The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1894-10-28

organization was mostly lost: In the con-
fusion Commands were useless. Whlle "A
disposition on the part OF the men 70
fall back a pace or two each liIIe W
load ss axe 'h line 'n remained in this way
about ten minutes, rather giving way
than advancing.
Ii Is impossible to read this without see
ing that the battle was won. The enemy
had met the shock Of battle and yielded
to fl. HIS line was broken, his men
were siezed with panic. Generalization
had set in, organization was gone. Moth
ing was needed but few fresh troops
TO assal him vigorously and his v ho'e
force would have incontinently Ned IN
hopeless route. Any soldier that has ever
been in battle knows that this IS what
Halls report means.
Why. then. were there no fresh SOL
liers at Picketts' back 10 bolster MN
up when the force Of his onslaught hdd
spent itself? Was Il because Lonsstreet
had none to put there? By no means,
he had an abundance Of them. Coiohei
Venable. Of General Lees STAFF, tells US
that he heard General Lee order Ten
eral Longstreet to back the movement
with the divisions Of Hood and McLaws.
and that long afterwards when he re-
minded General Lee OF IT, he replied
know IT; / know it." But, however this
may be, there is no sort Of question tnat
Anderson's division of Hill's corps was
put under General Longstreets commahu
for the purpose OF this assault n that
It was formed in line Of battle immediate
~ in rear Of Pickett's and PettigreWs
commands. and could have been moved
forward at the moment they were
moved forward TO cooperate directly IN
the assault Andersons division con-
sisted OF five brlgades and had at least
G,OOO men In line. Had it moved forward
with Pickett and Pettigrew, that part Ct
it which was behind Pettigrew and
TrimbIe would have taken their place
when they fell back and 1t would have
been unnecessary for Pickett to wheel
Armistead off to his left TO complete
his lire. In that case Armistead's line
would have been n comparatively fresh one
to repeat the blow which Picketts hrst
line had delivered and it would have
been at once supported by Wilcox's and
Perrys brisades (Which were the bril-
gades Of Anderson's division behind
Pickett. Halls report makes IL mp0S-
sible to doubt what would nave been the
effect Of the attack in this order The
rout which picketts attack caused was
produced by the attack OF a single line,
who can doubt what that result would
have been, in toe light Of Halls report. II
it had been Immediately succeeded, first
by Armisteads fresh attack and directly
afterwards by Wilcoxs and Perry's?
What did General Longstreet actually
do in the way Of supporting the attack
with Andcrson's division? We unhesi-
tatingly affirm that he I'D nothing. lie
says that he ordered Anderson forward,
bat II is plain from the contest that
he did not give the order until 'ickett
was practically destroyed. According T.
Andcrson's report he did not order him
forward at all
General Wilcox says In his report Of 1t:
"The advance had not been made
more than twenty or thirty minutes be
fore three staff officers i'm quick success
sion zone from the Major General com
handing the diyision) gave me orders 10
advance 10 the support of iickntts d.
vision
Twenty or thirty minutes, then, after
Pickett had started, Wilcox was with
ont orders to move. SO far as ordering
Pickett was concerned, his ord. had
just as well have been postpone. until
the next Christmas ana Wilcox says
that when he moved forward there was
nothing of Picketrs division to be seen
and go he returned
Upon the whole, then, il IS our opinion
that no soldier ever failed more sisnally
to act with Judgment and discretion tEan
General Longstrcet on this great occa-
sion, and we do not think We overs,ate
the case when we say that his failure
to make use of the forces he nad at
his command on the third day of the
battle of Gettysburg cost the Confc ieracy
that battle.