Mexico weekly ledger., 1897-12-09
THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

Tarir legislation having been settled by the
extra session OF congress. the question next
pressing for consideration is that Of the cur
rency.
THE NATIONAL FINANCES.
Not So Difficult rs 1t May Appear.
The work OF putting our finances upon a
sound basis, difficult as 1T may seem, VIII ap-
pear easier when we recall the financial op-
erations OF the government since 1868 On the
30th day OF January of that year we had out
standing demand liabilities in the sum of
e72s, ,s6s 447.4l on the first OF Janury
70 Of nan oar ae
ing obligations, the figures are even
more striking On July /. 1885 the principal of
was q, 49,, ,33I sss. On the first day of July
1893, this sum had been reduced to 1855, ,037, lOO
or an aggregate reduction OF sl Al, ,294 108. The
interest bearing debt of the United States on
the first day OF December 1897 was ss47 .365 go.
The government money now outstanding lDe,
cember y consists OF s3l6, ,6elOl6 of United
States notes, tl07, 1s3 $50 OF treasury notes
issued by authority of the law OF 1890, 1854 $685.
704 OF silver certificates, and soi $50 a6l of stand
ard silver dollars.
Currency Revision.
With the great resources of the government,
and with the honorable example OF the past be-
fore US. we ought not TO hesitate to enter upon
o currency revision which will make our de-
mand obligations less onerous to the govern
ment and relieve our financial laws from am
biguity and doubt
from the close of the war to 1898, makes unrea-
sonable and groundless any distrust either of
our financial ability Of soundness; while the
situation from 1888 to 1897 must admonish con-
gress OF the immediate necessity OF so legslat-
Ing as to make the return OF the conditions then
prevailing impossible
Many Plans Proposed.
There are many plans proposed as a remedy
for the evil Before We can find the true rem
edy we must appreciate the evil II is not that
our currency Of every kind is not good, for
governments pledge is out to keep it so, and
that pledge will not be broken. However, the
guarantee OF our purpose to keep the pledge
will De best shown by advancing toward its
ful6llment.
Evil-of the Present System.
The evil of the present system is found in the
parity Of our different forms of money, that is,
keeping all of them at par with gold. We sure
ly can not be longer h,edless of the burden this
prosperous conditions while the past four years
have demonstrated that it is not only an ex-
pensivs charge upor the government, but a
dangerous menace to 4he national credit
The Government Must Be Protected.
It Is manifest that we must devise some plan
to protect the government against bond issues
for repeated redemptions. We must either
easy by the multiplied redemptions of our de-
mand obligations, or increase the gold reserve
aSs ~
enactment. has undertaken to keep at par with
gold. Nobody Is obliged to redeem In gold but
the government n & The banks are not required
An anomalous Condition.
The government is obliged to keep equal with
gold al its outstanding currency and coin obli-
cations, while Its receipts arc not required to
be paid in gold. They are paid in every kind of
money but gold, and the only means by which
the government can with certainty get gold Is
when Il most needs IL, THE government with
out any nxed gold revenue Is pledged to main
tain gold redemption, which II has steadily and
given, 1t will continue to do.
The Endless Chain.
The law which requires the government after
them out again as current funds, demands con-
stans Feplenishment OF the gold reserve This
Is especially SO IN times OF business panic and
expenses OF the government. At such times
the government has no other way to supply
t. Se' tss s1d ,Ss Sss
debt. as during the administration Of my pre-
dsoessor when s2s5, si5. 400 Of ~ per cent bonds
pay The expenses Of the government in excess
Hf the revenues and sustain tho gold reserve.
While IL Is true that the greater part Of the
dsncient revenues, q considersble portion was
required TO maintain the gold reserve.
Shall We Continue the Present Policy?
With our revenues equal to our expenses,
Of bonds But II the gold reserve falls below
tioo 600 900 how will It be replsnished except by
selling more bonds? Is there any other way
practicable under existing law? The serious
question then. is, shall we continue the policy
That has been pursued In the PAST; that is, when
the gold reserve reaches the point Of danger. Is
sue more bonds and supply the needed gold, OF
shall we provide other means to prevent these
recurring drains upon the gold reserve?
