The National tribune., 1897-10-28
army, and allowed for the accidents that

army, and allowed for the accidents that
were common and inevitable.
But, as | have recorded, that single
stem of railroad, 473 miles long, sup
piled an army of 100000 men aud
$4,000 animals for the period of 1876
days; viz, from May / to Nov. II, 1864.
To have delivered regularly that
amount of food and forage by ordinary
wagons would have required $4,000
wagons of six mules each, allowing each
wagon to have hauled two tons 20 miles
each day, a simple impossibility in roads
such as then existed in that region OF
country.
Therefore, | reiterate that the Atlanta
campaign was an impossibility without
these railroads; and only then because
we had the men and means to maintain
and defend them, in addition to what
were necessary to overcome the enemy.
Habitually, a passenger-car will carry
90 men with their necessary baggage.
Box-cars and even platform-cars, answer
the purpose we'll enough, but they should
always have rough board seats. For
! sick and wounded men, box-cars filled
with straw or bushes were usually en-
ployed. Personally, | saw but little of
the practical working of the railroads,
for l only turned back once as far as
Resaca; but | had daily reports from
the Engineer in charge, and officers who
came from the rear often explained to
me the whole thing, with description
of the wrecked trains all the way from
Nashville to Atlanta.
RISKS WERE GREAT.
I am convinced that the risk to
life to the engineers and men on that
railroad fully equalled that on the
skirmish-line, called for as high an order
/ of courage, and fully eqnalled it in inn
portance. Still, I doubt if there be any
necessity in time of peace to organize
corps specially to work the military rail-
roads in time of war, because in peace
these same men gain all the necessary
experience, possess all the daring and
courage of soldiers, and only need the
occasional protection and assistance of
the necessary train guard, which may be
composed of the furloughed men coming
and going, or of details made from the
local garrisons to the rear
For the transfer of large armies by
rail, from one theater Of action to another
by the rear-the cases of the transfer of
the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps-Gen.
Hooker, $4,000 men-from the East to
Chattanooga, 1892 miles in seven days,
in the Fall of 1863; and that of the
Armyofthe Ohio-Gen. Schofeld, $4,000
men-from the Valley of the Tennessee
to Washington, 1,400 miles in l days,
en- route to North Carolina in January,
1865, are the best examples of which l
have any knowledge, and reference to
these is made in the report of the Secre-
tary of War, Mr.. Stanton, dated Nov.
%, 1865.
Engineer troops attached to an army
are habitually employed in supervising
the construction Of forts or feldworks
Of nature more permanent than the
lines used by the troops in motion, and
in repairing roads and making bridges.
had several regiments Of this kind that
were most useful, but as rule we used
the infantry, or employed parties of freed
men, who worked onthe trenches at night
while the soldiers slept, aud these in turn
rested by day.
Habitually the repair of the railroad
and its bridges was committed to hired
laborers, like the English navvies, under
the supervision of Col. w. w. Wright,
a railroad engineer, who was in the mill
tary service at the time, and his success
full labors were frequently referred to in
the official reports Of the campaign.
USING THE PoNTooNs.
For the passage of rivers, each army
corps had pontcon-train with de-
tachment of engineers, and, on reach
ing river, the leading infantry divis-
ion was charged with the labor of put
ting it down. Generally the single
,o,,too, tro;p Gould rrouida for o00 Eoot