The copper country evening news. [volume] (Calumet, Mich.) 18??-1907, 1898-02-28
READY FOR THE WORST
The Government Has Long Been
Preparing For War.
PROBABLE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
To Force the Fighting In Cuba, Let the
Spanish Coast Alone and Protect the
Great American seaports-Walter Well
mans Inside Information.

mans Inside Information.
WASHINGTON. Feb. 26.-[Special. There
Is now no concealnent in administration
circles that the government Is preparing
for the possibility of war and has been pre-
pairing for 1t during year or more past
AS l wrote some time ago, my dispatch
being the first disclosure of the govern
ment's military policy made In the press,
the authorities here determined long
time ago that If war were to come they
would not be found unprepared for it.
When the war between the states broke
out, it is we'll known fact that the north
was not ready for hostilities. In the light
of history it is easy to see that the unfor-
tunate conflict was doubtless prolonged at
least two years at the cost of vast treas
ure and many thousands of lives by this
neglect. "In time of peace prepare for
war" is an axiom which no nation can af
ford to neglect. During the last week the
newspapers all over the country have in
many dispatches and narratives confirmed
the accuracy of the news which gave con-
corning the elaborate preparations for war
which were being made by our govern
ment
am now able, upon the best of author
ity, to give some important facts concern
ing the plan of campaign adopted by our
military authorities. If war comes be-
tween the United States and Spain, our
plan will be to make 1t an offensive war so
far as Cuba Is concerned and defensive
war as to every other part of the field. 1t
has been agreed that we cannot afford to
attempt an attack upon Spain or upon
| Spanish commerce. The southern coast of
| Spain, lying almost wholly within the
| Mediterranean, we would not dare cam
paign against, as our ships and transports
| might be caught within the strait of Gil
braltar and be there destroyed by the
| Spanish navy. That part of Spain lying
| on the Atlantic, in the bay of Biscay,
offers no Inducements to an attack by our
| fleets.
| Coast Protection.
| The administration has decided that In
| case war comes-and it Is not here yet by
| a long ways-our first duty is to protect
| our coast cities. In Boston, New York,
| Philadelphia or other seaports OF this
country the Spanish cruisers might do
| more damage in few hours than we could
| inflict upon Spain in a month. We have
the wealth and commerce lying exposed.
Spain has little by comparison. According
| to this decision great part OF our neet
would be engaged from the moment war
was declared In defending our coast line.
The ships would be divided into squadrons
or detacbments, each assigned to the work
of protecting a particular port. They
would cruise some distance at sea to inter
cept Spanish ships and give battle and
would, of course, be ready to respond al
4 any time to orders to assemble at another
point which might be threatened with at
tack.
One of the highest officers Of our gov
eminent pointed out to me today that 4
| war comes it is not likely to be as much o.
picnic as some people may imagine 1t
| Spain could afford to ignore Cuba, he said
and concentrate her attention upon TIT
! United States. She could afford to ASSUME
that we were going to overrun that island
notwithstanding all her opposition. w
would not get much II we took 1t. 1t is
country already war ravaged and stripped
On the other hand, the destruction of al
American city of the first class, or perhap
the levying of vast tribute to avert bonn
bardment, would be ample balm for an.
wound Spanish pride might suffer through
the capture of Cuba by our forces.
Probable Spanish Tactics.
.It must be remembered, 4" said Che bigl
official with whom l enjoyed this privat
talk, "that Spain as the attacking part
could choose the point of attack Her tao
tics would undoubtedly be to assemble he
! fleets at some point in the ocean agree
|, upon beforehand, and thence to swoo
down upon city of the United States Sc
lected by her naval experts. In the natur
of things we could not know which cit
was to be honored by this visitation til
the fleet of the enemy was very near GU
shore 1t might be New York, 1t Nigh
/, be Boston, it might be Charleston, 1t nigh
be our navy yard at Portsmouth. w
/, should be able to offer in defense only tina
} detachment of our ships assigned to tn
, protection of that particular part of tn
: coast. The result would be that when TIL
first blow was struck we should be at
great disadvantage Before our re-enforct
ments could be brought up-one, two G
!, three days-the damage would be done an
: Spain would have the infinite satisfactio
of having bombarded an American cit
1 and perhaps destroyed number OF on
: best ships.
s cat the outset Spain would have til
q best of It, because she could mobilize
- naval force greater than any we coul
!, offer against her But of course this di
s advantage would quickly disappear. In
: short time all our available fleets woul
;, be concentrated at the point of attack. "
0 should know where the enemy was, an
we could go at him. II he ran away, "
could follow him. We could stick to h
. heels. After the first shock, in which Spai
would no doubt get the better Of us,
would be struggle to the death, conte
: of strength of armor, power OF guns. spec
;, Of ships, seamanship and courage. He
t we should not be afraid to meet Spail
: We should at least b. her equal. After
: week or two more the advantage would
!, on our side, on account OF the distan
= from base at which the enemy's fleets we
operating. In time they would be har
pered by lack of coal and other supple
It ought not to take US more than mont
: or six weeks to whip the Spanish Zee
q and drive what was left Of them awe
2 from our coasts.
D. Meanwhile we should have taken po
e session of Cuba. Havana would probab
!. be ours within ten days from the declar