The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1898-05-06

Should Be-
Equipped

No volunteer troops arc needed In
Cuba. and very few regulars will be
sufficient. II would be criminal to send
90. 900 American soldiers over the gulf
stream. Not because Of epidemic dis
ease. There Is no such q thing In the
country In Cuba. Not because of loss
Of life IN great engagements. There is
no necessity in having them.
Enable Gomez and Garcia to equip
the Cubans for war, and they will make
il hard and strong. Give them good
rides. They know how to use them.
Men who for three years have each had
an average Of ten cartridges in their
boxes, and none to follow, have learned
not to waste them.
The exact military situation In Cnha
today 10 just the condition for Gomez
, to utilize II armed and supplied. He
hrs at the lowest estimate $4,000 men
who have handled arms and are accus-
toned 10 Spanish fire. The enthusiastic
Cuban junta probably claims 100, 600.
The truthful Gomez put it last January
at 86, 900. There are undoubtedly 100,
600 In Cuba available for armament
But the estjsnate Of $4,000 men now
ready for business only includes Cuban
soldiera neither employees Of the civil
government organizations nor ranch
eros The fathers and the supporters Of
families living In the woods having
failed to obey Weyler's RECOMMENDATION
bando are included. They, however,
would be most useful az they now are
as scouts, and many would undoubtedly
join the regular forces. Fully armed,
equipped and supplied, Gomez and Gar.
cia can with little physical assistance
clear the island of Spanish bases for
Spanish food and Of themselves compel
tho quick surrender of all the Spanish
forces outside Of Havana, Matansas and
Cienfregos. These ports and their oors
rallied forces can be starved or taken at
Sanpson's will.
This statement that 80, 900 Cubans
can easily destroy all but three Spanish
bases and capture three-fourths a the
Spanish troops may appear absurd to
our military authorities. 1t would be
absurd if not based 1pon what may be
called absurd military conditions. And
that 10 the term for Spanish strength
outside Of the cities mentioned. Take
map Of Cuba and note the fact that all
Spanish supplies aome first to Havana.
That is Cuba's r.llitary heart. The far
ther away from that the weaker is each
Spanish post In food and munitions.
And they are absurdly weak at their
best. Ex.Miniseer Canalejas admitted
last November that tho Spanish troops
were starving. There never was our
plus In any base except the three men,
toned. There is less now. There will
be nothing soon. This means death to
Cuban nonoombatants- proteges--
a. we'll as to Spanish military move
ments. and the island should be taken
quickly. This Is what Gomez can do.
Ask him what he wants, then send Co.
mez what he wants and where he wants
IL, and at onoe.
The coast is ours. This island is like
ribbon and with easy deep approaches
to all necessary parts of its coast line.
Our transports could start simultane-
ously for all insurgent bodies. Before
the ships can be started each leader to
be supplied can be given by Gomez off,
cial instructions and brought to the
point Of Decentralization and unloading.
Knowing that cartridges in plenty are
soon and surely to come. Gomez can
use what ammunition he has in the to-
tai disablement of every railroad in
Cuba. There is now no Spanish water
transportation, and with the railroads
gone the poorly supplied Spanish bases
would be absolutely isolated.
Eastern Cuba need not be considered.
Spain Is weakest there. Garcia has per.
haps $4,000 men. AS soon as supplied
Garcia could desert eastern Cuba and
march, as only Oubans can march, due
west His is the best disciplined consid-
erable force In Cuba. Garcia would need
four companies Of United States caval-
~. Our infantry could not wisely at
tempt to keep up with hardened Cuban
foot soldiers. have seen these march
40 miles day for seven days and on
almost nothing but sugar cane for food.
No artillery would seem necessary to
this eastern chief. One transport land.
ing at point on the south coast near
est Garcia would equip him. One gov
ernment tug or torpedo boat could keep
abreast Of bis position aud maintain
communication between Garcia and Co
mez and the United States government.
Gomez could march at once. He
might have 90 pieces, one troop of cav
airy and one regiment of regular In
fantry from the states. What are called
forts In Cuba are square holes in the
ground with wooden covers. None has
artillery. A few are small masonry
gusrdhouses. The average garrison is
about 80 men. There are none of these
which cannot be quickly reduced by
81 inch fieldpicce. and no town has over
q dozen Of them.
Arms and munitions can go easily
landed within 40 miles OF Gomez's pres
ent position. He will need little forage
while orossing Santa Clara province.
There is excellent grazing there. Ma
tanzas has remaining much sugar cane
also. Gomez could take Sancti Spiritus,
vxxo lor ON.