Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-05-28
Cervera's Ships Said to Be in Two
Cuban Ports.
CIENFUEGOS AND SANTIAGO De CUBA
Both These Cities Have Splendid
land-Cocked Harbors.
Z A D1Z FLEET SAILS

| hEf WEST, Fla. May 2S-It is now al
| MOST certain that Commodore Schley has
the spanish fleet bottled up In the harbor
OF Santiago de Cuba. There is SO uttIe
4 ooubt about this that the naval camnairn
Is proceeding upon the assumption thai Ad-
| n,lral Cervera is incapable OF doing on,
harm. Within few days the exact condi-
uons at Santiago de Cuba will he known
| without a shadow of doubt.
In spite OF assertions TO the contrarv
commodore Schiey was not absolutely sure
Oh MS game when he last communicated
with Rear Admiral Sampson and the COM
ihooore VIII not take active steps to block
up .ne entrance Of Santiago harbor until
perfectly certain that Admiral Ger
vera's ships are inside
| However. he may have done this already
as commodore Schley'c last commun,oa-
ton, forwarded on Thursday. only reacna,
Rear Admiral Sampson yesterday.
Three Days at Cfenfueso..
The commodore stayed three day. at
Cienfuegos. He signaled to his ships. II
believe the Spanish fleet is I'm the harhor" "
On this belief a message was sent to the
American admiral. The details Of how
Commodore Schley found out that he NO.
mistaken are not yet known At any rate
| acting on the admirars instruction. the
| commodore then moved east. arriving ont.
side Santiago de Cuba on Wednesday morn
ing, May 2o
The topography of Cfenfuegos and Sam
iago de Cuba is almost Identical. Both
karbors are about six miles long with nsr
rev entrances about 800 yards wide and
protected by highland. A whole feet could
lie in the harbor of either place and be
| Invisible from the outside
After his experience at Cenfuegos. IL is
probable that Commodore Schley was very
conservative in deciding whether or not he
mad caught Admiral Cervera From the
tche OF his dispatches II is evident that
the commodore soon gained much second
hand and external evidence which pointed
to Admiral Cervera's presence in the inner
farbor. This evidence was apparently
| strong enough to make the commodore feel
| certain the object of his trip had been &C.
| ccmplished, but in view of his previous ex-
perience. he would not risk a decisive state
ment until after ascertaining the fact for
| himself. 49, a. ...-..4-
Facts VIII Soon BE Known.
Before this dispatch is published, # is
likely that Commodore Schley has sent
some vessel into the entrance OF the har.
Dor OF Santiago de Cuba, has obtained
from reliable source ashore information
| as to the exact number and the names OF
the Spanish warships sheltered by the hills
about that place.
Contrary to the generally expressed opin-
icn the harbor of Santiago de Cuba is
poorly protected. Like Havana and San
Juan de Porto Rico. it has its MORO Cas-
tie, which is even a better target than
these Of Havana and San Juan. The only
IN he rS srnn ha
which have been laid in the channel of
Santiago since the war was declared But
countermning would probably render these
mines harmless, should it prove desirable
for Commodore Schley's ships to enter the
harbor. Such a step, however, is unlikely.
In this connection it may be noted that
since the commencement of the naval oper-
atoms the moral effects of the mines have
been great. This condition promises to
continue, and will probably mark the naval
operations to a greater extent than ever
imagined in the past.
A prominent naval authority said to the
correspondent of the Associated Press:
1.-The moral effect of torpedoes and mines
will prove far superior to their actual ef-
feet. In fact. so great is their moral force
that 1 doubt whether their powers of ex-
ecution will have an opportunity to be
judged in this war
Blockade fs Uneventful.
The blockade Of northern Cuba continues
uneventful and is apparently successful.
The measures Of precaution which Rear
Admiral Sampson adopted up to yesterday
to guard the eastern and western passages
did not detract from the efficacy of the
blockade
Now that the element of uncertainty re-
garding the Spa nish shirss' W houts ia
almost entirely removed the ships which
were solely occupied in watching for the
Spaniards have become an additional force
for the blockade, and without any incon-
venient change of position. Commodore
Schley has been reinforced, but his posi-
tion was clearly SO strong that the REIN
forcement which he received made no diff
ference to the strong fleet in northern Gu
ban waters. Cd. -.=-.i .
The rumors of the sailing OF a second
Spanish squadron did not worry Rear Ad-
miral Sampson in the slightest degree Ills
feelings on the subject were aptly express
ed recently when he said:
am perfectly satisfied that we have
bagged those fellows" (referring to Ad-
miral Cervera's ships).
Rear Admiral Sampson does not cross
his bridges until he comes to them, and
when that time comes his uncomfortable
patience and strategic ability can be relied
upon to see him safely across.
Army fs Ready to Move.
For the second time since war was de-
clared the admiral has been notified tha.
the army is ready to move. This is good
news to all the naval officers The two
branches of the service have been playing
game of wait; the army resting until the
navy disposed of the Spanish fleet and the
navy unable to occupy nuch-needed bases
Until the troops were ready for debarka-
ton. In view Of the fact that the Spanish
feet was far faster than the American
fleet. and that the former had no desire FOR
an engagement this policy of inaction.
However far-sighted II may have been.
temporarily produced much natural irrita-
ton among the naval officers.
All appearances now point to the passing
away Of this feeling. and hearty active
cooperation between the army and navy
may be anticipated.
BY great good fortune no accident Aaa
- - 49,