The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1894-02-20

upon the law for the time being
which may be altered from time TO
time, subject only to vested rights.
See authorities supra and Sleight V.
Read, Is Barb. 1854; Pritchard V.
Bank, Is Am. Dec. (Ls.) 1872; hugh
V. Ottenheimer, q Or. 232.
In brief, assuming for the purposes
| of this case, that the Queen Consort
had only the same rights as other
married women, the King had a
vested right In the land In question
| for their joint lives; she could not by
executing a lease divest him Of his
! right, and the Legislature could not,
and did not attempt TO give her
power to do so; but she had d vested
reversion in the land to take effect In
possession upon his death; lac had no
vested right in this reversion; she
| had by Section / of the Act of 1883
power to dispose of this reVersion by
lease, besides power by Section z to
make contracts, oral or written, seal
ed or upsealed, as If sole, with GER
tain exceptions which do not apply
to this case; her power thus to dis
pose of her property and to contract
was constitutionally given to her by
| the Legislature without interfering
with his vested rights. Her lease
was therefore valid AS between the
lessor and lessees, it was good as
contract from the time of its execu-
ton and delivery. and, the King
having died, the lessees became en-
titled to the possession of the dennis
ed premises at the time when the
term was by the provisions Of the
lease to commence. If the King had
continued to live, the lease would
have been subject to his rights, as
between him and the lessees. The
question Is not whether the lease was
void or voidable, but whether it was
void or valid, and we are of the opin-
ion that twas valid, so far as the
lessons power to execute 1t Is con
cerned.
In Parry V. Kelley, SO Cal. 334,
Mrs. Kelley, while covert, executed a
mortgage of community property.
BY statute, the community property
was not liable for her contracts made
after marriage unless secured by
pledge or mortgage thereof execut-
ed by the husband, but she had
power to enter into any engagement
as if unmarried. Her husband after
wards died and she inherited a share
of the mortgaged property. The
Court held that while she had at the
date of the mortgage no title on
: which she could create a lien, yet
that since she had power to make
a mortgage as IT unmarried
the mortgage was good as a
contract and that her interest after
wards acquired by descent inurod to
the benefit of the mortgage. So in
the case at bar, if the lessor had had
no title at the date of the lease, the
lease would nevertheless be good as
contract and if she had afterwards
acquired title, the lessees would be
entitled to possession. But this is
not case of latter acquired proper
ty;" for the lessor already had, at the
date of the lease, the title to the re-
version.
In Hershizer v. Florence, 80 Oh
st. SIG, the defendant, a woman
married and acquired certain real es
| tate prior to the Act of 1860 which
placed her property under her sole
J control, and the amendment of 1866
which enlarged her power to contract
with reference to her separate estate
and rendered such estate liable to
3 execution In actions against her. LIZ
1867 she became surety upon certain
9 promissory notes. Her husband haC
acquired by virtue of his marriage {
= vested right in the real estate prior
, to the passage of the Act. The
. Court held that, subject to the hus
. bands vested right, 1.-The notes are s
charge upon the wifes estate, which
!, can be sold, if necessary, to pa,
them" In other words, she could b,
contract made after the passage o
. the Act charge her reversion in th'
q estate acquired before its passage.
. In Farr v. Sherman, IL Mich. 30
), the marriage, and acquisition of tn,
q land by the wife, took place befor,
:, the passage of the Act of 1856
O Soon after its passage she conveyed
the land without the knowledge o
+ consent of her husband. Prior to tn
q passage of the Act her sole deed wa
: void By the Act she was given powe
o of alienation as if sole. The HUSBAND
. died before the action, which wa
. eiectment, was brought The Cour
held that the deed was valid, saying
= "whether the husband, il living wit
\ her, or surviving her, may not hav
e rights adverse to the claim of he
q yendee to possession, and superior t
! that claim during the life of sucl
y husband, is question not involves
!, in this case; certainly no one but tn
:, husband can dispute the plaintiff
3 claim or title; and as the husband
= = dead. the right of the plaintiff to tb
, possession is perfect"
, Plaintiffs counsel argued at som
u length that the Queen Consort ha
Q power to execute the lease in quest
q ion irrespective of the powers con
,, ferred upon married women by til
u Act of 1888, on the ground that he