The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-09-26

IlOukh ~ sum- uNc pTOlCCllOn W OuIutTu . HI
pathizers living quietly at home. Pillage he
use. giving n receipt to the owners for what was
taken. What property he could not use he
destroyed. where he believed that otherwise 1t
would be employed for the benefit of the Confed-
crates.
When Halleck was ordered East, July IL.
1862, to succeed Mcclellan as General.in-C Chief.
he recommended as his successor in the Depart
ment Of the Tennessee Col. Robert Allen, who
was then serving on his staff as an aide. The
selection was overruled at Washington. and the
command was given to Grant. Col. Church
points out that the army belonging to Grants
new department, though large In the aggregate
100000 mem. was so scattered. and the activ-
ity OF the hostile population by which he was
surrounded was so constant, that he was put on
the defensive. His dislike of Halleck's engineer.
ing methods was shown by an Immediate with
drawRl from tho lines Of fertilization estab-
lished around Corinth at the cost of much
time and labor. to others moro simple. and
requiring a smaller force to man them.
Grant himself tells us in his memoirs
that the most anxious period in tho war for
him was when he was forced to abandon the
role Of the offensive. which was natural to him.
In order to carry out the policy Of dispersion en-.
Joined upon him by his superiors. He was re-
CURED to hold rs much territory as possible and
at the Same time to keep his troops In readiness
to reinforce Buell., who at this time was In chase
OF Bragg. who was pushing North and threaten
ing Louisville and Cincinnati. BY the end Of
September various calls for troops had left
Grant with but so. y men. and further dcple-
tions OF his forces for the purpose OF strengthen
ing Buell. compelled him to abandon a por-
ton Of his own territory. The Confederate
Generals Van Dorm and Price seized the
opportunity to unite their armies for a move
ment against Corinth. Their attack on that
place. however. was repulsed. with a loss to the
enemy OF more than $4,000 men. and Grant was
thereby relieved from anxiety touching his
ability to hold most of the territory which he
commanded. In November. 1852. he was ready
to resume offensive operations. md the move
ments began which eliminated in July. 1863,
with the capture Of Vicksburg. the most memoir
able achievement OF the kind between the capture
Of Ulm by Napoleon and the capture OF Metz in
1870. Ono OF the obstacles which Grant had TO
surmount In his preliminary operations was in.
reference on the part OF the cautious and dis
trustful Halleck. 1t will be remembered that.
againat the advice OF Sherman. Mcpherson,
Logan. and every important officer of his army.
he decided on the bold expcdient OF protecting
himself against an attack in his roar by leaving
himself without any rear. He determined to
cut 'oose from any base. carrying what
supplies no could with him. and gathering
others from the country rs he went along.
Had Halleck. who was General. in. Chief. un.
derstood the situation. and could he have
reached Grant. the movement would have been
cut short at Its inception. Grant counted upon
advancing so far with his plan that, before Hal
leck could be heard from, his Interference would
-nVnA a~N Lac - IIlI -. -,
land that he WAS too learned a soldier to con-
sent to a campaign in violation Of all the prin.
ciples OF tho art Of war" 1t is well known that
Grants plan was carried out triumphantly, and,
in tho opinion OF his present biographer, his
self'reliance and determination were never moro
conspiCuously shown. Grant himself declares
In his memoirs that he would have accom-
plished In January, 1868. what. as It was, he
did not accomplish until July. had he. at the
earlier date. had the confidence In his ability to
live off Of tho country that no afterward ac-
auired. 1t was Grants success In feeding his
army in Mississippi that made a complete con.
vert OF sherman, who turned to great account
the experience acquired when. later. no "cut
loose v from Atlanta and marched TO the sea.
or all tho comments on the Vicksburg cam.
paign the most valuable are those made by
Grant himself In after years, some OF which arc
reproduced In the book before us. They run as
follows : "Some of our Generals failed because
they worked out everything by rule. They
knew what Frederick did at ono place. and Ma
polcon at another. They were always thinking
about what Napoleon would do. Unfortunately
for their plans, the rebels would be thinking
about something else. ! don't undcrratc the
value OF military knowledge, but II men mako
war in slavish observance of rules they will fnil.
No rules will apply TO conditions OF war as diff
fcrcnt as those which exist in Europe and
America. Consequently, while our Generals
were working out problems of AN ideal
character, problems that would have
looked well on a blackboard, practical
facts were neglected. To that extent l con-
slider remcmbrances Of old campaigns a
disadvantage. Even Napoleon showed that; for
my impression is that his first success came be-
cause he made war in his own way, and not in
imitation Of others. War IL progressive, be-
cause all the instruments and elements OF war
are progressive. do not believe in luck In war
any more than in luck in business. Luck is a
small matter may affect a battle or a move
ment. but not a campaign or o career. = . .
War has responsibilities that are either fatal to
. commanders position or very successful I