Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1898-07-20

more than the crumpling of one col
umn before they surrender the beliefs
of years.
The Napoleonic maxim that cavalry
cannot charge unshaken infantry was
due to Napoleon's experience with
rundown forces. His mounted men
were badly drilled and his horsefesh
was poor. The great Frederick un-
derstood the high value of this branch,
and his campaigns give many instances
of the value of mounted troops in al
most all kinds of warfare. The rec
ords of all great wars bristle with the
achievements of the troopers. Even
in the Franco-Prussian struggle the
actual damage wrought by the Uhlans
was far out of proportion with their
numbers, and the value of the fear
they produced was immeasurable. At
Salamanca, LIE Marchand's British
"heavies" were sent over bad ground
against the steadiest of French infan-
try. Men and horses fell in swaths 20
yards from the line. The rear line
did steeple.chase jumping over piled
corpses to get to the front. LIE Mar
chand was instantly killed and many
of his officers, but the infantry was
broken and the position carried. The
Peninsula campaigns furnish repeated
proofs of the fact that infantry will
not stand against we'll handled cavalry.
Prince Frederick Charles, one of the
greatest of modern warriors, was
steady believer in the efficacy of cav
airy, and so, too, was Won Wrangel.
The opponents of the trooper arm
and prophets of its utter effacement
are used to instancing the failure of
the brilliant Austrian cavalry at Sado-
wa when sent against breechloaders.
These were troopers seasoned by long
service and so drilled that 80 squad
rons of them were maneuvred in mass
with the ease and certainty of one.
They were, however, led over ground
that sloped up three degrees. 1t was
sodden with rain. The horses were
80 wearied that many of them fell from
exhaustion when the charge began.
The infantrymen who received them
had been selected by five hours of saw
age and continuous fighting. All faint
hearts had gone to the rear. 1t is safe
to say that there was not Prussian
on the west ridge of Chlum that day
who did not wish to be there. Even
under these conditions the charge came
very close to success, though all Eu-
rope was shouting that cavalry was
useless against breechloading fire.
The French got their chassepots in
1868 and 1869. No German officer
belieyed. that his troop would be of
any good against them. Yet at Won
vile the first line of the German
cavalry halted under heavy fire on the
plateau, took intervals by passaging,
went off the plateau at a walk and
wheeled up to the front again as
steadily as if on dress parade. This,
too, was magnificent, and it was war.
1t was done to encourage the young
troops, cost only 70 men and horses,
though the chassepots were barking in
thousands, and it was worth what it
cost. Again at Vionville Bredow's six
squadrons went over two lines of Gun
shaken" infantry as if they were
paper. In another charge the troopers
went over the French cannon, losing
only so men. They came so fast that
the artillerymen found it impossible
to depress their pieces with sufficient
rapidity and accuracy. In this battle
So squadrons of German horse proved
that the French line of foot lacked the
strength of cobwebs, yet this same
French infantry was so good that two
days later 1t took an entire division of
the German footmen three hours to 60
through them, at a cost of 4, 900 lives,
or 80 per cent. of the attacking force.
There will never be any finer or
steadier or more "unshaken" infantry
than these French. They were pri-
Yates and non-commissioned officers
who, to quote Won Moltke, "sought to
redeem with their life blood the errors
for which they were nowise response
ble." The Franco -Prussian war was
thick with similar instances, which are
carefully eschewed in the writings of
anti-cavalry doctrinaires.
Our tactics differ from those of the
English army in only one important
particular. With the former, when it
is necessary to advance support and
reserve and prepare for the charge the
first line falls back and the others de-
ployed pass to the front through the
intervals in the retiring line. The
theory there is that the first line may
be too exhausted to 60 on the charge.
With our army the first line remains at
the front, the reserve joining it in the
intervals and on the hanks.
In the old days troops were safe
when held in reserve 500 yards back
of the fighting line. Now for $500
yards behind this line the ground is
torn with bullets. Consequently troops
are held 5000 yards back, and even
at this distance there will be occasion
al casualties. To take part in an en-
gagement the reserve force must be
moved entirely through this wide and