Lewiston teller. [volume] (Lewiston, North Idaho) 1878-1900, 1896-12-17

in fact, so able and experienced a
jurist as John NJ. Cooley admits
Constitutional Limitations note
page TAI, sixth edition) that lit
must be confessed that it is impos-
sible to harmonic cases. An
examination of the large number
of authorities cited by counsel in
the argument Of this case accentu-
ates the statement Of Judge Cooley
and, perhaps we shall not be OBJ
noxious to the charge of evading a
duty should we decline to enter
upon task which so eminent a
jurist declares to be hopeless.
We confess ourselves unable to
appreciate the argument which
would make the language of sec
ton I, article 20, and section of
said article synonymous or express
sive of the same intention If they
were, as counsel for defendants con-
tend they intended to mean the
same thing, why was not the same
language used? We know of no
rule of construction, nor has our at
tention been called to any that
! would warrant us in arbitrarily say
ing that the language used in the
two sections was intended to mean
TIE same thing. On the contrary,
the reason seems to us to be the OH
er way. We can understand why
the makers Of the constitution
should apply different and more
stringent rule in the adoption of a
call for constitutional convention
from what they would in the mat
ter of a mere amendment. It is true
the amendment under consideration
is one of vast importance-but SO
likewise are the other amendments
submitted at the same time But
with the character or importance
Of the amendment we have nothing
to do in this consideration. Was the
amendment adopted as required by
the terms and provisions of the con-
stitution. To hold that it was not is
virtually to say that no amendment to
the constitution Is practicable. In fact /,
counsel do not strenuOusly contend for
construction Involving such a con.
clusion, but rather insist upon the
words, majority OF electors" in Sec
ton should he construed to mean the
same as the words, "majority of all the
electors voting at such election" In
section 8. Even the authorities cited
by counsel do not 60 to such an extent
or sustain such q conclusion,
For us to 60 into an analysis Of all
the authorities cited and read upon
the argument would accomplish moth
ing. We have carefully examined
them all in the light of the able argu-
ments Of counsel, and we find our
Sc lives unable to base our conclusions
upon any apparent weight of authority.
We must deci0e this case upon the
provisions of our constitution as the
same appear to us; and so doing we
are compelled to say that the construc.
ton contended for by the petitioner is
the correct one.
Experience has shown that it Is al
most If not quite an impossibilitv to Sc
cure an expression from every elector
upon any question, and above all upon
q question of an amendment of the con.
stitutiOn. And it Is equally difficult to
ascertain the actual number of electors
at any gwen time. To rely upon the
vote cast upon some other question at
the same election would be entirely
unsatisfactory aud such Il construc-
ton, is, we think, at least implicitly
negatived by the provisions of scc elton 3.
While it is true that some 10000 OF
more electors would seem to have been
entirely Indifferent upon the question
of the adoption of this and the other
amendments, still all were-must have
bcen.-fully advised as to the import
ance of the question submitted, and
should their indifference be taken n
conclusive of their opposition to the
amendment, upon what rule of honesty
or Righteousness could this be claimed.
Is 1t not more reasonable AS we'll as
more righteous to say that in Il matter
about which they manifest such indif'
ference, their silence shall he taken a.
assent.
The decision on the suffrage amend.
ment csrries tht other that were votet
oil the same time. These are thu