The San Francisco call., 1898-04-21
AT THE MERCY
 OF FOES GUNS Cities on Seacoasts That Could Easily Be
 Bonn barded. Captain Harkins Offers Some Valuable Suggestions in Ref
 erence to DefenSeS.
Believes That Ships of War Are Required for Protection From
 Foreign Fleets.

BERKELEY, April 20.-AS the neceS- sity for strengthening the Notifications along our seacoast and increasing our naval force is generally admitted by all patriotic citizens, I have concluded to submit a few thoughts that have have suggested themselves to me in connection with this subject, with a hope they may interest the public and that some of them may be utilized by the men who are controlling the des- tinies of the nation. Several of our seacoast cities lie so close to the ocean that forts and guns, no matter how strong and powerful, cannot prevent their destruction by an enemy's fleet in time of war. This is especially true of the cities of San Francisco and San ta Barbara. One war vessel with mod ern high power long-range guns could destroy either or both of these cities with but little risk by approaching them at night OF during one of the fogs that are so prevalent along the coast and commencing bombardment, keep ing in motion while in action.
 Every projectile from the ship would do more or less execution, while it would be mere accident if a shot from a shore battery would hit the ves- sel. 1 have selected these cities as be- ing especially exposed to attack, but there is scarcely a city on our seacoaSt that is not in danger of being captured or destroyed by an enemy's fleet if not protected by war vessels. Even those cities that are well inland on bays, harbors and rivers that are accessible to ocean vessels are not exempt from this danger AS proof of this 1 would call attention to the fact that Admiral Farragut captured the city of Mobile in 1864 with a fleet of wooden vessels with comparatively small loss, although the city was defended by number of for tifications, shore batteries, sunken tor- pedoes, rafts and some war vessels, among them a formidable ram. The monitors attached to Farraguts fleet took but little part in the combat, and they were too slow and unable to Keep up with the attacking squadron.
 If the Confederates had had fleet of war vessels to give battle to Farra- guts fleet in the lower bay, 1t Is very probable that even if Farragut had been successful his fleet would have been so much injured by the conflict that he could not have passed the for tifications and Instructions and cap- tured the city.
 Naval arrnor and armament have kept up with Notifications and shore batteries since then. What has been done in the past can be done in the future. The history of the wars of the past teaches us that the more eHec- tive way to defend is to attack, and that a nation, city, army, fleet or fort reduced to a purely defensive attitude generally succumbs sooner or later. This has been the rule, with but few exceptions. In assuming the offensive, the time, place and mode Of attack can be selected, which is a decided advan- tage in warfare, either by sea or by land.
 It must therefore be evident to all who have given this subject much thought that Notifications alone are not sufficient for the protection of our seaboard cities in time of war, and that a strong fleet of war vessels IS an ao- solute necessity to prevent thelr oe- struction or capture by an enemy fleet. If this is conceded, the question naturally arises, What type of war vessel is best adapted, not only for this purpose, but for the protection of oIlr growing commerce and our ln- terests in foreign countries? Some or the war vessels on which we are eX- pending large sums are to some extent experiments, and may prove more dangerous in action to those that serve on them than to the enemy. This lS It is so topheavy with armor and guns that if it should meet with an ac- cident or be seriously injured in com bat it would be likely to sink so fast that 1t would be very difficult, IT not impossible, for the crew to escape even in a smooth sea. This was fully dem onstrated during the maneuvers Of the English fleet in June, 1893, when the warshiD CamperdoWn accidentally rammed the battle-ship Victoria, which caused the latter to sink so fast that she carried with her to an untimely end over 400 of her officers and crew. This occurred in daylight during a smooth sea- This incident should Of itself be sufficient to cause our public men to hesitate before recommending or authorizing the construction of any more battle-ships.
 The unprotected cruiser is useful as | a commerce destroyer. but as it stands high out of the water it presents a conspicuous target for an enemy S guns, and is so constructed that the guns and the men that operate them are unprotected If the men are killed or wounded or the guns injured, the vessel becomes useless as an engine of warfare.
 The monitor is too slow, and as 1t nossesses indifferent seagoing qualities if is useful for harbor defenses only. | As a substitute for these vessels and combining all of the best and most es- sential features of the three classes mentioned I would suggest protected torpedo gunboat that would sit low in 1 the water, with but few guns, some | large and some small, and as many torpedo tubes as could be advantage ously used. with a high rate of speed, light draught and good seagoing quali- l ties. All of these important features can be combined, and such a vessel | could be hastily constructed and easily l docked.
 As all great naval engagements in the past have been fought near land. it l is very probable that conflicts of a like nature will also in the future be fought near land. If such should be the case vessels of light draught would have a l decided advantage over those drawing more water.
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