The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-06-23

Medical Authorities Anxious for the
Landing of the Troops.

medical Authorities ANXIOUS TOT the
Landing of the Troops.
WASHINGTON, June 22.-The medical au-
thorities here are anxious that the troops
should be landed at the earliest possible
moment from the transports off Santiago
and believe that to effect this the COM
manders would be justified in exposing the
men to some considerable degree of risk
from attack rather than to continue their
confinement on board the transports. The
fact that the animals taken along have suf-
fered heavy mortality is an indication that
the lot of troops cannot be very comfort
able. The appearance of typhoid fever
among the soldiers, as reported from
Santiago, is said at medical headquarters to
be due. not to conditions on the transports,
but to bad water or food taken in Florida
before the transports embarked. 1t is mani
testify impossible from medical point of
view for typhoid fever to develop within the
short space of time that the transports have
been at sea unless the germs were absorbed
some time before the vessels left Tampa.
In relation to the report that comes from
the squadron to the effect that Cervera is
giving signs of making a desperate dash
out of the entrance of Santiago harbor, the
naval officials here say that Sampson has
undoubtedly Gone everything that prudence
would suggest to prevent the success of any
such movement. The fact that he did not
allow transports to join his squadron, but
kept them twenty miles off at sea- is proof
positive that he did not purpose to subject
them to possibilities of destruction at the
hands of the Spanish topedo boats should
one or more of them manage to escape from
the harbor over the wreck of the Merrimac.
A c ba low
Oquendo, Colon and Maria Teresa, the Off
Gals are confident that, Notwithstanding the
reports from Spanish sources that the Mer-
rimac does not successfully block the chan
mel, these vessels cannot emerge without
blowing up the wreck However, Sampson
is taking no chances that can be avoided,
and, now that his squadron is so largely re-
inforced by the seventeen war ships that
made up the convoy which escorted the
transports, it is scarcely possible, should
the Spanish force the passage, that they
could escape destruction at the hands of the
American fleet.
Inasmuch as the story is reiterated that
the government has served notice to the
Spanish authorities that Cervera will be
held personally responsible for the safety
of Hobson and his men, it may be stated
positively that no such notice has been sent
from Washington. 1t is of course, possible
that Admiral Sampson might have taken
some such STEP but it is scarcely believed
here that he has found it necessary to dc
so. The opinion prevails at the Navy De-
partment that the Spanish refusal, or at
least Blanco's refusal (for it is not known
that the Spanish government at Madrid has
refused) to exchange Hobson, is solely be-
cause he has. had full opportunity during
his detention in the Spanish lines to observe
the character of the defenseS and to gather
other military information that might be
disastrous to the Spanish if disclosed to the
American naval and military commanders
In such case there would be, of course, some
reason for the present attitude of Captain
General Blanco in refusing to make the
exchange at this time, but the other
hand this reason would of course disap-
pear upon the capture of Santiago and
there would be no longer a preteXt for the
refusal to exchange Hobson and his men,