The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-07-11

the highest cripr. Not without reason has he
been called the father Of strategy; he was I'M
doubtedly tho dfst great author Of scientific war
fare. As Napoleon. has remarked. he not only
conceived aplan ofcampaign magnificent, yet en-.
tircly feasible, but ho also perceived and occupied
the decisive points on tho theatre Of war;
he brought his forces to bear on tho spot whore
success was most probable; no took tho initia-
Two and usually did what his ndversaries were
convinced he would not do; no discopcerted
them by his rapid attack. and, above all. by his
skill In hiding his purpose; he was master Of the
result almost from the first moment In moving
against . hostile forco, he followed tho principles
OF strategic art; he massed his strength on his
adversaryis flank and rear, avoiding, II possible,
the necessity OF a~ssailing him In front; all this
he did with q fertility OF resource and o bril-.
liancy Of design which command the highest
praise. especially when we consider that be was
almost always inferior in numerical strength to
his opponents. With equal wonder docs tho
student OF war observe the conduct OF Hannibal
on the field OF battle. Is q master of tactics, he
has never been surpassed. It 10 doubtful II he
has had an equal. In this province of the SOL
dior's art, the effects Of his superlative intelli-
genee wero extraordinary. complete. decisive.
His tactical system was, from tho outset,
adapted to make tho most Of all that WAS faulty
and weak In Roman command and Roman
methods in battle. No general has ever made
better use Of peculiarities of the ground to assist
bis troops; no saw at a glance whore
his enemy was most vulnerable. and made
this point tho object Of his most determined
efforts. Yet, perhaps, tho supreme excellence
Of this great tactician was the skill In surprise
and strategy shown In his preliminary move
ments, and even moro distinctly In his great
battles, Nothing so terrified the brave but
supplemented Romans as HannIbal's smbushes
and unforeseen attacks, their idea Of war being
to tight It out on an open field in bold and
dogged fashion. The craft evtnced by Hannibal
In war Yves. no doubt. az we have said. the
origin Of the charges OF "Punic Faith !" that
have been made against him.. We have thus
far spoken Of strategy and tactics; In tho
great work also of organizing armies and
preparing them for the field Hannibal
stands on tho highest eminence. His military
chest was usually well filled: II his troops
were sometimes in arrears OF their pay he a.
ways managed to supply their wants; the care
no took Of his resources Is probably the cause
that he was accused Of oovetousnoss by his
Roman detractors. The devotion his troops
constantly showed to him must have been duo
as much to his admirable vigilance in providing
for their daily requirements as to their conf
dence in his supremacy In the field. II, finally,
we reflect on how Hannibal demeaned himself
In the strcas Of battle. how admirable was his
faculty Of IN how extraordinary his re-
sources in moments Of danger. and, above all,
how unbending his constancy in adverse for
tune, we can scarcely hesitate to say that his
tory can exhibit no moro noble example of
moral grandeur in wal.
1t Is, at the same time, true, and o life Of Han
nibal would be imperfect II 1t did not empha.
size the truth. that 1t Is impossible for history 10
contemplate without horror what must have
been the results had the victor Of Gamma subju-
gated Romo. The great law-giving city of the
world would have been blotted out; the Roman
people would have been sold into bondage: the
principles of enlightened and progressive Gov
eminent, which had even then taken root in
Italy, would have disappeared. perhaps never to
flourish again. A tyrannical slave State, ruled
by q worthless caste, would have been i'm
posed on the Aryan races from the Hclles-
pont to the Atlantic waters: the conse-
quences must have been appalling. Car
thage could never have become one of those
great conquering powers that make civil
ization attend conquest: the wild tribes from
the O1us and the Jaxartes would probably have
destroyed Greek culture in the East; the swarm
ing Celts might have overrun Italy; the savage
peoples already stirring behind the Rhine and
the Danube might have anticipated the advance
Of the Goths. Above all, the Mediterranean
world would never have been blessed with the
Par Romano, the Peace OF Rome;'' the en-.
pire would not have arisen to prepare the way
for the faith OF Christ, for the extension OF ra-
tional law, for tho ideas that spread with tho
march OF the .legions. Never would the mould
OF modern Europe have been cast. Hldcous
idolatry and Ph9nician oppression might have
maintained through long. long centuries q dread
and horrible supremacy In some OF the fairest
parts of the world. NJ. W. II.