The Anaconda standard. [volume] (Anaconda, Mont.) 1889-1970, 1895-04-28


tum, otherwise had never been doubt
ed by the department. For this rea-
SON the first reports OF the occupation
OF Corinto received at the department
from unofflcial sources was discredited
and doubts expressed as to their ac-
curacy. The secretary had been un-
able to obtain any definite information
from his own agents as to the action
OF the British. probably for the reason
that Mr.. Baker. our minister to MIC
aragua. Is not at present In that coun-
try and there is no charge at Managua-
The situation at Corinto is now re-
garded as ominous of serious trouble.
for the dispatches indicate that the
Nicaraguans are disposed to resist any
further advance by the British. The
information reaching here Is to the ef-
feet that the Nicaraguans may further
isolate the British at Corinto by burn
ing the bridges across the lagoon sepa-
rating the town from the main land.
The British position is said to be very
bad from a strategic standpoint. The
town is practically on an island. being
separated from the main land by
stretch of marshy ground. This Is
traversed with bridges. and without
them Corinto is cut or from the shore.
The Nicaraguans have retired to the
shore end of the bridges. and those
well informed on the situation believe
that If the British make any movement
to cross the lagoon. the bridges will be
burned and the little band of Nicara-
guam troops will make a stand against
further encroachments. The British
are evidently apprehensive of trouble
on this score, as indicated by the cable
gram from Colon, showing that the
three vessels, the Royal Sovereign, the
Wild Swan and Satellite have been so
placed as to command the town with
their guns. 1t is probable that this dis
position has been made so as to In
sure the occupying forces. numbering
about 400 armed men, from an attack
from the Nicaraguans rather than
with any deliberate purpose of bonn
harding the town.
The news of the situation at Corinto
created a sensation here. and particu-
larly in the state department Sir
Julian Pauncefote, the British ambas-
sador, came to the department, and
after remaining in private consultation
with Secretary Gresham for short
time, the two repaired to the war de-
partment to consult with Secretary
Lamont The latter was absent at the
time, but coming in later. repaired inn
mediately to the state department and
talked over matters with the president.
Later on the news came to the depart
ment by the associated press that the
Nicaraguan government had made
sharp move by declaring Corinto
closed port. This was evidently a dis
turbing element in the calculations,
for Assistant Secretary Uhl was at
once dispatched to the British. embasoys
to confer with Sir Julian Pauncefote,
the most unusual proceeding In de-
partmental etiquette. There can be no
doubt that the action OF the Nicara-
guam government in declaring Corinto
a closed port has seriously complicated
the most troublesome question, and
even IL there is no resort to hostilities
at present, 1T opens a prospect OF
alarming events in the future, which,
in fact, are even regarded as likely to
involve the United States directly in
the affair, in spite of the earnest dis
position of the administration to avoid
the ENHANCEMENT. The action means
that no goods can now be entered at
Corinto, a port which has heretofore
received over half the imports into the
country, without violating the national
law of Nicaragua. The British may
collect duties If any goods enter the
place, but the latter would be liable to
seizure the moment they crossed the
British lines into the interior. They
must do this to find market. for the
coast, being unhealthy. is thinly popu-
lated, and the great consuming class
of the population lives in the interior.
The first effect of the decree closing
the port, therefore, will probably be to
divert nearly all the import trade of
the place to San Juan del Sur, or per-
haps Realajo, a seaport near by. for II
is improbable that many merchants
will take the chances of getting their
goods into Nicaragua through the Brit
ish lines under the circumstances. In
this case, the length OF the stay Of the
British in Corinto is problematic. But
another consideration arises at this
point, for our government has been as
sured that the occupation will not be
permanent, and, indeed, the first para
graph of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ex-
pressly pledges Great Britain against
any occupation of Nicaraguan terri
tory. So the problem will arise how
to collect the indemnity within rea-
sonable time. This may be settled
summarily by simply extending the
occupation and blockade beyond Corin-
to, SO as to include all OF the Pacific
ports. From the disposition shown by
the Nicaraguans at present, this can
be done only by force. and is likely TO
add very largely to the expense in
Cured in the collection OF the In
demnity. which items will surely be
added by the British to the original
sum. This course. moreover. will seri-
ously embarrass the commerce of the
United States. and on this point Great
Britain has given Secretary Gresham
certain assurances of the manner in
which the British may be sure of at
tanning their ends by a prompt declar-
alton Of war and an invasion of Mica
ragua. involving the capture of the
capitol and the imposition upon the