Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-06-19
cAMAKA AND OUR PLANS.

The news which now comes from UNI
questionable sources that SPANS reserve
eouadron has sailed. accentuates the
necessity for hurrying our operations at
and around Santiago de Cuba, and FOR
making them short, sharp. and decisive.
IL cannot fail Of recognition that ali
future operations must hinge largely
,lpon complete victory for our arms in
that uuarter-a victory which will involve
fhe destruction or capture Of Cervera's
squadron. Indeed. that is the vital con-
summation to be attained. Until Cervera
has been disposed of, Sampson must keep
II heavy force of Santiago. He cannot
afford TO take the slightest risk of any
of the ships of the bottle-up squadron's
escaping, and, therefore, our navy must
remain. in great measure, handicapped
az 10 operations elsewhere. until the work
CIT out at Santiago shall have been
thoroughly accomplished. And that the
policy should be, and doubtless VIII BE-
10 do the work quickly, is, as we have
indicated, shown by the fact that the
Cahiz squadron Is at last upon the seas
Considering our experience with the tao
Tics of Cervera's prior to his winding up
In Santiago harbor, it would seem folly
40 ignore the reserve squadron as fac
tor to be seriously reckoned with IN
FORMING any further plans OF campaign
until we can detach sufficient number
NJ shlps from duty on our coast and
nround Cuba to ensure its being COPIED
with successfully.
But with Cervera's squadron our prizes,
or at the bottom of Santiago harbor. the
Cad.z squadron could no longer inject
any appreciate element of uncertainty
into the situation. Plans Of future opera
tions could be mapped out with much
more certainty Of our being able to FOL
low them. We could spare such a naval
force TO look after the Cadiz squadron,
provided It sails in this direction, as
would insure almost absolutely the pre-
rention OF it's interference with our pro
Gramme.
In This connection It is stated that the
government purposes, after Santiago fans
10 dispatch Immediately an expedition
10 Porto Rico, and to make descent upon
and establish another base at some point
ON the north coast Of Cuba, whence we
can cooperate with Gomez 1t Is also
stated that the intention is to delay the
reduction of Habana and the landing OF
the main body of our army on the ismnd
until after the rainy season is over.
How far this news can be relied upon
we know not. But we do know that from
The present outlook 1t would appear that
Il might not be the unwise course. There
is no doubt that the Spanish people are
rapidly beginning to realize the hopeless
negs of their cause and that there is
throughout the Peninsula sentiment
which threatens TO present TO the gov
eminent the alternative OF peace or revo-
luton. What, with Cerveras ships de-
stroyed or captured, Porto Rico in our
hands, the desperate straits 10 which the
spaniards in the Philippines have been
driven. our forces cooperating with the
insurgents at two or more important
points in Cuba, and the reserve squadron
at our mercy, there would be the pros
pect OF that sentiments becoming so in
tensified as 10 render the reduction OF
Aabana unnecessary for the conclusion
OF peace. And certainly If peace can be
secured and our ends accomplished with
out the loss OF life In battle and by dis
ease a Habana campaign would entail,
the contamination is deyoutly to be
wished.