Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1897-01-17

fenslve military positions held by either
army anywhere throughout the war.
During the closing hours Of the bat
tie OF Chattanooga-that is, during the
afternoon of Sunday. September 10Th
Rossville Gap was occupied in force by
General Negley, with at least a DIVISION
of those Union troops which had been
forced from the Union right end centre.
had passed to the rear through Mission
airy Ridge, and, turning to the right.
had taken possession of Rossyille Gap,
md so stood once more across kpe La
,fayette road, which was Braggs line
Of advance to Chattanooga. Not only
this. but Sheridan's Division entire had
moved through the gap. and marched out
three miles on the Lafayette road to-
ward Bragg. and stood across the road.
in close contact with General Bragg
left. at the time the battle ended. These
troops had all recovered from the con-
fusion, into which a portion of them had
been thrown by the break at noon at
Chckamauga.
ION the morning Of September 2lst,
when Forrest moved up within mile or
the gap, to reconnoitre, and when he
supposed that the Union army had reach
| ed Chattanooga, and was 'evacuating as
hard as they can co. 1t was, as already
stated, In position, formed. and ready for
| battle on such impregnable ground as
above indicated.
General Thomas's report tells how
his army was here disposed for battle.
at the very time General Forrest, In close
proximity TO these lines. concealed by
the forests, was writing his dispatch to
General Polk. After initiating and SUI
perntending the movement by which he
| withdrew his forces from the Kelley
| field line. TO be followed with those from
Snodgrass Hill, for the purpose or pass
ing them through McFarlands Gap In
Missionary Ridge. around Braggs right,
and placing them In Rossville Gap, be-
| tween Bragg and Chattanooga, General
Thomas says:
81 then proceeded 10 Rcssville. ac-
companied by Generals Garfield and Cor
don Granger. and Immediately prepared
TO place the troops in position a that
| point. one brigade Of Negley's Division
was posted in the gap on the RinAold
road, and two brigades on the top OK
the ridge to the right of the road. ad-
Joining the brigade in the road: Rey-
nolds's Division on the right of NeSleys,
and reaching TO the Dry valley road;
Brannan's Division In the rear or Rey-
nolds's right, as q reserve; McCook
Corps on the right OF the Dry Valley
road, and stretching toward the west, MS
right reaching nearly 10 Chattdhoosa
creek; Crittenden's entire corps was post
ed on the heights TO the left OF KING
gold road. with Steedman's Division OF
Granger's Corps in reserve behind his
left: Baird's Division in reserve. and In
supporting distance Of the brigade In the
gap; McCook's Brigade OF Granger
Corps was posted as reserve TO ths
brigade OF Negleys on the top or the
ridge to the right of the road; Minty's
Cavalry was on the Ringgold road, about
a mile and a half in advance or the gap.
NO CHANCE FOR BRAGG.
with practically the entire Army OF
the Cumberland rested and thus skill
fully posted In strong position, with SUI
fcient rations and ammunition. and with
its right guarded on front and flank
by Wilder's mounted infantry. and three
brigades OF cavalry. with speers Infantry
Brigade as a support to these. and AL
as General Thomas telegraphed, IN hign
spirits II Is not difficult to see what
would have happened II Bragg. even win
his seasoned and magnificent veterans.
had followed Forests advice. to press
forward as rapidly AS possible
THAT General Bragg was better m
formed than General Forrest is suflcient-
ly shown by the fact that at the very
time Forrest was sending the dispatch
quoted General Bragg was teiegrapnins