Evening star., 1896-10-20

were formerly under of spending a large
portion of their time in hearing appeals Tor
office and weighing the conflicting claims
of rival applicants; the possibility OF organ
izing the clerical force with regard solely 10
its efficiency, and the increased incentive 10
industry and fidelity under system in
which advancement is made the reward OF
meritorious service. The institution OF nxed
terms Of office would impose upon appoint
ing officers a considerable burden in the
scrutiny of applications for employment,
even aside from its probable introduction
of partisan influence as controlling con-
sideration in securing appointments. Thus
the service would speedily deteriorate at
the very point when deterioration would
prove most serious and costly. Under the
Spoils system the interference of persons
of political influence in the internal affairs
Of the executive departments was most
common. Desig! ations for particular du-
ties. opportunities for travelling at public
expense, extraordinary leaves of absence
and similar favorS were sought by Send-
tors and Representatives on behalf of their
favorites. and weakened officials not in
frequently believed themselves under the
necessity of yielding in spite of the fact
that the quality of the service was serious
ly impaired by their complaisance.
The smallest details We're not consid cred
too insignificant to occupy the time of The
peoples representatives, and tie --riter is
personally cognizant of an instance in
which congressional interference extended
10 the location the desk OIL q subordinate
in a government office at Washington.
Only those who have engaged in the effort
to secure satisfactory results, in spite OF
such hindrances and annoyances, can real
fZe the extent of their injury to the public
service and of their cost to the taxpaying
public. The return of these practices with
the adoption of any system which allows
the consideration of political services in
making appointments is inevitable.
Effect ON Employees.
The incentive to diligence in the perform
ance Of duties is in direct correspondence
with the degree of confidence on the part
of employees that their future in the serv-
ice is dependent upon the quality OF their
services and the sufficiency of the rewards
the Industrious and capable may reason
ably anticipate If the new appointee is
informed that he must leave the service at
the expiration Of a definite period. the
hope of permanent employment, strong
incentive to Industrious application to
duty, Is wholly removed. 1t is true that
the alternative, fear of immediate djsmis-
sal, may be used as whip, but this pro-
duces a class of unwilling, disaffected en-
ployes, and is a most unsatisfactory, as
well as an unk:nd and brutal substitute.
Even were 1t possible under a system based
upon temporary tenure to enforce rigid
competitive requirements as to fitness, the
quality of the employees received would
rapidly deteriorate.
There is rapidly growing belief that the
development of the merit system will soon
make an honorable profession Of the civil
service similar methods have already
done in the most enlightened countries of
Europe. There are many positions, the pc
cuniary emoluments of which are small,
yet which from the opportunity they offer
for original investigation under the very
best conditions are exceedingly attractive
TO young men of scientific attainments ard
aspirations. Not only is this true, but SUBJ
Crdinates in these offices are receiving the
IND of ini v-il1 hoe
them for holding the higher places, and the
hope that they may do SO in the fullness
Of time is a strong inducement to earnest
work AMI unceasing application to duty.
Young men of education and ability would
refuse to enter a service which they woull
be forced to leave at definite time after
spending In 1t their most vigorous and
fruitful years Competition for positions i'm
the civil service would be limited to those
who were conscious of their incapacity to
succeed anywhere, who had already failed
IN private business, or who felt the need of
a temporary shelter while awaiting favor
able opportunity to begin a career in some
other line. 1t is perfectly obvious tina. the
most efficient and satisfactory employees
cannot be drawn from any or all OF these
classes, and that a system which thus linn
its the desire to enter public service must
be extravagant and costly.
Besides, this efficiency in any kind of
work is in a very large degree cumulative.
No matter how capable clerk may be
when originally appointed, 1t is rare in
deed that continuous progressive improve
ment is not noted. 1t is the very summit
of folly to dismiss good employees of eA-
perience and substitute those who, no mat
ter how able. must be instructed before
they can perform their duties, and such
system would not be tolerated in any pri-
va.e or corporate business.
This examination of the essentials of civil
service reform affords convincing evidence
that the continuance of minor officials in
office during good behavior is a funda-
mental factor in the scheme of reform and
has had an important share in effecting
who desire general equality of opportunity
and all who can be injured by an inefficient.
corrupt and costly civil service, must re-
gard any proposition to introduce fixed
terms of office as a serious menace to a
most necessary and benefcent reform that
is now fairly established. ...
H. T. NEwCOMB