The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-05-31

a splendid object lesson as to the vital
strength and of the republic.
and was of in~caIculable value I'm its
moral influence upon foreign observers.
"A similar thing is now going to happen
again. We shall put our 125, 900 militia
In line, and whether we ave TO send
them all TO the front or not. we shall.
by and by. bring them together In one
great assembly here at Washington,
and the moral effect of that as a dem
onstration of our latent power as a ma
ton will be great and valuable. The
war may be too hort to require us to
use this latent power on which we
have made the first call-and the
shorter the war Is the better we shall
be pleased-but even IL il ends
row. this demonstration OF our capa-
city for war on a great scale has been
made. and its moral effect will remain
Moreover. attention having been
called in a pointed way to our def
ciencies in military organization, in
coast defenses and in naval equipment
at various points, the country VIII now
insist that they shall be remedied at
whatever cost. so that we shall never
at any future time find ourselves taken
by surprise or at a disadvantage in
facing any foreign complication.
This war is a fortunate war in
many ways. 1t comes at a good time
and under fortunate circumstances for
us. 1t is, in my opinion, going to save
several other bigger wars. II we had
shown ~pusillanimity now we should
have taken our place as a second-class
power. with this extremely probable
result-that other nations. perceiving
us to be a second class power. not will
ing to fight even Spain on a question
involving American principles and
American interests In the hemisphere,
would have taken advantage of the
discovery to embark in various ambi-
tious enterprises of their own on this
sid of the world. Emperor William
might possibly. In such an event. have
bought st. Thomas and st. Croix; 9TH
err powers might nave bought other
American possessions: England. with
out conquering Venezuela, might have
purchased Venezuela. and a whole Sc
ries of similar acts might have fol-
lowed on the part of European powers
in this Western half of the world IL
we had proved in this xigency that we
are rot ready or willing to fight Spain
for good cause.
The Monroe doctrine would thus
have been made - disappear. unless
we had been prepared to enter an
armed contest 20 prevent UGH action
by these great powers. a war with
any m of which would have been
much harder to fight than this one
with Spain. Hence IL Is quite clear to
my mind that this war Is most fOrtu-
nate, in this respect. at least-that IL
will have the effect of preventing
larger wars. which otherwise would
have come upon us, unless we had
been willing. not only to give way TO
Spain. but to surrender u Monroe
doctrine.
The Monroe doctrine is only incl
dentally touched by our action in the
case of Cuba. The Monroe doctrine
has always implied the recognition OF
existing European governments I'm this
hemisphere. but only upon this ond
tion-that any European power having
possessions here which IL grossly mis-
governs we hall feel 1t to be our right
and duty to expel. We have never
taken the position hat European pow
| ers already established here were to
be driven out, but simply hat they
should make no new establishments
here. and. as a corollary. hat such ter
ritories and peoples as were already
under their dominion should be well
governed.
This exceptional attitude which we
have taken toward Spain-demanding
that she must go. bag and baggage.
entirely out of Americas the only
case of the kind that can arise, be-
cause Spain is the only European ma
llon lud- HliSkONffuS oh tuS sue Vi
the world. England does not misgov-
ern her colonies: she holds those of
her colonies that are composed of civ
ilized people capable of s~elf-govern-
ment with their own consent. and. so
far as 1 know. that Is true also of
France and Germany. So that the
reason for which we are fighting Spain.
while IL bears incidentally upon the
Monroe doctrine. cannot possibly lea
us into a war with any other European
power.
This var Is fortunate. too. in this,
that. while Spain is not so powerful a
nation as TO make IL prudent to avoid
a conflict with her, yet she is not so
weak a nation as to max her an un-
worthy antagonist. or n whose de-
feat will be an ~inglorious thing in it
self. Her strength and resources. and
the extent of her naval and military
establishments. are not so small that
we can be charged with making a
cowardly fight. Her expulsion by force
from this hemisphere Is, indeed, no
holiday affair.
1T is furthermore exceedingly fortu-
nate that the United States goes into
this war not for itself. nor to gain any
thing for its own ACKNOWLEDGMENT. but
simply to fight for friends and neigh
bors. Yet another piece OF good for
tune for us is that things are so sit
uated in Europe at his time that
Spain cannot get any help from the
concert OF Europe which. three or
four years hence, she might be able
tn get. All the conditions OF the time.
and, IL seems to me, all the C
stances of the war, are in our favor.
My feeling is that IL is manifest des-
tiny clearly indicated by these for
innate circumstances to which l have
alluded. 1 think IL will appear in his
tory, both as to its immediate outcome
and as to the far-reaching conse-
quences of which I have spoken. as
wars in which any nation eve en-
gagged. And h world pay well infer
that II we will take such a stand and
make such sacrifices for a neighboring
people. we would certainly fight for
ourselves n our own interests still
more readily and resolutely."