The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-04-27

wrought, out SO long as a Dattle snip lives
she is the cruisers superior, and should
she meet her would destroy her. However,
mere are cruiser data Of vessels above 1000
tons: England has lis, Japan TO- United
states ~; total. $50. France g. Italy IL,
Spain g. Portugal 2, Argentine 8, Brazil 5,
Chill 3, Peru L; total, So Here, again, the
Latin force is far inferior. So to hold the
trade OF the world in it's grasp would be
simple matter for our triple alliance, and
perhaps the battle might be won by starry
alton.
THE PERSONNEL AND THE SMALL
CRAFT.
NOW, as to the personnel, Great Britain
has trained force of seamen and officers
of over 100 CO., Including reserves the per-
sonnet available for sea duty numbers APP
proximately 100000 men. Japans' personnel
can be safely. put at 10000; in other words
she can muster, like ourselves, as many
men as she has ships for Our force afioat
is nearly $1,000, making for cur combination
a total of 1S5,0G0-say POO, 600 men. A greater
number will be found in the Latin coalition
France has about $4,000 men and reserves
Italy 10000, Spain $4,000, Portugal 5000, Chilli
10000, Argentina 5000 Brazil 5,OcO-a total
OF about $4,000 men. But without ships
men are Of no account: hence this factor
is unimportant.
A navel element of defense common to the
countries we have been pitting against each
other is the torpedo fotilia. 1t is force
which must be reckoned with, though it is
an unknown one, on account of the quick
ness with which it can be augmented. The
figures as they hold now may De given
roughly as follows:
Destroyers-Gredt Britain 145; Japan 10;
United States, 3; total, lis; France, IS; Italy
20; Spain, 6; Argentina, 4; Brazil s; Chilli
4; total SO. In this valuable seagoing type
the Anglo-Japanese-Uni States fleet has
an excess of two to one which will enable
it to effectively dispose of the torpedo boat
fleet mbinatiOn
to about $50 boats, aginst the triumVi-
rates $50 boats. However, England and
the United States could readily, if called
on to exert themselves, add torpedo boats
at the rate of one hundred each in about
three months The other powers cannot do
such quick work.
THE LAND FORCES.
Enough mas been said to demonstrate con-
clusively that on the seas the combination
of Anglo-SaxOn and japanese can stand up
successfully, against a Latin bund. And
when arfhor. armament and discipline en-
ter into consideration this fact will stand
indisputatbe-r To defend country against
enemies Soldiers and Notifications are pro-
vided, aS we'll sailors and ships, and the
two forces, ought to go hand iii hand and
work together. An ideal defense is a pure
ly naval one, for We're the force afloat suffi-
GENTLY great in numbers and power every
port and harbor in Il country could be held
inviolate and the entire littoral guarded.
overhaul cd, and routed as we'll.
This policy, broadly stated, is that Of
moving the defence of ones own shore up
to the littoLal of the enemy. Even Great
Britain, with her tremendous sea power, is
not yet in 4 9Hondition to meet all the emer-
gencles OF, such a defence. So recourse
must be had to Notifications on land as
a means of securing immunity Of attack
from seaward. Unless the object of an at
tack be Invasion, the coast Notifications of
country need to be established only at
those points where they protect the
prominent cities, arsl.::a!s and navy yards.
70 safeguard these institutions against
Commandment is imperative, else the enemy
will strike home
In the event of war, however, involving
the Latlns against the English, Americans
and japanese, many other considera tons
besides those pertaining to bombardment
must enter. The question Of obtaining and
protecting coal for the fleets is one of de-
clded moment Both fleets and fortitica-
items will be required to protect adequately
those stations where the shlps must be sup
piled. This in itself is an immense under
taking, for Great Britain alone owns so
many of them that the drum beats in their
sarrlsons are heard around the world. Bcr-
muda, Halifax, St Lucia, Gibraltar, Malta
cyprus, Alden, Trncomalee, Singapore
Hong Kong, are some Of the gems in this
glrdle OF black diamonds. Not all the Latin
colonial possessions together can approach
! these in point of situation strength and
| coaling facilities. The Azores Canaries
| cape Verde, Mauritius, Tahiti, Martinique
are not of the same luster, though they
nave a decided. strategic value.
plockiide these vantage points would De
| undoubtedly the part of wisdom of the SUI
i perlof force at sea, and to swoop down upon
tnem ana destroy them would be a part of
the tactics to be employed. Forts with great
guns and squadrons of harbor defense ships
| would nave to be the means employed to
| prevent any catastrophe falling to one of
! these places. Already has England attended
| TO this matter more thoroughly than other
nations, and today her coaling and fitting
| depots are as impregnable as land defenses
| can make them
| 10 garrison military posts, whether at
| nome CT abroad, in such a manner as to
! render them independent of the navy has
been part Of the policy of all the countries
OF which we have been speaking. The Dire
bund, England, Japan and the United States
nave, however, while doing their bert in this
direction, not neglected to take into consid-
| Grafton the invaluable assistance home de-
| tense will receive from powerful fighting
| fleet.
| This is not so observable in the Latin
confederation we have in mind MANY of
I the countries composing it are very deficient
IN the strength of their fortified tons and the
guns mounted therein are not of the best.
especially is this true of the entire coast of
| south America, where, though every port is
|
fortifcations, yet they all are so ancient. so
badly located and Of such faulty construc-
ton that the emplacement of modern guns
| to operate against a modern fleet would lie
| out of the question Our cOmbina ton of the
| three great powers could force every one
| and have the towns and shipping these de-
| lenses are supposed to protect at their
| mercy.
Invasion of IA foreign shore under the cir
| cumstances al such warfare as we have sup
| posed would be probable feature of the
operations" This would call for men and
| ships. hIprevious war England has sent
| men to invade foreign lands; so has Japan:
| so, too, has France and Spain and Others.
| Probably they would make the attempt
i again. al
The method of procedure which might be
| adopted isadfhcult to foretell or ioresee, in
view Of the many complicated situations
which must of necessity arise from prose
| cutting a war on so grand a scale as we
| have indicated. STILL that armies would be
in the field and on the sea cannot be doubt