San Antonio daily light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1886-1907, 1897-10-13
WEAKNESS OF MODERN ARMIES.
The Opportunity of Some Possible
FIXTURE Alexander.

FIXTURE Alexander.
We are by no means sure that armie,
at the end of the nineteenth centur,
are not to some extent in the condi
ton of the armies of the last few year
of the eighteenth century. No doub
the modern generals are, or shall Wa
say seem, less sleepy-headed than thu
old bewigged Austrians and Prussians
though they, it must be remembered
were in their day reckoned men Of
science; but at the same time we ex
pect that a good deal of our modern
military organization has become stit1
and impractical. We shall be told, no
doubt, that the Prussian army went
like clockwork in 1870, but we must
be allowed to doubt whether the clock
work is quite as new now as 1T was
then, in spite of appearances Besides,
Prussia had just the very force opposed
to her in 1870 against which good
clockwork would be sure to prevail
a piece of bogus military mechanism.
Whether Prussia would have had as easy
victory if some Frenchman had
arisen capable of organizing and using
really mobile force of 10000 men is
another question. 1t is possible that
such a spearhead stuck into the clock
work might have done a great deal of
damage. That, however, is speculation.
What we do know is that the Prussian
army was splendid fighting organism
at the end of the seven years war, and
that at Jena, some 40 years after, it
proved utterly unable to meet Ma
poleon's quick, fierce assault.
In spite, then, of the magnificent or
ganiZation of the present European
armies, and of their vast size, we be-
lieye it to be quite possible that some
new Alexander may arise who will or
ganize a new method of fighting
which, for time at any rate, may
bring all their far-stretched greatness
to ruin. Of course, such a genius in the
art of war may never get to the front,
but that his opportunity exists in the
present bioated ornaments we have no
sort of doubt. Yet it will be said, how.
about the big battaions? All military
authorities agree that in the end, and
considering that the European nations
are practically equal in courage and
morale, the way to win battle is to
confront five men of the enemy with
eight, or if possible ten, men of your
own.
That proves that big armies will al
ways beat the small? By no means. 1t
is because we entirely and absolutely
acquiesce in the big-battalion theory
Providence as on the side of the big
battalions" was Napoleon's dictum-
that we hold that small and properly
organized mobile armies will beat the
huge, unwieldy armies that the mod
ern European strategists contemplate
putting in the field. Remember, your
big battalion must confront the little
battalion, not on paper, but on the
ground. Hence, If body of 10000 men
can be swiftly and suddenly confronted
with body of 10000, the big-battalion
rule is on the side of the 10000. The
fact that the 10000 belong to an or
ganization which has a couple of hun
bred thousand men behind it does not
matter. Unless the 100000 men are
available ct the moment they do not
count.
An extremely mobile army, ready to
spring first in one direction and then
in another, is quite capable of beating
an army of three or four times it's size,
and beating it always, by having a sub
stantial majority of combatants in
every actual engagement. OF course,
the big army may be so splendidly Or
ganized that it will be quite as mobile,
if not more mobile, than the small
army. In that case the small army will
be swallowed whole. All we contend
is that the hugeness of the European
armies tends to make them immobile,
and that therefore it is always posi-
BILE that some clever invention in the
direction of intense mobility may give
victory to a small ard apparently not
particularly well-found army in other