Morning appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1877-1906, 1898-02-01
OPINION BY-BELKNAP. c. J

1t is shown by the complaint that a
claim against decedent's estate was pre-
ented to the respondents upon the 18th
day of October, 1896, and disaIlowed Iv
them upon the 9th day Of March. 1897.
Action for the purpose of establishing
the claim was commenced upon the l7th
day Of June, 1897. Respondents inter-
posed a demurrer to the complaint upon
fhe ground that the suit was not COM
menccd within thirty days aGer the re-
J ection Of the claim. The demurrer was
sustained and appellant declining to
amend, Judgment was entered against
him.
Before the commencement of this ac-
ton. and upon the 23yl day of March
1857. the Probate Lew of 1861 was repealed
and the present Law adopted. (StatS. 1897,
u. 49,
The Probate Law of ls6l allowed hold
er~ Of rejected claims three months with
in which to mmeuc suit for the Dur
pose of determining tFeir VALIDITY. the
present law requires such suits 10 be
4 onlnlenced within thirty DAYS after no.
tice Of their rejection, under penalty of be-
ing barred. Suit was not commenced
within thirty days after the rejection of
the claim, but appellant contends that the
claim having been filed during the exist
ence of the Probate Law of 1861. the pro-
visions ofthat law apply 10 this case. and
that he had a vested right to proceed un-
der It. If either of these contentious is
correct, the judgment should be reversed
H. The first place. we may say that a
right of action depending solely upon a
statute that has been repealed, falls with
in the repeal of the statute. This principle
is so well settled that reference 10 author-
lty is unnecessary.
Il take the effect of repeating a statute
TO be- said Lord Oh. J. Tindal in Key VS..
Goodwin, 4 NJ. & P, 351," 10 obliterate it
as completely from the records of the
Parliament as if it had never passed, and
that it must be considered as a law that
never existed, except for he purpose of
those actions or suits which were COM
%fnenced, prosecuted, and concluded whilst
it was an existing law"
1t would have been competent for the
Legislature to nave provided that pro-
ceedings commenced under the law of
1851 should be conducted under its pro-
visions, but emitting any provision of
this nature and absolutely repeating the
la w, all proceed .n9s commenced under it,
t all with it.
Judge towan in Butler VS.. Palmer, l
Hill, 81, III summing up the authorities
upon this subject, aid: "1he amount Of
the whole comes to this: that IL repeating
clause is such an express enactment, as
necessarily divests all inchoate rights
which nave arisen, under the statute
which it destroys. These rights are but
an incident to the statute and fall with it.
unless saved by express words in the re-
pealing clause"
Is the right to proceed under the law of
1861 a vested right? The question may be
answered by the text writer's.
In Cooley's Const. Linn. p. 442. the
learned author says: 1.-THE right to Il par
ticular remedy is not a vested right. This
is the general rule: and the ,~ceptiolls
are of those peculiar cases in which the
remedy is part of the right itself. AS Il
general rule. every state has complete
control over the remedies which it offers
to -uitors in it's courts. 1t may abolish
one class Of courts and make another. Z
may give II new and additional remedy
for a right or equity already in eaisteuc. .
And it may abolish Old remedies ana