The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-01-27
THE STUDY OF STRATEGY.
,ScrssIrr Avn UIIIITF or the VAR
NiYIL COILEGE.

n.r.pc. and Tactical Dp~rntinn.-Iutsr-
,.ure views of Dt.tin ruished Writers on
Method. of Prepnrinr for Ho-tirties.
CANA accoun, was recently given in TUE suS
., the general principles upon which the
course OF Instruction ut the Institution on
Cosster's ilarbor Island Ia based. The view
o,us ut.lity however becomes more complete
hvno,iug tho rapidity with which military and
..,al operations are carried on OF late years
and the neel 10 preparing for them before
h,nd As Motks has remarked. Though the
ore,i,al science alone will never lead us TO
,I,tory, we cannot AFFORD to neglect II entirely.
Gan Won W.lliscn says very truly that from
.norledeo to successful execution ls a great
iump Nut from ignorance II Ia deal greater
The hest guide for the future II our own expert
.r,e but since that must always be limited.we
must eudeavor by study to make our own the
.Yperlence OF others. Another way for sel'-
slucation Ia practice In the solution OF prob
lem. such as the one we have Just studied"
In an argument made few days ago TO
,he House Naval Committee. II was set forth
that the great masters In the art OF war hold
mat " all clements that contribute most
directly and effectually to the success OF mill
tary operations. preparation has the first pla co
And in these days wars are shorter In duration
than formerly. more concentrated and more
overwhelming. 40 that the time OF preparation
IN It's turn il necessarily longer and more alb
,orbing. This. indeed Is perhaps one cause
ofthe prolonged and extensive military and
naval preparations which we see going on In
Europe As one German writer has said. Ex-
srtions are. therefore. now being made iu all
countries. with the object OF placing them
selves In readiness In time OF peace for
state OF war; not merely by the assimilating
OF the organization OF forces. but also by the
taking into consideration OF the different
theatres OF war and the plans OF operation in
connection herewith. no less than by the
most exact and systematic regulation OF every
factor which may complete and render avail
able all real powers OF offence" 1t is such
considerations as these that give special
value to the work Of the Naval College.
The events which precede and follow the
actual outbreak OF war progress too quickly to
allow time for general or special recon-
nUissance Of the theatre OF operations either at
homo or abroad. Hence this work. which
took place formerly In time OF war. should be
accomplished in time OF peace.
This is true Of naval warfare. for to the ex-
istence Of men and vessels in reserve and the
powers Of rapid assemblage arc added en-
HANGED qualities OF speed and sea endurance.
These qualities give to naval operations such
possibility both OF quickness and vlgor
In execution and increased length OF reach
that the time permitted for preparation for
defence Is correspondinRly shortened. Be-
sides. measures taken only on tho eve OF war
q time OF emergency and excitement-wlll
naturally be Ill digestod and extravaganza.
The sudden nature OF war Is historical Dur
III cases OF hostilities have occurred in the
civilized world. One hundred and seven OF
these have been commsnced By SUBJECTS Of
states without due declaration OF war.
with preparation for war and defence prop
the study Of past naval campaigns. OF tactical
evolutions and OF our own and neiRhboring
Into operation ali the forces at our disposal on
the outbreak OF war. For, in regard to this
tromr,t,n,ess OF initlatIyei y Is wei said that
crowd 81 mea 'ures which the enemy would
have taken
matter OF character but Col Maurice. r. A.,
wisely remarks that commander Is much
more NOR. Likely t. dsfIde sr,ght II he has In mind
perIence Of the past. than IT. without anything
to guide him. ne Judges by a so-calied common
sense, which has already led him TO ignore tho
earnest advice Of those who have been them
selves most successful In war.
The IuestiHns discHssed and worked out Mt
naval history, naval tactics. coast defence. tor
roio warfare, and International law These
subjects are not fully studied elsewhere and
some are only touched upon at the Naval
Academy, whose course is already crowded so
poHemsnt Of graduation. But 1t 10 necessary
to guard against graduation at an age too ad-
OF rLst sea Instinct and faculty 40 nacnssnrn
for naval officers. In addition. the study and
aaeluisition OF the matters dealt with at the
Wnr College require that officers should have
considerable previous experience Atoat. and
knowledge Of the details Of naval life, 1t is
not intended that the work at the college shall
interfere with sea duty. whose importance is
recognized as paramount. both by officers and
men But I is proposed that L shall take a
atlnle row given TO considerable extent to
routine occupations. to dock yard service. and
OBJECT Of pR the o The
ton Tor and action In war
In addition to tho lectures upon the main
subjects OF the college 1t has been the custom
In the oast TO ord specialists In the different
departments OF naval activity opportunity
M eaSonragement to communicate the re-
cults Of their experience to the officers in at
l:nianre, One OF the most imIorttnt u these
with :ancss nowhere else. yet whose practical
Utility to officers is daily demonstrated.
There Is also immediate practical work 70 be
elements entering into the naval defence OF
our coasts and waters This study is. in fact.
Low under way. so far as tho very scant per-
sonnet % the college will allow.
As pertinent TO the preceding views. the fol-
Gw!ng opinions II eminent officers are cited:
taPt hAhah, In the last annual report made
hy him as President OF the college. says; "Hav-
ihg given row seven years to the study uf
tics N their various branchesl. with my whole
attention engaged upon them. and In view OF
tue opposition the college has had hitherto TO
encounter, Feel Narrated and compelled to
til mat no sustained work has been doae. nor
10 any now hrIug done, upon them. except by
shl through N" college. Its claim upon the
hNpI oi the Government and Congress de-
Lthls upon iLe Importance OF the suhI Gets
WIN which y alone among the organizations
OF me navy undertakes TO deal" In regard 10
naval tactics, Nire- Admiral roomb. X y. says:
lls science ~ naval Tastes sttll reIaains IN an ex
srvtt'nSl vague aud unsAliS' actOTy rAts: but the
s.t""I - nov a. ever, persuaded that there
70, 10 put NJ u on an absolutely sound bass
fnsN ne ne believes that proper experiments and
~ i'Alcuons Arisng thereon are entirely Teuabls
- -r lOIh launL OF the srience And he has always
n!.h alarm IN" general apathy Of British Al
tt,Ns ON ihc shule subject lie trusts tT never
ssA1 'tofra occasion NO iOubt' wrote tins un-
o,lhale AlmTt N august lHCa. "ITts Thought that
s'lhs hrhcf Slth twenty nine ships I considered
hsl. VITA vessels OF anything hkr tie same
"'||. am not afraid to COMES. TO you that
ne rry tN meet sim twenty. our naval tactics
- ttbM. late ~" only know how TAug . Ourselves
T.'e an nat l. precisely what the eHeny Wishes
- "a. neither the time nor the means 10 agree
S,, Al,ttrr system Sllh the commanders o. tho
''''-' { the TO nations"
,,ali In writing Of strategy the officer lust
Xsi SAYS, Bat the instances l quoted ut
Siesoh al the Nile and at Santa Cruz are sufil-
Ssnl Indicate that bravery and strategy
fsm1.ned are very much more powerful than
tIANr5 alone. The brave man had better Ee