The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1895-10-24
1oyGsTREETs cRITIcIsM OF LEE.
. Review of Gettysburg, Showing
1ougstreet's Fault in That Battle.

IQmgsfreeIs EuuAH IN Innt Battle.
r5ftor of the Morning News: If the let
co. of Virginia Stuart Mosby-Coleman,
I'm washington, in the Atlanta Journal
81 saturday, 18th, correctly reports
- interview with Gen. Longstreet, then
,ra "Old Warhorse" has put himself be-
hind breastworks and thrown down the
.-.-e. The writer says Gen. Longstreet
Ss9rqres Gen. Robert +. Lee was a poor
crr1ander. and made many mistakes.
al. evidences his poor generaiship by en-
-1azizing the battle Of Gettysburg as
Sow lei us hunt up the record and turn
M che search light, and see how far facts
Justify Gen. LOngstreet's estimate Of Gen.
F-rst, let us consider Charlottesville.
Tna easy. yet bloody victory of Fred
- ksburg assured, Gen. Lees position
rs= safe from a second attack in front,
a-7 he would not endanger his position or
army by detaching Gen. LOngstreet with
fra larger part of his corps for service in
Southeastern Virginia. II any benefit ac-
rr1li to the confederate cause by Long
streets operations around Suffolk, history
does not reveal it,
Hooker was apprised of Longstreet's
absence. He had recruited and disciplined
its army up to numbers and efficiency
fha Potomac army had never before at
tanned, so much so that ne dld not con-
eiler his claim for superiority as empty,
when he declared his army the finest
army on the planet" AS a good general
Heved prompt action on his part would re-
e1Ir in the destruction Of Lees army.
ms plans had so much the assurance of
success, that he did not THINK mis- dlSpatch
~ Halleck bombastic when he wrote the
rebel army is now the legitimate property
of the army of the Potomac.
Everyone cOnVersant with the details of
the wonderful battle of Charlottesville,
remembers how Hooker threw SedgewicS
with 10000 men to menace and attack
Lees right and rear below F'redericks-
burg. while with SO 900 men he crossed the
Rappahannock above Fredericksburg de-
termined to maneuver Lee out of his en-
trenched position, and force him to fight
in the open field. Fifty-three thousand
three hundred and three gray soldiers
constituted the total force of the wonder
ful Army of Northern Virginia, while
l3370s blue troops marched out Of their
winter quarters to envelope and destroy
the hopes of the cOnfederacy.
1t is useless to go into detail. The Won
derful tactics and genius of the great
Nirgiuian never We're more conspicuous or
shone with brighter luster than in this
mighty combat Yet Gen. Longstreet was
not there else there would never have
escaped a single blue soldier to tell the
tale of disaster. If history reveals more
magnificent combat and victory, all cir
cumstances considered, then it falls to
appear on its pages.
Let us unveiI facts of Gettysburg. All
students of that great battle know
the confederate successes. of the first
day; 500 prisoners being part Of the
trophies of that day. Longstreets adj
vance OF GOOQS ana Mcl4dW s DIVISIONS
after a hard march, reached Gettysburg at
daylight July ?. Hood was advanced to
the extreme right with orders 10 follow
up the Emmetsburg pike, and attack the
enemy up that road. Through his scouts
ana his own observations he saw that he
could turn Little Round Top and seize
the key point of the battle field. Hood
dispatched first one, then another stan
officer, with this Information, and asked
permission to utilize his knowledge of
the situation, receiving the logged order
attack up the Emmetsburg pike" he
dashed off to Longstreet to personally urge
that he be allowed to seize the advantage
Longstreet to change Gen. Lees instruc-
tons, but persistently he required Hood
to attack up the Emmetsburg
pike" Those who know the
Great Virginian, who have studied
his character and tactics know that a.
lowance was made by him for contin-
gencies or change in circumstances, and
therefore we must criticise the stolidity
Of Longstreet when Hood, by three staff
officers, then himself fully explained the
situation. students of this, the culmi-
mating field of the civil war, greatly crit
icise LonGstreet and not Lee. II failure
mustb charged upon any one officer,
eran and not upon his commander. Gen.
Lee never claimed perfection, none Of his
screen himself behind the faults OF his
officers. The fruits of Hoods investiga-
ton We're within his reach but by Long
streets persistence, he was forbidden to
appropriate them, and history records Get
tysburg as a repulse to Lee. Readers OF
history, students of facts, are referred to
Hoods Advance and Retreat" and Fitz
Lees Life of Gen. Robert Il. Lee" For
ouch blind adherence to orders and the
loss of the battle Ringing upon it, Ma
pOleon would have cashiered LongstrSet
for the loss of Gettysburg.
Turn now to the Wilderness: Long
streets delay came the nearest to losing
that battle. His orders were to be up
during the night to relieve Heth ana VIII
cox, who, with II 900 men, had wthstood
the savage attacks of Hancock with 1850
troops all day. Longstreet was behind
time, and but for the superb gallantry
Of that magnificent Texas brigade the
Wilderness might have been the grave
Of the confederacy. Again, let US view
the excellence of Gen. Longstreet's abil-
lty for separate command, as evidenced
I'm his campaign against Burnside at Knox
vile. He moved upon that place and at
tempted 20 invest it. 1t has since Deen
shown that if he had promptly assaulted
when he first appeared before the town,
the chances of success would have been
favorable. The delay gave Burnside time
10 strengthen his defenses. When Long
street did assault his effort cost him
700 men, resulting in failure, while ne
inflicted loss of less than 50 upon the
enemy
Bragg's defeat at Missionary Ridge pre-
Guided help from that quarter, SO Long
street was forced to abandon the siege
OF knoxville and march to Virginia to
Sgaln take his place in the Army OF
northern Virginia. Pert.