The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1895-01-27
About two hundred


mules were captured. -,
General Lee whose goodwill valued
much higher than Sheridahs. was very
much pleased by what ! mad done, ana
considered IL of sufficient Importance TO
be specially reported to the secretary Oh
War.
"Chaffins Bluff. August l6, ls5i.
Hon. ]. A. Seldom, Secretary OF war;
Colonel Mostly reports that ne attack
ed the enemy's supply train near Berry
vile ON the 18th, captured and destroyed
over seventy-nye loaded wagons, and Sc
cured over two hundred prisoners, includ-
Ing several officers; between 20 and w
mules and horses; upwards OF 20 peer
cattle, and many valuable stores.
siderable number OF the enemy kiiled anu
wounded. fIis loss was TWO kilieo anu
three wounded.
..R. T.. LEE. General
IN this affair / had my whole battalion
five companies-with mountain ho"l'zer.
A heavy mist hung over the 'ahey tha'
morning; the attack was about sunr'.%'
The train was heavily guarded by infantry
and cavalry; We .ould not carry OF one
third that we captured, and / only report
ed 10 General Lee what we got away win.
That day we carried the BATTALION battle
flag. 1t was not inscribed win Skull
and cross-bones, as romancers nave
told, but was the same nag that JACK
son had borne in triumph through the
Valley. Stockton Terry, OF LyhchDuts'
was my coior-bearer. Sheridan seemed 10
think that it was not fair Tor three nun
dred men to attack three thousand IN
fog.
PARIY's mANoEUvREs.
Early demonstrated several days In
Sheridan's front about Halltown, but he
was In an impregnable position, which he
could not leave. Kershaw's division of
infantry, with a small force OF cavalry
was left facing Sheridan on the Winches-
ter pike: Early, with the remainder OF
his army, marched on towards
the vicinity of Shepardstown, ana
Fitz. Lee, with his cavalry, was
sent to threaten d crossing of the Potomac
at Williamsport The object was to
frighten the North with the spectre OF
another invasion. The audacity of this
movement can only be justified by Its sue
cess. Kershaw was south; the bulk OF
the Confederate army was north of Sheri-
dan. a. similar vancouver resulted IN
the ruin Of the allies Vt Austerlitz, anu
the defeat Of Marmont al Salamanca. 1t
IS unaccountable why Sheridan did not
take advantage of what, under ordinary
circumstances, would have been an inn
prudent extension Of the Confederate line.
If he had thrown the bulk of his army
against KershaW, and then pivoted around
on his right. he would have been in pos
session OF Early's line of retreat. He
stood still and telegraphed Grant: THE
enemy succeeded this evening in getting
Shepardstown. / don't know whether
they Will cross or not. i will not give
up this place, and hope TO be able 10
strike the enemy divided" Why didn't
he strike? The enemy was already d.
vided. He said to Halleck: Merritt was
followed, AMI had 10 leave Shepardstown
and fall back here. Custer crossing to the
north side at Shepardstown. 1t Is pos
sibe that / may have TO cross the river
to the north side, should the enemy
cross"
Nearly all Of his cavalry was sent over
the river TO prevent Esrlys crossing. At
night Wilson's division crossed tne Po-
tomac on the bridge at Harper's Ferry,
and marched north to Boonsboro Gap. in
the South Mountain, to keep Early from
going to Washington. The fact of near
ly all his cavalry having been sent over
the river in advance of Early proves that
If he had crossed Sheridan intended 10
take the prudent course of keeping him in
his front, and not attacking him in rear.
lie would have entirely separated his in
fantry from his cavalry. \ bold COM
mander. instead of opposing, would nave
been glad 10 build a bridge for the Con-
federate to cross on he would have left
the South Mountain pass open so that
they would have had al unobstructed
march. He ought 10 have remembered
the m1xim Of Napoleon. never to interfere
with your enemy when he is making a
false move II Early lad passed east
of the mountains force larger than his
could in few hours have h6en collected
already have been in his rear. The Con-
federates would hen have met the fate
of the Roman legions in the Caudine
Forks. 1t is plain from Grants Dispatch
es that he was impatient for the want
of some positive success in the Valley.
lie had seized the Weldon railroad and
was anxious Tor Sheridan to march into
the interior Of Virginia and close all com
munication between Richmond and the
South. The isolation CT Richmond would
end the war. But, so far from making
any progress in that direction, Sheridan
stin rested on the Potomac. with the bulk
Of his cavalry in Maryland. General
Grant thought that General Lee would be
compelled to call the troops from the Val
ley to defend his own lines. He said 10
Sheridan:
Watch closely, and II YOU find this
theory correct, push with all vigor. Give
the enemy no rest and if it is possible to
follow 10 the Virginia Central railroad.
follow that far DO all the damage to
railroads and crops you can"
A few days before he had told Halleck
of the exhausted condition of General
Lees army.
They are now so extended" he said
that they are forced TO keep every man
on the watch, and. from accounts of pris-
oners, are running their men to death
shifting them from one place TO another.
WHAT SHERIDAN WAS WAITING FOR
To defeat the Confederate army and
stay in the Valley would not aid Grant 5
operations any more than simply TO hold
II there without defeating II. Grant had
told Hunter that he would be satisfied If
he detained a force equal TO his own
there II the small Confederate force
could keep the great armada OF Sheridan
where it then was, on the defensive, Cen
eral Lees purposes would be accomplish
ed. Early drew back TO the vicinity Of
Winchester; Sheridan advanced TO Ber-
ryville. For three weeks the armies faced
each other. There was no decisive event.
Sheridan was waiting, he said, for Early
10 send part of his troops 10 Richmond
lie ought 20 have tried 10 prevent this
being done. Kershaw then was more
needed by General Lee than by Early.
At last the opportunity came. Kershaw
left the Valley. General Lee had not or
dered IT. he had left IL to Early's dis
erection 10 retain him. No doubt Early
thought that he could hold Sheridan there
without Kershaw. and he could have done
so without fighting a battle.
THE FIGHT AT wISCHEsrEE.
On September 11th. In a letter TO Early