The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1893-04-17
BANKER CLEWs, VIEWS.
The Financial Outlook as Seen From
Wall Street.

NEW Ohht A)EAl III ub HAhU NBGh III
Wall street has developed some reactionary
features. The sharp movement in May
wheat at Chicago has suggested the possi-
/ bility OF trouble in the immense speculatiuns
iu that staple. The revival OF gold exports
| on scale larger than had been expected at
the present stage, and the prospect of like
large shipments next week, have renewed
/ the sensitiveness connected with that factor
and stimulated the courage of the ''bearn
/ side, while Inducing speculative holders TO
/ tighten their load. The untavorab,e o charac-
| ter OF the April report of the department. of
/ agriculture also has a tendency to affect
stocks uufavoTably, especially those OF the
| grain roads. On Thursdays market came
the report of the failure of the English,
/ Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank
/ of London, with Si0,000,000 OF liabilities;
which naturally suggested the possibility of
| sympathetic effects upon American securi-
| ties in Europe. simultaneously, came the
! information that the governor OF Nebraska
| bad signed the maximum rate" bill which
| viii have the effect of reducing rail rates
20 per cent on the roads ia that state-a
matter OF no small consequence to an im-
portAnt group of lines. The Industrial
/ stocks have especially felb the effect OF these
unfavorable influences, from the fact that,
! being unsatisfactory as collatorals, they are
subject more than other securities to SYM
| pathize with "a stringent condition OF the
money market.
This is a somewhat serious chapter of ao-
cidonts, aud their effect hos been the more
! felt because of their happening slmulta-
neously. Breaks OF this character are,
! however, to be expected so long AS certain
! stubborn factors disturbing confidence are
| continued. Foremost among those factors
| is the unsettled condition of the sill yer
! problem. Until either an international
] n % ho kkarrnnu ~ Of
| 1890 Is repealed, this can only be regarded
as a menace to our currency system and,
| therefore, to large proportion
! of our Investments, with consequent
! danger of oscillations OF foreign confidence
IN our securities. This special exposure ng-
| grayates the appreheneions connected with
exports OF gold. Under existing crcum-
stances the country needs 10 keep up its suE-
! ply Of gold as All Offset against the large
/ amounts Of silver money we are creating
| aud yet our silver igsues aid in driving out
our gold, and, in proportion as that process
| expands, our credit abroad is liable to suffer
| and our securities there held are subject to
| being returned There is here a sort OF uu-
! controllable confusion OF cause and effect,
which beGets indefinite apprehensions and
aggravates the coasequences arising from
| ell other causes Of disturbance.
| IL has been hoped that the outflow Of
| gold might be checked through the revival
| of the exports Of produce; but that hope hes
| not yet been In any measure realized.
Speculation still holds back the immense
value OF surplus wheat, corn, cotton and
provisions from export; and, 40 far as re-
spects wheat, the April official crop report
has encouraged the disposition to hold for
higher prices. 1t now looks as though there
might be found no way out of this specu-
lAtlye deadlock except through gold feinR
exported instead Of products TO such an ex-
tent as to produce pressure in the money
| market that would compel holders Of these
| products to release hem for export. There
can be no question that this boarding OF
| some $500 100 of products which ought,
ia the ordinary cOurso OF Things TO have
been ore this largely distributed
among other countries 10 producing YER Y
| embarrassing arrangements 10 tho course OF
the foreign exchanges; aud the country has
| rarely been In q condition in which IL could
SO III afford to stand exposed to such de-
rangements. Had the export trade beel
| permitted 60 take It's natural course, We
should probably have had to-day 50.000,0 900
| more gold in the banks and the treasury
than we actually have; nor is that the only
| misfortune; We have also been compelled by
| these circumstances 90 incur O very large
temporary opeu indebtedness to Europe,
demand tor the settlement OF which may
come upon us az any time. What cau be
! said for the prudence Of speculetors who are
thus piling upon their heads a pressure that
may crush them at any momentl
These arc disturbing elements in the sit
uatIon that can be remedied in no other
way than by working out their own cure.
| And that remedy can come only through
an Adjustment between the range of values
| on the staples specified, ns between the for
| oSn and domestic markets. There may
have to boa Welding OF prices on both sides
OF tho Atlantic, but-cousidering, first, that
we are the more dependent Of the two sides,
next, that our prices must bs regarded as
illegitimately high in view Of the unusual
largeness OF our exportable surplus at this
stage Of the season, end next, that the con
| ditiOn OF the home money market
is likely to compel realizing on
these stoples--in view of these
facts, the probability IL that most of the
necessary concession will have 80 lie made
by our holders. Unul this adjustment be-
tween domestic holders and foreign buyers
has been effected. there can be no real CON
| fidence in the cosy working of financial
affairs and the stock market must stand
exposed to unsetthng surprises. so soon,
however, as the worlds fair opens, public
attention will be largely diverted from
these disturbing conditions; and, though
that exhiarAting excitement oaunot remove
the real causes OF disturbance, yet it will
prove an important influence toward neu-
tralizing their effects upon the spirit OF
stock exchange operations; and the increased
railroad earnings consequent upon the fair
travel viii equally operate In that direo-
!