The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-10-10

having q proportion of her military forces sta
toned permanently in remote provinces and de-
tendencies with which the only communication
is by sea. A State so situated cannot put forth
its whole strength on land unless its navy BIO
supreme upon the ocean.
Before examining the part played by sea
power in the last Of the three crusades against
the Turk undertaken by Russia since 1918,
tho author pauscs to measure the influence
exerted by the Union navy in our civil war.
His INT on tho land operations in this
country are not always creditable to his in.
telligence. but he secs distinctly the tremen.
dous advantage which the North derived from
maritime command. He would not say. indeed,
that the effect Of seq power upon the issue was
so patent ns 1t had been in the case OF Ibrahim's
campaigns in Syria or in that Of the Crimean
war. Nevertheless, q study OF the rebellion has
convinced him that its outcome was, in reality.
determined by the control OF the sea. which,
from the outset, was assured to the Fedcrals.
When tho war broke out, almost the whole of
tho United States Navy was at the disposal OF
the Federals. The personnel of the national
feet was recruited mainly on the seaboard. be-
tween the Chesapeake and the Canadian border.
One OF tho first incidents OF the struggle was the
destruction of tho naval establishment at Nor
folk, in Virginia, and tho burning OF the war
vessels building and repairing there by officers
acting under instructions from Washington.
Subsequently, however, the Confederate took
possession OF Norfolk. and managed to equip
some Runboats there. They also contrived to
convert one OF the war vessels which had been
only partially burned, into an ironclad, the
famous Merrimac. with which they sud
denly challenged the supremacy of the North
80 ~ Mnvirr ln~n 10 uannfnn RnpHS
the Merrimao destroyed two Federal men-of-
war and threw the whole Union squadron into
dismay. Happily for the Union cause. there ar.
rived from New York, on the very night after the
appearance OF the hostile armored ship. a war
vessel of even more eccentric type. the little
Monitor. In the duel fought upon the morrow
neither gained the upper hand, but the Merrinac
withdrew up the James. and was subsequently,
blown up. Thereafter, every effort Of the
secessionists to create sea power miscarricd.
There were no shipwrights in tho Confed-
crate States. no secure building yards,
no means OF creating a navy fit to cope with the
formidable Northern fleets. A few
destroyers harried Federal trade, and blockade
runners continually evaded the vigilance of the
Union ships Of war, but, upon the whole, the
Federal navy may be said to have kept the
South In a state OF siege. The OF the
sea stifed secession. The Importance OF the
capture of New Orleans is fully appreciated by
the author OF this book. He sees that. followed
as 1t ultimately was by the taking Of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson. it virtually split the Con-
federacy in twain. AS regards the moral effect
OF the occupation of this great city by the
Federals. there is no doubt that. owing 10 its
close relations with many great mercantile cen.
tres east of the Atlantic, it's loss greatly dam.
aged Confederate prestige in Europe. After the
Federals acquired entire control of the Missis.
sippi, tho tide set strongly in favor Of the
Union within the theatre of war west Of the Allie
Rhanies. The armies of the South were now cut
off from valuable sources Of supply in the trans
Mississippi States; the forces of the Mon could
be concentrated from the West and the North
against eastern TENNESSEE; and by the end OF
1868 q great Federal host was firmly estab-
lished at Chattanooga prepared to move south
eastwardlv on Atlanta in the coming spring.
Tho part played by gunboats on the Tennessee
and the Cumberland is passed over nearly
without mention. Major Callwell dealing almost
exclusively with those campaigns which serve
to illustrate the influence of prepondcrance
upon the ocean. This preponderance had a di-
rect and indirect effect. The sea power of the
North made itself felt indirectly by means of the
blockade and directly through the facilities OF
movement and supply which it afforded to the
Federal forces in Virginia. Had not the FEEDER
ais, for example, possessed maritime
they would not have been able to reinforce Wash
inRton with promptitude in an hour OF peril,
and the capital might have fallen into Early's
hands. The author thinks, however, that
President Lincoln and his advisers did not avail
themselves as fully AS they might have done Of
their naval dominion on the Atlantic coast. 1t
is pointed out that Mcclellan alone of the sue
cessive commanders who tried to force their
way to Richmond deliberately founded his plan
of attack upon the sea. Grant, indeed. was ulti-
mately driven by force of circumstances to base
himself upon the James. but it had not been his
intention at the outset to operate against the
secessionist capital from that side. Having
reached the estuary. however, after many san
culinary engagements, he was there enabled.
through maritime command, to gather up his
forces for the final stroke. We arc also re-
minded that Sherman could not have acted with
tho freedom and independence OF communication
which have made his march through Georgia
memorable had not the w~arships of the North
ranged tho sea supreme from the Chesapeake to
Florida. In summing up the effect of Federal
sea power on the contest. attention Is directed
to one other point. Had the Confederates been
amo in the Atlantic the North might have
been often the scene of conflict. As 1t was, ex-
cept for some bold raids OF Southern horse in
the Ohio basin. for Lees two notable incur
blonS nortn OF the Potomhc. ana lOr Early 9
audacious dash at Washington in 1864, Federal
territory never felt the terrors Of invasion. This
immunity from molestation was the consequence
of Northern maritime A preponder-
ant navy at tho disposal of President Jefferson
Davis would have altered the whole aspect of
affairs. With Confederate warships cruising off
their shores. the seaboard regions of the Union
would have been a constant prey to descents of
bands Of hlibusters and to attacks of expedi-
tionary forces on a larger scale. Instead of I'M
dertaking inroads into secessionist Virginia,
the legions of the Union would have been occu-
pied. ~ a large extent, in watching for maritime
invasions along the coast from Maryland to
Maine. The nero threat Of ravaging the coast
of Now Jersey. Connecticut, and Massachusetts
might have gone far toward inducing the Fed
erals to acquiesce in the separation of the South
ern States.
On the outbreak of the war of
4 orr 10 tho /. ,o-. .,ith naunanf tn m rtt ina