Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1898-10-26

to Santiago, although it appears not the
same day Admiral Sampson expected. At
one time Commodore Schley contemplat-
ed going to Key West with the squadron
for coal, but this was abandoned, the re-
pairs to his collier having been temporar-
lily repaired and the necessity for a trip
to Key West being avoided. Santiago
was then blockaded. The admiral con-
graduated the commodore on his success
and directed him to maintain a close
blockade at all hazards, especially at
night.
Then follow kilograms from Schley
showing that he had recognized the enc
my IN the port and from Secretary Long
to Schley pointing out that the most abso-
lutely urgent thing was to know positively
whether the Spanish division was in the
harbOr. If they were, an immediate ar
my and navy movement was to be made.
In one dispatch the secretary said it would
be discreditable to the navy if the pres
ence of the Spanish fleet were not ascer-
dispatch evidently had not been received
at the department when the secretary's
kilograms were sent. Meantime Admiral
Sampson had made arrangements to pro-
coed to Santiago with a number of his
vessels. He arrived there June 1.
Then follows a historical resume of the
doings of the feet while off Santiago. of
the bombardment of the forts, of the tax
ing OF the lower bay at Guantanamo by
the Marblehead and the Yankee, copies
OF memorandums regarding methods of
blockades, kilograms bearing on the pro-
posed army movements to Santiago, etc,
practically all of which is told in official
kilograms. On June s the admiral urged
upon the department, as he had previously
done, to expedite the arrival of the troops
for Santiago, the difficulty Of b%lockading
the Spanish ships daily increasing.
Anticipated Cervera's Action.
The admiral re%produces the order of bat
tie incidental to the landing of Skaters
army corps June %, when ships were sent
to shell the beach and cover the landing
of the men. In this order the following
occurs:
The attention of commanding officers of
all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de
Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity Of
the utmost vigilance from this time forward.
both as TO maintaining stations and readiness
for action as to keeping q close wtach upon
the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral
even intends TO attempt to escape, that at
tempt will he made soon.
The admiral here remarks that much
trouble was experienced in landing on ac-
count of the wandering proclivities of
some of the Transports. which had to be
looked up. The progress of ~diSembarka-
ton was rendered somewhat difficult by a
heavy sea, the heaviest during the three
weeks the fleet had been stationed there.
1t appears that according to a dispatch
to Secretary Long, dated June rs, the
channe at Santiago not having been OBJ
structed by the sinking of the Merrimac,
Admiral Sampson was preparing Il tor
pedo attack to hasten the destruction of
the Spanish vessels, although he regretted
resorting to this method because CT its
difficulties and small chance of success.
He would not do this, he says, We're the
present force to be kept there, as it then
insured a capture which he believed
would terminate the war. The above
telegram was sent, the admiral explains.
with reference TO the proposed attachment
of some of our navy ships for service
abroad. CThe proposed expedition &c the
Spanish c%oaSt.) A dispatch from Secre-
tary Long shows that this expedition was
to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark,
Yosemite, Yankee and Dixie, and they
were TO go to the Azores for orders en-
route to Tangier, Morocco. The Golfers
were to join the feet at the Azores.
Shafter Asks for Help.
On June 30 the admiral received a COM
m%unication from Maj.-Gen. Shafter an
nouncing that he expected TO attack San
tiago the following morning, and asking
that he (Sampson) lombard the forts at
Aguadores in support of a regiment Of in
fantry, and make such demonstrations as
he thought proper at the harbor's mouth,
so as to keep as man. of the enemy here
as possible. This request was complied
with. and on July l Gen. Shafter asked
that the admiral keep up his fight on the
Santiago water front. On July 2 the fol-
lowing was received from Gen. Shaf;er:
Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is
now strongly intrenched about three-fourths
of a mile from town, l urge that you make
effort Immediately to force the entrance to
auni6 fnfnFQ losses among nv men. Wnlc1
are already very heavy: You can now oper+
ate with less loss of life than / can. Please
telephone answer.
A reply was ~telephoned Gen. Shafter
from Admiral Sampson through Lieut..
Stanton. which said the admiral had bonn
barded the forts at the entrance of San
tiago and also Punta Gorda battery in
side. silencing their fire, and asked wheth-
err he tShafter) wanted further firing on
the admirals part. The explanation vas
made that it was impossible to force an
entrance until the channel was cleared Of
mines. To this Gen. Shafter replied:
1t is impossible for me to say when / can
take batteries at entrance of harbor. If
they are as difficult to take as those which
we have been pitted against. it will be some
time and q great loss of life. ! am at a loss
to see why the navy cannot work under Il
destructive fire as well as the army. My
loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all
means keep up fire on everything in sight Of
YOU until demolished. ! expect, however,
in time and with sufficient men, to capture
the forts along the bay.
Feared Mines in the Channel.
Admiral Sampson then says:
l wrote Gen. Shafter the following letter,
and began making preparations to counter
mine, and, with the object of arranging an at
tack upon the batteries at the entrance, a
visit was arranged to Gen. Shafter, SO that
the matter might be thoroughly discussed
and combined action take place. / had il
view the employment of the marines for an
assault Oh either the MORO or SOcapa bat
terry, while at the same time assaulting the
defenses at the entrance with the fleet:
United States Flagship New York, First
Rate, Off Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1885
by Dear General: l have your note of this
morning-just received at 11:30. An officer
of my staff has already reported to you the
firing which we did this morning, but l must
say in addition to what he told you that the
forts which we silenced were not the forts
which would give you any inconvenience in
capturing the city, as they cannot fire eX-
cept to seward. They cannot even prevent
our entrance into the harbor of Santiago.
Our trouble from the first has been the chan
mel to the harbor, which is well streWn with
observation mines, which would certainly
result In the sinking of one or more of our
ships if we attempted to enter the harbOr,
and by the sinking of a ship the object of the