Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1897-05-03
GEN. wEYLER'S POLICY IN CUBA
WHOLLY INEXCUsABLE.
SHOWS HIS IGNORANCE OF WAR
WHY SPAIN HAS NOT BEEN ABLE To
PUT DOWN THE REBELLION.
Logical End of Present Policy Is Ex-
terminatiOn-ShOrto of That There
Can he No Peace-Inter-
esting Review of the
Situation.

lOllOWlnB as SpeClll correspondence rum
Havana. under date of April IS:
Here is an island $50 miles long and. say.
ar average of eighty miles wide. There
has been fighting here for more than two
years. Why is 1t that Spain. with a force
of 100000, has failed to drive the insurgents
into the sea?
Military men here who have watched the
struggle critically say the insurgents are
still in arms everywhere. because the tao
tics pursued h. proved that the Spanish
generals are ignorant of the science of
war. and have persisted In adopting and
following plans which are utterly untitled
to the task in hand. They maintain that
General Weyler's plan-that is. the doggej
policy of concentration of non-combatants,
fertilization and 6evastation-will be known
as one of the great military crimes Of his
tory.
And why? There seems to have been no
military necessity for this concentration
and the accompanying hunger and pesti-
lence.
Ostensibly Spains hope has been to crush
the rebellion and restore amicable rela-
| tions between this priceless colony and tho
mother country. A sharp. offensive cam
| pagn might have accomplished that end
within six months of the inception of the
rebellion, but there was no such campaign.
and the comment of to-day Is that General
Weyler, since he took up the task laid
uOWn Dy MS predecessors, has lOI Only lOi-
| lowed disastrous policy, but has succeed
ed in so widening the breach that there is
| no hope of closing it.
determination the Logical End.
The logical end of his policy is extermina-
| ton. Short of that there is no peace, no
| hope of restoring the relations proper be-
| tween colony and mother country. 1t is in
| vain that General Weyler has been sowing
hatred that will raise crop of nettles for
Spain for all time to come.
The facts are these: Opposed to con-
tinental army, presumably a well drilled
and effective organization. numbering some
100000 men, is predatory nomadic force
of 5000 men, scattered through six prov
| inces, without a base of supplies or even
a formidable armament.
| In the history of recent rebelions with
| which civilized powers have had to deal
| one finds that the educated soldier has pur-
sued one general policy. 1t was to give
| inferior force no rest-to follow it hard and
| fast, drive it from hill to hill ravine to ra-
| vine, until at last a decisive action was un-
| avoidable, and the rebels were defeated, or.
| fearing to give battle, they scattered, and
the job was finished.
| That is the instructive history of the
| United States Indian troubles. of the Riel
| rebellion in the Canadian Northwest, and
| British expedition to Wady-Halfa, and of
| every other British expedition for twenty
| years. In these and other instances ii was
| recognized that delay would be to the ad,
| vantage of the weaker force, since it would
| not only allow it to select stronger posi-
tlons. but to consolidate and recruit ITS
the rebels without delay. and to rely on
superior force and equipment to do quickly
| what was to be done.
Spain Bnnkrupted to No Purpose.
| Cuba presents the contrast. To crush
what Spain regards as handful Of rebels
| whom she despises she makes herself bank
rupt and pours troops from the peninsula to
and purposes she has given General Weyler
| carte blanche. He has defended few rail-
ways, garrisoned few interior towns and
| spent in building these forts has given the
rebels time to feed their horses: yes. more
than that. to plant vegetables raise fodder
throughout practically all of the island ex-
cept the tract Immediately along the rail-
| ways.
General Weyler points with pride to these
| forts a few kilometers apart. along every
ersed the country. whether he knows any
thing about military affairs or not, knows
that as a protection against an active pred
| They poorly protect a few bridges and a
few villages into which reconcentrados have
| been crowded-which amounts to nothing.
since the rebels can truly say that it is not
worth while to waste powder or men in TAX
ing one of them And were it necessary.
there is not one which a company of bold;
hard riding, straight shooting men could
! knock over in a night and bury in 1t the
poor boys who NOPE within the stone walls
And while we hear much of garrisoned
and fortified towns In the island there is
not one from Cape Maysi to Cape San An
| tonio-Havana excepted-which $50 of the
| before mentioned hard-riding straight
shooting men could not loot between SUM-
set and sunrise
Gomez Within Easy Reach.
For weeks it has been notorious that
| Gomez, the head and front of the rebel
lion. has been in the neighborhood of Ar
| roya Blaiico. There men who persist
| in believing that n general with an over
| whelming force could have used Sancti
Spiritus or the town of Arroya Bianco it
| self as q temporary base of operations
| and have made every acre of land west of
the Jucaro-Moron trocha too hot for reb-
| els feet. Yet month after month General
| Weyler who controls both coasts Of the
narrow island and all of its railways, per-
| sists in scattering his troops here and
| there for the purpose of rounding up the
country folk and herding them together in
| abject misery in the smaller towns.
Plainly speaking the army of occupation
has no commissariat department. that
| branch of the service is understood by
well grounded soldiers. Because of his la
mentable shortcoming in this particular
morning. have coffee at some ingenio CEN
trail few leagues away, and return for
| supper and lodging at the point from which
they rode few hours earlier.
Hence the reconcentrados-victims of
what history will probably call a great
military crime. 1t presents in a sense a
parallel to the deportation of the Acadfans
but 1t exceeds that historic event both in
extent and in ruthless disregard of con-
sequences.
DR.. ZERTUCHA ARRESTED.