The daily morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1883-1899, 1898-12-03
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1
ptruct a substantial railroad, practically
the whole length OF tho island Of cube.
With branch roads 10 tho leading eities
on tho ooastf Such q road would. Of
course, cost largo sum, perhaps t1o.ooo.-
90; but II would give employment 20 tha
people OF Cubs, teach them habits Of
industry. be en- inducsment for them 10
cultivate their farms and thus furnish
supplies for the iaborers and for MARKET
when ins road u constructed. Thls. a
my judgment y absolutely essential "a
the pa1iheAtion and Development Of that
great island. The road would Be Z sood
properly. and when II has served itb pur.
pose for ths government, It could Be
cold for ils cost II such an Improvement
is not made. the government will no
doubt expend fully that sum IN charity.
The secretary says that even II this
road IN 10 be built. there Is necessity for
large appropriation 10 relieve the des-
titute. Some recommendations that oe-
cur in the early portion Of the report
arc that provision bo made for q statue
Of General Grant; that provision be made
for second assistant secretary Of war,
and that an appropriation be made for
the construction OF the Lake Union
Washington ship canal
The statement OF expenditures and esti-
mates presents some formidable figures
The expenditures for the fiscal year ended
June % last were ts2.SA7sl. and the esd
mates for the next fiscal year. beginning
July 1. lss9. are 1s5.z9.577. OF this great
estimate tho sum OF tS5,i5oSoe Is charged
to pay OF the army. The estimate Of ex-
traordinary appropriations required for
the six months ending June %. 100. are
80. n. SO. and the estimates for that
period. combined with those Of the next
fiscal year. reach a total OF tz25.i27917.
At this point the secretary includes
reports OF General Miles and all the other
gen5salD who participated In active oper-
ations he then takes up the telegraphlc
and other correspondence relating TO the
war. and that matter occupies more than
a fourth OF the secretary's whole report.
This part OF the official story begins
With the statement that early in May a
movement on Havana was contemplated
and Il was believed that the city would
be assaulted and captured before the
rainy season set in. but the plan was sub
sequently abandoned on account OF the
reported movement OF the enemys feet
II was proposed 10 send another part OF
Il TO Key West on account OF the close
proximity Of the latter place to MarieI.
Cuba The secretary quotes one OF the
dispatches at this point as follows:
headquarters OF the Army. Washing
ton. May g-The major general COM
manding directs that the following order
be sent by telegraph to General Wade at
Tampa:
Direct Major Shafter to move his COM
mand under protection OF the navy. and
seize and hold MarIeI or most important
! point on north coast OF Cuba. where ter
rltory is ample to land and depIOy army
Follow up his command With all the
force sent to you. Troops viii be sent to
you as rapidly as possible from Chlca-
mauga and other points.
-. C. GILMORE.
Assistant Adjutant General"
This order was forwarded by Adjutant
General Corbin to General Wade who
was further instructed 10 have the troops
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to be followed by four months supplies.
A number OF kilograms are included To
show that dimficulty was experienced
in getting water at Key West for the
expedition
The next dispatch Is from General Miles
outlining the plan OF campaign. II reads
as follows:
Headquarters of the Army, Washing
ton. May e.
The Honorable Secretary OF War:
| ''Slr-Referring to my letter OF yester-
day and to our consultation since, l de-
sire to submit the following:
"As we are now about to inaugurate
active military operations In conjunction
with the navy l think It would be ad-
| visable TO load transports at Tampa with
a strong force OF infantry and artillery
move them to Key West and thence along
the northern coast OF Cuba. waere they
would have the full protection Of Admira
Simpsons feet until they reach Admira
, Schley's fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and
, then. by combined effort OF the army
, and navy capture the harbor garrison
J and possibly the Spanish fleet at that
: point.
, III. before reaching Admiral Schleyi
fleet It shall be found that he has already
accomplished the above object or thai
the Spanish fleet shall have escaped
then urge the importance OF a combined
attack Of the army and navy upon Porte
Rico.
I'VE will be able to land a superior
/, | NNs.,1 ANlt hoA
will result in capturing the island with
its garrison, providing It is done beforl
It can be reinforced from Spain. The dis
tance from Key West to Porto Rico /.
lao miles, and from CadiB, Spain, t
1 Porto Rico It Is about 1000 miles.
"T'he possession Of Porto Rico would b
Q OF very great advantage to the military
as it would cripple the forces Of Spain
I giving us several thousand prisoners
r could be well fortified, the harbor mine(
: and would be q most excellent port 70
! our navy. which could be speedily re
= lieved from any responsibility in thu
charge Of that port, as We could leave |
s sufficient garrison to hold It against an!
d force that might be sent against 1t.
n "Then we should commence, in m.
n Judgment, a movement towards the ives
q by capturing the ports along the northeri
z coast of Cuba, at the east end, supplying
4 the insurgents with abundance Of arm
and munitions of war; and as speedil,
as possible land our cavalry and SUN
Client light artillery to enable them I
move from the harbor Of Porto de Nuevi
tas along the line of railroad to Puert
. Prindpe, From that base our cavalr
q and light artillery. in conjunction wit
It the forces of Lieutenant General Garci
l. and General Comes should move ives
. to near Santa Clara. These movements
70 In my judgment, can be accomplishe
10 during the rainy season. through a couI
% try comparatively free from yellow feve
l. we'll stocked with cattle and having gras
70 sufficient for our animals, While this
p being accomplished our volunteer arm
10 will be prepared to land in the vicinit
of MarIel, HailSna, or Matanzas, In SUI
"a hclent force upon the island Of Cubs
ce The advantage OF this movement will
Of that an army and navy will act in col
s, cert and close union that It does not d
TX vide our navy and that It win utilize OF
most available military force in the be-
n way during the time Of the year whe
Cd military operations are most difncult.
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