The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1897-04-08

The commerce act does not author
ize an agreement like the one in ques-
ton. 1t may not in terms prohibit.
but it is far from comforting, either
directly or by implication, any author
ity to make ii. If the agreement be
legal it does not owe its validity to
| any provision of the commerce act,
and if illegal is it not made so by that
act. The fifth section prohibits what
is termed pooling" but there is no
express provision in the act prohibiting
the maintenance of traffic rates among
competing roads by making such an
agreement as this, nor is there any pro-
| vision which permits it. AS
the commerce act does not authorize
this agreement, arguments against a
repeal by implication of the provisions
of the act which it is alleged grants
such authority becomes ineffective.
There is no repeal in the case. and both
statutes may stand, as neither is in
consistent with the other.
On the point that the Sherman act
did not embrace railways, the court
says:
| We see nothing either in contempo-
raneous history, in the legal situation
( at the time of the passage of the stat
ute, in its legislative history, or in any
general difference in the nature or kind
OF trading or manufacturing companies
| from railroad companies, which would
lead us to the conclusion that it can
not be supposed the legislature in pro-
hibiting the making of contracts in re-
straint of trade intended to include
railroads within the purview of that
! act Neither is the statute, in our
judgment, so uncertain in it's meaning
or its language so vague that it ought
] NOT TO be held applicable to railroads.
We think after careful exami-
nation that the statute covers and was
intended to cover common carriers by
railroad.
MEANING OF THE STATUTE.
Assuming then that the Sherman act
applies to railways, the justice dis
| cusses the meaning of the language of
the statutes He says:
Inc next question to be discussed is
as TO what is the true construction of
the statute, assuming that it applies to
common carriers by railroad. What is
the meaning of the language as used in
the statute that every contract combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations. is-hereby declared
to be illegal?' Is it confined to con-
tract or combination. which is only in
unreasonable restraint of trade or com
merce, or does it include what the Ian
Suage of the act plainly and in terms
covers all contracts of that nature?
We are asked to regard the title of this
act as indicative of its purpose to in
clude only those contracts which were
unlawful at, common law but which re-
QuIre the sanction of a federal statute in
order to be dealt with in a federal court
1t Is said that when terms which are
known TO be common law are used in
a federal statute those terms are to be
gwen the same meaning that they receive
at common law, and that when the Ian
guage of the title is Ito protect trade
and commerce against unlawful re-
straints and monopolies." il means those
restraints and moncpolies which the COM
mon law regarded as unlawful and which
were to be prohibited by the federal stat
ute We are of the opinion that the Ian
guage used in the title refers to and in
cludes and was intended to include those
restraints and monoDolieS which are
made unlawful in the body of the stat
ute 1t is TO the statute itself that re-
sort must be had to learn the meaning
thereof
ALL AGREEMENTS ILLEGAL.
The conclusion which we have drawn
from examination into the question be-
fore US is that the antitrust act APP
plies to railroads and that it renders il
legal all agreements which are in re-
straint of trade or commerce as we have
above defined that expression, and the
question then arises whether the agree
ment before US is of that nature.
Does the agreement restrain trade or
violation of the act? We have no
doubt that il does. The agreement on
its face rec;tes that it is entered into
for the purpose of mutual protection
by establishing and maintaining reason
able rates. rules and regulations on all
freight traffic, both through and local.
To that end the association is formed
and 2 body created which is to adopt
rules which. when agreed to. are to be
the governing rates for all the COM
panies, and a violation of which subjects
of a penalty. and. although the parties
have a right to withdraw from the agree
ment on giving 30 days notice Of a. de-
sire so to do, yet while in force and as
Stunning It to be lived UP TO, there can
be no doubt that its direct. Immediate
and necessary effect is to put a restraint
upon trade or commerce as described in
the act.
For these reasons the suit of the gov
eminent can be maintained without proof !
of the allegation that the agreement was
entered into for the purpose of restrain
ing trade or commerce, or for maintain !
ir- rates above what was reasonable. /
The necessary effect of the agreement is |
to restrain trade or commerce. no mat
ter what the intent was on the part of /
those who signed it.
We think that the fourth section of the |
power and authority to bring such action |
as this, and if the facts be proved an /
Injunction should issue.
For the reasons given the decree of the (
United States circuit court of appeals /
and of the circuit court for the district /
of Kansas must be reversed and the case |
remanded to the circuit court for fur !
Their proceedings in conformity with this |
opinion.