The record-union., 1896-03-02

tablish markets But absolutely pro-
hibiting the sale" of articles is a diff
ferent thing from prohibiting hawking
or peddling them.
To sell" means to transfer to an
other for an equivalent, to give up for
consideration, to dispose of in return for
something, especially money (Web-
ster's Dictionary To ''peddle" means
to journey about from place to place,
or from house to house, and retail
goods, to hawk, to go about and sell; to
retail, by carrying around from GUS
toner to customer; to hawk, to retail
in very small quantities. CWebster's
upon the back; to offer for sale by out
cry in the street, or to sell by outcry
(Webster's Dictionary
A person might have a wagon-load of
wood in his back yard, or he might be
hauling it through the street to his
premises for his own use. and if he
should, in either case, be offered price
for it, and should sell it, the selling
would not constitute either peddling or
hawking it, Hence, it does not neces-
sarily follow that because the defend
ant sold load of wood on the street
THAT ne peuQleQ Oh HdW hSd II.
It is plain that the ordinance lacks
the appropriate and apt terms needful
to limit its meaning to embrace ped
ding and hawking only. The market
established at which condemned arti-
cles may be sold may Unquestionably
be regulated, governed and controlled,
but this power does not embrace the
power to prevent sales elsewhere. (2S
Georgia Reports, 560)
Dillon, in his work on municipal COR
porations, Volume l., Section 50, de-
fines the limitation of such corporations
as follows: 1T is a general and undis-
puted proposition of law that munich
pal corporation possesses and can ex-
ercise the Following powers, and none
others:
'First-Those granted in express
words.
"Second-Those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted.
"Third-Those essential to the de-
clared objects and purposes of the cor
poration-not simply convenient, but
Indispensable.
ANY fair, reasonable doubt concern
ing the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation,
and the power is denied.
This ordinance goes far beyond the
powers defined by Mr.. Dillon, by abso-
lutely prohibiting the mere sale in
other places in the city of articles OF
prime necessity in less than prohibited
amounts at any one sale. Such does
not come within what is ordinarily un-
derstood by regulating markets
If it were lawful to compel the sale
of all such produce at one place, then
the manner of the sale at the desig-
mated place would be a fit subject OF
regulation Such regulation is one
thing, while the prohibition of the sale
elsewhere is quite another.
The ordinance does not seem to be
aimed at the exposing for sale in wag-
on-loads upon the frequented streets of
the city of the articles specified.
The manner of such traffic might well
be fit subject for municipal regula-
ton, and if the ordinance embraced no
more than that, it might be sustained,
but as it is it is unreasonable and
against the common right, both of the
producer and the consumer.
1t therefore follows that the judgment
should be reversed and the defendant
discharged.
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
A C. HINKSON, Judge-
We concur: A. P. Ca1nn, Matt T.
Johnson, Judges.