The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1895-10-13
THE WAR Ships WEAKNESS.
Huge IroncIads vulnerable I'm Their
Motive Power md PersonneL

Captain A. T. Mahan. in the Century.
A war ship is vulnerable in two chief re-
spectsEin her motive power and in her per
sonnet. 1t is imaginable that one might be
wholly neutralized without materially in
1uring the other The question. not only of
to-day. but OF a century's standing, il.
due the ship? In olden times the British
habitually attacked the personnel, the
French the motive power, and each was
consistent; for the aim Of the former was
to insure decisive results, and that of the
latter to avoid them. Each has had its adj
vocates. and consequently there is some
the whole IL is, / think. fair TO say that
experience replies attack the men. And
the reason is much the same as a hundred
years ago; not only is it impossible to have
the men as we'll protected as the motive
power. but the destruction of the men who
handle the offensive powers of the ship
makes the motive power practically use
less.
Now the weight which a ship of given
SIZE can carry Is limited, and must be dis
tributed among several objects. of which
gun power is one, and the question has to
be met, how shall this gun power be SUBJ
divided among the different classes Of gun?
IN your aim is the motive power you want
heavy guns; for the motive power-the en-
glneS ard boilers-are given the utmost pos
siole protection by position. by the thick
est armor, by the coal stowage, the pro-
tective deck. and so on, 20 pierce which
great force is required. But heavy guns
means few guns, and few guns mean few
cAtOtcs dit LcN SHOTS mean FEWER hits.
while of those that hit. IL they strike the
protective system OF the engines. ETC., few
er stIll penetrate, a truth long fOreSeen,
yet very generally dropped out of sight.
and which the Yalu battle mas singularly
confirmed.
On the other hand, the weight of armor
required to protect the water line ade-
qGately makes il impossible to extend by
similar means adeQuate protection to the
Dattery spaces. except only those occupied
by the heavy guns; and even where these
arc adequately prOtected-impervious. that
technically called rapid fire"-there can
be no question that their accuracy is sin
gularly embarrassed. For that reason il is
sought to aim and fire them from an in
terlor positlon-the coming tower, for in
Sldnce-a plan or which IL is enough here
10 say that. except for the heaviest guns,
II is tending to fall into disuse.
considering the vast Importance of secur-
ing the best practice from the heavy guns
for | am not at all arguing against them.
comes necessary TO beat down and keep
down all the other fire of the enemy. II
success Is thus attained a distinct and inn
menSe advantage is gained for the heavy
guns over those OF the enemy; for. II the
Tapid-fire guns which have established
rets they can greatly annoy the men in
them. and may enter the gun ports. This
superiority, If maintained, may result In
VICTORY. 1t has long seemed to me that
the mutual relations of the heavy and
rapid-nre guns OF & ship have a strong
analogy TO a field battery OF artillery and
It's infantry supports. the latter Of which
at once protect and secure the efficient
service OF the former. However that NAV
be. the rapid-fire gun of moderate caliber
mas just now faily established its position
warfare.