The morning call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1878-1895, 1895-01-25

classes than those mentioned in the constltu-
tion) to nonresident foreigners, just as we ask
the privilege of voting to be extended to
women. The censtitutionality of the act came
up in the case of PURCELL VS.. Smidt (21 Iowa,
$40, and the act so extending it was held con-
stitutional,
We quote a portion of the decision, and to
show its entire application to the subject in
hand put the words signifying the different
classes of persons in the two constitutions to-
gether and it viii be seen that either may be
read with equally good cause. Reading the
first words in small type gives the decision as
rendered, reading the bracketed words applies
the principle to our case. After quoting art.
/, sec. %, supra, Cope, j., says:
The particular question made rs. whether this
is restriction upon the power of the Legislature
for extending the same privileges to other than
those named In the clause foreigners (citizens), to
wit: (wome1 citlzens) nonresident foreigners.
whether it simply enables the class named to
enjoy the rights specified, and limits the power Of
the Legislature TO exclude them. bare recur-
renee to the principles of constitutional con-
struction will afford an unerring answer In the
construction OF State constitution it is the rule
that the State Legislature may exercise all right
III legislative powers which are not expressly pro-
hibited or necessarily included in the prohibited
powers.
Bearing in mind these rules of construction and
that the instrument to be construed is State
constitution, there is no difficulty in determining
the consGitutionality of the law of 1853. For the
constitution having provided that resident for
eigners tmaIe citzens) shall enjoy certain rights
1t becomes limit of prohibition upon the legisa-
tive power to deprive such foreigners (citizens)
of those rights, but is not restriction upon the
Legislature as to the granting OF like rights or
privileges to other foreigners (citizens) than those
named. In other words the constitution itself
eoniers upon resident foreigners (nae citizens)
rra ali rio md hal mis- afu frn
interfering with them, but IL contains restrc-
tions as to the power of the Legislature to confer
the same other rights upon nonresident for
eigners (women eitiZens).
The act of 1858, which simply extends the rights
in respect TO the possession (snfrage), enjoy ment
and descent OF property to others than these
named in the constitution, is therefore constitu-
tional, since there is no prohibition to the e1er-
else of such power.
The same question arose in the same way In
our.own State, in People VS.. Rogers, ID Cal,
and the court said:
Tt Legislature could not, indeed. abridge this
privilege, but 1t was not disabled from extending
it, OF adding other privileges. 1t might as well be
urged thst because the constitution provided that
no law should be passed imparing the obligations
OF contracts, no legislation could be had; or be-
csuse a homestead was exempted from forced
sale there could be exemption of other prop
erty.
And SO to paraphrase the above, the Legisla-
ture cannot abridge the privilege OF suffrage
granted by the constitution to men, but it is
not disabled from extending it to women. To
the same point see: Dayid's Administrator VS..
David, Sc Ala, 40; Martin VS.. Hughes, 81, n. c.
293; Const. Cal, Desty, p. 214, note.
1t is needless to multiply authorities. We
consider the reasoning in the cases cited as
conclusive and their application TO the present
case too plain to admit of any doubt Since,
then, the Legislature has unlimited power I'M
less restrained, and since in regard to suffrage
to women it is neither expressly nor implicitly
restrained, it follows that the Legislature may
grant suffrage to women.
II. ~ "The express mention of one thing i'm
plies the exclusion of those not mentioned"
Broom's Legal Maxim, p. 581, and cases cited.
2. (d) We are aware that this maxim is in
voked to prove that women are excluded from
the right of SUFFRAGE but let US see. By the
mention of males in the constitution there is
conferred on them a constitutional right to
vote, j. e., a vote guaranteed by and derived
from the constitution, and the failure to men,
ton women excludes them from a constitution
derived right, but it does not exclude them
from statutory right. The exclusion extends
only to the same kind of right viz, a consti-
tutional right. The principle was declared in
PURCELL VS.. Smidt, supra. There the mention
of resident foreigners excluded nonresident
foreigners from the constitutional right to in
herit, but as was expressly decided it did not
exclude them from statutory right TO in
herit; so, here the mention of males excludes
females from the constitutional right to vote,
but not from statutory right. See cases above
cited. We repeat, the exclusion extends only
to the same kind of right, viz, constitu-
tional right, and not to a statutory one. Much
confusion has arisen because of failure to
recognize this principle, but once admitted it
will be found that the apparent contradictions
of decisions and opinions are at once recon-
ciled.
Under the maxim then women are not pre-
vented from voting under statutory pro-
vision, by the first part of section L of article
II of the constitution of California.
(b) The second part of section l, article II,
was intended to and does bar certain persons
forever from exercising the right of suffrage
Chinese, idiots, insane persons, felons, ETC., are
forever barred. But women are not mentioned
among the barred classes, nor can they be in
Guided by any implication Since she is not
within the classes barred she must be in q class
not barred, for the mention of one class as be-
ing barred is the exclusion from that category
of classes not mentioned; and if not barred,
then certainly the Legislature may confer the
privilege by statute.
3. 1t is familiar rule of Interpretation that
the different parts of an instrument must be
construed together, and such construction
adopted as will give meaning to every part.
(Sedgwick on Construction, etc., second ed, PIP.
1919 and 200, and note where authorities are
collected.)
Section "a of article reads as follows: "No
property qualification shall ever be required
for any person to vote or hold office"
1t is conceded by every one that the Legisla-
ture cannot abridge the right of suffrage, and
if it cannot extend it, then it cannot legislate
on the matter at ali, and the basis of voting is
irrevocably fixed by the constitution. Now if
suffrage is unchangeably fixed already, as is
mentioned, what is meant by section "a of
article l above quoted? 1t would be utterly
meaningless. If by section 1 of article III the
Legislature is prohibited from touching suffrage
at all, what sense is there in the constitution
further saying it shall not prescribe prop
erty qualification? The very fact that the
constitution says the Legislature shall
not legislate on suffrage in a particular way
in the way of fixing property qualiica-
tion-implies that it may legislate in any other
way in regard to it. If that section means any
thing, it means that it was contemplated that
the Legislature might extend the right to vote,
but that in doing so they would be prevented
from making the right to depend upon a prop
erty qualification. This construction makes
section "a OF article l rational; gives it mean
ing, and is the OIily one that does give If a.