The Black Hills union. [volume] (Rapid City, Pennington County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1889-1904, 1895-05-10
THE HOLY TERROR CASE.
The Verdict Set Aside by Judge VIM.
rdn

The hearing on the motion OF defen-
dants for a new trial,in the Holy Terror
case was finished on Saturday afternoon
after which Judge Gardner rendered his
decision sustaining the motion of the
defendants and granted a new trial.
The following taken from the Rapid
City Journal OF May 5th is what the
court says in announcing his decision:
GENTLEMEN: When the jury whose
verdict is now under consideration was
called to try certain issues IN this case it
was in order that their verdict might en-
tighten the conscience and judgment OF
the court as to those issues. After care
fully reviewing their work, I am com
PEELED to say that the light cast into my
mind and conscious thereby is OF SO
lur1d and CHASTITY a hue that can only
call 1T mere darkness VISIBLE" After
hearing the proof and viewing the pre-
misses, [ confess this verdict is to me an
uniathomable mystery which | can only
explain by assuring that the intellec-
tual processes Of Judges and juries differ
by celestial diameters." However, my
respect for the Jury system and for the
individual gentlemen who constituted
this jury, is SO high that [ should yield
even my present positive CONVICTION to
the Judgment OF the twelve men who
were summoned to my aid, were there
no extraneous facts and circumstances
trendlng to shake my confidence IN their
verdict. Many l~ntimations have reached
my ears, by the voluntary communica-
lions OF jurors and by the aftidayits
stricken frnm the record, that this YER
dict was not the mature, calm and
honest judgement OF a part, at least, Of
the jury;and while / have endeavored to
Danish from my thought all these mat
ters this verdict seems SO r%epugnant to
the clearest and most convincing cyl
dencc that I am forced to believe that it
flowed from the tainted spring Of preju-
dice, sympthy or passon, rather than
from the calm sources OF reason and
judgment. The closing argument Of
counsel for the prevailing party is
charged to be the exciting cause OF this
passion and prejudice. In my Judgment
the learned and eloquent counsel who
closed the argument INDUCED IN many
highly improper and lnf1ammatory
lights OF eloquence in which excessive
zeal for his cause bore him far beyond
the utmost limits OF the record. 1t has
before been nv disagreeable duty to set
aside verdicts which I believed to be
right, by reason OF the Incorporate and
unwarranted remarks OF counsel. |
have, after careful investigation, become
thoroughly convinced that the rights Of
counsel IN argument are circumscribed
within certain fixed and we'll defined
lines which courts have no power to
modify or extend and which counsel
must pass at their peril. 1t may pos
siblyb be the duty of trial judges to watch
the course OF argument more closely
than l do, and more vlgilantIy restrain
counsel within the limits OF legitimate
argument. 1t has not been my custom
in the past, nor Will it be in the future,
to arbitrarily interfere with the utmost
freedom OF argument. | usually hear
but little OF these addresses to Jurles,
being engaged IN the difficult and deli
cate task OF preparing instructions for
the jury. l take 1T for granted that the
lawyer at the bar knows what his re-
cord is and if he sees tit to depart from
1T he must do SO at his peril. A Judge is
not a schoolmaster.