The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1898-08-30


Sampson mas forwarded to the navy
department the following letters which
have passed between himself and Cap
tain Taylor Of the battleship Indiana:
~. S. s. Indiana,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Aug. 6.
Dear Admiral:
THE report of Commodore Schley on
the battle of July 3rd, as published,
gives credit in the senevth paragraph
to four ships and mentions by name
their captains, Philips, Evans, Clark
and Cook, and adds:
1.-The dense smoke of the combat
shut out from view the Indiana and
h Gloucester, but as these vessels
were closer to your flagship no doubt
their part of the conflict was under
your immediate observation
I'm your report, as published, you
make but slight mention Of the In
diana, stating that the Iowa and In
diana, having done good work, and
not having the speed, the ships were
directed by me- etc, etc.
THE results of these reports is that
AiC opNoiho Va "A w.
line of battle except the Indiana have
received personal mention in the Off
cial report before the department, while
the two smaller vessels have also had
distinctive me 1tion, either from the
commander-in-chief or the cond-
command.
IF the official record should be re-
ferred to in future it will appear from
it's general tone that the indiana was
g L~~
Leaving out. my personal interest in
the matter, it is right that I should
consider the officers and crew of the
ship, and I speak for them as well as
myself when / submit to you, admiral,
that the above combination of reports
will place the ship, in the opinion of
the department and the country,
markedly below all the other vessels
Of your squadron. respectfully sub
NIT, sir, that this is injustice to the
Indiana and her officers and crew.
II can say, without disparagement
of any other vessels, that during the
first hour of the fight the Indiana's
gun fire contributed to the destruction
of the Oquendo and the Teresa more
than that of any single vessel of our
squadron except one and equaled hers.
I do not know why the second in COM
mand failed to observe the Indiana
during his period of our hottest ac-
ton. I saw the Brooklyn quite plain
ly.
IAN examination Of these reports
with reference to the Indiana will, I
believe, convince you, sir, that they do
produce the effect of putting the In
diana below all the other vessels of
the squadron. If it be your opinion,
sir, that this is the case, and that all
vessels from the Brooklyn to the Vix-
en- rendered services as much more
49, ~.rh
lished repOrt of the cOmmander-1n-
chief and the second in command, TAX
en- together, would indicate, Their I
must accept it for myself and the
ship; if, on the contrary, that be not
your opinion, 1 urge respectfully that
such steps be taken to remedy this in
justice as may seem wise to you.
VERY respectfully,
III. G. TAYLOR,
Captain, u. S. NJ, Commanding.
ITO the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Naval Force, North Atlantic Sta
ton
"U. S. S. New York,
Guantanamo Bay, August s.
"Sir: I am greatly obliged hat you
have called my attention to what ap-
pears to have been an injustice to your
ship, officers and crew for the part
which they took in the action of July
Bird, and also for the very proper man.
ner In WHICH you nave represented IL.
I think, however, that you will agree
with me that in submitting such a
report to the secretary of the navy,
where so many officers are vitality in
terested and justly proud of their ship,
it is no easy task to do so without
apparently bestowing praise unjustly.
1t requires very careful consideration
of the report from every point of view
to avoid misunderstanding.
"Tbe DOSitiOn of the ShiDS of the
squadron must be carefully considered
to fully appreciate what it was posi-
bic for each vessel to accomplish un-
der the circumstances in which she
was placed. Those that were to the
westward of the escaping enemy were
certainly better placed for stopping the
enemy. and also better placed for de-
livering their fire than the vessels to
the eastward which was the blockad-
ing station of the Indiana.
mo distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide against
every variation of such a Sortie, nor
do / consider that any commanding Of
ficer deserved either credit or blame
because the ship under his command
was faster or slower than another ship
or carried a eavier or lighter battery,
but rather that the commanding officer
was blameworthy when he failed to
put his ship in the proper place for
destroying the enemy, Just In p
tion to the advantage which he pos
-sessed over his neighbors.
Each commanding officer, in my
opinion, was personally responsible for
the good use which he made of the
tools with which he had to work. 1
certainly did not intend to criticise
you, nor to bestow less praise upon
the Indiana h was bestowed upon
any other ship of the squadron.
"Th fact that the commanding Of
flcer of the Indiana was signaled to re-
turn to blockade at the mouth of the
harbor after she had so calamity con-
tributed to the destruction Of the Span
ish ships was only a necessary pre-
caution which the commandments
felt obliged to ake to prevent disas-
ter to the large number of transports
which were left in that vicinity when
the fleet started in pursuit of the en-
There were still some armed