The Yale expositor. (Yale, St. Clair County, Mich.) 1894-current, 1896-12-11

shipment of arms, by the raising and ship
ment of funds, and by other means,
which the spirit of our institutions and
tho tenor of our laws do not permit to be
made the subject of criminal prosecution.
Some of them, though Cubans at heart
and in all their feelings and interests.
have taken out papers AS naturaliZed cit
liens of the United States, a proceeding
resorted TO with a view TO possible pro-
lection by this government. and not UNI
naturally regarded with much indigna-
ton by the country of their origin. The
insurgents are undoubtedly encouraged
and supported by the widespread SYM
pathy OF the people of this country, who
always and instinctively feel for every
struggle for better and freer government
and which in the case of the more adj
venturous and restless elements of our
population leads in only too many in
stances to active and personal participa-
ton in the contest. The result Is that
this government is constantly called upon
to protect American citizens, to claim
damages for injuries to persons and
property now estimated at many millions
OF dollars and to ask explanations and
apologies for the acts of Spanish Off
Gals whose zeal for the repression of re-
bellion sometimes blinds them TO the inn
munities belonging to the unoffending
citizens of a friendly power. 1t follows
from the same causes that the United
States is compelled 20 actively police
long line of sea coast against un,awfu
expeditions, the escape Of which the ut
most vigilance will not always suffice TO
prevent These inevitable entanglements
of tho United states with the rebellion in
Cuba. the large American property inter-
ests affected. and the consideration OF
philanthropy and humanity I'm general
have led TO a vehement demand i'm Vari-
Gus quarters for some sort OF positive
rtervention on the part of the United
states.
II was first proposed that belligerent
rights should be accorded to the insur-
oents-a pronostion no longer urged be
cause untirely and i'm practical operation
clearly perilous and injurious TO our own
interests. 1t has since been and Low Is
.H...a.1 ..I ln hA
dence of the Insurgents should be rccog
pized. But imperfect and restricted as
the Spanish government OF the Island ma
be, no other exists there, unless the VIII
Of TIE military officer In temporary com
mand of a particular district. can be dig
0ifed as a species of government. 1t II
now also suggested that the United states
ehould buy the island-a suggestion pos
ebly worthy of consideration II there
were any evidence of desire or willing
ness on the part OF spain 10 entertain
such a proposal IL is urged, finally. tha
all other methods failing, the existing IN
ternecine strife in Cuba should DE ter
minated by our intervention, even az the
cost of war between the United Statef
and Spain-a war which its advocates cen
idently prophesy could be neither lars'
IN its proportions nor doubttul IN It's issue
The correctness of this forecast need Bt
neither affirmed nor denied. the UmtC'
States has nevertheless charac,er
maintain as a nation, which plainly die
tates that right and not might sbout
be the rule of its conduct. Further
though the United States Is not hhuo.
to which peace Is a necessity, II u ~
truth the most pacific of powers, ana dc
slres nothing as much as TO live in amltH
with all the WORLD.
TO Cuba genuine autonomy-a measure OF
home rule which, while preserving the
sovereignty of Spain, would satisfy al
rational requirements OF her spanish SUD
iects-there should be no just reason why
tie pacifcation of the island might not be
effected on that basis. Such a result
"a uld appear to he in the true interests oil
an concerned. 1t would at once stop the
conflict which is now consuming the re
sources of the island and making II worth
less for whichever party may ultimately
prevail II would keep intact the possess
ons of Spain without touching her nonor
which will be consulted rather than I'M
pugued by the adequate redress OF ADMIT
ted grievances. 1t would put the prosper
ity of the island and the fortunes OF its
inhabitants within their own control
without severing the natural ana an'lenl
ties which bind them to the mother coun-
try and would yet enable them 10 test
their capacity for sclf-goVernment unuei
the most favorable condltlons: II laS , DSIa
objected on tho one side that spain shoulu
NOT promise autonomy until her insurgenl
| subjects lay down their arms; on the oth-
er side, that promised autonomy, hoWeVel
liberal is insufficient, because without as.
surance of the promise being iuihlieu bul
| the reasonableness of requirement Dy
| Spain of unconditional surrender on tne
part of the nsurgcnt Cubans before thelt
| autonomy is conceded, is not altogether
apparent. 1t ignores important teatul eS
| OF the situation-the STABILITY two v.,rs
duration has given to tie instruction.
The feasibility of its indefinite pro.onga-
| ton I'm the nature of things, and as SHOWN
| by past experience; the utter ana ln.Inl,
| npnt ruin OF the island, unless the prescnl
| strife is speedily composed: above all, the
| rank abuses which all parties in spain, all
| branches of her government ana al heI
| leading public men conccde to exist ana
| nrofess q desire to remove such ctrcum-
| stances, TO withhold the proffer of needed
| ~eforms until the parties demanding them
nut themselves at their mercy by throwing
| down their arms. has the appearance OF
! neGlecting the gravcst of perils and lnVlt-
| ing suspicion as to the sincerity OF any
| nrofessed willingness to grant reforms
| The objections on behalf of the insurgent.
| that promised reform cannot be relled
! upon-must, of course, be CONSIDERED,
| though we have no right 10 assume ana nc
| reason for assuming that anything spain
| undertakes for the relief Of Cuba Will no,
he done according to both the spirit ahu
| the letter of the undertaking.
| United states May Take n Hand.
| Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious
and precautions on the part of the weaker
| of two combatants are always natura
and not always unjustifiable-being SIN
| cerely DESTROYS in the interests OF both as
| well as on it's own account that the CUBAN
| nroblsm should be solved with the leaSl
| POSSIBLE delay-it was intimated by TINS
| government to the government OF SPAN
| some months dSO, IL a StlllSAttN w ,
| IRE of home rule were rendered the CuDai
! insurgents, and would be accepted by
them upon guaranty OF It's execution
| the United States would endeavor TO tnt
| a way not Objectionable to spain OF fur
| uishing such a guaranty. Whiie no den'
| mite response to this intimation has vel
! been received from the Spanish govern
ment, ii Is believed TO be not altogether
unwelcome. while, as already suggested
40 reason is perceiV ed why IL should no
be approved by the insurgents. Neither
| party can fail to see the importance o.
| early action The friendly offices OF the
! United States either in the manner above
| outlined or i'm any other way consisten
| with our constitution and laws will al
[ WAYS be at the disposal of either party
| Whatever circumstances may arise, GU
| policy and our interests would conStraii
| US to object to the acquisition of TIT
| island or an interference with its contro
| by any other power.
II should be added that IL cannot h.
| reasonably assumed that the hitherto ex
| pectant attitude of the United States VIII
be indefinitely maintained. While we ar
| anxious to- accord all due respect To tn
| sovereignty of Spain. we cannot view tn
pending conflict in all it's features AM
properly apprehend our inevitably clos
relations TO II and its possible result
| without considering that by the course o
| events we may be drawn into such an un
, | usual and unprecedented condition as VII
| fix limit to our patient waiting TO
| Spain TO end the contest either alone an
, ! i'm her own way, or with our friendly co
fion Whom tho inability of Spaiu (