The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-01-28

and crush Getty. In either case the
Union army would be severed, and its
reserve artillery, supplies and transpor.
tation exposed to capture and destruc-
ton.
The information that Hancock's Corps
was not at the crossing had just reached
Gen. Meade, and Lieut.-Col. Lyman was
dispatched in great haste with orders to
Gen. Getty. He must attack immedi-
ately and if possible check or delay the
advance of the Confederate army. The
attack must be made. And it was
made.
Officers and men leaped over the rude
works they had been constructing and
plunged into the almost impenetrabie
forest The understanding trees, dense
underbrush and tangling vines made
the advance extremely difficult As
good a line as possible was preserved,
and it moved steadily on. No skirmish-
ers were met-they had been driven
back on their main line. Our first greet
ing was terrific volley of musketry all
along the line and from only q few yards
ia our front.
Hundreds of our men fell at that first
volley, but it was Immediately returned,
and the rattle of musketry continued
until dark. The density of the forest
was so great that We could see but a
short distance. The men aimed at the
wall of fire and smoke in our front
The distance between the two lines was
so short that under ordinary conditions
we could have charged upon the enemy
with the bayonet before giving time to
reload. But here bayonet charge was
impossible. A line could advance only
slowly and with great difficultyeven when
unopposed. Anything like a dash upon
the enemy was simply out of the ques-
ton. The best that could be done was
to hug the ground and keep up an
IScEssANT FIRING.
Two or three attempts to advance were
made at points where the firing had
slackened, and each attempt was met by
increased firing and great loss of life.
We could only hold our line. The
enemy could not advance upon us.
This was the condition of affairs on
the left of the Plank road until about
dark. There was no advance Of the
enemy and no falling back of our line.
At one time the enemy advanced down
the road and came near capturing two
pieces of artillery there, and was driven
back with slaughter.
What time the troops of the Second
Corps arrived l cannot say. / know
that some of the regiments were there
before dark, for two of them assisted me
to advance my left. / understood that
some regiments were there when the
attack was made, but l did not see
! them, and think they were coming up
the Brock road. My advance on the
left of the Plank road was simultaneous
with the advance of the other two of
Getty's Brigades on the right. / know
that my brigade was alone on the left
of the Plank road in making the attack,
and that it maintained its entire front
until it was relieved by the Second
Corps, about dark.
Soon after dark the firing ceased, and
the enemy fell back. [ was too much
occupied, the forest was too dense and
the rapid fire of musketry was too great
| for me to know much that was going on
on my right and left.
have been thus particular In stating
facts because Gen. Hancock's report is
somewhat indefinite as to who made and
maintained this attack. / simply want
for Gen. Getty and his command, and
for myself and my command, what be-
longs to us | hope nothing I have said,
or that | may say, will be construed into
intended criticism of Gen. Hancock.
feel sure that he did not intention
ally do Gen. Getty an injustice, and
would not detract from the credit due to
Gen. Hancock and his corps on that oc-
casion. The corps was not there to par.
ticipate in the attack simply because il
was impossible for it to get there and in
position in time. saw Gen. Hancock
there in person before the attack was
made. He rode On in advance of hi.
corps, and kept his staff busy in con.
veying orders and in urging forward his
command. After the corps arrived j,
did effective and gallant service or
Getty's right and left. A section of ar
tillery also did effective service on the
Plank road.