New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1898-01-13
GERMAN FEDERALISM.
IT'S EVOLUTION AFTER THE WAR BE-
TWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

ell q co.
With the counterpart OF this volume Won
Sybel began from necessity to work without the
aid Of the material In the Foreign ONCE OF the
German Empire. Prince Bismarcks loss Oh
favor was also a loss 70 the historian. How
ever readers will have TO be keen critics. ana
almost capable themselves of writing the recent
history of the German nation. to point out
where Won Sybel has left a hiatus to be nIled
by documents which he could not reach. lie Is
not dealing With a war period now. but with the
opening years Of that anxious interval between
the war OF Prussia with Austria and the dread-
ed struggle for German unity against france
In those days he took prominent part IN ieeis-
lation. and he knew what all the greatest men
OF the various nations were saying. Ana no"
that all this has become history, ne mas that
Prues,ans and non-Prussians alike manifest a
readiness 10 acouaint him with the incidents or
every decisive moment. and, In fact, that theli
willingness to do this has been "in proportion 10
The extent TO which they themselves had been
participants" Thus history begins to take the
aspect Of memoirs. though with the personality
rarely in the foreground. 1t is needless to say
that this peculiarly adds interest 10 volume
which might be expected to flag little after
the exciting episode of Sadowa and the certainty
already attained that German unity under Prus-
sian leadership was a foregone conclusion
Won Sybels theory Of history Is that the Ger
man Empire was created by the victory over
Austria He made that point at the conclusion
Of his narrative Of the events OF loOo, ana ne re-
turns to It again at the opening OF the present
volume His work at large shows PLAINLY 'ha'
he refers 10 something more than the mere
series Of warl1ke and political moves whlch were
making German unity possible. What the events
of 1866 brought about was condition IN winch
all the men of national leanings began to see
the possibility Of thinking alike In details. OF
foreseeing and providing for the future one OF
the most suggestive anecdotes IN the DOCK IL
that relating to a conversation between Moi'he
and Suckow. an officer in the little army OF
WCrtemberg soon after the Austrian war IL
must he remembered that Wurtemberg was then
apparently much opposed 10 Prussia Yet
suckow was able with little difficulty compare
,ive,v ~ secure n REORGANIZATION of the army
on the Prussian model. That meant merely the
adont,on Of the best military system Of the day
Rut Suckow advocated union with Prussia, and
hts suggestions 10 his King implied the shaping
Of military affairs so thai the army would fall
in case Of need right into its place in general
scheme This scheme was apparently Suckows
own No evidence is given TO snow that his
ideas were inspired from any external source
He had simply watched the imitation on SWISS
roatbods IN his State and had thought them bad.
Ru, IN the mere act Of thinking for Wnrtem-
berg he found himself also thinking for the
whole line Of German defence. In making out
the future possibilities Of his own little field. he
began 10 see what others on all sides Of him
would have to do. This would not have been
possible II feeling in South Germany was alto
gether what II seemed. There were those who
said In the legislative chambers that German
furt
seemed before But il is clear that the German
nolitical problem was much simpler than IT
seemed TO these people. Not that things went as
smoothly as Nationalist like Suckow wished.
There was much obstruction. But this obstruc-
ton was not in vital matters Practically all
the German armies, outside or Bavaria were
Prussian In system early In 1857. At the centre
of this growing military unity was one man,
Moltke. who knew exactly what was soon to be
done and how 1t could be done But he was to
learn that other men were. so to speak. almost
thinking his thoughts. In the spring OF lS'S
Suckow went to Berlin to learn what he could
He did not meet with encouragement The vot-
ing matorities in Wurtemberg were still mimi
cal to Prussia. and consequently the Prussian
authorities were not inclined to be confidential
Nevertheless Suckow persisted. He asked
Motke what wurtemberg ought to do II France
suddenly invaded South Germany. Moltke mere
" asked what Wtrtemberg could do and how
ouicklv she could do II. His opinion was
that Prussia would have to find cover for her
left flank a long distance north OF Wurtemberg.
Suckow warmly resented the treatment OF his
State as a foreign country. Motke softened a
little, and Suckow went on to tell what he
should like to do as a soldier in such case as he
had anticipated. Moltke's face frightened. 1t
was lust as II some one had shown him that
idea was feasible which he had before re-
luctantly abandoned. Il see" said he, that
with the correct views which you entertain, 1t
will not be difficult for US two staff officers to
understand each other"
1t was only necessary TO gain time when men
were in this state OF mind ready TO think each
others thoughts. in order TO have the whole
nation on the alert against every aggression
from without There had been a time when po-
Mtical thinking in Germany was done mainly by
those Of whom this thinking required But
the whole nation was wide awake about the IA
nous Luxenb ourg question. and yet the great
statesmen were ostentatiously quiet. They pre-
sented to French diplomacy the aspect OF non
interference. But they somehow managed TO
present another face to Germany. Legislators
and the public began to discuss matter which
diplomacy had hardly more than proposed In
secret Incidents like that showed how definite
had become already the collective personality OF
the German people. the real rulers OF the nation.
Won Sybel only enters on the disputed phases OF
the Luxembourg controversy by narrating what
happened One will hardly obtain from him
inkling Of the endless recrimination that has
found it's way into print. But he makes the
reader see very clearly what the French diplom-
atists failed to at the time. namely, that
they were dealing less with Bismarck and with
the King of Prussia than with the awakened
consciousness of the gathering German races
1t looks like wonderful piece Of good fortune
now that this awakening consciousness had to
deal with very concrete question. With Prus-
ala or against her summed up the whole debate