The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-01-24
BELONGS TO THE CITY
WITH ANNEXATION THE FEE SIM
PIE TO SCHOOL PROPERTY PASSES.
supreme Court Reaffirms a Principle
of Law I'm Case Brought by the
Indianapolis School Board.

The Supreme Court, yesterday. in an
opinion by Judge McCabe, ,reaffirmed its
line of decisions in recent years in regard
to the ownership OF school property To-
Gated within territory that is taken from
one school corporation and added to an
other. This was in the case of the In
dianapolis School Board against the trus-
tee of Center township to quiet the title
to three pieces Of school property that came
within the city limits by annexation. The
trustee refused to make a deed TO the
property and suit was brought. 1t was
claimed by thes trustee that as there was
q debt owing by the township for part
of the cost OF these buildings it should
be reimbursed to that extent. When the
complaint was filed by the School Board
the trustee filed what was called an answer,
but what was in reality cross-complaint,
setting up the fact of the indebtedness and
asking that judgment be rendered in favor
of the board for the title to the property.
but in favor of the township for at least
a portion of the amount OF the Indebted
ness. On this cross-complaint the Super
Tor Court rendered judgment, after overrul-
ing a demurrer to ii. The judgment was
in accordance with the pleadingS OF the
trustee and required the city to pay a.
S21.4S.
In the past the Supreme Court has held
various opinions on this question, but In
recent years it has held to the opinion that
the annexation of property to city or the
creation OF a new school corporation gives
in fee simple the title to all school prop
erty within the limits of either OF the cor
poratio1s TO the one embracing it,. There
was one decision, which was quoted Dy the
court, in which it was held That Wherever
the part of the territory that was left out
side embraced more than half OF the orig
inal territory the city or corporation an
nexng should pay its pro rata share of
the value of the public property annexed,
but this decision was overruled by later
one and since that time there has been no
decision Except that the fee simple passes.
The decision which overruled the former
ones and which has been followed Tor
number or years, was in the case or the
town of Leesburg against Plain scnooi town
ship, SO Ind, 5S2. In this opinion 1t was
held that
The long-continued possession OF the
sch Dollhouse in question by the appellee as
schol township and the expenditure or large
sums of money upon Ii for school purposes,
conferred no new or additional claim 10 IL
upon the appellee. The appellee held, as
those expenditures were presumably for
the benefit of the cestui que trust, or the
class of persons now represented by the
appellant, and were In no manner lncon-
sistent with the present claim or the APP
pelant to the possession or the scnool,
house. BY proper transfers all the Scnooi
children of the vicinity can be permitted
to attend school at such schoolnouse, as
they might have done before the appel
liant became separate school corporation.
within the town of Leesburg cannot be
made to pay it's fair proportion Of the in
debtedness still resting on the township on
account of the schooihouse, that suggests
a defect in existing laws which can, and
perhaps ought to be, remedied by addi-
tional legislation, but does. not affect the
question as to which school corporation is
entitled to the possession of the lots and
school buildings. In making expenditures
of public money upon sch0olhouseS, town.
ship and other school trustees are expected
to take ordinary future CONTINGENCIES INTO
of the ground on which school buildings
are erected Inattention to such consdera.
ticns may and doubtless often does, entail
losses for which courts can afford no ade-
1t is this view that is followed in the
present case. In regard to the Judgment
the lower court, the Supreme Court further
saws Judgment cannot be rendered against
any Ierson or corporation except for
tort, in the absence Of express legislation,
IL there is no contract or the person or
corporation is not a party to the cause
that brings about the action. In this case
Council Of the city. which is entirely dis
tinct from the school corporation, and with
ont the consent or even knowledge OF the
school corporation; Therefore. IN the ao- .
some such payment the school corporation
could not be held liable for any sum, even
though the entire cost OF the property in
question was unpaid.
The case was reversed with instructions
to the Superior Court to sustain the de-
murrer of the plaintiff to the cross-com-
plant, which gives the title of the prop
erty to the city without the payment Of any
money!.