The Indianapolis journal., 1898-12-03
STORY OF THE WAR
As Told by the Official Dispatches ON
File at the Department.

File at the Department..
The secretary here includes in his report the
reports of General Miles and all the other generals
who participated in active operations. He then
takes up the telegaphic and other correspondence
relating TO the war and that matter occupies
more than fourth Of the secretary's whole re-
port. As already stated the dispatches are al
lowed to tell the story of the war without COM
ment as far as possible, although in instances the
secretary prefaces them with short notes, ex-
planatory of the reasons which led to their trans
mission This part OF the official story begins
with the statement that early in May movement
on Havana was contemplated and it was believed
that the city could be assaulted and captured
before the rainy season set in but the plan was
subsequently abandoned, account Of the re-
ported movement OF the enemy's fleet. 1t was
proposed to send another part of it to Key West,
on account of the close proximity Of the latter
place to Marel, Cuba. The secretary quotes one
of the dispatches at this point, as follows:
Headquarters Of the Army,
Washington May 9.
THE major general commanding directs that
the following orders be sent by telegraph TO Gen.
Wade, at Tampa: Direct General Shafter to move
his command, under protection of the navy, and
seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on
north coast Of Cuba, where territory is ample to
land and depoy army Follow up his command
with all the force sent to you. Troops will be
sent you rapidly as possible from Chtcka-
mauga and other points.
~ c. GILMORE, Asst AdJutant General"
This order was forwarded by Adjutant General
Corbin to General Wade who was further in
structed TO have the troops fully equipped with
sixty days rations, to be followed by four
months supplies. A number of kilograms are i'm
cluded to show what difficulty was experienced
in getting water at Key West for the expedition.
The movement of troops being delayed until May
16, Ii was proposed to carry number of them to
Key West and disembark them there, so that the
ships might return to Tampa to bring more
troops until II 600 men could be assembled at Key
West. General Wade, however, telegraphed on
- &1pk+ raA pFslfa m Il or
West, that It became a serious question how
large body of troops could be maintained there.
At this point appears order to General Miles
to make an inspection of the camps before the
departure Of the shafter expedition; though there
is nothing in the correspondence to show what
action was taken under it. The order reads as
washington, May 26.
MAI. Gen. Nelson A. Miles. Commanding United
s.Sir~You Win proceed to the following points to
make thorough inspection Of the troops there
in camps: Chckamauga, Ga; Tampa, Fla. I;
officers of your personal staff On the completion
of this duty you will return to the city and
make report Of the inspection here in order I
"R. A. AIGER, Secretary of War;
On the 21st Cen. Shafter telegraphed General
Miles that he was temporarily OBTAINING the part
of the volunteer regiments at jacksonville on
account of the difficulty Of finding a suitable
camp ground<at Tampa.
MILES'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
The next dispatch is from General Miles
outlining the plan OF campaign. 1t reads as fol-
lows:
washington, May 27.
''The Honorable, the Secretary of War:
"Sir-Referring to my letter of yesterday and
to our consultation since. desire to submit the
following. As we are now about to inaugurate
active military operations in conjunction with the
navy, think it would be advisable to load the
transports at Tampa with strong force of In
fantry and artillery, move them to Key West
and thence along the northern coast OF Cuba
where they would have the full protection of
Admiral Sampsons fleet until they reach Admiral
fleet Santiago
combined effort OF the army and navy capture
the harbor, garrison and possibly the Spanish
'If before reaching Admiral schleys feet it
shall be found that he has already accomplished
have escaped, T. then urge the Importance Of a
combined attack of the army and navy on Porto
Rico. We viii be able to land a superior force
and believe that combined effort will result
I'm capturing the island with its garrison, provided
The distance from Key West to Porto Rico is
lao miles and from Cadiz. Spain, to Porto Rico,
It is about 1000 miles. The possession Of Porto
Rico would be Of very great advantage 10 the
military 1t would cripple the forces of Spain,
giving US several thousand prisoners. II could be
well fortified, the harbor mined and would be q
most excellent port for navy, which could be
speedily relieved from any responsibility in the
charge OF that port, we could leave a sufficient
garrison TO hold II against any force that might
be sent against il.
''Then we should commence, In my judgment,
movement toward tine west, by capturing the
ports along the northern coast of Cuba, at the
eastern end, supplying the insurgents with
abundance or arms and munitions of war, and
speedily as possible land our cavalry and
sufficient light artillery to enable them TO move
from the harhcr OF Porto de Neuvitas along the
line Of railroad to Puerto Principe. From that
base our cavalry and Hight artillery, in conjunc-
tion with the forces of Lieutenant General Garcia
and General Gomez, should move west to near
Santa Clara. These movements in my judgment,
through country comparatively free from yellow
fever, well stocked with cattle and having grass
sufficient for our animals. While this Is being
accomplished our volunteer army will lie prepared
to land in the vicinity Of Mariel, Havana. or
Matanzas In sufficient force upon the Island Of
Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be
that the army and navy will act IN concert and
close unison; that IL does not divide our navy
and that 1t will utilize our most available mill
tary force IN the best way during the time OF
the year when the military operations are most
difficult. believe that the entrance to the port
Of Cienfuegos can be ohstructed or blockaded BY
one two monitors to better advantage than to
send the army there, where il would have to meet
a strong garrison, which Is already there. and
all Of the forces that be quickly sent by rail
directly from Havana and MatanZas
III the above plan Is approved troops could be
ordered TO embark the transports Immediately
and the purpose would be the occupation OF
Spanish territory, FIRST by moving our troops as
speedis as possible to Santiago de Cuba and
Porto Rico. and later 10 the north coast of Cuba.
especially cavalry. This military occupation
to continue until hostilites cease. Very respect
fully, NELSON A. MILES,
Major General Commanding"
THE GREAT DIFFICULTY
Without indicating what disposition was made
OF the suggestions contained IN this dispatch.
Secretary Agar goes to briefly explain the CON