The Jersey City news. (Jersey City [N.J.]) 1889-1906, 1894-01-08

would be inappropriate TO some and desirable
for.others. Then it would be warranted not
only by the necessities of the situation, but
by reasonable construction OF the con-
stitutional provision In such a case, the
municipalities in which the peculiarities ex-
ist would constitute a class, and the leglsia-
tion in fact would be general, because 1t
would apply to all to which it would be ap-
propriate. But distinctions which do not
arise from substantial differences-ditfer-
ences so marked as to call for separate legis-
lation, constitute no ground for supporting
such legislation. Iong Branch vs. sloan,
% Vroom, 1862; Van Giesen VS.. bloomfield,
IS Vroom, 442; Township of Lodi VS.. State
% Vroom, 404.
'sThese rules have been continuously de-
clared by the courts ever since the adoption
of our amended Constitution.
SIN the latest case on the subject, in State
VS.. Somers Point, Mr. Justice Depue SAYS
AS applied to legislation of this character, a
law is special or local, as tradlstlngulshed
from general in the sense of the prohlbltory
clause in this paragraph of the constitution,
switch embraces less than the entire class OF
persons or places to whose condition such
| legislation would be necessary or appropr1-
ate, having regard to the purpose Tor when
such legislation is designed. A law which SO
particularizes, and by such means is re-
stricted in its operation to persons or places,
which do not comprise all the objects winch
|
| local within the meaning of the constltu-
| tional interdict'
THE MATTER OF CLASSIFICATION.
sit has been inquired upon what principle
| can a classification of race courses into those
used and maintained before, and those used
and maintained after, January lst, 1873, be
| sustained? What. in this view is the sub
stanial difference between them, which re-
ouires different system of legislation appll-
\ cable to each? Where are the characteristics
sufficiently marked and important to make
them distinct classes! l can perceive no
such difference and no such characteristics
| nor can perceive any reasonable ground on
which one class should require any different
| legislation from that which the other re-
| quires.
ITO make classification good it must be
| founded upon differences and characteristics
sufficiently marked and important to make
them naturally class by themselves. ivan
Riper VS.. Parsons, II Vroom 123; Anderson
vs. CITY of Trenton, Is Vroom 4o6; Tyler VS..
Plainfeld, 26 Vroom 529)
| s'There are no qualities in race courses
| which are sufficiently marked and important
to distinguish those in use prior to January
| /. 1898, from those set up after that date.
| Legitimate classification rests on the
quality of its members; not on the particular
| time when those qualities were acquired;
| (Pavonia Horse R. r. Co. v: Jersey City, 10
| Vroom 297: Pierson " O'Connor, 16 Vroom
| Sc; Stahl " Trenton, 25 Vroom A.
| NO CLASSIFICATION OF RACE TRACKS.
'sThis statute affords no proper and ap-
| propriate classification of race courses which
| will support the application of distinctive
system of legislation applicable to each class,
! so distinctive and different as the two meth
| DDS of licensing appearing in this act. The
| act is simply special legislation of the most
| palpable character, and plainly within the
| interdicting provision of the constitution
4 Lott, ff1ta1- lc1
| affairs of towns and counties, and it must,
upon this ground alone, be declared uncon-
stitutional and invalid
ssBut there is still another obvious defect
| in this statute. 1t is not alone special in its
| character but it also distinctly and subtan-
| TALLY grants to certain corporations, assocl-
| ations OF individuals exclusive privileges,
| imnunities or franchises 1t is clear that
| this act is grant of an exclusive privilege
| to race courses used before January /, 1893,
| to obtain license without complying with
| the onerous conditions embraced in the
| fourth section of the act. Under the pro
| visions of this latter section. the Board of
| Chosen Freeholders, supposedly exercising
only public functions for public welfare, be-
fore they could exercise the power conferred
upon them of granting a license to a race
course, must declare, in any event, upon
their Judgment in behalf of the public, that
the race course is public necessity
4
sNow, it is manifest that this provision of
| the statute operates to create such classif-
! cation as not to confer upon all race courses
| alike the benefit which inureS from the eXer-
! else of the powers under the first section of
| this act. The act creates and confers prlvl-
leges upon one class of race courses and
| grants to certain corporations, associations
and individual privileges and immunities
which can be rarely, if ever, conferred upon
| others under its provisions. The conditions
imposed are not even similar One class of
race courses may be established without re-
| gard to conditions at all, another class can
only be established by submitting to the i'm
position of condition which may be either
of difficult or impossible performance
lone class is privileged to the point almost
of monopoly, and the other class is discrimi-
mated against almost to the point of absolute
prohibition, and this is a vice of statutory
enactment declared against, and plainly in
terdicted by the provisions OF the constitu,
ton, against the passage OF local OF special
laws granting to any corporation, association
or individual any exclusive privilege, i'm
munity or franchise.
| AN ANALOGOUS CASE.
Justice Lippincott then says than an
analogous point to the very one in considera-
ton was settled by the Supreme Court in the
case of the State v. Post decided at the No
| yernber Term, 1892 The suit was brought
| to test the constitutionality of the act which
made it a misdemeanor to take, without
consent of the owners, oysters from beds
marked by owners who had occupied them
since January /, 1890.
From the decision in that case Judge Lip
pincott quotes as follows:-"The right to
plant oysters on its land of the State for the
sole use of the occupant is privilege, and
inasmuch as it (the act) excludes all Others
from taking them, it is an exclusive priv
ilege which cannot be granted by special,
local or private laws. = = = q The State
may grant rights in some of the lands with
out disposing of all its possessions, but it can
not select individuals or corporations as the
objects of iJs bounty to the exclusion OF
other citizens of the State
THE CONCLUSION.
Judge Lippincott concludes as follows:-
eIn the opinion, establishing a principle
which seems to be thoroughly applicable tc
the present case, Mr. Justice Van Syckle
continues: This act does not confer its bene-
fits upon all the citizens of the State who
may elect to accept them upon the terms
prescribed by the law maker; it does not
shield the property of all who now, or here
after occupy and plant, but is expressly re-
stricted in its operation to those who have
used and occupied from January !, 1880
and who were in occupancy on the passage
of the act in 1890. The law can never
apply to any person other than those
of it's enactment; occupancy, claim
ing and stalking grounds constitutes the meri-
torious ground for the grant, and is the basis
of the classification upon which law to be
valid must be formed. The Legislature il