The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-09-04
A PLEA FOR THE NAVY.
The Ex-Secretary Says a Large Navy
Does Not Mean War.

Hen. Hilary A. Herbert in the Forum
Public sentiment in America never was
so united nor was it ever prouder or more
sensitive than it is to-day. spark can
kindle a confiagration among us at any
moment Look at the unanimity with which
Congress and the people sustained President
Clevelands Venezuela message. and at the
utterances of the people. the press and the
United States Senate on the Cuban ques-
ton. The House, too, no doubt, would
have adopted the resolution recognizing the
belligerent rights of the Cubans If 1t had
been able TO reach vote. On the Cuban
question, dministrations-upO which so
much of responsibility rests-have so far
been, and are likely hereafter to be- more
conservative than Congress. But who is
there TO affirm that Presidents will always
resist the demands made upon them for
Narlike measures? President Madison
naturally hesitated in 1872 to declare war
against Great Britain The odds We're fear
full; but the war party compelled him, just
as it compelled Napoleon III in 1870 King
George of Greece in 1897, and as 1t might
compel Spain in the near future, to q dec
laration of war.
And here it may be as well to answer
the argument that a larger navy would
only be greater inducement to war. jim
goism' is not a matter of calculation, but
of sentiment. WarIike congressman, as
the Congressional Record shows, are not
necessarily friends of an increased navy
And so of our people. Prudence with them
is undoubtedly "a rascally virtue" Ad-
verting again to our civil war, 1t was only
a woful minority on either side that
stopped TO count the cost when that great
struggle was approaching. So ii certainly
would be if a foreign nation should give US
cause for war. Preparedness on our part
will simply suggest to other nations that
they must not give us cause of offence.
This article would not be complete with
out glanCing at what is possible, though IT
is hoped not probable conflict with
Japan, arising out of conditions In Hawaii.
We haze in Pacific waters our Asiatic fleet.
with six cruisers and gunboats, and our
Pacific fleet with one battle ship, two mon
itors and four cruisers and gunboats;
forming together fleet not equal 10 that
which Japan could concentrate
Japan has recently bought ana mas now
in English waters two nrst-class LUO-ton
battleships rated at nineteen Knots, the
Full and Yashima also. two S,0N-ton ar
mored cruisers now being constructed by
Armstrong at Elswick England. The Full
and Yashima could coal sooner at inter-
vening ports and steam more rapidly than
our larger fleet which could only go al
the speed of the sowest vessel. Suppose
We should not wish TO risk the unequal
fight IL we decided we could afford, in
view of possible trouble with Spain 10
strip our Atlantic coast, we should prob
ably not send reinforcements by the Suez
canal because. first, the canal would be
difficult for our deepest-draught vessels,
and it might not be open to us after a
declaration OF war, and second, we might
not be permitted to coal the English
ports which alone are available. If we
should leave the defense OF the Atlantic
to the monitors and smaller cruisers and