The daily morning journal and courier., 1894-08-27
TORPEDO BOA Ty 4 FAILURE.
England's Mano, u e.,s of 1894 Make Unfavorsble Criticisms on Them.
 From the London Times1


 From the London Times.l
 A subsidiary feature of the manoeu- vres. of no little interest in itself. Is the total failure of the torpedo boats on either side to put in an effective ap- pearance or in any way to hamper the movements of their adversarles. This Is. of course. partly due to the fact that, owing to the premature conclu- sion of the manoeuvres they had only single night in which to operate. Admiral Fltzroy passed Carnsore Point, where a force of Blue torpedo boats might have been expected to be concentrated, after nightfall on Satur- day. On the same night both Of the Blue fleets were within striking dis tance of the Red torpedo boats sta tioned at Belfast. Admiral Fitz Roy does not seem to have been attacked at all. The c. Blue fleet was not at- tackled at all. but the D Blue fleet was attacked early in the night, apparently without success.
 The Red torpedo boats found Admiral Drummonds fleet, but failed 10 attack 1t successfully. But one division os the Blue torpedo boats met us on Satur- day evening off the Fish Bank. Its leader was informed by the admiral that three cruisers, presumably belong | ing to Admirals fleet had been seen from the signal station at Blacksod Bay at an early hour in the morning land might therefore be expected~t to be 1 in the neighborhood of Belfast during l the night. Here was a case in which the torpedo boats had definite object to look for and definite place in which 1 to look for it. They found three crnis' | CTS under theMull of Galay. and. not | receiving or failing to understand the private signal, they forthwith proceed ed to attack them, Unfortunately the | three cruisers in question turned out to be the Warspite. Australia, and Ga latea, belonging to Admiral Drum lnond's fleet, and, though no ship was | torpedoed, two out of the three torpedo boats were put out of action. the third having previously gone astray. Two points are here to be noted--one that the torpedo boats were operating not at random, but in pursuit of definite object, namely, three enemy ships whose probable position and course were approximately indicated to them | beforehand the other that after all the object. they found was not the ob- | ject they sought, but three friendly l ships whose destruction. had it been accomplished, would have inflicted ir- reparable loss on their own side. This very awkward habit Of mistaking a 1 friend for foe Is one which has often before been exhibited in manoeuvrs by torpedo boats. It is less likely to oc- cur in actual warfare, because nearly all foreign ships, differ very widely in external appearance from any of our own: but its occurrence is regarded by many authorities as sufficiently prob- able, to require that English torpedo boats should always make the private signal before proceeding to extremi. ties. This means, of course, that Eng. fish torpedo boats will never be able tc | attack except under the most 'unfavor. able onditions--conditions so unfav' orable, indeed, as almost to insure theil destruction.
 But those who take this view regard it as a logical deduction from Lord George Hamilton's dictun1 that the tor pedo boat is essentially the weapon 0! the weaker combataiit. So regarding 1t they also regard the almost certain destruction Of an English torpedo boa, by an enemy asSof less moment tc England than the, possible destruction of an English battle ship by friend and they consider that the best way to avert such a catastrophe as the lat
 ter is to require the torpedo boat tt declare itself by making the private signal in all cases which leave room fol more than shadow of doubt. These l VI o1,,o ora ,,nxu fn vdo os thcv xs,i1l ht