The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1896-11-30
Ways and Means of tho Cuban Leader.

~AO SAS~AC "a SA0 SuoOh ALSGuCL
WEYLER again makes the complaint which
he has 30 often made since he got to Cuba,
that the revolutionists refuse to accept his
challenge to a decisive battle, a regular en-
Ragement, to be fought under the rules, the
Toledo rules. It has been his desire
from the first that GOMEZ and MACEo
should muster all their forces, array them
upon a field, or at one side of 1t, take up a
position. go through such as
properly precede al action in military art,
and then await the onset Of a Spanish army
five or ten times the size Of that of the
revolution. We suppose that under the
Spanish plan of campaign the next thing
after the battle would be the surrender of
GOMEZ n MAcEo, who, when put to death,
could give no more trouble, SO that it would
be safe for WEYLER to slaughter all the
Cubans left alive after the battle.
Soon after WEYLER arrived in Havana he
expressed a desire for a battle of the regu-
lar kind, to be fought as early as the vast
body of reenforcements expected from Spain
could be got ready for it. He has longed for
such a battle every day since then, and
he complained last week that MAcEo
would not come out to fight it. We once
printed a sketch of a plan of campaign
drawn up by WEYLER himself, that he IL
Illustrated upon a map of Cuba, into which
he had stuck many pins, the yellow
pins representing the Spanish troops and
the blue ones the rebels. Sitting before
the map with the members Of the general
staff at one side, he would move a lot Of the
yellow Spanish pins against the few lone
gonna hlna rahal nina xyhich M on-laI.
could see, would amoose upon the advance
Of a superior force ready to take the heads
off of them. Thu description Of WEYLER's
plan of campaign which we got from Ha.
vana a while ago., was one OF the finest
things Of its kind that ever entertained a
staff or any number of stats.
We suppose that when WEYLER tanned
his recent campaign against MACEo he
organized his colored pins again upon
the map. One blue pin on the top of n
hill: that stands for the enemy; a hundred
yellow pins surrounding it and closing in
upon 1t, sharp end foremost: these stand
for Spain's battalions. What must happen
to the poor blue pin' Why, the dullest
blockhead in the Spanish general staff
could tell. Who would be such a fool
as to think that the yellow pins,
all in battle array, couldn't get at
the solitary and unhappy blue pin on
the top Of the hilli Yet, for all that, WEY-
LEIt has found 1t easier to win his pin cam
paign on the map of Cuba than his man
campaign in Pinar del Rio. The blue
MAcEo man-pin, you see, had a better head,
a sharper point, and a stronger shaft than
all of WEYLER's yellow man-pins in full
regimentals.
These remarks, thus far, are explanatory,
in some measure, OF the science of war.
Up to this time it has not been the pur-
pose of the military leaders of the revolu- |
ton to risk a general engagement with an
army five or ten times greater than their
own. They have preferred to fight the en-
envy in a way of which the enemy has often
expressed his disapproval.
What Is the object of the Cubans in this
war 1t Is not to test their strength I'm a
regular engagement" with Spain's army.
1t is to destroy the enemy, in order to gain
the independence of Cuba. In seeking that
one great object they follow their own
methods of warfare; they adopt those
methods which give promise of a success
full result. They take advantage of the
enemy wherever they can; they take DOS
session of places which are iuacces-