The Universalist. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1884-1897, 1895-01-12

and that all conclusions that we reach
by their use, are discredited by the
weakness and limitations that natur-
ally and universally attach to the fac
ulties themselves.
Modern Agnosticism had it's or
igin in the philosophy of Kant. This
eminent metaphysician attributes to
man the power of reason in two diff
ferent relations; the one is a specu-
lative reason; the other is a practi-
cal reason; and the principles of
both adapted and applied by the
judgment. The speculative reason is
conversant with what man can know;
the practical reason with what man
ought to do. According to Kant the
speculative reason does not give man
knowledge of God, but on the con-
trary expressly involves the impossi-
bility of such knowledge. On the
other hand he asserts that the prac-
tical reason gives to man the recog-
milton OF God, as necessary postu-
late for proper moral action. Reason.
therefore, according to Kant, both de-
MES to man any probability of
knowledge of the infinite God and
at the same time affords him knowl-
edge of God rs necessary to the ex-
istence of moral action and moral
character On the one hand he ex-
pressly affirms the impossibility of
any conception of the infinite, and on
the other palms upon man certain
fiction under the name of a concep-
tion of the infinite. The latter he
does, not because the existence of an
Infinite Being is an absolute truth,
but in order that man may exist as a
moral being.
This theory of Kant destroys the
unity of the human mind by separat-
ing the speculative and practical rea-
son, and arraying mans moral against
his intellectual nature. 1t also de-
stroys our confidence in the conclu-
sions of mans reason by making these
conclusions positively contradict each
other. 1t removes the very founda
tions of all true philosophy and re-
ligion by impeaching the veracity of
mans reason, and undermining our
confidence in our own rational and
moral powers. If the conclusion of
the speculative reason is true when it
denies to man the possibility of
knowing God as the infinite Creator
and Father, how can we trust the con
clusions of the practical reason when
it affirms we must know God or NOR
al action is impossibles
The Agnosticism of Sir William
Hamilton contradicts one of the fun
damental axioms of his own philoso-
ply. He holds that man cannot
know the infinite, at the same time
that he affirms as logical axio n and
self evident truth, "That the knowl
edge of opposites is one." Thus he
says we cannot know what is long
without knowing what is short; we
cannot know what is tall without
,lo4 =
We know what is virtue only by
knowing what is vice. Now if this
axiom be true and this principle be
self-evident, it follows, = that we
know the Infinite or we can not know
the finite, that we know the uncon-
ditioned or we cannot know the con-
ditioned, that we know the absolute
or we do not know the limited. 1t is
thus evident that the practical appli-
cation of this axiom destroys the ag-
nosticism which affirms that man can
not know God. Hamilton argues that
because we cen not know the infinite
and absolute perfectly that, therefore.
we do not know him in any sense.
This logic would prove that we do not
know anything-that we have no
knowledge-for certainly we do not
know anything perfectly.
DIR. Mansel, as the disciple of Ham
ilton, in his work on the Limits of
Religious Thought applies theagnos-
ticism of Hamilton's philosophy to
the doctrines of Christian Theology.
This he does with the avowed pur-
pose of defending the Christian relig-
ion from the assaults of modern
skepticism by showing that the OBJ
iections to Christianity grew out of
the limitations of mans knowing fac
ulties and not out of the revelations
of truth made in the teaching of
Christ The result of this effort,
though kindly intended and ably
prosecuted, has not benefited, but in
jured Christianity by creating deep
er, wider, darker skepticism than it
was intended to remove. To assail
the power of the human mind to