New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-03-12
GENERAL J. NJ. SCIIOFIELD.
HIS "REMINISCENCES OF HIS LONG CA
REER AS a SOLDIER.

0rc
49,, =, 80, o,parcn, PURPOSE aside from the rec
ord itself The model for such WORKS j. INV
roo,rs of Ca.sar on his campaigns. Iut N"' .
his eyes on the politics or MS "'"e' -, 80.
personal "reminiscences have always "e'" ,a,,ly
tion as 10 their perspective There was .o,,y
something morbid in his logic AZ 'in'eS HFl ,.,,cs
a ,,nce Of this is also TO be found IN the
=" ms c,,rr,or Tho utter simplicity o.
cran,.s nature makes his military narTa'lf' o''
the most effective IN the whole range Oh w. n,s
General schonold shares Grants CANOE, ,.ao,,
logical consistency Neither of nc wv , or,
for rev arguments aoout cohC'uS'"'' g.. 10
so,,,ca by events This quality is not one . Nv
,.a >, elaboration and thought II ma" "''
:, ~, hv nature he never gets H. YET " u " ~
o,.n,ved that tho man OF complex na'WV' NJ
thought wavcrs may be rs safe IN Ms ,,a,
as the simpler man whose INGENIOUS 81" =,
General Schonold pats psycholosi'"' E'"r -,,
linz ar two abiding 10 Shcrmans maich '"''"e'
60, r,sn he savs: "shcrmans plan was so
FIRMLY fixed IN his OWE mind almost i,o'' . T.,
s,sr, that hc was determined TO adhere 70 ~
anita NJ all posgblc onpostion, even hcI'u'"N ''~
adverse opinions and advice OF "'hV'" 80"
Hence as was his habit in such cases re ''' ,
every Imaginable reason. without f'F"'1 80
logical or Illogical character. 70 conNlHVv -, -
,ho eoundncss Of his conclusion Hut tho DEL W
- -, roosons which convinced his own NINA i,
.,,., tho chafr Is nil wirnowcd away n o'a' M"
hrIgh. "a the golden grain That j. 10 S'',,
mon was brilliantly justified by me
movement n which the real argumen' oe'o,
WIS the comparative estimate o. INC
crh,,rs men aud especially Of tho leaders I'l' ".
-, sbor,,,, WIS wrong ne 70 the tim" II woud
81. - in INDISPENSABLE things. hu' he was HEn'
a, h,s oni,,lon as TO what Thomas nnc Scno''
could do and thanks 20 General scnoheih nm
and 20 the lao; and bloody first struggle WIZ" ~
he knew what kind Of campaign 'ha' mp
o,,o,r would carry on When Hood super@o"."
49,, ,ro-v Hood? What so.t of a fellow ~ ne
nv. o,aucr wes Yes know him well ana l VIII
ell sos, vho, sort ot n man he Is lie IL MI YOU
,ike HI now before YOU kHow H. nv" '
eueo ,hc p;edicicr to the let;or at every turn o!
