The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1894-10-23

sided ever by a single Justice.
The Judiciary Act of 1892 left the
Supreme Court almost solely an ap-
pellate court to sit in full bench, and
took from it nearly all original juris-
diction, to which class of jurisdiction
the granting of new trials properly
belongs. At the same time the Cir
cult Court on this island was
reestablished with powers substanti-
ally as large as those previously
possessed by the Supreme Court
when sitting at term as court of
original jurisdiction presided over
by single Justice, which, as we have
seen, exercised the power of granting
new trials in criminal cases. The
powers of the Circuit Courts on the
other islands were also enlarged to
nearly, if not quite, the extent of
those granted to the Circuit Court
on this island. All the Circuit Courts
were also given all such powers, be-
sides those expressly enumerated, as
may be necessary for the promotion
of justice in matters pending before
them" (Sec. 42) Without going in
to greater detail, it is obvious that
the Legislature intended, and
sufficiently declared their intention,
that the Circuit Courts were to be
after January l, 1898, if they had
not been before, courts of general
jurisdiction, and not courts whose
jurisdiction is precisely and fully
defined in the statutes" 1t intend
ed to raise the courts of higher orig
iual jurisdiction on the other islands
to the level of that on this island
rather than reduce the latter to the
level of the former. The motion to
dismiss the exceptions is overruled.
Defendants first ground of excep.
ton is that the verdict was contrary
to the evidence. This consisted in
part of an extra Judicial confession
alleged to have been made by de-
PENDANT. 1t is commended that evil
dence of such confession is not
sufficient for conviction unless zorro
borated by other proof of the corpus
deIicti, and that there was no such
other proof. Conceding for the pur-
pose of this case what does not ap-
pear to have been invariably held in
other courts, that the principle of
law contended for is correct, we are
of the opinion that such corrobora-
tive evidence was adduced in the
present case. Indeed, there was
positive aud undisputed evidence
that the cane field was set fire to in
three distinct places at about the
same time near midnight and that on
the following day there was found
near by some wicking which smelled
oily and had matches rolled up in it.
This was sufficient evidence from
which the jury might infer the corpus
deficit, that is, a malicious burning of
the field of cane by some one. See
Am. & Eng. Enc. vol. 4, p. 300. and
vol. 3, p. AS, D. 2 The alleged con-
fession Of the defendant was then
properly introduced to connect him
with the corpus deficit. There was
also another evidence, of little value
it is true, tending to connect the de-
PENDANT with the corpus deficit. A few
days before the fire the defendant,
who was a contract laborer of the
company whose cane was burned,
had been arrested and fined for re.
fusal to work, and there was dds
puted) evidence that at the time of
the fire he was not at his quarters
but was soon afterwards at the place
of the fire. The guilt of the accused
was not established as clearly as
might be, but there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict.
A second ground of exception was
the refusal of the trial Judge to
allow defendants counsel to ask a
witness for the prosecution, with a
view to discrediting him, under what
name he lived while in Hilo. Evi-
dence to be admissible for the pur-
pose of affecting the credibility of a
witness must be such as bears direct |
ly upon his character for truth and |
veracity. Otherwise it would be ir-
relevant 1t is not competent if it |
merely tends to disgrace the witness.
We do not see how the fact that
witness lived under different name
at another time and place could |
affect his credibility,-even if it |
would necessarily tend to disgrace |
him. See Wharton, Or. Ev. Sec. |
1856; Green !. Ev. Sec. 45S.
Two months after the trial the de
PENDANT filed a second motion for a
new trial based upon alleged newly |
discovered evidence consisting main |
~ of the statement of a Japanese
witness for the prosecution that the
testimony given by him at the trial
was false. The motion was properly
overruled, because not fled within
ten days of the trial. The King V.
Reeve, supra Nor could it be sus-
tanned on the merits. The most that
the affidavits in its support show is
that one of the witnesses perjured
himself at the trial and this is shown
only by the statement of the perjurer
himself. On a second trial, should
one be granted, the prosecution
would presumably proceed without
calling the witness, whose testimony
was mainly cumulative or corrobors-
tory, and there is no reason to sup
pose that new trial would result