The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-11-04
Alleged Defects Of Our Electoral
system.

The leading article in the November num-
Der of the Forum is contributed by the
Hon. j. G. CARLISLE, ex-Secretary of the
Treasury; 1t is an exposure of what he
terms defects in our methods of electing a
President and Vice-President We shall
find Il, easy to show that most of these sup
posed shortcomings are of trifling conse-
quence, while, as regards the only one that
is of substantial import, Mr.. CARLISLE at
present suggests no remedy, although 1t is
possible that he may do this in the second
article, which he promises for the next
number of the periodical.
1t is perfectly true, as Mr.. CARLISLE says,
that, under the existing process of electing
q President and a Vice President, which is
embodied in the Twelfth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, di-
vers unpleasant things might happen, pro-
vided you happen to have imagination
enough to c~onjure up chimeras. Undoubt-
eddy, the Twelfth Amendment provides
that, in case no candidate for the Presi-
dency receives a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed, then, from
the persons, not exceeding three, having
the highest number of votes on the list of
those voted for as President, the Hous of
Representatives shall choose the President
by ballot, the representations Of each
State having one vote. 1t is also beyond
question that the Twelfth Amendment
provides that the person who shall receive
q majority of the whole number OF electors
appointed for the Office of Vice-President
shall be Vice President; but, If no person
have such a majority, the Senate shall elect
No. f-~-. A. .,~ 49, ~
list having the highest number of votes.
1t obviously follows from this amendment,
as Mr.. CARLISLE points out, that if, owing
to n multiplicity Of electoral tickets, it
should occur that more than three persons,
voted for as President, should receive the
highest and an equal number of votes, then
there would be no choice by the electoral
colleges; neither could there be a constitu-
tional election by the House of Representa-
tives, because, under the Constitution,
not more than three persons can be
voted for in that body. In such a case, it
would be impossible to select the three per-
Sons to be voted for, and, therefore, impos-
sible to proceed in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Constitution. 1t Is
equally manifest that, If more than two
persons voted for as e.President should
receive the highest and an equal number of
electoral votes, there would be no election
to that Office by the Presidential electors,
and there could be none by the Senate, for
only two names can be considered by tina
body. In all such cases the electoral system
would exhaust itself, leaving us without
an elective Executive or a Vice President
TO take his place.
These are contingencies which the PEG
pie can never be persuaded to consider
seriously. Consequently it is absurd to ad
vocate a constitutional amendment to pro
vide for them. The chanc of four candi
dates receiving each from the Presidential
electors the highest and an equal number
of votes is too remote and visionary to b,
made the subject of discussion In Congress.
or in the State Legislatures. The sam,
thing may be said of the chance of thre,
nominees for the Vice-Presidency receiv
Ing each from the Presidential electors tn,
highest and exactly the same vote for tn,
second Office under the Constitution.
Mr.. CARLISLE comes nearer to reachinJ
the common sense and touching the feel
ings of the people when he adverts to an
other consequence of the method of choos
ing Presidential electors provided by tn
Constitution. The Constitution provide
that the electors are to be appointed b
each State in such manner as its Legisla
ture may direct. Under that provision
State Legislature might vest the appoint
ment of Presidential electors in the Go,
ernor, or In any other State officer @
officers. AS q matter of fact, the powe
delegated to the Legislature by the Stat
Constitution has been exercised in thrs