Audubon Republican. [volume] (Audubon, Iowa) 1894-1925, 1897-12-09

thereto. But this conflict must be one
which Is recognized in the sense of in
ternationaf law as war.
Recognition Not justified.
"Belligerence, too, is fact. The mere
existence of contending armed bodies and
their occasional conflicts do not constitute
the existing condition Of affairs in Cube,
the tests recognized by publicists and writ
ers on international law, and which have
been observed by nations of dignity, hon
esty and power, when free from sensitive or
selfish and unworthy motives, i fail to
find in the instruction the existence Of
sssh political To tme
world, having the forms and capable OF
the ordinary functions of government
toward it's own people and to other states,
tice, with a local habitation, possessing
such organization of force, such material,
such occupation Of territory as to take the
contest out of the. category of a mere re-
bellious insurrection or occasional Skin
mishes, and place it on the terrible foot
ing of war. to which recognition OF bel
1.-THE contest, moreover. is solely on
land: the insurrection has not possessed
itself of a single seaport whence 1t may
communication with foreign powers ex-
cept through the military lines of it's adj
versaries. No apprehension of any of
which war upon the ocean is apt to pre-
cipitate upon the vessels, both commercial
and national, and upon consular officers of
other powers. calls for the definition of
their relations to the parties to the contest.
Considered as question of eXpediency.
regard the accordance of belligerent rights
still to be as unWise and premature as re-
gard 1T to be, at present indefensible as
measure of right.
Such recognition entails upon the coun-
try according the rights which flow from it
difficult and complicated duties, and re-
quireS the eXaction from the contending
parties of the strict observance of their
rights and obligations. 1t confers the right
of search upon the high seas by vessels of
both parties; it would subject the carrying
of arms and munitions of war. which now
may be transported freely and without in
terruption, in vessels of the United States
to detention and to possible seizure: it
would give rise to countless vexatious ques-
tons, would release the parent government
from responsibility for acts done by the in
surgents, and would invest Spain with the
right to exercise the supervision recognized
by our treaty Of 1895 over our commerce on
the seas, very large part of which, in its
traffic between the Atlantic and the gulf
states and between all of them and the
waters which wash the shores Of Cuba.
The exercise of this supervision could
scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, GER
tainly' to collisions perilous to the peaceful
relations of the two states. There can be
little doubt as to what result such super
vision would before long draw this nation.
It would be unworthy Of the United States
suit, by measures of questionable right or
expediency, or by any indirection."
What Recognition Would Mean.
Turning to the practical aspects Of a rec
ignition of belligerency and reviewing its
inconvenience and positive dangers, still
further pertinent considerations appear.
In the code of nations there Is no such thing
as a naked recognition of belligerency I'M
accompanied by the assumption of interna-
tional neutrality Such recognition will
not confer upon either party to domestic
conflict status not heretofore actually
party to other states. The act of recogni-
ton usually takes the form of solemn
proclamation of neutrality which recites
the de facto condition Of belligerency as
it's motive. 1t announces a domestic law
of neutrality in declaring state. 1t assumes
the international obligations of neutral
in the presence of a public state OF war. 1t
warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they
violate those righteous obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect to be shielded
from the consequences. The right OF visit
and search on the seas and seizure of YES
sells and cargoes and contraband of war
and good prize under admiralty law must
legitimate consequence of a proclamation
of belligerency. While according the equal
belligerent rights defined by public law to
each party in our ports disfavors would be
imposed on both, which while nominally
equal would weigh heavily in behalf of
Spain herself. Possessing navy and con-
trolling the ports of Cuba her maritime
rights could be asserted not only for the
military investment of the island but up to
the margin of our own territorial waters,
and a condition of things would exist for
which the CubanS within their own domain
could not hope to create parallel; while
it's creation through aid or sympathy from
within our domain would be ever more I'M
possible than now, with the additional OBJ
legations of international neutrality we
would perforce assume.
Regarded, ut Present, as Unwise.
The enforcement of this enlarged and on
erous code Of neutrality would only be
influential within our own jurisdiction by
land and sea, and applicable by our own
instrumentalities. 1T. could impart to the
United States no jurisdiction between
Spain and the insurgents. 1t would give the
United States no right of intervention to
enforce the conduct of the strife within
the paramount authority of Spain accord
ing to the international code of war. For
these reasons / regard the recognition of
the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents
as now unwise, and therefore inadmissable.
Should that step hereafter be deemed wise
as measure of right and duty, the execu-
tive Will take it.
Intervention.
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds
failed to receive my most anxious ana
earnest consideration. But should such a
step be now taken, when it is apparent
that a hopeful change has supervened in
the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new
government has taken Office in the mother
country. 1t is pledged in advance to the
cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba
by the bayonet: that vague promises of re-
form after subjugation afford no solution
of the insular problem; that with SUBJ
stitution of commanders must come
change of the past system of warfare for
one in harmony with new policy which
shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to
the horrible alternative of taking to the
thicket or succumbing in misery" that re-
forms must be instituted in accordance
with the needs and circumstances of the
time, and that these reforms, while de-
signed to give full autonomy to the colony
and to create a virtual entity and self-con-
trolled administration, shall yet conserve
and affirm the sovereignty of Spain by
just distribution of powers and burdens
upon basis Of mutual interest, untainted
by methods of selfish expediency.
Lies in Honorable Paths.
The first acts of the new government lie
In these honorable paths. The policy of
cruel rap1ne and determination that so
long shocked the universal sentiment of
humanity has been reversed. Under the
new military commander broad clemency
is pronered Measures have already been
set on foot to relieve the horrors of starva-
ton. The power of the Spanish armies, it
is asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin
and desolation, but to protect the resunp-
ton OF peaceful agricultural pursuits and
productive industries. That past methods
are futile to force a peace by Subjugation is
freely admitted, and that ruin without con-
Citation must inevitably fail to win for
Spain the fidelity of a contented deDend-