Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1896-12-17

I.Rnps should De accorded TO the tnsurHents-a
proposition no longer urged, because untimeIy
and Impractical In operation and clearly peril
Gus and Injurious 20 our own interests 1t has
Teen AID Is now sometimes contenced that the
Independence Of the insurgents should be rec
oguized- but imperfect and restricted as the
Spanish government Of the island nav he no
| other exists tEere-unleSs the will OF the mill
tary ofncer In temporary command Of a par
tieGl2r district can be dignI6ed as a species OF
United States should buy the isIand-a sug-
gestion possibly worthy OF consideration II
there were any evidence of q desire or will
| ingneSs on the part of Spain TO entertain such
proposal II IS urged. finally. that all other
met mods failing, the existing internecine strife
In CGSa should ee terminated by our inteTven-
tlon. even at the cost Of a war between the
United States and Spain-a war which its ad-
IIOcatSs ConICently pFophesy could pc neither
large in its proportions nor doubtful in its is
| sue The correctness Of this forecast need be
neither affirmed nor denied The United
States has. nevertheless. a character to main
| tain az a nation. which plainly dictates that
right and not might should be the rule Of It's
Further. though the United States is not q
nation TO which peace Is q necessity. 1t Is in
| truth the most pacific Of powers, and desire~
nothing SO much as 10 live in amity with AL
| the world Its own ample and diversified do
mains satisfy all possible lODginRS for terri
tory, preclude all dreams OF conquest, and pre-
vent any casting Of covetOus eye upon neigh
boring regions however attractive That our
conduct towards Spain and her dominions has
constituted no exception to this national dis
position is made manifest By the course OF our
government. not only thus far during the pres
| ent insurrection. but during the ten years that
! followed the rising at Yara in 1858
No other great power. II may safely be said,
under circumstances Of similar perDlexity
would have manifested the SAME restraint and
the same patient endurance 1t may also be
said that this persistent attitude OF the United
States toward Spain IN connection with Cuba
| will unquestionably evince slight respect
! and regard for Spain on the part of the Amer
/ lean people. They, in truth. do not forget her
| connection with the discovery Of the western
| great qualities OF the Spanish people. nor fail
to fully recognize their splendid patriotism and
their chivalrous devotion TO the national honor.
They view with wonder and admiration the
cheerful resolution with which vast bodies Of
men are sent across thousands of miles Of
ocean and an enormous debt accumulated, that
the costly possession Of the Gem OF the An
TILES may still hold its place in the Spanish
crown, and yet neither the government nor the
people Of the United States have shut their
eyes TO the course Of events N Cuba or have
failed to realize the existence of Conceded
grievances. which have led to the present re-
volt from the authority OF Spafn-grievances
recognized by the queen regent and by
the cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and
enlightened OF Spanish statesmen without
regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms
proposed by the executive and approved by the
legislative branch of the Spanish government.
It is in the assumed temUer and disposition of
the Spanish government to remedy these grew
ances. fortified by indications OF influential
public opinion in Spain. that this government
has hoped to discover the most promising and
effective means of composing the present strife,
with honor and advantage to Spain. with the
achievement Of all the reasonable objects OF
the insurrection.
1t would seem that If Spain should offer to
Cuba genuine autonomy. measure Of home
rule which. while preserving the sovereignty
OF Spin, would satisfy all rational require
ments OF her Spanish subjects, there should be
no just reason why the pacihcation Of the is
. result would appear TO be in the interest of
all concerned. 1t would at once stop the con-
the island and making it worthless for which
ever party mar ultimately prevail. 1t
spain without touching her honor. which
VIII be consulted rather than impugned by
the adequate redress OF admitted grievances
IL would put the prosperity OF the island and
the fortunes of it's inhabitants within their
own control without seyering the natural and
ancient ties which bind them to the mother
country. and would yet enable them TO test
their capacity for self-goVernment under tho
most favorable conditions.
