The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1898-12-03

eentinp, to be kept for some three days
swathed In flannel underclothing, sat-
urated with Kerosene. Under this
treatment she died in great misery.
There was evidence in the case that In
some instances similar treatment by
defendant had resulted favorably, but
also that i'm one IL had burned and
blistered the flesh, as in the case OF
deceased Defendants counsel at trial
asked the court to charge, following
the rule i'm Thomsons case. that de-
fendant could not he convicted unless
II Were proven beyond reasonable
doubt that death resulted from his
treatment and that he had such know
ledge or probable information of the
fatal tendency of his prescription ms to
justify the jury i'm presumlng that
death was the effect of his obstinate
or wlful recklessness. and not Of an
honest intent and expectation to cure.
This request was refused. defendant
was convicted, and his conviction af-
iirmed by the appellate court, who, by
Holmes j.. said that the language Of
ThumsOn'S case relied upon by defend
ant viz, that ITO constitute man
slaughter the killing must have been
consequence of some unlawful act.
Now there IL no law which prohibits
any man from prescribing for Il sick
person, with his consent If he honest
~ intends to cure him by his prescrip-
t,nu"--was ambiguous and wrong. II
II meant that the killing must he the
consequence of an act which is un-
lawful for independent reasons apart
from its likelihood to kill" such"
continued the court. may once have
been the law; but for a long time it
has been just as fully, ana latterly. We
may add. much more willingly, recug-
nizrd that man may commit murder
ur manslaughtrr by doing otherwise
lawful acts recklessly, as that he may
10y doing acts unlawful for Independent
reasons. from which death accidental
~ rnSurs." Thomsons ease. it was
said. did not intend to lay down new
law. hut cited and meant to follow
Lord Hale. whom it had taken no lit
orally. since his lordship admitted that
other persons might make themselves
liable by reckless conduct u v. G..
472l and why not ~ physician as Wen'
THE TRUE STANDARD.
As to what constitutes criminal reCk-
substantially that the standard H. not
gauged by the actors belief or idea Of
danger but by common experiences. IF
the thing done "is generally supposed
to be universally harmless and
only a specialist would furesee that in
given case it would do damage, Il per-
son who did not foresee it and who had
no warning would not he held liable
for the harm. The use of the
thing must be dangerous according to
common experience. at least to the eX-
tent that there is manifest and APP
preciable chance of harm from what is
done, i'm view either uf the actors
knowledge or of his conscious ignor-
ance. Common experience is
necessary to the man of ordinary pru-
dence. and man who assumes to act
us the defendant did must have it at
his peril The defendant knew
he was using Kerosene. The jury have
found that it was applied as the result
nf foolhardy presumption or gross neg
ligence. and that is enough. "
Indeed, if the defendant had known the
fatal tendency of the prescription, he
would have been perilouslv near the
line of murder" The rule laid down in
this carefully reasoned case must COM
~ amounts only To this-that if one
| unVerSed and unskilled in medical sci
ence and practice undertakes. never
theless, the cure of a patient, and in
So doing uses remedies ur adopts "A
Observation-Disclosures positive or mega
tive ought 10 make no differcnce-from
| which there is a manifest and appreCi-
! able chance of harm according to COM
aNn hn oh a la
for his recklcssness and shall not he
excused by the innocence of his inten-
! tiop. And certainly when part of the
treatment adopted is the exclusion of
| proper treatment, this is just as harm
ful as If positively injurious methods
We're adopted. 1t is just as much homi-
| eide to cause death by starvation by
| keeping food from the victim, as to use
an active poison.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.
How does this principle apply to
| "Christian science" faith cure" ol
| any ecce"tric treatment of the sick
| that 10y operating strongly on the mind
| may restore the lost equilibrium? Is
| the pursuit of any nf these methods
practice Of medicine"
While the ordinary quack. who. as
| has been said. pretends only to extra
| ordinary human skill or knowledge ia
| therefore. generally held to be praC.
! titioner Of medicine, Christian scient.
! lists. who 90 further and pretend t.
| procure for lucre divine intervention
! by their prayers, contend that in thus
offering to heal the sick. although fol
! hire, they are not praCticing medicine
| but observing religious rites and are
| therefore protected in their practices BY
constitutional safeguards. We are thus
! brought To consider what is the "praC.
! tiCe of medicine" The answer to this
query must depend in most instances
upon the words OF the statute and thu
| peculiar circumstances of the case. In
the New York case of Smith V. Lane
GA Hun, G32, A. d. lSSD. plaintiff, ap.
parently masseur, sued for agreed
fees which defendant refused to pay
on the ground that plaintiff, not beinl
licensed to practice medicine. could no
recover compensation for his treatment
which, as the opinion of the court re,
cites. consisted entirely of manpula
tion with the hand. 1t was performed
by rubbing, kneading, and pressure
The court said:
DEFINITIVE.
THE practice of medicine is pur.
suit very generally known and under
stood, and so also is that of surgery
| The former includes the application
and use of medicines and drugs for the
purpose Of curing, mitigating. or allie
waiting bodily diseases; while the
functions of the latter are limited tc
manual operations, usually performed
by surgical instruments or appliances
To allow incompetent or un,
qualified persons To administer or ap