St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1895-04-29
posed to resist any further advance

said to be very bad from a strategic
on an island, being separated from the
! mainland by a stretch of marshy
ground This is traversed by bridges
and without them Corinto is cut off
from the shore. The Nicaraguans
have retired to the shore end Of the
bridges, and those well informed on
the situation believe that if the Brit
ish make any move to cross the lagoon
the bridges will be burned and the lit
tie band of Nicaraguan troops will
make a stand against further en-
croachmentS.
The British are evidently appre-
hensive of trouble on this score, as
indicated by the cablegrams from
Colon, showing that the three vessels,
the Royal Arthur, the Wild Swan
and the Satellite, have been SO placed
as to command the town
WITH THEIR GUNS.
1t is probable that this disposition
has been made so as to insure the oc-
cupying forces, numbering about 400
armed men, from an attack by the
Nicaraguans, rather than with any
deliberate purpose of bombarding the
town, for there is no evidence that
the British desire to advance into the
interior at present, and it is certainly
not part of the original programme
of operations, as made known to our
1lpa
The news of the situation at Corinto
created a commotion here, and partic-
ularly in the state department. Sir
Julian Pauncefote, the British am
bassador, came to the department,
and after remaining in private con-
sultation with Secretary Gresham for
a short time, the two repaired to the
war department to consult with Sec
rotary Lamont. TIE latter was alb
sent at the time, but coming in later
repaired Immediately to the state de-
partment, and talked over matters
with the officials.
Later on, the news came to the
department through the Associated
Press from Colon that the Nicaraguan
government had made a sharp move
by declaring Corinto
A CLOSED PORT. 5--12s'
This was evidently a disturbing ele-
ment in the calculations, for Assistant
Secretary Uhl was at once dispatched
to the British embassy to confer with
Sir Julian Pauncefote, a most unusual
proceeding in department etiquette.
1t is said at the embassy that Sir
Julian Pauncefote, the British ambas-
sador, had not received confirmation
from the foreign office Of the occupa-
ton of Corinto up to the close of the
embassy at clock. The embassy
did not expect direct information
from London, as it is said the foreign
office has no occasion to communicate
with the British representative at
Washington.
There can be no doubt that the
action of the Nicaraguans in declar-
ing Corinto a closed port has seriously
complicated this most troublesome
question, and even if there is no re-
sort to hostilities at present 1t opens
a prospect of alarming events in the
future, which may be, and in fact are,
even regarded as likely to.
INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES
directly in the affair, in spite of the
earnest disposition of the administra-
ton to avoid the ENHANCEMENT. The
action means that no goods can now
be entered at Corinto, port which
has heretofore received over half of
the imports into the country, without
violating the national law of Nicara-
qua. The British may collect duties
if any goods enter the place. But
the latter would be liable to seizure the
moment they crossed the British lines
! into the interior. They must do this
to find market, for the coast being
unhealthy, is thinly populated, and
the great consuming class of the popu-
! lation lives in the interior.
The first effect of the decree closing
the port, therefore, will probably be
to divert nearly all, if not the entire
import trade of the place, to San Juan
del Sur, or perhaps Realajo, sea port
near by, for it is improbable that
many merchants will take the chances
of getting their goods into Nicaragua
through the British lines, under the
circumstances.
In this case, the length of the stay
of the British at Corinto is problemat-
ical conditional as it is upon collect
ing enough revenue from customs to
make good the indemnity demanded.
But another consideration arises at
this point, for our government has
been assured that the occupation will
not be permanent, and indeed the
first paragraph of the
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY
expressly pledges Great Britain against
any occupation of Nicaragua territory.
So the problem will arise now to col
lect the indemnity within a reasonable
time This may be settled summarily
by simply extending the occupation
and blockade beyond Corinto so as to
| included all the Pacific ports of
| Nicaragua. From the disposition
| shown by the Nicaraguans at present
(; this can be done only by force, and it
is likely to add very largely to the ex-
pense already incurred in the collec-
ton of the indemnity, which will surely
sum. This course, moreover, would
seriously embarrass the commerce OF
the United States, and on this point
/ Great Britain has given Secretary
Gresham certain assurances.
Another manner in which the British
may be able to secure their ends is by
| prompt declaration of war, and an
INVASION OF NICARAGUA,
involving the capture of the capital,
Managua, and the imposition upon
the Nicaraguans of the British terms
as the price of pehce.
1t may be that the British govern
ment will be driven to the latter. course
in interests of trade, our own as well
as that of her own merchants, which
she is bound TO safeguard. If goods