The San Francisco call., 1896-02-22
Three Interesting Suits Decided
by the Supreme
Court.
WEAVER GIVEN a SHADOW
A Judgment Which Must Be Cashed in
Fund Where There Is No
Money.

Three decisions were handed down by
the Supreme Court yesterday, each having
points of close relation, and all bearing
upon the question of municipal finances.
In the case of the City and County
against Broderick, an action to prevent
him from auditing election demands for
1891, which ran over the estimate of $780,
coo, the judgment was affirmed; the iudg-
ment affirmed was that the Auditor could
not be restrained. In the second case, q
similar suit against the Treasurer to re-
strain him from paying the demands after
they were audited, a similar decision was
also affirmed. In the third case, one
brought by c. o. Weaver, one of the City's
creditors, to recover his money, the judg-
ment refusing him satisfaction was re-
versed and he was allowed judgment
against the City.
In the Broderick suit, he stepped forward
as soon as the audited claims for the cleo
ton reached the limit of $150,000, which
the Supervisors had set. The actual
amount ran SAC. .0C0 over this, but an at
tempt was made to stop the auditing of
any more warrants. In affirming the de-
cision which allowed the Auditor to pro-
ceed, the Supreme Court says:
The estimate which the Board of Supervisors
Is directed to make of the necessities of the
several funds as the basis of the tax which
they Will levy, is not a conclusive determina-
tlon OF the amount that may be expended by
these several necessities, and although the
failure 10 levy a tax which shall raise q suff-
clent amount OF oney for these needs will
prevent the expenditures, yet if the money has
been collected and is in the treasury, applica-
bic thereto, its expenditure or disbursement is
not limited by the amount OF the estimate. In
thls present case the Board OF Supervisors was
required 10 estimate the expenses that would
be incurred at the general election for the year
1881, and i'll the exercise of its judgment
deemed 1t necessary to provide the sum of
$780, 900 therefor. AS the incurring of these
expenses was not under its control, it would
not be competent for that body 10 determine
the amount that would be expended, and it's
estimate would be at the most only IN approx
innate opinion of the amount of the expense
nor does the fact that its estimate was too low
deprive the holders of claims for the excess
above this estimate OF the right to payment so
long as there is any money in the treasury ap-
plicable thereto
The duties of the defendant are defined by
the consolidation act and other statutes, and
1t is not competent for the Board of Super
visors by any ordinance or resolution TO re-
strict nlm in the office or to absolye him from
the performance OF his duties. If a demand
upon the treasury has been approved and
ordered paid by. the proper board or officer,
and is presented to him in proper form and
he has satisfied himself that the money is
legally due and remains unpaid, and that pay
ment thereof from the treasury is authorized
mand, and the holder of the demand has a
right to the enforcement of this duty He is
not justified in showing any favoritism by
auditing the claim of one pers On in preference
to that OF another upon the theory that there
may not be sufficient money in the treasury to
meet all demands upon it, and, rs the appellant
OF its creditors shall first be paid, it cannot
restrain the defendant from auditing demands
against the City which have been properly al
lowed and ordered paid.
Upon the opinions given in the Brode-
rick case the court affirmed the decision
in the case against the Treasurer. The
third case, however, is peculiar one.
The Supreme Court offered shadow to
the plaintiff in the suit. C. D, Weaver did
some plum bing work for the Fire Depart
ment in December, 1892, and he submitted
a bill for $4517 IL. This was one of the
bills which the City found itself unable to
pay, so Weaver sued for his money. Judg-
ment was rendered against him and he
appealed. The Supreme Court has re-
versed the judgment of the lower court
and has directed that judgment in favor
of Weaver be entered, but that he be not
paid except from the funds of the fiscal
year ending 1895. AS there is no money
from that year the judgment is not of
much use to the creditor. He has his
judgment and apparently that is all he
has, but there NAV be some unpaid taxes
for that year still outstanding, and should
any money come in from that source his
judgment may be paid.
The City was behind that year over
$500, 900. 1t is set forth that the unlocked
for increase in the election expenses was
the cause OF the shortage, but these surplus
election expenses were paid from the
general fund "and the authority vested in
the Election Commissioners, and it must
therefore be assumed that the expenses
were properly and legally paid. Whoever
deals with municipality, the Supreme
Court says, does so with notice of the
limitations of it's powers and with notice
that he can receive compensation only
from the funds of the current year. Even
II at the time of making his contract there
are sufficient funds in the treasury, he is
charged with notice that these funds NAV
at any time be paid out for municipal ex-
penSes, and his IS IN the same condition as
any creditor who has dealt with one whose
assets are exhausted before he presents
his claim.
The Supreme Court found that when
Weaver did the work for the CITY there
was money in the general fund and there
fore his claim was valid in its inception,
and he was therefore entitled to Judgment
The depletion of the funds was no salts.
faction to him, nor did it alter his right to
recover, but 1T does not allow him to re-
cover from any funds except those for the
year in which the Indebtedness was con-
tracted. The order of the court is as fol-
lows:
The Judgment is reversed, and the Superior
Court is directed to enter q judgment in favor
OF the plalht1f and against the defendant for
the sum of 1926 90, and directing that the
same be satisfied out of the income and reve-
nues of the defendant, provided for the fiscal
year ending June 80, 1893, in accordance with
the foregoing opinion.
The question naturally arises, what
will Mr.. Weaver do with his judgment,
now that he has t?''
cuhDD!c cTnDlCe cnnDrn