The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1897-08-01
Betting on British Race Courses.

In England, as in the United States, pub
lie opinion is divided as to the propriety of
allowing bets 10 be made on horse races.
That the practice, IL unregulated by legis-
lation, Is subject to grave abuses, Is ao-
knowledged generally, hut there is n feeling
among the upper classes that men who can
afford to lose should he permitted to back
horses under certain restrictions. It was
long supposed that the abuses Of the prac-
tice, and these only, had been done away
with by the Gaming Houses act Of 1853,
which prohibited under penalties the max
ing Of bets on horse races in any "house,
Office. room, or other places" For many
years this act was construed popularity to
mean that, while what are known In the
United States rs poolrooms, but In Eng
land are called betting houses or betting
offices, undoubtedly were abolished, yet at
race tracks themselves men were at liberty
to bet with the professional bookmakers.
Eventually. however, in the case of
HAWKE VS.. DUNN five puisne Judges de-
clded that under the statute just referred
to a bookmaker was not allowed to make
bets in a race course Enclosure. No appeal
was taken in that case, but in order to test
the soundness Of the decision rendered
therein, an action was lately brought
against the Kempton Park Race Course
Company by one POWELL, a shareholder,
to restrain the company from permitting
bets to be made or their premises. The
case was heard by the Lord Chief Justice,
who granted tho injunction on the ground
that he was bound by the decision
Of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved,
given in HAWKE VS.. DUNN. This pre-
liminary injunction was, OF course, ex-
pectcd by the betting man, but an ap-
peal from it was made Immediately
to the Court of Appeal, which delivered
Judgment on July 8. The bench was a full
one, consisting of Lord EsHER, Master Of
the Rolls, and Lords Justices LINDLEY,
LoPEs, SMITH, entity, and RIGBY. The
Master of the Rolls read the Judgment, in
which four of his colleagues concurred. 1t
was to the effect that the decision Of the
five puisne Judges in the case of HAWKE
vs.. DUNN was wrong, and that conse-
quently, in the case before the court, an
injunction against the Kempton Park
Race Course Company should not nave
been allowed.
The facts, Lord FISHER pointed out,
were these: The Kempton Park race
course, owned by the defendant COM
pany, comprised certain Enclosures, one
OF which was known as "Tattersall's
ring" to which any one had access upon
the payment of a sovereign, but no part of
which was reserved by any one for his own
purposes. Among those who entered the
Enclosure were professional bookmakers,
who offered and accepted bets as a matter of
business. At the time Of the passing of the
Gaming Houses act in 1853 such Enclosures
were In existence. and they were frequented
by bookmakers. Upon this basis of facts
arose the question @. law whether such a
use Of the Enclosure by a bookmaker was
legal. This again raised three inquiries
First, was such Enclosure such a place as
could come within the meaning of the
s~tatutef If yes, then secondly, was the In
closure so used as to make II a place H.
legally usedf If 1t were used illegally, did
the company knowingly and Willingly per.
nit the breach Of the law1 If to any one
of these three questions were returned an
answer favorable to the company, then,
said Lord EsHER, no injunction could lie.
or course the company must have known
what was done h~abitually Ia the in
closure, but they could not be said
to have permitted what did not exist.
1t was necessary, therefore, to determine
whether the use made of the Enclosure by
bookmakers was an illegal use.
Lord EsHER held that 1t was not. He
thought that the Tattersall's ring was
not capable of being defined as a place used
as If 1t were a house, room, or office. Yet
the word "place," as employed in the Gam
Ing Houses act, must have had some limi-
%tation, and that limitation must have been
to a place capable of being used as II ii
were a persons house, room, or Office. Now,
the essence OF a house, room, or Office Is
that some person has therein a certain pro-
prietary right or right of user peculiar to
himself. If a man has partners with him
in a room, such part of the re on as he ap-
propriates to himself, and such part only,
can be defined as his room or office. In
a word, n "place," in the meaning of
the statute of 1863, necessarily implies
some exclusive right in using. In the case
submitted to the court, however, the facts
showed that not one of the bookmakers
claimed to use, or did use, any part of the
Kempton Park Enclosure In an exclusive
way. No one, therefore, in Lord EsHER's
opinion, could maintain that the Enclosure
had been used contrary to the statute. 1t
followed that he did not agree with the
Interpretation put upon the act In the case
OF HAWKE VS.. DUNN. The Judges In that
case, he thought, did not determine rightly
what kind Of user was meant. In Ills judg-