Evening star., 1895-08-03

Mcclellan suggested to the President that
Lee might prefer to take his army to
washington rather than give battle on the
James. Looking back at the peninsula
campaign. / am constrained to say that it
does seem that Gen. Mcclellan constantly
thought and gave more Importance to the
capture Of Richmond than he did to the
danger of the capture Of Washington by
Lee. The capture Of Richmond. with Lee
still master. would have been nothing,
while the capture of Washington would
have been the closing scene. In his Mary
land campaign Gen. Halleck found it neces-
sary to warn Mcclellan fifteen times that
his movements were such as to endanger
Washington.
Some of McClellan's Ideas.
After the battle of the Antietam Nc
Clellan announced his purpose to fortify
Maryland Heights; to hold Harper's Ferry;
to watch the enemy closely, and to attack
him only If he should again attempt to
cross into Maryland. He wanted to build
double-track suspension bridge and a
permanent wagon bridge across the Po-
tomac at Harpers Ferry: and he was going
to devote the winter to the reorganlzation
of the army and the instruction OF the
new troops; and finally he sent to Gen.
Halleck his ultimatum: my own view Of
the policy to be pursued is to retain in
Washington merely the force necessary to
garrison it, and to send everything avail
able to reinforce this army. The railroads
give us the means of reinforcing Wash
ington, should It be necessary. If am re-
inforced as I ask, and am allowed to take
my own course: I will held myself respon-
sible for the safety of Washington"
T This ultima-um stood for one long month
and all the time the President was beg
ging, praying and ordering him to move
much greater than Lees, and infinitely
better equipped, better fed and better
cared for During Gen. Grants continuous
battles with Lee the stormy weather and
the condition of the roads compelled a
cessation of fighting for about week, and
knowing the hopes the President and Mr..
Stanton had in him, and the necessities for
earnest fghting, directed Gen. Halieck to
ped his movements against Lee Mr.. Stan
ton commented upon this, and said it was
the only way Lee could be beaten.
But Gen. Mcclellan was not allowed to
be responsible for the safety of Washing
ton. That was restriction put upon him
when he started out to meet Lee. The
troops that were designated for the de-
tense Of Washir- gton were taken from his
control to prevent repetition of the penin-
sula danger.
III This City Had Been Taken.
When he said he would have no difficulty
in recovering Washington should 1t be cap
tu1ed, did he mean what would only have
been left of it? for I cannot conceive of
such capture without destruction The
capture of Washington would have meant
the recognition Of the southern confed-
eracy by England, France and Spain, and
this would have resulted in hostile inter-
ventien oy these nations against the fed
erai government. 1t would have meant the
obstruction of the Presidents house and
the great plant by which the money to
carry on the war was produced.
1,! a single torch would have destroyed the
war ana navy departments, the residences
OF all the cabinet members, the navy ward
ana the arsenal The treasury vaults and
the banks would have been looted, the peo-
pie In panic and in flight, the plunderins
of the houses, and the city on fre in everv
olrection This would have been the capi-
tai that he would have recaptured. To
have blown up the Capitol the enemy
would have used million tons of powder.
II they could have gotten 1t. Its great
double dome, then going up, would have
gone down.
In my judgment, the capture of Washing
ton would have closed the war. England,
France and Spain would have rushed on
to Richmond with aid and recognition In
this powerful element at the north and
in Washington would have been glad, and
Washington, the city of magnificent dis
tances, would have been blottel from the
map of the world as the capital of the
great American nation.
That the occasion for the recapture of
Washington did not occur is now seen to
have been best for the north and best for
the south, best for the people and best for
the nation. For this the two .ivil heroes
gave their lives. This is the priceless
legacy which the dead and the living of the
Army of the Potomac finally gave us.
l have often heard Mr.. Stanton speak of
the singular conduct and expressions of Nc
Clellan as to the safety of Washington,
and I have often felt that Mcclellan
seemed to wish to put Washington in
condition that would compel the flight Of
the whole crew." as he called the cabinet
and the President.
Lincoln's Estimate of Mcclellan.
The President, in justification of his act
in placing Mcclellan in command of the
defenses of Washington, after the defeat
of Pope, in a stormy cabinet meeting, said
Il quote from Wells, Lincoln and Seward):
with -etreating and demoralized army
tumbling in upon us, and alarm and panic
in the community, it was necessary that
something should be done. but there seemed
to be no one to do it, He therefore, had
directed Mcclellan, who knew this whole
ground, who was the best organizer in the
army, whose faculty was to organize and
defend, and who would here act upon the
defensive, to take this defeated and shat
tered army and reorganize it.
He knew full well the infirmitiss Of Nc
Clellan, who was not an affirmative man;
was worth little for an onward movement;
but beyond any other officer he had the
confidence of the army, and he could more
efficiently reorganize it and put It in con-
dition than any other general II the Sec
net, would name a general that could do
this as promptly and well. he would ap-
point him. For an active, fighting general,
he was sorry to- say. Mcclellan was a
failure; he had the slows; was lever
ready for battle, and probably never would
be; but for this exigency, when organiza-
ton and defense were needed, he consider
ed him the best man for the service, and
the country must have the benefits of his
talents, though he had behaved badly.
whether changing the plan OF opera
ton (discarding Mcclellan and placing
Pope in command in 'front.' was wise or not
was not now a matter In hand. These
things, right or wrong, had been done
If the administration had erred the coun-
try should not have been made to suffer
nor our brave men been cut down and
butchered. Pope should have been sustain
ed, but he was not. Whatever may have
been said to the contrary, 1t could not be
denied that the army was with Mcclellan.
He had SO skillfully handled his troops
in not getting to Richmond as to retain
their confidence.
TT was humiliating, after what had
transpired and all We knew, to reward
Mcclellan and those who failed to do their
whole duty in the hour of trial, but so it
was Personal considerations must be sac
rifced for the public good There has
been design, purpose in breaking down
Pope, without regard to the consequences
to the country, that is atrocious. 1t is
1yv, hfc hut fh0Ta