The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-12-08

depicted in my last annual message has
In the least improved If Spain stu holds
siderable towns. the insurgents still roam
at will over at least two-thirds OF the In
land country If the determination OF 3 SPAN IN
strengthen with the lapse OF time and Is
evidenced by her unheSitating devotion of
largely increased military and naval forces
to the task, there Is much reason to believe
that the insurgents have gained in point
of numbers and character and resources,
and are none the less inflexiole IN their re. re-
securing the great objects for which they
took up arms.
If Spain has not yet re-established her
made good their title to be- regarded as an
independent state. Indeed, as the contest
@ ernmsnt exists Sh 'n on the sian except SO far
as Spain Is able TO maintain il, has been
practically abandoned. Spain does keep on
foot such a government, more or less inn
perfectly, in the large towns and their i'm
mediate suburbs. But, that exception being
made. the entire country is either given
occupation of one or the other party Ii is
reported indeed on reliable authority that,
at the demand of the commander-in-chief
OF the insurgent army, the putative Cuban
TO exercise its functions. leaving that gov
ernment confessedly (what there is the
best reason for supposing Ii always to have
been in facU government merely on
paper.
Were the Spanish armies able to meet
battle, prompt and decisive results might
be looked for, and the immense superiority
of the Spanish forces in numbers: dis
cipline and equipment could hardly fail to
tell greatly to their advantage. But they
are called upon TO face foe that shuns
general engagements, that can choose, and
does choose, its own ground. that from the
nature of the country Is visible or invisi-
BILE at pleasure, and that fights only from
ambush. and when all the advantages of
nj TIC In
a country where all that is indispensable to
life in the way of food, clothing and shelter
Is 80 easily obtainable, especially by those
there is hardly limit to the time during
which hostilities Of this sort may be pro-
A WAR OF DESOLATION
Meanwhile. as in all cases of protracted
civil strife, the passions of the combat
ants grow more and more infiamed and
excesses on both sides become more fire.
quent and more deplorabe. They also
are participated in by bands of marauders
who now in the name of one party and
now in the name of the other, as may
best suit the occasion, roam over the
country at will and plunder its wretched
inhabitants for their own advantage.
Such a condition of things would inevita-
bly, entail immense destruction of prop
erty, even if it Were the desire of the
parties 10 prevent IL as far as practicable.
But while such seems to be the original
now apparently abandoned Ii. and is act
Ing upon the same theory as the nsur-
gents-namely, that the exigencies of the
contest require the wholesale annihilation
of property. that Ii may not prove of use
and advantage to the enemy. 1t Is to the
same end that in pursuance of general or
ders Spanish .garrisons are now being
withdrawn from plantations and the
rural population required to concentrate
itself In the towns. The sure result would
seem to be that the industrial value of
the island is fast diminishing, and that
unless there is a speedy and radical change
an Sng That It vsue w ds
very largely of course, in it's capacity to
produce sugar-a capacity already much
reduced by the Interruptions to tillage
which have taken place during the last
two years. 1t is reliably asserted that
should these Interruptions continue during
much rn1 T money l will be required % ITO to restore res re
the land to its normal productiveness that
it is extremely doubtful if capital can be in
duced to even make the attempt.
The spectacle of the utter ruin of an
adjoining country. by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the globe.
would engage the serious attention of the
government and people of the United
States under any circumstances. In point
of fact. they have concern with it
mental or philanthropic character. 1t lies
SO near to as to be hardly separated
from our territory. Our actual pecuniary
interest in IL is second only to that of
the people and government of Spain. 1t
| is reasonably estimated that at least from
$50, ,0O0, 900 TO 100000 of American capital
is invested in plantations and in railroad,
mining and other business enterprises on
the island. The volume of trade between
the United States and Cuba. which in
1889 amounted to about $64, 0OO rose in
1898 to about s103 100000, and in 1894. the
year before the present insurrection broke
out, amounted TO nearly $96,000O00.
AMERICAN SYMPATHIZERS.
Besides this large pecuniary stake Ia the
fortunes of Cuba, the United States finds
itself inextricably involved in the present
contest in other ways. both vexatious and
costly. Many Cubans reside in this coun-
try, and indirectly promote the insurrec-
tion through the press, by public meet
ings, by the purchase and shipment Of
arms, by the raising of funds and by other
means, which the spirit of our institutions
and the tenor of our laws do not, permit
| cutions. Some of them, though Cubans at
heart and In all their feelings and inter-
ezens ef of the unted states proceedins
resorted to with view to possible pro-
lection by this government and not un-
naturally regarded with much indignation
by the country of their origin.
The insurgents are undoubtedly encour..
aged and supported by the widespread
Sy1Updlny the peOpit VI lUlS COUHlTy
| ways and instinctively feel for every
| struggle for better and freer government.
and which in the case of the more ad-
venturous and restless elements of our
| population, leads in only too many in
stances to active and personal participa-
| tion i'm the contest. The result Is that this
| government is constantly called upon to
| protect American citizens, to claim dam
ages and injuries to persons and property,
| now estimated at many millions of dollars.
| and to ask explanations and apologies for
| the acts of Spanish officials, whose zeal for
| the repression of rebellion sometimes blinds
| them to the immunities belonging to the
| unoffending citizens of a friendly power.
| 1t follows from the same causes that the
| United States is compelled to actively po-
| lice a long line of sea coast against uniaw-
| full expeditions, the escape of which the
! utmost vigilance will not always suffice
| to prevent.
| United States with the rebellion in Cuba,
| the large American property interests af-
fected and considerations OF philanthropy
and humanity In general, have led TO a
| vehement demand in various quarters for
| some sort of positive Intervention on the
part of the United States. 1t was at first
proposed that belligerent rights should be
| no longer urged because untimely, and, in
| practical operation, clearly perilous and
| injurious TO our own interests 1t has
| since been, and is now sometimes, con-
| tended that the independence of the In
| surgents should be recognized. But i'm
| ernment OF the island may be, no other ex-
! lists there, unless the will of the military
officer in temporary command of par
| ticular district can be dignified as q species
| of government II Is now also suggested
| that the United States should buy the
fSla md acfi NJ