The leader. [volume] (Brookhaven, Miss.) 1895-1905, 1898-11-30
A HISTORY OF THE WAR.
In One of = Most Interesting and
Valuable Character.

Washington. Nov. sI-Far out Of IN.
lines OF the ordinary annual report Of the
bureau officers Is that of Capt. Crownin-
shield, chief Of the bureau Of navigation.
navy department. which has just been
made public. Not only was the head OF this
bureau a member Of the war or strategy
board. as II came to be known. but he was
responsible for the execution OF the plans
formed by that board and for the move
ment OF every shp and the assignment OF
every officer. Consequently no bureau Of
f1cer had equal opportunity TO know the
moving purposes and exact history OF the
war. The report Is absolutely free from
personalities; there Is no reference what
ever TO the now happily-ended Sampson
Schley controversy: no criticism OF any
officer nor any commentator that might
be regarded as invidious and discriminat-
ing. But the report is confined TO the state
ment OF hard facts, with few important
recommendations for the betterment OF the
naval service.
The war history begins with the sim.
pie statement OF certain precautionary or
ders that were issued, but even In the abb
sence OF comment. attention cannot fall
TO be attracted TO the remarkable fore
sight exhibited In the preparation OF the
official orders They begin with an order
dated January II last directing the com
mander OF the European stations TO retain
about to expire, and those following pro
vide for the successful extrication OF the
European squadron from the danger TO
which 1t was exposed upon the outbreak
OF the war. show how the south Attain
tic squadron was brought up TO reen-
force Sampson. how the Oregon started on
her famous race around South America
how stores and ammunition were forward
ed 10 the squadrons. and finally they wind
up with the famous laconic order to Dewey
OF April "a: War has commenced between
the United States and Spain. proceed at
once TO the Philippine islands. commence
operations at once. particularly agains.
Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels
or destroy Use utmost endeavors." These
orders show that four months before Ger
vera's feet reached this side our whole
north Atlantic feet was ready for any
emergency within striking distance Of one
Of the two points from which attack
might come.
The completeness of our naval victories
during the war and the almost absolute
immunity from injury which our ships
and crews enjoyed. naturally led to gen
eral conclusion that our gunnery had much
10 do with the matter As matter OF
fact. all reports bear out this conclusion
In fact 1t appears that the experience OF
each combat was that our marksma nship
was so far superior that. at a range at
which the Spanish guns and gunners were
effective that before the range was or
could be reduced. the Spanish ships were
either seriously crippled or their crew.
demoralized."
Capt. Crowninshield declares that the OK
pCrience CT the war has been another DEM
onstration Of the Importance to the ma
ton OF sea power. He says that from
the first the only apprehension felt in this
country was on account OF the Spanish
navy. II was Cerveras ships that were
feared-we did not fear the Spanish army
would not have feared II IF 1t had been
three times as powerful. unless II had been
supported by a navy powerful enough tt
have formed an efficient convoy and
brought II TO this coast. On the contrary
the Spanish navy, even without the Span
ish army. would have been a menace
though 1t had consisted OF only one first.
class cruiser Until that cruiser had beer
olockaded, captured or destroyed any IN
protected point on our coast and all Of oui
sea commerce would have been at its
mercy. and no army. however efficient
could have protected US from 1t. 1t re-
quired a navy for this work. and an ef.
| fective navy"
Touching upon the combined operations
| Of the army and navy, the reported diff.
fCrences which arose between the com.
| manders during the campaign were salts
| factorily solved by victory. One glar-
| ing defect of the system Of joint opera
| OF transporting and conveying troops. and
| IL is recomme uded that 10 secure smooth.
| er handling of such a campaign. the navy
| be by law charged with the transport
service.
The naviga ton bureau recommends that
congress authorize the increase of the
| naval force 10 10000 men for general serv'
| ice and $3.50 apprentices. and an argument
| is made to show absolute necessity OF some
| such increase, unless the reserves on the
| receiving hips q re to be reduced below the
| danger points, and that was very closely
| approached during the last war.
lie shows that difficulty was experienced
| in mastering the men In. the department
| having no right to call upon them. and the }
| having no responsibility TO the navy de
| partment were not subject to orders
| Therefore the bureau recommends the pas
sage Of The Cummings bill which pro
| vides in substance for appropriations foi
| The naval militia on an entirely different
| basis This would provide for the creation
| of a national naval reserve entirely under
| the control Of the department. recruited
from the seafaring classes who would be
compelled to serve In war times under
penalty of desertion. The men would be re.
| quired to report once year for drill fci
which they would receive one month:
| pay.
| Another recomme ndation is that the sys
| tenn Of rewards by promotion be abolished
| and that medals of honor be substituted
| so that officers may be rewarded without
| detrment to others Finally. the sug
| eestion OF the superintendent OF the coast
| signal service that this should be made 6
| permanent institution is approved. as il
| will AFFORD skeleton at small cost. arount
| which a highly efficient service could bs
| promptly built up upon the outbreak OF
| a war