The morning call., 1894-10-26
pot by force, when ordered to do so. make him

that IN all PROBABILITY portion or his brigade
would be ordered on active duty. and lie should
have directed his coionels to place their regi.
ments 10 condition for active service His
commissary could have purchased hard tack
and canned meats in bulk and the rations could
have been distributed on the train.
We believe that the attempt TO take the depot
on the 4th of July would have been a success
had the San Francisco troops marched directly
to that point instead ofmarching TO Sixth and
L streets for breakfast. General Dickinson
neglected the most important duty of COM
mander. that OF supplying his command with
subsistence. He was responsible for the alb
sence OF supplies In his command. General
Dickinson fully understood the object of the
movement OF the troops TO Sacr mento and of
the march upon the depot His instructions
received jus! before leaving for the depot were
TO cooperate With and support General Sbee-
han. These Instructions must have been un-
derstood by him to mean such action with the
troops uader his command as would best &C.
comDllsh the object In view.
After arriving at the depot he remained at
his post In his brigade until he was overcome
by the heat, his prostratlop at the time being
serious. On arrival at the depot lie formed his
brigade in street-column order. placing his
troops in four squads, and during the time he
was In command no movement or disposition
OF his command was made or undertaken. If
an attack was expected or if one had been
made by the mob his position was faulty, for
he was no longer In the streets but in an open
space. and the line OF fire was the front of but
one company. He should have placed bis CON-
mand in formation TO have MADE or resisted an
attack. The fact that his was not the leading
brigade is no excuse.
In the question OF cooperation with General
Sheehan the court cannot find General DicKin-
son entirely TO blame. Having command OF the
Second Brigade lie was permitted to exercise
his judgment, and when he received the mes
sage from General Sheenan he was entitled to
demand orders or Instructions as TO the nature
OF the movement. Ii was also permissible for
him TO ask for orders from the major-general,
as he knew that General Dimond was in COM
mand. General Dickinson was in command of
strong and efficient force. and 1t was within
his province, if In his judgment II was advIs-
able, TO deploy one of his regiments and ad
vance against the depot. And IL would I'M
doubleday have been TO the best interests of
the service if be had ordered the First Regi-
ment OF Infantry 10 take the depot when he re-
ceived the request from General SheehaD. il
appears from General Dickinson's own state
ment that he sent several OF his staff officers to
General Dlmond 10 obtain permission 20 make
a movement with a view 10 taking the depot
| from the east end. Thereafter General DiclIln-
son was requested by General Sheehan to make
such movement and then General Dickinson
| said he must have the permission OF General
Dimond before doing so. Upon this fact bring
reported to General Dlmond he directed Gen
| eral Dickinson 10 confer and cooperate with
| General Sheehan. In view OF all the facts.
| General Dickinson is to be criticized for his
neglect 10 make any movement toward the
| depot. It is true the order from General
| Dimond was not that he should comply with
| the request OF General Sheeban, but the order
! as given Immediately following General Shee-
/ hams requesD must have been understood by
! General Dickinson.
Colonel Sullivan was present at the conSuIta-
ton held in San Francisco on June 80 and was
| then advised of the necessity Of preparing his
command for service. He Is responsible for
the lack OF preparation OF his regiment. 1t
would have been an easy matter for him 10
have directed his cOmmissary 10 procure hard.
! tack and canned meats sufficient for one or two
DAYS rati0ns. Colonel Sullivan must be criti
cized for his actions while in command of the
| Second Brigade on July 4. The fact thai
| General Dickinson had been overcome by hea
was reported TO Colonel Sullivan about 1 &c
p. NJ and be was ordered TO take command Of
the Second Brigade. Immediately after the
command devolved upon him lie received ar
order from the majOr-general commanding hin
| TO advance against the depot. to use force anC
10 clear the depot with bayonet or with lead il
necessary These orders were positive ana re
! CURED implicit obedience. but instead of exc
cutting his orders he Immediately left his com
/ mand went TO the headquarters of the major
. general and urged that the order be reseinded
stating that his troops were not in condition t
take up the offensive.
Whatever his ideas were he should have
obeye1 his orders but instea OF doing so b,
left his command, went TO the major genera
and afIerward made a speech to the strikers
The court finds that he was at fault in tire,
ibings-omitting to carry out the order OF hi
commanding officer. leaving his command afte
receiving The order and violating military Law
in making speech to a mob, which is expressl!
prohibited Regulation 1o1O
| When Colonel Sullivan waited or Genera
|, Dimond in his headquarters General Dimont
. then repeated the orders to him and directed
Colonel Sullivan TO take the depot by force ant
to use lead II necessary. General Dmond aIst
, informed Colonel Sullivan that written order
had been received from the United States Mar
shall authorizing the use of those extrem
, | measures.
Colonel Sullivan, instead Of complying wit
. these orders thus repeated, told General ID
mond the men were completely Frustrated b.
the heat and were becoming demoralized, ant
, that "their condition was not such as 10 rende
il safe TO adopt offensive measures at tina
time.'' Colonel Sullivan was then directed b,
Major General DimOnd 10 report these facts |,
upon told the Marshal that he thought it ba
, policy at that time 20 adopt any offensive meas
: ureS and also advised against any offensiv
, operations and that the lives Of his own troop
, would be sacrificed.
Colonel Sullivan addressed the crowd an,
asked hem II there would be any objection Of
their part to taking the members OF his req
, ment into the depot out of the sun. The crow
not agreeing TO this he withdrew. This ad
. dress was made from the top of a cab. A
hereinbeiore sci forth the statement in regar
TO the decentralization of the troops was no
] well founded and Colonel Sullivan is TO b
severely criticized. not only for his refusal I
obey orders, but the representations so mad
by him TO the maj0r-general and the Marsha
! undoubtedly resulted IN the declaring OF tn
; armistice by the Marshal and In the cessation
, of active operations
Major Jansen Of the First Regiment ais
urged the maj0rgeneral not to bring on a cor
. fict and stated that the troops were demoralize
aud unreliable. This statement is not born
, out by the testimony and Major Jansen is ais
, to be severely criticized IN this respect
! Colonel Barry was also present at the consu
! tatoD held June 80 and Is 10 blame for Oh
want of preparation In his regiment, and I'll
/ remarks that have been made In reference
the commlssary stores OF the Second Brgad
and the First Regiment are equally Applicant
, | TO the Third Regiment. There was also gres
. lack of discipline in portions OF the Third Reg
, ment, and some of the field and compan
officers did not seem TO have had their me
. under proper control.
. Colonel Nunan remained at the depot viii