Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1897-11-11

from the country of the entire stock OF
gold is, aa we explain in paragraphs
ard 16 Of this dispatch, open to more
than doubt; and in 30 far as either en-
forcea measures to prevent gold from
being exported. tho power OF the union.
and possibly alsu it's desire, to effect its
object viii be diminished.
A further doubt occurs to us in the
| possibility that either France or the
United States may, for reasons which
will suggest themselves to your lord
shin, be reduced for time to paper
currency. In that case the agreement
would cease TO operate for an indefinite
| period under the stress OF circum-
stances This possibility, though of
no Importance in the case OF union
comprising all the important countries
of the world, cannot be disregarGed
when two or three countries only form
| the union.
Another important source of doubt
lies in the consideration that three
sided agreement is open to much greater
risk of termination by the action OF
ona or two of the parties than many
sided agreement such as the govern
mept of India advocated before 1888.
In the latter all the commercial coun-
tries would be IN the union, and all
would be in ar equal position; there
would be no ground for surprising that
the operation of tho agreement bens.
fitted one country at the expense OF an
other There would therefore be no
substantial inducement for withdrawal
from the regime adopted by common
consent; the union might for practical
purposes continue to subsist and 10
produce its effect even after the diseent
ing country had Withdrawn. On the
other hRnd, in three sided agreement
such as is now proposed, either France
or tho United States might any day
find come reason for thinking that some
other nation was obtaining some ad-
vantage at their expense in consequence
Of the great difference III the standard OF
vane, anu tAereupon discussions might
ensue as to the expediency OF terminal.
ing the agreement which would have
only less serious effect than it's actual
termination.
Another reason for matchmaking that
the proposed agreement is not likely to
succeed will he found in the considera-
tons mentioned in paragraph G, regard
Ing tho improbability of France and
the United States allowing their gold
reserve 10 disappear. We attach great
importance to these considerations, he
cause we are convinced that they vitallv
affect the prospects of any agreement
being SUCCESSFULLY carried our. With
the precautions to which We have re-
ferrsd the experiment might be con
tinueh, for the risk 10 the two nations
would DO very small. But without
these precautions, or If they proved ia
be inadequate for their purpose. e..
the retention of a sufficient stock OF gold
-ws believe the inducement to abandon
the experiment would hs very strong,
and If even one country adopted that
course it would be impossible 10 pre-,
vent the whole agreement breaking
down.
For these reasons alone, without talk.
ing into consideration the objections
, kased on the particular ratio proposed,
, which We shall separately discuss We
/ have no hesitation in recommending
| your lordship to refuse to give the un
dertakiug desired by the governments
of France and the United States. W.
are quite clearly uf opinion that the in
] terests Of India demand that har mints
, shall not be opened as part of an ar
/ rangement to which two or three coun
tries only are parties ana which doei
not include Great Britain,
, We note that the proposals of tht
] governments of France and the Unitet
{ States are subject to the proviso tina
. they are satisfied that they will reGeiv,
assistance from other Powers in in
r creasing tho demand for silver. W,
behave that a limited increase of tht
quantity of silver used as currency wiI
8 exercise a very triiiing influence, i
D any, in raising the gold price of silver
Q and that the only assistance from othe
| Powers which can he of any real valu,
: would be the addition of other countrie
I to the bimetallic union of France anC
the United States. If, however, assur
Q ances OF really substantial cooperation
! should be secured from other c0untrie
0 we shall be glad to learn the exac
! nature OF the assurances, and we shall
] then consider whether the promised co
D operation changes the conditions of ih
! problem or adds materially to th
r chances Of success.
! We believe, however, that whateye
U inducements are held out to US by othe
Q nations, our best policy in monetar,
: matters is to link our System with tina
. of Great Britain. Our commercial con
. nexions with that country are far NOR
important than those with all the res
: of the world PUT together, and NOR
8 than sixth part Of our expenditure !
incurred In that country and meHsure
+ in its currency. The advantages, whicl
d in this respect we gain by following tn
9 lead Of Great Britain, are not obtainel
Q or not fully obtained, ii we becoml
+ members OF monetary union in whic
!, Great Britain takes no part. And
1t indeed, as we have already explained
Q we have little hone of an efficient uuiu
Q being formed unless Great Britnin is
70 member. We think IL a REASONABLE
3 position for US to take with regard I
il the present proposals by France an
is the United States that we should sa
ia that the government OF India Btiov
r long and earnestly to further the forma
tion of an international union; tina
1t when they saw that the opposition G
I. England rendered impossible the al
o tainment of that object within an
t. measurable time, they tenlporaril
10 abandoned their efforts in that direg
lr ton, and decided, as the least preju
10 dicial OF the courses open to them, {
10 throw in their lot with Great Rritai
ss and to adopt the gold standard; that
j. as it appears Improbable that an of lee
i've union will be formed without th
~ adhesion of Great britain, and as th
~ measures adopted to introduce n col
Ii standard in India are now appfoachin
"a final SUCCESS. they consider that it vi
If be wisest to adhere to the eours
u adopted in 1893 until Great Britain
IL prepared TO join in international b
"a inetallism; and that they, therefore
f,5k 4.xo ~ ~.