The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1897-12-07
CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER

"e.of>l hrsg In . Consemporanesus Latter
Tells How il Was Dooe-He s.v. 49,.
tho Omcsrs and Soldiers War. n-..N -
tno fsoomproufs and The Yspkie. w.,k.a
ma Took Possessions Wiimtnxt.. 20
Po ~CIanoring for the Yankies to Cem.v
Messenger Bureau,
Raleigh, N. c., December
On the 20tr OF January, 1865. General
hraxton Bragg. commanding the de.
pdrtment OF North Carolina. wrote
from Wilmington to his brother -
Governor Thomas Bragg or tbia c;+v
the Following letter which has been
alluded to in the course of discussions
OF the capture OF Fort Fisher, but new
er before been printed:
Inc unexpected blow which has
FALLEN upo us Is almost stunning hut
Dc Snall not impair my efforts. Two
nours before hearing of the certain fall
OF the fort, I felt as confident as ever
man dd Of successfully defending it.
Inc responsibility is all mine, Of course,
ana L shall bear it as resolutely as
possible. but time Will make known
some matters which may as well be
tod you now in confidence, to be used
"lscreetly. NO human power could
nave prevented the enemy from land
lng. covered as he was by a fleet of
SHIPS carrying 600 heavy guns. Any
where beyond the range Of our heavy
guns on the fort our land force could
not approach him. Once landed. our
only chance was to keep him, if pos
srble, from the fort. with less than half
MS numbers. Had we extended far
enough toward the fort to prevent his
movement that way, he could have
crossed the narrow peninsula north of
US and cut us off entirely, when the
Iront and all must have gone. The
n is heavily timbered and very
swampy. We then confronted him as
closely as possible, to watch his move
4nents and endeavOr to strike if he
would form under his shipping. A dense
swamp lay betWeen us and extended
three miles towards Fort Fisher. In
this portion l ound the two forces
when L reached Genera Hoke and took
the just at midnight on Fri
Gay Calvary was on our extreme
right, towards the front, and occupying
ground entirely to the sea, placing
us etWeen the enemy and the fort for
observation. These were to report any
movement and the troops lay upon
their arms all night, ready to move to
the attack or towards the fort if the
enemy did SO. My knowledge Of the
ground vas good, as l knew General
Hoke's to be, both of US having been
over it. l fully approved of General
Hoke's dispositions Of the troops. We
stayed in our camp. under the heavy
smelling of the enemy'S fleet for the
night. No repOrt of any movement
having been made, we moved out early
no r~ecOnnoitre, Tioke towards the fort
and / to our left. 1 found the enemy
in strong force in front Of our left,
as well as could be seen across the
swamp. But to our great surprise
HOke found him extended beyond our
right and entirely acrOS the peninsula
between us and fort Fisher, and strong
~ e~ntrenched, having no doubt been
there the most of the night. Not a
word had been heard from our cavalry
and they had evidently Withdrawn from
their position in the night and did not
themselves know what had occurred,
for they fired on HOke and staff, who
got in front of them in accommodating
On learning this I put the command in
motion and ordered the enemy dislodg-
ed, if it was at all practicable. General
HOke and his brigad made a close re-
connOiSance and expressed to me the
opinion that his troops were unequal to
the task. 1 moved forward with them
and made a close examination n after
q conference confirmed Hoke's opinion
and decided not to attack. Our attack
and failure would AVE ensured the fall
OF the fort and would also have opened
the whole state. We could not have
succeeded without defeating double our
numbers behind entertainments, while
at the same time exposed to a akin
fire from their fleet, plainly in sight and
within good range, the sea as smooth as
glass. But / did not feel the slightest
apprehension for the fort. The enemy
had landed without artillery and not
even a general officer brought ashore.
Prisoners captured and deserters COM
ing in c~oncurred in one report, that if
repulsed once they would retreat and
re-ernbark, the fort being considered
too strong for them. Believing myself
h Grants army could not storm and
carry the fort, if it was defended, /
felt perfect confidence that we were
not only safe but that the enemy had
assumed a most precariOus position,
p from which he would escape with great
difficulty. I accordingly ordered Hoke
TO entrench Immediately in his front
and push his lines close on him, so a:
keep him engaged and closely observed.
While this was going on l started one
thousand OF our best men, VINO had
defended forts at Charleston. to rein
force Fisher, and as I considered the
garrison there absolutely as sunfcient
being about 1000 strong, l ordered
about 600 less reliable troops to come
cut, considering it an unnecessary ex-
pense of life to KEEP them there. Ihls
order was, however, rescinded on Gen
eral Writings appeal, and he was al
lowed to keep the whole. With this
garrison / considered the fort perfectly
safe and capable of standing any length
OF siege. We had steamboat connection
with it, which we could keep open at
aLl times during the night.
Had the cavalry done its duty and
promptly reported the enemy's move
,neuts. I think the result would lave
been different. Such was the cOnfigu-
ration of the country and the obsta-
cles tina he would have accomplished
his object with the force he had. Oul