The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-09-26

he had done under me. but this did not Justify
the dispatches which Gen. Halleok sent 70
Warrington, or his subsequent .conoealment OF
them from me when pretending to explain the
action OF my superiors.'
Regarding tho battle OF Shiloh, or Pittsburg
Landing, which on the first day ended In q do
feat Of the Union forces, redeemed on the next
day by q repulSe Of tho enemy, Col. Church
makes some observations which wo desire 70
quote verbatim. "It is difficult" he says, Ito
formulate n strictly military criticism on tho
battle of Shiloh, and this fact may explain the
endless disputes and discussions concerning
them. We had no armies thon. in the European
sense, on either side. The combatants were citi-
zens, full Of zeal, full of energy, and fred with
patriotic devotion; but they hnd few OF the
characteristics OF unity and associated action
which constitute tho distinctive features
Of an army. To both sides may be APP
piled Bragg's description of tho Con-
federate forco: 1t was a heterogeneous mass
in which thcro was moro enthusiasm than dis
%ciplino, moro capacity than knowledge, and
more valor than instruction" Again: THE
errors OF ignorance were so evenly balanced that
1t is difficult to say which side profted most by
them at Shiloh. The best comment on tho battle
is that both parties to it wero engaged for many
years afterward In apologies and explanations
as to what they did and what they left undone.
1t was Halleck's purpose to concentrate his
forces at Pittsburg Landing and to advance on
Corinth. Johnston checked this movement. It
was Johnston's intention to destroy Grants
army before Buell. arrived; then TO defeat Buoll
and carry tho war across the Ohio River. He
failed In the attempt. II Grant was misled
as to the intentions of the enemy, he
was only following an unbroken line
of distinguished presidents furnished by
great commanders since the beginning OF
war. The prescicnco and intuitive divlnation
of an enpmy's designs exist only In the imagina-
ton Of historians. In but three days In one of
his campaigns. Napoleon made three erroneous
calculations of the Prussisn movements 1t
is we'll known that Shiloh. though tho ultimate
advantage rested with the Union arms. won no
honors for Grant, but that, on the contrary,
hostile feeling against him ran high. and at
temptsw were made to have him removed from
tho mma Gen. Sherman's comments on
this matter are reproduced by the present biog-
rapher: Grant displayed the GOODNESS, the
personal courage, forethought, and elaboration
which aftcrward made him famous among men;
yet he was traduced, slandered. and wronged.
not only by the press universally. but by those
who were in positions of authority over him.
1t appears that his sharp experience at Shiloh
completed a change in Grants views as to the
struggle between the North and South. He was
now for the first time convinced that the con-
test was to be a long and bitter one, and he
shaped his course accordingly. He abandoned
his policy OF protecting friend and foe alike.
though he still gave protection to Southern SYM
pathizers living quietly at home. Pillage no
forbade, but he took what he needed for public
Gso, giving a receipt to the owners for what was
taken. What property he could not use he
destroyed where he believed that otherwise 1t
would be employed for the benefit Of the Confed-
crates.