The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-04-17
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS.
ASuil for DlYOrCs q hsnSa By HuSDand
Tor DeSerl!on.
TIE CRUELTY OF A MOTHER INLAY
The son and Husband Held Kcspons'oie'
Trust E.tntc Adverse fosse-sion-Neg-
Iieencc OF Common carriers-'
pacity TO Contract -S"in"''

,,u,cb,ns vs.. Hutchns. From the Cir
emit Court OF Warwick. Affirmed opinion
by keith. president.
suit for divorce a mensa' etc. by
husband for dcsortion. Answer OF wiie
alleges cruel treatment by husband
mother 10 tho extent Of frequent assaults
upon her. SO that she required the as
distance Of ncighbOrs 20 dress her WOUNDS
that she Informed him Che living In New
YORK. ana she in Warwick That unless
ho could provide a home for her, even
los cabin. she would be compelled TO re-
turn 10 her friends, and declares her az
lection FOR him. denies any intention 10
desert him. and avows her Willingness TO
return whenever ne will give her nome
ana protection from insult and cruelty.
Dispositions sustained the answer.
Hc.d. Notwithstanding the many
changes in the law, 10 Is the right OF me
husband TO select the place where MS
family shall live and 10 determine OF
whom the family circle shall consist. he
remains the head OF the family. and should
receive respect and obedience as long as
he deserves them. But this position Of
dignity imposes corrclative Obligations. lie
owes his wife protection from danger. and
to permit cruelty and wrong 10 be done
her by another. even by his father or
mother, as as great a breach OF duty as
though committed by himself. The facts
Of this case establish cruelty in its most
restricted definition. and such cruelty as Is
contemplated by our statute Of divorce.
The appellant is responsible for the acts
OF Dis mother. con the principle that
ono is responsible for what he permits
If husband, In spite OF his wifes
remOnstrance, keeps IN his house persC ns
who. by ,hcir treatment, put her In peril,
~ Is cruelty for which she may have a
divorce Bishop on Marriage and Divorce.
section 1887, 9 oregon. 452. Tho case in 81
Graft. b. IS not analogous because there
the answer IS not responsive TO the bill,
nor the aVcrments Of facts therein sus-
tanned by the evidence.
VOID ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, RULE
TX.
Nicholson VS. Gloucester Charity School.
From the Circuit Court of Gloucester.
Reversed. opinion by Keith. president.
Deeds of trust 10 secure Nicholson. Oc-
tober, 1852. 90 secure appellee. May. 1888.
and 10 secure another January. 1879.
Commissioners report established priority
for the deed Of lNs9. Appeals by both APP
pellant and appellee Appenees appeal
dismissed al January term for failure 10
execute bond. Appellee's claim, nOtwith-
standing dismissal that they are before
Held. ]. This rule construed. q Graft,
6S6. So Va, 553."Whcre the parties appeal
ing and the parties not appealing stand
upon the same ground, and their rights
are involved In the same question and
Equally affected by the same decree. the
appellate court VIII consider the whole
case and settle the rights of the parties
not appealing as well as those appeal
ing" Before the dismissal of appellees'
"a
pending In which errors could have been
considered. and one of them remainss
The trustee named In the deed 10
Nicholson Is the same person who, as
clerk OF the county court, took and GER
titled the acknowledgment Of the grantors.
This Is fatal objection. - Va, 49l. a
grantee IN deed, or a beneficiary under
IT, cannot take the acknowledgement
thereto with a view 10 its registration,
and his certificate thereto is invalid au-
tnority 10 admit IL 10 record and recorda-
ton under IL is without effect II Va,
~ o6 Va, g. ID, 72l: ~ Va $50
q. Tho deed TO appellees was acknowl-
edged before T.. one of the incorporators
cf the Charity School which is a purely
eleemosynary institution. He was entitled
10 receive per diem for each days at
tendance at the board meetings. and also
per diem for his services as secretary
OF the board. Any pecuniary interest
however small. IS ground of disqualified
uon. but the interest must be direct. To
hold that corpOratOr in q purely elee-
mosynary corporation had in IL a dis
qualifying pecuniary interest would be IN
extend the principle OF the decisions cited
above. To do so would be most frex-
pellcnt and unwise, and tend greatly to
cmnarrass the conduct Of business with
out az all promoting purity in the admin
10 ~.
prior In time 10 the deed OF 1889 sbould
nave been given precedence over il. and
tNe decree OF the Circuit Court should be
reversed.
TRUST ESTATE.
Mggans Administrator Us. Riqcan
rom the Circuit Court Of Mecklenburg
Reversed in part. Opinion by Cardwell.
Judge Keith, r.. dissenting.
In 1876 Riggan. a childless widover.
married 5. a widow with two children
Wife had life estate in realty and absolute
estate IN personality. After passage OF
married woman's act in 1877, life estate
was sold. r. died in 1890 leaving a
brother as his sole heir-at-law. Suit by
widow, alleging facts stated. and an
agreement with X. that her property
should remain her separate estate 10 be
managed by him as her agent or trustee
and that whatever moneys he received be-
longing TO her should constitute him her
debtor TO that extent: that at his death
ne was indebted TO her for money received
by virtue OF said agreement, and Of the
laws of Virginia; ana that the admins
traitor wrOngfully withheld from her the
exemption TO which she was entitled
under the statute.
The life estate in the realty had been
sold for 5000 master reported that she
was entitled TO this sum. with interest
from RS death. Court below decreed
that chooses I'm action Of wife. not col
lected prior 10 date Of said act. became
her separate estate; and that limitations
began 10 run as TO them from the time
she had knowledge of their collection:
and further that both r. and wife. hav-
ing sold their joint estate in wife's life
interest In the realty, wife not entitled 10
the purchase money but only TO rents
OF RS death.
The questions TO be decided here are:
First was there an agreement between
r. and wife during coverture that she
should have proceeds Of sale of her life
estate. and. second. II there was sucn an
agreement (nO creditors OF the husband
being affected thereby. can IL be en-
forced In a court Of equity.
Held. J. The evidence clearly establish
as such an agreement.
p IL having been agreed beforehand
that the bond given FOR the purchase
money OF her life estate should be made
PAYABLE to her or for her benefit, and the
bond having been executed accordingly,
X. assumed the attitude Of a trustee.
holding it for the benefit OF his wife, ana
as her separte estate: and when II was
paid he occupied the same relation as