Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1895-05-04
The Monroe Doctrine Shown the
Door by England.
PRECEDENT OF THE CORINTO EPISODE
A New Declaration to Be Made by
Congress.
RELATIONS TO BE DEFINED


showing the door.
| That such is the result of the Corinto
| episode so far as the United States is con-
| cerned, many public men privately admit
| They find it impossible to take any other
| view of the matter. Whether the admin
| istration was right or wrong In the atti-
| tude it assumed is not regarded as being
| so much to the point The fact remains
| that the attitude assumed was formally
and officially assumed, and this govern
ment stands committed by It, That awful
| thing, precedent, has been made. Great
| Britain and the whole of Europe are
| greatly amused, while Central and South
| America are correspondingly depressed. 1t
is comedy for the one side and tragedy for
the other, with the United States, under
Mr.. Cleveland's guidance, the bountiful
| provider of both entertainments.
| A New Declaration.
But while the Monroe doctrine, so long
so called, has in Its supposed form received
its quietus, there is no thought of aban-
doning the question of just what relations
| this country, as the great republic. of right
| sustains, or ought to sustain to the Cen
| trail and South American republics as re-
| publics. The solution of that question is
| now sidered imperative and that 1t will
| be entered upon when Congress assemblies
| next winter is certain. Both national pride
| and the business interests involved in the
| Nicaragua canal will demand this, and
new dc ctrine, embodying the popular con-
| ception Of the old Monroe doctrine-a sort
| of Monroe doctrine up to date-will be
| formulated and passed for official promul-
| cation.
| present themselves. The transatlantic
view, just developed will have to be met.
| England says, and Europe will echo it, that
| the United States must either shoulder all
| Cllar
| lean republics with transatlantic powers.
and answer itself squarely and promptly to
those powers, or else keep hands off in
| such controversies altogether. No middle
| ground is mentioned. Such a thing
bitration, with the United States using
| friendly offices, seems not to have been
| considered. The United States must either
| buckle on her armor and go to battle with
| out delay, else cross her hands behind
| her back and look on while a helpless little
| neighbor is cudgeled to the content OF
| powerful antagonist. 1t will be for Con-
| gress to find middle ground. Englands
| proposition, it is thought safe to say, will
| not be accepted The United States will
| undertake to act neither the policeman
for the western hemisphere. in
| different idler, when the interests OF her
smaller neighbors are involved. She will
| find something to do in such circumstances
| without undertaking to do it all.
To Satisfy Sentiment.
| 1t may be- however that the greatest
|
sentiment In the little republics themselves.
There is not only depression. but a con-
sternation Of feeling existing there at pres
ent. The cable news shows that the people
| of Central America are greatly disap-
| pointed in the United States. They are
| even talking of forming an alliance among
| themselves to resist future foreign aggres-
| sions. They have lost faith in this country.
| The great republic, their powerful neigh
Dor, upon whom they Lad been leaning so
| confidently, has failed them. The Monroe
| doctrine turns out to DE the Mrs. Harris
| of diplomacy. There's no such person. Will
| they care. then, to cooperate in any policy
| devised and proposed by this country look
| ing to the establishment oil mutual rela-
| tions that will mean something? viii it
| avail anything to assure them in frank and
| respectful terms that the foreign policy of
the present administration, from the Ha-
W allan episode down, has not reflected pop
| uiar sentiment in the United States? But
| most of all, what must policy represent
| that will restore to the United States her
| lost prestige in this business, and at the
| same time commend itself to those coun-
| tries to the south, helping along as best
| they can the cause of a popular govern
| nent?
The Administrations Interpretation.
The Monroe doctrine. the admnistra-
| ton Interpreted it, was monumental selfish
ness. 1t didn'. mean anything of benefit
to anybody but to the people Of the United
| States. They alone were considered. 1t
was not championship Of popular govern
ment at all. Monarchical intrigues and
| aggressions on this side of the Atlantic
were to be forbidden If the Interests of
| the United States were threatened. Ac-
cording to this theory, Louis Napoleon was
| ordered out of Mexico because the estab-
| lishment of a monarchy, with amiable
Austrian under bad influences On the
| throne, might work harm to this country
| The Central Americans now may ask would
| that action have been taken if Louis Ma
| poleon had been operating as far south as
| Nicaragua or Brazil? And this point when
pressed will, it is believed, call Cor some
thing more than fine phrase-making On
| the part Of the United States.
| Clearly, therefore, as some public men
| believe, If anything is to be accomplished
in the direction indicated It must be by the
| adoption of a policy by the United States
which, while free from undue assertion,
| shall yet extend to her small neighbors to
| the south the benefits of q real friendship.
| Otherwise, 1t will be useless to approach
| them at all. If the United States is not
| to enter into any contention between a
| small American republic and a transatlan-
| tic power unless her own Individual well
| fare is threatened, the small republics
| will not care to accept her hand. They
may even openly refuse 1t, and proceed to
| develop the idea suggested Of an alliance
| among themselves to protect themselves
| against foreign powers melted to hostil-
| tiles because Of their helplessness when
taken singly.
Such m Alliance Not Likely to Sue
| coed.
| If such an alliarce could hope for sue
| cess in Central America, more than one
man of prominence in the United States
would be glad to see it formed. They
| would be glad, too, to see England the first
| victim of its power She would be likely
| sooner or later to tackle 1t, and If she could
receive good basting the result of her
tyranny it would recall with satisfaction
| in this country the basting the colonies
| gave her. But the idea is that no such
| union as the colonies effected is possible
| among the Central American countries.
| They are peopled by a different race, and
| their interests not closely inter-
woven as were those of the colonies. The
| solution of the difficulty. therefore. seems
| to be understanding between them and
the United States whereby the greater
| power shall in times of stress act as the
| friend Of the lesser powers.