The record-union., 1894-10-26

S.ooo ? III the sun at the depot and until
they were finally dismissed.
The depot may be approached by three
or Jour different streets, leading to it di-
rectly or indirectly. There seems to have
peen no organized plan and no consider
atlon OF the adyisability of marching
against the depot in parallel column of
aIeacK, so that on arrival a strong line
might have been Immediately formed
ana sufficient force of skirmishers
thrown forward.
1t appears that the strikers had publicly
announced, and that General Sheehan
was FULLY satisfied, that no resistance
would be made to the occupancy of the
depot by the troops, and he So informed
General Dimond and General Dickinson.
Durlng all the time about three hours)
IhaI tne troops remained at the armory
on the morning of the 4th, no attempt or
eHoft was made by any one to ascertain
the actual situation of affairs at the depot;
the number of strikers there their dispo-
sItlon, their arms, as we'll as their temper
renamed unknown to the commanding
officers. 1t appears that Generals Dimond
and Dickinson accepted the assurance of
General Sheehan that there would be no
resistance; and the column of nearly 1000
men moved upon the depot without TAX
Ing the trouble or precaution to send for
ward force in advance, or even to throw
out single skirmisher.
NO real effort, from military stand
point, was ever made to enter the depot
or take possession Of the railroad pre-
misses. The force which came in direct
contact with the crowd consisted of the
'front.' OF only one company OF sixteen
files, and no determined effort was made
by that company to clear the crowd away
from its front. The proof is overwhelm-
ing that the four companies ana Calling
gun detachment comprising General
Aheehan's command were permitted to
pass as they pleased between the COM
panies, and to gather around the Gatling
gun. There can be no mistake as to this
TACT, as it is shown by the photograph
taken at the time.
After further long details of events
leading up TO the march TO the depot, the
court says j
MAJoR-GENERAL DIMoND.
Major General Dimond says in his re-
port that ne "cheerfully accepts the re-
sponsibiiity of the management of the
campaign resulting from the sLrike''; and
IN certain sense it may be said that he is
responsible for the various errors COM
mitted in July last. Absolute COM
mand carries with it the entire re-
sponsibility. But the court is of the
opinion, while thus broadly placing the
responsibility upon his shoulders, that in
the execution Of the various movements
he is not to be held entirely to blame.
But, nevertheless, he is personally re-
sponsible for a number of mistakes.
he gave proper commands for the con-
centratlon OF the troops at Sacramento,
and the concentration was made in q
short time and with remarkable zeal on
behalf of the officers and men. The
court does not consider the Major General
responsible for the want OF rationS which
should have been taken by the San Fran
cisco troops. He gave the necessary or
ders, and his subordiuates should have
attended to the details.
He was anxious to move the Second
Brigade from San Francisco TO Sacra-
mento by boat, and made his arrange
ments 10 that effect; but on July Sd the
southern Pacific Company informed him
that 1t had no steamer which it could
place at his disposal, and the troops had
to go by train. The concentration was
made so that his command would arrive
in Sacramento on the 4tn, when 1t was
well known that all places of business
would be closed and that the Capital City
would be filled with large numbers of
citizens from the surrounding country.
1t was his duty to endeavor to diSlodge
the strikers from the railroad property
without any struggle and without loss of
life, if possible. 1t was ill-advised to
make any attempt against the depot OH
such national holiday.
lie states that he contemplated landing
the troops near the depot but the trains
were stopped, without his consent. at.
Twenty-lrSt street, and he was told that
arrangements had been made to break
fast the troops at the armory. The break
fast was such only in name, and con.
sumed much time. Long delays and the
extended march tatigued the men unnec-
essariiy and exposed them to the rays of
the sun on one OF the hottest days known
in Sacramento. These delays also re-
suited in giving information as to the
movements Of the troops and allowed
large crowds to congregate.
The court is Of the opinion that GEN
eral Dimond is not directly responsible
for the stoppage of the TRAINS or for the
delay Of the breakfast. But, on the other
hand, when the trains were halted at
Twenty-first street he should have is
sued orders to proceed to the depot and,
ii necessary. should have taken charge of
the trains himself. On the arrival of the
trains at Twenty-tirst street and while at
breakfast at the armory, the Major Gem
eral commanding advised with Brigadier-
General Sheehan of the Fourth Brigade.
who, as he resided in Sacramento, was
supposed TO be familiar with the situa-
ton and competent to give the Major
General such information as might be
necessary.
rigadier-General Sheehan assured the
Major-General that the strikers would
offer no resistance, and would allow them
TO enter the depot without opposition
Notwithstanding these assurances the
Major-General should have taken the
proper precautions so that there could
have been no question of success in case
of resistance. After a delay of about
two and half hours the troops took up
the march from the armory to the depot
in single column. The depot is situated
in open ground and can be reached by
three or four different streets.
The court is of opinion that the COM
mand should have moved in two or more
parallel columns, so that on its arrival at
the open ground near the depot. the
troops could have deployed and force
Of SklrmlSherS been thrown forward
The court finds that the Major General
is, equally with the brigade command
ers, responsible for the faulty formation
OF the troops when advancing to the de-
pot.
On taking up the march from the ar
mory the column was in close columns
of companies. Large crowds were al
lowed to accompany the troops, covering
the sidewalks on both sides of the street.
The brigade commanders might have
thrown out fankers to prevent the col
umn from being interfered with or mo-
Tested on the march. On the arrival of
the column in the open near the depot,
the Maj General established headquar-
ters in the depot building, out of the i'm
mediate presence of his troops.
The court is of the opinion that his post
should have been with the column, so
that he could have personally issued his
orders and verified their execution; if bis
orders were neglected or disobeyed, the
officer neglecting or disobeying should
have been placed under arrest or de-
prived OF command. There seems to have
been no organized plan of attack, but the
Major appears to have relied on