The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1895-03-29
sTRAGETIC. JAPANESE.
Their Generals Use the Forces at Their
Command in An Able Manner-The Story
of the Campaign.


Victoria, B. C., March 2S.-Adyices from
Toxic under the date of March IL, says
The japanese in Southwestern Manchuria
have completely broken and dispersed the
power full armies that were opposed to them
and there have been long intervals of COM
parative inaction on the part of the japan
ese.
4 division OF tile first army occupied Hal
Cheng on December 18th. and brigade Of
the second army proceeded 10 Tia Ping on
January 10th and the outposts of the two
forces We're soon in c0mmu n ication.
lie situation then became this: The
japanese lines extended from Tai Ping,
forty miles north toward Hal Cheng and
taen struck eastward to point twenty
miles north of Fenghwan.
The Chinese lines were nearly parallel
throughout the Whole distance, their pl in
c:pal basis being Wing kow and Ten Chang
iai. on the south. and Lilo Yang On the
north. In that interval the Chinese had
three armies, the Lilo Yang army of 10000
men, which placed Use If SO as 10 cover the
Dads leading north from Hal Cheng o Lilo
Yang.tne new Chwang army of 10000 posted
in and about CLwang, fourteen miles north
of Hal Cheng, and the Wing Kow army of
$1,000 massed round Wing now, twenty-five
miles southwest Of Kaiping and having lis
headquarters at Tien Chwang Tai, nine
teen miles further west on the coast of
Pechili Gulf.
The two Japanese armies were division
and brigade aggregating about thirty
thousand under Lieutenant Gene Kalzuro
i'll Hal Cheng and the brigade of about
eight thousand under Lieutenan Kawahji
| in al Fling.
Thus. on one side there were SO, OoO men
and on the other 10000.
These orders would have been as nothing
to the Japanese had an immediate advance
been an object. but movement. farther
west into Manchuria did not enter into
their plan of campaign until the approach
of spring they remained quietly in Kai
Cheng and Hal Cheng.
Against the lat ter which was the key to
the Japanese. indeed OF the whole position.
Shin King, the Chinese made repeated as
saults, but on each occasion they were driv-
en- back with such ease that the affair was
a mere tiasco.
Finally. towards the close of February,
Wei Hal Wei having been taken, and there
remaining only the final operat ion against
| Fekin to be organized. il became necessary
10 break up the Chinese forces in Chin King
Tor four reasons; first. because Wing kow,
modern New Chwang, would furnish a most
| convenient base for an army operating
against Pekin. and second, because it was
desira BILE TO free as large a number of Japa-
nese troops in Shipping so as they might
join in The march against Pekin.
| Great. however, as is the disparity be-
tween the fighting capacity of the Japanese
| and Chinese troops. twas not simple
| problem that the Japanese generals in
| : bill Kin had to solve.
| With thirty-eight thousand troops, diyid-
ed into bodies of 10000 and 5000. separated
| by distance OF forty miles, they hadlto at
| tack three Chinese armies aggregatingfsev
| enty thousand and extening over a front
of some sixty miles.
The me hod adopted was no less bold than
successful. On February "A. the Kai King
forces start ed forward its outposts SO as to
occupy an important position in the Chm
csc lines, thus crea ing the impression that
the attack of the Japanese was to be direct
ed in the first place against Wing Kow. Gen
eral sung. who commanding at Ying
kow. attempted to rush back the intruders,
| employing force of between $4,000 and 20
COO fer the purpose, but was SO severely
beaten that his connection with the other
two Chinese aImies On The north was fol
the moment severed.
Four days later Lieut.. Gen. Katzuro
moved out Of Hai Cbeng and threw il, 600
men at the Lao Yang army on his ncrth
crushing it completely and rolling il rapid
~ back twenty miles towards Kow Yang in
| IL xL.x IL
chances of its rallying and resuminp it's
Ilace in the general lie were temporarily
destroyed.
So resolute was Kaziuro's advanc that the
public never suspected him of any design
except TO march upon Lao Yang itself.
>ira.egists, Lowcvei, saw that if that were
Kez uIo's purpose lie was violating the
rules of sound war;, re, fer his line of ad-
vance now al right angles 10 his line of
comu. unica ion and be was leaving on bis
left rear in New Chwang. a hostile army
of 5000 men.
But sud denly, after three days of this
noithward movement. Katzurd turned into
"a road lead ing dir CT to New Chwang and
On the fifth of March he made fierce at
tack against that place from two direct
ions, the brigade that he left behind in
Hal Chang attacking from third direct
ion simulth neously.
The roui of the Chinese was complete.
They lost about one tho sand eight hun
dred killec and three thousand prisoners.
On the following day Katzuro pushed TO-
ward King kow ag; inst which place the
.Kai Ping brigade taking, advantage of the
confusion caused by katZuIo's brilliant
coup IN the north HAD advanced, capturing
it without difficulty.
LEFT SUDDENLY.