The evening times., 1898-11-02
THE ARMY AND POLITICS.
Why the Military Service Must BE
RefOrm6 IL.


mortal purposes. and l sometimes be-
lieve it contains the great hope of man
kind. We have been slowly and reluctant
ly dragged into a war with Spain-one
which we have averted for many years,
but which was sure to come.
1T came. and we grappled with it. Aft
er a severe struggle Spain was whipped
into seeking peace terms and now that
we can mop our heads and breathe easier
for few moments, what do we find? We
find we have a small modern navy, which
is better and more efficient than our
widest hopes could dream. Very well;
it is not. tinctured with politics. AT least,
there has not appeared on the surface any
of the seheming of politics. Its operations
have been straightforward professional
work on the part of everyone connected
with the Navy Department. Every pos
sible detail seems to have been thought
out, every want anticipated. The Secre-
tary pressed the button and the warships
did the rest.f
I'VE found our army In different shape
We find nothing but disappointment
nothing to be proud of except the fighting
ability Of the line officers and the enlist
ed men. The staff corps lay peacefully
down on their backs at the beginning, and
the generals and colonels commanding
troops had to detail line lieutenants to
hustle up necessities in the open mar
ket TO keep troops from starving to death
The volunteers have had most destruct-
i've summer in the camps of instruction,
and they now clamor to be mustered out
a victorious army comes home on it's
back. The administration of the War De-
partment is hope!essly discredited before
the people. The deadening hand OF selfish
politics is laid over all.
I'VE are enjoying an armistice at pres
ent aand with our newly acquired ISL
ands, which We desire to hold, we have
almost unanimously concluded that We
must have an army.
Now, what will our new army be
| like? VIII it be built along the lines die
! tated by military minds thinking only OF
/ effectiveness, or will ignorant and Sc fish
( politicians created il along their own
! lines? l am in great doubt about this
! matter. l only know for certain that a
! poltico- military system will bring d!sas-
ter.
However il we are to have an army
which is TO do the work expected oil ii
properly, we must at least do the follow
! ing things. and doubtless many others,
or We will not have such an army. OF
/ which fact you can be absolutely sure
The general of the army, or whatever
ma jor general commands Il from Wash
! ington, must be the head OF the army
/ not in theory, but in fact. He must be
1 the responsible head of the army-yne
! whom we can praise if things go well or
one whom We can condemn If things 20
iii.
/ ~ ~. ,f I'll, 49,
| when we should have had 50 much. We
had nothing. The press and Congr ess
turned Historically on Gen. Mites. tha
head OF the army. 1t bitterly denOuncei
him. and bdde him come forward and
I tell them why. He laughed at both. He
{ could afford TO do il. There was nothing
/ else to do. Then he explained that lie
knew nothing more Of the administra-
! tion of the army than any Congressman
/ could find out by applying 10 the Secre-
tary of War. All the heads Of the stan
coprs reported to that quaint creature
| and not To him.
The high-wateT mark of this COndi
tion was reached when the general com
| manding the army had TO reply u &
corps commander before Santiago tha
he did not supersede him; he could not
supersede d subordinate! So used have
OF the army that they become grotes que,
ly mixed in their military reiation-they
have lost the unites. From a military
standpoint the thing is funny.
/ The Secretaries of War have been "a
1 ways prominent working politicians-to .
greater extent than other Cabinet mem
bers They have with one exception
since the civil war, used the department
along political lines, and even this excsp
tion jealousy guarded the department
prerogatives. The adjutant general ha:
been responsible to the Secretary alone
and has come 10 be regarded in the ar
my the real working head. The fac
that the admtant general should be tn,
private secretary of the general in com
mand is a long-forgotten truth
The next important thing which mus
come To pass before we have q a good ar
my is AN interchangeable line and staff.
/ This should be true of every staff corp
except the medical one and possibly tn
paymasters.
''In regard to a general staff-or NOR
properly war board-it is an institution
which prospers best under d czar o
kaiser 1t needs Il monarch over it VIII
is the head of the army above all else
and who is SO independent of all hamper
ing. and so vitality solicitous OF its eff
fectivenesS, that he. king-Iike, can de
mand the best. To a czar or kaise
the general staff is second only To God
We Americans remark that the gener
ais and admirals do best who have tn
worst signal service staff officers at thei
command. y wire to Washington is til
bete noire of our commanders Ii is a.
open secret that the best generals Eng
land sends out have always good com
municationS, perfectly established, wit
the home Government. but always unfor
tunately, two days ahorseback in tn
rear. They consequently are two day
away from interfering politicians who ar
at any time liable to become hysterica
and who, under such conditions, woul
not hesitate to sacrifice the reputation
and lives of soldiers.
AT present the heads, of staff are nc
responsible to the general of the arm,
and indeed things have so arrange
themselves that they are responsible I
no one, in a true sense. They do not an
cannot be made to work together as tn
interests of the army dictate. So W
have a lot of staff establishments goin
it higgledy- -piggledy, and the poor Lin
gets along as best it can. The idea tha
staff is nothing but an arrangement
do the business of the army and to aC
minister to its necessities is almost los
/ sight of. 1t is utterly independent of th
fighting line, which it ignores, in fact
There should be, either at West Poir
or elsewhere, an infantry and cavalr
school, If we are to increase our arm.
! where officers could be turned out fc
) those branches. 1t is quite unuecessar
to make engineers out of such, and fl
/ many reasons / believe it is a bad thin
/ know many a fellow who is ideally f.
ted by instinct and physique to comman
infantry or cavalry who would not ar
, could not be an engineer. l could nev'
see even remote connection betwee
/. i building an iron bridge and jockeyir
= a troop of cavalry into FORM
: