The times., 1898-11-19
SAMPSON &H& GEoaRAPHER

In The Timeso in the morning OF the
pointed article, headed Sampson versus
Sampson" in which it was shown by
cold facts and figures that the ambitious
admiral had REVISED dates and distances
for his own purposes without exact re-
gard to historyTor to fact. Comments on
the publication In question were copious,
but quiet. iHile
Officials, from the dignifed Secretary Of
pored over the article and wondered.
''His position is absolutely indefensible," !"
said one official.
yes" said another. "Sampson's own
official reports are his accusers. They
show that he deliberately and calmly sat
down and wrote a report to the Navy
Department on July Is. just twelve days
after the naval fight off Santiago, which
falsified his first report of July 3, which
was correct. The first. or telegraphic re-
port, too, was sustained by the VAIN
wright board. the members Of which
found 1t impossible by any known or un-
known rules OF mathematics or reason
ments in the two reports
Figures sometimes speak more plainly
than words" remarked an army officer.
1.-The figures in The Times article speak
In thunder tones and tell a story that is
beyond explanation. The question now
naturally arises: What place in the his
tory of the war. with Spain will Samp-
sons report of July 15 have?"
.'The publication shows perversion of
facts for Simpsons own advantage" said
former naval officer.
but nothing more was to be expected
from him. 1t is immaterial whether his
unvarying record previous TO this war as
bureaucrat was in line with this per-
formance. as even the most casual refer
ence to 1t shows. His record as a bureau
chief shows such tactics, notwithstand-
ing his well-known display of piety.
He posed as a Republican while at the
head of Navy Department bureau dur
ing Democratic administration, but dis
covered blow holes in the Carnegie
armor.
Taking his record in the war with
Spain alone, there are several irrefutable
instances of attempting TO mislead the
| authorities and the public, which is
| notably the case in the grandiloquent
battle orders and plans of campaign upon
which so much emphasis was placed. His
diary of the war was written apparently
to discredit Schley. The elaborate plans,
illustrated drawings to show how the
| feet was disposed might and day TO pre-
vent the Spanish squadron from getting
out of Santiago harbor, and earlier to
prevent Cervera from sneaking into Ha-
vana harbor, at the time II was firmly
believed by the department, the strategy
board. and Sampson himself, that that
was Cervera's destination instead of San
| tiago were for the same purpose.
These pictures and schedules have been
the chief foundation for the vociferous
clamors of SIMPSONS friends that, no
matter If he We're unfortunate enough to
be out of sight of the entire battle of
July 3, the victory was his alone. because
1t was fought solely from his plans the
attempt being TO show that If It had not
been for his diagrams and variegated or
ders the Spanish ships would have escaped
altogether.
TT is well-known fact that In spite
of all SIMPSONS exhaustive preparations
on paper after his close blockade had
prevented Cervera from attempting a
sortie-although Schley's plan had been to
lie few miles farther off the ocast to
induce the enemy's cruisers to come out
and take their chances in a running fight
at the critical moment Sampson disre-
garded his own battle orders and finally
abandoned them altogether by sending the
Massachusetts, supposed to be faster and
better than the Oregon, all the way to
Guantanamo to coal and make minor re-
pairs; that on the fateful Sunday morn
ing, after church call had sounded on the
American war vessels, calling the crews
away from their fighting stations, he took
himself off in the flagship New York,
chosen for his flagship because of her
superiority over the Brooklyn and the
battleships, and considered to be more
nearly a match for Cervera's ships than
any other American vessel, and went down
the coast westward twelve miles to con-
verse with Gen. Shafter over the tele-
phone.
This action, in taking the formidable
flagship on messenger boys errand, just
after one of the heaviest battleships had
departed, was as fair material for a
court of inquiry as the abandonment at
sea of the Maria Teresa.
"a consistently careful fleet command
er, with ordinary discretion, would have
taken a steam launch, torpedo boat or
any of the numerous fancy steam yachts
which were lying about, and left his best
fighting ship in the fighting line. where
it belonged and where, according to his
own orders, upon which SO much empha-
sis, is laid, 1t should have always been
found.
Most of his other conversations or con-
situations with Shafter had been con-
Quoted through aides.
"sampson had, besides, the Massa-
chusetts and New York away. also sew
eral auxiliary cruisers, which were at
Guantanamo coaling. Cervera's trained
eve saw this weakened condition of the
American line Che has so stated since)
and his ships came out of Santiago Har-
bor.
"sampsons elaborate plans contem-
plated that Cervera, would only try to es-
cape at night. which the Spanish admiral
said never occurred to him. There was
always a laxity of SIMPSONS blockade
in the mornings and the Spanish officers
were aware of this. Sampson expected