Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1894-03-30
VERDICT AFFIRMED.
MANViLLE MUST SUBMIT TO THE
INEVITABLE.
willie Has Had a Fair Trial, and
Must submit 10 the Verdict.

he supreme Court W ednesdaN
handed down" its decision in thu
Manyllle case, affirming the judgmen
Of the Superior Court. This was a.
expected, for after the trial, its emf
nent fairness was very generally con
coded by bar and spectators, and tn,
only wonder expressed was that tn,
jury rendered verdict OF murder il
the second instead of the first degree.
Manvilie was sentenced by Judg,
Gordon to fourteen years in the peni
Tertiary, for the killing OF J. S. Nc
Cabe. Motions in arrest OF judgment
and for a new trial, were made anC
overruled. From the ruling OF tn,
court in denying the motions for {
new trial and for arrest OF judgment
Manville appealed.
The appellant Manville assigned az
error a great many rulings of the cour,
below, both in the admission and ex
clusion OF testimony. The Supreme
Court examined them all, and from
such examination" says the opinion
We have been unable to find any er
ror in them" Continuing. the opin
ion reads as follows:
During the progress OF the trial ap
pellant introduced Coroner Hartsock
to prove that Conboy, witness fol-
the State, had made a statement to
him the day after the tragedy oc.
Cured, concerning the manner in
which the shooting was done, which
statement was at variance with a ma
terial point made by him on the wit.
ness stand. The State in rebuttal in
troduced three witnesses, viz: Rag
less, Foster and Wilson, who testified
that the statement made by Conboy
was substantially the same as the
statement made by him on the wit
ness stand. The appellant earnestly
insists that the admission of this testi.
mony was prejudicial error; that the
testimony of a witness cannot be sus.
tanned by showing that his testimony
corresponds with statements that lie
had previously made, citing Ellicott ct
al. va. William Pearl, 10 Pet, 402, to
sustain this contention; and while the
general doctrine announced in that
case. and which is no doubt a correct
doctrine, sustains appellants conten-
ton, the exception made to the gen.
eral rule is as plainly enunciated as
the rule itself, and the case at bar
falls squarely within the scope OF the
exception instead of the rule.
The defendant in this case assailed
the testimony OF Conboy as a fabrica
ton. That was the object of Hart.
socks testimony, to make it appear to
the jury that at first Conboy had told
the truth, but subsequently he had
fabricated the statement which he
made under oath.
Whatever distinctions the author
tiles may have made in reference tc
the admission of this kind of test.
mony, practically all of them would
sanction its admission under the cir.
cumstances of this case; and outside
of the legal proposition discussed, il
seems to us that this testimony was
plainly admissible to show, or at least
to tend 10 show, that Conboy did not
make the statement attributed to him
by Hartsock. but that Hartsock was
mistaken. 1t was the same converse.
ton that they were testifying 10 tina,
Hartsock had testified to, not to at.
tempt to prove that at some other time
and place the witness had made an
other or different statement. The
jury certainly had right to the test.
mony of all the witnesses to the con-
versation to aid them in determining
whether or not the witness made the
statement attributed to him by the
defendants witness. This, it seems to
us. was the object of this testimony
Certainly this was the practical effect
OF it.
During the cross-examination OF the
appellant he was asked by the attorney
for the State if he did not state to the
Sheriff on the day OF McCabe's funeral
that "if there has been no accident or
slip McCabe was in hell by this time"
This question was objected to as incom-
petent and immaterial, and the court
refused to admit it, on the ground that
it was not proper cross-examination.
The question was then asked for the
avowed purpose of laying the ground
for impeachment. This was objected
to and the objection was sustained.
Appellants counsel then desired to
note an exception to the asking of
any questions OF this sort before the
jury; whereupon the court made the
following statement to the jury:
"The jury will understand that when
they retire their verdict must be made
up on the evidence that is given, and
they are to give no weight to the testi-
mony which is ruled out"
This statement by the court to the
jury the appellant contends was not
sufficient, but that the court ought to
have proceeded to rebuke the attorneys
for the State for asking the question.
We hardly see how such a procedure
on the part of the court could have
been of any benefit to appellants
cause. If anything. it would have
made the question a more prominent
one in their minds and more lasting
one in their memories. The court
plainly told the jury that they were
not to consider evidence which was
ruled out. The instruction was with
direct reference to this question and
made at the time the question was
asked; and even if we should conclude
that it was an improper question to
ask on cross-examination, rs tending
to show that animus of the defendant,
who was then testifying in his own
behalf, the court certainly went as
far as he was justified under the cir
cumstances in going when he in.
structed the jury that such question
should have no weight with them in
the determination of their verdict.
This was long and tedious case, and,
it seems to US, is unusually free from
error on the part of the court.
1t is contended by the appellant
that the testimony does not sustain
the verdict; but in the absence of any
legal error we do not feel justified ia
disturbing the verdict of the jury. 1t
is we'll established principle that the
jury is the tribunal instituted by law
to pass upon questions of fact, and
where there is conflict of testimony
their verdict will not be disturbed by
the courts. This has been the uniform
holding OF this court and of all other
courts; and in fact there can be no
other holding under the law. The
a.