The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1898-08-27

of the fleet from the CanarleS. 1t is SAID
that all the jails there We're opened and
the malefactors taken aboard the Spanish
( ships. You can force a man aboard ship
but you can't force him to fight.
Our men had another advantage. They
had had gun practice Most of the gum
ners were on personally 'affectionate terms
with their guns, had made bullseyes with
them, and not only ached to train them
on the enemy, but had such confidence in
their craftsmanship that fear was out of
the question, The crews simply knew
their whole interest was in their own
ships, not in those of the enemy. The
Spaniards are not towards, yet their i'm
pulse from the first was to dive out of
their ships. They felt sure of defeat
L value, too. the moral effect on the
men of large ships. That also gives con-
SHELLS AND ARNOR
The resistance of thick armor was il
iustrated in some instances. Battle is
better test than the condition of the prov
ing ground In the COlOns SiX-inch arm
or the nose of quite a gOod-sized proiec-
tile was found sticking and a large 70
inch common shell had exploded on it
without doing any damage. However. on
the NlZcaya large shell had entered well
aft in the cabin and had passed right
through, tearing off a plate on the other
SIDE; she was not armOred. On the Iowa
Two large shells struck well forward a
the water line, but on the unarmored
part of the ship The first. 6-inch, did
not even pierce the cOffer-dam but
though it pulVeriZed the cellulOse if is
still in the coffer-dam. the inner side of
which 1T did not penetrate. Moreover. as
1t dld not explode, the rotating band be-
ing recovered entire, though separated
from the shell, it presumably was an
ar1nor-plerclng shell. Surely it must have
mad little velocity. This is the more sur
prising, as the Spanish ships all had the
long, h1gh-power English guns. Still the
dow probably was an ObliQue one The
other big shell also struck the water line
Just a few feet aft Of the first one and
made a clean hole in the coffer-dam.
Sf~il< in hot oh oil
pIoded. bUt.the pieces seem to have been
carried along, most of them going through
the chain locker, which is right abreast
me hatch. There are seven goOd-siZed
holes through it, besides any number of
dents The chain locker happened to be
empty, so the pieces passed through into
the midship chain locker, where they We're
caught by the chain. One of them passed
through the after side of the chain locker
and struck the base of the turret. Most
81 Ihe pieces We're picked uD around the
deck in the immediate vicinity and in the
chaIn locker, showing that the force Of
ue pursuing charge must have been
slight. One of the pieces gave the arc
Of the base of the shell, which proved to i
be a Pinch. The shin was struck by q
a StanchiOn aft. probably any number
OF IlIneS on the arn1Or. and scars made
by two small-arm bullets We're discovered
on the muzzle face of one of the after
lZ-lnch guns. Everything would tend TO
t7L9phaSlze the superiority of armOred
Snlps over unarmOred ones. Such a rid
ding as some of the Spanish ships re-
ceived could not have been inflicted on
any of our ships that were engaged
Everything goes 10 prove the value of
the battleship: the power thew have TO
keep off torpedo boats and rapfd-fire fus- /
ilade. and the confidence a battIeshfp in /
spires in the crew, all go to show the
value of the type.
The Importance of having no woodwork
aboard and making the most perfect pro-
visions against fire cannot be overestimat-I
ed Fire was what destroyed the Spanish
fleet. and not only the fire from our ships
had little wood aboard any of the yes /
sells. Vet no one of them was under fire /
more than few minutes about fifteen) /
before smoke could be seen rising from
the decks It seems even the cork paint
burned. one fire on the Nizcaya was ex-
tinguished. hut others started quickly. /
both forward and aft. The water mains
We're shot away. and the fight had to be
given up. Something must be done to
protect these mains hereafter in every
fighting sip. Fire and smoke always have
the worst possible effect on the crew, and
owing to the great number of matches and
compartments on the ship flames are the
harder to discover and fight. Tt was
found simply impossible to keep fighting
both the fire and the ship. the gunfire
slackening IN immediately the alarm was
given. SO clear did this become that
whenever the flame and smoke could be-
seen from our fleet it was felt that all
was up with that ship. and the tendency
was 10 direct our gunfire on some other