Spirit of the age. [volume] (Woodstock, Vt.) 1845-1913, 1896-12-12

Thinks the Cuban War May BE Pro-
longed indefinitely.
We're the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists In the open, or In pitched
battle, prompt and decisive results might be
looked for, and the immense superiority Of
the Spanish forces In numbers, discipline
and equipment could hardly fail to tell
greatly to their advantage. But they ire
called upon to face foe that shuns general
engagements, that can choose and does
choose its own ground, that from the NIL
ture OF the country Is visible or invisible mt
pleasure, and that fights only from ambus-
cade and when NIL the advantages OF position
and numbers are on its side. In country
where all that is indispensable to life
In the way Of food, clothing and shelter is
SO easily obtainable, especially by those
born and brel on the soil. 1t is obvious that
which hostllities OF this sort may be pro-
longed. Meanwhile, rs in all cases OF pro-
tracted civil strife, the passions OF the COM
batants grow more md more innamcd and
excesses on both sides become more frequent
and more deplorable. They nre also partic
pated in by bands OF marnuders. who, now
in the name OF ono party and now In the
name OF the other. as may best suit the oc-
/ cason, harry the country ut will and plum
der Its wretchel Inhabitants for their own
I advantage. Such a condition OF things
would inevitably entail immense destruction
]
both parties to prevent 1t rs far us practica-
! bic. But while such seemed to be the origi-
nal policy ofthe Spanish Government, it has
now apparently abandoned 1t and Is acting
upon the same theory as the insurgents,
namely, that the eXigencies OF the contest re-
quire the wholesale humiliation Of properly.
that 1t may not prove OF use and advantage
to the enemy.
1t is to the same end that in pursuance Of
general orders Spanish garrlsons are now
being Withdrawn from plantations and the
rural population required to concentrate it.
seem to be that the industrial value Of the
island is fast diminishing, and that unless
there is speedy and IA tical change In ex.
Isting conditions it will soon disappear alto.
gether. That value consists very largely,
Of course, in its capacity to pro-
reduced by the Interruptions to till
age, which have taken place during the
last two years. 1t is reliably asserted that
should these Interruptions continue during
the current year and practically extend. as
ls now threatened, to the entire su yar-produc-
ing territory OF the island. 30 much time ami
80 much money will be required to restore
the land to Its normal productiveness that it
Is extremely doubtful II capital can be in
dueed to even make the attempt.
Our Pecuniary Interest in Cuba.
The spectacle Of tho utter ruin Of an I'D
Joining country, by nature one OF the most
fertile and charming on the globe, would en-
gage the serious attention of the Government
and people of the United States in any cir
concern with 1t which is by no means of II
wholly sentimental or philanthropic chara.-
ter. 1t lies so near to US as to BIZ hardly
separated from our territory. Our actual
pecuniary interest in 1t Is second only to that
OF the people and Government of Spain. 1t
10 nuhf nokf fnoof fnd hat nk fna,,
e3O,00O,00O to s5O,O00,OOO Of American
capital are invested In plantations
and in railrond, mining and other
business enterprises on the island. The vol
ume OF trade between the United States aud
Cuba, which in 1889 amounted to about
900, and in 1894, the year before the present
insurrection broke out, amounted to nearly
$0f,00O0o0. Besides this large pecuniary
stake In the fortunes OF Cuba, the United
States finds itself inextricably involved in
the present contest in other ways both veXa.
tious and costly.
Navy nnhans -nsi.;a in -ahis country u nd in.
directly promote the insurrectIon through
the press, by public meetings, BY the pur-
chase and shipment OF arms, by the raising
OF funds, and by other means, which the
spirit OF our institutions and the tenor of our
laws do not permit to be made the subject Of
criminal prosecutions Some OF them. though
Cubans ut hnart aud In all their feelings and
interests, have taken out papers as natural
ICED citizens Of the United States, proceed
ing resorted to with view to possible pro-
lection by this Government, and not unnat-
urally regarded with much indignation by
the country Of their origin. The insurgents
are undoubtedly encouraged and supported
by the widespread sympathy the people OF
this country always and instlnctively feel
for every struggle for better and freer gov
srnment, and which, in tie case OF the more
a.
population, leads in only too many
Instances to active and personal rarticipa-
tion in the contest. The result is that this
Government is constantly called upon to
protect American citizens. to claim damages
timatsd tim % at many S % millions of dollars, and to
ask explanations and apologies for the acts
Of Spanish offlcials, whose zeal for the re-
preston OF rebellion sometimes blinds them
othe immunities belonging to the unoffend-
ing citizens Of friendly power. It follows
from the same cause that the United states
sea cost against unlawful expeditions. the
escape OF which the utmost vigilance will
not always suffice to prevent.
The Question of Intervention.
These inevitable entanglements OF the
United States with the rebellion in Cuba, the
large American property interests affected,
and considerations OF philanthropy and hui
demand In various quarters for some sort OF
positive Intervention on the part OF the
United States. It wns at first proposed that
belligerent rights should he accorded to the
insurgents-a proposition no longer urged
because untimely aud In practical operation
clearly Ierlous and Injurious to our own
interests. 1t has since been and is now
sonnet lines contended that the Independence
Of the insurgents should be recognized. But
imperfect and restricted as the Spanish
government Of the island may be, no other
exists there-unless the will OF the military
officer in temporary command ofa particular
district can be diynifled rs n species OF
government. 1t is now also suggested that
the United States should buy the island
a suggestion possibly worthy of consideration
II there were any evidence OF desire or
willingness on the part OF Spain to entertain
such proposal. 1t is urged, finally, that.
all other methods failing, the existing inter- |
necine strife in Cuba SHOULD be terminated
by our intervention, even Mt the cost of war
between the United States and Spain-a war
which its advocates confidently prophesy
could be neither large tn its proportions nor
doubtful in Its ISSUE
The correctness OF this forecast need be
neither affirmed nor denied. The United
States has nevertheless a character to main
tain as a nation. which plainly dictates that
right and not might should be the rule OF its
conduct. And yet neither the Government
nor tho DeOpI0 OF the UNlt0u SlatcS nave suut
their eyes to the course OF events In Cuba, or
have fnilcd to rcatize the existence OF con-
ceded grievance, which have led to the pres
ent revolt from tho authority Of Spain
grievances recognized by the Queen Regent
and BY tho Cortes, voiced by the most patri.
otic and enlightened Of Spanish st stesmen,
without regard to party, and demonstrated
by reforms proposed by the executive and
approved by the legislative branch OF tho
Spanish Government. 1t is In the assumed
temper and disposition Of the Spanish Gov.
ernment to remedy these grievances, fort
fed by indications OF influential public
opinion In Spain, that this Government has
hoped to discover the most promising anu
effective means OF composing rue ptsseh. pa.
strife. with honor and advantage to Spain
and with the achievement of all .he renson-
able objects Of the Insurrection.
Cleveland's Plan for Ending the war.
1t would seem that II Spnin should oher
to Cuba genuine autonomy-a mehsure VI