The San Francisco call., 1896-08-29
VESTED RIGHTS
OF PROPERTY.
Arguments in the Spreckels
Case in the Supreme
Court.
AN INTERESTING POINT.
D. M. Delmas on the Response.
hility Regarding Community
Estates.
ELEMENTS OF A TRANSFER.
Husbands May Not Disburse Com.
mon Earnings at
Will.
ELEMENTS OF A TRANSFER.

4uS case VI OpItChelS VS.. OpTSCk6lS CduS
before the Supreme Court on argument
yesterday morning. Henry Ach for the
respondents and D. M. Delmas for the ap-
pellants were the only speakers, but they
went over the case SO thoroughly there
was nothing left to be said when court ad-
journed.
The case is before the Supreme Court on
an appeal by Claus Spreckels from an ed-
verse judgment by Judge Slack, in
his suit to recover possession of 5000
shares of stock delivered to the de-
fendant. Rudolph Spreckels. 1t was
contended by the plaintiffs that the trans
fer of stock was invalid because it was
done in violation of the law requiring the
consent of the wife to all transfers OF COM
mun1ty property. The defendants claimed
that the law making such requirement
was unconstitutional, as interfering with
one of the vested rights of the husband.
Mr.. Delmas' argument before the Supreme
Court was along the line of that conten-
ton. In brief he said:
On the 3Ist OF March, 1891, the Legislature
of this State adopted anEmendment to the laws
regulating the rights of husband and wife in
the community OF the marriage, by which the
absolute right of disposition which had been
heretofore granted as early as the statutes of
1850, and had been perpetuated by the codes,
was modified 10 the extent of requiring to the
validity of any gift of the community prop
erty the written consent of the wife. That
amendment, wnen added to the statute as 1t
then existed, would make section 172 of the
Civil Code read as follows:
The husband has the management and control
of the community property, with the like absolute
he has of his separate estate, provided, how
ever, that he cannot make gift OF such commu-
nifty property without valuable consideration
unless the wife in writing consents thereto
The only question presented by the record
which is now before your Honors on this ap-
peal to which l desire, for the present, at
least, to address myself, is the question de-
cided by the court below relating to the con-
stitutionality of this statute To state in their
broadest terms and most general comprehen-
siveness the facts upon which that contention
was made and decided, would state them as
follows:
The husband and wife were married before the
adoption of this amendment, and before the
adoption of the amendment had acquired the
comm unity property under discussion. After
the amendment the husband undertook with
out the consent of his wife to make gift of
the community property thus acquired, and
the question presented upon those facts is
this, Is that gift valid? 1t was held by the
court below that the gift was valid because the
amendment in so lar as 1t undertook to oper-
ate upon the community property acquired
before the amendment, was unconstitutional.
The broad ground upon which that decision
H.,
the laws as they existed before that amend
ment, the husband was the sole owner, and
had the sole and absolute and unqualified
right to dispose. OF the community property as
he pleased, to give it away as he pleased. The
wife had no rights whatever in the community
property, except mere hope or expectancy
that some of it might be left at her husbands
death which she might then take, and, that
being the condition OF the relative rights of
the parties the statute which undertook as to
that property to impose any conditions upon
Int ~ NJ rserhf fha 4
heretofore existing under the law, was an
abridgment OF a vested right, impairing, there
fore, the simplest and most elemental prin-
ciples which underly all our constitutions.
AS have stated TO your Honors, that ques-
tion is squarely pres ented by the record here,
and very nakedly, because 1t arises upon a
demurrer to q complaint brought by the
husband and wife to recover the property, and
upon which demurrer ruling sustaining 1t
was made. The plain tifts, declining to amend
have appealed to your Honnrs.
Now, we were favored in the court below by
q learned and lengthy opinion OF the learned
court, in which the grounds upon which the
decision was placed are very fully and very
clearly stated. This is the fundamental prop
osition which underlies the decision. After
stating what the condition of the law was
before 1891, and what the relative rights of
the parties were, as understood by the learned
Judge, he says it is evident that the interest of
the wife in the community property has been
enlarged by the amendment of 1891, in so tar
as the amendment extends, since the power Of
the husband TO dispose of the property by gift
is subject to the wife's written consent and to
that extent the. interest OF the husband is
lessened, and his vested rights in the COM
munity property acquired before the amend
ment became law are impaired. If the
vested right of the husband to dispose of the
community property is interferred with by
legislative enactment, the law in that respect
is unconstitutional.
This position of the learned Judge is illus
trated and amplifed by the argument that
under the statute as 1t stood before the amend
ment, the husband had been given the abso-
lutte management and control of the COM
munity property; that, as a result from that
grant OF absolute dominion over the property
the wife had no estate or interest, legal or
equitable, In the property, and was in no sense
property, and as a further result that the title
to the property was in the husband, and he
was In law the sole owner thereof
The question then presented at the very
threshold OF this discussion is: SIS the funda.
mental proposition which underlies the whole
OF this opinion true? Is it correct, or was it
under our system of laws from 1S49 up to
1891, that the right, or power rather which
the husband had, to manage and control the
community property, was vested right in
such @ manner that the grantor of that right
the Legislature of the State, could not itself
thereafter limit or eircumseribe; or take away
its former grant or delegation OF authority?"
The constitution of 1S49 article XII section
IA, is in these words:
All property, both real and personal OF the wife
owned or claimed before marriage and that ac
quired afterward by gift devise or descent shall
De Her Separate property ana laws shall be
more early defining the rights of the wife in rea
ton, as well as 10 her separate property as TO that
held in common with her husband
In obedience to that direction, the Legisla-
ture, at its session n 1850, did enact ST tatute
by which it undertook to define more clearly
than the constitution had attempted to do the
rights of the wife and the rights of the hus-
band in the community property, viz: that
the husband shall have the management of the
separate property of the wife, but no sale of
such property or lien thereon should take
place unless b. instrument in writing
signed by both husband and wife and ac-
knowledged by her upon separate examina-
ton.
1t has never been contended that that right
of dominion over the separate property of the
wife was vested right in the husband which
the Legislature could not impair By the
codes of his State i'll 1873 the Legislature
took away from the husband the right to con-
troll the separate property of his wife. To con-
tend that this amendment of the law giving
the husband control of his wife's separate
property was unconstitutional, because it de-
priyed him OF vested right, is manifestly
untenable.
The Supreme Court of Washington decided
in an exactly similar case that an amendment
to the law by which the power to control
formerly possessed by the husband over the
community property was taken away was not