New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1896-03-18

critic. agree that 81 many such iiiciuo"'' f
pened to show serious and charac'eiis''' 'e
feet in General Lees methods
But the Gettysburg affair different II
was General Lees wish to strengthen MS army
in every way possible for this campaign ana
bis frs, effort was by the gradual disclosure
Of his plan to induce the Richmond Govern,
ment 10 bring forward all the troops that couio
be SHARED from the far South He was only
nartially successful. In the next place he was
deeply soIicitous about the movements OF the
cavalry under General J. +. B. Stuart. ana IL
was here that General Lcngstreet incurred re-
sponsibility. The orders t. Stuart on the eve
Of the campaign were sent through Lohgstee'
headquarters unsealed. They showed that Lee
preference was fol the cavalry 10 rlde 'hio"ei'
Hopewell Gap east of the Union Army 'housh
the alternative of going west and crossing the
Potomac at Point of Rocks was considereo'
General Longstreet was TO decide at the last
moment which of these two routes was the
better BY his own showing he did more IMAM
decide this question His opinion was that II
the cavalry went to Point of Rocks the purpose
Of the carpaign would be exposed, in meas
ure and he doubted the possibility OF passing
through HONEYWELL Gap in the rear of the Union
Army. His own choice was that the cavalry
should ride on the right of the First Corps to
.he Shepherdstown crossing. But he gave Stu
ort no positive orders. Il think. ne "'o'e'
"vour massage of the Potomac by our rear AT
the present moment will, in measure, as
close our plans You had better not leave U.S.
therefore, unless you take the route IN 'he
rear of the enemy" He gave positive orders
in minor matters, which assumed thai stuart
would ride to Shepherdstown In touch WIN INC
army Stuart treated hint and orders ahKe
with contempt. alleging afterward Lees per
mission to make what General Longs'reet Calls
a "nomadic ride" The result was Lees secohu
disappointment-a terrible one-when the nrS'
day passed at Gettysburg without WORD from
tho cavalry or any means of learning the move
ments of the Union forces. which were ga'her-
ing to fight him. The question OF responsibility
for Stuarts absence is one for military eN-
perts But General Longstreet certainly ieaNes
open the question whether or not ne was 10
give positive orders which Stuart could dsopey
only at his own risk.
General Longstreet found General Lee at
Gettysburg excited and ANNOYED. The Confed-
crate leader had meant to avoid aggressive p"'-
tie and General Longstreet's first thought was
march around the Union left. Blu; Lee exclaimed
IF he Uhe enemy 10 there tomorrow VIII at
tack him" Longstreet's reply was: III he IS
there Tomorrow II will be because he wants you
n attack" If General Longstreet Is right, Lee
was like a man completely surprised and the
further story of the battle leads to the inference
that he never recovered his selfpoise. lie uh-
derestimated by several hundred yards the as
lance over which Pickett was sent upon MS ais
astrous charge. and insisted upon the movement
against strong protests. General Longstreet gave
the final order for the charge but he goes INTO
minute details to show that he was not 10 Diane
He even quotes General Lee as saying after inc
charge was over, 1T is all my fault "ehei"
Iongstreet indicates that his opinion from the
first was that the Confederates should nave
avoided the battle. and he cites statements some
OF which are already historic, 10 show that Lee
deplored all his remaining years his failure 10
march away by his right flank toward Nashlhg-
ton az Longstreet suggested
One of General LOngstrcet's pet ideas was tho'
the Confede-ates should make the utmost use
of their interior lines. reinforcing at opportunc
moments one army with troops from another
| He was allowed to illustrate his meaning IN one
campaign and that was the way he came 10 take
part In the battle OF Chickamauga. As to the
failure Of Bragg to make any use OF that victory
! he can only say what all military critics say.
| But his own chance came when he was detached
with separate command against burnside IN
Tennessee His wish was to have gone on this
expedition Immediately after the battle Of Chick
| amauga By the time IT was undertaken Grant
was at Chattanooga. and the aspect Of affairs
was beginning to change rapidly. II Is 10 General
/ Longstreets credit that Grant was alarmed by
| the movement against Burnside. But the alarm
soon subsidized when 1t was seen that Long
streets movements were very slow. In spite OF MS
reputation for celebrity and proTptness. General
| Iongstreets elaborate explanation amounts 10
q charge that Bragg, while urging haste In Tor
| NAL orders was at the same time withholding
TRANSPORTATION. The result was that burnside ana
| IonRstreet kept each other on the Watch, ana the
| latter had time to let his army make lts own
clothes and shoes and fit Itself out generally, 10
the envy Of all the Other troops In the Coniedcr-
ate service In the midst OF so much prosperity,
The veterans who had marched barefoot into East
Tennessee doubtless sympathized fully In their
! Generals estimate Of the strategic value OF the
fold But at last they had 10 go hack with him
+ and fight their way from the Wilderness to APP
| nomattox General Longstree. notes more than
| ono Mace where the tide Of war might nave Deel
turned and the South have won. 1t Is the right OF
a gallant man to have his visions