St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1895-04-28

The British are evidently appre-
hensive Of trouble on this score, as
indicated by the cablegrams from
Colon, showing that the three vessels,
the Royal Arthur, the Wild Swan
and the Satellite, have been so placed
as to command the. town
WITH THEIR GUNS.
1t is probable that this disposition
has been made so as to insure the oc-
cupying forces, numbering about 400
armed men, from an attack by the
Nicaraguans, rather than with any
deliberate purpose of bombarding the
town, for there is no evidence that
the British desire to advance into the
interior at present, and it is certainly
not part of the original programme
of operations, as made known to our
government, to lombard the place.
The news of the situation at Corinto
created a commotion here, and partic-
ularly in the state department. Sir
Julian Pauncefote, the British am
bassador, came to the department,
and after remaining in private con-
sultation with Secretary Gresham for
a short time, the two repaired to the
war department to consult with Sec
rotary Lamont. The latter was abb
sent at the time, but coming in later
repaired Immediately to the state de-
partment, and talked over matters
with the officials.
Later on, the news came to the
department through the Associated
Press from Colon that the Nicaraguan
government had made a sharp move
by declaring Corinto
A CLOSED PORT.
This was evidently a disturbing ele-
ment in the calculations, for Assistant
| Secretary Uhl was at once dispatched
| to the British embassy to confer with
Sir Julian Pauncefote, most unusual
| proceeding in department etiquette.
1t is said at the embassy that Sir
Julian Pauncefote, the British ambas-
sador, had not received confirmation
from the foreign office of the occupa-
ton of Corinto up to the close of the
embassy at clock. The embassy
did not expect direct information
from London, as it is said the foreign
office has no occasion to communicate
with the British representative at
Washington.
There can be no doubt that the
action of the Nicaraguans in declar-
| ing Corinto a closed port has seriously
complicated this most troublesome
question, and even if there is no re-
sort to hostilitieS at present it opens
a prospect of alarming events in the
future, which may be, and in fact are,
even regarded as likely TO
INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES.
directly in the affair, in spite of the
earnest disposition of the administra-
ton to avoid the ENHANCEMENT. The
action means that no goods can now
be entered at Corinto, a port which
has heretofore received over half of
the imports into the country, without
violating the national law of Nlcara-
qua The British may collect duties
| If any goods enter the place. But
the latter would be liable to seizure the
| moment they crossed the British lines
into the interior. They must do this
| to find market, for the coast being
unhealthy, is thinly populated, and
| the great consuming class of the popu-
| lation lives in the interior.
! The first effect of the decree closing
the port, therefore, will probably be
| to divert nearly all, if not the entire
! import trade of the place, to San Juan
| del Sur or perhaps Realajo, sea port
| near by for it is improbable that
many merchants: will take the chances
of getting their goods into Nicaragua
! through the British lines, under the
| circumstances. t-t
In this case, the length of the stay
of the British at Corinto is problemat-i
| ical conditional as it is upon collect
+, ing enough revenue from customs to-
make good the indemnity demanded.
| But another consideration arises at
/ this point, for our government, has
| been assured that the occupation will
not be permanent, and indeed the
| first paragraph of the
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY i
;expressly pledges Great Britain against
any occupation of Nicaragua territory
! So the problem will arise now to coli
lect the indemnity within a reasonable.
| time. This may be settled summarily
| by simply extending the occupation
and blockade beyond Corinto so as to-
| included all the Pacific ports of
| Nicaragua. From the disposition
shown by the Nicaraguans at present
this can be done only by force, and it
! is likely to add very largely to the ex-
pense already incurred in the collec-
/ ton of the indemnity, which will surely
! be added by the British to the original
sum. This course, moreover, would
! seriously embarrass the commerce of
! the United States, and on this point
| Great Britain has given Secretary
i Gresham certain assurances
Another manner in which the British
may be able to secure their ends is by
a prompt declaration of war, and an
| INVASION OF NICARAGUA,
involving the capture of the capital,
Managua, and the imposition upon
| the Nicaraguans of the British terms
as the price of pebce.
1t may be that the British govern
ment will be driven to the latter course
in interests of trade, our own as well
as that of her own merchants, which
she is bound to safeguard. If, goods
entered at Corinto after payment of
! duty to the British occupants should be
| seized in the interior, the owners, Brit
| ish or American, would have a very
I good claim for reparation. The only
/ question is as to whose duty it would
/ be to secure this, whether the United
States would feel bound to intervene
! in the case of an American merchant
| in such case, and therein lies one of the
| factors which may involve our country
directly in the. dispute. 1t. has been
asserted as a hard and fast rule of in
ternational law that duties cannot be