The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-11-17
Replies of HohenIohe and Won Bie-
berstein to an Interpolation Based
ON Bismarck's Disclosures.
GERMANY'S POLICY EXPLAINED
AND SHOWN TO BE IN THE INTEREST
OF PRESERVING THE PEACE.
While Adhering to the Dreibund. the
Fatheriand Has Cultivated Friend-
Iy Relations with Russia.

BERLIN. Nov. 16.-In anticipation OF q
statement from the Imperial Chancellor.
Prince Hohenlohe, on the subject OF the
revelations made by Prince bismarck
through his organ, the Hamburger Mach
richten. regarding the secret treaty which
existed between Russia and Germany from
1856 to 1880 there was large attendance at
the opening CT the Reichstag to-day.
Among those present was Count Herbert
Bismarck eldest son of the ex-Chancellor.
who. it was rumored. was TO take an active
part in the debate and defend his father
against attacks. Count Won Hompresch. a
Centrist leader. introduced the interpella-
ton. notice of which was given on Wednes-
day last. In brief, the question was. Did
a secret convention between Russia and
Germany exist up to 1880. and. il so. why
was it not prolonged? Finally, have the
recent disclosures had influence upon the
Dreibund and Germany's relations with the
other powers?
In reply. Prince Hohenohe said: I'm re-
gard to the negotiations between Russia
and Germany from 1857 TO 1850. ii was
agreed at the time that absolute secrecy
should be observed. The point OF time
when this obligation ceased cannot. in con-
sequence. be defined by alone. / there
fore for the moment, am not In a position
to give official information concerning the
result of those negotiations then. AS re-
CARDS the tendency of German policy to-
wards Russia since the spring Of 1880, il is
equally impossible 10 give an exhaustive
reply so long as that obligation continues.
and l leave it TO the Foreign Secretary,
who took part in the deliberations, to say
| what can be said in that respect.
After a careful examination of the
| available material. / cannot help recogniz-
| ing as full of weight the motives which
| governed German policy. and. at the same
time, can express the conviction that no
unfavorable modification in our relations
with Russia has made itself felt The as
sertion at that time that British. or, indeed.
| any foreign influences have had a contrib
| utory effect, or that they now have must
be dismissed as devoid of all foundations
| feet which recent publications have had
upon the position of Germany in the Drei-
bund and her relations with other Euro
| pean powers, / am glad TO be able to de-
clare that the cloud OF distrust which at the
| first moment was observable among some
| classes or the population OF those countries
has again disappeared. and our relations
with our allies are marked now. a. before.
| by abso ute mutual confde nee. An the same
| way our relations with Russia have never
| for moment ceased to be good and
| friendly" applause from all parts OF the
/ house.)
Won BEIBERSTEIN'S SPEECH.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs. Baron
| Chancellor. He said: In entering upon
the subject Of German policy toward Rus
| sa / am perfectly alive to the great diff
| ficultes of the task. Please do not expect
| any revelations from me. 1 have no au-
| thority to make Them and, moreover. they
would probably only increase the strife,
and we have enough strife in che country.
! (Cries of Very true.) My task is TO
throw light upon certain attacks. so far as
general interests at home and abroad re-
| quires them to be dealt with. In the latest
controversy two accusations leading in di-
ametrically opposite directions stand out
| prominently. one Is that Germany's policy,
| after 1890, committed serious blunders and
| surrendered an important security for the
| preservation OF peace. The other charge,
| leveled against the policy prior 10 1880.
asserts that at that time things We're
agreed upon with another state. contrary
| TO existing treaties.
''rhe latter charge is the most serious,
| for IL strikes us in spot where. as we are
entitled TO say, with some pride, We Were
| most susceptible. (Cries of Hear. Hear,r
/ therefore address myself first to that
| charge and repel with emphasis the idea
| that anything was ever agreed to by Ger
many with any state whatever that IL in
That has not occurred (cries of Heart
| Hear.) neither in the letter nor in the
spirit, for whatever we have agreed 10 was
| designed to serve the interests of peace. 1t
| is however. doubtful whether, with a num-
| ber of alliances and treaties. the intrinsic
value of each Increases or decreases. The
danger arises in multifold security that it
may refuse its Office at q decisive mo-
| ment
| The Minister for Foreign Affairs further
| said. Wars which are avowediy wars OF
aggression are things of the past even be-
tween nations that believe they have rea-
| son to be dissatisfied with their lot There
| exists at the present time so great desire
| for peace. increased by the general system
the effects of modern warfare. that every
| government which Is resolved TO make war
| will use every effort. for the sake of its
| people, to avoid the odium of being the ag
| gressor There Is more freedom nowadays
TO discuss the questions as to who Is re-
| sponsible for war. where from IL results
! that "A treaty of alliance can only be ef-
| fectve. in case of attack. upon the contract
ing parties regard for each other as the
| defenders of just cause and not the
aggressors. This feeling cannot be set
down i'm clauses. Ii must be acquired,
! maintained and cultivated. IL does not
have its birth in treaties. nor does IL neces-
sarily cease TO exist on the expiration or
| the treaty. 1t is based alone on the case
| of the governments as well as the governed.
| upon the knowledge that the maintenance
/ of the respective positions OF the allies
| among the powers Is their common interest
one asks il is Itself prepared TO grant under
given circumstances.
RUSSO-GERMAN ENTENTE.
These are the factors doterminng the
actual value of treaties. n the recent
revelations IL was asserted that until 1890
| "A complete Russo-German entente existed
by which. in the event that either was at
tackled the other would maintain benevo-
| lent neutrality. Whether this is correct
| cannot say. But / know that Clause I
of our treaty with Austria pledges us in the
event of a Russian attack to hasten to the
/ aid of Austria with our whole military
power But il the revelations are correct
we might be placed in the position that.
| I'm the event of war between our two east
ern allies. we should be asked on one side
TO maintain benevolent neutrality and on
| the other 10 support with all our military
4 strength. We should then have to decide
| who was attacked and who was the at
| tacker. This suggestion however. Is only
valuable as an illustration.
when the Austro-German treaty of 1s7e
was concluded a special provision stipulated
/ that I'm spite OF the secrecy OF the treaty
| IL might be communicated confdentially TO
Russia This communication was duly
made In order 10 avert possible difficulties
/ and Observation-Disclosures arising out OF
conditional secrecy. III Caprfvi took an
4 other view Of the reinsurance. IL he scented
dangers i'm unconditional secrecy con-
4 sidered IL ever doubtful whether the guar
/ antees OF peace might not thereby be less
ened, there might be ground for criticisfng
/ his opposing this view. But | maintain
1 the conviction that this experienced and
j conscientious man is above the attack