Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1898-03-09
Atisfellansuus &raains.
DEFENSES OF HAVANA.
Moro Castle and Cabanas Could Offer but
Feeble Resistance.

Feeble Resistance.
Special Dispatch to The Globe-Democrat.
PHILADELPHIA, March 7.-Should
the painful necessity of teaching the
Spaniards few lessons by means Of
shot and shell arise, Havana would
naturally be the first objective point,
and its reduction the first test applied
to the American navy. First, The de-
fenses of the Cuban capital must be
considered. The main forces that
could be brought to bear against an
attacking squadron are the batteries of
Moro Castle, Cabanas Fortress and
Purita Fortress, at the entrance to the
harbor. Across the city from the
Moro Castle to the outskirts is less
than 4 miles, and, while the inner har-
Dor is provided with several fortresses,
they would be of little or no avail
against sea attack until the ships
had forced the straits and proceeded
inside to engage them.
The harbor entrance Notifications
are massive, but old, built mostly of
stone and earth embankments, that
experts say would not long Withstand
the battering of modern high-power
guns. They are defended by guns Of
tremendous size in many cases, but of
style of long ago, and generally not
much more effective than field pieces
for the kind of work demanded in
bombardment. Besides these there
are several batteries of Armstrong and
Krupp guns, modern pieces of large
size and designed to be very effective
weapons.
The best naval strength which
Spain could likely muster for the ce-
fense Of Havana would consist of two
battleships, four cruisers of the larger
type and perhaps a dozen smaller
crafts indifferently armed and not full
ly manned. The battleships and crui-
sers are not in the best of condition.
To menace, blockade or lombard
Havana the United States could con-
centrate the finest and most powerful
fleet of warships that ever carried the
stars and strips into any cline. 1t is
we'll equipped in every way, with
plenty of tried men TO manipulate its
guns and engines and plenty Of am
munition to do harm with.
Foremost in the fleet is the huge
Iowa. Next in line are the twin bull
dogs of the fleet, the Massachusetts
aud Indiana. Next the Texas, the
peerless cruisers New York and Brook
lyn, the Marblehead, Montgomery and
several more of the smaller fellows,
besides three modern torpedo boats.
TO this feet is added the strength Of
the big double-turreted monitors Pur-
itan, Terror, Amphilrite and Mian-
lonomah. A naval movement by the
United States against Havana might
not necessarily include a lombard
ment.
"Suppposing," said one naval expert
yesterday, "that the United States has
demanded a large indemnity from
Spain and that the demands have
not been complied with, necessitating
their enforcement by other than
peaceable means. First of all, the
fleet of war ships commonly called
the North Atlantic squadron, but for
an occasion like that increased by all
the reserve force possible, would be
ordered to proceed against Havana.
"It is hardly likely that Admiral ST.
card, if he were in charge would care
to plunge in and lay the city in ruins
without giving the city a chauce.
Therefore, the first move must be a
blockade. This would have u two-fold
effect, and, if all the reports emanat-
ing from Havana are true, it would
speedily cause capitulatlon of the city
without single shot being fired at the
forts, for it is known that the city is in
no condition to stand siege, which
means the cutting off of food and 9TH
er supplies.
"The other effect, which has prac-
tically the same ending, would be pro-
duced by the insurgent armies. Prop
erly armed and equipped, the insur.
gents would quickly complete land
blockade, which would cut the city of
from that side, while the whole fleet in
front would effeclually cut any supply
from the sea. Thus situated, the city
of Havana would have TO submit in.
side of two weeks.
"In any event, the Iowa flagship,
would lead the fleet into action, not
only because she would carry the pen