The times., 1898-10-24


from Gen. Shafter on July 2, during the
fighting before Santiago:
Terrible fight yesterday. but my line Is now
strongly intrenched about three-iourths OF 4
mile from town. urge that you make effort
ture losses among my men, which are already
very heavy. You can operate with iess loss
of life than / can. Please telephone answer
W. R. SHAFTER, Major General
And the following was telephoned 10
him:
Gen shafter:
Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded
forts at entrance Of Santiago. and also Punta
Gorda battery inside. silencing their fire. Do YOU
wish further firing on his part: He began at
$50: finished at 80 Your message TO him
here. impossible TO force entrance until We
after forts are taken Possession of by your tro7ps
Nothing in this direction accomplished yesterday
LIEUT.. sTAUNroN.
To which reply was made as follows:
J=ly 2.
1t is impossible for me to say when l can take
batteries at entrance TO harbor. Ii they
difficult to take a. those which have been
piited against, il Will he some time and great
loss of life. | am at a loss to see why the navy
cannot work under a destructive fire as well as
the army. My loss yesterday over 500 men.
By all means keep up fire on everything in sight
of You until demolished expect, however. in
time and with sufficient men, 10 capture the forts
along the bay. SKATER.
SnmpsOn's Closing Words.
The report of Admiral Sampson con-
cludes with the following significant
statement:
II wrote Gen. Shafter the following let
ter. and began making preparations TO
countermine, and. with the object of ar
ranging an attack upon the batteries at
the entrance a visit was arranged to
Gen. Shafter. so that the matter might
be thoroughly discussed, and combined
action take place. l had in view the en-
ployment of the marines for an assault
on either the Morro or Socapa battery,
while at the same time assaulting the de-
fenses at the entrance with the fleet:
L. s S Flagship New York, First Rate,
OF Santiago de Cuba. July ,. ls9s.
My Dear General: have your note of this
morning-iust received at 1880
An officer OF my staff has already reported to
yoy the firing which We did this morning, but
must saw in addition to what he told you that
the forts which silenced were not the forts
which would give you any inconvenience in cap
turing the city. as they cannot fire except TO
seward They cannot even prevent our entrance
into the Uarbor of Santiago. Our trouble from
the first has been that the channel TO the harbor
is well strewn with observation mines, which
would certainly result IN the SINKING OF one or
more of our ships if we attempted TO enter the
harbor and by the sinking of ship the object
of the attempt TO enter the harhor would be de.
feated by the preventing OF further progress on
our part
1t was my hope that an attack on your part
of these shore batteries, from the rear, would
leave US at liberty TO drag the channel for tor
pedoes.
II it is your earnest desire that We should force
our entrance. | will at prepare to undertake
it, think, however, that our position and yours
would be made more difficult if, as is possible,
we fail in our attempt.
We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty
countermining mines, which | will bring here
with as little delay as possible, and if can
succeed in freeing the entrance Of mines by their
use | will enter the harbor.
This work, which is unfamiliar to US, will re-
quire considerable time.
1t is not so much the loss of men as it is the
loss OF ships which has until now deferred me
from making a direct attack upon the ships
within the port. Very truly,
W. T. SAMPSON
Rear Admiral, L. s N.
Commander-in-Chief, U. s. Naval Fotce, North
Atlantic Station.
July 3.-The sortie of Admiral Cervera's
squadron and its destruction has been
| made the subject of a separate paper,
| and need not be repeated here.
This event closes the purely naval CAM
| paign, crowning with complete success
|