The sun., 1897-10-03

win be exceedingly dificult for me to carry the
infantry column over tPe mountain and st;iko
sufficient rations TO do so, and think II best to
take some position near Front Royal and oper-
ate with cavalry and infantry"
In reply TO another telegram from Grant he
wrote: "Thc difficulty OF transporting this
% S 3nHp a. Ss to sRs
IL as impracticabe with my present means Of
transportation" In another letter he said:
inmate this campaign by the destruction Of tho
crops, &C., In this valley, and the transfer Of
the troops to the armies operating against Rich.
% R%aiins supplies through difleuit passes four: our:
munications from 1856 to 14b miles. without the
organization Of supply trains and all the ap..
IN IN Ss he states that
many reasons he was much opposed to the
plan Of acting against Charlottesville; "bnt
opening of the Orange and Alexandria Rail.
road" and this would require troops Ia, guard
It. Then, too, he feared that "a number Of
overwhelming me. be quickly returned to CON; CON;
plan, he he states that Grant advocated tho
wholly different GoncSpion Of d ddr,v1E Early ,y
correspondence regarding the subject took
place between us, throughout which Viii, IL i st3outiy o
held TO be q false move all that my army had
gained. 1 being on tho ground, Gen. Grant left
to me the final decision Of tho question"
In truth. seeing the extreme reluctance OF his
lGntennnt to carry PIT ne ins,rmcti9ns gyon
h s It TO te that tss
official records contain no mention Of his
wholly diifcrent conception Of driving W Early
had reported Early's army to DO completely
| broken up"
tion at Cedar Creek than Grant again returned
10 the subject, and wrote; What want Is for
you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad
yo% yo% ' Is bsst III Th" ' %%s fhs telegram which
caused Sheridan to retain the sixth Corps IN
GSy f + s 81 G
up your great victory until you can reach the
Central road DO nd ssn vGS hdss Eba to are
| heis he hoped might he done, by adding. II say
| nothing about reaching Lynchburg with por.
.Shty Sp 2t yS9qf yS9 force because doubt the pract
Sheridan, however, did not follow up his vic.
move NOV; on the Central road as you desire. TO
advance against Gordonsville and Charlottes.
vile with a line Of commmunications nm H up this
! ticahlc.' and he added that such a move would
1emoralize the troops, now in magnificent trim.
points until late in December Grant could not
give up his lonsShershed cher. project and at his L.
Gordonsville, but the weather being intensely
cold the roads slippery with ice and hail. and the
expedition being solely of cavalry, unproyided
MOTH noRn sthof TofSsr
This was the only move made against these
points until the following March, when they
| lowed by the evacuation of Richmond.
The reasons assigned by Sheridan for his
course do not seem sufficiently weighty TO justify
| him in his refusal to obey his chief; The
mountain passes fourteen miles In length and
| the long limo of supplies could hardly have
been insuperable obstacles, for in his final report
with macadamized roads through them. and
| indeed are not gaps, but small valleys through
| the main chain. Tho general bearing of al
these roads Is toward Gordonsville and they are
excellent for troops to move upon from that point
| into the valley. In fact, the Blue Ridge can be
| crossed almost anywhere by infantry or cav
airy" Moreover. while the correspondence
occupied points within twenty five miles OF
| both Char lottcsville and Gordonsville. As fol
| the organization Of wagon trains and rations
and others yet larger were well on their way tc
| him. He had already penetrated far into tn,
| enemy's country, and WAS close upon his mos
| important lines of supplywith large and vic
| torious army. In @ country abounding in fooC
| and forage. with no obstacle to overcome bu
| a beaten, dcmoralized, and scattered enemy o
| less than one-third his strength, it seems tina
| an attempt should have been made 10 comply
| with the earnest wish OF his commander, ever
| though he may have doubted its wisdom. Tha
| Grant was disappointed was evident. He hat
Vile. iiiie''''N ' '' ~ -'''' 'H - i'''''
1t is, indeed. difficult to understand thu
| latter's stout" resistance to Grants wishc
Snd soSn Ws
| nullihed his victories won in the field. ]
! seems not otMnlikey.that if:he had complied will
| Grants instructions immediately after the bat
tic OF Fishers Hill, Richmond would have fallel
in Septembcr or October, 1864, instead o
| April, 1868.
L. W. V. KENNoN. Captain. U. s. Army.