The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1897-04-18
A COAST ARTILLERY RESERVE.

the eyes Of the bold and adventurous
directed.
A COAST ARTILLERY RESERVE.
AS work progresses on our comprehensive
system oil coast defenses the question OF
force TO man them is becoming more and more
pressing, and at as early day as possible pro-
VISION should be made for a coast artillery re-
serve. VI what use are all our costly guns
and forts without an adequate and at least
partially trained force to III an them in case of
war? The regular army men, if the cavalry
ana infantry are set to serve the guns, will
never sufiice TO man the fourth part of our
heavy guns and their auxiliaries, and yet no
steps have been taken to form reserve force.
reserve Is an obvious expedient which
nearly every nation has adopted in one form
or another. BY Its means the change from a
peace to war footing is made in the least
time, with the least friction and with q CORE
spending gain IN efficiency
NO nation has simpler military problem to
solve than we. Coast defense evidently forms
Its principal element. Without waiting for
the completion OF our defenses. which will be
a matter OF years at best, some definite organ
iZatlon should be decided upon at once and
start made toward providing an efficient coast
artillery reserve. Without this our defensive
preparations Will remain incomplete even
after every gun is mounted.
whether this force should be State or
National one is an open question. There are
many objec tons to putting these new duties
on the National Guard, which already has its
full share of work laid down. To do so would
be to sacrifice to large extent their efficiency
as infantry or else put on the State the added
burden oil new organizations. The expense of
keeping up the National Guard is already felt
as heaVy drain on many of the States, and
doubtless some of them, in the South espe-
cially, would be only too glad to shift the bur
den on the National Government if the way
were made clear. However, the National de-
tense must not be jeopardized by the failure
or inability of any State TO keep the requisite
body of men in training
Although we on the seaboard have more at
stake i'll case OF a naval attack still the ques-
ton OF seacoast defense is essentially ana
truly National one. The attendant enormous
expense and the intr!cacies of The subject are
such thatit can be dealt with satisfactorily
only by the General Government and by effi-
GERS who devote their entire time to it. Under
the State system difference OF methods and
organization would be certain and might re-
suit seriously III cases where troops of two or
more States unite in the defense OF q harbor,
as would be the case at several points on our
coasts. In place OF that unity of command, of
training and organization so essential to sue
SSSS We WOuIu uuu ulHereCCeS anu DlCkGIluRS
which might easily jeopardize our cause.
complete harDor defense requires the
hearty and active cooperation of both ports
and ships. Neither can act alone TO the best
advantage. The navy will always constitute
National force, and unity of action, If no other
reason, requires all the elements OF harbor
defense, both personal and material, to be
under one direction and this can only be the
General Government.
= ,cfI al.
sufficient number OF men TO perform the
manual labor connected with harbor defense.
The really essential matter is the providing
and training in advance of sufficient body OF
officers and gunners and also of men for the
special services such as range-finding and
torpedo-work.
practical and satisfactory solution seems
TO lie in the formation of localized reserves for
each harbor 10 be defended. This reserve
would be composed of men specially enlisted
and also of men of sufficient merit. who h ave
served term in the reg ular artillery, and are
then transferred to the reserve for a term of
years, with the privilege of re-enlistment
therein Reserve men would be required to
live in the artillery district to which they be-
long and to report at certain times each year
to their proper organ zation for a short tour of
duty. This would naturally be at the regular
target practice season when the maximum of
instruction could be given.
For this they would receive small monthly
stipend and regular pay during the period
called out. Besides giving an opportunity of
securing the force of eneineers, electricians
etc, which will be essential, it provides way
OF securing the services of men who have ad
the training OF regular service. With the
short three years period of enlis tment no
sooner has q man become good arrilleryman
than he takes his discharge, and the Govern
ment not only loses his services but must
train another in his place. Training in ertii-
lery matters thus goes on continuously, but
there is still no increase in size of the trained
force. The men on the reserve would be borne
on the army rolls and in the course OF a few
years we would have an ADEQUATE body OF
trained men ready 10 serve the guns at mo-
ments notice. This body would be homo
geneous, reliable and effective.
This plan places the coast-defense organiza.
ton where 1t belongs. with the National Gov
eminent 1t would in effect double or treble
the regular forces at q nominal cost and in war
the organization stands ready and can be re-
crulted up TO any limit des ired. This general
plan has the Endorsement of so distinguished
National Guardsman as General Wingate
Any other organization than q National one
will be unsatisfactory, not in accord with the
military necessities of the case, and will give
poor returns for the time and money expended
With the correct organization as the founda-
ton the rest will follow easily and naturally