The Washburn leader. [volume] (Washburn, McLean County, N.D.) 1890-1986, 1897-01-02

Is able to maintain II, has been practically
abandoned. Spain does keep on foot such /:
government. more or less impcrfectly, but
that exception being made, the entire cOun
try Is either given over to anarchy or is
subject to the military occupation of one OF
the other party.
1t is reported. indeed. on reliable author
ity, that. at the demand Of the commander
in-chief OF the inSurgcnt army. the putative
Cuban government has now given up all at
tempt to exercise its functions, leaving tho
government confcssedly (what there is the
best reason for surprising 1t always to have
been In fact) government merely on pa
per. Were the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists In the open or in pitche,
battle, prompt and decisive results might
be looked for. and the immense superiority
OF the Spanish forces III numbers, disci
pine ana equipment could hardly fail to tel
greatly to their advantage. But they arc
called upon to face foe that shuns genera
engagements. and that can choose, and does
choose. it's own ground. that, from tho
nature of the country Is visible or invisible
at pleasure. and that fights only from am
hnSraldc aud when all the advantages OF po
SitiOn anc numbers are on its side. In q
country where all that is indispensable tt
life in the way of food, clothing and shell
ter is so easily Obtainable. especially by
those born and bred on tine soil, it is ohvi
Gus that there Is hardly a limit to the time
during which hostilities Of this sort may be
prolonged. Meanwhile, as in all cases OF
protracted civil strife. the passions of the
combntants grow more and more intlamed
and excess on both sides becomes more fire.
qucnt and deplorable. They are also par
ticipated in by bands OF marauders. who
now in the name of one party and now III
the mime OF the other. as may best suit the
occasion. harry the country at will and
plumber its wrctched inhabitants for theil
h {S,fvS
would inevitably entail immense destruction
of property, even If 1t were the policy OF
both parties to prevent it as far rs prac'
ticable. But. while such seems to be the
original policy of the Spanish government
1t has now. apparently. abandoned 1t. and
Is acting upon the same theory as the in.
surgents namely. that the cXigencies OF
iion Of property, that it may not prove OF
use and advantage to the enemy.
1t is to the same end, and in Pursuance
Of general orders, that Spanish garrisons
are now being withdrawn from planta-
lions and the rural population required to
concentrate itself in the towns. The sure
result would seem to be that the industrial
value of the island is fast diminishing. and
that. unless there IS a speedy and radical
change in existing conditions. 1t will soon
disappear altogether. That value consists
very largely. of course. in its capacity to
produce sugar. a capacity already much re-
luced by the Interruptions to tine tillage
which have taken place during the last two
years 1t is reliably asserted that. should
these Interruptions continue during the
current year. and practically extend. as is
now threatened. to the entire sugar-produc-
ing territory of the island, so much time
and so much money will be required to re-
store the island to it's normal productive
ness that it Is extremely doubtful If capt.
tai can be induced to even make the at
tempt. The spectacle of the utter ruin of
an adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the globe.
would engage the serious attention Of the
government and the people Of the United
States under any circumstances. In point
of fact. they have u concern with 1t which
is by 10 means OF wholly sentimental or
philanthmpic character. 1t lies so near to
us as to be hardly separated from our ter
ritory. Our actual pecuniary interest in 1t
Is only second to that Of the people and
government of Spain. 1t is reasonably esti-
mated that at least from $3O,OO0,OO0 to
S5O.OO. 900 of American capital are invested
in plantations, and in railroad, mining and
other business enterprises in the island.
The volume of trade between the United
States and Cuba. which in 1859 amounted
to about $SO,OOO,O00, rose in 1893 to about
$1O3. 100000, and in 1894, the year before
the present instruction broke out, amount
ed to nearly S96, 5000, 900. Besides this large
pecuniary stake in the fortunes of Cuba,
the United States finds itself
Incxtricably Involved
in the present contest in other ways both
veXatious and costly. Many Cubans reside
in this country, and indirectly promote the
throughout the press, by pub
lie meetings, by the purchase and shipment
of arms. by the raising of funds, and by
other means, which the spirit of our in
situations and the tenor of our laws do not
permit to be made the subject of criminal
Some of Them though Cubans
at heart and in all their feelings and inter-
csts. have taken out papers of naturalized
citizens Of the United States. n proceeding
resorted to with a view to possible protec-
ton by this government and not immature
ally regarded with much Indignation by IL e
country Of their origin. The insurgents are
encouraged and supported Ey
the widespread sympathy the people of this
country always and instinctively felt for
every struggle for better and freer govern
ment. and which in the case of the more
adventurous and restless elements of our
population leads in only too many instances
to active participation in the contest. The
result is that this government Is constantly
called upon to protect American citizens,
to claim damages for injuries to persons
and property now estimated at many mil
lions of dollars, and to ask explanations
ticials whose zeal for the repression of the
sometimes blinds them to the inn
munities belonging to the unoffending cit
liens of friendly power. 1t follows from
the same causes that the United States Is
compelled to actively police long line Of
sea coast against unlawful expeditions. the
escape of which the utmost vigilance vii!
not always suffice to prevent.
These invariable entanglements Of tue
United States with the rebellion in Cuba.
the large American property interests af-
and considerations of philanthrophy
and humanity in general, have led to u
vehement demand in various quarters, for
some sort of positive Intervention on the
part of the United States. 1t was at first
that belligerent rights should be
accorded to the insurgents-a proposition
no longer urged because untimely and In
practical operation clearly perilous and i'll
furious to our own interest. 1t has since
been and Is now sometimes cOntended that
the independence of the insurgents should
he recognized. But imperfect and restricted
as the Spanish government of the island
may be, no other exist there-unless the will
Of the military officer in temporary CON-
mand of a particular district. can be dig
nified as species Of government. 1t is now
also suggested that the United States should
buy the island-a suggestion possibly worthy
of consideration If there were any evidence
of desire or willingness on the part Of
Spain to entertain such a proposal. 1t Is
urged, finally. that, all other methods fail
ing the existing internectine strife in Cuba
should be terminated by our intervention,
even Mt the cost Of Il war between the