The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-12-22
Orlop, setting fire TO the crews bags
TERRIBLE HAVOC.

Orlop. setting fire to the crews bags
TERRIBLE HAVOC.
"At 7.3O one shell destroyed completely
the steering gear. Another de-
stroyed the mizzen. bringing down my
flag and ensign. Another shell eN-
ploded on the poop and put out OF ac-
ton nine men. \ fresh shell exploded IN
tho officers cabin. covering the hospital
with blood. destroying the wounded who
were being treated there Another OK
ploded in the ammunition room. /
had TO food the magazines when the cart
ridges began to explode one large shell
penetrated the fire room. putting out OF
action one master gunner and twelve men
serving the guns Another rendered use
less the starboard bow gun, and while
the fire increased astern another IRE
started forward from another shell. The
hroadsde guns continued firing until
there was only one gun and ten seamen
remaining unhurt for serving them
THE SHIP ABANDONED.
The ship being out of control the hull,
smoke pipe. and mast riddled with shot,
half of the crew out Of action, among
whom were seven officers ] gave the
order 10 sink and abandon the ship before
the magazines should explode,
/
was substantially the story Of the loss
of all of the other Spanish ships. and
Admiral Montijo sums up his action
with this statement:
"The inefiicency Of the vessels which
composed my little squadron, the lack
Of all classes Of the personnel. especially
of gunners and seamen sunners' the IN
aptitude OF some of the provisional ma
chinists. the scarcity Of ropid-ire can
non. the strong crews Of the enemy. ana
the unp- rfected character OF the greater
part of our vessels. all contributed TO
make much more decided the sacrihce
which we made for our country and 10
prevent the possibility Of the horrors OF
a bombardment of the city Of Manila.
with the conviction that with the scarcity
Of our force against the superior enemy
we were going to certain death and
could expect a loss Of all our ships
Our casualties. including those Of the
arsenal. amounted to 3sl men killed and
wounded"
THE FLYING SQUADRON.
Apparently the first suggestion Of the
organization Of the Flying squadron
which was TO divert Admiral Camara' ;
squadron from its voyage 20 Manila.
came from Dewey. for in dispatch or
June 27th. he says: "In my judgment II
the coast Of Spain was threatened the
squadron of the enemy will have TO re-
turn"
And that was exactly what happened.
A month later the Admiral paid a hiSh
commitment 10 the British consul at Ma
Mia. Mr. Rawson Walker who FOR three
months had been discharging the duties
of United States Consul in Manila and
rendering the Admiral great assistance.
The AdHirars estimate Of the import
ance OF the Philippine Islands, IS set out
I'm the following telegram sent In answer
TO an inquiry on the subject from the
government:
THE PHILIPPINES.
Manila. August 20. 1898.
Secretary OF the Navy, Washington:
Referring to the Departments tele-
gram of August 18th. important Islands
are: Colon, Luz0n. Panay Cebu,
Negros, Leyte. others owing TO the ma
ture OF the inhabitants have a small
amount Of civilization want Of cultivation.
They may be neglected especially isles
of Southern group.
"Luzon Is in all respects the most de-
slrable to retain. Contains most impor-
tant commercial ports. Manila Is farth-
est north Produces all OF the good to-
bacco Friendly natives. Civilization
somewhat advanced Not yet developed.
Possible rich minerals. Population So
600 Subig Bay best harbor for coaling
purposes and military; water deep. land
locked: easily defended. Strategically.
command Of bay and city Of Manila,
with arsenal at Cavite most valuable.
Panaya, Cebu Negros thickly populated,
most civilized and well cultivated Ilo-
Ito. second commercial port center. Of
sugar trade a good harbor strategically.
I'm view Of the situation. good for defense.
Cebu. third commercial port; good har-
Dor, very desirable.
POOR COAL on ISLANDS
mo coal Of good quality can be pro-
cured I'm Philippine Islands. Some has
been mined on Cebu. English company
| trust II may not be necessary 10 order
me 10 Washington. Should regret very
much 10 leave here while matters remain
In present critical condition.
(Signed) "DEWE
Very naturally the report OF the opera
lions of the North Atlantic fleet COM
prises the largest part Of the printed
body. Most Of the facts have already
appeared but in the very beginning there
Is a most interesting exchange OF letters
between Secretary Long and Admiral
Sampson, showing that even before 80
outbreak Of the war the Admiral had
worked out a complete plan for the inn
mediate reduction Of Havana with his
own squadron. unsupported, and was
only prevented from carrying out thai
plan by orders from the Department,
which wished to protect the bis iron
clads
sCHLEY'S REPORT.
An unpublished report up 10 this time
Is one by Admiral Schley. dated June
LIST. giving an account Of the lombard
ment by his fleet OF the for'ihcations OF
Santiago, the day before Sampson ar
rived on the scene. The Admiral says in
part:
None OF our vessels were struck. al
though the shots fell over and around
them. have learned from insurgents
that the Relna Mercedes was struck by
a shell and eight men killed and also that
a number OF shots struck the MORO. The |
developed the fact that The
Spanish vessels are In the harbor and !
that the fortihcations are well provided |
with long-range guns OF large calibre." !
The Water Power Plant.
a -