The National tribune., 1894-02-01

Cleburne's Division, of Cheatham's Corps
was the leading division of Hoods column,
and know from personal observation what
Cleburne did. was commanding Co. B in
the 6iih Ohio, which regiment was On the
skirmish-line, and first came in contact with
Cleburne's men. Cleburne formed his bat
tle-line parallel with the Rally Hill road,
and facing not in the direction Of Spring
Hill, but toward the Columbia pike, which
was a hslf-mile or more TO the west, and
here ran nearly parallel with the Rally Hill
road His right, something less than mile
from Spring Hill, rested opposite ridge COW
cred with timber, which concealed part of
the battle-line of Bradley's Brigade, occupy
ing the crest of the ridge. His center faced
some open fields, which stretched all the way
across to the Columbia pike His left was
In front of an inclosed woodland pasture
1t was probably these open fields which
determined the place Of Cleburne's forma-
tion, for the intention was to have him
march over to the pike and there change
direction to the north and
AON ANOE ON cfhlNI HILL
sstride the pike. Bates Division, also of
Cheatham's Corps, was following Cleburne's
In the column, and OF crossing Rutherford's
Greek Bate was ordered to march across to
the Columbia pike and then sweep down
the pike in the direction of Columbia.
Browns Division, the remaining one of
Cheatham's Corps was crossing the creek
while Cleburne and Bate were moving on to
carry ont their respective orders. After
Brown got over the creek be would be in a
position TO support either Cleburne or Bate,
as circumstances might dictate Hood halted
his four remaining divisions south of Ruth
srford's Creek and formed them In line facing
west in the direction where Schofield's main
body was posted.
There is no writer, Federal or Confederate,
that know OF, who disputes the situation as
have here described il. In view of this sit
uation and of the greatly superior force which
Hood was commanding, will Col. HAIRY dis
pate that it was fraught with the very gravest
danger to Schofeld's army if Hoods unde-
piable advantage had been pushed with a
reasonable degree of Vigor and intelligence?
There can be but one fair Interpretation put
upon Hoods disposition of his army. His
orders at Rutherford's Creek were
BASED UPON THE THEORY
that small Federal force was occupying
Spring Hill while the main body of Scho-
fields army was yet in the vicinity of Duck
River; for be sent only one division toward
Spring Hill while he forced five divisions
the other way, leaving Browns Division
available to be used in either direction. His
theory was in full accord with the actual
facts.
But some Of Hoods subordinates adopted
theory of their own which favored Scho-
fields situation, and acting in accordance
with hat theory they defeated Hoods plan
and saved Schofeld's army. If Hoods
orders had been carried out without any
kicking" before night fell he would have
had Cleburne's Division astride the Columbia
pike Immediately south of Spring Hill and
facing toward that village. Stanley's com.
mand would then have been hemmed in
between Cieburne on the south and Forrest:
cavalry on the east and north.
In the other direction Bates Division
would have been astride the pike about two
miles south of Cleburne's position, but facing
The other way, with Brown between the two
and ready TO support either. The four divis
ions with Schofeld at Duck River would
then haFe been encompassed On the north