The Beaver herald. [volume] (Beaver, O.T. [Okla.]) 1895-1923, 1897-12-16

BEEN made In diplomatic issues Throughout
all these horrors and dangers 10 our own peace
this government has never In any way abrogated
its sovereign prerogative Of preserving to itself
the determination OF it, policy and course nc
cording TO lts own high sense OF right and in
consonance with the dearest interests and
convictions OF our own people should the pro-
longation OF the strife so demand
or the untried measures there remain only
Recognition OF the insurgents as belligerents;
recognition of the Independence OF Cuba. neu-
tral Intervention 10 end the war by imposing n
rational compromise between the contestant,
and Intervention In favor OF one or the other
party. speak not Of forcible annexation. for
that cannot he thought OF That, by our code
OF morality would he criminal aggression
Recognition of B-iiirerency.
Recognition OF the bellgerency OF the Cuban
insurgents has often been canvassed rs pos
sibe II not Inevitable step both in regard to
the previous ten years struggle and during the
present war. 1 am not unmindful that the two
houses OF congress In the spring Of 1898 ex-
pressed the opinion by concurrent resolution
that condition OF public war existed requiring
or justifying the recognition Of a state Of bellg
erency in Cuba and during the extra session the
senate voted Joint resolution OF like import,
which. however, was not brought to n vote in
the house. In the presence OF these significant
expressions Of the sentiment OF the legislative
branch II behooves the executive to soberly
consider the conditions unuer Wnlcn so lmpOr-
tant measure must needs rest for justihca-
tim IL is to be seriously consid-
e,ed whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood which alone can demand the recog-
milton OF belligereDcy in It's favor. Possession.
in short, Of the essential qualifications of SOW
orcignty BY the insurgents and the conduct Of
the war by them according to the received code
OF war are no less important factors toward the
determination of the problem OF belligerency
than are the influences and consequences OF the
struggle upon the Internal policy OF the rccog-
nizng state.
Turning TO the practical aspects of n recogni-
ton OF beligcrency and reviewing its incon-
| yeniences and positive dangers still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code
| of nations there Is no such thing aS a naked
recognition Of belligerency unaccompanied by
the assumption Of international neutrality
| Such recognition without more will not con-
fer upon either party to domestic conflict n
| status not theretofore actually possessed or af-
feet the relation OF either party to other states
The act OF recognition usually takes the
form of o solemn proclamation of neutrality
which recites the de facto condition of belliger-
ency its motives IL announces a domestic
law OF neutrality in the declaring state. 1t as
sumes the international obligations OF a neu-
trail in the presence OF public state OF war.
| IL warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction OF the proclaimant that they vio-
| late those rigorous obligations at their own
peril and cannot expect TO be shielded from the
consequences. The right of visit and search
on the seas and seizure Of vessels and cargoeS
and contraband of war and good prize under
| admiralty law must under international
law be admitted legitimate con-
sequence OF proclamation of bel
lgerency. While according the equal
belligerent rights defined by public law to
each party in our ports disfavors would be i'm
posed on both which, while nominally equal
| would weigh heavily In behalf Of Spain herself
| Possessing navy and controlling the ports
OF Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted
| not only for the military investment of the
| island, but up to the margin OF our own terri
| torial waters, and a condition Of things would
exist for W hich the Cubans within their own
domain could not hope to create o parallel:
| while its creation through aid or sympathy
from within our domain would be even more
| impossible than now with the additional
obligations OF international neutrality we
would perforce assume.
| Recognition Now Deemed Unwise.
The enforcement OF this enlarged and oner-
Gus code OF neutrality would only be influential
| within own jurisdiction by land and sea
and applicable by our own instrumentalitv. 1t
could impart to the United States no jurisdic-
tion between Spain and the insurgents 1t
would give the United States no right of inter-
vention to enforce the conduct OF the strife
within the paramount authority OF Spain ac-
ccrding to the international code Of war. For
these reasons l regard the recognition OF the
beiperency OF the Cuban insurgents as now
unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should
that step hereafter BE- deemed wise meas
ure of right and duty the executive will take It,
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has
been frequently suggested and has not failed
to receive my most anxious and earnest con-
sideration. But should such step be now
taken when 1t is apparent that n hopeful change
has supervened in the policy of Spain toward
| Cubay new government has taken office in
q hR y
to the declaration that all the effort in the
world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba
by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform
after subiugation afford solution OF the
nsular problem; that with a substitution OF
| commanders must come u change OF the past
| system OF warfare for one in harmony with q
new policy which shall no longer aim to drive
the Cubans to the horrible alternative OF
taking TO the thcket or Succumbing in misery"
that reforms must be instituted In accordance
| with the needs and circumstances of the time,
| and that these reforms while designed to give
| full autonomy to the colony and to create a
virtual entity and self-controlled administra-
tioL. shall yet conserve and affirm the sover-
eighty OF Spain by u just distribution Of pow
ers and burdens upon % basis OF mutual inter-
est untainted by methods Of selfish eXpediency.
| Policy of determination Reversed.
The first acts of the new government lie In
these honorable paths The policy of cruel ra-
pine and determination that so long shocked
| tne ullNelSul sentiment OF immunity mas Detu
! reversed Under the new military commander
n broad clemency is proffered Measures have
| already been set on foot to relieve the horrors
OF starvation. The power of the Spanish
armies, 1t is asserted is to be used not to
| spread ruin and desolation. but TO protect the
| resumption OF peaceful agricultural pursuits
and productive industries That past methods
are futile to force peace by subjugation IS
| freely admitted and that ruin without coDcilia-
| tion must inevitably fail to win for Spain the
| fidelity of a contented dependency. DEGREES in
application OF the foreshadowed reforms have
already been promulgated
The Near Future win Tell.
| Not a single American citizen Is now under
| arrest or in confinement in Cuba. of whom this
government has any knowledge The neal
future will demonstrate whether the indis-
pensabe condition OF o righteous peace Just
alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well ns
equitable 10 all our interests so intimately IN
volved In the welfare of Cuba, is likely 20 bt
attained II not the exigency OF further anc
other action by the United States will remain
To be taken. WheG that time comes that actor
will be determined in the line Of indis
put able right and duty II will he faced with
out migivings or hesitancy in the light OF tn,
obligation this government owes to itself q
the,people who have con hded TO it the protection
of their interests and honor, and TO humanity
Hawaiian Annexation.
BY a special message dated the 18th day o
June last, i laid before the senate q treaty
signed that day by the plenipotentiaries OF th'
United States and OF the republic OF Hawaii
having for its purpose the Incorporation OF tbs