The times., 1898-10-02

ly superior in numbers. and strongly for
titled. and swept them away liks chafr.
The achievement deserves monument,
and yet neither Gen. Shafter ia his fun
report nor Gen. Lawton. in )us special
report, of the action at FL cdney. gives
IL adequate notice for concise military
bulletin.
Gen. Shafter says nothing about the
conference at El PoZo on the night of
July ,. in which. it is said, he advocated
a retreat TO higher ground. Rumors cur
rent In the camp at that time gave TO
Gen. Wheeler the credit of thwarting
any such purpose, If IL were ever enter
tanned BY Gen. Shafter Ii is true that
after the heavy lighting of the 1st and ID
oI Ju.y. followed by the discouraging
news that Gen. Pando was approaching
Santiago with considerable re-enforce-
ments, there was some feeling that it
would not be possible TO hold the posi-
uon that had been won at great sacrifice
of life. Our troops occupied, for the most
part. the lower hills, under the Spanish
position, and the plain lying between the
Rio Seco and the Rio San Juan. 1t was
not very good position 10 defend, but 1t
was good enough. and If the Spaniards
had attempted TO assail 1t seriously they
would have found it impregnable when
held by American soldiers. The accurate
kept the ground clear in front of the lines
to ,he extent of the ranse of their guns.
TO retreat would have meant absolute
ruin and the army of invasion would
have been driven into the Caribbean or
annihilated in the wilderness before it
could have fled so far. Perhaps it will
not be known, until the time when mem
oirs begin TO appear, after the death OF
some of the participants in that confer
.baf b,,t II ic
well known that the army was gloomy and
despondent on that night and when the
guns opened after dark and told us that
the Spaniards were making an assault
upon our lines, many predicted terrible
disaster. But ii happened in this case.
just as it would have happened In case
the Spaniards had made an attack on
our position at any time, that the we'll
aimed rifles of our troops swept away
the foe as fast as he appeared above his
line of intrenchments.
''On that same night the dreaded Span
ish re-enforcements came. Garcia and
4,c0d or 5000 Cubans had been assigned
10 the duty OF keeping them out of the
city, but they had no difficulty in march
ing by him. Gen. Escario's march was
covered in part by the night attack but
it was performed under circumstances
that should have made it impossible
When Gen. ShafteT met Garcia at Aser-
raderos he told him, according TO his
own report, that he could exercise no
military control over him except such as
he would conceGe'; and yet the vital task
OF keeping out Pando's re-enforcements
was intrusted to Garcia's army 1t seems
that no investigation was made by Gen.
Shafter TO see thar Garcia had closed the
entrance into Santiago. a few hundred
men could have kept the re-enforcements
brought by Escario from entering the
city. and yet the road was left entirely
open, and the commander did not even
know that aGrcia was not doing what
he had promised to do. The worthless
ness Of the Cuban soldiers had already
been demonstrated at FL Caney
The night attack seems 10 me to be
magnifed by Gen. Shafter Those who
We're in the firing line that night told
me that not more than a few hundred of
the enemy took part in the assault, and
that il was not serious at any time Gen.
Shafter himself was at FL Pozo, attend
ing the famous conference, when the fir
ing began, and he rode back 10 head
quarters while it was progressing. The
assault was made upon our right, six or
seven miles (by road) from the head
quarters, and was not serious enough to
arouse even the war correspondents,
y
Gen. Shafter disposes of the visit of
Gen. Miles in a brief paragraph. Those
who We're present knew at the time that
Gen. Miles was in command and took the
/ leading part in the negotiations. but did
not consider that this detracred in any
way from whatever praise was due to
Gen. Shafter for the conduct of the cam
paign. We knew, however, that the
Spanish Commander Toral was conduct
ing the negotiations with Gen. Miles, and
that it was Gen. Mics who made the dar-
ing bluff that determined the Spanish
commander 10 surrender.
The report. as q whole. will not be
considered satisfacto by those who
took part in this campaign. 1t gives due
praise to the leaders. but it seems to me
To neglect the men who really won the
battles, just as they were neglected by
the War Department when they needed
food and medical attention