The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1893-03-28
FOR ANNEXATION.
The Uni0n league Club or New
York Strongly FavoYs IT,


York recently submitted the fol-
loving report and resolutions and
recommended their adoption
The great importance of the Ha-
waiian Islands TO this country is in
danger of being lost sight of by the
public. There was an intuitive appre-
citation of their importance, and a
general approval of their acquisition
when the opportunity to do so first
presented itself. The delay in ratify-
ing the Treaty recently negotiated be-
tween the United States and the Com
missioners of the Provisional Govern
ment of the Islands is causing no lit
tie anxiety in the minds of those who
have considered the subject care
fully.
The question presents itself in two
aspects; first, as to the benefits
stheir acquisition will be TO this ma
ton, and second, as to the menace it
will be TO US to have their control fall
into the hands of another nation.
These two questions may well be con-
sidered together III the few sugges-
tions we make by way of argument
in favor of their acquisition. All the
facts of the situation are not indisput-
ably known TO the public, but enough
is known TO safely lead q prudent
mind to the conclusion that the time
is now ripe for the annexation of the
Islands, and that such annexation is
very desirable for the United States.
While we are dealing with pro-
visional government, it is de facto
government recognized by substan-
TALLY all the civilized governments of
the world. 1t is the only government
on the Islands. Whatever may be
the right or wrong of the overthrow
of the monarchy, it is an accomplish
ed fact. Revolutions in governments
seldom follow on the strict lines of
moralists. They are generally at
tended with some wrongs to some
body, and in the affairs of nations it
is not the practice nor Is it practicable
TO 90 behind revolutions to enquire
deeply into the causes of the same, or
to attempt to make right any pos
sible wrong that may have been COM
mitted. Governments deal with
recognized governments. If we ac-
quire the Islands, it will not be by
force and conquest, but by the consent
of two governments empowered to
circumstances the acquisition of the
Islands will follow the traditional
policy of this government. Florida
was acquired mainly because it was
not desirable to have a Spanish col
ony located there. The Louisiana
purchase was made largely TO prevent
that vast territory falling into the
hands of the British government.
While the element of the value of
these acquisitions weighed heavily in
the transaction, the question of terri
Uorial protection was a great factor.
The acquisition of the Hawaiian ISL
ands presents itself in the same dual
light. In the event of war it would
be a menace to our interests and pos
sessions on the Pacific Coast to have
them fall under the dominion of any
other power. We had abundant ex-
perience in our late war, with So
called neutral ports near our Atlantic
seaboard. The acquisition of the ISL
ands will be of great value TO our
growing commerce on the Pacific
Ocean in times of peace. Already our
commerce on the Pacific is menaced
in many ways. No opportunity to
strengthen our hold upon the vast
lines of trade that are SO rapidly de-
veloping there should be lost. Such
chances generally come but once, and
If lost then, may be lost forever.
The public mind has not risen to an
appreciation of the trend of events in
these days in the matter of warfare.
We may safely rest IL peace and feel
secure from any army of men that
may, under any circumstances, attack
us on land. No army could, from
any possible source, effect a Judgment
here, that we could not easily cope
with, but is this the case in the event
of an attack from the sea? No
thoughtful man would dare for one
moment to affirm it. The navies of
the world are slowly but surely in
creasing in power and efficacy. There
is now no menace of attack apparent.
Numerous arguments OF the most
forceful kind based upon policy and
the seIf-interest of other nations can
be and are advanced against the prob
ability Of a naval attack by any ma
ton. Is it quite safe. to rest in peace
full security depending upon right and
justice, while our Atlantic and f'aci-
fic coasts are vulnerable to attack
from the sea , Should any Opportun-
ity be lost TO add anything to their
security that we can? Reason as We
may about the probability of such an
attack, we are not safe until we make
ourselves secure in the event of an
attack. In the history of the world
when the time was ripe for startling
events, the movements have been
rapid and unexpected to the average
observer. The men TO lead the move
ments have almost always sprung up
suddenly from obscurity. No one
could have foretOld the genius and
ambition of Napoleon ten years before
all the thrones of Europe were totter-
ing TO their fall. Four years was long
enough to raise our own Grant from
obscurity TO the rank of the first Cap
tain of his age. The Franco-Prussian
war seemed to break out suddenly
from trifiing causes with startling re-
suits. Because nothing seems likely
to happen to involve us in n great
naval contest, il by means follows
that such q contest may not come
upon us. Important international
events may be ripening faster than
We think. Ambition and the love of
glory may be smoldering now IN the
breast of an unknown genius of war,
who and where we do not know. We
may have to meet the brunt of blow
from the sea, when, we do not know.
No nation has placed such tempting
prizes of rich cities by the sea az we
have and left them unprotected. Let
any ambitious naval nation once get
possession of our chief seaboard cities,
and they would sap our resources and
throttle our enterprises. No hamlet
or our inland country is so remote as
not to suffer from such a calamity.
Let no one in this broad land say this
question does not affect me; am not
on the seaboard. The inland parts of
our country have an interest in the