The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-12-17
CHIEF cOMM|SSARY WESTON.
GIVES EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.
Suffering for Want of Food Be-
fore santiago, saying Much More
Hardships Were In Indian Wars.

WASHINGTON. Dec is.-Hr1E- Zen.
Weston. chief commissary OF the Snafter
expedition, testified today before the war
investigating committee that there was an
absence OF red tape rnethv6s in feeding the
volunteers at Siboaey. He said he never
heard a complaint of the condition of The
conamissary supplies at the front. Special
efforts had been made in behalf OF the VOL
unteers. whose officers, he recognized.
sometimes did not quite understand how TO
get wha: was due to the men. Surgeons
were given articles from the hospitals on
memorandum. and they were paid for out
OF funds al Washington. Col. Roosevelt
once came 20 Santiago and wanted 10 buy
tomatoes and certain extra supplies for his
men, and he refused to let him pay for
them, as there was no need for IL.
Witness said he took 1900 with him when
he went to Florida, and still has "a lot OF
IL left.
Referring to difficulties caused by the
subsistence department depending on the
quartermaster's department for transporta-
ton. he said Ii was a ridiculous idea. ana
the transportation was a matter he would
not like TO speak Of without thinking 1t
over. and he had Thought heap about it.
too" So far as the food was concerned.
Gen. Weston characterized the Santiago
campaign as a mere bagatelle. the hard
ships being trivial compared 10 his own
experience In frontier Indian campaigns.
when he and his men were forced to use
the wagon mules for food
The Rev. DR. Henry McCook of Phila-
delpsIa, chaplain OF the Second Pennsyl-
vania and commissioner of the National
Relief Association. said that on his return
from Cuba he had called on President Nc
kinney August s. and added:
II there was anything / did know, and
he did not get it out of me. am unaware
OF II. He has wonderful powers of cross
examination
The president at that time commissioned
him to find and permanently mark the
graves of the soldiers and he did so. He
pictured the desolatef conditions Of the
graves. but said the names We're nearly
ali marked. Some wounded men had
wandered OF and died, and their graves
remained unmarked. In Santiago, when
he landed July q. there was a dearth Of
everything needed. The medical depart
ment opposed the work of his relief asso-
citation. but changed their views later
The medical department, he thought,
charged its chief surgeon with burden
some detail clerical duties that prevented
satisfactory attention TO outside work. He
denounced the red tape method and offered
numerous suggestions for improvements.
Quartermaster General Ludington testi-
fed TO the operations of his department
prior 10 and during the war.
equipment, he said. was in securing tent
duck and kersey, both Of which were
manufactured especially for the army.
acquisitions for tents were filled promptly
as a rule, and ne recollected very few
delays in furnishing hospital teAts
Gen. Ludington did rot agree with the
suggestion Of Commissary General Egan
that the commissary department ought to
furnish cooking and eating utensils and
their transportation, as well as provide
for food.
Concerning the shipment of medical sup
plies. Gen. Ludington said they were
rushed forward as promptly. or more so.
than any other supplies. and he knew Of
no ins,ance where there had been delays
OF weeks in shipping medicines from New
York to Camp Alger. or from ST. Louis 20
Camp Thomas. This had been the testi-
mony OF numerous other witnesses DR..
Conner cited one instance where a 200-hed
hospital outfit had been lost between New
York and Fernandina.
Gen. Ludngton said that his department
at present was quite fairly supplied with
efficient officers, although he Gid not have
quite SO many as he wanted
Chief Engineer John NJ. Wilson a mem
Der or the commission. then swore himself
In as witness and testified In detail as 10
the preparations for coast defense, includ-
ing torpedoes. for which he had been allot-
thing less than S. COO GOO.
Gen. Breckinridge, inspector general Of
the army. was heard ut the afternoon SEES
sion. He spoke of the need OF a thorough
inspection service. with adequate rank to
make this inspection effective Mr. Cox
asked IL the inspectors inspected the heads
of other bureaus. Gen. Breckenridge said
ii went that far. IL such were the orders
although no such orders had in fact been
issued
Gen. Breckenridge spoke Of the change
IN the inspection service when the recent
war broke out. the officers no longer re-
porting 10 the inspector general
Mr.. Cox remarked that the .nspection hal
ceased to have head. and SIR Hay added
that The inspector generals duties had
practically ceased.
IL was very much more limited. az any
rate" he answered
The inspectors had not reported 10 him
during the war. he said. in reply TO cues
tons. These reports were stil coming In
and the secretary OF war had sent for them
to Submit 30 the Dodge commission
II. would SEEM" said Mr.. Hay. that for
the time your office was in a condition OF
innoouous deSuetuie"
1t was somewhat 80. / am afraid" an
swered Gen. Brecknrdge
He did moi know who brought about the
change of the inspection system during the
WAY Nc tFfltf$ came IN the usual way
In reply 10 Mr.. Ieatz as 10 the wisdom CT
the change. Gen Breckenridge said Il tend
ed 20 the disin;egration Of the inspection
system. As 10 the permanent consolidation
Of The adjutant generals and inspector gem
erals cTiCe he expressed his disapDrovai
as the place ~ one officer was az his desk
while the other was outside, conducting his
Inspections He strongly favored having
Inspectors report 20 the inspector general
y "a a a
Gen. Corhiu. In which the latter expressed
the view that the two offices should he
managed alike. Gen. Breckenridge said he
knew Gen. Corbin dsd not care TO receive
the Inspectors reports. and wold proba bly,
send them down II they came, lie en-
phas,xe8 TIE need Of having inspectors und-
e. the Inspector general The pending bill
provided inspectors general for separate
army branches, wtliea II adopted, would
result IN what be regarded as a defective
system