Red Lodge picket. [volume] (Red Lodge, Mont.) 1889-1907, 1897-12-11

merce on the high seas, very large part
of which, in its traffic between the Allan
tic and Gulf states and between all OF
them and the states on the Pacific, passes
Though the waters which wash the shores
Of Cuba.
scarce fail to lead, if not 10 abu5a, s,."-
! tainly 20 collisions perilous to thA peace
ful relations of the two states There can
pervision would before lang draw upon
this nation. 1t would be unworthy of
the United States to inaugura te the possi-
bilities of such result, by measure of ques-
tonable right or expediency or by any
indirection.
Cuba Would Suffer.
Turning to the practical aspects Of a
recognition of belliserency and reviewing
its inconveniences and positive dangers
still further pertinent consderat tions ap-
pear
In the code Of nations there is no sucn
thing as naked recognition of bel!iser-
e4cy umaefompaned By the asSumptien
milton, without more, will not confer upon
either party. 70 domestic conflict status
not theretofore actually poss assed, or af-
feet the relation OF either party to other
states
The act of recognition usually takes the
form of a solemn proclamation of neu-
trality, which recites the de facto condi-
ton Of belliSerency as its motives. 1t an
nounees a domestic law of neutrality in
-
ternational obligations Of a neutral ia tlle
presence of public state of war. It
warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction of the claimant thac they vio-
late those rigorous obligat:ons at thsir
own peril and can not expect to be shield
ed from, the consequence. The right of
of vessels and cargoes and contra band of
war, under admiralty law, must under
international law be admitted as legiti-
mate consequence of a proclamation Of
belligerency.
While according equal belligerent
rights defined by public law to each party,
in our ports disfavors would he impossi-
hle to both, which, while nomina]ly equal
would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain
herself, Possessing a navy ana claiming
the ports of Cuba. her maritime rights
could be asserted. not only for the mill
tary Investment of the island, but up to
the margin of our own territorial waters
and a condition of things would exist for
which the Cubans could not hope to ere
ate parallel, while its creat ton. throu%h
sympathy from within our domain. would
be even more Impossible than now with
the additional obligations of interna ,ional
neutrality we would perforce assume.
cnerous code of neutrality would only be
Influential within our own jurisdiction OF
land and sea. and applicable b. cur own
1t could impart to the
United States no jurisdiction between
Spain and the insurgents. 1t would give
the United States no right Of intervention
to enforce the conduct of the strife with
in the para mount authority of Spain ac
cording to the international code OF war.
Fer these reasons. | regard the recogn-
ton of the belligerency of the Cuban in
SurgentS as now unWise and therefore in
admissable. Should that step hereafter
be deemed wise as a measure of right
and duty. the executive will make such in
tervention upon humanitarian grounds as
has been frequently suggested and has not
Jailed to receive my most anxious and /
earnest considerable