Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1894-10-14

| \V
| that, starting out with front or TWO
! brigades. when we reached our point OK
| attack we could not present fun reSi-
| mental front.
NO SUPPORT ON THE RIGHT.
In regard to our support ! have only
this to say: That my position was near
| our extreme right. and II any trootS al
vanced to our support on the right niu
not see them. What occurred on the iett
OF our column / am unable TO say as
was too far from 1t TO observe. with any
degree OF accuracy. the movement At
that point As we neared the enemys
line the troops In our front surrendered
and rushed through our ranks to the rear
when we reached the stone fence there
was brief pause in the movement, ana
from behind II our men commenced nrinS
on this enemy, who had formed new
line TO the right Of the position we had
| captured, and stretching back In the d.
rectiOn Of the cemetery. Just as we
reached the fence Captain Fry, General
kemper's acknowledgement rode up ana
asked. "WhO is in command OF the First
Virginia Regiment" | told him | was
He said. General Kempsr orders that
you move your regiment by the right
flank" | gave the order Fall in. First
Regiment" placing myself just in rear
OF the stone fence. | think not more than
dozen men took their places In line,
| and almost as fast as they did SO were
shot down. ] turned TO Captain Fry and
said "Sir, there is 10 regiment TO move
hnvaaf,a hpah and rDslN
rapidly from the field. Just then General
| Armisteads line arrived. and | turned to
advance with him, having no longer any
| command Of my own, but just as | reach
Ell the fence over which they were pass
i ing | was wounded 50 severely in my
right arm as to disqualify me for any
| further lighting on that occasion.
a quantity OF rocks had been gathered
and piled around large rock near the
| fence AT the point at which most OF our
men crossed over IL. On this large
rock / took a seat. beside Colonel Cant
of the Nineteenth Regiment, who was
wounded and watched the result OF the
| forward movement. 1t was led by some
! one / supposed TO be color-osarer OF
Armisteads Brigade. He advanced, as
| 1t seemed TO me- some 20) yards beyond
the fence waving his flag and cheering
the men on. When but a short distance
from the enemy's new line he halted
and turned TO the rear evidently 10 see
the strength OF his following. and also
! to see II any troops were advancing TO
| our support Seeing but a handful OF
followers. and no support. he turned from
| the enemy and deliberately marched
| from the field with his small following.
] and thus ended the charge Of Pickett )
! Division.
NO ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE.
AS to the statement so often seen in
| northern journals, that at the close OF
/ the charge large body Of the division,
! generally about 500 IA number equal to
| the highest estimate ever made Of our
strength when we started in laid down
! their arms. | believe IL 70 be utterly I'M
! true. The body of men have referred
/ TO az advancing within the enemys line
were, | am confident. the only men LETT
/ Of the division who preserved their orgGni-
! cation, and | can testify that they were
! allowed, and did leave the Held deiper-
ately, and although the enemy continued
I TO fire on them they made no advance
1 from their position. or any attempt "a
capture them. | left Colonel Cant sitting
! on the same stone when ! retired from
I the field. They certainly made no at
tempt to capture me. and | saw Colonel
/ Cant afterwards on horseback on his way
to the hospital. The only movement
! | saw looking like an attempt To capture
! us was the advance of column iar 10
our right / called Colonel Giants atteh-
! ton TO this movement; but when looked
again they had retired within their lines,
| and | learned afterwards they had been
! driven back by our artillery. When re-
! firing from the field ! had not gone far
/ when | came to one OF our men, mortally
wounded and In great agony. lie begged
! me. for Gods sake. TO try ana do some-
| thing for him. | recQllect distinctly my
| sensations. Ny first thought was, There Is
/ no hope for you: IL | stop 10 help you
| will probably lose my life. Ny second
| was. IL is a hundred 10 one you VIII not
/ get off this field alive, and this may De
the last opportunity you will have TO 90
z fellow-creature a kindness. / stopped,
/ and made him "a comfortable as | could
and / have often thought since that my
/ stopping to help him might have saved
/ my life. one other Incident | Will men
ton, as il serves to show how our charge
/ onneared 10 an on-looker. Before reaching
| the hospital | passed two young men
/ talking in loud and excited voices. one or
/ them said that some one had told him
/ that Pickett's Division had disgraced VIZ
/ g!nia; that when ordered 10 charge the
enemy they had s.died of 10 the left.
/ knowing the fals!ty of the charge ana
/ feeling keenly the fact that the DIVISION
had been sacrificed in a vain attempt 10
| execute their orders, il was more than L
! could stand, and | told the young man
70 tell his informant, with my compli-
ments, that he Id. giving him my name
| company. and regiment
HOW WE MIGHT HAVE WON.
The war IL over, its results fixed and
UnaIterable and IL Is perhaps vain ana
useless to speculate az TO what might
have been. Yet | cannot forbear giving
/ my views in regard to the charge at Grt-
tysburg, OF which | have just given de-
scrlption. ! shall die In the belief that
had our division been formed and ad-
vanced in line parallel with the line OF
the enemy, that line for som thing IKE
a mile would have been swept away by
| our charge with far less loss than We
! sustained: or II, after we had started,
| the lin, had been rectifled by command
like this. Change front! Forward on the
! first company, right in front. BY COM
many right half whel!' and as soon as
| the proper line was attained, Forward.
Double quick, Charge" the same result
would have been attained, though perhaps
with greater loss / also firmly believe
| that had there been a hundred m7n LETT
| of the 'Dlt First 10 nave tAeCut'b NeHS-
raj Kemp-rs order to move by the right
| flank. they would have driven the enemy :
| line. for | was near enough TO observe
! IN, extreme difficulty with which their
officers could keep them in place. Let
f, those sheer at this who have not learned,
| as | have, from experience what hun
bred men can accomplish in battle who
are brave enough To execute any order
given them or perish in the attempt.
am also firmly persuaded that had any
considerable body OF troops appeared
| marching TO our support, the enemy
would have abandoned their position
| and victory would have crowned our arms
account for the failure OF the enemy tc
attempt our capture by the difficulty they
had in maintaining their new line. and
! the impossibility OF their believing thai
| so small a number OF men could have
had the audsclty TO break their line OF
battle and penetrate to such distance
within it without ample support, when IN
truth support WIS had none.
Very respectfully.
Il. y. REEVE.
A Big Trap for Eels.
Baltimore American)
! Late Wednesday afternoon over l,5o
! aals wera cantured unaWares The cells