The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-10-23

the reply suggests that the United States is
doubtless partly inspired in making it's pro-
posals by fear of experiencing some diff
fcultles and dangers which India has al
ready surmounted- after years of embar-
rassment."
Then follows the opinion that india is
on the point of securing a stable exchange
of 16 pence per rupee, and it would be ex-
ceedingly foolish to throw away the posi-
proposals which, if they failed of their in
tended object, would place India perma-
nently under the silver standard, with all
its admitted disadvantages. Nothing but
assured success could justify India in join
ing in the experiments and our belief is
that the proposals will fail to secure a per-
manent ratio of l51a to l. One reason for
this conclusion is that the arrangement
would rest on too narrow a basis. The
union of two countries with a third lending
assistance, is very different thing from
the international union of a majority Of the
important countries of the world advocated
by the Indian government in dispatches for
warded in March and Jure 1892 and in
February and September 1885 We doubt
whether any two or three nations In the
ain, could establish the required stability
1t is certain that France and the United
States and India could not"
THREE REASONS GIVEN.
The reply then proceeds to discuss vari-
Gus reasons why the experiment would not
succeed. First, France and the United
States, seeing the prospect Of a total dis
Of silver has been raised to the intended
ratio, might take measures to prevent the
export Of gold. Second, either country
might be reduced to a paper currency, in
which case the agreement would cease to
operate. Third, a three-sided agreement
would be open to greater risk of termina-
ton by one or two parties than a many
sided international agreement. besides
which, either France or the United States
might some day think some other nation
benentng at its expense and this would
lead to a discussion as to the eXpediencyfOf
terminating the agreements. discussions
only less serious than actual termination.
For these reasons alone, without consid-
ering objections to the particular ratio pro-
posed, we do not hesitate, continue the au-
thors of the reply, Ito recommend that
your lordship refuse to give the undertake
ing desired. We shall be willing to consider
what effect the cooperation of any other
nations. II secured, may have on the prob
lem; but we believe that our best policy is
to link ourselves to Great Britain" They
then proceed to argue that the ratio Of 1919
to l is too high. Differing so widely from
the existing ratio, it would immensely in
crease the difficulty. Indeed if it could be
secured and maintained successfully, we
should object to the ratio in the interest of
India, and we recommend your lOrdship on
behalf of India TO decline to participate in
or to do anything to encourage the fOrma-
ton of a union based thereon.
AS we have already pointed out, the sud-
den rise in the exchange value of the rupee
especially planting, in which European
capital is largely embarked, that, in our
opinion, the true interests of India demand
that any measure to attain stability of ex-
change for gold and silver. should be based
upon a rate not greatly differing from 16
pence the rupee. Any advantages from
considerable rise in exchange would be far
Outweighed by the resulting evils Having
discussed the probable effect in various di-
rectiOns upon Indias local interests the
dispatch recommt nds a. reply in the mega
tive, adding: We presume that a union
based upon a ratio low enough to suit our
interests would not be acceptable to France
and the United States"
In conclusion, the official dispatch init
mates that the present proposals might
have been favorably considered in 1892, but,
''the experience of the last few years has
made the position very different" 1t also
notes that the conditions under which we
have had to reply to your lordship's dis
commercial and banking committees of In
dia" but even had another reply been
possible, it could only be after the fullest
preliminary consideration by our banking
and commercial bodies"
The dispatch is signed by Lord Elgin, the
viceroy of India Sir George Stewart White,
commander-in-chief of the British forces in
India and extraordinary member of the
council of the Governor General, and by
the following ordinary members of the
council: Sir James Eeslard, fnancial men,
major general; Sir e. II. H. Collen, Hon.
Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers and Hon. Ar
thur Charles Trevor. The correspondence
concludes with Lord Salisbury's dispatch
to Ambassador Hay, the contents of which
have already been cabled.