Omaha daily bee., 1896-12-27
NOT BY FORCE ALONE
PaCifCation of Cuba Requires More Than
Military Maneuvering,
LIBERAL REFORMS ARE IMPERATIVE
Extension of the Cortos' Plan of Last Year
Seems Necessary.
LEADERS AT MADRID ON THE SITUATION
Marshal Campos and General Calleja Give
Their Views,
GOVERNMENT HAS MISSED A CHANCE
Failure to Promptly Put Into Eject
Reforms Already Voted Has
Aided the Present Rebel
lion Greatly.
GOVERNMENT HAS MISSED A CHANCE

lion Greatly.
Copyright, 1896. by Press Publishing Company
MADRID, (by way of Bayonne, France).
Dec, 26-(New York World Cabegram-
Special Telegram.)-General Campos cap
tain general of Cuba before General Weyler,
thinks the Spanish government made great
mistake in not carrying out at the beginning
of this instruction the colonial reforms
voted by the Cortes last year. He believes
that the contemplated concessions might
have deferred many revolutionists and dis
affected persons in Cuba from openly join
ing the rebellion, and would have made for
eign interference impossible. He does not
expect much to result from General Wey-
lers system Of operations, If General Gomez
and the other Cuban chiefs persevere in their
guerrilla warfare and policy of holding out
! in order TO exhaust the military and finan-
cial resources of Spain, and at the same time
to wear out the patience of the United
States. He is said to persist in the opinion
that the permanent pacifCation of Cuba can
not be obtained by force of arms alone
without autonomist concessions. He would
heartily support any Spanish government in
repeling foreign Intervention or mediation.
He refuses to be interviewed by the news
paper men, because his position as the prede-
| cessor of the present captain general, and
his well known opinion being wholly at
variance with the policy now followed by
the government and by General Weyler
oblige him to refrain from any new exuosi-
ton OF his views, but the gallant marshal
is not so reserved or circumspect in ex-
pressing his opinion in private conversation
with his political and military friends, or
in the Madrid salons he frequents.
MISTAKE MADE AT MADRID.
1t Is no secret therefore, that he thinks
| the situation in Cuba has decidedly not i'm
proved, either in its military, political or in
ternational aspects, since he resigned at the
| beginning OF the present year. After ascer-
| tanning Indirectly from trustworthy sources
the opinions of General Campos, ] dscoy-
cred that General Caleja, who was governor
| general of Cuba when the revolution began,
still perseveres in the views he expressed
in the senate and to the queen regent on his
| return TO Spain, namely: That the home
rule reforms voted by the Cortes would
have contributed very materially toward
! checking the spread and limiting the dura-
tion of the actual insurrectiOn IL they had
been put in force in 1895. and might yet
prove of great assistance in pacihcation and
| in detaching from the rebellion important
separation. General Caleja, like General
Campos, thinks the reforms will have to
be far more radical now to produce sub
| stantial results.
l asked General Ochando. who was Gen
90 e
February to August, 1895, his opinion on
the military situation in the colony Gen
| eral Ochando said: az think General Weyler
| is likely to obtain results in his new plan
of campaign in Pinar del Rio, because,
first, he advances with such overwhelming
forces that the rebel bands must break up
into units and seek safety in flight, and,
secondly he has very judiciously withdrawn
the most of his forces from the Artemisa-
Mariel trocha, thus affording the old bands
OF Maceo means Of egress to return to the
central and eastern provinces by passing
across the provinces of Havana and MatanZas,
which they can only do in small groups, to
avoid pursuit by the Spanish cavalry and
columns guarding the provinces
PLAN CERTAIN TO SUCCEED.
II think the bands in the province of
Pinar del Rio now are mostly dismounted
and likely to fly before General Weyler
eastward to find horses which are abandoned
in Havana and Matanzas provinces. When
General Weyler has cleared Pnar del Rio
of a majority of the insurgents, he will leave
forces to cope with the small bands OF
marauders sure to hold out in the Tomas
mountains, and he will advance rapidly to
Clear Havana and Matanzas provinces to
save the crops and to furnish the government
with the desired opportunity for political
measures, which are indispensable to COM
plete what force of arms alone cannot ac-
complish.
ION the whole, l think that the military
outlook is more hopeful and that military
operations eliminating in clearing half the
island, saving part of the tobacco and sugar
crops. may greatly facilitate political ac-
ton"
ascertained that General Lopez Domino
guez and all other generals of the liberal
party also think it advisable to combine
economic action in Cuba with military OPP
erations. ARTHUR e. HOUGHToN.