The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-11-21

tastOno aAAoidtd W tnt PtV&tiAtl VI
cities to the larger camps. They hold
that II the systems of the men had not
been weakened by dissipation they
would not have succumbed SO readily
to the other influences which affected
them.
1t was typhoid fever which broke
down the strength of the commands
generally. the outbreak becoming dis
tinctly manifest In July. Sporadic
cases appeared In most of the regi-
ments in May and June. these cases
having been brought In many instances
from the state companies. In fact,
some regiments, as the 18th Minnesota.
suffered more from this disease at their
state rendezvous than any of the regi-
ments in the large federal rendezvous.
1t appears from a general review Of the
sanitary reports already filed that the
prevalence of the disease was proper
tionate to the unsanitary camp condi-
tions which 1 have referred to. The
probability OF its communication to the
soldiers In camps through the agency of
flies was pointed out as a reason for in
sisting on sanitary police of the
strictest character.
1t is well known to the medical pro-
fession that this fever is preceded by a
contaminated water supply and IL Is
now recognized that the great preva-
lence of this disease In any aggravated
form in the camps of the civil war was
due to the use OF surface and shallow
well waters infected by typhoid ex-
creta- To prevent the transmission by
the water supply, 1 recommended the
use of boiled and filtered water when n
pure spring supply could not be OBJ
tanned. and to enable an efficient NJ
tration OF suspected waters to be made.
field filters of approved construction
were issued on my recommendation by
the quartermaster's department.
Care Of the Sick and Wounded.
The seriously sick were to be treated
in their division field hospitals. unless
their transfer TO a general hospital was
advisable. under the care of the most
experienced physicians and able sur
geons on duty with each division. Med
ical officers left on duty with their regi-
ments were to exercise sanitary super
vision over the well men and to deter
mine whether a soldier reporting him
self as sick should be sent TO the hospi-
tai or that he remain as a trivial case
under treatment in quarters. The con-
solidation of the medical force by divis-
ions. implying, as 1t did, the breaking
up of the regimental hospitals. met with
a strong opposition from regimental
medical officers. particularly from those
who were not detailed for special serv-
ice at the division hospitals.
Long before the Fifth army corps en-
barked for Cuba its field hospitals were
in condition for efficient service. When
the command embarked on the trans
port vessels the baggage wagons and
mules were left behind. The ambu-
lance trains of all the divisions. with
a large part of the outfit Of each of the
hospitals. were also left behind. Three
ambulance wagons were taken apart
and stored on one of the vessels.
These did excellent service at San Juan
a nd of ahtNla fasaes
of the third or reserve division hospi-
tai were subsequently shipped to Cuba.
where they arrived July ?, and were OF
value In moving the sick and wounded
TO the hospital at Siboney and to the
hospital shops and transports. OF the
property and supplies carried to Cuba,
a portion was not available for SER
vice at the time IL was needed, to-wit:
on July l, and 3, when the wounded
from FL Caney and San Juan were COM
ing from the front for care and treat
ment. This was because, in general.
no opportunity was afforded to land
the medical property. Earnest efforts
supplies at the front with the troops.
During and after the battles at FL
Caney and San Juan there was an in
sufficiency OF tents, cots and bedding,
due to the causes stated
After the capitulation of Santiago the
troops at the front broke down rapidly
under the fatigues they had undergone.
and the malarial influences TO which
they were exposed but by the time
an ample supply of tents, furniture.
bedding. clothing and medical stores
had reached Siboney. together with a
corps of trained nurses and a force of
surgeons. which were sent to duty at
the yellow fever hospital. being immune
to the disease. Meanwhile. to relieve
ka tn l,a oil hos Cr1.f fn1G y
convalescents and sick as could bear the
journey were sent 20 the United States
on transport vessels. This was an
emergency measure to relieve the hospi-
tails at Siboney and permit OF the trans
fer to them OF the men who were sick
in regimental camps. The transfer of
troops from Santiago TO Montauk Point
was also an emergency measure and the
great responsibility of excluding yellow
fever infection from every transport
rested on the medical officers who had
charge of the embarkation. Had they
failed in this duty the effect would have
been disastrous during the voyage to
the men on shipboard and the risk of
importing the disease into this country
would have been greatly increased.
1t is needless TO refer at this time to
the complaints of starvation which ap-
peared almost daily in the newspapers
during the occupation OF Camp Wikoff.
for II is now generally understood that
the weakness. prostration and emac' a
ton of so many of the troops were the
results of malarial typhoid and yellow
fevers from which the army suffered as
a consequence of its exposure to he
climatic influences and TO infections of
Santiago. and its neighborhood. pend
ing and subsequent to the surrender of
the city.
Troops In the Home Camps.
The method of hospital organization
in these camps was practically the
same. and there was much similarity in
the conditions affecting them and cor
respondingly in their history. Regi-
ments reported in but few instances
with the material and supplies for their
medical care. but they brought sick men
with them and these required immed-
late care. Provision had to be made -Or
division hospitals in view of future field
service. and for regimental hospitals