Daily Kennebec journal., 1896-12-05
Gloss Call ter Grant.


The remark was made by gentle
man who participated in the battle Of
Corinth, "a years ago. Oct A. He was
asked to explain. He did 1t in this
wise: Grant, you know, but without
just cause, was under a cloud for
some months after the battle of Shiloh.
When l say without cause l do not
mean to infer that there was not sur
prise at Shiloh, but l do mean to say
that probably no general Of modern
times. certainly no general developed
on either side during our great war,
could have fought the battle of Shiloh
better than General Grant after it once
began. The only just criticism which
seems to have been made concerning
that battle is that strong line of
works had not been thrown up day or
two before the confederates attacked.
Grants work at Shiloh was of such
character that no word uttered by su-
perior or inferior should have shaken
the confidence Secretary Stanton had
in him. But that confidence was
shaken, and history long ago told us
that it was done through the late
General Henry w. Halleck.
But to return to my story. For
the next few months General Grant
was on his good behavior. so far as
Stanton was concerned, and he occu-
pied most trying position. His forces
We're scattered, and in some instances
against his judgment and wishes, and
he had under him some officers for
whom he had the highest respect and
who always had his best wishes. but
who did not have his entire confidence.
The latter part of September and
the early part of October, 1862, were
to Generals Grant and Buell-Buell
who had to deal with Bragg in his at
tempted invasion of the North. and
Grant in dealing with General Sterling
Price. who moved into Mississippi and
formed a junction with General Van
Dorm, thus making a large army, well
drilled. tested in battle. commanded by
officers who had grown up in the old
army. The object of Price and Van
Dorm was to crush Grants scattered
troops and be in situation, later on TO
cooperate with Bragg. No one know
ing the attitude of the secretary of
war and General Halleck toward Cen
eral Grant doubts that had Van Dorm
and Price done what they sot out to
do-crushed Grant-it would have been
important force. But there was an
overruling providence then. as there
seemed to be all through the great
struggle. General Grant made his
plans to defeat Van Dorm and Price.
They were as perfect as any he made
in any of his campaigns. Had they
been executed to the letter Van Dorn's
army would have been as effectually
ruined as Hoods was at Nashville
over two years later.
"Corinth was one of. the most fiercely
fought battles of the war. General
Rosecrans was in command. He had
four Decentralization Stanley's.
Davies and Mekcans-with some cav
airy. the usual amount of artillery. all
a force of 10000. He had been
led 20 believe that Van Dorm had
double that number. but he had less
than 10000 on the third Of October
Rosecrans moved his forces about
three miles from Corinth. proposing to
fight the battle outside of the fortifi-
cations constructed the spring before
There was sharp contest the after
noon of the third. participated in by
General Buford's brigade and a Mime
sofa regiment commanded by Colonel
Sanborn. now United States district
judge for Minnesota, residing at st,
Paul. Through a mistaken idea as TO
the location of the enemy. General
Rosecrans troops had been so stationed
that they We're not within supporting
distance of each other. That night Cen
eral Rosecrans issued an order 10 make
midnight attack with the bayonet.
General Charles S. Hamilton. who
knew that the enemy was in front of
him. in large force. was Mortified at
the order. and sent word to Rosecrans
that he could not carry out the order
until he had had a personal conference
with the commanding general,
General Hamilton, in writing Of the
incident short time before his death
said: My reply to his order brought
General Rosecrans to the front. He
burst out vehemently with, General
Hamilton. what do you mean by dis
obeying my orders?' | replied. Cen
eral, | am ready to obey your orders.
but not until ] have explained what
must inevitably result. The night at
tack will be ineffective because the
troops cannot keep their formation in
the brush. and in the darkness of the
forest cannot distinguish friend from
foe Since the fight this afternoon
Davies division has fallen back to-
ward town. They VIII be the first at
tackled in the morning. My troops are
too far away to support them | am
not within supporting distance of any
division, neither can any division
come to my support in the event of
sudden attack. The enemy knows that
| am on his flank: he will not leave me
to attack the town. His first move
ment will be upon me; | shall have to
sustain the brunt of the whole army.
Our position is false one. You should
draw in your lines to the immediate
vicinity of town. where one division
will be in close supporting distance OF
another. where a weak point can be
instantly re-enforced. The place for
this division is where | put it this
morning. I can hold the ground there.
If you make these dispositions you will
win a victory: if you do not you and
the army are ruined.
General Hamilton in his paper that