The morning call., 1894-04-25

Sented the Williams IlpifS, IL. Il. Bulk6iey
was retained for the English Savages, II.
E. Highton and ex-Judge Wheeler were
attorneys for the alleged widow, Alice
Edith Dickson Blythe, while Edward r.
Taylor was appointed by the court to
represent absent heirs.
Tue great trial commenced ON July 10,
1889, before Judge Coffey, sitting in the
Probate Court with out a jury, which bad
been expressly waived. Months ard
months went by, and yet the famous liti-
CATION was not over; each claim was
patiently heard and witnesses were sent
Tor high and low, far and wide, to bear
out the testimony OF one or other of the
various claimants. 1t was generally sup
posed that the action was a rich harvest
for he various lawyers engaged, but on the
word of the trial Judge this was not so, a 8
no fees have been allowed save only in
exceptional cases. and then not on behalt
of any collateral claimants to the property.
Finally the trial came tn an end, and on
July 81, 1890, Judge C,ffey rendered the
most ample and elaborate opinion yet filed
in these courts In this opinion the Judge
discussed the claims of Florence Blythe,
Alice Edith Dickasen, the Williams heirs.
the Blythe Company and the Kentucky
Blythes. Only the two firSt-named claims
had any especial prominence in this de-
ciSioD, and they were most deliberately
discussed. Judge Coffey cited various let
tiers alleged 10 have been written by Blythe
to Julia Ashcroft, the mother of the claim
ant, who. of course, was the principal wit
ness in the case.
In the end, after discussing synchron-
isms and anachr0nisms, statements and
contradictions. resem blances and dissimi-
larlties, evidences reco ncilable and irrecon-
cilable, Judge Coffey came 10 the con-
clusion that Florence Hinckley was the
illegi,imate child OF the deceased Thomas
II. Blythe. The Judge said: "All that the
law OF California requires is such recogni-
ton and acknowledgment as have been
here established in evidence. Whatever
might be the law of England or of another
country or State, it cannot control the
canons of descent in California;
are solely dominant. The Civil Code
of California bestows upon plaintiff the
capacity of heir; if the acts of decedent
have been proved it follows that she is his
heir. l. is the statute of California that
is under discussion. and our statute settles
the question. If l have correctly appre-
hended its meaning there is no room for
further discussion"
The claim of Edith Alice Dickinson,
after careful consideration. was dismissed
by the Judge in these words: "Ths may
be case of hardship. but it is without
legal merit. The claimant was not the
wife and is not the widow of the decedent."
L
edged by the court to be the next of kin,
save that Florence, as Blythe's daughter,
stopped the way to their success.
The Blythe company was dismissed on
the ground that its case did not present
the characteristics of the real Thomas IL.
Blythe, and as to the case of the gypsy
Blythe claimant. Judge Coffey said it was
like Scotch verdict-"not proveu."
From that day to this the matter has
been before the courts. Many months of
last year were occupied in the hearing of
various motions for a new trial on the part
OF various claimants, and Judge Coffey
created a sensation by briefly denying
them all Immediately upon submission.
Then the case was taken TO the Supreme
Court Interminable briefs were fled
but the Williams claim, the admittedly
strongest of all next to that of Florence
by being denied at the close of last year.
paved the way for the all-important deci-
sion to follow.
It came yesterday. At about a quarter
to 4 o'clock the great decision was filed in
the Supreme Court. the particular appeal
upon which the general decision was
grounded being that of the Blythe Com
pany.
The opinion delivered in the case OF the
Blythe Company opens with the following
significant words: "a number of other
appeals, taken by various other defend
ants, were argued and submitted al the
time of the argument and submission of
said appeals herein decided; and said
other appeals will follow and be deter
mined by the conclusions arrived at in this
present opinion"
Then, again, after a general history of
the case, and of the establishment of the
various claims, the court says: The fact
being established and unassailed that none
of the defendants except the Williams
olo iyr,o 10 or m m N lie 70 oil tn ar In
any manner akin TO said Thomas H.
Blythe, deceased, the appellant is in no
position TO inquire about any errors which
the trial court may have committed in ar
irving at the conclusion that respondent is
the rightful heir" In fact, SAYS the court,
these appellants have no legal status III
the case.
''The predecessors of appellant acquired
a status in the court below by averring a
| claim to the estate founded upon a certain
| alleged kinship to the deceased; but the
| court having found that there was no such
| kinship, and that finding not being contro-
verted, the appellant has no status here.
Having no claim Of kinship. ownership
| or interest In the said estate, the appel
liant is not a arty agGrieved' within the
meaning of sections 657 and 93S of the
| Code of Civil Procedure, and is not preju-
diced by any ruling or judgment. made or
rendered touching the rights of respondent
or of any other claimant"
Then follows a digest of the evidence
produced at the trial of the case, with the
| contentious made by the various appel
lanis. VERY powerful arguments" says
the court, ''are made 10 the point that the
| evidence is insufficient to warrant the find
ing that respondent is the child of the de-
cedent. The question here now is not
whether the Judge of that court weighed
the evidence with absolute accuracy and
arrived at the only conclusion justly pos
sible-the same conclusion to which any
her Judge or jury would have been
forced to come. The question is: Was
there such a manifest conflict of material
evidence on the point as threw the deter
miDation of the fact, under the established
rule, entirely within the province OF the
trial Judge?
ut is needless TO cite here the numerous
decisions of this court to the point that we
cannot disturb a finding of fact by jury
or trial Judge which is the result of the
consideration as evidence which is really
and materially conflicting. finding
should not be disturbed whatever we
might think of the preponderance of the
evidence where there is presented a tair,
reasonable ground for difference OF opln-
ion. and where a conclusion either way
could not be considered as the necessary