Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-07-28
SOME DANGERS APPREHENDED
This Government Must Act Inde-
pendentIy of Other Powers.
A WAR OF T RIFF +


the end. we have accomplished a series of
victories 1t was apprehended at the be-
ginning that. inasmuch as this government
| was not prepared for war, we might not be
| entirely exempt from injury at the outset
Even this slight apprehension was not real
| lied, and at this hour 1t is apparent to the
| whole world that should the war be pro-
| tracted Indefinitely Spain would be incapa-
| Die Of infiictlng any damage upon US.
Some Dangers Apprchended.
The dangers attending a peace settle
ment appear differently to different per-
| sons. There are some very able men, both
IN and out of Congress, who dread the de-
Velopment of ambition and think that the
dream Of empire is liable to disease Our
| imagination and lead us into tangled ways,
which, in prospective view, they think the
wisdom of our forefathers anticipated and
warned US against. Others see only dam
ger Of conflict through antagonizing some
| foreign interest.
The danger that is apprehended by some
of the most studious and thoughtful men
in public life is that in trying to avoid the
ambition of empire and the danger of Of
Tending our neighbor we will fall upon a
| much less apparent but greater evil. 1t is
quite apparent to them that the real evil
Of "entangling alliances" and that which
was apparent to the founders OF the gov
ernment, was that such entanglements
would Interfere with our perfect liberty Of
action. Without that alliances woulI only
strengthen. The thing which the very ma
ture of our government demands and which
1t cannot exist without, is liberty of action.
To acknowledge the right of any other ma
ton to direct or even to advise our course
would be to compromise the very principles
on which our government is founded. 4
very little yielding on this point might
prove sufficient to destroy oar isolated in
dependence. An alliance would limit our
liberty of action only with respect to the
subjects of the alliance, but the recogni-
ton of general interest in AMI power over
our action by any or ali other nations
| would completely destroy national inde-
pendence.
Must Act independently.
In the peace settlement with Spain it is
felt that the greatest danger lies in the
possibility of the interests or wishes of
other nations being taken into considera-
ton to the extent of obviously influencing
| our action. Not all who are apprehensive
on this score are in favor of territorial ey-
pansion They merely desire that This
government shall act entirely of its own
motion in whatever settlement is agreed
upon and that no suggestion from nor con-
sioeration of what some other government
may wish or dc shall be given weight. The
suggestion that the Philippines, being taken
from Spain, shall be divided among other
nations, or that a joint protectorate, in
which the United States would be associ-
ated with other nations, is received with
the greatest possible disfavor !, is fell
that the only considerations that can safe
ly be taken into account in framing a
treaty of peace with Spain are first, what
is just as between the two nations directly
concerned, and second, what our own in
terests require. An attempt to appear mag
unanimous toward Spain might be misunder-
stood and lead to evil results in our future
dealings with that or some other nation
But generosity toward Spain, though car
ried to an absurd extreme could not have
any small part of the evil possibilities that
would surround granting the privilege to
any other power to participate in ana be a
beneficiary or interested party in the final
settlement. For this reason some men who
are IN favor of policy of expansion and
who want to see the Philippines held per-
manently by the United States, would much
prefer to See them and even Porto Rico
also, returned to Spain without even the
retention of coaling station than to see
this government take possession of the is
lands with the understanding that as the
price OF their approval of this action other
| powers should be given a share of the
spoils.
Probable Disposition of the Powers.
Just before the trouble with Spain cul-
minated In war representatives of all the
powers called on President Mckinley, by
way OF experiment, to see how far inter-
ference would be tolerated, and offered
| their good Offices to prevent the war. The
President met their advances with great
dignity ant remarkable skill. 1t is believed
that the character shown by the President
on that occasion is what has prevented
up to this time, the further advancing of
suggestions from any outside source 1t
is now apprehended that when it comes TO
settling the terms, of peace, the same dis
position to have hand in it which prompt
ed the call on the President Just before
the war will incline certain of the powers
to attempt to exercise their influence aid
1t will be more serious matter, as their
direct interest in the result will be more
apparent and the advantage both moral
and material, to be gained by them if .her
interest is'recognized as involving a right
will be such as to encourage some persist
ency and daring on their part.
In the minds of many of those who are
in favor of retaining permanent possession
of the Philippines the question involved is
one which lies closer to the interests of
European powers than merely that of
whether the United States or Spain shall
have the islands or of what may be the
value of the islands themselves The mo-
tive for retaining the Philippines which is
confessed by many of those who favor that
course is to develop and maintain a COM
mercial interest in the orient. They hold
that with the Philippines entirely out of
the question the future of this country
must be influenced by developments in
China and Japan. This consideration led
many to favor the annexation of Hawaii
who cared little for the mere possession
of those islands If it was not to be attended