The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1898-09-18

4 1htIt ioA %Ag N-4'-.b 49, - 49,
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Of that state. and a similar contract is
construed in O'Malley VS.. Appellant. 81
Hun, 572
Even If appellee had compiled with al
rules Of the Association. and fully kept
lis contract during tho % months in
which II was estimated his stock would
mature. he would only have been entitled
TO receive what his stock had earned, un-
less II had then matured. The fact that
he IS q borrowing member does not rem
der his stock more valuable. IL he fail
TO comply with his contract OF subscrip-
ton or borrowing, and asks 10 have his
stock before maturity credited on his
Indebtedness TO the company he may
only be credited with the amount to the
credit Of his certificates on the books OF
the company. That amount was only
N.1O7e5. His Indebtedness was S2.695.6G.
The difference is what he owed the COM
pauy.
USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY.
Franklin county VS.. ellis q Johnson
and same VS.. Saunders. Reversed. Opin-
ion by Buchanan, J.
The county judge Of Franklin employed
q ianitor for the courthouse. who was
permitted under the contract 10 store
fuel. etc. I'm a basement room OF that
building which was owned I'm fee by the
county. The ianitor was indebted 70 ap-
pellees. and agreed that they might use
part OF said room. Action OF e1ectment
and verdict for appellees which lower
court refused 10 set aside.
He.Q The question involved was care
fully considered I'm Allegheny county We.
Parish, SO Va. Gl5. ii was therein held
that the inhabitants OF a municipal cor
poration or county are IT'S corporators
and the officers but the public agents OF
the corporation. whose duties are pre-
scribed By statute or charter. which all
persons not only may but are bound 10
know. Contracts not authorized by char-
ter or statute and therefore not WITHIN
the scope Of the powers Of the corporation
are void. Lands acquired for courthouse,
Jail etc. being acquired under speciai
power and for special purposes only the
county is of necessity confined In its use
OF the land 10 the purposes for when au-
thorlty 10 acquire was given subject 10
the restriction imposed.
The county judge had no authority 10
authorize or assent 10 a lease TO the ue-
fondants OF the room 10 be used for stor-
age. and the fee simple owner had the
right TO recover possession.
RELEASE
Lynchburg Perpetual Il. & i. CO. vs.
Felers and ais Affirmed In part re
versed I'm part. Opinion by Buchanan D.
In February 1891, Hun gave oeed OF
trust ON q lot in Roanoke TO secure 5000
borrowed of appellant. Shortly after he
sold mart of the lot to trustees OF church
Tor s. GOO. of which 5000 cost and assump-
tom OF his debt 10 appellant About
same time be sold another part OK the
lot 10 Strickler, one OF said trustees In
November of the same year, Feilers
bought another portion OF the lot from
Hun The trustees after three monthly
payments of sf2gi each upon the debt Sc
cured by the deed notified Hun that they
could and would not proceed further
Sometime between November, 1891. ana
November. 1Ss3-the exact date not ap-
pearing-Hun and the church trustees
agreed TO rescind their contract. No
reconveyance was made. but his deed 10
them, never recorded. was destroyed.
Prior 10 November 20. 1892 Hun agreed
20 sell 20 the trustees portion OF tho
lot embraced in the resclnded contract
the trustees requiring. as condition,
precedent. the release of the lot from the
lien of the deed. The lien was released
by appellants, az TO that portion, Novem-
Der 18th. and onsthe 26th Hun conveyed
10 the trustees. a large part OF appel
lant's debt is unpaid. What property is
liable. and In what ordery
Fellers contended that his lot was abb
solutely released by reason OF the re-
session Of the contract between Hun
and the trustees. by which contract the
latter had assumed payment OF the debt
secured BY the deed. and that this re-
session was with the assent Of the appel
lees.
Held I. The burden Of proving such as
sent was on Fellers. lie had purchased
with knowledge Of the lien. and he must
show that appellant with notice Of his
equities had done some act 10 his preju-
dice. The evidence does show that appel
lants had notice OF Fellers's purchase. or
that ne had an interest in the land when
appellants executed the release Of No
vember, 1892 But 1t does not show that
appellant was a party to or knew OF the
RECESSION OF the contract of July, 1891, by
which the trustees of the church assumed
payment OF the debt secured by the deed.
Tho lower court therefore erred IN
holding that the Fellers property was alb
solutely released II was only discharged
from an amount Of the trust debt equal
to the value OF the parcel released, so
far as proceeds of that parcel had not
been applied 90 the lien. The injury 10
Fellers was the difference between the
value Of the property released and what
was actually paid out Of its proceeds
upon the lien.
2 II Fellers's lot will not pay out that
portion OF appellants debt chargeable
upon IL as stated, the Stricken lot viii be
liable. being next in order Of alienation.
II will also BE- chargeabe with that por-
ton Of tho debt OF appellant from which
Fellers was discharged by the release Of
the church lot. The general rule is the
inverse order Of alienation IN case Of re-
lease OF a parcel primarily liable. but this
effect OF the release may be obvlated by
tho conduct OF the parties to be affected.
3 Pom. Eg. Jur. sec. 1920. SuiclCer's con-
duct precludes him from claiming the
benefit OF the general rule. lie was one
~ the trustees OF the church when the
purchase was first made, when that con-
tract was rescinded, when they made
their second purchase on condition of q
release of the deed. and when that re-
lease was made. He was an active par
ticipant with full knowledge OF all The