The San Francisco call., 1896-03-08
THE POWERS
Of 4 JUDGE,
Decision Of the Supreme
Court in People Against
Knutte.
THE THIRTEENTH JUROR
Carroll Cook Says It Works Only
in the Interests of the
Defendant.
DISCUSSED BY TEE LAWYERS.
Great Interest of the Legal Profession
in Justice Van Fleets
Opinion.

Wherever two or more San Francisco
LAWYERS met yesterday, whether in the
nearly deserted courtrooms, at luncheon,
ct the Bar Association, or the club, II the
conversation became at all general 1t
touched upon the decision OF Justice Van
Fleet in the case of the people against
Christian Knutte as reported in The CALL.
And usually it more than touched"
upon this topic; it discussed quite thor
oughIy and often at considerable length
the merits or dement's OF the decision. AS
q rule LAWYERS whose briefs are mostly in
criminal cases upheld the decision and de-
clared that it was not only the iteration of
q well-recognized principle, but the laud-
able emphasizing of just one,
Lawyers whose practice is largely in the
civil courts took the opposite view. In
Justice Van Fleets opinion (concurred in
by Justices Harrison and Garouttel they
saw the alarming emphasis of principle
which, they claim, gives the presiding
Judge entirely too great discretion over
matters OF fact.
The criminal lawyers pointed out that
a defendant could never be the one to suf-
fer under the strictest construction of the
rule which constitutes the judge the
thirteenth Juror, because this discretion of
the trial court can only be exercised in re-
gard to the jury's verdict and then only in
case the verdict finds the defendant guilty;
never in case of an acouittal. The civil
lawyers, however, declare that the grow
ing tendency, as e1empliied in this opin-
ion, to make the court arbiter of the facts
as well as the law, not only makes the
Judge the thirteenth juror but constitutes
linn the sole juror-in fact, renders useless
the functions OF Jury.
The civil lawyers, as rule, cite that
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure
which declares "All questions of fact,
when the trial is by jury, are to
be decided by the jury, and all evidence
thereon is to be addressed to them"
But what becomes OF the iury's right and
duty 10 decide the fact when, as Justice
Van Fleet says, the Judge "ought to be
satisfied that the evidence as whole was
sufficient to sustain the verdict"
''In my opinion these words constitute
the Judge the sole Juror in the case said
Attorney Joseph Leggett, in discussing the
opinion. "1f this Is TO be the practice OF
what possible service can the jury be in
civil case? | believe It TO be contrary to
the spirit and letter OF the constitution,
which sedulously forbids the Judge to even
intimate 10 the jury that he has an opin-
ion one way or the other concerning the
facts.
1T certainly does amount to an infringe
ment upon the system OF jury trials in
civil cases." said Henry E. Highton. ''If
q Judge is to decide the evidence, the fact
as well as the law, why have a jury at all?
Certainly, in that case the jury is a useless
inCum bran c."
The rule seems to be immensely broad
ened by these words of Justice Van Fleet"
said Attorney James L. Gallagher ii be-
lieve there is great danger to the Jury sys-
tenn in this view of the functions and duties
OF trial Judge"
The decision which caused all this inter-
est and discussion is here given verbatim,
as reprinted from the typewriter copy
now in the hands of the publishers of
California Decisions" 1t reads as fol-
lows:
Filed March 6, 1896.
DEPARTMENT 1.
PEOPLE (APPELLANT) vs.. CHRISTIAN KNUTTE
(RESPoNDENT).
Criminal, No 63.
Respondent was tried for the offense of OBJ
tanning money and property by false pre-
lenses. AT the conclusion OF the evidence in
chief for the prosecution the court advised the
jury TO acQuit, for the reason that, in the
judgment o. the court, the case had not been
established; and the case was then submitted
10 the jury, upon the instructions OF the court,
without evidence on behalf of the defendant
or argument OF counsel The jury, notwith-
standing the advice OF the court, found the de-
feudant guilty, and thereupon the court, OF its
own motion, made an order setting aside the
verdict and granting the defendant new
trial.
From this order the people prosecute this ap-
peal, the sole point made being that the action
OF the court was an abuse OF its discretion.
The case is argued here by both parties uIon
the assumption that the new trial was granted
upon the ground that the evidence was
deemed insu thcient to sustain the verdict;
vr0 sod md 3cc I'D ft,a
order OF the court, it may be safely taken,
from the courts action in advising the jury to
acqult, that this assumption OF counsel is cor
rect 1t mas been so repeatedly held here
TO become automatic that where new trial is
granted on this ground, or where il is one of
various grounds upon which the trial court
may have based the order, its action will not
be disturbed except in case showing man
liest and unmistakable abuse OF discretion.
ms discretion Is OF course, not arbitrary,
but, like many otner judicial functions is to
be exercised under the sanction of the Judi
cial oath; and the strong presumption being
always that II was SO exercised 1t will
require in any case very clear showing TO the
contrary to overcome such pres sumption and
enable US 10 say that the power OF the court in
that respect was abused. While ii is the ex-
cluslNe province OF the jury to find the facts,
II Is, nevertheless, one OF the most important
requirements OF the trial Judge to see to il that
thls junction OF the jury is lntelligently and
justly exercised. In this respect, while he
cannot competently interfere with or control
the jury IN passing upon the evidence, he,
nevertheless, exercises @ very selutary SUPER
visory power over the verdict. In the exercise
OF that power he should always satisfy
himself that the evidence as a whole
is sufficient to sustain the verdict found
and If in his sound judgment it does
not, he should unhesitatingIy say so
and set the verdict aside. (People VS.
Lurh Yit, SO Cal. 1909
II can, of course make no difference in the
exercise OF this power by the court that the
evidence in the case was wholly that OF the
prosecution and stands, in the sense at least
that 1t is not controYerted by evidence on be-
half OF defendant, without conflict. The same
duty rests upon the Judge in such q case as
where the evidence is conflicting to satisfy
himielf that guilt has been established: and
Notwithstanding the evidence may be all one
way, he is not required TO believe it. "a
court may reject the most positive tes-
timony, though the witness be not dis
credited by direct testimony impeach-
ing him contradfctinS his statement.
The inherent improbability OF statement may
deny it all claims 10 belief." (Blankman VS..
Vallejo, 10 Cal. 6SS, 645) The Judge has the
witnesses before him, and, as suggested in
People VS.. Lum Yit, supra, "an equal oppor-
tunity with the jury to observe the manner of
witnesses, the character of their testimony and
10 judge of their credibility and to discover
their motives; he, too, ought to be salts
ned that the evidence whole was
sufficient to sustain the verdict: IL he
was not. IL was not only the proper exercise OF