Arizona republican., 1895-05-02
The Right to Proceed
 Summariiy
Against Violators of Ordin-
 ances is Established.
The Denial Of Trial by Jury Not a Deprivation of Consti-
 tutional Right.

A ueclSlon O1 interest to every 1ncOr- porated town but one in Arizona, was made by Judge Baker in his hearing of an application for writ of a certiorari in the case of the corporation of Tempe against Justice O. c. Smith of Tempe precinct. Application was made last Saturday and the writ was directed to issue and made returnable yesterday.
 The question involved WAS the fright of persons charged with @ violation of city ordinance of Tempe to trial by jury. Among several persons against whom suits had been instituted for a refusal to pay licenses prescribed by an ordinance was A. R. McCamley and Geo. w. Kane, proprietors of a saloon, by the charter under which the town was organized any justice of the peace living within the corporation and if there are none within the corporation the nearest justice of the peace is invested with the functions of police judge in matters arising within the corporation so organized.
 The case of McCamley and Kane was taken before Justice Smith. A jury trial was demanded and granted and the case was set for trial last Saturday. Application was made on that day for writ of certiorari, the applicant al- leging through it's attorney w. l.. Van Horn that under the charter the city was allowed to proceed sammarily in cases of violations against the ordinan- ces and it was also shown that any other form of procedure would place an unbearsble burden of expense upon the corporation.
 The applicant WAS sustained by Judge Baker, and Justice Smith was directed to give the defendants, McCamley and Kane, summary trial. The case against them, however, will not be taken up until the expiration of the ten days allowed in which to perfect an appeal. In the meantime, though, summary proceedings will be begun against other persons who have refused to pay licenses.
 Judge Baker decided that Justice Smith had exceeded his jurisdiction in granting a jury trial. Municipal ordi- nances are not criminal statutes, said he. and violations against them are not crimes governed by rules of criminal procedure except in certain particulars not necessary to consideration of this case. The violated ordinance was merely police regulation and had no relation to the administration of the criminal law of the territory.
 For the reason that such violations had not been defined by statutes to be crimes or oHenses, the denial of 8 trial by jury was no contravention of con- stitutional right of which so much has been heard. The right of corporations to regulate it's own affairs in 8 sum- mary manner was 20 old that it had become estab ablished except in cases iu which there is legislation to the con- trary. There was none in this case, and besides there was an ordinance in Tempe providing that trials should be without jury. The court believed the ordinance to be valid.
 The defendants and others who will be defendants in other cases arising in Tempe lay great deal of stress upon a clause in the charter in which the word ''juror" is used. Though that circumstance is of no force in view of other provisions of the charter it ia said that that clause was an oversight. The legislative act was remodeled from one passed in 1877 in which trial by jury was provided for. In the reforma- tion of the act th.s provision was omitted and the other retained becauss it was overlooked.
 The only town not affected by this, decision is Mesa which was orgaaizedq under the charter of 1877. PtmniA and. Tempe alone are operating under the new act. The towns of Fiagstaf, Pres colt, Tucson and Nogales were incor- porated under special charters but yes terday's decision On tke point at issue. is equally applicable to them.