The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1898-04-21

day, at O'Clock q. m, pushed on
through Centerville, the rebels retiring
quietly before it.
Three miles beyond that village, how.
ever, the rebels were found strongly
posted at Blackburn's Ford. on Bull
Run, and, on being pressed, showed
fight. This was at 1:30 p. m. A spirited
conflict, mainly with artillery, resulted
the rebel. being in heavy force, under
the immediate command of Gen. James
Longstreet. The Unionists, more ex-
posed, as well as outnumbered, finally
drew back, leaving the rebel position
intact.
The losses were nearly equal: SO on
our side, 6S on the other. Sherman's
battery, Capt. Ayres, did most of the
actual fighting, supported by Col. Rich
ardson's Brigade, consisting of 1st Mass,
18th n Y, and I'd and Sd Mich.
Regarded as reconnaissance in force,
the attack might be termed a success
since the result demonstrated that the
main rebel army was in position along
the wooded valley of Bull Run, half
way between Centerville and Manassas
junction, and proposed to remain.
Gen. MeDowell's army was moved up
to and concentrated around the ridge on
which Centerville is situated during the
18th and 18th, with intent to advance
and attack the rebels, posted along Bull
Run and between that stream and Ma
nassas junction, on Saturday, the Goth.
But delay was encountered in the re-
ception of adequate subsistence, which
did not arrive till Friday night. Dur
ing Saturday three days rations were
distributed and issued, and every prepa-
ration made for moving punctually at 2
o'clock next morning.
Meantime, Beauregard, maintaining
an absolute quiet and inofensiveness on
his front, and fully informed by spies
and traitors of every movement between
him and Washington, had hastily
gathered from every side all the avail
able forces of the Confederacy, including
$4,000, or nearly the full strength, of
Gen. Johnston's army of the Shenan-
doah, and had decided to assume the
offensive and attack our forces before
Gen. Patterson could come up to join
them.
Had our advance been made on Sat-
urday, as we originally intended, it
would have encountered but two-thirds
of the force it actually combatted; had
it been delayed few hours longer We
should have stood on the defensive, with
the immense advantage of knowing the
ground and of choosing the positions
wherein to fight. Such are the over
ruling casualties and fatalities of war.
Bull Run is a decent mill-stream,
fordable, in Summer, at intervals of
half a mile to a mile. Its immediate
valley is generally narrow and wooded,
inclosed by bluffs, neither high nor very
steep, but afording good positions for
planting batteries to command the roads
on the opposite side, so screened by
woods and brush as to be neither seen
nor suspected until the advancing or at
lacking party is close upon them.
This fact explains and justifes Gen.
McDowell's Cor Scott's) order of battle.
This was, briefly: to menace the rebel
right by the advance of our First Divis-
ion on the direct road from Centerville to
Manassas Junction, while making q
more serious demonstration on the road
running due west from Centerville to
Groveton and Warrenton. and crossing
Bull Run by the Stone Bridge; while
the real or main attack was to be made
by column $4,000 strong, composed
of the Second { Hunter's) and Third
(Heintzelman's) Divisions, which start
ing from their camps mile or two east
and southeast of Centerville, were to
make considerable detour to the right,
crossing Cub Run, and then Bull Run
at a ford known as Sudley Spring, three
miles above the Stone Bridge, thus turn
ing the rebel left, and rolling it up on
the center, where it was to be taken in
flank by our First Division (Tyler's)
crossing the Stone Bridge ut the right
moment, and completing the rout of the
enemy.
The Fifth Division (Miles's) was held
in reserve at Centerville, not only to
support the attacking columns, but to
guard against the obvious peril of a
formidable rebel advance on our left
across Black burn's Ford tn Cantary;IIa
thanking our flank movement. capturing
our munitions and supplies, and cutting
DIT our line of retreat.
The Fourth Division (Runyon'0
guarded our communications with
and Arlington its foremost
regiment being about seven miles back,
from Centerviile
Ito be coniinued)