Spirit of the age. [volume] (Woodstock, Vt.) 1845-1913, 1898-12-24

for the defense OF the port upon A few
torpedoes not properly placed. Find
Ing Subic bay defenseless, the Spanish
squadron repaired to the bay of Manila
to meet battle under less unfavorabl
conditions. The admiral avoided the
city, not wishing to draw fire upon it.
and prepared his fleet for action, paint
his vessels a dark grey. and having the
fires spread and springs on all the cables.
He says that the forces of Dewey's YES
sells, leaving out transports, amounted
to 21,410 tons, 1920 horse power, 1853
guns, many rapid-fire; 1850 men. and an
average velocity of II miles. Against
this power Of his only five effective Ships
was 10,111 tons. 1920 horsepower IS
guns, very short of rapid-fire; 1875 men
and maximum speed of IL miles.
The admiral describes in vivid Ian
guaGe the terrible effect Of the American
onslaught on the Spanish vessels. He
says: The Americans fired most rap
idly. There came upon us numerous
projectiles, as the three cruisers at the
end Of the line devoted themselves al
most entirely to fighting the Cristina.
my flagship. A short time after the
action commenced. one shell exploded
in the forecastle and put out of action
all those who served the four rapid fire
cannon.
Meantime another shell exploded in
the orlop deck, setting fire to the crews
bags. At 1880 one shell destroyed
completely the stearing gear, another
destroyed the mizzen, bringing down
my flag and ensign. Another shell ex-
ploded on the poop and put out Of ac-
ton nine men. A fresh shell exploded
In the officers cabin. covering the hos
pital with blood, destroying the wounded
who were being treated there. Another
exploded in the ammunition room.
had to flood the magazine when the car
tridges began to explode. One large
shell penetrated the fire room, putting
out of action one master gunner and IL
men serving the guns: another rendered
useless. the starboard bow gun, and, while
the fire increased astern, another fire
started forward from another shell.
The boardside guns continued firing I'M
til there were only one gun and one sea-
man remaining unhurt for serving them.
The ship being out Of control, the hull,
smoke pipe, and mast riddled with shot.
or confused with the cries of the
wounded, among whom were seven Off
GERS, I gave the order to sink and aban-
don the ship before the magazines ex-
plOded."
The story Of the loss of the Castella
was substantially the story Of the loss
of all the other Spanish ships, and Ad-
miral Montijo sums up his account with
this statement:
1.-The inefficiency Of the vessels which
composed my little squadron, the lack
of all classes Of personnel, especially
master gunners and seamen gunners,
the inaptitude Of some of the provisional
the scarcity Of rapid-fire
cannon, the strong crews Of the enemy
and the unprotected character of the
greater part Of our vessels all contrib
uted to make much more decided the
sacrifice which We made for our country.
and to prevent the possibility of the
horrors of a bOmbardment of the city
Of Manila, with the conviction that with
the scarcity OF our forces against the
enemy we were going to certain
death and could expect Il loss of all our
ships. Our casualties, including those
of the arsenal amounted to 381 men
killed and wounded"
An evidence of the strategy exhibited
b. the navy department in sending re-
Inducements to Dewey is shown in IL
disru;rh OF June p, informing him of
the coming of the Monadnock. Prob
ably with a view to preventing him from
falling into a trap, she was not dis
patched directly to Manila, but was or
dered to point GOO miles due east from
Cape Engano. where she was to meet
one of Deweys ships.
Apparently the first sugge stion # 80
organization of the flying sau.d'"n
which was to divert Admiral Camara's
squadron from it's voyage to Manila
came from Dewey, for in a dispatch of
June q, he says: In my judgment IL
the coast of Spain is threatened the
squadron of the enemy will have to re-
turn" and that was exactly what hap
pened.
The report of the operations of the
north Atlantic fleet comprises the larger
part of the printed matter. Most Of the
facts have already appeared. but there
Is an interesting exchange of letters
between Secretary Long and Admiral
Sampson, showing that even before the
outbreak of the war, the admiral had
worked out complete plan for the i'm
mediate reduction Of Havana with his
own squadron, unsupported, and was
only prevented from carrying out that
plan by orders from the department,
which wished to protect the big iron
clads.
There is lively report from Captain
Sigsbee of the engagement between the
st. Paul, under his command, and the
Spanish torpedo boat destroyer Terror
which resulted in the flight Of the latter
In sinking condition into the harbor.
where she was run aground to prevent
her from sinking. Captain FOlger of
the cruiser New Orleans testifies to the
done by the shot of the st. Paul,
repeating the testimony of an English
resident of San Juan, who examined the
Terror.
An unpublished report up to this time
IL one of Admiral Schley, dated June l.
giving an account of the bombardment
by his fleet of the Notifications of San
tiago, the day before Sampson arrived
on the scene. The report says In part:
None Of our vessels We're struck, al
though the shots fell over and around
them. have learned from the insur-
gents that the Reina Mercedes was
struck by a shell and eight men We're
killed; also that a number of shots
struck the Moro. The reconnaissance
developed the fact that the Spanish ves-
sels are in the harbor, and that the forth
fications are we'll provided with long
range guns of large calibre."
The other features of the report have
been previously covered. from time to
time, in the reports of various officers.
WASHINGTON Dec, 22-General Nelson