The herald., 1894-10-26

depot. His instructions. received just
before leaving for the depot, were to co.
operate with and support General Shee-
han, these instructions must have been
understood by him to mean such action
with the troops under his command as
would best accomplish the object in
view.
After arriving at the depot he re-
mained at his post in the brigade until
he was overcoms by the beat. his pros
tration at the time being serious. On
arrival near the depot he formed his
brigade in etreet column order, placing
his troops in four squads. and during the
time be was in command no movement
or disposition of his command was made
or undertaken.
Ii an attack was expected, or II one
had been made by the mob, his position
was faulty, for he was no longer in the
streets. but in an open space. and the
line OF fire was tina front of but one
company. He should have placed his
command in formation to have made or
resisted en- attack. The fact that his
was not the leading brigade ia no excuse.
General Dickinson is to be criticised
for his neglect TO make any movement
toward the depot. II is true that the
order from General Dimond was not
that he should comply with the request
OF General Sheehan, but the order as
given Immediately following General
Sheehan's requesN must have been un-
derstood by General Dickinson.
Colonel Sullivan was present at the
time of the consultation held in San
Francisco June seth. and was then ad-
vised OF the necessity of preparing his
command for service. He is responsible
for the lack of preparation by his regi-
ment. Colonel Sullivan must be criti-
cised for his actions while in command
OF the Second brigade on July 4th. The
fact that General Dickinson had been
overcome by heat was reported to Colo
mel Sullivan at about ! 80 p. m. and he
was ordered to take command of the
second brigade. Immediately after the
command devolved upon him, he re-
ceivsd an order from the major-genersl
commanding him to advance against
the depot. to use force and to clear
the depot with bayonet or with lead if
necessary. These orders we're positive
and required implicit obedience. but
instead of executing his orders he inn
msdiatsly left his command. went to
the headquarters Of the major-general
and urged that the order be reecinded.
stating that his troops were not in con-
dition to take up the offensive. What
ever his ideas wsre he should have
obeyed his orders. but instead of doing
so he left his command, went to the
maior'general and afterward made
speech to the strikerB.
The court finds that he was at fault
in three things: Omitting to carry out
the order OF his commanding officer.
leaving his commsnd after receiving the
order. and violating the military law in
making q speech to a mob. which is ex-
pressly prohibited CIRCULATION 10l7).
When Colonel Sullivan waited on Gem
ersl Dimond in his headquarters, Gen.
eral Dimond then repeated the orders
to him. General Dimond also then in.
formed Colonel Sullivan that written
order had been received from the
United States marshal, authorizing the
use of those extreme measures.
Colonel Sullivan, instead Of complying
with these orders, thus repeated, told
General Dimond the men were COM
pletelv prostrated by the heat and were
becoming demoralized, and that "their
condition was not SUCH as to render it
safe to adopt offensive measures at that
time"
Major General Dimond to report these
facts to Marshal Baldwin, and Colonel
Sullivan thereupon told the marshal he
thought it bad policy at that time to
adopt any offensive measures, and also
advised against any offensive operations,
and that the lives of hia own troops
would be sacrificed.
Colonel Sullivan addressed the crowd,
and asked them if there would be any
objection on their part to taking the
members OF his regiment into the depot
out OF the sun. The crowd not agreeing
to this, he withdrew. This address was
made from the top of cab. Az here
inbefore set forth, the statement in re.
gard to the decentralization of the troops
was not well founded, and Colonel Sui
livan is to be severely censured, not
only for his refusal to obey orders, but
the representations 80 made by him to
the major-general and the marshal un.
doubtsdlv resulted in the declaring of
the armistice from the marshal, and in
the cessation Of active opetations.
Major Jansen OF the First regiment
also urged the major general not to
bring on conflict, and stated that the
troops were demoralized and unreliable.
This statement is not borne out from
the testimony, and Major Jansen is also
to be severely censured in this respect.
Col. Harry was also present at the
consultation held on June 30th, and is
to blame for the want OF preparation in
his regiment, and the remarks that
have been made in reference to the COM
missary stores of the Second brigade
aud the First regiment are equally ap-
plicable to the Third regiment. There
was also great lack of discipline in por-
tions OF the Third regiment, and some
of the field and company officers did not
seem to have their men under proper
control.
Colonel Nunan remained at the depot
with the two companies of the Sixth
infantry regiment until after the Sacra-
mento companies moved away, when he
marched from the ground without or
ders. His immediate commander had
left the depot with two companies of the
Second infantry, and did not give Col
onsl Nunan any orders or instructions.
Colonel Nunan then gave orders for his
companies to move into the shade.
There was no decentralization in his
command, but the court finds that Col
onel Nunan committed grave error in
moving bis command without orders.
In view OF the fact that the command
OF the troops had been turned over to
the United States marshal and he had
full authority, il he had simply notified
the crowd to disperse, and on their re-
fusing had given the major general au-
thority to use force and take possession
of the depot, it would have been better.
In any event no armistice with mob