The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-01-14

cloud of dust supposing them to be
the head of McPherson's column, and
being anxious to get into camp before
dark, he had called in his pickets and
started down the road, leaving me
perfectly exposed. Some struggling
wagons, escorted by New Jersey regi-
ment, were passing at the time, and
composed the rear of Hurlbut's train.
The rebel cavalry, seeing the road clear
of troops, and these wagons passing,
struck them in flank, shot down the
mules of three or four wagons, broke
the column, and began a general skir-
mish. The escort defended their wagons
as well as they could, and thus diverted
their attention; otherwise | would surely
have been captured In a short time
the head of McPherson's column came
up, went into camp, and we spent the
night in Decatur.
THE MERIDIAN RAID.
The next day we pushed on, and on
the 14th entered Meridian, the enemy
retreating before US toward Demopolis,
Ala. We at once set to work to destroy
an arsenal, immense storehouses, and the
railroad in every direction. We staid
in Meridian five days, expecting every
hour to hear Of Gen. Sooy Smith, but
could get no tidings of him whatever.
A large force of infantry was kept at
work all the time in breaking up the
Mobile q Ohio Railroad, south and
north also the jackson & Selma Rail-
road, east and west. | was determined
to damage these roads so that they could
not be used again for hostile purposes
during the rest of the war. ] never had
the remotest idea of going to Mobile, but
had purposely given out that idea to the
people Of the country, so as to deceive
the enemy and to divert their attention.
Many persons still insist that, because we
did not go to Mobile on this occasion,
had failed; but in the following letter to
Gen. Banks, of Jan. 81, written from
Vicksburg before starting for Meridian,
it will be seen clearly that indicated
my intention to keep up the delusion of
an attack on Mobile by land, whereas /
promised him to be back to Vicksburg
by the 1st Of March, so as to cooperate
with him in his contemplated attack on
Shreveport:
HDo'Rs DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, 7
VICKsBURG. Jan. 81, 1864.
Maj .-Gen. N. P. BANKS. commanding Depart
ment of the Cult. New Orleans.
GENERAL: Ireceived yesterday, at the hands
of Capt. Dunham, Aidde-Camp, your letter of
the 25th inst, and hasten to reply. Capt. Dun.
ham has gone to the mouth of the White River,
en- route for Little Rock, and the other officers
who accompanied him have gone up to Cairo,
as / understand, to charter % steamboats, for
the Red River trip. The Mississippi River,
though low for the season, is free of ice and in
good boating order but understand that Red
River is still low. had man in from Alex
andria yesterday, who reported the falls or
rapids at that place impossible save by the
smallest boats. My inland expedition is now
moving, and will be of for Jackson and Me-
ridian tomorrow. The only fear have is in
the weather. All the other combinations are
good. / want to keep up the delnsion of an
attack on Mobile and the Alabama River, and
therefore would be obliged if you would keep
up an irritating foraging or other expedition
in that direction.
Ny orders from. Gen. Grant wifi not, as yet,
Justify me in embarking for Red River, though
/ am very anxious to move in that direction.
The moment learned that you were preparing
for it, / sent a communication to Admiral
Porter, and dispatched to Gen. Grant at Chatta-
nooga, asking il he wanted me and Steele to
cooperate with you against Shreveport; and
will have his answer in time, for you cannot
do anything till Red River has IL feet of water
on the rapids at Alexandria. That will be
from March to June. / have lived on Red
River, and know somewhat of the phases of
that stream. The expedition on Shreveport
should be made rapidly, with simultaneous
movements from Little Rock on Shreveport,
from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined
force of gunboats and transports directly up
Red River. Admiral Porter will be able to
have a splendid fleet by MARCH, ]. think
Steele could move with 10000 infantry and
5000 cavalry. could take about ten thou
sand, and you could, l suppose, have the same.
Your movement from Opelousas, simultaneous
with mine up the river, would compel Dick
Taylor to leave Fort De Russy (near Marks
ville), and the whole combined force could ap-
pear at Shreveport about day appointed be-
forehand.
/ doubt If the enemy will risk
A SIEGE AT SHREVEPORT,
although am informed they are fortifying the
place, and placing many heavy guns in position.
1t would be better for Us that they shonld stand
there, as we might make large and important
captures. But do not believe the enemy will
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