The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1897-07-30

CRASH Of the situation and nerve to persist
in the face of great obstacles once the
struggle had begun. / am inclined to
think that the nearest parallel to the de-
struction of the Confederate ram Abe
marie was the bridging of the dangerous
gan in the Federal line of works at the
battle of Franklin, Tenn, by General EN-
erson Opdyoke and his little brigade OF
veterans
franklin was field marked by heroic
deeds and matchless individual prowess,
vet noted for the absence of anything like
strategy or tactics Hoods 1000 Confed-
crates ATTEMPTED to run down and over
whelm Schoflelds 10000 Federals. Had
Schofield lost the day the disaster might
have changed the face of things in the
west
The Bold, Bold Hood.
After abandoning Atlanta to his foes
Hood had cleverly drawn Sherman into
northern Georgia, but he found his forces
heavily overmatched and unable to give
battle in open field. Yet he was not the
man to yield all the west to the enemy.
For the emergency nothing would fit so
well as the motto Be bold, be bold and
eyermore be bold, and of boldness Hood
had an apparently exhaustless supply. he
resolved to give Sherman the slip and
march rapidly to Nashville Louisville and
Cincinnati, strike terror to the north, win
the smiles of France, who only waited a
good excuse for aiding the COnfederacy,
and bring up at last on Grant rear in
northern Virginia after crossing Ohio and
the Blue Ridge. Was ever the dream of
daring military adventurer wilder than
that? But what was to hinder? sherman,
distance and the scattered Union troops to
be met with on the wayY AS for the last
two obstacles, Hoods soldiers were equal
to the march and equal also, he believed,
to any improvised force that could be raked
up to impede him in all the west Sher-
man himself, he believed, would turn and
go back south, and that is just what he did
do.
Sherman Away to the Sea-
Grantand sherman had discussed plan
after Atlanta fell for drawing Hood away
from his rich base of supplies in Alabama
by marching a Union army through
Georgia TO the gulf or TO the sea. Both
agreed then that in such event Hood would
certainly follow. Hood was in front of
Sherman at the time this conclusion was
reached but when he abandoned his camps,
stripped for the race and struck out west
ward, leaving Sherman in northern
Georgia, he was to all intents and pur-
poses loose in Tennessee, for Sherman had
nothing in the field to prevent the Confed-
crates crossing from Alabama anywhere
ahey chose eyertheless Sherman chung
% the theory that if be marched the main
PORTION of his army to the sea Hood would
follow, and, though Grant at the last mo-
ment advised him to ruin Hood before
starting off at a tangent, and Lincoln was
"anxious if not fearful, - he began the his
toric and picturesque march.
Hood North of the Tennessee.
Hood marched westward across Ala ALBANIA
$50 miles, victualing and equipping his
army en- route for its wonderful venture
into hostile territory. By the middle Of
November he was over the Tennessee at
Florence, Ala. His numbers, including the
cavalry that would join him, were about
10000. Another theory Sherman held
about this remarkable campaign was that
bis lieutenant, General Thomas, with a
corps of about IL, 600 men under General
d. NJ. Stanley, and an indefinite force Of
mounted and dismounted cavalry, could
hold the line of the Tennessee river and
Reep Hood south of it. He afterward added
The Twenty third corps, under General j.
n. Schoheld, 10000 strong, which he de-
saohed from his main army before starting
for the sea. With this combined force,