The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-10-10
NEW FACTS FROM INDIA
DARING DEEDS OF MOHMANDS
CAUSED THE AFRIDI UPRISING.
Too Much Fear of Russia-The Trou-
bIes Are Made Up of n COmbina-
ton of Tribal DisafTections.

the Afr1d1 uprising STANDS revealed. 1t IS
the daring act of the Mohmands in burn
ing the village of Shankarghar, within
touch of the British garrison at Shabkadr
towards the beginning of August This
was stroke which the most sanguine OF
tribesmen could scarcely believe possible.
Such a success had not been scored by
hostile tribesmen in forty years. The en-
terprise displayed upset the equilibrium of
the adjacent tribes at moment when their
fanaticism was already aroused on account
of their sentiment of veneration for the
Swat valley. This fact can hardly be
termed the primal cause. The injustice
which has brought about a state of feel
ing which rendered the tribesmen like tow
which only needed the match to blaze has
already often been told. There seems to
be no doubt that the incident described
is exactly what may truthfully be declared
to have been the last straw which broke
the back Of the traditional camel This
action has at various times been followed
by successes which have only served to
infiame the spirit of the spirited Afridis,
until now they consider themselves a
match for any body of English troops ever
drilled
That the English government is prepar-
ing for war in vigorous fashion is appar-
ent on every side, When Sir William
Lockhart was delegated to take command
in what will be known to history as the
Afridi campaign that was prima face evil
dence of the governments serious alarm
Officers of his ik are not called in for
tupenny service The troops are not going
out in large bodies nor is any effort at
mobilization apparent but they are stead
lily moving III all directions, and SO conf
IDENTIFY that II is clearly evident every
march is merely in accordance with a gen
eral plan. There is generalship at work.
and it is likely that before long there will
be signs Of it that he who runs may read
have seen no explanation of the situa-
ton which indicates more strongly the
actual facts as they are open to the perlsal
of a man of good judgment than the state
ment made by Sir Auckland Colvin whose
long connection with India as member of
the Vice Regal Council and as lieutenant
governor of the northwest India prov
inces gives great weight to his words. This
is what he says:
After the disturbances have been Dut
down the question of the merits of the
frontier policy adopted in recent years will
presumably be thoroughly overhauled and
semeed to me to be, apart from all cues
tlons of right or justification that in order
~ 10 Sne f' II REQUIRED much larger
posal In India, or than Indian revenues
could pay for should the army be raised to
further troops required. Any extension of
that policy, such as by taking up points
IN the Afridi country, for instance, or un-
lection all or any of the tribes now ranged
against us, would prove so costly as, prac-
TIC ncally IN IN my Judgment, to make it quite
be, IN the long run, wise or successful which
IS not firmly based on such considerations
as those which Lord Lawrence placed on
record as fundamental-namely, that it
should not, either Immediately or in a WISH
pie future compel us to impose additional
tdXatlon on the people of India that il is
calculated not to lessen materially the con-
tentment of the masses in India; that it is
not not opposed 70 the policy Of outstanding the
multiplying our resources therein.
LINES OF DEFENSE.
Roughly speaking, until 1885 and until
the Penjdeh affair the military authorities
OF India, as a whole, were able to judge
pretty effectually of any measure that might
be proposed to that end, and were able, SO
to speak, to box their compass. Since 1885,
however, the military authorities have oc-
cupied themselves mainly with plans and
projects for the security of India against
attack from Central Asia. This has given
them far greater weight in the councils of
India. 1t has enabled them to speak with
the greater Importance due to their efforts
being directed against a more formidable
foe, and against what is presented by them,
on, ] know not what authority, as an inmi-
nent and impending danger.
The military authorities in India have,
therefore, affirmed and do affirm from time
to time that this or that position or range of
mountains or such and such strategic lines
or valleys, or what not, are essential for the
denfense of the country against a European
invader They are not likely to underesti-
mate Their requirements and as the re-
government of India has been dragged, as
it has seemed to me almost helpless, at
their tail across the several mountainous
areas and remote valleys which, during the
past ten years, have been the scenes of
constant and successive conflicts. Almost
every consideration for the good govern
ment of India has been made to yield to the
alleged requirements of defense against eX-
ternal attack, and out of these has come
about in course of time our present conflict
with the tribes, whom it is apparently
deemed indispensable to overawe in order
that they should not assist an invading
force if left alone and in liberty. By and
by, when the authorities in India have
grown more accustomed to the situation
created by the presence of Russia in Cen
trail Asia, it is to be hoped that some sort
of more stable equilibrium may be again
established between the several interests
pressing on their consideration from various
and conflicting quarters
1t is. of course, the Khyber pass which is
regarded as the key to the situation. That
is why the news of the carrying of the two
forts located there created such consterna-
ton among those who knew what the lines
were along which the government had been
working all these years. Here was long
campaign for the direct purpose of guarding
against European invasion, and yet with one
effort q body of fiery natives swooped down
and took the key to the whole situation
with comparatively little trouble. What a
commentary!
AN UNCANNY PLACE.
Only a visit can make one appreciate what
q weird, uncanny place the Khyber pass is.
1t is a deep slit in the mountains thirty
three miles long and cut by torrents that
have rushed towards the Indus. Its widest
part is only 450 feet wide, and it narrows
down to less than ten feet in places, while
the mountain of slate rock rises on either
side absolutely perpendicular The road, or
bed. is fairly good, though in places rough
with single. Ali Musjid is nine and half
miles from the entrance on the Indian side.
1t is a very rough, poor old fort, but could
hardly be taken without artillery, and alb
solutely governs the pass. The road by il
is only forty feet wide, and happens TO be
very slippery on account of projecting rocks.
The mountain rises like wall on each side
and the fort looks straight down from a
height of about 300 yards. Ali Musjid has
figured prominently in history. 1t was near
there that Burnes camp had a narrow es-
cape from being overwhelmed by the sud