Southwest-sentinel. [volume] (Silver City, N.M.) 1883-189?, 1893-02-28


likely that all these symptoms are
closely connected. The depression
in prices is not local but universal
in Europe and America. 1t COM
menced with the fall of silver in
1873, when Germany took The final
step Of throwing out silver money
and buying gold to replace it. Up
to that period GO per cent. of the
coin in circulation in Germany
was of silver, estimated to amount
to 1876, 100000; of which S145,-
100000 was thrown on the market
before the great increase in the
production of silver which did not
take place until twelve years later.
The cost was great; but, by the
aid of the were indemnity, the
change was possible. 1t has, how
ever, never been shown what Ger
many gained by it. She sold sill
yer at an artifcially depressed mar
ket and bought gold at a high
price, but France could spare
nearly all her gold and was never
theless able to return, after the
war, to specie payments; for she
retained the double standard and
silver was sufficient for her pur-
poses. The finances of France in
spite of the immense indemnity
paid, are, at least, as sound as
those of Germany, for no CONNER
cial revulsion occurred there as in
Germany and it does not appear
that the French people have suf-
fered inconvenience in any way.
In fact the silver using people have
not suffered from commercial cri-
SEES and seem to be in a better
condition than others; for Mr..
Bagehot pointed out, in his evil
dence before the House of Com
mons Silver Commission, that, in
India, although the rupee had fall
en- in value as measured in gold,
prices had not risen but, while the
English officials in India and Eng
lish exporters of cotton goods from
Lancashire were suffering because
they were obliged to change into
gold the silver prices realized in
order to make their remittances to
England, Indian manufacturers,
whose whole interest lay in that
country rel greatly assisted in
the competition for the trade of
Asia as the English manufacturers
were oppressed by the whole
weight of the premium on gold.
The only serious reason adj
duced for the adoption of a uni
versal gold standard is the difficult
ty of maintaining a staple ratio
between the two metals. This
has always existed, but it was new
er serious until the recent on
slaught against silver; for bi-met-
alism is ne new thing. That has
existed for centuries and was the
normal condition of the curren-
cies of Europe until recent times;
nor We're disastrous consequences
ever attributed to it. England
stood alone on a single standard
of gold; for Portugal and Turkey
need not be taken INTO account.
Germany and the northern nations
had a silver standard, while France
and the Latin union, and the
United States before the war,
We're bi-metallic countries with a
double standard. The ineonven-
fences of the varying exchanges is
a surface inconvenience familiar
for centuries to all bankers. 1t
does not call for so desperately
revolutionary a remedy as an at
tempt at the destruction of one
half of the worlds property in the
precious metals; and more espec-
tally not, in the face of the cons
tant expansion of the inverted
pyramid of credit currency which
is reared upon the diminishing
bulk of the other half. The sill
yer certificates Of the United
States represent real money actu-
ally existing in the treasury, avail
able still throughout more than
one-half the world in exchange for
all the n~ecessaries of life and for
all the raw materials necessary for
manufactures. They came in for
tunately, to prevent the utter col
lapse which the gradual withdraw
al of the national paper currency
was inevitably bringing on. Let
it be granted that. in the existing