The Portland daily press., 1898-12-22

SCaIClby Ol Tdplu uT0 CttUuOu, buC
crews of the enemy and the unpertecteu
character of the greater part of our yes
sells all contributed to make much more
decided the sacrifice which we made for
our country, and to prevent rae posi-
blity of the horrors of BON bardment
of the city of Manila, with the conviction.
that with the scarcity of our force against
the superior enemy, we were going to
certain death and could expect loss of
all our ships. Our casualties, including
those of the arsenal, amounted to 38l men
killed and wounded.
An evidence of the strategy exhibited
by the navy department in sending reipv
forcemenJs to Dewey is shown In a des-
patch of June 27, informing him of the
coming of the Monadnoek. Probably
with view to prevent her from falling
into trap she was not despatched
directly to Manila, but was ordered to
a point 600 miles due east from Cape
Enaano, where she was to meet one OF
Dewey's ships. Apparently the first sug-
gestion OF the organization OF the lying
squadron which was divert Admiral
| Camara's squadron from its voyage to
patch of June e. he says:
9In my Judgment if the coast of Spain
| is threatened, the squadron of the enemy
will have to return. and that was ex-
actly what happened. A month later the
admiral pays high compliment to the
British consul at Manila, Mr.. Rawson
Walker, who for three months had been
discharging ths duties of United State
consul in Manila and rendering the Ad-
miral great assistance.
| The admiral's estimate of the imports
| anoe OF the Philippines islands is set out
| in the following telegram sent in an-
! swer to an inquiry from the governments
Manila. August 90, 1893.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington:
Referring to the department. tele-
gram of August ID, important island S are
Colon, Luzon, Panaya, Cebu, Negros,
Leyse. Others, owing TO the nature OF the
inhabitants. have small amount of civ
| ilization, want of cultivation. They may
| be neglected, especially isles of southern
group Luzon is in all respects the most
| desirable to retain. Contains most i'm
porJant commercial ports. Manila is
| farthest north; produces all of the gGod
| TOBACCO. Friendly natives, civflizatiob
advanced Not yet developed. Possibly
| rich minerals Population SIS, 600. SuLic
lay best harbor for coaling purposes and
military Water deep; landlocked; easiiy.
defended. Strategicaily command or
! Cavite, most valuable. Panaya, Cebu,
Negros thickly populated, most civilized
and we'll cultivate. Iloilo second com-
mercial port; centre of sugar trade;
good harbor strategetlcaliy, Iii view Oh
the situation, good for defense Cebu
third commercial port. good harbor,
very desirable. no coal OF good quallJy
can be procured in Philippine islands.
Some has been mined on Cebu by Eng
lish company. I trust it may not be nee
essary ue order me to Washington. Should
regret very ssmuch to leave here while
matters remain in present critical condi-
tion.
(signed) Dewey.
The report of the operations Of the
North Atlantic feet comprises the larger
part of the printed matter. Most OF the
facts have already appeared, but there is
an Interesting exchange of letters be-
tween Secretary Long and Admiral
Sampson showing that, even before the
outbreak of the war, the Admiral had
worked out complete plan for the I'M
mediate reduction of Havana with his
own squadron, unsupported. and was
, only prevented from carrying out that
plan by order from the department, which
wished to protect the big iron eIads.
Secretary Long addressed Admiral Samp-
son April 9th confidential letter telling
him that in the event OF hostilities, the
( department wished him to do all in his
power to destroy the Spanish war vessels
| in the West Indian waters. He says:
| sslhe department. doss not wlsn the Ves-
sells of your squadron to be exposed to the
| fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago
or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba,
unless the more formidable Spanish yes
sells should take refuge in those hartors.
Even in this case, the departments would
/ suggest that rigid blockade ana the en-
ployment of our torpedo boats would ae-
| oonplish 6hs desired object.
The reasons set out by Secretary Long
| for this instruction were that there would
be no United States troops avalla bic TO
occupy the captured towns until October
| and that the lack of docking faciEtles
made it particu1arly desirable that our
vessels should not be crippled before the
capture or destruction OF SPANS most
| formidable vessels.
How strongly Admiral Sampson en-
deavorad to secure reversal of this de-
eision. appears in q letter dated ''U. s.
Flaoshin New York, Key West. Fla,
ADril 9. 1895" In which, addressing the
Secretary, he says:
| 81 sympathize with all you say about
guarding our big ships against possible
serious loss while the enemy S fleet is still
/ intact. At the same time l regard It as
very important to strike quickly and
strike hard as soon as hostilities COM
mence.'' He then proceeds TO give his
reasons why direct attack would be adj
| yisable, and adds:
Il see the force of your reasoning that
we would have no troops to occupy the
city ii it did surrender, yet NJ. Secretary