The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1895-02-07

and organized them into an improvised
division, with base of operations on a
line of the Little Tennessee River, COM
pleting for all practical purposes line
for military operations across the len
nessee Valley from the Cumberland TO
the Smoky Mountains.
Further occupation Of the Valley
would result in a continuous conflict be-
tween the Union forces and the Confed-
crate advance for supremacy, which was
impracticable for the Union forces on
account Of railroad communication being
severed at Loudon with Knoxville.
Transportation was only effected by the
transfer with wagun-trains across the
pantoon bridge of all supplies.
The commissary supply was
ABOUT EXHAUSTED
In the Sweet Water Valley, except the
sick-wheat. Long hauls from the mount
ain coyes would be hazardous,
REQUIRING AN INCREASED FORCE
to maintain. The first occupation being
for supplies, all had been obtained that
were desirable.
Ii not being the policy of Gen. Burn
side to reduce has force by indecisiye
engagements beyond the point of neces-
sity, upon the report OF Gen. White OF
these facts, Gen. Burnside ordered him
to vacate the south side and maintain
h,r l,,,oe -, 4lo ,,o,.b s,la &c sba Ion
nessee River, Gen. Sanders's cavalry
forces maintaining their lines on the
Little Tennessee and observing the
movements of the enemy south in the
valley.
The disposition of the forces was as
follows: Kingston already fortified by
Col. Moore's First Brigade, Second DI-
vision, Twenty-thWd Corps, reinforced
by Col Byrd's East Tennessee Brigade;
Col. Chapin's Second Brigade, Second
Division, Twenty-third Corps, north Of
Tennessee River, opposite Loudon; Gen.
Sanders's Cavalry Division, on the
Little Tennessee River; the Second Di-
vision, Ninth Corps, at Lenoir Station,
within easy supporting distance of Gen.
Whites forces, commanded by Gen.
Potter constituting a base for future
military operations.
/ have not the precise date at hand
Of the evacuation. About the 25th Of
October, 1868, Gen. White personally
ordered the writer to assign the troops
to their positions, and cut and swing the
pont0on to the north bank Of the river.
No disposition had been made of the
railroad engine that Comrade Sefried
referred to. In the time allotted to the
movement of troops it was impossible to
track it across the pontoon. / learned
from authenticated sources that the Con
federate citizens had conspired to run it
back to the Confederate lines then
ordered The engineer TO put on full
head of steam, couple up the train, and
move slowly toward the railroad abut-
ment, pull the throttle wide open, then
step of.
When Gen. Burnside demanded. an
explanation Of Tic mad leap of that
engine and train into the Tennessee
River. they were dumb.
Gen. Stevenson advanced his division
from the Hlawassee to line Of the
Tennessee River on the south side, with
Headquarters at Loudon, before Nov. /,
1863. They not having repaired the
railroad bridge across the Hiawassee,
his communication was not complete
with Gen. Bragg's army, while Gen.
Whites railroad communications were
complete with Knoxville; the Tennessee
River being a natural defense imposed
between the opposing forces. Thus
matters remained until Gen. Longstreet's
advance relieved Gen. Stevenson, pre-
parstory to LOngstreets invasion Of East
Tennessee.