The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-05-23
AN INVASION OF ENGLAND
A GRAPHIC PREFECTURE OF THE
POSSIBILITIES INVOLVED.
The Foe Would Likely Be Destroyed
or Captured, but the Shock to Brit
ain Would BE Tremendous.
London Spectator.

duCe them TO take certain precautions for
the defense of their own land of which a
present they will not hear. They rely at
heart absolutely upon the superiority of
their fleet and refuse to consider two state
ments, both of which nevertheless are
demonstrably correct. One is that if any
power, or which is more probable. any
coalition of powers, ever declares war upon
us the whole energy and ability of that
power or that combination will be devoted
TO a scheme of invasion, the root idea of
which will be that the presence of a
foreign army on British soil even for a
week will inhict so tremendous blow
upon Great Britain that the defeat and
capture of that army would not be an ex-
cessive price to pay for the resulting gain.
No one will enter upon a long maritime
campaign in which he could hardly hope to
win, or will dream of eXhausting Britain
by desultory expeditions over all the world.
He will plan an invasion of some kind or
he will remain at peace. Such an invasion
may be most improbable, but when We con-
slider the amount of military capacity
which would be directed to devising 1t, the
frequency with which new explosives are
discovered and for a time kept secret and
the desperate efforts that would be made
to draw off the British fleet, it is rash to
believe that it would be impossible for US
to lose for forty-eight hours the command
of our own waters.
Had the Emperor Napoleon accepted Full
toms offer, had VileneuYe succeeded in
keeping Nelson at a distance without fight
ing him. had we had at the moment of in
vasion to face a serious internal trouble,
Napoleon might have invaded the island,
and the whole course of history might have
been changed. And the second statement is
that the impact produced by an enemys
landing would, even if it We're in the end de-
feated, be far more disastrous than Eng
lishmen have ever realized The heart of
the empire might suspend it's beating Gun
world of trading and manufacturing de-
ponds for vitality entirely upon the condl-
ton of our banking system, and If there
were a run for gold. which to a certain eX-
tent at all events would be inevitable, that
system might temporarily cease to work.
1t certainly would cease If we were defeat
ed in the first battle on our own soil and
the English certainty, that we should not
be defeated, is rather an assumption than
a truth proved beyond dispute. Our sol
diers would no doubt die the Greeks-we
mean no aspersion on their courage-did
not die; but we might have an incompetent
general, we might have to meet soldiers
armed with a new weapon, as the Austrians
had at KoniggratZ. or we might be visited
with one of those strange panics to which
all soldiers, our own included, are occa-
sionally liable, which they themselves can
not explain, and which for a moment the
crucial moment, reduce regiments or armies
into helpless mobS. Or, and this is by far
the most probable form of possible disas-
ter, after the most creditable fighting on
our part. the fortune of war might turn
against us, and all England might know
that we had been defeated, without know
ing also that the enemy had been paralyzed
by the losses incident to his success.
AN INVITATION TO PANIC.
The single idea would be that the road to
7 n11fn nr1I +ho 0ffn Of hot
idea would be; for the hour, ruin such as
the world has never witnessed. The panic
might, we believe would, suspend the whole
social organization of the kingdom. All
banks would shut their doors. The means
of paying wages would be unprocurable,
masses of men threatened with starvation
would be raging in city streets, as the Ath-
enian mob is raging nCw and, unless
Parliament had very trusted leaders, its
deliberations might only add to the general
coltusicn London knows instinctively that,
IL attacked by a triumphant enemy, it can
neither be defended nor fed; that, in fact.
its only solid protection would be victory
in the field; and London, If it got out of
mana, would be a pandemonium such as
only shells could reduce to order. We Eng
fish despise foreign nations because their
capitalists are liable to excitement" panic
aimless ins urrectionary movements or re-
volts like that of the Commune. We are
Just now abusing poor little Athens, which.
experience which justifes our overweening
confidence. We have no more idea of what
London would be under the influence of ter
ror than what the solar system would be
If the law of gravitation were suspended.
All might be, all would be. put right, in
time for the national character is sound
There must be six hundred thousand in the
island who have been through the military
mill, and the supply of varied CAPACITY is
unlimited. But the influence of the dark
week would be felt ali throughout our sub
sequent history. Just imagine the effect of
the kilograms upon India, upon the colonies,
upon the whole of the mercantile plant"
scattered over earth--of which the mercan-
tile marine is only part-accessible to the
news. The week would cost us national
debt in money alone, besides it's future eff
feet in the destruction of the idea that Eng
land is in the world the one inviolable mag
aziEe for the storage of universal wealth.
We say nothing of other results than the
commercial. There is nothing to be gained
by heightening the colors of such a calam-
ity. and our object to-day is only to ask
whether the experts are certain that sup
posing such an incident of war
rash invasion to occur, and & hostile
armament to reach our shores, they are
fully prepared to meet it. Have they the
men, the munitions the organization, and,
above all, the field artillery? Can they
that IS, be reasonably certain Of meeting
and destroying an army of $4,000 good
troops within forty-eight hours of their es--
tablishing themselves upon coasts?
That ought to be the minimum of what
we should seek FOR our second line of de-
Tense; but we feel 30 complete confidence
that we are not only prepared, but actual
Iy READY, to make that moderate effort
only the effort which Greece has just
tried in vain to make. Have we the men,
effective, properly distributed with a work
ing organization? Have we the munitions
especially artillery, actually in store? Has
the problem ever been thought out, so
that If the emergency occurred there would
be no hurry no confusion. doubt as to
the right man and the right thing to do
nothing of that fluster which signifies that
a nation is on the eve Of a calamity? We
seeing minute scale what the con-
sequences OF unreadinesS are; are we GER
tain that they could never be repeated in
our caSe-aS certain as the Bank of
England is, for instance that no CONNER
solvent? We have no means of answering
the question but we have a diffuSed doubt
to the answer, arising from our belief
that the government thinks, what under
exceptional conditions might be false, that
it will always have sufficient time
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.
We should order out the reserves, they
say; we should draw up plans suited to the
emergency; we should summon the officers
best suited to the hour; we should order
the great manufacturers to use their i'm
mense resources In supplying all we need.
All that is excellent supposing the datum,
sufficient time to be granted; but suppose
that time not to be forthcoming that it
takes days to get the reserves, that the
officers are scattered over the earth. that
the troops actually on the spot and ef-
fectiVe are insufficient, that the great fac
tories are paralyzed by momentary de-
ficiency in the wage-paying power. Experts
81 20 saving and doubtless saving truly that