The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1898-09-15
General Skaters Comment on
Cuban Climate and Conditions.
He Issues His Report on the
Santiago Campaign.
EXPLAINS SOMETHING
Attempt Was Made to Conceal
Outbreak of Yellow Fever.
The Great Obstacles In the
Santiago Campaign.

ter report or the campaign when
terminated in the fall of Santiago has
been made public. He briefly recounts
the organization of the expedition and
its embarkation, and devotes the main
body of the report to the active opera
tons about Santiago.
After reciting the delay at Tampa,
due to inadequate facilities, General
Shafter says that on June he received
orders to sail without delay, but not
with less than 10000 men.
After some transports had already
reached the lower bay, Geographic in
structiOns were received from the sec
rotary of war directing that the sailing
OF the expedition be delayed waiting
further orders. This delay was occas-
Toned by the navy reporting that a
Spanish war vessel had been sighted in
the Nicholas channel. The ships in the
lower bay were Immediately recalled.
Inc expedition sailed on June IA with
SIS officers and 1902 men. General
Shafter briefly covers the trip and
landing and his first meeting with Gen
era1 Garcia, adding:
During the interview General Gar
cha offered the services of his troops,
comprising about 1000 men in the vicin-
lty of Aserradero and about 5000 I'M
der General Castillo, at the little town
OF CuJababo, few miles east of Bal
qu1r1. accepted his offer, impreSSing
1t upon him that I could exercise no
military control over him except such
as he would concede, and as long as he
served under me I would furnish him
ratiOnS and ammunition"
After comforting with Admiral Samp-
son and General Garcia the plan of
campaign was outlined by General
Shafter.
The Decentralization was to COM
mence on the 22nd at Baiquiri, with
feints by the Cubans on Cabanas and
by the navy at various shore points, in
0TrTr,1 4
place of landing.
General Shafter says:
These movements committed me to
approaching Santiago from the east
over a narrow road, at first in some
places not better than a trail, running
from Baiquiri through Siboney and
Sevilla, and making attack from that
quarter. This, in my Judgment, was
| the only feasible plan, and subsequent
information and results confirmed my
| judgment"
General Shafter gives the varying
! efforts towards securing a surrender.
On the 18th the surrender was again
| demanded.
BY this date the sickness in the
army was increasing very rapidly, as
a result of exposure in the trenches to
| the intense heat of the sun and the
heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in
| Cuba are almost equal to rains. The
| weakness of the troops was becoming
| so apparent I was anxious to bring
| the siege to an end, but in common
with most of the officers of the army I
| did not think an assault would be justi-
| fable, especially as the enemy seemed
| to be acting on good faith in the pre-
| liminary propositions to surrender.
July II I informed the Spanish COM
mander that Major General Miles, COM
mander-fn-chief of the army, had just
| arrived in my camp and requested him
| to grant us a personal interview on the
| following day. He replied he would be
! pleased to meet US. The interview took
| place on the 18th, and I informed him
! his surrender only could be considered,
and that he as he was without OppOr-
| tunity of escape, he had no right to
continue the fight"
General Shafter then gives the de-
| tails of the surrender, final surrender,
| his entry into the city and the raising
! of the American flag. In closing he
| says:
| Before closing my report I wish to
| dwell upon the natural obstacles l had
J to encounter and which no foresight
could have overcome or Obviated. The
rocky and precipitOus coast afforded no
| shelter landing places, the roads were
| mere bride paths; the effect Of the
tropical sun and rains upon unacch-
| mated troops was deadly and a dread
I of strange and unknown diseases had
1 its effect on the army
cat Baiquiri, the landing of the
troops and stores was made at a small
| wooden wharf which the Spaniards
| tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and
the animals were pushed into the wa
( ter and guided to a sandy beach about
| 200 yards in extent. At Siboney the
| landing was made on the beach and at
! a. small wharf erected by the engi-
neers.
Il had neither the time nor the men
| to spare to construct permanent
wharves In spite of the fact that had
nearly 1000 men continuously at work
on the roads, they were at times i'm
| passabIe for wagons.
1.-The San Juan and AguadOres rivers
would often suddenly rise so as to pre-
vent the passing of wagons, and then
the pack trains with the command had
to be depended upon for the victual1ng
/ of my army, as we'll as the 10000 refu-
gees who could not in the interests of
humanity be left to starve while we had
ratiOns.
.'Often flor days nothing could be
moved except on pack trains.
After the great physical strain and
| exposure of July 7 and 2, the malar1al
and other fevers began to rapidly ad-
vance throughout the command, and on
July f. the yellow fever appeared at
Siboney. Though efforts were made TO
keep this fact from the army, IS soon
| became known
| ''The supply of quartermaster and
| commissary stores during the campaign
| was abundant and Notwithstanding the
| difficulties in landing and transporting
| the rations, the troops on the firing line
| were at all times supplied with the
| cOarser components, namely oat bread,
| meal, sugar and coffee.
There was no lack of transportation,
| for at no time up to the surrender
| could all the wagons had be used
| I'm reference to the sick and wound
ed I have to say that they received
every attention that it was possible to
| give them. The medical officers without
] exception worked night and day to al
| 1eviate the suffering, which was no
| greater than invariably accompanies
| a campaign. Tt would have been better
/ hn6 1lo171o I'm a