The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-10
4 yIGoRous CAMPAIGN.

The government has decided very
wisely to press the campaign forward
With the utmost vigor. Probably no
time has been lost. because the country
was unprepared for land tight, ana
good Judgment has been shown in not
acting so spsediiy as 10 prevent ELL
cheney. Now not a day must be lost In
acting most aggressiveiy.
epain II evidently determined not to
yield without another fight. Disastrous
N the battle before Manila was TO her
naval force, II could not be considered
such q defeat as would warrant cry
for quarter. spain's policy would be. no
doubt, to drag along. hoping that some
complication would arise which would
relieve II from being the central object
OF attack. There are other no less
potent reasons why no time should be
lost. Chief among these liz that the
rainy scnson will soon set In and Cuba
win be a very undesirable place for our
troops. Another reason Is that we are
under such an enormous cost The de-
struetion likely TO be caused by war
will not be any less three months HENCE
than now, but the cost OF maintenance
viii be considerably greater I'm that
time. 1t seems probable that even be-
fore this edition Of the Post-Intelligen-
Ger Is delivered. battle may be fought
OF Porto Rico. IT must occur within
thu next few days at latest. Meantime.
II che army can be landed In Cuba. the
whole conflict can be wound up within
two weeks.
BY next Sunday the permanent army
of occupation will be established In Gu
ba. followed by the volunteer regiments
as fast as they can be transported. The
counsefs OF those who realize that a
war. even with Insignificant Spain, was
no trlalng matter. have prevailed.
Orders have been issued that the fun
extent OF the vast resources OF the na-
ton ~ 10 be encompassed In order 10
carry out the plans with energy and
rapidity. Those who expressed the be-
lief that the regular army. which con-
sists of only twenty thousand men or
30, would be sufficient. may be surprised
10 Hnd that on the best authorities not
only of this country but of Europe. IL
will take something like thirty thousand
soldiers to keep peaceful possession Of
the Philippines alone.
Il takes some time to equip thirty
thousand 10 sixty thousand soldiers and
20 make the necessary arrangements TO
keep each one In provisions and cloth
ing ard ammunition through the
chances OF a, campaign; and not less
than that number will be needed In
deed. more viii be wanted IL the plan
Is adopted OF having TWO army corps
of twenty-five thousand men each In
Cuba, actively fighting the Spaniards.
with supporting force of Atty thou
sand volunteers more on the southern
coast. The transportation alone OF
such a body OF men forms enc OF the
problems of the situation.
Meantime the war upon the seas Will
he waged. Although every effort is
made 10 obtain definite news. IL must
be understood that no newspaper can
guarantee the accuracy OF information
In advance ~ movement. The Post
Inteiligeneer yesterday published dis
patch from Cape ffaytien, Hayti, which
said II was believed that SIMPSONS ae@t
would give battle 10 the Spanish squad
ron inside Of forty-elght hours That
correspondent IS very anxious ~ give
accurate news. but near as he Is 10 the
scene OF probable conflict. he is stilI so
far away that he must depend upon
fugitive reports. always tincsured with
a doubt that they may be parposely dis
serninated for the purpose Of nisleadin Z
the enemy. The same correspondent,
says that Sampson. with seven war ves-
sells. intends attacking the Spanish
feet, whose number must be the same.
and which is augmented hy sixteen
gunooats. Powerful as oar vessels are.
thai nassanisa feet could give II con-