Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-12-21
AT BAYONET'S POINT
Autonomy to Be Forced on the
Cubans.
GEN. RLANC0 PREPARING TO FIGHT
Reorganization of the Spanish
Army.
RLANCO PREPARING TO FIGHT
PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Copyright, 1897, by Charles NJ Pepper.)

MARlANOA, Cuba, December II, 1897
Military operations are the chief means
lor establishing Spains colonial policy in
CUBA Since the insurgents will not have
autonomy on d silver platter it is to be
pressed on them at the point of the bay
onet. The soil in which the plant must
grow has to be ploughed by rifle ball and
cannon and enriched by more blood In eff
feet fresh campaign is undertaken by the
arms of Spain. This makes pertinent the
inquiry as to the condition of the army
which is to enforce the acceptance Of au-
tonomy and the ability of the insurgents
TO resist its implantation. At the outset
the boasts of Gen. Blanco that he will soon
reduce the insurrection to a mere state of
trigandaGe may be dismissed. They are an
echo of Neylers Dragging that the island
would be racifed III three months. The
captain generals vauntngs of no more
weight than the vauntings of a corporal of
the guard. Nothing in the present condi-
tions justiiies The hopes or the promise of
decisive results in the near future. The
prospect is one of varying fortunes in the
field, alternately for the troops and for the
insurgents until the rainy season in May
After that the usual suspension of actual
campaigning through the hot, wet summer
months.
General Blanco had a monumental task
to undertake on his arrival 1t was 10 re-
organize a sick and starving army. OF the
3J0pI soldiers who We're in the hospitals,
or the pretenses of hospitals. 1000 were
there from hunger. Give me food FOR my
men. was the despairing cry of one of the
Spanish generals, and ! will not ask for
medicines. Two thousand of the sick sol
d-erS have been sent back to Spain; some
thing has been done for those whose all
ment was lack of nourishment; some new
hospitals have been established and the
old ones bettered. That is what the
Z htr tt.S Il
days ago l visited one of the large ones in
the country forty or fifty miles from Ha-
Nana. 1t WAS shown me with pride. The
senitary condition was fearful. The fetid
atmosphere was a menace to healthy per-
sens who might breathe it. To the inmates
brought there already weakened by disease
1t could only mean a certain end to their
suffernss. In the military hospitals around
Havana the cool weather has lessened the
death rate from yellow fever, but the SOL
diers everywhere are yet dying like flies.
And sight of them In their camps and
barracks out through the country shows
that the vacancies in the hospital cots will
be quickly filled with new recruits. The
physical state of the troops which are raw
aged by the fevers of all kinds cannot show
marked gain.
RcDrgnnizins the Army.
In the reorganization proper of the army
an improvement is shown. Some of the
lost columns have been found. Battalions
which had been out of view for months
have rcappeared The forces are in better
shape for mobilization. 1t is possible to
shift them from one part of the island to
another. The estimate of an effective force
of 10,GO has been raised to $4,000. But 1t
is with what he has that Gen. Blarco must
conduct his future Cperat atiCns. He brought
with him l 100 men. No further arrivals
of troops have been chronicied. The hints
that no fresh levies are to he made in the
IF c
the peninsula is unable to raise more, or
whether the Sagasta ministry needs all the
troops at home TO prev ent a CarliSt up
rising. does not change the position in
which the captain general finds himself
He must make his future levies on Cuba
itself.
The outlines of this plan are put forth
cautiously They have not taken complete
form in the minds of the authorities. The
first element is, naturally, the Spanish pop
ulation. Its support of the government to
the extent of bearing arms has not thus
far been unanimous. The volunteers in
Havana, who number between 1900 and
10000, prefer to remain a home guard
They breathe fewer threats against au
tonomy because their employers have had
prudence enough to curb them. But there
are many chasms to be bridged before these
Havana volunteers will be planting autono-
my with powder and shot. In the country
the drawbacks are not SO great The vol
unteers have already had actual service to
do in defending their neghborhoods from
insurgent raids and assaults. They have
shifted lighting little and would not be
bad material out Of which to mold force
of regular soldiers. Auxiliary to these vol
unteers are the local guerrilas. Sometimes
they form the basis of the volunteers.
They are not, however, all Spaniards. In
their ranks are Cubans of certain type
negroes, and mixture of the scum of all
nationalities. They were responsible for
share of the fearful atrocities committed
under Weyler's despotism. The regular
troops also had a share in the atrocities,
but the guerrillas reveled in the license
given them.
The insurgents have hung many of these
guerillas. L have heard Spanish officers
voice longing to hang the remainder
They have no place in war which is pro-
fessedly to be conducted hereafter on
principles recognized by civilized nations.
The class that joined the guerillas enlisted
early there is not much of a reserve
on which to draw for soldiers of this kind.
But the whole matter of depending on the
island to furnish the future levies is too
indefinite to have place in any campaign
ing that may be done during the next few
months
Morale of the Higher Ranks.
Capt Gen. Blanco has for the command
of the $1,000 supposedly effective troops
two lieutenant generals, fourteen generals
of division and twenty-eight generals of
rigade. So whatever the drain has been
ra nks she has enough generals to carry on
the war. Some of them have not yet found
their commands, though they are making
progress in that direction. Gen. Blanco's
personal staff seems to be Of better stuff
than that by which Weyler was surround
ed Il may be because these officers are
newer to their surroundings and their op-
portunities. Time will be required to show
whether that is so. The morale of the
army in it's higher ranks is undoubtedly
better. The cafes of Havana have less
attraction for them. Instead Of slipping
coffee, smoking cigarettes and keeping up
the dispute of line and staff they show a
desire to go out in the field where some
fighting may be found. That they do fight
is proven by the reports Of the various en-
ga agements in which officers of rank are
killed. This may be partly due to their
inexperience and their ignorance of the
country but it is also evidence of actual
participation in the fighting.
The captain generals chief Of star La
Lieut.. Gen. Pando. The other lieutenant
general. Valera, ia chief Of the reserve.
Gen. Pando was chosen for political as
much as for military reasons. He was
specially well informed of the conditions in
the eastern provinces. which are for gil
practical purposes held by the insurgents.
In the past his relatives, with some Of the