The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1894-11-14

protect their hank. thirteen tnOuS-
and FIVE hundred, or at most fourteen
thousand troops, had been massed to
attack an army, but with no more hope
of success than had the Spartans at
Thermopyle, the English cavalry at
Balaklaya or the Old Guard of the
French at Waterloo.
Pickett's division formed at 1890
a. m, in line nearly parallel and in
rear of the rise upon which runs the
Emmittsburg road, but rather dlago-
nally to the Union position at the con-
templated point of attack. Kemper'
right was one thousand eight hundred
and sixty yards distant from it, while
Pettigrew prolonged the line somewhat
en- echelon. Pickett's first formation
was in one line, Armistead, Garnett
and Kemper from left to right. Gar,
nett's troops were twenty yards only
in rear of Wilcox's brigade Of Ander-
sons division, which had been sent
out to the front between daylight and
sunrise to protect guns then being
put in position by Col. 3. P. Alexan-
der, of the artillery. Wilcox states
that the four brigade commanders were
together nearly all the time before the
artillery opened Gin the yard near the
Spangler House. and that there was
no officer present in that open field at
any time higher in rank than brigade
general, which differs with an account
by the right corps commander, who
has said that Lee rode with him
"twice over the line to see that every
thing was arranged according to his
wishes and that there was no room fol
misconstruction. Of his orders.
Lees object was to cut the Fedora
army at its left centre as Marlborough
split that of Vendome in the same
month one hundred and dfty-fve years
before, thinking, perhaps, its right
wing could be destroyed first or driven
so far out of the way that he could
turn in whole or part against the left
wing before it could disentangle itself
from the rocks and woods of the Round
Top.
TESTIMONY OF LEE g STAFF OFFICERS.
It is fortunate three Of Gen. Lee s
trusted staff oficers.-Taylor, Venable
and Long-have recorded that the
plan Of assault involved an attack by
Longstreet's whole corps, supported
by one half of Hill 8, or all Of it if he e
called for it, or upon the bright shield
of the Southern chieftain there might
have been lasting blot. Taylor, the
adjutant general Of the army, says it
was originally intended to make the
attack with Hood and McLaws, re-
enforced by Pickett, and it was only
because of the apprehension of Gen
Longstreet that his corps was not
strong enough that Gen. Hill was
called on to support him, and Hill, in
an official report, states that his troops
were sent to Longstreet i'as support
to his corps" Lee erode along a per
tion of the line held by A. P. Hill s
corps and finally took position about
the Confederate centre on an elevated
point, from which he could survey the
field and watch the result OF the
movement" Long says the order for
the assault by the whole corps was
given verbally by Gen. Lee in his
presence and that Of Major Venable
and other officers Of the army. Vena,
BILE states that he heard the orders
given to support Pickett's s attack by
McLaws and Hood, and that when he
called Gen. Lees attention to it after.
ward he said: II know it, l know it.
A consummate master Of war such
as Lee was would not drive en- masse
"a column of fourteen thousand men
across an open terrene thirteen OF
fourteen hundred yards, nearly every
foot of it under concentrated and
converging fire Of artillery, to attack
an army on fortified heights Of one
hundred thousand, less it's two days
losses, and give his entering wedge nc
support. Why, if every man in that
assault had been bullet-proof, and il
the whole of those fourteen thousand
plendid troops had arrived unharmeo
on Cemetery Ridge, what could have
been accomplished 2 Not being able tt
kill them there would have been time
for the Federals to have seized, tied
and taken them off in wagons before
their supports could have reached
them. Amid the fire and smoke OF
this false move these troops did not
know "some one lad blundered," but
had right to feel that the movement
had been well considered and ordered
because it had elements Of success
But there was no chance to write vic
tory upon their auttering flags. The
pages of history which record the
MAGNIFICENT exhibition of human cour.
age drip with the useless sacrifice Of
blood.
LoNesTREET's RELUCTANCE TO OBEY
Longstreet was disappointed wher
he received the order to make this
attack and wanted to move to the
Federal left, but Lee knew his rela
tions with Meade had been too init
mate during the last two days and the
relative hosts too close for such tarti
cal folly. His right corps chief say;
he took Pickett, who was to command
the charge, to the crest of Seminar,
Ridge, pointed out the direction to be
taken and the point to be assaulted
that he "could see the desperate anc
hopeless nature of the charge and the
cruel slaughter it would cause" and
that his ''heart was heavy" when ht
left Pickett; that his objections t. t
Pickett's battle had been overruled
and that the day was one Of the sad
dest of his life, for he foresaw wha
his men would meet and would gladly
have given up his position rather thar
share in the responsibilities of thai
dav. Lee, au contraire, was impati
emily waiting to see Longstre ! $ corp:
and one-half of Hills, or, if necei i-ery
all of it, break, with the force of she
tempest which strands navies, through
the hostile lines, if the testimony Of
his staff officers is worthy of credence
The details of the attack were prop
crly left to the officer who was to make
it. Lee did not care whether Hooc
and McLaws, attacked, reinforced BY
Pickett and Hills troops, as at hrst
intended, or whether Pickett led anc