The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1895-02-05
COlJRTENAY, GRANVILLE
THAT JAPANESE TREATY.
1t May Not Become Operative AfteI
All.

| WASHINGTON. Feb. 3.-The belief is
growing in diplomatic circles that tine
action of the senate in attaching to the
new Japanese treaty a proviso that it may
be terminated in one years notice after it
goes into effect, will operate to defeat the
| treaty, and it can be stated on good
| authority that in that case In it's present
| shape the entire treaty will be rejected by
| the Japanese government. Anyway, 1t
| transpires that the senate was influenced
in this, not by any fear that the interests
of tho liberty of American citizens in
Japan would suffer by making them sub
ject TO the Japanese law and by relin-
gushing the right to extra territorial
jurisdiction, for this clause does not go
into effect until five years have elapsed.
The actual resolution was founded on
tariff considerations.
BY the treaty the United States allowed
Japan, within 80 days after its ratifica-
ton, to fix her own tariff charges on inn
ports from the United States instead of
holding her to tho old treaty which, by the
terms of the United States itself, fixed the
rate at one flcure-5 per cent. ad valorem
on all imports. In thus admitting
Japan's right to fix her own tariff sched-
ules, the United States went further than
Great Britain or any other great power.
The Japanese looked upon our action
with deep gratitude as the first recogni-
ton of the fact that she was really on even
terms with the other nations. The little
amendment, which, at first glance, seems
inconsequential, really means much to
Japan, for it is said to touch the founda-
ton OF her whole projected new tariff sys-
tenn. The draft of laws necessary to put
this into effect has been already prepared
awaiting the ratification of the treaty, yet,
if Japan should accept the amendment
she will be placed in n peculiar position.
Having proceeded under the new tariff
for short time, and in the meantime
| having negotiated trade relations with
other nations, Japan might be suddenly
notified by the United States of the termi-
nation of the treaty year. The relations
of the two countries would then revert TO
those prevailing under the present treaty
and that would Immediately make all the
duties on United States imports into
Japan only per cent. This itself would
seriously disarrange the Japanese reve-
nues, but the secondary effect would be
worse, for Immediately every other nation
| with which Japan was in treaty relation
would claim the benefits of the favored
nation clause, and secure the 8 per cent.
rate, thus completely destroying the Jap
anese revenue system.
Inasmuch as it has been for many years
the object of the most advanced Japanese
to relieve their people from the heavy
burden of internal and direct taxation to
which they are now subjected for raising
| tho revenues for the support of the gov
eminent, the possibility of thus wrecking
| all their hopes by one slight amendment
of the treaty, inserted by the very power
to which the Japanese looked for hclp in
leading other nations to similar treaties,
il is said by diplomats acquainted with
the views of Japan, it could not be con-
templated by the Japanese government
| with anything less than alarm.