Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-07-03
1oHN WASAGOODBOY,
WAITED COMPENSATION FOR
SERVICES PRIOR TO 1900.
On rgB COURT HAD 10 SETTLE IT,
granting n New Triai-CaSe
In,oI,ins Titie 10 Land Patented
.-oe-other supreme Cours De-
DelIvered Last Thursday.

,..ksons Administrative vs. '"NN'SH' ~
80, .,,B OPINION by cardwell. ]. -
-, Jackson, son o; David. son OF
80 when about Is years old. hav-
,ost his mother. was put with his
- .,5,a,her and lived there as a men,
-, his family. His grandfather died
me time John attained majority
80 There Is no pretenee OF a con-
]" ,stWeen him and his grandfather
.,v him wages. and the only fact TO
-, contract prior TO 1896 is that the
.". ...l.ther had been heard 20 say that
s.. .,r,s a good boy. and II was hard
d, without him"; that he paid one of
~, sons 20 cents a day and board for
-. -. ii, his farm. and that Johns work
-. north as much as his uncles; that
49, neen heard 10 say, several times,
no should have wages and once,
60, be should be paid well for his
Work
ytf.r where compensation is claimed
D.. ssrices rendered near relatives, the
,.~ Will not imply a promise, and no
...,,,-y can be had unless an express
....-,., or its equivalent, is shown. 1t
\. "a, enough 20 show a moral obligation,
go, actual promise must be proved,
-. e-,s from which one can be reason
Mo inferred. by evidence so clear. d.
81, and explicit as to leave no doubt
80 N the understanding and intention
% .be parties. Loose declarations TO
s-5soss. or even 10 the claimant. are not
.,,rgb pa.ucularly when such relative
a. ac.d 10 must be shown that &C.
le.es8 Intended and assumed a legal
Ctig..i-a that could be enforced against
- An action cannot be precicated
co., n mere intention. Amer. Encyc.
~ "a. O'Keller VS.. Faulkner II 5. T..
y s,- In re Kirkpatrick's Estate, Is >.
y p 40. Harshburger's Administrator
- slrer and Wife. 81 Graft, 81; Stone
burner 4 Richards VS.. Motley, lately de-
cidsl by this court.
The verdict was not only excessive in
Including compensation for services prior
IN ISL. but was contrary 10 the law and
evidence I'm the case. and should have
been Sc. aside.
NEW TRIAL.
Chairman. Receiver. VS.. Virginia Real Es-
tate Investment Company. AInriheu'
Ouirion by Buchanan. J.
on the first trial, verdict for plaintiff
SCI aside and new trial ON second trial.
verdict FOR defendant. and motion 10 set
aside oyerru,eG. VIII Of error TO action
O. c9Jr, on both trials.
Held. !. Under section 1884 Of the Code,
amended Acts 1912. PAGE 962. where
there have been two trials. appellate
court shah look first 10 the evidence and
pr5cseIings Of the first trial, and If II
discovers that the court erred in setting
aside the verdict ia that trial. it shall
arnul all Subsequent proceedings 70 said
verdict. and enter judgment thereon.
So the question here is whether the
evidence go the first trial was such as to
make 70 the duty OF the court TO set aside
the action OF the lower court granting
q new trial, and 70 enter judgment upon
the lrst verdict
Held. u is always a fair presumption
that tho verdict OF the jury is correct,
and when the Judge who presided and
who heard an the evidence and Witnessed
ell the proceedings. is satisfied with 1t,
end refuses % set IL aside, an appellate
court. without such opportunities. ought
not 90 interfere without the strongest
reasons. On the other hand when the
tual judge grants "a new trial some lati-
tule must be allowed his discretion, es-
pec!aliy when the verdict on the new
trial IS for the opposite party. Patterson
IS. Ford. , Graft. TO- %. The refusal to
grant a new trial operates as a final adju-
dicau0n; q new trial simply invites fur
th5r investigation and affords opportunity
FOR showing the truth without including
either party. and so a stronger case must
Be made 90 justify an appellate court in
disturbing an order granting a new trial
than where it has been refused. Bartons
law Pr, 1855; Ruffners Heirs vs.. Hal
q W. Va, as 3D.
o The evidence upon the first trial does
not warrant this court in reversing the
action OF the Circuit Court in granting a
new trial.
g. There was no error in the proceedings
10 the prejudice OF the plaintiff upon the
second trial.
DISSEISIN or COVENANTS. &C.
Johnston. &c. VS. Virginia Coal and Iron
Company. Affirmed. Opinion by Harri-
son, j.
This is a case involving the title to land
patented In l796. and title now asserted by
the alleged heirs of one of the original
grantees, alleging that they are tenants
10 common with those claiming 10 be the
owners Of the interests of the other
grantees under the patent. These inter-
ssis were sold for taxes IN 1886 10 Ohnger,
srd there have been many alterations Of
Tie lands 10 various parties since that
tme-the appellees being the latest pur-
e1asers.
Held. The evidence abundantly shows
that Immediately after Olinger obtained
TIE deed from the clerk under the tax
sale In 1850. he took actual possession, and
mat he and those claiming under him
have been in open, notorious. and con-
unuOus possession, claiming and dealing
With the whole as their own from that
eay 20 this When the appellee became the
purchaser in 1S2. by metes and bounds,
Il was a stranger; and therefore, could
i9t have occupied any relation of trust
ana confidence 10 the appellants. The
Coed from Hyndman (whO mad a regular
chain Of title running back TO Oiinge).
da.ei May s. 1852, conveying the entire
iIact by metes and bounds @ the Virginia
Goal and Iron Company, gave that COM
peny color OF title for the whole boundary.
Il d purchaser takes the conveyance Of
ne whole estate from one tenant in COM
mon aud enters into exclusive posses sion
lnCer such conveyance. claiming tile 10
The whole, this is an custer OF the other
tenants; and the grantee so entering and
claiming title may rely upon his adver-
sary possession if continued a sufficient
PERIOD 10 bar the recovery by the other
tenants. Buchanan VI. King. p Graft,
81 Inasmuch as appellee was stranger
When IL took a conveyance OF the whole
estate from the allenees Of Olinger. and
iook exclusive possession claiming title
= the whole IL has a right 10 rely upon
Us adversary possession. and is In no
sense tenant IN common with appellants.
court Of chancery. therefore, had no
Jurisdiction 70 entertain suit OF appellants
Tor partition. and the bill was properly
dismissed. II Il had had jurisdiction the