The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-03-23
Important Decision by the United
States Supreme Court in the Case of
the TransmissOuri Association.
THE ANTITRUST LAW UPHELD
AND ITS PROVISIONS CONSTRUED AS
COVERING ALL COMBINATIONS.
Minority Opinion I'm Behalf of Four
buckles i'm the Sugar Trust Case.

WASHINGTON March 22.-The Supreme
Court has decided the case of the United
States VS.. the Transmissouri Freight Asso-
citation against the railroads. The opinion
was rendered by Justice Pockham and re-
verses the decision OF the court below and
holds the antitrust law of 1890 TO be ap-
plcabe to railroad transportation. and the
traffic agreement of the pool to be illegal.
Justice Peckham reviewed the history of
the case and stated the conclusions of the
court in a very few words. He said that
the bill had originally been filed by the
government for the purpose OF securing
the setting aside of an agi cement operating
in the Southwest, which constituted the as
sociation TO fix rates Of transportation, TO
which the various roads constituting the
pool should agree. The bill was filed un-
der the law known as the Sherman anti
trust act of 1890. The defendants had. in
their answer, denied the governments ale
cations in respect, especially, TO the point
of improper intent, and on these showings
the case proceeded to a hearing. The court
below decided that the Sherman act did not
apply TO railroads and. therefore, refused
to sustain the government 1t was also
held by the lower court that even If the
act did apply, the agreement was not one
looking to the unreasonable restraint in
trade.
Continuing Justice Peckham said that
when the case was brought into the Su-
preme Court the defendants had moved TO
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
freight association had been dissolved leav-
ing nothing bSfore the court and also on
the allegation that the amount involved
s,,,fic n inctisy ci1pra tiOn
of the case in the Supreme Court of the
United States. These motions were both
overruled by the courts conclusions, an
nounced to-day. Justice Peckham said the
mere dissolution of the association did not
determine the question, as there was still
relief TO be had. Taking up the case on its
merits he said the court had reached the
conclusion that the Sherman act does cover
the question of railroad transportation and
that the agreement between the various
roads is within the prohibition of the act
Hence the decision OF the lower court
which was favorable TO the contention of
the railway companies was reversed and
the case renamed.
SCOPE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Replying to the objection that There is
no language in the antitrust act which
is sufficiently plain to indicate purpose to
merce act which permit the agreement
the opinion AYERS that the interstate-com-
merce act does not authorize an agreement
of this nature There is, therefore, no
repeal in the case" it says. ''and both
statutes may stand, as neither Is lncon-
sistent with the other"
The opinion takes up the assertion that
the Sherman act was aimed at only such
combinations as the Standard Oil Company,
the beef trade and the Whisky Trust and
says they not the only associations
controlling great combinations or capital
which had caused complaint at the time
the law enacted, but that there were
l. many and loud complaints from some por-
| tons of the public regarding the railroads
| and the prices they were charging for the
| service they rendered Neither is the stat
ute," the opinion continues, uncertain In
| it's meaning or it's language so vague that
| ii ought not to be held applicable TO rail-
| roads. 1t prohibits contracts. combina-
tons, etc. in restraint OF trade or COM
| merce. Transporting commodities is com
| merce and if from one State TO or through
| another 1t is interstate commerce"
Summing up the point of applicability to
| railroads the court says: while the
| statute prohibits all combinations in the
| form of trusts or otherwise the limitation
| is not confined to that alone. All combina-
tions which are in restraint of trade or
commerce are prohibited, whether in the
| form of trusts or in any form whatever.
| We think after a careful examination that
| the act covers and was intended TO cover
| common carriers by rail
| The court next took up the question of
| the true construction, assuming that the
| law applies TO railroads. On this point II
| said: "The claim that one company has
| the right 10 charge reasonable rates and
| that therefore IL has the right TO enter into
] a combination with competing roads TO
maintain such rates cannot be admitted.
| The conclusion does not follow from an ad-
| mission of the premise What one conn
pany may do in the way of charging rea-
| sonable rates is radically different from en-
tering into an agreement with other and
competing roads 10 keep up the rates 10
that point If there be any competition the
extent of the charge for the service will be
seriously effected by the fact. Competition
| will itself bring charges down to what may
| be reasonable, while in the case of an
| agreement to keep prices up competition
| rate is practically fixed by the companies
| themselves by virtue of the agreement so
| long as they abide by it," Concluding this
| branch, the opinion says: we conclude
that the antitrust act applies TO railroads
| and that it renders illegal all agreements
| which are In restraint or trade or COM
| merce 1t is further held that the agree
| ment in this was of such nature as
| to constitute restraint of trade of suf-
| ficient magnitude to render il violation
| of the act The effect was TO restrain
| trade no matter what the intent was on
| the part of those who signed 1t. 1t was
| stated that the granting of the injunction
| prayed for was not intended to have a
| retroactive effect.
Justicd White delivered the dissenting
\ OPINION IN DtUali VI HliuSetl ana JUSTICES
! Field Gray and Shras. He said that the
| agreement in question was not an agree
| ment to fix rates. but 10 classify freights
| and prevent an increase or reduction of
| them except upon given notice. Hence the
| document was not in restraint of trade or
| commerce. To say that il was. was in ef-
| feet to follow the letter and not the spirit
| of the law. The law officers OF the govern
| ment consider that the effect OF the de-
| cision will be far-reaching. They think il
will result in requiring that all traffic
| agreements be submitted to the Interstate
| commerce Commission. They also express
| the belief that il means reversal of the
| opinion delivered in the Circuit Court of
| Appeals for the Second circuit last week in
| the case OF the Joint Traffic Association
tho opinion being favorable TO the railroad
| combination.