Herald and news. [volume] (West Randolph, Vt.) 1878-1943, 1897-12-09

| them Is accompanied WIFI an dppdlCAe
disposition to charge us with failure IN
this regard This charge is without any
basis in fact. 1t could not have been
made if Spain had been cognizant of the
constant efforts this government has
made at the cost of millions and b. tn
employment of the administrative minis
try of the nation at command, to per
form its full duty according to the law o.
nations That 1t has successfully pre-
vented the departure of a single exredl.
ton of armed vessels from our shores
in violation of our laws would EN- u
be a sufficient answer. But OF thii as
pect of the Spanish note l. is not neces-
sary to speak further now Firm in
conviction of a wholly performed oh iSa
ton, due response to this charge has been
made in diplomatic course.
That>by our code of moral would be
criminal aggression. Recognition of the
belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has
often been canvassed as a possible, if not
inevita bic. step both In regard to the pre-
| viouS ten years struggle and during the
| present war. | am not unm ndful that
the two houses of congress In the sprir 8
of 1896 expressed the Of ilion by concur
| rent resolution that a condition OF pub
lie war existed, requiring or justityins
| the recognition of a STAG Of HI ger ncy
| I'm Cuba and during the x IA sess on n p
| senate voted a joint resolution Of like inn
| port which, however, was not brought
10 vote in the house Of represen' a ives
| In the presence of these significant eX-
| pressions of the sentiment OF the ieg's-
| lative branch. il behoOves the eNecut We
to soberly consider the conditions under
| which so important q measure must needs
rest for justification. II Is to be serious
| ~ considered whether the Cuban insur-
| rectlon possesses beyond dispute the at
tributes Of statehood which alone can
/ demand the recognition of belliger ncy
I'm its favor. Possession I'm short Of e
| essential qualifications Of sovereignty BY
| the Insurgents and the conduct cf he
war by them according TO the reeeiv
code of war are no less important tao
/ tors toward the determination Of the
| problem of belligerency than are the in
| fuences and consequences Of the strug
gle upon the internal policy Of the Iecog-
nizing state.
Turning to the practicable aspects Of a
/ recognition of belligerency and review
| ing its Inconvenience and positive dan
gers, still further pertinent consldera-
tons appear In the code of nations
there is no such thing as a naked recog-
milton of belligerency unaccompanied by
| the assumption of international neutral
! ity Such recognition without more VIII
not confer upon either party to domes-
| tic conflict "A status not heretofore ac-
tually possessed, or affect the relation
| of either party 90 other states. The act
OF recognition usually takes the form OF
| solemn proclamation of neutrality
| which recites the de facto condition Of
| belligeroncy as its motive. II announces
| a domestic law of neutrality IN the de-
| caring state. II assumes the internal
| tional obligations of neutral in the
presence of a public state of war Il
warns all citizens and others with the
| Jurisdiction of the proclaiman that
they violate those rigorous obligations
at their own peril and cannot expect TO
be shielded from the consequences. The
right OF visit and search on the seas and
seizure of vessels and cargoes as con-
tuaband of war, under admiralty law.
must under International law, be adj
mitted as a legitimate conse quence OF a
proclamation of beligercncy.
The enforcement OF this enlarged and
onerous code Of neutrality would only b.
influential within our own jurisdiction by
land and sea. and applicable by our own
instrumentalities 1t could impart to the
United States no jurisdiction between
Spain ana the insurgents, II would give
the United states no right of intervention
to enforce the conduct Of the strife with
in the paramount authority Of Spain ac-
cordng to the international code Of war.
For these reasons | regard the recogni-
ton Of the belligerency OF the Cuban in
surgents as now unwise and therefore in
admissible. Should that step hereafter he
deemed wise as a measure Of right and
duty the executive will take II.
Intervention upon humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggested
and has not failed to receive my most
anxious and earnest consideration. but
should such a step be now taken when X
is apparent that "a hopeful change has
supervened In the policy OF Spain TO-
ward Cuba? a new government has
taken office In the mother country. II is
pledged in advance to the declaration
a., al ha n
suffice TO maintain peace in cuba by the
bayOnct; that vague promises to reform
after subiugation afford no solution OF
the insular problem; that with a sub
stitution OF commanders must come a
change of the past system OF warfare for
one in harmony with a new policy.
which shall no longer aim TO drive the
Cubans 10 the horrible alternative Of TAX
ing to one thicket or succumhing In mis-
ery;" that reforms must be Instituted in
accordance with the needs ana Giro msta :
ces of the time and that these reforms,
while designed TO give full autonomy to
the colony and 10 create a virtual entity
and self-controled administration shall
yet conserve and affirm the sovereignty |
of Spain by just distribution of powers |
and burdens upon basis OF mutual in |
terest untainted by methods of selfish ex- |
pediency.
The first acts of the new government |
cruel rapine and determination that so |
long shocked the universal sentiment OF |
humanity has been reversed Under the 1
new military commander broader /
clemency is proffered. Measures have al |
ready been set on foot to relieve the ho /
rors Of starvation The power Of the /
Spanish armies. IL is asserted. IS TO be /
used not to spread ruin and desolation, |
but TO protect the resumption of peace |
full agricultural pursuits and productive 1
industries. That past methods are futile /
to force a peace by subiugation Is freely l
admitted, and that ruin without con-
ciliatiOn must inevitably fail to win for
Spain the fidelity Of "a eontented PEN
dency
That the government Of Sacasta has
entered upon a course from which recess
sion with honor Is Impossible can hardly I
be questioned; that in the few weeks ID
has existed it has made earnest Of the
OF its profession IS undennfI,. I
] shall not impugn its sincerity. nor
should Impotence be suffered to enlbar-
rass Il IN the task 1t has undertaken. 1t
IS honestly due 10 Spain and TO our
friendly relations with Spain that she
should be given a reasonable chance to
lice hs sas-ra "a ION |