Red Lodge picket. [volume] (Red Lodge, Mont.) 1889-1907, 1896-12-12

voiced by the most patriotic and enlight
| cred of Spanish statesmen without re
| gard to party, are demonstrated by re
| forms proposed by the executive and Up
| proved by the legislative branch of tn
| Spanish government 1t is in the assume
| temper and disposition Of the Spanish gov
| ernment to remedy these grievances, for
| tilted by indications OF influential publ
| opinion in Spain, that this governmen
has hoped to discover the most promisin!
| and effective means of composing tn
| present strife, with honor and advant
| - 10 Spain, and with the achievement
| Of al the responsible objects of the IN
SliErection.
Home fSuIe Suggested.
| Al would seem that If Spain should Of
| fer to Cuba genuine autonomy-a meas
| ure Of home rule, which, while preserving
he sovereignty of Spain, would satisfy
All rational requirements Of ner Spanisi
SGbJectS-there should be no just reason
why The paCilication Of the island mgl
not be ,lfcced on that basis such .
@SUlt would appear TO be in the true
interest Gf aI concerned. 1t would s,oI
@r once the conflict which is nGW con-
sUmi!e the resources IF the island and
ii;iaIna II worthless Tor whichever party
may ultimately prevail. 1t would KEEP
intact the possessions of Spain without
touching her honor. which VIII be up
hC ID rather than impugned by the ale-
Iudte redress Of admitted grievances. 1t
would put the prosperity Of The island md
he fortunes Of its inhabitants WITHIN
he crown control without severing lie
natural and ancient ties Which bind thaln
. the mother country, and H.olid yet
enable them to test their capacity tor
Clf-guVeinment under the most faVofA-
Die conditions
Rights GUD:inS.
1t has been objected the one side that
Spain would not promise autonomy until her in
surgent subjects laid down their arms; on the
other side that promised autonomy however lib
eral, is Insufficient, because without assurance
of the promise being fulfilled. But the reason
ableness of the requirement by Spain of uncon-
ditional surrender on the part of the insurgent
Cubans before their autonomy is conceded, is
not altogether apparent. 1t ignores important
features of the situation; the stability two
years duration has given to the nsurrection;
the feasibility of it's indefinite prolongation in
the nature of things as shown by past expert
ence; the utter and imminent ruin of the island
unless the present strife is speedily composed,
and above all, the rank abuses which all par
ties in Spain, all branches of her government
and all her leading public men concede to ex-
st and profess a desire to remove.
In the face of such circumstances, to with
hold the proffer of needed reforms until the
parties demanding them put themselves at
the appearance of neglecting the gravest OF
perils and inviting suspicion 10 the sincerity
Of any professed willingness to grant reforms
The objection on behalf of the inSurgents-that
promised reforms can not be relied upon-must
of course, be considered. though we have no
right to assume this, and reason for as
sunng that anything Spain undertakes to do
for the relief of Cuba will not be done accord
ing to both the spirit and the letter Of the
oSerturcs Made to SPAIN
ttnl.lS iizjy1 tJ,rf
part Of the weaker of two combatants are al
ways natural and not always unjustifiable--be-
ing sincerely desirous in the interest of both
as we'll as on it's own account that the Cuban
problem should be solved with the least pos
sible delay-it was intimated by this govern
ment to the government of Spain some months
ago that if a satisfactory measure of home
rule We're rendered the Cuban insurgents, and
would be accepted by them upon a guarantee
If it's execution, the United States would en-
leaVor to find a way not Objectionable to Spain
If furnishing such guaranty While no definite
'esponse to this intimation has yet been re-
eeved from the Spanish government it is be-
ieved to be not altogether unWelcomed while
is already suggested, reason is perceived
Why it should not be approved by the insur-
GENTS Neither party can fail to see the i'm
,ortance of early action and both must realize
hat to prolong the present state of things even
or a short period will add enormously to the |
nle and labor and expenditure necessary to
,rng about the industrial recuperation of the |
sand.
1t is, therefore, ferVently hoped all grounds |
hat earnest efforts for healing the breach be- |
Waen Spain md tie insurgents N Cuba upon |
he lines above indicated may be at once in |
and pushed to immediate sue
essfu issue. The friendly offices of the United |
states, either in the manner above outlined |
II in any other way consistent with our con- |
titution and laws, will always be at the dis |
,osal Of either party. Whatever circumstances |
nay arise, policy and our interest would |
OnStIan US to object to the acquisition Of the |
sland or an interference with its control by |
ny other power.
Patience VIII Soon Cease.
1t should be added that it can not be reason |
bly, assumed that the hitherto expectant atti-
ude of the United States will be indefinitely |
@ nantalned. ME we are anxious to accord |
II due respect to the sovereignty of Spain, we |
an not view the pending conflict in all its |
eatures and properly apprehend our close re-
atoms to it and its possible results without |
that by the course of events we |
nay be drawn into such an unusual and unpre- |
edented condition will fix limit to
atient waiting for Spain to ond the contest, |
ither alone and in her own way, or with our /
fiendly cooperation. When the inability of !
pain to deal successfully with the Insurgents
as become manifest. and it is demonstrated |
hat sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur-
OSeS of its rightful existence. and when the |
truggle fot re-establishment has degenerated |
nto a strife which means nothing than
he useless sacrifice of human life ana ut
er destruction Of every subject matter Of the
onflict, a situation is presented in which our
bligatons to the sovereignty of Spain will be
by higher obligations, which we can
ardly hesitate to recognize and discharge
Leaves 1T 10 Mckinley.
Deferring the choice of ways and methods !
ntil the time for action arrives, we should
lake them depend upon the precise conditions
hen existing; and they should not be deter
lined upon without giving careful heed to ev-
ry consideration involving honor and in
crest, or the international duty we owe to
pain. Until we face the CONTINGENCIES sug-
ested, or the situation is by other incidents
changed, should continue in
he line of conduct heretofore pursued, thus
! all circumstances exhibiting our obedience
. the requirements of public law and re-
ard for the duty enjoined upon us by the posi-
ion we occupy in the galaxy of nations. A
of emergencies that may arise
houd plainly lead US to avoid their creation
ither through a careless disregard of present
uty undue stimulation and i'll
med expression of feeling. But l have deemed
not amss to remind the congress that time
lay arrive when a correct policy and care for
ur interests as we'll regard for the in
arests Of other nations and their citizens join
by considerations of humanity and a desire
see rich and fertile country intimately re-
ited to us saved from complete devastation
ill constrain government to such action
s Will subserve the, interests involved and at
ne same time promise to Cuba and it's inhabi