The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1896-11-12
FIGHTING THEM OVER
What Our Veterans Have to Say About
Their Old Campaigns.
HOW 1T WAS DONE.

Discussion of the Valley Campaign of 1862.
EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: The valley
campaiyn O. 1862 has been much discussed,
both at home and abroad, by military critics
All are not agreed as to its merits. But 1t
succeeded, and, after all, that goes iar To-
ward shutting off adverse criticism. From
a military point of view it was very merl-
torious, both in its plan and in its execu-
tion. looking toward Southern success.
In the Spring of 1862 the Federal Govern
ment was preparing to engage in a vigorous
campaign, all along its lines, IN Virginia,
Kentucky. and Tennessee. Cooperation was
the one thought that dominated the plan.
But unfortunately for the Federal cause, IL
lacked that cohesion necessary to success,
and its separate bodies were not wlthln
reasonable supporting distance OF each otner.
Gen Lee was not the last one to detect
this weak point. So he simply exchanged
tactics with the Federal authorities. de
became actively aggressive, which forced
his enemies to play the defensive roll OF
warfare.
This one campaign, more, perhaps. than
any other during the war, attracted UNI
versal attention, because 1t gave practlc'.i
proof of two "new theories" as to army
tactics: That cavalry could he mace very
the volunteer soldier, being raw recruit
from the farm and workshop, could DE re-
lied upon for effective field campaign serv-
ice under the most trying circumstances.
Both of these were indeed a revelation TO
the military world.
Beginning with May 1, 1862, we find Gen.
Mcclellan aud Gen. Lee facing each other on
the Peninsula. with various smaller forces
scattered along the valleys of the Shenan-
doah region The real object, therefore, OF
the aggressive campaign IN this valley was
to capture or disperse these detachments ID
detail before they could be concentrated,
thus preventing cooperation in case OF Dat
tie, and to scatter and confuse them SO they
could not be quickly reorganized and
brought into effective service; and IN the
meantime TO threaten Washington and Bal
timore. and thus prevent further reinforce
ments being sent 10 Gen. Mcclellan.
All Gen. Jackson's orders, and DISPOSE
tions OF forces under his control, prove that
this was the objective.
The Luray and Shenandoah Valleys are
incased between two huge mountain
ranges on the east and west with parailei
range dividing the two valleys, IN one OF
which there is a considerable river, all nav
ing general trend north and south, begin
trends east and west, and ending at the Po-
tomac River at the north, running chiefly
east Each of these ranges have ample gaps
through which an army can pass directly
from one valley into the other, or IRON
either valley out into the open country on
the extreme west. or east of each valley, re-
spectiyely.
A moments thought will convince the
student that it is grand field for artistic
military operations; also very dangerous
ground.
The several gaps were about 90 miles
apart: some. however, were 40 miles apart,
the entire distance from Page Valley TO
Potomac River being about 80 miles. SO,
for an army to get caught in either valley
between these gaps in the mountains meant
almost certain destruction.
These facts are cited to prove that the
campaign had considerable merit in its exc
cution, as well as in its plan, and to show
how difficult it was TO capture any force in
either valley. He must be caught between
some two OF these mountain gaps. There
was no other way.
Gen. Jackson can scarcely be criticised
adversely for his execution of this entire
plan, except this, that it was very unwise
for him to stop and fight Gen. Fremont at
Cross KEYS on June 8. He could have
crossed the bridge at Port Republic at any
time On the night of the 9TH without risk OF
even molestation. He would then have
been practically out of danger from all quar-
ters But by hating to fight very profile
NAUTICAL battle with Gen. Fremont he opened
an awful trap for bimself. 1t is the wonder
of all critics why Gen. Shields did not close
it upon him. Had Gen. Shields crossed the
bridge and burned it, then manuvered
along the west side of the river until he
connected his left with Fremont's right,
/ can't see how, by any possibility, Gen.
jackson ould have escaped. 1t was indeed
averitable trap. No General is TO be praised
for taking such risks voluntarily. He got
out of it all right, it is true but it was be-
cause of Gen. Shieldss blunder, and not by
his proves.
Much adverse criticism has been made
because Gen. Fremont came to S:rasburg to
intercept Jackson's retreat, rather than to
march directly from Franklin over to Har-
risonburg.
1T is true that there was an element of in
subordiDaiion in Gen. Fremont's change of
line. which always deserves censure. But
from purely military standpoint, Strasburg
was his true objective, so that he and Nc
DoweH might cooperate; but he should
have acted more promptly. His success de-
pended almost entirely upon reaching Suas-
burg IN advance of Jackson.
All the evidence goes 10 prove, too that
had he put bis troops 10 half the strain that