The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1895-08-11
WOMEN HAVE A
RIGHT TO VOTE
Continued from Page j.

I j IUIeTTEU ITUIII
( doubtful language, because it would be
! the exercise of a power of such
doubtful propriety and validity that any
court would hesitate TO believe that Con-
greSS intended to exercise it Congress
has the right. and exercised their right,
10 say that certain persons should be en-
7 tiled to vote upon the adoption or rejec-
ton of the constitution. This is going
quite asa far as it seems to me that Con-
SreSS under any circumstances is author
lied TO go. To hold that they may go
further and provide for the qualifications
of electors of state officers at one cleo
ton. whom they may select would be
equivalent to holding that Congress would
nave the right to prescribe like qualifca-
tons at any further or future elections
II they saw fit. co not think so far as
the eIecuon or state officers IS concerned
that 1t would be within the power of Con-
Sress TO determine who should vote for
them al any election
A much nicer question, however. arises
as to whether or not Congress has pre-
scrlbed the persons who may vote upon
the adoption or rejection of the cOnSti-
tuition There is no question but that by
the second section of the enabling act
Congress has provided that all male citi-
ZenS who have resided in the territory
FOR one year prior to November. 1921,
snail be entitled to vote on the ratifica-
ton or rejection of the constitution. and
it might be said that this was intended
10 limit the number of persons who
should vote upon the ratification or re-
lection OF the constitution If this were
the only language upon the subject; but
section four OF the enabling act provides
tnat at this same election for the adOp-
ton or rejection of the constitution the
qua nhed voters of the proposed state
snail Vot edirectly for or against the
co nstitutlon. Counsel upon both sides
c'5ncede that so far as the election for
me ratification or rejection of the con-
st1tutlon IS concerned that Congress had
'rne right to fix either directly or indi-
rectly the class of persons who should
vote at that election, and 1 do not think
Congress has attempted to do so. 1t is
quite evident that as TO one class Con-
sreSS directly singled them out, pointed
them out by legislation and it would
seem also to be clear from section 4 Of
the enabling act that they intended that
another class whom they did not attempt
to designate directly should also be al
loWeu 10 vote at that election. 1t is
claimed by the defendant that even If it
be true that the qualified voters men
toned in section 4 were to be deSigna ted
by the action OF the constitutional con-
Nentlon itself, that still by the prOViso to
section II of the schedule. the cOnstitu-
Llonal convention has designated the
same class that are mentioned in sec
ton : of the enabling act. and that no
others are therefore entitled to vote. Tho
canon of construction that the express
slon or one thing is the exclusion of the
others, is relied upon in this instance
ard it is claimed that the constitutional
convention having declared that all male
citizens over the age of twenty-one years
who have resided in the territory for one
year prior to such election are hereby
authorized to vote for or against the
adoption of this constitution and for the,
state officers herein provided for, that
they have excluded all other classes. The
oiInculty about this argument is that the
clause Just cited occurs in a prOviso to
section II. The maxim relied upon as
understand 1t never is applied to a pro-
the effect to make a pr @Vts9 re nSsG
the general clause to restrain or qualify
or explain the preceding matter. and it
IS confined to what precedes it unless it
clearly appears to be intended to apply
to some other matter. 1t is construed in
connection with the section of which it
forms a part, and it is substantially an
exception to it. See Sutherland on Statu-
tory construction, sec. 223.
In the case of the Savings Bank VS..
227, speaking of the office of proviso
III that case where a construction was
claimed very much like the one claimed
by the defendant here. the court saws:
THE broad construction of the proviso
contended for makes it plainly repugnant
10 the body of the act, and it is there
fore inadmissible.''
In the case at bar. section IL of the
schedule provided generally for an cleo
ton for the adoption or rejection of the
constitution and for state officers. fixes
the time that it shall be held the man.
ner in which it shall be held. and that
returns shall be made, but fails to state
what persons shall vote at such an cleo
ton If left without anything further
1t would follow naturally that all per-
sons qualified under the constitution to
vote would constitute the class of per-
sons entitled TO vote at that election and
none other; but the provisO is added for
the purpose of adding another class, to
the electorate provided for by the con-
sututlon; and to hold that the proviso
excludes all other classes as above
stated would be to hold in effect that it
repealS the general clause. which is a,
construction that is inadmissible Sec
ton IA of the schedule provides that the
election shall be held by the qualified
voters OF the proposed state. There was
much said in the argument as to the
meaning of the term qualified voters OF
the proposed state" which occurs both in
lne enabling act and in the constitution.
1t is contended on behalf of the plain
tiff that it refers to that class of per-
sons who are qualified according to the
grant of the electorate franchise con-
tanned in the proposed constitution itself
and on behalf of the defendant that it
refers to those persons living within the
territorial limits OF Utah who by the
existing laws of the territory and of Con-
greSS are qualified voters. 1t seems to
me that the term clearly refers to those
persons who are by the constitution OF
the proposed state designated as cleo
tors Looking at the entire scheme for the
change of government it resolves itself
into TINS that Congress has provided for
the organization of a convention who
shall frame constitution and submit lie
TO some class of persons for their adop-
ton or rejection Congress it is true has
stated that certain persons must be per-
United TO vote at that time, and that
certain other persons are also permitted
10 vote, 10 De designated by the cOnSti-
tutlonal convention. 1t would seem quite
natural that where a social compact in
the nature of a constitution IS to be
submitted to persons for their adoption
or rejection, that it should be submitted
TO all those who will be called upon to
assume the duties and responsibilities OF
electors under it. As is we'll said in the
case OF Blair V. Ridgley, Al, No. III, the
people of the state in a political sense
are that portion of the population upon
whom political duties and responsibili-
ties are devolved. In the state of Utah,
as II is 10 be organized under the pro-
posed constitution the political RESPONSE
DllltleS and duties are to be deVolved
upon both men and women if they pos
sesS the requisite qualifications of citi-
zenship and residence. 1t would seem
therefore naturally that that class upon
whom such responsibilities and duties are
to be devOlved should be the class to de-
terInine whether or not they will accept
t. L think this was the design of Con-
sress in providing for the holding of
state election at the same time as the
election for the adoption or rejection OF
the constitution. 1t was for the purposes
Of that election considered that the con-
sututon should be treated as in force,
and it must be so treated.
We must go to the constitution to de-
-ermlne who shall be elected, to deter
mine what their qualifications shall be-
10 determine from what particular parts
)r portions of the geographical area OF
The state they shall be selected, to deter
mine their tenure of office, to determine
the compensation. to determine in a large
their duties, and it seems to mo
IA turally to determine who shall elect
Them. In other words the question as to
who shall be elected what they shall be
elected for. and who shall p1eot thar,