Omaha daily bee., 1896-03-24
MUST ANSWER THE QUESTION
Supreme Court Hands Down a Far-Reaching
Decision.
COMMERCE COMMISSION GAINS A POINT
Law Granting Immunity 10 Parties
Compelled to Testify Concerning
violations of the Interstate
Commerce Act Held Valid.

United States today in the case of Theodore
f. Brown, involving the right of a court to
compel an answer by a witness t. questions
put by the Interstate commission,
Notwithstanding he may plead self-incrimina
ton as the result of an answer. The de-
cision was opposed to Browns contention
that he was protected by the constitution
from this requirement and the decision of
the court below was affirmed. The opinion
was handed down by Justice Brown. Justices
Field, Shiras, Gray and White dissented,
holding that the constitutional provisions
were sufficient to relieve Brown from the
requirements to answer.
In announcing his opinion Justice Brown
said the question involved was whether the
law Of 1898 specifically relieving witnesses in
interstate cases from prosecution
when they reveal facts which might incrim-
mate themselves operates to take from wit
nesses in such cases the privilege of silence
as guaranteed by the constitution, and the
conclusion was that it did. He said this act
was in the nature of a general amnesty in
such cases and had been SO regarded and up
held In half a dozen decisions in the state
courts.
Replying to the objections that while the
act served as a protection to witnesses
against prosecution it did. not shield them
from the disgrace involved in confessing a
criminal act. Justice Brown said it did not,
nor was it contemplated by a provision in
the constitution that one should be shielded.
He added in response to objections that the
law would operate to protect a witness from
prosecution in the state courts, the federal
statutes being superior to those of the
states, that the latter statutes are the SUI
preme law of the land and apply in the state
as well as in the federal courts. He also adj
vanced the opinion that in this case the re-
fusal of Brown to give his testimony was due
rather to his desire to shield others than
himself. AS Brown was only the auditor of
the road his duties were not of such a char
acter that he could be held criminaiiy liable
for any violation of the law. 1t was the in
tention that the constitutional provision
should protect from real and substantial
dangers and not from imaginary evils, as in
this case. The consequence Of granting i'm
munity from answering to such officials
would inevitably be to render the interstate
commerce laws incapable of enforcement and
the result would be to PROSTATE congress at
the feet Of the powerful. railroad corporations
of the country.
The decision of the circuit court for the
western district of Pennsylvania requiring
him to answer the questions as nropounded
was therefore affirmed.
PROTECTION is AMPLE.
Justice Br5wn said the case involved an
alleged incompatibility between that clause
of the fifth amendment to the constitution,
which declares mo person shall be com
Sllth III any iiii " pS q ililGS
against himself" and the act OF congress
of February /, 1893. This act had. he said,
been passed to meet the defects in the inter-
state law, pointed out in the case
of Counselman against Hitchcock. The
clause of the constitution was, he said, sus-
ceptible Of two interpretations. If construed
literally, and the witCess be left to deter
mine the matter for himself, the practical
result would be that no one could be com
PEELED to testify to a material fact in a
criminal case unless he chose to do so, or
unless it was entirely clear that the privilege
was not set up in good faith. If, on the
ether hand, the object of the provision be to
secure the witness against a criminal prose-
cution which might be aided directly
or indirectly by his disclosures, then, if
no such prosecution be possible, a statute
absolutely securing to him such immunity
from prosecution would satisfy the demands
Of the clause in question.
THE danger he said, "of extending
the principle announced In Counselman
against Hitchcock is that the privilege may
be put forward for a sentimental reason
fcr a purely fanciful protection of the wit
ness and for the real purpose of securing
immunity to some third person who is inter
ested in concealing the facts to which he
would testify. Every good citizen Is bound
to aid in the enforcement of the law, and
has no right to permit himself, under the
preteXt Ct shielding his own good name, to
be made the tool Of others who are DESTROYS
of seeking shelter behind his privilege. In
the present CASE he said, "it was clear that
Brown was not the chief or even a sub.
stantial offender against the law, and that
his privilege was claimed for the purpose
of shielding the railway or its officers from
answering a charge of having violated its
provisius. To say that, notwithstanding
his immunity from punishment, he would
incur personal odium and disgrace from
answering these questions, seems too much
li1yN on nhttpn n n q n utI % IN Il nat 81
serious consideration.
But even IL this were true, he would
still be compelled to answer, If the facts
sought to be elucidated were material to
the issue. If, as was justly observed in
the opinion of the court below, a witness
standing in Browns position were at liberty
to set up an immunity from testifying, the
enforcement of the interstate commerce law
or other analogous acts wherein it is for the
interest of both parties to conceal their
misdoings, would become impossible, since
it is only from the mouths of those having
knowledge Of the inhibited contracts that the
facts can be ascertained."
MUST PROTECT HIMSELF.
On the point of shielding a witness from
disgrace, he said: "a person who commits a
criminal act is bound to contemplate the con-
sequences of exposure to his good name and
ought not to call upon the courtsto protect
that which he has himself esteemed to be of
such little value. The safety and welfare of
an entire community should not be put into
the scale against the reputation of a self
criminal, who ought not, either In
justice or in good morals, to refuse to dis
close that which may be Of great public util-
ity in order that his neighbors may think
well of him. The design of the constitutional
privilege ID not to aid the witness in yindi-
his character, but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence
to convict him of a criminal charge. If he
secures legal immunity from prosecution. the
possible impairment Of his good name is a
penalty which 1t is reasonable he should be
compelled to pay for the common good.
Justice Shiras read a dissenting opinion, In
which Justices Gray and White concurred, In
he took the position that the federal
would not shield the witness from prose-
in the state court and expressed the
opinion that the failure 10 enforce the law of
1893 would not weaken the interstate COM
law. Justice Field also read a dis
opinion. He held that the amnesty
granted in the congressional act OF 1893 was
IN effect a pardon and said that only the
could exercise the function of par
1Oning. He commended that the constitutional
provision was intended as much for the pur-
pcse of preventing the infamy and disgrace
4 man might bring upon himself by incrim-
mating himself while on the witness stand.
40 for his protection against prosecution, he
1ontendel that the law in question did not
ibrogate the constitution; first, because the