The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1894-03-16
Tho United States and the Brazilian
Rebellion.

Although Admiral MELLo has not yet SUR
rendered the two war ships under his COM
mand, and although the revolt in Rio
Grande do Sui may last for some time
longer. the attempt to overthrow the Gov
eminent headed by President PEIxoTo has
evidently collapsed. To what extent may
the failure OF the robels be attributed to the
firm attitude OF the United States
Soon after the outbreak of the insurrec-
tion. 1t became known that some OF the Eu-
ropean powers were in favor OF acknowl-
edging the rebels as belllgerents. and this
feeling was reflected In the conduct OF the
commanders OF many Of the foreign war
ships in the harbor Of Rio de Janeiro. The
English naval officers went SO far as practi-
cally to concede belligerent status to the
insurgents. by refusing to make good the
unquestionable right Of English merchant
vessels to traverse at will the harbors Of a
friendly power. The indications OF sympa-
thy. both on the part Of naval officers at
the spot. and on that OF the diploma
lists representing certain European powers.
we're multiplied and intensified after Admit
raj DA GAMAs avowal OF a wish to see the
monarchy restored. II the foreign friends
of the rebels had managed to carry their
ligerency. two important and probably de-
cisive results would have followed. In the
first place. the rebels would have estab-
lished blockade not only at Rio dc Janeiro
but at Para and Santos. thus cutting of
the PRIxoTo Government from its prn-
cipal financial resources. Deprived OF tho
revenue from the chief Custom Houses.
President PEIxoTo would have found 1t hard
60 t.in
and, in all likelihood, impossible to make
good the losses incurred In battle or through
sickness and desertion. In the second
place. the Brazilian Government would
have been unable. even had 1t possessed the
money to pay for them. to purchase ves-
sells In any country which had recognized
the rebels as belligerents.
That the status Of belligerency was never
acquired by the Brazilian rebels was due to
the fact that the United States not only re-
fused the desired recognition. but taxed all
the resources OF It's diplomacy to prevent
any such proceeding on the part OF other
foreign Governments. 1t Ii truth Of which
President PRIxoTo is perfectly aware. that.
during the last six months. when his own
fate and that Of republican institutions In
Brazil were at stake. he has had no we'll
wishers In places OF power In Europe. and
that nothing but the steadfast friendship OF
the United States averted concerted con-
cession OF the rights OF belligerents to the
rebels. which would probably have assured
to them success. 1t Is not likely that either
he or any OF those Brazilians who are sin
cere republicans. will ever underrate the
magnitude OF their Indictment to this
country. They are as likely to forget the
sympathy with the rebel advocates Of mon
archy which the British naval officers at
Rio took no trouble TO disguise.
The service which we rendered. In their
hour OF need. to the PEIxoro Government
and to the cause OF republican institutions
In Brazil ought to have a profound and
permanent effect on the future commercial
and political relations OF that country with
the United States.