Montpelier examiner. [volume] (Montpelier, Idaho) 1895-1937, 1896-12-11

IreaSOnabienesS OF the requirement D
Spain, of unconditional surrender o
the part of the insurgent Cubans befor
their autonomy is conceded, is uot alto
gether apparent. 1t ignores importan
features of the situation-the stabilit,
of its indefinite prolongation in the ma
ture of things and as shown by pas
experience; the utter and imminen
ruin of the island, unless the presen
strife lie speedily composed; above all
the rank abuses which all parties II
Spain, all branches of her government
and all her leading public men concede
to exist and profess desire to remove
Facing such circumstances, 10 with
hold the proffer of needed reforms until
the parties demanding them put them.
selves at mercy by throwing down their
arms has the appearance of neglecting
the gravest of perlls and inviting suspi.
cion as to the sincerity of any pro.
fessed willingness to grant reforms
The objection on behalf of the insur-
gents-that promised reforms cannot be
relied upon--must, of course, be consid.
cred, though we have no right to assume
and no reason for Stunning. that any
thing that Spain undertakes to do for
the relief of Cuba will not be done &C.
cording to both the spirit and the letter
of the undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious
and precautions on the part of the
weaker of the two combatants are al
ways natural and not always unjustif-
able-being sincerely DESTROYS In the
interests of both as well as on IT'S own
account that the Cuban problem should
be solved with the least possible delay
1t was intimated by this Government
to the Government of Spain some
months ago that If satisfactory meas
ures of home rule we're rendered the
Cuban insurgents, and would be &C
cepted by them upon a guarantee of its
execution, the United States would en-
deavor to find way not Objectionable
to Spain of furnishing such guaranty.
While no definite response to this In
timation has yet been received from
the Spanish Government, 1t is believed
to be not altogether unwelcome, while,
as already suggested, no reason Is per
ceived why 1t should not be approved
by the insurgents; neither party can fall
to see the Importance of early action,
and both must realize that to prolong
the present state Of things for even
s hort period will add enormously to the
time and labor and expenditure neces-
sary to bring about the indnslxfxf secu.
peration of the island. II leore,
fervently hoped on all wss9mds thek
earnest efforts for healing the breach
between Spain and the insurgent Gu
bans upon the lines above indicated may
be at once inaugurated and pushed to
an immediate and successful issue. The
friendly Offices of the United States,
either in the manner above outlined or
In any other way consistent with our
Constitution and laws, will always be at
the disposal of either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise,
our policy and our interest would con-
strain us to object to the acquisition of
the island or an interference with IFS
control by any other power.
1t should be added that 1t cannot be
reasonably assumed that the hither-
to expectant attitude of the United
States will be indefinitely maintained.
While we are anxious to accord all due
respect to the sovereignty of Spain, we
cannot view the pending conflict in all
its features, and properly apprehend
our inevitably close relations to 1t and
Its possible results without considering
that by the course of events we may
be drawn into such an unusal and I'M
precedented condition as will FIX limit
to our patient waiting for Spain to end
the contest, either alone or in her own
way, or witE our friendly cooperation.
When the inability of Spain to deal
successfully with the insurgents has
become manifest, and 1t demonstrated
that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba
for all purposes of its righttul existance,
and when hopeless struggle for its re
establishment has degenerated into
strife which means nothing more than
he useless sacrifice of human life and
he ter destruction of the very subject
matter of the conflict, situation will be
presented In which our obligations to
the sovereignty of Spain will be sup.
erseded by higher obligations, which we
can hardly hesitate to recognise and dis
charge.
Deferring the choice of ways and
methods until the time for action ar
rives, we should make them depend up.
on the precise conditions then existing
and they should not be determined up.
on without giving careful heed to every
consideration involving our honor and
interest or the international duty we
owe to Spain. Until we face the con.
tingencies suggested, or the situation is
by other incidents imperatively changed
we should continue in the line of con.
duct heretofore pursued, thus in all cir
cumstances exhibiting our obedience to
the requirements of public law and our
regard for the duty enjoined upon us
by the position we occupy in the galaxy