The Weiser signal. [volume] (Weiser, Idaho) 1890-1904, 1896-12-17


votion Of largely increased military and
naval forces to the task. There Is much
reason to believe that the insurgents have
gained IN number. character and re-
sources, and are none the less inflexible in
their resolve not to succumb without
practically securing the great object for
which they took up arms. If Spain has
not yet re-estabnshed her authority,
neither have the insurgents yet made
good their claim to be regarded as an in
dependent state. Indeed as the contest
mas gone on, the pretense that civil gov
efnment exists on the island, except SO
far as Spain is able to maintain it, has
been practically refuted. Spain does keep
on foot such a government, more or less
imperfectly, In the large towns and tho
immediate suburbs but that exception be-
ing made the entire country Is either
given over to anarchy or is subject to the
military occupation of one or the other
party. 1t is reported indeed, on reliable
authority, that at the demand Of the COM
mander-in-chi Of the insurgent army
the putative Cuban government has now
given up all attempt to exercise Its func-
t1ons, leaving that government confessed
~ (what there is best reason for suppos-
ing 1t always has been in facD q govern
ment merely on paper.
No Decisive Battles.
Were the spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists in the open or In pitched
battle, prompt and decisive result might
be looked for, and the immense superior
ity of the Spanish forces In numbers, dis
cipline and equipment could hardly fail to
tell greatly to their advantage. But they
are called upon to face a foe that shunS
general engagements, that can choose and
does choose it's own ground, that from the
nature of the country Is visible or invisi-
BILE, at pleasure, and that fights only from
ambuscade and when all the advantages
of position and numbers are on its side.
In a country where all these causes are
dependent, especially by those born and
bred on the soil, 1t Is obvious that there is
hardly limit to the time during which
hostilities of this sort may be prolonged
Meanwhile, as in all cases of civil strife
the passions Of the combatants grow more
and more infamed and excesses on both
sides become more frequent and more de-
porable.
Guerilla Fighting.
They are also participated In by bands
Of marauders, who, now in the name of
one party and now in the name of the
other, as may best suit the occasion, ha-
rass the country at will and plunder it's
wretched inhabitants for their own nd-
vantage. Such a condition of things would
inevitably entail immense destruction Of
property, even If 1t were the policy Of both
parties to prevent it as far as practicable.
But while such seemed to be the original
policy of the Spanish government, 1t mas
now apparently abandoned 1t, and is act
ing upon the same theory as the insur-
gents, namely, that the eXigencies Of the
contests require the wholesale annihlla-
ton of property that 1t may not prove of
any use and advantage to the enemy.
1t Is to the same end that, In pursuance
of general orders, Spanish garr1sons are
now being Withdrawn from plantations
and the rural population required to con-
centrate itself In towns. The sure result
n a
value of the island is fast diminishing
and that unless there is speedy and
radical change in existing conditions 1t
will soon disappear altogether. That
value consists largely, of course, In Its ca
pacity to produce sugar, capacity al
ready much reduced by the Interruptions
to tillage which have taken place during
the last two years. 1t is reliably assert
ed that should these Interruptions con-
tinue during the current year, and prac-
tically extend, as is now threatened, to
the entire sugar production territory of
the island, so much time and so much
money will be required to restore the
land to Its normal productiveness that 1t
is extremely doubtful that the people can
be induced to even make the attempt
OF Great Concern to Us.
The spectacle OF the utter ruin of an
adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming ON the whole
8
Of the government and the people of the
United States in any circumstances. In
point of fact, they have concern with 1t
which Is by no means of a wholly SEN
timental character. 1t lies so near to us
as to be only partly separated from our
territory. Our actual pecuniary interest
in tt is second only to that of the people
and government of Spain. 1t is reason
ably estimated that at least from thirty
to fifty million dollars of American cap
ital are invested in plantations and rail
roading, mining and other business enter
prises on the island. The volume of trade
between the United States and Cuba,
which in 1889 amounted to about $64 600, 900,
rose in 1896 to about $103 900, 900, and in 1894,
the year before the present insurrection
broke out, amounted to nearly So, 1000, 900.
Involved In other Ways.
Besides this large pecunlary stake III
the fortunes of Cuba, the United States
finds itself inextricably involved In the
present contest In other ways, both vex-
atous and costly.
Many Cubans reside in this country and
Indirectly promote the insurrection by
public meetings, by the purchase and
shipment of arms, and by other means
which the spirit of our institutions and
the tenor of our laws do not permit, and
made these the subjects Of criminal pros
ecution. Some of them, thoroughly Gu
bans at heart and In all their feelings and
interests, have taken out papers and are
naturalized citizens of the United States,
a proceeding resorted to with view to
| possible protection by this government,
and not unnecessarily regarded with
much indignation by the country of their
| origin.
| The insurgents are undoubtedly encour-
| aged and supported by the widespread
| sympathy the people of this country al
ways and instinctively feel In their strug-
| gle for better government and which In
the case of the adventurous elements
of its population leans in only too many
| instances to active participation in tbe
| contest. The result is that the government
| is constantly called upon to protect Amer
| lean citizens, to claim damages for in
| juries to person and property now esti
mated at many millions of dollars, anc
to ask explanations and apologies for the
acts of Spanish officials whose zeal fol-
| the repression of the rebellion sometime.
blinds them to the immunities belonginf
to the unoffending citizens OF a friendl.
power.
On FiIibusterinE.
1t follows from the same causes tina
| the United States Is compelled to an act
| i've policy along the line of sea coas
against unlawful expeditions, the escap
of which the utmost vigilance will no
always suffice to prevent. These inevi
table entanglements of the United State
with the rebellion In Cuba, the larg
American property affected, and consid
erations of philanthropy and with hu
manity In general, have led to a vehemen
demand In various quarters for some sor
| of positive intervention on the part of tn
| United States.
| Can't Recognize BeIligerency.
| 1t was at first proposed that belliger