The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-09-19


Mcclellan disappeared as a figure of
historical consequence with Lincoln's or
der relieving him from command. This
order, dated November 5, 1852, was written
from date to signature by Lincoln's own
hand. Mcclellan took credit TO himselfin
after years for not heading q mutiny of his
troops. He said: MANY were in favor OF
my refusing to obey the order, and of
marching upon Washington to take pos
session OF the government"
There Is probably some truth, but not
much, in NJ cClelian's pretense that moth
ing but his patriotic seli-restraint pre-
vented mutiny and march on Washing
ton. the upsetting of Lincoln's administra-
ton and the elevation Of Mcclellan to
dictatorship. A few reckless, hot-headed
young officers. personally devoted TO the
fortunes of the fallen chief, quite likely
gave such counsel to Mcclellan. General
Siokles. number of years ago in a speech
before the Army Of the Potomac at De-
troit, Mich, asserted that on the march
from Washington 10 Antietam a number
throw Lincoln. Stanton and the Repub-
liean congress into the Potomoc and pro-
claim himself Dictator" but that McClel-
Ian refused to seize the opportunity.
Beyond the counsel OF obscure and pas
sionats personal adherents, ii is not
likely that Mcclellan was urged to ''dis-
obey the order OF removal, march on
Washington City. and take possession
of the government" Gems. Franklin.
Porter and Smith, OF McClellan's corps
commanders, were politically hostile to
Lincoln's administration, but they were
all men of too much sense to have given
Mcclellan such suicidal counsel, and such
men as Gems. Sumner, Couch. Hancock.
Reynolds and Humphreys were incapable
of such treason to the government
IL every corps commander in the Army
OF the Potomac had favored il the volun-
teer army of that date was too intelligent
in its loyalty 10 have listened to such
coansels for a moment. Mcclellan was
not Cromwell or Bonaparte and the Z nited
States was not England OF the seventeenth
century nor France Of Bonaparte's day.
There never was general in the Army Of
the Potomac who could have successfully
played the part OF "ths man on horse
back" with his troops. Lincoln knew this
when he issued his order of removal; he
knew when he read McCleilan's famous
letter from Harrison's Landing that the
commander OF the Army Of the Potomac
had become mere military tool of
copperh-ad Democratic politicians. He
knew the people we're behind the admins.
tration. and because be knew this be Was
not afraid of the empty mounting. of Nc
Clellan or Seward or Chase. lie felt SURE
he could rule his cabinet and that he could
discard Mcclellan or any other faetious
military Incompetent or mslcontent when
be ceased 20 be useful. lie knew that no
inscisnt, unrsady creature had the stuh in
hirn for dictator. and he knew that even
n he had the courage TO turn traitor his
army would have risen 90 arrest him ia
hi. camp. as did the army Of the French
Rspubsic when Dumouriss turned traitor.
This dictator" talk was a,wsys on the
lips Of Democratic eongrsSxnaen after
Burnside. great defeat al FreasFleksbarg,
Dscsmeer Is is62 Every hotel in WASH
ington City was fun OF stay ~ home
rangers" praying that Burnside would
march ca Washington City and quarter
his army there for the winter. Lincoln
had evidently heard Of this. for he ssernly
said 30 Hooker when BE appointed Aim 30
command. Give rs vsctory and ! viii
take care Ct ths Dictatorship" Llneola
trusted the American people behind the
array; hs trusted the American people IN
the army. and because Re trusted them he
treated wsth oontesnps tie talk Of MoC.el-
ssn's PETTY psrtfssns concerning dictator.
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