Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1897-12-16

chaser had not the benefit Of the statute,
because the point in the proceedings had
not been reached at which the door was
shut against parole evidence.
l apprehend that up to the time the
deed has been made and recorded, parole
evidence is not only admissible to show
defects in the proceedings. but that the
burden is on the purchaser TO show
strict compliance with the law.
l have been referred 10 the case OF
Bond Us. Petit, 50 Va. D. 474, and many
other cases decided in this State, an
nouncing the same doctrine. L do
not think the principle laid down in
these cases is applicable to the one
under consideration for the reason that
these cases arose under statutes entirely
different from the one on which the
deed in question rests, and especially is
Bond VS.. Petit not authority in this case,
because that was a bill filed to enjoin the
clerk from making the deed, so that the
defendant, by the very terms of the
statute, was not entitled to its protec-
ton, because the time had not expired
or the events transpired which the
statute provides must occur before the
curative power can be invoked.
CHhen follows the comments of the
Court upon the twelve different reasons
submitted by the plaintiff why the deed
in question should be set aside; but which
are more or less specifically applicable
TO this case, and are. therefore. omit
ted)
The next question, therefore, is the
cOnstitutionality Of said legislation, as
applied TO the facts in this case. For,
although the Legislature may have at
tempted 10 exclude proof Of certain facts
which 1t had not the power TO do under
the Constitution, yet the act is not for
T that reason unconstitutional or void, in
so far as its provisions are within the
constitutional limitation. Therefore, such
defects, irregularities. or omissions in the
proceedings complained of in the bill,
as were within the legislative discretion
and power, are now forever hidden from
the eye of the law behind the shield
constructed by the General Assembly.
when it declared that they should not be
considered after the purchaser had OBJ
tanned his deed and had the same duly
admitted to record.
Though the statute may be a harsh one,
and occasionally work an individual hard
ship or seeming injustice, yet if it be
constitutional, Il court, even for the love
of exact justice in each particular case,
dare not transcend its constitutional
limitation by converting itself into
legislature. 1t is far better that indi-
vidual burdens be borne than that the
well marked lines separating the legis-
lative and judicial powers be defaced, or
even denied.
The act of February 9, 1874 provides
that after the time for the redemption
thereby allowed had elapsed, the regu-
larity Of the proceedings under which the
purchaser at the sale claims title shall
not be questioned. nor shall the arrearage
Of the taxes for the non-payment of
which such sale was made, or such title
was vested be denied so as to affect such
sale or title, unless such irregularity, or
the fact that such arrearage did not eX-
ist appears on the face of the proceed
ings in court, duly commenced before the
expiration of the time for the redemption,
and duly prosecuted to a judgment or
decree. 1t was under this action the case
Of Flanagan VS.. Grimrett ct ais, 10 Graf
tan. page, AL, etc, that the deed could
not be questioned by parole proof OF a
failure to advertise the sale, as the law
directed.
In the case of Thomas VS.. Jones, 1t was
held by the present Court that the ques-
ton of notice required by the act Of
1876 could not be enquired into, be-
cause of the provision Of section Col, of
the Code. Certainly these two enquiries
not permitted in this case were OF more
vital Importance than any or the srounus
relied upon in the case at bar.
For the foregoing reasons / am OF
opinion that the plaintiffs bill should be
dismissed; but i do not think the de-
PENDANT should have a writ Of possession,
because il appears that the plaintiff
claims it under the Carter title.