The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1895-11-12
Is SPAIN DIsCOURAGBD9

alIdlIS III CuDa seem 10 nave taken q
very significant turn. General Martinos
Campos, leader of the Spanish forces act
ing on the island to suppress the rebellion,
Is reported to have made recent declara-
lions which are singulary different from
| those which he made at the beginning of
the campaign. Then he declared that the
| rebellion would be suppressed at once.
his failure to accomplish that, together
with the growing strength of the rebellion,
the thinning out of the Spanish troops by
disease and the Encouragement and physi-
cal suffering of the soldiers, led him to an
nounce later that with the coming OF win
ter the additional troops sent by Spain
and his men on the ground would be in a
better position to fight, and that the war
would certainly be ended before spring.
Now he says that unless the policy of re-
lentlessness toward the rebels is changed
by the home Government and amnesty
promised to all belligerents the war will
require 10000 men and three years OF
time. More than that, he acknowledges
the great likelihood of the United States
recognizing the ''belligerent rights" of the
insurgents. On top of all these doubts
and dangers come other significant pieces
VI AiS"S' OilS 10 llllI VIC ICDCIS are lIlNGSl-
ing both ends of the island; that business
in Havana is paralyzed; that the Spanish
leaders have decided to concentrate their
forces at Santiago de Cuba and practically
leave the rest OF the island to the insur-
gents, ana that the Spanish home Govern
| ment has divided into two bitter factions
and developed a struggle which may seri-
ously affect the chances of Spain in Cuba
All this is not only virtual announce
ment that Spain is unable to suppress the
rebellion but that it is time fer the United
| States to intercede. 1t looks, indeed, as
| though such interference would be well
! come to Spain, as in sense it would spare
| that country the humiliation of defeat,
although the island would be lost. In
short, Spain appears 10 accept the loss of
Cuba as an inevitability, and is anxious to
get out of the scrape with as little further
loss of money and dignity as possible.
Recognition of the bellgerents by the
| United States would have a tremendous
meaning for the insurgents. Some fine
points of international law are involved
and there IS wide margin for the raising
Of the question as to whether such recog-
milton under all the circumstances would
| be in strict regard for the policy OF the
nations; but if by any means it could be
ascertained that Spain would not object to
| this species of interference all these doubts
would disappear.
If Spain, in the maintenance of it's dig
nifty, should refrain from giving expression
to such willingness, our Government
might proceed in the not strictly defined
margin of a nations right to exercise an
independent judgment. 1t has the right,
| for instance, to decide for itself without
the consent of other nations that the war
IS productive of unnecessary and bar
barous slaughter of human life, and that
the interests of our citizens in the island
are suffering unduly and unnecessarily.
This wo1ld not require a consideration of
the moral principles involved in the as
serted right OF Spain to Cypress the
Cubans and refuse amnesty to the rebels.
Indeed, on this latter point the utterances
OF General Campos see m clearly to be IN
tended to call the attention of the United
States to the attitude of the Spanish Gov
eminent on this point, as suggestion of
our right to interpose on that ground.
Every one of the recent occurrences not
only strengthens the opportunity, but Gre
ates the duty of the United States to inter-
fere on behalf OF the insurgents without
in any way impairing its obligations to
Spain as friendly power.