The herald., 1895-12-26

from the field and remained all the next
day on the battlefield, and the second night
crossed over into Virginia.
Burnside, on December 18th, had 116,-
663 present; attacked Gen. Lee at Freder-
icksburg with $500 present (see vol. 3,
p. 143, Battles and Leaders.) In this fight
the Federals had majority of 5S,1 1873 and
their total loss was 1868, while Lees
total loss was 4201.
General Hooker, on April 3Oth, crossed
the Rappahannock with an army present
equipped Of 133,7OS and 4O4 pieces of
artillery, and General Lee met him with
an army of from 55 900 to 10000 (vol. 3,
Battles and Leaders.) Hooker in several
desperate battles was driven from the field
and across the river, losing total of IT,
2S7, while Lee's total loss was l2,463.
(See Battles and Leaders, vol. 3. p. 1881
General Grant crossed the Rappahan-
mock with $4,000 veterans, and was con-
fronted by Lee with G2,0UO. In thirty
days Grants total loss was 81 ,144. (See
Battles and Leaders, volume 4 g, pages 1874
and 1851
Do not these great battles show that an
equal number OF Federals were never q
match for the same number of Confeder-
ates? We will not give the reason why.
The facts are known TO every reader, and
it was a knowledge of these facts which led
General Buell., the commander of the army
of the Cumberland, the Blucker, who met
Grants cry under the river bank at Shiloh
of, "Help, Cassius, or l sink! :" and threw
into his disprited and disheartened ranks
2 $40 effective men. and this turned the
tide against the Confederates. This General
Buell., a brave Union general. thus speaks in
an article entitled East Tennessee and The
Campaign of Perryville, (psee 81, vol.
3, Battles and Leaders-) "a philoso-
phical study of our civil conflict must
recognize that influence of some sort opef-
ated fundamentally for the side of tho
confederacy in every prominent event f
the war. They are involved in tho fact
that 1t required enormous sacrifices for
24,OO0,00O of people to defeat he political
scheme OF S,O00,0O0; 2,0OU,00O soldiers
to defeat 100000, a naval fleet and
10, 900 troops to advance against weak
fort manned by less than 100 men at Fort
Henry; 80 900, with naval cooperation, to
$4,000 to oo overcome 10000 at
retreat of $1,000, entrenched, after
months maneauvering at Corinth; 100,-
900 repealed by 10000 in the peninsula
campaign against Richmond; 10000 with
powerful naval force for nine months
ag ainst 10000 at Vicksburg; 10000 to
barely withstand the assault of 10000 at
Gettysburg; 10000 sustaining fright
full repuse of 10000 at Fredericksburg
100000 attacked and defeated by 10000
at Chansellorvile; $1,000 held in check
two days by 10000 at Antietam; $4,000
retaining the field uncertainty against 49,
Chickimauga and beleaguered by 10000
at Chattanooga; 10000 to defeat the in
vesting line OF 10000 at Nashville, and
finally 100000 to overcome $4,000 in a
years strugge in Virginia."
Pursuing this same line of thought, Cen
eral Palfrey, for long time the colonel
of the Twentieth Massachusetts reg ment,
in his volume on IAN ietam and FEEDER
icksburg," says on page lZ5: Ibid the
southern men fight better than the north
ern men, and ii they did, why did they?
These questions are interesting, but they
with diffidence. There .an be no
doubt about the proposition that greater
results were habitually achieved by GER
tain number of thousands or tens of thou
sands Of Lees army than by an equal,
number of the Army of the Potomac. The
reason for this is not to be found in any
difference OF patriotic zeal in the two
that the different modes of life at
the south and at the north, made
the southern soldiers more fond
of fighting than the northern men.
Not TO mention the intenser and more pas
sionate nature, and the comparatively
lawless (not to speak invidiously) life at
the south, where the population was scat
tered, and the gun came ready to hand,
made the southern man apter soldier than
the peaceful. prosperous, steady-going re-
cruit from the north. The southerners
showed that they felt the gaudium GER
taminis-with the northerner it was differ
ent. Tney were ready to obey orders;
they were ready to do the work to which
they had set their hands; they were ready
to die in heir tracks, if need be, but they
did not go to battle as TO feast. With
officers and men it was the same. They
did not like fighting. Sheridan, Hancock,
Humphreys. Kearney. Custer, Barlow and
such as they were exceptions, but the rule
was otherwise.
Another reason may probably be found
in the needy condition which was common
among the southerners. Their stomachs
we're not seldom empty. their backs and
feet ill-clothed and il-shod, while the
northern soldiers were abundantly pro-
vided with everything.
These are not our words, but the words
of two most distinguished generals of the
United States army.
We have backed up every fact we have
used in this article, by reference to the
authority and page, and if Colonel Dunkel-
berger or any of his critical friends wish to
examine these authorities, we will be glai
to show the book and page, now in the city
library.
We accept all the results of the war
fully, and we are certainly entitled to de-
mand that the truth shall be told about