The Portland daily press., 1896-01-28
MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX.
Gen. Longstreet's Memoirs Of the Civil
War.

war
Simple and Graphic Narrative of ths
Most Important Battles of the Civil
War-Bull Run, Antietam and Gettys
bnrs-Closing Scenes of the Conflict.
There are but few remaining of the
prominent commanders of the civil war on
either SIDE OF the Confederate Generals,
james Longstreet is almost the only one;
hence his memoirs Just issued by J. B.
Lippincott of Philadelphia, and of which
j. O.. Adams and Co. of 25 Brownfield
street, Boston, are the New England
agents may be looked upon as almost
the last word from that side. Long
street was one OF Lees atlsst and most
trusted lieutenants. His military CON-
neotions with the rebellion began early
and continued until the collapse of the
Confederaoy. He was prominent in the
first battle of Bull Run and his memoirs
contain long account of that conflict.
THE first pouring down volleys," writes
Longstreet 'were most startling to the
new troops. Part of my line broke and
started at run. To stop the alarm ]
rode with saber in hand for the leading
files. determined to give them all tina,
was in my sword and my horses he els,
or stop the break. They seemed to see al
much danger in their rear as in front,
and soon returned and marched back tt
their nlaona fn he ,;e ~
the enemy. As the experience of botl
commanders was limited to staff seryiot
it is not surprising that they failed te
appreciate the Importance Of prompt and
vigorous maneuvers in the hour of battle.
Beauregard gave indications Of COM.
prehensive military mind and reserve
powers that might, with experience
and through encouragement from the
superior authorities, have developed him
into eminenoe as field marshal His
adversary seemed untoward, not adapted
to military organization or combina-
tions. Most of his mon got back to
Washington under the sheItering wings
of the small bands of regulars. The
supplies of subsistence, ammunition and
forage passed as we marched through
the enemy's camps toward Centerville
seemed ample to carry the Confederate
army on to Washington. Had the fight
been continued to that point. the troops,
in their high hopes, would have marched
in terrible effectiveness against the de
morallzed Federals. Gaining confidence
and vigor in their march, they could
we'll have reached the capital with the
ranks of McDowelps men, The brigade
at Blackburn's Ford Give regiments)
those at McLean's and Mitchell's Eords,
all quite fresh, could have been re-en-
forced by all the cavalry AMI most of the
artillery, comparatively fresh, and later
by the brigades of Holmes E we'll and
Early. This favorable aspect for fruitful
results was all sacrificed through the as
authorities of staff officers, who,
upon false reports, gave conference.-the to
the orders OF their chiefs.''
Longstreet narrates in graphic man.
ner the experiences of the peninsula cam
paign, the fighting at Malvern Hill, Fair
Oaks and Seven Pines and the subse-
quent campaign against Pope; the ad-
Vance into Maryland which ended with
the defeat of the Confederates at Antie-
tam and the subsequent operations at
Charlottesville and fredericksburg, Con-
corning the battle Of Gettysburg, Gen.
Laongstreet says:
Gen Lee said that the attack of his
ri t,t NO sr,.,s i
which he should not have said. He
knew that l did not believe that SUCCESS
was possible: chat care and time should
be taken to give the troop the benefit OF
positions and the grounds; and he should
have put an officer in charge who had
more confidence in his plan. Two-t thirds
of the troops were of other commands,
and there was 10 reason for putting the
assaulting forces under my charge. He
vlsed in favor of that end of the line for
battle. Knowing my want Of confidence,
be should have given the benefit of his
presence and his assistance in getting
the troops up, posting them, and arrang-
ing the batteries; but he gave no orders
or suggestions after his early desigHa-
ton of the point for which the column
should march. Fitzhugh Lee clai ms evil
denoe that Gen. Les did not even appear
were being assigned to position.
Gen. Lee was on the field from about 3
o. clock of the afternoon of the first day.
Every orde. given the troops of the 1st
Corps on that field up to its march on
the forenoon of the I'd was issued in his
presence. IL the movements were not
satisfactory in time and speed of moving
it was his power, duty and privilege to
apply the remedy, but it Was not part
of nhar'o nj nr privi1pCa tn
witness things that did not suit him.
fail to apply the remedy, and go off and
with his staff officers about it.
In their efforts to show culpable delay in
the movements of the 1st Corps on the
3D., some of the Virginia writers endeavor
to show that Gen. Lee did not even give
me guide to lead the way to the field
from which his battle was to be opened.
He certainly failed to go and look at it.