The Red Cloud chief., 1897-06-11
THE END NOT IN SIGHT
CUBANS CAN KEEP UP THE
WAR INDEFINITELY.
~spanisrds Prohibit Red Cross work-No
Apparent Conditions Justifying Insur-
gent observation-disclosures Not
Advisable

CHICAGO, June 0.-The Chicago Tri-
Dunes correspondent telegraphs the
following from New York:
Special Commissioner w. J. Calhoun
says that he had formed the impress
sion befosc leaving the states that ne-
groes, and possibly bandits, were the
chief agents in the insurrection. He
had not been there three days before
he was convinced the whole strength
of the Cuban people Is back OF the in
surrectlon. He became satisfied that
II was In reality the struggle Of Cuba
for the Cuban, and that they would
fight desperately for independence.
Everything he subscque utly saw and
heard strengthened this belief
Call . IN had heard the reports of
pacificat!on by General Weyler and
had credited them in some degree.
His stay in Cuba destroyed this notion.
Instead of ~pacificntion, he found signs
of war everywhcre-even at the gates
OF Havana. The Spanish troops held
certain parts Of the island as an artrry
of occupancy, while the insurgents
were making constant and often sue
ccssful raids Mr.. Calhoun was so
impressed with these evidences of
actual warfare that he gave out a
blunt statement, saying he could see
no end of the war and that the devas.
tation was growing.
NO CIVILIZED WARFARE.
He could not discover that any ap.
fraaah o.. ,s,,ls..l ..1lzlu ..---
was being made on either side. He
was overwhelmed with evidence to
show the atrocities committed by the
soldiers under Weyler, particularly
the gucrillas who form n part of the
regular army. Such cases us he was
able to investigate personally, gener-
ally proved to be correctly stated. lie
found that the Spanish government
had denied the Red Cross society per-
mission to operate between the two
contending parties.
Mr.. Calhoun's personal inquiries and
investigation satisfied him that the
starvation and suffering caused by
Weyler's concentration order were
not exaggerated. He saw the scenes
Of human misery at Mantanzas which
determined him to look no further
into that phase of the war, because he
had seen enough. He Is convinced
that the effect of Weyler's coneeptra-
ton order Is to depopulate Cuba,
though he moy not assume the re-
sponsibility of saying that such is its
purpose. That its effect Is greatest in
starving women and children he will
be able to state without reservation.
OPPOSES BELLIGERENCY.
MIR. Calhoun did not seem to be
strongly impressed with the claim OF
the insurgents to recognition as bel
ligerents as belligerency is usually de-
fined by the lawyers, and Mr.. Calhoun
Is himself a lawyer. The existence o.
a Cuban government is unknown to
him; perhaps for one reason, because
he did not go to the Eastern province.
to seek it. However. he thinks the
insurgents have a right to make wa
in their own way, and, while he coul(
discover no progress toward driving
the Spaniards out of the island, h,
gives the insurgents credit for thei,
IL WoiASy W nSSp uP VIZ PASSShe hAnu "
warfare indefinitely. In other words
here can be no pacilcation by Spain
AGAINST ANNEXATION.
Mr.. Calhoun returned from Cub,
with his mind made up that 10 en-
souragement should be given the CIV
u bans to expect annexation to tn
" United States. The assimilation Q
} She mixed population Of the island, a
! lie looked at it. would be too much TO
/ the United States, at least in tn
& present generation. This opinion wa
: stated with great frankness to bot
= Cubans and S~paniards.
Calhoun concluded by warmly prai'
, ing General Lee, not only for h
! course in the Ruiz case, but for tn
vigor and promptness with which tn
- consul general acquitted himself l
the cases of all American citizens