The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-03-18
EFT, who was to command the charge.
to the crest of Seminary Ridge, pointed

TO the CrCSC OF CeHlluaTy nluSc, puluGeu
out the direction to be taken and the
point to be assaulted, that he could
see the desperate and hopeless nature
of the charge and the cruel slaughter
it would cause; that his objections to
Pickett's battle had been overruled,
and that the day was one OF the sad
dest of his life, for he foresaw what
his men would meet, and would gladly
have given up his position rather than
share the responsibility of the day.
Lee, on the contrary, was impatiently
waiting to see Longstreet' corps, and
one-half or all Of Hills, break with
the force of q tempest through the
hostile lines. He only wanted the
muskets numerous to plant victory
upon his standards.
MAGNIFICENT, BUT NOT WAR.
Colonel E. P. Alexander, the COM
mander of a battalion Of artillery of a
division of the 1st corps, wa directed
by Longstreet to station himself at a
point where he could observe the
effects Of the great cannouade that
was to prepare the way for the assault.
A note from Longstreet told him that
if the artillery fire did not drive off
the enemy or demoralize him he would
prefer he should not advise Pickett
to make the charge but that he ex-
pected him to let Pickett know when
the moment arrived. That the respon-
sibility and fate of a great battle
should be passed wei to a lieutenant
colonel is, and always will be, a sub.
ject Of grave comment. When the
Federal fire ceased and some of his
guns limbered up, Alexander wrote
Pickett: For Gods sake, come quick.
Pickett asked Longstreet if the time
for his advance had come and the lat
ter bowed his head. He could not
speak assent. Nine small brigades of
infantry sprang to the attack, while
the divisions Of Hood and McLaws,
one-half of Hills and the whole Of
Ewell's, stood fixed in their positions,
while their comrades swept up the
hill. All the world knows the magni-
Gcent, yet awful, story of the annihi-
lation of Pickett's division and Of the
supporting columns. Lee was bitterly
disappointed at the days result. He
had confidently expected to burl at
least one-half of his army upon the
enemy, cut him in two and wheel upon
the broken wings. He was playing
for big stakes and a decisive victory
which would bring in its train peace
to the people and success to his cause.
"Longstreet has a great deal to say
about this assault. He writes that he
objected to the plan that the enemy's
left centre should be attacked by a
column composed of McLaws's and
Hood divisions, reinforced by Pick.
ett's brigades. I thought it would
not do, that the point had been fully
tested the day before by more and
fresher men; that the divisions Of
McLaws and Hood were holding mile
along the right of my line against TO-
900 men, who would follow their with
drawal, strike the flank of the assault
ing column and crush it; but the COL
umn as proposed was too small, etc.,
etc. Longstreet goes on to say that
after Lee had heard his objections he
changed his mind and then concluded
that the divisions of Hood and Nc
Laws could remain on the defensive
line; that he would reinforce by divis-
ions of the Sd corps and Pickett's
brigades, and stated the point to
which the march should be directed.
NOW. the extreme right vas com
paratively safe and Hood and McLaws
could have been moved out Of the
lines to take part in the attack. That
Lee expected to see these divisions in
the attacking column, but that Long
street, acting upon his own response
billty and his own line of action, held
them out because he believed his idea
better than that of the commander.
these things seem to me proven by
unimpeachable evidence. | do not
know where Longstreet got this infor.
nation that Lee decided to leave these
divisions in the line of defence. ]
have never been able to discover the
source.
LEE IS MIsREpREsENTED.
1T might be worth while to notice
the quotations made by Longstreet
from letters written by General Lee.
In a letter from Colonel Goree, of
Texas, the writer is quoted IS having
heard Lee say that If he had per.
mitted you (Longstreet) to carry out
your plan instead of makingth attack
on Cemetery Hill he would have been
successful Now, this sentence has
been quoted without giving its con-
n~ection in the letter, which entirely
changes it's meaning. Colonel Taylor
and 1 have repeatedly challenged Gen
eral Longstreet to produce the remain-
der of hal letter, but he has never
allowed us to see it.
"a SINH r. remark which Longstreet
makes use Of as having been made by
General Lee is: sOh, General, had
but followed your advice instead of
pursuing the course that I did, how
different all would have BEEN | do
not believe that General Lee ever said
this nor do any Of his friends. 1t ie
true that with the wonderful magnani-
nifty which Lee 80 fully possessed he
took all the responsibility on his own
broad shoulders and some of it must
be put there. First, the discretion
allowed which separated him from his
cavalry; second, the omission of posi-.
tive orders to Ewell to advance on the
evening Of the 1st and the failure to
replace an officer who opposed his
plans with one who would have enter
ed into them heartily and readily CO.
operated with him to whip the enemy
in detail"
Some men are as unsatisfactory
as a soapy door-knob and twice as
slippery.
Some idea of the terrors of a
bursting volcano may be gained from
the account of the last eruption in
Hawaii. The crater of the volcano
was filled from 600 to 1000 feet deep
with molten lava, which finally forced
its way through a subterranean pas
-. r. -,c An no;1oo Prom tboro IN