The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-07-25
Would England Insure Her Merchant
Vessels in tho Event of War?

plying the United nHdom Win 1000 In
war time Is contributed by Lieut.. Col. G.. S. |
CLARKE to the July number of the Ma
tiona Reuieu. We call this article sensi-
BILE. because it discards as impracticable
most Of the remedies proposed, though
there are objections to the suggestion
which 1t advocates. which was made by
the late Admiral Sir GEORGE TRYoN. that
upon the outbreak OF war the State should
not leave its mercantile marine at the
mercy of private underwriters, who would
be likely to make food SO costly that the
poor would s~tarve, but should itself under
take to insure all seagoing vessels against
marine risks.
The author begins by recognizing the ex-
treme gravity Of the problem, which is
greatly moderated by those who contine
their attention to wheat. 1t is true that, OF
the $l7S, 500. 900 expended by England in
1895 upon wheat and wheat flour, only
$27, 800, 900 was required to purchase the
amount that was homegrown. OF the rest
Of the money, about $780, 600, 900 went to
the United States and Russia, our own
country obtaining nearly two-thirds there
OF. The value Of the imported wheat and
-four, however, constituted only about IS
per cent. of the total value of food products
sent from outside countries to the British
Isles, which in 1896 exceeded $3.50, 000,.
600. Even if, therefore, it were possible
by any of the three methods proposed to
avert a wheat famine, there would still re-
main the far greater difficulty of providing
the other four.fifths of the food supply now
derived from external purveyors. Every
2.o - A. ,l..a --a.1Al. No.
ever, Of making good even the deficit in
wheat that is expected to occur in wartime,
is pronounced not feasible by Sir G.. S.
CLARKE. For instance, the proposal to
rende England se~lf-supporting by means
of import duties is declared TO be wholly
beyond the scope Of practical politics,
for the reason that bread Is the staple
food only Of the poorest, and nc British
Government in these days would dare to
Increase the cost Of the principal nutrimcnt
of the toiling millions. That bounties
would not avail TO bring a sufficient addi-
tional area of land under cultivation the
writer shows by pointing out that the extra
area required would be nearly 1000, 600
| acres, and these are not obtainablc in Great
Britain except at the expense OF pasture
'hthNa' 'AA,h - oAh -
down the meat supply. Obviously, it
would be just as difficult to i'm
port meat In war time as 1t would
be to import grain. The third recon-.
mende solution of the problem is the es-
Enlistment of State granaries of wheat,
some proposing a reserve OF twenty-five
| million quarters, while others think that
ten millions would suffice. In the first
place, wheat deteriorates rapidly in flavor
and value after removal from the stack TO
the warehouse; but, waving this objection,
we can see that the practical effect of State
granaries would be to make the buying and
selling Of wheat a function of the Govern
ment, which would thus revert to the an
cient fallacy that the State may control the
prices of commodities. Moreover, having
once interposed in the case of wheat, the
State would be unable to resist the demand
for a like interposition in the case of those
other imported food products which form,
as we have seen. four-tlfths of the whole.
There is, then, no practical method OF re-
plenishing Great Britain's food supply in
time Of war, except b. continuing to import
commodities from her trans-marine pur-
yeyors. This is not, however, the only rea-
son why to her a command OF the sea Is in
dispensable. The maintenance of the nor
NAL importations of food products would he
of no avail to her toiling multitudes I'M
less it were possible also to maintain
the normal importations of the raw ma
terials needed for her manufactures. Upon
such raw materials she expended In
1893 more than SSH, 100000. Cut off
those raw materials and British work
men could earn no money wherewith
to purchase food. 1t Is well known that
from 1861 to 1868 Lancashire, owing
to the stoppage of some so per cent. OF the
imports of raw cotton, experienced the
horrors of famine. Then, again. If manu-,
features stopped, exports would stop, and
without exports how would Great Britain
pay for her imported food stuffs, even
though We assume her to be able to trans
port them2 England's commerce, there
fore, must go on, and Sir &. S. LARKE
believes that, except in the probable con
tingency Of her war fleets being beaten at
sea, and thereby disqualified for the con
yoying function, 1t would go on. We are
reminded that during the wars against
NAPOLEON. although after Trafalgar all
the marine energies Of France and the
other States controlled by him were con
centrated upon the destruction of British
commerce, yet, as a matter of fact, the
number of vessels captured did not exceed
2 per cent. of the total volume Of British
shipping. Commerce, then. would proceed
but, ii the underwriters were left to them
selves, 1t would proceed under conditions
which would seriously enhance the prices
OF food stuffs. For, although In the Ma
poleonic wars the proportion of captures t.
the whole volume of shipping was small
yet the aggregate value OF vessels and car
goes lost was very large. Henc the rate
Of marine insurance rose to s and l.
per cent. for vessels under convoy
and to 20 per cent. for unprotected
voyages. 1t Ia to be borne in mind
moreover. that In the Nap9lsonic aa'