Staunton spectator and vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1896-1916, 1898-04-14

t1-so .;1,..-had DGen made
effective over the better part Of the
four central and western provinces,
Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and
Pinar del Rio.
1.-THE agricultural population, to the
estimated number of 100000 or more,
was herded within the towns and their
Immediate vlcinage, deprived OF the
means of support, rendered destitute
of shelter, left poorly clad, and expos
ed to the most unsanitary conditions.
AS the scarcity of food increased with
the devastation Of the depopulated
areas of production, restitution and
want became misery anc starvation.
Month by month the death rate In
creased in an alarming ratio. BY
March, 1897, according to conservative
estimates from official Spanish success,
mortality among the reconcentradoes,
from starvation and the diseases there
to incident exceeded 30 per centum OF
their total number"
He then proceeds to review the mill
tary operations in Cuba, and refers to
messages of his own and his predeces-
sor; to the efforts Of Gen. Woodford to
bring about an amelioration OF the
condition of the island, their futility;
sending of relief to the destitute OF
Cuba: the work of the Red Cross So
ciety. and the fact that thousand OF
lives had been saved by the munitic
ence of the United States. The Presi
| dent then refers to the suggestion sent
to Madrid for an armistice until Octo
Der 1st In order to have the conflict
brought to a close; also for an immedi
ate revocation of the order of recon
contration. The replies of the Spanlst
Cabinet were by no means satisfactory
and the diplamatic relations between
tnat country and the United States
were brought to an end. The Presl
dent then proceeds to review the his
tory of similar cases which have come
to the notice of the United States
when Spanish dominion on this sid
of the ocean has been thrown off. H
says:
l do not think it would be wise or pru
dent for this government to recognize
at the present time the independents
of the so-called Cuban republic. Sucl
recognition is not necessary in orde
to enable the United States to inter
vene and pacify the island. To com
nit this country now to the recognl
ton of any particular government il
Cuba might subject us to embarrassln
conditions of international obligation
toward the organization SO recognizes
In case of intervention our conduc
would be subject to the approval or dis
approval of such government; W
would be required to submit to its d
rection and to assume to it the mer
relation of friendly ally. When
shall appear hereafter that there
within the island a government capa
BILE of performing the duties and dis
charging the functions OF separat
nation, and having, as matter OF fac
the proper forms and attributes OF ma
ltionality, such government can b
promptly and readily recognized, an
the relations and interests OF the I'm
red States with such nation ADJUSTED
There remain the alternative forms
5 intervention to end the war, either a
, an impartial neutral by imposing
! rational compromise between the COZ
testapt-, or as the active ally OF Tn
= one party or the other"
: This action. he believes, would be o
= the grounds of humanity, duty to ou
selves and the Cubans, and the r
, moval of menace to our own peace
The President in alludiDg to the d.
etruction of the Maine says:
. The naval court of inquiry, whic
it is needless to say commands the I'll
qualified confidence of the government
was unanimous in its conclusion ths
the destruction Of the Maine was eau