The times., 1897-10-29
The Spanish Vote.

Now that in substance we know the text
Of the Spanish note. it is greatly comfort
ing 20 observe that, in various respects, tt
is ShreW dly constructed TO mean whatever
Mr. Mckinney wishes il to mean. In fact
we are compelled To pause, in order that
we may express admiration for mani
festauon Of diplomacy which must be re-
garded as due as much To the finesse Of
foreign office IN Madrid. Both national
agencies desire to preserve the status quo
Senior sagasta ardcntly hopes to secure
from the American Administration Jhe
naval, police and detective assistance
which shall prevent aid from reaching
the patriots in Cuba. On his side he knows,
because he has been assured, that If he can
provide Mr.. Mckinley with any tenable
excuse for using the powers of the Amer
lean Government in a vigorous way for this
purpose, and without too much exciting
American Indignation, 1t win conserve
the interests and purposes of the Spanish
Cuban bondholders and the Sugar Trust.
They constitute the motive power behind
the Administration policy, and that policy
j. everything that Spain needs to ask, if it
can he maintained in the face of a nations
I indignant shame ard mortificatiou.
In furtherance OF this good understand
iaE, it must be agreeable to friends of
MIR. Hanna and Mr. Mckinley to Ieara
that the language of the Spanish com
muncation is not couched in the terms
of insult when. we are sure, Gea. Wood
ford's explanations 10 the prime minister
have averted. In q placid sort of way.
and without indulgence in violent language
Spain tells us that she does not intent
10 surrender Cuba. That is d position
completely in harmony with the views OF
the Administration, which does not want
her to do so. or the change would have
been accomplished before this. But Spain
cannot either reform Cuba or recon
quer it. The Cuban people, with a vic
torious army at $4,000 men in the field,
viii not accept subjugation. even - please
the American Government.
SO the result Of Spain's reply is nil,
under any conditions that the American
people for moment would tolerate. 1t
is not impossible to imagine that the cabi-
nets OF the two countries could reach
solution, ii the administration of MIR Nc
Kinley FELT that IL had a free hand IA
the matter. It would be feasible TO es-
tablish an American naval Gordon around
Cuba which effectualy would prevent the
landing Of supplies for the armies Of the
republic. II that could be arranged, the
ammunition Of the patriots would give out
and the military activity of Marshal Bianco,
added TO the efforts of Spain To bribe
! Cuban leaders conjoinedly might be ex.
| pected 10 produce results. But we do
not believe that the Administration VIII
dare TO attempt the one, nor that the
heroic commanders of the Cuban forces can
be tempted with the other. What might
] be done with the Cuban influences in this
country we are unable to say; but If
any of them were susceptible Of corrup-
ton they could be and would be dis
credited and changed.
Therefore tic situation seems only TO
indicate postponement of the inevitable.
Alike, Mr.. Mckinley and Senior sagasua
h.
I alter the aspect Of affairs and produce
some basis of hope for the reStora tien
of Spanish rule and ruin in the Island.
Almost al ything that would tend to
show an improvement, from humani
tartan Point of view, would be hailed
as an argument for delaying our certain
interference 10 stop the reign of Spanish
atrocity, either by recognizing indepeld-