Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1894-12-19

kIiHj OK JuElICC NtSEtftts VCt0st sssS 1870
of Common Pleas. In 1870. The verihca-
tion had then been made In substantially
the same form by John Evans, and en-.
tirely on information and belief, without
giving the source Of his Information IT
the grounds. Justice Merritt's attorney,
Francis II. Cutting. moved to quash the
charge, but the Court decided against
him.
I'VE consider ourselves bound BY this
decision" continued the Chief Judge,
"and we hold that the verihcation 10 SUI
fcient."
He then took up the different charges.
The Court, he said, was unanimously Of
the opinion that the general allegations
OF neglect Of duty and inefficiency. and
that Justice Diver had worked but NIFTY
SIX days. were sufficient to put him to
defence.
A police Justice is made. by Special
provision OF the statutes, preserver Oh
the peace, and empowered to prevent ar
trays. This IL his official. duty. OF the
bench as well as on II. The charge or be-
ing involved In public brawi Is conse-
quently material.
Judge Barnard held that II was proper
20 discharge a policeman for misconduct
while OFF duty and In citizens clothes.
The Court unanimously held that as a
police Justices duty Is more grave than
that of a policeman, so breach OF the
peace becomes a more serious oHence on
the part OF the higher officer and JUS
tice Diver must show what mitigation
or palllatIon there was for his conduct.
The Court also agreed that the OFFER OF
rewards TO captains OF election districts
would be- IL proved. ground for removal,
and was. consequently. properly made.
The majority OF the judges. however.
h. oil n k0.lt imQtlCl
DIVERS afllation with the green goods
gang" should be stricken out as 1t re-
ferred 10 a time before he went into
Office. The complaint was allowed to
stand with the exception OF this one
charge.
JUDGE PRYOR'S COMMENTS.
Judge Pryor read an independent opin-
ion, commenting on the election incident
and dissenting from his colleagues on
the propriety of hearing the green
goods" charges. He said:
THE improperly Of Judge OF q higher
court taking an active and ostentatious
part in n political canvass is manifest
and universally recognized; because such
conduct tends TO impair his impartialty
and efficiency In the judicial office. by
subjectlng him to the bias OF partisan
influences. and exposing him in his de-
cisions TO the suspicion Of prediction for
his political associates and prejudice
against his political adversaries. Hence,
in re Eaves. a Federal Judge declared that
a commissioner should not be an active
PARTISAN
IF active partisanship be Incompatible
with the functions of higher Judge,
much more mischievous is 1t In police
justice. who. from his inferior education
and character. is more easily swayed by
improper motives: who. by the knowledge
and control of the criminal class incl
dent to his office. is armed with the power
Of sinister ascendancy over electors the
most susceptible 10 vicious influences.
and who will be tempted to a lenient
treatment of culprits in requital OF votes
cast in conformity to his will and in
furtherance OF his interests. or all func
tionarics a police Justice is precisely the
one who should most scrupulously abstain
from the contentious of party politics.
But more Is implied In the charge
under consideration. 1t is alleged that by
the offer of bounties and positions the
respondent stimulated the political lead
ers of the district TO a competitive strug-
gle for the greatest majority Of Demo-
cratic votes. Mindful of the class TO
whom this incentive was applied we
see at once It's pernicious tendency to
fraudulent practices in the election, II.
indeed, II be not an open invitation and
encouragement TO such practices.
I'm my Judgment the conduct imputed
to the respondent by this charge is male
feasance in Office. and If established by
evidence would alone require his removal.
THE fourth charge accuses the respond
ent Of completely in the system of swind-
ltFae Had I.fp "a
Of affording in his safe hiding-place
for the plumber of the outlaws.
WOULD JUSTIFY REMOVAL.
"Manifestly. the thing here imputed 10
the respondent was not an official act and
apparently it was done before his appoint
ment to Office. But what Of that? Is IT
TO be argued that the being O thief and
the associate Of thieves Is not fatal to
the efficiency OF a poice-justice in the
discharge Of his duties? And. though the
crime was committed before his incum-
bency. 1t matters not. for the very occu-
pancy Of the Office by a conscious criminal
Is Itself malefeasance In Office.
Nor may II be contended that the APP
pointment of the respondent condones the
offence beyond our power to adjudge 1t
a ground of removal. The allegation is
that the offence was not disclosed until
after the appointment; but, II known be-
fore. the conscious concurrence OF the
appointing power In elevating a criminal
TO the bench. instead Of effacing his crimi-
nality. would only give him an associate
criminal.
"To urge that a thief may not be re-
moved from the bench because his crime
has been discovered since his appoint
ment is an argument of no effect upon
my understanding. a criminal dispensing
justice to a feilow-criminal is not only
a contradiction in terms. but an intoler-
able scandal in a civilized community.
In my opinion. the fourth charge pre-
sents matter which. II proved, would not
only Justify but require the removal Of
the respondent"
Judge Pryor said he wished to be under
stood that he had not prejudged Justice
Diver, whom he believed to be innocent,
as no proof Of guilt had been offered.
Judge Daily said new charges could be
preferred If there was any evidence of
the Justices affiliation with green goods"
men since his appointment to office.
The points having been settled, Mr..
Rollins filed an answer. in which Justice
Diver denied the charges.