The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1897-03-27
GIVEN BY JUSTICE WHITE
WILL AFFORD LITTLE COMFORT
TO RAILROAD MEN.
A Very Strong Presentation of the
Case From the Standpoint of the
Minority of the United States
Supreme Court.

! trust law of 1890 was valid and con-
stitutional and that the agreement of
| the association was in restraint or
! trade and tariff in violation OF its
| provisions, and in which Justices Field,
Gray and Shiras joined, had been made
public in full. 1t is nearly as Yoluml-
nous as the opinion of the court de-
l:vered by Justice Peckham and ira
verses the arguments and conclusions
/ of that document in 3, righteous way.
Introducing the matter, Justice
White says: 'The theory upon which
1 the contract is held to be illegal is
| that even though it be reasonable, and
hence valid, under the general princi-
| pies of law it is yet void, because it
conflicts with the act of congress. Now,
at the outset, it is necessary to under
stand the full import of this conclu
sion. AS it is conceded that the con-
| tract does not unreasonably restrain
trade, and that if it does not SO I'M
reasonably restrain trade, it is valid
under the general law, the decision
substantially is that the act of con-
gress is a departure from the general
| principles of law and by its terms
destroys the rights of individuals or
corporations to enter into very many
reasonable contracts. But this propo-
| sition, l deem it, is tantamount to an
assertion that the act of congress is
itself unreasonable. The difficulty of
meeting, by reasoning, a promise of
/ this nature is frankly conceded. for,
OF course, where the fundamental prop
osition upon which the whole con-
| tention rests is that the act of congress
is unreasonable, it would seem con-
ductive TO no useful purpose to invoke
reason as applicable to and as con-
trolling the construction of a statute
/ which is admitted to be beyond the
4 ~
is the act of congress relied on to be
! so interpreted as to give it a reason
able meaning, or is it TO be construed as
peIng unreasonable and as violative of
the elementary principles of justiee?"
The opinion discusses this question
In the light of former decisions as to
reasonable and unreasonable agree
ments IN restraint of trade and on that
point the conclusion is reached: :
That TO define them. the words In
restraint of trade as embracing every
contract which in any degree produced
mat erect would be Violative of rea-
son, because it would include all those
contracts which are the very essence,
or trade, and would be equivalent to
sayihg mat there should be no trade,
ana therefore nothing to restrain
The principles of proper construction.
are reviewed by. the justice and he
says; If these obvious rules of in
depreciation be applied, it seems to me
they render it impossible to construe
the words every restraint of trade
used IN the act in any other sense than
as. excluding reasonable contracts as
the TACT that such contracts were NOT
considered 10 be within the rule of
contracts in restraint of trade. was
thoroughly esta bIished both in England
and IN this country at the time the act
was ADOPTED. 1t is, | submit not to be
doubted. that the Interpretation of the
words every contract in restraint of
trade so as to embrace within it's pur-
view every contract, however eason-
abe, would certainly work an enorm-f
Gus injustice and operate to the undue
restraint of the liberties of the citizen.
But there is no canon of interpreta-
Lion winch requires that the letter be
followed, when by so doing an I'M
reasonable result is accomplished. on
the contrary, the rule is the other wav
ana exacts that the spirit which vivi-
hes, and not the letter which killeth. is
the proper guide by which to correctly
interpret a statute.
The remedy intended to be accom-
plished by the act of congress was to
shield against the danger of contract
or combination by the few against the
interest OF the many, and to the detri-
ment o. freedom. The construction
now given, l think. strikes down the
interest of the many to the ADVANTAGE
and benefit of the few. 1t has been
held In cause involving a combina-
ton among workingmen that such COM
blnatonS are embraced in the act of
congress in question, and this view
was not doubted by this court. The
Interpretation of the statute therefore
which holds that reasonable agree
mentS are within it's purview. makes il
III
or combination of the laborer to bene-
mt his condition either by obtaining
an increase of wages or diminution of
the hours of labor. 1t follows that the
construction which reads the rule of
reason out of the statute embraces
within its inhibition every contract or
combination by which workingnen
seek 70 peaceably better their condi-
ton. 1t is therefore, as | see it. abso-
lutely true to say that the constr1c-
ton now adopted which works out |
such results not only illustrates the |
plain purpose intended to be accom- |
plished by congress, but also makes
the statute tend to an end never con-
templated, and against the accomplish |
ment or which its provisions were en-
acted"
Justice White also discussed the |
question:: Does the implication ir-
resistibly arise that congress intended |
in the act of 1890 to abrogate, in whole /
or in part, the provisions of the act of |
1887, regulating interstate commerce" |
and includes that the nature of the
two enactmentS clearly demonstrates |
that there was no such intention"
A consideration of terms of the inter- |
state commerce act makes it clear to |
him that the contract here sought to |
be avoided as illegal. is either directly |
sanctioned or implicitly authorized |
thereby. The agreement in question |
seeking to secure uniform classical |
ton and to prevent the under cutting
of the published rates, even though
such agreements be made with com
peting as we'll as joint lines, is in ac-
cord with the plain text of the inter-
state commerce act, and is in harmony /
with the views of the purposes of that
law contemporaneously expressed to I
congress by the body Immediately
charged with it's administration and
tacitly approved by congress.
ITO my mind the judicial declaration
that carriers can not agree among
themselves for the purpose of aiding in
the enforcement Of the provisions of
the interstate commerce law, will strike
a blow at the beneficial results of that
act, and will have direct tendency to
produce the preferences and discrimi-
nations which it was one of the main
objects of the act to Illustrate"
And in conclusion the minority saws:
Manifestly, this decision Is utterly
with the view that in the
case of a railroad company every
restraint imposed by contract upon its
freedom Of action is necessarily in
r,t1r 70 he rar,ra1 sx,<r |