The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1898-12-02

We have been disposed to be as
charitable as posi- BILE, and 81 We the dead
captain of the Portland the benefit Of
every doubt, but the established facts of
the case force us 10 the conclusion that it
was his mistake. and his alone, that led
to the terrible catastrophe on the Cape
Cod shore. 1t makes no difference
whether Manager Liscomb's instructions
reached him in the form of q peremptory
order which he could not refuse to regard
without being guilty of culpaDle disobed1-
ence, or, as may ave been the case. in
the form of an admonition which he
could reasonably think left him some dis
erection, 1t was he and he alone who de-
cided to start the boat, for 1t is not pre-
tended by anybody that he was ordered to
60 or encouraged to go. How he happened
to make the terrible mistake he did will
never be known. In some way he became
impressed with the idea, perhaps, that
the storm was not going to be a very
severe one, or perhaps he thought that he
could keep ahead of it, or If it should
oyertake him that he could run into some
port and escape. But whatever he
thought, it is clear that he took chances
that he ought not to have taken, and that
he did SO entirely by his own volition.
Doubtless he never dreamed that he was
imperilling the lives of mis- passengers
and his own. For some reason he failed
to appreciate the danger. His Judgment
want I,uaccnr, Y,tablv astrav
i a% sf-
The report Of Admiral Sampfon which
has just been published by the navy de.
partment makes it clear that there was
some jealousy and .harijfeeling beteen the
commanders of the navy and the army
in the operations around Santiago Shat.
ter wanted Admiral Sampson to force an
entrance into the harbor and assist the
army to take the place Sampson was
willing to undertake it if Shafter would
attack the shore batteries on the land side
he pointed ont that to attempt to enter
the harbor would probably result in the
sinking Of one or more of his ships, and
that would SO obstruct the channel that no
ships could get in. 1t is not clear why
k1AHlbOI 0AA LOb nutaCh uuo cAOAO 6ssVtSa ! 20
as appears to have been the original plan.
After the fighting before Santiago he
again urged Sampson to force the harbor,
and he seems to have reluctantly agreed
to try, at the same time pointing out
that the experiment would be attended
with great risk and might turn out dis
astrously. The attempted escape OF Ger
yera's feet and its destruction SO changed
the situation that it became unnecessary
| to make the experiment. 1t looks to the
| impartial observer as IL the Admiral had
the best of this controversy. To have
attempted to force his ships through the
mines known to exist in the Santiago
channel would in all probability have
resulted in the destruction OF one or
more of them and the complete blocking
of the channel. and it was practically
| impossible to remove these mines while
the shure batteries were in possession of
the Spaniards. The attack and capture
OF the shore batteries by the army from
the rear was absolutely essential to
the successful forcing Of the harbors by
the navy. Gen Shaftsr for REASONS best
known to himself, though at first agree
| ing apparently to attack the shore bat
teries, afterward changed his mind and
Undertook to take the city by an assault
from the north and east; in which 1T
was practically impossible for the navy
to cooperate with much effect. A fter the
attack failed Gen. Shafter seems to have
undertaken to throw part Of the re-
sponsibility upon the navy, but In the
light of all the facts it looks as il Admiral
I Sampson did all that was possible under
the circumstances, and that the only
reason he did not do moro was because
Gen. Skaters plan of campaign pre-