The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1894-08-24

statement of the facts concerning the
various leases aud their renewals is
necessary.
On July IL, 1902, the town Of
Bloomsbury, by committee of its
Council accepted lease in writing
from the Land Improvement Com.
pany, for Oak Grove Park for the
term of one year. commencing on the
sth day of June, 1899, for the rental
of five hundred dollars with the option
Of renewal. This lease was made and
considered as a renewal of the former
lease between the same parties exc
cuted in 1891. On May 5th, 1893,
motion was carried in the Council to
again lease the Park on the same
terms as those of the subsequent year
However, no renewal of the lease
was ever actually made pursuant to
this motion. There the matter seems
to nave been dropped and affairs have
remained in this condition ever since.
No rent has been paid the Company
for the years 1902 and 1893.
Under this state of facts we are of
the opinion that there was no lease
with the Land Company for 1898, and
that even if the town had used the
Park for that year, which is disputed,
and if the Land Company be entitled
to recover at all, it could not claim
from the town rent under a lease not
in existence, but would only recover
for 1893 on quantum meruit, that
is, for what the use of the Park would
be reasonably worth.
However, more important ques.
ton rises in this connection, viz Can
the Land Improvement Company re-
cover from the town in any eventr If
our answer to the former question is
correct if the contract or lease enter
ed into by the Town Council on July
IL, 1892, was ultra wires, that is, be-
yond the power of the Council to
make, then their contract in said lease,
binding the town to the payment of
rent was void and of no effect. Let
me quote from the work of Judge
Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
Sec. 933: Upon a contract which is
ultra wires in the true sense of that ex-
preston that is, upon contract re-
lating to matters wholly outside of the
chartered powers Of the corporation,
there is no liability upon the contract,
and the corporation is not estopped
from setting up the defence" 1t
would be rank injustice to permit the
corporate officers to bind their princi-
pal, the town, by contracts they ne yer
had any power to make.
Again, it is general and funda-
mental principle Of the law that all
persons contracting with municipal
corporation must at their peril In
q,ttre into and ascertain the nature
and ertent of tie po,oer of the cor.
poration or its officers to make the
contract; and a contract beyond the
scope Of the corporate power is void,
although it may be under the seal of
the corporation. (See Dillon on
Nun. Cor. Sec. 447).
In contracting, therefore, with the
town the Land Company was bound
to know whether the municipal officers
had the power to bind their corpora
ton by such lease. If the Land
Company was mistaken in this it was
at its own peril and loss. Although
the town officials may have taken pos.
session of and permitted the public
to use the Park, the Land Improve
ment Company cannot compel the
tax payers to pay rent therefore, if
the conduct of those officials in TAX
ing possession of this real estate was
without authority and the Land Com
pany knew, or was bound to know,
that their act was in that respect
illegal.
In word, if, as we have already
held, the lease of July IL, 1892, and
Its attempted renewal of May 4th,
1898, were acts beyond the power of
the corporate officers, then their con-
tract is not binding on the town and
there can be no recovery by the Land
Company on the lease.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED keller,
Aug. I6, 1894. Solicitor.
p. S.-We are aware that this