The National tribune., 1898-03-24

two schemes had been proposed. One con
templated six ships of the line and Siz
frigateS to be built, and nine vessels to be
purchased from the merchant marine and
converted into small cruisers.
The other, offered by Hon. Joseph HeweS
proposed 10 frigateS, from % to SO guns, tC
be built, and II smaller vessels to be pur-
chased and converted.
The scheme proposed by Mr.. Hewes was
originally drawn up by Paul Jones, even
before he had been appointed Lieutenant
and Mr. HeweS offered it with but few
changes. When Jones placed his scheme
in Mr. HeweS'S hands he accompanied II
with a Memorandum of Reasons for the
Within Scheme"
1t appears that he knew what the other
program was. In his Memorandum
he says:
cat this stage of our fortunes l think il
unwise to attempt ships OF the line. Such
ships are too large. and costly, and re-
auire too many men for our present re-
sources Besides their use Is that oil fleets
calculated to fight ranged battles or make
extensive demonstrations.
eve cannot now nor for a long time to
come hope for conditions admitting OF
such an attitude at sea. AS II Is, only
four powers are able to maintain fleets OF
the line capable of standing up In ranged
battle. England, France, Spain and the
Netherlands, and their fleets are the
growth of centuries.
eve must be content with small be-
cinnincs. Nor would | counsel sole re-
lance on small vessels able only to harass
the enemy's commerce. That may be left
to the enterprise of private persons In the
main.
you perceive, my dear sir, that l now
come to the class of vessels we do need;
that is, frigateS. This class, rating 81 10
SO guns. can endure long voyages, Whlch
1y-- Ga OF a. ShnltG
a squadron of four to SIX frlgates con-
stantly in British waters, harborlng ana
refitting in the ports OF France, winch
nation must from self interest alone soon
lean towards, if not openly espouse, our
cause.
by keeping such squadron IN BRITISH
waters alarming their coasts, 1ntercepting
their trade. and descending now and then
upon their least defended ports is the only
way that we. with our slender resources,
can senSibly affect our enemy by sea war
fare.
RATES of insurance will rise, necessary
supplies from abroad, particularly IN naval
stores. will be cut off; transports and ships
laden with military stores Tor the land
operations against us will be captured,
and last, though not least, considerable OF
their force in ships and men Will be kept
watching or searching Tor Cur frlgateS:
"In planning and building such frlgateS
-"
prime quality. But no officer of proper
spirit would consider it his duty to run
from an enemy frigate OF like or nearly
like force.
"a sharp battle now and then, and carry
ing one or moro of their frigateS into French
ports would raise us more in the estlma~
ton of Europe, where we now most OF all
need countenance than the capture OF one
of their armies on the land here IN America.
IF we can show to the world that we can
beat them afoat with an equal force, 1T
will be more than anyone else has been
able to do in modern times, and 1T Will,
therefore. create great sentiment OF re-
spect and favor towards us on the CONT
nent of Europe 81
Il trust, my friend, that you will not
find this somewhat long discourse tedi-
Gus. At any rate, you know that my
opinions are based upon long and arduous
experience at sea, and drawn from diligent
study of the modes and effect of maritime
warfare as have myself Witnessed it,"
The HeweS Memorial states that the
views of Mr.. Jones were received by the
Committee with close attention, and the
impression they made was marked.