The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-09-15

ton on the Tltnt. Aboul ~ y. III NV
enemy made a vigorous assault 20
break through my lines, but he was
I repulsed at all points.
ION the morning of the 81 the battle
was renewed, but the enemy seemed
TO have expended his energy In the as
sault OF the previous night and the
firing along the lines was desultory
until stopped by my sending the fol-
lowing letter within the Spanish
lines"
General Shafter then gives the dis
matches passing etwee him and Gen
eraI Toral, already published. He pro-
ceeds:
Il was of the opinion that the Span
iards would surrender II given a niue
time. and ] thought this result would
be FASTENED IL the men Of their army
could be made to understand that they
would be well treated aes prisoners OF
war. Acting on this presumption, l
determined to offer to return all the
wounded Spanish officers at FL taney'
who were able to bear transportation
and who were willing 10 give thelF
paroles not to serve against the FORCES
OF the United States until regularly
exchanged. This offer was made ana
accepted. These officers, as wen az
several OF the wound Spanish PR
Yates. q in all, were sent 10 thelr ms
under the escort Of some Of our mount,
cd cavalry. Our troops were received
with honors. and ! have every reason
10 believe the return of the Spanish
prisoners produced a good impression
on their comrades.
The cessation of firing about noon on
tho I'd practically terminated the bat
tie of Santiago; all that occurred after
this time may properly be treated unuer
the head Of the siege which followed.
After deducting the detachmehts re-
tanned at Siboney and Baiquirl 10 rem
der those depots secure from attack
lection haA "a nrntpCt our HANKS,
others acting as escorts and guards 10
light batteries. the members of the nos
pItal corps. guards left i'm charge OF
blanket rolls which the intense neat
caused the men to cast aside before en-
terInR battle, orderlies, etc, 1t is Doubt
ful II we had more than 10000 men on
the firing lines on July l when the bat
tie was hercest and when the improve
ment and strong positions OF I'll Cahey
and san Juan were captured.
"A few Cubans assisted In the attack
at I'll Caney and fought valiantly, but
their numbers were too small 10 ma
terially change the strength as indl-
Gated above. The enemy confronted us
with numbers about equal to our own.
They fought obstinately in strong en-
trenched positions, and the results at
tanned clearly indicate the intrepid
gallantry Of the company otficers ana
mon and the benefits derived from the
careful training and instruction given
i'm recent years in rifle practice ana
other battle exercises. our losses IN
these battles were % officers and POS
men killed and 81 officers and Luz men
wounded. Missing, 79. The missing
with few exceptions. reported later on.
General Shafter says the ARRIVAL OF
General Escario at Santiago was not
anticipated. He said: General Gar
ola. with between 1000 and 5000 Gu
bans, was entrusted with the DUTY OF
watching for and in"tercepting the REIN
forcement expected. This, however, he
failed to do and they ESCAPED into the
city on my extreme right near the bay.
After speaking of Admiral Cervera's
sortie and the destruction or his heet,
General Shafter says he again called
on the Spanish commander to surren-
der. He says:
con the same date | informed Ad-
miraI Sampson that IL ne would force
his way into the harbor the city would
surrender without any further sacrlnce
of life. Commodore Watson replied
that Admiral Sampson was temporarily
absent. but that in his opinion tWat-
son's) the navy should not enter the
harbor.
THE strength of the enemy's position
was such that | did not wish to assault
If IL could be avoided. An examination
of the enemy's works made after the
surrender fully j~ustifes the wisdom Of
int N'hi - aN'lA'Hs ~
could only have been carried with great
loss Of life"
General Shafter gives the varying ef-
forts toward securing a surrender and
his reopening the engagement on the
10th, when the truce ended. on the nth
the surrender was again demanded.
by his date the sickness in the ar
my was increasing very rapidly as a
result Of exposure in the rench to
the intense heat of the sun and the
heavy rains. Moreover. the dews In
Cuba are almost equal to rains The
weakness of the troops was becoming
Z 50 apparent | was anxious to bring the
siege to an end, but i'm common with
most of the officers Of the army | did
not think an assault would be justi-
fed. especially as the enemy seemed to
acting in good faith I'm the preliminary
propositions 10 surrender.
July II I Informed the Spanish COM
mander that Major General Miles, com
mandcr-in-chicf of the American army,
, had just arrived In my camp. and re-
quested hin to grant us a personal in
terview on the following day. He re-
piled he would he pleased TO meet us.
P The interview took place on the 18Th
? and informed him his surrender could
be only unconditional and hat as he
. was without hope of escape he had no
3 right to continue the fight"
General Shafter then gives the de-
tails of the fnal surrender. his entry
into the city and the raising Of the
/, American flag.
In closing he says; Before CLOSING
my report I wish to dwell Upon the
natural obstacles | had to encounter
and which no foresight could have over
come or obviated. The rocky and pre-
cipitous coast afforded no shelter for
landing places. the roads were mere
/, bride paths. the effect Of the tropical
sun and rains upon unacclimated troops
was deadly and a dread of strange and
unknown diseases had its effect on the
army.
AT Baiquiri the landing Of the troops
and stores was made AT a small wood
en- wharf. which the Spaniards tried u
hum hut misunderstanding and the amt