The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-12-27
A WAR SECRET.
Why Authorities Were Anxious that
Vessels Should Not Be Risked.

Washington Special in Philadelphia Tele-
graph.
With all that has been written about the
war with Spain there is a great deal that
has not been touched upon. In the publica-
tons the surface has been just scratched
over. as the investigating committee is
scratching the surface with prepared ques-
tions. Nobody who knows anything of con-
sequence tells all he knows. The public is
not in position to judge of the merits of
any mooted question. If all were known
there would be very little room for contro-
versy, and probably no disposition towards
1T. AS it is there is contention as to
whether the war was properly conducted
conflict between General Miles and General
Corbin a feeling of more or less antag-
onism between the army and navy; a Schley
faction and Sampson faction as to the
credit to be given for the services of the
navy and question Of why, in the old
Harry, Secretary Long at the very outset
of the war instructed Sampson not to run
the risk of damage to his armor clads Some
are associating this latter with the wide
famed permission to go swimming WITHOUT
going near the water. Each Of the disputed
questions could be easily settled if it were
not for the idea prevailing in the human
IS
the whole truth ought seldom to be told
l am going to tell little of the truth
that has not before been told about the
naval proposition There was a reason, and
a good reason, why Sampson was ordered
not to risk his vessels The Navy Depart
ment knew more about the entire situation
than was known to the public or to either
with the fleets Each subordinate officer
acting upon his own information, without
view of the whole broad situation, would
have carried out policy good enough from
his point of view Sampson would have
made direct attack upon Havana; Schley
would nave watched before Cienfuegos for
the Spanish fleet which was at Santiago;
and Shafter would have had the American
fleet go into Santiago harbor. Each of
these things was right from the point of
view or the man advocating it, but the in
formation of each was deficient. 1t was
trying to the patience of officers with the
Meet that they should be told not to risk
their vessels, and such an order was hard
to understand The first reason for pre-
serving the vessels, plainly enough, was to
protect the coast against a possible attack
by Spanish fleet. But after this reason
was removed through the knowledge that
there was no real danger of such an attack,
there was another and more potent reason
why the navy should be preserved in it's en-
tire strength at most any cost of prolonga-
ton of the war.
This reason was the same that led to the
formation of the Watson squadron, alleged
TO be intended for an attack upon the Span
ism coast, and for the separate organization
of a squadron under Schley available for
service in foreign waters. 1t was the dan
ger that was far more threatening than the
public knew, that foreign power would
interfere. 1t would not have been wise, 1t
would have been almost treason. to have
disclosed the fact at the time though it was
known, not only to the higher officials of
the administration, but to some of the men
whose business it is to keep the public in
formed of current events. 1t was the part
of diplomacy and of wisdom for this gov
eminent to seem to accept in good faith the
protestations of neutrality from a nation
that was making many outward demonstra-
tons that were regarded as suspicious by
every one. Yet it was equally the part of
wisdom to prepare for the worst. 1t was
fleet, though suffered in winning a victory,
might expose us to an attack from without.
Spain was the least considered in the warn
ing to preserve our ships from injury The
least development of weakness might have
changed a neutrality into hostility.
A foreign fleet was assembled at the Phil
power was being assembled in Europe for
a purpose not disclosed. Information was
received that this latter fleet was to sail
through the Suez canal to join the fleet at
the Philippines. This purpose was not an
rounced. On the contrary. while the fleet
was being assembled particular care was
taken to assure this government that the
most friendly feeling was entertained to-
wards the United States. The assurance
was accepted, but at the same time 1t was
deemed advisable to form the Watson
squadron, announcing that it was formed
for the purpose of an attack upon Spain.
This fleet was ready to sail into the Medi-
terranean ahead of any foreign fleet. to
stand between it and the Suez canal, and to
pass through that canal ahead of it; and
the Schley fleet was ready to follow into
the Mediterranean behind such foreign
fleet, the two fleets to hold that position as
long as the other kept course towards the
Philippines. This apprehension of outside
trouble was not the development of mo-
ment but was ever present until after the
destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santiago.
Simpsons failure to follow more agrees
sive course al San Juan and later at SAINT
iago was due to his instructions from the
department and the department was influ-
enced by the most potent reasons to pre-
serve the naval force in all It's strength.
nor would the department care to make the
explanation now but the statement above is
true