Morning appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1877-1906, 1897-11-14

right OF action on a judgment, inasmuch
as execution can be issued to enforce the
judgment already obtained, and no better
| or higher i hit or al vantage is given to
| the subsequent Judgment But this is
| not true in fact as in many cases it may
| De OF advantage to obtain another iudg-
ment IN order to save or pr0long the lien:
and in this case. the advantage of having
record evidence Of the Judgment is suffi-
| clently perceptible. The argument that
the defendant may be vexed by repeated
Judgments on the same cause OF action, is
answered by the suggestion, that An eff
tectual remedy to the party against this
annoyance Is the payment of the debt"
Ames VS.. Hoy, II Cal. II.
Considering the provisions Of our stat
utes under which Judgment is made a
lien upon the real property of the judp-
ment debtor for term of two years after
the Judgment has been dock eted we can
well say that it may be an advantage to
OBTAIN another judgment in order to save
or prolong such lien. The Supreme Court
of Indiana in later cases than the one
cited in the opinion Of Chief Justice
Beatty, say that the law is wei, settled.
that judgment creditor may enforce his
judgment by the process of the court in
which he obtained it, or he NAV elect to
use the judgment as An original cause of
action and bring suit thereon and prose
cute such suit to final Judgment.
Hansford ct al. vs.. Van Auken. Ad-
ministratOr, 20 Ind. 100.
Palmer VS.. Glover, u Ind. go.
In the absence of direct legislation re-
strlctlng or limiting the common law rilIn
of the right of action upon judgments.
there are found within our statutes pro-
visions from which the court is author
lzed In holding, as a matter of Inference.
that no change in that rule was intended.
otherwise some legislative restriction or
limitation Of the right under the common
law rule, would have been included in the
statute other than the one barring the ac-
ton if not commenced within six wears
after the right accrued. In other words.
the Legisl4tur. -to to the Judgment
creditor the right of action at any time
within SIX years after such right accrued
without other limitation~
Furthermore the statutory law pre-
served that right a> against the Judgment
dehtor who might be out of the State, by
allowing such action to be commenced
Within the time limited after his return
TO the state, which might be, a, in this
case, long after the right of execution had
been barred.
We mGs therefore hold, that under the
common ,aW rule, which prevails in this
State, that the right of action upon an I'M
satisfied Judgment is matter of course,
and that it Is not necessary to aver in the
compliant, or show by the record. that
other good cause exists therefor.
Noare also of the opinion that the con-
t"ntl0n of the respondents thntthe com
pItint and record show that Il good cause
does exist for the bringing Of the action
from the facts that the complaint and rec
ISclose. that n the time the action
\ 'e commenced the statutory right Of
'N'rulion had been barred by more than
nine YEARS jinso, while he Statute of Linn
ltati'1S h3'' only been running two davs.
Fhr respondents h"lj i Judgment. which
Is the highest e> >idnncc Of Indebtedness
without any right t. enforce the same.
and that right "oul; hc ohtained by an ac-
tlon prosecuted 70 final Judgment.
hejudgment Will therefore be affirmed.
BEI.kEAP. ca. and BONNIFIEI,n
J. conrur.
Filed Novcm her. II. 1897.
EUGENE HOWELL.
Secretary of State and cx-otficio Clerk of |