The Indianapolis journal., 1896-03-24
Witnesses I'm Interstate Commerce
Cases Are Not Permitted to Plead
SeIf-Incrinii ma tfon.
THEIR RIGHTS ABRIDGED
By THE STATUTE ENACTED BY con-
GREss THREE YEARS AGO.
Dissenting Opinions by Justices Field.
Railway OmciaIs Affected.


court to compel an answer by a witness to
questions in nterssate-commerce cases, not
withstanding he may plead self-incrimina-
ton as the result of an answer The de-
cision was opposed to Browns contention
that he was protected by the Constitution
from this requirement and the decision of
the court below was affirmed. The opinion
was handed down by Justice Brown. JUS
tices Field. Shiras. Gray and White dis
sented, holding that the constitutional pro-
vision was sufficient to relieve Brown from
the requirements TO answer
The case was advanced on the docket of
the Supreme Court, on the motion of the
Attorney-general made at the instance of
the interstate-commerce commission. Ut was
considered test case and the claim was
set forth in a letter written for the commits
sion that large number of similar cases
must wait on it's final decision by this court.
The case came to the Supreme Court on an
appeal taken by Brown from the decision
of the Circuit Court for the Western dis
trict of Pennsylvania to grant writ of
habeas corpus, and arose out of proceedings
by the interstate-commerce commission
against the Allegheny Valley Railway Com
pany. of which Brown is officer. He was
witness before the grand Jury for the
swer certain questions propounded to him on
the ground that, in so doing, he might In
criminate himself He was then proceeded
against for contempt of court found guilty
and sentenced to imprisonment. Mr.. Brown
pleaded his constitutional right of silence.
but the statute of Feb. IL, 1898, requiring
against him and held to be valid by the
Circuit Court. In the decision to-day the
foregoing ruling Of the Pennsylvania court
was affirmed.
NO crIrE,rD n Erop f~pJnrINATc
+ In announcing his opinion to-day Justice
Brown said the question involved was
whether the law of 1893, specifically re-
lieving witnesses in interstate-commerce
cases from prosecution when they reveal
facts which might incrirninate themselves, op-
crates to take from witnesses in such cases
the privilege Of silence as guaranteed by the
Constitution and the CONCLUSION was that it
did. He said this act was in the nature of
general amnesty in such cases and had
been so regarded and upheld in half dozen
decisions in the State courts Replying to
the objection that while the act served as
a protection to witness against prosecu-
ton II did not shield from the disgrace in
VOWED in confessing a criminal act, Justice
Brown said it did not, nor was 1t contem-
plated by a provision in the Constitution
that one should be shielded He asserted in
response to objections that the law would
operate to protect witness from prose-
cution In the State courts, the federal
statutes are. the supa<me law of the land
federal courts. He also advanced the opin-
ion that in this case the refusal of Brown
to give his testimony was due rather to
his desire TO shield others than himself. As
Brown was only the auditor of the road,
his duties were not of such character that
he could be held criminally liable for any
that the constitutional provision should pro-
tect from real and substantial dangers and
not from imaginary evils as in this case.
The consequence of granting immunity from
answering to such officials would inevitably
be to render the interstate-commerce laws
incapable of enforcement and the result
would be to prcstrate Congress at the feet
of the powerful railroad corporations of
the country. ~
Justice Brown said the case involved an
alleged incompatibilty between that clause
of the fifth amendment to the Constitution
which declares that no person 'shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a wit
1888. This act had, ne said. been passed to
meet the defects IN the interstate commerce
law pointed out in the case of Counselman
tion was. he said. susceptible of two inter-
pretations. II construed literally and the wit
ness Is left to determine the matter for him
self, the practical result would be that no
one could be compelled TO testify to a ma
terial fact in a criminal case unless he chose
to do SO; or unless 1t was entirely clear that
the privilege was set up IN good faith. If
on the other hand. the object OF the pro-
vision be TO secure the witness against a
criminal prosecution, which might be aided
directly or indirectly by his disclosure. then,
if no such prosecution be possible, statute
absolutely securing to him such immunity
from prosecution would satisfy the demands
of the clause in question.
DUTY OF THE GOOD CITIZEN.
"The danger" the Justice said, ''of extend
ing the principle announced in Counselman
VS.. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be
put forward for a sentimental reason, or for
purely fanciful protection Of the witness,
and for the real purpose of securing i'm
munity to some third person who is inter-
ested in concealing the facts to which he
would testify. Every good citizen is bound
to aid in the enforcement of the law, and
has no right to permit himself under the
pretext of shielding his own good name, 10
be made the tool of Others who are desirous
of seeking shelter behind his privilege"
In the present case the Justice said, II
was clear than Brown was not the chief or
even substantial offender against the law,
purpose of shielding the railway it's off,
GERS from answering charge Of having vio-
lated its provisions ITO say that" contiD-
munity from punishment, he would incur
personal odium and disgrace from answering
these questions. seems too much like an
| consideration. But, even IL this were true
| he would still be compelled to answer. il the
1 IdctS Sought lO DC tfutiudteu were material
| TO the issue. III. as was justly observed In
| the opinion of the court below, witness
| standing in Browns position We're at liberty
| TO set up an immunity from testfying the
| enforcement of the interstate-commerce
| law or other analogous acts wherein IL is for
| the interest of both parties to conceal their
| mlsdongs, would become impossible since 1t
| is only. from the. mouths of those having
| knowledge of the inhibited contracts that the
| facts can be ascertained
On the point of shielding witness from
! disgrace the Justice said: "A person who
| commits a criminal act is bound to contem-
| plate the consequences of exposure to his
| courts TO protect that which he has himself
| esteemed TO be of such little value. The
| safety and welfare of entire community
| should not be put into the scale against the
reputation of a self-confessed criminal, who
| ought not, either in justice or in good morals
| TO refuse TO disclose that which may be OF
| great pubic utility in order that his neigh
/ bors may think well of him. The design OF
| the constitutional privilege is not to aid the
| witness in vindicating his character, out tc
/ protect him against being compelled to fur
/ nish evidence TO ccnvict him of a criminal
| charge If he secure legal immunity from
| prosecution. the possible impairment OF his
4 good name Is q penalty which IL is reason.
able he should be compelled TO pay for the
| common good n7i2 IT,
| Justice Shiras read dissenting opinion. ir
| which Justices Gray and White concurred
eral law would not SHE'D the witness from
| prosecution in the State court and expressed
1 the opinion that the failure to enforce the
| law of 1888 would not weaken the Interstate
| commerce law.
DISSENTING OPINIONS.
Justice Field also read dissenting opin-
| ion. He held that the amnesty granted ir