Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-03-18
'tEEGAVE THE ORDER
Argument That Gen. Longsirset Failed
10 Do What Mas Expected Of Him.
MIR. RoYALL ON GETTYSBURG.
He Gives n Highly Interesting Ac-
count of the Famous Battle and
c.mpatrn and Points ont why the
Confedcrates Did Not Win.

lawyer and editor. delivered his inter-
es,ing lecture on THE Battle and cam
palen of Gettysburg" at the Theatre las.
night for the first time in Richmond anu
II was heard by a very apprecia'''e
audience The lecture, or aoureSs' "a"
Mr.. Royal rather prefers to call H. was
under the joint auspices Of the Daughters
NJ the Confederacy and the veteran
Cavalry Association. and for the Deneht
of the ]. r. b. Stuart monument fund'
Mr. Royall was gracefully INTRODUCED
NV President r. w. Sydnor, OF the Ve'e-
ran Cavalry Association, and prefaeed
his address by explaining with id'se
chart the situation at Gettysburg whe"
the memorable fight took place and the
positions OF the troops, etc.
THE DISPARITY OF FORCES.
After this brief explanation Mr.. Royal
,sean bis address. "Whie much has
been written about the battle and cam
paign OF Gettysburg" he said, much YET
remains to be written. The world mas
never vet come to understand the utter
disparity OF forces with when Geherai
Lee undertook the invasion OF Pennsyi-
vania.' -,.,. ..
The lecturer referred to authorities 10
proye that General Lees army at Gettys-
burg did not consist Of more than oI,VV
men--infantry, cavalry, ana atuiis'1
while Meade had upon the battle-heid an
Of a hundred and five thousand men, win
1000 men on his left flank, at harper
Ferry under General French, ana larsS
force on his right flank under Genetal
Couch, which was certainly as much as
10000 men, and perhaps much larger.
lot
demonstration, and the world would come
20 finally admit them to be so. Ihere
was a prevalent impression, ne salo' lna'
General Stuart, with the cavalry, was
wrongly away from General Lee wheh
the battle came on. This was an err.
He did not have time, he said, 10 discuss
& but a full treatment or II coula DC
seen In General Fitzhugh Lee Lie Vi
General Robert IL. Lee e,..,
Stuart had full authority under General
Lees orders to do all that he ana. anu
,he speaker added that If stuart hau Deeh
present and HAD prevented the oatue ol
Gettysburg coming on Just az II oiu 0oino
IN he would have done General Lee the
greatest dsservice that he couiu nave
rendered him.
SKETCH OF THE BATTLEFIELD.
Mr. Royall briefly sketched the battle
Of July Isl. Two divisions of HiPs Corps
came accidentally upon the outskirts Oh
cattyeburs ON the first day of July In
conflict with the First and Eleventh
Corps Of Meade's army; told how there
was a fierce battle Joined, and now TWO
divisions of Ewelrs Corps coming up III
the nick OF time thestwo Federal corps
were routed and driven pell-mell through
gettysburg. with a loss in killed, wound
ed and prisoners Of more than half OF
their numbers, as well as their command
ing officer General Reynolds. who was
killed ,.
The action was over at about O'CLOCK,
when General Lee arrived, and sent word
10 General Ewell to press on and &C.
crnv the heights in rear of Gettysburg,
(the position from which he vainly es-
saved TO drive Meade during the next
~tWc days). Ewell was cautioned, now
evsr, not to bring on general engage
rnents, as Longstreet's Corps had not
come up.
Whether in obedience TO this caution, or
because he thought he could not take
the heights, Ewell did not attempt 1t,
and he has been much censured for not
doing so; but, said Mr.. Royal. General
Early. one Of the first military critics
this country ever had, has examined
this question in very able paper, pun
lshed in the Southern Historical Society
papers. and has demonstrated that Ewen
would probably have failed If he had
attempted TO occupy the heights that eve
ming.
But. said Mr.. Royal, II General Ewen
had occupied those heights that evening.
II would have been a case like that OF
the cavalry-he would have done Gene
rel Lee the very greatest disservice pos
sible as he said he would proceed 10
show.
HOW THE FIELD LAY.
Mr. Rovall then described In detail the
situation Of the opposing armies when
night closed down on the LIST day oil
July and at light on the morning OF
the I'd. He thus described the battle
field:
"stand at washington. with your face
to the northwest. fish-hook in your right
hand, the bend OF which is pointed TO
the northwest. with the short shank OF
II on the northeastern and the long shank
on the southwestern side, with the
town OF Gettysburg directly in front OF
the bend OF the hook. Little Round
Ton mountain was at the end OF the
long shank OF the flsh-hook. This fish
hook gives a fair idea Of the Federal
position at daylight Of July I'd. one
division of the Twelfth Corps was In line
OF battle on the short shank OF the
hook. 1t was extended around the hook
by the remnants OF the Eleventh ana
First corps, ana 1eaTS > DNioioh VI tHt
Twelfth, about three thousand strong, ex-
tended the left OF the First Corps along
the long shank OF the hook. leaving
gap OF more than a mile between its left
and Little Round-Top.
There was nothing In line Of battle at
sunrise of the second In this gap. The
Third Corps (Sickles's) consisted OF
Birney's and Humphreys divisions. each
containing three brlgades. Two brigades
OF each reached the field Of battle during
the night Of the 1st and went Into
camp between Little Round Top and
Gettysburg, inside Of the fish-hook. Each
division had possibly 1000 men--S.000 be-
stween the two. Two brigades OF this
corps had been left at Emmetsburg. and
they did not come up until o'clock the
next morning. These were all the troops
that General Meade had present at sun
rise n the second day.
GENERAL MEADEs FORCES.
There were $4,000 In line. and $1,000
in camp as described. Ills next nearest
force was the Second Corps Hancock's)
which camped on the evening OF the
first four miles from the battlefield
and did not reach the field until o'clock
the next morning The next was the
Fifth Corps Sykess) which camped nine
miles from the battlefield. and did not
come up until 8 o'clock the morning OF
the second
His next. and only other force. was the
Sixth Corps Sedgwicks). which camped
twenty-five miles from the field, and ala
not come up until the afternoon OF the
second.
4. The Confederate position was this:
All of Ewells Corps was up and was IN
line OF battle around Meade's right and