Kansas City journal., 1898-04-18
Why Not Recognitfou.


Why Not Recognition.
| From the Philadelphia Press
IN one OF three conditions the United
States must find Cuba when its military
and land forces land there Cuba must
either be under Spanish sovereignty. in
which case the United States proposes to
wrest it from Spain. or it must be the
territory of the Cuban republic in which
case our forces. like those of France dur
ing our Revolution. must be under Cuban
orders while in Cuban territory, as Ro-
chambeau was under Washington's orders
ard General Miles would now be under
Gomez orders. or Cuba must be under
the third condition, which President Nc
kiniey lays down. a territory in which
Spanish sovereignty has ceased to be eff
cacious ard no other authority has taken
Its place. so that some power must inter
fere TO organize stable government
Under one of these three conditions the
United States must act. Recognition Sc
lects and creates the condition most embar-
RAISING for us from start to finish. Under
II the United States enters the territory
or republic whose laws and officers its
military forces must regard. respect and
obey. With its constitution We must COM
ply. With Its courts, civil or military. we
cannot interfere. If il enters on bloody
Spanish reprisals or or coniiscation and
exile. with its independent action the
United States cannot interfere because by
its own act it has recognized the republic
as de facto and de jure sovereign in Cuba.
and this fiat sovereignty has its natural
and legitimate defender and advocate in
Bryan, the defender and advocate of fiat
dollars.
Not satisfied with the difficulty of rec
osnition. the senate resolution adds the ah-
surdity Of accepting Spanish government
and authority as in existence by ordering
the president to end it. and yet demand
ing the withdrawal of Spanish troops from
country which. in the same breath. we
declare Spanish. At the proper stage. when
Spanish troops prove in the way OF estab-
fishing order. the United States would have
right to expel or disarm them. but it has
right to do this only in the course of the
proper work to which it is called by the
anarchy of the island.
Anarchy or loss of order, the third con-
dition, in which the island is, in fact. and
which a score OF precedents recognize as
good reason in law for interference. offers
all the advantage and none of the obstacles
presented by the other two. Assert that
condition and recognize it and Spain's SOW
ereignty is at an end, far our action is
concerned; no other sovereignty is in the
way, the military forces act to preserve
order-a course and work for which we
have precedents and on which our courts
have passed-the United States is COM
mitted to nothing and has no perplexins
issues of debt to decide. Its forces are
there not as tenants but as policemen and
tiremen. They give peace and create Or
der untrammeled by any sovereignty, and
when this work is done Cuba creates its
own sovereignty and deals itself with what
ever debts and liabilities may exist on the
territory concerned.
In short by recognizing in Cuba only
facts and no fictions, the United States
enters Cuba with free hands to restore
order, neither waging war on Spain nor
as an ally of the republic" and is free to
do its proper work and incur no obligations
whatever. past. present or to come, save
those of civilization and humanity.
Comparative Fleet Power.
From the New York Sun.
One way of computing the comparative
power of warShips is to estimate the foot
tons of fire energy for three minutes fire.
True. the fire energy of one Finch gun for
three minutes fire would be 5000 foot
tons while that Of a e-inch would be
81 $50 foot-tons. This estimate takes no ac-
count of armor. and hence its usefulness
as q mode of comparison is confined to
ships of the same or similar classes. But
this qualification is equally applicable to
every other basis of comparison whatever.
To illustrate. take the great cruiser Pow
erful with her 14,aoO tons and her two o.
inch guns. 1t does not follow that she
would he a match for a monitor of 5000
tons and carrying a single 1O-inch or even
single 9-inch gun. Yet the disparity in
dicated by relative weight Of metal IS far
less than that indicated by tonnage. while
fob mite nit fa1
other the monitor. so inferior measured by
either of the foregoing tests ought to
prove the superior.
The Russian and English fleets now in
Chinese waters are composed OF ships of all
classes, from those of the battle-line to
protected cruisers; moreover the proper
tionS in which the classes are represented
are not SO unequal as to call for any cor
rection to be applied on that account. And
it is interesting to observe that the Rus
slams fire energy for three minutes fire is
3,242 S2I fcot-tons and that the English
mems is 6,116.3S6 fcot-tons. The second. it
will be observed. is nearly double the first,
yet England seems not to have made any
sensible draft upon her vast navy. while
Russia's squadron leaves a distinct gap.
Nine of the British squadron combine a
heavier gun fire than that of the whole
American fighting line; this is not saying
that the nine English ships would be a
fighting match for the American line:
they would be nowhere near it on account
of difference of type. But the compari-
son is not useless as suggesting a measure
of the sea power which Britain has as
sembled in the Chinese seas, hopeessly
overwhelming that of her three rivals in
the same seas, while they all know that
her reserves will still spare squadrons ex-
ceeding in strength their entire fleets.
and yet leave her coasts more than ade-
quately guarded.