The Corvallis gazette. [volume] (Corvallis, Or.) 1862-1899, 1897-12-10


! peace and order within the borders of thu
/ island; that we could not contemplate al
J indefinite period for the accomplishment
| of these results.
No solution was proposed to which the
4 slightest idea of humiliation to Spair
i could attach. All that was asked or ex
| pected was that some safe way might bt
i speedily provided and permanent peac,
restored. 1t so CHANGED that the consid
Grafton of this offer, addressed to the
/ Spanish administrati ton, which had de
clined the tenders of my predecessor ant
| which for more than two years had poured
more treasure into Cuba in the fruitles:
4 effort to suppress the revolt, fell to 9th
/ ers. Between the departure of Genera
! Woodford, the new envoy, and his arriva
| in Spain, the statesman who had shaped
/ the policy of his country fell by the hant
/ of an assassin, and although the cabinet
of the late premier still held office and re.
| ceived from our envoy the proposals ht
| bore that cabinet gave place, within 6
few days thereafter, to a new administra.
tion under the leadership of Sagasta.
Spafn's Friendly Reply.
The reply to. our note was received or
the 23d day of October. 1t is in the direc.
| ton of a better understanding. 1t appre-
ciates the friendly proposals of this gov
| ernment. 1t admits that our country is
deeply affected by the war in Cuba and
! that our desires for peace are just. 1t de-
| clares that the present Spanish govern
ment is bound by every consideration to q
change of policy that should satisfy the
| United States and pacify Cuba within g
reasonable time. To this end, Spain has
| decided to put into effect the political re-
| forms heretofore advocated by the pres
/ ent premier, without haltiHg for any con-
sideration in the path which, in it's judg-
ment, leads to peace.
The military operations, it is said. will
! continue, but will be humane and con-
! Quoted with all regard for private rights
! being accompanied by political action
! leading to the autonomy of Cuba, while
| guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is
claimed, will result in investing Cuba with
distinct personality, the island to be
! governed by an executive and by a local
council or chamber, reserving to Spain
the control of the foreign relations, the
army and navy and the judicial admins
trationS.
To accomplish this, the present govern
ment proposes to modify existing legis-
lation by decree, leaving the Spanish
cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators
and deputies, to solve the economic prob
lens and properly distribute the existing
debt.
Give Spain a Chance.
In the absence of declaration Of the
measures that this government proposes
to take in carrying out it's proffer of good
offices, 1t suggests that Spain be left free
to conduct military operations and grant
political reforms, While the United States,
for it's part, shall enforce its neutral obli-
cations, and cut off the assistance which,
it is asserted, the insurgents receive from
this country. The Supposition of an in
definite prolongation of the war is de-
MED. 1t is asserted that the Western
provinces are already well-nfgh re-
claimed; that the painting of cane and
tobacco therein has been resumed, and
that by force of arms and new and ample
reforms very early and complete pacifi-
cation is hoped for.
The immediate ameliorat tion of existing
conditions under the new administration
of Cuban affairs is predicted, and there
withal. the disturbance and all occasion
for any change of attitude on the part of
the United States.
Discussion of the question of interna-
tional duties and responsibilities of the
United States as Spain understands them,
is presented with an apparent disposition
to charge us with failure in this regard.
TINS charge Is Without any basis in fact.
1t could not have been made If Spain had
been cognizant of the constant effort this
government has made, at the cost of mil
lions and by the employment of the ad-
ministrative machinery at the national
command, to perform it's full duty accord
ing to the law of nations That it has
successfully prevented the departure of
single military expedition armed vessel
from our shores in violation of our laws
would seem to be a sufficient answer.
But on this aspect of the Spanish note it
is not necessary to speak further now.
Firm in the conviction of a wholly per-
formed obligation, due response to this
charge has been made in diplomatic is
sues. Throughout all these horrors and
dangers TO our. own peace, this govern
ment has never in any way abrogated its
sovereign prerogative of reserving to it.
al he q pf itc nd
course, according to its own high sense of
right and in conSonance with the dearest
interests and convictions of our own peo-
pie; should the prolongation of the strife
SO demand.
OF the untried measures there remain
only:
Recognition of the insurgents as bellig-
erents; recognition of the independence of
Cuba; neutral Intervention to end the war
by imposing a rational compromise be-
tween the contestants, and Intervention
in favor of one or the other party"
Not Question of Annexation.
/ speak not of forcib,e annexation for
that cannot be thought of. That. by our
code of morality, would be criminal ag-
gression. Recognition of the belligerency
of the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible if not inevitable
step, both in regard to the previous 10
years struggle and during the present
war. I am not unmindful that the two
houses of congress, in the spring of 1896,
expressed the opinion, by concurrent reso-
luton, that condition of public war ex-
listed requiring or justifying the recogni-
tion of state of belligerency in Cuba,
and during the extra session the senate
voted a joint resolution of like import,
which, however, was not brought to
vote in the house. In the presence of
these significant expressions of the senti-
nf the legislative branch If hphOnVaS
the executive soberly to consider the con-
ditions under which so important
measure must needs rest for justification.
1t is to be seriously considered whether
the Cuban insurrection possesses, beyond
dispute, the attributes of statehood which
alone can demand the recognition of bel
ligerency in it's favor. Possession short
of the essential qualifications of sover-
eighty by the insurgents, and the conduct
of the war by them according to the rec
ognized code of war, are no less important
factors toward the determination of the
problem of belligerency than are the in
huences and consequences of the struggle
upon the internal policy of the recogniz-
ing nation. The utterances of President
Grant in his memorable message of 1875
are signally relevant to the present situa-
ton in Cuba, and it may be wholesome
now to recall them. At that time a
serious conflict had for seven years wasted
the neighboring island. During all those
years an utter disregard of the laws of
civilized warfare and of the just demands
of humanity, which called forth express
sions of condemnation from the nations
of Christendom, continued unabated.
Desolation and ruin pervaded that pro-
ductive region, enormously affecting the
commerce of all commercial nations but
that of the United States more than any
other, by reason of proximity and larger
trade and intercourse.
Not a Time for Recognition.
Turning to the practical aspects of
recognition of belligerency and reviewing
its inconvenience ard possible danger,
further pertinent considerations appear.
In the code of nations, there is no such