The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1896-05-22
OURCOAST DEFENSES.
EFFECTIVENESS or THE NAVY.
kxpsr0 HAVE Discovered That shfps
should Avoid Hostile Cuasaes
With Land workn.



spTpoyec plan that the raareuvers Of the
SEA Meet must Be wholly strategic. while
nose OF the hs-hor scGai-oa mast De
isrgesy tactical. with direct ard permanent
Teaa 'lcn 70 the land works OF the port to
~hicn Il may be assigned The view IRE
s-nte1 $ a military ene. with no attempt
10 inquire into the proper distribution ana
coIsea1atloa Of naval material nor TO learn
TIE special influence en- nautical values Of
the sailors craft
At this late day 81 - needless 70 argue
against purely naval defense Of our
coasts The agitation which led to this
Ssloposiuon grew out OF mistaken notion
q wha- vas taking place abroad. and in the
-Fst acsh or the discovery many wrong
headed but ardent Supporters OF the navy
lot time sincerely bei.ved in the oosss-
putty or sole dependency on sea power
ior the protection OF OR coasts. One
p.onc enieAl high In once. tn
smaaan'iy snd publicly announced
the supposed vxlaelessness OF lara
iorn And the supreme reliance which
me country should place In fleets for its
prtecuoo against q maritime foe. II
presently became apparent that defense
nf fcrunca.on was far from being ahan-
cened abroad. but that. on the contrary.
new ana enormously powerful works were
peing erected continuously. and. further
more. naval experts had discovered that
not only should ships avoid hostile con-
tact with land works but thar by their
very design they we're not intended for
such use
Without the guidance OF actual opera
tons there must Be uncertainty as TO the
true combination OF forces and their cr-
gAnixafsoa for perfect coast defense. Many
things Of value may be learned from naval
maneuvers. and the late unequal contest
In the Orient is not without Its strategic
lessons. II the history OF actual naval
operations needed verification in our own
Cay, II has most fully received 1, in the
naval peace mAneuyers conducted by the
several maritime powers Of Europe DUR
ing the past nve years When these cam
r,aigns were directed with intelligence and
vigor. when there were no prear-anged
moves TO deprive the neet and squadron
commanders Of independence Of action.
and when care was taken to approach war
conditions as closely as possible In every
particular. then the results shown sholld
be regarded with due seriousness and CIV
en- fair weight IN the choice OF q coast de-
tense policy.
From history and from the story Of these
maneuvers (Which were designed 20 Illus
trate actual situations In the defense OF
coast llnes) the reader b strongly impressed
with the following logical Deductions:
!. To defend successfully even a moderate
length Of unfortified coast line. q defending
fleet must be strong enough TO separate
into two or more bodies. each sufficiently
large To break blockade by the enemy.
2. Should the enemys fleet be stronger
than that of the defense. the latter dare
not remain In port for fear OF Q blockade.
3. II is impossible for one feet to mask
another without being In actual touch
with II: otherwise the attacker u lost and
the coast open to surprise.
l. A coast whose harbors are defended
by defense vessels only u helpless against
concentrated attack.
s. For = successful defense. q defending
feet must be active In the offing. keep
fed harbors in which to refit. recoai and
obtain protection
6. Each fortified harbor IL a strategic
base for an active defending feet. thus en-
iarging its theater of maneuvers and Civ
Ing IL more opportunities for detached ope-
rations.
Z. And. finally. power determined on a
purely naval defense must have In each
port OF commercial Importance strong
feet of harbor-defense vessels. including
battleships. protected cruisers. floating
batteries, and torpedo vessels Gas II cannot
be known where the enemy's attack viii
develop. and in addition one or more pow
erful cruising fleets fitted to meet the
fighting ships OF an enemy and to prey on
its commerce.
II It be generally conceded that the de-
termined policy OF our coast defense will
place this duty in the hands of both army
and navy. there should be distinct I'M
Outstanding as to the limits OF the part
each is TO take. these, by prearrangement.
being made 10 depend on the strength and
distribution OF each arm To begin with,
there Is always a common ob1ective--the
ships endeavoring to obtain hostile control
Of the coast and harbors. Before any prob
lem, strategic or tactical, can hope for
fair solution when two such distinctive
arms as ships of war and fortifications
are combined. there must be a full and
sincere study of the situation In a united
council OF the naval and military heads
To that end the services should
be brought much nearer together than
they are at present in the discussion and
study Of coast-defense problems, not only
TO provide more inteiiigentiy for any fu-
ture combination, but to become mutually
informed on the capabilities OF each
branch of the defense. that each may
know the limits OF power and the ccnds-
tons OF maximum efficiency of the other.
To accomplish this. there should be a
special training IN coast defense for line
officers OF the navy and artillery officers.
to be given under the auspices OF both
services, and under the conduct Of the
bes; naval and military Instructors The
naval war college, b.oa6ened and less ex-
elusive. would offer = ground plan for
such project To be OF real value. such
a college should be under the immediate
supervision OF the war and navy depart
ments, and the aim should be. not only
TO instruct the officers OF the two services
in the best means of united action. but
actually 10 prepare plans for defense
against any possible attack from the sea,
arranging definite combinations and draw
ing up ali necessary orders TO cause In
stant execution AS the material OF both
branches continued to accumulate and
strengthen, taes. plans could be modified
ana rearrAnged 20 conform 10 such In
crease.
Thus. no. only would cur country be pre-
rzrei AZ all t.r-r.. against naval attack, 80
FAR as our means of defense would allow.
but both SCI vices would be prepared 20
perform their parts rith greater mutual
confidence and .zzs delay and confusion.
As a minor means 70 this end there should
b. a common code Of signals an easy
means Of Transmission OF information con-
cer-fnv the enerayes vessels from the ships
70 the shore. srf some common method os
showing location Of real and dummy mine
fields IN contrast with Tits suggested
piar. we know that the ordnance constrssc-
tso. corps Of the two services have seen
q. TO ,eparafs widely IN regard 20 eaItbers.
ammunition and mechanism. making In
tsrrhaar. o. a common source OF artillery
supply fsnrosssos-.
The defense OF OR coasts would seem
to require:
l. A feet fer strategic operaroas ana
blockade
, s.aQaarons for harbor AMI rone De-
ferse
9 Forts. batteries. sos2etoes directed
fraxa land, mine fields
Special attention Is here called TO head
fngs l. and IL
1.-The Fleet.
Moyisrn rrac.tscs seems TO make TIRE sea-
sosrg feet a strategic factor I'm It's reia-