The morning call., 1894-01-23

require unanimous decision Of the sitting
Justices to terminate the long ORA wn-out
proceedings.
For the sake of convenience, different
branches of the case have been cOnsoli-
dated. There are ten appeals from the
judgment of Judge Coffey pending. These
are divided between appeals from the
order denying motion for new trial
and appeals from the judgment declaring
Florence to be the rightful heir.
Although apparently the matter of the
Blythe estate, as that opposition is under
stood IN general terms, the present pro-
ceedlDgs are conducted under a special
provision of the Code of CIVIL Procedure,
known as Section 1864. which was passed by
the Legislature to afford means OF dealing
without 100 much delay with the affairs sur.
rounding the estate of Thomas h. Blythe, who
died intestate, in this city, on April 4, 1888.
The nna decision in the case VIII, OF couIs Sc,
result In the distribution OF the estate
Thomas II. Blythe was well-known charac-
ter of this city. having arrived here In early
days. His antecedents are shrouded in con-
siderable mystery Scotland, England and
Wales were given as his place of birth.
Claimants from these countries sprang up en-
deavorlng to prove relationship. and after the
granting OF letters of administration to the
then Public Administrator Philip A. Roach,
the celebrated contest was commenced.
In 1873 Blythe was In England on a visit.
and 1t is said that there he met Julia Perry
daughter OF James Crisp Perry. and through
his relations with her Florence was born.
Blythe left England In August of that year
aud in December the child was born. 1t was
claimed for this child that she was Blytnes
ilegltimate daughter, and first had been
adopted as such under section $50 of the Civil
Code and Instituted an heir under section 1887
of the same code. Without touching on con-
trOyeTted points Of law, the difference between
these sections Is substantially that the first,
which defines adoption. relates TO conduct,
declaration and acts, all included in the phrase,
Treating IL as II 1t were legitimate child"
while The latter provides That "every ilegiti-
mate child Is an heir of the person who, in
writing, signed In the presence OF competent
witness, acknowledges himself TO be the father
OF such child"
After the complaint on behalf of Florence
peared and set forth their reasons for ex-
pecing portion at least OF the estate The
most important OF these was the alleged widow,
Alice Edith Dickson Blythe. She had lived
with Blythe for many years and was with him
at the time OF his death. She admitted mat
both Blythe and herself believed Florence 10
be the child of Blythe by Julia Perry. Alice
Edith limited herself to an acknowlede ment
OF this paternity, disclaimed an interest in the
question of adoption or heirship and admitted
that IL Florence were really Bythe's child she
was entitled to one-half the estate.
With these issues presented the trial of the
case lasted year before Judge COffey. In the
fall of 1890 Judge Coffey decided the case and
held, first, that Florence Blythe was the iegtl-
mate daughter OF Thomas II. Blythe, by Julia
Ashcroft, formerly Julia Perry; second. that
she bad been adopted under section 230; third,
that she had not been instituted as an heir
under section 1887: fourth that the Williams
claimants were the true collateral heirs and
would have succeeded but for the birth and
adoption OF Florence Blythe; fifth, that Mrs.
Blythe bad not been the wife and was not the
widow OF Blythe, anG sixth, that none Of the
other claimants were relatives OF Blythe. The
conclusion, expressed in the finding and 1udg-
meni, was that Florence Blythe was entitled 10
The whole estate.
Then followed the appeals which are now
| being tried in the Supreme Court.
The difference between an appeal from tudg.
| ment and an appeal from an order refusing a
new trial Is that the former only takes up such
! questions as arises on the findings, pointed by
! such parts OF the testimony as may be incor-
! porated with a bill of exceptions, while the
latter presents the entire testimony and. there
fore, includes all issues OF the fact and error,
claimed 10 have been committed in the admis-
sion and exclusion of testimony offered.
Mrs. Blythe takes no part I'm the matter OF the
GU stlon OF adoption or Institution. so her ap-
peal from the order denying a new trial, the
| time for which has not expired, will not take
! place until the July term.
The appeal from the judgment by the Will
| lams claimants. To which some OF the Other
! defendants and claimants were parties, offered
| Tor The consideration OF the Supreme Court
simply the law OF adoption and the law OF In
slitution under lie two sections already men
! TONED. That appeal, between the Williams
claimants and the plaintiff has been heard and
! decided. and the Supreme Court in bank. con-
sisting of five Justices, held that the four let.
tiers signed before Mr.. Hart, TO which lie testi-
! fed before Judge Coffey, constituted institu
| ton, but only three concurred in sustaining
Judge Coffeys decision on the score OF adop-
! don, and In bank II takes four to render judg
ment.
| The net result down TO this time is that as be
| tive n the Williams claimants and the plaintiff
| the judgment OF Judge Coffey was affirmed, not
on the ground assigned by him, but on the
| point OF institution, and on the assumption
too. contested on The motions for new trial
| that the four letters were actually proved tC
have been signed before competent wi ness
! AS the williams claimants rested their alleged
rights upon these two points of law, they are
now considered to be out of the case.
This was the condition OF affairs till yester
day. when the arguments on the two motion!
were commenced. Nine appeals were 10 bt
| considered, and In each case the arguments or
the two motions were heard together.
The Blythe Company was represented by d