Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-03-17
lcUBA AND INTERVENTION
how the Subject is Treated By Theodore s,
Wosisey.
Yale's Professor of international Law
Reviewsfhei Situation at
soiRe length.

/
week, written by Theodore s. Woolsey,
professor Of international law in Yale Uni
versity. The article has been favorabIy
cen mented Ipona by high government Of
nc,ais, as indicating the considerations
"hicn VIII properly have weight in deter
mining the action of the administration
upon the Intervention and indemnity ques
| tons.
The Maine explosion does not necessarily
bring the relations between Spain and the
Oplted. States to a crisis; but 1t certainly
does not make them more friendly The old
difficulty remains with the added knowl-
edge that the report of the board of in
curry as to the loss of our ship may be
DEFINITE enough to force the government s
mana. There is. too, a fast growing belief
tnat the administration is at or near the
intervention point. This belief is not found
ed upon any definite official statement; it
is, rather the result Of a study of the prep
araaons Tor war now making on both sides,
anu Oh conviction that 1t is the logical
consequence of the situation There Is, too
mat subtle, unressoning premonition of
future events which, when widely shared
iI.sures their fulfillment, not as the result
Oh VoHtion, but of impellTyg fate. Let US
prieny review the situation, to determine If
intervention is a justifiable course.
mere mas been an instruction in Cuba,
which for three troubled years has disturb
eraDie expense and with good success, our
government has prevented the dispatching
OF armed expeditions against the Spanish
power IN Cuba. The revenue cutters and
also the ships of the navy have been used
III this guard duty. Many detentions and
arrests, several trials and a few conyic-
tions testify to the fidelity of the United
states IN this respect Military supplies for
the cuban insurgents have been sent out
from our ports, but that Is a lawful traffic.
Inc burden OF preventing it belongs to the
spanish authorities in Cuba. Those au-
tforfties, inefficient in the discharge of
their own duties, have necessarily COM
piained OF our negligence. They appear to
nave completely failed to appreciate our
a III. IN preserving our neutrality. I
better one, though there is no neutrality,
technically speaking, wher there is no rec
ognized war. Spain also has our govern
ment to thank that no recognition of bel
ligerency has been accorded. This would
have been a lawful step, though in my
OPT ion an impolitic one for our own inter
ests A recognition of Cuban independence
would not have been lawful at any time
during these three years, except as a de-
Hberate war measure.
1t Is, then, my conviction that this coun-
try has not failed in it's duty to Spain,
though the performance of that duty has
not been easy. state will preserve its
neutrality in war at all costs and as
matter of course. But 1T is a fair ques-
ton whether, in case Of insurgency, in
oenn1teiy prolonged, the same state is
bound to the same duties.
There is another factor in determining
cur position toward Spain which is impor-
tant. Our very considerable trade with
Cuba has been reduced to a fraction of it's
former volume. Many millions of the prop
erty of cur citizens, in sugar and tobacco,
have been destroyed by both Spanish and
Cuban soldiers. For adj CT this loss, in de-
fault Of recognition of Cuban belliger-
ency, Spain is legally responsible. Yet, who
lnlayineS that SllFh losses he cO1lecfa52
We see our proDerty burned, our trade cut
off, our commercial intercourse hampered
in variety of veaa1ieus ways. yet with no
end In sight. In President Grants time we
bore with similar state of things for
eight years. Are we'ealied upon to suffer
such losses. to make such sacrifices for UNI
appreciative Spain, Indefinitely?
And, thirdly, there is the argument based
upon the claims of humanity. So long as
the rules Of civilized warfare were observed,
so long, that Isl; as the no1-combata pop
Clation was not fnterfered with, there was
little choice between the two parties Oc-
casional atrocities might be committed by
either side, but neither side was so con-
SriclOus sinner as to warrant outside in
reference. The Cubans at least held their
own. But there came a change of policy.
The .non-com blatant country population was
forced to settle within range of the guns of
the Spanish, irtrenched in the towns, and
there destitute of food or of the means of
growing or getting food, it starved.
A report of our consuls upon the condi-
ton of these people is soon to be made
public, which very possibly may strengthen
this argument. AS y nation we have no
special racial or religious sympathy with
the native Cuban population. But it would
be inconsistent with the spirit of our age
and with the character of our civilization
If we showed no horror at such a measure
oe coercion; no desire in some way to re-
lieve such suffering. Can any relief be eff
fective which does not remove the cause?
These are the three justifying reasons.
I, {y,fn f3Oy1 f<,,r%
national action. to heal this open sore; the
burden of neutrality; the dictates of our
commercial interests: the call of human
ity. Any one of these is strong; together
they are very nearly convincing. And If
our government should act supon them, l
believe the opinion of jur.sts would incline
to be that such action was warranted.
Ttis at least, was the conviction of the
present administration curly in the year.
Because Of it's remonstrances and wishes,
there was made change of Spanish policy
in Cuba. Weyler was recalled, trade was
made freer, ard a system of autonomous
government for the island was Sc. up.
So far as its effect upon the insurrection
goes this change of policy has been futile.
Whether the condition of the non-com-
blatant population has been bettered is an
open question which our consuls must an
swer. But 1t is clear that the trouble re-
mains; that the real question is not ma
terially altered And repeat the opinion.
that some form of Intervention by our gov
justifiable.
Yet 1t does not follow that, because legal,
1t would be good policy. The two are quite
distinct, to be argued on different lines.
Here are some of the considerations bear
ing upon the question of policy in such in
PREVENTION. Shall It be immediate. or should
another delay be allowed to test the scheme
of autonomy?
Shall 1t threaten armed enforcement of
It's terms, or be diplomatic?
Is it likely to be resisted by Spain AMI to
lead to war?
Are we prepared 10 carry on war cred
itably, even with SO weak a power as
Spain? s.
Would the damage to our trade through
war be balanced by the future gain of
getting rid of this Cuban incubus?
Would not the. expenses of a war be
heavy and offeEt u dangerous temptation
to the issue Of paper money?
II war were Successful, would 1t not be
likely to result In thG annexation of Cuba?
Would not Instrumentation of Cuba be a
serious strain upon our institutions and
methods of government?
Is there no way Of uniting other powers
with our own Inc seealrif the pacifcation
of Cuba? sei 3n
On the other hAnd,js Spain likely to lind
allies in ease Of war with the United