The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1897-10-23
WOLCOTT'S PROPOSALS,
ENGLAND'S REFUSAL S,

measures, If they were TO succeed even
temporarily in their objection, would
be an intense disturbance of Indian
trade and industry. There would be
sudden rise in exchange, Which, if the
ration Of 151a to ! were adopted, would
be to about pence the rupee.
such a rise would be enough to kill
our export trade, for a time at least,
until the public were convinced that
the arrangement would be permanent
and have the effect intended.
The paralysis of trade and indus
try would be prolonged and would be
accompanied by acute individual suf-
ferinE. None of the advantages eN-
pected would be attained, and the coun-
try would pass through a
CRITICAL PERIOD,
which would retard its progress for
years. The position would be disastrous
alike 20 the state. TO individuals and to
trade generally. The exchange value of
the rupee, having risen suddenly, would
fall equally suddenly TO a point far
lower than the present level, probably
to 9 pence and even lower. Such a
fail, apart from other disastrous re-
suits, would necessitate additional tax
alton to the amount of many crores."
GAVE WAY TO FEARS.
The reply then proceeds to point out
that the proposed agreement would be
Il much more serious question for In
dia than for the United States and
France, as the whole risk of disaster
from failure would fall upon India. If
the agreement broke down, the United
States and France could take precau-
tons against a depletion of their gold
reserves. but in India the rupee, when
the collapse came. would fall headlong
and the government would have no
remedy against huctuation in the eX-
change value OF midas standard of
value with the fluctuations in the price
OF silver.
For" continues the reply, IF the
Indian minis are re-oDened to silver
nov, it will be practically impossible
for the government ever to close them;
and if it were possible it would be only
after large additions had been made
to the amount of silver in circulation.
After noting that the effect of the
addition scheme would probably be an
increase in prices in France and the
United States. but a decrease in India.
q change which France and the United
States would contemplate with equa-
ninity. but which would be manifestly
impossible to India" the reply suggests
that the United States is doubtless
partly inspired in making it's proposals
by a fear Of experiencing the same diff
ficulties and dangers which India has
already surmounted after years Of
embarrassment.
BASIS TOO NARROW.
Then follows the opinion that India
is on the point of securing q stable
exchange Of i6 pence per rupee, and it
would be exceedingly foolish 30 throw
away the position already attained by
an acceptance OF proposals which, if
they failed of their intended object.
would place India permanently under
the silver standard With all its admit
ted disadvantages. Nothing but as
sured success could justify India in
joining in the experiments and our
belief is that the proposals viii fail to
secure d permanent ratio of 1512 TO /.
! One reason for this conclusion is that
the arrangements would be on too mar
row a basis. The union of two coun-
/ tries. with third lending assistance,
! is d very different thing from the in
/ ternatona union of q majority of the
! important countries of the world, adVo-
Gated by the Indian government in
/ dispatches forwarded IL March and
June, 1892, and in February and
I September, 1856
{ We doubt whether any two or three
nations in the world, unless one of them
required stability. It IS certain that
! France, the United States and India
could not"
! OBJECTIONS URGED.
The reply proceeds to discuss various
reasons why the experiment would not
succeed.
F'irst.-Franca and the United States,
/ seeing the prospect of a total disap-
( pearance of gold coinage before the
/ price of silver had raised to the in
! tended ratio, might take measures to
/ prevent the export of gold
/ Second.-Either country might be re
! duced to q paper currency. in which
case the agreement would cease to
! operate.
Third.-A three-side agreement
would be open TO greater risk of ter
minatiOn by one or two parties than a
! besides which, either France or the
! United States might some day think
I some other nation benedung at its eX-
pense and this would lead to discus
! sion as to the eXpediency of the termi-
nation OF the agreement, discussions
only less serious than actual termina-
| ton.
For these reasons alone. without con-
! sidering objection to the particular ra-
ito proposed, we do not hesitate y
| continue the authors of the reply, ITO
recommend that your lordship refuse
! to give the undertaking desired. We
shall be willing to consider what effect
the cooperation of any other nations,
! If secured, may have on the problems,
but we believe that our best policy is
! to link ourselves to Great Britain"
OBJECTIONS TO RATIO.
| They then proceed to argue that the
ratio of 151a to l is too high Differing
! so widely from the existing ratio il
would immensely increase the difficulty.
! Indeed, if it could be secured and MAN,
} tanned successfully, we should object
! TO the ratio in the interests of India,
and we recommend your lordship on be-
| half of India, to decline to participate
| in or do anything to encourage the for
! nation of a union based thereon.
CAS- we have already pointed out. the
! sudden rise in the exchange value OF
! the rupee would be so disastrous to In
dian industries, especially planting, in
| which European capital IS largely en-
barked. that, in our opinion. the true
interests Of India demand that any
I measures TO attain stability of eX-
( change for gold and silver should be
based upon ratio not greatly differ
ing from 16 pence the rupee Any adj
I yantages from a considerable rise ir
| exchange would be far outweighed By
the resulting evils
| Having discussed the probable effect
in various directions upon midas Ioca
interests, the dispatch recommends 4
! reply in the negative. adding: I'VE