Evening journal. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1888-1932, 1898-11-11
NILES REPORT IN.
No Trouble Between Him and
Shafter.
PRAISES THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN
Sampson Co-operates Heartily VITA
Army-NewEpRDer Stories of III
Feeling Manufactured out
of Whole Cloth.

the war Win SPAN was maze pubic
last night. The report begins with
statement Of the army's condition prior
TO the blowing up OF the Maine and the
acts Of congress increasing the regular
army to $4,000 men and approprlating
SCI, 000. 900.
The report continues:
"On April 9 / recommended the equip
ment Of $4,000 volunteers and also on
April Is recommended that an addi-
tional auxiliary force of 10000 men be
provided for the protection of the coasts
and as a reserve. This. with the in
crease Of the regular army and the TO-
600 immunes. would have given us an
effective force of 1851. which, with an
auxiliary force Of $4,000 natives, / con
sldered sufficient and deemed It of the
first Importance to well equip such
force rather than to partly equip a
much larger number.
AT the commencement of the war
the problem was largely a naval one,
and until the question of superiority
between our navy and the Spanish navy
or such naval forces as might be fur
nished by any other European power or
combination of powers supporting the
Spanish government was determined
military operations had TO be deter
mined by the success or failure of our
naval forces. / was fully convinced that
should our navy prove superior the pO-
stion Of the Spanish army in Cuba
would be rendered untenable with a
minimum loss Of life and treasure to
the United States. There We're two
most serious obstacles TO be avoided
one was placing an army on the island
OF cuba before our navy controlled the
Cuban waters, and the other was put
ting an army on the island at time
when n large number of the men must
die from the diseases that have pre-
vailed I'm that country, according TO all
statistics, for the last 100 years. For
the latter reason I addressed a letter
20 the secretary of war under date OF
April IS. forwarding a communication
from Surgeon General Sternberg re-
garding the danger Of putting an army
in Cuba during the siclSly season and
at the same time urged the plan Of
harassing the Spanish forces and doing
the enemy the largest amount of In
jury during the time necessary for our
navy to demonstrate its superiority
the rainy or slclSly season and the time
actually required to equip and instruct
the volunteer forces with the least pos
sible loss TO ourselves In that letter
also asserted the belief I have enter
tanned from the first that we could Sc
cure the surrender OF the Spanish army
In the island Of Cuba without any great
sacrifice OF life.
"Congregatlng tens OF thousands Of
men, many Of whom were not uniform
ed and scarcely any properly equipped,
IN great camps away from their states
rendered 1t difficult for them TO be prop
erly supplied with food, cooking uten-
slls. camp equipage, blankets tentage,
medical supplies, transportations, etc,
and was TO great extent the cause. IN
my Judgment, OF the facilitating effect
upon the health and strength Of the
men, who were otherwise in good phys
zeal condition The material necessary
to clothe and equip large armies was
not even manufactured at that time,
and the consequent condition OF the
troops for weeks and months was inju-
rious TO the commands in many ways.
"Whlle troops were being assembled
at Tampa. Mobile New orleans. Chick
amauga, Washington and In the differ
ent states an expedition TO the Philip
pine islands was gathered al San Fran
cisco under the command OF Major
General Wesley Merritt The command
as was possible with the means availa-
BILE. The expedition sailed May %, 1898
was we'll conducted and eminently sue
cessful in every way Full reports have
been submitted by General Merritt and
his subordinate officers"
The report here takes up in detail the
Cuban expeditions OF Lieutenant Colo
mel Rowan, Lieutenant Whitney and
Colonel Dorst.
The first mention OF General shaftei
Is contained in the following para
graph:
"A strong expedition was organized
consisting of 5000 men, under command
OF the senior officer then at Tampa
Major General w r.. Shafter the oh.
jective point being Tunas, on the soutl
side of Cuba, where II was expected {,
open communication with the forces
under General Gomez and support an,
cooperate with him in that mountain
region (Which Is a healthful part %
Cuba). and also to furnish all the sup
plies needed by that force This expe
dition. when fully prepared. was de
layed on account OF the movement o
Admiral Cervera's fleet from Cap
Verde islands 10 the waters of the Yves
Indies, and the movement Of our troop
was suspended awaiting the result o
the expected conflict between that flee
and our own"
The bottling Of Cervera's fleet at San
tiago necessitated a radical change fl
General Miles plans. He says:
Definite information having been re
ceived that Cervera's fleet had been in
closed In the harbor OF Santiago 4
Cuba by the navy, orders were given {
General Shafter, May So 1898 to plac
his troops on transports and go TO tn
assistance of the navy in capturing tina
fleet and harbor II was expected tina
the transports engaged at that tim
would convey some 20 600 men.
Il desired TO go with this commant
and on June sent the following tele
gram to the honorable secretary of wai
This expedition has been delaye
through no fault Of any one connecte
with II. II contains the principal pai
Of the army, which for intelligence an
efficiency is not exceled by any body ,
troops on earth. II contains IA Of n
best conditioned regiments Of volur
teers, the last of which arrived tn
morning. Yet these have never bee
under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cen
are undrfllpd and i'm one racrff,erf 90