Arizona weekly journal-miner., 1898-11-16

fVMAdR Iside of the city. W@ EEfe NE1Th e American FffEsy[ESyNaNkEllea leaders believed E+MkkZ5AE SZH,ithat the Span NEHTNE@ liards were in- GN->-- -Ltending to make
 stubborn fight, in the vindication of
 their honor, at the gates of the city.
 The troops generally shared this view.
 It had been intended up to June 24
 that Lawton's division take strong de- fensive position north of SibOney land
 ing, on the road to Santiago, that Rents division encamp west of Law .on, while
 Wheeler's division would hold the road
 from Siboney back to Daiqueri, thus
 keeping up land communication between
 these two landings These positions,
 within easy range of the navy guns,
 were to have been maintained until all
 the troops, artillery, transportation
 wagons and animals, rations and ann
 munition were safely landed and dis
 tributed.
 The adjutant general of one of the divisions, who was in position to know
 the inside of things, told me at Camp
 Wikoff that the affair at Las Guasimas forced the rapid movements of the army forward upon Fl Caney and San Juan hill The capture of that position drew the army westward to Savilla, where there were excellent camping grounds, good water, room to deploy the divisions and Co receive the Spaniards in case of attack. It was supposed by many of the general officers that the army would halt in that camp for some time in order to get up artillery and put the whole outfit in shape for an attack in the di- rection of Santiago.
 In spite of the efforts of the staff de- paItments it was impossible to land and transport supplies faster than the men and animals at the front consumed them. There was a lack of steam launches, lighters. scows and wharfs. The army never had three days supply of rations ahead.
 There had been much marching and countermarching to get the troops into position, and it was very hot. Soldiers had DO changes of clothing. All they had with them was a roll containing a blanket, in some cases a shelter tent, their arms and hzversaeks. Precipitation soaked their underclothing as though they had been in bath, and the ire quent rains drenched them on the out
 side The soldiers say that while they would not have minded this state of things ordinarily, yet, following their long voyage, it left no time for recupera- ton. The extreme heat and the peculiar odor rising from the soil affected their appetites, and they could not relish the coarse army nations, nor procure any thing whatsoever for variety. Those l who had recourse to the native fruits, especially the mango. paid dearly for it. The mango is little larger than peach, 1 shaped like pear. Its meat is coarse, like that of the pumpkin; its rind like 1 an apple, thick and tough. The expert 1 enced Cubans warned Americans against | eating manages, as they said they con- 1 tained the germs of fever, but as they l were very cooling to the throat some | men, especially the volunteers could not resist the temptation.
 While the army was strung along the l Santiago road between Daiquiri and | Savilla, the regiOn westward toward | Santiago was reconDoitered. Just how | complete these reconnoisances were is I mystery. I asked the staff officers and l division generals whether it was known l beforehand that the approaches to San | Juan heights were exposed to Spanish | view and fire from their works on the l crest, particularly the road and trail at l the crossing of the San Juan river and | it's tributaries. could learn nothing. ! The answers were, 'I suppose that this was known at army headquarters. '" The fact remains that on July l before l the battle opened the troops found them selves blocked in the road and in the ] beds of the streams after daylight with | in view of the Spaniards and within l range of their small arms.
 It was stated that certain general, | who refused to commit himself on any l points likely to lead to controversy, ex- ! amined the region thoroughly and rec l commended that trails be cut parallel to | the main road and on both sides of it. ! General Chaffee said that the region | far south of the road to Santiago was | examined with a view to making an at- | tack upon the Pmta Gorda battery. l The Punts Gorda battery was the first | objective thought of after the army set | it's face toward Santiago from the east This was the strongest battery on the . bay and by taking it Shafter's army would have turned Morro, and, in fact. captured the key to the land defenses of the harboT. But the ground in rear was impossible for an attack.
 El Clancy had been thoroughly recon noitered as early as June 27 three days after Las Guagimas, and three days be- fore the attack upon it. All the partio- ulars as to approaches and defenses were known at headquArters
 There was Q difference of opinion | around headquarters as to the impor- tance of Fl Caney. General Shafter said, "we did not wish to leave it as shelter for a strong Spanish outpost on the right flank of our line, ." when if | should move forward against the high . r-round east ana northeast or SanuagO- | General Lawton's division was to con- ] stitute the right wing of the assaulting l force. and learrSed from his headQuar | ters that Lawton was unwilling to hurl . his division against the height assigned . him for capture, leaving the Spanish in . possession of Fl Clancy close in his rear. . It should be said, however, that Gen. ! eral Lawton believed he could take Fl . Caney in half an hour, and other gen ! erals, more especially Wheeler and . Young, who had looked the ground . over. said about the same thing. These . opinions were based upon information . gained before Fl Caney had been re-en ! forced and strengthened. When LawtOn . came to attack, 1t was another matter. | Wheeler says that he asked Shafter to . let the cavalry division take Fl Caney, . but Shafter said the task had already been given to Lawton. and he could not . change 1t.
 On the 2Sth and 29th of June the whole corps moved forward from the Savilla camp toward Santiago, bringing up between La Redonda and Fl Poso. . Fl Poso is a narrow defile between mountains. Before descending into the . defile. the troops obtained from the tops