Lewiston teller. [volume] (Lewiston, North Idaho) 1878-1900, 1897-12-10

by necessity. It IL always and justly re-
garded as an unfriendly act and gratu-
itous demonstration OF moral support to
the rebellion 1t Is necessary and 1t IL re-
Quired. when the interests and rights OF
another government. or Of It's people. are
parties thereto. But this conflict must
be one which will be recognized in the
sense of international law as war. Bellig-
Of contending armed bodies and their oc-
casional conflicts do not constitute war In
the sense referred to.
fairs In Cuba the tests recognized by pub
lcsts and writer's on international law,
which have ssn obs Gy o.
motives, / fail to find in the insurrec lion
cal cal organization, real. palpabe and mani:
Capable '"f Of ~0' oransry fune.,oas y
own people and to other states. with
courts for the administration OF justice.
with a local habitation possessing such
occupation Of territory. as to takc he con-
test out of the category Of a mere rebel
m Hss and psss i. on the sreSe
ing Of war. to which a recognition OF bel-
ligsrency would aim to elevate It.
the insurrection has not possessed Itself
Of a single seaport. whence II may send
forth It's flag. nor has 1t any means OF
cept through the military lines Of It's ad.
versaries. No apprehension OF any OF
these sudden and difficult complications
which war upon the ocean ls apt to pre-.
cipitate upon the vessels. both commercial
and national. and upon the consular OIL
milton of their relations as parties to the
contest
Considered as a question q exgGs,disncys
rights s.iii to be az unwise an premature
sible as . measure q right. Such recog-
Il the rights which flow from its difiicuit
and complicated duties. and requires the
exac.ion from the contending parties o.
the strict observance OF their rights ana
obl.gations; II confers the risnt Of search
sn ana snne ct ns 1sh
may be transported freely AMI without in
terruption in vessels Of the United States,
give rise to countless vexatious questions;
responsibility for acts dong by the insnr-
gents. and would invest Spain with the
right to exercise the superv sion recogniz-
ed by our treaty OF 1875 over our COM
s sess
tic and Gulf states and between all of
them and the states on the Pacific. passes
through the waters which wash the shores
The exercise Of this supervision need
scarce fail TO lead. II not 10 abuse. Ger
full stations OF the two states. There can
be little doubt as to what result such su-
pervision would before lang draw upon
the United States to inaugurate the posi-
bilties of such result. by measure of ques-
tionable right or expediency or by any
indirection.
Cuba Would suffer.
Turning TO the practical aspects OF a
| it's Inconvenience and positive dangers
still further pertinent considerations ap-
pear.
In the code OF nations there Is no nuci,
| thing as u naked recognition of belliger,
| ency unaccompanied by the assumption
| milton, without more. win not confer upon
either party 10 a domestic conflict status
not heretofore actually poss sssed, or af-
feet the relation OF either party 10 other
| The act of recognition usually takes the
| form of solemn proclamation of neu-
| trality. which recites the de facto condt-
ton OF bellgerency as Its motives. 1t an
nounces a domestic law Of neutrality In
se Of h rs n
presence. Of a public state OF war. II
warns all citizens and others within the
late those rigorous obligations at thei,
own peril and can not expect to be shield
| ed from the consequence. The right OF
visit and search on the seas and seizure
l of vessels and cargoes and contraband o.
war. under admiralty law. must, undeI
| International law be admitted as a leEit.
mate consequence OF proclamation o.
belligerency.
| While according equal belligeren
rights defined by public law to each party
In our ports dipfavors would be impossi
BILE to both. which. while nominally equal
would weigh heavily In behalf Of Spail
herself. Possessing navy and claiming
the ports OF Cuba. her maritime right
could bc asserted. not only for the mill
tary Investment OF the island, but up I,
the margin OF our own territorial waters
which the Cubans could not hope to ere
ate parallel; while its creat ion. througl
sympathy from within our domain, wOul,
be even more impossible than now will
the additional obligations of ifiterra:iona
neutrality we would perforce assume.
cnerous code of neutrality would only b
influential within our own jurisdiction q
land and sea, and applicable By our oW
instrImentalities. 1t could impart to tn
United States no jurisdiction betwee
Spain and the insurgents. 1t would Civ
the United States no right Of interventio
! to enforce the conduct of the strife with
In the para mount authority of Spain nc
, cording to the International code of wal
For these reasons. l regard the recogn
ton Of the belligerency of the Cuban ir
surgents as now unwise and therefore In
. admissible. Should that step hereafte
! be deemed wise. as measure OF rigf
! and duty, the executive will make such II
l PREVENTION upon humanitarian grounds a
has been frequently suggested and has nj
failed to receive my most anxious an
) earnest consideration.
!. FAITH IN SPANS PROMISE!