Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1894-08-24
GOODMAN is GUILTY.
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
AND Is YEARS Imprisonment.

MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, AND
I FOR MANSLAUGHTER-TH -FOUH
MINUTES TAKEN TO REACH IT.
&c., &C., &C.
When the INDICATOR s report of the Good
man murder case closed on Thursday evening
last all of the evidence had been submitted
Mr.. William Z. Craig of Staunton, one of the
counsel for the prosecution had concluded
his argument. Friday Messrs Crump anG
Anderson spoke in behalf Of the prisoner
and on Saturday Mr.. Il. l.. Parrish for the
defence and Commemorative Attorney
Allen for the prosecution, closed the argu
ment. Judge Moore then instructed the iur,
as follows
COMMONWEALTH INSTRUCTIONS.
l. That murder is the unlawful killing Of
another, with malice which may be express
ed OF implied, and is distinguished in Virgin
ia as murder in the first and murder in the Sc
cond degree.
2. Every homicide in Virginia is presumed
in law to be murder in the second degree; il
order to elevate the offence to murder in the
first degree the burden OF proof is upon thu
Commonwealth, and to reduce the offence tt
manslaughter the burden of proof is upor
the prisoner.
3. To constitute murder in the first degree
the prisoner must have been melted to the
killing by malice, and the killing must have
been willful, deliberate and .premeditated
act on the part of the prisoner; that is to say
he must have willed, deliberated, and pre-
meditated that he should kill the deceased OF
do him seriously bodily injury, the necessary
result of which would be his death, and from
which he died. But it is not necessary that
the intent to kill, to make such intent will
full, deliberate, and premeditated should ex-
list any particular length of time prior to the
actual killing, for it is only necessary that
such intention should come into existence for
the first time at the time of the commiss ion OF
the act. OF at any time previous thereto.
4. That on a charge of murder malice is
presumed from the fact of killing. Where
the killing is proved and is unaccompanied
with circumstances of palliation, the burden
of disproving malice is thrown upon the
accused.
5. That whenever the killing is wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated, the law infers
malice from this fact.
6. That the rule OF law is that man shall
which is the necessary consequence of his
act.
Z. That a mortal wound, given with a
deadly weapon in the previous possession Of
the slayer, without any, OF upon very slight
proyocation, is prma facie, wilful, deliber-
ate and premeditated killing, and throws
upon the accused the necessity of proving ex
tenuating circumstances.
s. That to sustain provocation as defence
to murder in the first degree it must be shown
that the prisoner at the time of the fatal
shots was deprived of the power Of self
control by the provocation which he had re-
ceived, and in deciding the question whether
this was or was not the case regard must be
had to the character Of the provocation, to
the nature of the act by which death was
caused, to the time, if any, which elapsed
between the provocation and the act which
caused death, and to the prisoners conduct
during the intervals Immediately after the
shooting, and to all the circumstances tend
he fired the fatal shots.
8. That if they believe from the evidence
that the prisoner, Thomas \. Goodman, in
tended to shoot the deceased, II. G. Parsons,
made all assault upon said Parsons, seizing
him by the lapel of his coat, or collard him,
for the purpose of provoking him into shoot
ing or attacking him (Goodman), in order
that he (Goodman) might have pretext for
shooting the said Parsons, and that the sa id
Parsons, being so provoked. did throw his
hand backwards, as if to draw pistol, and
that the said Goodman thereupon shot and
killed the said Parsons, the said Goodman is
guilty of murder in the first degree.
10. That no provocation whatever can rem
der homicide ju5tifiable, or even excusable;
the least it can reduce it to is manslaughter
II man kills another suddenly, without any,
or without a considerable provocation. the
law implies malice, and the homicide is muir
der; but il the provocation were great, and
such as must have greatly provoked him, the
killing is manslaughter only. But words of
reproaeh, how grieyOus soever, are not provo
cation sufficient to free the person killing
from the guilt of murder.
IL. Ii the jury believe from the evidence
that the prisoner, L. A. Goodman, killed the
deceased, Il. g. Parsons, by reason Of the
letter written by Parsons to the Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Company, dated June I,
1891, suggesting accusations against Goodman
in connection with his official acts with the
railway company, then they will take into
consideration the nature, the manner, and the
means of the retaliation by Goodman for the
provocation given by the said letter. And if
they believe that the retaliation or punish
ment SO given by Goodman was outrageous
in its nature. and beyond proportion to the
provocation of said letter, they will consider
it rather the effect of a brutal, diabolical
malignity than of human frailty, and that the
crime committed by Goodman amount to MUIR
der, notwithstanding such proyocation.
u. That iii every case Of homicide upon
provocatlon, how great soever this provoca-
ton may have been, if the homicide be COM
mitted deliberately and upon revenge, after
the provocaton and the lapse of sufficient
time for passion to cool and reason to inter
pose, such homicide will be murder; for in
all possible cases deliberate homicide upon
principle of revenge is murder; no man under
the protection OF the law is to be the avenger
of his own wrongs.
10. Tie jury is instructed that no words of
reproach or accusation. spoken OF written, nc
matter how grievous soever they may be, will
afford sufficient provocation to free the party
killing from the guilt of murder; and that if
they believe from the evidence that L. A
Goodman killed Ii. e. Parsons with deatly y
weapon, by reason of the contents of the let
ter of June /. 1891, written by the said Par
sons to the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad
Company. the said Goodman is guilty Of MUIR
der, Notwithstanding any proyocation CON
tanned in SAID letter.
II. The Court instincts the jury that in a
trial for murder the necessity relied on to JUS
tify killing must not arise out Of the prison
ers own misconduct, unless the jury believe
from the evidence that, although the necessi-
ty did arise out of the prisoners own miscon-