The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-12-15

ritorv would the control Of Alaska give to
EnoIand which she did not already pos
sess through her control OF British Column
hin. which is actually conterminous with
one NJ our States7 1t Is absurd to say that
"Nr. SEWARD saw that the safety Of the
Jrnited States rested in the immediate
| n,rcbnse of Alaska" The safety Of
the United States was. indeed, at
stake In the Oregon controversy, but
that. through negligence or pusillanim-
| ity, was permitted by our Government to
he decided against us. Mr.. SEWARD want
! ed Alaska for commercial purposes, and.
| from his point Of view, he was amply JUS
tilted in buying It, in view Of the relatively
small price at which Russia offered to sell
the territory. That it Is of any material
use to us from a military or strategic view
point, so long as British Columbia Is inter
posed between 1t and the rest of the Union,
no reasonable person will contend.
We pass to the three presidents afforded
by Texas, California and the Gadsden Pur-
chase, to only one of which does Judge
AGNEw refer at any length. The joint res
olution Of Congress, by which Texas was
admitted to the Union, is declared by him
10 nave Dtth H hc
holds, moreover, that It was not justified
by any overruling political necessity.
"Texas was acquired" he said, "to pre-
serve Southern equality in the Senate"
That may have been the motive of many
Southern members Of Congress, but It
was by no means the motive actuating all
the supporters of the joint resolution. 1t
was feared, and justly feared, that Texas,
IL not admitted to the Union, would fall
under the protectorship of England, by
which power measures had been already
taken to that end. Texas, in other words,
in 1S45, was in a position similar
to that occupied by Hawaii ut the
present time. If we did not take
1t some non-American power would.
Even Judge AGNEw admits that the SUBJ
sequent acquisition of California and New
Mexico In 1S4S made the control Of Texas
an absolute necessity to us. With regard
to California and New Mexico he seems to
think, though his a~llusion to the matter
is contained in a single line, that we &C.
quired those territories through the
exercise of the war powers vested in
the Federal Government. That, of course,
is one way Of looking at tho mat
ter, but, as a matter of fact, we paid
$15 ,O0O,OOO in cash, and assumed
$4,000, 900 worth of debts due from Mexico
to American citizens, this being the price
agreed upon for the coded territories in the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 1t can scarce
ly be pretended that California was neces-
sary to our national safety, at a time when
it could only be reached by a voyage round
Cape Horn, or by the route across the 18th
mus. We bought California and New Mex
leo because we wanted them, and those who
questioned our right to do SO were unable
to impeach the transaction successfully,
either before the United States Supreme
Court or before the tribunal of the popular
common sense. The same thing may be
said of the Gadsdcn Purchase, made shortly
afterward. This had behind it no plea of
overwhelming necessity, for it merely
rounded out conveniently, from a strategic
and commercial point of view, the southern
boundary of ournewly acquired possessions.
Judge AGNEw, apparently, has never seen
the imposing array of testimony from mill
tary and naval experts as to the strategic
of Hawaii to the defence of our
coast. If he had, he could not but
admit that a much stronger case can be
made out for the annexation of the Ha-
Islands at this juncture than was
made for the acquisition of Alaska or of the
Gadsden Purchase, and that, SO far as the
national safety is concerned, those islands
are more needful to us now than California
was in 1S4S. But, as we have said, the
whole question of our right to annex terri.
tory, whether contiguous as in the case of
or non-contiguous as in the case of
is res a~djudicata.