The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-11-29
Cervera Knew He Was Sailing to
Certain Defeat.
ANTE-BELLUM PROPHECY
SPANISH NAVY IN NO CON-
DITIoN FOR WAR.
Some of His Vessels Were Equipped
With Defective Guns and His
Fleet Sailed With Half Rations-
Astonished By the Order to Sail
For Cuba.

Washington, Nov 2S.-The, navy de-.
partment today published, through the
office of Naval Intelligence, the Views"
of Admiral CerVera regarding the Span
ish navy in the late war.
Captain Glover, the chief intelligence
strength of the United States and the
of a number of letters published in La
Epoca of Madrid, on the 9Th of the
present month. The letters are dated
from before the war up to May 5. They
were written by Cervera in protest
against Span rushing into war in the
face of certain defeat, due to the naval
strength of the United States and the
unpreparedness of the Spanish navy.
Cervera writes: Il ask myself if it
is right for me to keep silent and there
by make myself an accomplice IL ad
ventures which will surely cause the
total ruin of Spain? And for what pur
pose? To defend an island which was
ours, but belongs to us no more, be-
cause, even if we should not lose it by
right in the war, we have lost it in
fact, and with it, much wealth and an
enormous number of young men, vic
Tins of the climate and bullets in the
defense Of what is now no more than
a romantic idea. Furthermore, l be-
lieve that this opinion of mine should
be known to the queen, and by the
whole council of ministers. l have
deemed it my duty TO express my opin-
ions to the proper authorities clearly
and without beating about the bush.
Now let orders be given to me; 1 will
carry them out with energy and deci-
sion; l am ready for the worst"
Captain Glover says Spain had neg
lected her navy, and Cervera shows
that it was imprudent for her to at
tempt war against a superior naval
power. Taking up some of the vessels
in detail, in a letter written in January,
he shows how the Vizcaya carried de-
fective guns; how the Carlos V was a
failure because of lack of power; and
how the Catalina, begun more than
eight years before, was still incomplete.
And then he predicted that a conflict
would be disastrous to Spain.
In a letter written in February, the
admiral speaks of the Colon having no
guns; of other vessels being defective;
of the inability of the fleet to coal at
Cadiz; of their being obliged to go with
half rations, and, finally, their having
no charts Of the American seas. He
says that the eight principal vessels
on the Havana station are worn out,
and that, taking things as they are,
the Spanish naval force, compared with
that of the United States, is in the pro-
portion of l to 8. In such conditions,
a campaign, he writes, would be disaS-
trous, if not an offensive one, and all
that could be done in an offensive way
would be to make some raids with a
few fast vessels
The admiral points to the futility Of
attempting to blockade the United
States ports, and asks how the Spanish
navy would repair, even should they
win a great victory, without resources.
| He says: "It would be foolish to deny
=! that what we may reasonably expect is
| defeat, which may be glorious, but, all
the same, defeat which would cause us
| to lose the islands in the worst possible
manner
"Only in case we could count on some
powerful ally could we aspire to obtain
a satisfactory result"
The admiral refers to the Spanish Pa
! ciflc force as not able to afford even a
shadow Of resistance to the American
naval force Further on, he speaks OF
the war as last in sight, and laments
! the incomplete state of the Spanish YES
sells. But, after all, he says that he is
| glad the end is coming, and is pre-
pared to do his duty He is on record
as protesting against the idea of send
ing the little torpedo boat 1lotilla tC
! Cuba, pointing out that naval defeat
for Spain would precipitate the loss OF
Cuba He speaks of the surprise and
establishment experienced by all the
officers of his squadron on receiving
orders from Spain to sail from Cape dc
Verde for Cuba, inasmuch as they hat
united in pointing out the condition OF
| the ships.
Says the admiral: with an easy
conscience 1 go to the sacrifice, but
cannot understand the decision of the
navy general officers against my opin-
ions''
The last letter in the series is one
from Admiral Villamil, of Cervera!
squadron, addressed directly TO Sagas-
ia, pointing out that the sacrifice of tht
Spanish naval forces will be as certain
as it will be useless and fruitless fol-
the termination of the war.