The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1897-12-07

! own plan. The cruel policy of concentration
| was initiated Feb Is, 1896 The districts
| controlled by the Spanish armies were de-
populated. The agricultural inhabitants were
herded in and about the garrison towns.
their lands laid waste and their dwellings
destroyed. This policy the late cabinet OF
Spain justified as a necessary measure OF
war and as a means OF cutting OH supplies
from me insurgents. 1t has utterly failed
as a war measure. 1t was not civilized war
fare. 1t was determination.
Against this abuse of rights of war l have
felt constrained on repeated occasions to
enter the firm and earnest protest OF TINS
government. There was much of pubic con-
den naticn Of the treatment of American
citizens by alleged Illegal arrests and long
imprisonment awaiting trial or pending pro
tracted judicial proceedings. | fe:t 1t my hrst
duty to make instant demand for the re-ease
or speCdy trial of all American citizens I'M
der arrest Before the change of the Spanish
cabinet in October last twenty-five prisoners,
citizens of the United States, had been given
their freedom. For the relief of our own
citizens suffering because of the conflict the
aid of congress was SOUGHT IN d sPeG ca
4 1897 effective aid has been given to
American citizens in Cuba, many of them at
their own request having been returned TO
the United States.
The instructions given to our new minister
IN Spain before his departure for his post
directed him to impress it upon that GOV,
States to lerd its aid toward the ending OF
the war in Cuba by reaching a peaceful and
lasting result just and honorable alike to
Spain and to the Cuban people Ia atss IN IN
of the contest the widespread losses it en-
tails the burdens ard restraints 1t imposes
uDon US with constant disturbance Of ma
tfonal interests and the injury resulting from
an indefinite continuance of this state OF
things 1t was stated that at this 1uncture
our government was constrained TO strenu-
ously inquire if the time was not ripe when
Spain of her own yoliton, moved by her
own interests and every sentiment of hui
mainly, should put stop to this destructive
war and make proposals OF settlement hon
orable to herself and just to her Cuban col
ony. 1t was urged that we as neighboT-
ing nation with large interests in Cuba could
be required to wait only reasonable time
for the mother country to establish its au-
thority and restore order within the borders
of the island, that could not contemplate
as indefinite period for the accomplishment
of this result.
NO HUMILIATION.
No solution was proposed to which the
slightest idea of humiliation to Spain could
attach and, indeed, precise proposals were
withheld to avoid embarrassment to that gov
eminent. All that was asked or expected
was that some safe way might be speedily
provided and permanent peace restroed. 1T
so CHANGED that the consideration OF this
offer addressed to the same Spanish ADMIN
istration which had declined the tenders of
my predecessor and which for more than two
years had poured men and treasure into
Cuba in the fruitless effort to suppress the
of Gen. Woodford, the new envoy, and his
arrival in Spain, the statesman who had
hand of an assassin and although the cabi-
net of the late premier still held office and
received from our envoy the proposals ne
bore, that cabinet gave place within few
days thereafter to a new administration un-
der the leadership of Sagasta.
The reply to our note was received on the
23d day of October; It is in the direction Of a
better understanding. 1t appreciates the
friendly proposals of this government. 1t ad-
mits that our country Is deeply affected by
the war in Cuba, and that its desires for
peace are just. 1t declares tnat the present
Spanish government is bound by every con-
sideraton to a change of policy that should
satisfy the United States and paeify Cuba
within a reasonable time. To this end Spain
reforms heretofore advocated by the present
premier, without hating for any considera-
ton in the path which in its judgment leads
to peace. The military preparations will con-
tinue, it is said, but will be humane and be
conducted with all regard for private rights,
being accompanied by political action leading
to the autonomy of Cuba while guarding
Spanish sovereignty. This. 1t is claimed, VIII
result in investing Cuba with distinct per-
sonality; the island to be governed by an
executive and by a local council or chamber,
relations, the army and navy, and the judi
cial administration. To accomplish this the
present government proposes to modify exist
ing legislation by decree, leaving the spanish
deputies to solve the economic problem and
properly distribute the existing debt. In the
absence of a declaration of the measures that
this government proposes to take in carrying
out its proffer of good offices it suggests that
Spain be left free to conduct military opera
lions and grant political reforms, while the
United States for its part shall enforce It's
neutral obligations and cut off the assistance
which it is asserted, the insurgents receive
from this country. The suppositon of an in
definite prolongation of the war is denied. 1t
is asserted that the western provinces are al
ready well nigh reclaimed; that the planting of
cane and tobacco therein has been resumed
and that by force of arms and new and ample
reforms very early and complete paclncation
is hoped for.
The immediate amelioration of existing con-
ditiCns under the new administrator OF
Cuban affairs is predicted and therewlthal the
disturbance and all occasion FOR any change
of attitude on the part of the United States.
Discussion of the question of the international
duties and responsibilities OF the united
States as Spain understands them Is present.
ed with an apparent disposition TO charge US
with failure in this regard. This charge Is
without any basis in fact. 1t could not nave
been made if Spain had been cognizant of the
constant efforts this government has made at
the cost of millions, and by the employment
of the administrative machinery of the nation
at command to perform its full duty according
to the law of nations. That 1t mas success
fully prevented the departure of single mill
tary expedition armed vessel from our
shores in violation of our laws would seem TO
be a sufficient answer. But of this aspect of
the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak
further now Firm in the conviction of a
wholly performed obligation due response to
this charge has been made in diplomatic
course.
Throughout al these horrors and dangers
to our own peace this government has never
broken, even in any way abrogated its SOW
ereign prerogatives of reserving to Itself the
determination of its policy and course &C
cording to its own high sense of right and in
consequence with the dearest interests and
convictions of our own people should the
prolongation of the strike so demand.
THREE WAYS OPEN.
OF the untred measures there remain only:
Recognition of the insurgents as bell gerents,
recognition of the independence OF CUBA;
neutral intervention to end the war by I'M
posing a rational compromise between the
contestants and Intervention in favor OF one
or the other party. | speak not OF torciole
annexation, for that cannot be thought of.
That by our code of morality would De GRILL
inal aggression.
insurgents has often been canvassed as the
possible if not inevitable step both in re-
gard to the previous ten years struggle ana
during the present war. l am not unmlndful
that the two houses of congress in the spring
of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent
resolution that a condition Of public war ex-
listed requiring or justifying the recognition
of the state Of belgerency in Cuba, and dur
ing the extra session the senate voted joint
resolution of like import, which, however,
was not brought to a vote in the house OF
the representatives. In the presence of the
significant expressions of the legislative
branch, it behooves the executive to soberly
consider tie conditions under which such
an important measure must needs rest for
justification. 1t is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses be
yond dispute the attributes of statehood
which alone can demand the recognition OF
belligerency in It's favor. Possession, in
short OF the essential qualifications of SOW
ereignty by the insurgents and the conduct
of the war by them according to the re-
served code of war are less important
factors to ward the determination of the pr2b-
lem of belligerency than are the influences
and consequences of the struggle upon the
international policy of the recognizing state.