The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1894-10-07

. selfish and intensely eeoslssiS3A AAos
compared With Grant or even With sherf-
dan, there il 20 doubt. He never ssia
anything generous OF Grant uafll ne " as
dead. AID then Gen Frye producsd from
the archives Of the war department let
ter written By sherman saving thai Il
Gen. c. y. Smith had lived Grant would
have been IA obscurity.
The evacuation Of Corinth. which Re
calls great victory in his correspondence
he denounced after Grants death IS dis
grace 10 Halleek. although he praised
HsIleck q. shs time, writing him. when
you 90 Eas. you leave nobody behind In
whom the army trusts" During Haiieek's
life Sherman never denounced him OK
justified Grant, bat when Grant and Hal
ieck were both dead be could say nothing
too good for Grant: nothing too dspreei-
alive of HaIleck- His corps com manders,
Logan and Blair, Sherman treated most
ungenerously. although Logan's personal
gsllantry restored Sherman's broken lines
at the battle Of Atlantis Had Logan's
charge az the head of the Fifteenth corps
failed, Sherman. who was more than two
miles distant, would have lost the battle.
and yet be gave the Army of the Tonnes
see 10 Howard and then apologized for
what he did after Logan's death
It is q curious fact that while he re-
proaches his brother in his correspondence
for his loss of faith in Mcclellan. Gen.
Sherman in bis strategy OF the War, :"
denounces Mcclellan as follows:
His fatal mistake was in the choice of
his line Of operations in the spring of 1862
Had he moved straight against his antag-
onist behind the Rappahannock with his
then magnificent army, and had he fought
steadily and persistentiy. as Grant did two
years later. he would have picked up his
detachmenss. including McDowelI's corps.
would have reached Richmond with an
ershelming force, would have captured
the city, dispersed the Confederate army
and ended the war. / do not entertain
the idea that Lincoln. Stanton, Chase and
Halleck could have conspired for his de-
feat for any motive whatsoever. He had
ample power and adequate force but failed
in his objective which should have been
the Confederate army instead of the city
of Richmond. The Withdrawal of Blenker's
division and McDowell's corps was the
direct consequence of his own plan of
campaign, which involved the defense of
Washington as well as the capture of
Richmond. He failed because he chose .
wrong objective and a wrong line of opera
ton. common mistake in strategy"
Sherman proceeds to denounce the An
tietam campaign as equally faulty; his
battle tactics were bad in that ''he not
only made his attacks 90 disconnectedly
that they afforded no help to each other.
but kept Is 600 men in strict reserve to the
very end of the battle. Porter's corps
might as well have been in Washington.
This blunder was one that no great tacti-
clan ever committed in McClellan's cir
cumstances, for his reinforcements were
near and those Of his enemy exhausted.
The only excuse that can be made for his
timidity must be the ignorance he labored
under as to the great numerical inferiority
of Lee"
In his assertion that he was not sur
pri.ed at Shiloh, Gen. Sherman is directly
contradicted by many honorable officers
of high rank and intelligence who fought
in the battle. Gen. Buell., an able and
honorable officer, has examined this ques-
ton of surprise" at Shiloh, and closes
the controversy with the incisive remark
that if an enemy can march an army of
IS. 900 men within q mile and half of
your lines by 4 p. N. without discovery
unsiI he assaults you the next morning is
not "a SURPRISE" what is surprise from a
military point Of viewf
Whether Gen. Sherman's intense egotism
hurried him into hasty statements that he
was afterwards too vain to recall, or
whether he was really Indifferent to the
truth IL Is not easy TO say of so eccentric
and highly strung temperament.
OF course . man who wrote and talked
90 necessarily and excitably as did Sher-
man would say . great deal impulsively
that needed revision. but this does not ex-
plain his sci fish and ungenerous treatment
of his military peers and Of his great sub
ordinates. 1t Is perfectly clear that Sher-
man was Mcclellan" man so long a,
Mcclellan commanded the army: he was
a "Busll" man until Buell. was relieved:
be was .Grant" man when Grants star
shot up after vicksburg into . iuminary
Of the first magnitude; he was a "Halleck"
man until Halleck lost his grip" at
Washington.
IL is difficult To resist the conclusion
that Gen. Sherman. while great soldier
and sincere patriot. was far inferior to
Grant in simplicity. magnanimity and in
genuousness of character. He had an over
weening self-esteem that made him domi-
neering and contemptuous of the rights
aud abilities of others; he seldom praised
anybody heartily until they had been
dead number of days. He was great
soldier, but he does not appear to have
been man of noble nature, and it Is a
subject for national congr.tulation that
Gen. sherman never was afflicted with
political ambition, for IS president he
would have had an administration more
purely personal and domineering than
that of Andrew Jackson.
He Was born soldier, but be had not
single quality OF Q statesman. But for the
civil war he would have lived and died OBJ
scurs; be had tried banking and the law:
be had quareled with everybody; he was
unit for civil pursuits; he was a born
despot. with . genius for var. He was as
patriotic So Wellington. aud about as sell
fish and ungenerous 20 his able subordi-
mates; in short, he was 9 great soldier, but
very lar from q great man.