Barton County democrat. [volume] (Great Bend, Kan.) 1885-1915, 1897-12-16

the island to be governed by an executive and
by local council or chamber, reserving to
Spain the control OF the foreign relations, the
army and navy and judicial administration To
accomplish this the present government pro-
poses to modify legislation by decree. leaving
| the Spanish cortes, with the aid of Cuban sem
ators and deputies. to solve the economic
problem and properly distribute the existing
debt
In the absence of declaration of the meas
| ures that the government proposes to take in
carrying out its prefer OF good offces it sug-
gests that Spain be left free to conduct militia
| ry operations and grant political reforms,
while the United States for its part shall en-
force its neutral obligations and cut on the as
| sistance which IL is asserted the Insurgents re-
| ceive from this country. The supposition of
an indefinite prolongation of the war is denied.
| 1t is asserted that the western provinces are
already well nigh reclaimed; that the planting
| of cane and tobacco therein has been resumed,
| and that by force OF arms and new and ample re-
| forms very early and complete pacifcation is
| hoped for. The immediate amelieration of ex-
| listing conditeonS under the new administration
of Cuban affairs is predicted. and therewithal
| the disturbance and all occasion for any change
of attitude on the part OF the United States
Discussion of the question OF international
| duties and responsibilities of the United
| States, Spain understands them, is pre-
sented, with an apparent disposition to charge
us with failure in this regard This charge is
! without any basis in fact. It could not have
| been made IL Spain had been cogniZant of the
| constant efforts this government has made at
| the cost of millions and by the employment of
| the administrative machinery OF the nation at
command to perform it's full duty according to
| the law of nations That it has successfully
prevented the departure OF a single military
expedition armed vessel from shores in
violation OF our laws. would seem to be a SUI
| ficient answer. But Of this aspect Of the Span
| iSh note it is not necessary to speak further
now.
Firm in the conviction of wholly performed
lOINf 81 III otnn an-
BEEN made in diplomatic issues. Throughout
| all these horrors and dangers to our own peace
this government has never in any way abrogated
its sovereign prerogative of preserving to itself
| the determination of it's policy and course
cording to its own high sense of right and in
consonance with the dearest interests and
convictions of our own people should the pro-
longation Of the strife demand.
OF the untried measures there remain only:
Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents:
recognition OF the independence of Cuba;
| trail Intervention to end the war by imposing a
rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor Of one the other
party. speak not OF forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought Of That by our code
of morality, would be criminal aggression
Recognition of Belligerency.
Recognition OF the belligerency of the Cuban
insurgents has often been canvassed pos
Sible if not inevitable step both in regard to
the previous ten years struggle and during the
present war. am not unmindful that the two
houses Of congress in the spring of 1898
pressed the opinion by concurrent resolution
that a condition of public war existed requiring
juStifying the recognition of state of bellig
erency in Cuba and during the extra session the
senate voted joint resolution of like import
which, however, was not brought to O vote in
the house In the presence OF these significant
expressions of the sentiment of the legislative
branch it behooveS the executive to Soberly
consider the conditions under which so impor-
| tant measure must needs rest for iustifica-
tion. 1t is to be seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood which alone can demand the recog-
milton Of belligerency in its favor. Possession.
in short, of the essential qualifications Of SOW
ereignty by the insurgents and the conduct of
the war by them according to the received code
of war are no less important factors toward the
determination of the problem of belligerency
than are the influences and consequences of the
| struggle upon the internal policy Of the recog-
nizing state
Turning to the practical aspects of a recogni-
tion of belligerency and reviewing its incon-
venienceS and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code
of nations there is such thing naked
recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by
the assumption of international neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not
fer upon either party to domestic conflict
status not heretofore actually possessed or af-
feet the relation of either party other states
The act of recognition usually takes the
form of solemn proclamation of neutrality
which reciteS the de facto condition of beliger-
law of neutrality in the declaring state 1t as
sumes the international obligations of q neu-
trail in the presence of public state of
1t warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction OF the proclamant that they vio-
late those rigorous obligations their own
peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the
consequences The right of visit and search
on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoeS
and contraband of and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law be admitted as legitimate con-
sequence of proclamation of bel
ligerency. While according the equal
belligerent rights defined by public law to
each party in our ports disfavors would be i'm
posed on both which. while nominally equal
would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself
Possessing navy and controlling the ports
| of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment of the
island, but up to the margin of our own terri
torial waters, and condition of things would
exist for W hich the Cubans within their own
| domain could not hope to create parallel;
while its creation through aid sympathy
from within our domain would be even more
| impossible than now, with the additional
| obligations of international neutrality we
would perforce assume.
Recognition Now Deemed UnwIse.
The enforcement of this enlarged and oner-
| Gus code of neutrality would only be influential
| within our own jurisdiction by land and sea
| and applicable by our own instrumentalitv. 1t
| could impart to the United States no iurisdic-
| ton between Spain and the inSurg II
would give the United States no right of inter
| vention to enforce the conduct of the strife
| within the paramount authority of Spain ac-
| cording to the international code of war. For
these reasons I regard the recognition OF the
| beligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now
unwiSe and therefore inadmiSsible. Should
| that step hereafter BE- deemed wise as meas
ure of right and duty the executive will take it
| Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has
been frequently suggested and has not failed
to receive my most anxious and earnest con-
siderat L. But should such step be now
| taken when it is apparent that hopeful change
| has supervened in the policy of Spain toward
| Cuba? new government has taken ONCE in
| the mother country. 1t is pledged in advance
to the declaration that all the effort in the