The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-10-24
nest being at Santiago. They are In
part. as follows;
InstructIous 10 sohIsy.


sIR.-spanish squadron probably at
Santiago de cuba-four ships and three
torpedo boat destroyera II you are
satlshed that they are not at clenfue-
gos, proceed with all dispatch, but eau
tiouslV, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the
enemy is there. blockade him in port.
You win probably ind It necessary to
establish communication with some Of
the Observation-Disclosures or others
to learn definitely that the ships are in
port. 1t being impossible to see into II
from the outside"
The Admiral said he felt much con-
cerned as to the delivery of these orders
and sent duplicate by the Hawk with
en- additional memorandum. The admir-
al suggested that If the information did
not reach Commodore schley before
daylight Of May %, to mask the real
direction he should take as much az
possible He adds: Follow the Spanish
squadron whichever direction theE
take"
The admiral of Havana gives copies
of orders OF battle which were to be
followed in the event that CerVera left
Santiago on the approach OF Schley's
feet from Clenfuegos and attempted to
cruise around the coast to Havana, in
which case the Havana squadron would
attempt to intercept him by going east
about 200 miles beyond the junction Of
Santaren and Nicholas channels. Strict
orders were given for screening lights
and to see that none were accidentally
shown. The squadron was to cruise
generally to the eastward in the day and
westward during the night. In one OF
his dispatches the Admiral complains
that his movements are greatly ham
pered by monitors constituting the
principal force under his command. On
May 49,, as shown by the report Com-
modore Schley expressed the belief that
the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On
the 9th, the admiral sent word to
schley, directing him to proceed with
an possible speed to Santiago because
Of information received that the Span
Iards were there. The same time orders
were sent to have the collier Sterling
dispatched to Santiago with an express
sion of opinion that the commodore
should use It to obstruct the channel at
its narrowest part leading into the
harbor. The details OF the plan were
left to the comTnodore's judgment, as he
(Sampson) had "the utmost confidence
in his ability to carry this plan to a
successful conclusion and earnestly
wish him good luck" Sampson appar-
emily felt certain OF the presence OF the
Spanlards at Santiago and urged that
the harbor must be blockaded at all
hazards. Schley in the meantime had
proceeded to Santiago, although It APP
pears not the same day Admiral SRmp-
son expected. At one time Commodore
SchleY contemplated going TO Key West
with the squadron for coal, but this was
abandoned, the repairs to his collier
having been temporarily repaired and
the necessity for a trip to Key West
being avoided, Santiago was being
blockaded. The admiral congratulated
the commodore on his success and de
tected Nm to nafntain q close block
ade at all hazards. especially at night.
Then follows kilograms from Schley
showing that he had recognized the
enemy in the port and from Secretary
Long to Schley, pointing out that the
most absolutely urgent thing was to
know positively whether the Spanish
division was IN the harbor. II they
WETHt I'll AlAAIHEAA1NG 1AAAAI
movement was to be made. In one dis"
patch the secretary said It would be
discredltable to the navy II the pres
ence OF the Spanish fleet were not as
Immediately. The commo-
dore's dispatch evidently had not been
received at the department when the
kilograms were sent. Mean
while Admiral Sampson had made ar
to proceed to Santiago with
n number OF his vessels. He arrived
there June /.
Then follows historical resume OF
the dolngs OF the feet while of Santi-
ago. of the bombardment Of the forts,
of the taking OF the lower bay at Guam
tannmo bV the Marblehead and the
Yankee, copies OF memorandum re-
gardlnE methods OF blockades, tele-
grams bearing on the proposed army
to Santiago. etc, practically
nll OF which Is told In official kilograms,
on June s, the admiral urged upon the
as he had previously done,
to expedite the arrival Of the troops Tor
the difficulty OF blockading
the Spanish ships daily increasing. On
June 10, dispatch was received snow
ing that the army expedition was tenn
porarlIy stopped because OF the report
ed observation of additional spanish
vessels in American waters. In nem-
orandum dated June IS. the. admiral
says: ,
again TO call the attention Of command
ing officers to the positions occupied by
tho blockading leet. especially during
the day time. and II Is now directed
that ali ships keep within a distance of
the entrance to Santiago Of four miles,
and this distance must not be exceeded.
'If the vessel IS coaling or Is other
wise restricted In her movements, she
must nevertheless keep within this dis
lance. II at any time the flagship
makes a signal which Is not visible to
any vessel. such vessel must at once
approach the flagship or repeating ves-
sci to a point where she can read the
signal ,., ..,.,
have already been given on this head,
has led TO endless confusion. Many
times during the day the feet Is so
scattered that It would be perfectly
posslble for the enemy to come out OF
the harbor and meet with very little
opposition. a..
strict attention VIII be given this Or
watching Santiago HArbor.
The admiral rcproduces the order Of
battle Incidental to the landing of Shat
TORS nrmv corps June %, when ships
were sent to she'll the beach and cover
Tho landing OF the men, In this order
the following occurs; n..
"The attention OF commanding officers
n, nil vessels engaged In blockadinS
Santiago dc Cuba is earnestly called to
the necessity OK the utmost vigilance
-, ,i,Is tit,,e forward, both as to