The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-09-29
Facts Which Prove that 1t Would Be
u Serious Undertaking.

H. w. Wilson, in London Mail.
Let us now turn to the Dardanelles,
which people talk so complacently of fore
ing. Here we have long, tortuous and
narrow passage of some fifty miles from
the Mediterranean to the Sea of Marmora,
swept by strong current. The average
width of the straits is only two miles, whilst
at the narrowest point the channel is only
one thousand yards broad. On either side
the ground is the most favorable for forts
the most unfavorabIe for ships as the forts
being placed high direct plunging
or downward fire against the decks of
ships, whilst ships will find it difficult Ito
reach the forts at all with their guns. 1t
is well known that ironclads-or, indeed,
modern vessels of any type-are peculiarly
susceptible to plunging fire, against which
the thin armor of their decks cannot pro-
tect them satisfactorily.
In 1878 Horribly, when he led his squadron
up the narrows, found that scarcely a gun
in his fleet could be trained upon the Turk
ish batteries on the cliffs. He had, how
ever. no occasion to fire a shot, as the
Turks, then in alliance with us, did not
oppose our passage.
1t would be different matter to-day
The Dardaneles forts are described bv
Rogalia Won Bierbersten in 1891 as follows:
AT the very entrance to the straits where
the width is about two and one-quarter
miles, are Forts Sedil- Bahr-Kelessi with
sixty guns and ten mortars, and Kun
kelessi, with thirty-six guns and twelve
mortars. To these mast be added two
strong earthWorks, each mounting sixteen
guns, which gives total of 166 heavy guns.
In war every kind of mine and torpedo
would supplement the terrific cross-fre of
up, at the narrowest point, where the cur
rent is swiftest where the fairway is rem
dered hard of passage by shoals and where
the cliffs on either side rise high is a. sec
ond tremendous group of works, mounting
between them no fewer than $40 guns and
forty-eight mortars, distributed in nineteen
forts or earthworks, many of which are
strongly constructed, in accordance with
the progress of military art The guns are,
many of them, of large caliber; even in
1878 there was a fffty-ton Krupp. Here again
the defense would have the assistance OF
mine fields and all manner of torpedoes
and can enflade the fairWay with gun ire
The ships must come into action singly-
moving IN line ahead-the only possible
order, and can then only direct a feeble fire
upon their assailants. They cannot move
at all till, by the tedious and Wearisome
process of creeping or sweeping thew
have cleared the fairway of mines. Any
damage to steering gear or propellers in
do not doubt that the British fleet would
force its way up, although 1 doubt whether
there is any other navy in the world which
would attempt so desperate an undertake
ing. Of this [ am sure, that our sailors ,
would not enter the Sea of Marmora with
out very heavy loss both in men and ma
teriaL The Turks, fighting behind earth
works, are by no means contemplate en-
emies. as they proved to Sir John Duck
worth in 1907 Our ships would have to
undergo one battering from the first series
Of forts, after clearing away the mines.
They would then have to undergo a worse
q the narrows.
Surprising all went well. and no ships
We're lost in the mine fields or disabled bv
the Turkish torpedo craft, which prob
enter the Sea of Marmora having sus-
tanned a good deal of damage and fired
much precious ammunition away. Behind
1t are still the Turkish forts which it
must repass on its return. 1t is cut off from
all communication with England, in hostile
waters. unable to procure coal. Against
Constantinople it can do less than nothing
Sir John Duckworth threatened a. bonn
barGment in 1S0I-wnen Russia was on our
side-and found that humanity, political
and last. but not least the
very uselessness of such a measure for |
babe it. He had to retreat for he had no
army tc overawe the Sultan's land forces
On his way down most of his ships We're
roughly handled and he lost twenty-nine
killed and 13S wounded in the narrows
The lesson is one which we might note
on the whole l should conclude that the |
passage of the Dardaneles is only possible |
to strongly armored ships, and that per-
hapS by night alone. The dispatch of an |
army corps up the straits is impossible till |
the forts have been reduced. and Turkey |
1isposes Of at the lowest estimate. 200 900 |
armed men. who. if we attacked the Sultan
will. whatever his sins. defend him with |
Ottoman obstinacy to the last.
But [ think / have made it c1ear that an |
attack upon Constantinople. we stand
now. is an absurd dream and would involve |
a useless sacrifice of life.
villages Looted and burned.