The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1894-08-26

|
EwelI moved up supports 20 Beth, and the
enemy moved UP supports to their SIDE
so that by 2:90 In the day a furious battle
was on. between nearly fifty, thousand men,
| fairly divided between sides. II resulted
In complete triumph for the Conieu-
crates, and "a complete rout TO the enc
my in which his losses In killed ana
wounded was very heavy. besides I'VE
| thousand prisoners. General Lee reached
an cmlncnce. commanding a view OF the
battlefield about 2:90. and sweeping he
scene with his feld-glasscs, saw the enc
my scampering back over the Nils ana
through the town OF Gcttysburs' Inc
fighting OF the next two days was on the
eminences east Of Gettysburg. 10 "hich
these dcmOralizcd troops were ma"iHs'
| Lee at once sent Colonel Walter Taylor
| TO General EwelI with instructions TO
move on and occupy those heights WIN
| out, however. bringing on general en-
| gagement. Ewell. unfortunately, paid too
| much attention 10 the latter part of his
| Instructions, and moved forward with so
much caution that night caught him short
! OF the hill tops The enemy had had
1900 men In the engagement. none OF
the rest OF his army being within assist
Ing distance All that could be mustered
Of that force that evening for the defence
OF the heights was 5000 demoralized troops.
Of whom 1900 were cavalry. The caution
Of that good old soldier. Ewen, cost us
| dear that evening.
When night closed in on July lst the
| situation was this: General Lee had his
| whole army practically concentrated and
| in hand. Stuart, with the cavalry, was
| not Immediately present. but he was near
enough for the business of the situation
| Eweil and Hill were in the actual presence
Of the enemy, with 1900 men on
| the spot ready for action, and LOngstreet
! was four miles in rear, with the exception
OF Pickett's division, which was some
| twenty miles In rear, but could have been
put In position on the field by FORCED
march at an early hour next day.
Meade had nothing present but the rem
! nant OF the two corps which had been SO
badly defeated. and the arriving troops.
At sundown of July LIST the rest OF his
army was situated thus: The second corps
was at Tarrytown. Md, thirteen miles
away; the fifth corps at Union NILS.
twenty-three miles away, and the sixth
tyfour miles away.
The battlefield Of the next two days
was those precious heights which Ewen
had unfortunately failed 10 occupy on
the evening Of the LIST. They are some
what in the form Of a fishhook, the apex
pointing west and just east Of Gettysburg,
the long shank being on the southern and
the short shank on the northern side.
EwelPs line enveloped the short. or north
ern side. prolonged around the apex OF
the hook by Ill., and LOngstreet was to
continue the line TO our right Lee knew
the prodigious advantages that the situa-
ton gave him, and was eager 10 assaii
his enemy at the earliest dawn. He had
talked the whole situation over with
Longstreet after 2. VI. Of the list. and
he saw him again later in the evening.
The evidence is overwhelming that he
told Longstreet he must have his corps in
position at an early hour next morning
and attack. That evening he rode into
Gettysburg and had an interview with
Ewell, Early and Rodes. He wanted them
to begin the attack because he dstrusted
the promptness Of Longstreet, but finally
surrendered his judgment to theirs. they
tages would accrue through Longstreet
commencing the attack ana getting pos
session Of the high ground that was in
front Of his part Of the line General Lee
knew his man, but, unfortunately, yielded
his opinion to theirs. The layman will
say that Longstreet ought TO have had
his corps I'm position at dawn next morn
ing, and ought 10 have assaulted the
Union lines as soon as it was light. In
point of fact he was not ready to attack
until i. NJ next day, by which time
the whole Union army had got UP and
was equally ready for action, and the
precious hour had passed. lie attacked
after A. and fought brilliant and par
TALLY successful fight, which was CO.
operated in by both Hi and Ewef. But
no substantial break was made in the
enemys line, and the morning OF July 81
opened with the battle Of Gettysburg still
undetermined. Then It was that General
Lee determined TO make the famous as
sault on Cemetery Hin. which is at the
very apex OF the fshhook. Had 1t sue
ceeded Meade's army would have been
cut in two and the wing, could have been
fought in detail.
Pickett's Division was selected for this
terrible assault, and the evidence is COM
plete that Longstreet was ordered 10 sup
port their charge with the divisions Of
Hood and McLaws. Then did that band
of devoted Nirginans perform a feat
which has no parallel in war. With the
steadness OF soldiers at dress parade they
marched fifteen hundred yards across an
open field. with such a storm Of shot and
shell raining upon them as never fell on
men. Gaps opened in their ranks, which
were promptly closed, but I'm spite of It
all they marched forward and drove the
what value was that II they were not TO
be sustained? LOngstreet had not obeyed
General Lees order and followed them
with the divisions OF Hood and McIaws.
With half their number stretched upon
the field, with one Of their brigade COM
manders (ArmisteaO dead, twenty-five
yards inside the enemy's intrenchment
that he had broken through, with another
(GarnetO dead in twenty yards Of the
intrenchment that he was assailing, and
the third (Kemper) prone upon the field
and left for dead they were abandoned TO
themselves. and were assaulted in front
and from right and left. They had done
their work, and broken the enemys lines.
Was IL for them 10 maintain themselves
against Meades whole army? 1t is pitia-
BILE to think Of their fate. remembering
what they had done. They were over
=