The times., 1898-07-11
SToRMING A CITY.
The Modern Methods of Siege and
Inyestrn%Ht.

The Modern Methods of Siege and
Investment.
LoHg-ranse and rapid-fire guns have
made it almost impossible to capture a
well garrisoned place by assault The be-
siegers now find il necessary TO advance
under cover of earthworks and trenches
until they are near enough to shell the
town and force its defenders to capitu-
late.
The former superintendent OF the Mill
tary Academy at West Point, Gen. o. H.
Ernst, now in the field. and an unques-
toned authority. has this to say regard
ing assault upon a fortified place:
1T has fair chance of success when
made from point close up TO the works
and against a garrison worn out with the
labors and anxieties of a long siege. or
when following closely after the explo-
sion of mine
This has reference to a fortifcation. but
when the siege is laid to an intrenchad
camp or fortified city many preiimina-
~ points must be taken into considera-
| ton. The city must in the first place,
be blockaded and deprived of food SUP
plies and ammunition. If its water sup
ply comes from distant point that point
must be captured and fortified The de-
Tenders OF the city are fully aware Of
the object of the opposing forces and
resist these initial moves in the game OF
war They keep up a continual fire on
the invaders make sorties in order to
break the lines and plant batteries at ali
points commanding important avenues TO
the besieged town When Atlanta was
besieged during the civil war and the Con-
federates found that they were cut off
from the outer world. or that they would
be soon. they abandoned the city The
same course was pursued by the defend
ers of Richmond.
At the siege of Metz it took an army ot
10000 seventy days to force 173.0O0 TO
capitu,ate. although the Germans had
built and fortified a line twenty-four
miles long around the city. Gen. Ernst
says that the result at Metz caused many
military authorities 10 doubt whether an
army could invest and besiege another
of equal magnitude He says:
The object of the sortiss from Metz
was to break through the Gordon and
get away with the active army. leaving
the place to be held by its garrison The
fortiGcations aided such attempts. and
if ttey had been mere field intrenchmenss
which were being evacuated. the belea-
guered army would have had still less
chances of success.
From this he argues that an army
somewhat demora!ized by defeat. If il
remains dormant for while may be in
vested by equal numbers and taken by
siege
One Of the most interesting accounts
given in the article by Gen. Ernst refers
to the siege of BelfOrt The works planned
for the defense of the place were incOm-
plete when the war broke out. and some
of the detached works were of tenn
porary type, and those were selected by
the Germans as points OF attack The
garrison consisted of sixteen thousand
ard the attacking force of thirty thousand
men The investment began on Novemb -
9. and by the middle OF January the at
tacking force had been increased TO
eighty thousand The bombardment began
on December 3. and continued night and
day until February Il. during which time
more than FIVE hundred thousand pro-
jec lies were thrown into the place. Near
| iy every hosue in the city was struck but
| the defenders of the place kept the Ger
| mans al distance by first occupying
! exterior positions. and then freely using
| projectiles at long range.
| This kept the line of investment so at
| tenuated that the attacking force was
| inadequate particularly as lines Of cir
| cumyallation had 10 be thrown up and
! defended by part of the artillery. AFTER
| ninety-eight days investment and sixty
] eight Of bomba rdment.' says Gen. Ernst
"the attack found itself just where II
| would have been on the first day Of the
siege had ii not been for these held
works" Further operations against the
| works were stopped on February II, Par
! is having capitulated-
| IL is a well-known fact that the siege
! of one city may not be taken as model
! for another unless all conditions are sim
| liar and for that reason the geographi-
| cal position of a place. its peculiarities
| and characteristics determine The meth
| DDS employed in its investment. In an
/ instance where a city has sea front a
! harbor. the problem becomes doubly diff
! cult because naval force must CO.
! operate with the army. If the plan To
| starve the enemy is adopted the water
| blockade must be perfect as sorties from
| that direction must be anticipated as well
| as from the land. Then the attacking
| forces on he land side work their way
| toward the besieged town. insrenching
! themselves at every possible weak spot.
| harass the enemy and keep sharp look
| out for assaults from the besieged
| town. If the investment is perfect the
| result is only a matter OF time. The
! food of the besieged becomes less and
| poorer, the enthusiasm diminishes in pro-
! portion. desertions. INSTRUMENTATION and
| lax discipline weaken the holders of the
! place. and under such circumstance
which obtain. however only when the in
vestment is perfect, and the end is defer
| red because the attacking force does not
| wish TO sacrifice life-frequent sorties. in
| many instances useless and hopeless are
| the only means of keeping the forces
| under control.