The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-27
ALL DID NOBLY.
Concluded from First Page.)

not obstruct It, T. Therefore maintained the
blockade as follows: To the battle ships
was assigned the duty. in turn, of lighting
the channel. Moving up to the port at a dis
lance or from one to two miles from the
Morro-dependent upon the condition OF the
atmosphere--they threw a searchlight beam
directly up the channel and held it steadily
there. This lighted up the entire breadth of
the channel for half a mile inside of the en-
trance so brilliantly that the movement of
small boats could be detected. Why the
batteries never opened fire upon the search
light ship was always matter of surprise
to me; but they never did, Stationed close
to the entrance of the port were three picket
launches, and at a little distance farther
out three small picket vessels-usually con-
verified yachts-and, when they were availa-
bic, one or two of our torpedo boats. With
this arrangement there was at least a GER
tainty that nothing could get out of the
harbor undetected. After the arrival of the
army, when the situation forced on the
creased. The night blockading distance was
reduced TO two miles for all vessels, and a
battle ship was placed alongside the search
light ship, with her broadside trained upon
the channel in readiness to fire the instant
a Spanish ship should appear. The COM
handing officers merit the greatest praise
for the perfect manner in which they en-
tered into this plan and put it into execu-
ton. The Massachusetts, which, according
to routine was sent that morning to coal at
Guantanamo. like the others, had spent
weary nights upon this work. and deserved
better fate than to be absent that morn
ing. ] inclose. for the information of the
L.
dums issued from time to time relating to
the manner of maintaining the blockade.
PRAISE FOR ALL.
"13. When all the work was done so well
1t is difficult to discriminate in praise. The
object of the blockade of Cerveras squad
ron was fully accomplished, and each in
dvidual bore well his part in 1.-THE COM
modore in command on the second division.
the captains Of ships their officers and men,.
The fire Of the battle ships was powerful
and destructive, and the resistance of the
Spanish squadron was, in great part broken
almost before they had got beyond the
range of their own forts. The fine speed of
the Oregon enabled her to take front po-
sition in the chase. and the Cristobal Colon
did not give up until the Oregon had thrown
a thirteen-inch shell beyond her: This per-
Torrance adds to the already brilliant
record of this fine battle ship and speaks
highly of the skill and care with which her
admirable efficiency has been maintained
during a service unprecedented in the his
|. tory of vessels of her class. The Brooklyn's
westerly blockading position gave her an
advantage in the chase which she main
tanned to the end, and she employed her fine
battery with telling effect The Texas and
the New York were gaining on the chase
during the last hour, and had any accident
befallen the. Brooklyn or the Oregon, would
have speedily oVerhauled the Cristobal Co
lon. From the moment the Spanish vessel
exhausted her first burst of speed the re-
far below what might reasonably have been
expected of her. Careful measurements of
time and distance give her an average speed
from the time she cleared the harbor
mouth until the time she was run on shore
at Rio Tarquino-of 1871 knots Neither the
New. York nor the Brooklyn stopped TO
couple up their forward engines, but ran
out the chase with one pair. getting steam,
of course, as rapidly as possible on all boil
ers. To stop to couple up the forward en-
gines would have meant delay of fifteen
minuteS-or four miles in the chase.
IA. Several Of the ships were struck, the
Brooklyn more often than the others, but
very slight material injury was done, the
greatest being aboard the Iowa. Our loss
was one man killed and one wounded, both
on the Brooklyn. 1t Is difficult to explain
this immunity from loss of life or injury
to ships in a combat with modern vessels of
the best type; but Spanish gunnery is poor
at the best, and the superior weight and
accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men
from their guns and silenced their fire. This
is borne out by the statements of prisoners
and by observation. The Spanish vessels as
they dashed out of the harbor were covered
with the smoke from their own guns, but
this speedily diminished in volume and soon
almost disappeared The fire from the rapid
fire batteries of the battle ships appears to
have been remarkably destructive. An ex-
animation of the stranded vessels shows
that the Almirante Oquendo especially had
suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides
are everywhere pierced and her decks were
strewn with the charred remains of those
who had fallen.
''15. The reports Of Commodore w. S.
Schley and of the commanding officers are
iAclosed.
"16. A board appointed by me several
days ago has made a critical examination
of the stranded vessels, both with view of
reporting upon the result of our fire and the
military features involved, and of reporting
upon the chance of saving any Of them and
of wrecking the remainder. The report of
the board will be speedily forwarded. Very
respectfully, w. L. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral United States Navy, Com
mander-in-chief United States Naval
Force North Atlantic Station"