The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-11-24
GLORIOUS STORY Told
In a Bureau Report, of the
Work of the Navy.
INCREASE PLANS URGED
Defects in the Reward System
Pointed Out.

Washington, D. c., Nov. 25.-Far out
the lines of the ordinary annual report o
the bureau officer is that Of Captain
/ CrowninshieId, chief of the bureau OF haVl
/ CATION, navy department, which has Jus
been made public. ont only was the heac
of this bureau a member OF the wor, Oh
/ strategy, board, as it cae to be known
/ but he was responsible for the execution
! of the plans formed by that board and foi
/ the movement of every ship and The as
! Segment of every officer. Consequently
/ no bureau officer had equal opportunity tC
know the owing purposes and exact his
tory of the war The report is abso'
lute,y free from personal bias; there Is nc
reference whatever TO the now happily
ended Sampson-Schley controversy; nc
criticism of any officer or no commenda-
ton that might be regarded as invidious
and discriina ting. But the report is con-
fined to the statement of hard facts, with
a few importan recommendations for the
betterment of the naval service.
GETTING THE NAVY IN PLACE.
The war history begins with the simple
statement of certain precautionary orders
that were issued, but even in the absence
of comment, attention cannot fail 10 be
attracted to the remarkable foresight eX-
hibited in the preparation of the official
orders They begin with an order dated
January II last, directing the commander
of the European stations to retain in SER
vice men whose enlistments were about to
expire and those following provide for
the successful extrication of the European
squadron from the danger to which it was
exposed upon the outbreak of the war;
show how the South Atlantic SQUADRON
was brought up to reinforce Sampson; how
the Oregon started on her famous race
around South America; how stores and
ammunition were forwarded to the squad
rons. and finally they wind up with the
famous order to Dewey, April "A:
''War has commenced between the Unit
ed States and Spain; proceed at once TO
the Philippine islands. Comemnce opera
tons at once: particularly against Spanish
feet. You must capture vessels or destroy.
Use utmost endeavors."
Those orders show that four months be-
fore Cerveras feet reached this side our
whole North Atlantic fleet was ready for
any emergency, within striking distance of
one of the two points from which attack
might come.
THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN.
Trained gunners to the number of forty
five, who had just graduated from the
course on the Amphitrite. were placed on
the vessels of the fleet, and rendered a
good account of themselves. AS exhibit
ing the quality of these men, Captain
Crowninshield cites the destruction of
three gunboats by the little Scorpion in
ManzaniIlo harbor. July IS. of which the
commanding officer reports:
Orders were given TO obtain the range
with two of the six-pounders, after which
the first shell from the five-inch gun blew
her up, apparently having struck her boil
ers."
Captain Crowninshield says: ''The COM
pleteness of our naval victory during the
war and the almost absolute immunity
from injury which our ships and crews en-
joyed. naturally led to a general conclu-
sion that our gunnery had much to do
with the matter. AS matter of fact, all
reports bear out this conclusion The per-
centage of hits, smaller, it is true, than
that which has been obtained at target
practice, was modified by three conditions:
In the first place, the demolition Of the
eremy's ships has usually been so COM
plete that it is certain that the marks Of
any hits were obliterated by subsequent
fires and explosions In the second pace,
the ranges at which the combats have
taken place have usually been so much
greater than those used in target practice
that this difference will account for a
reduction Of from 80 to 60 per cent in the
percentage Of hits; and finally, the rate
OF fire was much higher in the battles
than at target practice. The bureau had
been endeavoring before the war TO in
crease the rate Of target fire and when all
this is considered it Will be found that the
hits per gun per minute have been re-
markedly high. In fact it appears that
the experience of each combat was that
our Workmanship was so far superior that
a range at which the Spanish guns and
gunners We're ineffective our guns and
grnners were so effective that before the
range was or could be reduced the Span
ish ships were either seriously crippled
o. their crews demoralized.''
NO FEAR But OF CERVERA.
Captain Crowninshield declares that the
experience of the war has been another
demonstration Of the Importance 10 the
nation Of sea power. He says that from
the first the Only apprehension felt in this
country was on account of the Spanish
navy. Il was Cervera's ships that were
feared. We did not fear the Spanish
army; would not have feared IL If IL had
been three times as powerful. unless II had
been supported by a navy powerful enough
to have formed a sufficient convoy and
brought il 10 this coast. on the contrary.
the Spanish navy. even without the Span
ISL army. would have been a menace.
though il had consisted of only one first
class cruiser. UntI THAI cruiser had been
h.oekaded. captured or destroyed any I'M
protected point on our coast and all OF our
sea commerce would have been AZ lis
mercy and no army. however efficient.
could have protected Us from It. Il re-
CURED a navy for this work. and an ef
fective navy"
Touching upon the combined operations