The Independent. [volume] (Honolulu, H.I.) 1895-1905, 1897-08-23

10 reach Honolulu from Japan re-
quires voyage Of over thirty-six
hundred miles, and the Islands are
not ,on the American Oriental sail
ing route, The capture OF Hawaii
would be foolish enterprise for
any antagonist Of the United States
1t is palpable that we could not
hold the Hawaiian Islands, If the
enemy found it desirable to possess
them ian unlikely hypothesis), with
out vast outlay and without weaken
ing our home defences. If we con-
structed impregnable forts there
and mounted thereon hundreds OF
modern cannon, we should be left
alone in our grandeur without any
enemy 10 defeat, or anything parti-
cularly valuable to protect. Our
Honolulu armies would be as lonely
as was Robinson Crusoe. If we are
to defend ourselves, We must do 30
at home. Why should we seek the
South Pacific in order to secure our
coasts?
| have heard that the possession
Of the Hawaiian Islands means the
control of the North Pacific, / adj
init that the nation possessing this
group may dominate the North Pa
ci6c; but such dominancy will not
in any manner depend upon the &C.
cupancy of these spots in the ocean.
The subsection of the North Paci-
&c depends upon the naval prowess
of contending nations. The most
valiant army stationed in Hawaii,
and possessing the best equipment
and unlimited supplies, cannot rule
the North Pacific without an unri-
vailed naval force. Take the case
OF England, now the leading sea
Power. Does that Empire need the
Hawaiian Islands, located near the
twentieth degree OF north latitude,
when she is the possessor OF magni-
ficent ratification at Esquimault,
situate close to the fftieth degree
of north latitude2. That defence is
far more effective as controlling
element, so far as the North Pacific
us concerned, than would be any
construction at Honolulu. The en-
thusiaetc advocates of annexation
forget that the North Pacific must
yield to ships Of war, and that a
nation possessed of all the islands in
the South Pacific would not, be-
cause Of such possession, command
the seas there or elsewhere.
1t is averred that we shall need
the Islands when we construct the
Nicaragua Canal. We are advised
that we cannot otherwise properly
defend that work. The suggestions
already made dispose of this pre-
tence. If we make and own the Ca
nal we must fortify its approaches
The western terminus would not be
better protected by guns mounted
at Hawaii than by those which
guard the Golden Gate. Our bat
tleships can be dispatched from Ca
lifornia to Nicaragua more speedily
than from Honolulu. Nor would
the presence Of an enemy at the lat
ter point imperil the Canal, A foe
can reach our shores without touch
ing at Honolulu; and, as / have said
if we arrange matters 80 as to make
it uncomfortable there for an enemy
he will take another course and thu.
steer clear of us. The important
naval Powers have numerous posses
, sions in and on the Pacific,
But it is urged that we must hav,
coaling-station, and that, there
fore, annexation is desirable, Pear
Harbor is ours: if we desire to forti
fy it, to dredge it, to make t. useful
we may do so; and eoalips station
will thus be provided without an
7 nexation. Such static would b.
unnecessary in times oil peace; anC
in the event of war coal should b
. procurable upon the usual lines O