The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-09-26

complishing tho immediate object. In the face Of
storms of criticism he adhered to his purpose
with n tenacity characteristic of the man until
results had indicated the soundness Of his
Judgment. Rejecting. from tho beginning Of
his career. tho theories that ~hanpered others,
and that were only adapted to encounters be-
tween armies thoroughly ORGANIZED and trained,
Grant understood the Importance Of action, and
Of continued action. to transform raw troops
into Veterans" Finally. IL no made mistakes.
he know how to mako Of these the stepping
stones to final victory.
The appointment of Grant to the ONCE Of Cen
eral-in-Chief was designed to give TO the North
ern armies the unity Of direction essential to
success. Up to that time the exercise Of tho
central military power had been lamentably In
coherent. Operations would now DO under tho
control of the President, and then Of Gen. Hal
leck; at one time directed by the Secretary Of
War. and at another time by the General in tho
field. 1t was intended to put an end to this con-
fusion by the selection Of an officer to whom
should be intrusted the supreme control. and
who should really command the armies Of
the United States.' Even though Grant,
however, had been placed In supreme com.
mand, he was not entirely safeRuarded from
attempts to interfere with him at Wash.
ington. It seems that when he was max
ing preparations for his direct march against
Richmond, by a movement against Lees right
flank, Secretary Stanton complained because
the Lieutenant General had taken from the de-
fences of the Federal capital artillerymen that
the Secretary thought were needed there. ct
think I rank you In this matter. Mr.. Secretary"
was Grants reply. I'VE shall have to sec Mr..
Lincoln about that returned the Secretary.
ss a y -g-Nk - i
Lincoln ranks us BOTH" They won't to tho
White House. won't you state your case.
Gen. Grant r. said Stanton. Grant replied: IT
have no case to state; 1 am satisfied as 1t is.
Mr.. Stanton stated his case. Then Lincoln an
swercd: You and I. Mr.. Stanton. have been
trying to boss this job, and We have not sue
ceeded very well with it. We have sent across
the mountains for Mr.. Grant, as Mrs. Grant
calls him.. to relieve us. and I think We had
better leave him alone to do as he pleases."
Upon Grants adherence to his plan OF advance
toward Richmond after the bloody battle Of The
Wilderness, the biographer's comment is that
the Army Of the Potomac, under tho leaders
preceding Grant. had never fought to q finish.
Advances had been followed by retreats, and
long periods of ~innction had interviewed between
the trials OF strength in the field. Tho ma
nruvres Of strategy designed to determine tho
theatre OF war and to place an army in the most
favorable position In presence OF the enemy had
been successful to a considerable extent, but
there had been no corresponding success In the
department of tactics. Col. Church admits that
1t may be a question for argument how far
Grant himself showed mastery in this depart
ment of warfare. but It is pointed out that no
had. in a high degree, the quality OF obstinacy.
and that no officer who preceded him in ytr-
ginia could say with equal truth what Butcher
IL A. NDH
the exhausted condition OF the troops had rained
upon me. but 1 have remained deaf to them all"
The General had decided in his own
mind that. with the advance on Richmond once
begun. there could DO no steps backward, except
in the face Of such overwhelming disaster as he
believed impossible. Nowhere, heretofore. had
assaults been followed up as they should have
been. Ten months of idleness deliberately on.
Joined had succeeded the staggering blows dc.
livered at Vicksburg. Gettysburg, Lookout
Mountain, and Knoxville Reaction after suc-
cess had shown itself. in n word, as paralyzinR
In Its effect as had defeat itself.
In the chapter describing the engagements
which took place in the course of Grants march
from the Rapidan to the James. the biographer
does not hesitate to speak OF Cold Harbor as the
least excussble OF the series of desperate and
unsuccessful attempts to carry Confederate in.
trenchments by direct attacks. Rank after
rank of the Federal lines went down before this
deadly fire from the Confederate works, and.
within an hour. nearly IL. 900 dead and,younded
Union soldiers lay In front of tho enemy's
trenches. Lees loss, on the other hand, was
scarcely u 1.-THE Of what he inflicted. Grant
himself says, in a passage OF his Memoirs Quoted
in this book: II have always regretted that the
last assault at Cold Harbor was over msda. M
advantage whatever was gained to compensata
for tho heavy losses sustained"
During the winter Of ls61-65 Grant's army
which lay within its lines before Petsrsburg
was further away from Richmond than It had
been six months before. and the opinion became
current at the North that his campaign wa. a
failure. His biographer admits that it had no,
succeeded according to tho Generals expccta
tons, for the army of Lee. which lie set out 10
destroy, was still defiant. Although defiant
however. its ardor for aggressive action had
been sensibly cooled. Lee had Inade no serious
attempt TO reverse the roles of offence and da
fence since tho battle of the Wilderness IT,,
WAS only too happy II he could maintain hi,
position behind his formidable intrencbment
and retain at least a sufficient hold unor
lines OF communication to save his troon,
from complete starvation. II he hud not val
managed TO destroy Lee. Gran. had at lcas,
succeeded In holding him in 50 tight a grin tho,
sherman WAS able TO ace omplish his purnnsc,
without being molcste!. "a Lincoln pui #
Grant proposed to hold the leg while sherman
TOOK on the skin. Thus it came TO pass that the
much'Vaunted march through Georgia was
| pfaeticaIy unopposed; 1t was. indeed. q sort q