The sun. (Wilmington, Del.) 1897-19??, 1898-04-24
ANTIQUATED
Methods Of Warfare Which Still
Exists Among the 6paniarde.

Methods of Warfare Which Still
Exists Among the spaniards.
1t is expected that the forces that will
be used in Cuba will consist of cavalry,
infantry and light artillery. Heavy
artillery could hardly be used in the wet
season, and, besides, it would not be
necessary in operations against the
Spaniards. :.
Consel General Lee, it lie understood,
advised the use Of these branches OF the
service for the campaign in Cuba. He is
of the opinion that the army can success
fully conduct operations in the island
during the wet weather If it has cavalry
and light batteries.
Rapid-fre guns and plenty Of them,
will be depended on very largely to do
the fighting.
It is reported by all observers of the
military methods OF the Spaniards that
their infantry at once forms a hollow
square upon the approach OF cavalry.
This military formation has been in
practice for century, and the Spaniards
have not learned any other way to repel
cavalry attacks.
Military experts say that when an
army is so formed it can be decimated
by rapid fire guns and destroyed if 1t
does not SOON break such formation.
The cavalry will be used to force the
Spaniards into position, to get them at
bay, as it were, and the infantry and
light artillery will then attack with rapid
fire guns.
1t is said that Spanish forces in Cuba
are poorly armed. They have a fairly
good rifle, the Mauser, but are made
quately supplied with ammunition, and,
most of the troops being young boys,
don't know how to use their guns. In
rapid-tiring guns they are very deficient.
Artillery is their weakest point, and
they cannot now supply the deficiency.
Even Havana is defended by Anticipated
cannon, with the exception of six fine
new Krupp guns, which, however. have
been allowed to rust on their carriages,
and the artillerymen do not know any
thing about their use.
At Matanzas they have four guns Of
the same kind-heavy ten and twelve
inch cannon-but there are no carriages
for them, and they are perfectly useless.
1t is said there is only one ordnance
officer of the army-Ordineau-who I'M
derstands the handling of such guns.
General Lee, it is understood, advised
the War Department that few good
regiments would be sufficient for the
first movements in Cuba.
He relies strongly upon the efficiency
of the army under General Gomez and
General Garcia, which would naturally
be our allies in war.
He reports that the revolutionists have
an effective army of 10000 troops, which
they could increase to 100000 at most
any time if the arms for them are found.
Gomez has kept his army at its pres
ent number because it was too difficult
to maintain large army in that country,
after it's repeated devastation, and be-
cause 10000 men were strong enough to
keep up the war and crush Spain slowly.
On the other hand, the Spaniards have,
he says, not more than $4,000 or $1,000
effective troops. If the revoutionists are
armed and small but well-disciplined
and seasoned army from this country is
landed in the island he thinks the
Spanish will have no chance for success
full resistance.
Another element in the war that Gen
eral Lee, it is und arstood, commented on
is that Spain's troops in Cuba are de-
pending upon this county for food sup
plies.
The island can be entirely cut off from
food by the action of the United States
1t is estimated that Havana would
suffer as much as if it were actually be-
sieged if we should prevent our ships
from carrying anything forthe Spaniards
and the Spanish ships from procuring
supplies from our rorts.
Havana, it is said by Consuls and all
who have studied the conditions of af-
fairs on the island, is absolutely with
out food.
1t is said, indeed, that none of the
Spanish armies has any stores of pro-
visions, and that Havana is worse off
than any other place.
An attacking force that merely con-
tents itself with shutting off the food
supply would soon reduce them to sub
mission,
1t il very probable that one of the
plans OF the military authorities is to
make effective allies of the Cubans by
arming them, and thus turning good
fighting force Of 100000 men against the
Spaniards.
1t is said that arrangements are already
made looking to this end, and insuring
the immediate and effective cooperation
of the American and Cuban forces.
The landing on the island would viz
tually be on the western end and on the
northern coast. While this would place
the army at considerable distance from
the Cuban forces under Gomez, it has
advantages that more than Offset this
apparent separation of the allies.
A union could soon be effected and
the revo!ulionists, freed from any re-
straint along the military lines in the
east would soon sweep on Havana Pro-
vince and unite with the Americans.
The fleet would also aid in the junction
Of the forces at, any point that would be
fixed upon for such invasion.