Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-03-18

Gen Hslieck asked 10 b informed where Pope
vas and what he WAS doing and said,
Until know that cannot regulate Portsr's
movements He ID much exposed now, and
decided measures should b taken ct once.
Until know what NY command and position
are 70 BE- and whether you stin intend to place
letter to me, and orally through Gen. Burnside
at the Chickahomtny, I cannos decide whore
can be OF most use. II your discrimination 10
unchanged ought 70 60 10 Alexandria at once.
Please dsdns my position and dusiss."
The letter referred 10 related 10 TIE With
dr1val Of The army non Hasrison's Lsodins
on the peninsula altar Gen. NoClsllan's retreat
10 that plaes, IN which letter Gen. Halieek
said:
"A nov bass on the Rappahanneck ss Fred
Of Rchncnd and secures !. rssnforoeS.ns Of
forty or my thousand frsaA and disciplined
Roopa"
This was subsequently, explained b. Gen.
Burnside personally to Gen. McClsllan thas Il
va intended BY the Prssidsnt 70 give Gen. No
Cael,a command OF ell the soops on hs a.
Both this letter Of Gen. Halleck and Gen.
Burnsidss promise diplomacy. % to the sin
cerity Of which Gen. McClellan had misgivings.
He did NOS believe It He VS. advised to como
to Aexandna, where b arrived on the night Of
the ash. On the morning Of the 9Th Col
Herman Haupt, who bad charge Of railroad
transportation, was told Of the expected AZ
rival Of Gen. McClelland and TO find hum and
get his directions. In his II. g. Journal, which
Col Hsupt has kindly allowed me to examine.
he says:
II took . rowboat and searched among the
transports that had arrived. and found him in
tne CABIN OF Q steamer, some distance below
Asxandria, with his stat. where he bad arrived
the night before. explained to him that
q ayr knRA~ r..
rations for men, that the enemy WAS in his rear;
that communication with Pope was cut Of. and
mat relief was an imperative necessity. I ex-
planned to him how relief might be effected by
sending out strong forcs 70 protect the trains.
This Gen. Mcclellan declined TO approve, say
ing that 1t would be attended with too much
risk. There we're then plenty Of troops In Alex
audria- Gen. McCleiland would not give his
consent nor assume any responsibility. He
would give no instructions nor suggestions of
COL. HAUPT's PATRIOTIC SERVICE.
Col Hauptbrought the general ashore with him
andst the conclusion of the above interview atCol
Haupts Office in Alexandria Gen. Nc lellan, after
writing . dispatch mounted his horse and rode
off. leaving Col Haupt in condition Of great
dissatisfaction and uncertainty. Col. Haupt
determined to send Gen. Pope relief in supplies
and sent to Gen. Mcclellan for 200 sharp
shooters a. . guard for the relief train but he
got no answer. At midnight he took lantern
and went four miles down the road to Gen.
Hancock's camp. found HIM in bed and got the
guard from that admirable soldier The
train went out TO Pope relief and brought back
important information. On the Gath, Col
Haupt says. there were 80 900 troops in Alex
lance from Alexandria to Bull Run was only
twenty miles and most OF the camps were
four miles south Of Alexandria il would have
been but short days march for them
to have Joined Gen. Pope. They would
have been In better condition for immediate
action than if they had been packed in cars.
For several days the officers were demanding
transportation, which they knew could not be
furnished, and such demands were only an ex-
cuse for not going. The trouble seemed to be
an indisposition to help Gen. Pope, and As o
consequence only about one-fourth-2l. 600
Of the Army Of the Potomac 10000 Strongly
took part in Pope's battles. The railroad was
but q single track, with limited equipment Of
cars and engines, and these were unnecessarily
often detained at the front. 1t il . sad fact
that while these troops were awaiting transpor-
tstion at Alexandria many of their commanders
were in Washington, and Pope was fighting,
and, whatever may be said OF his incompetency,
| he fought his army with courage and constancy
and stayed the march Of Lee upon Washington.
where he certainly would have come hut fog
Pope's fighting.
In the midst Of the uncertainty as to Gen.
Pope the telegraph operators ard the railroad
! men were. under the direction Of Col Haupt
the advance pioneers pushing on to the posts
! of danger ont to Fairfax and all along the line,
bringing off the wounded, sending news Of the
peril at the front and calling for help for him
whose flaming sword beckoned toward Alexan-
dria fo- help day after day.
MESSAGES THAT SHOCKED Mr. LINCOLN.
In his telegram Of the 2sth, at night. Gen
Mcclellan said, pope must cut through to-
day" and it Is in this very telegram, referring
| to Franklin. that Gen. Mcclellan also says: 1--WE
are not vet in condition to move, NAV be to-
morrow morning" Marvelou.ly strange words
these! Fourteen hours later, in q telegram to
the President. ne said: Pope must be left to
get out Of his scrape." 1t WAS not Pope's
doings that he got into the tolls Of the great
| army OF Lee. and II it was. certainly il was
shocking even to think OF such o thing when
the Army OF the Potomac WAS within q davis
marching distance Of Gen. Pope. Every tele-
was on Mr.. Stanton's desk day after
day and night after night, and these
two especially shocked both the Presi-
dent and Mr.. Stanton, for the President
was with Mr.. Stanton much of this time. On
the 9th, at night, Gen. McClelland advised
Gen. Hslieck that he had q. his disposal Is. 0oO
men. including Franklin's corps, and some
| artillery, and recommended that they be kept
for the defense OF Washington. but added:
This force is in readiness to march at a mo-
tnent uotico 10 any polnb you may indicate. 7"
Looking now at the subsequent struggle to get
Franklin sent to Pope, how strange the matter
seems. 1t did seem strange to the War Depart
| ment at that time.
POPE FIGHTING ALL TIE TINE.
1t is important here to repeat that while all
this very peculiar correspondence was going on
Gen. Pope's army was in the tolls Of powerful
enemy and fighting furiously in the defenss of
Washington; that he was out Of supplies and
looking and hoping for Franklin. who could
have reached him without the least hindrance
At that time 1t Was Mr.. Stanton who said. while
watching this telegraphic play between Wash
ington and Alexandria and in which he took no
part a. an actor, that Gen Halleck ought 10
have gone to Alexandria and taken the troops
ont himself. and that had .'Stonewalr' Jackson
been at Alexandria he would have marched
through q wall OF fire to reach the battle field
Yes. he would have got there, and after having
used his forty rounds Of cartridge would have
finished with the bayonet.
In nearly every telegram about Franklin and
Gen. Pope's condition Gen. Mcclellan urged
that the works for the defense Of Washington
be manned. All his anxiety seemed to
be FOR the safety OF Washington. His
treatment Of the grave crisis did not in
clude Gen. Pope as . factor entering into the
solution Of the impending destruction of his
army. He considered Pope a. having already
been destroyed, and all his actions are In singu-
lar contrast with his pretended earnest, sincere
and natrintic a. Gee h. .>F.<x uy..l