The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1894-04-07
large upon this subject. The jurisdiction
beyond question is plenary and comprehen-
sive."
POWER OF THE COURT.

II would be anomalous, lndeed, IL the
court holding this property In possession,
in trust. could not protect IL from injury
and could not restrain interference which
would render abortive all efforts to perform
the public duties charged upon this rail-
way.
1T was suggested by counsel that. as i'm
proper interference with this property dur
ing its possession by the court is contempt,
punishment therefor would furnish ample
remedy, and that therefore an injunction
would not lie. This is clearly an erroneous
view. Punishment for contempt is not
compensation for injury. The pecuniary
penalty for contumaey does & not got go to the the
tempt is deemed a public wrong, and the
fine inures to the government The injunc-
rIon goes IN PTevenon 40 ,b OF b wpHne ee,are 20 Ine
the fine in punishment of contumacy The
authority TO issue the writ is not impaired
by the fact that independently OF the writ.
punishment could be visited upon the wrong
doer for interference with property in the
possession of the court. The writ reaches
vents the contemplated wrong: The pro
ceedings in contempt is eX post facto, pun
fshed for a wrong effected.
Asserting then as undoubted the right
of the court by its writ to restrain un-
lawful interference with the operations of
this railway, turn my attention to the
objections urged to particular paragraphs
of the writs. 1t is contended that the re-
straint imposed by that part of the, orig
inal writ to which objection is made by
this action is in derogation of common
right and an unlawful restraint upon the
Individual to work for WhomsoSeever he may
which he will labor and TO abandon such
employment whenever he may desire. In
needful to look to the conditions which
gave rise to the issuance of the writ. Here
was a railway some 400 miles in length
traversing some seven States of the Union
engaged in interstate commerce carrying
the mails of the United States. This vast
property was within the custody of the
court through its receivers in trust to
operate and TO discharge the public duties
imposed upon ii, TO keep Ii going con-
Germ until the time should come to hand
it over to its rightful owners with all pub
lie duties discharged and with its fran
chise, rights and privileges unimpaired. The
property some 1900 men. These men are
prohac vice officers of the court and are
responsible to the court for their conduct.
WHY HE ISSUED THE INJUNCTION.
"The petition represented TO the court
and the facts are confessed by this mo-
tion-that some of the men threatened to
suddenly quit the service of the receivers
and to compel by threats, and force, and
violence other employees who were willing
to continue in the service to quit their en-
ploy; that by organized effort and by force
and intimidation they would prevent others
from taking service under the receivers in
place of those who might leave such
service and would, therefore, as means
of forcing the receivers TO submit to the
operating the road and discharging their
duty TO the public as common carrier
and would SO conduct themselves by dis
abing locomotives and cars and taking
possession OF the property of the receivers
to destroy and prevent it's use and hinder
and embarrasS the receivers in its man
agement, thereby causing incalculable loss
TO the trust property and inf1cting incon-
venience and hardship upon the public. The
restraining portion or the writ complained
of and now under consideration prohibited
these men from combining and conspiring
tent OF crippling the property of the re-
ceivers and embarrassing the operation of
the road and from carrying that con-
spiracy into effect. The writ was in pre-
vention of the mischief asserted In no
respect as / conceive, does that portion
OF the writ interfere with the individual
I'm the case under consideration the re-
ceivers sought to change the terms and
conultlons conula OF service The employees had of
the terms proposed. Notwithstanding the
public character OF the service, upon noti-
hcation of their declination at a time prior
to Jan. /, 1894, reasonable in view of the
service in which they were engaged they
had undoubted right to abandon their en-
ployment upon that day. That. however. is
not the case presented to and dealt with
by the court. Nor does the rectitude of the
writ OF Injunction rest upon any mere right
OF the employees in good faith to abandon
tnelr employment. The restraints imposed
were with reference to combining and con-
spring to abandon their service with the
object and intent of crippling the property
It's office was to restrain the CARRYING into
effect of the conspiracy.
Inc second branch of the motion has
reference to the writ of Injunction issued
upon the supplemental petition of the re-
ceiVers, restraining any combination or
conspiracy having for its purpose the in
auguration of strike upon the lines of the
railway operated by the receivers and from
ordering, advising or approving By COM
munlcation or instruction otherwise the
employees of the receivers to join i'm a
strike This part of the motion presents the
issue whether a strike is lawful The an
swer must largely depend upon the uroner
definition of the term
ONE CLAUSE STRICKEN OUT.
The Judge then cited various definitions
of the word strike, and dwelt upon strikes
in general, said he knew of no peaceful
strike and that no strike was ever heard of
that was or could be successful. accom-
panied by intimidation or violence Con-
tinulng, he said:
one clause of the supplemental injunc-
tlon mas been characterized as wholly I'M
warranted. That clause is-'and from or
uerlhg, recommending, approving advis-
ing others to quit the service of the re-
celVers OF the Northern Pacific railway on
JAM l, 1894, at any other time In fair
ness; thls clause must be read in the light
OF the statements of the petition. 1t was
thereln asserted to the coura that the men
would not strike unless ordered so to do by
the executive heads of the national organi-
cations and that the men would obey such
orders instead of following the direction of
the court The clause is Specially directed
10 the chiefs of the several labor OrganiZa-
tonS. The of the words order, recon-
mend approve or advise was, to me, the
various forms of expression under which,
by the constitution or bylaws of these or
ganizations the command was cloaked-as,
for instance, in the one organization, the
chief head advises a strike in another he
approves a strike: in another, he recon-
mends' the quitting of employment. What
ever terms may be employed, the effect Is
the same. The command may not be dis
nnT a ~ n lCfO From
the order and of social ostracism This
language was employed to fortify the re-
straintS of the other portion of the writ,
and to get the various diSguises under
which the command is cloaked. 1t was so
inserted out of abundant caution, that the
meaning of the court might be clear, that
there should be no unwarranted interference
with this property, no intimidation no vio-
lence, no strike. 1t was, perhaps, unnec-
essary, being comprehended within the
clause restraining the heads of these organi-
cations from ordering, recommending or ad-
visng strike or joinder in strike
"It is said, however, that the clause re-
strains an individual from friendly advice
to the employees as a body, or individually
of remaining in the service of the receivers.
Read in the light of the petitions upon
which the Injunction was founded, do not
think that such construction can be in
dulged by any fair and impartial mind. 1t
might be used as a text for a declamatory
address to excite the passions and preju-
dices of men, but could not, think. be sus-
judicial mind. The language of a writ Of
Injunction should. however. be clear and
explicit and, if possible above criticism
to its meaning. Since, therefore, the