The Roanoke daily times. (Roanoke, Va.) 1895-1897, 1896-01-19
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
Colonel MarshaIi's Defense OF
General Lees Strategy.
Lee Never Kntonded TO Give Battle North
of the Potomac. Exoept ON His Own
Terms-The Absence OF STUART CAV
airy on q Useless Raid Left Him Isnor.
ant OF the Enemy's Movements.

jan, 1S.-AnniveE6ary
services In memory of Gen. Robert e..
Lee were held at the Masonic Temple
tonight. A number OF Southern Sem
stors and Representatives we're present.
The feature Of the services was an adj
dress BY Col. Charles Marshall, private
secretary to General Lee, in which he
answered with much e~laborateness the
criticisms made by General Longstreet
INC others OF Lees Gettysburg cam
phign. The keynote of his address was
that General Stuart, in command of the
Confederate cavalry, had failed to COM
prehend his orders, and thereby had left
Genera Lee without information of the
movements of tho Federal .ruops.
Col. Marshall said that sll persons
who have read VIVA has been wri ,ten by
prominent army officers ann fail to
nave observed how much the writer's are
influenced In their opinions and also
OF events by after acquired in
formation OF the facts. II some OF these
writer's would put themselves in the DO.
sition in which they were when the
events occurred they would not be as in.
fallible, perhaps, as they now make
themselves appear, but tho truth of his.
tory would suffar less. Thus General
Lees conduct Of the Gettysburg cam
paign had been misjudged by assuming
that he knew what We now know.
One OF the most striking traits of
General Lees mind, Colonel Marshall
said, was his ability to form a correct
Judgment from all the fac ts and clrcum-
stances th.s came to his knowledge.
Taking up the movements eliminating
ar t1attun hnrn Nnlonal KI.--L- n
we are told by General Lee that his
object was to draw the Federal army
opposite fredericksburg from its posi-
ton and trsnsfer hostilities beyond the
70 omac. 1t unable to obtain the yelu-
able results which might be expected to
follow q decided advantage gained over
the enemy in Maryland or Pennsyl-
vania, IL was hoped that we should ct
least so far disturb his plan for the
summer campaign as to prevent it's ex-
ecution during the season of active
operations"
Col. Marshall detailed the various gen.
eral movements ordered in %sus of
Lee's campaign, and said the orders to
General Stuart to hold the mountain
passes of the Shenandoah Valley with
part of his command, to Cross into MARY.
land with the remainder and place him
self on General Ewell's right as he
moved northward. General Stuart had
discretion whether to enter MARYLAND
east or west of the Blue Ridge, but"was
instructed to lose nj time in placing his
command on the right of our column as
aoon as he perceived that the enemy
was moving northward."
Colonel Marshall says the movement
of the cavalry parhAps had more to do
With the events that Immediately fol.
lowed than any other circumstance and
that 1t cannot be que STONED that a great
error was committed in Stuart's owe
ments. General Longstrest, under
whom stuart was, In forwarding Lees
letter made h suggestion to Stuart
that he should pass by the enemy's rear
'lf he thinks he can get through"
which suggestion was not in conformity
with General Lees letter, and contem-
PLACID the entire detachment of the cav
airy from the rest OF the army.
This. In Colonel MarshAil's opinion,
evidently was responsible for the sub
sequent Confederate disaster. The re-
port OF General Stuart on his move
ments was quoted In extenso, and his
action In crossing east Of Hooker's army
criticised as contrary to repeated in
functions. General Lee. the speaker
said, had the most implicit confidence
In General Stuart's vigilance and enter
prise. He had not heard from him since
leaving Virginis, and thought IL pos
sible that a large detachment of the
Federal army, instead Of moving north.
ward, would proceed to Washington and
Baltimore, and go to Richmond by
water, remarking hat 1t would compel
the I'm media return of his army to
virginia. The apprehension was due
entirely to his hearing nothing from
Stuart, and determined him to take
ACTON that would com pei the euemv
to leave Virginia and deter him from
any attempt On Richmond.
at night of June %. General Lee first
learned from q scot of Longstreet's that
the Federal army had moved northward
and had reached Frederick with it's ad-
vance,. Meade in command and the OBJ
1ect apparently to obstruct Confederate
communication with Virginia. It would
have been entirely within General Lees
power to have met the enemy while
stretched out on the road between Fred.
ericksburg and Gettysburg. II had not
been his intention to deliver q battle
north Of the Potomac IL It could be
avoided except upon his own terms.
The evidence offered, Colonel Mar.
shall thought, %sbundantly established
the fact that the cavalry movements
were not made by General Lees orders
and that he had not at o critical mo-
ment OF the campaign sent the entire
cavalry force Of his army upon q useless
raid,
The cavalry movement he attributed
to Longstreet's suggestion to Stuart,
and the failure of Stuart after the dis,
erection Longstreet had given him was
at an end, to retrace steps and obey
Lee'a order to be on Ewell's right, the
speaker concluding, from the tenor of