The daily morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1883-1899, 1898-04-17
will Consist Of Cavalry, Infantry and
Light Artillery.
ADVISED BY GENERAL LEE
Troop, Eill Land Oh the vest Tad Of the
Island and Effect Iunetufe with the
lnsurgeuts Lndef GomsL.

New York. April ia Times dlsDaich
from Washington says:
II s expected the forces used IN Cuba
viii consist Of cavalry. infantry and Hight
artillery. Heavy artillery could hardly
Doe used 10 the wet season and besides
lt would not be necessary.
CousuI-General Lee advises the use Of
these branches OF the service In Cuba. He
thinks the army can. successfully con-
duct operations In the island during the
wet weather II II has cavalry and light
batteries Rapld-hre guns ard plenty OF
them will be depended upon very largely
10 DO the fighting Il Is reported by all
observers Of the military methods of the
spaniards that their infantry at once
forms d hollow square upon the approach
Of cavalry This military formation has
been IN practice Tor a century and the
spanards have not learned any other
way to rcpel cavalry. Military experts
say that when an army is so formed Il
can be- dccimaied by rapld-hre guns and
destroyed II II does not soon break such
formation. The cavalry will be used 20
force the spanlards into position. to get
them al bay, as II were, and the infantry
and light artillery will then attack with
rapid-nre guns II is said that the Span
ish forces in Cuba are poorly armed.
They have a fairly good rifle, the Mau-
ser. but are inadequately supplied with
ammunition and most OF the troops being
young boys do not know how to use their
guns In rapid-hre guns they are very
deficient Artillery is their weakes,
point and they cannot now supply the
deficiency Even Havana is defended by
antiquated cannon with the exception OF
six fine Krupp guns which, however, have
been allowed to rust on their carriages
as the artlllerists do not know anything |
about their use.
At Matanzas they have four guns OF
the same kind, heavy 10 and 12-inch can
non, but they have no carriages for them
and they are perfectly useless. II is !
said there Is only one ordance officer OF
the army. Ordrineau, who understands |
the handling OF such guns. General Lee
4. t- ,,,a.r.t,1I ,a,.ia.1 th. xrar 1anart- /
ment that few good regiments would |
be sufficient for the first movements in
Cuba, He relies very strongly upon the
efficiency OF the army under General Co
mrz and General Garcia which would
naturally be our allies in war He re-
ports that the revolutionists have an ef-
fcctye army Of 1000 troops which they
could Increase to lOO,o0O almost any time
II the arms for them were found Co
meg has kept his army at its present
number because 1t was too difficult to
maintain a large army in the country
after its repeated devastation and be-
cause 5000 men were enough to keep up
the war and crush Spain slowly. on the
other hand. the Spaniards have not more
than 5000 to 5000 effective troops If the
revoluuonists be armed and small but
well disciplined and seasoned army from
this country is landed in the island he
thinks the Spanish will have no chance
for successful resistance.
Another element in the war that Cen
eral Lee commented on is that Spains
troops in Cuba are depending upon this
country for food supplies, The island can
be entirely shut of from food by the ac-
ton of the United States. 1t is said that
Havana would suffer as much as II it
were actually heseged II We should pre-
vent our ships from carrying anything
FOR the Spaniards and the Spanish ships
from procuring supplies from our ports.
Havana It is said by consuls and all who
have studied the condition of affairs on
he island is absolutely without food, 1t
IS said, indeed, that none of the Spanish
armies have any stores of provisions and
that Havana is worse OFF than any other
place, An attacking force that merely
contents itself with shutting off the food
supply would soon reduce them to sub
mission
1t is very probable that one of the
plans Of the military authorities is to
make effective the Cubans by arming
them and thus turning out good fight
ing force against the Standards. 1t is
said that arrangements are already made
looking to this end and securing the inn
mediate cooperation Of the American
and Cuban forces The landing on the
island would virtually he on the western
end and on the northern coast, While
this would place the army at a consider
able distance from the Cuban forces un-
der Gomez 1t has advantages that more
than offset this apparent separation OF
the allies \ union could soon be ef-
fected and the revolutionists, freed from
any restraint along the military lines in
the east, would soon sweep on Havana
province and unite with the Americans
The fleet would also aid in the junction
of the forces at any point fixed upon for