The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-04-12
LONG DELAYED MESSAGE


IUUU UIlHIlU WlUuhul
Continued from Page one.)
This extreme test was, In fact. ap-
piled in the cas- of Texas. The con-
gress to whom President jackson re-
ferred the question as lone probably
leading to war;" and therefore a prop
er subject for a previous understand
ing with that body by whom wal can
alone be declared, and by who all the
provisions for sustaining its periis must
be furnished" left the matter of recog-
milton Of Texas to the discretion of the
executive. providing merely for the
sending Of a diplomatic agent when the
president should be satisfied tha the
Republic of Texas had become AN in
dependent state" 1t was so recognized
by President Van Buren,. who commits
stoned a charge d. affairs. March Z. 1887.
after Mexico had abandoned an at
tempt to nqu the Texas territory
and then there was at the time no bona
fide contest going on between the in
surgent province and its former sov-
ereign.
last: 1T is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood. which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its IA
vor."
The same requirement must certain
ly be no less seriously considered when
the graver issue of recognizing indie
pendence is in question, for no less pos
tive test can be applied to the greater
act than to the lesser. while on the
other hand the influences and conse-
quences of the struggle upon the inter-
nal policy of the recognizing state,
xNh fa form, fSn IN ~ 49,. 49, 49,
recognition of belligerency is con
cerned, are secondary, IL not rightly
eliminable factors. when the real ques-
ton is whether the community claim
ing recognition is or is not Independent
beyond peradventure.
Neither " Use Nor Prudent.
Nor from the standpoint of expedi-
ence do l think 1t would be wise or
prudent for this government to recog-
nize at the present time the independ-
ence of the so-called Cuban republic.
Such recognition is not necessary in
order to enable the United States to in
tervene and pacify the island. To COM
NIT this country now to the recog-
milton of any particular government in
Cuba might subject us to embarrass-
ing conditions of International bill
cation toward the organization so rec
ognized. In case of intervention, our
conduct will be subject to the approval
of disapproval of such government.
We would be required to submit to it's
direction and to assume to II the mere
relation Of a friendly ally. When ii
shall appear thereafter that there is
within the island a government capa-
BILE of performing the duties and dis
charge the functions of a nation and
aving as a matter OF fact, the proper
forms and attributes of nationality.
Gl1nh OnNarnnnnnt nnn hn no nt1xr N nj
readily recognized and the relations
and interests of the United States with
such nation adjusted.
There remain the alternative forms
OF Intervention to end the war either
as an impartial neutral by imposing a
rational compromise between the con-
testants or as the active ally of the
one party or the other. AS to the
first. 1t Is not to be forgotten that dur
ing the last few months the relation
of the United States has virtually been
one of friendly Intervention in many
ways, each not of itself conclusive, but
all tending to the cXertion of a poten-
tia influence toward an m pa
cific result, just and honorable to all
interests concerned. The spirit OF all
our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosper
ity in Cuba, u~ntarnished by differences
between the United States and Spain
LIN uiiStdliltu ny the DlOOu OF American
The forcible Intervention of
the United States as a neutral to stop
the war. according to the large distates
of humanity and following by historical
presidents where ~neighboring states
have interfered to check the hopeless
of life by internecine conflicts
beyond their borders, is justihable IN
grounds. 1t involves. how
hostile constraint upon both the
parties to the contest as well as TO en-
force a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
Grounds of Intervention.
The grounds for such Intervention
might be briefly summarized as fol-
lows:
First-In the cause of humanity and
to put an end to the barbari.ies. blood
starvation and horrible miserias
existing there n which the par
ties to the conflict are either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no
answer to say this is all in another
belonging to anothe. nation
and is therefore none of our business.
1t Is expressly our duty, for il is right
at our door.
Second we owe II 10 our citizens N
to afrorl them hat protection
and the in lemnity for life and property
no government there can or viii
afford. and to that end terminate the
that deprive them of legal
rd-T right to intervene RAY be
by the very serious injury to
the commerce, trade and business of
our people and by the wanton destruc-
ton of property and devastation of the
sland.
Fourth-And which is of the utmost
Importance, the present con li.iol If at
fairs in Cuba is q constant msnaca 4,
our peace and entails upcn this gov
eminent enormous expense. With such
waged for years In an island
so near us n with which our people
have such trade and business rela-
lions: when the lives and liberty OF our
citizens are in constant danger and
heir property destroyed and them
selves ruined; where our trading YES
sells are liable to seizure and are seized
~ ~ aar.. door b.. .as.LL..-