The sun., 1894-03-04

eisions. really embsrrass rather thsu aid IN the
administration Of justice. But the author re-
minds ne thatJudg will not. as rule. write
| opinions u they are not to be published. and
consequently. he deems itinex pedlentto adopt
| a policy which would discourage or prevent
| the deliberate study OF cases which written
opinions tend TO promote and secure. He sees,
too. that It would be impractleable to avert
their publication Ia some form. either ON
cial or unofficial. Written opinions. when filed.
belong to the public records. and It would be
against first principles to prohibit their publi-
cation by statute. while. without such prohibit
tion. they would ind reporters and publish
ers so long there should be demand
sufficient to reward the labor and EXPENSE OF
publication. Neither does Judge Dillon con-
cur In the suggestion that dissenting opinions s
should not be published. although the multi
plication OF case law might thus be kept
within narrower limits. Who is authorized.
he asks. to assume that the majority Of given
bench is always riRht3 Not inireuuently dis
sentlnG opinions are the sounder II a dis
senting opinion is written It is q fact in
the case. and It's suppression simply be-
cause It expresses dissent can be de-
Tended on no ground either OF princi-
pie or Of public policy. Tho conclusion is that,
so far as legislative restrictions are concerned.
the publication OF reports OF adiudged cases
will probably go on. incessantly adding to the
bulk and. to some extent to the uncertainty OF
the law until the effect becomes at last insup-
portable. judge Dillon believes. however. that
q remedy will then be found. for the reason
that the interests OF justice are not doomed to
be crushed by the very machinery which has
been devised only to the end that justice may
be furthered. Whether that remedy will con-
sist In the breaking down or modification OF
the doctrine OF judicial precedent or In some
form OF codifcation he does not venture to pre-
dict. He is himself inclined to think that a sys-
tematic critical, and thorou gh discussion OF the
English doctrine OF judicial precedent is a de-
sideratum In our legal literature. It is pointed
out that. in European States. judicial decisions
have generally no binding effect as precedents.
and hence Judicial reports are there relatively
few and It is submitted as q du usstion, which
should at least excite inquiry. whether. in the
present comparatively matured state OF our
law. the doctrine OF judicial precedent in the
scope and rigor given to It In English and
American jurisprudence is now really better
doctrine than the modified one which prevails
In the Continental system. where. although
tho opinions and judgments OF the highest
tribunals exercise influence. they are not, as q
rule. invested with binding force. The author
quotes with approval some remarks OF Prof.
Baldwin OF Yale University on this head.
Il cannot but think" the latter says. that an
undue prominence has been given to judicial
precedents. as q natural source or enunciation
OF the law. The guiding principles OF our
law are few and plain. Their application to
the matter We may have In hand It 10 the busi-
ness OF our profession to N AXE and II We spent
mere time in doing 1t ourselves and less IN en-
deavoring to find how other men have done It,
we should. I believe. be better prepared to In
form the court and serve our clients"