The star. (Reynoldsville, Pa.) 1892-1946, 1897-12-08

ties to the contest. Considered as n
question Of expediency. I regard the
accordance of beligerent rights still TO
be as unwise and premature as I re-
gard 1t to be, at present, indefensible
as a measure of right.
Such a recognition entails upon the
country accordingto the rights which
flow from II difficult and cimplicated
duties, and requires the exaction from
the contending parties of the strict OBJ
servance of their rights and obliga-
tions. 1t confers the right of search
upon the high seas by vessels of both
parties; II would subject the carrying
of arms and munitions of war, which
now may be transported freely and
without interruption in vessels Of the
United States, to detention and to pos
sible seizure 1t would give rise to
countless vexatious questions. would
release the parent government from
responsibility for acts done by the in
surgents and would invest Spain with
the right to exercise the supervision
recognized by cur treaty 1895 over
our commerce on the high seas. very
large part of which, I'm its traffic be-
tween the Atlantic and the Gulf states.
and between all of them and the states
On the Pacific, passes through the
waters which wash the shores of Gu
could scarce fail to lead. II not TO
abuses, certainly to collisions perilous
to the peaceful relations of the two
nations. There can be little doubt as
to what result such supervision would
before long draw this nation. 1t would
be unworthy of the United states to
inaugurate the possibilities Of such Il
result, by measures II questionable
right or expediency, or by any indis-
cretion.
Turning to the practical aspects OF
recognition of belligerency and review
ing its inconvenience and positive
dangers, still further pertinent consid-
erations appear, In the code of ma
tions there is no such thing as naked
recognition of belligerency unaccom-
panied by the assumption of interna-
tional neutrality. Such recognition
will not confer upon either party to a
domestic conflict status not therefore
actually possessed of affect the rela-
tions of either party to other states.
The act of recognition usually takes
the form of solemn proclamation OF
neutrality, which relates the de facto
condition of beligerency as its motive.
II announces n domestic law of neu-
trality in the declaring state. It as
sumes the international obligations OF
a neutral In the presence of a public
state of war. 1t warns all citizens
and others within the jurisdiction of
the proclaimant that they violate those
rigorous obligations at their own peril
and cannot expect to he shielded from
the consequences. The right of visit
and search on the seas and seizure of
vessels and cargoes and contraband Of
war and good prize under admiralty
law must under international law be
Il 11,4ttt ta1 Iasr 81
of proclamation of belligerency.
While according the equal belligerent
rights defined by public law TO each
party in our ports disfavors would be
imposed on both. which while nomn-
ally equal would weigh heavily in be-
half of Spain herself Possessing a
navy and controlling the ports of Cuba
her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment of
the island. but up to the margin of otfr
own territorial waters, and a condi-
tion of things would exist for which
the Cubans within their own domain
could not hope to create a parallel;
while its creation through aid of SYM
pathy from within our domain would
be even more impossible than now
with the additional obligations of in
ternational neutrality we would per-
force assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged and
onerous code of neutrality would only
be influential within our own jurisdic-
tion by land and sea and applicable to
our own instrumentalities. 1t could
impart to the United States no right of
intervention to enforce the conduct of
the strife within the paramount au-
thority of Spain according to the inter-
national code of war
For those ron sons I rppo ri fbn ranor.
milton of the belligerency of the Cuban
insurgents as now unwise. and there
fore inadmssible. Should that step
hereafter be deemed wise as a measure
of right and duty the executive will
take il.
Intervention upon humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggested
and has not failed to receive my most
anxious and earnest consideration. But
should such a step be now taken when
1t is apparent, that hopeful change
has supervened in the policy OF Spain
toward Cuba? A new government has
taken office in the mother country. II
Is pledged in advance to the declaration
that all the effort In the world cannot
suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by
the bayonet; that vague promises OF
reform after subjugation afford no solu-
tion of the insular problem; that with a
substitution OF commanders must come
change of the past system of warfare
for one in harmony with a new policy
which shall no longer aim to drive the
Cubans to the horrible alternative OF
taking to the thicket or succumbing In
misery" that reforms must be insti-
tuted in accordance with the needs and
circumstances of the time, and that
these reforms, while designed to give
full autonomy to the colony and tC
create virtual entity and self con-
trolled administration, shall yet con.
serve and affirm the sovereignty oi
Spain by just distribution OF powers
| and burdens upon basis of mutual in
terest untalnted by methods of selfish
expediency.
The first acts of the new government
| lie in these honorable paths. The policy
of cruel rapine and determination thai
so long shocked the universal sentiment
of humanity has been reversed. Under
| the new military commander a broad
clemency Is preferred. Measures have
already been set on foot to relieve the
horrors OF starvation. The power ol
the Spanish armies, II Is asserted, is tc
be used not to spread ruin and dissola
| tior. but to protect the resumption OF
| peaceful agricultural pursuits and pro-
ductive Industries. That past method,
are futile to force peace by subjuga.
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