The Dickinson press., 1897-12-11

oS04S W0o AOg UkOu&UI 70 q VOt6 IN G00
house Of the representatives. In the
presence of these significant expressions
Of the legislative branch 1t behooves
the executive to soberly consider
the conditions under which 30
important measure must need rest for
justification 1t is to be seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurreotion pos-
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition Of belligerency in its favor.
Possession, in short, Of the essential quail
ifcations Of Sovereignty by the insurgents,
and the conduct Of tho war by them &C.
cording to the reserved code Of war arc
no less important factors toward the de-
termination Of belligerency than are the
influences and consequences Of the strug.
gle upon the international policy of the
recognizing state.
Recalls Grants Utterauees.
The utterancesof President Grant in his
memorable message of Dec. 2, 1879, are
signally relevant to tho present situation
In Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to
recall them. The conditions were the
same then as now except that the war had
been longer continued and the devastation
even greater. The conclusions Of Presi-
dent Grant were at that time, however,
against recognition of belligerency, be.
cause he did not believe it in fact existed,
as bclligerency is Understood by the Law Of
nations. 80,
Practical Aspects Of Recognition.
Turning to tho practical aspects of q
recognition Of belligerency and reviewing
ito inc0nvoniancaa md rooit1x,o do~ro,o
still further pertinent considerations
appear. In tho code Of nations there is
no such thing as naked recognition Of
belligerency unaccompanied by the as
sumption of international neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not
confer upon either party to the domestic
conflict status not Heretofore actually
possessed, or affect the relation Of either
party to other states The act of recogni-
ton usually takes the form of solemn
proclamation Of neutrality which recitea
tho do facto condition of belligerency as
its motive. It announces domestic law
on neutrality in declaring state. It a.
sumes international obligations of Q neu-
trail in the epresence Of a public state Of war.
1t warns all citizens and others within
tho Jurisdiction of tho proclsimant
that they violate those righteous obliga.
tions at their own peril and cannot expect
to be shielded from the consequences.
The right of visit and search on the seas
and seizure of vessels and cargoes and
contraband Of war and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law be admitted as legitimate conse.
quence Of q proclamation Of belligerency.
While according the equal belligerent
rights defined by public law to each party
in our ports disfavors would be imposed
on both which, while nominally equal
would weigh heavily in behalf Of Spain
herself.
Would Be Bad for Cuba.
Possessing navy and controlling the
porte Of Cuba her maritime rights could
DO asserted not only for the military in
vestment Of the island but up to the mar.
gin of our own territorial waters and q
condition Of things would exist for which
the Cubans within their own: domiiI,
could not hope to create 8 parallels; while
itscreation through MD or sympathy from
within our domain would be even more
impossible than now with the additional
obligations of international neutrality
we would perforce assume
The enforcement of this enlarged and
onerous code Of neutrality would only be
influential within our own Jurisdiction
by land and sea and applicable by our
own instrumentalities It could impart
to the United States no jurisdiction be-
tween Spain and the insurgents 1t would
give the United States no right of inter-
vention to enforce tho conduct of the
strife within the paramount authority of
Spain according to the international code
Of war. For theaS reasons / regard the
recognition of the belligcrency of the Gu.
ban insurgents as now unwise and there.
fore inadmissable Should that step here
after be deemed wise as q measure of
right and duty tAe executive will take II
Intervention Oh Humsntarian Grounds.
Intervention On humanitarian grounds
had been frequently suggestsd and has
not failed to receive my most anxious and
earnest consideration. But should such q
step be now taken when it Is apparent
that hopeful change has supervened in
the policy Of spain toward Cubs2 A new
new government has taken office in the
mother country. It is pledged in advance
to the declaration that all the effort in tho
world cannot suffice to maintain peace
In Cuba by the bayonet; that vague
promises of reform after subjugatiop af-
ford no solution Of the insular problem;
that with substitution Of com.
manders must come a chal6e in the
past systcm:of warfare for one in harmony
with new policy which shall no lopger
aim to drive the Cubans to tho .'hstf1ble
alternative Of taking to the thickee or
succumbing in misery" that reforms
must be instituted In accordance with tho
needs and circumstances Of the time and
that these reforms, while designed TO give
full autonomy to the colony and to 6rSsts
q virtual entity and self controlled I'd;
ministration, shall yet conserve and az.
firm the sovereignty Of Spain by = distri.
butionl Of powers and burdens upon q
basis Of mutual interest untainted by
methods Of selfish expedienoy.
The first acts of the new government
lie in these honorable paths The policy
OF cruel rapine and determination that "a
long shocked the universal faenttmsut e
humanity has been feverped. UHder She
new military commander a 'bfoSd cl6n.
ency is preferred. Measures have already
been set on foot to relive the horrors Of
starvation and DEGREES for the application
ofIthe foreshadowed reforms have already
been promulgated.
Recession With Honor Impossible.
That the government of Sagasta has
entered upon course from which Fecos.
sion with lonur Is Impossible can hardly
be- questioned; that in the few weeks Il
has existed 1t has made earnest of the
sincerity of its professions is not undeni.
able. I shall not impugn its sincerity,
nor should inpatience be suffered to EN-,
harrass it in the task 1t has undertaken.
i is honestly due to Spain and to our
friendly relations with Spain that she
should be given a reasonable chance to
realize her expectations and to prove the
asserted efficacy Of the new order OF things
TO which she stands irrevocably commit