The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1898-12-22
Heroes of w ar
Learned.
THEIR EXPLOITS.
Unknown Facts Of the Con-
tlict Brought to Light.

Washington, Dec. 21.-The official re-
ports of all commanding officers of the
navy during the war have been com
piled and published by the navy de-
partment.
While treating of events that have
already figured in published official re-
ports, the documents still contain
many minor reports that throw side
war. In the brief record of the pro
ceedings of the naval war board an IN
known hero is brought to light in the
person of Ensign H. H. Ward, who at
the beginning of the war was on duty
IN the navigation bureau, alternating
with Lieut.. Whittlesey in the heavy du-
ties Of assistant to the chief of the
bureau.
He volunteered for secret service du-
ty and his exploits, about which moth
ing has been said in the past, may we'll
be placed on record besides those of
Lieut.. Rowan in Cuba and Lieut.. Whit
ney in Porto Rico. Within a week after
the declartion of war Ensign Ward dis
guished himself, and went straight into
the heart Of the enemy's country max
ing his headquarters at Cadiz, the prin-
cipal Spanish naval station, and in
y
the actual strength of the Spanish ma
val vessels and their movements. Then
he went to the West Indies and reported
everything that was going on there of
importance to the American navy.
Next he went in disguise to Porto
Rico, where he was arrested as a sus-
pect and a spy. BY adroitness he
managed to secure his release and, es-
Gaping from San Juan, cabled the navy
department full account of the state
ment of defenses there and the prepar-
ations for reception of the Spanish
squadron under Cervera.
All this time even the officials of the
navy department We're under the i'm
preston that Mr.. Ward was engaged
in installing a system of coast signals
on the New England coast while Ward
was in Porto Rico.
Ensign Buck another attache of the
navigation bureau, was on the shores
| of the Mediterranean In disguise,
watching every movement of the
squadron under Admiral Camara,
which started for the Philippines, but
turned back
| OF the strategy board itself, it is said
that it was part of its duty to keep
informed of all the movements, re-
sources and plans of the Spanish naval
forces through secret agents, and 1t IS
now known that the navy was thus in
formed of all important movements.
At times, however, information was
conflicting and decisions had to be
made as to which report was true.
Under the head of precautionary or
ders appear in the volume instructions
to all the United States ships abroad
to stock their bunkars with the best
coal obtainable and to keep them full.
Admiral Dewey was told, long before
the declaration of war on February 70:
I'm the event OF war with Spain, your
duty will be to see that the Spanish
squadron does not leave the Aslatlc
coast, and then offensive operations in
the Philippines. Keep Olympia under
further orders"
The latter order is explained by the
fact that the flagship had been or
dered back to the United States for
an overhauling. Admiral Howell, then
In the Mediterranean with his squad
ron, was told TO wait in neutral waters
FOR orders ana the shipp in the South
Atlantic were instructed to move
northwaPd so as not to excite suspic-
ion. The reports of the famous naval
battle at Cavite include one from Con-
sui Gen. Williams, rather of an unusual
thing in reports CT a strictly naval
character but fully justified by its pic
turesque and trenchant description of
Dewey's victory.
eminent on the same engagement by
Admiral Montijo, the conlmander-in-
chief of the illfated Spanish fleet. The
admiral depicts the bad condition of
the Spanish fleet and defenses. He
says that the cruiser Castillo was in
capable Of manOuVering on account of
her bad condition, while the defenses
at the entrance to Subic bay were very
backward. With must disgust, he
found that the guns which should have
been mounted, were delayed month
and half, and he was no less DISCUS
ted to find that reliance was had for
the defense of the port upon a few tor
pedoes. not properly placed. Finding
Subic bay defenseless, the Spanish
squadron repaired to the bay of Ma
Mia to meet battle under less unfa-
vorable conditions
The admiral avoided the city. not
wishing to draw fire upon it, and pre-
pared his fleet for action, painting his
vessels a dark gray and having the
fires spread and springs on the cables.
He says that the forces of Dewey
vessels, leaving out transports, amour
ted to 21,410 tons; 1920 horse power.
1853 guns, many rapid-fire; 1850 men and
an average of velocity Of l. miles
Against this the power of his only five
effective ships was 10,111 tons; II 200
horse power. 76 guns, very short of
rapid fire; 1875 men and maximum
speed of u miles. The admiral de-
soribes in vivid language the terrible
effect Of the American onslaught on
the Spanish vessels.
He says: THE Americans fired most
rapidly. There came upon us numerous
projectiles, as the three cruisers at the
end of the line devoted themselves al
most entirely to fighting the Castillo.
my flagship. A short time after the
action commenced one shell exploded
in the forecastle and put out Of action
all those who served the four rapid-fire
cannon. =" Meantime another shell
exploded on the orlop deck. setting fire
to the crews bags. At 7.30 one shell
destroyed completely the steering gear
So Another destroyed the mizzen,
bringing down my flag and ensign. An
other shell exploded on the poop and
put out of action nine men. A fresh
shell exploded in the officers cabin COW
ering the hospital with blood. destroy
ing the wounded who were being treat
ed there. Another exploded in the am
munitlon room. I had to flood the
magazine when the cartridges began 10
explode. IS One large shell pene-
trated the fire room, putting out of
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