The Cape Girardeau Democrat. (Cape Girardeau, Mo.) 1876-1909, 1894-09-29
A MAHAN's VIEWS.

"
The Commander of the Cruiser Chicago In
tervIewed on the Battle on the River
Yslu Between the Japanese and Chinese
The Difficulties Of the Position of the
Latter Pointed Out and Commented On
LONDON, Sept. 24.-The UniteGrStates
cruiser Chicago sailed yesterday after
noon for Havre where she will be
locked. She will return to Gravesend
in ten days to take coal. Shortly be-
fore the Chicago sailed a representa-
tive of the United Press went on board
of her and obtained an interview with
Capt. Mahan, her commander, on the
recent naval battle between the jap
anese and Chinese fleets. Capt. Mahan
said:
THE great thing with a fleet of war
vessels with a lot of transports in
charge is to prevent surprises Dr. en-
barrassment. In this case there was a
surprise, and this fact, to my mind,
supplies n prominent lesson. 1t is nee
essary in attempting to convoy ram
sports that the conveying fleet should
be decisively superior to that of the
enemy, but the Chinese fleet was
much embarrassed by the presence
of their transports. / am inclined
to think that the Chinese admiral
formed in fleet so close in shore be-
cause he was obliged to do so. If he
had gone out to meet the Japanese.
fleet, which was the proper course, he
would have uncovered the mouth OF
tho riuo- into ruhinh tho franSnnrfs
had gone. Consequently he drew up.
close in shore, by which movement he
was tactically embarrassed in maneu-
vering. If his fleet had been much
larger than the Japa nese he might
nave advanced, at the same time leaving
a sufficient number of vessels to head
off a rush which the Japanese might
have made.
"The whole affair illustrates the
difficulty attending an attacking
movement across the water unless you
have control of the water absolutely.
Whether the Chinese succeeded in
their object it Ices not appear, but the
question is whether it was worth such
a risk for the sake of landing troops.
It certainly was bad management to
fight SO close in shore, for two of the
Chinese vessels had not the room to
turn and SO went ashore. That is n
reason why the Japanese did not try
to pass through the Chinese line, for
they would have got into shallow
water and become entangled.
1T was a big engagement for modern
vessels, but l see nothing yet to lead
me to suppose that the engagement
will point to the reconstruction or re-
modelling of war vessels. The details
so far are very medger. / don't know
anything about the manner of attack,
but doubtless before long the japanese
will give full information. L don't
even know what was the formation of
the Chinese fleet in resisting the at
tack. All that is clear is that
the Japanese were on the Of
fensive and the Chinese on the
defensive. 1 only wish l had more
time to write what l have to say.
What interests me most, is to know
the manner in which the battle was
fought. Upon this point we have got
nothing. But the great lesson is in the
risk of attempting to carry a great
force across water. AS a general rule
such an attempt is unsafe. Never
theless, the mere existence of
a hostile fleet does not con-
stitute such a detriment upon
the resolute man who sees
that the object of his attempt is suffi-
cient to Justify the risk. 1t remains to
be seen whether the object the Chi
nese accomplished was sufficiently inn
portant to justify the risk she took.
To a naval man the most interesting
thing will be to know in what order
the Japanese fleet approached the Chi
nese, whether it was concentrated
upon part of the Chinese line or spread
out over the whole line. l have nc
time to say more, as l have too much
ship work to carefully study the mat
ter"