Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1897-07-18
CENTREVILLE COUNCIL.
THE STATEMENTS OF GEMS. s"ii "'
pEAuREGARD, AND JOHNSTON
PRESIDENT DAVlSS REPLi'
RccoIiections DO Not AGrce-'o"''
Letters That Are Very in'ere''""
Contributions so the "is'''
the Lnte War.

the Lnte War.
The following appeared IN the Na'h-
~ po.rer az special correspondence
from washington: ,..o ~
In October $3.50 the fifth volume o,
,Records Of the war Of the keoe'non
mas ,ssred. ard my attention WIS
,,,c,ed 10 n paper entitled Cou"O" -
~ -. centrevnle." Being In Irre-
,oo,ooccs with Hon. jefferson DAVIS
sen, him a proof copy Of the paper '"u
received from him a reply.
send copies Of the "Councii-oi " 81
paper and President Davis's letter 70 ii0
for publication In the Banner
" MARCUS :. WRIGHT.
Council OF war at Centreyilie' oo'oDe, -
,ssi..-On the 18th Of September Io'i'
General Joseph Z. Johnston addressed "
,o,,e- IN the Secretary OF War in regard
% tho inheritance Of putuag this army IN
oord,tion 10 assume the offensive ana
suggested that his Exceliency' the l's''-
dent or the Secretary Of War or some
one representing them, should AT an carry
dsv come TO tho headquarters OF INC
army. at or near Fairfax Courthouse Ior
tho nnrnose Of deciding whether the army
eould be reinforced to the extent that 'he
commanding general deemed necessary
for an offensive campaign
His Fxcellcncy, the President, arrived
nj Fairfax Courthouse a few days there
after. late IN tho afternoon, ana pro-
ceeded 10 the quarters OF General Beau
regard. on the same evening General
Johnston and ! called 10 pay our respects
No oficia! subjects Of importance were
alluded TO i'm that interview. Al O'Clock
the next evening by appointment or the
President, a conference was nae between
himself, General Johnston, General Ieau-
regard and myself. Various matters or
detail were introduced by The President
aud talked over between himself and the
two senior generals. Having but recently
arrived, and not being well acquainted
with the special subjects referred TO.
took little or no part IN this converse
ton. Finally. with, perhaps, some abrupt
ness, / said: Mr.. President, IS It not
possible 10 put this army In condition
TO assume the active offenslve?" adding
that this was question Of vital i'm
portance upon which the success OF fail
question brought on discussion. The pre-
else conversation which followed / do not
propose TO give; II was not an argument
There seemed to be little difference OF
opinion between US IN regard IL general
views and principles. II was clearly stated
and agreed that the military force OF
fhe Confederate States was at the highest
point it could attain Without arms from
abroad: and that the portion Of this par
ticuiar army present for duty was in the
finest fighting condition; mat if kept in
active II must retrograde immensely in
every respect during the winter, the effect
OF which was foreseen ana DREADED by
us all. The enemy were daily increasing
~ number. arms, discipline and efficiency.
We looked 10 a sad state Of things at the
opening Of the spring camp ign
These and other points being agreed
upon without argument il was again
asked: "Mr. President, Is II not possible
20 increase the effective strength Of this
army ana put us in condition to cross
the Potomac and carry the war into the
enemy's country? Can you not. by strip
ping other points 10 the last they viii
bear. and. even rlsking defeat in other
places, but Us in condition TO move for
ward? Success here at this time saves
everything; defeat here loses ALL" In eX-
pianation and as an Illustration OF this
the unqualified opinion was advanc u
that II for want OF adequate strength on
our part In Kentucky the Federal forc,l
should take military possession OF that
whole State. and even enter and occupy
q portion OF Tennessee, q victory gained
by this army beyond the Potomac would.
by threatening the heart of the Northern
States, compel their armies 10 fan back.
free Kentucky. and give us the line Of
the Ohio within ten days thereafter. on
the other hand, should our forces in Ten
nesSse and Southern Kentucky be
strengthened, so as TO enable Us 10 take
and hold the Ohio river as a boundary, a
disastrous defeat of the army would at
once be followed by an overwhelming
wave OF northern invaders, that would
sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee. ex-
tending 20 the northern part OF the cot
ton States, II not 10 New Orleans. SINH
lar Views were expressed In regard TO
ultimate results in Northwestern Vir-
ginia being dependent upon the success
or failure OF this army. and various other
special Illustrations Were offered, show
Eng. In short. that SUCCESS here was a
success everywhere: defeat here. defeat
everywhere. and that this was the point
upon which all the available forc,s of
the Confederate States should be concen-
trated.
II seemed to be conceded by all that
our force at that time here was not sutii-
Client for assuming the offensive beyond
the Potomac. and that even With a much
larger force an attack upon their army
under the guns of their Notifications on
this side OF the riV,r was out OF the
question.
The President asked me what number or
men were necessary. IN my opinion. TO
warrant an offensive campaign, TO cross
the Potomac, cut on the communications
OF the enemy with their fortified capital.
and carry the war into their country
answered Fifty thousand effective. sea-
soned soldiers" explaining inst by sea-
soned soldiers l meant such men as we
had here present for duty. aad added that
they would have 20 be drawn from the
Peninsula. about Yorktown. Norfolk.
from Western Virginia, Pensacola. or
" hatever might be most expcdien,.
General Johnston and General BeNure
gard both said that a force Of 5000 such
men would be necessary. and that this
force would require large additional
transportation ana munitions OF war. the
supplies here being entirely inadequate
!. sThs exact date does not appear In the
Ncords That above Is approximately, II
- absolutely. correct.