New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1897-05-21
POSSIBILITIES ABOUT CUBA.

Tho course of events indicates that the Presl-
lent may presently propose new pohcy WIN
regard 10 Cuba. The distinct offer or meolatioh
q year ago and SPANS unequvocal REFUSAL
Tho disclosure of consular information as 10
,,e actual increase Of insurgent strength. am
the mode of conducting the war by spanish
authorities. with the consequences 10 Amer,
lean citizens and business interests ana the
course of debate in the Senate. go far 10 war
rant the impression that the President has IN
mind some proposition other than an oner OF
n ediation which he may soon submit 10 Coh-
gross There would be manifest injustice IN
basing any comments upon conjecture OF ID
ference regarding his purpose, as some nave
done but there are some contingencies winch
may be considered with advantage
II is evident that recognition Of belligerency
,.ou,d not in itself be an unfriendly act 10
Spain. because 1t would give no advantage or
benefit TO the insurgents. In the opinion OF
rany of their most competent friends. II would
Iva only an embarrassment and hindrance TO
tlem Ar the same time II would necessarily
,rvolve rho commerce of this country in no lit
tlc embarrassment by reason Of the right 10
search on the high seas by belligerents. and II
must be admitted that the exercise or such
power by Spanish vessels would In It's man.
rer and spirit be extremely apt 10 render hos
tlities unavoidable. Recognition depends upon
questions Of fact. Should the United States
find that a state Of war exists. and Delliger-
ent power In Cuba which international law and
the facts require this country to recognize, a
choice might become necessary between that
course and some other. whatever the disadvan-
tcges Of either.
Direct Intervention with recognition OF Cuban
hn inf ~
AID Spain, if based upon ascertained facts. If
it were certainly known to the United States,
and to Spain also, that the struggle could only
end in Spf nish failure and Cuban independence,
Il might be in fact a great relief to Spanish
pride ard to Spanish Ministry embarrassed
ry it's failure to suppress insurgents, If the
United States should so far intervene as TO
make Withdrawal from Cuba necessary. The
Spanish Government, Of course could not pub
Ecly acknowledge the fact, even in that event,
and would attribute its failure to the cours,
Of this country but its actual relief might go
far 10 prevent any hostilities Again, the ques
ton is largely one of facts, respecting which
the Administration necessarily has fuller ana
better information than can be made public.
One important consideration Is commonly
overlooked. This country would by no means
Dc Dcucuteu III d!i itSI'cNts, cItHti W thc ihuS-
repdence or the annexation of Cuba. To say
nothing of the social and political possibilities
and difficulties in the future. there are obvious
consequences Of the highest Importance 10 the
Nations revenue system. and TO the develop
ment of many industries. which go far 10 sup
port the claim that except for the protection OF
It's own citizens the United States has, at this
moment and under existing circumstances, no
selfish interest TO promote by Intervention. For
instance, material part Of the revenue depends
upon imports Of sugar and tobacco, on which
duties under the present act yield s45,oOo,oOO,
under the House bill would yield on the same
tmportations about s74,o0o,ooo, and under the
senate bill about $72,000,000. Radical changes
would DO necessary If either Cuban independ'