The Caucasian. (Clinton, N.C.) 188?-1913, 1898-04-07
AN ABLE PAPER BE
Mr.. y. C. DOUGLASS
Reviewing the Railroad Commission Act and
lhe Recent Decision by Judge Timber
lake on the Contempt Cases.

such distinct entities that one of
them may sue the other, one may be
liable and the other not, &c. How
much more is it true then that the
corporation may be liable and the
employee no,i And how true is 1t
that il both are intended to be made
liable it must be specifically so sta
ted and not left to be inferred that
the employee is liable because the
corporation is
But it is argued that our X. X.
Com. Act (Sec. 4 specifically pro-
vides that any 'person, persons,
company or corporation" may be Ii
able. What does the section say
ANY person. persons, company or
corporation violating the provisions
OF this section shall be- &c. A per
son in order to be guilty must vio-
late the provisions of the section.
The provision uf the section is "that
it shall be unlawful for any common
carrier" to make or to give &c. A
person therefore in order to be guilty
under the provisions of the section,
must be common carrier. And
some individual persons in the state
may become liable under the statute
because they are common carriers,
and such, we tone it was the reason
for the use Of the words "person,
persons"
But are the individuals concerned
in our case common carriers Is A.
Il. Andrews common carrierf Is
j. B. MunsOn common carrier
They are only the agents of q COM
mon carrier. which is the corpora
tiOn. Conse quently they do not come
within the provisions of the statute,
they could not therefore be guilty of
the statutory crime-neither at COM
mon law as agents of the corpora
ton. nor as individuals by the word
ing of the statute-anl consequent
ly they could not have been liable to
incriminate themselves by any an
swers they might have made before
the X. Il. Commission.
1t will be observed that in cases OF
violation of the I. s. G.. Act by a
corporation, the director, officer, re.
ceiver, trustee, agent or person act
ing for or employee by such corpora.
ton, together with all such as aid or
abet, are alone punishable and not
the corporation itself. Under the
Railroad Commission Act the corpor.
alton alone is punishable, thereby
making the act of the officer &C.,
Tho o NJ De <ho oornoro <;op 1e <h;e
act is not the act of the corporation
only but is also his own act as we'll
then two are guilty for the deed oi
one. Suppose the common carrier
was a corporation sole, then 20,
would punish the sole incorporation
as the corporation and would ther
punish him as individual. The Law
will not countenance such thing
as that, and the l. s. C.. Act recog
nized that fact when it made specla
provision for the employees of th'
corporation. No man can act il
two capacities at the same time
Conse q uently any act which an Off
eer of corporation does while act
ing in his official capacity cannot b,
his own individual act, and he indi
vidually cannot be liable for it. Sc
Turnpike case.
And we would especially call At
tention to the fact that even unde
the provisions of the I. S. G. Act
where it Is specifically provided tina
the individuals, the agents, etc
shall be liable it is nevertheless he'll
tha':
"Where an arrangement in viola
tion of the /. s. G.. Law was made b
the Assistant General Freigh
Agent, the fact that local freigh
agent and the agent who made ou
the bills of laden knew that ther
was something out of the usua
course of business in such shipmentl
was not sufficient notice to thel
that the company was violating sal
act to make them criminally liable
Federal Reporter, vol. 43, p. 2G.
IAN agent of a railroad VIII
merely collects freights and ha
nothing to do with fixing them is ne
indictable under the l. s C. Ac
for collecting a greater rate for
shorter than for q long haul. U.
VS. Miller, So Fed. Rep. 229.
Now then section 8 of the Bal
road Commission Act provides thu
"Said Commissioners shall have fu
power and authority to examine a
officers ~, under oath, &c. Se
ton 81 of the same act provides tn.
. elf any person duly summoned
) appear and testify, &c.
The defendants are guilty Of a v
olation of section q of the Railroa
Commission Act unless they are
: be excused from answering the que
[ tions on the ground that their a
: swers might tend to criminate ther
$ It must be admitted that under Il
{ statute (section R. R. c. Az tht
) are not indictable as principals f
issuing free passes. But it is argue
: that if these officers did the &C
: complained of as agents and ofice
, of the Railway Company, thu
| would be liable to Indictment
r common law, as all persons who q
t and abet in the commission of q mi
O6hcduOE VI az COuWVA low pa
2 cipals and indictable as such.
b In the first place, this propositi'
!, is not universally true. "Statuto
!. expressions differ, and some of the
o are interpreted as providing thu
: penalties only for the actual doers
J. the forbidden thing" Bishops Cril
i Law, vol. /. p. 657.
t The distinction ls>this: Where
!. statute Greats q felony and prescrit
@ particular punishment therefor,
z where q statute provides q punis
i ment for a common law felony
t. name, those who were present a
n ing and abetting in the commissi
,s of the crime are held to be includ
l. by the statute, although not me-
n ioned as such in the statute. E
J. when the punishment is imposed
j. the statute upon the person alo
l. (here the corporation) who actua
O. com mits the acts constituting the