The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1893-06-29
LONGSTREET ON LEE.
An Opinion as to His Military Ability
and Most Tactical Battles.
New Orleans Times-DemOcrat.I

The question was asked of Gen.
Longtreet the other day: Which
do you consider Lees best battle?'
WE'LL" responded the General,
reRectively, "perhaps the second bat
tie of Manassas was, all things consld-
cred, the best tactical battle Gen. Lee
ever fought. The grand strategy OF
the campaign also was file and seems
to have completely deceived Gen.
Pope. Indeed, Pope failed to COM
prehend Gen. Lees purpose from start
to finish, and on August goth, when l
was preparing to push him OF the
Warrenton Pike, he still imagined US
to be in retreat, and his most untort-
innate movements were based on that
false assumption"
| said to the General that | thought
the world generally would agree with
him as to the campaign, and then
asked him in which of the battles he
thought Lee displayed bis poorest gen
eralship. He promptly answered.:
"Although it is perhaps mere SUPER
erogation to express my views, yet |
will give them to you for what they
are worth. have always thought the
preliminary dispositions to capture
Harper's Ferry, involving as a corol-
larry the battles of South Mountain and
Antietam, were not only the worst
ever made by Gen. Lee, but invited
the destruction of the Confederate
army. l was opposed to the move
ment, because his plan and the topog-
raphy of that vicinity made necessary
the division of our army into four
parts, in the immediate presence of a
superior enemy. But, chiefly owing
to the timidity, if not incaPacity, of
the Federal commander, and some
what to the prestige we had gained on
the Chickahominy and along Bull Run,
we captured Harper's Ferry and es-
capped with drawn battle. Tactically,
as usual, Lee fought good defensive
battle at Sharpsburg with greatly infe-
ror numbers, and withdrew at his leis-
ure across the Potomac without moles
tation.
"Gen. Lee displayed his greatest
weakness as tactical commander at
Gettysburg, although, for the reasons
named, Antietam might we'll have
been to us far more disastrous had the
Federal army there been commanded
by such man as Grant. The tactics
at Gettysburg were weak and fatal to
success. Gen. Lees attacks were made
in detail, and not in one coordinate,
overwhelming rush, as they should
have been. The first collision was an
unforeseen accident. We did not in
wade Pennsylvania to merely fight
battle. We could have gotten battle
anywhere in Virginia, and very much
better one than that offered us at Get
tysburg We invaded Pennsylvania
not only as division to demoralize
and dishearten the North, but if posi-
Die to draw the Federals into battle
upon our own terms We were to so
vancouver as to outgeneral the Union
commander, as we had done in the
second Manassas campaign; in other
words, to make opportunities for our
selves and take prompt advantage of
the most favorable one that presented
itself l had confidence that this was
the purpose of Gen. Lee, and that he
would accomplish it. We were not
hunting for any fight that was offered.
"When in the immediate presence of
the enemy Gen. Lee reversed this Of
fensive defensive policy-the true and
natural one for us-by precipitating
his army against a stronghold from
which | doubt if the Fcderals could
have been driven by less than 100000
fresh infantry. That is all there is of
Gettysburg; we did the best we could.
We failed simply because we had I'M
dertaken too great a contract and went
about it in the wrong way. Like Pope
at Manassas, Lee at Gettysburg out
generated himself.
"On the defensive Gen. Lee was
absolutely perfect. Reconciled to the
single purpose of defence, he was in
vincible. This is demonstrated by his
Fredericksburg battle, and again in
the Wilderness, around Spottsylvania,
at Cold Harbor, and before Peters,
burg.
"But of the art of war, more par
ticularly that Of giving offensive battle,
| do not think Gen. Lee was master.
In science and military learning he
| was greatly the superior of Gen. Grant
or any other commander on either
side. But in the art of war l have no
| doubt that Grant and several other
officers were his equals. In this field
the characteristic fault was headlong
CombativeneSs. He chafed at inaction,
always desired to beat up the enemy
at once and have it out. He was too
pugnacious. His Impotence to strike,
once in the presence of the enemy,
whatever the disparity of forces or
relative conditions, l consider the one
weakness of Gen. Lees military char
acter.
"Thls trait of aggressiveness," con-
tlnued Gen. Longstreet, after a pause,
"led him to take too many chances
Into dangerous situation. At Chan
cellorsville, against every military prin-
ciple, he divided his army in the
presence of an enemy numerically
double his own. His operations around
Harper's Ferry and Antietam were
| even worse"
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