The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-08-07

go.
So. as We have said. the country
would have been prepared to forgive
these American soldiers II they had
Withdrawn from the scene. DO you re-
call that dispiriting dispatch from
| Shafter which threatened to put the
. celebration of the Fourth Of July I'M
der a black cloud spread all over his
country? II was the dispatch in which
Shafter announced his inability to take
Santiago by storm and in which he
called for endorsements. Well, the
facts have been brought to the Know
edge Of the public within half a dozen
days. and they are these-not each
item here given from an official report
but every word OF II vouched Tor by
the highest authority, and no a line ~
il gainsaid since it reached the pubic
eve in the East nearly a week ago.
General shafter suffered much in
body and mind Just before the fall Of
Santiago. 1t was during this suherins
that, on the night Of July 2, he called
a council of war to decide upon the
ad~visabiIity of Withdrawing the army
from in front Of the Spaniards.
When General Wheeler was called In
he remarked that he proposed to stay
where he was, and did not favor re-
treat. He was practically alone In
this. Generals Kent and Sumner vot-
ing to fall back. II was not until GEN
erals Lawton and Bates returned from
In front OF Ell Caney that General
Wheeler had any backing. Both OF
them voted against retreat. Neverthe-
less. the retreat was determined upon.
General shafter," adds the testi-
money we are quoting, in part, from
the New York Herald, determined to
demand the surrender OF Santiago,
hoping TO be able to retire under cover
Of the negotiations which would nee
essarily follow.
THE next morning. two miles ana
n half in the rear of the camp, he was
lying in the tent left him by General
Lawton. He was on his back and in
great agony. He had men rubbing him
on either side. and had come to the
conclusion that he would be physically
incapacitated skilfully to conduct the
ratreat. He was canvassing names
Wheeler was too III, and for some rea-
son General HATTIE would not think OF
Kent or Sumner. who had voted 10
retreat"
General Shafter thus tossed on his
} cot. at the very hour, on hat eventtul
morning of July 3, when Cervera was
irving quietly to steal out Of Santiago
harbor. shafter did not learn of Ger
vera's going out until later in the dav'
; His dispatch, expressing the conclusion
he had reached. was beyond recall; 1t
t had gone to Washington. One remark
able SEQUEL was that, in his official re-
mort OF the Santiago engagement Gen
= eraI Sbafter did not mention with a
word Of commentator General Sumner
{ or General Kent. who distinguished
2 themselves in the fight thai followed
hut who had. a few hours earlier, been
2 NJ Skaters mind with regard to the
( proposed retreat.
2 When all these matters become writ
ten history, the responsibility for Grim
lnal Encouragement will be unerringly
r fixed: where II rests Is plain enough
alyeady. II will presently be shown
z that the Pennsylvania Railroad COM
: many. for Instance. or the New forF
I Central. or one or the other of the ex-
= press companies. or, indeed. any one OF
scores of business concerns in tins
COMMUNICATING from late Aprll III
aarlx lime for delivery-would hav,
4 landed at Santiago five times the mum
10 Der OF soldiers Shafter had, well fen
well equipped, well supported. well de
Tended; and either of them would nave
V done II for a fraction OF the MONEY
e which this country will pay Tor Rnsse'
n A. Ayers rotten operations on Cuoa
VI southeastern shore.
"a Really the war department at WASH
\ ington appears 10 have lone tts yer
worst. 1t transpires that its render
vous AT ~Chickamauga was and is utter
~ mat. that the headquarters a
l. Tampa were about as bad as coul
- be-Generai Breckenridge, in his re
p mart more than hints Il; and that tn
= much-talkcd-of Camp Alger nea
~ Washington, a veritable pest hoi'
ut ranks with the worst OF them as
r man killer-the war department itsel
~ has concluded to abandon as quickly a
ir possible this last-named camp whie'
al IL is confessed, could not well nav
a been worse chosen.
Of .ss
en- II was after the fight at santias
n that our soldiers were held fast b
n: the war department, on Cuban SOIL
at hght for their lives against a MOI
o. dangerous enemy than the Spanisr
Al his worst could possibly be. B'