The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-11-02
In the Cost of the War and the Value
Of the Philippines.
OUR GOVERNMENT NOT UNEASY
If the Conference should Fail, spain
Could Not Resume Hostilitics on
Any Scale That Would BE Dan
gerous-We Would Simply
Have 10 Take Military Pos
session of the Territory.

WASHINGTON. November 1.-The
Cabinet to-day devoted most OF its at
tention TO consideration Of questions
connected with the administration Of
affairs in Cuba and Porto Rico. The ad-
mlnis.rative feature OF the Philippine
question also received some attention.
Nothing has been heard from the COM
mission at Paris as to yesterdays pro-
ceedings. ana it is realized that nothing
is to be expected in the way Of develop
ments until Fridays session.
While the Cabinet gave little attention
to-day to the peace negotiations at Paris,
there is no longer any doubt as 10 the
general purpose of this government TO
retain the entire Philippine archipelago.
\ BALANCE SHEET.
After balancing the cost Of tho war
on one side and our acquisitions on the
other, IL it IS found that any compensa-
ti0n is due 20 the Spanish government
it Will be made in a lump sum. No
Spanish bonds OF any character or
amount other than local or municipal
bonds will be paid or assumed by tnls
government What sum OF money this
government wOuI consent TO pay 10
Suan cannot even be estimated, but when
the final account is rendered II Is be-
lieved that the balance due Spain Will
be small-prObab.y not exceeding S-9'-
Oyo.00J or 100000
The belief still prevails among ma
jority OF the Cabinet that the Spaniards
viii accept the terms laid down by the
United States. and that whatever OF de-
lay occurs before that result is reached
viii be chargeabie only 20 the purpose
OF the Spanards 20 secure the best pOssi-
bic terms-tO extort the last possible
million dollars before acceling 10 our
demands.
MAKES LITTLE DIFFERENCE.
The possibility Of disagreement OF the
commissioners and the failure OF the con-
ference. however is now contemplated
with greater equanimify than at the ear
lier stage Of the negotiations. The adj
ministration has satisfied itself that
Spain Is neither able nor willing 10 re-
sumo hostilities on any scale that would
make her q dangerous opponent TO the
United States Therefore, supposing the
Paris conference TO fail all that would
be imposed upon our government as an
immediate duty would be 20 take COM
plete military possession of the Philip
pines. This, il IS believed, could be ac-
complished by us without loss Of time
or life.
The last vestige Of Spanish military
power in the islands is that under Col
Rios. con mander-in-ohief Of the Viscay-
as Islands and by depudzed authority,
in charge Of an Spanish territory not
directly within the control Of the United
States in the Philippine Islands. His
force Is insufficient from a military point
of view and its doubtful If he could have
held his own against the insurgents had
the Tagals been allowed by Admiral
Dewey 20 make Manila the base Of an
expedition directed against the Spanish
commands.
DIFFERENT IN CUBA.
SO far as Cuba IS concerned, the dif-
fculty might be more serious but even
there the Spanish military forces are
not In condition 10 offer prolonged re-
sistance TO the American conquest OF the
island and with the Spanish navy at the
bottom OF the sea they could not be REIN
forced by troops from Spain. Therefore.
about the worst that could happen would
be the necessity imposed upon MS OF
struggling along without the signature
OF a treaty OF peace, but I'm full posses
sion OF an the territory We desire and
that such conditions can exist without
damage 10 material interests is shown by
the history of the Spanish-American re-
publics which revOltcd from Spain's rule.