The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-01-08

adopted the slow and sure means of
success. And he was right. He had
slowly but thoroughly learned his
trade.
When we turn to General Lee every
thing is different. He had no chance
to serve an apprenticeship, like Grant,
in the subordinate grades, but began
as full General. From his first great
battle to his last-from the beginning
of the war to the end-always con-
fronted by an army numbering three
to his two, and sometimes nearer two
to one-a single decisive defeat meant
the loss of Richmond and destruction
to his Government. Under similar
responsibilities all Generals except
Frederick and Napoleon have been
prudent and cautious, but Lee could
never afford to be cautious. In his
first battle ("seven days" in front Of
Richmond), with odds of II to 9 against
him, leaving one-third of his forces to
cover Richmond, with two-thirds he
marched across an unfordable river,
around McClelland's right flank, broke
the line of provision supplies, and by
this daring strategy alone defeated
the enemy. I say in strategy alone,
for in the actual fighting Lees losses
exceeded McClelland's, and the Fed
erals held their positions in every
battle except the second at Gaines
Mill.
Then Lee fell back to Richmond,
leaving one division of about $4,000
men to watch McClelland's 10000,
when Pope, with a new army occupied
Culpepper, point in the opposite
direction from McClelland's position.
Reasoning that the fear Of losing
Washington was sufficient protection
for Richmond, Lee marched after
Pope, who, with odds in his favor of
about 4 to 3, retreated behind the
Rappahannock. A delay Of two weeks
would have given Pope three to one,
but Lee did not delay. Like Grant,
be placed low estimate upon his op-
ponent's ability, and almost contempt
uously sent Stonewall Jackson around
by Manassas Gap, to Pope's rear, ex.
posing three men to the attack Of
eight. Holding Pope on the Kappa
hammock by a noisy demonstration
with Longstreet's corps until Stone
wall got "a hours start, we have the
strange position of $4,000 men sur
rounding $4,000, the lesser number
divided into two massess, one days
march apart, and a mountain gap be-
tween, which could be land was) occu-
pied by the enemy. The methodic,
selfish General, who wants a "sure
thing in war, prefers being beaten
according to regular rules to taking
such chances. But the born genius
foresees what his opponent will do in
an unforeseen emergency and moves
with confidence. Pope, with his con-
founded masses, made rush for Ma
masses, where Stonewall stood them
off for one day, until Lee could arrive.
Lee then placed Longstreet's corps in
such a position that the battle Of
Second Manassas was won before the
opening gun was fired. When Pope,
at last concentrated, again attacked
Stonewall, Longstreet's 8 batteries en-.
fladed the attacking Federals, Long
streets infantry charged and repulsed
Pope's left flank, and the battle was
won.
Of course, we can charge up all lost
batteries to the imbecility Of the los
ing General. But what causes the
brain power Of an educated profession
al soldier to stampede but the skill Of
his opponent? Had Pope been attack
ed according to the rules of war, as he
understood. those rules, he would not
have lost his mental balance and his
campaign.
The next move into Maryland and
the battle Of Antietam offers little of
a strategical or tactical nature for
comment. It only shows Lees hardi
hood in refusing to retreat without
battle and in defensively engaging
more than double his own forces in
that stubborn contest. The offensive
campaign failed, and the capture Of
II 100 Federal prisoners at Harper'a
Ferry, while making the enemies far
greater than his own, did not compen
safe, for their losses could be easily
replaced, while Lee 8 could not. An
tietam was drawn battle, but was
strategically defeat for the Confed
crates. I fear we must score one error
against Lee.
But Lees maneuvering during the
next three months sealed book to
the general public-was little short of
marvellous. When he fell back from
the Antietam field his army was actu
ally reduced by losses in battle, star
vation and struggling to about Is 900
men. Yet he boldly confronted Nc
Clellan with over 100000 men just
across the Potomac, and seemed anx-
ious for fight, even sending Stuart
with his cavalry on raid clear around
Mcclellan. Lee so thoroughly bluffed
the Federal commander that when the
latter finally advanced he entered Vir
ginia east of the Blue Ridge, using
those mountains to protect his right
from Lee with only half his own mem
bers. Then was exhibited daring
strategy which was almost comical.
Lees sick and stragglers had returned.
increasing his force to $4,000, equally
divided into the two corps Of Jackson
and Longtreet, while Mcclellan had
120, 900. When the Federals moved
south along the eastern slope of the
mountains Lee moved south along the
western slope, leaving Jackson behind
near Front Royal, and with Long
streets 10000 crossed the mountains
into Culpepper and confronted his
enemy. Here was another strange
military spectacle. An army 10000
strong divided into two corps 60 miles
apart, with a mountain range inter
vening, actually threatening the front
and right flank of an army of 120, 900,
fully concentrated and commanded by
a professional soldier of experience,
who knew all the art of war which
could be learned from books. When
Mcclellan seemed ready to advance
against Longstreet, Jackson sent
IL