The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-06-11


maze Of doubt and contradiction as TO
the dispatch of the first army of in
vasion to Cuba. one thing stands out
clearly namely. that the government. |
feeling strong in its present position
and plan. is moving cautiously and |
with the deliberation which II believes |
will secure success unattended with |
disasters. With this main purpose In |
view. the army and navy are co-operat- |
ing toward the dispatch Of the troops. |
some $4,000 in number. under escort of
a strong fleet OF naval conveys. made |
up of 1s warships headed by the bat
tleship Indiana. Unattended by this |
strong fleet. the troops might have left |
convoy was ready for this service. /
Since then. however. reports have come |
as to the presence OF Spanish ships in |
the North Atlantic. Realising that |
nothing was to be gained by haste. and |
that the war was progressing steadily
towards success. IL was determined
not to take the one small chance of
having our troop transports menaced
by some scouting ships OF the enemy.
As a result. the troop transports have
not proceeded to Cuba, either yesterday
or the day before, as has been repeat
ness to go. but will not move until the
naval convoy is ready to accompany
them. assuring safe conduct from
Florida to the point of destination.
Whether that will be to-day or to-
morrow, the war department declines
positively TO say. and there Is authority
for the statement that any reports pur-
porting to give the day or hour when
this formidable feet of invasion will
start is not only unwarranted. but
meets with the most vigorous official
condemnation. The administration
feels that the time has come when 1t is
of the utmost Importance that the pre-
else movements of these invading fleets
should not be published in this country
and then heralded to the enemy.
The completeness with which the
transport of the troops has been planned
is shSse0s by the list OF transport ves-
sells given out at the war department
! to-day. OF this list, "a large steamships.
| varying from 400 tons down to 600
tons. are at Florida ports ready to carry
out troops to the point Of invasion.
| There are some IL other craft. includ-
ing vessels suitable for conveying fresh
water. stores. etc. and for lightering
the troops and stores from the ships TO
the beach when the debarkatlon begins.
The entire transport fleet. of about 80
steamships. augmented by the fleet OF
naval conveys, is in number. will make
Z "A IOTTnludDie marine DfOctsslDn. tXcteu-
ing In magnitude the notable spectacle
Of the naval review during the worlds
| fair year.
The first official confirmation Of the
| engagement at Guantanamo last Tues
day came to the naval department to-
day and was made the subject of a bull
letin. The terms in which Admiral
| Sampson described the affair tended
| strongly to take away the large i'm
| portance that had been given 1t in the
unofficial discussion. There was a nota-
| BILE failure on the part of the admiral
TO mention anything like a landing. al
| though statement that the Marble
head now holds the lower bay by impli-
cation may carry with IL the idea that
her marines are ashore. Elderly naval
officers who have been In Guantanamo
bay describe 1t as admirably situated
| for the reception of transports, with
plenty of water for the biggest of the
transports and enough for the smaller
class Of warships that might be used to
convoy them. The locality is one that
would make good base of operations
against Santiago itself. should IL be de-
cided TO attack the latter town by troops
| from the rear instead of by the war
ships.
The statement coming from San Fran
cisco that the real object Of the Charles
| tons voyage was the seizure of the
1
| OF truth in 1t. When II was decided
to send the Monterey and Monadnock
| clear across the Pacific from Mare
/ island to Manila. IL was we'll known
J that this could not be done without
/ sending along coalers. because of the
insufficient coal supply OF the monitors.
1t was not deemed practicable TO tow
the big ironclads the 1000 miles of the
| voyage that would have to be traversed
| age that would have to be traversed
| by them without coal so IL became
necessary TO find places In the Pacific
where they could replenish their bunk
\ ers. A study of the charts showed
that there were several groups of islands
| lying between Hawaii and the Philip
pines which might afford a harbor in
| which the collers could lay alongside
| the monitors and fill up their coal bunk
| ers. The officials do not deem IL pru-
| dent to name the particular islands
chosen for the purpose, but II is OBJ
vious that. being barred by neutrality
| laws from the possessions OF neutral
| countries. the first course of the navy
| department would be to some Spanish
| islands. such as the Ladrones or the
| Carolines. Therefore. IL Is assumed
| that IL the Charleston really goes to
one of the former islands. II will be
| with the purpose of securing in advance
| a suitable harbor for the use of the
monitors.