New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1895-02-10
WITH A WAR FLEET COMING.
HOW NAVAL EXPERTS WOULD DEFEND
THE COAST
THE PROBLEM BEING TO RESIST THE ADVANCE
or HOSTILE SQUADRON rPON NEW
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE.
WASHINGTON Feb. 9-The results of last summer $
course at the Naval War College. just puphshcu
for the information Of Naval officers contain some
interesting recommendations regarding the uci'"Oe
of the Atlantic seaboard which were brought OUT
through the studies pursued by prominent o''0'
chosen for the duty. The principal focus OF thousn
and discussion was the following probiem' "iiion
closely follows the actual conditions whch "'s"'
confront the United States with its Navy no" co'-
peted and building:
War declared October /; Octoher 20 enemy NEE ,h
mask Sandy Hook entrance. Force Is SIN ~ ~
line ten heavy cruisers, six scouts ten to,peao 9
boats Forts and mines ,oroIa ay temporary rem
devious for eneny's golfers Enemy scout a aiso
sells watch force in Gardner ra naH o descend
rpon our Goa st between Boston ana New or, pr III
sron, HaIfax November 10 consists of ten line
twenty heavy cruisers. twenty .torpedo-oodts oon
DESTROYER and scout class, also d corps OF 'V"o
Of ali arms in 100 transports Our entire force cX
cept some local defence vessels at New 1rk naS
snmbies AT Gardeners Bay and New-London, ana
organizes by November TO- rms force - I'VE nv nv,
five heavy cruisers ten light cruisers one ram Eye
scouts two dynamers and ten torpedo boats. - re
enemy's probable plan being ultimately TO apii9Pach
Sound prepare plan of meeting this demonstration.
show best disposition of our forces
In the solution differing views were developed
resulting in more than strategic plan oil de-
fence; officers divided as to the two principal
plans for disposng cf the American fleet upon the
approach of a superior enemy. one OF THESE WAS
10 withdraw up the Sound within the deiences OF
New-York; thence to harass the enemy AT either
entrance as opportunity afforded and deal de-
cided blow with the fleet strengthened by the ioca
coast-defence monitors against one OF MS detach-
nen,s II from any cause il should be Temporarily
weakened Narragansett Bay was found to De
desirable refuge, but the fleet could probaoV DC
sealed up there by an enemy. though ior's an"
mines supported by mobile force would dehy MN
an entrance. Buzzards Bay offers no protection
from an enemy, but the construction OF de'p
canal from its head into Cape Cod Bay would ere
ate there a position OF unique Importance strate-
gical and tactical. Nantucket and Vineyard souhoS
have the highest tactical value as ports OF refuge
and sortie. With the overwhelming force opposed
the difficulty of navigation gives great odds 10 t"e
United States fleet which. by thorough acquain-
lance with the locality. Independent of buoys ana
lighthouses. can add fifty per cent 10 its tactical
strength
The unanimous opinion resulting from the STUDY
Of this problem is that in any such war inc opera
tons of correct strategy must lead TO engagements
fought in bays sounds and other interior waters
and that study Of the tactical possibilities OF these
waters should be thorough and unceasing. IL WAS
noted that these narrow waters would enhance the
tactical value OF both rams and torpedo-boais ana
that torpedoes discharged from ships also would
have their opportunity.
Another fact which becomes apparent j. that
fighting ships drawing from eighteen TO tweniy-iour
feet other things beng equal will be more valuable
than those drawing twenty-four to thirty feet. In
these waters where the principal comDals are
likely to occur the lighter draughts have much
greater scope of action larger areas OF good anchor
age ground and a choice of channels that may
prove decisive in tactical crises. Sandy HOOK, Tor
example. offers several channels for draughts be
tween eighteen and twenty -four feet. while ships
dra wing from twenty-four to thirty are restricted
to one. the main ship channel. Inside the Hook
large for anchorage or battle Is avaNabIe 10
the former while the latter are restricted to
mere channelway leading toward the Narrows In
Gardeners Bay the same thing Is truc. The bar OF
Greenport Channel. leading into the inner waters
and of great importance in war, is easy and safe
for less than twenty-four feet. and intricate and
dangerous for more. The same figures hold good
for many positions Of tactical value in Narraganset
Bay and the Nantucket waters.
This dividing line Of tweny-four feet draught
APPLIES to this theatre OF war only-that is from
Cape Cod to Delaware Bay. The next most impor-
tant section. strategically considered from Cape
Cod TO the Bay of Fundy. is characterized by deeper
and holder water. and the tactical loss Of heavier
draught is not so marked. on the other hand. the
coast waters south of the Delaware are shoaler
and future tactical examination Of that region VIII
probably show that the dividing line between
greater or less efficiency Is eighteen rather than
twenty-four feet. In the consideration OF the stra-
tegic position OF this country in such theatres of war
as the CdTlDDe9N sea anu buii VI .NN"'NN NO"' 81
durance becomes prominent as factor, and as
sumes q value much in Of high speed. III
higher speeds are to be maintained the acquisition
OF coaling stations the Spanish Main Is requi'
Site II is declared eXpedient strongly TO fortiiy
Key West as a coal base and naval rendezvous.
Some of the conclusions of the college are as fol-
lows:
The limit OF size and cost FOR ships OF the Inc
seems to have been reached and passed by modern
navies Naval tactics demand a number Of tactical
with which make battle combinations. IT =
nations policy and economy limit It's principal Heet
strict four nfs Of 1850 tons and each or
Of of SSs an Sf ions or ana een S9S S @
100000 each Our fighting ships should draw less
MATES Tasr 'na We Should sv for
speed in fighting saips. The weight Of guns and
A certain rapidly Of fire must be maintained.
Until this can be secured for the very hesVy cal
retcally and in peace practice three minutes is
given as the time per round for the heaviest guns
In the confusion of battle there Is reason to believe
that this time will IL six minutes. Records Of
Alexandria and the Yaoo even with all allowance
made. do not justify us In expecting less. The time
between fires regarded as an element OF naval tao
tics. must be coupled for intelligent consideration,
with the speed of the fleets and their relative drec-
ton Of moVemI mt
Officers should navigate frequently and for long
They should become expert pilots for heavy draighi
IN n %ei as Of oq se
New-York. GARDENERS Bay and Nantucket Sound.
in the waters Of Nantucket and the Vineyard; they
know the channels and sA1als for vessels drawing
from twelve 10 eighteen feet but for draughts rang
Ing from twenty to thirty feet their knowledge is
based upon little experience. No enemy. therefore.
could procure skilled pilots for his heavy ships.
our officers expertness II gained by long practice.
would double the tactical value of our fleet.
Preparations should be made during peace for the
organize ton in Peconic Bay when war is imminent,
OF a great fotilla OF gunboais. torpedoboats
rams mprovised from the floating resources Of the
coast and for similar smaller fotilla in New-York
Nantucket Sound and other favorable points
The system OF lookouts signalling ana transmits
sion OF information should be perfected during
peace and include naval reserves. revenue-cutter
service lighthouse and life-savng stations with com
nefe plans of location OF telegraph ana telephone
lines existing and proposed The details Of arming
and provisioning the lookout ations should be fully
under TODD This general system should include the
or ganlzation OF the scouting squadron which Is to
with the lookout stations from
ward The value OF position south OF Nantucket
Shoals and in communication by telegraph with
tho coas. lookouts. becomes apparent In cases OF
louhi as 10 what ports might be attacked. an eX-