The representative. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1893-1901, 1898-09-07


Beach His Ships IL Necessary and
Save as Many of His Men as Pos
! sible-COuld Not Have Taken Any
other Action.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 5.-The bureau Of
| information of the war department mas
made a translation Of a signed article by
Felix Bastarreche from R:vlsta General Ia
| Marina, of Madrid, for August, commenting
| upon the loss of Admiral Ceryei as squadron
! and drawing technical deductions from the
| results of the great naval battle. The Inn
| portance o. :he article lies in the fact that
! Revista, which is the seni-otticial organ
| of the marine department Of Spain, iadi-
Gates that the Spaniards have awakened 10
| the fact that American gunnery Is Of the
| highest order, made SO by the constant
| target practice of the American sailors.
| After commencing the valor Of Cervera and
| his men and expressing appreciation CT
| Americas acknowledgment of their bravery
as shown In her treatment of the prisoners,
| Revisia says: -4.--,...... etaAs ".......
Though without a detailed official report
Of the battle, the press has published a
| telegraphic report Of Admiral Cervera 10 che
| general In chief stating that the squadron
under command has been destroyed, heading
this part by saying that he sailed in ohedi-
| ence to his orders. Therefore Admiral Ger
vera sailed, In obedience to orders, to go
| to Havana, though we do not know tho form
| In which he was told to do so. Vessels cs
| the size Of the cruisers which composed THIS
| squadron cannot possibly 60 out OF the port
| of Santiago de Cuba at night without max
| ing the sudden turns which exist In The
| channel. If they had placed such marks,
| which are not ne cessary to buoy the c.lan-
mel in daytime, the enemy would ha yc been
notified by the troops that occupied the hills
| and the condition of our squadron would
have been much worse tnan in daytime, on
account of the great distances which the
vessels would have had to maintain bet veeii
| them in going out, and especially for the
| safety of their crews, supposing they lad
made the sOrtie without accident
But 1t so happened that this day was fun
moon and therefore the night as bright o.
day. There was, therefore, no sensible CT
ference between making the sortie at lay or
night Leaving the criticism as to the time
. of the sortie there remains that of the
| manoeuvre, Admiral Cervera trying to
obey the order received and endeavoring to
go to Havana, trusting to the speed Of his
ships and the chances of miss fires, that
| some of the vessels might escape the Dulk
| of those of the enemy and thus effect the
voyage to Havana, or Cenfuegos, in case
| they could not reach the former port.
1.-The sortie from Santiago had to be made
| In single column because the channel is
| very narrow; thus 1t became nece ssary that
| they should be beaten vessel by vessel, since
they were obliged to follow one another and
could not make movements simultaneously
! At ABOUT 200 metres from the port they were
| obliged to head either one way or the other.
q gIrnn Of onro fho,,
sells occupied considerable length and con-
| sequently it was not possible to go the
| whole length of line which stretched out on
both t1anks and in this case touched both
| coasts. l
ut became necessary then to 20 either east
| or west This was the only method by which
| he had any probability Of obeying the order
he had received, al the sane time preventing
| the vessels from falling into the hands OF
| the enemy, as 1t was easy to run them
| aground on the coast whereby he would al
SO be able to save great many of the men.
! While Admiral Cervera knew perfectly we'll
the impossibility of beating the enemy by
striking at the line, he knew at the same
| time the moral effect of the result If one
ship should successfully enter another port
of the island OF Cuba. There was thus no
other line of conduct for him to pursue.
and that this was his plan is demonstrate
ed by the fact that the ships sailed regard
less whether they ran aground, were burned
up or sunk; that is, those ships, or that ship
that could do SO, should try to go through
| the enemy's lines at the cost Of those that
might perish. At the same time, the worthy
admiral. in accord with the captains, di-
rected that before surrendering, the ves-
| sells should be run aground, that the en-
| emy might not hoist his flag on any of them
| If it were possible, at the same time saving
the greater number of their crews, these be-
| ing the first two duties of the admiral of a
squadron.
HE took the course to the westward and
not to the east. We think this need not be
discussed, since the port where the enemy
was established was Guantanamo, and there
moreover, there were reinforcements which
| would have prevented their continuing the
voyage, though they would then be obliged
| to sacrifice more of their vessels. To
divide the squadron that two cruisers
and one of the torpedo vessels should go to
the eastward and the others to the west
ward we think would have been very un-
wise, since if the forces Of all the vessels
united, in spite of their weakness, required
battleships for their destruction, from the.
moment the force was weakened its destruc-
ton would be facilitated. And this is easily
understood when we consider that the artfl-
lery power Of the auxiliary cruisers Of the
enemy was greater than that of the Colon
and about the equal of the other three crris-
ers. At the same time, the torpedo chasers
could neither attack nor defend themselves,
beins united the attack upon some might
permit the saving of the others.
Not to obey the order that he received
! does not admit of any discussion because
| then there would be military discipline.
| Therefore, as he had received orders TO go,
| he had to do so; but if there remained to
| Admiral Cervera, some Of the newspa-
pers have said, a certain discretion to 10
out when he conceived Santiago lost, he
could not have done SO more opportunely,
| because by the arrival of 5000 reinforce
ments, without subsistence, the situation of
| the defenders of the place would have be-
come impossible on account of the lack of
| resources, and his remaining there would
make it still worse, because there were
| 1000 men more to feed. If he had not sail
! ed the squadron would have been included
| in the capitulation, and today the American
| flag would have been flying from These yes
| sells. While, on the other hand, it is doubt
| full If they can hoist it on any of them, al
! though the present resources very great
| for saving the hulls and parts of hulls and
! though every day they say that they will
| save this vessel or=tAat, up to the present