The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1897-07-30

activitv turned the attempt on Schofield's
mart into hasty retrograde march, which
came near ending in Federal catastrophe
of the crossing Of the Harpeth river near
the little town of Franklin, Tenn.
Terrific Combat.
Two features of the battle at Franklin
placed it among the brilliant and bloody
contests of the time-namely, the fiery
charge of General Cleburne's Confederate
division and the equally fierce counter
charge of General Opdycke's Union bri-
oade and there was something unusual on
fnot acting as spurs to martial yalor. Hood
had entered upon the march from Column
bia toward Nashville in hopes OF surprls-
inc the defenders of middle tennessee,
and Schofeld, with an inferior force, placed
across the Confederate front, had lmpeded
the march. Only the day before Hood had
almost surrounded SChotield at Spring
Hill: but, owing, as he asserted, TO the
slO1yness of his subordinate generals IN at
tackinp. the Union forces had slipped out
of the trap in the night and by forced
march reached Franklin, on the south
bank of the Harpeth river.
At Franklin Schofield halted his columns
on the southern border of the town, where
a line of slight intrenchments was hastily
constructed, and the weary soldiers lay
down on their arms to enjoy brief rest
while the long army trains were crossing
the river over couple of rude bridges to
a safer position north of the stream.
A Gap In the Line.
The troops of Schofeld's Twenty third
CORPS commanded by General J. D. Cox,
occupied the main line of works, which
extended across the Columbia and Nash
vile pike, along which Hood was march
ing in active pursuit. The extremities of
the works rested on the river bank above
and below the town, and the only break
In the line was at the point where the pike
ran through. There a gap had been left
In order to accommodate the trains and
artillery as we'll as the .hzAgades bringing
up the rear. These latter, three in num-
Der, belonged to General D. NJ. Stanley's
Fourth corps and constituted Wagner's d.
vision. Stanley crossed the Harpeth with
Woods division Of his corps, leaving Wag-
ner to handle the rear guard.
OF the three brigades in Wagner's divi-
sion two Conrad's and Lanes, were
halted by General Cox's order on knoll
half a mile in front of the general line
and covering the gap in the works at the
General Emerson Opdyoke, acted as ex-
IRENE rear guard throughout the march
from Spring Hill to Franklin and several
times checked the impetuous Confederate
advance. Late in the afternoon it filed
through the gap into the works at Frank
lin, and the men rested behind Cox's own
division, close to the pike.
Ordered to Fight His Own Eook.
Opdyoke explained his position and his
action as fOllows:
"My brigade was the rear guard from
Spring hill, and as l was moving up the
Columbia pike toward Franklin l came
to where Lanes and Conrad's brigades
were in position, in perfect exposure on
the plain. General Wagner rode to me and
ordered me into line with them. / ener-
getioally objected to having troops out
where they were in serious exposure and
where they could aid the enemy and no
body else. Wagner rode on with me as
was urging my objections, for did not
even halt, and when we reached the main
line of Carriers hill there was no room for
moro troops, and so we rode on until we
come to an open space, where we had arms
stacked. Wagner then. e., before arms
were stackcd-said to me: Now, Opdycke,
fight when and where you think best l
may not see you again l did not see him
again and that was the only order re-
ceived"
General Wagner returned to the extreme
front and shared the fortunes of Lanes
and Conrad's brigades.
At Bay on the Rivers Brink.
Schofield had no object in accepting
battle at Franklin except to defend his
passage over the river, which was to oom-
mence at dark, but Hoods main body
reached the vicinity soon after noon, and
the open nature of the ground enabled the
antagonists to view each others move
ments To Hood g men the spectacle was
tantalizing In the extreme for there with
a river at his back, lay the foe that had so
often eluded their blows. Besides the
words of recrimination over the issue at
Spring Hill spoken by Hood that morn
ing and the night before burned in the
veins of his generals, and the spirit aroused
by them communicated itself to the men.
Cleburne especially, renowned and gal
liant leader was deeply cut by Hood S dec
laration that his favorite troops, naming
Cleburne's Tennesseeans, had disappoint-
ed his hopes at the most critical point in
the campaign.
Must lie Driven Into the River.
When the Confederate lines were form
ing for the attack, Cleburne 5 division held
the right and rested on the pike confronted
by the Union works and troops already de
scribed. Hood stated to his subordinates
that he desired that the enemy be driven
into the Harpeth river at all hazards and,
anticipating hot work, Cleburne asked per
mission to form his division into three
| lines of one brigade each. Hood granted
the request, although Stewards corps of
his army had not come up, and his line
was shorter than he desired After form
ing his column Cleburne rode back to
Hood and said, General, am ready and
have more hope In the final success of our
cause than / have had at any time since the
first gun was fired" The charge was
sounded, and he turned at once to the head
of his columns.
A Sudden Desperate Attack.
Cleburne's division advanced along the
Columbia pike which bisected the Union
line near the center, the most hazardous
point to attack, the works being the heav-
lest and the best manned with troops and
cannon. There were 3S Union guns in the
works and in reserve in or near the pike in
the center The first opposition to Gle
burne's assault was made by the brigades
of Lane and Conrad of Wagner's division.
These troops had strengthened their posi-