The weekly intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1891-1901, 1897-12-11

constant efforts this government has made at
the cost of millions and by the employment of
the administrative machinery OF the nation at
omman to perform its full duty according Ia
the law OF nations That it has successfully
prevented the departure of a single military
cxpeditiln or armed vessel from our shores in
violation OF our laws, would seem to be u Suf-
ficient answer. But Of this aspect of the Span
ish note it is not necessary to speak further
now.
Firm in the conviction Of u wholly performed
obligation due response to this charge has
BEEN made in diplomatic issues. Throughout
all these horrors and dangers to our own peace
this government has never in any way abrogated
its sovereign prerogative of preserving To itself
the determination of its policy and course ac-
consonance with the dearest Interests and
convictions of our own people should the pro-
longatiOn of the strife so demand.
OF the untrled measures there remain only
Recognition OF the insurgents Us belligerents;
recognition of the Independence of Cuba; neu-
trail Intervention to end the war by imposing q
rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other
party. / speak not of forcible annexation. for
that cannot be thought CT. That, by our code
Of morality. would be criminal aggression
Recognition of BelIigerenc y.
Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban
insurgents has often been canvassed as O pos
slble IL not inevitable step both in regard TO
the previous ten years struggle and during the
present war. 1 am not u0mindful that the two
houses OF congress In the spring OF 1898 ex-
pressed the opinion by concurrent resolution
that n condition OF public war existed requiring
OF iustifying the recognition OF o state of beilig-
erency In Cuba and during the extra session the
senate voted q joint resolution of like import.
which, however, was not brought to 9 vote In
the house. In the presence of these significant
expressions OF the sentiment of the legislative
branch It behOoVes the executive to soberly
consider the conditions under which so fmpor-
tant q measure must needs rest for justIhca-
tlon. 1t is to be seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes OF
statehood which alone can demand the recog-
milton OF belligereucy In its favor. Possession,
in short. OF the essential qualifications of SOW
ereignty by the insurgents and the conduct OF
the war by them according to the received code
OF Wat are no less important factors toward the
determination OF the problem OF belligerency
than ore the influences and consequences OF the
struggle upon the internal policy Of the recng~
nizing state.
Turning to the practical aspects OF o recogni-
ton OF belligerency and reviewing its Incon-
ventences and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code
OF nations there is no such thing a. q naked
recognition OF belligereney unaceompanied by
the assumption OF International neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not con-
fer upon either party to o domestic conflict O
status not heretofore actually possessed or at
feet the relation OF either party to other states.
The act OF recognition usually takes the
form OF q solemn proclamation OF neutrality
which recltes the de facto condition OF belliger-
ency as its motives. 1t announces O domestic
law of neutrality In the declaring state, 1t as
sumes the International obligations OF a neu-
trail In the presence OF a public state OF wal.
II warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they vio-
late those rigorous obligations at their own
peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the
consequences The right of visit aud search
on the seas and seizure Of vessels and carRoes
and contrabAhd OF war and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law be admitted Us . legitimate con-
sequence of n proclamation OF bell
ligerency. While according the equal
belligerent rights defined by public law to
each party In our ports disfavors would be i'm
posed on both which. while nominally equal.
would weigh heavily In behalf OF Spain herself.
Possessing q navy and controlling the ports
OF Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted
not only for the military investment OF the
island, but up to the margin of our own terri
torial waters, and o condition OF things would
exist for which the Cubans within their own
domain could not hope TO create q parallel;
while its creation through aid or sympathy
from within our domain would be even more
impossible than now. with the additional
obligations of international neutrality we
would perforoe assume.
Recognition Now Deemed Uuwise.
