The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-03-16
WAR WITH SPAIN.
Ser lo,h .Suu.

in that ease has only to blockade the
scaports Of Cuba to ,taryc ont the
Whole Spanish army and that without
landing a single man on the island.
The Spaniard- viii simply be com
PEELED to surrender because Of the
lack Of food.
~ prevent tie possibility that they
might MAKE a desperate cnor, inland
t. oyrrl r lie insurgents and get
thcir Hrsctahh md other provisions,
something mig be done easily,
quickly and at once. There are many
seaport, f some I'M artancc in C,.ba
absolutely lcfensclcss from tie sea-
side. Cardcna,, for instance, in the
province Of M~antanxas. on the north
crn coast. j. one Of them. Cardcnas
was taken in lSH by the insurgcnt
%arsi>o lopez with Il handful Of
Americans IN board II small merchant
vessel. Since then no fort capable Of
rcslslsting a amor shot has been
built there. The Americans can hold
tardcnas and from there communicate
with the insurgents in the country.
In a short time the whole Cuban army
may be well armed by them and Sc
cure some cannon to attack the inland
towns. II without such munitions
anu with the immense risk.and diff
Guilty they incur in securing scanty
supplies from the feeble tiIibustcrinr
expeditions they not only hold their
own against Spain, but actually i'm
prison the Spaniards in their forts and
cities it is obvious that possessing war
appliances which will place them in
this respect on the same footing as
tile Sraniards themselves. they will
cxtcrminatc all the Spanish columns
daring 70 leave their fortified places
and eventually invest them in the
principal cities.
With a single dynamite gun Of
small calibre, and with the three or
four thousand rifles received by him
from several small expeditions sent
from the United States, Gen. Garcia
has driven the Spaniards from the
greater part of the province of Santi-
ago dc Cuba.
1t is a fact, which even Spanish d.
plonacy will not dare to deny, that if,
instead Of %hampcring the Cubans in
the Unitcd States in their work of
sending expeditions 10 their brethren:
il instead Of prosecuting them in SO
drastic a manner as was done during
the administration Of Mr. Cleveland:
it. instead of keeping, at an enormous
cost to this country. the American
navy and police watching the Cuban
1alta and it's agents, the Uubans
here had been unmolcsted, the possi-
bility which now confronts us of an
international war woald not exist.
The Cubans, with no more than 49,
600 mel in the field, and with all the
odds against them, have proved in
three years that they are more than a
match for Spain. With a regular and
ample supply Of var materials, they
can free their island without any
other help from abroad.
In a war between Spain and the
United States it is beyond doubt that
the whole Cuban army would be on
the American side. There is no doubt
either, that we would give them all
tho rifles, cartridges and cannon they
need. They would then take care Of
the land operations. We would only
need to blockade the Spaniards by the
sea and let them starve.
Or course, the Spaniards would
make an attempt with their navy to
break that blockade. The contest
would then only be Il naval one. But
with their capitol only eighty miles
from Key West, and sixty miles from
Dry Tortugas, which would probably
be the center Of our naval operations,
Is 1t reasonable to suppose that the
Spaniards could relieve Habana either
by stealth or by force? In a few days
the proud Spanish stronghsld, with
its Cabana fortress and its MORO
Castle, with its mined bay and its
fam"ua torpedoes, wculd be at eur
mercy, and not very Mueh blood
would be ahed.