The herald., 1898-12-22
Associated Press Special Wire

|
WASHINGTON, Dec. 81. = The official
reports of all comanding officers of the navy
during the war have been compiled and pub
lished by the navy department. While
treating of events that ahve already fig
ured in official reports that have reached
the public, the documents still contain many
minor reports that throw sidelights on in
teresting phases of the war.
HIDDEN HEROES
Almost at the beginning, in the brief record
of the proceedings of the naval war build
ing, an unknown hero is brought to Light
in the person of Ensign Fl. III. Ward, who,
at the beginning of the war, was on duty
in the navigation bureau, alternating with
Lieutenant Whttlesey in the heavy duties
of assistant to the chief of the bureau. He
volunteered for secret service duty, and his
exploits, about which nothing has been said
| in the past, may well be placed on record be-
side those of Lieutenant Rowan IN Cuba
and Lieutenant Whitney in Porto Rico.
Within week after the declaration of war
Ensign Ward disguised himself and went
straight into the heart of the enemy's coun-
try, making his headquarters at Cadiz, the
principal Spanish naval station, and inform
ing the navy department here of the actual
strength of the Spanish naval vessels and
their movements. Then he went to the
West Indies and reported everything that
was doing there of Importance to the Amer
lean navy. Next he went into the enemy S
country in disguise, this time to Porto Rico,
where he was arrested as spy. BY adroit-
ness he managed to secure his release, escap-
ing from San Juan, and cabled the navy de-
partment full account of the state of the
defenses there and the preparations max
ing for the reception of the Spanish squad
ron under Cervera. All this time even, the
officials of the navy department were under
the impression that Ward was engaged in
installing a system of coast signals on the
New England coast.
| While Ward was in Porto Rico Ensign
Buck, arNther attache of the navigation bu.
reau, was on the shores of the Mediterra-
mean, in disguise, watching every movement
of the squadron of Camara, which started
for the Philippines but turned back.
ACTION AT CAVITE
The reports of the famous battle of Cayite
includes one from United States Consul
Williams, a rather unusual thing in re-
port OF strictly naval character, but fully
justified by its picturesque and untechnical
description of Dewey's great victory. Fol
lowing it is report to his government on
the same engagement by the commander-in-
chief of the ill-fated Spanish fleet, Montejo
The admiral depicts thel bad condition OF
the Spanish fleet and defenses He. says
that the cruiser Castillo was incapable of
maneuvering, on account of her condition
while the defenses at the entrance of Subig
bay were backward. With much disgust
he found that the guns which should have
been mounted were delayed month and a
half, and he was no less disgusted to find
that reliance was had for the defense of
the port upon few torpedoes, not properly
placed: Finding SubiG bay deNenseless, the
Spanish squadron repaired to the bay Of
Manila to meet battle under less unfavor-
able conditions. The admiral avoided the
city, not wishing to draw fire upon it, and
prepared his fleet for action, painting his
vessels a dark gray and having the fires
spread and springs on the cables. He says
that the force of Dewey's vessels, leaving
out the transports, amounted to 81 ,4lO tons
1920 horsepower, 1853 guns (many rapid
fire), 1850 men and an average velocity Of
II miles. Against this the power of his
only five effective ships was lOlll tons
II 200 lhorse-po 76 guns (very short OF
rapid fire), 1875 crew and maximum speed
OF IL miles. The admiral describes in vivid
language the terrible effect of the American
onslaught on the Spanish vessels. He saws;
FIRED TOO FAST
The Americans fired most rapidly. There
came upon us numerous projectiles as tn,
three cruisers at the end of the line devoted
themselves almost entirely to fighting th
Christina, my flagship. A short time aftel
the action commenced one shell exploded
in the forecaste and put out of action al
those who served the four rapid-tre can
mons.
Meantime another shell exploded in th,
foretop, setting fire to the crew bags
AT 1880 o'clock shell completely de
stroyed the steering gear. Another de
stroyed the mizzenmast, bringing down m,
flag and ensign; another shell exploded il
the poop and put out of action nine men
A fresh shell exploded in the officers cabin
covering the hospital wici blood and de
stroying the wounded who were bein
treated there. Another exploded in the am
munition room.
Il had to flood the magazine when tn,
cartridges began to explode. On
large shell penetrated the fire room, put
ting out OF action one master gunner ant
twelve men serving the guns. Anothe
rendered useless the starboard bow gun, ant
while the fire increased astern, another fir
started forward from another shell. Th
broadside guns continued firing until Their
were only one gun and one seaman remainin,
unhurt for serving.
ORDER TO SINK THESHIP
"The ship being out of control, the hull
smokepipe and the mast riddled with shot
orders confused with the cries of til
wounded, half of the crew out of action
among whom were seven officers, gave tn,
order to sink and abandon the ship befor
the magazines should explode"
The story of the loss of the Castillo wa
substantially the story of the loss of al
the other Spanish ships, and Admira
Montejo sums up his account with thi
statement:
"The inefficiency of the vessels which