The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1897-05-17


alton, having about $12. O0e. 900, 900 of bond
and share capital, which will advance
rates.
1t is difficult to discuss such screeds Sc
riously. To assume that Oregon and Elori-
da railways will pool with each other; tho Q
in Florida with one or more in New Hamp-
shire; that the Philadelphia d Reading
Railway Company will pool with the Mex
lean central or the Boston & Maine with
heat, but it is not intelligent, because no
such instance is on record, or is contem-
plated or possible.
AS to avoiding competition, the railways
could contract to divide money or tonnage,
or both, and to maintain rates, until 1887,
yet none of the things now held up to
public fear and eXecraIion ever transplred.
Why, with all their power and higher rates,
did they not then stop parallel construction,
then establish monopolies, - and then in-
crease, or, at least, resist and stop, the an
nual tendency of rates downward? The
enormous increase of railway mileage OF
the United States and the constant and
voluntary rate reductions are among the
incontrovertible answers. They did not at
tempt to do it and could not. The unceas-
ing forces of the great factors of true COM
petition produced annual reductions in rates
and will keep them low permanently.
An additional strong reason, as forceful
to-day as then, is that railways sought to
build up large local and through trattics at
low rates rather than to carry less business
at higher rates, a policy which developed
local traffic as we'll as the national tonnage.
There was no water route, for example,
from Pittsburg to Baltimore, but these
gums VIZ 5lNNh LIZ 0NiANAAA VI ~ 90
low as the rail rates from Buffalo to New
York which were made against the canal
rates. In other words, due competition and
enlightened self-interest prevailed. Pools
did not even preserve former dividends on
any stock. Every company in the Union
which has increased it's stock has reduced
its average rates. If the New York Central
Company should double it's bonds and
shares this year it could not, with all its
own powers plus those of it's propTietorS
and allies, increase its average rate in the
slightest degree. because the lines compet-
ing with it would not increase their capi-
tallzatlons, and the Erie canal, Hudson, st.
Lawrence and Mississippi rivers and the
competitions of Galveston, Baltimore,
Montreal and. London would prevent it.
THE TELEGRAPH LINES.
The analogy of tie present telegraph
charges to railway pooling is strong and
convincing. simultaneously with the earlier
construction of railways, parallel tele-
graphs were built, the one to transport per-
sons and property the other intelligence.
The telegraphs entered into what was then.
as now, falsely called competition. in
which they had rate contests, lost money,
struggled for capital and became involved
with legislatures. They increased their
stocks and entangled interested railway
companies. Finally the wires were sub
~stantially consolidated. The railways could
only amalgamate connecting lines, but the
telegraph companies combined parallel
AtH 'h(It ~"A. NONto b0N'( ms NAN
graphic combinations, it was widely alleged
by those who now deem railroad pooling
equally monstrous. that he might use the
derived from inspected mes
sages to create syndicates and fortunes
which would threaten the Republic. On the
contrary, although it's stock was increased,
the Western Union Company proceeded,
through desirable economies, to reduce it's
rates, extend it's lines, increase its facilities,
achieve greater CELEBRITY in the transmission
and delivery of messages and made them
so inviolate that it resisted even the gov
ersment's demands to produce them. Aside
from special Geographic charges to the
government and the press and for night
messages, the charges made terrttorlally are
uniform, and the Users of its facilities not
only no longer complain of Determinations,
but applaud it's reduced. well-known and
unrelated charges because they are uni
to that company than he does Tor a ike
service.
substantially. railways seek correspond
ing rights to agree legally with parallel
transporters, in order that they also may
maintain those sound principles and
charges. to be guarded, however, in the
railway instance, by due national regula-
ton. The telegraph results clearly repre-
sent better commercial and public condi-
tons without law than the disturbing rail-
way conditions under the interstate-com-
merce and antitrust acts and decisions.
AS these facts cannot be cOntroverted. the
railways desire those distinctive grants of
authority for legal organization which win
remove business and legal doubt. and which
are as practical, effective and necessary in
railway administration as to organize and
conduct chambers Of commerce, stock. mar
thine or produce exchanges and boards Of
trade. The same principle requires the
union and concert of counties in the state
and of the state in Congress. The New
York Clearing House. with annual clear
ances fifty times the gross yearly railway
receipts, has proven a national bulWark of
finance. and assists all right fiscal purposes
and doors. That one or more of such bodies
sometimes do wrong Is an argument for
them, because their principles and deeds
show high averages of rectitude and public
benefit. and they correct those wrongs.
When. however, railways seek to adopt
like sound business methods to enable them
to practically and publicly exercise these
tried principles, law denounces, legislation
condemns and decisions hamper them, and
have done so for too many years.
1t is time this was changed. and that more
consideration be given TO the benefits they
have wrought, and to the facts and expert
ences which have exploded many prejudices
and theories in the past.
These benefits will be discussed next
EEORGE Y RIANCHARD.