The sun., 1898-02-17
Japan and the Chinese ImbrogIio

Japan ana the ChtneS0 lmDrOSl1O.
Although we have still to wait for author
itative statements in the House Of Com
mons concerning what has actually occurred
at Pekin during the last few weeks, there
seems to be doubt that Japan has given
notice that she purposes to retain the naval
stronghold of Wei-hai-Wei, and that, con-
sequently, China is relieved from paying
the outstanding portion of the war indem-
nifty. If this be true, the situation in tho
far East is clarified to certain extent. but
1t remains TO note how the incident affects
the interests OF the several European pow
ers concerned.
In the first place, it is evident that, If
China is in no Immediate need of loan,
the influence Of England ON the one hand
and of Russia on the other is minimized.
Russia may perhaps be content with what
she has already acquired, namely, the right
to keep her fleet at Port Arthur during the
winter, and to extend to that point branch
other Trans-Sibcrian railway. 1t is Germany
that is most tempted to protest, since, If
the Japanese are to remain permanently
at Wei-hai-Wei, they will oppose her as
sertion OF an exclusive sphere of infu-
ence over tho populous and prospectively
rich province of Shan-Tung. Moreover,
the value of Port Arthur to Russia
Is considerably diminished, since, with the
permanent establishment OF the Japanese
at Wei.hai-Wei, the former naval station
Is no longer the absolute master of the en-
trance to the Gulf of Pe-chi.li The main
point, however, to keep in mind is this
that. II the Japanese are to keep Wei-hai-
Vai ha RnSSinpc Artb md ba
Germans Kiao. Chou, the partition of the
Chinese seacoast has been actually accom-
plished That which Sir MICHAEL HICKS
BEACH and Mr.. A. j. BALFoUR publicly
declared should never be brought about,
does, as a matter of fact, exist.
Nor, from our point of view, Is this the
worst. Three points of strategic and COM
mercial Importance on the Chinese sea-
coast having already passed under the
sovereignty of European powers, it is al
most certain that England and France will
demand equivalents. Should this demand
be made by the two powers last named, and
should they divide between themselves the
littoral south of the Yang tse. .Kiang, it is
obvious that our trade with China would
be regulated not by the treaty concluded
by us with the Government of the Celestial
Empire, but by such temporary concessions
as the powers participating in the partition
may see fit TO make to us. What Is given
one day may be withdrawn the next and
1t Is, therefore, entirely possible that our
trade with the Middle Kingdom, already
important and capable of indefinite in
crease, may be, at an early date, cut Off.
1t Is extremely improbable that harbors
occupied by Germany, Russia, and France
will long remain free ports, even though
they may be declared such for the time be-
Ing. 1t Is well known that the policy Of
the three countries mentioned with regard
to their colonial possessions has been hith-
erto one of rigorous protection. 1t is
scarcely credible that any of them would
long adhere to the waiver of that policy in
the case OF coigns Of vantage occupied by
them in the Middle Kingdom. If we de-
sired to make lastingly valid the rights
secured to us under our treaties with China,
1t behooved us to combine betimes with
England and Japan, and protest against
that partition of Chinese seacoasts, which
seems to have been accomplished. II we
have not done 1t, this is, apparently, be-
cause, as the Secretary of State is reported
to have said, the traditional policy
transmitted from President WASHINGTON
prohibits US from engaging in entangling al
iances with foreign powers. 1t seems mani
fest. however, that this traditional policy
might DO pushed too far. Under our protec-
ZIONIST system we have SO far developed our
manufactures that, as regards certain arti-
cles. wei are enabled TO oundersell our compet-
it0rs In several markets, of which China IL
one OuQhkour CoyafnInant In nonakrick kha
output Of our manufactures By submitting