The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-11
In the Meantime Assisting the Navy
by HaraSsing the Enemy with
Small Expeditions.
HE PREFERRED STATE CAMPS
FOR VOLUNTEERS UNTIL LATTER
WE'RE DRILLED AND EQUIPPED.
Operations at Santiago and in Porto
RicO-NO One Criticised by Miles
Several Officers COmpIimented.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1O.-The report of
Major General Miles, commanding the
United States army, was made public to-
day by direction of Secretary Alger. The
keynote of the report is found in one of
the opening sentences, where it is said:
The military operations during the year
have been extraordinary unusual and ex-
tensive," a statement which is fully borne
out by the long recital of important events
which General Miles shows have made the
military history of the year 1898 the most
remarkable since the end of the civil war.
In point of interest the document divides
naturally into four chapters, for, while
brief allusion is made to such matters as
the military expedition to Alaska, interest
naturally centers in the portion which
treats of the war with Spain Under this
general head, the report deals with the
plans of campaign of the war preparations;
with the Santiago campaign; with General
Miless operations in Porto Rico, and lastly
with the important changes in existing or
ganization which are, in General Miless
opinion, necessary to. make the army an eff
fective weapon for the defense of the coun-
try. There is an entire absence of any evil
dence of direct criticism, though certain
APPARENT desire to justify previously express
sed plans of details of the campaign, and,
where it deals with events the document
is. largely made up of a quotation Of official
dispatches.
Treating of the war. General Miles begins
with statement of the unpreparedness of
the country. showing how the vast equip
ment left by the million soldiers Of the civil
war had been dissipated or had become
obsolete until the tentage, transportation,
and camp equippage was insufficient for
any important military operation. He re-
counts the. legislation of Congress just prior
to the war looking to the increase Of the
army and cites his own recommendation ON
April 9, that 40 900 men be provided for coast
defense and reserve; that the regular army
be increased and 10000 immunes recruited;
making force of 1851 men, which, with
$1,000 native auxiliaries. he considered suffi-
cient. Such force properly equipped, he
believed to be better than a large force
partly equipped.
WANTED $1,000 VOLUNTEERS.
In the letter containing this recommended
ton he said: 81 also recommended that at
least twenty-five regiments of infantry,
five regiments of cavalry and the light ar
tillery be modified and placed in one large
camp where they can be carefully and
thoroughly inspected, fully equipped, drilled,
disciplined and instructed in brigade and
divisions, and prepared for war service"
He further asked for $4,000 volunteers to
make up an army of 10000 soldiers for Of
fensive operations in Cuba, the whole force
to be fully equipped leaving the state
troops to defend the coasts and for a re-
serve
g..
lows: II have the honor to submit the fol-
lowing: That in my judgment the available
force of the regular army should be mobil-
lied in the best and most available health
full position in the Department of the Gulf.
1 suggest Chickamauga Park on account or
it's altitude and advantages for preparing
a command for the serious requirements of
actual warfare" He also dwelt upon the
Importance of the most perfect equipment in
all branches. artillery, engineering and
medical, with supplies for six months, and
equipment for $1,000 native Cuban soldiers.
General Miles says in his report that in
the beginning the war problem was purely
a naval one and he was convinced that
should our Eavy prove superior the position
of the Spanish army in Cuba would be
rendered untenable with a minimum loss
of life and treasure to the United States.
Says he: There were two most serious OBJ
stacles to be avoided-one was placing an
army on the Island of Cuba before our navy
controlled the Cuban waters; and the other
was putting an army on the island at a time
when a large number of the men must die
fron%Sthe diseases that have prevailed in
that country, according to all statistics, for
the last hundred years." He pointed out
in letter to the secretary of war these
dangers, inclosing a communication from
Surgeon General Sternberg, and urged that
the Spanish be merely harassed and dam
aged during the rainy. unhealthy season,
while the navy was demonstrating its SUI
periority, and the volunteers We're being
equipped In that letter he says: Il also
assert the belief l have entertained from
the first that we could secure the surrender
of the Spanish army in the Island of Cuba
without any great sacrifice of life" In
this letter, which is attached, DR.. Guiteras
is cited in support of the recommendation
to delay the army movement in Cuba, and
it is said that aside from disease, the United
States troops would have to cope with
eighty thousand Spanish troops, the rem
nant of 2140O0, which troops had become
acclimateo. There was still time, he said
TO put 1900 regular troops into healthful
camps until they could be used in Cuba with
safety.
FAVORED STATE CAMPS.
In order that volunteers should be speedily
made efficient, on April 20 General Miles
wrote the secretary of war that they should
be encamped for sixty days in their respec-
tive States and disciplined and equipped and
their officers instructed; all important, he
said. TO health and efficiency This pre-
liminary work should be done before the
troops leave their States, wrote General