The age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1897-1902, 1898-12-01
SANPSON'S WORK
At SANTIAGO.
The Admiral Explains Some Of
Skaters Reflections
ON THE PART PLAYED BY NAVY
Could Not Enter a Harbor Lined
With Mines.
SHAFIER APPEALED TO THE BOATS
Thought They Could Work Under De-
structive Fire as Well as Army.
HIS LOSS HAD BEEN HEAVY
It Was Sinking of Ships Sampson
Dreaded-Admiral Feels He Was
Thought They Could Work Under De-
structive Fire as Well as Army.
HIS LOSS HAD BEEN HEAVY
It Was Sinking of Ships Sampson
Dreaded-Admiral Feels He Was
Treated Discourteously When Not
Called to Surrender Conference.

Washington November 30.-The navy de-
partment today made public a report from
Admiral Sampson, covering the operations
of the United States blockading fleet Off
Santiago after the destruction of Cervera's s
squadron.
The report begins with dispatch dated
July Is, on the flagship New York, and
winds up with one from the same flagship,
dated Guantanamo, August A. In the first
report Admiral Sampson tells of the DEM
onstration made against Aguadores by the
Michigan troops under Duffied, the point of
which was that as soon as the ships took
part in the firing the Spaniards disappeared.
He says that the bombardment of Santiago
on the I'd of July served no particular end,
because Skaters attack had been post
-poned. He quotes dispatches from himself
to Shafter, stating that it was impossible
to force an entrance to the harbor until
the mines had been removed. and that work
could be accomplished only after the troops
had taken the forts. Shafter replied that
Ia could not tell when he could take the
;, batteries If they were as difficult as those
against which he WAS pitted it would take
some time and a great loss of life. He
says:
81 am at loss to see why the navy
cannot work under a destructive fire as
well as the army. My loss yesterday
was over 800 men. BY all means keep
up fire on everything in sight until de-
molished. l expect, however, with time
and sufficient men to capture the forts
along the bay
shafter Again Appeals
An hour later on the same day. July 2,
ElaIteI again led n fn irn.
mediately force the harbor entrance, so as
to avoid future loss among his men, al
ready heavy. Says he
You can operate with less loss of life
than l can" In reply the same day
Admiral Sampson pointed out that the
emanuel of the harbor was well strewn with
mines which would certainly result in the
sinking of one or more of his ships If he
attempted to enter the harbor, and that by
sinking one, the harbor would be blocked
against the entrance of the others. He had
hoped that Shafter would take the bat
teries from the rear so that he might drag
for the torpedoes, but if it was Skaters
earnest desire that he should force the
entrance he would prepare to undertake it.,
thinking, however, that the position of
both army and navy would be made more
difficult If they failed In the attempt He
promised to use mines at Guantanamo u
countermine those at Santiago, which
would consume considerable time Samp-
son says
at is not so much the loss of men as it Is
the loss of ships which has until now de-
tered me from making a direct attack up
on the ships within the port
After the battle with Cerveras fleet Shaf-
ter ienewed his request that Sampson force
an entrance, saying his present position had
cost him thousand men, and he did not
wish to lose any more. Sampson, in COM
ment, says this showed complete misap-
prehension of the circumstances. He al
leges that the sinking of the Mercedes
would have obstructed the entrance of the
larger American ships, and that extensive
shore batteries were known to exist. His
chief of staff had indicated to Shafter that
the points should be carried before any
attention was paid to the city, and the TAX
ing of these points would have insured the
destruction of the mines and the entrance
of the American fleet. Shafter had cor
daily consented to this, and Sampson did
not know why the plan had been changed
until the troops had been advanced too far
to divert. He expresses the belief that an
adherence to the original plan would have
resulted In much quicker surrender of
the Spanish troops and less loss of life, ex-
cept the navy, which would have borne the
brunt of the attack.
When He Fell Ill
Sampson tells how he contemplated bring
ing up the marine battalion from Guantan-
amo, landing them at the foot of Moro to
assist in the assault or to take the west
battery, and had no doubt of the success
of his plan. He arranged to visit Shafter
to talk this over, but being i'll. was obliged
to send his chief of staff, Captain Chad
wick They reached an agreement to bonn
bard Santiago from the sea for twenty-four
hours with the heavy guns, and IL that
failed to bring the enemy to terms then to
assault the Socapa battery with the ma
rines and Cubans and force an entrance to
the harbor with some of the smaller ships
Sampson says:
'I have thus been surprised to see pub
fkshed in the newspapers any statement of
refusal on my part to endeavor to force my
way into the harbor. and cannot under
stand, In case the newspaper report be a
truthful statement of what was sent by
him. why General Shafter should send any
report Of this kind.
II here. moreover, would animadvert