Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-11-22
THE N Az AL MILITIA
Commander Dickins Makes a Report That
Will Provoke Comment.
FavOrs Establishment of Armorfes
and the Withdrawal of
the Vessels.

chief of the naval bureau of navigation,
has made a report 10 the Secretary of the
Navy in regard to the naval militia, which
will undoubtedly provoke considerable dis
cussion among officers of the navy, as
well as those of the militia.
NAVAL vessels he says. '.have been
loaned to the different states having naval
militia organizations with the intention
that these vessels would be sufficient for
the nautical or ship-ife training of these
organizations, but the custom has gradual
ly obtained of diverting, in addition, the
vessels of the North Atlantic squadron
for this purpose during the summer
months, especially in July and August,
which months, for obvious reasons. seem to
suit the naval militia the best. The natur-
al consequence has been that the training
of the officers and men of our national
vessels and the fleet maneuvers have been
seriously interfered with, just at a time
when they should be engaged in those
drills off our coast. as at that season the
pected.
This suggests the question. which is
the better policy for our country, the train
ing of naval militia, which is in fact
the navy of a state, or the training of our
national naval force? The policy hereto
fore pursued, If carried to a conclusion,
as the state navies increase in numbers
would practically make the state navies
dominant, and the national navy would be-
come disorganized force This suggests
the question, Would the services of the
state navies be Of enough value in time of
war to warrant continuance of such
a policy?
Il think that it is generally conceded
that they would be part of the interior
lines of defense, practically the coast line
in ether words coast defenders, and as such
would, think, In actual warfare be more
in connection with the military than with
the naval forces. If one were sure such
q a
all or their training should be in the direc-
ton of their conducting operations on the
coast as scouts, signal men, boat men. i'm
promising torpedoes making torpedo at
tacks in small boats or tugs, LAYING sub
marine mines and general nautical work
along shore, including inlets, rivers etc
such being the case, it would appear
1 think, that the men selected for this
work should be obtained, as far as posi-
BILE, from 'longshoremen, tug and small
coasting steamer captains and mates, arti-
sans and hremen, yachtSmen, masters
mates and seamen from our coasting trad
ers, fishermen and others.
Substitute ArmOry for Vessel.
Il do not think that 1 am wrong when
L state that the vessels assigned to the
different states have been practically more
or less used as a sort of club house for
the naval militiamen, they much preferring
to go on board our regular cruisers for
some Of their training. Therefore, 1 would
suggest that their training be confined to
such work along the coast as / have in
dicated. I would also recommend that each
state maintaining naval militia battalions
erect an armory on the shore, where boats
and equipments of all kinds be kept and
the building be made sufficiently large for
needed drills, which could be made use of
the entire year. This method has already
been adopted at Newport and Bristol, R. L.,
ana without knowing the comparative pro-
ficiency of the naval militia Organizations
ior THIS year. cannot doubt that
those at Newport and Bristol are as
proficient as those having vessels assigned
to them. Consequently, after each organi-
zation is provided with an armory 1 would
withdraw the vessels assigned to them
as unnecessary.
Furthermore, I am constrained to adj
init that IN my opinion the naval militia
In time of war would, as such, have no
place, and would not exist on our ma
tional vessels. They would be like infantry
without legs. Such of them as would be on
our national vessels would be in an individ-
ual capacity, and enlisted for general SER
vice, as the other members of the crew
would be. the force of the naval militia
being correspondingly reduced. 1 even pre-
dict that most of the officers themselves
of the naval militia, particularly those who
happen to be graduates of the Naval Acad-
envy, and believe nearly all of them are
such graduates, would desert the organi-
ization and apply for commissions in the
regular service. as naturally their inclina-
ton would be to go where greater oppor-
tunities would be offered to take all risks
end gain all consequent rewards, as ex-
pressed in the words death, capture, glory
or promotion.
Commissions In the Naval Militia.
"Apropos to giving commissions to off,
GERS In the naval militia, 1 think steps
should be taken by the department to pre-
vent those officers being assigned to our
ships in time Of war on the commissions
bestowed upon them by the governors of
states. Those coming into the navy should
have commissions as determined by the
President, by and with the advice Of the
Senate, thus avoiding possibly what took
place In the army during the civil war
that is, q large number Of political gener-
ais being forced into general service by
governors OF states. Already some officers
have been appointed into the naval militia
having the high rank Of commander.
and even as high as q naval captain.
think 1t should be noted that there is at
least one retired naval officer commissioned
In the naval militia: and II 1t should be-
come necessary for the department to give
an order to such an officer In time Of peace
owing to existing laws In regard to retired