1t has been objected on the one side. that
Spain should not promise autonomy until her
insurgent subjects lay down their arms. On
the other side. that promised autonomy. how
ever liberal, Is insufficient. because without
assurance Of the promise being fulfilled
Spain OF unconditional surrender on the part
of the insurgeIt Cubans before their autonomy
is conceded is not altogether apparent.
It ignores important features of the situation
the stability two years duration has given
definite prOlongation in the nature of things,
and as shown by past experience; the utter
and imminent ruin of the island. unless the
present strife is speedily composed; above all,
the rank abuses which all parties in Spain, all
branches Of her government and all her lead
ing public men concede to exist and profess
desire to remove
Facing such circumstances. to withhold the
prefer OF needed reforms until the parties
demanding them put themselves at mercy by
throwing down their arms, has the appearance
OF neglecting the grayest OF perils and invit-
ing suspicion to the sincerity OF any pro-
fessed willingness to grant reforms.
The objection on behalf Of the insurgents
that promised reforms can not be relied upon
Unjust, of course, be considered, though we
have no right to assume and no reason for as
Stunning, that anything that Spain undertakes
to do for the relief of Cuba will not be done ac-
cordng to both the spirit and the letter Of the
undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious and
precautions on the part Of the weaker of two
combatantS are always natural and not always
unjustiiaDie, and being sincerely DESTROYS in
the interest OF both is well as on It's own &C
count that the Cuban problem should be solved
with the least possible DELAY, IL was intim atcd
by this government to the government of
Spain some months ago that, II g satisfactory
measure OF home rule were rendered the Gu
ban insurgents and would be accepted ~
| Tinted States would endeavor to find a way
| not objectionable to Spain OF furnishing such
While no definite response to this intlmation
/ has yet been received from the Spanish gov
eminent. it Is believed to be not altoge Their
welcome while> as treaty IS suggested, 10
reason is perceived why IL should not be APP
proved by the insurgents. Neither party can
fail TO the i'm pOrtanCe OF early action, and
| both must realize that to prOlOng the present
state OF things for even short period will add
| enormously to the time and labor and eXpendI-
ture necessary to bring about the Industrial
| fore, ferveutIy hoped on all grounds
that earnest efforts for healing the
breach between Spain aud the insurgent Gu
bans, upon the lines above indicated, NAV be
| at once inaugurated and pushed TO an imrne-
| date and successful issue. The friendly Of
| fees OF the United states, either in the man
| ner above outlined. OF in any other way con-
sistent with our constitution and laws. will al
| ways be az the disposal Of either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise, our poi
| icy and our interests would constrain Us TO 90
ject 10 the acquisition OF the island the
| reference with its control by any other
power.
titude of the United States will be Indefinitely
maintained While we are anxious TO accord
all due respect 70 the sovereignty Of Spain, we
/ can not view the pending conflict In all its
| features and properly apprehend our inevitable
relations TO 1t. and possible results, without
| considering that by the course OF events, we
precedented condition a. will fix a limit to
patient waiting for Spain to end the contest,
either alone and in her own way, with our
| friendly cooperation
| When the inability of Spain to deal success
| fully with the instruction has become mani
| fest, and IL Is demonstrated that her SoveT-
eighty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes Of Its
1 rightful existence, and when hopeless Strug-
I gle for its re-establiShment has degenerated
| into strife which means nothing more than
| the useless sacrifice OF human life and the ut
| ter destruction OF the very subject matter OF
| the conflict, situation viii be presented In
which our obligation to the sovereignty Of
Spain will be superseded by higher Obligations
! by which We can hardly hesitate to recognize
and discharge.
Deferring the choice Of ways and methods
until the time for action arrives. We should
make them depend upon the precise conditions
then existing; and they should not be deter
mined upon without giving careful heed 10
every consideration involving our honor and
interest, or the international duty We owe TO
spain. Until we face the CONTINGENCIES sug-
Qested or the situation Is by other incidents
INN orufAv nl CHANGED continue