New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1897-05-09
III.

In touching upon induction DR.. Sigwart trav-
erses some favored opinions OF experimental
philosophy. especially those advocated by John
Stuart Mill. In the first place he deals with
Mills attack on the syllogsm in its ordinary
form Illustrated by this familiar specimen: All
men are mortal; Socrates. is man. therefore
Socrates is mortal. 1t was Mills contention
that the conclusion was here only seemingly
drawn from the major premise by means OF the
minor the truth being that ii was necessary 10
know that Socrates mortal before 1t could
be asserted that all men were So The major
premise thus involved a begging OF the whole
question. What the argument, so far as II was
one. amounted to for Mill was a statement of
experience that men who were living had died
and the inference from that experience that men
now living must die. The general proposition
was to his mind superfuous. Nevertheless it
might be looked upon as short formula Tor all
that could be justly inferred from the testimony
of experience, memorandum which gave Sc
curity that no contradictory experience had been
forgotten Against this view Dr. Sigwart holds
that the general proposition is far more than a
record implying an enumeration of particular In
stances. If it no more than that, then its
validity would depend upon its certainty in re-
gard to the particular items. To be able to as
sert that all men are mortal merely as nu-
merical generality would require a complete cen
sus of the living and the dead. and even that
would give no certainty as to the future. The
universal major premise is not then summary
of an indefinite number of experiences, but the
statement of the necessity of connecting the
predicate with the subject" This necessity could
never be attained by empiricsm. But 1t Is just
this necessity in the universal proposition whch
makes the particular data Of value as PROOF In
any particular case. The effect of this cxplana-
ton upon the so-called logic OF induction Is
obvious. Induction as means OF testing inc
validity of universal propositions Is completely
discredited. 1t is an indispensable part or
mental life, but 1t would be useless were 1t not
for the logical background OF necessity against
which the mind pictures all Its knowledge. In
the shadow Of this necessity induction deals with
PREMISES that are always hypothetical and are
liable to refutation from a study of their conse-
uuences but which can never be rendered more
than probable. II is only by a hidden syllogism
that anything like certainty Is given to the
ostensible processes OF induction. Bacon. to
whom the modern inductve theory Is referred.
unconsciously illustrated this point In his search
for what he called the form" Of heat. something
which is everywhere where heat is and nowhere
where heat Is not. His method is one OF X
II.
mated from one class OF objects after another in
the hope OF finding AT last what IL Is in itself.
The science OF the thing does not signify, but
what DR.. Sigwart dwells upon Is that Bacon's
process was really grounded upon distinctive
major premise (he form OF heat is either this or
that or something elsc) with many distinctive
members, while the minor premise is copula-
tive negative judgment each member Of which
is obtained by a special syllogism OF the second
figure He Is so enthusiastic in pursuit OF
Bacon's scholasticism that he lapses into ii him
self by naming the moods Cesare and Comestres
which Bacon used In his special syllOglsms. This
ia the only place In his work where any Of the
mnemonic words OF the old logicians used
Thus induction. according to Bacon. Is In full
harmony with the Organon OF Aristotle. His
endeavor to obtain certain propositions" re-
marks DR.. Sigwart, (which are not liable to the
dangers Of ordinary induction leads him back
to the same logical rules which he had described
as incapable of building up science" Locke re-
newed the effort to base all knowledge on expert
ence alone but only to have II shown by Hume
that on this ground there could be no real knowl.