The enforcement of this enlarged and oner-
GUS code OF neutrality would only be influential
NlLnll our OWN JURISDICTION Dy lana ana sea
and applicable by cur own fundamentally. 1t
COULD impart to the United States no jurisdic-
tion between Spain and the insurgents 1t
would give the United States no right of inter-
vention to enforce the conduct of the strife
within the authority OF Spain ac-
cording to the International code of war. For
these reasons 1 regard the recognition OF the
beligerency OF the Cuban insurgents rs now
unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should
that step hereafter BE- deemed visa as a meas
IRE of right and duty the AX6rnttVA will talsA II
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has
been frequently suggested and has not failed
to receive my most anxious and earnest CON-
sideration- But should such a step be now
taken when 1t is apparent that a hopeful change
has supervened I'm the policy or Spain toward
Cuba? A new government has taken once In
the mother country. II Is pledged in advance
TO the declaration that oil the effort In the
world cannot suffice To maintain peace In Cuba
by the bayonet; that vague promises OF reform
after subjugation AFFORD no solution OF the
insular problem; that with O substitution OF
commanders must come q change of the past
system of warfare for one In harmony with O
new policy which shall no longer aim to drive
the Cubans to the horrible alternative of
taking to the thicket or succumbing In misery"
that reforms must be instituted In accordance
with the needs and circumstances OF the time,
and that these reforms. while designed to give
full autonomy to the colony and to create O
virtual entity and self-controled administra-
tion. shall yet conserve and annrm the sover-
VI Spain W = laSN Va POWN
ers and burdens upon O basis OF mutual inter-
est untaInted by methods OF selfish expediency.
The Near Future VIII Tell.
Not q single American citizen is now under
arrest or in confinement In Cuba. OF whom this
has any knowledge. The near
future will demonstrate whether the indls.
pensable condition OF O righteous peace, Just
alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well a.
to all our interests SO Intimately iHE
attained. If not, the exigeney of further and
other action by the United States win emain
TO be taken. When that time comes that action
will be determined in the line OF indis-
putable right and duty. 1t will be faced with
out migiVings or hesitancy 10 the light OF tia
obligation this government owes to itself. 20
the.people who have conhded to 1t the protection
OF their interests and honor, and to humanity. |
Hawaiian Annexation.
BY q special message dated the 18th day OF
June last. 1 laid before the senate q treaty
signed that day by the plenipotentlarieS OF the
United States and of the republic OF Hawaii, |
having for its purpose the Incorporation OF the
islands as an integral part OF the
United States. anu under its sovereignty. The
senate having removed the injunction of Sc |
crecy. although the treaty IS still pending be- |
fore that body, the subject may De properly res
action of the congress is required to determine
by legislation many details OF the eventual
union should the fact OF annexation be accom-
plished, as l believe 1t should be.
cOuSlabchLAS uiSiafOTluS " NCkJ |
early period any aggressive policy OF absorp-
tion in regard to the Hawaiian group. q long
series of declarations through three-Quarters
OF q century has proclaimed the vital interests
OF the United States In the independent life of
the islands and their intimate commercial de-
tendency upon this country. Al 1.-THE same time
it has been repeatedly asserted that In 40 event
could the entity OF Hawaiian statehood cease
by the passage OF the island under the domtna-
ton or influence OF another power than the
United States. Under these circumstances
the logic OF events required that annexation,
offered but declined, should in the
rlpeness of time come about as
the natural result of strengthening
the ties that bind us to those islands. and be
by the free win of the Hawaiian state.
That treaty was unanimously Iatiaed without
by the senate and president OF the
republic OF Hawaii on the 10Th OF September
last and only awaits the favorable action OF the
senate to eject the complete absorb
tlon OF the islands into the domains or the
United States. What the conditions of such q
union shall be, the political relation thereof to
the United States, the character OF the local
the quality and degree OF the
franchise IT the Inhabitants. the az
tension or the federal laws 10 the territory Of
fhe enactment of special laws to ht this pecu
liar condition thereof. the regulation OF needs
Of labor therein, and all matters upon the treaty
Jas been wisely relsgated to the congress.
u the treaty Is confirmed as evety eonsideEss
tion OF dignity ana hoaor requires, the wisdom