The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1897-12-10
the autonomy of Cuba while guarding

LII UHc absence OF q QeclaraUlOnEOI Gn6
measures that this government proposes
to take in carrying out it's proffer of good
offices, it suggests that Spain be left free
to conduct military operations and grant
political reforms, while the United States
for it's part shall enforce it's neutral obli-
cations and cut off the assistance which,
1t is asserted, the insurgents receive from
this country. The supposition of an in
definite prolongation of the war is de-
MED.
The immediate amelioration of existing
conditions under tho new administration
of Cuban affairs is predicted and there
withal the disturbance, and all occasion
for any change of attitude on the part Of
the United states.
Have Done Our Duty as to Filibusters.
Discussion of the question of the inter
national duties and responsibilities of the
United States, as Spain understands
them, is presented, with an apparent dis
position to charge us with failure in this
regard. This charge is without any basis
in TACT. 1t could not have been made If
Spain had been cognizant OF the constant
efforts this government has made, at the
cost OF millions and by the employment
OF the administrative machinery OF the
nation at command to perform its full
duty, according to the law of nations.
Due response to this charge has been
made in diplomatic course.
Throughout all these horrors and dan
gers to our o Tn peace this government
has never broken nor in any way abrO-
gated Its sovereign prerogatlve OF reserv-
ing to itself the determination of it's pol
icy and course according to it's own high
sense of right and in consonance with
the dearest interests and convictions of
our own people, should the prolongation
OF the strife SO demand
Three UntrIed Measures Yet Remain.
OF the untried measures there remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as
belligerents, recognition of the independ-
ence OF CUBA; neutral intervention to end
the war by imposing rational cOmpru-
mise between the contestants and inter
vention in favor of one or the other party.
l speak not of forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought of. That by our
code of morality would be criminal ag-
erosion.
The Question of BeIligerency.
Recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents has often been can
vassed as d possible if not inevitable step
both in regard to the previous 10 years
struggle and during the present war. /
am not unmlndful that the two houses Of
congress in the spring of 1896 expressed
the opinion by concurrent resolution that
a condition of public war existed requir-
ing or justifying the recognition of the
state OF belligerency in Cuba and during
the extra session the senate voted a joint
resolution of like import, which, how
ever, was not brought to vote in the
house of the representatives. In the
presence of these significant expressions
of the legislative branch it behooves
the executive to soberly consider
the conditions under which so
important a measure must need rest for
JUS Iitication 1t is to be seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of bellgerency in it's favor
Possession, in short, of the essential quail
iicatIons of sovereignty by the insurgents,
and the conduct of the war by them &C
cording to the reserved code of war are
no less important factors toward the de-
termination of belligerency than are the
influences and consequences of the strug-
gle upon the international policy of the
recognizing state.
Recalls Grants Utterauces.
The utterances of President Grant in his
memorable message of Dec. z, 1879, are
sisnally relevant to the present situation
in Cuba and it may be wholesome now to
recall them. The conditions were the
same then as now except that the war had
lnprar nd bo
even greater. The conclusions of Presi-
dent Grant were at that time, however
against recognition of belligerency, be-
cause he did not believe it in fact existed,
as belligerency is understood by the law of
nations.
Practical Aspects of Reco gnition.
Turning to the practical aspects of
recognition of belligerency and reviewing
it's Inconvenience and positive dangers,
still further pertinent considerations
appear. In the code of nations there is
no such thing as naked recognition of
belligerency unaccompanied by the as
sumption of International neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not
confer upon either party to the domestic
conflict status not heretofore actually
possessed, or affect the relation of either
party to other states The act of recogni-
ton usually takes the form of solemn
proclamation of neutrality which recites
the de facto condition of belligerency as
it's motive. 1t announces a domestic law
on neutrality in declaring state. 1t as
sumes international obligations of q neu-
trail in the presence of apublic state of war
1t warns all citizens and others within
the jurisdiction of the proclaimant
that they violate those righteous obliga-
lions at their own peril and cannot expect
to be shielded from the consequences
The right of visit and search on the seas
and seizure Of vessels and cargoes and
contraband Of war and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law be admitted as a legitimate conse-
quence OF proclamation of belligerency.
While according the equal belli gerent
rights defined by public law to each party
in our ports disfavors would be imposed
on both which, while nominallys equal
would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain
herself.
Would BE Bad for Cuba.
Possessing navy and controlling the
ports of Cnba her maritime rights could
be asserted not only for the military in
vestment of the island but up to the mar
gin of our own territorial waters and a
cond ton of things would exist for which
the Cubans within their own domain
could not hope to create parallel; while