The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1895-08-04
THE LESSONS OF THE YALU.
Pointed Ont by Capt. \. Il. Mahan, the
Great Nava, Tactician.
The Century for August.

1t appears from Commander McGiffin's
narrative that both Chinese and Japanese
We're led, by design or accident, TO accu-
mulate projectiles and ammunition on
deck in advance of immediate demands-a
practice greatly deprecated. But is the
depreciation wholly sound? Offense is bet
ter than defense. Rapid fire with some
risk is better than slower fire with no
risk-risk. that is. from this particular
source-because the slower fire yields to
the enemy an advantage greater than the
risk avoided. on board a foreign battle
ship. not long ago. the captain said to me
that in providing for action they accumu-
lated certain number of rounds-ten.
think-near each rapid-hre gun Don't
you consider that a great risk" ] asked.
Undoubtedly" he replied; but not so
great risk as that the enemy should fire
faster than we"
think he was right. Collingwood used
to tell his crew that II they could fire
three well-aimed broadsides in as many
minutes no enemy could resist them. Far
ragut noted with emphatic commentator
in 1889 when the French attacked the cas-
tie OF San Juan de Ulua at Vera Cruz.
that they habitually kept a great number
OF shot accumulated in racks on deck-a
practice many naval officers still remem-
be-. The introduction OF shells-explosive
proiecties-gave pause 10 this habit. for
direful experiences had taught that
shot solid or hollow striking one would
eyplode many near by. Nevertheless, the
difficulty OF insuring rapid supply at any
time even the quietest. and the dreadful
liability TO severance of the chain OF sup
ply by the casualties of battle. suggest
the imperative necessity OF an accumula-
ton This should be so planned and
proportional 70 the rate of fire possible 10
the gun as 70 insure the minimum Of risk
that must be taken II the fun efficiency OF
the battery is to be maintained. Especial
" is this necessary for the beginning of
an action-usually. at least as regards the
single ship. the most pregnant Of the final
result
As regards systems, the result Of this
episode IS drawn battle. which may be
summed up broadly as the successful re-
sistance Of two ships. armored. with joint
dfsplacement.of con tons 20 FIVE ships.
partly protected, OF 1900 tons. This as
far as Il goes favors the view that a Civ
en- amount OF tonnage IN one or in few
big ships possesses decided advantage
over the same. or even 4 greater amount,
divided among several This yiew-!s also
in strict accord with the general teachings
OF warfare that force concentrated under
one command is more efficient than that
disseminated among several This con-
clusion must not. Of course. he pressed to
ahsurfity bat tempered. as all practical
conclusions are. by moderation and dis
erection. 4 ran may consider one 10 no
ton shin better than two OF 500 without
wanting one Of - go tons at all. for sufH-
-fent reasons. Our forerunners found
-s-run ship absolutely superior to two
r~;catez-Far the latter 10 attack was con-
eiaeref fcIlv-yet the seventy-four was
their norm for the battleship. and only
exeeutioualIv was exceeded IN size
on the other hand. this episode was a
drawn flght because forty-five (naore Or
leqsl ouick-fring guns got the better OF
eight Pinch guns unsupported by any
quick-fring guns at all. They did so. I
apnreheud. because eydestroyed theper-
sonnel OF the ship. either directly or by
shattering its power OF Efficient offease.
Men. however brave. cannot stand ID
acain.t fire Of certain intensity: and
when such a condition Is reached and sus-