The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1897-02-24
nent. The noise from the discharge
vas terrific. as this was the first time

and Passaic, the leading vessels, re-
ceiged this fire, and each was badly
damaged. Torpedoes were around in
almost every direction, one exploding
under the overhang of the Weehaw-
ken, lifting the vessel little, but
doing no very great damage. Each
commanding officer of monitor open
ed fire when he considered himself in
easy range, and soon the battle was
general.
DISTINCTIONS were made out ahead.
These were rows of piles driven into
the mud, raft booms and ropes to
catch the screws of vessels. These
were Aoated by casks, which in turn
were roped together. These obstruc-
tions caused the leading vessels to
stop, thus bringing the other vessels
up altogether.
The Patapsco was steaming slowly
ahead when she brought up for few
moments upon something. The en-
gines were reversed and she backed
off, but during these few minutes we
were very severely pounded by the
enemy. The vibration caused by the
heavy shot striking the turrets was
very great. Bolts were broken, the
heads of which went flying in every
direction, injuring people, and on one
vessel killing the quartermaster at the
wheel and wounding the pilot badly.
A mammoth electric torpedo, made
of steam boiler, eighteen feet long,
three feet in diameter, filled with
three thousand pounds of powder, was
planted in the main ship channel,
near Fort Sumter. It was connected
with the battery on shore at Fort
Wagner by an electric wire. There
was a road along shore, and over this
the wire was to be connected when it
was to be brought into service.
When the battle began this conneo-
tion was made. When the feet stop
ped on account of the distractions one
vessel got Immediately over the NAM
moth torpedo. This was observed
from Fort Wagner and the order was
given to fire, but with no result, and
this was the cause of the failure:
A negro teamster, who was Mt the
lower end of the island when the bat
tie began, had been forgotten, and,
becoming frightened, he whipped up
his team of mules to get to place of
safety. The wagon wheels parted the
wire and so broke the connection, saw
ing the vessel from total destruction
and preventing great loss of life
among the crew. Some days after this
we learned from Charleston newspa-
per Of the existence of this cylindrical
torpedo and why it had failed to work.
The officer making the report to Gen.
Beauregard was Captain Langdon
Cheeves, an acquaintance OF mine of
years gone by. He said:
Had I had the placing Of vessel
to be blown up I could not have put
one in better position to be destroy
ed than the one over the large torpedo.
When the order to fire was given the
- thing would not work. -
There was passage through the
distractions, known only to the block
ade runners. The formation of the
feet had become deranged, and there
was little chance of rearranging it in
this narrow channel. Then it was
that the admiral gave the order to
Withdraw, as it would have been i'm
possible to find the passage spoken Of.
Then came the almost single handed
fight, so to speak, between Fort Sum-
ter and the Keokuk, with gallant
Rhind in command. The Admiral's
signal was to disregard his motions.
Rhind took advantage of this, no
doubt, Judging that. as the Keokuk had
been at the rear of the line, hence the
last vessel to engage, she should be
the last vessel out.
Rhine dashed ahead at full speed,
close up to the fort: passing us on our
port side. It was a splendid sight.
| remember saying to Lieut.. Hamil-
ton, who was standing by me at the
moment:
"Rhind will not stop up there very
long"
Nor did he. He steamed to within
fifty yards of Fort Sumter and about
four hundred yards of Fort Moultrie,
receiving the concentrated FIRE of both
forts for about twenty minutes. He
then put his helm to port, passing on
our seaboard side, the turrets and hull
riddled with shot, looking like pop
per box. Rhind got his vessel out Of
fire and anchored. By hard pumping
she was kept ahoat during the night,
though the water poured in through
the shot holes. Early next morning
about daylight she went down.
By Z clock in the evening of April
7 our feet had all anchored, and the
first attack upon Charleston s defen-
ces ended in failure.
Other attacks were made, when the
ironclad fleet had been greatly rein
forced, and Admiral Dahlgren COM
manded, but Sumter held out, and
was apparently stronger than at the
commencement of the siege.
When it was found it was impossi-
Bile to drive the enemy out by shot
and shell, it was determined to try
boarding-good, old-time boarding,
with cutlass and pistol. This expedi-
tion was quietly gotten ready, and, as
We supposed, without the knowledge
of the enemy. Between 400 and 500
blue jackets and marines, carried up
in ships launches and cutters, made
up the attacking party. Commander
Thomas II. Stevens commanded. All
were volunteers from the ships.
At 10 o'clock on a dark September
night the party started in tow Of a
tug. We had no steam launches then.
At certain distance from the walls
of Fort Sumter the tug dropped the
boats and the men took to their
muffled oars to dash against the enemy,
expecting to take them by surprise.
A plan Of attack had been arranged.
The boats were to keep together as
close as possible and in some kind of
order, but this was found to be i'm
possible, as each boat would steal
ahead of the others. They were like
race horses before the start. Stevens
could not control them, so he gave the
order to advance.
The enemy knew of the coming of
the expedition and were well prepared
to meet it with hand grenades, lighted