The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1898-06-02
THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIP
PINES.
(Prof. Theodore S. Woolsey in the New
York Times)

YORK Times.
| We are waging war which we believe
to be just. 1t is in defence of humanity
and of our sorely tried national interests.
Its object is the paciicatlon of Cuba.
The entire civilized world, save Great
Britain, believes that it is war of selfish
aggression. We declare that our motives
| are pure, and enact in the most formal
way self-denying ordinance to assure
| the world that we shall not retain Cuba.
If under these circumstances we do seize
perhaps, but Porto Rico and the Philip
pines, one or both, with what face can
we maintain our a1truistic professions?
In appearance and In fact we should be
hypocrites
But can we part with our prospective
they are, we could not add them to the
number of bastard republics. Nor could
we give them or sell them to this Power
and to that, lest all the sighted Powers
should resent it and demand an equiva.
lent. The most favored nation clause and
ohO bebidHOC-O1- PSWOI plAAOAPxO oOOAl w
turn singularly close together. Yet to
hand them back to Spain, no matter on
what condition, would be deliberate
surrender Of their peoples to thefgrinding
tyranny from which at great cost we have
rescued their Cuban brothersoo Are we
not, then. by process of exclusion, forced
to accept as our own what the fortune of
war may give us, even if it be white
elephantS Possibly. There must be a
balancing of considerations. Unless we
do retain our conquests, however, the
line of least resistance would seem to
lead to Spanish ownership.
What are the objections to the retention
by the United States of the Philippines
as future part of its territory. Are
they practical and sound, or are they
chiefly ethical like the one already
given?
One relates to the form of government
which could be applied to them. Our
conquests hitherto, as well as our pur-
chases, New Mexico and California, as
well as Louisiana and Alaska, have
brought us territory barely inhabited at
all. But here are thickly populated is
| lands, whose people are SO mixed in race,
| so uncertain in quality of civilization, SO
destitute to all appearance in self-govern-
ing capacy, as to make it doubtful wheth-
er they could ever be brought into our
union as an integral part. For the pres
emit, at least, they must be governed with
a strong hand.ze This might mean indet-
mite martial law; it might mean govern
ment by commission or a Governor ap-
pointed by the President, relying upon a
| military force for support. Either meth
cd might succeed temporarily, though
either method is liable to abuse. But
neither offers permanent solution. The
satrap system is too repugnant to our po-
! litical ideas. Nor can we contide in the
| selection of officials to man such system
until our civil service is better developed.
| Another objection is to be found in the
military burden involved. Some effort
is necessary to picture to ourselves the
| change of military and naval establish
| ment which would be necessary If the
United States became a colonial Power.
1 his sort of ambition grows by what it
feeds upon. Puerto Rico, Hawaii. the
Philippines, would only whet, not satisfy
the TASTE We should require foothold
in China to compete in trade facilities
with other Powers. We should insist
upon the exclusive control of Central
American inter-oceanic canal. Indeed
/ many urge this at present, looking at the
question from the theoretical and strategy
should need Cuba as the key to the East
ern approach to this canal. We should
need coaling stations and dry docks-in
other words, fortified and garrisoned
ports-at convenient points in the Pacific
and South Atlantic. All this means
| more territory to defend, more soldiers
to defend with, more ships to keep up
hn 1np Mot, 49,
| many more. How gladly Britain would
limit her responsibilities if she could!
But it would be construed as sign Of
weakness, and she fears the conse-
tquences. She cannot let go. We. are
more fortunate because we have not
| taken hold. We are rich and prosperous
| people. This is largely owing to two
causes (aside from race and form of gov
ernment) cheap land and freedom from
militarism. just as the cheap government
land is becoming a thing of the past,
and men are wondering whether they car
grow wheat at profit and fertilize also,
! we are asked to assume the military bur.
| den.
One other objection to a national policy
which must involve large expenditures
closer political relations with other Pow.
ers, and trade rivalries reaching to the
ends of the earth relates to its effect upon
domestic problems. We have several CUES.
t1ons upon which national parties divide,
stable currency, compromise tariff,
and reform IN various departments of ma
tional, state and municipal politics.
These must be settled soon and wisely,
as many believe, If this republic is to sue.
cessfully endure. But how can they be
properly settled or advantageously con.
sidered If burning questions of foreign
policy are complicated with them? Take,
for instance, the one hundred and fifty
or two hundred millions of additional
income which this policy of colonial ex.
pansion would require, or the much lar.
ger sum needed in case of actual war.
tFor war would be more likely than at
| present, just as man is more likely to
| injure another if he has weapon than il
he has none To raise such revenue in
wolves dozen considerations hike these !:
national pdebt, issuing paper money
abolition of pension payments lowering
tariffs to make them more productive, an
| income tax, heavier internal taxation.
| Is it not true that currency reform and
sound tariff legislation would be very
much interfered with, if not altogether
prevented, by the financial necessities OF
a colonial policy? while the financial
advantages Of it. through extension OF