The San Francisco call., 1897-05-16
TIE DEFENSE OF LONDON


TIE DEFENSE OF LONDON
What Paris is to France London is to the
British empire. To realize this we have only
TO imagine what the empire would be without
London. Paris has often been the ultimate
objective of invading armies, for the fall OF
that capital means, practically speaking, the
subjugation of the country.
In a strongly centralized Government an at
tack on the capital is an attack at most vital
point and usually its capture puts an end to
effective opposition and ends the war.
Although the Government of England is
much less centralized than that of France, and
the capture OF London might not terminate
the war. still as it is the acknowledged hnan-
ciai and commercial center of the world, such
catastrophe could not fail to have the most
momentous and far-reaching consequences.
This enormous aggregation of wealth aud an
dustrial enterprise the very center of civiliza-
tlon, would be most tempting prize for an
invading army, to say nothing OF the political
results which would follow its capture.
While most OF the European capitals have
within the past twenty years been gradually
converted into so many immense fortresses,
provided with distant 0utworks TO give secu-
rity against bOmbardment and with internal
arrangements for supplying and maneuvering
armies, England has been content to leave
London entirely unprotected.
The reasons for this seeming apathy are not
far to seek. The events OF the Napoleonic
wars are not yet forgotten, nor how the plans
OF the Emperor for the invasion OF England
were defeated by the British navy. To attack
London an invading army is required, and
this in turn depends on holding command of
the sea, at least for certain period.
Therefore. as long as England's position
at sea remains unaSs aila BILE there seems but
little danger of an attack on London. Many
military students hold that the true defense
OF London lies with the navy, and that with
the navy once defeated Notifications
would not suffice to stop the in
-vaders. England's policy is therefore to be
able TO hold the sea against any power
or combination of powers Owing to this
supremacy at sea she Is not only great
naval and commercial power, but great
military power as we'll. BY means of the sea
her forces are multiplied as it were and can be
a. once brought to bear upon the most threat
ened point. With her insular position and
invulnerability to ordinary attack 1T is not
surprising that England should have SO long
neglected these matters of internal defense
and organization on which the Continental
powers have concentrated so much thought
and spent such fabulous sums OF money.
OF late years, however, British self-confi-
dence has been somewhat shaken, and the
project OF fortifying London, or rather OF or
ganizing its defense, has received large share
of attention. 1t has been pointed out that if
it should so happen that the English home
fleet were overpowered at the beginning
of war with a first class Conti-
mental power, such as Germany, an
invasion by a wel-equipped and well-organ-
ized army would be almost certain to follow.
Can England be whipped at sea? In peace
times the navy is necessarily much scattered
and considerable time would be required to
mobilize a sufficient feet for home de-
tense. With sudden declaration of
war it is quite within the range
OF possibilities that way might be opened
for an attempt on London 1t is probable
that such an invading force would be supe5
rior to any England could Assem- BILE at short
notice, and by making q rapid march on Lon
don its capture would be reasonably certain.
Such an opera ton would be raid on a grand
scale, and while the risk involved would be
great, the prospect of thus ending the war by
sudden and brilliant coup is SO tempting
that it would probably be attempted.
1t is precisely this danger which makes some
sort of land defense for the city necessity.
The invading force would travel light and
must be met in front and detained long
enough for an organ ICED resistance to be
made. If possible while so detained it would
be surrounded and cut off entirely. But if
the force once gains possession OF London it
would furnish a base for further oper ations,
and if held would mean the termination OF
the war. The very suddenness of modern war
and the completeness of preparation of the
Continental nations all increase the probabil-
ity OF such an attempt being made.
The main rinciples which should govern in
the defense OF London were decided upon ten
years ago by the most eminent soldiers in
England. 1t was concluded that the city
must be surrounded by defensive positions,
strongly held and fortified with artillery as a
second line of defense" This WORK has been
going on now for some years In the
main the scheme adopted is that developed
by the eminent military writer, the late Gen.
eral Sir Edward Hamley, in volume entitled
National Defense" published in 1889. The
leading idea is similar TO that underlying the
project of Moltke's, drawn up in 1860, for the
defense of Prussia against Austria. Instead of
fortifying Berlin directly he preferred the pre-
par alton OF a line at some distance south of
the city. so that 1t could be held for short
time by even comparatively weak corps
AS London can be approached either from
the south or northeast there are to be two pro-
posed Enes-one running from Tilbury to Ep-
ping, the other on the south, following the
general line of the North Downs.
To defend these positions force OF some
$4,000 men is required, and some 12O
volunteer brigades have been assigned to the
work and 233 guns. 1t Is calculated that If
an efficient volun teer corps and proper Or
ganization can be had there would be no
difficulty in placing $1,000 men in position
by the morning of the fourth day from the
time mobilization was ordered.
1t remains to be seen whether such force
can hold its own against compact, we'll
commanded army of regulars. Lines such as
those described can be made very formid-
able in a short time and under COM
petent engineers can often replace to ad-
vantage. the more expensive and perma-
nent forms of fertilization. The question
will be largely as 10 the efficiency of
the men behind the works. In respect of
preparation for war England is in much the
same category as the United States. Imminent
danger OF war and invasion forms the force
ty which the Continental armies are kept in
such a constant state of readiness, and 1t is
altogether probable that until the necessity is
brought home TO her England will be to 9
great extent unpre pared for war OF any mag
nitude.
NATURES LESSON
ho fnE ,lo-h1 tui ifvofa NJ orh