Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1894-11-23
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT.
Judge witt Gives Some OF Those ASKED
by Each Side.

ID
by Each Side.
The counsel in the case were not long
in presenting the instructions. and out
of the number submitted by them the
Court adopted and gave the following:
1. Murder is the unlawful killing Of any
person with malice aforethought.
2. Murder. as distinguished by the laws
Of Virginia. is murder Of the first degree
and as murder of the second degree.
9. Murder by poison. lying in wait. I'm:
prisonment, starving. or any wilful. de-
liberate, and premeditated killing, or III
the commission of. or attempt to commit
arson. rape, robbing or burglary. Us MUIR
der of the first degree. All other murder
is murder of the second degree.
l. Every homicide In Virginia Is pre-
sumed in law 10 be murder Of the second
degree: In order to elevate the offence
to murder Of the first degree, the burden
Of proof is upon the Commonwealth: and
to reduce the offence to manslaughter,
the burden of proof is upon the prisoner.
s. To constitute murder In the first
degree the prisoner must have been in
cited to the killing by malice, and the
killing must have been a wilful. DELHI
crate and premeditated act on his part;
that is to say. he must have willed, delib-
Grated, and premedtated that he should
kill the deceased or do him some serious
bodily injury, the necessary result OF
which would be his death. And the Court
instructs the jury that. unless 1t Is clearly
and distinctively proved by the evidence,
beyond all reasonable doubt. that the
prisoner had willed and deliberated and
premeditated to kill the deceased or do
him such serious bodily injury, they
should not find him guilty Of murder
in the first degree.
6. On charge of murder. malice Is
presumed from the fact Of killing. When
the killing Is proved. and is unaccom-
panied with circumstances of palliation,
the burden of disproving malice is thrown
upon the accused.
T. When the killing Is wilful, deliberate
and premeditated. the law infers malice
from this fact
g. The rule of law IL that man shall
be taAen to intend that which he does.
or which Is the necessary consequence of
his act.
0. a mortal wound given with pistol
In the previous possession Of the slayer.
without any. or upon very slight provoca-
ton is. prima facie. wilful. deliberate, and
premeditated killing. and throws upon the
prisoner the necessity Of proving extenu-
ating circumstances.
10. Although the jury may believe from
the evidence that the prisoner shot the
deceased and inflicted the wounds which
caused his death during q quarrel, yet
il they further believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the auar-
rel was provoked and brought on by the
prisoner with the object to provoke the
deceased TO strike him In order to have
a pretext to take his life. and that the
rsrfc hfIC oh fIa
inflct the wounds from which he died,
as charged in the Indictment. then they
are instructed that such an act constitutes
wl,ful, deliberate. and premeditated
killing. and, as such, is murder OF the
first degree.
H. Words, however grievous, which
may have been spoken by the deceased
to the prisoner. or by the deceased TO or
about the wife of the prisoner. cannot
justify the killing OF he deceased by
the prisoner, but the use of such words
by the deceased can only be shown in
evidence and pleaded In extenuation OF
the offence In order 10 reduce the grade
OF the crime.
To sustain such provocation as a de-
fence TO murder of the first degree
II must be shown that the prisoner at
the time OF the infliction by him OF the
power Of se.f-control by the provocation
he had received; and In deciding the ques-
ton whether this was or was not the
case, regard must be had 10 the charac-
ter of the provocation. to the nature Of
the act by which dsath was caused. to
the time which elapsed between the pro-
vocation and the act which caused death.
10 the prisoners conduct during the in
te,-yai and to all the circumstances tend
ing to show the state OF his mind at the
time he committed the act.
II the jury believe from the evidence
that the prisoner at the time he fired
the fatal shot was acting in the heat of
passion engendcred by the words spoken
by the deceased TO or about the wife Of
the prisoner. and that such words were
In themselves calculated TO provoke
high degree Of violence; that a sufficient
time had not elapsed since the words
were spoken for the passions engendered
thereby to cool and subside. then the
killing Is murder OF the second degree.
But. II the jury believe from the evidence
ttat a sufficient time had elapsed since
such words were spoken for the passions
ergendered thereby to cool and subside,
epd that after yards the prisoner went to
the place OF the fatal encounter armed
with a deadly weapon for the purpose Or
killing the deceased on account OF such
' ords 30 spoken 10 or about his wife. and
d'd k,,l tho ds~~assd on that account
wiIfully and with malice and premedita-
ton. then the prisone: Is guilty Of MUIR
der OF the first degree.
To constitute wilfrl deliberate. aud
pi emeiitated killing, = Ii not necessary
that an intention TO LIN should exist Tor
AIRY particular length OF time prior TO the
actual killing, Il = oily necessary thai
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