The record-union., 1897-05-28
THE VAN LOBBN sells CASE.
Full Text Of the Decision Of the Supreme
Court.
Why That Tribunal Upholds the
Action of Reclamation Dis
trict No. 55I.

case of the People ex rel P J. Van
Loben Sells, plaintiff and appellant,
against Reclamation District No. DOL,
defendant and respondent, to which
reference has been made, is a long and
important one. The case was an action
of quo warranto, in which the only
defendant is the corporation whose
right to be a corporation is called in
question. The Supreme Court doubts
whether such an action can be main
talned, but as no objection was made
for lack of the proper parties, and
as the question is of public interest,
it tthe cOurt declined to raise the
question.
According to the decision rendered,
the defendant claims to be a reclama-
ton district organized Under the pro-
visions of the Political Code. 1t does
not claim to have been organized under
Section 34S1 of the code. but by pre-
senting to the Board of Supervisors the
petition required by Section 3446, and
by compliance with the provisions ap-
plicable to the conditions shown in
such a petition. The relator contends
that the lands included within the de-
fendant's district were, at the time of
in another valid and subsisting recla-
nation district. and since the provis-
ions of the code applicable to an or
ganization which includes lands already
within reclamation district were not
followed, defendant was not legally or
ganized.
1t is averred in the complaint" the
decision continues. that the lands in
cluded in the defendant reclamation
district were included in Swamp Land
District No. :, and that the latter then
was valid existing public corporation
for reclamation purposes.
/. THE reply to this is that the
Act of 1861 is unconstitutional and
void, because the district was organized
upon the application of the owners of
one-third of the land, without notice
to the owners of other lands If the
| board was authorized or required to
organize public corporation upon
| such an application which could sub
ject the lands to taxation, there would
be great force in the suggestion The
case would be within the decision
reached in Brandenstein VS.. Hoke, 101
| Cal, 131. Whether the same rule
would apply, although the power to
eXpend money and levy assessments
was not given to a public corporation
but was reposed in a State Board of
Commissioners, it is not necessary here
! to inquire"
To the next proposition made on be-
half Of the defendant the court holds
that the districts marked out under
the Act of 1851 We're not public cor
porations, but merely tracts of land
/ susceptible of one mode Of reclamation,
for which specific work was to be done
by the State Board. Section 34S1 of
the Political Code, it is held, provides
a mode in which owners of land in
reclamation districts may organize por-
tions of such districts, but nothing is
| said about public corporations. If
there We're swamp land districts, which
were not corporations, the Act would
apply to them, as we'll as to those
which had some kind of autonomy. and
were corporations.
The requirements of the Act of 1861
are quoted in the decision, and contin-
uing it says:
| When work was done the account
therefor was first approved by the
| Commissioners and then submitted TO
| the State Board of Examiners. and
when paid, was so paid out of the State
swamp land fund. The Commissioners
| had jurisdiction throughout the State
| and We're State officers. The district
had no autonomy whatever, and moth
| ing was done in its name or by any
| board of officers as officers of the dis
| trict. No one could act for it or bind
it in any way. The charges were paid
| by the State from the proceeds of the
sale of swamp lands within the dis
| trict, or if the cost exceeded that
| amount it was made a charge against
the land within the district. No pow
| erS whatever We're conferred upon the
| district or upon any officer thereof, nor
was any duty imposed upon any one
| which implied that a corporation had
| been created.
The district was not organized in
any sense Of the word. There was
nothing to which corporate powers
| could be attributed. 1t had no board,
no agency, and no managers. The Leg
islature, through it's creative power,
might have called into existence some
agency for the district and endowed
it with corporate power, but it never
did so. None of the numerous Acts re-
ferred to attempt to do anything of the
| kind"
Continuing, the decision reads:
'"But If it should be considered a
quasi corporation, or public corpora
ton for municipal purposes. as recla-
nation districts have been said to be-
it would make no difference If these
districts can be said to be corporations
| loI IL
corporations for municipal purposes
! That phrase means no more than that
they are State organizations for State
purposes. They certainly are not mu-
nicipal corporations, in the strict
sense"
At this point Dillon's definition OF
municipal corporations is quoted, and
further on the decision states:
These districts belong to neither
public nor private corporations. They
are special organizations. formed to
perform certain work which the policy
of the State requires or permits to be
done, and to which the State has given
a certain degree of discretion in max
ing the improvements contemplated.
They are described by Dillon in his
work on Municipal Corporations, Sec
tions "A. % and 26. He calls them
quasi corporations. Perhaps it would
have been more accurate to say that
they are not corporations at all. but
are so classed. because many of the
presumptions and rules which apply to
corporations have been made applicable
to them. They are public agencies
which would cease to exist when the
policy of the State has changed so that
they are no longer required or when