The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-01-11
AnEntoA = onrrl.

VI ~ cOF-cWs AhuO NiouO
can reveal whether or not, a. has been lately
stated In both Europe and America, the
Government of Great Britain has instruct
cd Sir Julian Paunoefote to sound the Gov
eminent at Washington as to the FEAST
biity OF an alliance between the two
great branches Of the EnRlish-speaking race
for the protection Of the Chinese Empire from
acknowledgment by the European powers. 1t
may or may not DO true in exact terms but It
was asserted last spring by THE SUN. and docs
not appear to have been authorltativoly denied.
that before Sir Julian started for England on
his summer vacation no called at tho State De-
partmcnt and loft q copy OF tho general arbitra-
tion treaty. which had been so revised ne to
meet tho objections raised against 1t in the
Senate at the time or its rejection and init.
mated that even in this emasculated form its
acceptance by our Government would be graft
flying to his own.
Now 1t would naturally occur to any intelli.
gent person that II the British Government 10
willing to accept such a treaty II lie because IL
finds therein something moro than q nero
agreement to arbitrate our differences after
they shall have been submitted to the Senate
and 1t has consented that that course shall DO
followed. And this in turn raises the question,
What provision docs the proposed treaty con-
tain that makes it really valuable to Great
Britaint
The answer seems obvious, and It can DO no
other, than, II ratified. the treaty would bind us
to first refer any question with Great Britain
and her dependencies. affecting our general or
external relations, to the Senate with q Wow to
arbitration. before taking hostile action. Such
reference would necessarily involve delay, and
to that extent would be o Limitation upon our
Governments freedom Of action. 1t would
doubtless be represented to the world at large
90 q naturalization Of the United States. IL
not as q positive alliance on her part
with Great Britain as against all other
powers There 10 tho best Of reason for
believing that this consideration was tho
principal one which the Government Of
Great Britain had in mind in consenting to the
arbitration Of her differences with Venezuela
and to tho general treaty of arbitration with US.
But spcculations aside. there 10 every reason
why Great Britain should desire It even IL she
has not formally proposed an alliance offensive
and defensive with the great republic.
Throughout the Revolutionary war. and for
many years afterward. when happily for us It
was too late. Great Britain did not conceal her
desire to win us back to her dominion, and
afterward TO make US an ally and n CONNER
cial dependent as against her European neigh
bors. True, she sought to humiliate and OPP
press us during tho Napoleonic period and
pSa hhS 49, ~
US during the dark days OF the rebellion. but now
| that we have recovered from that destructive
struggle and have become the richest and one of
the most powerful nations in the world 1t may
fairly be assumed that sho would hail with Joy
an alliance with us. which would enable her to
surely keep the pence in Eastern Asia and to
maintain the autonomy of the Chinese Empire.
Is such an alliance. in the face Of our tradi.
tional policy of "entangling alliances with
none," possiblei
All Americans remember with pride the fare
we'll address of Washington. Many of his in
functions have not only passed into proverbs Of
governmental policy, but have long since ceased
| to be subjects of discussion. Hitherto no one
has doubted the entire wisdom Of the advice
| which urges us to cultivate peaceful relations
with all nations, entangling alliances with
none.' And yet it is conceivable that a condi-
tion Of affairs might arise undor which Great
Britain might offer. and we might find it to our
| interest to accept, an alliance which would for
ever close the schism that began with the Rev
~olution. and forever unite the two branches of
our race In friendship against the rest Of man
kind.
Many thoughtful observers believe that Great
Britain, Notwithstanding her enormous wealth,
her widely extended commerce, and her great
naval strength. has eliminated as a dominating
| po"SA 10 ~ WIN . ohoiAps IL ~ thut
her army has passed permanently into the second
rank, and. although the word has recently gone
forth that it must also be reorganized, it may
we'll DO doubted that it can ever be made equal
to the demands which n great European war
would surely bring upon IL. Moreover. it seems
certain that even her navy may at an carly day
be overmatched by a coalition between any
two Of the great powers, in which event she
would most certainly lose her superiority on the
sea, and then her only salvation would lie in ar
alliance with US.
What could she offer us that we could afford
to accept in return for such an alliancei From,
the earliest day OF our national life-indeed
from the earliest association OF the colonies fol
common defence-the dream Of our wisest states
men has been for q continental republic. Oui
first confederation and our first wars with
France and England were made for tho attain
mont of that end. Our first Constitution pro
vided for 1t. our first Congress was the Cont
mental Congress-" our first army was " the Con
tinental Army" and above and back of all tina
has been said and done for the realization o.
that dream lie tho fundamental polity of oul
people, the great and paramount interests Of oul
race in the Western Hemisphere. the one SUI
preme assurance which, II realized, would
dedicate this continent to "the peace o.
God which passeth all understanding re
lieve it forever from the necessity of main
tanning a great standing army, and cna
BILE IT to say authoritatively that no hostil,
shot should be fired anywhere In the worlt
without the permission of Its Government. Tn,
Monroe doctrine and the declarations OF ouI
party platforms in favor of our manifest destin,
have their supreme and all sufficient ~justinca
ton in tho idea Of continental union, and will
that realized by tho consent and assistance o
Great Britain, what would thore be left for II
to quarrel about
This, too, may be n dream which 1t will tax,
many years to convert into a reality-and yet
who can say 1t is an impossibility. or that cir
cumstances may not bring about its consumma
ton at an early dayi At all events. should Lore
Salisbury, for reasons OF his own, think 1t advis
able TO really sound our Government on the pos
sibility of n limited or even a general alliance
what harm could there be II the Secretary o
State should say he was willing to discuss tn
mattcri And II In the discussion he should cal
attention to the fact that while the traditiona
policy of our Government is "pence with al