Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-09-08

| trenches around Santiago
Orders From the President.
Under verbal Instructions Of the Presi-
dent, 1 was directed to go wherever 1
deemed my presence was required ard
| that should give such directions as in my
opinion were best for the army and for the
government. These were the circum-
stances under which I left Washington,
arriving at Santiago July IL. not as a pri-
Tate individual nor as a visitor.
ANY pretense that I went there 6.srobed
OF my authority or official capacity is too
childish to be considered by sensible men.
From the moment I arrived at Santiago /
was responsible for what might occur
Il arrived there with the Yale, Columbia
aid Rita, loaded with infantry, and .tree
ships loaded with artillery. besides those
already disembarked. l designed to dis
the west size of Santiago, as was under
stood before leaving Washington. snd be-
tore we went ashore made the necessary
arrangements accordingly.
Il thea proceeded TO the front and after
consulting with Gen. Shafter a note was
sent to the Spanish commander by Gen.
| Shafter. saying that the commanding gen.
eral of the United States army had arrived
| In his camp with strong reinforcements
and would meet him between the lines at
any hour agreeable to him. The reply of
the Spanish commander was that he would
meet NE at u o'clock next morning
The meeting was held. and after some
conversation between Gen. Shafter and
Gen. Toral. 1 frankly Informed the Spanish
general that 1 had left Washington six
| days before. and that 1t was then the de-
termination of the government that this
| Portion of the Spanish army must be cap
tbred or destroyed.
ToraI Given More Time.
Il also Informed the Spanish general that
my reinforcements had already arrived
that some of these forces had already dis
hq r tye6 and ha
disembarked on the west side of the har-
Dor, and that it was useless for him to
contend against the inevitable These
transports could also be plainly seen by
the Spanish from Moro Castle and other
points.
General Toral replied that so long as
ne mad rations and ammunition he had to
nght IN order to maintain the honor of the
spanish army. In response to that ne was
informed that he had already maintained
the honor of the Spanish army and that
further efforts would be useless and would
result in the wanton sacrifice of human
life. He then said that he was waiting to
hear from his government, and was in
formed by me that he had already taken
much time for that purpose. and would be
given until daylight of the following morn
ing-it being then 3 o'clock-to submit his
| final answer. He begged for longer time
and earnestly requested until II o'clock
next day. This was finally granted by me-
the meeting dissolved and the officers sep
arated On returning from this conference
a dispatch was received by me from
washington as follows:
WASHINGTON. July 10, 1885,
Major Gen. Miles:
You may accept surrender by granting
| parole to officers and men, the officers re-
tanning their side arms. the officers and
men after parole to be permitted to return
| to Spain, the United States assisting. If
not accepted, then assault, unless in your
judgment assault would fail Consult
with SAMPSON and
to the assault as you Jointly agree upon.
Matter should be settled promptly.
r. A Alger. Secretary of War.
He Accepted Surrender.
This does not look as if I were there as
| visitor. / was charged with the respon-
sibilfty of ordering an assault upon the
intrenchments and Notifications of an
army, which. if successful, would have
cost at least five thousand lives, or of
Withholding the assault if in my judgment
such assault would fail. No greater discre-
ton was ever given to any general com
handing an army, and what is more as
will be observed. l was authorized to &C
cept the surrender, which in the interest of
my subordinates l declined to do, and went
away, leaving all the honor to nv next in
rank, Gen. Shafter
ION the morning succeeding the first in
tervfew d letter was received from Cen
eral Toral, of which the following is
ulSEdl translation.
SANTIAGO DE CUBA July a. 1898
General-in-Chief of the American Forces:
Honored Sir: His excellency the general
in-chief of the army of the Island of Cuba
telegraphs from Havana yesterday, at
p. m, the following: believing the business
of such Importance the capitulation of
that place should be known and decided
upon by the government of his majesty, l
give you notice that 1 have sent the con-
ditions of your telegram asking an imme-
date answer and enabling you also TO
show this to the general of the American
army to sec If he will agree to await the
answer of the government. which cannot
be as socn as the time which he has de-
cided, communication by way of Ber-
muda is more slow than by Key West. In
the meanwhile your honor and the general
of the American army may agree upon
capitulation on the basis of repatriation
{returning to Spain).'
L have the honor to transmit to you this,
that in case you may consider me foreso
ing satisfactory, he may designate persons
in representation of himself, who, with
those in my name, may agree to clauses of
the equalization upon the basis Of return
Ing to Spain, accepted already in the be-
ginning by the general-in-chief of this
army. Awaiting a reply, l am. very re-
spectfully, your servant. JOSE TORAL-
Surprised the Americans.
AT the meeting on the following day
General Toral stated that he was prepared
to surrender with the approval of the cap
tain general of Cuba, but 1t would require
a little time to have his acts confirmed by
the home government; that in the mean
time he was prepared to appoint commits
sioners to arrange the clauses Of captu-
lation. Not only this, he offered to surren-
der the balance Of his command, which had
not been under fire or engaged during the
campaign.
This remarkable offer was on his own
motion, and was in the nature of sur
prise to the American generals present.
However, at the conference of the day pre-
vious had reminded him that he had been
rendered the most liberal terms ever offered
to an enemy; that his fleet was destroyed,
and that they were 1900 miles from home.
''Forais offer could be accounted for in
one of two ways-either that the troops
were wanted at home to meet a threat
ened revolution, or that they wanted to get
home. and regarded this the only means
of doing at the expense of the United
States. Whether Bianco and the rest of
the Spanish forces in Cuba would have
surrendered on the same terms Is not now
and perhaps may never be known.
THE fact that they had agreed to sur
render was satisfactory to me, and L i'm
mediately left the field telegraphed the