Santa Fe new Mexican. [volume] (Santa Fe, N.M.) 1898-1951, 1898-12-05

~ convinced That they were. That night
the squadron lay off about three miles,
keeping a sharp lookout, with the Du-
pont p~atrolling inside, About midnight
three bright fires, clearly signal fires,
, blazed up in a row on a hilltop to the
westward, Nobody knew what they
were 1t was the general opinion that
they were Spanish signals, Perhaps,
said some, the Spanish fleet was hourly
expected at C%ienfuegos, and the fires
were signals to warn it of the presence
of our ships. A few thought they might
be signals from the insurgents to us.
This may seem a trivial matter, but
really it was of the highest importance.
Had we known what those signals
were, a shall appear hereafter, Cervera
would have been discovered two days
earlier than he was and much trouble
would have been spared to Schley and
in fact the whole nation,
Monday, May 23.-The squadron lay
with engines stopped off Cienfuegos, ap-
parently waiting for something to turn
up, 1t should be remembered, however,
that Schley's instructions were to main
tain a close blockade, and we had no
definite knowledge that the Spaniards
were not there. The collier Merrimac,
all unconscious of the glory awaiting
her, the gunboat Castine and the dis
patch boat Hawk joined the squadron
that morning The Hawk reported to
Schley that she had heard Cervera chad
been at Santiago" Schley argued that
the S%paniards had left there and gained
Cienfuegos before we arrived. At noon
the British steamship Idula came in
sight and headed boldly for the harbor
A shot from the Castine across her bows
brought her up with a round turn Her
captain went aboard the Brooklyn and
told Schley he wanted to go into Glen
fuegos to bring out British refugees,
Sohley thought he saw a chance to learn
definitely whether or not Cervera was
there, and permitted the Idula to go in.
The Idula's captain promised to come
out not later than the next morning,
but the ldula never came out-at least
not until we had all got safely away
The Idula's captain also gave Schley
some Information, which came out
later and which still further confirmed
Schley in his mistaken belief that the
Spanish ships were at ~Cienfuegos. This
information" was a lie pure and SIM
pie. He told Schley that Cervera had
left Santiago on Friday AS Cervera's
ultimate destination was known to be,
and, in fact, was, Cienfuegos, it was
reasonable to suppose, believing this
lime juicer captain, that the Spaniards
had reached that port before we got
there. Late in the afternoon Schley
made this signal to his ships;
reports from Jamaica say Spanish
feet left Santiago Friday | believe it
is in Cienfuegos. heard heavy firing
Saturday evening, which | interpret
as a welcome to Cervera's fleet.
Nobody on the Texas had heard this
"heavy firing, and SO far as I learned
nobody else on the feet heard it, but
Commodore Schley was so persistent in
his belief that he had caught Cervera
that he almost persuaded himself that
he had seen the Spanish ships.
Tuesday. May 24.-The squadron
maintained it's position, in column,
open order, three miles off Cienfuegos.
At 6 :O5 o'clock that morning the Mar
blehead, Eagle and Vixen arrived. At
8 o'clock Commander McCalla of the
M%arblehead went aboard the Brooklyn
and gave Schley provisional orders from
Sampson to go to Santiago. This is an
important point for the friends of Ad-
miral Schley. 1t is charged that Schley
delayed an unnecessarily long time after
receiving these orders. Some writers
seem to think he got them on May %.
He got them, as said, at $3.50 a. m. on
May "a. To 60 back to the Washington
and Sampson end of the story, on May
20, the day after Cervera entered San
tiago harbor, an unconfirmed rumor to
that effect reached the navy depart
ment. The department sent this mes
sage to Sampson at Key West:
The report of the Spanish fleet being at San.
tiago de Cuba might very we'll be correct, SO
the department stongly advises that you send
Immediately by the Iowa to Schley to proceed
O1 u OAp W Y llo "ilolOC nina
leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos, and
meanwhile the department will send the Min
n~eapolis, now at st. Thomas. Auxiliary No
46l will proceed at once off Santiago to join
schley, who should keep up communication
via Mole, Haiti, or Cape Haitian, Haiti. If the
Iowa has gone, send order to Schley by the
fastest dispatch vessel.
The Iowa having already gone to join
Schley, Sampson sent the Marblehead
to him with these instructions:
Spanish squadron probably at Santiago
de Cuba-four ships and three torpedo boat
destroyers If you are satisfied they are not
at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dispatch, but
cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and If the
enemy is there blockade him in port. You
will probably find 1t necessary to establish
communication with some of the inhabitants
fishermen or others-to learn definitely that
the ships are in port, it being impossible to
zee into it from the outside.
1t will be noted that these instruc-
tions say IF you ara satisfied they are
not at Cienfuegos," 60 to Santiago.
This was just what Sohley was not
satisfied. He was satisfied to the con-
trary, in fact. just here comes in the
significance Of the signal fires previous.
'ly mentioned. Schley, in conversation
with McCalla, after having received
Sampson's orders on the morning Of
May "a, alluded to these signals.
why, they are prearranged signals
with the insurgents, " exclaimed Nc.
Gala. They were to show three horses
by day and three fires by night on the
hilltop as a signal that they want to
communicate with the American ships"
why didn't know about it?" said
Schley. /
II don't know" replied McOalla
briefly, ''but I'll go and see what they
want"
And he did,. Sohley meanwhile wait.
ing results. At 8:4O o'clock McCalla