The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-06-08
And Mounted on the Hills So as to Command
the City and Admiral Ceryera's Fleet.
Hurry Orders Sent to Tampa to Break the Railway
Blockade and Free Much Needed Supplies
for the Army of Invasion.

WASHINGTON, June 7.-Despite efforts
of the War Department to suppress infor-
nation on the subject 1t became known
to-day that troops had embarked for Cuba.
Some time ago when it was announced that
several transports had sailed for Santiago
the report was vigorously denied, but 1t is
now certain the transports did sail, and
that they carried the party of marines
which landed near Santiago yesterday. The
transports also carried arms and ammu-
milton for the insurgents, and possibly some
siege guns. To-day it was learned an army
had embarked at Tampa, and that several
thousand regulars were on their way to the
eastern end of Cuba.
Starting out to-day with a strong belief
that there had been nothing in the nature
of a serious engagement between SIMPSONS
forces and the Spanish defenses at Santiago,
the Navy Department officials as the day
wore on and the full and detailed reports of
the Associated Press from its correspond
ents with the fleet began to flow in, were
the day closed they were ready to admit
that it was evident that Sampson had made
a strong attack on the Spanish force. The
one point on which they maintained their
confidence was that no troops had been
landed. They were prepared to admit that
Sampson might be clearing the way with
his big guns for the landing of the troops
that possibly some marines had been
landed temporarily, but that forces had been
put ashore they would not admit, for the
reason that no information had reached the
War Department of the actual departure of
the soldiers from the gulf ports for Cuba.
1t is not denied, however, that every effort
is making TO put the troops into Cuba at the
earlist possible moment Although no Of
fetal advices are at hand it is believed
troops were actually embarked at Tampa
to-day, and may get away tonight The
reason for this belief is found in the ad-
mission by officials that the troops have
been under orders to embark for some time
past. The difficulty that presented itself
was the absence of absolutely necessary
supplies, which in most cases were stored
away in some of the thousands of freight
cars which blocked the railroad tracks
many miles out from Tampa. The orders
that went forward yesterday were of a
cldrdcleT 10 cause d SPECIFY DT6dhlHS Oh
the deadlock and if the troops now have
their supplies, which is believed to be the
case, there is no reason why they should
not sail at once for Santiago
By the newspaper reports of the breach
Sampson has made in the coast defenses
there, there is every reason to believe that
little difficulty will be found in the actual
debarkation of the troops, particularly if
marines are already ashore to guard the
landing. A suspicion is entertained in some
quarters that Sampson was hastened in
his movements at Santiago by the news of
the intended departure of the troops from
Tampa and made this attack in order that
the navy alone might have the honor of
effecting the first occupation of Cuban soil.
1t is likely that the first troops of the regu-
lar army to take up position ashore will
be the engineer battalion, although they are
so badly hampered by the heavy siege trains
they carry that they must be greatly de-
layed in making landing. These guns, by
the way, have given infinite trouble, for the
transports that were hastily chartered were
so lightly constructed as to require great
deal of strengthening before the great
masses Of steel could be safely placed in
them.
The extent of Sampson's attack on the
Santiago defenses has brought out one fact
very clearly, namely, that he has practically
unlimited power as to the time and charac-
ter of an attack and that he is unhampered
by restrictions from Washington. The ex-
act nature of his orders has never been
made public, but a naval official in posi-
ton TO know what they are said that Ad-
miral Sampson had greater power conferred
on him than had ever been given TO any
commander-in-chief 1t was for him to de-
eide on the time for an attack. and the
place and manner of its execution. He may
attack before troops arrive or. in his dis
cretion. act without the cooperation of
troops. Or, if circumstances warrant, he
may refrain from any operations. In short.
1t is said that Admiral Sampson Is complete
master of the tactical and strategic opera
tions by the naval forces off Santiago This
is in line with the policy approved by the
highest naval authorities. Captain Mahan,
a member of the war board, brings out in
his standard work on Sea Power that IL
is for the naval commander-in-chief to or
ganiZe and direct his offensive or defensive
operations. In referring to the brilliant les
sons afforded by Nelson, Rodney FarraEut
and other great commanders-in -in-chief, he
gives them the credit for working out and
executing the splendid campaigns under
their direction, without orders or restraint
from outside authority. The only reserva-
tion made in this general principle is that
the center of government shapes general
policies and the naval campaign Is directed
towards the execution of this general pur-
pose Of the government In the present case