The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1894-03-25
AT BRANDY STATION, VA.
TINE GREATEST CAv<LKT BATTLE
OF The PRESENT AGE.
xn,sre,tipx Description Of the Fight ana
What Led up 20 IL, by Coionei Won
gorese and Captain scheibert
Translated from the German for The Times
from q copy in the state Library
ued from last Sunday
Seventh Chspter--MiIitsr, Review ana ns-

prospects.
Tho battle was for the Confederaies.
nm impromptu affair. Stuart had made
mastery arrangements In regard TO the
observation Of the. Rappahannock. which
had been detailed to him, for he could
concentrate bis corps very easily and yet
keep his eyes on the river. Under these
circumstances he could expect that ad-
yanccd brjgades Jones' as well At BeV-
erly Ford as that OF Robertson's at kei-
Tvs Ford. would report 10 him promptly
the crossing Of the river. The position 81
the cavalry. therefore. behind river that
could only be fOrded In "A few places APP
pcarcd 10 be comparatively safe. Never
tbelcss. both brigades were taken by sur
prise. and even stuarts Headquarters
whlc. was located somewhat too close 10
the avant guards was compelled TO take
10 the horses In great hurry. 1t WAS
only due 10 the dcXterity OF the saliaht
quartcrmastcr. Major f1tzhueh mat ule
cntir. camp. all Of Stuarts papers ana
Schelborts diary did not fall into the
hands Of the enemy.
Plcasanton's plan was oleverly formed
admirable manner. The crossing Of the
river was executed so promptly as to
completely surprise Stuarts avant guards.
who only too late found an opportunity
10 take the proper measures, and who,
even then, could not make the necessary
reports quick enough. At Beverly Ford,
where Buford crossed the river. the entire
mounted artillery of Stuart would have
fallen into the hands Of the enemy II
Jones had not. with appreciauve presence
of mind and energy. bravey pushed for
ward what troops he could lay his hands
on, and. reinforced by Colonel Black. Sc
cured the minutes necessary Tor the ar
tillery 10 drive Off After the guns had
taken their position near st. James church
the further quick advancing Of Buford
gradually ceased. although the latter
had taken with him five regiments Of in
fantry. while the divisions of w. Lee
and Hampton came 10 the assistance OF
Jones outpost brigade.
At Kelly's Ford Gregg crossed the river
with his columns, almost unmolested by
Robertson. and was enabled TO undertake
his march without seeing any obstacle I'm
his way-the Third division for Brandy
Station and the Second for Stevensburs.
The obstacles which Stuart placed in the
latter's way, the two regiments Of Butler
and Wickham. were too weak TO stop the
march of such a superior force, and, be-
sides they did not watch the roads through
the Dumping woods closely enough.
Greeg therefore. who passed through
the woods with parts Of his Third cavalry
division. appeared entirely Unexpectedly
in Stuarts rear after leaving Dumping
woods which had completely covered his
movements.
The march Of the Second hostile cavalry
vision towards Stevensburg, even If II
was undertaken only TO gather informa
ton, was Of no purpose on account OF It's
narrow object. If Gregg had kept the
Two divisions together, or If he had sent
the second one over Carews Mil towards
Brandy, or If, with the advanced detach-
lnent of his own strong division. he had
developed true cavalrisuc spirit, he
could have prepared a fatal defeat for
Stuart's cavalry, something which perhaps
every Confederate cavalryman on the bat
tle-feld expected.
The divisions of William Lee, Hampton
and Jones were engaged in a heated COM
bat with Bufords columns. Fitz. Lees
division was further to the left, covering
Wellfords Ford, on the Hazel river.
Robertson still remained undecided near
Browns House. at the lower ford. Nearly
Stuarts entire cavalry was engaged In
the combat to such an extent that only
the roar Of cannon from the height in
formed them that the enemy had marched
around into their rear
As quick as the courers who brought
Stuart the information as to the opera
ton OF the enemy. Gregg himself, with
his sduadrons, could march into the rear
of the unsuspecting Confederates and run
them down in the country which was
covered with woods before his arrival
could he noticed: he could do this with SO
much better success. because he could
drive Stuarts fleeing cavalrymen into the
arms Of his own party. But he hesitated
ne waited for the Second division, and
left the daring and clear-sighted Stuart
the worst which a cavalry leader could
leave his enemy-time!
In view of the quality Of the Confed-
crate cavalry and the cavalristie spirit OF
its leaders. this moment decided the fate
of the day. Stuart proved to be equal
10 the occasion Although he acted
against the counsel of Won Borcke. who
advised him to occupy a concentrated po-
sition upon the heights, and committing
the fault Of engaging himself too seriously
in the front, without having sufficient re-
serve on hand. it must be said In his
excuse that he believed one brigade ana
two regiments which he had placed
against the right wing to be sufficient
guarantee against being surprised from
That direction. In his report he severely
censured the two regiments for not ar
resting the enemy but in the first place
fhey were sent I'm the wrong direction
(stevensburg). or they drifted there, and
on the other hand, they were too weak to
seriously resist the enemy. Besides he
believed 10 be able to dispose Of Fitz
Lees division at any moment
When the news reached him that the
enemy had marched around him and that
strong forces had entered his head
quarters 20 cut off his retreat, Stuarts
power and military genius reached the
very highest point. Notwithstanding his
perllous condition, he retained his cold
bloodedness and saw at a glance that
his only safeguard was In delaying the
enemy, and In attacking him with his
entire force. At once he threw against
the enemy the regiments OF Hartman and
White. and part OF his artillery. to bring
him 10 a standstil: then he left only the
most necessary troops in the engagement
with Buford. and with the balance Of the
columns OF Hampton and Jones he turned
about TO open a line of retreat towards
Culpeper. wherein he succeeded after a
hot combat.
only after Grcgg's columns had been
completely routed and disappeared upon
the road 10 the Rappahannock. Stuart
ordered his troops a second time TO turn
about. and after the successful attack Of
William Lee he threw his whole force
upon Buford. At this moment Munford
took an active part. who probably had
not understood the whole situation. II
the gallant General F'itz Lee, who was
laid up with a sore foot. had been the
leader OF the division instead Of Alunford.
the day would have ended still more
gloriously.