The times., 1898-10-24
Reviews the History of the
Cuban Blockade.
ALL BEFORE THE BATTLE
The Official Statement Is Made Up
Largely of TeIcGrnms to and From
the Navy Department Why He
Ceased the Bombnrdment of San
Juan, Porto Rico.

lantic fleet, covering the period from May
to July 3, the time of the destruction of
the Spanish squadron under Admiral Ger
by Secretary Long.
The report does not attempt TO describe
the memorable running fight off Santiago,
which resulted in the annihilation of the
Spanish war ships, but concludes with
the statement that 1.-The sortie of Admiral
Cervera's squadron and its destruction,
has been made the subject of a separate
paper and need not be repeated here"
According to the charted day and night
formation of the American fleet in the
blockade off Santiago, accompanying the
order of battle, dated June 2, Admiral
SIMPSONS report shows that the vessels
composing the flying squadron, under
Commodore Schley, occupied the entire
left, or west side, of the semi-circular
line of blockade, with the Iowa centrally
located at a point about nine miles dis
tant from the Moro, while SIMPSONS
vessels occupied the right, or east, side of
the semi-circle, with the Oregon occupy
ing the outer position.
From this statement and the course
pursued by the Spanish ships in their
flight from Santiago harbor, il is clearly
shown that the vessels composing the
original flying squadron, under Schley,
necessarily bore the brunt of the battle.
The Order OF Hattie.
On June the following order of battle
was issued by Admiral Sampson:
L :. Flagship New York, First Rate,
OF Santiago de Cuba, June >, 1895
The fleet of Santiago de Cuba Will be organized
during the operations against that port and the
Spanish squadron follows:
First squadron Cundor the personal command OF
the commander in chief)-New York, Iowa Ore
ron. New orleans, Mayfower Porter
Sec nd squadr n Commodore Schiey) Brooklyn,
Massachusetts Tex,s Marbehead, Vixen.
Vessels joining subsequently, will be assigned by
the cormander-in-chief The vesse!s Will blockade
Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about SIX
miles from the MORO in the daytime and closing
in al night, the lighter vessels well insaore
The first squadron will blockade un the cat side
OF the port, and the second squadron On Inc
west side. Ii the enemy tries TO escape, the ships
must close and engage soon as possible, and
endesvor TO sink his vessels or force them 70 run
ashore in the channel. Ii is not considered that
the shore batteries OF sufficient power to do
any material injury 10 battle-hips.
In smooth weather the vessels Will coal on
station II withdrawn TO coal elsewhere, or for
Other duty, the blockading vessels on either side
will cover the angle thus lett vacant.
1t will be seen by this order that the
battleship Iowa was transferred from
Schley's command TO the first squadron
under Sampson. 1t will also be seen that
II was Schley's fight and victory, as, ac-
cording to Admiral SIMPSONS official bat
tie order, given above, the second squad
ron having been placed by him officially
under Schley's direct command, he
al IN p<argiSa frll
discretionary powers as to how the battle
was to be fought, so far as his squadron
was concerned. The simplicity of the gen.
eral Instructions in the battle order shows
that this was Admiral Sampson's inten-
tion. These instructions simply state. "if
the enemy tries to escape the ships must
close and engage as soon as possible. and
endeavor to sink his vessels or force them
10 run ashore in the channel
Left to Schiey's Discretion.
II will thus be seen that Sampson did
not particularize. and Schley. acting upon
his own Judgment, fought the battle as
existing conditions demanded. Sampson,
of course was not aware of the order of
battle to be adopted by the enemy. and
therefore could not give explicit orders
as to how the Spanish squadron should
be attacked.
The report Of Admiral Sampson contains
many interesting and important state
ments, which make clear certain matters
which have heretofore appeared vague to
the public mind. For instance. it has been
matter of speculation why Sampson did
not capture San Juan. Porto Rico. on the
morning of May 70, when he bombarded
that port. His official statement in the
report under that date is explanatory. He
gays:
The squadron arrived off San Juan the morning
OF the 18th, and the bombardment of that place
ensucd, beginning at $40 and ending at 7:45 1t
was soon seen that Admiral CeryeraA squadron
was not in the port. 1t was clear % nv own
mind that the squadron would not have any great
difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place,
but the fact that We should be held several DAYS
In completing arrangements for holding il: that
part Of our force would have TO be left to await
the arrival Of troops TO garrison it: that the
movements Of the Spanish squadron. our main
objective weIe still unknown; that the FLYING
Squadron was still North, and not in a position
TO render any aid; that Havana, Ceryera's natural
objective. was thus open 10 entry by such force
Is his, while we were thousand miles distant,
made immediate movement toward Havana
imperative
thus reluctantly gave up the project against
San Juan and stood westward for Havana
InefHciency of Monitors.
Admiral Sampson delivers a shoulder
blow at the general efficiency of moni-
tors in naval warfare, in these words:
May 4-The flagship left Key West at 5:45 a.
m of May 4, having appointed rendezvous of
the several ships which selected to form
the squadron off Cruz del Padre light, Nicholas
Channel. al p m. of that day.
The flagship calling off Havana proceeded 10 the
rendezvous in company with the Iowa. Indiana
and Detroit. The Terror. Amphitrite, Mont
gomery. Porter, Wompatuck. and the collier Nj
agara were already there. The squadron at once
stood eastward, the mentors being taken in tow
This was the beginning OF our experience with
the ineficenCy Of the monitors. Their coal supply
was small that ii was at once evident that
they must either frequently coal or they mus,
be towed Therefore, the New York took one
Of the monitors in tow, and the other was towed
by the Iowa. There resulted endless trouble
and delay from the breaking of towlines, etc. At
the first opportunity, when the sea was SUI
fciently smooth, the monitors given coal
from the Niagara, and again taken in tow. Had
the been rough, had the enemy appeared
al this junciure, the squadron would have been
in 4 much better position for an engagement
had the monitors been elsewhere. Subsequently,
when engaging the batteries of San Juan, il
evident that their shooting very bad Owing
TO the quick rolling OF these vessels even in a
very moderate sea, they were unable TO fire with
any degree of accuracy.
Had Faith in Schley.
The report of Admiral Sampson shows
that at one time it seemed TO be the in
tention of the Navy Department that
Schley's squadron was to be intrusted
with the duty of capturing or destroying
following telegram, sent to Commodore
Remey. the commanding officer of the
naval force at Key West.