The record-union., 1898-04-12

ernment are not lessened and dimin-
lshed. AS the Cuban Parliament does
not meet until the 4th of May next,
the Spanish Government would not OBJ
1ect, Tor its part, to accept at once a
suspension of hostilities, if asked for
py the insurgents from the General-in-
Chlef, TO whom it would pertain, in
sucn case, to determine the duration
and conditions of the armistice
Ihe propositions submitted by Gen
efal Woodford and the reply of the
spanish Government were both in the
form of brief memoranda. the texts of
winch are before me-and are sub
sIantially in the language above given.
Inc junction of the Cuban Parliament
IN the matter of preparing" peace and
the manner of doing SO are not ex-
pressed in the Spanish memorandum
out from General Woodfords explana-
tory reports of preliminary discussions
preceding the final conference, it is un-
derstood that the Spanish Government
stands ready to give the insular Con-
gress full powers to settle the terms
OF peace with the insurgents, whether
oy direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of legislation, does not appear
t.. THREE UNTRIED MEASURES
with this last overture in the direc-
ton of immediate peace and its dis
appointing reception by Spain, the Ex-
ecutive was brought to the end of his
effort
In my annual message of December
last, | said: Of the untried measures
there remain recognition of the insur-
gents as belligerents, recognition of the
independence of Cuba, and interven-
ton 10 end the war by imposing a ra-
tlonal compromise between the con-
testants and intervention in favor of
one or the other party. l speak not of
forcible annexation. for that cannot be
thought of. That, by our code of
morality, would be criminal aggres-
sion"
Thereupon / reviewed these alterna-
tives in the light of President Grants
measured words uttered in 1879 when.
after seven years of sanguinary and
destructive and cruel barbarities in
cuba, he reached the conclusion that
the recog milton of the independence of
Cuba was impracticable and indefens-
ibe, and that the recognition of bellie-
erency was not warranted by the facts
according to the tests of public law.
commented especially upon the latter
aspect of the question. pointing out
the Inconvenience and positive dangers
of recognition of belligerency which.
while adding to the already onerous
burdens of neutrality within our own
jurisdiction, could not in any way ex-
tend our influence or effective Offices in
the territory of hostilities.
Nothing has since occurred to change
my view in this regard, and / recog-
nize as fully now as then that the issu-
ance of proclamation of neutrality
by which process the so-called recognl-
tion of belligerence is published, could.
of itself and unattended by other action
accomplish nothing toward the one end
for which we labor, the instant pacifi-
cation of Cuba and the cessation of the
misery that affiicts the island.
PRECEDENT FOR RECOGNIZING
INDEPENDENCE.
Turning to the question of recogniz-
the present insurgent Government in
Cuba, we find safe precedents in our
history from an early day. They are
well summed up: In President Jack
sons message to Congress December
u, 1886, on the subject of the recogni-
ton of the independence OF Texas he
said:
In ali the contests that have arisen
out of the revolutions of France, out
of the disputes relating to the crews
/ of Portugal and Spain. out of the sep
aration Of the American possessions or
both from the European Governments.
/ and out of numerous and constantly
occurring struggles for dominion in
| Spanish America, so wisely consistent
| with our just principles has been the
action of our Government that we have
under the most critical circumstances
avoided all censure and encountered nc
other evil than that produced by a
transient re-estrangement of good will
in those against whom we have been,
by force of evidence, compelled to de-
| eide
1t has thus been made known to the
world that the uniform policy and prac-
tice Of the United States is to avoid all
! interference in disputes which merely
relate to the internal governments OF
other nations and eventually to recog-
nize the authority of the prevailing
| party without reference to our particu-
lar interests and views, or to the merits
of the original controversy. But in this
as on every other occasion, safety is
to be found in rigid adherence to
/ principle
In the contest between Spain and
| the revolving colonies we stood aloof
and waited not only until the ability
OF the new States to protect themselves
was fully established, but until the
danger of their being again subjugated
had entirely passed away. Then, and
not until then, We're they recognized
Such was our course in regard to Mexi-
co herself.
1t is true in regard to Texas that the
civil authority of Mexico had been ex-
PEELED, its invading army defeated. the
! chief of the republic himself captured
and all present power to control the
| nearly organized Government of Texas
annihilated within its confines. But
on the other hand, there is, in appear
| ance, at least, an immense disparity
| of physical force on the side of Texas
! The Mexican Republic under an ally
is allying it's forces under a new leader
and menacing fresh invasion to re-
! cover its lost domain
Upon the issue of this threatened in
Vasion, the independence of Texas may
be considered as suspended, and were
there nothing peculiar in the situation
of the United States and Texas, our
acknowledgment of it's independence al
such crisis could scarcely be regarded
as consistent with that prudent reserve
with which we have hitherto held our
selves bound to treat all similar ques-
tions''
ACTION TAKEN AS TO TEXAS.
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceed
ed to consider the risk that there might
be imputed to the United States mo-