The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-09-10
tiago Campaign Was Welt Com
aucted-Our rrcops' superb Ccur-


circumstances the mistakes were very
few. and he says that il Is wonder that
our army aid as well as ii did and the
campaign was managed as we'll as II was
The principal thing in connection with
the campaign" he said today. was the
difficulty Of operating SO far from a base
of supply and the handling az the sup
plies. The campaign proved that II Is al
most Impossible 10 conduct operations
when troops and supplies must be trans
ported by sea. landed in the surf and then
forwarded TO the army in the field.
In the case at Santiago the difficulties
were greatly increased by the fac; that
there was noticeable lack Of small
boats for landing the supplies, and while
there were abundant quantities 90 food
and medicines on tue ships. IL was almost
impossible 10 ger them 20 the troops.
Il do not think spirited resistance
by the Spaniards would have prevented
q landing. Landings are usually sue
cessful. even In the face of firing, Even
If the Spanish had massed their force Il;
Baiquiri they could not have prevented
landing. for the troops could have dis
embarked at Guantanamo. Cabanas or
somewhere else, and the Spanish coald
not have opposed them.
Neither do / think the siege OF San
tiago could have resulted differently. IL
the Spanish had not surrendered the city
could have been taken by assault. While
a delay meant excavation for the Ar1eri-
can troops. and would thus have benefited
the spanish. delay would have given
the Americans time 10 secure reinforce
ments, and in the end Santiago would
have surrendered or fallen by assault.
You might have lost enc, two or three
thousand men. but the city would have
been taken. II WAS Il problem how to
secure the city best, by assault or siege:
to risk the lives OF thousands IL. battle
or in the trenches. Happily The result
was obtained in the least costly manner.
THE spirit and courage displayed by the
American troops was superb. ] was not
able 10 see as much of the volunteer troops
as of the regulars but wha; / saw of both
enables ME 10 say that l 60 not believe
there are any better soldiers In the world.
They settled down to the work in the
trenches with the same courage that they
sealed the heights OF San Juan.
THE lighting IS not always the hardest
part OF soldiers duty. When they are
carried away with the excitement of bat
tie they perform prodigious feats of hero
Ism, but the steady grind OF Siege like
this one Is more trying on the men and re-
quires even higher courage than the MAX
ing OF charge.
In both cases The men did their work
well and uncomplainingiy. They accept
ed the conditions cheerfully and lay in the
trenches day after day, exposed TO all the
dis incidental to terrible climate: the sun
beating down on them. noxioos vapors
arising from the soil and exposed to all
kinds Of fevers and other iils / was sick
myself for five days.
at is impossible 10 convey an adequate
view of the difficulties due TO ,isc climatic
conditions. Nothing like IL has ever come
under my observation. The enervating ef
fecis OF the terrible heat and the condition
OF the SOIL the difficulty Of maintaining
CAMPS for SO many men in such a limited
territory and the consequent sickness made
the difficulty Of handling the supplies
many times what ii would have been under
favorable circumstances
81, was almost impossible TO land the
supplies, and after they were landed the
weakness OF the men and the condition OF
the roads rendered IL exceedingly hard TO
get them TO the troops at the front. can
only compare IT, or rather contrast II. with
,ine Russian campaign In the Balkans.
There the cold was almost as intense as
the heat was At Santiago. but of the two
prefer the cold.
I'm one respect your army WAS TO be con-
graduated, and that is on the supply Of
ammunition. Ammunition OF all kinds u as
abundant. I think the krsg-Jorgenson
rifle is satisfactory but I think 1; was
mistake to have the regulars armed with
these and the volunteers wifi the Spring
field. Usually the difficulty OF supplying
both with ammunition would be very great.
although Ia this case ii was no, noficea-
tle'
Col. YermoloT returned from Santiago
on the Seneca. OF his experience On this
vessel he said:
The Seneca was undoubtedly over
crowded II was one az the worst OF this
class OF vessels. The officers had plenty Of
food. bareback. beans and other deiicacies
included In the regular army ration.
The water was six weeks old and of the
color and consistency Of beef tea There
was g little pure water on board. bur It
WAS reserved for the sick and woun5ei.
Miss Jennings. the nurse In charge, used
20 suggest 70 us that she make Us some
beef tea. as the water was unfit TO drink
We told her not "a tempt Us. as We might
yield and DEPRIVE the sick and wounded Of
part OF their xcan;y store.
We were disapp0intef when we arrived
al Newport News az not being allowed 10
land. There we're seventeen Suspected
cases on board, and while we id not be-
leve ;hey were yellow fever eases ws
could not satisfy the doctors there. Win
their limited means for Ola rnoslng the
cases. they could no, degs rhine whether
they declined 10 permit u land
when We reacbed New York we " re
received by very capable and courage
ous gentleman, Dr.. ft1ty. who soon re-
iieyed our suspense and enabled gB 10 ssnd
after bsing IL quarantine for two days
Ire condition OF the officers On hoard tbs
seneca was nat 20 rad after w. reached
NewpoF; News az We ware able 10 get
fresh water there, ard 49, sent ont and
purchased Il quantity ~ provisions.
The other foreign representatives were
OF board the Senscs~ including the Ger
mar. French, Austrian. japanese ard 9TH
sr ofgtcers."
Col Ysr-nol1ff VII remain n this cfyuE-
,rv ecr several weeks ard possibly 1anger
He r. very DESTROYS ~ rsvlzit.ne she
scenes OF sa@ 0peresio-ss shout Santia 90
ard also 10 visls Porto Rec. wnsre Re was
unable 10 so. IN order 70 complete MS re-
FORT 70 hfa gcver inert. TIE report vii
% 4 military oas purely, AMI an De very
.echaicaa--Ph Is 1eipa.s Press