New-York tribune., 1898-12-31


cal,y unknown mountain defiles and valleys 10
keen omen long lines OF communication, which
| are constantly exposed to attack: to fight where-
ever the foe happens to be met, and to retreat. IL
| retreat is necessary, where every rock anu
bowlder holds concealed enemy ana thousa"uo
OF concealed bandits appear as II by magic "
threaten the fanks and rear OF the 'h'aoei'
all this is certainly calculated TO produce so'
diers who man for man. can meet wiz" CUT
| odence the best troops Of any nation. Inc u'i-
| acult work Of the commissariat and the medicai
| service also appears TO be admirapy uone'
though one finds that in Afghanistan' III 1910
80. of the total loss OF fifty thousand. "A num-
her approximately equivalent to the entire force
that was In the field at any one time. mueh '"e
greater part was due TO disease
There Is one all-mportant point. however III
which this border warfare appears to fail as an
| oanoua.e nreparation for the struggle with
European force. even though this must take
| n,aca in essentially the same field OF operations.
For though the Indian frontier may be the
"best training ground Of troops In the world
nc chting the natives is clearly not the best trah-
ing In the modern European art or war; ana Vi
this Major Yourghusband's book supplies afnp'e
evidence. In other words while the man III '"e
ranks gets the best kind Of soderly dlsclphhe'
the officers who direct the tactical operations
and strategcal combinations receive at the
hands of their native enemies almost none Oh
that practice in these matters which the rus
sian and the Frenchman would so promptly give
them Indeed. when one considers that 'he
tactics OF the Afghan can always be known in
advance that they generally the exact re-
verse OF what Europeans would adopt under
similar circumstances and that II one IL TO 90
a certain thing the training OF ones faculties
10 do something exactly opposite is not particu-
larlv helpful one may infer that British COM
manders are being to certain extent, united
for their great future task. The whole troup!e
lies in the fact that as has been stated the
Asatic awaits attack When assailed he gem
orally abandons his frontier however strong 1t
may be. and occupies some interior. often we'll
chosen position Sought out here he allows his
enemy to violate with impunity all the rules OF
sound tactics. and helps him with an abundance
Of blunders OF his own. and when defeated IN
battle. as he IL pretty sure to he. his cohesive
power disappears at once. And he does not
learn. Although he and his forefathers." says
Major Younghusband. have been lighting
against U.S. on and off, for couple OF centuries,
and though his positions are often chosen with
the greatest skill, yet. curiously enough. he al
most invariably leaves open loophole Tor nahK
attacks or turning movements. Moreover. hav-
ing on such occasions watched his British op-
ponents disntegrating their forces in the eXecu-
ton Of wide turning movements. he has never
vet trained his forces 10 be sufficiently ciscl-
plined or sufficiently mobile to take advantage
Of this favorable circumstance by delivering
counter attack" This sort Of thing certainly
simplifes the task Of the British commander
most delightfully."-. but II can hardly be OF much
use in developing his military talents In fact,
this book abounds in examples OF British tao
tics-of division in the face Of the enemy or
turning movements in which the turning d.
vision wanders through an open country where
with the small body of troops
left 10 hold the enemy is impossible and or rash
attacks-whioh II carried out in the presence OF
a European foe would result IN swift ana Ut
ter destruction. Lord Robertss turning move
ment at the Peiwar Kotal is a notable case In
point. where chance was taken (wisely. per-
haps considering the emergency and the char
acter Of the foe) which involved the possible
annihilaton Of his entire force.
But IL such defects in military training seem |
10 be inherent to the peculiar offensive defensive
tactics which necessarily form the staple or
Indian warfare one is curious to learn whether |
the little experience In defence which the Brit
ish Army gets tends TO counteract them. In |
Europe" as Major Younghusband remarks. the
British Army has won most Of its most cee-
brated battles by employing what are termed
offensive defensive tactics That is. by receiving
the enemy's attack in selected and perhaps
prepared position and when he has exhausted
his efforts in vain assaults to issue (sic) COM
paratiyely fresh and unshaken, and to hurl him
fercely into the abyss OF defeat-as at Water
loo" One turns therefore, with anticipation TO
the chapter on Defensive Warfare. where he
states the general conditions OF such warfare
that prevail along the border. and illustrates
them from the comparatively few instances OF
defensive action on the part Of the British, the
most notable of which are Lord Roberts's de-
fence OF Sherpur and that Of Chitral, which has
recently been vitality described by Sir George
Robertson II cannot be said however, that,
valuable as this chapter is much light Is thrown
by II upon the general problem, though 1t leaves
no doubt in the readers mind Of the ability or
the British soldier to play the hero in defence
as well as in attack. In brief the inferences
which the book enables US to make with regard
to the future great defence OF the frontier are
no; altogether reassuring.
From general questions OF tactics and strategy
we pass in the pages Of Lieutenant Churchill
and Mr James. TO a chapter Of actual frontier
fghting which admirably illustrates the prob
lens Major Younghusband discusses. Whoever
wants 10 know all the strength and weakness OF
Indian border warfare; what sort OF an enemy
the Pathan is when defending himself In his
mountain Businesses. and what qualities the
British soldier English and native, has de-
veloped. should read these stirring narratives OF
the great Afridi revolt Of 1897. Just why this
uprising occurred is not even yet quite clear
Perhaps it was the Turkish victory over Greece;
perhaps the Amir's famous book on the "Jehad";
perhaps chronic hatred Of England. increased
by the events Of the Chitral campaign: perhaps
just native fanatcism innamed by the Mad
Mullah"; perhaps all together. But whatever 1t
may have BEEN suddenly the trbesmen in