The National tribune., 1896-04-16

enemy, with only one division. Ger
Thomas then sent Gen. Whipple, hi
CHEF of staff, to ascertain if Schofiel'
needed reinforcements. Gen. WhipplC
after examination of Schofeld's I'm
and reserves, reported to Gen. Thoma
that it was not necessary to weaken Gen
Smiths line by drawing second di
vision from him to aid Gen. Schofeld
and Gen. Thomas revoked the ordel
that had been issued.
Gen. Wilson had become impatient
at the loss Of so much valuable time
and sent one staff officer after another
TO Thomas to make known bis readiness
to attack, and finally rode around The
left of Hoods line to learn the cause oi
the failure of the infantry to attack
At 8 o'clock p. m. Gems. Wood and
Steedman, weary Of waiting, attacked
Hoods right flank on Overton's Hill
with Posts and Thompson's Brigades
supported by Streights.
Our men marched fearlessly to the
front in the face of the enemy, who
were behind their Notifications, and were
met by a deadly fire Of shot and shell
that fearfully decimated their ranks and
caused them to recoil and fall back.
Although their efforts were unsuccessful,
it caused Hood 10 again send troops
from his left and center to the support
of his rioht flank
Gen. Thomas, after the assault of
Woods and Steedman's forces, rode
over to his right flank to hasten, if pos
eible, the cooperative attack of Schofield
and Wilson. When he reached the po-
sition of Gen. A. j. Smith, commanding
the Sixteenth Corps, Gen. Smith referred
to him request from Gen. Macarthur
asking permission to
ASSAULT THE SALIENT
Of Hoods line directly in front of COUGHS
Division, of the Twenty-third Corps.
Thomas said
"No; the prescribed order of attack
gives the initiative to Gen. Schofield, in
conjunction with the cavalry, and | de-
sire maintenance of this order. / will
ride to Gen. Schofeld's position and has
ten his attack"
When Gen. Thomas reached Schofeld
he ordered him to attack at once. Scho-
field was reluctant to move, from the
fear Of loss that an assault would pro-
duce, and Thomas replied that the
battle must be fought, if men are
killed"
While the matter was under discus
sion, Thomas looked to the left, and OBJ
serving that Macarthur was moving upon
the angle, said to Schofeld:
eGen. Smith is attacking without
waiting for you. Please advance your
whole line"
At this moment Gen. Wilson called
Gen. Thomas's attention to the move
ment Of the dismounted cavalry upon
the fortified hill on the extreme flank of
Hoods line. Both assaults were success
ful, and almost at the same instant NOV
ing southwark carried the angle of Hoods
line, and Wilson's troops, moving in the
opposite direction and striking the enemy
in reverse, gained the other important
position.
When the shout of victory was heard
upon Thomas's right wing, the divisions
Of the Fourth Corps and Steedman's
troops moved upon the enemy with ire
sistible force, and Hoods right was as
quickly routed as his left had been. The
combined attack Of Smith and Wilson
was made at $50 p. M, and by 4 o'clock
the left half of Hoods army was in
confused retreat. A few moments later |
the other half gave way, and Hood dis
covered that lis army was hopelessly de-
feated and on the retreat, officers and |
men Eieing with one another in the race
to escape from Thomas's exultant and |
victorious troops. Gen. Thomas SAYS:
"But unfortunately night was too |
near at p m. on dark, foggy after
noon in December for the triumphant !
army to gain the fruits of such victory. |
Had the attack on the right been made
at noon, the result would have been diff
ferent."
On the morning Of the 18th the
Fourth Corps, under Gen. Wood, crossed
the Harpeth River at Franklin and fol-
lowed the cavalry force on the Columbia
Turnpike. On the morning Of the 18th |
Gen. Wilson moved forward bis cavalry
with the intention of forcing Hoods
rear-guard to make a stand at Spring
Hall, but was unsuccessful, as Hoods
forces had marched rapidly all night
and could not again be brought TO bay.
The condition Of the roads from the
ice blockade and the incessant rains for
the past few days, were almost impass-
able, and the cavalry and infantry on
the dirt roads or plowed fields could not
move rapidly enough TO gain the fanks
OF the retreating army. Then, again, the
streams were swollen and the bridges
were burned, necessitating a wait for the
waters TO fall in order that the pursuing
army might cross.
Without doubt Gen Thomas intended |
that his infantry should move over the |
macadamized roads, while his cavalry
should move upon the fanks of the re-
treating army, over the dirt roads, and
thus gain Hoods rear, but the condition