Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1897-07-18


naign. The manner In which GENERA
| Johnston on other occasions reaues'ou
me 10 visit the army under his comhaho
was so different from that represented ~
this paraphrass that ! wish a copy %
the letter had been givsn-whicn was
probably not longer than the statement
made OF its contents. If the purpose
was TO discufs the reinforcement OF ms
army by the transfer OF troops from other
commands az the recital OF the paper IN
dicates. General Johnston would nave
known that in Richmond, where all the
returns were 20 be found, that question
could be best considered and decided.
As his army was not engaged In active
onerations. IL would seem 70 have been
more probable and proper that he should
nave gore to the War Office. rather IMAM
have asked the President, or the oeCre
tary of War, or some one represehtiis
them. should go 10 his headquarters 70
solve so grave a problem; not py the
beet obtainable data. but on such specu-
lative views as the paper exhioits. 'eiy
little experience. or a fair amount OF
modestv. without any experience, would
prevent one from announcing his conciu-
sion that troops should be Withdrawn
from a place, or places. without knowing
how many were there, what were the
terms or conditions of their enlistment
and what was the necessity for their con-
finuance in that service.
went to the headquarters OF the
army. in compliance with the request OF
General Johnston, on the day after my
arrival reviewed he troops on the pam
above Fairfax Courthouse; after whlch
nronosed 10 General Johnston that we
should have the desired conference anu
readily assented 10 his wishes that the
two generals next In rank TO hiinsell-
Generals Beauregard and @. W. Splth-
should be present. / was there py IN
vitation. and the confidence / feit III
those officers and IN the purpose lot
which the consultation was desired Is
shown by the fact that / met them
unattended. and did not require min
utes 10 be kept OF the proceedings con
dItions which would not have existed
tho use 70 which the meeting has peen
put had been anticipated. In view OF
previous correspondence, the question:
for consideration. so far as l knew was
what course should be adopted for the
Army Of the Potomac in the Immediate
future Therefore. I made the preli-
minary inquiry as 10 the number OF
troops there present for duty. TO
my surprise and disappointment, the et-
fective strength was stated to be but
little greater than when IL fought the
battle Of the Dist Of the preceding July.
Tho frequent achievements when haa
been sent 10 that army in no"ise pre-
pared me for such an announcement.
To nv inquiry as 10 what force "ouid
be required for the contemplated advance
into Maryland. the lowest estimate maze
by any OF them was about twice the
number there present for duty. no"
little 7 was prepared for such cohul-
ton Of things will be realized from the
fact that previous suggCuons by the
generals In regard 10 purpose 70 al
vance into Maryland had induced me-
uben T went TO that conference. to take
with me some drawings made by the
veteran soldier and engineer Colons
Crozet. Of the falls Of the Potomac 20
show the feasibility OF crossing the rircT
at that point Very little knOwl dse o.
the condition and military resources OF
the country must have sufficed to show
that I had no power 70 make the de-
manded addition TO that army without
a total disregard Of the safety of other
threatened positions. II only remained
for me TO answer that ! had not power
m furnish such a number Of troops; and
unless the militia bearing their private
arms should be relied on, we could not
possibly fulfil such a requisition until
after the receipt Of the small arms which
we had early and constantly striyen 10
recure from abroad. and had for some
time expected Whatever other object
there may have been for intensifying the
dangers OF inaction, IL surely could not
by these conferrecs have been thought
necessary TO impress their danger special
" on me. and so put their thoughts on
record for after times In such connection
as to give them that special application.
Nv correspondence OF anterior dates
might have shown that l was fully aware
Of It. and my suggestions In the inter
view certainly did not look as II IL was
necessary to impress me with the ad-
vantage OF action. In one part Of the
paper IL Is stated that the reinforcements
asked for w,re to he seasoned soldhrs.
such as were there present. and VINO were
said TO be in the finest fsnting condition.
This. If such a proposition has been made
would have exposed its absurdity, as we'll
as the loophole IL offered for escape. by
subsequently asserting that the troops
furnished were not up to the proposed
standard. 1t must b. remembered that
this was during the first year Of the war
into which the Confederacy entered with
out an army In another part Of the pa
per IL is stated that Their wa hope and
expectation that, before the end of the
winter. arms would be introduced into
the country, and that then We could sue
cessfully invade that Of the enemy; but
this supply Of arms, however abundant
could not furnish seasoned soldiers. and
the two propositions are. therefore, IN
consistent In one place II is written that
II was felt II might be better TO run the
risk OF almost certain destruction fight
ing upon the other side Of the Potomac,
rather than see the gradual dying out
and deterioration OF this army during a
winter, etc, but when 1t was proposed
20 cross into Eastern Maryland on a
steamer in our possession for a partial
campaign. difficulties arose like the lion
in the path of the sluggard, so that the
proposition was postponed and never exc
cuted In like manner the expedition into
Western Virginia was projected and
achieved by General T. j. Jackson who
was not of this council. We are not in
formed who II was that "felt" that stern
desire and purpose dread. TO go forth al
the risk Of almost certain destruction"
but from the foregoing and other indica-
tons. including the d cislon OF the con-
ferrees that twice the force available was
necessary for the contemplated move
ment across the Potomac, IL is TO be in
ferrtd that elsewhere among the three
generals the described feelings must nave
existed II is true that 10 some extent
quite short OF the dire extremity OF de-
structon, a desire 10 cross the Potomac
in 1861 was expressed by other officers.
who thought the risk should be taken