Little Falls weekly transcript. (Little Falls, Morrison Co., Minn.) 1894-19??, 1897-12-10


nation at command to perform it's full
Due response to this char!s,e has been
made in diplomatic course.
Through out all these horrors and dan.
gers to our own peace this government
has never broken nor in any way abro-
gated its sovereign prerogatlve OF reserv-
ing itself the determination of Its pol
icy and course according to it's own high
sense Of right and in cOnsonance with
the dearest interests and convictions OF
our own people, should the prolongation
OF the strife So demand
Three Untr.ed A.esisures Yet Remain.
OF the untriad measures there remain
only: Recognition OF the insurgents as
beliigcrents, recognition of the independ-
ence of CuDa; neutral intervention to end
the war by imposing Rational comprO-
mise between The contestants and inter.
vention in favor of one or the other party.
l speak not Of forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought of. That by our
code Of morality would bo criminal as
gression.
The Question of Bcligerency.
Recognition of the belligerency of tho
CuDaln insurgents has often been can
vassed as u possible if not inevitable step
both in regard to the previous 10 years
Struggle and during the present War. l
am not unmindful that thu two houses OF
congress in the spring of 1895 expressed
The opinion by concurrent resolution that
u condition of public war existed requir-
ing or justifying the recognition OF the
Suite OF bellgerency in Cuba and during
the extra session the senate voted u joint
resolution Of like import which, how
u:er, was not brought to vote in the
house Of the representatives. In the
presence Of these Significant eXpressio ns
of the legislative branch it Dehooyes
the executive to soberly consider
inc conditions under which SO
i'm ,,ortant u measure must need rest for
JUS location. IL is to be- seriously consid-
cred whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of delinquency in its favor.
Possession, in short, OF the essential quail
iticatlons OF soyerelg nty by tho lnSurs gents,
and the conduct or che War by them ac-
cordins to the reserved code of war are
no less important factors toward the de-
termination of belligerency than are the
influences and consequences OF the strug-
gle upon the international policy OF the
recognizing state.
Recalls Grants Utterauocs.
The utterances Of President Grant in his
memorable message OF Dec. z, 1879, are
ST. nally re4evant to the present situation
recall them. The conditions were tho
~ hat ho1 hnl
been longer continued and the devastation
even greater. The conclusions of Presi-
dent Grant were at that time, however,
against recognition Of belligerency, be-
cause he did not believe it in fact existed,
as belligerency is understood by the law Of
nations.
Practical Aspents Of Recognition.
Turning to the practical aspects of 4
recognition Of belligerency and reviewing
its inconveniences and positive dangers,
still further pertinent considerations
appear. In the code of nations there is
no such thing as u naked recognition of
belligerency unaccompanied by the as
sumption of international neutrality.
Such recognition without more will not
confer upon either party to the domestic
conflict d status not heretofore actually
possessed, or affect the relation of either
party to other states The act of recogni-
ton usually takes the form of a solemn
proclamation Of neutrality which recites
the de facto condition of belligerency as
it's motive. 1t announces u domestic law
on neutrality in declaring state. 1t ;As-
sumes international obligations of nell-
trail in the presence of u public state of war.
1t warns all citizens and others within
the Jurisdiction of the proclaimant
that they violate those righteous obliga-
tions at their own peril and cannot expect
to be shielded from the consequences.
The right of visit and search on the seas
and seizure of vessels and cargoes and
contraband of war and good prize under
admiralty law must under international
law, be admitted as q legitimate conse-
uuence of q proclamation of belligerency.
While according the equal belligerent
rights defined by public law to each party
In our ports disfavors would be imposed
on both which, while nominaQy equal
would weigh heavily In behalf Of Spain
herself. S.,
~ Would h had for Cuba.
Possessing navy and controlling tho
ports of Cnba her maritime rights could
be asserted not only for the military in
vestment Of tho island but up to the mar
ain Of our own territorial waters and .
condition Of things would exist for which
the Cubans within their own domain
could not hope to create . parallel; while
Ito creation through aid or sympathy from
within our domain would DO even more
impossible than now with the additional
obligations Of international neutrality