The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-12


tionai confirmation has been received of
the news from London that the Span
ish squadron which left the Cape Verde
islands two weeks ago had returned 70
Cadis. the belief has greatly strengthened
In ofdcial circles that = cruise 70 Porto
Rican or Cuban waters was never very
seriously considered By Admiral viliamil.
says the Washington correspondent Of the
Tribune. No word has reached the navy
department from Acting Admira. Samp-
son since the neet under his command was
sighted on the north coast Of San DomIn-
go, but the failure OF any Of the swift
scouting cruisers sent IN advance to dis
cover any traces Of the Spanish squad
ron, and the non-appearance OF the Span
ish men-of-war at any Of the usual coal
ing and supply stations Of the Windward
group. have almost convinced the naval
authorities here that the Spanish COM
mander has thought discretion TO be the
better part Of yalor and has actually
sought the refugs OF home port.
As the capture Of Porto RICO at this
time has been held by the president and
his advisers to be Of little or no stragetic
plifying the task Of reducing Havana and
expsliing the Spanish land forces from
Cuba. II has been virtually decided, az
soon as the absence Of the Cape Verde
squadron from West Indian waters il
definitely established. to recall 10 Cuba the
greater part of Acting Admiral Samp-
sons feet. Cable dispatches instructing
the American commander TO make no at
tack At present on San Juan, but to await
further orders OF Porto RICO. have been
sent to tho various cable stations in the
Windward group and viii doubtless be
delivered within the next day or two
There is, OF course. no immediate de.
mand for the services Of the whole Key
West feet before Havana. The smaller
men OF war left behind by Acting Admiral
Sampson are competent TO protect the pas
sage OF the landing expedition from Tam
pa and TO cover the icdgemen. OF the in
vadinE army on the Cuban coast. But
should an effort to reduce the Notifications
OF Havana from the water side be thought
necessary, the heavier sighting ships. now
OF Porto Rico, would have TO be called
on to undertake the bombardment: while
II the vizeaya, the Almirante Oquendo,
the Maria Teresa and the Cristobal Colon
should. after all. have passed unnoticed
into the Caribbean sea. and should appear
unexpectedly OF the west end of Cuba.
the presence Of the full Key West fee, in
that neighborhood would he found indis-
pensab.e to beat on the assailants ana
maintain what American forces had al
ready landed.
Though Monday 10 the date now set for
/ the departure Of the mrs, division OF reg
uiars from Tampa. It would create no
great surprise II ths troops were detained
on Florida soil few days longer. To take
advantage OF the comparative la,eness OF
the season. . sharply directed campaign
against Havana IL considered advisable.
But 1t seems certain that the volunteers
who are 70 follow the regulars 10 Cuba
cannot be assembled on the guls coast In
III condition for field work within the
next two weeks, so that actual operations
In Cuba will scarcely be possible before
May IS. By that time TOO all doubts
about the disposition Of the Spanish naval
forces will have been solved. and Acting
Admiral sampsons united feet can be
employed 10 cooperate with the American
lard force In pushing the siege of the Gu
ban capital.
No serious weight Is attached here 10 the
suggestion that Spain will send feet
through the Suez canal to attack Admiral
rewey's forces in the Philippines. It Ii
considered unlikely tia. the Spanish gov
ernnaen, would strip Its home ports OF
adequate protection In order to undertake
the re-concuest os a distant coleny which
could be held only at the sacrifice of
national interests in every other quarter
Of the weird. Moreover. with the govern
rnsnt and cabine, engrossed in a struggle
for peace at home. Spain Is scarcely in a
position TO pursue. for the present. any
hi, a defensive and negative naval and
military programme.