Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-03-18

Al this history would not be complete with
out the report which Secretary Chase says Gen.
HAilsck promised to give in answer to Mr..
6tantons call for an explanation Of Gen. Mo
Clellan's disobedience Of orders to send troops
to Gen. Pope I hare give copies Of these
papers:
sEcRxTAlx srAMTox's CALL.
WAR DIPARrxExr,
WASHINGTON, August %, 1861
Maj. Gen. b. W. Halleck, Chief:
General: desire you to furnish me informa-
ton upon the following points:
LIST. At what date you first ordered the gen
eral commanding the Army Of the Potomsc to
move from the James river.
I'd Whether that order was or was not
obeyed according to its purport with the
promptness which, in your Judgment, the ma
tional safety required, and at what date the
Sd. What order has been given recently for
the movement Of Franklin's corps, and whether
required
lth. You will furnish me copies of the orders
referred to In the foregoing inquiries.
GEN. HALLEcK's ANSWER.
"WAsHINaroS, August 80, 1852
Hon. E. NJ. Stanton, Secretary Of War:
''Sir: In reply to your note Of last evening
have to state: First That on the s0th Of July
I directed Gen. Mcclellan to send away his sick
as quickly as possible, preparatory to his moving
in some direction. Receiving no answer the
August directed him to withdraw his entire
army from Rarrison's Landing and bring it to
Aqua creek.
''2d. That the order was not obeyed with the
promptness I expected and the national safety,
In my opinion, required. 1t will be seen from
my Geographic correspondence that Gen. Nc
Clellan protested against the movement and
that it was not actually commenced until the
18th instant. 1t Is proper to remark that the
reason given for not moving earlier was the
delay in getting of the sick. As shown in my
correspondence was most earnestly pressing
him to move quickly for the reason that felt
very anxious for the safety Of Washington.
From all tho information I could obtain I
believed that the enemy intended to crush Gen.
Pope's army and attack this city. I also
believed that our only safety was to
unite the two armies as rapidly IS
possible between the enemy and Washington.
The object Of pushing Gen. Pope forward to
the Rapidan was simply to gain time for Gen.
McCiellan's army to get into position some
where in rear Of the Rappahannock. This I at
first hoped to accomplish by landing the troops
Of Gems. Burnside and Mcclellan at Aqua
creek. Bat the time which elapsed between
the arrival OF these two armies compelled me
to bring mos. of Gen. McClellan's forces to
Alexandria, as Gen. Pope was then falling back
from the upper Rappahsnnock before the main
movement was begun it was rapidly carried
out; but there was an unexpected delay in COM
menciug it. Gen. Mcclellan reports the delay
was unavoidable.
sd. That on the 2eth August at l1:9O tele-
graphed to Maj. Gen. Franklin, at Alexandria to
march his corps by Centreville toward Warren
ton and to report to Gen. Pope. Finding that
Fraaklin's corps had not left te,egrap hed 10
Gen. Mcclellan on the 9th at 10 a. m to ha w
it maceh in the direction of Manassas as soon as
possible. On the came day at II M again
telegraphed to Gen. Mcclellan tina. Gen.
Porter reported a general battle i'm minent, and
that Franklin's corps should move out by
forced marches, carrying three or iou- days
provisions; to be afterward supplied as far as
possible by railroad. I also gave him the posi-
tons OF Gen. Pope's troops well as could
ascertain them, and suggested the possibility
that the enemy would attempt to turn his
right. At SPIN. Gen. Mcclellan teiegrsphed
that he should retain Cox's corps with Gen.
Franklin till next morning, and would visit my
headquarters Immediately. lie came to my
headquarters soon after midnight, and left
about O'Clock in the morning of the
28th At our interview I urged on him the
importance Of pushing forward Franklin as
early as possible. Hearing about noon that Gen.
Mcclellan had not reached Alexandria. l tele-
graphed at l2:40 p. m. (2Sth) to Gen. Franklin
II he had not acted on Gen. McClelian's order
to do 40 on mine, and move toward Manassas
Junction. At l p. m. Gen. Mcclellan tele-
graphed TO me that the moment Franklin
could be started With reasonable amount Of
artillery, he should go forward. At 2:45 p. m.
be telegraphed some rumors he had heard about
the enemy's movements and expressed tho
opinion that the troops sent from Alexandria
should be in force, and with cavalry and
artillery. or We should be beaten in detail. I
replied at $50 p. m. that not moment must be
lost in pushing a. large q force possible
toward Manassas, 30 81 to communicate with
Gen. Pope. before tho enemy could be REIN
forced. He telegraphed back that Franklin's
corps was not in condition to move and fight
battle: At s:4t telegrsphed to him that there
must be no further delay in moving Frankin's
corps toward Manassas. that they mus. go to-
morrow morning, ready or not ready. II We
delay too long to get ready there will be no
necessity OF going at all. for Pope will either be
defeated or victorious without our aid. II there
ia q want Of wagons the men must carry pro-
visions with them till the wagons can come to
their relief. At 10 O'Clock he replied that he
had ordered Franklln's corps to move ut
o'clock. On the morning OF the 29th at 1880
he telegraphed to me that Franklin's corps had
started ut q. m, and that he could give him
but two squadrons Of cavalry. At ~ m. he
telegrsphsd that Frnnklin's corps was without
proper ammunition and without transporta-
ton; and again at P. m. he teiegraphed that
in his opinion Franklin ought not to advance
beyond Anandale. At $40 p. m. replied that
I wanted Franklin's corps to go far enough to
find out something about the enemy; that per-
haps he might get such information at Anan-
dale AZ to prevent his going further; that other
wise he would push on toward Fairfax. added
that our people must move more actively and find
out where the ensmyis. Tam tired Of guesses.'
Late in the afternoon heard that Franklin's
corps had halted ut Anandsle and he himself
had been seen in Alexandria in the afternoon.
I immediately telegraphed to Gen. Mcclellan,
| at 7:S0 Pm, that his (Franklin's) being in Al
exandria and his corps halting at Anandale was
contrary to my orders, and ordered him to in
vestigats and report the facts Of this dis
obedience; that his corps must push forward
az directed, protect the railroad and open our
communication with Manassas. Gen. Mcclellan
replied at Pm, referring to his previous tele-
grams, and said that he had not deemed IL safe
for Franklin tomarch beyond Anaudaie. and that
he was responsible for his being in Alexandria
and his corps hating at AnandaIe. Early on the
morning Of the S0th I made inquiries Of
the quartsrmaster general in regard TO trans
portaton. and autographed at $40 TO Gen. No
Ciealan that IVES by no means sstisfied With
Gen. Franklin'a march Of yesterday (29th1.
Considering the circumstances Of the case he
was very wrong In stopping ct Anandale. re-
ferfed to the fact thas he could have obtained
transportation II b. had applied for II 70 the
quartsrmaster's department., and added: He
knew the importance Of opening sommunica-
ton with Gen. PoPss army and should have
aeted more promptly.
''Ths foregoing q, believe, Q correet sum-
mary Of the orders and instructions given BY
me n regard 70 The movement Of Gen! Frank
tivssa - A.. l.