The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-03-01

! he Was merely Wattifh hbti ~
| Division could come up, ana get INTO ~
sitlon. The partial success of CrawiYtn .
! attack was due 10 It's being 50 syu"''''
, Campbclfs Brigade was not eNpeclinb -,
J and. moreover. had On unfortunate @n ~
! IN its position. due TO the angie u w
woods which exposed the rear 81 lie
J right regiments as soon as the iclt So
way. During the artillery nflns, h,c
! 81 piece of artillery could tet 'nt"" ~
! these woods 10 their part. 50 as 20 GU
! hladc the eucmys battery "i r,s a.,
/ Can't IOacuc's two 1O-porndcr faiIol's
/ I'm the ROAD near which ten. Nlhdcr w.
| staudine Tie rode through the WOODS 20
] where Camphcus Brigade was iyih6
! down behind the fence, ana haNHns lo"hu
no road. inquired Of Coi. caIhsN COM
handing The brigade, but he haa seen
I none Tho writer rccollccts distinctly
seeing the enemy in The opposite Wcous,
/ across the stubblc-iela, but they hau Hot
/ Vet advanced into the open. ON return
/ Inc he found that Gen. Nindcr had been
| struck hy a piece OF she'll and on over
taking the strctchcr. and finding his adJu-
I fant-gcncr3l and aide-ue-canp WIN hl.ni
/ ne rode back, and Joined Col honaid'
/ commanding the "StOncWall BIl5dut,
which was thcn advancing. The enemy
were driven out OF our woods, but an
/ uarcntly halted IN the woods from
which they had advanced. soon fchdtr :
and Arca,r's Brgades passed up TO our
left along the edge OF the field, and alier
reaching the opposite woods, faced 10 the
right. and carried everything before them.
(see Col Ronalds report in Moore
| Rebellion Record vol. tx, p. J,''( = ne
troops driven by Fender were Doubtless
Gordon's brigade which had come up 10
reinforce Crawford. but too iate. IL rs
strange that Gordon should have p"'h
posted Too yards in rear OF CfaWlord'
which is certainly not in supporting 9ls-
lance Gen. Andrews says that Gordon
retrcated only TO his original position;
This may be. for IL was 100 dark. "nI
these troops were too far on the ROAD loI
us 10 see. but We pursued IN coiuinH
down the road for some time after ualh'
| until we ran against PickettS. Wheh we
halted, and retired during the hltht' con
WINGED that Banks had been reinforced.
Why Ricketts, was not sent up sooner 10
support Banks is a mystery 10 the Wftsi'
The writers Of these papers, anu Mi'
Ropes IN addition. blame Banks LOT az
lacking. and try 10 show that ne eAcee9,
cd his orders. lut, $ Cos. Ailah Wen
saws (.Army Of Northern Virginia IN
1st.," p. III. note): While Ranks Hlili-
taiv Judgment was sadly at fault ON tHlS
as On many other occasions, Al VIII nc
hard 10 prove, If language means any
fhln. thar re Z ali tfafIsrfess' MS or
ders." Banks took the precautsoh 'o
have Col MarshalIs yerp9il oI rae s linn
ishors. II the enemy advances, ana at
tack him Immediately as he approaches
and be reinforced from here ttulpepeI
&. 40, does not mean attack ine ene ,tE
fails TO understand what 10 does mean.
Pope cannot shift the responslDil,E 10
Banks He should have been WIN hdHhs
in advance and have ordered mp fNchtlt9
as soon as Banks met us. for Ricketts,
was lying lew miles back, dolhb hV'h-
Ing and in full hearing OF the guns 1T
Bants had not attacked, he Woulo soon
kaW. been attacked IN over Nhciiin"s
forc~ ard his disaster Wouii nave btel
all che greater As IL was, MS altdcN
broke the force of ours, ana caused i,s5
damage TO himself. Col. Horton is, now
over very severe on Banks lie says;
"As for the tactical conduct OF the ac-
ton. il Is only necessary 10 say that
l.atts did not know what troops me hao
on The field. nor where they We're IoI
what they were doing. He ascfioed ms
failtle TO every cause but the right one
his oNr utter incapacity. rms may ne
truo. but two divisions, OF hNe bilEaoes,,
one a very small one Ohat OF Greene, on
the extreme lcfD, could never nave WIZ
stool Jackeon's attack, no matter now
Wen they We're handled 1870.
