The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1895-07-17

lx-r~r-rstiral as Is shown by the following.
.srhe court erred IN giving charge u. as
4, defen1ant's Silence. Il was wrong IN
this:
rsrs;-rt stated TO the jury that from his
silence no inference OF guilt should arise
IN the minds of the jury against the de-
ferSanf. This was equivalent 10 saying 10
ire isET-r that no inference O. guilt ought 10
arsss in eheir minds. II left 70 the jury
the mere fa-r that as matter Of propriery
Or ordinary justice probably no inference
,uxh. 10 arse; that IS. should arise The
s4assafe is mandatory. II says that ne
court must charge the jury that no infer
snce shall arise In other words tnat the
,slrv should he charged that the Inference
~ aryist shall not arise from the silence.
The ma p<satnry words OF the statute should
have been given and not the discretionary
clause"
7, = evident from the reading OF the
charge that the court complied ful-
" with the statute in respect 10
the inference Of guilt in his instruction 10
she fury on this point; and II appellate
courts Should interfere with the verdicts
AZ ir,ries and the administration Of the law
,,r.,n S11ca strained construction OF Ian
s-uapa or choice OF words as IS here indl-
GAIA me administration of law would be-
coma a farce and trial by lower courts a
useless labor.
f,ro,nsea for the appellant, for the court 10
cav IN the Jury that 'the presumption OF
srnocen..e remained with the defendant
or,,y VI, 20 the submission of the cause 10
the i,rrv. and then ceased when the pre-
s.,r,,T.Eon had been overcome by the evil
sence 7, might have been error III the
court had given any such instruction as the
one complained az, but the record shows
that n ala not. Instruction No. > was as
follows:
ssrha law nresrrnes the Innocence OF a
y,s~sop accused Of crime. and this pre-
s=,1nrption IL not a matter OF form merely,
u hir,, ,he Jury may disregard At pleasure,
hstt Il - a mart Of the law of the land, ana
n f. a right guaranteed by that law 10
every nerson accused OF crime, and this
nresurnn,ion continues with the defendant
fhro,,.-ho,yt All the stages of the trial unit.
the case has been finally submitted 10 the
i,,rv and the Jury has found that this pre-
s,rn,n,h,n has been overcome by the evil
derce Of the prosecution In the case oe'yofla
a reasonable doubt.
So that the contention OF the appellant
TRAIT the presumption OF innocence ATTENDS
the defendant throughout the deliberations
of the i,,rv and until the arrival OF the YER
dict Is fully sustained by the instructions
criticised: for under this instruction the
ilrv are told that the presumption Is not
only with the defendant throughout all the
STAGES az ne trial ard until the case has
been finally submitted, but until the jury
have found that this presumption was
overcome by the evidence. The jury can
not find that the presumption was over
come by the evidence until they go into an
Investigation Of the evidence, and IL Is Idle
to talk about jury beng misled by such
an expression as this, even II the court had
stopped with the expression until the case
has been finally subm tilted TO the jury, for
everything that IS submitted to the jury
goes with them into their deliberations.
That is the only object Of the submission
Of evidence. or the submission of an in
etruction to Jury. and a juryman who
would be dull enough to place the con-
s.r,,ction commended for by appellant upon
any such instruction, and conclude That
this presumption of innocence ceased be-
fore II would avail the defendant nything,
would be so dull as to be absolutely ire
sponsive TO any Intelligent instruction al
all
instruction No Is to the effect that
reasonable doubt is such a doubt as a man
of ordinary prudence, sensibility and de-
cis{on In determining an issue of like con-
Germ TO himself as that before the jury IS
TO the defendant would allow to have any
influence upon him or cause him TO pause
or hesitate in arriving at his determination;
that such doubt should grow out OF the
evidence in the case and not be merely
speculative conjeetural or imaginary. This
instruction is criticised because IL fs alleged
that 81 assumes that there might be
a doubt in the minds Of a jury, but
that such would be a speculative, con-
jectural or an imaginary one. We do not
think there is anything in the In
e-truction that would warrant the concsu-
sion that there was any such an assump-
ton. or that ii could be deduced that the
court thought that If there was a doubt
that such doubt would be speculative.
conjectural or imaginary. AS matter of
fact. speculative. conjectural or imagin-
airy doubts should not lead TO the acqut
tai Of the defendant charged with any
crime II might be that IL would have
been a better use OF language If the court
had instructed the Jury that a proper
doubt could he entertained from the want
of evidence; bur we think that the jury
were not misled by going into any refined
distinctions between the phrases want
Of evidence" and should grow out OF
evidence"
And the fourth objection, that II ad-
mitted the right OF doubt arising upon
tho law as charged 10 the jury: is not ten
able for the jury have no right TO doubt
the law The legal propositions are for
the court II is a. jurors province to de-
eide questions of fact by applying 10 them
court
objection Is made to charge No. :, for
the reason that 10 state the object of the
statute was to invite injunctive proceed
ings by the jury, the court in this case
stating that the purpose of this statute
was 10 restrain public officers from using
for their own profit the public money in
trusted 10 them for safe keeping. or in
any other manner than as authorized and
directed ny law. II the defendants case
is 50 shaky that IL will not bear the dis
cussiou Of a law proposition or a proper
definition Of the statute in the presence of
the Jury. that ia his misfortune and not the
fault of the law. The purpose Of this
statute had 10 be understood by the jury
before they could come 70 a correct deter
mination as 10 whether or not the de-
PENDANT had violated the provisions Of the
statute in committing the acts with which
he was charged.
That New York Draft.
In charge No. 6 the court instructed the
iurv that II they believed from the evidence
credit Of the city in the Washington Ma
tional bank. and If the defendant drew an
instrument. signing the same as city
treasurer. directing Henry Thurman 10 be
Maid $4,000 and that the Washington Ma
tional bank obeyed the direction and
charged on its hooks the money 70 the
city and lessened its credit $1,000 that
such was payment OF money, and that
the Jury should construe the check or in
strument merely as the inStrumeltality
by which the city % Seattle's money was
transferred from the possession Of the
defendant to Henry Fuhrman: and upon
these facts. II the transfer was a profit.
they must find the defendant guilty as
charged. We think this instruction was
eNaatIr rlrht The facts nroNan mnnn