Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1898-04-14
the central government are not less.
ened or diminished.

ened or diminished.
AS the Cuban parliament does not
meet until May 4 next, the Spanish
government would not object. for its
part, to accept at once suspension of
hostllities, if asked for by the insur-
gents from the general-in-chief to
whom it would pertain in such case t.,
determine the duration and condition
Oh the armistice. The propositions
submitted by Gen. Woodford and the
reply of the Spanish government are
both in the form of brief memorap
dums and are substantially in the Ian
guage above given. The function of
the Cuban parliament in the matter OF
It's doing so are not expressed in the
Spanish memorandum. but from Gen
Woodford's explanatory reports of pra-
llmlnary discussions preceding the
hnal conference. it is understood tina.
the Spanish government stands ready
to give the insular congress- full now
ers TO settle the terms of peace with
the insurgents, whether by direct ne
EQUATION. or directly by means of leg
lslatlon, does not appear. With this
last overture in the direction of i'm
mediate peace and its disappointing
reception by Spain, the executive was
brought to the end of his effort.
In my annual message of December
last [ said: OF the untried measures
there remain: Recognition of the in
surgents as belligerents; recognition
OF the independence of Cuba: neutral
Intervention to end the war by impos-
lng rational compromise between the
! contestants and intervention in favor
OF one or the other party l speak not
Or forcible annexation, for that cannot
be thought of. That, by our code of
morality, would be criminal aggres-
sion Thereupon I reviewed these al
ternatives, in the light of President
Grants measured words, uttered in
1875, when, after seven years Of san
! culinary, destructive and cruel barbar-
tiles in Cuba, he reached the conclu-
sion that the recognition of the indie
! pendence of Cuba was impracticable
| and indefensible, and that the recogni-
! ton of belligerency was not warrant
ed by the facts, according to the tests
of public law. / commented especially
upon the latter aspect of the question,
| pointing out the inconvenience and
positive dangers of recognition of
| belligerency which, while adding to
| the already onerous burdens of neu-
trality within our own jurisdiction,
| could not in any way extend our infiu-
ence or effective offices in the territory
OF hostilities. Nothing has since oc-
gard, and l recognize as
| folly now as much as
| then the idea that the issuance of a
proclamation of neutrality, by which
| process the sO-called recognition of
telligerency is published, could of it
self, and unattended by other action,
accomplish anything toward the one
end for which we labor, the instant
pacifcation of Cuba and the cessation
Of the misery that affiicts the island.
| Turning to the question of recognition
at this time of the independence of the
| - SN'SAis A'AA'oA >ShS 81 "a III SuOci,
we find safe precedentS in our history
from an early day. They are we'll
summed up in President Jackson s
message to congress, Dec. q, 1886, on
the subject of the recognition of the
| independence of Texas. His words
are evidence that the United States
in addition to the test imposed by pub
lie law as the condition of the recog-
milton of independence by a neutral
state (to-wit, that the revolted state
shall constitute body polite, having
a government in substance as we'll as
in name, possessed of the elements of
! stability and forming de facto, if
left to itself, a state among the nations
! reasonably capable of discharging the
duties of state) has imposed for it's
own governance in dealing with cases
like these the further condition that
recognition of Independent statehood is
not due to revolted dependency until
the danger of it's being again subjugat-
ed by the parent state has entirely
passed away This extreme test was
i'll fact applied in the case of Texas.
i said in my message of December
last: It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood which alone can demand the
ecognition of belligerency in it's IA
or The same requirement must GER
tainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing
independence is in question, for no
ess positive test can be applied to the
greater act than to the lesser; while
on the other hand the influences and
consequences of the struggle upon the
internal policy of the recognizing state,
which form important factors when
the recognition of belligerency is con-
cerned, are secondary, if rot rightly
eliminated factors when the real ques-
ton is whether the community
claiming recognition is or is not indie
pendent beyond peradventure Nor
from the standpoint of expediency do
[ think it would be wise or prudent
for this government to recognize at the
present time the Independence of the
so-called Cuban republic. Such rec
ognition is not necessary in order to
enable the United States to intervene
and pacify the island. To commit
this country now to the recognition of
any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing con-
ditions of international obligation
towards the organization so recog-