The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-12-07

1 ISdCHeu the conclusion tnat the COnIllCt
In cuba, dreadful and devastating as We're
It's, its incidents, did not rise to the fearful
! 1T is possible that the acts OF foreign
powers. and even acts OF Spain herself.
! OF this very nature might be pointed to
! in defense of such recognition But now,
! should carefully avoid the false lights which
might lead IL into the mazes of doubtful
Iaw bey ana e,dI 1T queSsona6le propriety and ad
1 has been its guide, of doing only that which
! is right and honest and of good report.
The question of according or of withhold
| ing rights of belIgerency must be judged
| IN every case, in view of the particular at
| tending facts. Unless justified by necessity,
( 1t is always, and justly, regarded as an un-
! friendly act and gratuitouS demonstration
or moral support to the rebellion. 1t is
| necessary and it is required when the in
! tereSts and rights of another government or
| of its people are so far affected by a pend
/ ing civil conflict as to require a definition of
| its relations to the parties thereto. But
! this conflict must be one which will be
recognized in the sense of international law
AS VIEWED BY GRANT.
| ''Belligerence, too. is a fact. The mere
| existence of contending armed bodies and
| their occasional conflicts do not constitute
| war in the sense referred to. Applying to
| the existing condition of affairs in Cuba
the tests recognized by publcists and writ
| ers on international law, and which have
| been observed by nations of dignity, homes
| ty and power when free from sensitive or
selfish and unworthy motives, / fail to find
| in the insurrection the existence of such :
substantial political organization. real,
| palpable and manifest to the world, having
| the forms and capable of the ordinary func
tions of government toward its own people
and to other states, with courts for the ad
minstration of justice, with a local habi-
| tation, possessing such organization or
| force. such material such OCCuDaIlOn OF
| territory, as to take the contest out OF
the category of a mere rebeilious insur-
| IectiOn or occasional skirmisheS and place
| it on the terrible footing of war, TO Whlcn
| recognition of bellgerency would aim
! to elevate it.
..The contest, moreover is solely on land;
/ the insurrection has not possessed itself or
| single seaport whence 1t may send forth
| it's flag, nor has it any motions or cum
munication with foreign powers, except
| through the military lines OF its adverSarteS.
No. apprehension Of any of those sudden
and difficult complications which war
upon the ocean is apt to .precipitate upon
/ the vessels, both commercial and national,
| and upon the consular officers OF other pow
ers, calls for the definition of their relations
| to the parties to the contest. Considered
| as a question of expediency, l regard the
| accordance of beilgerent rights stiil TO De
| as unwise and premature as l regard it to
| be at present indefensible as a measure
| OF right.
| try according the rights which flow from
| it difficult and complicated duties ana re-
| QuireS the eXactiOn from the cOnIenulIl6
| parties of the strict observance of their
| rights and obligations. 1t confers the right
| of search upon the high seas by vessels OF
! both parties it would subject the carrying
| of arms and ammunition of war, which now
| may be transported freely and without IN
| terruption in vessels of the United states,
| to detention and to possible seizure; 1T
! would give rise to countless vexat1ouS queS-
! tionS would release the parent government
from responsiplllty Ior acss eDme a Dy i the the
/ right to exercise the supervision recognized
| by our treaty over our commerce on the
| high seas, a very large part OF which, IN
| its traffic between the Atlantic and the
| gulf States and between all of them and the
States on the Pacific, passes through IN rne
waters which wash the shores of Cuba. Tne
| exercise of this supervision could scarce
| fail to lead, If not to abuses, certainly 70
collisions MS peous e %bere ene en be little doubt
| as to what result such supervision would,
| before long, draw this Nation. 1t would be
unworthy of the United States 70 inaugu-
| rate the possibilities of such result by meas
| ures of questionable right or expedlency, or
| by any indirection.
THE CODE OF NATIONS.
Turning to the practical aspects Of
recognition of belligerency and reviewing
| it's inconveniences and positive dangers, still
| further pertinent considerations appear In
the code of nations there is no such thing
| as naked recognition of belligerency un-
accompanied by the assumption of interna-
| ~NNCca%@~@~@~
confer upon either party to domestic
conflict a status not heretofore actually
possessed or affect the relation of either
| party to other states The act of recog-
milton usually takes the form of solemn
| proclamation of neutrality which recites
| the de facto condition Of belligerency as
| it's motives. 1t announces q domestic law
| of neutrality in the declaring state. 1t as
sumes the international obligations of a
| q a nlIhIiQ STATE
| of war. 1t warns all citizens and others
within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant
| that they violate those rigorous Obligations
| at their own peril and can not expect to
| be shielded from the consequences.
The right of visit and search on the seas
/ and seizure of vessels and cargOeS as con-
| traband of war and good prize under ad-
| miralty law must, under International law,
be admitted as legitimate consequence OF
| cording the equal belligerent rights defined
| by public law to each party in our ports,
| disfavors would be imposed upon both
| which, while nominally equal, would weigh
| heavily in behalf of Spain herself. Posses
| sing a navy and controlling the ports or
| Cuba, her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment Of the
| island, but up to the margin of our own
| territorial waters, and a condition OF things
would exist for which the CubanS within
! their own domain could not hope to create
| a parallel; while it's creation through aid
or sympathy from within our domain would
| the additional obligations of international
neutrality we would perforce assume
| The enforcement of this enlarged and on
! erous code of neutrality would only be in
| fluential within our own jurisdiction by land
and sea and applicable by our own instru--
/ mentalities. 1t could impart to the United
| States no jurisdiction between Spain and
/ the insurgents. 1t would give the United
| States no right of intervention to enforce
| the conduct of the strife within the para
mount authority of Spain according to the
| international code of war.
| For these reasons, / regard the recog-
| milton of the belligerency OF the Cuban in
| surgents as now unwise, and, therefore, in
| deemed wise as a measure of right and
| duty, the executive will take 1t. Interven-
| ton upon humanitarian grounds has been
| frequently suggested, and has not failed
| to receive my mGSt anxious and earnest
| consideration. But should such a step be
| now taken, when it is apparent that a hope
| full change has Supervened in the policy of
| Spain toward Cuba?
A new government has taken office in the
mother country. 1t is pledged in advance to
| the declaration that all the effort in the
| world cannot suffice to maintain peace in
| Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises
| of reform after subjugation afford no solu-
| tion of the insuiar problem; that with a
| substitution of commanders must come a
/ change of the past system of warfare for
| one in harmony with new policy, which
| to the horrible alternative of taking to the
| thicket or succumbing in misery" that re-
| forms must be instituted in accordance
| with the needs and circumstances of the
| time and that these reforms, while designed
| to give full autonomy to the colony and
| to create a virtual entity and self-controlled
| administration shall yet conserve and af-
| f5rvo tho aovarnieyufv of Gpofp hxy i,,ef dic-