The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-11-18
WATER 11eHr DOORS ON WAR SHIPS.
The AIi.inportsut Lesson Drawn iron, n
RsNiey Of the Victoria Dl.neter.

| WARRINGTON. NOV. lf.-lt may 1nlrly DO sal
that the minutes published by the British
Admiralty upon the real cause Of the los
OF the battle ship Victoria are more VALUABLE
than any other summary OF Its lessons whicl
| has yet been ATTEMPTED. and are indeed OF tn
| highest importance in conveying its true les
sons to the public.
Tho court martial held at Malta was neces
| sarily occupied largely with determining thu
| facts In regard to Vice Admiral Tryons orde
| which brought on the great disaster. and als'
in regard to Rear Admiral Markham anc
| Capt tombstone on the Camperdown. Bu
apart from the personal conduct OF these OFF
GERS. there was also the question whether thu
Victoria had such faults in design rs to make
her peculiarly liable to capsize. and whether
also she might have been saved in spite OF the
collision with the Camperdown.
Tho Grst OF tho Admiralty minutes deals with
the personal que itions involved. and expresses
regret that Rear Admiral Markham and Capt
tombstone when they mlstrusted Tryon' 8 fat a
order. did not reverse tho statboard screw
and close the water-t tight doors instantly. In
stead OF waiting to do 30 until after the ships
had turned eight points inward and were end
on. They also find that Capt tombstone did
not at once order extreme helm to be used.
when Markham had directed preparations to
be made for collision. and that he did not
carry out the orders given him with proper ra-
pidity and efficiency.
But OF wider application or Significance seem
to be the remarks Of the Admiralty on the
questions OF stability and OF provisions against
sinking. This is the more evident from the
closing words OF the findings OF tho court
martial that It had put on record all evidence
obtainable as to the closing OF the water-tight
doors Of the ship that went down. but did not
feel itself competent. or indeed called upon
Ito express an opinion as 10 the causes OF
the capsizinR Of the Victoria" Hence the task
OF the Admiralty became imperative.
This body finds that up to a very short time
tabout one minute) before the collision took
place. . largo number of water-tlght doors.
matches. and ports in the Victoria were open.
and that. owing to the thrush OF water. many
Of these. situated in the forward part OF the
ship. could not afterward be closed. Many
compartments must therefore have been
Hooded in addition to those which were ac-
tually preached by the collision. But why did
che capsize before foundering? Tho explana-
ton here Is that the armor door on the star
the siX-inch gun ports Of that battery. and the
turret ports were open at the time OF the col
servers s on other ships noted that the water
had reached such height as to permit its
entry through the open turret ports and armor
were awash ut the moment when the
water into the battery: accompanied by tho
descent OF large quantities OF water from the
upper deck within the battery through open
and the inflow Of water through the turret
ports. necessarily had the effect Of suddenly
seriously reduced by the sutmergence OF tho
bow. and Of making her capsize;
as ~ lion ,nsa drawn AZ mat the
sui1iciency OF stability. On the contrary, that
stability was ample for all requirements. When
,ric height was i've seH iee Stability reached it's
at an angle OF 81 !, degrees to the
vertical and the range of stability was 81,
degrees.
The next question taken up is the important
one as to what would PROBABLY have happened
the Victoria before the collision occurred.
Here the very striking declaration is made
aVe BEEN ioss vet nskns ali
due allowances for probable damage. the ship
would have remained ahoat and under control
Her bow. It is said. would have been depressed
about to the water Level: her heel to sta tar
before the lu gci, BEGAN: her battery ports
would have been several feet above water. and
she would have retained ample stability.
Can anything more strikingly show that tho
lives on the Victoria were sacrificed by neg
lect OF the very safeguards that had been pro-
miraty finds that. these .water-ticht doors
were sufficient and were n good order It
also nnds that the longitudinal bulkhsads In
injuries above the protective deck. but the
caused the loss OF the ship. The fact that she
had no armor belt at the bow had no inu-
ence upon the final result, FOR no armor d, belt
The conviction is inevitable that the Vic
terrible catastrophe averted. had the water-
tight doors been kept closed. AS they should
for naves to hsed and is
Of congratulation that imperative orders on
this subject have heen issued in our own.
Assistant Comptroller and Director Of Naval
into all the details Of the collision. and then
adopts certain broad CONCLUSIONS; To begin
with. It is declared that the interval Of
tHiah h doors DOORS and hatehways and and the 'i in
nadsqUate for The e Complete fument Of that
forward, below the reflective deck. and near
endeavor was made to close the water-tight
doors subsequently TO the collision. the doors
NAMED open permitted water to pass, into
adjacent to those preached and
greatly increased the loss OF buoyancy. the de;
transverse stability.
Mr.. White further holds that. 80 far as can
DO JuuRtu uhu ull nhtClWHyb. &c. Deeu
closed prior to the collision. tho Victoria would
have continued to retain ample buOyancy and
stability. and would not have ceased to be
under control. Under tho actual circum-
1t was INEVITABLE that the vessel should have
retained tho position described by the various
witnesses az reached before the lurch began
with her bow buried about thirteen feet be-
low water and with a keel to starboard
q about Is to 20 degrees. And yet
cs TA's s%f' ss'n ports II 'hs
tho turrot and upper deck battery been
closed. the door secured. and water excluded
from turret and battery. the Victoria would
not have capsized."' He further suggests that
provision should always be made Tor closing
gun ports and openings in upper works
through which water may pass Into the inte-
rior Of the ship.
1t may well DO said that these last words OF
The Admiralty and OF Mr.. White on tho great
naval disaster OF the year are the weiRhtiest OF
all. and are those which most need to be taken
10 heart in all nayies.