Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1896-11-27
CLEVELAND AND CTnA.

CEEN ELAND AND CUBA.
Probably the most significant thing
about the return Of Captsin-General Wey-
Ter TO Habana Is that he has returned
in the face Of the fact that the Congress
of the United States will meet Monday.
December 9TH. Well he knows that the
Cuban question will be treated by the
President either in his regular message or
in a special message. And well he
knows that our public sentiment. always
strong in favor of the recognition Of cuba.
will now be stronger than ever since his
campaign has resulted ingloriously.
1t can scarcely be doubted that General
Weyler put his army in motion a few
weeks ago, hoping TO overtake and van
quish Maceo and thus remove the pro-
liability of the recognition Of the Cubans
by the United States. But he mas failed
in his purpose. The Cubans are still in
the field and are as formidable as ever.
They exercise authority, such as it is,
over the larger part Of the island, and are
fast dragging the mother country to the
verge Of ruin IN her efforts TO bring them
10 terms.
Disease, assertions. and debt form
q triumvirate with which Weyler has
10 count in addition TO a willy foe, who
are always present when an attack may
be made by them successfully, and are
always absent when the Spaniards try to
surround them.
The truth Is that the rebels, or patriots
or whatever one may choose TO call them.
have a sort of New World vigor and in
senuity. while their opponents have an
the languor and old-fogyism Of Southern
Europe.
Captain-General Weyler may return to
the field before Congress ASSEMBLIES, but
unless he meets with incredibly good luck
81 Is not to be supposed that he win have
reduced the contumacious subjects of
Spain 10 an obedient mood by that time.
Indeed, there can scarcely be any doubt
that Weyler thinks that he sees the
handwriting upon the wall, and is help
lessly awaiting presidential and congress
sional action.
That General Lee has made an i'm
portant report TO the President can hardly
be questioned. That he has also had
several interviews with the President
upon this subject is well known. But the
Generals position as TO the duty Of this
government is not so well known. True.
The newspapers have tried to trace TO
him various alleged opinions of his on the
subject but 50 far they have been sig
nally unsuccessful. quite recently Gene
raj Lee visited Fredericksburg, and after
his departure therefrom there appeared
in the Star Of that city an open letter
Oh.
was reproduced in the Dispatch, set forth
the reasons why he should recognize Cuba
and advised him TO do so.
Unquestionably. the letter made a good
argument, and II attracted no little at
ten,ion. The upshot Of IL all was that
Fltz Lee began to be credited not with
the actual authorship. but with the views
that 1t contained. In short, Fitz is sup
posed by some 10 have talked over the
matter with a friend in Fredericksburg
who used his information IN the shape Of
an "open letter."
We need scarcely say that this is not
10 be credited Fitz, TO be sure, is new
in the school Of diplomacy. but be IS old
in experience in keeping State secrets.
Besides, the Star Itself denies the story
Doubtless in the numerous guesses that
have been made as to the report that Fitz
has submitted 10 the President, the truth
has been struck now and then, but as
yet II can't be Identified. The Dispatch
has done very little guessing upon the
subjcct, but we are prepared TO believe
that Fitz Lees report VIII satisfy every
American patriot, and be grounded on
the bedrock Of facts, which he viii pro
ouce aud which will carry conviction with
them. Moreover, It Is our belief that Con
sul-General Lees report VIII strongly In
nuence the President, and will result I'm
message 10 Congress which will be IN
effect en- ultlmatum-that is 20 say, that
unless the Spaniards are able 10 resume
authority over Cuba within limited time
the Cubans viii be recognized. We have
waited patiently for the triumph OF
Spanish arms; yet "a little more time
might be granted the Spaniards-but an
understanding should be had on this
point
Such Is the case as we see it. We want
no wars. nor broils. If they can be avoid
"a. But our government has q duty TO
perform and II seems 10 US that this duty
cannot well be postponed much longer.
VIII war b. the result OF Cuban recogni-