Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1897-02-12
WARSHIPS' WEAK SPOTS.
Methods OF Attack W3lich Are
Most Effective.
A United ststss ofioer Gives Some Inser-
esting Information About the Great
IronoIsds- Offensive and De
fensiye Powers.

A war ship Is vulnerable in two chief
respects--in her motive power and in
her personnel II is imaginable that one
might be wholly neutralizcd without
materially iDjuring the other. Theques-
ton, not only of to-day. but Of cen
tury's standing, Is, which Is II better 10
attack in order TO subdue the ship? In
olden days the British habitually at
taoke1 the personnel. the French the
motive power. and each was consistent;
for the aim OF the former was 70 insure
decisive results, and that Of the latter
- avoid them. Each has had its advc-
catss. and consequently there is some
thing - be said on each side; but upon
the whole Il Is. think. fair To say that
experience replies, attack the men.
And Inc reason Is much the same as
hundred years ago; not only is IL impos-
siblc 70 have the men as well protected
MS the motive power, but the destruc-
ton Of the men who handle the often
siye powers OF the ship makes the mo-
tive power practically useless
Vow the weight which ship OF
fiven size can carry Is limited. and must
Le distributed among several objects, Of
which gun power is one, and the ques-
ton has To be met, bow shail This gun
over be subdiyided among the differ
eat tlaases of gun? If your aim is the
rlot,se power you want heavy guns; for
re motive power-the engines and
br'l -aic given the utmost possible
prot on, by position, by the thickest
arm. ~ nc coal stowage, the protec-
tive md SO on 10 pierce which
Crea Is required. But heavy guns
mei guns, and few guns means
few 4ots. and fewer shots mean |
fewer nits; while OF those that hit, IL
thes strife the protective system OF the |
eng ts etc. fewer still penetrate a
trui lorF foreseen, yet very generally |
sironnoa oGt OF sight. and which the |
Nal hatlle has sipgularly confirmed.
o. ha other hand, the weight OF
afu equired TO protect the water
line rnately makes 1t impossible to
ext, similar means adequate pro-
tecin 70 the battery spaces, except
opls occupied by the heavy guns,
aud where these are adequately
PROT ttd--impervious, that is, to the
inas from those lighter guns, tech
Mica ~ called "rapid fire"-there can
he 10 question that their accuracy of
fire sireularly embarrassed. For that
reason u Is sought TO aim and fire them
froa tl interior position--the coming
tower. for instance--a plan Of which IL
Is c1oupl here to say that, except for
ne heaviest guns, IL is tending TO fall
INTO G.s.ge.
Considering the vast Importance of
'rru ne he best practice from the
sea,y guus-for ! am not at all arguing
igainsl hem, only against their excess
i've numDer--it becomes necessary 20
'eat oossn and keep down all the other
ne of the enemy. II success in this is
tta'ucd, distinct and immense advan-
1gc is gained for the heavy guns over
aosc of the enemy; for. IL the rapid
re l,as which have established heir
sccndancy cannot penetrate the tur-
cts, they can greatly annoy the men in
hem. and may enter the gun ports.
esult in victory. 1t has long seemed 10
re that the mutual relations of the
eavy and rapid fire guns of the ship
ave strong analogy TO n field bat
FRY OF artillery and It's infantry sup ,
orts the latter at once protect and Sc
are the efficient service of the former.
owcver that may be. the rapid fire gun
modern caliber has just now fairly
Established its position MS 10 the great
u offensive power in naval warfare
aptsA. T. Mahan. in Century.