The herald., 1896-03-24
THE RIGHT OF THE COURTS
TO COMPEL WITNESSES TO MAKE AN.
SWER IN CERTAIN CASES
The Law Relieving Prom Prosecution Wit
nesses In Interstate Commerce Cases
Held to Take From q Witness . Right
GuaranteediIby the Constitution.

Held to Take From q Witness Q Right
Guarantsedilby the Constitution.
Associated Press Special Wire.
WASHINGTON, March GA decision
was rendered by the supreme court of the
United States today in the case OF Iheo-
dore T. Brown, involving the right of the
court to compel answer by a witness to
questions in interstate commerce matters,
notwithstanding he mly plead self-ncrim-
ination as a result of his answer. The de-
clsion was opposed to Browns contention
that he was protected by the constitution
from this requirement, and the decision of
the court below affirmed. The opinion
was handed down by Justice Brown. jus
tees Field, Shras. Gray and White dis
sented, holding the constitutional provis-
ion was sufficient to relieve Brown from
the requirement of answering. In an
nouncing his opinion Justice Brown said
the question involved was whether the law
OF 1913, specifically relieving witnesses in
Interstate commerce cases from prosecu-
tion when they reveal facts which might
incriminate themselves, operates to take
from witnesses in such cases the privi-
leges of silence as guaranteed by the con-
s;tution, and the conclusion was that it
did. He said this act was in the nature of
a general amnesty in such cases and had
been so regarded and upheld in half
dozen decisions in the state courts. Re.
plying to the objections that while the act
served as protection to- witnesses against
prosecution it did not shield from the dis
grace involved in confessing u criminal
act. Justice Brown said it did not. nor was
1t contemplated by provision in the con-
stitu.ion, that one should be sh!ei1ed. He
added, in response to objections, that the
law would operate to protect a witness
from prosecution in the state courts, the
federal statutes being superior to those Of
the states, that the latter statutes are the
supreme law of the land, and apply in the
state as well as in the federal courts. he
also advanced the opinion that in this Gaze
the refusal of Brown to give his testimony
was due rather to his desire to shield
others than himself. As Brown was only
| the auditor of the road, his duties were not
of such character that he could be held
criminally liable for any violation of the
law. 1t veg the intention that the consti.
tutional provision should protect from real
| and substantial dangers, and not from
imaginary evils, as in this case. The con-
sequence OF granting immunity from an
swering to such officials would inevitably
be to render the interstate commerce laws
incapable of enforcement, and the result
| would be to PROSTATE congress at the feet
of the powerful railroad corporations of the
country.
The decision of the circuit court for the
western district OF Pennsylvania requiring
him to answer the questions as propounded
was. therefore, affirmed.
Justice Brown said the case involved an
| alleged incompatibility between that clause
of the fifth amendment to the constitution
! which declares no person shall be ''comn
! pelled in any criminal case to be witness
! against himself" and the act of congress
| of February H.. 1898. This act had, he
said, been passed to meet the defects of
the interstate commerce act. This clause
| of the act was, he said, susceptible of two
! interpretations. If construed literally, and
the witness be left TO determine the matter
for himself. the practical result would be
that no one could be compelled to testify
to a material fact in a criminal case unless
| he chose TO do so, or unless it wss entirely
clear that the privilege was not set up in
good faith. If, on the other hand, the OBJ
| ject of the provision is to secure the wit
ness against a criminal prosecution, then
if no such prosecution be possible, a stat
ute absolutely securing to him such i'm
muni,y from prosecution would satisfy the
| demand Of the clause in question.
'The danger,' he said, "of extending
the principle announced III Councilman vs..
Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put
forward for sentimental return for a
purely fanciful protection of the witness,
and for the real purpose of securing immu-
nifty to third person. who is interested in
conceaiing the facts TO which he would
testify. Every good citizen is bound to aid
| in the enforcement of the law, and has no
right to permit himself, under the pretext
of shielding his own good name. to be
made the tool of others who are desirous of
seeking shelter behind this privilege"
In the present case, he said. it was clear
that Brown was not the chief or even a
substantial offender against the law, and
that his privilege was claimed for the pur.
pose of shielding the railway it's officers
from answering to charge of having vio-
lated its provisions. To say, notwith-
standing his immunity from punishment,
he would incur personal disgrace from an
swering these questions, seems too much
like an abuse OF language to be worthy of
were true, he would sill be compelled to
answer if the facts sought to be elucidated
were material to the issue.
IF, as was justly observed in the opinion
OF the court below, witness standing in
Browns position were at liberty to set up
an immunity from testifying, the enforce
! ment of the interstate commerce law or
other analogous acts wherein it is for the
interest of both parties to conceal their
misdongs. would become impossible,
since 1t is only from the mouths of those
having knowlenge of the contracts that the
| facts can be ascertained.
On the point of shielding witness from
disgrace he said: "a person who commits
an act is bound to contemplate the conse-
quences of exposure to his good name. and
ought not to call upon the courts to protect
that which he has himself esteemed to be
of such little value. The safety and well
fare of an entire community should not
be put into the scale against the reputation
of a self-escaped criminal, who ought not,
either in justice or in good morals. to re-
fuse to disclose that which may be of great
public utility in order that his neighbers
may think well Of him. The design of the
constitutional privilege is not to aid the
witness in vndicating his character, but
to protect him against being compelled to
furnish evidence to convict him OF crimi-
nal charge. If he secured legal immun-
ity from prosecution, the possible
Impairment of his good name is a penalty
which is reasonable. and he should be
compelled to pay for the common eood.'
Justice Shiras read dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Gray and While con-
Cured. in which he took the position that
the federal law would not shield the wit
ness from prosecution. and expressed the
opinion that the failure to enforce the law
OF 1898 would not weaken the interstate
commerce law. Justice Field also read a
dissenting opinion. He held that the am.
nesty granted in the congressional act of
1893 was in effect pardon, and said that
only the president could exercise the func.
ton of pardoninQ. He contended that the
constitutional provision was intended az
much for the purpose of preventing the
disgrace man might bring upon himself
by discriminating himself ON the witnesi
stand as for his protection against prose
cution. He contended thar the law in