The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-07-18

arn,ioq 4, tho beginning and II was never
| lcsscncd after they reached the NcHltS
/ OF Richmond and Petersburg. Dut was
! greatly increased. The curious may spe-
/ culate as 10 what would nave ! zen the
| rceuit ~ the resources in men and muni-
iions Of war OF the two commanders had
been reversed. or 1: Lees strength had
/ CONTAMINATED Grants. Occupying
neutral posltlon. as between tho two
| Federal commanders. Grant and Butler,
and certainly having no reason To ad-
/ nlre the latter, | cannot but be amused
/ at the effort Il Grant. by the use OF rev
/ fash phrases. 10 make Butler the scapc-
goat Of all his failures.
Tho disparity between the forces or
/ Sheridan and myself In the Valley cam
I r,airn was even greater than that ne
tween Lee and Grant My force, when
arrived in front Of the Notifications or
/ Washington on the 18th Of July. 1864. was
J eight thousand 5000 muskets. three
| small battalicns Of artillery with ABOUT
forty (fO field pieces. OF which the largest
were twelve FOUNDER Napolcons, ana
about two thousand (2cOO badly mounted
and equipped cavalry. Of which n large
/ portion had been detached TO cut the I'l"-
roads leading from Baltimore north. Gen
cral Grant says that two divisions OF the
sixth Corps and the advance of the Nine
fore ! did. and Mr.. Stanton says / was
not there by the Sixth Corps, part OF
/ tho Nineteenth Corps under General
| Emery. and a part of the Eighth Corps
/ under General Gilmore. My force had
/ then marched over 500 miles marching at
least twenty miles each day, except the
day Of the fight nj Monocacv. when il
marched fourteen miles and fought and
/ defeated Wallace.
sr fra.Nlr - ~
as il is called by General Grant my cf-
| fective strength was about eight thou
! sand five hundred $500 muskcts. tho
three hattalious Of artillery and less than
| three thousand 8.00O cavalry. Sheridans
| Infantry consisted q the sixth. Nine
| toenth and Cooks Corps. composed one
| division Of the Eighth Corps and what
was called the Army Of West Virginia.
| Some idea may be formed OF lne
strength Of the Sixth Corps when 1t is
| rccoflected that the Army of the Poto-
mac was composed Of three corps on the
1st of May previous .to-wit: the Second,
| Fifth and Sixth, and that its effective
| strength then was. according 10 MT
| Stanton's statement. 3N6. The same
statement shows that the available
strength Of the forces I'm the Depart
mont of West Virginia" On the LIST OF
| May 307S2 and most Of the troops IN
| this department were concentrated IN the
| Valley Documents subsequently captur-
cd showed the strength OF the Nineteenth
Corps to have at the battle Of Winches-
ter not less than 1900 effective men.
Ofrcial reports captured at Cedar Creek
showed that Shcridans Cavalry on the
18th q September. two days before the
fight. numbered 1000 present for duty
His artillery was vastly superior to mine
I'm number of men and guns Inc SKIN
Corps alone must have exceeded my en-
tire strength. unless IL had met with such
/ tremedOus losses as 10 reduce us Stl'Hs 'il
at least threc-fourths. From all the IN
formation received and from documents
captured AT Cedar Greek. / am satisfied
that Sheridan's effective infantry strength
AZ Winchester could not have been less
than 5000 muskets. and it was prooaniy
moro Tho odds against me. therefore,
were fully four to one and probably more
his very great superiority in cavalry was
very observation-disclosures 10 me, as the 'ou"-
try was very open and admirably aaop'eu
t. cavalry operations. and my cavalry
being mostly armed with tnneid ilh.S
without pistols or sabers could HOT Hs"'
mis- whose equipment and arms We're
comnlotc. At the fight at Cedar Creek
7 had been re-enforced by one division OF
infantry G[ershaw'sl numbering twenty =
seven hundred (2.lJO muskets, one small
battalion Of artillery and about six num-
dred G0O cavalry which about MADE up
my losses at Winchester ana flsheI
rIu I went into this fight with eight
thousand five hundred $500 muskets,
about forty pieces Of artillery and about
twelve hundred O.@O cavalry, as the
rest OF my cavalry, which was guarding
the Lnray Valley, did not get up in time.
though ordered TO move at the same
time moved to the attack sheridan
infantry had been recruited fully up 10
it's strength at Winchester. and his
cavalry numbered S700, as shown by the
official reports captured. The main cause
why the route Of his army i'm the morn
ing was not complete was the fact that
my cavalry could not compete with his
and the latter therefore, remained intact
He claimed all his own guns that had been
captured I'm The morning and afterward
recaptured, as so many guns captured
from me. whereas / lost cnly twenty
three guns and the loss Of these and the
wagons which were taken was mainly
owing 10 the fact that q bridge. on = mar
row part of the road between Cedar Creek
/ and Fishers lin, broke down. and the
guns and wagons. which latter were not
numerous. could not be brought off. Pur-
suit was not made to Mount Jackson, as
stated by both Grant and stanton, but my
/ troops were ndlteu loI lAc HIsNl at
Fishers Hin. three miles from Cedar
Creek. and next day moved back TO New
Market six miles from Mount Jackson,
without any pursuit at all. So far from
its being true as stated by Mr.. stanton.
that no force appeared in the Valley after
| this the fact Is that ] reorganizcd my
force at Now Market. and on the 10Th OF
November moved down the Valley again
and confronted Sheridan on the llth and
18th i'm front of his intrenchmentS be-
tween NowtOwn and kearnstcwn. and then
retired back 10 New Market because pro-
visions and forage could not be obtained
I'm the lower Valley. The expeditions 10y
which the posts of New Creek and Bever-
lv were subsequently captured. were sent
out also from my force in the Valley.
The strong force which General Grant
saws was entrenchcd under me at
Wavneshoro. when Sheridan advanced
M the Valley i'm the latter part Of Feb
ruarv. 1865. with two divisions Of cavalry
OF 5000 each O0eO in ain. consisted Of
about one thousand 1000 infantry and
a few pieces Of artillery. most OF my In
fautrv having been returned e General
Ice TO meet corresponding doiachments
from sheridan to Grant and all my
cavalry and most OF the artillery having
boen sent of on account Of the impossi-
hnitv Of foraging the horses in the Val
la, Obvious reasons Of policy prevented
any publication Of these facts during the
war. and il viii now be seen that l was