The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-11-12

In sending Admiral Dewey's squadron TO
the Malayan seas, the Americans could
have no reasonable aim except to divert
the attention of the Madrid government
and of the meager naval re-
serve forces of Spain. a piece
of strategy which was highly effica-
cious in breaking down the material and
moral forces of Spain.
But now that the desired effect has
been obtained cannot comprehend what
reason the Americans have to retain that
land in their power. Spain is suffering
severely from her defeat, after the pro
longed and disastrous instruction in
Cuba, and she is MORALLY hurt in her
commerce and industry. The Americans
are absolute strangers to the Philippines
and their population. They are unprovid-
ed with the immediate organization neces-
sary to rule that extensive and remote ter
rltory and to exercise authority there. The
tAlpinos have a certain degree of culture
and some rudimentary ideas as to public
administration, but as whole the country
is not yet capable of self-government.
The cession of sovereignty over the
Philippines 10 the United States would he
disastrous TO those having business inter-
ests there, as well for the natives as for
the Spaniards, and for Europeans of every
nationality. Spain cannot transfer her
Philippine sovereignty to the United States
by mere clause in a peace treaty The
United States would be confronted with
war for the subjugating of 100000 Ma
layans. This would mean the destruction
of all property in The Philippines. Trade
anu commerce would be par
manufacturers of Spain would
lose the markets they now enjoy,
their factories would suspend and their
employees lie idle. The markets for their
products would have vanished, but the
United States would not gain these mar
kets. At least they would gain them only
by fire and sword. The case of the Philip
pines is entirely different from the cases
of Cuba and Porto Rico.
LAS to the attitude of the Tagalos, al
ready risen in arms against Spain, there
cannot be doubt. Habits of fighting al
ready acquired, ambitions awakened by
the assurances Of the chiefs, who have
trained the masses to cry for independence
and the hopes which the United States
government itself has raised in them.
would all tend to make the Tagalos the
bitterest enemies of the United States.
1.-THE result of all this would be a war
of subjugation in our islands of Oceanic,
a war which would be very costly in men,
as well as in money for the United States,
war of desolation and ruin for the Phil
ippines and their Inhabitants and in even
greater proportion than that in Cuba a
war which would give to one or several
powers humanitarian arguments that
would Justify their Intervention for rea-
sons similar to those that caused Ameri-
can Intervention, in Cuba
1--WE who have such large personal and
business interests in the Philippines view
with dismay the possibility of this terri
BILE event. How can it be that the Amer
lean people. who boast of bringing intel
/ ligence to bear upon humanitarian ques-
/ lions, should not hesitate in the face of
certain prospects of plunging into such
a series of inevitable disasters? These
would result not in only the damage to
property and loss of life inseparable from
all war but these evils would be agra
waited by the diversity of races and
the enmity existing between them
rendering difficult the esta blishment of
any authority that could keep the disas-
tiers of war within normal limits. All |
/ have said would apply equally whether the
! United States annexed the Philippines or
established a protectorate. The latter
course would either be insufficient to
maintain order or would have to assume
y such character as would be regarded and
! opposed by the natives as virtual annexa-
tiOn