Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1896-11-10

up the bay, provided there were enough
| water for her to proceed.
| The fort on the Punta is just opposite
| the Moro Castle, and ii is quite as
futile in the matter of defence. Further
| around on the ocean side is the Batera
| la Reina, at the foot of Calledel Belas-
| coain.
| 1t is a rickety structure of stone, and
probably prove quite as dangerous as
old Fort William, on Governors island
These three forts. without ever catch
| ing a sight of the invading Cubans,
would probably lombard the town in
blind way, without doing other damage
than tearing down buildings and play
ing into the insurgents hands by set
ting fire to the city.
Far more effective would be the two
forts Santo Domingo de Atares and
Castillo del Principe on the southern
and southwestern borders of the city.
The former fort is situated at the head
of the western arm of the bay and COM
mands the country to the south in the
direction of Cerro and Jesus del Monte.
The Castillo del Principe is situated
on an eminence to the west. forming
the terminus of the great Paseo Militar.
Both of these forts date back to 1868.
when Condo de Regla was governor of
the island. They have not been i'm
proved much since then. but they would
prove quite effective against an attack
ing land force. In fact, they would
prove more formidable than any of the
Notifications across the bay.
To the south of the Cabanas is Fort
No. of San Diego, on a hill about 100
feet high. 1t is too unimportant to|
merit extended comment. The small
fort called Santa Clara, facing the sea
at the foot of Calzada de la Infanta,
has almost fallen into disuse.
The relative importance of the forts
around Havana can only be judged by
the rank of the commanding officer of
each. According to this basis the
Castillo del Principe and the Cabanas
come first. The list is as follows:-
Castillo del Principe. brigadier gen
eral: Castillo de la Cabana, brgadier
general: Fuerte de San Diego, first
lieutenant: Castillo del Moro. major
Of infantry: F'uerte del Punta. captain
of infantry; Fuerte de Atares, first
lieutenant of infantry: Fuerte de la
Eeina, captain of artillery: Fuerte de
Ia Santa Clara. captain of artillery.
At present the Guardia Civil in Ha
Nana, which corresponds somewhat
With our militia. numbers about 5000
These soldiers could be relied upon to
repel a Cuban infantry attack with |
far greater certainty than the forts |
because the Cubans would not be fool |
ish enough to attack the city by day |
Light.
1t is not generally known that once |
before during the present war the |
Cubans We're upon the verge of at |
lacking Havana. 1t was during the |
insurgent raids in the neighborhood of
Regla and Marianne.
Some time after these raids it was |
said that the Cubans had bribcd the |
commandant of Fort Atares and that |
the gates We're to be opened to the |
insurgents at a given signal. Had this |
been done Havana would certainly |
been laid waste before Atares could |
have been demolished. 1t is said that
the plot was discovered and that the |
commanding officer of Atares was sent
back to Spain in disgrace
If the insurgents contemplate an at /
tack on Havana during the present
winter the very best they can expect
will be to make a destructive dash
into the city at night by way of the
Calzada del Cerro work their way
swiftly up into the Gale de la Reina
and out toward Vedado without a
pause.
1t is a daring scheme, and if accom-
plished will only be another proof of
the utter impOtency of the Spanish
forces.
They will never see Havana" say
the Spanish officials. Such a thing is
impossible. We have too many SOL
dierS.'
1t does not seem impossible, how
ever, to capable non combatants who
have studied the situation Carefully.
although such an attack might prove
practically fruitless. There are not a
hundred regular Spanish soldiers in
Havana, and all the defensive fighting
would have to be done by the 5000 men
of the Guardia Civil
The Spaniards are supposed to have
15O326 soldiers scattered about at va