The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1896-04-05

ments of the Federal army been known
1t had not been intended to de
| liver u general hnitle so far from oui
| base unless attacked, hut coming uneN-
! pectodly upon the whole Federal army
| to Withdraw through the mountains WIN
| our extensive trains would have been
| difficult and dangerous -,
Hence il seems that both commanders
| felt the Importance to each that he must
| receive. buttle General Meade guarded
closely his views ANA although urged
| from Washington, only once tnouent OIL
| aggressive battle. On the morning OF the
| "a he sent troops of his right TO look for n
way for battle, but the grounds Were
found SO purely defensive that ne could
not open strong battle. This gave MN
greater confluence in his defensive, ana
wav aroiind his left, which was also
called to his mind by wire FROM Washing.
ton but too late for u change. MY right
was at that monlcn, beyond his ieit ana
my scouts beyond Round Top and in rifle
range of his packed wagons. SO inviting
was the opportunity to continue the move
TO our right that General Hood delayed TO
omen the battle of the day. urging the
move to the right. until third order was
sent him. On the Confederate side al
thought of work for defensive battle was
abandoned on the afternoon or the ISL
and troops on the march were ordered FOR
ward by forced marches 10 be IN mana
for the next day. ...
tries to explain why when orderered TO az
tack with his whole force at sunrise OF
the I'd he did not get into action uht,i
O'Clock in tho afternoon FitzhuGh Lee
has read letters from all Of General Lees
staff that no order for sunrise was given.
and he had read evidence CONCLUSIVE rom
an aut h mt heated sources that the order
was not given and that during the after
noon and night OF the LIST, ana nntil DAY,
light of the %, General Lee ana beN'iA'
Ewcll were at work looking for an open,
Ing for his battle by the left. second
corps. IL says Meade was not eager for
battle. Lee was. But Meade was eager
No. 1, a ,st,fl N IN ar
and no apprehension except That thc de-
lay might give time for his adversary
to find the way to his rear .a,r
"Ahout eight years alter the SURRENDER
this idea of sunrise attack was incubated
and has been so often repeated mat SOM
have grown TO regard 1t as IL matter OF
"Fitzhugh Lee gays: AS have said.
Iongstreet ordered to attack al sunrise
which made no sign of moving nniil u
o'clock on the right the attack had been
carried out according TO orders but ialied
because the scheme had not been carried +,
about the matter he should know that
there was no fight on any part OF NE liile
night, when the advance was made against
the enemy's right. lie claims that GENERA
Lee thought. TO beat the enemy IN aeiail;
when he found tho Union army. says nc
came up unexpectedly. AZ matter OF
fact, that army was up ana eoh Ger ,,,,,tI
While Yet the Confederate cavalry and
Pickett's division of infantry and artillery
were on the march. ,
"of the battle on the "a BY 5yyri p,iehetfhs,
quotes Colonel Taylor, Of General Lees
staff, as authority that the original ,s prd Ter
and Heoe's divisions, supported
by Pickett's fresh troops. T..at was Gen
raj Lees order when he Joined me on the
evening OF the 3D.. but when told that the
DECISIONS of McLaws and Hood We're
standing against twenty or thirty thou
sand of the enemy: that they had lost 70
lie the day before. that t,ey had but
eight thousand men In their ranks, when:
,yith Pickett's. would make a column OF
Twelve thousand. seven hundred men TO
march a mile under concentrated fire OF
he enemy's artillery and infantry, strong
" posted. eighty Thousand men strong |
that the withdrawal of the two divisions
from the front of the -enemy's left would {
be followed by that force. which would {
swing around our right against the Hanks
Il our attacking columns gain the EN-.
,is retreat, he concluded to allow. the !
divisions r. hold their line and ordered