Eagle River review. [volume] (Eagle River, Wis.) 1890-1927, 1897-10-28
if the whole power of the Government
is REQUIRED to do it,"

is required to do it."
Since the days when Secretary OF
State Webster uttered these words, and
President Pierce and Secretary of State
Marcy negotiated a treaty Of annexa-
ton, down to the date Of the negotia-
ton of the present treaty of anneXa-
ton by President Mckinley and Secre-
tary Sherman-during this long inter
val we have seen Democrats, Wings,
Republicans, Populists, Gold Standard
men and the friends Of free silver, re-
CARELESS of party, all advocating Amer
lean control in Hawaii. Nor is there
now any indication of divergence from
this truly national policy. It was, III
fact, emphasized by the Republican
party in their national platform at st.
Louis in 1896, in the following words:
''The Hawaiian Islands should be
controlled by the United States, and no
foreign power should be permitted to
interfere with them"
This was the true Democratic doc
trine before the Republican party ex-
listed. 1t is distinctly an American and
not party policy. 1t is a policy that
has been championed by Pierce, by
Marcy, by Johnson, by Grant by Ar
thur, by Seward, by Fish and by Blaine.
To-day this policy is advocated by gol1
Democrats like J. r. Proctor and Thos.
F. Bayard; by silver Democrats like
Senator Morgan Of Alabama and Sena
tor Rawlins Of Utah; by gold Republi-
oono lilo Sam fcrc Frua T.o1rn Davis
and Thurston; by silver Republicans
like Senator Teller; by Populists like
Senator Stewart of Nevada and Senator
Allen Of Nebraska; by Senator Kyle,
the independent 1t is advocated by
such radically antagonistic newspapers
as the Herald, Tribune, Sun and Jour-
nal Of New York. It is advocated by
such men as ex-Secretary Foster, Gen.
Schofeld, Admirals Belknap and Walk
er, and by Capt. Mahan. It is a COM
mon ground upon which all can come
together because Hawaiian annexation
is policy as broadly national as the
Monroe doctrine.
The reasons for the adoption of this
policy are self-evident. Hawaii is the
only spot in the Pacific Ocean, north
of the equator, that is near enough to
the Pacific coast to be used as base
Of naval operations against us. A for
eign power, in possession of Hawaii
would be within four days steaming
distance of San Francisco. Shut out
from Hawaii, foreign nations would be
forced back the entire width of the
Pacific, distance prohibitive of effect
i've naval operation because battle
ships cannot carry coal enough to
steam that distance.
A foreign power in possession of
Hawaii would compel the elaborate for
tification Of every port on the Pacific
coast in order to afford protection to
our people and property out there. With
all foreign powers excluded from
Hawaii, our people and property on the
Pacific coast would be comparatively
free from foreign danger. If we do
not annex Hawaii some other country
will, and it is more economical for US to
fortify one point in Hawaii than TWEEN
ty points in California, Washington
and Oregon.
We need Hawaii far more than Ha-
wall needs us. We need it as England
needs Gibraltar, not so much for it's
territory nor its commerce, but for it's
location. We need it, not for agrees
sion, but for the protection of the in
terests that we have there and for the
protection of our people and property
upon the Pacific coast.
Another, and a subordinate, reason in
Iavor OF annexation Is because Hawaii
hes In the direct track of all trans-Pa-
enc trade. With one exception, all of
the seven different steamship lines that