The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1897-12-21
FALL OF FORT FISHER.

and by B O'Clock next morning hao
thrown up a line OF entertainments
from the sea to the river. General
Terry In his official report says:
1.-The first object which I had In view
after landing was to throw q strong
defensive line across the pen1nsular
from Cape Fear river to the sea, facing
Wilmington, so as to protect our rear
from attack while we should be engag-
ed in operating against Fort Fisher.
Shortly after S O'Clock, leaving
Abbots's Brigade to cover our stores,
the troops were put in motion. On az
irving at 1t the pond" was found to be
a sand-fat, sometimes covered with
water, giving no assistance to the de-
tense Of a line established behind It.
Nevertheless it was determined to get
a line across at this place, n Paine's
Division, followed by two Of Ames'
Brigades, made their way through.
The night was very lark and much of
the ground was a marsh and billy
adapted to the construction OF works,
and the distance was found to be too
great to be properly defended by the
troops which could be spared from the
direct attack upon h fort. 1t was
not until 9 O'Clock p. NJ. that Paine
succeeded in reaching the river. The
ground still carer the fort was then
recol.noitered and found to be much
better adapted to u purpose; accord
ing1y, the troops were Withdrawn from
their asst position n established ON a
line bou 2 miles from the work. They
reached this final position at 2 o'clock
A. M. of the 14th INST. Tools were i'm
mediately brought up and intrench-
ments commenced. At s o'clock a good
b~reastwork, reaching from the river
to the sea and partially covered by
H. Nd 49, ---
in a defensfble condition. It was much
improved a~fterward, but from this
time our DOT hold ON the peninsular
was secured"
General Bragg continues:
"On learning this I put the command
in motion and ordered the enemy dis
lodged if it was at all practicable. Gen
eral HOke and his b~rigadiers made a
close reconnaissance and expressed to
me the opinion that their troops were
unequal to the task. I moved forward
with them and made a close examina-
ton and after a conference confirmed
their opinion and decided not to at
tack"
Humane commander! This line was
held by Paine's Division and Abbott's
Brigade, all colored troops, and num-
bering less than Hoke's Division. Gen
eral Bragg says:
I "The enemy had landed without ar
tillery and not even a general officer
brought a horse"
| While General Terry reports:
EARLY in the morning Of the 14th the
landing Of the artillery was
ed and by sunset all the light guns
were gotten IN shore. During the follow
ing night they were placed on the line
most of them near the river, when the
enemy, in a S he should attack us,
would be least exposed to the fire of
the gun boats"
AS some Of these guns engaged the
steamer Chicamauga in full view of
the Generals Camp, it is hard to I'M
derstand his ignorance Of their pres
ence on the beach. The letter pro-
ceeds:
Believing myself that Grants army
could not storm and carry the fort, If
it was defended, I felt perfect conf
dence that we were not only safe, but
that the enemy had assumed a mos
precarious position, from which he
would escape with great difficulty"
CONDITION OF THE FORT.
If the fort had remained in the n
ditiOn in which General Bragg saw it
previous to January 18th, Grants army
could not have stormed and carried it.
It had twenty heavy guns bearing on
the beach, supplemented with one NOR
tar and three Napoleons. In front was
a perfect palisade line pierced for
musketry, and constructed in irregu-
lar lines, giving al enflading fire for
light artillery, and in advance We're
numerous sub-terra mines, capable of
| blowing up the beach from river to
sea for more than one hundred yards
in front of the works. Although con-
structed primarily. with a view 70 pre-
vent the entrance Of a feet into the
river, yet, u%ninjured by bombardment,
it could have resisted any assault.
But before h assault $1,000 shells had
expended their fury on the works.
Every gun save one 10-inch Columbiad
was destroyed, the use of all but one
Napoleon rendered impracticable,
every wire leading to the mines
ploughed up, and the palisades such a
wreck as actually to offer a protection
to some of the assailants. The ter
rifle fire in front, real and enflade
from the fleet upon the and face rem
dering the salients practicable for as
sault, forced me, from the numbers
killed and wounded, to cover by bomb
proofs all the troops on the land face
except those at the Columbiad and
Napoleon, n the sharpshooters pro-
An LIN IL dl
Bragg expect us if we repealed all the
assaults to pursue the enemy without
his cooperation? If not, why, in his
inactivity, did he not only consider
himself safe, but the enemy in a pre-
carious position? I understand that
General Bragg would take advantage
OF the darkness on the night of the 14th
and attack the enemy. About 9 O'Clock
l went out Of the works with Captain
Patterson's Company as skirmishers
and engaged the enemy's pickets to
ascertain their position, intending to
attack them in force as soon as I heard
the advance Of General Bragg, but I
waited in vain for him to avail him
self Of the last opportunity to capture
the enemy and saw the fort, while the
| fleet would have been forced to remain
+ inactive.
THE NATTER OF REINFORcE-
T0