Evening star., 1897-01-16


servant, GEORGE WM. BRENT
Assistant Adjutant General
Maj. Gen McIaws has reported thnt the enemy
are crossing the river on their pontoons Gen
% FORREST has has also been ordered to cross the Ten
nessee Gen. McLaws Is nDw within two miles of
Chattanooga G. "
get into the mountnirs and cross on the left if
Yours, &c, GEoRGE WI. BRENT.
Gen. Brags's Report.
In speaking of his inability to follow and
attack the Union army Immediately after
its leaving the Chickamaiiga field for Chat
tarooga, Gen. Bragg says in his official re-
port: u.
AIRY immediate pursuit by our infantry
and artillery would have been fruitless, as
II was not deemed practicable with our
weak and exhausted force to assail the
emery. now more than double our num-
bers, behind his intrenchments."
This condition of the. right wing of
Brasg's army toward the close of the bat
Tie on Sunday had beer communicated TO
Gen. Longstreet by Gen. Bragg as an
pears from Gen. Longstreet's official re-
port: ls- ~. =. -
About O'Clock in the afternoon (2Oth) T
asked the commanding general for some
OF the troops of the right wing but was in
formed by MIN that they had been beaten
back so badly that they could be of no
service to me. l had but one division thai
mad not been engaged, and hesitated to
venture 10 put 1t in, as our distress upon
our right seemed to be almost as great as
tnat OF the enemy upon his right
Ine above citations from the records af-
1ord clear understanding of the prelimi-
Idries 10 the controversy which General
LongEtreet opened with Gen. Bragg. This
took official shape in a letter from Cen
Longstreet to the confederate secretary of
war, and Gen. Bragg's ailusion to the sub
Jeot In MS ofncial report. both Of which are
given below:
Hon NEAR CHATTANOOGA. september &C. 1863
lion j. A Seddon. Secretary of War.
sir:-May take the liberty to advise you of our
condition and our On the Goth instant, after
very severe battle, gained a complete and glo-
except, perhaps the first Manassas On the morning
or the 21st Gen Bragg asked my opinion as to our
best course: suggested at to strike at Burn
side and If he made his escape to march upon
Rosecrans communication in of Nashville He
Seemed TO adopt the suggestion and gave the order
to march at O'Clock In the afternoon. The right
wing OF the army marched some eight or ten miles
my command following the next day at daylight
was halted at the crossing of the Chickamalra.
ana on the night of the 22d the army was ordered
:" narsh a' % io1 Chattanooga thus giving the
here already prepared for him by ourselves. Here
we nave remained under instructions that the
enemy shall not be assaulted To express my con-
vlctions In few words our chief has done but
one thing that he ought to have done since joined
10th, All other things that he has done he ought
mot mot t" have re done am convinced that nothing but
we have our present commander.
r Now to our wants Can't you send Gen. Lee i?
our operations here should be oTensive-untii we
have recovered Tennessee. at all events We need
to accomplish this. You will be surprised to learn
that TINS army has neither organization nor mo.
1t them. In an ordinary war l could serve without
complaint under any whom the government
stake In this to remain quiet under such distressing
circumstances. Our most precious blood is now
in have succeeded , Then goes honor. treasure and
our commander willing anxious to do all things
that would aid US in great cause, and ready to
receive what aid he could get from his subordinates
II seems that 1 was greatly mistaken. 1t seems
that he cannot adopt and adhere to any plan or
course. sa1s.. whether Of his of else
l desire 10 Impress upon your mind that there is no
exaggeration In these statements. On the contrary
est nailed 4. to my to the
letter exceedingly long is to pray you to help us,
l remain. with the greatest respect, your most
Obedient servant,
J. LoNGsTRaEr. Lieutenant General.
His Denaal.
Gen. Bragg. in Ills report thus very
pointedly denies that 'he.,at any time con-
templated such movement as Gen. Long
street understood him tosapprove:
~ The suggestion s1 Of movement by our right i'm
Tennesses aateT the battle TO the north of the
aSueeoeS, ano thence npOnI Nashville, requires
notice only because 1t VIII hnd place on the fles
OF the department. Such movement was utterly
impoesloie Tor want Of trnnspMtatiOn. Nearly half
Su. army consisted of refrcenents just before the
DatIe, , Without wagon or au artillery horse and
ueaIS, not quite. third of the artillery horses
on tne neid had been lest. The railroad bridges
.o9; nad Deen destroyed to appoint south of Ring
sUa anI on all the road from Cleveland to Kn0S-
vnie. 10 these insurnibuntable difficulties were
aHueu s tne entire absence of smeans to cross the
river except by fording Il Jew precarious points
700 0eep Tor artillery ard tie well known danger
~ suaden rises, by which oil Sommunica tion w01ld
1e CUT, contingency which did actually happen n
lev aays after the visionary scheme was proposed
nue tne most serious objection to the proposition
vas I.s entire want Of military propriety n
aodhuoced 10 the enemy entire line OF conlmuni-
caGoh ana laid open to him our depots of supplies
WnIe IL placed us with greatly inferior force
oeyond dimcult and at times impossible river in
cOuntay anording no subsistence to men or ami
Iais. also left open to the enemy. at distance
OF oniy ten miles. our battlefield. with thousards
OF our wounded and his own. and all the trophies
ana supplies we had won. Ali this was to be rtske]
an9 gwen up Tor what? To gain the enemy's rear
anc cut MIN on from hts depot of supplies by the
IVute over tne mountains. when the worry movement
anAnaone0 to his unmoested the better AMI
mose pracccab!e route, of half the length. On the
soutn sioe OF the river It Is hardly necessary to
say tae proposition was not entertained what
ever may have been the differences drawn from sub
The Gaze. therefore, when judged by the
reccros, seems to resolve 1tsek into this: