The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1896-03-04
BELLIGERENT RIGHTS.
And Some of the Effects Of Grant
ing Them to Cuba.
PRESIDENTS COURSE A MATTER
OF SPECULATION.

Senator Lindsay's Call Upon the Execu.
tive and What Came of 1.-THE State
Condition of Things.-The Feeling in
Congress.-Some Individual Opinions.
Washington, Mar. 1-Senator Lindsay
of Kentucky, who has been credited with
representing in the upper house the
views of the administration on the Cuban
question, called at the State Depart
with Secretary Olney, presumably with
reference to the further proceedings in
Congress upon the Cuban resolution. 1t
is quite apparent to visitors at the White
House and State and other departments
that the officers of the administration are
seriously concerned at the prospects of
action by Congress that may lead to an
open issue between the two branches of
the government. The hope is expressed,
however, that the matter will blow over
without serious friction if undue haste in
the proceedings can be avoided
The acknowledged reluctance of the
administration even to recognize the be-
ligerency of the insurgents, much less to
go to the length of recognizing their in
dependence, is said to be based upon the
tain from the seat of trouble. The State
Department claims it has not accepted
without careful examination, and cor
roboration wherever possible, statements
coming from either the Spanish govern.
ment or from the Cuban sympathizers in
this country as to the actual state OF
affairs in the unhappy island. 1t is all
mitted on all sides that it has been ex-
ceedingly difficult to arrive at the exact
facts, and while it is realized that the
matter collected is necessarily imperfect,
still it is founded upon the best and most
impartial statements that the Depart
ment of State is able to control, namely,
the reports of the United States consular
officers in Cuba.
TENDENCY OF THE REORTS.
1t is known that the general tendency
of these reports is to the effect that the
insurgent cause is not nearly SO strong
as has been supposed in Congress, and
some officials assert that, as conditions
now exist, the administration would no
be warranted in extending recognition to
what it oan only regard as guerilla
movement The officers nf the admins
tration are generally credited with the
opinion, based Oh the facts received by
the consular reports, that If left to their
own devices the insurgents cannot prevail
against the Spanish forces in Cuba, and
consequently that Congress has been mis-
led as to the situation. 1t is said that
the President will probably take steps
to lay before the influential members of
the administration party in Congress the
facts upon which he bases his opinion
that the time is not yet ripe for the
recognition of the Cuban insurgents.
Administration people are curious to
know exactly what form congressional
action will take. A concurrent resolution
will not require the action of the e1ecu-
tive, and, it is said, will be no more
binding upon him than would similar
action on the part of one of the state lag
islative bodies. The resolution as it
passed the Senate merely expressed the
sentiments Of that body with regard to
the situation in Cuba, but was in nowise
mandatory in it's terms. 1t is held, there
fore, that it does not increase the Presi-
dents responsibilities III the matter in
asmuch as the execution of it's suggestion
are left practically to his discretion,
just as at present.
A JOIN1 OR CONCURRENT RES
OLUTION.
The adoption Of joint resolution re-
curing the action of the executive, either
ir approval or disapproval, would, how
ever, put a decidedly different and more
serious aspect on the question. While
it is stated in official circles that the
President would deprecate the necessity
for action on his part, one way or the
other, just at this time, he would un-
doubtedly approve bill recognizing the
belligerency, or even the independence
OF Cuba, more in Difference to the almost
universal demand for such action rather
than because he really believed it the
best thing to be done under existing con-
ditions. The feeling that a veto message
would only serve to postpone the recogni-
ton of the insurgents would also proba-
bly, induce executive approval. A veto
message would serve no purpose beyond
giving the Presidents counsel against
hasty or inoonsiderate action in a matter
involving the national welfare.
THE FEELING IN CONGRESS.
The sentiment in the House is as over
whelmingly in favor Of vigorous action
as in the Senate, but what opposition
there is, though weak in mum bers, is
possessed of more influence and power to
make itself felt than was the opposition
In tho Sopata Thera ic q rrnot doaI of
uncertainty as to the force of concur
rent resolution, while there is no ques-
ton at all about the Joint resolution