Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-12-06
1t is Very Shadowy in the Island Of
Cuba.
FORCING MEN TO TAKE OFFICE
Reformists Do Not Believe in the
Sagasta Pan.
THINK INDEPENDENCE NEAR
Copyright. 1917

Captain General Blanco was able to begin
the other half of his task first. This was
to make showing of Cuban support for
autonomy. Unlike with the Spanish ele-
ment. he had the name of a party with
which to make a beginning. In the political
history of Cuba the autonomista party has
been respectable organization The shell
remains. The kernel Is gone. The name
does not conjure the autonomists who
Joined the insurgents back from the field.
A few men of fair talents who were identi-
fled with the original movement halted
when the choice was revolution. They re-
mained autoromists in theory. and held
their peace under the shadow of Weyler's
displeasure. They called themselves lead
ers yet they were without followers.
Forcing Cubnns to Take Omce.
This was the condition which confronted
General Blanco when he took control
month ago, with instructions from Sagasta
to select Cubans for the posts of civi! gov
ernment. He summoned the autonomst
leaders before him and invited their aid.
The captain generals first shock was in
discovering the unwillingness Of most Of
them to take office, rare spectacle in any
country. They Stunned share in the re-
spcns:bility of restoring peace in Cuo;i, un-
utl g loHidi poiiCy VI NHiSH 'iiSS nav
been advocates. Its nature was too well
known to them. Official pressure, which
amounted to government coercion, finally
induced some of them to take mold. Senior
Bruzon. distinguished lawyer, became
civil governor of the province of Havana.
1t is said he had his choice between that
and exile to Africa. The government put it
a little differently. saying Spain did not
hi
services when they were needed Autono-
rnists were named as governors of other
provinces and also as alcaldes or mayors in
some of the cities.
The first step ir Spain's autonomstic
program was not taken with the unsn-
nous support of those who went by the
name. Though only the semblance of a
political organizat ton. the autonomists split
the shadow of themselves and divided into
radicals and conservatives. 1t Is some
thing like the fractional division Of a frac-
don. Marquis Montaro, who is recovering
from a severe illness, became the head
of The conservatives. Years ago Mr.. Mon
taro had influence with his people. That
influence ceased the day he came out in
favor of the reforms Of CanovaS and got
his title. If any Of 1t had remained, his
action ir signing the testimonial to Weyler
on 1.-The butchers departure would have
destroyed what was left. Blanco seems to
have had political instinct of the right sort
in knowing whom not to select for carry
ing out the policy Of the Sagasta minis
try. The division among the autonomists
is not in itself important. The reform
istos." who In former years had advocated
liberal reforms without distinctive home
rule, fill in the breach. and by upholding
1,ni- oh, tLo
rcnage. Their fluctuations to Sagasta and
Moret having given Cuba a govern
Incnt by Cubans and for Cubans are sin
of that government.
While none of the leaders who have
been placed in positions by Blanco have
been in the field, most of them have rela-
tives and friends that are out in the brush.
How far their persuasion may go with
these to lay down arms cannot be deter
mined at once. 1t does not yet give prom
Use of great results. Some of these au-
tonomist leaders Will exert themselves only
on the surface. One of the best known of
them is credited with saying: Il hold ofii-
cial position because L must. but it is only
while Cuba is drifting to her destiny" He
no longer believes that the destiny of Gu
ba is to be even nominaIly a colony of
Spain with large measure of home rule
If Il single insurgent leader who was for
merly an autonomiSt could be induced to
yield his arms and support Spain's pres
ent policy it would have greater ~weight
than the combined influence of the group
Of autonomists who have not smelt pow
der. That is, 1t would have weight if an
insurgent leader who took such a course
could be credited with patriotism instead
# x-Ifh nicre e~nlS .
Havana without being shot or hung by
his fellow insurgents. Though much is
heard in the states about bribing the in
tion is paid to it here.
Results Not Encouraxtng,
General Blanco's plan of conciliating or
persuading the men who have been in re-
volt against Spains authority to quit for
a consideration must be measured by re-
suits. So far these are not encouraging
General Pando was to carry out the plans.
He took the field ostensibly for military
operations. in reality to arrange terms
with the rebels to whom overtures had
been made. After week in the field the
surrender of the Cuervo brothers with 100
of their followers and the promise that
30 more would come in was reported A
an American, gave me an account Of 1t. He
counted just twenty-five men in all and he
heard of no others who were expected
When the event was first reported the in
surgents sought to discount it by saying
that the Cuervo brothers had never oper-
ated with them This was untrue. Iha
force of the surrender of the Cuervos was
weakened, however, by the fact that Gen
eral Gomez had ordered them to report for
court martial for some breach Of discipline
In a raid on Guines.
General Pando has since been to other
parts of the island and Is continuing his
military operations The telegraph may
carry occasional tidings of his successes
and here and there the yielding Of Cabe-
ella, or chief of a small band, may be re-
ported. but until Gomez and Calixto Garcia
give the word there will be NO end to the
insurrection as such. Picking 1t apart
piecemeal by persuasion or otherwise seems
fruitless method. The results secured are
not lasting. Treachery has caused some
bands to be broken up. General Castillo,