Bridgeton pioneer., 1896-12-10
isfy all possible longings for territory. pre-.

lSIy aI possible lOnglngS TOT territory, pre-
clude all dreams of conquest and prevent
! any casting of covetous eyes upon neigh
boring regions, however attractive. That
our conduct toward Spain and her domin.
ions has constituted no exception to this
national disposition is made manifest by
the course Of our government not only
thus far during the present insurrection,
but during the ten years that followed the
rising at Yara in 1868. No other great
power, it may safely be said under cir
cumstances of similar perplexity, would
have manifested the same restraint and
the same patient endurance. 1t may also
be said that this persistent attitude of the
United States toward Spaia 4 in connection
with Cuba unquestionaby evinces no
slight respect and regard for Spain on the
part of the American people. They in
truth do not forget her connection with the
discovery of the western hemisphere, nor
do they underestimate the great qualities
of the Spanish people nor fail to fully rec
ognize their splendid patriotism and their
chivalrous devotion to the national honor
They view with wonder and admiration
the cheerful resolution with which vast
bodies of men are sent across thousands OF
miles of ocean and an enormous debt ac
cumulated that the costly possession of
the 'Gem of the Antilles may still hold
it's place in the Spanish crown. And yet
neither the government nor the people of
the United States have shut their eyes to
the course of events in Cuba or have failed
to realize the existence of conceded griev-
ances, which have led to the present revolt
from the authority of Spain-grievances
recognized by the queen regent and by the
cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and en-
ightened of Spanish statesmen without
regard to party and demonstrated by re-
forms proposed by the executive and ap-
proved by the legislative branch of the
Spanish government. 1t is in the assumed
temper and disposition of the Spanish
government to remedy these grievances,
fortified by indications of influential pub
lie opinion in Spain, that this government
has hoped to discover the most promising
and effective means Of composing the pres
ent strife with honor and advantage to
Spain and with the achievement of all the
reasonable objects of the insurrection.
The Autonomy of Cuba.
1t would seem that if Spain should offer
to Cuba genuine autonomy-a measure of
home rule which, while preserving the SOW
ereignty of Spain, would satisfy all ration
al requirements of her Spanish subjects
there should be no just reason why the
pacification of the island might not be
effected on that basis. Such result would
appear to be in the true interest of all con-
cerned. 1t would at once stop the conflict
which is now consuming the resources of
the island and making it worthless for
whichever party may ultimately prevail.
1t would keep intact the possessions of
Spain without touching her honor, which
IOo
the adequate redress of admitted griev-
ances. 1t would put the prosperity of the
island and the fortunes of Its inhabitants
within their own control without severing
the natural and ancient ties which bind
them to the mother country and would yet
enable them to test their capacity for self
government under the most favorable con-
ditions. 1t has been objected on the one
side that Spain should not promise auton-
omy until her insurgent subjects lay down
| their arms; on the other side, that promised
| autonomy, however liberal, is insufficient
because without assurance of the promise
| being fulfilled.
But the reasOnableness Of requirement
| by Spain of unconditional surrender on
| the part of the insurgent Cubans before
| their autonomy is conceded is not alto
| gether apparent. 1t ignores important
features of the situation-the stability two
years duration has given to the insurrec-
tion; the feasibility of it's indefinite pro-
| longation in the nature of things and as
| shown by past experiences; the utter and
| imminent ruin of the island unless the
present strife is speedily composed; above
| all, the rank abuses which all parties in
| Spain, all branches of her government and
| all her leading public men concede to exist
| and profess a desire to remove. Facing
| such circumstances, to withhold the proffer
| of needed reforms until the parties demand
| ing them put themselves at mercy by
| throwing down their arms has the appear
| ance of neglecting the gravest of perils and
inviting suspicion as to the sincerity of
any professed willingness to grant reforms.
| The objection on behalf of the insurgents
that promised reforms cannot be relied
| upon - must, of course, be considered
| though we have no right to assume and no
| reason for assuming that anything Spain
| undertakes to do for the relief Of Cuba will
| not be done according to both the spirit
and the letter of the undertaking
A Gentle Hint to Spain.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious
| and precautions on the part of the weaker
of two combatants are always natural and
not always being sincerely
desirous in the interest of both as well as
| on its own account that the Cuban problem
should be solved with the least possible de-
lay-it was intimated by this government
to the government of Spain some months
ago that, if a satisfactory measure of home
| rule were rendered the Cuban insurgents
and would be accepted by them upon a
guarantee of its execution the United
States would endeavor to find way not
Objectionable to Spain Of furnishing such
guarantee. While no definite response to
this intimation has yet been received from
the Spanish government, it is believed to be
not altogether unwelcome, while, as al
ready suggested, no reason is perceived
why it should not be approved by the in
surgents. Neither party can fail to see the
| Importance of early action, and both must
realize that to prolong the present state of
| things for even short period will add