The Democratic advocate. [volume] (Westminster, Md.) 1865-1972, 1898-08-27
A Contrast.
GEO. WASHINGTON.

From the Philadelphia, (Pa.,) Ledger, August "A.
A retrospective view Of the war will show
a remarkable contrast between the War and
Navy Departments of the Government with
respect to the management of the affairs en-
trusted to them. They were equally unpre-
pared for war; but both had a few months,
notice of possible conflict, and the naval
authorities used that notice to such advan-
tage that they were ready to act at once. At
I a. M. on April q, the day that war was
declared, Admiral SIMPSONS fleet sailed
from Key West to blockade the ports of Cuba,
and on the next day the vessels began taking
prizes. Admiral Dewey sailed from Hong
Kong for Manila as soon as he received news
of the declaration of war, and ten days after
wards had destroyed the Spanish squadron at
Manila. The Navy Department kept up its
good work, capturing many prizes, Its ser
vices eliminating in the destruction OF Ger
vera S fleet and the capture of Manila Not
a ship was lost or seriously injured, and the
casualties in battle were insignificant in num-
Der. During the three months and a few
days which the war lasted great auxiliary
fleet of cruisers and transports was equipped
and manned, so that the navy at the end OF
the war was much stronger than III the begin
ming. All of its work was we'll and clearly
done, and neither the Secretary of the Navy
nor any officer of the navy has been called
upon to apologize for or explain his actions.
The story Of the army has been quite differ
ent, in spite of the bravery of men in action.
The army was set in motion as sool as the
navy; that is to say, as soon as war was de-
clared but the troops were gathered at un-
suitable and unhealthy camping grounds, the
utmost confusion prevailed in the Commis-
sarv and Quartermaster's departments, and
even the regulars, who were as fit for service
as the navy. were kept i'll idlenesS fora month,
though Sampson and Dewey both needed
them to support their attacks upon land forth
fcations. At last, on June TO- the invasion
of Cuba was begun by the navy, the marines
landing at Guantanamo, and not until June
IL did the army expedition sail for Santiago.
Two months after the declaration of war the
troops were landed at Santiago, having been
kept on overcrowded transports in tOrrid
weather eight days, when two days should
have suficed, and when they disembarked
and took the field the cavalry was dsmount-
ed, he foot soldiers were forced to attack
entrenched positions without the aid of artil-
lery, which had not been landed, and nothing
but the indomiable bravery of the men ena-
bled the army to win Il victory. 1t was dearly
won, and then the discovery was made that
scarcely any provision had been made for the
care of the sick and wounded, and much I'M
necessary suffering ensued. In two weeks,
however, the campaign ended in the truce
which resulted in the surrender of Santiago.
The end came just i'll time, for the army
had been so depleted by sickness that some
of the officers declared that not 10 per cent.
of their men were really fit for duty. Their
condition was due, in large measure, to the
incompetence and bad management of the
War Department. and strenuous efforts had
to be made outside of the department to save
the army from destruction. General Miles
and General Merritt, less hampered by the
War Department, succeeded in conducting
their campaigns in Porto Rico and at Manila
without scandal, with infinite credit, indeed,
but the wa. came to an end before they had
been given an opportunity TO fully exhibit
what could be accomplished by good general
ship, combined with the good fighting quail
ties of the American soldier. The Secretary
Of War and his tavorite General Shafter have
been kept busy since the Santiago campaign
congratulatng each other on the victories
won, in spite Of their bad management, and
in apologizing or Sinking responsibility for
the conditions Of camp life that made peace
full service i'll our country, as we'll as in Cuba,
more dangerous than battles with the Spanish
troops.
The reason for the contrast between the
conduc of the Navy and War Departments is
not far to seek. Politics was excluded from
the Navy DEPARTMENT.; politics ruled the War
Department. Even the acceptance of reg-
ments and their assignment to duty were
made matters of favoritism, to be decided by
the opportunities of Senators and Represent
atives. Appointments to office in the army
were made to oblige influential politicians,
without regard to the good service, and with
disastrous results.
There is one man responsible for this scan
dalous administration of the affairs of the
War Department, and that is Secretary Alger.
President Mckinley will share that response
bility if he shall continue him in the Cabinet.
Strict justice would require that Alger should
be dismissed in disgrace, but outraged public
opinion would probably be satisfied with his
retirement in any way, and it would at least
be consistent with his methods in dealing with
the army if he should go out of office as the
result of Il political deal to let him down easy.
With Alger out of the War Department,
we might hope to have a less obvious contrast
between the methods and work of the Navy
and War Departments