The record-union., 1898-01-07

the plaintiffs herein, for the expense in
CURED in making such Improvements,
in proportion to the plaintiffs interests
in the property. In support of this view,
the defendants cite a number of author
tiles. which, in my opinion, do not sus-
tain their contention here.
Section 1918 of the Civil Code is as
follows: EVERY conveyance of real
property, acknowledged or proved, and
certified and recorded as prescribed by
law. from the time it is filed with the
Recorder for record, is constructive no.
| tice of the contents thereof to subSe-
ouent purchasers and mortgages
The rule which counsel attempt to
invoke in this case, that, where i'm
| proyements upon land are made Whlle
the occupying claimant bona fde be-
| liayed the land his own, but his title
to which. after such improvements, is
| found to be defective, is one that is
| founded in sound justice and equity. In
! All IF the cases which / have examined
upon this point however, where equity
| has interposed in behalf of the tenant
| and reimbursed him for Improvements
| made upon land to which he had no
title the facts were essentially diff
| fera,1t from those of the case at bar.
| In those cases it was held that if the
| tenant had reason to believe, and did
believe. in good faith, that he had a
complete title to the premises. and, so
believing, conducted improvements
thereon and thus enhanced the value
thereof. it was the duty of the person
in whom the real title was found
| -ofr hIIp n
his expenditures, upon the principle
that no man should be benefited by an
othsr'ss money or labor, without max
| ing compensation.
In this case the defendants must have
known the extent of their interests in
the premises, for it will not be de-
MED that the defendants and all the
world. under the section Of the Civil
Code above quoted, had constructive
notice of the contents of the deed from
Hampton Whitaker to Mary E. Scott
and the plaintiffs herein, and that the
| defendants had constructive knowledge
that their grantor had but a life es-
| tate therein. 1t is for this reason that
the case at bar is different from those
which were cited by counsel for the de-
| feniants.
If the life tenant could charge either
| the remainder or the estate for
| improvements on the land in which he
| holds the life estate, then he, at his
pleasure (in the language of one of the
| authorities cited), could improve the
remainder-man out of his entire estate.
/ The improvements made by the tenant
without the consent of the owner be-
come fixtures, and hence part of the
realty, if at the time of their construc-
ton, there was no contemporaneous
agreement that the same should re-
main personal property, and it is not
| claimed that there was any such agree
ment.
/ am of the opinion that the defend
| ants will be, at the termination of the
| life estate, entitled to compensation in
proportion to the respective interests of
all the parties, for Improvements which
were forced upon them by law, such as
| Improvements Of the street, sidewalk,
and construction of cesspool, etc.
cannot see, however, how it could well
be determined by the court at this time
how just proportion of such expense
could be adjusted between the parties.
1t is impossible to determine how long
the life estate may exist, and therefore
how much benefit the life estate party
will have derived from such improve
ments, in comparison to that which the
remainder-m will enjoy therefrom.
In other words, I am of the opinion
| that the cause of action set forth in
| the oross-complafnt cannot be main
tanned until the termination of the life
| estate.
| For the reasons stated, the motion to
| strike out the cross-complaint will be
| granted, and plaintiffs will take judg-
ment upon the pleadings in accordance
| with the prayer of the complaint
Findings viii be prepared in accord
| ance herewith.