The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1898-04-03
THE ARMY OF SPAIN.

! From trustworthy sources it has been
/ learned at Washington that 10000 men
/ have thus far been killed, wounded or
Z otherwise incapacitated during the
present war in Cuba. AS to the pc
/ cuniary expense, Governor General
BIanco has intimated to the home gov
eminent that he needs $S.000,0o0 a
month for the expenses of his army,
and 81, 000, 600 every month to pay part
/ of the nine months of arrears-aggre-
! eating $50. 900, 000-to contractors, civil
officials and army and navy pension
ers.
The previous war in Cuba. from the
rising of Cespedes at Yara in 1868 to
| the convention of Zanjon in 1878, when
it was officially supposed to have been
ended, Spain lost, according to recent
military work by Don RepaZaz of Mad
rid, $780, 900, 600 and 100000 men.
Such figures. in view OF the results
accomplished in Cuba, cannot be fully
understood without some knowledge of
the Spanish army. The almost incon-
ceivable folly and Incompetence of
Spain has shown in dealing with Cuba
are nowhere so strikingly shown as in
connection with her army. The present
Spanish force in Cuba is said to con-
sist of $4,000 regulars, of whom not
more than $4,000 are effective for mill
tary purposes. In addition there is
volunteer army, mostly in the nature
of a home guard for Havana, consist
ing of 30. 900 men. At home the Span
ish army at present. including detach-
ments in nearby possessions. is esti-
mated at 100, 900 men. which may be in
creased by reserves to $4,000 men.
@ g e
But even this army is largely paper
,1r.1 Il IF
the great standing armies of France,
Germany. Austria and Russia, and the
care that is being taken to bring them
to the perfection of military minutiae
in drill discipline, equipment, ETC., are
likely to attach too great Importance to
official figures in the case of the army
of Spain Its true condition IS known
to its more intelligent officers and to
European governments, which make it
their business to ascertain the strength
and weakness of the fighting machines
and forces, the navies and armies of
their neighboring states.
81 @
An English writer visiting in Spain
last year gave an account of his oDser-
vations upon tie Spanish army in the
United Service Magazine. The real rea-
son, one patent enough, he says, to any
foreign resident in the peninsula, why
the Spanish army has pursued such
tagging campaign in Cuba, is simply
that cavalry. infantry. artillery, en-
gineers-all branches of the service
ali1e-have had no schooling in their
trade" Not a man. from brigadier gen.
eral to private. seems TO have grasped
the rudiments Of science of war as 1t
is understood in other European coun-
tries The troops have no regular dxli,
no practice in gunnery or any branch
OF military routine. AS result they
are execrable shots, and many of the
raw recruits scarcely know how TO
shoot. Even physically" says the Eng
Hshman. they are the wretchedest of
beings, wiry enough. but undeveloped,
since nothing is done to strengthen,
diet or improve them. 1t makes one sad
to see the quality of the expeditions
packed off in heartless shoals to Cuba;
boys, to look at of 10 and 16, who have
never held a rifle till this moment, and
now are almost ignorant which end 1t
fires. Good lads-too good to go to
such uneven butchery-with cheerful,
patriotic, willing faces, but the very
antithesis of a soldier"
@ @ @
OF such material not much could be
expected under any circumstances. The
annual contingent of recruits is fixed at
so 900 men, and all Spaniards past the
age of 19 are liable to be drawn for the
three years. when they pass into the
first or active reserve for three years,
after which they are included for six
years in the second service. On paper
this scheme would seem to be an ad-
mirable one, and adapted to give Spain
large effective army in crisis. In
reality. owing to inefficiency of admin
istration OF the army and also to the
fact that 1.500 pesetas will purchase
exemption from service. Spain can at
best mobilize a big army of undrilled
men Of little efficiency as compared
with better drilled and armed battal- |
ions. Neither officers Tor men possess |
technical knowledge of modern warfare, |
and seem to rely solely upon native |
daring and courage, qualities which |
may readily be conceded. but are more |
likely Of themselves to lead to a mas |
sacre than a battle. with a well-drilled |
md well-officered army as opponents. |
The army, also, especially in Cuba, is |
in cavalry. and to this defect |
many of the Spanish themselves are in |
elined TO charge their failure in the. |
Cuban war.
g o 9
Don Repazas, in his. military study of /
The War in Cuba presents picture |
# Spanish military ineficiency almost