The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-04-08

poses with respect to the Cuban Ques- |
tion, and therefore eny theory that |
the note was intended as a remon- |
STRANGE is not regarded as tenable.
The reply of this government, which |
had previously been read and approved |
by members of the cabinet, Is not con- |
sidered as indicating any change in |
the fixed purpose of the president to |
intervene in Cuba at once nor is it be- |
lieved that it was the expectation of
a majority of the foreign representa- |
tlves present that the United States |
should change it's policy or regard the |
joint note as other than an expression |
in behalf of peace and without special |
significance.
So far as known in administration |
circles, no further representations on |
this subject are expected. No offers OF |
mediation on the part Of any European
power have been received and there is
high authority for the statement that
none would be accepted or proffered. |
This has been the fixed policy of the
government from the first, and there is
no prospect of change in this regard
Historic Steps.
At the embassies and legations the |
presentation of the joint note Of the
powers was regarded as the event of
the day. An ambassador from one Of
the great powers of continental Europe
stated that 1t was without parallel In
history; that it was the first and the
only time that the six great nations of
Europe, representing in the aggregate
the power Of civilization, had united in
this solemn manner to secure the peace
of the world. 1t was, this high author
ity stated, a movement historical in
character and one fitting to occur on
the advent of the twentieth century.
Calls at the various embassies and
legations late in the day showed that
the response of the president had Great
ed a most favorable impression In for
elgn quarters. The presidents answer
was looked upon, to some extent, as
a counter appeal to the great powers
for their cooperation in the cause of
humanity against the intolerable con-
dition of affairs in Cuba.
In some diplomatic quarters there
was a disposition to read the joint
note between the lines,'' and to give
it suggestive character beyond the
mild phrases adopted. This was not
the generally accepted view, however.
The favorable manner Of its reception
was looked upon as a wise move at
this critical juncture, for, without re-
jecting as an intrusion the foreign |
suggestions, they were so received as
to give the greatest promise Of SYM
pathy, rather than opposition from the !
most powerful joint influences in the |
world.
War Inevitable.
At the capital the situation was ar |
IDENTIFY discussed among individuals,
and came up in public debate in both
houses Senator Morgan, of Alabama,
said he was ready to vote for decla-
ration Of war in discussing an amend
ment to the sundry civil appropriation |
bill.
In the house a significant declara- |
ton was that of Gen. Grosvenor, who |
declared he believed war was inevita-
BILE. In fact, the speeches made by |
Gen. Grosvenor, in answer to charges |
against the administration by Mr.. |
Lentz, Of Ohio, was an important con- |
tribution to the news Of the day.
The Importance of Gen. Lees tele |
grams was considered by members not |
to have been overestimated, and the |
impression that the president was am
ply justified In Withholding his mes |
sage became a conviction. This fact |!
was emphasized by the adjournment |
until Monday of both houses.
The opinion in the senate and house |
Is that war must come. Even the most |
optimistic Of the conservative sena- |
tors have given up hope of peaceful |
settlement.
A great deal of consideration was |
given by senators and representatives |
to the form Of action. On this point |
there Is wide divergence Of opinion |
but 1t has assumed two distinct pro- |
portions. One is the recognition of in |
dependence Of the island coupled with |
armed Intervention with a declaration |
that Cuba should be free The desire |
on the part of those favoring the lat |
ter plan being to avoid recognizing |
the insurgents and their government or |
any government until after the United |
States has control of the island. The |
latter plan is said to be that of the |
president, and efforts are being made |
to have it adopted so there will be no |
DIVISION between the executive and |
Fear is expressed that there NAV he q |
long debate in the senate, If some com
promise is not agreed upon before the |
committee on foreign relations makes |
its report Ne