The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-03-31

cussIon and must present things a.
fhey appeared at the time to those VINO
were called upon TO direct the AFFAIRS Oh
which I shall speak" Nowhere IN the
published correspondence does the ph'as,
east OF the B,ie Ridge appear. renein,
Longstreet says, PASSING Bf lhE
REAR OF THE ENEMY" and THE
PROPOSED ROUTE IN REAR OF
the enemy" and General Lee says,
WHETHER you CAN PASS AROUND
THEIR ARMY WITHOUT HINDER
ANCE. DOING THEM ALL THE DAM
AGE YOU CAN. AND CROSS THE
RIVER EAST OF THE MOUNTAINS.
Nowhere do we find the expression east
or west OF the Blue Ridge until II APP
pears in General Lees reports. when
are dated July 3lst. 1868. and January,
1864: and in these reports IL Is not useo
fin such connection as will at all justify
Colonel Marshall's Interpretation WIN
General French at Harper's Ferry WIZ"
a signal station on Maryland heish's'
which correctly reported every move
nent OF Lees army in the valley WIN
the Twelfth corps at Leesburg. the fii,h
corps and Pleasonton's Cavalry at Aide
an attempt to cross between Harper
Ferry and Edwards Ferry would have
been little short OF madness. GeneraI D.
a. Early says. In the paper from when
have previously quoted: When Hooker
was crossing the Potomac at Edward
Ferry IL was simply impossible lot
Stuart to cross that stream between thar
point and Harper's Ferry. as Hooker was
keeping up his communications with
That place, and the interval was narrow"
We may add that the idea OF such an
attempt probably did not once occur
either to General Lee, or to Generai
Longstreet, or to General Stuart
once more Colonel Marshall says:
'The first movement of General Stuart
after leaving Salem Depot. early on the
morning OF the 18th, brought him In CON
fict with General Hancock's brigades
near Haymarket, and. finding that ne
could not pass around the rear OF the
enemy. the discretion so given him by
General Longstreet was at an end, and
there was yet time for General Stuart TO
retrace his steps. ."
NOT A COMPETENT JUDGE.
In view Of the evident bias OF Colonel
Narshalls mind and the strained con-
structions OF language by which he at
tempts to Justify HIS attack upon General
Stuart, submit that Colonel Marshall Is
not competent or an impartial judge
of the limitation 20 the discretion given 10
General Stuart; and IN opposition 10 his
opinion | affirm that Stuart was a bet
ter Judge than he, and that stuart con-
sidered that he was fully in the line OF
his duty, and was carefully executing his
orders TO the best OF his ability.
As 10 the fact. as affirmed by Colonel
Marshall, that there wns yet time for
General Stuart to refrace his steps" II
might be sufficient to say that General
Stuart did NOT think 80. At least sixty
five miles OF mountain country lay be-
tween Stuart at Haymarket and the Po-
tOmac at Shepherdstown. His horses
We're subsisting entirely upon grass. and
impeded Icy six pieces Of artillery and his
ordnance trains, be. could not have hoped
10 cross al Shepht%dstown earlier than
the morning OF June 2sth. and perhaps
reach the passes Of the South Mountain
on the 10Th. with a command much re-
duced in numbers and efficiency by hard
marching. Here he would undoubtedly
have encountered the enemy's cavalry,
superior I'm numbers and condition, with
hardly a hope that he could prevent
strong column from breaking through
and creating havoc among the trains OF
Lees army Moreover. what must he DO
in view Of his orders TO damage 'he
enemy. and delay his movementsi lie
now for the first time found before him
the condition on which General Lees flrst
order was based The enemy was actual
days march nearer TO their rear than he
was at Rector's Cross Roads Must he
forego this advantage ana trail back over
the mouBiainsf Who that knew stuart
would imagine him doing such a thingf
II is only necessary to notice one other
point in Colonel Marshalls address Ha
asserts that the concentration Of Lee
army at Gettysburg could have been ana
would have been more speedily Effected
If General Stuart had furnished TO Gen,
Lee the Information he expected, ana
that Lee would thus have been enabled
10 crush Meade's army Ia detail,
There are many well-hformod writers
and thinkers who disagree with Colonel
Marshall. have already quoted General
Early's published statement He lthe
enemy WAS FOUND. HOWEVER,
WITHOUT THE AID OF CAVALRY
AND WHEN FOUND. THOUGH BY
ACCIDENT, HE FURNISHED Us TIE
OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE HIM
FATAL BLOW"
WHAT GENERAL EARLY SAID.
In the year 1875 | had much cores
pondence with General j. A. Early on
the subject OF the Gettysburg campaign.
and / venture To quote from TWO OF ms
letters Although they were intended
only for my eye, am sure that, If awe,
the old hero would gladly consent that
might use his words in defense OF his
friend Stuart He writes this under dale
of February .. 1873:
"The real fact is that while General Lee
NAV have been for a time harrassed and
embarrassed by the want OF the presence
near him Of an efficient cavalry force,
yet no real harm ensued, for he did ma
out where the enemy was, ana did get
hin. IN a position where crushing de-
feat would have been inflicted on him, It
General Lees plans had been heartily sec
onded, and promptly carried Out by those
whose duty il was % do 50. The absence
of the cavalry at the time mentioned was
necessary. and was authorized by General
Lees instructions, and IL Is unjust TO cast
censure on stuart But for his presence
on the right of the enemy. the cavalry OF
the latter would have been at liberty 10
move north and then ! would have peen
In imminent danger. aud Ewells trains
might have been destroyed No one eN-
pected the cavalry 20 fight the battle OF
Gettysburg, and these men who under
take to speak of Stuart's deinquencies
cannot understand what they are taking
about -
Again. unler date Of February -. 1878,
General Early writes:
81 really DO not believe that the battle
NJ Gettysburg was lost because stuart
was unable TO communicate with General
Lee previous to that battle, nor because
he failed TO communicate with me, or !
failed to communicate with him, whether
by negligence or misfortune, nor because
Stuart was not up on the first day
have stated my views fully on the causes
of our failure 10 gain that battle. ana
am drmly impressed with the conviction
that the utmost vigilance. energy ana
dispatch that Stuart could have used IN
giving General Lee Information OF me