The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-08-27

New York, Aug. ga Herald dis
patch from Santiago says: Prior to
enlbarking on the steamer Mexico, Ma
jo- General Shafter consented to be in
terviewed. He said:
Il look upon the campaign just
closed as a successful one in the high
est degree, not only in regard to the
military operations, but more especial
" in regard to the great results
achieved. From a military point OF
view, l perhaps took steps winch
might not be deemed justifiable under
other circumstances, but L knew the
temper and the capabilities or my SOL
diers and the moral effect of our grad
ually coping up the enemy within his
own lines.
MY engineers were very apprehen-
sive that the Spaniards might break
through on my left and cut off Sibo-
new This from a purely military
standpoint, might have been truthful
ly correct, but personally 1 had not for
Il moment any fear on that score. The
result has, l think, proved the correct
ness of my conclusions
Our primary object was 10 drive
Cervera out and next TO take the town.
We had gradually driven the SpanardS
back on their lines, circlinS the city
and slowly advancing day by day. The
enemy began losing spirit as soon as
our guns had been placed in position
to cover the town.
when Cervera left, the situation
was changed The town was at my
mercy, and had l given the order for
a direct assault, it would have been
taken within four hours. L believe that
with the forces then at my command,
reinforced as they had been, l was in
a position to take the city by force.
But if / had taken step OF such a
character, what would have been the
result? l estimate that our casualties
would have been 5000, and the action
l took has had more brilliant real re-
suits without the heavy losses of
lives.
From the moment General Toral
made a proposition for a conference L
knew he was determined TO give up,
and acted accordingly
Personal reflections have been cast
upon me because l was not on the fight
ing line. That was not the place for
a general in command of an army. 1t
must be remembered that 1 was con
nected by telephone with the officers
at the front, and was better able to
direct operations from the position L
had taken. Save for two days, when
i'll, 1 was in direct command of this
campaign, which l consider unique in
American history, for it was really the
first time the United States had fought
with its regular army. The civil war
was war of volunteers, but this cam
paign was fought by our regular
troops.
L did not notice the fact at first, but
there We're only three volunteer regi-
ments engaged against the SpaniardS.
While the highest credit is to be given
them, and they fought bravely and
we'll, there was the moral support of
the regulars back of it all. Our vol
unteers lacked that unity, cohesion and
individual support noticeable in our
trained troops. but at the same time
TO disparagement should be made of
the volunteer regiments in the cam
paign. What they lacked otherwise
they made UP for in enthusiasm and
patriotic spirit, and ! desire to COM
mand no better army than the one
composed OF the class Of volunteers
under me i'll the Santiago campaign.
The operations Of the regulars in
the campaign have proved conclusive
" their superiority over some organ
iZatioas of state militia, in which the
men are partially compelled to serve
ly sense of shame but do not show
the enthusiasm OF volunteers.
There has been some question con-
corning the transportation facilities of
the army. The facilities were all there
and the transportation equipment pro-
Vided was all il should have been, but
our difficulties were enormous. There
was only one road, and TO have built
another would have taken two years.
The nature of the country, the wealth
er. all these things helped to disorgan-
ize this department The use of wa
CONS was almost impossible"