Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1898-04-15
DELAYED MESSAGE.
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lCun-iiidc.' from first lnrc
Cuba have greatly aided the charitable
work.
The President Of the American Re,
Cross and representatives of other con
tributorv organizations have generally
visited Cuba and cu-nperatcd with In,
Counsel General and the local au
thurItirS to make effective distribution
of the relief collected through tn,
efforts of the central committee
Nearly S2oD,0O0 in money and supple:
have already reached the sufferers ant
more is forthcoming. The supple:
are admitted duty free and transpor
tation To the interior has been arranged
81 that the relief, at first necessarily
confined to Havana and the larger
all of the towns where suffering exists
Thousands OF lives have already been
saved.
EXTERMINATIuN PROBABLE.
The necessity of relieving the condi.
ton of the reconcentrados is recognized
by the Spanish government. Within
Il few days past the orders Of General
Wcylcr have been revoked, the recon
ccntrados are, it is said, to be permit
ted to return to their homes and aided
to resume the self-supporting pursuits
OF peace; public works have been start
ed to give them employment and n sum
of 100000 has been appropriated for
their relief.
The war in Cuba is of such Il nature
that, short of subjugation or cxtermin-
alton, final military victory for either
side seemed impracticablc. The alter
native lies in the physical exhaustion
of the one or the other party, or per-
haps both, a condition which in effect
ended the ten years war by the truce
OF Ian Jon.
The prospect of such protraction
and conclusion of the present strife is
a contingency hardly to he contcm-
plated with equanimity by the civilized
world, and least of all by the United
States, affected and injured us we are
deeply and intimately by its very ex-
istencc.
| SPAIN Is WARNED
Realizing this, it appeared to he my
duty, III Il spirit OF true friendlincss, no
less to Spain than the Cubans, who
have so much to lose by the prolonga-
ton of the struggle, to seek to bring
about an immediate termination of
the war. To this end | submitted, on
the 9th ultimo, rs 4 result of much
representation and correspondence
through the United States minister at
Madrid, propositions to the Spanish
government looking to an armistice
until October l, for the negotiation of
peace with the good Offices of the Pres
ident.
In addition asked the revocation of
the order of recommendation, SO rs to
permit the people TO return to their
farms and the needy to be relieved
with provisions and supplies, in the
United States cooperating with the
Spanish authorities so rs to afford full
relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet
was received on the night of the 3lst
ultlmo. II offered rs means to bring
about peace to cOnfide the preparation
thereof to the insular department,
lnasmuch as the concurrence of that
body would be necessary to establish a
final result, without being, however,
understood that the powers conferred
by the constitution to the central gov
ernmcnt are lcssened or diminished.
As the Cuban parliament does not
meet until the 4th of May next, the
Spanish government would not OBJ
]ect, for its part, to accept at once Il
suspension of hOstilities if asked for by
the insurgents from the General-in-
Chief, to whom it would pertain to
determine the duration and conditions
OF the armistice. The propositions
submitted by General Woodford and
the reply of the Spanish government
were i'll the form of brief memoranda
before mentioned. and substantially in
the language above given. The func-
ton of the Cuban parliament in the
matter OF preparing" peace and the
manner OF doing SO are not explained
i'll the Spanish memorandum, but from
General Woodford's explanatory re-
ports of preliminary discussions pre-
ceding the final conference it is under
stood that the Spanish government
stands ready to give the insular con-
gress full power to settle the terms of
peace with the insurgents, whether by
direct negotiation or Indirectly by
means OF legislation, does not appear.
INTERVENTION OR RECOGNITION.
With this last overture in the direc-
ton of immediate peace and its disap-
pointing reception by Spain, the exec.
utive was brought to the end of his
effort. In my annual message of De.
cember last, said: "Of the untried
measures there remain-Recognition
OF the insurgents as belligerents; rec
ognition OF the independence of Cuba
and Intervention to end the war by
imposing rational compromise be-
tween the contestants, and interven-
ton in favor of one or the other party.
speak not of forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought of; more, by
our code of morality, it would be
criminal aggression"
Thereupon reviewed these alterna-
tives in the light of President Grants
measure in the words uttered in 1875,
in which, after seven years of sanguin-
ary,'destructive and cruel barbarities
in Cuba, he reached the conclusion
that the recognition of the independ-
ence of Cuba was impracticable and
indefensible, and that the recognition
of the belligerency was not warranted
by the facts according to the texts of
public law. l commented upon the
phase of the question, pointing out the
inconvenience and positive dangers
of recognition of belligcrency, which,
while adding to the already onerous
burdens OF neutrality within our juris-
diction, could not in any way extend
our influence or effective offices in the
territory of hostilities. Nothing has
since occurred to change my views in
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