The sun., 1897-10-03

tary interest is the surprise OF the morning and
h9w !, was possible S would S seem that no
movements since the withdrawal from Staun.
ton, The service of security and informa-
ton was almost entirely neglected; the pre-.
vious victories had not been properly followed
up and the damage done to the lighting power OF
the enemy was vastly overrated; the belief that
the enemy would not again venture down the
valley led to the neglect of the most ordinary
measures OF preventing n surprise; the cavalry
pCkets had been removed from Cedar Creek
and the Shenandoah River in front OF Thoburns
position. and had not been replaced. This
river and to form his lines without detection
within striking distance OF the Union trenches.
while the fog and darkness prevented his dis,
covery by the infantry pickcts until his attack
was made Thoburns officer of the day heard
sound in the dir"ction Of the river, and went
with n patrol 10 Investigate 1t and get infornn-
were still at the ford, but he was captured With.
Again. tho faulty location ; Of the Union lines
WINS an invitation TO disaster Thoburns di-
with beautiful natural glacis of easy slope
toward the river, and was secure from ordinary
front assault, but it was detached from any sup:
port, with ravine between it and the rest of
the army. and il fanked, as it was, the only sal
Withdrawal It Is probable that Sheridan i,ii,i did
not anticipate such a move as that SO admirably
executed by Gordon. and which involved a
the Shenandoah River Against amy other
move the position secure from capture,
After the battle the opposing forces rested
quietly at Cedar Creek and New Market respcc-
Kernstown to secure better, quarters and u
shorter oI", line of sgBpXy y EbHr lar whose rest at
self since leaving Cold HHrbor, had quickly re-
cupcratcd his losses. and followed down the
valley, taking position near Newtown, whore he
remained during the nth and 18th: sheridan
was too strong 10 be attacked. and Early's cav
airy being roughly handled. he withdrew on
~ ~ ha Hafn Tinnn
the whole OF the Union force in the valley until
the middle Of December. when the Sixth Corps
| ginia were. sent to City Point.
About the middle of November Kersbaw 5
Rade to West Virginia. In the middle of De.
| cember Lee called for the return OF the entire
Second Corps to Richmond With his few re.
| tcrs ut StauntOn.
The valley campaign was ended Early had
| saved Lynchburg: he had threatened Washing.
| ton; he had interrupted communication for
three m9ntfs over the important military lines
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal; ho had Collected "% led
Northern soil; he had diverted a Force more
| Grants army in front OF the Confederate capital
and he had preserved intact the western lines
om Ky Other S Sand sEerdaR ah Snh on
| her OF battles; he had destroyed large amount
OF grain and supplies in the valley; hchad i'm
| proved the morale of his troops, greatly reduced
| the price of gold and insured thc.rC-clcction OF
thc. existing Administration. From a strictly
| military point of view there wns little gained
and so FAR as the effect OF tho valley opera ton,
| on the general campaign Is concerned, sheridan
| "ouln nave accomplished almost AN much hnd ht
| remained during the entire season behind hi,
| intrenrhnents al llaltown merely detaininl
| Early troops in the valley.
| Ii j. remarkable thnt u campaign SO complete
| ly victorious IN the field should BE- SO barren o
decisive results. and this can hardly be nc
counted Tor except On the suppoaition Of Yer!
Lo9king back over the campaign. II is seer
TINT from 'hc beginning of the ycor al The oprr
| n'ions III ihe valley were intended by Grant tt
Ton S ,Ss maj" %Ta ftS"sO tss%S %gSS 'o4HS E,
valley. but 10 he offensive operations dircctc,
against Lees comnuniGalons. CrooS had d.
YirEn!a and the West, and Hunter had hcrr
directed TO push on, If possible, 10 Charlotte
vile and Lynchburg, and destroy the raiiron'
weeks, Hunter did moi 70 10 tharlottcsyillc a
al, and failed 10 take IynchhGrg sheridan fc'
follow the enemy until lie could en-, Lees line
of supply, and this idea constantly rccurs II
Grants tclcgrams and letters throughout tn
year, 1t was, without doubt, The true line u
operations for Il force acting from the yallc,
As am ma to the RiGhmond campaign, and per
tion' there n fru itful campaign. rather thHn
barren episode. Leo was walchiully careful =
stroy, Twice, when these lines We're threat
cncd, he weakened his own hard-prcssod an
3HHtnImbsrSd tHdt IN army 70 protect them, knowm
Aftg. the battle OF the OpeGuan Grant tcIe
graphed: IT practicable, push, your success
Hill, Keep on and your good work will cats
the fall OF Richmond" a few days later, sept
have caused tHa HreatSst ronsernation II y"
can possibly subsist your army 10 the front
few days more do II. and ma kc a great effort I
destroy the roads about Charlottesville an
the canal wherever you can reach H." Shcl
id9n,s views did not accord with those of hi
course mark ed out for him. He complained Z
the length of his line OF supply. Grant, how
ever, had planned TO rebuild tho railroad froI
Alexandria to Culpcper, and in fact. had II
ready built II as far ~ Manassas junction
This would have given sheridan n shorter lin
and base from which To push south, but Il
refused 10 bc convinced, and wrote. II will 4
on ana clear out the valley EGrlys army wa
completely broken up aud is displritcd.
, .Tho Union forces in this hattle Numbered abo,