The Kinsley graphic. [volume] (Kinsley, Kan.) 1890-1940, 1898-04-15

L
of fOrcible annexation. for that cannot be
thought OF. That. by our code Of morality,
would be criminal aggression Therefore re-
viewed these alternatives in the light of Presi-
dent Grants measured words, uttered in 1875
when after seven years of Sanguinary destruc-
tive and cruel barbaritieS in Cuba he reached
the conclusion that the recognition Of the in
dependence of Cuba was impracticable and in
defensible: that the recognition of belligerence
was not warranted by the facts according to the
tests of public law. 1 commented especially
upon the latter aspect Of the question pointing
out the inconvenience and positive dangers of
. recognition Of belligerency. which. while
adding to the already onerous burdens of neu-
trality within our own Jurisdiction could not
in any way extend our influence or effective Of
fees in the territory OF hostilities. Nothing
has since occurred to change my view in this
regard and recognize as fully now as then
that the issuance Of a proclamation Of neutral
ity by which process the so-called recognition
of be,iigerence Is published, could of itself
and unattended by other action accomplish
nothing toward the one end for which we la
Dor the instant pacifcation Of Cuba and the
cessation Of the misery that af1icts the island
Precedents Recognition.
Turning to the question of recognizing at his
time the independence of the present insurgent
government in Cuba we find safe presidents
in our history from an early day. They are
we'll summed up in President JackSon's mes
H..
ject of the recognition Of independence Of Tex
as He said: In all the contests that have
arisen out OF the revolutions of France out of the
disputes relating to the crews Of Portugal and
spain. out OF the separation OF American possess
sions of both from the European governments,
and out Of the numerous and constantly occur
ring struggles for dominion in Spanish Amer
lea, SO wisely consistent with our just principles
has been the action of Our government that we
have. under the most critical circumstances.
avoided all censure and encountered no other
evil than that produced by transient estrange-
ment of good will in those against whom We
have been by force of evidence compelled to
decide 1t has thus made known to the world
that the uniform policy and practice of the
United States is to avoid all interference
in disputes which merely relate to the internal
government of other nations, and eventu-
ally to recognize the authority of the pre-
vailing party without reference to our particular
interests and views or to the merits Of the orig
inal controversy, but on this, as on every other
occasion, safety is to be found in q rigid adher-
ence to principle.
I'm the contest between Spain and the revolt
ed colonies we stood aloof and waited not only
until the ability Of the new states to protect
themselves was fully established but until the
danger of their being again subjugated had en-
tfrely passed away. Then, and not until then.
were they recognized. Such was our course in
regard to Mexico herself.
Andrew jackson on Texas.
1T is true that with regard to Texas the civil
authority OF Mexico has been expelled, it's In
vading army defeated. the chief Of the republic
himself captured and all present power to con-
sole the newly organized government of to-
days annihilated within it's confines. But, on
the other hand, there is in appearance at least.
an immense disparity OF physical force on the
side of Texas The Mexican republic undsr
another executive is rallving it forces under a
leader MANAGING fresh
recover its lost domain.
Upon the issue of this threatening invasion,
the independence Of Texas may be considered
as suspended. and were there nothing peculiar
in the situation of the United States and Texas.
our Acknowledgement of it's independence ut
such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as
consistent with that prudent reserve with
which we have hitherto held ourselves bound
to treat all similar questions"
Thereupon Andrew jackson proceeded to con-
slider the risk that there might be imputed to
the United States motives OF selfish interests
in view Of the former claim on our part of the
territory of Texas and of the avowed purpose
Of the Texans in seeking recognition Of inde-
pendence as an incident to the Incorporation OF
Texas in the union. concluding thus:
prudence. therefore, seems to dictate
that we should still stand aloot
and maintain our present attitude, II
not until Mexico itself. or one of the great for
eign powers shall recognize the independence
of the new government, at least until the lapse
Of time or the course Of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute tn, ability OF
the people of that country to maintain their
separate sovereignty and to uphold the govern
ment constituted by them. Neither Of the con-
tending parties can justly complain of this
course. By pursuing it, we are but carrying
out the long-eStablished policy Of our govern
ment. policy which has secured respect and
influence abroad and inspired confidence at
home"
These are the words of the resolute and
patriotic Jackson They are evidence that the
United States, in addition to the test imposed
by public law as the condition OF the recogni-
ton of independence by a neutral state (to-wit t,
that the revolted state shall constitute in fact
body polite. having a government in sub
stance as well as in name possessed of the ele-
mentS of stability and forming de factO, III
left to ITSELF state among the nations, rea-
soEably capable of discharging the duties of a
state'0. there was at the time no bona tide con-
test going on between the insurgent province
and its former sovereign
I said in my message Of December last: 1T
Is to be seriously considered whether the Gu
ban instruction possesses beyond dispute the
attributes OF statehood. which alone can de-
mand the recognition Of belligerency in its
favor" The same requirement must certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence is in
question, for no less positive test can be ap-
piled to the greater act than to the lesser.
while on the other hand the influences and
consequences of the struggle upon the internal
policy OF the recognizing state. which form i'm
portant factors when the recognition of bellig-
erency is concerned, are secondary, if not
rightly eliminable factors when the real Ques-
ton is whether the community claiming recog-
milton is or is not Independent beyond perad
venture
Averse to Recognition.
int nf
think it would be wise or prudent for this gov
eminent to recognize at the present time the