New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-07-08

I
Sampson made daring plans and carried them
out In their accomplishment he obtained the
credit of having made the first landing in Cuba.
that credit being joined to the other successful
moves of the Navy made with 80 much expcdi-
ton. Selecting Guantanamo point forty
miles to the east Of Santiago and the only
coast point where land-locked bay of suf-
dcient depth for large ships could be found, ne
sent the Marbehead. the Suwanee and the
Yankee to clear The way for the landing OF SIX
hundred marines, who had been brought down
on the Panther The conflict was sharp and
short. and the marines. after burning the VII,
lage at the entrance to the bay. entered ana
3 took possession.
On the second day there was a sharp skirmlsh
. In which a number Of men were Killed. but the
marines retaliated with the destruction OF ten
Spaniards for every American killed and took
seventeen prisoners. A permanent camp was
established the details of the first few days
events having already been published. ana the
American feet. with an assurance so remark
able as almost to border on bravado. began 10
use the bay a n permanent base OF naval OPP
erations. The bay Itself was found 10 DE hhpo
with mines but all OF them. twelve In number
were removed without explosion. although TWO
were In contact with the bottoms or the Marine
head and the Texas The success or thls move
meant a great deal 10 the fleet aiioWihs !. nol
only to coal and provision from the supply poa'A
In a smooth bay. but providing harbor FOR the
small vessels In case of heavy seas or dangerous
tropical windstorm3.
DECISION NOT TO FORCE AN ENTRANCE
While these operations had been going on Ad-
miral Sampson and Commodore Schley had
given some attention to the subject OF forcing
an entrance into the harbor and 1t Is fact
worthy Of note In the face Of the bitter crit
icism Of the failure to make such an attempt,
that both Of these careful strategists ard in
trepid leaders decided that such an expedition
would be disastrous and undoubtedly foolhardy
The situation this: The neck of the har-
bor not considering the position or the Merr,-
mac wreck. is only 80 feet wide and with
double twist OF the channel that calls for
large swinging area on the heights to the east
of the entrance is Moro Castle, At an elevation
Of 100 feet. while beneath IT, in two tiers.
two batteries at the heights OF - and 100 feet
On the hill to the east Of Moro is large earth
work mounting modern guns. On the west or
the entrance La Socapa Castle stands up 200
feet from the water-ne. and slightly lower, on
the brow Of the hill. an earthwork battery
mounts two G-inch and two 4-inch modern ship
guns-probably taken from the Rena Mercedes.
The altitude OF these guns gives them great
advantage over the ships their plunging IRE II
kept I'D with any rapidity accuracy being
sufficient to penetrate the protected decks. on
the contrary the ships II moving In close would
have to elevate their guns beyond the normal
altitude and would have to hit fairly on In.
top of the earthworks TO do any damage. other
wise the shells would go far over harmlessly
land on the hill beneath the earthworks. Even
II these forts were senced. there are n number
of small batteries enfilading the harhor mouth
and a formidable battery Of large modern guns
on Cayo Smith. an island Just within the mouth
Of The barber.
But added to all these things are the more
serious facts that the locations Of mines. "
which there are many. are not known 10 the
feet. and that an attempted entrance would
very slowly. In order TO avoid grounding. Once
In the entrance there is no turning about until
the open harbor Is reached. and then the four
big ships OF Spain. with their 11-.Ech guns,
would have had an admirable target. shot
In the engines. disahlement Of the steering
gear o. hole under the water-line. either
from torpedo Or shell. would prove tho de-
structon Of the ship. the absolute blockade Of
the chanre! and the loss OF the entire crew.
, That Is the answer TO criticisms Of delay on
the part Of the Navy and It's probable effective
ness.
In the three weeks since the arrival OF the
combined squadrons two assaults on the bat
teries have been made under the direction OF
Admiral Sampson. although there have also
been several small engagements
THE BATTERIES NOT DAMAGED.
Whatever the object may have been. the fact
Is apparent that outside OF loss Of life by the
Spaniardc and a salutary moral effect to
quality Of the American guns and the accuracy
Of the gunners. the batteries themselves are
the two bombardm enis. and the experiences at
CharlestOn's defences in the last war. and Sc
tastopols in the Crimean War. simply
repeated The gunners leave their guns when
the shells are unpleasantly near. md. while the
earthworks may be damaged. repairs are made
In a night
1t is estimated that 100000 worth Of ammu-
rition was thrown at these batteries In the
bombardment Of the 9th and 10th. and the
hat better
than ever with more guns mounted The din
Guilty OF placing snots at point the attitude o.
which is little short Of 200 feet and the range or
which is 1900 yards, has already beer touched
upon and does away with any criticism OF the
gunners
The Spanish fire never has been severe except
in the first short bCmhardm"nt by Commodore
Schley not more than 10 per cent OF In" guns
actually noticeaDl firing. and those only At long
Intervals. II is undoubtedly true that they are
short OF ammunition and that they al" SAVING IL
for their ina, struggle 1t is also Meter Of note
that all the guns In the first attack used smoke
lc2S powder
There should also be word said about the
repeated stories Of torpedo boat attacks at night
The stories Of night attacks may be attributed
to vivid imaginatons not alone OF correhpohd-
ents who miles off. but the naval oi1cers
and others the ships who have to make ex.
cuses for their firing The fact that several or
the small vessels have narrowly escaped being
sunk by shots from the American ships. and the
further fact that both torpedo-b?ats nave dani,
aged machinery and boilers under repair VIII
do away with the anxiety In that respect Al
though two hostile fleets have been Ia proximity
for three weeks these dread destroyers have
been used only for dispatch and picket boats.
and not for the operations for which they were
built The dynamite cruiser Vesuvius has, how
ever been used. It is believed. efYectually, In
sending terror to the hearts Of the Spaniards In
Santiago. even II no great destruction OF prop
crty accomplished
or the Cuban Army Of 1000 promised to
sst In operations in the east Of Cuba only about
one thousand five hundred have appeared. al
though General Garcia said that he pur
posely keeping 1000 men in the interior. OF this
number General Rabi, with 700 men, has been
transferred from the west Of Santiago to the
east to take part In the operations OF the United
States troops. while about one hundred remain