The sun., 1896-01-26

SooPfHhto Win MIN after tN uereht
at the island Of Ko-je. That was the turn.
ing point In the Japanese invasion OF the
sixteenth century. The author OF this book
would not attribute so exaggerated an i'm
portance to sea power rs to assert that, with
out the victory at Ha-yang Island. tho Japan
csc campaign In China during the present con-
test would have failed. so overwhelming was
Japan's military superiority and so complete
was Chinn's collapse. that probably no SIN
gle event could have altered the fortunes Of the
war. But the crushing defeat of tho Chinese
navy and the consequent command Of the sea
acquired ut the outset by the Japanese facili-
tated all the operations Of the latter and enabled
them TO land their armies when and
where they chose, and to devise and
execute plans of campaign which would have
been too hazardous in tho absence OF naval
supremacy. For this reason 1t is that, though
tho battle OF Hai-yang Island was fought only
two days after the battle at Phyonp- yang and
although all the Japanese troops were still In
Corea and remained there for over a month
longer before invading the Middle Kingdom,
this naval engagement Is, in this book. placed at
the beginning of the campaign In China. Tho
naval victory had no influence over tho Corean
campaign. which had already been decided two
days before, but It was a most important fnctor
In the next campaign OF tho Japanese and con-
tributed to their brilliant success.
".
A chapter is devoted TO tho capture in q single
day Of the huge and presumably impreRnable
naval fortress Of Port Arthur, by tho second
Japanese army under Marshal Oyama. This
wonderful result Is attributed to fundamental
error Of the Chinese. who imagined that war
consists In preparing vast amount OF first class
war material without any regard to tho ques-
ton whether tho soldiers that are to use It are
moro undisciplned rabble. enlisted at a mo-
ment's warning. The author notes that tho
Chinese fired their guns willingly enough. but
did not employ much infantry fire; when they
did use their rifles It must have been at very
long range II we may Judge from the small
proportion Of killed TO wounded among the
Japanese troops By the fall Of Port
Arthur tho Japanese wore placed in pos
session of tho best dockyard in tho far
East. provided with every mechanism for re-
pairing ships of war. They had now splendid
naval base of operations at tho enemy's door.
1t is calculated that the machinery, docks, &C..
at Port Arthur represented . valuo of sixty
million yen. about thirty million dollars in
gold. All this was purchased At q very small
cost of life: there were, indeed, but 270 Japan
csc placed hors dc combat, Of whom tho ridicu-
lously small numb of lS represent those actu-
ally killed in battle. though many. Of course,
afterward sucoumbed to their wounds. The Chi
nese on their part, lost over 1000 killed. Our
readers will remember tho sensation which the
fall of Fort Arthur produced. Not only on
lockers in tho West but the foreigners
residing in the far East had been inclined to
depreciate the Jauanese victories rhese had
been won In obscure corners of Coren and the
Chinese frontier. and the Japanese accounts
were suspected Of exaggeration. 1t was also
assumed that China had not had timo to put
forth her whole strength. and tho belief was
general that, with few months of preparation,
tho Chine.e could repulse any Japauese attack
on such a formid able fortress as Port Arthur.
All these surmises were refuted by one days
fighting. Now for tho first time. at Pekin.
serious alarm was felt. Tho despIsed enemy
seem.d At rho pates. An attempt was bur
r,eolv made 70 avert the imminent danger.
and n neace rni.sion was nroiected Ru, Chinese
1--we of subterfuoe waa not vat crushed. and in
stead of sendlng vell-known statesmen with
fulI now.rs a few irrasnonsihle Euro,rans with
inadeouate credentials were despatched to
lama, The Toxic Gov.rnment naturally "a.
frse6 to oman n.uo,,.tion. with .uch envov.
and no,ite,v sent than hack. the Janane,e peo-
ple were indignant and considered the sham
mi,.ion "A an insult to the national dignity.
Tho Wei-bai. Wei campaign was very short.
Th. Ara. troop. belonoinp to the third Japsness
army landed. near the city of Yune.chene. on
IN. mainland of China proper. on the 2Oth of
January. 1925. On the 10th OF February they
were in nossession of forts And ships. In four
weeks the army had disembarked. advanced
attack ed and won the place. The actual fight
ino onlv last.l two w.ews from ,he 3O,h of
January IN tho 10Th of February And it would
not have lasted 40 lonv but for the violent
storm. which suspended all operations for two
davs and gave the brave Chinese Admiral Ting
vh,ch would hav. given his shins mncb troub,e
nh. c.,,nra NJ this urs., naval fortrss. wa. tbs
mo.t dramatic snisoae of The war. nothing
indesd wa. wanting IN enhapce tho rnectacular
,,.,. - - .L ,,I.,
of tho struggle could be observed: military at
tacht. and naval ofscers from men ,f war be
longing to the PRINCIPAL nayies of the world fol-
lowed with intense curiosity all the operations:
and the Japanese. conscious that they were act
inr before a gallery of nations. determined TO