The National tribune., 1898-07-21
THE CAPTURE OF SANTIAGO.

THE CAPTURE OF SANTIAGO.
| The first brilliant chapter in the his
tory of the war for the expulsion of the
Spaniards from Cuba has been written
to the end.
1t is a chapter that will not dim in
comparison with any in military history.
Less than one month ago-23 days,
to be exact-an American army of 49,
600 men was landed in the most skillful
way on remote, precipitous, rock-bound
sea-coast, occupied, az the issue proves,
by at least $4,000 Spanish troops These
had had possession of the country for a
long time, they were forewarned that an
attack would be made there, they knew
almost the place of the intended land
ing. Their country was splendidly cal
culated for defense, its strongest points
had been determined and fortified centu-
ries ago, and the present defenders had
only to amplify previous work. They
had seemingly every opportunity to
make small detachments hold our masses
at bay, and to concentrate their superior
strength at the most available point, and
hurl our forces back in confusion to the
cover of the Nays guns.
Surprising the manhood of the two
armies to have been at all nearly equal,
any competent military man, if given
the choice of the two hands to play,
would have quickly and certainly chosen
the Spanish. Given $4,000 good men,
standing on their own ground, and such
ground as that around Santiago, he
would have felt himself sure of holding
at bay and ultimately defeating double
or treble their strength.
But the American troops, made up
of what We believe to be the finest fight
ing material in the world, and splendidly
led, in a very few days forced the
enemy back into his last line of works,
hemmed him in on all sides, and finally
forced his unconditional surrender. 1t
is true that the attacking force had been
in the meanwhile augmented to about
10000, but this was comparatively
small yet, when the strength of the
position is taken into account, and it is
remembered that the progress of the
science of armament has given much
the greater advantage to the defensive.
1t is campaign which for swiftness,
thoroughness, completeness of results
achieved at the smallest cost has no
in the annals of war.
1t giIes US possession of the entire
eastern end of the Island Of Cuba, with
one very important city and several
smaller ones, with barbors, bays, etc,
and an extent of territory about equal
to Connecticut and Rhode Island com
5ined. Still more, it removes entirely |
from the field of action about 24,000
regular Spanish troops, with all their
arms and equipments left in our hands
Several thousand more irreguIars are
thrown out of action.
1t is the brilliant beginning of the
end. At Santiago the Army and Navy
found obstacles that they will not have
to encounter at Habana. 1t is true
that at Habana the Notifications are
heavier and more extensive and the
army much larger. But the country
is exceedingly easier to operate in, the
are more accessible TO regu-
lar siege operations, and no matter how
many men Blance may have we can
put more against them, and they can
be at once placed where their superiority
will count.
IF Spain could not defend Santiago
she cannot defend any place.
SOME papers urge that our Navy