The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1898-08-04
(LOndon SpectatOr.)

(LOndon SpectatOr.)
The first thought of all English
men in regard to the naval battle is
that the American fleet did its work
splendidlv. The whole performance
OF Admiral SIMPSONS fleet was in
accordance with the best traditions
of the Anglo-Saxon navies, ana every
Englishman has read of their doings
with flush of pride. There was the
old hard pounding, such as the
Elizabethan sea dogs used, and the
same curious mixture of steadiness
and daring, GOODNESS and reckless
dash. No doubt the comparative
strengths were very different, but as
one reads of the Spanish ships tear
ing full speed up the coast of Cuba,
closely pursued by the relentless
Americans, who poured in con-
tinuous and well-directed fire, it is
impossible not to think of the armada
as it passed up the channel in flight,
brakes ships hanging on its flank
and riddling the Spaniards' hulls
with their ceaseless tire-a fire which,
as on last Sunday, always hit and
always did damage. Had, indeed,
the Spanish ships been more num-
erous and larger, and had most of
the Gloucester, the battle, after the
Spanish ships emerged, would have
been working model of the battle
which began the destruction of the
armada. In word, the moral
aspects of what was almost the first
and may be the last fleet action be-
tween the Spanish and the English
both cases it was the man behind
the gun who, in the last resort, won
the battle.
WHAT CERvERA MIGHT HAVE DONE.
The technical lessons of the last
naval battle will have, of course, to
be fully worked out by the naval eX-
perts, but even the most superficial
view shows one or two facts of great
Importance. They are not new facts
exactly, but old facts with new faces,
and therefore well worth consider
ing. The first thing that strikes
one is the practical futility of passive
courage, especially at sea. One
might almost as well be coward as
a man who runs headlong on his
death, careless whether he loses his
own life, but also careless whether
he kills his enemy. If the Spaniards
had been as cool and dashing as they
were Indifferent to death, they might
not have beaten the Americans, but
at least they would have done an
immense deal Of damage to the
American fleet. Granted that Adj
miral Cervera had formed the resolve
of breaking out of Santiago by day
light, how should he have acted?
How, that is, could he have sold
his ships and the lives of his men
dearest? That surely should have
been the question put to himself by
the Spanish Admiral.
A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
If it had been put, could the
answer have been any other than
something of this kind? Il will
order each of my ships as she gets
clear the neck of the bottle which
forms the harbor of Santiago to
choose one of the American ships:
and to fly straight at her rs savage
dog flies at man. My ships shall
ram the American if she can, but if
not, assail her as furiously as possi-
bic. If the American ship gives
way before the Spanish onslaught
the Spaniard can get out to sea and
escape. If, on the other hand, the
American closes with her. then there
will be a fierce fight. in which one or
the other, or probably both, will 90
to the bottom. This will probably
happen, but meantime some of the
Spanish ships will have had time to
get into the open sea. Once there.
scatter and fly is to be the order"
If Admiral Cervera had adopted
these bold, or. if you like, mad.
tactics, he would no doubt have lost
most of his ships, but then he would
have probably sunk or damaged
three or four of the American ves-
sells, while one or two of his own
would very likely have got away
scot-free. As it was, he lost all his
ships and did no damage to the
Americans. He secured this really
astonishing result by, instead Of
living at the throats of the Ameri-
cans, attempting to run along the
shore with the American fleet be-
tween him and the open sea. AS he
and his ships ran the Americans
poured upon them a storm Of shot
and shell, and showed once again
that he who runs away is in far
greater danger than even he who
waits to be killed, but intends to
sell his life as dearly as possible
That is an old-time lesson to be
drawn from the battle off Santiago.
Another is equally clear, equally i'm
portant and almost equally old.
THE MAN BEHIND THE Gun.
1t is that in naval war what really
matters is not the armor-plating. the
build OF the ship. or even the power
to the engines, but the man behind
she gun. When Captain Mahan was
entertained in England at a naval
dinner. the speech of the evening
was admitted by all to have been
made by the American officer. He
reminded his hearers that strategy.
and armor. and new types of gun,
and scientific lodges. and all the
rest were very good things, bat in
! the last resort what really mattered
was the man behind the gun. That
was true in the old wars, and has
been proved true again, both at
Manila and Santiago. Straight shoot
/ ing Is. after all, what wins the bat
tie. OF course. you had better have
q gun that will fire and fire a power
full shot at a longish range. but even