Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1897-05-21
Indian Troops a Failure.
Secretary Proctor's scheme, How II
Worked and why IL Did Not Prove a

Secretary PrOctor's scheme, How II
Worked and why IL Did Not Prove a
Success.
A Washington despatch says that with
the disarmament of Capt. Scott's company
OF Apaches at Fort Sill, which is ordered
for the end of the present month, the ex-
pertinent of adding an Indian contingent
to our regular army comes to an end. This
was favorite project of Secretary of War
now Senator Proctor, and the order
for the first enlistments was issued in
March, 1891. The purpose of the plan was
manifold. On its public side, the idea was
to utilize the warlike spirit which the In
dian is popularity supposed to inherit from
many generations of fighting ancestry, and
thereby supply TO our army a native ele-
ment, such as the French have added TO
theirs in Africa and the British in Asia:
and at the same time to give the whole
American Indian race sense of national
ity, of loyalty to the United States govern
ment, through the assimilation of the flower
of its younger generation with one branch
Of the public service. On the personal
side there was a hope that the constant
discipline, the methOdical habits of life and
work, the outwardly decorous and respect
full behavior, and the rules of cleanliness
and wholesome diet imposed in the army
would have a good effect upon the young
Indian and help 10 wean him away from
the barbarism in which he had grown up.
The army as rule did not take kindly
to the secretary's project, and, but for the
fact that it was the secretary's, it would
have Jared hard in the earlier reports from
the field. Under the circumstances, nearly
everybody felt under cOmpulsion to help it
along with word and work. The scheme
was to mass the Indians in small compa-
MES, and scatter these through the army,
assigning one to each infantry regiment ex-
cept six, and TO each cavalry regiment except
two, this arrangement ruling out the negro
regiments among others. The Indian com
panies were to be Differed at first by
whites, with the understanding that, as
fast as any of the privates acquired sutfic-
lent training, they could be made nom
commissioned officers, this promise of pro-
motion and extra pay serving as a stimulus
to obedience and painstaking.
The handful of clever and ambitious
junior officers who were put in charge of the
Indian companies generally tried hard to
make the best of their men, and, as they
saw changes in the right direction here and
there, were sanguine of the final result.
And such changes did occur The Indian
is not Initiative like the negro, and usually
takes unkindly to new things. But COM
monty he admires the soldier: and this
chance to be himself a soldier, wear bright
blue uniform, with brass trimmings, and
carry sword or gun or both all the time,
won his fancy. Moreover, a few of the
older white campaigners shared the enthu-
siasm of the juniors, inferring from their
experience with Indian scouts that Indian
soldiers would make an equally good or
better record. But the difference between
the scout and the soldier soon showed H.
self. The scout was enlisted for six months.
the soldier for five years. The scout, in
time of peace, had little to do, and could
lie about in a cosy camp in a familiar
country, with his women and children
around him, as long as he reported period
ically to his commanding officer; whereas
the soldier must live in barracks separated
from his family, must hold himself ready
for the daily exercises of the post, and was
liable at any time to pull up stakes and be
transferred to some distant point, among
new people and unaccustomed scenes.
Three or four leading reasons are given
Tor the failure of the Indians to make good
soldiers. One is the family feature lust
ihOhVlOlcu-lu OIneT words the Indians
discomfort when separated from his wives.
children, mongrel dogs and other domestic
surroundings. Another is the tribal rela-
ton and the difficulty which the Indian
hnds in acknowledging any higher author
lty than that of his tribal chief. The
slowness of the average Indian in ac-
quiring the English tongue, and his re-
tusal to use it when off parade, was still
another difficulty. 1t was found, too, that
the Indian, with his slow way of Welding
his confidence, and his habit of attaching
himself to persons rather than organizs-
lions, could not accommodate himself to
the more or less frequent changes of officers
which the demands of the service made
necessary. Still another difficulty was
found in the fact that, however strict the
regulations, intoxicating liquor cannot be
Kept away from the troops, and TO the In
dian this liquor is fire water in the broad
est sense. 1t does not simply make him
merry, or stupid, or ugly, for the time
being, as it does a white man. 1t fires his
brain and he has an irresistible impulse To
Kill, or break, or burn. Woe to the officer
or the fellow soldier who gets in his Way at
such time and attempts to reduce him to
good behavior.
In spite, therefore, of the patience with