The sun., 1895-02-05

A
cumstances. The merits and drawbacks oi
particular ships or classes Of ships can also
be noted, and in countries where strategical
maneuvres are carried on upon large
scale useful hints are derived a. to the legis-
lation needed to secure naval defence.
T show the extent OF these annual ma
npuvres IL may be mentioned that 109
British ships took part in the manmuvres
OF 1887. 90 In those Of 1888. 112 in those
OF 1889, so in those OF 1890, 78 in those Of
1891, 92 in those of 1899, 80 in those OF
1893, and 90 in those of last year. Ex-
tensive mobilizations are also found in
the man1uvres OF the French, Italian,
German, Russian, and other navies. France
sometimes has two sets OF summer manpu-
vres, one in the British Channel or the North
Sea, and the other in the Mediterranean. As
to the practical lessons learned, the problems
solved, the experiments tried, and the prop
ositions tested in these manpuvres, It
would take pages to describe them. OF
late years also the questions involved have
often become very practical. For n single
example, last summers mannuvres around
Ireland were made to simulate hostilities,
which would show the needs OF Gibraltar as
repair station and rendezvous in the case
Of certain hostilities between the Mediter-
ranean and Channel squadrons OF France
and England. The value Of torpedo boats is
a frequent subject Of consideration.
or course, man1uvres on the extensive
scale just spoken of are not to be expected
in our navy. or our few ships in commits
sion great part are usually scattered on
foreign stations, while of the remainder
only portion belong to the North Atlantic
station, and thus far ships that make their
rendezvous at Mare Island have never been
able to have feet maneuvres. However, IL
strategical maneuvres are out of our reach,
tactical manpuvres are possible, and these,
as Lieut.. j. c. CoLwELL has recently said,
serve no less valuable purpose:
"The units of a fleet require exercise together for
the that such training required by the
units OF regiment before Il be cassed superior
TO mob The individual worth OF the men OF n regi-
mcnt the ships OF feet may be great but II they
lack the training which would enable them to act In
concert their value lost should the warfare extend
beyond guerrilla work In the case single cruiser
raids or scouting In the other. Mobility OF a fleet in
war is as much necessity ia that OF regiment in
the field, and assembiage OF ships whose officers
have been insuficently trained In tactical evoutons
would In action, be quite dangerous each other
and "a little worthy OF consideration by trained
snemy as would q regiment Of rinemen whose drill
had never extended beyond the manual OF arms.
"A proper appreciation of this has led busine esslke
powers to concentrate their naval strength fleets
which constantly drilled at steam tactics that |
their officers may acquire the OF handling ships
with slacrty precision and safety. when at high |
peed in the close proximity to each other which
always prevail in fleet mansuvrng or cruising In |
To what extent Admiral MEADE's fleet can |
carry out tactical mannuvres remains to be |
seen. But all the vessels are modern steel |
ships, and, with the single exception of the
Atlanta, may be classed as fast cruisers.
This fact should promote the value and sue
less of the exercises.