The Globe-republican., 1898-10-13
HICHSORN, ON THE WAR.


boat is not the formidable engine Of
war which it has been credited with
being. The naval battles Of the future.
as Of the past, win be fought by the
most powerful engines Of naval war
fare that can be constructed. The
battle-ship, in spite of its great cost.
win continue to occupy the prominent
place. The torpedo boat will have its
uses, but they viii not be the import
ant uses Of a naval engagement. Dur
| ing the war just closed the torpedo
boat was practically of no use at all.
Just before the outbreak Of hostilities
there was a great scare on account OF
the fotiIla of torpedo-tcats and tor
pedo-boat destroyers which was said
TO be on its way across the Atlantic
from the Cape Verde Islands. When
the war actually came. we heard moth
| ing more about them until they were
destroyed. In fact, torpedO-boats were
not used by either cOmbatant. except
occasionally for dispatch boats, duty
to which other craft might be more
advantageously assigned. The Wlrs-
low, it is true, was sent into the mar
bor of Cardenas to reconnoiter. bu!
this was guntoat service and not the
work for which torpedo-bcat Is In
tended.
AS for the Spanish boats, there was
really nothing to fear from them
Sissbee made quick work Of the Ter
ror of San Juan, although the st. Paul
which he commanded, was exactly the
kind of a vessel, unarmored, and pre-
senting a full side, that torpedoeS
might be expected to inflict damas'
lon.
The Furor and the Pluton wer:
among the very best and the mos
modern of the destroyer class. and ye;
the Gloucester. which is merely a con
verted yacht. defeated them both.
The war has taught US to rely on
our great battle-ships and cruisers
with absolute confidence. Hitherto
the question has been open to fair dis
cussion in the absence Of any practical
illustration Of their work in actua!
warfare. But now We know what
they can do.
The two vessels which. as ships-of-
war, have given the best account Of
themselves. without regard to the man
per in which they were handled, al
though that. Of course. was above crit
icism with all our ships. are the Ore
gon and Brooklyn. and these are type;
of vessels which are likely to become
more and more in vogue. not only III
the American navy, but in the navies
Of foreign powers. The Brooklyn, fO'
instance, with only four inches Of at
mor on her sides. was far more than
n match for the Viscaya, with :.
Itwelve-inch arn,or belt. This type OF
vessel combines speed with efficiency
to a most desirable degree.
AS for the Oregon. she combines
great strength Of armament with :,
reasonable amount of speed and Goa.
which seems to be eminently desira-
bic. Battle-ships will be built more
and more on the Oregon plan, with
greater speed if possible, without in
| reference with their effectiveness as
| fighting machines.
The navy will have to be supplied
| with vessels particularly adapted to
the work for which, at the beginning
Of the war. we We're compelled to buy
all sorts Of vessels at all sorts of
prices. When the war broke out We
were practically without ships suita-
bic for auxiliary service. We had no
patrol-boats and hardly any dispatch
boats. So that steam yachts, tugboats
and even ocean liners had to be bought
or chartered for the use of the navy.
The result was highly gratifying wher
it is considered with what sort of ma
terial we had to deal. But in prepar-
ing for the possibility of another war.
the United States will have to build
ships especially adapted for this aux
iliary work. Some of the ships which
were bought for this emergency can
doubtless be made to answer the pur-
pose permanently very well, but as d
rule the auxiliary feet ought to be
constructed from specially prepared
plans.
Perhaps the most important lesson
which We have learned is the necessity
Of making our fighting ships fireproof.
You remember that at Manila and a,
Santiago the Spanish ships took fire
and they suffered as much or more
from this cause as from the impact Of
our shells.
The war has demonstrated also the
value Of the rapid-fire guns and the
eight-inch guns as compared with the
guns of larger calibre. At Santiago
the secondary batteries of the Brook
lyn and the Oregon are reported to
have been more effective than any |
other portion of their armament. The !
Manila and Santiago battles also have |
shown that smOkeless powder is an in
valuable part of ships equipment.
1t is rather curious that no good /
has been given durins |!
the war Of the value Of the experiment