The San Francisco call., 1896-08-26

We concur: MCFARLAND, ].
VAN FLEET, j.
GARoUTTE, ].
HENSHAw, j.
BEATTY, G. j.
TEMPLE, ].
Considerable excitement was created
among the local Office holders, their friends
and politicians of all shades.
1t was at first thought that the decision
had direct application to the City and
County of San Francisco, but careful
perusal of it showed most careful avoid
ance of any reference, direct or Indirect, TO
this County.
Just what the decision means is clearly
indicated in the following interview with
an attorney who is we'll informed on every
phase of the litigation growing out OF the
county government act OF 1888.
ION its face" this gentleman said, 'tthis
decision declares the so-called county
government act of 1898 constitutional.
In the act different. provisions were made
regarding counties of the eighth class;
that is, counties having population
between 80, 600 and 80, 500. In those coun-
ties the act provided among other things
that the officers should be elected for two
years. This exec ption to the general rule
the Supreme Court has declared is an
unconstitutional provision, and that there
fore the act has to be read in its general
provisions as applying to all counties,
including counties of the eighth class.
This decision means that all county
officers elected in 1894 hold over for four
years, and that elections for county Off
GERS will be held in 1893 and every four
years thereafter.
1.-THE decision does not directly apply to
the City and County of San Francisco, but
other cases are pending in which this ques-
tion will be raised.
"While it is true that courts never de-
eide new questions, and therefore in this
decision OF suit from Solano County the
Supreme Court was not called upon to de-
eide the constitutionality of the act in its
effects upon the County and City of San
Francisco, it would appear from the cur
rent of recent decisions that the act must
so apply or else be adiudged unconstitu-
tional upon the appeal of the case pending
from San Francisco.
1.-The tendency of the Supreme Court of
recent years has been to strictly construe
provisions, requiring that all laws of
general nature should have a uniform
operation and prohibiting the Legislature
from passing special laws regarding county
government and other matters where gen.
eral laws would serve.
"The decision in the case OF Denman VS..
Broderick, regarding the constitutionaiity
of the Election Commission, will clearly
show this tendency, and in the later case
of Miller VS.. Curry, decided on August of
this year, the reasoning of the court would
seem to be directly applicable to the con-
stitutionality of the county government
act and of its application to San Fran
cisco.
'tThe county fee bill of 1895 did not in
terms refer to any city and county govern
ment as such, but provided generally for
county officerslfees. Upon the appeal of
the case of Miller vs. Curry it was tried to
show that the City and County of San
Francisco was not included in the provi-
sions of the act. Upon this point the Su-
preme Court said:
By article XI, section 5, of the constitution,
the Legislature is enjoined to provide uni
form system of county government for the
various cities, 30 regulate the compensation OF
county officers in proportion TO their duties,
and to provide for the strict accountability OF
all such officers for the fees and moneys COL
lected by them in their official capacity. By
section of the same article the provisions of
the constitution affecting cities and affecting
counties are, so far as may be. made applica-
Bile to consolidated city and county govern
ments while by article ", section 25, of the
constitution, the Legislature is prohibited
from passing special or local laws affecting the
or prescribing the powers and duties OF off GERS
in counties, cities, cities and counties (subdi-
vision 2S), or regulating county and township
business (subdivision 81.
The law under consideration Is general in
its terms, and, W hile it makes no distinct men,
tion of officers in consolidated government is,
II ulQGFtakeS 10 geSIdD1lSn the ices, not alone
of county and township officers but of other Of
icers in this State. In the somewhat anoma-
lous municipal corporations recognized by the
constitution, and known to the law as consoli-
dated cities and counties, the officers o not
lose their distinctive characters county Off
GERS or OF city officers merely because they
hold within the corporate limits OF such gov
ernment. The County Clerk of the City and
County of San Francisco, the Sheriff of the
City and County of San Francisco, the Re-
corder of the City and County of San Fran
aic oro oooh and oil nf93r Thaxv
have no place properly as officers of city.
Upon the other hand the Mayor of the City
and County Is distinctly and separately City
officer as distinguished from County.
A law, therefore, which under the constitu-
tional mandate undertook to regulate the du-
ties or the compensation of county officers
would fail OF the basic requisite of the consti-
tuition that all laws of general nature shall
have a uniform opera ton (Const., Art. ], sec.
p ii it should be held that its terms did NOT
apply, and were not meant to apply, to county
officers in consolidated governments. And il
m ust, therefore, be concluded, without room
for question, that the act under consideration
is in It's terms applicable 10 the City and
County OF San Francisco.
'In that case it was claimed that the act
OF 1866, applying specially to San Fran
cisco, prevented the application of the
county fee bill to this City. Upon that
point the court said:
The Legislature is presumed to know the
constitution and the limitations upon its pow
SFb theIclu etL lortll. Al lne case az Oar,
has been said, the Legislature had only the
power to pass general law upon the su bject
in question, applicable to all county officers.
If it was the legislative intent (and the legis-
lative intent is always the ultimate fact be
determined) to except the county officers of
the City and County OF San Francisco from the
operation of the law, this might as well have
been done by an exception expressed in
the terms of the act itself. No one
would for moment question but that
such an exception would impair
the general operation of the law, and thus
violate the PROVISIONS o. article l, section 2,
of the constitution. In that event either the
exception would be void, or. If inseparable
from he thor parts of tho law ha W hole oot