The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-07-23

lie ACT or 1901, that section DefnR lLSeJ a
term In the charter contract-II MoraWetz
Priv. Corp, Sections 1106, 1895.
A railroad corporation chartered, for In
stance by some other State. might own
or operate a railroad in Indiana. Such a
company would have no charter contract
with the State of Indiana. The State might
provide by law for a board authorized to
fix rates, and such rates, If reasonable,
might be rate for such foreign. company
and regulate it's charges in Indiana. Such a
law would be within the power of the Leg
islature. But the enactment of 1897, here in
question, cannot be referred 10 any such
untrammeled power in the Legislature,
since the charter agreement between the
State and the defendant railway company
covers the subject Of rates. The grant by
Section of the act of 1861 cannot be taken
back, evaded or annulled in any way other
than that stipulated, namely, by d law
which shall be an amendment to the act of
1861; and valid legislative interference must
fall within the scope of Section II of the
act last mentioned. that being part of the
agreement The State and the corporation
have agreed that within the restrictions
imposed by the Constitution of Indiana on
the legislative function touching any law
for the formation of business corporations,
the Legislature may amend the act OF 1861,
and the question is whether or not the
act of 1897 is, in view of said restrictions,
competent as an amendment 10 the act of
1861.
COMMENT ON NAVIN DECISION.
''These distinctions are made here be-
cause as will presently appear, TIE Su
case that the enactment of 1897 is solely
by virtue of the general power of the State
to legislate on rates. In this way that
court clears the subject of constitutional
objections The defendant railway COM
pany is treated as though it had TO charter
agreement with the State of Indiana-as
though its charter had been granted for
instance, by Ohio or Illinois. The police
power of Indiana On railroad tariffs is
thought of as authority, which is in itself
unQueStionable and all-Sufficient for the en-
actment of 1897. Considered merely as re-
ferable TO the police power, want of uni
formity in operation, it seems to me, might
be valid objection to said enactment. But
that question reed not be discussed | think
1t may be said as a general proposition that
no enactment which would be invalid as an
exercise or the police power could be valid
as an amendment to the act of 1861; but, on
the other hand, an enactment proposed as
an amendment to the act of 1861 might be
unoDJectionable as police law, and yet not
be an amendment within the constitutional
restrictions which concern law like that
OF 1861. To hold such an enactment valid
would sanction a breach of the charter
agreement. Under a police law the rates
must be reasonable; but where there is
charter agreement as to rates that agree
ment controls. In Banking Company VS..
Smith, supra, though the rates fixed by the
board might have been reasonable, yet if
the corporation power to charge, IL 1t saw
MT so cents per hundred weight or II cents
per cubic foot for each hundred miles, such
would have been the rates whether reason
able or unreasonable. may add that a law
for the purpose of securing and enforcing
fair and reasonable charge by common
carriers is not to be classed with those
laws making for the public health and pub
lie morals, the power to enact which can
not be contracted away, or parted with, by
the State.
IT being now understood that the words
Of Section II of the act of 1861, This act
may be amended at the discretion
with Sections and u an agreement binding
upon the State of Indiana, what the sense
of this agreement is-whether the enact
ment of 1897 is an amendment to this act
can be determined only by reference to
certain provisions in the Indiana Constitu-
ton bearing upon the question. AS the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Bur-
cess " SeIgman supra, was obliged to
construe the statute of Missouri in order to
ind the meaning of the contract between
Sellgman and the corporation, so here the
meaning of the contract between the State
and the corporation cannot be known with.
out construction of said constitutional
restrictions on the legislative function
touching any law for the formation of cor
porations, the act of 1897 be not competent
as an amendment to the act OF 1861 then
ana in breach of the national Constitution
the act OF 1897 would impair the obligation
OF the charter agreement as expressed in
void.
THE EFFECT LOCAL.
L take it as clear that no enactment
can be competent as an amendment to the
act of 1861, which, when read in connection
with what would be left of said act, would
make the whole an unconstitutional statute
II the enactment of 1897 be valid, then the
law for the formation of street-railroad cor
porations in Indiana, as now extant, pro-
vides that in no city which had a popula-
ton of 100000 in $780, namely, Indianapolis,
such a corporation cannot charge more
cents for each passenger, no matter what
It's contract with the city may be, and
must transfer passengers from one of it's
lines to another without extra charge and
TINS under special code of penalties in
Volving the forfeiture of it's street fran
cnlSeS ana divers criminal prosecutions
while in any other city, regardless of pop
ulation, now or hereafter, the rate agreed
on with such city may be charged, the mat
ter of transfers being there left to the
company subject to agreement with the
city, and the penal code applicable in the
one city Identified by the law can have no
force 1t seems to me that, to the one
city Unidentified in the act, the law, on the
hypothesis now under view, would be spec
cial and local since it could never apply
to street railroad business by corpora tons
organized under the act of 1861 in any other
part Ita OF the state; and as to that portion Of
the State, other than the one city, it would
be special and local. since it could not APP
ply to the one city.
Section % of Article of the Constitution
Assembly
shall not pass local or special laws in any
of the following enumerated cases, that is
to say, regulating the jurisdiction and du-
ties of justices of the peace and of consta-
bles; for the punishment of crimes and mis-
demeanorS, and so forth, enumerating fif-
teen additional subjects. Section 70, fol-
lowing in the same article, reads: In all
the cases enumerated in the preceding sec
ton, and in all other cases where a general
law can be made applicable all laws shall
throughout the State Section 13 of Article
IL reads: Corporations, other than banking
shall not be created by special act, but
may be formed under general laws.
LAWS MUST BE GENERAL
From the language of Sections % and
%. when read together, it VIII appear that
a local or special law is any law which
is not general that is to say, of uniform
operation as applied to similar condition,
throughout the State Assuming the
validity of the enactment of 1887, then the
law Of which that enactment forms a part
is local or special, since it is not general
and of uniform operation throughout the
State The people of Indiana said in their
Constitution that where general law can
be made applicable, all laws shall be gen.
erai and of uniform operation throughout
than mat m9T be Pth e
der general laws in other words that a
general law can be made applicable when
the formation of business corporations is
the subject matter of legislation. These
when read together, express
the meaning that any law Tor the forma-
ton of corporations must be general; that
Is TO say, OF uniform operation under like
conditions throughout the State. The queS-
ton whether or not a general law be
made applicable to the mattec of corporate
for enterprises OF business and
profit is thus forecloSed in the Constitution
itself Upon tins question no discretion or
power of deciding, is vested either in the
l poiSi 4fl or h2 Of he