The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1896-04-07
DISSENTS.
Continued from Page 8.


II is as much a contract within the mean 4
ing OF the constitution OF the United
States, as a grant to private corporation
for valuable consideration, or in consid-
Grafton Of public services TO be rendered
by it, OF the exclusive right to construct
and maintain a railroad within certain
lines and between given points, or
bridge over a navigable stream within
prescribed distance above and below
designated point
The court held that the plaistiff was
entitled to an injunction against the de-
fendint.
II is noticeable that the act concerning
the Union Railroad Company, although
its subject matter is different from the
grant 10 the water works company, Is
similar in Its scope and provisions, so
far as any questions OF law are concerned.
There is the same authority
to ,ts issus srsoob,ss sonds and meGtgsss peGasss
to perform public service and extend
its service when the public good requires,
under penalty In case of failure OF forfeit
ing its exclusive rights. 1t is authorized
to fix the rate OF fares not TO exceed the
rate charged at the time OF the passage OF
the act, and is required to pay to the city
OF Providence share of its gross earn
ings: "In full payment for the rights and
privileges in and to the streets and high
ways OF said city hereinbefore granted"
In the later act relating to the Provis
dence Cable Tramway Company and the
Union Railway Company of May 23, 1893,
the Union Railroad Company Is required,
in consideration OF the grants OF exclusive
rights to the Tiamway Company in certain
streets, contained In the act, to render an
account of its earnings and pay special
tax upon the gross earnings of the latter
company to the city. The payments were
to begin when the provisions OF the act
in NV
the city and the railroad companies.
such acceptance was made ana delivered
by the city and the companies.
II Is evident from the foregoing IL the
waterworks act constituted contract
within the protection OF the constitution
that the acts In relation to the Union
Railroad Company and Cable Tramway
Company constituted such contracts.
The further question is whether said
acts or contracts can be released, altered
or amended by virtue OF the general pro-
vision OF law respecting corporations in
general. in force at the time of the passage
OF said acts, 10 the effect.that." All acts of
incorporation hereafter granted shall be
subject TO the provisions Il this chapter
and may be amended or repealed at the
will of the General Assembly, unless ex-
press provision be made therein to the
contrary
This question is dependent upon the
ture, as manifested in the same. Did
the Legislature intend to grant said ex-
elusive franchises subject TO said general
provision OF the law, or do said acts man
Hest particular intention inconsis-
tent with said general reser-
vations II the latter, said acts being
passed subesquent&in time TO the passage
OF said general law, the last express
ion OF the legislative will would be con-
trolling, and said acts would take effect
as contracts, aud could be repealed,
altered or amended. This question has
been substantially decided by the United
States Supreme Court, whose decision
overrnles any State decision, in the
similar case of Louisiana Gas Go. VS..
Citizens Gas Light Co. ll5 u. s. 6S3.
The Legislature of Kentucky in 1867
granted an exclusive gas franchise in the
streets OF Louisville to the plaintiff cor
poration for the term OF twenty years.
In 1869, with the consent OF the corpora
ton, an act In amendment regulating the
franchise was passed. In 1872 gas
franchise for the term of fifty years i'm
the streets of said city was granted to
another corporation. These acts were
passed subsequent to general law which
had been passed in 1856, reserving the
power to amend or repeal charters. Sec
tion of said last mentioned act pro-
vided "Thst all charters and grants of or to
corporations or amendments thereon, and
oil other statutes, shall be subject TO
amendment or repeal at the will of Leg
lslature unless contrary intent be there
in plainly expressed" The United States
Court oyerruled the decision of the State
Court, and held from the terms of the
franchise of the Louisville Gas Company
and the obligations undertaken by il,
that contract was estab ablIshed and that
said contract was not subject to the gen.
erai law, asa contrary intent was mani
fest in the said terms of said act. Ac-
cording to the argument in this case. the
provision of the Cable Tramway Company
Act, which required ratification by the
city and the Union Railroad Company
ana Tramway Company OF the Tramway
Company act (Which reaffirmed the ex-
elusive franchise of the Union Railroad
Company and conferred an exclusive fran
chise upon the Tramway Company as q
consideration OF and prior to the pay
ments TO be made TO the city under said
Iramway Company act, is inconsistent
with any other purpose than to withdraw W
their charter and franchise powers from
the operation OF the general reservation
OF power to repeal or amend the charter
powers OF corporations.
The Legislature therefore must have
intended to have waived, in reference to
said companies, said reserved power.
compelling the companies TO give trans
fer tickets would impair the right con-
ierred upon the companies to charge fares
not exceeding tive cents, the rate at the
time of the passage of the acts in ques-
tion. III the Legislature can alter the dis
tance passenger Is to be carried, it is
in effect altering the rate of fare to be
charged by the companies. III IL can re-
gulate and diminish the fare, where does
the power 10 diminish the fare stop? III
1t can diminish the fare by one cent,
what prevents a dimunition OF the fare TO
cent. bn
panies are required to continue their pay
ments to the city, their power to make
them IL impaired in part. The consider
alton OF their agreements to make the
payments, namely 10 regulate the fares, Is
directly attacked and impaired. The
State would repudiate its contract in part,
and at the same time hold the companies
TO said payments, and to the perform
ance OF their other agreements under the
same contracts. The Legislature in said
acts manifestly expressed no such inten-
tion, but expressly intended and enacted
express provisions to the contrary.
Furthermore the United States Supreme
Court I'm the case OF the State of New .Jer-