The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-07-21

their use Is concerned the manner OF pro-
auction is wholly nnimportant.
MUST NOT DISCRIMINATE.
IN the manufacture of articles of COM
merce, reprehensible means may be used;
children may be required to labor when
they ought not to be, convict labor may
De uhiawfully contracted for, unreasonable
hours may be demanded OF workmen and
uh"hoiesome and dangerous quarters may
pc provided toI them; such things may
form a proper subject for legislative inter-
ference Dut in all such cases the remedy
must oe sought in the jurisdiction where
the ouense is committed. Ii cannot be said
however that labor performed under such
circumstances imparts any faint or inarm-
ity 10 its products after il has f1oated out
into the commercial or market channels ~
the country. For this reason ii is imnor-
tant 10 Keep IN view the distinction be-
tween the means OF production and the
product itself. Articles of merchandise are
the subjects of contract and ownership
They may be bought and sold; they may De
transferred from one State to another. bear
ing only the burden and suffering the re-
sricuons that are properly imposed upon
similar articles. If a person buys a chair
for his individual use, he does not concern
himself as TO who the maker was; he Sc
lects what he wants and as customer.
buys IL upon the best terms he can. If a
merchant buys chairs, in order to resell
them, 1t is ordinarily unimportant to him
as to how or by whom they We're manufac-
tured; his object in buying and selling s
TO make the best bargain he can for him.
self. The object of the manufacturer is to
produce an output on the best terms he
can: when he disposes of his product in the
market he has no further interest in 1t,
for his dominion over it is gone and it be-
comes a subject of commercial traffic in
competition with articles Of like kind.
Suppose a merchant in another State
owns chairs that he has purchased in the
ordinary channels of commerce, some of
which were made by convictS, others by in
diYiduals and still others by corporations;
are they not his property? Is not his title
complete and unqualified? Is he not in
vested with all the incidents of ownership.
guaranteed by the law OF the land?' Does
he not possess the right to contract in re-
gard to his property to transport 1t from
place to place and to expose it for sale and
articles are sold? Can it be said that a
State may discriminate between his goods
by permitting him to sell a portion thereof
and denying him the right to sell others OF
merce regulated? Is not the power to con-
tract as vested right taken from citi-
zen! Are not his commercial privileges suS-
pended or materially qualified?
II 1t is true, that the right to regulate
commerce between the several States Is ex-
clusively federal, then the statute in ques-
ton is an infringement of such federal
rights and cannot be upheld. There is such
palpable discrimination between the right
to sell goods of the same class for the sole
reason that they were made by different
agencies that no room is left for doubt as to
the invalidity of the law complained of.
The statute in question is almost a literal
copy of similar statutes enacted by the
States of Ohio and New York In each of
these States the courts have, as far as I
have information, refused to uphold the
laws and have declared them unconstitu-
tional.
For the reasons above given the motion
to quash the information will be sus-
tanned.