The record-union., 1898-07-02
Excepting a Telegram That the Bat.
lie Had Begun.
Belief That the Early Attack Was for the
Purpose Of Developing the Strength
Of the Enemy and If Possible
Learn Vulnerable Points.

months after the battle of Manila, and
that glorious engagement, began the
first set battle of the war in this hem
isphere What the result will be was
not known at the departments close
Never since the declaration of war has
there been such feeling of intense in
terest and anxiety manifested. Tha
officials here are confident that they
have done everything possible t.
strengthen Skaters hands for the great
conflict he is waging, and they have
unlimited confidence in his discretion,
his bravery and his energy. The at
tack to-day, several days before the
public mind expected the battle, is a
tribute to his energy, as well as to his
judgment, according to the present
lights, for he undoubtedly found it nee
essary to crush the foe in detail, fol-
lowing Napoleons favorite maxim. IN
stead of allowing them to consolidate
and outnumber him.
As the day wore along without bring
ing any news the anxiety increased,
and the question was in every ones
jutant General Corbin's response was
brief but pointed: He is fighting, not
writing" and this was accepted a
likely and sound explanation.
Just before 4 o'clock came a brief
dispatch from Playa del Este, the cable
an engineer officer to General Miles,
and made no reference to the progress
of the battle, merely referring to GER
tain necessary material and livestock.
On the whole, this very absence of
official news was regarded as rather a
favorable indication, the reason being
that this mornings engagement was
but a skirmish, and that our army was
feeling the enemy to discover and at
tack at his weak spot. 1t was nearly
u o'clock when the Signal Office served
the welcome news that the enemy was
retreating
General Miles was of the opinion that
the action of to-day was in the nature
of a heavy skrmish all along the
American front, particularly on the
right, and that its main purpose was
to develop the strength of the enemy.
and if possible learn the vulnerable
points along the Spanish front. This,
however, was based only on the lack
Of definite information, and Cen
eral Miles felt that any hour might
bring word of a general engagement.
Brigadier General Stone was inclined
to believe that after maintaining their
stand to-day the Spanards would re-
tire during the night, leaving the city
evacuated The military authorities
here are fully considering the chances
of such retreat of the Spanish army
from Santiago, and are endeavoring so
to shape events that General Skaters
forces will not only take Santiago. but
will capture the 1900 Spaniards be-
fore they get away northward TO effect
a juncture with General Pando.
Full information as to the possible
lines of retreat has been placed at
the disposal of the War Departn ent.
one of the most interesting statements
is that of General Manager Cox of the
Spanish American Mining Company at
Baiauiri. who is thoroughly acquainted
with all the country surrounding Santi-
ago. He shows that the two possible
lines of retreat are: First, by the road
to El Cobre: or second, by following
the line of the Sabanillo and Marato
Railroad. The first line will be easy
for about the first ten miles, or as Tar
as Ell Cobre. but after that the country
is mountainous and barren, and would
not afford subsistence, and the pass TO
reach the central plateau of the isiand
would be difficult.
The more likely line of retreat VIII
be along the line of the above men
toned railroad, crossing the Sierra
Vaestra at FL Cristo, a pass 6Oo feet
above the sea, ten miles north of san
tiago, which is the lowest pass through
the Sierra Maestro for many miles. The
country back. of this is rolling plateau
of rich agricultural land. At Manacas,
on the railroad, two miles north of the
pass, is an iron bridge, consisting Of
a series of thirty foot spans on iron
trestle bents. This point is about two
miles beyond the Cristor summit. and