The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1896-03-29


longer the duty of the faithful to make
pilgrimages to Mecca, but to the toni
of the Mahdi. a smal,ehexagonal struc
ture. crowned with a dome. which
stands in the heart of Omdurman it.
self. About a country nearly as large
as the United States east of the Mis-
sissippi river, the Dervishes have
drawn Gordon within which no Euro
pean traveller can safely enter. and out
OF which not even news can pass.
SO much for the situation In the Su-
dan itself. 1t may be assumed that its
reconquest would be almost as easy
now as its successful defense, is years
ago, would have been difficult. The
Only obstacles to the return of the Su-
danese to decent government and the
| enjoyment OF at least Standardization.
are political, and they arise, not in
Egypt itself. but in far away Europe
The whole situation in the Sudan
problem was changed, and IL was a
hopeful change. when the Italian min
istry fell on account of the Abyssinian
victory at Adua. If the Rudini cabinet
Is wise and patriotic IL may, after a
show of hostilities until the war fever
is stilled in Italy itself. make peace on
easy terms with King Menelek. and
with him attack the Mahdists from the
east. Menelek would be very willing
to do this; his people have been Chris
tians longer than any European nation
save the Italians, and they cherish un-
dying hatred toward the Mohamme-
dams, who for q thousand years entire
ly surrounded their country, isolating
1t from the rest Of Christendom. Their
resentment has more recent causes.
When the Mahdist power was at its
height-it has declined materially in
the last 10 years-Abyssinia was in a
fair way to advance rapidly in civil
ization and prosperity; but upon the
King John of that day, predecessor of
the King John who died in 1887, the
Mahdists fell with crushing force. de-
feating his armies and Staying the king
himself, although the fight was so hot
ly contested that since that time the
Dervishes have usually been willing TO
let the Abyssinians alone. King Meme
lex has more than 100000 men under
arms In the field and in garrisons. he
has arsenals and artificers, whereas the
Khalifa has neither. at least of any de-
gree of efficiency, and his tribes must
now be at least no better armed than
they were 10 years ago, perhaps not so
well. There have been queer stories
afioat in Europe of Russian assistance.
both of money and of arms. extended
to King Menelek. They have been ex-
aggerated. The money Menelek could
undoubtedly use, and the arms, but he
has both In reasonable plenty. Yet the
recent decoration of Menelek by the
car is significant.
The Abyssinians present a strange
combination OF civilization and saw
agery. of Paris gowns and tables with |
out forks or napery; but they can fight
as the Italians are abundantly able to |
testify. If, on the ground of common |
belief in Christianity, the Italian cabi- |
net could reconcile the public of Italy |
an alliance with their so recent foes, |
both interest and inclination might |
a he
from the east, and the subsequent par |
tition OF portion of the territory be-
tween the victors. The armies of the |
Congo Free States have been for some /
time surreptitiously active on the west |
ern borders of the Mahdist's domain.
although the fact long escaped the at
tention OF Europe in the diversion of |
public interest to the other end of the
dark continent by Jameson's raid
An Italian arrangement with Meme
lex may not yet be possible but there
Is very little doubt that the movement
In the Congo Free State is undertaken
In concert with Egypt. nor is there any
doubt that these two allies could, with
out the Italians and the Abyssinians.
make conquest of the Sudanese, IL Eu-
rope would but hold its hand and let
the game be played out. If there were
no peace between Italy and Abyssinia.
the former would at least be assisted
TO hold kassala against the Mahdists
by a diversion of their forces to meet
attacks from other directions.
the only difficulty in the way is that
Egypt, although nominally an indie
pendent power, is practically the ward
of Great Britain, which is committed
TO temporary occupation of the coun-
Try for the Khedive's good, and is
striving as usual to find excuses for
making that occupation permanent
france, which by withdrawing from the
oint military occupation of Egypt fool
SHY left Great Britain in command has
never yet reconciled herself to the logi-
al consequences of her own act, and is
accustomed to look with suspicion upon
my plan with respect to Egypt which
involves the extension of her power
Ind possessiones.
But the friendship of Russia for the
Abyssinians might in the event of an
lttack upon the Sudanese, reconcile
france to Anglo-Egyptian advance
rom the north, IL Salisbury can sug-
'est any other corresponding advant-
ge for France. Perhaps he has al
eady suggested such compensation in
pain. Far more likely he has suggest
d IL in Africa itself. When the NAH
list pie is cut there may be a slice TO
id to the great Niger possessions OF
he Gallo republic.
There can be no doubt, political con-
he Sudanese and of Egypt itself are
losely bound up with the reoccupation
I the equatorial territory by the
'hristian powers. Up TO date the ques-
lon has been one of religion and of
overnment. II will become a question
I livelihood itself. The Nile has been
allied the father of Egypt, but its
'aters are limited in quantity. Away
4 Central Africa. about the head
'aters of the Nile and along the upper
ranches and tributaries of that river,
he Italian colonies from the east and
rench colonies from the west may one
ay seek to divert the upper waters OF
he river from Egyptian use TO such an
xtent as to cause in the Nile valley
UGH disputes over the ownership OF
ne waters necessary TO redeem the
esert as have occurred on a small
cale in some of our own western
tates.
Even II the two. three or four par