Red Lodge picket. [volume] (Red Lodge, Mont.) 1889-1907, 1896-12-12

authority, that at the demand of the com
mander- chief Of the nsurgent arm
the putative Cuban government has nov
/, given up all attempt to exercise its func
I tlons, leaving that government confessed
~ (What there is best reason for suppos
ing it always has been in facO a govern
, ment merely on paper
No Decisive Battles.
ere the Spanish armies able to NEE
their antagonists in the open or in pitched
! battle, a prompt and decisive result Nigh
{ be looked for and the immense superior
Ity of the Spanish forces in numbers, dis
cipline and equipment could hardly fail t
| tell grea ly 70 their advantage. But ,hey
are called upon TO face a foe that shun.
general engagements. that can choose ant
! does choose its own ground. that from TIE
nature OF The country is visible or invisi
bic, at pleasure. and hat fights only from
ambusc 3de and when all the advantages
Of pos. i d and numbers are OF Us side
i'm 2 r"H. INV where all these causes are
dependen., especially by those born and
bred on the soil. it is obvious lilat her i.
hardly limit 10 the tine curing which
hostiA II this s0r, o.as Dc oro Jlgad.
2ieaI is IN all ,sse- Of C.VI strife
lhe N af ae eg. 4tants gro nGEr
and l..e1 a .. e>casses a.. bo.h
sides m4r fiji. uear and u pre d,
piora
4.riT~ Fighting.
~, ar ,... !" D, ,las
at .o. IN he nlnc ot
i, IA name Of til
-u. he occasion. l.a
-. H. III tId punder j.
-y-a ,4 Inhabitants for their own "a
,..,..a- e such Il condition of things would
inevitably entail immense destruction cf
roper y. even if it We're the policy Of both
artieS 20 prevent it as far as practicable
Hut y hile such seemed to be the originai
lolicy Of The Spanish government, it mas
now apparently abandoned it, and is act
ing upon the same theory as The insur-
gents namely. that the eXigencies of The
contests require the wholesale annihia-
ton of property that it may not prove Of
any use and advantage to the enemy
1t is to the same end that in pursuance
Of general orders, Spanish garrlsons are
now being withdrawn from plantations
and the rural population required to con
centrate itself in towns. The sure result
would seem to be that the industrial
value of the island is fast diminishing
and that unless there is a speedy and
radical change in existing conditions il
Will soon disappear altogether. That
value consists largely, of course in its ca
pacity to produce sugar, a capacity al
eady much reduced by the Interruptions
TO tillage which have taken place during
the last two years. II is reliably assert
ed that should these Interruptions con
tinue during the current year. and Drac-
tlcally extend, as is now threatened to
the entire sugar production territory Of
the island, SO much time and so much
money will be required to restore the
land to its normal productiveness that it 4
is extremely doubtful that the people can
be induced to even make the attempt.
OF Great Concern to Us.
The spectacle OF the utter ruin Of an
adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the whole
globe. would engage the serious attention
# the government and the people of the
United States in any circumstances. In
ooint of fact, they have concern with il
which is by no means of a wholly sem
mental character. 1t lies 50 near to US
Is to be only partly separated from our
erritOry. Our actual pecuniary interest |
n it is second only to that of the people |
md government of Spain. 1t is reason
bly, estimated that at least from thirty |
o fifty million dollars of American cap
tai are invested in plantation and rail |
oading, mining and other business enter |
,rses on the island. The volume of trade
&SAi
which in 1889 amounted to about S64 600 600. |
ose in 1896 to about s1O3 0oO0 600 and in 1894 |
he year before the present insurrection |
roke out, amounted to nearly $96. 900 900. |
Involved in other Ways.
Besides this large pecunlary stake in |
he fortunes of Cuba the United States |
nds itself inextricably involved in the
resent contest in other ways, both vex-
tiouS and costly.
C,,b |
Indirectly promote the insurrection BY |
ublic meetings, by the purchase ana |
hipment of arms, and by other means |
which the spirit of our institutions and |
he tenor of our laws do not permit and
lade these the subjects of criminal pros
cution. Some of them, thoroughly Gu
ans at heart and in all their feelings and
interests, have taken out papers and lrc
aturalized citizens of the United States.
proceeding resorted to with d view to
ossibe protection by this government
nd not unnecessarily regarded with
1uch Indignation by the country of their
rigin.
On FilibuStering.
1t follows from the same causes that
he United States is compelled to an act
We policy along the line of sea coast
sainst unlawful expeditions, The escape
f which the utmost vigilance will not |
ways Suiiitt " i)IeNtfll. ilcSG lneEl-
able entanglements of the United States
;ith the rebellion in Cuba, the large
merican property affected, ana consid-
rations of philanthropy and with hl-
lanity in general have led to vehement |
emand IN various quarters for some sort
positive intervention on the part Of the |
Jnited States.
Can't Recognize BcIligerency.
1t was at first proposed that belliger-
mt rights should be accorded the m
proposition no longer weighed |
ccause untimely and impracticable, an
peration clearly perilous and injurious to |
ur interests. 1t has since been and is
ow sometimes contended that the nde-
endence of the insurgents should lie
but imperfect and restricted |
$ the Spanish government of the island
lay be, no other exists there unless the
ill of the military officer in temporary |
ommand of the insurgents can be dig
l1ied as species of government. 1t is
CIV also suggested that the United States
hOuld buy the island, a suggestion DOS |
hly worthy of consideration if there were
ny evidences of q desire or Willingness
il the part OF Spain to entertain such |
1cposal. 1t is urged, finally, that all |
ther methods failing, the existing inter-
ecine strife in Cuba Should be terminat-
by our intervention, even at the cost |
J. Wdr between the united States and |
pain-a war which its advocates conf
emily prophesy could neither be large in |
S proportions nor doubtful in it's issue.
The correctness of this forecast need be |
either affirmed nor denied. The United
tates has, nevertheless a character to
laintain as a nation, which plainly die
ates that right, and not might. should be
le rule Of its conduct.
Have Territory Enough.
Further, though the United States is
OF nation to which peace is a neces-
ty, it is in truth the most pacific of |
overs, and desires nothing so much as
} live in amity with all the world. Its
Wp ample and diversified domains, salts
wing all possible longings for territory,
lecludes all claims of conquest and pre-
ents any casting of covetous eyes upon
regions, however attractive.
hat our conduct toward Spain and her
ominions has constituted no exception
} this national disposition is made man
est by the course of our government,
OF only thus far during the present
but during the 10 years that
1lioWed the rising at Yara in 1868. No
ther great power, it may safely be said,