The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-03-02

OF years Of savings and extortion and a
call to a Jehad, or holy war, would not only
bring fighters, but treasure. to the SER
vice OF the Khalif. In an attack from
the west, however, the Sultan would not
stand alone. He would, under the changed
circumstances, he effectively supported by
Russia, and 1t is exceedingly problematical
whether any single European power, or
even two, would be prepared to face such a
powerful combination on the defensive.
The front to he attacked would be exceed
ingly narrow, and the reserve Of defence
behind 1t practically unlimited. 1t Is under
such circumstances that the Turk and the
Russian both shine and exhibit their most
solid qualities. The Sultan Of Turkey is
the Concierge Of the Bosporus, the Guard.
ian Of the Gate for Russia, a power which
cannot under any condition allow II to pass
into other hands than her own.
The war material In the possession OF the
Turks Is enormous in quantity and OF good
quality. Their infantry arm IL the German
Mauser, and the reserve of ammunition Is
ample for three years active campaigning.
Their artillery Is from the krupp establish.
ment at Essen, both the heavy guns on the
Dardanelles Notifications and the light guns
Of the field batteries. The Turks are excel.
lent gunners. and, like all semi-civilized
races, Rave n kind OF reverence for the big
cannon and it's power. The weakness OF the
Turkish army is It's cavalry, but as the
possible scenes Of any more fighting by the
Turks will be in hilly and mountainous
countries, that Is not of as great Importance
as II otherwise might be. The stan or
ganization Of the Turkish army is now at
n higher point Of efficiency b 1t
has ever been, thanks to the help OF
Germany. As to the fact that the Turk.
ish soldier Is in arrears with his pay,
that counts for little with him when he
Is in active warfare and fighting for Islam,
with the chance Of becoming a martyr for
the faith. 1t Is when he Is called from his
home and kept for months In what he re.
CARDS as useless service, waiting for fight
ing that never comes, that he revolts and
demands the material compensation due
him. Yet he never planes the Sultan for
his privations, but the Pasha or admins
tration that he believes, and generally with
reason. to he robbing him. The fanaticism
of the people has hitherto been the Sultan's
chief safeguard; IL that has been under
mined, "a no doubt efforts have been made
to undermine II, the situation might be-
come critical for him personally, though not
for his successor II there should be one.
As to the Turkish navy, IL is not worth
taking into serious account. The Sultan,
dreading always the possibilities Of a dy.
nastic revolt supported by the fleet, has
discouraged in every way its being kept in
a state Of efficiency. The list OF ships with
their speed ms cruisers looks well On paper.
but is i~llusory in the last degree. The
small but compact and efficient Greek
navy would have comparatively little diff
Guilty in keeping the seas clear Of the Turk.
ish warships and that would enormously
enhance the difficulties of the Turks once
their army had crossed the Greek frontier:
for the sea would serve as a safe line Of
communication for the Greeks to receive
supplies at any point Of their coast. That
Is. assuming that all the powers, without
exception, maintained strict neutrality.
What the powers really fear in their pre-.
tended solicitude for Greece IL not the
crushing of the Greeks, but the break up Of
Turkey with the scramble that would fol.
low for the pieces. They aro equally un.
willing TO seriously attempt the coercion Of
Turkey. for more than ono power would
refuse to join in the effort, and tho Turk is
prepared to resist.