The daily morning journal and courier., 1894-08-28
Torpedo Boat BIundsrs.
tCorrespondenoe London Times. ]


 vers. of no little interest In Itself. Is the total failure of the torpedo boats on either side to put In an effective ap- pearance or In any way to hamper the movements of their adversaries. This Is. of course. partly due to the fact that, owing to the premature conclu- sion of the maneuvers, they had only a single night in which to operate. Ad- mlral Fitz Roy passed Carnsore Point, where force of Blue torpedo boats might have been expected to be con- centrated. after nightfall on Saturday On the same night both of the Blue fleets were within striking distance of the Red torpedo boats stationed at Belfast. Admiral Fitz Roy does not seem to have been attacked at all. The c Blue fleet was not attacked at all but the D Blue fleet was attacked early in the night. apparently without suc- cess. All this Is most instructive. The night, though fairly clear. was very dark. A ship without lights could hardly have been seen at all from the deck of a torpedo boat at distance of more than 300 yards. Admiral Fltz Roy apparently proceeded altogether with out lights. In these circumstances it Is plain that the Blue torpedo boats could come across him only by the merest accident. No skill or vigilance on their part could enable them to 60 it. The conditions in the neighborhood of Bel fast were little more favorable to the Red torpedo boats stationed there be- cause the channel is narrower and the Blue fleets used their navigation lights. But even here the chances were all against tn torpdo boats, which not only had to find the ships to be attacked. but to fire their torpedoes before they them- selves had been under fire for thirty rounds from the ships. It has been proved experimentally that more than thirty rounds can be fired from a ship in the very brief interval which elapses between the discharge of the torpedo and the moment 1t strikes the ship. Hence, in the most favorable circum- stances, a torpedo boat has very little chance indeed under the rules laid down for the maneuvers.
 But, without further insisting on this point, which is a point of maneuver practice not quite analogous to the con- ditions of actual warfare, I would point out that the proper tactics of tor pedo boat attack seem as yet to have been very insufficiently studied. For the reasons I have eiyen: the chances 'of d torpedo boat finding the ship or fleet it desires to attack appear to be 50 small, except in the case of ship or fleet known to be at anchor in known position, as to make the success of the torpedo boat matter of the merest accident.
 A moonlight night, which increases the chances of torpedo boat, also in creases the defensive power of the ship in a measure proportional to the wider horizon commanded by the latter. Hence it is the opinion of many of the most experienced torpedo officers that a division of torpedo boats must be provided at its station with a cruiser which can scout for the enemy and give the torpedo boats direct informa- tion of the position he occupied and the course he was steering at nightfall. In that case it becomes comparatively easy for the torpedo boat to find the enemy; in any other case the whole pro- ceeding reduces itself to game of blindman's buff, in which it Is the tor pedo boat that is blindfolded. ..,.
 A most instructive and significant illustration of the foregoing principles was afforded on the night of Saturday. The Blue torpedo boats failed entirely failed to attack 1t successfully what reason have not been fully in- formed. But one division of the Blue torpedo boats-the Queenstown divi- sion, which was transferred to Kings town-met us on Saturday evening of the Kish Bank. Its leader was inform ed by the admiral that three cruisers, presumably belonging to Admiral Dale's fleet. had been seen from the signal sta tion at Blacksod Bay at an early hour in the morning, and might therefore be expected to be in the neighborhood of Belfast during the night. Here was case in which the torpedo boats had definite object to look for and defi- mite place in which to look for it. They found three cruisers under the Null of Galloway. and not receiving or fail, ing to understand the private signal they forthwith proceeded to attack them. Unfortunately; { the three cruis. CTS in question turned out to be the warspite, Australia and Galatea, be. longing to Admiral Drummond's fleet and though mo ship was torpedoed. tive out of the three torpedo boats were put