Fergus County argus. [volume] (Lewistown, Mont.) 1886-1946, 1898-05-04
Gilt Edge Decision.
CONTINUED from Fourth Page.1

a patent. 1t is a general rule that
an appeal will not lie from the local
officers order for hearing in a case
over which they have jurisdiction,
unless it Ia shown that there has
been an abuse OF their discretion in
the matter. johnson ct al, v.
Beaufort ct al, 81 L. D., 122.
"The appeal from the decision deny
ing the application to purchase was
properly taken and must be con-
sidered. At the time such appli-
cation to purchase was filed there
was pending against the Gilt Edge
application for patent, a protest
alleging a noncompliance with the
law in the matter of annual I'M
provements. The allegation of said
protest if true would prevent entry
of the Gilt Edge claim.
L%ittlejohn, the only party to the
entire record who does not appear
interested in the question OF the
determination of title to the Gilt
Edge claim, alleges in his affidavit,
filed October 30, 1897, that no work
had been performed upon said Gilt
Edge claim during the year ending
December q, 1896, and that work
thereon had not been resumed prior
to his relocation of the claim as the
Plattsburg o August q, 1897. The
affidavit of work done during 1896,
filed by the company, lis sworn to and
filed December %, 1896, by H. s.
Sherard as agent or said company,
who swears that NJ. Duvall had
done twenty-five days work on the
claim from January End to January
18th, to the value of 800.
February 26, 1898, after the local
officers order for a hearing, further
affidavits showing that the required
work had not been done were filed,
among which is an affidavit by
Duvall dated October IA, 1897, to the
effect that no work had been done
on the Gilt Edge claim after
December, 1895; that he has read
Sherard's affidavit; that no money
was paid to afiiant for work done
after December, 1895, and that no
work was done upon said claim dur
ing January 1896, which is the time
alleged in Sherard's affidavit. Other
affidavits were filed for and against
the claim, that work was regularly
performed, and the resident counsel
insisted that the company has
proven u compliance with all the
requirements. Even if the work had
not been performed during the year
1896, the resident counsel contends
that the work was resumed before
the relocation of the claim; that the
company's application was a
segregation OF the land and prevent
ed the relocation of the land until
after the allegation of the abandon
ment had been established, in other
words it is stated, in effect, that any
person desiring to relocate such land
would be required to prove the
abandonment of the claim before
any relocation could be made, and in
support of this proposition the case
of Andrew Gibson (21 L. D., 219,) is
cited.
This is not, however, the establish
ed practice and rulings OF the depart
ment. In order to entitle one to a
hearing to establish the abandon
ment and forfeiture of a mining
claim, he must show that said claim
has been lost by having been relocat-
ed before work was resumed thereon.
In fact the very next case that is
cited by the resident counsel holds
that after failure to do work for any
full year, he who first locates the
ground after the expiration of the
year has the better title thereto.