The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-04-12
and the government is Gomez. 1t would
not be Spanish else.
After "Neutra, Intervention, "what?

In the light of the presidents mes
sage the address of Mr.. Rubens, coun-
| sci for the junta, becomes interesting.
Turning back to that remarkable, bel
| ligerent and highly Spanish document.
we find this naturaliZed Don very we'll
| informed last Wednesday of the con-
tents of the message that went in Mon
| day. The Recommendation of the presi
dent for neutral Intervention he alleges
| was the result Of an understanding
between Washington and Madrid.
What would follow, he says, would be
| the occupation of the island by our
forces; plebiscite permitting the peo-
pie to choose between autonomy with
allegiance to Spain retained, independ-
| ence and annexation to the United
States. THE presence and pressure of
federal force would determine the cleo
| ton in favor of annexation" This, he
declares. the Cubans will not permit.
| They are out for absolute independ-
ence. Such intervention will be taken
as declaration of war by the United
States against the Cuban revolution
lists. If the United States land an
| armed force, the Cubans who are in
revolt will treat it as an enemy to
be opposed and. if possible, expelled"
| True. these are the words Of an
Amer1canized Spaniard practicing law
IN New York, and who would be the
| last man to join the forces resisting
| such intervention; but he speaks for
the junta, and the junta speaks for the
rebels, and such resistance is one Of
the conditions the president may have
to meet should his request be granted.
Suppose Rubens speaks by the book,
| what then? Spain has sent 100000 SOL
diers into Cuba since 1895, and the war
| has settled down into a guerrilla con-
| flict with the rebels holding the interior
| of the eastern half Of the island. How
many men would we have to send there
to chase Gomez and his ragged latter
| donations out of the mountains and
| make them accept autonomy? All our
expenditure in naval preparation would
go for nothing. for the fighting would
/ be done on land. Would we not have
| to send an army big enough to form
| living, moving trocha across the ISL
and, which would sweep eastward.
brushing the insurgents before it into
the sea or forcing them into surrender
| and submission?
| Then again, considering the inherent
cussedness of the Spanish disposition,
whether in the pure bloods or in the
| mixtures that inhabit the Central and
| South American republics" what
guarantee would we have that any
| peace, however secured, would be Of
| any permanence? How lasting has
peace been in any of the Spanish re-
| publics? If permanent pacification is
| the thing we are to intervene to get, so
| that our trade with Cuba may never
again be harassed and injured, could it
be obtained in any other manner than
| by our permanent occupation of the ISL
ard. establishment Of government and
administration of affairs? AS one con-
templates what may come after "neu-
trail Intervention" complications certain
and probable. thicken until one about
reaches the conclusion Grant did that
it were better to let these fellows fight
it out and keep ourselves out of their
| quarrel. When they shall have accom-
plished mutual determination, we
| might go in and occupy the land.