Rock Island Argus., 1897-12-07

ency in its favor. Possession, IN snort.
Of the essential qualifications of sover-
eighty by the insurgents and the con-
duct OF the war by them according to
the received code Of war are no less
important factors steward the determine
ton OF the problem Of belligerency than
are the influences and consequences of
the struggle upon the internal polity
Of the recognizing state.
THE president then quotes approv-
ingly the utterances of President Grant
in his message of Dec. Z, 1875, when he
said that recognition of the independ-
ence OF Cuba was indefensible at that
time and that belligerence was a fact
that the Cuban situation then did not
PRESENT.
Turning to the practical aspects of
recognition of belligerency and review
ing its Inconvenience and positive dan
gers still further pertinent considera-
tions appear. In the code of nations
there is no such thing as a naked recog-
milton of belligerency unaccompanied
by the assumption Of international neu-
trality. Such recognition without more
Will not confer upon either party to
a domestic conflict status not hereto
fore actually possessed. or affect the
relation OF either party to other states.
The act of recognition usually takes the
FORM or solemn proclamation of neu-
trality which recites the de facto con-
dition Of belligerency as its motive. 1t
announces domestic law of neutrality
in the declaring state. 1t assumes the
international obligations Of neutral in
the presence of a public state of war
II warns all citizens and others within
the jurisdiction Of the proclaimant that
they violate those righteous obligations
at their own peril, and cannot expect
IN h<. ch oil 14I 81
The right of visit and search on the
seas and seizures of vessels and car
goes as contraband of war and good
prize under admiralty law must under
International law be admitted as a le-
gitimate consequence OF a proclama-
tion Of bellirorency. While according
the equal belligerent rights defined by
public law to each party in our ports.
disfavors would be imposed on both
which. while nominally equal. would
weigh heavily in behalf of Spain her
self. Possessing a navy and controlling
the ports of Cuba her maritime rights
could be asserted not only for the mill
tary investment of the island but up to
the margin of our own territorial wa
tiers. and condition of things would
exist for which the Cubans within their
own domain could not hope to create
a parallel. while its creation through
| main would be even more impossible
than now, with the additional obliga-
tions Of International neutrality we
would perforce assume.
The enforcement OF this enlarged and
onerous code Of neutrality would only
be influential within our own jurisdic-
tion by land and sea and applicable
| by our own instrumentalities 1t could
impart to the United States no juris-
diction between Spain and the insur-
gents. 1t would give the United States
| no right of Intervention to enforce the
| conduct of the strife within the para
| mount authority of Spain according to
the international code Of war For these
reasons 1 regard the recognition of the
belligerency Of the Cuban insurgents
| as now unwise and therefore inadmis-
sable. Should that step hereafter be
deemed wise as a measure of right and
duty the executive will take it.