The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-05-29
SchIey's Stay Of Three Days on Cicn-
fuegOs HarbOr Due to Belief the
Spaniards Were There.
HIS PLANS At SANTIAGO
WILL NOT BLOCK THE PORT UNTIL.
HE IS SURE OF HIS GAME.
Incidents of a Weeks Cruise will.
SIMPSONS SquadrOn-CO-Opera-
ton with Cuban Insurgents.
(copyrlght. 1sss. by the Associated prnss1

MI w I<O1 ld-p may Zo-o.0Z a. NIT is
now almost certain that Commodore Schley
has the Spanish fleet bottled up in the har-
Dor of Santiago de Cuba. There is so little
doubt that the naval campaign is proceed
ing on the assumption that Admiral Cervera
IS incapable Of doing any harm. Within a
few days the exact conditions at Santiago
de Cuba will be known without a shadow
of doubt
In spite of assertions to the contrary,
Commodore Schley was not absolutely sure
of his game when he last communicated
with Rear Admiral Sampson, and the COM
modore will not take active steps to block
up the entrance of Santiago harbor until he
IS perfectly certain that Admiral Cervera' s
ships are inside. However, he may have
done this already, as Commodore Schley' s
last communication, forwarded on Thurs
day, only reached Rear Admiral Sampson
yesterday. The commodore stayed three days
at Cienfuegos. He signaled to his ships: Il
believe the Spanish fleet is in the harbor"
On this belief message was sent to the
American admiral.
The details of how Commodore Schley
found out that he was mistaken are not vet
known. At any rate, acting on the admiraPs
instructions, the commodore then moved
east, arriving outside of Santiago de Cuba
May 15 The topography of Cienfuegos and
Santiago de Cuba is almost identical. Both
harbors are about six miles long, with mar
row entrances, about three hundred yards
wide, and protected by high land. A whole
fleet could lie in the harbor of either place
and be invisible from the outside.
After his experience at Cienfuegos it is
probable that Commodore Schey was very
conservative in deciding whether or not he
had caught Admiral Cervera- From the
tone of his dispatch it is evident that the
commodore soon gained much secondhand
and external evidence which pointed to Ad-
miral Cervera's presence in the inner har-
Dor. This evidence was apparently strong
enough to make the commodore feel certain
the object of his trip had been accom-
plished but in view of his previous expert
ence he would not risk decisive statement
until after ascertaining the fact for him
self Before this ditpatch is published it is
likely that Commodore Schley has sent
some vessel into the entrance of the harbor
of Santiago de Cuba or has obtained from
q reliable source ashore information as to
the exact number and the names of the
Spanish war ships sheltered by the hills
about that place.
NOT WELL PROTECTED.
Contrary to the generally expressed opin-
ion, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba is
poorly protected. Like Havana and San
Juan de Puerto Rico. it has it's Moro
Castle, which is even a better target than
those of Havana and San Juan. The only
danger to be feared is from the mines which
have been laid in the channel of Santiago
since war was declared. But countermining
would probably render harmless these
mines should it prove desirable for Com
modore Schley's ships to enter the harbor
Such a step, however, is unlikely. In this
connection it may be noted that since the
commencement of the naval operations the
moral effect of the mines has been great.
A prominent naval authority said to the
correspondent of the Associated Press:
The moral effect of torpedoes and mines
Will prove far superior to their actual eff
feet. In fact, so great is their moral force,
that doubt whether their powers of exc
cution will have an opportunity to be judged
IN this war"
The blockade of northern Cuba continues
uneventful and is apparently successful
The measures of precaution which Rear
Admiral Sampson adopted up TO yesterday
TO guard the eastern and western passage,
did not detract from the efficacy of the
blockade.
Now that the element of uncertainty re-
garding the Spanish ships whereabout is
almost entirely removed, the ships which
were solely occupied in watching for the
Spaniards have become an additional force
for the blockade and without any incon-
venient change of postion Commodora
Schley has been reinforced but his position
was clearly so strong that the reinforce
mentS which he had received made no diff
ference to the strong fleet in northern Gu
ban waters.
The rumors of the sailing of a second
Spanish squadron did not worry Rear Ad-
miFal Sampson in the slightest degree. His
feelings. on the subject were aptly expressed
recently when he said: Il am perfectly sat
isfied that we have bagged those fellows"
referring to Admiral Cervera's ships.) Rear
Admiral Sampson does not cross his bridges
comes his unconquerable patience and
strategic ability can be relied upon to see
him safely across.
ARMY READY TO MOVE.
For the second time since war was de-
clared the admiral has been notified that the
army is ready TO move. This is good news
TO all the naval officers The two branches
OF the service have been playing a game
of wait; the army resting until the navy
disposed of the Spanish feet and the navy
unable to occupy much needed bases until
the troops were ready for debarkasion. In
view Of the fact that the Spanish fleet was
far faster than the American fleet and that
the sormer had no desire for an engage
meri this policy of inaction, however far
sighted 1t may have been temporarily pro-
Egced much natural irritation among the
naval officers. All appearances now point
20 the passing away of this feeling and
hearty cooperation between the army and
navy may be anticipated. BY great good
fortune. no accident has occurred of suffi-
cicnt Importance to render any of our ships
utterly helpless or beyond the aid of tow
ing during the fleets cruising of the past
month. Such accidents, however. are quite
within the bounds of possibility. With such
tender machines as torpedo boats doing
hard duty in all kinds of weather accidents
come into the list of probabilities which
naval commanders have 10 count on.
With a base in the enemy's territory, with
a harbor of, refuge and coaling station
within twenty miles of the cruising grounds,
Rear Admiral Simpsons task, arduous at
best, VIII be made great deal easier. But
such base can only be obtained through
co-operRtion with the army. as the force of
not large enough to cope with the possible
strength that Captain General Blanco could
concentrate on short notice. Then. while the
Amy Of the United States Is Operating on