Evening star., 1898-09-15

II was of the opinion that the Spaniards
would surrender If given a little time. and
l thought this result would be hastened IL
the men of their army could be made to
understand they would be well treated as
prisoners Of war. Acting upon this pre-
sumption, 1 determined to offer to return
all the wounded Spanish officers at Ell
Caney who were able to bear transporta-
ton. and who were willing to give their
paroles not to serve against the forces of
the United States until regularly
changed. This offer was made and accept
ed. These officers, we'll several of
the wounded Spanish privates-twenty-sev
en- In all-were sent to their lines under the
escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our
troops were received with honors and 1
have every reason to believe the return of
the Spanish prisoners produced good i'm
preston on their comrades.
The Siege.
| 1.-The cessation of firing about noon on the
| Sd practically terminated the battle of San
| tiago; all that occurred after this time may
properly be treated under the head of the
| siege which followed. After deducting the
| detachments retained at Siboney and Dali
| quiri to render those depots secure from
| attack, organizations held to protect our
| fanks, others acting escorts and guards
| to light batteries, the members of the hos
| pttal corps. guards left in charge of blanket
| rolls, which the intense heat caused the
| men to cast aside before entering battle
| orderiieS, etc, it is doubtful is We had more
| than u coo men on the firing line on July
/. when the battle was fercest. and when
| the important and strong positions of Ell
Caney and San Juan We're captured.
"A Few Cupans assisted in the attack of
| Es Caney, ana fought valiantly but their
| numbers We're too small to materially
| change the strength as indicated above
The enemy confronted us with numbers
about equal to our own; they fought obsti-
| Tateiy in strong and intrenched positions.
and the results obtained clearly inlca:e
! the intrepid saiantry Of the company. Of
| f1cers and men, and the benefits derived
| from the careful training and instruction
given in the company in recent years IN
| rifle practice and other battle exercises.
Our losses n these battles We're - officers
and DOS men killed. and 81 officers and l293
men wounded; missing. 10 The missing
with few exceptions, reported later
Gen. Shafter says the arrival of Gen. Es-
| carlo at Santiago was not anticipated. He
says:
| Gen. Garcia. with between 1000 and
| 1900 Cubans, was intrusted with the duty
| OF watching for and intercepting the rein
torcements expected This. however, he
| tailed to do, and Escario passed into the
city along on my extreme right and near
the bay
Demand for Surrender.
After speaking of Admiral Cervera's sor-
| tie, and the destruction of his fleet, Gen.
Shafter says he again called on the Span
ish commander to surrender.
ON the same date l informed Admiral
Sampson that if he would force his way
into the harbor the city would surrender
without any further sacrifice of life Com
mcdore Watson replied that Admiral
Sampson was temporarily absent put that
in his (Watson's) opinion the navy should
not enter the harbor."
THE strength of the enemy's position
was such L did not wish to assault il it
could be avoided.
An examination of the enemy's works
| made after the surrende-', fully justifes
the wisdom of the course adopted. The
lntrenchments could only have been car
ried with very sreat loss of life
General Shafter gives the varying efforts
opening the engagement on the 10th. Wuen
| the truce ended. On the 11th the surrender
was again demanded.
by this date the sickness in the army
vas increasing very rapidly, a result
of exposure in the trenches to the intense
heat of the sun and the heavy rains.
Moreover. the dews in Cuba are almost
equal to rains. The weakness of the
anxious to bring the siege to an end, but
/ in common with most of the officers Of the
| army | did not think an assault would be
! justifiabie, especially as the enemy seemed
| to be acting in good faith in their pre-
| liminary propositions to surrender
July II l informed the Spanish COM
| mander that Major General Miles, COM
mander-in-chie of the American army had
| just arrived in my camp, and requested
| him to grant us a personal interview On
| the following day. He replied he would
| be pleased to meet us. The interview took
| place on the 18th and I informed MIN
| his surrender only could be considered, and
| that as he was without hope of escape he
| had no right to continue the fight
| General Shatter then gives the details
| of the final surrender his entry to the Clty
| and the raising of the American lag In
closing he says:
| Before closing my report l wish to
| dwell upon the natural obstacles ! had to
| encounter and which no foresight couit
! have overcome or obviated. The rocky and
precipitouS coast afforded no sheltered land
ing places, the roads We're mere bride
| paths, the effect of the tropical sun and
! rains upol. unacclimated troops was deadly
! and a dread of strange and unknown dis
| eases has its effect on the army
| 'At Daiquiri the landing of the troops and
stores was made at small wooden wharf
| which the Spaniards tried TO burn. but un-
| successfully. and the animals were pushed
| into the water and guided to a sandy beach
| about 200 yards in extent At Siboney the
landing was made on the beach and at
| small wharf erected by the engineers. I
| had neither the time nor the men to spare
| to construct permanent wharveS.
In spite OF the fact that l had nearly
| 1,0J0 men continuously at work on the
roads, they Were at times impossible for
ers would often suddenly rise, SO to pre-
vent the passage of wagons, and then the
eight pack trains with the command had
| to be depended upon for the victualing of my
army well the 10000 refugees, who
could not, in the interests of humanity. be
| left to starve while We had rations Often
| for days nothing could be moved except on
pack trains.
Appearance of Yellow Fever.
After the great physical strain and ex-
posure of July l and . the malarial and
other fevers began to rapidly advance
throughout the command, and on July 4
| the yellow fever appeared at Siboney.
Though efforts were made to keep this
fact from the army, it soon became known.
THE supply of quartermaster and COM
missary stores during the campaign was
abundant and Notwithstanding the difficult
ties III landing and transporting the ration
the troops on the firing line We're at all
times supplied with its coarser components,
namely of bread, meat, sugar and coffee.
There was no lack of transportation for
at no time up to the surrender could all the
wagons | had be used.
IN reference to the sick and wounded
have to say that they received every at