Evening journal., 1898-11-21

cases appeared IN most OF the regiments
la May and June. these cases having
been brought I'm many Instances from
The state camps In fact some regi-
ments. as the Fifteenth Minnesota. suf-
fered more from this disease at their
ftate rendezvous than any Of the regi-
inents I'm t1e large federal camps
'lt appears from a general review OF
the sanitary reports already filed that
The prevalence Of the disease was pro-
portioned TO the unsanitary camp con-
ditions which / have referred TO. The
probability Of its communication 60 sol
diers in camp through the agency of
flies was pointed out as a reason foF
insisting on a sanitary police of the
gtrictest character. IL Is well known TO
the medical profession that this fever is
propagated by a contaminated water
supply and It is now recognized that
the great prevalence Of this disease IN
an aggravated form I'm the camps OF the
civil war was due to the use Of en- face
and shallow well waters infected by
typhoid excreta. To prevent transmits
sion by the water supply ! recommend
ed the use Of boiled and filtered water
when a pure spring supply could not be
obtained. and TO enable an efficient Ill
tratlon Of suspected waters to be maze
field filters OF approved construction
were issued on my recommendation by
the quartermaster's department.
THE seriously sick We're to be treated
in division field hospitals, unless their
transfer to a general hospital was adj
visable. under the care of the most ex-
perienced physicians and able surgeons
on duty with each division. Medical
officers left on duty with their regi-
ments were to exercise sanitary SUPER
vision over the we'll men and to deter
mine whether a soldier representing
himself sick should be sent to hospital
or remain as a trivial case under treat
ment IN quarters. This consolidation Of
the medical force by divisions. imply
ing, as IL did, the breaking UP Of the
regimental hospitals, met with a strons
opposition from regimental medical Of
ficers. particularly from those who We're
not detailed for special service at the
division hospitals.
Long before the Fifth army corps
embarked for Santiago Cuba. it's field
hospitals were IN condition for efficient
service. Subsequent events, however,
rendered valueless these preparations
OF the medical department When the
command embarked on the transport
vessels, the baggage wagons and mules
were left behind. The ambulance trains
OF all the divisions, with o. large part Of
the outfit of each-of the hospitals, We're
also left behind. Three ambulance
wagons were taken apart and stored on
one 90 the vessels. These did excellent
service at San Juan and FL Caney. Ten
OF the amhulances Of the Third or re-
serve. divisional hospital We're SUISSE
uuently shipped 90 cuba, where they
arrived July 2 and were of value in
moving the sick and wounded TO the
hospital al Siboney and to the hospital
ships and transports.
"Of the property and supplies carried
90 Cuba q portion was not available for
service at the time It was most needed.
TO wit. on July !. and 3. when the
wounded from El Caney and san Juan
We're coming from the front for care
and treatment This was because. in
general. no opportunity was afforded TO
lnd the medical property. Earnest CT
forts were made by medical officers to
have supplies at tho front with the
trocps. During and after the battles OF
El Caney and san Juan there was an
insunlciency of tents, cots, bedding ana
medicines. due TO the causes stated, but
an the hospitals were well equipped for
surgical work
transfer Of troops from Santiago 90
Montauk Point, N. " was also an
emergency measure. and the great re-
possibility Of excluding yellow fever
infection from every transport rested on
The medical officers who had charge OF
The embarkation. Had they failed ia
his duty the effect would have been
disastrous during the voyage to the
men confined on shipboard, and the risk
Of importing the disease into this coun-
try would have been greatly increased
1T is needless to refer at this time 20
The complaints OF starvation which APP
peared almost daily i'm the newspapers
during the occupation OF Camp W.koI
Tor Il IS now generally understood that
the weakness. prostratlon, anRmia and
amaciation Of so many of the troops
We're the results of malaria, typhoid and
yellow fever from which the army suf-
rercd as a consequence Of its exposure
20 the climatic influences and local in
fections OF Santiago and its neighbour
hood pending and subsequent to the
surrender OF the city.
"The method Of hospital organization
IN home camps was practically the same.
There was much similarity in the condi-
tons affecting them and corresponding
~ In their history. Regiments reported
I'm but few Instances with the material
and supplies for their medical care. but
they brought sick men with them and
these required immediate care. Pro-
vision had TO be made for division hos
pitfalls In view of future field service and
for reglmental hospitals in view Of the
immediate necessity.
"Chief surgeons OF corps and divisions
began the organization and equipment.
but they were met at the outset by the
apparent impossibility Of securing men
for service as cooks, nurses litter hear
ers. ambulance drivers transfers. etc.
"As "a rule the hospitals were kept in
campaigning condition-that is. the
tents were neither framed nor foorcd
until the increased prevalence of tv-
phoid fever attracted attention 20 their
crowded condition. when the object OF
their existence became suddenly chang.
ed from a school for field service &C. a
hospital for the treatment of n loca
outbreak of disease. Special diet llitch.
ems under the Management Of capable
individuals were opened at most OF the
hospitals. Money for this purpose was
sent 10 them by me from funds contrib.
uted and placed at my disposal Money
NVne allen sent directly nv fuTfsrf,ls.. q.