Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1895-10-09

pnn his own judgment was prpuseu'
as he would OF every stage CT MS pro-
gress be met by force that now az
II has been reinforced. eaua,led his own
and that could be constantly IN
creased by detachments from tachin"nu'
while he could obtain nothing In the
WAY of additions to his strength. ln's
statement cannot be verinec DS tHc
records The inspection Reports io'
August 1861 show that Sheridan had an
active force with him In The held presen'
for duty Of 5C.6lS men: OF this io'p W..
cavalry. The inspection reports a. TN
game time show that Early had, IN
cind,nc Kershaw's Division that had JUST
ioined him. 1ilS infantry. fond' 'he
euIoeist of Sheridan and good nor'her"
autbority cs imates E1riys total err,
tive strength at that time AT i,"p.
will thus be seen that Sher dah Caf@ii
largely exceeded the number Oh taty
infantry. including Kershaw. ana Wi'nuu'
Kershaw was about equal TO Ear'S
whole army.
THE LOSSES AT WINCHESTER.
A few days before the battle OF W
chester or the Opequon, as sohe'l, -,
called (September l9th), kersha" 1t,
vision started back TO Richmond pu' Nv
not reach there. II was recalled 10 tne
valley after the battle, and joined h-diiS
not far from stanton. kershaW III
,.,sion numbered 81 officers and $40 me-"
present for duty. In the bait e. 'heieio
Earlv's total Of all arms did not eNceeI
II lq5 IL Is true that sheridan dc'u"'
line OF b1ttle strength. was weakened ny
the attachments he WAS cotnpeneu
make 10 guard the border and his me ol
communications Now. the inspection re-
norty show that at the time Of the battle
sheridan had In his department "O-o
"uresent for duty" and lli,jjl 'agsre-
gate present" The deduction from MS
line Of battle strength should. therefore
be made from his total force In ms ue-
partment. and not from that carried 10
the front. Those left in the rear Were
guarding his communications ana the
border The faci tiles for rapid concentra-
ton were such that til were Simply 50
many reserves from which he cOuid ~
any time be quickly reinforced ne Jay
after the battle OF Winchester ne oruei,"
5000 troops from Washington to the Sheh
andoah Valley to guard his line OF supply
The battle was fought only thirty mlitS
from his base at Harper's Ferry. so ne
had all his supplies and all his army con
centrated before ne made the attack. IHc
on V detachm5n that General Lee ""'
able TO make from the army AT feteis
burg TO reinforce Early after the Ddtue
was one brigade Of cavalry Inc lact
WAS that Sheridan had with him IN inc
field a much. larger army than lhe on1
that was defending Richmond. The DO
grapher asserts that in this battie 'ne
Confederate forces sustained losses equ"I
TO those we suffered" etc. Pond gives the
loss in the Union army as about 5oV'
and in the Confederate about $500. 30
far from having "annlhilated Early
army in the Valley, as Sheridan, in ms
memoirs" claims 10 have done the IN
spection reports for october. after all tn
battles had been fought, show present
for duty" 1l.lS9 infantry. The most OF
the troops returned 10 Richmond in De
cember. and constituted large portion
Of The army SURF ndered al App0mittoN.
The cavalry aggregate was 5.S2'
SHERIDAN'S FEARS GROUNDLESS.
The following kilograms show how
groundless were SheTidan's fears OF be
ing verwhelmed by reinforcements from
General Lee:
WASHINGTCN. September @-Lau-
tenant General Grant. city Point: ! hope
ii will lay no consuaint on YOU nor 40
harm any way for me TO say | am lit
tie afraid lest Lee sends reintorcements
to Early and thus enable him 70 turn
ON Sheridan. \. LINCOi-N'
DEEP BOTTOM. September 2g.-Presi-
dent 4. Lincoln: Your dispatch just re-
ceived. / am taking steps to prevent Lee
from sending achievements q Early
by attacking him here.
L. 5. GRANT.
Iieutenant-Gcneral.
Mr.. Lincoln took it for granted that
Sheridan was going on south. If he had
supposed that he was going to turn
round and retreat back down TIE Val
ley before an army which he had Ju-t
telegrapned 10 General Grant was All
broken up" then the very thing tina
he would have desired would have been
FOR General Lee To weaken his INES 10
reinforce Early. Grant would then nave
taken advantage OF 1t either 10y hanh
movement or TO break through ana cap
ture Richmond The bioSrapher assigns
as a reason for Sheridans retreat against
Grants wishes. that the Valley was eN-
hausted of provisions, and il was i'm
possible to keep open his line of com
munications through seven miles of
country infested by guerriilas.
on September 29th, when Sheridan was
about HarrisOnburg, Grant tclographed 70
Haneck: II am satisfied no troops have
gone from here against MN, ana theS
cannot in the next two days. By thal
time he will be through Uhe Blue Ridge
mountains) and on his way to position
where he can defend himself and supply
himself"
GRANT WAS NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
This shows conclusively that Grant sup
posed Sheridan would march on Char-
lottesville. where he cOuid De supPHeu pS
the Orange and Alexandra railroad. NO
doubt he was thunderstruck when ne re-
ceved the following telegram from Sheil-
dan announcing his retreat:
In moving back TO this point the Whole
country from the Blue Ridge 10 the North
mountains has been made untenaD!e Ioi
a rebel army. | have destroyed Z'0O parhs
filed with hay, wheat, and farmlhs-lhl-
PIGMENTS over 20 mills filled with hour
and wheat; have driven in 'front.' Oh the
army over 4uO0 head of stock, and nave
killed and issued 10 the troops not less
than 1900 sheep" This is only what was
done on the retreat; a few days before lie
had informed Grant of the great quantity
Of forage and provisions he had destroyed
further up the Valley But the supplies
he DESTROYED would have subslsted MS
army long enough to reach CharlottesNlI!e
or Lynchburg. He made the country
desert. and then said he retreated because
IL was a desert. lie was like the man
up a tree who sawed off the limit on
which ne was sitting-of course, he heard
something "drap."
The plan now adopted was TO take two
corps back to Front Royal-repair gap
of sixteen miles Of the Manassas railroad
and hurry these troops TO Alexandra
and thence by water TO Grant II was
calculated that the railroad would De re-
paired to Front Royal by the time that
sheridan could get there and that they
could reach Petersburg and capture Lees
lines before Early's troops could get there
GRANT AND HALLECK TO SHERl-
DAN.
CITY POINT VA, october 3.-Grant 10
Staunton: 81 will follow Sheridans sug-
.,a- tion of ringing the Sixth and Nine