The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1898-10-02
ANDERSON.
His Report on
Manila.
DETAILED STORY.
He Did Not Have Much
Faith in Aguinaldo.

! Washington, Oct. 1.-The reports of
Cen Thomas M. Anderson, command
ing the I'd division of the 9Th army
corps, and Gen. Macarthur, command
ing the LIST brigade Of that division as
to the operations about Manila, were
made public at the war department to-
| day. Gen. Anderson had command Of
the first expedition The following ex-
tracts are taken from his reports:
"On the first day of July, 1 had an
| interview with the insurgent chief
| Aguinaldo, and learned from him
that the Spanish forces had with
drawn, driven back by his army. as he
claimed, to a line of defense immedi-
ately around the city and its suburbs
"He estimated the Spanish forces at
about IA 900 men and his own at about
| the same number. He did not seem
pleased at the incoming of our land
forces, hoping. as / believe, that he
could take the city with his own army
without the cooperation of the Ameri-
can fleet.
| Believing that however SUCCESSFUL
the insurgents may have been in guer-
lila warfare against the Spaniards, that
! they could not carry their lines by as
sault or reduce the city by Siege, and,
further, that hearty and effective CO.
operation could not be expected, 1 had
at once a series of Reconnaissance
made, to exactly locate the enemy's
lines Of defense and to ascertain their
strength
| Gen Anderson thus describes the at
| tack on Manila which was under his
| immediate direction, subject to orders
from Gen. Merritt, whose headquarters
We're on dispatch boat.
The feet opened fire at $50 a. m. The
first shots fell short, but the range was
| evidently effective. at once tele-
graphed Gen. Macarthur to open on the
blockhouse No. IA, and begin his at
| tack. At the same time several Of the
| guns Of the Utah batteries opened fire
on the enemy's works In front of the
I'd brigade and two guns on the right
of this brigade opened an oblique FIRE
toward blockhouse No. IA. Riding down
the beach saw two of our lighter
draft vessels approach and open on the
Holverin with rapid fire guns, and OBJ
served at the same time some men Of
i the I'd brigade start up the beach. i
ordered the LIST California, which was
the leading regiment Of the reserve to
so forward and report to Gen. Greene.
Going to the reserve telegraph l re-
| ceived d message from Macarthur that
his fire on the blockhodse was effective
but that he was enhladed from the
right. knew from this that he wished
to push the insurgents aside and put
in the Astor battery. I then authorized
him to attack, at which he did and
soon after the 23d infantry and the 18th
Minnesota carried the advance line of
the enemy In the most gallant manner
| the one gun Of the Utah battery and
| the Astor battery lending most efcec-
] tive assistance.
In the meantime the Colorado regi-
ment had charged and carried the right
| of the enemy's line, and the 18th regu-
lar infantry and the Sd heavy (regultZ
artillery, acting as infantry, had ad-
Yanced and passed over the enemy
works in their front without opposition,
The reserve was ordered forward to
| follow the I'd brigade and a battery of
Hotchkiss guns was directed to follow
the 18th infantry. Going to the teie-
| graph station on the left Of our line on
the beach, l found the operator start
| ing forward in the rear Of the LIST Cali
| fornta, and / moved forward until the
| instrument was esta blshed in the first
| house in Malate. The first ticking of
the sounder informed me that Gen.
Macarthur was heavily engaged at
/ second line Of defense near Singalong
1T was evident that the best way to
! assist him was to press our success on
| the left. therefore directed Gen.
| Greene to connect If possible with Gen.
Macarthur by sending a regiment to the
right.
"But the enemy seemed determined for
a time to give US a street fight. and the
| Colorado and California regiments were
/ the only ones available
I The field telegraph wire, extending in
a wide circuit to the extreme right for
| q time gave discouraging reports. The
| front was contracted, the enemy en-
| trenched and the timber thick on both
| sides of the road. Only two regiments
could be put on the firing line. The
14th infantry was brought forward,
but could not fire a shot. Under these
circumstances I had Macarthur to
countermarch and come to Malate
i by way of Greenes entertainments and
| the beach. This was at rs, but soon
| after / learned that Macarthur was too
| far committed to retire. The guns of
| the Astor battery had been dragged to
| the front only after the utmost exer-
| lions and were about being put into
| battery. At the same time l received
a telegram stating that the insurgents
were threatening to cross the bamboo
bridge on our right; and to prevent this
and guard our ammunition at Pasay l
ordered an Idaho battalion to that
point. f3A3 M
"A remarkable incident Of the day
was the experience of Capt Stephen
| O'Connor of the 23d Infantry With a
detachment Of Is slkirmishers he sep
| arated from his regiment and brigade
at block house No. A. striking a road
in the rear Of the enemy, marched into
the city without opposition until he
came to the Gale Real in Malate
Along this street he had some unim-
portant street fighting until he CAME
to the Pass De La Calabada, where
learning that negotiations were going
on for surrender he took post at the
bridge Of the North Sally port and the
whole outlining Spanish force south of
the Pasig passed by this small detach-
ment in hurrying in Capt. O'Connor
deserves recognition for this GOODNESS
and bravery displayed In this remarla-
BILE adventure. S}
Our loss in the first brigade was
/ three officers wounded, four enlisted
men killed and IS wounded. The loss
in the I'd brigade was one killed and
FIVE wounded, making a total of five
killed and 40 wounded. The antece-
dent loss In the trenches was IA killed
/ and 60 wounded mntiAf a total loss Of
/ 1872 casualties in the taking Of Manila
This is only part OF the price we
have paid and are paying for this sue