The Dickinson press., 1896-12-12

lnd disposition of the Spanish government
10 remedy these grievances. fortified by
Indications Of influential public opinion In
Spain, that this government has hoped
10 discover the most promising and effective
means Of composing the present strife. with
slOnOr and advantage to Spain, and with
the achievement of all the reasonable OBJ
tects Of the insurrection.
Ii would seem that II Spain should Offer
to Cuba genuine au:onomy-a measure ct
.rcignity Of Spain. would satisfy all ra-
tlonal requirements Of her Spanish sub.
jects-there should BIC no just reason why
the ractfcatiOn Of the island might not be
effected on that basis. Such result
would appear to be in the true Interest Of
all concerned. 1t would at once stop the
conflict which is now consuming the re-.
sources Of the island and making 1t worth
less for whichever party may ultimately
prevail. 1t would keep intact the possess
sions Of Spain without touching her honor,
which will be consulted rather than I'm
pugned by the adequate redress Of ad-
mitted grievances. 1t would put the pros
perity OF the island and the fortunes OF Its
Inhabitants within their own control, with
out severing the natural and ancient ties
which bind them to the mother country,
and would yet enable them to test their
capacity for self-gOvernment under the most
favorable conditions.
Offers of Intervention Ignored.
1t has been objected on the one side
that Spain should not promise autonomy un.
til her insurgent subjects lay down their
arms: on the other side, that promised
autonomy, however liberal and insufficient,
because without assurance of the promise
being fu1nncd, but The Teas0na6lencss of Il
requirement by Spain Of unconditional
surrender on the part Of the insurgent Gu
a nS IlOHn e1Nntp Il, n1n0
not altogether apparent. 1t ignores I'M
portaM features Of the situation-the stabil-
ity two years duration has given to the in
surrection; the feasibility OF its indefinite
prolOngatiOn In the nature of things, and
us shown by past experience; the utter and
Imminent ruin of the island, unless the pres
ent strife Is speedily composed; above all,
all branches OF her governments and all her
lending public men concede to exist and pro-
fess desire to remove.
Facing such circumstances, to withhold
the prefer Of needed reforms until the part.
les demanding them put themselves at
mercy by throwing down their arms, has the
appearances Of negiecting the gravest perils
of any professed willingness to grant re-
forms. The objection on behalf Of the In.
surgents-that promised reforms cannot he
relied upOn-must be, of course, considered,
though we have no right to assume and no
reason for assuming that anything Spain ull-
dcrtakcs to do for the relief Of Cuba will
NOT DC dohe accordihg 10 Doth the spirit anu
| the letter Of the undertaking.
Nevertheless. realizing that suspicious and
precautions on the part Of the weaker of
two cOm6atants are always natural, and not
always uh1ustlnaoic.bcing sincerely dcsir-
GUS In the interest OF both as well as on its
OWL account that the Cuban problem should
W soi'ca Win the ieast possiDie deiay-St
was ihumateu ny THIS government to the
government OF Spain some months ago that.
II satisfactory measure OF home rule were
rendered the Cuban insurgents, and would
oe accepted ny them upon guaranty OF Its
execution the United states would endeavor
70 ma a way not Objectionable TO Spain OF
furnishing such guaranty.
While no definite response to this intima-
non mas yet been received from the Span.
isl government. II is believed to be not
altogether unwelcome, while, as already
suggested. no reason Is perceived why 1t
should not be approved by the insurgents.
Neither party can Tail to see the Importance
OF early action and both must realize that
TO rr0i0ng the present state OF things for
even a short period will add enormously to
the time and labor ana expenditure ncces.
sary TO bring about the industrial recnpera-
ton OF the island. II Is therefore earnestly
for healing the breach between Spain and
the insurgent Cnbans upon the lines above
Indicated may be ut once inauguratcd and
pushed TO an immediate ana successful Is.
sue. The friendly offices Of the United
States. either In the manner above outlined
or In any other way consistent with our
constitution and laws, will always he ut
| the disposal OF either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise our
policy aud our interests would constrain
MS I" object to the acquisition OF the island
or any interference with Its control by any
other power. 1t should be added that II
cannot be reasonably assumed that the
hitherto cXpectant attitude OF the United
| States will be indefinitely maintained
spect TO the sovereignty OF Spain, we can
not view the pending conflict In all Its
| features, ana properly apprehend our In
| evitably close relations to 1t ana Its possible
results. without considering that by the
1 course OF events we may be drawn :ntG
such an unusual ana unprecedented s'n'
ddlOi as VIII NIX iinlt 10 our patent
waiting for Spain to end the contest. either
alone and In her own way. or with our
friendly cooperation. When the Inability
OF Spain to deal successfully with the i'll
snrrGction has become manifest, AMI IL Is
demonstrated that her sovereignty IL eX'
| tinct In Cuba for all purposes OF lis right
| ful existence, and when hopeless struggle
FOR Its re-establishment has deg"nerated
| into strife which means nothing more
| than the useless sacrifice OF human life and
| the utter destruction OF the very subject
matter OF the conflict, n situation will be
presented III which our obligations to the
| sovereignty OF Spain will be superseded by
higher obligations, which We can hardly
| htsita:e TO recognize ana discharge.
Defe. ring the choice OF ways ana methods
| should make them depend upon the precise
| not be determined upon without giving
careful heed to every consideration invOlv
iEg our honor and interest, or the inter
| national duty we owe to Spain. Unit! We
face the contingency suggested, or the stu