The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1898-05-08

As an Illustration Of this war enthrss-
asm. the tremendous oversuppIy OF re-
sources Is very noticeable From every
state the report comes OF quotas more
than full. And after the congressional gro
vision for 125sd0 volunteers. and an in
crease OF the regular army to sl.00o men.
there come appeals in the interests Of
special classes. like the 1o 600 yellow fever
immunes. the colored troops, the indian
troops. and ali sorts Of side aids K IS al
interesting question how large an army
could be called without exhausU1g the
volunteer spirit OF the United States.
Among the District militia here i is safe
10 say thai the quota has not yet called
for one in ten Of the men who want 10 so,
and there has been a great rivalry among
the local soid!ery IN getting places in the
twelve companies Of seventy-ssyen men
eac hassigned 10 go into service as there
would be in securing seats near the band
stand al a holiday plcnic. I; may be thar
some OF this enthusiasm for enlistment
and service IS tempered by the belief that
the chances OF being accepted are small.
and If accepted the liability Of seeing act
ual fighting IS sun smaller
Il Is, fortunately, hard 10 see how anv
large part OF the Isl 600 men who viii
soon be under arms can be got within
range OF any Spanish bullets II the m
equipped Cuban insurgents. whom Il has
been the fashion OF the conservative party
10 decry, have been able to keep the
Spanish soldiery bottled up in the fortified
towns Of the island. u seems "a II Il
would be an easy task for a very small
number of American soldiers. aided by the
same insurgents, TO push the Spaniaris
of the island. Estimates OF the number
OF Insurgents have varied all the way
from 1000 20 Sc. coo, Mr.. Thomas r Daw-
ley. Jr., was quoted in these dispatches a
few weeks ago as saying he thought It
would be hard 20 find more than 1000 IN
surgents in arms. Senator Proctor, whose
speech was the Uncle Toms Cabin" Of
this war. placed the insurgent strength
at 80, e00. But whichever estimate Is cor
rect does not matter. II the rebels have
been able 70 hold the Spanish at bay for
more than three years. especially when
the home government resources were
fresh, II seems as II 1900 American SOL
diers. we'll armed and equipped. ought to
be as effective as tbs small number OF
Americans at BUena Vista were against
an army Of the Spanish race. greatly out
numbering them. There can be no ne
cessity 70 IA large army IN Cuba.
But from any point of view the raising
of the army OF 49, 600 was doubtless wise
AS a msans OF frightening Spain into sub
mission of course a large army, Ike a
L. -, T.
vincing argument as TO the nature and
IS not a war in the strict sense; the mo-
extent of our resources. Moreover. this
tives are not those OF ordinary warfare.
nor are the contestants so nearly alike IN
ability and resources to constitute this
square fight This is rather an exhibit
ton OF International police power. and as
such is fitting that the police authorities
should have force greatly outnumbsr-
ing the rioters whom they wish TO subdue.
According 10 our theory, the Spanish gov
eminent has been guilty. as a part of its
lIorrible misrule of Cuba, OF an attempt
to extermiuate a race by starvation Our
consular reports say that 10000 Of her
non-combatant subjects have been mur-
dered through hunger and disease, as a
result OF me recommendation OEueE- nc
United tSates government is going into
Spanish affairs as an international police
man to put an end to a system OF muir
der and it justifies Itself IN so doing on
the ground that the Cuban question has
been declared to be an American dues-
ton, and the condition of the island
vital concern to the American people The
destruction Of the Maine was really an
accident that befeH US while occupying
a miIder relation Of police supervision. or
rather OF police observation. But in the
long run this war must be looked upon as
our attempt to put an end to conditions
so shocking and brutslizing that we could
not permit their indefinite continuance.
In this light. il Is entirely proper that
our army should tremendously outnumber
those whom we are TO meet; and besides,
there are the practical reasons in favor
OF such a course, that the heavier the
force, the less injury We ars liable 20 re-
ceive. and the sooner the hostilittes VIII
be ended. SO from every viewpoint the
argument for large army IS convincing,
even though not much Of II may see actual
field service.