Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-12-08
define the character Of acts oomprehended

with a view to raising revenue from this
and other sources, the legislative assembly
ISL, passed an act, the 18th section Of
which (said to have been copied from Q
revenue act Of Congress then In force)
reads as follows:
shall pay $1,000 annually. Every person
who shall sell or offer for sale any real
estate or article of merchandise Of any
description whatever. or any ticket of ad-
or other place Of amusement, with a prom
ise. expressed or implied to give or be-
stow. or In any manner hold out the prom
Use of gift or bestowal Of any article or
thing, for and in consideration of the pur-
chase by any person Of any other article
or thing, whether the object shall be for
individual gain or for the benefit of any
institution Of whatever character. or for
any purpose whatever, shall be regarded
as gift enterprise: Provided, That no
such proprietor, in consequence Of being
thus taxed. shall be exempt from paying
any other tax imposed by law, and the H.
cense herein required shall be in addition
thereto, claws of the District of Column
bia 1871 y, part II, PIP. 90. 97)
, AFTER less than two years experience Of
license there came a complete revolution
OF public policy as declared by Congress
That which had been permitted and made
a source of revenue was then prohibited as
an ofense. On February II. 1873. an act
was passed entitled An act prohibiting
bia.' Q7 Stat, 464.)
This was embodied in the Revised Stat
utes for the District Of Columbia, becom-
ing sections 1176 and 1177 thereof. as fol-
lows:
Sec. 1176. So much of the act of the leg
islative assembly of the District of CO.
llmbia. entitled An act imposing a license
on trades, business and professions prac-
ticed or carried on in the District of Co
lumbia, approved August %, 1871, as au-
1horlzes gift enterprises therein. and Ii
oenses to be issued therefor, is disa pproved
and repealed. and hereafter it shall be I'M
lawful for any person or persons to en-
gage in said business In any manner as
defined in said act or otherwise.
Sec. HI. Every person who shall in
any manner engage in any gift-enterprise
business in the District shall, on convic-
ton thereof, in the Police Court on infor-
nation filed for and on behalf of the Dis
trict. pay fire not exceeding $1,000 or be
Imprisoned in the District Jail not less than
one nor more than six months, or both, in
the discretion of the court"
Extent of the Power.
1.-THE first contention, on behalf of the
plaintiffs in erorr,. in respect OF the opera
ton of the above statute is that it is Sc
general In its scope as necessarily, to COM
prehend, and undertake to PUNISH as Of
lenses, acts that are matters OF common,
private right clearly beyond the power OF
SoISleSS " pToIllDlt OF 10 interfere Wlth
in any manner under the guar antics of the
Constitution. and that this forbidden pur-
pose and operation are inseparable save by
construction only, from the operation upon
those acts whicn, with equal ciearness, ale
within the power TO prohibit and punish.
II IS argued therefore that the forbidden
operation being inseparapie from that
which is permissible, the whole act must
De declared void IN accordance with the
doctrine OF the Supreme Court Of the Unit
cd States in the following cases: U. 5. vs.
reese, " L. s., PA, III; trademark cases
lvu o.. s.. 81, %; 4. s. VS.. Harris, 1uG L. s.
C&9; Baldwin vs.. Franks, 12u u. s.. B7S 6sil
with The exception of the trademark cases.
tnoSe were all cases of criminal prosecu-
tons under sections Of the Revised stat
utes relating to conspiracies to deprive
citizens of the United States of certain legal
rights, etc, ana it was plan that Congress
had exercised powers not conferred by the
Constitution and it's amendments, and
hereunder had undertaken to punish, as
ofenses against the authority of the United
states, acts which, in general, were cog
nlZable in the state courts only as crimes
against the state. The court declined to
limit the sections, by construction, so as to
make them embrace those acts only that
would, when committed under certain con-
diuons, come within the federal jurisdic-
tion. To do SO it would have had, as was
said in Reese VS.. U. 8. OF U. s., p. 22D, to
Introduce words of limitation into a penal
statute: and. as was said later in trade
mark cases 600 L. s., p. 9S, it is not
within the judicial province to give to the
words used by Congress a narrower mean
ing than they are manifcStly intended to
lear. in order that crimes may be punished
which are not described in language that
brings them within the constitutional pow
er OF that body
I'm the case at bar there Is no question
of conflicting state and federal jurisdic
tons, or of constitutional prohibition of
any interference whatsoever in the subject
matter of legislation; but merely a Ques
ton as TO the degree or length to which
an acknowledged power may be extended.
I'VE think, therefore, that this case must
fall within another rule Of statutory con-
structicn equally well established as the
former. Sections 102 and 1U3, Revised Stat
utes, providing punishment for witnesses
Who refuse to answ er questions PROFOUND.
ed In the course OF an investigation insti-
tuted by Congress. afford example.
In case arising under those sections
1t was said by the chief justice in deliver
ing the opinion of this court:
IT mas been strongly urged in argument
mat the terms of the section, 102, are sufi-
GENTLY broad and comprehensive to in
clude a class of witnesses protected and
exempted by the provisions of article of
the Constitution, and especially so when
read, as urged it should be, in connection
with the next succeeding section, 1903. of
the Revised Statutes; and, therefore, the
section is void in toto. But it is not pre-
tended that the appellant belongs to the
class OF witnesses contemplated by the
article Of the Constitution referred to; and
II the contention of the appellant were
conceded to be correct. as applied To
class of witnesses under different condi-
tons, it would not follow necessarily that
the statute should be stricken down IN
Its entirety, because it may be susceptible
OF an unconstitutional application in Ger
tain cases that may possibly arise This
Is not reasonable, nor is it in accordance
with the rule of Interpretation adopted
nf hn mt tod
as applied to statute good on it's face
but where, by reason of it's general and
comprehensive terms, it may be made. by
obstruction. to apply to objects forbidden
y the Constitution. In such case the
statute will be allowed it's full force and
operation, as applicable to all cases, right
fully and consttutionally within Its pro-
visions, but such application will be re-
strained as to these objects simply TO
which the statute is forbidden to extend
This is the rule. as we understand it,
upon which the Supreme Court acted in
the state freight tax case Is Wall; super
visors VS.. Stanley. 1O5. U. s., 3O5, 313; Vir-
Sinia coupon cases, ia. U. s., 269, and
other cases that could be cited. Chapman
VS.. U. S.. App. D. c., 1922 131 See also,
In re Chapman, 166, u. S., 661, 687
Police Power.
1.-THE comprehensive scope of the police
q In 10,