The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-07-02

AFTER the Ddtlle OF Mdnlid, anu VI thc
first day of the month, like that glorious
engagement, began the first set battle
Of the war in this hemisphere. What /
the result will be was not known as
the departments close. Never since |
the declaration of war has there been |
such feeling of intense interest mani |
tested. The officials here are confident |
that they have done everything possi- |
BILE to strengthen Skaters hand for |
the great conflict he Is waging. and |
they have unlimited confidence in his
discretion. his bravery and his energy.
The attack to-day. several days before
the public mind expected the battle. is
attributed TO his energy, as well as to
his judgment according to the present
lights, for he undoubtedly found II
necessary to crush the foe in detail.
following Napoleon's maxim. instead Of
allowing them to consolidate and out
number him.
AS the day wore along without bring
ing any news. the anxiety increased.
and the question was in every ones
mouth: why did he not report?"
Adjutant Corbin's response was brief
but pointed: He Is fighting. not writ
ing" and this was accepted as a likely
and sound explanation. Just before
o'clock came a brief dispatch from
PLAYA del Este. the cable station near
Santiago. But II was from an engineer
officer to General Miles. and made no
reference to the progress of the battle.
merely referring to certain necessary
material and live stock. on the whole,
this very absence of official news was
regarded as rather a favorable indi-
cation. the reasoning being that this
mornings engagement was but skir-
mish and that our army was feeling
the enemy to discover his weak spot.
II was nearly O'Clock when the signal
office served the welcome news that
the enemy was retreating.
General Miles was of the opinion that
the action OF to-day was in the nature
of a heavy skirmish all along the Amer
lean front. particularly on the right,
and that its main purpose was to de-
velop the strength OF the enemy and.
II possible learn the vulnerable point
along the Spanish front. This. how
ever, was based only on the lack of
definite informant ton, and General Miles
felt that any hour might bring word Of
n general engagement. Brigadier Gen
eral Stone was inclined to believe that
after maintaining their stand to-day
the Spaniards would retire during the
night leaving the city evacuated.
The military authorities here are full
ly considering the chances of such
retreat of the Spanish army from SAN
tiago and are endeavoring to so shape
events that General Skaters forces
will not only take Santiago but VIII
CAPTURE the 1900 Spaniards before
they get away northward 10 effect a
iuncture with General Pando. Full IN
formation as to the possible lines OF
retreat has been placed at the disposal
of the department.
one of the most interesting state
ments is that OF General Manager Cox
of the Spanish Mining COM
| many at Baiquiri. who is thoroughly ac-
| auainted with all the country sur
rounding Santiago. He shows that the
| two possibles lines Of retreat are: First,
/ by the road 10 FL Cobre: or. second, by
| following the line of the Sabanillo &
/ Marato railroad The first line will be
/ easy for about the first 10 miles. or as
/ far as Ell Cobre, but after that the
country is mountainous and barren ana
| would not afford subsistence. and the
pass to the central plateau of the island
/ would be difficult. The more likely line
/ of retreat will be along the line of the
| aforementioned railroad. crossing the
| Sierra Maestro at FL Cristo. pass SOC
/ feet above the sea, 10 miles north Of
| Santiago which is the lowest pass
through the Sierra Maestro for many
| miles. The country back OF this Is a
rolling plateau of rich agricultural
! land At Manacas. on the railroa
| two miles north of the pass, Is an iron
/ bridge. consisting OF series OF "o-Iop'
snans on iron trestle bents. This point
is about two miles beyond the Cristt
summit, and Just beyond this bridge
! the railroad divides into two branches
The destruction of this bridge would b'
| the most feasible method of preventing
the approach of General Pando's span
ish troops TO relieve Santiago. IL Is
probable that II the Spaniards retreat
/ by this road they will make stand of
the plateau AT FL Cristo and hold tn
Z mass of EI Cristo. The only other pass
[ through the mountains near this pom
| Is at Escandel summit. about SIX miles
/ in a straight line east Of FL Crtsto pass
! Escandel summit is 1.12O feet above th'
| sea and is reached from Santiago va
| Caney.
The road from Santiago 20 Caney Il
fairly good being wide enough for We
/ bicIes Between Caney and Escande
/ the road. which is no more than tran
| ascends the mountains ana Is Yer.
| winding and broken. Beyond Escandei
| across the range. the country Is heaNii,
timbered and broken and the roads ar
not good. II is an ideal country 70
I ambush. This is probably the ont,
mass through the spanish position
that could be turned should the Spanisl
troops occupy the Crlsto plateau an
rass.
While not prolific in his utteranees
Admiral Dewey loses no opportunity Z
keep the navy department informed o
the state of affairs at Manila. \ dis
! patch came from him to-day date
/ Cavite. June %. reporting that condi
tions are practically unchanged. bu
nothing regarding the arrival OF his re
iuforcements. He had some other mat
/ ters Of interest 10 communicate, bu
they were not OF a character that coul
he properly made public at this stage
For one thing. it can be stated tina
Admiral Dewey has been particular {
avoid committing his government
/ any particular line of action respecttn
the future OF the Philippines or 10 4
anything that would embarrass Ger
eral Merritt I'm framing a policy To me-
the needs of the case when he arrive
He has made no official pledges TO IN