The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-06-03

Monitor was GOT ready in the mick Of time to
meet the Morrinae, because the SSnfederates
we have to go to war with a modern military
and Il will then be altogether too late to try to
build Monitors to meet them.
PREPARATION WOULD HAvE PREVENTED THE
WAR OF 1917.
II this point needs any emphasis surely tho
history OF tho war OF 1912 applies to 1t. For
twelve years before that war broke out oven tho
to be drawn into hostilitics with one or the other
OF the pair OF combatants whose nattie roSa
s sIiSStos at rr MStsTl0S; to Yet Sor we T made sut not aes
at Washington contented themselves. with try;
ing to build a fotilla OF eunboats which could
essery to take the offensive ourselves. Me
already, possessed a dozen hrst,class cruisers,
almost Incredible folly, tho very Congress that
declared the war voted down the bill TO increase
the tno, navy by twenty battle ships; though oSsh it mn WAS
tho simpler conditions of that day such a fleet
could not have been built and put into frst.class
did the nation pay for its want Of foresight and
forethought. Our cruisers won q number OF
to the nation in the face Of disaster;
but they .were powerless TO do material!
G Gar% B to I tine f EaIEapsiS wer nsT mad 8 re increase so
our little navy, but In the face of a hostile on
envy already possessing command of the seas
were built; but practically almost al. the fight:
ing on the ocean was done by the handful Of
rrigatos and sloops which, we possessed when
to put to sea until after peace was restored.
Meanwhile our coast was blockaded from one
end to the other and was harried at will by the
hostile squadrons. Our capital city was burned,
and the ceaseless pressure Of the blockade pro
duced such suffering and irritation as nearly TO
bring about a civil war among ourselves. II in
the first decade of the present century tho
American people and their rulers had possessed se;
powerful battle ships there would probably have
been no war OF 1872; and even II war had come,
and commcrce by the blockade would nave been
prevented. Merely from the monetary stand.
and yet this would have been the smallest part
OF the gain.
OUR MAIN RELIANCE A NAVY.
1t can therefore be taken for granted that
there must he adequate preparation for conflict,
II conflict is not to mean disaster. Furthermore,
this preparation must take the shape OF an effi-
cient fighting navy. We have no foe able to
conquer or overrun our territory. Our small
army should always be kept in hrst-class condi-
ton, and every attention should be paid to the
tho south have we neighbors capable OF
menacing us with invasion or long resisting a
serious effort on our part TO INVADE them. The
enemies we may have to face will come from over
sea; they may come from Europe, or they may
come from Asia. Events move fast in the West;
they move even faster in the Oldest East. Our
interests are rs great in the Pacific as in the AT
Indies. Merely for the ,' protsction of '~ our own
shores we need a great navy; and what Ia moro.
we need 1t TO protect our interests in the islands
from which it is possible to command our shores
and to protect our commerce on the high seas.
SHIFTS AND GUNS MUST BE OF THE BEST.
In building this navy, we must remember
two things: First, that our ships and guns
should be the very best Of their kind; and sec
ond, that no matter how good they are, they
will be useless unless the man in the coming
tower and the man behind the guns are also the
hest OF their kind. 1t is mere folly to send men
10 perish because they have arms with which
they cannot win. With poor ships were an Adj
m mirfi be Se bsmten ap 81 a F%FF fssttc, reiles ied IN S and he
surely would DO beaten If his opponents were
in any degree his equal in skill and courage; but
ton of material can avail. and with them very
grave shortcomings In equipment may be over
come. The men who command our ships must
have as perfect, weapons ready, to their hands as
can be found in the civilized world, and they
must be trained to tho highest, point IN using
them. They must have skill In handling the
ships, skill In tactics. skill in strategy, for ignorant
courage cannot avail; hut without the courage
the dogged ability to hear punishment. the
power and desire to inflict it, the daring. the
incur rcsponsibiiity Which have been possessed
by the great Captains Of all ages. and with
out which no man can ever hope to stand in the
front rank of fighting men.
MONROE DOCTRINE IDLE WITHOUT A POWERFUL
NAVY.
Tame submission TO foreign aggression of any
kind is a mean and unworthy thing: but IL Is
even enS ,b hsea n,,ra ana more more unworthy NV 10 oiaster nrst,
those preparations which can alone ohviate the
necessity for submission. I believe with all my
heart in the Monroe doctrine. and / believe also
that the great mass of the American people are
loyal to 1t: but it Is worse than idle TO announce
our adherence to this doctrine and yet to decline
not mere lip loyalty. We had far better
submit 70 interference by foreign powers with
announce that we will not tolerate such inter.
ference. and yet refuse to make ready the means
a" as in mI PRIVATE %to Iife, we !" b old front RGstt'ptS tends ID to REn nTirS
peace and not strife. II we possess q formidable
ever BE- dragged into a war to uphold the Monroe
doctrine. 1--WE do not possess such a navy. war
may be forced on us at any time.
DIPLOMACY USELESS wITHoU FORCE.
1t is certain, then, that we need a first class
navy. Lis equally certain that this should not
be merely a navy TOR defence. Our chief harbors
should, Of course. be fortified and put in condi.
tion TO resist the attack OF an enemy fleet; and
one OF our prime needs is an ample force OF tor
Pedo boats to use primarily for coast defence.
But in war the mere defensive never pays, and
can never result in anything but disaster. 1t is
not enough to parry a blow. Tho surest way to
&&t o master eaS of FetRns e prize rs ring 70 ever Fs!"f Fought 1t
his way to supremacy by mere dexterity
in avoiding punishment: He had 10 win by
the choice OF time and place to attack. sooner or
later he will do irreparable damage, and II he is
merely a repulse. and there are no means Of FOL.
lowing it up and making 1t II rout. We cannot
rely upon coast protection alone. Forts and
heavy land guns and torpedo boats are indis-
pcnsable. and the last, on an occasion, may he
used for offensive purposes also. But In the
present state OF naval and military knowledge
we must rely mainly. as all great nations always
have relied, on the battle ship. the fighting ship
OF the line. ,Gunboats and light cruisers
not do without them. In time OF peace
they are the police OF the seas; in time OF war
they would do some marrying Of and
n great deal OF scouting and diminishing; but
our main reliance must be on the great armored
battle ships with their heavy guns and shot.
proof yitals. In the last resort we must trust TO
the ships whose business II IL to fight and not 10
run, and who can themselves go to sea and
strike at the enemy when they choose, instead OF
waiting peacefully TO receive his blow when
and whore he deems II best to deliver
It. II in the event OF war our fleet
OF battle ships can destroy tho hostile fleet,
then our COASTS arc safe from the menaco
Of serious attack, even a fight that, ruined our
fleet would probably so shatter the hostile fleet
as TO do away with all chance of inyasion; but il
we have no fleet wherewith to meet the enemy
on tho high seas or to anticipate his stroke by
our own, then every city within reach OF the
tides must spend men and money in preparation
for an attack that may not come, but which
would cause crushing and irredeemable disaster
II II did come.
Still more is It necessary to have a feet OF
great battle ships II we intend to live up to the