The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-11

them to be properly supplied with food.
cooking utensils, camp equipage, blankets,
tentage, medical supplies. transportation,
ETC., and was to a great extent the cause,
in my judgment, of the debilitating effect
upon the health and strength Of the men
who were otherwise in good physical con-
dition. The material necessary to clothe
and equip large armies was not even offered
at that time and the consequent condition
of the troops for weeks and months were
injurious to the commands in many ways"
The report recites orders made by him,
dated May %, prescribing the proper equip>
ment of the different commands which, Cen
eral Miles says, were delayed In publication
from May Is until that date. Orders are
referred to for the sending Of the regulars
to New Orleans. Tampa and Mobile to be-
gin the invasion of Cuba; for the gathering
of troops at Chickamauga, and for the
movements Of 10000 troops on Cuba, but
teralized,' he says. 1.-THE want of proper
equipment and ammunition rendered the
movement impracticable."
At this point there is a brief depression
where, in a paragraph. General Miles refers
to General Merritts Philippine expedition,
as organized and equipped, and conducted,
eral Miles then pays an eloquent tribute to
the brilliant exploit of Lieutenants Rowan
and Whitney, who secretly explored Cuba
and Porto Rico and ascertained the military
situations.
SHAFTER'S EXPEDITION.
He resumes the report with an account
of the dispatch of General Skaters ex-
petition saying: II desired to go with this
command" His exact request on this point
as telegraphed from headquarters at Tampa
was as follows: 'rhis enterprise is so i'm
portant that desire to go with this army
corps, or to Immediately organize another
and go with it to join this and capture
position No. 2. Now that the military is
about to be used, believe it should be con-
tinued with every energy, making the most
judicious disposition of it to accomplish
the desired result" He also stated this ex-
petition has been delayed through no fault
of any one connected with it. 1t contains
the principal part of the army, which for
intelligence and efficiency is not excelled
BY any body of troops on earth" The tele-
gram was dated June 5.
The day following Secretary Alger tele-
graphed in reply: THE President wants to
know the earliest moment you can have
an expeditionary force ready to go to Porto
Rico large enough to take and hold that
island without the force under General
Shafter." General Miless response was
I'm ten days.
He next speaks of the unsuitability OF the
transports, which were merchant freight
steamers and of the accumulation of troops
and supplies at Tampa, crowding the facil-
tiles there and causing great delays. Final
ly the Santiago expedition sailed on June IA
and General Miles quotes an order issued
by him to General Shafter, directing the
latter to make a number of inquiries to
ascertain whether every possible provision
had been made for the transports, for the
supply Of rations hospital supplies, wagons
landing boats, ETC., winding up: II would
suggest that thorough attention be required
to every detail in order to insure perfect
order in the disembarking of your COM
mand' The order is dated June IL, and
June Is General Miles received the follow
ing dispatch from Secretary Alger: I'm
portant business requires your presence
here; report at once. Answer
A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
June "a General Miles submitted to the
secretary of war a written plan of cam
paign. Briefly stated, the points were: That
provision be made for the reception of at
least. $1,000 Spanish prisoners. That after
capturing Santiago some deep-water ports
be taken on the north coast of Cuba. That
Nuevitas be captured, and that with $1,000
cavalry and some light artillery and a small
body of infantry an advance be made into
Puerto Principe, in the interior with the
troops and thence move towards Ha-
vana. This movement would occupy the
time until Sept. 80; the troops would be in
~, of ho he
rainy season, and the prisoners could be
used in road-making. Should a Spanish
force be advanced to Villa Clara, the entire
United States army could be thrown be-
tween that point and Havana, the Spanish
army could be divided and beaten in detail.
Should that plan be rejected, then, after
capturing Santiago, the entire force should
be removed to the western end of the island
and a campaign made against Havana.
General Miles next recites an order to him.
self from Secretary Alger ITO organize an
expedition for operations against the enemy
in Cuba and Porto hlco." The italics
(quotatons) are his own From the order,
dated June e. it appears that an expedition
was to be organized under the Immediate
command OF General Brooke for such move
ment The command under General Shat
ter, or such part as could be spared from
the work in hand, was to join the foregoing
expedition, and, reads the order, You will
command the forces thus united in per-
son."
General Miles at this point mentions a
project he had conceived at that time for
the capture of the Isle of Pines, which was
a smuggling base for supplying food to Ha-
vana, and the harbor of Nipe, on the north
coast, as a coaling and refuge station for
the navy. Continuing, he says: The yellow
fever at this time had broken out in Missis-
sppi, and it was feared that it might spread
over the Southern States. The safety of the
military camps was then a matter of great
Importance, and after consulting with the
best authorities 1 advised that troops at
Mobile be sent to Mount Vernon, Ala,
which has been a refuge for the garrisons
on the gulf for many years; also to Miami,
on the east coast of Florida, another place
of refuge, and also to Fernandina, Fla, in
order to isolate the troops as much as pos
sible from railroad centers, where they
would be likely to become infected by the
travelling public. also recommended that
sent to Fernandina and also to Porto Rico,
and at the same time suggested that troops
be stationed in the Loudon and Shenandoah
valleys, in the vicinity of Antietam, and on
Long Island sound. These recommendations
were in order to avoid overcrowding the
larger camps at Chickamauga and Camp
Alger"
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