The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-12-02

great struggle was going on, and one has
tened to turn the scale OF victory, while the
other remained at his post. Even II Butcher
had not stirred. ii Grouchy had been an
able General he would have dispatched
some divisions to the field OF battle, while
with the remainder, he kept the Russians
at bay.
The Prussian General did this, and in it
showed his ability as Il commander. But
II he had failed in this stroke OF policy he
should never have allowed the very army
he was appointed To watch, march away
from him unmolested. The only excuse
for him is, he obcyed orders. But he did
not obey orders. Ii is miserable shutting
to declare he oheyed implicitly the direc
tons given him, because he continued his
manuvers at Wavres when the only per
son they were designed to affect had de
parted for Waterloo.
English writer's would have us believe
GroUchy acted the part OF faithful off
Ger, simply because he stayed where he
was told to. thousand changes are rung
on the words, "he oheyed orders BY this
mode OF construction, he would have been
an equally faithful officer performed his
duty just as fully, had he quietly bivou
ackcd his army at Wavres, while the Prus-
sian columns one and all were marching
TO Join Wellington. He should not have
stirred though he had been left without an
enemy TO oppose him. unless he had re-
CelVed orders to move.
1t would be Just as reasonable to say
that he performed his duty if he had STAYED
at WaVreS when the hostile army had all
gone, as TO declare he performed it in re
naming, when forty or fifty thousand had
left. He was not wanted there if he could
not keep Blucher from forming junction
with Wellington; and to- remain was simply
to carry out the letter OF his orders, and
neglect entirely their spirit.
The Generals under him knew their duty
better and besought him TO let them march
their divisions 10 the spot where the heavy
and incessant thunder OF cannon told that
the decisive battle was passing; but he re
fused his permission. They did not wish
for orders, for they knew If Bonaparte was
acquainted with the state OF affairs, they
would be given soon enough.
There is one thing, however, which needs
clearing up. Napoleon declared, when q
prisoner at St. Helena, that he dispatched
an order to GrOuchy the flight before the
battle, TO occupy defile which would have
obStTucted the march Of Blucher on Water
loo which order Grouchy asserts he never
received. lin speaking oil it, Napoleon re-
marked that he must have had some
traitor in his staff, and it is very probable
this was the case, and BiHeher, and not
Grouchy, received the important tidings he
had sent.
But even If this were so, still he showed
great weakness of character in the course
he adopted. The truth Is, he was not an
able officer a brave fighter and n good
General when acting under immediate
orders, he was not equal to n separate COM
mand and never would have been en-
truste ed with the great interests he was,
had the Marshals who had grown up
around Napoleon been with him in this
last struggle.
Nothing can show the imbecliity Of
GrOuchy more than remark he once
made at a dinner table in New York City,
in company with several eIiled French
Generals. In speaking of their old cam
paigns ne of the Generals turned to
Grouchy, and said:
'How is it, Marshal Grouchy, that you did
not, when you heard the heavy cannonad
ing at Waterloo, leave Butcher and march
thither:"
4 POOR EXPLANATION
why" replied the other, you see if /
had Butcher might have marched on
Paris"
The idea of BIuchers marching Paris,
with Napoleon at his back, was too lu
dicrous even for the poIiteneSs Of Greuehy's
friends. and they could not refrain smile
at TIE reply. Gen. VaHdamme, who was
present at the table, Immediately said:
Il wanted to- go with my division, but
Grouchy would not let me, and when in
sisted he threatened to treat me as an in
subordinate officer"