Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1898-04-08

charged by railroad. III IL can IOTDlu
the people to impose an unreasonably
low rate, 1t can by parity of reasoning
forbid the railroad to charge an unreason-
ably high rate. This latter question is
not, indeed, directly involved in the case,
but it is certainly indirectly involved.
Indeed, the court expressly declares that,
while the state "cannOt Justify unreason-
ably low rates for domestic transporta-
ton upon the ground that the carrier is .
earning large profits on its interstate /
business neither can "the carrier Justify !
unreasonably high rates on domestic
business upon the ground that only in
that way can it meet losses on inter state ,
business" The right of the public to
regard railroads as national highways |
and to determine what rates may be
charged upon them is implicitly, if not
explicitly, affirmed by this decision. /
Secondly, it is also affirmed that this
right is vested in and to be exercised by
the courts; that whatever authority over
railroad rates is attempted by either state
or national legislation is subject to review
by the courts; and that the latter will
protect the railroads from palpably un-
Just anu iltUNlldUlt ltR uidl lBucs iO
court does indeed say that the question
of rates could he more easily determined
by a commission composed Of persons
whose special skill, observation, and eX-
perience qualify them" for the task; but
it also aflirms that the court cannot
shrink from the duty of determining
whether the rates of the railroad have
been invaded or disregarded by the
legislature, difficult as the question may
be to determine. 1t appears to US that,
under the constitution, there can be very
little doubt that this duty is laid upon
the supreme court of the United States,
that it is the final tribunal, and that it can
not shrink from the task under the present
conditions. Whether those conditions
ought to be changed, whether we are not
laying upon the judiciary generally, and
upon the supreme court of the United
States especially, more complicated bur
dens than our tribunals are competent to
| bear, whether we are not repOsing in
them a greater authority than free
people should repose In any one depart
ment of its government. are other ques-
/ tions, ana are worthy of serious Consid-
Grafton. In England no court can ever
set aside the decision of parliament. The
judicial and the legislative bnCics are CO.
ordinate authorities. each supreme i'm its
own sphere That is not the American
plan Whether it ought not to he the
! American plan is question which may
/ hc raised i'm the near future: and how it
/ will be decided will depend, i'm our judy
mcnt, not a little upon the way in which
/ the courts exercise the authority which
/ they are now, under our Constitution,
/ rightly assuming.
The third principle is that, in determin-
ing the value of railroad properties, 1.-THE
original cost Of construction, the amount
expended in improvements, the amount
and market vaHe of its bonds and stock,
e.. the probable earning capacity of
the property under any rates prescribed
by the statute, and the sum required to
meet operating expenses, are all matters
for considerations" With the fullest
respect for the supreme court, we doubt
whether this furnishes a Just standard.
1t seems to us to be far too complicated
to be practicable in execution. 1t seems
to us also that in many cases it would be
an unjust standard. The value OF the
bonds and stock of a railroad depends
upon its dividends, and these, again, up.
on the amount which it charges and
receives from the public for the service
rendered Thus, if the supreme court is
right, the railroad would only have to
show that it must charge a certain sum
in order to keep up its dividends on its
watered. or otherwise Oyervalued stock
and bonds, to secure the judgment Of the
court That this vas reasonable rate"
Property is worth in the world only
what it will cost to duplicate that prop.
erty, and rates are not unreasOnably low
which pay "A fair interest on what it
would cost to duplicate the railroad line.
This is the simple and, as it seems to us,
the only practicable and the only really
Just standard of measurement.