The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-10-10
SOME n BOOKS.
TIE nF.es ~ se. P.vsr since water

power In war the most Valuable contribution
get made BY any Of his disciples is the volume
entitled The Effect Of Maritime Command on
Land Campaigns since Waterloo. by Major Z.
O. CALLwELL Of the British Army tscribnersl.
The author OF This volume takes mp tho history
Of aeA power at tho point where II was dropped
by Capt, Mahan and oariies 10 to the present
hour; that 10 to cay, he reviews the influence Of
maritime command on land campaigns In the
revolutionary struggles OF the Spanish.Ameri.
cans and of tho Greeks in tho Turk
iah war of 182s-2e. in tho revolt of
Mehemet All against tho Ottoman Sultan
in 1880, In tho European revolutionary
struggles OF ls4s-5o. including especially the
nrst war between Germany and Denmark;
In tho R~nsso-Turkish war OF 1s54-58. in tho
franco Austrlan war of 1859 and the second
war between Germany and Denmark, In the
war OF 1906 and In the Franco. German war of
1970-7l, In tho American civil war, and tho
Russo-Turkish war OF 1S77-7s, in the suisse
quont wars in South America, the campaign of
Tol-ql-Kebir, and, finally. in the war between
China and Japan. The purport of the book be-
fore US, as brought out by an examination OF
these various contests in detail, is that tho ef-
feet OF sea power upon land campaigns is often
far. reaching and decisive. Not only in the pres.
emit century but. indeed, in every age there
have occurred instances where the course of
Conquest between coutonding armies has
been menifestly governed by maritime
conditions IN adjacent waters. The tri.
remes OF Themistocles swept the Persian
hordea back from .Attica, never to return,
whereas Marathon, brilliant victory as It
was. had checked. merely for a moment, tho am.
bilious prospects Of the Persian Kings. BY the
tardy creation of a feet. when the Punic wars
began, Rome took tho first step on the road
which brought the younger Scipio to the gates
nf Gprthnt-a Ar ArtiIt0 thu npnrfhrnuv ~ n
great naval armament Involved the destruction
OF an imposing military force. Tho Scandina.
Wan rovers who coerced and subjugated power.
full races In northwestern Europe, conquered in
virtue OF immunity from molestation till they
had set foot on shore. The expulsion of the
French from North America and from tho East
indies was. as Capt. Mahan has shown, the re.
suit Of the supremacy gained by the British
navy Of the day over its historic rival. The
battle Of Trafalgar. fought of the coast of An
dalusia. drove Napoleon's legions from Boulogpe
TO seek for glory in Moravia in the heart of cen
trail Europe. The triumph of England in the Pc.
ninsular war is generally attributed to the stir
Ing achievements of Wellington upon the battle
field. but we ought not to overlook the influence
Of the peculiar strategical conditions which the
maritime omman of the supporting fleet
around tho coast of Spain and Portugal exerted
over the struggle. 1t is true, as Major Callwell
comedies, that the final decision of a war on
land is, In most cases. brought about by some
general action. Not unnaturally the decisive
combat. the actual and conclusive clash of arms,
challenges the attention Of the contemporary OBJ
server; tho train OF events which led up to the
battle and made it possible is apt to be disre-
garded and forgotten in the reioicings at the
tactical success. The effect. indeed, of sea
power on land campaigns is. in the main. stra-
teefcal. Its influence upon the progress of
military operations. however effective this may
be, Is often only very indirect. This explains
why it has remained SO frequently unnoticed
till the records of the campaign have been ex-
amined. and until the causes of the dramatic
episodes which excite the popular imagination
are traced back to their source.
In the uprsings of Spanish Americans against
their mother country, during the first quarter
Of this century, the effect Of sea power Is most
signally demonstrated by a review Of the for
tunes OF Chilli and Peru. 1t is true that else
where the principal cause of the long delays
which ensued before the various provinces won
their independence is 10 be found in the infu-
ence which Spanish maritime command ex-
erted over the operations on land. The Royal.
fist troops were generally ablo to hold the fort
Eesses on the coast. and to use them as starting
points for expeditions into the interior. Rein
forcements, moreover. arrived from time to
eime across the ocean from Cadiz and BARGE
Iona without hindrance. Spain. although groan-
ing under invasion In the early years Of strug-
gle, and convulsed with factions toward its
close, was yet enabled, in virtue of sea power.
to carry ON tho conflict for many years.
For the most part, however. the warfare was Of
such a character as to be of interest rather
from the viewpoint of national than of military
history. and it was only in Chilli and in the in
tervention OF Chill for the liberation of Peru
that the operat' ons are thought worthy of care.
full inspection by the author of this volume.
The peculiar geographical features of Chilli are
we'll known. It is a long. narrow strip of rich
and fertile territory interposed between the
Andes and the sea. 1t Is obvious that, in such
Q country. military movements must be gov
erned in no small degree by sea power. This
is . truth illustrated not only when the repub-
Nc was struggling for its freedom, but also in
very recent times. In the first instance us1O)
the Chilians experienced little difficulty in
overthrowing the Royalist government. In
1913, however, an expedition was despatched
by sea from Lima for the purpose of re-
DubjugatinG them, and this. O year later. was
successful. 1t was not until 1917 that q force,
composed partly of Gillian refugees and partly
OF Sympathetic Argentines, under Gen. San
Martin. crossed the Andes and recovered San.
tSBoa ho 'oiphraioo.t IL spanish army OF &C.
oupaton retiring into tho coast fortress of
Talcahuano. The influence Of sea power, how
ever. s1erted Itself anew in favor of the Royal.
lists. A second cxpeditionary force was sent
from Callao TO tho Gillian coast. and for a few
weeks tho existence OF the budding State was
impertlled. Eventually tho Spaniards were
driven back upon their base at Talcahuano,
but ID had become obvious to tho rev.
oluttonary leaders that the dominion of the
edjAcent seas possessed by tho enemy rem.
dered their situation most precarious. They
determined. therefore, to form a Gillian navy
ut all costa. and In a short space of time a feet
Of four san was ready to meet the Spaniards on
the high seAa- Tho success achieved by the
qest thus inprovised exceeded all expectations.
Within . month after 1t weighed anchor it
brought back to the Bay OF Valparaiso no fewer
than nine Spanish transports. Spanish su.
premAcy upon the ocean having been thus chal.
ienged. 1t was felt that CHILEAN independence
was. at last. secure. On the arrival. a few