The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-24

destruction of three gunboats by the little
scorpion in Manzanillo harbor July IS, of
which the commanding officer reports: OR
GERS were given to obtain the range with
Two of the siX-pounders. after which the first
smell from the five-inch gun blew her up,
apparently having struck her boilers"
taptatn Crowninshield says: The COM
pleteness Of our naval victory during the
war and the almost absolute immunity from
INJURY which our ships and crews enjoyed
naturally led TO general conclusion that
our gunnery had much to do with the mat
ter AS a matter of fact, all reports bear out
this conclusion. The percentage of hits,
smaller, II is true than that which has been
obtained at practice, was modified by three
c0nditiOns-in the first place, the demolition
of the enemys ships has usually been so
complete that it is certain that the marks
Of many hits were obliterated by subsequent
fires and explosions: in the second place. the
ranges at which the cOmbatS have taken
place have usually been so much greater
than those used in target practice that this
difference will account for reduction Of
from 50 TO 90 per cent. in the percentage OF
hits, and, finally. the rate of fire was much
higher in the battles than at target prac-
tice. Considering everything, II VIII be
found that the hits per gun per minute nave
been remarkably high. In fact. II appears
that the experience of each combat was
that our maIksinapship was so far superior
and gunneTs were ineffective our guns and
gunnerS were so effective that before the
range was or could be reduced the spanish
ships were either seriously crippled or their
crew demoTalized
Captain Crowninsheld declares that the
experience Of the war has been another
demonstration OF the Importance TO the Ma
ton of sea power. He says that from the
first the only apprehension felt in this coun-
try was on account of the Spanish navy. II
was CerveTa's ships that were feared. We
did not fear the Spanish arn1y-would not
have feared il If it had been three times
as powerful unless II had been supported
by a navy powerful enough to have formed
an efficient convoy and brought il to this
coast. On the contrary, the Spanish navy
been menace, though it had consisted Of
only one frst-class cruiser. Until that
cruiser had been blockaded, captured or de-
StFoysd any unprotected point on our coast
and all of our Sea-borne commerce would
have been at its mercy, and no army, how
ever efficient, could have protected W. from
It. II required navy for this work and
an effective navy.
Touching upon the combined operations of
the army and navy, the report says that
happily all points of difference which arose
between the commanders during the cam
Taign were satisfactorily solved by victory.
One glaring defect of the system of joint
operations was found, however in the mat
ter of transporting and conveying troops,
and IL is recommended that to secure
smoother handling of such a campaign tile
navy be by law charged with the transport
service.
The Navigation Bureau recommends that
Congress authorize the increase of the naval
force TO 10000 men for general service and
200 apprentices, and an argument is made
TO show the absolute necessity of some such
increase unless the reserves on the recelV-
ing ships are to be reduced below the dan
ger point, an evil that was very closely APP
preached during the last war. To carry out
this recommendation the report recoin-
mends the passage of House bill No 10403
which also carries with it an increase of
ninety-nine i'm the number OF line and en-
gineer officers and of one hundred warrant
machinists, all very much needed. The
bureau also recommends the passage of the
Cummings BILL which provides in substance
for appropriations for the naval militia
on an entirely different basis This would
provide for the creation of national naval
reserve entirely under the control of the
department, recruited from the seafaring
classes, who would be compelled TO serve in
war times under penalty of desertion. The
men would be required to report once a year
for drill. for which they would receive one
months pay.
Another recommendation is that the sys-
TEN of rewards by promotion be abolished
and that medals of honor be substituted
so that officers may be rewarded without
detriment to others. Finally the sugges-
ton Of the superintendent of the coast
signal service that this should be made a
permanent institution is approved, as it
viii form a skeleton at small cost around
which a highly efficient service could be
promptly built upon the outbreak Of the
war