Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-02-29
THE CASE. OF CUBA
Some of the Effects of Granting
gs Belligerent Rights.
! 1siu
ADMINISTRATION CIRCLES PUZZLED
The Presidents Probable Course a
Matter for Speculation.
SENATOR LINDSAY'S CALL
ADMINISTRATION CIRCLES PUZZLED
SENATOR LINDSAY'S CALL

Senator Lindsay of Kentucky, who has
been credited with representing in the up
per house the views of the administration
on the Cuban question, called at the State
Department today and had an interview
with Secretary Olney. presumably with ref
erence to the further. proceedings in Con-
gress upon the Cuban resolutions. 1t is
quite apparent to visitors at the White
House and State and other departments
that the officers of the administration are
seriously concerned at the prospects of ac-
tfon by Congress that may lead to an open
issue between the two branches of the
government. The hope is expressed, how
ever, that the matter will blow over with
out serious friction If undue haste in the
proceedings can be avoided.
The acknowledged reluctance of the ad
ministration even to recognize the belig-
erency of the insurgents, much less to go
to the length of recognizing their indie
pendence, is said to be ba sed upon the best
information it has been able to obtain from
the seat of trouble. The State Department
claims it has not accepted without careful
examination, and corroboration wherever
possible statements coming from either the
Spanish government or from the Cuban SYM
pathiZers in this country as to the actual
state of affairs in the unhappy island. It
is admitted on all sides that it has been
exceedingly difficult to arrive at the exact
facts, and while it is realized that the mat
ter collected is necessarily imperfect, still
it is founded upon the best and most i'm
partial statements that the Department OF
State is able to control, namely, the reports
of the United States consular officers in
Cuba.
Tendency of the Reports.
1t is known that the general tendency of
these reports is to the effect that the insur-
gent cause is not nearly SO strong as has
been supposed in Congress. and some Off
cials assert that, as conditions now exist
the administration would not be warranted
in extending recognition to what it can only
regard as a guerrilla movement. The Off
GERS of the adminiStra tion are generally
crA'ited with the opinion based on the facts
rf4 aled by the consular reports. that II left
to their own devices the insurgents cannot
prevail against the Spanish forces in Cuba
and consequently that Congress has been
nisled as to the situation. 1t is said that
the President will probably take steps to
lay before the influential members of the
administration party in Congress the facts
upon which he bases his opinion that the
time is not yet ripe for the recognition of
the Cuban insurgents.
Administration people are curious 10 know
exactly what form congressional action will
take. concurrent resolution will not re-
quire the action of the executive, and, it is
sdid will be no more binding upon him than
would similar action on the part of one of
the state legislative bodies. The resolution
as it passed the Senate merely expressed
the sentiments of that body with regard to
the situation in Cuba, but was in nowise
mandatory in its terms. 1t Is held there
fore, that it does not increase the Presi-
dents responsibilities in the matter, mas
much as the execution of its suggestions are
left practically to his discretion, just as at
present
A Joint or Concurrent Resolution.
The adoption of a joint resolution requlr-
ing the action of the executive, either IN
approval or disapprovaI. would, however,
put a decidedly different and more serious
aspect on the question While it is stated
in official circles that the President would
deprecate the necessity for action on his
part, one way or the other, just at this
time he would undoubtedly approve bill
recognizing the belliserency, or even the
independence of Cuba, more in Difference
to the almost universal demand for such
action rather than because he really be-
lieved it the best thing to be done under
existing conditions The feeling that veto
message would only serve to postpone the
recognition of the insurgents would also
probably induce executive approval. A
veto message would serve no purpose be-
yond giving the Presidents counsel against
hasty or inconsiderate action in a matter
involving the national welfare.
I 'f''i The Feeling in Congress.
The sentiment in the House is as over
whelmingly in favor of vigorous action as
in the Senate, but what opposition there
is, though weak in numbers, is possessed
of more influence and power TO make itself
felt than was the opposition in the Senate.
There is great deal Of uncertainty as to
there Is no question at all about the joint
resolution form. The latter unquestiona-
bly, requires the signature Of the President
and has the force of law, and if the Presi-
dent should exercise the veto power Con-
gress could pass it over his veto and it
would then become mandatory upon the
executive. The joint form is preferred by
some because it may be passed over a
veto.
There does not seem to be any adequate
authority on the question of the concur
rent resolution. The Constitution seems
very explicit on one side of the question,
while custom is almost uniformly on the
other. The custom has been to regard such
resolutions as merely an expression of
opinion by Congress, not requiring action
by The President and not having the force
of law. But the Constitution says that
every order, resolution vote to which
the concurrence OF the Senate and House
Of REPRESENTATIVES may be necessary lex.
be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the same shall take eff
feet shall be approved by him, or, being
two-third vote,'' etc. This proposition is
as broad as possible, but it has been ignor-
ed in its application to concurrent resolu-
tions and orders. A concurrent resolution
has been regarded as merely declaration
intended to quicken the action of the Pres
ident. The Senate judiciary committee, to
whom was referred the Hill resolution
calling for an investigation and report on
this subject, has referred the matter to
Senator HILL as subcommittee, and he is
row making an investigation.
Would Sigu IN Joint Resolution.
Men who have talked with the President
on the subject. say that if the question were
presented to him in the form of joint res
oIution, he would undoubtedly sign it, but
that If 1t comes in the form of q concur
rent resolution, he will not regard it as
mandatory, and will exercise his own DIS
Ct cieton both as to point of time and char
acter Of action. The doubt of the force Of
the concurrent resolution arises from the
silence Of the Constitution in respect to
such measures en- the question of the ten
days limit. which applies to bills neither
vetoed nor signed. The best informed men
in Congress are reluctant to express an
opanion.on the subject publicly.
AS the effect of the action derends upon
this qaestion, there Is a great deal of doubt
as to whether the resolutions when adopted
WIN dfheunt to anything. The Armenian
resolutions. passed some time ago, have
been thus tar ignored by the President as
far Con md fs