Phillipsburg herald. [volume] (Phillipsburg, Kan.) 1882-1905, 1897-12-09

army and navy and judicial administration NC
accomplish this the present government pro-
poses TO modify legislation by decree, leaving
the Spanish cortes, with the aid OF Cuban sem
ators and deputies, to solve the economic
problem and properly distribute the existing
debt
In the absence Of declaration Of the meas
ures that the government proposes TO take IN
carrying out It's prefer OF good offlces II sug-
gests that Spain be left free TO conduct militia
ry operations and grant political reforms,
while the United States for It's part shall en-
force It's neutral obligations and cut OF the as
sistance which II Is asserted the insurgents re-
ceive from this country. The suppositi0n OF
an Indefinite prolongation OF the war Is denied,
II is asserted that the western provinces are
already well nigh reclaimed; that the planting
OF cane and tobacco therein has been resumed,
and that by force Of arms and new and ample re-
forms very early and complete pacihcation Is
hoped for The immediate amelieratlon OF OK
listing conditions under the new administration
OF Cuban affairs is predicted and therewithal
the disturbance and all occasion for any change
Of attitude on the part OF the United States
Discussion OF the question Of international
duties and responsibilities OF the United
States, rs Spain understands them, is pre-
scented, with an apparent disposition to charge
us with failure in this regard. This charge is
without any basis In fact. II could not have
been made II Spain had been cognizant OF the
constant efforts this government has made ut
the cost OF millions and by the employment OF
the administrative machinery OF the nation NJ
command to perform It's full duty according TO
the law Of nations That II has successfully
prevented the departure OF q single military
expeditiln or armed vessel from our shores In
violation OF our laws, would seem to be suf-
fcient answer But Of this aspect OF the Span
ish note 1t Is not necessary TO speak further
now
Firm In the conviction OF wholly performed
obligation due response TO this charge has
BEEN made in diplomatic issues. Throughout
all these horrors and dangers to our own peace
this government has never In any way abrogated
It's sovereign prerogative Of preserving to itself
the determination OF its policy and course &C
cording TO It's own high sense Of right and In
consonance with the dearest interests and
convictions Of our own people should the pro-
longaton OF the strife so demand
OF the untried measures there remain only.
Recognition Of the insurgents us belligerents
recognition Of the independence of Cuba; neu-
trail Intervention to end the war by imposing n
rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor Of one or tho other
party. l speak not OF forclbc annexation Tor
that cannot be thought of, That, by our code
of morality would be criminal aggression.
Recognition of Belllgerency.
Recognition OF the bellgcrency OF the Cuban
insurgents has often been canvasSed as pos
sible II not inevitable step both in regard to
the previous ten years struggle and during the
present war am not unmindful that the two
houses Of congress in the spring OF 1898 eX-
pressed the opinion by concurrent resolution
that condition Of public war existed requiring
or justfying the recognition Of state of bellig-
erency in Cuba and during the extra session the
senate voted joint resolution Of like import
which, however, was not brought to a vote in
the house In the presence Of these significant
expressions of the sentiment Of the legislative
branch 1t behooVes the executive to soberly
consider the conditions under which so impor-
tant q measure must needs rest for justica-
ton, 1t is to be seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood which alone can demand the recog-
milton Of bellgerency in It's favor. Possession,
in short, Of the essential qualifications Of SOW
ereignty by the insurgents and the conduct Of
the war by them according to the received code
Of war are no less important factors toward the
determination OF the problem Of belligerency
than are the influences and consequences Of the
struggle upon the internal policy OF the recog-
ni2ing state,
Turning to the practical aspects Of q recogni-
ton Of belligerency and reviewing its ncOn-
veniences and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear In the code
Of nations there's no such thing as naked
recognition Of belligerency unaccompanied by
the assumption Of international neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not con-
fer upon either party to a domestic conflict n
t,p, 4
feet the relation Of either party to other states.
The act of recognition usually takes the
form of solemn proclamation of neutrality
which recites the de facto condition of beliger-
ency as its motives. 1t announces domestic
law of neutrality in the declaring state. 1t as
sumes the international obligations of n neu-
trail in the presence OF public state Of war.
II warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction OF the proClaimant that they vio-
late those rigorous obligations at their own
peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the
consequences The right OF visit and search
on the seas and seizure Of vessels and Cargoes
and Contraband OF war and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law be admitted rs n legitimate con-
sequence Of proclamation of bel
ligerency. While according the equal
bellgerent rights defined by public law to
posed on both which, while nominally equal
would weigh heavily In behalf of Spain herself
Possessing navy and controlling the ports
Of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment OF the
island, but up to the margin Of our own terri
torial waters, and condition Of things would
exist for which the Cubans within their own
domain could not hope to create a parallel;
while its creation through aid or sympathy
from within our domain would be even more
impossible than now, with the additional
obligations of international neutrality we
would perforce assume.
Recognition Now Deemed Unwlse.
The enforcement Of this enlarged and oner-
GUS code Of neutrality would only be influential
within our own jurisdiction by land and sea
and applicable by our own instrumentality. It
could impart to the United States no jurisdic-
ton between Spain and the insurgents II
would give the United States no right Of inter-
vention to enforce the conduct of the strife
within the paramount authority Of Spain ac-
cordlng to the international code Of war For
these reasons l regard the recognition Of the
beligerency OF the Cuban insurgents as now
unwise and therefore inadmissble Should
that step hereafter be deemed wise as meas
ure of right and duty the executive will take IT,
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has
been frequently suggested and has not failed
to receive my most anxious and earnest con-
siderat OF. But should such step be now
taken when 1t Is apparent that hopeful change
has supervened In the policy Of Spain toward
Cuba? new government has taken Office in
the mother country 1t Is pledged in advance
to the declaration that all the effort in the
world cannot suffice to maintain peace In Cuba
by the bayonet that vague promises Of reform