The Weiser signal. [volume] (Weiser, Idaho) 1890-1904, 1895-02-07
TREATY WITH JAPAN
Amendment by the Senate May
Cause Its Rejection.
OBJECTIONS SURE TO C)ME
Some Particular Provisions De. red by
the MIX ido's Cove rnm mt VIII
lie La cking.

Washington, Feb. S.-The belief is
growing in diplomatic circles that the
action of the senate in attaching to the
new japanese treaty a proviso that it
may be terminated in one years no
tice after it goes into effect will operate
to defeat the treaty, and it can be stated
on good authority that in it's present
shape the entire treaty will be rejected
by the Japanese government. 1t tran
spires that the senate was influenced in
this action, not by any fear that the in
terests or liberties of American citi-
zens in Japan would suffer by making
them subject to Japanese law and re-
linquish the right to extra territorial
jurisdiction. for this clause does not
go into effect until after five years have
elapsed.
The actual reason was founded on
tariff considerations. BY the treaty,
the United States allowed Japan, within
so days after its ratification, to fix her
own tariff charges on imports from the
United States, instead of holding her
to the old treaty by the terms of which
the United States itself fixed the rate
at one fgure-5 per cent. advalor-
EN- on all imports. In thus admitting
Japan's right to fix her own tariff
schedules, the United States went furth-
er than Great Britain or any other great
| power. The Japanese looked upon our
action with deep gratitude as the first
recognition of the fact that she was
really on even terms with other great
nations. The little amendment which
| at first glance seems inconsequential,
really means much to Japan, for 1t is
said to touch the foundation of her
| whole projected new tariff system. The
| draft of the laws necessary to put this
into effect has been already prepared,
awaiting the ratification of the treaty.
/ Yet if Japan should accept the amend
ment, she will be placed in peculiar
position. Having proceeded under the
new tariff for a short time, and in the
meantime having negotiated trade rela-
tons with other nations, Japan might
be suddenly notified by the United
States of the termination of the treaty
| in one year. The relations of the two
countries would then revert to those
prevailing under the present treaty, and
that would Immediately make all duties
on United States imports into Japan
only 5 per cent. This itself would Sc
riously disarrange the Japanese reven-
ues, but the secondary effect would be
! worse, for Immediately every other ma
ton with which Japan was in treaty re-
lation would claim the benefits of the
| favored nation clause, and secure the
per cent. rate, thus completely destroy.
ing the Japanese revenue system. In
asmuch as 1t had been for many years
the object of the most advanced Japan
ese to relieve their people from the
heavy burden of internal and direct
! taxation, to which they are now sub
jected for the raising or revenues fol
support of the government, the posi-
bility of this wrecking all their hopes
by one slight amendment of treaty in.
| serted by the very power to which the
Japanese looked for help In leading
other nations to similar treaties, IT is
said by diplomats acquainted with the
views of Japan, that it could not be
contemplated by the Japanese govern
ment with anything less than alarm.