The National tribune., 1896-03-19
GEN. MEADE.

and more or less confusion existed.
"Push on 10 Cemetery Hill" was the
word, and the officers endeavored to re-
form the men on the plain beyond the
crater.
On page 20, in the book published
giving the evidence brought out by the
"Committee on the Conduct ofthe War,
in investigating this failure, Gen. Burn
side stated: ~One regiment, the ID Pa.
Prov. IL A, reformed Immediately and
got beyond the crater, but the cross or re-
verse fire from the enemy in the trenches
in the immediate vicinity broke them
up" Col. Barney, their Colonel, was
severely wounded at this time.
The opening in the rebel lines was but
a trife wider than the crater itself, and
it was but few moments before the
enemy on either side were coming out of
their bomb-proofs and firing into the rear
Of the newly-formed line, the result of
which was that the men rushed back in
the crater for shelter, and the day was
lost.
Meade kept sending orders to Burn
side TO Push in his troops and take
Cemetery Hill" So Wilcox went in
with his white division only to get in
the same disorganized mass that Ledlie's
Division were already in. Wilcox, as
well as Ledlie, got censure from the
~Court of Inquiry" for allowing their
men to get in this condition and not
pushing on for Cemetery Hill, as ordered.
There was no officer in the army that
could have taken a division in any kind
Of order through that crater exposed to
the flank fire on either side at the time
that Wilcox's Division went in.
If Gen. Meade had not interfered
with Burnside's original plan all this
confusion as well as the flank fire would
have been avoided, for Sigfried's Bri-
gade would have opened gateway at
least 40 rods in width for the passage Of
the other troops The rebs, for about
20 minutes after the explosion, were
TOTALLY DEMoRALIzED,
and did not fire gun. Five minutes
would have taken us to their lines, and
IN 10 minutes more, sweeping down both
ways from the crater, We would have
covered ample room for the main column
70 advance in safety toward Cemetery
Hill.
Not satisfied with the failure of the
Wilcox Division, nearly two hours after
the explosion the Cololed Division was
ordered to make charge, and although |
IN command Of the leading regiment, |
was not informed Of the point we were
TO strike until the head of the column
reached the crater and Col Van Buren,
Of Burnside's staff, pointed to a white
house On Cemetery Hill as the place we
were expected to reach.
Instead Of going through the crater
my regiment turned to the right and
went down the rebel lines, the regiments
following did the same, and Sigfrieds
Brigade of col0red troops cleaned out
about 200 yards of the intrenchments,
capturing several hundred prisoners.
Then came that order again to ad-
vance on Cemetery Hill We were
joined by the Second Brigade Of the
Colored Division, and started, but met /
Mahone's Division Of rebels on the
plain beyond the first rebel line. and
they made short work Of us.
Out Of 4,500 guns which the division
carried in, 1865 did not come out. NY
regiment lost eight officers and 200 men.
The charge Of the Colored Division was
little episode that was not really
needed, as there was no hope of success
at that late hour; but perhaps it was a
good thing, as it convinced all who wit
messed the movement that the negroes
would fcht.