Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1894-10-13

| III >S& val operations of the
| o. different engagements
| Mr.. Herbert said that
ii was not necessary
| for the Navy Department to detail an Of
| fcer to observe the movements of the naval
| forces of the Chinese and japanese, as the
War Department had done in relation to
the armies Of the two belligereDts. Naval
| officers were already on the ground, and
| under the general orders governing ships
in foreign waters they would observe and
report on the conduct Of the Chinese and
japanese navies wherever it was possible.
| he SAID also that he had no doubt that II
| the Navy Department wanted volunteers
l to go aboard vessels engaged in battle for
| purposes Of observation a great many could
he found to undertake this hazardous serv-
| ice.
| Mr Herbert might have added that the
officers Of the American navy. working in
| the interest Of the naval intelligence bu-
! reau, had gone ashore on more than one
occasion when fighting inland was in
prospect. and had followed one OF the bellig-
erent armies SO as to observe and report on
| the conduct of some engagement This
happened during the British operations in
| Egypt I'm fSS2, and later in Chile. The re-
ports of these officers are features of the
| elaborate reports On war operations issued
| by the Navy Department through its intel
/ 1igcnce bureau.
| The naval intelligence bureau is the most
secret institution in the American govern
ment except the diplomatic service In
soiae respects IL is even more secretiye
| than the State Department. And vet il is
! col Quoted on far more liberal plan than
| the intelligence offices of other naval pow
ers 1 was talking with Assistant Secretary
| McAdoo few days ago about the opera
! tons OF this bureau, which is under his
! direct supervision. and he said: mo gov
| crnment in the world is SO liberal as ours
in making public informa ton about naval
dHaiIs. The representatives of other ma
! ti"ns obtain more information here than
| they could in all the other capitals OF the
\ word put together on the subject Of ships
! ana naval ordrance. No other nation has
| Pablo tests of its armor and its proiectiles
| Ana as to making public a series of frauds
Ike those at the Carnegie works. there is
no nation that would not strain every
nerve TO prevent 1t. What other naval
| power would tell the world that the armor
| plat" on its war vessels was probably de-
| fecttNs: What other nation would take n
| plate from one o, its vessels and put IL to
pu"ie test TO prove. perhaps. that the
vessel was poorly protected? The only rea-
son we are so open In naval matters is that
| pIhhc sentiment In this country demands
thai v" shall conduct public affairs with
out SEE y. This government is a sort of
| Cooperative concern, and every one In n
! fe",S that he has a right to know how n IS
being conducted. / do not know thar the Ia clx
Oh secrecy in these matters does us any
particular harm; for We are not sit;,a ted as
| ar" the nations OF Europe with nossih,s
Toes On our borders
Left 1t tn "a Rarher shop,
Atr McAdoo is conscious that he is not
imbuei with the proper spirit in his deal
ing with the intelligence bureau. for one
day he was so thoughtless as TO leave a
Very important and highly confidential doc
| ument from that bureau in his barber shop
and 1t remained there Tor a day or two
| before he could trace it, No international
| computations have arisen so he Is reason
any certain that the matter did not fall
INTO the hands Of the enemy but what
| might have happened under certain condi-
lions is beyond computation.
but really IT Is surprising that the Navy
| department should not only give represen-
tat:Ves Of other nations access to our ar
| NOR tests. but should publish the results ia r
| ana Wide These. however. form but a
small! part Of the informa ton stored IN the
| naval Intelligence bureau
Inc system or naval intelligence is not
complicated. At each of the princinaI cant
lais OF the world We have naval attaches
or we are represented from time to time Inv
| naval officers. detailed for the work II il
the duty of these officers to collect all the
Information obtaiDable about improvements
IN haVai architecture, in naval equipment
! IN coast defenses-in fact, in everything
blch would be of Importance TO this nation
TO know in time of war The naval intelli-
Gence bureau, says Lieut. Singer who has
charge OF II, Is organized on a '.prepare for
war OASIS, and most of the Information
nieI with this bureau will find its chief mis-
! sion when the United States gets into
trouble with some maritime nation
In addition 10 these naval attaches there
are, throughout the navy, intelligence Of
Hcers. The commanding officer of each YES
sci assigns one of the officers under him to
TINS duty, which he performs In connection
4 -llG iaG boo. III.
duty or every officer TO observe closely all
mat may be of value 10 the service and all
ofhcers are encouraged TO write reports to
De forwarded to the Navy Department. But
TINS duty falls chiefly ON the intelligence
otncer. His work is confidential 1t passes
through the hands of the comma nding Of
| hcer OF the vessel, and from him il is sent
| to the Navy Department Here IL is re-
ferred to the intelligence bureau from
which 1t Is referred again to the bureau OF
The department to whose particular work
1t Is chiefly devoted. At this bureau ex-
tracts are made from Il, If necessary and IL
is then returned to the intelligence bureau
where ii is filed The system of filing is
like that Of library. All of the reports
are indexed anu cross-indexed on sets of
| cards, which furnish an easy means of ref
erence to reports on any subject. And the
range Of subjects take I'm everything which
has any place in naval records. from rope
to heavy guns, and from steam pumps TO
coast defenses. Reports about tools" are
grouped under one head. Under another are
reports about ports Sailors all over the
world exchange news about the minor mat
tiers of ship equipment, and these matters
are reported constantly to the department
Watching Wars.
Wherever a war between nations might
be declared, the United States would have
at least ore vessel. or usually a fleet 1t
would be the duty OF the intelligence officers
on these vessels to observe and report
promptly to the department any experience
which might be an object lesson for the
American army or navy II we should be in
volved in an international conflict These
reports are intended, primarily, for the use
Of the Navy Department.: but each year a
compilation Of them Is made and published
for limited distribution TO libraries I'm
doubtedly there will be ready for the next
publication of this character to be prepared
by the intelligence bureau q very full de-
scription Of the operation Of the Chinese
and japanese navies, so far as officers OF the
American navy were able to observe them
The naval Intelligence bureau was organ
lied In 1882. That was the year of the bonn
bardment Of Alexandria by the British. In
1885 the intelligence bureau issued q re-
port Of the British operations in ERypt
compiled by Lieut.. Commander Goodrich
This report nils $40 pages and IL illustrated
with seventy-nine fuii-pagc plates. In adj
dition to these Illustrations there are WOOD