The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1897-11-07

must bdccOrdfng to the letter. that the
| qualification of the proviso extends to
the whole section. to all of the seven sub
| divisions into which it is divided, and it
| is not to be confined to the fifth one
| alone. We think otherwise; that the
| col'ocation Of the proviso sufficiently de-
| notes the meaning that II should qualify
| the taxing power only under the fifth
| Subdivision Of the section, which was TO
| provide for sinking fund or funds
etc. Provisos are construed as affecting
| the paragraph to which they are annex
| Ell, and we are of the opinion the one in
question should be 50 construed here
| to apply, not to the whole section, but
| only to the fifth paragraph to which il is
annexed
The syllabus Of the case on this point
reads:
"a proviso in a statute is construed as
affecting the paragraph 10 which it is
| annexed only, and not TO the whole sec
ton or act, unless the collocation Of the
| words SHOWS a different intention"
In the case of Wolf VS.. Bauerliis,
Lawyers Reports Annotated, $50, Mr..
! Chief Justice Alvey, speaking for the
| supreme court of Maryland, said:
sit is said that the function OF pro
viso is that of limiting and qualifying
the language of the statute, and not
that of charging or extending the act
or section OF which ii is a part; and that
proviso should always be construed
with reference TO the Immediately pre-
ceding part OF the clause or section TO
which il is attached. Tie. WEBB, "A How.
Pr 247; Kensington VS.. Keith, Pa. 2lo;
Elk Parte Darlington, Q. B. 649. sos;
Endlich, Interpretation Of Statutes,
Sec. 1885,"
The syllabus Of that case is in the fol-
lowing language:
"a proviso in a statute should always
be construed with reference to the i'm
mediately preceding part Of the clause
or section to which it is attached"
The safe rule to be adopted, and which
will admit of a broad and comprehensive
construction Of every statute, and place
upon 1t that Interpretation which Will
give effect to the true intention OF the
legislature, and which has the support OF
these authorities, although it embraces
the always important element of legis-
lative intent not included in the princi-
pal of construction as stated in the
Maryland case is. that the language OF
a proviso IN a section of a statute should
be held TO relate, not to the whole sta
tute, or to the whole section, but only TO
the clause or proviso of which it is
part, unless another purpose or intention
on the part fthe legislative body en-
acting 1t is deducible from the enact
ment.
An intention on the part Of congress
limit the entire indebtedness of the ter
ritoyy to per cent we cannot draw from
the language of the act, or the section
under considera ton. There is nothing
in any other part of this act of July 80,
1886, that indicates the congress had
any such intention, and the clear and
express limitation upon the purpose and
character of the Indebtedness which the
territory may create, and the amount of
indebtedness which the various munich
palities in the territory may contract,
strongly rebut the idea that congress. in
tended to make a general limitation, on
a much smaller per centum basis than
that fixed for these municipalities, upon
the entire Indebtedness to be created by
the territory. Had such an intention as
that claimed by the auditor of the ter
ritory inspired this congressional enact
ment it seems to US that it would have |
been useless to have framed the section !
with two exceptions instead of one. The /
seven different purposes for which the /
territory Was authorized TO contract l
debt could have been framed as well in |
one exception, instead of two separate |
and distinct ones, if congress had in |
tended that the Limitation placed upon /
the exercise of the authority to contract |
debts authorized by the second exception
or Subdivision should be equally appli- /
cable to the first. There was no reason
for framing these exceptions in two
divisions, making two classes Of indebt-
edness, unless il was intended for one
class TO be authorized under different
conditions and limitations than those OF
the first. The purposes for which debts
may be contracted under the first excep-
ton relate to the paramount necessities
OF the territory, and congress evidently
had no intention that these necessities
could not be supplied, and The ordinary
and necessary expenses of the territory
remain unprovided for, when there was
a casual deficit in the revenues, or that
the interest upon the territorial debt
should not be paid. or the necessary ex-
penses of suppressing an instruction or
providing for the public defense could
not be met, because the territory was in
debt 1 per cent Of the assessed value OF
the property therein. The purposes for
which debts might becreated under the
second exception, although important,
are OF secondary concern to those speci-
led in the first exception. All the neces-
sfties Of the territory relating to penal
charitable or educational institutions
AN be met, as they have been with re-
ference 10 the first two OF these. thus ,