The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-07-13
Possibility that Sagasta Will he
Forced to Accept Responsibility of
Deciding for Peace or War.
SIGNIFICANT UTTERANCES
SAGAsTA REPORTED AS SAYING
THERE is NO REMEDY BUT PEACE.
Alleged Authoritative Announcement
gIe-NO Overtures for Truce.

LONDON. July 13.-The Madrid cor
respondent of the Times says; "The crisis
hangs fire. The ministers still meet in coun-
ell and the difficulties of retirement seem
even greater than the difficulties of remain
ing in office. The Conservatives are not
prepared to accept Office and it Is hard to
imagine a Liberal Cabinet without an un-
disputed Liberal leader. The logical con-
clusion is that Senor Segasta must accept
the responsibility of deciding whether or
is required is that he should make up his
mind on that essential point. If he reso-
lutely adopts peace policy nearly all his
colleagues will support him, and for those
who do not substitutes can be found. If,
on the contrary, he decides to continue the
struggle he must largely remodel the Cab
met. For the moment he appears to hesi-
tate between the two courses, perceiving
clearly, no doubt, by the light of his long
experience in political life, the dangers of
both. On the one hand, general public opin-
ion seems now decidedly in favor Of peace
Nearly all the influential papers recognize
that the supplies in Cuba are not nearly
so great as was supposed; that Porto Rico
could not long resist formidable attack;
that, since America has now obtained un-
disputed command of the sea, Spain cannot
longer assist her colonies in their efforts
against a powerful invader and that
she will obtain better conditions
now than when her powers of existence are
completely exhausted. On the other hand
military circles still favor holding out and
are beginning to very violent war Ian
guage The three chief military organs all
publish articles urging resistance to the ut
termost and employing against the part.
isans of peace terms Of invective which l
refrain from reproducing. If they repre-
sent faithfully the general state of feeling
in the army l can understand at least one
of the reasons why Senior Sagasta hesitates
to adopt a resolute peace policy.
'In the course of his long political life
Sagasta has lived under all kinds of gov
ernments-from repressive absolutism to
anarchical republcanism; and he has taken
an active part in more than one revolution
No man is more capable of gauging accu-
rately the real Importance of any current Of
public opinion and of weighing accurate
ly internal against external dangers. His
hesitation, however cannot continue much
longer. for a majority of his colleagues i'm
sist upon some decision being taken with
out further delay,
1.-The newspapers to-day quote long ex-
tracts from an important work on Cuba
published by General Polavieja, who spent
twenty years there rising from the rank
of subieutenant to be captain general, be-
sides filling with distinction several inn
portant civil posts, including the governor
generalship. 1t is rather surprising TO find
from his correspondence that his political
views differed radically from those of OFF,
cal circles in Madrid At comparatively
early period General Polavieja arrived at
the conclusion that Cuba could not remain
permanently a Spanish colony. When this
conviction rpened he wrote endless
letters TO private and official friends
urging the necessity of making
timely preparations for an amicable
separation. In 1879, when governor
Of Puerto Principe, he wrote General Blan-
co explaining the cubans would never aban-
don their efforts for independence and the
United States would never relax its schemes
for annexation. lie argued. therefore, that
Spain ought to prepare to grant independ-
ence in order to avoid being elected violent
ly with loss to the national interests and
stain TO the national honor. When he be-
came Governor General Polavieja, perceiv-
ing the ever growing danger of an American
attack, urged the government to build six
cruisers and twenty floating batteries for
the protection of the Cuban coast. His
policy in short was to grant friendly inde-
pendence as soon as possible. but so long
as Spain retained the island. to be strong
enough to suppress insurrection and to re-
slst foreign INVASION
The Madrid correspondent of the Daily
Mail says: "scnor Segasta. on being asked
whether a decision had been taken regard
ing peace. replied: No: but what remedy
can there be but to make peace? The
Ministeriaists assert the regular army in
Cuba does not object to a conclusion OF
peace. but that the twenty-thousand volun-