The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1897-02-22

convention is sufficient to elect a state
printer; that such a convention was
held in 1895 although there was not
quorum of the senate present; that
Hudson was DULY elected state printer
and that. therefore, Snow was not ent1-
tied to the office. Chief Justice Martin
held that before a state printer could
be elected there must be a joint con-
vention of the legislature; that the per-
son elected must receive a majority OF
the votes cast by the members of each
house assembled in joint convention;
that since Snow did not receive a ma
jority of the votes of the senators vot-
ing in such joint convention in 1891 he
was not legally elected state printer
and was not, therefore, entitled to re
cover the office. With this diversity of
opinion among the justices, judgment
was rendered against Snow for costs
and he was denied any right to the Of
fee.
1t will be seen from these opinions that
Chief Justice Martin and Justice john
son arrived at the same conclusion,
namely, that Snow was not entitled to
the office, and upon this conclusion the
decision was made against Snow. 1t is
true that these two justices did not
reach that conclusion by the same
course of reasoning. but the ultimate
conclusion in the mind of each justice
was the same as that reached by the
other, and it makes but little difference
by what mental processes that cOnclu-
sion was arrived at. When a judgment
is rendered in an action, it is equally
tees agree on the reasons for the judg
ment or not. The decisions of our SUI
preme court show that it is not unusual
for one of the justices to dissent from
the reasoning in the opinion of the
court but concur in the conclusion ar
rived at. When a question arises as to
whether a matter in controversy has
once been Irrigated, we look to the is
sue that was joined in the case and
then to the judgment that was rendered
The reasons given by the court are of
little or no consequence in a SubSe-
quent proceeding where the same issue
of fact is involved.
In the two cases in the supreme court,
which have been referred to, Snow as
serted that he was state printer and en-
titled to the office. The court decided
that issue against him and rendered
judgment accordingly. If Snow had
proven in those cases to the satisfaction
of the court that he was state printer
judgment would then have been rem
dered in his favor and Hudson ousted
from the office. Snow has had his day
in court against Hudson on the ques-
ton as to whether he was state printer
or not, and, having been defeated in
that case, the judgment is conclusive, in
so far as his right to- the office is con-
cened, in all controversies at least be-
tween himself and Hudson.
It was urged in the argument of this
case that if Hudson had a judgment
in that case and Snow was attempting
to interfere with his possession of the
by motion in the supreme court, in the
case in which judgment was rendered,
asking that court to protect him against
interference on Shows part by enforc-
ing the judgment aginst Snow. But q
complete answer to this contention is
that the only judgment that was rem
dered in that case which could be en-
forced in that action was a Judgment
for costs, while a judgment for costs
determines the rights of the parties
still the person in whose favor it is rem
dered may not be able to enforce it.
in the case in which it is rendered, ex-
cept to the extent of collecting the
costs.
Where a judgment is rendered for the
plaintiff, it is usual to incorporate in
the judgment the relief prayed for and
granted by the court to the plaintiff,
but where the judgment is rendered for
the defendant, unless he asks for affirm
ative relief, il is the practice to render
judgment in his favor for costs only.
Much was said in the argument of
this case as to what the supreme court
determined to be the law in relation to
the election of state printer in the cases
referred to. but for the purposes of this
case it makes but little difference what
the supreme court declared the law to
be in those cases. In this case it is a
question as to what is the law of res
adjudicata rather than what is the law
governing the election of state printer
Those were original proceedings in the
spreme court in which issues of fact
were being tried and the rights of the
parties determined in accordance with
the facts found and the law as applied
to those facts. While the judges of that
court were unable to agree upon the
law of those cases, they were, from the
facts found, able to agree upon the
judgment to be rendered; and that
judgment is as binding upon the parties
TO that suit subsequent litigation, as
though the judges had all agreed on the
questions of law involved.
Are the questions raised in this case