The record-union., 1897-09-16


counties, or cities and counties, the
regulation of primary elections accord
ing to their best judgments, within the
limits of the Act
In Lewis VS.. Colgan, 115 Cal. 534, it
was held, approving a previous an
nouncement of the doctrine, that:
The rule respecting such powers is,
that in addition to the powers express
ly given by statute to an officer or
board of officers, he or it has, by impli-
cation, such additional powers as are
necessary for the due and efficient ex-
ercise of the powers expressly granted,
or as may be fairly implied from the
statute granting the powers.
1t is true in Section ), as in some 9TH
er places, the language is somewhat
ambiguous as to city, or city and coun-
ty. Thus it viii be found in Section
,, 1T shall be the duty of the Election
Commissioners of each county, or city
and county, to select from precinct
registers of the county or city, or city
and county 1t will b conserved that
the words "or city" are injected into
the last sentence. Those words must
be meaningless because this court will
take judicial notice that nowhere in the
State of California does the Board of
Supervisors, or any governing body of
a county, or city and county, control
municipal elctions except in the city of
San Francisco, and that therefore any
language that provides for the control
of city elections by the governing body
of any county, or city and county. ex-
cept in the city of San Francisco, would
not have any force For the provisions
of Sections 9 and 81, making the Act ap-
plicable for cities and towns, speci6-
cally provide who shall control the
elections in such cities or towns, while
the Board of Election Commissioners
of the city and county of San Francisco
control in that instance; and with the
words for city" eliminated from Sec
tion D that section can have no appli-
cation whatever to municipal elections
so far as time for the selection of such
officers is concerned.
With this review of the Act itself,
and without any comments as to the
matters of detail of the Act as whole,
1 will submit the following authorities
upon construction of statutes, and as
to the time when laws providing new
modes of procedure generally, take eff
feet.
1 assume that the course of legisla-
ton in this State upon the subject of
regulating primary elections and the
power and duty of the Legislature to
provide safeguards for the selection Of
candidates for office, is so well known
and thoroughly settled that it would be
an idle ceremony to give space to it.
and l will not indulge in anything of
the kind
This court has frequently been called
upon TO construe statutes that were
ambiguous, and there has never been
a time when an Act was in substance
fair and reasonable that it could not be
harmonized and made clear. This was
found to be necessary in the case of
F. w. Eaton, petitioner, VS.. w. A.
Brown, Registrar, ct al, 96 Cal. 3T1.
In which case the present general cleo
ton law underwent the process of
pruning and left most valuable reg
ulation for the conducting of elections.
Again in Welch, petitioner, VS.. Will
Jams, County Clerk, etc, SO Cal. 800.
A case where it became necessary to
insert words into the registration law
in order to avoid an absurd cOnstruc-
ton.
Section 4 of the codes of California
in express terms, commands a liberal
construction of the law, with a view
to effect its objects and promote JUS
tice"
! 1t is an elementary proposition in the
construction of statutes that absurd
and unjust results shall be avoided,
thus: In FELTON, VS. West, 102 Cal 800
] ind ic loH in
this State, and most probably in all
other States, that if a statute is am
biguous or doubtful, or susceptible of
different constructions or interpreta-
tions. then such liberality of construc-
ton is justified as within a fair inter
probation of it's language will effect it's
apparent object and promote justice"
Also, Jacobs VS.. Supervisors of San
Francisco, 100 Cal. 127; Merced Bank
etc, VS.. Casaccia, 103 Cal. .645.
Again. we find this doctrine an
nounced in plain terms in People ex
rel. VS. Craycroft ct al, Ill Cal. 546-7.
In Jennings VS.. Brown, ia Cal. 800,
this court, in passing upon an election
law, said: II am not inclined to hold
that any of the requirements of the
election law are directory only, but,
while all of its provisions are manda-
tory. they should be literally con-
strued.'
Upon the subject of the taking effect
of laws, the following are deemed to
be in point as extreme cases. The
case of Parks, Auditor, VS.. Commits
sfoners of Soldiers and Sailors Home,
| 43 Pac. 542, is a case from Colorado,
and is to the effect that an Act passed
in 1895 providing for the raising of
revenue for future use, required for
State purposes, and for which appropri-
ations were then made, but which
could not be paid for want of present
revenue, in which il was held: 1.-THE
Act of 1895 making an appropriation
for the State Normal School, and re-
! curing the State Board of Equaliza-
ton to levy a tax of one sixth of a
mill for the year 1896, and annually
thereafter for the support of : .ch in
stitution, authorized that Soard to ex
tend such levy upon the assessment
! for the year S95.'
/ Again, in Heilig VS.. City Council, etc,
81 Pac 164 (Wash), a case where the
/ time and mode of assessing property
was changed, the new law not taking
/ effect until after the time for assess
/ ing under the old law had expired. it
was held: 1T is also claimed that this
! Act should be considered as prospect
I i've only in its operation. and that in
! asmuch as. under the old law. the AS
SCISSOR might have completed and re-
/ turned his assessment to the City
Council before the new law went into
/ force. therefore the council should be