The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1897-12-07

pie are SC far affected by pending civil con-
fiict as to require definition of its relations
to the parties thereto. But this conflict must
be which is recognized in the sense of
international law as war;
NO GOVERNMENT
Belligerency too, is factor The mere
existence of contending armed bodies and
their occasion conflicts does not constitute
war in the sense referred to- Applying to the
existing conditions of affairs in Cuba the
tests recognized by publicists and writer's on
international law. and which have been OBJ
served by nations of dignity, honesty and
power, who tree from sensitive or selfish and
unworthy motives, fail to lind in the insur-
rection the existence of such a substantial
manifest to the world, having the forms and
capable of the ordinary functions of govern
ment towards its own people and to other
states with courts for the administration of
justice with a local habitation, possessing
such organization of force. such material
such occupation of territory, to take the
contest out of the category of a mere re-
beIlious insurrection or occasional skirmishes
and place 1t on the terrible footing OF war.
to which recognition of belligerency would
aim to elevate it.
| the insurrection has not possessed itself of
! 81 gle seaport, whence it may send forth its
5 flag nor has it any means of communication
= with foreign powers, except through the mill
tary lines of it's adversaries. No apprehen-
/ sion of any of those sudden and difficult COM
! plications which war upon the ocean is apt
mercial and national, and upon the consular
officers of other powers. calls for the definition
/ of their relations to the parties to the con-
! test. Considered as a question OF eXpediency,
! [ regard the accordance of bellgerent rights
! still to be unwise and premature, as | re-
| gard to be, at present indefensible in a meas
ure of right.
Such recognition entails upon the country
| according the rights which flow from it diff
| cult and complicated duties and require the
| exaction from the cOntending parties of the
! strict observance of their rights and obiga-
! tions. 1t confers the right of search upon the
| high seas by vessels of both parties; it would
subject the carrying of arms and munitions of
war, which now may be transported freely
| and without interruption in vessels of the
United States to detention and to possible
| seizure; it would give rise to countless vexa-
| parent government from responsible
! ity for acts done by the in
| surgents, and would invest Spain with the
right to exercise the supervision recognized
! by our treaty of 1885 over our commerce on
! the seas, very large part of which in it's
! traffic between the Atlantic and the Gulf
| states and between all of them and the states
/ on the Pacific, passes through the waters
! which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise
! of this supervision could scarce fail to lead
! if not to abuses, certainly to collisions peril
Gus to the peaceful relations OF the two
states. There can be little doubt as to what
result supervision would before long draw
! this nation. 1t would be unworthy of the
! United States to inaugurate the possibilities
| of such result by measures of questionable
| right or eXpediency or by any lndlrectlon
PRACTICAL ASPECTS.
Turning to the practical aspects OF recog-
milton of belligerency. and reviewing its neon
ven.ences and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code
of nations there is no such thing as naked
recognition of belligerency unaccompanled by
| the assumption OF international neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not con-
fer upon either party to a domestic CONNECT
status not heretofore actually possessed OF
affect the relation of either party to other
states. The act of recognition usually taxes
the form of so emn proclamation or neutral
ity which recites the de facto condition OF
belligerency as its motive. 1t announces 90
nestle law neutrality in the declaring
state. 1t assumes international Obligations OF
neutral in the presence of a public state OF
war 1t warns all citizens and others within
the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they
violate those righteous obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect to be shielded
! from the consequence. The right of visit and
search on the seas and seizure of vessels and
cargOes and contraband of war and good prize
under admiralty law must under international
law be admitted as a legitimate consequence
or proclamation OF beiEgerency. Nnle, az
cording the equal belligerent rights defined by
public law &c each party in our ports dls-
favols would be imposed on both, which,
while nominally equa! would weigh heavily IN
behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy
and controlling the ports of Cuba her mari
time rights could be asserted not only for the
military investment of the island but up to
the margin of our own territorial waters AID
condition of things would exist for which
the Cubans within their own domain could not
hope to create parallel; While its creation
through the aid or sympathy from within our
domain would be even more impossible than
row with the additional obligations of inter-
national neutrality we would perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged and oner-
GUS code of neutrality would only be inhuen-
tial within our own jurisdiction by land and
sea, and applicable by our own instrumentall-
ties. 1t could iInpart to the United States no
jurisdiction between Spain and the lnsur-
gents. 1t would give the United States no
right of Intervention to enforce the conduct
of the strife within the paramount authority
OF Spain according to the international coue
of war For these reasons, regard the
recognition of the bellieerency of the Cuban
insurgents unwise and therefore, in
admissible. Should that step hereafter be
deemed wise as a measure of right and duty
the executive will take it.
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds
has been frequently suggested and has not
failed to receive my most anxious and earnest
consideration. But should such step be
now taken when it is apparent that nope.
full change has supervened in, the policy OF
Spain toward Cuba? A new government has
taken office i'll the mother country. 1t is
pledged in advance to the declaration that
all the effort in the world cannot suffice to
maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that
vague promises Of reform after subJugaton
afford no solution of the insular problem;
that with substitution of commanders must
come a change of the past system OF warfare
for in harmony with new polcy whlch
shall no longer aim to drive the Cupans TO
the "horrible alternative of taking to the
thicket or succumbing in misery; that re-
forms must be instituted in accordance win
the needs and circumstances OF the time anu
that these reforms while designed to give full
autonomy to the colony and to create VIII
ual entity and se,f-controlled administrator
shall yet conserve and affirm the sovereignty
of Spain by a distribution OF powers anu
burdens upon a basis of mutual interest un-
tainted by methods of selfish expediency
BETTER POLICY.
The first acrs of the new government lie in
these honorable paths. The policy OF cruel
rapine and determination that so long
shocked the universal sentiment Oh humanity
has been reversed Under the new military
commander a bread clemency is proffered.
Measures have already been set on Ioot TO
relieve the horrors of starvation. me power
of the Spanish armies it is asserted is TO De
used not to spread ruin and desoiation put 10
protect the resumption OF peaceful agIlc ;
tural pursuits and pr Sein Nv forca peace
by subiugation is freely admltteu anu t tI
rnin without conciiiation must inevitably ran
to win for Spain the fidelity OF cohtehteu
dependency. , $1,000, s
6ecrees in application of the foreshadoWed
reforms have already been promulgated. Inc
full text of these DEGREES mas not peem
summary from our minister are: All civil
and electrical rights of peninsuar Spanlards
are in virtue OF existing cohsli uioI So
iards A scheme of autonomy mas been pro-
claimed by decree, to become effective upon
ratiication nv the cortes. 1t creates a Gu
han parliament which with the insular eX-
ecutive, can consider and vote upon all SUB
iects affecting local order and interests pos
sessing unlimited powers save as to matters
of state, war and the navy, as to which the
governor general acts by his own authority
as the delegate of the central government.
This parliament receives the oath of the gov
ernor general to preserve faithfully the lib
critics and privileges of the colony
are responsible. 1t has the right