The Universalist. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1884-1897, 1897-03-06
SPENOER's "UNKNOWABLE.y
BY REV. c. G. CONNER.

SHALL not attempt in this article
to note those things about which [
lind myself in essential agreement
with the author of "First Principles,'
but simply some things wherein, to
me, his own thought is not careful,
accurate or full in that division of his
book which he entities "The I'm
movable"
|. First, l would note some of the
minor inaccuracies. CD He speaks
of the average human intelligence
from which all our individual intelli-
gences are inherited" This is not
the language of exact science. Indi-
vidual powers are inherited from the
individual, and being massed with
other, make an average. We must
have the private before we get the
public; the individual before the
mass.
(2) He says sail places must be
equidistant from boundaries that do
not exist" but he involves himself
here in contradiction or tries to set
forth what is unthinkable. We can
not conceive of equidistance in rela
lation to boundlessness.
(3) Again, he says that con lifting
chair, the force exerted we regard
as equal to that antagonistic force
called the weight of the chair" Alb
surd! If we lift the chair, our force
must be greater.
The author is not sufficiently care
full in his statements.
ii. In the next place he draws the
circle of his own thinking too small.
O Potential existence becoming
actual existence is thinkable. The
acorn is the potential oak and be-
comes after its power. We see it, and
therefore think it.
(2) He is not right in saying that
in unlimited space place is not. He
assumes on the hypothesis that mo-
tion is unthinkable. But anything is
limited to place in the boundless-
ness of space. Motion is movement
from place to place or point to point,
relatively speaking. We see it. and
therefore think of it.
81 it is not true that as we men,
tally follow out decreasing velocity,
as long as we have mind to do SO,
there remains still some velocity
We see bodies in motion and bodies
at rest.
Those we observe in motion we af-
terward see at rest, while motion
is relative to place, and place is not
infinite but is limitation.
(4) He SAYS that we know only by
comparison or contrast. But if there
be no other basis of knowledge, how
did knowledge begins There was
time when we had not an idea. How
did we get the first one? How did we
attain unto knowledge of the first
thing of which we ever became con-
scious9 May we not know of light
or white without knowing of red, or
blue, or black? We cannot know of
dark without knowing of light, be-
cause one is merely the absence of
the other. But we do think of a
thing without contrast or even COM
parison. Because it belongs to
class, we know it as such. Our
knowledge of it classifies it, rather
than its class gives us our knowl-
edge. In section "a, Mr.. Spencer is
putting single process of thought
for the whole power of the mind
(5) When he speaks of grouping
the Infinite with the finite, the abso-
lutte with the relative, he does not
use the terms we'll. We might as
properly speak of bringing the ocean
side by side with drop of water in
it, or of grouping for study a man
and one of his passing actions.
All the spaces of thought are not
we'll covered by the philosopher.
III. While Spencer proves the in
adequateness of the human mind to
deal with certain problems which are
presented to it, while the universe it.
self and many things therein are not
comprehensive, of their existence we
can have no rational doubt.
1t is averred that we cannot con-
ceive of infinite past time, yet we can
not conceive of it as otherwise than
infinite. We can not comprehend the
boundlessness of space, yet we can
not think of space as otherwise than
boundless.
Self-existence is not thinkable, in
a sense, yet we cannot think of mat
ter, even, as other than eternal. And
however, the world was shaped-it
was shaped in some manner-it was
not without an adequate cause. And