The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1898-08-26

| ~. S. S. Indiana,
| .., guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Aug. 6.
cheV orr the report Of CGmmodore
| gives credit in the seventh paragraph to
four ships and mentions by their names
Cook, and adds: The dense smoke of the
COMBAT shut out from my view the In
diana and Gloucester but as these vessels
were closer TO your flagship no doubt their
| part In the conflict was under your imme-
| date observation
"Second-In your report as published you
make put slight mention of the Indiana
| stating that the Iowa and Indiana having
done good work, and not having the speed
OF the other ships, were directed by me,
| etc.
''Third-The result of these reports is that
| the captains of all the vessels of the line of
| battle except the Indiana, have received
| prsonal mention in the official report before
| the department, while the two smaller YES
| sells have also had distinctive mention either
| from the commander-in- or the second
| in Command
'Fourth--If the official record should be
referred to IN future it will appear from it's
| general tone that the Indiana was less de-
| serving than all of her consorts. Leaving
| out my personal interest in the matter, it is
right that l should consider the officers and
crew of the ships, and | speak for them as
well as for myself, when l submit to you,
admiral, that the above combination of re-
| ports will place the ship, in the opinion
| ly below all the other vessels of your
| squadron: respectfully submit, sir, that
| liiiS 10 AlJuSIlSC W li0 dllQ hCI OlAl-
| GERS and crew.
"Fifth-I can say. without disparagement
| of any other vessel, that during the first
| hour of the fight the Indana's gun fire con-
| tributed to the destruction of the Oquendo
| and the Teresa more than that of any single
vessel of our squadron except one, and
| equaled hers 1 do not know why the sec
| ond in command failed to observe the In
| diana during this period of our hottest &C
| ton. L saw the Brooklyn quite plainly.
| ''Sixth-An examination of these reports
| with reference to the Indiana, will, l believe,
convince you, sir, thatKthey do produce the
effect of putting the Indiana below all the
other vessels of the squadron. If it be your
| opinion, sir, that this is the case, and that
all the vessels, from the Brooklyn to the
| Vixen, rendered services much more
valuable than the Indiana as the published
| report of the commander in-chief and the
second in command taken together would
indicate, then / must accept 1t for myself
| and the ship; if the contrary, that be
not your opinion l urge respectfully that
such steps be taken to remedy this injustice
as may seem wise to you. Very respect
fully, II. c. TAYLOR.
ITO the Cornmander-in-Chief. United
States Naval Force North Atlantic Sta
ton" tsa-sscs.1s
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba, Aug s.
"Sir-I am greatly Obliged that you have
called my attention to what appears to have
been an injustice to your ship officers and
crew for the part which they took in the
action of July and also for the very prop
er manner in which you have presented it.
think, however that you will agree with
me that. in submitting such a report to
| the secretary of the navy, where so many
| officers are vitality interested, and justly
| proud of their ship, 1T IS no easy task to do
so without apparently bestowing praise un-
justly. It requires very careful consid EZRA
| ton of the report from every point OF view
| to avoid misunderstanding.
'Second-The position of the ships of the
| squadron must be carefully considered to
fully appreciate what lit was possible for
each vessel to accomplish under the circum-
stances in which she was placed those that
were certainly better placed for stopping
| the enemy and also better placed for deiv-
| ering their fire than the vessels to the east
ward, which was the blockading station of
fThird~No distribution of the fleet could
completely predict and provide against ev-
| cry variation of such a sortie, nor DO con-
slider that any commanding ofncer deserved
either credit or blame because the ship
under his command was faster or slower
| than another ship or carried q heavier or
| lighter battery, but rather tnat inc com
! failed to put his ship in the proper place
| for destroying the enemy, just N proportion
| to the advantage which he possessed IN
| speed, battery or position over ms neigh
| bors
''Fourth-Each commanding officer, in my
opinion, was personally, responsible Tor the
| good use which he made of the tools with
| which he had to work. l certainly did not
| intend to crticise you, nor to bestow less
| praise on the Indiana than was bestowed
any other ship of the squadron.
''Fifth-The fact that the commanding Of
| ficer of the Indiana was signaled to return
| to blockade at the mouth of the harbor aft
! err she had so calamity contributed to the
| destruction of the Spanish ships was only
| a necessary precaution which the command
| er-chief felt obliged to take to prevent dis
| aster to the large number of transports
| which were left in that vicinity when the
| fleet started in pursuit of the enemy. There
were still some armed vessels remaining IN
| the harbor of Santiago--at least two. and
| we did not know then how many more
| which could have come out in the absence
of the fleet and produced great havoc among
| the troop ships. which were defenseless in
| the absence of an armed vessel.
'Sixth--This explanation, together with
| your letter, will be sent to the department
1 with the request that it may be attached
| to and form part of the original report
| Very respectfully W. T. SAMPSON,
| Rear admiral u S. NJ commander-in-
| chief u. S. naval force North Atlantic sta
| ton.
'.The commanding officer U. S. S. Indiana,
| Guantanamo bay, Cuba"