The record-union., 1898-07-21

la s@re
erett answered this in a smart dis
patch, disclaiming, pro forma, any de-
sire or intention on the part of the
United States to acquire Cuba, but that
the dispatch itself afforded the strong
est evidence of a contrary disposition.
Mr.. Everett assumed from the outset
that the Senate would inevitable refuse
It's consent to the treaty proposed, and
adds:
Its certain rejection by that body
would leave the question Of Cuba
IN a more unsettled condition than
1T is now
Mr Everett further said:
The President uoes not covet the
acquisition of Cuba for the United
states. AT the same time he con-
slders the acquisition of Cuba as
mainly an American question. The
proposed convention proceeds on a
different principle. 1t assumes that
the United States have no other or
greater interest in the question
than France or England; whereas,
1T is necessary only to cast ones
eye on the map to see how remote
are the relations of Europe, and
how intimate those of the United
States with this island.
1t is obvious from this that Mr.. Ev-
erett stood in line with the other great
statesmen quoted in entertaining the
opinion that the Island of Cuba was a
territorial integer of the United States.
A NATIONAL INDIGNITY.
In 1913, during the administration Of
President James x. Polk, an offer Of
500, 100000 was made for the island by
the United States, but was spurned by
the Spanish monarchy as "a national
indignity." This offer had not been
Withdrawn when, in 1854, President
Pierce requested the American Minis
ters to France, England and Spain ''to
meet and compare opinions and to
adopt measures for perfect concert Of
action in aid of the negotiations at
Madrid The commission was COM
posed Of James Buchanan, Minister to
England; ]. Y. Mason, Minister to
France, and Pierre Soule, Minister to
Spain. These representatives of the
United States met in conference, first
at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th
and 11th of October, and later at AK
la Chapelle, in Prussia, on the 18th and
TO the 18th Of October, 1854, the date
of the manifesto. Their conclusions
were arranged under two heads:
1. The United States ought, if
practicable, to purchase Cuba with
as little delay as possible
=. The probability is great that
the Government and Cortes of
Spain will prove willing to sell, be-
cause this would essentially pro-
mote the highest and best interests
of the Spanish people.
The manifesto then proceeds to
traverse the entire question of the re-
lation of Cuba to the United States; its
geographical, commercial and political
Importance to the United States, but
declared in unmistakable terms, as fol-
lows:
Indeed the Union can never en-
joy repose, nor possess reliable Sc
curity, as long as Cuba is not en-
braced within it's boundaries.
Cuba has thus become to US an un-
ceasing danger and a permanent
cause of anxiety and alarm.
The manifesto then proceeds to argue
the case on behalf of Spain, and insists
that the large sum of money the United
States would be willing to pay to Cuba
would greatly enhance the prosperity
Of Spain. 1t was suggested that France
had constructed continuous lines Of
railways from Havre, Marseilles, Val
enciennes and Strasbourg, via Paris to
the Spanish frontier, and that Spain
would do we'll to take the money Of
fered by the United States to continue