Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-08-02
GEN. LINARES' REPORT TO NADRIn
BEFORE THE SURRENDER.
KNEW HIS CASE WAS HOPELESS
IMPOSSIBLE TO ESCAPE AND INpoS-
sIBLE TS RESIST LONGER.
Men Had Nothing but Rice to Eat
General Linnrcs PatriOtIcaIIy Of
fers to Sacrifice Himself in
Remittance If Thought
Necessary.

GUANTANAMO, PROVINCE OF SAN
TIAGo DE CUBA, July 25-An Official re
port of General Lfnares TO the Madrid gov
ornment. transmitted on July Is. is full o
pathos, as it tells of Spaniards thousand.
of miles from home, striving to defend
property which the owners have deserted
The report sent by cable on July - was ad
dressed TO the minister of war. 1t was
translated for the Associated Press by
Commodore Schley. The text in full is as
follows:
official cablegram, July L.. 1885 To the
minister of war, from the general in charge
OF the division of Santiago de Cuba:
Although confined to my bed by great
weakness and in much pain the situation
oil the loEg suffering troops here occupies
my mind TO such an extent that | deem il
my duty to address your eXcelency. that
the state of affairs may be explained.
"Enemy's lines very near the town on
account of the nature of the ground: our
lines are in full view from them. Troops
weak; sick in considerable proportion not
sent to hospitals. owing TO the necessity
for keeping them in the intrenchments.
Horses and mules without the allowance
of forage. In the midst of the wet season.
with twenty-four hours daily fall of rain
in the trenches. which are simply bitches
dug in the ground without any permanent
shelter for the men. The men have moth
ing but rice 10 eat. and no means of chang
ing or drying their clothing
Considerable losses: field officers and
company officers killed. wounded. sick de-
prive the troops of necessary orders in crit
ical moments
Under these circumstances. ii is impossi-
bic 10 hight our way out because. in at
tempting to do so. our force would he
lacking one-third OF the men, who could
not leave. and We would be weakened be-
sides by casualties caused by the enemy.
resulting finally in yeritable disaster
without saving diminished battalions
In order to get out. protected by the Hol-
guin division. it will be necessary for them
10 come and treak the enemy's lines in one
place. so that my forces may break through
in another. both acting in conjunction. For
this operation the Holguin division will re-
quire eight days. and Will have to bring
a large amount OF rations. which il is i'm
possible to transport.
The solution of the question is omin-
ously imposed upon us. Our surrender is
inevitable. and We can only succeed in pro-
longing the agony. The sacrifice is useless,
and the enemy understands this. They see
our lines. and theirs being we'll established,
close up, they tire out our men without
exposing themselves. Yesterday they can
nonaded US on land with such an elevation
that We were unable to see their batteries,
and from the sea by the squadron. which
had perfect range and bCmbarded the town
ir sections with mathematical precision.
The complete exodus of the inhabit-
ants, insular as well peninsular in
cludes the occupants of the public Offices.
with few exceptions. There only remains
the clergy and they to-day started to leave
the town, with the archbishop at their
head.
''The defenders here cannot now begin a
campaign full of enthusiasm and energy.
They came here three years ago, strug-
Cling against the climate. privations and
fatigues, and now they are placed in these
sad circumstances. where they have no
food. no physical force and no means of
recuperating. They are defending the
property of those that have abandoned il !
and of those that now are being fed by
the American forces
The honor of arms has its limits and |
appeal 10 the opinion of the whole nation |
as 10 whether these long suffering troops |
have not kept il safely many times since |
May is. when they Were subjected to the |
first cannonade. If it Is necessary that the !
sacrifice be endured for reasons of which |
am ignorant or that someone shall as