The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-10-10
nnrinme nation. n va innrit.hl. th.t ~.

maritime naucn. ~ was inevitable that aeA
power should govern the course Of the revolu-
tionary movement which broke out with such
fury in 1921, when tho Greek peasants from the
adjacent valleys seized tho stronghold of
Patras, and. presently, gained possession
Of almost the whole Peloponnesus. Tho
Inhabitants OF the islands Of the Egean
quickly followed the example Of their
mainland compstrlots and We'd with each other
in euuipping local ~tiotillas to challenge tho
osmanlis on the sea. With surprising swift
ness n navy came into being which carried the
banner OF the Cross all over the archipelago.
The failure OF the Porto to recognize the para
mount Importance OF maritime command In tho
particular circumstances, until shameful disas.
ter compelled the recognition OF 1t, proved tho
salvation of the patriot cause. The ~overwholm.
ing naval strength of the Ottoman Empire was
not thrown into the scale till the Greeks, by
their heroic fight for freedom, had won tho
moral support OF Europe. 1t was Canaris, with
his freships off tho Anatolian shore, who dealt
the deadly stroke which laid tho one really for.
midable Turkish army of invasion low on the
threshold Of the Peloponnesus. 1t was by the
agency of sea power that Ibrahim Pasha, tho
representative of tho Sultan's Egyptian vsssal,
subsequently gained important triumphs in the
districts of Greece which had been tho cradle of
the insurrection. 1t was again the absence OF
IhuLl w ihh1e W hhNA paw
those Egyptian triumphs from ending in the
subjugation Of the Greeks while the great pow.
ers were stu hcsitating. II was next the con.
centration ,t the great naval forces OF tho Sui.
tan In one locality which planted the banners of
the Crescent on the ramparts Of Missolonghi.
It was finally tho catastrophe at Navarino
which wrested Hellas from the grasp of Islam.
Sea power. tlpen. was unquestionably the
determining factor in the Greek war for indie
pendence. Nevertheless. there are certain
points in connection with this contest which
diminish the value OF its lessons. Tho naval
operations of neither side can be taken as mod.
els OF the iudicious application of maritime re-
sources. The conduct of the Greek fleets was
signalized rather by brilliancy OF isolated enter.
prise than by a sound continuity OF naval policy
adapted to the circumstances Of the case. The
behavior Of the Ottoman squadrons was gener.
ally discreditablc, and was often beneath con-
tempt. Yet, IL sea power was not always util.
lied to the best purpose during the vicissitudes
Of this singular struggle. 1t controlled every
varying phase OF the campaign: there were cpl
sodes in the conflict Of vital moment to the
belligerents. during which its influence was all.
powerful on land; and when at last the crisis
came 1t decided the issue and turned the scale in
favor Of the cause of liberty.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1s2S-29 presents q
striking example of the Importance OF maritime
But for the endorsements sent by
sea TO Paskievich. the Russian General in Ar
menia, it would have taxed his resources and
abilities to the very utmost merely TO retain his
hold on Kars and Akhalsik, in the second year
Of war. Thanks to Russian preponderance in
the Black Sea. Gen. Wittgenstein had been able.
in 1928. to maintain his ill.organized force for
months in the barren uplands OF the eastern
section of Bulgaria and to compel the surrender
of Turkeys great coast fortress, varna. 1t was
by acting in concert with the Russian fleet that
Wittgenstein's successor, Diebich. turned the
great mountain bulwark which bars the road
TO an invader from the Danube toward the Gold
en- Horn. A maritime base was secured upon
the further side of the balkans. and thence a
final blow was aimed at the very heart Of the
Ottoman Empire. The Sultan found his capital
apparently at the mercy Of an invading host
which stretched across from the Euxine to the
Mediterranean Sea, and was supported on its
TANKS by formidable fleets. Sea power permit
ted Diebich. with a mere fraction of the army
under his command, to threaten the hostile cap
ital, regardless of great gatherings of Osmanli
troops at Shumla and elsewhere, almost in con-
tact with the long line of land communication
which connected him with Besserabia. Naval
preponderance, in fact, decided the issue
in the invaders favor. and caused the
Russian triumph in The theatre of war.
IL WAb uu6 W II naval lOECSS U II SLdE
operating in the Mediterranean that the mill.
tary resources in outlying sections Of the vast
Ottoman Empire remained. in great part, idle
spectators while the invading hosts from the
north and the east forced their way into its CEN
tire. 1t Is true, undoubtedly, that the campaigns,
alike in Europe and in Asia. were land CAM
paigns, and that Of actual fighting on the sea
there was none worthy of the name. Neverthe-
less. maritime command was the dominant note
throughout. To outward appearances the Rus
sian Navy played a secondary part during the
war; in reality, its undisputed supremacy gov
erned the operations and shaped their course
from start to finish.
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