Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1896-12-11

Oh the lSlallu might DC cllectcu on tnal
basis. Such Il result would appear tC
be in the clear interest of all concerned
1t would stop at once the conflict
which is now consuming the recource'
of the island and making it WORTHLESS.
for whichever party may ultimately
prevail. 1t would keep intact tn,
possessions of Spain, without touching
her honor, which will be consulted
rather than impugned by the adequat,
redress of admitted grievances. Il
would put the prosperity of the islanC
and the fortune of its inhabitants with
in their own control, without scyerinG
the natural and ancient ties which
bind them to the mother country, anC
would yet enable them to test theil
capacity for self government under the
most favorable conditions. 1t ha.
been objected ON the one side that
Spain would not promise autonomy
until her insurgent subjects lay down
their arms; on the other side that
promised autonomy, however liberal
is insufficient, because without as
surance of the promise being fulfilled
But the reasonableness of the re.
quirement by Spain of unconditional
surrender on the part of the insurgcnt
Cubans before their autonomy is con.
coded is not altogether apparent. II
ignores important features of the
situation; the stability two years
duration has given to the instruction
the feasibility of its indefinite pro.
longation, in the nature of things
as shown by past experience; the utter
and imminent ruin Of the island I'M
less the present strife is speedily COM
posed, and, above all, the rank abuses
which all parties in Spain, all branches
of her government and all her leading
public men, cOncede to exist and pro-
Tess a desire to remove. Facing such
circumstances, to withhold the proffer
of needed reforms until the parties
demanding them put themselves at
mercy by throwing down their arms
has the appearance of neglecting the
gravest of perils and enlisting sus-
picion as to the sincerity of any pro-
fessed willingness to grant reforms.
The objection on behalf OF the in
surgents-that promised reforms can
not be relied upon-must, of course,
be considered, though we have no
right to assume and no reason for as
Stunning that anything Spain under
takes to do for the relief of Cuba will
not be done, according to both the
spirit and the letter of the undertake
ing.
Nevertheless, realizing that sus-
piciOns on the part of the weaker of
two combatants are always natural and
not always unjustifiable, being sincerely
dcsirous in the interest of both, as we'll
as on its own account, that the Cuban
problem should be solved with the
least possible delay, it was intimated
by this government to the govern
ment of Spain some months ago that
if satisfactory measure of home rule
were intended the Cuban insurgents
and would be accepted by them upon
guarantee OF its execution, the United
States would endeavor to find way
not Objectionable to Spain of furnish
ing such guaranty. While no definite
response to this intimation has yet
been received from the Spanish govern
ment, it is believed to be not altogether
unwelcomed, while, as already sug-
gested, no reason is preceived why it
should not be approved by the in
surgents. Neither party can fail to
see the Importance of early action, and
both must realize that to prolong the
present state of things for even short
period will add enormously to the
time and labor and expenditure
necessary to bring about the industrial
recuperation of the island. 1t is there
fore fervently hoped on all grounds
that earnest efforts for healing the
breach between Spain and the in
surgent Cubans upon he lines above
indicated may be at once inaugurated
and pushed to all Immediately sue
cessful issue. The friendly offices of
the United States, either in the man.
ner above outlined or in any other way
consistent with our constitution and
laws will always be at the disposal of
either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise,
our policy and our interest would
constrain us to object to the acquisi-
ton of the island or any interference
with its control by any other power.
1t should be added that it cannot be
reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude of the United
States will be indefinitely maintained.
While we are anxious to accord all
due respect to the sovereignty of Spain
we cannot view the pending conflict in
all its features and properly APP
prehend our close relations to it and
its possible results, without consid-
ering that by the course of events we
may be drawn into such an unusual
and unprecedented condition rs will
fix limit to our patient waiting for
Spain to end the contest either alone
and in her own way or with our friendly
cooperation.
When the inability OF Spain to deal
successfully with the insurgents has
become manifest and it is demon
strated that her sovereignty is extinct
in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful
existence and when hopeless struggle
for its re-establishment has degenerated
into strife which means nothing
more than the useless sacrifice of
human life and the utter destruction
of every subject matter of the conflict
a situation will be presented in which
our obligations to the sovereignty of
Spain will be superseded by higher
obligations which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge.
Deferring the choice of ways and
methods until the time for action
arrives, we should make them depend
upon the precise conditions then
existing, and they should not be
determined upon without giving care
full heed to every consideration in
volving our honor and interest for the
international duty we owe to Spain.
Until we face the contingencies sug-
gested or the situation is by other in
cidents imperatively changed, We
should continue in the line of conduct
heretofore pursued, thus in all cir
cumSfaupns avhihifipu our ohaJ iapco