The times., 1898-10-09
7HE FUTURE OF CUBA
As Seen Through the Glasses
of the Junta.
SIX MONTHS OF OUR RULE
The Spokesman of the Cuban Junfa
In New York Gives an Outline of
the Impending Events on the ISL
and-America VIII Be Tolerate
for Six Months Only.


ton on the part of the insurgents, OF
! their refusal to disarm and disband. of
rejection of work, of desertion 10 guer-
Has. and of animosity toward Ameri-
can occupation. led Horatio S. Rubens,
the spokesman of the Junta, to discuss
the probable course of events in Cuba
and the situation in general. To the New
York Evening Post he said:
What must precede everything else Is.
! of course, the evacuation of the island
/ by the Spanish troops and officials When
I that shall be finally accomplished, no one
: can say with any certainty. We know
I how long it took the Spanish Transat-
lantic Steamship Company to remove to
/ Spain the 10000 Spanish soldiers who sur
rendered at Santiago. To get away the
/ 10000 still remaining in various parts OF
the island will obviously take much
longer time. What, however, is likely to
delay the evacuation much more than the
physical difficulties, or than the inevita-
BILE Spanish inactivity and procrastina-
/ ton, Is the indispositiOn of the Spanish
officials, military and civil. TO Quit the
+ island. There is no question that they
1 viii hang on as long possible They
/ continually hope for complications to
arise which may renew their tenure of
the island-a hope against hope il is
true; but IT is human and especially
Spanish. to indulge in that species Of de-
lusion- In addition, it is greatly TO the
interest of the Spanish officials 10 pro-
long their possession Of office and power
as long as practicable. Ii means putting
money in their purse so long as they re-
tain control OF the custom houses. It Is
! their last whack at the spoils of Cuba,
on which they have fattened for cen
( turies. and they are assuredly going to
I make the most OF it. 1t is 10 be expected.
/ therefore, that the Spanish evacuation
will be a long-drawn-out affair. unless ac-
celebrated with determination by the Unit
ed States
Well after that long Ionged-for event
has transpired. and Cuba at last breathes
in an atmosphere uncontaminated by the
1 dominance of the Spaniard. a complete
/ military government of the United States
viii follow Possibly the Cubans did not.
from the beginning, foresee the necessity
Of such government, but row they per-
eeive-at least the leading and represen-
tative Cubans-that il is an unavoidable
course, and really in the interest Of the
island. AT first it may have seemed to
suggest an intended departure BY the
United States from the promise so.emnly
made TO establish an independent form of
government in the island and then to
Withdraw its forces. Some alarm may
have momentariIy arisen as the result OF
this seeming; but the second thought OF
the Cubans cOnvinces them that the
United States has no notion of repudiat-
ing its pledges; that this Government Is
to be implicitly trusted. and that al
though everything may not be done in
precisely the way Cubans may have con-
ceived as the natural and proper way,
the end of it all viii be the erection OF a
government free and independent rep
resentative, and with all the elements
and promise of stability.
The military occupation and admins
tration of the islands are therefore. fully
J accepted as a fOregOne conclusion. How
long ought it TO last? Certainly no
longer than is necessary TO establish order
and the native government How
long that VIII be il is difficult to pro-
nOunce- Expressing. however, what seems
to me the most intelligent and representa-
tive Cuban expectation on the subject. I
ought to be ample time for the perform
ance of everything requiring to be done
by the United States. A much longer Pc
riod Of occupation would assuredly seem
10 representative Cubans needless al
though in speaking Of the future one must
ailo"- for the bearing Of circumstances
which may arise and are now unforeseen
What really appears to be uncalled for at
this time is the sending of so large an
army OF occupation as is now contem-
plated-6e,0 ,0o9 men. Cubans although not
disposed 10 quarrel about it. are unable to
understand why a force of that size
| should be employed. There is nothing in
the situation. TO their thinking to warrant
the landing of such an army.
The Spanish troops are glad enough to
go back to Spain, and when they are gone
who viii remain to be opposed or sup
! pressed by 60, 900 men? Only the Cuban
people. with perhaps some guerrfIIas.
: partly Spanish, partly Cuban, il may be.
: But the Cuban people themselves win at
tend to all outlaws and bandits II ia
true that before the war bandits receiv-
ed a semi-toleration. and even protection,
from the native population, because they
= were looked upon as the enemies OF
Spanish law and government, and because
they did, in fact direct their chief o-era-
, | tiOns against the Spanish. The expu sion
: of Spain changes all that. Today tha
a / oSIldll Is reSdFded Dy the CUBAN people
e no longer as the enemy of Spain. but OF
themselves, and they can be counted upon
: to suppress him with rigor. The Ameri-
: can army will. therefore have Unly the
Cubans to deal with. and as they are
h trusting both the policy and the honor OF
the United States. and are awaiting with
Il patience the cOnSUmmation of all its
plans. they fail to comprehend the need
} of $1,000 soldiers in the island Moreover.
It they are of the opinion that when th-
American Commissioners have studied
e the situation there more fully. they viii
recognize the superfiuoCsness. not to say
5 the absurdity. of quarterfng IN the island
: such an enormous body of troops How
ever, even this is looked upon as a small
1t matter. If to America it seems best q
employ such a force in peaceful occupa
IL tion. well and good; the wisdom. equal!
r with the faithful intentions OF Americ a
is trusted.
e But such are the peculiarly close ant
1t fraternal relations of the American ant
Cuban people that what would seen
II anomalous in any other case win TO
10 seem so in this Strictly speaking, Amer
> lean troops in Cuba after the establish
ment of the republic would be a fOreisl
ID army but friendly, allied, foreign army
ID Its functions would be recognized by in
telIigent and controlling Cubans as neces
re sary 10 afford TO the world that suaraT
1f tee of security and stability in Cuba
which was secured and given when III
e. United States interfered 1t would be I
Z Cuban eyes a guarantee which was no
really needed. but which might seem I
is foreign powers as due from the Unite
es States. For the sake of the Unite
nd he IiSCharra nf ifs full i1l.li