The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1898-05-05
"TRE AMERICAN
CONFLICT"
Leading Incidents and Episodes
of the War of the Rebellion.
By HORACE GREELEY.
BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
(Continued.)


REBEL TRooPS-A DISCUSSION OF TIL
CAUSES AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
DEFEAT.
The forces actually engaged in thi
celebrated battle, so decisive in its re
suits and SO important in its conse
quences, were probably not far frem %
900 on either side;;l while the com
batants actually on the battlefield, OIL
so near it as to be practically at the
disposal of the respective commanders
were, ON either side, not far from $4,000.
But the rebels, who were somewhat
fewer at daybreak, fought under the
encouraging stimulus of a knowledge
that every hour, as it passed, added to
their strength; that each railroad train
arriving at the Junction brought fresh
brigade after brigade to their support !;
and these, as they arrived, were fastened
to that part of the field whereon their
services could be most effective: while
our men, who had been called to arms
at 2 o'clock in the morning, and had
generally thrown aside their;Knapsacks
and haversacks to facilitate their move
ments, had been IA hours marching
Some of them on the double-quick
for miles-or fighting, and were utter
IL exhausted and faint with hunger and
thirst; while not single company HI 4
been added to their numbers.
Some regiments fought badly, and
had been demoralized and dispersed
prior to the general catastrophe /; but
the great majority evinced courage
and devotion which, under favoring
auspices, would have commanded vic
tory. They gave way only when hope
seemed dead-when the ever-increasing
hosts of their foes not only outnumbered
them in their front, but filled the woods
on their right flank, exposing them to
an enflading fire, which they could not
return with effect and, their defeat once
confessed, the confusion and panic of
their flight are explained, not excused,
by the fact that, owing to the long de-
tour they had necessarily made in adj
vancing to the attack, pursuant to the
plan of battle, their line of retreat lay
in part along the front of the foe, much
of whose strength was actually nearer
to Centerville than they were when the
fortunes of the day turned against them.
CAUSES OF DISASTER.
The causes of this disaster, SO shame
fully misstated and perverted at the
time, are now generally understood.
No one could, at this day, repeat the
Misrepresentation that for the moment
prevailed, without conscious, palpable
guilt and ignominy. The true, con-
trolling reasons of our defeat are,
briefly, these:
!. The fundamental, fatal error on
our side was that spirit of hesitation, OF
indecision, of calculated delay, of stolid
obstruction, which guided our military
councils, scattering our forces and para.
lying our efforts. Had any real pur-
pose of suppressing the rebellion been
cherished by Gen. Scott, be would never
have scattered our Eastern forces along
the line of the Potomac and Chesapeake
from Cumberland to Fortress Monroe
divided into three or four distinct
armies, under the command of militia
officers who had never smelt burning
powder, unless in a squirrel-hunt. Hi
advance across the Potomac, after hav
ing been put off go long as possible
was made, as we have seen, ON the 24tl
of May. Within one week thereafter
a column of 10000 men should have
taken the road to Richmond, with theil
commander in their midst, even though
he had to travel in an ambulance
Moving slowly, steadily, cautiously for
ward, our army should have been rein
forced by two or three fresh regiment
each day, being exercised in field ma
nuvers at every opportunity. On o.
before the LIST day of July, this array
100000 strong, should have been be
fore Richmond, not then fortified to an,
serious extent, and should have replaced
the Stars and Stripes ON the steeples O
that city by the Fourth, at least Tha
we had ample force to do this, is nov
beyond doubt; for the rebels, gather
ing all their strength from the Shenan
doah on the one side to the James OF
the other, were barely able, on the 21s
three weeks after we should have
been before Richmond-to beat thir,
Of our regiments that might and shoulc
have confronfed them
III. The fragrant disobedience anc
detection of Gen. Patterson, unaccount
able on any hypothesis consistent wit
the possession, on his part, of courage
common sense, and loyalty.
LII. The failure of Gen. Scott to sem
forward with Gen. Mcdowell fore
adequate to provide against all contin
gencies. The fact that 10000 volun
teers remained idle and useless, through
out that eventful Sunday, in and immed
ately around Washington-Scott havin
obstinately resisted entreaties that the
should be dispatched to the front-ir
sisting that Mcdowell had "me
enough that he needed no cavalr,
etc.-of itself attests strongly the in
becility and lack of purpose that the
presided over our military councils.
~. The rebels were kept thorough
Doll II r.. Ii