The record-union., 1898-05-24
STRATEGY AND TACTICS.
HOW A NAVAL BATTLE IS
PLANNED IN ADVANCE.
Work and Responsibility Divided
Between Authorities Afloat
and Ashore.

companies the expanding condolences
Of after dinner oratory, a very gallant
and capable flag officer is reported TO
have made of late breezy attack upon
all bookmen and closet strategists gen
! orally. He blithely denied in these
post prandial utterances the usefulness
of either and, holding up to scorn their
audacity in planning ashore for more
capable men afloat, he ranged the eX-
ecutiVes in the fleets so much above
the administrators in the department
that nothing for the moment seems lett
/ the latter but the hiding of their dl-
minished heads.
| But they deserve better things than
| this, and somebody ought to speak
good word for them and their useful
work; for useful it is, despite the hot
raking given them by the veteran sail
or. They have both here and abroad
| important roles to play in the naval
/ scheme, and, if one may judge by past
achievements, the particular ones at
present employed in the duty with US
! are quite as brilliant and capable as
| their more lucky colleagues who are
| serving afioat. 1t is almost ancient
history now to set down what Moltke
did for the German army-and yet, II
the sweeping generalization OF the re-
tired Rear Admiral be accepted, the
great Danish strategist ought to nave
no standing in court
| 1t would be a brave man who would
dare assert this, and, when one comes
down to it, it would be an unreasoning
one who in cool blood denied the value
of even our hastily gathered Strategic
Board. 1t may be true, of course, that
no individual among our strateglsts
possesses the native genius Of Moltke-
for he was the rare and perfect flower
of many generations; but it must
equally be clear that, unlike him, they
have taken up a labor which is hand
icapped by the inadequacy of resources,
the defects of organization and the
lack of preparedness, notably in their
very line Of endeavor, with which we
famed into war Still, matters seem
to be moving fairly WELL all things
considered, and in the consistency OF
certain underlying ideas the evidences
of a general plan may be traced. And
this, if nothing else, shows the value
of the board, of many minds struggling
with a difficult game; for a general
plan logically followed is the begin
ming of all real intelligent effort.
Given a certain problem, the first
duty of a government that has appeal
ed to the sword is to seek its speediest
and surest solution, at the least cost
in men, honor and treasure. Many dit-
ficulties confront, for at the start it
must reckon with its own and with the
enemy's capacities of attack and de-
!
must establish a vigorous definition of
it's own and the enemy's sea power, and
at the outset it must seek the COM
mand of the sea-" In this essential, in
this command of the sea, lie the main
opportunities of victory, for nearly
everything else is dependent upon it
and to it's consideration the first
thoughts of the strategists who are in
trusted with the general scheme of
operations must be directed.
The naval force of a country engaged
| in war" says Commander Wainwright,
| U. S. n, will act either on the Of
| fensive or defensive, but in both cases
| it's objective will be the fleet of the
enemy. A portion Of the force may be
acting extensively against the enemy,
while another portion remains to de-
fend the coast. The stronger force will
generally seek the enemy's fleet near
! his coast, while the weaker force will
remain near home ports so as to util-
| ize the advantages of short lines of
communication, repair shops, supply
depots and coast Notifications. The
stronger force will endeavor to obtain
command of the sea, and after that to
utilize this command, by invading the
enemy's country, by blockading his
ports and destroying his mercantile
marine and in endeavOring to bring the
war to a successful ending by seizing
his territory and destroying his COM
merce.
"The weaker fleet will dispute this
command of the sea, and will endeavor,
by taking advantage of the mistakes
or misfortunes Of the enemy, to defeat
him and if possible to turn the tables
upon him and seize the command of the
sea with all it's intendent advantages.
Every country must look more to its
sea power not only to defend its coasts
but also to protect all its interests be-
yond it's coast, and no country can be
| a great maritime nation without ade-
| quate sea power"
Having, then, first reckoned its avail
able and real assets, determined exactly
| what duties are imposed and how these
may be met, the Strategy Board-or the
general staff" as it is known abroad
is called upon to formulate the plans to
be pursued. In every considerable mil
itary nation all this has been long in
hand, for it is a continuous work, so
persistently followed in peace that at
| - L oPo b0
plan best suited to the existing con-
ditions of any particular nation that
may be a possible enemy is available
out of many alternative plans.
This is something we have never been
able to achieve on any comprehensive
scale. mainIy-indeed, almost entirely
because Congress always denied it's ne
cessity and because civilian secretaries,
ignorant of the alphabet of war, usually
put aside each and every scheme pre-
sented as unnecessary, expensive or in
opportune.
To a slight degree the War College
was created to meet some Of the pr1-
mary necessities imposed by the want
OF a general staff, and lucky indeed is
the country that a few determined, in
| telligent and far-seeing officers were
able, despite an ignorant opposition, to
nurse to a sturdy growth this valuable
| institution. The general and compre-
hensive scheme finally adopted becomes
the accepted strategy of the campaign.
Though they differ widely, strategy is
often confounded with tactics, for it
must be kept in mind that, broadly gen.
eralized, strategy is a science and tao
ties is an art, with the inherent dis
tinctions which exist elsewhere in these
definitions AS a science strategy has