The morning call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1878-1895, 1894-08-29
THE JAPANESE WAR.

The story comes from Toxic that the
japanese are not content with waging war
in Korea, but clamor for an invasion of
China. The latest report is that they have
actually landed force north of the Peiho
River for march on Picking. The idea is
perhaps good one. True, it might have
seemed more logical if it had followed a
Japanese victory in Korea, and not jap
anese defeat. But perhaps the battles in
the peninsula are mere affairs of outposts
which 90 not go to the root of the contrO-
versy. The two great powers of
Eastern Asia are fighting not for a strip of
territory. but for supremacy; whichever
wins in the present conflict will hence
forth be dominant. The japanese say,
and European travellers corroborate the
assertion, that the Japanese army is
superior in discipline. equipment ana NOR
ale 10 the Chinese force; IL it is. the
sooner it carries the war into China the
better.
An army seeking to invade Northern
China must attack it by way of the Peiho
River; it must move oD Picking from base
at TientsiD. Hence it must have the COM
mand of the Gulf of Pechili, and it must
be strong enough to reduce the Taku forts
at the mouth of the Peiho. The recent
reconnaissance of the Chinese works at
Using Hai-Wei by the japanese feet was
probably intended to feel the strength of
the Chinese in the gulf Assuming that
the japanese control that body of water,
which does not yet appear. the next Ques-
ton is the reduction OF the Taku forts.
In May, 1858. Lord Elgin reduced them by
a flank march and an attack in the rear
and again in August, 1860. the combined
French and English forces landed at Pey
Tang, twelve miles from Taku, and
stormed the works. Ii is understood that
since then they have been greatly
strengthened and armed with the latest
improved guns of large calibeI. The north
beach of the Peiho is mud bank, in
which transports are apt to ground, and
through which troops cannot easily be
landed. To attack the forts. the Japanese
would have to follow the example Of the
others in 1860, to land at some distance.
and make their attack from tho rear. II
the forts are garrisoned by reliable force
led by competent engineers, they could
only be reduced after siege, during
which the besiegers would be exposed to
attacks from a Chinese relieving force.
AoSutuluR 16AG btldb tub 1OflS are TAKEN
nothing but defeat in the open could pre-
vent the japanese marching to Tientsin
and thence to Picking. In 1860 the allies
met with no resistance after they bad
passed TRku. Chinese detachments fioated
on their front and on their TANKS, but
were too wise to give battle. Picking fell
without the loss of a life. The question
of the hour is whether the Chinese are
more formidable in a military point of
view now than they were thirty-four years
ago. If not, an enterprising japanese
general might bring the war to close by
a glorious peace signed at Picking before
the Peiho freezes over. But Taku is a
hard nut to crack, and 1t is not likely that
the Japanese have troops enough to bottle
it up as the Germans bottled up Bazaine at
Metz. 1t is also probable that China has
improved her ornaments within the last
thirty years.
Two or three days ago dispatch stated
that the Chinese army under TUT, which
defeated the japanese On the 18th, had
pushed on and won another victory back
of Chemulpo. But no one attaches much
faith to these dispatches until they have
heen pOnflrmed