Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-12-22
NAVY REPORTS PUBLISHED
THROW SIDE LIGHTS on FEATURES
OF THE WAR.
Idea of Flying Squadron Originated
With Admiral Dewey-Hc Also
Wanted to Keep the Phil
ippines-SnmpsOn's Let
ter to Long.

ports OF all commanding officers OF the navy
during the war have been compiled and
published by the navy department. While
| treating of events that have already fig
ured in official reports that have reached
the public. the documents still contain
many minor reports that throw side lights
on interesting phases of the war Almost
In the beginning. in the brief record of the
proceedings of the naval war board ar
unknown hero is brought TO light in the
person of Ensign II. IL. Ward. who, n,
the beginning of the war. was on duty in
the navigation bureau, alternating with
Lieutenant Whittlesey in the heavy duties
Of assistant to the chief of the bureau. He
volunteered Tor secret service duty. ard his
exploits. about which nothing has been SAID
in the past, may well be placed on record
beside those of Lieutenant Rowan in Cuba
and Lieutenant Whitney in Porto Rico
Within week after the declaration OF
war. Ensign Ward distinguished himself,
and went straight into the heart of the
enemy's country. making his headquarters
at CadiZ. the principal Spanish naval sta
tion, and informing the navy department
here of the actual strength of the Spanish
naval vessels and their movements. Then
he went to the West Indies and reported
everything that was going on there of i'm
portance TO the American navy. Next. hs
went again into the enemy's country in
disguise, this time to Porto Rico. where
he was arrested as Il suspicious character
and spy. By adroitness he managed 10
secure his release and escaping from San
Juan. cabled the navy department a full
and the preparations making for the re-
ception of the Spanish squadron under
Cervera.
All this time even the officials of the
navy department We're under the impress
sion that Mr.. Ward was engaged in INSTALL
ing a system of coast signals on the New
England coast.
Keeping Tab on Cnmnrn.
While Ward was in Porto Rico. Ensign
Buck. another attache of the navigation
bureau. was on the shores of the Mediter-
ranean in disguise, watching every move
ment of the squadron of Admiral Camar;i,
which started for the Philippines but turn
ed back. OF the strategy board itself il is
informed of all of the movements. re-
sources and plans of the Spanish naval
forces through secret agents and 1t IS now
known that the navy was thus informed of
all important movements. AT times. how
ever. information was conflicting and de-
cisions had to be made as to which report
was true.
Under the head of precautionary orders
appear in the volume instructions to all
the United States ships abroad to stock
their bunkers with the best coal obtainable
told long before the declaration of war. on
February 20. in the event of war with
Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiat-
ic coast. and then offensive operations in
1sor the philippines. Keep Olympia until further
The latter order is explained by the fact
that the flagship had been ordered back
to the United States for overhauling. Ad-
miral Howell, then in the Mediterranean
with his squadron. was told to wait in
neutral waters for orders and the ships in
the South Atlantic were instructed to move
northward SO as not to excite suspicion.
The Consolation of MOntejO.
The reports of the famous naval battles
of Cavite includes one from United States
Consul Williams, n rather unusual thing
but fully justified by its picturesque and
untechnical description of Dewey's great
victory. Following it is a report to his
the commander-in-chef of the i'll fated
Spanish fleet, Montejo. The admiral
SSePiG,tS SePn,s ee the bad conditions of the
the cruiser Castillo was incapable of ma
neuvering on account of her bad cond-
III ton; ,,t;h while the defenses at the entrance
much distrust he found that the guns
which should have been mounted were de-
layed month and a half. and he was no
for the defenses of the port upon few
toFped1es' EEnd;nM snn,p not properly placed
ish squadron repaired to the Bay of Man
ila to meet battle under less unfavorable
conditions. The admiral avoided the city,
not wishing to draw fire upon it, and pre-
pared his fleet for action, painting his YES
sells dark gray and having the fires
spread and springs on the cables; He says
that the force of Dewey's vessels leaving
out the transport, amounted to q 40 tons.
$3.50 horse power. 163 guns tmany rapid
mics a asanst ths the power OF
his only five effective ships was oil tons,
n,an horse power. I6 guns very short of
rapid-iire). ISIS crew and maximum speed
twelve miles. The admirai describes in
vivid language the terrible effect of the
American onslaught on the Spanish vessels.
He says:
Cristinn Doomed Early.
THE Americans fired most rapidly.
There came upon us numerous projectiles
as the three cruisers at the end of the
American line devoted themselves almost
entirely to fight the Cristina. my flagship.
A short time after the action commenced
one shell exploded in the forecast!e and
put out of action all those who served the
four rapid-fire cannonS.
Meantime another shell exploded in the
orlop setting fire TO the crews bags: ut
$50 one shell destroyed completely the
steering gear. another DESTROYED the miz-
zen. bringing down my flag and ensign;
another shell exploded on the poop and
exploded in tho officers cabin, covering the
hospital with blood destroyed the wound
ed who were being treated there. An
other exploded in the ammunition room.
i had to flood the magazine when the cart
ridges began to explode.
Spanish Ships on Fire.
Zone large shell penetrated the fireroom
putting out of action one master gunner
and twelve men serving the guns. An
other rendered useless the starbOard bow
gun, and, while the fire increased asterli,
another fire started from another shell.
The broadside guns continued firing until
there was only one gun and one remaining
ing out of control. the hull smokeppe and
mast ridded with shot or confused with
the cries of the wounded: half of the crew
out of action, among whom were seven
officers ! gave the order to sink and aban-
don the ship before the magazines should
explode"
The story of the loss of the Cristina was
substantially the story of the loss of all
the other Spanish ships. and Admiral Mon
telo sums up his account with this state
ment:
composed my little squadron. the lack Of
all classes of the personnel. especially mas
ter gunners and seaman Sunners: the in
aptitude of some of the provisional ma
chinists. the scarcity of rapid fire cannon.
the strong crews of the enemy and the un-
perfected character of the greater part OF
our vessels all contributed TO make mucn
more decided the sacrifices which We made
for our country and to prevent the possi-
bility of the horrors of n bombardment of
the city of Manila. with the conviction that
with the scarcity OF our force against the
superior enemy. We We're going to certain
death and could expect a loss of all of
our ships. Our casualties, including those
of the arsenal amounted to 3Sl men killed
and wounded
Dewey Suggested Flying Squadron.
An evidence of the strategy exhibited by
the nevy department in sending reinforce