The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-03-18

MS corps CeaW were HUI puIIluS w.
gether; the wheel horse selected TO
start it was bulky and stubborn. We
hear from General Longstreet that on
the evening of the LIST he was trying
to induce Lee not to attack, but
manouvre, and the I'd he went to
General Lees headquarters at day
light and renewed my views against
making an attack It was clearly the
duty Of Longstreet to carry out his
commanders views, and not lapse into
refractoriness. He had a plan of bat
tie in his head, which Lee rejected,
and Longstreet sulked.
LoNGsTREET's PLAN OF BATTLE.
This plan was to move around be-
tween Meade and Washington and cut
the Union line of communication.
Lee might possibly have moved toward
Frederick on the I'd, and thus forced
Meade to fall back to Westminster,
but he could not hope to reach Balti-
more or Washington or a point be-
tween these cities before Meade. He
would have been caught between the
powerful works of Washington and
Meade's army, while the change Of
base would have greatly endangered
his lines Of communication. Lee
could not move around now and
maueuvre or scatter his legions to
gather supplies as he had done, be-
cause his opponent was uncomforta-
bly, near. He could not march en-
masse with a host subsisting by pill
lage, and to concentrate was to starve.
There was no alternative-he must
fight. Many distinguished Union gen.
erals who were at Gettysburg have
told me that Longstreet's plan was
impossible and not to be considered.
WAS THE BATTLE LOST HERE?
Gas I have said, Longstreet, order
ed to attack at sunrise with the divis-
ions of Hood and McLaws, made. no
sign of moving until II o'clock. On
the right the attack had been made
according to orders, but failed because
the scheme had not been carried out
on the left. At last, at II o'clock,
Longstreet admits that he had orders
to move to the right, but delayed, on
his own responsibility. His disobedi-
ence of orders in failing to march at
once with his command, then present,
many believe, lost to Lee the battle
of. Gettysburg. With a corps COM
mander who knew the value of time,
obeyed orders with promptness and
without argument, Lees movement
On Meade's left could have commenced
at z or 8 a. M, with all the chances
for success, and there would probably
have been no combat on the Sd, for
the Federal forces were then coming
up in detail.
"When McLaws and Hood advanced
eight or nine hours afterward the con-
ditions had changed. Meade, having
relinquished his design to attack from
his right, had been steadily strength
ening his left, and his whole army
was now concentrated on a splendid
defensive line. for Lee had waited, as
if he did not purpose to take advan-
tage of being first prepared to fight.
Longstreet would have secured Round
Top a few hours earlier and would
have prevented Meade from holding
Little Round Top, which Meade called
the key point of my position
LoNGsTREET VERSION.
"Lougstreet's two divisions made a
superb record, if late, when they be-
gan to fight. I examined the field
over which Longstreet's forces were
to pass and found that the troops
could have been moved to be at the
objective point by sunrise. There
were no natural difficulties of rough
ground or long distance. These are
the details of Longstreet's failure to
support his commander in a critical
time. The corps commander says in
fat contradiction to my statement that
General Lee did not utter one word to
him of the march of his troops until
he gave his orders at II o'clockfor the
move to the right. Orders for the
troops to hasten their march of the lst
were sent without even a suggestion
from him, but upon his announcement
that he intended to fight the next day
if the enemy was there. I have the
fullest confidence, however, in the
truth of my evidence upon this point.
"Longstreet was slow and slug
gish, until he was engaged in battle.
Then he handled his troops we'll, but
he could not O fast in an emer-
gency. Statements like this are wild
nonsense and cruelty unjust. THAT
Lee was excited and off his balance
was evident on the afternoon of the
first day, and he labored under that
oppression until enough blood was
shed to appease him Those who
know the character of Lee are amazed
at the condition of mind of the writer
of this, as shown in portraying General
Lee as a b~loodthirsty savage, appeased
only by the slaughter of men. The
intelligent and impartial critic must
admit the offensive disposition of Lee
skillful. He knew clearly what he
wished to do. Had I Stonewall Jack
son at Gettysburg, I would have won
a great victory he said after the war.
PICKETT S CHARGE A BLUNDER.
OF equal Importance with the failure
of the morning attack, in a discussion
of this nature, is, of course, the re-
sponsibility for Pickett's charge. 1t
is fortunate then of General Lees
most trusted staff officers, Taylor,
Venable and Long, have recorded that
the plan of assault involved our attack
by Longstreet's whole corps, support
ed by one-half of Hills or all of it if
he called for it. Colonel Taylor, the
adjutant general of the army, says it
was originally intended to make the
attack with Hood and McLaws rein
forced by Pickett, and it was only be-
cause of the apprehansions of General
Longstreet that his corps was not
strong enough that Hill was called on
to support him. Long says the order
for the assault by the whole corps was
given verbally by General Lee in his
presence and that of other officers of
the army. Venable states that he
heard the orders given to support
pickott's attack nv McLaWs and Hood.