The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1895-11-08

/ Of SIl45 90, and for windows, doors
astragals, trausoms, halusters, sash,
veutilators, blinds and sand, of the
value of Sl646 20. The objection 70
! the allowance of these items is, that
| they were not covered 10y the desert D.
! ton of the materials in the notice OF
\ the claim of lien required by the
statute.
In the notice the lien was claimed
| 90 for materials furnished, TO wit, lum-
\ Der and hardware" The materials in
question do lot come within the de-
\ finitions Of the terms "lumber" aud
hardware" as found in the Century
and Standard dictionaries, and as
given in this case with refer
euce TO these particular materials
| by persons familiar with these terms
as used in these islands the architect
/ aud the contractor under the building
! contract in question and the manager
OF the plaintiffs business. This was
| also apparently the finding of fact by
the trial Judge, who disposed of the
point on the question of law. The
argument Is that the statute is sutfi
GENTLY complied with by a claim for
materials" only, and that the words
lumber and hardware" may be
treated as surplusage.
A partial enumeration which pur-
ports to be complete enumeration is
worse than none at all, because it is
misleading See Whittier V. Mill
Co., SO Am. st. Rep. (WaSh.( 149.
And even if a claim merely for ina
terials" were sufficient, there would
be considerable ground Tor limiting a
person who did not make such claim,
to the claim actually made. He
ought not 10 expect more than he
claims, especially If his claim is mis-
leading.
But, is a claim merely for "materi-
als'' sufficient? The statute requires
that the mo ice shall set forth the
amount of the claim, the labor or ma
terial furnished, a description of the
property sufficient to identity the
same, aud any other matter necessary
to clear understanding of the same"
Many statutes elsewhere upon this
subject require a full or itemiZed &C
count, but our statute, like some 9th
ers, does not go 50 far In Lonkey V.
Wells, Is New. 27I, the statute re-
quired the material man to fl e u claim
"cOntainlDg statement OF his de-
mand." The lien was claimed for
material, to wit: lumber, doors,
sash, blinds, holdings, castings and
mill work " The Court held this
sufficient description, as it showed the
"nature and char acter' of the de-
mand. That our own statute does not
require a full itemized state
quirement of Section 5, that "the
defendant shall DE served with de-
tailed specification of the claim, pro-
vided that no such specification shall
have been furnished before proceed
ings were commenced"
1t seems to Us, however, that the
nature or character of the materials
should be shown. The statute re-
quires the notice to "set forth
the material furnished" This means
more than that the claim may be sim.
ply for material" 1t means at least
that the class or kind or nature of the
material should be shown. The pro-
vision that the notice shall set forth
"auy other matter necessary to
clear understanding of the same"
also bears out this construction.
While the words descriptive of the
materials furnished should be con-
strued literally, yet no materials
should be included which do not fair
ly come within the generally accept
ed definitions of those words.
The statute Is artificial, arbitrary.
1t gives h material-mau exceptional
privileges, but it gives these only on
condition that he shall comply with
the terms of the statute. The statute
provides that the Glen shall not at
tach" untless notice, of the character
described, is filed. As has been al
ready said, the statute is to be strict
ly construed. 1t is in the power of
the material man to give proper des-
cription of the materials he has sold.
1t is reasonable to require him to do
so, in view of the extraordinary favOrs
extended to him. A nd this should be
required in justice to the owner, pur-
chasers, incumbraucers, other maze
rial-men and all other persons whose
interests may be affected by the lien.
The reason has greater force when, as
in this case, the materials are fur
nished, not to the owner himself, but
to the contractor and perhaps without
any knowledge on the part of the
owner. See Russell ". Bell, A Pa. St
A; PhiIl., Nee Liens, Sec. $40 If the
lien were claimed by the contractor
for all the labor and material furnish
ed for a building under an entire con-
tract, a more general description
might perhaps be sufficient under the
statute.
We find DO ground for disturbing
the judgment as against the defendant
but as against the defend
ant Hawaiian Lodge the judgment is
set aside and new trial ordered.