Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1895-01-31
a RECORD THAT DAMNS.

a RECORD THAT DAMNS.
Facts Which Show the Rottenness of Re-
publican Methods.
The ST. Louis Globe-Democrat. which
sometimes rises above partisanship, is
subject to the most disastrous relapses.
Here is an instance of the latter:
1T is a well-known fact that the present un-
fortunate situation is due mainly to a radical
departure from the republican policy under
which such situation was unknown. The
democratic tariff law has reduced the revenue
to point which causes monthly deficit and
democratic schemes Of currency reform have
seriously impaired the public credit
This is not well known, and it is not
the fact.
about the gold reserve and the curren-
cy generally began under the Harrison
administration, for such trouble really
begins when the first false step is
taken, and that was years before. But
it is a fact that the trouble began to
manifest itself distinctly and unmis-
takably under the Harrison admins
tration, and that it progressed so far
that even in the last month Of that adj
ministration Secretary Foster had pre-
pored to issue bonds. This was charged
last fall, and when Foster was asked
to deny it, he wrote to Washington to
inquire whether there was any record
evidence there that he had done this.
Being informed that none had been
found, he wrote a letter saying there
was no foundation for the statement.
Then letter of his own was printed
giving directions for the preparation of
the plates, and the plates themselves
are still in existence.
A few indisputable facts are worth
libraries full of theories Specie pay
ments were resumed January 1. 1879.
For the fiscal years from 1879 to 1881,
inclusive, the redemption of United
States notes averaged S2,635, 900 per
annum. ALI understood that they
could get gold for greenbacks when
they wanted it. and, consequently, few
| wanted it. The banks furnished the
gold needed for export. For the fiscal
year 1892 the redemptions amounted to
50, 125, 900. This was under the Harrison
administration, and before the cleo
ton. The distrust caused by the Sher-
man act and the Mckinley bill had al
ready begun. For the twenty-seven
| months succeeding the close of the
fiscal year 1892 the redemptions
| amounted to S2O6, 500. 900. All of this
period, except thirty-four days, was
| under the Mckinley bill.
Prior to the period of distrust which
began under Harrison the normal
| amount of gold received for customs at
New York was about IS per cent. From
| July 1, 1892, TO September 30, 1S94-all
of which period, except thirty-four
days, was under the Mckinley bill-it
| was only about IL per cent, and dur
| ing the last seventeen months only 81
per cent. The movement upon the
| gold reserve. therefore, and the virtual
| suspension of specie payment by the
| banks, began under the Harrison adj
| ministration and has gone on at an
| accelerating ratio. Account for it as
| you may, that is the simple fact. I'm
| partial financiers attribute it to the
| Sherman and the Mckinley acts.
1t may be asked, what had the Nc
kinley bill to do with it? It certain
| ly had as much to do with it as the new
tariff act. and republican papers say
| that the latter is the cause of the pres
ent trouble because it does not yield
| revenue enough. Now the Mckinley
| bill is subject to the same objection.
| The republicans deny this, because
| they say there was no deficit till the
| Mckinley bill was repealed. They try
| to establish this by showing that there
| was no deficit lat the end of fiscal
| year." while the Mckinley law was in
| force. But every intelligent person
knows that this is bubble and mere
| attempt to palter with us on double
sense. 1t is easily demonstrable that
the Mckinley bill did not yield revenue
enough to meet the enlarged scale of
| expenditure to which the republicans
committed the country.
| The Harrison administration began
dissipating the surplus even before the
Mckinley bill was passed. The habit
of estimating this surplus at 500. 0OO.-
| COO is misleading. Mr.. Cleveland left
in 1889 an accumulated surplus of about
| 500, 900, 900, and besides, the revenues
were some 500, 900 a year in excess
| of expenditures. If the revenue had
been kept up and expenditures kept
down during Mr.. Harrison's term the
| surplus would have been nearer $780,
| O00. 900 than 100000. 900. A reduction of
revenue was, therefore, proper if ex-
penditures had been kept down. But
| the Fifty first congress. while reducing
| the revenue. increased expenses, and
this led invaria bly, to deficit.
| The Harrison administration adopted
| several expedients to avoid the appear
ance of a deficit. First it squandered
the surplus-not only the surplus in
March, 1889, but that which accumu-
lated between that time and the pas
sage of the Mckinley bill. Then it
! changed the form of the debt statement.
| Then it seized a trust fund of So .0GO,-
| 900, held for the redemption of the
| bank notes, and used that, and much
| OF it was not refunded before the eXpi-
ration OF Mr.. Harrison's term. Then
| finding itself unable conveniently to
| pay more than So. O00, 900 of bonds due
| September. 1891. it continued them. In
! these various ways. by the shifts and
evasions of bookkeeping, it contrived
| to conceal the deficiency of revenue
| which existed under the Mckinley bill.
II the Mckinley bill furnished rev.
enue equal to expenditures. why was
| the surplus dissipated? Why was the
national bank redemption fund seized?
Why were S25. 900. 900 of bonds contin-
| ned within less than year after the
| Mckinley bill was passed? In all but
the name this was a borrowing OF
money and this would not have been
| necessary if the Mckinley bill had
been affording adequate revenue.
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