Macon beacon. [volume] (Macon, Miss.) 1859-1995, 1894-09-29
CAPT. MAHAN'S VIEWS.
The Commander of the Cruiser Chicago In
te1viewed on the Battle on the River
faiu Between the Japanese and Chinese
The Difficulties Of the Position OF the
Latter Pointed Out and Commented On.

terviewed ON the Battle On the River
faiu Between the Japanese and Chinese
The Difficulties Of the Position Of the
Latter Pointed Out and Commented On. !
LONDON, Sept. 2i.-The United States
cruiser Chicago sailed yesterday after
noon for Havre where she will be
docked. She will return to Gravcsend
in ten days to take coal. Shortly be-
fore the Chicago sailed representa-
tive of the United Press went on board
OF her and obtained an interview with
Capt. Mahan, her commander, on the
recent naval battle between the Jap
anese and Chinese fleets. Capt. Mahan
said:
THE great thing with feet of war
vessels with lot of transports in
charge is to prevent surprises or en-
barrassment. In this case there was a
surprise, and this fact, TO my mind,
supplies a prominent lesson. 1t is nee
essary in attempting to convoy tran
sports that the conveying fleet should
be decisively superior to that of the
enemy, but the Chinese fleet was
much embarrassed by the presence
of their transports. | am inclined
to think that the Chinese admiral
formed in fleet so close in shore be-
cause he was obliged to do SO. If he
had gone out to meet the japanese
fleet which was the proper course, he
would have uncovered the mouth OF
the river into which the transports
had gone. Consequently he drew up
close in shore, by which movement he
was tactically embarrassed in maneu-
yering. If his fleet had been much
larger than the Japa nese he might
have advanced at the same time leaving
a sufficient number of vessels to head
off rush which the japanese might
have made.
"The whole affair illustrates the
difficulty attending an attacking
movement across the water unless you
have control of the water absolutely.
Whether the Chinese succeeded in
their object it does not appear, but the
question is whether it was worth such
a risk for the sake of landing troops.
1t certainly was bad management to
fight so close in shore, for two of the
Chinese vessels had not the room to
turn and so went ashore. That is one
reason why the Japanese did not try
to pass through the Chinese line, for
they would have got into shallow
water and become entangled.
1T was big engagement for modern
vessels, but | see nothing yet to lead
me to suppose that the engagement
will point to the reconstruction or re-
modelling of war vessels. The details
so far are very meager. don't know
anything about the manner of attack,
but doubtless before long the japanese
will give full information. ] don't
even know what was the formation OF
the Chinese feet in resisting the at
tack All that is clear is that
the Japanese were on the of
fensive and the Chinese on the
defensive. I only wish | had more
lIiic W Nlilc Wnut nave w SdN
What interests me most, is to know
, the manner in which the battle wa!
fought. Upon this point we have go
nothing. But the great lesson is in thu
, risl; of attempting to carry grea
, force across water. As a general rul
such an attempt is unsafe. Never
theless. the mere existence o
, Il hostile fleet does not con
stitute such detriment upol
=, the reSolute man who see
, that the object of his attempt is sutii
! cicnt to Justify the risk. 1t remains t
be seen whether the object the Chi
ncse accomplished was sufficiently i'm
portant to justify the risk she took
10 naval man the most interestin!
u thing will be to know in what orde
the japanese fleet approached the Chi
n nese, whether it was concentrate,
g upon part OF the Chinese line or sprea
out over the whole line. have n
e time to say more, as | have too mucl
l. ship work to carefully study the mat
( ter