The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-04-05

Won MOltkc In 1870. The laws OF war III
| analogous cases. closely adhered 10, are
unerrng of results.
MUST RECEIVE BATTLE.
''in his official report OF July 81, 1863,
| General Lee said: The march toward
| Gettysburg was conducted more slowly
than IL would have been had the move
| ments OF the Federal army been known.
IL had not been intended to deliver
a general battle so far from our base UNI
| less attacked but coming Unexpectedly
| upon the whole Federal army, 10 with
| draw through the mountains with our ex-
| tonsive trains would have been difficult
| and dangerous
Hence II seems that both commanders
| felt the Importance to each that he must
receive battle. General Meade guarded
closely his views and although urged from
Washington. only once thought OF
aggressive battle. on the morning OF the
"a he sent troops OF his right TO look for
a way for battle. but the grounds were
found so purely defensive that he could
not open strong battle. This gave him
greater confidence in his defensive. and
cuietod apprehension except Of the open
way around his left which was also called
10 his mind by wire from Washington Dut
too late for a change. My right was at
f.at moment pfNtlN biS w. 49,
scouts beyond Round Top and I'm r.he
range OF his packed wagons. SO inviting
was the opportunity TO continue the move
to our right that General Hood delayed
to open the battle OF the day, urging the
move TO the right, until third order
was sent him. On the Confederate side
all thought OF work for defensive battle
was abandoned on the afternoon OF the
LIST, and troops on the march were ordered
forward by forced marches TO be In hand
for the next day.
General FiiZhugh Lee says: Longstreet
tries TO explain why when ordered to at
tack with his whole force at sunrise OF
the % he did not get into action until 4
o'clock I'm the afternoon Fitghugh Lee
has read letters from all OF General Lees
staff that no order for sunrise was given.
and he has read evidence conclusive from
all authenticated sources that the order
was not given. and that during the after
noon and night of the LIST, and until day
light Of the I'd, General Lee and General
Ewell were at work looking for an open
ing for his battle by the left. second corps.
He says Meade was not eager for battle.
Lee was But Meade was eager for bat
tle-he had everything his own way-and
no apprehension except that the delay
might give time for his adversary to find
the way TO his rear.
About eight years after the surrender
this idea OF sunrise attack was incubated
and has been so often repeated that some
have grown 20 regard II as a matter Of
hitorcal record.
'Fitzhugh Lee says: AS ] have sad
Longstreet ordered 10 attack at sunrise
with the divisions of Hood and McLaws.
which made no sign Of moving until II
IL. q. a. q l..
carried out according TO orders, but failed
because the scheme had not been carried
out on the left II he knows anything
about the matter he should know that
there was no fight on any part Of the
line except that OF the first corps until
after night. when the advance was made
against the eDemy's right. lie claims that
General Lee thought 10 beat the enemy In
detail. but General Lee was a little sur
prised when he found the Union army:
says he came up Unexpectedly AS a
matter OF fact, that army was up and
and General Meade was anx-
ious for battle. while yet the Confederate
cavalry and Picketts division of infantry
and artillery were on the march.
''Of the battle of the Sd by Pickett's,
Pettigrew's and Trimbles divisions he
quotes Colonel Taylor. OF General Lees
was that the attack was TO be made by
McLaws and Hoods divisions, supported
by Picketts fresh troops. That was Gen
eral Lees order when he joined me on the
evening Of the Sd. but when told that the
divisions OF MeLaws and Hood were
against twenty or thirty thou
SAND or the enemy; that they had lost 20
TO 80 per cent. OF their numbers I'm the
battle the day before; that they had but
eight thousand men in their ranks. which.
with Picketts. would make a column of
we've thousand, seven hundred men 10
3 arch mile under concentrated fire OF
4 eheihye artillery and Infantry, strong
7 posted, eighty thousand men strong;
hs the withdrawal of the two divisions
roi the front OF the enemy ssleft would
G followed by that force. which would
wiz around our right against the TANKS
{ OF IT attacking columns. gain the EN-
let's burg road In his rear ana cut OF his
urea l. he concluded TO allow the divi-
'ns To hold their line and ordered the !
, ops under Pettigrcw and Trimble as
= col umns with Pickettes As he failed |
& ct any part OF his command. except |
ose III lder my immediate orders. I'm the |
tile n day before until after nigbtfan. |
d uly five brigades tten, it was not |
obab le that lie would be more successful |
the til 'rd day, and / would have been |
{ a III Il, of the enemy's front unguard- |
mare pi ng against his army, which was |
III emit &c nched and gu arded by stone |
Ills wit n l.. 700 men. work that should |
I have peen Ventured with less than |
.hty tho usand men. fresh for battle No
ri of th army except those with me
ned actie n with the battle OF the day.
."rl tE WAR is OVER"
He comp aims that the responsibility |
d fate of a great battle should bA pass
over to n Mathematical lionel is ana al
Tvs will be a subject OF & rave comment
nv did not O. NERAL Lee ssign an officer
/. tho duty? II OF his bal teries were or
red into the ombat. while | had only
mmand of thos of the fiji st corps Gen
Al Lee had a ch ief of aru llery, briga-
r. general. who was the proper person
observe the arti uery pra ctice and give
,ice OF its eject Besides he had Col
81 Long. of his stan. a. professional
tiuerist. who woul have been proper
slcnrnent by the c. onfedei ate chieftain.
conditions being fair But General
e approved my ASST gnmen of Lieuten-
/ Colonel l.. +, Alec lander to that ser
q because he knew he W as man of
rye. greater intellect. ben .er judgment
Il better artillerist thz1 any OF the
tinery Of his army
Lee says that y zee expected
see these divisions (Mcl-au and HOOD
the attacking columns but General
g says that he did not. He Nong-
'eoO was, therefore. rec nforced by
this division and two briga des of Pen
RS. TO the command OF VIII ich General
imble was assigned
'Rut IN Is uyeIess 10 take up the carping !