The Monticellonian., 1894-09-28
CAPT. mAHAN. VIEWS.

The Commander of the Cruiser Chicago In- tervlewed on the Battle on the River
 fafu Between the Japanese and Chinese
 The niaicqIties Of the Position of thc
 Batter Pointed Cut aDa Commented On.
 LONDON, Sept. 2i.-The United States cruiser Chicago sailed yesterday after l noon for lIayre where she will be doelied. She will return to Gravcsend in ten days to take coal. Shortly be- fore the Chicago sailed representa- tive of the United Press went on board of her and obtained an interview with Capt. Mahau. her commander, on the recent naval battle between the Jap ahese and Chinese fleets. Capt Mahan said;
 "The great thing with e,heet of war vessels with a lot of transports in charge is to prevent surprises or em- ! harrassment In this case there was 2 surprise, and this fact. to ny mind, supplies q prominent lesson. tis nee essary in attempting to convoy tran sports that the conveying fleet should be aeelsively superior to that of the enemy, but the Chinese fleet was much embarrassed by the presence of their transports am inclined to think that the Chinese admiral formed in fleet so close in shore be- cause he was obliged to do so. If he had gone out to meet the Japanese fleet, which was the proper course, he would have uncovered the mouth of the river into which the transports hal gone. Consequently he drew mp elese in shore. by which movement he was taeticaily embarrassed in maneu- vering. If his fleet had been much i larger than the Japa nese he might i have advanced, at the same time leaving l Il sufficient number of vessels to head i off a rush which the Japanese might i have made
 The whole affair illustrates the 1 difficulty attending an attacking l movement across the water unless you 1 have control of the water absolutely l Whether the Chinese succeeded ir their object it does not appear, but tht question k whether it was worth suel a risk for the sake of landing troops | It certainly was bad management t' fight so close in shore, for two of thC Chinese vessels had not the room tC turn and so went ashore. That is on, reason why the Japanese did not tr, to pass through the Chinese line, fo they would have got into shallo7 water and become entangled.
 It was a big engagement for moderi vessels. but see nothing yet te lea
 me to suppose that the engagemen will point 10 the reconstruction or re modelling of war vessels. The detail so far are very meager. don't knoN anything about the manner of attack bat dorts wAak-Eitly. s ,. -''T1SS before long the .TST5a ,7. f Wit give full information. dor :. even know what was the formation :. the hinese fleet in resisting the T
 tack. All that is clear is tb, the Japanese were on the :. ' fensive and the Chinese on II 7 defensive. l only wish I had mol
 1ne t9 write what l have to sa,
 That interests me most. is to lxno the hammer in which the battle WA ; fought Upon this point we have pe , nothing Hut the great lesson is in in
 FISK et attempting to carry a gres
 force across water. As general rul
 such an attempt is unsafe. Never
 theiess, the mere existence ,, hostile fleet does not con
 stitute such detrimcrt upor the resolute man who tro
 that the object of his attempt is sufl cient to justify the risk. It remains |
 be seen whether the object the Chi
 ncse accomplished was sufficiently i'm
 portant to justify the risk she look
 To naval man the most intcrcstinl
 thing will be to know in what ordeI
 the Japanese fleet approached the Chi
 hese' whether it was concentrated o19t p o4ngIr 4narl 2t the Chinese line or spreac time to say more, as I have tot;;- ots;;-..,...a ..,....a... ship work to carefully study the mat. ter