The record-union., 1897-12-07


doubt the attributes of Statehood which
alone can demand the recognition of
beliigerency in it's favor. Possession,
short of the essential qualifications of
sovereignty by the insurgents, and the
conduct of the war by them according
to the recognized code Of warfare, are
no less important factors toward the
determination of the problem of bellig-
erency, than are the influences and con-
sequences of the struggle upon the in
ternal policy of the recognizing State.
GRANTS UTTERANCES RELE-
Want TO THE PRESENT
SITUATION.
The wise utterances of President
Grant in his memorable message of De-
cember Z, 1870, are signally relevant to
the present situation in Cuba, and it
may be wholesome now to recall them.
AT that time a ruinous conflict had for
seven years wasted the neighboring is
land. During all those years an utter
disregard of the laws of civilized war
Iare and of the just demands of hu
manity, which called forth the express
ions of condemnation from the nations
or chrlstendom, continued unabated.
Desoiatlon and ruin pervaded that pro-
ouctlVe region, enormously affecting the
commerce of all commercial nations
but that of the United States more than
any other by reason of proximity and
larger trade and intercourse. AT that
Juncture, General Grant uttered these
words, which now as then sum up the
elements of the problem:
"A recognition of the independence of
Cuba being, in my opinion, impractic
able and indefensible. the question
which next presents itself is that of
the recognition of belligerent rights in
the parties to the contest. In a former
message to Congress l had occasion to
consider this question, and reached the
conclusion that the conflict in Cuba,
dreadful and devastating as were its
incidents, did not rise to the fearful dig
nity of war
1t is impossible that the acts of for
elgn Powers, and even acts of Spain her
self of this very nature might be
pointed to in defense of such recogni-
ton. But now, as in it's past history,
the United States should carefully avoid
the false lights which might lead it into
the maZes of doubtful law and of un
questionable propriety. and adhere
rigidly and sternly to the rule, which
has been its guide, of doing only that
which is right and honest and of good
report. The question of according or of
Withholding rights of belligerency must
be judged in every case, in view of the
particular attending facts. Unless jus
tilted by necessity it is always, and
justly, regarded as an unfriendly act
and gratuitous demonstration of moral
support to the rebellion. II is necessary
and it is required, when the interests
and rights of another Government or of
its people are SO far affected by a pend
ing civil conflict as to require a defini-
tion of its relations to the parties
| thereto. But this conflict must be one
which will be recognized in the sense of
| International law as war.
Belligerence too, is a fact. The mere
existence of contending armed bodies
and their occasional conflicts do not con-
stltute war in the sense referred to. APP
plying TO the existing conditions of af-
fairs in Cuba the tests recognized by
publicists and writer's on international
law. and which have been observed by
nations of dignity, honesty and power
when free from sensitive or selfish or
.nsurrection the existence of such a sub
stantial political organization, real, pal
pable and manifest to the world, having
the forms and capable of the ordinary
functions of ordinary Government to-
ward its own people and to other States
with courts for the administration of
justice, with local habitation, possess
ing such organization of force, such ma
3
take the contest out of the category of
a mere rebellious insurrection, or occa
sional skirmishes, and place it on the
terrible footing of war, to which a re-
cognition of belligerency would aim to
elevate it.
The contest, moreover, is solely on
land; the insurrection has not possessed
itself of single seaport whence it may
send forth its flag, nor has it any means
Of communication with foreign Powers
except through the military lines of its
adversaries. No apprehension of any of
these sudden and difficult complica-
tions which a war upon the ocean is
apt to precipitate upon the vessels. both
commercial and national, and upon the
consular officers of other Powers, calls
for the definition of their relations to the
parties to the contest.
Considered as question of expedi-
ency, I regard the accordance of bellig-
erent rights still to be as unwise and
premature as l regard it to be- at pres
ent. indefensible as a measure of right
Such recognition entails upon the coun-
try, according the rights which flow
from ii difficult and complicated duties
and requires the exaction from the con-
tending parties of the strict observance
of their rights and obligations. 1t con-
fers the right of search upon the high
seas by vessels Of both parties; it would
give rise to countless veXatious Ques-
fions; would release the parent Govern
ment from responsibility for acts done
by the insurgents and would invest
Spain with the right to exercise the su
| pervision recognized by our treaty of
1895 over the commerce on the high
seas. a very large part of which, in its
traffic between the Atlantic and the
Gulf states, and between all of them
and the States on the Pacific, passes
through the waters which wash the
shores of Cuba. The exercise of this
supervision could scarce fail to lead, if
not to abuses, certainly to collisions per-
| ilous to the peaceful relations of the
two States. There can be little doubt as
to what result such supervision would
! before long draw this nation. 1t would
be unworthy of the United States to in
augurate the possibilities of such result
/ by measure of questionable right or ex-
pediency. or by any indirection."
/ FURTHER PERTINENT CONSIDER
ATOMS.
Turning TO the practicable aspects of
a recognition Of belligerency. and re-