The morning call., 1894-10-07

purchased at some station which
| from the place Of destination is beyond
the intermediate point. We see no de-
mand for legislation of the character out
lined by appellants construction OF the
statute. The circumstance Of passenger
| purchasing ticket from one point to an
other and then only actually using 1t for
portion Of the distance would not seem
to be an event of such common occurrence
as to demand the needs of legislative
action"
1t was further contended by the COM
pany that section 400 of the Civil Code
upon which the plaintiff relied for his
| stOp-over right was repealed by section %
of article XII of the Stats constitution,
and this claim of repeal was based upon
the additional claim that the constitutional
provision cited placed the full and exclusive
power of fixing railroad transportation
charges within the State in the Railroad
Commissioners.
The court, however, says: "Section 400
declares that the railroad company must
provide. and on being rendered the fare
therefor fixed as provided in the preceding
section furnish to every passenger desir-
ing passage ticket which entities the pur-
chaser to certain rights and privileges al
ready considered, and this section also
aftixes penalty for the violation OF any
of its provisions. In all portions thereof.
save single one, the section is entirely
disconnected from aud independent of sec
ton 4S9. With this single exception it ap-
pears to be fall of its own vitality and
| possessed of ample strength within itself
to stand out alone law as independent
and complete as any other section within
the lids OF the code. Section 489
is in no way dependent upon section 400.
There is no mutually in their connections
and dependencies. Section 490 could have
been repealed and the vitality OF section
4S9 would not have been affected il the
| slightest degree"
Then again, the Central Pacific Company
leased TO the Southern Pacific Company
certain railroads for a period of ninety
nine years. and also assigned to the South
ern Pacific Company certain leases it held
of other roads. The leases held by the
Central Pacific Company were assigned
with the right 20 take. hold. operate,
maintain and enjoy said railroads and
other property in the same manner as the
Central Pacific Company holds, operates,
ETC., the same under said leases" So the
appellant company in this case contended
that section 400 of the Civil Code. under
which DR.. Ro binson claim ed his stop-over
privilege, did not apply to the Southern
Pacific Company because it did not apply
to its lessor, the Central Pacific Company,
and this contention WAS based on
technicallies of section 2SS of the Civil
Code. Concerning this the court remarks:
''For the purposes of this case we will
concede that by reason of that section the
provisions of section AGO do not apply to
the Central Pacific Company. That much
being conceded. is its lessee, the Southern
Pacific Company, by virtue Of its leases.
assignments. ETC., likewise unaffected by
the prov sion of that section?"
The Southern Pacific Company is
| foreign corporation and was organized
under the laws of the State of Kentucky
in March, 1884. more than ten years after
the enactment of sections 2SS and 400 of
the Civil Code: and aside from any rights,
privileges or exemptions passing to it by
virtue of these leases and assignments, it
only exists in this State and is enabled to
do business in this State by virtue alone
of those provisions of the code which we
have conceded have no binding force and
effect upon the Central Pacific Company.
|
ance and gravity with which the appellant
surrounds its contention in this respect.
A corporation organized and carrying on
! its business under a certain set OF laws,
leases and assigns all or portions of its
property to another corporation organized
and carrying on its business under another
and different set of laws. Do such leases,
assignments and transfers give the second
( inn In inhf IN thar ftor -
its business under the laws which were
only applicable to the first corporation
Such contention can have no support in the
| law.
1t was further con tended that section
400 bad no application to this case, be-
cause the railroad began at Oakland pier,
within the corporate limits of the city of
| Oakland; therefore the point referred to
in the complaint instead Of being an in
termediate station, was the Initial point,
Oakland being the station at which the
railroad began. and there being no rail-
road between San Francisco and the Oak
land pier, but a ferry only. But the Su-
preme Court does not take this view, de-
Gliding that ''as to a trip from San Frau
cisco 10 Alamedavia Oakland, Oakland is an
| informed late station and the fact that the
ueleuuanG COMPANY mas TWO or more STOP
ping-places in Oakland. where. for the &C
commodation of the public, passengers are
allowed to enter and leave its local trains,
can make no difference"
The last contention was that the line
travelled by plaintiff was not the most d.
rect route, and that passengers are only
allowed to take the more circuitous route
OF condition that they make a continuous
passage. The Supreme Court says, SIT is
sufficient for present purposes to say that
the ticket purchased by plaintiff in this