The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-10-24

patch the secretary said II wotA Dc c's.
,,-edE.ahie 20 the navy II the pressnes "a
the Spanish feet vefs net ascsrtaineo ia
.aedsa.siy. TIE commodefe's oispatca esr
partr,ert. when Secretary Longs seleerams
were sens. Meanwhile Sampson lad rsde
arrangements 70 proceed g SANTIAGO x:.a
number CT his vessels. He arrived there
June L
Then follows . historical resume q the
Soirxs os the fee. while Of Santiago. %
The bombarinert Of the ports. OF IRE sak-
ing :; he ever bay ,s a. Guaa.an .an'e. >.
memoranda regarding methods OF block
AIDES. kilograms bearing On the propcsei
army movement g. Santiago, Ard prac-
ticany all OF which IL told in ofnesal fels-
On June the admiral urged ucon the
department a. he had previously done. 70
.,aro he isrcul.v Of blockaaIng ;ha sran-
;sh shsns daily increasing. On June 70
aisoa.ch was received. showing that the
army expedition was ten poFarAv s'o.pss-
d.,ionaf Spanish vessels sn American waters
In memorandum dated June Is the al
mira SAYS:
ERE attention OF the comma ndinz oficsrs
20 the positions occupied by the hockadnx
feet. especially during the day time. ard
II is now directed that all ships keep Wiz
IN distance Of the entrance 10 Santiago
O. four miles ant. this distance must net
~ TIE vessel IS Scaling. or I. otherwise
nevertheless keep within this distance: II
at any tire the flagship makes signal winch
is not visible 70 any vessel sucn Vesssl
must a: once approach re nassrip o. ,,Is
repeating vessel 10 point where she can
read the signal -
Disregard Of these directions. which
have already been given under this head.
has led 10 endless confusion. Many times
during the day the feet 10 so scattered that
/. would BE perfectly possible FER the enemy
20 come ont cs the harbor and meet with
yer~ little opposition.
The commanier-in-ctef homes that strict
attention will be given this order"
The admiral reproduces the order OF bat
TIE: incidental! 70 The landing @ Skaters
army corps JHCe =. In this order the TO-
."The attention Of commanding officers OF
all vessels engaged In blockadng Santiago
"a Cuba IS earnestly called 70 the necessity
for the utmost vigilance from this time
forward both as 70 maintaining stations
and readiness for action. and 20 keeping
close watch upon the haroor mouth. ~ tne
Spanish admiral ever intends TO attem1t. 70
escape that ATTEMPT will be made soon"
The admiral here remarks that much
trouble was expected IN landing on account
az the wandering nrocivities of some az
the transports which had TO be looked UP.
The progress Of Decentralization was rem
dered somewhat difficult by heavy sea.
The heaviest during the three weeks the
feet had been stationed there. owing to
stiff bow off the coast of Jamaica It ap
pears tina. according 10 dispatch 10 Score
tary Long dated June Is the channel at
Santiago not having been INSTRUCTED by the
sinking OF the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson
was preparing 4 torpedo attack to hasten
thu destruction Of the SPANISH vessels. al
though he regretted resorting TO this meth
I'd because OF the AsfF1culties and small
chances OF success He would not do this.
he says. were the present force to be kept
there az 4 insured n canture which he be-
HeyaJ thrNoir4ta above
telegram was sent the admiral explains.
with reference 10 the proposed detachment
abroad tthe proposed expedition to the
Spanish COAST a dispatch from Secretary
Long shows that this expedition vas 70
consist OF the Iowa Oregon, Newark. Yose-
60 to the Azores for orders. The Golfers
were 10 join the feet at the Azores.
On June % the admiral received COM
munication from Maj. Gen. Shafter an
ncuncing that Ne expected to attack San
tiago the following morning, and asking
that he Sampson, lombard the forts at
Aguadores. in support OF a regiment OF
infantry. and make such demonstration as
ne thought proper at the harbor's mouth,
50 as to keep many Of the enemy there
as possible This request Was compiled
that the admiral keep W his tight on the
Santiago water front. On July the fol-
Loving was received from Gen. Shafter:
Terrible fighting Yesterday. but my line
-
fourths Of a mile from town. l urge tina.
you make efforts Immediately 10 force the
entrance, 10 avoid future losses among my
men. which are already very heavy. You
can now operate with less loss OF life than
l can Please telephone answer.
A report was telephoned Gen. Shafter
from Admiral Sampson through Lieut..
Stanton which said the admiral had bonn
ago. and also Punta Gorda battery inside.
silencing their fire. and asked whether he
tShafterl wanted further firing on the ad-
mirals part 'ttC explanation was made
that il was Impossible to force an entrance
until the ckanne! was cleared of mines-a
work OF some time after tne forts were
taken possession o. by the troops. TO this
Gen. Shafter replied:
1T ia impossible for ME 10 say when l
can take the batteries al the entrance OF
. harbor If they are as difficult TO take as
those which We have been pitted against,
Il will take some time. and a great loss OF
life. l am at lcss to see why the navy
cannot work Under a destructive fire as
over 500 men. By all means keep up fire
on everything in sight of you until demo,
ished. l expect. however n time and with
sufficient men. TO capture the forts along
the bay
The admiral then says:
Il wrote Gen. Shafter the following let
ter. and becan making preparations to
countermine, and, with the object OF ar
ranging an attack upon the batteries al
the entrance. a visit was arranged with
Gen. Shaf;er. so thai the matter might be
thoroughly discussed and combined acton
take place. had in view the employment
OF the marines .or an assault on either the
Moro or Socapa battery. while at the
same time assaulting the defenses az the
entrance with the feet:
United States Flagship New York.
First Rate. OF Santiago de Cuba, July 2,
lses
My Dear General: I have your note
Of this mornng-just received az II 30. An
officer Of my staff has already reported 20
YOU the firing which we did this morning.
but | must say III al it;ion 10 what ne told
You that the forts which we sllenced were
not the forts which would give you any
Inconvenience In capturing the city, as
they cannot fire except TO seward. They
cannot even prevent our entrance into the
harbor at Santiago. Our trouble from the
first has been that the channel 20 the har-
Dor : we'll Strewn with observation mines,
which would certainly result; in the Silk
Ing OF one or more Of our ships II We At
tempted TO enter the harbor. and by the
sinking Of q ship the object OF the attempt
70 enter the harbor would be defeated by
the preventing Of furt her progress on our
part
Il, was my hop@.that NJ attack on your
part 81 those shore batteries from the
rear would ieave us at liberty 20 drag tAs