Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-08-03
REPORT FROM LINAREs.
Pathetic Account of snntiago's State
Before Surrender,

| GUANTANAMO. PROVINCE OF SAN
TIAGo DE CUBA. July 2s.-An official
report of General Linares TO the Madrid
| Government, transmitted on July 18th, is
| full of pathos, as 1t tells of Spaniards
| thousands of miles from home, striving
| to defend property which the owners have
| deserted. The report sent by cable on
| July 18th was addressed TO the Minister of
| Marine. 1t was translated for the Asso-
| eiated Press by Commodore Schley. The
| text in full is as follows:
"Official cablegram, July II, 1893 to the
Minister of War; from the Geperal-in-
Chief of the Division of Santiago de Cuba:
Although confined to my bed by great
weakness and in much pain, the situation
of the long-suffering troops here occupies
my mind TO such an extent that deem It
my duty TO address your Excellency that
the state of affairs may be explained.
TROOPS WEAK AND SICK.
"Enemys lines very near the town on
account of the nature of the ground; our
lines are in full view from them. Troops
weak; sick In considerable proportion not
sent to hospitals owing TO the necessity
for keeping them in the entertainments.
Horses and mules without the usual al
lowance of forage. In the midst of the
wet season, with twenty hours daily
fall of rain in the trenches, which are
simply bitches dug in the ground with
out any permanent shelter for the men.
The men have nothing but rice to eat,
and no means of changinggor drying their
clothing. Considerable losses; field Off
GERS and company officers killed. wound
ed. sick, deprive the troops OF necessary
orders In critical moments.
Under these circumstances 1T is i'm
possible to fight our way ont, because in
attempting TO do so our force would be
lacking one third of the men. who could
not leave, and we would be weakened,
besides. by casualties caused by the
enemy, resulting finally in a veritable
disaster without saving our diminished
battalions. In order TO get out. protected
by the Holguln Division II will be neces-
sary for them to come and break the
enemy's lines in one place, so that my
forces may break through in another,
both acting in conjunction. For this
operation the Holguin Division will re-
quire eight days and Will have to bring
a large amount of rations, which II is
impossible to transport.
SURRENDER INEVITABLE.
'The solution of the question is omi-
eyitable. and we can only succeed in pro-
longing the agony. The sacrifice is USE
less, and the enemy understands this.
They see our lines. and theirs beng well
established close up. they tire out our
men without exposing themselves. Yes
Lerday they cannonaded us on land with
such an elevation that we were unable"to
see their batteries, and from the sea by |
he squadron. which had perfect range, |
ma bombarded the town in sections with |
precision.
1.-THE complete exodus OF the inhabit-
ants. insular as well as peuinsular. In
dudes the occupants Of the public offices, |
With few exceptions. There only remains !
he clergy, and they to-day started 10
cave the town with the archbishop at
heir head.
..The defenders here cannot now begin |
campaign full OF enthusiasm and energy.
hey came here three years ago, strug-
ling against the climate. privations and
atigue. and now they are placed In these
ad circumstances, where they have no
BOD. no physical force, and no means of
They are defending the
roperty OF those that have abandoned IL
nd Of those that now are being fed by
he American forces
.srha honor of arms has Its limits, and
appeal 10 the opinion OF the whole ma
on az 10 whether these long-suffering
rooms have not kept II safely many times
nee MAY 18th, when they were subjecfe1
, the first cannonade. II II Is necessary
aat the sacrifice be endured. for reasons