The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-03-01

(At Gainesville. Ga. in 1896.
On that day the First Corps stood upon
the Blue Ridge from Ashbys 10 smoker
Gap, Sluarts cavalry on the PLAINS IN
Ridge. lie says. AT the above date
General Lee had not cetttmined on seid-
ing any Of nis army norm OF .HC -.
tomac except Ewelfs tSecond) corps,
that was in advance W hich n cans, OF
course. that General Lee marched MS
army from Fredericksburg 70 the Poto-
mac with no other Interior designs or
plans. and would leave him inN en-
piricai attitude. The claim 10 the con
trary. which dee thinks 20 put under IN"
dust was that General Lees plans for
tae nfarch of Ga, summer we're laid and
deliberately studied from about the lVth
If Nay. All plans, Of course. are SGD
ject To delays. from movements OF the
enemy. but the strategy OF the march 10
the Potomac behind the well -guarded
Blue Ridge was 80 encouraging OF
st:ei 9Th thai little 81 prehension OF delay
was felt once We could pun the ddNer-
sary from his heights above fredericks-
burg. I'm tle official report OF his move
incnts and plans General Lee says me
position occupied 10y the enemy opposite
Fredericksh 1rg being one In which ne
could not be attacked 10 advantage. II
was determined 10 draw him from IT.
The exec utlOn OF this purpose embraced
ihe relicf OF the Shenandoah Valley from
the troops that had occupied the lower
part OF b. during the winter and spring,
and. IL practicable. 10 transfer the scene
o. Aostiltlcs north of the Potomac
Plans may not DE important in general
warfare, hut iueN are essential To good
conduct in handling armies of invasion.
This axiom. with General Lees evidence.
shows the cruque in error in his first
issue.
The plan Of move northward. after pass
Ing the Potomac. was studied with deeper
interest aud laid with more care than that
through Virginia. The latter, "A plain
move 10 hold the strong line Of the Blue
Ridge looking towards Washington, while
d 4 N..tnH
screen down the Valley OF Virginia to
the Potomac. was so safely defensive.
and AT the same time threatening towards
the national capital, that there was little
apprehension OF serious trouble while in
Virginia. The former was 10 devise ways
ana means for collecting supplies, cover
our line OF travel, and lead the enemy
as Tar as possible 10 ilelds most favorable
Tor our active work. II was projected
early $50 May. and was the especial study
from that time 10 its contamination, and
looks better since than before the march.
The plan: The Second Corps. IN advance.
10 march in two columns, one north
through H1gtrstOWn and thamberSDurg.
the other northeast through EmmittsbuTE
and Gettysburg. the Third Corps passing
behind the Blue Ridge. TO cross the PO-
tomac at ShephcrdStoWn. and follow the
march OF the eastern column of the Sec
ond The First Corps after the Third
had passed down the Valley of Virginia
towards the Potomac, 10 Withdraw from
the Blue Ridge. cross 10 the west bank
Of the Shenandoah. march for the cross
ing ot WllliamspOrt. and follow on the
route Of the western column OF the Sec
ond. the cavalry to follow the Withdrawal
OF the First Corps from the Blue Ridge,
cross 10 tN west bank of the Shenan-
doah. ride for the crossing at Shepherds
town. thence pressing and threatening to-
wards Baltimore But these were
changed. as the Second Corps crossed into
Maryland in favor OF "A cavalry raid,
the column OF the Second Corps assigned
for the march east marched north 10
Greenwood on route about parallel with
its western column. and the Third Corps
marched through Hagcrstown.
WITH THE RECORD.
Colonel Tosby calls this writing his
tory on the a priori principle" and says:
General Longstreet does not pretend TO
have any written or record evidence 10
support ma assertion. on the contrary.
the records show that at that time no
such plan could have been entertained
or even discussed" He doesn't seem TO
Consider that a prudent general does not
always puI his strategy on paper. lest
il might fan into other hands. But there
is evidence OF the plans Ia most Of the
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. dispatches referring 20
the events as they passed. besides the
report OF the general OF his proposed in
yaslon.
10 criticisO and bury, he should know
that it claiHs 20 be with the record IN all
things. There are times. however. when
events are more pOteut OF facts than the
Hu-lailtU ittOiNrs anu may hf AofA 10
correct errors OF the latter. Accounts OF
events are not always noted at the mo-
ment OF occurrence. II recorded from
memory days ana weeks after they nave
passed they frequently have errors OF
omission and commission, but the logic OF
events Is infallibie. and may be used 10
the disestablishment Of paper records.
a striking illustration OF this IS made in
accounting for the Gettysburg campaign
In Manassas TO AppOmattoN
Colonel Mosby quotes letter from ths
Confederate Chief. OF the 22d Of June. tc
eiD # think your best course will be to-
MaSds the Susquehanna, taking the routes
by Emmlttsburg. Chambershnrg, and Nc
COnnelsbuig," ana another 10 his cavalry.
man: "One column Of General Ewells
army will probably move towards the
SufQuchanna by Emmittsburg route. an
other by chambersbuIg." He quotes IN
full letter OF mine OF the same date "a
General Stuart, which refers 10 plans OF
the march In its context. meptions Gen.
Lees letter. that II transmits. as making
similar reference. and 10 impress the
mind OF our cavalry leader. those plans
haf been adopted. a foot-note was added
10 the letter. II Is so heavy OF evidence OF
plans and impending movements that 4,
should have place just here:
wildwood June 22. 1853 y. NJ
ssMator-Gen. j. Il. IL. Stuart, command
''Gencral. General Lee has inclosed e
mo this letter for you. TO be forwarded
10 you, provided you can be spared from
~ front. and provided, think that you