Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1895-11-17
GEN. MEADE'STEMPER
IRIS IRREGULARITIES MADE HIN An
ENIGMA.
what Dana Wrote About It-A vote
from Mr.. LlncoIn-GeneraI H"iiech
md the Tcsty Comm"n"e'-"""
His Own Course.

cu,,ari,ies OF temper. to draw 1T mildly
were such as to make him something Oh
an enigma. even to his closest associates
I'm the Army OF the Potomac which he
commanded from Gettysburg to the closr
OF the war He was singulariy iretiui
mana most trying characteristic always
and especially in one occupying h'sh
com,nand-and often INDUCED on the
slightest provocation in very unpaiatapie
language toward those with whom ne
came In contact. This Feasibility OF tenn
per made him many enemies In the army
IL IS generally understood that az one
period personal dislike OF General Meaue
was almost universal among the officers
Of higher rank. Hon. Charles a. DANA
who as Assistant Secretary Of War was
with the army during the early days
at Petersburg, in one OF his reports to
Secretary stanton made the following
vigorous statements concerning Geherdi
Meades faults OF temper:
CITY POINT, VA. July 7. 1851
Hon. r. VI. Stanton. Secretary OF War.
A change in the commander OF the
Army OF the Potomac now seems proba-
BILE Grant has great confidence IN Meade
and is much attached 10 him person
ally. but the almost universal
dislike Of Meade which prevails among
the officers Of every rank who come III
contact with him. and the difficulty OF
doing business with him felt by every
one except Grant himself, so greatly I'M
pair his capacities for usefulness and
render success under his command so
doubtful that Grant seems to be coming
10 the conviction that he must be r.
llevcd. ! have long known Meade
10 ~ a man of the worst possible temper
especially toward his subordinates. 90
not think he has a friend in the whole
army. No man, no matter what his busi-
ness or - service, approaches nm
without big insulted In one way or an
other. and his own staf-oflicers do not
dare TO speak 10 him unless ilrst SPOKEN
to, for fear OF either sneeTs or curses.
The latter, however, ] have never heatu
him indulge In very violently. but he Is
said 10 apply them often without occa-
sion and without reason.
Toward the end there Is discernible a
modification OF the bitter feeling against
Meade: nevertheless IL is certain that he
never became a popular commander either
with the officers or men OF his army
though his military capacity was recos-
niZed and respected by all
While Mr.. Dana's Characterization of
General Meade's dctatorial manners UNI
doubtedly conveyed the truth 10 the Sec
rotary of War. and accurately diagnosed
the feeling toward him in the army. II
vet appears that In carrying forward MS
military operations this hot-headed COM
mander. SO quick at trigger in personal
matters, never acted upon impulse, and
never lost his equipoise; every movement
in important or dangerous crises seems to
have been dictated only by the most cool
and dispassionate judgment SO tenacious
and clear of purpose was he that no
amount OF pressure or nagging from his
superiors could sway General Meade 10
act against his judgment OF the necessi-
ties OF n given military situation.
This surprising characteristic in so ir-
ritable and passionate man had two re-
markabe Illustrations during General
Lees mystifying flank movement from
the Ranidan toward Washington In the
fan Of 1868 General Meade. finding the
Confederates on his right flank, and
| threatening his communications with
/ Washington, fell back rapidly from the
| line Of the Rapidan, first to the Kappa
/ hammock. and ultimately behind Bull Run.
/ concentrating his army In the vicinity OF
! Centerville II was then we'll known that
| General Lee had recently detached Long
/ street 70 the assistance Of Bragg at Chat
! tanooea and that consequently he was
still probably inferior In strength 10 the
! Union army. although that also had been
/ reduced BY two corps. sent TO reinforce
/ Rosecrans. after the battle OF Chicka-
/ manga The Washington authorities,
therefore. correctly viewed General Lee s
advance as a big bluff" which ought 10
be called" and constantly urged Gene
raj Meade to make a stand and fight.
LINCOLN'S NOTE.
In a short note TO General Halleck, the
Federal reneral-in-chief, dated october
| g. 1863. President Lincoln, touching upon
/ the situation as he understood II, and
| pointing out the probability OF General
! Lees lnfcrlority OF numbers. closes with
the following eminenty Lincolnian sug-
| gestiOn.
II General Meade can now at
! tack him 0.ee) on a field no more than
! equal for us. and do so with all the skill
and courage which he, his officers, and
| men possess the honor will be his II ht
| succeeds. and the blame may be mine II
he fails.
Yours truly. \. LINCOLN
In deep anxiety TO impress General
Meade with the importance OF immedi-
ately attacking General Lee, the Presi'
dents letter was transmitted by Hallech
| to the front by special messenger, Col
| onel Cults OF his STAFF. As the Presi
dent and hi military advisers al Wash
incton could have had but little accu'
rate knowledge of what was passing
with great rapidity from hour TO hour
at the front and hence were in mea'
sure Incapable OF judging OF the chances
OF success in collision; and. therefore
declined TO assume the responsibility,
Of making direct order for an al
tack, this urgency on the part or his
superiOrs must have been excessively eN
asperating 10 the Union commander
the more so because II was his distinct
purpose to deliver battle upon the first
favorable opportunity. But General Lee
had projected his movement so unexpect
eClv and prosecuted il with such energy
and rapidty as 10 leave General Meade
for a time In almost complete darkness:
as TO his enemy's whereabouts and ul
innate purpose. He was unwilling. there
fore through undue precipitation, &c
take any chances OF repeating the appall
ing Federal blunders and disasters OF th'
ureccdinr year on this very ground.
The war records make It perfectly clear
now that General Meade lost grea'
opportunity in this short campaign, fol
II appears that General Lee was far In
( ferlor In strength 10 the Union army
The very holiness Of his movements wa;
calculated 10 conceal his numerical weak
! ness But with the meagre knowledge
Meade possessed OF Lees movements hi
was undoubtedly justified In line o
action which Rad the appearance Of
timidity. II General Pope, In the cam
paign OF 1852. also several days in isnor
/. Ia .Nffs .F4.l la