The morning call., 1895-02-04
MAY THEREFORE, BIZ REJECTED
Important Questions That Hinge on
the Tariff Relations.
GRATITUDE is SOMEWHAT PREMATURE.
Under Certain Conditions the Revenues
of the MikadO'S Domain Would Be
Seriously Crippled.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3.-The belief is grow
ing in diplomatic circles that the action of
the Senate in attaching to the new
japanese treaty proviso that it may be
terminated in one years notice after it
goes into effect will operate to defeat the
treaty, and it can now be stated on good
authority that in its present shape the
entire treaty will be rejected by the Japa-
nese Government.
1t transpires that the Senate was in
fluenced in this action not by any fear that
the interests or liberties of American citi-
zens in Japan would suffer by making
them subject to japanese law and to re-
linquish the right to extra territorial juris-
diction, for this clause does not go into
effect until five years have elapsed. The
actual reason was founded ON tariff consid-
erations. BY the treaty the United States
allowed Japan within thirty days after
its ratification to fix her own tariff charges
on imports from the United States instead
of holding her to the old treaty. by the
terms of which the United States itself
fixed the rate of one figures per cent ad
valorem on all imports.
In thus admitting Japan's rights to fix
her own tariff schedules the United States
went further than Great Britain or any
other great power. The Japanese looked
upon our action with deep gratitude as
the first recognition of the fact that she
was really on even terms with other great
nations. The little amendment which at
| first glance seems inconsequential really
means much to Japan, for it is said to
| touch the foundation of her whole pro-
| iected new tariff system. The draft of the
| laws necessary TO put this into effect has
! been already prepared, awaiting the ratifi-
cation of the treaty; yet, if Japan should
accept the amendment she will be placed
in peculiar position.
Having proceeded under the new tariff
| for a short time, and in the meantime hav-
ing negotiated trade relations with other
nations, Japan might be suddenly notified
| by the United States of the termination of
the treaty in one year. The relations Of
| the two countries would then revert to
those prevailing under the present treaty,
and that would Immediately make all du-
ties on United States imports into Japan
| only per cent. This itself would seri-
| ously disarrange the Japanese revenues,
but the secondary effect would be worse,
for Immediately every other nation with
which Japan was in treaty relation would
claim the benefits of the favored-nation
clause and secure the per cent rate, thus
completely destroying the Japanese rev.
enue system.
Inasmuch as it had been for many years
the object of the most advanced Japanese
! to relieve their people from the heavy
burden of internal and direct taxation to
which they are now subjected for the rails
ing of revenues for the support of the Gov
eminent, the possibility of thus wrecking
all their hopes by one slight amendment of
the treaty inserted by the very power to
which Japan looked for help in leading
other nations to similar treaties, it is said
by diplomats acquainted with the views of
Japan, could not be contemplated by the
Japanese Government with anything less
! than alarm.