The record-union., 1896-03-28

first, as having a retroactive effect;
second, as an attempt to amend Section
33S of the Code of Civil Procedure
without reference to the amended Act
or a republication of it as amended, and,
third, as interfering with the defend
ants vested rights in the bar of the
statute.
These contentious may be briefly dis
posed of, first, the amendment has no
retroactive effect. 1t operates upon ex-
listing assessments as they stood at
the time the law went into effect. If at
that time a cause of action upon an
assessment was barred to a district, this
amendment did not, and did not at
tempt, to revive the old or to give an
other cause of action therefor. What
it did was merely to change the mode
or procedure for the collection of the
assessment by providing for install
ments and by changing the time when
the cause of action accrued.
Second-The amendment did not in
fact. or in effect, modify or change Sec
ton 33S of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The statute of limitations begins to run
against a right only when a cause OF
action upon that right has accrued. By
the Act of 1880 it began to run thirty
days after the assessment list was filed
with the Treasurer, and if action was
not commenced within three years
thereafter the cause was barred &C. c. p,
Sec. 1873, Sub. u. Under the amendment
the cause of action accrued twenty days
from the date Of the order directing
it's payment. The right of action there
after existed for three years, when it
was barred by the same section of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The same
limitation exists in both cases, and it
is the limitation provided by Section
1888, Sub. l of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. Manifestly there is no amend
ment and no attempt to amend this Sec
ton.
Third-It is not claimed that the cause
of action under the law of 1880 was
barred as to this assessment at the
time the amendment went into effect
Only two years of the three had passed;
but it is insisted that the appellant
had such a vested right in the passage
of time and the statute of limitation
that the cause Of action against him
must be held to be the cause of action
dildCl lilC ldW VI 1OoO 81 THAT WITH
the third year had expired in March,
1891, the causes of action were one and
all barred. c. P. r. r. Co. VS.. Schackel-
ford, 63 Cal, 261, is here relied upon
1t is not at all in point. When the law
of adverse possession was changed so
as to require the payment of taxes by
claimant, the question was presented
whether in establishing the necessary
five years possession it was incumbent
to prove the payment of taxes during
all that period, when a part of it was
before the amendment became a law
1t was held not to be a question of
vested right, but of giving to law a
retroactive effect which the Legislature
never intended.
But a man has no vested right in
the running of the statute of
limitations until it has completely
run and barred the action
And when a change in the statute is
made during the time of it's running,
that time is not a credit to the de-
fendant under the new law The whole
period contemplated by the new law
must lapse to bar the action Such
are the general rules applicable alike to
criminal and civil actions, unless the
new Act itself expresses a contrary in
tent Commonwealth VS.. Duffy, SO Pa
st. DUO; Bigelow VS.. Bemis, 2 Allen,
497; Vance VS.. Vance, 10S u. S., SIT;
Sohn VS.. Watterson, IL Wall, 500;
Wheeler VS.. Jackson, 137 U. s., 255;
Gilman VS.. Cults, % N. H., 376; Henry
VS.. Thorpe, IA Ala, 103; Wood on
Limitations of Actions, cd Ed Sec II,
and cases; Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations 9th ED, p. AS; Bender
VS.. Crawford, 33 Tex, 745; Pearsall vs.
Kewan, 70 N. c., 472.)
Section 1856 of the Political Code was
not repealed in 1891, but was amended
In the particulars indicated The Con-
stitution requires a republication at
length of an amended Act, that the
Legislature may readily see what effect
the proposed amendments will have
upon the original law. But this repub-
lication Of portions of the Act, un-
changed and modified by the amend
ment, does not operate as a repeal and
re-enactment of those portions which
have continued to be the law through
out. &C. p. r. r. VS., Schackelford, 63
Cal, 261)
Upon the trial defendant admitted
snip VI tHe TRACTS OF Iand de-
scrlbed in the complaint, and the court
found accordingly. Whether or not one
OF these tracts SO described and so ad-
mitted to be the land Of the defendant
contained seventy acres as alleged. or
less, is fmmaterial, as it is not shown
that the assessment was levied upon
the lands by the acreage.
The claim that a difference exists be-
tween the acreage embraced within the
exterior lines of the district and that
In the assessment roll is here made for
the nrst time cannot be considered. In
any event. there would be no presump-
ton in favor of the accuracy of the
former estimate over that of the latter
The judgment and order appealed
from are affirmed. HENSHAw
We