The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-05-21

morclads and accompanying unarmored
cruisers will probably steam 10 entrap
tho Spanlards at the rate OF tweive KNOTS
an hour. This would mean tribe over
three days before tho United States SHIPS
could form a junction or Santiago.
SIMPSONS squadron going one way ana
Schley's the othet. In one or these
sQusdrons there Will probably BET no
Indiana. oregon. Texas and New YORK,
whno in the other will be the Massachu-
setts. Iowa and Brooklyn, or a similar
arrangement. whereby one OF the squa-
drons will have one OF the fast armored
cruisers, Brooklyn or New York. the
other squadron taking the remaining
one Inasmuch as the oregon, Indiana
and Massachusetts, are all OF the same
grade Of vessels, probably not more than
two Of them will so with one squadron
FAST UNARMORED CRUISERS.
Admiral Sampson will probably take
several Of the fast unarm0red cruisers.
such as the Detroit, Montgomery and
Cincinnati, which are armed with rapid
FIRE guns, so as TO cope with the torpedo
boat destroyers that are with the span
ish fleet. IL Is probable also that ne VIII
take the four or five torpedo boats that
are at his disposal at Key West ana use
them as scouts, and also use them lh
fighting I'm case II becomes necessary and
desirable 10 combat the torpedo boats OF
the Spaniards The guns on board the
combined fleets OF Schey and Sampson
I'm such an arrangement would numueI
from two 20 three times as many as
those on the Spanish boats and proDaDly
would deliver FIVE times as much metai
at single discharge. There seems
therefore. TO be no escape from destruc-
tlon for the Spaniards in the coming con-
xrrffh
tihcations at Santiago. with sucn an
arrangemont OF his armorcads ana MS
other vessels. sampson will still have as
reserve guard his four great monitors,
and in case of serious disaster TO any VI
our vessels they would constitute a lorce
which could simply overwhelm any OF 'he
Spanish ships that might have escaPcu
destruction in the battle.
THEIR PLANS PLAIN.
Now that the Spanairds have arrived AT
Santiago their plan of action seems
reasonably plain. Forced to leaNe 'he
Cape Verde Islands. IL became necessary
10 20 TO the West Indian waters If they
desired TO be OF actual assistance TO the
army in Cuba OF TO secure the sympathy
off the Continental nations In their as
tress. When they left the cape NeIue
Islands the United States vessels were
doing blockade duty off Havana PORTO
Rico WAS within easy reach or our shlpS.
and therefore IL was undoubtedly pialheu
"a drop i'm at Martinique BY clIculIous
route both 10 avoid the possDihlg OF
,9cctinr tho American ships of Porto
i5tc, ana arSo TO learn the exact naNa'
and military situation By capie. then
desire seems TO have been 10 aVolo d
dabt with the United states Nesse's eA
cent I'm some Cuban harDor prolec'eu pS
fortihcations. oo,Y
T. tos been learned that the vessels
were unsuccessful in securing satisiac'
-, ,,,r,Iv of coal at Martinique, and II
,,roiablv became necessary. therefore, TO
ston at some other port before running
for q Cuban harbor. They could not 20
90 the North. because the United states
eoet was at Porto Rico at the time or
near there. and Il was evident that they
bo3 not sufficient coal 20 make cuba In
ono iump. Therefore, they sought Cura-
Goa ON the southern limit Of the Cario-
bean sea. and probably there secured
inst enough coal 10 land them in the
rea,est Cuban port, which is Sanllaso
dc Cuba. The distance between 'pra
Goa and Santiago de Cuba Is ABOUT
$40 miles They left Curacao on sunday
May 18th, and If they arrived % Santiago
yesterday they have been iour Gays max
ing the 500 families, showing great
desire to economize IN coal, because
the rate Of speed was between eight ana
nine miles at the most 1t is easy. there
fore. 10 see that the Spanish fleet has
been decidedly hampered by the lack
of coal. This may account for the fact
that no attempt was made to catch the
Oregon
CONPELBED TO FIGHT.
There seems to be no way by which
Continued on Seventh Page)