Barre evening enterprise. (Barre, Vt.) 1898-1898, 1898-05-07
GIVE CUBANS ARMS.
tHrsE ARE WHAT GENERAL GOMEZ
NEEDS, SAYS SYLVESTER scovEL

Navy Troops to Cuba-Our fleet hld,ny
ma the Interior Cut OF, cpain's rov,,
WIN Boon End.
No volunteer troops ara needed in
Cuba, and very few regulars will be
sufficient. 1t would DO criminal to send
80, 900 American soldiers over the gulf
stream. Not because of epidemic dis.
ease There is no such a thing in the
country In Cuba. Not because of loss
of life In great engagements. There Is
no necessity in having them.
Enable Gomez and Garcia to equip
tho Cubans for war, and they will make
1t hard and strong. Give them good
rifles. They know how to use them.
Men who for three years luvo each had
an average Of ten cartridges in their
boxes, and none to follow, have learned
not to waste them.
The exact military situation in Cuba
today is Just the condition for Gomez
to utilize If armed and supplied. He
has at the lowest estimate 80, 900 men
who have handled arms and are accus.
toned to Spanish fire. The enthusiastic
Cuban junta probably claims 100. 600.
The truthful Gomez put 1t last January
at IS, 900. There are undoubtedly $780,
600 in Cuba available for armament.
But the estimate of 80, 600 men now
ready for business only Includes Cuban
soldiers, neither employees of the civil
government organizations nor "rauch-
eros. The fathers and the supporters Of
families living in the woods having
failed to obey Weylor's RECOMMENDATION
baudo are included. They, however,
would bo most useful as they now arc
as scouts, and many would undoubtedly
Join the regular forces. Fully armed,
equipped and supplied, Gomez and Gar.
cha can with little physical assistance
clear the island Of Spanish bases for
Spanish food and Of themselves compel
the quick surrender of all the Spanish
forces outside of Havana, Matanzns and
Cienfuegos These ports and their cor
rallied forces can be starved or taken at
Sampson will.
This statement that go. 900 Cubans
can easily destroy all but three Spanish
bases and capture three-fourths Of the
Spanish troops may appear absurd to
our military authorities. 1t would be
absurd if not based upon what may be
called absurd military conditions And
that is the term for Spanish strength
outside Of the cities mentioned. Take
map Of Cuba and note the fact that all
Spanish supplies come first to Havana
That is Cuba's military heart, The far
ther away from that tho weaker is each
Spanish post in food and munitions.
And they are absurdly weak at their
best. Eek. Minister Canalejas admitted
last November that the Spanish troops
were starving. There never was sur
plus in any base except tho three mon-
toned. There is less now. There will
be nothing soon. This means death to
Cuban oncombatants-our proteges-
as we'll as to Spanish military move
ments, and the island should be taken
quickly. This is what Gomez can do.
Ask him what he wants, then send &C.
mez what he wants and where be wants
ii, and at once.
The eoast is ours. This island is like
ribbon and with easy deep approaches
10 all necessary parts Of its coast line.
Our transports could start simultane-
ously for all insurgent bodies. Before
the ships can DO started each leader tc
bo supplied can DO given by Gomez OIL
eial instructions and brought to the
point ef disem barkation and unloading
Knowing that cartridges in plenty are
soon and surely to come, Gomez can
use what ammunition he has In tho to-
tai disablement Of every railroad IN
Cuba. There il now no Spanish water
transportation, and with the railroads
gone the poorly supplied Spanish bases
would bo absolutely isolated.
Eastern Cuba need not be considered.
Spain Is weakest there. Garcia has per
hnps $4,000 men. As soon as supplied
Garcia could desert eastern Cuba and
march, as only Cubans can march. due
west His is tho best disciplined consid-
erabie forre in Cuba. Garcia would need
four companies of United States caval-
ry. Our infantry could not wisely at
tempt 10 keep up with hardened Cuban
foot soldiers. fhave seen these march
40 miles a day for seven days, and on
almost nothing but sugar cane for food
No artillery would seem necessary te
this eastern chief One transport land
ing at a roint on the south coast near
est Garcia would equip him. One gov
eminent tug or torpedo boat could keeI
abreast Of bis position and maintain
communication between Garcia and 90
mez and the United States governments
Gomez could march at once, III
might have rs pieces, one troop OF cav
airy and one regiment Of regular IN
fantry from the states. What are callet
forts in Cuba are square holes in tn
ground with wooden covers. Mono ha
artillery. A few are small masonry
euardhouses The average garrison II
,bout 80 men. There are none of thes'
which cannot be quickly reduced by
50 inch fieldpieoe. and no town has owe
donen Of them.
Arms and munitions can he easil.
LANDED within 40 miles Of Gomez's pres
emit position. He will need little forag
while crossing Santa Clara province
There is excellent grazing there. Ma
tannas has remaining much sugar can
also. Gomez could take Sancti Spirltus
Santa Clara and every smaller town Oh
his line of march without much inter
fering with his progress, and Garcia
marching light could catch him in tw
weeks near Matanzas. II quicker juno
ton were desired, Garcia's men coul
be put aboard transports and lance
4