Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-05-09
An Aggressive Move by Land anG
Sea With Ample Force.
new PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
Objections 10 Sending Few Troops
to Cuba.
FIFTY THOUSAND TO GO

proposition to send 500 troops TO es,ab-
l.sh base Of supplies and to stop at that
tor while has been abandoned This plan.
which was at first favored by the President
ana Secretary Algcr. was opposed by the
military experts. 1t was adhered To. how
ever. until Saturday. but the opposition
mad resulted in its not being put into on
GRAFTON before that time. Yesterday the
more comprehensive plan of the military
experts was accepted and is expected to be
put INTO operation as speedily as it is pos
soie 10 assemble transports and get troops
aboard Several objections to sending but
few troops with provisions were raised.
ana the opposition to IL on the part of the
military officers. 1t is said. was unaninops
Ii mad no support except from civilian
quarters.
Three ObJectiOns.
Three objections to 1t were well sustain
ed. One was that IT contemplated an un-
necessary prolongation of the war An
other was that it would not be effective I'm
getting relief to the suffering non-comba-
tants on the island beyond very narrow
radius. ana still another was that il would
expose the small force left in defense OF
the base OF supplies to unnecessary dam
ger. and that the Cuban forces coulc not
quarter in sufficient strength to be effec-
1--WE. The War Department is very much
disposed to look upon the Spanish soliiery
as not entirely civilized, and. therefore to
be dealt with somewhat differently than
would be an English or German army. The
reports OF the engagement at Manila indi-
cate that. though Intellectual, the Span
lards fight bravely. with a disregard of
HE, and with display of treachery al
most barbaric. 1t is not known with abso-
lutte certainty how large an effective force
the Spanish have In Cuba, but whatever
they have is concentrated. and in a land
engagement excessive odds will count in
the long run. The last reports of the
Spanish army in Cuba placed 1t at over
loooV0. It. may not be more than half
that, but an army of $4,000 should he ex-
pected to prove more than a match for
5000, even behind breastworks The re-
verses which England has suffered from
time to time during number of years in
dealing with the uncivilized and half-civil-
lied hordes in some of her possessions have
all been the result of having but a small
force assembled at some point where they
could be overwhelmed by great numbers.
This is regarded as a lesson in dealing
with an army deficient in military skill,
but powerful to numbers and reckless
o. life.
A small body of our troops landed in
Cuba might he utterly destroyed. though
they should kin two or three times their
own number of their assailants.
Another thing considered is that the VIC
tory at Manila. the desperate situation of
the Spanish government at home, the ef-
Of RI. IL
developments hourly expected at Porto Rico
all give promise of speedy termination of
the war if blows are struck with vigor and
in rapid succession. II is proposed there
fore. to smash right at it and close up the
war quickly as possible, avoiding pro-
tracted disturbance and lessening the dam
ger of international complications II is
calculated that, though il will take possi-
bly, week or ten days longer 10 get a
large army to Cuba than it would to land
R small force and establish a base of sup
pies, the large force would bring relief 10
the suffering en- the island more speedily
than could the small force.
To Land Fifty Thousand.
The plan is to land not less than 10000
and probably much larger force at sew
eral points in Cuba. and to advance upon
having confined the Spanish forces in Ha-
vana. to relieve the suffering of the rest
of the island and to reduce Havana by land
and sea attack. The volunteer as well as
the regular army will be used for this in
vasion. The hour when the aggressive
movement is to be made cannot be stated.
1t may be inside CT ten days. Ii will not be
delayed longer than is required to assem-
BILE the transports. concentrate the troops,
regulars and volunteers, and to complete the
special equipment which is necessary for
campaign in that climate. How far this
preparation has already advanced and how
quickly it can be completed is a military
secret which could not be published il
known.
Spanish Fleet Impotent
The argument against landing a large
force on the island that it might be incon-
venienced by the operations OF the Spanish
navy I'm cutting of supplies for some quar-
ter no longer has force, and all apprehen-
sion on that score is dispelled by a better
knowledge of the condition of the Spanish
navy. The possibility of the Spanish feet
being able to relieve Havana or to interfere
with our military operations is no longer
considered. 1t is regarded entirely prob
able that the news of a few days. possibly
a few hours. will be such as to dispose OF
all questions of Spanish naval operations
If We are to have an engagement with the
main Spanish fleet IT will probably occur
before 1t would be possible for our military
plans to be put into effect. The military
operations are to be proceeded with
promptly and aggressively. the navy being
intrusted to take care of its part OF the
business In a way to relieve the War De-
partment OF any necessity OF considering
where the Spanish navy may be or what 1t
may do.
Briefly. the proposition Is TO move ag-
gressively by land and sea with ample
force. and to conclude the war as soon as
possible.