The citizen. (Frederick City, Md.) 1895-1923, 1895-09-06
MODERN IRoN.cLAp FIGHTS
Attacks Upon the Motive Power and tn,
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Attacks upon the Motive rover and the
Personnel
A war ship is vulnera BILE in two chief
respects-in her motive power and in
her personnel. 1t is Imaginable that
one might be wholly neutralized with
out materially injuring the other. The
question. not only of to-day, but of a
century's standing. is: Which is it bet
ter to attack in order to subdue the
ship? In olden days the British habit
ually attacked the personnel, the
French the motive power, and each
was consistent; for the aim of the
former was to insure decisive results,
and that of the latter to avoid them.
Each has had it's advocates, and conse-
quently there is something to be said
on each side; but upon the whole it is,
think, fair to say that experience re-
plies: Attack the men. And the reason
is much the same as hundred years
aga3a rbtenly is it impossible to have
the men rs well protected as the mo-
tive power, but the destruction of the
men who handle the offensive powers
of the ship makes the motive power
practically useless
Now the weight which ship of given
size can carry is limited, and must be
distributed among several objects, of
which gun-power is one: and the ques-
ton has to be met, how shall this gun
power be sub-divided among the differ.
ent classes of gun? If your aim is the
motive power you want heavy guns;
for the motive power-the engines and
boilers-are given the utmost possible
protection, by position, by the thick.
est armor, by the coal stowage, the
protective deck, and SO on, to pierce
which great force is required. But
heavy guns mean few guns, and few
guns mean few shots, and few shots
mean fewer hits; while Of those that
hit, if they strike the protective system
of the engines, ETC., fewer still pene-
trate. truth long foreseen, yet very
generally dropped out of sight, and
which the Yalu battle has singularly
confirmed.
On the other hand, the weight of
armor required to protect the water
line adequately makes it impossible to
extend by similar means adequate pro-
lection to the battery spaces, except |
only those occupied by the heavy guns;
and even where these are adequately |
protected-impervious, that is, to the
missiles fyxn those lighter guns tech
nically called apid-fre"-there can
be no question that their accuracy of
fire is singularly embarrassed. For
that reason it is sought to aim and fire |
them for an exterior position-the con-
ming tower, for instance-a plan of |
which it is enough here to say that,
except for the heaviest guns, it is tend
ing to fall into disuse.
Considering the vast importance of
securing the best practice from the
heavy guns-for am not at all argu-
ing against them, only against their
excessive number-it becomes neces-
sary to beat down and keep down all
the other fire of the enemy. If success
in this is attained, distinct and i'm
mense advantage is gained for the
for, if the rapid-fre guns which have
established their ascendancy cannot
penetrate the turrets, they can greatly
annoy the men in them, and may enter
the gunports. This superiority, if
maintained, must result in victory. 1t
has long seemed to me that the mutual
relations of the heavy and rapid-fire
guns of ship have strong analogy
to field battery of artillery and its
infantry supports, the latter of which
at once protect and secure the efficient
service of the former. However that
may be, the rapid-ire gun of moderate
caliber has just now fairly established
its position as the greatest offensive
power in naval warfare. Capt. A. T.
Mabap II, Canturv