The San Francisco call., 1898-04-12
LABOR GAINS
 4 VICTORY Judge de Haven Decides Against the J. Kelso
 Company. It Must Stand Trial for Violat- ing the Federal Eight
 Hour Law.
A Corporation Must Respect the Statutes and Can Be Punished
 Like an Individual.

Labor gained a decided victory yester- day, when United States District Judge de Haven handed down his decision to the effect that the John Kelso Company must stand trial for violating the Federal eight-hour law by working laborers for nine hours and longer on the site of the proposed Postoffice building.
 Several months ago John Keso, con- tractor, was arrested by the United States Marshal on complaint of several labor organizations in this city for having vio- lated the ederal statute. Kelso set up as a defense that the statute was aimed at contractors for public works, and that he was only an employe of a subcon- tractor, the John Kelso Company, the San Francisco Bridge Company having as- signed to the John Kelso Company the contract for eXcavating the foundations of the site.
 Upon this showing the charge against
 Keso was dismissed by United States
 tnl ( iunlssloner Heacock, and war
 rant was issued for the arrest of the Juhn heIso Company. The warrant was
 served upon Kelso as president of the
 company, at the suggestion of Assistant
 United States Attorney Knight, following the procedure laid down by the Civil Code of the State, there being no way of ac-
 complaining the same end under the Fed eral Statutes. Then the KelSo Company set up the contention that a corporation, not having soul to be saved or body to be kicked, could not be haled into court on criminal charge and could not be
 punished either by fine or imprisonment. | It also insisted that a corporation could | not be deemed to have malicious intent | a necessary ingredient to every criminal | ragout.
 Commissioner Heacock decided that the | corporation could be punished and was
 responsible criminally, and so he recom- | mende0 District l Court
 Thereupon the defendant made motion before Judge de Haven to Quash the | summons. and to dismiss the case. The matter was argued and submitted months | ago, and yesterday Judge de Haven de- cided that corporation, no more than l an individual, could claim exemption from | punishment for violating the law.
 The following are extracts from the de-
 cision:
 Tt will be observed that by the express | language of this statute there must be an 1 intentional violation of its provisions in | order to constitute the offense which the 1 statute defines. In view of this express l declaration, 1t is claimed on behalf of the 1 defendant that the act is not applicable l to corporations, because it is not possible | for a corporation to commit the crime de-
 scribed in the statute. The argument ad-
 vanced to sustain this position is in sub- | stance this: That corporation is only
 an artificial creation. without animate
 body or mind, and therefore. from its | 1 specific intention which by the statute is | made an essential of the crime defined. l The case of the State vS. the Great Works | Mill Company, 20 Maine, 71, supports this | proposition, and it must be conceded that l there are to be found dicta in many other l cases to the effect that corporation is | not amenable to prosecution for a positive | act of malfeasance, involving a specific 1 intention to do an unlawful act. | Tn a general sense 1t may be said that
 no crime can be committed without a | joint opera ton of act and intention. In 1 many crimes, however, the only intention 1 required is an intention to do the pro- 1 hibited act. In such case the in
 tention of the directors that the prohibited act should be done IS imputed to the cor poration itself.
 That a corporation may be liable civilly l for that class of torts in which a spe-
 cfic malicious intention is an essential element is not disputed at this day. Thus i an action for malicious prosecution will l lie against a banking corporation.
 An action will lie also against a corpora | tion for malicious libel. When
 a statute in general terms prohibits the
 doing of an act which can be performed | by a corporation there is no reason why ! such statute should be construed as not i applying to corporations when the pun l shment provided for it's infraction is one
 that can be inflicted upon a corporation,
 as, for instance, fine.
 On the subject of the service of the
 summons Judge de Haven says: 'The course adopted was to follow the practice prescribed by the Penal Code of 1 this State, and there was served upon
 mons giving full information of the of
 fense charged against the defendant cor
 poration and naming day for the de-
 fendant to appear in court and answer
 The motion of the defendant will be de- l nied.