The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-09-15
Tells the Official Story of the Fall
of Santiago.
ACCEPTED GARCIA'S AID
But Exercised No Military Control Over
Him-Obstinate Resistance at La
Guasima - Preparations Not
What He Desired.

minated IN lne ran OF santiago, mas
been mad public. He briefly recounts
the organization of the expedition and
its embarkation and then devotes the
main body of the report 20 the active
operations about Santiago.
General Shafter says the expedition
was undertaken in compliance with the
telegraphic Instructions Of May 30 from
the headquarters Of the army, in which
IL was stated:
Admiral Schley reports that two
cruisers and two torpedo boats have
been seen in the harbor Of Santiago.
Go with your force TO capture the gar
rison at Santiago and assist in captur-
ing the harbor and fleet"
After reciting the delay at Tampa,
due TO inadequate facilities, enera
Shafter say that on june Z he received
orders to sail without delay. but not
with less than 10000 men. After some
troops had already reached the lower
bay, Geographic instructions were re
ceived from the secretary Of war di-
recting that the sailing Of the eXpedi-
tion be delayed waiting further orders.
This delay was occasioned by the navy
reporting that a Spanish war vessel
had been sighted in the Nicholas chan
mel. The ships in the lower bay were
= Immediately recalled. The expedition
sailed on June IL with sl5 officers and
1902 men.
General shafter briefly covers the
trip and landing and his first meeting
with Genera Garcia. adding.
During the interview, General Car
cha offered the services Of his troops,
comprising about 1000 men in the vicin-
ity of Ac~ceraderos, n about 5000 un-
der General Castillo at the little town
of Cujababo, a few miles east of Bal
Quiri. / accepted his offer, impressinE
81 upon him that I could exercise no
military control over him except such
as he would concede. and as long as he
served under me. j would furnish him
rations and ammunition"
After comforting with Admiral Samp-
son and General Garcia, the plans Of
the campaign were outlined by Gen
eral Shafter. The Decentralization was
20 ommen on the 22nd at Baiquiri,
with feints by the Cubans on Cabanas
and by the navy at various shore points
in order to mislead the enemy as TO the
place of landing.
General Shafter says: These move
ments committed me to approach San
ttago from the east over a narrow road,
at first In some places not better than a
trail, running from Baiquiri through
Siboney and Sevilla. and making at
tack from that quarter. This, in my
opinion. was the only feasible plan, and
subsequent information and results
confirmed my judgment"
vi III u tIAA nv III
skirmish In which the rough riders par
ticipated. he says: General Young's
brigade passed beyond Lawton on the
night Of the 23d-24th, thus taking the
advance, and on the morning of the
latter date became engaged with "A
Spanish force entrenched I'm a strong
position at La Guasima, a point on the
Santiago road about 30 miles from 81
honey. General Young's forces consist
ed of one squadron OF the LIST cavalry,
one of the 10th cavalry and two of the
LIST II. s.. V. cavalry, in all 964 officers
and men. The enemy made an obstinate
resistance, but were driven from the
field with considerable loss.
"Our own loss was one officer and 10
men killed, six officers and So men
wounded. The reported losses of the
Spaniards were nine killed and q
wounded. The engagement had an in
spring effect on our men and doubtless
correspondingly depressed the enemy, as
IL was plainly demonstrated to them
tina they had TO face a foe who would
advance upon them under a heavy fire
delivered from Entertainments.
General Wheeler. division comman-
der. was present during the engage
ment. and reports that our troops. Off
GERS and men, fought with the greatest
gallantry. This engagement gave us a
well-watered country farther 10 the
front on which TO encamp our troops.'
The report continues: 1T was not
until nearly two weeks after the army
landed that IL was possible 20 place on
shore three days supplies in excess
of that required for the daily consump-
tion. on June 80 I reconnoitered the
country about Santiago and made my
plan of attack. From a hiC hill, from
which the city was I'm plain view, l
could see the San Juan hill and the
country about Eel Caney. The roads
were very poor and indeed little better
than bride paths until the san Juan
river and El Caney were reached"
General Shafter explained at a meet
ing Of generals his plan of battle, which
follows:
'Lawton's division. assisted by Cap
ron's light battery. was ordered to
move out during the afternoon towards
FL Caney TO begin the attack early
the next morning. After carrying FL
Caney, Lawton was TO move by the
Caney road toward Santiago, and take
a position on the right Of the line,
wheeler's division Of dismountCd C3V-
airy and Kent's division Of infantry
were directed to take a position on the
right. on the Santiago road, the head
of the column resting near 81 Paso.
toward which heights Grimes battery
moved on the afternoon of the 30th,
with orders 20 take possession there
early on the next morning, and at tie
proper time prepare the way for the
advance OF Wheeler and Kent on san
Juan hill. The attack at TINS point
was 20 be delayed until Iawton's guns
were heard at Fl Caney. and his in
fantry fire showed he had become well
engaged.
THE preparations were far from
what desired them 10 be, but we were
in a sickly climate: our supplies had
10 be brought forward by a narrow
wagon road. which the rains might nj
any time render impossible, fear was
entertained that a storm might drive
the vessels containing our supplies 10
sea. thus parting Us from our base 81
supplies, and lastly IL was reported
thai General Pando with 5000 rein
forcements for the enemy was IN route