The daily morning journal and courier., 1898-10-24


 cover the landing of the men. In this order the following occurs:
 The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba Is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward both as to maintaining stations and readl- ness for action and as to keeping close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Span iSh admiral ever attempts to escape, that at tempt will be made soon.
 The admiral here remarks that much trouble was experienced in landing on account of the wandering proclivities of { some of the transports which had to be looked up. The progress of disembark-
 ation was rendered somewhat difficult by heavy sea, the heaviest during the three weeks the fleet had been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica It appears that, according to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated
 June 26 the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten
 the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of it's difficulties and small chance of success. He would not do this. he says, were the present force to be kept there, as it then ensured a capture which he believed would ter
 minate the war. The above telegram was sent with reference to the proposed
 detachment of some of our heavy ships for service abroad (the proposed expe-
 dition to the Spanish coast). A dis patch from Secretary Long shows that this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yan- kee and Dixie, and they were go to the Azores for orders en route to Tangiers, Morocco The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.
 On June 30 the admiral received
 communication from Major General
 Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning
 and asking that he (Sampson) lombard
 the forts in support of a regiment of
 infantry and make such demonstrations
 as he thought proper at the harbor's
 mouth, so as to keep as many of the
 enemy there as possible. This request
 was compiled with, and on July 1 Gen.
 eral Shafter asked that the admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front. On July the following was re- ceived from General Shafter:
 Terrible fight yesterday but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. 1 urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to harbor. Please telephone answer.
 A reply was telephoned General
 Shafter from Admiral Sampson
 through Lieutenant Stanton which
 said the Admiral had bombarded forts at the entrance of Santiago and also
 Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing
 their fire, and asked whether he (Shaf- ter) wanted further firing on the ad-
 mirals part. The explanation was
 made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared
 of mines,-a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by
 the troops To this General Shafter
 replied: g,
 It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If l they are as difficult to take us those which
 we have been pitted against, 1t will be some time and great loss Of life. l am
 at loss to see why. the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 300 men. By all means keep up fire on everything In sight of you until demolished. expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay.s4
 Admiral Sampson then says: II
 wrote General Shafter the following let
 ter ard began making preparations to
 eountermine and with the object of all ranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance visit was arranged to General Shafter so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed and com bined action take place. I had in view the employment of marines for an as-
 sault either on ther Morro or SocApa battery, while at the same time assault ing the defenses at the entrance with the fleet.
 United States Flagship New York, First
 Rate, Off Santiago de Cuba, July 3 1898. My Dear General: I have your note of this morning-ju just received at 11:30
 An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning but I must say in addition to what he told you, that the forts which were silenced were not the forts which would give you any in- convenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except seaward They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines which would certainly result in the sinking of one or
 more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor and by the sinking of ship the attempt to enter the harbor would be de- fea ted by the preventing or further progress on our part. It was my hope that an attack
 on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag
 the channel for torDedoes. If it is your
 earnest desire that we should force our en- trance, I will at once undertake it. I think. however that our position and yours would
 be made more difficult if as Is possible, we fail in our attempt. We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines which I will bring here with as little delay as possible and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will
 enter me harbor. This work which Is un- familiar to us, will require considerable time. It is not so much the loss of. men as 1t is the loss of ships, which has until now de- tered me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.
 Very truly,
 w. Y. Sampson, Rear Admiral U. $. N. Commander-n-Chief, Naval Force, North Atlantic Squadron.
 Major General W. k. Shafter. U & " July 3-The sortie of Admiral Ger vera's squadron and it's destruction has
 been made the subject of a separate
 paper and need not be repeated here. This event closes the purely naval cam
 paign crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost three