The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1896-12-10

AAOo A14N1 1LNA
for supposing it always was to have beer
IN fact), government merely on paper
Were the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists in the open or in pitch
ed battle, prompt and decisive results
might be looked for and the immense
superiority of the Spanish forces in mum.
bers, discipline and equipage. could hard
ly fail to tell greatly to their advantage
But they are called upon to face foe
that shuns general engagements that
can choose and does choose its own
ground that from the nature, from the
condition, visible or invisible, at pleasure
and will, fight only from ambush and
when all the advantages Of position and
numbers are on its side. In a country
where all that is indispensable to life in
the way of food, clothing and shelter is
SO easily obtainable, especially by those
born and bred on the soil, obviously there
is hardly limit to the time during which
hostiities of this sort may be prolonged.
Meanwhile, as in all cases of protracted
civil strife, the passions of the COM
batants grow more and more inflamed,
and on both sides become more frequent
and deplorable.
They are also participated in by the bands
of marauders who, now in the name of
one party and now in the name of the
other, as may best suit the occasion, har-
rass the country at will and plumber its
wretched inha abitants for their own ad-
vantage. Such a condition of things
would inevitably entail immense destrue-
ton of property, even if it were the policy
of both parties to prevent it as far as
practicable. but while such seemed to be
the original policy of the Spanish govern
mpnt IL has now anna raptly a an Inn al
| it and is acting upon the same theory as
the insurgents, namely, that the exigen-
| cics of the contest require the wholesale
| annihlatiOn of property, that it may not
prove of use and advantage to the enc
my.
1t is to the same end that in pursuance
of general orders Spanish garrisons are
now being withdrawn from plantations
and the rural population is required to
concentrate itself in the towns. The
sure result would seem to be that the value
| that unless there is a speedy and radical
change in exhisting conditions it will
soon disappear altogether. That value
consists, very largely, of course, in its
| capacity to produce sugar, capacity al
ready much reduced by the Interrupt
ton to tillage which has taken place dur
ing the last two years. 1t is reliably
asserted that should these Interruptions
continue during the current year and
practically extend, as 1t is now threat
ened, to the entire sugar producing ter
ritory of the island, so much time and
so much money will be required to restore
the land to its normal prOductiveness that
it is extremely doubtful il capital can be
induced to even make the attempt. The
spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining
country, by nature one of the most fer
tile and charming on the globe, would
engage the serious attention of the
government and the people of the Unit
ed States under any circumstances. In
point of fact, they have concern with
it which is by no means of n wholly SEN
timental or philanthropic character 1t
lies so near to us as to be hardly separ-
ated from our territory. Our actual
pecuniary interest in it is second only to
that of the people and government of
Spain. 1t is reasonably estimated that
at least $30000,000 to $5000O,000 of
American capita, are invested in planta-
tons and in railroad, mining and other
business enterprises on the island. The
volume of trade between the United
States and Cuba. which in 1889 amount
ed to about S64. 100000, grew in 1893 to
about $103,000,000, and in 1894, the year
before the present insurrectiOn broke out,
amounted to nearly $96,00O,000. Be
sides this large pecuniary stake in the
fortunes of Cuba the United States
finds itself inextricably involved in the
present contest III other ways. both vex-
atious and costly.
Many Cubans reside in this country
and indirectly promote the insurrection
through the press and by public meet
ings; by the purchase and shipment of
arms; by the raising of large funds, and
by other means which the spirit of our
institutions and the tenor of our laws do
not permit to be made the subject of
criminal prosecution. Some of them,
though Cubans at heart, and in all their
feelings and interests, have taken out
papers as naturalized citizens of the
with view to possible protection by
this government and not unnaturally re-
gardcd with much Indignation by the
country of their origin. The insurgents
are undoubtedly encouraged and support
ed by the widespread sympathy of the
people of the country who always instant
ly feel for every struggle for better and
freer government, and which in the case
of the more restless elements of our popu-
active and personal participation in the |
contest. The result is that this gov
ernment is constantly called upon to
protect American citizens, to claim dam
ages for injuries to person and property
now estimated at many millions of dol
lars, and to ask explanations and apollo
gies for the acts of Spanish officials whose
zeal for the repression of rebellious |
sentiments blinds them to the |
immunities belonging to the non
offending citizens of friendly pow
err 1t follows from the same causes that |
the United States is compelled to actively |
police long line of sea coast against un-
lawful expeditions. the escape of which |
the utmost vigilance will not always suf-
fee to prevent. These inevitable entan-
clements of the United States with the
il Cuba, the large American
interests affected, and considera-
tions of philanthropy and humanity in
general have led to a vehement demand
in various quarters for some sort
Of positive Intervention on the part of
the United States.
NO BELLIGERENT RIGHTS.
1t was first proposed that belligerent
rights should be accorded to the insur-
gents, proposition no longer urged be-
cause untimely and in practical operation
clearly perilOus and injurious to our own
interests. 1t has since been and now
sometimes contended that the indepen-
lence of the insurgents should be recog-
lized but imperfect and restricted as
he Spanish government of the island may