The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1897-01-02

to present upon question raised the first hearing
but winch former counsel for the defendant then chose
least where believe be the here rehear
ing would probably result in different decision For,
II could be assumed from the facts agreed upon
husband had not reduced the policy possession during his
ehe st the statute IN question could not, like the other
statute referred be presumed have been intended be
an enactment of the law be subject the
alleged exception relating chooses action the
law upon tins subject totally different; did allow
the husband reduce his
after divorce ALL after divorce he is no longer husbands his
right the wifes chooses right;
marital rights longer the right property
the statute The words personal estate used
naturally include all personal whether action pos
session.
The point that the statute in question (Sec
ton $3.50 repealed by implication by the Married Womans
Act OF 1888 This considered by the
rendering Its decision and if remember rightly also
suggested counsel the hearing but touched upon
in the decision cared to argue it. Very
probably the Legislature which passed
patng married from the harsh of the
law would have also repealed the section question: if had
been brought to its notice But this only of prob
ability what would have been done 1t
done The section inconsistent with that Act 1t may
be regarded special provision for penalty forfeiture
in of divorce for the oense of adultery We glad
to note that the section has since been epeaedby Act
introduced by Senator Brown who substitute Judge took
part In the former decision and takes part In this
The point made the brief that Section 1881 is uncons
onal made ground the motion for ehearing
need only add that fail the of learned argu
ment upon this point.
The point is that did not apply to the
property question because the time of the divorce neither
dcton of the courthe wife because she had Caor
nia the policy because although remained here in the pos
session of the husband being personal property it followed
its the wife, contemplation of law. We presume that
by this that personal property follows its
wherever the latter may happen 60 temporarily but that
it governed by the law of the owners domic residence
ammo manendi Now there proof whatever that the
wife this intended change her doic which had
viousy been here and which the absence of proof the
would least after short absence, be presumed
continue here say nothing of the rule that the wfes
domc that of her husband under special
circumstances But however that be- both parties
undoubtedly domced here when the divorce proceedings
commenced and when the acquired jurisdiction them
and that sufficient the question of doicil
concerned The having acquired jurisdiction under these
the incidents of the divorce would follow accord
ing to the law of the place of divorce.
Finally argued that the divorce had become absolute
because the exceptions taken the divorce proceedings had
been disposed Of Comp 437 The construction of this
argued and decided the first hearing and
practically asked go the ground again The only
criticism made upon the former decision of this question
based upon misconstructon of that decision.
The motion for a rehearing is denied.
W. A. Kinney for plaintiff
L. A. Thurston, for defendant.