The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-05-12

liz AoANaJS WHICH IE0uOG tAAC0SA
are legally required TO make their inter-
state charges, say, from Chicago 70 bos-
ton, the maxima between numoerless IN
termediate places. This is not competition,
but the effect of the interstate act because
the OFFENDING line may not reach local
points on other lines which are neVerIHe-
less affected by the reduced through rates
its methods make necessary petWeeh
competitive centers.
are Illegal and punishable Oy fine and I'M
priSonment. The interState-commerce act
requires that the actual rates shall he pub
lished and charged alike to all; that they
shall be not reduced without three Gays
or raised except upon ten days publc no
tice, and that such rates shall not be more
or less than the tariffs filed, thereby stip-
ulating that railway competition shall differ
from trade competition. The minority
opinion in the TransmisSouri case presents
this succinctly and clearly, as follows:
THAT the interstate-commerce rates, all
of which are controlled by the. PROVISIONS
as TO reasonablenesS were not intended 10
fiuctuate hourly and daily, as competition
might ebb and flow, results from the factS
that the published rates could not be in
creased or reduced except after a specified
time. 1t follows then that agreements as
to reasonable rates and against their secret
reduction conform exactly 10 the terms Oh
the act"
For these reasons. as well as for the con-
venience, certainty and ~restfDlness OF TRACE
all merchants not seeking rebates Woulu,
for example, approve a rate OF ~ cents per
100 pounds from Chicago to New YORK, ana
such negative legislation as would sustain
that rate undeviatingly until as puDlcly
altered, rather than concur IN leSal oecl-
SionS or railway practices, when stimulate
a concealed rate of IS cents for large snip
pers. when the published tariff is ~ cents.
They well know that such vicious dlscrlml-
nations resemble trust methods ana render
commercial competition Impossible except
between controllers of vast capltal, VINO
may impoverish smaller traders, ana, con-
trolling warehouses full of trafhc, tehoer II
in trainloads to pliable railways or those
which lack business, or SHIFT ther ldiSS
tonnages from line to line, or unite Win
other shippers to more compel preferential
rates or conditions. 1t is regrettable TO say
that they too often obtain them; 10y sun
means some dealers become sniPpeaS ~ ~
diverted railway earnings as mucn do ~
their own merchandise, and thereby grow
the stronger to exact further railway con-
cessions, to stipulate purchase prices oop
sumers and perhaps to use thelr on
bined rebates and capital to 1urlneI comeIol
values on trade and financial exchanges
LAWS PURPOSE REVERSED.
The real purpose of the antitrust law IS
thus r.vcrsed. Not being, as the railways
contend, meant to apply to them, it is thus
far adiudged that it does; yet. being clearly
applicable to trusts, the latter escape its
effect and grow stronger from those large
transactions between themselves and those
carriers which grant them special adVan-
tages. which that decision more encour-
ages them to do.
REASONING from these conditions, it can
NOT ne 100 often OI StIOll6AS 80
however much all competitive always put
one may observe common anu leSdI iaC9,
the strongest and best disposed cohpdnlTs
must succumb to the obJectlonaDle conul-
tions forced upon them by the weakest OF
worst competitor. This also reVerses com
mercial and trust conditions, wherein the
stronger control.
AS a further illustration, the govern
ment's postal business would De impaired
and disorganized If allways, express cnt he
panies and house to house carriers cut the
postal rates 20 per cent, yet II real compeI1
ton is the legislative intent, why, snoulu
they be restrained from such carriage by
Schoonmaker we'll said: "A rate mace py
one line on a particular traffic must be me
the business" He also said; And
this pernicious power is the crea-
ton of law, and is protected oy
table theory. but now fully demonstrated
fallacy, that unrestricted competition
among railroads is a public beneht.
All such rate-cutting methods simply sell
transportation awards to the lowest anu
not the highest bidders, and are not proper
competition more than are auction safes OF
pawned, bankrupt or damaged goods leSlu-
mate business rivalry. 1t is the control OF
extinction of true carrying compeutlon anu
the destruction of all its legitimate rules;
functions and agencies. In these facts ana
illustrations lie answers. to those VINO say
the railways have only themselves 70 plaHie
for the unreasonable reductions or rates
and theu ntoward conditions of which they
and the untoward conditions of which they
WHAT COMPEIIIlON MEANO'
Based on these proven premises, COMPETE
ton properly means that when various per-
sons seek a coveted contamination or pat
ronage they shall be governed by those
rules in each branch of endeavor which APP
ply equally to'all honorable contestants
therefor. and which experiences have
proven fair and essential to enable the best
man. horse, yacht, machine, picture, ship
.oi1coo1 70 win under equal cOnQl-
tons. u
sidered and applied only 70 ral4"aS5' III
justment of rates to conform equl[aply 70
those causes which properly control or al
feet them; such as rivalries with oceans,
rivers. lakes and canals, competing MARKERS
which distribute, consume or reshlp, tne
relations of localities, etc. Economies IN
cheaper rails, coal, etc., longer anu more
numerous trains, lower grades, improved
criminal facilities, better station houses
more and safer tracks. celerlty OF serViGe'
etc, are also elements of legitimate eHluld-
ton intended to transfer and increase pusl-
ness and which effect lower rates thereon.
This true competition Will, therefore, never
cease between any rival lines.
When all these justly competitive forces
have been duly expressed IN reasonaote any
uniform rates, fares and rules, each ana
every violation of them, however small,
especially by those who helped to make or
who Endorsed them, CONSTITUTES a uIscrlnn1
ination; is dishonorable competition, ana
should not longer receive even negative
trade or national sanction.
INDORSED BY AUTHORITIES.
Various interstate commissioners have
strongly confirmed these views: Judge
Cooley said: How distinctly it is seen
here that it is utterly impossible to judge
of railroad competition and its effects It's
usefulness and it's mischiefs, by comparing
it with competition as we encounter it in
other lines of business
Hon. Martin A. Knapp said: Deprived
of special and exclusive rates, an advan-
tage far more odious and powerful than ex-
emption from taxation, those trusts are
shOrn of their strength and Invested of
their supremacy
Judge Patterson, who introduced the pool
ing bill of 1895, said: This preferential
80 t~hro1nhnut the country is Rr2dnal-