New-York tribune., 1898-12-03

cause Grant was not near enough 10 neip hiin'
The whole OF the subsequent winter and spring
down to the first week in May was practically
consumed in the effort to get foothold on 'ne
shore Of the Mississippi near enough to VicKs-
burg 10 make the subsequent movements poss'-
BILE The capture OF Port Gibson ana Graho
Gulf settled the point With something over
forty thousand men Grant had now 10 meet wv
armies either Of which was almost as large as
his own. Above all. he must prevent '
armies from getting together The mystery
surrounding his movements helped MIN huch
The Confederate Generals Pemberton and j. f.
r,,.,on MT knowing where he would strike.
scattered their strength. a serious mistake on
their part in order that each might be su-
per,or in force to the enemy. they drew so heav
,Iv an Bragg that the latter suffered the severe
defeat OF Stone River Taking his Holly Springs
,esso, N heart Grant now practically aban-
doned hi. base at Grand Gulf and started INTO
the .nen,v's country with three days rations
sherman was horrihed at the tine. Yet poth
might have remembered that Greene. In the
Revolutionary War, and Scott. in the war WIN
Mexico with small armies. II Is true. had mace
expeditions hundreds OF miles In length WITHOUT
anv base Of supplies The lack OF base was
amply compensated for. in Grants opinion. 10y
the fact that he was now out OF reach OF ORDERS
from Washington.
Twelve davs after the capture Of Port GID
o, GRANTS army defeated a portion of John
ston's forces at Raymond Two days later IL
captured Jackson. the capital OF MISSISSIPPI
Johnston escaped with most Of his army. put
the whole railroad system Of the state Tell INTO
Grant. hands one blow. Two days later
pemberton. with an army larger than CRAFTS
was defeated at Champions Hill and driven
back precipitately toward Vicksburg. From tna'
moment Nicksburg was besieged IN fact since
Grant already controlled all its supplies py
land while Porter with his gunboats. held 'he
river II Penlberton had persisted in MS enorls
20 unite with Johnston, Grant Wouio nave
beaten him into Nicksburs As II was. another
hatt,e was fought. and Pemberton again de-
feated and only hs forethought IN oreah'ns
down bridges behind him prevented his swiftly
marching foe from giving him race TOT MS
fortress In three weeks Grant had fought nve
battles had marched half way across the STATE
a. Mi.sissippi and back again. and had COM
oleted the investment Of the place which by the
Confederates was fondly called the western
Gibraltar. He had defeated two armies IN the
field and had nov locked one OF these IN 4
nr,son from, which ii only escaped six weeks
later nv surrender on this campaign alone
Grant is TO be reckoned the greatest master or
tho military art in the age between Napoleon
and Noltke His greatness is particularly
evinced by one thing which he refrained from
doing. Nine out Of ten generals down TO MS
time after taking so important place as JACK
SON. would have stopped TO fortify IL 1rah'
relinouished it with Indifference HIS op)ectiVe
was the enemy in arms. and his practice Is no"
and has been since 1870 accepted as correct, not
only in this country but in Europe
While these events were taking place some
thing happened to change the "hoie aspect "a
affairs in the East. General Lee. having taken
accurate measure Of Hooker gathered his FORCES
toeeth.r for an invasion Of the North Even
Martial and Temporary success for this move
rnent would have resulted IN a permanent diplo-
matte victory for the Confederacy. The South
ern league would have been recognized by the
European Powers. and the whole legal ana po-
utical aspect of the rebellion would nave peen
changed. AS Lee FASTENED across Maryland
Hooker demanded that he be reinforced with the
,roops. about ten thousand in number. that
were lying idle on Maryland Heights near Har-
per's Ferry Part of these troops were after
ward ordered TO Join the Army OF the Potomac.
but they did not reach it in time. so that the
demand Of Hooker and the refusal or the WASH
ington authorities both shown by subse-
resigned. and the Army OF the Potomac in pur-
suit Of an enemy fully its equal In every respect
and its superior in organization was left with
out a head BY that time, the indications are
clear. there was no general in the North who
really and anxiousy desired the command Of an
army which. splendid as it was. had barely held
its own against the mastery genius Of Lee and
the perfect subordination Of such generals as
IOngstreet and Jackson and Hill and Early
and Stuart Grant may be taken as one OF
those who had no desire TO rush In where angels
feared to tread. In a letter w-ltten TO Mr..
Washburne almost two months after the crisis
was past. and Lees army had had the last ele-
ment of It's tremendous aggressiveness beaten
out of IT, he remarked: Had it not been for
General Haeck and Dana think II altogether
likely I would have been ordered to the Poto-
mac My going could do no possible good. They
have there able officers. who have been brought
up with that army. and to import commander
to place them certainly could produce no
good While would not positively disobey an
order I would have objected most vehemently
TO taking that command or any other except
the one ] have" It was certainly in similar
spirit OF loyal obedience but not Of vivid hope
that General Meade accepted the command only
I'VE days before the battle which is already
reckoned Of the few decisive battles OF the
world Hitherto he had attained only the repu-
tation Of a subordinate general who made no
mistakes The most striking thing in Mr..
Bache's elaborate and affectionate memoir Is
the rarity with which Meade's name occurs in
the chapters Of history preceding the strug-
gle at Gettsburg out Of the smoke Of con-
fict his figure starts occasionally just az do
those of other corps commanders. That is an
admirable trait in this biogra pher. He has let
his hero's deeds speak for him. One could
wish that Mr.. Garland had been equally sedate
in portions Of his brilliant narrative Of Grants
career His account Of the capture Of Mission