The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-09-30

81 bis class ne vas It's greatest solder. al
though IL included the distinguished
Union gsaeral.. Roseerans. Pope. Sesson.
Easiis. Doubleday and Syxes. and the dis
tinguished Confederate generals, a p.
Stewart. D. III Hill, Z. II. Anderson. La
fsyeffs NcLaxs and Earl Van Dora
Longssrses illustrated the outworn
truth that man may be
military scholar and not be general.
and be may be . grss. general and not be
very distinguished military scholar in .
purely technical sense. Longssres; was
yaymasser ia the army when the war
broke out, and Hancock was quarter
master. Hancock ranked bat eighteenth
IN class Of twenty-five, and yet he vas
the only man ia his class that rose 10
military distinction. These facts concern
membering by those who wonder Why
Grant should have graduated tsenty-hrst
In o cIsss of tEirty-nine. and yet Grant.
like Hancock and Longstreef. was the only
really distinguished soldier in his class
IL only illustrates that In the schools Of
war Is in the schools Of peace. It is the
power to apply rather than the power TO
m<morize knowledge that makes an efficient
man OF the world.
Longstreet, ike Grant and Hancock.
disting uished himself in his irst engage
ment. which was Bull Run, July q, 1851.
lie fought 81 Williamsburg, a, Gaines
Mill, az Glendale; he won the second
Bull Run August 80. 1862. by the skillful
disposition Of his artillery; he rcpuised
Burnside's right wing with awful slaughter
at Fredericksburg; Lees bIunders at An
tietam and Gettysburg were made agains;
Longstreet's earnest protest, who pointed
out that the Confederscy could not afford
barren Jet bloody battles. His victori-
OTIS charge won Chickamauga. Longstreet
fell wounded at the Wilderness, shot by
his osn men. Longstreet was Lees
sblest lieutenant and his most trusted
military friend. not excepting stonewall
Jackson, whom Longstreet held in slight
esteem as soldier. save when he fought
under the direct eye and orders of Lee.
When Longstreet eriticises Lee 1t is in
the spirit Of candor and no. that of an
envious. jealous or soreheaded subordi-
nate. At Gettysburg Longstreet pointed
out that our line was so much shorter than
Lees we could reinforce it rapidly when
broken and expei the ASSISTANTS, and he
further pointed out that even If victorious
the attack would be a barren, costly tri-
umph, like that OF Charcellorsville, while
on the other hand Lee could easily by
moving on Meades left. maneuver him
out of his strong position and place him.
self between Meade and Washington City,
thus obliging Meade to attack Leo in po-
sition.
Longstreet once illustrated the situation
by referring to the cause of MacMahon's
defeat in the Franco Prusslan war. We
quote:
"The Prussians were on the shorter
route to Paris or to Metz, so that If Nc
Mahon should attempt to move in either
direction the Russians. availing them
selves of the shorter lines. would inter-
pose and force McMahon to attack, but he
had already been 50 beaten and democrat
ICED that he could not be ex pected TO MAKE
successful attack, and would therefore
be obliged to surrender. IL he had gone
directly to Paris before giving up his
shorter route. 1t is possible that he could
have organized q succoring army for the
relief of Metz
"Had We interposed between Meade and
Washington our army. in almost sue
cessful prestige was that of the Prus-
SLAMS, Meade would have been obliged to
attack us wherever we might be pleased 10
have him. lie would have been badly
beaten, like the French, aud the result
would have been similar.
81 do not mean to say that two govern
ments would have been permanently es-
tablished: for I thought before the war
and during its continuance that the peo-
pies would eventually get together again
In stronger bonds of friendship than those
OF their nrst love"