The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-04-01


willing to order direct assault, unless
some accident or positive neglect on the
part of our antagonist should reveal an
opening. However, it was manifest that
no such opening was intended by Hood,
who felt secure behind his strong defenses.
He had repelled our cavalry attacks on
his railroad, and had damaged us
seriously thereby. so | expected that he
would attempt the same game against
our rear Therefore | made extraordi-
nary exertions to recompose our cavalry
divisions, which were SO essential, both for
defense and offense. Fitzpatrick was
given that on our right rear, iii support
of Schofeld's exposed flank; Garrard
retained that on our general left and
McCook's Division was held somewhat
an reserve about Marietta and the rail-
road. On the 10th, having occasion to
telegraph to Gen. Grant, then in Wash
ington, | used this language:
Since July % Hood has not attempted to
meet us outside his parapets. In order to
possess and destroy eGectually his communi-
cations, / may have to leave corps at the raii'
road bridge well intrenched and cut loose with
yhe balance to make a circle of desolation
around Atlanta. i do not propose to assault
the works which too strong, nor to proceed
hy regular approaches. / have lost good
many regiments, and will lose more, by the
expirstion of service: and this is the only rea-
son why / want reinforcements. We have
killed, crippled, and captured more OF the enc
my than we have lost by his acts
On the 18th of August I-heard of the
success of Admiral Farragut in entering
Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a
most valuable auxiliary to our operations
at Atlanta, and learned that had been
commissioned
MAJoR-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY,
which was unexpected, and not desired
until successful in the capture of Atlanta.
These did not change the fact that We
were held in check by the stubborn de-
fense of the place, and conviction was
forced on my mind that our enemy would
hold fast, even though every house in
the town should be battered down by
our artillery.
1t was evident that we must decoy
him out to fight us on something like
equal terms, or else, with the whole army,
raise the siege and attack his communica-
tions. Accordingly, on the 18th Of
August, | gave general orders for the
Twentieth Corps to draw back to the
railroad bridge at the Chattahoochee, to
protect our trains, hospitals, spare artil-
lery, and the railroad depot. while the
rest of the army should move bodily to
some point on the Macon Railroad below
East Point.
Luckily, l learned just then that the
enemy's cavalry, under Gen. Wheeler,
had made wide circuit around our left
flank, and had actually reached our
railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca,
captured drove of 1000 of our beef
cattle, and was strong enough to appear
before Dalton and demand of its COM
mander, Col. Raum. the surrender of the
place. Gen. John Z. Smith, who was at
Kingston, collected together couple of
thousand men, and proceeded in cars to
the relief of Dalton, when Wheeler re-
treated northward toward Cleveland.
On the 10Th another detachment of the
enenly's cavalry appeared in force about
Aliatoona and the Etowah bridge,
when l became fully convinced that
Hood had sent all of his cavalry to raid
upon our railroads. For some days our
communication with Nashville was in
terrupted by the destruction of the tele-
graph lines, as well as railroad. | at
once ordered strong reconnoissances for
ward from our fanks on the left by Gar
rard, and ON the right by Fitzpatrick.
The former moved with so much caution
that / was displeased; but Fitzpatrick,
on the contrary, displayed so much zeal
and activity that | was attracted to him
at once. He reached Fairburn Station,
On the West Point road, and tore it up.
returning safely to his position on our
right flank. / summoned him to me,
and was so pleased with his spirit and
confidence, that concluded to suspend
the general movement of the main army
and to send him with his small division
of cavalry to break up the Macon road
about Jonesboro, in the hopes that il
weuld force Hood to evacuate Atlanta
and that | should thereby not only
secure possession of the city itself
but probably could catch Hood il
the confusion of retreat; and fur
fher to increase the chances of success
L ordered Gen. Thomas to detach
two brigades of Garrard's Division OF
Cavalry from the left to the right rear, tC
act as reserve in support of Gen. Xii.
patrick. Meantime, also, the utmost
activity vas ordered along our whole
front by the infantry and artillery
Fitzpatrick got off during the night o.
the 18th, and returned to us on the 22d
having made the complete circuit of At
lanta. He reported that he had de
stroyed three miles of the railroad about
.onesboro' which he had reckoncd would
take 10 days to repair; that he had en-
couniered division of infantry and :
brigade of cavalry (Ross's) that he hat
captured a battery and destroyed three
of ifs guns, bringing one in as trophy
and be also brought in three battlehag
and 30 prisoners. On the 23d, however
we saw trains coming into Atlanta iron