The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1898-09-08

Hana, Aat2nzG4, Santiago and few.
other points were drawn on his mill
tary map as hot-beds OF disease, de-
structive 10 any army, und places to bs'
avoided, especially during the slckly
season.
BItlsa' PiRia OF Campaign.
When finally called upon to submit a
plan of campaign he did so, and put Il
in writing. In substance he took the
stand flrst, that every effort should be
made to equip the cubans. aud thereby
enable them to harass the Spanish
forces. The cry OF "On to Havana"
should be encouraged, but when the
transports, loaded with troops. were
out OF sight Of land, they should sail
as straight as steam power could take
them to the gate Of the Antilles, and
the key OF the whole posltion-Porto
Rico. Then. having seized and occu-
pied that island, q movement to Cuba
was to follow, by means Of q strong
cavalry force, which was to be organ
lied and equipped by August or Sep
tember. He contemplated that 10000
cavalry, thrown to the centre Of Cuba,
cutting the Spanish forces in two, and
moving west to Havana by the time
the rainG season was over, and It would
be possible to manoeuvre an army, we
could move against that city a we'll
organized, well-equipped and we'll
disciplined army. and complete the cap
ture Of the Spanish forces.
The enclosure of Cervera's fleet in the
harbor OF Santiago changed the condI-
tlons and made It necessary to move a
military force to that point General
Miles, while at Tampa, felt the import
ance OF the enterprise so greatly that
he requested permission TO accompany
that expedition or Immediately organize
another TO Join 1t. This permission was
not granted, so far as accompanying
that expedition was concerned, but au-
thorlty was granted to equip q second
forward movement and operate
against the enemy in Cuba and Porto
Rico" However, before this expedition
was equipped calls were made for addl-
tional forces to go to Santiago, and they
were Immediately forwarded. On the
third day OF July General ShRfter tele-
graphed that his losses had been great
ly underestimated; that he met with
a stronger resistance than he had an
ticipated, and that he was seriously
considering the adviSabllltV Of falling
back to position FIVE miles to the rear,
and that he had been unable TO be up
during the heat for four days.
Told Shafter to Hold On.
Under such circumstances General
Miles telegrnphed General shafter that
he would be with him in a week, with
strong reInEorcements. OF course, taking
the troops which had been ordered by
the President to operate agnlnst the en-
emy In Cuba as we'll as Porto Rico.
These reinforcements were pushed rap
idly forward, and some of them arrived
In advance Of the commanding general,
and were put In position in the trenches
around Santiago. Under verbal In
structIons Of the President, General
Miles was directed to go wherever he
deemed his presence was required, and
that he should give such directions as
in his opinion were best FOR the army
and for the government.
These were the circumstances under
which General Miles left washington.
Arriving Mt Santiago JULY II, not as
as private Individual nor as visitor.
Any pretense that he went there dis
robed Of his authority or official capnc-
ity IS too childish to be considered by
sensible men. From the moment he ar
rived at Santiago he was responsible
for what might occur. He arrived there
with the Yale, Columbia and Rita, load
ed with infantry, and three ships load
ca with artillery, besides those already
tiisembarked. He designed to dlsembark
the troops and artillery named on the
west side OF Santiago. as was UNDER
stood before leaving Washington, and
before he went ashore he made the nee
easarV arrangements accordingly. He
then proceeded to the front, and after
consulting with General shatter, a note
was sent to the Spanish commander By
General Shafter, stating that the COM
mnndlng general OF the United States
army had arrived IN his camp with
strong reinforeements, and would meet
him between the lines at an hour agree
able to him.
Inisrvirw with ToraI.
The reply Of the Spanish commander
was that he would meet him al II
o'clock next morning. The meeting
was held, and after some eonverIatlon
between General shafter and General
Toral General Miles frankly informed
the Spanish general that he had left
Washington six days before, and that
II was then the determination OF the
government that this portion OF the
Spanish army must be captured or de-
stroyed. He also informed the Span.
lsh general that his reInforcementS had
arrived with him. that some OF these
forces had already disembarked and
that the remainder would be dlsem-
barked on the west side Of the harbor,
and that It was useless for him to con-
tend against the inevitable. These
TRANSPORTS could also be plnInlV seen bV
the Spanish from MORO Castle and 9th
er points. General Toral replied that so
long as ne had ratlons and ammuni-
tlon he had to fight, in order to uphold
the honor OF the Spanish army. In re-
sponse to this he was informed that he
had already maintained the honor OF
the Spanish army, and that further et-
fort would be useless, ana would result
In the wnnton sacrifice OF human life.
He then said that he was waiting to
hear from his government, ana was IN
formed by General Miles that he had
already taken much time for that pur-
pose, and would be given until Daylight
OF the following morning, It being then
3 O'Clock, TO submit his final answer.
He begged for longer time, and earnest-
Iy requested until 12 o'clock OF the next
day. This was finally granted by Gen.
eral Miles, the meeting dissolved ana
the officers separated. On returning
from this conference dispatch was re-
ceIved by General Miles from Washing
ton, as follows: ,,
'rWAsHINGTON D. C., July IL. 1898.
"NajOr General Miles;--fou may ac-
cetyt surrender by ErnWting parole TO
officers and men, tho officers retaining
NNA nfH