El Paso daily herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1881-1901, 1897-09-22

The old times when every sailor could
be changed to man-of-wars man are
past. AT the present time 1t takes con-
sldera be training to convert even the
skilful merchant sailor into a good
marine.
''1he Spanish fleet is very much bet
ter prepared. Its war ships, though
by 70 means as powerful as the Ameri-
can, are faster and carry their full
compls lnent of officer and men, which
strength can be kept up to It's full linn
it by calling in the reserves. These,
however, are not the on y advantages
Spain would have over the United
States in case OF war. SPANS plan
would doubtless be to guard Cuba and
Porto Rico as well as possible and to
inaueurate guerilla sea warfare on
the coast of the United States, evadipg
at the same time all serious engage
mepts on the high seas, except under
very favorable circumstances. By
me ans of its auxiliary ships, more Du-
merous than those OF the United Sta ties,
the Union ships could be constantly
harrassed until the officers and men
would be worn out with the constant
watchfulness and guard duty. In the
Spanish ships the crews would not be
subjected TO such severe strains, for
they could Opstantly find relief in the
they could also obtain everything nee
essary to put their ships in an effective
condition. The important commerce
of the n'ted States would be deStrOye ed
and the Spanish ships would certainly
fiud opportunity TO lombard the Amer
lean seapOrtS.
WOULD BE ON THE DEFENSIVE.
In any case, the United .ates would
have to assume the otfe nsive, and would
Ia
Spanish fleet il a decisive engagement.
Whether this would be posi- ole or not
is extremely difficult to IoreIell. The
conditions are not favorable to the
union. 1t can hardly b. assumed that
the Spanish fleet would separate itee. f
very far from its base Of operations in
Porto Rico and Cuba. A pitched naval
battle of the old style would therefore
not be prOba bic, and would most liz ely
occur by chance, when the Spaniards
had received false Information of the
For an attack on the Spaniards in the
West Indies, the American fleet would
| undoubtedly be divided into two squa-
drOns, one for Porto Il co, the o-her
| for Cuba. With the exception of few
villages, there is not much to attack in
Porto Rico, and in Cuba the attack
would be confined to the destruction OF
government property.
During the day the fleet would be
able ito destroy the government pro-
party in Havana. AT night, however,
numerous small vessels of speed of
twenty-six knots would slip out of the
harbor and threaten the union war
ships with destruction. The loss of a
torpedo boat is not iDp orta1t; that of a
war ship amounts to much, 1v0 to 200
men; four TO five millions of dollars, and
it takes Two or three years to replace u
war ship.
The foregoing considerations will
show that the United States will have
little or no prospect of attacking Spain
successfully, and that there is little
p Obability of damaging Spain to any
:. rious ext ,nt in the West Indies. The
Spanish fleet, before com encing the
devastation of the American coast,
would attempt to separate the two
Union squadrOns in the West Indies,
and then to attack each separately.
Should these tactics be successful, there
can be no doubt that the American
fleet would suffer irreparaole damage,
# not complete destruction. 1t is
therefore evident that the United
States could iuflict but slight damage
on Spain, while the latter, though I'M
able to conquer the United States.
would nevertheless be able to work
destruction to the extent of several