IN. canrsisn whcE Logan nj Atlanta an" o'0V'
an bis complete discontinue AT Nash'iIIo
Throughout this period Schoheld name Is NV
.r,c.h,v linked with Hoods as that or the man
who un.]ers ooi him AMI how 10 dofeat MIN o"'o
IN their Gals, DAYS schpCeh he'd persuaoeo lioVu
to finish hts studies. When ne observer Io" "'i
a fighter his old classmat. was, nc rathc: 'eSIe't,
this but. after eli; Hood was NOR" usefnI 10 MS
opponerts than the etratccist Johnston wouio nave
b.cn He made quick wo,k cf the dying Cohfcae'-
acx Against .his irnpctucus commander VINO TOOK
every rick fate placed General SchoEcd WHOSE
ideal OF military genius is that "hich I'aNeS NUN
ing 10 chance Few campaigns have hcen moro
bitterly fought over after they became history IMAM
IN. ono which thcse two old friends shared as an
chou. .he resporsiSpitv for the Confederate re-
pulse ct Spring HILL while the controversy among
Union officers over the battle OF Franklin mas lux
rishcd examples of almost every knd o. mIi''ry
polcncs The campaign was the cumlnau'n OIL
General schonolds career IN the Civil War ana
hs study of II Is perhaps the most interesting part
~ his hook lie leaves Sherman making ready ior
the march from Atlanta 10 the sea: not however
wIthou: showing what he considers the defects ii
Shern,an's plan and In Is execution. Inc mani "e
feet so far as the science Of war was concerned
was that the real objective OF the Atlanta cam
r.irn had been missed. Popular notions had IN
tested military practice, so that the capture OF
great towns which we're rea.y burden TO the VIC
Tor was wore thought OF than the dcfeat OF armies
" tho United States ever have another civil war
A: will probably he marked hy fcw such cries as
ION TO Richmond General Schoneld argues that
Hoods army was tie real objective OF the Atlanta
caInraIgn ard that Sherman was scientifically
wronc-i-s letting that army slip. since he knew
that IL would have 10 he defeated b. somebody.
But Sierraan RICH. in his theory thAt HOod
could be defeated without thu help OF the great
army which he led 10 Savannah. so he LETT the
enxie.ies Of the struggle behind him 20 Thomas
and schohed. Thomas had no army aside from
earrisons Schofeld had corps. HIS strategy
was necessarily centred to delaying Hoods move
rents from day 10 day until Thomas coui gather
troop at Nashville for nna! struggle;
The time was late November. Days were short
nights
was more time for thinking than there was for
marching General Schoneld intimates that Hood
might have done well 10 he awake and thinking
sometimes when he slept. Blu, Hood felt secure
on ponts where his antagonis, was In doubt
He could get fun information from tho people as
20 tho Union forces. while General SchoGad had
10 derend wholly on his own scouts and spies. and
the cavalry. Hoods facilities IN this regard mislei
him. He fanced tim, HIS movements were In part
tAnobserved. whereas his oHponon, was staying
awake nights 10 watch him Meanwhile Thomas
was urgently commanding SchoHcli TO impede tho
enemy as much possible. while tho lattcrs APP
pcals for troops and pontoons were unavaiing. But
things were not 50 bad as they looked. General
Schoncld being foremost in the race northward
could choose the best roads, ana He'd obliged
70 lead his men through the mud Schohed could
march at night. This Hood could not do unless ne
fell In behind on the turnpike Thus the latter
at "a disadvantage IN spite Of his numbers. ard was
never able 10 strike blow With his whole force be-
fore tho battlefield OF Franklin was reached. He
ovcres,imated the marching power Of his men, and
yet In tile end ne caught his opponent AT disad-
vantage which he was quick 10 discover The
small Union army with a river behind IT, was
ruined II defeated. II would have preferred TO fight
on better ground. But the effort be ready for
baltic at any moment had put every soldier the
alert and General Schoneld prides himself on the
certainty with which troops in reserve. knowing
their place in the line broken by the impetuous
rebel charge, practically destroyed the victors of
moment The battle WAS matter OF minutes
only and yet the losses in Hoods army were reck-
oncd by thousands. The COnfederates drew off
beaten but rot discouraged. General Schonold in
fists that any other troops would have given up in
despair But Hoods had stll one more great
battle in them the Two days fight before nashville
General Schone'ds personal claim to the battle
Of Franklin, with It's necessary rrei'mnares Is
that. as against any other commander. the affair
was entirely his own. lie shows that comrunica-
tons were such that this could not be otherwise.
His criticism Of Thomas IS that the latter should
have left Nashville and taken command. or. failing
that should have sent reinforce ucn,s and above
all. pontoors for bridge AT Franklin II was tho
lack OF bridge which left him in It position whore
defeat would have been utter ruin. While he docs