The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1897-04-01
HOW THEY FIGHT IN CUBA.
The Wary Spnniards Fear Being En-
trnpped in the FOrests.

q
that the Cuban insurgents will not face
them in open battle, but retreat after
the first few volleys have been ex-
changed, and that their perfect knowI-
/ edge of the country roads and trails
enables them to escape.
4 The one great object of the Cubans in
ithe field is not so much to win by fight
Ing as it is to cripple Spain by draining
Per resources. The longer they can hold
yout without giving battle, the more
Amoney will be needed to clothe and feed
the vast Spanish army. The financial
condition of Spain is understood by
every Cuban soldier, and they all fully
recognize the Importance of putting
their oppressors to as much extra ex-
| pense as possible.
| The Cuban campaign since Maceo eX-
ecuted his great raid has been purely
defensive, having for its object the above
result. Chiefs like Gomez and Maceo
| have at times assumed the offensive,
but only for a short time. These de-
| fensive tactics have proved of more
benefit to the Cubans than 4 series of
| pitched battles. The successful work
ing of their plan is demonstrated every
| time that Gen. Weyler asks for reenfoce
ments.
J.. Next to Maceo's great campaign in
! fiinar del Rio, probably the most re-
markable example of defensive tactics
has been those employed by Gen. j. NJ.
Aguirre since he assumed command of
the insurgent forces in the province of
Havana.
Although the other chiefs have sue
ceeded in evading the Spaniards as well
as Aguirre, yet his proximity to the cap
ital makes his campaign of special i'm
| portance.
The northern brigade of the province
of Havana, under Aguirre and Brig
adler Cardenas, is divided into two cav
airy regiments and company of in
fantry, numbering in all about 900
armed men. Their field of operations
extends from Havana on the west to
the limit of the province of Ceiba Mo-
cha on the east, distance of As miles,
ard from the coast south, to a line di
viding the province in the center.
In this territory are stationed about
1900 Spanish troops, whose sole OBJ
iect is to corner or entrap this small
Cuban brigade and force them to a de-
cisive fight.
The Spaniards hold all the towns,
which are strongly fortified and have
each a permanent garrison of from 100
to 300 soldiers to protect them from de-
struction by the Cubans
| Operating field columns are sta
| toned at the towns of GuanabaCOa,
Ninas, Jaruco, Aguacate, Ceibas. Mocha,
Madruga, San Jose de las Lajas and Sta.
Maria del Rosario, in all nine columns,
averaging 1000 men in each.
The local guerrilleros that have been
formed recently will probably increase
the active field force to about 10000
well-armed and equipped men.
The remaining 1000 are scattered in
the smaller towns and forts, protecting
1sugar factories and bridges.
The railroad is also in possession of
the Spaniards, enabling them to concen-
trate their forces at any given point in
the district within six hours. With
Havana as their base of supplies, the
| Spaniards have all that can be desired
from a military standpoint. For II
months they have planned combination
and surprises for the purpose of en-
trapping thisinsignificant little force of
900 Cubans, who are poorly armed and
often have been without ammunition,
| but every time the Spaniards have been
foiled.
The Spaniards, despite all reports to
the contrary, rarely attack unless they
ere sure that they outnumber the
enemy.
The Cubans, through their excellent
system of scouts, are always well in
| formed of the movements of the enemy,
and in such case they quietly break
camp and march five miles further on,
outside of the trap. Occasionally the
Spaniards succeed in overtaking them
and a fight ensues.
| The Cubans usually throw out two
| companies in Skirmish line and retreat
under its projections; for as long as
there is line to face, the Spaniards will
be very cautious about advancing.
| | have seen six men hold a Spanish
column of 800 in check for more than
an hour by firing upon them from the
woods. The Spaniards, fearing an am,
buscade, would not venture into the for
est. In fact, this fear of being en-
trapped into an ambush is an important
| factor of the actual warfare in Cuba,
and is the real reason why Weyler is
having such a hard time of it i'll the
| Pinar del Rio hills.
| The Cubans, should they stop to give
battle TO their enemies in the province
OF Havana, would soon find themselves
In a serious predicament, as at the first
sound of the firing all the Spanish col.
umns hurry to the scene, and the
chances are that their overwhelming
numbers would tell in such case. But
by retreating rapidly under cover of
fire they soon place themselves beyond
| reach of pursuit.-LeSlic's Weekly.
Az 1t Seemed to Him.
"Doctah, l 9wine AK yo' 70 anudder