Evening star., 1896-08-07

Gen. Foster On the Treaty Of Peacs
Negotiated at ShimOnOaeki.

Gen. Foster On the Treaty Of Peace
Negotiated at ShimOnOseki.
General Foster. who accompanied Ii
Hung Chang on his mission to negotiate
peace with Japan. in the capacity of con-
fidential adviser to the Emperor Of China,
contributes characteristic sketch Of the
Chinese viceroy to the August Century.
Concerning the treaty of Shimonoseki, Mr.
Foster says:
While he thus bore the most important
trust ever committed to him by the en-
peror. 1t was by no means a task to his
liking. He was by nature high spirited, and
his military and political success had made
him naughty and imperious. He was
proud Of his country, of its past history,
and OF its Institutions. He partook of the
national feeling of contempt for the Japa-
nese. and he felt keenly the humiliation
which the war had inflicted upon his peo-
pie. He knew the mission to which he had
been assigned would make him unpopular,
and expose him to fresh indignities from
his partisan enemies. He felt he was tax
ing his life in MS hand when he should
place himself on Japanese SOIL and he so
expressed himself to the incredulous for
eign diplomats at Peking: but he dared not
shrink from the duty which his sovereign
had imposed upon him.
Seldom has public man. under such try
ing circumstances, borne himself with such
true heroism and patriotic devotion A
the land of the despised but triumphant
enemy to sue for peace: and yet he never
failed to maintain his accustomed de-
meanOr or his country's diAnity. And 1t is
due to the Japanese plenipotentiaries who
were designated to receive and treat with
him at Shimonosekt to state that they ex-
hibted toward him the highest marks Of
respect, and during the entire negotiations
allowed no word to escape from their lips.
and nothing to occur, which mi ght be con-
sidered personally offensive to their dis
tinguished guest. He had the good fortune
to conduct negotiations with two cOmpeers,
men of marked ability, and worthy repre-
sentatives Of their government and race.
Marquis Ito. the prime minister's a typical
member Of the progressive party. educated
In Europe, and trained in modern political
science and methods of government, but an
ardent and patriotic japanese. He had a
valuable colleague in Count Mutsu minister
Of foreign affairs. who had been long In his
country's service at home and abroad. Mar
Quis Ito, ten years before. had been sent by
his government to Tfentsin to arrange with
the Viceroy Ii a settlement Of Corean af-
fairs: and the same subject brought the
viceroy to Japan, but under changed condi-
tions for the negotiatorS.
The defeated party always negotiates at
disadvantage. and the vfceroy did not fall
to appreciate the situation: but the tudg-
ment of the impartial observer is that he
came out Of ii with as much credit as was
possible and 1t Is quite certain that he OBJ
tained better terms for his country than
cured. This was due In part to the per-
sonal consideration shown him by the Jap
anese negotiators. but mainly to his own
diplomatic experience and his thorough
knowledge Of his own government.
Japan was robbed Of a large measure Of
her triumph by the interpos:tion of the
European powers. and 1t has heen stated
that the viceroy consented in the treaty to
because of his knowledge that these pow
ers would compel its return to China. But
this is not a fair statement of the facts.
Neither the viceroy nor his government
had received any Information from Russia
or other power before the treaty was sign
ed as to Its action on the subject, but he
had been close student of European poll
tics for many years. and his action was
based upon convictions born Of that study.
He neither reads nor speaks any foreign
language, but he has secretaries charged
with the duty Of keeping him informed
of current events, and has had much in
tercourse with diplomats and other in
telligent foreigners. ind he well knew that
Russia, If no other nation, would not allow
the domination of Corea by Japan or its
permanent lOdgment on the continent SO
near to Peking and Russia's own posses
sions. and he was willing to make the Lao
tuIg cession III order to escape other harsh
terms.
But the viceroy's statesmanship and
strength OF character were most conspicu-
GUS In his conduct after the treaty was
signed and he had returned to China. He
Sent urgent teleSraphc representations TO
the emperor and to the foreign Office, cali
ing for prompt ratification and exchange
Of the treaty. in spite of the foreign in
fiuence and the national clamor. His per-
sonal enemies were actively exerting them
selves against the treaty, led by the Vice
roy Chang Chi-tung. who had written the
highly laudatory address on the occasion cf
his birthday celebration, and who to that
end was fomenting the rebellion in Formosa
and supplying the rebels with arms from
the imperial arsenal at Shanghai. 1t great
ly rebounds to the credit Of the young
emperor that in such grave crisis he fol-
lowed the advice Of his venerable coun-
selor and ratified the treaty.