The sun., 1897-10-03


ering, Winchester and the Millwood and Front
'3} On al the % 10th Sheridan moved out from Hall
town and on the nextday occupied the line Of the
Opequon Creek. Early retreated toward Stras-
hs uns e aS Se
suit. On the 18th he took up the strong posi-
ton at EheFs H there to await nsx
Rumors Of Early's expected reinforcement
ceived telegram from Grant, written two days
before stating that 1t had just left Richmond
tSr Se and Sa
ing all night. He reached Winchester in the
morning, "the whole operation being conduct
ed so secretly in the darkness as not to be dis
Early quickly followed without waiting for
18th he struck the Federal rear guard inaiot-
ing a loss of more than $50. in killed. wounded.
through Winchester and again occupied the
line Of the 0pequon
vision Of the Nineteenth Corps. while Early's
command was increased by force under An
fantry Cutshaw's battalion of artillery. and two
brigades OF Fitz Lees cavalry The opposing
forces now numbered about 10000 and 2l,Ooo
On the sIst Of August Early made an attack.
SON e was s0i 50 retarded By the Union cavalry that
he took no part in the nfadntry y
sd trestsd e the strongly inrohcbed position at at
Early spent three days in demonstrating
against thfs line, but finding It too strong to at
went with the rest Of his force 70 Williams.
Eort and shcpheMydsSWnd p on tbi the Potomac as
vasion va on Of Maryland and PENNSYLVANIA. a. In
making the move he struck Wilson's and
where they had been ordered n reconnois-
sence, and drove them back upon the army by
different roads. Custer was cut off and escaped
CAPTURE by hastily crossing the Potomac:
| Sheridan hoped that Early would 90 into
they would attempt to 90 to washington" and
that he hoped to strike the enemy when divided.
The Confederate leader was too shrewd to cross
rear, and soon fell back to Winchester, where
he was rcjoined by Andersen. Some days later
A'TTa The sci sezaFe fh Of the Weldon Railway and tho
esssu Quest the @ Peturn Of KershSWs division On On
the 30 OF Septembsr therefore ,h;, hnderso9 @
fi% Lees sf eavsry by way H'o Of S Th nns
| road had been open up to this time, but 1t
hanpened that the move was made on the very
| day that Sheridan was reoccupyinR his former
lines, and Anderson stumbled upon brigade OF
Crooks command as the latter was going into
put an end. In consequence Of this encounter
II was decided that Anderson should for the
skirinishng, but on the l4th Anderson again
snd 05 ary Gn na"
road which carried him beyond the Union left.
moved Rodess and Gordon's divisions to Bun
18th, with Gordon's division, some artillery
md md cavalry, he went to M9rtins6urg; While IN
Grant Grant was With sheridan at ChSricstown. 'n.
Earys moves UP to this time had been CON
dnctcd with consnmmatc skill and Judgment,
rashncss he states, however; that tho, events
OF the last month had satisfied him that the
commander opposed to him was without en-
which amounted to timidity."' othcrwise he
move az this one to Martinsburg. II Is evident
that he held different m opinion Of Grant. Grant. for for
an OF eary s @ o%aS sy sent
Gordon back 70 Bunker HIN, with orders to
march to StephGnsGGns dSpot by sunrise the
tho same night to stcphensona, where, also,
Early himself returned.
theatre Of war was in truth indicative of his
urgent desire for speedy, action ,!Earlys con.
merely annoying and humilatinG, but il was
retGrding the progress of the campaign IN front
Very "aa 70 a G
The camRsgG iron from the beginning Of August
lion Sheridan states that, although he knew that
he was stronger than Early, ''yct In consequence
| Of the injunctOns OF Gen Grant he deemed il
necessary 10 be very cautious" and that mot
| wilhstandinR his superior strength no deter
mined to take all the time necessary to equip
himself with the fullest information, and then
seize an opportunity under such cOnditlons that
he could not well fail of success" This ap'
pllos particularly to the time spent in the lower
| valley. II must be said, however, that from
the beginning OF the campaign opportunit les
had been repeatedly offered to him which might
by aggressive action have been made brilliantly
decisive. On several occasions he was in a
position 10 throw greatly superior force OF
Early's line OF communications, and in tht
advance upon Strasburg an opportunity wa:
offered him of successvely overpow wering bol
Early and Andersons commands, which were
separated by practically impassablc obstacles
| Instead of attempting this Sheridan ordered 9
retreat. Again, 1t is difficult to conceive o
| conditions more favorable to success than thost
which existed on tho 25th and 26th OF August
when he could have placed an army nearly. OF
| quite three times as strong as Early across th'
latter's limo OF retreat without endangering hi
own. Such an opportunity Is one seldom pre-
scnted TO a General. The issue could hardl,
have been doubtful; yet nothing was at
tempted, though a reconnOisance on Anderson
front showed the weakness OF the containing
force.
In his report of the years operations Grant
with his characteristic magnanimity, assumed
tne responsibility for: shcridan's 'inaction