The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1895-01-09
BOUNTIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Court Of Appeals So Decides In
The Case AGAINST Secretary Carlisle.
4 RULING OF GREAT IMPORTANCE,
Sugar Drawbacks or Boupties Must Cease.
Ths Miles Planting Company Refused
Mandsmus.

lumbia. through Justice Shepard, to-day
delivered an opinion affirming the decision
of Judge McComas, in the District Cir
cult Court, refusing TO grant the applica-
tion of the Miles Planting and Manufac-
turing Company, OF Louisiana. for a
mandamus to compel the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Commissioner of In
fernal Revenue TO make an examination
of the sugar produced by the company
preliminary to the payment of a sugar
bounty for 1891. which Secretary Carlisle
refused to pay on the ground that the
new tariff law repealed the bounty pro-
vision of the Mckinley act. The case Is
an important one involving the constitu-
tionality of the bountes and of the new
tariff law
The most interesting feature OF the
courts opinion is its practical declara-
tion that the granting of bounties is un-
constitutional.
THE COURTS DECISION.
Upon the question OF coEStitutioEality,
the court says.
The power OF Congress to pay bountles
10 manufacturers or producers, in order
to encourage the manufacture or produc-
ton OF any article, has never been pass
ed upon by the courts, but the principle
which underlies the queS tion, and upon
which its solution depends has, in the
opinion of the court, been time and again
asserted and applied III the court OF
last resort in such cases, particularly
in the celebrated opinion of Justice Mil
Ter. holding that the Government cannot
take property from citizens 20 bestoW 1t
on favored Individuals
Quotations from number of opinions
in support OF this doctrine are given by
the court.
The power 10 give the bounty 10 pro-
ducers OF sugar must, as we have seen,
be referred to, and determined by, the
general grant OF the f1rst clause of the
second article OF the Constitution The
court thinks il would be a causeless con-
sumption of time to enter upon discus
sion OF the Interpretation of the language
contained in this clause. nor is II neces-
sary TO do so. sun. IL says, the question
remains. Is the grant of a bounty to pro-
ducers OF sugar constitutional exercise
OF the power of taxation, as so under
stood. The court thinks that authori-
ties cited establish beyond question that
the power of taxation In all free gov
ernments like ours Is limited to public
objects ana purposes governmental in
their nature. No amount OF incidental
public good or benefit will render valid
taxation or the appropriation of revenue
TO be derived therefrom Tor private
purpose.
THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGN.
If it may be for the general welfare of
the United States to encourage the pro-
duction of sugar by the grant of boun-
", II is hard to conceive why the pro-
ducers of corr, wheat, cotton, wool, coal,
iron, silver ore, ctc., might not be paid
a bounty also.
"If Congress-" continues the court, "be
conceded the power to grant subsidies
from the public revenues TO all objects
a.. a to h.. fen l.
fare, then 1t follows that this discretion,
like the idea that this is Government of
delegated, limited and enumerated pow
ers, renders superfiuOus all the special
delegations of power contained in the
Constitution and open a, way for Hood
of socialistic legislation. the specious plea
for all of which has ever been the gem
eral welfare 1t is Il doctrine that we
cannot subscribe TO. sim less are we able
to subscribe to a doctrine that legislation
may be enacted by Congress in pursuance
of a natural policy analogous TO that
adopted by Germany and France or any
other Government on the face of the
earth.
There is no inherent sovereignty in the
General or State Governments. The peo- |
pie are sovereign. Certain powers Of SOW
ereignty they have delegated with a free |
hand; others have been reserved. Legis- |
lation by the Assembly Of France, the |
Reichstag of Imperial Germany, or the |
Parliament of Great Britain, where power |
is unlimited, furnishes no proper pre- |
cedent for legislation in this country"
In conclusion, the court says that all |
acts granting drawbacks and bounties. |
no matter how worded or devised, have |
met with determined opposition and denial |
of power at all times, and II cannot be |
said that they ever received general con- |
sent or acquiescence. The fact that |
moneys have often been paid out under |
acts OF doubtful or questionable validity |
can have no great weight under a system |
where the question. by reason of diff
culties alluded to in the opinion. Is so |
hard to be raised in an elective manner. |
But if there had been "A practice by |
Congress-" says the court. uniform and
acquiesced in, our opinion is SO
clearly against the validity of this act |
that We could not be controlled by it in
the performance of IL In our duty. No |
time, no acquiescence. no estoppal runs
against the people under the protection
of our written Constitution. From what
has been said ii follows that the iuda-
ment must be in all things affirmed, and |
with costs 10 the appellees.'
THE OPINION UNANIMOUS.
The opinion of the court was unanimous,
but Chief Justice Alvey filed a subsequent |
concurring opinion.
81 fully concur" says the Chief JUS
tice, with my brothers, in the afIirmance
OF the judgment appealed from IN this
case, but ! do so upon the distinct |
grounds that the statute authorizing the
payment of the sugar bounty has been
expressly repealed by the recent tariff
act of 1894, and thereby all right to boun-
ty has been cancelled. and even If that
were not so, this case as here presented
shows no sufficient foundation for opening
of a mandamIs against the Secretary OF
the Treasury and the Commissioners OF In
ternal Revenue. l do rot however, deem
t necessary for any purpose OF this
,ase to discuss and decide the constitu-
iional question of the power or Congress
20 provide for the payment OF bounties
N such case as that provided for by the
late tariff act of 1880. / prefer 10 express
l. a.. Il