The record-union., 1894-10-26
THAT DEPOT INCIDENT.

CONTINUED FROM FOURTH PAGE.l
his brigade in street column order, plac-
ing his troops in four squads, and DUR
ing the time he was in command no
movement or disposition of his COM
mand was made or undertaken. If an
attack was expected, or If one had been
made by the mob, his position was faulty,
for lie was no longer in the streets, but
in an open space, and the line of fire was
the front OF but one company. he
should have placed his command in
formation to have made or resisted an at
tack. The fact that his was not the lead
ing brigade is no excuse.
In the question OF cooperation with
General Sheehan the court cannot find
General Dickinson entirely TO blame.
Having command of the Second Brigade,
he was permitted to exercise his judg-
ment, and when he received the message
from General Sheehan he was entitled to
demand orders or Instructions as to the
nature of the movement. 1t was also per-
miSSi bic for him to ask for orders from
the Major-G General, as he knew that Cen
eral Dimond was in command. General
Dickinson was in command of a strong
and efficient force, and it was within his
province, ii in his judgment it was advis-
able, to deploy one OF his regiments and
aivance against the depot; and it would
undou btedly have been to the best inter-
ests OF the service if he had ordered the
First Regiment of Infantry to take the
depot when he received the request from
General Sheehan.
1t appears from General Dickinson's
own statement that he sent several of his
staff officers to General Dimond to obtain
permission to make Il movement with
view Of taking the depot from the east
end. Thereafter General Dickinson was
requested by General Sheehan to make
such movement, and then General Dick
inSon said he must have the permission
OF General Dimond before doing SO.
Upon this fact being reported to General
Dimond he directed General Dickinson
to confer and cooperate with General
Sheehan.
In view of all the facts. General Dickin-
son is to be criticised for his neglect to
make any movement toward taking the
depot. 1t is true the order from General
Dimond was not that he should comply
with the request of General Sheehan, bat
the order as given immediately follow
ing General Sheehan's requesD must
have been understood by General Dick
inSon.
The statements make by General Dick
inson, with regard to the decentralization
of his command on July 4th, were not
we'll founded, and he is to be criticised
for not being better informed in this re-
spect.
COLONEL SULLIVAN.
Colonel Sullivan was present at the
consultation held in San Francisco on
June Both. and was then advised of the
necessity of preparing his command for
service. He is responsible for the lack of
preparation of his regiment. 1t would
have been an easy matter for him to have
directed his Commissary TO procure hard
tack and canned meats sufficient for one
or two days ratiOns.
We think Colonel Sullivan must be
criticised for his actions while in COM
mand of the Second Brigade on July 4th
before the depot in Sacramento The
fact that General Dickinson had been
overcome by heat was reported to Col
onel Sullivan at about l:30 p. NJ, and
he was ordered TO take command
of the Second Brigade. Immedi-
ately after the command devolved upon
him he received an order from the Major
General commanding him to advance
against the depot, to use force and to clear
the depot with bayonet, or with lead if
necessary.
These orders were positive and required
implicit obedience, but instead of execut-
ing mis- orders he Immediately left his
command, went to the headquarters of the
Major General and urged that the order
be rescinded, stating that his troops were
not in condition TO take up the offensive.
Whatever his ideas were he should
have obeyed his orders, but instead of do
ing so he left his command, went to the
Major-General, and afterward made a
speech to the strikers. The court finds
that he was at fault in three things-omiU-
ting to carry out the order of his COM
manding officer; leaving his command
after receiving the officer Orderl and
violating military law in making a speech
to mob, which Is expressly prOhiblted
(Regulation l0l7.)
When Colonel Sullivan waited on Gem
eral Dimond in his headquarters General
Dimond then repeated the orders to him.
and directed Colonel Sullivan to take the
depot by force, and to use lead if neces-
sary. General Dimond also then informed
Colonel Sullivan that written orders had
been received from the United States
Marshal authorizing the use of these ex-
treme measures.
Colonel Sullivan, instead of complying
with these orders thus repeated, told Gen
eral Dimond the men were completely
prostrated by the heat and were becom-
ing demoraliZed, and that their condi-
ton was not ssuch as to render it safe to
adopt offensive measures at that time,o
Colonel Sullivan was then directed by
Major General Dimond to report these
facts to Marshal Baldwin, and Colonel
Sullivan thereupon told the Marshal that
he thought it bad policy at that time to
adopt any offensive measures, and also
advised against any offensive operations
and that the lives of his own troops
would be sacrificed.
Colonel Sullivan addressed the crowd.
and asked them if there would be any
objection on their part to taking the
members of his regiment into the depot
out of the sun. The crowd not agreeing
to this, he withdrew. This address was
made from the top of cab.
AS hereinbefore set forth, the statement
in regard to the decentralization of the
troops was not well founded, and Colonel
Sullivan is TO be severly criticsed-not
only for his refusal to obey orders. but
the representations so made by him to
the Major-General and the Marshal un-
doubtedly resulted in the declaring of
the artnistice by the Marshal and in the
cessation of active operations.
a. aMajor Jansen, of the First Regiment.
also urged the Major General not to
bring on a conflict, and stated that the
troops were demorallzed and unreliable
This statement is not borne out by the
testimony, and Major Jansen is also to
be severely criticised in this respect.
COLONEL BARRY.
Colonel Barry was also present at the
consultation held on June 3Oth, and is to
blame for the want of preparation in his
regiment, and the remarks that have
been made in reference to the commits
sary stores of the Second Brigade and the
First Regiment are equally applicable to
the Third Regiment.
There was also great lack of discipline
in portions OF the Third Regiment, and
some of the field and company officers
did not seem to have their men under
proper control.
COLONEL NUNAN.
Colonel Nunan remained at the depot
with the two companies Of the Sixth In