Evening star., 1898-08-24
Alleged Interview Obtained by a
Western Correspondent.
CRITICISM OF ALGER and SHAFTER
Accusation That His Dispatches
Were GarbIed in Washington.
DEFENDS HIS OWN ACTS

The Kansas City Stars correspondent in
Cuba sends the following interview with
Gen. Miles:
PONCE, Porto Rico, August 11.-After
l arrived in Santiago with reinforcements
| for Gen. Shafter and while I conduct
| ing the surrender negotiations Adjutant
General Corbin sent q secret dispatch to
Gen. Shafter assuring him that my coming
made no difference in his command; that
l did not go to supersede him.
This dispatch l did not see then. Gen.
Shafter did not mention 1t to me, but il
was given out for publicat ton in Washing
| ton. 1t might have caused great trouble
and confusion, except that it was based
on an imoossibility.'
Gen. Miles said this TO the correspondent
for the Star yesterday in the course of a.
conversation touching upon the Cuban ques-
ton. He said it firmly and with considera-
Bile suppressed feeling, and from the way
ne spoke 1t is evident he will nave some
thlng to say on the subject when he re-
turns home. In explanation of what he
meant he continued:
Il no more superseded Gen Shafter than
colonel supersedes a captain. If a cap
tain were sent ahead with company of
soidiers and was later on Joined by his
colonel with the rest of the regiment the
colonel would not supersede the captain
he would simply take command of the en-
tire force, as L did at Santiago.
Miles Commanded
THAT this fact was recognized by the
war Department is shown by all the SUBJ
sequent proceedings, for the dispatches
from there in regard to the surrender all
came to me, and Gen. Shafter was not men
toned in them. L have been commanding
general OF the army of the United States
ever since Mr.. Cleveland appointed me such
three years ago, and have heard nothing
fn hali I
of the responsibility
The dispatches from and to Santiago
an snow this, but they were very much
mutilated and garbled in Washington
when given 10 the public Words ,nd 80 eon
fences were left out, which changed the
meaning and significance of the messages
ana several very important ones which
would have thrown a clearer light upon
the situation. were entirely suppressed
Newspapers which reach here from the
United States show that considerable dis
cusslon is now going on as to the credit
Tor moving the Santiago army from Cuha
back to the states. Secretary Alger claims
IL appears, that he originated the idea and
mas already made the necessary arrange
ments before the appeal sent from the com
nandlng ofhcers at Santiago reached Wash
irgton.
On file in General Miles headquarters is
copy ot cablegram sent by General
Miles to Secretary Alger July 81 This
cane was suppressed by the Secretary in
w ashinston, and no attention was paid to
the recommendation CT General Miles
which outlines the plan now followed by
the War Department but for which others
are claiming credit.
His Recommendations.
If General Miles recommendations had
been promptly followed out and his state
ments of the condition of the army been
given to the public when received much
of the sickness and trouble would have
hean hla 5e
follows:
There is not a single regiment of regu-
lars or volunteers that is not infected with
yellow fever, from one case in the Sth Ohio
to thirty-six cases in the 33d Michigan.
After consulting with best medical au-
thoritieS it is my opinion that the best mode
OF Kidding the troops of the fever will be
as L have directed namely: The troops to
go up as high in the mountains as possible
selecting fresh camps every day. If this
does not check the spread of the disease
the only way of saving a large portion of
the command will be to put them on trans
ports and ship them to the New England
coast to some point designated by the sur
geon general
1t Skaters disobedience of orders
and the departments disregard of General
Miles recommendations that was respon-
sible for the terrible condition of the San
taSo army, as revealed by the appeal of
the commanding officers at that point,
made public August 4, fourteen days after
Miles telegram.
'AIl the time 1 was in Cuba, however, /
was extremely anxious to get to Porto
Rico" Gen. Miles said later TO the CORES
pendent of the Star.
The matter had been fully discussed in
Washington before l left, and it was agreed
that the necessity of securing a foothoid
upon Spanish soil was very great. In ac-
cordance with this idea, I left Santiago as
soon as the surrender was complete. 1t
had been urged in Washington that
should rendezvous my soldiers and ships in
the Bay of Nipe, the northern coast of
Cuba, before proceeding to Porto Rico. ]
cCmbated that idea, and saw no reason
why should not rendezvous in Porto Rico
to begin with. If peace comes quickly the
wisdom of this is apparent, for it would
have taken several weeks to carry out the
Nipe plan of campaign.
Changed His Plan.
"A plan was then agreed upon which
provided for landings on the north coast.
1 was to land at Fajardo, on the northeast
corner of the island. 1 proceeded from
Santiago to the north side of Porto Rico,
where 1 was to have met steam lighters
and tugs from the United States, sent TO
facilitate my landing. These did not put
in an appearance, and, in fact, not one of
them has turned up to this day. There is
no harbor at Fajardo, ard, not securing
the lighters and tugs, 1 determined TO
change my plan and surprise the enemy,
at the same time securing a safe landing
for my forces
this the fact that the Spaniards were
fully informed as to the plans adopted in
Washington. They were given out there
in minutest detail long before 1 was ready
to move, and the whole thing thor
oughly exploited before the public and the
press of the entire world. The Spaniards
were given every chance to prepare for
my coming.
IF you will look at the map you will
see that Fajardo is not far from San Juan.
There Is no harbor there. and as 1 had no
lighters 1t would have taken long time
to land my force, great difficulty would
have been experienced in getting REIN
forcements and supplies. and 1 would have
been without a practical base. In the
meantime, the Spanish could have moved
a large force from San Juan and thrown
up a line of intrenchments, and we might
have found ourselves much in the posi-
ton of the United States army at Santiago
shortly after 1t landed. The conditions
which would have resulted would have
been similar to those with which you are
familiar in Santiago.
'I determined, therefore. even after pass