Fort Worth gazette. [volume] (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1891-1898, 1895-10-16

ffANf u t7Nts ~ ~ AtNlkf NlUhIttlt. nnW-
ever, for IT says that EVERY vote. reso-
oiution or order requiring the concur
renee OF both hnuaea OF the legislature
snail before IL takes effect be presented
TO the governor for his approval, and
the same rules shall apply to a vote,
resolution or order as required by
the next preceding section in. refer
enoe TO n bill"
Why use the additional expression. I
Shall before II take eftoct'' when
speaking of "a vote, resolution or or
der and omit II when referring to a
"bilr'? II cannot be said that both Sec
tons mean the same thing, though diff
ferently expressed, for the variant lam
guage evinces purpose and dclibera-
tion.
Besides. our constitution. in article Q.
section !, says, the powers of govern.
ment shall be divided into three de-
partments--those which are legislative
Into one. those which are executive in
TO another, and those which are judi
cial Into another: and that none of
the powers properly belonging to the
one shall be exercised by the other"
Judge Roberts In the case of Houston
Tap and Brazoria Railroad company,
"A Tex, 1856 says; each of these de-
partments Is absolutely Independent OF
the other. and that when one assumes
power not belonging to 1t, its acts are
void and not binding on the other de-
partment."
This being the plain letter of the con.
stitutlon. as well as the judicial con-
struction Of II, how can 1t be claimed
that the governor can perform "legs-
lative functions?" our constitution has
also provided for the passage of
laws under its appropriate head of
Legislative department" and under
another and separate head Of the "exe-
cutlve department" provided for 'exe-
cutive" action, seemingly for the pur-
pose OF giving effect to each provision
of the constitution and of keeping
separate the different departments.
The constitution of West Virginia Is
exactly like ours in separating the de-
partment of government and distrib-
utlng its powers" and In providing
for the passage OF laws" under the
head of the Legislative department"
and for the approval of laws" under
the head Of the executive depart
state I'm passing upon the question here
Involved in the case OF Mounts vs..
the state (36 w. Va.). IA S. Il. Rep, 707
says: ut is claimed that the word
passage" In article g. section 30. w.
Va. constitution, which reads mo act
of the legislature, except such as may
be passed at the first session OF the
legislature under this constitution
shall take effect until the expiration OF
ninety days after its passage" means
the final act Of approval by the gov
ernor, superadded to the affirmative
vote Of the two houses.
Under the constitution of this state
the three departments-the legislative,
executive and judicial-are required to
be Separate and distinct, so that Meth
er shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to either of the others" The
governor has no legislative functions
to perform. His approval of the law.
passed by the legislature 1t Is true,
gives II vitality as "a law, but should
he decline to approve II, bare ma
jorlty in each of the two houses may
pass the law over his veto, thus show
ing that 1t was not intended that he
should have any legislative power, not
even the casting vote. His veto
amounts to an appeal for reconsid-
GRAFTON" by the legislative branch, and
not defiance of the passage of the
bill. Our constitution carefully dis
tingulshes In its phraseOlogy between
the passage" Of law and its ZAP
proval by the governor" II nowhere
cOnfounds these terms. The functions
of the governor. in SO far as they effect
legislation, are contained in an entirely
different article under the head Of the
Executive department" to that con-
corning the passage Of laws.
interpret this action of the gov
ernor to be deliberative but not legls-
latlve. The approval of a bill by the
governor relates back to the passage"
OF the act, and the period OF ninety
days is computed from that time, for
the reason that that was the con-
olusion OF the proceeding that was leg
islatiye. In this respect we are gov
erned by those authorities. which un-
der the constitution OF certain states,
Tennessee for example, require each
act to be signed by the respective
sneakers before II becomes n law. (Sec
= NAfnnlfnalF RnNt Oh
that case It was held that the signing
by the speaker related back TO the date
of its passage, and gave the law
validity from that date. We think
the analogy in this case and the rea-
soning more applicable to our own
constitution and Its Interpretation than
the cases cited from the supreme court
of the United States" II would seem
that this decision settles two PROPOSE
lions adversely to the opinion of Judge
Hurt, viz: /. That under constitution
like ours the governor does not eX-
erlcise Legislative power" when he
approves an act and 2. That II he does,
his act relates back to the date of the
passage" OF the law and that the
act is "passed" at the conclusion OF the
proceeding which was legislative.
Again, II Judge Hurt is correct In
saving that the non-approval and non
dlsapproval of bill by the governor
for ten days is equivalent TO "ap-
provnl," then the ten days has refer
ence to n time when the legislature is
I'm actual session" Bowen vs.. People,
p N. Y. 52l.
The case of Fowler VS.. Pierce, Cal,
l65, to which Judge Hurt refers with
approval. says that lin approving a
law. the governor acts as component
part Of the law-maling power but this
nower Is unit, though distributed,
and the parts can only act In unison.
| Whenever part ceases to act, the
| whole becomes imperative. The exc
| cutlye act owes It's vitality 10 the eN-
istence OF the legislative body. Upon
| the adjournment OF that body the pow
err ceases. and all acts of a legislative
nature are void,
To the like effect Is the case of Har-
| dee VS.. Gibbs, so Miss. sos. and Cooley
| Const Lin, sec 10s.
There was no necessity for Judge
| Hurt to decide that when the gov
| ernor approves a law. he exercises
| legislative power" for the two bills he
| was considering had never been "ap-
| proved" There was no action on the
| mart of the governor, but instead non
| action, and as Judge DEMO says, there
| is uuite a distinction"
! II Judge Hurts contention Is correct
viz: that ''non-approvRl' and "non-dls-
! anproyal'' OF a law at the right time,
| ana which would be during the act
uaI' session Of the leglslature--is