The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1896-01-08

Vicksburg, and how could Lee success.
sively paralyze the faculties of Nc
Clellan, of Pope and now Of Burn
side ?
As the bird falls helpless into the
jaws of the charming serpent, SO fin
ally Burnside crossed the river at
Fredericksburg and gave his magnif-
cent army up to useless slaughter
And that is all there is to be said of
this battle. The only comments that
Lee did not wish to fight there. Ger
tain of success, he preferred engaging
two days march further south, where
the open country would enable him to
follow up the anticipated victory, as
his letters written before the battle
to President Davis explained. But
his dislike to giving the country in
rear up to the devastation Of the Fed
eral Army prevented this move.
After the battle Of fredericksburg
both armies were tied up by the mud
dy roads and remained in winter quar-
ters until the spring of 1864. General
Burnside joined his unsuccessful pre-
decessors in retirement, and-General
Hooker assumed command of the
Army of the Potomac. General Lee
detached Longstreet with two divisions
for service in Southeastern Virginia,
leaving $4,000 Confederates to oppose
12O, 900 Federals.
And now we will see campaign
which for simplicity and daring auda-
city surpasses anything in Napoleon s
career. 1t can be told in few words.
When Hooker had reorganized and
completed what he called 'the finest
army on this plant" he sent Sedgwick
across the river with 10000 men to
threaten Lees front Sedgwick was
protected by heavy batteries on the
heights in rear. Then Hooker with
$1,000 men made a nights march to
the west and crossed, taking position
at Charlottesville, some Is miles be-
yond Lees left flank, and solidly in
trenched. Lees letters, written pre-
viously, show that he expected pre-
cisely this move, but from the Difficult
ty of feeding his army had not recalled
Longstreet. He felt fully able to
meet Hooker with the astonishing odds
against him of over 12 to 5.
Leaving Ewell with 5000 men in
his old intrenchments to confront
Sedgwick's 10000, Lee marched
straight into the wilderness which
protected" Hooker's masses. And
here we have another of those astound-
ing strategical positions, So far beyond
the ken of the careless general reader:
Hooker had about 10000 men in line.
intrenched, with 10000 in reserve.
Lee deployed $4,000 men opposite
Hooker's left wing and threatened
instant battle by noisy skirmish
while screened from observation by
this wilderness, which Hooker had
chosen for his battlefield. Then Lee
detached Jackson with $4,000 men to
march around Hooker's right-the OBJ
jective point nearly 20 miles away
1000 men surrounding $4,000 Of
''the best soldiers on this planet"
To contemplate the mental resources
of a General capable Of taking such
risks is like studying the immensity
sf space. And we must always bear
in mind that the entire Confederate
cause depended upon the success Of
Lees army. One overwhelming defeat
meant the loss Of his cause.
jackson s corps, at 6 p. M, was in
position, and the great battle of Chan
cellorsville was won before his skir-
mishers fired their first shot.
Such are the boundless results Of
military strategy in a master hand.
This is the pith of Napoleon S remark
read by millions but only understood
by dozens-'In war men are nothing !;
man is everything"
In studying these magical flights OF
genius the average writer searches in
his. own uninformed Drained for the
solution. The victory Of Chancellors,
Vile is attributed to stonewall Jack
son daring and precision, and to the
paralyziDg of Hooker's brain at the
critical time. Of course, to do skill
ed worked the skilled workman requir
es the best of tools, and Stonewall
was matchless in execution. But of
what avail the best tempered tools
when bunglingly used?
Of course such success as this re
quires paralyzed opponent. But
what mysterious power is this which
enables the quiet mind of one man to
overcome the thinking faculty Of a
brave veteran soldier, the hero Of
many battles, his entire life spent in
studying the details of his profession
and ready to give his life for success !?
We may confuse the record with side
issues to infnity and find no light.
Week mortals may say that tall oaks
are created by happy combination Of
soil, water and air; plain common
sense says that tall oaks were needed
by God in his plan of nature, and He
created them for wise purpose.
We may rest our claim of Lees
great superiority as general right
here. But brief remark upon Get
tysburg, the turning point of the war,
seem necessary.
The invasion of Pennsylvania was
a desperate move in "grand strategy
to relieve Vicksburg by threatening
Baltimore and Washington. Ii failed
through poverty Of resources. Lee
has been censured for "losing'' the
battle of Gettysburg. He did not
lose that battle, for it was "drawn,
both armies retaining their original
position for "a hours after, and each
inviting attack. Picket made his
grand charge with 5000 men, and 24O
Of them with General Armistead broke
through the Federal lines. Lee ex-
pected and ordered $4,000 men to do
the work. The problematical effect
of 10000 more men, reduced one
third by natural losses, rushing into
the gap opened by those 240 heroes,
will cause the military student to
reflect that perhaps Lee was right,
and at least that the desperate national
emergency which Lee saw so plainly
justified desperate attempt.
From Gettysburg to the coming of
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