Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-11-01

language Of the rule as stated by Mr.. JUS
tice Miller, above quoted, it exceeded its
powers In the sentence which II pronounc-
ed. and the petitioner was discharged upon
habeas corpus. The petition in this case
must therefore be considered in the light
Of the rule above stated.
Jurisdiction of the Police Court.
Had the Police Court jurisdiction of the
party in the offense for which he was tried?
and had 1t power to impose the sentence IT
did? are the only questions which can be
considered upon this application.
The statute in express terms confers juris-
diction on the court to hear and determine
the case, and to impose the penalty created
thereby. and the court had jurisdiction of
the person Of the petitioner by his actual
arrest and presence in court. 1t is appar-
ent therefore that the only questions which
can arise as to Jurisdiction are the constitu-
ttonality of the statute comforting It, and
the personnel of the court by which 1t was
exercised
Referring to the grounds alleged in the
petition for the issue Of the writ. 1t is very
clear that under the foregoing rule the sec
considered.
The second is that the petitioner was de-
MED the constitutional right Of a trial by
an impartial jury. But that is not an error
which affects the Jurisdiction Of the court
to try the case or its power to pronounce
the sentence. lnlS exact question was de-
termined by the Supreme Court in Schnei-
ders case. l4S U. s., 157 and 162. One of
the grounds Of the application for the writ
In that case was that the petitioner had
been denied an impartial jury by the Su-
preme Court Of the District, and Chief JUS
tfce Fuller, delivering the opinion Of the
court denying the writ, says: THE ground
Of the application does not go to the juris-
dtctton or authority of the Supreme Court
OF the District, and mere error cannot be
viewed In these proceedings"
A distinction is attempted to be made
between this and the Schneider case In that
In the latter case the court permitted the
questions to be asked the Jurors. as tend
ing to show whether they were impartial or
not. while In this case the question put by
petitioners counsel to one Of the jurors
supposed to have that tendency was not al
lowed. But disallowing the question, IL II
should have been allowed was not err
ror affecting In any way the jurisdiction or
power of the court Besides, in the Schnei-
der case error was alleged in the record
by the action Of the trial court In accept
Ing Jurors whose own answers under oath
showed them to be disqualified, contend
ed by the defendants counsel. well AS
by ruling out questions put by defendants
counsel, which they contended had a ten
dency to develop whether the Juror was
biased; so that the Schneider case contain
| ed the very feature this one does.
The Third Ground of the Petition.
The third ground of the petition is that
| petitioner was denied a constitutional right
at the trial, i'm that he was not duly in
| formed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation against him by the information
| filed in the Police Court. That informa-
ton charged him with having engaged in
the sale of intoxicating liquors in the Dis
trict of Columbia without having license
| therefor.
That charges an offense under the stat
ute Of which the Police Court had juris-
diction, and that closes the door to further
| inquiry upon habeas corpus far as the
| sufficiency Of the information was con-
| cerned. Whether II charges the offense
with that particularly of specification re-
| Quired by the common law and the consti-
| tuition cannot be determined upon habeas
corpus. This exact question was determin-
| ed by the Supreme Court in the case Of
Coy. before referred to. See 127 U. s.. 759.
The fourth ground Of the petition is that
| the case was submitted to the jury upon
| erroneous Instructions as to the law by the
Police Court From what has been said in
| relation to the second and third grounds, 1t
| follows that these alleged errors cannot be
considered upon habeas corpus. and. there.
fore they have not been considered. Tn
| doubtedly, the judges Of the Police Court
| would feel greatly relieved II there was
! provision of law by which their judgments
upon points OF law could be reviewed In
| cases like the one under consideration. and
| there was probably an inadvertence some
where in not providing for such a review
In the bill transferring the appellate juris-
to the Court of Appeals. but the absence Of
| such a remedy would not justify Judge Of
| this or of any other court in making a writ
! OF habeas corpus serve the purposes of a
| writ of error.
Authority to Pass the Sentence.
This leaves as proper for consideration
upon this application the first, fifth, SIXTH
seventh and eighth grounds of the petition
each of which in one form another chal-
| lenges the jurisdiction of the Police Court
| over the case of Shea, or its powers or au-
| thority to pass the particular sentence i'm
| posed.
The first ground is briefly that Justice
Mills. who presided at the trial. was neither
an officer de jure nor de facto, but a mere
! usurper of authority, and that his act as
| judge of the Police Court is absolutely void
| This position Is supported by three conten-
tions in the argument of the petitioner S
counsel. First. that the act of Congress
authorizing a judge Of this court to desig-
nate justice Of the peace to preside in the
Police Court Is unconstitutional and void ;
second, that it was repealed by the act
creating an additional judge Of the Police
Court. and third, II valid and unrepealed. it
only authorized an appointment of one JUS
tice of the peace. while the judge of this
/ court designated two at the same time to
serve during the same period. and that such
designation Is void.
Section lO47 Of the r. s. U. s. relating to
the District provides that I'm case of sick
ness. absence or disability Of the judge
either of the justices of the Supreme Court
of the District shall designate some justice
Of the peace to discharge the duties of the
police judge until such disability be re-
moved" Section 104S provides that the JUS
/ tice of the peace so designated shall take
the same oath as is required to be taken by
the police judge and that he shall receive
$40 per day for the time he presdes in the
court. 1t Is argued that these two sections
create an office. like that of acting Judge.
or Judge pro tempore of the Police Court
and lodged the power Of appointment in one
of the justices of the Supreme Court Of the
District in violation of the constitutional
provision that officers of the United States
shall be nominated by the President and
appointed by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate except to such in
ferior officers as Congress may provide to
be appointed by the President alone by the
courts of law. or the heads Of departments
Court of Law.
Admitting that this office belongs to the
| class last named, and that 1t is competent
for Congress to have vested the appoint
ment in court Of law" as specified In the
Constitution, the argument is that the sec
ton quoted does not do this, but gives the
power of appointment to a justice of a
| court. AS each Of the justices OF this court