The silver star., 1897-12-09

the recognized code OF war lre no less
Important facts toward the determine
tion Of the problem than are the in
fuences and consequences of the strug-
gle upon the internal policy OF recog-
nizlng the state.
The wise utterances of President
Grant in his memorable message of
December q, 1875, are slgnally relevant
to the present situation In Cuba, md 1t
may be wholesome now to recall them.
At that time rliinous conflict had for
seven years wasted the neighbOrIng
island. During NIL those years an utter
disregard of civilized warfare and the
demands of humanity, which called for
the expression OF condemnation from
the nations of all ChristendOm, contin-
ued unabated. Desolation and ruin
pervaded That productive region, enor-
mously affecting the commerce of all
nations. but that of the United States
more than any other by reason of
proximity and larger trade and inter-
course.
At that juncture General Grant ut
tered these words. which now, as then,
sum up the elements of the problem:
"A recognition of the independence
of Cuba being. In my opinion, imprac-
ticable and indefensible. the question
that next presents itself is that of
recognition of belligerent rights of the
parties. Such recognition entails diff
cult and important duties. 1t confers
the right of search upon the high seas;
1t would subject the carrying of arms
and munitions i'm vessels of the United
States to detention and possible seiz-
ure; 1t would give rise to countless
vexatiOus questions; would relieve the
parent government from responsible
ity for acts done by insurgents. and
would invest Spain with right to eX-
ercise supervision over our commerce
on the high seas"
Turning to the practical aspects of
n recognition of belligerency and re-
viewing the Inconvenience and posi-
tive dangers still further pertinent
considerations appear.
Recognition OF BeIllgerency.
In the code of nations there is no
such thing as Il naked recognition of
belligerency unaccompanied by the as
sumption of international neutrality.
Such recognition. without that. will not
confer upon either party to domestic
conflict II status not heretofore actually
possessed. The act of recognition us
ually takes the form of solemn proc
VI WHICH
the de factO condition of belligerency
as motive. 1t assumes the intcrna-
tional obligations of neutrality in the
presence of Il public state of war. 1t
warns all citizens and others within
the jurisdiction of the proclnimant that
they violate those obligations mt their
own peril and cannot expect to he shell
tered from the consequences. The right
to visit and search vessels and the
seizure of vessels and cargo and con-
traband of war under admiralty law
must he admitted as n legitimate con-
sequence of Il proclamation of bellig-
erency. While according to each equal
Delligerency rights, as defined by pub
lie law, to each party in our ports. dis.
favOrs would be imposed on both
which, while nominally equal, would
weigh heavily on Spain herself. Pos
sessing navy and controlling the
ports of Cuba Spains maritime rights
could he asserted not only for the mil
itary Investment of the island, but up
to the margin of our own territorial
waters. and condition would exist for
which the Cubans within their own
domain could not hope to create n par
allel; while Its creation. through aid or
sympathy, from within our domain,
NOhNi Dt even IllOFt lIllIhSSlDle vnsln
now. with the additional obligations OF
neutrality we would perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged and
Onerous code of neutrality would only
he influential within our own jurisdic-
tion by land and sea. and applicable by
our own instrumentalitics. 1t could i'm
part TO the United States no jurisdic-
tiOn between Spain and the insurgents:
1t would give the United States no
rights of Intervention to enforce the
conduct of strife within the paramount
authority Of Spain according to the in-
ternational code of war.
For these reasons regard the recOg-
milton of the belligerency of the Cuban
Insurgents MS now unwise. and there
fore inndmissible. Should that s;pp
hereafter he deemed wise ns Il measure
OF right and duty the executive Will
take 1t.
No Intervention Now.
Intervention upon humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggested,
and 1t has not failed to receive my anx-
ious and earnest consideration. No
such step should now be taken, how
ever. when 1t Il apparent that hopeful
change has supervened In the policy of
Spain toward China. A new govern
ment has taken office In the mother
country.
1t IL said that NIL the effor.s In the
world cannot suffice to maintain peace
by the bny0net. that vague promises of
reform after subjugntlon afford no so
luton In the insular problem, that
with II substitution of commanders
must come change OF the past system
Of warfare for one of harmony, with u
new policy which shall 10 longer aim
to drive the Culans to the 'horrlble nj.
ternntivc OF taking to the thickct or
succumblng In misery" that reforms
must be instituted In accordance with
the needs md circumstances Of the
time. and that reforms. while designed
to give full autonomy TO the colony and
TO crentc virtual entity AMI sclf-con-
trolled administration. shall vet con-
serve md affirm the sovereignty Of
Spain bv n lust distribution OF powers
and burdens uDon bnsIs Of mutual in-
tercst. untnlnted by selfish expectancy.
The first ac,s OF the new government