The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-04-20
ITALY'S FIGHTING MEN
EVIDENCE OF THEIR BRAVERY IN
THE RECENT AFRICAN AFFAIR.
Battle with the Abyssinfans a Repetf-
ton, ON u Great Scale, OF the
Famous Charge at Balaklnva.

Rome Letter in New York Post.
Some recent remarks in the Evening Post
respecting the Abyssinian disasters as bear
ing on the qualities Of the Italian army seem
to me clearly erroneous. AS to the battles
fought, that at Saati, in the early days of
the colony, was a decisive victory, though
in that Of Dogali a single battalion, taken
by surprise on the march to reinforce Saati.
was surrounded and exterminated; but 1t was
said by the rebels who went out to bury the
dead, that they lay in their ranks as they
stood fighting, with not a fugitive, while the
Abyssinian losses were such that Ras Alulia,
who commanded. withdrew to the hills and
left Saati unmolested. In the next battle.
which took place at Agordat. the Italian force
attacked and routed a Dervish army three
times its strength in one of the most brilliant
battles in the history of African enterprise,
the Dervish loss exceeding the number of the
Italian army. This was followed shortly
after by the capture of Kassala, a fortified
position taken from the Egyptians by the
Dervishes several years before, and stormed
by the army of General Baratierl, who has
now been defeated at Adua.
The present war opened with a revolt Of a
minor chief of the coded province and a bat
tie at Halai, in which the rebels were defeat
ed and dispersed. with the loss of their chief.
Closely following this came the attack OF
Mangasha, one of the preterders TO the
throne, and son, by a concubine, of Johannes,
the defeated and dead rival Of Menelik, at
the head of fourteen thousand Abyssinians,
armed with rifles, and four thousand spear
men. The battle, in which less than four
thousand Italian troops, mostly African bat
taiions under Italian officers and organiza-
tion, were attacked at Coatit, with all the
well-known courage of the Abyssinians, end
ed in the total defeat Of Mangasha, pursued
till the night made it impossible to carry pur-
suit further, and the remnant of the f~ugitives
escaped to Shoa. But Menelik, who had fur
nished and organized the invasion Of Manga
sha, now set to. work on the preparation of
an expedition i'm which all the strength OF
the empire should be called out, and gathered
an army of eighty thousand rifemen. fur
nished with arms of the latest patterns and
abundant ammunition by the French agents,
grown careless, and, though warned by the
government, from information received by its
agents at leila, of the extent of the prepare
tons, left his outpost at Amba-Alagi unSup-
ported and delayed the recall until too late.
This force was attacked by the leading divi-
sGUp Of snd 5ns ADy is 2 stro arm g !; n nn9o5siae55
position, and, after a hard-fought battle last
ing all the morning, and in which the Abys-
sinian losses were greater than the Italian
q AOtACat was 0CASA III ~
of It about seven hundred men escaped from
the field, over one thousand OF them having
shed IN d ineir Places oSf sb the sa .51sntlng e of m,l 5fers
critics OF most European nations, and even
including French.
UNFIT FOR COMMAND.
1t was now evident that Baratieri had
become either physically, mentally, or mill
tarily so demoralized that he was unfit for
command, and the Ministry desired to re-
call him. substituting Baldissera: but polit-
ical influences prevailed, Baratieri being an
influential Deputy on whom future hopes
were based by the group of ~Piedmontese
politicians who opposed the Ministry, and
who had influence enough in the higher re-
gions to prevent the change. Baratieri was
advised to remain on the defensive and be
prudent. while the Abyssinians took po-
sition at Adua, in a very strong position,
recognized, indeed, by the general as Inn
~pregnable. In a dispatch OF the morning Of
positions were equally formidable. a wide
valley separating the two armies. Here the
time passed in the slow Generalization OF
the Italian army; the general seeming, ac-
cording to the evidence of correspondents
present and OF several officers. to be at
tackled by s~oftening of the brain. He him.
self says in his report that he was hardly
conscious OF what he was doing or why he
gave the order to attack. The result we all
Knoxville most disastrous defeat ever
known in African wars. But the fighting
edge" Is to be seen In the losses, nearly
half the army. and in fighting, for the pur-
suit OF the retreating remnant was very
brief. take from the report just printed,
drawn up from the evidence of the sur
vivors, a portion, that relating to the Da
Bcrmida division:
Cut off. the enemy having broken through
the center. the Da Bormida. brigade re-
manned alone on the battlefield, fighting
till night, bravely, heroically. Towards
a. m, Da Bormida had sent UP on a height
on M loft aHh0nG RI 80 NAnAnaI n
bertone. the battalion of irregulars (mobil.
lied militia. Africans under their own
chiefs). which fought Tor a half hour
against overwhelming. forces. and then was
obliged to retire with a heavy loss; two
battalions sent In support could not fire
efficiently without hitting our own men,
es of the enemy were moving on him from
the right, attacked them, deployei, repulsed
them, and advanced nearly to the camps
the moment our men believed. that they had
won the victory; but, the enemy always in
creasing. Da Bormida ordered a retreat in
a direction diverging from the center, and
effected 1t in echelon with counter attacks
at the point of the bayonet. TIE artillery
fantr gre exhausted au ted a nearly ali it's sn car tns y.
In this retreat la Bormida fell riddled with
balls.
But this was at Z p. m. The men had beer
marching all night and went into the battl,
faSting. Inc OmcerS VINO last saw the Zen
eral say that when the retreat was begun h,
said TO them, go on. my lads; l will sta,
here" and. lighting a cigar. faced the enem,
and was shot down.. The, force of the Abys
sinian army was six times that Of the Italian
which had marched by moonlight twent,
miles over a country cut up by ~ravines. most
ly unreconnoitered. and SO difficult that II
places 1t was necessary to take the gum
from the mules backs and carry them b,
hand: and as the General had three days be
fore decided to fall back from the position!
the provision reserves had been sent on, an
the whole army was on short allowance TO
the three days before the Hight, into which
1t entered without resting. The enormous su
1 abled them to flank the Italians and attacl
the reserve before it had formed or extricat
ed itself from the ravines. and threw Ii int,
confusion al the greater that, from the ma
ture of the attack, they supposed that tn,
main body In front had been annihilated
In confusion II retreated. being the only divi
sion that moved from its positions withou'
the order to retreat. In spite Of losses in tn
others, in actual nghting. quite unprecedentes
in modern warfare. except at Amba-Alagi
Several battalions were practically annihi
lated without moving from their positions
three-fourths of the officers failing out Of tn
total number in the battle. The Abyssin
ian dead were SO numerous that the parie
mentaire sent TO Menelik to arrange for tn,
burial of the Italian dead reported that tn,
Abyssinians had not been able 10 bury thei
own from the number.
Troops without any fighting edge dom
hight in that way, and there were offers
during the few days succeeding the battle
OF thousands Of volunteers from all parts o