Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-11-13
CUBA AND EUROPE
What Might Follow Interference by
the United States.
fHE EUROPEAN SYSTEM THREATENED
An English View of the Situation
and Its Critical Features.
PRIDE OF THE SPANIARDS

From the London Spectator.
Our countrymen are wrong in thinking
that war between Spain and America will
not concern them. that, in fact, they can
sit IN their usual style looking on as at
nest interesting play. 1t will concern them
good deal. Not to mention the immediate
rise which will occur in the price of
wheat. there will be. as we are the sea
power. most dangerous and difficult ques-
lions 10 be faced, of neutrality, of search.
OF privateering, and of the supply of un-
licensed SPECTATORS of the munitions of
war. 1t is not quite unimportant to US that
STain should be solvent for her insolvency
will involve grand crash in banking cir
cles in Paris: while anarchy in Spain,
which might be a result of submission to
demands from Washington, would throw
the whoie European system into confusion,
perhaps wake most dangerous ambitions
both as to Spain and as to Morocco which
she still regards as her reversionary estate.
we are not sure either that in the present
position OF Europe. which is avoiding war
Dy the sort of strain with which a coalition
avoids differences of opinion, the very fact
of war existing may not have a highly dis
trrbing effect. dividing it will the SYM
pathles of great populations, and rousing
the dynastic fears which wake whenever a
Itpublc SHOWS itself strong for actual con-
hict With gunpowder barrels lying about
shooting is not altogether a safe practice.
War is Easy.
The chances of such collision do we
iear, gravely concern us, and SO far as we
can perceive the chances are not in favor
OF peace The Americans. We take it,
tfough not, perhaps. intent on war, are not
lndisposed to risk it. They are moved. to
begin WITH by the expressions in Cuba. of
Vnich they see far more than we do. and
If-h
the keynote of the Weyler policy being thai
the pacificos''-that is, the population
Whlcn declines to hght-must be ruined
lest the insurgents should utilize their re-
sources They have consequently been ex-
PEELED from their estate and farms and
urlNen into the towns, where they have no
means oil subsistence A policy like that
would produce horrible scenes even if the
army were English or German or Ameri-
can, and Cuba is occupied by Spanish
army, which, from acknowledgements. is
compelled when outside Havana to main
tam itself, feed itself, and pay itself as a
guerilla army would We find il difticu1t tn
Deieve that the American government
"nlch, recoliect, is very naughty gov
eminent, and quite believes itself the
strongest in the world-Will recede in any
way from its declarations which are that
cuba must be pacifed at once and that If
1t is not pacified public feeling in America
will compel Intervention
NO one denies that Gen. Woodford in his
communications with the Duke of Tetuan
stated this as fact, though he may have
alsciaimed any wish to use it as a menace
Yet OF the pacihcation there is little pros
pect.
Chances of Autonomy
The hghting section of the Cubans have
rejected the autonomy offered them by the
new ministry, the autonomists give Spain
no active help because uncertain what
autonomy will mean, and real autonomy 1t
Is not In the power of Senior Sagasta to be-
stow. If Spain is not to be driven into
bankruptcy, she must retain the power of
taxing Cuba to relieve Spanish finance and
no honest plan of autonomy is consistent
win that taxation. Nor-and this is the
elux OF the whole situation-do we feel
sure that the government of the queen re-
gent ahxiously desires to avoid war If the
new ministry is convinced that the Cubans
VIII not Yield, its best road out of an i'm
possible situation might be war; for which
accoI9ins 10 american accounts. 1t has just
provided pretext by threatening. if the
nnDusters are not stopped, to search all
American ships on their way to Cuba Thu
americans have fought over that claim be-
lore, and will, We may rest assured fight
again before IL is allowed Victory in war
would of course end the Spanish difficulties
while defeat would allow the government
10 give up Cuba without affronting the
Spanish idea of honor, and so, as the Times
correspondent affirms endangerin., the
monarchy itself. We believe his account
OF Spanish pride. strong as it Is, is strictly
tHc tIutI, ana ne might have added
That this pride is all the more irritable lust
now because of the prevailing discomfort
Spanish Taxes.
There exists in Spain, as we understand
the situation. definite sentiment of re-
spect for the queen regent whose nroud
and independent character and devotion tn
her sons interests please the people: and
there also exists a perceptible wish that the
boy King, the only child in history born
win the crown on his head. should nave a
lNir chahce Oh showing whether he is COM
petent TO rule But besides these feelings
Is a great body of dissatisfaction rising in
the southern provinces to acute discomfort
Inc towns are frightened by the expendi-
tLre. the country folks writhe under a
tenure which leaves them always moor and
oVerworked. and beth are made savage by
demand on their children equal when the
relative populations are remembered to a.
demand on Great Britain for 800 900 lads in
three years If that demand saves Spain II
Will De forgiven, but If not If almost every
household in every village is to have a dead
son or sick son, and nothing to show for
that misfortune. the hatred of Madrid NAV
mciufe the throne, and even, though the
Cariists do not think so, kingship In the all
slract- Spain has never passed through the
revolution. and Spain humbled and de-
spotted by mlsSovernment, or IL YOU will
by the misfortunes of its government NAV
yet determine to pass through that fire
she has an idea, remember, which, though
federalism she gave up her proper destiny
Relative Strength.
We must add-for II is essential to our
argument. though we have pressed the
point before-that our countrymen exag-
gerate the difference between the power of
the Union and the power of Spain. Uiti-
mately that difference is enormous but 1t
does not appear so TO Spanish eyes, Span
iards think, enormously, that by a system
CT pTivateerinS they could put an end to
American trade, only a portion of which, as
they forget. is carried on In American bot
toms They think that they could make
the landing of an American army in Cuba
an excessively risky and difficult operation
and they believe that II an army landed in
the island their own great army there
would be able TO defeat it. The Spaniards,
with more reason than EnglIshmen think
believe in their own soldiers. and attribute
their failure in Cuba to any cause rather
than military incompetence or want of
readiness for battle. In short. while they
expect TO be beaten in the long run and
fully share the English opinion as TO the
Resources of the great republic, they do
not expect to be defeated with ridiculous
ease, or TO be in any way GishonOred nv the