The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1897-05-20
CLEvELAND'S STAND ON CUBA.
EXTRACTS FROM OLNEY,s LETTER
OFFERING TO MEDIATE.

|
Have Sent the Report on Which IL
Was BRscd-Gen. Lee Pointed out
That the Insurgents at That Time
Had More Men in the Field Than
Ever Before Despite Captain Gem
eraI WeyIer's Claim That He Was
Rapidly Pacifying the IsIand-The
Secretary OF states COmmunicn-
tiOn Conservative.
| Washington, May 19-The secret arch
ives of the state department, which have
hid the consular reports on the Cuban war
| from the public. were partially disclosed
| to-day by Senator Foraker of Ohio. Dur
| ing the past week, the debate in the SEN
ate has been pregnant with limitations
and innuendoes of reports from United
States officials in Cuba, held at the stsle
department, which, If published would dis
close a condition on Cuban soil which
would influence public opinion in a decid-
ed manner. The facts. therefore, which
| Senator Foraker announced without stat
! ing from whom they came, created de-
cided stir. Especially startling was the let
ter from Secretary Olney, in which this
|
! the refusal of that country to accept the
aid proffered.
| While one of the consular reports was
read without the name of the author be-
ing disclosed, II is stated to be a commu-
nication from Consul General Lee. which
fully sets forth his idea of the conditions
that exist in Cuba. The extract was quot
ed as follows, no date being given; Il cam
not understand the truth of the claim that
al. the provinces of the island are pacined
except that of Santiago de Cuba, because
there are more insurgents under arms at
| this time than when 1 first reached the
Island some ten months ago, and l do not
! think it a fair inference to draw from ex-
! listing conditions that the war Is approach
! ing termination, because, in pursuance
OF an established policy. the insurgents
avoid, as far as possible, all serious en-
gagements.
THE impossibilty of expeling the Span
ish troops from this island by force of
arms is wen known to them, and they do
not propose to risk the lives Of their men
| and the success of their cause on one or
more pitched battles. / conclude, there.
| fore, that the war will drag it's weary
length along so long as the insurgents can
dig sustenance from the ground on the
one side, or money be obtained by tho
other-to the continued result of untold
human suffering loss of human life, the
murder of innocent men. women and chill
dren by both sides and the frightful havoc
which disease makes In the ranks of the
soldiers, particularly among the unaccli-
| mated Spaniards
THE poverty and distress of the PEG.
| pie is daily increasing and the loss of
! property of all sorts daily becoming more
| enormous. No one can fully appreciate
the situation without being here In per-
son. The number Of people. starving wo-
| men and children, of all races, reported,
has greatly increased in this city within
the past few weeks, while in other points
on the island the suffering has been pro-
| portionately greater"
The letter from Secretary OIney TO
| Spanish Minister De LONE under date Of
| April T. 1896, is the one in which interview
/ ton Is suggested. In opening Mr.. Olney
said: 1T might well be deemed a derelc-
! ton of duty by the government of the
| United States, as well as a censurable
want of candor to Spain, If / were longer
! TO defer official expression as well Of the
| anxiety with which the President regards
the existing situation In Cuba, as of his
| earnest desire for the permanent paciflca-
ton of that island. Plans giving reasona-
bic assurance Of that result and not incon-
sstent with the just rights and reasonable
| demands Of all concerned, will be earnest
ly promoted by him by all means which
the constitution and the laws of this coun-
| try place at his disposal
at is now some nine or ten months since
the nature and prospects of the insurrec-
ton we're first discussed between us. In
| explanation Of its rapid, and up to that
time, quite unopposed growth and prog
| ress, you called attention to the rainy sea-
| son, which, from May or June until No
vember, renders regular military opera
tons impracticable. Spain was pouring
such numbers Of troops into Cuba that
your theory and opinion that when they
could be used In an active campaign the
insurrection would be also instantly sup
! pressed, seemed reasonable and probable.
In this particular you believed, and sin
cerely believed, that the present insurrec-
ton would offer a most marked contrast
to that which began In 1868 and which.
! being feebly encountered with compare
lively small forces. prolonged It's life for
| upwards Of ten years.
1T Is impossible TO deny that the ex-
| pectation thus entertained by you In the
summer and fall Of 1895, and shared not
merely by all Spanlards, but by most dis
|
completely disappointed. The Insurgents
! seem to-day to command larger part Of
the island than ever before. Their men
under arms estimated year ago al from
| 10000 to 5000 are now conceded TO be
| at least two or three times as many. Mean
while, their discipline has been improved
and their supply Of modern weapons and
| equipment has been greatly enlarged
while the mere fact that they have held
out 10 this time has given them confidence
| IN their own eyes and prestige with the
world al large In short, u can hardly be
| questioned that the insurrection Instead
OF being queled Is to-day more formidable
than ever and enters upon the second year
Of It's existence with decided prospects Of
| successful results. Whether "A condition
OF things emitting the insurgents to rec
ognition as belligerents has yet been
brought about may, for the purposes Of
the present communication, be regarded
| as immaterlal"
other portions Of this document we're as
| follows. Even u a. be granted that a
| condition OF insurgency prevails and
| ,.ttln, rnora A Ia on 40 large Ia aaafa