The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1898-10-01

| order it unless we were in danger OF
| losing our position by the assaults OF the
| Spanish, for the reason that in his
| opinion, it would precipitate a general
engagement, for which he was not ready.
Now, however the brigade of General
Macarthur was in position and the
Monterey having arrived under date of
August 9th, Admiral Dewey agreed TO
my suggestion that we should send a
joint letter to the Captain General noti-
flying him that he should remove from
the city all non-combatan within 4S
hours, and that operations against the
defences of Manila might begin at any
time after the expiration of that period.
This letter was sent August 7th and
a reply received the same date to the
effect that the Spanish were without
places of refuge for the increased num-
ber of wounded, sick women, and child
rem now lodged within the walls. On
the 9th a formal joint demand for the
surrender Of the city was sent in. The
Captain Generals reply, of the same
date stated that the council of de-
fense had declared that the demand
could not be granted but the Captain
General offered to consult his Govern
ment il we would allow him the time
strictly necessary for the communications
by way of Hong Kong.
This was declined on our part for
the reason that it could. in the opinion
of the Admiral and myself, lead to no inn
mediate result favorable to us. and the
necessity was urgent that decisive ac-
ton should be taken to compel the enemy
to give up the town, in order to relieve
our troops from the trenches and from
the great exposure to unhealthy condi-
tions which were unavoidable in
bivouac during the rainy season. The
seacoast batteries in defense of Manila
are so situated that it is impossible
for ships to engage them without firing
into the town, and as the bombardment
of a city filled with women and child
ren, sick and wounded. and containing
Il large amount of neutral property.
could only be justified as n last resort.
it was agreed between Admiral Dewey
and myself that an attempt should be
made to carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of internchments in front
of the positions at that time occupied
by our troops, which with its flank on
the seashore. was entirely open to the
fire of the navy.
1T was not my intention to press the
assault at this point, in case the enemy
should hold it in strong force. until after
the navy had made practicable breaches
iii the works and shaken the troops hold
ing them, which could not be done by
the army alone, owing to the absence nf
siege guns. 1t was believed, however.
as most i'll accordance with the principles
of civilized warfare that the attempt
should be made to drive the enemy out
of his intrenchments before resorting to
the bombardment of the city.
by orders issued some time previous
ly Macarthur's and Greene's brigades
were organized as the Second division of
the Eighth army corps. Brigadier Gen
cral Thomas M. Anderson commanding
and in anticipation of the attack. General
Anderson moved his headquarters from
Cayite to the brigade camps and assum-
ed direct command in the field. All the
troops were in position on the 18th at
an early hour in the morning.
about Q n. m., on that day our fleet
steamed forward from Cavite and bcfora
10 a. m, opened hot and accurate fire
of heavy shells and rapid-fire proiectiles
on the sea flank of the Spanish in
trenchments at the powder magazine
fort, and at the same time the Utah
batteries, in position in our trenches near
the Gale real began firing with great
accuray. At 1925. on n prearranged
signal from our trenches that it was
believed our troops could advance, the
navy ceased firing, and Immediately q
light line Of skirmishers from the Colo
RADIO regiment of General Greene's bri-
gade passed over our trenches and de-
ployed rapidly forward. another line
from the same regiment from the left
flank of our earthworks advancing swift
ly up the beach in open order. Both
these lines found the powder magazine
fort and the trenches thanking it de-
serted. but as they passed over the
Spanish works they were met
by sharp fire from
second line situated in the streets Of
Malate, by which a number of mon
were killed and wounded, among others
the soldier who pulled down the Spanish
colofs still flying on the fort and raised
our own.
"The works Of the second line soon
gave way to the determined advance of
Greene's troops, and that officers pushed
his brigade rapidly through Malate and
over the bridges to occupy Rinondo and
San Miguel, as contemplated in his in
structions. In the meantime the brigade
of General Macarthur, advancing sim
ultaneOusly on the Pasay road. encoun-
tered very sharp fire, coming from
the block houses, trenches, and woods
III front, positions which it was very
difficult to carry. owing to the swampy
condition Of the ground on both sides of
the roads and the heavy underground
c0ncealing the enemy. With much gal
lantry and excellent judgment on the
part of the brigade commander and the
troops engaged, these difficulties were
overcome with a minimum loss and
Macarthur advanced and held the bridges
and town of Malate as was contem-
plated in his instructions.
"The city of Manila was now in our
possession, except the walled town.
but shortly after the entry of our troops
into Malate a white flag was displayed
on the walls, whereupon Lieut.. Col. C.
\. Whittier, L. S. V. of my staff. and
Lieut.. Brumby, u. $. n. representing
Admiral Dewey. were sent ashore to
communicate with the Captain General
''In leaving the subject of the operaa-
tions Of the 18Th, | desire here to record
my appreciation of the admirable manner
in which the orders for attack and the
plan for occupation of the city were
4 .