The morning call., 1894-08-23
TIE WAR IN KOREA.

The war dispatches from Korea come
through Chinese sources. and may, there
fore, be subject TO suspicion. According
to their most apparent Interpretation, the
Chinese army from Tientsin-that is to
say. III Hung Changes army-under CON-
mand OF General Tin, moved down the
| southwest coast Of Korea, ami attacked
the Japanese at Ping Yang, driving them
from the place. The Jeps retreated south
to point named in the dispatches as
Chuug-hu, and made a stand there; but
they were again attacked, driven out and
! forced to retreat in the direction of Seoul.
This does not square with the recent re-
port that the Japanese had occupied and
fortified the mountain passes leading into
Korea from China. 1t argued overcOnfi-
dence on the part of ;he Japanese to take
up positions between the Korean capital
and the Chinese border. unless IN consid-
cradle force. They would have shown
better judgment if they had fought nearer
Seoul. and drawn the Chinese further
from their base. The deciding battle OF
the campaign may be fought sooner or
later for the possession of the Korean
capital
There is a story that japanese troops
are already re-embarking from the southern
part of Fusan. but for what destination is
unknown The MikadO has thus far suf-
tered no reverse of consequence. Nothing
has happened to destroy his hopes. At
latest dates the Japanese people were full
Of spirit, were volunteering as fast as
arms could be procured, and were sub
scribing with alacritv to a popular loan.
III fhnrafnrn ha ,aA hat ho
tales about the re-em barkation of japanese
do not imply any abandonment OF the
campaign. 1t may be merely a change OF
base.
At the same time the fall of Ping Yang
and Chung-hu are ominous for the Japa-
nese cause, for nothing demoralizes an
army like opening campaign with defeats.
The battle Of Ping Yang was fought on
Friday, August II, and the battle of
Chung-hu, eleven miles south, on the fol-
lowing day. August Is. If the Chinese
pursued the flying foe on Sunday, the two
armies must to-day be encamped In sight
of the valley IN which Seoul stands. The
decisive battle may have been fought
Or, perhaps. both sides may be preparing
for the encounter. the Chinese awaiting
the MantchoOrian contingent, which is on
the march, the Japanese fortifyng the
passes in the range which covers Seoul
and bringing re-enfOrcements by sea. When
the battle does take place, the Japanese
will, judging from our knowledge of the
situation, have the advantage of fighting
under the cover OF works constructed by
experienced engineers Our acquaintance
with the topography is too limited 20
enable judgment 10 be formed as to the
possibility of a flank march which might
sever the connection between Seoul and
Chemulpo. But the result of a battle
would alter the relative situation OF the
belligereDts. Ii the Japanese should win.
General Tin will fall back, intrench and
await re-enEorcements with heavy artil-
lery. If the Chinese should win the Japa-
nese would probably seek protection under
the guns Of their feet.
An inferior power, contending against
a superior power, can convert its weak
ness into source of strength by compel
ling its adversary to assume the aggressive
on hostile ground. But when it under
takes the aggressive itself, and chooses
neutral territory as the theater Of the war,
its weakness generally tells against 1t in
the long run.