Rocky Ford enterprise., 1896-12-10
The Cuban Question,

The Cuban Question.
1.-The insurrection in Cuba still con-
tinues with all its perplcxtles. It Is
diillcult To perceive that any progress
has thus far been made towards the
Paciilcation of the island, or that the
situation OF affairs rs depicted In my
last annual message has In the least
Improved. II Spain still holds Ha-
| vana and the seaports and all the con-
siderable towns. the insurgents still
roam at will over ut least two-thIrds of
the inland country. If the detcrmina-
tion of Spain to put down the insurrec-
tions seems but to strengthen with the
lapse OF time, and Is evinced by her un-
hesltating devotion OF largely increased
military and naval forces to the task,
there Is much reason to believe that the
insurgents have gained In point of
number and character and resources
and are none the less infiexible In their
resolve not to succumb without practl-
cally securing the great object for
which they took up arms. II Spain has
not yet re-established her authority,
neither have the insurgents yet made
good their title to be regarded as an In
dependent state. Indeed, ms the con-
test bas gone on, the pretense that
civil government exists on the Island,
except so far as Spain Is able to main
tam II, has been practically abandoned.
| spain does keep on foot such n gov
ernment, more or less imperfectly, In
the large towns and their immediate
suburbs. But. that exception being
made, the entire country Is either given
over to anarchy or is subject to the
military occupation of one or the other
party. 1t Is reported, indeed, on reli-
able authority. that at the demand of
the commnnder-inchicf of the insur-
gent army, the putative Cuban govern
ment has now given up all attempt to
exercise its functions. leaving that
government confessedly (what there Is
the best reason for supposing 1t always
to have been in facD government
merely on paper. Were the Spanish
armies able to meet their anita agonists
In the open or In pitched battle prompt
and decisive results might be looked
Tor, ana the immense superiority Of the
Spanish forces in numbers, discipline
and equipment, could hardly fail to tell
greatly to their advantage.
But they are called upon to face n
foe that shuns general engagements.
that can choose and does choose Its
own ground, that from the nature of
; the country is visible or invisible at
pleasure. and that fights only from am
buscade and when all the advantages
of position and numbers are on its
side In country where all that Is in
dispensable to life in the way of food.
I clothing and shelter is so easily OBJ
. tainnb1e. especially by those born apd
bred on the soil. II Is obvious that there
Is hardly limit to the time during
which hostllities of this sort may be
prolonged. Meanwhile in all cases of
protracted civil strife. the passions of
the combatants grow more innamed
and eNcesscs on both sides become
more frequent and more deplorable.
"They are also participated In by
bands of marauders who now In the
name of one party and now in the
name of the other as may best suit
the occasion. harrass the country at
will and plunder the wretched inhab-
itants for their own advantage. Such
n condition of things would inevitably
entail immense destruction of proper
ty even If 1t were the policy of both
parties to prevent it as far as practi-
cable. But while such seemed to be
the original policy of the Spanish gov
ernment it has now apparently been
abandoned by it and is acting upon the
same theory as the insurgents, name
ly, the eNigencies of the contest re-
|
property. that it may not prove of any
use and advantage to the enemy. 1t
is to the same end that in pursuance
of general orders. the Spanish garri-
sons are now being withdrawn from
plantations and the rural population
required to concentrate itself in the
towns. The sure result would seem
to be that the industrial value of the
island is fast diminishing, and that un-
less there is n speedy and radical
change in existing circumstances 1t
will soon disappear altogether. That
value consists largely, of course, in
Its capacity to produce sugar, n capac-
ity already much reduced by the inter
ruption to tillage. which has taken
place during the last two years. 1t is
reliably asserted that should these in
tcrruptions continue during the cur
rent year. and practically extend, as
is now threatened, to the entire sugar
producing territory of the island, so
much time and so much money will
be required to restore the land to its
normal productiveness that it is eN-
tremely doubtful if capital can be in
duced even to make the attempt. The
spectacle of the utter ruin of an adj
Joining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the
whole globe. would engage the serious
attention of the government and the
people of the United States in any
circumstances. In point of fact. they
have concern with 1t which Is by no
means of n wholly sentimental or phi
lanthropic character. 1t lies so near
to us as to be hardly separated from
our territory.
sour actual pecuniary interest in it is
second only to that of the people and
government of Spain. 1t is reasonably
estimated that at least from S3000O.OOO
TO $4,000, 900 of American capital are in
vested in plantations and in railroads,
mining and other business enterprises on
the island. The volume of trade between
the United States and Cuba. which in
1880 amounted to about S64.000,0O0. rose
in 1893 to about S1030o0,000. and in
1894. the year before the present insur-
rection broke out. amounted to nearly
S96. .OOO, 600 Besides this large pecunary
| stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United
States firL itself ineXtricably involved
in the present contest in other ways, both
yeya.Ous and costly.
| "Mapy Cnbans reside in this country