Oxford eagle. (Oxford, Lafayette Co., Miss.) 1876-current, 1896-12-10

+ |-4..a
EiSuts -haufd De accorded 10 the tuNurxrnss- I.
/ proposition 20 longer urged because antiuleiv
& sa IN Praetleal IN operation and clearly perth
I snd - snd injurious "a cur aSn interests Il has
/ eccn aat = nuN sometimes contrutied that the
Independence of tho insurgents should Be rec
ggutred But imperfect and rpstrfrte,, A. m.
spanish government u the island NAV be no
otnrr sxArts there-unle-s the will % the uilt-
I tAfY otlcer n temporary command Of q par
@9Ntranenh II n uas Also suggested that the
Z ! Onlted states should buy the island-a sux-
scstlon possibly worthy of Consideration Il
taerr were any evidence of q desire or Zfif-
/ ingnsSs On the part Of spain 10 entertafa such
prrprsaA Il Is urged. auaIIv. that al other
methods failing. the existing internecine strife
[ n th1a should De terminated By our Interven-
/ ton. even at the Gust of a war bstween ne
{ Z nited states and 81 ain-a war which its ad-
vocates confidently prophecy could be neither
Z AarEe n II proportions nor doubtful In its Is
sue The correctness of this forecast need be
neither Affirmed nor denied. Tue Cnited
states mas nevertheisss, character 10 main
AIN n nation which plainly dictates that
conduct
Further. though the United States is no,
nation To which peace IL q necessity. IL q. In
[ ruth the most pacific. Of powers. and desires
nothing 80 much as 70 live In AEniry with all
me world. Is own ample and diversified do
mains satisfy all possible longings for terri
/ tory, prccin'ie all dreams Of conquest and pre-
vent any casting Of covetous eye upon neigh
: boring regions however attractive. That our
conduct towards spain sud her domfnions has
constituted no excepticr To this national dis
Position ts made manifest BY the course OF our
government. not only thus far during the pres
/ ent Instruction. but during the ten years that
followed the rising at Yara In lses
/ No other great power, II NAV safely be said.
[ under circumstances OF similar perptexity
[ would have manifested the same restraint and
/ Tie same patient endurance II may also be
said that tais persistent attitude OF the United
states toward spain IN connection with Cuba
VIII unQue.tiouably evince no slight respect
and regard for spain on the part Of the Amer
can people They in truth. do not forget her
connection with the discovery Of the western
hemisphere, nor DO they underestimate the
great qualities u the spanish people. nor fail
. fully recognize their splendid patriotism and
their chtvalrOus devotion 10 the national honor
They view with wonder and admiration the
cheerful resolution with which vast bodies Of
men are sent across thousands Of niles OF
ocean and an enormous debt accumulated that
the costly possession o. the Gem Of the An
TILES may still hold its place in the spanish
croNn. Aau Yes me- taer the government nor the
people Of the United States have shut their
eyes 20 the course Of events IN Cuba or have
Jailed 20 realize the existence Of conceded
grievances. which have led to the present re-
volt from the authority OF Spain-grievances
recognized by the queen regent and by
The cortes, voiced BY the most patriotic and
enlightened Of spanish statesmen without
regard TO party. and demonstrated BY reforms
proposed BY the executive and approved by the
legislative branch of the Spanish government.
Il Is IN the assumed temper and disposition Of
the spanish government 20 remedy these griev-
ances. fortified by Indications OF influential
public opinion In spain. that this government
has hoped 20 discover the most promising and
effective means Of composing the present strife.
with honor and advantage TO spain with the
achicvement Of all the reasonable objects OF
the insurrection-
II would seem that II Spain should offer TO
tuba genuine autonomy. a measure Of home
rule which. while preserving the sovereignty
OF spain, would satisfy all rational require
mentS Of her Spanish subjects. there should be
no Just reason why the paeiication Of the is-
land might not be effected on that basis. Such
result would appear TO BE- in the interest of
al concerned II woull at once stop the con
nict- which Is now consuming the resources OF
me siand anu making u worrhi. - for which
ever party mas Ultimately prevail Il
would keep intact the possessions Of
spain without touching her honor which
VIII be consulted rather than lmpuZned b-
the adequate redress Of admitted grievances
II would put the prosperity Of the island and
the fortunes % - inhabitants within their
own control Without severtng the natural and
ancient ties shicn bind them IN the mother
country, aud would vet eEAhfe them 70 test
their capacity for Self-goverament Under the
most favorable conditions
Il has been objected. on the one side. that
Spain should not promise autonomy until her
tnsurxent subject lay down their arms. On
/ the other side that promised autonomy. how
ever liberal. il Insufficient. because without
assurance q the prumise being fulfilled
/ But the rcasonaoleness Of a requirement BY
/ spain Of unconditional surrender on the part
/ OF the inSurlelt Cuhans before their autonomy
is conceded i not altogether apparent
II Ignores important features Of the situation
the stability two years duration has given
{ N the insurrection. the feasibility Of its in
I tfnn1tc prOluugAEl9u In tne nature or things.
