Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1898-07-28
THE WARS NAVAL LESSON
TECHNICAL DEDUCTIONS BY AN Of
FlCeR ON THE IOWA
and the Battle of santiago - Iueffec-
tivcncss of hips Against Land Bat
tcrics -smoleless Powder Indis-
ponsable-Armor Resistance.

naval LESSONS | see in our hight with Ger
vcra's squadron says an officer of the
Iowa in communicate to the Boston
Transcript. And let me say right here no
! one person can write true ana just story
of such an action. No ono sees ii all. and
the best descriptions arc compilations
| The newspaper correspondents get their
accounts i'm this way. They come aboard
| and gather UP details from all OF us and
then combine the result into form that
| has unity. But each man in action sees
! how inadequate the best stories are.
Again, though my conclusions may be
! rcpettions of the observations Of others
| they cannot but be incomplete, for all the
! information to be had Is not yet AT hand.
only after the Spanish wrecks have been
/ thoroughly examined, when all the Of
| fetal reports arc in, ana tho facts and
| conditions of the fight have been OK
/ changed and discussed shall we he in
| position to get all the knowledge possible
out of our experience and that of the
Spanish squadron.
This battle will be accepted by some
naval experts as the only one of modern
/ times that could be counted on for thco-
rotiCal conclusions of value to the builders
/ of warships In the Yalu River the in
/ equality of the two sides in character
caused students to hesitate about drawing
many differences from it. 1t is true we
/ have only emphasized the Yalu lessons in
many respects. hut | think We can 20
ahead with the two together. one check
ing the other. to say positively that We
/ have learned something.
TO go back a bit. tho ircffcCtivoncss Of
| Il fleet against land batteries is demon
/ Stratcd | think. by our homhardmont Of
! San Juan and Santiago. We failed to re-
/ ducc their works. We silenccd them all
right enough As we gained in skill we
were able to drive the gunncrs away very
! quickly. Eut their silence was only tempo
| rary, even when the batteries were weak
, and the conditions al favorable to our
ships; when our guns numbered twenty To
one.
Everybody knows by this time that the
batteries guarding Santiago rarhor ar" on
tho bluffs. Some of them 2o) feet above the
water line. This uuquestionHbly makes
them harder to hit, but ii likewise in
| crcases the difficulty OF the aim. We
found out the difforcucciu the iattorr spoCt
| when the same Gunncrs (prohablyl came
out i'm the ships. The first hroadsdc from
Cervcra's squadron was much more Of
. foctivc than the fire of the shore bat
tcries, and this despite the fact that the
range during the bomhardment was often
| less than at the opening OF the sea fight
when the Spaniards fired so well
SEARCHLIGHTS INVALUABLE.
| The ability of a watchful an efficient
fleet to ward off hostile torpedo boats has
been fully brought out. Here we have re-
manned for months blockading II port in
which there were always two torpedo
boats. our ships lay sometimes as close
IN as Il mile off the entrance. And several
attempts were made by the dcstroyers to
attack us. None of them got out without
henC seen. and always they We're driven
| back. our readiness was the thing. In
South American wars torpedo attacks
! have been successful several times, and
the torpedo boats were nowhere near as
swift and powerful as the Spanish de-
stroycrs l'uror and Pluton. II Is safe to
say that we have shown that If a man-uf-
war is ready at all times to open UP in
stantly an efficient rapid fire that ship
has little or nothing to fear from torpedo
boats. with the rapid fire guns modern
vessel can throw a storm Of shell into an
enemy. 4 torpedo-hoat, with her paper
/ sides, might as well sink herself before
starting, 80 certain Is she Of destruction.
There must he swarms Of tnc3r seats To
have any prospect of success against Il
modern ship of any siE", cfsa wnen the
, circumstances are most favorable for the
attack. ScarChlight tactics were wei
brought out off the blockade ana the
great service that they can do. Without
; the scarchlights our fleet could not have
kept the Spaniards pcnncd up Illuminat-
ing as we did, night after night, the en-
trance of the harhor. by swinging the
light slowly from side to side over all the
water, nothing could have escaped unscer
, by the picket boats in indicating To tho
crews manning the guns just whore to di-
rect the fire, Since 1t was an inVarlahl,
rule never to throw the beam of a search.
light on one of our own vessels, there
could he no doubt left in the mind of tn,
gun-pointor as to the hostile character o
the approaching vessel. It eliminated al
the delay and liability of error tn whict
any verbal orders are so liable.
VALUE or A SECONDARY FLEET.
The necessity of Il secondary feet as i
might be called. was also shown The
. number Of important and hazardous mis-
l sions was 50 great for these smaller yes
. sells that they were more constantly OF
the go than the provcrbial fashion butter
D fly in the height of the season. The Wort
. of these despatch-boats was most exhaust
q ing, and care should be taken that the!
!, be given great credit for their cfiiticn
y and valuable services, Indeed. thes
u smaller craft are noted for the lack o
a space aboard for "idlprs."
. 1t II obvious, of course that Il larg
= supply fleet Is Indispensable. \ ship can
o run without fuel, and in war times tn
n boilers seem to eat up coal Nor can
crew. no matter how brave, fight as we
/. hungry as they can on fun stomach
Z at is hard work to night on cracko
O hash" SO let there be plenty of supp,
y ships our repair ship, Vulcan, was a
- Indispensable adjunct and so, of Cours,
d, I WIS the ammunition supply snip, AItt
v each engagement every ship, no matte
u how little she used, brought her ammun
II ton up to the limit. The hospital ship ha
& to II fleet not only the obvious use tina
o makes 1t II necessity; it gets out of sigh
d the wounded men and Is comfortin
h thing to know IL near at hand,
r SMOKELESS POWDER AN AL
4 VANTAGE,
!, Perhaps one of the most important 10.
u sons is the advantage of smokeless pow
:! der. with the incessant firing of our shI
{, ! there was always smoke hanging roun
n some part of the ships batteries, thong
10 we had gentle breeze and the enem
~ was to windward of us. Fire from I'll
, guns had to be slackencd again and agai,
- and | doubt If the Colon could have @.
- capped with so little punishment If tn
u smoke from the few minutes firing at II
10 leading ships had not left cloud whcl
t. combined with the firing of the small,
ut quick-hre guns, prevent the pointing
,e the heavier guns. OF course, with a quicl
n fire gun, any temporary lifting of II
n, smoke will give plenty of time to deliv,
y, "A fire, but with the slower firing turr,
10 guns the view must be unimpeded for son
time. The smoke from our guns did Il
enemy no harm either, as some part
the shin was almost bound to protrud
and with this assistance his guns cou
be laid. Both sides were even in thi
n. however since. with the exception of Il
Az Colon, none of the Spanish ships Ia
Lo smokeless powder The Colon did not ha,
~ any heavy guns In her turrets, as tn,
~ had not been completed. Wash deck gea
III It IL said filled up their turrets, but Il
or turrets could not have been so small