The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-03-01


have fought the battle OF the Both OF Au-
gust but FOR this ignorance of Lees pres
ence on his part" This ignorance even
1 after Hatch's disastrous Tepuise by iioou'
/ late In the evening. ~ tfuiy mhfNtho ,'S
| IL causes Mr.. Ropes 10 add %. '5l; VI
this aOth OF August Gen POPE was 70
/ learn. by a severe e2perience, the IolS
/ OF obsfinately closing one eyes 10 iaV'S;
and yet Gen. Quincy had previously Sdlu
/ that Pope acted much more wisely thals
/ he wrote or talked %. -. me 'vth "a
/ August was the great day OF IN ISL
/ and the result Is well known 70 hiY,o'f ~,
I As an apolOgist FOR Pope, Mr. i.op''
says. There was no disofganizaboh no
rout though the contrary has frcquenug
been affirmed by partisan writers; 1 go
/ Pope had. IN the battle OF the "Oth, SUI
/ ferrd "a severe. though by no meaIs a
/ disastrous. defeat O.. i4). II is true tla'
/ IL was not the rOut OF first Manassas,
/ but. if we had had fcw more nouis -.
/ daylight. il would have been. Inc me-,
/ were flushed with victory, and couiu no,
/ have been stopped il such deieat hSl,
! been suffered by Lees army, we shou'
! certainly have called II disastrous NJ
/ Ropes concludes: In reviewing inc IAN
| paign. we ought freely 20 accord 10 Gen;
/ Pope the merit Of courage, energy -"
/ decision OF character IT Is imposslpit,'
! however. 10 credit him with sttatsb,,c
! skill" %. 90. This is very fnild' anu -
scarcely consistent with the severe cru
! cism OF Col Lyman. Pope was compiele
~ out-gcneralled. and, while ne ul1 Hot
hesitate 10 attack, he attacked ~iihont
concert. by piece-mcal sometimes WIN d
single brigade as I'm the case OF trONci,
and was necessarily repulsed. As soon as
1sOngstrcet was ready 10 make MS couh-
tcr-attack, IL was successtul from w w
start That Pope's troops fought Wen,
was not due 20 him, but 10 themselves
and their immediate commanders: 81,
Mr. Ropes C'Army Under Pope. p. 100
notes with approval POpe's braegart as
patch to Halleck on the evening oil ene
Goth. II refutes itself: for what CON
sis .ency Il there in saying Inc IN e"o ,,,nH
is badly whipped, and We shall do wei
enough We have delayed the
enemy as long as possible without loslns
the army" If the enemy was 'uadlN
whipped" what danger was tneic ol
losing the army" and why did rope re-
treat several miles 10 Centreville: III lnS
army was entitled TO the grauluuc on
grounds. the couT Try was grateiul ioi
very small favors, and, as rope $40, 500
passed out Of history. he must nay. naVc
thought the country very unSiateiui.
He was merely "whistling to keep MS
Cen WaIcott thinks that "the bold and
biaggart tone OF Pope's dispatches 20
Halleck, the commander-in-chlei, oush5
to deceive nobody now p. l4D anu
that his campaign in the field will al
ways remain. TO the careful and accurate
student, a sad record OF bloody mlscaI
ridges' (p. 142). Gen. Walcott mas SNet
Chantiliy" that this writer has seen. IL
IS written by an eyewitness, and ne
well calls ii a short. spirited, ana olooay
battle" Gen. Lee failed IN ms opJect
here because the attack was made TOO
late in the day, and Pope had received
an Sntimation Of II. but IL hurried rope
back 10 Washington. Inc Niolehl sloii
was very trying 10 men worn down ny
constant marching and iighune DIX u
doubtless interfered equally with both
combatants As Jackson replied 10
Branch Tell him to hold his ground,
if his guns will not go on neither VII. me
enemys" (Allans Army OF Ncfiheih
Virginia D. 3l6, note. Our brigade
tStOnowalD was the extreme left OF me
line i'm the woods, and not iar from tne
road. It's only participation IN the ushi
was when a force or the enemy HINaIceip
about dark, and both sides nred a VOL
lev. and left. our men were qulchly
rallied. and resumed their FORMER p4D-
ton. but the enemy never returned. Inc
writer picked up a flag that had bfeh
drOpped i'm our nasty retreat. ana feStof-
ed il 10 the regimental commander. Inc
nervous strain that the men had endured
for so long was too much Tor them. Oul
only consolation was that the enemy
were worse scared than we We're
Gen. Walcott thinks Opp. l42-D that
1T was probably fortunate f-r the coun-
try that Gen. Lee did not force a baltie
on Sunday or Monday at CentreNllle.
