Rocky Ford enterprise., 1894-05-17
IMPROVEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
BODIES.

| The country just now seems to be undergo
| Ing severe spasm OF civic virtue. The air 10
thick with reforms Of every description, but
| they are especially numerous In the depart
| ment of politics and IN that Of economics. As
| the changes to be effected in the latter are in
| most cases proposed TO be brought about BY
political action, we shall not be far wrong in
! saying that the subject Of politics cngrosses
by far the major part of the discussion.
Whether or not at Its conclusion the advo-
| Gates of change will find themselves possessed
of anything more satisfactory than the con-
sciousness of having valliantly beaten the air
remains to be seen; 1t may be safely asserted
that their efforts Will not be fruitful of any
thing more satisfactory than this unless they
take care to fnd out first the causes Of the
present dissa atisfying conditions.
However various the opinions advanced and
the remedies proposed, all who are dissstis-
fed with tho present condition Of political af-
fairs seem to be agreed that 1t is largely due
to what we vaguely term ''corruption;" in
other words, to the placing Of private inter-
ests above public interests by thUse to whom
the affairs OF government are entrusted. We
hear great deal about public morality and
OF the necessity for increasing 1t, although
those who clamor most loudly for the In
crease Of public morality, whatever that may
be, do not give us any very clear ideas rs to
the method Of bringing 1t about. take 1t
that those who speak OF public morality mean
the general active interest and concern OF the
public In the conduct OF public affairs. II
this be the case, make bold to aver that
what we most need Is not more public moral
ity, but better means Of utilizing what we al
ready have.
Especially is It the case In the construc-
tIon of our legislative bodies-our congress,
our state legislatures, our city councils and
the iike-that instead OF taking means to Sc
cure the best possible talent and integrity,
we take means which almost invariably tend
In the opposite direction. Through our abb
snrdly nping the construction of the British
House of Commons, VIC have carried the sim
gle-membcred district system to even more
impoltic and unjustihable lengths than have
the British themselves. 1t seems as though
no argument Is necessary TO show that moth
ing is ever gained by restricting the area of
choice. and that there is always chance OF
loss. We.not only have The single membered
district, as do the British, but we also compel
our electors in such district by custom II not
by law, 10 limit their choice to tho residents
Of their own district. Nothing could be much
more absurd than this, especially in the Sc
lection Of such bodies ms the city councils.
But the single c-membered district itself is o
much worse evil than the restriction Of the
area Of choice. Originating in the custom of
the early English kings, who first convoked
tlon upon the taxation which the various re-
gions of the kingdom could bear, the system
hns been Incorporated by our constitution
makers in our legislative system apparently
encc which separates the work Of our modern
legislative bodies from that Of our first House
OF Commons.
One of the principal evils inherent in the
single-membered district system Is that It al
ways leads to the result that the legislnting is
done by the representatives Of only a minority
OF the people, and frequently of q small MI
norty at tnat Indiana sends thirteen repre-
seutatives to Congress. In the election of
1892, out of these thirteen the seven receiving
the least numbers of votes received only 1919
per cent. of the total number Of votes cast in
that state for representatives in Congress.
The major portion OF the influence Of Indiana
In the national House may thus be exercised
suit is the worst Of that yenr. Iowa stands
close second, with u corresponding rate per
cent. Of 20.9. Then come Pennsylvania, L.
Ilnois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York. CALI
fornin, and SO on through the list of states,
thirty.seven in number, q majority Of the
of each of which was elected
by u minority Of Its voters actually voting In
that election. This can hardly be said 70 in
dictate a very close conformation to the ma
jority rule.
or course, as is evident, this state Of Affairs
arises from artiicially dividing the electorate
into districts and allowing representation on
merest bit of arithmetic to show that majority
of the representatives of q majority Of the cleo
tors n ny represent only slightly more than one
fourth of the voters. When there are more than
two parties in the field, 20 that the represent
alton goes TO the party having plurality,
majority Of the representatives may represent
less than quarter of the electors, as was ac-
tually the case In 1892 in California, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Gerrymanderlng Is, Of course, partially re-
sponsible for this state Of affairs, but not
nearly to the extent that many people be-
lieve. In Texas, in the election of the same
year, seven cut Of the thirteen representatives
were chosen by "a per cent. of the voters ac-
tunlly voting. / have not heard that Texas 10
suffering from any very violent gerrymander.
The corresponding rate per cent. for Alabama
in the same year was 2s7, and for Georgia 1t
was 31.2. But the fact that gerrymandering
helps to vitiate the system does not improve
the case for the present system, but rather
makes it worse; for without the system of
siuglc-membered districts there would be lit
tie use for gerrymandering. With popular
system gerrymandering would be absolutely
impossible.
have taken my illustrations Of the work.
ing of the present system entirely from the
records of the congressional election Of 1899,
because have not at hand the statistics OF
the election of state Legislatures and city
councils, but do not In the least doubt that
the same state Of affairs would be revealed