The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-26
HONOR TO SIGNAL CORPS
The Greatest Factor in the War
With Spain.
GENERAL GREELYS REPORT
Credit for the Location OF Cervera's Fleet
In Santiago Harbor Belongs to
the Corps-Valuable Com
munications.

eral Greedy. chief signal ofiicer. to-day
presented to Secretary Alger his report
Of the operations OF the signal corps
during the recent war with Spain. In
the first section Of his report General
Greedy intimates that the corps offices
in Cuba were handicapped because
they were not allowed to take with
them the signal corps telegraph train.
which had been sent to Tampa for the
Santiago expedition. He then adds the
following: ''The lack Of thoroughly
trained men was not the only serious
that threatened the efficiency OF the
signal work. Seeing that visual signal
ing, which the commanding general OF
the Nth army corps relied upon. con-
trary to professional advice, was prac-
tically impossible for land operations,
and only useful between the coast sta
tions and the feet, and II Is impossible
to surmise what would have been the
result had IL not been for the supply
OF insulated wire, telegraphic and tele-
phone Instruments, ETC., which Lieuten-
ant Colonel Allen furnished TO Lieuten-
ant Colonel Green"
Colonel Greely discusses at length the
physical difficulties of maintaining
communication by wire in Cuba during
the Santiago campaign. but points out
that at all critical portions OF the cam
paiga General Shafter was kept In d.
rect communication by telephone with
his subordinate commanders, the lines
being interrupted. but maintained un-
der an almost constant fire OF the enc
my. Special stress Is laid upon the
value Of the signal corps facilities in
directing the fire OF the naval vessels.
The arrangements were so complete
and excellent that the major general
commanding was able to communicate
directly with the admiral commanding
| the fleet, and in additiop{ spmunica-
ton @ with the war de,ssssnsnt in 20
| minutes.
General Greedy then says: Concern
| ing this telegraphic and telephone SER
vice which did not fall within the plans
| of the major general commanding the
| fifth army corps, and for which he
| made no provision, the chief signal Of
| ficer of the army feels it incumbent
upon him to put out its absolute mill
| tary necessity and value and to indi-
cate the extraordinary risks which any
general commanding a detached army.
| especially on a foreign soil, assumes
| when he leaves himself unprovided
| with telegraphic or telephone facili-
| ties"
General Greedy is confident that dur
| ing the single month of July the lines
| of communication maintained by his
| corps in Cuba were worth more TO the
| nation than has been the cost of the
| signal corps of the army from its in
| ception to the present day. He refers
| TO the ease with which the major gen.
| eral commanding the army commune
| Gated with Washington, giving impor-
| tant information and received impor-
| tant orders. He then adds: I'm addi-
| tion IL is not pleasant to surmise what
| might have been the fate OF the FEVER
stricken army in Santiago de Cuba had
| it's fortunes and movements been de-
bated by mail instead OF electrical COM
/ munication."
| General Greely strongly commends
| the use of the war balloon and de-
i clares that it's utility was thoroughly
| demonstrated. Concerning the criti-
| cism made of the balloon operations at
/ Santiago, he says: THE forcing OF the
signal corps balloon to the skirmish
| line. where the position is reported to
have caused serious loss to the troops
| by disclosing their movements and at
/ tracing the enemy's fire. was the ac-
/ ton of Major General Skaters chief
| engineer. Col. George c. McDerby, in
the face of the professional advice Civ
/ en- by Lieutenant Colonel Maxfield. of
the United States volunteer signal
/ corps, who is charged with the prac-
i tical operation of the balloon and who.
| besides sharing absolutely every dan
| ger to which Colonel Derby was sub
jected, in addition had his horse shot
under him in a previous reconnaissance
/ of the ground"
| General Greedy said that "the signal
corps failed to receive from Major Gen.
/ eral Shafter in his original report, even
| a notice that II participated In the San
tiago campaign" An interesting part
| Of General Greely's report Is that which
relates to the telegram censorship. Up
| on this feature he says: There has
been a misapprehension on the part of
many that the signal corps exercised
| press censorship during the war, an
opinion that is entirely unfounded. as
the chief signal officer ignored all sug-
gestions looking to interference with the
free and untrammeled publication of
/ press matters, even by the most sensa-
| tional and unpatriotic journals. 1t may
be added that the associated press and
many of the journals in the most pat
| riotic spirit, expressed frequently AMI
| freely not only their willingness, but
also their desire. to refrain from the
| publication of any information that
| would embarass the administration or
be detrimental to the success OF mill
tary operations. These offers were not
Pickwickian. for in more than one in
| stance information of the highest inter-
est to the public has never been pub
lished in this city. being held back by
press associations. newspaper corre-
spondents and editors as calculated, IL
given publicity, to injure the national
| cause"
General Greely's report indicates that
the credit for the location of Admiral
Cervera's fleet in Santiago harbor be-
longs to the signal corps and says that
"in the interest of history. let alone jus
tice to the signal corps of the army. the
truth should be told The location OF
Cervera's squadron at Santiago was
| first made by Colonel James Allen and
later verified independently by Lieu
tenant Colonel Joseph Z. Maxfield. both
officers Of the signal corps. The block
aiding OF the squadron was due 20 the
conservative action of the president and
secretary of the navy, based on reports
and representations made personally TO
them by the chief signal officer of the