The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-12-22
Ensign II. n. Ward Volunteered
for Perilous Duty.
HEADQUARTERS AT CADIZ
Was Captured in Porto Rico as a Spy.
but Escaped-Montejo's Description
o G the Great Fight Reports
From Dewey and Sampson.

piled and published by the navy de-
partment. While treating OF events
that have already figured I'm official re-
ports that have reached the public, the
documents still contain many minor re-
ports that throw side lights OF inter
esting phases of the war. In the brief
record Of the proceedings OF the ava
war board an unknown hero is brought
to light in the person of Ensign IL. III.
Ward. He volunteered for secret serv-
Ice duty. Within a week after the dec
laration of war. Ensign Ward went
straight into the heart of the enemy's
| country. making his headquarters at
Cadiz and informing the navy depart
ment here OF the actual strength OF the
Spanish naval vessels and their move
ments. Then he went to the West In
dies and reported everything that was
going on there of importance to the
American navy. Next he went again
into the enemy's country In disguise,
this time to Porto Rico, where he was
arrested as a suspicious character and
a SPY. BY adroitness he managed TO
secure his release. and escaping from
San Juan, cabled to the navy depart
ment a full account OF the state OF the
defenses there and the preparations
making for the reception of the Span
ish squadron under Cervera. All this
time even the officials of the navy de-
partment were under the impression
that Mr.. Ward was engaged In INSTALL
ing a system Of coast signals on the
New England coast.
Ensign Buck. another attache of the
navigation bureau. was ON the shores
of the Mediterranean I'm disguise,
watching every movement OF the
squadron OF Admiral Camara, which
started for the Philippines, but turned
to.l. nf sha atrata0y hoard itself AZ ig
said that IL was part of its duty to
keep informed of all of the movements,
resources and plans OF the Spanish
naval forces through secret agents, ana
IL Is now known that the navy was
thus Informed OF all important move
ments.
Admiral Dewey was told long before
the declaration of war, on Feb. %, in
the event Of war with Spain your duty
will be to see that the SPANISH squad
ron does not leave the Asiatic coast.
and then offensive operations in the
Philippines. Keep Olympia until fur
Their orders" The latter order Is eN-
planned by the fact that the flagship
had been ordered back to the United
States for ~overhauling.
ADMIRAL Howell, then I'm the Mediter-
ranean with his squadron. was told TO
wait I'm neutral waters for orders. ana
the ships in the South Atlantic were in
structed to move northward so as not
e excite suspicion.
The reports of the famous naval bat
. tie at Cavite include one from United
states Consul Williams. a rather un-
, usual thing In a report OF "A strictly
naval character. but fully justified by
. it's picturesque and untechnical descrip-
fion of Dewey's great victory. Fol-
owing II II "A report to his government
on the same engagement by the COM
/, mander-ln-chief of the Inflated Span
: ish fleet. Montejo. The admiral depicts
the bad condition of the Spanish fleet
and defenses. He says that the cruiser
Castillo was incapable OF m"aneuverinG
on account of her bad condition, while
the defenses at the entrance Of Subic
bay were very backward. The admiral
avoided the city, not wishing To draw
fire upon 1t and prepared his fleet foI
action. He says that the force OF
' Dewey's vessels. leaving out the trans
! ports, amounted to lao tons, 49, 29O-
g horse power. 1863 guns ,many rapid hrel
2 l.15O men n an average velocity OF II
= miles. Against this. the power of his
only five effective ships was 1O,lll tons
II, 200 horse power. IS guns very shor'
OF rapid hre). 1876 crew and maximum
h speed 10 miles. The admiral describes
i'm vivid language the terrible effect oi
: the American onslaught on the Spanish
y vessels. He says:
a The Americans fired most rapidly
There came upon us numerous protec
tiles. as the three cruisers at the enc
OF the line devoted themselves almos
o entirely to fighting the Christiana. m!
flagship. A short time after the &C
!. ton commenced one shell exploded u
the forecastle and put out Of action al
those who served the four RAPID FIR
cannons.
Meantime. another shell exploded II
&c the foretop. setting fire to the GREY
IL bags, At 1850 o'clock a shell destroye,
! completely the steering gear. Anotho
RaaaWfn -A.Nl
my flags and ensign. Another shell tx
ploded on the poop and put out of nc
ton nine men. \ fresh shell explode
in the officers cabin, covering the hos
:" pital with blood and destroyed III
wounded. who were being treated there
ie Another exploded In the aInmunitio'
le room. I had to Hood the maGazln
n when the cartridges began to explode
IN one large shell penetrated the fire loon
Ii putting out OF action one master
~ ner and II men serving the guns. An
10 other rendered useless the stlrbolr
OF bow gun. and while the fire Increase
IN as,ern another fire started forwar
r. from another shell. broadside gun
~ continued firing until there were onl
one gun and one seaman remaining un
" hurt for serving. The ship being out 4
% control. the hull. smoke pipe and tn
an mast rlddled with shot. or confuse
We with the cries OF the wounded. half &
OF the crew out OF action. among whor
us were seven officers. | gave the order I
sink and abandon the ship before th
magazines should explode"
The story OF the loss OF the Castill
- was subsequently the story OF the los
NJ OF all the other Spanish ships. an
Montejo resumes his account with hi
N, statement:
Is. THE inefhciency OF the vessels while
as composed my little squadron. the lac
o. OF all classes Of the personnel, especial
ce ~ master-gunners and seamen gunner
nd the inaptitude OF some Of the provision
by al machinists. the scarcity OF rapid al
cannon the strong crews Of the enem.
n, and the unprotected character of ii
en- greater part of our vessels. all contril
ne uted to make more decided the sacr
by nces which we made for our countr