The herald., 1896-08-07
COUNTY OFFICERS SALARY
Judge York Hands Down
an Opinion
ADVERSE TO THE CLAIMS MADE
Exhaustive Resume Of the Cues.
ton Involved
THE MEANING OF A MONTH
Section 400 Of the Political Code Has
Not Been Repealed
The Computation Of the Two Years Term
Set Out and Defined
Two Decisions Of Superior Court Judges Take
Opposite Ground One Case Now on
Appeal In the Supreme Court.
Different Views Of Law
THE MEANING OF A MONTE
Section 400 Of the Political Code Has
Not Been Repealed
The Computation Of the Two Years Tern
Set Out and Defined

An opinion was handed down by Judge
York yesterday that, while complicat-
ing somewhat a question that has been
keenly debated by certain county off,
Gals, will probably result in the ques-
ton being definitely settled.
The suit upon which the opinion re-
ferred to has been given was that of
Robert Beardsley VS.. the County of Los
Angeles. The plaintiff was deputy coun-
~ recorder, and he. in common with
other officials, claimed salary for his
services. The same identical question
has been ruled upon twice before by
superior court judges, and in one case,
that of Lopez VS.. Bickwell, 1t is now be-
fore the supreme court on appeal, and,
it is understood, has been argued and
submitted
The particular case upon which Judge
York has given his opinion, and reached
a different conclusion to that heretofore
reached. went to department three on
appeal from Justice Owens, and conse-
quently this settlement of the case is
final in this instance, unless the court
should determine to grant new trial,
which would probably result if the SUI
preme court should decide adversely to
the stand taken by Judge York. The
opinion in full is as follows
The plaintiff prosecutes this action to
obtain judgment for services rendered
as deputy county recorder of Los An
geles county, and for services of a sim
liar character by other deputy officials
assigned to him. The services in ques-
ton were rendered between January LIST
and January eth, 1895. The claims are
based upon the proposition that the time
| between said dates was in excess for
services for the month preceding Mon
day, January I, 1895. The salaries of
officers are required to be paid monthly.
The auditor is required, on the first
Monday of each and every month to
draw his warrant on the county treas
urer in favor of each of said officers
for the amount of salary due him for
the preceding month. The whole con-
tentiOn centers on the meaning of the
phrase preceding month" To deter
mine its meaning we are not restricted
to the general definition of the word
month" The question is, what did the
legislature intend by the use of the
phrase? Section 4109. political code, pro-
vides that the official year is to be COM
puted respectively from and including
the first Monday after the first day of
January of any one year to and excud-
ing the first Monday after the first day
of January of the next succeeding year.
Under that section, if in force, it seems
to be conceded that an official month
commences on the first Monday of one
| month and ends on the first Monday of
| the next month.
Section 20 of article Xxx. of the consti-
tuition of this state provides that "Eec-
tons of officers provided for by this
! constitution, except at the election in
the year 1879. shall be held on the even
M har nI apxyt1 1of1 IL
ton of their respective terms. The
terms of such officers shall commence on
the first Monday after the first day of
January next following their election
The county government act of 1891,
conceded to be in force at the time of the
rendition of the services for the payment
of which this action IS prosecuted, pro-
| vides that "All elective county and
| township officers Except superinten-
dent of public schools and assessors),
except otherwise provided for in this
| act shall be elected at a general cleo
ton, to be held in November. 1892 and
every two years thereafter. until other
| wise herein provided, and shall take Of
flee at IL oclocl, meridian on the first
Monday after the LIST day of January
| next succeeding their election. Il
The officers elected under the provisions
of this act shall hold Office until their
| successors are elected or appointed and
| qualified"
1t is commended, on behalf of plaintiff,
that section 4109 of the Political code
| was repealed by the county government
| act of 1891. I think. however that this
is an oversight Of counsel, because the
| provisions of the act of 1891, which, it is
claimed. repeal said section of the polit-
ical code, are identical with the provis-
| ions of the county government act of
1883, and, if there has been any repeal of
that section of the political code it was
effected long prior to the act of 1891.
But, under well-settled rules of con-
struction, said section 4109 of the politi-
| cal code was not repealed by the county
government act. 1t is not necessary to
discuss the rule with reference to re-
peals by implication. for in both of
| these acts (of 1888 and 1891 there is
| repeating clause, as follows: "All acts
and parts of acts inconsistent with this
act are hereby repealed" 1t is a we'll
| settled rule of law that when an act ex-
| presses a repeal of former acts only so
Ifar as they are inconsistent with it's
| provisions, such provision expresses
and limits the extent of the repeal. The
| question is, what did the legislature in
tend by the repeating clause? A similar
repeating clause was under considera-
ton in the case of the Bank of British
| North America VS.. Israel Calm, 10 CAL
465. In deciding that case, our supreme
court quote with approval from the de-
| clsion Of Justice Field in the case of Chi
cago Railway company VS.. United
States, 127 u. s.. 400: when there are
two acts or provisions of law relating
to the-same subject, effect is to be given
to both, il that be practicable. If the
( two are repugnant. the latter VIII oper-
ate as repeal of the former to the ex-
tent of the repugnancy. But the second
! act will not operate as such repeal mere
ly because it may repeat some of the
provisions of the first one and omit 9TH
ers or add new provisions In such
cases the later act will operate as a re-
peal only where it plainly appears that
1t was intended as a substitute for the
first act. AS Mr.. Justice Story says 1T
may be merely affirmative, or cumula
tive. OF. auxiliary The supreme court
further say: THE legislature in pass
Ing the later act, evidently had the
question of repeal under consideration
and gave expression to the extent of its
intention in that regard" Had the act
| of 1SS2Sheen.int q a non,r1a4a LII