Democratic messenger. [volume] (Snow Hill, Md.) 1869-1973, 1896-11-28
SNOW HILL. NOV. % 1896.
WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN.

VIA. " M WV LII w ts&A ~ .
IL is. perhaps, safe to say that some
OF our politicians have not considered
fully the financial results of war,
should the United States for good
reason decide to declare war upon any
power. There would. of course, on
the first declaration of war he severe
disturbance of business, with decline
OF values. but that would have been
expected. There would he also n very
heavy increase Of taxes it Congress
should decide ia favor of the sensible
policy of meeting the military expenses
OF each year out Of the revenue of that
year. Such policy, however. II is
to be feared. would have few advo-
Gates. the plan of shifting the burden
TO the next generation being almost
always preferred by Legislators. This
means heavy issue of bonds to the
amOUnt-for a starter-of some $780,
100000 the yearly interest on which
under the circumstances would hardly
I've less than $4,000 900.
Army and navy would, of course,
be very much increased. We should
wish to garrison all our seaports, for
which purpose 100000 men might be
required. and for operations in the
field as many more soldiers would be
needed. Forts, guns. ships. contracts
spending on a vast scale would be
imperative. IL the power we were
about to fight were naval power, our
exports OF grain and cotton would be
at once arrested, with the result of a
glutted home market and low prices.
Soldiers in the army would be unable
to consume much more than they did
at home. and our home factories have
never been able to work up more than
a fraction of our cotton crop. The
cessation of exports of grain, cotton,
&c, would mean diminished net earn
ings and bankruptcy for most of them,
Other dependent interests would suffer
with them. the only active industries
being those which directly served the
army and navy.
But the most interesting result
would be the effect Of the permanent
increase Of bondholders, soldiers. sail.
Ors and pensioners upon politicians
and politics. A very large class of
citizens object to any increase of the
public debt because il strengthens the
bondholding element and will tend to
perpetuate the national banks. In
their view man who lends his money
to the government when il SAYS il
needs il, is an Odious man and il is
against public policy to borrow,
especially if the lender expects to be
paid his interest in gold. Opponents
of 1.-THE money power"-bondholders
and bankers-could hardly see with
out dismay a new lease Of life given
TO that power. They would hardly
vote for war il they foresaw that it
meant a permanent burden of 49,.
100000 year, payable in gold,"
and the perpetuation of the greatest
grievances.
A Western paper recently criticised
General Miles for recommending that
the regular army be increased from
$4,000 10 some 10000, alleging that
this was in the interest Of the pluto
Gratis of the cities. Those who think
the army should not have been used TO
suppress the Chicago mob some years
ago cannot approve the development
OF the instrument used in that case to
restore order Yet the increase Of the
army caused by our next war would
lead inevitably to the realization Of
the proposal of General Miles. Once
increased TO 100000 or 200. 900, the
army of the United States would
never again be reduced to its present
proportions. 1t would probably be
kept 100000 strong, owing TO the
more warlike temper created by the
war. The navy, too, would be main
tanned, after the conclusion of the
war, ON larger scale The increase
Of annual expenses, due to increased
public debt, army and navy, would
hardly be less than sl00,0 100000, 10
say nothing of the increase Of pension.
ers. A small war, such as we are
supposed to wish TO wage with Spain,
would probably produce all the result.
here sketched. It could hardy cost
less, owing to the habitual extrava.
gance Of Congress. 4 great war with
a frst-class European power would
cost immeasurably more.-BaLo. Sun
THE Philadelphia Press is one OF