The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1895-09-06
BOWLER'S BOUNTY DECISION.
PAPERS IN THE CASE TRANSMITTED
TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

eisiOn of the Court Of Claims Either
Party May Appeal to the supreme
Court OF the United states for a
Final Decision of the Matter.
Washington. Sept, 5.-The much antic-
ipated decision Of r. b. Bowler, contron-
er Of the treasury in the sugar bounty
cases was made public this afternoon.
The particular case decided was the claim
Of the Oxnard Beet Sugar Company of
Nebraska. for the payment Of a portion
of the sugar bounty appropriated in the
sundry civil bill, passed by the last con-
gress. The amount involved in this case
was only S11,7S2.50. being the first claim
allowed by the commissioner of internal
revenue under an appropriation Of S28S.OOO
to pay the producers Of beet, sorghum or
cane sugar previous to August 2s 1885,.
| when the sugar bounty provisions OF the
Mckinley law was repealed. But the de-
cision, of course. involves the eonstitu-
tionality of all sugar bounties.
The controller asserts his jurisdiction
over the matter ana his right TO refuse
payment of these bounties on the ground
of the unconstitutionality Of the appropri-
alton. He quotes the decision Of the court
of appeals of the District of Columbia
in a suit brought before them by the
Miles Plant Manufacturing Company Of
louisiana for mandamus to compel the
Secretary Of the Treasury and the collec-
tor of internal revenue to pay the sugar
bounties provided by the Mckinley law,
and holds in substance that that court
having decided all such Dounties TO be
unconstitutional its decision was one of
which he was bound to take cognizance.
He adds:
This brings up, therefore, for consid-
Grafton the question whether the con-
troller has any power or authority under
any circumstances whatever to question
the constitutionality Of a statute passed
by congress with all the legal formal-
ties"
II was most vigorously contended that
he had not, and that any attempt upon his
part to do so would constitute a danger
Gus usurpation Of power; that the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of an act Of
congress could only be decided by the
courts, and that until so decided by the
supreme court 1t was the duty of every
executive officer to obey the act. although
| himself convinced of its unconsututional-
ity. He quotes many decisions on this
point and says: From all these cases the
| conclusion is Irresistible that It is the
| duty Of the executive officer to obey the
| law; that the constitution is the supreme
law and so are statutes passed in pur-
suance thereof; that statutes which do not
conform to the constitution are not law
and therefore when a statute is In appar-
ent conflict with the constitution II be-
comes the duty of the executive officer to
determine for himself as between the
statute and the constitution where the
statute is the law"
He further argues that while in theory
every executive officer, however subor-
dinate, is obliged to obey the law. whether
constitution or statute yet practically
a mere subordinate officer who acts under
the orders of a superior who is bound to
determine what the law is may be justi-
fled in following the directions of his SUI
perior. In deciding questions upon the
settlement of public accounts the con-
troller is not subject to the direction
of any superior upon whom he can throw
the responsibility of determining what
the law is. That question was finally set
tied by the act Of March 80, 1865, incor-
porated in Section 191 of the Revised
Statutes, which, modified to meet the
changes in the accounting system made
in the Dockery act, still remains the law.
The controller" he says, has never
claimed to be invested with any judicial
power by virtue of which he is authorized
to hold and treat an act as unconstitution-
al otherwise than is any superior execu-
tive officer charged with the responsible
ity of ascertaining what the law is, in or
der to guide his actions. But" he says
'the controller is an executive officer
whose duty requires judicial functions in
the highest degree"
Exercising those functions, the control
Ter cites a strange fact, that unless the
so-called cod fishery bounties can be con-
sidered as bounties in fact which is Sc
riously doubted, no direct money bounty
act has ever been passed by congress un-
til the sugar bounties of the Mckinley
act
Replying to the position assumed by the
defenders of the sugar bounty that the
power to appropriate money is absolute
ly in congress; that ii is a political power
recognizable by the courts and that cor
rection lies with the people at the polls If
its use exceeds constitutional limits, he
says:
mo authorities are advanced to sus-
tain this proposition The power to ap-
propriate is co-extensive with the power
to lay taxes. The appropriation is the
means by which the purpose FOR which
the Max is levied is carried out. Unless,
therefore, there is the power to tax there
can not be the power to appropriate"
He proceeds as follows: mo single case
has been presented in which il was held
or even suggested, that, If a matter had
been originally beyond the power Of the
legislative body because in violation Of
the constitution the legislature by a sub
sequent act could have made it valid
The contention that a moral obligation
existed, authorizing congress to make the
present bounty appropriation, rests upon
the alleged fact that by a sudden repeal
of the bounty provision of the Mckinley
act an injury was done to the sugar pro
'ducers, who believed that they would re-
ceive the benefits of that bounty, if not
for the fun period of time therein named.
at least for all that had been earned un-
der its provisions prior to its repeal and
for the crop which. at the time Of the re-
peal, was actually grown, but not yet
manufactured. But it must not be over
looked that If tho Mckinley bounty was
unconstitutional a wrong was done to the
people whose money was paid out Of the
treasury without their authority.
The theory which rests at the basis Of
this moral obligation is the repeal OF a
constitutional act. If the original act
was null and void because unconsti
tutional, the cessation Of payments there
under because Of its repeal would be no
different from the cessation Of payments
because the act had been held unconsti-
tutional By the supreme court. If the
A.