Evening journal., 1897-12-07


tion or armed vessel from our shores in
violation Of our laws would seem to be
sufficient answer.
or the untried measures there remain
only recognition of the insurgents as
/ belligerents, recognition of the inde-
pendence Of Cuba, neutral Intervention
TO end the war by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants
and Intervention in favor of one or the
other party.
NO FORCIBLE ANNEXATION.
speak not of forcible annexation. for
that cannot be thought OF. That, by
our code of morality, would be crimi-
nal aggression.
Recognition Of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents has often been can
vassed as a possible if not inevitable
step both in regard to the previous ten
years struggle and during the present
war. It Is to be seriously considered
| whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes Of
statehood which alone can demand the
recognition Of beliigerency in its favor
Possession, in short, Of the essential
qualifications Of sovereignty by the in
surgents and the conduct of the war by
them according to the received code of
! war aIt no less important AdtAolH lD-
ward the determination Of the problem
OF belligerency than are the influences
and consequences Of the struggle upon
the internal policy of the recognizing
state.
Tho wise utterances of President
Grant in his memorable message of
Dec. z. 1875. are signally relevant to
the present situation in Cuba, and it
may be wholesome now to recall them.
At that juncture General Grant uttered
these words. which now. as then, sum
up the elements of the problem
"a recognition of the independence Of
Cuba being in my opinion, impractical
BILE and indefensible, the question which
next presents itself is that of the recog-
milton Of belligerent rights in the par
ties to the contest. In a former mes
sage to congress I had occasion to con-
slider this question and reached the
conclusion that the conflict in Cuba,
dreadful and devastating as were its
Incidents did not rise to the fearful
dignity of war. 1t is possible that
the acts of foreign powers and even
acts Of Spain herself of this very ma
ture might be pointed 10 In defense Of
such recognition. But now, as IN its
past history. the United States should
carefully avoid the false lights which
might lead il into the mazes of doubtful
law and of questionable propriety and
, adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule
which has been it's guide, of doing only
that which is right and honest and of
good report.
UNFRIENDLY If UNNECESSARY.
p "rhe question of according or OF with
holding rights OF belligerency must be
judged I'm every case in view OF the
particular attending facts Unless jus
titled by necessity It is always and
Z Justly, regarded as an unfriendly act
and a gratuitous demonstration of
moral support to the rebellion. 1t is
1 necessary, and it is required, when the
I interests and rights of another govern
ment or of its people are so far af-
: fected by a pending civil conflict as TO
e require a definition of it's relations to
- the parties thereto. But this conflict
D must be one which will be recognized
e in the sense of international law as war
"Belligerency. too, is a fact The mere
n existence of contending armed bodies
and their occasional conhiCts do not
constitute war in the sense referred to
Applying to the existing condition OF
h | affairs in Cuba the tests recognized 10y
n publicists and writer's on internationa
q law. and which have been observed 10y
n nations of dignity, honesty and power
when free from sensitive or selfish anC
4 unworthy motives l fail to find in th'
o insurrection the existence Of such a sub
q stantial political organization, real pal
pable and manifest to the world, having
4 the forms and capable of the ordinar.
>, functions Of government toward its owl
l. people and to other states, with court
for the administration of justice with
| I,.f cfTq1 n
a ization Of force, such material. such oc
n cupation of territory as to take the con
test out Of the category of a mere re
belliOus insurrectiOn or occasional slkir
IA mish and place it on the terrible foot
=, ing of war, to which a recognition O
is belligerency would aim to elevate it,
ct INSURGENTS HAVE NO SEAPORT
D. "The contest, moreover, is solely o
At land. The insurrection has not possesse
lie itself of a single seaport whence it ma
to send forth its flag, nor has it any mean
is Of communication with foreign power
ne except through the military lines Of II
Il adversaries. No apprehension of any
D. those sudden and difficult complication
~ which war upon the ocean is apt [
r precipitate upon the vessels, both CON
1T mercial and national, and upon the cor
r sular officers of other powers calls fC
~ the definition OF their relations to th
or parties to the contest Considered as
ol question of expediency, 1 regard the az
nd cordance Of belligerent rights still to 1
H. as unwise and premature as 1 regard
n to be, at present, indefensible as
s. measure Of right.
sh "Such recognition entails upon tn
rs country according the rights whic
ic flow from il difficult and complicate
X duties and requires the exactlon froi
the contending parties of the strict oil
servance of their rights and obligation
he 1t confers the right of search upon IL
es high seas by vessels of both parties,
of would subject the carrying of arms an
he munitions Of war which now may I
ms transported freely and without intel
no ruption in vessels of the United Stat,
its TO detention and TO possible seizure,
IS would give rise TO countless vexatiol
,r. questions would release the parel
he government from responsibility for ac
"a done by the insurgents and would il
ed vest Spain with the right to eXerci.
dy the supervision recognized by our treat
ng OF 1895 over our commerce on the hie
-. | caae worry large mart of which in (