Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-05-31

NT----~~N"H"
General G. w. Smith. the next ranking
officer.
The next day there was delay and I'M
certainty on the part Of the Confederates'
who spcn; ,rcst OF ire day gathering
arms, and some severe lighting, when
had no decisive results. and when, IN
the afternoon, President Davis put Gene
raj r. Il. Lee In command of the army
he decided that IL was not best 70 con-
tinue the battle on that ground, ana re-
tired his troops 20 their old positions,
the Federals being only too glad 10
get rid Of them, and not venturing TO fol-
low.
Seven Days Battles.
General Lee at once took in the situa-
ton, formed his plans. and proceeded 10
execute them.
Mcclellan had 10000 men encircling
Richmond, strongly fortified, splendidly
equipped. and abundantly supplied with
everything that could promote the eiii-
cheney of an army He was hoping Ior
the return Of McDowelrs 1900, who had
gone from Fredericksburg on the boot
less errand of Dragging Stonewall jack
SON." He had, also, 10000 troops at Fort
rcss Monroe. whom he could speedily
call to his help, and he was sending
the most piteous appeals 10 Washington
TOT more TtlllOTttiufiiNo dboiiiob liN S'NA-
whelming numbers Of the rebels"
General Lee had only 5000 men, yet
he had 10 idea of awaiting a siege. but
determined to assume the aggressive.
Sending j. T.. y. Stuart on his famous
ride around Mcclellan he thus learned
the weak points in the encmy's line, and
determined 10 cut him Off from his base
at the White House and drive him
from his position In front OF Richmond,
II he could not destroy the Federal army.
He drew from North Carolina and the
South all the troops he could obtain-five
brlgades In all-and. after Jackson had
finished his brilliant Valley campaign, by
defeating at Cross Keys and Port kepub-
lie. the two armies sent TO capture him
Lee ordered him to deceive the enemy
50 as TO make tho impression that he
would advance down the Valley again
and then hasten to his assistance In
driving Mcclellan from his position.
This Jackson did so effectually that
the enemy was fortifyng against an eX-
pected attack from him at Strasburg, at
the very hour that "old Stonewall and
his foot cavalry" were laundering on
McClellan's right flank. on the Chicka-
hominy. After Jackson had Joined him
Lee had bare 5000 men of all arms
with which TO attack McClellan's ll5'OO
in position, and ten thousand more
at Fortress Monroe within easy
call Add to this the fact that Nc
Clellan had naturally strong positions.
fortified with the skill OF able engineers
and ample material, and IT will be seen
that Lee undertook a bold task. and exc
cuted 1t with consummate skill, backed
by the heroic conduct of his troops He
has been criticised as "slow and eau
tious," but certainly his conduct on the
"Seven-Days' Battles" does not show this.
McchanicsviIIc and EIIerson's MIL.
Mcclellan had purposed attacking from
his left flank. on the south side of the
Chickahominy. and on the 18th of June
made a strong demonstration against
General Huger's position, but was re-
pulsed, and driven back TO his old line.
The day before he got information from
a deserter which he did not credit. that
Jackson was advancing on his flank, and
telegraphed 10 Washington, only TO find
the authorities there I'm profound igno-
rance of Jackson's whereabouts. on
the afternoon OF the 18th. however. he
got information from IAN intelligent con-
traband," which convinced him that
Jackson was indeed advancing on him;
that Beauregard was in Richmond with
a heavy force. and that his gallant lit
tie army" would be compelled TO meet
IAN overwhelming force of at least 200.-
900 rebels" His telegram 10 Secretary
Stanton, dated June %, 1862, 6:15 Il. NJ.
was decidedly panicky, and. among other
things, said: Il will do all that
a general can do with the splendid army
| have the honor to command and, II 1t
Is destroyed by overwhelming numbers.
can at least die with 1t, and share its
fate"
CONFIDENTIAL BATTLE ORDER.
General Lee had issued his confidential
battle order on the oath TO the effect that
General Huger and General Magruder
should hold the lines south of the Chick
ahominy: that Jackson should camp on
the night of the 18th at some convenient
point near Slash church. west of
the Central railway. and move at
a. Nj. on the 10Th on the road
leading to Pole Green church; that
Branchs Brigade should cross the Chick
ahominy as soon as notified that Jackson
was moving on the Pole Green road, and
that the rest of a. L. Hilis Light Di-
vision" should cross at Meadow bridge
Dust above where the Chesapeake and
Ohio railway now crosses the Chickahom-
iny) and move with Branch on Mechan-
icsvlle; that as soon as a. L. Hill had
driven the enemy from MechanicsVille
Longstreet aSd D. II. Hin should cross
the Chickahominy at that point, Long
street supporting a. y. Hill and ID. IL. Hill
Joining jackson as they should push the
enemy down the north side of the Chick
ahominy. and cut him off from his base at
the White House on the Pamunkey. and
that Huger and Magruder should closely
watch the enemy in their front. attack
hin, az suitabIa oDnortunity offered, and