The state chronicle., 1893-06-21
Longstreet on Lee.
leans Times Democrat.

"Well," responded the General,
refectively, "perhaps the second
battle OF Manassas was, all things
considered, the best tactical battle
Gen. Lee ever fought. The grand
strategy of the campaign also was
fine, and seems to have completely |
deceived Gen. Pope. Indeed, Pope |
failed to comprehend Gen. Lees !
purpose from start to finish, and Oh
August 3Oth, when was preparing
to push him off the Warrenton Pike,
he still imagined us to be in retreat,
and his most unfortunate move
ments were based on that false as
sumption"
1 said to the General that I
thought the world generally would
agree with him as to the campaign,
and then asked him in which OF the
battles he thought Lee displayed his
poorest generalship. He promptly
answered
"Although it is perhaps mere su-
pererogation to express my views,
yet I will give them to you for what
they are worth. I have always
thought the preliminary disposi-
tions to capture Harper's Ferry, in
volving as corollary the battles Of
South Mountain and Antietam, we're
not only the worst ever made by
Gen. Lee, but invited the destruc-
ton of the Confederate army. l
was opposed to the movement, be-
cause his plan and the topography
of that vicinity made necessary the
division Of our army into four parts,
in the Immediate presence of su-
perior enemy. But, chiefly owing
to the timidit if not incapacity, of
the Federal commander, and some
what to the prestige we had gained
on the Chickahominy and along
Bull Run. we captured Harper's
Ferry and escaped with a drawn
battle. Tactically, as usual, Lee
fought a good defensive battle at
Sharpsburg with greatly inferior
numbers, and withdrew at his leis-
ure across the Potomac without mo
lestation.
"Gen. Lee displayed his greatest
weakness as a tactical commando,
at Gettysburg, although, for the
reasons named, Antietam might vel
have been to us far more disastrous
had the Federal army there beer
commanded by such man as Grant
The tactics at Gettysburg we're veal
and fatal to success. Gen. Lee
attacks were made in detail, and no
in one, coordinate, overwhelming
rush, as they should have been
The first collision was an unforsee,
accident. We did not invad
Pennsylvania to merely fight bat
tie. We could have gotten a battl
anywhere in Virginia, and a yer,
much better one than that offere'
us at Gettysburg. We invaded
Pennsylvania not only as division
to demoralize and dishearten th
> North, but if possible to draw tn
Federals into battle upon our ow
terms. We were to so maneuvre a
I to outgeneral the Union commando
l as We had done in the second Ms
l nassas campaign; in other words,
g make opportunities for ourselve
and take prompt advantage of tn
most favorable one that presente
0 itself, I had confidence that th
> was the purpose of Gen. Lee, an
0 that he would accomplish it "
: were not hunting for any fight ths
s was offered.
= "When in the Immediate present
q of the enemy Gen. Lee reverse
= this ofensive-defensive pol;cy-tl
: true and natural one for us-t
g precipitating his army against
l. stronghold from which I doubt
r the Federals could have been drive
It by less than 100000 fresh infantr
@ That is all there is of Gettys bure
j. We did the best we co I'D. v
70 failed simply because We had u
70 dertaken too great contract al
went about it in the wrong wa
Il Like Pope at Manassas, Lee at &c
4 tysburg outgeneralled himself.
y, "On the defensive Gen. Lee W
n absolutely perfect. Reconciled
le the single purpose of defence,
B. was invincible. This is demonstr
- ted by his fredericksburg bait
Or and again in the Wilderness, arou1
ar Spottsylvania, at Cold Harbor, 81
or before Petersburg.
"But of the art of war, more part
u ularly that of giving offensive bs
tie, I do not think Gen. Lee was
of master. In science and militia
* learning he was greatly the SUP
rs rior of Gen. Grant or any 9th
O. commander on either side. b
in the art of war I have no dou
'e that Grant and several 9th
e. officers we're his equals. In this fe
We the characteristic fault was hea
ne long combativeness. When bl
III was struck he wished to return
us on the spot. He chafed at in,
se ton, always desired to beat up
enemy at, once and have it out.
es was too pugnacious His impatier
H. to strike, once in the presence
40 the enemy, whatever the dispar
Sc of forces or relative conditions
se consider the one weakness of G.
,s- Lees military character.
D. "This trait of sggressivenes
us continued Gen. Longstreet, after