The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-12-19

their origin. whether that has been by them
subversion of the pre-existing government
or by the violent or voluntary separation
of one from another part OF a common ma
ton. But. with respect to the new powers,
the recognition of their government COM
prehends, first, an acknowledgment of their
ability TO exist as independent states. and.
secondly. the capacity of their particular
governments 10 perform the duties and full
hll the obligations towards foreign powers
incident 10 their new condition.
Some speculation is INDUCED in at the
Capitol as TO the condition of analrS IN
case the resolution was vetoed by the Pres
ideHt and became law over the President $
veto. The question of the right of Con-
gress TO recognize any form of government
in Cuba would be involved, and diherent
views are held as to whether Congress or
the executive has the right of recognition.
One senator discussing this matter to-day.
instanced case which might arise II there
"A conflict between the executive and
Congress on this point. Cuban eXpedi-
ton might he fitted out and would attempt
to sail from n port of the United states
Under orders of the executive, the revenue
cutters would seize the vessel for violation
of the neutrality laws. The case would
then be taken into the courts on the legal
ity OF the joint resolution, which became
law without the signature of the President:
and the issue would be whether or not
Cuba had been recognized by the action or
Congress alone. All these questions have
been discussed. and il is believed Will be
quite thoroughly gone over when the reso-
luton comes up in the Senate.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS.
The effect of the resolution in causing an
agitation and possible uprising in Spain is
felt by officials to present the most serious
feature of the situation at the present time.
The government authorities at Madrid un-
doubtedly have been informed by the Span
ish minister here of the action taken to-
day. There is no reason to expect any ex-
preston of official displeasure, as the
Spanish authorities will be fully advised of
the long legislative procedure through
which the resolutions must pass before be-
coming effective, but the mere determine
tion to report such resolutions. 1t is feared,
Spain. and il is by no means certain that
the government can keep this feeling with
i'm bounds. 1t is felt to endanger such out
breaks as occurred a year ago, when less
radical resolutions were under considera-
ton. Owing to the Legislative difficulties in
the way of the resolutions becoming effect
i've. the Spanish government itself will
make no move at present. There is known
to exist a strong opposition in the Senate
to the adoption of the resolutions. Under
the Senate rules. the debate can be pro
to obstruct has manifested itself. yet it is
said to be possible as one OF the means or
preventing action. After action by the SEN
ate there must be the debate in the House,
with possible changes in the resolutions be-
fore they have to run the gantlet or the
presidential veto. If the uitimate result
the policy of the United States, then off,
cials say war would be inevitable Until
the matter advances to this stage no ON
ciaI action by Spain is expected, but it Is
said that Spain almost certainly Will ac-
cept the resolutions as a casus belli imme-
diately that they become the policy or the
United States government.
Senior Depuy de LONE. the Spanish minis
ter was informed of the action of the Sen
ate committee on the Cameron resolution
| after it occurred. He did not seem either
| disturbed or surprised. He said that as II
| was a matter before Congress he must de-
| cline to discuss il or comment upon ii In
| any way. Anticipating, however, that state.
ments OF various sorts would be attributed
| to him by the press, he wished to forestal
| them by saying through the Associated
| Press that any alleged interviews with hin
| which might appear would be unauthorized