The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-08-04
GRANT WAS OPPOSED TO DELAY.
How the Hero of Apponattox Would Have Treated the
SpaniardS.

and fortify his new position, and twice
afterward he came near forcing his
northwestern front up to the Ohio river.
II promptly informed the department
commander of our success at Fort DON
elson and that the way was now open
to GAINESVILLE and Nashville"
Grant added that unless otherwise or
dered he would go to Nashville i'm
[ mediately and push on the campaign.
His zeal and genius were rewarded
by this letter from Halleck:
1T will be better 10 retreat than to
risk a general battle. Avoid any gen
eral engagement with strong forces"
I Then Halleck reversed all of Grants
plans for a decisive movement and
telegraphed the government at WASH
ington:
Grants army seems to be as much
dem0ralized by the victory of Fort
Donelson as was that of the Potomac
by defeat at Bull Run"
Grant had gone to Nashville to look
over the situation. and arranged for
moving forward his army and captur-
ing the city 1t did not please theI
strategists. General c. F. Smith was
put in charge of Grants command by
Hallecl's orders. but happily Lincoln
reversed the order.
Again, after the battle of Vicksburg.
which made Grant famous throughout
the world, it being achieved by violat-
ing all the rules of strategy and book
warfare. and the routing of the regu-
lar confederate forces for more than 100
miles in every direction, Grant says:
Il felt that the troops who had done
so much should be allowed TO do more
before the enemy could recover from
the blow he had received. and while
important points might be captured
I Nj hon doh IL.
cOmmander-in-chief the idea of a cam
paign against Mobile, starting from
Lake POntchartrain. Halleck proposed
al other course. So was obliged
to settle down and see myself put again
or the defensive. as 1 had been a year
before in west Tennessee. 1t would
have been an easy thing to capture
Mobile at the time 1 proposed TO go
there. Having that as a base of ooer-
atoms. troops could have been thrown
into the interior to operate against
BraggS arm. This would necessarily
have compelled Bragg to detach in or
der to meet this fire on his rear. If he
nad not done this the troops from Mo-
bile could have inflicted inestimable
damage upon much of The country from
which his army and Lees were receiv-
ing their supplies. All my urgent re-
guests were refused, when renewed.
The general-in-chief having decided
against me, the depletion of an army
which had Won a succession of great
victories commenced, as had been the
case the year after the fall of COrinth.
when the army was sent where it
would do the least good"
The result of the great disasters to
RCsecrans, following the refusal ON
General Halleck to accept Grants Sug-
gestiOns. alarmed the government. At
last General Grants glorious star was
about to rise resDlendent in the heav-
ems. At last the government. like Nc
Kinley today. resolved to substitute
victory Cor strategy
General Badeau says: 1T was deter
mined to give Grant almost absolute
control over the forces, in operation
west of the AlleghenieS." The situation
was SO serious that Secretary Stanton
jCurneyed from Washington expressly
TO meet Grant (fOr the first time) and
&C rfer with him as to the best way oS
saving the army and the Union. The
disaster which ROsecrans had suffered
in Chickamauga FASTENED this decision.
and the course suggested by Grant for
nearly a year before finally was forced
upon the government and accepted by
the powers at Washington.
Grant was now in control of great
armies and great movements-all his
own. Theory and strategy on paper
vanished. ROsecranS, Burnside and
their starving armies, bottled up in
the mountains of Tennessee, were saw
ed. the confederates hurled from their
positions at Lookout Mountain, Chat
tGEOoga and other StronghOldS, and
Grant. with Sherman and Sheridan, al
lowed to finish UP the war in his own
way.