The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-04-08
SHERMAN'S MEMOIRS.
0Continuedfron first page }

were then beyond my control. There
were still about 1000, mostly captured
at Jonesboro, who had been sent back
by cars, but had not passed Chat
tanooga. These | ordered back, and
offered Gen. Hood to exchange them
for Stoneman, Buell., and such OF
my own armv as would make up the
equivalent: but | would not exchange
for his prisoners generally, because l
knew these would have to be sent to
their own regiments, away from my
army, whereas all we could give him
could at once be put to duty in his I'M
mediate army. Quite an angry cor
respondence grew up between us, which
was published at the time in the news
papers, but it is not to be found in any
book of which have present knowledge,
and, therefore, is given here, as Illus
trative of the events referred to, and of
the feelings of the actors in the game OF
war at that particular crisis, together
with certain other original letters OF
Gems. Grant and Halleck, never hitherto
published.
LETTER FROM GEN. GRANT.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES, CITY PoINT, VA, Sept. IL, 1854
Mai Gen. W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Mill
tary Division of the Mississippi.
GENERAL: / send Lieut.-Col. Horace Porter,
of my staff with this. Col. Porter will explain
to you the exact condition of affairs here, better
than can do i'm the limits of a letter. Although
feel M yself strong enough now for offensive op-
erations, am holding quietly to get advan-
tage Of recruits and convaescents, who are COM
ing forward very rapidly. My lines are necessa-
rily very long, extending from Deep Bottom.
north of the James, across the peninsula formed
by the Appomattox and the James. and south
of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. IhlS
line is very strongly fortified. and can be held
with compal atiyely few men bat, from Its
great length, necessarily takes many in the
aggregate. propose. when j do move to ex-
tend my left so as to control what is known as
the Southside Lypchburg Petersburg
Road then, if possible, to keep the Danyille
Road cut. At the same time this move is made,
j want TO se1d a force OF from six to ten thou
sand men against Wilmington. The way pro-
pose to do this is to land the men north of Fort
Fisher, and hold that point. AT the same time
a large naval feet will be assembled there, and
the ironclads will run the batteries as they did
at Mobile. This will give US the same control
of The harbor of Wilmington that We now have
of the hsrbor of Mobile. What you are to do with
the forces at your command. do not exactly
see. The difficulties of supplying your army,
except wher they are constantly moving be-
yond where you are, j plainly see. If it had
not been for Prices movement, Candy could
have sent $4,000 more men1o Mobile. From
your command on the Mississippi. an equal
number could have been taken. With these
forces my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one-haf to Mobile and the other
half 10 Savannah. You could then move as
proposed in your telegram, SO as 70 threaten
Macon and augusta equally. Whichever one
should be abandoned by the enemy. you could
take and open up new basis of supplies. My
object now ia sending s;aff-otficer to you is
not so much 10 suggest operations for you as to
get your views, and to have plans matured by
the time every thing can be got ready. 1t would
probably be The 5th of October before any of
the plans here indicated will be executed. If
you have anv promotions to recommend, send
the names forward, and / will approve them.
In conclusion, il is hardly necessary .or me
to say that feel you have accomplished the
most gigantic undertaking given to any Gen.
eral in this war; and with skill and ability
that will be acknowledged in history as unsur-
passed, if not unequaled. 1t gives me as much
pleasure to record this in your favor AS it would
in favor of any living man, myself Included.
Truly yours, u. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-Ieneral.