The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-03-18

yesterday morning and spent the day
upon the battlefield with Major Gen
eral O. O. Howard, who commanded
the 18th corps of the Army of the
Potomac in the struggle. General
Lee remained In the town over night
with Commodore Virginius Newton,
of Richmond, and this morning again
visited the field for three hours.
THE GETTYSBURG DISPUTE.
IT am we'll satisfied with the result
of my visit" said General Lee to
'the Press" representative, as he
climbed into the carriage at Bloody
Angle to return to town. II wished
to get certain data regarding distances,
nature of the country and positions of
troops in the Confederate line. 1have
decided the battle in my life of Gen
eral Lee. but I shall write another
story Of the fight to meet more fully
the attempts made to shift the burden
of disaster upon the shoulders Of Gen
eral Lee.
II was surprised and sorry to read
many passages in General Longstreet's
book that would seen to indicate that
advancing years have made his mem
DRY vague concerning the battle, for
proven facts contradict these state
ments fatty. These allegations have
been rehearsed many times-that Lee
lost his head at Gettysburg and had
no plan of battle, that be was respon-
sible for Pickett's useless charge; that
he regretted that he had not taken the
advice of Lorgstreet, that be was un-
willing to take the responsibility for
the critical movements Of his forces
and that he failed to issue the orders
needed to make the sunrise attack
on the second day successful.
"Taking up his last point first,
Longstreet tries to explain why when
ordered to attack with his whole force
at sunrise he did not get into action
until 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
Meade was not eager for battle; Lee
was. As late as 3 p. m. on the I'd,
and before he was attacked, Meade
t%elegraphed in cipher to Ha!leck, that
if the enemy did not attack, and he
finds it hazardous to do so. or is salts
fed that the enemy is endeavoring to
move to my rear, and interpooe be-.
tween me and Washington, I shall
fall back to my supplies at Westmin.
ster.'
LEE DESIRE TO FIGHT.
Lee, impressed with the idea Ct
whipping his opponent in detail, on
the other hand, was eager for the con-
test next day and so was his confident
enemy. He was under no obligation
to anyone, as Longstreet afirms, to
fight a defensive battle; he sought the
enemy's soil to gain a victory. and
his objective point was the army Of
the Potomac. He knew the Union
army had not been concentrated and
was anxious to attack before it could.
He had already talked with Longstreet
on Seminary Ridge on the afternoon
of July 1st and attempted to impress
him with the Importance of an early
attack next day, and later that night
saw him again.
The Confederate commander was
anxious at first that Ewell and Hill
should begin the battle, and seemed
apprehensive that Longstreet might
not get into position as Don as condi-
tions demanded, but finally yielded to
the opinion expressed that Longstreet
should commence Ghe battle by a for
ward movement on Hills right, seize
the commanding positions on the
enemy's left and e%nvelop the flank Of
the troops in front of the other two
corps.
Lee left the conference, Early states,
with the distinct understanding that
Longstreet would be ordered to make
the attack early next morning. Gen,
eral w. N. Pendleton, his chief of
artillery, has put on record that Lee
told him that night that he mad order.
ed General Longstreet to attack on
the flank at sunrise next morning
Hill, in his official report, says "Gen.
eral Longstreet was to attack the flank
of the enemy and sweep down his
line And General Long, of Lee
staff, writes that orders were issued
for the movement to begin on the left
early as practicable. Lees plan OF
battle was simple. His purpose was
to turn the enemy's left flank with
his 1st corps and after the work began
there to demonstrate against his lines
with the other two in order to prevent
the threatening flank from being rein
forced, these demonstrations to be
converted into a real attack as the
fanking wave of battle rolled over the
troops in their front.
THE FATAL MORNING DELAY.
"When Lee went to sleep that night
he was convinced that his dispositions
for hattie next day were understood