The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1897-04-21
The Beginnings of a War.

inferior to the Turkish, although in
spirit superior. The late irruption
Of Greek irregulars into Macedonia,
read of without reference to the map,
would seem foolhardy in the extreme,
but study of the map printed by
the State day or two ago. in con-
nection with the following article
from the New York Tribune, will
correct such an impression. The
chief strategic points are indicated
in the map, and consultation of it
will enable interested readers to fol-
low intelligently the course of the
campaign about to begin.
The Tribune says
Whether the Greek government or
merely the national league is respon-
sible for it, the invasion Of Macedo-
mia is uncommonly we'll planned Its
strategy is obvious, but it is admira-
BILE, and worthy of the shrewdest
captain that ever led Greek arms to
victory. Perhaps it will not be sue.
cessful. The Turks outnumber the
Greeks by about four to one, and
have the advantage of German lead
ership in the field and German and
Russian sympathy behind the scenes,
while the Greeks stand entirely
alone. Nevertheless, Greece has
stood alone before this, without fall
Ing, and this movement upon Gre
vena, if properly followed up. may
cause the Turks and their allies the
worst quarter Of an hour they have
had since the fall Of PIevna
Reference to the map shows the
reason of this. The peninsula is d.
vided longitudinally by the Pindus
mountain range On the eastern
side the Turks have their beadquar.
ters at Elassona. and their base of
supplies at Salonica, the latter being
connected with ConstantinopIe by
rail. On the western side their head
quarters are at Janina. But they
have no base of supplies on that side
of the mountains Everything must
be sent over from Salonica. by way
of EIassona, or by a longer route.
Now the Pindus range is obout 1000
feet high, steep and rugged There
is only one available pass across it,
that of Zygos. just above Metsovo.
and that is traversed only by pedes-
trians and horses, not by vehicles
That is the only direct route of COM
munication between Elassona and
Janina
Now the Greeks have made dash
along the eastern side Of .Pindus, and
have cut that line of communication
between the two wings of the Turk
ish army If they gain and fortify
the pass it will be permanently cut,
for it would take long and arduous
campaign to dislodge them from
Zygos. Then the bulk Oh their army
can advance from Arta, as it is now
reported to be doing. attack and
probably vanquish the Turks at
Janina, and overrun Epirus at will.
Edhem Pasha at Elassona will be
powerless to prevent them, unless by
long detour around the Pindus
range, either to north or to south If
he should march north, into Albania,
be would be abandoning the Vistritza
valley to a Greek advance, which
might imperil Salonica itself If he
should march south, he would be in
vading Greece, and would have to
fight every step of the way.
There is a report that he will ad-
vance upon Larissa, and thus will
either compel the Greeks to return
from Macedonia to defend that place,
or will actually capture it and thus
bring Greece to terms. Yes But
he would thus be exposing himself
to great janger. The Greeks might
readily send force from Volo either
overland or by sea to the ValeEof
Tempe, where they already have a
fortified post, and, advancing thence
up the Peneus, strike him in flank or
rear The fact is. the Greeks have
at every point such advantage of po-
siticn as largely makes up for their
numerical inferiority. The war, if
war come, may no. be by any means
the one sided affair the anti-Greek
alliance hopes it will be.
Much depends upon the course of
the expected war in it's early stages.
Macedonia is mainly Greek by race
and religion, though Turkish by gov
ernment, and succession of Hellenic
victories in that province would
doubtless produce an uprising of it's
masses which would greatly embar-
rass the forces of the sultan and per.
haps drive them to less hostile terri
tory for their further operations