The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-09-26

1or.r.iv cavalry. Now. when Grant took hold.
1 was waiting to sec what his pct imDossibiltty
would be. and 1 rcckonod II would be cavalry, OF
course. for wo hadn't horses Enough to mount
what men VIC had. There were fifteen thousand
or thercnbouts up near Harper's Ferry and no
horses to put them on. Well. the other day.
Grant sends TO mo about those very mon, just ms
1 expected; but what he wanted to know was
whether he could make infantry Of thom or die
band 'om. lie doesn't ask impossibilitios of mo.
and he's tho first General / have had that
didn't" On another occasion. when speaking OF
Grant, Lincoln struck the keynote OF this bog
raphy: "Tho great thing about him 10 his cool
pcrsistency OF purpose. He is not easily excited.
and has the grip OF a bulldog. When he once
gets his tooth in, nothing will shake him of"
Some European observers Of our civil war are
said to ha We expressed the opinion that Grants
campaigns and battles would prove OF little
value to tho student Of strategy and tactics.
The present biographer thinks that such adverse
criticisms are attributable largely to ignorance
of the conditions under which war must DO
wagod in q country OF vast distances and Inn
passable roads. What. he asks. are the So
called " rules of war" that Con. Grant violated .
"They originate in tho brains of civilian critics
like Macaulay, for tho best military authorities
are agreed that 1t is impossible TO formulate q
code which can be 80 described. The best Gen.
erals are those who know when TO disregard all
rules. The study Of great campaigns may train
the intel igence Of tho so dier, but 1t cannot
shape his action on tho field of battle in set
forms. Cnsar's bioRrapher tells us that he was
no deep calculator; his habit was to act for
the Immediate exigency." Col. Church goes
on TO say that Grant won tho confidence Of tho
Administration at Washington because "ho
showed the highest qualities Of a General in his
quick perception Of the conditions Of the mill
tary problem; not as IL existed in Europe, not as
1t was In the time Of Cesar or Hannibal or Ma
poleon, but as it was right before him on the
Mississippi and tho James. In Missouri. in Ken.
lucky, in Tennessee and Virginia. He occupied
himself less than others with the question as to
how armies should be organized according to ac-
copied maxims, but. better than others. he UNI
d%erstood. from the outset, tho art of making the
most effective use Of the material which tho
American volunteer soldier offers to the COM
mander. Students Of war critciso him. and.
doubtless, will always ~criticise him; but thoy
should not forget that. II his method did not
conform in every respect to their standards, 1t
was always directed by q clearly defined pur-
pose in his own mind as TO tho best way of 90
complishing tho immediate object. In the face of
storms Of criticism he adhered to his purpose
with n tenacity characteristic of the man until
results had indicated the soundness Of his
Judgment. Rejecting, from tho beginning of
his career, tho theories that haIppered others,
and that were only adapted to encounters be-
tween armies thoroughly organized and trained,
Grant understood tho Importance of action, and
Of continued action. to transform raw troops
into veterans" Finally, IL no made mistakes.
he know how to mako of these tho stepping
stones to final victory.