Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1896-01-18
His Downfall as a Soldier His Eleva-
tion as a Man.
DIFFICULTIES he ENCOUNTERED
Home Government Failed to Un-
derstand the Situation.
STRENGTH OF THE CUBAN,5

The downfall of General Campos as
soldier is his elevation as a man and
brother. He is a victim of the extreme and
inhuman type of the Spanish politician.
He has neglected no duty, but has simply
refused to pursue course against which
both his judgment and his conscience re-
volted. Such is the light in which the
friends of Cuba read the latest news from
Havana.
Campos' Difficulties.
The Star in November last quoted gen.
tleman who had but just returned from
Cuba, and while there had met General
Campos. This gentleman did not pretend
to have received any personal condolences of
the Spanish commander, but from one
source and another had been able to gather
some of the embarrassments under which
General Campos was laboring, and ne
pointed them out.
His Reports Not Credited.
Chief among them was the difficulty Cen
eral Campos was then encountering in his
effort to get before the government at
Madrid the true understanding of the sit
uation. He had come to Cuba apparently
with very liberal authority, but, as he soon
s.uI found out. there was string to it. His
first report home was not rejected. but
1T aroused complaint. The feeling at Mad
rld was that the revolt was without excuse
was confined to a few professional malcon-
tshts' ana the remedy proposed was that
OF bloody determination. General Campos
set at once about correcting this in his Off
cial communications. An investigation of
the cuban grievaEc Eces brought him to SYM
patnlze with the greater part of the pro-
gram of the autonomists, and his request
at once for large reinforcements put an
entirely new face on the extent of the dis
ocntent and the capacity of the leadership
that was expressing it.
Needed the American Feeling.
Inc Madrid government responded with
the reinforcemants, but made it plain to
General Campos that he was expected to
use them for all that they might be worth
Here was another check. General Campos
was too wise to undertake almost within
cannon shot of the American shore such
warfare as bis instructions virtually COM
Trehended. American sentiment, he saw,
was largely enlisted in Cuba's behalf and
would TAX" consuming flame Immediately if
Spanish activity should take the form Of
butchery. This sentiment must be reckon
ed with; t. do so. indeed was part of the
diplomacy that the situation called for If
SPAN was to be properly served, nothing
must be done calculated to increase or
make more active the friendship already
existing in the United States for the Cuban
cause. III cry of horror at bloody work
hy Spanish soldiers beyond the limits of
legitimate warfare should GO up from en-
gagements in Cuba, the result, General
campos could see. would be formal pro-
test by the United States, and that would
mean the paralyzing of his right arm.
Soldier and Politician.
So that according to The Stars inform
ant, as long ago as November the relations
exist lg between General Campos and the
Madrid government We're very much strain
ed. Tie soldier, looking at matters from
close inspection on the island, was propos-
ing enc thing, while the politicians, off at
Madrid, were proposing another Neither
side would ACCEPT the statement of the case
made Dy the other. The policy of General
Campos comprehended conciliaton. What
the politicians wanted was a butcher The
talk about autonomy and humanity sound
ed to them like treason. They rejected with
scorn the pointed suggestion that the Gu
end adjustment, and they have finally dis
placed the man who had the temerity to
make it and to insist on it.
What Is Expected Now.
Presumably the new commander in chief
will be expected to follow the course pre-
scribed for Gen. Campos. Will he do it?
Does success lie in that direction? Has
Gen. Campos missed the signs of the times?
If butchery is to be substituted for warfare
in Cuba; If the fight for the re-estabish-
ment of Spanish authority on the island
means in case of success flat denial of all
the demands Of Cuba for reform in the
local administration of affairs, will this
government longer remain passive? Is 1t
not more likely to call halt on the Span
lard as soon as his ferocity manfests it
self?
Strength of the Cubans.
For the moment the Cubans in the field
must greatly benefit, 1t is thought, by this
change. 1t is a pronounced recognition of
their strength and capacity. If the fore
most soldier of Spain, with a hundred
thousand troops, and ships of war patrol
ling the coast, has failed to put them down
by all means short of committing atrocities,
they have reason to think very well of
themselves. Their American friends are
certainly prouder of them than ever and
more disposed to help them than ever.