The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-29
HIS WARNING UNHEEDED
CERVERA STRONGLY OPPOSED SPAIN
RUSHING INTO WAR.
Letters That Show the Admiral Is
tiOns of Disaster Verified.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2S.-The Navy De-
partment to-day published through the
Office of naval intelligence the Views of
Admiral Cervera Regarding the Spanish
Navy in the Late War" Captain Glover,
the chief intelligence officer, explains that
this is a reprint of a number of letters pub
lished in La Epoca, of Madrid, on the 9Th
of the present month. The letters are dated
from before the war up 10 May .. They
were written by Cervera in protest against
Spain rushing into war in the face of GER
tain defeat, due to the naval strength of the
United States and the unpreparedness Of the
Spanish navy. Cervera writes:
II ask myself if 1t is right for me to keep
silent and thereby make myself an accom-
plice in adventures which will surely cause
the total ruin of Spain. And for what pur-
pose? To defend an island which was ours
but belongs to us no more, because even if
we should not lose it by right in the war,
We have lost it in fact, and with it ali
wealth and an enormous number of young
men, victims of the climate and bullets i'll
the defense of what now is no more than a
romantic ideal. Furthermore, 1 believe that
this opinion of mine should be known. to the
Queen and by the whole council of minis
ters. 1 have deemed it my duty TO express
my opinions to the proper authorities clear
ly and without beating about the bush Now
let orders be given to me; ] will carry them
out with energy and decision. l am ready
for the worst"
Captain Glover says Spain had neglected
her navy and Cervera shows it was inn
prudent for her to attempt war against a
superior naval power. Taking up some of
the vessels in detail in letter written in
I'll
defective guns, how the Carlos V was a
failure because of lack of power, and how
the CATALONIA, begun more than eight years
before, was still incomplete. And then he
predicts that a conflict would be disastrous
TO Spain. In a letter written in February
the admiral speaks of the Colon having no
guns, of other vessels being defective, of the
inability of the fleet to coal at Cadiz, of
their being obliged to go out with half ra-
TONS and finally their having no charts Tor
American seas. He says that the eight pr1n-
cipal vessels on the Havana station are
worn out, and that, taking things as they
are the Spanish naval force compared with
that of the United States is in the proper
ton of one to three. In such conditions
If not offensive one, and all that could
be done in an offensive way would be TO
make some raids with few fast vessels.
The admiral points to the futlllty OF at
tempting to blockade the United States
ports and asks how the Spanish navy
would repair even should they win a great
would be foolish to deny that what We may
reasonably expect is defeat which may be
glorious, but all the same, defeat which
would cause us to lose the island in the
worst possible manner. y only IN
case we could count on some powerful ally
could we aspire to obtain satisfactory
result
The admiral refers to the Spanish Pacific
force as not able to afford even a shadow
of resistance to the American naval force.
Further on he speaks of the war as at last
in sight and lamentS the incomplete state
of the Spanish vessels. But, after all, he
says that he is glad the end is coming and
is prepared to do his duty. He is on record
as protesting against The idea of sending
the little torpedo boat fiotilla to Cuba,
pointing out that a naval defeat for Spain
would precipitate the loss of Cuba. He
speaks of the surprise and establishment
experienced by all of the officers of his
squadron on receiving orders from Spain to
sail from Cape Verde for Cuba, inasmuch
as they had united in pointing out the con-
dition of the ships Says the admiral:
with an easy conscience l go to the
rifice, but cannot understand that decision
of the navy general officers against my
opinions"
The last letter in the series is one from
Admiral Villamil, of CerveraS squadron,
addressed directly to Sagasta, pointing out
that the sacrifice of the Spanish naval
forces will be as certain as 1t will be use
less and fruitless for the termination of the
war"