The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-01-01
Assign Of the. Times.

It is a remarkable thing even in
this day of reconciliation that, while
Henry Watterson, southern man, is
going around leoturing about Abraham
Lincon, Professor Andrews Of Rhode
Island is reoitipg rhapsody oD
Robert E. Lee. 1t looks, indeed, as
if time were overthrowing the illusions
Of sectional prejudice and establish
ing decisions of truth.
The second lecture of the Savannah
lyceum course last night was on Gen
eral Lee. The Guards hall was
crowded. Professor Andrews had
served as soldier in the northern
army. He had fought Lees troops
more than once. he is in position to
give many interesting hints about the
war. What he says about the great
Confederate chieftain was drawn from
the trenches and the field. It is the
observation Of private soldier and
this is valuable.
Professor Andrews reviewed the
ancestry Of Robert E. Lee, ''the
noblest Roman Of them all" he
came from race of warriors, a family
of conquerors. His generalship was
marked from the moment he took COM
mand in Richmond after Joseph E.
Johnston had been wounded and
Albert Sidney Johnston had been
killed. The first achievement of Lee
was the march against Pope. 1t was
brilliant campaign, FOR while Pope
had located Lee at one point the latter
popped up at another and totally
unexpected place. In speaking of
Lees campaign in Maryland, Profess
sor Andrews said:
'sFitzhugh Lee says that Lee made
mistake, but he himself believed.
that he showed the bes6 policy at the
battle of Antietan, He gave him no
credit for his actions at Fredericks-
burg. His attack upon Hooker over
the Rapidan showed his fighting
qualities and Of that attack General
Howard Of the Eleventh corps bore.
testimony. Hooker retreated. he.
dropped Lee like one would live.
wire.
The lecturer did not go into details
Of the three days fighting at Gettys-.
burg. Lee had been blamed for not
seizing Cemetery hill, but Ewell had
not the men at his comand to do it,
and even if he had there was no one
who could have foreseen the advantage
it would have given the confederates
on. the second day. He could not be-.
lieve that Longstreet disobeyed orders
or was Intentionally slow in coming.
on the field, Pickett's forlorn hope
was no mistake, for Lee could not.
have known that over the wall lay
Hancock s infantry ,and1artillery. In.
going into Pennsylvania Lee had
determined upon defensive strategy
and offensive ntactics; that is, he
would not attack unless attacked. It
has been charged that he fought often
| siye tactics. That is a mistake. i
think" said Professor Andrews, his
form Of defensive was offensive. "
Lee did not consider his army whipped
at Gettysburg.
The lecturer called attention to the
fact that identically the same tactics
| we're used by the Prussians at Sadowa
that Lee had Employed at Gettysburg.
The Austrian lines formed smaller
fsh-hook aud the Prussians lay about
them, as the southern army did, in a
longer line or ''fsh-hook." 1t was
by the sudden arrival Of the crown
prince with his army corps that victory
was secured.
It was when Grant took charge Of
the northern army that Greek met
Greek. Grant pounded the gray
columns Of Lee, but they stood the
shock. The southern army was with
out clothes or food. It was constant
" melting away, but it was a splendid
fighting machine still, veritable
engine. he showed himself at every
.c G.no,o1 Gvonf