The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1897-05-25

what rates Will be considered unreaS0na-
BILE and unjust has not yet been stated
by the United States Supreme Court.
The discussion in the cases just cited,
as well as in others, plainly shows a dis
position to interfere and condemn legisla-
tive rates only when it is clear that their
enforcement amounts to Il destruction
of the value of the property. In Mum
VS.. People, GO H.. so. and Chicago VS..
Dey, 30 Fed. Rep, $685. it was held that
rates fixed by legislative authority that
will give some compensation, however
small, to the owners of railroad property,
cannot be held insufficient by the courts.
This rule leaves large power to the
Legislature and would sanction statutes
which would cut down railroad dividends
to ii mere pittance. Yet it is hard to
see how any other rule can be adopted
which will not in effect deny the right
of the Legislatures to make regulation
of such rates. or else leave little more
than the shadow of such power in the
Legislature while the real power is as
sumed by the courts" The effect of
the reduced rates on the entire line of
road is the correct test and not that they
are unremunerative on a certain part of
the line. st. Louis VS.. Gill, 1876 Z. ).
$40: Missouri VS.. Smith, 60 Ark 221.
In Dow VS.. Beidleman, 125 L. S. $50,
it was held that rates which would pay
only one and one-half per cent on the
original cost of the road were not Illegal
when the road is held by Il reorganized
company or ITS trustees after foreclose-
ure In Missouri VS.. Smith, supra, it
was held that rates sufficient to defray
current expenses and repairs and some
profit ON the reasonable cost of build
ing the road could not be interferred with
though they were not high enough to pay
interest on all its debts, since they may
have been incurred through extravaganza
or mismanagement
In Chicago VS.. Wellman, 143 L. 5.
$50. the act of the legislature of Wis
consin fixing railroad fares at , cents per
mile was sustained. the court saying that
.'before the courts would declare an act
unconstitutional because the rates pre-
vented stockholders receiving any divi-
dend. or bondhoders amy interest, the
court must be fully advised as to what
was done with the earnings, otherwise
by exhorbitant or unreasonable salaries
or in some other improper way the COM
pany might tax the public with unreason
negatived by proofs OF reasonable sala-
ries and expenses or if the record is silent
the legislative rate will be sustained"
This is valuable and noteworthy deci-
sion and no judge dissented from so just
a ruling The same principle is reaf-
firmed in Reagan VS.. Trust Co., 154 L.
s. at p Az.
In the most recent case, Livingston VS..
Sanford, 164 Z. S. SIS decided Deem
Der 1896. 1.-THE court. while maintaining
that ordinarily the rates must not be
such as TO leave the owners no profit at
all, says: I'VE could not say that the
act was unconstitutional because the
company (as is alleged and admitted
could not earn more than 4 per cent on
its capital stock. 1t cannot be said that
Il corpora ton is entitled as Of right and
without reference TO the interests of the
public to realize any given per cent on
its capital stock When the question
arises whether the legislature has exceed
ed its constitutional power in prescrib-
ing the rates to be charged by a corpora
tion controlling a public highway, stock
holders are not the only persons whose
rights or interests are to be considered.
The rights of the public are not to be
ignored" The court further says that
the inquiry as to whether rates are rea-
sonable and just includes whether they
are reasoira bic and just to the public,
and adds: 1.-The public cannot properly be
subjected to unreasonable rates in order
simply that stockholders may earn divi-
dends. :: If corporation cannot main
tain such il highway and earn dividends
fo,. boIJarc II iS mis- fal. II
and them which the constitution does not
require to be remedied by imposing unjust
burdens upon the public
CHARTER EXEMPTIONS.
In Stone vs.. Farmers Co., 116 [. S 30I
1T was held reversing the Supreme Court
of Mississippi and also in Stone VS.. Hi
nois. 116 L. S. 349 that 4 provision in
a railroad charter that 1.-The company may
from time to time fix, regulate and re-
ceive the tolls and charges to be re-
ceived' did not constitute Il contract re-
stricting the State from fixing or reduc-
ing charges within the limits of its gen
eral power to declare what shall be
deemed reasonable rates. SO a charter
provision giving a railroad company "pOw-
er to charge such sums for transportation
of persons and property as shall seem de-
sirable" or sit shall deem reasonable
does not preclude the legislature from
prescribing maximum Of charges which
it may make. Peik VS.. Chicago, 81 L.
s. 164; Chicago VS.. Ackley, Ibid; Stone
VS.. Wisconsin, 81 Z. S. 1S1; Chicag go VS..
Mimi. 134 Z. S. AIS; Ruggles VS.. Rail
road, 10S e. 5. 526; Laurel Fork VS.. West
Va, Co, % West Va. 324; and this is
true though the charter expressly gives
the corporation power ito fix its own
rates. since this is implicitly subject to
legislative power to require them to be
reasonable. Railroad VS.. Miller, 1872 L.
s. 70; Ruggles VS.. People. 81 Ill. 256;
Railroad VS.. People, % Ill. 313; Wells
VS.. Oregon. Sawy. 600, and the same
has been repeatedly held as to gas com
panies and water companies. a char
ter giving Il railroad a right to fix its
rates if not beyond a rate stated in the
charter is held not contract but sub
jcct to the legislative power to fix other
reasonable rates as a maximum from
time to time as money changes in value
ar 0narofinp coStS dininich Canpgio