Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-08-03
FENCING BY SPAIN,
Effort to Gain Advantage in the
Field of Diplomacy,


1t is possible that a day or two NAV pass
before it is known definitely whether Spain
has accepted our terms for the negotiation
of peace. 1t is evident that Spain wants to
bubble a little before definitely declaring
herself 1t is difficult for her to abandon
the hope Of gaining some slight advantage
in the field of diplomacy, to retrieve some
what her failure in the field of battle Lit
tie doubt is felt that Spain will accept our
terms but it is believed that before that
has been done a persistent effort will be
made to gain advantage by having the
terms modified or more explicitly defined
SO as to hold this govern ment down to
closer lines when it comes to drawing I'D
the treaty of peace itself. 1t is not i'm
probable that further, explanation of our
terms will be asked for, and it may be
that the answer will come first in the form
OF a counter proposition. 1t may be said
with reasonable certainty, however that
no counter-proposition will be considered,
and there certainly is no prospect of any
modification nor material change in the
form of agreement proposed as the basis
OF negotiations.
Firmness on the part of this government
is not likely to result in failure of agree
ment, since Spain is in a position where she
cannot afford to hold out and the influence
of the French ambassador will probably be
in the direction of having the terms accept
ed as promptly as possible. There is quite
long step between an agreement on these
terms as a basis of negotiations and the
agreement on a treaty of peace, but it is
definitely understood that the treaty of
peace itself is not to be in any way more
favorable to Spain than are the general
terms given as a basis Of negotiation.
The question of the disposition of war ma
teriais now in possession of Spain in Cuba
Porto Rico and the Philippines, which ap-
parently Spain is anxious to have included
in the preliminary agreement belongs prop
eriy to the future final settlement by treaty
1t is rot probable that Spain will be per-
mitted to retain ally of the war material
in Cuba or Porto Rico. The disposition of
whatever materials of this sort she may
have in the PhilippiE es will be matter of
the greatest consequence to Spain if she
is permitted to retain any part of the Phil
ippine groups The belief is strongly sup
ported that the administration desires that
our acquisition of territory in that region
should be confined to the absolute posses
sion of one island. If the rest of the group
should be restored to Spain-or should
never be occupied at all by this government
Spain would be rendered helpless to main
tain her government over the islands re-
naming to her if she were compelled to
surrender all her military equipment and
stores whatever they amount to. The in
surgents are already in possession of a
large amount of arms and ammuni ion cap
tured at Cavite. Spain will naturally strive
TO secure permission for the withdrawal
OF ner army now at Manila, with it's arms
ana equipment, to another part of the
group, If the United States should decide
merely to retain the Island of Luzon