St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1894-04-08
LAWYERS BEGAN TALKING.
CARLISLE, JUDGE WILSON AND M6.
SHELBY ARE HEARD.
REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
Judge Bradley Puts Sharp Ques-
tions to tho Defendants Attor.
ney-indications I hat Defense
Against Breach of Promise IL
q Mere Shadow Only Legal
Points We're Ifaised Yesterday.

WASHINGTON. ADfll I.-1n6 pIOS-
poets of dry legal argument in the
Pollard breckenridge case did not prove
sufficiently attractive to draw out even
the members of the bar to Judge Brad
ley'S court this morning. Neither OF
the principals was there, although the
lawyers bristled with legal documents
when they entered, while in their wake
followed sundry colored porterS laden
with stacks of calf-bound tones. The
proceedings were begun by Calderon
Carlisle, who said to the court the
PRAYER of the plaintiff for instructions
to the jury comprised fourteen distinct
instructions, covering every possible
aspect OF the case, to be asked of the
court. Stripped of their legal verbiage,
the substance of the instructions asked
for are as follows:
That this is suit for breach of prom
Use Of marriage, and if the jury find
from the evidence that there were
mutual promises of marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant, if the
defendant was married thereafter it
constitutes breach of promise.
found to have had illicit intimacy
before the promise of marriage that
~ nld constitute no defense, and if
she had illicit intercourse with 9th ers,
ami he knew it before he made the
pr mise. it was not a defense. The
burden OF proof that there was to be a
Sc alliance of a marriage contract, with
har tn nd mi RI
b: a contract carried out. rested upon
tue defense. and the jury must be con-
WINGED by the preponderence of evil
dence that such was the fact. The jury
must find for the plaintiff, unless they
find that there was mutual agreement
not to carry out semblance of q con-
tract and find it by prepOHderence of
evidence. Also, unless they find that
the plaintiff did not accept the promises
from the defendant and knew at the
TIME that they were not made in good
faith, but agreed with him that they
should not be binding, and this must
be shown by preponderance of evil
dence. If he made the promise to marry
in bad faith and she accepted it in good
faith, DO defense was constituted
thele by. In determining whether
she understood the contract to he in
good faith the conduct of the plaintiff
and defendant at and after the
time of making the contract are 20 be
considered. Ii the promises are found
to have been repeated by him before
Mrs. Blackburn and Maj. Moore. the
fact of secret understanding must be
proved by a preponderarce of the evil
dence. and the fact of carnal knowledge
between the two is not a defense. If
the jury believed the plaintiff to be un-
chaste and that the defendant knew Of
her unchaStity. that unchastity does
not constitute a defense. If the jury
believes that she told him she had
been intimate with Rhodes, and there
after he promised to marry her, tina
intimacy does not justify breach of
contract. The secret marriage made
after promises maze before other does
not constitute defense, but an aggra-
walton of damages. That if he was
married April 20, kept that marriage a
secret and thereafter entered into the
contract, that marriage is not defense.
The jury are to consider all the rela-
tions of the parties, the prospective i'm
prUvement in her circumstances by the
promised marriage. the commission of