Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1898-06-21

fore Gon. Shafior sailed. his feet ~
thirty transports viii ilo Mt n safe dis
tlnrr from shore while a war council
d. being held between the commanding
uNrUrf NJ thH two forces and their chief
HInn officers Admiral Sampson has
probably become familiar with The
most accessible and least dangerous
localities Loo the immediate vicinity VI
Santiago. through hla communications
continuously maintained with the Gu.
bans ashore. tir d. also pnHfrsaHd " the
power Co. batter down any Qualifications
which may have been established IN tho
urlrhn1rhlod or tho most desirable
landing place. whether The position
iu Guantanamo hlv now held hy The
marines. pr that no Arcoruderu. which
wua seized several days 1En hy tha Cu-
ban general, UHhl, ton miles west "
tho main Obj "UtINr ru.nt. IH selected,
vIN depend largely urnu fhH condition
or ihs troops upon their arrival ana the
amount NJ caution 70 IH c1ra.d rcd nee.
usHIry On exercise
M most advantageous point ot
drhltfuiI1n und.r ordinary cIrcum-
stances. fnr tho Initiation % sharp
ana p.HiY lnYHrtmHnf NJ fHufIlrn.
n found 10 th. Carnegie strr come
plnya wharf nt ArutHrH We. ls
barely six miles east of MORO fstlr.
this wharf hfiug admirably adapted
fnr landing the heavier supplies. the
Siege train. ordnance ana horses. but
tho Snlular1H are reported 90 have
placed batteries M such position aH
in command tho locality with nu one
nlndlug IRE " hnHvv artillery which
might easily destroy thH wharf its"lf
hy shoiinE mr. create havoc among the
troops after they have land a Possibly
Admiral Sampson heavier ships
might succeed ln disWnuntinr these
batteries. hut grave fears 1rp expressed
that thH ships runs could not reach
come of tho masked positions upon the
hin
Thert r. u wide divergence ~ rspart
opinion regarding the probable dur'-
ton " tho military campaign before
ths fuli NJ SauulEn. Army officers who.
with Gen. Miles. dnrrrcHtr the expos.
urr NJ American troops 90 unnecessary
risks declare that they would not he
surprised N an entire week were con-
stunned 10 landing the army ana perfect
inr o. Organization ashore before the
actual ncroHs-cuuntry march ls begun,
They had anticipated that great mum.
Dor ~ horses md mules would die ON
The voyage and that 90 the surviving
animals would b. practically unit fnf
use fnr lt least four mi Eve days after
they regain terra nrma
They also point out ihat the base
~ supplies must hr thoroughly proc
trctrd hy rarihWnrkH lu order that lt
may Boz held hv % small force beyond
tho slirhtsat possibility or doubt Tho
roads must be- built flr The transport
N essential subsistence. supplies and
ammunition, uH we'll as capable %
bearing the heavy artillery in such u
rough country 1H Santiago province
nn average advance nf HiN ur eight
miles per dnv Will hH satisfactory ana
n effective resistance n offered. prog.
ross win be- ~ slower rate pH SAM
tlnru n more closely approached.
on Tho other hand civilians who are
familiar with spanish operations dur
lng me last two yH1rs IN cuba are
confident that Cen Shufter will meet
'ncks by scattered guerrilla bands and
that the rnuiditv ~ hls investment ~
tho city and hay Will both astonlsh and
crafty every one hut me friends of
Rnnin.