The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-05-28
Cavalry In Modern War.

I =
ed by cavalry. using the fat of the sa-
Der only, more quickly than they are
scattered by the bullets OF militia in Amer
/ ica- There is something in the speed.
weight and size of a charging man and
horse that shakes the nerve of the most
stout-hearted pedestrian. The incontroll-
| able instinct OF the footman is to get out
! OF the way, and he gets out OF the way.
A cavalryman learns to love his horse
with love surprising that of woman.
He learns to depend upon him. He absorbs
confidence from every swell OF the giant
muscles between his knees. The man
and beast conjoined furnish mutual sup
port that is admirable, and in battle OF In
calculable value. Dismounted every cav
airy are the most difficult Of troops TO
dislodge, for the reason that the riders,
deprived of their horses, do not know
when nor how TO run.
Military experts believe that the inva-
sion of Cuba by the American army viii
furnish exceptional opportunities for the
use Of cavalry. 1t is. for the most part,
a good horse country, of wide fields and
level spaces. 1t is believed, too, that this
picturesque arm of the service will dem
onstrate that its usefulness is not end
ed by modern arms and projectiles though
many theorists incline to the opinion that
the days of cavalry as cavalry were end
ed in the times of Gravelotte and Sedan.
The celebrated and fruitless charge OF
the French cuirassiers, where men and
steeds went down in heaps and the watch
ing Wilhelm said, ut is magnificent, but
it is not war;" sticks in their memories.
That charge was Balaklava over again.
Somebody blundered- The general eff
cheney of cavalry under proper condi-
tons is not discredited by 1t, nor is the
centuries old record of a remarkably val
liable arm to be stained by an individual
failure. Men who remember what the
cavalry was and what the cavalry did
in the war between the states demand
something more than the crumpling OF
one column before they surrender the
beliefs of years.
The Napoleonic maxim that cavalry can
not charge mistaken infantry was due
to Napoleon's experiences with rundown
forces. His mounted men were badly
drilled and his horsefesh was poor. The
great Frederick understood the high
value of this branch and his campaigns
give many instances of the value of
mounted troops in almost all kinds Of
warfare. The records of all great wars
bristle with the achievements of the
troopers. Even in the Franco-Prussian
struggle the actual damage wrought by
the Uhlans was far out OF proportion
with their numbers, and the value of the
fear they produced was immeasurable.
At Salamanca LIE Marchand's British
"heavies'' were sent over bad ground
against the steadiest of French infantry
Men and horses fell in swaths twenty
yards from the line. The rear ranks
did steeple-chase jumping over piled
corpses to get to the front. LIE Marchand
was instantly killed and many of his
officers. but the infantry was broken and
their position carried. The Peninllla
campaigns furnish repeated proofs of the
fact that infantry will not stand against
well-handled cavalry. Prince Frederick
Charles, one Of the greatest of modern
warriors, was a steady believer in the
efficacy of cavalry, and so, too, was Won
Wrangel
The opponents of the trooper arm and
prophets of it's utter effacement are used
to instancing the failure of the brilliant
Austrian cavalry at Sadowa when sent
against breechloaders. These were troop
ers seasoned by long service and so drill
ed that thirty squadrons of them were
Unanswered in mass with the ease and
certainty of one. They were, however,
led over ground that s1oped up three de-
grees. 1t was sodden with rain. The
horses were SO wearied that many of
them fell from exhaustion when the
charge began. The infantrymen who re-
ceived them had been selected by five
hours of savage and continuous fighting.
All faint hearts had gone to the rear. 1t
is safe to say that there was not a Prus-
sian on the west ridge of Chlum that day
who did not wish to be there. Even under
these conditions the charge came very
close to success, though all Europe was
shouting that cavalry was useless against
breechloading fire.
The French got their chassepots in
1868 and 1863. No German officer believed
that his troop would be of any good
against them. Yet at Vionville the first
line of the German cavalry halted under
heavy fire on the plateau. took intervals
by passaging, went off the plateau at a
walk and wheeled up to front again as
steadily as if on dress parade. This.
too, was magnificent and 1t was war.
1t was done to encourage the young
troops, cost only seventy men and horses.
though the chassepotS were barking in
thousands, and it was worth what it cost.
Again at Vionville Bredow's six squad
rons went over two lines OF "unshaken"
as if they were paper. In an
other charge the troopers went over the
French cannon, losing only fifty men.
They came so fast that the artillerymen
found II impossible to dspress their pieces
with sufficient rapidity and accuracy. In
this battle thirty-six squadrons of Ger
man horse proved that the French line
of foot lacked the strength OF cobwebs
yet this same French infantry was so
good that two days later 1t took an en-
tire division of the German footmen three
hours to go through them, at a cost OF
4. 600 lives, or SO per cent of the attack
ing force. There will never be any finer
or steadier or more "unshaken'' infantry
than these French. They were privates
and noncommissioned officers who, 10
quote Won Moltke. sought to redeem with !
their lfeblood the errors for which they
were In no wise responsible. The Fran
co-Prussian war was thick with similar
instances. which are carefully eschewed !
in the writings of anti-cavslry doc /
trinaires.
In the old days troops were safe when
held ~ reserve 500 yards back OF the fight |
ing lima Now, for 3,5eo yards behind this !
line the ground Is torn by bullets. Con-
sequently troops are held 400 yards back. /
and even at this distance there will bs /
occasional casualties. To take part II /
an engagement the reserve force must /
be moved entirely through this wide and !
dangerous zone Infantry can not do * i
in less than twenty-five minutes, and an /.
other ten minutes viii be used Il get l
ting them into line. Cavalry can cover 1
the distance In six minutes The rapidly /
with which their range alters makes them i
a difficult target, and the moral effect 1
OF their laundering and swift advance Is !
great Il is estimated thai the cavalry 1
loss in a charge should not exceed one 4
third OF the infantry loss American mil 1
itary men OF tho more advanced kind * /
pect service Of the highest value IA heavy i