Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-01-12
dead marked field such as never saw


before or since"
GETTYSBURG.
After Charlottesville On which Long
street had no parU came Gettysburg.
Lee had hoped to draw troops from the
South and develop important results north
OF the Potomac. He wished Beauregard
sent to support the movement, but the
authorities at Richmond failed to compre-
bend his plans. Before the first days bat
tie at Gettysburg Longstreet noticed Lees
nervous condition. when he rode away
from me in the forenoon he made no
mention OF his absent cavalry. nor did he
Indicate that IL was not within CALL so
was at loss 10 understand his nervous
condition, and supported the suggestion
so far as TO say. If he IL there tomorrow
It will be because he wants you TO al
tack and queried. II that height has be-
come the objective. why not take II at
once? We have 1000 men. less the
casualties OF the day; he cannot have
more than 10000 Then II was that
heard of the wanderlngs OF the cavalry
and the cause OF his uneven temper.
80 yexed was he at the halt or ths
Imboden cavalry at Hancock. In the
opening Of the campaign. that he was
losing sight OF Pickett's brigades as
known quantity for battle. His manner
suggested to me that a little reflection
would be beker than further discussion.
and right soUh he suggested to the COM
mander OF the Second Corps TO take
Cemetery Hill If he thought 1t practicable,
but the subordinate did no; care 20 take
upon himself a fight that his chief would
not venture TO order"
He further states that when he left
General Lee, about O'Clock IN the eve
ming. he had formed no plans beyond
that OF selling CUPS Hin as his point
from which to engage, nor given any or
ders for the next day. though his des-
perate mood was painfully evident, ana
gave rise TO serious apprehensons. lie
had heard nothing of the movements OF
the enemy since his crossing the potomac
except the report of the scout. AS inoi-
Gated by these movements, General Lee
was not ready with his plans. he hau
not heard from his cavalry. nor or the
movements of the enemy. further than
the information from dispatch captured
during the night that the Fifth corps
was In camp about five miles from Gettys-
burg and the Twelfth Corps was re-
ported near Cups Hill AS soon as IL
was light enough to see. however, the
enemy was found in position on his Tor
mdable heights. ,,,.,,1.
This We learn Of the second day
struggle: T.
The opportunity for our risht was III
the air General Halleck saw II from
Washington. General Meade saw and
was apprehensive of II. Even G enerai
Pendleton refers to IL in Favorable men
ton In his official report. Failing 10 auop.
III, General Lee should have gone WIN IN, us
to his right. He had seen and careluliy
examined the left OF his iine, ana o.S
gave US a guide to show the way 10 the
right, leaving the battle 20 be adJusted
TO formidable and difficult grounds with
out his assistance. IL he had been WIN
US, General Hoods messengers coulu nave
been referred TO general headquarters,
but to delay and send messshsSIs i've
miles in favor of move that ne nag re-
iected would have been cohtuihdclloss'
The opportunity was with the Conlede-
rates from the assembling on Cemetery
Hill IL was inviting OF their preconcelV-
ed plans 1t was the object or ana eN-
cuse for the invasion as substitute LOT
more direct efforts for the reiief OF NicNs-
burg. Confederate writer's and takers
claim that General Meade could have es-
caped without making aggressive Ddttie,
but that is equivalent 10 CONCESSION OF
the inertia that failed to grasp the op-
There was a man on the left OF
the line who did not care 10 MAKE the
battle win. He knew wnere II was ha9
viewed II from its earliest FORMATION, Aa9
orders for his part in II, but so Withheld
part Of his command from IL as 10 make
cooperative concert OF ACTON lmpracu-
cable lie had a prurlency FOR the nonOls
Of the field of Mars, as eloquent, before
the fires OF the bivOuac and his chief, OF
the glory of wars CORY shield; but wneh
it's envied laurelS were dipping 10 lne
CRASH when the heavy field called Tor
bloody work. he found the placid horizon,
far and away beyond the cavalry, more
lovely and inviting. he wanted command
of the Second Corps, and, succeeding 10
II. held the honored position until Gene
raj Lee found, at last that he must as
,,,fos him from fold service.
Gene.al I.ongstreet designates Lees
censure OF Ewell as unjust and very
ungenerous' Qtaliclsed), and proceeds to
say that "he Nee was excited and on
his balance, was evident on the after
noon Of the list, and he labored under
that oppression until enough blood was
shed to appease him"
THE THIRD DAY.
1.-The general plan was unchanged.
Longstreet, reinforced by Picketts three
brigades, which arrived near the pat
tle-field during the afternoon or the "a,
was ordered to attack the next morning,
and General Ewell was ordered 10 attack
the enemy's right at the same time. me
latter during the night reinforced General
Johnson with two brigades from RodesS
and one from Early's division"
This Longstreet calls heterogeneous"
"Tle did not give or send me orders for
the morning Of the third day. nor did
he reinforce me by Picketts brigades for
morning attack. As his headquarters
were about four miles from the com
mand, / did not ride over but sent 10
report the work of the second day. In
the absence of orders | had scouting
parties out during the night in search
of a way by which we might strike the
enemys left and push 1t down towards
his centre"
Here follows the story Of Pickett's
charge:
General Pickett rode 10 confer with
Alexander. then TO the ground upon which
/ was resting, where he was soon handed
a slip of paper. After reading 1t he hand
ed il TO me. 1t read:
''If you are coming at all. come at once,
or L cannot give you proper support, put
the enemy's fire has not Stacked - all. Az
least eighteen guns are stu nring from
the cemetery itself ALEXANDER"
Pickett said, General shal ad-
vance,
The effort TO speak the order failed and
I could only indicate IL by an affirmative
bow. He accepted the duty with seem
ing confidence OF success, leaped on his
horse, and rode gayly 10 his command.
mounted and spurred for Alexanders
post He reported that the batteries he
had reserved for the charge with the in
fantry had been spirited away by General
Lees chief Of artillery; that the ammuni-
ton OF the batteries OF position was so
reduced tndt ne cOulu not use tueIn III
proper support OF the infantry. lie was
ordered to stop the march at once and
fiji up his ammunition-chests. But. alas.
there was 40 more ammunition 10 be had
The order was imperative. The Confede-
rate commander had fixed his heart upon
the work. Just then number OF the
enemys batteries hitched up and hauled
off. which gave glimpse Of unexpected
hope. Encouraging messages were sent
for the columns TO hurry on-and they
were then on elastic springing STEP The
officers saluted as they passed, their
stern smiles expressing confidence.
PICKETTS MEN.