The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1896-05-09
MATABELE TACTICS.
The Savages Readily Assimilate Euro
pean Military Ideas.

Now that it is probable that the operations
against the Matabele rebels Will be some
what protracted, description Of their tao
ties will not come amiss. 1t is difficult to
gauge their fighting strength, but in all like
lihood 1t is between seven thousand and eight
thousand. One great feature In the character
of of Gf the Zulu Is tas
1t was thus that their power was, in the first
instance, built up. The matter fell out thus:
Dingisiwayo the heir TO the chieftainship of
the Aba Tetua, wandered, in the course Of a
long exile to Cape Town. There he noted
the great value of the discipline exercised in
the training Of European soldiers. and also
the power of the bayonet In fighting at close
quarters. Accordingly, on his return to his
tribe, he organized his warriors into regi-
ments on the European model, and intro
duced the broad stabbing assegai as SUBJ
stitute for the bayonet. Chaka, who spent
his youth with Dingisiwayo. was an apt
pupil. and he, in his turn. organized the Zu.us
on the same model. But he went further. and
introduced a perfect system of tactics
When that section of the Zulu nation now
known as Matabee set forth to conquer a
new kingdom, under the leadership Of Um-
zilikazi, they had been trained in this sys-
tenn.
Accordingly. the Matabele retained. and
carried to the highest perfection, the famous
fighting tactics of the Zulus-that u.s. the
crescent formation Two projecting horns are
pushed forward, which try to outf1ank and
surround the enemy, and then heavy chest
Is hurled forward in solid mass against
the enemy when thrown into confusion.
These tactics. have a fairly close resemb-
lance to those of Napoleon Perhaps the best
opportunity ever given to Engiishmen to
judge of the Zulu method was at the battle
OF Ulundi. Many who fought in the square
it,. will remember the triple line of Skin
mishers that formed the horns and the dense
black mass of men who came from Ulundi
itself, and formed the chest
But the Matabele do not altogether trust
to open attack, or TO the fury of their
charge; In the darkness of the night they try
to steal near their foe. crawling silently and
craftily as snakes, and then, with the day.
break, charge with fierce shouts. 1t is won
derful how closely they can lie. On Oct. q.
1888, a strong patrol went out to burn the
lnsucameni Kraal.t The patrol had TO pass
through the Somabuli forest to reach the
kraal, and on its way disturbed an encamp-
ment of the Matabele. These men had
and had actually got between the Chartered
forces scouts and the camp unnoticed 1t
was only the superstitious fears of the Mata-
Dele that saved the patrol on this occasion.
Again, two days later the same sort of
thing occurred, A patrol was sent out to
bring In Edward Burnett. a wounded scout
AS 1t was feared the patrol had missed the
camp, rocket signal was sent up 1t after
ward transpired that a Matabele impi had
been posted between the patrol and laager,
but when the warriors heard the report and
saw the falling stars they put 1t down to
witchcraft, and refrained from attacking the
patrol. Again, the description given of the
beginning of the battle of Shanghai tells
much the same tale When night closed in.
the Chartered force was quite unsuspecting
that the enemy was near. The scouts had
reported that the country for miles around
was clear of Matabele. Yet at dawn, or just
before 1t, a fierce attack was made.
Certainly the lessons of the former war
should not be forgotten. The Matabele then
were proved to be skillfu in making a
stealthy approach. cool and determined in
delivering their attack and sullen and de-
liant even when beaten back In fact IL must
be said that they were dispersed rather than
beaten. 1t is plain that they have benefited
by the lessons of that war; they have been
quick to modify their tactics to enable their
men to face the deadly, sweeping fire of the
Maxims. and the training given to the native
police has, manifestly, not been given in
vain. 1t may be questioned, also, whether
there have not been other influences at work.
as IT undoubtedly is strange that the rebels
have been SO well supplied with arms and
ammunition: 1t is, therefore, to be hoped that
the leaders in future operations will bear in
mind the nature Of the Matabele tactics, and
not fall into the error of undertaking the
enemy, FOR In that way lies defeat, since II
must be owned that in all the recent en-
gagements the Matabele have proved far
more dangerous foes than they did at any
time during the former war.