The Florence tribune., 1897-06-19
CUBAN WARFARE.
How the Insurgents Deal with the
 Spaniards.
By Scattering Through the Forest They Eyade the Soldiers of the Crown, Who Fear Being
 Ambushed.

The Spaniards have repeatedly stated that the Cuban insurgents will not face them in open battle, but retreat after the first few volleys have been ex- changed, and that their perfect knowl- edge of the country roads and trails enabies them to escape.
 The one great object of the Cubans in the field is not SO much to win by fight ing as t is 10 cripple Spain by draining i. her resources. The longer they can hoId oHt without giving battle th6 rDose money will be needed to clothe and feed the vast Spanish armg. The financial condition of Spain is understood by every Cuban soldier, and they all fully recognize the importance of putting their oppressors to as much extra ex- pense as possible.
 The Cuban campaign since Maceo ex- eeuted his great raid has been purely defensive, having for it's object the above result. Chiefs like Gomez and Maceo have at times assumed the offensive, but only for short time. These de- fensive tactics have proved of more benefit to the Cubans than series of pitched battles. The successful work ing of their plan is demonstrated every time that Gen. Weyler asks for reenfoce- ments.
 Next to Maceo's great campaign in Pinar del Rio, probably the most re- markable example of defensive tactics has been those employed by Gen. J. NJ. Aguirre since he assumed command Of the insurgent forces in the province of Havana.
 Although the other chiefs have sue ceeded in evading the Spaniards as we'll as Aguirre. yet his proximity to the cap ital makes his campaign of special inn portance.
 The northern brigade of the province of Havana, under Aguirre and Brig adler Cardenas, is divided into two cav airy regiments and a compafy of in fantry, numbering ill all about 900 armed men. Their field of operations extends from Havana on the vest to the limit of the province of Ceiba Mo- cha on the east. distance of 45 miles, and from the coast south, to a line di- vidinr the province in tle center,
 h this territory are stationed about }41ao Spauish troops, whose sole oh- jeet is to corner or entrap this small Cuban brigade and force them to de- cisige fight
 The spauiards hold sll the towns, which are strongly fortified and have each q permanent garrison of from 4o0 to 3e0 soldiers to protect them from de struction by the Cubans.
 Operating field columns are sta toned at the towns of Guanabacoa, Minas, Jaruco, Aguacate, Ceibas, Mocha, Madruga, San Jose de las Lajas and Sta. Maria del Rosario, in all nine columns, averaging 1000 men in each.
 The local guerrilleros that have been formed recently will probably increase the active field force to about 10000 well-arIned and equipped men. The remaining 4,o00 are scattered in the smaller towns and forts, protecting sugar factories and bridges.
 The railroad is also in possession of tle Spaniards, enabling them to concen- trate their forces at any given point in the district within six hours. With Havana as their base of supplies, the Spaniards have all that can be desired from military standpoint. For II months they have planned combination and surprises for the purpose of en- trapping gthisinsignifieant little force oi 900 Cubans, who are poorly armed and often have been without ammunition but every time the Spaniards have beer foiled.
 The Spaniards. despite all reports tc the contrary, rarely attack unless thes are supported by other companies ol gre sure that they outnumber tht enemy.
 The Cubans, through their cxcellen system of scouts, are always well in ] formed of the movements of the enemy ! and in such ease they quietly breal camp and march five miles further on outside of the trap. Occasionally tn Spaniards succeed in overriding then
 
 and a fight ensues
 The Cubans usually throw out twi companies in s1lirmish line ard fetrea under it's protection; for as long a there is a line to face, the Spaniards vii be very cautious about advancing. l I have seen six men hold Spanisl column of 1,5o0 in check for pore thai an hour by firing upon them from tn woods. The Spnniards, fearing an am buscade, would not venture into the for est. In fact, this fear of being en trapped into an ambush is an importan factor of the actual warfafe in Cubs and is the real reason why Weyler having such hard time of it in th Pinar del Rio hills.
 The Cubans, should they stop to giv battle to their enemies in the provinc of Havana, would soon find themselve in a serious predicament, as at the frs sound of the firing all the Spanish co, umns hurry to the scene, and tn chances are that their overwhelmin numbers would tell in such ease. Bu by retreating rapidly under cover c fire they soon place themselves beyon reach of pursuit .-LeElie's Weekly.