New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1896-03-01

numerous than the new ones when rise ai'er
every fight. What a gigantic battie at 81" NC
tween we-matched fleets manned by europeans
or Americans will be like Is only dimi! ioie
Swallowed by LISA and Haiyang But MT. VIII
son trie, 10 peer into the future and to this ef-
fort his whole narrative. beginning with the
French armored floating batteries used In the
Crimean War. contributes
Almost the first thing that the war in the
Black Sea did for naval science was 10 sho"
that wooden ships were unequal to the shells
and shell guns which had by that time been IN
vented. 1t takes an effort now TO realize that
these guns were smoothbores. but In the hands
Of Russian sailors they sufiiced to destroy a
fleet of thirteen Turkish vessels in less time
than 1t takes to tell the story Only one ship
escaped This affair Of Sinope-a massacre
rather than a battle-put reality into the dreams
of those who had begun TO that warships
must soon become something different from
what they were One Of these was THE Dream
er Of Ham" Napoleon III had experimental
with armor-pates, and his most startling con-
tribution to the war in the East consisted OF
five ironclads. The metal plates were thin, but
these were laid on heavy oak deck, ana the
result was surface which proved impenetraple
for Russian artillery though the new ships
were easy targets at a distance of only 500
yards 1t was shown that men could fight on
shipboard with artificial ventilation and that
comparatively slight protection enabled them
to fight on even terms with an enemy In
trenched on land. But these batteries were in
capable of evolution. They were fought at
anchor
The next step in the development Of the
modern warship was taken in America. 1t was
only after trial that masts and sails were
stripped from the Crimean ironcads. The
Americans began by trusting entirely to steam.
They aimed to create fighting machines that
would be under the control Of the brain within
them Mr.. Wilson dwells infinitely on the de-
tails Of the building and the fighting of the
Merrmac and the Monitor. which. hastily built
as they were. remained the types Of armored
ships throughout the Civil War. He does not
neglect the horror and anxiety which gave
tragic grandeur to two Of the ugliest structures
that ever noated. But he indicates his belief
that the fears caused by the Merrinac and the
hopes raised by the Monitor were only partially
justified The Merrimac could never have ven
tured TO sea- but the Monitor did her less harm
than was supposed at the time. What was
proved beyond all future question was that
the old wooden ine-of-batte ship was worth
less in comparison with even the rudest armored
vessel The lesson Of Sinope received tenfold
additional force from the desparing heroism or
Hampton Roads In the Monitor 1t was shown
that fighting machine infinitely more efii-
cient than a massive seventy-four might De
smaller than a yacht. What the battle-ship
would be at the close Of the century was not
even guessed. But with the Monitor came the
gun turret. to stay vessels as unlike 1t as
were those II displaced.
Meanwhile Farragut, whom Mr.. Wilson COM
pares to Blake and describes as the greatest
naval warrior since the time of Nelson, laid to
/ rest a fear which had troubled naval experts
for several generations. Could ships-wooden
or unarmored ships. Of course-pass hostile
forts at short range? Mr.. Wilson only ac-
knowledges the existence Of the American naval
historian, Maclay. one occasion, and then
with tinge Of resentment But he certainly
takes his view Of Farraguts exploit at New
Orleans from Maclay. When Farragut proposed
TO pass up the Mississippi between Fort JACK
son and Fort st. Philip. he was confronted In
the council Of war with the tradition that
such things were impossible. Mr. Maclay, ana
after him Mr. Wilson, mentions the fact that
Washington tried to have the French SHIPS
ascend the York River in defiance OF Corn
wallis's batteries. and was siienoed with the
same tradition. There ,s room for the suspicion
that both Mr. Maclay and Mr.. Wilson are wrong
in allowing even tacitly that this was a uni'
versal naval tradition. 1t is allied with the
common military opinion of the seventeenth
century that no army could afford to leave an
uncantured fortress anywhere on its march
But neither American nor British sailors had
accepted 1t In old times. and it figures IN Nei.
sons career only as something which he could
count on a French commander being supersti-
tious about.
The tradition did not cause Farragut 10
hesitate for a moment. He urnerved the
enemy's garrisons with previous lombard
ment-that according to Mr.. Wilson. being all
that he expected from mortar batteries-and
then made his way up the Mississippi against
a strong current and in spite, of booms and
hostile shipping. What was left Of the tradi'
ton was efYectually disposed OF by his entrance
10 Mobile Bay past Notifications far more Elf
GENTLY defended than were those at New-Or'