Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-07-29
A GRAVE PROBLEM.

What about the Philippines? That is
the question that is coming most prom-
pently TO the front since Spain has made
peace overtures. And naturally. 1t is a
question involving delicate and complex
questions within a question. 1t is'the only
question which, when we come down TO
the actual work OF arranging peace terms
with Spain, will call really for "negotia-
ton" 1t may be said that up to that
Judicata- The casus beli was our demand
upon Spain to relnquish sovereignty over
Cuba and withdraw her forces from the
island. Spain refused 10 comply with that
demand and we undertook TO enforce 1t.
That her compliance must be one of the
conditions of peace is not a matter open
10 discussion. 1t is a condition precedent,
absolutely, TO any final agreement. 1t is
thing as fixed as the laws OF the Modes
and Persians and that far the course
Is one of plain sailing.
In the prosecution of hostllities we also
directed our military operations against
Porto Rico. which, after Cuba, IS
virtually the only remaining foothold
of Spain in the Western Hemisphere,
and the American flag has been
raised on the island. This action
is justified by wise military policy
eIone-that policy which dictates weak
ening the enemy wherever you can weak
en- him to your own advantage. From the
military point Of view, simply, it was
logical result of hostilities. 1t was
natural enlargement of the scope of our
operations. But that is not all. The per-
manent possession Of Porto Rico by the
United States-and that is what the pres
IS logical result of the war. When Spain
accepted war rather than quit Cuba, she
staked all OF her territory in the western
world on the hazard. She invited the con-
clusion that. should We triumph, she
would be driven from this hemisphere She
deliberately united the destiny Of Porto
Rico with that OF Cuba. and acquitted US
of the charge OF aggression" in our ex-
petitions against the former. She made |
our occupation of Porto Rico as security |
for indemnity a necessity. and con-
sldering the accepted fact that she will |
not DO able to pay indemnity in money, |
our permanent retention of the island be-
comes second condition precedent to
inal agreement upon terms of peace.
Moreover. since. owing to the situation
Spain precipitated-and precipltated with
her eyes open-our seizure Of Porto Rico
can In no wise be construed as violating
the Monroe doctrine, up TO this point
also. the course is one OF plain sailing.
But with the Philippine factor of the
problem 1t Is different. The course be-
yond Cuba ana Porto Rico promises to
present many windings that will REQUIRE
cautious, and intelligent dipio.
matte steering 1t is true that Dewey's
work In establishing base at Manila
was a necessity of the war. AS he could
not stay in any neutral port. he had to
make base. His action In seeking the
Spanish feet at Manila and sinking IT was
as much logical demand OF the situation
as any other movement we have made.
It is also true that the sending of REIN
Iorcements TO Dewey was necessity. ,
But the permanent occupation OF the
Philippines would be i'm clear disregard
~ both the letter and the spirit Of the
Monroe doctrine. 1t would be an admis-
sion OF the right OF European nations TO !,
interfere in the affairs OF this face of
he globe. II would probably be the be. r
ginning OF the end Of cur getting drawn
INTO the csaaeless whirl OF European com
plications. ,
Why, then. not content ourselves with $
! coaling station In the Philippines. and :
lor the rest abandon themy The aues.
ion is easier asked than answered
rhsoogh The exigencies Of war we haye /,
= measure become mixed. up in an /,
''hanee or semi-ailance with the Phil Il
ppine Insurgents. At any rate. we rest /,
Anasf : moral obligation TO see that Il