The sun., 1896-01-26

quest, and would not leave until similarly ro-
qucsted. Orders were nt once given to the jap
anese troops encamped near the capital to at
tack tho Kings palace next morning. Tho order
was promptly executed, and. after short on
gagement. tho Japanese became masters Of
Seoul and of the person of the King. The Min
party were driven out and replaced by progress
sive politicians who at once invited the Japan
Csc to drive out tho Chinese from Asan. 1t was
now q question of only a few days whom hostili-
ties would break out between China and Japan.
But. as It happened. It was not q military but
naval collision which began tho war.
We cannot undertake to follow in detail the
authors account OF tho sinking Of tho Kow-
shing, tho British steamer which was bringing
to Asan a Reinforcement Of 1900 Chinese SOL
diers. Neither can we do moro than glance at
some Of tho conclusions embodied In tho 200
pages which describe the subsequent military
and naval operations, namely. tho Asan cam
paign and tho capture Of tho Corean strong
hold. PhyonR- Yang; the Invasion Of Manchuria
by the first Japanese army; the campaign Of the
second Japanese army in tho Regents Sword
peninsula, ending in the capture Of Port Arthur:
and. finally, the campaign Of a third japanese
army on tho mainland Of Chinn proper. which
Of Wei-Hai-W Wei and Of the Chinese ironclads.
Tho narrative ends with a description OF the
first. insincere and abortive. attempt at negotia-
tions on the part of China. and Of the second
and successful peace embassy headed BY LII
Hung Chang.
In even tho briefest notice Of this book. the
authors comments on tho significance Of tbs
principal events deserve particular attention.
II Is pointed out, for instance. that the conse-
Quences Of the victory at Phyong-yang were
enormous. The strongest city Of Coroa had
been taken In day by the admirably adjusted
converging movements of four japanese de-
tachments: the great Chinese army which was
to enter Seoul had been dispersed; all hopes Of
assistance from China were lost by tho Con-
servattve party In Corea. With the battle
around PhyonR- yang the Corean campaign may
be said to have beec finished: no further re-
sistance was offered by the Hermit Kingdom.
while tho Chinese retired beyond tho Yalu
River to defend the frontiers of their own
empire Hostilities had only begun on the 25th
of July. 1894; yet by the 18th Of Soptem-
ber or In less than two months. Corea
was conquered. and at . very trihing
cost Of life. 1t Is estimated that In battle. or
from wounds and sickness, the Japanese lost
but 683 men in the peninsula. Those who are
surprised at the rapid success Of the Mikado's
tors. three centuries before. had been almost as
expeditions. In little over two months from
the date Of landing, Hideyoshis General, Koni-
shi. had taken Phyong-yang, although he had
to march his troops across country. having no
steamers wherewith to convey them quickly to
convenient landing places on the coast. The diff
ference lies In. the sequel. While the Japanese
invasion Of the sixteenth century stopped short
at Phyong-yang. which marked their last great
success; in the war Of the nineteenth century,
the battle of PhyonR-y yang was only the first Of
. series OF brilliant victories.
The remarks on the naval battle Of Hai-yang
Island. which took place on Sept II, 1894. arc
likely to impress.the reader those OF compe-
tent naval critic Admiral Ito. who command
ed the Japanese ships in this engagement, has
been blamed for not having destroyed the whole
Chinese fleet The truth is that history offers few
examples of the destruction of an tire fleet:
when such destruction occurs, as at the battle Of
the Nile It will be noticed that tho feet was at
anchor, or had its movements cramped by the
land. Even in such memorable nav al victories
as those won at Saamis and Lepanto. a large
number of vessels succeeded In escaping. At
Hai-yang Island the Chinese lost four
sells. nearly third of their fighting
force, and. when consider that most
of the naval battles OF the last century were de-
cded hy the loss of only small part Of one OF
the fleets, we must recognize that the Chinese
suffered a crushing defeat. 1t must also be
borne In mind that Admiral Ito had in his squad
ron three weak vessels which hampered his
movements. yet he succeeded in not losing one
of them. though one was a merchant steamer
that could have beon disabled by single lucky
shot In the engine. and another II gun boat of about
600 tons. The author of this book deems IL
hard to say what the Japanese might not have