Birmingham age-herald., 1895-09-06
BOWLER AND THE BOUNTY The Comptroller Renders an Ad-
 verse Decision E HE REVELS IN LEGAL LORE He First Asserts His Jurisdiction and His Right
 to Refuse Payment. THE CONTENTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION The Ultimate Rights of the Claimants, He Says, Are in No Way Affected,
 for They Have Perfect
 Remedy.
THE CONTENTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION

Washington, Sept. 1.-The much antic ipated decision of Comptroller of the Treasury Bowler in the sugar bounty cases was made public this afternoon.
 The particular case decided was the claim of the Oxnord Beet Sugar company of Nebraska for the payment of DOT ton of the sugar bounty appropriated in the sundry civil bill passed by the last congress. The amount involved in the case was $11,7s2.5O, being the figures of the claim allowed by the commissioner of internal revenue under an appropria- tion of $23S, 900 to pay the producers of beet, sorghum or cane sugar previous to the 2Sth of August, 1894, when the sugar bounty provisions of the Mckin- ley law were repealed. But the decis- ion, of course, involved the constitution ality of all sugar bounties.
 The comptroller first asserts his juris- diction over the matter and his right to refuse payment of these bounties upon the ground of the unconStitutionality of the appropriation. He quotes the de- cision of the court of appeals of the Dis trict of Columbia in suit brought before them by the Miles Plant Manufacturing company of Louisiana for a mandamus to compel the secretary of the treasury and the commissioner of internal rev enue to pay the sugar bCunties provided by the Mckinley law, and holds in sub- stance that that court having decided all sugar bounties to be unconstitutional, it's decision was one of which he was bound to take cognizance. He adds:
 This brings up, therefore, for consid- eration the question whether the comp troller has any power or any authority under any circumstances whatever 10 question the constitutionality of stat o1 !, xxrtfh a "a formalities
 Tt was most vigorously contended that he had not and that any attempt upon his part to do so would constitute dan eprouS uSurpation of power; that the question of the constitutionality of an act of congress could only be decided by the cou $, and that until so decided by the supreme court it was the duty of every executive officer to obey the act, although himself convinced of its un7 constitutionaity."
 He quotes many decisions on this point and says:
 From all these cases the conclusion
 is irresistible that the duty of the ex- ecutive officer is to obey the law; that the constitution is the supreme law, ana so are statutes passed in pursuance thereof; that statutes which do not con form to the constitution are not law, and therefore when a statute is in apparent conflict with the constitution it becomes the duty of the executive officer to de- termne for himself as between the statute and the constitution, wherein the statute is the law"
 He further. argues that while in the ory every executive officer, however sub- ordinate is obliged to obey the law, whether the constitution or the statute, vet practically a mere subordinate off1- cer who acts under the orders of a su- perior, who is bound to determine what the law is, may be justified in following the directions of his superior. In de- ciding questions involving the settle ment of public accounts the comptroller is not subject to the direction or any su- perior upon whom he can throw the re- sponsibility of determining what the law Is. That question was finally settled by the act of March 30, 1868, incorporated in section 191 of the revised statutes, which. modified to meet the changes in the accounting system made in the DOCK cry act still remains the law.
 'The comptroller" he says, "has never claimed to be invested with any judicial power, by virtue of which he IS author ized to hold and treat an act as uncon- stitutional otherwise than is any supe- rior executive officer charged with the responsibility of ascertaining what the law is in order to guide his actions.
 "Rut." he says, "the comptroller is an executive officer whose duties require the exercise of judicial functions Tn the highest degree" Exercising those func- tions Comptroller Bowler cites as strange fact that until the so-called cod fishery bounties-if they can be consid- cred as bountes in fact. which is se- riousIy doubted-no direct money bounty act has ever been passed by congress un- til the sugar bounties or the Mchlniey act Replying to the position assumed hv the defenders of the sugar bounty that the power to appropriate IS abso- lutelv in congress; that it is political. power not cognizable by the courts anu that this lies with the'peopie at the poiis if it's use exceeds constitutioHai ii'h''s' he says: 4. ,, tain this proposition. The power to ap- nropriate is co-extensive Wlth the bower to levy taxes The approprlation is the means by which the purpose TOT which the tax is ievied IS carrleu out, Until. therefore there is the power 10 tax there cannot be the power to appro- priate." .,, .>,o .;,4 case has been presented in which It was held. or even suggested, that II mat fer had been originally beyond the pow ar of the legislative body because in vio- lation of the constitution the legislature hv a subsequent act could have made It valid.
 "The contention that moral obliga- ton existed authorizing congress 10 make the present bounty app oP. |',oii' rasts upon the alleged fact that by a sudden repeal of the bounty provisions of the Mckinley act an injury was done to the sugar producers, who believed that they would receive the benefits of that bointy, if not for the full period of time therein named, at least for all that had been earned under it's provisions prior to it's repeal, and for the crop which at the time of the repeal was actually grown, but not yet manufactured. But it must not be overlooked that if the Mckinley bounty was unconstitutional wrong was done to the people, whose money was paid out of the treasury without