The Bolivar bulletin. (Bolivar, Tenn.) 1888-1946, 1896-12-11

I
| elements % Our population, leads in only too
many instances. To active and personal partie-
4 ipatlon In the contest The result is that THIS
/ government Is constantly Bellpd upon 10 pro-
Il tect American eitisehs TO claim damages for
/ injuries 20 persons and property, now esti-
mated at many millions Of dollars. and 10 ask
explanations and apologies for the acts OF
/ spanish of5cials. whose zeal for the repression
/ OF rebellion sometimes blinds them to the i'm
4 nunitieA belonging to the unofending citizens
/ Of friendly power. IL follows from the same
/ causes that the United States IS compelled to
actively police long line OF seacOast against
/ unlawful expeditions, the escape OF which the
utmost vigilance will not always suffice 20 pre-
I vent. THESE inevitable entanglemeuts OF the
/ United States with the rebellion in Cuba the
/ large American property interests affected,
ana considerations OF philanthropy and hu-
mainly IN general have led 20 vehement de-
mand ~ various quarters FOR some sort Of
/ positive Intervention on the part Of the United
| States.
IL was at first proposed that belligerent
| rights should be accorded to the insurgents-a
proposition no longer urged. because untimely
and impfaf tical ia operation and clearly peril
Gus and injurious TO our own interests Il has
| been and is now sometimes contended that the
Independence OF the insurgents shOnld be rec=
oguiZed. But IMPERFECT and restricted as the
Spanish government OF the island may be- no
other exists there-unless the will Of the mill
tary OIncer IN temporary command Of a par
hcular district can be dignified as a species OF
government. IL is now also suggested that the
United States should buy the island-a sug-
gestion possibly worthy Of consideration II
there were any evidence OF a desire or will
ingness on the part OF Spain o entertain such
I
methods failing, the existing internecine strife
In Cuba should be terminated by our interven-
I IT1,S s e. ~ ING SOst Ol war 1eI%ten me
vOcates confidently prophesy could be neither
large IN Its proportions nor doubtful in its is
sue The correctness Of this forecast need be
neither affirmed nor denied The United
states has. nevertheless, q character to main
tain as nation, which plainly dictates that
conduct.
Further, though the United States is not a
nation TO which peace is necessity, II is In
truth the most pacthc' OF powers, and desires
nothing so much as 10 live in amity with all
the world. Its own ample and diversified do
mains satisfy all possible longings for terri
sory, preclude all dreams Of conquest, and pre-
vent any casting OF eOvetOuS eve upon neigh
boring regions however attractive. That our
conduct towards Spain and her dominions has
constituted no exception to this national dis
position is made manifest by the course OF our
government, not only thus far during the pres
ent insurrection, but during the ten years that
followed the rising at Yara in 1868.
No other great power, it may safely be said,
under circumstances of similar perplexity,
would have manifested the same restraint and
the same patient endurance. 1t may also be
said that this persistent attitude of the United
States toward Spain IN connection with Cuba
Will unquestionably evince no slight respect
and regard for Spain on the part OF the Amer
lean people. They, in truth, do not forget her
connection with the discovery OF the western
hemisphere, nor do they underestimate the
great qualities Of the Spanish people, nor fail
to fully recognize their splendid patriotism and
their Chtvnlrous devotion to the national honor.
They view with wonder and admiration the
cheerful resolution with which vast bodies Of
men are sent across thousands Of miles of
ocean and an enormous debt accumulated, that
the costly possession Of the Gem Of the An
titles may still hold fits place in the Spanish
crown. and yet neither the government nor the
people OF the United States have shut their
eyes to the course Of events in Cubn or have
failed TO realize the existence Of conceded
grievances, which have led TO the present re-
volt from the authority Of Spain-grievauces
recognized by the queen regent and by
the cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and
enlightened OF Spanish statesmen without
regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms
proposed by the executive and approved by the
legislative branch Of the Spanish government.
