Santa Fe new Mexican. [volume] (Santa Fe, N.M.) 1898-1951, 1898-05-02
The Situation in Cuba,

From developments in the war situa-
ton the past week. it would seem
that the army and navy officers of the
United States have adopted and are fol-
lowing a plan Of action in Cuba that
promises to place matters on that island
in a very satisfactory shape in a short
time. BY bombardment, Matanzas and
Cardenas, two excellent ports on the
north shore of the island, have been
virtually prepared for occupation by the
army and navy OF this country. The
distance from Key West, the base OF
supplies for the fleet, to these harborsjs
not great and communication can easily
be maintained, and while they have not
been occupied by American forces,
Captain Sampson will see that the Span
ish do not make any extensive repairs
on the Notifications.
So soon as it was known that the two
forts had been hammered into the prop
er condition to receive the army OF
occupation, troops were hurried from
the nearest points in the south tc
Tampa, where they will be embarked
for Cuba and landings will be effected
at Matanzas and Cardenas, undoubtedly
early this week. That Cuba will
be invaded, every one recognizes, and
it is a wise precaution to have some
| place in readiness to receive the invad-
ing army.
Then, in order to make the fighting in
| the island of the short and sweet order,
it is necessary to have the cooperation
OF the insurgents. They are in need of
arms and ammunition. From Matanzas
and Cardenas it will be an easy matter
to open roads to the camps of the Cuban
army. The present Spanish force on
the island, including the volunteers, is
estimated at something like 300, 900 men,
and it is absolutely necessary to have
roads to the interior which can be easily
guarded and near to the objective point,
Havana. These things seem to have all
been provided for by the bombardment
of the two most convenient ports.
BY driving the Spanish forces from
the smaller places to Havana the cam
paign of occupation will be practically
reduced to one or two decisive battles
In this plan there is the wisdom of saw
ing time and expense, as well as lives
besides giving the starving reconcen
trados a chance to plant what few
crop, they may have seed for or are sup
piled with, before the season is very fal
advanced. Since the one great object
in intervention is to relieve the condi-
ton of these unfortunate people, the
campaign appears to possess many de.
| sirable features. That it will succeed
there is no observation-disclosures gener.
ally accomplish what they set out to do.
Viewing the situation in Cuba from
this light there is no wonder that the
Spanish government is sending out
cheering dispatches from Madrid. 1t il
absolutely necessary that the %Spaniards
should be kept in good spirits, so far al
that country is concerned, If the war il
to be protracted until the much hoped
for assistance from some other power il
to come in time to be of any aid in re
tanning possession of the island, perhaps
Porto Rico as well. No matter how
much damage may be inflicted upor
Spanish strongholds on the island by the
American feet, denials of defeat are tt
be expected from Madrid, and even aftel
the last Spanish soldier is driven from
Cuban soil, some of the Madrid papers
will persist in the claim that they have
only gone home for rest and another
supply of butcher knives.