and as shown BY past experience. the utter
and imminent ruin OF the island. unless the
/ present strife IS speedily composed. above ALL
/ the fan< sousss SsscH al parties n spain. AL
1 ins public men eoneede 10 exist and profess a
/ desire % remove
/ prefer Of needed reforms until the parties
/ demanding them put themselves at mercy by
/ throwing down their arms, has the appearance
/ Of ueglecting the gravest Of perils and fnvtt-
/ ing suspicion as 70 the sincerity Of any pro-
fessed willingness to grant reforms
The objection on behalf Of the insurgents
that promised reforms can not be relied upon
must, Of course. be considered. though we
have no right 70 assume, and no reason for
suming that anything that Spain undertakes
corsiing 10 both the spirit and the letter Of the
undertaking.
Nevertheless. realizing that suspicious and
precautions on the part Of the weaker Of two
combatants are always natural and not always
uniustiianie. and being sincerely desirous in
/ the interest Of both we'll on It's own ac-
! count that the Cuban problem should be solved
with the least possible delay IL was intimated
/ by this government to the government Of
/ Spain some months ago that, a satisfactory
/ measure Of home rule were rendered the Gu
/ ban insurgents and would be accepted by
them upon q guaranty Of It's execution. the
1 United States would endeavor to and way
not objectionable To spain Of furnishing such
guaranty.
has yet been received from the spanish gov
ernment. il Is believed to be not altogether
welcome. while. as a treaty - suggested.
reason Is perceived Why IL should rot be sp-
proved by the insurgents. Neither party can
/ fall % see the tmportanee Of early action. And
/ both must realize that % prulanz the present
enormously % the time aaa labor and expeudi-
recuperafion of the issand Il is. there
% sSss .sTsss. . sPsa ,oa on s..sE a. 1ss
/ breach between spain aud the insurgent Gu
I bans upon the lines above Indicated. may be
| date and saccessful issue. me friendly Of
/ ices OF the Cnited States. either tn the man
ner above outlined. or IN any ether way con-
ststrnf with our constitution and laws. Will al
ways be AZ the disposal Of either party
/ Whatever circumstances may arise. cur rol-
| icy and our interests would eonsrrain Us 20 OBJ
/ ieet 20 the acquisition OF the island the in
reference with It's control BY any other
power
Il should be added that IL can not be reason
/ abip assumed that the hitherto expectant at
tifude Of the Cnited States viii be indefinitely
maintained While We are anxious 70 accord
all due respect 70 the sovereignty OF spain. Se
can not view the pending conflict IN all It's
features and properly apprehend our inevitable
relations to it. and possible results. without
may be drawn into such an unusual and un-
| precedenfed condition Is Will nx a limit 70
/ patient waiting for spain 70 end the contest.
/ either alone and In her own way, or with our
friendly cooperation.
/ Whel the Inability Of spain 70 deal success
/ fully with the insurreetlon has become mani
q
eighty Is extinct IN Cuba for all purposes Of It's
ri<ntfui existence. and when a hopeless strug-
I xie for It's re-estzolishmenr has degeneratsd
1 into strife which means nothing more than
I the useless sacrifice OF human life and the ut
ter destruction Of the very subject matter OF
the conflict. situation wfI be presented In
which our obligation 70 the sovereignty Of
! spain Will be Superseded BY higher obligations
By which can hardly hesitate 10 recognize
and discharge.
until the time for action arrives. We should
make them depend upon the precise conditions
then existing aad they should not be deter
mined upon without giving careful heed 70
every consideration Involving cur honor and
/ Interest," or the International duty we owe 70
spain. Until we face the contingencies sns-
rested or the situation IA By other incidents
| Imperativcly changed. snouid continue In
the line OF conduct heretofore pursued. thus In
l al circumstances exhibiting cur obedience 70
/ me requirements af public law and our regard
for he duty enioined upon Is By the position
we occupy In the family Of nations
coutem plation Of emergencies tcat may
arse should plainly lead % avoid their
crearfon either through q careless disregard Of
nr.ssur duty or even Al undue stimulation and