The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-08-24
ronrEDo BoArs rorED a FAILtRE.
E.eisnrs sea Nss@uvres ~ tesA N-ks
Cnn.yornsie Critieis-s %. Theu,.

FNop me Londor Times.
A subsidiary feature Of the manouvres OF no
little interest In itself. Il the total failure ofthe
torpedo bonts on either side 10 put In an efec-
tive appearance or in any way 10 hamper the
movements 81 their advcrsaries. This Is. OF
course. partly ,irc to the fact that, owing to the
premature conclusion Of the man1uvres, they
Admiral Fits Roy passed Carnsore Point, where
a force OF Blue torpedo boats might have been
saturday. on the same night both Of the Blue
fleets werc within striking distance OF the heu
Fltz Roy does not seem to have been attacked a.
ell. The G. Blue. fleet was not. attacked NJ al,
but the D Blue fleet was attacked early In the
The Red torpedo hoats found Admiral Drum
mond's feet, but failed to attack H. successfully.
US nS ON Saturday evening ON the KisRR bank. It's
leader wns informed BY the Admiral that three
fleet, had been seen from the signal station at
biacksnd, Bay at an early hour in the morning,
neighborhood Of Belfast during the night. Here
was y case In which the torpedo. boats had a
definite object TO look for and = definite place In
under the Null OF galloway, and, not receiving
Or Telling to understand the private signal, they
ne,ely, the three cruisers in question turned out
70 ne the wnrspite, Australia. and Galstes, be;
though no ship was torpedoed two out OF the
three torpedo boats were put out OF action. the
are here TO Be- noted"onne that the torpedo boats
a definite object namely, three enemy's
approximately indicated to them beforehand;
the other, that after all the object they found
ly ships whose destruction, had II been accom-
plished. would have inflicted irrepsrahle loss on
their own side; This very, awkward habit OF
often before been exhibited in man9uvres by
torpedo boats. II is lees likely to.occur In actual
warfare bPCausa naarlv all fOTefQn shtDa differ
very widely in external appearance from any OF
our own; but its occurrence is regarded by many
, HSseq English =" ior sSId1iSiss ostss !pSoSia always 70 sf make
the private signal before proceeding to extrcmi-
ties: This means, of course, that English torpedo
the most unfavorable condltions-conditions so
unfavoreble. indeed, as almost TO Insure their
But those who take this view regard II as a
logical deduction from Lord George Hamilton's
weapon OF the weaker combatant. So regard
s%tTuction Of nm English torpedo boat by an
possible destruction OF an English battle ship by
q friend; and they consider that the best way 10
suiFs the sSsh i6 q peas'SiG csRs te % Is feS i iss.if By !; t max 5s.
,9S rh fo Pr mors t IbiSn1l i IL AL cases ~ d0 which I 1esys
lew, are nU Uey .h ,a a shaa9w OF n9p no nnese
Of your readers, who will perhaps be not q
little surprised to learn. that they are held
seem to place the strategic value OF the torpedo
boat for English purposes even lower than some
place IL; and IL is certainly not a little remarks-
BILE that they .shoulS be entertained at q time
when some high authorities are beginning to
doubt whether the position even of the battle
ship In the naval warfare Of the future is not be-
ginning 70 be imperilled BY the development Of
as bookkeeping torpedo boats, which might in
favorable circumstances attack even in the day
t Inns @ oi hhaf baygsr round ponnd t me ~ enemy In mt ne DAY,
10 large numbers after dark.