Evening star., 1898-09-09
HONEST MEN BEHIND THE Gun.
EnSiishmcn StflI Drawing Lessons
From Our Victory AT Santiago.
Cnrrnernndcnce in LIN

En&iishmcn StilI Drawing Lessons
From Our Victory at Santiago.
Correspondence in LIN Jon Chronicle
Much has been said Of the man behind
the gun, and 1t has been pointed out that
the Saxon being superior 10 the Latin, il
was only natural that Spain should be de-
feated on the sea. Very true; and vet il
seems to me one factor in the equation has
Dcen overlooked. Morality counts in fight
ing like everything else. Your honest man
Is a better man-in all things-than a rogue
according to the testimony of one of the
onicers OF the Spanish fleet the crew of The
Cristobal Colon Were mainly cOnvicts
taken out of the gaois and rorcibly put
aboard the ship just before she sailed from
Spain. is 1t 10 De supposed for one minute
that men OF this stamp could stand up be-
1ofe American sailoTs-sailors because they
love their work and glory in their country
Another Spanish officer is authority for the
statement that liquor was plentifuliy serv-
ed TO al the crews before The ship LETT San
tlago harbor, and that great many OF the
men were drunk. Drunken ,onVicts pitted
against sober, cool-heaced American free
rnen! is II surprising that sixty min
utes Cervcra's feet was a mass of twisted
steel and iron. while the American SQUAD
ron had passed through Its ordeal TN
scathed?
We have been finding explanations for
the marvellous hitting qualities" of the
American gunners. as demonstrated both
at Manila and Santiago. One, to me the
simplest, has been overlooked There are
very few American naval commanders who
have had much experience in fleet work
American sqUadrons have rarely consisted
since the close of the civil war and until
the commencement OF present hostilities of
more than three or four vessels and thes.
have generally been scattered over the sta
tion- There has been practiC ally no oppor-
tunity for fleet evolutions. for the intricate
maneuvers which distinguish European
navies In their place American command
ers have devoted their time to gun drill, to
sub-callber- and target practice, with the
Cne END In view of bringing their men to
the highest state of proficiency as tunners
PROBABLY, IN fleet tactical eVolutions the
American admiral might be at a disadyan-
tage. but in gunnery he has shown the
world what he can do
Another thing We have been taught Is the
uselessness OF the coming tower. IL cam
not De ascertained that a single command
ing officer awaited himself OF the protec-
ton of his armored citadel. The space IL
TOO narrow TO permit a captain TO see
everything happening around him, and in
action the commanders vision must not be.
narrowed. Perhaps even strong ar obiec-
uon to the use Of the coming tower is the
Implied reflection IL conveys en- the courage
OF the commanding officer. The men must
stand in the open. the captain is safe be-
hind his steel walls. The sight of the cam
tain standing bridge or pilot house see
ing and seen by bis men, encouraging them
ey his presence. sharing with them the
rIsks. rs an inspiration, an incentive TO
greater deeds Would Nelson be the rlor-
sous figure of history IL he had been shot
while telegraphing to the engine room from
the coming tower?- Farragut dashed 10 the
rigging made even the timidest a hero: IN
comparative safety behind his belSed wallis
the inspiration of his presence would nave
been lost.