St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1895-09-03
NORTHERN PACIFIC RECEIVERS
WRONGLY APPOINTED BY
JENKINS,
so DECLARE THE JUDGES
WISCONSIN COURT WITHOUT JUs
RISDICTION IN THE
CASE.
ORDERED TO APPEAR IN COURT
The Receivers Must Now DefenG
Themselves Against Charges
of Maladminist

SEATTLE, Wash, Sept. BY the
decision of Judge Gilbert, concurred
in by Judge Hanford, Receivers
Oakes, Payne and Rouse must ap-
pear in the United States court for
the Northern district of Washington,
in this city, October 2, and defend
themselves against the charges Of
maladministration brought by Bray
ton Ives, president of the Northern
Pacific. The opinion of Judge Gil
bert was read in court this morn
ing and the concurring opinion Of
Judge Hanford was filed late in the
afternoon. The receivers are each
ordered to file in this court a bond
of 100000; also a report of their
actions from the time Of the last
report confirmed by Judge Jenkins
up to the present. 1t is held that
the acts of the receivers
are not invalid, and the $5,000,-
600 of receivers certificates are
valid liens as soon as confirmed
by the respective courts. By the
decision the question of jurisdiction
is settled and the court here be-
comes the court of primary jurisdic-
ton, settling the question Of collat.
eral attack.
The second part of the Ives ap-
phcation will come up at the hearing
of the order to show cause, and the
question of fact as to whether the
receivers have been lack in the adj
ministration of the trust estate
will be opened.
BY JUDGE GILBERT.
Judge Gilbert says: .'The actual
possession of the property of the in
solvent corporation by the first
court, through its receivers, could
extend ne further than the limit Of
that courts jurisdiction. The rights
the receivers are accorded, in courts
whose jurisdiction is exterior to that
of initial proceedings, have their
basis in comfy. Such comfy rests
| upon the fact that another court is
IN the actual possession of a portion
OF the property, which cannot be
We'll segregated, and which is to the
best interes S for all concerned re-
qulred to be managed by a single
system. Here, however, it is shown
that, at the time of filing the ap-
plication to remove the receivers.
there is no part of the railroad line
OF the Northern Pacific within the
jurisdiction of the court that first
appointed them, and that there is
IN that district no personal property
held in receivership. All the prop
erty that remains to be disposed of
is in other jurisdictions. IT
follows, from this state of
1acts, that the court is DOW
erless to make an order which
affects in any way the management
or possession of any property of the
corporation. No foreclosure of said
mortgages can be had, no possession
to purchaser can be given. until
the courts which have the actual
possession of said railroad shall con-
sent thereto.
In our judgment the rule of com.
ity which has been invoked in oppo.
sition to the judgment does not appIv
10 such a case as this. The foundat
ton of the rule is the recognition OF
the right that exists in another iuris<
diction. 1t is predicated upon tho
fact that another has first taken and
retained the possession of the prop<
erty. It's reason consists in the fact
that the court of initiatory proceed
lngs has in its possession. and must
necessarily administer, a portion O;
property which a wise policy de.
clares must be disintegrated. Thai
reason does not exist in this case.
Not only does it not exist, but many
considerations lead us to believe thai
wiser, more satisfactory manage
ment of railroad may be obtained
by a court which has Jurisdiction
over at least some of the territory
where the same is situated, or where
some ONCE of the company is Iocat>
ed
JUDGE HANFORD.
In his opinion Judge Hanford con-
sidered, as parts of one proposition.
the question of remitting dues to
Judge Jenkins court as the court of
primary jurisdiction and of collateral
attack. The application, ne said, was
a direct proceeding. Want of juris-
diction, apparent on face of record.
was the ground on which the attack
was made, and on such grounds the
right of parties to litigate was not
concluded by any decree of the court
whose jurisdiction was questioned.
The real estate of the defendant be-
came immovable, could not be
brought within the jurisdiction of the
Milwaukee court, nor could ju-
risdiction be required by taking pos
session of such assets as money,
bonds and other securities, or in the
cars migrating over other lines; and
no consent of parties could give to
a court jurisdiction that it had never
possessed.