The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1895-01-27

ter. and could not get my coHWe"" gu.
| hc,ehuy IN mana to attack him ". sssn.
| ing I will have 10 make slight oeiay
here to get up my supply tram , IRON
| HaYper's Ferry. iaey should reach WIN
| chester tonight. coming here tomorrow
| forenoon" The conclusion from Wis
| would be that nc intended to attack ,ne
/ next day; az he did no; attack, the m
| ference is that he mad not so 'h'e""Fu
| SHERIDAN uSiAsY.
| cbnr;aan says that at this time fufhoTs
| ., endorsement coming 10 Early IRON
| fu;reper gave him great uneasIness' no
| no was afraio OF their ges ing III MS rear
| on the front Royal and winchester pike
| OF moving from Front Royal 20 }o'h h.ae
| ~ along the base OF the MaSsanut,eh' a4i1
I aging him in flank. lie should nave
wetcomed such movement of the Con-
| ,.derates. as IL would have given MIN the
opportrinity 30 s,riKe them ia detail.
on the lith brigade OF cavalry was
sent hlia on reconnoHdnce 10 front my :
al; on the mex; day wo more were ordered
there. on the 10th they skirmished with
Andergoils advance. Anderson mad now
crossed the Blue Ridge and was IN the
t.uray Valley; the Massanuttoh noun
can, was between him and Early. The
Only road by which they could Unite, il
Fairy stayed at Fishers Hill, ran along
sherIdans troops. Sheridan remained
I'VE days at Cedar Creek, in 'front.' OF
r;a.ly. with his army interposed between
him and Anderson's column that was
APPROACHING from the east re Hisn.
baye attacked either while the other was
on: II supporuns mstal1e. on lhe n'S S
Of Tho 18TH ne quietly retfeated 10 ~
chetser thence 10 Berryvllle, ana hiiaiS
10 Balltown. in the forks OF the Sheh-
inc batteries on Maryland Heights. ms
nrn,v was now back in the same posluo"
4, was when he took command, thIee
-, hotnrr Early and Anderson fol-
loved in pursuit, and united at NincheS-
a.. ,rhe concentration OF an army III
me prcssnce OF IN enemy IL sl"d!
baza rdous operation. a co'nplHeu inoNe
rrpnt is more difficult when me Co'"'ii.''
or, fron divergent bases. III thcH coih-
,'...',,t>,,, a. I,roken. corctrt Of action
,1d nnufral cooperation ~ lnposslDle.
In his WORK. The Operations o. war
t,e,'eral Hyrnlcv, @. the English army
SAYS: "If then. allied armies operttih8
ram divergent bases, cn commune, their
a,.,r, tions win be more effective than II
,hev had n common base. But IRON me
moment their concert is destroyed by the
irtcrposition OF an adequate 1orce' the
cnances are against them
Why mp Sor s In DAN TIGHT!
Ouaerc. Instead of retreatinS why did
MOI Sheridan attack Early or Anderson or
Goth, before they united?
IN 1873 B.uchef marched from Namur 10
unite with Wellington. who was advancing
from Trusssls on Quatrc Bras. Napolcoi
had entered Belgium the day before. His
plan OF campaign was TO interpose ne
,Neen the two aliieu armies anu fSht thsii
seDarately. He first defeated Blucher at
Iasnv. then turned on Wellington. VINO
saved himself by retreating towards MS
base The conditions were more laVoTa
bic 10 Sheridan at Strashurg, as EarIY
and Anderson were much further apart
than Wellington and Blucher. III pre-
Ccdent were wanted. IL would not nave
been necessary. however, 10 go PACK 10
;be Napoleonic wars. In 1855 HOOKER
dressed the Rappahannock. with Inc
larger part of his army, az a iora, anu
ordered Sedgwick To- cross with the re-
noin6er lower down, and join MN al
,baucellorsville General LIE left Ear
~ with n small force 10 hold SedSwlck III
heck. and defeated Hooker before sedS-
wick was able to give him any help' lie
then turned on Sedgwick and drove nm
over the river. in 1862 In the Shenandoah
Valley, two armies undcr Fremont ahu
Shields. were copVerginS on Jackson ana
expected to envelope him. win ce-
Ierlty that recalled Castigiioni and IFveh'
ne turned on Fremont and delivered
staggering blow; then crossing the Sneh-
audoah he struck Shields another tHat
sent him I'm full retreat down the Valley.
WHAT JACKSON WOULD HAVE DoYr.
The difference between the conduct Of
Jackson NJ Port Republic and Sheridan
at Strasburg would seem 10 solve the
doubt suggested by General Grant III his
memoirs. whether Jackson would nave
achieved his reputation If lie had met
Sheridan I'm the Valley. General sheridan
gives as a reason Tor his retreat IRON
Cedar Creek a dispatch hom General
Grant. dated 18th. which he received Cd
the morning of the 18th, informing MN
that two divisions Of infantry-some cav
olrv-with twenty pieces of artillery, had
zone TO Early 1t directed Sheridan TO
bc cautious and ACT ON THE DEFEN-
SIyE until movements here force them
TO detach to send this way.
The operations at Petersburg were not
as successful as had been anticipated.
Gereral Grants instructions We're eV.-
IDENTIFY based on the supposition that the
reinforcements from General Lee Wou4u
have reached Early before Sheridan re-
reived his dispatch. He did not know
that Anderson had halted some days IN
Culpeper. Even on the morning they
we're received Anderson must have stu
been east of the Blue Ridge. II EarIy
was no stronger then than he was Wheh
Sheridan took command at HalltoWn
clearly Grant could not have meant TO
suspend the order he had then gwen
to drive him south. But to take defen-
s.ve position is one thing; to retreat is
another. Grant never ordered a retreat
GRANTS INSTRUCTIONS IGNORED.
A commander in Sheridan's position
must exercise = large discretion instruc-
tions must be construed In accordance
with their sense and spirit. If they show
on their face that they are based on
false theory of facts they should not be
executed when they are received. General
Sheridan knew from what direction An
derson was advancing lie told Halleck
that me knew it the day before he re-
crivcd Grants dispatch. But General
Sheridan has entirely ignored later dis-
patch dfth) from Grant telling him that
only one division of infantry had gone TO
Early. This was received on the 18th, be
fore ne retreated. when Anderson was
fifteen miles away at Front Royal, with
the Massanutton noun tains between him
and Early. Grant said: 1T Is now posi-
tive that KershaWs division has gone,
but no other infantry has. This rein
forcemeni to Early win put him nearer
on an equality with you in numbers than
| want TO see, and will make II necessa-
~ for you to observe some caution about
attacking. | would not, however, change
my instructions further than 10 enJoin
caution" This dispatch admits that he
was aware of Early's inferiority in num-
hers: If he had been equal or superior 10
Sheridan in strength. the accession would
not have put them nearer on an equality,