The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-31
The Result Of the Joint Traffic
Decision.
TO CRUSH OUT THE WEAK
Chsuncsy Dspew Reviews ths Railroad
Situation and Asks for. Enlarged
Powers for the Commission
and Pooling.

follows: The decision of the supreme
court OF the United States necessitates
the dissolution Of the Joint Trafic ASSOC
citation as at present constituted.
Broadly stated. the decision means that
there hall be no associations among
railroads by which they will nave any
agreement In regard to rates. either
the maintenance of rates or the pre-
vention of rate cutting. or the preven-
] vention OF determinations against
weak shippers in favor Of strong ones
or against mail localities and those
along the lines in favor Of the great
terminal cities.
The object of the Joint Traffic asso-
citation was. first. to assist the inter-
state m act: second, to prevent
secret rate cutting. and third. to pre-
vent the favoritism to great cities and
to great shippers. which Is gradually
wiping out intermediate towns and the
small business men.
1T is absolutely necessary for the
railroads OF the ountry 10 know The
movement of traffic and traffic ccndi-
tions as to freight which In to be NOV
ed at the different reservoirs. where II
is concentrated. II is also necessary
that they know whether and why this
freight is securing an outlet. II for ex-
port. through the gulf of Mexico, or by
the Canadian route, or the Atlantic sea-
board.
1T will be necessary therefore that
some association should exist as a sta
tistical bureau for the purpose OF gath
ering this information and presenting II
in frequent reports TO the lines which
are members. All that the railways ask
Is that under a form OF voluntary
agreement or a pooling law they may
be permitted to arrange among them
selves so that there shall be uniform
rates to everybody who ships
over the various lines for the same SER
vice. In other words, as the railroads
are semi-public corporations, h the
public should be treated upo lines the
same as the government treats people
who use the p~ostofice or the same as
men are treated who use the telegraph
lines. viz: uniform rates and the same
treatment to every one for like service.
THE great error OF the people who
framed the interstate nct was
in supposing that In preventing the rail-
roads from agreeing upon rates and
having a pool. they are getting lower
rates and preventing determinations.
Their legislation proceeded on the
thought that there Is but n line. for
~nstanc between New York and Chi
~
| Now, IL is possible for a combination OF
capital to lake the weak line and ship
it's product over that line upon an
agreement much below the current
rates. The weak line may be In the
hands OF a receiver and have no obli-
cations TO pay either upon its stock OF
upon its bonds-in other words upon
the Invested capital which built IL. The
other lines cannot afford to go INTO
bankruptcy by following this rate. and
10 haNn h1
traffic. or they d their W traf-
fc upon regular and reasonable rates.
"The effect OF this Is very soon evil
dent. The rates which these big ship
pers get over this bankrupt line enable
them to make their product so much
cheaper than the people who are STU
ated upon other lines OF who sent 10
market from other places than the ter
minus OF the bankrupt line, that they
drive them out of business. Then the
antitrust. ant1-corporation, anti-comoi-
nation people by their own device nave
created a combination and a trust. rms
process has been going on ever since
the interstate m act and the
anti-pooling provision were enforced. IL
the process continues the present rapid
proeress of the consolidation OF every
product into the hands OF one concern
or a few men will continue. until both
the producer and or the coun-
try VIII nave their prices hNeu W AhN
combination in the various products OF
the people. IL the eight lines. however,
were in a position where they cou>l
protect each other and the pubic In
giving equal options by all rail lines,
then N enterprise and energy and nat
ural facilities OF intermediate places.
with smaller Expense and less capital
in their business, with the owners at
tending to their own affairs. would re-
suit in a wide distribution OF indepen-
dent business; in the farmer finding
many competitors for the produc OF
his farm, and the railways having
thousands of customers instead OF a
very few.
"The objection to a pooling law has
always beer that the railways would
combine 10 raise prices. II IL apparent
ly useless for the railroad man TO say
what he knows TO be a fact. that the
demands of the different markets. the
competition OF the waterways n the
conditions OF the different centers NJ
which freight is gathered make 1t I'm
possible for the railways to raise rates.
But the railways are not only, Willing
hut anxious that this danger should be
obviated by giving the government su-
pervision and control over all pooling
rates. The railroads ask for no pooling
law except upon these conditions: First.
the Dooling contract shall not be made
until II has been approved by the in
~terstate commerce commission, and,
second. that " the rates prove oppres-
sive or unjust in the trafic which Is
subject to the pool. the interstate com
merce commission shall have the right
to step in and right the wrong III there
is any. or abrogate the pool The only
objection I have ever heard Is that the
government cannot be trusted. Ger
tainly there has been nothing In the
conduct of the interstate m
since its formation which tustifes such
a charge. II such a charge II true. then
all Is a failure where the
greater responsibilities devolve upon IL.
The railroads do not care how much
the Interstate commission Is
strengthened IL In its present form II is
~, ontfralv satfsfactory