Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1898-05-27
inshield and Captain Mahan. As stated by

purpose was to 60 over the whole situation.
from the Philippines to Cuba and Porto
Rico and decide Just how far the plans al-
ready laid should be modified to meet ex.
isting conditions. This involved q discus
sion OF such important points as the pro-
priety OF the immediate advance Of the
military force upon Cuba: the credibility Of
the advices so far had touching the loca
ton Of the Spanish squadron; the policy Of
preceding the Cuban expedition, or accom-.
panying it with one directed against Porto
Rico. and, finally, the extent of the mill.
tary assistance to be sent to Admiral
Dewey at Manila. As already indicated.
the proceedings were rather in the nature
OF consultation than Of a war council,
where full decision is demanded at once,
portant questions were disposed of at the
council.
None nf the members Of the conference
felt authorized to tell what had taken place,
but there are thought to be patent indica-
tions OF a decision to embark military ex-
peditions In the course Of the next few
days. whether for Cuba or Porto Rico can
only be conjectured.
The news a. to cervera's supposed en-
trapment at Santiago rests now, as It did
two days ago. on . semi-onicial report
coming to the navy department from
source believed to be reliable. 1t was not 4
naval source. nor one connected with tho
state department.; neither did It come from
press advices. It was from parties having
relations with the navy department, and
In a position to be accurately advised. The
naval authorities were extremely anxious
to secure an oficial confirmation from one
Of the American commanders, and. had this
been received. It would have been made
public at once. But. lacking this the de.
partment has given to the public all IL felt
warranted in giving from the facts, name.
ly, an expression Of belief that the spanish
aeet was in Santiago harbor. This ba.
been reinforced by the negative fact that
the fieet has been seen at no other point
Still the word from Sampson and schley IA
being most snxiously awaited.
Naval ofhcsrs are NOW turning their at
tention to inquiries whether II IL possible
for Admiral cervera to get out Of sautiaso
harbor. They hold that this maneuyer ia
impossible. and. that being 80 the career
sf the Spanish admiral Il at an END. 40 "a,
as It constitutes menace against our
ships. The British comment that Admiral
Hornby- in lsss. escaped with his entire
Meet from a harbor under similar cenal.
tions. and that Admiral cervera should he
able to make his escape when he gets ready
to do So Is not accepted. The naval view
here is Just the contrary.
1t is pointed out that Admiral r1ornhv
escaped from an open bay. while Admiral
cervera must-come througi, a narrow chan.
mel about 800 yards wide. on which the
American searchlishts win play constant.
". 1t is said that this is not mere opinion.
but that naval maneuvers were carried on
at Key West ana Tortugas a few months
ago which furnish positive demonstration
that Admiral Cervera cannot make an exit
without being discovered.
An onicer who was on board one of the
American ships during the Tortusas move.
menfs says a sham night attack Of torpedo
boafs was made upon the big battieships
and cruisers. The latter were given NO
notice Of the projected attack and there
was no extra guard. such as the Amer,-
can ships now maintain. But every torpedo
boat engaged In the attack was discovered
long before It was within striking distance
Of the cruisers and battleships. One Of the
attacking torpedo boats was 30 bewildered
by the searchlights that It nearly ran into
q cruiser.
The lesson drawn from this attack was
that night sally by an enemy was i'm
possible. owing to the modern methods of
discovering an approach. It had shown
also that the attacking fleet could not get
within range. although they had come
within the range Of the guns of the ships
attacked.
II is said that these maneuvers at Tor
tugas and Key West practically represent
the situation before Santiago. If Ceryera
sent out his torpedo boats as scouts, they
would be detected before they had done
any damage and destroyed by the small
gunboats. The American ships would have
the advantage Of concentrating their en-.
tire fire upon one small passage about 200