The San Francisco call., 1896-01-02

movement with reference to st. Thomas
Island. Mr.. Seward says:
Inc unprotected condition of the At
lantlc Coast line of the United States was
never fully comprehended until exposed
by the experiences of war.
The sovereignty of the islands in the
Caribbean Sea, comprising the West
Indies, is divided among all the naval
powers, the United States alone having no
toothold there. Convinced OF the actual
necessity of securing for this Government
fortified naval supply station in the Ca
ribbean President Lincoln and Secretary
Seward summoned Vice Admiral Porter
for consultation in regard to the matter. y
Procuring the necessary charts and de-
scriptious OF the region, and laying them
before the President, Admiral Porter made
the following strong representations
st. Thomas lies right in the track of all
E.sea-going vessels from Europe, Brazil, the
East Indies and the Pacific. Ocean bound
to the West Indian Islands or to the
United States. 1t is the point where all
vessels touch for supplies, when needed,
coming from any of the above stations.
1t is a central point from which any or all
of the West Indian Islan9s can be assailed.
while it is impervious to attack from land
ing parties and can be fortified to any ex-
tent. The bay on which Ties the town OF
II. Thomas is almost circular, the en-
trance being by neck guarded by two
heavy forts which can be so strengthened
and protected that no foreign power can
ever hope to take it. st. Thomas is a small
Gibraltar OF itself and could not be at
tackled by naval force. There would be
no possibility of landing troops there. as
the islands are surrounded by reefs and
breakers and every point near which a
vessel or boat could approach is a natural
fortitication and only requires guns with
little labor expended on fortified works.
There is no harbor in the West Indies bet
ter tltted tnan st. Thomas for a naval sta
ton. Its harbor and that of st. John, and
the harbor formed by the Water Island,
would contain all the vessels of the largest
navy in the world, where they would be
protected at all times from bad weather
and be secure against an enemy. In fine.
ST. Thomas is the keystone to the arch of
the West Indies. 1t commands them all.
1t is OF more Importance to US than to any
other nation
These facts, averred Mr. Seward, ac-
cepted in connection with the injuries and
EN- barrassments suffered by our navy and
commerce, left no doubt in the minds of
President Lincoln's administration OF the
importance TO the United States of the ac-
QUESTION of these islands. The question
was frequently discussed with the Danish
Minister, and In January. 1865, both Presi-
dent Lincoln and Secretary Seward caused
the desire of this Government to purchase
the provinces in the West Indies to be
made known to Denmark
The prevailing sentiment at Washington
was favorable, and the scheme was favored
by the Peasants party, or Liberals, of
/ Denmark, but a Conservative Ministry
was in power and it opposed the partition
of the provinces. Again the proposition
was offensive to Germany, and in different
degrees to England, France and Spain
and when these facts were discovered the
scheme became less and less popular. as
Denmark had not yet settled the Schles-
wig Holstein imbroglio with Germany and
was in no position 10 hazard further issues
with her great natural foe, nor to make
other enemies.
The project was completely lost sight of,
said MIR. Seward, in the quick succession
OF overwhelming events that make the
year 1865 the most momentous in Ameri-
can history.
In the midwinter of 1866 Secretary
Seward went to the West Indies for his
health, and while there, at the request of
President Johnson, made personal observa-
tions with view to purchase there by
this Government. The Secretary's precon-
ceived opinions in regard to the Danish
Antilles were confirmed, and negotiations
were for a second time opened with Den
mark. In July, 1866, this Government of
fered Denmark $5,0000G0 for the islands of
St. Thomas, st. John and Santa Cruz.
The Liberals had just obtained control
in Denmark, but the new Ministry was SO
deeply absorbed with domestic interests
that no response was made to the second
and formal advances toward the purchase
of the islands.
Ten months after the second proposition
was received the Danish Prime Minister
informed our National representative at
Copenhagen that his Government declined
the So 900, 900 offer, but would cede all the
provinces to the United States for SIS. .OOO,-
000. The United States made second
offer, this time of 81, 800, 900, which was de-
clined, and again amended by this coun-
try to an offer of $500, 900 for the islands
of st. Thomas and ST. John, leaving out
Santa Cruz, an agricultural island, and not
desirable as post. The United States
agreed to a stipulation that the consent by
vote OF the islands should be the sine qua
non of the transaction.
The Alaskan treaty with Russia seemed
to pave the way to the success of the St.
Thomas negotiations. Russia assured
Denmark of her moral support in the
premises, and on October "a, 1867, the
Danish King consented to a solemn treaty
for the transfer of the West Indian Islands
to the United States. ratification to be con-
tingent on a favorable vote of the West In
dinr,