The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1898-05-23
THE NAVAL SITUATION
ASsIT LOOKS TO LONDON.
CerVera seems to Have Accomplish
ed Nothing With His Fast Fleet,
and Sampson No More

LONDON, May 23.-The Times this morn
ing, in an article reviewing the war, takes
IL for granted that Admiral Ceryera's
SQUADRON coa!ed in Venezuelan waters
from four British Golfers. 1t suggests that
the cruisers Fizcaya and Infanta Maria
Teresa risked a disadvantage in being
reported there. in consideration of their
ability 10 send dispatches TO Gen. Bianco,
and 10 have rejoined the flagship at
prearranged place and TO have arrived at
Santiago de Cuba on the 18TH
The Times says:
Even If Ii took longer route TO escape
observation. Admiral Cervera's force has
been excessively deliberate IN its move
ments, and his fast cruisers have not yet
shown great speed. lis strategy, so nluca
boosted a Madrid is not yet apparent
Possibly his movements are hampered by
the torpedo boats, but by the extreme
slowneSs OF his notwithstanding destroyers
his chances were lost or dealing an effect
I've blow al Key West. Tampa or at the
blockade force deprived Of its most ef-
hcient force by Admiral SIMPSONS abor-
tive raid on San Juan de Porto Rico TIE
high speed Of the Spanish cruiser squad
ron 50 far has not been turned totally 10
account, and although its arrival at San
uago de Cuba may have some moral value
IN assuring the Cuban garrlsons that they
are not abandoned. no naval objects seem
20 have been attained. The United States
commanders now know where the enemy
Is. and have time 10 concentrate a SUI
perior force and 10 cover their vulnerable
points
Discussing the problem OF blockade of
Admiral CerveTa at Santiago de Cuba. or
an attempt TO force him TO give battle. the
Times article says:
The United States commander possesses
ample forces. but night and the Spanish
cruisers will give them chances to escape.
The result Will be watched with much in
tercst. The degenses OF SANTIAGO are prob
IA effective those n
Mia. To take the United States cruisers
into the harbor In the face OF a powerful
operation. but a torpedo fiot,lla. IL it ex-
listed in either fleet. might find opporiu-
mites for effective employment.
IF Admiral CerTera succeeds In get
ting to sea and obtaining coal, he Will un-
questcnahly hamper the Cuban blockade.
although he can obtain direct advan-
tage 1t is evident that the monitors great
" delay Admiral SIMPSONS squadron.
Such an incumbrance imposes heavy dis
abilities on the American freev. and a fast
squadron capahle OF pursuing the Span
needed Failing such force, there APP
pears 10 be no reason why Admiral Ger
vera should not steam To San Juan de
Porto Rico. coal and go TO sea again be-
fore he could be overtakeu. A recent re-
port confirms the existence OF large
quantity cf coal at san Juan. and II Adj
mir9l Cervcra can avail himself of this
supply and leave behind the torpedo craft
Savannah without difficulty.
"A raid on either OF these points would
have 40 important results. but X would
greatly interfere with the operations Of the
blockade. Reviewing the whole field OF
operations. the most important lesson Is
the effect produced by the presence Of "a
small. compact. high speed squadron,
which. however. hitherto has been some
What aim3eSSly employed. From the mo-
mea5 ~Aea Il 'Nas known that this squad
ron had arrived oft Martinique all the
plans ~ The United States board q STRAIT
eeV were disarranged. Nv undertaking a
homh1r6menf Of the forti3catons AZ San
JU81 nothing was gained. The Iaite1
states has been Handicapped BY the lack
~ E fast. homogeneous squadron.
IL would be wise in tu.l.rc 20 leave the
direction % the operations 10 naval COM
n sUders, Councils have never proved "a
9ahie directors ~ war. Thcir proper func-
tiOn Is - Obtain information and 10 toT-
ward Il 80 thc atmirais who must have.
as Nelson claimed the right "a be- free 20
AZ when the fitting opportunity arrived.