The times., 1898-12-26
SAMPSON THE UNREADY.
The Condition of His Fleet When
Ceryera Came Ont


The Condition of His Fleet when
Cervera Came Out.
(Arthur Warren in the Engineering Magazine.)
All war correspondents are not immune.
Their susceptibility to the fever of excite
ment may be a qualification.
One of the feverish accounts of the sink
ing of Cervera's feet began: LAS the
smoke from the Spanish vessels rose from
behind the hills at the narrow entrance
of Santiago harbor a hurried signal from
the Brooklyn was followed by a rush OF
the American crews to the winches, and
then all the Yankee ships weighed anchor
and started full speed after the enemy
The account was possibly graphic, but
it was not true. The crews did not rush
to the winches, because they were not or
dered to do so; there would have been no
object. The ships did not weigh anchor.
because in weeks they had not dropped
an anchor. 1hey did not start at full
speed, because they were not in condition.
How was it that the correspond
ents at Santiago omitted to mention
fact no less important than this-that on
that Sunday morning when the Spanish
fleet broke out from the harbor of San
tiago the American fleet was unprepared
TO make quick movement of any kind in
the face OF the enemy?
For the navy the war with Spain in
American waters was an engineers war.
Admirals and captains are brave
enough and keen tacticians, TO doubt, but
the best part of the Spanish feet would
have slipped through somebody's fingers
that Sunday morning at Santiago II
America $ lighting engineers had not by
the hardest of work, overcome the ob
stacles imposed upon them by orders from
the bridge. If the fighting had been
against men more nearly kin-say Eng
lish or German-under conditions iieuti-
cal with those off Santiago on the morn
ing of July 3. some American hulks might
now be rusting at the bottom OF trupic
seas. For engines We're uncoup!ed and
many fires out and steam SO low that al
the energy of the stokers was required to
get IL UP again.
The American ships had been OFF the
coast for weeks. waiting for the enemy
10 come out. When the enemy came out
.he American ships were ready to saoot,
but not TO give chase. This was no fault
of the engineers. 1t was not the effect
OF over-confidence. 1t was the result of
condition. The condition is peculiar to
naval practice. 1t was long ago discard
ed in the merchant service. In the mer-
chant service a chief engineer controls
his department. In the navy the captain
controls the engineers. and is in turn con-
trolled by the commanding officer of the
feet. The chief engineer Of an Atlantic
liner looks To his captain for starting and
stopping signals only: for the rest ne
takes his orders from his owners and re-
ports to them. The chief engineer alone
+, is responsible for the care, operation and
economy OF the machinery. In the navy
he Ship'g On "a m decides
boilers shall be used. how much coal sh all
be burned, what pressure shall be car
ried. And the American captains at San
tiago had everything in readiness. except
their boilers and engines. There were two
exceptions-the Oregon and the G.oucss-
ter.
Eternal vigilance IS the price of good
engines. Robert Milllgan. fighting engi-
neer and the men under him put the Ore
gon where the men behind the guns could
destroy the best ships of Spain. .
Forced draught practice answers to Gen.
Sherman's description of war. II is hell.
Every snip in the United States service
is supposed by the regulations TO have a
forced draught test twice a year. Only
the commander of the ship can order 1t.
But some OF the ships have never made
a forced draught run since Their trial
trips. Perhaps the captains do not be-
iieve in It. AT any rate their men have
not been trained to use 1t in emergency.
Millisap declined to ask the captain for
permission to use forced draught. He
knew that his short-handed crew were
working hard enough. and half their work
was still before them, and fight at the
end OF it. Or the fight might come any
day. But the men had caught the spirit
OF their chief: their pride was 10 keep
everything in readiness. The difficulty
was not to get them TO work. but TO pre-
vent them from overworking. When the
chief saw that they really wanted TO try
forced draught for the ships sake he per-
suadsa the captain to let them do il. 1t
was to them what gun drill is to the men
on the deck and in the turret. So they
did it, and they did 1t again. and at San
tiago they handled the forced draught like
a play thing.
Not an, ounce of salt water was all
lowed in the oregon's boilers. Milligan,
writing from Cailao to brother officer,
said: Il fear that ] am rapidly becom-
ing the most unpopular man in the ship,
because / am determined that we shall
| not put salt water in the boilers and. to
that end, have insisted to the captain
that. II necessary, we must cut down the
fresh water allowance for officers and
| men to the bare amount necessary for
! drinking and cooking. using salt water
| for bathing and all other purposes
The lay mind might suppose that the
| object of sending the fleet to Santiago
| was TO have il ready to jump at the
| enemy at the sound of the general alarm
| There is touch of the farcical in build
| ing warships, equipping them with pow
| erful machinery, to be able. at the in
| stant of battle. to get out of them only
| a fraction of their power But some
| hOdy in bnrifV In, tho fa
| of Gilbertian topsy sy-turvydom So the
| American fleet waited for the Spaniards
| with engines uncoupled, boilers filled
| (as they had long BEEN with salt water
| when they were not empty. and half the
| CRATES as clean as whistles and as cold as
j ice boxes.
"On the fighting ship the fighting man
must stand supreme said Theodore
| Roosevelt. when he was Assistant Secre-
| tary of the United States navy. And
then he shrewdly added: only he mus;
know how to handle his tools, and must
| change as the ship changes, so that
| precisely as he once knew about sails
now he must know about engines. There
can be no divided command. Only one
man can exercise it: but he must be thor.
oughly fitted for 1t.
| When there was no enemy anywhere
about-on the way from Hampton Roads
l 10 VI tht oh4ict
States flying squadron had all her engines
and four of her boilers in use. When she
went on the blockade at Santiago and
had the enemy in touch, the flagship oi
the flying squadron had only half her en-.
gine power and half her boiler power
ready for use. Did the bridge expect the
enemy to signal: PLEASE connect youl
engines and boilers, and be good enough
| to light your fires. / am coming out!'
Admiral Cervera was polite enough to pay
the Brooklyn the compliment of his bes
| ;~,o,tyonc He ackuouledpes that h,