The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1893-07-23

whole campaign: the same running siege
would have presented itself had vs gone
to sthe Peninsula II sas not primarily
aqusstion Of Richmond or Petersburg; il
IA. the wearing ont Of the resistant. AZ
gressive power Of Lees army.
Ofcourse Grant made mistakes: all great
commanders hare been fooled at times;
bat Grants mistakes we're very few and
far between. and he never made the same
mistake twice. II il urged that Grant
erred in judgment at Cold Harbor, bat the
Judgment rests on the fact that ne was re-
pulsed with heavy loss. The strength Of
the position could only be developed by
attack. Grant attacked and Was repulsed
with far less relative loss for the numbers
engaged than Lee at Malvern Hill and
Gettysburg the third day. There Was
no excuse for Lees rashness at either
Malvern Hill or Gettysburg, for the coun-
try was open and the strength Of the posi-
ton against direct attack was clear. At
Cold HaFbor the strength Of the enemy's
position vas concealed largely By the na-
ture Of the ground. and could only b
tested BY assault The shame of Shiloh, II
there is any shame about it, rests on Gen.
Sherman. who was placed In command Of
the front. while Grant went down the river
to meet Gen. Buell. for consultation.
Sherman never secuted the country
in his front; never dug rifle pit;
never fortified by the simplest defenses
his front line: he allowed IN army Of
55.0 men to get within two miles Of his
front line by p. m. Of the day before
Shiloh without discovery. The shame of
the first days surprise is Sherman's, not
Grants, and Gen. Buell. fairly says that
Sherman ought to bear it. Outside Of
Cold Harbor Grants career is that Of
soldier who fought no important engage
ment in which he did not relatively
intiict more injury than he received.
Lee resisted the impact Of the Fed
eral armies from June 1. 1862. to
the accession Of Grant, but Lees
resistance the moment our armies
were placed under the command Of Grant
lasted about six months. The pounding
began At the Wilderness May S. 1854, and
-
captured the first of the next September.
The business was really settled in four
months after Grant opened At the Wilder
ness. When Atlanta fell the lat of Sep
TENDER the zig was up."
Was Grant . greater soldier than Lee?
Gen. Longstreet says that tho rarest and
most indispensable quality of great gen.
eral Is not so much his technical knowledge
Of grand tactics and strategy a. his un-
finching moral courage to meet. face and
force the military responsible to the ut
termost; in this respect he thinks Grant
was the greatest soldier of the war on
either side; and, Furthermore, he il dis
posed to believe that Lee was prompted 1t
times to reckless assaults by his native
pugnacity. The truth 10 probably that
Grant would have acted very differently
had he been In Lees defensive position,
and Lee would have acted very differently
had he been constantly the assailant.
What was the grade Of Grants military
geniusf Probably about that Of yelling
ton. Like Wellington, he was . prompt,
energetic, resolute, taciturn, indexible,
imperturbable soldier, who hated war on
general principles, but would make war
most bitterly to save his country. Like
Franklin. Washington, Marshall and
Lincoln. Grant was above all things and
under all circumstances . pure patriot.
He was
Patient Of toll. serene amid alarms.
Improbable in faith, insincibls in aYms