The record-union., 1896-12-22

claims to be within the provisions of the
Constitution of the State OF California,
and is not class or special legislation In
the case of ex-paTte Tuttle, the Supreme
Court says: AN ordinance of the City
and County of San Francisco prohibit
ing the selling of pools on horse races
except within the inclosure OF race
track, where the race is to be run, is a
valid police regulation, not in conflict
with the State Constitution, and is not
void because its incidental effects may
be to confer special privilege or ben
eft upon those who own or control the
racecourse by giving them the exclu-
sive right to carry on the business, or
of selling to others the privileges of pool
selling; nor does THE exception men,
tioned in this ordinance grant mo-
nopoly to certain persons in exclusion
of Others for in the same case the Su-
preme Court holds that the city through
it's legislative power has the right to
regulate the particular time and place
that betting on races will be permitted,
and this is just what they have done in
the case at bar.
ordinance in question Is not such po-
lice regulation as comes Within the
enumerated powers of the Board OF
Trustees; as the authority conferred by
the Constitution in Section IL, Article
XII, and that conferred by our charter,
Subdivision AZ, Section 20, are ex-
pressed in almost identical language,
and as the Supreme Court in the 91st
Cal. 592, held that the section of the
Constitution referred to vested a large
discretion in the legislative branch of
the municipal government in dealing
with questions of this character in de-
termining not only what games or
wagers should be made the subject of
legislation, but if permitted at all, un-
der what regulations they should be al
lowed to exist, it would seem that this
objection cannot be sustained.
Does the ordinance contain subjects
not enumerated in the title, and if so
does the charge in the complaint come
under the unenumerajted subjects as
claimed by the defendant? The COM
plaint shows that the defendant was
assisting in making bets or wagers on
horse races and the title of the ordi-
nance clearly expresses the one subject
embraced by the ordinance, viz: The
regulation Of bets and wagers on horse
races" Further than this, under Sec
ton IA of the charter. any ordinance
containing a subject not expressed in
the title thereof is void only as to the
matters not expressed in the title, and
as that portion of the ordinance vio-
lated by the defendant was clearly
stated in the title, the defendant cannot
be heard to complain that there are
other matters in the ordinance which
are not expressed in the title. This
principle Is further borne out in the
case of ex-parte HasweH. 112th Cal.
421, where the court say: Nor is
there anything in the further point that
the ordinance is void because en-
that not expressed in its title" The
provision of the Constitution as to the
requirements in that respect of Acts
of the Legislature is not made applica-
BILE In terms to municipal ordinances,
and was evidently not intended so to
apply. A similar requirement Of the
Constitution of the State of Missouri
was held not to apply to city ordinances
In the absence of an express provision
OF the statutes making 1t 50. (Tarkio
VS.. Cook, 120 Mo. Am. St. Rep. 27S)
AS to whether or not the court has
Jurisdiction of the subject matter, 1t
appears that the acts complained of
were committed within the city limits
as appears in the complaint. The court
has jurisdiction Of the complaint
It would seem that the main point of
defendant in this case, and upon which
he bases his contention as to the Illegal
ity of the ordinance in question, Is the
exception made therein excluding -Agri-
cultural Park from the provisions of
the ordinance. but that question is fully
settled in the case Of ex parte Tuttle,
91st, Cal $50 ct seq. In fact almost
every point raised in this case is COW
cred by the decision just quoted, but
admitting for the sake of argument that
the exception mentioned in said orGi-
nance was in Itself unconstitutional and
void, It is we'll settled as a matter of
law that the balance of the ordinance
viii stand.
I have now touched upon all the
points raised in this case, and have en-
deavored to arrive at just and legal
determination of the legal questions
involved, and feel the responsibility
resting upon me. 1t is not expected,
in fact it is very seldom that the final
determination of case which involves
questions Of law alone, should be left
entirely with the Judge Of an inferior
court, and I have devoted as much time
and study to this case as though the
matter were to be finally determined
here, and in conclusion would say that
courts are not ready to declare laws in
valid or to thwart the express will of
the people, expressed through its leg
islative bodies. In fact a municipal
ordinance must be very clearly obnox-
fous to such objections as those made
or some one of them, before 1t will be
declared invalid by the courts. Every
intendment Is to be INDUCED in favor
of it's validity, and all doubts resolved
in a way to uphold the law-making
power, and the contrary conclusion will