The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1895-03-19
Decision by Justice Brewer of the
Supreme Court In the Case of a Man
Who Exacted an Illegal Fee.
OAKLAND, CAL, WATER FRONT
BILL IN EQUITY DISMISSED IN AN
OPINION BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Rail-
way Receivership Cases ALLEGED
of Postal Employees.

W<ADI1IINdION, Mdfcn lS.-An interesting
opinion on the status of pensions was de-
livered by Justice Brewer in the Supreme
Court to-day. Congress being at liberty to
give or withhold PENSIONS said the Jus
tice, may prescribe who shall receive and
determine all the circumstances and condi-
ions under which any application there
Tor shall be prosecuted. No man has a
legal right to a pension, and no man has a
legal right to interfere in the matter of OBJ
tanning pensions for himself or others. The
whole control of the matter is within the
domain of congressional power"
This declaration was incidental to the
courts opinion on the appeal of Henry N.
Frisbie, who was convicted and sentenced
TO three months imprisonment by the Cir
cult Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana under an Indictment charging
that ne demanded a greater sum than $40
for his prosecution of q pension claim. in
violation of the act of June q, 1890. which
placed that limit on the attorneys fee. The
Justice said: 1T is within the undoubted
power OF the government to restrain some
individuals from all contracts, as well as all
individuals from some contracts" He
then referred to contracts for purchase or
sale OF lottery tickets in that connection.
After stating that a pension granted bv the
government is a matter of bounty, that no
pensloner had a vested legal right to his
pension, that Congress had the right TO
give, withhold, distribute or recall them,
Justice Brewer said: Having power to
iegisiate on this whole matter, to prescribe
the conditions under which parties NAV as
slst IN procuring pensions, it has the equal
power to enforce by penal provisions COM
pnance with its requirements. There can he
no reasonable question of the constitutional
atty of this statute The conviction was
sustained. ~
Chief Justice Fuller to-day delivered an
opinion Diminishing the bill in equity brought
by the State of California VS.. the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, involving the
ownership of the Oakland water front. for
want of original Jurisdiction. Referring to
the question of the interest of other par
Ties, VINO 90 not appear in the case. the
Of the court, said: Sitting as a court 5nitno Of
well-settled principles, invoke the considera-
ton of the question whether other persons
VINO have an immediate interest in resist
ing the demands of complainant are not in
dfspenslble parties, or, at least, so far nee
essary that the cause should not go on in
their absence. Can the court proceed to a
decree as between the State and the South
ern Pacific company and do complete and
final justice without affecting other persons
not before the court, or leaving the contro-
versy in such a condition that its final
with equity and good conscience? We are
constrained to conclude that the city of
Oakland and the Oakland Water Front
Company are SO situated in respect of this
litigation, and we ought not to proceed in
their absence"
"A OPINION.
Justice Harlan, in the dissenting opinion,
cited the boundary suit of Florida against
Georgia, in which the Encouragement was
allowed to file briefs for the United States
without making the government a party to
the case in a technical sense, and contend
ed that practically the same course had
been pursued in this case, the city of Oak
land having been allowed to file briefs and
documents to illustrate its alleged title and
to participate in the taking of evidence.
'The case has been fully heard upon it's
merits" he continued, "as they involve the
rights of California and the Southern Pa
cific company and the city of Oakland. All
of these parties earnestly desire that we
proceed to q final decree on the merits. If
any other party is interested in the result
of the case we can hold the case until that
party. if it so wishes, can make proof of
such interest and it's nature, just as the
city of Oakland has done. The suggestions
that the Oakland Water Front Compan
has such an interest in this suit as to
entitle it to be heard comes from the court,
not from the company or from any parties
before us. The court did not say that a
decree as between California and the South
of others, or that it could be pleaded in
bar, in any subsequent suit, therefore it
court should not exercise its obligations to
decide the case between the State and the
corporation. According to the interpreta-
ton of the Constitution laid down the court
would not exercise it's original jurisdiction
over a case, but would two or more States
If it appeared that individual citi-
zens had an interest in the controversy? '
In conclusion Justice Harlan asked how
the State of California was to obtain a
The effectiveness of such suit would depend
upon the ability of the State to bring the
Kentucky corporation into court SO that it
would be bound by final decree. The franz
ers of the Constitution did not intend to
compelled to submit its controversies with
citizens of other States to the court of such
words of regret that the court could not
settle a matter that would bring so much
trouble to the State.
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION.
The question of the jurisdiction of a fed
eral court to appoint a receiver and taxi
railroad property out of the hands of a
receiver appointed by a State court was
also passed on by the Supreme Court to-
day. he case was that of James T. Shields,
jr., receiver of the Morristown & Cumber
land Gap Railroad Company, appellant,
against John w. Coleman and the Atlantic
Trust Company, from the Circuit Court of
the Eastern district of Tennessee. The
plaintiff in error was appointed receiver
Oct. Is, 1892, by Judge Sneed, of the State
Court of Tennessee, and afterwards w. S.
Whitney was appointed receiver by the
United States Circuit Court. Shields filed
a motion in the United States Circuit Court
asking the court to vacate the order APP
pointing Whitney receiver, which motion
was overruled. The question at issue was
stated by justice Brewer, who delivered
the opinion of the court as given above.
The Supreme Court was declared to be of
the opinion that the Circuit Court had not
the power to take the property out of the
hands of the receiver appointed by the
State court. The contention that the re-
ceiver had no such interest in property as
would give him a standing in the Circuit
Court to petition for its restoration to his
possession was declared to be a mistake,
since it was a matter of everyday occur
renee, the Justice said. for a receiver to
lake legal proceedings to acquire possess
sion of property or for the collection of
debts. The contention that Judge Sneed
had not Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver
was also overruled. AS was the claim that
the proceedings had been moved to a final
decree by which various lines had been
determined and property passed beyond the
Jurisdiction of the court. Justice Brewer
said that the mere forcible continuance of
possession by the federal court did not
transform that which was in the sense
wrongful into a rightful possession The
case was remanded TO the Circuit Court for
proceedings not inconsistent with the opin-
ion.
in the Case of the Chicago, Kansas City &
Western Railroad VS.. Clifford r.. Pontius,
in error from the Supreme Court of the
State of Kansas, affirming the decision OF
fbo court below. which had allotted dam