Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1897-07-07

the Immigration treaty. Ibis
clause reads that "said treaty may
be terminated at any time by
mutual consent" The Japanese
Government construes it to mean
that the treaty cannot be termin-
ated by either of the signatory
powers without the permission of
the other, making the agreement,
in effect, perpetual. Hawaii con-
tends that the words have no such
meaning, but in a case where two
men make each other a promise
which is TO hold good until "ter-
minated by mutual consent" the
purpose is clear. 1t is a binding
promise until both agree to dis
solve it, and SO we think, apart
from any abstract view as to the
natural and proper limitation of
treaties, that the Japanese case is
very strong. -
One may readily estimate the
quality of Kanaka craftsmanship
by this example. No Government
in its senses would make treaty
with an ambiguous time clause.
But the Kalakaua regime never
had any very acute senses except
those of appetite. 1t was often
fooled and oftener bought. The
willy japanese, by the present of
decoration here and there and by
vague promises of future alliance,
or perhaps for actual cash in hand,
were able to do pretty much as
they pleased with the King and
his advisers. When the Toxic
statesmen made up their minds
| that Hawaii would be a good
dumping place for surplus coolies
it was easy to coax the Hawaiian
royal Government into thinking
the same thing. If not, it was
easy to bribe it. The shrewd
Orientals were like confidence men
cheating children or buying them
with candy. They readily secur-
ed the immigration treaty they
wanted, doubtless for a very small
consideration, and the result is be.
fore the world in the presence on
the islands of "a, 900 Japanese who
are eager to seize them politically
aud commercially.
What is to be done in this mat
ter? To our view the rights or
wrongs OF the treaty will not be
considered for a moment if japan
is left to deal with an unprotected
Hawaii. When there IL treaty
issue between a strong power and
a weak one, the will Of the strong
power obtains unless the weak
one can get help. The Anglo
Venezuelan case proves the rule.
We are certain that If annexation
or protectorste is denied
Japan will force her construction
of the treaty upon the Dole Gov
ernment. In that case the latter
would have to do one Of two
things-surrender it's cause to
Japan and let the Asiatic sub.
mergence come or appeal to some
other power, presumably Great
Britain, to accept the gift which
the United States had spurned.
In either event this country would
have lost its only chance to
dominate the North Pacific and to
control those crossroads of the
ocean which would be of such
vast Importance when the Nicara-
qua canal had been built. II
would have abandoned naval
outpost to possible foe, and with
| it the enormous trade of the most
opulent of the midocean islands.
1t would have given away a Ber-
muda which had a thousand times
the wealth and richness of the
Bermuda already lost.
There is but one way for Ha.
waii to save itself from the effects
of the injudicious treaty and that
is to secure annexation to some
strong power. That act, under
international law, would annul the
Japanese convention, but there
appears to be no other way. The
islands cannot remain indepen-
dent and secure relief. They
must 60 somewhere, and the great
question is, Shall they come to us
or 60 to a power that may use
them to do us harm? There is
but one answer which wise and