The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1898-02-06

onensiye and our fleets would attack cadiz
ma Barcelona, but after having taken them
| n would not necessarily end the war. -
might be necessary TO invade ,no oIun na
| IL thus that England has always fought neI
wars. She has never depended upon ner nees
to win her final victories and her nee, t ne ,,d
do everything that ships could do but wnen
| a victorious power dictates terms OF peace
| She does 1t with army IN the enemy
| cnpital. do not, therefore, believe thht OUT
| country has ever seriously thought OF war
with Spain, because she has made no prep
aration for II from military standpoint.
The old admrals Views lev, are w w,nwa are not
| the consensus OF opinion. Hear II as gathered
by washington correspondent from naval
point OF view Il may give weigh, ~, 70 n sn,s
| department itself takes OF probable OUT
break:
In case of war, Dry Tortugas. seventy miles
| west Of Key West, would be the natural base
| Of action. II has fine harbor and is within
| easy touch with ali Southern ports of supply.
| In all probability the purpose would be to
blockade Cuba and especially strictly Spanish
parts of the island Such Spanish ships not
| in or about Havana would be dislodged, de.
stroyed or captured under the insufficient
protection OF other Cuban ports with the
concentration OF the cnemy's vessels effected
| in Havana harbor. the question would resolve
itself into either dash on their part under
cover of Havanas guns or the bombardmcnt
There Is every reason to believe the strug-
gic, In event OF war, would be nearly strictly
naval, and with Cuba's climate blockade
would be the only pardonable exposure our
forces could stand.
A commander of the United States navy,
now stationed In Philadelphia. said that this
would unquestionably be the ruling principle
OF war at first but that before 1t broke
out the feet of the United States within avail
able distances would be mass ed as it is al
ready in part, In Southern waters. The map
be done and how quickly. 1t will be seen
that within fifty days the whole strength of
the navy can be placed under the command
of one flag officer. Key West would have
TO be protected by shps--it hns no other de.
fense-and it is there that the squadron must
have coal and other supplies. OF coal there
is now an abundance for any emergency.
More than 100000 tons are in reserve, and,
although no report Is made of other supplies,
II is not likely that there is any lack of them.
Looking to condition OF affairs such AS
our admiral has spoken Of when the need of
an army for Spanish invasion might be actual,
there is absolutely no provision. Our regular
army is $1,000 strong nominally, but its entire
force would be utterly vaueess to invade
Spain. The Peninsuar wars of Napoleon and
Wellington were fought with armies of 100 900
to 1000 on either side, and one which was
less than the former number would be ut
terly useless and quite possible, If that
strength, unsuccessful in making any impress
sion whatever With the exception of the
Mexican war. those of the United States have
been defensive There is OF course. no lack
OF transport nor of nucleus for raising n very
large army. What else IL would lack 1t Is not
worth while to make guesses upon. II is not
for moment to be thought of that Spain
could invade this country or even effect n
landing with military force, or IL she did
she could not ever get her soldiers back again.
Nor would she contemplate sending them
The map, however, shows the condition
which would exist with reference to our fleet
within short time after war might break
out, and II is worth studying