The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1894-11-14

| was to marcn on the calTeMc IlgHt W
protect their flank. Thirteen thous
and five hundred, or at most fourteen
thousand troops, had been massed to
attack an army, but with no more hope
of success than had the Spartans at
Thermopyl;r, the English cavalry at
Balaklava or the Old Guard of the
French at Waterloo.
Pickett's $ division formed at 80
a. M. in line nearly parallel and in
rear of the rise upon which runs the
Emmittsburg road, but rather dlago-
nally to the Union position at the con-
templatcd point of attack. kemper $
right was one thousand eight hundred
and sixty yards distant from it, while
pettigrew prolonged the line somewhat
en- echclon. Pickett first formation
was in one line, Armistead, Garnctt
and Kcmpcr from left to right. Gar
nett troops were twenty yards only
in rear of Wilcox brigade of .Ander-
son's division, which had been sent
out to the front between daylight and
sunrise to protect guns then being
nut in position by Col Il. 2. Alcxan-
der, of the artillery. Wilcox states
that the four brigade commanders were
together nearly all the time before the
artillery opened ''in the yard near the
Spanglcr House, and that there was
no officer present in that open field at
any time higher in rank than a brigade
general, which differs with all account
by the right corps commander, who
has said that Lee rode with him
twice over the line to see that every
thing was arranged according to his
wishes and that there was no room for
misconstruction Of his orders.
Lee object was to cut the Federal
army at its left centre as Marlborough
split that of Ecndomc in the same
month one hundred and ffty-fvc years
before, thinking, perhaps, its right
wing could be destroyed first or driven
so far out of the way that he could
turn in whole or part against the LETT
wing before it could discntangle itself
from the rocks and woods of the Round
Top.
TESTIMONY OF LEE $ STAFF OFFICERS
1t is fortunate three of Gen. Lee S
trusted staff ofliccrs-Taylor, Venablc
and Long-havc recorded that the
plan of assault involved an attack by
Longstrcct's whole corps, supported
by one half of Hill S, or all of it if ne
called for it, or upon the bright shield
of the Southern chieftain there might
have been lasting blot Taylor. the
adjutant general Of the army, says it
was originally intended to make the
attack with Hood and McLaws, re-
enforced by Pickett, and it was only
because of the apprehension of Gen.
Longstreet that his corps was not
| strong enough that Gen. Hlll was
called on to support him, and Hill, IN
an official report, states that his troops
were sent to Longstrcct ''as support
to his corps. Lee rode along a por-
ton of the line held by A. p. Hill 5
corps and finally took position about
the Confederate centre on an elevated
point. IRON which he could survey the
field and watch the result of the
movement. Long says the order for
the assault by the whole corps was
given verbally by Gen. Lee in his
presence and that of Major Nenable
and other officers Of the army. Hcna
ble states that he heard the orders
given to support Pickett S attack by
McLaws and Hood, and that when he
called Gen. Lee S attention to it after.
ward he said: Il know it, | know it.
4 consummate master of war such
as Lee was would not drive en- massc
column of fourteen thousand men
across an open terrene thirteen or
fourteen hundred yards, nearly every
foot of it under concentrated and
converging fire of artillery, to attack
an army on fortified heights of one
hundred thousand, less it's two days
losses, and give his entering wedge no
support. Why, if every man in that
assault had been bullet-proof, and II
the whole Of those fourteen thousand
plendid troops had arrived unharm"d
on Cemetery Ridge, what could have
been accomplished !? Not being able to
kill them there would have been time
for the Fcdcrals to have seized, tied
and taken them off in wagons before
their supports could have reached
them. Amid the fire and smoke OF
this false move these troops did not
know ;'somc one had bluudcred, but
had right to feel that the movement
had been we'll considered and ordered
because it had elements of success
But there was no chance to write VIC
tory upon their huttcring flags. The
pages of history which record the
magnificent exhibition of human cour.
age drip with the useless sacrifice OF
blood.
LoyGsrREET $ RELUCTANCE TO OBEY
Lonsstrcet was disappointed when
he received the order to make this
attack and wanted to move to the
Federal left, but Lee knew his rcla,
tions with Meade had been too init
mate during the last two days and the
relative hosts too close for such tartl-
cal folly. His right corps chief say,
he took Pickett, who was to command
the charge, to the crest Of Seminary
Ridge, pointed out the direction to be
taken and the point to be assaulted ;
that he ';could zee the desperate and
hopeless nature of the charge and the
cruel slaughter it would cause, and
that his ':hcart was heavy when he
left Z ckctt; that his objections to
pickctt's battle had been overrulcd,
and that the day was one OF the sad
dcst of his life, fo- he foresaw what
his men would meet and would gladly
have given up his position rather than
share in the responsibilities OF that
day. Lee, au contrairc, was imlatl'
entity waiting to see l.ongstrcct corps
and one-half of Hills, or, if nccc '"ry.
all of it. break. with the force OF he
tempest which strands navics, through
the hostile lines, if the testimony Of
his staff officers is worthy Of crcdcncr.
The details of the attack were prop
crlv left to the oiliccrwho was to make
it. Lee did not care whether l"nd
and McLaws. attacked, reinforced by
Pickett and Hills 5 troops, as at first
intended. or whether Pickett led and