The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-16

Exclusive of the portion of the Spanish
army which surrendered at Santiago, the
lowest estimate of the number of Spanish
troops in Cuba is $1,000 In addition, volun-
teers in the Spanish army who are Cubans
are estimated at from 20 900 to 90, 900. At the
lowest calculation the Spanish army in
Cuba was 100000 strong the day that the
protocol for peace was signed. The larger
part of this army is in the vicinity of Ha-
vana, covered by Notifications which as
complete as engin ee.ing and labor can make
them.
Every day the country reads the details
of the nalarial fevers which FRUSTRATED tie
army of General Shafter after it ha! dis
played the highest Courage and endurance
while capturing Santiago. That army, en-
bracing less than $4,000 men, was able to
compel about half that number to re1der
after the most courageous fighting. To-day
the country knows how much it cost in
heroism, endurance and suffering to capture
Santiago and its garrison Suppose the
President and the generals who were his
advisers had yielded to the clanor of 'en
to Havana, which was so general for Il
month before the Santiago expedition saile d,
based upon the stories of yellow newspa-
pers that the Spanish army would not fight.
that the insurgents numbered thousands
and the Spanards were not half as numer-
Gus they are--what would have followed
At that time the President might have
caused $4,000 or $4,000 men, largely unsea-
soned and undrflled volunteers, to have been
landed in the vicinity of HAVANA much
more pestilential locality than Santiago in
the torrid and wet season. Does any rea-
sonable man now believe that such an army
could have forced the surrender of Havana,
defended by $1,000 seasoned men behind the
most formidable intrenchments? 1t is not
possible. The valor of $4,000 or $4,000 men
could not have awaited against equal
army behind Notifications. We might have
laid siege to the city. which would have
meant that the army would have been kept
in lines of works through the rainy season
in front of Havana. From what has oc-
Cured at Santiago with a captured town, it
is easy to form some estimate of the calam-
ity which would have fallen upon large
army besieging Havana. BY thousands, in
stead of hundreds men would have been
Frustrated with fevers, and either the siege
would have been raised to take the victims
home or new men would have been taken to
Havana by thousands to take the place of
the dead dying and broken with disease,
who in turn would have become the victims
of the hostile climate. 1t is not too much to
say that all the troops under the first call
would have been disabled in an attempt to
capture the strongly defended city of Ha-
vana, making new levies necessary for the
taking of the town on the return of favora-
BILE weather.
To some extent the expedition against
Santiago satisfied the quite general demand
for active operations in Cuba, so that the
howl, ION to Havana" died away. 1t is not
pleasant now to contemplate that, in spite
of the judgment of all the general officers,
there was, during May and large part of
June, an impatient and unreasoning demand
that Havana be taken, in which many
thousand patriotic citizens Joined, and that
President Mckinley very near becom-
ing an unpopular executive because he re-
sisted demand which, if he had yielded to
it, would have resulted in the useless sac
rifice of thousands of lives and the wastirg
by disease of large army. We ought to
learn most useful lesson from this chapter
of recent history.