The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-12-05

not understanding the. principle ITSELF. or
TssserpsS G.y TO-, r Is .nScdiSSi. he ,ssyS. ,aSs
10 90 SSp u copsOived and executed BY
Sherman, as a preliminary to the march north
ward o ,1r fa snq strategic plans OF Grant,
Whereof sherman aud othcr chief COMMANDERS
s SSso goes on to say that Grant plans had
I'm view, as their great object. again TO cut In
tive ,S sso o SS9iIGTet Of tho MNiiisssissippi RiyST 10 The
Gulf. This next, limo of section miGht DO
G chS.,SnSos" A hti"ntS. "S Mont son%mgsn' and
Mobile. But with ne disappearance OF
ali roason for that plan, Of territorial
strategy had diseppearcd, and the occasion was
then presented s,rtfsv lSr Ip pIa TrS Of !NS mat not Of ww1Rirss
Lees army was the sole military objective.
Grant g sSs, Mas @pTiT II si1InS 1q Inc to ie, nir'i THii s credit Tit' FOR Or
this last plan, and he modcstly retrained from
any more than a brief mention OF ms own plans.
sary fully TO execute. But history will do jus,
ticc to Grants great strategicrinl designs as well
The fact that Savannah was one Of the points
in both CIR nt's plans and Shcrman's Is consid:
cred by Gen. Schoteld merely nm incident, ana
n very nimportant one; In his opinion. indeed
after Hood got out OF the way, sherman mighe
to Augusta, and thence, %northward, wholly ig.
noring savannah, az well as Charleston. oxcepe
early in the season. Savannah was a good place
to go to in order to spend the winter, pcsines u9s
s shis BOOK afiG IS Faonti { fOI that Sherman. She %%fnS could "a
not have overlooked So simpie a prop9sitlon
:" asbe IS sSt wa sUr as he confidently said absolute
master of the situation before he started Tor
nHfishn so to a m%1a Sf his commit commSniesiions that
they could not be PVT in orSer again a IN a Ie ~
@ Ssyiect h sscH wG; p at %t # me- S ali Winter tS Fe with two la
or three corps, while no sent back to Thomas
ample :, force to dispose =, Of Hood; trnsn tn II Tine the
ncsscc had been as decisive as they actually
were with the smaller one Thomas had, sher:
man could have recalled TO Atlanta all the troops
toward Virginia with ,eiThty.fivo or ninety, Or
~ been accomplished by the middle Of January
gan his mac 1rom Sara%nuI.' From Atlanta
to Columbia, $. C.. crossing the Savannah River
that from Savannah to Columbia. Or, IL sher-
man had not cared about paying q visit TO
much shorter Piedmont route to Charlotte, n.
g.. and thence northward by whichever route
attitude Of master. sherman lost it the momens
he started eastward with his main army, leaving
and the march through Georgia and the capture
OF savannah did not by, any means restore mat
Hm ood Wa 40 S ar,nsIin d 1T W%s not N rG Tsnnes Sn.H'
Gen, SGhoileld rcenrs in another place to the
possibilities Of a direct march TO Atlanta via
Columbia or Charlotte with u much larger army
at exactly, the same time. for tho purpose of
showing that even sherman's great strategic
not ncccssitate or justify his action in march.
ing first to Savannah and picking his own thea
Eested would have nsSaiived, in Gen. schoheIG's
promise Of the Contodernte chief that Sherman
should be driven out of Georgia. Tho fact that
large as Hoods or larger, could have remained
quietly at Atlanta, while one of his subordi,
have been the most emphatic possible f~rustra-
ton OF the Confederate intention TO force him
part Of sherman earnest desire would have
been unrealizSd,, namely, to destroy Georgia.
compensated for. by the more complete ~dostruo.
ton of South Carolina. the cradle Of secession
sRd Te6el,iG onsr In a WORD STc the .H,m more GSS I c GaIy
Schofeid tho moro clear 1t appears 10 the latter
that, while the formers plans were magnificent,
told. the legitimate aim Of just military criti-
cism, not TO build up or pull down the reputa-
students in their efforts to perfect themselves
in the art and science of war.
1t is frankly conceded. however, by the author
favorable view Of sherinnn's tactical as we'll as
Of his strategical operations in connection with
the operations, of all the other armies under
Grants general plans and direction there was
prevented their complete ultimate success in
the capture of Lees army. II Grant had not
surrender Of Lee was necessarily followed By
that of all the other Confederate armies.
shernan's great march had not been MADE, that
march with 30 large an army made the end of
any possible doubt. In view of a public service
SO original in its conception. so grand in Its
magnitude. and so brilliant in Its execution. any
fame of the General who planned and executed
that, grand campaign. nor that Of the General.
in-Chief, the success of whose far-rcaching plans
had made the brilliant exploit of his subordinate
possible. Such criticisms rs are set forth in
this volume are justihable only in the interest
of exact truth and of exact military science, so
that imperfections in the operations OF tho
greatest commanders may not he mistaken by
the military student as having been among the
causes which led to success"