The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-06-21
Why We Mood tho philippines.

That the Philippines win be ours by
right Of conquest Is certain, and we may
also take for granted that neither Russia
nor Great Britain, which are the two prin-
cipal powers in the Far East, will permit
any interference with our occupation of
them. We are told, however, in certain
quarters hat we ought not to retain them,
for the reason that such retention would
run counter to our national traditions,
largely founded on WAsHINGToN's farewell
address. Let us see what basis there Is for
this assertion.
With regard to the so-called traditions,
It should be enough to say that WASHING
TON, who In political affairs was prudence
personifed, was the last man in the world
to presume to lay down the rules by which
his country must be governed a century
after his death. When he penned his fare
we'll address, he was dealing with a situa-
ton then existing, and not with one of
which he could have no premonition. At
the time when he warned us against en-
tsnglement in foreign complications, our
nation was in It's infancy and surrounded
by dangers, hedged in as 1t was on the
north, west and south by the possessions Of
European powers. He could not ~foresee
that the acquisition Of Florida and of
the whole vast stretch of territory
between the Mississippi and the Pa
ciic would relieve us forever from men.
ace on the south and west, and that on the
north the relatively slow growth of Canada
would render that country a hostage rather
than source Of peril. Neither could he pos
sibly ~foresee the present extent of our trade
with the Middle Kingdom, a trade which
places US high in the list of the Western
peoples, the commercial interests of which
will be materially affected by China's fate.
Much less could the wisest man a hundred
years ago forecast the immense develop.
ment which may be expected in the next
generation for our trade with the Celestial
Empire, when to the natural resources of
that country shall have been applied the
stimulus of steam and electricity.
1t is certain that WAsHINGToN's contem.
poraries did not hesitate to risk collision
with transatlantic powers by the employ
ment of our navy for the protection of our
against encroachment. While
he was yet alive, we were engaged for two
years in a naval war with France, in the
course of which We made many captures.
Our expeditions against the Barbary States
were sanctioned by both the Federalist and
Democratic-R Republican parties. The war
OF 1912 against England was ardently
supported by the great majority of our
sountrymen, and II In the course of that
contest we had managed to take the Ber-
mudas, the Bahamas, or the British West
Indies, we should undoubtedly have tried to
keep them. In so doing we should have fol.
lowed the precedent set by the Continental
Congress, which evinced well nigh as ear.
nest a desire to gain possession of the Der.
mudas as of Canada. The Continental Con-
gress rightly held the ownership of islands
near, or in, the Caribbean. of great impor.
lance to the maintenance of our trade with
the Antilles and with Central and South
America. What the Bermudas were in
the eyes of the Continental Congress, the
Philippines ought to be in our eyes to-day,
for the reason that, II we leave out Cuba
and Porto Rico, our trade with the An.
titles, and with the so-called Spanish Main,
ia OF less value, from an actual and prospec-
tive point of view, than is our trade with
the Far East.
But II even in the days of WASHINGTON,
which coincided with the age of sailing
ships, American statesmen recognized the
usefulness OF islands, considered as stations
for repair and for rcvquipmcnt with food
and ammunition, how much more should Il
be recognized to-day in the ago of steam |
That, which in neighboring Atlantic wa.
tiers was not unrcasonably coveted q cen.
fury and a quarter ago on grounds of con.
venience, has now, in view of the breadth
OF the Pacific. and of the limited coal ca.
pacity of steamships, become absolute.
ly indispensable. Unless we acquire in the
waters of the Far Fast some means
OF renewing the coal supplies of our
ships OF war, we cannot hope long to safe.
guard even our present trade with China
much less To enforce our just claim to share
the commercial and industrial privileges
which may frola time to time be- conceded
to foreigners by the Pekin Government. II
may DO said that, inasmuch as the United
States side with England in desiring to
maintain the territorial integrity of the