New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-06-08
THE TORPEDO IN WARFARE.
SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT HAVE
BEEN RAISED.

THE POSITION THE TORPEDO WILL OCCUPY As A
TYPE-THE SEA FIGHT OF THE FUTURE.
Admiral Colomb, In The United Service Review.
Our defence consists in the mobility OF our naval
any given point In the shortest possible time Pos.
sibe enemies are then given to understand that u
they try to strike at any given point they must ex
pect that Their forces VIII be struck AT that
point and BY II least an equal force IN , ,ns VEN
be fully developed This knowledge, IN the minds Oh
possible enemies, forms a losical defence; as sney
reason 10 hope for success which they cannot have
under the conditions. Opinion having swayed round
dinerent course in regard to torpedo boats than we
pursued In regard to coast de ence sun,yesscs INC
tcrpedo-boat, as originally planned was just as
difference is that she is now seagoing and sea-
keeping-at least. In theory while the original tor.
seagcing nor seakeeplns. like the coast-defencs
ifcncads and the gInboats. -.
So, when foreign nations built great numbers Of
these vessels. the British Admiralty though mucn
had secured vessel in he torpedc-boat Destroyer
which was seasons ana sraLeepns. ana poSssGIi , ~
profnson 50 now it may be Said that ts policy OF
design in England is based on the idsa OF keeping
BY desire to obtain seagoing Of the highest
speed and the creates coal-csrTyinS capacty a.
feed when these end. are In view. As regard:
strategy every naval Power must settle Tor ,se's s
own coasts or whether IT'S circumstances are sucn
as to throw II into defensive attitude. powerless
to do more than minimize the damage which must
necessarily arise when the fields Of battle are in s
own waters. Permanen OF type In warships' 80
far can only DC naintd 20 long a. me s,aes,
view
1t present we arc tn face Of the tremendous
R wnh~r 81 snposn sn a. M r The poro
iastins POSITION or whether il vii rise 70 power
early date proposed to build rams pure and simple
to contend win and to supsrssde the iron.en,a
and but gatly armored-iust sufficiently armored.
n ra G o ha s' them BY the
battle-ship. Such ship was never built, and It
+ bad one to say s Hp' ann %sa a nse at
early period the torpedo. which had tili then been
was given vessel 10 ITSELF, and from that moment
the torpedo became an Independent threat to the
That threat has been greatly developed in recent
years and the place i viii take Ultimately may
Is wrong % A. published experiments IN Eng
land 30 opinion adverse 10 the torpsdo-boat in the
has been formed upon experiments which do not n
the eas. Justify a. ESpgrm.n;s tried d,s as 9rSaS
ablo the rorpedo-boat attack in broad daylight.
The point here is ha ths question + y,m o 70 ane
thing about IT, We hold opinions which i IS posi-,
S IN SO S Sa whoc position Is
stable than i SENS But IT. Is not oniy nus b uH,
makes the forecast of future naval ciItcult L
IS that the progress of Invention may be- for all
turbing the balance which creates existing warship
design
the immense progress tha, has been made In In;
creasing the propuisyN power Of the pound OF coal
destroyed sa-powcr and there is no reason to sup
greatly adding 10 the speed OF the torpedo-boat or
vessel greatly strens hened the threat Of tina, In,
mposspy nay dssSy 5hs b f IN is 'Gfpsas s
straish,er Longer ard more certain trajectory
than II originally had. and II travels at much
appying he syroseope 10 The rGdler may possibly
extend tn effective range o. the geapon TO one
thousand yards The destructive effect or biow
from the weapon has been continuously Increased
by enargng tho charge.
torpedo boat gun may really he compete answer
to the torpedo-hoat. The Maxim automatic SI-mm;
three hundred rounds per minute; and With smoke
less powder this terrible steSm Of b IRE ia, sure
the Nordenfedt gun could ever have been sup;
sars sn' Re only e T to the opedo
boat. compelling her 20 ADOPT armor as alone ca
Tho NEE great sr arm n Ensana Wicker, Sons
also urder Harvey's and Krupp's patents, armor
OF such resisting power as could not have been
strikes a, the root OF the IDEAS which have pro-
duced the tornedoboat Is quite possible that tho
The difficulties Of forccastins the future OF tactics
are greater than in forecasting, that OF Stacey
matter OF opinion, and Of very loosely formed opin.
Ion whether ne futur. SO hsn, VII ~ or he
tween torpodo-vessels alone. or between torpedo
vessels and battie-ships cn one side ard torpedo.
vessels and battle-ships tho other side. do NOT
myself believe II possible TO hGht mixed Nects. but
Others quite competent 10 Judge as | am leci
confident that " there are 20 he sea nights In tno
immediate future they will he fouSot on both Sides
bv torpedo-vessols and batteshns closely ASSOCIATE
ed and intermng,cd. The decision to come 70 Is
evidently crucial and ornamental believe " can
be truly arrived at by proDer courses or experiment.
But am bound TO say that were responsible for
the naval expenditure of any ration should NOT
dream OF large and sudden expansion until | knew
the result OF these experiments When Encland
awoke. some thirteen years ago 10 the conViction
thar src was = uniqu" naval situation. requiring
domin. nj naval force, ard that nothing snort OF
dornir mt naval force could he any defence 70 her
Emrii. she quite right 10 follow the lead OF
her possible opponents. and n build what they
built only in greater number. But that would NOT
DC true policy for nation which must rear MIL.
,ary more than naval attack. such nation snoulo
closely forecast and by careful watching AVOID inc
risk of throwing its money away on what might
prov. to be an obsolete force when she wanted 10
use