The San Francisco call., 1897-06-20
PRESENT VALUE OF GIBRALTAR.

After a British occupancy of nearly two
centuries, the Rock" as il is called, has come
to be considered as much part of the en-
pire as London itself The average Briton, no
doubt, thinks that the holding of Gibraltar is
an essential element of the control of the
Mediterranean and that its loss would be a
severe blow to British prestige, place &C
quired and held so long by the yalor OF
British troops would certainly not be given
up without a struggle, and if the question of
It's retroeession to Spain should be seriously
proposed. overwhelming public opinion
would be aroused which would prevent its
execution.
Sentiment in this. as in many public ques-
tions, has prepondera ting influence, aud yet
calmly considered IN the light OF facts, il is
reasonably certain that if Gibraltar were re-
stored to Spain, country TO which IL belongs
naturally and geographically, not only would
England be as strong in every way as now, but
in many respects her Narlke efficiency would
be increased in case OF war she would be
relieved of the task of defending a useless
possession.
The Mediterranean has been not inaptly
termed an English lake. BY the acquisition
OF Gibraltar, the seizing of Malta and Cyprus
and the continued occupation Of Egypt Eng
land effectually controls the route to India
AS long this is the case her Eastern posses
sions are in comparatively little danger AS
the guns of Gibraltar do not command the en-
trance to the Mediterranean its only value
would be as naval base, and for this purpo
it IS lacking in some of The most essential
modern requirements.
good naval base of the present day should
have ample and safe facilities for the docking,
cOaling and supplying of warships. Once in
port, and especially in dock the ship is prac-
tically defenseless, and should therefore be
fully protected by the guns of the fort from I.
tack either By land or sea. OF these essential
requirements Gibraltar possesses but one-im-
pregnability. There are no docking facilities
and no place where q ship could be docked or
coaled without being So bject toa concentrated
fire from Spanish guns on the mainland, just
across the bay Of Algeciras, ana within easy
cannon range.
In case OF war or misunderstanding with
Spain Gibraltar would thus be practically
worthless. With the short-range cannon of
former days such was not the case but the
improvement in guns has entirely altered the
aspect OF the case. Probably Gibraltar is as
impregnab.e as ever, but no power can afford
to be thus dependent on the goodwin of
another in case of war. Owing to the we'll
known desire of Spain to regain possession OF
Gibraltar she could scarcely be expected to re-
II ain neutral under all circumstances. In the
hands OF Spain Gibraltar could easily be made
a strong naval base, as she would also control
the mainland.
II the Languedoc canal in France. connect
ing the Bay of Biscay with the Mediterranean,
is ever enlarged as proposed, so as 10 pass war
ships the strategic value of Gibraltar would
be siIl further reduced. By this canal of 148
miles the 2000 miles around Gibraltar are
saved, and the position would be turned and
Gibraltar could be left out of account as far as
France was coucerned. Tnc French have al
ready established q powerful naval base at
Biserta in Tunis, and with the canal once
completed they would have powerful position
il the Mediterranean and might even dispute
the control OF that sea with England.
The holding OF Gibraltar has become an &C.
cepted English policy, and as It's revenues are
about equal to the expenses. it win doubtless
continue to fly the British flag indefinitely.
However, the move OF France will probably
determine Englan to acquire some such posi-
ton on the African coast. For this purpose
Ceuta on the Morocco coast has been proposed
1t is only fourteen miles from Gibraltar, pos
sesses none of the defects OF the latter station
and could easily be made a powerful naval
b'se and would prove an effectual Offset 10
Bserta.