The National tribune., 1896-01-09

possible by Gen. McDowell's plan, but
HIGHLY PROBABLE
Indeed, his plan, with very little modl-
fication, might have been made the best
that was possible under the circumstances
After forming his turning column into
batte-line west of the Warrenton pike,
he ought to have engaged the enemy
brisklv at Balls Ford and Island Ford,
and if possible to have forced crossing
there while the first battle was in prog
ress at the Henry Plateau.
This would have practically redeemed
the error that he had already made by
which Beauregard had been allowed to
establish his lines at right angles with
Bull Run.
To have turned his right wing would
have been almost certain victory. he
could not have remained there as be
was. But suppose he had attempted to
do so: his left would then have melted
before the turning column. lie would
then have been forced to reform east or
south, in the face Of a victorious foe,
that was superior in numbers, at least.
SUCH COMBINATIONS
as Beauregard was allowed to make
there could scarcely ever have been
made afterward by either army with
the same success.
Let us ask ourselves what the plan of
battle ought to have been, and what in
all probability it would have been, at
the beginning, had the authorities at
Washington been more careful in secur-
ing necessary information as TO the con-
dition Of the country to be traversed.
The selection of Centerville for a
base was very good. True, it was some
what exposed, being little too far
south But, all things considered, it
was perhaps the best. There were four
fair fords over Bull Run, within easy
supporting distance of each other; to
wit, Lewis's, Stone Bridge, Balls, and
Island Fords. Young's Branch empties
into Bull Run about the center between
these crossings
So, for more than half of the battle
line, the Confederates would have had
a creek at their back, unless they had
established their line south Of 1oung's
Branch. 1t is true that their line was
south of Young's Branch, any way, but
Its general trend was east and west;
whereas the Federal strategy should
have compelled them to accept
EXACTLY OPPOSITE ANGLES.
The turning column would then have
formed the Federal left, which would
necessarily have uncovered Mitchell's
and Blackburn's Fords, and, at the
same time, threatened the enemy's base.
Fiat Run, on the south side Of Bull
Rus, and Cub Run, on the north side,
would have protected the Federal left
flank, and Youngs Branch its right
flank The Confederates would not
have dared to mass against the Federal
right, because that would have entirely
uncovered his base at Manassas juno
tion.
Had this plan been used, even in
case Of defeat he might have pre-
vented panic or rout, as he would prac-
tically have controlled every ford on
Bull Run, except, perhaps, Union Mills
The proper time for this fight, as here
planned, was on the 18th and 18th of
July. Then none of Beauregard's rein
forcements would have been present, and
Gen. Johnston and Gen. jackson would
not have been there to assist and en-
: courage Gen. Beauregard and bis army.
Gen. Mcdowell would have had
DECIDED ADVANTAGE
IN artillery position. He could have
covered either Of the fords successfully.
Even to carry out Gen. MeDowell's
plan, there was no necessity for the
detour to Sudley's Ford on the night of
the goth. 1t was all right for this turn
ng column to form at right-angles with
Bull Run. This could easily have
formed after that column had crossed
Stone Bridge, while the left wing would
have formed below, parallel with Bull
Run.
Now. / hear one say, that would
cause an enflade by the artillery along
the line Of the turning column. Not a
BIZ Of it. No Confederate line-ofbattle
could have been held parallel TO Bull
Run within at least half mile Of
those crossings, where the Federal artil-
lery would have been stationed. There
would have been no possibility of
SUCH A MISFORTUNE.
Another viii ask How will YOU fight
your infantry while your artillery en-
cages the enemy?" Fight it parallel
with my infantry columns on the same
line. That was often done successfully
during the war;
Aside from all this, the pivotal power
in all such movements is supposed TO
rest in the turning column, and in case
the enemy is driven it is supposed 10
have power TO compel a retreat.
Ii was grand field for artistic war
fare. Gen. Mcdowell ought to have
won a victory. He doubtless would
have done so had he countered Gen.
Beaulegard's combination tactics. which.
as We have shown, he might have ac-