The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-10-24

THE AOM|RAl'S REPORT
CONTINUED from Page Two.)

entrance to Santiago of four miles and
this distance must not be exceeded
IF the vessel IN coaling or In other
wise restricted in her movements. she
must nevertheless keep within this dis
lance. II at any time the flagship
makes a signal which 10 not visible TO
any vessel. such vessel muso at once
approach the flagship or the repeating
vessel to a point where she can read
the signal.
f"Disregard Of these directions. which
have already been givep under TINS
head, has led to endless CONFUSION.
Many times during the day the heet Is
SO scattered that II would be perfectly
possible for the enemy to come out OF
the harbor and meet with very niue
opposition. commandments
hopes that strict attention Will be
given this order" :
The admiral r~eproduces the order Of
battle Incidental to the landing OF
! Skaters army corps on June Y. In
his order the following occurs:
The attention of the commanding
| officers OF all vessels engaged in block
aiding Santiago de Cuba is earnestly
called to the necessity for the utmost
vigilance from this time forward. ooth
as TO maintaining stations and readi-
ness for action and to keeping a close
watch upon the harbor mouth. III the
| Spanish admiral ever intends to At
tempt to escape that attempt VIII De
made soon"
The admiral here remarks that much
trouble was expected In landing on ac-
count of the wandering proclivities OF
some OF the troops which had TO De
looked up. The progress of disembark-
alton was rendered somewhat dimcuit
by a heavy sea. the heaviest during
the three weeks the feet had been STA
&c n Atm n nH
the coast OF Jamaica. II appears that
according to a dispatch to Secretary
Long. dated June rs. the channel at
Santiago. not having been obstructed
by the sinking OF the Merrimac, Al
miral Sampson was preparing a tor
pedo attack to hasten the destruction
of the Spanish vessels, although ne
regretted resorting to this method be-
cause of difficulties and small chance
of success. He would not do TINS, ne
says. were the present force to be kept
there. as IL insured a capture when
he. believed would terminate the war.
The above telegram was sent, the al
miral explains. with reference to the
proposed detachment of some of u
heavy ships for service abroad. CThe
proposed expedition to he Spanish
coast.) A dispatch from Secretary
Long shows that this expedition was
to consist Of the Iowa, Oregon, New
ark, Yosemite. Yankee and Dixie. and
they were to go to the Azores for or
ders. The Golfers were to Join the
fleet at the Azores.
On June 30th. the admiral received
a communication from Major General
Shafter announcing that he expected TO
attack Santiago the following morning,
and asking that he tSampson) lombard
the forts at Aguadores in support or a
regiment OF infantry and make such
demonstration as he thought proper at
the harbors mouth. so as TO keep away
as many OF the enemy there as posi-
Bile. This report was complied with. On
July LIST General Shafter asked that
the admiral keep up his fight on the
Santiago water front. On July End. the
following was received from General
shafter:
!, Terrible fight yesterday. but my line
In strongly intrenched about three
fourths of a mile from town. | urge
that you make effort immediately &c
y force an entrance to avoid futurt
: losses among my men, which are al
: ready heavy. You can now operate
with less loss of life thar i can. Please
telephone
: reply wa t%elephoned General Shat
, ter from Admiral Sampson through
u Lieutenant Stanton, which said tht
admiral had bomberded the forts at th'
: entrance of Santiago and also Punt
x Gorda battery inside. silencinF theil
nre, ana dShtu NhtNhti NV
wanted further firing on the admiraf'
I part. The explanation was made tina
n IL was impossible to force an entrance
q until the channel was cleaned OF mines
n "a work of some time after the fort
e were taken possession of by the troops
To which General Shafter replied: Il
is impossible to say when i can TAX
the batteries at entrance OF harbor. i
they are difficult TO take as thos
which we have been pitted against,
will AXE some time and a great los
p of life. am at a loss TO see wh'
IS the navy cannot work under a destruc
n tive fire as well as the army. MY los
"A Yesterday was over 800 men. BY a
means keep up fire on everything |
sight OF you until demolished. ex
- pect, however, in time and with sum
= cient men TO capture the forts alon
the bay"
Admiral Sampson then says:
II wrote General Shafter the follow
~ ing letter and began making prepare
~ lions to countermine. and. with the OF
y feet OF arranging an attack upon IN
" batteries at the entrance. a visit wa
> arranged with General Shafter so tbs
IN the matter might be thoroughly dis
v cussed and combined action a X plac'
ip / had i'm view the employment OF III
ie marines for an assault OF either n
MORO or Socopa battery, while at III
same time ~assaulting the defenses
the entrance with the 1eet:
United States flagship New Yori
X first rate. OF Santiago de Cuba, Jul
or 2. lsss-My Dear General: I have yo'
te note of this morning. just received
II 1880 a. m An officer OF my stan hi
already reported TO you the hring whit
r we did this morning. but l must say
addition to what he told you that u
forts which we silenced were not n
-. forts which give you any ~inconvenien
in capturing the city. as they cann
fire except to sea ward. They cam
n even prevent our entrance into the ha
" Dor OF Santiago. Our trouble from q
I'll first place is that the channel to u
harbor Is well strewn with Observable
mines. which would certainly result
Eft the sinking of one or more of our shi