The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1897-03-31
THE CAPTURE OF RIVERA.

A 6iscouraxensns. but no; a defeat 10
the consequences 20 the cubars o. RIve-a's
capture. Since ne succeeaed N2ceo he has
had apparently very little opportunity 70
Distinguish himself Such fighting ss Tia
past fsw months have Witnessed has been
done In tha sasnern part OF the island
where Gomez - ia command. He was
e brave Officer. bur either through want
St q cranes 70 6ewDons,rzte his capacity
as leader. or because his executive abll-
~ did not equal els personal courage as
ksas not taken the place OF Maceo- II L.
known tf1at thsre are several officers who
have had more experience and II may b
that Gen. RoIofT. now the minister o: war.
will take 4 more active part IL the cam
2aIgn. The struggle will 10 On uorwith-
Standing the defea; Of Rivera. although IL
is rot improbable the insurgents Under him
may go 20 the east instead OF returning
TO the western end Of tae Island. Ges-
Ban6sra. row with Gomez. viii not I'M
probably have q more distinctive COM
r1and IL Gonnez recovers Soon
Any success the csloans achieve. how
ever. will De due to their determination
and TO their ABILITY usually TO avoid
Spanish troops In direct warfare and BY
ihar4sssng them at unexpected times and
places. But Cor this the Cuban cause
wculd Iook very gloomy. Within a short
time toe president Of the Cuban republic
has died. Maceo has oeen killed. Rivera 10
captured and Gomez Is wounded. There
are troubles among the cU0aRs them
selves. which are generally kept from TIE
outside world. One Of these Is clash Of
provisional government Gomez has TAX
en- too much authority upon himself. the
non-military leaders think. and the fact
that be has directly addressed the presl-
dan, Of the United States, especially on
matter relating to the civil phases Of a
government. shows his unconscionsnesss
of or disregard for official etiquette. Soon
after the death of Cisneros. Gomez de-
manded the resignation OF one OF the MEM
beers OF the council. and II had 10 be ac-
ceded to. lie Is said 10 be impsrious to
those about him. and tyrannical TO those
In subsection 10 him. This is not dis
advantage. because a great number OF tho
Cuban fighters. although hardy and brave.
are lawless and need a strong hand. Any
war such as that wagipg In Cuba attracts
to its fields the desperate as well as the
patriotic. the freebooter as well as the man
who fights for principle. Besides this. the
wild. animal-like life they lead IL democrat
izing; many of them have lost everything
they possessed: and despair. hunger and
fatigue often provoke discomfort In the IN
disciplined ranks.
On the death of Cisneros. the vice preHa-
dent. Bartolome Masso was chosen to sue
coed him, and the vice presidency in turn
fell 10 Or. Capott. ex-pressdent Of Ha-
vana university. Masso is welI-known. but
has never distinguished himself by any
indications OF such capacity for
command 80 Cuba's condition calls
for. Even cisneros was more to
DO esteemed for integrity than looked
up 10 for leadership. Gomez has chafed
under the incompetence. as he considered
Il. OF the local government. which, 50 far
as can be Judged from very imperfect
knowledge. has nothing like the capacity
OF the Junts. the directing body which OPP
crates from this country.
The pre~ens plight Of the insurgents
may resui, In forcing 10 ne front tho
mlch-needed commander. who shall be-
come the Napoleon Of the occasion. There
- an opportunity which may produce 8
Bolivar or a Santa Ana. who shall catch
up the loose ends OF the movement. weave
into practicable whole the many willing
threads OF patriotism and bravery. and
guide tho suffering people to victory.