Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1895-08-23
IRONCLAns-IN ACTION,
Vessels Vulnerable Points Found In
Her Personnel and Motive Power.

Vessels Vulnerable Points Found In
Her Personnel ,nRd Motive Power.
Capt. A. T. Mahan in Ne Century.
A warship is vulnerable In two chief re-
spects-in her motive power and In her per
sonnet. 1t is imaginable that one might be
wholly neutralized 5Githout materially In.
Juring the other. The question, not only OF
today, but Of oentury's standing, is
Which is 1t better to attack in order to sub.
due the ship? In ,olden days the British
habitually attacked the personnel, The
French the motive power, and each was in.
consistent, for the 5aim Of the former was
to insure decisive results and that of the
latter to avoid Them Each has had its
advocates, and consequently there is some
thing to be said on each side, but upon the
whole 1t is, I think. fair to say that expert.
ence replies-attack the men. And the rea-
son Is much the same as q hundred years
ago; not only is 1t impossible to have the
men as well protected as the motive power
hut the destruction Of the men who handle
the offensive powers Of the ship makes the
motive power practically useless.
Now the weight which ship Of given size
can carry Is limited, and must be distribu.
ted among several objects, of which gun
power is one, and the question has to be
met-how shall this gunpower be subdivided
among the different classes of guns? II
your aim is the motive power you want
heavy guns, for the motive power-the en-.
gines and boilers-are given the utmost pos
sitle protection, by position, by the -hick-
est armor, by the coal stowage, the pro-
tective deck and 50 on, to pierce which
great force Is required. But heavy guns
mean few guns, and few guns mean few
shots. and few shots mean fewer hits
while of those that hit, If they strike the
protective system of tho engines, ETC., few
err still penetrate, truth long foreseen
yet very generally dropped out of sight
and which the Yalu battle has singularly
confirmed.
On the other hand, the weight of armor
required to protect the water line adequate
1y makes 1t impossible to- extend by sim.
liar means adequate protection to the bat
terry spaces, except only those occupied by
the heavy guns, and even where these are
adequately protected-imrervious. that Is
to the missiles from those lighter guns
technically called rapid-fire''--there can be
no question that their accuracy of fire Is
sirgularly embarrassed For that reason
1t Is sought to aim and fire them from an
exterior position-the coming tower, for
instance-a plan Of which 1t is enough here
to say that, except for the heaviest guns
1t Is tending to fall into disuse.
Considering the vast importance Of secur-
ing the best practice from the heavy guns
for I am not at all arguing against them.
only against their excessive number-it be-
GENES necessary to beat down and keep
down all the other fire of the enemy. If
success in this is attained. q distinct and
immense advantage is gained for the heavy
guns over those of the enemy. for II the
rapid-flre guns which have established their
ascendancy cannot penetrate the turrets,
they can greatly annoy the men in them
ard may enter the gunports. This superb
GRITTY. If maintained, must result In victory.
1t has long seemed to me that the mutual
relations of the heavy and rapid-f1re guns
of ship have a strong analogy to a field
battery Of artillery and its infantry sup
ports, the latter of which at once protect
and secure the efficient service of the for
mer. However that may be- the rapid-fre
gun of moderate caliber has just now fair
ly established its position as the greatest
offensive power in naval warfare.