The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-30
Els TOLD BY A SPANIARD
STORY OF THE BATTLES AND CAPT.
ULATION OF SANTIAGO.
Lieut.. Tejeiro's Account of Cervera's
tempt to Escape from Sampson.

| It's WdT series, lDlS Tune the BatIleS anu
Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, by Lieut..
lose Miller y Tejeiro. the second in COM
.nand of the naval forces of the province
of Santiago de Cuba" Captain Clover, the
chief of the intelligence bureau, explains
in an Introductory note that the writer was
an eyewitness of most OF the events that
he describes, and from his position had
cess to official information The style is Pc
culiarly interesting, free from bias and has
an air of authenticity, which will give the
book q place in history, though it is not
an official publication. The chief of the
bureau expresses regret that, owing to
limited force. the bureau was obliged to omit
a number of interesting chapters in the
translation.
The author began, according to his
statement, to keep exact diary of events
at Santiago from the moment of the ap-
pearance there of Cervera's fleet. realizing,
as he says, that the vessels were to have
a most powerful influence on the war. 1t is
impossible in limited space to give more
| than the merest outline The publication
begins with a chapter entitled THE Two
Fleets telling of the arrival of Cervera's
squadron on the 18th of May and of the dis
| appointment Of the people, who expected no
less than eight battle ships instead of five.
He makes comparison very carefully and
accurately of the vessels of the two squad
rons The lieutenant mentioned the fact
that provisions We're very short, also that
the military element of the province were
nine or ten months in arrears in the pay
ment of consignments, and had been living
on credit for some time. Every thing was
lacking, food, money, credit and purchas-
ing resources were exhausted. What hap
pened at Santiago was true of other places
in the islands. The merchants, instead of
contributing to- the welfare of the army,
hid whatever they had and raised prices.
The picture he draws of the conditions in
the besieged city is quite terrible. He
speaks Of the difficulties of coaling and
shows that the fleet was very badly sup
WHY THEY DID NOT FIGHT.
Concerning the opinions as to why the
fleet did not go out, he refers to the great
| joy caused by it's arrival and then says that
enemy TO sustain with superior forces the
| blockade with all it's difficulties ana dan-
| gers. 1t was not believed that the Amer
| lean ships would expose themselves to Sc
rious disaster or would force any one of the
| ports which were being blockaded. The
! Spanish ships did not have to give battle IN
order to obtain results, and says that if
| provisions had not been wanting in Sam
| tiago and the Spanish fleet had remained
there no one could tell to what extremes
| Impotence and despair might have carried
Admiral Sampson
| A diary of the blockade is given, telling
! what occurred in the way of bombardments
and losses to the Spaniards by the Amer
lean guns. The movements of the Amer
lean fleet was a puzzle to the Spaniards. as
they did not know why they remained on
watch all day and disappeared at night. But
It was supposed that the Americans were
| afraid of the destroyers. Speaking of the
Merrimac. he says that I'VE at Santiago
| have not succeeded in ascertaining definite
| ly-though it is probably known in Spain,
| from american newspapers, that are in the
| habit OF publishing rythng-what was
| the real object that the Merrimac had i'm
! view"
The arrival of the army created consid-
| cradle CONSERVATION in Santiago, and con-
| siderable speculation as to where the army
would land. Provisions were still running
| snort, and 1t Is stated that if III Caney and
| San Juan had not been taken the Spaniards
| would not have lost communication with the
cultivated region nor would the aqueduct
Lave been cut The small number of the
spanish FORCES made 1t impossible to save
| these positions. He speaks Of the destrucs-
| I've work of the Vesuvius whenever the
bombs fell upon any point where there were
| Speaking of the battles Of Ell Caney and
san Juan, he says the Americans, it must
| be acknowledged, fought with truly admir-
| able courage and spirit. While the battles
| were going on at Ell Caney and San Juan
the enemy sent forces against the whole
| haraSsing and making the attack more gem
1 eral. The casualties of the Spanish side are
| stated to be sixty officers and 53S men. He
claimed that only 500 men defended Ell
/ Caney for ten hours, and that 25O defended
San Juan for four hours.
| He speaks Of the lively bomba rdment by
/ sea and land the 20 of .JnlV and the SOPfia
| of the Spanish fleet on July B. He speaks
| Of the action of the Spanish admiral as one
/ time the Spaniards did not know whether
| the ships had succeeded in making their
escape but having been informed they had
O'Clock that the pilot came In and informed
| them that the Teresa, OqUendo and the
| destroyers had been lost The lieutenant
most of which is taken from persons who
| were saved from the Spanish ships. The
noted. The fire of the Spanish ships was
| said to have been SLOW while that of the
American ships was very brisk.
THE DISASTER FORETOLD.
In discussing the disaster, he says that
the loss Of the feet had been foretold by all
it's commanders, but public opinion in the
Island of Cuba required the presence of
the fleet in Cuban waters. The ships had
not been cleaned, were short of coal and
| i4Ok LA SOIO COuuAllOu W LSHls LIE meet
received definite orders from the captain
general of Cuba to leave Santiago in spite
Of Admiral Cerveras remonstrances. He
says: THE Spanish are proud of the dis
aSter of Trafalgar on account of the hero
| ism of the navy, but the battle of Santiago
is much more glorious The Mercedes was
sunk in the narrow part of the channel to
prevent the American fleet from entering
He then takes up the narrative of the con-
ditiOns in the city and what was done from
July 4 until the surrender, which includes
the bombardments on different days and
especially those of the 10th and 18th At the
time of the surrender there We're 200 sick
and wounded soldiers of the Spanish army
The total losses in all the attacks on Santi-
men killed, 107; officers wounded s.; men
wounded, $50; prisoners and missing Z Of
icers and 116 men.
He closes the account of the naval battle
of Santiago saying: Il have never been able
tc understand the reason why there 3, rs
sent to the Island of Cuba a fl set that was
in no manner able to cope with that of the
United States and which therefore, could in
no wise prevent the ships of the latter from
blockading our ports and controlling the
sea, but since it was sent and its arrival be-
ing able to prevent the loss of the island
which was lost, as experience has shown
from the very moment when war was ac-
cepted, owing to the conditions prevailing
there, then it should have been prevented
from being destroyed, as it was
without resulting in any advantage
whatever. The only way of gain
ing any advantage would have BEEN
in my opinion. taking advantage of the fact
that all the hostile ships were in Cuba, to
-