Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-04-17
The Presidents Cuban Program.

The more closely the Presidents program
with regard to Cuba is examined the more
Objectionable 1t Is seen to be- 1t Is Spanish
IN all of it's features, and If carried out 1t
will involve this country in very serious
trouble.
Let 1t be supposed that SPAIN yielding to
the Presidents representations, accedes to
his proposition and promises substantial
reforms for Cuba Details are submitted
to him. and these, in turn, are submitted
by him to the insurgents. The insurgents
refuse to accept them unless they are
guaranteed by this government. They
plead in justification of their refusal the
fact that Spain stands convicted Of having
violated promises of like tenor made years
ago. SPANS unsupported word, therefore,
is no longer good The President, acting
for this government. indorses Spain's pa
per, and the insurgents accept it.
Let it be supposed that the insurgents, so
influenced, have laid down their arms, and
Spanish authority Is again paramount on
the island. General Weyler, or some other
commander of his kidney, is on deck, and
the time arrives for carrying out the re-
forms agreed upon. If the Cubans feel and
have occasion to feel that there is delay,
or, if action begins promptly, that it is not
In accordance with agreement to whom are
they to complain? To Spain? That would
be useless and absurd. Spain could not be
expected to redress the very wrong she was
deliberately committing. To the United
States? What authority would this gov
eminent have on the island? What means
would We possess for the official ascertain
ment of the truth of complaints, OF for the
redressing of any wrongs? If We COM
planned to Spain in Cuba's behalf, would not
Spain be certain to reply that we were be-
ing msled by a lot of cutthroats and
malcOntents? And If We persisted would
We not get an ill-natured request to keep
hands off and let matters take their course?
1t Is plain enough, therefore, that the
Presidents program, even if accepted by
both the Spanish and the insurgents, could
not be made effective without the creation
OF sort of board of arbitration and admin
istration charged with the duty of seeing
that the promised reforms are carried into
effect. The responsibility of this govern
ment to the insurgents in such circum-
stances would be very great. With their
swords sheathed and their guns stacked
and their ponies turned out to grass Trey
would be completely at the mercy of their
late opponents unless the strong power
which had induced them to stop fighting
were in position and willing to see them
creation of such a board? And If she
should, would not there be constant danger
OF the embodiment of the two powers grow
ing out of the operations of so delicate a
piece of machinery?
There is still another point. Mr.. Cleve-
land is not in sympathy with public senti-
ment on the subject of Cuba. His term as
President is drawing to a close But the
term of the government will go on. There
Is every reason to believe that the next
Congress. If the matter is not previously
settled. will fully agree with the present
Congress about Cuba Why then should
Mr.. Cleveland move in the premises at all
except by the chart that the people have
marked out? Why embarrass them and his
successor In office by course which they
will be certain to repudiate IL he tries to
commit them to it2 There is every assur-
ance, indeed, that the next President, in
structed by Mr.. CIeveland's career, will
lind his greatest usefulness and highest
pleasure IN representing the people; and
not In hectortng them lecturing Them and
trying to balk them.