Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-01-19

Division. In ''Picketts Men," published "a
1870, says that 1.-The two other Divisions
(Heth and Pender) were to move s''nu'
taneously In support. charging In seconu
and third lines" This indicates that the.e
was some idea OF u triple line az fiehe..
Headquarters though Colonel HarriSyu
narrative of the battle In this ana otheT
respects Is somewhat faulty.
ORDERS misunderstood.
General Pettigrew was killed lew
DAYS after the battle. and mace no 'epo,s
of his division. The reasonable inIere".e
IL that the orders were misunderstood.
The fact still remains. however. that hve
brlgades did not advance TO the suppois
of the attacking column. ana the iet. "a
Pettigrew's line was wholly uhsuppoi ~
But there were other ana nlOs' eS s,e,'
tiaI supports ordered to accompany PICK
ett's advance. General Lees report, as
before quoted. says: 1.-THE batteries were
directed TO be pushed forward as the IA
fantry progressed, protect their nA"N''
and support their attacks Closely.
General Longstreet says: II gave oiuei
for the batteries to refill their amnuni-
tion-chests. and to be prepared to ioiio"
I'D the advance OF the infantry.
Major Eshleman reports; III hdNins
been understood by previous aiiahse-
ment that the artillery should advance
with the infantry. Immediately uirscteu
CAPTAIN Miller TO advance ms ana LEU
tenant Battles batteries. Captain Miller
having suffered severely from the loss
of men and horses. could move forward
only three pieces of his own battery ana
one Of Lieutenant Battles section. Iheh'
with one piece Of Major Henrys pat
TALON. under the direction Of Major
Haskell. he took position 400 or 90
wards to the front. and opened with
deadly effect upon the enemy. With the
exception of these five guns no others
advanced"
GENERAL PENDLETON'S EXPLANA-
TON.
The chief Of artillery. General w. ~.
pendleton gives this explanation OF ,ne
failure Of the artillery TO support lhe
attacking column: 80.
proceeding again to the right, 10 see
about the anticipated advance OF '"s
artillery, delayed beyond expectation
found, among other difhcuities' many
batteries getting out or low III aiilluii'.
ton. and the all-important question Oh
supplv received my earnest attention.
Frequent shell endangering the First
corns ordnance-train In the convenient
locality / had assigned 1t. it had been
removed farther back. This necess.tated
longer dine for reflling calssons. what
WAS worse, the train itself was very
limited so that its stock was soon ex-
hausted rendering requisite demand upon
the reserye-train. farther of. The whole
amount was thus being rapidly reduced.
With our means 20 keep up supply at
The rate required for such a conflict
proved practically impossible. There had
TO be- therefore, some relaxation OF the
protracted fire. and some lack of support
for the deferred and attempted advance
WHAT GENERAL LEE SAID.
This statement is relieved of its am
biguity by General Lee, who tells the
result as follows:
The troops moved steadily on. under
n heavy fire OF musketry and artillery.
the main attack being directed against
the enemys left centre His batteries re-
opened as soon as they appeared. Our own
having nearly exhausted their ammuni-
ton I'm the protracted cannonade that pre-
ceded the infantry, were unable 10 reply,
or render the necessary support to the
attacking party. OWING TO THIS FACT,
which was unknown TO me when the as
sault took place, the enemy was enabled
to throw a strong force OF infantry
against our left, already wavering under
a concentrated fire OF artillery from the
ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill
on the left. 1t finally gave way. and the
right, after penetrating the enemy's lines,
entering his advance works, and captur-
ing some Of his artillery, was attacked
simultaneously In front and on botf
TANKS. and driven back with heavy loss"
There is no obscurity In the language OF
General Lee. The artillery did not render
the necessary support. and. in conse-
Quence Of this fact, the assault was a
disastrous failure. This must be regarded
as a complete vindication Of the infan-
try No blame can be attached to the
officers and men OF the artillery service
participating in this fearful battle. They
did their work nobly.
is NO IDLE BOAST.
Taking into consideration the facts re-
| ferred TO In this paper. nearly all OF
which are from the official records. II
will be seen that II was no vain boast
Of General Lee when he said Of pickett
charge: IF they had been supported, as
| they were to have been, We would have
held the position, and the day would have
| been ours"
1t is perfectly apparent that General
| Lee attributed the defeat Of Pickett solely
| TO thu failure Of the batteries to advance
as ordered: and It is equally certain that
had the General been Informed Of the
| fact that the supply Of ammunition was
| exhausted. the advance would not have
! been made at all.