The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-02-28
GEN.ALGERA AT
OWE OF TIE GALLANT LOTIONS OF
THE WAR FOR THE UNION.

m WAN FOR THE MON.
right In which rhii Sheridan
FIRST showed tho stun Ho Was Made or
Soon after the evacuation OF Corinth in 1869
Gen. Beauregard. the Confederate commander.
was compelled to retire to Bladon Springs,
Ala, TO recuperate his health, expecting that
his absence would be cnlv temporary. Prest-
dent Davis was dissatisfied with Bcaurcp ARDS
management OF affairs both at shiloh and dur
ing Haliesk's siege of Corinth, and he took
advantage Of Beauregurd's absence to super
sede him permanently by appointing Gen.
Braxton Bragg to tho commend OF the chief
| Confederate army OF the West. Meanwhile
the great Union army which had brought
about Bcaureeard's discontinue was futile
ly dispersed upon various innocuous expo
| ditions. and upon observing this strange spec
tacle the disneartened Confederates took cour.
age. Bragg Immediately set ON foot some Wig
orous measures to recover lost ground.
These INC 'ements resulted In the inva-
sion Of Kentucky In August and Sc 2tember.
1852. To conceal his ultimate aim AS long rs
possible. great activity vas displayed by the
Confederate commander all along the Union
front in West Tennessee during the middle Of
the summer: there were cavalry raids and
many minor engagements. oil finally culmi-
~ ~ M Dohh . olA y utAthI
Al Corinth the first week in October. 1852.
One Of the first of these Affairs, after Bragg
took the direction OF Confederate operations,
was the fight at Bonneville. Miss, July 1, in
which tho Confederatcs were cleverly out
man9uvred and badly beaten. In itself this
little battle WINS q most remarkable affair. and
IL loses none Of its interest from the fact that
II was here that Philip II. Sheridan first dem.
onstratei his great capacity for the COMMAND
OF troops in battle. II was here. also. that n
modest limo officer first attracted the attention
OF his superiors, and got his foot upon the fret
rung Of the ladder OF fame. He was an un-
known Captain Of cavalry. and his name sas
Russell A. Alser. 1t was wholly to Sheridan's
strategy and TO Capt. Alger'r bravery and
dash that the Cnionists owed their victory. for
they were greatly ~outnumtered, with no sup
ports In reach. II happened In this wise:
On the 3oth OF June. 1862. in pursuance OF
the new policy OF aggression. Gen. Bragg d.
rected one OF his suoOrdinatcs. Gen. james Il.
ChhliDers. after the war a well-known politi-
clan and IA CONGRESSMAN from Mississippi. TO
move FROM tho vicinity OF Tupelo with = strong
force toward the north via BlACs land and make
q ielnt toward Rienzi at Bonneville: hut once
In the rear OF the enemy suddenly to make for
Chalmers would thus cut on ana capture tne
Union force ut bonneville, which was supposed
to be small. Capt: 4. H.. Sneridan OF the res
made Colonel OF the Second Michigan kegi-
ment OF cavalry about u month previously. lie
was stationed rs hn outpost at bonneville with
his own regiment and the Second Iowa cav
airy. IL 4. impossible to determine tho force
Chalmers hhd with him: Sheridan estimated
high as i.UUO. IL probably did not much ex-
sses .'ov1; ShesidAT,s iorSe Is Officially stated
AFFAIR are very measte, and the best account
IL that reported by Sheriuan himself, which is
confirmed IN nearly every detail.
Gen. Chalmers re iched the vicinity OF Boone
Vile on the night OF June. 80. On the morning
OF July i he began the advance n ainst Sheri-
dan by two roads converging near the town.
On the BlEokiand road he came IN contact
with Sheridan's pickets about three aid n half
miles west OF bonneville. 10 gain all-impor-
tant time. Lieut.. Scranton, In charge OF the
tickets. fell back slowly. impeding the Con-
iedelAtes as much as possible. Al the ju.ctiUn
OF the two roads. PERHAPS "A mile out from the
town. scranton made n ~determined stand. haN-
ing been reinforced by one company sent out
By Sheridan. and subsequently, by three more.
all now commanded Nv Capt. a. T.. Campbell.
lhis force dismounted and formed In line. and
the fghting that followed developed the tact
that the enemy was present in large force. Ur to
this tine Chalmers l.nd shown only the heads OF
By the heavy growth OF tinber IN which he was }
operating, and Col. Sheridan was Ia gieaJx
doubt AS TO his real purpose. But the JEil~
resistance here under Campbell iorcen him.
dep'oy two OF his regiments on tie right Ia
ieit Of the road. when II became .pparentfhal
the Confederate comnlsnder meant busInes-.
There was no lime 10 lose Ia PREPARING To rteI
Upon receiving full info rma,Ion Of the rray.
ity OF the situation. Sheridan directed Camp
bell TO hold fast. IL possible. Til he could Ge
supported. but 4, Competed TO retire he was
every means lhgt fell ia his way TO proIoug the
lighting. Col. Edward Hatch OF the Second
Iowa was now ordered 20 leave one company
for the protection OF the camp. u Little To the
north OF the railway station. aud tax ng the
panies. to form tue whole in rear OF Can't
Campbell TO protect his TANKS and support him
mounted line. Mile these preparations we're
being made, the. Confederate. attempted TO
drive Campbell from his position by a direct
failed. however. for the Cnionists, re-ervihg THEN
nrc until thalmers's men were within about
thirty yards. then opened upon them with such
a shower OF bullets from the Colt repeating
rides that they were compelled TO fall rapidly
was the rapidity OF this fire that partially de.
ceived the Ionfederates as tn the true nun.
beers opposed To them.
Fooled In his direct attack. Chalmers now re-
sorted TO the expedisnt OF outnanking Camp
bell by his superior numbers room compelling
what 10 the rear, where Sheridan was now
making arrangements TO deliver his main fight.
Ar soOc ~ the Confederates saw this retro
grade movement they again charged In front,
but were again, as Gnllantly rcpelled AS In the
hnnd TssS ! I ana ' !Ss ,, %ss ws sharp handle;
Iowa men. This enabled Campbell: to retire
the Second Iowa oE the right of Campbell. and
strenrthened. the latter with AL the men
available. He now hrd about all Lis force in
line and was prepared for a last struggle.
Chalmers soon began his banking movements
again. directing his attention. more particular
" TO Shcridan's left fans, around which he
pressed. threatening the Union camp and
transportation 10 the rear.
Fearing that Chalmers would envelop him
and capture the camp and Transportation
should he Continue the passive defensive. Sher-
idan now determined TO assume the offensive
AS his only salvation. His fertile mind hit
upon the strategcm OF passing u small column
around the enemy's weakened left by a cir
cuitous wood road, and strike his rear by "a
mounted, charge simultaneously with an ad-
vance OF the main line ON his front. In lis
graphic account OF this affair Sheridan says
he knew this rear attack ON Chalmers would be
a most hazardous undertaking.. but the situa-
ton was so critical that IL could be relieved
only by some radical "hange OF tactics.
great sacrifice might be necessary TO save the
day, II" at once selected -four sabre compn-
MES, two from each regiment, and placed Capt.
Russell a. Alger in omna OF them, Sher-
idan informing him In an energetic manner
that the quick aud desperate work born OF a
forlorn hone was what was expected OF him
und-r the presen. iuncture OF afrkiis.
I ADJ. Alger WAS IL structcd to move 10 the
right and follow the Id wood road through
he thick timber around the left Of the cnemy's
now " ell advanced line 10 N noint Ub.-o (,