The Prince George's enquirer and southern Maryland advertiser. (Upper Marlborough, Md.) 1882-1925, 1898-09-02
ARMY MTSMANAGE EN- ENT.

There has as yet been no investigation
into the army administration during the
recent war, but the press and the very air
are filled with charges of acknowledgement.
Some of the facts and some of the causes
of this failure lie on the very surface, and
the probe of investigation is unnecessary
to their disclosure.
At the outset of the war the part to he
performed by the army was sufficiently
apparent The army had to wait until the
event could the real conquest of Cuba he
until sufficient body OF men
had been trained and seasoned, and until
the rainy and sickly season was over IN
Cuba. As the force of the enemy in Cuba
was some 200, 900 efficient men, we had to
prepare an army competent to cope with
this body. In view of this fact the call
for troops seems not to have been eNces-
sive This being so, the men should lave
been gathered in training camps almost
exclusively in the Northern States and in
places by the sea, and in the mountains,
of mild climate convenient to the railroads
and to ports of shipment. Health during
the summer was primary condition, and
to this it was essential not to subject the
men to novel climatic conditions.
Three cardinal mistakes were made in
the outset: First-Too many men were
brought into particular camps This was
the case at Chickamauga, at Tampa, at
Camp Alger and elsewhere. There was
no possible benefit in collecting 1000 men
at Chickamauga. 1t is practically impos
sible to maintain health in a camp of this
magnitude, remaining for months at the
same place; and this is especially SO when
the area of the camping ground is not suf
ficient The ground and water become
saturated with filth and disease germs.
Beneath torrid sun the conditions of
mortality could not be more ingeniously
prepared, if mortality had been deliberate
ly designed. 1t is to be borne in mind that
where large armies are operating against
one another they are extended over pro-
portionately large territory, and the fire.
quent moving of camps contributes to
health
Second location of the camps was
unwisely chosen. Beyond the necessity of
a reasonable protection for the Southern
cities, there was no occasion to select
camps in the South, especially as many of
the men were not acclimated and the sick
ly season at the South was approaching.
1t is appalling to think what might have
been the consequences if yellow fever had
appeared in one of these camps. 1t would
have spread over the country like wildtire.
And yet this was a contingency both pos
sible and probable.
Third-After the camps were selected
there was constant shifting of regiments
and brigades from one place to another
without any apparent reasons. An timer
airy of some of the regiments would be
curious reading, and the puzzle is, what
was the purpose of it? All of this put an
additionally severe strain on the staff.
War is undoubtedly game of chances,
of changing purposes and changing dis
positions. The recent war illustrates this.
Nothing could have been more unforeseen
than the results at Manila and the Santi-
ago affair, and, it may be said, that these
disturbing factors, and the possibility of
these and similar ones, furnish justitica-
ton of the actions of the War Department
So far from this being the case, these most
startling incidents demonstrate the I'M
wisdom of the War Department. Neither
of them evidenced the necessity of the
great aggre cations of men, the selection
of camps in the South, and the aimless
marching of men uphill in order to march
them down again.
The gathering of the army and the San
tiago expedition have also shown the la
mentable inefficiency of the commissary,
quartermastcr and medical staff. The
facts are that there have been frequent
failures to supply the men with proper
food, to prevent avoidable discomforts in
transportation and in camp and to furnish
proper quarters and attention for the sick.
If this collapse CT the staff had occurred
only at Santiago it might not be the occa-
sion for absolute surprise, but occurrin g
here in a country with an abundance of
supplies and transportation, it surpasses
belief. Even at Santiago the matter seems
to be now resolving itself into want of a
supply of landing boats-a matter easily
to be forseen and provided for.
The fact of the business seems to be that
there has been lamentable want of iron
in the army administration at Washin gton.
One of the inevitable incidents of army
administration, as Of all other administra-
ton, is its tendency to resolve itself into
a circumlocution Office. If the war office
at Washington is examined, it is probable
that the orders will be found all right:
and if one will follow these orders down
he will find the Endorsements and refer
ences all right. Indeed, it is probable that
many of them have been Endorsed down
kept the endless chain moving by starting g
a requisition upward to receive its series
of Endorsements. 1t is the ancient pro-
cess of referring and not doing. But who
has seen that the orders were obeyed?
One can imagine what a startling effect
would be produced by the sudden irrup-
ton of such a god of war as Stonewall
Jackson, with such quartermaster as
Colonel Hartman, into this merry go round
of inefficiency!
The only two attempts which seem to
have been made to break into the repose-
fulness of this inefficiency would be ludri-
cous if not so melancholy. One of them
was General Miles appearance at Tampa
after the congestion of incompetency
there had been measurably relaxed by the
mere lapse of time, and the other is the
visit of the Secretary of War to Montauk
Here at the tail of the war the head of the
war office is spending days talking to sol
diers about their privations, granting spec
ial furloughs and seeing tn at the sick get