The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1894-05-27
THE COURTS DECISION.
Justice Brewer Uphoids the Action of
the Tax Commissioners.

''The decision of the Supreme Court of
the State removes from this case all ques-
ttonS of conflict between the act and the
Constitution of the State, and the only
matter remaining for our consideration is
whether there is in the act as delivered any
trespass upon rights which the federal Con-
stitution secures TO the plaintiff. Notwith-
standing the elaborate attack made both
IN brief and argument upon this act it
seems to us that it's constitutionality has
been practically settled by decisions of this
court, and particularly those in State rail-
lucky railroad tax case dI5. u. s.. S21) In
both of these cases legislation providing
for the assessment of railroad property by
9. State board while all other property. in
the State was assessed by county officials
was held to be obnoxious to no provision
In the federal Constitution. Counsel deny
count of differences between the constitu-.
tions of Illinois and Kentucky and that of
Id bpdt~ ths tbs Of no e f5
Legislature to classify property for taxa
ton and only requiring uniformity as to
particular law operates and that
of Kentucky containing no provision re-
curing taxes to be- levied by q
property. A sufficient answer to this is that
the decision of the Supreme Court in this
tuition of the State of Indiana authorizes
just the method of assessment adopted in
this case.
ut is contended specifically that the act
assessment, in that 1t does not require no
tice by the State board at any time before
the assessments are made final and sew
eral authorities are cited in support of the
proposition that liz is essential to the valid
ity of any proceeding by which the prop
erty of the individual is taken that notice,
at some time and In some form, before the
final adjudication, must be given. But the
difficulty with this argument is that it has
no foundation in fact. The statute names
the time and place for the meeting of the
assessing board, and that is sufficient in
tax proceedings; personal notice is unneces-
sary. In State railroad tax cases page 61O
are these words, which are also quoted,
with approval, in the. Kentucky railroad
ting fixed by law. It's sessions are not Sc
cret. No obstruction exists to the appear
ance of any one before it to assert a right
assessing taxes, this is all that can be
reasonably asked
NOT DENIED A HEARING.
again it is said that the act does not
require the State board to grant to the
railroad companies any hearing or oppor-
tunity to be heard for the correction of
errors at any time after the assessments
have been agreed upon by the board, and
before they are made final and absolute, or
before the final adjournment of the board,
and also that it gives to the board arbi-
trary power to deny 10 plaintiffs any hear
ing at any time. but the fact and the law
both against this contention. The
plaintiff did appear before the board and
was heard. by it's counsel and through o.
officers, and the construction placed by tN
Supreme Court of the State on the act-a
construction which is conclusive upon this
COURTS that the railroad companies are
given the right to be present and to be
heard.
''It is urged that the valuation, as fixed.
was not announced until shortly before the
adjournment of the board, and that no
notice was given of such valuation i'm time
to take any steps for the correction of err
therein. If by this are to under
stand counsel as claiming that there must
be notice and a hearing, after the determi-
nation by the assessing board as we'll as
before, are unable to concur with that
view. A hearing before judgment, with full
opportunity to present all the evidence and
arguments which the party deems import
ant is all that can be adjudged valid
Hearings new trials. are not essential to
due process of law, either in judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings. One hearing if
ample, before Judgment satisfies the demand
of the Constitution in this respect Ii not
infrequently happens in this, as in all 9TH
er courts, that decisions are announced
and judgments entered on the last day of
the term. and too late for the presentation
or consideration of any petitions for re-
hearing or motions 1te, for n q new new trial VIII
thus entered is entered in defiance of the
requirements of due process of law, and
upon the merits of his case is deprived of
the constitutional protection because he is
not beard second time?
because to the ordinary taxpayer there is
allowed not merely one hearing before the
county officials, but also a right of appeal
with a second hearing before the State
board while only the one hearing before
the latter board is given TO railroad COM
panies in respect to their property, there
fore the latter are denied the equal pro-
lection of the laws. If single hearing is
not due process, doubling ii will not make
1t so: and the power of a State TO make
classifications in judicial administrative
proceeding carries with Ii the right to
make such classification as will give to
ings before their rights are finally deter
mined, and to parties belonging to a diff
ferent class only single hearing.
Prior TO the passage of the Court of
Appeals act by Congress, in 1891, litiga-
ton in the Circuit Court. IL the amount in
dispute was less than 5000, was given but
a single trial, and In that court, while If
the amount in dispute was over that sum
the beaten party had a right 10 a second
hearing, and in this court Did il ever en-
ter into the thought of anyone that such
classification carried with Ii any denial of
due process of lawy
ASSESSMENT OF ROLLING STOCK.
Again, the act is challenged as permit
ting the assessment and valuation OF prop
erty outside the State. This contention is
based largely on the provision in Section
50 that the rolling stock shall be listed and
taxed in the several counties in the pro-
portion that the main track used or op-
Grated in such county bears to the length
OF the main track used or operated by