Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1897-06-08
CUDA'S REBELLION.
Commissioner Calhoun's Impressions
OF The Situation.
NO olyILzsp METHODS OF WAR.
General Weyi,r's Purpose seem, 10 bs
10 Starve he Nativ Peaceful
Popula ion to Death.

CHICAGO, June s.-The Chicago
Tribune's correspondent, Charles M.
Pepper, teiegraphs the following from
New York;
Special Commissioner w. ]. Cal
h QUO, who returned here yesterday
from Cuba, says TINT he had formed
an Impression before leaving the states
that negfoss amt possibly banaits were
tho chief agents In the insurrection.
He had not been there three days be-
fore he was convinced the whole
strength Of the Cuban people 10 back
OF the insurrecliJn. He became salts
he'd TINT 1t was in reality the struggle
OF Cuba Tor the Cuban and that they
would tight desperately Tor independ-
ence. Everything he subsequently,
cav and heard strengthened tnis be-
lief.
Calhoun had heard the reports OF
pacification OF Gen. Weyler and had
credited them In some degree. HIS
stay in Cuba destroyed this notion. He
could not finu the pncificatton whicn
WAS reported, Instead, he found signs
Of war every at the gates
OF Havana. The Spanish troops nelc
certain parts OF the Island as an army
OF occupancy, while the insurgents
are making constant and often success.
fuI raids. MIR. Calhoun was so i'm.
pressed with these evidences of actual
warfare that he gave out blunt state.
ment, saying he could see NJ end OF
the war ana that the devastation was
growing.
Mr.. Calhoun could not discover that
any approach to civillzod methods o.
warfare was being made on either
side. He was overwhelmed with evil
uenoes to show the atrocities com.
mitted by the soldiers under Weyler,
particularly the guerillas, who form
part of the regular army. Such Cases
rs he was able TO investigate PERSONAL.
ly, generally proved to be correctly
stated. He also learned 1t was true
that the Red Cross society was NOT
permitted to exercise it's offices OF
mercy between the two contending
parties. This refusal was on lhs par.
OF the Spanish COVER nmeDt.
Mr.. Calhoun's personal Inquiries
and Investigations have satisfieu him
that the starvation anu suffering
caused by WeyIot's RECOMMENDATION
orders, were not exaggerated. He
saw the scenes OF human misery AZ
Matnnzas, which, determined him to
look no further into that phase Of the
war, becauas ne had seen enough.
II will possibly have deteImJning
effect in deciding whether the war In
Cuba has reachsd o stnte of savagery
tnat iustifies the U nited States in In
tervening on the grounds OF civilixa-
ton anu humanity. That the effect OF
Weyiei's concentration Oruer 10 to de-.
populate CuDa he is thoroughly con.
WINGED, though he may not assume
the responsibility Of saying that sucn
10 his purpose. That lie effort Ia
greatest in stsrving women anu chill.
uren, he Will be abie TO state without
reservation.
do not think Mr.. Calhoun was
strongly impresssu with the claim oi
the insurgents 10 recognition as bal
ligereuts, gs beliigerency Is usually
defined ny sihe lawyers, anu Mr.. CAL
houn Is himself lawyer. The ex-
isience OF Cuban government ID
unknown to him, perhaps for one res-
son, because he did mot 40 out to the
eastern provinces to seek. However,
he thinks the insurgents nave the
right to make war in their own way,
and, while ne cJuld discover no pro.
gress toward driving the Spanisrds
out OF the Island, he gives the insurs- :
ents credit for their ability to keep W
the present kind Of warfare inae mite
ly. In other words, there can be mt
pacifica!ion by Spain.
While Mr.. Calhoun did net attach
30 much i'm p0rtanoe to belligerency "a
to other phases OF the question, whal
he saw did not cause him any fears ioi
The United States In case the policy Of
belligerency should be adopted by the
administration and by Congress.
During mis- stay In Cubs, Mr.. Cal.
houn gave q great deal OF attention Il
the financial conditions. He under
stood perfectly that the hope OF the
insurgents was to win in practically
bankrupting Spain. While he did MOI
see actual bankruptcy, he found that
the credit OF the peninsula was grow
ing weaker, that faith IN its ability to
pull through safely was lesseDiDg ever
among Spanish partisans In Havana
and that in Watching the future pro.
gress OF the insurrection, Spain'i
ability to get money must also bt
carefully watched. Mr.. Calhoun alst
heard much about the corruption
among tho favOrites Of CaDovss and
Weyler in the payment OF the troop
uuu iok tuo uAuhkhkcu VI phy WulCL
were piliDg up, but he did not follow
this branon Of the inquiry exhaust
lively.
While not charged with the rsspor
stbility Of formulating policy OF In
tervention or Of beliiRerency, Mr.
Calhoun returned from CUBA with hi
mind made up that no encouragement
should be given the Cubsns to expec
annexation TO the United States. 1
Spain will not permit them to pur
chase their Independence and tn
United States steps in on the ground
Of humanity or OF commercial interest
or OF political conditions, to stop tn
warfare, In his view 1t should be witt
u distinci specific understanding tina
1t is not a step toward annexation. Tn
etsimilation OF the mixed population
OF the Island, ns he looked at II, woul'
be too much for the United States, al
least in the present generation. Thi
opinion was STATED with franknes
both to Cubans anu Spanisrds, aud
DO not violate any confiienos In re
stating 1t mere.
Calhoun concluded by warmly prsis
ing Gen. Lee. not only for his course
In the RIiz case, uut for the vigor ant
promplness with which the consu
general acquainted himself in the case
ui all American cluz
food for the starving Indians.