Congress Should Provide Remedy.
II 10 further legislation is had, and the policy
OF selling bonds is to DO continued, then con-
gress should give the secretary Of the treasury
authority to sell bonds at long or short periods
bearing less rate Of interest than is now au-
earnestly recommend as soon as the re-
csipts Of the governmsnt are quite sufficient to
o shs
sentsd for redemption in gold and redeemed in
gold. such notes shall be kept and set apart and
only paid In exchange for gold.
An Obvious Duty.
This Is an obvious duty. II the holder of the
United States note prefers the gold. and gets
it from tho government, he should not receive
withot paying gold in exchange for it. The rea-
son for this IS made all the more apparent when
the government issues an interest-bearing debt
States notes-a non-interest bearing debt
On demand and for gold II they are put put es out n
lowed by snothsr bond issue TO redeem a a. them M m
another tnterest-bearing debt to redeem non
interest bearing debt
- OOnoftiou Auhs o0kht TO DC bemS0i6d.
In my view 1t Is OF the utmost importance
that tho government should be relieved from
the burden Of providing all the gold required
for exchanges and export. This responsibility
is alone borne by the government without any
help itself. The banks do not feel the strain OF
upon the government. and the size Of Of the h gold gold
RESERVE in the treasury has come to be, with or
without reason, the signal Of danger or Of Sc
curtty. This ought to ho stopped.
q Constant Menace.
II we are to have an era of prosperity In the
country with sufficient receipts for the ex-
psnses of the government we may feel no i'm
mediate embarrassment from our present cur
rehcy; but the danger sill exists, and will be
ever present, menacfng US SO long as the eI-
isttng systs n continues And. besides, 1t is in
timed OF adequate revenues and business tran
Quilltky that the government should prepare for
the worst. We can noi avoid. without serious
consequences, the wise consideration and
prompt solution of this question
The Secretary of the Treasury's Plan.
The secretary OF the treasury has outlinsd q
plan in great detail for the purpose OF removing
the threatened recurrence of a depleted gold
reserve and save US from future em6arrass. %
your careful consideration.
Concurs With the Recommendation.
] concur with the secretary of the treasury in
his Recommendation that national banks be
allowed 70 issue notes to the face value of the
bonds which they have deposited for circulation
and that the tax on circulating notes secured
Dy deposit OF 6uch ponds be reduced 20 one
half OF one per cent per annum. also join
him In recommending that authority be given
for the establishment Of national banks with o
minimum capital of s25 600. This will enable the
smaller villages and agricultural regions OF the
country 70 be supplied with currency to meet
their needs.
National Bank Note Restriction.
recommend that the issue of national bank
notes be restricted to the denomination OF ten
dollars and upward II the suggestion have
herein made shall have the approval Of CON-
gress, then / would recommend that national
banks be required to redsem their notes in gold
FOREIGN RELATIONS.
The Cuban Gu ION the Most Important
Problem.
The most important problem with which this
government is now called upon to deal pertain
ing TO its foreign relations concerns its duty
toward Cuba and the insurreetion Problems
and conditions moro or less in common with
these now existing have confronted this gov
ernment at various times In the past The
story OF Cuba for many years has been one OF
unrest; growing discomfort; an effort toward o
larger enjoyment Of liberty and self-control;
OF organized resistance to the mother country;
OF depression after distress and warfare, and OF
Intellectual settlement 10 be followed by re-
pewed revolt
For no enduring period since the enfran-
ehiseIent OF the continental possession OF
tion OF Cuba or the policy CT Spain toward
Cuba NOT caused concern 10 tho United States
Weakness Of Spain's Hold ON the Island.
The prospect from TINA 10 TINA thas tie
weakness of SPANS hold upon the island, and
the political vicissitudes and endorsements
Of the home government might lead to the
transfer trans - o. Caes q contlnenGal tin power called
declarations Of the United States TO permit no
disturbance Of Cuba's connection with Spain.
rsE