The Portland daily press., 1898-12-02
SPANISH w sAKNESs.
Astonishing Revelations in the Letters OF
Admiral Cervera.
(New York Post. J

great and how decisive part in our war
with Spain was played by the navy. His
task is certainly an easy ono, for, like
Antony, he will simply have to speak
right on and only tell us what we all do
know. He will do it, Of course. in terms
of precise naval science, and his exposi-
tion of the operations at sea will be. we
do not doubt, the standard one. But no
fair estimate OF the case can leave out OF
account the extraordinary weakness of
the Spanish navy. Its efficiency on paper
was enormously in excess of it's fighting
power on the water; and to none was this
better known than to the Spanish naval
officers Our Office of Naval Intelligence
has just published pamphlet entitled
"Views Of Admiral Cerser Regarding
the Spanish Navy in the Late War, -
which contains some astonishing revela-
tions.
1t is made up of letters written by Ger
vera from a date long anterior to the out
break of hostilities down to May 5. 1h7y
show that that gallant officer knew, and
repeatedly informed his government, that
|the sailing west from Cape Verde meant
the certain destruction of the Spanish feet
When we recall the panic terror inspired
all along our eastern coast that Cereyra's
squadron was steaming towards us, there
is something comic in reading the Ad-
miral's own account of the terrible state
of his ships, and his positive conviction
that he was sailing them to infallible
ruin. At the very moment that our coast
cities were frantically falling for defence
from his expected attack, he was frankly
telling his government that he was beaten
before he sailed. and that the wretched
condition OF his squadron already
amounted to "a disaster, and 1t is to be
feared that it will be more frightful one
before long,
AS early as 1896, Admiral Cervera had
written demonstration of the inability
of the Spanish navy to cope with that of
the United States In January last he
renewed his warnings on that head point
ing out the gross defects In the equip
mont of his ships. Shortly before the
Maine was blown up he wrote to the
Minister of Marine complaining that no
charts OF the American seas" were to
be had by the naval commanders. As the
conflict drew sensibly near, he detailed
to the government the frightful uppre-
paredness of his squadron. The Colon
was without her big guns; the Vizcaya's
boilers were foul, and she could make
only half speed; the heavy guns on the
Teresa and Oquendo were practically
tuseless through defective mechanism and
bad carJiiages. On the very day before
the fleet was finally ordered to sail, the
captains held council of WAR and decid
no ma n all the
West Indies. and advised the government
| to recall the ships to the Canaries, aban-
doning Cuba aud Porto kico to their
tate. When In spite of all, sailing orders
came, Cervera, obeying like the brave
patriot he was, yet felt it bis duty to tell
his government that moth ing can be
expected of this expedition except the
| total destruction of the fleet, or its hssty
and demoralizing return" In this opinr
ion he was joined by Admiral vilaiml,
who snid he was ready to die (he old at
Santiago). as seaman should be, but
| that he must tell Sagasta the loss of the
squadron was certain.
| Another of the remarkable features OF
| the sailing Of this last of the Spanish
Armadas is that it put to sea absolutely
without plan. There is no plan or
conoert,'' wrote Cervera on the eve OF
sailing. 1t was only by a kind of good
luck that he even got into Santiago.
Once there, he confessed he cid not know
what to do next. Some dispatches have
| been published which passed between
Blanco and Csrvera during the first few
days after the latter made Santiago,
which reveal in striking way the utter
| hopelessness of the whole enterprise.
| Blanco had very good information OF the
movements Of our men-of-war, and gave
| Cervera ample notice Of Schleys' sailing
to blockade him.. The Spanish Admiral
might have easily left Santiago before
Sohley arrived In fact, we know from
the diary of the BrilishConsul at Santa 70
| that preparations we're made for the
| So uadron to leave oil May 3D. 1.-The
Spanish fleet" noel Mr.. Ramsden on
that day, lis taking in coal, water, and
provisions in a hurry, and it Is evld snt
that it is preparing to go to sea, probably
tonight or in tina morning, as hear the
pilots have teen ordered for this even
ing"
| Sure enough, Blanco expected Cervera
I to get away in time to escape blockade,
| but on M ~ "a he got despatch from
Gen. Linares, In command at Santiago.
saying that Ceryera and his captains had
decided to stay. The reason was that the
suuadron was not lit to sail, and did not
knoN where under the sun to go II 1t did
saiL The most he could do, Cervera said
was to remain in Santiago harbor with
his useless ships, and hold as large part
| as possible of the American navy on duty
block ading him. Thus the whole bead
less and hopeless expedition drew near its
lamentable end.
| IL is needless to dwell upon the last act
of the tragedy. Cervera made MS des-
nairinp dash On July only on positive
orders from Blanco. That officer took q
rosy view of the prospects. He had great
confidence in the success" OF the scheme
| to break the blockade. As favorable
sien.'' he informed Cervera that the cap
tain of the German cruiser Geier, then in
port at Havana, had Expressed the
opinion that the squadron can effect its
departure from Santiago without expos
Ing itself to great risks" One would like
| to know what business the captain of the
Geier had giving Blanoo advice, ane
what he thinks now. But Cervera wal
under no illusion. He told Blanco plain
| " that sour attempt to leave this por
would mean our Immediate, absolutel,
sure destruction.
But the cheerful Blanco ordered hin
out, and, that nothing might be forgot
ten, teleQraphed on July 8 to the military
commander at Cienfuegos: Make prepar
ations for the reception Of the squadron
commanded by Admiral Cervera which lef
Santiago this morning, and Wnich maj