The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-02-23
.ou,a never bavo driven him out with


necossitated McClellan's straddling me
ChickahomIny IN order 10 connect with
Mcdowell and when he thought 'na'
this connection was almost assured MS
movement was paralyzed by the unileces
sarv marching and counter marching Oh
McDowclls divisions. without any enoo'
and the sending OF only one 10 McN re nan
With Banks's original force OF zo'"ou me-"
at Winchester. with which Blenkei uiNI-
sion OF 10000 men might readily nave pee"
retained instead of being sent on 10 = ~
mont in the mountains OF west NlrsIiia'
a perfectly useless march-Jacksoh' WIN
his force OF 1900 or 1900 men, wouiu
have heeu unable 20 contend ana wouln
scarcely have vcntured upon the unequal
contest This with Wadsworth's force OF
% 900 men IN front Of Washington would
have been 1900 in excess OF the NUMBER
agreed upon for the defence OF Nashihs-
ton
We think that Mcclellan was right IN
saving that Banks, occupying the Sheh-
andoah valley was in the best position
TO defend not only that approach to
Washington. but the road to llarper's
Ferry and above" FINS coronat opus,
and II Banks had not been so weakened,
the detention Of Mcdowell would nave
begn UNNECESSARY. and We must regard
this as q very serious interference on the
part Of the Government with Mcclellan
plans, and one that proved fatal 10 his
success. II was proved in 1861 that the
Valley was the gate 10 Washington. and
10 would have so proved in 1862 II Jackson
had had more force, hut he accomplished
all that was expected Of him, that is, the
prevention OF the reinforcement Of Nc
Clellan and the utter arrangement OF his
plans.
a Ifagftucfc al1y and
interestingly "The Siege of Yorktown"
There should never have been any siege
Of Yorktown. and this Is evidently Gen.
Palfrey's opinion. If tho weak attack Of
part OF W. T. Smiths division Of Keyes'
CORDS had been made i'm sufficient force,
the lines would undoubtedly have been
broken. But Mcclellan showed here as
elsewhere his indisposition 10 be the at
lacking party. and after making this
feeble attempt. he sat down TO dig dirt
and bring up heavy guns. and Gen John
ston allowed him to amuse himself IN
that way until he was ready TO OPEN
when Johnston quietly withdrew as he
had done mt Centreville
Gen. Palfrey. too. discusses the ques-
ton whether Mcclellan had any right 10
expect that the navy would aid IN ST.
lencing the batteries on York river, ana
from the evidence of the naval officials
decides II negatively. 1t may be that the
Navy Department had never given Nc
CleIlan such an assurance, but from the
promised cooperation lof the navy II
might reasonably have been expected.
We have not space 10 follow in detail
this interesting paper, but we may agree
with Gen. Palfrey that ''if Mcclellan had
divided ms army into two or three princi-
pal attacks, there can be no doubt that
Il, hats. I.ap lIrnaCCfIII
which would have assured the success of
all" Certainly if his attack on April 10th
had been followed up. 1t ought TO have
been successful.
Gen. j. w. Palfrey. author OF the
volume on "Antietam and Fredericks-
burg" in the Scribner series, discusses
in the next three papers the period be-
tween the fall of Yorktown and the Seven
Days Battles, these battles to Malvern
Hill, and the battle Of Malvern Hill.
These papers and the preceding one oc-
cupy the ground covered by Gen. Webb's
volume on "The Peninsula in the Scrib-
ner series. and the first $50 pages OF Col.
Allan's Army of Northern Virginia i'm
1857 the best work that has been pub
lished on the campaigns of this army in
this year and one that will always re-
main an authority on this subject
The battle of Seven Pines forms the
principal subject Of the first paper The
failure of Gen. Johnston to accomplish
all that he wished I'm that battle may be
attributed 10 the lack OF cooperation of
Gen. Huger's division on the right. which
caused such delay in beginning the bat
tie. and the further delay in putting in
Gen. G.. W. Smiths division on the left,
which gave time for Summers prompt re-
enforcement Of Keyes
Longstreet and ID. II. Hill made a splen-
AID fight; there IS no question about that;
but had the four Confederate divisions
been concentrated earlier on tho two ad-
yanced Federal divisions, much more
would have been accomplished. The
wOunding Of Gen. Johnston late in the
evening seriously affected the battle OF
the lst of June so that nothing was then
accomplished. Gen. Palfrey speaks Of II
as "a small, short. sharp. infantry fight
lie says. Whether they really tried TO
pierce our line. We shall probably never
know. Smith was in chief command: and.
so FAR as / can remember. he never was
heard OF again. We certainly did not
draw Off, and they certainly did. If they
We're trying TO pierce our line, they failed.
If they were trying TO get away. they
succeeded" But he says further: Il
know that the 1st of June was with us
most anxious day; | know that the
persistency (as we thought iD Of the
Confederates made us fear a complete con-
certration of their whole forces upon US:
/ believed that | knew that day that
Sumner was gravely anxious" II Gen.
Johnston had been in command, there
might have been good ground for this
anxiety.
Passing 10 the Seven Days Battles it
appears that Mcclellan was at last Just
ready 10 attack when Gen. Lee anticipat-
ed him. It has always seemed to us that
the fight Of Gen. \. T. Iill on the even
ing of June 10Th was useless one II
ne had waited until next day the enemy
would have retired from Beaver Dam any
how JacksOn's movement compelled that.
and Hill gained nothing but. on the con-
trary, lost a great many gallant men. 1t
was unfortunate that jackson could not
reach his position on that day. but It
could not be helped.
After earning the title Of foot cavalry 8"
In the Valley. We had marched as fast as
We could. but We could not reach the
field on the 18th. The only delay that [
recall was on the 18th, when we had TO
wait for d. If. iini to march by us and
get on our left. Why he did not march
sooner. | never knew
Gen. Faifrey rightly speaks of Gen.
McClelan's "farcical over-estimate Of
the Confederate force. putting it at from
10000 TO 200. 600 men" @ the latter fig
ure reported TO the Secretary Of War
June %. 1852" and the former. "the more
deliberate estimate OF his report" But
Gen. Palfrey himself puts the figures too
high. lie says: Upon the whole IT seems
probable that they had rather less. than
more. than 10000 He quotes Swintons
estimate near 10000 men," and says;
iii would seem that the number of lO0.