The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-08-24
SAMPSON ON THE WAR.
What, in His Opinion, the Naval Battles
Have Demonstrated

Boston, Aug. IA Boston Journal
reporter Interviewed Rear Admiral
Sampson on the train for Washington.
AdmirRl Sampson was reminded that
Admiral Colomb, the English naval au-
thOrity, had said that this war had
taught no lessons in naval architecture
or naval strategy.
IF he said that" was the comment,
he does not know what he is talking
about, for the war has taught a great
many things For one thing. 1t has
shown the necessity of making ships OF
war hre-proof. 1t won't suffice merely
to make the wood hre-proof, in my opin-
ion. for there are objections 10 the pro-
cess, as it involves unnecessary sx-
pense. Ships ought to be built practic-
without woodwork at all, and there Is
no good reason why this cannot be done.
After the way IN which the woodwork
OF the Spanish ships caught fire, caus-
ing the destruction of the ships, there
can be- no question about the import
anee of the change
The trouble with Colomb may be
that ne has always been an advocate
OF torpedo boats. We are not likely 10
hear so much about torpedo boats as
we used TO hear before the war" was
suggested.
Probably not. At the same time, IL
must be remembered that torpedo, boats
nave never ItdllN ldu q ldlI AfbAs NV
have always been faulty In construction,
necessary qualities having been sacri-
feed 10 speed. There is no good reason
why a torpedo boat should have a speed
of more han "A or IS miles an hour, but
IL has been thought SO important to
have them speedy that they have been
made too light, and in some instances
they are little better than e~Ggsheils.
The torpedo boat has it's uses, but It
,,,gAr n ha hpiIf upNnrdina 10 the right
ideas. 1t won't DO. either. TO draw too
hasty a conclusion from the way In
which the Gloucester. which was a con-
verted yacht, did up the Juror and
Pluton. The Gloucester was hastily
transformed into a torpedo boat destroy
er, but IL Is not a small boat by any
means."
How about the big guns? The eight
/ inch and the rapid fire guns seem 10
have done most OF the execution, both
at Manila and at Santiago, and a great
many people seem to think the guns or
higher calibre are not OF SO much &C
count in battle"
The big nuns will always be needed.
There IL work which they can do and
which is out OF the question for the
smaller Calibres. II happened at SANTA
60 that the eight-inch guns and the
r~apid-fre guns did great execution. but
his was because they could strike the
Spanish below the belt, as IL were. That
H.. the lightly armored portions OF the
Spanish ships were exposed TO their fire
Al Manila the Spanish ships were not
heavily armored at all.
When IL comes to piercing heavy or
NOR the high caliber guns must bt
brought into action. The armor pierre
ing capacity OF "a gun II almost exactly
prupoTtioned 10 its caliber. 70 instance
an eight-inch gun can pierce eight-incf
armor. a l2-inch gun 12-lnch armor, and
So on. Yes, the big guns are needed.
"Then there is the question of smoke
less powder. our ships ought 20 be sup
piled with sInokeleS powder for sew
eral reasons. First. the most importan
is the great advantage In velocity. VIII
ordinary powder the velocity Is some
thing ike 2.lO0; with smokeless powde'
IL j. nearly $500. Ships using black pow
der are at a disadvantage. too. from tn
fact that when the gun has been de
charged the gun next 10 II u wal
until the smoke has cleared before IN
target can be sighted. These are amonl