The herald. [microfilm reel] (Los Angeles [Calif.]) 1893-1900, 1894-01-28

formed our left wing, while the right
wing etill remained on the north side.
The water in the river was low at this
time and the construction OF bridges was
at once commenced. The most impor-
tant one was to connect the main army
with General HeintzlemRn. and 1T was
known as Grapevine or Summers bridge.
General Summers corps being located at
this point, he was charged with the
work of it's construction, assisted by
General Heintzleman's engineers on the
south side of the river.
| stationed one of the balloons with
an assistant on our right wing at Me-
chanicsville, personally remaining with
the main portion Of the army on Gaines
Hill, where constant observations were
taken day and night of the movements
of the enemy, which, from the time we
reached the banks OF the Chickahominy,
were constantly being strengthened.
There was scarcely day passed with
out bringing fresh acquisitions to the
large camps already existing about Rich
mond.
General McClellau's army at This time
mum bered about 10000 effective men,
and as the reports reached him, which
my frequent observations confirmed,
that the confederate forces were con-
stantly being strengthened, he became
anxious about the reinforcement OF his
own army. and, az the position l held
gave me full opportunity of knowing.
he expected General Mcdowell TO make
connection with him with the $4,000 or
more men he had across the Potomac,
near Washington. Then the intention
was, with these united forces, to march
on to Richmond.
On more than one occasion l was re-
quested by General Mcclellan to make
careful obser gations to see if the ex-
pected movement of McDowell's troops
was not taking place, as his understand
ing was that this would be done, and he
was looking for reinforcements in this
direction.
But our little army was left to its fate,
as the authorities at Washington, with
the willing acquiescence of the COM
msnder of that part of the army refused
to cooperate with US as we expected be
would. Thus, we were in the enemy's
country, contending with largely su-
perior force, whose numbers were con-
stantly increasing, and liable to be sur
rounded at any moment, owing to the
fact that we were not reinforced as we
ought to have been.
To be able to render all possible aid to
the commanding general, and to give
quick information of all the enemy's
movements to all branches of our army,
l had procured full equipment of tele-
graph instruments with batteries, and
large reels of telegraph wires with
which bad made the necessary connec-
tions from the balloon to all required
points, 30 as to have everything in read
mess for the transmission of the mes
ssges, even from the balloon in the air,
when the battle which was inevitable,
should occur.
| was not satisfied with day observa-
tons, knowing well thatEmuch impor-
tant information could be obtained at
night by observing the camp fires OF the
enemy, their location. extent, and the
lsteness burned. New camp fires were
added nearly every night during our en-
campment before Richmond, thus de-
monstrsting the arrival of fresh troops.
On May 10Th there were particular
evidences of a movement of the enemy,
and on the night OF the Goth the camp
fires remained burning up to an unusu-
ally late hour. This to a careful OBJ
server had more than usual meaning.
Making the deductions of experience, |
was convinced that extensive prepara-
tiong were going on, which indicated
that movement OF their army was i'm
minent. These deductions were con-
firmed on the early morning of the 3lst,
when, ON looking over the enemy's
camps, l saw instead of the usual camp
fires the whole country free from smoke.
was convinced. therefore, they were
on the move, and so reported. The
clearneHs of the atmosphere gave me
good opportunity to observe the move
ment OF the enemy, but as long shadows
were cast by the woods and undulating
lands, was unable for the time being,
to correctly observe the direction taken
by the enemy's forces, although | was
convinced, as the result of former OBJ.
servations, that they were going to at
tack the left wing under command OF
General Heintzleman. And, as soon aa
the sun lit up the country, / found the
roads, etc., we're filled with troops NOV
ing in that direction.
At this critical time, between and 5
O'Clock in the morning, the construction
of Sumner or Grape Vine bridge was not
nearly completed, and it was not posi-
BILE, therefore, to unite our armies and
support Heintzleman, owing to our in
ability to cross tbs river.
Knowing this, my first dispatches
were to Heintzlemgn, to inform him of
his peril, and at the same time l sent
dispatches to General Mcclellan SO that
be would fully realize in how critical a
condition Heintzlemen WAS placed.
was not satisfied with mere dispatches
to Mcclellan, but descended to earth
and rode to his headquarters, about a
mile away, to more strongly impress
upon him the Importance of increasing
the construction force at work on this
bridge.
1t ia not necessary to state that the
result OF these dispatches and personal
explanation was that everything that
could possibly be done to urge on the
construction of the bridge at both ends
was Immediately done.
In the meantime the enemy continued
it's march in large force toward Heintzel-
man, and about noon formed in line and
began the attack, and kept up one of
the most vigorous caunonade and mus
kerry fires had ever witnessed, until
long in the afternoon. Heintzelman
then reported that many of his regi-
ments were out of ammunition, the
ammunition being on the north side of
the Chicahominy river, with communi-
cation not yet completed SO that it could
be transported across.
This old hero, when he learned that
his ammunition wac giving ont rode