The record-union., 1894-03-03
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
Conflicting Locations on a Plumas
Placer Mining Claim.
Wheels Within Wheels in a Mill and
Lumber Company Give Rise
to Litigation.

The Supreme Court has rendered a de-
cision in the case of Louis T. Quigley ct
a., respondents, VS.. Charles L. Gillett
ct al, appellants.
The action was taken to determine the
adverse claims of the parties to the right
OF possession of certain placer mining
land in the county of Plumas. In March,
1891, the respondents located placer
mining claim upon the land, calling 1t
the Fortuna claim, and in November
1891, the appellants filed in the United
States Land Office an application TOR
patent for the Diana placer claim, winch
included said Fortuna claim.
Respondents duly filed protest with
the Register against the issuance OF
patent. Appellants claim that the grant
ors of Gillett located the lands long prior
to the location by the respondents, and
that the protest was not sufficient one.
Judgment was rendered for the respond
ents, and Gillett appealed.
The court states the bill of exceptions,
and quotes authorities in answer TO them,
aud shows that the Superior Court based
Its decision on the theory that the burden
of proof that the amount of work re-
quired to be done by law was actually
uone, rested on defendants.
The Supreme Court quotes an opinion
Of Justice Field that the forfeiture of the
defendant Gillets rights could not be es-
sabliShed except on clear and convincing
proof of failure of the former owner to
have work performed or improvements
made TO the amount required by law, and
says that that decision Is decisive OF the
case in hand, and that it follows that the
theory Of the court below was not correct
and its findings not justified by the evil
dence, the judgment therefore is reversed
and the cause remanded.
A COMPLICATED PARTNERSHIP.
A decision has also been rendered in
the case of j. 4. Chaplin, L. L. Peckin-
paugh and Charles Peckinpaugh, re-
spondents, VS.. Albert Brown, appellant.
Plaintiffs and defendant were partners
on August 10, 1887, doing business under
the firm name of sugar Pine Mill and
Lumber Company" and owned 100 acres
of land, on or near which they built a
saWmill.
On that date Chaplin and Brown eX-
ecuted contract with the copartnership
to purchase all the lumber sawed from
the 100 acres from timber then standing
or fallen or that might be sawed from
other claims before finishing saving the
lumber from the claim (6O acres) at So per
thousand, delivered in the mill yard, and
the ufDn dgT60u 10 Q6lINOT 10 Iu6 TWO
100000 feet or more annually.
An agreement was also entered into by
the copartnership with the two Peckin
paughs by which the latter were to cut,
haul and saw into lumber all the timber
on the I60 acres and stack it in the mill
yard for So per 1000. For this purpose
they were 10 have the use of the mill, but
to keep it in repair.
Chaplin and Brown assumed the firm
name of North Fork Lumber Company,
and continued their contract under that
name. In 1887 Chaplin assigned his inter-
est to Brown, who, in 1888, took in John
Bartram and b. Z. Ellis. In the fall of
1883 the Peckinpaughs assigned their con-
tract with the Sugar Pine Mill and Lum-
Der Company to these three.
The object of this action is to dissolve
the Sugar Pine Mill and Lumber Com
pany and straighten up its accounts, the
transactions being complicated by the
saving of logs not cut from the 100 acres.
The Supreme Court finds that from the
stipulated statement of accounts and the
findings of the court below, defendant
Brown was charged 50 per 1000 for all the
logs purchased by the North Fork Lum-
Der Company, whereas he should have
been charged only for The use OF the mill
i'll saving those logs at fifty cents per
1000.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded for new trial.