Fort Worth gazette. [volume] (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1891-1898, 1894-05-13

growing power OF inc lnlleu othtes 4 w hob
believe any combination of our enemies
would dare resort to this measure"
"Thls Hypothetical as you consider
IT."
at is very hypothetical and speculative.
regard It as very remote. Shl it is impos-
slble to feel thoroughly assured. War, II IL
came, would come out OF accidents and not
from preparation. But even admitting the
risk of sudden accident, war is very improb-
able. An isolated war is most unlikely. A
general war is still more improbable"
''You do not think afIairs on the continent
are shaping themselves toward war:"
mo not at all. l believe that if events
arose which made war necessary, that war
would be an isolated ONE
"will not these large standing armies have
to find an outlet2"
mo, think that Is a superficial aspect.
People will continue to submit to great ex-
pense to avoid war. They will not commit
suicide to save themselves from dying. The
Italians, Of course, are in less agreeable
position than other people. They are on the
verge of bankruptcy. but fail to see how
they could establish themselves by war.
Besides war is impossible now without
popular support, except OF course, in a sud-
den heat. But should such thing take
place it will be, as l have said an isolated
war"
would EnglAnd's next war-if may carry
on the hypothesis--be fought on the old
principle"
"The old English naval principle was to
consider the coast OF the enemy the first limo
! OF defense. In these modern days tho block
ade OF warships Is virtually impossible. To
blockade our enemy we should have to
double the fleet and oven then mako up our
minds to resign the power OF efficiently pro-
tecting commerce. This plan Of blockade is
really based on the supposition that in
| future naval war it would be impossible for
US from the first to obtain the same over
wholming superiority at sea which Nelson
| won for us at Trafalgar No conceivable in
crease of strength would DO sufficient to
make us safe II We trust to naval defense
alone in face Of the facilities for conoentru-
| tlon which steam affords. In these days in
which hostllitios spring up suddenly in order
! that the attacking country may obtain the
advantage OF surprising It's enemy, It is
necessary that the British squadrons aHoat
in distant seas should be strong enough
TO hold their own without reinforcement
against probable onomies on tho same
station
elm case of war you would advocate the
holder measured
Eyes. Instead Of allowing our enemy to
| neutraliEe our superior force by remaining
| patiently in port, while We wore out our
ships by hanging round his harbors. we
should try to defeat his squadrons In Oman
sea. After that we should be in a much bet
ter position to find and capture his scattered
cruisers. Our policy would be to cut of the
enemy's supplies OF fuel by attacking his
coalships and capturing his coainc stations.
Our squadrons would be better employed in
such active work than In crawling about
home waters, guarding one end Of broken
line OF communication"
"What about England's hold on suez I'm
time OF war;"
I'VE have two routes to the East; that by
the suez canal and that by the Cape. In the
Mediterranean, in the event Of war. our
enemies might easily be too strong for us
We hold only Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus
and Cyprus is a source OF weakness, not Of
strength. 1t possesses no sufficient puns
iortincatons or garrison forts defense We
cannot pretend to guard trade routes. In
iaot, unless we had Italy for an ally IL ia
probable We should be overmatched In Modi- |
terraneAn waters. This might occur nj least
IN the early stages OF tho war; The French
possess series Of magnificent bases ON tbe
Mediterranean and would be able-were thev |
| opposed to us-to force us to rellpouish for |
q time at least the Mediterranean line To the |
his'' This, OF course would set Hong Kong
ana the Straits much further on from
England The power which commands the |
sea can forbid tho use Of the Suez canal In |
others by guarding all the approaches 10 II
out ms would only be an additional task FOR |
a heet already supposed to be ubiouitops
inc canal as means of communication In |
.i'ue Oh war is delicate and fragile as a |
sp'uers web. A few ships sunk in 1t, a |
ei'Afse or two OF dynamite exploded, a few |
'orpedoos laid down In the highland the |
weeks ~ u'yS vi
sir Charles Dixie believes the navy must
20 the chief agent in defense. but ,,backed
uy iortiheatons and land forces.s In f,ct
NC mas eontended in the house and ont for |
adequate and thorough preparation bv land |
ui'u sea, at home and abroad. in Great prit.
am ana IN Greater Britain--to use tho ant
name hesaye the mighty motherof nationsS |
wnen' as a young man fresh from cam. |
bridge, he journeyed round the world in 1867
but WARP he saidi shat is too bvpotbet.
things.p " '1'A ABOUT these
~ 10 have the pleasure Of meeting Sir Charles |
D'lke ,, ana not speak Of politics were an inn
Possibility. He was asked for his onInion on
Tue new national party OF which sn o,
1--WE politicians talk loudly and insistantly
y do not want to talk about tbat . he 70.
l,'ea u am very strong politician. bat |
no, aoe a strong party man. OF course tho crso.
,ion q a new party IS most Improbable. No.
.' believes in it. OF course from lima Ia
VINE parties receive people from other mar
e aSs, II they receive large number that re-
81 ss z. medifes their policy; especially h
,s arc people Of any iniuence n isot,
u, newcomers Will not join another party |
" ~1 ~ such conditions But in the sense |
.as CREATION Of new parties, that Is quite