The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-05-04

rights than it had ITSELF" The opin-
ion in this case also was written by the
chief justice. The same decison (cit-
ed and approved in Ruggles VS.. R. Co.,
108 U. S., SIG, and r. Co. VS.. Illinois,
108 U. S., 541, and in other cases) sus-
tained the power of the legislature to
classify railroads according to the
amount of business done, and to pre-
scribe "a maximum of rates for each of
the classes" the court saying that a
uniform rate for all railroads in the
state might possibly operate unjustly,
and that at any rate it was in the dis
cretion Of the general assembly to clas-
sify the roads and fix different rates.
In fact the latest case, Covington VS..
Sanford, 164 U. S., 57S, it was held that
it was in the legislative power to pre-
scribe different rate for each road.
In Peik VS.. Chicago, "a U. S., 164, the
chief justice again delivering the opin-
ion, that where a railroad was chartered
by two or more states, each state had,
A1ON tAClCSS, Luo 116ut W uA LuS IdLS5
between any two points in it's own ter
ritory, and further said, quoting Mum
vs. Illinois, that the legislature and not
the courts, must be appealed to for the
change" And on the next page, Chica-
go VS.. Ackley, "a U. s., 179, the court
again held that the maximum fixed by
the legislature is binding, and the rail-
road company will not be permitted to
collect more by showing in the courts
that the prescribed rate is unreasonably
low. This has since been reaffirmed in
Budd VS.. New York, 143 U. S., SIG U. S.,
SIG, at p. SAT.
This question, however, cannot arise
as to rates which shall be fixed by the
railroad commission of this state, since
the legislature in it's liberality express
ly provides in the act of 1891, creatin =
the railroad commission, that if any
common carrier shall deem the rates
prescribed too low, the company may
appeal to the superior court. In the
court jury Of twelve men can pass
upon and settle the fact in dispute
whether the rate is reasonable or not
Nothing can be fairer than to submit
the question to the same tribunal which
settles all disputed issues of fact when
the lives, liberty, rights and property
OF any citizen are at stake.
1t must not be forgotten that there
is broad distinction in the law, run
ming through all the ages, between the
above and similar avocations "affected
sovereign or the public has the right to
regulate and fix rates and purely prf-
vate matters, as farming, selling mer-
chandise, manufacturing and similar
matters, which are purely private in
their nature, and as to which the pub
lie has never claimed or exercised the
right of regulation. 1t is by ignorance,
or an affected ignorance, of this broad
distinction in the law and which is
based on the essential difference in the
nature OF things, that denial has been
sometimes attempted (by those not law
yers) Of the right of public regulation
in matters as to which the public has
always possessed that right.
AS to railroads and public carriers,
the complete list Of decisions uniformly
sustaining the public right to fix their
charges, both in state and federal
courts, would fill many pages. Enough
has been cited to enable the student
to see that the principle is absolutely
settled beyond possibility OF question,
and he can trace up other decisions to
that effect If so inclined
In the great case of People vs.. Budd,
III N. Y, %, the highest court of New
York, speaking through one Of it's ablest
and purest judges, said: Society can
not safely surrender the power to reg
ulate by law the business Of common
carriers. It's value has been Infinitely
increased by the conditions Of modern
commerce under which the carrying
trade of the country is to a great ex-
tent absorbed by corporations, and as
a check upon the greed of these con-
solidated interests the legislative power
of regulation is demanded by imperative
public interest. The same principle up
on which the control of common car
riers rests has enabled the state to reg
ulate in the public interest the charges
of telephone and telegraph companies,
and to make the telephone and tele-
graph, these important agencies of COM
merce, subservient to the wants and ne
cessities of society. These regulations
in no way interfere with a national
liberty-liberty regulated by law" This
decison was affirmed by the supreme
court of the United States.
The rights of the courts to interfere
with the rates fixed by the law-making
power was denied in Mum vs.. Illinois,
and several other cases in 81 U. S., and
in Budd VS.. N. Y, above cited, but iii a
Rea gan VS.. Gill, 1856 U. S., 362 and 4;3,
and St. Louis vs. Gill, 156 US, GAO. it
has been since declared that the fixing
and enforcement of unreasonable and
unjust rates for railroads was unconsti-
tutional. But just what rates will be
considered unreasonable and unjust has
net vet been stated bv the limited States