The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1895-08-31
A FEAST OF PHILOSOPHY.
Professors Royce, LIE Conte
and Mezes on the "Con-
ception of God"
SOME DISTINGUISHED VISITORS.
Fifty-Second Meeting of the UNI
versity of CALIFORNIA; Philo-
sophical Union.

BERKELEY, CAL, Aug. 30.-It was an
august assem- blage that filled Harmon
Gymnasium last night TO listen to the
words of profound philosophical reason
ing. Many distinguished visitors from
various parts of the State were present,
and the large platform was filed with
regents, professors and intimate friends of
the speakers of the evening. The occasion
of this great gathering was the ffty-second
regular meeting of the University of Cali
fornia Philosophical Union, and those who
formed the central point of interest were
DR.. Josiah Royce, o. G. rs, professor of
philosophy at Harvard University; DR..
Joseph LIE Conte, professor of geology at
the University of California, and DR.. Sidney
Mezes, q. G. a. professor of philosophy at
the University of Texas. During the past
year the union under whose auspices the
exercises were held has been studying DR..
Royce's book on "The Religious Aspect of
Philosophy"
The address last evening was the first of
a series of four to be given by DR.. Royce,
and the topic chosen for his initial paper
was the Conception of God" Following
the remarks o DR.. Royce were the COM
ments by DR.. Mezes and Dr. lie Conte.
= The exercises were opened with few
words of welcome by Professor Howison,
president of the Philosophical Union, who
spoke of the past work OF the union, its
present prosperity and purposes for the
future 'sThis," said he, lis the first meet
ing of the kind we have ever held and it is
our ardent desire to perpetuate the prac-
tice. The next one will be held on the
evening before next commencement, and
tla hox, aIraa RI Q6 &C
US is Professor John Watson of Kings Col
lege, Queenstown"
Briefly stated, Professor Royce's argu.
ment was as follows:
1t is best to formulate ones philosophical
conception OF God by means of an attempt to
prove the existence of God. A preliminary
definition OF the conception OF GOD may, now
ever, be suggested in terms of the divine Om-
niscience; viz, thus: By God is meant being
who thoroughly knows and com prehends the
world; so comprehends it that the world, of
which we are so ignorant, contains from the
divine point of view no mysteries whatever.
Can one prove that such a being exists?
We can only know what our experience indi-
Gates, and as our human experience depends
upon our physical organization as beings hav-
ing just these senses, just this nervous struc-
ture, just these sensations, it may be urged
that we can never come to know any genuine
or absolute reality whatever, and that we can,
therefore, still less ever come to know that this
reality contains any 0mniscient Being. But we
we first define what We mean by reality.
When taken in an ordinary and relative
| sense, reality simply means that which o more
perfect experience than ours would have
present to 1t. And when taken in an absolute
sense, reality would still mean simply what a
| perfected, an absolutely connected, coherent,
| self-possessed experience would have present
to it. The conceptions "Absolute Reality" and
IAN Experience that knows Absolute Reality"
prove upon analysis to be correlatiye. The
ultimate reality, whatever it is, can genuinely
a. ST n object
ultimate type OF experience. Unless there is
such ultimate type OF experience, there is
no such thing as a genuine reality al all.
But it may now be asserted by one who
opposes the belief in the existence Of an Omnis-
cient Being, that what we are really ignorant
of,Ias limited and finite beings, is this: Whether
| there is any genuine or ultimate reality in the
universe at all. All our human experience is
limited, relative, finite, fragmentary; accord
ingly, all the realities that we human beings
| directly or Immediately know are limited,
| transient, and only relatively real.
But if one asserts that all the actual expert
| ence in the universe is finite, fragmentary and
is no ultimate reality at all, he must of neccs-
| ity still assume that this whole universe of
finite experience, thus supposed to be actual.
has in its totality an actual constitution of
| some definite sort. This actual constitution of
| the whole world OF experience must be viewed,
| however, something real and accordingly as
| something experienced, known, ]. e., present
| to the consciousness of some alI-embracing
being. But hereupon the experience of this
! all-embracing being would OF necessity have to
| be once more defined as that very self-deter-
| mined organized absolute experience OF which
| we were in search.
But in this way the effort to define the
| universe es not containing an Omniscient
Being proves to be self-contradictory. And, on
| the other hand, the effort to define what we
mean by asserting that human experience is
| limited and fragmentary, and that man is
| ignorant of the absolute reality, proves to be
| the very effort that leads both to the concep-
ton of God as the omniscient Being, and to
the proof that the reality of this conception
cannot be rejected without selfcontradiction.
| From the attribute of omniscience, however,
| other divine attributes will follow, and, in
conclusion, the identity of the foregoing con.
ception of God with the essence of the Chris.
tian conception is suggested.
Following the lecture came a criticism
by Professor Mezes, who said:
agree that Professor Royce has proved that
an ultimate Being exists, that he is fully con-
scious, that his experience is organized-i. e.
that within his experience there are to be
found no unanswered questions, no unsatished
desires. But cannot admit that Professor
Royce has proved that this Being possesses
worth and dignity. cannot agree that this
Being is entitled to be called God.
Professor Royce gives no warrant for belief
in the existence of absent facts, especially no
warrant for belief IN the existence of those
facts we call our fellow-beings. This leaves
our fellow-beings as improved assumptions,
and we have no phiosophic right to assert that
huCn mere assumptions nave q place IN the
experience of the inclusive self. Now, allow
ing, for the sake of argument, that the reality
of outer or physical facts is not marred by this
philos0phic destruction of our fellow beings,
We readily see that the physical universe, and
so much spiritual fact rs any one of US may at
any moment himself directly experiences. e.,
his present problems, desires, etc.--exhausts
the list of we'll established reality. Only,
then, with such physical facts, and with the
meager allotment of spiritual life just men,
toned, can we assert that the inclusive mind
is furnished.
The second part of my criticism may best be
introduced by reminding you that the con.
tents that can be assigned to the ultimate
Being, over and above the facts that can be
established as just indicated. must con sist of
so much experience az answers legi, mate
questions. But when we ask what sort Of ex-
perience answers these questions; or, again,
what questions are legitimate, we get into Diff
fculties. question that certain facts plague
with. may seem nonsensical to B, though B
appreciates the facts fully; solution that
seems unsatisfying to A may entirely satisfy B.
In word, whether questions suggested by
facts are legitimate, and whether solutions are
satisfactory, does not depend wholly on
such facts and solutions, but depends, also in
part on the temperament OF the minds that
ask and answer.
II we wish to avoid materialism, we must ad-
NIT in logic, as well as in ethics, an element of
personal caprice. Accordingly, not skno wing
the temperament of the inclusive self, and
owing to its element of irredueible caprice,
hoin 10 m hat TOW