Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1894-02-17

llss7-r-- Napoleon, both inter
SsM3Sy ~ esting and appropri-
~ FSa ate which might have
-, sscEs;1 Il been profitably heed
sae. sa'1'y which shout; Ssals
not be unheeded even
now 1t was while
Napoleon was in retirement, with ample
time and leisure to mediate over the
causes which led to his meteoric rise and
/ fall, that he proclaimed as general mill
tary principle the absolute necessity OF
terrifying material capitals. He even de-
clared that 1900 artillerymen and 10000
rational guard men could defend any duly
fortified city against an attacking army
of 100000 men, and went so far as to adj
nit that had Vienna, Berlin and Madrid
been fortified the countries of which they
are the capitals would have been preserved
from the fatal results of his campaign of
1906 and 1sos; and that had Paris been
properly fortified in 1914 his own empire
would have been saved from overthrow.
While, of course, the theories or refiec-
! tions of Napoleon in exile not calcu-
| lated to stir up any excitement in these
days of American progress, the thought
| nevertheless suggests itself that as war
| strategy changes but little in even a
hundred years. a glance at our own ma
tional defenses might be interesting.
Washington Today Defenseless.
AS a matter of fact, although we have
| no less authority than that Of the famous
| lieutenant general of the southern con-
| federacy (Early) for the statement that in
1854 Washington. duly garrisoned and alert,
was we'll nigh impregnable against any at
lacking army. Washington today is as de-
| f,v,r IDrfss o1
walked without hindrance into our midst
to burn and pillage public archieves, or
as in 1861, when our streets, after the dis
astrous battle of Bull Run. were filled by
/ fleeing federal soldiers, who, if not followed
within the city by the confederates, was
due to the fact that the southern army
was as badly demoralized in victory as the
| Union men had been in defeat. There were
| hundred defenseless approaches then
now, forming natural doorways to the capt.
| tai. Indeed, there was not fortincation
or earthwork then, north, east or west of
| Washington, and those that were subse-
/ quently erected, have, in the past twenty
eight years, been allowed to go to rack and
rum, apparently without any thought OF
past necessity or future eXigency. Nobody
in particular, perhaps, can well be held
responsible for tnis inasmuch as the opin-
! ion seems to prevail that the policy of
maintaining the field works of the last war
is unnecessary in times of peace.
| At this period but two army garrisons
are maintained in the immediate vicinity
of Washington, both of them being nothing
more than mere military barracks, one for
| the accommodation of four troops OF cav
airy at Fort Myer on the Virginia shore of
| the Potomac and the other for Iive batter
les of artillery on the water front of the
city. There are however, siXty-eght mold
| ering mounds extending circularly thirty
seven miles around W ashington, each one
| of which, though fast decaying, marks the
spot where some fort or battery was To-
| Gated, and altogether belonging 10 that gen.
eral system OF exterior defenses which was
evolved from conditions and practical ex-
perence that would seem to entitle il to
more serious consideration at all times. The
war OF the rebellion, 1t is argued, was one
| OF greater magnitude on land IMAM TINS gov
| eminent is ever likely TO engage in again.
We had powerful enemy OF our own hlnd,
| making Tor our national capital, which,
much 10 our embarrassment. was situated
on the border line or the strongest southern
state whose territory was TO be the chief
| theater OF the war. livery inch of the
ground in and about Washington was as
| we'll known to southern leaders as to north
em defenders. rhe situation was of vital
Importance, demanding the quickest con-
| Ception ana SWltteSt execution of the most
effective system of defense which any capt.
tai in the world ever stood in need OF. Even
in the very beginning of the war reserved
forces on the Union side were hastily amas-
| sed 10 Withstand hIeatened invasion of a
| victorious southern army. and in May, 1861
a small force OF United states troops cross
ed the Potomac and began the erection of
offensive works. These works were neces-
| sarily weak, being designed at first TO pro-
tect the deDoucheS ~ the Long bridge and
| hold
| Virginia side, preparatory to the occupation
| of permanent fortified points on surround
ing heights. Necessarily, these works We're
| hurTIedly thrown up without regard to any
preconceived plan of defenses, and like all
isolated field works, even with the best ar
! rangcment for thanking, could not be re-
lied npor against assault.
An Engineer Commission.
1t was soon found, therefore, that the
danger had not been met and yet the mill
| tary engineers Were handicapped by the
action of Congress, which. in appropria ting
Sl50,Go0 for the payment for the hasty works
already established. specifically prohibited
any part of the money being applied to any
new work. Congress, like many people in
the north, believed then that the war was
TO be of too short duration TO require en-
larsed defcnseS OF the capital of the ma
ton. But the engineers OF the army show
ed the Importance OF additional works need
t!onal capital. Military leaders argued tina,
If Washington should fall into the hands Of
even a small southern army it might be
held long enough at least to win for the
confederacy recognition by leading foreign
governments, the moral effect of which no
man could tell. 1t was, indeed. time OF
vital emergency, when the iron hand and
strong viii of Secretary Stanton were need
ed. In the autumn OF 1852, despite the pro
hibitCry act Of Congress against the cree
ton of any new fortifications around Wash
ington, Secretary Stanton appointed a COM
mission of such eminent military men as
Gems. Totten, Meigs, Barry, Barnard and
Cullum to report upon the completion OF
the forts and SUN cheney of the general ex.
terror defenses of the city. That commits
sion was the author of the defense line OF
the rational capital as II existed at tn.
close Of the war, and for which the Union
cause had Secretary Stanton and his mill.
tary advisers alone TO thank
1t was a system. according to an eminent
military writer, wherein, when completed
the works either reciprocally Ranked each
other, or at least the approaches to any one
or to any part of the line were well swept
by artillery or musketry fire from other
parts. The system, of course, lacked those
features which are to be found in estab
, lished permanent Notifications elsewhere
For instance, hurriedly erected as the ma
| jority of the Notifications were in tn,
haste and excitement of impending danger
there was lack of coordination of plan.
and symmetry of designs, which, in tn,
latter years of the war, necesstated add
| tional work to make the earlier forts con