The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1894-11-14

HOW GETTYSBURG WAS LOST.
FITzHUGH LEES STORY OF THE FATE
Full, FIELD.

FlTzHUGH LEES STORY OF THE FATE
Full, FIELD.
Condensed from an Account in Fttzhugh
Lees Life Robert E. Lee.
The discussion of the battle Of Get
tysburg is more general to-day, not
only throughout the country, but
throughout the world, than it was
thirty years ago, when it was yet fresh
in the minds Of all the living, and its
fearful sacrifices and heroic achieve
ments on both sides were as living
pictures in view of the nation. 1t is
now undisputed that it was the deois-
i've battle of the war. When Lee
formed his lines on Seminary Ridge
he presented the largest Confederate
army that ever appeared on any battle
field during the entire war. Never
before had Lee commanded so many
men and never thereafter was he able
to approach the number who obeyed
his orders on that fateful field.
HOW THE BATTLE BEGAN.
It is known that both Gen. Meade
and Gen. Lee were moving toward
each other when their advance forces
met at Gettysburg, without either
knowing the particular direction of
the other, and both armies were moved
in such positions as to be able to con-
censrate readily at different points.
What was supposed at first to be a
mere skirmish at Gettysburg on the
first day of July was precipitsted by
Gen. Heth, who got permission to
move into Gettysburg for the purpose
of supplying his men with shoes.
That movement was met by the ad-
vance of Reynolds corps that was
making reconnaissance in force, and
the conflict began without either side
supposing that q great battle was to
be fought. Early in the afternoon
Hill s whole corps was on the ground
in action, and Howard's 8 corps had
come to the support of Reynolds, who
had fallen early in the battle. Thus
what opened as skirmish precipita-
ted fully $4,000 men, in the harvest
of death within very few hours. and
the Union army was defeated with the
loss of four or five thousand prisoners
and driven in confusion on Cemetery
Hill.
THE SECOND DAYS FIGHT.
On the second day instead Of sim
ultaneous attack upon the Union lines,
as Gen. Lees plans contemplated,
and as he had verbally ordered, no
attack was made until late in the
afternoon, thus enabling Meade to
largely increase his force and strength
en- his position, and when the attack
was made it was a desperate and
bloody effort to gain Little Round Top
and Culp's Hill, both Of which could
have been taken unopposed any time
during the day before. Lees entire
plan Of battle had miscarried, and his
biographer sets forth at every stage Of
failure how the responsibility was
upon the hardness Of Gen. Longstreet.
He did not attack in the morning at
daylight, as he should have done, be-
cause Pickett's division was not yet
there, and thus nearly the entire day
was lost, during every hour Of which
the strength of the Union position was
greatly increased by breastworks and
the numbers Of the army multiplied.
On the evening of the second day it
was evident to Lee that the position
of the Federal army was too strong to
be broken on either Of its hanks, as he
had sacrificed many Of his soldiers in
vain efforts to get possession of Cuip 8
Hill and Round Top. He was thus
reduced to the necessity Of adopting
one of three courses, viz To make an
assault upon Gen. Meade left centre,
at the point where it was nearest to
Dee's lines to make flank move
ment around Meade's left and thus
attempt to force him out of his posi-
tion, or to retreat. Gen. Lee doubt
less well cons: Tered all Of these sug-
gestions. He had discussed the
question of attempting a flank move
ment with Gen. Longstreet, who
strongly urged it, but it did not meet
with Lees approval, and after fully
considering the matter he expressed
the belief that with proper concerted
action an assault could be made sue
cessfully, and his orders were given
accordingly. Gen. Pickett's division
had arrived on the field in the after
noon Of the second day and had not
yet participated in any Of the battles,
and as Longstreet's corps was now
complete, with more fresh men in it
than any other, he was charged with
the duty of assaulting the Union lines
early in the morning.
PICKETT S AWFUL CHARGE.
We cannot better convey to the
reader the story of Pickett s luckless
assault than to quote copiously from
Gen. Fitzhugh Lees story as it comes
from his own pen q:
"Gen. Longstreets dispositions were
not completed as early as was expect
ed" continues Lee, "and before he
could notify Ewell the enemy attacked
johnson, was repulsed, and johnson,
thinking the fighting was going on
elsewhere, attacked in his turn and
forced the Union troops to abandon
part of their intrenchments, but latter