The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1895-08-07

good name of another person and to
bring him into disgrace, adherence,
| odium, hatred, contempt or ridicule,
/ or to cause him TO be excluded from
society"
/ Conceding that the ofense imputed
/ must be one involving moral turpi-
! tude and (or) attended with the risk Of
| social degradation it becomes necessa-
/ ~ to ascertain what "moral turpitude'
| Is. As defined by Newell, p. IS, the ad-
! jective moral in this connection
means "any manner or custom re-
| lating to or according to the received
/ and customary rule of right and duty
| between man and mani? relating
| TO the private and social duties of
men as distinguished from civil re-
J sponsibilities' Turpitude signifies
moral "baseness, depravity or enorm-
| ity." III. And 'moral turpitude is
defined TO be an act of baseness, vile
ness or deprayity in the private and
! social duties which man owes to his
| fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and custom
airy rule of right and duty between
man and man." Id. 80.
We are still in uncertainty, for the
rule of right and wrong is derived
from the state of public morals at the
time. Definitions of what actionable
words are libelous are broad enough
to allow adoption Of decisions to
changes in the social state. Offenses
that in some crude and debased state
OF society are considered as eXcus-
able, would in more refined and en-
Hghtened conditions be held to be the
reverse.
The question, therefore, for us to
decide Is whether the offense of hav-
ing opium in possession for sale in
wolves moral turpitude and would
subject the person to whom the
dalton. This question is for the
Court and not the jury. The defama-
tory matter in question seems to us to
be unambiguous.
1t would be popularity understood
as impGting TO the plaintiff the
offense of being a dealer in opium; of
selling opium. By all the authorities,
if the alleged defamatory matter is
plainly unambiguous, the question of
its meaning and character is for the
Court. Newell, p. go, and cases
cited.
The mere possession of opium by a
private individual was by the law in
force at the time of the alleged libel,
and is now, punishable by a fine of
not less than fifty nor more than two
hundred and fifty dollars, or by inn
prisonment at hard labor for a term
not less than one month nor more than
six months, or both in the discretion
of the magistrate. And to import, sell,
give or furnish opium was punishable
by fine of not less than five hundred
dollars nor more than two thousand
dollars, and by imprisonment at hard
labor for any term not less than six
months nor more than two years.
:. j. 90
of opinion IN this community as to
whether the use of opium as a mar
cotic can be prevented by the present
law making it contraband and forbid
ding its importation, sale or possession
(some persons being of opinion that q
law licensing dealers under restrictive
regulations would be the better policy,
the opinion is very general that its
habitual and continued use effects |
evil and destructive results in the |
moral and physical nature of the user. |
This general subject, and especially |
the danger to which the young of all |
races residing in these islands are ex- |
posed from the prevalence of the !
opium habit among Chinese, has for
years been matter of public discus
sion in the Legislature and out of it. |
1t seems to us that the sense of the |
is that the conviction of n
person as a smuggler of opium, a |
dealer in it or as having it in posses
sion in any quantity, would subject |
him to social degradation, to say |
of the ignominious punish !
ment of imprisonment at hard labor
that might follow. To a citizen of
good repute an imputation of an
)ffense of this character would be
greatly damaging. 1t would expose
1im TO odium or contempt. The
)ffense of selling opium implies a will
ingDess on the part of the offender to
.isk the health and morals of the COM
nuDity for the sake of gain, and this
We feel involves Il degree OF moral
,orpitude; and we hold the alleged
lefamatory matter is iibelOus, and
he Circuit Judge was right in deny
ng the nonsuit.
The plea in the case was the "gen-
raj issue" 1t denied the truth of
ZACH and every allegation in the COM
)laint
On the close of the plaintiffs case,
he non-suit being denied, the de-
offered to prove the truth of
he matter in the alleged libel. This
vas refused by the judge on the ground
hat upon this complaint the plea of
general issue did not put in issue the
ruth of the alleged libel. To this de-
endant excepted.
1t is well settled according to the
ommon law that in an action Of this
haracter (for libel or slander) the de-
endant under a plea of general issue
annot be permitted to give in evil
ence any matters tending TO establish
he truth of the defamatOry matter.
Greenleaf Evid. Sec. 424. Newell
}. 7S7.
At common law if a defendant de-
Tres to admit the publication OF the
efamatory words and avoid the con-
egueDce by asserting the truth of the
anne he can do so under plea of JUS
fication. And the tru tn, if pleaded,
a complete defense to a civil action
f SANDER or libel.
The defendants contend that the
lle OF the common law does not APP
ly here in the face of the statute,
,bioI, alIOuyS a Defendant uDdar an |