The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1895-11-06

trolled as TO the ability of q married
woman TO contract, may perhaps be
regarded as obiter dictunl, inasmuch
as the locus doDliciLii in that case
was also the locus cOntrGctuS. See
also 3 An. & Eng. Enc. of Law 573.
/ But it may now be considered as set
| tied by the decided weight Of author
| ity and, it seems to me in coDsonance
/ with the better reasons, that the lea
| loci cOntractuS is generally TO govern
questions OF capacity To contract As
well as questions of the validity OF the
! contract itself. See the leading case
Of Milliken V. Pratt, l25 Mass. 374,
| for discussion of the authorities aud
lucid statement OF the arguments
pro and con, by Chief Justice Gray,
now Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States. See also Ross
V. Ross, 129 Mass. 243; Bell V. Pack
ard, SO NJ. los; Graham V. National
Bank, 81 y. y. 1893; Nixon V. HALEY,
IS III. GIL; Wright V. Remington, Al
y. J. L. As; Holmes V. Reynolds, 50
VT. 80; Story, Conf. of Laws, Sec. 103;
Whar., Conf. of Laws, Sec. 120.
FOurthly, in this case, which is the
locus cOntrdctuS, France or Hawaii,
by the law of which the capacity of
the plaintiff TO make the contract in
question should tie determined?
The locus cOntrdctuS, that is, the
seat of an obligation, may be either
the locus ceLebr0 tiOniS or the locus
solutions, the place where the con-
tract is made or that where it is to be
performed. Whether it is one or the
other in any particular case is ques-
ton Of fact rather than of lava ques-
ton chiefly of the intention of the par
ties. For the validity of "a contract
-, nv 10 wi
to whicp it was made" In general
in the absence of anything showing a
contrary intention, the locus cetebT0-
tiOniS is to be regarded as the locus
cOntructuS, but if the contract is to be
performed elsewhere, this Is regarded
as strong and in some cases conclusive
evidence that the contract was made
with reference to the LeC loci SOLu-
HOniS. For a clear statement of the
law and references to the authorities
upon this phase of the case, see Pritch-
ard V. Norton, 106 L. s. 124.
In the present case, [ find that the
contract was both made and to be per
formed in this country, and hence
there is no occasion to consider any
conflicting views as to whether the
Ter loci ceLe6ratiOnis or the Ler loci
sOLutiOniS should govern for they are
identical in this case.
In the first place the contract was
made here. This is clear both from
the contract itself and from the plead
iDgs.
The contract was executed by Ma
dame Trousseau in Paris, June 10,
1882, and by Mons. Trousseau at Ho-
nolulu, July Is, 1882 But it must be
as completed as a binding
contract at the same time and place,
no
lateral contract. And, since it cannot
have become a contract until there
was a meeting of the minds of the
parties, it must be considered as haV-
ing become binding at the time aud
place where it was last executed, that
is, at Honolulu, the assent of the party
first executing being deemed to con-
tinue until execution by the other
party. If there were two unilateral
then there can be no ques- !
ton that the promise sued on, that is, |
Mons. Trousseau's was made here
The pleadings also show that the |
was made here, for the agree
ment is described in the declaration
rs "made and signed by the said de-
cedent on the 18th of July, AID. 1882"
at which time the document was exc
,uted by him at Honolulu.
In the seconi place the contract was
70 be performed here. On Madame
Trousseau's part, performance, name
y, discontinuance and forbearance,
was to take place here. On Mons.
rrOusseau's part his admission of the
of the claim against him
vas made here; his payments were to
De made to the French Consul
lere though payable ultimately in
Paris; failure on his part to pay
he Consul here is expressly
made a breach of the contract;
payment by him to the Consul
lere would be performance on his
,art whether the money ever reached
Paris subsequently, or not; in case of
lis departure from Honolulu, he was
o notify the Consul here of his pro-
,Osed new residence, and, presuma
'ly, continue to remit to the Consul
lere. 1t may be that the remote mat
er for the settlement of which this
greement was made was the decree
# the French Court, or some other
natter having its seat in France, but
his alone, if shown to be a fact,
you'd not control the other circum
tances of the case, while on the other
and, the Immediate matter for the
of which the agreement
yas made was the suit in the Hawai-
an Court. :
$50, could a separated wife make
ontract of this kind with her hus- .
and? 1t is provided in Section 1889
the Civil Code that whenever
ecree of separation is granted, the
ecree shall have the effect, during
Ich separation, to reinstate the wife,
neither the wrong dOer or not, in the
ght to cue or be sued, to ALLEVIATE
I'd convey property, to make con-
acts, and to do all other acts as if
ne were .feme sole" The question
J, whether this statute is TO be con-
.rued as authorizing contracts with
ny person, according the plain and
atural meaning of the words, or as
by implication contracts
18th a husband.
The statutes elsewhere most similar
, the statute now in question and
hich have been the subject of judicial
are the 80 called married
Omen's acts. Under these acts there
,pD0l IN he ACKNOWLEDGEMENT nf