The Kimball graphic. (Kimball, Brule County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1905, 1896-12-12

the independence of the insurgents
should be recognized. But imperfect
and restricted as the Spanish govern
ment of the island may be, no other ex-
lists ~there-unless the will of the mill
tary officers in temporary command OF
a particular district can be dignified as
q species OF government. 1t is now also
suggested that the United States should
buy the island-a suggestion possibly
worthy of consideration if there We're
any evidence of a desire or willingness
on the part of Spain to entertain UGH q
proposal. 1t is urged, finally. that, all
other methods failing, the existing in
~ternecine strife In Cuba should be ter
minated by our intervention ven at the
cost of a war between the United
States and Spain--a war which its ad-
Vocates confidently prophesy could be
neither large in its proportions nor
doubtful in its issue.
"A Character TO Maintain.
The correctness of his forecast need
be neither affirmed nor denied. The
United States has, nevertheless, a char
acter to maintain as a nation, which
plainly dictates what should be the way
to rule.
Further, though the United States il
not a nation to which peace is a neces-
sity, 1t is in truth the most pacific of
powers n desires nothing 81 much az
to live in amity with all the world. Its
w ample and diversified domains sat-
isfy all possible longirgs for territory.
,,,a1,,lD, "a 4 =. q .,l
prevent any casting of covetous eyes
upon neighboring regions, however at
tractive. That our conduct towards
Spain and her dominions has consti
tuted no exception to this national dis
position is made manifest by the course
of our government. not only thus far
during he present insurrection, but
during the ten years that followed tho
rising at Yara in 1868. No other power.
1t may safely be said, under circum-
stances of a similar perpleXity would
have manifested the same restraint n
the same patient endurance. 1t may
also be said that his persistent atti-
tude of the United States towards
Spain in connection with Cuba, UNI
questionably evinces no slight respect
and regard for Spain on the part of
the American people. They in truth do
not forget her connection with the dis
covery of the western hemisphere, nor
do they underestimate the great quail
tiles of he Spanish people, nor fail to
fully recognize heir splendid patriot
ism and their chivalrous devotion to the
national honor. They view with Won
der and admiration the cheerful reso-
luton with which vast bodies of men
are sent across thousands of miles Of
ocean and an enormous debt accumu-
lated that the costly possession of the
gem of the Antilles may still hold its
place in the Spanish crown. And yet
neither the government nor the people
in the United States have shut their
eyes to the course of events in Cuba
or have failed to realize the expense of
conceded grievances which have led to
the present revolt from the authority Of
Spain-grievances recognized by the
queen regent and by the Cortes voiced
by the most patriotic and enlightened
Of Spanish statesmen. without regard
to party, and demonstrated by reforms
proposed by the executive Ind approved
by the legislative branch of the Span
ish government. 1t is in the assumed
temper and disposition of the Spanish
government to remedy these griev-
ances, fortified by Indications of infiu-
entail public opinion in Spain. thai this
government a hoped to discover the
most promising n effective means of
composing the present strife, with hon
or and advantage to Spain and with the
achievement of all the reasonable OBJ
jects of the instruction.
Suggests Autonomy.
1t would seem hat If Spain should Of
fer to Cuba genuine autonomy mea-
sure of home rule which, while preserv-
ing the sovereignty of Spain, would sat
isfy all rational requirements Of her
Spanish subjects-there should be no
just reason why the paciication of The
island might not be effected on that
basis. Such a result would appear to
be in the I interest of all concerned.
1t would at once stop the conflict which
is now consuming the resources of the
island and making it worthless for
whichever party nay ultimately pre-
vail. 1t would keep intact the posses
sions OF Spain without touching her
than impugned by the adequate redress
of admitted grievances. 1t would put
the prosperity of the island and the
fortunes of its Inhabitants within their
own control without Severing the nat
+ and ancient ties which bind them
to the mother country, and would yet
enable them to test their capacity for
self government under the most favor
able conditions. 1t has been objected
on the n side hat Spain would not
promise autonomy until her insurgent
subjects lay down their arns on the
other side, that promised autonomy,
however liberal. is insufficient, because
without assurance of the promise being
fulfilled.
That the reasonableness of the re-
quirement by Spain of unconditional
surrender on the part of the insurgent
Cubans before autonomy is conceded
is not altogether apparent. 1t ignores
important features of the situation
the stability two years duration has
given to the instruction, the feasibil-
ity of its indefinite prolongation in the
nature Of things and, as shown by its
past experience, the utter and immi-
nent ruin Of the island, unless the pres
ent strife is speedily composed; above
all, the rank abuses which all parties In
Spain, all branches Of her government
and all her leading public men concede
to exist and profess a desire to remove
Facing such circumstances to with
hold the prefer of needed reforms ur.
til the parties demanding them put
themselves at mercy by throwing down
their arms has the appearance of neg.
Letting the gravest Of perils and invit-
ing suspicion as to the sincerity of any
professed Willingness to grant reforms
The objection on behalf of the insur-
gents that promised reforms cannot be
relied upon. must of course be consid.
cred, though we have no right to as
sumo and nc reason for assuming thai
anything Spain undertakes to do for
the relief of Cuba will not be done &C.
cording to both the spirit and the letter
Of the undertaking. Nevertheless, real
izing that suspicious and precautions
on the part of the weaker of the two
combatants are always natural and
not always unjustifiable, being sincere.
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