The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1897-06-24

the opinion of the majority, which, he
suggests will lead to a great deal of
confusion, as 1t practically nullihes
the former opinion, in his judgment.
Justice Buck holds that public inter
est demands that the case be tried and
the issue determined. He says that
technical objections calculated to keep
certain people in office are obnoxious
to the people In general. In regard to
the plea that the office of court stenog-
rapher is a confidential one, and for
that reason the selection should be left
wholly to the judge, taking it out from
the domain Of public offices, Justice
Buck says there is no reason for any
such confidential relations. The court
Stenographer is sworn public officer,
and his official acts should be public
He has no right to make anything else
than a public record, and the taxpayers
be allowed a voice in naming the ser
wants whom they are taxed to pay.
The dissenting opinion of Justice
Canty is not SO mild as that of Justice
Buck, by about 80 degrees. He says
among other things:
II cannot concur. There is too much
temporizing and doubling Either" he
says, 1.-The Office Of court sten0grapher Is
a public office, or it is not public Of
flee. If it is a public office, then under
the constitution, it cannot be held by a
member of the legislature. If it is not,
then the incumbent has no right to
draw a salary from the treasury Of
the county as q public officer" The
judge ridicules the idea that the Office
is entitled to especial consideration be-
cause of any confidential character
He finds no place in the law where a
distinction is made in favor of conf
Dental Offices and with evident sar-
casm draws a picture of the high and
naughty stenographer, who is not anne
nable to the constitutions swelling round
one day with mighty and momentous
state secrets in his bosom, fired the
next day by one stroke of the pen by
the judge who appoints him.
Justice Canty continues
HE is not an object of charity. If it
is once found by the members of the
legislature that they can find for them
selves fat places where they can draw
large salaries without being burdened
with any official duties, they will, in
deed, be in clover. The majority con-
ceGe that whether or not the proceed
ings shall be instituted by private
relatOr. is in the sound discretion of
this court On what do they base this
discretion? On nothing but the fact
that a member of the legislature wants
to draw $1,000 per year, and hold an Of
flee Of a confidential character.
Neither is the fact that the attOr
y
in proceedings to Gust the respondent,
any reason why the court should re-
fuse TO do so. 1t has an Independent
discretion Of it's own. The case is NOT
doubtful There is absolutely nothing
to justify the court in refusing to ell
terrain the proceedings
The exercise of this discretion in
refusing should be based on something
substantial, but here we have the
spectacle of a willful violation of the
constitution, and here by an inscruta-
bic discretion, based on nothing but the
sweet will of those who exercise it, the
violation will be upheld and allowed
to continue.
eff one clause of the constitution
can be set aside at will, why not all of
them?"
The syllabus Of the majority decision
is as follows:
State of Minnesota ex rel. Augustus S. Dow
dali, relatCr, VS.. John F. Dahl, respondent.
1. This court has the right and under some
circumstances, in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion, it may become it's duty
to allow an information in the nature of quo
warranto to be filed by private person hav-
ing no personal interest in the question dis
tinct from the public, to test the right of an
incumbent Of public Office to hold the same,
Notwithstanding the attorney general has re-
fused to give his consent thereto.
.. But the granting or Withholding leave
to file such information at the instance of
private person rests in the sound legal discre
ton of the court and is not matter OF
strict legal right, and when the attorney gen.
eral has refused to consent the case should
be exceptional and one in which it clearly
appears that the public interests require it
to Justify the court in oVerrulng his judgment.
3. Without deciding whether stenogra-
pher in the district court Is holding an of
flee" within the meaning of article 4, section
8, of the constitution, and in view of the
provisions of the statute, S. L. 1891, chapter
$40. under which such stenographer is ap
pointed by and for each of the judges of the
district court in question, and his duties
Hereunder in connection with the fact that
the proposed relator has no personal interest
in the question, distinct from the public, it
is held that in the exercise Of a sound
judicial discretion the petition herein, praying
holding his position in violation of the consti-
tutonal provision above mentioned that the
petitioner be granted leave to file an inform
alton for the purpose above Indicated should
be denied. Collins, j.
The court also afirms the decision in the
case of Keigher against st. Paul, to re-
cover disputed sprinking contract. The
sylab in this and the other decisions follow:
Patrick Keigher appellant, VS.. The City Of
st. Paul, respondent.
Held that the evidence justified the court
in finding that certain payments were made
generally on account and not specially made
and received in extinguishment of the prin-
cipal OF the debt; following Moran Mfg. Co.
By the terms of certain street sprinkling
contracts the amount of work to be done and
consequently Of compensation to be paid were
not definitely fixed and could not be ascer-
tanned until the end of the sprinkling season.
These contracts were payable only out of the
proceeds of assessments to be made for that
purpose. Held that the board of public
works was not required to make monthly as
sessments to pay for the work, but might
wait until the work completed and then
make one assessment for its entire cost also
held that it implied term of the
contracts that the city should have a reason
able time after the completion of the work
in which to make and collect such assessment
and that until the expiration CT such reason
able time the contractor was not entitled to
of the contract price. Orders affirmed.
Mitchell, ].
Eva T. Reynolds, appellant, VS.. Atlas Acct
dent Insurance Company of Boston, re-
SpOndent
An accident insurance policy provided that
Gin consideration of the warranties and agree
ments contained in the application Endorsed
hereon'' the company accepted him as a mem
hereon." One of the conditions Endorsed on
the policy was that 1.-The application for mem
bership is made a part Of this contract and
printed thereon"
Held, that attaching copy of the applca-
ton to the back of the policy with mucilage
or some similar substance and delivering
the same to the insured constituted an I'm
dorsement' of the application upon the policy
within the meaning of the contract
answered categorically was indistinctly writ
ten in the original application, appearing
to consist of the letter M and a part of the
letter 80 but in the CODY attached to the