Butler citizen. [volume] (Butler, Pa.) 1877-1922, 1893-05-26
The Crisis in Germany.


the truest sense Of the term, appealed to
chosen representatives. In making this
appeal the government addresses itself to
the national feeling. Its argument is sim
pie. The German Empire is situated in
the centre of the European continent, be-
tween two great powers, France and Rus
sia, which may be assumed to be unfriend-
ly and watching for favorable chance for
q concerted attack. In case of such an at
tack Germany would have to carry on "a
war with two fronts"--one to the west
against France, and the other to the east
against Russia. The armies of each of
these powers are superior in numbers to
to that OF Germany. The German army
may excel either Of them in the quality Of
the men, in instruction, drill, and disci-
pline. But combination of the hostile
forces wonld make their military strength,
if not irresistible, at least highly dangerous.
Germany has indeed fortified herself by
the compact with Austria and Italy, the
famous Triple Alliance, which, in case of
an attack from hostile powers, would CO.
operate with her. But Italy is in q most
deplorable condition, and Austria may at
the critical moment find herself embarrass-
ed by the distracting animosities of the
different nationalities within her own bor-
ders, the powerful Slavic element sympa-
thizing with Russia and France. Even if
the allies could be counted upon for faith
full and energetic cooperation in the dread
ed emergency, their military forces joined
to those of Germany would not bring up
the total to the combined strength of
Russia and France The peace of Europe
is maintained mainly by the certainty that
Russia and France, if they attacked Ger
many would find their match, or more
than their match. As soon as they have
reason to think that Germany with her
allies will not be able to resist them, the
temtation for an onslaught Will be danger
ously seductive, and the existence OF the
German Empire will be in great peril. In
asmuch as France and Russia have been
constantly augumenting their ornaments,
this temtation exists now. 1t Is therefore
imperatively necessary that the German
Empire, which will have to bear the brunt
of the conflict, should correspondingly in
crease its forces as q guarantee of peace.
This is the position of the government.
Assuming the premises as to the relative
strength of the armies to be correct, this
argument is not without weight. We heal
| it frequently said that if Germany would
only restore Alsace and Lorraine to France
| the French would at once cease to be hos
tile to Germany, and the situation would
| be relieved of the strain. This is a mis-
take. If Alsace and Lorraine were thu:
restored, the French would take it a, 6
demonstration not of conciliatory feeling
but of conscious weakness on the part o.
| the Germans, and the chances are ten t.
one that they would then revive their ole
| demand for the frontier of the Rhine al
l the natural froutier of France" avai
| themselves of the first favorable opportun
l ity to get it and thus to wipe out the dis
/ grace of their defeat of the war of 1870 ant
1871. But even if this were not so, the
l decisive fact would still remain that it wal
not alone the acquisition of the two prov
inces by Germany, but mainly the lorna
l ton of the German Empire as the leading
uower of Europe, that has excited the bit
ter jealousy and resentment of France ant
Russia also. The dissolution of the Ger
man Empire, the breaking up OF Germany
l into a number of comparatively powerlesl
states, is the real object of their desire, anc
until this object is accomplished their hos
tile feeling will not be essentially changed
In fact, the acquisition of Alsace and Lor
raine, with the two great fortresses OF Met
and Strasburg, has 80 strengthened the de
fensive position of Germany on its western
frontier Us greatly discourage French at
tack, and it is therefore rather guaranty
of peace than an Indictment to war. What
ever there may be of dissafection to Ger
manv in Alsace and Lorraine is, in thi
respect, of little consequence, for the TIVE
fortresses would be of no less importance
even if they were considered as two yer,
strong positions held in the enemy's coun
try. The restoration of the two province
to France is, therefore, from the German
point of view, entirely out OF the ques
ton.
THUS the position of the German Empir
between two hostile neighbors is such a
l to render O state of constant preparatlel
necessary, unless the Germans be wlllin.
to give up their existence as united ma
| ton. which, of course, they are not, or un
less France and Russia be willing to Civ,
up their unfriendly attitude, and demon
strate this willingness by reducing thei
ornaments, which they do not. This is 81
generally recognized by all classes OF th'
German people except the Socialists, ant
/! even by many of these, that the appeal o
the government would be of almost certain
effect we're not the question whether tn
present military organization OF German.
Is really sufficient or insufficient for al
probable emergencies calling forth seriou
| differences of opinion. The burdens Inn
posed upon the people by the constan
augmentation OF the military and naya
| establishments are very heavy, and I'M
mad race bewteen nations for military su
periority opens prospect OF an almost IN
definite increase Of the load. The opposition
to the government takes the ground tina
such an increase is justificable only Wnel
| it IL necessary; that the German army,
shorter term of service be introduced I
permit the drilling Of larger number 9
men in given period, is large enough Z
meet all requirements; and that the splri
of militarism in the government Is aireau,
strong enough to cause serious apprehen
sions. and ought not to be permitted TO be
come still more powerful. Such Rrgu
ments are calculated to have great effec
with a people groaning under heavy tax
Patton, and not a little disturbed in thei
confidence as to the future by the frequen
surprises to which the young emperor
in the habit of treating them.
The opposition consists mainly OF ID
Socialists, majority of the advanced LiU
erals, and a part of the Centre or Catboli
party. Although these political element
90 far asunder as to most other question
of public interest. yet their concurrent ei
forts will in all probability render it impos
sible to the government to get malorlt.
in favor of the army bill in tbs next heich
stag. What then will happen nobody ca
foretell. The young Emperor has pnsilei!
declared that he will have the increase Q
the military establishment he demands
whether the next Reichstag sssents to !
or not. This declaration, amounting a.
most to threat, is likely t, add to the de
termination and also to the strength OF Tn
opposition, and thus to have an effect con
trary to that which it was intended to pro
duce. That the Emperor is at present re
solved, as he expressed himself, to 'stak
all in his power to obtain the enactment o
the measure" hardly admits of doubt
How far he will go when the stake is prac
ticalty before him, and when he has to fac
popular discomfort in more portentot
form than that in which he has so far seel
it, is more questionable. In any event, ]
may be said that Germany is rapidly drift
ing into the most dangerous crisis of he
internal affairs since the formation OF th'
empire.