The Londonderry sifter. (South Londonderry, Vt.) 1883-19??, 1898-11-11
: FRIDAY MORNING, NOV II, 1898
How Dewey Won N. Victory.

i"o ourout huhDer OF the Century
Magazine has an article upon the Manila
struggle by Lieut.. b. A, Fiske which has
unusual interest. Lieut.. Fiske served in
the action on the Petrol, his station was
alo't where he could see what happened
ne' haps as well as any human being saw,
and h writes with full understanding in
all respects and with care. Here is what
he says about the entrance to the hostile
harbor =
Meanwhile the fleet kept on, Commo-
dore Dewey leading, in person, into har-
Dor where he had never been-leading at
night into harbor supposed to be filed
with mines and tlanked with guns, and to
hold the enemy's fleet. Standing by the
standard compass forward, near the bows
and high above the deck, he and Lieut..
Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia,
who had also never been in Manila, kept
their night-long vigil. A less brave man
than Dewey would not have dared to risk
such an entrance; and yet it was not an
wv VI ioohSh uaiiuS, VI cNcu VI uHWdT-
ranted hazard. He had exhausted every
means of information (not many, it is
true) about the defense of Manila, and
had studied thoroughly the pros and cons
and weighed them with perfect fairness.
His train of reasoning had brought him
to a certain conclusion, and thence to a
decision, in the calmness and quiet of his
cabin; and this decision he proceeded to
carry out when he found himself face to
face with the actual emergency, the re-
sponsibility on him alone. The risk he
ran was certainly great; and this does
f, not mean the risk of his own life and
safety, for that was the last thing he
thought of, but the risk of losing men or
ships, or even the battle Itself. Who can
tell, except the chief himself, what is his
feeling of responsibility when the sue
cess of an important military movement
approaches it's hour of trial
After describing the action in outline
Lieut.. Fiske goes at some length over the
causes of our victory, and then sum-
marizes the thing thus:-
1t seems probable, then, that the Span
ish fleet was taken by surprise, and that
the gun captains fired their guns with
too great lack of GOODNESS and care,
though all fought with the courage of
despair. Opposed to them was the Amer
icap Haaf which u.inpI m aI o,,ta ,ro
over them many times greater than their
superiority of force. To explain the rea-
son of the utter disproportion between
the forces of the fleets and the dana &c
each inflicted, we find that the American
fleet worked with these advantages: The
commodore took the Spaniards by sur
prise. He took the offensive instantly,
and chose his own time and distance. He
50 handled his fleet, and the captains SO
handled their ships, that the gun captains
were given the most perfect opportunity.
Officers and men were in excellent discl-
pine. The gun captains fired straight.
officers and men kept quiet and cool.
| hO uho SiC"o NClS NNii NiiliCb ahN
carried out the orders of their captains
quickly. The guns, gun-carriages, pro-
ljecliles, powder, fuses and primers we {
admirable and had been kept in good con-
dition, The ships were well cons tructed
and had been kept in good condition.
! The engines We're well constructed, and
had been kept in good condition; and the
engineers force had been splendidly
drilled. There was feeling of conf
dence in the mind of every man that the
commodore would do the best thing al
/, every juncture, and this feeling of conf
dence in the commodore was also reposet
in the captains and officers, and reUiprC
cally was felt by the commodore, cap
tains and officers toward the men. The
effect of this buoyant and mutual trus
cannot be overyalued; and when added
to this was calm eparedness o.
mind" and a clear comprehension of thu
dangers of battle, coupled with "a herr
for any fate" we can see why not on'
single man in all the fleet, at any stage o.
the fight, showed the smallest tendenc,
to weaken or do anything unworthy.