The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-02-23
CAMPAIGNS IN 1926
A REVIEW BY PROF. JAMES NJ.
GfRNETT
NJ tbe Tir.t Volume OF Papers OF the
Massachusetts Historical
society.

sFTTs. vOL /. CAMPAIGNS in
sIpsixYA i<5-s9 Edited by Theodore
!, Dwsrh, Published by Houghton.
MDnln &. CO. Boston and New foTH'
lssJ.
The above-namcd volume consists. as
its ,ltlc shows. Of papers read at dinerent
t,,,c~ before the Military Historical So
ciety of Massachusetts. and the greater
norton OF II was published IN lSSl as
.~rhc Pcnnisular Campaign OF Mcclellan
On iscg" That volume has. however been
long out OF print. and TO the present re-
issno have been added two papers one
Mt the beginning, On "Patterson's Sheh-
andoah Campaign" 10y Col 7. l.. Liver
more. and ore at the end, on Operations
In The Shenandoah valley Maith
June 9. 1872" 10y Mai J. i. Hununt' on.
The papers on "McClcllans Iehh's"'"'
Campaign are as follows. -
+ Cen McCIenan's Plans. by J. G.
pone. H. The Siege OF Yorktown, by
Cen J. G. Palfrcy. Ill After tho an
Of Yorktown. ~. Tho Seven Days Bat
Ties. 10 Malvern Hin: v The hattle oil
Maven HHi-au by Gen T. Palirey'
vi Comments ON the Campaign by ten.
{ 4 Whittier
i, viii thus be seen that the volume
gives a hirds-cyc view. SO 90 sty, OF tue
ororations OF the Army OF The Potomac
and the Army of Northern virginia 10
and Including July Z. 1852. with "A sketch
Of Pattersons operations In lsol ana JACK
son iu 49,
fu detached papers 81 this kind we do
NOT look for the ninuteness OF detail or
the unity Of narrative. found in regu-
lar. history surh as that Of Swinton that
of the Count OF Parts Col VIM. Allan's
'Jackson's Valley Campaign and 'The
Army OF Northern Virginia in 1852, or in
the volumes Of the Scribner series.
IL is. however. Of interest 20 know that
this society is dovoting itself TO mill
fary study OF the campaigns of the war,
and that its papers are characterized 10y
a sense Of fairness and a desire 10 ascer-
rain the exact truth with impartiality
Credit can be given 10 the writers of these
papers for this effort, although there is
The usual tendency. in some OF tie papers,
70 exacgcrate the numbers of the Con-
federate forces IL IS p difficult matter for
Northern writers TO realize the odds
against which the Confederates nearly
always fought The only thing that can
CRATE upon the feelings Of a Confederate
reader is the occasional use Of the terms
rebels" and rebellion"
1t seems to the writer. that we are far
enough from the days OF the war to lay
aside those offensive terms and that
papers containing them. even though
written some years ago. should be revised
for publication.
To notice the papers somewhat more
particularly. although the remarks upon
each much be necessarily brief, Col.
Livermore gives the best account OF Pat
tersons pians-a want Of pians-and
movements that the present writer has
seen. We have never accounted the Pat
ierson episode as OF mucn value in the
history OF the war. but it IS plain that
the forces he had, under an energetic
general might have made il very warm
for Gen. Johnston, and. indeed. have
easily prevented his junction with Beaure-
gard. Moreover. after Patterson had
learnt that Johnston had given him the
clip. he might have taken the route
through Smokers Gap and Lccsbure.
even al the risk Of being a little late, con-
nocted with McDowell's right wing near
Centrcville. and insured the victory for
the Federal forces.
col. Iivermore right saws: 'If Pat
tersons army had burnt its wagons and
started out for Bun Run with what II
could carry I'm knapsacks and haversacks,
at the risk of a day or two Of hunger, II
would have been far better than 10 have
been absent from the battle" But Pat
terson ggsatty- exaggerated the number of
JohnstCns forces-iust as Mcclellan did
later those of Leland was unwilling 20
approach close enough to find out by
actual conflict.
As 10 the expiration of the term of SER
vice Of some of his men. il is hardly 10
be supposed that they would have left the
fcld on that ground. although 1t has been
stated that some Of McDOWclls men
marched back 10 Alexandria on that ac-
count. when the guns OF the battle were
sounding In their ears. Imagine a Con-
Tolerate regiment leaving the field for
such a reason. II would have been hOOted
out of the army. even n It had not met
a worse fate. However. the Confederates
were lighting pro arts 81 fOcis. and such
conduct IS unthinkable. il certainly
showed great lack OF patriotism on the
part Of the Federal regiments and Of
zeal for the Union.
Much. very much. has been written
about Gen. McClellan's plans of the
campaign of lS52 and the alleged inter-
ference Of the Government with them"
and we presume that 10 will be a mOOted
question 90 the end of time. Mr. Ropes
Is well known. as one Of the ablest
writers ON military subjects that the
North has produced. lie has written the
volume In the Scribuer series ON "The
Amy under Pope" one of the best i'm
that SERIES and other works. and is now
engaged on "'rhe Story Of the Civil War"
the first volume OF which has been pub
lishcd
lie discusses 'McClelian's Plans" with
ability ami knowledge. and with every dis
position 90 be fair 20 Mcclellan. But
however much we may condemn Nc
riellan. We cannot concur with Mr..
Ropes conclusions From Confederate
point OF View. the proper course for Me
Clellau To- have pursued would have been
20 have marched straight on Johnston at
centreNille ana risked a battle. 1t is
hardly 90 he supposed that Johnston
would have awaited him there. but he
would most likely have retired behind
Bull Run. and We should have had the
battle OF Manassas over again with the
chances all in favor OF Mcclellan. But
with his exaggerated idea of Johnston's
strength. Mcclellan hcsitated 10 risk an
engagement. and when the proper time
came. Johnston retired from the position
at Centrovnic al his leisure.
This pui a stop TO the proposed Jrbana
movement. and the Peninsular one was
adopted. Mcclellan certainly expected
the cooper alton OF the navy In the re-
duction Of Yorktown and Gloucester
Point The navy claims That he had no
right 10 expect this. that 81 undertook
simply to ncutfaii2c the Merrimac The
parusans OF each can settle that question
emone themselves. but II seems to MS
that this was very little FOR the navy 20
do II surely should have co-operated
with Mcclellan. even without any specific
request to that effect. and II IL had CO.
operated efficiently IL might have pre-
vented Mcclellan from wasting a month