The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-07
KENNAN'S STORY OF THE WAR.
Red Cross Representative Describes
Santiago Experiences.
George KEENAN,, in the Outlook.

George KEENAN,, in the Outlook.
The most serious embarrassments with
which the army of invasion has had to con-
tend since 1T reached the coast and began
its march on Santiago are first, the extreme
difhculty of landing supplies in place like
this. where there is neither pier nor shelter
and where the beach is dashed a large part
of the time by a high and dangerous surf;
and, second, the difficulty of getting these
supplies to the front over a single line of
very bad road, with an insufficient number
of mules and army wagons. General Shat
ter's commssaries and quartermasters
have done all that they could do since they
arrived, and, under the circumstances, have
succeeded fairly well, but if these two diff
ncuities had been foreseen and provided for.
tnere would not now be so many smashed
hghters and launches on the beach, and the
soldiers at the front would not have been
SO much Of the time on short rations, nor
nave been compelled to boil water and cook
their rations in coffee cups and tomato
cans, as they are now doing The difficulty
OF landing supplies on this exposed and
surf-beaten coast might have been antici-
pated, it seems to me- and provided for.
The war ships of SIMPSONS and Schley's
neets were here long before General Shat
ter's army left Tampa, and their command
ers must have seen, 1 think, that to get
supplies ashore through the surf at any
point between Santiago and Guantanamo
pay would be extremely difficult and haz-
droous, and would probably require the use
or special engineering devices and appIi-
ances. The prevailing winds here are from
the east and southeast and from such winds
the little indentatonS of the coast at Sibo-
ney ana Balquirt afford no protection what
ever. "A strong breeze raises a sea which
may amount to nothing outside, but which
is very troublesome, If not dangerous to
loaded boats and lighters as soon as they
reach the line where it begins to break in
surf The water is very deep close to shore;
IL is dlfncult, therefore, to construct pier
OF any great length and even if there were
a long and solid pier, small boats and light
ers could not discharge cargo upon it with
ana down and dashed against it by heavy
sea. am not an expert IN such matters, but
IN H. watching the landing Of sup
steamer and from the army transports.
It has seemed to me that what is known
beleve, as cable hoist" might have been
used to advantage if it had been provided in
time. 1t is a continuance resembling the
caDle and car employed by life-saving crews
ashore under similar conditions: or to use
comparison that is more familiar it is a
reproouction on a large scale of the travel
ing cash boxes on wires used in large de-
partment stores. If a suitable transport
were anchored outside the line of surf, fifty
or Seventy-fve yards from the beach and a
steel cable were stretched from it to a
strong mast on shore, l do not see any rea-
son why cargo might not be carried over
much greater rapidity and safety than it is
now carried on lighters Such devices are
used, think, at several points on the west
ern coast of South America for putting
guano and phosphateS on board of vessels
where communication with the shore is haZ-
ardouS and uncertain on account of swell or
surf.
The second difficulty, viz, that of trans
portatlon to the 'front.' might have been
Ior-r
wagons and mules. Our army before San
tago has suffered for want of great many
things that the soldiers had with them on
the transports but that were not landed
and carried promptly forward Among such
things are large tents, rubber blankets,
camp kettles and large cooking utensils
generally. Whats the use of telling us to
drink only boiled water" said an officer of
the Seventh Infantry to me, when we
or an old tomato can to boil it in, or to keep
1T in after it has been boiled? They tell us,
also. that we must sleep in hammocks, not
get wet II we can help it, and change our
underclothes whenever we do get wet
That's all very well, but there isn't a ham,
mock In my company. / haven't any rub
Der blanket or spare underclothes myself,
and don't believe any of my soldiers have.
They made us leave everything that we
could possibly dispense with at Tampa, and
then, when we got here, they didn't land
and send with us even the indispensable
The complaint of the officer was perfect
" just one, and l have heard many more
bike 1t. The insufficient and inadequate pro-
vision for the care and feeding of the
wounded at the field hospital of the Fifth
Army Corps, which l have tried to describe
In previous letters, was due largely. to the
inability of General Skaters commissaries
and quartermasterS to cope successfully
with the two great difficulties above indi-
Gated, viz, landing from the steamers and
transportation to the front The hospital
corps had supplies on the vessels at ST.
honey, but, as everything could not possibly
be landed and carried forward at once, pref
erence was given to ammunition and rations
for able-bodied soldiers rather than to tents,
blankets and invalid food for the wounded
1 do not mean to be understood as saying
that the hospital corps had, even on the
transports. everything that they needed in
order to enable them to take proper care
for the eight hundred or one thousand
wounded who were thrown on their hands
in the course of forty-eight hours. I do not
know whether they had or not. Neither do
| mean to say that the commissaries and
Quartermasters did not do all that they pos
sibly could to land and forward supplies of
all kinds. / mean only that a result of
our inability to surmount these difficulties
promptly, our army at the front was not
properly equipped and our wounded were
not adequately cared for The hospital corps
and quartermaster's and commissary de-
partmentS of the army, however, were not
alone in their failure to anticipate and fully
provide for these difficulties. The Red Cross
itself was in no better shape. There was
perhaps much excuse for us, because when
we fitted out we did not know where the
army going nor what it proposed to do
but we had been assured by the surgeon
that so far as the care of sick and wounded
soldiers was concerned, our services would
not be required. We expected however,
that they would be, and, could we have
known in what field and under what condi-
tions our army going to move and
fight, we should probably have had, in some
directions, better, at least a more suit
able equipment. If we had had here last
week half a dozen army wagons, an equal
number of saddle horses, and forty or fifty
mules of our own. we should have been in
much better condition than were to cope
with the difficulties of the situation. But
for the assistance of the army, which helped
us out with transportation, Notwithstanding
its own limited resources, we should not
have been able to establish a Red Cross
station at the front in time to cooperate
with the hospital corps after last
weeks battle. nor should we have been able
to send food to the ten thousand refugees
from Santiago who fled, hungry and desti-
tute, to the right wing of our army at
Caney For an opportunity to get into the
field we are indebted to General Shafter,
to his hospital corps. ard to the officers
of his army, and we desire most CRATE
fully to acknowledge and thank them for
the helping hand they extended to us when
we have virtually no transportation what
ever of our own.
we now have a Red Cross station in the
field hospital of the Fifth Army Corps at
the front: a hospital of our own here with
twenty-five beds attended by six trained
,,,,vcnS under direction of DR.. Lesser, and we