The record-union., 1897-05-28

.he Legislature specifically forming
Reclamation District No. 20o, was
valid. 1t was passed in 1913, ana IN
cluded all the land that is now includ-
ed in the defendant corporation. 1t was
repealed in 1880, if the Legislature
could then repeal it. If the foregoing
discussion as to the nature OF these
corporations be correct, then certainly
counsel have not pointed out the llml-
tation in the Constitution which would
prevent it,
The statute creating the district is
here quoted, and the decision continues:
THE answer denies that the alleged
corporation had ever been valid and
subsisting corporation. The findings
either contain no findings, upon the
issue, or finds against the plaintiff. The
bill of exceptions contains no evidence
which tends to show that the reclama-
ton district authorized by the Act was
ever in fact organized. No existing or
ganiZation was recognized in the Act,
and thereby made a CORPORATION. No
person or body was named who should
exercise corporate powers. NO entity
was brought into existence by the Act,
but an organization was provided for,
and the owners of the land were declar-
ed to be a body polite and corporate.
Whether under such circumstances the
land described could be said to be
within an existing reclamation district,
may be questioned. We think, however,
the repeal was effectual. There is GER
tainly no express limitation to be found
in the Constitution, and the legislative
power is plenary, except as limited in
that instrument. Evidently it is not a
case in which a general law can be
made applicable. A general law provid
ing method in which those interested
may cause a corporation to be dissolv-
ed would not meet the case. 1t was
public agency called into existence
to construct a public work; to do some
thing which the general policy of the
State requires to be done. The State
changes it's policy, revokes the agency,
and thereby ends the corporation which
existed only for that purpose.
There is no express limitation to be
found in the Constitution upon the
power of the Legislature to dissolve a
municipal corDoration-if we We're to
concede this TO be one. 1t has been
the formation of such corporations by
special laws is not a limitation upon
the power of the Legislature to dis
solve them by such laws. Dohrman VS..
Taxing Dist, Lea, Tenn 425) The
provisions which may possibly imply
such a limitation refer expressly, not to
municipal corporations, but to cities
and towns.
The AttorneyGeneral also contends
that the entire law in regard to re-
clamation districts is void, because it
requires property qualifications for
voters. (Sec. l, Article II, Constitution;
also Section "a, Article -
| IF these quasi corporations are mu
nicipal corporations, designed to pro-
vide for local self government, we see
no answer to this suggestion. The point
seems to be sustained by the decision in
MADEIRA Irrigation District, 81 Cal. 800.
There is a difference, however, between
! an irrigation district under the Wright
Act and the reclamation districts. In
| our opinion these latter districts are
not municipal corporations, and no one
| is a. voter in the sense of the constitu-
| tiOna1 provisions. Certainly there can
| be no electors when there are no resi-
dents within the district. The district.
as already said, was part of a scheme
! for conducting a public work and not
| for local self government. In regard to
street work. and other local improve
ments, it has often been provided that
| the work shall only be done upon ap-
| plication of the owners of the land; and
! if the law provided that the owners
could elect a committee of their num-
Der to superintend the work, we do not
see how it would change the principle
/ This could not constitute an exercise of
| the elective franchise, which is the
matter to which the constitutional
/ provisions have reference. The general
| public has an interest in the reclama-
ton of swamp and overflowed lands
! Nevertheless it is one of those public
enterprises which results in a benefit
to private lands, and therefore the cost
| is made a charge upon such land. That
those who are specially interested, and
who must pay for the Improvement are
heard upon the question as to whether
| it shall be done, and are permitted to
| appoint those who shall superintend
! it, is not unusual, nor does it interfere
| with the rights of electors.
| THE order is affirmed
! The decision was written by Justice
| Temple and concurred in by Justices
Mcfarland and Henshaw