The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-09-16

Of q fEAns-kearts1, se4f-dtstg1sTTus uaan
wko was beaten IN mind before hs f0ughs
battle. snd BEGAN .; Yo-Etosn 70 con-
ss3er boz be consd cover the shame Of tAs
failure he feared By framing excuses and
arrsyiag thoss approximations Of disaster
that are Always ths blue devils that follow
IN the train Of ineapacisy AMI inactivity
whether In the field Of var or the walks o.
peace.
Before be ever fights . battle In the
Peninsula campaign he writes his wife
that be IS almost resolved 10 resign, return
to the wsEks Of peace and family and let
the abolition administration save the cocn-
try a. best Is could. A fine spirit truly for
the general OF IL. 900 men. who had not
jet fought battle. 20 write his wifs that
the sight of fs~ wounded men had ABOUT
persuaded him 10 resign, come home. kiss
the baby. rock the cradle and watch the
battle Of giants from afss. The stern Joy Of
the conflict, which is one Of the prime fac
tors Of successful soldier. was utterly alb
sent In Mcclellan by his own confession
Measured by the contrast between bis own
military proclsmations. his military de-
Tense and his military performances. Nc
ClslIan was at once the Sir Forcibie Feeble
and the Sir Frstful Plagiary of the roll of
war After Bull Run Mcclellan took COM
mand Of the army Of the Potomac. His
popularity with bis troops Was something
due to his youth, his good looks, his
asniability. his courtesy, bus chiefly 70 the
fact that from corps commanders down to
colonsls Of regiments, engineers and COM
manders Of batteries, his army was largely
officsred by men of the old army
who were his personal friends or his
political sympathizers. The corps COM
msndsrs blew Mcclellan's horn and then
passed ii to his division commanders, who
passed 1t to the brigadiers and the colonies.
and the colonies to the green, warm
hearted, enthusiastic rank and file. It
was q manufactured popularity in advance
OF performance, manufactured by the same
methods that are cunningly used by po-
liticaI charlatan to manufacture popularity
with the world without doing anything
beyond bis capacity TO look well, talk
agreeably, and feed taffy to everybody
he meets. Any handsome soldier of
AEtFaEtlNe tnaH1EF6 GOntQs NttA tAc
same machinery, have wrought the same
results with q great army of raw yolun-
teers, who treated Mcclellan just as
woman does q shiftless fellow who has
won her first love; she continues to swear
by him after his shiftlessness has become
town talk. Mcclellan was supersensi-
tive. amjsbie. sentimental man, destitute
- uh
good quartermaster. good inspector gen.
eral. . good commissary, . good chief Of
engineers, q good professor at West Point.
but was temperamentaIly utterly untitled
to be trusted with the responsibilities of
great general.
A soldier who was not out of bed the
morning Of Antietam until after the battle
had been raging for nearly two hours
with great fury may be very pleasant
gentleman in many relations Of life, but is
certainly not At to command a great army
in q great battle. Mcclellan halted thirty
days before yorktown, where only 20.00)
Confederates confronted an army that
could have walked over them by sheer
weight of numbers had the word been
given. At Williamsburg bloody. blum
dsring battle lost US 8. 600 men. At Fair
Oaks, straddling the river with our army.
We Lost 6000 men by another
bloody biunder. Then came the
Seven Days battle. At Gaines Mill
Gen. Porter. with $500 men, stood off
Gen. Lees $4,000, while our left wing and
center. over $1,000 strong, never made
move 10 relieve our right wing from pres
sure. The army was rolled back from
Richmond to the shelter Of the gunooats
on the James with loss of 1900 killed
and wounded. 1t was a campaign of utter
tactical and strategic failure that cost the
| army by battle and disease from May 20
TO July 2, 1852, over 5000 men.
Then Lee turred on his heel and rushed
on Pope, who commanded some $4,000
men before Washington City. On the 81
| of August the Army OF the Potomac was
recalled from the Peninsula. Despite of
entreaties. orders and reproaches McClel-
Ian did not bring his army to the Potomac
in less than three week.-Mrs. first troops
under Reynolds joining Pope the Esd of
| August. The corps of Heintzleman and
Porter. about $1,000 men, joined Pope
and fought with him until his
defeat, August 80, 1862 Out Of 9l,-
600 veteran troops of MoClsllan's army
| ordered to join Pope August 3, these were
all that reached Pope by August 80, Sup
| pose Grant st City Point, on the James, in
response TO the call for troops TO repulse
Early in July. ls64. had moved as leisarely
as did MeClellap, what would have been
the fate of Washington, Baltimore and
| Philadelphia The Sixth corps left City
| Point the evening Of the 9Th OF July and
reached Washington the evening Of the
IIth. That was the way Grant moved
| troops when they we're sorely needed to
beat the enemy before Washington. Gen.
| Sumner and Franklin's corps could, by
the testimony of Gen. Summer. have easily
been with Pope. if peremptory ordsrs had
been given aud enforced.
/ The battle Of Antietam VAS fought by
81 900 men against ~, coo. 1t was a drawn
battle, marked by nothing bat sheer per-
sistsnt. brutal slaughter; it vas fought
without intelligent plan and without any
special concert OF action. The next morn
ing Lee offered battle; Mcclellan had re-
eeivsd I4.ooo endorsements. and yet with
O., coo men reported present for duty Me-
Clellan declined to tight Lee who had not
more than So.oe0 men left Gen. Franklin
testified that he showed Mcclellan q posi-