The San Francisco call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1895-1913, 1895-08-17

H. Herman, the first venireman exam
ined, stated that he would not under any
circumstances bring in verdict of guilty
on circumstantial evidence. He was ex-
cused on the challenge of the prosecution.
A. Burnham was challenged and ex-
cused on the ground that he had an
opinion on the case which could be re-
moved only by the strongest kind of evil
dence.
John L. Herget, the "Young MITCHELL
of the paImy days'of the prize-ring, stated
that he had formed a strong opinion on
the case.
"We have tried Durrant often at my
place of business" he said.
He was challenged by the District At
torney and excused.
A. Lemaire was against capital punish
ment under any conditions. and was
promptly challenged and excused.
T. }. Eagan, a grocer at 933 Greenwich
street, was the possessor of strong opinion
on the case, for which reason he was ex-
cused, as was also M. Mohr, bookkeeper,
resiuing at 2218 Van Ness avenue.
s. Trip, an ex-employe in the railway
mail service, residing at 131 Valencia
street, was excused by reason of the fact
that he was not on the last assessment roll.
n. Bullerdieck, hay and grain dealer, re-
siding at 1873 Seventeenth street, was chal-
lenged by the defense on the ground that
he possessed strong opinion on the case.
He was excused, and j. E. Marks and W.
G. Copeland were challenged and excused
on the same ground.
Some little interest was created in the
examination of A. S. Levinson, the venire-
man examined next. In answer to ques-
ton by the District Attorney he stated
that he would convict on circumstantial
evidence, but would require that that evil
dence establish the guilt of the defendant
IN his mind beyond possible doubt
When he had gone this far the court took
him in hand.
do l understand you to saw" INQUIRED
his Honor, chat your mind would have to
be satisfied to the demonstration of a GER
tainty in the matter2"
well" was the reply, almost to q GER
tainty.'
Mr.. Deuprey next took him in hand.
Under the law" he said, "a reasonable
doubt is defined as follows: 1T is that
state of the case which, after the entire
possession and consideration of all the
points, leaves the minds of the Jurors in
that condition that they cannot say that
they feel an abiding conviction to moral
certainty, of the truth of the charges
Now, that is the doubt you spoke Ola
reasonable doubt?"
Eyes, sir" was the reply.
NOW then, If they proved to you be-
yond such doubt as l have defined that
the present charge that you are to try, if
you should be sworn as juror, would you
acquit?'
II think I would
In other words, if you were satisfied be-
yond that doubt which have now defined
to you, and as plainly presented by the
law. you would convict?"
well, yes / would" was the reply.
"What meant to convey was that where
the evidence is circumstantial it would re-
quire stronger evidence to convince me
than where it was direct"
1--WE deny the challenge" said Mr..
Deuprey.
What did you mean to say in answer
to question of mine that you would not
be satisfied with moral certainty2"
"Well, would not feel morally certain
unless it were beyond almost probable
doubt. I should require more positive
ciecumstantial evidence than would d.
rect"
Mr.. Levinson was questioned again by
Mr.. Deuprey and Judge Murphy, his
Honor finally allowing the challenge and
the defense noting an emphatic exception.
D. ]. McAuliffe, a decorator and painter,
residing at 1882 Sixteenth street, was ex-