The Goodland republic. [volume] (Goodland, Kan.) 1891-1907, 1897-12-10

81 local council OF chamber, reserTing 70
SPAN the control Of the foreign relations the
army and navy and judicial sdministration- To
accomplish this the present government pro
pcses 20 modify legislation b decree. leaving
Z he Splash cortes. with the aid OF Cuban sen
ators and deputies, 70 solve the economic
problem and properly distribute the existing
debt
In the sbsenoe Of declaration Of the meas
ures that the government proposes % take IN
carrying out its profer CT good Offices It sug-
gests that Spain be left free 20 conduct militia
I y operations and grant political reforms,
Z while the United States for its part shall en-
force its neutral obligations and cut OF the as
sistance which &c IS asserted the Insurgents re-
cetF6 from this country. The snpposition Of
al Indefinite proclamation Of the war IS denied
| II Is asserted that the western provinces are
siresLiy ven nigh reclaimed; that the planting
| 81 cane and tobacco therein has been resumed.
and that By force Of arms and new and ample re-
forms very early and complete pacifcation IS
hoped for. The immediate amelierstiOn Of ex-
/ tsting conditions under the new administration
Of Cuban Affairs is predicted and thereWithal
the disturbance and all occasion for any change
Of attitude on the part Of the United Slaves
Discussion Of the question Of international
duties and responsibilities OF the United
States as Spain understands them. IS pre-
Sented, with an apparent disposition 20 charge
Us with failure In this regard This charge IS
without any basis In fact It could not have
been made II Spain had been cognizant Of the
constant efforts this government has made at
| the cost Of millions and By the employment Of
the administrative machinery Of the nation at
command 70 perform its fun duty according 70
the law OF nations That 1t has successfully
prevented the departure Of single military
eLpeditiln OF armed vessel from our shores in
violation Of our laws would seem TO be q SUI
hcient answer But Of this aspect OF the Span
ish note It is not necessary 70 speak further
now.
Firm in the conviction Of a wholly performed
obligation due response 70 this charge has
BEEN made in diplomatic issues Throughout
al these horrors and dangers to our own peace
this government has never in any way abrogated
sovereign prer0gatiYe Of preserving to itself
the determination Of its policy and course ac-
cording 20 its own high sense Of right and IN
consOnance with the dearest interests and
convictions Of our own people should the pro
lOngatiOn Of the st-ife 50 demand
Or the untricd measures there remain only:
Recognition Of the Insurgents as belligerents;
recognition Of the independence OF Cuba. neu-
traI Intervention 70 end the war BY imposing
rational compromise between the Contestants,
and Intervention in favor OF one or the other
party. I speak not Of forcible annexation. for
that cannot be thought Of That, BY our code
Of morality, would be criminal aggression
Recognition OF BeIIigereney.
Recognition OF the belligerenCy Of the Cuban
insurgents has often been canTassed as q POS
sibls II not inevitable step both in regard 70
the previous ten years struggle and during the
present war am not unmindful that the two
houses Of congress in the spring OF 1873 eI-
pressed the opinion b. concurrent resolution
that . condition Of public war existed requiring
OF fustifying the recognition Of state OF bellg-
erency IN Cuba and during the extra session the
senate voted a joint resolution Of like import.
which, however was not brought to vote IN
the house In the presence Of these significant
expressions o. the Sentiment Of the legislative
branch tt CehOOTeS the executive to sOberly
consider the conditions under which so impOr-
tant q measure must needs rest for justifca-
ton It is to be seriously cOnsid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood which alone can demand the recOg-
milton Of belligerency In its favor Possession.
II short, Of the essential qualifications Of soy
ereignty By the insurgents and the conduct OF
the war by them according TO the received code
Of war are no less important factors toward the
determination Of the problem OF belligerency
than are the influences and consequences Of the
struggle upon the internal policy Of the recOg-
niZing state
Turning TO the practical aspects Of q recognf-
ton Of belligerency and reviewing its incOn-
Yeniences and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code
Of nations there's no such thing as naked
recognition Of belligerency unaccOmpanied BY
the assumption OF International neutrality.
Such recognition without more VIII not COZ
fer upon either party to o domestic conflict q
status not Heretofore actually possessed or az
feet the relation Of either party TO other states
The act OF recognition usually takes the
form OF Q solemn proclamation Of neutrality
which recites the de factO condition Of beIliger-
ency as its motives 1t announces domestic
law Of neutrality in the declaring state. It as
sumes the international obligations Of a neu-
tral in the presence Of q public state Of war
It warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction OF the predominant that they VIC
late those rigorous obligations at their own
peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the
consequences The right OF visit and search
on the seas and seizure OF vessels and cargOes
and contraband OF war and good prize under
IL L.
law be admitted as a legitimate con-
sequence Of q proclamation Of bel
ligerency- While according the equal
beIligsrent rights defined BY public law to
each party in our ports diSfavors would be i'm
posed on both which while nOmiually equal
would weigh heavily in behalf Of Spain herself
Possessing navy and controlling the ports
OF Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military Investment Of the
island, but up to the margin Of our OWE terri
tOrial waters, and . condition Of things would
exist for VI iCh the Cubans within their own
domain could not hope TO create parallel:
while its creation through aid sympathy
from within our domain would be even more
impossible than now, with the additional
obligations Of International neutrality we
would perfOrCe assume
Recognition Now Deemed UnWise-
The enforcement OF this enlarged and oner-
Gus code OF neutrality would only be influential
within our Own jurisdiction b. land and sea
and az plicable BY our own instrumentaIity. It
could i1rplrt 70 the United States no furisdic-
ton between Spain and the insurgents Il
would give the United States no right OF inter
TentiOn to enforce the conduct Of the strife
within the paramount authority Of Spain &C
cordinE to the international code OF war For
these reasons I regard the recognition OF the
beli0erency OF the Cuban Insurgents as now
unEise and therefore fnadmissible Should
that step hereafter b deemed wise as q meas
ure OF right and duty the executive wiz take it
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has
been frequently suggested and has not failed
TO Gsceivc my most anxious and earnest con-
ssderat l. But should such a step be now
taken when IL is apparent that hopeful change
has superTensd in the policy OF Spain toward
Cub1s a new government has taken once in
the mother country II is pledged in advance
70 the declaration that al the effort in the
world cannot sufice 70 maintain peace in. Cuba
BY the bayonet; that vague promises Of reform
after subiugstion afford no solution OF the
fnsuiar problem; that with q substitution Of
commanders must come q change Of the mast
system o. warfare Tor one IA harmony with
new policy which shall no longer aim to drive
the Cubaus TO the horrible alternative OF
taking TO the thicket OF succunbing in uuisery:-i
that reforms must be instituted in accordance
with the needs and circumstances OF the time
nd tast these reforms. while destined to give
fun autonomy 70 the colony and 20 create 4
virtual entity and Eeff-Cur trcf1e-7 rf7rufnf-frr