Spirit of the age. [volume] (Woodstock, Vt.) 1845-1913, 1898-12-03
SAMPSON SPEAKS
Reflects on Shafter and Charges
Lack Of Cooperation.
SURPRISED At STATEMENTS.
Recommendation to the Secretary
BlancO's Depariure-Revile by the
SpaniaI Ids-rhe CaIlist Sca,e.

|
BlsncO's Depar,ure--RevileL by the
SpaniaIds-The CaIlist Sca.e.
Washington. Dec. IA report from
Admiral Sampson, covering the opera
tions Of the United States blorkading
fleet of Santiago, after the destruction
Of Cervera's fleet. wa. made public by
, the navy department yesterday. The
report begins with dispatch dated on
the flagship New York, July 10, and
winds up with one from the same flag
| ship, dated Guantanamo, Aug. l.
In the first report Admiral Sampson
tells Of the demonstration made against
Asuadores by the Michigan troops under
! Duilield, the point of which was that as
scon as the ships tool: part in the fight
the Spaniards disappeared. He says that
the bombardment OF Santiago on the I'd
ofJuly served no particular end because
Skaters attack had been pustpored.
He quotes dispatches from himsaif to
| Shafter, stating that it Was impossible
| TO force an entrance to the hai Dor until
| the mires had been removed, and tha,
work could be accomplished only after
| the troops had taken the forts. Shafler
| replied that he could not tell when he
| could take the batteries. If they We're
as difficult as those against which he was
pitted it would take some time and Il
| great loss of life
Said he: Il AM at loss to see why
the navy cannot work under a destruc
tive fire as we'll as the army. My loss
| yesterday was over 800 msn. BY all
means keep up fire on everything in sight
until demolished. l expect however.
with time and sufficient men, to capture
the forts along the bay"
| An hour later on the same day, July .,
| Shafter again appealed to Sampson 10
force the harbor entrance Immediately
so as to avoid future loss amorg his M n
already very heavy. Said he: You can
operate with less loss of life than | can"
In reply on the same day Admiral
| Sampson pointed out that the channel of
| the harbor was we'll streWn with min :,
which would certainly result in the sink
ing Of one or more of his ships if he at
tempted to enter the harhor, and that by
sinking one the harbor would he blocked
against the entrance of the others He
had hoped that Shafter would take the
batteries from the rear, so that he might
drag for the tOrpedOes, but if it was
Skaters earnest desire that he should
force the entrance he would prepare to
undertake it, although the position of
both army and navy would be more diff
cult il they failed in the attempt. He
promised TO use mines a t Guantanamo TO
countermine those at Santiago, which
! would consume considerable time.
Said Sampson: 1T is not so much the
loss of men as it is the loss of ships
which have until now deferred me from
making a direct attack upon the ships
within the port"
After the battle with Cervera's feet
Shafter renewed his request that Samy-
son force all entrance. saying his pres
ent position had cost him 1000 men a Il he
did not wish to lose any more.
Sampson, in comment, says this
showed complete misapprehension Of
the circumstances. He alleges that the
sinking of the Mercedes would obstruct
the entrance of the larger American
ships, and that extensive shore batteries
We're known to exist. His chief of staff
had indicated to Shafter the points which
should be carried before any attention
was paid to the city, and the taking of
these points would have insured the de-
struction Of the mines and the entrance
of the American fleet.
| Shafter had cordially consented TO this
! and Sampson did not know why the plan
was changed unless the troops had been
advanced too far to divert lie expressed
the belief that an adherence to the orig
inal plan would have resulted in the
much quicker surrender of the Spanish
troops and less loss of life. except by the
navy, which would have borne the brunt
of the attack.
Sampson tells how he contemplate ted
bringing up the marine battalion from
Guantanamo, landing it at the foot of
| MOrro to assist in assault or TO take the
west battery, and had no doubt of the
success of his plan. He arranged to
visit Shafter to talk this over but, being
| i'll, was obliged to send Chief of Staff
| Captain Chadwick. They reached an
| Arrangement to lombard Santiago from
| the sea for "a hours with the heavy guns.
and, If that failed to bring the enemy 10
| terms, then to assault the Socapa bat
| terry with the marines and Cubans, and
force an entrance to the harbor with
some of the smaller ships.
Admiral Sampson says: II have been
surprised to see published in the papers
any statement of refusal on my part 10
enieavor to force my way into the har-
Dor, and cannot Understandable case the
newspaper report he truthful state
ment Of what was sent by him--Genersl
Skaters sending any report of this
kind.
II here moreover. would animadvert
upon the apparently extraordinary open
ness with which every detail of hope,
effort or suggestion on the part of the
army, has been published. The unws-
dom of such procedure is too manifest
| for discussion"
After referring to the existence of
what he terms an indefinite truce ut
that time, Sampson quotes message
from Shafter dated July 10, asking him
to begin firing on the city, according to
program, but to be careful to put his
shots well to the westward. near thu
bay, to avoid disastrous moral effev,
upon his soldiers. He quotes dispatch
from Secretary Long. saying that the
secretary of war desires Sampson to
force the harbor; that he wishes to Do
"In Death Not Separated"
Watertown, N. Y. Nov 30.-Fred w.
Ganter, the champion bicycle rider of