The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1897-12-11

definition Of its relations TO the parties
| thereto. But this conflict must be one
| which Is recognized in the sense OF III
ternational law as war.
Recognition Not Justified,
| "Belligerence. too. is a fact. The mere
| existence OF contendirg armed bodies ana
| their occasional conflicts do not constltute
the e EXISTING a Condition Of affairs in cuba,
| the tests recognized by publlcists ana witt
| ers on international law, ana whicn nave
| esty and power when free from sensitive o.
| selfish and unworthy motives. l ran 70
| find in the instruction the existence o.
,ash p sHSsssn'is and R0 msnfest
| world. having the forms and capable o.
the ordinary functions OF gevsrnm a,as
toward its own people and TO other states'
| with courts for the administration OF JUS
tice. with a local habitation, possessing
such organization of force, such ma i, a.
such occupation of territory as 10 take the
contest out of the category OF mere re-
bellious insurrection or occasional sklT-
mishes and place L on the Ierr in, So-
ligerency would aim TO elevate II.
1.-The contest. moreover, is solely on
land; the insurrection has no. poii !, may
send forth its flag. nor has II any means OF
communication with foreign powers eX-
SePt IhrousS 'h ep mhsens Of any Of
those sudden and difficult complications
which war upon the ocean Is apt 10 pre-
Cinltate upon tue VESSELS, pptI
and national. and upon consular officers OF
other powers, calls for the definition OF
their relations to the parties TO the contest;
Considered as question OF expediency. l
regard the accordance of beiligerent rights
still 10 be a $ unwise and premature as re-
gard II TO be. at present, indefensible as
measure of right.
such recognition entails upon the coun-
try according the rights which flow from II
difficult and complicated duties, and re-
quras the eNaction from the contending
parties of the strict observance of their
rights and obligations 1t conters the right
of search upon the high seas by vessels OF
both parties. IL would subject the carrying
of arms and munitions of war, which now
may be transported freely and without in
terruption, in vessels OF the United States
10 detention and 10 possible SEIZURE: II
would give rise 10 countless veNatious ques-
tons would release the parent government
from responsibility, for acts done by the in
surgents, and would invest Spain with the
right 10 exercise the supervision recognized
by our treaty Of f7!5 over our commerce on
the seas, very large past OF which, in its
traffic between the Atlantic and the gulf
states and between all Of them and the
states on the Pacific. passes through the
waters which wash the shores Of Cuba:
scarce fail TO lead. II not 10 abuses. ccr-
taiuly 10 collisions pcrlous TO the peaceful
little doubt as to what result such super
vision would before long draw this nation.
II would he unworthy Of the United States
10 inauguratc the possibilities Of such re-
sun, bv measures OF questionable right or
cNpediency, or 10y any indirection'
What Recognition Would Mean. "
Turning to the practical aspects Of n rec
ognition of belligerency and reviewing lts
Inconvenience and positive dangers. still
further pertinent considerations appear
In the code of nations there is no such thing
as a naked recognition OF belliSerency un-
accompanied by the assumption u interna-,
tioral neutrality. Such recognition Will
not confer upon either party TO domestic
conflict status not heretofore actually
possessed or effect the relation OF either
party 20 other states. The act OF recogni-
ton usually takes dhe form Of Il solemn
proclamation of neutrality which recites
the &c facto condition of belligcrency as
its motive Ii announces a domestic law
of neutrality in declaring state. 1t assumes
the international obligations Of a neutral
in the presence Of public state or war II
jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they
violate these righteous obligations al their
own peril and cannot expect 10 be shielded
from the consequences. The right OF visit
and search on the seas and seizure OF yes
sells and carGoes and contrahand of war
and good prize under admiralty law must
under international law be admitted as a
legitimate consequence of proclamation
OF bellgerency. While according the quail
belligerent rights defined by public law TO
each party in our ports disfavors would he
imposed on both, which while Tomnally
equal would weigh heavily in behalf of
trolling the ports of Cuba her maritime
rights could be asserted not only for the
military investment Of the island but up TO
the margin OF our own territorial waters.
and condition Of things would exist for
which the Cubans within their own domain
could not hone to create parallel: while
its creation through aid or sympathy from
within our domain would be ever more i'm
possible than now, with the additional OBJ
legations Of International neutrality we
would perforce assume.
Regarded. at Present, ms UnwIsc.
The enforcement Of this enlarged and on
.r0us code Of neutrality would only he
Influential within our own jurisdiction by
land and sea, and applicable by our own
United states no jurisdiction between
Spain and the insurgents. II would give the
United States no right of intervention TO
enforce the conduct Of the strife within
the paramount authority of Spain accord
ing 10 the international code Of war. For
these reasons l regard the recognition Of
the belliSercncy Of the Cuban insurgents
S now unwise, and therefore inadmissahle.
Should that step hereafter be deemed v.se
as n measure of right and duty. the eXecu-
tive Will take IT,
Intervention.
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds
has been frequently suggested. and has not
failed TO receive my most anxious and
earnest consideration. But should such
step be now taken. when it is apparent
that hopeful change has supervened in
the policy OF, Spain toward Cuba? new
country. 1t Is pledged in advance to the
declaration that all the efforts OF the world
cannot Sifflce 10 maintain peace in Cuba
by the bayonet: that vague promises Of re-
form after subjugation afford no solution
of the insular problem that with a sub
stitution of commanders must come
change OF the past system of warfare for
one in harmony with a new policy which
snail no longer aim to drive the Cubans to
the horrible alternative of taking to the
thicket or succumbing in misery" that re-
forms must be instituted in accordance
with the needs and circumstances of the
time, and that these reforms, while de-
signed 10 give full autonomy to the colony
and TO create a virtual entity and self-con-
trolled administration, shall yet conserve
ana affirm the sovereignty OF Spain by
just distribution of powers and burdens
upon basis Of mutual interest, untainted
by methods OF selfish cxpediency
Lies In Honorable Paths.
The first acts of the new government lie
IN these honorable paths. The policy of
cruel rapine and determination thai SO
long shocked the universal sentiment of
humanity has been reversed. Under the
new military commander a broad clemency
is pronered. Measures have already been
set on foot to relieve the horrors of starya-
ton. The power OF the Spanish armies IL
Is asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin
and desolat1on, but 10 protect the RESUME
ton OF peaceful agricultural pursuits and
productive industries. That past methods
are futile TO force peace by subjugation Is
freely admitted, and that ruin without con-
Citation must inevitably fail to win for
Spain the fidelity of n cOntentpd demand