The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-10-10

WlR-hOleteln demonstrates TO now large an eS-
tent the Danes owed their success in the first
contest to their naval supremacy.
Nv.
The conflicts which we have hitherto consid.
cred were on q scale relatively small. The So
called Crimean war, which ended with the
Treaty Of Paris. is the only great European
struggle since the Napoleonic era in which sea
power has played a principal and conspicuous
part. The coasts of one Of the mightiest of en-
pires we're for two years a prey to the raids of
hostile ships of war. Naval attacks were de-
livered upon fortresses of acknowledged
strength. Tho greatest expcditionary force
which has been despatched across the sea in
modern times was safely landed in hostile ter
ritory and almost in the presence of o formid.
able army. The full extent Of the influence,
however, which maritime command exerted over
the conflict as a whole is not apparent from q
mere narrative OF Its leading episodes. Tho Bal
tic campaign OF 1854, denounced by an unthink-
ing public as q miserable failure. achieved moro
than had been accomplished by many a brilliant
naval exploit with the history of which every
schoolboy is familiar. 1t is true that the opera
lions OF the allied feet in the Baltic were not
signelized by any brilliant victory. BY its
reconnoissances and its crossings to and fro.
however. it held great hostile armies in its grip.
The Gar Nicholas I. well knew the greatness OF
French military resources, and the despatch of
an expeditionary force from the French coast to
Livonia or the Gulf Of Finland was a contingen-
cy which he had to keep in view. He dared not
send away his soldiers from the Baltic south
ward to Grim Tartary. In a word, the dread of
enterprises never attempted and never, indeed,
contemplated by the allied powers forbade the
concentration of the Russian legions in the real
theatre of war. If we turn to the Crimea itself,
tho infuence ~ maritime command becomea
even more unmistakable. 1t is true that, at the
outset, when the allied armies put forth from
Varna, few persons realized that, in the COM
ing struggle in Grim Tartary. sea power
was to be the prime factor in governing its
course. and that the issue was to hinge on the
greater facilities for feeding an army in the
field with men and food and war material af-
forded by maritime communication than by
vast plains offering no obvious obstacles to
military movements on the largest scale. As
the contest went on. however. the truth was
recognized by all observers. The fact was re-
called that vainly had Napoleon invaded Russia
by land with half a million men and planted his
victorious standards on the towers of the Krem-
lin. On the other hand, the allies. in 1854. al
though they had only established themselves in
a remote province of the Cars dominions, had.
by maintaining their grip on 1t, broken the
strength Of the greatest of military powers for
several years. and thereby gained the end for
which they stroye. The Crimean war was a strug.
Gle in which military force was pitted against sea
mower and was decisiyely yano uished by tho
latter. 1t was the nayies of the West which
crushed the Car and arrested the southwark
advance of Russia for the space of twenty years.
review of the war of 1865. in which Prussia
and Italy were ranged against Austria and the
rest of the Germanic Confederation. makes it
clear that, although the campaigns in Ger
many. In Bohemia and on the Pc and Mincio are
of great historical and strateeical interest. sea
mower influenced them very slightly. and only
IN the case of the conflict In yenetia. The Ans.
trian fleet confined its operations to the north.