The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-08-04
nN0naNDs' Riw rRoBLHns.
what Her Ships Might Have to DO i'm the
Channel aud the Mediterranean.


WASHINGTON. d. c.. Aug. The
chronic question OF how England is to
beat the combined fleets of France and
Russia is once more coming up In dis
cussions. stimulated. apparently. by the
current naval manocuyers. The Pail
Mall Gazette debates 10. and not over
hopefully. one difficulty seems to be
The geographical position OF France. with
coasts both on the Channel and the
Mediterranean. giving her interior lines.
and helping her chances OF connecting
with Russian naval forces. advancing
from tho Baltic and tn Hack sie,ls.
Another difficulty for ENGLAND is that
Of sealing up hostile ports. under modern
conditions. by "A blOckadlne fleet, which
Captain Mahan has set forth To do
this requires n very superior force on the
hlOckadihg side. and II the bl0ckadcd
fleet once gets out. 1t may have the
whole ocean before H.
rendering this subject. the Pan Mall
Gazette concludes that, go war with
France. if Russia Joined in the struggle.
there would be three main British fleets.
"a powerful one al Malta, "a second strong
force at plymouth, guarding the Channel,
and a third feet smaller with ifs base
at one Of the Baltic islands. The enemy
would have four main fleets one a Brest
another strong one at T0ulOn. and two
smaller fleets in the Raluc aud the
Black Seas.
II the Toul0n aud Brost fleets stimuli
taneously leave their bases and steam
for meeting point somewhere west OF
Gibraltar. they must. since The distances
are in their favor. succeel in effecting "a
junction before the English fleets can
reach them From TOul0u 20 Gibraltar
is only 105 miles whereas 10 Is $50 from
Malta 10 the same point. From Brest to
Gibraltar is g2j miles. as against l,O4
from Plymouth Then the French fleets
having united. can turn ou either Of the
two English fleets. should these steam in
pursuit, and crush them 300 detail. The
French will he between our forces IN SUI
porior strength to cithcr and there can
be little doubt as TO What the result
would be.
One conclusion Nigh. be that. I'm the
case supposed. there is no special rea-
son why the British fleets should remain
40 Malta and Plymouth as n on the de-
fonsive leaving their adyersaries TO effect
their junction. The authority quoted
seems 10 indicate that the best plan in
the case suppose d. 90 seal mp one Of
the French fleets. say that at Brest. and
TO do this eve must increase our battle
snip ncct tlll we have enough vessels Tor
"a close blockade. or five to the enemy S
three
Thus the old solution q the problem in
building more ana stil moro ships is
again reached and. added To- the heavier
vessels FOR the llno OF battle. there must
De cruisers enough 90 protect British COM
merce lest the British Islands should have
their food supply cut of.
This last matter hy tho way has call
cd out. during the present year, "A rather
remarkable proposition from General
Rice. This IS C. establish granarics in
the islands capable VI holding half Il
years supply Of wheat for 5000 900 peo-
PIE. This period is fixed because IL Is
assumed that NJ the end Of II the coun-
try could begin 10 supply itself from the
soil. The sum which General Rice would
set apart for the purpose is sii0.e0OO TO
start with. He would invest $4,000. 000
IN purchasing what. storing ono-nfih OF
II annually for five years. and selling and
renewing that amount each year. so as
10 avoid Keeping the grain too long.
This is rather costly method Of pro-
viding for a contingency. hut II illus
trates current British propensity TO
Speculate ON the chances OF England's
being defeated az sea by n combination
Of fleets against her. and Of the results
mat might then be expected