The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-07-09

taeh6s doing special duty ; these also, then,
were shut OF from taking any active part
in military operations. The remnant Of the
army, not detached for garrison or special
duty, say Do 5000 men, Is divided into
columns, which march with little purpose
from one fortified town to another. Now
and then a band Of rebels will be met; II the
Spanish soldiers repulse them, they allow
them to ride OF unpursued. They fear to
pursue, lest they be led into n narrow pass
and shot to pieces, q fate which many .
Spanish column has encountered.
As q rule, in the field the Spanish invader
acts more frequently on the defensive than
on the aggressive. This Is not the way
in which instructions are subdued. There
arc, 1t seems, Spanish Generals in Cuba
who hold that WEYLER should have put
down the rebellion within ninety days. Mr..
ALvoRD thinks that the same view would
be taken by any unparalleled military
authority, who had studied the forces
on both sides, and made due allow
ances for the advantages possessed by those
who fight upon their native soil. The
motives actuating WEYLER in allowing the
war to drag along, and prompting q largo
portion of the staff and line to support
the policy of their superior were indicated
by an incident.
On an American sugar estate Mr.. Al
voRp had absolute proof that thousands OF
dollars were paid to q Spanish General In
order that troops might be stationed there
to protect the ripened cane from the In
surgents. At breakfast one morning tho
manager of the estate jokingly asked tho
Colonel Of a column II the war were
not turning out too profitable to be
speedily closed. The Colonel replied In an
assumed toni Of injury: You make a crop
every year; we do not get a chance to mako
one in ten years. This Ia our harvest. You
ought to be charitable and let us alone"
What the Spanish officers term their har-
vest Is derived not only from property owl.
ers on the island, but from the money
raine from Spain ~ostensibly for tho pur-
pose of maintaining war. The vast num-
Der Of superfiuous forts built has cost
Spain an enormous sum, for, although the
soldiers did the manual work, there was
much expensive material to be bought. and
contractors had to oversee the building.
Then, again, the money of Spain is wasted
VI ueeQleSo trduspOFUhtiVu- LEoopS ato IL
cessantly moved by sea, when they could
be more quickly and easily moved by land.
Tho inevitable inference Is that an under.
standing as to commissions exists between
the steamboat companies and the military
authorities.
With regard to the charge that tho Cuban
instruction is mainly a negro uprising,
Mr.. ALvoRD admits that at tho outset few
-ufthe white GHbans were m favor Of IL. On
the o.her hand he ~testiies that to-day the
whole of the white native population is ac-
lively or secretly trying to throw of the
Spanish yoke. 1t is true that only q small
percentage of the white Cubans have
Joined the insurgents, ranks, though even
in the army the proportion Of whites
to negroes is about ten to four; the great
bulk, In other words, Of the force in the
field is made up of educated, patriotic,
white Cubans who are struggling for the
independence Of their country. It is only
the impossibility Of securing arms that
keeps the ostensibly peaceful Cuban out OF
the active conflict. Those who do not 20
out to fight for lack of weapons are daily
risking deportation or lifelong imprison.
ment in chains to help their brothers in
the "long grass"