The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-07-11

NNAA-A - SNhS WV
tho military art at the time, he certainly has
nevor boon surpassed as q warrior; that he was
gifted with marvellous diplomatic skill and
with rare political insight; above all, that he
wos q singlc-minded patriot apparently without
ono selfish thought and devoted throughout a
heroic life to tho cause Of his country, In spite OF
the incessant exhibition of inRratitude and cow
ardioe at home. Hannibal. too, was one Of the
greatest leaders OF men who have over been seen
on the stage Of events; he ruled an army OF
many races and tongues, whether In victory or
defeat, with absolute sway; he maintained
q protractod. and, ultimately. q hopeless,
contest for q great many years by
tho sheer force Of his native talent;
even In tho hour OF disaster he mastered
the gov eminent and the people Of Carthage. ana
showed himself superior TO fate; whom an exile
and q soldier without q sword, he bowed kings
OF the East to his will, and even in his old age
he inspired Rome with terror. His domestic
life. so far as we can judge, was as pure and
honorable as his public career, nor ID there n
doubt that the "Punic faith which Roman his
torians have imputed to him means simply that
he displayed q wonderful craft in war, and that
he was q consummate master Of the art Of strata
gem. Mommsen, although holding a brief for
Rome, has felt constrained to say. Though
anger and envy and meannoss have written the
history Of Hannibal, they have not been able TO
mar the spotlcss and noble image It presents."
We shall not, of course. undertake to follow
the great Carthaginian In his woll-known march
from Spain across the Alps to Italy. We shall only
call to mind certain figures too often overlooked,
which indicate first, with how large q force his
father and brother-in-law had supplied him, and
secondly, with how small q proportion OF that
force he descended into the valley Of the Pc.
OF his scheme Napoleon himself has said: N
more vast, more far.reaching plan has been
carried out by man; but II was methodically con-
Quoted" 1t certainly came much nearer
fulhllment than Napoleon's own project Of
an invasion % India from Egypt Han
nibal's military and diplomatic arrange
mcnts were completed in about a year after
he had received his ommand that lie to say,
when he was about thirty years old. He had re-
coivcd pledges OF friendship from some of the
tribes in the tracts between the Ebro ana the
Thone; support had been promised to him by
the 1nsubres and other Gauls in Italy; his ENJOYS
had been well received in Maccdon. The army
under his command in Spain numbered some
100000 men, of whom 10000 were fine cavalry;
he had about sixty elephants and fifty warships.
He was obliged. however, TO dotnch Il large part
OF his forces for the defence OF Carthage and
Other Phmnician cities, and also for the purpose
OF maintaining his communications with Spain.
which, like a real General. he kent steadily in
view. Ito set or from CarthaCena Mt
tho head OF 90. 900 foot. 10000 horsemon and
thirty.scvcn elephants. Though not the largest,
It was Individually the best army Carthage ever
possessed. BY tho time, nevertheless. that he
had crossed the Pyrcnecs, it had been already
reduced to n force that seemed quite unequal to
cope with the military strength Of Rome. 1t
then numbered only $4,000 foot and 5000 horse
men, apart from the elephants, still thirty-seven.
What was this compared to the resources Of a
power that could easily place 200. 900 men in
the fieldi Even this force was sadly depleted
by the time It had crossed the Alps and de-
scended into he valley of tho Pc. In a record.
supposed to have been made by himself. Han
nibal has declared that, OF the 90. 900 men
he had led from the Pyrenees. there re-
manned o ly 10000 infantry and 5000 horse
men; these were but the shadow of a mi itary
force. the men spectrcs, the horses scarcely able
to stand. 1t deserves special notice that not
one of tho elephants was lost in the long and
arduous march. for they had been m object
OF peculiar attention and care. Then came
Hannibal's victory at tho Trebia over a
Roman army much larger than his own. and
tho subsequent uprising Of tho Cisalpine
Gauls on his behalf. The battle of the Ire
bia, II not the most tremendous, was. no doubt,
ono of tho most brilliant OF Hannibal's triumphs.
or the consular armies numbering As, 900. all
but $4,000 were made prisoners. wounded. or
slain. The great Carthaginian often required
to this battle in his old Gge as affording a capt.
tai example of his skill in the field. The imme-
diate result was that the Italian Gauls rose in a
body and Joined his standard; no fewer than
$4,000 warriors. 1t is said. flocked into his camp.
Neverthelcss,a at Lake Thrasimenus his army. not
withstanding his Gaulish endorsements, was
not more than $4,000 or go. 900 strong, while
tho force opposed to him is computed by Mr..
Morris at from 60, 900 to 10000. When the bat
tie was over he had 10, 900 prisoners, and Is, 600
Of the Romans were slain or wounded, while the
victors lost but 800 men. The author OF this
book finds 1t easy TO refnte the assertion that
Hannibal after Thrasimeaus ought TO have
marched on Rome. 1t is pointed out that he had
no siege equipage; that the military strength Of
the republic had not been broken. grave as had
been tho disasters OF tho last six months: that
tho city was fortified and extremely stron-:
and, that not one OF the Italian States allied to
Rome had thrown Off its allegiance. The con-
clusion is that Hannibal would assuredly have
met with n terrible reverse had he attempted to
attack Rome under such conditions. HE projects
for the war were moro far.seeing and profound,
and offered him, indeed. the only solid hope
Of triumph he could have. He knew that
Carthage was much inferior to Rome In
military force; nay. that any army no
could bring into tho field must ultimately
DO weaker tnan lS roman opponent HIS
purpose. therefore, was not to strike d.
rectly at Rome and to hazard the issue Of q
contest on a decisive effort against the great
city in which he felt that nearly all the chances
would be distinctly adverse. AS Mommsen has
shown. no had calculated from the first that
Macedon and Hellas might como to his aid. and
that tho various communities OF Italy might
rise against the dominant power; here were his
real prospects OF success. He prudently resolved
not to advance on Rome until he had combined
a mighty league against her. He accordingly
advanced first eastward and then southwark.
till he met the Romans again at Gamma, where
his whole force was not more than 40, 600 strong.
or the consular armies, amounting to 20, 900
men, 1t Is probable that from 90. 900 to 60. 900 per
ished in the battle; the loss OF Hannibal was but
5000. Still another calamity befel Rome in this
crisis OF adverse fortune. An army had been des.
patched into northern Italy to prevent the Gauls
from sending aid to Hannibal; 1t was decoycd
into an ambush and destroyed. For the moment,
the republic appeared PROSTATE. WIN than did