Passing over the preliminary move
menis Of the two armlts, aitef zen LtV
brought up Longstrcets Corps from kich-
mond we come TO Jacksons celebrated
nanG movement on Manassas. MT. Ropes
callU this 20 project as rash as II vas
unItccedented" %. 80. But Cen i'ee
knew with whom he had 10 deal. Ilat
Was. indeed one of his disunguishlns
characteristics as general, crlucaIly
weighing the calibre OF ms opponent
and knowing when ne couio TAKE Ilshs.
Wift an army of only Jp,On men against
ono of 10000 which was expecting IciIl-
forcsments every day, Gen Lee was COM
PEELED TO take risks, just as Idttt O.,
Chanceliorsviile. The strange pau 10
that pope should have regarded the
movement as merely a cavalry RAID, ana
even after ne found out better Shouiu
have issued such an order as lhaI 10
Mcdowell Of L; NJ, august IN Con- con,
tain.ng the notable prediction: III you
will march promptly and rapidly al lhe
earliest dawn OF day, upon Manassas
Junction. we shall bag the whole crowd
Ropes's "The Army Under Pope j.. pl.J
Very true. 81 Jackson should stay thSIe
TO be "bagged." The only sensible order
issued 10y Pope during the campaign was
that directing the concentration at
Gainesville, ana ne spoheu IL an ~ n,.'S
subsequent order But that order was
issued in the hope of getting ahead or
jackson. instead Of behind nm. Nc
Dowel. Sigel. and Reynolds were ny
virtue OF this order, nteiposed as Il
wedge between Lonsstreet ana Jackson
and if Pope had brought there the rest
OF his forces, instead OF sea1lhs theH Oh
on a Wild-goCse chase 10 MaiiasaS anu
might have happened. Why Pope should
have imagined that jackson would at
tempt 10 turn TO the south ana Wesl rs
incomprehengiDle, ana the count oi fdils
is right in treating the idea as absurd
10 81 The most natural supposiboh
was that he would put his corps IN such
a position as TO connect as soon as pos
sible with LOngstreet, coming through
Thoroughfare Gap and Haymarket Nc
Doweu should have strengthened Ricketts,
and enabled him TO hold the gap. Even
after the hot fight OF King, on the even
ing of the 18th, Pope totally misconceiNed
The situation. Kings TWO brigades put
up a good light. Although Jackson had
his own and Ewelrs Divisions TO nght
King. he sent the writer, late that even
ing 10 bring up A. T. Hin, but he could
not find him, from lack OF Information
as 10 where to find him. Jackson merely
pointed with his hand, and said, In That
direction" and the writer rode around
until dark. 10 no purpose, but doubtless,
10 his own preservation. THESE writer's
all blame King and Ricketts, Tor retirlhg
TO Manassas that night, but they had
originally been ordered 10 Manassas, ana
then their direction changed 10 Centre
vile: on tindinE the way apparently
blocked towards Centreville and not be-
ing able 10 find Mcdowell. their CORPS
commander. they concluded TO obey the
original order.
col. Lyman. who sums mp a. review OF
the reports of Col. Haven and Gen. Weld,
SAYS: There Is. perhaps. no instance IN
the war where commander showed
greater ignorance of the positions. not
only Of the encmys troops, but Of his
own" 10 BOD. THIS "hitS the nail on
the head" but. 10 may he remarked, by
way Of parenthesis. that both Col Ly-
man and COL LivermOre are wrong IN
asserting that Pope was outnumbered.
We have already shown that Pope had
% 900 men more than Lee. That Pope
totally miscOnceived the situation. is
2Sth TO Gen kearny, just as Kings
fight was over. which contains the fol-
lowing remarkable discovery: Gen. Me
DOwell has intercepted the retreat of the