The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-09-24
TIETAM.

Col. A. II. Nickerson. for many years an
Mcclellan thanked God for great victory
at Antietam: Gen. Lee. with apparent sin
cerity, thanked the same God for having
vouchsafsd to the Confederacy q great
victory at Antietam, or. as he called it,
Sharpsburg.
OF course Mcclellan and Lee were not
both victorious at Antietam. Both armies
camped on the field of battle. Mcclellan
says his army slept on a field won by their
valor. and Lee says his army remained
there till the night of the DAY following
the battle. Lee says that McClellan's adj
vance was so slow at the time the Confed-
crates left Frederick as to justify him
in the belief that his army could capture
Harper's Ferry and concentrate after
wards before they would be called upon to
meet the Union army. Mcclellan arrived
in front of Lees position at Sharpsburg
on the afternoon of September Is and
found there two of his own divisions,
Richardson's and Sykes. The heads of
the remainder of his columns were 80 close
at hand that he could have at once made
the same movement he did with Rockers
corps twenty-four hours later. Had ne
done so the battle that began at Antietam
on the morning of September IL would
have been fought and surely won on the
10th. tor Jackson's command could not
possibly have reached Lee from Harper's
Ferry in time to have saved ths battle.
As 10 was, Hill's corps Of Jackson's CON-
mand did not reach Lee until the after
noon of the nth.
into McClellan's hands and revealed to
him that a large part of the Confederate
army was either at Harper's Ferry or at
the worst barely on its way to Sharpsburg.
In fact. none of Jackson's command
reached Lee until late in the afternoon of
the 18th. 1t was the opportunity Of Nc
Clellan's life. In justice to Gen. Mcclellan
il should be said that had Gen. Burnside
obeyed McClelan's repeated orders to
carry the bridge in his front and the
heights beyond. nothing could have saved
Lee from an overwhelming defeat. The
bridge that Burnside was ordered to as
sault at 8 n. m. could have been carried by
10 O'Clock. and we would have been in
possession of the heights beyond by noon.
A. r. Hills head of column did not reach
the field until 1 80 p. m. Had so able and
energetic a soldier as Fltz John Porter
commanded the lett nothing could have
saved Lees army. but Porter held the
center and was not seriously engaged.
Gen. George Crook. who commanded one
of the brigades of Union troops engaged at
the Burnside bridge, years after the war
said:
MANY lives were uselessly sacrificed at
this point. because the pianest military
precautions were not observed in making
that crossing. In fact, that he went him.
self and superintended the posting of two
pieces OF artillery in such a position that
they nearly compelled the occupants of
the defensive position to yacate. and so
materially reduced their fire that the
passage OF the bridge, after many failures.
was rendered practicable. All the as
sagits made previous TO the posting of
that section of artillery had been unsuc-
cessfai, and were attended with fearful
loss Of life. Ii had az TO that time been
Burnside battle of Fredericksburg on
smaller scale.