The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1895-05-30
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States for the Eastern district of Texas
On March %, 1892, Crawford filed this
SUIT III the district court of Harris county
to recover damages for injuries alleged
to have been received while in the emp
ploy of Dillingham;, who was then the
receiver of the railroad. These injuries
were inflicted after the receiver had beer
were inflicted after the road had beer
sold, under the mortgage, and purchased
by Olcott; and after this sale had been
confirmed by the Federal district court
but before possession of the road had been
taken by Olcott.
After the delivery of the property to the
Houston and Texas Railroad company
Crawford made it party to. the suit
alleging that it had purchased the road
charged with his claim, and, that the
revenues and earnings of the road
while in the hands of the receiver were
applied to the making of permanent i'm
provements upon the railroad 1t is not
stated whether these revenues were de-
rived from the operation of the road. he
fore or after the sale. The other facts
of the case sufficiently appear from the
opinion.
Question-"Did the appellant AXE said
railroad from the receiver freed from tine
claim of the appelleeY
~ AS general rule, the purchaser of a
railroad at sale made under an order of
court holding the custody Of the prop
city by a rec eiver, takes the property free
from claims against the receiver arising
out of the operation of the road; but the
court ordering the sale may impose such
liabality as part of the consideration for
the purchase. (62 Texas, Al
1t follows that the purchaser in this
case can not be held, under the orders of
1llo ho wiz
scented his claim in accordance with the
orders imposing the liability.
(2) Is the purchaser liable to the plain
tiff, under the facts, Independent of the
orders of the circuit court?
We have carefully examined the au-
thorities, and find no case like this.
Neither have we discovered any text
book authority on the question. We must
therefore determine it upon general prin-
ciples by court of equity to analogous
cases.
The sale was made and confirmed in
1888, and the master was then directed
to make a deed to the purchase. 1t not
appearing otherwise, we conclude that the
deed was made at the time of the con-
frmation, in pursuance of the order, and
that the purchase money was then paid
or credited on the mortgages. This clear
ly passed the title to the purchaser; and
the court thereafter held the property as
that of the purchaser.
The plaintiff was entitled 70 have the
earnings of the road while operated by
the receiver after the sale and convey
ance to the defendant, applied 10 the sat
isfaction of his claim; and this fund was
not diverted from its proper application
when it was invested in betterments upon
the property. All improvements made
before the sale included in and paid for
by tke price bid by Allcott, but sub
sequent Improvements We're not so in
Guided, and not so paid for by him. The
defendant having received the benefit of
this missapplied fund is liable to the
plaintiff to the extent of its investment
in the betterments after Allcott's pur-
chase.
60 The plaintiff had the right to sue
the receiver in the State courts, without
the consent of the circuit court, which
appointed him. If the circuit court re
tanned jurisdiction over the property and
had continued its receiver until the ter
mination of the suit in the State court
the judgment of the latter must have
been enforced by the former; hut having
discharged its receiver and turned over
the property to the purchaser, its juris-
diction ceased; and the State court had
the power to proceed to adjudicate the
rights of the parties, and to enforce its
own judgment according to the laws of
the State. &c Tex, 421.)
We answer that the defendant is liza
BILE to plaintiff to the extent that i'm
provements were made with funds de-
rived from the operations of the road
after the title was vested in Alcott, who
purchased at the sale. Opinion by
Brown, ].
Rathburn & Co. VS.. the State. Certi-
fed question in a case from Grayson
county. Fifth district.
Question: "Does the adoption of the
local option law in a county or sub-divis-
ion thereof relieve persons selling liquor
therein, for the purposes permitted by the
local option law, from the liquor dealer
occupation tax, provided for by the act
of the legislature of 1893, p. 177?'
The general law authorizes the issu-
ance of license to sell liquors as such,
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