The county record. [volume] (Kingstree, S.C.) 1885-1975, 1898-06-02

OF Admiral Cervera's cruisers had led di-
rectly to the abandonment Of Admiral
SIMPSONS feint on San Juan de Porto
Rico, and had tied up at Tampa and Key
West the transports gathered to carry an
American army OF invasion to Cuba.
The general scope Of the new policy was
developed when the President directed the
enlargement OF the land force OF the ma
tion to more than 4 quarter OF million
lighting men and issued orders for the
future guidance OF the commanders OF
both land and naval forces, the details Of
which for obvious reasons cannot be dis
closed II can be stated in a general way,
however that the programme OF the Ad-
ministratiOn contcmp.ates these opera
tlOnS:
l. The destruction OF the Spanish war
fleet in Cuban waters, or any other fleet
Spain may send over to fight.
2. The invasion OF Cuba and Porto Rico
as sooa rs the way has been made clear for
the safe transport OF American troops to
those islands.
8. The occupation OF the Philippines by
an army three times as great as that first
intended for that service.
!. The adoption OF offensive measures in
both Cuba and Porto Rico and the unre-
lenting prosecution OF the war until the
Spanish Government has recalled its armed
forces or the American troops have driven
them out or destroyed them.
s. The ending OF the war 5efor the end Of
summer.
The plans indicated in the mos. unmis-
takeable manner the determination Of the
President to adopt the most aggressive
means that great army and efficient naval
force can inaugurate. All plans are in a
measure contingent upon the operations OF
the fleets.
1t is said to be the desire OF the Govern
meut to strike Il blow at Spanish Obstinacv
by Immediately seizinG and occupying
Porto Rico, an island whose climate is far
more healthful than that OF Cuba, and
whose value for purposes Of indemnifica-
tion at the close OF the war is self
apparent. With the aid OF a part
of Admiral SIMPSONS fleet, it Is
thought that San Juan could easily be
taken. and the open nature of the country
makes it improbable that the Spanish
forces can long hold out in the interior Of
the island.
Reports at the War Department show
that there are $4,000 Spanish troops ut
Porto Rico.
At present there are about $4,000 men
in the army. counting the regulars and vol
unteers. The call for 70, 900 men, together
with the imunes will bring the total up to
go 600. or the number which it is thought
will bo required for the plans now under
consideration. These will be divided among
the expeditions as follows: About one
hundred thousand for the Cuban invasion;
at least thirty-ive thousand for the Philip
pines, and perhaps this will be doubled;
twenty thousand for Porto Rico, which llS-
ure may be reduced. The extra troops sent
to the Philippines.
With the Spanish feet caught in the
harbOr OF Santiago, an interesting ques-
ton arises rs to what Notifications the
American ships will have to encounter II
they start in after the Spaniards. The
entrance to the harbor Is not over 200
yards wide 1t is even narrower than that
OF Havana.
Across this entrance the Spaniards have
planted three rows OF mines. Castle Point,
the eastern headland of the harbor, has
the more ancient Notifications.
When the st. Louis and Wampatuck
were of Santiago cutting the cables they
had an action with the forts which gave
them a good idea OF the strength OF the
batteries. Moro apparently had no mod
ern gun One field piece was drawn up
Just east OF Moro and, with another SINH
lar gun already there, was all the artillery
fired from that point, A short distance
east was 4 small battery.
Inside Of Castle Point is battery OF
eight-inch mortars. The St. Louis and
Wampatuck silenced the battery on the
shore but when they withdrew the mortar
battery was still firing.
The American ships would have no diff
flculty in silcncinS all the batteries now