Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-07-01


The next day there was delay and un-
certainty on the part of the Confederates'
who spent most Of the day gathering
arms. and some severe fighting, wnlcn
had no decisive results. and when. IN
the afternoon, President Davis put Gene
raj Il. T.. Lee I'm command OF the army
he decided that II was not best TO con-
tlnue the battle on that ground, and re-
tired his troops to their old positions.
the FederaIs being only too glad 10
get rid of them, and not venturing to fol-
low.
Seven Dnys' Battles.
General Lee at once took In the situa-
ton. formed his plans, and proceeded to
execute them.
Mcclellan had 10000 men encircling
Richmond. strongly fortified. splendidly
equipped aid abundantly supplied with
everything hat could promote the EN-
cheney OF an army. He was hoping Tor
the return Of McDowell's 1900, who had
gone from Fredericksburg on the boot
less errand Of "bagglng Stonewali jack
son." He hal, also. 10000 troops at Fort
ress Monroe, whom he could speedily
call TO his help. and he was sendlng
the most piteous appeals TO Washington
for more reinforcements against the over
whelming numbers of the rebels
General Lee had only $1,000 men, yet
he had no idea of awaiting a siege, but
determined 10 assume the aggressive.
Sending j. r.. Il. Stuart on his famous
ride around Mcclellan" he thus learned
the weak points in the enemys line, ana
determined to cut him off from his base
at the White House and drive MIN
from his position in front vi Richmond
If he could not destroy the Federal army.
He drew from North Carolina and the
all no he could Obf1ln-1lNe
brigades in all-and. after Jackson had
finished his brilliant Valley campaign. by
lefeating at Cross Keys and Port RepuD-
ic. the two armies sent TO capture him
Lee ordered him 10 deceive the enemy
so as to make the impression that ne
would advance down the Valley again
and then hasten TO his assistance In
driving Mcclellan from his position.
This jackson did so effectualiy that
the enemy was terrifying against an ex-
pected attack from him ~ Strasburg, at
The very hour that "old Stonewall and
his foot cavalry were numbering on
McClellans right flank on the Chicka-
hominy. After Jackson had Joined him
Lee had bare 5000 men of all arms
with which to attack McClelian's 10000
in position and ten thousand more
at Fortress Monroe within easy
call. Add to this the fact that Nc
Clelan had naturally strong positions.
fortified with the skill OF able engineers
and ample material and At will be seen
that Lee undertook a bold task, and exc
cuted It with consummate skill, backed
by the heroic conduct of his troops. He
has been criticised as SLOW and eau
tious." but certainly his conduct in the
''Seven-Days' Battles" does not show this.
MecbanicsviIIe and ElIcrsOn's MIL.
Mcclellan had purposed attacking from
his left flank, on the south side Of the
Chckahominy. and on the 18th OF June
made a strong demonstration against
General Hugers position, but was re-
pulsed. and driven back 10 his old line.
The day before he got information from
a deserter, which he did not credit, that
Jackson was advancing on his flank, and
telegraphed to Washington. only TO find
the authorities there i'm profound igno
rance of Jacksons whereabouts. On
the afternoon of the 18th, however. he
got information from ian intelligent con-
traband," which convincad him that
Jackson was, indeed, advancing on him;
that Beauregard was in Richmond with
a heavy force, and that his gallant lit
tie army" would be compelled to meet
IAN overwhelming force of at least 20O-
600 rebels" His telegram TO Secretary
Stanton. dated June %, 1852, 6:15 T.. NJ,
was decidedly panicky, and. among other
things. said: Il will do all that
a general can do with the splendid army
| have the honor TO command and, il II
Is destroyed by overwhelming numbers,
can at least die with IL, and share its
fate
CONFIDENTIAL BATTLE ORDER.
General Lee had issued his confidential
battle order on the oath TO the effect that
General Huger and General Magruder
should hold the lines south of the Chick
ahominy that Jackson should camp on
the night of the 25th at some convenient
point near Slash church, west of
the Central railway. and move at
8 A. NJ. ON the 26th on the road
leading to Pole Green church; that
Branch's Brigade should cross the Chick
ahominy as soon as notified that Jackson
was moving on the Pole Green road. and
that the rest of A. Il. HIPS Light Dl-
vision" should cross at Meadow bridge
Gust above where the Chesapeake and
Ohio railway now crosses the Chickahom-
iny) and move with Branch on Mechan-
icsyille: that as soon as a. u. Hill had
driven the enemy from Mechanicsville
Longstreet and ID. III. Hill should cross
the Chickahominy at that point, Long
street supporting A. =. Hill and ID. VI. Hin
Joining Jackson as they should push the
enemy down the north side of the Chick
ahomny. and cut him off from his base at
the White House on the Pamunkey, ana
that Huger and Magruder should closely
watch the enemy In their front. attack
him II suitable opportunity offered, and
closely pursue him IL he abandoned his
works and retreated