The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-29
Uncle Sans Prompt and Vigorous
Measures for Making the Stir
ring Slogan a Reality.

Havana. on the southern shore, is the
only pace OF importance from a strategic
view besides Santiago de Cuba, the latter
the strongest fortified port on the island.
40 miles away. nearly In the southeast
corner OF Cuba, that needs any particular
attention from our fleets. Other towns on
the southern coast. like Trinidad and Man
zanlLo, are intellectually guarded against
a hIteen minute oombardnent, and the in
,er.or towns OF Santa Clara, Puerto Prin-
cipe, Santa Catalina. Cubitas and others
are only deserving OF mention frora their
geographical significance as eenters OF pop
u!atlon and trade. They have virtually
been surrounded by the insurgents for the
past year or more, and. though there would
possibly he some bloody fighting In occupy
ing them with a victorious force ana a few
dozen or few hundred even might be
killed on either or both sides. there could
not be any conflict in connection with tae
capture or capitulation Of these towns
that would rise to the dignity OF bat
tie. IL IS quite probable that the cubaa
insurgents. increased N numbers and with
adequate supplies. will crush out by un-
aided effort all the Spanish troops at the
eastern half Of the island. No serried
ranks will march against strongly in
trenched foe. Between the Spaniards and
the insurgents there will De more guerrilla
warfare than anything else, while the
Americans VIII march on steadily, as they
did through Mexico IL 1Sf1.
Making due allowance for personal bray-
cry, the Spaniards and those Cubans
forming the guarda civiies in the ranks
of the royal army cannot compete for
any extended time with the superior drill.
craftsmanship. vaior. strength, force and
prestige of the American soldier. They
have a strong ally In their climate. but
Il cannot under the worst circumstances
prove more disastrous to us than il has 10
the peasant youths and citizen soldiery OF
Span--in fact less SO. for our medical
comnlissarat Is better prepared to resist
the attacks Of such an insidicus foe as yell
low fever or its constant companions, dys-
EMERY and miasmatc fevers of more or
less virulence. Our hospital management
is superior. and the entire scope OF the
pharmacopoeia Is at our disposal. Moth
ing Is lacking. We have the powers Of
curing and healing. and every private has
in his Exit" the ordinary means OF pre-
ventfou.
The subjugatlon OF the Spanish force in
Cuba Is really not a serious matter. As
an army their number is ridlculously small
in comparison with the hosts we can send.
II Is i-eauipped. lacking III many essen
tails OF the disciplined soldier and not a
foeman worthy OF our steel though In the -
devisng OF treacherous attacks and in the
commission of such crimes as assassna-
tIons. poisoning wells and communicating
contagious diseases by various means they
are not equaled
The destruction of the coast defenses at
Havana. Matanzas. Cardenas, Cienfuegos
and Santiago de Cuba places tho Island at
the mercy of the invader. That is the
story In ertome.
What follows after the conquest? The
island would be In charge OF a military
governor. some major general probably,
deputized for that special purpose by the
president and confirmed in his position by
congress, who would for n brief time at
least keep the island under martial law.
a provisional government would then be
instituted under his orders. and the peo-
pie OF Cuba would he invited TO signify
their preference by vote for the form OF
government they desire and the leaders
they wish 20 govern them
There may be an educational test, which