The Worthington advance. [volume] (Worthington, Minn.) 1874-1908, 1898-12-01
a HISTORY OF THE WAR.
II One of8a Most Interesting and
Valuable Character. - .&r

/ Washington. Nov. M.-Far out Of tn.
INES OF the ordinary annual report Of the
bureau officers is that of Capt Crownin-
shield. chief Of the bureau of navigation.
navy department., which has just been
made public. Not only was the head of this
bureau member of the war or strategy
board, as 1t came to be known, but he was
responsible for the execution of the plans
formed by that board and for the move
ment of every ship and the assignment of
every officer. Consequently no bureau Of
hcer had equal opportunity to know the
moving purposes and exact history Of the
war. The report is absolutely free from
personalities there is no reference what
ever to the now 5happily-ended Sampson
Schley controversy; no criticism OF any
officer nor any commentator that might
be regarded as invidious and discriminat-
ing. But the report is confined to the state
ment OF hard facts. with q few important
recommendations for the betterment Of the
naval service.
The war history begins with the sim
pie statement OF certain precautionary or
ders that were issued, but even in the alb
sence OF comment, attention cannot fail
to be attracted to the remarkable fore
sight exhibited in the preparation of the
official orders. They begin with an order
dated January II last directing the COM
mander OF the European stations to retain
IN service men whose enlistments were
e@OOOI ~ SAlAS, duO those following pro-
Vlde Tor the successful extrication of the
European squadron from the danger to
which 1t was exposed upon the outbreak
OF the war, show how the south Allan
tic squadron was brought up to reen-
force Sampson. how the Oregon started on
her famous race around South America.
how stores and ammunition were forward
ed to the squadrons, and finally they wind
up with the famous laconic order to Dewey
OF April "a: war has commenced between
the United States and Spain. proceed at
once to the Philippine islands. commence
operations at once. particularly agains:
Spanish feet. You must capture vessels
or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." These
orders show that four months before Ger
vera's fleet reached this side our whole
north Atlantic fleet was ready for any
emergency within striking distance of one
OF the two points from which attack
might come
1.-THE completeness Of our naval victories
during the war and the almost absolute
immunity from injury which our ships
and crews enjoyed, naturally led to gem
eral conclusion that our gunnery had much
to do with the matter. AS a matter of
fact. all reports bear out this conclusion
In fact 1t appears that the experience Of
each combat was that our craftsmanship
was so far superior that, at q range at
which the Spanish guns and gunners were
ineffective, our guns and gunners were so
effective that before the range was or
could be reduced, the Spanish ships were
either seriously crippled or their crews
demoralized."
Capt. Crowninshield declares that the ex-
perience CT the war has been another DEM
onstration of the Importance to the ma
ton of sea power. He says that from
the first the only apprehension felt in this
country was on account of the Spanish
navy. 1t was Cervera's ships that were
feared-we did not fear the Spanish army
would not have feared it IF it had been
three times as powerful. unless it had been
supported by navy powerful enough to
have formed an efficient convoy and
brought it to this coast On the contrary.
the Spanish navy, even without the Span
ish army, would have been menace,
though 1t had consisted of only one first
class cruiser. Until that cruiser had been
olockaded, captured or destroyed any un-
protected point on our coast and all of our
sea commerce would have been at its
mercy. and no army, however efficient,
could have protected US from it, It re-
quired navy for this work. and an eff
fective navy"
Touching upon the combined operations
of the army and navy, the reported diff
ferences which arose between the COM
manders during the campaign were salts
factorily solved by victory. One glar-
ing defect of the system of joint opera
tons was found. however, in the matter
of transporting and conveying troops and
IT Is recommended that to secure smooth
er handling of such a campaign, the navy
be by law charged with the transport
service.
The navlEat1 bureau recommends that
congress authorize the increase of the
naval force to 10000 men for general serv-
ice and $500 apprentices, and an argume mt
! Is made to show absolute necessity of some
such Increase. unless the reserves on the
receiving ships are to be reduced below the
danger points; and that was very closely
approached during the last war;
He shows that difficulty was experienced
in mastering the men in, the dep artment
having no right to call upon them, and they
having no responsibility to the navy de-
partment, were not subject to orders.
Therefore the bureau recommends the pas
sage of the Cummings bill, which pro-
vides in substance for appropriations for
the naval militia on an entirely different
basis This would provide for the creation
of national naval reserve entirely under
the control Of the department. recruited
from the seafaring classes, who would be
compelled to serve In war times under
penalty of desertion. The men would be re-
Quired to report once year for drill for
which they would receive one month 8
pay.
Another recommendation is that the sys-
tenn OF rewards by promotion be abolished,
and that medals Of honor be substituted,
so that officers may be rewarded without
detriment to Others Finally, the sug-
gestion Of the superintendent Of the coast
signal service, that this should be made a
permanent institution is ap proved, as it
will afford a skeleton at small cost, around
which a highly-efficient service could be
promptly built up upon the outbreak Of
a war;