The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1896-09-15

included items of this nature along
with fees for service in criminal cases
in his demand, is not entitled to a writ
of mandate.
A COUNTY CHARGE.
The opinion says that one section of
the county government act provides
that the sums required by law to be
paid to jurors in civil cases shall be d
county charge and it should be noted
that this provision appears as one of
eleven specific subdivisions of section
1885, each of which applies to matters
arising in connection with the admin
istration of affairs of the county, in
Guiding matters connected with the
administration of justice in both civil
and criminal causes in the district
courts. AS to the remaining subdivi-
SiOns. there would seem to be no queS-
ton but that the county must pay,
without reimbursement from the state,
all charges lawfully accruing under
any of such subdivisions.
Section 166 in connection with the
subdivisions of sections "a and lis, if
considered alone and without limita-
tions, would seem to require the
county treasurer and the county audi
tor to make and transmit to the state
auditor a complete itemiZed state
ment of all certificates issued by the
clerk of the district court and county
attorney for mileage and attendance
of grand jurors (whose compensation
is not made a county CHARGE and the
mileage and attendance of all petit
jurors engaged in the trial of cases in
the district court These provisions
standing alone would probably be con-
strued to include the mileage and fees
of jurors engaged in the trial of civil
causes in the district court. as well as
in criminal cases.
REPUGNANT SECTIONS.
1t is contended upon the part of the
county that section 166 must be con-
strued either as requiring reimburse
ment to the county by the state Of fees
of jurors engaged in trial of civil cases
paid under subdivision 4, of section
165, or that the two sections are re-
pugnant, and that section 166 must pre-
vail as constituting the latest express
sion of the legislative will and intent.
1t seems to me that the former con-
tention leads to a reductio ad abSur-
dam. To make the mileage and attend
ance of jurors in civil cases (Which are
the sums required by law TO be paid to
jurors in such cases.. a county charge
in one section and then in the next sec
ton to make them a state charge by
requiring repayment to the county by
the state is an dbSurdlty which ought
not to be ascribed to a legislature, even
one which was aveTcrowded with the
demands of necessary legislation.
The greatest weight in the argument
on behalf of the plaintiff was given TO
the remaining contention, i. E., that
section 166 being wholly repugnant and
irreconciiable with subdivision 4 of
section 165, the matter must be disre-
garded. The inquiry must be as to
whether or not such repugnancy ex-
lists, and if so, which section must pre-
vail.
1t is principle of statutory con-
struction, supported by reason and re-
spectacle authority, that if general and
special provisions are in the same act,
the presumption is that both are in
tended to operate. In adjusting the
general provisions to the special pro-
visions considerations of reason and
justice are proper to be borne in mind
and ought to have much weight and
force.
INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
It would therefore seem to have been
the intention of the legislature to make
"the sums required by law to be paid
to jurors in civil cases a county
charge, as shown in subdivision OF
section 165, but it would also seem to
be q. matter of common honesty to lin
it section 165 SO as to exclude these
sums from becoming ultimately a
charge against the state.
The opposite construction would re-
suit in the collection by the county of a
fund under pretense of the payment of
certain expenses. and then it's appro-