Fort Worth gazette. [volume] (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1891-1898, 1896-01-15

TO publish ii because of J,eueral i.e..s
known wishes that IL should not DO pub,
,lshed, but Governor Carroll OF Mary
inhu' IN letter 10 General Fitzhugh
a,e, under date OF April 10, 1876, says.
! an ~ receipt to-day of your letter
m we l1th lust, with It's interesting
enclosures In reference to the battle OF
Hetty sbnfg. have not had leisure TO
lvhow closely tho controversy TO which
Tue article refers, but remember perfectly
my conversation with General Lee ON
this subject. He said plainly TO me that
tue battle would have been gained II
General Long ,rect had oheyed the or.
ders given him. lie said further: Gen.
cfal Longstrect, when once In fight,
was n most brilliant soldier, but he was
Tue hardest. man TO move ] bad In my
army. lSouthcrn Historical Society
Papers, Vol. ", p. 1888.
have other and even stronger proofs
on tina point, but reserve them for flu
ture use.
Have not made ont my case by nd
dncing positive proofs that Leo ordered
Longstrect TO make this early attack
The negative evidence of gentlemen
who did not know OF the orders ut the
tine amounts. of course. TO nothing
against positive proofs that they were
given.
WHY THE PLAN WAS CHANGED.
Nor does the fact that on the morning
of the "a General Lee again considered
the expodicncy of making the attack
with Ewelrs corps prove anything eS-
cept that General Lee found Longstrcct
80 unwilling to attack Gin his interview
with him that night and again the next
morning, when, as he himself tells ua,
this corps commander went at daybrcaa
to demonstrate with Lee against attack.
Ing Mcado's position at alD he felt con
strained to open tho battle under the
lead of ono more hopeful aud more ready
TO obey his orders, provided he could do
80 with equal hope of success.
hut General l.ougstrect denies hut
Lee ordered him that night TO make the
attack early the next morning, and he
should have the full credit OF his denial,
although the proofs 10 the contrary nre
oycrw hclming, and his failure TO correct
tho Official reports Mt the time they were
made is fatal 10 his clam. Suppose
General Lee merely expressed 10 Long
street wish that he should make the
| attack, ought not that to have beon
sufficient Stoncwnll jackson once said
! 10 General Lee about II matter of minor
| Importance: General Lees slighteet
wish is SUPP 'me order to me" Wen
might Lee hnvu .Acla med some years
later, III | had had Sionewnll Jackson
at Gettysburg | would have won the
BATTLE
General Longstrcot's denial Of having
received this order inuy be attributed ia
his failing memory, which caused him
in his first article on Gettysburg Ia the
| lhLadclphin Times to contradict his
own Official report five times.
u 4 4 4. II a. 10.
\ cnive positive order to attack at II
o'clock ON the "a, and yet he did not at,
tnck until d:30 in the afternoon. and
pdmits that although the order was foi
| him TO attack with what troops he had
IN" he waited for Laws brigade, thus
| taking the responsibility Of dlsobcying
tie positive orders of his chief.
Iie Is convicted, ont Of his own mouth
aud on his own ground.
ADVANTAGES OF EARLY ATTACK
have no space 20 discuss the adVnn
tage Of the carly attack and can only
say that the official reports OF Genera
Meade and other Federal generals show
that his army was not fully up until
o'clock D. M: that Round Top, whlct
General Meade says was the key TO the
position, was not occupied until O'Clock
In the afternoon, and that Edward EN
cfeti, IN his great Grafton at uettysbnrg
stated a historic fact when he cOngrat
uated the country on "thc proviucntn
uact!on Of the rebel army" and CITED
feciA to show that II the attack had beer
made at daylight, or IN The carly morn
ing of tie "a, nothing but mlrnc.,
could have saved the army from u greal
uisnstcr."
! Nor can here go Into the discussion
of tho third days battle. can onlS
say that the proof ~ overwhelming una
lnnyatreet Wns ordered 10 mnLc the
assault ut daybrruk on the 30, stimuli
ltrneous'y with l1welrs ntloch from ~
left, and that he was ordered to iInke 4
with his whO,c corps (spO the statement
Of Colorcls Taylor mud Ncnable o.
Lees etaff. p. los of -Four Years wiz
Lea, supported by A. i. H!lIe corps
lie attacked about . o'clock in the after
noon WIKI. Picketts ni'lson OF tnte,
brigadcs. Hpth'a small division undei
pettl grew, and two brirades OF Pcnder''
division, thu whole numbering about Ii,
COO mon, while the rest of Lees army
looked on. admired the splendid hcrnisn
Of that "forlcrn hope" and wondered
why they were not sent IN.
AS no THE RESULT.
There may be honest differences o
opinion as to what the result would hay
been II Lees orders had been carried
ont, but know that General Lee him
scIf died i'm the belief that We shoul,
have won great victory on the "a
and that. falling Ia that, we should, OF
tho Sd, have cut Mcade's army in twin
sinashcd to pieces the wings before the!
could have reunited, captured Washing
ton aud Baltimore, and established In
independence OF the Confedcracy. Ant
If General Lopgstreet AMI his partisan
INSIST upon ho,uing Lee to the SUDAN
sr.f-nbn. Cation with which, ut Chan
po.lorsyile, he gave the glory OF III
victory TO Stoncwall Jackson, and, moy
,np AMONG his shattered legions at Get
wsburg, said "1his Is all my fault,
,hrn accept the Issue and renly; Yes
il was Lees fault that he allowed hi
tender feelings for his old war horst
10 prevent him from putting LonGstree
under arrest and cashlcring him for dis
obedience Of orders.
know not how better to sum up IN
whole case than to quote General Rlch
ard Taylor's conclusion of his notes o.
lGettysburg Ia his destruction aud Rt
constructions" He says: "a recent art
dc In the public press, signed by Genera
Ionrstrect, ascribcs the failure nj Get
tvsburg to Lees mistakes, which h
ii .ongstrect) In van pointed out AMI RI
monstrnted against. That any subjec
involving the possession and exercise o
intellect shonld be clear to Lonestrec
and concealed from Lee IL startlin
nronosition to those nossessing knowlede
az the two men. We have biblical nt