Arizona silver belt., 1896-07-16
WARsHIps' WEAK SPOTS.
Methods of Attack Which Are
 Most Effective.
A United states officer Gives some Inter- estiug Informatioh About the Great Ironclads-O Oncnsive and De-
 fensiye Powers.

A war ship is vulnerable in two chief respects--in her motive power and in her personnel. Ii is imaginable that one might be wholly neutralizcd without materially injuring the other. Theques- tion, not only of to-day, but of cen tury's standing, is, which is it better to attack in order to subduc the ship? In olden days the British habitually at tackled the personnel, the French the motive power, and each was consistent; for the aim of the former was to insure decisive results, and that of the latter to avoid them. Each has had its advo- cates, and consequently there is some thing to be said on each side; but upon the whole it is, I think, fair to say that experience replies, attack the men. And the reason is much the same as a hundred years ago; not only is i, impos sible to have the men as well protected as the motive power, but the destruc- tion of the men who handle the offen- sive powers of the ship makes the mo
 tive power practically useless.
 Now the weight which Q ship of a given size can carry is limited, and must be distributed among several objects, of which gun power is one, and the ques- ton has to be met, how shall this gun power be subdivided among the differ. ent classes of gun? If your aim is the motive power you want heavy guns; for the motive power--the engines and boilers--are given the utmost possible protection, by position, by the thickest armor, by the coal stowage, the protec- tive deck, and so on to pierce which great force is required. But heavy guns means few guns, and few guns means few shots, and fewer shots mean fewer hits; while of those that hit, if they strike the protective system of the engines, etc, fewer still penetrate, a truth long foreseen, yet very generally dropped out of sight, and which the Yalu battle has singularly confirmed.
 On the other hand. :.ie ossight of armor required te protect the w2ter line adequately makes 1t impossible k extend by similar means adequate pro tection to the battery spaces, except only those occupied by the heavy guns, and even where these are adequately protecte that is, to the missilts from those lighter guns, tech nicaltt called rapid fire"-there can be no question that their accuracy of fire is singularly embarrassed. For that reason it is sought to aim and fire them from an interior position-the coming towCr, for instance-a plan of which 1t is enough here to say that, except for the heaviest guns, it is tending to fan into disuse.
 Considering the vast importance of sec 'Iring the best practice from the heavy guns-for am not at all arguing az linst them, only against their excess size number-it becomes necessary 10 bS at down and keep down all the other fife of the enemy. If success in this is attained, a distinct and immense advan- uge is gained for the heavy guns over uose of the enemy, for, if the rapid fine guns which have established heir as'endancy cannot penetrate inc tur- rets, they can greatly annoy the men in them, and may enter the gun ports. This superiority, if maintained, must rest lt in victory. It has long seemed to me tha. the mutual relations of the heavy and rapid fire glns of the ship have strong analogy to field bat tery of artillery and its infantry sup ports the latter at once protect and sc- cure he efficient service of the former. However that may be, the rapid fire gun of nc dern caliber has just now fairly established it's position as to the great est offensive power in naval warfare.- Capt. A. T. Mahan, in Century.