The Laurens advertiser. (Laurens, S.C.) 1885-1973, 1898-03-08
IF We SHOULD GO TO WAR WITH SPAIN?
"A BLOCKADE OF CUBAN PORTS.

NOuntrteS. +
New York Sun.
la case Of u war between the United
and Spain the island of Cuba
would be freed from Spanish rule much
more easily than Is generally imagin-
Ihls country would not need to
send u large army to the island to fight
Spaniards In the field. Neither
would 1T need to lombard Havana nor
attack 1t in an: other way. Perhaps
the war would end, as far as Cuba is
concerned, Without the Americans fir.
ing u single shot either by land or sea.
Though these statements may at first
appear astonishing, they are the mere
~ logical conclusion to be- derived from
the knowledge Of the real state OF
affairs in the struggling island.
taLZas, on the northern coast, Is one Of
them. Cardenas vas taken in 1919 by
the insurgent Narciso Lopez with d
D OF Americans on board a small
merchant vessel. Since then no fort
capable OF resisting u cannon shot has
been built there. The Americans can
hold Cardenas and from there com
municate with the insurgents in the
country, In a short time the whole
Cuban army may be we'll armed by
them and secure some cannon to attack (
the inland towns. If without such
munitions and with the immense risk
and dthiculties they incur in securing
scanty supplies from the feeble fill
clustering expeditions they not only
hold their own against Spain, but
actually imprison the S~paniards in
their forts and cities it is obvious that
possessing war appliances which will
place In this respect on ii Q same foot
ing as the SEaniards, themselves, they
Will e~xterminate all the Spanish
columns daring to leave their fortified
places and eventually invest them in
the principal cities.
With u single dynamite gun of small
calibre, and with the three or four
thousand rifles received by him from
several small expeditions sent from the
United States, Gen. Garcia has driven
the Spaniards from the greater part
Of the province Of Santiago de Cuba.
1t Is a fact, which even Spanish di.
plomacy will not dare to deny, that If,
instead OF ~hampering the Cubans in
the United States in their work of
sending expeditions to their brethren;
If, instead Of prosecuting them in 50
drastic u manner as was done during
the administration Of Mr.. Cleveland;
ii, Instead Of keeping, AZ enormous cost
TO This country, tho American navy and
The police watching the Cuban Juuta
and its agents, the Cubans here had
been unmolested, the possibility which
now confronts US Of an international
war would not exist. The Cubans,
with no more than 40, 900 men in the
field, and with all the odds against
them, have proved in three years that
they are more than q match for Spain.
With a regular and ample supply of
VAR materials, they can free their
island without any other help from
abroad.
In u war between Spain and the
United States it Is beyound doubt that
tue whole Cuban Army would be on
the American side. There is no doubt
l. either, that we would give them all
the RI s, cartridges, and cannon they
: need. They would then take care OF
J The land operations. We should ouly
t need to blockade the Spaniard s b.
the sea and let them starve.
! or course, the Spaniards would make
T. an attempt with their navy to break
That blockade. The contest would
I then only be u naval one. But with
their capital only eighty miles from
KY West, and sixty from Dry Tortu.
+ yas, which would probably be the CEN
. tire OF our naval operations, is it rea-
] oonablc to suppose that the Spaniards
: could relieve Havana either by stealth
n by force? In u few day the proud
Spanish stronghold with sits Cabana
q ;%ortress and its MORO Casle, with its
8 mined bay and its famous torpedoes,
! could b@ at our mercy, and not very
I much blood would be shed.
The Spaniards with an army OF 49,
600 men, Of which 20 90, coo are reg
;, ar troops, all that is left Of the 200, DOC
} soldiers sent from Spain since 1895 and
L decimated by battle and sickness, con-
brol only seaports and the strongly
fortified towns Of the interior. The
. | nnnnf,p frnr, cast 30 ,uNs t. 4. A.
I bands Of the insurgents. The eastern
part Of the island, including Santiago
de Cuba and Puerto Principe, Is held
: ny the Cuban generals, Calixto Garcia,
Jesus Rabi and LDpe Recio Loynaz
There the Cubans are stronger than in
: my other section Of the island. They
ave in these two provinces 20. 900 men
/ at least, armed and with plenty of am
munitioD. there they hold the Span
ssh columns in constant check, and the
recent defeats of Gen. Pando in Santi.
I ago de Cuba, AT the entrance OF the
} Cauto river, and Of Gen. Jimenez Cas-
: iellanos at La Eaperauza, almost with.
IN sight OF Puerto Principe city, show
conclusively what the power OF the
Cubans Is in the east.
. The central part of the island. that
ia to say, the province of Santa Clara,
IL controlled by General Maxine Go
: hCZ. Inc CUBAN commandments
has at least 10000 men there under his
orders, with Cnrrillo, Monteagudo, AL
yarez and several others as subordi-
nate commanders.
There are about 5000 insurgents in
the provinces of Mani Zas aud Havana.
This is where the Cubans are weakest,
the Spanish fortified towns being near
er to one another and the Spanish army
more numerous. But nevertheless,
they have strength enough to keep up
a very lively guerrilla warfare, raiding
almost daily the most important towns
and making dashing attacks on the
outskirts of Habana city itself. The
"ecent death OF their plucky leader.
Gen. Aranguren, has not abated their
ardor. Gen. Betancourt, Gen. Alejan-
dro Rodriguez, Gen. Rafael de Garden
as, and Coils. Davalos, Collazo, and
Others are cutting out a great deal OF
work every day for the Spanish and
yuerrillas in the Habana and Matanzss
provinces.
Pinar del Rio province, the western
extremity, Is q Cuban stronghold. The
Cu5ans t ere are as strong as In Santa
Clara and hold the long and impregna.
Die chain Of mountains extending
through tho province. They do not al
low the Spaniards to get out of their
towns. Gems. Delgado and Ducasi are
the principal Cuban leadnrs in that