The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1897-05-14

their fair charges and rules. This Is not
competition, but reward for illegal dis
ordinations.
Untrue Competition.
1t Is not, therefore true competition
when ono or more railways unequally al
ter proper public rates or rules To which
they have previously assented. and which
other and more judiciously managed rail-
ways seek To observe IN furtherapce OF
law and the public interest, rs the groat
majority of railways sincerely desire and
strive tn do Nor is 1t true competition
when strong and we'll. meaning carriers,
which have lost their business TO lax
rivals, take some legal chances 10 regain
and keep it, because IL they waited for
the laws inefficient help in such Instances
all their rival business would be lost.
Aagin, if one railway company offers
the tariff rate, another reduces 1t unrea-
sonaby, and other carriers offer further
rebate in varying ways, IL is clear that II
the first rate was reasonable the last one
is unreasonably low, and that such de-
vices, which are not competition, involve
loss to the first shipper and the last car
rier Such conditions constitute prefer
ence, discrimination, waste and bank
ruptcy, ard mean that fair rate standards
should be restored.
Assume, again, one railway, sturdy for
its proper rates, pittcd against another
pliant with concessions from the same
rates. and two shippers of diverse bust
ness standards. and that the yielding rail-
way grants the persuasive large shipper
unknown rebates. In such strife both
railways may be ruined, one because 10
loses its business, the other because IL loses
its profits, and the one merchant - sure
To be ruined; but the receiver OF rebates
will survive and will control his kind OF
business at the point where the rebate is
granted. This is not competition within
any honorable meaning. Nor even II 10
be ncdern law. Is IL sound business sense
or good public policy to say that 20
rightfully and rightly place both of said
railways and both OF said merchants on
equal and equitable conditions Is a
restraint of trade?
When one of these two merchants fails,
he retires from such strife. If but one OF
these two railways fail IL must continue
in business, ana the thoughtless say 1t Is
then best prepared 90 take the largest
traffic at the lowest rates To which other
carriers must conform or lose their traffic,
being the only trade in which a bankrupt
makes values for solvent rivals and the
only business which it Is popularity be-
lieyed may be increased upon insolyent
capital
This is not true competition, and rail
way reorganizations based on such false
conditions invite renewed failure, for
they induce reprlsals and the loss of the
business they thus divert from others.
Results of Preference.
Again, If all railways gave but one
shipper one cent per one hundred pounds
advantage he would ultimately control
the cereal markets of the nation. sc
would he If one rail way at each large
shipping point granted him that prefer
ence while all other railways thercat stood
firm for right rates and doing. The re.
suit, therefore differs only in degree II
the same advantage bo given by one OF
many railways To- five shippers at the sainc
or different points, who may then attack
each other until the survivors are fewer.
This Is not competition, but assault ano
uncomfortable favoritism. The protection
Of right always requires the restraint OF
wrong Especially is this true of trans
uortation, wherein both protection anC
restraint must come from railway coop
Grafton which is now intcfTiictcd, ol
from the law, which has so far withheld
it's sanction to this bost plan for both.
Further, tho merchant who reduces
prices affects only his rivals in his local
ity, while the railways which reduce
through rates are legally required 20 make
their Interstate charges, say, from ChicaR,
10 Boston, the mnXima botwecn numie &c
less intermediate places. This ~ not
competition, but the effect OF tho Inter
state act. because the offending limo may
not reach local points ON other lines
which aro nevertheless affected by the re
duCcd through rates its methods make
necessary between competitive ccnters
Finally, in this point, charges so vhrict
are illegal and punishable by fine and I'm
prisonment Tho lntersta0 COlnmtrcc ac
requires that the actual rates shall "
published and charged alike 90 all thai
they shall he not reduced without tbrc'
days or raised except upon ten days pub
lie notice. and that such rates shall not b'
"more or less" than the tariffs nled, there
by stipulating that railway competition
shall differ from trade competition:
The minority opinion In the Trans
Missouri case presents this succinctiy
and clearly, as follows: :,
THAT the Interstate Commerce rates al
~ which are controlled by the provisions
ns to rcasonablcncss, were not intended u
nuctuate hourly and daily, as competition
might cbb and ilow results from the fac
that the published rates could not b,
Increased or reduced except after specified
time. IL follows then that agreements n'
to reasonable rates and against thcii
secret reduction conform exactly to Ith'