The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-04-03

lowed to live TO make trouble for them.
me court also pointed out that. according
ou~rglars-tha given by Hinshaw-they en-
gagged IN a struggle which led them out OF
the mouse where Hinshaw was shot and
then returned 10 the house and rificd his
pantaloons pocket. scattering his loose
cnange. knife and keys, on the floor. car
rled Mrs. Hinshaw's body from where she
was shot on the bed and threw IL out OF
the back door. carefully closed the door
between the sitting room and bedroom and
me door between the sitting room and din
ing room. threw the appellants revolver
inside near the coalhouse. his razor into the
street, his pantaloons on the block near the
~woodhouse. his pocketbook into the street,
and silently stole away without track
marx or trace OF their going on the fresh
The opinion recites the fact that no fur
niture was broken or disturbed I'm the Hin
shaw house. which was strange II such a
herce struggle as claimed by the appellant
mad taken place. But the most unreasona-
bic act involved in the appellants story.
the court found. was that he and his wife
should engage in a struggle for life with
w fer0ciOuS burglars and that his wife
should come up. !ay her hand on his arm
and coolly say TO him, will. is this you?'
and wholly forget the Instincts OF nature
10 scream instead of quietly and indifer-
emily Witnessing such AN awful struggle
between her husband and a burglar. II
was also thought strange thas Hinshaw
should not have made an outcry during the
struggle. The opinion ironically suggests
that perhaps Hinshaw was too considerate
Tor the safety of the burglars to make an
cutlery that might bring persons who would
capture them. and states that the burglars
were certainly considerate of his !,fe. for
ahe nineteen wounds were all superficial
Iesh wounds. not involving the slightest
Hanger 10 the appellant. Says the opinion
on this point:
The superstition that these two burglars
could not infiict one single mortal or serious
wound on this lone man if they had
wanted 10, while they were able at the very
lITSt SnOt 10 send Il bullet crushing through
AlfS- f1llSDaW = brain is "A most .NRApdinElU
unreasonable ana fallacious story. That
part OF the evidence which tends to support
the NefClct was such as To authorize and
Justify the jury in finding that the wounds
inflicted on the appellant were all ~self-in-
flicted. Ii Is true the proof on this point
not free from conflict: but il is the
province or the jury to determine such dis
putes and controversies and If they err
therein IL is a mistake of fact and not of
law me only rcmedy for the correctness
OF such a mistake is an application to the
trial Judge for a new trial. AZ he overrules
such a motion tho. presumption il that he
did his duty and that the jury had not
made any mistake of fact. The evidence
shows that one shot was fired through the
front door of the bedroom. slantins DOWN
ward at an angle of forty-hve degrees and
which proved beyond doubt that that shot
was nred at no one. That made three shots
nred inside the house. Then the u~ndisputed
evidence OF the %neighb0rs shows that there
were two shots fired outside the house.
When appellants revolver was found five
cham6efsc xsVere found empty and n
loaded. -
QUESTION OF THE MOTIVE.
The opinion enters into a discussion of
circumstantial evidence and cites authori-
ties in support of the statement that the
jury did not err in concluding that Hinshaw
was the murderer of his wife. Then the
question of a motive is considered in refu-
tation OF the claim of appellants counsel
tndt all circumstances of guilt are out
weighed by the absence of any reasonable
motive. Says the opinion, after quoting
from al authority:
so that the jury were legally justified in
mferring a motive from the commission OF
the crime itself If motive had been essential
10 make out the crime, but il was not.
There was evidence from which the Jury
were fully justified in inferring that appel
liant was actuated by a very natural motive.
though extremely aIrocious II was. The evil
dence was such as to justify the jury i'm the
belief that appellant had been seen going
INTO a certain house In Belleville clandes-
timely, the back way, where a certain
young woman lived. ON a certain other oc-
Caslon, when appellants wife was obliged
10 drive to Danville some ten miles away.
to take her sister to a train, appellant sent
Tor the same young woman to come to his
house, which she did, and spent a large
part of the afternoon with him practically
alone. On another occasion the same young
woman was seen between midnight and 4
o'clock i'm the morning coming from the al
ley Immediately i'm the rear of appellants
residence, and from that alley west the
width of the lot adjoining to appellants
residence into another alley running south
into the street fronting appellants resi-
dence. and thence diagonally southwest
wardly to the west side of the street i'm the
direction of the house where she lived. and
was seen TO enter IL and close the door after
her."
The opinion goes on TO say that after the
tragedy the young woman did not visit the
house like the rest of the neighbors, imme-
diately. She waited several days. and was
then observed to engage i'm a low CONVERSE
ton with the appellant. The defense made
an effort to dispute these statements re-
garding the relations between Hinshaw and
the young woman. but the court, in review
ing the evidence. finds that IL is conflicting
and against the appellant for the reason
that the young woman herself was not
called to the stand. Continuing, the opinion
says:
HINSHAw'S IMPROPER ACTS.
80 the jury was fully warranted in be-
lieving and finding that the appellant had
formed some sort of relation or association
with the young woman mentioned. which
was highly improper for a married man.
and especially a minister of the gospel. and
that such relation was the motive for the
killing OF his wife. all Of which he hoped 10
conceal. While not regarding the estab-
ishment of motive 10 do the deed as indis-
pensable TO the conviction of the appellant.
and while possible that criminal relations
may not have existed between the appellant
and the woman mentioned. the suspicious
circumstances pointing toward such rela-
tions made a basis for a difficulty between
the appellant and his wife on the night OF
the homicide. as admitted by him. and that
difficulty of itself. and in the absence OF the
criminal relation mentioned, strongly suB-
gested motive and made a question Tor the
jury to pass upon. The motive thus estab-
lished constitutes another circumstance
which adds immensely 10 the force ana the
weight of each and all OF the other circun-
stances outlined above. making the train
OF circumstantial evidence strong enough
to impart TO it the legal quality that appel
lant's counsel say was lacking and justify
the Jury in so finding beyond "A reasonable
doubt; namely. that IL was such as 10 eN-
clude 10 a moral certainty every hypothesis
but that of his guilt or the orense imputed
TO him..
IL is. therefore. concluded by the court
that the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the verdict.
The expert testimony of DIR. Gels that "A
discoloration on a block of wood was prob
ably human blood was the basis OF another
objection by the appellants counsel. Ii
was a block of wood taken from the sill OF
the window of the woodhouSe. The theory
of the State was that HinShaw went into
the woodhouse and inflicted the Wounds
upon himself and then threw his trousers,
pocketbook and razor out into the street.
where they we're subsequently found. There
were no footprints IN the fresh snow where
the supposed burglars walked. The obJec-
ton of the defense TO the admission or
Dr. Geis's opinion was that he could only
infer that the discoloration was human
blood and il was unfair 10 testify from
differences. The objection was not con-
sidered good by the court. which holds that
the circumstance of the blood stain Was
but one OF many which put together make
a nearly complete whole chain establishing
the guilt of the appellant
Another objection was the admission OF