The San Francisco call., 1897-06-03

| the till their fafherland, and who are always
| ready 10 ba ance temporary interruption OF
money-m aking, or n temporary hnanclAI hhu
| commercial disaster, against the seit-sacrlnce
| necessary in upholding the honor OF the Ma
ton and the glory of the flag:
| But after all these people, though oiten
! noisy. form but q small minority OF the whole.
! They would be swept like chaff before the gust
| OF popular Jury which would surely come II
ever the Nation rea .ly saw and felt danger or
an insult. The real trouble IS that In such case
| his gust OF popular fury would come TOO late.
| Unreadiness Tor war is merely rendered more
disastrous by readiness 10 bluster, to talk de-
| fiance, and advocate vigorous policy in
| words while refusing to back up these words
| by deeds is cause Tor humiliation. 1t has
| always been true and in this age IL is more
than ever true, that it is too late TO prepare for
! war when the time OF peace has passed. The
| short>ightedne.s OF many people, the good
| humored indifference TO facts of others, the
| sheer ignorance of a vast mum ber, and the self
| ish reluctance to insure against future danger
| by present sacrifice among yet otheTs-these
| are the chief obstacles in the way of building
up proper navy and carrying out proper
| foreign policy.
No battle-ship can be built inside of two
years, under no matter what stress or circum-
| stances, for we have not in this country the
| plant to enable US 10 work faster. Cruisers
! Weuld take almost as long. Even torpedo
| boats, the smallest of all, could not be put in
| frst-class form under ninety days. Guns
| available lor use against hostile invader
would require two or three months; and in
! the case OF the larger guns, the only ones
! really available for the sc tual shock of battle
could not be made und eight months Rifles
and military munitions of every kind would
require a cores sponding length OF time Tor
preparation; in most cases we should
have to bulld not merely the weapons we
need but the plant with which TO make them
IN any large quantity. Even il the enemy
did not interfere with our efforts.
which they undoubtedly would, It would,
therefore, take from Tree to six
months after the outbreak of a wsr for
which we are unprepGred before we could in
the slightest degree remedy our unfeadiness
During this six months il would be i'm poss be
TO overeStimate The dimage that could be done
by resolute and powerful antagonist. Even
at The end OF that time we would only be be-
ginning 10 prepare 10 pArry his attack for 1t
would be two years before we could attempt to
return il. Since the change in military con-
ditlons in modern mes there has never been
an instance il which war between any two
nations has lastco more than about two years.
In most recent wars the operations OF the first
ninety days have decided the IeSult OF the con-
hct. All that followed has beeu mere vain
effort 10 strive against the stars In their
courses by dong Gt the twelfth hour wha: it
was useless 10 Go alter the eleventh.
We must therefore make p our minds once
for all, TO the TACT that II Is too late 10 make
ready lot war when the tight has once begun.
The preparation must come before that In
the case OF the Civil War, none of these coudi-
tlons applied. In 1861 we had good fleet,
and the Southern COnfederacy b ad not snip.
We were able 10 blockade the Southern pOrts
at once, and We could improvlse engines Of
war more than sufflcien To put against those
OF an enemy who also had 10 improyise them
and who la bored under even more serious dis
advantages. The Monitor was got ready in
the nick of time TO meet the Merrimac, because
the Confederates had TO plan and build the
latter while We were planning and building the
former; but ii ever we have TO go TO war with
a modern power shall fnd S Nerrimacs
already built and il will then be altogether
too late 10 try 10 build Monitors to meet Them.
1t can be taken Tor granted that there must
be adequate preparation for conflict, If con-
fiict is not TO mean disaster. Furthermore,
this preparation must take tue shape OF IN
efficient fighting navy. We have no foe able
10 conquer or overTun our territory. Our
small army should always be kept in first
class condition a.d every attention should be
paid 10 the National Guard, but neither on the
north or the south have we Reighbors capable
OF menacing Us with invasion or long resist
ing serious effort on our part to invade them.
The enemies We may have TO face will come
from over sea; they may come from Europe or
they may come from Asia.
