The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1894-11-14
HOW GETTYSBURG WAS LOST.
FITzHUGH LEES STORY OF THE FATE
Full FIELD.
Condensed from IN .lccomnt in Fichnyh
Lees Lie Robcft +. Lee.

Condensed from IN .iccount in Fttchuyh
Lees Life Robcft 4. Lee.
The discussion of the battle of Get
tysburg is more general to-day, not
only throughout the country, but
throughout the world, than it was
thirty years ago. when it was yet fresh
in the minds Of all the living, and its
fearful sacrifices and heroic achieve
mcnts on both sides were as living
pictures in view Of the nation. 1t is
now undisputcd that it was the dccis-
i've battle of the war. When Lee
formed his lines on Seminary Ridge
he presented the largest Confederate
army that ever appeared on any battle
field during the entire war. Never
before had Lee commanded so many
men and never thereafter was he able
to approach the number who obeycd
his orders on that fatcful field.
HOW TIE BATTLE BEGAN.
1t is known that both Gen. Meade
and Gen. Lee were moving toward
each other when their advance forces
met at Gettysburg, without either
knowing the particular direction of
the other, and both armies were moved
in such positions as to be able to con-
centratc readily at different points.
What was supposed at first to be
mere skirmish at Gettysburg on the
first day Of July was precipitated by
Gen. IIcth, who got permission to
move into Gettysburg for the purpose
of supplying his men with shoes.
That movement was met BY the ad-
vance of Reynold corps that was
making a reconnaissance in force, and
the conflict began without either side
supposing that great battle was to
be fought. Early i'll the afternoon
Hills whole corps was on the ground
in action, and Towards corps had
come to the support of Reynolds, who
had fallen early in the battle. Thus
what opened as a skirmish precipita-
ted fully so, 900 men, in the harvest
of death wi hin a very few hours. and
the Union army was defeated with the
loss of four or five thousand prisoners
and driven in confusion on Cemetery
Hill.
THE SECOND DAY FIGHT.
On the second day instead Of sim
ultaneous attack upon the Union lines,
as Gen. Lee S plans contemplated,
and as he had verbally ordered, no
attack was made until late in the
afternoon, thus enabling Meade to
largely increase his force and strength
en- his position, and when the attack
was made it was desperate and
bloody effort to gain Little Round Top
and Culps Hill, both Of which could
have been taken unopposed any time
during the day before. Lee S entire
plan Of battle had miscarried, and his
biographcr sets forth at every stage OF
failure how the responsibility was
upon the tardincss of Gen. Longstrcct.
lie did not attack in the morning at
daylight, as he should have done, be-
cause Pickctts division was not yet
there, and thus nearly the entire day
was lost, during every hour OF which
the strength of the Union position was
greatly increased by brcastworks and
the numbers of the army multiplied.
On the evening of the second day 1t
was evident to Lee that the position
of the Federal army was too strong to
be broken on either of its fanks, as he
had sacrificed many of his soldiers in
vain efforts to get possession of Culp 5
Hill and Round Top. He was thus
reduced to the necessity of adopting
one of three courses, viz: To make an
assault upon Gen. Meade s left centre,
at the point where it was nearest to
Dec's lines to make flank move
mcnt around Meade left and thus
attempt to force him out Of his posi-
ton. or to retreat. Gen. Lee doubt
less we'll considered all of these sug-
gestions. lie had discussed the
question of attempting flank move
mcnt with Gen. Longstreet, who
strongly urged it, but it did not meet
with Lee approval, and after fully
considering the matter he expressed
the belief that with proper concerted
action an assault could be made sue
ccssfully, and his orders were given
accordingly. Gen. Pickett's division
had arrived on the field in the after
noon of the second day and had not
yet participated in any of the battles,
and as Longstrcct 5 corps was now
complete, with more fresh men in it
than any other, he was charged with
the duty of assaulting the Mon lines
early in the morning.
PICKETT S AWFUL CHARGE.
We cannot better convey to the
reader the story Of Pickett S luckless
assault than to quote corlously from
Gen. Fitzhugh Lee story as 1t comes
from his own pen
Gen. Longstrect dispositions were
not completed as early as was expect
ed, continues Lee, and before ne
could notify Ewcll the enemy attacked
johnson. was rcpulscd, and johnson,
thinking the fighting was going on
elsewhere, attacked i'll his turn and
forced the Union troops to abandon
part of thcirintrcnchlIcnts, but after
a gallant and prolonged struggle was
not able to carry the strongly fortified
crest of the hill. The projected at
tack on the enemy left not having
been made. Lee states, 'hc was
unable to hold his right with a force
largely superior to that Of Gen: John
son, and finally to threaten his flank
and rear. and rendering it necessary
for him to retire to his original posi-
ton about p. m. The delay to
attack on the right was but a rcpeti-
ton of the preceding day 5 tactics.
1t was impossible t. move from differ
cnt Aanks slew officer and prompt
one "at the same time. Long>treet
was delayed. Gen. Lee $ report tells
us. by force occupying the high,
rocky hills nn he enemy extreme
left from which his troops could be
attacked in reverse as they advanced,
and he deemed it necessary 20 defend
his flank and rear with the divisions
of Hood and Mcl.aw> .ile was
therefore reinforced by Ilcth division