The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-02-15
HOW THEY FIGHT IN CUBA.
A Large Territory Over which Troops
of Both Sides Are Scattered.
Ieslie's Weekly.

The Spaniards have repeatedly stated that
the Cuban insurgents VIII not face them IN
open battle, but retreat after the first few
volleys have been exchanged and that their
perfect knowledge Of the country roads and
trails enables them TO escape. Nine months
experience i'm the field with Generals Co
meZ, Maceo and Aguirre has given me the
opportunity of studying the war and or
comparing the tactics on both sides 1nere
is much truth in the Spanish reports; but
the reasons that compel the Cubans 10 en-
ploy their present tactics are carefully
omitted.
The one great object Of the Cubans i'm the
fielc is not much to win by lighting as
it is 10 cripple Spain by draining her re-
sources. The longer they can hold out
without giving battle, the more money will
be needed to clothe and feed the vast Span
ish army. The financial condition Of Spain
is understood by every Cuban soldier. and
they all fully recognize the importance OF
putting their oppressors to much extra
expense as possible. The Cuban campaign
since Maceo executed his great raid has
been purely defensive having for its object
the above result. Chiefs like Gomez and
Maceo have at times assumed the offensive,
but only for a short time These defensive
tactics have proved of more benefit To the
Cubans than a series of pitched battles.
The successful working OF their plan Is
demonstrated every time that General Wey-
Ter asks for ie-enforcements. Next TO
Maceo's great campaign in Pinar del Rio.
probably the most remarkable example OF
defensive tactics has been those employed
by Gen j. NJ. Aguirre since he assumed
command of the insurgent forces i'm the
province of Havana Although the other
chiefs have succeeded in evading the Span
iards as well as Aguirre. yet his proximity
TO the capital makes his campaign of spc-
ciaI Importance Inc northern brigade OF
the province of Havana. under Aguirre and
Brlgadler Cardenas Is DIVIDED INTO Two
cavalry regiments and company OF IN
fantry. numbering in all about nine hum
dred armed men. Their field of operations
extends from Havana on the west TO the
limit OF the province of Ceiba Mocha
the east, a distance of forty-fiye miles. and
from the coast south TO line dividing the
m hn N \ N
stationed about fourteen thousand Spanish
troops. whose object is to corner or entrap
this small Cuban brigade and force them
to decisive battle The Spaniards hold
all the towns. which are strongly fortified
and have each permanent garrison or
from one hundred to three hundred soldiers
TO protect them from destruction by the
Cubans. Operating field columns are sta
toned at the towns of Guanabacoa; Mlnas.
Jaruco. Aguacate, Ceiba Mocha, MadTuga,
San Jose de las Lajas and Sta. Marie del
Rosario-in all nine columns. averaging one
thousand men in each. The local guer-
rilleros' that have been formed recently
will probably increase the active field force
to about ten thousand well armed ana
equipped men. The remaining four thou
sand are scattered in the smaller towns ana
forts. protecting sugar factories and
bridges.
The railroad is also In possession OF the
Spaniards enabling them to concentrate
| their forces at any given point in the dis
| trict within six hours. With Havana an
| their base of supplies. the Spaniards have
all that can be desired from n military
| standpoint. For eleven months tney nave
planned combinations and surprises for tho
purpose of entrapping this insignificant lit
| tie force of nine hundred Cubans. who are
poorly armed and often have been without
ammunition: but every time the Spaniards
have been foiled. The Spaniards. despite
all reports. to the contrary. rarely attack
unless they are supported by 9th r columns,
or are sure that they outnumber the enemy.
The Cubans. through their excellent sys-
tenn of scouts. are always well Informed OF
the movements OF the enemy. and In sucn
case they quietly break camp and march
about five miles further on, outside Of the
tran Occasionally the Spaniards succeed
in overtaking them and fight cnsues. Tho
Cubars generally throw out two companies
I'm skirmish line and retreat under It's pro-
lection: for as long there Is a line to
face the Spaniards Will be very cautious
| about advancing.
/ have seen six men hold Spanish col
umn of fifteen hundred I'm cheek for more
than an hour. by firing on them from The
woods. The Spaniards. fearing ambus-
cade. would not venture into the forest. In
ambush is an important factor a. the actual
warfare in Cuba and is the real reason why
| Weyler is having such a hard time OF IL I'm
the Pinar del Rio hills.
The Cubans. If they should stop TO give
battle 10 their enemies In the province or
Havana. would soon find themselves IL n
| serious predicament, as az the frst sound
OF the firing all the Spanish columns hurry
TO the scene. and the chances are that their
overwhelming numbers would tell IN such
case. But by retreating rapidly under
cover OF fire. they soon place themselves
beyond the reach OF pursuit.