Events move fast In the West, but this gem
Grafton has been forced to see that they moved
even fas ter in the older East. Our interests
are as great in the Pacific in the Atlantic,
IN the Hawaiian Islands as n the West Indies.
Merely Tor the protection OF our own shores
we eed a great navy; and what is more, we
need it to protect our interests in the islands
from which it is possible to command our
shores and to protect our commerce on the
high seas.
lame submission to foreign aggression OF
any kind is q mean and unworthy thing. but
1t is even meaner and more unworthy 10 blus-
ter first and then either submit or else refuse
10 make those preparations which can alone
obyiate the necessity for submission.
believe with all my heart in the Monroe
doctrine, and ! believe also that the great
mass of the American people are Ioval
to it; but Ii Is worse than idle TO announce
our adherence TO this doctrine. and yet to ce-
cline 10 take measures 10 show that ours is
not mere lip-loyalty. We had lar better sub
NIT To interference by foreign powers with the
affairs of this continent than 10 announce
that we viii not tolerate such interference,
ana yet refuse TO make ready the means by
which alone we can prevent IL. In public, as
in private life, bold front tends 10 insure
peace and not strife. Ii we possess a formid-
able navy, small is the chance indeed that we
shall ever be dragged into q war to uphold the
Monroe doctrine. II We do not possess such 8
navy war may be forced on Us at any time.
1t is certain, then, that we need frst-class
navy. 1t is equally certain tnat this should
not be merely a navy foE defense. Our chief
harbors should, OF course, be fortified and put
in condition to resist the attack of an enc
my's feet, and one of our prime needs is an
ample force OF Iorpedo-boats TO use primarily
Tor coast defense. But in war the mere de-
Ienslye never pays and can never result n
anything but disaster. II is not enough to
parry blow. The surest way to prevent ils
re petition is to reiuTn ii. No master of the
prize-ring ever fought his way 10 supremacy
by mere oex ter1iy IN avoiding punishme Mt.
he had TO win by inflicung punishment II
the enemy Is given the cnoice OF lime and
place 10 attack sooner or later he will do ire
parable damage, and If he is at any point
beaten back why, afler all, IL is merely re-
pulse and there are no means of following fl
up and making rout.
We cannot rely upon coast protection alone.
Forts ana heavy land guns and torpedo boats
are d1spensable, and the last on an occa-
sion, may be used for offensive purposes alone
But IN the present state of naval and military
knowledge we must rely mainly, as all great
nations always have relied, on the battle-ship,
the nghttng-ship of the line. Guuboats and
llgnt cruisers serve an excellent purpose and
we could not do without them. In time of
peace they are the police of the seas. in time
of war they would do some marrying of com
merce and great deal of scouting ana skir-
mlshing, but our great reliance must be on
the great armored battle-ships, with their
heavy guns and shotproof viials.
In the last resort we must trust to the ships
whose business II Is to fight and not to run
ana who can themselves go 10 sea aud strike
at the enemy when they choose instead of
waiting peacefully to receive his blow when
and where he deems it best to deliver it Tin
the event OF warIour battle-shIps can destroy
the hostile Meet then our coasts are safe fiom
the menace of serious attack-even a fight
that ruined our feet would probably so SHAT
ter the hostile fleet as 10 do away with sil
chance OF invasion; but II we have no feet
wherewith to meet the enemy on the high
seas, or 10 anticipate his stroke by our own
then every city within reach OF the tides must
spend men and money In preparation for an
attack That may not come, but which would
cause crushing and itredeemabIe disaster if il
did come.
great battle-ships If we intend to live up to
Inc Monroe doctrine, and TO iusist upon its
observance In the two Americas and the
Islands on either side of them. If foreign
power, whether in Europe or Asia. should de-
termlLe TO assert Its positiou in those lands
wherein we feel that our influence shou d be
supreme, there is but one way in which we
can enectlYely interfere. DIPLOMACY is NJ
terly useless where there is no force behind
~, ~ the diplomat is the servant. not the mas
A q u