The sun., 1895-02-10
The Fall OF Wei-Hai-Wei.

The Fall OF wei-Hai-wei.
Although the defence of the stronghold
at Wei-Hai-Wei, or, rather, Of the island
forts on Liu-KungTao has been more pro-
longed and stubborn than that Of Port
Arthur, thanks to the aid given by the Chi
nese fleet, this fact only brings into stronger
light the Importance Of Japan's victory.
The chief feature OF that triumph seems to
be not the capture Of this port and arsenal,
| striking as that result Is, but the destruc-
tion of a valuable part of Chinas northern
fleet. Ths strategic position of Wei-Hai-
Wei on the Gulf of Pechili and its capabili-
ties as port of refuge and repair
made its reduction most desirable; and
in the forts and storehouses connected with
the station the Japanese may have found
abundant spoils AS possible menace if
| left unreduced, to an advance toward Pekin,
| Wei-Hai-Wei also received the attention
| Of the Japanese forces. Yet ths fruits of
victory thus indicated are overshadowed, as
it seems to us, by the destruction Of several
of Admiral TING's vessels, the Ting Yuen go
ing first With that result achieved, Japan
can, il she chooses, transfer her base to the
neighborhood Of the Peiho at a bound, and
may have little fear of interference with her
transports or supplies.
1t was possibly the hope of Admiral ITO to
capture his opponents fleet intact, as the
result of the reduction of the mainland forts
by Count OYAMA's army, which feat was
accomplished with the same ease that had
been apparent in that commanders storm
ing of the works at Port Arthur. But the
stout resistance of the fortified island in
the harbor and of the fleet indicated that
the surrender of the latter could not, at
least Immediately, be looked for The
use of submarine mines or other obstruc-
tions must have made any attempt to
enter and to engage the Chinese forts and
fleet with Admiral ITo's entire command
perilous, il possible at all. But the device
adopted, that of sending in torpedo boats,
which destroyed several Chinese vessels,
Admiral CARPENTER giving the number as
three, accomplished decisive result with
the least conceivable expenditure of effort
and the least conceivable loss on Japans
part. One torpedo boat was sunk, with all
on board, and some other damage resulted
from the enemy's fire.
Thus the great lesson taught by the bat
ties at Wei-Hai-Wei seems to be that of the
value Of the torpedo as an appliance in naval
warfare. 1t had been indicated, indeed, in
several recent wars, yet never so impress
sively as now. During Chili's civil conflict
the destruction Of the ironclad Blanco En-
calada by automobile torpedoes in Caldera
Bay was rightly considered one OF the most
suggestive incidents of the contest between
the two forces. There, however, the armor-
clad was the victim Of surprise and, indeed,
of negligence, as she was not under steam
and lay like log, her machinery being I'M
der repair. She did not bring her guns to
bear seasonably, and her plucky assailants,
the guuboats Lynch and Condell, escaped |
without being damaged by her. Again, in |
the late Brazilian rebellion the formidable |
ironclad Aquidaban was sunk by the little |
torpedo boat Gustave Sampaio, thus CIV |
ing second example of how a great |
battle ship may be destroyed by a single |
blow from one OF these little craft. |
But the Aquidaban seems to have had no |
picket boats or torpedo craft of her own to
aid her in keeping Off her assailants.
At Wei-Hai-Wei, however, we find not |
one alone but three IL not more Chinese
vessels torpedoed and sunk, with a whole
fleet to menace the daring assailants, and
also with Admiral TING himself possessing
a torpedo hotilla, which nevertheless could
not or at all events did not prevent the ex-
traordinary result.
The full details of this attack are yet to be
learned, and the inferiorty of China to
Japan in the art of war, both on sea and on
land, must be taken into the account. Still,
the result achieved by torpedo boats at Wei
not as auxiliaries merely, but
as the main combatants, it being
a dash of boats against feet 80 far sur
passes anything hitherto on record that
it will be discussed by the great naval
powers of the world for months and years
to come.
1t is said that the Japanese torpedo fleet
effected its entrance into the harbor by
enough of the distractions to
allow these light-draught craft to go for
ward What the Chinese were doing during
this process does not appear But, what
ever the facts, two points beyond question
are the need of supplying armorclads with
really effective nets against automobile tor
pedOes, if such nets can be had and Of picket
boats around a fleet at anchor and exposed
10 attack.
Congress also may well take note OF this
fresh evidence ot the effectiveness Of torpedo