Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1897-12-09

1 country % establish IT. authority and re-
store order within the borders Of the IN
| land: that Ne could not contemplate an In
definite psFiod for the accomplishment q
No solution was proposed to which the
slightest idea q humiliation to Spain could
attach. and. indeed, precise proposals. were
| withheld to avoid embarrassment to that
| government. All that was asked or ex-
pected was that some safe way might be
speedily provided and permanent peace re-
stored. II SO CHANGED that the consdera-
tion of this offer, addressed, to the same
| Spanish administration which had declined
the tenders of my predecessor. and which
| for more than two years had poured men
and treasure into Cuba in the frWtless ef-
fort to, suppress the revolt, fell TO others.
Between the departure OF Gen. Woodford.
the new envoy. and his arrival in Spain,
the statesman who had shaped the policy
of his country fell by the hand OF an as
| sagain, and although the cabinet of the
late premier still held ONCE and received
from our envoy the proposals he bore. that
cabinet gave place within few days there
after to q new administration under the
leadership OF Sageota.
| The reply to our note was received on
| the 2sd day OF October. II Is in the d.
rection OF q better understanding. 1t APP
preciates the friendly purposss OF this
government II admits that our country
is deeply affected by the war in Cuba and
that it's desires for peace are just. II de-
clarcs that the present Spanish govern
ment Is bound by every consideration TO
change or policy that should satisfy the
United States and pacify Cuba within
reasonable time.
| To this end Spain has decided to put
into effect the political reforms heretofore
1 f.S tl...
hating for any consideration In the path
which In its Judgment leads 70 peace. The
| military operations. IL is said. Will con-
| tinue, but will be humane and conducted
with all regard for private rights. being
accompanied by political action leading to
the autonomy of Cuba while guarding
| Spanish sovereignty.
| This. IL Is claimed will result in In
vesting Cuba with a distinct personality
| the island will be governed ty an execu-
| tive and by local council CT chamber,
reserving to Spain the control of the for
| eign relations, the army and navy and the
| judicial administration To accomplish
this the present government proposes to
modify existing legislation by decree.
leaving the Spanish cortes with the aid
| OF Cuban senators and deputies, to solve
the economic problem and properly dis
tribute the existing debt.
In the absence OF a declaration OF the
|
| take in carrying out It's proffer OF good OF
4 fees Il suggests that Spain be left free TO
! conduct military operations and grant po-
litical reforms, while the United States for
| its part shall enforce its neutral obliga-
tions and cut Off the assistance, which. Il
Is asserted, the insurgents receive from
| this country.
The supposition OF an indefinite pro-
| longation of the war Is denied. 1t Is as
serted that the Western provinces are al
ready well nigh reclaimed; that the plant
! ing OF cane and tobacco therein has been
resumed and that by force of arms and
new and ample reforms very early and
| complete pacification Is hoped for.
Spain Promises AmeIiorntion.
The immediate amelioration Of existing
conditions under the new administration OF
| Cuban affairs is predicted, and Herewith
all the disturbance and all occasion for any
change of attitude on the part OF the Unit
| ed States Is cbviated.
Discussion of the question Of the inter-
national duties and responsibilities OF the
United States, az Spain understands them,
are presented. with an apparent disposition
| to charge US with failure in this regard.
The charge Is without any basis in fact. 1t
could not have been made IL Spain had
been cognizant OF the constant efforts this
! government has made at the cost OF NIL
lions and by the employment Of the admin
istratve machinery OF the nation at COM
mand to perform its full duty according to
| the law Of nations. That II has successful
| ly prevented the departure OF a single mill
tary expedition or armed vessel from our
shores in violation OF our laws would seem
| to be a sufficient answer. But OF this as
pect of the Spanish note IL is not necessary
to speak further now. Firm in the con-
viction Of a wholly performed obligation
due response to this charge has been made
in diplomatic course.
Throughout all these horrors and dan
gers to our own peace this government has
never broken nor even in any way abro-
gated its sovereign prerogative CT reserv-
ing to itself the determination of its policy
and course according to its own high sense
OF right and in consonance with the dearest
interests and convictions of our own people
should the prolongation OF the war 90 de-
mand
OF the untred measures there remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as
belligerents; recognition of the independ-
ence of Cuba: neutral Intervention to enc
the war by imposing a rational compro
mise between the contestants, and inter
vention in favor of one or the other party
that cannot be thought Of That by oul
code of morality would be criminal eg-
gresson.
Recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents has often been can
vassed-a possible IL not inevitable step
both in regard to the previous ten years
struggle and during the present war.
am not unmindful that the two houses o
Congress- in the spring of 1896, expressed
the opinion by concurrent resolution tha
condition of public war existed requr.
ing or justifying recognition of the stat,
of belligerency in Cuba, and during tn,
extra session the Senate voted a Joint res
olution of like import, which. however
was not brought to a vote in the House o
Representatives.
In the presence OF these significant ex
pressions of the sentiment of the legisla
tives branch IL behooves the executive I,
soberly consider the conditions unde
which so important measures must need
rest for justification. II is to be seriousl.
considered whether the Cuban insured
tios possesses beyond dispute the attri
butes OF statehood which alone can de
, mand the recognition of belligerency II
, its favor. Possession. In short. of the es
sontial qualifications of sovereignty by tn
insurgents, and the conduct of the war b.
, them according to the recognized code o
war are no less important factors towar'
, the determination OF the problem OF bel
ligerency than are the influences and con
[ sequences OF the struggle upon the in
tcrnal policy of the recognizing state.
The utterances OF President Grant II
his memorable message on December Z
1875, are signaily relevant to the presen
situation In Cuba, and 1t may be whole
some now to recall them. At that tim
a ruinous conflict had for seven year
/ wasted the neighboring island. Durini
I all those Years an utter dlsregar'
, OF the laws of civilized warfare AM
of the Just demands of humanity