Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1894-11-13

jurisdiction the resolution should have eX-
pressly declared the final action contem-
plated by the House. but rather that there
was no possible constitutional action that
the House or Congress could take in rela-
ton to the subject matter of the inquiry.
Having previously held that the language OF
the preamble excluded the idea of i'm
parchment, the court holds that 1t was con-
stitutionally incompetent for Congress to
legfsate upon the subject matter OF the
resolution, as that was the collection or a
debt due the United States, and the subject
Of judicial and not legislative action. That
this was the ground Of the decision is ap-
parent from a statement Of 1t by Mr.. JUS
tice Field In his opinion at the circuit In
the case of In re Central Pacific Railroad
Company, 30 Fed. Rep. 241, where, in COM
menting upon the decision In the KQbourn
case. he says: In the Supreme Court the
questions involved received great consldera-
ton, and 1t was held that the subject mat
ter of the investigation was judicial, and
not legislative, and that there was no pow
er in Congress, or in either House. on the
allegation that an insolvent debtor of the
United States was Interested in a private
business partnership. to investigate the af-
fairs of the partnership, and, consequently,
no authority to compel witness to testify
on the subject 30 F. r. 252
1.-THE case under consideration by the learn
ed justice arose upon an application by the
Central Pacific railroad commission, APP
pointed under an act Of Congress to investi-
United States circuit court for California
for rule against the president Of that
company to show cause why he should not
lie required to answer questions put to him
by the commission, similar in nature to
those in the Kibourn case and 1t was held
that the Central Pacific railroad commission
had no Jurisdiction to make the inquiry. as
the only relation existing between the Unit
ed States and the company was that OF
creditor and debtor, bringing the case clear
ly within what was decided in the Kilbourn
case.
A Similar Case.
I'm the case Of People ex rel. Mcdonald
VS.. Keeler, % N. Y, 463, the court Of ap
peals Of New York had before 1t question
in all substantial particulars like the one
raised by these demurrers, relating to The
jurisdiction Of the Senate committee under
these resolutions, and the case Of Kilbourn
VS.. Thompson was pressed with great earn
estness upon that court as having decided
the point contended for here to wit: That
no inference could legally be drawn in sup
port of jurisdiction beyond what was ex-
pressly aVowed or recited In the resolution
authorizing the Investigation; but that
court, in stating the question decided by
the Supreme Court in the Kilbourn case,
uses the following language: I'm Kilbourn
VS.. Thompson the court said: If any pur-
pose had been avowed to impeach the Sec
rotary, the whole aspect of the case would
have been changed but the court held that
the recitals in the resolution repealed any
such idea, and that no hint of any intention
OF final action by Congress on the subject
appeared in the resolution, and that on the
argument no suggestion had been made of
what the House of Representatives, or Con-
gress, could have done In the way Of rem
edying the alleged wrong; and they held
that that was simply fruitless investiga-
ton into the personal affairs of individuals,
which could result In no valid legislation
on the subject to which the inquiry re-
cd nd hot fhn ho1
no authority in the matter" After recitng
the resolution in the New York case, he
court of appeals proceeds as follows: IF
the resolution had shown upon it's face that
the only purpose of the investigation was to
satisfy the taxpayers Of the state as to the
truth Of the charges, or to relieve the de-
partment Of public works from reproach,
and no further action was contemplated or
could be had in the matter by the legisla-
ture. the cause would fall within the de-
cision in Kilbourn vs. Thompson" 1t
seems therefore, that the only matter de-
cided In the Kilbourn case as to the juriS-
diction of the House to proceed, was that
1t had no legislative Jurisdiction of the SUBJ
ject matter proposed to be investigated,
and as the preamble Of the resolution was
couched In such terms as to preclude all
idea of an intention to impeach, 1t had no
jurisdiction to proceed with the investfga-
ton. 1t cannot be considered au-
thority that no presumption can legally
arise favorable to jurisdiction, or to the
intention of the legislative body to proceed
to final appropriate action where the terms
of the resolution are such not to repel
such presumption. 1t would seem to be
inappropriate to apply to the Senate the
rule governing in determining the jurisdic-
ton of courts and other bodies of inferior,
special and limited jurisdiction. by holding
that every material fact necessary to con-
fer Jurisdiction should be set out in the
record of Its proceedings. On the con-
trary, the more reasonable rule would seem
to be that where the Senate has Jurisdiction
q
the presumption should arise that 1t intends
to make final appropriate use Of the in
formatio obtained in the course of the in
vestigation. And this is In accordance with
the holding of the court Of appeals of New
York in the case above referred to, where
the principle is stated In the following
language: I'VE are bound to presume that
the action Of the legislative body was with
a legislative object, If 1t is capable Of be-
ing so construed, and we have no right to
assume that the contrary was intended
The same principle which renders It the
duty of the courts to hold legislative action
illegal when 1t unduly encroacnes upon the
province of the judiciary, forbids inter
ference by the latter with the action of
legislative bodies or the exercise Of their
discretion in matters within the range of
their constitutional powers"
Jurisdiction Sufficient.
THE conclusion, therefore, is that in or
der to confer Jurisdiction on the committee,
it was not necessary for the resolutions to
set forth or avow what final action the Sem
ate had in contemplation upon the Informal
ton to be obtained. 1t is sufficient to 1uris-
diction IL 1t appears that the Senate had
lawful authority to take any legitimate ac-
ton, unless 1t also appears affirma lively up
on the face Of the resolutions that no final
action was contemplated, and that the in
vestigation was to be carried on simply for
the purpose of vindication or animadversion,
and 1t cannot be contended that there is
mentioned i'll the indictments to justify such
a construction. 1t was said in argument hy
defendants counsel that the resolution in
Keeer's case required the committee to re-
port with recommendations, thereby indi-
ting an intention of further action, while
no report Is required by the resolution men
toned in the indictments to which The ques-
tons asked defendants applied. But If the
principle stated by the court in the Keller
case, that If any future legal action Is pos
sibe 1t should be presumed that 1t Is in
tended, is correct, the question whether a
report is required Is immaterial, that
only tends to show that future action is in
tended. But 1t Is immaterial upon another
ground. Under parliamentary law AMI
usage, q committee Is required and expected
to report its proceedings to the body from
which it receives its appointment, whether
the resolution of appointment requires a re-
port or not The only object of the appoint
ment is to obtain a report The principle is
thus stated in Cushings Parliamentary