The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-06-12
AN ABLE DECISION.

The decision of the Supreme Court on the
3-cent-fare act must be regarded as one of
marked ability and clearness. Take, for in
stance, the discussion Of the assumption
that the Hugg bill involves the violation Of
contract, which is as follows:
1t is insisted by appellant that the act of
1897 IS unconstitutional because it impairs
the obligation of a contract. Counsel for
appellant do not point out any contract the
obligation of which is impaired by said act.
If II is the contract under which the street.
railway company took possession of the
streets of indianapolis and constructed it's
tracks, it is sufficient to say that the city
was not authorized to enter into any con-
tract which would prevent the Legislature
from leSislating upon the subject of fares.
the power to reasonably regulate the rates
of fare for transportation of passengers
within the State on street railways.
The foregoing opinion is sustained by a
long list of authorities, which are followed
by a quotation from the statutes relative to
street railways which reserves the right to
the Legislature to amend or repeal such
act at its discretion. Not content to leave
the matter of regulating fares with the pro-
visions of the act of 1861, the court proceeds
as follows:
That power would exist, even if the right
served. In order to exempt a common car
rler from legislative control over its rates
or fare, 1t must appear that the exemption
was made in its charter by clear and UNI
mlstakable language inconsistent with the
exercise of such power by the LEGISLATURE
Appellant had the power to pre-
scribe the terms upon which and the time
for which a street-railroad company organ
lied under said act of 1861 should occupy the
streets of said city, but such contract when
made was subject to the right of the Legis-
lature to amend or repeal said act at it's
discretion, and no contract made by the city
with a street-railroad company could pre-
vent the exercise of such power by the
Legislature. 1t is clear, therefore, that said
act of 1897 does not impair the obligation of
any valid contract Of either the State or
appellant.
In marked contrast with the labored argu-
ment of Judge Showalter are the clear and
common-sense views of the court upon the
contention that the Hugg 3-cent-fare act is
special legislation, as follows:
A law which applies to cities having a
population OF 100, 600 or more, when there is
but one such city, but is so framed as TO
operate on all other cities in the State as
they acquire the necessary population is a
general law, because it. operates upon all
cities alike under the same cir
eeumstanees. Pennsylvania Company VS..
that law concerning the fares to be coli
lected by street-railroad companies shall
operate uniformly on all street-railroads in
the state. 1t is sufficient if it operates alike
upon all such companies under the same
circumstances and conditions Such a law
is general within the meaning of the Con-
stitution.
The foregoing are but samples of the
clear and strong presentation of the law bv
the Supreme Court, which is sure to attract
wide attention and reflect great credit
upon the author Judge Monks