The Goodland republic. [volume] (Goodland, Kan.) 1891-1907, 1897-06-18
wnY sHE FLoPsEp.

suuW ugW bub use OF SILVER was uDlLB I
any harm. There were some theoretio- |
al objections to the bimetalIic princi- /!
pie, but they amounted to nothing more
than technical qJibbies. twas claimed |
that it was impossible TO maintain two
metals at exactly the same value. and
that there were bound to be small
fluctuations. But il we concede this
20 be true (which we do not it a con /
tention which fails to prove the sub
stance Of the issue. There might be
small fluctuations, and it might cause
some Inconvenience, particularly in for
eign exchanges. But these would be
utterly trivial compared with the in
defensible wrong and injury which
must follow the abandonment OF one
Of the metals entirely. Mr.. Sherman
admitted this, very frankly, in his
Groesbeck letter.
But the fact is that when the general
decentralization of silver began in Eu-
rope, and actually took place in Ameri- /
ca, its economic effects were not CON
sidered by the great body of the people
On either continent.
If, when Germany took her first step
in that direction, the prime movers had
stood up and declared that its purpose
was to enhance the value of gold, di-
minish the value of commodities and
property in general, thus increasing the
burden Of all debt, the measure would
probably not have received a dozen
votes in the German parliament. If it
had been generally known that the de
monetization of silver would be fol
lowed by such a fall of prices that the
money value of our great staples would
be reduced One-half in "a years, does
anyone suppose that the United States
would have been a party to the act?
We all know better. The truth is that
even among business men" very few
had a clear conception of what the eff
feet would be, They had been in the
habit Of letting the great bankers con-
troll the finances of their respective
countries. There can be no question
that the demonstration of silver was
mainly brought about by the latter
Of course, they would not declare that
they wanted the change made in order
to enrich themselves at the expense of
others; and so the subject has been OBJ
scured by mysterious talk about the
"par of exchange" and the superiority
of gold over silver as a measure Of
value, all of which is mere by-play.
The moneyed classes have always ia
vored the policy of restricting the
money supply so as to increase the
value of their holdings; and such is the
direct effect of demonetizing one of
the precious metals. In an article on
the gold standard in Japan the position
was taken that it had been brought
about by the creditor classes regardless
of the effect upon the industries of
the country. Strong corroborative eyi-
dence of the sOUndness of that view is
now furnished by the London EconO-
mist, one of the most pronounced and
uncomprOmising advocates of the gold
standard published anywhere.
It not only shows what the change
actually is, giving a translation of
the law, but it shows why it was
done. Japan was prospecting with her
silver money, and there was nothing
in the business or industrial situation
to make such change necessary. But
it was thought that if Japan placed
herself upon the gold standard she
could borrow money more readily
abroad, J. E., in Europe.
The entire defense of the gold stand
ard $50 far as there is anything atallin
it) .revolves around the idea of borrow
ing money. 1t is assumed that a mon
etaFy. system which makes it easier for
a government to negotiate a loan is the
better system, no matter what the effect
may be upon the welfare of the people
as a body, A moments thought will
show the utter faHacy of such a claim.
AS matter of course a man who has
money viii lend it more readily if he
knows that he will be paid in money
Of higher value than that which he
loaned, But this very circumstance
proves that a rise in the value of money
must be a direct gain to the money
lender; and it is perfectly obvious that
what he gains in this way somebody
/ else must lose.
The value of gold is constantly Tis--
ing. For more than 20 years it has
gone up, that is, increased in purchas-
ing power, something like four per
cent. a year. So that when man
loaned money at six per cent. he, in eff
feet, collected ten. He could lower the
rate to four per cent. and still the up
ward movement of the money in which
he was paid made it in substance a loan
at eight per cent. This is the reason,
and it is the only reason, why men are
willing to accept a lower rate Of inter
est on bonds payable in gold. They
more than keep even by the rise of the
in every country where the gold stand
ard has been adopted the money lenders
have added enormously to their wealth.
while the producers, selling their prod
ucts for less and less money, have
grown poorer with each succeeding
year.
Yes, it may bsponceded that by adopt
ing the gold standard the japanese gov
eminent can borrow money more read
lily. This very action viii, itself, cause
gold to rise still more rapidly and add
still more to the profits of those who
lend the gold. But it must not be for
gotten that while it viii make IT easier
for governments, and for individuals
who can furnish acceptable security, to
borrow money, it viii also make it more
difficult for them 10 pay.
There are large numbers Of honest
men ROW fatuously defending the gold
standard upon the ground tbstif a man