The silver messenger. (Challis, Idaho) 1890-1912, 1898-05-03


provisions, extra spars, sails and
running gear, sufficient to last
for a cruise of many months-to-
day we doubt if it would be pos
sible for any navy to gather to-
gether a feet which could keep
the sea for twenty-one consecu-
tive days without touching at a
coaling station to replenish its
bunkerS.
The question of coal supply is
serious one at any time, and it
can be readily seen that in the
event of hostilities between the
two nations which are separated
by 5000 miles of water, like this
country and Spain, the question
easily becomes first in import
ance. The navy that elects to
place the wide Atlantic between
itself and it's coaling base will
carry on it's campaign under an
enormous disadvantage. Not
only must it maintain a line of
coaling ships, but these ships
must be conveyed across the
water, to which duty not in
considerable number number of
its fighting ships must be
assigned. Moreover, to make
certain of the transfer of the
coal to the fleets, some sort of
coaling port must be established,
for coaling at sea is both slow
and hazardous and only capable
of being carried out in fairly
smooth water.
AS the case now stands. Spain
possesses two coaling stations in
the West Indies, one at Havana
and another at Porto Rico, and
as Cuba would presumably be
the objective point of both com
batants, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that Spain would send her
fleet to Cuban waters and en-
deavor to strike a decisive blow
in general feet engagement.
Should she be successful in this,
however, she would still be
under the necessity of conveying
her coal ships across the Allan
tic, a task which she could not
hope to accomplish successfully
in face of the numerous and
powerful auxiliary feet which we
shall soon have at our disposal.
On the other hand, it is quite
possible that Spain may choose
to place the burden of keeping
open 1000 mile line of com
munication upon our navy, temp
orarily surrendering Cuba and
Porto Rico, and choosing her
battle ground on the eastern side
of the Atlantic. If she does this,
there is no denying that we
would gght at a great disadvan-
tage, and the success of our fleet
would be more predetermined.
One of our first objects, if we
did rest satisfied with the acqui-
sltion of Cuba, would be to sec
ure base of operations within
reach of Spain itself, where coal
might be stored and as much re-
fitting as did not involve visit
to the dry-dock carried out. The
Canaries would furnish such a
base, and it is likely that col
lision between the fleets would
occur in the vicinity of these
islands. If we encountered the
full force of the Spanish fleet, it
is not to be supposed that our
ships, even though victorious, as
we think they would be, would
come scathless out of the fight.
The Spaniards are strong in tor
pedo boats, and we might even
lose ship or two in the general
melee. 1t is likely, in any case,
that the victor in a modern fight
will be ripe subject for the dry
dock and navy yard. If so, this
would necessitate part of the
victorious feet limping home for
repairs before it could follow up
its advantage. This. in itself,
would be a perilous trip, for
shot-holes at the water line, or a
few feet of the outer bottom
ripped up by glancing blow
from the ram of battleship.
would not improve the chances
of a ship surviving such weather
as the SanFrancisco and New
Orleans encountered on their re-
cent passage.
OF course we should win the
struggle; but just how long it
would last, or what it would cost
us in men and ships, is a ques-
ton that would be determined by
the degree to which nation
driven to baV would orolopo +bo