The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1898-04-13

appear from Cuba. All the indications
are that Congress intends that Spanish
rule in Cuba shall cease. The feeling in
that body is that this country has been
annoyed long enough by the disorder
which has prevailed in that island for so
many years, and this feeling is greatly
intensified by the blowing up of the Maine.
Congress also believes that there can be
no permanent peace in Cuba as long as
the Spaniards are in authority there.
No Doubt the President was we'll aware
of the prevailing sentiment in Congress
before he wrote his message, and it is
probable that he had grave doubts that
the course of action which he proposed
would be approved, but what was he to
do? If he had outlined clear and vigor-
Gus policy he would have recommended
armed Intervention between Spain and
Cuba, either to compel the Cubans TO ac-
cept autonomy or to secure independence
for Cuba or he would have recommended
the recognition of Cuban independence
without Intervention. Instead of recon-
mending Intervention, however, to estab-
fish autonomy or independence, he propos-
ed to restore peace and order and to es-
tablish a stable government, leaving in
doubt the kind of government which he
had in mind. The consequence is that
Congress is all at sea, and there is no tell
ing what it viii do.
But, if he had recommended interview
ton to establish autonomy Congress
would have promptly rejected his recon-
mendation for reasons already stated
The only things he could have recon-
mended therefore, with any prospect of
success, were intervention TO establish Gu
ban independence or the recognition of
Cuban independence without interven-
ton.
If he had recommended either of these
things he would have raised question in
which the European powers would have
been profoundly interested at once. They
would have wanted to know whether a
policy looking so much like conquest did
not mean the annexation of Cuba. Eng
land and France and Denmark have pos
sessions in the West Indies as well as
Spain, and they would have had good
ground for asking an explanati ton of such
an extraordinary proceeding on our part,
and if we could not have given a salts
factory answer we should have lost their
moral support, and might have had more
serious complications than those which
we have with Spain.
There is some excuse for intervening
for the purpose of putting an end to
condition of affairs in Cuba which has
become burdensome and intolerable to us,
but there is no ground known to inter-
national law that would justify us in
intervening to drive the Spaniards out of
Cuba, or even to recognize the independ-
ence of the Cubans. There is no govern
ment on the island other than that estab-
lished by Spain. and the strength of the
insurgents is wholly problematical. They
do not come out into the open and meas
ure strength with the Spanards. They
carry on species of guerilla warfare,
striking the Spaniards here and there,
destroying plantation buildings and blow
ing up bridges and wrecking trains.
To intervene to assist them in gaining
their independence, or to recognize their
paper republic as the government of
Cuba, would expose us 10 the suspicion of
aiming at the annexation of Cuba.
And if we should intervene and assist
the insurgents in driving out the Span
iards, would not the authority of the Uni
ted States be supreme in Cuba until the
insurgents could organize and establish a
| government? If we exercised authority
during the chaotic period would there not
be a basis for demand for annexation?
| There certainly would, and the demand
would be made, and perhaps successful
| ly. Even if we should simply recognize
| the independence of Cuba, we should be
| held responsible for the Cuban republic,
| if the Cubans should be successful in
| establishing republic If the republic
| should be disturbed by disseusions as it
would be, probably, we should have to in
tervene 10 restore order. and that would
/ mean, ultimately, annexation.
| No doubt the President saw all these
things clearly when preparing his mes
sage. He recommended the only policy
we have right TO pursue, and the only
one we could pursue, in all probability,
| without becoming entangIed in troubles
much more serious than any which are
now plainly apparent He hoped by hav-
ing the army and navy at his disposal,
not only to bring hostilities in Cuba to
an end but to force Spain either to give
Cuba such a government as would be sat
isfactory to a great majority of the Gu
bans or to abandon the island altogether
He hoped 10 do that without war and
without involving the country in compli-
cations with European governments. His
policy may lack the vigor and aggressive
ness that is gratifying to the pride of
Congress and a large portion of the peo-
pie, but we could afford to accept a mild
policy if We could accomplish what we
desire by means of il without war. II
looks, however, as if Congress would in
sist upon policy leading to war.
Hazy Order.
1t is not surprising that Gen. Blanca
was somewhat mystified by the order from,
| Madrid 10 Droclain N arr,,is.ia- 4.