The San Francisco call., 1897-06-27
cENTRALIzA ION IN HE ARMY.


An army is like machine in more than one
sense. For the accomplishment OF results
each part must perform its proper functions,
and all work together toward a common end.
Ihe means OF obtaining the necessary cone
renee and cooperation OF the parts OF an army
| are organization. admins tration and dlscl-
pine Similar means are adopted in all large
aggregations of individuals, as in a railroad
company. But while the latter is left free to
perfeet It's organization and administration SO
as TO produce the best results the army, on
the other hand, is almost entirely creature
OF law. Its organization is fixed by law, and
SO to very large degree is its administration
and discipline.
10 produce the best results either In peace
or war an army must be under one central
control and direction, and by means OF per-
feet administration and organic ition the VIII
OF the commander is made to operate through
out the entire mass down 10 the lowest pri-
Vate. 1t thus becomes q powerful and ell
cient instrument
The organization of our army is confessedly
faulty ard far from modern, but thus lar Con-
gress has not seen fit to make the changes
deemed by the most accomplished officers as
necessary 10 produce the best results. In the
matter OF organization we are fully thirty
years behind the European standard. While
q proper organization is of the greatest i'm
por;ance and the best guarantee of success in
war, the methods of administration may still
be so faulty that the best organization counts
for little. II seems to be the fate of our army
that its administration should be conducted
on the most cumbersome lines. Methods are
In vogue that would ruin any large civil or
ganization.
While certain amount of red tape is neces-
sary, our little army is in danger of being
entirely overwhelmed by an avalanche of pa
pers of all sorts. The number of returns and
reports required is appalling. This result has
been brought about gradually. For num-
Der OF years past there has been decided
| tendency toward Capitalization in army az
fairs. The powers and functions of the
bureaus at Washington have been largely in
creased.
The most petty details, instead OF being de-
clded on the ground and by the officers most
competent 10 determine the matter, must be
referred to Washington for decision. The re-
suit Is that the departments are Overburdened
and behindhsnd ana delays and confusion re-
suit at all points. Business is managed more
or less by cast-iron rules rather than in ac-
cordance with the conditions of climate and
surrounding. Some idea of the system may
be formed from the statement that authority
Tor the purchase OF supplies in each aud every
individual case must be specifically granted
by the Secretary of War, even for departments
.
government. Subordinsies, stripped of nearly
all control and responsibility, grow Indifferent
and indecisive- Even the general OF the army
has little real power, nearly everything being
concentrated in the heads OF departments,
who are responsible only 10 the Secretary OF
War.
If delays were the only results flowing from
such methods II would matter little, but as II
IS we are training officers in methods of sd-
ministration which must be radically changed
on the approach of war AS our armies will
be composed of volunteers, we, OF ali other
! nations, should adopt a system OF military ad-
ministration which should be at once simple,
direct, and adapted to aid rather than hinder
| The operations of troops.
Our general and staff officers bear the pro-
portion OF three to eight 10 officers OF the line,
while the staff corps and departments cost
sixth OF the total expenditure for the
army Besides this, over 200 line officers and
/ large number of enlisted men are detailed
on staff duty. Our large staff has many points
| 10 recommend it, and can easily serve for
/ a much larger army. As il would be the
/ hardest part of an army TO improyise its
/ maintenance is justified.
The authority of the President and under
/ him OF the Secretary of War cannot and should
! not be limited within narrow bounds. But at
/ the same time it would seem that under a
proper system the Secretary should have only
] general CONlrOl anu direction The details
/ should be LETT to these who are fully fitted by
/ education and experience to attend TO them.
| Powers should be deleg ated TO su bordinates,
/ who should exercise them fully within pre-
/ scribed limits and be held to an an account
/ ability. Similar reasoning shows that the
| heads Of departments in turn should be re-
| lieyed of the petty details of adm nistration
and be left free o give general supervision.
| No one can doubt that such methods of ad-
m a n nj IL
and legal, but that they are the only methods
which will insure the best of service from the
greatest numbers Each officer should BE-
! given responsibility and means and be held
accountable for results. Decentralization,
rather than its opposite, is the keynote of
German success In army administration and
has produced results which have made that
army model for the world. Subject TO some
differences OF condition, possibly, such policy
should be the one followed in our army, and
its efficiency, both in peace and war, would be
vastly increased.