The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1897-10-27

pass through critical period which would
retard the progress for years"
The reply then proceeds TO point out that
the proposed agreement would be much
more serious question for India than for
the United States and France, as the whole
risk of disaster from failure would fall
upon India If the agreement broke down
the United States and France could take
precaut against depletion Of their
gold reserves, but In India the rupee, when
the collapse came, would fall headlong and
the government would have no remedy
against huctuation In the exchange value
of midas standard Of value with the fluc-
tuations In the price of silver. "For," con-
tinues the reply, IF the Indian minis are
reopened to silver now, ii will be practically
impossible for the government ever to
close them; and, II 1t were possible, 1t would
oe only after very large additions had been
made to the amount Of silver in circula-
ton"
Motive of the United States.
After noting that "the effect Of the adop-
ton of the scheme would probably be an
increase in prices in France and the United
States, but a decrease In India" a change
which France and the United States
would contemplate with eQuanimity, but
which would be manifestly impossible &c
India" the reply suggests that the United
States is doubtless partly inspired in max
ing its proposals by fear Of experiencing
some difficulties and dangers which India
has already surmounted after years OF en-
barrassment.
Why 1t Would Fail.
The reply then proceeds to discuss va
rious reasons why the experiment would
not succeed. First, France and the United
States, seeing the prospect Of a total dis
appearance of gold coinage before the price
of silver has been raised to the intended ra-
ito, might take measures to prevent the eX-
port of gold; second, either country might
be reduced to paper currency, In which
case the agreement would cease to operate;
third, a three-sided agreement would be
open to greater risk Of termination by one
or two parties than a many-sided interna-
tional agreement, besides which. either
France or the United States might some
day think some other nation benefiting
at its expense, and this would lead to dis
cussions as to the expediency of the ter
mination OF the agreement, discussions
only less serious than actual termination
Refusal Recommended.
For these reasons alone, without con-
sidering objections to the particular ratio
proposed, we do not hesitate" continue the
authors Of the reply, ito recommend that
your lordship refuse to give the undertake
ing desired. We shall be willing to consider
what effect the cooperation Of any other
nations, if secured, may have on the prob
lens. but we believe that our best policy
is to link ourselves to Great Britain"
Ratio Too High.
They then proceed to argue that the ratio
of fifteen and one-half to one is too high.
Differing so widely from the existing ratio,
it would immensely increase the difficulty.
Indeed, if it could be secured and main
tanned, we would object to the ratio in the
interests Of India, and we recommend your
Iordship, on behalf of India, to decline to
participate in, or to do anything to en-
courage the formation Of a union based
thereon"
Having discussed the probable effect in
various directions upon midas local inter-
ests, the dispatch recommends reply in
the negative, adding: I'VE presume that
union based upon ratio low enough to suit
our interests would not be acceptable to
France and the United States" In conclu-
sion the official dispatch intimates that the
present proposals might have been favor
ably considered in 1892, but the experience
of the last few years has made the position
very different" 1t also notes that 1.-The
conditions under which we have had to re-
ply to your lordship's dispatch preclude
our consulting with the commercial and
banking communities of India" but "even
had another reply been possible it could
only have been after the fullest preliminary
consideration by our banking and CONNER
cial bodies
The dispatch is signed by Lord Elgin.
the viceroy of India: Sir George Stewart
White, commander in chief Of the British
forces in India and extraordinary member
of the council of the governor-general, and
by the following members Of the council:
Sir James Westland financial member of
the counciD, Sir John Woodburn, major
general; Sir E. H. Collin, Hon. Mackenzie
Dalzell Chalmers and Hon. A. c. Trevor.
The correspondence concludes with Lord
Salisbury's dispatch to Ambassador Hay,
the contents of which have already been
cabled.
1-1xu~r