Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1897-11-11

Iuneh W0ulu rise with great 3Wiftne5s,
il would keen steudy for time, and,
then. when the cullapse cams, it would
fall headung What course could We
then adopt 10 prevent the iluctuation Of
the exchange yalue OF oar standard of
value with the fluctuations in the price
OF silper2 We do not think that any
remedy would he open 70 US. for If the
Indian mints were reopeneu to silver
now, it would, in ur opinion, be prac-
teally impossible u the government of
India ever to $50 them again, and
even If they wer closed. it would only
be after very larei additions had boon
made to tho amount OF silver in circu.
latiun.
There is another important considera-
tion in which India ia affected in a
manner different from France aud the
United States. The effect of tine scheme
will probably be an increase in gold
prices that 10. in the prices current
in France and in the United States)
and fall in silver prices (that is
in the prices current in lndial. This
is not tina place in which to discuss
the economic effects Of a Use or fall
in prices-a matter in respect of which
there may be difference of opinion.
But we presume that France and the
United 'SIntes contemplate with equa-
nimity the possible effects of the
change of prices upon their trade and
production generally, while it is mani
testify impossible for us, affected as we
are in the opposite direction, TO take
tho same view.
Moreover, it s3ama to us somewhat
unfair to expecs that India should,
after its atrngg ,es and difficulties of
the last decade, consider itself on the
same plane in tbs discussion of these
projects as France and tho United
States. India has. since 1879. passed
through period of serious tension and
embarrassment alike TO trade and to
the government. We are satisfied that,
great as hayu been the troubles which
have attended this period Of transition.
the attainment in the end OF the para.
mount object OF stability in exchange
is worth more than all the sacrifices
made. We believe that our difficulties
arm now nearly over. aud that wa shall,
in the near future, succeed 10 establish
ing stable exchange at 16d. the rupee
by continuing tbs policy initiated in
1893.
The United States are possibly, in
part at lHast, inspired, in making these
proposals, by the idea that they may
have befurs them some of the diff
cultiea and dangers which we have ex-
pariencsd. We need not say that il our
way was clear before us the considera-
tion that another and friendly nation
would derive benefit from the course
adopted by US would present itself tc
| our minds as good reason for the adop
tion of a course of action which would
have that result. But the case is quite
different when, on the eve of emerging
with SUCCESS, by our own unaided
efforts, from the monetary disturbances
Of the last 20 years. we are asked, in
view Of the benefit to other nations, tc
throw away the advantages we have
gained and plunge into new period oil
struggle and change. Only the most
absolute certainty of early and perma-
nent SUCCESS would warrant our accept
ance of such position. We cannoi
help seeing that il the policy of 1893 il
now abandoned, and if the triple unior
now proposed as a substitute shoulc
fail in it's operation or should termi
nate, and in its failure subject Indian
trade to the violant shocks we have
described, the government, Of Iudii
could not, as responsible government
call upon the commercial public to fact
1 another prolonged period of doubt, sus
pense, agitation and difficulties. Fo
il must be clearly and fully recognized
that if India joins in the proposed
measures we shall be left dependent, al
the sole means of attaining STABILITY il
exchange, on the success of thos
measures, and that If they should fai
India must be content to remain per
manently under the silver STANDARD
with all its admitted disadvantages.
If, then, there is any reasonable
doubt OF the SUCCESS of the suggested
measures, we are of opinion that VI
ought to refuse to cooperate, an(
should maintain our freedom to watcl
the course of events, and take sucl
action from time to time as these MA,
render expedient. A possibility o
even probability that the elforta o
France and the United States nigh
meet with success would not he enough
to justify us in parting with our free
dom or doing anything to further OF
experiment which, il it fails, will CD
tail consequences to the traue AMI
finances Of India which must be de
scribei, without any exaggeration, a
disastrous.
We have given very careful considera
ton to the question whether France an
the United States arc likely, with th
help OF India, to be able to mRintain th
relative value of gold and silver nerma
nently at the ratio they intend to adopt
and have come TO the conclusion tia
while we admit possibility Of tn
arrangements proposed resulting in tn
permanent maintenance of tine yau
OF gold and silver at the ratio of 151
to !, the probability is that they wi
fail to secure that result, and that it
quite impossible to mold that there i
anything approaching practical Gel
tainty of their doing 80.
One reason for this conclusion is tht
the arrangement would rest on too mar
row basis. A union consisting of tw
countries, with third leading assis
ance, is very different thing from til
general international union of all (
most OF the important countries of tn
world, which was advocated by th
government of India 10 the iliapatcht
of March and June. 1892, and of Eel
rrary and September, 1856.
To afford a hope that a monetar
union will SUCCEED 10 establishin
: stability in the relative value of COL
AMI silver it ia essential that til
nations adhering to il should be {
! such number and importance that th
metallic currency OF the whole bod
, shall be of sufficient extent to allow th
exercise of adequate influences on til
, value of the two metals. We dout
whether any two, or even three, natiur
/ in the world, unless, indeed. one {
! them was Great Britain, could compl
! | with this nnnditinn and Wa hare r