The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1895-05-09
THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

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edit the New York Times and Erening
Post to belittle the Monroe Doctrine to
the uttermost. They are simply follow
ing their natural un-American instincts
in doing this. They make much of the
limitations of the original utteranee of
President Monroe, and elaborate on
Secretary Stewards apparent indifference
to the principles, when Louis Napoleon
invaded Mexico. As to the first, Presi-
dent Monroe went as far at the time rs
the occasion demanded. He said all
that was necessary to say then, and
wisely said no more. His utterances
struck the popular heart, and at once
became regarded as an essential part of
the polity of the United States As a
living principle must, the Monroe Doc
trine has grown and expanded, so that
it has applications wider and more bind
ing than when first laid down. To try
to cramp it down to the limits of its
original letter is about as sensible as to
insist that the Republican party's prin-
ciples must be confined to its original
declaration against introduction Of slav-
cry into the Territories.
As to Secretary Stewards position,
every man of the generation of the war
fully understood it. Louis Napoleon
took advantage of the rebellion to invade
Mexico and put an Austrian Prince
upon the throne. This was the most
outrageous defiance of the Monroe Doc
trine, and felt to be so by every man.,
North and South. But we could do
nothing. Every energy was absorbed in
the effort to put down the rebellion. One
of our greatest fears, and one of the
greatest hopes of the rebels, were that
England and France would recognize
the Southern Confederacy. To avoid
that calamity Secretary Seward, as was
right in the emergency, paltered with
the knavish French Emperor about the
Monroe Doctrine. He expressed indif-
ference in the matter, and temporized to
keep the French off our backs until we
could get the rebels down. But the
moment the tide began to definitely turn
las soon as Gettysburg and Vicksburg
we're won-Secretary Stewards tone on
the Monroe Doctrine began to harden,
and it was not long until he was writing
to Paris about the United States "view-
ing with great anxiety the presence of
the French troops in Mexico"
After Appomattox there is no doubt
that Lee was anxious to join his troops
with those of the Union in a march into
Mexico, which would have sent the
French out on the double-quick. Grant
favored this, if the conditions could be
made favorable. Lee could lead his
men anywhere. His Government had
been destroyed, and they looked to him
for direction. Grant, of course, could
only do as ordered. Seward felt that
the French Emperor should be given
the chance to retire with some show of
grace, and so stayed Grants willing
hand. All the same, Phil Sheridan was
hurried off to the Rio Grande, and a
large force speedily followed. Sheridan
took the artillery, muskets, and NUM-
tions which the surrendering rebels
turned over, and deposited them at con-
venient places along the Rio Grande,
where the patriotic Mexicans could cross
and get them. He disposed of his forces
in such a way that the French COM
mander found it prudent to withdraw
from the line of the Rio Grande and
take up more defensible position far
in the interior. Everything was ready,
the moment the time should arrive, for
grand swoop upon the French which
would have swept them out of Mexico.
There were 100000 tried and sea-
soned soldiers-North and South-who
would have been only too glad to help,
if their help was needed. Louis Napo-
leon had sense enough to see this and
get his troops back home.
That was the way the American peo-
pie felt about the Monroe Doctrine then.
Chief Justice Chase said, in regard