The record-union., 1895-09-06
Comptroller of Treasury Bowler
DispOses of the Matter
BY REFERRING THE CASE TO THE
COURT OF CLAIMS
The Particular Case the Claim of the
OXnard Beet Sugar Company of
Nebraska for tho Payment of q Por-
tIon of the Bounty Appropriated in
the Sundry Civil Bill Passed by the
Last Congress.

Last Congress.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 5.-Tbe long-ex-
pected and much-anticipatedd decision OF
K. b. Bowler, Comptroller OF the Treas
ury. in the sugar bounty cases was made
public this afternoon. The Comptroller
refers the whole matter to the Court OF
Claims for adjudication. The particular
case decided was the claim of the Oxnard
Beet Sugar Company OF Nebraska for the
payment of portion OF the sugar bounty
appropriated in the sundry civil Dill
passed by the last Congress.
The amount involved in this case was
only Sl1,7S2 80, being the first claim al
lowed by the Com missioner of Internal
Revenue, under an appropriation OF
S23S, 900 to pay the producers of beet,
sorghum or cane sugar previous to the
18th of August, 1894, when the sugar
bounty provisions of the Mckinley law
were repealed. But the decision, OF
course, involves the consttutionality of
all sugar bounties. The Comptroller
first asserts his jurisdiction over the mat
ter and his right to refuse payment of
these bounties on the ground of the un-
constitutlonaiIty OF the appropriation.
He quotes the decision OF the Court of
Appeals of the District OF Colum bia III a
case brought before them by the Miles
Plant Manufacturing Company OF
Louisiana IOr ulandamuS to compel the
Secretary OF the treasury and the Com
missioner OF Internal Revenue to pay
the sugar bounty provided by the Nc
kinley law and holds in substance that
that court having decided all such
bounties to be unconstitutional its de-
cision was one OF which he was bound to
TO take cognlzance.
lie adds: This brings up, therefore,
for consideration the question whether
the Comptroller has any power or au-
thority under any circumstances what
ever to question the constitu1ionality OF a
statute passed by Congress. 1t was most
vigorously Contended that he had not
and that any attempt upon his part TO do
so would constitute dangerous usurpa-
ton of power; THAI the question OF the
constitutionality of an Act OF Congress
can only be decided by the courts, and
that until so decided by the Supreme
Court il was the duty OF every executive
officer 10 obey the Act, although himself
convinced OF its unconStltuilonality."
He quotes many decisions Oh this
point, and says: From all these cases
the conclusion is irresistible that it is the
duty of the executive officers to obey the
law: that the Constitution is supreme,
and so are the statutes passed in pursu-
ance thereof; that statutes which do not
conform to the Constitution are not law,
and therefore when statute is III appar-
ent conflict with the Constitution il be-
comes the duty of the executive officer to
determine for himself the constitutional
ity of the statute"
He further argues that while In theory
every executive officer, however subordi-
nate, is obliged TO obey the law, whether
the constitutionality is questionable or
not. in deciding questions upon the set
tlement of public accounts. the Comp
troller is not subject to the direction of
any superior upon whom he can throw
the responsibility of determining what
the law is. the Comptroller" he says,
mas never claimed to be invested with
any judicial power by virtue of which he
is authorized to hold or treat an Act as
unconstitutional, otherwise than is any
superior executive officer charged with
the responsi biiity OF aScertaning what
the law is in order to guide his actions.
But the Comptroller is an executive OIL
Ger, whose duties require the exercise of
judicial functions in the highest degree"
Exercising those functions, Comptrol-
Ter Bowler cites as a strange TACT that I'M
| less the social led cod fishery bountieS can
be considered as bounIies in fact, which
is seriously dou bted, no direct money
/ bounty Act has ever been passed by Con-
press until the sugar bountieS of the Nc
kinley law.
Replying to the position assumed by
| the defenders OF the sugar bounty that the
| power to appropriate IS absolutely in
Congress; that it is a political power not
cognizable by 1.-The courts, and that the
correction lies with the people at the polls
/ if its use exceeds constitutional limits,
he says: ''N o authorities are advanced
to sustain this proposition. The power
TO appropriate is co-extensive with the
power to lay taxes. Unless, therefore,
there is the power TO tax, there cannot be
the power 10 appropriate. The conten-
tiou that moral Obligation existed, au-
thorlzing Congress 10 make the principal
bounty appropriation rests upon the fact
that upon a sudden withdrawal of the
bounty an injury was done to the sugar
producers who believed that they would
receive the benefits of that bounty, if not
for the full period of time therein named
at least for all that had been earned under
It's provisions previous to its repeal. But
it must not be overlooked that if the Me
kinley bounty was unconstitutional an
injury was done to the people whose
money was paid out without their au-
thority. The papers in the principal case
will be returned to the Auditor,tor trans
mission by him, through the Secretary OF
the Treasury, to the Court of Claims,
| under Section 1862. for the rendition of a
! Judgment, as required by the provision OF
j Section 1868, OF the Revised Statutes, in
| order that there may be furnished pre-
| cedent for the future action OF the execu-
/ tive department IN the adjustment of the
/ class of cases involved III these sugar
! bounties."