The Jersey City news. (Jersey City [N.J.]) 1889-1906, 1897-11-29
VHS7IBULE AG7 GOOD.
Judge McCarter of Newark
Decides That the Consol-
idated Has Viola
ted the Law.
COMPANY MUST PAY THE PENALTY
constitutionality Of the Statute
Not Considered-The Trolley
People 1t Is Understood
Will Appeal.
COMPANY MUST PAY THE PENALTY
Especial to 1.-THE Jersey city News."J

Especial to 1.-THE Jersey City News."1
NEWARK, Nov. 20, 1s97.-Judge Nc
Carter, of the First District Court, rem
dered a decision on Saturday unfolding
the trolley car vestibule law.
THE case was tried upon an agreed
state of facts, in which the defendant
admits that it operates in the city of
Newark, on the tenth day of November
last, a street railway car by means of
an electric motor, not constructed with
vestibuled platforms of the kind referred
to in the act, but insists that it is not
amenable to the penalty described in said
act, because both sections thereof are
meaningless, and that the act is so word
ed as to be incapable of enforcement,
and should be judicially declared to be
imperative. The constitutienallty of the
act was not directly assailed, and is not
here considered. The claims of the trac-
ton company in reference to the first sec
ton of the act is that It'll so worded that
the prohibited season for operating cars
without vestibules is incapable of ascer-
tainment, or that if any season is indi-
Gated by the section, it is the warm sea
son of the year, between the first day
of April and the first day of Novem-
Der.
Under these circumstances, what Is the
duty of the Court in the construction OF
the statute? Mr.. Endlich, in his work
on the Interpretation of statutes, says
The presumption against absurdity in
the provision of a legislative enactment
is probably a more powerful guide to its
construction than even the presumption
against unreason, Inconvenience or injus-
tice. The Legislature may be supposed
to intend all these, but it can scarcely
be supposed to intend it's own stultihca-
ton. Accordingly it has been said that
when to follow the words of an enact
ment would lead to absurdity as it's con-
sequences, that constitutes sufficient au-
thority to the Interpreter to depart from
them. $ 8 In general it may
be safely said that where the words in
the statute are susceptible of two con-
struetions, one of which will lead to an
absurdity and the other not, the latter
is to be adopted, though it be not a lit
eral construction, but a liberal one
1.-THE Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr.. Justice Dayton, in the case OF smith
VS.. Tucker, says
i. Every statute should be so construed
as to suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy. A different construction in
stead of this would greatly aggravate ex-
listing evils, for all those cases
which were embraced within it. become
wholly unprovided for. This case, there
fore, L hold to be within the spirit and
intent of the act, and if it were not with
in its letter (Which is not admitted l
should feel bound to give it such con-
struction as would embrace the case
See also authorities therein cited. This
case is in point, and the doctrine therein
a Il - 80 fna 6v oil tho fAxT-
book writer's, that where the words used
are confusing, the Interpretation should
construe them, or even add to them, SO as
to make the section conform to the mani
fest intention Of the Legislature, rather
than leave the act an absurdity. 1t,
therefore, follows that even il the words
ton, the entire section should be con-
strued to prohibit the operation of electric
cars on and after the first day of Novem-
Der, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven.
between the first day of November and
the first day of April next following, or
during the so-called winter months, eX-
cept IN accordance with the terms of the
.sBut the act is ineff1cacious unless there
be a penalty for its infraction, and this
the second section undertakes to pre-
scribe. Two alleged vital objections are
made by the defendant to the phraseology
of the first portion of this section. 1t IS
contended that by the use of the words
for each day or part of day any such car,
ETC., shall be operated, a penalty OF
TWENTY-FIVE dollars shall be inflicted upon
the person operating the same the pen
year, without reference to any months
thereof; that the word such relates to a
car vestibuled in accordance with the pro-
visions of the first section, and that this
company having vestibuled it's cars in ac-
cordance with the terms of the first Sec
ton, must then be liable to a penalty for
operating each car of twenty-five dollars
per day, throughout the year, and that
thus the statute IS again rendered absurd.
ut is undoubtedly true that the word
ing of this section is neither as precise
nor clear as might be desired, but in my
Judgment a fair reading of it will not sus-
word such undoubtedly relates back
to the word car in the first section. That
section makes it unlawful to operate a
car. motor, or vehicle, for the conveyance
less said car shall be constructed with
vestibuled platforms, etc. The primary
use of the word car in the first section is
that contained in the prohibitory clause,
and not that within the exception thereto,
and | know of no rule, grammatical or
legal, that would require a different con-
struction. In the case of Camden and Am
boy Railroad Company VS.. Briggs, decid-
ed in the Court of Errors and Appeals, it
was said: 1T does not follow in the search
for an antecendent word, you must neces-
sarfly seize the first word that may
answer the reference, for that word may
do with the subject matter, and be used
or placed in that position accidentally
9Th words manifestly relate to the car
prohibited by the first section from being
operated during certain periods of the
year. Nor is there any more difficulty
with the question of the extent of the
year in which the penalty may be en-
forced. The statute, it is true, says for
each day or part of day, but it is a car
dinal principle of the construction of the