The islander. [volume] (Friday Harbor, Wash.) 1891-1899, 1897-12-16

the Cuban insurrectfon possesses, beyond
dispute, the attributes of statehood which
alone can demand the recognition of bel
ligerency in its favor. Possession short
of the essential qualifications Of sover-
eighty by the insurgents. and the conduct
of the war by them according to the rec
ognized code of war are no less important
factors toward the determination of the
problem of belligerency than are the in
fiuences and consequences of the struggle
upon the internal policy Of the recognize
ing nation. The utterances of President
Grant in his memorable message of 1875
are signally relevant to the present situa-
ton in Cuba, and it may be wholesome
now to recall them. At that time a
serious conflict had for seven years wasted
the neighboring island. During all those
years an utter disregard of the laws of
civilized warfare and of the just demands
of humanity, which called forth express
sions of condemnation from the nations
of ChrfStendom, continued undated.
Desolation and ruin pervaded that pro-
ductive region, enormously affecting the
commerce of all commercial nations, but
that of the United States more than any
other, by reason of proximity and larger
trade and intercourse
Not a Time for Recognition.
Turning to the practical aspects of a
its inconveniences ard possible danger,
further pertinent considerations appear.
In the code of nations, there is no SUCH
thing as naked recognition of belliger-
ency unaccompanied by the assumption
of national neutrality. Such recognition
without neutrality will not confer upon
either party to a domestic conflict status
not therefore actually possessed, or aft
feet the relation of either. party to other
states. The act of recognition usually
takes the form of a solemn proclamat ton
of neutrality which recites the de facto
condition of belligerency as it's motive. 1t
announces a domestic law of neutrality
in the declaring state. 1t assumes the in
ternational obligation of neutral in the
presence of a public state of war 1t
warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction of the claimant that they vio-
late those rigorous obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect ITO be shield
ed from the consequence. The right of
visit, and search and seizure of vessels
and cargoes and contraband of war un-
der admiralty law must under interna-
tional law be admitted as legitimate
consequence of a proclamation of belliger-
ency While according equal belligerent
rights, defined by public law, to each par
ty in our ports, disfavor would be impos-
sible to both, which. while nominally
equal, would weigh heavily in behalf Of
Spain herself. Possessing navy and
claiming the ports of Cuba, her maritime
rights could be asserted. not only for
the military investment Of the island,
but up to the margin of our own terri
torial waters, and condition Of things
would exist for which the Cubans could not
hope to create a parallel; while aid from
within. our domain would be even more
impossible than now, with the additional
obligation of International neutrality
which we would perforce assume.
VIII Intervene When Necessary.
Sure of the right, keeping free from all
offense ourselves, actuated only by up
right and patriotic consi alterations, moved
neither by passion nor selfishness the
government will continue its watchful
care over the rights and property Of
American citizens and will abate none of
its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agencies peace which shall be honorable
and enduring. If it shall hereafter be a
duty imposed by our obligations to our
selves, to civilization and humanity to
intervene with force, it shall be without
fault on our part. and only because the
necessity for such action will be SO clear
as to command the support and approval
of the civilized world.