The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1898-08-26
MAKES A DIG AT SCHLEY
FOR NOT SEEING THE INDIANA
DURING TIE FIGHT.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON REPLIES SO0THINGLY
And Explains Why the Indiana was SignaIled
to Return 10 BIockade--The Whole
Correspondence was Referred to
the Navy Department.

son mas IOfNdEucu " tllC A'"'J
mont the following letters which have
nasscd between himself and Captain
Tovlor of the battlcship Indiana:
T. S. S. Indiana, Guantanamo Bay
cuba. August 6, 1898.
Admiral: The report of Commodore
Schlqv on the battle of July 3rd' as pup
lishcd gives credit in the seventh para
~ranh to four ships and mentions W
name their Captains, Philips, Evans
Clark and Cook, and adds:
oTbe dense smoke of the combat shut
ont from my view the Indiana ana "Iou-
cestcr. but as these vessels were closer 20
vour flagship no doubt their part Ill the
conflict was under your immediate OBJ
scrvation."
In your report as published you
mako but slight mention of the Indiana,
stating that "thc Iowa and Indiana nav
ing done good work, and not having inc
specd of the other ships, were directed
by me-" etc, etc.
3. The result of these reports is that
the Captains of all the vessels OF the
line of battle except the Indiana nave
received personal mention in the ofhclal
report before the Department, while two
smaller ships have also had distinctive
mention either from the commandments
chief or the second in command.
If the official record should be re-
fcrred TO in future it will appear from
its general tone that the Indiana WAS
loss deserving than all Of her consorts.
Leaving out my personal interest III the
matter it is right that l should con-
slider the officers and crew of the SNIP
and | speak for them as well as for my
self when I submit to you, Admiral
that the above combination of reports
will Mace the ship. in the opinion of the
Department and the country, markedly
below all the other vessels of your
squadron. / respectfully submit, sir,
that this is unjust to the Indiana ana
her officers and crew.
< can say without disparagement
of any other vessel that during the first
hour of the fight the Indiana's gun fire
contributed 10 the destruction of the
Ouucndo and the Teresa more than that
of any single vessel of our squadron eN-
.cept one and equaled hers. | do not know
why the second in command failed to OBJ
serve the Indiana during this period of
orr hottest action. / saw the Brooklyn
quito plainly.
q An examination of these reports
with reference to the Indiana will. | be-
lieve. convince you, sir. that they do
produce the effect of putting the Indiana
below all the other vessels Of the squad
ron. If it be your opinion. sir, that this
is the case. and that all the vessels from
the Brooklyn to the Vixen rendered ser
vices rs much more valuable than the
Indiana as the published report of the
cornmander-in-chief and the second in
command taken together would indicate,
then | must accept it for myself and
the ship. if on the contrary that be not
your opinion | urge respectfully that such
steps be taken to remedy this injustice as
may seem wise to you.
Very respectfully.
II. G.. TAYLOR.
.C"rtain Z. S. Navy. Commanding.
To the Commander-in-chief United States
Naval force, North Atlantic Station.
SIMPSONS REPLY.
Il. s. s. New York, Guantanamo Bay
August 8, 1898.
Sir: | am greatly obliged that you
have called my attention to what appears
to have been an injustice to your ship,
officers and crew, for the part which
they took in the action of July Bird, and
also for the very proper manner in which
you have presented it, | think however
that YOU will agree with me that, in
submitting such a report to the Secretary
of the Navy, where so many officers are
vitality interested, and justly proud &c
their ship. it is no easy task TO do so
without apparently bcstowing praise un-
r. Al d
GRAFTON Of the report from every point
of view to avoid misunderstanding.
2. The position of the ships of the
squadron must he carefully considered
to fully appreciate what it was possible
for each vessel TO accomplish under the
circumstances in which she was placed.
Those that were to the westward of the
escaping enemy were certainly better
placed for stopping the enemy. and also
better placed for delivering their fire
than the vessels to the eastward which
was the blOckading station of the In
diana.
8. No distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide against
every variation of such a sortie nor do
| consider that any commanding officer
deserved either credit or blame because
the snip uuuCI HIS tOillHluHu WIS IdSteE
or slower than another sh;p, or carried
a heavier or lighter battery, but rather
that the commanding officer was blame.
worthy when he failed to put his ship
in the proper place for destroying the
enemy. just in proportion to the advan-
tage which he possessed in speed, bat
terry. or position over his neighbors.
4. Each commanding officer in my
opinion. was personally responsible for
the good use which he made Of the tools
with which he had to work. | certainly
did not intend to criticise you. nor to be-
stow less praise upon the Indiana than
was bestowed upon any other snip Oh
the squadron.
5. The fact that the commanding Off
Ger of the Indiana was signallcd to re-
turn to blockade at the mouth of the
harbor after she had so CALAMITY contrib
utcd 10 the destruction of the Spanish
ships, was only n necessary precaution
4 TOE