Alma record. (Alma, Mich.) 1878-1928, 1896-12-11

If Spain has not yet reestahlished her
authority, neither have the insurgents yet
made good their title 10 he regarded as an
independent state. Indeed as the con-
test has gone on, the pTetense that civil
government exists on the island, except so
far as Spain is able 10 maintain II, has
been practically abandoned. Spain does
keep on foot such government. more or
less imperfectly. In the large towns and
their immediate suburbs. But, that excep-
tion being made, the entire country is either
: given over 10 anarchy or is subject 10 the
military occupation OF one or the other
| party. IL Is reported indeed, on reliable
authority that, at the demand OF the com
mander in chief Of the insurgent army,
! the putative Cuban government has now
given up all attempt TO exercise It's func-
tions, leaving that government confessed
~ twhat there Is the best reason for sup
, posing IL always to have been in facO a
government merely on paper.
Why Spain Does Not Win.
Were the Spanish armies able 10 meet
! their antagonists in the open, or in pitched
battle; prompt and decisive results might
| OF the Spanish forces in numbers. dis
| oipline. and equipment, could hardly fail
20 tell greatly 10 their advantage But
thcy are called upon 10 face a foe that
shuns general engagements, that can
choose and does choose its own ground.
that from the nature OF the country, Is
visible or Invisible at pleasure. and that
| lights only from ambuscade and when all
| the advantages OF position and numbers
is indispensable to life in the way OF food.
clothing and shelter is so easily oEtainable,
especially by those born and bred on the
soil, II Is obvious that there Is hardly n
limit 10 the time during which hostilities
OF this sort may be prolonged.
Situation Deplorable.
Meanwhile, as IN all cases Of protracted
civil strife, the passions of the combatants
grow more and more infiamed and excuses
on both sides become more frequent and
more deplorable. They are also partic-
pated in by bands Of marauders, who. now
N q
name Of the other. as may best sur the
occasion, harry the country al will and
plumber its wretched inhabitants for their
own advantage Such condition OF things
would inevitably entail immense destruction
| of property, even If il were the policy
OF both parties to prevent II Is far prac
ticahe. But while such seemed 10 be the
original policy OF the Spanish government,
II has row apparently abandoned it and Is
acting upon the same THEORY as the in
surgents, namely, that the eXigencies Of
the contest require the wholesale annihila
ton Of property that IT may not prove OF
use and advantage to the enemy. II is TO
the same end that In pursuance or general
orders, Spanish garrisons are now being
withdrawn from plantations and the rural
population required TO concentrate itself
in the towns
The sure result would seem TO be that
the Industrial value OF the Island Is fast
diminishing, and that unless there is
speedy and radical change in existing con-
ditons II will soon disappear altogether:
That value consists very largely, OF
course, In its capacity to produce sugar-a
capacity already much reduced by the In
terruptons TO tillage, which have taken
place during the last two years. II Is re-
liably asserted that should these interr'lD-
tions continue during the current year
ened, TO the entire sugar-producing ter
ritory OF the island, so much time and so
much money Will be required 70 restore
the land 10 it's normal productiveness that
It Is extremely doubtful II capital can be
induced TO even make the attempt.
Would Engage Our Serious Attention.
The spectacle Of utter ruin OF an adjoin-
ing country. by nature one Of the most
engage the serious attention of the gov
eminent and the people Of the United
States in any circumstance. In point Of
fact, they have concern with II which is
10y no means Of wholly sentimental
or phllanthropic character. II lies so near
10 Us as TO be hardly separated from orr
territory. Our actual pecuniary interest In
II is second only TO that OF the people and
government Of Spain. II is reasonably es-
tmatcd that at least from $780, coo TO
SjOC0OoCo Of American capital arc invested
In plantations, and in railroad. mining
and other business enterprises on tho
island. The volume Of trade between the
United States and Cuba, which in 1889
amounted to about $G,0C0,o00, rose in 1893
TO about 'loS, Qoc 900, and in 1894 the
year before the present Instruction
broke out, amounted to nearly $685. 90.
vcxstious Entanglemcnts.
Besides this large pecuniary stake in
the fortunes Of Cuba, the United States
finds itself ineXtricably involved in the
present contest in other ways both veX-
atious and costly. Many Cubans reside In
this country and indirectly promote the
insurreCtion through the press by public
meetings, 10y the purchase and shipment Of
arms, by the aiSiug OF funds and by other
means. which the spirit OF our institutions
and the tenor Of our laws do not permit
TO he made the jcct Of criminal proseCu-
tons. Some OF them, though Cuhans at
heart and in all their feelings and interests,
have taken out papers as naturaliZed citi-
10 Of he n 81 sc a o.
sorted TO with view TO possible protec-
ton by this government, and not unnat-
urally regarded with much indignation by
the country OF their origin. Inc lnSur-
gents are undoubtedly encouraged and sup
ported by the widespread sympathy the peo-
pc OF this country always and !nstnctlNely
feel for every struggle for better ana freer
government and which in the case OF the
more adventurous and restless clements
Of our population leads In only too many
instances TO active and personal pAruclpa-
ton in the contest.
The result is that this government Is
constantly called upon to protect Ameri-
can citizens, TO claim damages for injuries
to persons and property, now estimated at
many millions OF dollars, and to ask tx.
plantations and apologies for the acts or
Spanish officials whose zeal Tor the repreS-
sion OF rebellion sOmetimeS blinds them 10
the immunities belonging 10 the offending
citizens of friendly power II loIoWS
from the same causes that the Cmtcd
States IS compelled to actively ponce a
long line Of sea coast against unlawful cX-
petitions, the escape Of which the utmost
Vigilance will not always suffice to pre-
vent.
The Question of Intervention.
These inevitable entanglcmcnts OF tho
United States with the rebellion in Cuba, |
the large American property interests af- |
fected and considerations OF philanthropy
and humanity in general have led 10 We /
hement demand in various quarters for !
some sort Of positive intervention or |
the part OF the United States. II was at
first proposed that beliCereDt rights should I
be accorded TO the inaurgcnts-a prouo- /
sit!on no longer urged because untimcly /
ard in practical operation clearly perilous /
and injurious 20 our own interests. It has /
since been and is now sometimes cOntended /
that the independence Of the insurgents /
should he recognized. But imperfect and /
restricted rs tho Spanish government Of I
the island may he, no other exists there 7.
unNss the VIII of the military officer IN /
temporary command Of particular dis /
trict can he dignifcd as a species u gov /
eminent. ~ is now also suggested that the /
United States should buy the island-a sug- /
gestion possibly worthy OF consideration .
II there were any evidence OF a desire or /
willingness on the part OF Spain TO Cutcr- /
tain such q proposal II is urged finally, /
that. all other methods failing, the existing .
intcruccine strife In cuba should be ter /
minated by our intervention, even at the .