Herald and tribune. [volume] (Jonesborough, Tenn.) 1869-current, 1894-01-03

the letters of Carter to Gen. Sherman
Nov. ., he wrote his superior, indicat-
ing perfect willingness to undertake
the seizure of the East Tennessee rail
roads with the help of four additional
disciplined regiments. On the 7th he
wrote Gov. Andrew johnson, then at
London, KY, urging an advance into
East Tennessee, the he had "done all in
his power to get troops and means to
advance.
But, while thus looking with hope
toward the Federal army, Carter mean
while did not let grass grow under his
feet. Within two weeks he had success
fully mobilized several trustworthy
bands of the Unionists at available
points for striking. The bridges aimed
at were remote from each other, the
extreme points being fully 200 miles
apart. Several of these bridges were
defended by armed men, and all were
watched. The plan was to attack and
destroy them simultaneously. The diff
ticulties attending so sweeping a pro-
ject were almost tinsurmountable.
But nothing daunted Carter. He rode
from point to point, disguised as a con-
tractor-sometimes on the trains in the
very midst of Confederate regiments, en-
route to the front-setting on foot the
necessary measures; drilling his coad-
tutors IN their several parts, collecting
arms and ammunition for the men and
material for the conflagration-tarred
ropes and other equally combustible
matter. So judicious and secret were
the dispositions made by Carter and the
other leaders in this affair, such was
the good faith observed, that no inkling
OF the intended attack on the Confed-
crate railway communications seems to
have gotten abroad.
On the night of November s, entirely
unexpected, the blow fell. The COM
binations were 80 well concerted as to
result in entire success. Some five or
six important bridges on the East Ten
nessee & Georgia, East Tennessee &
Virginia and Western & Atlantic roads
were fired and destroyed, bringing their
traffic to standstill-one near the Vir-
ginia line, another 10 miles southwest
OF Knoxville, and still others about
Chattanooga and Dalton, Ga. Some
were enveloped in flames five minutes
after the watchmen had inspected them.
At one bridge the guard was attacked
and dispersed
The greatest CONSERVATION prevailed
among government and railway offic.
ials. The daring deed had galvanic
effect on the dropping spirits of the
Union people, who had previously been
in great fear of the Confederate mill.
tary power. The bridge burning exploit
gave them renewed courage; opened up
great possibilities. The whole East
Tennessee region was thrown into fer
ment, and state of rebellion ensued
against the Confederacy. There were
very few arms to be procured or
bloody conflict must have followed. If
national preparation had been in such
forward state as to permit the advance
OF Gen. Thomas with strong force
down through Cumberland Gap to the
timely support of this fire in the rear, a
dangerously blow could have been
dealt the Confederacy at the very out.
set of its career 1t was the most vul-
nerable point of attack in the South.
The military commanders had prev.
iously warned the Richmond govern
ment that to all iDtents and purposes
East Tennessee was to them an enemys
country.
His work done, Carter proceeded to
promptly escape, slipping out of the
country through the mountain passes
into Kentucky with as much celerity
as he had gone into it. He reached the
Federal lines again on the 10th of No
vember. But many enthusiastic parti-
sans, who embarked with him in the
dangerous undertaking, were not 80
fortunate; perhaps they were not 80
wise as Carter. In fact, it proved to be
in the end a most unfortunate and
tragic business for all concerned, and
hurtful in the extreme to the Union
cause instead of helpful, because it
brought the vengence of thee Confederate
power down upon the defenseless people
instantly, whereas the Federal govern
ment was wholly unprepared to defend
Its friends in that remote quarter. The
movement was, in short, premature.
Richmond and Nashville were never.
theless, for the moment, greatly alarmed.
Only the most vigorous and rigorous
measures would suffice to meet the
crisis, the danger was far greater than
the mere destruction of few bridges
specifically indicated. The cohesion,
the very life of the Confederacy itself,
was involved. The disatfection might
spread. There were other sore spots in
the South. Carter success was clearly
understood to have been only possible
through the willing connivance of the
people thereabouts, where an almost
universal sentiment of unionism was
now demonstrated to prevail.
Isham G. Harris, the great war gov
ernor OF the South, telegraphsd Jeffer-
son Davis from Nashville that "the
Union men are organizing; this rebel