The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-14
OUR HEAVY ORDNANCE
INTERESTING WAR REPORT FROM
GEN. FLAGLER's BUREAU.
How the Nation Was Handicapped
-COast-Dcfense Question.

appropriations made for the Ordnance Bu-
reau 49, $50. This large sum is derived
from the appropriations for the fiscal year
which were made for war purposes, amount
ing to $21, 5O4, 592
Regarding the equipment of volunteers
the general thinks it would be as we'll to
have the government equip them instead of
their bringing their state arms into service,
saying that it could be done as quickly
owing to the condition of the arms of state
troops.
lie speaks in terms of praise on the man
ner in which work has been performed at
arsenals and ordnance factories in the rush
that was made in putting the country on
footing for war with Spain AS to the equip
ment of an army. he says: so long as the
principal dependence in this country in time
of war is a large volunteer force, newly
levied, it Is impracticable to keep on hand
large supplies of cavalry, artillery and horse
equipments as these in the course of a few
years will not only deteriorate, but will
have to be materially modified to keep pace
with improvements. The major part Of such
material by taking advantage of the re-
sources of Rock Island and the ether arse
nails and the numerous private establish
ments capable of producing it can be sup
Piled as rapidly as troops can be raised
mustered into the service and prepared for
campaign. There should, however, be on
hand field and siege artillery, with carriages
and a portion of the harness required for
100000 men. Such guns and carriages can
not be turned out in large numbers until
about six months after initiating the work. ="
For equippng an army with a supply of
small arms he thinks there should be a sup
ply of 100000 on hand of any new arm and
the arsenals kept in a condition so as to
produce 250O per day.
THE COAST DEFENSE.
An interesting feature of the report is
that which treats of coast defense. The
general says: Attention is especially in
vited to the experience Of the last few
months in attempting to provide quickly
coast defense. 1t is believed to be imprac-
ticable, and we will always be forced in any
emergency to rely on what has been pro-
vided in time of peace. think it fair to
state, though not in the way of complaint
that this has been urged on Congress each
year for the past ten years. The situation
is very simple. A plan has been adopted for
providing a complete coast defense. With
the present facilities of the department this
work can be carried on economically and in
the most efficient manner in such a way as
to complete the present plan in about six
teen years. Estimates ought to be SUBJ
mitted each year for so much of the work
as the facilities for its production will per-
init. 1t rests with Congress to determine
how much of the work be provided for
each year consistently with the resources of
the country. But the work cannot progress
faster than the appropriations provide for.
1t is probable that there must be added to
the plans and estimates for the coast de-
Tense some provision for the defense of
added possessions
General Flagler does not claim for the
45-caliber Springfield rifle an equality with
the new 30-caliber magazine rifle of the
army, but says that it is a very good arm
and possesses many merits. This feature
has heretofore been commented on in dis
cussion of small arms used during the war;
The machinery for the ma@ufacture of small
arm ammunition was not the best, yet the
department turned out 90OO00OO rounds for
the war. For years past, the report states
that the appropriations for equipments of
infantry. cavalry, artillery and horse have
been barely sufficient to meet the consump-
ton of the regular army, and, although
there were buildings, oere was not machin-
cry with which to manufacture these sup
plies. 1t was not possible to fill acquisitions
for the volunteer troops when made.
Details are given of what was done to
rapidly increase the coast defenses when
the war began. He called attention to the
fact that Congress has never appropriated
what was asked for powder and proiectiles
and, in consequence, the supply at the be-
ginning of the war was inadequate, and he
gives some instances of the work done by
the department to make good the deficiency.
The following statement is made as to
powder For several years this depart
ment has been experimenting on smokeless
powders for seacoast guns, and had COM
pleted the determination of the specifications
and requirements for the smokeless powders
for nearly all the seacoast guns and mortars
Some of the powder manufacturers that had
been engaged in the production of these ex-
perimental powders had small plants for
their productions. 1t was impossible, how
ever, to produce the powders fast enough
to meet the emergency, and in some cases
experience in their use was necessary for
adapting them to all the requirements of
the service. All the companies, however
were ready at once to take up the manufac-
ture of the carbon powders, and as the re-
quirements for this were simpler they could
expand their plants for this production more
rapidly, and for a time this department
thSASAoAS dSNOlSu All It's energies TO produce
ing sufficient supply of the carbon pow
ders. Later, and as fast as possible, the
manufacture was changed to smokeIess now
derS.
SMOKELESS POWDERS.
1T should be stated however that
smokeless powder only was manufactured
for field and siege artillery. The fact that
the field and siege artillery was to be en-
ployed was not determined until about the
time that war was declared, and there
were no funds available for securing am
munition for these guns before that time
The preparation of smokeless powder am
munltion for these guns commenced at
once, but it was necessary to issue i'm
mediately the ammunition on hand for the
batteries that were sent to the front and
as this was all charcoal powder ammuni-
ton, it accounts for the fact that only this
black or charcoal powder ammunition was
generally used in actual service against
the enemy.
The furnishing of siege and field guns
and ammunition for the war encountered
the same difficulties as in other branches
of the ordnance equipment, yet the bureau
furnished such guns for the Manila and
Porto Rican expeditions The artillery was
not used at Santiago to any extent. OF
siege guns twenty-five were taken for sea-
coast defenses at the beginning of the war.
General Flagler quotes the following from
the report Of Lieutenant Colonel H. D.
Boruse chief ordnance officer at Santiago.