The opposing armies were OF equal hu-
merical strength" chat is erroneous, cs-
pecialy as both Franklin and sumner
had now come up, ana composer %,
equally gallant men; but in each-ala5.
for the Union army OF Nirg-nia-the
character and conduct OF the respective
commanders had produced their leSiu,
nafo fruit The Confederate army, led
by real masters I'm the art OF war who
were trusted respected, and loved by
fellow-Ofiicers and men, was victorious,
united, and fiercely enthusiastic. Inc
Union army, Jealousy cursed ana us
int aaan
the army of Virginia, battle-weaiitd
and battle-disgusted, dreaing the Lead
ership Of the men under whose comnan
their comrades had been slaughtered IN
detail: the other, the army OF the fot"-
mac hating Gen. Pope as matter or
conscience and duty 10 their old COM
mander-a unit only in want OF confidence
and respect for Gen. Pope and his lieu
This presents a very different picture
Of POpcs army from that presented uy
Mr.. Ropes and the facts were WITH Gen.
VI alcott. who was there, and hence was
more competent 10 speak But THIS re-
view must be brought to close.
Col. Lyman, reviewing the reports OF
Col Haven and Cen Weld decides Up.
2fD that Mcclellan disObeyed the or
ders of Halleck in retarding the advance
of Franklin's Corps from August -Sth 10
August 18th ." and Col. LiverinOre lp. .si5)
saws: "The conclusion OF a preceding
committee that Mcclellan was 10 blame
for the detention of Franklin and Cox
cannot be avoided, although Halleck
should share in the responsibility for the
detention OF Cox from the evening OF the
20th. when he assented TO il. We think
UaIleck and Mcclellan were both 10
blame for the detention OF Sumner.
These are, then. the conclusions at which
the committees OF the society arrived
after thorough study OF the facts ana
we have no desire TO dispute them.
Col. Livermore also blames Porter for
not attacking on the 10Th, even II -. X.
Jones and Wilcox were in his front lie
thinks that Kemper was not there, al
though lie was in supporting distance
part Of the day.
But. as already stated, why not blame
Mcdowell too for carrying OFF Kings
Division. and not attacking with their
whole force? Mr.. Ropes concludes the
subject with a paper written after the
report Of the Board of Officers was PRINT
ed in 1879 While cOncurring in the con-
illusions Of the board. he says OF Porter
a. $50: Still, in reviewing the Whole
case, / may frankly say that | think he
might have done more than he did our
ing that afternoon to ascertain the
strength of the enemy, and also TO at
tract their attention. and thus relieve the
main army" We may agree with Mr
Ropes i'm this. for Porter's Corps was SIM
ply one Of observation. and his reconnois-
sance was very feeble, but We must re-
iterate that we think Mcdowell equally
10 blame If not more so, and no one OF
those writers blames Mcdowell. The
Joint order begins Up. $50: you VIII
please move forward with your JOINT
commands towards Gainesville;' and, al
though The order is cloudy In rs refer
ence TO Cen;rcville, there Is nothing IN
IL that countermands this. II they haI
moved forward together. ordered Rick
etts 10 follow. as Pope intended Gor he
saws siucfruct him 10 iOfn the other di-