The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1895-02-05

army In the valley or Nlrklh'h va" -
n.arily. after making Washington cry
secure against any attack by early "
move IL South until Il should cut 'he
Central railroad, the orange ana AieN-
andr,a railroad the James River anu
Kanawha canal and the Virginia ana Ten
nessee railroad at Lynchourg. Ih'S wac
strategy OF the FIRST order, ana IL INC
plan had been carried out II must nave
forced General Lee 10 abandon i'''
rnopd and Petersburg In the summer VI
early fall OF 1864. But. although She'i'""
had an army OF $500 men present TOT
duty. while Early had 10 oppose him only
II on ne marched backwards ana lot
wards with this huge force. sometimes
,p the Valley. then In retreat
almost back 20 the Potomac uh-
III 81 became evident That the
unnermost thought in his mind was now
ne might protect himself against Early
and not how he should brush Early out OF
the way and go forward with the exeou-
ton OF General Grants plans. 1t Is I'M
possible 10 read the evidence which Colo
mel Mosby coIates from the records WITH
out having this conclusion irresietapiy
forced upon the mind.
The second point is this: II General
Early had not. unfortunately. sent ker-
shaw's division back to Richmond
day or two before the battle OF Nlnches-
ter the chances are ninety-nine In one
hundred that. Notwithstanding the I'M
mense disparity Of forces. even when Ear
~ had Kershaw. he would have given
sheridan a disastrous defeat In that
battle. winchester was one OF INC
most stubbOrnly contested pa'''''
of the war. 1t is iact' anu
/ sheridan comedies H. that at one
time in the battle Early had pierced
| his centre and he had brought up MS
last reserves. Had Early had kershd"
on the field then to throw upon thesc
last supports that Sheridan could IN
v,,I,o. the result could not have peeh
doubtful. When it is remembered 'hd'
Early with only 1900 men, was bringing
! an army of 5000 II these straits III an
au-dav contest in open fields, when AT
last terminated in little more than a
/ draw. one is lost in admiration Tor the
| heroism of the one commander ana MS
army and in contempt for his adversary
In sending Kcrshaw 10 Early General
Lee had. unfortunately, given Early
discretion whether he would Keep MN
in the Valley or send him back. sheridan
had shown SO much vacillation and imld-
itv since he had been in command OF
. the Valley army, that Early had plainly
become a. little over-conhdent. ENer-
! cising the discretion. then, with Which
General Lee had clothed him, he ordered
Kershaw to return to General Lee al
Petersburg q few days before sheridan
attacked him at Winchester. 1t was a
most generous and magnanimous act upon
| Earlys part. to which few commanders
OF whom history gives w. any account
would have been equal. But 1t was
| most unfortunate one, and very possibly
| changed the whole complexion OF the
! war. No man can say what the result
would have been If Early had routed
! sheridan at Winchester, as he most as
! si,rcdly would have done If kershaw had
been there. and had Immediately followed
| it up with an occupation Of Washington
The third point brought out by Colonei
Mosby, with great modesty but win
great power, is the invaluable service
which a small partisan force can render
| against an invading army, when led by
an energetic, restless, enterprising com
| mander The unceasng war which Mosoy
! kept up on Sheridans communications
| and supply trains quite paralyzed ms
army and almost tied him to the vicinity
| Of the Potomac river. II we had mad IN
! the Southwest a partisan band Ike Mos
| by's. led by ii commander ike Mosby 10
| operate upon Shermans communications
! In his advance to Atlanta, it is our dellb-
! crate belief that General Johnston would
! have utterly destroyed Sherman's army
H. the heht Of the developments ThCn
Il csc publications of Colonel Mosby are
throwing upon the operations of 1861, We
are disposed to think that the W-ole
theory of the Confederacys defence
against the Unions invasion was wrong.
1t should never have tied itself 70 Nlcn-
moud ass the point Of operation. klcn-
mona COull always be dltdNhft ~ ga
army whose base rested upon udewater,
whence an abundance of supplies could
be always drawn without the slightest
risk. This was an element of incalculape
weakness TO the COnfederacy, and OF m
! calculablc strength to the Union. But
If the Confederacys capital had been al
Iynchburg. long lines of communication
would have had to be maintain ed to sup
Ply an invading army. Upon these cease
| less war could have been kept up by par
! Isan bands, that would have done the
invader as much harm as the armies II
his front. We are satisfied now that we
see what Colonel Mosby really accom-
plished by way of embarrassing Snerl-
den. that the Confederacys true pohcy
was to have kept itself well inside OF IT'S
territory. and to have had a considerable
army of partisan rangers to war upon
the communications of the invaders.
Finally. now that intelligent historical
criticism has really taken mold OF Sheu-
dan and his performances there Will not
be enough OF him and them lett to make
a striped jacket for d circus clown.
HORRIBLE SHOWING FOR THE SOUTH
...to.,,c,,t ,o,,,.e ,,,t f,or, NNaeb-