The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-04-18

with his known energy and celebrity are
ineNphcable except on the hypothesis
that ne was moving as the pioneer 10 the
army under Beauregard. This great
loss OF time on the Occoquan and around
Fairfax Courthouse, where he received
the report of Il scout. who had been
south as far as the Rappahannock. under
orders, seems t. indicate that he was eX-
pecting something from that direction.
Then. again. look at tho delay around
Rockville, which, under the theory that
he was merely riding wild and purpose
less raid. appears to be wholly inexcusd-
bic. But as soon as you return to the
reasonable hypothesis that General Stu
art acted on the suppostiou that his
force would be- mistaken as the advance
guard of Beauregard's army. the delays
at once appear TO be part OF an admira-
bly, planned and adroitly executed piece
Of strategy. There are evidences, AL
through the reports of Generals Lee and
Stuart. of the avoidance of the one sub
ject in their efforts to shield the Rich
mond authorities from adverse criticism.
STRICT COMPLIANCE
This theory is borne out and almost
fully substantiated by the movement OF
a part of the command from Rockville IN
the direction OF Ellicott city. with orders
10 leave the telegraph line uninjured, but
TO emphasize the presence OF General
Stuart with the troops upon every pos
sible occasion.
General Stuart exacted Of all his sub
ordnates a strict compliance with orders,
and even under the most cxtenuating
circumstance rarely tolerated any in
fraction, even though successful results
may have been obtained. knowing this
TO be the policy that not only controlled
General Stuart himself but which he
invariably enforced with subordinates,
how can We reconcile his deliberate dis
obedience OF General Longstreet's order
to leave General Hampton i'm charge of
the two brigades designated TO guard the
mountain gaps. except under the hypothe-
sis that everything had been arranged by
oral instructions from General Lee7
General Lee depended very largely upon
General Stuart's eye for topography. the
accuracy Of his estimates concerning the
strength and purposes of the enemy, as
Wei as his almost infalrible judgment on
the practicability OF a movement OF the
army in any given direction. and yet We
are asked TO believe that our great COM
mander weakly deprived himself of the
services Of his chief OF cavalry in an
hour OF the most trying need. in order
that he might indulge him In the fun OF
a wild ride. This has always appeared
preposterous. and must continue 10 be re-
garded as absurd BY those who followed
General Stuart In all the great movements
OF his cavalry corps. and never failed to
recognize the importance OF the strategy
developed in every instance.
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS.
Notwithstanding the fact that the or
der for concentration near Salem was not
issued until the afternoon OF the 18th Of
June. quartermasters were ordered on the
morning OF the sd 70 accumulate a forage
supply az this point OF rendezvous. and
when the movement began on the morn
ing Of the 28th. there had been no leak
age as TO It's destination. The impression
prevailing at the time pointed TO Winches-
ter "a the objective point OF our march,
and this was iaughingly encouraged by
General Stuart himself. These facts not
only Illustrate and emphasize the exist
ence OF oral instructions, the purport OF
which General Stuart alone knew. but
they clearly indicate that hs>Saa NOT