Middletown transcript., 1897-12-11

rational compromise between the cor
testants and Intervention in favo
J of one or the other party. 1 speak nc
of forcihle annexation, for that canno
be thought of. That by our code 0
morality would be criminal aggression
/ Recognition of the belligerency G
the Cuban insurgents has often beel
canvassed as a possible, if not inevit
able step both ir regard to the previou
ten years struggle and during the pres
ent war. l am not unmindful tina
the two houses of Congress in tn
spring of 1896 expressed the opinion b.
resolution that condition of public ex
listed requiring or justifying the recog
milton of state of belligerency in Cub
and during the extra session the Senate
voted a joint resolution of like import
which, however, was not brought to 6
vote in the House Of Representatives
In the presence of these significant ex.
pressinns of the sentiment of the legis.
lative branch it behooves the executive
to soberly consider the conditions
under which 80 important meas
ure needs rest for justification. 1t is
to be seriously considered whether the
Cuban insurgents possesses beyond dis
pute the attributes of statehood which
alone can demand the recognition of
belligerency in its favor. Possession,
in short, of the essential qualifications
Of sovereignty by the insurgents and
the conduct of the war ty them accord
ing to the recognized code Of war are
no less important factors toward the
determ ination of the problem Of belli-
gerency than are the influences and
consequences of this struggle upon the
internal policy of the recognizing state.
1.-THE President here quotes extern
sively from President Grant to sustain
his opinions.l
x y
Turning o the political aspects of a
recognition of belligerency and review
ing its Inconvenience and positive, dan
gers still further pertiGent considera-
tions appear. In the code of nations
there is no such thing as naked re-
cognition of belligerency unaccompan-
led by the assumption Of international
neutrality. Such recognition without
more will not confer upon either party
to domestic conflict status not there
tofore actually possessed or affect the
relation of either party to other states.
The act Of recognition usually takes
the form of a solemn proclamation of
neutrality which recites the defaeto
conditions Of belligenercy as its motive.
1t announces a domestic law of neu-
trality in the declaring state. 1t as
sumes the international obligations of
a neutral in the presence Of public
state of war. 1t warns all citizens and
Others within the jurisdiction of the
proclaimant that they violate those
rigorous obligations at their own peril
and cannot expect TO be shielded from
the consequences. The right of visit
and search on the seas and seizure of
vessels and cargoes and contraband of
war and good prize under admiralty
law must under International law
be admitted as legitimate con-
sequence of proclamation of belliger-
ency. While according the equal bel
ligerent rights defined by public law to
each party in our ports, disfavors would
be imposed on both, which while nom
inally equal would weigh heavily in be-
half of Spain herself. Possessing a
navy and controlling the ports of Cuba,
her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment of
the island, but up to the margin of our
own territorial, water and condition
of things would exist for which the
Cubans within their domain could not
hepe to create parallel; while its
creation through aid or sympathy from
within our domain would be even
more impossible that now, with the
additional obligations of international
neutrality we would perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged
and oner0us code of neutrality would |
only be influential within our own juI-
isdiction by land and sea and applicable |
by our own instrumentality. It could |
impart to the United States no juris- |
1iction between Spain and the iusu. :
gents. II would give the United States |
no right of intervention to enforce the |
conduct of the strife within the para
mount authority of Spain according |
to the International code of war.
For these reasons / regard the rec
ignition of the billigerency of the Gu
ban insurgents as now unWise and
therefore inadmissible. Should that
step hereafter be deemed wise as
measure of right and duty the executive
will take it.
Intervention upon humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggested
md has not failed to receive my most
Inxious and earnest consideration But
should such step be now taken when
t is apparent that a hopeful change
las supervened in the policy of Spain
oward Cubap A new government has
AIKEN effice in the mother country. 1t
s pledged in advan ce to the declara-
ion that all the effort in the world can
lot suffice to maintain peace In Cuba
y the hayonet; that vague promises Of
eform after subjugation affected no
olution of insular problem; that with
substitution of commanders must
ome change of The past system of
warfare for one in harmony with q new +