The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1897-04-03
Must Result from the Supreme
Court Decision
I'm the TransmissOuri Traffic
Association Case
SAYS MIR. A. r. WALKER
To Let Matters Alone as They
Now Stand
Will Bring Such a Commercial
Panic
As Has Never Before Been
Heard OF.
COURT CRITICIZED.
Decision Makes Criminals of
Half the People.
No Business Arrangement Can
Stand Against 1T.


New York, April 3-AIdace F. Walk
er, chairman of the board of directors
of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa F'e
Railroad company. was asked today
for his views on the supreme court de-
cision in the transmtssouri case. He
has been in succession an interstate
commerce commissioner, then chairman
of the western traffic association, of
which the transmissouri freight asso-
citation is a branch, then chairman of
the joint traffic association, predeces-
sor of the present body bearing that
name, then receiver of the Atchison sys-
tenn, and now chairman of it's board of
directors. Colonel Walker, in reply to
questions, spoke as follows:
AT a time when the air was full of
courage, when business was increasing
and values were advancing, returning
confidence has received a shock like
clap of thunder from a clear sky in the
decision of the supreme court subject
ing railroads to the antitrust law and
giving to the law a new and unexpect-
ed construction. Our railroads are our
greatest industry. Their success is the
surest criterion of commercial prosper
ity. Their financial collapse would be
the severest commercial misfortune that
could befal our country.
This decision has come as a pro-
found surprise to railroad officials and
counsel. The railroads have never con-
cG1NGQ LnaL InGy We're SUBJECT TO In6
antitrust law Courts have decided
that they were not They have been
subjected to congressional regulation
and control by an entirely distinct ser
les of statutes, forming what is known
as the interstate commerce law. The
argument of the supreme court in sup
port of the claim that railroads, though
not mentioned in the antitrust law, are
subject thereto, is long and alludes to
many considerations.
1T was shown to the court by the
journals of congress that the bill. in
precisely its present form, was reported
by the judiciary committee of the sen
ate, passed that body, and was under
consideration in the house. Mr. Bland
offered an amendment, which the house
accepted, making railroads subject to
the bill The senate accepted the amend
ment, with certain changes. The house
refused to concur in the changes. a
conference committee recommended
their adoption, their report stating that
the only object of the original bill was
the control of trusts, and that the
amendment extended the scope of the
act so as to include transportation.
THE house rejected the report of the
conference committee and adhered to
the original language of the Bland
amendment. A second conference COM
nittee reported in favor of dropping
the entire question in controversy
Thereupon, both houses passed the bill
as first drawn.
This history shows that congress
deliberately and Understandings aban-
of transportation under the control Of
the act. The recent opinion omits to
recite these convincing facts, though
stating that one senator, in speech,
regarded that subject as included in the
law.
Coming now to the construction of
the antitrust act section, section ] pro-
hibits agreements in restraint of trade
(of course, under the interstate COM
merce clause of the constitution; sec
ton prohibits monopolies. The act
monopoly 1t has been the general
understanding of counsel, and the in
ferfor courts uniformly have SO decid-
ed, that we must look to the common
law for definitions of the phrases here
employed; that is to the body OF we'll
considered cases on those subjects in
England and America. 1t was belieV-
ed that the act was, in substance, the
extension of the federal Jurisdiction
over subjects previously controlled by
the states only, and the use of terms
that had well-defned meanings at
common law was supposed to make
this purpose clear
lat the common law each case of al
legged restraint of trade is considered on
it's individual merits. Agreements that
to some extent may restrain trade are
not void unless the restriction is broad
er than is necessary for the fair prOtec-
ton of the parties making it, or unless
it is manifestly unreasonable and I'M
just under all the circumstances. In
respect to corporations doing business
of public nature, it is held that agree
ments between corporations are not in
valid as restraint upon trade so long
as the rates charged the public are rea-
sonab1e and just; that beyond this point
the public is not interested in contracts
that may be made.
But the supreme court tells us that,
because the phrase restraint of trade
is not limited in the act as in the COM
mon law, it is all embracing; that il in
cIudes reasonable as well unreason-
able restraints; that because the we'll
known boundaries are not enumerated
in the statutes which conferred federal
jurisdiction the law must be enforced
with no boundaries. The decision ac-
cordingIy sustains the view that con-
gress has deliberately decided to pro-
hibit all agreements and combinations
in restraint of trade and commerce,
whether such agreements are reasona-
BILE or the reverse
Where does this take us2 Although
this act may not be regarded as apply
ing to railroads only, except, possibly,
such other industries as may be car
ried on in one or more states at the
same time similar acts are rapidly find
ing their place upon the statute books
of every stale, and a similar construc-
ton may be expected to be placed upon
adopt the decisions of the supreme court
without hesitation, and being subject to
grave criticism il they do not. Under
such laws all agreements between insur-
ance companies upon premium rates are