The Virginia enterprise. [volume] (Virginia, St. Louis County, Minn.) 1893-19??, 1898-06-03

VI uOubt.
In spite of, assertions to the contrary,
Commodore Schley was not absolutely
sure of his game when he last commune
Gated with ~Rear-Admiral Sampson, and
the commodore will not take active steps
to block up the entrance of Santiago de
Cuba harbor until he is perfectly certain
that Admiral Cerveras ships are inside.
However, he may have done this already,
as Commodore Schley's last cOmmunica-
ton, forwarded on Thursday, only reached
Rear-Admiral Sampson yesterday.
Thought They We're at Cienfuegos.
The commodore stayed three days at
Cienfuegos. He signaled to his ships, II
believe the Spanish fleet is in the har-
bor.' On this belief Il message was sent
to the American admiral. The details of
how Commodore Schley found out that
he was mistaken are not yet known. AT
any rate, acting on the admiral's i'll
structions the commodore then moved
east. arriving outside Santiago de Cuba
on Wednesday morning, May rs.
The topography of Cienfuegos and San
tiago de Cuba is almost identical. Both
harbors are about six miles long, with
narrow entrances about 800 yards wide
and protected by high land. A whole fleet
could be i'll the harbor of either place and
be invisible from the outside.
After his experience at CienfuegOs, it is
very conservative in deciding whether or
not he had caught Admiral Cerevra. From
the tone of his dispatches, it is evident
that the commodore soon gained much
secondhand and external EVIDENCE which
pointed, to Admiral Cervera's presence in
the harbor& This evidence was apparent
"; strong enough to make the commodore
feel certain the object Of his trip had been
accomplished, but in view of his previous
experience, he would not risk decisive
statement until after ascertaining the fact
for himself
Before this dispatch is published, it is
likely that Commodore Schley has sent
some vessel into the entrance of the har-
Dor of Santiago de Cuba, or has obtained
from reliable source ashore information
as to the exact and number and the
names Of the Spanish warships sheltered
by the hills about that place.
Santiago Poorly Protected.
Contrary to the generally-expressed
opinion, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba
is poorly protected. Like Havana and
San Juan, it has its Moro castle, which
is even a better target than those of
Havana and San Juan. The only danger
to be feared is from the mines which
have been laid in the channel of Santiago
since war was declared. But counter
mining would probably render these
for Commodore Schley's ships to enter
the harbor. Such IL step, however, is
unlikely.
In this connection it may be noted that,
since the commencement Of the naval OPP
eratons the moral effect of the mines
has been great. This condition promises
to continue and will probably mark the
naval operations to a greater extent than
was ever ina sined in the past.
prominent naval HNfhOrltV said fO
the correspondent of the Associated
press: ''The moral effect of torpedoes
and mines will prove far superior to their
actual effect. In fact so great is their
moral force that T doubt whether their
powers Of execution will have an oppor-
tunity to be judged in this war;
Blockade Peaceful and Uneventfu1.
The blockade of Northern Cuba contin-
ues uneventful and is apparently success
full. The measures of preca ution which
Rear-Admira! Sampson adopted up to
yCsterday-to guard the eastern and
western passages-did not detract from
the efficacy of the blockade.
"Now that the element of uncertainty
regarding the Spanish ships whereabouts
is almost entirely removed, the ships
which were solely occupied in watching
for the Spaniards form an additional force
for the blockade and without any incon-
yenient change of position. Commodore
Schley has been reinforced, but his posi-.
ton was clearly so strong that reinforce.
| ment which he received made no differ.
ence to the strong feet in Northern Cuban
waters. Z
The rumors of the sailing of a second
Spanish squadron did not worry Rear.
Admiral Sampson in the slightest degree
His feelings on the subject were apparent
ly expressed recently when he said: II am
perfectly satisfied that we have bagged
those fellows (referring to Admiral Ger
vera's ships.
Rear-Admiral Sampson does not cross
his bridges until he comes to them, and
when that time comes his unconquera BILE
patience and strategic ability can be re-
lied upon to see him safely across.
Army Reported Ready to Move.
The second time since war has been de.
clared the admiral has been notified that
the army is ready to move. This is good
! news to all the naval officers. The two
game of wait; the army resting until the
navy disposed Of the Spanish fleet, and
the navy unable to occupy much needed
bases until the troops were ready. All
appearances now point to the passing
away of any feeling between the two
| branches of the service and hearty active
cooperation between the army and navy
| may be anticipated.
BY great good fortune, no accident has
| occurred of sufficient Importance to render
any of our ships utterly helpless or be-
| yond the aid Of towing during the fleets
cruising for the past month. Such acci
dents, however, are quite within the
bounds Of possibility. With such tender
| machines as torpedo-boats doing hard
even come into the list of probabilities
which naval commanders have to count
| upon.
| With base in the enemy's territory
with a harbor of+refuge and coaling sta
| ton within twenty miles of the cruising
| grounds, Rcar-Admiral SIMPSONS task
| arduous at its best, will be made easier
| through cooperation with the army, az
the force Of marines at the disposal Of
! the admiral is not large enough to cope
with the possible strength that Capt.
| Gen. Blnnco could concentrate on shor
notice. Then, while the army of the
United States is operating in shore, it il
safe to say the naval gunners will not b.
| idle. 4 : 2
| Sailors Eager for News.
| During the weeks cruise Of the flag
ship New York from Matanzas towards
athe eastern end of Cuba and back, Their,
were few incidents of interest. Every
one interested in the news from Schley
and disappointment was visible in everl
face when it became generally known
| that the commodore was mistaken il
thinking he had Admiral Cervera bottled
up Mt Cenfuegos, but this feeling Of dis
| appointment soon gave way to renewed
| enthusia SIN when news was received from
Santiago de Cuba. This really was NOR,
acceptable than the reports from Glen
fuegos, for had Admiral Cervera succeed
| ed in effecting q landing at Cienfuego
he would most likely nave been able t
transport his alleged cargo of arms ant
ammunition to Havana, while from San
! tiago de Cuba it will be almost impossi
| BILE for him to do so.
During the first few days out from Ke.
West there was heavy sea, which mad
| lie miserable for the torpedo-boats Rog
ers and Foote and made the monitors rol
very heavily. 5#:s
The sharpest kind Of q lookout va