Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1894-02-17

Ter that any system resulting from ne
cessities and conditions of actual expert
ence in such a war as the rebellion is
ehHtied TO consideration, which should
perpetuate it, at least in part Even If
only few of the most important forts
were garrisoned by handful of men each,
the general line might be preserved at the
expense of a but small annual appropria-
ton by Congress, making the old forts in
peace times interesting historical monu-
ments, which in time of war could be
quickly recouvertei into established points
of defense, such a defense indeed, as not
only Napoleon, but most enlightened en-
gineers since his time have declared to
be necessary for the protection of the ma
tional capital in war The old forts might
well be put to another practical use. They
might he regarded a chain of object
lessons for our army officers to study, and
in that way might be obvjatei a repetition
of the modification caused by Gen. Bar
Eard's criticism, that, 'officers of the army,
who had spent much of their lives in Wash
ington and New York, found themselves
more ignorant concerning the military feat
ureS OF the surrounding country Cof Wash
ington) than they Were of that part of
Paris to which military history and its
fortified tons had attracted some attention"
There is a decided tendency" said the
army officer first quoted above, Ito go too
much to England, France and Germany
for our war lessons, unmindful of the fact
that we have huge battlefields and num-
erous object studies at home. Why, l was
in a large garrison once, where, with a
single exception, every military essay read
during the lyceum term related to the
movements of foreign armies, absurdly ex-
tending back to the days of Philip of Mace
don, and Caesar.
Continuing. he suggested that it might
be well for the authorities to require that
one lecture season at least throughout the
entire army be devoted exclusively to the
subject of our national capital deteiises.
The suggestion would seem to be a good
a.a-- adj fQp FA roc lf.ad
than compelling army officers Of all grades
to study that important question and give
to the War Department their most careful
thoughts and suggestions on the subject.
How Early Was Repulsed.
There are he said, many people who be-
lieve in letting the future take care OF it.
SELF and many more who find no argument
in the axiom, In time of peace preoare for
war" But such as they would seem to
forget the fact that for the first two years
of the war washington's defenses consisted
of few field works. which could not be
dignified by the name of forts or even for
tifications and it was not until 1854 that
the capital had anything like a fortified
exterior. Fortunately, IL was not until July,
1864, that Gen. Early got permission from
Gen. Lee to perambulate through Maryland.
and after securing thousand or more
fresh cavalry horses and levying tax OF
S220, 600 in gold on the little towns OF Frede-
rick City and Hagerstown, came near stam-
peding the whole patriotic north by his
sudden descent upon Washington at what
was conceived to be its most vulnerable
point. 1t is, of course. generally agreed
| now that neither Lee nor Early twho had
| let slip earlier opportunities OF attacking
| Washington) had any real idea of captur-
| ing the capital at that time, the movement
/ being intended only to draw on part OF
| Grants forces in Lees 'front.' in order TO
| permit attack or force Grant himself 10
Patb Lee
| prised, and surprised in a double way, for
| Early, Intentionally or otherwise. die come
near capturing Washington. Indeed, there
| are positive statements that he would have
| done so had not Grant sent the sixth corps
| and part of the nineteenth to reinforce
| Washington, while at the same time nlain-
tanning defiant attitude toward Lee, and.
much to the latter'S disappointment, le-
| framing from attack.
Inspiration From Lincoln.
It is needless now to go into details of the
| withdrawal of Early's army. There Were,
| and are still. military men north and south
who believed then, as now, thai Early
could have taken Washington the first
evening of his arrival when. a matter
| of fact the Union forces We're caught nap
| ping but Early himself asserted the con-
| trary, and gave as a reason the exhaustion
of his command by reason of the intense
! heat and the clouds Of dust that nearly
/ StrangleQ MS SOlClerS on the march, All
! that may have been the work of Divine
| Providence. But there was another in
! cident connected with that episode. which
seemed like a Divine intervention, and had
| its great influence on the day. Abraham
Lincoln was himself present at the main
point of defense. to see the battle he said.
| but may be God had ordained his presence
there for a purpose Union soldiers saw
| him on the parapet of Fort Stevens. and
| those who did not see him knew he was
| there, for the word was passed. So. when
the federals, under Wheaton, sailed forth
| to drive back the enemy ahead, too near.
| and whose sharpshooters were picking of
men on the forts. Abraham Lincoln still
waved his hat in sight, and his soldiers
| fought like devils. In vain was President
Lincoln importuned to cease his exposure
| to fire. until finally man within three feet
of him was shot down; then, for the coun-
| try's sake, as he was urged, he retired. But
| the battle was then over, for Early's main
| force mad already begun to withdraw, and
| next mornings sun .over that field in front
| of Fort Stevens shone only on the dead and
| wounded left behind by Early. In his re-
port to Gen. Lee. Gen. Early. after discuss
| ing the probable effects of his possible en-
! try into the city before the reinforcements
| arrived. declared that washington can
| never be taken by our (confederate) troops
unless when surprised without troops 10
| defend it, Early doubtless knew what he
| was saying. At all events. he could not be
! suspected of timidity, for he had already
proved himself the intrepid victor against
|
| and had swung in a circle around the Union
! capital. levying gold, capturing a thousand
! horses, and driving his opponents out of his
path. Ii was old Fort Stevens that had
| proved a wall to him, but. alas. so oblitera [.
! ed is that old fertilization now ones eyes
| would hardly be attracted by it, and no one
| looking al IL would dream that il had once
| been a bulwark of Washington. 1t was the
Oily fort around the city ever under fire of
| the enemy, but it filled its purpose and
defied attack.
And so are all the forts around Washing.
| ton going fast to decay. some of them be.
| Jig already leyeled with the ground while
others are little more than fading hills
Some of them, il is true, are on priya 4,
! property, but had the disposition existed 70
preserve them way could have been de.
| vised. Money has been freely appropriate
| TO PARK and label battleIields of the late
| war, and what field is more interesting and
| important than that around the capital? II
| will be said. of course. that in the next
emergency it will be all the more easy e
! construct defenses on lines already known
military men concede, but at best il would
take months at least to do what required
| work of four years, from 1861 10 1863 and
! what may happen during that period OF
preparation would depend upon condition.
, and circumstances no more readily contem
plated now than in 1914, 1861 or 1854.
Work Easy Now
In time of war no defensive work can h,
as well done as in peace. In 1863 we hat