Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-06-25
REINF0RCEMENTs FOR LINAREs
SHOULD THEY ARRIVE THEY MIGHT
MAKE SHAFTER TROUBLE.
He Will Probably Try to DO His Work
Before They Reach tho Scene
Cnbans May Have Had
Some Hard Fighting
Already.

ing the official Spanish reports of heavy
fghting between the American invading
army and the Spanish forces near San
tiago. army officers here are confident that
no engagement of any moment has oc-
CURED between those troops. Part of the
landing project was a movement in force
by the Cubans across the country to pre-
vent the Spanish forces concentrating upon
the beach to oppose the landing of the
American troops. Taken in connection
with Sampson's plan of binding the Span
iards to the real landing place by an in
discriminate harryng of the coast for
twenty miles east and west, this scheme
worked admirably, so far as the Amer
lean troops are concerned, as was evil
denced by their landing without the loss
Oh man. 1t is suspected, however. that
'he Cupahs have had to pay for this ex-
emption on the part of the Americans and
tnat the engagements described in the
spanish dispatches were really between
the Cubans and the Spaniards far back in
tne rear, instead of between the Ameri-
cans and Spaniards Seeing that the Cu
nave Deen hberally supplied by Sampson
ana Shafter. it is conceivable that the
spanlards might easily mistake them for
American soldiers at little distance.
me news coming from Jamaica that Cen
eral Pando is sending heavy reinforcements
to the Spanish general. Linares in Santia-
Co. Is likely to have the effect of hasten
ing the campaign against that town by
the Americans. Pando has 10000 soldiers
at Hoguin, less than 100 miles from Santa
so. They are the pick of the Spanish army
IN Cuba, and their commander is known as
the lighting general Were they to COM
bine with the Spanish force in Santiago. the
American campaign might he very much
prolonged, and the task set for our troops
would be much heavier. Two factors have
been relied upon to prevent this combina-
ton. The first is the very rough nature Of
the country between Holguin and San
tiago, which would be exceedingly difficult
for troops to cover in less than four or
five days. at the earliest. The second is
the active efforts of the Cubans to harass
the Spaniards on the march and retard
their movements. With the force they now
have in that country, the Cubans could do
this very effectually, but they could scarce
ly undertake to absolutely check the whole
Spanish force of 1O,OGO men.
The reports from Santiago indicate that
the Spanish admiral is using his squadron
exactly as was anticipated. to defend the
town from attack by soldiers in the rear.
This only emphasizes in the mind of army
officers the necessity for speedy action on
the part of the invaders, for, with Pan
dos men to reinforce the garrison and
Cervera's squadron in full play, the Span
ish forces would be, from a military point
of view, much stronger than the combined
force of Americans under Shafter and
Cubans under Garcia and Rabi.
1t is believed that considerable reliance
must be placed upon the American siege
train. for, as soon as the heavy guns are
in place on the crest of the hills, it is ex.
pected that the position of the Spanish
admiral below, exposed to a plunging fire,
will he untenable, and he will be obliged
either to surrender or make a desperate
attempt to escape from Santiago harbor.
The naval authorities here are satisfied
that no Spanish warship has escaped from
Santiago harbor so far, and the Spanish
newspaper stories to the effect that ''the
cruiser Reina Christina escaped from Sam
tiago," ETC., were received here with a
good deal of amusement. As one officer
put it, the Spaniards must be possessed OF
{; regular Flying Dutchman" in the Reina
Chrisaina. for. at last account and very
recent one too. that particular vessel was
lying in the bottom of Manila bay, where
Dewey had sunk her on May day. The
story is regarded as fair sample of those
put aiioat to deceive the Spaniards at home
and give comfort to their friends III Eu-
rope. The formal statement by the Span
ish minister of marine that the Maria
Christina had succeeded in running the
blockade into CienfuegOs naturally demand
ed more attention than the first publication,
although the officials do not hesitate TO eX-
press doubt of its accuracy. This vessel
is not. as may be supposed. a formidable
war craft. but is nothing more than one OF
the ships OF the Compagnie Trans-Atlan-
tique, of Cadiz. hastily fitted up with a
few five-inch Hontoria guns. She was
built in 1888 and is a sixteen knot vessel of
4,3S1 tons displacement.
If she has gotten into Ceinfuegos she
has crossed over from some of the smaller
islands of the West Indies, or, may be,
from Porto Rico. 1t is believed, however,
that. if the vessel actually reached Cuba,
she has gotten in at Batabano or perhaps,
Manzanilo. both of which ports are out
side the blockade lines
There has been so much talk of Span
ish vessels running the blockade when,
as matter of fact, if they came to Cuba
at all they entered some unblockaded port,
that the officials here are beginning to
recognize deliberate purpose on the part
of persons secretly hostile to the United
States TO give basis for the Spanish repre-
sentations maze to European powers that
our blockade is Intellectual. No vessel that
enters a port outside of the blockade lines
can be said to have run the blockade"
and the number of vessels that have really
entered or escaped from blockaded ports
is exceedingly small. In fact, taking the
number actually known from the official
records. it would appear that the present
blockade of Cuba by the American fleet
has been the most successful ever known,
when the extent of the blockaded terri
tory is considered.
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