St. Paul daily globe., 1895-11-27

like the defendant, has never for day
during thirty-four years discharged its
duties to the state as prescribed and
contemplated by the act which gave
Ii life, to serve as an instrumental.ty
for the evasion of the law by other
companies. The Manitoba company
would not for an instant claim, or at
tempt to exercise the right of consoli-
dation, except as authorized by it's
charter or by the general law. Whence
is derived the authority to effect consol-
idation with the Northern Pacific, either
by reason of lease of property or the
ownership of stock?''
Referring to the meaning of section
II. of the charter, which provides for
the right of repeal without disturbing
the vested rights of the company, Gen.
Childs argues that the legislature's
meaning must be construed in the light
of the law as it was then understood
as to the sacredness of vested rights.
If the contention that this exemption
applied to all the vested rights and
every right granted was vested right,
then the legislature could not amend
the act in any particular not sanctioned
long argument on this phase of the
case, quoting extensively to sustain his
view. On the contention that the pro-
posed agreement IS against public pol
icy, Gen. Chiids says:
1.-The effectua ton of the agreement is
against public policy, tending to the
creation of an oppressive monopoly
hurtful to the common welfare, the
Z. u .,
revocably granted by the legislature,
even assum ng that the terms of the
grant are bread enough to contemplate
it. No court has ever yet undertaken
to accurately define or declare the ulti-
mate boundaries of the police power Of
a state. Perhaps the courts have no
where gone farther upon the subject
than did the federal supreme court in
Lawton VS.. Steele, 152 U. S. lS6, in
which 1t says:
1.-THE extent and limits Of what is
known as the police power have been
appellate courts of nearly every state
in the Union. 1t is universally con-
ceded to include everything essential
to the public safety, health and NOR
abatement. by summary proceedings,
of wha tever may be regarded as pub
lie nuisance Under this power it has
been held that the state may order the
destruction of a house falling to decay
or otherwise endangering the lives of
passers-by; the demolition of such as
are in the path of a conf1agration; the
slaughter of deceased cattle: the de-
struction of decayed or unwholeSome
food; the prohibition of wooden build
ings in cities; the regulation Of rail-
ways and other means of public con-
veyance, and of interments in burial
grounds; the restriction Of objection
able trades to certain localities; the
compulsory vaccination of children;
the confinement of the insane or those
afflicted with contagious diseases: the
restraint of vagrants, beggars and liab-
itual drunkar6S; the suppression of OBJ
scene publications and houses of ill
fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating
liquors are sold Beyond this, however,
the state may interfere wherever the
public interests demand it. and In this
particular a large discretion is neces-
terrnine. not only what the interests of
/ the public require, but what measures
are necessary for the protection of
such interests.
After citing long line of authorities
to sustain his view on this phase of
the case, Gen. Childs calls, attention
Specifically to the things the defendant
1IlQ -INOlI1ClH dSlllC piOpOSCu W QO,
and he urges that they amount to
actual consolidation. He says that SO
far as it is the desire of the two COM
panies to enter into lawful traffic ar
rangements for the Interchange of
business or the joint use of certain
tracks, the state has no objection, but
the purpose of the state is to prevent
consolidation, whereby both lines are
to be controlled by the same interests.
Gen. Childs here quotes extensively
from decisions of various courts on
the question Of unlawful combination
or monopoly for the restraint of trade.
In conclusion, the attorney general
says:
"In the foregoing it has been attempt
ed to present reasons against the ef-
fectuation of the proposed agreement,
and to establish the following PROPOSE
tions:
"First-That the act Of 1856 is not a
contract within the meaning of the
Dartmouth college decision.
"Second-That it is a public law and
subject to amendment at the legisla-
tive will.
'Third-That the words 'in any man
ner so as not to impair Or destroy the
vested rights of the corporation found
in section II, are words of precaution,
a m ere incident to the main purpose OF
section II, with no legal force or effect
in preventing the operation of the laws
of 1874 and 1881.
"Fourth-That the consolidation con-
templated by the special law of 1856
was, at most, but the consolidation of
| lines with a view to the continuous
shipment of commodities, and did not
contemplate the consolidation of the
immense interests in question.
"Fifth-That the defendant had ac-
quired no vested right in 1874, which
the legislature was bound to respect,
or which section II contemplated.
'SiXth-That the road it was author
ized to consolidate with another road,
1t does not own, and hence has no au-
thority, in any view of the case, to en-
ter into the agreement.
"Seventh-That as the defendant is
not the owner of any railroad, but
operates only lines which have been or
ganiZed under other charters, and
whose respective entities are yet pre-
served. the consolidation of these roads
would be palpable violation of the laws
of 1874 and 1881.
'Eighth-That the consolidation will
constitute a great monopoly of rail-
road interests in a large portion of
Minnesota, and in the states to the
west of it, involving parallel and COM
peting lines. and is therefore opposed
to public policy. and should be re-
\ t,,rs i IL s,,, t.