The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1896-06-27

VI
everywhere TO the absolute control of
| the owner as to price, just as corn,
| cotton, and wheat are the subjects of
| unrestricted purchase and sale.
| To give a legal and fixed value to
| American coins of gold and silver i'll
| the United Kingdom, for instance, we
must begin by concluding a treaty,
| and must then get the legislative con-
| sent of both governments. Without
| such legislative consent, or in case of
| it's withdrawal after it has been given,
such treaty would only amount to an
engagement that would be impossible
| of performance, but it would be none
| the less an engagement binding upon
| the honor of the country, the breach
of which can only result in reprisals
or war.
| A violated treaty has no other re-
| dress than reprisal or war, If its obli-
| cations are insisted upon by the party
| aggrieved,
| As to any matter within the scope OF
| the treaty powers, the President, with
| the concurrence of two-thirds of the
| Senate, can make a treaty, which is
| the supreme law of the land without
the consent of Congress.
| If the subject of the treaty so made
4
confined TO the President and Senate,
no other department of the govern
ment would be bound by it's provis
| ions.
NOT AN EXECUTIVE ACTION.
The coinage of money and the regu-
| lation of its value and of the value of
foreign coins is expressly given to Con-
| gress bS the Constitution. 1t is not
given to the President and the Senate,
as one of the treaty powers. Giving
1 this power TO Congress, which cannot
l make treaties, necessarily excludes it
| from the category of treaty powers.
! 1t is an organic power of sovereignty
| that no department can destroy or
modify.
| The President and the Senate can
not begin the making of an interna-
| tional agreement that they have no
| right to conclude and make obliga-
| tory on the government. If they can
not impose a duty upon the govern
ment as to fixing the ratio between
| gold and silver, they have no right
to negotiate upon the subject.
| Thus it is obvious that there is no
| power anywhere in our government
| that cannot propose AN international
| agreement with Great Britain on the
subject of coming or making money
| or regulating the value thereof, or of
| foreign coins. As an international
| agreement is what you propose, |
| think you must admit that such a
thing is impossible, because neither
the treaty making power nor Con-
gress can make such an agreement, if
| it were otherwise possible to settle its
| terms.
Congress can pass resolutions, and
bills announcing our National policy
on these subjects. We have often
done this, and we can invite European
powers to conform their policy to ours,
but such overtures could not be made
binding on any subsequent Congress
| even if they We're accepted and all
| such efforts would fail of success.
INDEPENDENT ACTION DEMANDED
/ So that we are compelled to act in
ldependently of all foreign nations on
| these subjects, If we take any action.
| And this is as it should be, for the
power to supply money TO the people
| is an inseparable part of every Na~
/ tional sovereignty. A government can
neither be sovereign or independent
| that submits or subjects its financial
| system to the control of any other
| power, whether it is done by treaty or
1 by statute inv.
| We cannot safely or honorably give
| to any European powers the right to
| fix our coinage ratio at any sum. nor
| to compel us to receive their coins as
| legal tender money, or in payment for
| custom dues. If we could really fear
| a dump" of silver upon our markets.
no better plan could be devised by
/ which this would occur.
/ Aside, however, from all questions
| as TO our powers, duties, or public
1 policy, and aside from the insuperable
difficulty of getting two or six National
| legislatures into concurrent action as
| to any definite line of international
policy, let lis admit, for the sake OF the
| argument, that your proposed inter
national agreement is fully executed.
and is for the time entirely satisfac-
tory to all the powers concerned in it.
| If, in case of war or other great ne
cessity, one or more of these nations
should see proper to break away from
the compact, the remedy or redress
OF the others for such dereliction would
be war against the delinquent power.
DEPENDENT ON BRITISH POLICY.
III that delinquent power should be
Great Britain, what would be the con-
Il -.
and where would we again commence
to re-estabish the lost ratio between
silver and gold and the other lost adj
vantages secured to the subordinate
states by her agreement? Would all
be lost? i put this question because
you VIII feel called upon to say
whether you are willing to rest the
soundness and permanency of our
financial system upon the pleasure, or
convenience or within of British policy.
as 1T may be hereafter influenced by
her aggressive movement in territorial
| and commercial dominion.
| | believe that the Southern Democ-
racy would as willingly see our great
and valuable mines of silver in the
| West sealed up, and would as willing
| iy witness the loss of 800. OOO. 900
a year in permanent wealth to
our country, as to place their
product, by agreement, under the con-
troll of Great Britain as to it's value as
l mo