The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-08-29
AWH0LE ARMY PERISHED
THE WORST DISASTER THAT EVER
OVERLOOK A MILITARY FORCE.
A Previous Border War in India in
Which England Suffered Severely
at the Hands of the Afghans.


/ Inc scene OIL the present EiSllSu lIOuUiS
on the frontier of India is the region sur
| rounding the famous Khyber pass. a defiie
| in eastern Afghanistan, through which runs
the road from Peshawar to Cabool. The
| pass is traversed by the Cabool river, and
for many miles to the north and south is
| the only practical route through the
| mountains for army or large caravan.
| This district is mountainous, and the noun
| tains are among the ruggedest on the face
| of the earth, huge masses of broken crags,
| precipices many hundreds of feet in height,
| inaccessible peaks the sides of which are
| covered with snow that never melts. That
| so forbdding a country should have inhab-
| itants at all is remarkable; that the in
habitants of such a country should be as
rude as the rocks which surround them is
| to be expected Living in stone huts which
! elsewhere would hardly be deemed fit for
cattle, cultivating a few square yards Of
soil that is kept in place by retaining walls,
marauders by profession thieves and muir
derers by instinct, bloodthirsty, knowing no
faith utterly disregardful of promises
given the mountaineers of eastern Afghan
| istan are among the worst men in a coun-
trv which from time immemorial has been
| noted for the perfdity and righteousness
| of it's population. They have not mater1-
| ally changed since Alexander the Great
marched through the pass on his way 10
India; they are now what they were When
| they and their country first appear III the
| annals of the historian.
The British are to-day engaged in fight
| ing the sons and grandsOns of the men
| who in 1912, were responsible for the most
| crushing disaster that ever befell an army,
for in that year a British force was apso-
| lutely annihiIated, not hguratlVely out III
the most literal sense of the word, only one
| man escaping to tell the tale of the mas
sacre The story of the disaster ana me
events which led to it is one of the most
| thrilling episodes in Indian history, ana
| illustrative alike of the English desire TO
| annex contiguous territory ana OF AsIdtIc
| intrigue and perfidy. India was theH uilueI
the rule of the powerful East tno n9vtb;ng .
| that could be taken ana was worm lnS
trouble, and Afghanistan was IN state Oh
| misrule that practically amounted TO an
| archY Various claimants were asserting
| nv force of arms their right to the throne,
and the strife between these Wen as oii wa 6
some years before plausible excuse Go5, Tas
| offered for English interference. FROM 1901
| to 1899 the country was nomlnally ruleu py
| three brothers, of whom the n0teu 49, u.s.
| Mohammed was the most powerful, nolqlHE
| the northeastern region and having Cdpool
for his capital. Dost Mohammeo WAS cq bis
| stantlv engaged in war, either WIN US US
| brothers with Persia, on the west VI us
| dominions, or with the indian princes o on
Ine ed H. cor which led to the
| famous disaster to the British arms.
ORIGIN OF THE TROU BILE.
Early in the course of the Dost Moham-
med wars. Shah Shujah, claimant Oh the
Afghan throne, took refuge IN lndla' ana
placed himself under the protection OF the
| Indian government, which Warmly eS-
poused his cause, and, upon the prete&I tndl
| Doe+ had made war upon an ally of the
al
ties was proclaimed and in February 1889
the British army composed of about twelve
| thousand fighting men, with forty thou-
| sand camp followers, crossed the Indus and
| entered Afghaastan. AT first the eXpedl-
| tionary force was apparently SUCCESSFUL eV-
| erywhere One Afghan position aII9r an
| other fell before the British guns; Ghuzhl,
| the impregnable was Stormed, the army OF
| Dost Mohammed melted away. CaDool
| opened its gates to the lnVaosrs' Dos' 9at =
| rendered and WIS sent to India as state
| prisoner Shah Shulah was Installed IN I'd
| bCol as the sovereign, and the country was
| regarded as not only conquered, put pdGl-
| fed But the conquest of Afghanistan oy
| the English was like the conquest OF SPAN
by the French, nor were the people oa o,1e
| former any more than the latter, recon
| ciled to the idea of a prince supported ny
| foreign arms Popular uprisings took place
| all over the country, the troops were kepI
| constantly on the move for two years and
| e. ooo 6o6 a Tear The Indian government
|
| envoy that expenses must be reduced Inc
| onIy way in which this could be done was
| to cut down the allowances OF the. natlNe
| chiefs, who had been subsidized, and as
| soon as this was suggested they pfohe oul
| III open revolt. 49,, -
| cupied barracks d short distance from the
| city and was commanded by General Ed-
| phinstone, a very ag1d onlcer, Wno' ny
| reason Of govt and other tntlrm1tleS, was
| equally PROSTATE in body and mind. There
was practically no leader Of the forces, ana
when the city ToSe ~ the envoy and
! Burnes the English resident, We're muir
| dered the troops were beSleged III their
! cantonment, the commssary Tort, Weahly
| parrisoned was taken, and the British
| force was reduced to starvation AS winter
vas coming on, the imposslbillty or remain
| ing in hostile country without supplies
| was recognized, and preparations 1or eVac-
| uating the position were begun. The IT.
| ever, delayed the evacuation as ne hoped
! that by negotiations with the chlets, mat
| tiers could be arranged, or that help would
| arrive Both expectations were disap-
| nointed. and finally the British army capt.
| ulated, promising to eVacuate the country
while the Afghans guaranteed them saIe
| conduct out of AfghaniStan and supplies
| for the march. On Jan. l, 1912, the capitu-
| lation was signed, and on Jan. the army
comprising 1850 fighting men and L, OOO non
| combatants marched out of the barracks
| at CabOOl and took the road to JelaIabad
and the Khyber pass.
AFGHAN TREACHERY.
| The treachery of the Afghan chiefs was
| instantly apparent for before the long line
was out of sight of Cabool it was attacked
| on every side by the tribesmen. The coun-
try from Cabool to the pass is broken and
rugged. and two days hard marching lay
| before the army. Every rock hid an Afghan
| marksman, every commanding height was
| held by the enemy. During the first day s
| march nearly all the pack animals were
lost The Afghans, armed with swords and
| long knives, fell upon the camp followers
| a halt was made, but there was no rest,
for the tents were gone there were no pro-
| visions, q deep snow covered the ground
and attacks of the natives were increasing.
| During the second day the retreat became
| a disorderly rout; it was not the march of
| an army, but the hurried rush of mob
| Of fugitives. All discipline was gone; Off
| GERS and men, camp followers and women,
| crowded together in the narrow road to
| the pass, while from every side came the
| steady fire of the Afghan guerrillas. AL
| though the most ample proofs had been
| chiefs, the officers again opened negotia-
tions with them; the women and several of
! the leading officers including the general,
| were given or surrendered themselves as
| hostages, but still the firing went on, and
| by the time the fugitiVes had reached
| the entrance of the first pass through the
| mountains they had neither leaders, pro-
| visions nor ammunition, and a large num-
| Der of the soldiers were even without guns.
| Khyber pass is a mere canyon in the
| mountains, the road winding along the
| bank of the riv r, and at almost every point
| for five miles is commanded on both sides
| by OVerhanging preCipiceS No army could
force its way through the defile if the crags