The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-05-03
General Longstreet's Defence.

UtntTdl LOH-otTCclS DSlNhSCs
Editor Of The Times:
In great battle mistakes and misun-
derstandings naturally occur
nave read General Lees order OF the
battle of Gettysburg, and also General
Longstreets letter in your yesterdays
issue denying that he received airy spe-
cial order from General Lee 10 charge
with artillery at the time Pickett MADE
his advance This Is perhaps uue. Gene
raj LongStreet says correctly, TO charge
with artillery IN front Of Pickett would
have been folly" as the infantry would
have had to march over ,he lead ar
tillery and been discouraged thereby. To
charge after Pickett was repulsed
would have been both folly and nadress.
General Lees plan evidently was under
stood in the main, and was carried out
First, a heavy cannonade along Pickctts
whole front, with the view Of Weakening
tle enemys line, and, then, with this ac-
cOmplished 10 make the infantry assault,
and If this was successful, to follow II
Up promptly with the artillery, so as 10
make success complete But it turned out
that this terrible cannOnade Of 100 guns
for nearly an hour did not weaken the
enemy's line at all If the truth was
known, 1 doubt If we killed and wounded
q thousand men, perhaps not 500 | re-
member General Alexander said TO me:
81 have orders when l find the weakening
of the line occurs. to send word 10 Pick
EFT TO advance, so / will send him word
If ne advances at all. he must do 50
now, as our ammunition Is nearly eX-
hausted." But there was no evidence that
our artillery had weakened the enemy's
line. We were in few minutes ordered
to cease firing. From my position on the
right. / could not see Picketts charge,
though ia thirty, or perhaps rorty min
utes after we ceased firing. / learned IL
had failed. None OF the artillery along
our line as far as I could see, 20 the
left could have advanced, If ordered,
because Of a deep valley Just in front
Of Us and from two visits / have made
to Gettysburg since the war. ! am salts
fed the advance Of the artillery N
line with the infantry-that is, between
the regiments could not have been ac-
complished without some preparation fer
the guns TO cross deep bitches IN this
onc-mile field between the opposing
forces. There were high rail Fences elso
ACROSS this field. Pickett attempted an
impOsibility. We cannot imagine more
beautiful position for defence by artillery
than the enemys position. Every rart Of
ground on which Pickett had to pass.
right up 10 the stone wall, could be seen
by every man along Meade's line, and,
with a beautiful, wide, level road on top
Of the heights, every threatened point
could be quickly reinforced by artillery.
our advance was. unfortunately. well aG-
vertisod to the enemy. and he hsd splen-
did artillery at hand, I'm abundance.
with which TO reinforce quickly. The Off
GERS would need no orders. They could see
where the danger was long before brave
ArmStead struck the stone wall. Pickett
had TO 20 a mile before no could kill
man, while the enemy began WILDE the
very moment Pickett bes3n MS advance.
No 1900 men OF Frederick tie Great or
Napoleon could carry those hei-his II
well defended by an equal numhcr Of
brave men with such artillery support.
IA no artillery went along with Pickett,
it seems he did not understand the order.
except in the sense Of general order
for the artillery TO follow Up the in
fantry. II successful.
Men can't be expected 70 carry
stone wall, reinforced 10y abundance Of
artillery, right behind their backs, pour
ing grape and canister into their faces.
three or four hundred yards before they
reach the wall, behind which are men
well rested and well protected with mus
kets and bay onets in their hands. Our
ucu had been lying in a hot July sun for
siX or eight hours, and had to marcn
mile under a heavy FIRE Of infantry and
artillery without any artillery support
az an. IL ID hardly possible 10 imagine
line for defence SO favorable as that of
Gettysburg There was little or no smell
ter IRON the start for the attacking
party.
The enemys guns could be DEPRESSED
so as TO rake the front up TO the very
stone wall. 10 made the position stronger
than regular fort. There was consider
able resemblance between this field and
thaJ OF Second Manassas, except here the
enemy had the stone wall and at Ma
nassas We were I'm the open field. Here
the enemy were repulsod in twenty-five
minutes or less by artillery, almost
alone. with loss only OF $50 by the at
lacking column OF 10000 men. l suppose
our loss IN killed and wounded at the Get
tysburg attack was 5000.
General Lee had II may be. too much
faith In his men, and We had too much
faith in ourselves. l never saw such SUBJ
lime confidence in general as we had
"a him. We, the rank and file. lost 10
faith by the repulse. We would have been
glad had Meade attacked us next day.
We offered battle, but he wisely de-
cined 1t.
Observation-Disclosures, mistakes and differ
ence OF opinion are inevitable In great
military operations. as intimated IN the
beginning OF this letter, and their calm
d scusSion may be both interesting and
profitable, provided the proper spirit be
always maintained. l am sorry to see
this spirit sometimes absent, especially
i'm the case OF Longstreet and the late
General Mshone-two among The greatest
lioutenant-eeneralsi in the late war. saw
a great deal OF both Of them. While under
Malone. never feared surprise. In an
attack made by Longstreet as lieuten-
ant. | never feared defeat. Longstreets
driving the Federals through and out OF
"Devira Den" and up Round Top"
should immortalzc him, and Mahones
dsOdging and defeating the enemy after
the mine explosion. thus saving Peters
burg. should entitle him to monument
Malone was "active. vigilant, and brave
ana. considering HIS disadvantage IN
early life. he was far superior 10 Abra-