The age-herald., 1898-05-11
THE BATTLE
 OF MANILA BAY
From the Cincinnati Times-star.

Into an artillery duels the Supeflorlly OI tho American gunners and the rapidity Of fire of the American guns won a victory; the ineffectiveness of the Spanish gunners and the slowness of fire of their guns aided a defeat. The battle was fought at great range a condition greatly to the benefit of the superior artilleryist. The Spaniards opened fire at 6,00O yards (sh miles); the Americans replied at 4,0OO yards e 1-S .niles) but probably the bulk of the fighting was done at 2.500 yards dh miles). The Spanish fleet was chopped to pieces and disabled apparently from the first fire, which was centered on the flagship and the larger ves- sells in the enemys center.
 The terrible completeness of the victory teaches mainly that it Is upon the men behind the guns that naval victory must depend. It emphasizes the correctness of the American naval theory that the chances of victory under modern condi- tions must be measured by the rapidity and the effctiveness of fire. The teaching before the era of ironclads was to measure by the tonnage of the opposing squadrons and the weight of metal thrown. This American naval theorists abandoned with the advent of the ironclad. adopting that of rapid fire. great gunnery power and effect i've artilleryship. Many European theorists have held that we erred in doing so. but the very decisiveness of our victory in Manila bay is proof that can not be over come. True, we had the advantage of ton mage and weight of metal thrown. but the terrible havoc wrought the rapid fire of our guns and their effectiveness, which smothered first the enemy's fire and then destroyed the vessels with no loss or dam age to urselves proves our theory to have been the correct one.
 That the inexperienced may further un- derstand the matter there are several ex- plantions to be given, When the Merri- mac and Monitor brought the ironclad into existence, the resisting power of armor exceeded the penetrating power of shot. With the advance of seience-the increased size and the rifiing of guns, and the in crease in explosive powers-American theorists laid down one broad maxim as the basis of naval theory, tactical and con- structional-that the penetrative power of shot exceeded the resisting power of armor. On this basis they adopted offensive plans; constructed guns of the greatest rapidity of fire, and by constant practice brought the gunners up to a high efficiency as marksmen.. The theory can be best ex- pressed by saving they thought the ship which could shoot the oftenest and hit the most frequently would win from a ship, although of greater power and size, if it's guns were of slower fire and the gunnery ineffective. The quickness with which Jea ey's gunns $ sn otl cred the nemy es- tablished the correctness of the American theory; the real battle not lasting long enough for our superiority in tonnage and weight of shot to cut figure.
 The terrible fire of the American ships prevented an advance to- ram. them by the Spanish; the foftfier, rearing sf6al water and conscious of their superior gunnery, did not advance for the same purpose. The effectiveness of the torpedo boats in battle was proved, the Olympia sinking two that sallied forth to meet her. It re- affirms that they are only for surprise in the dark. The great distance rendered it impossible for either side to attempt the use of the torpedo tubes of their vessels, they being only effective at 800 yards. Therfore another battle will, have to be fought before the value of torpedo tubes AS CSteiphSACu UT tHclr uSe COuueHlIeu,
 Admiral Dwey's battle plan was that of Faragut, his tutor, and strictly American. The enemy. supported by the water bat tery of Cavite, rested in two lines between Manila and Cavite, the flagship in the cen ter. Admiral Montejo had selected his
 strongest position. Dewey adopted the Port Royal form of attack advancing in a single line, from the right of the enemy to his left, and using the port guns; then, turning to starboard (right). describing an ellipse, using his starboard guns. Five times he performed this maneuver and then having victory won returned to his am- munition ship, anchored out of range for breakfast, only to renew the attack later.
 Arriving at the extreme left of the ene- my's position the American fleet made a short turn, and, using their starboard guns. returned to the extreme right This ma neuver lasted from 53O a. m. to S:30 a. m.. three hours.
 The world must applaud the daring of the admiral in forcing at night the outly- ing defenses at Corregdor island; his cour- ageous disregard of submarine mines or floating torpedoes; and it must applaud the seamanship of the captains beneath him in enabling him to accomplish difficult ma neuver, not once but five times The voice of Farragut at Mobile must have thundered forth to Dewey once more, D. the torpe- does; sail ahead" as in the darkness of night he stole past the enemy's outpost, through tortuous channel, forced to rely upon the skill and honesty of native pilot: 1t must have inspired him, as, with the gray of dawn he aligned his vessels and be- gan the attack upon the enemy, Twice submarine mines were exploded before his flagship. the Olympia, as she led the way, fortunately before she was over the spot, but he never slackened speed, but "sailed on." and very probably with a sailors bluntness again "d-- the torpedoes"
 The transitition from the daring to the cautious is very marked in Dewey. Hay ing destroyed the enemy's fleet, effected the capture of Cayite for base, and received the equalization of Corregidor island, he became cautious. With the bay under his control, he cut the cable, and did not at- tack the city, deeming his force insufficient. Ia to hoI hfo ,Ax