The record-union., 1896-02-26


primary election law is unconstitu-
fional.
The opinion was rendered in the case
Of Marsh against the Supervisors of
Los Angeles County.
The opinion, a short one, is as follows:
..This is a suit by taxpayer to enjoin
the defendants from appropriating pub
lie funds of the county for the purchase
Of ballot boxes and the payment OF
other expenses involved in carrying out
the provisions of the Act of March u,
1895. commonly known as the primary
election law. The claim of the plaintiff
is that the Act is local and special, and
therefore unconstitutional and void.
This contention was sustained by the
Superior Court of Los Angeles, and the
in1unction granted. Appellants appeal
from the judgment.
There can be no question that the
Act is local and special since, by its
terms, it is to apply to. take effect in.
and be in force only in counties of the
first and second classes, that is to say,
San Francisco and Los Angeles.
1.-The Constitution allows the classifi-
cation of counties according to popula-
tion for the purpose of regulating the
compensation of county officers in pro-
portion to their duties, and for that pur-
pose a classification has been estab-
lished under which San Francisco fails
into the first class and Los Angeles falls
into the second class. But the fact that
these and the other counties of the
State have been classified for purpose
which the Constitution recognizes as a
proper and necessary one does not re-
aieve a law relating to other and distinct
matters from the objection that it is
local and special if by it's terms it is
limited in its application or operation to
one or more classes of counties less
than the whole This Act therefore,
not being regulation Of the compensa-
tion of county officers, is local and spec
ial, Notwithstanding it embraces two
counties, each of which constitutes one
of the classes defined by the County
Government Act, and the only question
TO be determined is whether or not the
subject Of the Act is one of those as to
which special and local legislation is in
hibited by the Constitution.
''The Act is intended to regulate pri-
mary elections. e., the election of del
egates to nominating conventions, and
rot only in its general scope and nature,
but by various specific provisions, is
made an essential part of the general
election law of the State. By Section
p, for example, it is provided that no
candidate can have his name printed
upon any ballot as q candidate for pub
lie office at a general election in this
State unless he shall have been nomi-
mated by q convention composed of dele
gates chosen as in the Act provided, or
nominated by a certain percentage of
electors, as in the Political Code pre-
scribed. The entire Act presents an
elaborate scheme for the conduct of the
primary elections by sworn. officers,
whose certificates of election will con-
stitute the credentials of the delegates
to the various political conventions,
State district and local. Not only is it
a general law which should have a uni
form operation, and not only is the case
to which it applies one in which gem
eral law could be made applicable, but
from an inspection CT it's terms it clearly
appears that it was designed originally
to apply uniformly throughout the
State. This is shown by various ex-
presSions scattered throughout its first
twenty-four sections, in which the orig
4nal scheme of the law is embodied.
Section 25 which is in some respects
incongruous with other portions of the
Act, seems to have been a later addi-
tion- 1t provides for the election in
Presidential years of delegates to a
State convention to choose delegates to
a national convention, and by a proviso
as made obligatory only in counties
which cast 5000 votes and upward at
the last preceding general election.
But by Section % this proviso is su-
perseded by the provision limiting the
application and operation of the Act to
counties of the first and second class.
But for these two sections we should
have a law complete and full, capable
of applying and intended to apply in
every part of the State. It is not a
matter for argument or speculation,
therefore, whether this is a case in
which the general law could be made
applicable. This Act, by it's terms,
shows that such is the case, and if it
did not it is apparent that law regu-
lating the election of public officers by
prescribing the exclusive means by
which candidates of the great political
parties can secure a place on the official
ballot is necessarily law of a general
nature and capable of uniform opera
ton.
1.-THE Act is therefore unconstitutional
by reason of its conflict with Section II
of Article L, and Subdivision 33 of Sec
tion % of Article ". of the Constitu-
tion. It is also in conflict with the more
specific provisions of Subdivision IL of
Section p, Article ", prohibiting local
or special laws for conducting elections.
Counsel for appellants have made no
answer to these objections to the valid
ity of the Act, and we know OF none
which can be made. An amicus curiae
makes an urgent appeal in behalf of the
law on the ground that it is a good law
designed to prevent and capable of
preventing evils of great and increasing
magnitude, but he does not deny that
Section 70 makes it unconstitutional if
1t IS allowed to stand. He suggests.
however, that we should hold that sec
ton void Che would have to include Sec
ton p also). and the Act valid through
out the State. If we should do so we
would be imposing upon the whole State
a law which it is clear the Legislature
intended to apply only in two counties.
and which would not otherwise have
been passed. This we cannot do. as it
would be nothing short of legislation.
IF the Act is as beneficent as is
claimed, it is tc be regretted that it
cannot stand but as Ire have more than
once been compelled 70 remind the de-
tenders of special and local laws, we
cannot have the advantage or such
legislation when it is gooc under Con-
stitution which sternly prohibits it upon
the assumption that it is generally bad
a.