Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1898-05-28
Uncle Sans Prompt and Vigor-
Gus Measures For Making the
Stirring Slogan a Reality.

/ sist the approach of the hated Gringo.
Clenfuegos, leo miles 20 tho southeast
! of Havana, on the southern shore. IS
/ the only place OF Importance from a
/ strategic view besides Santiago de
/ Cuba, the latter the strongest fortified
I port on the island. 500 miles away near
/ ly In the southeast corner OF Cuba, that
| needs any particular attention from
our fleets. Other towns on the south
ern coast ike Trinidad and Man2a-
milo. are ineifecttvely guarded against
! Is minute bombardment and the IN
terror towns OF santa Clara. Puerto
Principe. Santa Catalina, Cubitas and
others are only deserving OF mention
from their geographical significance as
centers of population and trade. They
have virtually been surrounded by the
insurgents for the past year or more,
and, though there would possibly be
some bloody fighting In occupying them
with victorious force and few dozen
or few hundred even might be killed
on either or both sides. there could not
be any conflict in connection with the
capture or capitulatinn OF these towns
that would rise to the dignity of bat
tie. II is quite probable that the Cuban
insurgents, increased in numbers and
with adequate supplies. will crush out
by unaided effort all the Spanish troops
at the eastern half OF the island. No
serried ranks will march against
strongly intrenched foe. Between the
Spaniards and the insurgents there will
be more guerrilla warfare than any
thing else, while the Americans will
march on steadily, as they did through
Mexico in 1si7
Making due allowance for personal
bravery. the Spaniards and those Gu
bans forming the guarda civlles in the
ranks of the royal army cannot COM
pete for any extended time with the
superior drill, craftsmanship. valor.
strength, force and prestige of the
American soldier. They have n strong
ally In their climate, but 1t cannot I'M
der the worst circumstances prove more
disastrous to us than 1t has to the
peasant youths and citizen soldiery of
Spain-in fact, less So for our medical
commissariat is better prepared to re-
/ sist the attacks of such an insidious foe
as yellow fever or its constant COM
panions, dysentery and miasmatic fe-
| vers of more or less virulence. Our hos
pital management is superior. and the
entire scope of the pharmacop9ia is ut
our disposal. Nothing is lacking. We
and every private has in his kit the
| ordinary means of prevention.
The subjugation OF the Spanish force
in Cuba is really not serious matter.
AS an army their number is ridiculously
small in comparison with the hosts we
can send. It is Ill equipped, lacking In
| many essentials Of the disciplined SOL
| der and not foeman worthy of our
! steel though in the devising of treach-
erous attacks and in the commission of
such crimes as transformations, poisoning
wells and communicating contagious
diseases by various means they are not
equaled.
The destruction of the coast defenses
at Havana, Matanzas. Cardenas, Glen
| fuegos and Santiago de Cuba places the
island at the mercy of the invader. That
Is the story in epltome.
What follows after the conquest? The
island would be in charge of a military
governor. some major general proba-
| bly,, deputized for that special purpose
by the president and confirmed In his
position by congress. who would for n
brief time at least keep the island I'M
der martial law. A provisional govern
ment would then be Instituted under
his orders, and the people OF Cuba would