Hot Springs weekly star. (Hot Springs, S.D.) 1892-1917, 1896-12-18
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S THE PRESIDENTS MESSAGE. !



reported, indeed, on reliable authority,
that, at the demand Of the Commander
in-chief Of the insurgent army, the puta-
tive Cuban Government has nov given
up all attempts to exercise its functions,
leaving that government confessedly
(what there is the best reason for sup.
posing always to have been in fact a gov
eminent merely on paper. Were the
Spanish armies able to meet their an-
tagonists in the open or in pitched battle.
prompt and decisive results might be look
ZOE, blu they are called upon to face a
foe that shuns general engagements. that
a choose, and does choose. its own
ground, and it is obvious that there is
hardly a limit to the time during which
hostilities Of this sort may be prolonged.
Meanwhile. as in all cases of protractei
civil strife. the passions of the COM
batants grow more and more intlamed.
n excuses on both sides become more
frequent and more d%eplorable.
The spectacle Of the utter ruin of IN adj
Joining country, by nature one Of the most
fertile and charming ON the globe, would
engage the serious attention of the yoy-
eminent and the people of the United
uAAS AASAA1SNAbASCSs Al NJluL
OF fact, they have n concern which
is by no means of II wholly sentimental
or philanthropic character. 1t lies so near
to us us to be hardly separated from our
territory. Our actual pecuniary interest
in it is second only to that of the people
and government Of Spain. 1t is reason
ably estimated that ut least from $3O,OOO.-
600 to $5O,OO0.OOO of American capital
are invested in plantations and in rail-
road, mining and other business enter
prises OF the island. The volume of trade
between the United States and Cuba,
which in 1880 amounted to about $G4,OOO,-
OO. rose in 1893 to about SOB 100000,
and in 1894, the year before the present
instruction broke out, amounted to nea
~ S9S,O0O,00O. Besides this large pc
cuniary stake in the fortunes Of Cuba, the
United States finds itself inextricably in
volved in the present contest in other
ways. both vexatious and costly. Many
Cubans reside in this country and in
directly promote the insurrection through
the press. by public meetings, by the pur-
chase and shipment Of arms, by the rails
ing OF funds and by other means, which
the spirit of our institutions and the
tenor OF our laws do not permit to be
made the subject Of criminal prosccu-
tions of a friendly power. 1t follows from
the same causes that the United States is
compelled to actively police a long line
of seacoast against unlawful expeditions,
the escape Of which the utmost vigilance
Will not always suffice to prevent.
These inevitable entanglements of the
United States with the rebellion in Cuba.
the large American property interests af-
fected and considerations of philanthropy
and humanity in general have led to a
demand in various quarters
for some sort of positive intervention on
the part of the United States. 1t WINS
ut first proposed that belligsrcnt rights
should be accorded to the i-nsurgents-a
proposition no longer urged because I'M
timely and in practical operation clearly
perilous and injurious to our own inter
ests. 1t has since been and is now some
times commended that the independence of
the insurgents should be recognized. But
imperfect and restricted as the Spanish
Government Of the island may be, no
other exists there-unlcss the will of the
military officer in temporary command of
a particular district can be digniied as q
species of government. It is now also
suggested that the United States should
buy the island-a suggestion possibly
worthy of consideration if there were any
evidence of Il desire Or willingness on the
part of Spain to entertain such a pro-
pcsal. 1t is urged, finally, that, all other
methods failing, the existing interncine
strife in Cuba should be terminated by
our intervention, even Mt the cost Of a
war between the United States and
Spain-a war which it's advocates con-
fidently prophesy could be neither large
in its proportions o doubtful in its issue.
The correctness Of this forecast need
be neither affirmed nor denied. The Unit
ed States has nevertheless a character to
maintain rs a nation, which plainly die
tates that right and not might should be
the rule Of its conduct.
1t Is in the assumed temper and dispo-
sition of the Spanish Government to rem
edy its grievances, fortified by indica-
tons of influential public opinion in Spain
that this Government has hoped to dis
cover the most promising and effective
means of ending the present strife
with honor and advantage to Spain and
with the achievement of all the reasona-
bic objects Of the instruction. It was in
timated by this Government to the Gov
of Spain some months ago that
if a satisfactory measure of home rule
We're rendered the Cuban insurgents and
would be accepted by them upon a guar
anty of its execution, the United States
would endeavor to find n way not OBJ
to Spain Of furnishing such
guaranty. While no definite response to
intimation has yet been received from
the Spanish Government, it is believed
to be not altogether unwelcome, while,
rs already suggested, no reason is per-
ceived why it should not be approved
by the insurgents. Whatever circum-
may arise, our policy and our in
terest would constrain us to object to the
of the island or IN interfer-
ence with its control by any other power.
1t should be added that it cannot be rea-
onably assumed that the hitherto expect
mt attitude of the United States will be
indefinitely maintained. When the ina
bility of Spain to deal successfully with
the insurgents has become manifest and
it is demonstrated that her sovereignty
is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its
existence, and when a hopeless
for its re-establishment has de-
generated into a strife which means moth