The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-03-08

a
or interstate commerce, such power is not
without limit; and that under pretense of
regulating fares and freights the State can
not require railroad corporation to carry
persons or property without reward, neither
can it DO that which in law amounts to the
taking OF private property for pubic use
without Just compensation, or without due
process of law"
Justice Harlan said that the following
principles must be regarded as settled:
First-A railroad CORPORATION is a person
within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment declaring that no State shall
deprive any person or property without due
process of law nor deny to any person with
IN its jurisdiction the equal protection OF
the laws.
Second-A State enactment or regulation
made under the authority of State enact
ment establishing such rates for the trans
portation of persons or property by any
railroad as will not admit OF the carrier
earning such compensation as under all the
circumstances is just to 1t ana TO the pup
lie would deprive such carrier OF its prop
erty without due process of law. and deny
to it to the equal protection of the laws, and
would therefore be repugnant to the four
teenth amendment of the Constitution OF
the United States.
Third-While rates for the transport ation
of persons and property within the limits
of a State are primarily for Its determine
ton the question whether they are so I'M
reasonably low as to deprive the carrier or
it's property without such compensation as
the Constitution secures, and therefore
without Que process of law, cannot be so
conclusively determined by the Legislature
of the State or by regulations adopted UNI
der it's authority that the matter may not
become the subject of judicial inquiry
Discussing the question as Ito what are
the considerations to which weight must be
given when we seek to ascertain the COM
pensation which a railroad company is en-
titled to receive, and prohibition upon the
receiving of which may be fairly deemed a
deprivation by legislative decree OF property
without due process of law, Justice Har-
Ian said Undoubtedly that question could
be more easily determined by commission
composed Of persons whose special skill,
observation and experience qualities them
to so handle great problems OF Transports
ton as to do justice to the public as wei
as to those whose money has been USED TO
construct and maintain highways for the
convenience and benefit of the people: But
despite the difficulties thai confessedly at
the court cannot shrink from the duty to de-
ternine whether it be true, as alleged, tnat
the Nebraska statute invades or destroys
rights secured by the supreme law OF the
land. No one, we take it, will contend
that a state enactment is in harmony WIN
that law simply because the Legislature or
the State has declared such to be the case,
for that would make the State Legislature
the final judge of the validity of its en-
United States and the laws made in pur-
suance thereof are the supreme law OF the
land, anything in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithsland-
ing. The idea that any legislature, state
or federal, can conclusively determine LOT
the people and for the 'cc~rts that what II
thorizes its agents to do, is consistent with
the fundamental law is in opposition 10
the theory OF our institutions, me auty
when their jurisdiction is properly, invoked
to see to it that no right secured by the
supreme law of the land is impaired or de-
stroyed by legislation"
1t had been contended on behalf of the
law that the State of Nebraska could !e-
gally require local freight business to be
conducted, even at an actual loss, II the
company earned on it's interstate business
enough to give it just compensation in re-
spect of it's entire line and all its business,
interstate and domestic. The court did not
accept this view, Justice Harlan saying:
I'VE cannot concur in this view. In our
judgment, ii must be held that the reason
abeness or unreasonableness of rates pre-
scrbed by State for the transportation
of persons and property wholly within its
limits must be determined without refer
ence to the business of an interstate char
acter done by the carrier, or to the profits
derived from that business. The state can
not justify unreasonably low rates for CO.
mestic transportation, considered alone,
upon the ground that the carrier is earning
large profits on its interstate business, over
which, so far as rates are concerned, the
State has no control. Nor can the carrier
justify unreasonably high rates on domestic
business upon the ground that only in that
way can it meet losses on its interstate
business. So far as rates of transportation
are concerned, domestic business should
not be made to bear the losses on interstate
business, nor the latter the losses on do
nestle business. 1t is only rates for the
transportation of persons and property be-
tween points within the State which the
State can prescribe, and when 1t under
takes to prescribe rates not to ,t be exceeded
exclusively to what is just and reasonable
between the carrier and the public in
respect of domestic business.
Referring to the arguments on the two
sides of the case as to what are reasonable
charges, ETC.. the opinion laid down the
following: I'VE hold that the basis of all
calculations as to the reasonableness of
rates to be charged by corporation main
tanning highway under legislative sane
ton must be the fair value of the property
being used by 1t for the convenience of the
public. And in order to ascertain that
amount expended in permanent improve
ments, the amount and market value of its
bonds and stock, the present as compared
with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property
under the rates prescribed by statute and
the sum required to meet operating expen-
SEES are all matters for consideration and
to be given such weight as may be just and
right in the particular case. What the COM
pany is entitled to ask for is fair return on
the value of that which it employs for the
public convenience. On the other hand,
what the public is entitled to demand is
o. public highway than the services rem
dered by It are reasonably worth. But even
upon this basis we perceive ground on
the record for reversing the decree of the
Circuit Court On the contrary we are of
opinion that as to most of the companies
in question there would have been under
actual loss in each of the years ending
June go 1891. 1892 and 1898, and substantially
no compensation earned for the services
rendered; and that, in the exceptional cases
above stated. the receipts or gains above
operating expenses of some of the com
panies would have been too small to affect
the general conclusion that the act, if en-
forced, would have deprived each of the
railroad companies involved in these suits
of the just compensation secured to them
by the Constitution. Under the evidence
there is no ground for saying that the oper-
ating expenses of any of them were great
er than necessary"
In conclusion, Justice Harlan said if bus
mess improved the State could apply to the
courts, his language being as follows: But
1t may be added that the conditions of bus
iness so far as railroad corporations
better, and that the rates prescribed by the
statute of 1893 may now afford all the COM
penSation to which the railroad companies
in Nebraska are entitled as between them
and the public. In anticipation, perhaps, of
such change of circumstances, the Cir
cult Court wisely provided in its final de-
cree That defendants. members of the board
of transportation. might when the circum-
stances have changed so that the rates
fixed in the said act of 1893. shall yield to
the said companies reasonable compensa-
ton for services aforesaid apply
wise as they might be advised for.
further order in that behalf. OF this proee
vision of the final decree the State Board of
Transportation, if so advised. can avail.
themselves. In that event, if the Circuit
Court finds that the present condition of
cation of the statute to the railroad com
panies in question without depriving them
OF just compensation. 1t will be its duty to
discharge the injunction heretofore granted