New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1897-02-01

broken. His principle is that there are no leaps
: no hiatus. vacuum in nature. His bitteres
scientific quarrel was with the Newtonians, VIII
held that gravitation could exist between bodie
separated by absolute vacancy.
All these characteristics Of Leibnitz's thought
even those which seem to the so-caed practica
mind to be tinged with absurdity, have the
counterpart In modern thought Nothing Il
more fundamental In science now than the belle
that nature makes no leaps. When Leibn't;
talks OF intelligences higher than man, he an
ticipates the speculations Of Wallace. When h'
explains his ideas Of progress in nature, he uses
words like an evolutonist. When he speaks OF
the immortality Of his monads. Of the indestruc
tibility Of life principles, he foreshadows the
theories Of Weissman as to the endless continu-
ance Of germ cells. The parallel with Weissman
becomes all the more apparent when Lebntz
loses sight of his metaphysics. as he some
times does and gives his monads physical at
tributes, when Weissman drops his physiolo-
gy and begins to write like metaphysician.
In fact, according to Erdmann. LeibnitZ even
when he most idealist was nearer TO
modern materialism than a modern idealist
would be. Just as Locke had conceived Of spir-
It's only as perhaps material" he adds so Leib-
nitz ventures to maintain only that Quasi-sous,
or things like spirits are the real elements even
Of what is corporeal." But given Kuno Fisch-
| er's definition Of the monad-drawn rather from
! the accidental expressions Of Leibnitz than from
his deliberate statements-as always an anmat-
ed body, and the connection between Leibnitz
and Wessman becomes as close the interval
Of almost two hundred years and the utter dis
appearance Of some purely physical notions OF
the eighteenth century will allow.
The point upon which Leibnitz differed most
! StrenuOuSly existence
| Of innate ideas. Here also, Leibnitz was nearer
! to modern theories than his rival To Locke the
| individual mind was in every case at the begin
ming an absolutely blank tablet. on which expert
| ence was TO write what it could. No modern
man Of science talks thus Of the mind. For him
1t is written all over with the characters Of hered-
ty. with ancestral prepossessions, and with the
data Of an experience that reaches back TO an in
definite and perhaps inglorious past. One Won
ders sometimes If the modern human being has
any ideas that not innate. But for Leib-
nitz the question was purely metaphysical. He
pointed out that Locke's borrowed principle,
nothing in the intellect except what experience
put there" must be amended because the intel
lect there, and mind was confessedly an OBJ
ject to be observed as we'll as an observing SUBJ
ject He conceded, however the Importance Of
the motive which led Locke TO base his whole
a rigid discipline those who under the specous
preteXt Of innate ideas and Of truths naturally
engraved upon the mind. to which we readily
give our consent care nothing about investi
eating considering the sources, the relations
and the certainty Of this knowledge" Jus
tifiabe and praseworthy Leibnitz declared that
he would go even further and would have a
formal demonstration even for axioms. In this |
severely fundamental scheme Lebntz presaged |
modern methods in geometry. But he did not |
think that proof even If perfect would increase
the certainty Of necessary truth
This is obvious in his effort to render irrefra-
gable the famous argument OF Anselm for the ex
istence Of God. Il have" said Anselm, in effect,
IAN idea Of being OF supreme grandeur and
perfection. including every degree OF grandeur
and perfection But one degree Of perfection-the
very highest in fact-without which my idea Of a
perfect being could not be- is existence. IT,
therefore. my idea Of a perfect being Is perfec-
ton in idea then this perfect being must exist"
Leibnitz maintained that most Of the previous
criticism on this demonstration wrong. His
view was that without the az" In the last sem
tence the proof would be complete. 1t assumes
something that must still be proved in order to
render IL mathematically evident: that is il IL
tacitly assumed that this idea Of the al-great or
all-perfect being is possible and implies no con-
tradiction.' To remedy this defect he sought
frst to define the noun perfection" Any def
milton that could be given would imply simplicity
and infnity. If a perfection could be resolved
into Itself and something else or II a limit could
be put TO 1t. 1t would not be perfect To prove
that any perfection is Incompatible with any
other perfection 1t is necessary to define each
and definition necesstates either division or
neither Of which is possible. There
II
projections. Thus the idea OF being possessed
OF all projections is possible. Hence this being
must exist since existence Is contained in the
lidity Of this proof but after Lebntz put It in
writing he conceded it's solidity. Nevertheless
1t Is still open TO an objection. The idea Of the
most perfect being Is, according to Leibnitz's
proof built up in the mind by adding perfection |
to perfection. To complete il the mind finally
10 all the other simple ideas which go TO make
up the complex adds that Of existence: II IS not
existence that 1t adds but only the idea of en- !
stence. Thus the proof lacks the universally t
If mathematical demonstration. Leibnitz |
himself seems to acknowledge this when he es- [
Inmates the moral weight OF Anselm's proof in
erms such as he or Bishop Butler would use in
! case Of conscience.
Though Leibnttz discusses innate ideas at
'reat iehBtn' the burden OF his criticism-a thor
'ughy Just one-upon Locke Is that the lat i
er did not distinguish with sufficient care
he origin Of the necessary truths. whose source I
S in the understanding. from that OF truths a
II fact drawn from the experience Of the e
enses, nor even from those confused percep-
Ions which occur to the mind. From his own 4
'oint OF view the question was really not an =
pen one In assuming the existence of his
nonads, he assumed also all the potencies with
Which he endowed them. With these granted
was impossible for him to concede that the 7
mind ever ceased thinking even in the most i
rofcund slumber This is still debatabIe :
uestion among psychologists the answer TO Il N
cling cnlnred In ri OH h..4 81 s.