Evening journal., 1897-12-07

the gold reserve falls below 500 600 600 /
how win II be replenished except by
selling more bonds?
A SERIOUS QUESTION.
Is there any other way practicable
under existing law2 The serious ques-
tion then is. Shall we continue the pol
icy that has been pursued in the past
that is, when the gold reserve reaches
the point OF danger issue more bonds
and supply the needed gold-or shall we
provide other means TO prevent these
recurring drains upon the gold reserve2
IL no further legislation IS had and the
policy OF selling bonds is to De contin-
ued, then congress should give the sec
retary Of the treasury authority to sen
bonds at long or short periods bearing
n less rate OF interest than is now au-
thorized by law.
/ earnestly recommend as soon as the
receipts Of the government are quite
sufficient 20 pay all the expenses OF
the government that when any OF the
United States notes are presented for
redemption In gold and are redeemed In
gold such notes shall be kept and set
apart and only paid out IN exchange
for gold. This is an obvious duty. II
the holder of the United States note
prefers the gold and gets IL from the
| government, he should not receive back
from the government q United states
note without paying gold in exchange
for IT, The reason for this Is made all
the more apparent when the govern
ment issues an interest bearing debt 10
provide gold for the redemption Of
/ United States notes-a noninterest
bearing debt. Surely It should not pay
them out again except on demand ana
for gold If they are put out In any
other way, they may return again, to be
| followed by another bond issue TO re-
deem them-another interest bearing
| debt 10 redeem a noninterest bearing
/ debt.
In my view 1t is of the utmost
| Importance that the government should
be relieved from the burden of provid-
/ ing all the gold required for exchanges
and export This responsibility is alone
borne by the government without any
of the usual and necessary banking
powers to help Itself.
AN AWFUL STRAIN.
The banks do not feel the strain of
gold redemption. The whole strain rests
upon the government and the size OF
the gold reserve in the treasury has
come to be. with or without reason, the
signal of danger or of security. This
ought 10 be stopped.
II we are to have any era of pros
perity in the country. with sufficient
receipts for the expenses of the govern
ment. we may feel no immediate em-
barrassmcnt from our present curren-
cy. but the danger still exists and will
be ever present. menacing us so long
as the existing system continues. and
besides Il is In times Of adequate rev.
enues and business tranquility that the
| government should prepare for the
worst We cannot avoid, without seri-
Gus consequences. the wise considera-
tion and prompt solution of this ques-
tion.
The secretary of the treasury has
outlined a plan in great detail for the
purpose Of removing the threatened re-
currence Of a depleted gold reserve and
70 save us from future embarrassment
on that account. To this plan l invite
your careful consideration.
concur with the secretary Of the
treasury i'm his recommendation that
national banks be allowed to issue notes
TO the face value Of the bonds which
they have deposited for circulation and
that the tax on circulating notes Sc
cured by deposit OF such bonds be re-
duced TO one-half OF / per cent per an
num- I also Join him in recommending
that authority he given for the estab-
lishnent Of national banks of a mini
mum capital stock of $4,000. This will
enable the smaller villages and agri-
cultural regions Of the country TO be
supplied with currency TO meet their
needs.
recommend that the issue of nation
/. f..N.. 4 10. la. ln
, nomination of $40 and upward If tho
suggestions ! have herein made shall
have the approval Of congress-, then
: would recommend that national banks
/ be required TO redeem their notes II
gold.
) SPAIN AND CUBA.
= The most important problem will
r which this government is now calle'
e upon TO deal with pertaining to its for
e eign relations concerns its duty towar'
( Spain and the Cuban insurrection Prob
81 lens and conditions more or less II
q common with those now existing hav
e confronted this government at variou
r times in the past. The story Of Cub
;, for many years has been one OF unrest
e growing discomfort, an effort toward
larger enjoyment Of liberty and sci
e control. of organized resistance TO tn
{ mother country, of depression after dis
70 tress and warfare and OF Intellectual set
G tlement to be followed by renewed re
y volt. For no enduring period since tn
r onfranchisement of the continental pos
d ! sessions Of Spain in the western cont
e nent has the condition OF Cuba or tn
= policy of Spain toward Cuba not cause
- concern to the United States.
The prospect from time TO- time tina
the weakness Of Spain's hold upon IN
a island and the present vicssitudes an
n embarrassments OF the home govern
ment might lead to the transfer Of Cub
I, to a continental power called forth. be
n tween 1923 and 1860. various emphat
n declarations Of the policy Of the Unite
"a States to permit no disturbance OF CT
a ba's connection with Spain unless I
! the direction of independence or az
,s QUESTION by us through purchase; ne
- has there been any change Of this q,
\ clared policy since upon the part of II
10 government.
i, The revolution which began in 1Sl
il, lasted for ten years despite the strenl
=, Gus efforts of the successive peninsula
governments 20 suppress It. Then.
, now. the government OF the Unite
ct,tos toctfGod ffe nraya cppoorr, &, 4,