The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1897-11-09
THE CASE OF SELMA CLEWETT
AGAINST THE HOUSE OBJ GOOD
SHEPHERD
ENDED ALL BUT A VERDICT.
UNOFFICIAL REPORT FROM THE
JURY ROOM AS TO THE
BALLOTING.
JUDGE DRILLS CHARGE IN FULL
End of the Case Which Has Caused
So Much Interest In
st. Paul.

Selma Clewett'sE cause against the
House of the Good Shepherd is In the
hands Of the jury. Judge Brill deliver
ed his charge to the jury yesterday
afternoon, and consumed but twenty
minutes in doing So The jury retired
at exactly o'clock.
1t was the general comment of the
attorneys present, that the charge
Of Judge Brill was a model OF clearness
and cOnciseness, couched as 1t was In
language entirely free from confusing
legal verbiage and unincumbered by
any extended treatise on false impris-
onment, or the laws regulating the
measure of damages. The charge in
full was as follows:
Judge Bril1's charge to the jury was as fol-
lows:
Gentlemen of the jury the trial of this case
has occupied good deal of time; the testl-
mony given in the case is lengthy. | snail
not take very much time in saying what
have to say to you in regard to the case;
l shall not confuse your minds by going over
the testimony in detail nor in stating the
law at great length, but L shall content my
self with calling your attention to the issues
in the case, and stating to you certain prln-
ciples which will govern your determination.
The action is brought by the plaintiff Sc
line CleWett, against the mouse VI me GOou
Shepherd, Susan Crow and Emma Richardson
to recover damages for an alleged raise I'M
prisonment The complaint in the case al
leges that on Dec. 8, 1894 the defendants
wrongfully imprisoned plaintiff against her
will, and continued such Imprisonment there
after until Feb. II, 1897. The answer denies
these allegations. The issue in the case IS
as to the false imprisonment or plalntln by
the defendants.
The defendant the House of the Good
Shepherd, is a corporation organized many
years ago under the laws OF the state as
reformatory institution Tor women. II main
tans, and during the time IN the complaint
mentioned, and for some years before ana
since. has maintained an institution IN thls
city known as the House of the Good Snep-
herd the character and the management Of
which have been referred to In the evidence
in the case. The defendant, Susan Crow, IS
the president of the corporation, and is known
as the mother provincial, and during the
time in controversy, and before ana since,
was the manager Of the institution the de-
fendant Emma Richardson, is and was the
secretary of the corporation.
Both parties to the controversy agree tnat
the plaintiff was an inmate of the institution
during the time, substantially, mentioned IN
the complaint. so there is no dispute IN the
case in regard to that fact-that she was an
inmate. go.
1t is claimed upon the part of the plaintiff
that she was unlawfully Imprisoned at the
institution. This is denied by the defendant,
and this dispute raises the first and princi-
pal question in the case for your detefmlha-
ton
False Imprisonment is the unlawful re
strant of the person of another against his
will The defendants had no right to lmprls-
on the plaintiff against her will and they do
not claim that they had any such right; SO
there is no question to whether the I'M
nrisonment was lawful or unlawful if there
was any imprisonment Tne ultimate ques-
ton for your determination is, was the plain
tiff detained in the House OF the Coca Snep-
herd against her viii? Several considerations
enter into the determination OF TINS 9ues-
ton and other questions arise incidentally.
Imprisonment may exist in various ways.
There may be actual physical force USED, II
may be by seizure of the person, 1t may be
by interposing obstacles to the freedom OF
movement such as locking one Ill room.
Actual physical violence, however, IS not
necessary TO he shown in order to constitute
Imprisonment. 1t is not necessary that per-
son be locked in room or that hahas De
laid upon her; a show OF iorce or threats OF
intiZ idation OF any sort, II for the purpose
of restraining the liberty of the other, II the
other submits is sufficient. The threats or
intimidation, however, must result IN actual
detantion OF restraint of the person.
The plaintiff had the full right at all times
to liberty. and this without regard to her
moral character. The fact that she mad given
birth to illegitimate children dld not lessen
her right. 50 far as the defendants were
concerned But she also had the power to
become and to remain an inmate in this
institution, and to submit herself to Its re-
straints and regulations, and under the evil
dence in this case 1t must be held-aEd l SO
ctsr9a - vouNtbat the entry of the plaintiff
into the House of the Good Shepherd was
voluntary and her reception there by de1end-
ants did not constitute false Imprisonment
There Is some dispute in the evidence as 10
whether she was tod where she was gong
before she went there but in the view take
CT the case, TINS Is hot ulaleIlal UPoH thiS
particular question.
Having entered the institution voluntarily
she was not prevented from leaving after
wards at any time. The defendants had the
kp however reasonable ru.e5
and regulations for the government CT the
institution and to regulate the conduct OF It's
inmates within reasonable limits, ana IL
would not be false Imprisonment to require
the inmates to comply with those rules 50
long as their right to leave the institution
was net interfered with And in thas en-
false imDrisorment that the plaintiff was not
allowed to so from one room to another
or from one department of the institution to
another. Keeping the doors locked cid not
amount to false imprisonment; requiring in
mates to express a desire to leave, would
not be, in itself, false imprisonment.
l said that the plaintiff, by entering the
institution did not waive her right to leave
at any time afterwards, but it not
sufficient that she had desire in her mind
to go and that the doors were kept locked
and the windows barred 1t was necessary
that she express her desire to those in charge,
and that they then detained her or failed to
let her go; and there was no false imprison
ment prior to that state of affairs. It
in so many words to be let cut; If she had
desire to go and this was conveyed to
those in charge so that they understood
ought, as reasonable persons. to have under
stood that she had then present fixed desire
to go and that to remain longer would be
against her will or consent, further deten-
ton of her would be false Imprisonment.
Remaining afterwards by the mere persuasion
or advice of those in charge would not be
Imprisonment if she was not coerced. They
had a right to advise and counsel her to
remain and even to demonstrate with her. II
her will was left by them free to act upon
the question, but they had not the right to
coerce her will so that CHE not at liberty
to choose.
She claims as I understand 1t, that she
desired in fact to go, shortly after she
went into the institution, and she claims
that she signif1ed her desire to go out after
she had been in the institution year. Ex-
actly what her expression then was Is not
very clear to my mind. On the part of the
defendants, it Is denied that she expressed
any desire to- go. You have heard the evil
dence. and 1t will be for you to say what
the fact was as to when she first expressed
desire to go. If she did at all and what her
expression was and what they had right to
believe, from what she said.
1t appears that at a certain time. after she
had been in the institution for year or
perhaps more she broke window and got
out and that she was returned shortly after
and that she remained for some time after
that. 1t appears that the defendants were