The Anaconda standard., 1895-04-23
HERE is The DECISION
The Full Text In the Northwestern
Bank Dickerman Case.
PART OF AN ANSWER NULLED
For Some Time the Question Has
Occupied the Time of the Local
Courts and Much Interest
Was Taken Therein.

GREAT FALLS, April 22.-The following
Is the full text of the decision in the case
of the state ex rel. the Northwestern Ma
tional bank VS.. A. E. Dickerman as
county treasurer:
The motion of the plaintiff to strike out tina
part OF defendants answer specified in the mo-
ton on file coming on to be heard. after argu-
ment by Messrs. Lyter & Greene in favor oft
motion. and A. j. Shores, In opposition
thereto, and due consideration,
1t is ordered. that such motion be, and the
same is hereby granted. c. j. BENTON.
Judge.
Memo: The controlling question in the case
Is the effect Of the bill passed by the legislative
assembly, approved Feb. Is, 1895, IAN act to
authorize the board Of school trustees of any
school district In Montana to repay from the
proceeds OF the sale OF bonds any money hereto
lore loaned or advanced 10 IL for the erection Of
school house or school houses in such dis
trict."
Other questions we're involved in the case and
were urged at the hearing Of the motion to
strike out, but II the enabling act above re-
ferred to Is constitutional such questions are
not material In deciding the motion
The defendant urges that such act Is uncon :
stitutional under section IS. article Is, of the
constitution, which provides THAT the "legisla-
tS tive sansn assembly sha! pass no. laws for
any individual or association of individuals ret
respective In Its operations, or which imposes
on the people OF any county or municipal sub
division Of the state new liability In respect to
transactions or considerations already passed"
in that, 1t is Retrospective, and that a school
district is municipal subdivision of the state.
and imposes on the taxpayers OF the district a
new liability In regard to transactions already
had before its passage.
That such an act is not retrospective in its
character is held in Jefferson City Gas Light
company VS.. Clark. 95 U. s. Cooperative
Edition), page 521. The court says: 1.-THE con-
stitutional inhibition does not apply to legsla-
tion recognizing or affirming the binding obllga-
tion Of the state or of any of its subordinate
agencies with respect to past transactions. A
law requiring municipal corporation to pay a
demand which Is without legal obligation, but
which Is just and equltale In itself, being
founded upon valuable consideration re-
ceved by the corporation, is not retrospective 9
law"
The authorities. as to the character Of school
district. are not uniform, but, in my judgment.
the weight Of authority is to the effect that
school districts are not municipal corpora
tions.
The supreme court OF Illinois, in a decision
pregnant with sound and logical reasoning. has
said: "School townships (distrc.s) being Gre
ated and continued only for educational pur-
poses, and not for the purpose OF exercising any
OF the functions OF government, are not munich
pal corporations In either their nature or pur-
pose" People VS.. Trustees, rs Ills 1856.
Judge Dillon on municipal corporations, 3rd
ed, sec. %, says: Corporations intended to
assist In the conduct of local government are
sometimes styled political, sometimes public,
sometimes civil and sometimes municipal and
certain kinds of them. with very restricted
powers, quasi corporations, all of these by way
of distinction from private corporations. All
corporations intended agencies I'm the ad-
ministration OF civil government are public, as
distlngui ished from private corporations Thus
an Incorporated school district or county. as
well as city, rs a public corporation; but the
school district, or county, properly speak ing, is
not, while the city Is, municipal corporation.
All municipal corporations are public bodies
created for civil or political purposes; but all
CIVIL political or public corporations are not
municipal corporations"
The supreme court of Wisconsin in Eato u VS..
Supervisors, etc., Al wis, 4s9. says: I'm the
proviso to section I, chapter fi2. laws 1887 the
word counties OF municipal corporations in
clude cities and villages and any other munich
pal corporation. strictly so-caled. but do not in
clude school districts or other quasi corpora
tions."
In article i2, section z, is found this passage:
"The power to tax corporations or corporate
properties shall never be relinqulshed or sus-
pended, and all corporations in this state or
doing business therein. shall be subject to tax
alton for state, county. school, municipal and
Other purposes on real and personal property"
etc.
Ifit had been the intention of the trainers of
municipal corporations there would seem to be
no necessity for the use Of the word school
In that section. Evidently a distinction was in
the minds OF the trainers OF the law between
''school" purposes and municipal" purposes
Again In section 2, Of article 10, we find this
language:
1.-The property Of the United States, the stat o.
counties, towns, school districts. municipal cor
porations and public libraries shall be exempt
from taxation, and such other property as may
be used exclusively for agricultural and horti-
cultural societies for educational purposes,
places for actual religious wor ship, etc."
Ii would appear that a distinction was majn-
tained and kept in view by the trainers of the
organic act else why the necessity for using the
expressions ''school districts, and smunicipal
corporations?" II school district Is munich
pal corporation. then the words school dis
trict" as used IN that section are wholly inoper-
ative and without force and effect. 1t Is fair TO
presume that both terms would not have been
used had not some distinction between them
bOfh haan "A In yiaw