The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-02-26
Future Naval Construction.

Future Naval Construction.
The loss of the battleship Maine is likely
to have important bearing upon the ques-
ton of our future naval extension;
whether we shall continue to construct
great floating fortresses of steel, which in
the twinkling of an eye almost may be
converted into a gigantic metallic coffin for
800 or 400 souls or whether we shall limit
ourselves to building smaller, but no less
efficient, vessels for the defense of our
ports and harbors.
We have seen, during the past few years,
that the great battleship of the period
the modern fighting craft, with
tremendous guns and an army of men on
board--is far from being invulnerable; and
when disaster overtakes a ship of the kind
It almost always amounts to an appalling
horror The United States and other
maritime powers are constantly expert
menting with monsrous craft; building
larger and larger vessels, with more and
more powerful guns; still the element of
safety to those who man the ships does
not seem to be increased in proportion TO
the size of the craft and the cost. On the
other hand, it would really seem that the
big vessels are more source of danger to
those on them than the smaller ones. Es-
pecially is this true when 1t becomes nee
essary for the great ships to go into ports
or harbors They are masses of immense
weight; they are necessarily hard to han
die; they must move slowly when in
When danger threatens they cannot shift
their position quickly to avoid it,
Within a comparatively short time we
have had instances of accidents and cas-
ualties to great ships which have been at
tributed In the public mind to inefficient
seamanship. The probabilities are that
the managers of the craft were not so
much to blame as the fact that they were
given mountains of steel and iron to nav
| igate instead of tractable ships. The
battleship of the period is VIGOROUSLY I'M
wieldy. The disadvantage of this was
shown in the late war between Japan and
China, and again when the Camperdown
rammed and sank the Victoria during the
evolutions of the British Mediterranean
squadron several years ago. In this lat
ter instance, had the vessels been less pro-
digeous in size and weight the casualty
could, and no doubt would, have been
avoided.
| The biggest and heaviest warship, there
fore, is not necessarily the best fighting
machine; and the heaviest guns are not the
most effective weapons. In the Yalu bat
tie of the Chinese-Japanese war, the
most fearful execution and damage to
the ships was not done by the heaviest
guns, but by the smaller and rapid-fire
pieces. The records show that the Chen
Yuen, which was commanded by that he
roic American. Capt McGiffen, suffered
most when the Japanese got their machine
guns to work upon her. After q few min
utes of the fearful work of the rapid-fire
pieces her decks were swept almost clean
of men. and her upper works were made
sieve.
A warship is vulnerable in proportion to
the size of target which she presents TO II e
enemy Ships of the class of the Maine
! and Indiana present very large bulk to
be shot at, meantime carrying pieces of
ordnance which are probably no more pow
erfu for coast defense than the guns of
! the new monitors. The monitors, ON the
other hand sit low in the water and afford
target of very small size, comparatively
! speaking, and cost much less. The same
| is true of the torpedo boats. 1t has been
said by an expert that a smart torpedo
boat, with not a gun on board and COM
manded by an efficient officer can do more
damage to a warship in two minutes than
the latter would be apt to do to the torpe-
do boat with all of her big guns in two
hours. The small target presented by the
torpedo boat, and her ability to run and
turn and dodge, afford better protection
| than heavily armOred sides.
The question when viii be discussed.
therefore, is whether we shall continue to
! build great battleships, at enormous cost.
or whether we shall build monitors and
torpedo boats. In connection with the
question there win have to be considered
what is TO be our territorial policy in the
future. If we annex Hawaii, and dabble In
| Cuban and other foreign affairs. it may be
necessary for us 70 supply ourselves with
a large number. of great batueships, cost
| ing $5,0OOO0O or more each.