The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-01-28
SHERMAN'S MEMOIRS.

"HO'N AAAA>s ASssA" ASoPohUCu piOMptlJ
to their request.
He telegraphed me to know if could
not modify or repeal my orders; but
answered him that a great campaign
was impending, on which the fate of the
Nation hung; that our railroads had
but a limited capacity, and could not pro-
vide for the necessities of the army and
of the people too; that one or the other
must quit, and we could not until the
army of Jos. Johnston was conquered,
etc.
Mr.. Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and
l advised the people to obtain and drive
out cattle from Kentucky, and to haul
out their supplies by the wagon road
from the same quarter, by way of Cum
berland Gap. By these changes we
nearly or quite doubled our daily accu-
mutation Of stores at the front, and yet
even this was not found enough.
I ACCORDINGLY CALLED TOGETHER
in Nashville the Master of Transports
ton, Col Anderson; the Chief Quarter
master, Gen. j. L. Donaldson, and the
Chief Commissary, Gen. Amos Beckwith,
for conference. | assumed the strength
of the army to move from Chattanooga
into Georgia at 100000 men, and the
number of animals to be fed, both for
cavalry and draught, at $4,000; then,
allowing for occasional wrecks of trains,
which were very common, and for the
interruption of the road itself by guer-
rillas and regular raids, we estimated it
would require 130 cars, of 10 tons each,
to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reason
ably certain of an adequate supply.
Even with this calculation, we could
not afford to bring forward hay for the
horses and mules, nor more than five
pounds of oats or corn per day for each
animal. / was willing to risk the ques-
tion of forage in part, because / expected
to find wheat and cornfields and good
deal of grass as we advanced into
Georgia at that season of the year.
The problem then was to deliver at
Chattanooga and beyond 130 car
loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle
to be driven on the hoof. and all the
troops in excess of the usual train
guards to march by the ordinary roads.
Col. Anderson promptly explained that
he did not possess cars Or locomotives
enough to do this work. / then in
structed and authorized him to hold on
to all trains that arrived at Nashville
from Louisville, and to allow none to 60
back until he had secured enough to fill
the requirements of our problem. At
the time he only had about sixty serv-
iceable locomotives, and about six hum
dred cars of all kinds, and he repre-
sented that to provide for all contingen-
cies he must have at least 100 locomo-
tives and 1000 cars. As soon as Mr..
Guthrie, the President of the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad, detected that we
were holding on to all his locomotives
and cars, he wrote me, earnestly remon-
strating against it, saying that he would
not be able with diminished stock to
bring forward the necessary stores from
Louisville to Nashville. Iwrote to him,
frankly telling him exactly how we
were placed, appealed to his patriotism
to stand by us, and advised him in like
manner to hold on to all trains coming
into Jefersonville, Ind. He and Gen.
Robert Allen, then Quartermaster-Gen-
eral at Louisville, arranged ferry-boat
so as to transfer the trains over the Ohio
River from Jeffersonville, and in a short
time we had cars and locomotives from
almost every road at the North. Months
afterward / was amused to see, away
down in Georgia, cars marked Pitts
burg & Fort Wayne" Delaware &
Lackawanna," Baltimore & Ohio,
and indeed with the names of almost
every railroad north Of the Ohio River.
How these railroad companies ever re.
covered their property, or settled their
transportation accounts, l have never
heard, but to this fact, as much as to
any other single fact, | attribute the
perfect success which afterward attended
our campaigns, and l have always felt
grateful to MI. Guthrie, Of Louisville,
who had sense enough and patriotism
enough to subordinate the interests of
his railroad company to the cause Of his
country.
FORESTS BOLD RAID.
About this time, viz, the early part
of April, was much disturbed by a
bold raid made by the rebel Gen. For
rest up between the Mississippi and
Tennessee Rivers. He reached the
Ohio River at Paducah, but was hand
somely repulsed by Col. Hicks. He
then swung down toward Memphis, as
saulted and carried Fort Pillow. massa-
cring part of its garrison, composed
wholly of negro troops. AT first | dis
| credited the story of the massacre, be-
| cause, in preparing for the Meridian
campaign. / had ordered Fort Pillow
to be evacuated, but it transpired after
ward that Gen. Hurlbut had retained a
| small garrison at Fort Pillow to encour-
| age the enlistment of the blacks as sol
diers, which was favorite political pol
icy at that day. The massacre at Fort
Pillow occurred April II, 1864, and