The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-12-20

views. and was quite ready 20 support his
minister
-. The unusual circumstances present
ed the situation In the following light.
The chances Of any disturbance taxing
place through the action OF the royaists,
after the departure OF The Philadelphia,
were considerably Increased by the Sgni-
ticant detention OF the Champion. Should
any such disturbance take place. it is
believed the British minister would seize
upon any pretext. however slight. to land
the Champions force. and that once on
shore, their influence would be 20 enoour-
age the royaissts and TO increase or pro-
long the difficulty. Should such action re-
suit in the restoration OF the monarchy.
English influence would henceforth con-
troll with Lilinokalanl.
10. There is another consideration
which bears upon thss point The British
are very much In the habit OF retaining
any f0othold once obtained. and there Is
much talk at present Of cable between
the Pacific colonies 10 land only on Brit
ssh soil Shoula an English military force
De established on shore at Honolulu TO
preserve orsier, there NIGH; not readily
be found the opportunity for its with
drawal Whatever willingness Of the
home government to yield TO the claims
OF the United States. strong colonial pres
sure would be brought upon II TO oppose
these claims. II should not be forgotten
in this connection that Pearl harbor Of
fers. strategically and otherwise. the fin
est site for naval and coaling station to
be found IN the whole Pacific.
I'll. Although / had fun confidence in
the republics ability 10 preserve order
and regarded the chance OF an uprising of
the royalists. even under the favorable
circumstances mentioned above. was very
remote. / did not feel that even such A
remote chance should be taken. and
decided 20 postpone the Philadelphia de-
parture at least until the arrival of the
Australians mail on the 18th. Before reach
ing this conclusion. consulted with the
United States minister. whose views CO.
incided entirely with my own. and | was
further confirmed in my opinion by the re-
ceipt of petition to keep the Ph4ladel-
phia at Honolulu. signed by several prom
nent merchants and business men repre-
senting large American moneycd inter
ests. This petition Is enclosed.
~ Before the arrival Of the Australia
Mai Woodhouse had been relieved By
Capt. n. c. s. Hayes, who came on the
steamer Arawa from his late post at
Tahiti. and who has the title OF British
commissioner and consul general. The
advent Of a new man, who had no other
policy than the policy of his government
and was not involved In local politics,
changed the situation. and feeling that
the risk Involved was then considerably
diminished. left Honolulu on the 18th.
''l3. II Is a fact that should not be lost
sight Of. that English influence Is al
ways opposed TO American influences in
the Hawaiian islands II is colonial and
local In its character. influenced largely.
L not wholly. by trade jealousies. but
It is a very potent factor and Is strong
enough TO eventually influence the atti-
tudes of the British diplomatic repre-
sentative. and 70 have It's effect upon
British naval officers who remain there
for any length OF time. The existence
% this antasonism and OF IS influence
srould always be taken into account
This expression was noticeable during
the last few days Of my stay at Homo
lulu. and especially before Mai Wood
house ceased to be minister. The Eng
iish and roysiiSts were equally elated
az the impending departure OF the Phil
adelphia leaving the Champion in port,
while the supporters of the government
regarded the situation with regret. Many
women were emphatic in their appre-
.hension fearing revival OF former
anxieiles.
IA When I left Honolulu. the Cham
plon was to remain until the arrival ~
the Hyaeinthe. which plan keeps an En-
glish ship continually At this port Tn
der these circumstances. an American
ship should also be kept there all the
time. While / would not hesitate in the
least 70 leave the island entirely alone.
I deem II unsafe TO leave them under
British protection. 1t 5eopar3ize our
influences there, and might lead to an
awkward complication The position OF
the United States. as expressed by the
late senate resolution. is sufficiently de-
fined. and in its relation TO other pow
ers is clearly understood by both natives
and foreigners In Hawaii; but that POSI-
ton involves responsibilities as well as
rights. and II We are not at hard TO
perform the duties - our virtual pro
tectcrate. no reuroach can attach to
another power which. In the event %
a disturbance steps IN ana takes our
place II would have a strong argument
in It's favor. and that British sentiment
81 the Pacific would eagerly embrace
such sn opportunity and would make
the most or the consequences. 7 have.
little doubt,
"a Had the departments orders given
me discretion in the matter. I should
have left the Philadelphia at Honolulu
ard returned to san Fra-c.sco with my
staff BY mail steamer. falling the arrival
OF the Charleston by the STR. but as
they were entirely unqualified I had 10
choice but 70 obey them az the earliest
moment that such q course was justified
BY paramount public interests. / tT1g~;
that another ship VIII he sent to Homo
luiG a. the earliest practicable moment"