The times., 1897-03-29
STRAPS AND STRATEGY.

STRAPS AND STKATEGY.
Interest in the military sit uation in
eastern Europe, involving as 1t does the
probable participation of some, if rot all.
of the greatest armies of the world is apt
to detract from the attention that stu
dents OF military science ought to devote
to the war in Cuba. The latter is of irnne-
date importance, because is lessons are
Of practical and primary value in CON
nection with any operations that here-
after may occur in the western henis-
phere; about the only division of tie world
that American land forces ever are likely
to act in. 1t need not be inferred, how
ever, that the brilliant campaigns OF Maceo
and Gomez are not OF Importance in more
general sense. Loring Pasha, oil his return
from Egypt, alter he mad conducted the
famous retreat from AbySsinia, told me
that, but for the experience he had gained
in the West and Rocky Mountain country,
fighting Indians, he never could have
brought that unfortunate Egyptian eX-
petition back 10 safety, after the blunders
and disasters perpetrated and sustained
by Ratib Pasha, the general-in-chief.
After all, successful war is dependent
as much upon its minor ds upon its occa-
sionally grand operations IncesSant and
effective harassment OF an army of an
enemy often reduces his strength, morale
and striking ability, beyond any effect
that a single, Or even two or three, pitched
battles might be expected to exert Habit
ual alertness and success in cutting com
Inunications, capturing and annihilating
detached positions, and cutting off sep
arated columns and parties, are among the
most useful means that one commander
can resort To against another In broken
country, it is doubtful il the net result of
such operations is not, on the whole, better
than definite victories once in while,
considering the question of economy in
the destruction Of life, ammunition ant so
on not To speak of the always-present risk
Of defeat, due to the accidents OF war
All the foregoing applies to the campaign
of Gen. CalixtO Garcia in the provinces of
Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe,
the two eastern provinces OF Cuba. The
available geography and atlas maps Of the
island are not as extended nor as lucid as
they might be, but they will afford some
light to the reader Military men who have
kept up with the Times reports of Cuban
operations will have noted that the scene
of recent military operations has shifted
from the extreme western province Of
Pinar del RIO to those of Matanzas and
Santa Clara, with continued raids and ex-
pe.litionary movements in Havana province,
up to the walls Of the IL land capital
This change resulted from the complete
whipping Of the Spaniards In Pinar del
Rio, their consequent assumption tina they
had ''pacified' their province, and a
new attempt by Weyler to make ho ad
against the revolution in Santa Clara and
the country to the east This naturally
led TO a corresponding alteration Of the
patriot program. Weyler threw re-en-
forcements into al the coast strongholds
Of the east: into such places rs Bayamo,
Puerto Principe. and SO on, for the pur-
pose of active operations from those direo-
tions, in support Of his Santa Clara demon
stration, and hoping TO make final con
centration of Spanish forces in Eastern
Puerto Principe or Santiago de Cuba, i'll
case he should be able To wipe out the
Republican army of Santa Clara.
We need not follow his campaign in the
province last named. He never dared to
bring on a general engagement, even sup
posing Gen. Gomez To be willing TO fight
one He pursued mis- unvarying policy OF
Keeping the main body ana the elite OF
his troops in solid formation around lis
precious individuality at al times. A
physical as well as a moral coward, this
brutal creature is unworthy OF conSidera-
tion as o soldier His plan of campaign
was TO make "Reminiscences in force at
no great distance from his main command,
cnufiding the command of mobile columns
TO officers supposed TO he bruye and COIN
petent If they won, he would reap the
credit and if they lost. they would get he
biaDle Gen. Gomez saw through The ar
eu1nent of weyler's program at once, and
simply pounded his detached columns as
he pleased The latter sustained Il sue
cession OF minor defeats, which reduced
the effective of his bodyguar1 until 1t
became evident to him that Gen. Gomez
would attack and probably exterminate
the whole outfit, himself included: reaching
from the field and retired to Havana.
While this was going on Rodriguez in
Havana and Rivera in MatanZas were
making things lively for the SpaniardS,
and in Santiago de Cuba Gen. CaliXto
Garcia was starting on spring campaign
which in it's results settles the question
of control in the eastern provinces for
good and all. Just at the end of February
Cen Garcia attacked the stronghold Of
Santa Anna, defeated the Spanish general,
Hernandez, captured 1,350 rifles, goo
sahers, 200, 200 rounds of ammunition and
three field pieces. -Four other pieces of
cannon previously had been taken in the
course of sharp fights at Las Tunas, Quay
mario, Jobabo, Salado and Menas. III only
one of them was Garcia wOrsted that at
Guaymairo, where the Cubans lost seventy
men but retreatedin in good order, carr ying
off their wounded and ON e captured cannon.