The Florence tribune., 1897-08-28
IN CASE OF WAR.
How Our Military Forces Would
 Be Assembled.
Some susgestions as to the Proper Handling of tIle United States Troops at Home aad
 Abroad.

The military defense act which tae United States doubtless stands most i'll need of at the present mument is one whereby De militia bodies of the whole country will become compat ase eoInprehenaiyely organized national fierce, with their position. dis ipligz assi znoF1fi eut aes argttly detas
 readiness in tine fer fore ,gf war.
 If tie United States should be iu- yoived now with Spain or any other power of consequence the first move would be to place the regular army in so the field, and immediately afte1Mard the national guard would be nobilized for active service. Right here worll ensue, as matters are now, a confused tangle, made all the more desperate by the patriotic enthusiasms of the various state bodies and a series of delays, bielx- eripgs, rivalries and dangerous dis putes, all permitted to thrive because a general war organization was not previously laid down, without settled authority for governing the assignment of troops.
 We have national guard composed of enthusiastic volunteers maintained iii many ctates more by their sacrinccs than by the just treatment of their state governments. The efficiency of the guard varies from high in several states to below zero in others. The regimental and company strength is widely different, the equipment and clothing extremely variant, the arms likewise differ, and some have magnih- cent arnories, while others drill in sheds. To bring order out of 100,o0G such soldiers, irregularly comprised ii detail, will take enormous. labor and time. as well as a waste of money, which would have been obviated by previous organization into Q modern national military machine
 Nearly every high army officer and many national guard officers have, at enc time or another, pointed out these dangers and urged some scheme for congressional action. Several of these plans have received careful attention, while others have been dismissed as Impractical because od their too Euro- pean heaviness or expense. The ma jority of them, however, have failed to win approval because they cid not properly recognize the civilian side oe the service or the sensibilities of the states and difference in state laws.
 Some have not remembered that the amount of training a militia1nan car possibly receive is Limited; that he is a working citizen first, and soldier afterward, and the amount of time sac- riiiced cannot be much larger. If a pow erful national force is to be organized out of the militia it must be carefully adapted to meet the variety of state conditions, and if effected quickly must disturb as little as possible the existing military laws of different common wealGhs.
 The proper plan to follow in the case is to perfect an organization of the forces for the purpose Of foreign war only, leaving for every other duty the military under the same authority as. if no national reserve existed. Belong ing to the larger body would affect each command only in the matter of their improved efficiency and equipment, as well as uniformity in size of regiments. Whatever service the troops performed as members of the national force must be considered as additional to all state duty, aud complete regiments only, which under their own state laws aae required 10 do a certain amount of drill and field duty every year for the state, must be eligible to the reserve.
 Upon enrolment in the reserve, the