Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1897-06-18
SHRIVER NOT, :, GUILTY
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before the committee Voluntarily? Is 1t es
sential that the writ of Summons should
have been issued and served? The indict-
ment alleges that the defendant did ap-
pear before the committee, having been by
the authority Of said Senate duly sum-
moned as such witnesssto appear before the
said committee to give testimony upon the
ma a under Der inquiry before the commit
sufficient to dispose Of this case upon his
motion. to say that the evidence recited
taiis TO support this allegation
A1ter re1errins to the fact that the stat
Judge Bradley said that It cannot be ex-
tended beyond the plain meaning of its
words and no doctrine Of estoppel can
making out the offense.
am OF opinion" said the Judge, that
no one can be found guilty Of a misde-
meanor, under the terms Of this statute,
t 10 re. le.using TO answer questions pertinent
not been summoned as q Witness by au-
testimony"
Last Point Advanced.
The last ground considered by Judge
Bradley was that as to the impertinency
OF the question asked Mr. Shriver, the
judge remarking that unless the ques-
lions asked the defendant which he re-
fused to answer were pertinent to some
one or more Of these matters under in
quiry his refusal, even If he had been law
fully summoned as witness, was not a
violation of the statute"
The defendant had testified" explained
Judge bradley, that member of Con-
facturer had told him that he had over
heard from his room, adjoining the room at
the Arlington Hotel used as the headquar-
ters OF the sugar trust, conversation be-
tween sugar men and senators, and from
that conversation the wire manufacturer
had reached the conclusion that the Will
son bill. which affected his interests, would
not pass the Senate.
He was asked the name Of the wire
manufacturer, and he declined to give it,
and. having also refused to give the name
OF the member of Congress. this indictment
Is pased upon the latter refusal. Would
the name. II given. have been q fact per-
t1nent to any of the specified charges. hay-
ing any probative force to prove or dis
prove them?'
Irrelevant" and "Pertinent."
After discussing the definition Of the
word relevant" a synonym of peril
nent,' Judge Bradley said that either may
be accurately applied to evidence adduced
by an investigating committee for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the truth or falsity
OF charge.
1T was evidently" said the Judge, 1.-The
purpose of the Congress in the statute in
question to limit the responsibility of wit
nesses summoned to testify in an investi-
cation OF charges to answer such ques-
tons only as would elicit facts which
would tend to prove or disprove the
charges. If congressional committee sees
mt to roam In the realm Of collateral IT.
relevant, immaterial, impertinent matters,
the witness who refuses to accompany it
will not be amenatle to the penalties Of
this statute. The answer giving the name
might have been a matter of convenience
to the committee, but 1t does not indicate
that the name would be a material fact in
proving or disproving the charges speci-
fed"
In conclusion, Judge Bradley said it is
plain that the name was not a pertinent
fact. and had 1t been asked in a judicial
proceeding and objected to 1t would inev-
itably have been ruled out.
The Judges Conclusion.
Further, the judge said that it cannot be
properly claimed that q witness violated
this statute when he refused to answer a
question propoInded merely to ascertain
the name of a person whom the committee
might desire to call, who, If called might give
the name of another person whom the
committee might desire to call, who might,
II produced, have some personal knowledge
of facts pertinent to the question under in
uuiry.
ut Is difficult" remarked the court, ito
give serious consideration to the conten-
ton that the question asked was pertinent
to the charges under Investigation. Giving
to the word pertinent" the meaning that
Congress must have intended it should re-
its own refutation. Being OF opinion that
the statute applies only to persons who
have been lawfully summoned, and also
that the question asked the defendant
which he refused to answer was not peril
nent to tile question under inquiry, 1t fol-
lows that the motion must be granted.