The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1896-05-22

shcuse ear eneny have nAvs, strength
sc-Eeie1, - .,3cce him 10 take tire ofsea-
Sve. tss- our ptArs racss dec33es
J. Whether cur Sect Is ssrcax enough -
raneuver sgat-sss that a. the enemy.
III st-n1g enough how FAR frem IT.
own base sacs2$ /. engage with the en-
envy. this distance depending On defended
eeal.zs stations In The thester Of operations
TIE defensive eosc.lion Of our barber
and coaSs rores
TheSs conscientious LEAD rs TO tie s,l-
sow1aS strs.egfc values for osr se4xclag
Feet n ne defense % or Coasts. the acct
TO take the offensive
!. IL CTR BARRIERS are fully dessaccd.
IL the eze-ny's sees be rot oyerycvsr~
ing.
! II the e.eny.s ports be not too an.
t2Sr. or. Il distant. II we have defended
ee2lfng stations near the ilne Of advances.
These conditions mutually ccunssr4ct o.
assist each other. Whereby the weakness
or cne may lessen or be efset BY the
strength % ihe cxher In the latter casa,
Tor example tie aesf coalS stu! retain the
offensive. Il the snersy have bat .sttls naval
strength. such as IA the case OF Rraxl
evea should our harbur protection be slight.
The feet xeas6 assume the defensive
offensive:
L When ne eEesays fieat IL cverwhein-
ing-saA ether Qualities helms faissy equal
When the rsets are fairly matched.
eat the enemy distant. and we having no
eo&Aas stations except at home
j When our ports are poorly defended
and the enemy active
The naval captains Of an earlier are
showed that coast was never 50 wei de-
Tended by them as when they crsii<~d OF
iheir eneuys ports or kept In touch with
his feet Possibly these methods have
been modified TO some extent by the level.
nm .a.
armor and ordnance, and the increased de-
pendence of fleets on bases OF supply. All
history seems to teach that 9 feet acting
strictly on the defensive must sooner or
later meet with disaster.
1.-THE squadron.
The composition OF harbor-defensa
souadrons depends so entirely on local
conditions that no general, fixed value
can be given them Should the port be
near deep water. ana hence subject to
Commandment. certain class of vessels
- needed 70 form an outer line where tho
enemy's hattiesh.ps or armored cruisers
are 70 meet Again. where the character
of the shore line forhids extensive fixed
defense<, as at the lower Mississippi. the
defense sQuadrons should be proportion
sfeiy increased and organized 70 meet the
seagoing neet OF the enemy. The orSaniza-
ton of harhor squadron would approach
that OF q seagoing feet also when the
channel was wide and TOO extensive for
the effective use OF shore guns. as the
Eastern end OF Isanx Island sound.
ie therefore follows that where rtrons
works can be so placed as TO fully protect
port from bombardment and the widths
OF channels are such that tho IRE from the
land can be made overwhelming the hsr-
Dor fleet can be minimixed and the heavy
hattlcshtps probably eliminated Having
determined by these limiting conditions
ha efr no ha~t 49, a.. A.
mains to consider the probable use TO 10
made of this force against an attack By
sea
The design and movements Of the enemy
must largely govern the disposition OF our
harbor vessels. although they should not
be so restricted as TO deprive them Of the
power OF the offensive should opportuni-
ties offer.
The part the mobile defense should p,ay
may be described briefly In an enunera-
ton OF the phases which an attack On a
harbor might take:
l. Biocka3e---Hostiie dispositions made
fo- the purpose OF blockade will naturally
throw the burden Of the offensive efforts
OF the defense on the harbor feet. To be-
gin with. the approach OF the enemy's
fleet must be vigorously disputed. with
the hope Of delaying the complete estab-
lishmant OF the blockade and OF compeli-
ing the enemy 20 reinforce his feet. This
may result in q weakening at some impor-
tant point elsewhere, thus tending 70 make
the blockade unacceptable TO neutral
powers A large biockading feet will have
many vulnerable points, and. with the de-
tenders more intimate knowledge ue the
coast. harbor exits and mine fields. their
interior lines and safety and comfort In
stormy weather, the harbor squadron,
actively and fearlessly handled, could em-
bGrrass or at least distress a feet many
times stronger than itself. Constant af.
lacks along the whole width Of the harbor
viii force the blocka.Iers to occupy q
broad front in order TO close every point
of egress, and the weakness that this
might entail should be turned To good ac-
count The scouting boats OF the enemy
must be met at all times. so also attempts
on torpedo and signal stations, Search
lights, and. Ia fact. all the defensive prep
arations not under the direct protection %
the land batteries. The vessels most
adapted to such enterprises wouid be tor
pedo vessels OF about COO TO 100 tons and
torpedo boats OF 100 tons or less. They
should be swift. noiseless. manageable.
and with low sreeboard. Their value un-
der these conditions may be illustrated BY
reference TO the performances of ths
Cushing al Newport. Leaving the land on
a dark night In the fun glare OF a power
fui searchiight. and continuing In II. sbs
became invisible at 100 yards. although
read by. Her movements were inaudible
at 500 yards. which is the extreme but
working range OF the most effective tor
pedo.
2 Bombardment-when a bomhardment
r. deliberately entered on against defend
ed port, II Is because a direct attack IL
thought to be too dangerous. or. for topo-
graphical reasons. unnecessary. No general
attack being feared. ne whole floating de-
Tense Should be developed. even 10 advance
ting heavy defense vessels TO within fight
ing range. They should especially guard
against the occupancy OF any dead space
which the shore might offer 20 the crefnys
ships ara no. sufficiently provided for In
the tactical arrangements on lana
The Run Past--Aefivs and determined
attacks on the mine fields and distractions
in . channel Of fair width will be almost
certain Indications OF an attempt 10 run
pas; the batteries. The physical conditions
Of mos, harbors viii require the column
formation in such a maneuyer: so ths float
ing defense should make dispositions es-
peciAly adapted 20 meet such arrange
ment- This formation is peculiarly weak IN
bow fighting, as the main power OF the at
tack must ne directed against the Land
works on the flank; therefore. II would
seem that TO enveiop the leading hostile
ships with the whole power Of the harbor
vessels and 70 crush or delay the column
ought 90 prove most effective. This void
be especially o?portuns "a the column Ia
just emerging from the inner entrance 81
some Intricate or narrow channel or tus.
after passing through the mine heiss, and
before II has tine 10 form ap In stronger
order.
One OF N. principal dangers against
which the haroor aeet must guard f. per
hitting Itself 20 set nnred up with tbs
attackers and thus paralyzs the mine and
gun 6efensE%. This T. even greater in