Birmingham state herald., 1897-02-03

etc. that one in reading the title of an act flor the better suppression of gam bling would expect to find in the body of the act only provisions against such practices or kindred practices as had been heretofore included under the term gaming in the criminal code. This IS mon sequitur for several reasons;
 First The state having already de- nounced the practices now included in the present statute as gambling contracts by the provisions of it's civil code, the lOs- ieal interference from the departure from the long use of the word gaming, and sub stituting gambling for it would of It. self dehote an Intent in penal statute 10 punish acts not up to that time incluoed in It's penal statutes as gaming.
 Second Because the legislature prior to this enactment had made penal only certain kinds of gaming. and used the term gaming" in reference to them, can not restrict the meaning of the word gambling" in a subsequent penal stat ute, to offenses suoh as had been there- tofore denoanced as gaming If the present act hxd not specified the acts it punished, and had used the word gam bling" games or contracts, there might possibly Dc some plausbility In the ar gument, 51t in the present case there IS nothing for .ke argument to rest on tnat the word gambling" had fixed ana well defined legal meaning, which re- sitricted it's meaning to the class of or lenses or Of like nature. as were al- ready punishable; and that the word was used in such a sense, and not In its ordinary or popular signification in this statute. The act Is not open to the ob- jection that it's subject Is not clearly ex- pressed in its title.
 It is further insisted that the act IS violative of the federal constitution for that it is an effort by the legislature 10 interfere with interstate commerce, US second section forbidding any person in this state to act as the agent of any other person in placing outside of this state for such other person any pool or ticket, or other device or chance, or wa ger, to to do anything in this state to aid any other person in entering into any transaction whereby he may win or lose money or other valuable thing upon any horse race, prize fight, drill, base ball game, or other contest taking place outside this state. We are unable to see how this IS an interference, or has anything to do with interstate commerce. But if 1t it touches such commerce at all 1t is in such way as is within state conn potency: The state has right to pro- tect the lives and morals of it's people against acts which threaten them even though such acts can only be accom- plished through some instrumentality Of interstate commerce. And 1t might as well-indeed with less want of force-be said that a law of this state inhibiting
 
 states and disseminating here obscene It. erature, or criminal libels upon our citi- Zens, would be an unwarranted interfer- ence with commerce between the states. The right of the state to enact and en- force such laws, assuming they touch upon such commerce. is supported by the same principle which upholds state statutes forbidding the running of trains on Sunday, and it cannot, we think, be doubted that such acts are free from the constitutional objection suggested.
 The act in Its declaration of the off, fense and imposition of penalties has no reference to or bearing upon any act done beyond the limits of the state. Its operation is solely upon acts done within the state, and 1t is upon all persons do- ing those acts in the state whether as principal or agent. The fact that similar acts done here, either by citizens or nor- residents, with respect to contests of speed, skill and the like occurring here are not denounced as crimes by this act, is of no consequence That was, mat. ter entirely within Legislative discretion, and many considerations might be con ceived for the exercise of that discretion as it has been exercised in the act. The inhibitions of the statute have nothing to do with anything occurring beyond the state, as we have stated, but only upon acts done here; and they apply with equal force to citizens of this and all other states. q fft.
 The act, we conclude, is cinstitutional. The demurrer to the indictment below should have been overruled. The judg- ment of the city court sustaining 1t is reversed, as also the judgment discharg- ing the defendant upon quashing the indictment. A judgment will be here entered overruling said demurrer, and va eating the judgment quashng the indict- ment and discharging the defendant. The cause will be remanded.