Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-05-21
CERyERA.s EXPLOIT.

The news that Admiral CerYera s squad
ron has reached Santiago de Cuba is con-
ffrned by official dispatches from the
Admiral to the Madrid authorities. and
serious news it Is. No matter what may
be the location of our squadrons, whether
at Key West, as reported yesterday, or
elsewhere, it must be admitted that in
the naval game of hide and seek we have
been playing with the Cape Verde squad
ron. we have so far been, ii seems clear
" outwitted. Moreover, considering the
fact that the Spanish squadron is faster
than either OF ours, the skill Cervera has
shown IN elusive tactics and the
evidence that Spain has a well organized
watch on our naval movements 1T must
also be admitted that it appears to rest
largely with the Spanish admiral to de-
eide when the opposing forces shall
come to close quarters, Il at all. As it
has been truthfully and tersely put,
1--WE have moro powerful ships than those
In the Spanish squadron. But our ships
that are more powerful are not so fast,
and our ships that are faster are not so
powerful" 1t would seem To follow,
therefore, that we cannot easily compel
Cervera to engage the superior force at
pur command unless he chooses so to do,
or unless we can corner him. That,
under the circumstances, he should
choose TO sting and run rather than
take the chances of a stand-up fight
would be in harmony with Spain's latter
day mode OF warfare. That he is not
ri
has up to date been pretty we'll proved.
We have said that the news of the ar
rival of the Spanish squadron at San
tiago de Cuba is serious. 1t is serious as
viewed from several standponts. Sue
cess IN GLIDING us makes in itself for
a proiongation of the war. But there are
other factors to be reckoned with as
contributing to that end. 1t is hardly to
he doubted that the squadron landed
large supplies of food, arms, and ammu-
milton, II not reinforcements. for Blanco.
The material effect of this cannot but be
10 impart fresh virility to the Spanish
cause I'm Cuba, and put the Captain-Gen-
eral in betterSpositicn to resist invasion
by our army. Still less is it TO be doubted
that the exploit will strengthen. for
a time at least. the hands OF the Madrid
government and the war party in Spain.
Owing to the Spanish character the moral
effect in Spain is calculated to be
as much a disadvantage to us as the
material effect in Cuba. It is to be
feared that the achievement of Cervera's
Is capable of being used to neutralize
the discomfort among the masses, dis
integrate the peace party that is said to be
in process OF formation, and stimulate
greatly the war spirit.
This Is not a pleasant line of reason
ing, but II represents the logic of the
situation as we see 1t now, and that Is,
that the goal of peace is receding. At the
same time we no more question now
than we questioned when war was de-
elared, that the end will be complete
victory for us. The whole situation
may change tomorrow or next day. We
hope ii viii. But In the mean time we
cannot do better than look the present
squarely in the face and profit by the
lesson 1t contains, as far as possible. II
ceryera's exploit shall inspire greater
energy in official circles and greater
earnestness among the masses in this
country, 1t may develop that that exploit
vas not an Unmixed evil for us