The Hawaiian gazette., 1895-11-08

conIact III question aud the managrI
OF the plaintiffs business. This was
also apparently the finding OF fact by
! the trial Judge, who disposed of tn.
point on the question OF law. The
argument Is that the statute is suffi
cientiy complied with by u claim for
"msterials" only, and that the words
"lumber and hardware NAV be
treated n surplusage.
\ partial enumeration which pur-
ports To be complete enumeration is
worse than none at all, because IL is
misleading See Whittier v. Mill
Co, so Am. st. Rep. wash l49
Ana even II claim merely for ina
terlsis' We're sufficient, there would
be considerable ground ior limiting a
| person who did not make such claim,
To the claim actually made. He
ought not to expect more than he
clsims, especially n his claim Is mis-
leading.
But, is a claim merely for "msteri-
ais sufficient? The statute requires
that the mo ice shall set forth the
amount OF the claim, the labor or una
terisl furnished, a description Of the
property sufficient To identify the
ebN obhti uctrSSATN
10 clear understanding of the same"
Many statutes elsewhere upon this
subject require full or itemized &C.
count, but our statute, like some 9TH
ers, does not go so far. Iu Lenkey v.
Wells, Is New. al, the statute re-
quired the material man TO ii le claim
containing u statement Of his de-
mand." The lien was claimed Tor
al aterial, To wit: lumber, doors,
sash, blinds, mp.dings, castings aud
mill work The Court held this
sufficient description, rs il showed the
"nature aud cha acter" of the de-
mand. That our own statute does not
require full itemized state
ment Is implied ny the re-
quirement of Section 5, that "tne
defendant shall be served with a de.
tailed specification of the claim, pro-
vided that no such specification shall |
have been furnished before proceed
ings were commenced"
Ii seems 10 us, however, that the |
nature or character of the materials |
should be shown. The statute re-
quires the notice to "set forth
the material furnished. Tnis means /
more than that the claim may be sim. |
ply for "material 1t means at least |
that the class or kind or nature of the |
msterial should be shown. Tue pro-
vision that the notice shall set forth |
ANY other matter necessary to a
clear understanding of the same"
also bears out thus construction
While the words descriptive of the
materials furnished should be con-
strued literally, yet no materials
should be included which do not fair
ly come within the generally accept
ed definitions of those WORKS.
The statute is artificial, arbitrary.
1t gives materisl-man exceptional
but it gives these only on
that he shall comply with
the terms of the statute. The statute
provi les that the "lien shall not at
tach" untless notice, OF the character
described, is filed. As has been al.
ready said, the statute is TO be strict
" construed. 1t is in the power of
the material man to give proper des-
cription of the materials he has sold.
II is reasonable IN require him TO do
-, in view of the extraordinary favors
extended TO him a nd this should be
in justice To the owner, pur.
'hasers, incumbrancers, other mate
aud all other persons whose
interests may he affected 10y the lien.
The reason has greater force when, as
n this case, the materials ara fur
lishei, not TO the owner himself, bu.
o the contractor and perhaps without
my knowledge on the part of the
'wner. See Russell V. Bell, A Pa. st. !
4; Phill., Nee Liens, Sec. $40 If the
leu We're claimed 10y the contractor
or all the abOr AMI material furnish
d for a building under an entire con
ract, more general description
night perhaps be sufficient under the
tatute.
We find no ground for disturbing
he Judgment a. against the de'endant
sedward, but a. az tiust the defend
ut Hawaiian Lodge the judgment is
et aside aud u new trial ordered