The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1897-08-01
FRANCO GERMAN. FRONTIER.

After, the war ofISTO and the loss OF Alsace-
Lorraine; FRANCE found herself possessed of a
frontier which had no natural: features to
serve as delenses-in fact the new iron tier line
was drawn by: Germany with precisely mat
idea :. Despoiled OF her ancient barriers, the
Rhine and the Yospes m cunt aims, France went
earnestly. at the task of providing ar hhclal
ba rriers. With The from tier but few marches
from Paris and no good positions intervening
some hing must BET done TO keepout tn i awinl
Teutonie horde, the renem brance OF which
was then SO fresh. -, -. = ~. : =: . ::
The present Eranco-German frontier is an
irreg ular line but:.3Q0 kilome ters. in length:
In drawing the line the Germans were I'M:
doubleday aetuated by 8 desire TO weaken the
French from tier aud at the same; time
strengthen their own. This objectwas most
effectually accomplished by pushing the line
beyond the Rhine 10: include:the passes OF the
Nosges and the strong fortress of Metzs key
point of future offensive Operations against
France. No natural obstacles of any vaine
now in terrepe between the frontier and Paris
The French froatier is thus naturally W ehk
both for *;ofense and defense. To take the
offensive France mus NOW force; the passes OF
the Nosges, and alter that the great Rhine
barrier yet remains. On the defensive she
must rely on artificial obstacles: almost en-
tireiy.. The German frontier, on the con-
irary, is strong both ior offense and Defense.
BY con trolling both banks of the Rhine and
the passes of the*@V osges, Germany can mass
her troops within her OWE territory and ar
rive ct ence within striking distance while
only: vague reports will reach the French to
indicate the point where the blow will FALL
Germ any In ad vaneing win fad an open coun-
try while with every. step of France. in adj
vance the physical and military difficulties
increase. s.. RI. :.
IA careful study Of the frontiers OF a possible
enemy isone of.the most important occu pa
tons OF the army staff in peace time, but: 1t Is
safe to say that the piece OF territory separa.
ting France and Ger many has*beeH more cafet
fully studied and mapped than any other re-
gion of equal size on the globe. In this region
has arisen a system of fortr esses the ike OF
which, beth in size and completeness of aFnia-
ment and equipment, the world has never
seen. In this work the French have spent
vastsurns, estimated asshigh as 1900 millions
offrancs. FEC: -:
In terrifying the frontier the principles
adopted by the Frenchwero to place in the
first line very strong places connected by
hume tous forts interceptiug the intermediate
routes. +; In this line=were LETT two: or three
gaps having few: If any artificial obstacles,
the object of thisarrangementb being TO invite
the enemy to push through and then take him
in flank. Behind this is a line Of strong posi-
tions to intercept the enemy In case the first
lfneis broken through: ri.
The general line selected tor defense Is that
of Lengney, Verdnn, Teul. Epinal and Belfoft-
Each of the above places is an imme nse ''in-
irenched camp, $50 called, but in reality vas t
fortress, com plete In every respect Beyond is
a line or circle Of detached works serving to
protect the place from commandment. ~. ::
+ The second line consists of the intrenched
camps OF Iaon, Rheims. Langres, Dijon and
Besan con: The third line is similarly COM
posed of the Notifications of Lyons, Par is and
Lille. Each OF the for tresses is under q GOV:
ernor, ass isted by q council of defense, and
with garrison carefully trained. Leading TO
this: line Of defense are ten. lines of railway
for effecting concentration of troops, and in
rear of the forts and connecting them is an
elaborate network Of railroads.
= SRA tegicalIy the first line has several roles
to fulfill both offensive and defensive, the
principal being TO re-enforce: the natural OBJ
atacles and form routes of invasion. and to aid
1.-THE field army both in covering its mabiliza-
tfot and concentration and facilitating the
subsequent deployment. It forms also sort
OF screen behind which change of base may
be nsdeif circumstances demand: 1t. In case
of a forward movement this line Is to be held
by the territorial army while the active army
moves forward in an offensive movement.
T.: The French seem determined TO prevent IN
yasion II possible, and when the long-pre-
'dicted comes this line will be the scene of
one!of the grandest ana most desperate con-
| fiicts yet seen. - 8 s