Kansas City journal. [volume] (Kansas City, Mo.) 1897-1928, 1897-12-07

commercial nations, but that of the United
States more than any other by reason of
proximity and larger trade and intercourse.
AT that juncture General Grant uttered
| these words. which now. as then, sum up
the elements of the problem:
"A recognition of the independence Of Gu
ba being. in my opinion, impracticable and
indefensble. the question which next pre-
Sents itself is that of the recognition of
belligerent rights in the parties to the con-
test In a former message to congress
had occasion to consider that question. and
reached the conclusion that the conflict in
Cuba. dreadful and devasting as were its
Incidents did not rise to the fearful dignity
of war.
EntangIementx to BE Avoided.
"It is possible that the acts of foreign
I. powers. and even acts Of Spain herself of
defense Of such recognition. But now. as in
its past history. the United States should
carefully avoid the false lights which might
of questionable propriety. and adhere rig
idly and sternly. to the rule. which has
! been its guide. Of doing only that which is
right and honest, and Of good report. The
rights of belligerency must be judged in
every case in view of the particular at
tending facts. Unless justified by necessity
| it is always. and justly. regarded as an un-
friendly act and gratuitous demonstra-
tion of moral support to the rebellion
1T is necessary, and 1t Is required. when
| ment or of its people are so far affected by
a pending civil conflict as to require a def
milton of its relations to the parties
thereto. But this conflict must he one which
will be recognized in the sense of interna-
tional law as war. Belligerency. too is a
fact. The mere existence of contending
armed bodies and their occasional conflicts
do not constitute war in the sense re-
| ferred to.
No Ground for Recognition.
Applying to the existing condition of af-
fairs in Cuba the tests recognized by pub
| licists and writer's on international law. and
which have been observed by nations of
dignity, honesty and power. when free from
sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives,
fail to find in the insurrection the exist
ence of such a substantial political orGani-
cation, real. palpable and manifest to the
world, having the forms and capable of the
ordinary functions of government toward
its own people and to other states. with
courts for the administration of justice
with a local habitation possessing such or
ganzation of force. such material, such oc-
cupation of territory as TO take the con-
insurrection. or occasion the skirmishes.
| and place it on the terrible footing of war.
| to which a recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate it.
The contest, moreover is solely on land:
the insurrection has not possessed itself of
4 single seaport whence it may send forth
| ltS nag, nor mas 1t any means OF Cummunl-
cation with foreign powers. except through
the military lines of its adversaries. No
apprehension of any of these sudden and
difficult complications which a war upon
the ocean is apt to precipitatc upon the
vessels, both commercial and national. and
upon the consular officers of other powers,
calls for the definition of their relations to
the parties of the contest. Considered as
question of eXpedienCy. T regard the ac-
| cordance of bellgerent rights still to he as
| unwise and premature | regard it to be,
inl,fpnSihle as m of
right.
| Recognition Entails Grave Duties.
Such recognition entails upon tho coun-
try according the rights which flow from it
difficult and complicated duties, and re-
quires the ,exaction from the contending
parties of the strict observance of their
rights and Obligations. 1t Confers the right
of search upon the high seas by vessels
, of both parties: it would subject the car
rying of arms and munitions of war. which
now may be transported freely and with
out interruption, in vessels of the United
States. to detention and to possible seiz-
ure: 1t would give rise to countless vexa-
tious questions. would release the parent
government from responsibility for acts
Spain with the right to exercise the super
vision recognized by our treaty of 1925 over
our commerce on the high seas, a very
large part of which. in its traffic between
The Atlantic and the Gulf states and be-
tween all of them and the states on the
.
! this supervision could scarce fail to lead,
If not to abuses. certainly. to collisions
perilous to the peaceful relations of the
two states. There. can be little doubt as
to what result such supervision would be-
fore long draw this nation. 1t would be
unworthy of the United States to inaugu-
rate the possibilities of such results. by
measures of questionable right or expe-
diency, or by any indirection."
Practical Aspects of Recognition.
Turning to the practical aspects OF a
recognition Of belligerency and reviewing
its inconvenience and positive dangers.
still further pertinent considerations ap-
pear. In the code of nations there is no
such thing as a naked recognition of bel
lgerency unaccompanied by the assump-
ton of international neutrality. Such rec
| ognition. without more. will not confer
| upon either party to domestic conflict
status not heretofore actually possessed
or affect the relation of either party to
other states.
! The act of recognition usually takes the
form of a solemn DroclamatiOn of neu-