The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1894-12-14
hAJOR DANIELS GRAFTON ON GEN
IIsNL EARLY

Major Daniels Grafton upon General
Early, published by us elsewhere TINS
morning, was worthy of the orator and
worthy of his theme. 1t was labor OF
love for Major Daniel to speak thus OF his
old comma nder. for he was that com
mander's loved and trusted confidential
chief of staff until he was himself so dis
abled in battle that he was unable longer
to keep the field. lie has examined Cen
eral Eerlys work as a Confederate SOL
eter critically. but fairly, and, while
Nass perhaps predominates In his esu-
nate OF Il, it is praise that is not mis-
1aced. Before he was given command
r a separate army Early had estab-
ssbed his right to be considered one of
Che very best subordinate commanders
that the Confederacy produced, and his
title TO that place is nowhere disputed
even now. But his operations when he
was given an Independent command were
not understood by all at the time. Major
Daniel has given those operations unstint-
ed praise, and he has made no mistake
IN doing so. Though Early was much
censured by many at the time. history
will say that his campaign in the Valley
against eherdan was one of the greatest
military exploits ever performed by any
leader, and that tardy justice. which is
none the less sure because slow, will
confirm General Lees estimate of him,
that he removed him from his command,
not because he deserved to be removed,
but because an impatient public would
not form proper judgment upon what
he had had TO contend with, and what
he had done under his insurmountabie
difficulties
We have been permitted TO see pri-
yate letter from General William ii.
Payne, who commanded, under General
Early. a brigade Of cavalry In that IA
nous Valley campaign (and there Is no
better critic living. and to make from 1t
the following extract. General Payne says
about the movements which preceded the
battle Of Winchester:
ITO the mass OF the army these move
ments appeared sigulariy rash, recklessy
aggressive. and even aimless one day
be would be at Shepardstown or Mar
tinsburg, the next driving the enemy's
putposts on the Winchester railroad, then
Swinging around TO the Shenandoah. make
savage demonstrations upon Sheridan's
left, and. finally, at the battle of Win
chester, meeting Sheridan with an army
which was IN apparently dispersed con-
uition when Sheridan's attack was made.
/ heard a distinguished Confederate COM
hander criticise Early for exposing his
brmy, and insist that he should have
fallen back TO Fishers Hin or retired
toward the Shenandoah river giving him
safe retreat in this case to the east or
IN impregnthle defence II attacked at
Fishers Hll
But all these criticisms are based upon
b misconception of the general condition
bf the Confederacy at the time. OF Lees
army in particular. and OF Early's mis-
zion in the Valley. He had just extri-
Gated the Confederacy from humiliation
and premature death by his encounter
with, and defeat OF Hunter his rapid
march down the Valley. his defeat of
Wallace, and his menace TO the capital
itself. IL was his business TO relieve
General Lee and to do that Il was essen
tial that he should magnify his forces
and mislead the enemy by threatened
attacks. To have fallen back TO Fishers
uill or provided for a retreat from the
Valley would have been 10 abandon the
purpose which sent and kept him there.
II would have been better for him 10 re-
turn 10 Richmond and resume his position
in Lees lines than TO have fallen back
10 Fishers Hill or the Shenandoah river.
This is another and striking illustration
of how situations which are not appre-
dated and movements which are not I'M
dtIstood are criticised and misJudged.
Early, IN fact, led a forlorn hope. He
seems 10 have known II. but with in
domitable courage he confronted II. His
campaign before Winchester was prac-
ficaliy like Joshua's before Jericho, and.
for long time. II had very much the
same effect. He bullied sheridans $1,000
men with rams horns"
This is perfectly fair statement OF