The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-06-08

Win StrOng Delle1 tndt tnefe ndd Deen
nothing in the nature of a serious en-
gagement between SIMPSONS forces and
the Spanish defenses at Santiago. the
navy department officials, as the day
wore on and the full and detailed re-
ports Of the associated press from its
correspondents with the fleet began to
flow in. were compelled to modify their
views, and when the day closed they
were about ready to admit that al
though without Official information on
the subject II was evident that Samp-
son had made a strong attack upon the
spanish force. 1he one point upon
which they had the confidence was that
no troops had been landed.
They were prepared to learn that
Sampson might be clearing the way
with his big guns for the landing of the
troops or that possibly some marines
had been landed temporarily. but that
forces had been put ashore they would
not admit. for the reason that no infor-
nation had reached the department OF
the actual departure Of the soldiers for
Cuba. II Is not denied. however. that
every effort Is making to put the troops
into Cuba at the earliest possible NOM
ent. and this afternoon 1t is believed. al
though no official advices to that effect
were at hand, that the troops have ac-
tually been embarking at Tampa to-
day and may get away Tonight. The
reason for this belief Is found In the ad-
mission by officials that the troops have
been under orders to embark for some
time past The difficulty that presented
itself was the absence of absolutely nee
essary supplies. which In most cases
were stored away in some OF the thous-
ands OF freight cars which blocked the
railroad tracks many miles out OF
Tampa. The orders that went forward
yesterday were of a character to cause
a speedy breaking Of the deadlock, and
II the troops now have their supplies,
which is believed To be the case, there
lis no reason why they should not sail
at once for Santiago.
BY the newspaper reports OF the
breach Sampson has made in the coast
defenses there. there is every reason 10
believe that little difficulty will be
found In the actual debarkation OF the
troops, particularly II marines ere al
ready ashore to guard the landing.
A suspicion Is entertained in some
quarters that Sampson was fastened in
his movements at Santiago by the
news of the intended departure of the
troops from Tampa and made this at
tack in order that the navy might have
the honor Of effecting the first occupa-
tion Of Cuban soil. 1t Is likely that the
first troops of the regular army TO take
neer battalion, although they are so
badly hampered by the heavy siege
trains they carry that they must be
greatly delayed in making a landing.
These guns. by the way. have given in
finite trouble. for the transports that
were hastily chartered were so lightly
constructed as to require great deal
OF strengthening before the great
masses of steel could be safely placed
on them.
The act of SIMPSONS attack on the
Santiago defenses has brought out one
fact very clearly. namely. that he has
practically unlimited power as to the
time and character of an attack. and
that he is unhampered by restrictions
from Washington. The exact nature of
his orders have never been mSde pub
lic but a naval officer In a position to
know what they are said that Admiral
Sampson had greater power conferred
upon him than had ever been given
to any commander. IL was for him to
decide on the time for an attack and
the place and manner of its execution.
He may attack. therefore. whenever in
his discretion IL is necessary. OR. IL
circumstances warrant. he may refrain
from any operations. In short. IL Is
said that Admiral Sampson Is complete
master of the tactical and strategic
operations by the naval forces of San
tiago This is in line with the policy
apPtoNtb by tHt HtSutSl HdNdl
tiles. Captain Mahan, a member of
the war board. brings out in his stand
ard work on sea power that IL is for the
naval commander in chief to organize
and direct his offensive or defensive
operations.
In referring to the brilliant lessons
afforded by Nelson, Rodney. Farragut
and other great commanders. he gives
the credit for working out and executing
the splendid campaigns under their di-
rection without orders or restraint from
outside authority. The only reservation
made in this general principle is that
the center of the government shapes
general policies, and the naval cam
paign is directed toward the execution
Of this general purpose Of the govern
ment. In the present case the author
tiles here have laid down the general
ends TO be attained i'm Cuba and Porto
Rico. and the war board has supple
mented this with every bit of informa-
tion which could assist the command
er-in-chief. But Admiral SIMPSONS
authority is practically without limit.
Under these circumstances the naval
authorities here have no means of
knowing when a battle Is TO be executed
or what the line OF action is to be.
The cruiser Buffalo. lately the Nicthe-
roy of the Brazilian navy. arrived in
Hampton Roads to-day directly from
yet actually on the United States naval
lists. She has been acquired subject TO
conditions that will doubtless be strict
ly fulfilled by the Brazilian government,
but which have not yet been met. They
are that the ship must be turned over
in good condition as to hull and ma
chinery. The ordnance will be supplied
by the United states government in the
shape OF I0-inch rapid-fre guns now
ready TO be put in the ship. The ma
chinery OF the Buffalo Is known to be in
bad shape. but just to what extent Is
not known here. The ship will be in
spected by a naval board when she is
ready for delivery to the government
Meanwhile. the work of putting her in
condition will go on at once at New
port News The Buffalo was not
obliged. like the Oregon. to make a
detour to reach a home port in order 10
avoid a possible enemy. because. being