Iowa state bystander. [volume] (Des Moines, Iowa) 1894-1916, 1896-12-11

20 Fe0UZc the eXlStenN'W ~ a.. ,,roa.
grievances which have leo 20 tne sgnsin
grievances recognised by the quesn
regent and by the cortcs, voiced ~ eno
most patriotic and enlightened OF npan
oh statesmen without regard 70 pa.ayI;
md demonstrated by reforms p1opo.ehsa ~
Dy the executive and approved ny wy
egislatiye branch Of the Spanish sos.
It is in the assumed temper
and disposition Of the Spanish govern ~.
nent to remedy these grievances LII
tified by Indications Of Influenza prn
lie opinion in Spain, that TINS koveat
ment has hoped to discover tne naoss
promising and effective means OF h cv
and advantage to Spain and with tne
Of all the reasonable oo'
|ectS Of the insurrectton.
A Hint to Spain.
It would seem that IL Spain shoulu
offer to Cuba genuine autonomya
measure OF home rule which, Wniie pre-
serving the sovereignty OK SPAN,
would satisfy all rational requiremen.ss
Of her Spanish subjects-there shoulu
be no just reason why the paclnca tio. ~.
Of the island might not be enecteo VI
that basis. Such result wouid ap
pear to be in the true interest OF -
1t would at once STOP .ne
conflict which is now consuming .ne:
resources OF the island, ana maklns
It worthless for whichever parry may "a,
ultimately prevail. 1t would keep IN.
tact the possessions Of Spain without
her honor, which VIII pc
consulted rather than impugned oy
the adequate redress of admitted
grievances. 1t would put the prosper.
ity of the island and the fortunes OF
it's inhabitants within their own con,
troll, without severing the natural ana
ancient ties which bind them to tne
mother country, and would yet enap.e
them to test their capacity LOT sell
under the most taVorapie
1t has been oo1ected On
promise autonomy until her insurgent
subjects lay down their arms. But the
Of a requirement. by
Spain, Of unconditional surrender on
the part Of the insurgent Cuhans
before their autonomy Is CONCEDED,
is not altogether apparent. 1t ig-
nores important features OF the
stability two years
duration has given to the Insured
ton; the feasibility Of Its indefinite
in the nature OF things,
and as shown by past experience; the
utter and imminent ruin OF the isiand.
unless the present strife IS speedny
above all. the rank abuses
which all parties in Spain, all branches
OF her government and all her leading
public men concede to exist and pro-
Tess desire to remove.
Facing such circumstances to With
hold the proffer Of needed reforms until
the parties demanding them put them
selves at mercy by throwing down
their arms has the appearance OF neg
lecting the gravest Of perils and lnvit-
ing suspicion as to the sincerity OF any
professed willingness to grant reform.
The objection on behalf OF the lnsurg-
ents-that promised reforms cannot De
relied upon must OF course be consid-
cred. though we have no right 10 as.
sumo and no reason for assuming that
Spain undertakes to do for
the relief of Cuba will not be done ac-
cording to both the spirit and the let
ter Of the undertaking.
Our Oner to Spain. D..
Nevertheless, realizing that suspi-
cions and precautions on the part OF
the weaker of two combatants are al
ways natural and not always unjusti-
sincerely DESTROYS, in the
interest Of both as we'll as on its own
that the Cuban problem should
be solved with the least POSSIBLE delay
lit was intimated bE(this government
to the government Of Spain some
months prgo that, II a satisfactory
meas6uer Of home rule were rendered
the Cuban insurgents, and would be &C.
cented Nv them upon q guaranty Of Its
the United States would en-
deayor to find q way not objectionable
to Spain of furnishing ouch guaranty.
While no definite response to this inti-
nation has vet been received from the
Spanish government, 1t Is believed to
be not altogether unwelcome. while, as
already suggested, no reason is per-
ceived why it should not be approved
by the insurgents Neither party can
fail to see the Importance OF early &C.
ton, and both must realize that to pro-
long the present state OF things for
exen a. short period Will add enormous
ture necessary to bring about the IN
dustrial recuperation Of the island. 1t
is. therefore. fervently hoped on all
grounds that earnest efforts for healing
The breech between Spain and the in
s,lrpent Cubans upon the lines above
indicated may he at once inaugurated
and pushed to an immediate and sue.
cessful issue. The friendly offices Of
the United States, either in the man.
ner above outlined or In any other way
with our constitution nnd
laws. will always be at the disposal Of
either party. Whatever circumstances
NAV arise, our policy and our Interests
would constrain us to object to the ac'
nlisition of the island or an Interior
ence with its control by any Cthei
power.
II Spain Fails. =,
II should be added that it cannot BIZ
reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude Of the United
States will be indefinitely maintained
While we are anxious to accord all due
respect to the sovereignty Of Spain, W.
cannot view the pending conflict in al
it's features. and properly apprehen6
our inevitably close relations to it, ant
its possible results, withou: consider
ing that by the course Of events We
may oe drawn into such an unusua
and unprecedented condition, as viii
fix a limit to our patient waiting fol
Spain to end the contest, either alone
and in her own way. or with our friend
~ cooperation. When the inability Of
Spain to deal successfully with the
instruction has become manifest, ant
it Is demonstrated that her sovereign
ty Is extinct IN Cuba for all purposes 81
its r!ghtful existence, and when 9
hopeless struggle for its re-establlsh'
ment has degenerated into strife
which means nothing more than the
useless sacrifice Of human life and thu
utter destruction of the very subject
matter Of the conflict, a situation vii
he presented in which our obligation:
to the sovereignty OF Spain will bt
superseded by higher obligations
which we can hardly hesitate to recog
nize and discharge.
Deferring the choice Of ways anc
methods until the time for action ar
rives, we should make them depend
upon the precise conditions than exist
ing; and they should not be determined
upon without giving careful heed tt
every consideration involving oul
honor and interest. or the internationa
duty We owe, to Spain. Until we fact
the contingencies suggested, or the sit
uation is by other incidents impera
lively changed. we should continue IL
the line Of conduct heretofore pursued
thus IN all circumstances exhibiting
our obedience to the requirements o.