Iowa state bystander. [volume] (Des Moines, Iowa) 1894-1916, 1896-12-11

10 re2Nze tne SXlSteuC0 Va SS...
grievances which have led TO the dp .e,S,
recognized by the queen
regent and by the cortcs, voiced py tno
most patriotic and enlightened OF span
lsh statesmen without regard to par.y;
and demonstrated by reforms proposeo
by the executive and approved py sno
legislative branch Of the Spanish GOV.
eminent. It Is in the assumed temper
and disposition OF the Spanish govern
ment to remedy these grievances lot
titled by Indications Of intluential pup-
lie opinion in Spain, that this govern.
ment has hoped to discover the mos.
promising and effective means OF com.
posing the present strife, with honor
and advantage to Spain and with tne
Of all the reasonable oo'
jects Of the Instruction.
49, A Hint to Spain.
1t would seem that II Spain snouiu
offer to Cuba genuine autonomya
measure of home rule which, while pre-
serving the sovereignty OF spain,
would satisfy all rational requirements
of her Spanish subjects-there shouId
be no just reason why the pacincation
of the island might not be enected on
that basis. Such a result Woulu az,
pear to be in the true Interest OF an
concerned. 1t would a. once stop inc
resources Of the island, and making
1t worthless for whichever party may
ultimately prevail. 1t would keep IN.
tact the possessions Of Spain without
touching her honor, which Will De
consulted rather than impugned py
the adequate redress OF admitted
grievances. 1t would put the prosper.
ity Of the island and the fortunes OF
Its inhabitants within their own con,
troll, without severing the natural ana
ancient ties which bind them to the
mother country, and would yet enapie
them to test their capacity for SELF
government under the most favorable
conditions It has been objected on
the one side that Spain should not
promise autonomy until her insurgent
subjects lay down their arms. But the
reasonableness Of a requirement by
Spain, OF unconditional surrender on
the part of the insurgent Cubans
before their autonomy Is conceded,
Is not altogether apparent. 1t ig-
norcs important features OF the
situation-the stability two years
duration has given to the tnsurrec-
prolongation In the nature Of things,
and as shown by past experience; the
utter and imminent ruin OF the island,
unless the present strife is speedily
composed; above all. the rank abuses
which all parties in Spain. all branches
OF her government and all her leading
public men concede to exist and pro-
fess a desire to remove.
Facing such circumstances to with
hold the proffer Of needed reforms until
the parties demanding them put them
selves at mercy by throwing down
their arms has the appearance of neg
Letting the gravest of perils and invit-
ing suspicion as to the sincerity of any
protested willingness to grant reform.
The objection on behalf of the insurg-
ents-that promised reforms cannot be
relied upon must Of course be consid-
cred, though we have no right to as.
sumo and no reason for assuming that
anything Spain undertakes to do for
the relief Of Cuba will not be done ac-
ccrding to both the spirit and the let
ter OF the undertaking.
Our Offer to Spain. ,
Nevertheless, realizing that suypi-
cions and precautions on the part OF
the weaker of two combatants are al
ways natural and not always unjusti-
fiable-being sincerely DESTROYS, in the
account that the Cuban problem should
be solved with the least POSSIBLE delay
1t was animated by(this government
to the government Of Spain some
months prEo that, II satisfactory
meaS61e~ Of home rule were rendered
the Cuban insurgents, and would be ac-
cepted by them upon q guaranty Of Its
the United States would en-.
deayor to find way not Objectionable
to Spain of furnishing such guaranty.
While no definite response to this init
nation has yet been received from the
Spanish government, 1t is believed to
be not altogether unwelcome. while, as
already sugg ested, no reason is per-
ceived why 1t should not be approved
by the insurgents. Neither party can
fail to see the Importance OF early ac-
ton, and both must realize that to pro-
long the present state Of things for
eyen a short period will add enormous
" to the time ana labor unca --xprnrsi-
ture necessary to bring about the tn
dustrial recuperation Of the island. 1t
is, therefore. fervently hoped on all
grounds that earnest efforts for healing
the breech between Spain and the in
surgent Cubans upon the lines above
indicated may be at once inaugurated
and, pushed to an immediate and Sue
cessful issue. The friendly offices OF
the United States, either in the man.
ner above outlined or in any other way
consistent with our constitution and
laws. will always be ut the disposal 81
either party. Whatever circumstances
may arise, our policy and our interests
would constrain us to object to the ac-
quisition Of the island or an Interior
ence with its control by any other
power
II Spain Falls.
It should be added that it cannot be
reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude of the United
States will be indefinitely maintained
While we are anxious to accord all due
respect to the sovereignty OF Spain, VIC
cannot view the pending conflict in all
its features. and properly apprehend
our inevitably close relations to it, and
it's possible results, Withou: consider.
ing that by the course Of events We
may oe drawn into such an unusual
and unprecedented condition. as will
fix a limit to our patient waiting fol-
Spain to end the contest, either alone
and In her own way, or with our friend.
ly cooperation. When the inability OF
Spain to deal successfully with the
insurrection has become manifest, and
it Is demonstrated that her sovereign.
~ AZ EAAiiASS iii >Ab1 AO1 S11i Pul pOSSS VI
its r!ghtful existence, and when q
hopeless struggle for its re-esta blish.
ment has degenerated into strife
which means nothing more than the
useless sacrifice Of human life and the
utter destruction of the very subject
matter Of the conflict, a situation will
he presented in which our obligations
to the sovereignty Of Spain will be
superseded by higher obligations
which We can hardly hesitate to recog'
nize and discharge.
Deferring the choice of ways and
methods until the time for action ar
rives, We should make them depend
upon the precise conditions than exist
ing; and they should not be determined
upon without giving careful heed tc
every consideration involving oul
honor and interest. or the international
duty we owe, to Spain. Until we face
the contingencies suggested, or the sit.
uation Is by other incidents impera'
lively changed. we should continue ir
the line Of conduct heretofore pursued
thus in all circumstances exhibiting
orr OIo6ianco IN thn vQO,1f ra roo nfS nj