Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1897-06-09
COMMISSIONER CALHOUN on THE
STRUGGLE IN CUBA.
NO SIGNS OF PACIFlCATIoN.
SAYS THAT HE CAN SEE NO END OF
THE REBELLION.
Stories of the MIserIes Attendant
Upon wcyIer's Policy Not Exas-
Ecrutcd-Mr. Calhoun Not in
Favor of AnnexatiOn-
Praise for Lee.

New York. June ESPECIAL Commissioner
W. J. Calhoun, who returned here yester-
day from Cuba, says that he had formed
an impression before leaving the States
that negroes, and possibly bandits, were
Jh- chief agents in the insurrection. lie
had not been there three days before he
was convinced the whole strength Of the
Cuban people is back of the insurrection.
lie became satisfied that il was in reality
the struggle of Cuba for Cubans, and that
they would fight desperately for inde-
penGcnce. Everything he subsequently, saw
and heard strengthened this belief
Calhoun had heard the reports Of pacii-
cation by General Weyler and had credited
them in some degree. His stay in Cuba
DESTROYED this notion. He could not ma
the paciiication which was reported. In
stead he found signs Of war everywhere
ever. at the gates Of Havana. The Span
isn troops held certain parts Of the island
a an army OF occupancy, while the IN
surgents were making constant and often
successful raids. Mr.. Calhoun was so i'm
pressed with these evidences Of actual war
fare that he gave out blunt statement,
saying he could see no end of the war and
that the devastation was growing.
Mr.. Calhoun could not discover that any
approach to civilized methods Of warfare
was being made on either side. He was
overwhelmed with evidence TO show the
atrocities committed by the soldiers under
Wtyler. particularly the guerrillas, who
form a part of the regular army. Sucn
cases as he was able to investigate per-
sol ally generally proved TO be correctly
stated. He also learned it was true that
the Red Cross Society was not permitted
10 exercise its offices of mercy between
the two contending parties This refusal
was on the part of the Spanish govern
ment.
Mr. Calhoun's personal inquiries and in
vestigation satisfied him that the starva-
tion and suffering caused by Weyler's re-
cOrCe ntration order were not exaggerated.
He saw the scenes OF human misery at
Matanzas, which determined him TO look
no further into that phase of the war, be-
cause he had seen enough, and 1t VIII
possibly have a determining effect in de-
Gliding whether the warfare in Cuba has
reached the state of savagery that justi-
fes the United States in intervening on
the grounds Of civilization and humanity.
That the effect of Weyler's concentration
order is to depopulate Cuba he is thor
oughly convinced, though he may not as
surne the responsibility of saying that such
is its purpose That its effect Is greatest
on starving women and children he VIII
be able to state without reservation
i do not thlnk MI. CdlnOuu was stIOhBly
impressed with the claim of the insurgents
TO recognition as belligerents. as belligeren-
cy is usually defined by the lawyers, and
Mr.. Calhoun is himself a lawyer. The ex-
istence Of a Cuban government is unknown
10 him: perhaps, for one reason, because he
did not go out to the Eastern provinces TO
seek it. However, he thinks the insurgents
have the right 10 make war in their own
way, and, while he could discover no prog
ress towards driving the Spaniards out OF
the island. he gives the insurgents credit
for their ability to keep up the present war
fare indefinitely. In other words, there can
be no paciication by Spain.
While Mr. Calhoun did not attach so
much Importance to belligerency as to 9TH
er phases Of the question. what he saw
did not cause him any fears for the United
States in case the policy of belligerency
should be adopted by the administration
and by congress.
During his stay in Cuba Mr.. Calhoun gave
a great deal of attention to the financial
conditions He understood perfectly that
the hope Of the insurgents was to win in
dependence by bankrupting Spain. While
he did not see actual bankruptcy. he found
that the credit Of the peninsula was grow
ing weaker. that faith in its ability TO pull
through safely was lessening, even among
Spanish partisans in Havana, and that in
watching the future progress of the insur-
rection Spains inability to get money must
also be carefully watched. Mr.. Calhoun
also heard much about the corruption
among the favorites of Canovas and Wey-
Ter in the payment of the troops, and for
the arreaTagcs in pay which were piling up,
but he did not follow this branch of the
inquiry eNhaustiVely.
While not charged with the responsibility
OF formulating a policy of Intervention or
helligerUnCy. Mr.. Calhoun returned from
Cuba with his mind made Up that no en-
CouraComent should be given the Cubans TO
expect annexation to the United States. If
Spain will not permit them to purchase
their independence and the United States
steps ina on the grounds Of humanity or
OF commercial interests or of political con-
ditions to stop the warfare. I'm his view il
should be with a distinct and specific under
standing that Il Is not step toward annex
alton. The assimilation Of the mixed popu-
lation Of the island, as he looked at it,
would be too much for the United States,
at least in the present generation. This
opinion was stated with great frankness Ia
both Cubans and Spaniards. and l do not