The evening tribune. (Pawtucket, R.I.) 189?-190?, 1896-12-07


| Il is reported. indeed. on reliable au-
thority. that. at the demand OF the COM
| mander-in-chief OF the insurgent army.
the putattve Cuban government has now
| given up all attempt to exercise its func-
tions. leaving that government confess
! sedly (what there Is the best reason for
| supposing II always to have been In facO
| q government merely on paper
Were the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists In the open, or In
| pitched battle. prompt and decisive re-
suits might be looked for and the i'm
mense superiority of the Spanish forces
in numbers, discipline. and equipment.
could hardly fan to tell greatly to their
advantage.
But they are called upon to face a foe
that shuns general engagements. that can
choose, and does choose. its own ground.
that from the nature OF the country is
visible or invisible at Measure, and that
fights only from ami y Scade and when
all the advantages of position and num-
, bers are on its side. In "A country where
all that is indispensable to life i'm the way
of food. clothing and shelter is so easily
otainable. especially by those born and
bred on the soil, IL Is obvious that there
Is hardly limit TO the time during which
hostilities OF this sort may be prolonged
Meanwhile. as in all cases of pro-
tracted civil strife, the passions of the
combatants grow more and more infiamed
and eXcesses on both sides become more
frequent and more deplorabS They are
also participated in by baAds of ma
rauders, who. now i'm the name of one
party and now In the name of the other
as may best suit the occasion. harrass
the country at will and plunder it's
wretched inhabitants for their own ad-
vantage. Such condition of things
would inevitably entail immense destruc-
ton Of property. even If ii were the policy
n nnr rfin IN %
practicable. But while such seemed to
be the original policy of the Spanish gov
ernment, 1t has now apparently aban-
doned IL. and is acting upon the same
theory as the insurgents. namely that
the exigencies of the contest require the
wholesale annihilation of property that 1t
may not prove of use and advantage to
the enemy.
1t is to the same end that in pur-
suance Of general orders Spanish gar
risons are now being withdrawn from
plantations and the rural population
required TO concentrate itself i'm the
towns. The sure result would seem to
be that the industrial value of the
island is fast diminishing. and that un-
less there Is a speedy and radical change
In existing conditions. 1t will soon dis
appear altogether. That value consists
very largely, of course, i'm its capacity
to produce sugar-a capacity already
very much reduced by the Interruptions
to tillage. which have taken place during
the last two years. 1t is reliably as
serted that should these interruptions
continue during the current year. and
practically extend, as is now threatened,
to the entire sugar producing territory
of the island. so much time and SO
much money will be required to restore
the land to its normal productiveness
that IL is extremely doubtful II capital
inducRd a a
tempt
The spectacle Of the utter ruin Of an
adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the globe,
would engage the serious attention OF the
government and people of the United
States In any circumstances In point
OF fact, they have a concern with II
which Is by no means of wholly SEN
timental or philanthropic character 1t
lies so near to us as TO be hardly sep
arated from our territory.
Our actual pccuniary interest i'm II Is
second only to that of rue people and
government of Spain. IL Is reasonably
estimated that at least from $50. .Ooo 600 to
$50, 100000 Of American capital are invest
ed in plapta and in railroad, mining
and other business enterprises on the
island. The volume of trade between
the United States and Cuba. which in
1889 amounted to about s64, ,O00 900 rose In
1894, the year before the present insur-
rection broke out. amounted to nearly
$96, 600, 600. Besides this large pecuniary
stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United
States finds itself inextricably involved
in the present contest in other ways both
veXatious and costly.
Many Cubans reside In this country and
indirectly promote the instruction
through the press, by public meetings, by
the purchase and shipment of arms. by
the raising Of funds, and by other means
which the spirit of our institutions and
the tenor of our laws do not permit to be
made the subject Of criminal prosecu-
tions. Some OF them, though Cubans at
heart and in all their feelings and in
terests. have taken out papers as nat
uralized citizens of the United States a
proceeding resorted to with view to
possible protection by this government
and not unnaturally regarded with much
Indignation by the country Of their ori-
gin. The insurgents are undoubtedly en-
couraged and supported by the wide
spread sympathy the people Of this coun-
try always and instinctively feel for ev-
cry struggle for better and freer gov
ernment, and which, In the case of the
more adventurous and restless clements
OF our population, leads In only too many |
instances to active and personal partici- |
patton In the contest. II result is that
to protect American citizens, to claim |
damages for injuries to persons and prop
erty, now estimated at many millions of |
dollars. and to ask explanations and apol- |
ogies for the acts Of Spanish officials, |
whose zeal for the repression Of rebel |
lion sometimes blinds them to the i'm !
munites belonging to the unoffending |
citizens Of friendly power. 1t follows |
from the same causes that the United |
States IL compelled to actively police a |
long line of seacoast against unlawful |
expeditions, the escape of which the ut !
most vigilance will not always suffice to
prevent.
These inevitable entanglements of the
United States with the rebellion in Cuba, |
the large American property interests |
affected and considerations OF philan-
thropy and humanity I'm general. have led |
to a vehement demand In various quar-
ters, for some sort of positive interven-
ton on the part OF the United States. 1t |
was at first proposed that belligerents
rights should be accorded to the insurgents
"a proposition no longer urged, because
untimely and In practical operation clear |
ly perilous and injurious to our cwn In
terests. Ii has since been, and Is now
sometimes contended that the indepen-
-