The times. (Owosso, Mich.) 1882-1897, 1896-12-11

sources. and are none the less infiexible in
their resolve not to succumb without prac-
ucally securing the great objects for which
they took up arms
Not Yet Entitled to Recognition.
II Spain has not yet reestablished her
made good their title to be regarded as an
Independent state. Indeed. as the con-
test has gone on. the pretense that civil
FAR as Spain is able to maintain NIP it, has as
been practically abandoned. Spain does
keep on foot such a government, more or
their suburbs Bus that sno
tion being made, the entire country is either
given over to anarchy or is subject to the
mtary oceu rn or one or the other
authority that, at the demand of the COM
mander In chief of the insurgent army.
the putati I've cuban government ia has now
tions. leaving that government confessed
ly (what there is the best reason for sup
posing IL always to have been In fact) q
government merely on paper
Why Spain Does Not Win.
Were the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists in the open, or in pitched
battle, prompt and decisive results might
be looked for, and the immense superiority
cipline, and equipment. could hardly fail
TO tell greatly to their advantage. But
they are called upon to face foe that
choose and does choose its own ground,
that from the nature of the country, Is
Visible or Invisible at pleasure, and that
fights only from ambuscade and when all
the advantages of position and numbers
are on its side. In q country where all that
Is indispensable to life in the way of food.
especially by those born and bred on the
SOIL II is obvious that there is hardly q
limit to the time during which hostilties
or this sort may be prolonged.
Situation DeplorabIe.
Meanwhile, as In all cases of protracted
civil strife, the passions of the combatants
grow more and more inflamed and excuses
on both sides become more frequent and
pated in by bands of marauders, who, now
In the name of one party and now in the
name of the other, as may best suit the
plumber its wretched inhabitants for their
own advantage. Such a condition of things
would Inevitably entail immense destruction
OF property, even II 1t were the policy
Of both parties to prevent it as far as prac-
ticable. But while such seemed to be the
original policy of the Spanish government,
ct mas now tb and is
surgents, namely, that the exigencies of
the contest require the wholesale annihila-
ton Of property that it may not prove of
the same end that In pursuance of general
orders, Spanish garrisons are now being
withdrawn from plantations and the rural
In the towns
The sure result would seem to be that
the Industrial value of the island is fast
diminishing, and that unless there Is
speedy and radical change in existing con-
ditions, 1t will soon disappear altogether:
That value consists very largely, OF
capacity already much reduced by the In
terruptions to tillage, which have taken
place during the last two years. 1t Is re-
liably asserted that should these interrupt
lions continue during the current year
and practically extend, as is now threat
ened, to. the entire sugar-producing ter
much money will be required to restore
the land to its normal productiveness that
1t Is extremely doubtful If capital can be
induced to even make the attempt
Would Engage Our Serious Attention.
The spectacle of utter ruin of an adjoin-
Ing country, by nature one of the most
fertile and charming on the globe, would
engage the serious attention of the gov
eminent and the people of the United
States in any circumstance. Pm point of
fact, they have a concern with 1t which is
by no means of a wholly sentimental
to US as to be hardly separated from our
territory. Our actual pecuniary interest In
1t is second only to that of the people and
timated that at least from $30,000,00o to
$50, 600 600 of American capital are invested
In plantations, and in railroad, mining
island. The volume of trade between the
United States and Cuba, which in 1899
amounted to about $64, 100000, rose in 1893
year before the present insurrection
broke out. amounted to nearly $96,0O0.0O0.
vexatious Entanglements.
Besides this large pecuniary stake in
the fortunes of Cuba, the United States
finds itself inextricably involved in the
atious and costly. Many Cubans reside In
this country and indirectly promote the
nsurrection through the press, by public
meetings, by the purchase and shipment Of
arms, by the raising of funds and by other |
means, which the spirit of our institutions
and the tenor of our laws do not permit |
lions. Some of them, though Cubans at |
heart and in all their feelings and interests, |
have taken out papers as naturalized citi- |
zens OF the United States, proceeding re- |
sorted to with view to possible protec- |
ion by this government, and not unnat- |
Irally regarded with much indignation by |
gents are undoubtedly encouraged and sup
ported by the widespread sympathy the peo-
pie of this country always and instinctively |
EEL for every struggle for better and freer
and which in the case of the
more adventurous and restless elements
Of our population leads in only too many
Instances to active and personal participa-
The result is that this government Is
called upon to protect Amerf-
IAN citizens, to claim damages for injuries
~ pei oono diu ~ 80
many millions of dollars, and to ask ex.
,lanations and apologies for the acts OF
spanish officials whose zeal for the repres-
lion of rebellion sometimes blinds them TO
he immunities belonging to the offending
itizens of a friendly power. 1t follows
rom the same causes that the United
states Is compelled to actively police
ong line of sea coast against unlawful ex-
the escape of which the utmost
-igilance will not always suffice to pre-
'ent.
The Question of Intervention.
These inevitable entanglements Of the
United States with the rebellion in Cuba,
he large American property interests at
ected and considerations of philanthropy
nd humanity In general have led to We
cement demand In various quarters for
ONE sort of positive intervention on
he part OF the United States. 1t was at
rst proposed that belligerent rights should
70 accorded to the insurgents-a propo-
ikon no longer urged because untimely
nd in practical operation clearly perilous
nd Injurious to our own interests. 1t has
ince been and Is now sometimes commended
hat the independence of the insurgents
hould be recognized. But imperfect and
as the Spanish government of
he island may be, no other exists there
Mess the will of the military officer in
temporary command Of particular dis
riot can he dignifed as a species OF gov
rnment. 1t Is now also suggested that the |
United States should buy the island-a sug-
estion possibly worthy of consideration
there were any evidence of a desire or