Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-03-18

between Geary's left ana Little hounu
IT, =, ,,ah, on INC I'd. he would have
caught Birney's and Humphreys uNis'Vn'
in bIouyac. they would have been sur
nrlssd and Instantly routed ana, Win
I,onas,reet marching down IN rear y,
Meade's line, with Ewell ana a. T. mn
attacking his front, everything tnere NUS s,
have been crushed and gobbled up. Inc
Second Corps QiancockD woulu: Oh
co.tse have come no as rapidly az pos
.ihle hut the affair would have been over
before he could get there. and he must
have been destroyed In turn. Sykes, COM
ING nm two or three hours later, with the
Fifth Corps, must have met with the
same fate. and the same would have hap
nened 10 Sedgwick, II he had come up
with the Sixth.
Mr.. Royal examined the evidences that
General Lee directed General Longstreet
10 attack Meade's left at light on the 20
with great elaboration. and claimed that
they proved to demonstration that
General Lee was eager to have the attack
made, and that he ordered Longstreet
10 make the attack at light, though Gene
raj Longstreet denies that any such order
was given.
THE ERROR OF LONGSTREET.
He claimed, therefore, that General
lOuHSlItetS u Ildht tiiio hetN~'N
according to General Lees wishes lost
us the battle. and our independence. He
did not claim that General Longstreet
dlsobeyed orders, but his conduct was,
the speaker said, an Illustration OF the
difference between Longstreet and jack
son. If General Lee had told jackson on
the evenig of the 1st that he wanted
Meade's left attacked on daylight OF
the ID. he need never have said another
word The troops would have been in
position. and the attack would have been
made at light. But General Longstreet
was opposed to fighting a battle at Get
tysburg. He wanted to swing around
Meade's left. threaten Washington. and
force Meade TO attack us. Instead OF sub
ordinatng his judgment to that OF his
commander, he spent the next morning
arguing with General Lee, and insisting
that the attack. If made, should be post
poned until Picketts Division came up;
and in this way he lost precious hours.
in which time Meade got all of his forces
W.
WHAT THE RECORDS SHOW.
The records now show that General
Lee knew perfectly well what he was
about. and that If Longstreet had loyalty
co-operated with him In pressing for
ward his plans. instead of pulling back
ana tnWdIunS MIN All tHdl TIC SOuiu'
Meade must have been destroyed. The
records now show that General Lee was
all right, and Longstreet all wrong.
When Longstreet did attack at 4 o'clock
on the evening OF the I'd, he. fought
very brilliant battle. with the divisions
OF Hood and McLaws. numbering less
than fifteen thousand men, he fought be-
tween forty and forty-fve thousand.
driving them all off the field.
Mr.. Royal then gave full history
of the dispatch from President Davis TO
General Lee. which was captured by Uric
Dahlgren and carried to General Meade
during the night of July 3D. just when a
council OF war that Meade had called
was considering the question whether
the Federal army should retreat or
should stay and fight the third-days' bat
tie. This dispatch. he claimed, decided
Meade TO stay and fight.
The remainder of the address was de-
voted to a description of the charge of
Picketts Division. which was made on
the third day.