The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-07-22
nnttIe shins ana Forts.


Santiago forts have opened again the ques-
lion Of the relative value of battleships
and land batteries for coast defense pur-
poses. Our great battleships were built
! chiefly for the purpose of defending our
! coast. the theory being that they were
more effective for that purpose than har-
bor forts. There is of course much 10 De
said in behalf Of both forts and battleships
! for coast defense purposes, but the result
| of the bombardment of the forts at Santi-
ago seems to justify the conclusion that
as means of defense forts and mines are
The most effective.
The bombardment Of the Santiago forts
was long and severe, and yet it turns out
| thai comparatively little damage was done
TO them, and they were not well provided
| with guns. Most Of the guns were out of
date, and therefore practically useless.
There were only few modern guns, and
| they were not well handled. 1t seems to
be the opinion of some of our naval officers
| that if the Santiago Notifications had been
provided with such guns as defend the har-
bors of New York and Boston, and had
| been manned by such skilled gunners as
are TO be found behind our guns, IL would
| have been difficult, if not impossible for
our warships 10 have destroyed them, or
| even bombarded them for any considerable
| length of timo without having suffered
| serious damage. Because of the fact that
| the guns of the Santiago fortifications
were of little account our warships might
have made their way into the harbor Of
| Santiago if it had not been for the mines.
They were dreaded far more than the guns.
Therefore Santiago might not have been in
our possession yet if its capture had de-
| pended wholly upon the navy.
One conclusion to be drawn from the
! Santiago experiences as that the plan fos
the capture of Porto Rico does moi include
the landing of our army at San juan the
capital. The landing, in all probability, is
to be made at some other point of the is
| land. 1t might take several days to re-
duce the San Juan fortihcations, and il
would not be advisable to keep the troops
on the transports all that time. San Juan
| win be taken as Santiago was, by the
| army.
And how will Havana be taken when we
get ready to move on the seat of SPANS
power in the West Indies? BY the army or
the navy? The navy, no doubt, will CO.
operate with the army, but the chief de-
pendence will be in the army. The army
viii make landing at some place near
Havana. and the city will be approached
and captured as Santiago was, from the
land side. Havana's fortifcations are much
stronger than were those of Santiago, or
are those of San Juan. Judging from our
| experience at Santiago, it would require
a long time to reduce the Notifications at
Havana, and our ships would be exposed
to. considerable danger while engaged IN
the task Indeed, it is doubtful if they
would be as fortunate as they were al
Santiago.
| These reflections in respect to battleshipa
and Notifications suggest the inquiry
what is Commodore Watson expected tC
accomplish by visiting the coast Of Spain
The Spanish harbors are much better for
titled with guns and mines than are those
of Cuba and Porto Rico. No doubt the
remnant of the Spanish navy will keeT
well under the protection of the guns ol
Watson, therefore. win not be able TO get
at the Spanish war vessels without frs
silencing forts and land batteries and ne
moving mines from harbors. Win he star
on his journey prepared to do all these
things? If not, what is he likely TO ac
eomplish?
1t is noticeable that some of the English
papers hold the opinion that to send {
squadron to the Spanish coast would be {
mistake, for the reason that it would tent
to unite the Spanish people and make
them less inclined to sue for peace. Tha
opinion is worth careful consideration, be
cause it is evident that unless Commodore
Watson could inflict very serious injur!
upon Spain it w5uld be a mistake to sent
squadron to her shores. 1t would b,
the wiser course TO utilize all our strength
in wrestling her colonial possessions from
, |