Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-06-07

OF march from the Potomac was to be IN
two columns. one through Emmettsburg
and Gettysburg. the other through Cham
bersburg, and that 1t was the desire of
tho Confederate chief to have three OF his
brigades of cavalry on the right flank Of
that march as soon as practicable. 1t re-
mains 10 be seen how and why IL was that
the cavalry failed to find its position.
AS Stuarts report Of his fight has not
been found. the two dispatches Just
quoted are the only items Of record Of
the events as they were passing. In the
official reports OF the campaign. made
after its failure, General Lee admits thg
he authorized his cavalrymen to cross tie
Potomac east Of the Blue Ridge, from
which 1t appears that large discretion
was given General Stuart, who, in his
official account. claims that it was given
upon his suggestion. But the day Of this
authorization is not of records
The plan of march from Fredericksburg
10 the Potomac was somewhat similar TO
that projected for the continued march
northward after crossing The Second
and Third corps to march through the
Valley OF Virginia west Of the Blue Ridge.
the First corps and cavalry TO march
east Of the mountain, the corps to hold
the points on 1t. guarding the gaps, the
cavalry TO remain on the plains in front
Of US. Upon taking position on the Ridge
on the 18th l informed the cavalry COM
mander that the plan Of march, after the
Third corps and trains had passed our
rear was for the First corps TO retire
west Of the Shenandoah and cross the
Potomac at Williamsport. and the cavalry
moving west following US was TO cross
at Shepherdstown, and ride well east:
when he informed me that his chief had
given him permission TO cross the Poto-
mac east OF the Blue Ridge, but the point
OF crossing was not at that time settled:
whether 1t should be at Point Of Rocks,
between the Blue Ridge and the Union
army, or between that army and Wash
ington city, the point Of crossing TO be
determined at the moment Of taking Up
the march. At =. NJ. General Lee wrote
again 10 his cavalry commander, and as
he had heard nothing from him since mis-
report OF 1:5 OF the morning, he thought
1t prudent TO send this letter in an I'M
sealed envelope, through my headquarters.
and in the envelope sent me a letter OF
instructions, naming conditions that
should control the use OF the letter for
the cayalryman. But the letter for Gene
raj Stuart. nor that to myself has been
found, so there Is no record by which to
judge Of their contents, except my letter
Of transmittal, and my note to General
Lee reporting that iIis instructions had
seen received and transmitted. These
many as well be quoted just here-y1z:
Headquarters. Wildwood,
June o. 1863, =. NJ.
"Major-General ]. Il. b. Stuart, Com
handing Cavalry:
"General,-General Lee has enclosed 10
me this letter for you. TO be forwarded
to you, provided you can be spared from
my front, and provided / think that you
can move across the Potomac without
disclosing our plans. He speaks Of your
leaving BY Hopewell Gap. and passing by
the rear of the enemy. If you can get
through by that route, 1 think you will
be less likely TO indc><e what our plans
are, than If you should cross by passing
to our rear. l forward the letter of in
structions with these suggestions.
Please advise me OF the condition OF
affairs before you leave, and order Gene
raj Hampton-whom 1 suppose you will
leave here in command-to report to me
at Wildwood, either by letter or in person,
as may be most agreeable to him.
Most respectfully,
JAMES LONGSTREET.
Northumberland"
IN. b think that your passage Of the
Potomac by our rear at the present
moment will. in a measure. disclose our
plans. You had better not leave us there
fore, unless you can take the proposed
route In rear Of the enemy"
Headquarters June %. 1868. 7:SO p. NJ.
General X. Il. Lee, Commanding. &c:
"General,-Yours Of o'clock this after
noon is received. i have forwarded your
letter to General Stuart, with the sug-
gestion that he pass by the enemy's
rear, If he thinks that he may get
through. We have nothing from the
enemy to-day.
Most respectfully,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Northumberland Commanding"
The former goes TO show that the In
structions for the cavalrymen were to
be transmitted. provided the cavalry
could be spared from the field east of
the Blue Ridge, and provided the ride
could be made and not disclose our plans
lie suggested In his instructions for
the cavalry the route through Hone
wei Gap of the Bull Run mountains. AS
the enemy had left the field of his one
rations OF the day before about O'clock
IN the morning. had not been seen or
heard from since, and the rear OF the
FIRST Corps was then drawing off from
tho Blue Ridge, marching west 10 be
IN position TO take up its line of march
LOT crossing the Potomac at Williams
port there was no reason for withhold
ing the instructions for General Stuart.
The letter transmitting them has hoan
USED on more than one occasion by the
cotorie Of critics, and claimed az an ordo.
Tor the raiding ride of cavalry. that I
was responsible for IL, not the cavalry-
man, and In one instance. IL not moro
the aiterpart OF my letter has been
Italcised, 10 impress upon the public
mind that the raid was made nv nv, or.
ders, and that the cavalry was undar
my command, at the same time tboY
claimed that II was under General Iaa.s
command. 1t Is military axiom that
command can't have two Commanders
on the same field at the same time. But
asiue from lhls, II any part OF the para
sIapn quoted and claimed as an order
ior the RAID assumes the tone of an
thority, 1t is only in the claim thai q
should mot leave u.s." which means ride
with my march across the Potomac
at shepherdstown. Especially would ms
construction follow. bearing in mind the
order TO that effect given by me ON the
isth' when, under the impression that ~
should be under my orders. The ONLY
part or the letter that assumes the tome
OF authority Is the cali for General
Hampton. to be assigned as Commando
OF the brigates 10 be left ON fba
Blue Ridge. That officer had made renn-
tation for vigilance and action when
battle was impending. which could nov
allow blade of gress TO spring between
MIN and his work. and It was exceedingly
Just and proper that the Commander
OF the rear column should know that the
aplomb or his OF his march was well
adjusted 10 contingencies that should he
anticipated under aggressive movements
and under every consideration was n q
proper part OF the functions OF thar an
thority that he should name the officer