Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-03-03
what n Recognition OF BclIigercncy
Will Mean.


country seem to overrate. while others
undervalue. the significance of a recos-
milton by the United States OF the CUBAN
revolutionists az belligerents. II Is worth
while, therefore. to point out what such
a recognition would not do, and then TO
indicate the direct effects which 1t wouid
have, together with the indirect results
to which, according TO the teachings OF
history and common-sense, 1t would be
apt to lead.
The urgent need OF the Cuban revolu-
tionists is a supply of arms and ammu-
milton, proportioned to the number OF
their soldiers in the field, or of those who
could be rallied to their standard. Our
own forefathers. during their war for IN
dependence, suffered from lack or wea-
pons, and must have disbanded the
Continental army, but for the supplies
surrsptitiously secured from France De-
fore the ministers OF Louis XVI took any
overt step on their behalf. Now, the
recognition of the Cuban revolutionlsts
as beligerents will have no direct bearing
upon this vital point. IL Will not directy
facilitate the shipment from United states
ports of the arms and ammunition lhdis-
pensable TO the triumph of the CUBAN
us to fulfill the duties prescribed for neu-
trails by international law and denned
I'm our Federal Revised Statutes. Indeed
IL we may Judge from the Itata case
there is some ground for contendng that
the dispatch or preparation OF an eNpe-
dition for the succOr of the insurgents Is
less distinctly breach OF neutrality Whhe
the insurgents are unrecognized, IMAM IL
would be after they had acquired the
status Of belligerency. However That may
be- this much Is certain: that, shoulu
the Federal statutes continue TO be en-
forced with rigor, 1t Will be every OH
as difficult after we have ofiiciaily ac-
.knowledged the existence of war in Cuba'
for what t. technically known as an ex-
peditlon In aid Of Cuba to leave Ameri-
can ports, as 1t Is now. That IL to say,
the Federal officers would be bound to ex-
ercise the same vigilance: but 1t may be
that the task imposed would prove beyond
their powers.
This brings us TO one OF the beneficial
results OF recognition. When the Cuban
revolutionary government is recognized
as a belligerent il will undoubtedly be
able to raise a considerable amount OF
money in this country, and perhaps IN
Europe. by the sale Of bonds. Its friends
and sympathzors in the United States
would thus beisnabled to purchase much
larger quantities OF the munitions OF war
than have been hitherto attanable. and
TO organize a much larger number or
expeditions. out of which the chances are
that several would manage 10 eyade our
Federal officials and effect a landing on
the island. Then again. the Cuban reyo-
lutionary government once recognized as
a beligerent, may issue letters OF marque.
be al
commissioned cannot. IL captured by the
Spaniards, be summary killed as pirates,
but must be treated as prisoners Of war.
The same privileges and immunities Will
accrue TO the officers and men OF their
land forces. these can no longer, when
taken prisoners, be tried by courts-mar-
tial and summarily shot; they Will be
entitled TO the humane treatment ac-
corded to prisoners Of war by civilized
nations. Should such treatment be denied
them by the Spanish authorities in Cuba,
the public opinion of the world would be
SO strongly enlisted in the Cuban cause
that the moral pressure for the interyen-
ton of the United States might become ir-
resistible.
This OF course. is not a necessary and
direct result OF recognizing belligerency
for, as We know, there was no foreign in
PREVENTION during our civil war There
would have been one. however. had We
not been careful to give Confederate pri-
soners the treatment 10 which bellige-
rents are entitled, after the Confederate
Government had been recognized as a
belligerent by European Powers. Had the
authorities in Washington permitted a
1.-THE Of the enormities perpetrated by
Valmaseda in the last Cuban war, and
imputed 20 General Weyler in the present
flag n rel he
back Lord Palmerston and Napoleon III.
from carrying out their plan Of forcible
interposition. Such. on the other hand, is
the temper, and We must add the folly,
of Spanish officials, not only at Habana,
but at Madrid. that they seem certain to
commit the blunder which we in our hour
OF trial were too humane and sasaciOus
to make. Nor is this the only egregious
error into which the Spaniards are likely
TO fall Exasperated by our recognition Of
their victims as belligerents, and deluded
by strange misconception OF their
military and naval strength, COM
pared with that OF the United
States, they are not unlikely TO
vent their arrogance and furious
hatred In outrages upon the lives and
property of American citizens. and upon
the American flag We need not say that
such outrages. IL not speedily and suit
aDly atOnel LOT, WOul0 excite on our part
a feeling of indignation and resentment
which would compel our government not
only TO recognize the independence OF
Cuba, but TO take the necessary practi-
cal steps to make her independence a
fact.
The direct and immediate result OF re-
cognizing the Cuban insurgents as bellige-
rents. although they have been sometimes
overestmated. will be Of considerable i'm
portance. The indirect and eventual
consequences Of such an act will in all
likelihood be tantamount 10 the liberation
and salvation Of the island. Such n con-
summation may be looked for at an ear
ler date, should the House Of Represen-
tatives concur In the resolution passed on
Friday by the Senate. and should the
President. in conformity with the wishes
OF Congress. attempt 20 use his good
offices with Spain 70 secure a recognition
by her Of the independence Of Cuba. Such
a proposal. If rejected. would doubtless be
followed By recognition OF the island $
independence on our part. This would
render IL almost impossible for Spain 10
borrow money OF the strength of Cuba s
resources. and thus her military power
would he seriously crippled.