Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1897-02-20
The STORY Teller.
THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER.
BY REAR.ADM1RAL STEVENS, U. 8. N.
From The Youths Companion.

Many a boy and girl would be sur
prised to know how often sentimental
reasons were responsible for important
operations during our late war. War
between countries differing in taste,
language and pursuit is, as rule,
cautious, deliberate and scientific
but what is known as civil war, or
a war between citizens of the same
state, abounds in operations intended
as much to create moral advantage
as to gain a strategic victory.
One of these sentimental reasons
was at the bottom Of the persistent
Union attacks on Charleston, S. c.,
although the occupation of Charleston
Roads by our feet effectually stuffed
up the enemy's blockade-runners and
formed valuable base of operations.
The authorities were determined that
Charleston's defences, and particular
ly Fort Sumter, should fall into our
hands, not only on account of the
moral effect which would be produced
thereby in Europe, but on account OF
the spiritual elation and depression
which would arise in the north and
south respectively.
The cause of Charleston's sentimen-
tai Importance was this: From the
firing on Sumter came the Civil war,
and the citizens of Charleston were
not only the first participants in actual
strife, but the nucleus about which
gathered the particles of secession.
The city was responsible for the first
attack on the flag, and was the actual
stronghold of the early resistance to
United States authority.
Its fail was regarded by the Union
authorities as moral necessity. In
order to gain possession of position
strongly fortified and so ably and val.
iantly defended, the most desperate
measures were daily devised and dai,
ly executed.
In 1868 Charleston roads was the
anchorage of the North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, under the com
mand of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren. The
wooden ships, the little monitors and
the Ironsidts, Commodore Rowan's
ironclad flagship, anchored, when not
engaged in bombarding the forts and
the shore batteries, about three miles
from the enemy's works. At intervals,
acting on some plan of the admiral,
they would weigh anchor and steam
up to within close range, when the
several vessels would take up advan-
tageous positions and open fire that
lasted sometimes for many successive
hours.
But this was no easy and monoto-
nous display of craftsmanship. Forts
Moultrie, Wagner and Gregg and the
batteries on Morris Island returned
our fire with interest and effect, while
navigation was dangerous on account
of the enemy's lines of torpedoes and
obstructions. In the midst of all the
turmoil, Fort Sumter squatted grimly
on the crown of her island, and only
an occasional shot from her walls, and
the barred flag that hung over her,
showed that she was still in the hands
of our opponents.
Month after month our operations
went on, until at last, on the morning
of September 7, the admiral received
Intelligence that the enemy had evac-
uated Forts Wagner and Gregg, and
that Morris Island was in the posses
sion of General Gillmore's soldiers.
The day of the 9TH was passed in
active work against the enemy, and on
the afternoon of the 9Th Admiral
Dahlgren decided that the time was
favorable for boat attack on Fort
Sumter, as he supposed that the enemy
would be discouraged by the fall of
Wagner and Gregg.
Sumter herself had new assailants
in our guns on Morris Island, and her
walls were battered and preached by
the bombardment to which she had
been subjected.
The admiral demanded the forts
surrender, but received the reply !:
"The fort will be yours when you come
and take it,"
THE ATTACK PROJECTED.
On the evening Of the 9th of Sep
tember, 1868, as was smoking an after
dinner cigar with my friend Commo-
dore Rowan, in the cabin of the Iron
sides, the admiral's hag-lieutenant, S.
W. Preston, was announced with or.
ders for the commander of the Patap-
sco-myself-to report on board the
flagship. On our way to that vessel
Mr.. Preston informed me that the ad-
miral intended to send boat expedi-
tion against Sumter, and added, "You
are selected to command"
I was very sorry to hear this, for in
my opinion the attack was certain to
be unsuccessful for many reason, among
them the following: We were with
out trustworthy knowledge of the in
ternal condition of the fort and of the
practicability of scaling the walls; no
means for this last necessity had been
devised, and we had no scaling ladders
nor other appliances for climbing into
the fort; sufficient time had not been
allowed for organizing a force with so
desperate a mission the enemy had
been made aware that some demonstra-