Evening star., 1898-09-10
NEEDS OF THE NAVY
Lessons We Have Learned From the
Recent War.
BATTLE SHIPS And ARMORED CRUISERS
Copper Sheathing Necessary to
Keep the Bottoms Clean.
DEMAND FOR BIG DRYDOCKS

Written for The Evening by Chief Construct ,r
Philip HichbOrn.
The war has taught us what some of US
already held, that the torpedo boat is moi
the formidable engine of war which it has
been credited with being The naval bat
| ties of the future, of the past will be
fought by the most powerful engines OF
naval warfare that can be constructed The
battle ship, in spite of it's great cost. will
continue to occupy the prominent place
The torpedo boat will have its uses, but
they will not be the most important uses
OF naval engagement During the war
just closed the torpedo boat practi
cally of no use al all. Just before the out
break Of hostilities there was a Great
scare account of the flotlla of torped5 .
beat destroyers which was said to be on its
way across the Atlantic from the Cape
Verde Islands. When the war actually
came. We heard nothing more about them
until they were destroyed. In fact, tor
pedo boats were not used by either com
batant except occasionally for dispatch
beats, duty to which other craft Nigh;
he more advantageously assigned. Tn
Wfnslow, it is true, was sent into the har
Dor of Cardenas to reconnoi,er, but this
was gunboat service and not the work fcI
which a torpedo boat is Intended.
AS for the Spanish boats, there was really
nothing to fear from them. Sigsbee MADE
quick work of the Terror off San Juan, al
though the St. Paul, which he commanded,
was exactly the kind OF vessel. unar
mored, and presenting a full side, that tor
pedoes might be expected to infiict damage
on
The Furor and the Pluton were among
the very best and the most modern of the
destroyer class, and yet the Gloucester,
which is merely a converted yacht, defeated
them both.
Oregon und Brooklyn.
The war has taught US to rely on our
great battle ships and cruisers with abso-
lutte confidence. Hitherto the question has
been open to fair discussion in the absence
OF any practical illustration of their work
in actual warfare. But now we know what
they can do The two vessels which, as
ships-of-war, have given the best account
of themselves their merits, without re-
gard to the manner in winch they were
handled, although that, of course. was
above criticism with all our ships, are the
Oregon and Brooklyn, and these are types
of vessels which likely to become more
and more in vogue, not only in the Aneri-
can navy but in the navies Of foreign
powers The Brooklyn, for instance; with
only four inches OF armor on her sides, was
far more than a match for the Nlzcaya'
with a twelve-inch armor belt 1 his type
of vessel combines speed with eIhclency TO
a most desirable degree.
AS for the Oregon, she combines great
strength Of armament with feasohapie
amount Of speed and coal carrying capacity
in a proportion which seems to be eminent
" desirable Battle ships will be built more
and more on the oregon pian with greater
speed. if possible, without interfering with
their effectiveness as fighting machines
Tie navy will have to be supplied with
vessels PARTICULARLY adapted to the work
for which, at the beginning of the war,
we were compelled to buy all sorts of ves
sells at all sorts of prices When the war
lr,l- III
ships suitable for auxiliary service. we
had no patrol boats and hardly any dis
patch boats. SO steam yachts, tugboats AMI
even ocean liners had to be bought or char
tel ed for the Of the navy. The result
was highly gratifying when it is considered
with what sort of material We had to deal
But in preparing for the possibility of all
other war the United States will have to
build ships especially adapted for this aux
ilisry work. Some of the ships which were
bought for this emergency can doubtless be
made to answer the purpose permanently
very well, but, rule, the auxiliary
feet ought to be constructed from specially
prepared plans.
Speaking From Experience.
We can speak from actual experience
now on a great many questions with re-
gard to which we could only theorize three
months ago. We know, for instance, that
drydocks are needed large enough to re-
ceve our biggest ships and numerous
enc ugh to prevent the necessity of their
lying long without repair or without haV-
ing their bottoms cleaned.
Our first-class fighting ships have been
in bad C. ndtion almost from the begin
ming Of the war, simply because we did
not have docks large enough to put them
into, and although even our smaller craft
have been nearly exempt from injury
in actual cambat, it has been impossible
to repair them speedily, because we had
not enough docks capable even of accom-
modating them. Had any of our ships suf-
fel ed great damage in battle it would have
been out of the question to put them quick
ly into condition again, and we should have
been at a terrible disadvantage.
The war has shown, too, that the bot
toms of all our ships should be copper
sheathed, so that they can be kept at sea
without the necessity of too frequent dock
ing for cleaning. At present not one of
our important ships is copper sheathed.
The only sheathed vessels in the navy are
the six gunboats of the Annapolis and Ma
rietta classes, and the New Orleans and AL
bany, which We bought from the Brazilian
government at the outbreak of the war
With copper-sheathed bottoms our ships
would be at great advantage in long
cruises such as are apt to be frequent
now that the war has brought into our pos
session far distant colonies.
d. -lr-, 49,