New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-11-12
PLEA OF A SPANIARn.
.-ur MARQUIS DE COMILLAs TALKS OF
THE RESULTS OF THE WAR.
-srplcT1oNs OF TROUBLES THAT WOULD FOLLOW
AMERICAN ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIP
PlNEs-SPANIsH INDUSTRY ALSO
WOULD SUFFER
WOULD SUFFER.

paris Nov 1.-THE Marquis de Comi.las the
.,,onscst individual. factor in SPANS financial and
commercial world. who is now in this city. made
.,s,en,ent to-day TO the correspondent OF The As
.oc,ated Press Of his personal views regarding the
plspano- American situation. He is here primarily
ss the representative before the Spanish Peace
commission Of la Production Nationala so
,ety organized protect the interests Of Spanish
,,o5ucts But he also represents the Spanish AS
.ociation of Shipowners and Brokers and he is
,-esident O. the Spanish Colonial Bank OF Bar
relona the institution which pays the interest
che so-calei Cuban bonds The Marquis is presi-
ssnt OF the Credit Mercantile. an association Of
snanlsh coal minc>. Of the ,argest life insurance
company OF Spain. Of the Philippines Tobacco Com
nanv whose fields are in the Island of Luzon; Of
,he Compania Trasatlantca. q Barcelona. which
carried the greater part OF SPANS troops 10 Cuba.
,sd vce-presdont OF the Northern Railroad OF
Spain.
Speaking Of the present conditions between Spain
and America the Marquis said:
Il cannot believe any substantial portion OF the
American people will wish to see unnecessary
hardship inflicted upon the vast number OF Span
,srds whose property and incomes may he de-
s;-oyed the result Of this 1t is not a
question OF the rich only but of the small
chants and manufacturers their employees and
lsborers In the hope Of securing some better UNI
Outstanding &C these interests on the part Of the
American people-and thus some better protection
10 ny views and wishes regarding them affected
by treaty Of peace.
DIFFERS FROM THE WEST INDIES.
The Philippine question presents very different
features from that of the West Indies. In the
Philippines Americans have interests OF con-
siderable importance. The Monroe Doctrine docs
not apply there. In sending Admiral Dcwey's
squadron 70 the Malayan the Americans could
have had no reasonable aim except to divert the
90 o,,.1 . tba
neagre naval reserve forces Of Spain. a piece Of
strategy which highly cfticacious IN breaking
down the moral and material forces Of Spain.
But now that the desired effect has been OBJ
tsned. cannot comprehend what reason the
Americans have to retain ihst land N their power.
Spain is suffering severely from her defeat. after
the prolonged and disastrous insurrection in Cuba,
and she is mortally hurt In her commerce and In
6usry The Americans are absolute strangers to
the Philippines and their population. They are
unproyided with the immediate Organization neces-
sary 10 rule that extensive and remote territory
and 10 exercise authority there. The Fiiipnos have
a certain degree of culture and some rCdimentaTy
ideas TO public administration. but as a whoie,
the country is not yet capable of sef-governmenL
The cesson of sovereignty the Philippines
70 the United States would be disastrous 10 All
those having business interests there well for
the natives for the Spaniards and for Europeans
Of every nationality. Spain cannot transfer ne"
Philippine sovereignty TO the United States by a
mere clause In a peace n. liy. The United States
would be confronted With war for the subjugaiOA
OF eigh; million Maayans. This would mean the
destruction of all property in the Philippines Trade
and commerce would be paralyzed there. The mer-
chants ana manufacturers Of Spain would lose
The markets they enjoy. their factories would
suspend and their employees lie idle. The markets
for their products would have vanished.
But the United States would not gain these
markets. At least. they would gain them only by
IRE and sword The only obstacle which the
its sovereignty ana TO render ii effective in the
Antilles the power OF Spain. In colonies
eight Millions Who have lived for ccnurits dent
fed with Spain. and immense majority Of whom
Try should she transfer her sovereignty without
their consent 10 L foreign nation.
NATIVE SYMPATHY WITH SPAIN.
The whole population Of Mindanao and the
archipelago Of the Visayrs. and the great body Of
the inhsbitIa;s OF the Island Of Luzon sympathize
with Spain and have defended her with
arms In past instructions as well in the pres
one with the same enthusiasm the Span
isrds Of the Peninsula could show. All these ele-
were broken would rise. without doubt. sin
se man in favor OF independence As to the atti-
tude of the Iaga!os. aready risen In arms against
Spain there can be no doubt. Habits OF fighting
ready acquired. ambitions weakened by the
suranccs of the chiefs. wAo have trained the masses
70 cry for Independence. ana the hopes which the
United States Government itself has raised in
them would all tend to make the TagaOs the bit
terest enemies Of the United States To make this
their armed forces and those Of the United States
g. shown in the bloody conflict that took place be-
tween them at CaVit6
'-rhe result Of al This would be war Of subjgi
cation in islands o. CCcaniCa. war which
would be very costly in men as well as money for
the United states a war OF desOlation and ruin
for the Philippines ana their inhabitants in even
greater proportion than that In Cuba has been, a
war which would give T. one or several Powers
humanitarian arguments that would justify their
Intervention FOR reasons similar 10 those that
caused American Intervention in Cuba We who
have such large personal and business interests In
the Philippines view with dismay the possibility OF
tbs terrible event
An have said would apply equally whether the
United States annexed the Philippines or estab-
lshed prOteCtOrafc The latter course would
either be- absolutely insufficient 10 maintain order
or would have to assume such a character as
would be regarded and opposed by the natives as