Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1894-10-02
JENKINS MODIFIED
Court Of Appeals on the Famous
Strike Order.
ONE JLAUsE DECLARED NOT light

And the Definition of the Word strike
Disagreed With-No Law That ComPels
Personal Service or Prohibits Men Quit
ting Work for Reasons Sufficient to
Them, Either Singiy or in a Isody-IIle-
gal Conspiracy and Combination.
CHICAGO, Oct. 2.-In the United States
circuit court Of appeals for the Seventh
circuit, which convened in the Monadnock
building, Judge Jenkins famous injunc-
ton writ enjoining the employees of the
Northern Pacific Railroad company from
striking" was reversed in part, and the
cause rcmanded with dircctions to sustain
the appellants motion to strike out tho
objectionable words: From so quitting
the service of the said receivers, with or
without notice, as to cripple the property
or prevent or hinder the operation of the
road" 1t is therefore held that the en-
ploycs had right to quit the employ of
the receivers, but had no authority to
enter into conspiracy or combination to
quit with the intention of crippling the
property or preventing the operation Of the
road.
No Decisive Victory for Either Party.
The decision of the court of appeals does
not thoroughly uphold Judge jenkins in
his injunction order, hut decisive victory
Is not accorded to the different brother
hoods Of railway employees which inter
vencd in the case and carried it to higher
court. The opinion was delivered bv JUS
ticc Harlan of the United States supreme
court, and the main ground taken for the
finding was that Judge jenkins order
should have been more specific This was
| what Judge jenkins tried to be when he
made his supplemental order explaining
that strike" and quitting were two
different things, and in effect that strike
| was always a riot that the strikers not
only quit work themselves. but quit with
the purpose Of seeing that no one else was
permitted to work
Matters That Are Not Questioned.
1t was because Judge jenkins would not
modify his order further that the appeal
! was taken. The court of appeals recites
| the history of the case and says: 1T viii
! he observed that the motion of the inter
vcnors does not question the power of the
court TO restrain acts upon the part of the
employees or others which would have d.
| rcctly intcrfcrcd with the receivers pos
session OF the trust property or obstructed
| their control and management of it, as
| we'll as attempts by force, intimidation or
| threats or otherwise to modest or interfere
| with persons who remained in the service
| of the receivers or with others who were
willing to take the places of those with
drawing from such service.
| Where the Issue l. Joined
| But it was coatended that the circuit
| court exceeded its powers when il cnioined
| the employees of the receivers from com
bining and conspiring TO quit with or
without notice the service OF said receivers,
with the object and intent of crippling the
! property i'll their custody or embarrassing
| the operation OF said railroad, and from 50
| quitting the service of said receivers with
or without notice rs to cripple the proper
" or prevent or hinder the operation of
| said railroad
| The Question to ise answered
This clause embodies two distinct
propositions: One relating to combine
tons and conspiracics to quit the service
of the receivers with the object and intent
OF crippling the property or embarrassing
the operation Of the railroads in their
charge, the other having no reference to
combinations and conspiracies to quit
or to the object and intent of any quitting,
| but only to employees so quitting rs TO
cripple the property or prevent or hinder
the operation OF the railroad Under what
circumstances may the employees of the re-
ccivcrs of right quit the service in which
they are engaged? Much of the argument
of counsel was directed TO this question -