, 1897-12-07

measure. 1t Wa, not civilized warfare,
1t was determination.
Americans Released From Prison.
Against this abuse of the lights of
war | nave felt constrained on repeated
occasions to enter the firm and earnest
protest of this government. There was
much of public condemnation of the
treatment of American citizens by AL
legged illegal arrests ami long imprison.
ment awaiting trial or pending profracted
judicial procedure. | felt it my first
duty to maze instant demand for the re
lease or speedy trial Of all A. american citi
Zens under arrest. Before the change of
the Spanish cabinet in October last. =.
prisoners. citizens of the United States.
had been given their freedom.
For the relief Of our own citizens suffer.
Ing because of the conflict, the aid of con
greSs was sought in II special message, an.
under the appropriation of April 4, 49,
effective aid has been given To America
citizens in CubA. many of them ut th.L
own request have been returned to the
United States.
The instructions given to our new min
lister to spain before his departure for his
post directed him to impress upon that
government the sincere wish of the
United States to lend its aid toward the
ending of the war in Cuba by reaching
. peaceful and lasting result, just and
honorable alik to spain ana the Cuban
people. These instructions rccitcd the
character and duration of the costeSt, the
wide spread losses it entails, the burden
and restraints it imposes upon lis, with
constant disturbance of national inter.
ests and the injury resulting from an i'll
definite continuance Of this state of things.
IL was stated that at this juncturc our
government was constrained to seriously
inquire if the time was not rips when
spain of her own voiition, moved by her
own interests and every sentiment of hui
lmanity, should put a stop to this dcstruc-
tive war and make proposals of settle
mcnu honorable 10 herself ami Just to her
Cuban colony. 1t was urged hat rs u
~ncighboring nation, with large interests
in Cuba, we could DE required to wait
only u reasonable length of time for the
nouhcr country to establish its authority
and restore peace and order within the
borders of the island; that we could not
contemplate an indefinite period for the
accomplishment of this result.
No solution was proposed to which the
slightest idea of humiliation to Spain
could attach, and indeed, precise proposals
were withheld to avoid embarrassment to
that government. All that was asked or
expected was that some safe way might
be speedily provided and permanent peace
restored. 1t so CHANGED that the consider
alton of this offer, addressed to the same
Spanish administration which had de
clincd the tenders of my predecessor, and
which for more than two years had poured
men and treasure into Cuba in the fruit
less effort to suppress the revolt, fell to
others. Between the departure of General
Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival
in spain, the statesman who had shaped
the policy of his country fell by the hand
Of al assassin, an although the abine of
the late premier still held Office and r.
:eived from our envoy the proposals he
bore, that cabinet gave place within u few
days thereafter to II new administration
under the leadership of Sagasta.
HI. Faith, In R.rnruns
The reply to our note was received on
the 23rd day of October. 1t is in the di.
rectiOn of IA better understanding. 1t ap
p%rcciates the friendly purposes of thi.
government. 1t admits that our country
is deeply affected by the war in Cuba, and
that its desires for peace are just. 1t de
clarcs that the present Spanish go FERN
mcnt is bound by every consideration to II
change of policy that should satisfy this
United States and picify Cuba within u
reasonable time. 10 this end Spain has
decided to put into effect the political ~,
forms heretofore advocated by the present
premier, without hating for n consid
GRAFTON in the path, which, in its judg-
ment, leads to peace. The military oper
atoms, it is sad, will continue, but will
be humane and conducted with all re-
gard for private rights, being accom-.
panied by political action, leading to the
autonomy of Cubaw while guarding Span.
ish sovereignty. This. it is claimed, will
result in investing Cuba with IL distinct
personality; the island to be governed by
an executive and by u local council or
chamber, reserving to Spain the control
of the foreign relations, the army and
navy and the judicial administration. 1O
accomplish this the prescott government
proposes to modify existing legislation by
decree. leaving the Spanish corteS, with
the aid of Cuban senator's IL deputies, tc
solve the economic problem and properly
distribute the existing debt.
In tine absence of u declaration of the
measures that the government proposes ro
take in carrying out its protfcr of good
Offices. it suggests that Spain be left free
to conduct military operations and grant
political reforms, while the United States
for its part shall enforce its neutral obi
cations and cut OIL the assistance which il
Is asserted the Insurgents receive from
this country. The supposition of an in
definite prolOngation of the war is denied
1t is assorted that the western provinces
are already well nigh reclaimed; hat the
planting of cane and tobacco therein has
been resumes and hat by force of arm.
and new and ample reforms very early
and complete pacilication Is hoped for.
The immediate arnclloration of existing
conditions under the new administration
of Cuban affairs is predicted AID there
with all the disturbance and all occasion
for any change of attitude on the part OF
the United States. Discussion of the ques.
ton of international duties and response
bilities of the United states. as Spain
understands them, is presented. with an
apparent disposition to charge us with
failure in this regard. This charge is
without any basis in fact. 1t could no,
have been made if Spain had been cog.
infant of the constant efforts this govern.
ment has made at the cost of millions and
by the employment of the administrative
machinery OF the nation at command to
perform its full duty according to the law
of nations.
OF the untried measures. there remain
only: Recognition of the Insurgents as
~belliycrents: recognition of the indepcnd |
ence of Cuba; neutral i~nttrventiont TO end
the war by imposing u rational cOmpro
mise between the contestants, and inter.
vention in favor OF one or the other par
ties. l speak not of forciblc annexation,
tor that cannot be thought of That, by
our code OF morality. would be criminal
aggression.
Recognition of the belligerenCy OF the
Cuban insurgents has often been can
vassed rs u possible, II not Inevitable step.
both in regard to the previous 10 years
struggle and during the present war II
am not unmindful that the two houses of
congress in the spring OF 1890 expressed
the opinion by u concurrent resolution
that IA condition of puolic war existed, re.
curing or justifying the recognition of a
state of belligerency in Cuba, and during
the extra session the senate voted u joint
resolution of like import, which, however,
was not brought to IA vote in the house.
In the presenceof these significant express
siOns of the sentiment of the legislative
branch, 1t behooves the executive to sober.
~ consider the conditions under which SO
Important u measure must needs rest for
Justification. 1t is to be seriously consid.
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attribute Of
-&aN ~ul ~,I.a 1~N 40 a. A.