The new dominion. [volume] (Morgantown, W. Va.) 1876-1904, 1897-05-08
The Erect or War on Prices for
Wheat.

the hostilities which have been going
ON in Thessaly cannot of themselves
have had the slightest influence on
the value of American wheat. Greece
and Turkey neither buy nor sell
wheat to any extent, whether they
are at peace or war. The total value
of all our exports to both countries
is about 100000 year, and wheat
is not even an item in that small ac-
count. The excitement in our wheat
markets has, therefore, been purely
speculative. 1t has been based on
the expectation that the war be-
tween Turkey and Greece would
eventually draw in some of the great
powers of Europe, which at present,
at least, doss not seem probable.
IL is a popular error to suppose
that the existence of a state of war
between any two or three countries
in Europe would necessarily mean a
large advance in the price of Ameri-
can wheat. At the commencement
of hostilities there would be an up
ward movement of prices, but unless
the war, as it progressed, actually
created large disturbance in the
ordinary conditions of the worlds
supply of wheat the higher prices
would not long be maintained. This
was shown in 1877, when war broke
out between Russia and Turkey. At
first American wheat went up fifty
cents bushel, the anticipation be-
ing that Russia's regular contribu-
ton to the worlds wheat supply
would be seriously diminished, and
there was feeling, far more acute
than now prevails, that the other
powers of Europe would be drawn
into the fight. The spectators were
disappointed in both expectations.
The other powers were not drawn in
and the Russian wheat crop for
1877 was larger by almost 100000
900 bushels than in 1876, so that
she exported rs per cent more wheat
during that year than in the preced-
ing year of peace. This precedent
and the natural conditions that gov
ern the matter make it highly i'm
probable that the war now on in the
East would create any great extra
demand for our wheat, even though
Russia and Austria should be added
to the list of combatants. Unless
Russia and Austrir should not only
enter the fight, but should draw
Great Britain in after them as an
antagonist, there would be no formi-
dable interference with the regular
course of wheat prod uction and
trade.
In considering the probabilities of
an advance in the price of Ameri-
can wheat that could be maintained
for long period the British mark
cts are the pivots of the situation. If
the supply of wheat to those mark
cts from other countries than our
own is not shut Off to considerable
extent, there will be no rise in the
price of our wheat that can be long
continued. The SPECTATORS in the
wheat pits may, of course, carry on
a bull movement for few DAYS,
based upon alarmist cablegrams
pointing to an enlargement of the
area of war, but unless the enlarge
ment comes, and in such way as
to draw England into the contest,
these bull movements cannot last
long. The appearance of England
as combatant in the East, partic-
ularly if opposed to Russia, would
certainly send up the price of Amer
lean wheat to very high figures.
Russia sends on an average about
100000 bushels of wheat into the
worlds markets to compete with
ours, and it is doubtful if she would
be able to send out single bushel
of it during war between herself
and Great Britain. She certainly
could net hope to keep the seas with
her inferior navy, and on the land
side France and Germany are the
only countries that import wheat,
and if Austria were hostile to Russia
those markets would probably be
closed to her also. Great Britain
needs to import about 10000, 900
bushels of wheat yearly to supply
her people. One-ninth of this total
is at present supplied by Russia;
Argentina supplies one-twelfth of it,
the United States supplies three
fifths of it and the British colonies
supply the small remainder. Out
side of England the principal wheat
importing countries of Europe are
France, which buys about 81, 600, 900
bushels a year, and Germany, Belgi-
UNI and Italy, which buy about 49,
100000 bushels of wheat each year.
ly.
1t is easily seen from these figures
that any war which throws Russia
out of the list of contributors to the
worlds commercial supply of wheat
must sharply increase the demand
for the American surplus. Any war
that brought France or Germany in
to the field would tend in the direc-
ton, but with less force, because
the two countries are both importers
and not exporters Of wheat, and the
only reason that their engagements
in war would tend to send wheat up
is that their own crops would be ex-
pected to fall off, while their action
as belligerents would increase the