The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-10-31
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.
GEN. BoYNToN TAKES a HAND IN
SETTING GEN. cox RIGHE
Gers Biunaors and Elisstatcments Pointed
Out BY an Impartial HIsteriAp. whs RE-

out by an Impartial HIstoriAp, whs re.
fers to Hceerds oh Fiie In Washington.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3o.-There is now small
excuse for any ono having access TO the pub
lishod records Of the war writing inaccurate
history OF its leading campaigns. There is
none for r~eviving exploded misconceptions aud
glaring missta somonts long since corrected, re.
asserting them. and treating them as accepted
history. Yet this is what Gen. J. ID. Cox has
done in a volume Just published purporting to
DO n history O. tho battle Of Franklin.
Gen. d.. y. STANLEY, quoting Gen. soboneld at
length us his authority, has already effectually
met the main point which Gen. Cox wrote his
book TO establish. There remains ono officer
Of national reputation who had brilliant and
important part In tho whole campaign before
and after Franklin from whom the country
ought to hear both in regard to the questions
about tho battle which Gen.: Cox brings into
controversy and those which he omits to men
ton. 1t can thus DO left TO tho distinguished
general officers OF that field to settle finally the
special controversies concerning 1t which Gen.
Cox has cha llenged.
But tho latt er has seen at In the Introductory
chapter OF HIS book to roncw covert attacks upon
Gen. Thomas and assume as settled the con-
~tsntions of Con. Sherman against Thomas
arising out of the march to the sea. This Is a
feature of tho book OF which every member Of
the: Army OF the Cumberland may properly
take notice.
In this introduction Gen. Cox makes two
points. First. tho battle OF Franklin '~justifes
the strategy OF such u loader as Sherman In his
division of his forces in Georgia and making
the march to the sea." Clearly, this battle
demonstrated tho exact opposite, since after
everything that 1t was possible to do to concen.
trato an army in Hoods front had been done,
the Union Army was largely outnumbered.
Gen. Sherman himself. in his memoirs. writing
Of the force with Gen. Schofeld, said:
This force, asgregating thirty thousand mon,
was therefore inferior to the enemy.
On the day Of the battle of Franklin Gen.
scho6eld telegraphed Gen. Thomas.
1 am satisfied that l have heretofore run too
much risk in, trying to hold Hood in check
while 80 far inferior to him in both infantry
part, or failure OF = subordinate, during the LAST ms
three days might have proved disastrous. l
don't want to get into 30 tight a place again.
Gen. Thomas also reported to Con. Halleck
that no WIS convinced that tho enemy very
far outnumbored him ISchofeld. at franklin
both in infantry and cavalry" In the latter
arm, he further telegraphed Halleck that Gen.
Wilson has now but about oue-fourth the mum.
Der of tho enemy, and Is therefore no match
for him"
The first point with which Gen. Cox opens
his volume Is ono which he has heretofore per-
B~istently insisted upon in his anonymous con-
tributions to the New York Nction. He here
treats 1t as II 1t We're an accepted fact, when the
official records are crowded with reports and
dispatches which show It's absurdity, the quot
ing OF which has time and again effectuaily ex.
ploded hts theory. Con. Cox's present aim
seems to be to pass 1t into history with the ma.
5ority OF ~.readers, who have no means of testing
such assertions by the records as q settled
question.
In this connection It should be
that certain things have been established by the
publication OF the war records. First, Gen.
Grant, early In the spring Of 1864, planned a
campaign for Sherman's army from Chattanooga
TO Atlanta. and from the latter point either to
Mobile or Savannah, or both, as should seem
best after tho occu patton of Atlanta. This plan
accompanied by a map explaining this, and the
contemplated moves OF the armies, was COM
municated to Gen. Sherman during the first
week In April, 1864, and go a month before the
opening Of the Atlanta campaign. This map
was discovered In tho war record Office after
the atlas Of maps was supposed to be completed,
and added as q supplemental sheet. In this
atlas it is numbered 1854. Immediately after
the capture Of Atlanta Gen. Grant telegraphed
Sherman that another campaign should be
undertaken as soon as possible, and that as
Mobile Bay had been occupied. the movement
had better DO toward the eastern coast.
Secondly, Grants march to the sea involved as
= necessary preliminary the destruction Of
Hoods army. Upon this point he was persist
emit and unyielding. until Sherman assured hira
that he had sent to Thomas, or made available
for him, abundant forces to take care OF Hood.
This statement placed Hoods force at from
$1,000 to 10000 and the force available for
Thomas from 90, 1000 to 10000. In the same
telegram he stated the force he had retained
for his projected march was only $4,000, when,
as a matter OF fact, he gives the figures in his
memoirs to show that the force with which he
started was 60, 2O4. OF this selected body he
wrote that "as the result of extraordinary eff
forts to purge this army " " " all on this
exhibit may be assumed to have been able
bodied, experienced soldiers, we'll armed, well
equipped, and provided, so far as human fore.
aight could, with all the essentials Of life,
strength, and vigorous action
The absurtiity of this contention Of Gen. Cox
that, i'm starting for the sea, the strategy of Sher.
man in the division of his forces was perfect,
is shown by the proposition that II enough were
left with Thomas to take care OF Hood, tiion
Sherman, on the Atlanta campaign. which wss
made against this identical army OF Hood, had
62,2o4 more than he needed. In the face Of Gen.
6herman's own precise statement, giving, as he
does, the figures for each arm OF the service, and
showing the aggregate to have been 80, 2O4, Gen,
Cox says that he took with him about so, 900
nen." But to cover this minimizing of the taking
from Thomas he adds: at turned out that tho
hurry OF absentees to rejoin their commands in
creased this number somewhat before comm uni
cations were broken
Secondly. Gen. Cox follows this first point Of
his book with the following covert attack ON
Gen. Thomas, made in his best style when deal
Ing with this officer, consisting Of misstate-
mont presented as II IL Werc unuuestioned and
accepted history:
The effective force under Gen. Thomas in
middle and southern Tennessee was GO, 800
officers and men present for duty equipped, -
which was tho official phrase indicating com.
Pleto readiness for active service. The agsre.
gate present was some 5000 more. These
figures do not include the troops In Schoneld's
department OF the Ohio,n East Tennessee and
Kentucky, nor those OF the military division
between the Tennessee. and Mississippi rivers,
~ o. when were subject to J aomas's orders.
Hoods army i'll the field numbered IL, 900 or
$1,000 men OF al arms, and had been very
closely estimated by Gen. Sherman. Thomas's
problem, therefore, was chiefly one OF coucen.