The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-10-13
RUSSELL SAGE WINS NOW.
RETERsIL OF LAIDLAW,s JUDgA
MENT FOR $4,000 DAMAGES.

n ssee's Act o. shie,s,-a H,--ssIf RsAiss
Lsisisw Nro- the Dynsr.ite We. H-stise-
tive sss Net Csleuistes, Me Is Not I,is.
ble-Errors Made ny the Trial Jwewe.
Russell Sage obtained yesterday from the
Supreme Court, General Term, = reversal Of the
Judgment for $4,000 which william r. Laid
law obtained against him for injuries Laidlaw
sustained by reason of the explosion Of bomb
in MFR. Ssge's ofice. The case Is ordered to It's
third trial. The decision Of the General Term
is written by Presiding Justice Van Brunt. with
Justices Follett and Parker cchcurring. The
court sets aside the verdict on points which
were not presented by counsel on the appeal.
r. G. James appeared for the plaintiff and Noah
Davis for the defendant.
Laidlaw alleged that Sage. before giving to
Norcross, the dynamiter, an answer to his de-
mand for 81. 200. 900. which answer there was
reason TO apprehend would lead to the execution
Of Norcross's threat TO destroy him. drew Laid
law between himself and Norcross, SO that Laid
laws body became a partial shield for Sage In
the explosion that followed. The case was dis
missed at the first trial by Justice Andrews. At
the second trial, In March last, the jury gave
Lsidlsw a verdict for s2b. 900. He had asked
for 800. 900. The present decision says:
An examination OF the record shows that the
learned Judge who presided at the trial seems
TO have fallen into fatal error In some of the
propositions charged and In the refusal to
charge others which were requested; the former
error arising at least to some extent because of
the reading Of portions Of the opinion of the
General Term to the jury without having re-
gard to that which in the opinion had preceded
the extract read
The court say that Justice Patterson. on the
second trial. read to the jury this extract Of the
opinion Of the General Term:
We fall 70 conceive why the burden q proof :, not
nnnn defendant nNhAF IA lpNn thn air IN
show that, without defendants acts, the p.sintiG
t SSai IS Wi"s St the fsAiseyy Of p he def emo m ;es srsu M ns
Thus substantially charging" say the Gen:
eral Term, that the General Term had held
that the plaintiff was entitled to q recovery un-
less the defendant should show that the plain
tif's injuries would have been as serious as they
were II he had not been interfered with. The
error into which the learned Court fell was in
from the opinion without considering that
which had gone before. The opinion read:
., r1ns whole /. ,hs s~rOp ,Ss motion OF ; To- a si::Rcsde NJ:
properly granted because I was Ineumeent upon
he fs' PoaTd not to have ssssO sssn i INJURED sl'R iRas c ssse,s sft
s%frp pTSof. 'I II Sage the h. aofss ssm ss sS ' inno sentfn
e Z could not he found from the evidence
ana ana a.. BE s e.fe"S%. dsnRRs ssss sSl .n sa %' m! Ss!Ts spp! S,mi Bit
, TssFs ss s,s Sssy act %s q HSl sss se sss a p %4ons tow sss 1PG sse
p ni,s n ,ns i sna nay "a ,s ssys been S,6 ases r. syom 5hs r d isrs y
done temphssis by the Judge we isii to conceive &C.
Clearly a different proposition from that
read 10. the jury as the law latd down by the
General Term.
I'm view OF this charge the defendants coun.
sci, at the close Of the case, requested the Court
to charge that:
"If the Jury md from the evidence that the defend.
dant did take the plaintiff and use him as q shield. but
that this action was involuntary, or such as would
instinctively result from a sudden and Irresistible i'm.
liable to the plaintiff for the consequences Of II.
THE Court: ! will not charge n exactly in those
words will charge IL that the essence Of the liability
must be q voluntary act.
The proposition requested to be charged. the
defendant was entitled to have submitted to the
jury: and In view of the previous statement, to
which attention has been called In reference to
this matter, II may have resulted In serious
prejudice to the defendant. The essence OF the
liability Is not whether the act Of Sage was vol
untaryo or not. An instructive act may be vol
untarv; an act done upon the. spur of the mo-
voluntary. But such acts are not the result of an
intent based upon reasoning, and upon the pre-
vious appeal, therefore, we held that according
to the testimony OF the plaintiff the jury might
find that the act of Sage in placing the plaintiff
between himself and anticipated danger was not
an instructive act, but rather proceeded from
calculation and design.
We considered II manifest that tho jury
might have come to this conclusion because the
defendant expressly refrained from giving the
answer Ito the dynamiter's demand for 81. 90o,-
000l which he had reason to believe would pre-
cipitate the catastrophe until he had placed
him himself as h he supposed, In a place Of compare,
therefore that in refusing this request, as al
ready stated; material prejudice was suffered
by the defendant"
Laidlaw has the choice OF appealing from this
decision to the Court of Appeals or OF taking
the offer for a third trial.