Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-06-25
our ARMY IN CUBA.

Now that our first real invading force
has landed on Cuban soil and the ad-
vance upon Santiago de Cuba has COM
men,ed In earnest, the American mind.
confidence in the final result notwith-
staining, is undergoing the most intense
strain II has experienced since the war
began. And this strain must continue
until 1t is known that the United States
flag floats over Santiago 1t NAV last
only for hours, but II may last for days.
SO far all has gone exceedingly well with
us. The debarkatlon OF our troops was
from all accounts an achievement in the
history OF such undertakings. 1t was
accomplished with much less trouble and
much more rapidly than had been ex-
pected. and met with no serious resist
ance. But 1t does not follow that we
are 10 have a walk-over i'm reducing San
tiago. Approximately. including the ma
rines and the Cuban insurgents, we have
at our command around Santiago a land
force OF 25,0O0 men. and the cooperation
OF our navy with the land forces is TO be
reckoned upon as a>powerful agency in
accelerating and making our Operations
a success. But the Spanish force is really
an unknown quantity. Admiral Sampson
is said TO estimate that General Linares
and Admiral CerYera can pit against
General Shafter 5000 troops Other esti-
mates however. put the Spanish force
concentrated in or near Santiago at 5000
men, and there appears good reason TO
believe that Blanco is still hurrying re-
Inducements TO Linares. Again, 1t must
not be forgotten that. although Cervera's
squadron is bottled up, 1t is by no
means assured that it will not be able
10 render effective aid in defence of the
city.
All other considerations aside. and view
ing the matter from the single stand
point that the question of early peace
may depend upon the fan of Santiago
and the capture or destruction of Ger
veras squadron. we cannot afford TO
make a mistake in our movement against
the city. 1t is believed in well informed
circles here and in equally we'll informed
circles in some disinterested quarters
abroad that Santiago has become
largely the crux OF the war so
md that considering Spanish inter-
hal conditions, complete success
" the American operations there would
:ause the Spanish people to compel the
government TO sue for peace. Should we
suffer temporary defeat or even serious
heck the effect in Spain might be TO
strengthen the government and the war
"a ~ hsA tfos
much OF its vitality Moreover, IL would
ioinspire Spanish hope of bringing about
,ome sort OF intervention. To say the
very least. It would probably help Spain
materially in her game OF playing for
time" which would mean for us a vast
deal in the matter OF pouring out money
alone.
1t Is hardly 20 be questioned that the
Spanish leaders do not also recognize
what has been above outlined-what may
DO involved in the fate OF Santiago-and.
therefore. 1t is logical to look for
bloody defence OF the place. The fighting
70 date seems to have been a series OF |
comparatively easy victories for our |
srms. the Spanlards in the main pur- |
suing Fabian tactics. But that does not /
argue that on the trial OF the supreme |
conclusion they will not stand to their
guns with desperate tenacity. AS we
have shown, the argument is the other
way.
SO. we repeat that our mental strain
our intense suspense-may be an expert
ence Of several days. IL may be an ex-
perienoe lasting until General Shafter
has been heavily reinforced from our
cafpps in this country. While It is de-
flg2ble that our work shall be short and
ehafps We cannot AFFORD 10 take any
chances OF It's not being decisive. And IL.
after feeling the enemy thoroughly, we
ma that there is any appreciable ele-
'ment OF uncertainty as 10 our ability TO
make our undertaking absolutely COM
pete on the first trial. il would be the
sfayest sort OF blunder not TO wait until
thAf uncertainty shall have been re-