The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1898-05-29

when we come to the state militia. or
national guard, as they are popularity
termed, we. find very heterogeneous
body, which for any immediate, aggreS-
sive warfare is unframed, and for
practical purposes unorganized The
difficulty is inherently due to the lack
of relation of this first line of defense
to the national government. 1t is a
state affair, and must be reorganized
for federal purposes. and herein comes
the lost motion of our present system
The militia is obviously necessary as a
state organization, subject to the call
of the governor upon occasions when
it would be unwise and inexpedient to
ask the federal government for assist
ance, just as it would be folly for a
city to have to call upon the state gov
ernmert for squad of police to raid
a local gambling den. There is a dis
tinct function for the militia as a local
organization, and yet it theoretically
should be in such condition as to be
readily and easily transferred to the
national service when occasion reQuir-
ed 1t is this transference which is to-
day the weak point of our military
system.
REMAINS A STATE BODY.
So long as the militia is in the serv-
ice of the state alone it remains a state
body, and, as such, cannot be ordered
beyond the limits of the state, nor can
any officer commissioned by the gov
ernor exercise his authority or COM
nand beyond those limits. The trouble
under the present call has come from
the fact that the only way the United
States could accept these militiamen
was as individual citizens of the United
States. 1t was only after they had
been mustered into the service. of the
nation that the government could
either assume control over or respon-
sibility for them. The New York Sew
enth insisted upon enliSting as an or
ganization and not as individuals while
other regiments in New York and other
states -eircumvented this difficulty by
the adroit action of the state author-
ties. The governors in many instances
ordered the national guard into camp,
and the guardSmen were then permit
ted, while enlisting as individuals, to
enlist in the regiment selected by the
governor in whole or in part as the
quota of the state under the call. By
such an arrangement the Sixth Massa-
chusetts. the Fifth Maryland and the
Tenth Pennsylvania retained their
identity.
No Cne doubts the wisdom of having
The mi Tia state force, as provided by
: the constitution, but the great military
problem of the day is to devise a sys-
TEN by which, while retaining its re-
sponsi5ility to the state, the militia
may be SO organized as to have di-
rect relation to the national govern
ment. A dual responsibility is needed.
The utter confusion Of the reSent Sys-
tenn is illustrated by the methods en-
plcyed in numbering and designating
in, hn
states. Indiana, numbering it's Mexi-
can war regiments from one to five. in
elusive. and its civil war regiments
OF infantry from six to 1876. Under the
present call The first lid ana volunteer
infantry is designated 1871 This sys-
tenn, adopted by some other states.
gives each regiment an individuality
for all time. The Massachusetts sys-
tenn of passing the name down. on the
other hand. gives historic continuity
not without certain charm. But for
this plan Baltimore would not have
been turned out last Saturday to do
honor TO the Massachusetts Sixth as
heirs of the old regiment which passed
through that city thirty-seven years
ago. Much can be said in favor of
either Plan or of any plan. but nothing
can be said for the commingling of all
plans. The result of this ineXtricable
confusion is going to be that the fut-
need tG take table of logarithms to
find his bearings. But this is only
typical of the heterogeneity lines OF
all the militia arrangements. And yet
they are the first lines of reserves, and
might be made so close a second to
the standing army itself In point of
preparation and efficiency as to con-
stitute a mighty bulwark of national
defense.
CAPT. BRADY's VIEWS.
Capt. f. w. Brady, of this CITY. who
saw service during the Civil war. and
at its close was admitted as a cadet
at West Point, from which he -gradu-
ated in 1869, and after two years in
the regular army, resigned to engage
in newspaper work, has given much
study to the relation of the militia to
the national government, and has
worked out a plan which he believes
If adopted, would disprove the maxim
of Scott that it is impossible for re-
public to be prepared for war; Capt.
Brady's scheme in brief is to have the
individual who enlists in the state mi
.litia become. at the same time, a Unit
ed States soldier, and by a somewhat
elaborate system of training outlined
below. to learn the art of war. The