Gloucester County Democrat. (Woodbury, N.J.) 1878-1932, 1898-09-15
GIN. SHAFTER'S REPORT
Another Story of the Fall Of San
tiago de Cuba.
GEN. MILES BARELY MENTIONED

GEN. MILES BARELY MENTIONED
Only Brief Paragraph Devoted to
the General of the Army-s'Words
Fail to Do Justice TO the Gallant
Commanders and Their Heroic Menu
Washington, Sept. 15.-General Shat
ter's report of the campaign which
terminated in the fall of Santiago has
been made public. He briefly recounts
the organization of the expedition and
it's embarkation and then devotes the
main body of the report to the active
operations about Santiago. General
Shafter says the expedition was UNI
dertaken in compliance with telegraph
ie instructions of May 80 from head
quarters of the army. in which it was
stated:
Admiral Schley reports that two
| cruisers and two torpedo boats have
been seen in the harbor of Santiago.
Go with your force to capture garrison
at Santiago and assist in capturing
harbor and feet
The report gives in detail the troops
assembled at Tampa. The cavalry was
dismounted because of lack of trans
portation for the animals and because
it was believed mounted cavalry could
not operate efficiently near Santiago.
This, General Shafter says, was found
subsequently to be correct. After re-
citing the delay at Tampa due to in
adequate facilities, General Shafter
says that on June he received orders
to sail without delay, but not with less
than 10000 men. The expedition
sailed on June IA with S15 officers and
1902 men. General Shafter briefly
covers the trip and landing, and his
first meeting with General Garcia,
adding:
During the interview General Gar
cha offered the services of his troops.
comprising about 1000 men in the vi
entity of Asseraderos and about 500,
under General Castillo, at the little
town of Cujababo, a few miles east of
Daiquiri I accepted his Offer i'm
pressing it upon him that 1 could exer-
else no military control over him ex-
cept such as he would concede, and so
long as he served under me I would
furnish him with rations and ammuni-
ton"
After comforting with Admiral Samp-
son and General Garcia the plan of
campaign was outlined by General
Shafter. The Decentralization was to
commence on the I'D at Daiquiri, with
feints by the Cubans on Cabanas, and
by the navy at various shore points,
in order to mislead the enemy as to
the place of landing.
1T was not until nearly two weeks
after the army landed that it was pos
sible to place on shore three days
supplies in excess of those required for
the daily consumption.
1.-THE preparations were far from
what desired them to be, but we were
in sickly climate, our supplies had to
be brought forward by narrow wagon
road which the rains might at any
time render impossible; fear was en-
tertained that a storm might drive the
vessels containing our stores to sea,
thus separating US from our base of
supplies, and lastly it was reported
that General Pando, with 5000 rein
forcements for the enemy, was en- route
from Manzanillo and might be ex-
pected in few days. Under these con-
ditions I determined to give battle
without delay"
Then follows the story of the battles,
and the report continues:
Great credit is due to Brigadier
General H. S. Hawkins, who, placing
himself between his regiments, urged
them on by voice and bugle calls to
the attack so brilliantly executed.
I'm this fierce encounter words fail
to do justice to the gallant regimental
commanders and their heroic men, for
While the generals indicated the for
nations and the points of attack, it
was. after all, the intrepid bravery of
the subordinate officers and men that
planted our colors on the crest of San
Juan hill and drove the enemy from his
trenches and blockhouse, thus gain
ing a position which sealed the fate of
Santiago
81 am greatly indebted to General
Wheeler who returned from the sick
list to duty during the period. His
cheerfulness and aggressiveness made
it sufficiently felt on this part of the
battlefield and the information he fur
nished to me at various stages of the
battle proved to be most useful
1.-The cessation of firing about noon
on the Sd practically terminated the
battle of Santiago. All that occurred
after this time may properly be treated
under the head of the siege which fol-
lowed. After deducting the detach-
ments retained at Siboney and Dali
quiri and for other duties it is doubt
full if we had more than $4,000 men on
the firing line on July l, when the
battle was fiercest and when the inn
portant and strong positions of Ell
Caney and San Juan were captured. A
few Cubans assisted in the attack at
Ell Caney, and fought valiantly.
1.-THE arrival of General Escario at
Santiago was not anticipated. General
Garcia, with between 1000 and 5000
Cubans, was intrusted with the duty
of watching for and intercepting the
reinforcement expected. This, how
ever, he failed to do"
General Shafter gives the various eff
forts towards securing a surrender, and
his reopening the engagement on the
10th, when the truce ended. On the
18th the surrender was again demand
ed. by this date the sickness in the
army was increasing very rapidly, as
a result of exposure in the trenches to
the intense heat of the sun and the
heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in
weakness of the troops was becoming
so apparent l was anxious to bring the
siege to an end, but, in common with
most of the officers of the army I did
not think an assault would be iustifia-
BILE, especially as the enemy seemed to
be acting in good faith in their prelim-
mary propositions to surrender.
July II / informed the Spanish COM
mander that Major General Miles, COM
mander-in -chief of the American army,
had just arrived in my camp, and re-
quested him to grant us a personal in
terview on the following day. The in
terview took place on the 18th, and
informed him his surrender only
could be considered, and that as he
was without hope of escape, he had no
right to continue the fight"
General Shafter then gives the de-
tails of the final surrender, his entry
to the city and the raising of the Amer
lean flag. In closing, he says:
Before closing my report wish to
dwell upon the natural obstacles I had
to encounter and which no foresight
Eould have overcome or obviated. The
rocky and precipitous coast afforded no
sheltered landing places, the roads were
mere bride paths, the effNf of the
tropical sun and rains upon unaccli-
mated troops was deadly, and the
dread of strange and unknown dis
eases had its effects on the army