The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-12-05
sHAFyrER AND SANTIAGO.
Statements by the General That
Throw a Light ON the Campaign.
Washinotnr Post

washington Post.
On the occasion Of the banquet of the Sons
of the Revolution, celebrated al belmont
cos, New York, on Friday evening last,
Gen. William r. Shafter. who commanded
the army of invasion and conducted the
Santiago campaign, had his first opportuni-
ty to speak of the dramatic episode in which
he wa S so potent and conspicuous a figure.
Perhaps we should not say that it was his
first opportunity because no doubt almost
any New York paper would have given him
any amount of space in which to blow his
horn had he been minded to adopt that
questionable method of communicating
with the public. General Shafter, however.
has acted the part of modesty. He returned
from command at Santiago, returned quiet
ly to duty at Governors island. and left
others to do the talking until 1t seemed
proper and opportune for him to say a
word. His opening was presented at the
banquet in question, and he employed 1t
with a simple candor which will commend
him to his fellow-countrymen
There is one feature of General Skaters
speech, however, which needs to be consid-
cred by itself, and that is presented in his
description of the circumstances under
which the expedition set out from Tampa.
We believe we may say of that expedition,
without fear of contradiction, that the de-
left in great confusion, that the vessels were
not properly loaded that commands were
divided from each other and that regi-
ments went in one ship, while their stores
were on another. 1t has been sufficiently
established, moreover, that the debarkation
was attended by an equal futility, that the
was no coincidence in the landing of the
men and their supplies. But all this is
readily explained If we accept the hypothe-
sis of premature departure in the first in
stance The lamentable things of which we
speak were only the inevitable results of the
initial blunder. We must go back, there
fore to the sailing of the transports from
Tampa in order to reach any intelligent
and satisfactory understanding Of the Incl
dent, and 1t is on this point that General
Skaters utterance is so enlightening and
so significant. He explained to his hearers
the original plan of campaign in cuba,
landing the northern coast of the island.
within striking distance of Havana. and
then went on to say;
Before we were able to put these plans
into operation news came that the Spanish
fleet was in the harbor OF Santiago. was
ordered to go there. / was ordered to load
were loaded. 1 got started Then orders
came for us to come back. 1t was reported
that a part of the Spanish fleet had been
seen off the southern coast of Cuba, and
that it would. therefore not be safe for the
transports, which held, practically, the
whole army of the United States, to sail
1t was proved later that this was mis-
take. That night I was ordered to proceed
at once, even with only ten thousand men.
! learned that the orders came through the
fact that Admiral Sampson had tele-
graphed that. with the assistance of the
navy. Santiago could be taken with ten
This is taken from the New York Jour
nails report of the affair, though it is sub
stantially what the reports of other papers
say, and is. no doubt an accurate repro
duction of General Skaters utterances. In
deed, the same explanation of the prema
ture and hurried departure of the Santiago
expedition has already been given by Gen.
Wheeler in his testimony before the Dodge
investigation commission We have every
departure from Tampa was FASTENED by
SIMPSONS appeal to the government,
coupled with his assertion that If ten thou
sand men were furnished him he could take
Santiago in fortY-eight hours
This opens up to US an interesting field of
speculation and inquiry. If Sampson did in
ed only 10000 men, operating on land. to
effect the immediate reduction of the Span
ish stronghold, he betrayed a military
ignorance which, to say the least, is worthy
of consideration. The developments CONTRA
dicted him at every turn. 1t is now notori-
Gus that he could not have taken Santiago
with the force he specified, either in forty
eight or in any other number of hours. His
various bOmbardments at the Spanish forts,
as we have since learned, resulted merely
in the displacement of one harmless old,
seventeenth century gun in MORO Castle,
and, had not Cervera committed the suicidal
folly of going out of Santiago harbor on the
morning Of the Sd of July the capture of
the place would have devolved on Shafter
alone and would have been achieved with
out any possible aid from Sampson, at a
frightful cost of life and property. That
Shafter would have finally reached the end
in view no one need doubt. His men were
indomitable and not to be repulsed. But it
would have been a fearful tragedy and to
it's consummation Sampson would have con-
trbuted only another futile and ridiculous
bombardment--a wealth of sound and fury,
signifying nothing.
Some day history will assert it's claim,
and the whole truth of the Santiago affair
will go into the impershable record of
events. When this crazy conspiracy of adu-
lation shall have expended itself, and fact
and reason be re-enthroned it will tran
spire that Santiago should and could have
been reduced without that invasion by the
army and without the lamentable tragedies
that attended it's brilliant conduct and its
splendid Valor and devotion.