The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1897-06-09

| Chicago, June S.-The Chicago IT'D
une's correspondent, Charles NJ. Pep
per, telegraphs the following from New
York:
Special Commissioner w. j. Calhoun.
who returned here yesterday from
Cuba, says that he had formed an i'm
preston before leaving the states that
! negroes and possibly bandits. were the
chief agents in the Instruction He
had not been there three days before
he was convinced the whole strength
of the CUBAN people is back of the in
surrection. He became satisfied that
it was in reality the struggle of Cuba
for the Cuban and that they would
fight desperately for independence.
Everything he subsequently saw and
heard strengthened this belief.
WEYLER A LIAR.
Calhoun had heard the reports of
pacification by General Weyler and had
credited them in some degree. His stay
in Cuba destroyed this notion. He could
not find the pacificdtion which was
reported. Instead, he found signs of
war everywhere-even at the gates of
Havana. The Spanish troops held GER
tain parts of the island as an army of
occupancy. while the insurgents were
l4dAlI6 IOIiSldll OAtCll SQNtCofoAN III
raids. Mr.. Calhoun was so impressed
with these evidences of. actual warfare
that he gave out a blunt statement,
saying he could see no end of the war
and that the devastation was growing.
Mr.. Calhoun could not discover that
any approach tn civilized methods of
warfare was being made on either
side. He was overwhelmed with evil
dence TO show the atrocities committed
by the soldiers under Weyler, Darticu-
larly the guerillas, who form a part
of the regular army. Such cases as he
was able to investigate personally. gen
orally proved to be correctly stated. He
also learned it was true that the Red
Cross society was not permitted to eX-
ercise its offices of mercy between the
two contending parties. This refusal
was on the part of the Spanish gov
eminent.
No EXAGGERATION.
Mr. Calhoun's personal inquiries and
Investigations have satisfied him that
the starvation and suffering caused by
Weyler's RECOMMENDATION order. were
not exaggerated. He saw the scenes
of human misery at Matanzas, which
determined him TO look no further into
that phase of the war, because he had
seen enough.
IT will possibly have a determining
Cuba has reached a state of savagery
that justifies the United States in in
tervening on the grounds of civiliZa-
ton and humanity. That the effect of
Weyler's concentration order is to be
to depopulate Cuba he is thoroughly
convinced, though he may not assume
the responsibility of saying such is his
purpose. That his effort is greatest
in starving women and children he Will
be able TO state without reservation.
l do not think Mr. Calhoun was
strongly impressed with the claim of
the insurgents to recognition as bellig-
erents, as belligerency is usually de-
fined by the lawyers, and Mr.. Calhoun
is himself a lawyer. The existence of
a Cuban government is unknown TO
him, perhaps, for one reason. because
he did not go out to the eastern
provinces TO seek information
However. he thinks the insur-
gents have the right to make
war in their own way, and while he
could discover no progress towards
driving the Spaniards out of the island.
he gives the insurgents credit for their
ability to keep up the present kind of
warfare Indefinitely. In other words
there can be no pacification by Spain.
While Mr.. Calhoun did not attach so
much Importance TO belligerency as to
other phases of the question. what ne
saw QlQ liOl FAUST ullli dHg Tears lOI
the United States in case the policy of
belligerency should be adopted by the
administration and by congress.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS.
During his stay in Cuba Mr. Calhoun
gave a great deal of attention to the
financial conditions. He understood
perfectly that the hope of the insur-
gents was to win in practically bank
rupting Spain. While he. did not see
actual bankruptcy, he found that the
credit of the peninsula was growing
weaker. that faith in its ability TO pull
through safely was lessening even
among Spanish partisans in Havana,
and that in watching the future prog
ress of the insurrection. SPANS ability
to get money must also be carefully
watched. Mr.. Calhoun also heard
much about the corruption among the
favorites of Canovas and Weyler in
the payment of the troops and for the
arrearages to pay which were piling
up, but he did not follow this branch
of the inquiry exhaustively-
While not charged with the respon-
sibility of formulating policy of in
PREVENTION or of belligerency, Mr.. Cal
houn returned from Cuba with his
mind made up that no encouragement
should be given the Cubans- toward an
nexation to the United States. If
Spain VIII HOl pC4liill luclll " DuT-
chase their independence and the
United States steps in on the grounds
of humanity or OF commercial inter-
ests or of political conditions. to stop
the warfare. in his view it should be
with a distinct specific understanding
that it is not a step toward anneXa-
ton. The assimilation of the mixed
population of the island. as he looked
at 1t. would be too much for the
United States. at least in the present
generation. This opinion was stated
with frankness both to Cubans and
Spaniards. and / do not violate any
confidence in re-stating il here.
Calhoun concluded by warmly prais-
ing General Lee. not only for his
course in the Ruiz case. but for, the
vigor and promptness with which the
consul-general acquitted himself in the
cases of all American citizens.
Cal H0IlN AT THE CAPITAL