The Weiser signal. [volume] (Weiser, Idaho) 1890-1904, 1896-12-17


of war between the United States ana
Spain--a war which Its advocates conn-
IDENTIFY prophesy could neither be large In
Its proportions nor doubtful in It's issue
The correctness of this forecast need be
neither affirmed nor denied. The United
States has, nevertheless, character to
maintain as nation. which plainly die
tates that right, and not might, should be
the rule of its conduct
Have Territory Enough.
Further, though the United States is
not a nation to which peace Is a neces-
sity, 1t Is In truth the most pacific of
powers, and desires nothing so much as
to live in amity with all the world. Its
own ample and diversified domains. salts
flying all possible longings for territory,
precludes all claims of conquest and pre-
vents any casting of covetous eyes upon
neighboring regions however attractive
That our conduct toward Spain and her
domnions has constituted no exception
to this national disposition is made man.
ifest by the course of our government
NOT only thus far during the present
insurrection, but during the 10 years that
followed the rising at Yara In 1868. No
other great power, it may safely be said,
under circumstances of similar perplex-
ity, would have manifested the same re-
straint and the same patient endurance.
1t may also be said that this persistent
attitude of the United States towards
Spain In connection with Cuba unques~
y
gard for Spain on the part of the Ameri-
can people They, in truth, do not for
gee her connection with the discovery of
the western hemisphere, nor do they un-
er-estimate the great qualities of The
Spanish people, nor fail to fully recognize
their splendid patriotism and their CHI
valrous devotion to the national honor
They view with wonder and admiration
the cheerful resolution with which large
bodies of men are sent across thousands
n nf M on oaf,11r 1nt,f
accumulated by the country in possess
sion of the gem of the Antilles. Cuba
may still hold It's place in the Spanish
crown, and yet neither the government
nor the people in the United States have
smut their eyes to the course of Spain IN
Cuba, or have failed to realize the ex-
pense. The conceded grievances which
have led to the present revolt from the
authority of Spain, grievances admitted
by the queen regent and by the corees
voiced by the most patriotic and enlight-
ered of Spanish statesmen without re-
gard to party, are demonstrated by re-
forms proposed by the executive and ip-
proved by the legislative branch of the
Spanish government. 1t IS in the assumed
temper and disposition of the Spanish gov
ernment to remedy these grievances, for
tilted by indications of influential public
opinion In Spain, that this government
has hoped to discover the most promising
and effective means OF composing the
present strife, with honor and advant-
age to Spain, and with the achievement
of all the responsible objects of the In
surrection.
Som7 uufe suggested.
1t would seem tnat II Spain should Of
fer to Cuba genuine autonomy-a meas
ure of homo rule, which, while preserving
the sovereignty of Spain, would satisfy
all rational requirements of her Spanish
subjects-there should be no just reason
why the pacfncation of the island might
9Nf nffA
result would appear to be in the true
interest of all concerned. 1t would stop
at once the conflict which is now
suming the resources of the island, and
making It worthless for whichever party
may ultimately prevail. 1t would keep
intact the possessions of Spain without
touching her honor, which will be up
held, rather than impugned, by the 3de-
quate redress of admitted grievances. 1t
would put the prosperity of the island and
the fortunes of It's inhabitants within
the crown control without severing The
natural and ancient ties which bind them
TO the mother country, and would yet
enable them to test their capacity for
self-government under the most favora-
BILE conditions.
R1Ents CuDnns.
Spain would not promise autonomy until her in
surgent subjects laid down their arms the
other side that promised autonomy however lib
eral, is insufficient, because without assurance
of the promise being fulfilled. But the reason
ableness of the requirement by Spain of uncon-
ditional surrender the part OF the insurgent
Cubans before their autonomy Is conceded, is
not altogether apparent 1t ignores important
features of the situation; the stability two
years duration has given to the insurrection;
the feasibility of its indefinite prolongation in
the nature of things shown by past expert
ence; the utter and imminent ruin of the island
unless the present strife is speedily composed,
and above all, the rank abuses which all par
ties In Spain, all branches of her government
and all her leading public men concede to ex-
list and profess desire to remove.
In the face OF such circumstances to with
hold the proffer of needed reforms until the
parties demanding them put themselves at
their mercy by throwing down their arms has
the appearance of neglecting the gravest of
perils and inviting suspicion to the sincerity
of any professed Willingness grant reforms
The objection on behalf of the insurgents-that
promised reforms not be relied upon-must
of course, be considered though we have no
right to assume this, and for as
suming that anything Spain undertakes to do
for the relief of Cuba will not be done accord
ing, to both the spirit and the letter of the
undertaking.
Overtures Made to SPAIN
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious on the
part of the weaker of two combatants are al
ways natural and not always unjustifiable-be-
Ing sincerely desrous in the interest of both
as we'll as on its own account that the Cuban
problem should be solved with the least pos
slble delay-it was int.mated by this govern
ment to the government of Spain some months
ago that II a satisfactory measure OF home
rule were rendered the Cuban Insurgents and
would be accepted by them upon a guarantee
OF Its execution, the United States would en-
deavor to find way not Objectionable to Spain
of furnishing such guaranty. While no definite
response to this intimation has yet been re-
ceived from the Spanish government it is be-
| eved to be not altogether unwelcomed while
| as already suggested, reason is perceived
| why 1t should not be approved by the insur-
| gents. Neither party fail to see the i'm
portance of early action and both must realize
| that to prolong the present state of things even
| Tor short period will add enormously to the
| time and labor and expenditure necessary to
hrin ahnrIt fla tndi rtn1 IT,.
island.
1t Is, therefore, fervently hoped on all grounds
| that earnest efforts for healing the breach be-
| tween Spain and the insurgents In Cuba upon
| the lines above indicated may be at once in
| augurated and pushed to Immediate suc-
cessful issue The friendly offices of the United
| States either In the manner above outlined
| or in any other way consistent with our con-
stitution and laws, will always be at the dis
| posal or either party. Whatever circumsta ucee
| may arise, policy and our interest would
constrain us TO object to the acquisition of the
| island interference with its control by
| my other power
| Patience WIN SoGn Cense.
| It should be added that 1t can not be reason
ibly assumed that the hitherto expectant atti-
| tude of the United States will be indefinitely
! maintained. While anxious to accord
| al due respect to the sovereignty Of Spain, VIC
| can not view the pending conflict in all its
| features and properly apprehend close re-
| lations to 1T and Its possible results without
| considering that by the course of events W,
! may be drawn into such an unusual and unpre
| oedented condition as will fix limit to ou
| patient waiting for Spain to end the contest
| either alone and In her way, or with ou
| friendly cooperation. When the inability o
| Spain to deal successfully with the nsurgent