The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1897-01-21
n and in advance of the glacis, was re-

on and in advance of the glacis, was re.
sorted to.
Curved fire was not used enough.
The armament of the work contained
but two mortars, one S-inch and one 10
inch. These, when earnestly served,
caused the most serious delay in the
progress of our work, and on one occa-
sion suspended it altogether. The Coe-
! horn mortar is most valuable weapon
in siege operations; from its lightness
| and portability it is peculiarly adapted
to the attack, and should follow close
on the heels of the sappers. In this
manner it was used by Gen. Gilmore
in the siege of Fort Wagner.
The circumstances of the military
situation were peculiar after Gen. Gill
more effected a lodgment on Morris
Island on the morning of the 10th of
July. The Union troops occupied one
end of the island, without batteries or
defenses of any kind, except what were
improvised from day to day. The Con-
1euerateS were on the
OTHER END, STRONGLY FORTIFIED.
The narrowest part of the island
Ca mere strip of shallow sand, fire.
quently overAowed by the sea) was be-
tween the contending forces, and within
half musket range of the powerful bat
terry aud numerous sharpshooters of
Fort Wagner, both parties having their
communications to the rear open. Why
did not the Confederates drive Gen.
Gilmore from the island, as their
commander stated should be done, in
stead of being driven from it them
selves?
Two conditions, steadily maintained,
achieved success. The first was an over
powering mortar fire from our batteries,
particularly toward the end of the siege
of Fort Wagner, opposed by a weak
mortar fire from the enemy. The second
was the difference, always in our favor,
except in rough weather, between the
flank fire upon us from the James Island
batteries, and the fire upon the enemy
from our feet, which could establish
short ranges and had considerable lati-
tude in selecting positions.
These conditions induced the Con-
federates to adopt an injudicious, be-
cause passive, defense. They depend
ed mainly on torpedo mines for the Sc
curity of their position. These would
have been useful against open assaults.
but should have been removed to facili-
tate night sorties as soon as the slow
attack by regular approaches was re-
sorted to.
While it would have been entirely
practicable to have pushed forward the
approaches to Fort Wagner without the
cooperation of the navy with greater
loss Of men and material), J, their presence
abreast of Morris Island helped to sub
due the fire of Fort Wagner and keep
the gunboats of the Confederates beyond
range in the harbor, thereby saving the
time and labor of establishing batteries
for that purpose.
The navy rendered valuable assistance.
The New Ironsides, in particular, under
the energetic command of Capt. Rowan,
was very efficient in subduing the fire of
Fort Wagner Throughout the period
occupied by the land forces in accom-
plishing their portion of the joint pro-
gram of attack, which in fact ended with
the demolition of Fort Sumter ON the 23d
day of August, and subsequent to this
until Forts Wagner and Gregg were
captured. the navy rendered all the Co
operation that was necessary or that was
desired of it,