Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-02-27


the Navy will demonstrate how hopelessly
behind foreign powers the United States
Is In naval equipment. This is particularly
true as regards Great Britain, our tradi-
ttonal enemy. Great Britain has, or will
have when the authorized ships are COM
pleted. 90 armored battle ships to our 8: II
coast defense vessels to our 20; this def
cheney on the part Of England being due to
her policy of placing her first line of de-
Tense at the enemy's coast. According to
the Secretary's report, Great Britain has
- armored cruisers to our 2: she has "A
unarmored protected cruisers to our ID; she
has 90 unarmored cruisers to our 20; she
has 10 unarmored gun vessels to our IL:
she has "a unarmored torpedo vessels to
our !. and she has 251 torpedo boats to
our g.
The Senator went ON to show the rev
ships Great Britain Is now building, the
large increase in naval enlistment and the
extensive reserve marine made up Of Brit
1sh merchant vessels.
Value of Coast Defenses.
Mr.. Proctor then compared the made
quacy Of our navy with what coast de-
lenses would accomplish. He said:
Such is our navy, but suppose that a
like sum had been expended on land de-
fenses, what would the country now have
to show for the expenditure?
There is no higher engineering author
ity on this subject than Gen. Abbott. He
says that the entire coast would be placed
in condition of security, even if operated
against by the largest naval means which
could be brought against it,
admiral Walker said before the COM
mittee that if our harbors were properly
fortified no squadron would attempt to take
them. For the sum with which We have
procured our navy we could have rendered
our Seaports practically safe against the
combined assaults of all the navies admit
tedly superior to our own, and could have
occupied the first place in the world as re-
CARDS fortified still ha
money enough left to provide a good share
Of the additional floating batteries and tor
pedo boats necessary. The plans of the
Et ard would have given us land defenses
calculated to Withstand all methods of at
tack, even after the improvements that
may reasonably be expected during many
years to come. The proposed works as
sumed an attack with high explosives, and
are planned to resist such an attack. The
guns were heavier than any mounted on
any ship abroad, except a few coast de-
Tense vessels notably the Italian), which
nc one even suggests can cross the Atlantic
ocean, yet even these were matched by
those estimated for our defense. Since the
date of the estimates for land defenses
the guns on cupboard have exhibited a
constant tendency to decrease in relative
power.
1.-THE land defenses would have had in ad-
ditioE to the Notifications:
''Ninety-eight eight-inch guns, as against
the navy'S 81; $50 ten-inch guns, as against
the navy's lS; 2O3 twelve-inch guns, as
against the pavys II; 6 fourteen-inch guns,
a. against the navy's "a thirteen-inch guns;
30 siXteen-inch guns, as against the navy's
none, 1,O32 twelve-inch mortars, as against
the navy'S none; "a ten-inch mortars, as
against the navy's none; sx-inch guns, as
against the navy's none; 800 quick-fire
guns. five-inch, as against the navy's 1S7.
In other words, the proposed land defenses
for the same sum would mount 1876 guns
OF eigkt-inch caliber and upward, as
against the navy's 138 guns, and would
have mounted 800 rapid-fire guns of five
inch caiiber, as against the navy's 1877.
These plans alone IL carried out would
provide Boston alone with Ill guns and
mortars of S-inch to 16-inch caliber, as
against the 1876 guns Of S-inch to I3-inch
caliber in our whole new navy.
"At New York there would be 269 guns
and mortars Of from S-inch to 16-inch cali
Der, as against the 1876 guns of the entire
navy. At San Francisco there would be
232 guns and mortars of from S-inch to To-
inch caliber, as against 1876 guns Of the
navy These comparisons between the re-
spective ornaments we would have a these
important points and the ornaments We
have obtained in the whole new navy for
the same money show that the scale is
much In favor Of any one of the above ports
alone, as against the combined force Of the
navy"
Mr.. Proctor presented tables comparing
the cost Of land and floating batteries
showing great excess of cost when batteries
are placed on ships. He cited events in the
China-Japan war to show that Japanese
land forces were an essential factor in the
capture OF Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.
The New Navy.
Continuing, the Senator said:
I'm the building Of this new navy we have
accomplished already all that 1t was origin
ally designed to do when this work was be-
gun. The question now pressing for an an
swer is. shall the next step be in the direc-
Of f,,r fhar
strength or in the completion of the land
coast defenses? If the latter, we may
know to cent the eXper ditureS to which
We commit ourselves, and exactly what We
will get for our money; If the former We
enter on an expenditure to which there is
literally no end.
These facts now bring us face TO face
with an all-important consideration In our
expenditure of money heretofore we have
had tolerably definite idea as to what We
were spending it for. We could not brook
the idea that our coast might be plundered
by a power like Spain or Chile. We may
assume that we have now guarded against
any possible humiliation of that sort But
what is the next step that We will take? 1t
ought not to be a step in the dark.
FROM this time on any expenditure of
money which we are prepared to make on
naval increase will merely make US stronger
than we need be with reference to powers
that are weaker than ourselves, while leay-
ing us still hopelessly inferior to the five
great naval powers that are now SO much
stronger than ourselves. Whether we look
backward or forward, further expenditure
Of money in this direction except for the
purpose of maintaining our present relative
position) will be money sadly misappropri-
ated. unless it be expended with the DELHI
crate purpose Of pursuing this course to its
logical end and of competing with and ex-
ceiling the great powers of Europe in naval
strength.
I'm country like ours there is certain to
come time when the people will refuse to
vote money for new construction, and will
content themselves with maintaining what
they already have.
when that time comes with land de-
lenses we have something to show for our
money, and If these defenses are complete
all appropriations may cease for MANY
years except trifling amount for care and
preservation. If appropriations for naval
constructions cease for a few years the
navy will sink into insignificance; in other
words, the policy of seeking naval suprem-
acy commits our government, simply for
the purpose OF keeping good its previous
expenditures, to an outlay once every eight
years equal to the entire amount necessary
Tor the fortification Of our coasts in such
a manner as to enable us TO defy the navIes
of the world.
ut would be much better to provide the
land Notifications at cost so many times
less than the expense of making our navy
anything like equal to that of Great Brit
ain, inasmuch as 1t is universally admitted
that the land Notifications will render our
coasts impregnable. 1t is also a matter at
Ino of