The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-10-24

Nicholas channels. Strict orders were given
for screening lights and to see that none
was accidentally shown. The squadron was
to cruise generally TO the eastward in the
day and westward during the night. On one
of his dispatches the admiral complains that
his movements are greatly hampered by the
monitors constituting the principal force
under his command.
SCHLEY ORDERED TO HURRY.
On May 20, as shown by the report Com
modore Schley expressed the belief that the
Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 27th
the admiral sent word to Schley, directing
him to proceed with all possible speed TO
Santiago. because of information that the
Spaniards were there. The same time or
ders were sent to have the collier Sterling
dispatched to Santiago with an expression
of opinion that the commodore should use
it to obstruct the channel at it's narrowest
part leading into the harbor. The details of
the plan were left to the commodore's
Judgment as he (Sampson) had 1.-The utmost
confidence in his ability to carry this plan
to a successful conclusion and earnestly
wish him good luck.
Sampson apparently felt certain of the
presence of the Spaniards at Santiago and
urged that the harbor must be bockaded
at all hazards. Schley in the meantime had
proceeded to Santiago, although it appears
pected. AT one time Commodore Schley
contemplated going to Key West with the
The damage to his collier having been tenn
porarily repaired and the necessity for a
trip to Key West being avoided. Santiago
ulated the commodore on his success and
directed him to maintain a close blockade
at all hazards. especially at night
Then follow kilograms from Schley show
ing that he had recognized the enemy in
the port, and from Secretary Long to
Schley. pointing out that the most abso-
whether the Spanish division was in the
harbor If they were, an immediate army
and navy movement was to be made. In
one dispatch the secretary said 1t would be
discredit able to the navy if the presence of
the Spanish fleet were not ascertaned i'm
mediately. The commodores dispatch evil
IDENTIFY had not been received at the depart
ment when the secretary kilograms were
sent. Meanwhile Admiral Sampson had
made arrangements to proceed to Santiago
with a, number or his vessels. He arrived
there June /.
Then follows an historicafsresume of 1.-THE
doings of the fleet while off Santiago, of
the bombardment of the forts, of the taking
of the lower bay of Guantanamo by the
Marblehead and the Yankee. copies of men,
oranda regarding methods of blockade,
kilograms bearing on the proposed army
movement to Santiago. etc. practically
ali of which is told in official kilograms
On June the admiral urged upon the. de-
partment, as he had previously done. to ex-
redite the arrival of the troops for SAINT
ago, the difficulty of blockadng the Span
ish ships daily increa sing On June 10 a dis
expedition was temporarily stopped because
of the reported observation of additional
Spanish vessels in American waters.
BLOCKADE INSTRUCTIONS.
In a memorandum dated June Is. the adj
miral says: 1.-THE commander-in-chiAfs de-
sires again to call the attention of COM
handing officers to the positions occupied
by the blockading fleet, especially during
the day time, and it is now directed that all
trance to Santiago of four miles and this
distance must not be exceeded. If the yes
sci is coaling. or is otherwise restricted in
her movements. she must nevertheless
keep within this distance If at any time
the flagship makes signal which is not Wis
IDLE to any vessel, such vessel must at once
approach the flagship repeating vessel
to a point where she can read the signal
Disregard Of the directions which have al
ready been given on this head has led to
endless confusion. Many times during the
day the fleet is so scattered that it would
be perfectly possible for the enemy to come
out of the harbor and meet with very little
opposition. The commander in-chief hopes
that strict attention will be given this or
der"
The admiral reproduces the order of battle
incidental to the landing of Skaters army
corps, June % when ships were sent to
shell the beach and cover the landing Of the
men, In. this order the following occurs:
THE attention of commanding officers of
de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity
of the utmost vigilance from this time for
ward. both as to maintaining stations and
readiness for action, as to keeping a close
watch upon the harbor mouth RI fhe Span-
ish admiral ever intends to attempt to es-
cape that attempt will be made soon.
The admiral here remarks that much trOu-
BILE was experienced in landing on account
of the wandering proclivities of some of the
transports. which had to be looked up, The
progress of Decentralization was rendered
somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, the heavi-
est during the three weeks the fleet had
been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow
on the coast of Jamaica. 1t appears that
according to dispatch to Secretary Long,
dated June &C. the channel at Santiago.
of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was
preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the
destruction of the Spanish vessels although
he regretted resorting to this method be-
cause of It's difficulties and small chance of
success. He would not do this he says
We're the present force to be kept there. as
1t then insured capture which, he believed
would terminate the war. The above tele
gram was sent the admiral explains with
reference to the proposed detachment of
some of our heavy ships for service abroad
(the proposed expedition to the Spanish
COAST. A. dispatch from Secretary Long
shows that this expedition was to consist
Yankee and Dixie and they were to go to
the Azores for orders en- route to Tangiers,
Morocco. The Golfers were to join the fleet
at the Azores.
On June 80 the admiral received a COM
munication from Major General Shafter, an
nouncing that he expected to attack Santi-
ago the following morning, and asking that
he (Sampson) lombard the forts at Aqua
dores in support of regiment of infantry
and make such demonstrations as he
thought proper at the harbor's mouth, so
as to keep many of the enemy there as
possible. This request was complied with,
and on July l General Shafter asked that
the admiral keep up his fight on the San
tiago water front. On July the following
was received from General Shafter:
Terrible fight yesterday but my line is
now strongly intrenched about three -fourths
of a mile from town.. l urge that you make
effort Immediately to force the entrance, to
are already very heavy. You can now
operate with less loss of life than I can.
Please telephone answer"
reply was telephoned General Shafter
from Admiral Sampson through Lieutenant
Stanton which said the admiral had bonn
and also Punta GOrda battery inside silenc-
ing their fire, and asked whether he (Shaf-
teri wanted further firing on the admirals
part The explanation was made that it
channel was cleared of mines-a work of
some time after the forts We're taken pos
session of by the troops. To this General
Shafter replied
can take batteries at entrance of harbor
If they are as difficult to take as those which
we have been pitted against. it will be some
time and a great loss of life ] am at a
loss to see why the navy cannot work under
a destructive fire as well as the army Nv
Io-s. wa .,l1