The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1893-10-09
Iax NICARAGUA CANAL

navy. ON sDo19Fs A9Ft1As 0ss~1ssSs Nt@-.
great ability IA the surrent number OF the
4tismfic Menfkiv the enormous con- nerclsl
aud navzI Importance 20 the Iaifed States
OF the projected Nicaragua canal Liver
pool and New York are ~ present aboGt
equidissant by water from all points on
the west coast of Amsrica, from Vaipa-
raise 20 British Columbia. since TO go
through the Straits Of Magellan vessels
from both ports must pass near Cape 81.
Rogue. on the east coast of Brazil. which
is nearly the same distance from each.
IL the Nicaragua canal existed, the line
on the Pacific equidstant from the two
cities named would pass. roughly, BY
Yokohama, Shanghai, Hongkong and Mel
bourne. or along the coasts of Japan,
China and Eastern acknowledgements ~
this case using the snez canal and New
York that CT Nicaragua The line Of eqai-
distance would be shifted from the eastern
shore of the Pacific TO its western coast
and ali points OF that coast east of japan.
China and Australia: for example. the Ha-
waiian islands. would be nearer New York
than 20 Liverpool.
About one-eighth Of the existing trade
of the British islands would be unfayor-
ably affected by the competition thus in
troduced. The chief political result of the
Nicaragua canal will be to bring cur Pa
cIfc coast nearer. not only to our Atlantic
seaboard, but also 70 the great navies OF
Europe. The commercial gain 20 the Pa
cite coast would be large, bat the con-
siruction of the canal would present an
element of military weakness that of
course would have 10 be met by a change
Of military and naval policy on the part of
the United States. We should be obliged
10 place ourselves in condition to defend
the Pacific coast and the canal which
would cut the present barrier between tie
two oceans.
Under the Clayton and Bulwer treaty OF
1850 the United States and Great Britain
are bound to acquire no territory in Gen.
tral America aud TO guarantee the neu-
trality not only of the projected canal
but of any other that might be con-
structed. The interest of Great Britain
still lies, as it then lay. in the mainte-
astutc when she made this treaty, for she
cast the burden of building the canal on
the people who would reap the great
est advantage from IL and who were
bound to keep everybody else out,
but were unlikely to undertake SO great
an enterprise for many years. and
at the same time Great Britain
shrewdly handicapped the United States
in favor of British sea power by entering
into joint guarantee to respect It's neutral
| ity when built. This secured postpone
ment OF construction indefinitely and yet
lost no substantial advantage necessary 10
| establish effective naval control in the in
terests OF British carrying trade.
| The result has been that We have kept
| others out while refusing ourselves to go
| in. Commodore Mahan feels confident
/ that the time has come when the i'm
| portance OF the Central American isthmus
| 10 the United States will have to be recog-
nized by radical changes in our military
and naval policy.
| The growth of the Pacific states enhances
| the commercial and political importance
| OF the Pacific ocean to the world at large
| and to ourselves in particular, while the
! productive energies of the country and its
extension TO the seas on every side impei
! it necessarily to seek access and outlet by
them 10 the regions beyond. The conse-
| quence, therefore, of an artificial waterway
which shall enable the Atlantic coast to
compete with Europe on equal terms as 10
distance fors the market of Eastern Asia
and shall shorten by two-thirds the sea
route from New York to San Francisco
and by one-haif that to Valparaiso Is too
obvious for elaborate argument
In these conditions is 10 be found, SAYS
/ Commodore Mahan, the assurance that
the canal will be built. Many causes will
! combine to retain in ths line of the Susr
canal the commerce of Europe with the
| East; but 10 the American shores of the
! Pacific the isthmian canal will afford a
mucn shorter and easier access fos trade
| already of noteworthy proportions. The
| power of Great Britain to control the long
route from Gibraltar to the Red sea is se-
/ rioasly doubted 10y many OF her statesmen
and soldiers, who favor dependence in war
upon tina! by the Cape Of Good Hope. The
| route by Nicaragua would be shorter than
by the Cape TO many parts Of the East.
| and the Caribbean is much more easily
/ guarded against European foes than the
line through the Mediterranean, which
passes close by their ports.
Under this increased Importance of the
isthmus We cannot safely anticipate for
the future such acquiescence in our de-
mands concerning the control OF the 18TH
mus that has been conceded in the past.
| The conclusion of Commodore Mahan's
| argument IS that since the canal is sure 10
be built, the United States cannot afford
70 forget that freedom OF interoceanie
transit depends upon predominance in a
maritime region-the Caribbean sea
through which pass all approaches to the
isihmus. To control this maritime region
We shall need 3 much stronger navy and
shall need 20 occupy ports suitably chosen
and spaced one from the other. upon which
rs bases the navy rests, and from which II
can exert its strength.
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