The enterprise. [volume] (Wellington, Ohio) 188?-1899, 1897-12-08

tomaUc course.
The UntrIed Measures.
OF the untried measures there remain
only: Recognition OF the insurgents as
belligerents; recognition OF the independ-
ence of Cuba, neutral Intervention to end
the war by Imposing rational compromise
between the contestants, and Intervention
In favor OF p one or the other party speak
not be thought of. That by our code Of
morality would be criminal aggression.
Recognition of insurgents.
Recognition of the belligerency Of the
Cuban insurgents has often been can
yassed as possible II not inevitable step
both n regard @ to tie previous ten years
not unmindful that the two houses of con-
gress in the spring Of 1896 expressed the
opinion by concurrent resolution that a
or .Justifying the recognition of the state OF
belligerency In Cuba, and during the ex-
ira session the senate voted a joint resolu-
tion Of IKE import, which, however. was
sentatiyes. In the presence of these Sig
niticant expressions. Of the sentiment Of the
legislative branch, It behooves the execu-
tive to soberly consider the conditions un-
der which so important a measure must
needs rest for justification. It Is to be
seriously considered whether the Cuban
insurrection possesses beyond dispute the
attributes OF statehood, which alone de-
mand the recognition of belligerency In its
favor. Possession, In short, OF the es
sential qualifications OF sovereignty by the
insurgents and the conduct of the war by
them according to the received code Of
war are no less important factors toward
the determination Of the problem of bel
ligerency than are the influences and con-
sequences OF the struggle upon the internal
policy OF the recognizing state.
Quotes President Grant.
The uttcrances OF President Grant In his
ms ga n hor
are signally relevant to the present situa-
tion In Cuba and 1t may be wholesome now
to recall them. At that time rulnous
neighboring island. During all those years
an utter disregard of the laws of civilized
warfare and of the just demands of hu-
manity, which called forth expressions of
condemnation from the nations of chris
tendon continued unabated. Desolation
and ruin pervaded that productive region,
enormously affecting the commerce of all
commercial nations, but that Of the United
States more than any other by reason of
proximity and larger trade and intercourse.
At that .Juncture Grant uttered these
words, which now as then sum UP the ele-
the independence Of Cuba being, in my
opinion, impracticable and indefensible, the
question. which next presents itself is
that OF the recognition of belligerent rights
In the parties to the contest. In former
message to congress had occasion to con-
slider this question, and reached the con-
cluslon that the conflict In Cuba, dreadful
and devastating as were its Incidents. did
not rise to the fearful dignity of war
ut Is possible that the acts of foreign
powers. and even acts of Spain herself, of
this very nature might be pointed to In de-
1r sHf tSga as II
carefully avoid the false lights which might
lead 1t into the mazes of doubtful law and
Of, questionable proprlety and adhere rig
idly and sternly to the rule which has been
n
| right and honest and of good report. The
question of according or of withholding
rights Of belligerency must be judged in
every case, in view of the particular at
tending facts. Unless justified by necessity
It Is always and justly regarded as an un-
| friendly act and gratuitous demonstra-
tlon of moral support to the rebellion. 1t
Is necessary, and 1t Is required, when the
interests and rights of another government
or of its people are so far affected by
pending civil conflict as to require a
definition of It's relations to the parties
thereto. But this conflict must be. one
which Is recognized In the sense OF In
ternational law as war;
Recognition Not Justified.
"Belligerence, too, is fact. The mere
existence OF contending armed bodies and
their occasional conflicts do not constitute
war In the sense referred to-: Applying to
the tests recognized by publlcists and writ
ers on international law, and which have
been observed by nations of dignity, hon
esty and power, when free from SENSITIVE or
selfish and unworthy motives, fail to
find in the insurrection the existence Of
iesI real, . psipabIe siSI''S and manifest to the
world, having the forms ana capable % OF
toward Its own people and to other states,
with courts for the administration OF JUS
tice, with a local habitation, possessing
such organization of force, such material,
such occupation of territory as to take the
contest out of the category OF a mere re-
bellious nsurrection or occasional skir-
mishes. and place 1t on the terrible foot
| ing of war; to which recognition OF bel
ligerency would aim to elevate It,
1.-THE contest, moreover, Is solely on
land; the insurrection has not possessed
itself of single seaport whence 1t may
send forth its flag, nor has It any means OF
communication with foreign powers ex-
cept through the military lines Of its ad-.
versares. No apprehension OF any OF
those sudden and difficult complications
which war upon the ocean Is apt to pre-,
cipitate upon the vessels, both commercial
| and national, and upon consular officers OF
other powers, calls for the definition or
their relations to the parties to the contest;
Considered as a question of expedlency,
regard the accordance OF belligerent rights
still to be as unwise and premature, as re-
gard it to be, at present, indefensible as
measure Of right
such recognition entails upon the coun-
try according the rights which flow from 1t
| difficult and complicated duties, and re-
| qlires the eXaction from the contending
| parties of the strict observance of their
rights and obligations. 1t confers the right
Of search upon the high seas by vessels of
! both parties; 1t would subject the carrying
Of arms and munitions of war, which now
may be transported freely and without in
terruption, In vessels of the United States
| to detention and to possible seizure; 1t
would give rise to countless veXatious ques-
| tions, would release the parent government
| from fnSnOn9ihilitV acts done NJ
surgents, and would invest Spain with the
| right to exercise the supervision recognized
by our treaty of l795 over our commerce on
the seas, a very large part of which, In It's
traffic between the Atlantic and the gulf
states and between all Of them and the
states on the Pacific, passes through the
waters %nen W %ash ths ssDss OF
scarce fail to lead, II not to abuses GER
tainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful
relations of the two states. There can be
| little doubt as to what result such super
vision would before long draw this nation.
1t would be unworthy of the United States
| to inaugurate the possibilities of such re-
suit, by measures of questionable right or
expediency, or by any indirection."
What Recognition Would Mean.
Turning to the practical aspects of a rec
| ognition OF belligerency and reviewing its
| Inconvenience and positive dangers, still
| further pertinent considerations appear
| In the code of nations there is no such thing
| AS a naked recognition Of belligerency un-
accompanied by the assumption of interna-
| tional neutrality. Such recognition will
| not confer upon either party to domestic
| conflict q status not heretofore actually
possessed or effect the relation OF either
party to other states. The act of recogni-
| tion usually takes the form of a solemn
proclamation of neutrality which recites
the de facto condition of belligerency as
| its motive. II announces domestic law
of neutrality In declaring state. 1t assumes
the International obligations of a neutral
in the presence of public state of war. It
warns all citizens and others within the
| jurisdiction Of the proclaimant that they
violate those righteous obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect to be shielded
| from the consequences. The right Of visit
and search on the seas and seizure Of ves-