The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-01-21

ms mead snat the GGDEe3erkSs army hSos
Richmond. vs the true point OF attack
Over ard over sgaia did Lincoln point out
TO Meade that rith The wearing out and
destruction Of the Confederate armies the
Confsdsrsey must fall. ssd tia, his ssss-
ness vas 20 strike Lee. nos to maasuvsr
the ensmy ous Of Richmond
The Official archives Of both the Federal
and Confederate governments, the nsrra-
tives Of the great. responsible commanders
on both sides, tbs historical contributions
Of the eminent sectors Of the civil war that
hare been pubished By Seri5ner's and In
the CSafnvy are rhe best snd most authentic
data thss We have concerning thu great
civil contact Of fs;1sa The impressions.
opinions. recoljections and "reminiscences
Of psrtisans and military bohernians Of
either side count for nothing in cred i5alify
sgainss the printed narratives Of Joe
Johnston. Beauregard. Hood. Longstreet.
" II. Hill. Grsnt. Sheridan, Sherman,
Cor. Force. Doubleday. Humphreys,
Webb. Paifrey. corrected, confirmed,
supple nensed and smplifed IS they are
By the archives Of the war department.
which include thoss of the Confederate
government captured when Richmond fell.
To illustrate. the New York Ese5sia7 Post.
Democratic newspaper. had no difficulty
in proving that Don Piatt's biography Of
Gen. Thomas was . gross libel on Lincoln,
sherman. Sheridan and Grant by quoting
from the official archives Of the war de-
partment. which included the dis
patches. correspondence and returns
Of the strength Of Thomas army.
Piatt makes the statement that until after
the battle Of Franklin, November 80. 1864.
Gen. Thomas vas outnumbered two 10
one By Hood and that his army was COM
posed Of 'odds and ends and trash sent
back By Sherman. = mere military ra5-
Bile" The Post quotes the forty-fifth
voiums of the Official War Records"
just published. which show that Gen.
Thomas on November 20, 1854. reported
bis troops present for duty TO be Il. 46s.
exclusive Of the employees of the quarter
masters and commisssry's departments.
but including Wilson's cavalry corps,
1888 strong, 1i,57s of which were
equipped The $500 dismounted cavalry
were available to tight rs infantry. On
this date, November 20. Hood began his
advance with $500 infantry and 10, 900
cavalry. So that November -, 1854, when
the campaign began, Thomas had nearly
two men TO Hoods one. On November
30. 1854. the date o; the battle of Frank
lin. Thomas made another official return
to the adjutant generals Office, showing
s., 40 present for duty. !" still emitting the
division ofemployes. His cavalry was now
returned at %. s29, Of which 1850 were
equipped" Still there was no concentra-
ton at the front, and although Hoods
force was reduced by 5000 in that san
culinary battle and the affairs which pre-
coded it. Schofield was ordered to fall back
to Nashville, where the concentration was
finally made.
Eight days Of good weather followed.
during which Hood not only advanced 10
besiege in Nashville his vastly stronger
opponent. but from his diminished force
detached one whole division and part Of
another to attack Murfreesboro and to
burn the railroad bridges between that
place and the very picket line at Nashville.
Forrest took part in this with his cavalry
and raided the country far to the north
east beyond Lebanon, sending o detach-
ment into kentucky TO operate on the
railroad behind Thomas. During that
whole week nothing was done on the ma
tional side.
On the 10th of December Thomas reported
that he had present for duty s7,7i0, still
emitting the division OF employees. His cav
airy was now returned at - SO, OF which
1924 were equipped" On the 9th the
memorable storm of rain and sleet gave
good reason for not then beginning ag-
gressiye operations, and the delay in be-
ginning the fight from that day to the 18th
Is not open TO criticism. Before that time.
however. during the whole OF Schofields
retreat with the two corps the eighty miles
from Pulaski to Nashville. there was not a
single day when il was not entirely feasible
| for Thomss to concentrate In front o!
| Hood larger force than the whole with
| which that general crossed the Tennessee.
| The movements OF troops actually made
| by rail during that period afford a measure
of time and transportation that demon.
| strates ID.
| The New York Epeais1 Post uotes these
| figures from the war records office and ex.
| presses its indignation that for twenty
| years detractors OF Grant, sherman. Lin.
coin and Sheridan. like Piatt and Boyn.
ton. have persisted in asserting that Gems.
Sherman and Grant forced Thomas 70
meet Hood with so inadequate force as to
make IL proof of wish to destroy him
In conclusion the Pos. says:
THE victory of Nashville proved that
| Grant spoke the truth in his dispa;ch O,
| December q when his words were: Il
have SIS much confidence in your conduct
| ing the battle rightly as l have in any
| other officer The figures and date. in
| the official records prove that he was quite
as correct in saying. but il has seemed ia
| me you have been slow, and have had no
| explanation OF affairs TO convince me 9th
| srwise.' To sherman, Thomas success,
| was as essential as his own, and his in
| junction TO get about Columbia, Tenn. as
| big an army as yen can and go at him
| was the essence of military wisdom as weil
as enterprise. To say that out of II 4si
| present for duty in Tennessee a com.
| mander could not concentrate enough 20
! stop the advance Of @a,O0o is To stnitify
| ones self"
Why TAXPAYERS ARE PERTURREp
Oar Democratic friends express the ut
| most xuFNrfxa that th. .axr.x -k-x..