The sun., 1894-01-20
The International Effect Of the Troubles
in Italy.

The International Effect Of the Troubles
in Italy.
Since the proclamation OF martial law in
Sicily, press dispatches have been subjected
to q rigorous censorship. and We have,
therefore. no trustworthy information re-
garding the success OF the attempt to sup
press the insurrectibn. All we know Is that
the connections were 30 widespread and
violent as to require the services OF at
least thirty thousand soldiers. and that. to
supply this force, although 1t Is but an in
significant fraction OF the italian army as
1t exists on paper. q part OF the reserves
had to be called out.
This circumstance excited keen interest
outside Of Italy, which has since been inten-
sified by the fact that serious disturbances
have occurred at Carrara. and seem likely
to break out at any moment elsewhere
on the mainland. The inquiry obviously
pressed by these incidents upon the allies
and the enemies OF King HUMBERT is this: II
the italian standing army cannot. without
falling back on its reserves. maintain inter-
nal order in the peninsula. Of what posi-
BILE value would 1t be in the event OF / for
eign war The difficulties experienced In
oAu ihS'ihB VNOh ioiSo 4 o
enough to put down local insurrection
seem to justify the assertion OF the London
Times that. at the close of the RUDINI Ad-
ministration. the condition of the army was
SO bad that 1t could not have made head for
month against an invasion. One might,
indeed. have argued u priOri that the sums
ostensibly allotted TO the armament and
the commissariat would not be honestly ex-
pended In country where Cabinet Minis
ters and Deputies are accused Of collusion
In banking frauds. and where IL Is notorious
that embezzlement and waste pervade
every branch Of the civil administration.
The London Times. to be sure. derives some
comfort from the return OF Signor CRIsPI
to power; but. in view Of the composition Of
the present Cham OF Deputies. who can
guarantee to him the considerable Pc
riod required to purge and thoroughly
reform every department OF the Govern
ment II war should come in the spring
Signor CRIsPI would have no better weapons
than those which are now at his disposal.
and these. as recent events have shown. are
scarcely more than adequate to the repres-
sion Of troubles at home.
1t Is true that. In the best informed quar-
ters. the Drift OF opinion does not point to
any immediate collision between the Triple
Alliance and the Frahco-Russian coali-
ton. It Is rather war between France
and England which Is believed to be- i'm
pending; and. as England has not single
friend among the continental powers, with
the possible exception Of Italy. she might,
for time. at all events. be left to her own
means OF self-deience. II the contest ulti-
mately became general. IL would be due TO
the desperate and successful efforts OF the
British Foreign Office to obtain assistance
from King HUMBERr. an assistance which he
could not or would not give without the
assent of his allies. The first sign OF snch
movement however, on the part OF Italy
would undoubtedly be followed by the in
terposltion OF the Car. 1t would serve his
turn TO sec England crippled in single
handed contest with France; and crippled
she assuredly would be through the depTe-
dations OF French cruisers on her commerce.
no matter what might be the result OF en-
gagements between ironclads. But the
Cars highest interests would be imperilled
should France be made the object OF a joint
attack by several powers. and he may be
trusted TO avert. or at least minimize. the
danger by formidable demonstrations ON
the German and Austrian frontiers.
In estimating the conditions and eontin-
gencies OF general conflict. we may regard
England as negligible quantity. SO far as
land operations are concerned. The largest
force of regulars which she Is now able to
muster for the defence OF the British Islands
scarcely exceeds one army corps. and the
whole Of that would be needed in ireland. IL
Irishmen should once more recognize that
Engl2nds danger Is their opportunity.
Outside OF Germany and Austria. the only
factor which the enemies OF France have
deemed worth considering, with view TO
land operations, has been the Italian army.
which, on paper. seemed powerful coadju-
tor The whole plan OF campaign devised
at Berlin Is believed TO rest on two assump-
tiOns. first. that large part OF the German
army would have to be posted in Posen and
West Prussia to face the Russian force as
sembled on the Nistula; but. secondly. that
the rest Of the German army directed
against France. would have to cope with
only part Of the French force. owing 10 the
redoubtable diversion which would DO made
in the south By Italy. II this second as
sumption is IN founded; III the Italian army.
owing 10 corrupt deficiencies OF armament
and eommlssarist Is barely qualified for the
maintenance & order in the peninsula. and