The record-union., 1898-06-22
PORTO RICO ISLAND.
NOT TO BE INVADED FOR THE
PRESENT.
The Presidents Plans Said to Be
For an Aggressive Campaign
Throughout Cuba First.

| NEW YORK, June 22.-A special to
| the Tribune" from Washington says:
| The project to occupy Porto Rico IS
now regarded by the highest military
authorities of both the navy and army
as practically removed from immediate
consideration. and unless the death rate
| of General ShafterS army from dis
eases indigenous to Cuban soil is eX-
ceedingly high, the Presidents desire
| of general aggressive campaign
| throughout the entire island of Cuba
may be promptly entered upon the mo-
ment Santiago is captured.
| The suggestion of a Porto Rican cam
| paign to precede the invasion of Cuba
! was put forth more than a month ago,
| before Admiral Sampson bombarded
| San Juan, and, pending the uncertain
| ty regarding the destination of Ger
! vera's squadron. The unexpected diff
| ficuties met with in organizing the
| great volunteer army needed for the
| Cuban capmaign, together with the
| urgent warning delivered by medical
experts against the advisa bility of ex-
porting raw, unacclimated recruits to
the pestilential climate of Havana and
| the surrounding country, where the
blockade conditions were presumed to
| ing scourge of yellow fever, together
with the comparative salubrity of Por-
to Rico and the relatively small Span
ish force holding that island, worked
strongly to bring about the approval of
| the scheme to obtain control of it as
war necessity.
| The Porto Rican enterprise was not
abandoned, but was temporarily pushed
aside by the more imperative necessity
Of sending General Shafter to Santiago
as expeditiously as possible. His fleet
! of transports had barely sailed from
| Tampa last week before many officials
! in Washington, in the absence of any
| countermanoing of the original orders
/ for mobihzing the Porto Rican expedi-
| ton, again took up it's details and We're
| hurrying the preparations along on the
| original lines, when General Miles re-
| turned and convinced the highest au-
| thOritieS that the best military reasons
| existed for concentrating every re-
source of the Government for the time
| being, at least, upon the support of
| General Shafter, whose campaign was
of more hazardous nature than had
| been generally appreciated.
| Notwithstanding the excellent equip
| ment and the trained forces which had
| been provided in this army corps, the
/ fact that 1o.0O0 men We're to be landed
! in a strange country in the face of a
4 much more numerous force, whose ex-
act strength could only be estimated,
| will prove the crucial event of the
whole war It's success may be expect
ed to result in Spain's prompt reaIiza-
tion of the futility of further resistance.
while serious reverse. even of a tenn
polary character might indefinitely
! prolong the duration of hoNtilities.
The illusion that the actual posses
sion of Porto Rico constituted any
valid advantage from an international
law point was speedily dispelled by the
citation of precedents, the most recent
of them being the acquisitions by ia
pan of Formosa at the treaty of ST.
monosi although the island was in pos
/ session of China at the close of the
war. 1t was also made evident that
the United States had absolute justifi-
cation which could not be combatted by
neutrals for exacting the surrender of
| Porto Rico by Spain as an indemnity
| against part of the cost of the war. es-
pecially as it was universally conceded
that this Government already had the
power of eventually debating the terms
of peace.
In fact. if there existed any response
BILE argument for running the risk of
sacrificing General Shafter for the ac
QUESTION of Porto Rico. at present an
altogether negligible element in the
war, it has yet to be supported with
any telling weight in the opinion of
State Department officials and mem
bers of the diplomatic corps in Wash
/ ington. 1t now appears to be conclu-
siyely settled that further atten-
ton will be paid to Porto Rico for the
present unless it develops strategic
Importance utterly unreeognZeG at the
present time.