The sun., 1894-08-20

aud another, " u. even a little stronger, NJ
Bere Haven, on the southwest coast Of
ireland The Blue side, SEYMOUR's, had at
Queenstown a feet, &C" superior even to
the "B" Red feet and IL also had at the
shannon, u little north Of the =" b. fleet,
"D" fleet which was much the weakest
Of the four yet Of goOd speed. To
prevent the Blues. &C" aud D.
from simply closing in on "B !" aud
crushing il forthwith. forbidden helt,
thirty miles broad. and running indefinitely
southwestwsrl from the coast, was estab.
lished between Queenstown and Bere
Haven In other words. &C" could not yet
ut "B" there. aud d." which was near
"B," west Of the belt. was too weak to
! attack it, Accordingly what evidently
I happened was that ID" hurried north
| from the strong Red "B - fleet, and sue
I cep,led IN forming a junction with the &c"
| Blue fleet. which moved north for the pur
pose on tlIe other coast Of Ireland, through
the Irish Sea Belfast, Hu isolated Red port,
l. said Ia have been the point where the
combined Blue fleets won a decisive battle.
There the Reds had half n dozen torpedo
boats stationed 81 ~ to check the passing Of
the North Channel by a Blue feet. But the
Blues had, scattered along both coasts Of the
irish Sea, many more torpedo boats than the
Reds, besides various torpedo boat catchers;
and their concentration was not broken up.
Then they attacked in succession their
divided enemies.
But further and still more interesting
view of these maneuvres, it appears is in the
application Of their result to current Affairs.
From the moment that the forbidden belt
was arranged, rs in last years man9uvres,
it was evident that the operations were not
intended to simulate any that could actually
take place around Ireland. What, then,
were they intended to represent' ireland
practically had been made by this
impossible belt the extremity of
peninsula. What peninsula was in
mind, A survey Of the map Of Europe
showed possible analogies in Spain, In Italy,
in Greece, in Denmark, and 50 on, 80 that
possible situations in the Tyrrhene Sea, the
Adriatic, the Baltic, and elsewhere were
suggested. The one that perhaps COM
manded the most attention was on the
Spanish coast. With Ireland represent
ing the Spanish peninsula, the Blue
fleets on the interior lines might
be two French squadrons, one at Tou
Ion aud the other having its bases on the
Atlantic seaboard. The Red fleets in COM
bination stronger than the Blue, were the
English, on exterior lines, operating from
Portsmouth and at Malta. Belfast, a sin
gle, isolated harbor of the Reds, off which
the Blue formed junction, was Gibraltar;
and there England's Mediterranean feet and
her Channel feet were attacked successfully
and beaten in detail 1t may be fanciful
analogy; but when the distance of the Red
bases from the scene Of probable conflict is
considered, with the small amount Of terri
tory given to the Reds at Bere Haven, and,
above all, the isolated situation of Belfast,
certainly the hypothesis is striking.
What, then, is the further lesson =, The
dispatches say that Belfast was found un-
provided with facilities for reftting and re-
pairing the Red fleet This, being inter
preted, shows that Gibraltar should be
strengthened as port of refuge and repair
and n strategic point d'dppui. For some
time this policy has been under considera-
ton, one Of its fruits being the lengthening
of the Admiralty mole at Gibraltar. while it
has been lately proposed to spend several
millions In building dock there, extending
the forts, and otherwise making the place
more efficient as q naval base Less than
two months ago many members Of the
House Of Commons, Of all parties, held
conference, with closed doors, to consider
this question. The sentiment Of the meet
ing favored the project, and a committee
was appointed to talk with Lord RosEBERY
about 1t. There is, 1t is true, a coun-
ter proposition, namely, to abandon the
Rock, and give 1t up to Spain. 1t Is urged
that something valuable could be got for 1t,
sLak t.. II 81.
would be secured. Again, while it Is ad-
mitted that the place is not q pecuniary
charge on the Government, its real naval
value has been questioned. A well-known
naval writer, w. LAIRD CLOVES, has pointed
out in the Fortnt0htly Revteto that as the
anchorage is directly under the guns Of
the Spanish shore of the bay 1t could not be
secure In case Of war with Spain, until
those guns were silenced and that shore
was occupied. Moreover, Spain might be
tempted to unite with an enemy of England,
under promise Of having Gibraltar restored
to her as the price of success. Hence Mr..
CLOVES would have the Rock ceded to Spain,
in exchange for the Spanish possessions on
the other side of the Strait, in Morocco.
which would afford q good naval station.
But the prevailing opinion Is unquestion-
ably adverse to such trade, or to giving up
Gibraltar at all. Now, accordingly, comes
very striking object lesson in the need of
strengthening the station. British naval
maneuvres have of late years been directed
so largely to furthering projects of navy
legislation In Parliament that it Is easy TO
imagine the arranging of this years mimic |
war with a view to pushing through the |
Gibraltar dock project Whether 20 intend |
ed or not, it is likely to aid that project.