The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-11-01

Showing How a Pleasure Trip May In
fiuence the Fate OF Nation.

|
| Washington Letter in Philadelphia Tele-
| Whether or not the Presidents Western
/ tour has any bearing on politics of this
portant influence upon the future OF this
/ country. The President was not an original
| eXpansionist. He was as reluctant to enter
| upon this new policy he was to have
| this country mixed up in the Cuban ques-
| ton The conviction that we must have
war with Spain was of slow development
with him. Even the conviction that we
1 had any right to interfere between Spain
and Cuba was of slow growth. Not only
! politics, but personally he shrinks from in
novatlonS. 1t is no secret that the Presi-
g GelC Woulu nave oeen embarrassed II ne
| mad been called upon TO decide upon terms
| of peace with Spain Immediately upon the
collapse of Spain's power of resistance.
The provision of the protocol by which
| Spain relinquished her sovereignty in Cuba
and Porto Rico, leaving the Philippine
| question for future consideration. was no
more in Difference to the delicate position
| in which Spain was placed than it was in
| consideration of the uncertainty as to the
At the time the protocol was Signed there
| was no purpose definitely formed to go be-
| You'd the retention of a coaling station in
| the Philippines. There was no determine
! ton to stop at that but plans had adj
! Vanced no further. The character of the
| commission selected finally to meet with
| the Spanish commissioners at Paris had
| much TO do with expanding the policy of
| the administration. The strongest men ap-
pointed on the commission were nDefdl eA-
| pansionists, selected not on account OF that,
| but because they were the most capable
men to be got to serve, and because they
would be the principal agents in the ratlIlca-
| ton of a peace treaty by the Senate.
1t is known that at the time of the ap-
| pointment of the peace commission the
President was much concerned lest we
should be driven to the adoption OF broad
er policy than the traditions of this govern
| ment seemed to the President to warrant.
1t was not until after the conference with
the commissioners before their departure
for Paris that it was determined that we
must hold the entire island OF Luzon anu
demand that a satisfactory government be
provided for the rest of the group, with
the agreement on the part of Spain tnat
none of the islands should be parted with
to any foreign power without the consent
of this government. That we should not
assume the Cuban debt and like quesllons
with which the Spanish commissioners nave
been taking up the time OF the commsslon
were decided on at the outset, but the
question of whether or not we would even
he willing TO undertake the responsibility
for the Philippines was not determined
1t was only a few weeks ago, after the
political campaign was well on, that MI
Hanna returning to Washington from the
West had a long talk with the President,
after which he declared that the Spanish
flag would not be permitted again 10 ny
over the Philippines. That was the date OF
the administration taking that advanced
stand. Mr.. Hanna said that ne had lC una
that popular sentiment demanded more, de-
manded that this government should annex
the Philippines as an entirety, but tnat ne
thought the people WOulQ ne COHleul Win
the assurance that the islands should not
be again subjected to Spanish misrule. rms
was far in advance of any position MI
Hanna had before occupied and still more
in advance of what the President had init
mated as his desire. 1t was taken in defer
ence to public sentiment
This was the extreme of the policy con-
templated until after the Presidents visit
to the West The President found that all
other questions We're considered With cold
ness by his audiences compared with the
tremendous enthusiasm with which they
greeted any remark which suggested the
possibility of a policy of expansion being
prosecuted. The influence of this sentl-
ment was apparent upon the President
speeches, and the more openly he intimated
policy of expansion the greater was the
enthusiasm aroused. 1t made decided inn
preston upon him, and he returned 10
Washington convinced that policy OF ex-
pansion was demanded by great majority
of the people of this country. Since then a
more aggressive attitude has been assumed
towards the Paris negotiations, and mem
bers of the Cabinet say that there is no
longer any doubt that Chis government Will
insist upon the absolute REIMBURSEMENT of
Spanish sovereignty over any part OF the
Philippines
made an exnanSionist of him.