The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1896-03-24
WITNESS MUST REPLY.
Even II He Incriminates His
Superior Officers.
DECISION sv SUPREME COURT


Washington City. March IA decision
was rendered by the supreme court of the
United States today in the case OF Theo-
dore F. Brown, involving the right OF
court to compel an answer by witness 20
questions in interstate commerce matters.
Notwithstanding that he may plead self
determination as result of the answer.
The decision was opposed by Browns con-
fention that he was protected by the con-
stitution from this requirement. and
the decision of the court below was at
frned. The opinion was handed down by
Justice Brown Justices Field. Shiras.
Gray and White dissented. holding thas
the constitutional provision was sufficient
to relieve Brown from the REQUIREMENT to
answer.
This case was advanced on the docket OF
the supreme court on the motion OF the
attorney general made at the instance OF
the interstate commerce commission 1t
was considered a test case. and the claim
was set forth in letter written for the
commission that large number of similar
cases must wait upon its final decision by
the court. The case came to the supreme
court on an appeal taken by Brown from
the decision of the circuit court for the
Western division of Pennsylvania refusing
to grant a writ of habeas corpus. and arose
out of a proceeding by the interstate COM
merce commission against the Allegheny
v
Is an officer. He was a witness before the
grand Jury for the commission in this case.
and refused to answer certain questions
propounded to him. on the ground that in
so doing he might incriminate himself. Hd
was then proceeded against for contempt
OF court, found guilty and sentenced to i'm
prisonment. Mr.. Brown pleaded his con-
stitutional right of silence but the statute
of February II, 1893 requiring answers to
such questions. was invoked against him
and held to be valid by the circuit court.
In announcing his opinion Justice Brown
said the question involved was whether
the law of 1893. specifically relieving wit
nesses in interstate commerce cases from
prosecution when they revealed facts
which might ircriminate themselves, OPP
crates to take from witnesses in such
cases the privilege of silence as guaran-
teed by the constitution, and the conclu-
sion was that 1t did. He said this act was
in the nature of a general amnesty in
such cases. and had been SO regarded and
upheld In half dozen decisions in the
state courts. Replying to the objection
that while the act served as a protection
to witnesses against prosecution 1t did not
shield from the disgrace involved In con-
Tossing a criminal act, Justice Brown SAIL
1t did not. nor was 1t contemplated by
provision in the constitution that one
should be shielded. He added, in response
crate to protect a witness from prosecd-
ton In the state courts. the Federal sta
utes being superior to those of the states.
that the latter statutes are the supreme
law Of the land and apply in the state
well as in the Federal courts.
He also advanced the opinion that in
this case the refusal of Brown to give his
testimony was due rather to his desire 10
shield others than himself. AS Brown was
only the auditor Of the road, his duties
were not of such character that he could
be held criminally liable for any violation
of the law. 1t was the intention that the
constitutional provision should protect
from real and substantial dangers, and
not from imaginary evils. as in this case.
Tho consequence of granting immunity
from answering TO such officials would in
evitably be to render the interstate COM
merce laws incapable of enforcement. and
the result would be to PROSTATE congress
at the feet of the powerful railroad cor
porations Of the country.