The record-union., 1896-12-08

from the authority of Spain-grievances
recognized by the Queen Regent and by
the Cortes, voiced by the most patriotic
and enlightened of Spanish statesmen,
without regard to party, and demon
strated by reforms proposed by the ex-
ecutive and approved by the legislative
branch of the Spanish Government.
WAY TO END THE STRIFE.
1t is in the assumed temper and dis
position of the Spanish Government to
remedy these grievances, fortified by
indications Of influential public opinion
| in Spain, that this Government has
hoped to discover the most promising
and effective means of composing the
present strife, with honor and advant-
age to Spain, and with the achievement
of all the reasonable objects of the in
Surrection.
1t would seem that if Spain would
offer to Cuba genuine autonomy-a
measure of home rule which while pre-
serving the sovereignty of Spain, would
satisfy all rational requirements of her
/ Spanish subjects-there should be no
! just reasons which the pacification of
/ the island might not be effected on
that basis. Such a result would ap-
pear to be in the true interest of all
concerned. 1t would at once stop the
conflict, which is now consuming the
resources of the island and making it
worthless for which ever party may
ultimately prevail. 1t would keep in
! tact the possessions of Spain without
| touching her honor, which will be con-
suited rather than impugned by the ad
equate redress of admitted grievances.
1t would put the prosperity of the
! island and the fortunes of it's inhabi-
| tants within their own control with
out severing the natural and ancient
| ties which bind them to the mother
country, and would yet enable them to
| test their capacity for self government
under the most favorable conditions.
WOULD PROMISES BE LIVED
UP TO?
1t has been objected on the one side
that Spain would not promise autonomy
until her insurgent subjects lay down
! their arms; on the other side that
promised autonomy, however liberal, is
insufficient, because without assurance
of the promise being fulfilled. But the
reasonableness of the requirements by
Spain of unconditional surrender on the
part of the insurgent Cubans before
their autonomy is conceded is not alto
gether apparent. 1t ignores important
features of the situation-the stability
two years duration has given to the
insurrection; the feasibility of its in
definite prolongation in the nature of
things, as Shown by past experience;
the utter and imminent ruin of the
island unless the present strife is
speedily composed; above all the rank
abuses which all parties in Spain, all
branches of her government and all her
leading men concede to exist and pro-
| fesS a desire to remove.
| Facing such circumstances, to with
hold the proffer of needed reforms un-
til the parties demanding them put
themselves at mercy by throwing )down
their arms has the appearance of neg
lecting the gravest of perils and in
inviting suspicion as to the sincerity of
any professed willingness to grant re-
forms. The objection on behalf of the
insurgents-that promised reforms can
not be relied upon-must of course be
considered, though we have no right to
| assume and no reason for assuming
that anything Spain undertakes to do
for the relief of Cuba will not be done
| according to both the spirit and the
/ letter of the undertaking. Neverthe-
less, realizing that suspicious and pre-
cautions on the part of the weaker
of the two combatants are always nat
ural and not always unjustifiable-be-
ing sincerely desirous in the interest of
both, as well as on it's own account,
| that the Cuban problem should be
| solved with the least possible delay
| it was intimated by this Government
! To fhn
months ago that if a satisfactory meas
ure of home rule We're rendered the Gu
ban insurgents, and would be accepted
by them upon guarantee of it's exc
cution, the United States would en-
/ deaVor to find way not Objectionable
to Spain of furnishing such guaranty.
| While no definite response to this in
timation has yet been received from
the Spanish Government it is believed
to not altogether unwelcome, while as
already suggested no reason is per-
ceived why it should not be approved
| by the insurgents. Neither party can
| fail to see the Importance of early ac-
ton and both must realize that to pro-
| long the present state of things for
even short period, will add enormous
| ly to the time and labor and expendi-
|
dustrial recuperation of the island
| 1t is therefore fervently hoped on all
grounds that earnest efforts for heal
ing the breach between Spain and the
insurgent Cubans upon the lines above
indicated may be at once inaugurated
and pushed to an immediate and sue
cessful issue. The friendly offices of
| the United States, either in the man
ner above outlined, or in any other way
| consistent with our Constitution and
laws. will always be at the disposal of
either party
MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE A HAND
| Whatever circumstances may arise.
our policy and our interest would con-
strain us to object to the acquisition
of the island or an interference with it's
control by any other power
| 1t should be added that it cannot be
reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude of the United States
will be indefinitely maintained. While
we are anxious to accord all due re-
spect to the sovereignty of Spain, we
cannot view the pending conflict in all
it's features, and properly apprehend
our inevitably close relations to it and
| its possible results without considering
that by the course of events we may be
drawn into such an unusual and un-
precedented condition as will fix limit
to our patient waiting for Spain to end
the contest, either alone and in her own
way, or with our friendly cooperation.
When the inability of Spain to deal
successfully with the insurgents has
become manifest, and it is demon