The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1897-09-11
WEAKNESS OF MODERN ARMIES

We are by no means sure that armies at the
end of the nineteenth century are not to some
extent in the condition of tie armies Of the
last few years of the eighteenth century. No
doubt the modern generals are, or shall we
say seem, less sleepy headed than the old
bewigg d Austrians and Prussians, though
they, il must bo remembered, were in their
day reckonei men of science; but, at the
same time, we expect that "A good deal OF our
modern military organization has become s iff
and unrractical. We shall be told, no doubt,
that the Prussian army went like cl)cEwork
in 1870 but we must be allowed to doubt
whether the olockwork IL quite as now now as
then, in spite OF appearances. Besides, Prus-
sin had just the very force opposed to her in
1870 against which good clockwork would be
sure TO prevail-a piece of bogus military
mechanism. Whether Prussia would have As
easy victory IL some Frenohman had arisen
capable of organizing and using really
mobile force OF $1,000 men Is another question.
1t is possible that such a spearhead stuck into
the cloclkwork might hav. conc great deal
of damage. That, hep is speculation.
What we do know IL TIM, 80 irussian army
was a splendid fighting srssnism at the end
OF the seven years war, and that at Jena
some forty years after, it proved utterly un'
able 20 meet Napoleon quick, fierce assault
In spite, then, of the magnificent organiza
tion of the present European armies, and of
their vast size, we believe it TO be- quite
possible that some new Alexander may arise
who will organize new method OF fighting
which, for time at any rate, may bring all
their far-stretched greatness to ruin. Or
course, such genius in the art OF war may
never get TO the front but that his opportu-
nifty exists in the present bloated armaments
we have no sort of doubt. Yet it will be snd,
how about the big battalionsp All military
authorities agree that. IN the end, and CON
sidering that the European nations ara prac
ticaly equal in courage and morale, the way
TO win n battle il To confront five men of the
enemy with eight, or If possible ten men Of
your own.
That sproves that big armies will always
beat the small2 BY no means. u is because
we entirely and absolutely acquiesce in the
big battalion Providence Is on the
side OF the big battalions" was Napoleon =
dictum-that we hold that small and properly
organized mobile armies Will beat the huge
unwieldy armies that the modern European
strategists contemplate putting in the field.
Remember, your big battalion must confront
the little battalion, not on paper, but on the
ground. Hence If a body Of 10000 men can be
swiftly and suddenly confronted with body
of 1000, the big battalion rule * on the side
OF the 40,OO). The fact that the 5000 belong
20 an organization which has couple OF
hindred thousand men le1ind it does not
matter Unless the 100000 mon are available
at the moment they do not count
An extremely mobile army, ready TO spring
first in one direction aud then in another, is
quite capable Of beating an army OF three or
four times its size, and beating 10 always, by
having substantial majority OF com
batants IN every actual engagement. OF
course, the big army may be splendidly
organized that it will be- quite as mobile, IL
not more mobile, than tho small army. In
that cnso the small army will be swallowed
whole. All we contend is that the hugeness
of the European armies tends 90 make them
immohile and that, therefore, 10 is always
possible that some clever invention in the di.
re,tion Of intense mobility may give victory TO
a small and apparently not particularly well
found army in other respects. Spec.
tator.