New-York tribune., 1897-01-18


There is at first sight little relation between
the arbitration treaty with Great Britain and
the Constitutional questions raised concerning
the power TO recognize Cuban independence
Nevertheless. such relation exists. The man
ncr in which the treaty has been negotiated
and is finally to be disposed Of indicates clearly
both the usefulness and the limitations Of Ex-
ecutive power in foreign affairs. The treaty
cannot 90 into effect without the assent of Con
gress or Of one House thereof. That is I'M
questionable Equally unquestionable is it that
it never could have been negotiated never
could have come into existence and been pre-
sented to the Senate for its determination, with
out the action Of the Executive through diplo-
matte channels Mr. Bayard. 1t is true, has cut
no figure in the case. But Mr.. Olnpy and Sir
Julian Pauncefote have. TO them Is TO be given
chief credit for what has been accomplished.
Congress may or may not approve their work,
but it could not have done that work itself.
1t has the veto power, but not the initiative.
Nobody questions the ultimate control Of Con-
gress over the foreign relations Of the cOrn-
trv. 1t exercises 1t not only through the ex
treme resort to the war-declaring power spe-
cifically granted TO 1t by the Constitution. and
through the confirmatory functions Of the Sen
ate likewise prescribed but also through its
authority over the National Treasury. The
Executive may recognize all the foreign gov
ernments IL pleascs, and receive their Minis
ters: but II cannot send single diplomatic rep
resentative to them without the consent Of Con-
Cress expressed through the appropriation Of
funds for the purpose. Congress has, too, the
power to enact tariffs and other laws regulat
ing commercial intercourse and immigration,
and TO do other things directly affecting the
foreign relations Of the Government. All that
Is indisputable, and 1t offers ample assurance
that the fine balance Of power arranged by the
Constitution between the coordinate branches
of the Government will be maintained
Nevertheless as the present example ind-
Gates. il Is not only eypedIent but necessary
that the Executive should take the initiative In
foreign policy. and. indeed. should control It
TO the utmost permissible extent. especially in
all direct negotiations with other governments
For international negotiations are bargains aud
every bargain has two sides and no bargain
can be made unless both sides are represented
In the making Of It, In Congress. when ques-
tlon OF domestic policy or politics is up. both
sides are represented and heard. But such is
not the case when Congress Is considering
question of foreign policy. Then only one side
Is heard. Foreign governments have no repre-
sentatives in Congress. and cannot have. They
can deal only with the Executive. TO which
their representatives are sent. For that rea-
son the conduct Of foreign affairs must De left
TO the Executive. II Congress does not ap-
prove the bargains the Executive makes II can
veto them. by refusing to ratfy them or by
Withholding appropriations. as It did very prop
erly in the Behring Sea case But In the very
nature OF the matter Congress cannot itself
make the bargains.
II is presumed, OF course. that the Executive
will always pay due regard TO the expressed
sentiments OF Congress, especially when those
sentiments are known to be those Of the vast