The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1894-03-17

capture or destroy Nictheroy, and from
time to time for months the forts and
ships kept up the conflict when diplo-
matte interference had diverted warfare
from the city. In one of the numerous
encounters an old armor-clad of Mello's,
the Javary, was sunk, but it was said,
through the leaking from loosened
Joints, rather than from being perforat-
ed by shells. though one had just struck
her.
The insurgents set up provisional
government at Destero, which place was
captured by the Republic and other
vessels that had left Rio, and they CO.
south, and when at length Admiral de
CANA, who had at first remained neutral
in the harbor ON the Tamandare, Joined
them and assumed command, two har-
bors islands were also AIDED; while the
going over of Fort Vilegaignon to the
insurgent cause and the blockade of
Santons, the we'll known port further
south were further incidents of import
ance But PeiXoto on his part had not
been idle. At New York his agents
bought the steamer Ell Cid, placed a
dynamite gun and other weapons aboard
the name being changed to the Nicthe
roy, and also acquired the steamer Brit
tannia. which was armed and called the
America, besides obtaining two fast
boat Destroyer, with her submarine
weapon, was also purchased. as were sew
eral torpedo boats from Europe. The
Tiradentes, not at Rio de Janeiro, and
the Bahia, which was at that port, had
remained loyal. With the collection of
this Heterogeneous feet the months passed,
but even when they were assembled in
Brazilian waters Peixoto hesitated to
pit them against the Aquidaban, the
Republica, the Trajano, the Tamandare
and other insurgent vessels that might
perhaps have blown them to pieces be-
fore they could get within the firing
distance of their shorer range arnia-
ments. However, on December, the
Aquidaban, under Mello, ran by the
Republica away, perhaps at Santos or
Destero, the opportunity to act be-
came tempting.
Signs, too, had become apparent that
the rebellion was fast eXhausting itself
through lack of resources. 1t had been
based on the theory of receiving stuff
Gent support ashore to force the prompt
resignation of Peixoto; and when this
was not accomplished, the question Of
the supply of munitions and wages, and
of achieving such successes in battle as
would keep up the courage of its sup
ports, became serious. The unsympa-
thetic attitude of at least most of the
foreign fleets that had gathered in the
harbor TO look after the INTEREST of their
respective countries also began to tell.
The most powerful of these fleets was
that of the United States, and toward
the close of January Admiral Benhams
decision that American merchant vessels
should 90 to the docks and there dis
charge and load their cargoes, being re-
sisted by da Cana, called outa none
tary six-pound shot from the Detroit,
IL, ,la0v,e had off in hrao
ing the prestige of the rebellion than
any amount of firing from the harbor
forts That incident occurred aftersthe
meeting of Peixoto and da Cana on the
San Francisco; then came the election
for president, as the result of which the
insurgents did not conceal their salts
faction although it showed that their
cause had little further excuse for exis-
tence. Our own government felt SO we'll
assured that peace was at hand that 1T
made preparations for breaking up its
fleet at Rio de Janeiro. But, with a con-
tinuance of it's unfaiIing tact, President
Peixoto's government, well aware of how
affairs stood, risked bringing. to the
capital it's Heterogeneous little fleet.
Tt had the more reason for doing so, as
the two most famous of the insurgent
vessel, the Aquidaban and Republica,
were absent from the narhor. 1t saw,
too, that this move might be just
enough to bring the insurgents of sur
render rather than uselessly undertake
further hostilities. and that the govern
ment would thus win the credit OF pro-
ducing the downfall of the rebellion by
its own show of naval energy, and not
solely by the ebbing vitality of what
was deemed "a lost cause. Above all
this downfall would be assured within
its own term, and not belong to its
successor. 1t appeared needless to de-
lay for the arrival of the Riachuelo and
the Benjamin Constant from Europe
The result was what might have been
The first rumor of a naval
battle at hand was quickly followed by
the announcement of capitalization. 1t
will be remem bered that even six weeks
ago da Cana was reportedsto have con-
templated surrendering to the United
States, as a way out of his dilemma; so
that when Peixoto proposed renewing
and also with torpedo boats, whose eff
cheney the Chileans had actually demon
strated, the insurgent admiral, with two
of his best ships absent, determined not
even to hazard the sinking of single
one of the remaining vessels that had
stood by him SO faithfully in cause al
ready become hopeless. Earlier in the
this little fotilla with his big armor
clad and other powerful vessels and
made havoc there.
But. as it has happily turned out, we
shall now only hear wonderful stories of
what might, could, should land would
have been done by the dynamite gun
and other weapons in annihilating da
Canals entire array of war vessels; and
what is far more important, we shall
hear, it may be hoped, of peace and
restored to Rio Janeiro. For
although Desterro, on the island of
Santa Catharina, is still in insurgent
hands and the Aquidaban and Republica
does not necessarily involve the indie
pendent revolt of Rio Grande do Sui