The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-10-12

WASHINGTON Oct. 1.-THE war In
vestiga ting commission devoted its fore
noon session to an examination OF Secre-
tary Ayers statement and the papers
furnished by him in reply 20 the commits
s!on's inquiries. The accompanying papers
include reports from various bureaus Of
the wal department and various letters
and telegrams bearing upon the conduct
Of the war. Secretary Alsor replies to tho
various questions propounded by the COM
missions. but gives especial prominence to
the plan of campaign, ana 10 the changes
that were made in the original plars.
lie stated that Tampa was chessu as
the base OF operations because u! ils
proximity to Havana at which pont ii
was originally intended tho landing should
he made. The determination to make 4
change was due TO the developments on
The southern coast of Cuba, ana to Ad-
miral Cervera's course in locating his feet
in the Bay of Santiago. When il became
quite certain that he was securely en-
trapped. Admiral Sampson wired the fact
to the secretary Of the navy. asking that
troops be sent Immediately. He said that
he had siienced the batteries which were
accessible from the sea. and that 1900
men could capture the town within forty
eight hours. The text of this message IS
given. as was the text OF various other
telegrams. showing the cause OF delay in
getting the expedition off
The report shows that Gen. Miles ad-
vised in the beginning that the first move
ment should be made against Porto Rico.
and that after that island should be sub
jugated the forces should TO landed at
some point on the north coast or Cuba.
The secretary of war replied to the sew
eral questions as follows:
l. Plan Of campaign decided upon inn
mediateiy after the declaration OF war.
Was il decided TO move at once on Havana
or that the campaign should be postponed
until the autumn?
A. Immediate blockade by the navy OF
the important ports OF Cuba, as directed
by the presidents proclamation. Tho
holding OF troops at points nearest 10 Cuba
TO be available in any emergency which
might arise. and especially 10 be ready for
prompt assistance in case the operations %
the navy should make the use of land
forces necessary or desirable.
Early IN May "A plan was partially ma
tured To land a force at Mariel point
about twenty-six miles west Of Havana,
reports having been received that In Its
immediate vicinity were high grounds.
well watered and suitable for camping
troops preparatory for a movement upon
Havana later, II Il was deemed advisable:
the thought being that possibly an assault
might be mads. upon the forces defending
that city before the rainy season set in.
Orders were issued 10 move on May 10. but
subsequently, plans were changed on ac-
count OF further Information that there
would he great danger To the health OF the
troops In that vicinity and also on account
Of the uncertainty OF the movements OF tho
euemy'S fleet. 1t was then determined 10
keep the forces In the United States at
points as near Cuba as possible for sune-
date embarkaiion should an emergency
demand IT, The Santiago campaign proved
~ be that emergency.
/, may be added further that fl was bo-
ucvei after consultation with medical au-
thorities that troops camping In the South
crn states during the summer would be-
come somewhat accllmaJed for their serv-
tees IN Cuba.
When vas tho Santiago campaign
determined. upon7
A. The Santiago campaign was made
necessary by the presence of Admiral Ger
veras fleet IN Santiago harbor. but had
previously been contemplated az ous
point on the coast where A reconn0lssanes
in force WAS TO be male TO ascertain tho
strength af the enemy IN the dlffercak
locaH H:ies IN Eastern Cuba The imns-
date destruction os Admiral Cervera'D
fleet was necessary, and 10 enable the
navy 20 accomplish this. the military forcs
under Mai Gen. Smarter was directed 20
move AT once On the city and province os
Santiago This movement was FASTENED
by reason - a telegram received from AL
mira. Samrson On June !, stating that ha
nad bombarded the forts at Santiago on
June and silenced the works quickly.
and IF 1QGD0 men were there the city and
feet could be captured within forty eight
hours.
fSee copies IF kilograms herewith at
tached, marked A. r.. G. -. Il. F. q. HI
Il Is proper 70 state that after the data
% m. message the Spanish garrison vas
largely reinforced. The opinion Of Ad-
Ynirai Sampson vas Doubtless correct az
the time The tr0ors safied from Tampa
On June IL. ls9s. with issss officers and
men
= why was Tampa selected az tho bass
or opera.ions7
4 on account of ths shipping facilities
A. that point ard its comparative shqrt
distance from cuba, rendering any move
u1ert of the troops p0ssl BILE on short ne,ics,
a. tho progress of the blockade or anv
cf1er condition might require.
why were summer camps organized
a. FerranGlua Jecksonvrl.a and Tampa
4 All Of the early camps in the South
were selected with special regard FOR the
health ~ the troops and their convenience
for prompt move g3snte ay rail and water
The camp a Fernandina was organized on
the recommendation of the major general
commanding tha army. Ths camp az