The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1895-09-05


mystical or mysterious in his nature: be
was frank and open in his conversation,
but not communicative of his plans and
purposes. He seldom confided his plans
even to his most trusted Heutenants. He
was thoroughly self-reliant, never but
once, and that early in his career, did he
hold council of war. By his reticence
he impressed those who did not know
him and who were not close observers of
ability. Gen. Ewell. his trusted and
loyal lieutenant, when he first served
under him called him "crazy," Gen.
Whiting reported to him with his division
at Staunton after the battle OF Port Re-
public, having been sent to reinforce him
from Richmond and leaving his troops at
Staunton rode twenty miles to report in
jackson would unfold to him his plans
in detail, but returned the same night to
his division with this only-that he would
receive orders in the II orning He COM
planned of his reception to q friend IN
terms not very complimentary to Jack
son, but acknowledging that he had been
treated in the most courteous manner.
for him to move his division to Gordons-
vile. There he met jackson and moved
with him to attack MoClellan's flank at
Richmond. He soon had reason to revise
his opinion of his chief.
Third His knowledge of the move
ments and plans of the enemy we're
usually very complete and accurate, and
the deficiency by an almost prophetic and
1nuuitive insight. His success was never
due to fortunate concurrence OF cir
cumstanoes, but was the result of plans
elaborated from abundant data, carefully
collected and considered. Genius never
displays itself in hap-hazard methods.
His retreat and withdrawal Of his forces
from the Potomac to Strasburg was timed
with
REMARKABLE ACCURACY
and shows a complete knowledge of the
movements of the opposing forces. 1t
was necessary that he should maintain
his threatening attitude in front of Har-
per's Ferry and along the Potomac to the
very last minute consistent with his
safety, for if he were to make simply a
vigorous pursuit-of Banks's defeated army
and an irresolute dash at Harper's Ferry,
and then a precipitate retreat up they
ley again, he would have lost not only
large part of the material results OF his
advance and victory over BANKS, Dut Qe-
stroyed entirely the moral effect of it. He
would have shown his weakness: the fear
and panic in Washington and in the
States bordering on the Potomac would
have Immediately subsidized; the move
ment of McDowell's troops would have
been stopped and they would have imme-
diately returned to reinforce Mcclellan.
But by an accurate knowledge of the pro-
gress of McDowell's troops on the one
side and Fremont's on the other, and
keeping his advance in constant contact
with the Union troops in his front, he was
able to prolong his occupation OF the
country in the Vicinity of Harpers Ferry
until the advance of McDowell's troops
was appearing through the Blue Ridge at
Front Royal, and Fremont's advance was
showing itself a few miles west of Stras-
burg, then by march of his main army
to Strasburg, he separated those two
forces which do not seem to have been
over-anxious at any time to come togeth-
er and stretching out his right and left
arm, held them apart until he had gath
cred in his forces. We might multiply
instances of his correct knowledge and
grasp of the situation in which he was
placed.
Fourth. jackson was an aggressive
fighter This we consider the most pow
erful cause contributing to his success.
The moral effect (Which is to be studied
in war; of taking the initiative in battle,
of:frst assuming the offensive, cannot
be too greatly over-estimated. 1t was
part OF Jackson's character; it was
natural for a man of his intense activity
and energy, coupled with
INDOMITABLE COURAGE
and WILL to strike instead of waiting to
be struck. He moved his troops with
h ic
oes, and delivered his blows without
hesitation and with power backed by
his resolute will. He recognized the fact
that armies were organized for lighting
and he never attempted an easier way to
victory than by fighting for it. 1t seems
contradictory to the character of this de-
vout, pious man of God, to call him de-
termined and persistent and ready fighter
but such he was, as all his campaigns
testify.sHis eagerness to attack was some
times to his great injury. as in Kern
stown in April, 1869 when he made an
attack upon much larger force under
Shields and again at Port Republic-such
was his impetuosity that he hurled a
small part of his forces against the ad-
vance of Shields, too inpatient to await
the slow movement of the balance OF his
forces over the narrow lmprovlsed bridge
across the Shenandoah
Fifth: He had wonderful hold upon
the affection and veneration of his soldiers
not SO much because of his success. as by
reason of his lofty character-strong in
it's simplicity and truthtulness, self deny
ing and self-sacrificing.
At the conc fusion of the paper, on
motion of General Conner, Major Thaxter
was thanked for his interesting and able
paper.
General Beale who commanded the
irst-Tenth- Twenty ninth Maine, was
called on. He recalled that he was near
Front Royal at the time jackson ad-
vanced up the valley. and sent to Gen.
Banks the first telegram announcing
Jackson's attack on Front Royal. General
Beale has now Banks reply, thanking
him for the information. General Beale
thinks if Jackson had been little
sharper he could have gobbled all hands
of Winchester. Why he did not do it,
Gen. Beale could never understand. If
Mcdowell had not been so unaccountably