Washington sentinel., 1898-10-22
FoR ETcN N EVA S.
Translated and Selected /1oSS IsadfHG
EnYO6sGn6G6SrSI for tie SENTINEL.
ENGLAND.
NAVAL BAsKs AND CoALINo STATIONS.
Ay1Hy and Navy Gazette.


have discussed the lessons of the lat'
war, or the want OF them, at grea
length, and yet one Of the more import
ant subjects on which light has beer
thrown has not yet received the attsn
tioD it deserves. Before this war broke
out the United States had not coalins
station or a naval base outside ITS wr
littoral, and vet il has been able to main
tain blockade extending over MANY
miles of coast, at great distances from
its ports, and moreover to utilize the
services of its squadron in China waters
thousands Of miles from its base. Surely
there are lessons to be drawn from these
circumstances, lessons which should
have an inpOrtsnt bearing for us both
as regards the acquisition OF new bases
and the garrisoning Of those we already
possess. What the Americans have done
on this occasion appears to us 10 have
been exactly that which we did in the
| old wars, save that whereas it was for
water nd refit that a squadron took
temporary base, ana nowadays il is for
| purposes OF coaling and repair. What
| the Americans did in the harbors OF
Cuba and Luzon they we're at liberty to
do elsewhere in Spanish territory, once
they had secured the supremacy Of the
seas and were strong enough to resist
successfully any ossible land attack
Similarly, if the boot had be zen on the
other loot and the Spaniards had been
able to wipe the American fleet from the
seas it cannot be doubted that they
would have been able to seize bases on
the American littoral from which to
carry on either blockade, commercial
raid or territorial attack. The value Of
such base has, OF course, itslimitations-
Docking could not be carried out, bat
then IN these days instead of careening
we send divers down to clean the ships
hull below water. Nor could any heavy
repairs be undertaken. Still 1t IS posi-
BILE that even a badly damaged vessel
after an action could with the assistance
OF depot ship like the Vulcan be rem.
dered sufficiently seaVorthy to return
to the nearest dockYard. So far as coal
ing is concerned, all that is desirable is
that the temporary base shall provide
shelter and smooth water, with, if posi-
BILE, facilities for defence against an
attack out OF the nearest torpedo boat
"nest" OF the enemy. Obviously, there
fore, the war teaches the uselessness, or
at least the Inexpeciency, OF multiplying
your coaling stations and naval bases in
times of peace.
OF course it would be ridiculous to
a'gue from the conditions OF the war
that we might wisely relinquish most Of
the coalinR stations we own, or that, on
the other hand, the nations which are
now showing themselves so anxious 10
acquire ioothoIds OF this nature are
proceeding on wrong lines. There are
naval bases and naval bases, the value
OF some depending on the power OF the
nation owning them to hold them by
naval strength. and some which, being
practically backed by the armed strength
OF their owners, require military eXpe'
dition tor their capture 1t is the naval
bases or coaling stations which belong |
to the first ofthese cateSories, the multi
the case OF a strong naval power, and |
useless IN the case OF a weak one. It |
seems to us, for example, that the lessons |
taught by the war should prevent us |
spending money at Wei Hei Wei, aud |
that while it neither argues for nor |
against the acquisition OF Port Arthur
by the Russians, 1t certainly makes it |
appear unwise on their part to strive to
obtain coaling stations on the Red Sea
or on the Siamese coast We have no
doubt that il will be said that as tar as
these latter stations are concerned, as II
was said OF Wei Hei Wei, that political
and not strategical reasons are at the
bottom of the moves This is quite
beside The question so far as the matter
concerned is regarded in its naval
aspect. But what is very certain is that,
however strongly fortifi d these isolated
bases may be, and however largely gar
rlsoned they must eventually fall II their
communications with the mother coun
try are severed. And. on tie other
hand, provided the mother country is
strong enough at sea to keep TIE COM |
munIcations open. she can multiply such |
stations indefinitely on The territory of |
her enemy, or on that Of weaker nations.
So It has been in the past and so 1t will |
be in the future IL cannot be supposed /
that It ese facts are not known and |
understood in Russia, France and Ger. |
many. The inference is natural, there
fore, that when we see these powers |
intent on securing fresh naval bases and |
coaling stations here and there along |
the trade routes Of the world, it is only |
as the complement OF an intention to |
secure also. If they can that naval sup |
remacy which alone means their safety. |
But although we credit foreign govern
ments with being perfectly well aware
OF the necessity Of adding to its fleet If
it adds to its coaling stations II is well
not to forget that at home there are
many people who are still possessed OF
the idea that by some occult and esoteric
power a naval base commands the ada
cent seas Time after time 1t has been
proved that outside the range OF the
guns mounted in its Qualifications the
naval base or coaling station commands
nothing whatever, and yet the old ialiacy
crops up again in every new discussion
without fail, though Havana. Manila and
Santiago be fresh object lessons to the
contrary.