Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-02-02

was confident from that facts IN VIC"
OF the positive orders that stuart hae
received, that General Hookers army mao
not yet crossed the Potomac. he re-
maiped at Chambersburg from the Atn y, -
! the 9th, and repeatedly observed WIN
there that the enemys army must sun
be in virginia as he had heard nothing
from Stuart.
Assuming that such was the fact and
that the movement OF the Confederate
army into Pennsylvania had failed TO with
draw that OF General Hooker from Vir-
ginia contrary to his confident expecta-
ton. General Lee began TO become I'M
easy as TO the purpose Of the Federal
commander, and to fear that he con-
templated q strong movement against
| Richmond.
I He remarked that such a proceeding on
the part OF the enemy would compel the
immediate return OF his own army TO
Virginia, IL II could, indeed, reach Rich
mond in time to defend the city. The
possession OF Richmond was absolutely
necessary at that time to preserve conf
municauon with the South, and its loss
would have led to the evacuation or the
whole of Eastern Virginia, at least as
far south as the Roanoke. 1 heard Gene
raj Lee express this apprehension more
than once while we lay at Chambers
burg and the apprehension was due en-
tIrely 10 his hearing nothing from Gene
raj Stuart. Under these circumstances ne
determined to take such action as would
compel the enemy to leave Virginia, ana
deter him from any attempt upon Richz
mond. General Longstreets Corps was
| at Chambersburg with the commanding
general. General A. p Hilps Corps was
about four miles east OF Chambersburg
| on the road to Gettysburg. General Eweli
was then at Carlisle. On the night or the
| 18th of June | was directed by General
Lee to order General Ewell to move d.
rectly upon Harrisburg, and TO inform him
that General Longstreet would move the
next morning Che 18th TO his support
| General A. F. Hill was directed to move
eastward to the Susquehanna, and, cross
ing the river below Harrisburg. seize the
railroad between Harrisburg and Phila-
delphia. IL being supposed that all re-
] Inducements that might be coming from
| the North would be diverted TO the
defence OF that city. and that
/ there would be such alarm created
/ By these movements that the Fede-
raj Government would be obliged 10
withdraw its army from Virginia and
abandon any plan that 1t might nave ior
an attack upon Richmond.
LEES FIRST INFORMATION.
I sent the orders about 10 o'clock at
night to General Ewell and General HILL
and had just returned to my tent, when
| | was sent for by the commanding gene
| raj | found him sitting in his tent with
a man in citizens dress. whom did not
know to be soldier. but who, General
Lee informed me, was a scout OF General
Longstreet's, who had JUST been brought
to him.
de told me that this scout had left
the neighborhood Of Fredericktown that
morning, and had brought information
that the Federal army had crossed the
Potomac, ard that its advance had
reached Fredericktown, and was moving
thence westward towards the mountains.
The scout Informed General Lee tnat
General Meade was then in command
OF the army, ana also as TO the move
ments OF the enemy, which was the hrst
information that General Lee had receiv-
ed since he left Virginia. He inferred
from the fact that the advance of the
enemy had turned westward from Frede-
rick that his purpose was 10 enter the
Cumberland Valley south OF our army,
and obstruct our communication through
Hagerstown with Virginia. General Lee
said that, while he did not consider that
he had complete communication win
Virginia, he had all the communication
that he needed, as long as the enemy
had no considerable force in the Cumber-
land Valley. His principal need FOR COM
municating with Virginia was to procure
ammunition, and he thought that ne
could always do that, with an escort, IL |
The valley were free from Federal
force but should the enemy have a con-
siderable force in the valley this would |
be impossible. He considered IT OF great |
Importance that the enemy's army shouii
be kept east of the mountains, and, con-
sequently he determined TO move his |
own army to the east side Of the Blue /
Ridge, SO as 20 threaten Washington and |
Baltimore, and detain the Federal force /
on that side OF the mountains 10 protect |
those cities. He directed me 10 counter
mand the orders to General Ewell ana
General Hill. and TO order the latter 10
move eastward on the road through /
Cashtown and Gettysburg, and EweA
70 march from Carlisle. so as to form
a junction with Hill either at Cashtown
or GETTYSBURG as circumstances might
direct He ordered General LOnSsreet
20 prepare 10 move the next morning, Iol-
lowing Hill. The army moved very
slowly, and there wuld have oeea 10
difficulty whatever in having the whole
OF 1t at Gettysburg by the morning OF
the LIST OF July had we been aware or
side OF the mountains.
You will thus see that the move
ment to Gettysburg was the result OF
the want OF Information, which the
cavalry alone could obtain for us, and
that General Lee was compelled to
march through the mountains from
Chambersburg eastward without the
slightest knowledge OF the enemy's
movements except that brought by the
scout While making this march the
only Information he possessed led him
to believe that the army of the enemy |
was moving westward from Frederick
10 throw itself upon his line of commu-
nication with Virginia, and the object
Of the movement as have stated,
was simply to arrest the execution OF
this supposed plan OF the enemy, and
keep his army on the east side Of the
Blue Ridge.
Ii would have been entirely within
the power of General Lee to have met
the army of the enemy while It was
moving on the road between Frederick
and Gettysburg, or to have remained
west OF the mountains. 1t had not
been his intention TO deliver a battle
north OF the Potomac. IL 1t could be
avoided, except upon his own terms
and yet, by reason Of the absence OF
the cavalry, his own army marching
slowly eastward from Chambersburg, and
southwark from Carlisle. came unexpect-
eddy on the Federal advance on the
1st day OF July, a considerable part
OF the Confederate army having not
yet reached the field OF battle
HOW 1T WAS BROUGHT ABOUT.
I do not propose TO enter into the
details OF the battle OF Gettysburg but
only 10 show you how that battle was
brought about, and how it was fought
on the first. second. and third days
with troops as they arrived. all of ,
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