The San Francisco call., 1897-03-27
JUSTICE WHITES
DISSENTING VIEWS
Differs From Other Mem
berS of the Federal
Supreme Court.
Cites Acts of Congress to Show
Interstate Commerce Laws
Are Valid.
Some Crumbs of c, mfort for the
Raj road Associations Demoral.
izei by the Recent Ru ing.

izei by the Recent Ru ing.
WASHINGTON, D. c., March 26.-The
dissenting opinion of Justice White OF
the Supreme Court OF the United States in
the Trans-Missourl Freight Association
case, wherein the majority Of the court
decided Monday last that the antitrust
law of 1890 was valid and constitutional
and the agreement of the association was
in restraint of trade and. therefore, in
violation OF its provisions, and in which
Justices Field, Gray and Shiras joined,
has been made public in full. 1t is nearly
as voluminous as the opinion delivered by
Justice Peckham, and traverses the argu-
ments and conclusions OF that document
in vigorous way. introducing the mat
ter, Justice White says:
The theory upon which the contract is held
to be illegal is that even though it be reason..
able and hence valid under the general
principles of law, it is yet void because 1T con-
fiicts with the act Of Congress. Now, at the
outset it Is necessary to understand the ful!
import OF this conclusion. As 1. is conceded
that the contract does.not unreasonably re-
strain trade, and that ii it does not 50 un-
general law, the decision is substantially that
the act OF Congress is q departure from the
general principles of law, and by its terms
destroys the righIs of individuals or corpora-
tions to enter into very many reasonable
contracts. But this proposition, deem II, is
tantamount to an assertion that the act OF
Congress is itself unreason able.
The difhculty of meeting, by reasoning,
premise OF this nature is frankly conceded. Tor,
OF course, where the fundamental proposition
upon which the whole contention rests is that
the act of Congress is unreasonable, 1t would
seem conducive TO nouseful purpose TO invoke
reason as applicable to and as controlling the
construction of a statute which is admitted to
be beyond the pale ofreason. The question
then is, is the act OF Congress relied on to be
so interpreted as TO give II a reasonable mean
ing or is it 10 be construed as being unrea-
sonable and as violative OF the elementary
principles OF justice?
The opinion discusses this question in
the light of former decisions as to reason
able and unreasonable agreements in
restraint of trade, and on that point the
conclusion is reached:
That to define then, the words 'in restraint
of trade embr cling every contract which
in any degree pro duced that effect would be
violative of reas on, because 1t would include
all those contrac Is which are the very essence
of trade, and would be equivalent to saying
that there shous be no trade, and therefore
nothing to restrain.
The principles of proper construction
are reviewed by the Justice, and he says:
If these obvious rules of Interpretation be
applied it seems TO me they render it impossi-
BILE to cOnstrue the words every restraint OF
trade used in the act in any other sense than
excluding reasonah bic ltracts, as the fact
that such contracts were not considered to be
within the rule of contracts in restraint OF
trade was thoroughly established both in
England and in this country at the time the
act was adopted.
1t is, 1 submit, not to be doubted that the in
terpre tation OF the words "every contract in
restraint of trade" SO as to embrace within
its purview every contract, howe, er reasona-
BILE. would certainly work an enormous injus-
tice and Operate to the undue restraint OF the
Ii ties OF the citiz.n: But there is no canon
of Interpretation which requires that the
letter be followed when by so doing an un-
reasonable result is accomplished. On the
contrary the rule is the other way, and exacts
letter which kilieth is the proper guide by
which to correctly interpret a statute.
The remedy intended to be accomplished by
the act Of Congress was to shield against the
danger OF contract or com mbination by the few
agains. the interest of the many and 20 the
detriment of freedom. The construction now
given, l think. strikes down the interest of the
many to the advantage and benefit of the few.
1t has been held in case involving COM
bination among workingmen that such COM
binations are EN- braced in the act OF Congress
in question, and this view was not doubted by
this court The Interpretation OF the statute,
therefore, which holds that reasonable agree
ments are within its purview makes it EN- brace
every PeaceaDie organization or combination
of the laborer to benefit mis- condition either
by obtaining an increase Of wages or diminu-
tion of the hours of labor.
II follows that the construction which reads
the rule OF reason out of the statute embraces
within its inhibition every contract or com BIZ
nation by which workingmen seek to peace
ably better their condition. 1t is, therefore.
as / see IL, absolutely true to say that the con-
struction now adopted which works out such
results not only illustrates the plain purpose
intended 10 be accomplished by Congress, but
ii also makes the statute tend to an end never
contemplated, and against the accomplish
ment OF which It's provisions were enacted.
Justice White also discusses the ques-
ton. "Does the implication irresistibly
arise that Congress intended in the act Of
1880 to abrogate in whole or in part the
provisions OF the act of 1887 regulating
interstate commerce. and concludes
THAT the nature of the two enactments
clearly demonstrates there was no such
intention"
A consideration of terms Of the inter
state commerce act makes it clear to him
"that the contract here sought to be
avoided as illegal is either directly sane
toned or impliedly authorized thereby.
The agreement in question, seeking to
secure uniform classification and to pre-
vent the under cutting of the published
rates, even though such agreements be
made with com peting as well as with
joint lines, is in accord with the plain
text OF the interstate commerce act and is
in harmony with the views of the purposes
Of that law contemporaneously expressed
in Congress by the body Immediately
charged with its administration, ami
tacitly approved by Congress.
To my mind the judicial declaration
that carriers cannot agree among them
selves for the purpose of aiding in the en-
forcement of the provisions OF the inter-
state commerce law will strike q blow at
the beneficial results of that act and will
have direct tendency TO produce the
preferences and determinations which 1t
was one OF the main objects OF the act to
frustrate."
And in conclusion the minority says:
"Manifestly this decision is utterly ir.
reconcillable with the views that in the
case OF railroad company every restraint
imposed by contract upon its freedom OF
action is necessarily injurious to the pub
lie interests. and hence invalid. Indeed,
the proposition that any restraint OF its
conduct which railroad may create by
contract is invalid because such road is
a public corporation is emonstrated to
be erroneous by the interstate commerce
act. which in the provisions heretofore re-
ferred to not only expressly authorizes
but in some instances commands agree
ments, from which restraint OF the action
Of corporation necessarily arises"
VIII appeal at Once.
NEW YORK, N. Y, March 26.-District
Attorney Mcfarland said to-day that an
appeal directed by Attorney Gen eral Nc