The Portland daily press., 1895-05-08

yet he was annoyed ty an unnecessary
shot fired by his men on the picket line.
He complained that such firing at night
broke his mems rest, and in the daytime
it disturbed their colnposure. He never
tolerated random firing in any form. A
regiment of foreigners in forest was the
only thing, SO far as / know, that made
him nervous. He felt them to be as
dangerous to their friends as to their
enemies
There are several noticeable resem-
blances between the operations of Napo-
leon at Wagram and of Hooker at Chan
ceIlorsville Both threw vast bodies of
troops across river, between sunset and
dawn, in the face of vigilant enemies.
The passage of the Danube by Napoleon
and of the Rappahannock..by Hooker, are
pointed out at our military academy as
the most instructive examples OF such
operations. Both commanders failed in
prof ting by the surprise OF their adyer-
aries.
The Archduke Charles, as soon as day
| light revealed the presence of the French
army, fell back to strong position,
from which his Austrians repulsed their
impetuous and confident assailants.
Hooker, more prudent, took up a de-
fensive position in the wilderness to
await the capture of Fredericksb burg, and
the JUNCTION of Sedgwick with the main
army. Wagram aud Charlottesville
were drawn battles, that is to say, heavy
effective in morale, material and
strength. There is, however, this i'm
portant difference-the commanding gen.
era of the Union army was disabled by
a serious injury from which he never
afterw ard fully recovered.
This misfortune left the army OF the
Potomac without head. During the
fol Uirarr h9ffIa
Sunday morning, May 3, 1868, Hooker
was tortured by pain and incapable to
command. These precious hours decided
the battle.
charlottesville and Gettysburg are
the beginning and the end of one cam
paign. Gettysburg was Hooker's re-
venge for Charlottesville. The armies
of Hooker and Lee had both been reor-
ganized; both prepared for decisive re-
suits. Hooker's initiative in May chose
Virginia as the field of operations. The
check at charlottesville and Hooker's
hurt required brief period for recupera-
lion. Lee profted by the chance to
transfer the battle-ground to Pennsyl-
vania. Moving toward the Potomac,
threatening the capital. closely followed
by Hooker, Lee repeated Hooker's mis-
take at Chancellorsville and sent off his
cavalry on useless raid through Mary
land and PENNSYLVANIA. Without Stuart
Lee was blindfolded. Hooker profted
by the presence of Pleasanton and his
superb cavalry corps, masked our ad-
vance, put our army on Lees flank,
threatening his communications, before
b knew Hooker had crossed the Poto-
mac, thus forcing the enemy to accept
battle on our terms.
6 gettysburg was won by the army re or
ganized by Hooker 1t was won by adopt
ing Hooker's plan of campaign, after he
as relieved. The campaign was shaped
by Hooker's movements, and executed
by Butferfield, Hooker's chief OF staff.
The battlefield was determined by an un-
foreseen collision of drifting columns.
Lee was so confident of success that he
waited only for the concentration of his
army to attack us wherever he might
find us. The battle of Getty sburg began
on July l., 1863, three days after Hooker
asked to be relieved from command. AS
Gen. Newton says, &" We were hammered
by the enemy into strong position. and
won it,n 1t was corps commanders
battle. If Hooker had remained in COM
mand Lee would not have been permitted
to take his army back to Virginia. The
fruits of our victory would have been
harvested.
History will aw ard to Hooker a large
share of the houors of the Gettysburg
campaign. Congress anticipated this
verdict when it gave the thanks of the
nation to Gen. Joseph Hooker for the
skill, knowledge and endurance which
first covered Washington and Baltimore
from the meditated blow of the advanc-
ing and powerful army OF the rebels, led
by Gen. Robert E. Lee.