Martinsburg herald. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1881-1920, 1898-01-29


gagged on that field, does not more fully
treat the battle and the Tennessee cam
paign of which it was the climax in his
new memoirs, "Forty-six Years In the
Army" His chapters on the events be-
tween Duck river, where his opponent,
Hood, began to push things, and the
Harpeth, where Hood was virtually de-
feated for good, are defensive in tone.
An instance of General Schofeld's
habit throughout this period of passing
lightly over important issues is found
in his curt remarks upon the one Incl
dent upon which the venture turned
finally, one where an untoward result
would have ruined all and placed the
nations cause in extreme jeopardy
That is in tho handling of Wagner's di-
vision in the crisis at Franklin. The
disaster to Wagner and what it involved
have been set down in all accounts as
the direct result Of blunder in general
ship. Sohofeld says that but for that
disaster defeat of his fiery adversary at
Franklin would have been easy and sure.
Yet he has never been able to fix in his
own mind the responsibility for it. 1t
would only have been cleared up, he
says, by court martial. Further, the
guilty party should have been shot.
This matter of Wagner's conduct is
but one of many incidents of that three
days campaign from the Duck to the
Harpeth which led TO controversies be-
tween the chief actors and their parti
sans In 1881 General Emerson Opdycle
printed an account of the campaign and
battle which whether original or not,
remains to be answered by the Schofield
party. Opdycke commanded one of
Wagner's brigades When disaster fell
upon the other two brigades under Wag
ner and a breach occurred in the center
of the Federal line at Franklin, OPP
dycke, with a promptness and judg-
ment to have been expected from him,
but too rarely shown by others in many
similar crises, charged and retook the
line and guns, saving the day. 1t was
owing to direct disobedience of orders
that Opdycke was able to perform this
service, an act justified by all his supe-
riors, including Schofeld. 1t has been
assumed that Opdycke took the fate of
his brigade into his own hands because
of a want of faith in the ability of
Wagner, his division commander, But
i'll Opdycke's story there is conclusive
evidence that his want of faith related
to a commander higher up.
Opdycke treats the entire interval of
Schofield's leadership not as a campaign
of positive nature and results, but as a
lucky escape from peril. He says, "That
he (Schofield) was not utterly destroyed
was due to two causes-frst, the want
of little sustained energy on the part
of his adversary, and, second, the con-
duct of his official subordinates, unin-
fluenced by himself. "
Opdycke's criticisms begin with the
first step taken by Schofeld when Hood,
with 43, 600 Confederates, confronted
him on Duck river. Schofield had there
Stanley Fourth corps, his own Twen-
ty-third corps and Wilson's cavalry,
about so, 600 men. The orders to Scho-
field from his general in chief Thomas,
were to delay Hoods march northward
so as to allow Thomas time to concen-
trate an army at Nashville for decisive
battle One Of the controversies over the
campaign, emphasized by Schofield,
deals with this order. 1t is said that
Thomas should have concentrated on
Duck river and fought Hood there.
Thomas said he would have done so ten
days later-that is, Dec. s to l0-but
that his troops were too far away when
Hood appeared at the end Of November.
Schoield claims to have saved Thorn
as one days grace. He admits having
risked the life Of his army to do it and
that he nearly lost it, but holds that
the result justified the risk. Opdyckc
thinks not. With his army on Duck
river at Columbia, p miles south Of
Franklin and : from Nashville, Scho-
field learned ON Nov. 80 that Hood had
crossed his army over the Duck five
miles above Columbia and was striking
out for Spring Hill, II miles in his
(Schofeld's) rear and on the pike be-
tween Columbia and Franklin. Soho
field sent Stanley, with Wagner S divi-
sion, TO seize Spring Hill, keeping three
out Of his five divisions at Columbia
and sending another off at a tangent tC
observe Hood S march. Meanwhile Hood
tIAASW nan HiS AOACb NpCu GpiluS NH.
Stanley was able to bluff his foes until
night, when they went into bivouac all
around him with pickets along but not
across the pike.
Schofeld moved his army back that
night through Spring Hill, reaching
Franklin early on the 30th. He would
have crossed the Harpeth at once, hut
the bridges had been burned. That aft
eruaun Hood reached Franklin ready fm
battle Opdycke says that Schofelt
gained no time, in fact, and uskod hi.
army for nothing He charges him witl
inaction torpor and want Of ability
Instead Of stringing his troops over {
road y miles long, only to be spared
by The enemy laxityr he should have
concentrated in front Of Hood after h,
had crossed Duck river and maneuyereC
all day the goth without Fighting, bu
covering the pike for tho removal O