The San Francisco call., 1896-08-26

ton" and subdivision twenty-four provides
that all of the provisions in the section re-
lating to counties of this class shall take i'm
mediate effect. These provisions of section
ITO, if literally construed, are in direct con-
aict with the provisions of section 90 in this
respect, that by section 60 ''all elective county
and township officers are to be elected every
four years. while by subdivision twenty-six of
section 40 'the officers mentioned in sec
tion 81 of this act' are to be elected every
two years, and from this repugnaEce it is con-
tended that the act is thereby rendered OF no
effect.
Intention of the Legislature.
1t is cardinal rule that a statute shall be
given effect, If possible, and, if by proper con-
struction of the language used in different sec
tions provisions which are apparently con-
ficting can be harmonized, it is the duty OF
courts to so interpret the statute that all It's
provisions will be allowed to stand. 1t is not
TO be assumed that the Legislature lntenaeQ
by the same statute to enact two inconsistent
provisions and to declare that the terms OF al
county officers should be four years and at the
same time that they should be two years. For
the purpose of ascertaining the intention Of
the Legislature in the matter we may con-
slider the form in which the different
provisions OF the statute nave Deels
the different provisions in reference 10 otner
parts of the act The provisions tor hololng
an election every two years is found IN a SUD.
division of the section relating 10 counties OF
the eighth class and should not be construed
as applicable to any other class or as lmpalrlng
the previous provision of all classes, unless
imperatfvely required by its language BY
limiting the clause used in this subdivision OF
section 17O, "the officers mentioned in section
81 of this act" to the officers mentioned IN
section 81, who may be elected IN counties Oh
the eighth class, we avoid construction
which would neutralize the provisions OF Sec
ton 60 and at the same time follow natural
rule of construction, In holding that the
Legislature intended the provisions of
section 17O for counties OF the eighth class
alone, and that all of its subdivisions are SUD
ordinate to this intention ana fnapplicabie 10
the counties of any other class This con-
struction finds support in the TACT that the day
upon which the election OF county ofhcers is
to be held is found only in section 90, whereas
subdivision 20 OF section lfo geslgnates mere
elected, thus impliedly referring TO the former
section for the day of election and making that
section applicable to the oncers OF tne
eighth class 1t must, therefore, be held that
the Legislature did not intend that the pro-
visions of this subdivision OF section 10
should be applicable to any other county tnan
those in the eighth class.
The nuestion is then presented, What effect
does this special provision for the counties OF
this class have upon the entire act 1t is con-
tended by the apPeants. ~. tnat Dy feas3n SO o,e oa
class the uniformity of the act, which is re-
quired by the constitution, is DESTROYED ana
that the entire act is void. 1t is not 10 be con-
troyerted that a statute providing for system
of county governments which in Its terms is
limited to q portion of the State would be In
contraYention of the provisions OF the constr
tuition which require the Legislature to pass a
uniform system for the entire State; bur 1t is
contended by the respondent that the speclai
provision for one class OF counties IN an act
purporting to provide for all classes may be
disregarded as being beyond the power OF the
Legislature and the general provision OF the
act sustained and made applicable 10 all the
counties OF the State.
An Demonstrations Provision.
Whether a statute containing an unconsti-
tutional provision, with others which are con-
stitutloual will be sustained as to those which
are constitutional and held Invalid merely as
to those which are not, depends upon the
nature OF the different provisions IN view OF
the evident purpose of the Legislature. II the
provisions are so interdependent that those
which are invalid are to be regarded as the
condition or consideration upon wh1eh otners
were enacted, and it is evident that the Legis-
lature would not have enacted the statute ex-
cept in its entirety, and did not intend that any
part should have effect unless the whole could
be made operative, the entire statute must
be held invalid. On the other hand, II The
different parts of statute are seyerabie and
independent of each other, and the PROVISIONS
which arc within the constitutional power OF
the Legislature are capable of being carried
into effect after the void part has been
eliminated, and it is clear from the
statute itself that it was the intent of the Leg
islature to enact these provisions irrespective
of the others, the unconstitutional provisions
will be disregarded and the statute read as II
these provisions were not there. FOR the pur-
pose of statutory construction the intention OF
the Legislature, as shown by the general scope
and purpose OF the law, is TO be ascertalned.
1t is never to be assumed that the Legislature
intended to enact an unconstitutional statute
or that it supposed that any part of an act was
beyond its constitutional power; and II the
general scope of sn act is within its power the
act is not to be rendered null by reason OF
subsidiary provision which was beyond its
power TO enact. ii the manifest purpose Of the
Legislature can be carried into effect by up
holding the act and dlsregardlng sucn suDsio-
iary provisions that purpose Will not be de-
feated by an uneonstitutio nal provision con-
tanned in a subordinate section in the act.
The title OF the present act is. 'An act to es-
tn blsh uniform system OF county and town.
ship governments" and this title, as well as
the scope OF the statute, may be considered for
the purpose of determining the intention OF
the Legislature. 1t must be assumed, from the
language used in the title, that the Legislature
intended to comply with the constitutional
requirements to provide for the election OF
county officers by a uniform law applicable to
all the counties in the State, and that the act
in question should be operative throughout
the State. By reason or the constitutional pro-
hibition against the passage of q special or
local law on this subject, any separate act con-
tanning the provisions OF subdivision twenty
six of section 40 would have been invalid and
would not have affected the uniformity OF
the general act. The provisions of this sub
division are none the less unconstitutional
when made an integral part of g general act
from which they are seyerable than they
being unconstitutional, may be disregarded as
fully as though embodied in separate statute.
In Chris tie vs.. Board of Supervisors, 80 CAL,
g. the Legislature had changed the time tor
the election of the Supervisor of Sacramento
County and provided that the terms of three
of the Supervisors then in Office should be ex-
tended for two years beyond the time for
which they had been elected. To the conten-
tion that the Legislature had no power to
extend the term of Office, and that, therefore,
the entire act was invalid, it was said that the
power to change the time of the election was
unquestioned and that it was perfectly plain
that such was the evident purpose of the
act, and that "if in addition 10 the exercise
OF this undoubted power, they have coupled it
with an attempt to perform an unconstitu-
tionai act by continuing the incumbent in
Office until October, 1871, the only result
would be that the attempt would be abortive
and that portion of the act would be void. But
this result would in no degree impair the eff
cheney of the act as valid enactment changing
the time OF the election from 1869 to 1872
Similar principles were announced in People
VS.. McCreary, "a Cal, 433; Rood VS.. McCargar,
40 Cal, III; and Mills VS.. Sargent, SO Cal,
379 (see also, Robinson VS.. Bidwel % CAL,
379). Mr.. Cooley in his treatise on constitu-
tional limitations, p. 211, states the rule as
follows:
The Act Is Valid.
'eThe constitutional and unconstitutional
provisions may even be contained in the same
section and yet be perfectly distinct and separ-
able, so that the first may stand though the