The Ketchum keystone. [volume] (Ketchum, Idaho) 1885-1899, 1898-10-22
WARSHIPS' WEAK SPOTS.
Methods Of Attack Which Are
Most Effective


A war ship is vulnerable in two chief
rcspects-in her motive power ana IN
her personnel It is imaginable that one
might be wholly neutralizcd without
materially iniuring the other. Theques-
tion, not only of to-day, but OF CEN
tury's standing, is, which is it better TO
attack in order to subdue the ship? In
olden days the British hnbitually at
tackled the personnel, the French the
motive power, and each was consistent;
for the aim of the former was to insure
decisive results, and that of the latter
10 avoid them. Each has had its advo-
Gates, and consequently there is some
thing to be said on each side; but upon
the whole it is, think, fair to say that
experience replies, attack the men.
And the reason is much the same As
hundred years ago; not only isit impos-
sible to have the men as well protected
as the motive power, but the destruc-
ton of the men who handle the often
sive powers of the ship makes the mo-
tive power practically useless.
Now the weight which ship OF ,
given size can carry is limited, and must
be distributed among several objects, OF
which gun power is one, and the ques-
ton has to be met, how shall this gun
power be subdivided among the di1er-
ent classes of gun? If your aim is the
motive power you want heavy guns; tor
the motive power-the engines and
boilers-are given the utmost possible
protection, by position, by the thickest
armor, by the coal stowage, the protec-
tive deck, and SO on. to pierce which
great force is required. But heavy guns
means few guns, and few guns means
few shots, and fewer shots mean
fewer hits; while of those that hit, II
they strike the protective system OF the
engines, ETC., fewer still penetrate. q
truth long foreseen. yet very generally
dropped out OF sight. and which the the
Yalu battle has singularly confirmed.
On the other hand. the weight o.
ar1nor required to protect the water
line adequately makes it impossible tt
extend by similar means adequate pro
lection to the battery spaces. except
only those occupied by the heavy guns
and even where these are adequately
that is, to thu
missiles from these lighter guns, tech
nically called ''rapid fre"-there car
be no question that their accuracy o
fire is singularly embarrassed. For tha'
reason it is sought to aim and fire then
| from an interior position-the coming
tower, for instance-a plan OF which !
is enough here to say that. except fol
| the heaviest guns, 1t is tending to tai
into disuse.
/ Considering the vast Importance o
securing the best practice from tn
| heavy guns-for am not at all arguing
against them, only against their exces
sive number-it becomes necessary u
beat down and keep down all the othe
fire of the enemy. If success in this j
attained, q distinct and immense advan
tage is gained for the heavy guns owe
those of the enemy; for, if the rapi'
fire guns which have established thei
ascendancy cannot penetrate the tur
rets, they can greatly annoy the men il
them, and may enter the gun ports
This superiority, it maintained, mus
result in victory. 1t has long seemed +
me that the mutual relations OF tn
heavy and rapid fire guns OF the shi
have strong analogy TO field bal
terry of artillery and its infantry sup
ports, the latter at once protect and sc
cure the efficient service of the former
However that may be, the rapid fire gnl
of modern caliber has just now fairl
established it's position as to the great
est offensive power in naval warfare
Can't. A. T. Mahan, in Century.