The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-01-21

subjected to a continuous and unpara
lelled fire. At last the enemy had bur
rowed their way within the moat
Nearly all the guns were useless
Transportation was well nigh imprac
ticable. Every corner of our defense.
was exposed, while sharpshooters picked
off our men at their leisure.
Evacuation was, therefore, a neces
sity, and orders to that effect were given
by Gen. Beauregard On the night oi
Sept. boats were ready for embarka'
ton. Quickly and swiftly as each de-
tachment left, other boats grounded on
the strand to receive their loads. A
sufficient number of men was retained
In the fort to
KEEP Up THE FIRING.
Finally, Col. Presley, with only two
companions, remained. The Federals,
in their sap, were only 80 steps away,
and SO our guns were not spiked. The
slightest unusual noise would have be-
trayed us. At midnight Fort Wagner
was abandoned.
"What had the Federals gained by
the lavish expenditure of the material OF
war, boundless treasure, and the fearful
sacrifice of lifes The sole object of the
occupation of Morris Island, as stated by
Gen. Gilmore. was the demolition of Fort
Sumter as preliminary to the entrance
of the ironclads. That accomplished,
it was thought that the gate to Charles
ton would be thrown open to the navy
and the cradle of secession would fall.
"1et, for Is months thereafter the
feet remained In the outer harbor, and
whenever the fire of the batteries were
directed against Commodore Dahlgren' S
feet it was noticed that he dropped
further out to sea. 1t was not until the
18th of February, 1865, when a row.
boat sent by the municipal authorities
of Charleston informing him in the outer
harbor that the Confederate authorities
had evacuated the city, did he venture
to enter, and then, without fear of tor
pedoes and harbor Instructions, did
monitors and gunboats steam up to the
wharves of the city"
One who visits Morris Island to-day
will yainly search for solitary fragg-
ment of the old Confederate earthwork.
The winds, with unseen, ethereal fingers,
have twisted up the former foundations
and with stormy breath have
BLOWN THE ANCIENT BOUNDARIES AFFAIR.
The ocean also has not been idle. Those
waves, which, as the subtlest and most
wonderful of enchanters. carve and re-
carve the coast-lines of the world-which
destroy to-day only to create tomorrow,
seem bent upon obliterating the site of
Fort Wagner; but no military gallantry
In the storied past or anticipated future
can possibly through fact or imagination
cast depreciating shadow upon the
heroism Of the defenders of Fort
Wagner
Fort Wagner affords striking ex-
ample of the injudicious location of an
earthwork. Its office was to hold and
control possession of all that portion of
Morris Island upon which effective
preaching batteries against Fort Sumter
could be established. We have seen
how signally it failed to do so.
The instructive and suggestive lesson
of Fort Pulaski, which was lost to the
enemy because Big Tybee Island, the
proper position for a heavily-armed out
work, was abandoned to us without an
attempt being made to hold it, was not
practically applied in defending the ap-
proaches to Fort Sumter.
After the primary error of abandon
fng Coles Island, where the enemy re-
linquished great advantage in evacuat-
ing this strong position, abandoning to
Gen. Gilmore the undisputed occupation
of Folly Island and the control Of Stono
Inlet, giving him secure base easily
held from which to
of Charleston as often as military reasons
rendered it advisable or expedient to do
20, the great mistake of the enemv on
that part of his line of defenses which
Gen. Gilmore attacked was made by bis
engineer, and consisted in locating Fort
Wagner near the north end of Morris
Island, instead of on the sand bills two
miles farther south, near Lighthouse In
let He would NOT have been forced to
witness the humiliating spectacle Of the
destruction of his principal work on an
interior line, over the heads of the de
tenders of an exterior line, had Fort
Wagner been even one mile farther to
the southwark.
With only one inclosed work for the
defense of Morris Island, the proper 10.
cation for it was near the south end. Its
armament should have been defensive
principally, and its strength of profile
such as to enable it to resist coup dc
main " beyond peradventure.
The heavy ordnance for channel de
fense on the north end of Morris Island
ought to have been arranged in 1-gun ol
2-gun batteries, as they were on the south
end. Too much dependence, however
Al II