Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1898-05-26
WAR NEWS FROM WASHINGTON
A General Review of the Situation as It Ap-
peared in Official Circles Last Night.
Charges Of Delay and Unpreparedness
Resented by the War and Navy Depart
mentS.

the officials found great comfort, knowing
the abilities of the American naval COM
manders in Cuban waters to keep the
Spanish admiral bottled up in his narrow
neck harbor until he shall surrender or
be starved out. If Cervera is actually at
bay the officials feel not the slightest APP
prehension of another squadron from
Cadz The reason for this belief is their
unquestioned ability to holu Cervera in
check with only a few vessels-perhaps a
couple of monitors and lorpedo boats
| thus leaving the remainder of the big
| armored fleet and a great number of I'M
| armored but serviceable war craft to take
care of any achievements that might at
| tempt to come from Spain to Cervera' S
| aid. The force that could be spared for
| this purpose without the integrity of the
| blockade at Havana permitting the
| escape of Cervera would be much larger
| than the entire Spanish naval force in
! Spanish waters capable of crossing the
| Atlantic.
The news of the safe arrival of the Ore
| gon in American waters was a source of
! unalloyed satisfaction to all naval Of
| ficers. Apprehension to the safety of
+, the Oregon practically disappeared when
+. the vessel reached Barbados and re-
ported her arrival to the Navy Depart
/ ment, but there was always chance
| that she might suffer from accident or
hostile attack in the short distance re-
naming on her homeward journey.
! Within the past few weeks or in fact
| ever since the determination was positive
J ly reached to invade Cuba before the dry
! season next fall, there have ben pub
/ lished intimations that the delay or what
| appeared to be the delay in the beginning
! OF the invasion was attributable to the
navy. In other words, the army has long
been prepared to start for Cuba but could
not do so for lack of conveys and ships
| to insure landing. 1t can be stated on the
| highest authority that the Impression
! thus created is wholly unjust to the navy
! and without warrant in fact The naval
! officers, one and all, take especial pride
! in the degree of readiness in which the
navy was found at the outbreak of hostil-
| tiles, and there never has been a moment
| even when SIMPSONS forces were at
! Porto Rico, when the navy was not pre-
pared on instant notice to aid the army in
| Erecting a landing in Cuba Nor, on the
| other hand, has the army been at fault in
, this matter. 1t was at first as is now
! well known, proposed to throw a small
| force of men or soldiers about 10 900 int o
! cuba 1mmedia tely and allow the remain
! der of the army of occupation to wait
! until next fall before going over There
were various reasons for abandoning this
plan, such as the discovery of the in s1f-
hclent support that could be rendered the
/, first army by the insurgents: the fact that
was brought out by appalling force that
/ to delay the campaign meant the absolute
/ determination of the starving reconcen-
! tradOS, and there were besides interna-
! uonal reasons for making haste These
/ considerations caused complete change in
| the army plans, and that involved DELAY.
/ To equip an army of leo 900 men in thirty
| days and put them in condition to fight
/ trained veteran soldiers on their own soil
was no small undertaking, so that in the
| opinion of some of the highest officers of
! the administration, there is no reasonable
! ground for passing criticism that there is
: or has been undue delay in beginning the
military campaign, either on the part of
/ the army navy.
! contracts be awarded for supplying the
armor for the three battleships under
| construction as follows:
To the Carnegie company, 1.153 tons for
! the Illinois and 2,55S. IS tons for the Wis
| consin; Bethlehem, 1.405 tons for the IlIi-
/ nois and 2,55S tons for the Alabama.
| at $500 per ton.