The record-union., 1896-06-09

C.ty therefore, the SsdIIle IuleS VI pIdC-
tice, pleading and procedure should ap-
ply as would be applied to other Grim
inal cases, and an accusation presented
entirely on information and belief is in
sufficient
Specification B is that the accused
directed two employees of the city to go
to the house of the accused and place
Upon wagons belonging to him certain
wagonbeds which We're constructed by
and paid for by the city of Sacramento;
that said wagonbeds were placed '4pon
said wagons, and have ever since re-
manned thereon.
AS an accusation of misconduct or
malfeaSance in office and of violations
of the charter, this specification is abb /
surd. There is nothing in the charter
or in any general law that makes it
crime for wagonbe6s belonging to
city to be placed on wagons of a private
individual, or city official For all that
appears it may be highly advantageous
to the city that the accused is thus car
ing for the city's property by placing
these wagonbedS upon wagons instead
of upon the damp ground. If the wagon
beds are actually in use by the city
and it is not charged whether they are
or are not-then the city is also, by rea-
son of the acts of the accused, obtain
ing the use of the wagons of accused,
along with it's own wagonbeds, which
| would be highly advantageous to the
city; and no wrongful intent or wrong
full act of the accused is charged in this
| specification.
Specification c is also on information
and belief. 1t is that he has used ana
employed upon the streets of the city
three wagons and team Of horses IN
which he was personally interested, ana
| of which he was part proprietor, ana
has for more than two months last past
regularly charged for and regularly
collected from the city money for the
use of said property in which he hlm-
self was directly interested. The time
when the three wagons and team OF
horses in which the accused was per-
sonally interested were made use OF
on the streets of the city is not
stated in the accusation, and, for all
| that appears, it may have been prior
to the time of his appointment as Su-
perintendent Of Streets. The allega-
ton is that for the last two months he
has been regularly charging and reg
ularly collecting from the city for the
use of this property. 1t does not fol-
low from this allegation that he has
been guilty of any violation of his Off
cial duty
Specification D is that the accused,
in violation of Section 211 of the char
ter, sold to the city two whitewash
brushes for the sum of 81, and endeav-
ored to collect for the same, but the
money was vetoed by the Auditor. If
this charge had stopped with mere
statement that he had sold two white
wash brushes to the city during the
time he was Superintendent of Streets,
it might perhaps be contended that it
showed a violation of his official duty.
The latter part of the statement dis
closes, however, that he did not sell
two whitewash brushes to the city.
1t takes to make a bargain. A
valid contract requires parties to it.
The most that can be said in favor of
this allegation is that the accused at
tempted to sell two whitewash brushes
to the city, and that his attempt was
defeated by the proper city authori-
ties.
The second subdivision Of the ac-
cusation is a charge that the accused
IS incompetent and incapable Of per-
forming the duties of his said office,
and has been guilty Of many acts Of
gross incompetence.
Counsel submitted that there is moth
ing in the charter or in any law of the
State, that authorizes the Board Of
Trustees to try an official of the city on
| the ground Of incompetency and remove
him from his office, and that incompe-
tency is not made an offense on which
a party is to be put on trial, either by
| the charter or by any general law.
Counsel for the petitioner then dis
cussed that provision of the charter
which declares the Trustees may try
and remove from office appointees
against whom charges had been pre-
ferred. This, it was claimed, is an ex-
ercise Of judicial power, not a legisla-
tive one, and therefore the charter is
| in that respect unconstitutional.
This point was argued at considerabl
| length, and various cases were cited
III support of the petitioners conten-
! ton. 1t was held that the charter es-
| tablished an inferior court within the
| city, but that it has no legal existence
and cannot exercise judicial power. be-
cause it was not established by the Leg
| islature, and the only authority to es-
tablish such court is vested by the Con-
stitution in the Legislature.
Mr.. Johnson, Corporation Counsel
met the argument Of the petitioners
counsel by the declaration that munich
pal corporations possess an inherent
power to remove from office subordinate
officials under their control There is
nothing Of a judicial character what
ever in the investigation held by such
bodies acting on charges preferred
against an appointed official
In exercising the power of trial and
removal from office of appointees. Mr.
Johnson held that a municipal BODY
would be exercising purely ministerial
or executive powers, and not those of
a judicial character.
MT johnson contended that If the
trustees have not the power of re-
moVal conferred on them by the char
ter, all their past acts in that line are
invalid, and officials removed for cause
must be reinstated
At the conclusion Of the arguments
Judge Catlin took the matter under ad
Visement until to-day.