The Bellefontaine Republican. [volume] (Bellefontaine, Logan County, Ohio) 1855-1905, 1898-11-18

from Commodore Schley announcing
that there was smooth sea and that
the Iowa and the Brooklyn were coal
ing. The day after his arrival Rear Ad-
miral Sampson issued this order of bat
tie, which was followed in the sinking
of Cervera' $ fleet:
The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba
closely, keeping about six miles from the
MORO in the day time and closing in at night,
the lighter vessels well in shore. The first
squadron will blockade on the east side Of the
port and the second squadron on the west side.
If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must
close in and engage as soon possible and
endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to
run ashore in the channel. 1t is not consider
ed that the shore batteries are of sufficient i'm
portance to do any material injury to battle
ships
In smooth weather the vessels will coal on
station If withdrawn to coal elsewhere or for
other duty, the blockading vessels on that side
will cover the angle thus left vacant.
The remainder of the operations have
already been described. 1t is expected
that Commodore Schley's report on the
operations of his squadron will be pub
lished, in which event some inkling
may be had of his conduct from the
time of the departure from Cienfuegos
until he was superseded in command by
Rear Admiral Sampson.
The inefficient Monitors.
Had Cervera's feet arrived at Cadiz,
Spain, instead of Martinique, as re-
ported on May 10, Rear Admiral Samp-
son would have taken steps for the i'm
mediate capture of San Juan. He makes
fhic cfa fo,nopt in bic ofio;ol rooort T.,
formation having been received on
April 29 of the sailing of Admiral Ger
vera's squadron from the Cape Verde
islands, it was decided with the con-
currence of the department that asquad-
ron should go into the Windward pas
sage for the purpose of observation, with
view to going farther east if thought
advisable, making en- route Cape Haitien
a place of call for dispatches. The New
York left Key West on the morning of
May and picked up the Iowa, the In
diana, the Terror, the Amphitrite, the
Detroit, the Montgomery, the Porter,
the Wampetuck and the collier Niagara.
The squadron at once stood to the east
ward, the monitors being taken in tow.
"This was the beginning of our ex-
perience with the inefficiency of the
| monitors" Admiral Sampson states.
''Their coal supply was go small that it
was at once evident that they must
either frequently coal or they must be
| towed. Therefore the New York took
| one of the monitors in tow, and the
other was towed by the Iowa. There
resulted endless trouble and delay from
the breaking of towlines, etc. At the
first opportunity, when the sea was
sufficiently smooth, the monitors were
given coal from the Niagara and again
taken in tow. Had the sea been rough
or had the enemy appeared at this juno
ture the squadron would have been in
| a much better position for an engage
ment had the monitors been elsewhere.
Subsequently, when engaging the bat
teries of San Juan, it was evident that
their shooting was very bad. Owing to
the quick rolling of these vessels, even
in very moderate sea, they were unable
to fire with any degree of accuracy
i Dispatches received at Cape Halter
on May z from the department., direct
ed Admiral Sampson not to $50 risk Of
cripple your vessels against fortifica
tions as to prevent them from soon aft
erward successfully fighting SPAIN
fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos v
Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Girls
tobal Colon, and four deep sea torpedo
boats, if they should appear on thi
side." He was informed of reports be
ing current that Spanish vessels were
ooaling and loading. ammunition at st
Thomas, and that several vessels witt
coal, attached to the Spanish fleet, WERE
to be near Guadeloupe. The department.
he was told, had sent the American
line steamers New York and st. Loui
to keep lookout for the Spanish fee
/ about so nautical miles to the east O
Martinique and Guadeloupe islands
and that the Paris was cruising arount
Porto Rico for that purpose.
Admiral Sampson called the com
manding officers aboard his flagship ant
had a consultation regarding the situa
J tion, the result being his decision t.
!, stand to the eastward as far as Sal
Juan, on the chance of finding the Span
) ish squadron in that port.
ssThe squadron arrived off San Jual
the admiral, land the bombardment @
, that place ensued, beginning at
minutes past and ending at quartz
, | to g. 1t was soon seen that Admira
I Cervera's squadron was net in the port.
Cervera's dash for liberty and th
. consequent destruction of his fleet pre-
vented an effort On the part of Rear Ad
miral Sampson to force the harbor @
, Santiago. This is made clear in the off
cial report of the operations, endin
q with the destruction of the Spanis
, squadron.
The dispatches show that on June 2
| Admiral Sampson informed Secretar
. Long that he was preparing a torped
. attack in order to hasten the Spanis
t ships destruction.
"Regret to resort to this method,
l. his dispatch continued, because of il
t difficulties and small chance of success
t torpedo boats being subject to smal
!, arms and rapid fire guns from the shor
y for a long distance. l should not d
s this were present force to be kept here
!, as it now insures a capture, which bs
lieve will terminate the war.
1t was Rear Admiral Simpsons III
derstanding that General Shafter
troops should capture the forts on tt
: eastern shore of the harbor, when /
could countermine and then enter tt
channel.
Shafter Asks Cooperation.
The rear admiral received this di
- patch from General Shafter on June 81
t. Iexpect to attack Santiago tomorrow NOR
= ing. l wish you would lombard the forts
IS Aguadores in support of regiment OF infa
}, try which shall send there early tomorro
10 and also make such demonstration as "
|, think proper at the mouth of the harbcr, SO
IS to keep as many of the enemy there as po