The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-01-08

Joined by Buels army, calmly gave
orders to attack and regain the lost
camps at daybreak. There was no
bluster, no theatrical appeals. Sim
ply few words: "Prepare to attack
at daybreak, then to sleep in the
rain, sitting at the foot of a tree, sur
rounded by the debris of a defeated
army, at the close Of the deadliest
battle since Waterloo, and differing
from the beaten army at Waterloo only
in having an unfordable river in the
rear.
And the silent genius snatched vic
tory out of the depths Of defeat by
next day, sweeping his enemy from
the field. Of course, he had superior
numbers, but what Federal General
ever afterwards equaled this feat with
an equal advantage Of numbers? With
out Grants dogged common sense all
was lost. The numbers were: First
day-Federals, 1881; Confederates,
40,335. Second day-Federals re-en-
forced by 10000.
Again the modest genius was thrown
into the slough of despond. Halleck
came to the front, accumulating an
army Of double the strength needed.
shelved Grant into sham 'second in
command" and began scientific war
against the silent forests of Mississip-
pi by system Of regular approaches
as laid down for siege works, over 80
miles from Shiloh to Corinth-a, cam
paign which in Europe would have
been celebrated in comic opera. Grant
had the very rare frmness to look
upon this baby play without saying 9
word. He declined to make an official
report of the Shiloh battle, but this
was the only indication Of his unspeak-
able. contempt for silly commander
in-chief. To Halleck's attempts to
make him scapegoat, to the frantic
abuse of the press, he replied not a
word. And there was probably but
lone General in America who could
have equaled him in this great trial.
This masterful forbearance saved him,
for when the huge army was trans
ferred to Kentucky Grant was left in
command of the outlying detachments
around Corinth and was permitted the
opportunity to slowly acquire the con-
| fidence of the authorities at Washing
ton.
| During the following months General
Grant was slowly working out the
problem which defed the skill of the
Engineer Corps and seemed insur-
mountable-the capture Of Vicksburg.
This position was protected on its
right flank for 100 miles by swamp
impassable for infantry or gunboats.
Ali the rules of gunnery forbade the
| navy to run by the batteries. The
iron-clad navy, and even the trans
ports, finally did run the batteries
and Grant instantly took advantage
of this by moving around Vicksburg,
| resolved to march upon Port Hudson.
But after lading Oh the east bank Of
the Mississippi he conceived one of
the most daring campaigns in all mill
tary history-to cut loose from his
base of supplies and march to the rear
Of the enemy, where the penalty Of
defeat, or even serious check, meant
actual starvation for his army. So
| apparently reckless was this move that
he knew cold Brains would instant
| ly countermand it (as in fact he did),
but Grant was out of communication
| with Washington until it was too late
| to.stop him. He had again trampled
| upon military tradition by placing
low estimate upon the abilities of his
opponent. And he won, as genius
always wins, when opposed by medioc-
rity. Thus the second great success
of the Federal army was achieved by
the quiet brain of Grant, and in op-
position to the opinions of the best
| Generals under and over him. In his
quiet, plodding way, he was superior
to the occasion.
OF his next great success, the battle
of Missionary Ridge, it is unnecessary
to occupy time, for the battle was won
By an accident-Sheridan's infantry
| assaulting without orders. But it is
only the skilled fighting General who
puts himself in the way of pro6ting
by such accidents.
In the spring of 1864 we find Gen
| eral Grant intrusted with giants
task-Commander-in-C Chief Of all the
armies of the United States, and Gen
eral commanding the Army of the
Potomac, which was to grapple with
an army and General who had never
known defeat. In the three years of
war Grants new command had never
been cheered by victory and had Sc
cured but two drawn battles-Antie-
tam and Gettysburg. In these two
alone had the Union troops retained
| their original position at the close:
Although they were claimed as victo-
| ries for the Union cause, and were
'strategical successes" to the men in
fighting line they were only drawn
battles, while all others had been de-
cisive defeats.
General Grant has been much cen
sured for sacrificing his trad
ing off three for one-in this cam:
paign against Lee, but what else could
he do? Tens Of thousands of the vet
erans had gone home at the expiration
of their three years service; their
places largely taken by boys, ignorant
| foreigners, bounty men and bounty
jumpers" )" Their discipline, drill and
equipment was superb, and the result
proved that their courage was equal to
every demand, but the enthusiasm of
success was all upon the other side.
Lees veterans habitually marched
four miles to their three, and on
rush would easily make three miles to
their two. In Lees army every bri-
gade was commanded by Brigadier
General, divisions by Major Generals,
corps by Lieutenant Generals, and the
army by full General-all tried SOL
diers. In Grants army half of the
Brigadiers were at home, their brigades
commanded by Colonels, Brigadiers
commanded divisions, and Meade, a
Major General only, commanded the
whole under Grant. These Generals
had neither the confidence of the
Government over them or of the men
ILL., ,roe r1u a