Evening star., 1898-03-14
THE DEFENSE OF CUBA
Spanish Realise That 1t Will Be the Point
of Attack.
Concentrating Warshfps at HaNana-p
Submarine Mines and Torpedocs-
Views of the Critics.


Members of the diplomatic corps are
eagerly scrutinizrg the movements of the
United States ard Spain in the present
international chess game Involving the set
uement of the Cuban complication. II
seems to be accepted that while both par
ties to ;he game are willing to leave the
vital point at issue to the arbitrament Of
the sword, each is holding back for some
overt act On the part OF the other In the
way OF hostile prove cation that would
JUSTIFY the other in the eyes of the civil
ized nations OF the world in reSorting 10
the employment of its full military and
naval strength
1t Is In accordance with this theory that
the United States and Spain are each max
ing complete preparations for 4 vigorous
response TO any hostile movement on the
part of the other In the expectation hat
the United States would probably begin
operations In the event Of war by an open
assault on Havara. the Spanish authorities
are apparently devoing their best ener-
sies to perfect.ng the defenses of that
port In execution of this Plan they have
concentrated several of S9ain's hes; war
ships IN that harbor and have arranged TO
reinforce them with other men-of-war as
soon as possible. A fleet Of torpedo boats
is already on its way there 10 assist In
the general defense.
Criticised by StraterfstS.
1t is stated that the harlor defenses have
been greatly strengthened in the last few
months by improved fortiications al Moro
Castle and Cabanas and also by the intro
duction of a system of submarine mines
and torpedoes. Local strategists seriously
question the wisdom of these steps. The
majority are inclined to the belief that
the Spaaiards are putting their besi YES
sells In veritable cul de sac. from which
escape would be almost impossible I'm casa
the United States should invest the harbor
with the large and formidable fleet near
al hand available for such purpose Even
with the naval reinforcements said 10 pe
on the way TO Havana. the total Spanish
strength there would be decidedly less
than that of the naval forces which lie
United States could put against IL AZ short
rotice.
an easy matter fer Admiral Sicari's fleet
at Tortugas to completely blockade the
harbor of Havana and shut off the Span-
lsh vessels In the harbor from all COM
munication with the outside world In
case they attempted 10 escape they would
oe sunk one by one. and in case they re-
mained their officers and crews wolil te
subjected TO slow starvation.
Food Supplies Intercepted.
The island no longer affords he means
OF subsistence, and all food suppli7s from
the outside world would be cffa,,iIally
checked by the blockading sauad-on. At
least, this is the view of the case taken
by many naval officers who have studied
the situation, ard IT has every Indication
OF piausibility. 1t is generally admitted.
however, that all signs fail IN war. 1ust
as they do in love. and that It is never
a safe maxim to believe that the enemy
will do exactly what you expect him 10 do.
Consequently, the plan OF bottling up the
Spanish fleet in the harborf of Havana
may not be so easy of acSsmolshmant as
1t appears. The Spaniard< ,vi ieatly knew
what they are about, and il is hardly c: cd
ible that they would knowingly place Item
selves in a position where all the chances
We're against them.
Relations With SPAIN
uuless the court of inquiry investigating
the cause of the destruction of the battle
ship Maine shall report that the Spanish
government is responsible. directly or in
directly, for that most deplorable episode
there is said to be no tangible reason for a
termination Of the friendly relations ex-
listing between the United States and Spain.
If Spain is absolved from all completely in
that disaster it is represented that the pres
ent conditions will remain unchanged un-
less one nation or the other does some
thing to provoke the other beyond the
bounds of endurance. Consequently the
controlling influences in both countries are
devoting their best energies for the avoid
ance of any action that can possibly be re-
garded as hostile or offensive to the other
In the present excited state of the people
or both countries IL is realized that war
can only be averted by the most careful
and conservative action. The progress of
events alone can determine whether war
is necessary to settle the issues which have
already strained the relations of the two
countries to the utmost tension.
The Presidents Policy.
1t is these considerations which cause
President Mckinley TO proceed slowly and
deliberately in the formulation and execu-
ton of plans for alleviating the terrible
situation in Cuba. Although he has prac-
tically concluded that the active interven-
ton of the United States is the only possi-
bic way OF ending the insurrection on the
island, he is somewhat embarrassed as to
how he shall proceed in that direction
without giving offense to friendly nation
and seemingly justify the claim that he
provoked that nation into n war I'm defense
of lis sovereign rights. There is no ques-
ton in his mind that Spain is unable to put
down the insurrection. and that the Cubans
are clearly entitled to the right of self
government. He is willing to heed the re-
peated advice of Congress and employ the
full force of the government for the reStor-
alton Of peace in Cuba but he does not see
clearly how such thing can be accom-
plished in the present state of affairs with
out his being put in the attitude of provoke
ing Spain into war in defense of one OF its
colonies. 1t is acknowledged that the
strength of the position of Spain lies in the
fact that she is determined to do nothing
that can be construed an unfriendly act
toward the United States, and that IL war
results it will be because IL was made in-
evitable by interference in its national af-
fairs.
Opinions of Diplomats.
Diplomats agree that the active interfer-
ence of the United States I'm the Cuban rev.
olution would be casus belli. according to
international law, and that Spain could not
tamely submit to 1t without loss OF honor.
They admit however, that anything less
than forcible intervention, for instance, the
recognition of the belligerency or inde-
pendence of the insurgents, would not
necessarily be regarded as hostile acts JUS
tifying a resort to arms. The belief is gen.
eral in diplomatic circles that while tho
President earnestly desires to end the ter
rible distress prevailing in Cuba. he is
equally anxious to avoid giving cause for
a war with Spain, and therefore. unless
ample cause for such Intervention in Cuba
is found in the case of the Maine. IL is as
serted that he is not likely under present
conditions to go beyond a recognition of the