The true Democrat. [volume] (Bayou Sara [La.]) 1892-1928, 1896-12-12
Continued from 1st page.

IL IS NO" 6lSO suggested tilat tlle tHl-
ted States should buy the island, sug
gestion possibly worthy OF cOnsidera-
ton If there were any evidence Of
desire or willingness on the part OF
Spain to entertain such q proposition.
1t is urged, finally, that all oher meth
DDS failing, the existing internccine
strife be terminated by our Intervention.
even at the cost Of war between the
United States and Spain, war, which
lis advocates confidently propllcsy could
be neither long in it's proportion nor
doubtful in its issues. Correctness Of
this forecast need be neither affirmed
or denied. The United States has ney-
.ertheless a character to mainain as a
nation, which plainly dictates thatrisht
and not might should be the RUE OF its
conduct Further than the right. the
United States, If not a nation TO which
which peace is a necessity, Is II truth
the most pacific Of powers and there is
nothing 50 desirable as to live in aNity
with the world. It's own ample and d.
versfied domain satisfies all possible
longings for territory and prevents any
SlSlIHS VI COFetOuo eJ Is upDii it!o !'po!
ing regions, however attractive.
1t has beefs objected on the one side
that Spain should not promise automny
until her insurgcnt subjects lay down
their arms. On the other side that
promised autonomy, however liberal. is
insufficient, because without assurance
Of the promise being fulfilled. But the
~ re mi bvy
Spain Of conditional surrender on the
part Of the insuvgent Cubans before
their autonomy is conceded is not alto
gether apparent. It ignores important
features OF the situatiOn-the stability,
two years duration, has given TO the in
surrection, the possibility of its indeti-
mite prolongation in the nature OF things,
and as shown by past experience, the
utter and imminent ruin Of the island,
unless the present strife is speedily
composed, and above all, the rank
abuses which all parties in Spain, all
branches Of the government and all her
leading public men concede to exist and
profess a desire to remove. Facing
such circumstances to withhold the
proffer Of needed reforms until the par
ties demanding them put themselves at
mercy by throwing down their arms
has the appearance OF negiccting the
gravest of perils and inviting suspicion
as to the sincerity Of any progressed
Willingness to grant reforms. The oO-
lection on behalf the insurgcnts-tnat
promised reforms cannot be relied up
on-must Of course be considered
though we have no right to assume and
no reason for assuming, that anything
Spain has undertaken for the relief OF
Cuba will not be done according to both
the spirit and letter Of the undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicious
and precautions on the part OF the
weaker Of two combatants are always
natural and not always justlfiabe
being sincerity DESTROYS in the interest
OF both as we'll as its own account, that
the Cuban problem should be solved
with the least possible delay, it was in
timated by this government to the gov
eminent Of Spain, some months ago,
that If a satisfactory measure OF home
rule were rendered the Cuban iEsur-
gents and would be accepted by them
upon a guarantee of itseXec' ution, the
United States would endeavor to find
way, not Objectionable to Spain, Of fur
nishng such guaranty. While no def
mite respone to this ntimation has yet
been received from the Spanish gov
eminent, it IS believed to be not alto
gether unwelcome. While, as already
suggested, no reason is perceived why
it would not be approved by the insur-
gents neither party can fail to gee the
importance Of early action. and both
must realize that to prolong the present
state Of things for even a short period
will add enormously to the time and Ia
Dor and expenditure necessary TO bTinS
about the industrial recuperation OF the
island. It is, therefore, fervently hoped
on all grounds, that earnest efforts for
healing the breach between Spain and
the insurgent Cubans, upon the lines
above Indicated may be at once inau-
gurated and pushed to an immediate
and successful issue, the friendly OFF,
ces Of the United. States, either in the
manner above outlined, or in any other
way consistent with our constitution
and laws will always be at the disposal
Of either party. Whatever circuHs tan
ces may arise, our policy and our in
terests would constrain us to object to
the acquisition of the island or an inter-
ference with it's control by any other
power. 1t should be added that it can
not be reasonably assumed that the
hitherto expectant attitude Of the Uni
ted Safes will be indefinitely maintain
ed While we are anxious to accord all
due respect to the sovereignty Of Spain
we cannot view the pending conflict in
all It's features, and properly apprehend
our inevitably close relations to 1t and
it's possible results, without considering
that by the course Of events we may
be drawn into such an unusual and I'M
precedented condition as will fix linn
it to our patient waiting for Spain to
end he contest, either alone and in her
own way, or without friendly co-opera-
ton. When the inability of Spain to
deal successfully with the insurgents
has become manifest, and it Is Demon
Strated that her sovergnty is extinct