Custer weekly chronicle. [volume] (Custer City, S.D.) 1890-1931, 1896-12-19

because untimely and in practical op-
clearly perilous and injurious to
our own interests. 1t has since been
and Is now sometimes contended that
independence Of the insurgents
should be recognized. But imperfect
and restricted as the Spanish govern
of The island may be, no other ex-
lists there-unless the will of the mill
tary officers in temporary command OF
q particular district can be dignified as
a species of government. 1t is now also
suggested that the United States should
buy the island-a suggestion possibly
worthy of consideration If there were
any evidence Of a desire or Willingness
the part of Spain to entertain such .
proposal. 1t is urged, finally, that, all
other methods failing, the existing In
ternecine strife in Cuba should be ter
minated by our Intervention even at the
cost Of Il war between the United
and Spain-a war which Its ad-
vocates confidently prophesy could be
neither large in It's proportions nor
doubtful in its issue.
A Character to Maintain.
The correctness of this forecast need
be neither affirmed nor denied. The
United States has, nevertheless, q char
acter to maintain as a nation, which
plainly dictates what should be the way
to rule.
Further, though the United States Ia
not a nation to which peace is a neces-
sity, it is in truth the most pacifc or
powers and desires nothing so much az
to live in amity with all the world. It's
own ample and diversified domains sat
isfy all possible longings for territory
precludes all dreams of conquest n
prevent any casting OF covetous eyes
upon neighboring regions, however at.
tractive. That our conduct towards
Spain and her dominions has consti-
tuted no exception to this national dis
position is made manifest by the course
Of our government, not only thus Tar
during the present Instruction, but
during the ten ears that folioWed the
rising at Yara in 1868. No other power.
it may safely be said, under circum-
stances of a similar perplexity would
have manifested the same restraint ana
the same patient endurance. 1t may
also be said that this persistent atti-
tude of the United States towards
Spain in connection with Cuba, UNI
questionably eVinces no slight respect
and regard for Spain on the part [
the American people. They in truth do
not forget her connection with the dis
covery OF the western hemisphere, nor
do thnp UNDERESTIMATE the great Oual-
tiles of the Spanish people, nor fail TO
fully recognize their splendid patriot
ism and their chivalrous devotion to the
national honor. They view with Won
der and admiration the cheerful reso-
luton with which a bodies of men
are sent across thousands of miles or
ocean and an enormous debt accumu
lated that the costly possession of the
gem of the Antilles may still hold its
place in the Spanish crown. And yet
neither the government nor the people
in the United States have shut their
eyes to the course Of events in Cuba
or have failed to realize the expense OF
conceded grievances which have led 10
the present revolt from the authority OF
Spain-grievances recognized by the
queen regent and by the Cortes voiced
by the most patriotic and enlightened
Of Spanish statesmen, without regard
to party, and demonstrated by reforms
proposed by the executive and approved
by the legislative branch of the Span
ish government. 1t is In the assumed
temper and disposition of he Spanish
government to remedy these grieV-
ances, fortified by indications of influ-
entail public opinion in Spain, that this
government has hoped to discover the
most promising and effective means OF
composing the present strife, with hon.
or and advantage to Spain and with the
achievement of all the reasonable OBJ
1nB svsUs nutUriUirIy.
1t would seem that II Spain should Of.
fer to Cuba genuine autonomy-a nea'
sure of home rule which, while preserv.
ing the sovereignty Of Spain, would sat.
isfy all rational requirements Of hel
Spanish subjects-there should be nc
just reason why the pa~cifcation of the
island might not oe effected on tha,
basis. Such a result would appear tC
be in the true interest of all concerned
1t would at once stop the conflict which
Is now consuming the resources of the
island and making 1t worthless fol
whichever party may ultimately pre-
vail. 1t would keep intact the posses.
sions Of Spain without touching her
honor, which will be consulted rather
than impugned by the adequate redress
OF admitted grievances. 1t would put
the prosperity OF the island and the
fortunes Of its inhabitants within Their
own control without severing the nat
ural and ancient ties which bind them
to the mother country, and would yet
enable them to test their capacity for
self government under the most favor
able conditions. 1t has beer objected
on Inc n side that Spain would moi
premise autonomy until her insurgent
subjects lay down their arms; on the
other side, that promised autonomy,
however liberal. Is insufficient, because
without assurance of the promise being
fulfilled.
That the rea~sonableness of the re-
quirement by Spain of unconditional
surrender on the part Of the insurgent
Cubans before autonomy is conceded
Is not altogether apparent. 1t ignores
important features Of the situation
the stability two years duration has
given 10 he Instruction, the feasipii-
ity of it's indefinite prolongation in the
nature Of things and, as shown by its
past experience, the utter and immi-
nent ruin OF the island, unless the pres
ent strife Is speedily composed; above
all. the ran abuses which all parties in
Spain, all branches of her government
and all her leading public men concede
to exist and profess a desire to remove.
Facing such circumstances to with
hold the proffer Of needed reforms un-
tH the parties demanding them put
themselves at mercy by throwing down
their arms has the appearance OF neg
Letting the gravest CT perils and invit-
ing suspicion as to the sincerity of any
professed willingness to grant reforms.
The objection on behalf of the insur-
gents that promised reforms cannot be
relied upon, must Of course be consld-
cred. though we have no right to as
sumo and no reason for assuming that
anything Spain undertakes to do for
the relief Of Cuba will not be done ac-
cording to both the spirit and the letter
of the undertaking. Nevertheless, real
izing that suspicious and precautions
on the part of the weaker OF the two
combatants are always natural and
not always unjustifiable, being sincere
ly DESTROYS in the interest of both az