, 1896-07-11

catalepsy VI a national army we nave
watched the Spanish Army for years. having
ALWAYS had a belief that the potential strength
of Spain was underrated, and we arc fairly
familiar with it's failure to cope with the
insurrectons which cost the mother-count1y
Spanish America, but we honestly confess
onrseIvps ut our wits end. We cannot even
imagine where the dry-rot turks. The SOL
diers are an brave, to begin with, as any men
in the world, singularly temperate, excel
lent marchprs. AMI, except when pronounclng
for a re- o|lutiou, as much under discipline
= : any other troops. TIL men opposed 10
tbem are not Of any special warhke race,
but are lust SpaniardS like themselves, or
haIf.ca>te> no better than themselves, or
negroes who must be in s~oldierly qualities If
not in bravery, inferior to themselves. They
die il is trne. readily in the Cuban climate,
but tbot loss is an ascerjaiued quantity. and
ia made M by the arrivals, while, though
there are many desertions, Of general dis
Affection there is not - trace, Inc officers
nav not be we'll trained, cut they do their
work regularly in Spain, they obey orders 50
readily that at home every General IN hlgh
command il a power in the State, and how
ever little they may know Of the scientific
aide of their profession. they must at
I.ast know far more than the leaders
of tha Insurgents. Nobody accuses them
~ shrinking from the bullets, and in
dsed in most Of The ~sklrmlshss reported
hattles there have heen nOne-fhe proper
tion of officers killed and wounded ID rather
unusually large. There are stories OF a kind
Of oorrupGion among them, unW1lllngness to
end a WAR during which they draw special
allowances; but we never remember a war
waged by any u oops IN which that libel was
not repeated, and the Spanish ohcers hao
snScial allowances in Morocco also. we are
driven by the process Of exhaustion TO sup
no,e that the Generals are incom petent, and
this is the theory of the Times, correspondent;
Init Marshal Campos vas the best soldier IN
Snain. and General Weyler conquered the
island before. Besides. il competent Generals
Who wish 10 win do something, and get
themselves defeated. end while it is simply
imnossjlIe that General Weyler should not
wish 10 win. the accusation against his I'M
mense amy. an amy which, as the saying
ooeE oupbt TO be allie to cal ltS opponents, IS
hat il does nothing. Moreover. the Govern
ment At HON, knows all that occurs, and has
CORRESPONDENCE hy the thousand, and could
inst as easily remove General Weyler and his
principal ,olleaEues as 1t removed Marsh&l
Campds. The populace in spain would not
fqht for them, nor is there the smallest
evidence that the authority Of the Queen
Regent could on a question Of promotion be
set at nought.
We confess in this matter to a complete
intellectual discontinue. We can form no
idea even in our own minds Of the causes OF
q scene vljcl, so far as we know, IS absolute
Iy without pr cedent, and which must II 1t
oontinueS-a and why should it not continue
tiu neither S rain nor Laba can find money
for lie troort?-produce he utter ruin of the
island. Enellshmcn in their hearts suppose
that to be impossible, because, they say, the
limited States will intervene. or Spain VIII
grant autonomy, OF one or the other party
Wwithin The Island will acknowl edge defeat;
but why should any Of those things occur?
The Government Of the United States does
not want Cuba with lis race questions to settle
it's Spanish and negro population, Its solid
Catholic vote, and Its exposure III war time
TO maritime attack. The Spaniards are per-
fectIy capable of holding on until they are
unable to raise more money, and then of
retiring, as they did originally from the
Spanish colonies without concedilg any terms
whatever. If they think their honour M
volved. that. if the war continues as at
present. is precisely what they Will do, while
The insurgents have no more motive for
admission than the Maroons had. They
do not loathe the guerilla war, with Its
skirmishes and adventures and intrlgues,
>, l.or4;F,, .n1 Uo on with II