The Bellefontaine Republican. [volume] (Bellefontaine, Logan County, Ohio) 1855-1905, 1898-11-18
NUMBER [ 90.

Gloucester took position off Aguadores
at a. m. and awaited the arrival of
the troops, which came by rail to with
in mile and half of this point;
which did not arrive, however, until
20 minutes past 8. On their arrival the
vicinity of Aguadores was shelled by
the three ships mentioned. There were
two rifle pits on the hill above the rail-
way bridge, at which few men had
shown themselves, numbering at vari-
GUS times from 16 to 20. They disap.
peared as the firing began. corner of
the fort was knocked off, and the flag
staff was knocked down by the Suwanee.
Desultory firing was kept up by the
Spanish from the wood adjoining the
rifle pits and about noon small field
piece was brought down the gorge.
which fired four or five times. The New
York, on observing this, enfiladed the
gorge, firing several s inch shells and a
number Of 4 inch. No firing by the
enemy was observed after this. The
troops then returned to the railway
train in which they had come and left
for Siboney at half past 49,"
BOmbardment of Santiago.
The rear admiral, in accordance with
General Skaters request. bombarded
Santiago from the water front, and on
July he received this message from
the. commanding general:
Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now
strongly intrenched about three-fourths of q
mile from town. l urge that you make effort
Immediately to force the entrance to avoid
future losses among my men, which are al
ready very heavy. You can now operate with
less loss of life than can. Please telephone
answer.
This reply was sent by the rear ad-
miral's direction:
Admiral Sampson has been bombarding forts
at entrance of Santiago and also Punta GordA
battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you
wish further firing on his partP He began at
half past 5; finished at half past z. Your mes
sage to him here Impossible to force en-
trance until we can clear channel of mines,
work of some time after forts are taken pos
session of by your troops. Nothing in this di-
| rection accomplished yesterday by the advance
on Aguadores
Notwithstanding Rear Admiral Samp-
sons desire that troops should be sent
against the Notifications in order that
he might enter the harbor, General
| Shafter declined to take action, stating:
| It is impossible for me to say when can take
| the batteries at the entrance to the harbor. II
| they as difficult to take as those which we
have been pitted against, it will be some time
| and at great loss of life. am at loss to see
| why the navy cannot work under a destructive
| fire as we'll the army. My loss yesterday
| was over 500 men. By all means keep on the
fire on the region in sight of You until demol-
sufficient men to capture the forts along the
bay.
Then Admiral Sampson determined
to act with the resources at his own
command. He had in view the employ
ment of the marines for an assault on
either the Moro or Socapa battery and
at the same time assaulting the defenses
at the entrance with the fleet.
With the object of arranging an at
tack upon the batteries at the entrance.
visit to General Shafter was arranged,
and it was this visit which prevented
the admiral from actively participating
in the battle on the following day. In
his letter the admiral stated:
An officer of my staff has already reported
to you the firing which we did this morning,
| but 1 must say in addition to what he told you
that the forts which we silenced were not the
, forts which would cause you any inconven'
fence in capturing the city, as they cannot fire
| except to seaward. They cannot even prevent
our entrance into the harbor of Santiago.
Our trouble from the first has been that the
channel to the harbor is well strewn with OBJ
| servation mines, which would certainly result
| in the sinking of one more of our ships ii
| we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the
sinking of ship the object of the attempt to
| enter the harbor would be defeated by the pre-
| venting of further passage on our part.
i r. bop qf ar
| of these shore batteries from the rear would
leave US at liberty to drag the channel for tor
, pedoes. If it is your earnest desire that we
should force our entrance, will at once pre-
, | pare to undertake it. / think, however, that
our position and yours would be made more
difficult if. is possible, we fail In our at
| tempt.
We have in our outfit at Guantanamo 10
| countermining mines, which will bring here
with as little delay as possible, and II We can
| succeed in freeing the entrance OF mines by
their use will enter the harbor. This work.
which is unfamiliar to us, will require consid'
} erable time. 1t is not SO much the loss OF men
| as it is the loss Of ships which has until now
| deferred me from making direct attack upon
the ships within the port.
First Mention of Troops.
) The first mention of the intention Of
: the government to send troops to San
B tiago was in dispatch received by the
= rear admiral on May %. He was in.
| formed on May 81 that the army wal
; embarking at Tampa, and he conducted
a the negotiations with General Garcis
regarding the cooperation Of the Gu
bans with General Skaters army.
f Acting Secretary Allen notified the
admiral on June 2 that General Shaftel
, expected to start on June with 1S, 00(
4 men.
The rear admiral telegraphed the de
q partment on June 3 that it was very
y important he should know whether th'
o army expedition had sailed. and on tn
b following day he cabled:
If TO- 600 men were here city and fleet woul
> | be ours within As hours. Every consideration
g demands immediate army movement. If de
layed, city will be defended more strongly b.
) guns taken from that feet
The convoy for the troops was read,
9 on June a, on the date fixed by Genera
o Shafter, but the latter was not.
) Rear Admiral Sampson again tele
J. graphed the department on June 8, urg
ing it to expedite the arrival Of troop
: for Santiago. He placed no confidenc
in the report of the "spook feet" an
g so cabled the department.
Q He was notified on June 10 that tn
o army expedition would start that after
noon, and on June 20 it arrived an
was landed, and then followed tn
s. naval operations already described.
!: The blockade established by Sampso
\. was highly effective, and he himsel
1t states that the use of the searchlight
n "was undoubtedly one of the most i'm
" portant elements in making the block
as ade successful, in that it made it impot
s. sible, as was stated on the New Yor