Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-01-22

an individual independence that would be
1nconceivable in any other army If "Te-
cumseh" Sherman had begun a campaign
under the same circumstances that Gen.
Rlanco did, his first act would probably
have been to hang three or four generals
of division and at least half a dozen briga-
diers for insubordination. The trouble is
not peculiar to Blanco. WeyIer, In spite of
bis despotism. had to struggle with it.
WI enever Spanish general thinks he is
not fully appreciated or falls ont with his
superior officers he goes home to the penin-
sIla. Usually it is on the plea of i'll health
Last spring Gen. Suarez Inclan, who had
Won his laurels in fairly successful cam
palgn against the insurgents, grew dis
satisfied with Weyler's course toward him
and went back. The captain general did
not have influence enough to retain him.
Within fortnight Gen. Segura has re-
turned to Spain. He was probably the
ablest commander in the field, but he had
difference Of opinion with Gen. Panco
and he left. Most of the commanders.
however, stay to fight out their contro-
versies. Often their insubordination takes
the form of passive -disobedience. By this
means they have nullified Gen. Blanco's
military and civil policy. They believed in
Weyler's methods of warfare In the little
campaigning that has been done they have
practlced those methods. They had no faith
In the political system of autonomy So far
as came within their authority they made
their lack Of faith felt
The Recent Riot.
The elimination of the army's hostility
10 autonomy came in the riot which is
shaking the foundation of the monarchy
MI oictx
army and scme of its officers; therefore
the officers formed themselves into a mob
of lawbreakers and wrecked the newspaper
offices. This only tells half the story. The
desperate condition of Spain's authority in
Cuba has to be understood to appreciate
the depth of the offense from the military
point of view. Elsewhere there would have
peen summary court-martials, possibly
some death sentences, assuredIv q largo
number of officers cashiered and dismissed
In disgrace. But SPANS control permits
no such vin6ioation OF military discipline.
Two hundred officers are known to have
been in the movement either actively or
passively. 1t is said that nearly a hundred
actually took part in the rioting A dozen
arrests were made, but they did not hold.
Ii one officer is punished, all who were
Implicated will demand that they, too. be
punlshed. Neither Blanco nor Sapasta
oares meet this menace. Instead stringent
laws are made to protect the offenders
from criticism. The army is disaffected.
its pay Is In arrears. 1t must be petted,
nattered and cajoled, anything rather than
De made to feel that 1t Is the servant and
not the master of the government. In
Cuba 1t responds by quickly supplantfnx
the civil authority,
How Tar the army will be satisfied with
the concessions made to 1t remains to be
determined. Probably 1t will not openlv
antagonize the government, vet some
things will have to be changed. Much
dissatisfaction Is felt over the monev
spent IN "persuading' the insurgents to
lay down their arms. The most insienifi-
himself with a dozen followers has receiv.
ed MS reward, sometimes in centens or
20 goid pieces, sometimes In silver coins
t tnese presentations OF insurgents have not
Deen numerous enough to make a deep
hole In the Spanish treasury. but they
nave been q source Of deep irritation to
the army. The complaint has been bitter,
and the cause of the complaint must STOP
The pretense OF providing for the recon.
centradoes was abandoned before 1t gave
rise to friction. The commander in the
Matanzas district who took the money sent
him by the government, and instead Of us
Ing 1t for the reconcentradoes bought
shoes for his soldiers, reflected the feelings
OF other commanders. They would have
done the same had the chance been af-
forded them.
The Dominating Political Power.
AS to autonomy 1t Is probable that the
army will be content with the demonstra-
ton already made against that policy and
will not openly demand its reversal The
rebellious officers can let the agitation to
that end go forward in Spain with the
moral support which their attitude gives
It, Gen. Blanco knows that the army of
which he Is nominally commander-in- chief