Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1898-09-08

~ TlSk the lie OF a single soldier, elt her
from disease or the bullets of the enemy
l have never sacrificed the lives of men
under my command, and do not propose to
subject them to any unnecessary risks in
the present campaign.
What He Ordered
''In the order Issued to the army at an
early date L directed that:
Every officer, of whatever grade, will,
SO far as may be in his power, guard and
preserve the health and welfare of those
under his charge. He must labor diligently
and zealously to perfect himself and his
subordnates in military drill, instruction
and discipline, and above all he must con-
stantly endeavor by precept and example
to maintain the highest character to fos-
ter and stimulate that, true soldieriy spirit
and patriotic devotion to duty which must
characterize and effective army.
The principles thus enuncia.ed have
been zeaiousiy observed from the first.
Owing to the fact that the season suited
Tor campaigning in Cuba had been exhaust
ed In debates and delay in Congress and in
necessary preparations [ was opposed to
rushing an ill-prepared, undiscipined and
rnequipped army lin a movement against
the capital of Cuba. defended by 100 900
trained Spanish troops and in this posi-
ton L stood practically alone for several
weeks. Havana, MatanzaS, Santiago and a
few other points We're down on my mill
to an army, and places to be avoided es-
pecially during the sickly season
When finally called upon to submit
plan of campaign l did so and put It in
writing. In substance, 1 took the stand,
first, that every effort should be made to
equip the Cubans, and thereby enable them
to harass the Spanish forces. The cry Of
On to Havana! was to be encouraged,
but when the transports loaded with troops
were out of sight of land, they We're to
straight hear
them to the gate of the Antilles and the
key of the whole position, Porto Rico.
Then, having seized and occupied that is
land, movement to Cuba was TO follow
by means of strong cavalry force, Which
was to be organized and equipped by Au-
gust or September.
II contemplated that with 10000 cavalry
thrown into the center of Cuba, cutting the
Spanish forces in two, and moving west to
Havana. by the time the rainy season was
over-when it would be possible to ma
neuver an army-we could move against
that city a well-crganized well-equipped
and disciplined army, and complete the
capture OF the Spanish forces.
The Enclosure Of Cervera's feet in tho
harbor Of Santiago changed the conditions
and made 1t necessary to movo a military
force TO that point at once. While / was
at Tampa organizing the expedition 1 felt
the Importance of the enterprise SO greatly
that requested permission to accompany
that expedition. or to Immediately organ
fze another to join it. This permission was
not granted SO far as accompanying that
expedition was concerned. but authority
was granted me to equip a second, for
movement and operation against the en-
envy In Cuba and Porto Rico. However
before this expedition was equipped. calls
We're made for additional forces to go to
Santiago, and they were Immediately for
warded.
On July Gen. Shafter telegraphed +, at
lis losses had been greatly underesti-
mated: that he met with stronger resist
ance than he had anticipated, and that he
was seriously considering the advisability
OF falling back to a position five miles to
the rear, and that he had been unable to
be up during the heat for four days. I'm
der such circumstances, telegraphed Gen
Smarter that l would be with him within
week with strong reinforcements, of course
taking the troops prepared for the second
expedition, which had been ordered by the
President to operate against the enemy in