The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1897-05-12

50 badly shattered as the modern idea Of
the Greeks. 1t is no time to correctly esti-
mate them In the midst of their disaster.
as history win do il, but the impression
made upon the world by their conduct Of
the war will not be removed during the
present generation. Ii was felt that the
populace was driving the government into
a war for which il was not prepared. but
even the least sanguine had no idea of the
utter responsibility of the military au-
thorities and the incapacity of the army
as an organized body. Both officers and
men manifested courage when they had
to fight or die. but whenever the alterna-
tive has been presented to them of fighting
or running. they always ran. Some Of the
scenes described by undoubtedly veracious
correspondents have never been equaled,
except when military bodies have sought
10 scatter riotous and undisciplined mob.
The whole nation. from the king to the
peasant, seems to have been in condition
of panic. The king displayed his liability
to hold the people In control by asserting
first to the war and then to the demands
of Rail-. His son. the crown prince. from
whom so much was expected, has been
worse than useless as soldier. 1t would
not have been surprising had he been un-
qualified to direct an army and conduct a
campaign in opposition to such skiilful
veterans as Edhem Pasha and the German
tacticians who aided him. 1t was expected.
however. that the presence of the young
prince would have had a salutary effect
upon the rank and flle and would have
stimulated them to effort, at the same
time that 1t brought them more readily
into an obedience which had not been too
strictly enforced in time of peace. There
ride forward in advance of the army. 1t
would have been sufficient for him to show
himself willing to take his place In the
ranks. His interference with the cam
paign brought the usual consequence of
meddling by one who is utterly unfamiliar
with the responsibilities he assumes. Yet
1t is hardly possible that the crown prince
is to be blamed for the defeat of the Greek
army. The superior numbers. discipline.
accoutrement and commissariat arrange
ments of the Turkish army are the reasons
for that defeat. 1t is said now that tie
cause of the Greek retreat to Pharsala was
the blunder OF one who mistook the re-
treat of the enemy for forward move
ment designed to outflank the Greeks. and
therefore ordered hasty retreat" Even
upon such eminent authority as the corre-
spondent of the London Chronicle this
statement should not be accepted as be-
yond question. A study of the movements
OF Edhem Pasha and of the results seem
rather to indicate that there was no mis-
take on the part of the Greek commander
as 20 the purpose OF the enemy. The
movement was evidently planned far
ahead. and its execution was most COM
plete.
The last hope OF thesGreeks Is now gone.
With the exception of the bombardment
of Prevesa- the Greek feet has scarcely
fired shot. This was. II was hoped. TO
constitute Greece's main reliance. but not
a word OF explanation has been given of
the inaction of the navy. All that is left
EON lVt tTtStS II 10 secure the most
favorable terms. Germany Is leading in
the movement and rather ostentatiously
debating the terms upon which she will
give her consent TO Intervention. The
modest attitude assumed by both England
and Russia Is very noticeable. But they
viii appear later. when the details are TO
be arranged. The demands of Turkey
presumably sanctioned in secret by Rus
STA, include the payment OF an indemnity OF
SIS. 90 900. the rearrangement Of the Greek
frontier. which means probably the ces-
sion OF Thessaly, the surrender OF the
Greek feet to Turkey. and settlement OF
the Cretan question. Assent 10 those con-
titions means the reduction of Greece
from a nation to a principally like the
Balkan states The question is whether
England will permit a.