Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-04-09
A War Of Conquest Not Now Con-
templated.
MERELY TEE FREEDOM OF CUBA
No Immediate Assault on Othe,
Colonies.
CRUSADE FOR HUMANITY

involve a war of conquest against Spain.
AS the President told the representatives
Of the six great European powers Thurs
day, the sole purpose Of this government
is to earnestly and unselfishly endeavor "to
fulfill duty to humanity by ending situa-
titn the indefinite prolongation of which
has become insufferable." Taking this
conservative utterance as a cue, 1t is be-
lieved to follow that his message to Con-
gress Monday will recommend prompt and
vigorous measures for the relief of the de-
plorable state of affairs existing in Cuba
as a result of the lnhuman methods of war
fare adopted by the Spaniards for the sub
jugation of the insurgents. So far as
known the Presidents plan primarily in
wolves immediate armed Intervention in
the interests of peace.
Congress, the executive and the people
are in perfect accord in the matter and 1t
Is confidently expected that the represen-
tations which will be made by the Presi-
dent in his message Monday will result in
the prompt enactment Of legislation which
will authorize MIN to employ the entire
military and naval strength of the govern
ment for the restoration of peace on the
island. Such a course of action will un-
doubtedly result in serious clash of arms
between the forces of the United States
and Spain. 1t is not expected that Con-
gress will declare a general war against
Spain and its colonies but will confine its
immediate action to giving authority for
the employment of the army and navy for
the alleviatton Of the terrible conditions on
the island and the resumption of CONNER
cial relations with the outside world.
Not a Policy of Vengeance.
Without considering the case of the
Maine in this connection our grievance
against Spain has this extent-no more.
The Maine disaster is Il thorn in our side,
but it is understood that the adminstra-
ton does not consider 1t in itself as a
casus belli, AMI 1t Is authoritatively stated
that the war policy of the United States
will not be one of vengeance on that ac-
count. The killing of the 2G6 Americans
on that .ll-starred vessel, whether the re-
suit of treacnery or neglect on the part
of Spanish officials at Havana, has un-
.doubtedly had much to do in shaping the
policy OF the administration for the over
throw of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba.
There is authority for the statement, how
ever. that no effort at retaliation will be
made, except as it may become necessary
in the execution of the plans for the res
the ultimate independence Of the Cubans
will be the inevitable result of successful
Intervention by the United States in their
behalf, and. as Spain has announced Its
purpose of defending her sovereign rights
on the island to the bitter end, the issue
is clearly drawn and a conflict at arms
is inevitable.
To Drive Spain Out of Cuba.
The primary aim and purpose of the
United States, therefore, will be the ending
Of Spanish sovereignty on the island, and
our future military and naval cp lions
will be predicated On that POLICY. The con-
quest CT Spain and her coo nes (cutsile Of
Cuta) is not conte Epated, and the ag-
g.essive action of this government will end,
It is said, with the Termination of Spanish
rue i'll Cuba. With that comp shed the
p. olongation of hos,i les vii ,ep nj en-
t:rely up n the futu.e course of spain.
Unl,ss subsequent eIe..tS sho Id render
it necessary. the United States will not
wage a general war agsinst Spain nor at
tempt 10 invade its territory, central or
colonial.
Consequently, there is no likelihood that
the United States Will initiate hostile opsr-
aticns against the Spanish colonies in the
Philippines. the c; mares or even at Porto
Rico, unless such q course becomes neces-
sary by the events Of the future as a con-
sequence Of its Intervention in the interests
Of peace in Cuba.
Capture of Cuba.
It is an open secret that the deliberations
Of the strategic experts of the army and
navy have been mainly directed to secur-
ing control of the Island Of Cuba as a nee
essary preliminary to the amelioration of
existing conditions. This has proved q
most troublesome war problem, inasmuch
as it involves the subjugation of the Span
ish forces now in control of all the Cuban
ports, and the subsequent disposition OF
an army Of 100000 soldiers in case of their
surrender. to say nothing of the care and
sustenance Of the concentrates.
So far as known, the plans of campaign
contemplate the seizure Of Cuba and the
interception Of any and all Spanish fleets
that may be dispatched to that island. The
Philippines. the Canaries and Spain itself
are not factors in the plans except as they
may be brought into 1t by subsequent
events.
The capture of Cuba has been deyolved
upon Capt Sampson's large fleet now rem
dezvoused at Tortugas and Key West and
Constituting the most powerful aggregation
VI WdISHlpS Thai the united states has as.
sembled at one point since the war of the
rebellion. The duty Of this squadron will
b to invest the island and lombard all
ports where resistance is offered. The main
portion OF the feet win be devoted to the
capture Of Havana. That place IL strongly
fortified and the harbor IL a network of
mines. but no doubt IL felt as to Its subju-
CATION. especially since the departure Of the
Spanish cruisers vixcaya and Oqueudo. The
cruiser Alfonso XII is still there, but no
fear 10 felt on her account. No difficulty is
anticipated In the subjugation OF all the
Cuban ports by bombardm.nt or In other
ways.
spenish Troops In Cabs-
A serious problem. however. is the dIspo-
sition OF thu large Spanish army In Cuba
IN case II should surrender or be given
permission to leave the island, in reace In
either ease q large feet Of steamers would
be necessary for their transportation. ana
u they were allowed to return to Spain
considerable time would be necessary for
their shipment. On the other hand. II