The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1894-10-22

when sitting as an appellate Court sat
in banco and heard exceptions from
the Supreme and Circuit Courts pre-
sided ever by single Justice
The judiciary Act of 1892 left the
Supreme Court almost solely an ap-
pellate court to sit In full bench, and
took from it nearly all original Jurls-
diction, TO which class of jurisdiction
the granting of new trials properly
| belongs. At the same time the Cir
cult Court on this island was
reestablished with powers substantl-
ally as large as those previously
possessed by the Supreme Court
when sitting at term as a court OF
original Jurisdiction presided over
by a single Justice, which, as We have
| seen, exercised the power of granting
new trials in criminal cases. The
powers of the Circuit Courts on the
other islands were also enlarged to
nearly, If not quite, the extent OF
| those granted to the Circuit Court
on this island. All the Circuit Courts
were also given all such powers, be-
sides those expressly enumerated as
''may be necessary for the promotion
Of justice In matters pending before
them" (Sec 42) Without going in
to greater detail, it is obvious that
the Legislature intended, and
sufficiently declared their intention,
that the Circuit Courts were to be
after January 1, 1898, if they had
not been before, courts OF general
Jurisdiction, and not courts whose
jurisdiction is precisely and fully
defined In the statutes" 1t intend
ed to raise the courts of higher orig
inal Jurisdiction on the other islands
to the level OF that on this island
rather than reduce the latter to the
| level of the former. The motion to
dismiss the exceptions is overruled.
Defendants first ground of excep-
ton is that the verdict was contrary
| to the evidence. This consisted in
part of an extra judicial confession
alleged to have been made by de-
PENDANT. 1t is contended that evil
| dence Of such confession is not
sufficient for conviction unless zorro
borated by other proof of the corpus
deficit, and that there was no such
other proof Conceding for the pur
pose of this case what does not ap
pear to have been invariably held In
other courts, that the principle of
| law contended for is correct, we are
of the opinion that such corrobora-
tive evidence was adduced in the
present case. Indeed, there was
positive and undisputed evidence
| that the cane field was set fire to in
three distinct places at about the
same time near midnight and that on
the following day there was found
near by some wicking which smelled
oily and had matches rolled up in it.
| This was sufficient evidence from
which the jury might infer the corpus
deficit, that is, malicious burning of
the field of cane by some one. See
Am. & Eng. Enc. vol. 4, p. 800. and
vol. 3, p. AS, n. 2. The alleged con-
! fession of the defendant was then
properly introduced to connect him
with the corpus deficit. There was
also another evidence, of little value
it is true, tending to connect the de-
| PENDANT with the corpus delictt. A few
days before the fire the defendant,
who was a contract laborer of the
company whose cane was burned,
/ had been arrested and fined for re
| fusal to work, and there was dds
puted) evidence that at the time of
/ the fire he was not at his quarters
| but was soon afterwards at the place
! of the fire. The guilt of the accused
was not established rs clearly as
might be, but there was sufficient
| evidence to sustain the verdict.
A second ground of exception was
the refusal of the trial Judge to
! allow defendants counsel to ask a
witness for the prosecution, with a
view to discrediting him, under what
name he lived while in Hilo. Evi-
/ depce to be admissible for the pur-
pose of affecting the credibility OF a
witness must be such as bears direct.
" upon his character for truth and
veracity Otherwise it would be ir-
relevant. 1t Is not competent il it
merely tends to disgrace the witness.
We do not see how the fact that a
witness lived under different name
at another time and place could
affect his credibility,-even if it
would necessarily tend to disgrace
him. See Wharton, Or. Ev. Sec
1856; 1 Green !. Ev. Sec. 45S.
Two months after the trial the de-
PENDANT filed second motion for g
new trial based upon alleged newly
discovered evidence consisting main
ly of the statement of a japanese
witness for the prosecution that the
testimony given by him at the trial
was false. The motion was properly
overruled, because not filed within
ten days of the trial. The King V
Reeve, supra. Nor coald it be sus-
tanned on the merits. The most tina
the affidavits in its support show il
that one of the witnesses perjureo
himself at the trial and this is shown
only by the statement of the perjurel
himself. On a second trial, shoulC
one be granted, the prosecution
would presumably proceed without
calling the witness, whose testimony
was mainly cumulative or CORRIDORS
tory. and there is no reason to sup