Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1897-12-10

ment has never in any way abrogatet
its sovereign prerogative of reservinl
to itself the determination of it's policy
and course, according to its own higI
sense of right, and in consonance will
TIE dearest interests and convictions OF
our own people, should the prolonga
ton of the strife so demand.
OF the untried measures there remain
only:
Recognition of the insurgents as bel
ligerents, recognition Of the independ-
ence of Cuba, national intervention to
end the war by imposing a national
compromise between the contestants,
or prevention in favor of one or the
other parties.
| speak not of forcible annexation,
for that cannot be thought of. That,
by our code of morality, would be Grim
inal aggression.
Recognition Of the Cuban insurgents
has often been canvassed as a possi-
bic, if not an inevitable step, both in
regard to the previous ten years strug-
gle and during the present war. / am
not unmindful that the two houses of
Congress in the spring of 1896 express
ed the opinion by concurrent resolution
that a condition of public war existed,
requiring or justifying the recognition
of belligerency in Cuba, and during the
extra session the Senate voted a joint
resolution of like import, which, how
ever, was not brought to a vote in the
House of Representatives
The presence of these great express
siOns behoOves the executive to solely
consider the conditions under which so
important a measure must need rest
for justification. 1t is to be seriously
considered whether the Cuban insur-
rection possessed beyond dispute the
attributes of statehood, which alone
can demand the recognition of bellig-
erency in its favor. Possession, in short,
of the essential qualifications of SOY.
ereignty by the insurgents and the con.
luct of the war by them according to
the recognized code of war are no less
important facts toward the determina-
ion of the problem than are the in
1uences and consequences of the Strug-
sle upon the internal policy OF recog-
lizing the state.
The wise utterances of President |
Grant in his memorable message of |
December Z, 1875, are signally relevant |
o the present situation in Cuba, and it |
nay be wholesome now to recall them. |
1t that time ruinOus conflict had for |
even years wasted the neighbOring |
sland. During all those years an utter
disregard of civilized warfare and the |
of humanity, which called for
he expression of condemnation from
he nations of all ChristendOm, cOntin-
led undated. DesolatiOn and ruin
ervaded that productive region, enor-
lously affecting the commerce of all
ations, but that of the United States
lOre than any other by reason of
rOXimity and larger trade and inter-
curse.
At that juncture General Grant ut
cred these words, which now, as then,
nm up the elements of the problem:
"A recognition of the independence
Cuba being, in my opinion, imprac-
cable and indefensible, the question
nat next presents itself is that of a
ecognition of belligerent rights of the
lrties. Such recognition entails diff
alt and important duties. 1t confers
le right of search upon the high seas;
would subject the carrying of arms
nd munitions in vessels of the United
tates to detention and possible seiz-
re; it would give rise TO countless
eXatiOus questions; would relieve the
aren't government from responsible
Y for acts done by insurgents, and j
Ould invest Spain with right to eX .
else a supervision over our commerce /
I the high seas"
Turning to the practical aspects of
recognition of belligerency and re-
ewing the inconvenience and posi- s
We dangers still further pertinent ]
appear. ;
Recognition of BeIIigerency.
In the code of nations there is no /
lch thing as a naked recognition of I
unaccompanied by the as {
lmption of international neutrality.
lch recognition, without that, will not I
infer upon either party to a domestic |
nflict a status not heretofore actually {
assessed. The act of recognition us {
lily takes the form of a solemn proc
nation of neutrality which recites |
e de facto condition of belligerency
a motive. 1t assumes the interna- I
)nal obligations of neutrality in the
essence of a public state of war. 1t l
arms all citizens and others within q
e jurisdiction of the proclaimant that a
ey violate those obligations at their i
vn peril and cannot expect to be shell Q
red from the consequences. The right L
visit and search vessels and the t
izure of vessels and cargo and con- L
lband of war under admiralty law /
ust be admitted as a legitimate con- Il
quence of proclamation of bellig- V
ency While according to each equal t
rights, as defined by pub f
law TO each Dal.fV in orr norris dis =
vors would be imposed on both
lich, while nominally equal, would h
Ugh heavily on Spain herself Pos y
ssing a navy and controlling the "
rts of Cuba Spain's maritime rights Ii
uld be asserted not only for the mil n
ry Investment of the island, but up ~