The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1897-10-26


LONDON. Oct. ae-The Times, after re-
marking editoriaiiy this morning that the
''real danger is that America Will take
some step 10 pTecipltate a crisis" says:
Gen NoodtoEd note, like other papers
emanating from Washington. cannot De
construed by the ordinary rules applicable
TO diplomatic CORES spondence. This IS
fortunate, inasmuch as IL contains ex-
pressions which II they came from a Eu~
ropean chancellor. must be interpreted as
menacing war. But Il Is unfortunate. be-
cause it makes the meaning Of the note
ambiguous. that no clear inUlmation is
given Of the consequence of q refusal 10
acquiesce in the American demands. The
note is extremely diffuse and ahounds in
expressions Of friendship and good Will
toward Spain. but while ii Apologies for
the earnest and positive nature of the
language used on the ground that il is de-
sirable 10 prevent Misunderstanding be-
tween the two friendly nations. that Ian
guage in fact lacks the precision which is
usually expressed in documents OF this
kind.
Limit tn Patience.
There Is the distinct statement that
American interests are suffering and that
an attitude of neutrality cannot be pro-
longed indefinitely. There is mention OF
the concurrent resolution of the houses
of congress last year; OF the recent reso-
luton Of the senate; of agitation In the
United States. There is an assurance that
public opinion now demands the recog-
milton of the insurgents as beiiigerents
In these circumstances. II is suggested
that the Spanish government should con-
slider whether it is not time TO terminate
the war by proposals consistent with its
dignity and with the interests OF Cuba
To this end. the government at Washing
ton makes tender OF its Offices and calls
4 s5n the Spanish government within the
present month 10 formulate definite pro-
posals by which that tend may be rem
dered effective. or to give satisfac ory as
surances that the war viii be fought to
a speedy close.
Prefers War tn Surrender.
Spain appears 10 prefer to lose Cuba In
a war she foresees VIII he disastrous 10
her. rather than 70 surrender what she re-
CARDS as just and right in Difference TO
menace. II is a foolish choice. but the
choice of a nation On the other hand, Il
President Mckinley and his advisers are
really animated by the friendly sentiments
they profess they may fairly consent 10
the modes; demand Of the Sagasta cabinet
for reasonable period 10 settle the thorny
II0AlEAn LaAuF4 ADNA4 b1 AAAt4A FA eANASS
sors.
"On the whole. the prospects OF Gen.
Woodford's obtaining any satisfactory ar
rangement are not bright. Furthermore.
Il would be a dangerous error 10 imagine
that the Span'ards are playing a game OF
bluff. They know they would be beaten.
but CastilaR pride IS willing 10 accept the
consequences
The Reply Handed to Woodford.
IT.
ard. telegraphing yesterday (Monday).
says:
United States Minister Woodford re-
ceived Spains reply today. Il is said
70 be a document Of over thirty pages.
The Spanish papers assert that the gov
e-nment will not send note 10 the Euro
pean powers on the question until events
compel I understand that this rumor
may be received with caution. as. when
the idea OF Il memorandum was first
mooted by Senor Canoyas and the Duke
OF Tetuan. II had 20 be abandoned under
the peremptory representations Of Ameri-
can diplomacy Since then the powers.
though very friendly. have shown no dis
position TO anything more than platonic
sympathy. Financial circles IN Spain are
more anxious than political circles. The
latter seem 10 expect that the United
States viii hesitate when they see Spain
Is in earnest
WASHINGTON. Oct &-Developmen,s
IN Cuba within the next thirty davs VIII
definitely determine President Mckinley s
attitude on the Spanish question. but ne
expects no troable. The administration
looks with much favor on SPANS change
OF policy and believes thai the new minis
try is sincere in rs endeav3rs % hrlng
ah0u, a speedy termination ot the strife
IN Cu5a by granting substantial reforms.
While not fully advised as % SPANS re-
rlv 70 Secretary Shewuau's note presented
by Minister Woodford- iD September. rs
general character IS known 20 tie authori-
ties here and & IS not anticipated by the
president thai any friction viii arise be-
tween the two countries as a result - The
change OF notes. There is the authority of
a cabinet OF Ger for tais statement
The prime object the president had in
view when Gen. WcodfoFd went 10 Mad
rid was 20 bring about IN improved con-
dit{on of affairs in the island x Cuba be-
fore congress reassembIed. Spain's reply
and her instructions to the new captain
general Of Cuba wiu show an advanced
s-ep IN that direction. But the admins
tratton is more concerned about the re-
ported change of policy than II IS about
the character OF SPANS reply 70 Minister
Woo6f0rd's representa- tons. They have
no reason 70 fear that Spain VIII make
an aggressive stand sEainst the United
states on the contrary. they are sure
ot a note friendly and couciliacory n tone
VIII Give Proof of Improvement.
The president realizes however. The
danger Of further agitation ~ congress
and a further disturbance of our interests
= something more substantial than me
rsere promises - Spain 10 grant genuine
autonomy cannot De furnished when
the rev session begsns Il car
hardly b. expected that Gen. Ban
co with.n q month after his arrival. wiU
De able ;o end tire war. but u Is can -
seewa that an advanced step has beer
taken "a ,hat direction. President NJ KIN
ley may by forwarding the correspond
er-a wE-ch has PASSED between 1hs twc
countries ard calling attention - az I'm
rrsvsa condition cf affairs IN Cuba, y
zhla % pac.fy congress long enough 70
give spain q chance thoroughly 20 tss'
ner rew reforms Hence it appears tha
ire wor8Iug of the presidents forthc0m
lnx rsesssre depends mainly upon the i'm
mediate sTecz az Gen BI41coE errlFa