The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1898-07-23

ton Of this court. The controversy
here Is between citizens OF different
states. The fact that this controversy
relates to property belonging 20 the es-
tate OF a deceased person. and that such
estate Is now in process OF administra-
ton In the courts OF the state Of Mon
tana. does not affect the Jurisdiction Of
this court to determine as between the
John A. Davis and the administratoT
OF his estate. what. II any, rights the
complainant may have under the agree
ment sought to be enforced. The ques-
lions involved are such as fall within
The ordinary jurisdiction OF courts of
equity. and hat the circuit courts Of
the United States have by virtue Of their
general chancery Jurisdiction authority
TO specifically enforce as between citi-
zens or different states. agreements con
corning property, although such prop
erty may belong 10 the estate of a de-
ceased person. is a proposition. which,
l think, may be regarded as firmly es-
tablished. Green VS.. Creighton, 20 How.
30: Hayes VS.. Pratt. 147 u. s. $50; Law
renee VS.. Nelson, i43. 215 U. s.; Byers
VS.. McCauley. 14s IT,. s. COS.
III.
The next question 10 be considered
and the one which was most strongly
insisted upon by the learned counsel
for defendant, is nat which arises up
on the objection Of defendants, that
there is an absence of necessary parties
to the bill. All the parties to the COM
promise agreement, under which the
viii OF Andrew j. Davis was probated,
are not made parties to this action.
These absent parties may be divided into
two classes:
F~irst-Certain of the he~irs-at-law of
John ID. Davis.
SGCOnh- Tbnao ro,ton- .L~ --tp
Andrew j. Davis and others who Joined
with them In executing the compromise
agreement.
The persons belonging to the second
class are entitled under the compromise
agreement to more than one-half of the
legacy given to John A. Davis by the
VIII of Andrew J.. Davis. The special
rene, prayed for in the bill
ment be .set aside, and that the
court shall adjudge that the complain
ant Is entitled TO receive the full one
half OF the legacy given to John A. Da-
Wis by the will just referred 10. In
other words, the omplainant asks for
a decree which in terms shall assume
to take away from these absent parties,
a portion OF the property secured TO
them by the compromise agreement. 1t
is argued upon behalf of the complain
ant that the court may upon the facts
stated rlghtfully enter such a decree.
| am unable to give my assent to such
n proposition. on the contrary 1 un-
derstand the law to be hat no court
has the right to give a judgment which
TO AFFECT the interests of per-
sons not before IL. This rule is not
simply one of practice from which the
court NAV under some circumstance
as for instance, when such abb
sert parties cannot be brought within
It's Jurisdiction, but IL Is one of those
rules of justice which for
bids any court to adjudicate upon the
of any one not actually or con-
structively before II. Mallow VS.. Hindc,
IL Whe. 1873. But while the complain
ant may not in the absence OF the other
parties to the compromise agreement,
be entitled to h special relief claimed
by him, IL does not necessarily follow
the demurrers to the bill must Le
because Of the absence Of
such parties. The bill contains a prayer
general relief, and il upon the facts
alleged the complainant is entitled To
any relief which the court can decree
without affecting the rights OF absent
or doing injustice to the de-
PENDANT actually before IL, the general
demurrers on account of absence of ne
parties should be overruled and
the defendants be required TO answer.
This rule is stated with great clearness
by Curtis J. in delivering the opinion
81 the supreme court In the case of
Shields VS.. Barrow. IL How. 100. The
Judge there said:
1t remains true, Notwithstanding the
act OF congress and the 18th rule. that
1 circuit court can make no decree af-
the rights Of an absent person,
md can make no decree between the
before it which so far involves
pr depends upon the rights of an absent
person hat complete n final judg-
nent cannot be dom to the parties to
he suit without affecting those rights.
use the language of this court In
VS.. Taylor. 10 VIII. i67: If
case may be completely decided as
the lltigant parties. the cir
that an interest exists In
tome other person whom the process of
he court cannot reach, as IL such party
70 a resident OF another state. ought
lot 10 prevent a decree upon the mer-
But II the case cannot be thus
completely decided, the court should
no decree"
lie this rule be applied 10 the pres
mt case. Is the complainant upon the
acts alleged in the bill entitled to any
elief against the parties defendant.
.ot involving or dependent upon the
lights of absent parties? Is the pres
49, ~ ~ WV fohAlNs W nv Iptn- /
agreement necessary In order
o enable the court to do complete Jus
Ice to the defendants In the action? II
he rights or claims of the defendants
the absent parties are inseparable
nder the compromise agreement or de-
endent n upon the other. then clear
= all the parties TO that agreement are
parties to this bill: but II
N the other hand the rights of the
artfes TO such an agreement are In
eparable, then no reason is perceived
the court cannot proceed and make
lch decree as may be just, as between
parties to this action. Under the
agreement. as / construe IL.
parties thereto are to have sepa-
ate shares of the estate divided, and )
! so far, the rights secured TO each by
lat agreement are separate and dis
net. and each must defend when IL is
ssafled, the right or title to his or her !