Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-08-09
WELL TO REALIZE THEM.

General s. NJ. j. Young, Of the regulas
army, who has just returned from SAM
tiago. is thoroughly Disguised with the
Cuban patriots" His deductions from
his experience in the fair island are that
these worthless are a lot Of degenerates;
that they are utterly devoid Of honor
and gratitude. and that they are no moro
capable OF self-government than the ma
tives of Central Africa. They are. as to
blood, says General Young. a mixture OF
negro, Spanish, italian, and Indian, VINO
inherit the bad qualities Of all these
races, and who would loot everything
in sight and then start in and rob one
another"
General Young further declares that
the leaders Of the so-called Cuban army
are adventures, ready to sacrifice every
body and everything to further their own
ends, and is emphatically Of the opinion
that few of them would hesitate to sell
out to the Spaniards if fully convinced
that the United States are not going to
deliver the island over to them.
General Young is not singular in his
convictions, and his picture of the Cuban
patriots is not an entirely original one.
Long before there was any certainty
about our espousing the Cuban cause an
educated and most intelligent sea captain,
who had sailed into every port in Cuba,
and. indeed. into nearly every port in
the world. told US that the class that
he r,,l the yrac
one Of tho worst lots" he had ever en-
countered. AS to their blood admixture,
aims, and ambitions, lie
described them pretty much as General
Young describes them.
Moreover, after war was declared, there
was abundant evidence forthcoming to
show that the insurgents were not en-
thusiastic over the prospect of being re- |
inforced by United States troops, their |
fear being that aid of that character |
would interfere with their dividing among |
themselves the political and other spells
when the Spaniards had been driven from
the island.
However, since we are 'in for it. we
must accomplish the work we have I'M
lertaken to accomplish in Cuba, no mat
er what the cost. We must pacify the
sland and establish thereon a stable gov
rnment. no matter how herculean the
ask, or how great the obstacles in the
yay of that contamination. That Is
hing settled.
Still. It were well that the task were kept
before our people in all OF It's
1t was well that none of the
difficulties were minimized. And for the
eason that there yet remains a strong
ointment among us in favor of annexing
he Philippines.
Were we to annex the Philippines, we
ould not be expected to do less by them
han we are expected to do by Cuba. We
would be under obligations to pacify those
stands and set up stable government on
hem, also. Unpromising as is the mate
ial we have to work upon in Cuba, still
1ore unpromising is the material we
iould have to work upon in the Asiatic
roup. As degenerate as is the average
uban insurgent, still more degenerate is
he Philippine Malay, while in natural
avagery he can give his Cuban brother
,rge odds. But that is not all. The
Ialays are desirable citizens" as COM
AIRED with certain tribes of the interior
( the Philippines. These latter have not
My never shown the slightest disposition !
, yield to the influences Of civilization.
ut it is serious question, whether any
ling short of their determination would
,nder the country they roam habitable l
" others. They are among the lowest |
der of human creatures; being clinical h
connected, 1t is held by some. with /
ibes in South Africa, that the British,
it'll all their experience in managing in
rior races, can make no impression on
.cept with machine guns.
So we say 1t would be well that we real ;
e the difficulties that are before us in -
aba, to the end that We be deferred E
ON counting infinitely greater difficult L
& elsewhere IL