The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-12-06
PRESENT AFFAIRS At HOME AND ABROAD
A Well W Document, Descriptive of the Origin, Progress and
Victories of the War-Recommendations a 8 to the I'm
provement of the Military and Naval Service.

end. The proffered expedient OF zones
II cultivation proved illusory: indeed.
no less practical nor more delusive
promises of succor could well have
been rendered to the exhausted n
destitute people. stripped of all that
made life and home dear. and herded
in a stange region. among unsym-
pathetic strangers. hardly less necessi-
tous than themselves.
BY the end of December the mortal
ity among them had frightfully in
creased. Conservative estimates from
Spanish sources placed the deaths
among these distressed people at over
40 per cent from the time General Wey-
ler's decree of RECOMMENDATION was EN-
forced. With the acquiescence of the
Spanish authorities a scheme was
adopted for relief by charitable contri-
buttons raised In this country, and dis
tributed under the direction of the con-
sui general and h several ~consuls.
by noble and earnest individual effort
through the organized agencies of the
American Red Cross. Thousands of
lives were thus saved. but many thou
sands more were inaccessible to such
forms Of aid.
The wal continued on the old footing
without comprehensive plan. develop
ing only the same spasmodic encoun-
tiers, barren OF strategic result, hat
had marked the course OF the earlier
10 years rebellion, as well as the pres
ent insurrection from its start. No
alternative save physical exhaustion of
either combatant and therewithal the
practical ruin of the island, lay I'm
sight but nov far distant no one could
venture to conjecture.
The Destruction OF the Maine.
At his juncture. on the 18th OF Feb
ruary last. occurred the destruction of
H. III = a
lying I'm the harbor OF Havana on a
mission of International courtesy and
good will, n catastrophe the suspicious
nature and horror of which stirred the
nations heart profoundly. IL is a strik-
ing evidence of the poise and sturdy
good sense distinguishing our national
character. that this shocking blow,
falling upon a generous people. al
ready deeply touched by preceding
events in Cuba, did not move them to
a desperate resolve to tolerate no longer
the existence of a condition of danger
and disorder at our door hat made
possible such a deed by whomsoeyer
wrought: Yet the instinct of justice
prevailed. and the nation anXiously
waited the result OF the searching in
vestlgation at once set on foot. The
finding OF the naval board OF inquiry
established that the origin Of the ex-
plosion was external by a submarine
mine. and only halted through lack of
positive testimony to fix the RESPONSE
bility Of its authorship.
The Crisis.
All these things carried conviction to
the most thoughtful. even before the
finding OF the naval court. that a crisis
i'm our relations with Spain and toward
Cuba was at IN So strong was this
belief that IL needed but "A brief eNecu-
tive suggestion to the congress tn re-
ceive immediate answer to the duty Of
making instant provision for the pos
sible and perhaps speedily probable
emergency OF war, and the remarkable.
almost unique, spectacle was presented
OF "A unanimous vote of both houses ON
the 9th OF March. apprcpriating SEQ
DOC, 900 FOR the national defense and for
each and every purpose connected
Herewith. to be expended at the discre-
ton OF the president"
That this act or provision came none
too soon. was disclosed when the appli-
cation Of the fund was undertaken
our forts were practically u~ndefended.
our ANY needed a large provision for
Increased ammunition and supplies and
wen numbers to cope with any sudden
attack from the navy of Spain, which
comprised modern vessels of the high
est type of continental perfection. our
army also required enlargement Of men
and munitions. The details Of the hur-
ried preparation for the decided con-
tingency Is told i'm the reports Of the
secretaries OF war and the navy, and
need not be repeated here. IL Is SUM-
cient to say that the outbreak of war.
when IL did come, found our nation not
u~nprepared TO meet the conflict.
Nor was the apprehension OF coming
strife confined to our W country. IL
was felt by the continental powers,
which, on April 6, through their ambas-
sailors and envoys. addressed to the
executive an expression OF the hope that
humanity and moderation might mark
the course of this government and peo-
pie. n that further negotiations would
lead to- ar attempt. which. while secur-
ing the maintenance or peace. would
| affirm all necessary guarantees for The
re-establishment OF order in Cuba. In
responding to that presentation, l also
shared the hope n a the envoys had
expressed, that peace might be pre-
served In a 10 terminate the
chronic condition of disturbance In
| Cuba, so injurious and menacing TO our
/ interests n tranquility, as well as
\ shocking to our sentiments OF human
ity: and. while approaching the hui
manitarian and disinterested charac-
ter OF the communication they had
\ adopted on behalf OF the powers, IL
stated the confidence OF his govern
ment. on it's part. that equal apprecia-
| ton would be shown for its earnest and
unselhsh endeavors to fulhll a duty of
humanity by ending a situation. the in
| definite p~rolongation of which had be-
! come insufferable.
DIPLOMATS Negotiations.
| still, animated by the hope Of a peace
| full solution and obeying the dictates
OF duty. no effort was relaxed 90 bring
about a speedy ending of the Cuban
struggle. Negotiations 10 this effect
| continued actively with the government
OF spain. looking TO the immediate con-
cIusion OF "A six months armlstice in
/ Cuba, with a view 10 effect the recogni-
ton Of her peoples right 20 independ-
| ence. Besides this. the instant revoca-
| ton of the order OF RECOMMENDATION was
| asked. so that the sufferers, returning
| TO their homes and aided by united
| American and Spanish effort. might be
put in a way 10 support themselves
and. by orderly resumption OF the well