The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-03-21

solid military qualities TO desist from seeking
enemies still valid, in order to enjoy what Nelson
calls the parade of taking possession OF bcaten
enemies" Our author deems It probable that
moro Spanish ships might have been secured
at Cape st. Vincent had 1t not been
for the eagerncss Of some British vessels
TO push on to now combats. But, while
fully allowing for the merits of many others,
from tho Commander.in-Chief down, he pro-
nounces 1t true of st. Vincent, as of most battles,
that there was a particular moment on which
success or failure hinged, and that upon the
action then taken depended tho chief outcome;
q decisive moment, In short That moment was
when tho enomy attempted, with a fair prospect
Of success, to effect tho junction which Nelson
foiled. As Collingwood afterward summed up
tho matter: The highest rewards are duo TO
you and Culloden. You formed the plan of at
tack; we were only accessories to the Dons' ruin.
For, had they got on tho other tack, they would
have been soon conjoined and the business would
have boon less complete"
Nelson's account of tho proceedings Of his ship.
the Captain, in the battle Of Cape st. Vincent.
on Feb. II, 1897, having been published not long
afterward, apparently by his authority. was
challenged as incorrect by Vice.Admiral Will
liam Parker, commanding the van, whose flag
was on board the third British ship, the Prince
George. Parker claimed that the latter, with
tho Blenheim and the Orion, had been much
closer to the Captain and Culloden than was Inn
piled in Nelson's narrative. Our author consid-
ers Nelson's account a simple IL somewhat ex-
ultant description Of the facts as thoy passed
under his observation; except In the statement
to which Parker objected, his assertions do not,
even inferentially, carry an imputation upon any
one else. Nevertheless. while Capt. Mahan con-
cedcs that the love of glory Is among
the most potent and elevating of mill
tary motives, and that in no breast has
1t burned with q purcr flame than in
that of Nelson. he nevertheless suggests that 1t
is better for officers to leave tho public telling
OF their own exploits to others, and he deems 1t
evident that Nelson. when taken to task, real
lied, uncomfortably, that he had not exercised
duo thoughtfulness. Before dropping the sub
ject, Capt. Mahan thinks it right to say that
Nelson had held from tho first that Colling-
wood. Troubridge, and himself were the only
ones who made great exertions on that glori-
GUS day; the others did their duty, and some
not exactly to my satisfaction" "Sir John
Jervis," he continued, sis not quito con-
tented. but says nothing publicly" He then
quotes an anecdote, which. if he had it
from Jervis, confirms his own opinion
about tho support given. Calder. the Chief
Of Staff. said. Sir. the Captain and Gull
loden are separated from tho fleet and unsup-
ported; shall we recall themf L will not said
Jervis, have them recalled. I put my faith in
those ships; II is n disgrace that they are not
supported and are separated" In his public
letter Jervis refrained alike from praise
and from blame. He mentioned but one name,
that of Calder. MS bearer OF dispatches. and only
incidentally said that he had been useful to him
at all times. In a private letter to the First
Lord Of the Admiralty he was more explicit, yet
scarcely adequately so. He named Troubridge,
Nelson, and Collingwood, but expressed himself
ma .cpnfdent that had thoaa who wara 1past in |
action been in the situation of tho fortunate
few. their conduct would not have been less
meritorious." Another anecdote Of Jervis.
however, shows the Importance which was
really conceded by him to Nelson's action. 1t is
characteristic of one who valued beyond most
traits in an officer the willingness to assume re-
sponsibility. THE test of a mans cour-
age" Jervis used to say, ais RESPONSE
bility." In the evening following the battle.
while talking over the events Of the day. Calder,
1t seems, spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the
line as an unauthorized departure from the
method of attack prescribed by the Admiral.
ut certainly was 90" replied Jervis. land IL
ever you commit such a breach Of your orders I
will forgive you also" Success covers many
faults, yet, in Capt. Mahan's opinion. 1t is diff
cult to believe that, even had Nelson been over
whelmed in the execution Of his unauthorized
manouvre at Cape st. Vincent, tho soundness
Of his Judgment and his resolution would not
equally have had the applause Of q man who
had just fought twenty-seven ships with fifteen,
because a victory was essential to England at
that moment" The author of this book submits
that the justification Of departure from orders
lies not In success, but in tho conditions of tho
case: and Jervis was not one to overlook these,
nor. thereafter, to forget that only one man In his
fleet had both seen the thing to do and dared tho
responsibility of doing II.