The Portland daily press., 1897-08-02

eANS
effort was made by some OF the ablest men
there to have the justices sit with the
President as revising board upon all
bills before they became laws. But the
project was defeated, and the action of the
court was confined to Interpretation and
constitutionality of laws after they were
enacted.
1t was much easier to separate the judi
ciary from the legislature and from the
executive than to separate the two latter
from each other. AS it is, the only legal
connection between the executive and
heads of departments and the legislature,
between the Administration and the Con-
gress, is, on the one hand, by written
communications stating plans and prop
ositions, needs and requirements. On the
other hand, Congress may ask the Pres
ident, and in some cases require, II not
incompatible with the public service, of
the heads of departments, information as
to the public needs, with intent upon
such facts to predicate legislation.
All other communication depends upon
individual will and effort. The President
may recommend, the heads of depart
ments may report, and Congress may take
no notice whatever of recommendation or
of report. In that case both the Presi-
dent and his advisers and the Congress
may have done their duty and no harm
have happened to the Republic.
All communications in writing have
their limitations arising out of the nature
of things They cannot go beyond the
pate such objections as then occur, not all
the objections which will occur. When
Simon Cameron said he would rather go
hundred miles to see man than write
him, 1t was not because written letters
| remain, but words are winged; it was
because if you see man and look into
his face you put the case right, and you
answer the objections he really has, and
not those you think he might have. What
| is true of letter is true of all written
communications. Hence it is that though
members of the Cabinet give frequent ad-
vice, it has comparatively little power.
| For this reason it has been frequently
asked: Why do we not avail ourselves of
| the services of the heads of departments;
why do we not give them seats on the
| floor of the House and Senate. and the
right to speak and contend in debate; the
right to bring in bills and propose mease
ures? Undoubtedly, 1t is said, such a
course would give to these gentlemen
greater power and influence and the Pres
ident would be able to call around him
men of the highest standing, and even a
| seat in the Senate would seem small in
comparison. On the other hand, if these
heads OF departments were men such as
have been described, they would have
ample power to convince, and would add
perceptibly to the grasp which both House
and Senate would have on public ques-
tions. This at least would be a fair con-
tention, and If it were all that was to be
said, conclusive. But even slight ex-
animation will show that, whatever else
| this new creation might be, it would not
be representative government, representa-
tive either of the States or of the people.
! OF course all these suggestions have,
away down in our minds, a reference to
the British system, desire to get re-
sponsiblc ministry, set of men who do
their work openly, take the responsibility
and enjoy the glory. if glory there be.
| If we had the same surroundings, the
same system might we'll do for us. In
government things go together, and you
| those who want the Cabinet to help leg
islate desire is responsible government.
| But heads of departments on the floor of
either of our houses would not give that
at all. 1t is true we have at present ire
| sponsible government, SO divided that no
| body can tell who is to blame. But the
fact that we have not yet solved our prob
| lem does not show that we shall not
| What Woodrow Wilson has written
about our system has some bitter truths
in 1T. Government by committee and of
two houses entirely independent of each
other produces some fearful and wonder.
full results. The growth of the British sys-
| tenn was out of circumstances at least as
bad as ours, and wo shall find some way
does not seem to me it will be the Brit
| ish way.
| Our forefathers, fresh from the OPP
preston and tyranny of British minis
| try and British monarch, and the pro-
foundest regard for the constitution of the
land they had left They did not hesitate
to say so in the convention which formed
our constitution: But any imitation, ex-
cept in very slight details, was out of the
| question. There could be no nobility.
There were no great estates. Our people
| were then, as now, too individually indie
pendent to submit to such a superiority
| The conditions of the mother country
were the result of ages and "could not be
created by breath or by stroke of the
| pen.'
Let us see what gives efficacy to the sys-
tenn of parliamentary ministry in Eng
land. The House of Commons on all
] great questions is omnipotent. At its
behest ministries rise and fall When the
defeated Premier demands it the ques-
ton must go to the people themselves.
Hence, when he speaks it is with author
| ity. He is not selected by the executive.
He is selected by the House of Commons.
he and those who serve with him. While
the members of the Cabinet are not all
members of the House, yet such as are
share the fate of the other members.
They go to the country as well as unoffi-
cial members, and with them achieve vic
tory or take defeat. Hence there is
throughout community Of interest and
community of danger.
How different it would have to be with
US. Our Cabinet is appointed by the
President, dependent upon his will, and
can be discharged by him at once. They
are in Office for four years if it so please
| the President. They cannot be reached
for any wrong advice they might give
the House or the Senate. They would
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