The record-union., 1898-11-12

desert he took over from Lord Wolse-
ley, and indeed from the immemorial
Arabs; and then from his own stroke
OF insight and resolution, amounting to
genius he turned a raid into an ire
'slstlble certain conquest by suppressed
ing camels with the railway. Others
mad thought of the desert route; the.
Slrdar, connecting Korosko to Halfa,
used it. Others had projected desert
railways, the Sirdar made one. That,
summarized in one instance, Is the
working Of the Soudan machine.
. AS intelligence officer Kitchener ac-
companied Sir Herbert Stewards desert
column, andeyou may be sure that the
utter breakdown of transport which
must in any case have marred that he
roic folly was not unnoticed by him.
Afterward, through the long decade of
little fights that made the Egyptian
army, Kitchener was fully employed. In
1887 and 1888 he commanded Suakim,
and it is remarkable that his most i'm
portant enterprise was half a failure.
He attacked Osman Digna at HANDFUL,
when most of the Enlir's men were
away raiding; and although he sue
ceeded in releasing a number of cap
self wounded in the face by a bullet.
without any decisive success.
The withdrawal was in no way dis
creditable, for his force was a tumble
Of irregulars and levies without disci-
pine. But it is not, perhaps, fanciful
to believe that the Sirdar, who has
never given battle without making
certain of an annihilating victory, has
1i ~ Of n
hazard bashi-bazouking at HANDFUL.
REVENGE COMES IN 1888.
He had his revenge before the end
Of 1888, when he led a brigade of Sou
danese over Osman's trenches at Ge-
maizeh. Next year at Toski he again
commanded a brigade. In 1890 he sue
ceeded Sir Francis Grenfell as Sirdar.
That he meant to be Sirdar in fact as
we'll as in name he showed immediate
ly. The young Khedive travelled south
to the frontier, and took the occasion
to insult every British officer he came
across. Kitchener promptly gave bat
tie; he resigned, a crisis came and the
Khedive was obliged to do public pen
Eance by issuing a general order in
praise of the discipline Of the army and
of its British officers
Two years later he began the recon
quest of the Soudan. Without a single
throwback the work has gone forward
since-but not without intervals. The
Sirdar is never in hurry. With i'm
movable self-control he holds back
from each step until the ground is
consolidated under the last.
The real fighting power of the Sou
dan lies in the country itself-its bar
renness, which refuses food, and its
vastness, which paralyZes transporta-
ton. The Soudan machine obviates
barrenness and vaStness; the bayonet
action stands still until the railway ac-
ton has piled the bank with supplies
or the steamer action can run with
fuil Nile. Fighting men may chafe
and go down with typhoid and cholera;
they are in the iron grip Of the ma
chine, and they must wait the turn Of
its wheels. Dervishes wait and Won
der, passing from apprehension to Sc
eurfty- Then, suddenly at daybreak
one morning, they see the Sirdar ad-
vancing upon them from all sides to-
gether, and by noon they are nearly all
dead Patient and swift, certain and
relentless, the Soudan machine rolls
conquering southwark.
In the meantime during all tho
years of preparation and achievement.
the man has disappeared. The man.
Herbert Kitchener owned the affection
OF private friends in England and of
old comrades of fifteen years stand
ing; for the rest of the world there is
no man Herbert Kitchener, but only the
S1rdar, neither asking affection nor
giving It,
ALL PARTS OF A MACHINE.
His officers and men are wheels In
the machine; he feeds them enough to
make them efficient, and works them
as mercilessly as he works himself.
he VIII have no married officers in his
army; marriage interferes with work.
Any officer who breaks down with the
climate goes on sick leave once: next
Tune he goes and the Egyptian Army
bears him on its strength no more.
Asked once why he did not let his
officers come down to Cairo during the
season, he replied: IF it was to go
/ home where they could get fit and I
gould get more work out Of them, 1
would. But why should / let them go
to Cairo ?p. It is unamiable, but 1t is
war, and it has a severe significance.
- VI SAPPOcC, tLCISlOTG,
the Sirdar is unpopular, he is not No
General is unpopular who always beats
the enemy. When the columns move
out of camp in the evening to march
all night through the dark, they know
not WHITTIER and fight at dawn with an
enemy they have never seen every man
goes forth with a tranquil mind. He
may personally come back, and he
may not; but about the general result
there is no doubt. You bet your boots
the Sirdar knows: he wouldn't fight
If he weren't going to win. Other gem
erals have been better loved; none was
ever better trusted.
For of this one human weakness the
Sirdar is believed not to have purged
himself-ambition. He is on his pro-
motion, a man who cannot afford to
make mistake. Homilies against
ambition may be left Ito those who have
failed in their own; the Sirdar's, If ap-
parently purely personal, is legitimate
and even lofty.-G. w. Stevens, in
London Mail
MAKING THINGS HOMELIKE.