The National tribune., 1897-02-11
CONFUSION AS TO NAMES.



in giving the names to engagements de-
scribed, which is very misleading. In par
| ticular l have noted tendency to get
mixed in referring to those forming the
caption of this article. All three have been
enormously used to designate the same
| battle, whereas there were three separate
engagements, each i'll no way connected with
the other two, being distant several miles
| and no two on the same date, but all oc-
| curing during the Dallas movement Of the
Atlanta campaign.
The battle of New Hope Church was
fought May 25, 1864, the Union troops en-
gagged being the Twentieth Corps, assisted
by Newton's Division, of the Fourth, the re-
mainder of the latter corps not arriving
| upon the field until nightfall, after the con-
f1ict was over. Gen. Joe Hooker commanded
the Union forces, and when night came on
had not succeeded in carrying the enemy's
position. The Army of the Tennessee,
forming the right wing, had moved directly
toward Dallas, establishing its lines within
two miles of that place and connecting with
Hooker. During the 26th no important en-
gagement took place, but on the 9th Woods
Division, of the Fourth Corps, supported by
Johnson's, of the Fourteenth, and McLean's
Ohio Brigade, moved to the left some two
and one-half miles, passing in rear of the
Twenty third Corps to point near Pickett's
Mil, whore determined effort was made to
turn the right flank of the enemy, without
success.
This engagement was properly known as
Picketts Mill, and is doubtless the one re-
ferred to by Comrades Brandley and Crowell
| in recent numbers under the name of New
Hope Church. The next day, May %, the
| rebels attempted similar movement against
the Union right near Dallas, and were re-
pulsed by Logan with even greater loss than
Wood sustained on the 9th. This was
known as Dallas.
Having been constant reader of The
| NATIONAL TRIBUNE for several years. l
have a distinct recollection of reading
several accounts of the bloody struggle near
Pickett's Mill, the most elaborate being
written by Gen. Thomas j. Wood himself
and accompanied by map of the battle
field, while Gen. Howard in his interesting
| "reminiscences also gave brief description
Of the battle. Similar accounts have also
appeared of the battles of New Hope Church
| and Dallas, so that constant reader of your
paper ought to be better informed as 10 their
| proper names. Yet ever and anon some
comrade awakening from a Rip Van Wrinkle
snooze (of which being deprived of The Ma
TIONAL TRIBUNE's regular visits is akin)
inquiries why no one has written up New
Hope Church or Dallas" meaning Picketts
| Mill. Perhaps he may never have known
the correct name, hence failed to recognize
the locality when it was written up. And
| so the battle RACES again. Luckily it is all
fought on paper now, for certainly to those
who entered that slaughter-pen once was
sufficient, and all they wanted of the real
| thing. Still, everyone who writes truthfully
OF what fell under his immediate observation
at least adds something to history, and is
therefore to be given due credit for what he
contributes, so there is something to be
gained even in thrashing over the straw.
/ freely confess that when Gen. Wood in
his article placed Willich's Brigade (Col. w.
H. Gibson commanding) in the second line,
could not understand it until asked my
comrade and -townsman, Pete c.,
for his version of it.
why" said he, "the General g right.
The Johnnies were in the first line and we
in the second, to be sure"
That settled it for Pete was there, and a
few days afterward established reputation
for strategy second only to Gen. Sherman
himself, by simply throwing himself into a
hollow square," surrounding and capturing
ought to have weight. Perhaps the General
was right but at the time it seemed to me
that both brigades charged-Gibson on the
right and Hazen on the left, and certainly
there was no line in front of my regiment,
except The enemy in his works and had not
Gibson been on the front line there would
have been no occasion for the use of those
bngles which the comrades say gave warning
to the enemy and allowed him to reinforce his
right. have always been of the opinion that
our presence was discovered first by the rebel
cavalry soon after we reached the position
from whence the charge was ordered. There
was a sharp, rafting volley of carbines in
the woods to our left and afterward fully an
hour was consumed in rec0nnoitering the
| position of the enemy, which gave him ample
time to prepare, and the vigorous sbelling
| that we sustained before our line advanced,
proved that he was ready to receive us. 1t
| is true Gen. Which had drilled the whole
brigade to manuver by bugle signals (the
German calls being used, which the rebels
could not understand, but that they were
used that day long enough before the charge
to betray our movements is incredible to
me, and certainly would have been sup
pressed by Gen. Wood when secrecy was of so
much importance. Our brigade at this time
was composed OF the 18th and 49th Ohio the
32d Ind. Germany and the S9th H., and
Gen. Which having been severely wounded
at Resaca, was necessarily absent The 18th
and 10th had the advance that day, as I re-
member, and not the 32d, SO the Dutch bugles
could not have given us away, although there
is no doubt the Johnncs knew as well as
dreaded "the Dutch General and his horn
brigade" as they called us. Again, Comrade
Brandley mentions charging " through TIM
her, mp hill, over fence to an open field,
down to ravine, up another hill to another
fence" etc. This was not the nature of the
ground we charged over, as there is no hills,
| fields, or fences, but instead succession of
timbered ridges and gullies, full of under
growth, no clearing and no fences, except
some very substantial ones built by the
Johnny rebs to keep us out Of their domain.
C0mrade Crowell says his regiment found
works." as also the comrade from whose
diary he quotes describes V-shaped works y;
and, as our Kentucky comrade was on
Hazen's left. perhaps there were only fences
there. If SO, they must have fanked the
works and struck the enemy's flank, which
was held by dismounted cavalry and ought
to have been carried with proper support,
which would have resulted in brilliant
victory, instead Of disastrous repulse.
But all accounts l have ever read Of this bat
tie previous TO that Of Comrade Brandley
carried the impression that Wood attacked
too far to the right, and in so doing failed to
turn the flank of the enemy, whose lines
| Aapto hic snctood. oo1 Tho