The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-10-21
SOME LESSONS OF THE WAR.
CHIEF ENGINEER MELVILLE TELLS
or HIS DEPARTMENTS WORK.
Calls Attention to the Lack OF Fro
vision fer Men to Man the New
Vessels for the Constr sction OF

WASHINGTON. Oct 2s.-The war which
has Just ended was the first IN which mod
err steam vessels have had a thorough
trial So says Chief Engineer Melville In
his annual report. Then h proceeds 70
nnts the important lessons go far as they
respect the machinery Of vessels. which
have been taught By the war as follows
The vital necessity OF giving the miachin-
cry os vessels IN reserve frequent tests an
der working conditions that any defects
may be discovered ana reInedied before
war makes the yesse!'s service absolutely
necessary.
The erea; importance OK having all our
naval stations n positions o. strategic
value properly fitted out fer repairs, and
with adequate supplies OF non-pertshaoie
stores.
That fresh water for TIE boilers Is almost
as important as coal and that disiilnng
ship Is an important adjunct at a base
where fresh wasd cannot be readily OBJ
sained.
That every fleet needs a repair ship TO
enable its efficiency 10 be maintained.
The great tactical advantages d water
tube boilers.
That II more than two main engines age
70 be fitted. there should be three engines
driving three screws and not Two main
engines on each shaft.
That there should be frequent trials un-
der forced draft 10 keep the blowers IN
good condition and 10 make the men thor
oughly familiar with the working under
maximum conditions.
That the personnel OF the service should
be adequate 10 the material 1t has been
notorious for some time that this Is not
the case, and We are providing for a de-
cided increase in the number of vessels
with no increase in the personnel. We
must make provision for training the en-.
listed men of the engineer department.
That our fighting ships must have the
highest practical speed.
The chief says the most obvious effort
OF the emergency demand was to demon
strate In a vigorous manner the facilities
and deficiencies of the various navy yards
and particularly to Justify the policy Va hicn
had been previously advocated By his bti-
reau. or placing the more Southern yards
and stations Ia a state OF modern efficiency
The experience at Key West Ia meeting
the frs, great rush created by the demand
for repair work on the ships was proof Of
the vast Increase in the cost or repair
work occasioned by insufficient buildings
and plant.
With pardonabie pride the report dweils
upon the tremendous amount OF work ac-
compiShed by the bureau in preparing the
fleet for war, involving the placing of new
Of ships In ordinary form and the equip
ment OF the auxiliary navy, nearly 10 YES
sells being added to the regular force.
The engineer In chief says thai there was
q remarkable absence OF Casualty in the
machinery department Of the vessels Of the
fighting squadron during the war. But the
torpedo boats could not show the same eX-
cellent record. The report says: IL is 4
sad state of affairs that nearly every one
has had some accident, and the machinery
Of some at the close OF the war was in
a condition that can be described as horri-
bile. where boilers were burned, cylinder
covers broken. pistons and valves stuck
and everything in bad shape. This condi-
ton OF affairs Seemed attributable " two
causes, the absence OF trained engineers
engineering superV ision and the holding OF
the boats for duty fer which they were
not intended"
The engineer in chief recommends the
early advance of the personnel bill, now
pending IN congress, which he supports by
train OF the most eogent reasoning.