The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1896-01-28

erly be said that this is of no conse-
quence. and that an exception may be
introduced IL in accordance with JUS
tice. Let us then see what sort or JUS
tice is effected by his novel doctrine:
The case aimed at evidently Is that OF
a supposed roguish promisor; but let
US suppose an instance in which the
rogue, as Is often the case. Is not 50
shrewd as he imagines himseh 10 De,
and that he is mistaken in his notion OF
the understanding of the promisee, ana
also in that OF the true Interpretation
OF the contract. which is correctly APP
pretended by the promisee and very
much to his advantage. On the doc
trine here enacted into law, the promi-
see, although perfectly honest, Is de-
prived of this advantage, the true IN
depreciation of the contract Is set ASIDE
and another engagement, not desired
by the promisee, substituted In It's
place upon which II is conceded the
minds of the parties never met.
THE law of partnership Is enriched
by some novel additions. One styled
Remuneration of Partnership permits
any partner, even though the associa-
ton is to continue for a fixed time, 10
exonerate himself from all future Ia
bility to third persons by giving notice
TO them. After this he cannot claim
any of the profits of the partnership,
but yet II is not dissolved, unless his
co-partners choose to make this renun-
citation a ground for dissolution. This
seems to give a man the privilege OF
viola ting his contract at pleasure. What
the renouncing partner had agreed
with his o-partners was TO furnish his
responsibility for a definite period. IL
may be said that the exercise OF the
privilege of reconciliation is not VIOLA
ton Of contract, but an act in pursu-
ance of II. But where Is the wisdom OF
precluding persons from agreeing TO be
liable for each others acts for a def
mite period IL they wish. 1t may be said
that an express agreement not to re-
nounce would still be effective. III this
view be taken of the section, IL
amounts to nothing more than to say
that the mere fixing of a term for the
continuance of a partnership shall not
mean what it has ordinarily been un-
derstood as meaning. In the definition
of the mutual obligations of partners II
is declared That they are trustees for
each other within the meaning OF
Chapter one of the Title on Trusts;
now all trustees mentioned in that
chapter are subject to removal for
cause, and new trustees may be APP
pointed in their places which would be
a novel procedure in the case of CO.
partners; but as the trainers of this
code have, as already observed, enacted
that they are not always to be taken to
mean exactly what they say, no other
harm is likely to arise from this provi-
sion than the litigation requisite to an
authoritative declaration of its mean
ing.
1.-The trainers of systems of laws do
not always sufficiently remember that
so far as respects the ordinary doc
trines Of the common law, an innumer-
able host of cultured human intellects,
many of them of transcendent ability,
have been studying and rejecting for a
thousand years upon what is just, fit
and expedient in all the ordinary affairs
of life. The final conclusions reached
| by this process are not likely to be
amended by the work of few revisers
giving comparatively brief attention TO
| each particular topic. Anything new
that may be thus suggested in the field
| thus long and diligently explored will
| be likely to be found erroneous. 1t is
| only where changes have occurred in
| life and affairs, that is, in the subject
matter to which laws are applied, that
| the prior conclusions may be in some
respects re-shaped or supplemented"