The morning call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1878-1895, 1894-10-31
He Killed 70 Coyotes and Asked
Money for Their Scalps.
BEATEN ON A TECHNICALLY.
The Supreme Court Decides the
State Board of Examiners Shall
Approve Such Claims.

The Supreme Court has discharged the
writ of mandate by which j. w. Ingram
sought to compel State Controller Colgan
to pay him 1855 for 70 coyote scalps CAP
tured in Kern County. Ingram loses his
case on a technicality.
The action involved an act of the Legis-
lature in 1891, by which bounty Of IS
per head was provided for every coyote
scalp presented to the authorities,
measure deemed necessary owing TO the
havoc made by these pests among tie
farming lands in the southern part OF the
State. Ingram was successful hunter of
coyotes, and having killed 70 OF them ID
Kern County he presented the scalps to
Controller Colgan and made formal de-
mand for 1866. Cogau, however, refused
10 audit the account and Ingram had re-
course TO a writ of mandate to compel him
to do so. The writ was issued aud after
ward granted by the lower court, and
from this judgment Controller Colgan APP
pealed to the Supreme Court.
a demurrer was interpOsed by Colgan to
the writ on the ground that the act OF the
Legislature providing this bounty for coy
ote scalps was unconstitutional, 10 that IL
provided for the payment of money with
out due consideration, thereby taking The
nature OF gift and violating the State
constitution. The demurrer, however,
was overruled and writ granted, and
from this proceeding an appeal was taken
The Supreme Court made short work OF
Colgan's claim that the act OF the Legsla-
turs was uncon stitutional. 1t held that
the act was decidedly the reverse and came
under the head of provisions for the police
power of the State On this point the de-
cision OF the Supreme Court reads as fol-
lows:
"The statute of March 81, 1891. is not
within the Limitation TO the exercise OF
the police power. That coyotes are pest
and a scourage to the breeders OF sheep
ana other small domestic animals is mat
ter of common knowledge. To provide
adequate means of defense to those en-
gagged in an important Industrial pursuit
is clearly within the general police powers
of the legislative branch of the Govern
ment, through which all police power is
exercised. The statute is not then void in
The sense that il violates the funda-
mental principles of tree govern meni
aud inITlnges upon the rights Of the
citizen.
The contention of appellant is that the
bounty provided to be paid by the statute
is gift and inhibited by the thirty-firsl
section of article " of the constitution oil
California. There being a con.
sideration for the claims of respondent
rendered by him under the offer of the
and is not therefore obnoxious to the pro-
vision of the constitution quoted.
'Our attention is not called to any other
constitutional provision, either State or
Federal, with which the statute in cues
ton is claimed TO conflict. Hence we con-
clude that as the statute comes within the
general welfare for which the Legislature
is authorized to provide under its police
powers, and not being yiolative of the
fundamental law, must be upheld as {
valid and subsisting law"
So far as the law on the question wa
concerned, therefore, the court decided
that Ingram had a valid claim. But
further objection by Colgan to the grant
ing of writ Of mandate proved fatal
Colgau urged that Ingram should have ha;
his claim approved by the State Board o
Examiners before presenting it to him fo
auditing. This rule comes under section
372 of the code. which provides for thi
course Of procedure.
In this contention the Supreme Cour
decides that Colgan was right, and on TIT
ground that it was Ingram's duty to pas
his claim through the State Board of Elk
aminers before presenting it to the Stat
Controller it ia decided that writ of man
date Eust be denied.