Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1895-02-04
THE JAPANESE TREATY.
With the Amendment 1t May BE Re-
jected by Japan.

With the Amendment 1t May BE Re-
jected by Japan.
The belief is growing in diplomatic CIR
cles that the action of the Senate In at
taching to the rev Japanese treaty a pro-
viso that 1t may be terminated on one
years notice after it goes into effect will
operate to defeat the treaty, and 1t can
now be stated on good authority that in
it's present shape the entire treaty will lie
rejected by the Japanese government. 1t
transpires that the Senate was Influenced
in this action. not by any fear that the
interests or liberties of American citizens
in Japan would suffer by making them SUBJ
ject to Japa nese law and relinquishing the
right to extraterritorial jurisdiction, for
this clause does not go into effect until five
years have elapsed. The actual reason was
founded or tariff considerations. By the
treaty the United States allowed Japan
within thirty days after it's ratification to
fix her own tariff charges on imports from
the United States instead Of holding her
to the old treaty, by the terms of which
the United States itself fixed the rate at
one figure-5 per cent ad valorem on all
imports.
In thus admitting Japan's right to fix
her own tariff schedules the United States
went further than Great Britain or any
other of the great powers The Japanese
looked upon our action with deep gratitude
as the first recognition of the fact that she
was really on even terms with other great
nations The little amendment, which at
first glance seems inconsequential, really
means much to Japan. for it is said to
touch the foundation of her whole project
ed new tariff system. The draft of the
laws necessary to put this into effect has
been already prepared awaiting the -atifi-
cation Of the treaty, yet If Japan should
accept the amendment she will be placed
in a peculiar and dangerous condition.
Having proceeded under the new tariff for
a short time, and in the meantime having
negotiated trade treaties with other ma
lions, Japan might be suddenly notified Ey
the United States Of the termination of
the treaty in one year. The relations of
the two countries would then revert to
those prevailing under the present treaty,
and that would Immediately make all du-
ties on United States imports into Japan
only per cent.
This in itself would seriously disarrange
the Japanese revenues. but the secondary
effect would be worse, for Immediately
every other nation with which Japan was
in treaty relations would claim the bene-
fits of the favored nation clause, and Sc
cure the per cent rate, thus completely
destroying the Japanese revenue system.
Inasmuch as 1t has been for many years
the object Of the most advanced Japanese
to relieve their people from the heavy bur-
den of internal and direct taxation to which
they are now subjected to raise revenues
for the support of the government, the pos
sibility of thus wrecking all their hopes
by one slight amendment of the treaty,
inserted by the very power to which Japan
similar treaties, 1t is said by diplomats
quainted with the views of Japan, could
rot tie contemplated by the Japanese gov
eminent with anything less than alarm.