Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1898-09-15

participating as dCllyRIy IN the UatthC 80
desired but from high hill near my
headquarters ! had q general view OF tne
battlefield, extending from Ell Caney on
the risht to the left of our lines on San
Gen. Shafter follows in detail the move
ments of the troops and the tntrencnlnk
done during the night. He says; Gen;
Aguad6res as ordered. but was unable to
accomplish more than to detain the
Spaniards In that vicinity.
Dufiieid. at ' sIboney u to send forward the
34th Michigan and the 9Th massachusetts,
both Of which had just arrived from inc
United States. These regiments reacheo
the scene the next morning.
"All day on the I'd the battle RACED with
more or less fury. burt such OF our troops
as were in position at daylight 'ne,n tn and
commanding position on the right, ABOUT
10 r. NJ the enemy made an Assault 70
throw my lines, but he was repuised at all
points.
ION the morning of the Sd. the battle
was renewed. but the enemy seems 70
have expended his energy in the assault
Of the previous night and the hiring along
the lines was desultory until stopped by
my sending the following letter within
the Spanish hnes:
Gen. Shafter then gives the dispatch
passing between himself and Gen. Toral,
which has been already pubAshed)
He proceeds:
iards wour. surrender If given little
time, and thought this result would be
FASTENED II the men of their army could
be made to understand that they would De
well treated as prisoners of war. Acting
upon this pres umption. l determined TO
offer to return all the wounded spanish
officers at Ell Caney. who were able to
bear transportation and who were willing
to give their paroles not to serve against
the forces of the United States until reg
ularly exchanged.
"This offer was made and accepted
These officers, as well as several OF the
wounded Spanish privates, q in all. were
sent TO their lines under the escort OF our
cedved with honors. and have every rsa-
son to believe That the return of the
Spanish prisoners produced good I'M
preston on their comrades.
1.-The cessation OF iiring about noon on
the Sd. practically terminated the battle
of Santiago. and all that occurred after
this time may properly be treated under
the head of the siege which followed;
After deducting the attachments retained
at Siboney and Daiquir to render these
depots secure from attack, organizations
held to protect our TANKS, others acting
as escorts and guards to light batteries
the members of the hospital corps, guards
left in charge of blanket rolls which inc
intense heat caused the men to cast aside
before entering the battle, orderies, etc.
1t is doubtful If we had more than l2.oo
men on the firing line. july !, when the
battle was fcrccst. and when the impor-
tant and strong positions of I'll Caney and
San Juan were captured.
n
FL Caney and fought valiantly, but their
numbers were too small to materially
change the strength as above indicated
The enemy confronted us with numbers
about equal to our own. they fought OBJ
stnatey in strong and intrenehed posi-
tons and the results obtained clearly IN
dictate the intrepid gallantry of the COM
pany officers and men and the benefits de-
rived from the careful training and IN
struction given in the company in recent
years. in rifle practice and otner battle
exercises.
..Our losses in these battles were q Of
ficers and 2OS men killed; 81 officers ana
ing with few exceptions reported later
Gen. Shaftcr says the arrival 81 Gen.
Escario at Santiago was not anticipated
He say: Gen. Garcia, with between
1000 and 5000 Cubans was interested with
the duty of watching for and Intervening
the reinforcements. This. however, he
| failed to do. and Escario passed into the
bay Bay :''"S u. '
After speaking of Admiral Cervera's
sorte and the destruction OF his Meet,
| Gen. Shafter says he again called on the
| Spanish commander to surrender.
| "On the same date l informed Admiral
Sampson that if he would force ms way
| intoI the harbor the city would surrender
| without any further sacrifice Of life:
Commodore Watson replied that Admiral
Sampson was temporarily absent but that
| should not enter the harbOr.
! 1.-The strength of the enemys position
was such did not wish to assault II IT
icould be avoided. An examination of the
enemy's works, made after the surrender.
| fully justified the wisdom of the course
adopted. The intrenchments could only
| have been carried with great loss of life.
Gen. Shafter gives the varying efforts
| towards securing a surrender and his re-
opening the engagement on the 10th. when
| the truce ended. On the 18th, the sur
render was again demanded.
| by this date the sickness in the army
was increasing very rapidly. as result
heat of the sun and the heavy rains.
| Moreover, the deaths in Cuba are almost
| equal to rains. The weakness of the
troops was becoming so apparent. ! was
anxious to bring the seige to an end but
in common with most of the officers Of
the army did not think an assault would
seemed to be acting in good faith in their
prelin mary preparations to surrender.
July IL. i informed the Spanish COM
mander that that MAJ; Gen: Miles; com, ,
just arrived in my camp. and requested
him to grant us personal interview on
the following day, He replied ? he would l,i
place on the 18th. and l informed him his
surrender only could be considered and
that as he was without hope of escape he
had no right to continue the fight"
Gen. Shafter then gives the details of
the final surrender, his entry into the
city and the raising of the American flag.
In closing he says: Before closing my
report l wish to dwell upon the natural
obstacles | had to encounter and which
no foresight could have overcome or OBJ
waited. The rocky and precipitous coast
afforded no sheltered landing places, the
roads were mere bride paths, the effect
of the tropical sun and rains upon un-
acclimated troops was deadly. and the
dread of strange and unknown diseases
had its effect on the army.
AT Daiquiri, the landing of the troops
and stores was made at a small wooden
, wharf which the Spaniards tried to burn
but unsuccessfully, and the animals were
pushed into the water and guided to
sandy beach about 200 yards i'm extent.
At Sboney the landing was made on the
beach and at a small wharf erected by
II the engineers. / had neither the time nor
5 the men to spare to construct permanent
: wharves.
"In spite of the fact that I had nearly
1000 men continuously at work on the
? roads. they were at times impossible for
. wagons.
1.-The San Juan and Aguadores rivers
. would often suddenly rise so as to prevent
the passage of wagons, and then the eight
pack trains with the command had to be
depended on for victualling my army as
well as the 29.O00 refugees. who could not
4 in the interests of humanity. be left ia
! starve while we had rations.
] "Often for days nothing could be moved
I except the pack trains. After the great
. physical strain and exposure of July and
$ 2. the malarial and other fevers began tC
G rapidly advance throughout the command
and on July 4, the yellow fever appeared
$ at Siboney. Though efforts were made tt
l. keep this fact from the army, 1t soon be-