The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1896-01-09
/. message on a public matter to foreign

a message on a public matter to a foreign
country. Indeed, she vo1ld not have sen'
such message TO parliament as President
Cleveland sent 70 congress-the ecmnis-
sion would have been appointed by the
crown. but the subject would have been
brought up in parliament in bill providihg
for their compensation, and the dirsctness
Of the movement automatically avoided
Emperor Napoleon III. snd the late en-
peror OF Germany used TO make periodical
announcements OF policy. the text OF which
was carefully scanned 10 detect the real
purpose.
The young emperor takes every occasion
10 make speeches and utter sentiments
Had MS grandfather assumed such an at
tsrude toward the Beers as ne did. ii would
have been regarded a. the declaration OF
policy ininlcal to England. 1t is not out
of the question that the emperor 50 meant
II, especially as be seems to have consai'ea
his ministers before sending the dispatch.
There Is a strong anti-Euglish sentiment Ia
Germany, as there is II France, and IL Is
not impossible that az a consequence Of re-
cent events, England may be forced 70
find her ally IN the last nation she would
have looked 20 a few months ago. England
fears no nation so much as Russia. The
only part OF the British possessions where
there is any real danger Is in India, where
a religious war. being the most fanaticai.
murderous and unreasoning. would place
her authority In jeopardy. War with Tur-
key would precipttate that conflict, and
England may well hesitate before riskfns
II. With Russia as her ally she could be
sure OF the neutrality OF France. she could
depend upon the powerful navy of Italy to
aid her in the Mediterranean, Austria's
jealousy Of Germany would keep that
country neutral, and, IL that were not
enough, her passiveness could be assur-
ed by the cession to her in partition OF
Turkey, Of Salonica.
Germany would then remain the only
power in Europe 20 cope with. The en-
peror may be assumed to be not unwilling
10 have a war. for two reasons. one is
that IL would revive in some measure
patriotic spirit, and the other is the minor.
but not less effectual one. that the en-
peror is heavily In debt. He has been reck-
lessly extravagant. and the Indignation
likely TO break out when the question Of
paying his debts arises would be assnaged
In the greater excitement over a war.
II has already been a subject OF remark
In some of the German papers. The civn
list. which the kaiser receives from the ma
tional exchequer every year amounts TO
close upon 100000 added to which the
emperor lives in palaces built by the people
and he is exempt from disagreeable atten-
lions on the part OF the tax collector. His
civil list Is more than double that received
from the crown by his father and grand
father, and in addition thereto he has at
his disposal the control OF the private for
tune and vast estates Of the royal house %
Prussia, which represents 900 This
property, belonging to the junior branch of
the Hohenzollerns-for the reignlng house
OF Prussia is only the junior branch OF the
family. of which Prince Leopold of Hohen-
zollern is the head - consists partly of
money loaned on mortgages In London and
New York while the remainder is in the
shape OF German real estate, valuable horse
breeding establishments. manufactures.
mines, etc. Besides this. the nation has
provided the emperor with three yachts.
one OF which is a floating palace, and a
couple OF railroad trains. one OF them a
palace on wheels.
An active campaign would, moreover, oc-
cupy the attention Of the people, and divert
them from the socialistic movement which
is yearly gaining strength.