The evening tribune. (Pawtucket, R.I.) 189?-190?, 1896-12-07


dreams of conquest, and prevent -sany
casting of covetous eyes upon neighbor-
| ing regions, however attractive. That our
conduct towards Spain and her domin-
ions have constituted no exception to
this national disposition Is made mani
fest by the course OF our government.
| not only thus far during the present
| tnsurrection. but during the ten years
| that followed the rising at Yara In 1868.
r. No otbSr great power. II may be safely
said. under circumstances OF similar per-
plexity, would have manifested the same
| restraint and the same patient endur-
ance. II may also be said that this per-
sistent attitude of the United States to-
| ward Spain in connection with Cuba,
| unquestionably evinces no slight respect
and regard for Spain on the part Of the
| American people. They, In truth. do not
| forget her connection with the discovery
| or the western hemisphere, nor do they
underestimate the great qualities of the
| Spanish people nor fail to fully recognize
| their splendid patriotism and their chiv-
| alrors devotion to the national honor.
They view with wonder and admiration
| the cheerful resolution with which vast
| bodies Of men are sent across thousands;
| OF miles of ocean and an onerous debt
accumulated that the costly possession
Of the Gem of the Antilles may still hold
its place i'm the Spanish crown.
And yet neither the government nor the
people of the United States have shut
their eyes to the course OF events in
Cuba, or have failed to realize the exist
ence OF conceded grievances which have
led to the present revolt from the author
ity of Spain-grievances recognized by
the queen regent and by the cortes, voiced
by the most patriotic and enlightened or
Spanish statesmen, without regard to
party, and demonstrated by reforms pro-
posed by the executive and approved by
the legislative branch of the Spanish gov
ernment. 1t Is in the assumed temper
and disposition OF the Spanish govern
ment to remedy these grievances, forti-
fed by indications of influential public
opinion in Spain, that this government
has hopes to discover the most promising
and effective means Of composing the
present strife, with honor and Advantage
to Spain and with the achievement Of all
the reasonable objects Of the insu rec
ton.
1t would seem that II Spain should offer
to Cuba genuine autonomy-a measure
of home rule which, while preserving the
sovereignty of Spain, would satisfy all
rational requirements of her Spanish sub
jects-there should be no just reason why
the pacification of the island might not
be effected on that basis. Such a result
would appear to be in the true interest
of all concerned. 1t would at once stop
the conflict which Is now consuming the
resources of the island and making 1t
worthless for whichever party may ulti-
mately prevail. 1t would keep intact the
possessions of Spain without touching her
hogor, which will be consulted rather
than impugped by the adequate redress
of admitted grievances
1t would put the prosperity or the
island and the fortunes of its inhabi-
tants within their own control. without
severing the natural and ancient ties
which bind them to the mother country,
and would yet enable them to test their
capacity for self-government under the
most favorable conditions. 1t has been
objected on the one side that Spain
should not promise autonomy until her
insurgent subjects lay down their arms;
on the other side. that promised auton-
omy, however liberal, is insufficient, be-
cause without assurance Of the promise
being fulfilled.
But the reasona bleness of a requirement
by Spain, of unconditional surrender on
the part Of the insurgent Cubans before
their autonomy is conceded, is not alto
gether apparent. 1t ignores important
features Of the situation-the stability
two years duration has given to the in
surrection the feasibility. of it's indefinite
prolongation in the nature of things, and
as shown by past experience, the utter
and imminent ruin of the island, unless
the present strife is speedily composed;
above ALL the rank abuses which all par
ties in Spain, all branches of her gov
ernment and all her leading public men
concede to exist and profess q desire to
remove.
Facing such circumstances, to with
hold the proffer of needed reforms until
the parties demanding them put them
selves at mercy by throwing down their
arms, has the appearance of neglecting
the gravest Of perls and inviting suspi-
cion as to the sincerity of any professed
willingness to grant reforms. The objec-
ton on behalf of the insurgents-that
promised reforms cannot be relied upon
must, Of course, be considered, though we
have no right to assume. and no reason
for assuming, that anything Spain under
takes to do for the relief of Cuba will
not be done according TO both the spirit
and the letter of the undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious
and precautions on the part OF the weaker
of two combatants are always natural
and not always unjustifiable--being sim
cerey desirous in the interests OF both
as well as on it's own account that the F!
Cuban problem should be solved with the |
least possible delay-it was intimated |
by this government to the government |
of Spain some months ago that, II |
satisfactory measure Of home rule were |
rendered the Cuban insurgents, and would |
be accepted by them upon a guaranty of |
it's execution, the United States would en- |
to Spain of furnishing such guaranty.
While no definite response to this inti- |
nation has yet been received from the |
Spanish government, 1t Is believed to be |
not altogether unwelcome, while, as al |
ready suggested, no reason Is perceived |
why it should not be approved by the In |,
surgents. Neither party can fall to see |
the Importance of early action and both |
must realize that to prolong the present |
state OF things for even a short period |
will add enormously to the time and |
labor and expenditure necessary to bring
about the Industrial recuperation of the |
island 1t Is, therefore. fervently hoped |
on all grounds. that earnest efforts for |
healing the breach between Spain and |
the insurgent Cubans, upon the lines
above indicated, may be at once inau-
gurated and pushed to an immediate and |
successful issue. The friendly Offices OF
the United States, either i'm the manner
above outlined or In any other way con-
sistent with our constitution and laws.
will always be at the disposal Of either |
party. Whatever circumstances may
arise. our policy and our interests would
constrain us to object to the acquisition
Of the island or an interference with its
~ other