Evening star., 1897-12-03

stituting the Commissioners of the District
of Columbia, and their exercise OF the ap-
pointing power. in my opinion, does no.
confer upon their appointees any official
relation to the municipality. II would seem
that for economy of administration the old
board was abolished. and their powers
transferred to the Commissioners. but no
purpose is indicated by the Congress to
make any change in the relations of the
police force to the corporation. The indict-
ment does not Charge that the defendant
was appointed by the Commissioners. but
ne must have received his appoin tment
either from them or from their predeees-
sOrs. the board of police. and, in either
case. he was not appointed by virtue or
any authority conferred upon the District
of Columbia. and because of this lack OF
official relation it seems to me to be clear
that ne was not an officer of the District
of Columbia in the sense In which that
term is used in the statute under which ne
was indicted.
There appears to be another reason for
holding that the defendant was not an
officer of the District of Columbia. whicfi
arises out of the functions or ponce
officer and the character or the duties that
he has &c perform. A police officer is an
officer of the state, rather than or the
municipality in which he exercises his Of
flee, says Judge Dillon in his work on
municipal corporations. Vol. 1, Sec. 30.
The question whether such an official
is an officer or agent OF the municipal cor
poration in which he exercises his func-
items has repeatedly arisen in civil actions,
and the authorities appear to be uniform
that he is not such officer OF agent.
but is public official holding his trust
from the state, appointed to discharge in1-
portant duties in which the municipality
has no Immediate. special interest, and
from which it derives no particular advan-
tage.''
Various authorities are cited. and the
opinion says:
In the case of an officer of the metro
politan police of this District, the conclu-
sion that he is a public rather than a
municipal officer is strengthened by the
fact that the statute of 1861. August 6, ex-
pressiy confers upon him all the common
law AID statutory powers of constable, ex-
cept for the service of civil process.
Police Court Connection.
''If not officer of the District In the
performance of his ordinary duties, was he
such officer de facto, and in its service
when performing the duty to which he was
assigned at the Police Court?
Examine the original act of 1851 under
which that court is constituted, and also
the provisions Of the Rev Stat, D. c.
chapter 3D. That court was given jur.sdic-
ton to try offenses against the United
states OF a certain grade. and the viola
tiCns of all laws and ordinances. originally
o: tn" corporations of Washington and
Georgetown. and of the levy court, and un-
Ger section 1919. X. s. d. c., Of the District
in force therein.
The act of 1861 imposed the expense of
the court upon the two cities and the levy
court in the proportions of 50 per cent for
the city of Washington, II per cent for the
city OF Georsetowr, and per cent for the
levy court. 1t provided that all fines ir
United States cases should be paid over 10
the proper authorities of said cities and the
levy court in these proportions, and that
those arising froEl the other cases of viola
tens of municipal ordinances should be
al hnr nf ir,r--
iscictons in which the violation was COM
mitted- BY section 1919. r. S. d. c., all
fines. penalties and forfeituIes, no matter
from what cases collected shall be paid
over to the District.
TN United States cases process for arrest
Is required to be directed to the marshal OF
the District except in cases of emergency,
wren 1t may be issued to the major of po-
lice. and in municipal cases such process
must be issued to the major of police The
fires. penalties and forfeitures imposed or
taxed by the court are to be collected by
tie marshal. or by the major of police. as
the case may be. process issued by the
court. Section 1879. r. S. d. C.
THE marshal is remunerated by fees for
such services. No compensation beyond his
salary for like services rendered by the
major of police is provided. The marshal
is compensated by fees allowed. The major
of police receives a salary. Obviously the
marshal and the major of police stand in
Ike relation to the court in the execu-
tion of its process. Under the necessities
OF the service both of these officers must
act by deputy. The defendant in the per-
forrnance of his duty to which he was as
signed by the major. acted his deputy.
He had no other authority power, for
all process executed by him, was required
TO be directed to the major of police. and
in the receipt of fines well as in the
execution of process for their collection he
acted in that capacity. Is the major of
police an officer or agent of the District,
service. reference
execution of process directed to him by the
Police Court. which he is bound by the
statute to execute and make return in
like manner as in other cases? Plainly
not.s He is an officer of the law, charged
with public duty in the performance of
which the District as a municipality has
no direct immediate interest, and over
which it can exercise no control. AS tn
such duty, neither the former board of
police, nor their successors, the Commits
sioners of the District. although the source
from which that official received his ap
pointment, could exercise direction. Sup-
pose process issued to him, and the maJcr
OF police refused to execute it, execution
having been forbidden by the Commission
ers. could it be doubted that he and they
would be amenable to contempt proceed
ings?'
'It appears to me to be very clear that
the defendant did not occupy an official
relation to the District of Columbia in the
sense of the statute under which he IS in
dicted in the ministerial duties which lie
performed at the Police Court as the dep
uty of the major of police.
These considerations and conclusions.
independently of the further question Of
the ownership of the money collected wniie
in the hands of the officer of tie Law he
fore payment over to the District. require
that the judgment shall be arrested. IL
is so ordered and the prisoner IS dis
charged"