IL IS in the assumed temper and disposition of
the Spanish government 10 remedy these griev-
Rnces. fortified by indications OF influential
public opinion in Spain. that this government
has hoped TO discover the most promising and
effective means OF composing the present strife,
with honor and advantage to Spain with the
achievement OF all the reasonable objects Of
the Instruction.
II would seem that II Spain should oner to
Cuba genuine autonomy, a measure Of home
rule which, while preserving the sovereignty
OF Spain, would satisfy all rational require
ments Of her Spanish subjects, there should be
no just reason why the pacihcation Of the is
land might not be effected on that basis. Such
a result would appear TO be in the interest OF
Gil concerned. IL would at once stop the
the island and making IL worthless for which
ever party NAV ultimately prevail IL
would keep intact the possessions Of
Spain without touching her honor, which
will be consulted rather than impugned by
the adequate redress Of admitted grievances.
IL would put the prosperity OF the island and
the fortunes OF its inhabitants within their
own control without severing the natural and
ancient ties which bind them to the mother
country, and would yet enable them to test
their capacity for self-government under the
most favorable conditions.
1t has been objected, on the one side. that
Spain should not promise autonomy until her
insurgent subjects lay down their arms. On
the other side. that promised autonomy, how
ever liberal, IS insufficient, because without
assurance Of tho promise being fulfilled.
But the reaSOnablenesS of "a requirement by
spain OF unconditional surrender on the part
OF the insuTRe1t Cubans before their autonomy
is conceded IS not altogether apparent.
IL ignores important features Of the situation
the stability two years duration has given
10 the insurrection; the feasibility Of its in
definite prOlongation in the nature Of things,
and Imminent ruin OF the island. unless the
present strife is speedily composed; above all,
the rank abuses which all parties in Spain, all
branches OF her governments and all her lead
ing public men concede to exist and profess a
desire to remove.
Facing such circumstances, to withhold the
prefer OF needed reforms until the parties
demanding them put themselves at mercy by
throwing down their arms, has the appearance
OF negIecting the gravest OF perils and invit-
ing suspicion to the sincerity OF any pro-
fessed willingness to grant reforms
The objection on behalf OF the insurgents
that promised reforms can not be relied upon
must, OF course, be considered, though we
have no right TO assume. and no reason for as
Stunning, that anything that Spain undertakes
to do for the relief OF Cuba will not be done Rc-
cording~tO both the spirit and the letter Of the
undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious and
precautions on the part Of the weaker OF two
combatants are always natural and not always |
unjustihRble, and being sincerely DESTROYS in |
the Interest OF both as well as on its own ac- |
count that the Cuban problem should be solved |
with the least possible delay, Il was intinRted |
by this government TO the government of |
Spain some months ago that II o satisfactory |
measure OF home rule we're rendered the Gu |
ban insurgents and would be accepted 10y !
them upon a guaranty OF It's execution, the |
United states would endcavor to ind a way
not objectionable 70 Spain OF furnishing such |
guaranty.
While no definite response TO this intimation |
has yet been received from the Spanish gov |
eminent IL is believed TO be not altogether |
welcome, while, as a treaty is suggested, no /
reason Is perceived why Il should not be ap-
proved by the insurgents. Neither party can /
fail to see the importance Of early action, and |
both must realize that to prolong the present |
state OF things for even short period will add /
enormously to the time and labor and eZpendi- |
ture necessary 10 bring about the industrial |
fore, fervently hoped on all grounds |
that earnest efforts for healing the |
breach between Spain aud the insurgent Gu |
hans, upon the lines above indicated, NAV be /
at once inRuECrated and pushed to an imme- |
diate and successful issue. The friendly Of |
fees OF the United States, either in the man
ner above outlined, or in any other way con-
sistent with our constitution and laws. will al
ways be at the disposal OF either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise, our pol |
icy and our interests would ConStrain US 10 OBJ |
ject 10 the acquisition OF the island or the in /
reference with its control by any other 1
Dover