Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1897-07-18

this connection there was some discus
| sion ~ the difficulties 10 be overcome
and tie probabilities Of success, but no
| one questioned the disastrous results o.
remaining inactive throughout the winter
| Notwithstanding the belief that many
| IN the northern army were opposeu
| on principle TO invading the Southern
| States. and that they would fight better
1 In defending their own homes than In
attacking ours, # was believed that the
! best II not the only, plan TO insure sue
| cess was to concentrate our forces and
| attack the enemy IN their own country
! The President. / think. gave no definite
| opinion In regard 10 the number OF men
/ necessary FOR that purpose. and ] am
/ sure that no one present considered this
a question 10 be finally decided by any
other person than the commanding gene
raj Of this army.
Returning TO the question that had
been twice asked. the President ex-
pressed surprise and regret that the num-
Der OF surplus arms here was so small
and | thought spoke bitterly OF this
disappointment. He then stated that at
that time no reinforcements could be
furnished TO this army OF the character
asked for, and that the most that could
De done would be TO furnish recruits 10
take the surplus arms in store here
gay. $500 stands: that the whole coun-
try was demanding protection at his
bands. and praying for arms and troops
for defence. He had long been expect
ing arms from abroad but had been dis
appointed; he still hoped TO get them,
but had no positive assurance that they
would be received at all. The manufac-
ture OF arms in the Confederate States
was as yet undeveloped TO any conslde-
4 = A..
great difficulty. he could not take any
troops from the points named. and with
out arms from abroad. could not rein
force this army. He expressed regret
and seemed TO feel deeply, as did every
one present.
When the President had thus clearly
and positively stated his inability TO put
this army In the condition deemed by
the General necessary, before entering
upon an active. offensiv campaign, It
was felt that il might be better TO run
the risk OF almost certain destruction
fighting upon the other side of the Pot0-
mac rather than see The gradual dying
out ana deterioration Of this army during
a winter, al the end Of which the
term Of enlistment Of half the force
would expire. The prospect of spring
campaign 10 be commenced under such
dercd all the more gloomy by the daily
increasing strength Of an enemy already
much superior in numbers.
On the other hand, vas the hope and
expectation that before the end Of the
winter arms would be introduced into the
country, and all were confident that we
could then not only protect our own coun-
try, but successfully invade that Of the
enemy.
General Johnston said that he did not
feel at liberty to express IN opinion as
10 the practicabiLy OF reducing the
strength Of our forces at points not with
in the limits Of his command, and with
but few further remarks from any one
the answer Of the President was accepted
as final, and it was felt that there was
no other course left but TO take a defer-
sive position and await the enemy. II
they did not advance. we had but 10
await the winter ana its results.
After the main question was dropped
the President proposed that, instead o.
an active onenslee campaign, we should
attempt certain partial Operations-a sud
den blow against Sickles or Banks, or "
break tho bridge over the MonOcacy
This, lac thought, besides injuring the
enemy, would exert Il good influence over
our troops, and encourage the people Of
the Confederate States generally. in re-
gard TO attacking Sickles, it was stated
IN reply that as the enemy controlled the
river with their ships of war, Il would
be necessary for US to occupy two points
on the river one above and another be
low the point Of crossing, that we might
by our batteries prevent their armed
vessels from interfering with the passage
or the troops. In sly case. the difficulty
pf & =
in The vicinity of an enemy and then re-
crossing made such expeditions hazard
GUS 1t was agreed. however, that If auy
opportunity should occur offering reason
able chances Of success, the attempt
would be made.
During this conference or council. which
lasted perhaps two hours, all was earnest.
serious, deliberate. The impression made
upon me was deep ana laslag; and 1 am
convinced that the foregoing statement IS
not only correct as Jar as il goes. but. In
my opinion, 1t gives fair idea OF al that
occurred at that time m regard TO the
question o. our crossing the Potomac
q. NJ. SMITH
Major-General Confederate States Army.
Our recollections of that conference
agree fully with this statement OF Gene
raj q. W. Smith.
q. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Confederate States Army.
j. r. JOHNSTON,
General Confederate States Army.
(Signed in trplicate)
Centrevil!e. January 81, 1862.
AIR. DAyIsS REPLY.
Beauvoir, Miss. October Is, iSS0.-Gene-
raj Marcus j. Wright: Dear Sir,-PIease
accept my sincere thanks for your kind
letter OF the 5tn instant, and for your
consideration In enclosing to me copy
Of a paper. the existence OF which was
unknown TO me, and which, because O.
its special reference 10 myself. l am
glad 10 possess. The paper purpOrts TO
be statement Of "a conversation OF two
hours duration, and TO have been pre-
pared from memory, four months after
the conversation occurred The occasion
is represented TO have been an otiicial
conference or council between myself ao
President OF the Confederate States. and
the three senior generals of the Confede-
rate army in Northern Virginia. III. is a
condemnatory fact not stated in tho
paper, that no notice was given TO me OF
a purpose to make a record OF the con-
versation attributed to me In the paper
thus secretly prepared. and SO preserved
Until In the nineteenth year after its
date. u was revealed 10 me by being Of
fered 10 the United States for publica-
ton among the documents relating TO the
war. It may naturally be asked, WIZ
was II secretly prepared. and why now
offered for publication?
Without assigning motive. or directly
answering the questions, / think. how
ever. IL can scarcely be claimed that the
object was thereby TO increase the mill
tary power and 10 promote the ultimate
success OF the Confederate cause. Now.
having introduced this contribution to the
history Of the war. in the Questionable
shape under which II appears, ! will sum
mariy notice its prominent features.
The paper bearing date 3ixt of January.