The Indianapolis journal., 1897-09-26
ENGL4ND'S WAR IN INDIA
BRITONs WILL STRIKE HARD, But
WILL TAKE THE TIME NEEDED,
Realizing the Increased Danger That
Would Follow Inadequate Punish
ment of the Tribesmen.

ment of the Tribesmen.
London Spectator.
AS yet no news of a decisive character
has been received from the Indian from
tier. None of the tribes, that is, have
gathered in sufficient numbers to make an
attack on them in force advisable, and the
government of India have not yet ordered
an advance up the valleys for the purpose
of furnishing the tribesmen in their villages.
A great deal of grumbling has been going
on as to this delay and we are being told
that the only way to restore our prestige
on the frontier is to strike quickly. Delay
will be taken to mean weakness. and so on
and so on. In reality, the government of
India are perfectly right to act with de-
liberation and caution. Their first duty is
to avoid anything approaching a disaster,
for that indeed might injure our prestige
and increase our troubles. Watching the
gates of the hills as cat watches the hole
of a mouse will never be taken by the
tribesmen to be sign of weakness. People
who talk about our having forty thousand
men on the frontier, and who declare that
such a force ought to enable US to deal at
our will with set of badly armed unor
ganized natives, have not realized in the
least the conditions of the military prob
lem. Unless the brigades are very carefully
handled, we may expose ourselves to an
endless series of petty disasters. The hills
within a hundred-mile radius from Pesha-
wur could easily swallow up forty thousand
men and leave no trace. In the hilly, stony,
often waterless and almost always foodless
desert which forms our northwest frontier
a1T aS
quickly as Cambyses lost his in the Soudan.
Remember that the brigades and divisions
that march into mountain region cannot
keep in touch with each other by opening
communications on their fianks. Each is
confined to its own narrow trench. When
body of troops marches up one of the deep
valleys it is often quite out of reach of
bodies moving parallel to it only thirty or
forty miles off as the crow flies. Between
the valleys are hills which, except at the
rare intervals where there are side passes,
cannot be crossed by troops and hardly by
messengers, since the hill tops are in the
possession Of the enemy. Nor is this all.
If the valleys all ran side by side like regu-
lar burrows, things might be easier. In
stead of this they twist and turn about,
and alter their direction so greatly that, in
the words of the Irishman they never lead
anywhere at all, except backwards or where
you don't want to go. We do not, of
course, mean that the valleys cannot and
will not be penetrated, but we do wish peo-
pie to realize how utterly foolish it would
be to fling an army pell-mell into the hills.
Let any one who wants to understand the
problem look at the frontier map just issued
by Messrs Stanford, a map which embraces
the area of disturbance, and extends from
Chitral in the north to Tochi in the south.
e rive w ba seo dogen Se9 6erent IL Is tribes as
ing as to march a brigade of volunteers
from London to Dorking on a bank holiday.
A DANGEROUS DELUSION.
Perhaps we shall be told that generals
must always run risks, and that unless we
are prepared to do so, we shall never put
things right. That is only a half truth
under ordinary conditions, and under pres
ent circumstances it is a most dangerous
delusion. Though it may not be the sole
cause, it is admitted that the chief cause
of the risings on the frontier is the fer
ment that is going on in the Mohammedan
world. But our Mohammedan Indian SUBJ
jects are by no means confined to the from
tier. They are spread throughout India,
and in the north they form the most i'm
portant, though not the most numerous,
section of the population. These men may
not yet be infected by the fanatical move
ment that has inspired the Moollahs to
preach an anti-British crusade but it is
certain that they would be greatly moved
by disaster on the frontier The educated
and well-informed MohamrnedanS would
doubtless realize that defeat in a defile
Of the hills could not possibly shake our
rule, but TO the uneducated and faEatical it
might seem a sign that the decree of fate
had gone forth against the white man. OF
course we could and should undeceive them,
and show them our true strength. but such
lesson would be an expensive and use
less exhibition. Another strong reason
against running any risk of dis
aster is to be found in the effect that it
would produce on the frontier itself. 1t
would at once double the area of the rising
and greatly increase it's intensity, and at the
same time it would make it very difficult
for the Ameer to keep his subjects under
control. Remember, too. that by waiting
and making preparations so complete that
a disaster will be impossible we imperil
nothing. 1t is not as if we lost anything
appreciable when a tribe is up over which
we have previously had control. The re-
voting tribesmen do not, when an army is
in the field, raid into the cultivated and CIV
ilized country or attack us in force.
AS rule, they simply range through their
siege any little hill towers or outposts that
they find attackable When a tribe gets
)ssession of a road up a valley there are
pitied, for these mountain deserts do not
produce such crop. 1t is not then, as if
province and were ravaging it. For the
most part they simply range their barren
hillsides and do q little miscellaneous pill
Laying and fighting, unchecked by the po-
litical officer and his deputies and as
sstants. No doubt this unchartered free
dom will have TO be stopped, but there is no
Nobody will suffer if the Khyber is opened
a month hence instead of next week. In
deed, within reasonable limits, not hurrying
matters may have a distinctly calming and
depressing effect on the tribes Fanatical
outbreaks tend to wear themselves out
When rebels have been in arms for a week
or two without any very visable results ex-
cept their first snail successes, which soon
get forgotten, they are inclined to ask
whether after ALL they have not made a
false step in rebeIing. 1t is true that they
have got full possession of their own hills
for the moment. but outside stands men
acing force which they dare not attack for
fear of certain defeat, and a force which
they know will sooner or later enter their
country and inflict severe punishment The
effect of such reflections is certain to be
dscouraging, and to make men ask whether
the Moollah was really as mad and as holy
as he looked-whetber, after all, he was not
a lying prophet. Men attacked in the first
flush of their fanaticsm are often far more
difficult to cope with than those who are
beginning once again to view matters in the
light of common day.
ADVANTAGES OF DELAY.
By avoiding all risk of disaster, and by
striking when they do strike with invinci-
BILE force, the Indian government will, we
have no doubt, get over the immediate from
tier difficulty without suffering and serious
injury. When, however, the immediate
military problem has been solved, they will
find themselves face to face with another
and more difficult and intricate question