The herald., 1897-12-15
Mcintyre Fined 500 for
Contempt
AN OPINION BY JUDGE CLARK
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF
THE JURORS MISCONDUCT
A San Pedro Case That Recalls Bunco
Practices-Darling Is Held for
Trial-Court Notes

of contempt of court yesterday after
noon by three superior judges sitting IN
banc and fined 500 with the alternative
of serving fifty days IN the county jail.
When Judges, Shaw, Clark and Allen
assembled the bench in Department five
at o'clock the court room was we'll
filled. many Of the spectators being law
yers. Judge Shaw inquired If Mcintyre
was in the court room and told him to
come forward. The defendant took a
seat at the table within the bar and
listened attentively to the proceedings,
and displayed but little nervousness.
Judge Shaw said: THE court has ar
rived at a decision in your case and
Judge Clark will read the opinion pre-
pared by him."
Judge Clark then reviewed the aff1-
davits of the four Jurors, Richard quinn,
e. NJ Milsap, H. B. Trimble and George
Longfellow, as we'll as the testimony of
atlantis at the trial of Mcintyre on Sat-
urday, which was in substance as set
forth in the aff1davits.
Continuing his honor said: The
charges contained in the affidavits OF
the jurors, Milsap, Trimble and Long
fellow, may be dismissed with the simple
statement that we are of opinion that
these affldavits do not state a case OF
contempt and are INEFFICIENT to confer
jurisdiction. 1t Is. at East, grave ques-
ton whether declarations made by
Jurors to each other In the jury room
after a case has been submitted to them,
and while they are celebrating upon
their verdict, can be inquired into for
the purpose of laying a foundation for
contempt proceedings.
But, admitting, without deciding, that
Q false statement Of fact, made by one
Juror to another in the jury room, and
while celebrating upon verdict, can
constitute the offense known as con-
tempt of court, 1t Is clear that it can con-
stitute that offense only when corruptly
made with an intent to improperly in
fluence the mind Of the juror to whom
made: and the affldavits in question do
not state that the declarations OF the
respondent, Mcintyre, were false or
made with such intent.
The charge. however, contained in the
affidavit of the juror, Quinn, and sup
ported by his testimony, stands upon an
entirely different footing. The statute,
in attempting to define what shall con-
stitute a contempt of court, declares (see
C. c. P. section 1909, subdivision 81 that
disobedience Of any lawful Judgment,
order or process of court shall be con-
tempt Of court. The penal code, section
1922, provides that "the jury must, at
each adjournment, whether permitted
to separate or kept in charge of officers,
be admonished by the court that 1t Is
their duty not to converse among them
selves or with any one else on any SUBJ
5ect connected with the trial, or to form
or express any opinion thereon until the
cause is finally submitted to them"
During the progress of the triai Of said
case Of the people VS.. Compton, at each
adjournment of the court the jury was
so admonished. If. therefore, we accept
the testimony Of the Juror Quinn as
true, and we are of the opinion that his
testimony is true, the respondent. Nc
Intyre, in so conversing about the case
and in making the statement that he
did, willfully and deliberately disobeyed
q lawful order of the court and is guilty
of contempt. That the statement made
by him involved a SANDER Of the fudge
who presided at the trial of said case of
the people VS.. Compton Is not material
to his guilt or innocence Of this charge.
The Islander Of one holding a judicial
office differs in It's legal consequences
from the SANDER of one not holding such
office only when it directly tends to OBJ
struct and Interfere with the lawful
and orderly administration of Justice
If, by reason of it's character, or the
time or place of commission, it does tend
directly to obstruct the due and orderly
administration of Justice it will consti-
tute the crime of contempt of court and
will be punishable as such, notwith-
standing it may also constitute a SLAM
der with the legal liabilities incident
thereto. Cooper vs. People, L. Ren
Amt. 439.)
But here our finding and decision are
not based upon such foundation. Here
the contempt consists in respondent hav-
ing conVersed about the case in question
at time when it was his duty as a Juror
and when he had, by lawful order of the
court, been commanded, not to. Had
ms statement been that some one other
than the judge who tried the case had
tod him that Compton was not guilty.
the respondent would be none the less
guilty of the charge. Indeed. had the
statement so made by him been true
he would still be technically guilty. The
character of his conversation and state
ment and its falsity is important ONLY
In that 1t tends to show a, corrunt mo
tive and leads irresstibly to the con-
ciuslon that he intended to influence tbe
mlnd OF Juror Quinn improperly. It
should, therefore, be considered only IN
mitigation or aggravation of punish
ment.
1t may be noted that the affidavit of
Juror Quinn is somewhat inartifcio,,,.
drawn. 1t would have been better bod
1t alleged that the jury had been ad-
monlshed as required by section 1922 of
the penal CODE, supra, and that respond-
ent had acted in disobedienco tberoof
but we do not regard this omission &C
fatal to the jurisdiction of the court
Upon the authority of ex parte All Men
~ Cal, ZO0, the court could, we thinl,
take Judicial notice of the order. (Sea
also Boone on Code Pleading" and
COOK VS.. Tallman, 40 Ia, to the efqact
That fact which is judicially known IA
the court Is TO be regarded as O. matter
OF law and should not be alleged The
a1ildavit sufficiently shows a violation
or dlsobedlence of the admonition or or
DER. To conclude, then, we hold that
the respondent McIntyre ubi1a ac+tnr