Evening journal., 1897-06-30
In CASE OF WAR.
How Our Military Forces Would
Be Assembled.
Some Suggestions ms 20 the Proper
handling of the tniteJ states
Troops ut Home ana
Abroad.

y
United States doubtless stands most IN
need of at the present moment is one
whereby the militia bodies of the whole /
country will become a compact aud |
comprehensively organized national /
force. with their position, discipline and I
movement accurately determined for
readiness in time for foreign war.
If the United States should be in
volved now with Spain or any other
power of consequence the first move
would be TO place the regular army into
the field, and Immediately aftervard
the national guard would be mobilized
for active service. Right here would
ensue. as matters are now, confused
tangle, made all the more desperate by
the patriotic enthusasms Of the various
state bodies and a series Of delays, biclS-
erings, riyalries and dangerous dis
putes, all permitted to thrive because
a general war organization was not
previously laid down, without settled
authority for governing the assignment
of troops.
We have national guard composed of
enthusiastic volunteers maintained in
many states more by their sacrifices
than by the just treatment of their
state governments. The efficiency of
the guard varies from high in several
states to below zero in others. Tho
regimental and company strength is
widely different, the equipment and
clothing extremely variant, the arms
likewise differ, and some have magnifi-
cent armories, while others drill in
sheds. To bring order out of 100000
such soldiers, irregularly cpmprised in
detail, will take enormous labor and
time, as well as a waste of nbney, which
would have been obviated by previous
organization into modern national
military machine.
Nearly every high army officer and
many national guard officers have, at
one time or another, pointed out these
dangers and urged some scheme for
congressional action. Several of these
plans have received careful attention.
while others have been dismissed as
impractical because of their too Euro
pean heaviness or expense. The ma
jority of them, however, have failed
to win approval because they did not
properly recognize the civilian side Of
the service or the sensibilities of the
states and difference in state laws.
Some have not remembered that the
amount of training a militiaman car
possibly receive is limited; that he is
a working citizen first, and n soldier
afterward, and the amount of time sac
rihced cannot be much larger. If pow
erful national force is to be organized
| - -, Z I,, flts
t adapted to meet the variety of state
conditions, and if effected quickly must
= disturb as little as possible the existing
t military laws of different common
wealths.
The proper plan to follow in the case
is to perfect an organization of the
forces for the purpose of foreign war
! only, leaving for every other duty the
) military under the same authority ns
( If no national reserve existed. Belong
. ing to the larger body would affect each
e command only in the matter of their
t improved efficiency and equipment, as
I we'll as uniformity in size of regiments
! Whatever service the troops performed
as members of the national force must
be considered as additional to all state
duty, and complete regiments only
which under their own state laws arr
, required to do a certain amount of drill
, and field duty every year for the state
I must be eligible to the reserve.
4 Upon enrolment in the reserve, tSI
United States should provide each regi
: ment with complete equipment ant
! with arms. They ought to have two uni
! forms, one for field service and one TO
y parade. for the fact must not be los
sight of that militia troops must alwayi
be given the opportunity to show them
selves upon occasions in dress uniform
!, and that, however unmilitary it ma,
- seem to some professional soldiers, thi
. endowment of a handsome uniform
: does too much for the enthusiasm ant
= esprit de corps to well be ignored.
!, The performance of weekly drill (bu
i with regular inspections by regula
: army oificers) may be taken as sufil
cient, but in addition to the six days
field duty for the state, the reserv
should go into camp of instruction b.
IT brigade annually for period of eithc
le ten or twelve days exclusive of tim
It occupied in transportation if ten days
le and every three years the encampmen
e should be by division, the alternating O
sr the three divisions of the corps upo
- different years permitting field officer
= Of the other divisions to attend for traiI
ing as they should be required to do.
The pay given to regiments for thei
of duty as members of the reserve shonl
st be so much per annum for the annui
l. work laid down, including attendauc
r at, say, As weekly drills, and all at
b. sences from drill should be deducte
ne pro rata from the pay, while penaltis
Sc should be ordered for dereliction {
y - duty and failure to join promptly fc
camp of instruction.
Beyond thus giving a general sketc
,e Of a national system for bringing eft
~ cheney out of the militia forces. the
n is little need to go. The plan may eve
a. have in detail such features as will M
e. do at all, but there is surely the bas