Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-02-04

army. It was hinted that between the COM
mander-in-chief and myself there was a
misunderstanding, ard that my army to
Use the term employed by the Spaniards
was deserted by Gen. Gomez and left in
the province of Pinar del Rio to be trapped
Such statements are so ridiculous that seri-
Gus people would not give them any consid-
Grafton, but still there are many Others even
among our most sincere friends and sup
porters, who might be foolish enough 10
think there was some foundation for the
rumors.
In the first place. there can be no such
thing as a misunderstanding. or runture
or whatever you may choose to call it, be-
tween General Gomez and myself He is the
commander-in-chief and as such his orders
are as laws to me. / am but lieutenant gem
erai OF the army, and at all times, in all
places and for all reasons, 1 am subject to
his commands.
Our army Is not organized on a rabble
Easis. The man who talks the loudest is
not the commander But it is organized on
the plan of a modern military force, where
order and discipline are maintained, and re-
spect for superiors invariably enforced:
All Loyal to Gomez.
But aside from rlles of military discipline
there is not soldier in the Cuban army who
would consider for an instant the disputinr
OF the words or commands of AIaximo
Gomez The entire army confides implicitly
In his patriotism and his military ability
we who have known him ard followed him
IN other wars are tco certain of our own
comparative weakness to doubt his wisdom
and judgment.
AS to the statement that he took his COM
mand and hurried back to Havana, leaving
u.s. as the Americans would say, "in the
lurch." will say nothing regarding 1t. We
have our own plans of fighting the battle
of Cuba, and 1t is not necessary that the
whole world be taken into our confidence
The Spanish government would like to know,
why we separated our forces in Pinar del
Rio. 1t would like to know why Gen. Co
mez marched back to the border of Matan-
zas. 1t would be pleased to know Just why
we make certain moves, and just why we
DO not make certain other ones.
When the authorities cannot see a plau
sible reason for some, to them, important
acton on the part of the rebel forces they
Immediately concoct some agreeable theory
ana spread 1t broadcast Still we do not
complain, and If they obtain any satisfac-
ton therefrom we are not worried.
But 1t has appeared strange to me that
~->SSS
themselves. They have done it from the
beginning of the war. and doubtless will
continue to the end. And yet they do not
seem to realize that they picture their own
Righteousness to the world; for what can
people think who having read the Spanish
dispatches saying that the revolution is
only pigmy affair the next day read OF
more troops embarking from Spain to re-
inforce the army Of over 100000 men al
ready here?
Gen. Campos was fond of carving ont
that policy, for while he sent nightly dis
patches to cheer the queen, the ministry
and the people, he was preparing to leave
for home because he was unable to put
down. Or even seriously hamper, the move
ment of rebellion.
The Invasion OF Pinar del Rio.
AS to the invasion Of this province there
Is nothing on our part to complain of.
must confess that the whole people of the
province were not anxious for US to come.
but it was because they feared their crops
would be destroyed. This has not, how
ever. been true, for we have been very
careful in all our marches to avoid the to-
bacco fields. for the tramping of several
thousand men would, of course, ruin the
crops.
What have we accomplished by our inva-
sion of the province? A great deal. In the
first place we drew the attention of the au-
thorities to this end of the island, and
6,O00 reinforcements under Nunez, Sanchez
and my brother. Jose Maceo, were enabled
to march from the eastern end Of the island
to the province Of Havana without having
a serious engagement. We needed these re-
inforcements to make better showing il,
the capital province, and we needed new
supply Of ammunition, etc, and did not
wish to march our forces back to the