The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-01-04
Result of His observations and In
to His London Newspapers.
BRITAIN'S DUTY is PLAIN
-FOUR METHODS OF ADJUSTING THE
VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE.
All Lead to Arbitration, and Salisbury
Must submit or War May Result
The "Oiney" Doctrine.

importan. dispatch:
Il am now at length able TO speak with
confidence OF opinion in the highest Amer
lean quarters. The only condition which
the men whom / specially desired to see
would speak has been my personal pledge
not even by hint to betray their names;
therefore. 1 can only give you my word
that am not exaggerating my authorities.
president C1eveland's message to Con-
gress has done several things good and evil
First, 1t has destroyed every chance of saw
ing the Armenians; second, 1t has given a
strong impetus towards closer ties between
Great Britain and her colonies; third, it
has enormously emphasized the line of
cleavage always existing, but discreetly ig-
nored, between East and West in the
United States. The West to-day regards
the East as practically a European annex,
and New York bankers as allies of the
money sharks of Europe. Fourth, it has
rendered certain the creation of great
American navy, which the next generation
will be almost irresistibly tempted to use
for aggression. Fifth, and most important,
it has, unless foolish words or unforeseen
events bar its natural consequences, paved
the way for better future relations, because
Americans, having experience of the conse-
quences, will cease their ignorant denuncia-
lions, and the Englishmen will learn to
show much greater respect to American
national opinion, knowing that force is be-
| hind it. and will. therefore, refrain from
provoking ii by utteranceS and acts of
| yelled contempt. Finally, the message has
| rendered possible the avoidance of a far
vaster danger, namely, the question Of the
| Nicaraguan canal. A who would be
| very near the head Of the American army
| in case Of war said to me: 1T is a bless
| ing the Venezuelan affair has happened,
because specific solution of this will point
| the way to the same thing over Nicaragua
| concerning which otherwise the two ma
| tons would certainly have fought
SCHOMBURG LINE WORTHLESS.
Every paper reprints my yesterdays
dispatch, with striking headlines. Great
surprise is expressed here that it should
have been necessary for an English jour-
nalist to come to Washington in order to
| secure the publication of official British
correspondence so vital to the issue. Pass
] ing over the compliment, the fact is GER
| tainly curious, and the significance not al
| together pleasant. However, the Schom-
| burg line is now proved destitute of any
| quality of permanence, and 1t therefore re-
mains to consider the situation as affected
| by its removal. 1 can affirm positively that
! the American government is, above every
| thing, anxious for arbitration. Whatever
| may have been it's actual result, the inten-
| ton of President Cleveland's message was
| amicabe. The close encourage of the Pres
| ident to-day scout the idea that it not
| a message Of peace. But behind it has
| sprung up national sentiment, which
| it would be utter madness on the part Of
the English people to disregard or under
/ Wv &c
worth discussing. All the learned pamph-
| lets, the professors opinions and the news
paper discussions of it are labor lost. The
fact is that if Venezuela does not come
within the four corners of the Monroe doc
| trine then the new doctrine-the Olney doc
| trine-covers it, and American opinion over
whelmingly favors it's general principles.
| Moreover, America demands arbitration as
a sacred right, and for this she will fight,
| If needful
While allowing all due weight to the
| Eastern press, you must remember the line
| of cleavage mentioned above. Remember,
| also, to what extent rhe South found sup
port in New York before the war of the re-
| bellion. The man who perhaps did more
| than any other single individual to make
Lincoln President tells me Lincoln said to
| him before war seemed inevitable: The
trouble is, the people of the South have
their creed, which they hold, and we have
ours. which We hold Their principles are
sacred to them. as our principles are sacred
to u.s. The same words apply to England
| and America to-day. Absit omen. | am
astonished at the depth and character of
| American feeling on this subject. Men eX-
| perienced staid, elderly, conservative,
many holding judicial positions of great re-
| sponsibilty. frankly declare their uncom-
promising support of this American doc
| trine And while it is clear that President
| Cleveland, infinitely too clever and too de-
voted to his own party not to see that his
| message would deal knock-down blow to
the two groups of his political enemies, Re-
| publicans and free-silver men, still, no
| mistake WOuld he nOSSihlp than for
| England to regard the message a mere
party maneuver. If this latter view gains
| take may be awful. When l reflect on the
| possibility of this, and know what / know
of American opinion, am profoundly de-
pressed. Arbitration is demanded by every
| consideration dearest to civilized mankind.
SALISBURY'S OPPORTUNITY.
''Now, how shall arbitration be reached?
| The best way of all would be for Lord Sails
bury to come to an arrangement direct with
| Venezuela. The Cabinet here would much
prefer this course. l understand on high
authority that the Venezuelan government
would express its regret at the Yuruari out
rage, pay all the additional indemnity de-
manded, and request England to resume
diplomatic relations, if in return England
| would agree on a reference of the whole
question to any competent tribunal she
might select. And America would bring
| zuela hesitated. All American interests
| bitratioas between the parties owning the
| soil. Lord Salisburys dispatch iltimates
| that the absence of diplomatic relations
constitutes a bar TO negotiation. The above
| suggestion removes this, and, as America
| viii defend the British right 10 an apology
ana indemnity, no loss of dignity would be
| involved by acceding.
| The second method is. If Lord Salisbury
| will say he believes the commission fair and
| competent to consider the historical ques-
| ton, and ask if the American government
| would permit him to name British commits
| sioners TO join il, without committing him>
self to abide by the result, L can assert
| that the Cabinet would instantly welcome
| the proposal. 1t is certain that the dual
commission would reach some acceptable
conclusion.
The third method Is. supposing the Amer
I lean commission devotes its attention first
TO the territory England is willing TO arbi-
| trate and reports there Is a prima facie
| case for considering the larger question at
| the same time. will Lord Salisbury then
| consent TO submit that question to either
| the single or dual commission?
| ''Ihere Is a fourth method, for i have
every reason TO believe that Mr.. Bayard
Will inform Lord Salisbury of the consti-
tuition OF the commission and say that IL
England is willing 10 lay ner case before
II without prejudice. America Will be very
| glad 10 receive the documents. Indeed, the
request Tor the British case may be more
direct and pressing than this. Ii is impos-
siole TO see how Lord Salisbury can refruse,
1 and equally impossible 10 .see how. having