Peninsula enterprise. [volume] (Accomac, Va.) 1881-1965, 1898-09-24
GBN. SKATERS REPORT.
Another Story of the Fall of San
tiago de Cuba.
GEN, MILES BARELY MENTIONED

Fail to DO Justice to the Gallant
Commanders and Their Heroic Men"
Washington. Sept. 15.-General Shat
ter's report of the campaign which
terminated In the fall of Santiago has
been made public. He briefly recounts
the organization of the expedition ana
its embarkation and then devotes the
main body of the report to the active
operations about Santiago. General
Shafter says the expedition was I'M
dertaken in compliance with telegraph
ic instructions of May so from head
quarters of the army.
The report gives in detail the troops
assembled at Tampa. The cavalry was
6ismounted because of lack of trans
portation for the animals and because
il was believed mounted cavalry could
not operate efficiently near Santiago.
This. General Shafter says. was found
subsequently to be correct. After re-
citing the delay at Tampa due to in
adequate facilities General Shafter
says that on June I he received orders
to sail without delay. but not with less
than 10000 men. The expedition
sailed on June II with SIS officers and
1902 men, General Shafter briefly
covers the trip and landing. and his
first meeting with General Garcia.
when the latter offered. and Shafter
accepted, the services of the Cuban
troops.
After comforting with Admiral Samp-
son and General Garcia the plan Of
campaign was outlined by General
Shafter. The Decentralization was TO
commence on the 22d at DaiQuiri, with
feints by the Cubans on Cabanas, and
by the navy at various shore points.
the place of landing.
1T was not until nearly two weeks
after the army landed that 1t was pos
sible to place on shore three days
supplies in excess of those required for
the daily consumption.
THE preparations were far from
what desired them to be. but we were
in a sickly climate. our supplies had to
be brought forward by narrow wagon
road which the rains might at any
time render impassable: fear was en-
tertained that q storm might drive the
vessels containing our stores TO sea,
thus separating US from our base OF
supplies, and lastly ii was reported
that General Pando. with 5000 rein
forcements for the enemy. was en- route
from Manzanillo and might be eX-
pected in a few days. Under these con-
ditions l determined to give battle
without delay"
Then follows the story of the battles,
and the report continues:
Great credit is due to Brigadier
General II. S. Hawkins. who, placing
himself between his regiments. urged
them on by voice and bugle calls to
the attack so brilliantly executed.
In this fierce encounter words fail
to do justice to the gallant regimental
commanders and their heroic men, for
while the generals indicated the for
nations and the points of attack. it
was. after all, the intrepid bravery of
the subordinate officers and men that
planted our colors on the crest of San
Juan hill and drove the enemy from his
trenches and blockhouse. thus gain
ing a position which sealed the fate of
Santiago.
Il am greatly indebted to General
Wheeler who returned from the sick
list TO duty during the period. His
cheerfulness and aggressiveness made
it sufficiently felt on this part of the
battlefield and the information he fur
nished to me at various stages of the
battle proved to be most useful.
THE cessation of firing about noon
on the Sd practically terminated the
battle of Santiago. All that occurred
after this time may properly be treated
under the head of the siege which fol-
lowed.
The arrival of General Escario at
Santiago was not anticipated. General
Garcia, with between 1000 and 5000
Cubans, was intrusted with the duty
OF watching for and intercepting the
reinforcement expected This. how
ever, he failed to do"
General Shafter gives the various eff
forts towards securing a surrender,a and
his reopening the engagement on the
10th, when the truce ended. On the
18th the surrender was again demand
ed. by this date the sickness in the
army was increasing very rapidly, as
a result of exposure in the trenches to
the intense heat of the sun and the
heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in
Cuba are almost equal to rain. The
weakness of the troops was becoming
so apparent I was anxious to bring the
siege to an end, but. in common with
most of the officers of the army, I did
not think an assault would be justifia-
BILE, especially as the enemy seemed to
be acting in good faith in their prelim-
mary propositions to surrender
July - I informed the Spanish COM
mander that Major General Miles, COM
mander-in- chief of the American army.
had just arrived in my camp. and re-
quested him to grant us a personal in
tsrvew on the following day. The in
terview took place on the 18th, and l
informed him his surrender only
could be considered. and that as he
was without hope of escape. he had no
right to continue the fight"
General Shafter then gives the de-
tails of the final surrender his entry
to the city and the raising of the Amer
lean flag In closing. he says:
Before closing my report I wish to
dwell upon the natural obstacles had
to encounter and which no foresight
could have overcome or obviated. The
rocky and precipitous coast afforded no
sheltered landing places, the roads were
mere bride paths. the effect Of the
tropical sun and rains upon unaccli
mated troops was deadly, and the
dread of strange and unknown dis
eases had its effects on the army"
General Shafter recommends for pro-
motion and brevets the following Off
GERS: Lieutenant Colonies E. J. McCler-
nand, George McC. Darby, ]. e. Miley,
J. ]. Astor, B. F. Pope and Charles F.
Humphrey. Colonel John F. Weston,
Majors c. G. Starr, Leon Roudiez, H. ].
Noble, S. W. Croesbeck and II. ]. CAL
lagher, Captains L. Il. Pummer, J. C.
Gilmore, Jr., A. H. McKittrick, john
son and Brice.