The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1896-02-02
without orders 10 report" al his head
quarters.
SHOULD READ.

j
IT, If he has not. then he ought to stop
| writing. and go 10 reading history. The
| instructions to Robertson say: you
| will instruct General Jones from time TO
time as the movements progress or
events may require and report anything
| of importance TO Northumberland
Longstreet with whose position you Will
communicate by relays through Charles
| town. ! send instructions for Gen. Jones,
| which please read" Jones was one OF
| the best outpost officers in the army.
| Stuarts main reliance was on MIN. his
| brigade was at that time much nearer
| The Potomac than Robertson's. Jones IN
| accordance with Stuarts order places the
18th Virginia Cavalry at Charlestown.
Longstreet was responsible for the Use
| made of these two brigades. as they were
under his orders. 1t woul1 have been
! much easier to send a courier back Tor
| them from Hagerstown. II the cavalry
| was needed. than from Cnlmbersbufg.
! He knew that Hooker's army had crossed
the river and was holding the South
mountain passes when he was at Ha-
| gerstown So his spy only told Gen. Lee
what he already knew. 1t could not
have been a surprise 10 hear at Cham
bersburg that the Northern army was
moving north. There was nothing eise
for u IN do. II when General Lee was al
Usgorstown he had supposed that HOOK
ar vas sfni south OF the Potomac nc
would not have moved north' Dut uue
east. toward Baltimore and Nashlhs' oIl'
There is not the slightest evidence W
show that in this campaign any lhJuiy
resulted to the army from want OF caEai-
nv. our communications were never III,
terrupted. General Longsireet SPEAKS ol
Suart's movement toward E"el's rlsnt
flank as a raid. As have SHOWN, u "aS
ro,bino Of the kind, but a part OF com
bincd movement Of the whole army. i"S
criticisms Of Stuart are all predicated
| ON the idea that Gettysburg was Genera
T,ao's objective point. and as Stuart was
| absent from the first days battle ne
must. therefore have been IN deiaui''
| But General Lee was not present III tio
| battle: he arrived just at the close vi
| this assun,ption a plausible theory was
invented that the battle was precipltated
| for want cavalry. In Belfoa Mae
aZine October and November lb'D' III
an article on Gettysburg, based on
study of the records. demonstrated the
error. and showed that General Lee never
intended 10 90 10 Gettysburg, bat that
Cashtown was his expected point OF con-
cenfration. General Heth. General Long
street. Long. and others. had represented
Gettysburg 10 be the strategic point on
which General Lee was manoeuvreing.
They forgot that we had held and then
abandoned il. OF course when the base
was knocked from under it, the theory
fell.
WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE.
General Longstreet now says that
Cashtown was the place where General
Lee ordered the concentration. He did
not say so I'm the Century. He fails TO
show the genesis of the battle. and who
was responsible for the defeat Of Cen
eral Lees plans. ] will first say that
in my opinion General Longstreet was
not. Hill. with Heth's and Penders d.
visions, was at Cashtown on the evening
OF July GOTH General Lee with Long
street was still some distance west OF
the mountain. Every division or ms ar
my-infantry. cavalry, and artiiiery-was
on the march. and converging on Cash
town on the morning of July lst They
could all have reached there by night or
in supnorting distance. on the evening
before GOTH. Hll and Heth heard that
body of the enemy had just occupied
Gettyeburg Early on the morning OF
July 1st, Hill with Heth's and Penders
divisions started down without orders TO
attack them. Before reaching Gettys-
burg they met Buford's cavalry on the
pike. Buford held them in check until
miles off with two carps, hearing the fir
ing, came to his support. Heth first pat
two brigades into the fight that were
soon knocked TO pieces; Archer and most
Of his brigade were captured. Heth says:
ARCHER and Davis were now directed 10
advance, the object being TO feel the
enemy and TO determine in what force
the enemy were-whether or not he was
massng his forces on Gettysburg. Heavy
columns Of the enemy were soon en-
countered. General Davis was unable 10
hold the position he had gained. The
enemy concentrated on his front and
TANKS i'm Overwhelming force. The enc
my had now been felt. and found to be In
heavy force" HI states substantially
the same thing. He put IN Heths other
two brigadcs. and then Psndcr's diyi-
zion. lie would have been badly beaten,
but Ewell on the march to CashtOwr.
received a note from Hill. and hearing
the firing. came 10 his rescue. Hill AMI
Hcth called the fight, which lasted from
about s o'clock A NJ. 10 r. NJ. and in
which over 10000 men were engaged on a
side. and five or six tho isanl killed and
wounded on each side. a reconnaissance.
II this was reconnaissance. then what is
a battle? General Lee had not ordered
any reconnaissance, and there was no ne
cessity for II. lie AS west Of the NOM
tain when he heard the firing. and did
OF understand its significance.
IT WAS \ RAID.
The object of a reconnaissance Is 10
get information. not to fight. Only su;li-
cient force is applied to compel an enc
my to develop his strength, and dis
play his position. The attacking force
then retires. After two Of Heth's bri-
gades had been shattered and heavy col
umns of the enemy deployed in his front,
he knew the enemy was in force. and
ought TO have retired, and gone back 10
Cashtown. The trouble was Hill had
fouTd out too much. II is plain that this
expedition was not reconnaissance, but
a raid. a high military authority says:
When once the object Of a reconnoi-
sancc has been gained. a retreat must be
sounded even in the middle OF a combat"
General Lee was in a state of duress
when he arrived on the field al the close
of the fight. lie was compelled to or
der up the remainder Of the army and
deliver battle on ground he had not chOs-
en-. or fall back 10 Cashtown. leaving his
dead and wounded on the field. and giving
the enemy the prestige OF victory. 1t is
clear that the want Of cavalry had
nothing 10 do either with precipitating
the battle or losing il. Stuart was absent
on the day 1t began for the same rea-
son that General Lee was.
This has been written more in sorrow
than in anger II is no pleasure 10 me
TO expose the mistakes of others my
motive is 10 defend the dead, and that
arm of the service to which | belonged.