The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1896-03-24

WASHINGTON, March pa decis-
ion was rendered by the supreme court
of the United States in the case of
Theodore F. Brown, involving the right
of a. court to compel answer by a wit
ness, to questions in interstate COM
MERGE matters Notwithstanding he
may plead Standardization as a re-
suit of the answer. The decision was
opposed to Browns contention that he
was protected by this constitution from
this requirement and the decision of
the court below was affirmed. The opin-
ion was handed down by Justice
Brown. Justices Field, Shiras, Gray
and White dissented, holding that the
constitutional provision was sufficient
to relieve Brown from the require
meniS to answer.
In announcing his opinion, Justice
Brown said the question involved was
whether the law of 1893 specifically re-
teving witnesses in interstate COM
merce cases from prosecution when
they reveal facts which might incrim-
mate themselves operates to take from
witnesses in such cases the privilege
of silence as guaranteed by the con-
stftution, and the conclusion was that
it did. He said this act was in the
nature of a general amnesty in such
cases, and had been so regarded and
upheld in half dozen decisions in the
state courts. Replying to the objec-
tons that while the act served as a
protection to witnesses against the
prosecution, it did not shield from the
disgrace involved in confesSing a GRIM
iral act, Justice Brown said it did not,
nor was it contemplated by a provis-
ion in the constitution that one should
be shielded. He added in response to
objections that the law would operate
to protect a witness from the prose-
cution in the state courts, the federal
statutes being superior to those of the
states, that the latter statutes are the
supreme law of the land, and apply in
the state as we'll as in the federal
courts He also advanced the opinion
that in this case the refusal of Brown
to give his testimony was due. rather
to his desire to shield others than him
self AS Brown was only the auditor
of the road, his duties were not OF Such
a character that he could be held GRIM
irafly liable for amy violation OF the
law. 1t was the intention that the
from real and substantial dangers, and
not from imaginary evils as in this
case. The consequence of granting
immunity from answering to such ofh-
Gals would inevitably be to render tine
Interstate commerce laws incapable OF
enforcement and the result would be
to PROSTATE congress at the feet
of the powerful railroad corporations
of the country. The decision of the
DISTRICT
of Pennsylvania requiring him to an
swer the questions as proposed was
therefore affirmed.
Justice Brown said the case involved
an alleged incompatibility between
that clause of the fifth amendment to
the legislation, which declares no per
son shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against hlmSelI,
and the act of congress of February
n 1892. This act had, he said, been
passed to meet the defects of the IN
terstate law This clause of the &C
ton was, he said, susceptible OF two
Interpretations. If construed literally,
and the witness be left to determine
the matter for himself, the pracucal
result would be that no one could De
compelled to testify to material TACT
in criminal case unless ne chose "
do so. or unless it was entirely Clear
that the privilege was not set up IN
good faith. If, on the other hand, the
object of the provision is to secure the
witness against a criminal prosecu-
ton. then if no such prosecution be
possible, a statute absolutely securing
to him such immunity from prosecu-
ton would satisfy the demand OF the
clause in question.
"The danger" he said, ''of extending
the principle announced in Counsel
man VS.. Hitchcock is that the privilege
NAV be put forward for a sentimental
return for a purely fanciful protection
of the witness and for the real pur-
nose of securing immunity to some
third person who is interested IN Son-
cealing the facts TO which ne woulo
testify. Every good citizen is 'pouhu
to act in the enforcement of the law,
and has no right to permit himself,
under the pretext of shielding his own
good name. to be made the tool of 9TH
ers who are DESTROYS of seeking Sheloer
behind his privilege.
In the present case, he said, it was
clear that Brown was not the chlet OF
even a substantial offender against
the law. and his privilege was claimeu
for the purpose of shielding the rail-
wav or its officers from answering a
charge of having violated its provi-
] sions. To say, Notwithstanding ms
| Immunity from punishment, he would
incur personal disgrace from answering
these questions, seems too much like an
abuse of language to be worthy OF
serious consideration; but even If THIS
were true, he would still he compelled
| TO answer If the facts sought
to be elucidated were material
| to the issue. If. as was just
! Nv observed in the opinion OF the
court below, witness standing IN
Browns position were at liberty to
set up an immunity from testify1ng,
the enforcement of the interstate com
merce law or other analogous acts
wherein it is for the interest of both
parties to conceal their misdoings,
would become impossible, since it is
only from the mouths of those having
knowledge of the contracts that the
facts can be ascertained.'
| On the point OF shielding a witness
from disgrace, he said: "a person who
commits criminal act is bound to
contemplate the consequences OF ex-
posure to his good name, and ought
not to call upon the courts to protect
that which he himself esteemed to be
of such little value. The safety and
welfare of the entire community should
not be put into the scale against the
reputation of a self-confessed criminal
who ought not, either in justice or in
-o~d ,,,a,ro1c tn ,>af1lSp tO disclose that