The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1896-11-22

the defense of the Confederacy was made
purely a question of geography Each
general of a district was expected to drive
back all enemies crossing his frontier,
without much regard to what was going
ON IN the other districts.
The better to carry out this idea, the
capital itself was removed from Mont
gomery in the interior 10 Richmond near
the frontier, where il was expected that
most of the fighting would take place
Aud the defense Of the shallow North
Carolina sounds in the rear of Richmond
was deemed of more Importance than that
OF the passes of the AppalachianS.
A policy more fatal to success could not
have been adopted. The armies of the
Confederacy were wrecked and wasted
in the vain effort to defend its capital and
the extended, indefensible frontier. Ev
cry great pitched battle of the war, unless
Chickamauga be an exception,was fought
within a days march of the frontier, or
Of navigable water, which was in effect
the frontier, because the Federals with
their gunboats held all the nayigable wa
tiers. Wherever the Federals chose to
throw down the gauntlet Of battle, the
Confederates Immediately picked it up.
there has never been any better fighting
in all the history of the world. But the
Federals were always well fed and cloth
ed, and never lacked for ammunition and
army supplies. because the Confederates
were willing to DO the fighting almost
within gunshot Of the Federal gunboats
and transports
And 50 the great advantage which
the Conefederates could have had in the
contest-that Of fighting from a center
was deliberately thrown away. 1t
never seemed to occur TO those inauthori-
ty that the battles for the Confederacy
should be fought not upon the tidal wa
ters of Virginia or upon the banks OF the
Mississippi that great inland sea-
and its navigahle tributaries, but with
concentrated armies Oh the tanks Of the
Appalachians.
When Bragg was sent through Cum
beriand Gap to occupy eastern Kentucky,
| the purpose was not TO change the seat of
war but to make a diversion" TO re
| lieve the pressure on the Mississippi"
| But what could poor Bragg do, invading
the rich and powerful North with his lit
| tie army Of thirty thousand men? And
yet he has been blamed because he did
not capture Cincinnati He did very
well. considering his opportunities Even
while Bragg was making his diversion,
twice as many men as he had in all his
army were scattered in garrison along
the Gulf coast, absolutely doing nothing.
But the frontiers must be defended, and
the capital too. il it took the last drop
of Confederate blood, Such was the poll.
cy of dispersion.
A lesson might have been learned from
the war of the Revolution; for in that
war the capital of the country was chang
ed no fewer than nine times, and the Brit
ish armies marched from one end Of the
thirteen colonies To the other yet Amcri-
ca was NOT conquered: or from that
greatest defensive war of ancient or mo-
dern times. wherein Frederick Ii OF
Prussia maintained the independence Of
his country against combined continent
tai Europe. With the Austrian armies
In his front, the French on his TANKS,
and the Russians and the Swedes pillag-
ing his capital in his rear, not battai
ion Of his army would he risk merely to
hold territory. For six of these seven
bloody years he did not even see his
capital Let the frontiers and the capital
take care of themselves. The heart OF
Prussia is her armyl'' And so attacking
and retreating, marching and counter
marching, delivering terrible blows when
ever he could strike to advantage, always
keeping his men together and preventing
his enemies from concentrating, he
fought on furiously desperately, until the
fortune of war changed and the last foe
was driven from his country. For him-
self he won the well-deseryed title OF
the Great" Prussia he saved from the
fate Of Poland, and for all succeeding
| ages he showed how a defensive war n
gainst superior numbers ought 10 lie
fought Such were the results Of the
policy OF concentration.
1t would have been better for the Con-
federacy III the government had thought
that the "'heart Of the Confederacy was
| her army for territory may be aban-
doned and vet re-occupied, and q city
may fall and yet be re-captured, but an
army once lost is gone forever, soldier
once dead cannot be brought back to life.
According to the policy of dispersion,
| however, ii was not the army that was
| to be protected, but the territory and
capital Of the Confederacy. And so
| fifteen thousand men were lost at Fort
| Donelson in the effort TO defend the
| frontier of Tennessee; thirty-tWo thou
sand men were lost Mt Nicksburg III the
effort to defend the frontier of Mississ-
| ppi; and thousands of brave men, I'M
| told and unnumbered, were lost in those
terrible battles to defend Richmond,
which was of no more value to the Con-
| federacv than Norfolk or any other city
upon tide-watcr. If every city upon the
seaboard had been evacuated at the be-
ginning of the war, the Confederates
would have been the stronger and the
Federals the weaker just to the extent
of the garrisons which We're necessary
| to hold them. In the war Of the Revolu-
ton the British Occupied every seaport
| from Maine to the Florida line; the only
effect Of it was to relieve the Americans
of the trouble and expense Of defending
| them
From first to last the armies Of the Con-
fcdoracy were never concentrated. Of
the six hundred thousand men in arms.
there were never got together on a single
battlefield more than seventy thousand a.
valuable men. The scattered armies