The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1898-03-16
WAR WITH SPAIN.
Plain Facts That Would Shape It's Course
and Results.
Nea0 York SIN.

in that ease has only to blockade the
seaports of Cuba to starve out the
whole Spanish army, and that without
landing single man on the island.
The Spaniards will simply be COM
PEELED to surrender because Of the
lack Of food.
To prevent the possibility that they
might make desperate effort inland
to overpower the insurgents and get
their vegetables and other provisions,
something might be done easily,
quickly and at once. There are many
seaports Of some importance in Cuba
absolutely defenseless from the sea-
side. Cardenas, for instance, in the
province Of Mantanzas, on the north
ern coast, is one of them. Cardenas
was taken in 1849 by the insurgent
Nareiso Lopez with a handful of
Americans on board small merchant
vessel. Since then no fort capable Of
resisisting cannon shot has been
built there. The Americans can hold
Cardenas and from there communicate
with the insurgents in the country.
In short time the whole Cuban army
may be we'll armed by them and Sc
cure some cannon to attack the inland
towns. IF without such munitions
and with the immense risk and diff
Guilty they incur in securing scanty
supplies from the feeble flibustering
expeditions they not only hold their
own against Spain, but actually i'm
prison the Spaniards in their forts and
cities 1t is obvious that possessing war
appliances which will place them in
this respect on the same footing as
the Spaniards themselves, they will
exterminate all the Spanish columns
daring to leave their fortified places
and eventually invest them in the
principal cities.
With a single dynamite gun of
small calibre, and with the three or
four thousand rifles received by him
from several small expeditions sent
from the United States, Gen. Garcia
has driven the Spaniards from the
greater part Of the province Of Santi
ago de Cuba.
It is face, which even Spanish d.
plomacy will not dare to deny, that if,
instead Of hampering the Cubans in
the United States in their work Of
sending expeditions to their brethren;
if instead of prosecuting them in so
drastic manner as was done during
the administration of Mr. Cleveland;
if, instead of keeping, at an enormous
cost TO this country, the American
navy and police watching the Cuban
Junta and its agents, the Cubans
here had been unmolested, the possi-
bility which now confronts us Of an
international war would not exist.
The Cubans, with no more than 49,
600 men in the field, and with all the
edds against them, have proved in
three years that they are more than a
match for Spain. With regular and
ample supply Of war materials, they
can free their island without any
other help from abroad.
In war between Spain and the
United States it is beyond doubt that
the whole Cuban army would be on
the American side. There is no doubt
either, that we would give them all
the rifles, cartridges and cannon they
need. They would then take care Of
the land operations. We would only
need to blockade the Spaniards by the
sea and let them starve.
Of course, the Spaniards would
make an attempt with their navy to
break that blockade. The contest
would then only be naval one. But
with their capitol only eighty miles
from Key West, and sixty miles from
Dry Tortugas, which would probably
be the center of our naval operations,
is it reasonable to suppose that the
Spaniards ceuld relieve Habana either
by stealth or by force? In few days
the proud Spanish stronghold, with
its Cabana fortress and its Morro
Castle, With its mined bay and its
famous torpedoea, would be at eur
mercy, and not very much bleod
wodld be shed.