The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1898-05-06
We Need q Great Navy, Larger
Army and C0aling Stations.
THH OLD ERA OF ISOLATION.

Philippines and there secure q base Of
operations or else to cut andsrun for home,
many thousands Of miles away. This was
true because as soon as the nations Of that
part of the world declared their neutrality
our wsrships were under obligation to
leave the harbors and to cease using
friendly ports as headquarters. The near
est United States port was away across
the Pacific ocean, while Spain had ports
at Manila, but two days steaming from
Hongkong. For this reason and not 90
much from desire TO capture the Philip
pines the advance upon Manila was or
dorcd.
II the Spanish feet In Asiatio waters
had been stronger than ours, we should
still have been compelled TO give battle or
to retire to this side of the Pacific. Prob
ably prudence would have compelled rs to
adopt the latter course. and the meaning
of that would be that the scene Of opera
tions was transferred from near the coast
of Spanish possessions TO our own coast
line. II the fortunes Of war were to 60
against IN, our coast cities would be left
at the mercy Of the Spanish fleets, just AZ
Manila was left subject to the relentless
movement Of Admiral Dewey's squadron.
Hswaii's Advantages.
But IL the United States had a naval
stronghold, with plenty Of coal and dry
docks and ample Notifications at Hawaii,
that would throw the frontier out 5000
miles from our coast line. II forced TO re-
tire from the Asiatio side Of the ocean, It
still would not be necessary to come all
the way home, with the enemy at our
heels. The halt could be made half way
over, at the Hawaiians, where our fleets
would have q great advantage over the
opposition In proximity to coal base and
means Of communication. 1t is figured by
our naval experts that with Hawaii ours
and fortified and with cable line run out
to the islands the United States fleet upon
the Pacific would be twice as strong as Il
II without the addition Of a single ship.
II to this were added construction Of the
Nicaragua canal, the advantage would be
infinitely greater. For instance, instead
of remaining In Asiatio waters, as at pres
cnt, Admiral Dewey's feet, having de-
stroyed the only floating enemy that men,
aced our merchant marine, could start at
once for Cuban waters via the Nicaragua
canal.
As 10 10 now, our ships would have to
round Cape Horn In order to re-enforce
the fleets In the Atlantic, and that Is q
long and rather dangerous voyage. or
course II would not do to send them
through the Suez canal and the Mediter-
ranean, for that would subject them to
the danger Of destruction or capture by
the Spaniards near Gibraltar. In the
opinion Of many eminent men here, of all
political parties and shades Of opinion,
current events are forcing the acquisition
Of Hawaii and also the construction of the
Nicaragua canal. One we'll known man
put 10 this way:
"Whether we like IL or not, events are
forcing the United States'into such activ-
ity In the worlds affairs as we have never
before manifested. Whether we like the
responsibility or not, we must assume it.
We shall presently have Cuba, the Philip
pines and perhaps Puerto Rico on our
hands. There will be no way to escape the
onerous duty which control Of them en-
tails. Complications Of various sorts may
grow out of our efforts TO administer them
or to dispose of them. Therefore We arc
projected into the worlds politics, and
there We must stay. Inasmuch a. there
IL no escaping this fat of the fates, IL is In
cumbent upon US to meet our responsible
ity a. best we can. The old era of isola.
tion and strictly minding our own bust
ness 10 at an end. To meet the responsi-
bilities OF the present and the future we
need great navy, larger army, Hawaii
and q coaling and naval station at least In
the West Indies, and means Of communi-
cation through the Panama isthmus."
Naval Fights In Midocesn.
As TO Hawaii, there appears to be an
nd fo vIAt ma M xryo IN fako tho le
lands. The men who are opposed TO an
and political grounds do not yield the
main points of their contention, which
are strong enough. But many Of them
other considerations involved and which
have just spoken Of. Action is likely to
DO deferred for some time, till tho atInos-
best observers here tho result IL no longer
In doubt.
One of the readers of your paper writes
10 ask me II IL IL true that battleships can
not engage an enemy upon the high seas,
but must walt till they get In smooth wa
ter. IL all depends upon the weather.
Battleships and other craft mounting
heavy guns are not 20 be operated success
fully and economically In q rolling sea.
Commanders would not choose such
weather for an engagements. Their guns
can be operated only at great inconven-
ience and some risk II the ships are rolling
In the trough of big waves. Thcir pro-
jectiies would miss much more often than
they hit. Inasmuoh M this would be true
Of cruisers and torpedo boats and ell tight
Ing craft the disadvantage would be about
the same with one feet ~ with another.
and probably, neither side would forco q
fight under adverse circumstances.
But battlcships may often light amid
favorable conditions In midoceap. IL 10 q
mistake TO suppose that out upon the
great sea the water Is always rough. Ono
may mako voyages to Europe In which
the steamer rolls scarcely st oil. The sea
IL often almost 90 smooth ~ mill pond
from New York 10 Liverpool or South
smpton. The absence Of waves end