti-
tuted all the advantage to the United
States, contemplated in the esoteric
negotiations with which the eX-Secre-
tary of State had been identified, and
which resulted in the formulation of
the Edmunds-Ireland protocol of prac-
tical surrender.
Since that time the Administration
has awakened to a realizing sense of
the deep Indignation which its apparent
intention to restore Spanish sovereign
" in the Philippines, has occasioned
throughout the Union, and Of the vul-
nerability Of its position, opposed as it
has been to the commercial financial.
humanitarian, and religious opinion of
the country. As consequence, the
leaders and conventions of the Repub-
Hcan party of late have displayed a
most intense desire to convince the vol
ing masses that solemn documents, like
protocols, are meaningless, and that
patriotism can surely and o(ly rely
upon platforms and speeches, Tor as
surance that the Administrator M
not carry out any little politicf Or
Spanish bond scheme. that it may haze
meant to originally. but will be truly
good, and obey the mandate of the na-
ton.
There is much of encouragement.
therefore, in the conditions at Pr ris. 1t
is now understood that the least de-
mand upon Spain will be our complete
possession of the Island of Luzon, and
the Independence of the remaining ISL
ands under an American protectorate.
This proposition, if successfully car
ried. OF course amounts to annexation
of the entire archipelago, since an in
dependent Tagal state under existing
conditions within and without would
be a social and political impossibility
But the plan upon which. as our dis
patches assert, the American Commits
sioners are working, will do for prelim-
mary purposes. 1t does not violently
ignore the letter of the protocol, and as
to the spirit of that confection, the less
anybody has TO say on the subject, the
better. perhaps. for the people who
were antecedently connected with its
acceptance and adoption by Mr.. Nc
Kinley. AS things stand, the Admins
tratiOn has a chance to let itself down
easy as regards popular feeling on this |
side. and finally to shunt around to
alignment with the people, possibly |
without the necessity of new appeal |
TO arms
That may not be the outcome, but |
let us hope for it. Naturally the Span |
iards will sulk and protest, and rre
one more effort to complicate Ls r..n |
the continental powers, by offeril tc /
divide with them what might be saved !
from our clutches by their active Il, er.
vention. So. 1t may yet be necessar- q, !
show our teeth, to denounce the truce. |
and to make a naval demonstration |
against the Spanish coast, before we
can bring the enemy TO his knees.
From this time on events ought to
move rapidly.