The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1896-05-16

should be liberal in favor Of the &C,
| cused.
The Court cannot by construction
create a crime or offense. In the Queer
v Gay, Haw. All, the Court say, "A
penal law cannot be extended by con
struction. The act constituting the
offense must be within both the letter
and spirit of the statute. Unless the
proper meaning of the language of the
statute brings case within it's letter
the rule of strict construction forbids
the Court to create a crime Or penalty
by construction, and requires it to avoid
the same by construction"
In the Queen V. San Tana, 9 Haw
1913. I'VE cannot change the language
of the statute, supply want, or en-
large upon it in order to make it suit
certain state of facts. We do not
legislate or make laws. Even where
the Court is convinced in its own mind
that the legislature really meant and
intended something not expressed by
the phraseOlogy of the Act, it has no
authority TO deparC from the plain
meaning of the language used. L can
not doubt says Lord Campbell, what
the intention of the legislature was,
but that intention has not been carried
into effect by the language used.
1t is far better that we should abide
by the words of the statute than seek
to reform it according to the supposed
intention. Every departure
from the clear language of the statute
is in effect an assumption of legislative
powers by the Court. 1t has indeed
been intimated that this is the case
whenever the Court permits the con-
sideration of consequences to dictate
the construction of doubtful act. The
judge must decide but the law has not
spoken. 1t is evident that his func-
tons necessarily become to a certain
legislative. (Endlich on Int. of Stat.
PIP. 1O-12.)
1.-The only means the Court has Of
finding the intention of the Act is from
the words in which it is expressed"
(The Court could not make the word
forward" mean solicit" or pro
cure.')
In the present case, we are not at
liberty to declare that the offense is
complete and within the true meaning
and letter of the Act unless the place
where the offense was committed is
within the meaning of the words "or
other public place"
One rule of construction is that
where a general word follows specific
and particular words of the same ma
ture as itself, it takes it's meaning from
them and is presumed to be. restricted
to the same genus as those words, or as
comprehending only things of the same
kind as those designated by them. End
Itch on Int. of Stat. Sec. 405.
This is true unless there be some
thing to show that a wider sense was
intended. The restricted meaning
which primarily attaches to the gen
eral word in such circumstances is re-
jected when there are adequate grounds
to show that it was not used in the
limited order of ideas to which it's pre-
decessors belong. Endlich, Sec. 408.
The general principle applies that
the terms are to receive their plain and
ordinary meaning and courts are not
at liberty to impose on them limitae
tions not called for by the sense or OBJ
jects or mischief of the enactment.
Endlich, Sec. 405, Sec 40.
u. S. v Coombs, II Peters, 80.
Statutes must be interpreted accord
ing to the intent and meaning and not
always according to the letter. A thing
within the intention is within the sta
tute. Statutes should be interpreted
according to the most natural and OBJ
vious import of their language. Every
legislative act must have reasonable
construction. That which is implied
in statute is as much a part of it as
what is expressed. Thomas V. Norton,
Haw. 50.
In Woodforth V. The State, the Court
says, that the rule for the construc-
ton of statutes which limits the
of words of general descrip-
ton to persons or things within the
class or classes designated by preced-
ing words of particular description, can
be used only as an aid in ascertaining
the legislative intent, and not for the
purpose of combining the operation of a
statute within the limits narrower than
those intended by the law maker. 1t
affords mere suggestion to the judi
cial mind that, where it clearly appears
that the law maker was thinking of a
particular class of persons or objects,
his words of more general description
may not have been intended to embrace
those not within the class. The sug-
gestion is one of common sense Other
rules of construction are, however,
equally potent, especially the primary
rule, which suggests that the intent of
he legislature is to be found in the or
binary meaning of the words of the
statute. Another we'll established prin-
ciple is, that even the rule requiring
the strict construction of penal sta
ute as against the prisoner (and in his
favor literally is not violated by Civ
ing every word of the statute it's full
meaning, unless restrained by the con-
text" The statute construed reads:
That if any person shall abuse any
Judge or justice of the peace; resist or
abuse any sheriff, constable, or other
officer in the execution of his Office"
etc. The Court held that a supervisor
If roads and highways" was within the
of other officer and that
the Legislature intended that the gen
eral words should have a broader sig
MITIGATION and embrace officers not of
he particular character of those named
in the Statute That If iS NOT intended