The San Francisco call., 1896-04-25
Judge Sanderson's Opinion of a
Judges Position in a
Case.
SHOULD SET vERDIcTs ASIDE.
Some Interesting Comments on the
Court as the Thirteenth Juror
in Trial.

Judge Sanderson has added something
to the comments which appeared in THE
CALL some weeks ago on the rights of
Judge to interfere IN the verdict of jury
Judge Sanderson's comments are en-
bodied in an opinion scaling down YER
dict rendered in suit against the Exam
liner for libel. E. J. Mize was put out of
Judge Conlan's Police Court two wears
ago, and the Examiner printed an article
in which he was described as a crank and
evidently insane. He sued for libel. and
the jury gave him verdict of $500. This
Judge Sanderson believes excessive. aad
he has ordered a new trial unless the
plaintiff will remit $3.50 of the amount.
In rendering bis opinion Judge Sander
son gives his view of the position of the
Judge and his power over a verdict. He
says:
verdict which plainly appears to have
been rendered under the influence of passion
or prejudice, or which is clearly unreasonable,
ought not to be permitted to stand
When trial Judge entertains these views of
the verdict of jury it is his plain dutv to
grant new trial, or modify or reduce the YER
dlctto certain sum, in order that the parties
may settle same, If they, mutually elect 90 to
do, in accordance with the terms fixed by the
trial Judge, and thereby end further Iitiga-
ton.
This supervisory right of the trial Judge over
the verdict of a jury is based upon sound rea-
son and upon rule of law universal, SO far as
/ am advised in the several States of orr
Union. 1t is a rule which has been repeatedly
declared by our Supreme Court, its first cleaI
est expression being found in the civil case OF
Dickey vs. Davis, 80 Cal. 565 and Ito latest
expression, probably, in the criminal case of
People VS.. Knutte, tried by Judge Bahrs. in
another department OF the Superior Court of
this City and County vol II, page I'll, Cal.
Decisions
L would not take either the time or the
trouble to discuss this matter here were il not
for the fact that the rulings of both the trial
and the Supreme Court, in this case of People
VS.. Knutte just cited, have been the subject of
much recent adverse criticism in the public
prints OF our State, under the impression,
PROBABLY, that this was novel and dangerous
doctrine, and in which some members of the
bar participated. No person, though, be he
lawyer layman or newspaper man, who will
take the trouble to investigate this subiect
will find this rule either modern or yjcions'
and no right-thinking person will, in my judg,
ment, ever wish to see the rule abrogated
which confers and imposes upon the trial
Judge the right of the duty of interposing and
exercising his power as Judge whenever
the life, liberty or property of citizen is
menaced, impaired or invaded by fhe eY-
roneous or unjust verdict of Jury.
The court critics denounce this as new law
and dangerous doctrine. 1t is neither It lis as
ola as the history OF jury trials in this repub-
lie, and consistent with reason and simple
justice. Certainly no trial Judge in criminal
case would allow a person whom he thought
innocent, or who was convicted on insufficient
testimony, or on testimony he believed to be
perjured, to be punished by the erroneous or
unjust verdict OF jury. The same is equally
true OF verdicts in civil cases. No trial Judge
would or should permit person to be des-
poiled OF property, when he believed a jury
had based their verdict on false or Insufficient
testimony. Subject, of course, to have his
that he has abused his discretion-which is
rarely done. The trial Judge is the final ar
bitter in jury cases as well as those tried with
out a jury. AS shown above this should no
done, in common justice to ali litigants. other
wise, improper and unjust verdicts would op-
press the losing party and there would be no
relief therefrom.
Unquestionably the province of the iury is
10 ma the facts in dispute. They are likewise
10 pass upon the value and effect of evidence
Their Judgment though, is not arbitrary and
conclusive. They are to exercise sound and
reasonable discretion. If their verdicts rest
upon such reason and discretion, then a trial
Judge rarely, If ever, disturbs their verdiets.
and under such circumstances he certainly
should never do so.
1t is said that if the Judge have the power to
set aside or modify verdicts at his pleasure
then the people might as well dispense with
the expense and inconvenience OF jury trials
This sounds plausible, particularly in this day
and age, when Judges are elected, as with us,
by the people, instead of being appointed by
the crown, as in times past But trial by jurv
is OF great antiquity, and an important part OF
the machinery OF our judicial system, which
oui people, IL nlgnly proDaDl VIII never be
willing to part with, since it guarantees deci-
sion as to the facts in dispute both in civil and
criminal cases, by neighbors of the parties in
interest.
Theory is one thing, but practice often de-
molishes its application. Though the rule in
this state be as elsewhere, that the trial Judge
must IN the end decide whether the verdict of
the jury shall stand or be set aside, yet it is
only in rare cases, and those of the plainest,
where the jury has given an erroneous or un-
Just verdict, that the trial Judge interferes
This department of this court may be aptly
cited In corroboration OF this statement. For
the past five years and upward this depart
ment has almost exclusively engaged in the
trial OF jury cases and mostly for damages, and
during that time hundreds of cases, may say,
have been tried by juries, and yet only in one
case have l granted new trial, and in only
four or five cases, and this among them have
l modified their verdicts. The jurymen ac-
cepted to try these cases have been men of in
tegr1ty and good sense, and their verdicts
mainly based upon logical deductions that
might with reason have been drawn from all
the evidence submitted to thom.
Doubtless if these cases had been tried bv
the court without q jury, the damages given
might have been for other and different
amounts, either greater or less, than those
given by the jury in these same cases, as the
weight. value and effect OF the evidence given
differently than it did the jury; but that
would be no good cause to disturb the verdi ct
of the jury, when there was any reasonable
view of the evidence on which to support the
verdict Most of the ,verdicts rendered by
juries for damages are the result of a compro-
mise OF diverse though honest views enter
tanned by the individual twelve jurors Jury
men, as well as judges, differ and doubt but
heir verdicts and decisions are in the main
founded on some reason, more or less cogent
and convincing, and as correct as can reason
ably be expected from finite beings who must
near conflicting evidence, deduce conclusions