The morning call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1878-1895, 1894-10-13
THE KOREAN WAR.

The letter of ex-Miuister Chang Yen
Hoon to a personal friend in the State
Department at Washington gives a Chi
nese version of the Korean embroglio.
The Chinese, according to this authority.
the Korean Government to suppress re-
belIion. The work accomplished, they
proposed to return to their own country.
But while they were at work with the
Korean rebels the Japanese also landed
troops in Korea, as the treaties allowed
them to do, and occupied Seoul and other
points of importance. When the Chinese
prepared to evacuate the Japs refused 10
follow the example, though advised to do
so by the British Minister and their own
envoy 10 Seoul, thus creating the i'm
preston with the Chinese that they con-
templated the conquest Of Korea. Hence
the war, which, so far as it has gone, has
Injured TO the advantage of Japan.
Ex-Minister Chang. who now presides
over the Foreign Office in China, appears
to be solicitous to gain the sympathy of the
American people for his country. 1t does
not seem 10 occur TO him that outside SYM
pathy is apt TO gravitate to the winning
side, especially if the winners show pluck
and genius to overcome the odds against
them. Here is China, country with
4OO,0O0,OO0 population, engaged in a war
with Japan, with 100000. China is
rich. Japan is poor. Yet whenever the
two armies meet on the battlefield the
Chinese are worsted. The Emperor of
China states that the Chinese were out
numbered at Kung Chow, and that that
was the cause of their defeat Why were
they outnumbered? 1t was the business
of the Government al Picking TO have the
heaviest battalions at the point of contact.
The roads through Manchura and Chilli
cannot be worse than the roads in Korea.
Ii the Emperor's story is correct it is he
and lot General Yet Cheh Choo Tho ought
to be degraded.
The Emperor has nothing to say about
the naval victories of the Japanese.
These may have been exaggerated in the
dispatches; but it seems 10 be certain that
the japanese command The Gulf of
Pechili, and that their fleets reconnoiter
Wei-hai- wei and Port Arthur at their con-
venience. THIS is substantial advantage
which amounts to blockade of the outlet
of Northern China, and appears TO de-
monstrate the superiority of the japanese
at sea, and their capacity 10 girdle the
peninsula of Korea.
The dispatches concerning the move
ments of the land armies are as usual
conflicting and obscure. One dispatch
states that the japanese expect TO occupy
MOukden by the first week in November,
while another asserts that the Chinese are
in force on the north bank of the Yalu
River. Both dispatches come from JAP
anese sources. Yet unless they mean
that the japanese expect to brush away
the enemy in their front without trouble
or delay they are irreconcilable. M
Japanese general would move on Mouk-
den. leaving an entrenched enemy in his
rear commanding his source of supplies
and his line of communications.
1t will be observed that we have no in
formation OF any movements by the
Russians in Siberia. One day we hear that
Russia has concluded an alliance with
Japan by which tie whole or part of
Korea is 10 be coded TO Russia when the
Chinese have been expelled; day or two
afterward we hear that Russia is supply
ing the Chinese with arms. Both state
ments are evidently newspaper conjec-
lures, not worth much consideration. 1t
is quite possible that the grave complica-
tons which have resulted from Alexan-
der's state Of health have prevented the
Government at st. Petersburg from acting
with its usual energy; but it may be
taken for granted that the pending war
Will not be brought 10 a close until Russia
has secured a Korean terminus for the
Siberian railroad, at a SPOT which will
not be closed by ice in the winter season.