New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1896-03-08

4 CONSISTENT VIEW OF THE SWEDISH
HERO.

Empire iGss-l7i9 by r. Nsbet Balm Pr. XVIII.
go -. T. Putnam's Sons. Nieroes OF the Ma
tlons)
Mr.. Balm makes out n better case for Charles
XII than nome other historians are willing to al
low It Is possible simply the mere state
ment OF facts. to raise most divergent theories
as to the character OF this King-to view him
a crazy royal Knght-errant. crowned Don
Qulxote: or az n military expert who could not
live without war: or as really n man % the high
est capacity both for and for civil affairs.
but fettered By the condition OF the times. There
have been those who looked for taint OF in
sanity In the Vasa blood, and fancied that they
found proofs OF this even in the self-contained
and almost uniformly victorious Gustavus Adolf
plus once assumed as proved, OF course this
alleged mental oblq iity might serve to account
FOR every mystery In the acts and character OF
Charles. But the solution is too easy.
1t is also too easy an explanation to say that
Charles made simply for the pleasure which
he took In H. This the spirit of the old
knights Grant The last OF the great Swedish
Kings would have been more than human II
he had failed to take pleasure In a science OF
which he was master. But this will not ac-
count for a wide-reaching political plan that
seemed for many years on the point OF being
realized On the other hand. the opinion that
Charles was wholly In his right mind is weak
.ened by his conduct in Turkey. and by the final
course OF obstinacy which ended In his death
There Is only this 10 say. that man, above
all n King. may be far from mad in counting
his own death when ne sees, that all the objects
he had In life must be given up
Mr.. Bain's biography aims to show that down
10 the residence In Turkey the plans or Charles
were necessary to Swedish policy. II Sweden
was TO retain control of the Baltic Sea and of
its possessions I'm what now territories or
Russia and Germany. From the Swedish point
OF view at that time, with the hopes and aims
Of Gustavus Adolphus In mind. 1t was not at
nil unreasonable to covet the whole littoral OF
the Baltic, or as much OF 1t as would make
Sweden supreme In the North. 1t happened.
however, that Swedish wishes In this matter
were directly in conflict with those OF Russia.
Denmark and he nascent Prussia. Charles
worsted all these opponents In fair fight. and
I'm the earlier moves OF his diplomacy. But he
had no SOME. Gct his feet on firm ground south
Of the Baltic than he found himself on the
verge o. that 'atal political quicksand, the
Poland OF his day. Poland has vague outlines
as a country. but 1. never had. even In its best
days, anything like national consistency. Any
other Swedish King. with the traditions and
ideas OF Charles. would have had to plunge as
he did into Polish politics As an offset to Rus
sian power Poland must be preserved and It
must be under the rule OF a King bound to
Sweden All the delays OF Charles In Central
Europe and the final disasters which drove him
to take refuge In Turkey. were due to the in
stability OF Poland. Charless first great dis
appointment and failure were due. not to any
defect IL himself. but to fate. which forced
upon him task that was impossible.
The criticism upon him for his long sojourn In
Turkey Is met In the same way. The only ma
lions In Europe to which the advance Of Russia
was q menace at that time were Sweden and
Turkey. 1t was impossible for them to work
together. except under just such conditions as
had now been brought about. Charles saw the
vulnerable points OF Russia on the Turkish Side
lie easily worked out plans for war. But the in
decision OF the Porte was as hopeless as the dis
union OF Poland. Turkish military leaders were
corrupt and incompetent. Armies were defeated
which Charles himself and man of his time