Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1898-10-26

MENTS THAT ESUlLTED IN IT'S
DESTRUCTION WE'RE PUT IN MO-
tt 0 N-GEsNERAL SKATERS
FAILURE TO GIVE CREDIT FOR
THE GREAT WORK DONE
Washington, ID. c., October 25.-
Brig. General A. w. Greeley, Chief
Signal Officer, to-day presented TO
Secretady Alger his report of the oper-
ations of the signal corps during the
recent war with Spain.
In the first section Of his repor-,
Gen. Greeley devotes particular atten-
ton to the organization of the signal
corps for the war. Referring TO the
Santiago campaign, he says:
Especial interest for the signal
corps attaches to this siege, since. as
stated elsewhere, the chief signal OH
Ger of the army was responsible for the
inception of this campaign, when
proved to be the turning point of the
war;"
Gen. Greeley discusses at length the
physical difficulties of maintaining
communication by wire in Cuba, but
points out that at all critical periods
Of the campaign Gen. Shafter was kept
in direct communication by telephone
with his subordinate commanders, and
was able to communicate directly with
the admiral commanding the feet, and
in addition communicate with the War
Department within twenty minutes.
Gen. Greeley is confident that dur
ing the single month of July, the lines
of communication maintained by his
corps in Cuba were worth more to the
nation than has been the cost of the
signal corps of the army from its in
ception to the present day.
Gen. Greeley strongly commends the
use of the war balloon and declares that
its utility was thoroughly demonstrate
ed.
Concerning the criticism made OF the
balloon operations at Santiago, he says:
.sTha forcing of the signal corps PAL
loon to the skirmish line where its po-
sition is reported to have caused ser
ious loss to the troops by disclosing
their movements and attracting the
enemy's fire. was the action Of Major
General Shafter, through his chief en-
gineer, Col. George Nee. Derby, in the
face of the professional advice given by
Lieut.. Colonel Maxfield, Of the signal
corps, who is charged with the practi-
cal operation of the balloon and who
besides sharing absolutely every dan
ger to which Col. Derby was subjected
in addition, had his horse shot under
him in a previous reconnaissance Of
the ground
Gen. Greeley says that "the signal
corps failed to receive from Major Cen
eral Shafter in his original report even
a notice that it participated in the San
tiago campaign"
Gen. Greeley's report indicates that
the credit for the location Of Admiral
Cervera's feet in Santiago harbor be-
longs to the signal corps. The location
of Cervera's squadron at Santiago was
first made by Col. James Allen, and lat
er verified independently by Lieut.. Col.
Joseph E. Maxfeld, both officers of the
signal corps. The blockading OF Ger
vera's squadron was due to the con-
sentative action of the President and
Secretary of the Navy, based on reports
and representations made personally
to them by the chief signal officers Of
the army. Secretary Long, alive to the
situation, in an official dispatch, says:
"All military and naval movements de-
pend upon that point (the presence Of
Cervera in Santiago harbor).
On May 10Th, Admiral Cervera en-
tered the harbor OF Santiago with his
squadron. That very day, Col. Alain
telegraphed in cipher to the chief sig
nal officer: Five Spanish vessels ar
rived at Santiago de Cuba. Fave not-
flied Admiral Commanding tSampson).
The Spanish flagship arrived at Santi-
ago de Cuba. The Adm El (CeTvera)
hastily wired Madrid" On the follow
ing morning, he added the following in
formation: 'Pelayo and four cruisers
in Santiago. No destroyer or torpedo
beats have arrived there" This "a
formation was communicated immed.-
ately to the President, and by his or
ders to the Secretary CT the Navy, who,
being impressed by the assurance Of
the chief signal officer OF the army as
to the entire reliability Of this report,
proved himself equal to the emergency,
and On that very day gave such prompt
and effective orders as resulted in the
blockade Of Santiago and the ultimate
destruction of Cervera's fleet"
The report then adds:
"A cipher message Of the 23rd states
correctly that Admiral Scnley was
that day at Cienfuegos and Ceryera
was at Santiago. Meanwhile the navy
had been unable TO verify the fact Of
Cervera's presence at Santiago, and as
a result the correctness Of the informa-
ton furnished by the signal corps was
sharply questioned. The chief signal
officer being informed that the whole
campaign was conducted upon his rep
was asked TO verify this |