The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1897-12-01

ported Uen. Lee calleu us IuIo uu0
tent. He then asked us how we were
mounted and what we had in our
haversacks. He then said to us !:
"Gentlemen, I am sending you to-
night to Gen. Jackson, who is on his
way from Harper's Ferry to join US.
He is coming on the Virginia side of
the Potomac, and you will find him
on the road. You will go from here
to Sharpsburg and cross the river at
that point, thence down the river
towards Harper's Ferry. 1t is more
than probable that you will fall in
with the enemy tonight, but you must
make your way, through by some
means. IF the bearer Of the dispatch
is captured he must Immediately de
stroy the dispatch; by no means let it
fall into the hands of the enemy. 1t
is of great importance that it be deliv-
cred to Gen. Jackson with all speed. "
Gen. Lee was evidently much depress-
ed, the first and only time 1 ever saw
anything Of the kind in him. We
Immediately set out, and in half an
hour had run into the enemy in the
streets of Sharpsburg. This body Of
the enemy turned out to be the four
hundred cavalry chat had escaped from
Harper's Ferry. aud we're making their
way up the north side Of the river.
They were resting in Sharpsburg when
we ran into them, and evidently
thought that the whole Of Stuart's
cavalry was upon them. In fact,
Stuart's cavalry was only a mile away,
and they had good reason to think so;
at least they scampered off at head
long gait and left us masters Of Sharps-
burg. Suffice it to say that Jackson
marched on the field of Sharpsburg
early the next morning. The body OF
cavalry was the same that struck Lees
unguarded ammunition train on the
Williamsport road after they had left
Sharpsburg. and it has always been a
historical query why they did not cap
ture the train instead Of riding through
it, and leaving the whole train to es-
cape over the river. The explanation
has always been simple to me. They
were fleeing from Harper's Ferry and
expecting every moment to encounter
Stuart's cavalry, and when the little
adventure I have related occurred they
we're sure the whole Of Stuart's cav
airy was upon them. The battle Of
Sharpsburg, which occurred the next
day, is matter of history. After
that battle we were concentrated at
Culpepper Court House. Gen. Burn
side was now in command Of the Fed
eral army, and Lee, uncertain as to
what move he would make, had as
sumed mastery strategy, ready TO
meet any possible contingency. AS is
well known Gen. Burnside determined
to march upon Richmond by way Of
Fredericksburg. Scarcely had he COM
menced movement when Lee broke
camp and, marching three miles to his
one, whipped around over the Kappa
hammock and faced him at Fredericks-
burg with his concentrated army.
Gen. Burnside spent three weeks re-
covering from the surprise Of finding
Lee in his front, when he thought he
had left him at Culpepper Court
House, and then commenced crossing,
having bombarded and burnt large
portion Of the city preparatory there
to. The line of battle of the Confed-
crates was on range of hills about a
mile and.a a half from the river, and
parallel to it. Between this range Of
hills and the river is level plateau
about four miles long. Upon this
the Federal army formed, near the
river and below the city; the city be-
ing to their extreme right. Opposite,
and forming the Confederate extreme
left, was Marye's Hill. Around the
front of Marye's Hill ran road and a
stone fence or wall, some three or four
feet thick, and about four and one
half feet high. Behind this stone
wall were massed two brigades in tri-
pie lines. On the top of Marye's
Hill, just above the stone wall, was
the battalion of the Washington Ar
tillery, Of New Orleans, under Lieut..
Col. Walton. Marye's Hill rises i'm
mediately from the road and stone
wall and is quite steep. The enemy
had about one hundred pieces Of ar
tillery on Stafford Heights, just across
the river, which easily played on
Marye's Hill. But the position, de-
Tended as it was, was almost impreg-