Reporter and farmer. [volume] (Webster, Day County, Dakota [S.D.]) 188?-1946, 1896-12-10

THAT exception being made. the chure coun-
try is either given over 10 anarchy or ~
subject 10 the military occupation OF one or
thc other party.
1t is reported. indeed. on reliable author
Ity, that. at the demand Of the commander
in-chief Of the insurgent army, the putatiVe
Cuban government has now given up al NJ
tenpt 10 exercise its functions, leaving the
government confessedly twhat there is the
best reason for supposing II always 10 nave
been In fact Il government merely on pa
per. Were the Spanish armies able to meet
their antagonists In the open or In pitched
battle. prompt and decisive results might
be looked for, and the immense superiority
OF the Spanish forces In numbers, ulsci-
pline and equipment could hardly fali TO ten
greatly 10 their advantage. But they are
called upon TO face a foe that shuns seaerai
engagements. and that can choose, ana does
choose. its W ground, that, from the
nature OF the country Is visible or Invisible
at pleasure. and that fights only from anl-
buscadc and when all the advantages OF po-
sition and numbers are on It's side. In u
country where all that is Indispensable 10
life in the way OF food. clothing and shei-
ter is SO easily obtainable, especially oy
those born and bred on the soil, IL is OWL
Gus that there is hardly a limit to the time
during which hostiiities Of this sort may De
prolonged. Meanwhile, as in all cases oil
protracted civil strife. the passions or the
combatants grow more and more infiamea'
and excess on both sides becomes more IRE
quent and deplorGble. They are also par
ticipated In by bands OF marauders, VINO
now in the name of one party and now III
the name Of the other. as may best suit the
occasion. harry the country AT VIII anu
plumber its wretched inhabitants for their
own advantage. Such a condition of things
would inevitably entail immense destruction
of property, even II IL were the policy OF
both parties 10 prevent IL as Tar as prac-
ticable. But. while such seems to be the
original policy of the Spanish government,
ii has now. apparently. abandoned IL, ana
is acting upon the same theory as the IN
surgents. namely. that the exigencies OF
the contest require the wholesale annihila-
tion Of property. that 1t may not prove or
use and advantage To the enemy.
IL Is 10 the same end, and in pursuance
OF general orders, that Spanish garrisons
are now being withdrawn from planta-
tions and the rural population required 10
concentrate itself in the towns. The sure
result would seem 10 be that the industrial
value Of the island is fast Eliminating, and
that. unless there IS a speedy and radical
change in existing conditions. IL will soon
disappear altogether. That value consists
very largely, OF course, In its capacity 10
produce sugar. a capacity already much re-
duced by the Interruptions TO the tillage
which have taken place during the last w
years. IL Is reliably asserted that, should
these Interruptions continue during the
current year, and practically extend, rs is
now threatened, 10 the entire sugar-produe-
ing territory OF the island, SO much time
and SO much money will be required TO re-
store the island to It's normal productive
ness. that Ii is extremely doubtful II capi-
tai can be induced 10 even make the at
tempt. The spectacle of the utter ruin of
nm oliatutnv .Enputry Gv natnra ana. nf tho
most fertile and charming on the globe,
would engage the serious attention of the
government and the people OF the United
States under any circumstances. In point
of fact. they have a concern with il which
is by no means OF a wholly sentimental or
philanthropic character. Ii lies so near TO
us as 10 be hardly separated from our ter
ritory. 0ut actual pecnniary Interest In Ii
Is only second TO That of the people and
government Of Spain. Ii is reasonably esti-
mated that at least from S30.00o.GO0 to
S50,OO0,OO0 Of American capital are invested
in plantations, and in railroad, mining and
other business enterprises In the island.
The volume of trade between the United
States and Cuba. which in 1889 amounted
to about SS0,000.000 rose in 1893 to about
$l03. 10000, and In 1894, the year before
the present insurrection broke out, amount
ed to nearly 500, 600, 1000. Besides this large
pecuniary stake In the fortunes of Cuba,
the United States finds itself
Inextricably Involved
In the present contest In other ways both
vexatious and costly. Many Cubans reside
In this country. and indirectly promote the
insurrection throughout the press, by pub
lie meetings. by the purchase and shipment
Of arms, by the raising OF funds, and by
other means, which the spirit of our In
stitutions and the tenor of our laws do not
permit TO be made the subject of criminal
prosecution. Some OF them, though Cubans
n heart and In all their feelings and inter
ests. have taken out papers Of naturalized
citizens Of the United States, a proceeding
resorted to with a view TO possible protec-
ton by this government, and not unDatur-
ally regarded with much indignation by Il
country OF their origin. The insurgents are
undoubtedly encouraged and supported ty
the widespread sympathy the people OF this
country always and instinctively felt for
every struggle for better and freer govern
ment. and which In the case of the more
adventurous and restless elements Of our
population leads In only too many instances
to active participation In the contest. The
result Is that this government is constantly
called upon TO protect American citizens.
TO claim damages for injuries to persons
and property now estimated at many mill
Hons OF dollars. and to ask explanations
and apologies for the acts Of Spanish Of
hciais whose zeal Tor the repression Of the
rebellion sometimes blinds them to the i'm
munities belonging to the unoffending cit
liens OF a friendly power. 1t follows from
the same causes that the United States is
compelled TO actively police a long line of
sea coast against unlawful expeditions, the
escape OF which the utmost vigilance will
not always suffice to prevent.
These inyariable entanglements OF the
United States with the rebellion In Cubn.
Inc large American property interests af-
fected. and considerations of philaptbronhv
ana humanity In general. have led To n
vehement demand In various quarters. for
some sort Of positive Intervention on the
part or the United States. IL was ot first
proposed that beiligerent rights should be
Accorded 70 the insurgeuts-a proposition
no longer urged because untimely and IN
practical operation clearly periIous and in
furious TO our own interest. IL has s,,co
feen and Is now sometimes commended thai
lne independence of the insurgents should
DC recognized. But imperfect and restric,ea
as the Spanish government of tho Island
may be, no other exist there-unless tba wi,,
OF the military officer In temnorarv con-,
mand or q particular district. can no die
nified as a species Of government. II is now
also suggested that the United States sbould
ouy the isiand--a suggestion possibly worthy
OF consideration " there were any evidence
OF q desire or willingness on tho mar, ~
spain 10 entertain such a proposal I, Is
urged, hnally. that, all other metbods fail
ing me existing internectine strife In f;,,ho
should be terminated by our intervention
even Al mo cost nf N ...-