The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-12-01
SAMPSON AND sHAFTER SPAT.
gHE ADMIR- RAILS REPORT DETAILS
TIE CLASH BEFORE SANTIAGO.

the General Of the Army--AdmiraL
sampson Denies Tint He Refused
To Force the Harbor. But Says sucIs
nm Action Would Have Been sui
cIdnI
Washington, Nov. 3a-The navy DEPART
ment to-day made public a report frorI
Admiral Sampson covering the operations
Of the United States bockading fleet off
Santiago after the destruction OF Cerve-
ros squadron The report begins with a
dispatch dated on the flagship New York.
July Is, and winds up with one from ths
same flagship dated Guantanamo, Aug 4.
In the first report Admiral Sampson tells
of the demonstration made against Agua-
dores by the Michigan troops under Duff
field, che point Of which was that as soon
as the ships took part In the firing the
Spaniards disappeared. He says that ths
bombardment OF Santiago on July served
no particular end, because of Skaters
attack having been postponed. He quoted
dispatches from himself 10 Shafter, stating
that II was impossible to force an en-
trance TO the harbor until the mines had
been removed, and that work could be
accomplished only after the troops had
taken the fcrts. Shafter replied that he
could not tell when he cou'd take the bat
teries If they were as difficult as those
against which he was pilted Il would take
some time, and great loss of life. He
says: II am at a loss TO SEE why the navy
cannot work under a destructive fire as
well as the army My loss yesterday wa5
over 500 men, BY all means keep up the
fire on everything in sight until demol-
ished. / expect however, with time and
sufficient men TO capture the forts alona
the bay"
An hour later on the same day July z,
shafter again appealed to Sampson 10
force the harbor entrance Immediately, so
as to avoid future loss among his men.
already very heavy you can operate
with less loss Of life than / can" he said.
In reply on the same day, Admiral
Sampson pointed out that the channel OF
the harbor was well strewn with mines
which would certainly result in the sink-
ing of one or more OF his ships II he at
| tempted the harbor, and that by sinking
| one the har5or would be blocked against
! the entrance OF The others. He had hoped
thaf S5after would take the batteries from
| the rear, so that he might drag for the
torpedoes. bun IL II was Shaftor's earnest
desire that he should force the entrance.
he would prepare 20 undertake u. think
ing however, that the position of both
army and navy would be made more dr.
ncult If they failed in the attempt
Sampson says. 1T Is not so much the
loss OF the men as II is the loss Of the
ships which have until now deferred me
from making "a direct attack upon the
ships within the port"
Alter the battle with Cerveras feet
| Shafter renewed his request that Sampson
force an entrance saying his present posi-
| ton has cost him thousand men and hs
| did not wish TO lose any more.
Sampson, in comment, says this shows
complete misrepresentation OF the cir
cumstances He alleges that the sinking
| of the Mercedes would obstruct the en-
! trance of the larger American ships and
| that extensive shore batteries we're known
to exist His chief Of STAFF had Indicated
| 10 Shafter the points that should be car
| ried before any attention was paid 70 he
| city and the taking of these points would
| have insured the destruction OF the mines
| and the entrance of the American fleet.
| shafter had cordially consented to this.
| and Sampson did not know why the plans
was changed unless the troops had been
! advanced too far to divert. He expressed
nal plan would have resulted in the much
quicker surrender of the Spanish troops,
| and less loss OF life. except to. the navy.
| which would have borne the brunt of at
| tack.
Sampson tells how he contemplated
! bringing up the marine battalion from
! Guantanamo, landing them at the foot OF
| MORO to assist in the assault or to take
! the west battery. and had no doubt OF
| the success of his plan. lie arranged 20
| visit Shafter to talk this over but be-
| ing m was Obliged 90 send his chief OF
| STAFF. Capt Chadwick. They reached an
| arrangement 70 lombard Santiago from
| the sea for twenty-four hours with the
| heavy guns, and if they failed 10 bring
the enemy to terms then to ASSAULT So
capa battery with the marines and Gu
! bans and force an entrance to the har-
| Dor wit.- some of the smaller ships.
Thus, says Sampson. II have been sur
| prised 10 see published in the papers any
! statement OF refusal on my part 70 en-
/ deavor TO force my way into the harbor
! and cannot understand. In case news
| paper report be a truthful statement OF
what was sent by him. Gen. Skaters send
| ing any report Of this kind
Il here, moreover, would animadvert
] upon the apparently extraordinary OPEN
| ness with which every detal of hope ef-
fort or suggestion on the part of the army
has been published. The unwisdom oe
such procedure is too manifest FOR discuss
sion"
Continuing the admiral says: II think
the fa.sity of the suggestion that the navy
was unwilling to cooperate In forcing an
entrance 10 Santiago is already sufficiently
shown. / would, however add. to show
the good win OF the navy and my desire
and understanding that in case the enemy
failed to come 20 terms through bombard-
ment the harbor entrance should be Fore
cd, that in the meanwhile all preparations
were completed for countermining, the
mines having been removed for this pur-
pose from the Resolete 60 the collier Leo-
anon Lieuts. Roy Smith and Il. r. Capeh-
aboard the Lebanon, and everything ar
ranged for action whenever desired. The
only reasons for postponement came from
the general commanding the army
"The navy has been placed IN such an