The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1895-01-27
MOSBY ON SHERIDAN.
TIE SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAM
PAIGN REvIE WE'D.
The Operations of Mosby and His Men.
sheridan la "a led and Distressed
ny Their Constant Attack.

ana west Virginia, were consolidated. ah'
General Sheridan was placed Ia command
of the whole. Augur commanded the
troops belonging TO the defences OF Wash
ington. ana the line OF the Potomac 70
the mouth OF the Monocacy. Wallace at
baltimore guarded the line OF the Baiu-
more and Ohio railroad as lar
as Monocacy Junction. Stevenson
al Harpcr's Ferry, commanded the
troops that were guarding the ca
nal ana the railroad west OF no
nOcacy 10 MariibSDuTg. The army wllich
IL was intended that Sheridan shOnid ieai
10 the field had been under General HUNT
.r. who hac Just returned ifom ms an
successful. expedition against AyhchOurs'
II was now resting at Iaiitown, two or
three miles south OF Harpers cry. In
the Shenandoah valley. 1t was thought
mat authority over ali the troops IN THIS
territory woJid insure unity Of action
when centred in a single head, and enable
the army Of the Shenandoah 10 be quick
~ reinforced, either for offensive or de-
fensIVe purposes. = here were such IacIH-
ties for rapid concentration that the scat
tered forces constituted SO many reserves
on wh.ch its commander could draw. The
handed py Genera Early: It hsd lately
returned from a demonstration on VAST
ingtou. ana "A few days before mad again
m,,.4c ~ i'cuf.loa 80 90. tIy 20 uO. ana -
cavalry had gone into Pennsylvania. The
shiit.ug OF tine scene and INVASION, OF the
North by a portion OF an army whose
surrender had been deily expected. created
not only as.onisnmen,, bat severe criii-
cism Of the military policy OF the Ad-
minISiratiOn ri Washington. The sud
den transformation WAS more wonderful
than the Illusions of the stage. ana
scarcely has a parallel in war. Mr.. Lin
coin tclcg3aphed Grant TO leave enough
troops IN front Of Petersburg to hold his
entertainments. ana with the rest ~ come
TO the defence Of Washington. General
Grant thought IL would look too much
like confession % failure If ne came
in person. Lut detached troops that barely
arrived in time 10 save the city, the
object OF kaI,y's movement was 10 create
"A diversion. The troops detached IRON
The Army of tho Potomac 10 defend ash-l
ington followed Early TO Tie ShehanIodh
VALLEY ana united there With Hunter.
On tine 10Th sheridan moved south, and
Early formed line OF battle at WIN
chester. Sheridan sayh, in his memoirs,
tnat ne always made the confederate
army his objective point and that he had
hoped Early would make stand at WIN
chester. He did not. however, move al
rectly against Early on this occasion. On
the contrary. ne Demonstrated around
Edrlys hank in the direction OF Front
Royal. 1 am not now crittcisins his
tactics or strategy, but his accuracy as a
historian. Eariy Iell back. ia order 10
cover his fine Of retreat to Fishers Hill.
where the Valley Is narrower than at
and it would be more difficult
TO turn his fanks. Sheridan says that
his object was to destroy Earlys army,
and not. by banking It out of position. to
run a race with IL up the Valley. But
the record shows that he did the very
thing hG says he did not mtend to do. anu
tnat his claim in his memoirs ito have
almost annihilated Early's army" Is not
on fact.
I'll RID,H 55.61S; EARLY, 17.i9j
The Inspection reports for August, 1864,
show that sheridan had J66lS present in
the Held Tor duty. of tins ia,36I were cav
s,ry At the same time Early's total
OF infantry exclusive of Kershaw. who
was not In the battle OF Winchester was
1905. Win kcrsnaw, 1T was i,iS5.
Pond. In "The Shenandoah Valley Cam
pai;u." estimates Earlys total effective
strength at 100 including. Kershaw 5
division: without kershaw. 1875.
IL appears. therefore that at the battle
OF Winchester Sheridan cavalry corps
alone was about equal to Early's total of
All arms. sheridan cavalry largely eX-
ceeded the number of Earlys infantry.
me inspection reports Tor October Slst
,Rfter all the battles give Early II 1888
present FOR duty, not including his cav
airy. The most OF these troops returned
by rail TO General Lee I'm December. The
nj. nptN hn
troops with Sheridan in the field. lie
had under him in his department total
present Tor duty OF yi,O25 at that time.
WHAT GE'NT ItALLY wtN1ED
Now the defeat of Early's army was
altogether Il secondary matter with
Grant What Grant really wanted was
for sheridan to repeat hunters enort TO
get possession of Lynchburg and Lees
line of supplies. with the canal and
railroad leading to Richmond in posses
sion OF the enemy, General Lee could not
hold 1t "a day. ON the contrary. II Sheri.
dan accomplished this object. IL made
very little difference whether Early was
beaten. or pushed south without accept
INK battle. The end accomplished would
be Just the same, The most effective co
operation, then, he could give General
Grant would be 10 get in the rear OF
render or retreat. ON the 18th Sheridan
advanced 10 Cedar Creek. there was some
diminishing of outposts about Strasburg.
Grants instructions were: Bear III mind
the object is TO drive the enemy south,
ana 10 do this YOU want 10 keep him
always in sight" The enemy was in
sight the only way 10 drive MIN south
was 10 move on. Sheridan halted. II
Grants plan had been executed. Richmond
would have fallen in Augut. 1854 Sheri-
dams hesitation al Cedar Greek saved II
eight months-that Is. assuming that with
hts great superiority in numbers he could
have defeated Early at Fishers llill and
advanced into the interior OF the State.
4 new factor now entered into the Shen-
andoah campaign. General Lee had de-
trcneG Anderson. with Kershaw's division
OF infantTy-FitZ. Lees two Drigades OF
cavalry-and Cutshaw's battalion OF ar
tulory. ana placed him In observation at
Culpcper. Hampton's division OF cavalry
had also started 10 join him, but had been
recalled '"rhe object" said General
Lee To Hampton, lis to threaten the
enemy > iiank and rear should he move
across the Blue Ridge into the Valley. and
10 retain his force about Washington. 1t
~ d. rable that the pressure OF the
troops In that region be felt, and should
the enemy move up the Potomac, leaving
his capital uncovered. that the cavalry
cross the Potomac. II practicable, east OF
the Blue Ridge. Should the enemy's cav
airy be concentrated in the ,aley ours
must meet IL. ~ IL cannot cause It's with
drawal by other operations" These in.
s'ructions are dated the nth. the day
after Sheridan moved from Harper's Fer
~ south. General Lee. evidently. az the
time OF writing did not know of II. on
the 18th he Informed Anderson who was