Morning journal and courier., 1894-03-20
MEADE AT FREDEnuoKsBUHe.


 Franklin Thinks Burnside Rorgo
 His Promise of Support.
 From the Philadelphia Inquirer
 The following letter has been received from General Franklin:
 HARTFORD, Conn, Feb. %, 1894. To the Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer:
 have received your letter of the 10th inst, askicR me to state the reasons why the advance of Neade's division was not supported ct the battle of Fredericksburg on December IS, 1869. The battle of Fred ericksburg was Q source of nearly endless recrimination among the actors in 1t more than generation ago, and was at that time thoroughly fought over in the newspapere. ! All of the reports on both aides are in ex- | istence in the "War of the Rebellion, Ot- | ficial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,n . work that can bs found in any public library and In many private hbra- Ties. Whatever information is contained in 1t, dated not too long after the fight, is reliable.
 Under the orders that he'd received from General Burnside, about o'clock a. m. on the day of the fight, I ordered Gen. eral Reynolds to attack with General Msade's diviaion, supported by General Doubledsy's and Genelal Gibbons divis ions. believe that General Reynolds did all that man could do to carry out thii order in the letter and the spirit. But General Doubledsy's division was attacked tby the enemy before it arrived at support ing distance from Aeade's division, snt General Gibbons division was not stroni enough to withstand the attack that 1t re ceived. So Meade's division with it wa driven back.
 The order of General Burnside directe,
 the attack with . division at least vel
 supported. This was by no means the or
 der which had been led to believe was t
 be issusd. He was at my headquarters tn night before and promised me that I shoul , , have an order before midnight which woul
 enable me to concentrate during the nigh F not only the three divisions that hay 5 named, but in addition General Stonemsn' , l corps, consisting of Birney's and Sicklel ] divisions, at that time on the other side c 3 the river. Such an order would have ens q bled me to attack at daylight with fore . that believed would have been irresist r ble. But, alasi the order did not com'
 and although Generals Reynolds and w. I Smith and myself waited until long afts
 midnight for the orders, sending sta
 officers one after the other during tt
 whole night to learn when 1t would com + received nothing from him until - o'clock in the morning, and then the ord, 2 was silent about the promise of the nigl before.
 In fact, believe now that he forgot : soon as he left me, that he had made sue s promise, believing during the who :. night that there was only some unantic ; pated detention. When he was in the Il of leaving me the evening before, when V was quite dark, I asked him whether l. might begin the concentration at oncs ar z he declined to give me the permission, 6 s suring me that should have the order | d fore midnight. Nothing will account f s the omission to give the order except t v theory that he forgot that he had pror ised 1t. Had the order been given as h 's 8 right to suppose it would be, there wou n have been five divisions to make the alta ). instead of division at least well su q ported" the language of the order as
 came. Respectfully yours,
 u w R FRANKIIN.