The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-11-25

necessary to : skirt the flank Of Austria,
traverse Prussia, and march between Swe-
den and Turkey; q defensive and offensive
alliance with these four powers was therefore
desirable, " not indispensable. Austria was
submissive to the ascendancy OF Napoleon and
Prussia TO his military force; he had. therefore,
only TO point out TO them his purpose; Austria
h~astened TO take part in IL, and Prussia was
easily impelled in the same direction. Tho lat
ter power, by the treaty Of Feb. "a, 1912, re-
signed herself to placing from 10000 to
10000 men and the greater part Of her
fortrcsscs and stores at the disposition OF the
French army. Austria, for her part, placed
between the two colossal States of the north
and the west, wns glad TO see them come to
blows; she hoped that her own power would
grow in proportion To their exhaustion. On
March IA. 1872, she promised France 10000
men, but she secretly prepared for them far
seeing instructions. She obtained q vague
promise Of ACKNOWLEDGMENT by way Of indemnity
for her war expenses, and had the possession of
.6alicia guaranteed. At the same time she ac-
cepted the possibility of ccding n part OF this
province to a reconstructed Kingdom Of Poland
on condition Il ut she should receive in exchange
the nlyrinn provinces. This is proved by the
sixth article OF The secret treaty between France
and Austria. IT il thus plain that the sncccss
OF the war did not depend on the cession OF
1hllClN, OF on inc restraints mpOseu ny AUS
trian eagcrrcss to retain that country. II fol-
lows that from his entrance into wilma Ma
poleon might have proclaimed the liberation of
OF the whole Of Poland instead OF disappointing
the hopes OF tho Poles and rendering them luke
warm by equivocal words. Yet, In Segur's
jui Rmicnt, the liberation of Poland was one of
those salient points which in war and politics
are decisive, on which everything else hangs,
and to which one should have chung at oil haz-
ards. But whether Napoleon reCkoncd too
much on the ascendnncy Of his genius, on the
strength Of his army, and on the weakness OF
the Car, or that, remembering what be left
behind him, he considered so remote IA war too
dangerous to be prosecuted methodicnlly and
slowly, or whether. az he himself admitted he
felt uncertain concerning the success OF his en-
tctprlse, he neglected TO proclaim the liberation
of Poland ur did not venture to Gene to n de-
cision on the point. lie even neglected to clear
the southern Polish provinces OF those hostile
forces which repressed the outburst of their
patriotism. and to secure by their insurrcciion
a solid hasis OF operations. The conclusion OF
Segur's views on this point is set 70, iii In u
passage which we quote wor,l for word " Ac-
customed to short paths, and thunderstrokes,
Napoleon desired to initiate his own previous
achievements. leaving out Of account the differ
ence Of localities and circumstances such Is
the weakness Of man. who always acts by imi-
tation, either OF others or OF himself: in other
words. in the case Of great men. by the force Of
habit. which Is but elimination ana thus II Is
that, by their strongest side, the men of cx-
traordinary merit perish" In the Russian
campaign the Emperor left everything to the
issue Of battle. lie had set on foot an army OF
six hundred and fifty thousand men. and
he believed that thereby he lad done
enough ~ gaia the victory. Instead OF
sacrificing everything In order to attain
that victory. 1t was by victory that he hoped to
gain everything else: hr aimed to use II ns a
means when 1t hould have been his faal end.
He .tonildcd to IL 50 much of the future. and
surchargcd IL with 50 much Of responsibility
tina, he made Il pressing and indispensable.
Hence his haste to seize II, in order to escape
from u critical position. AZ thu same time" says
let US be in no hurry to judge a genius
so great and comprehensive. Soon We shall
hear from himself this. of course, is In ref
crence to the notes known to have been made at
Helenal; we shall see how many necessities
cocrced him, and that. while we may admit that
the rapidity OF his movement was rash. success
would probably have crowned it, had not tn.
premature decline OF his health detractcd from
the physical strength o: this great man half of
the. vigor which his mind had kept"