The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1898-05-19
Baltimore Sun, l2th.)

Baltimore Sun, l2th.)
At first it seemed to many, If not |
to most persons, that a military in
vasiOn of Cuba at this late season of |
the year would be an unadvisable |
step. The rains, it was argued, wonld |
interfere with the movements of our
troops, as they had every year put
a stop to the operations of the
Spanish forces acting against the
insurgents. Then the summer, it
was urged, was the yellow fever
season, and it would be very unwise
to expose our raw and unacclimated
troops to the ravages of disease.
Perhaps stronger argument than
these was that suggested by the sup
posed approach of Il formidable fleet
from Spain. Until that fleet was
beaten off or destroyed and our con-
troll Of the Cuban waters and the
navigation Of the gulf absolutely
secure not only would our trans
ports conveying troops be exposed
to great and unnecessary danger,
| but our communications necessary to
| be kept open for the transportation
Of reinforcements and supplies, as
well as Of the sick and wounded.
would be constantly threat med.
Influenced, presumably, by some or
all these considerations it was un-
derstood that the policy of tn: Gov
crnment would be to postpone any
forward movement of the troops,
who would. in the meantime. be con
centrated in great camps Of instruc-
ton at convenient points, while the
navy would maintain q vigorous
blockade of the princi pal Cuban ports
and he ready to meet the Spanish
squadron upon its arrival in the
West Indies.
A few days, a few hours, perhaps,
have sutficed, apparently, to change
all these plans. The reported return
of the Spanish fleet to Cadiz affords
an opportunity to transport an army
to Cuba without risk or interruption.
By affording, at the same time, the
opportunity for capturing and oc-
cupying Porto Rico, the danger OF
anv formida BILE naval demonstration
by Spain on this side of the Atlantic
may be minimized, if not entirely
averted. Deprived of her only pos.
sible base of operation and cOaling
depot on this side of the ocean, it is
difficult to see what Spain could
hope to accomplish by sending her
fleet over here. BY one vigorous
blow. it seems possible for us to ac-
J complish now all that we could hope
I to do after waiting three or four
I months. The gain in time will be
1 simply enormous. The universe
J demand and expectation of our peo.
J pie is for short, sharp and decisive
war-not struggle long spun out
with its consequent increase of do
] mestic burdens, to say nothing o
the increasing danger, the longer
the war lasts, of foreign complica
! tions. These are weighty reasons TO
} not postponing until October wha
, we can do in May, and undoubtedly
, the administration has acted wisely
| in considering them.
/ The considerations which suggest
| ed the sparing of our army the ex
| posure and perils of a summer cam
] paign in tropical climate ignored
: too much the safety and need Of tn
navy. Blockading is trying work a
all times, constant strain day an
night upon the officers and men en-
\ gagged in it, and which would not be
= come easier to bear, especially o
.. board of our armOred vessels, durin;
na the intense summer heat. Moreover
= the rainy season on shore is also tn
!. hurricane season in the Gulf, and
compelled night and day to maintai
I their sleepless vigils on the Cuba
coast, without any friendly harbo
Il or roadstead in which to take refug
from the appealing fury of Mexica
.. ships would have been exposed t
even greater perils than any to b
feared from Spanish guns. 1t
desirable, therefore, that the blOcl
ade itself should be ended {
,g soon as possible, which can only /
by it's abandonment or the capture {
the blockaded cities, which of cours
/. could not be effected without the c.
operation of considerable Ian
force. Every days development
furnish additional demonstration
Il tne lltllc uSPShoChNS w w PA"N>
upon any cooperation on the part
IN the Cuban insurgents. At best, the
. are motley crew, half soldiers. ha
~ brigands, without arms, ammunitiC
eS or commissariat, living in sma
scattered parties upon the countr.
while they have done as much as II
Spaniards to impoverish and d
vastate. The letters from corr
q spondents who have lived wi
u, Gomez and shaered his wandering
M recently published in The Sun. sho
'' that except as guides and scouts Il
insurgents are incapable Of rende
ing much assistance to our army.
-, After all, it is our war. and 1T
right that we should conduct it al
- control its operations. 1t is que
tionable even whether the insurgen
have any sympathy with the huma
and civilized purposes by which o
. Government is actuated. 1t is dout