The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1896-12-08
THF HERALD TUESDAY. DECEMBER s. 1856

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shores of its eastern part, is practically
IN the hands of the revolutionists.
NOT UNAPT PARALLEL.
The character of these shores, filled
TO the westward with shallow indent-
atoms, inaccessible to any but light
vessels of small tonnage, and to the
eastward with rocky hooks dangerous
TO approach by night, and afford inSe-
cure anchorage for larger craft, lends
itself peculiarly to the guerilla warfare
or the interior, so that the insurgents,
being relieved of the need of maintain
ing and garrisoning points upon the
coast are effectively able TO utilize a
considerable part of it as occasion Of
fers to communicate with the outside
| world, and to receive clandestine sup
plies of men, arms and ammunition.
Inc situation in that quarter as re-
CARDS the ease of surreptitiouS access
and the difficulty of depressing Illicit
trarnc, finds not unapt parallel in that
OF the Cornish and Welsh coasts of En-
gland or the Scottish highlands, in the
last century, where a few adventures
were able to smuggle supplies and land
rebel emmisaries or forces, battling the
watchers OF maritime forces much
greater than those maintained by
Spain along the diversified shores of
/ Cuba.
While in fact controlling the greater
part of the internal area of the whole
island of Cuba, from Cape San An
tonic to Cape Maysi, and enjoying
practically unlimited use of an equally
large part of the coast, the revolution
airy forces are scattered being no
where united for any length of time
TO form an army capable of attack or
siege and fit to take the defensive in
pitched battle.
LIKE PADDY'S FLEA.
Assembling suddenly at a given
point, often in a single night they
make unexpected sallies or carry
devastation to the cane fields of Cuba,
and at the first sign of pursuit, or
organized assaults, they dispense only
10 reassemble in like manner at some
other spot.
So far as our information shows,
there is not only no effective local
government by the insurgents in the
territories they overrun, but there is
not even tangible pretence to estab-
lsh administration anywhere. Their
organization is confined to the shift
ing eXigencies of the military opera
tons of the hour, is nomadic, without
definite centres and lacking the most
elementary features of municipal gov
SlHIllSnl IH0re nowhere appears the
nucleus of statehood. The machinery
for exercising the legitimate rights
and powers of sovereignty and re-
spending to the obligations which de-
facto sovereignty entails in the face
OF equal rights of other states, is con-
spicuously lacking. 1t is not possible
TO discern homogeneous political
entity, possessing and exercising the
functions of administration and
capable, if left to itself, of maintain
ing orderly government in its own ter
ritory, and sustaining normal rela-
lions with the external family of gov
ernments.
ANARCHISTIC ACTS.
To illustrate these conditions the in
surgent chiefs assert the military
power to compel peaceable citizens of
the United States within their touch
10 deslSt from planting or grinding
cane under the decreed penalty of
death, and of destruction of their crops
and mills but the measure is one of
sheer force, without justification
under public law. The wrongs SO COM
mitted against the citizens of a foreign
state are without an international form
OF redress to which the government of
the United States may have recourse
as regards its relation to the perpetra-
tors. The acts are those of anarchy,
and in default of the responsibilities
of defacto statehood in the case, there
remains only the territorial account
ability of the titular sovereignty with
in the limits OF its competency to
repress the wrong complained of
In opposition to the nOmadic control of
the interior, and the undefended coast by
the insurgents, the Spanish authority
continues in the Seaports. Its garrisons
are there established; from them its
naval operations are directed and exc
of re
in time of peace. It's customs and mu-
nlclpal revenues are regularly collected (
and, with exception of the temporary !
restraints alleged to be due 10 the ad- |
mitted existence of a state of hostilities |
foreign commerce with the island is kept |
up, although largely diminished by the !
of supply and demand. AS to those parts |
of the island with which this country and /
its citizens maintain legitimately normal |
intercourse, the Spanish power is SUI |
preme although often exercised in a /
veXatious and arbitrary way, calling for |
just remonstrance.
NOTABLE CONTRAST.
So far, therefore, as the relative posi-
ton of the Spanish and insurgent forces /
IS compatible with the situation during |
the Yara insurrection, while the same /
phases of organized administration in the |
capital and seaports and effective rela- /
tons Of trade with the outside world on
the one hand. and on the other nomadic
derby government and strong only to
wage harrassing warfare in the interior,
are now, as then, apparent. the present
lnSurrectlon stands in notable contrast
with its predecessors, both as TO force
and scale of operations.
Although statistics of their military
are attainable with difficulty,
and are not always trustworthy when
obtained, enough IS certainly known to
show that the revolutionists in the field
greatly exceed in numbers any organiza-
ton heretofore attempted; that with
large accessions from the central and
western districts Of the island, a better
military discipline is added to increased
strength; that instead of mainly draw
inS, as heretofore, upon the compare
lively primitive population of eastern
Cuba, the insurgent armies fairly repre-
sent the intelligent aspirations of a large
proportion of the people of the whole
Island and that they propose to wage
vantage, to the end TO make the present
struggle a supreme test of the capacity
of the Cuban people to win for them
selves and their children the heritage of
sell government.
A notable feature of the actual s:tua-
ton is the tactical skill displayed by its
leaders. When the disparity in numbers
and the comparatively indefensible char
acter OF the central and western coun-
siderable force into Pinar del Rio. fol-
lowed by its successful maintenance
there for many months, must be regarded
as military success of a pronounced
character.
IS FORMIDABLE.
So, too, the Spanish force in the field,