The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1894-01-04
LOST OPPORTUNITY.
Col. HAIRY Declares that Such Thing wa
Impossible Under The Circumstances.

on the march from Spring Hill to Franklin
Tenn, by Gen. Hood in his invasion Of
Tennessee in 1864. Remarking that much
has been written by many Generals on both
sides, never have thought it proper TO say
anything on the subject, but as the question
is now asked, TO clear up history on this
subject, write TO throw considerable light
On it and confirm some of the misgivings on
thepart of The rebel mmanders-Cheatham,
Bate, Stewart, and Others-for letting the
sO-caled lost opportunity PASS.
have always considered that they acted
wisely in not making an attack on the Union
army and avoided a useless sacr fee of life
on both sides, which would have been of no
benefit 10 them. l have contended that it
was not a lost opportunity, and those who
are familiar with the situation, after reading
these facts, will take my view of the case.
The rebel army could not have captured the
Union army CT the road on which they
marched without having very large force
and daylight or bright moonlight 10 do SO
bat the night was very dark, no moon and
very little starlight, and the road was well
sheltered by light timber.
But to give you the facts and my knowl-
edge as TO why they had no opportunity to
lose, will have 10 give you little sketch
of my part in this affair.
had been In the service with the Army
ofthe Cumberland from its start as an officer
in the 18Th KY, and resigned 10 accept a
position in one of the new regiments about
TO be raised in my native State, Ohio. / re-
ceived a commission as Major of the 1S3d
Ohio Nov. 10, 1864, and proceeded TO Camp
Denpison 10 take charge of il and organize
the different companies stationed there,
which / did. and in a few days was joined
by Col. G. w. Hoge, of the 10th Ohio, and
Lieut-Col. Mervin Clark, of the 7th Ohio, 10
whom l turned over the command. We
proceeded to Louisville, where we were
armed and equipped, and went by special
train 10 Columbia, Tenn. We arrived there
Nov. q, and were placed in the Third Bri-
gade, Second Division, Twenty bird Corps
under command of Gen. Thomas II. Roger
The officers and men had hardly become
acquainted with each other when we were
put under fire at Duck River the following
day. / must give credit to these new re-
cruits. They stood the test well, and the
officers were satisfied that we had good
regiment. We were diminishing nearly all
the next day at Duck River, and about dark
received orders TO move toward Spring Hill,
Oh the way to Franklin, Tenn. Our orders
were to march quietly, 10 attract as little
pected to be attacked by the It bells, but with
very little trouble we passed through Spring
Hill.
When south of the town our regiment was
halted and ordered 10 move into an open
field, with a small creek running through it,
some 600 feet from the road. We were 10
guard This passage of the road and to fire on
the enemy should they make the effort to
take the road, and 10 hold our position at
all hazards; that if attacked, We were to be
reinforced at once. We took position in a
sort of Tavine, protected by some very light
underbrush and the small creek. Our men
lay on the ground with loaded muskets
waiting Tor the rebels to came. We were
large regiment, over 1000 men, and we
placed the men all along the creek TO make
our line as long as possible. To look at
them they looked more like a division of
our old army than regiment. We had not
long to wait-hardly half an hour-when
the rebels arrived, jubilant and apparently
happy, and at once went into camp about
1000 feet from out line. They took down
the fence rails and built their fires and
started cooking their supper, a thing we
had not had and dared not make or expect
that night. They put out their camp-guar,ls
about 800 feet from their camp, about 600
Our position was anything bat pleasant.
We expected every minute to be attacked
During this time / noticed several officers
on horseback, evidently Generals and staff
officers, coming close 10 our line. INSPECTING
the situation, and from information obtained
after the war / am certain they were Gems
Cheaiham, Bate and others, looking over the
position with view to attack They were
little imprudent.
1 was soTely tempted to capture one of
these groups, and would have done SO had
they come little nearer; but the orders
were TO keep quiet and remain there until
renewed therefore not a sound was uttered
and the officers did their utmost to have the
men keep as quiet as possible.
Had The rebels made their attack in this
dark night, with US in ambush, and with our
deadly aim, for the reason that they would
have been between their campfires and us
and We could see them as well or better
than If II was daylight, as their fires were
large and bright and we were cognizant of
all their movements we should have given
them terrible punishment A night attack is
always against the attacking parry when the
party attacked is expecting such an attack;
therefore. had Hood made his effort TO take
the Franklin Pike that night, he would have
DOeh 1Spulrtu Win lefflDlc slaughter, and
with what assistance the passing forces could
have rendered his defeat would have been
certain, and a useless sacrifice of life on
both sides would have taken place without
the desired result.
i am satisfied that the group Of officers
that came down TO the run on their recon-
hotter were doubtful of success, and returned
10 their camp for rest; and when ] read Gen.
Cheatham's explanation of his disobedience
Of orders of the lost opportunity in the
war Century Magazine, when he thought our
line overlapped his, and that the night
attack would result unfavorably, / made up
my mind that he was right, and that his
disohedience of rash orders from Gen. Hood
was the right thing and evidence of good
judgment Our position was such as should
have defeated twice our number, and ! do
not think that Gen. Cheatham had 1000
available troops that night that could have
been concentrated at that point. We GER
tainly could have had within half an hour
at least an equal number of troops on hand
tHaving been in several night attacks in
front OF Chattanooga year previous, had
some experience, and as to results / found
they invariably resulted in no advantage
and in considerable loss of life)
My experience of that memorable night
at Spring Hill in this field shall never for
get. We remained in our position until
about 3 a. M, but no orders came for eur
relief. The troops had all passed the road
aud all was quiet. made several trips to