The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-09-30
THE MEDITERRANEAN POWERS.
The Strength or Toulon and tho Need or
Improving Gibraltar as u Naval Station.

The strength or TOu1On and tho Need OF
Improving Gibraltar as n Naval station.
WASHINGTON, Sept 29.-The beginning of n
mole and dockyard at Gibraltar shows that the
British Admiralty is determined TO answer very
promptly by practical action criticisms on the
lack of facilities at that place for the repair Of
. great fleet.
The hypothesis put forth by some experts Is
that of n great battle fought near the mouth OF
the Mediterranean for the control of that sea in
which a French fleet should get the better of tho
English. 1t is shown that such q result Is not
impossible. on account Of the interior line pos
sessed by France, which might allow her Toulon
and Brest fleets to concentrate against the Eng
lish vessels on the Mediterranean station be-
fore they could be reinforced by the home feet
from Portsmouth. In case Of such q defeat,
the British squadron would, 1t Is said, be in n
bad position, since at Gibraltar 1t would not
have adequate resources for %rehtting.
There have been two views as to England's
policy In the Mediterranean, In view of the re-
quirements for maintaining English power
there, under the possible attack Of France, sup
ported by Russia, and threatening the English
coast rs well as the British feet In the Medi-
terranean. Some have argued that the wisest
plan for England In such a case would be 10
leave Egypt tn take care OF herself. w. Laird
Cloves, a well-known writer on naval topics.
AAoo WIN " oALAAk vi tIO
gency of war, but of exchanging Gibraltar in ad-
vance for . new and better naval station In
Morocco on the other side Of the straits. Spain,
of course, would be only too glad to effect
such a change. and the ground on which IL is
supported by Mr.. Cloves Is that a fleet
taking refuge at Gibraltar would be under
fire from land batteries on Spanish territory,
and hence would be imperilled either by the al
lance Of, Spain with EnRland's enemies or by
the forcible seizure of Spanish territory around
Gibraltar by the latter. Mr.. Cloves has also
sessed by To1lon over Malta and Gibrsitsr. He
declares II 70 be the finest naval and military
Sosloo on .t shs e. Msd inssf,nissIr in He H. ts srys Son that
even II all the seas around France be strongly
held by the most comprehensive combination Of
over Malta and Gibraltar Is that Ti Il draws W n It's
supplies from a great country at its back,
brought by sea. Again. in its splendid shipbuild-
ing plants II Is superior to them. and can thus
Admiral Colomb. in this years number OF
at much length ths question of EnRland's su-
premacy In the Mediterranean. His conclusion
Is that she must maintain It there, II she wishes
70 rule the waves beyond; IL has sometimes
keep In that sea a British naval force equal TO
that OF France combined with the possibilities
OF Russia. But Admiral Colomb does not con-
slider such a force in time OF peace a matter OF
prime Importance, provided the entire available
f i%S . OF Grsss Britain e1mhTns + equal to tina. e those
should keep a very large feet in the Mediter.
ranean, an enemy might be tempted 10 make .
mere feint there and change its real attack to
the Channel The advantage OF keeping the
main British fleet in home waters is a double
one, because IL not only makes a very
large number OF vessels available for SER
vice anywhere where IL Is seen that they
are needed, but saves also the great expense OF
keeping an nOrmous fleet in the Mediterranean
This he believes TO be all the sounder policy from
the high, speed and rapid mobilization now
practicable, while he has little faith in the
possibility Of crushing a British Meet in the Med
terranean by A single unexpected blow.
As TO the Suez Canal, Admiral Colomb saws
that |" IL Is very well to use IL in peace time, but
should war arise between the British empire and
any strong combination OF European powers we
ought TO blow up and destroy the canal, evacuate
Egypt. and bestow the whole OF our power in
maintaining intact the fine course of our COM
merCe around the cape" or course, apart from
the strategic Importance OF the Mediterranean
the commercial value OF II to Great Britain is OF
the highest consequence.
The construction OF the mole and dock yard
at Gtbraltar appears, therefore. TO he thoroughly
justified by the necessities OF the case. II
England is To maintain her mmAn OF the
Mediterranean she must have adequate repair
and cOaling facilities there. With such accom-
modations she can venture TO keep a smaller
fleet there In time OF peaCethan she would like
10 rely upon IN a accumulation Of two great nAvies
against her.