The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1898-12-06
Operations Of SIMPSONS
Squadron Off Santiago.
SHAFTER'S APPEALS TO FORCE
THE HARBOR ENTRANCE.
Misunderstood THE CIRCUMSTANCES
So Sampson Declared, Who also Said il Was
not so Much Loss of Life that Deferred
Him as Loss Of his Ships by
Exploding Mines.

Exploding Mines.
Washington, Nov 30.-Ine Navy De
partmcnt today made pUl'ic Il report
from Admiral &.on covering the "p-
feet off S1nIiaso after the deetrl.tion
It Ccrvera's >q"l,iron. Tho report be
s'ns with Il Dispatch dated on the flag
ship New York, July 10Th, and winds
up with one from the same flagship.
dated Guantanamo, August ith. In
the first report Admiral Sampson tells
OF the demonstration made against
.Aguadores by the Michigan troops I'M
der Dufficld, the point Of which WAS
that as soon as the ships took part n
the firing the SpaniardS disa ppCurcn. He
says that the bombardment of Santiago
on the second of July SERVED no p~articI-
lar end because Shafter'S attack had
been postponed. He quoted dispatches
from himself and Shafter Stating that
it was impossible to force al entrance
to the harbor until the mines mad been
removed and that work could be accom-
pIished only after the troops had taken
the forts. Shafter replied mat he c0ul,i
not tell when he could take the ba;
teries. II they We're as difficult as
those against which he WAS rItt"d it
would take some time and 4 great toss
OF life. Says he:
L am at a less to see why the navy
cannot work under Il destructive lire
as we'll as the army. My loss yesterday
was over 0 men. BY all means keep
up the fire on everything i'll sight mtii
demolished. ! expect, however. with
time and sufficient men, to capture the
forts along the bay"
An hour later. on the same day. July
ID, Shafter again appealed to Sampson
to force the harbor entrance Immediate
~ so as to avoid further loss among his
men. already very heavy. You can
operate with less loss Of life than / can"
he said. In reply. on the same day.
Admiral Sampson pointed out that the
channel of the harbor was Wen strewn
With mines which would certainly re-
suit in the sinking Of one or more Of
his ships if he attempted to enter the
harbor and that by sinking one the har-
bor would be blocked against the en-
trance Of the others. He had hoped that
Shafter would take the batteries from
the rear 50 that he might drag for the
torpedoes, but if it was Skaters earn
est desire that he should force the en-
trance he would prepare to undertake ii.
thinking. however. that the position Of
both army and navy would be made
more difficult if they failed i'll the at
tempt.
Sampson said:
1T is not so much the loss of the
men as it is the loss Of ships which has
until now deferred me from making Il
direct attack upon the ships within the
port"
After the battle with Cervcra's fleet
Shafter renewed his request that Samp-
son force an entrance. saying his pres
cnt position had cost him Il thousand
men and he did not wish to lose any
more. Sampson. in comment. says this
shows Il complete misrepresentation of the
circumstances. He alleges that the
sinking of the Mercedes would obstruct
the entrance of the larger American
ships and that extensive shore batteries
We're known to exist. His chief Of
staff had indicated to Shafter the points
that should he carried before any arten-
ton was paid to the city and the taking
of these points would have insured the
destruction Of the mines and the en-
tranc of the American fleet.
THE PLANS OF SAMPSON.
Shafter had cordially consented to this.
and Sampson did not know why the plan
was changed unless the troops had been
advanced too far to divert. He expresses
the belief that an adherence to the origi-
nal plan would have resulted in the much
quicker surrender Of the Spanish troops
and less loss of life except to the navy.
which would have borne the brunt of at
tack. Sampson tells how he contemplated
bringing up the marine battalion from
Guantanamo. landing them at the foot Of
Moro to assist in assault or to take the
west battery and had no doubt Of the
success Of his plan. He arranged to visit
Shafter to talk this over. but being i'll
was obliged to send his chief of staff,
Captain Chadwick. They reached an AZ
rangemcnt to lombard Santiago from the
sea for twcnty-four hours with the heavy
guns and if that failed to bring the
enemy to terms then to assault Socapa
battery With the marines and CubanS and
force an entrance to the harbor with
some of the smaller ships. Thus" says
Sampson. Il nave been surprised to see
published in the papers any statement
OF refusal on my part to endeavor to
force my way into the harbOr and can
not ulderStand-ln case the newspaper
report be 4 truthful statement of what
WAS sent by hlm-GeneraI Sha tiers send
ing any report of this kind.
Il here, moreover. would animadycrt
upon the apparently extraordinary OMEN
ness with which every detail of hone. cr-
fort. or suggestion on the part of the
army has been published. The unwis,
dom of such procedure is too manifest
for discussion" Continuing, the Admiral
says:
L think that the falsity Of the sugges-
ton that the navy was unwilling to CO.
operate in forcing an entrance to Santa.
go is already sufficiently shown. [ would
add. to show the good will Of the nav,
and my desire and understanding tbo1
in case the enemy failed 10 come I,