Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-02-10
CA M Pos ATTITUDE
No One Supposed He Had Abandoned
His Country's Cause.
THE REAL SITUATION EMPHASIZED
Cuba Must Be Free or Again Yield
to SPANS Yoke.
THE RIGHTS OF BELLnGERENTs

If the polling of Gen. Campos at this time
against the granting of belligerent rights
to the Cubans was intended to influence
sentiment in Congress on the subject it
will fail. No mistake had been made here
as to his attitude In the premises. Nobody
supposed that he had abandoned his coun-
try's cause. 1t was already well under
stood that his recall to Spain was the pen
atty imposed for his craftsmanship and
humanity, and not because of an aban-
donmtnt by him of Spain's interests on
the island properly pursued.
The Real Situation.
The cable from Gen. Campos, however
serves the purpose of again empha sizin g
the real situation in Cuba. Matters have
arrived at that pass where compromise is
impossible. Cuba must be free, or again
must yield to the Spanish yoke. That that
yoke, If again put on, will be harder to
bear than ever. is thought to be open to no
debate. The Spanish blood spilled in bat
t1e the enormous sums of money spent in
the campaigns, the destruction of property
incidental to all warfare, will all operate TO
make the policy of reinstatement of the
Cubans as severe and complete pos
sible. This Is pain enough to the men in
arms, and is contributing to strengthen
their original purpose of achieving free
dom
CampOs and Compromise.
1t was not to be expected that Gen. Cam
pos would concede anything like this. He
does not think it is too late to effect a
compromise, honorable and beneficial to
both sides. He worked for a compromise
all the time he was in command on the
island. He refused to employ butchery, for
the double reason that it was repu2nant to
his nature and he did not think it neces-
sary. He denies to the revolt the proper
tions or the dignity Of belligerency entitled
to foreign recognition, but even as he con-
ceives it he insists that it should be put
down by methods obtaining in honorable
warfare. If Spain triumphs by the use of
different means, that Gen. Campos will
again come forward with his honorable and
humane policy of treating the Cubaps
fairly and justly is considered certain. But
what will be likely to come Of his efforts?
Will his countrymen not treat him then
with greater disregard than they are now
doing? If the policy Of Gen. Weyler wins
in war, such a policy as Gen. Weyler may
propose in peace-Spanish peace-will win
then. Gen. Campos will be then, as he is
now, back number-a man without pres
ent credit or following at home, I'M
worthy Of serious hearing.
How the United States Should View Ii
This, 1t is insisted, is the only light In
which the United States should view the
matter. Naturally, General Campos does
not want the Cubans to win; and knowing
belligerent rights by this government would
tie, he opposes the proposition. But he
stands only for a sentiment-a very high
and worthy sentiment from his standpoint,
hut carrying with it no power at home
whatever. He stands alone. On the other
side are all the men in authority under the
government, and they are bent on the most
cruel subjugation of Cuba and her people.
The war is now to the knife, and the
knife to the hilt. Should Congress consider
the case as based upon the exact number
of men In the field, the character of the
towns taken and how many hours held, and
all that?- Is not enough asserted and con-
fessed to show that the Cubans are out in
force; that considering the disadvantages
under which they are laboring they are
putting up great fight, and that their
cause, judged from the American stand
point, is one Of the most deserving possible
to be presented? Ought a greater showing
| on the part of the insurgents to be demand.
ed at this time?