Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1898-11-24

Through the openings in the trees,
Captain Morton and others saw the left
Of tho San Juan intrenohments and
Spaniards with guns at hand 600 or 700
yards away, looking at the American
line. AT this time thedynamite and the
Hotchkiss guns in rear OF the brigade
opened fire on the Spaniards. The dyna.
mite gun was cholsed with the first car
fridge, and the cavalrymen say that the
Hotchkiss gun was silenccd by the
Spaniards, who then turned their rifles
and shrapnel upon the oavalrymen. In
this plight the cavalry remained an
hour and a half, subjected to constant
volley firing and to shrapnel. The Off
GERS of the brigade estimated that the
cavalry division suffered from rs to 90
per cent of its casualties around that
crossing. Dead and wounded were
brought there through ranks of men,
only few of whom had been under fire
before. Says Captain Morton, veteran
of 20 BATTLES, at was enough to rattle
the bravest, but not an officer or soldier
left the position, except to help the
wounded"
To some old soldiers it may seem
strange that at Santiago fighting men
left the ranks to help the wounded. But
that is according to the new order OF
things Every man has n first aid pack
age in his kit, and it is part of his duty
to apply it when comrade is stricken
down. If it had not been for this, the
mortality at Santiago would have been
terrible. The first aid bandage stops
the flow of blood and keeps the wound
Clean also giving the patient relief and
hope, which conduce to recovery. In
general, officers criticized the "shame-
full neglect Of wounded" at Santiago.
The next order to this brigade was
brought by aids who came to Major
Vessels and told him that the brigade
was to advance. They could give no
definite instructions. Vessels said that
he was not in command Of the brigade,
but that Colonel Carroll was and was
somewhere on the ground. The aids
discussed among themselves what was
to be done, and finally agreed that the
brigade had an order to advance.
The cavalry troops spoken of before
as being i'll front of Carroll's brigade
evidently belonged to Woods brigade.
In attempting to move out of the range
of the Spaniards' missiles and also to
find clear ground to form in the differ.
ent regiments got out of line, a matter
which caused some confusion to the bri-
gade commanders. 1t was this state of
things which led to the assertion that
the general officers were weak at San
Juan ridge. The fact is that the ground
was unsuitable for forming and char z.
ing in brigade columns. The regiments
kept well together until they started tc
go up the hill, when some commands
DETECTED to the right or TO the left, ac-
cording as they saw favorable ground
or a Spanish position 20 strike at.
General Sumner says that the cavalry
division was ordered to take position in
the road near the crossing of San Juan;
that he formed his line, and, being fired
upon, said to representative of Gen.
eral Shafter who was present: 1--WE
cannot stay here without heavy loss.
We must 60 back or 90 forward. " The
general added significantly, Forward
| we went!"
There was no lack of fearless and
capable men to carry orders to the CON-
mands through fire and blood. Colonel
]. II. Dorst, the adjutant general of the
cavalry division, was seen all along the
! line all day, and the same Of Captain
X. l.. Howe of Summers staff, who
was on horseback until the hill was
taken
After the aids had settled it that
Carroll's brigade was to so forward
Major Vessels ordered his second
squadron to go forward, supported by
the first. and to move ut once. Captain
Morton says that the majors did not
take time to pass the orders along to
the companies, but shouted out the
command "Forward!" Then the line
/ plunged into an almost impenetrable