Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-11-29
CERVERA WARNED SPAIN
Told His Country It Was. Rushing on to
Certain Defeat
Declared Before the Wan That the
full and That Cubs Was Lost.

The Navy Department today published,
through the office of naval Intelligence, the
views of Admiral Cervera regarding the
Spanish navy in the late war; The views
were expressed by Cerveras in protest
against Spain rushing into war in the face
of certain defeat.
Cervera writes: II ask myself if it is
right for me to keep silent, and thereby
make myself an accomplice in adventures
which will surely cause the total ruin of
SPAIN And for what purpose? To defend
an island which was ours, but belongs to
us no more, because even if we should not
lose it by right in the war, We have lost it
in fact and with it all wealth and an enor
nous number of young men. victims Of the
climate and bullets, in the defense of what
is now no more than romantic ideal.
Furthermore / believe that this opinion of
mine should be known to the queen, and
by the whole council of ministers. l have
deemed it my duty to express my opinions
t. the proper authorities clearly and with
out beating about the bush. Now let orders
be given to me: | will carry them out with
energy and decision: | am ready for the
worst"
Taking up some of the vessels in detail
in a letter written in January, he shows
how the Vizcaya carried defective guns;
how the Carlos was failure because of
lack of powder and how the Catalina,
begun more than eight years before, was
still incomplete. And then he predicts that
a conflict would be disastrous to Spain. In
a letter written in February the admiral
speaks of the Colon having no guns, of
other vessels being defective, of the inabil-
ity of the fleet to coal at CadiZ, of their
being obliged to go out with half rations,
and, finally, their having no charts of the
American seas He says that the eight
principal vessels on the Havana station
are worn out, and that taking things as
they are the Spanish naval force, compared
with that of the United States is in the
proportion of one to three. In such Condi-
tons a campaign, he writes. would be dis
aStrOus if not an offensive one, and all
that could be done in an offensive way
would be to make some raids with a few
fast vessels. The admiral-points to the fu-
tility OF attempting to blockade the United
States ports, and asks how the Spanish
navy would repair, even should they win
a great victory. without resources He
says: 1t would be foolish to deny that
what We may reasonably expect is defeat,
which may be glorious, but all the same
defeat which would cause US to lose the is
land in the worst possible manner. "
Only in case we could count on some pow
erful ally could aspire to obtain a salts
factory result
The admiral refers TO the Spanish Pacific
force as not able to afford even a shadow
Of resistance to the American naval force.
Further on he speaks of the war as at last
in sight, and laments the incomplete state
OF the Spanish vessels. But, after all, he
says that he is glad the end is coming and
is prepared to do his duty He is on record
as protesting against the idea of sending
the little torpedo boat hotilia to Cuba,
pointing out that naval defeat for Spain
would precipitate the loss OF Cuba. He
speaks of the surprise and establishment ex-
perienced by all of the officers of his squad
ron on receiving orders from Spain to sail
from Cape Verde for Cuba, inasmuch as
they had united in pointing out the condi-
ton of the ships. Says the admiral: with
an easy conscience | go to the sacrifice,
but | cannot understand that decision of
the navy general officers against my opin-
ions The last letter in the series is one
from Admiral Nillaamil Of CerVera's squad
ron. addressed directly to Sagasta point
ing out that the sacrifice of, the Spanish
naval forces will be as certain as it will be
useless and fruitless for the termination of
the war