The National tribune., 1898-12-08
A SpAuIApD'S STORY
The Fighting About Santiago
Told of by Lieut.. Muller.

Tejeir0, second in command Of the nava
forces of the Province of Santiago dc
Cuba. He was an eyewitness OF most o.
the events he describes.
The author began, according TO his own
statement, to keep an exact diary OF events
at Santiago from the moment OF the ap-
pearance there of Ccrvera's fleet, realizing,
as he says thatfthe vessels were to have &
most powerful influence on the war.
The publication begins with chapter
entitled "The Two Fleets telling of the
arrival of Cervera's squadron on The 10Th
of May, and of the disappointment OF the
people, who expected no less than eight
battleships instead OF five. He makes a
comparison very carefully and accur atcly
of the two squadrons. The Lieutenant
mentions the fact that provisions were
very short; also, that the military element
of the provinces, were nine or ten months
in arrears in the payment OF consig nmonts.
and had been living on credit for some
| time.
| Everything was lacking; food, money,
credit, and purchasing resources were ex-
hausted. What happened at Santiago
was true OF other places in the islands.
The merchants, instead of contributing to
| the welfare OF the army, hid whatever they
had and raised prices. The picture he
draws OF the conditions in the beSieged
| city is terrible. He speaks of the diff
culties OF coaling and shows that the fleet
was badly supplied
| Concerning the opinions as to why the
fleet did not 90 out, he declares that
| the ships in the harbor were compel
| ling the enemy to sustain with superior
| forces the blockade with all its difficulties
| and dangers. 1t was not believed that the
| American ships would expose themselves
| TO &c act art 10
Of the ports which were being blockaded
The Spanish ships did not have to give
| battle in order TO obtain results, and if
provisions had not been wanting in Santi-
ago, and the Spanish feet had remained
/ there, no one could tell to what extremes
| Impotence and despair might not have
carried Admiral Sampson.
| diary OF the blockade is given, telling
what occurred in the way OF lombard
mentS and losses 10 the SpaniardS by the
American guns. The movements % the
American fleet were a puzzle to the Span
| iards, as they did not know why they re-
NAMED on watch all day and disappeared
| at night. But it was supposed that the
Americans were afraid OF the destroyers.
| Speaking OF the Alerrimac he says:
" We at Santiago have not succeeded in
ascertaining definitely-though it is prob
| ably known IN Spain from American news
papers, that are in the habit OF publishing
everything-wi1at was the real OBJ ject that
the Merrimac had in view"
The arrival OF the army created con-
/ bic CONSERVATION in Santiago, and
considerable speculation rs to where the
| army would land. Provisions were still
running short, and ii l. stated that if Ell
Caney and San Juan had not been taken
the Spaniards would not have lost com
munication with the cultivated region, nor
would the aque1uct have been cut. The
4,
it impossible to save these Positions
He speaks f the destructive work OF the
NcSuvius whenever the bombs fell upon
any paint where there were works OK guns.
Speaking Of the battles of III Caney and
San Juan he says the Americans it must
be acknowledged, fought With truly ad
mira bic courage and spirit. While the
battles were going on at FL Caney and San
Juan tho enemy sent forces against the
whole Spanish line, for the purpose, no
d u5t, Of harassing, and making the at
tack more general.
The casualties OF the Spanish side are
stated 10 be 60 officers and 533 men. He
claims that only 52o men Tended Fl
Carey TO 30 hours, ard that 250 defended
San Juan for four hours. He speaks OF
the lively bOmbardment by sea and land
on the 2d of July. and the sortie Of the
Spanish fleet o3,July 3. he speaks Of the
venture 81 the Spanish Admiral as one of
the great st acts 1f vaior.
For some time the Spaniards did no.
know whether the ships had succeeded in''
making their escape, but having been in
formed they had, there was great rejoicing.
IL was ut o'clgck That the pilot came in
and informed ti1ein that the Teresa Oquen-
do, ard The destroyers had been lost.
The Lieutenant gives considerable space
TO the naval battle, most of which is taken
from persons who were saved from the
L. L
OF Admiral Cervera are noted. The fire Of
the Spanish ships was said to have been
slow, while that of the American ships
was very brisk.
In discussing the disaster he says that
the loss OF the feet had been foretold by
ali its commanders, but public opinion in
the Island Of Cuba required the presence
Of the fleet IN Cuban waters. The ships
had not been cleaned, were short of coal
and net il good condition to fight. The
feet received finite orders from the Cap
tain-Generai q Cuba to leave Santiago in
spite Of Admiral Ceryera's circumstances |
lie says the Spanish are proud OF the dis
aSter Of Trafalgar on account Of the hero
ism Of the navy but TIE battle of Santiago
is much more glorious. The Merce dcs was
sunk in the narrow part Of the channel, to
prevent the American fleet from entering.
He then takes up the narrative of the
condition in the city. and what was done,
from July 4 until the surrender, which !
includes the bombardmerts on different |
days, and especially those of the 10th and |
nth. Al the time OF the surrender there
were 2,1G0 sick and wounded soldiers Of
the Spanish army. The total losses in all |
the attacks on Santiago are given IS follows: |
Officers killed, IS; men killed, 10T; officers
wounded, 50; men wounded $50; prisoners |
and missing, officers and ti6 men,
He closes the account of the naval bat
tie of Santiago, saying
81 have never been able to understand |
the reason why there was sent to the |
Island of Cuba a feet that was in no |
manner able to cope with that Of the |
United States and which. therefore, Could |
in 70 wise prevent the ships Of the latter
from bockading our ports and controlling |
the sea; hut stree it MAS sent, without its |
arrival being able to prevent the loss OF |
the islard, which was lost, as experience |
has shown. from the very moment when |
war was accepted, owing to the conditions |
prevailing taere, then it should have been
prevented from being destroyed, as it was
without resulting in any advantage what
ever
''The only way of gaining any advan-
tagc would have BEEN in my opinion tax
ing advantage of the fact that all the hos
tile ships were IN Cuba, to send a few
ships with great speed, more or less well |
armed, 10 the commercial p5rts of the
United States and lombard them, even
though not very effectively. Ii is proba bic
that public olinion, especially Of those
who did not participate in the war, would |