Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1898-05-26


Departmcnt the situation as 10 the t,eets
Do'h american and Spanish. was preelse.
" as It was this morning. so Ear IA ths
o"cie's knew, the only notable difference
oe'hs an apparent strengthening OF the
eonhuence OF the officials In their belief
'n"' cerVera's squadron is lying In San.
uaso haroor. In this hope and belief the
o"clals found great comfort knowing
'he abilities OF the American naval COM
n'anuers In Cuban waters TO keep the
spanish Admiral bottled up in this mar
ro"-necked harbor until he shall surren-
uer or be starved out.
~ Cervera is actually at bay the Off
clais feel not the slightest apprehension
Oh any relief coming to him from the out
s'ue IN the shape of another Spanish
squadron from Cadiz. The reason FOR
'iilS beiief is their unquestioned ability
10 mold Cervera in check with only a few
Nessels-perhaps couple of monitors
ana torpedo o-boats-thus leaving the re-
inalnder OF the big armored fleet 70 take
care OF any reinforcements that might
attempt TO come from Spain to Cervera's
aid. The force that could be spared for
t"is service without endangering the in
'egrity OF the blockade at Habana, or
permitting the escape of Cervera, would
pe much larger than the entire Spanish
naval force now in Spanish waters capa-
bic Of crossing the Atlantic.
UNJUST CRITICISM OF NAVY.
gls.
ever since the determination was posi-
lively reached to invade Cuba before the
ury season next fall, there have been
puphsned intimations that the DELAY or
"hat appeared to be the delay. in BEGIN |
hihg the invasion was attributable 70 the |
navy. 1t can be stated on the highest |
au'horlty that the impression thus
created is wholly unjust TO the navy. and |
warrant in fact. The naval Off
GERS one and all, take special pride I'm
me degree of readiness in which the navy |
was round at the outbreak of bostilities
and there never has been q moment even
'hen SIMPSONS forces were at Porto
Rleo' when the navy was not prepared
IN instant orders 10 aid the army.
ARMY NOT AT FAULT.
Neither has the army been at fault in
MS matter. 1t was at first proposed to
hrow a small force Of men. about 10000
nto Cuba Immediately, and allow the re-
nainder of the army of occupation to
ialt until next fall. before going over.
here were various reasons for abandon
lg this plan, such as the discovery of '
ne insufficient support that could be =
sndered the American force by the in
lrgents. But the fact was brought out C
ltn appalling force that to delay the
lmpaign meant the absolute extermina-
on of the starving reconcentrados, and c
ere were, beside other reasons for
aking haste. These considerations
used complete change in the army
ans. and this involved delay. To equip
army of 10000 men in thirty days. and =,
t them in condition to fight trained
teran soldiers. on their own soil, was
small undertaking; so that in the
inion of some of the highest officials Fl
the administration, there is no reason c.
le ground for pressing the criticism r.,
At there is or has been undue delay in
ginning the military campaign, either
the part of the army or on that of ~
navy.
CONTRACTS FOR ARMOR. ge
ecommendation has been made that 'I
tracts be awarded for supplying the an
nor for the three battleships under
as follows: To the Carnegie
npany, 1,l5S tons for the Illinois and WI
SIG tons for the Wisconsin, to the Se'
helehem Company, LAOS tons for the =
nois and 2,55S tons for the Alabama qul
at $500 per ton. eve