The silver lance., 1897-12-10

the recognized code OF war are NO less
important facts toward the determine
ton Of the problem than ure the In
fiuences and consequences OF the strug-
gle upon the internal policy OF recog-
mixing the state.
The wise utternnces OF Fresiuent
Grant in his memorable message OF
December z, 1875, are signnl1y relevant
to the present situation In Cuba. and It
may be wholesome now to recall them
At that time a ruinous conflict hadsfor
seven years wasted the neighboring
island. During all those years an utter
disregard Of civilized warfare and the
demands of humanity. which called for
the expression of condemnation from
the nations OF all ChrIstendom. contin-
ued unnbated. Desolation and ruin
pervaded that productive region, enor-
mously affecting the commerce OF all
nations, but that OF the United States
more than any other by reason Of
proximity and larger trade and inters
course.
At that juncture General Grant ut
tered these words. which now, as then,
sum up the elements Of the problem:
"A recognition Of the independence
of Cuba being, in my opinion, imprac-
ticable and indefensible, the question
that next presents itself Is that of n
TetoSIltlOn VI DtilittTtut VI tiic
parties. Such recognition entails diff
cult and important duties. 1t confers
the right of search upon the high sens;
it would subject the carrying OF arms
and munitions in vessels of the United
States to detention and possible seiz-
| ure: it would give rise to countless
vexatious questions; would relieve the
parent government from responsible
ity for acts done by insurgents, and
would invest Spain with a right to ex-
ercise a supervision over our commerce
on the high seas"
Turning to the practical aspects of
n recognition of belllgerency and re-
viewing the Inconvenience and posi-
tive dangers still further pertinent
considerations appear.
Recognition OF BeIlIgerency.
In the code of nations there is no
such thing as naked recognition of
belligerency unaccompanied by the as
sumption of international neutrality.
Such recognition, without that, will not
confer upon either party to u domestic
conflict n status not heretofore actually
possessed. The net of recognition u.s.
ually takes the form of a solemn proc
lamation of neutrality which recites
the de facto condition of belligerency
as n motive. 1t assumes the interna-
tional obligations of neutrality in the
presence of u public state of war. II
warns all citizens and others within
the jurisdiction Of the proclaimant that
they violate those obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect to be shell
tered from the consequences. The right
to visit and search vessels and the
seizure of vessels and cargo and con
traband of war under admiralty law
must be admitted as a legitimate con
sequence of a proclamation of bellig
erency. While according to each equa
belligerency rights, as defined by pub
lie law, to each party in our ports, dis
favors would be imposed on boil
which, while nominally equal. woult
weigh heavily on Spain herself. Pos
sessing q navy and controlling tn,
ports of Cuba Spain's maritime rights
could be asserted not only for the mil
, itary investment of the island, but III
! to the margin Of our own territora
waters, and n condition would exist fol
! which the Cubans within their owl
domain could not hope to create par
! allel; while its creation, through aid Ol
, sympathy, from within our domain
would be even more impossible thar
now. with the additional obligations ol
neutrality we would perforce assume
The enforcement Of this enlarged an,
Onerous code Of neutrality would onl,
be influential within our own jurisdic
tion by land and sea, and applicable b,
our own instrumentalities. 1t could i'm
part to the United States no jurisdic
ton between Spain and the insurgents
1t would give the United States NJ
rights of Intervention to enforce tn,
conduct of strife within the paramount
authority of Spain according to the in
ternational code of war.
For these reasons regard the recog
milton of the belligerency of the CubaI
insurgents as now unwise. and there
hereafter be deemed wise as a measur,
of right and duty the executive viii
take it.
No Intervention Now.
Intervention upon Humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggested
and 1t has not failed to receive my anx
ious and earnest consideration. n,
such step should now be taken, how
ever, when 1t Is apparent that a hopefu
change has supervened In the policy o.
Spain toward China. A new govern
ment has taken Office In the mothe
country.
1t is said that all the efforts in TIL,
world cannot suffice to maintain peac,
by the bayonet, that vague promises o.
reform after subjugation afford no so
luton in the insular problem, tha
with a substitution of commander
must come a change of the past system
of warfare for one of harmony, with I
new policy which shall no longer ain
to drive the Cubans to the horrible al
tentative of taking to the thicket o.
succumbing in misery" that reforms
must be instituted in accordance will
the needs and circumstances of th'
time. and that reforms, while designed
to give full autonomy to the colony ant
to create virtual entity and self-ccn
trolled administration, shall yet con