The Irish standard. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn. ;) 1886-1920, 1896-01-25
ing beings is conditioned bx. their being

- ss- FsA ~ = d -
ing beings is conditioned by their being
compounded. For as consciousness is
! |indivisible, so 1t should seem is the con-
scious being in which it resides. And,
| if this be So it follows that, the body
being extraneous and foreign to the true
| self, no presumption of the body against
| the continued existence of the true self.
5. AS we lose limbs, organs of sense.
! and yet the true self continues; and as
animal bodies are always in state OF
| tlux, with no corresponding loss or gain
| of the true self we again infer the dis
tinctness of that true self from the body,
and it's independence at the time OF
| death.
g. Even supposing the Giving being
! to be material, we know not its bulk, and
unless it be bigger than one of the ele-
mentary particles which are indissolnble,
| no presumption arises against its surviv-
| ing death:
ion from anything happening from any
system of matter other than our bodies
and not so near to us.
| s. Inasmuch as our senses do not per-
ceive, but are carriers only to the perceiv-
| ing organ, we again infer the distinct
ness of the living powers.
8. Again, we SO infer because our
limbs are only instruments to the living
person" within and have relation to us
like in kind to that OF staff.
10. If this argument comprehend
brutes and imply that they may become
rational and moral it holds. But it need
not.
il. If even, as to his state of sensa-
ton the true self of man indicate inde-
pendence of the body, much more is he
Independent as to his state of reflection
and it's accompanying pains and pleas
ures: on which we see no effect from
death.
12. Certain mortal diseases up to
death do not affect our intellectual pow
ers. Is it likely that in death they will
kill these powers ?-Or that, in death,
anything else will do it?
13. We cannot infer from anything
we know about death even the suspen-
Nay, it may be the continuation thereof,
with enlargement.
IA. The case of vegetables is irrele-
want to question on the survival facul-
ties of perception and action, since they
have none. In sum: There is sufficient
proof Of independence to bar any pre-
sumption of simultaneous or allied de-
struction All such presumptions have
now been rebutted and ''credib1lity"
sufficient for the purposes of religion has
been shown.
Having thus summed up the negative
arguments Of Butler, let us proceed to the
positive, which indeed are few.
!. The fact of existence carries with
it a presumption of it's continuance,
which presumption holds until rebutted
by adverse presumption or proof.
2. From the fact of swooons, if not
also from dreams, we know that our iv-
ing powers exist when there is no capac-
ity of exercising them.
8. From the fact that in certain NOR
tai diseases the reflective powers remain
wholly unaffected he seems to infer such
an independence as supplies positive
presumption of future existence.
When we put the question, what is the
force, in the aggregate, of the arguments
ter, it will not be found altogether easy
to reply. will refer to two points in
particular. With respect to the argu-
ment of indiscerptibilitk much favored
by preceding writer's from very ancient
date, it ought not to escape remark that
Butler does not appear to place reliance
upon it, as, in his summing up, he makes
no allusion to it. And yet it is an argu-
ment which, If it were sound, would dis
pense with every other and at once prove
the whole of his case. But is it sound? ?
To me it appears wholly valueless.
For what is discerptibility? Can it be
defined otherwise than as the severance
in space of portions Of some whole which
were previously united in space? But
soul is not, according to the ordinary &C
ceptance of the term, material. 1t does
not then exist in space, and is not sub
ject to it's conditions. So that the idea
of discerptibility is wholly foreign to 1t,
and can have no concern in proving
either it's mortality o. it's Immortality.
/ Again, Butler is evidently led to his
conditional argument on behalf of the
immortality of brutes by the palpable
fact that they give no evidence of a true
self, within and above their corporeal
organs It has been feared by some that
this may lead to an inversion Of the ar
gu1nent, and a contention that if our
Giving being be like theirs little can be
| inferred from it as to a likelihood of in
| dependent survival The absolute final
| ity of death for brutes ought not, I sup
| pose to be taken for granted. But we
must carefully eschew the recognition of
any full parallelism in the application Of
the argument from living powers as be-
tween the two orders respectively.
That great argument for human sur
yival which arises from the palpable in
completeness of the work of discipline
for which men came into the world has
little or no application to the case of
| hr,,tes, whose life and death do not sug-
gest in the same way the idea of unful-
filled purpose.
In the beginning of Section 50 Butler
states that he has shown the credibility
OF a future life; and truly may it be said
that that against which no adverse pre-
sumption has been, or presumably can
be. made good, is credible. But at the
close of the section he says that he has
proved it up s'to a very considerable de-
cree Of proba abiEty;;'' which is different
matter. Credibility, as he holds, is suf-
ficient for all the purposes Of religion,
and this is reasonable; for in matter
which may profoundly concern us, such
credibility binds us to move onward.
Thus the argument of continuance
based upon existence is made to play a
capital part. Il It strong enough to sus-
tain the weight so laid upon it? This
question. as it seems to me, can hardly be
answered without introducing other con-
sideratio1s. May it not be held that the
likelihood Of this or that entity's cont5nu-
ance cannot be measured until after first
measuring the arguments for its present
existence? We may presume ALWAYS pro-
.ceeding upon the postulate that there Is
q, ~ f,,rr nf n ture} unon the cont ntinuance