The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1898-09-11
WARSHIPS OF THE FUTURE.
CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR HICHBORE GIVES
HIS views ON THE WAR.
The Warship That Ia Most Valuable IL the
BattIeship-Torpedo Boats Not of Exs
traordinary Value Copper sheathinG
sl,nuIL nn Had nm All Nnr YEnr XnnnAln.

NN = NV ~ cAN-VA - ~.
BattIeship-Torpedo Boats Not of ExS
trRordinary Value - Copper sheathinG
should BE Used on All Oar war Vessels
WASHINGTON. Sept. 10.-Chief Constructor
Hichhorn OF the United States Navy In an ina
terview has the following to say about the re-
suits Of the war with Spain and it's effect on
naval matters;
The war has taught us'what some Of us al.
ready held. that the torpedo boat Is not the for@
midable engine OF war which Il has been oreds
tied with being. The naval battles Of the fus
ture. as of the past. will be fought by the most
powerful engines of naval warfare that can DO
constructed. The battleship. In spite OF its
great cost. will continue to occupy tho prom-
inent place. The torpedo boat will have It's
uses. but they will not be the most important
uses OF \ naval engagement. During the war
Just closed, the torpedo boat was practically
Of no use at all. Just before the outbreak Of
hostilities, there was a great scare on account
OF the flotilla Of torpedo boats and torpedo
boat destroyers which was said to be on its
way across the Atlantic from the Cape Verde
Islands. -
When the war actually came. Wa heard
nothing more about them until they were deS
stroyed. In fact. torpedo boats were not used
by either combatant except occasionally for de-
spatch boats, u duty to which other craft might
be more advantageously assigned. The Wins
low, 1t Is true. was sent into the harbor OF Car
denas to reconnoitre. but this was gunboat
service, and not the work for which q torpedo
boat is Intended As for the Spanish boats.
there was really nothing to fear from thenl.
SiRsbee made quick work OF the Terror on
San Juan. although the st. Paul. which he
commanded, was exactly the kind OF o vessel.
unarmored, and presenting a full side. that
torpedoes might be expected to infiict damage
on. The Furor and the Pluton were among
the very best and most modern OF the de-,
stroyer class. and yet the Gloucester. which is
merely a converted yacht. defeated them botliS
The war has taught us to rely on our great
battleships and cruisers with absolute conf.
dence. Hitherto the question has been open,
to fair discussion In the absence of any praotl-
cal illustration of their work in actual war
fare. But now We know what they can do.
The two vessels which, as ships Of war, have
given the best account Of themselves on their
merits. without regard to the manner in which
they were hundled-although that, of course.
was above criticism with all our ships-are the
Oregon and Brooklyn. and these are types of
vessels which are likely to come more and
more In vogue, not only in the American Navy.
but in the navies of foreign powers. The
Brooklyn, for instance, with only four inches
Of armor on her sides. was far more than n
match for the Vizcaya. with "a 12-inch armor
belt. This type of vessel combines speed with
efficiency to a most desirable degree.
AS for the Oregon. she combines great
strength OF armament, with u reasonable
amount Of speed and coal-carryinE capacity in
sirabIe. Battieships viii be built more and
more on the Oregon plan with greater speed
II possible. without interfering with their ef-
forgiveness AS lighting machines: J
The navy will have to be supplied with yes
which, at the beginning Of the war. we were
sompelle d,, to buy wall all .Nr;s Of vessels at all
priacticaliy without ships suitable for aTuSSiiiarys
service. We had no patrol boats and hardly
ANY N despa Itch boats SSsh SO 8 th 1gtos steam h1d yaehfSs Z:
bought or chartered for the use Of the navy.
The result was highly gratifying when it is
considered with what sort OF material we had.
Of another war = the |,G}nniied1 States IS viii have to
gry work. Some 81 the slips which werui
bought for this emergency can doubtless be
we'll. but. az u rule. the auxiliary fleet ought to
be, constructed from specially prepared plans
Which w Ees Gould aIo only t d%sasiSa three eesn months aeinIa ago.
needed large enough to receive our biggest
ships and numerous enough to prevent the
a af wishGut q ha tRslE t iEiaiF b iS9 { si eIsaned E'PDs aF,
tirst;class fighting, ships, have been in bad
S %sT1 si%pi ElT Sesan fre% Re the did Pe ndt ba2gs Of do tRS
large enough to put them into, and although
exempt from injury in actual combat, 1t has
been impossible to repair them speedily. be-
cause we had not enough docks capable OF
ships suffered great damage in battle. it would
have been out Of the question to put them
have been at a terrible disadvantage
The war has shown, too. that the bottoms
SO that they can be kept, at, sea without the
necessity of too frequent docking for cleaning.
copper sheathed. The only sheathed vessels
IN the navy are the SIX gunDo9tS OF tho An-
leans and AlhnnV- which we bought from Inc
Brazilian Government, at the, outbreak of the
var; WITH MiihIa S soP a ~ sreat ady ,p bottoms rs ,o our
cruises. such as are apt to be frequent now
that the war has brought into our possession
Perhaps the most important lesson, which,
we, have learned is the necessity Of making our
tiago the Spanish ships took fire. and they
suffered as much or more from this cause az
at all necessary that u shell in striking a ship
should set fire to i. 1t is necessary to have .
although SO far as is practicable it is dispensed
with. There are some things about even q
tata for wood 700 'R2G has " ever beef been found. but Il il
quite feasible to make such wood as must bO
used freproof, by q chemical process which
OF our Gunboats. The wood Is mlneralized. Il
you may use that term, by being impreRnated
with phosphate OF ammonia. and after this
process has been undergone 1t is impossible. tn,
burn it. There has been. some question
wood of our w%arships in this way. and various
objections have been raised to the increase in
weight, the damage done, 10 clothes by being
inclosed in chests made of wood so treated and
40 on, But ull these objections are trivial
when the aim To be secured is borne in mindS
The work will cost a little more. TO be sure-
out the additional cost cannot be considered in
relation TO the increased safety, secured to our
ships OF war. | expect that in the future there
will he no woodwork aboard an American man.
of-war which j. not absolutely i%lrcproof.
The war has demonstrated also the value
OF the rapid-flre guns and the S-inch guns az
compared with the guns Of larger ealibre. At
Santiago the secondary batteries. of the Brook
Ign and the Oregon are reported 10 have been
more effective than any other portion Of their
armament. The Manila and Santiago battles
also have shown that .smokeless powder Is an
invaluable part of ii ships equipment.
1T Is rather curious thar no good demon
stration has been given during the war OF the
value Of the. experimental craft which the
Government. has been Interested in; The
ram Katahdin has had no opportunity to show
its merits. and the submarine boat has also
been ignored, The Ncsuvtus. II IL true. had
chance al Santiago, but il does not appear that