Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-03-18
done TO Pope am persuaded TO say that Gen,
Halieck WIS not free from great responsibility.

done TO Pops l am persuaded to say that Sen.
haiieck vss not free from great responsibility.
IcLnIAx AND STANTON
The last communication, dated July 3, 1864,
Gen. Mcclellan sent Mr.. Stanton wss after the
peuinsular defeat and in which he asked for
100 900 men 10 reinforce his army 10 enable him
TO take Richmond From that day their rela-
tious were not only strained, but Of q very
anomalous character. To Mr.. Stanton il vac
almost unoearabis; but as the President knew
both men. and % Mr.. Stanton was the strong
est, knew that he would stay; that sooner or
later Mr.. Stanton's protest, supplemented bv
that OF ths President and al that they meant in
their wcnderful words. would come up 10 con-
front hat leader who bad after they we're
subject Of those prosssts The occasion which
brought forth both these protests could not be
forgottsu- The surroundings under which
they vsre written were full Of miagivings. The
dread speetsr Of despair cuiminatsd With thess
surroundings In the hearts Of these two great
meant when hssid: "And We hold ourselves
ready ct my time to explain 10 You (himselD
In desau the reasons upon which this opinion y
founded" WI forever remain Q secret SIXTY
six days altar this protest was written Gems.
mand-
In his defense for not sending md for stop
ping Franklin when he did 90, Gen. Mcclellan.
| In his "own story" gives little or nothing of
the orders he received to send his army, and
MI. Prime, bis historian, mutilates Gen. Hal
Franklin should 60 on to FsirfaY and fnd ont
something about the enemy. On the day he
had stopped Franklin and while Pope was still
nghting for the first time Gen. Mcclellan ex-
pressed desire to 60 TO the front In tele-
gram at 1850 I'm. 70 Gen. Halleck he says:
Il cannot express to you the pain and morti-
hcation which have experienced today listen
ing to the distant sound of the firing Of my
men. As I can be of no further use here,
respectfully ask that il there is q probability
OF the conflict being renewee tomorrow / may be
permitted to 60 to the scene Of battle with my
stan, merely to be with my own men, IL nothing
more; they will fight none the worse for my be-
| ing with them- Ii it is not deemed best to in
trust me with the command even Of my own
army l simply ask to be permitted to share
| their fate on the battlefield"
This was i've days after his arrival at Alex
andria, and then Pope had only twenty-one
| thousand men Of Gen. McClellan's army to help
him, and up TO that very moment Franklin was
| not on the battlefield.
MIGHT HAVE REACHED POPE IN ONE DAY.
How strange this all seems when Il is remem-
bered that Manassas was only eighteen miles
from Alexandria and Bull Run only twenty. and
that by marching troops could have reached
from defeat. On the very day that Franklin's
march was stopped even Gen. Porter's corps
| OF regulars on the field and knowing that Pope
was fighting did not help him and on accom-,
! OF which Pope was crushed Had the troops
marched these twenty miles the raid made BY
the enemy in q march Of fifty-eight miles in
two days on Manassas and the destruction of
Bull Run bridge could have bean prevented
Col. Haupt, At Alexandria was pleading that
the troops shorld march, Mr.. Watson and Gen.
Halleck. at Washington, were doing the same,
but ALAS there was no one to lead the march.
Gen. Mcclellan needed no permission to 60
| and had he done so, il only to be with his men,
the army and the people Of the north would
have gone wild with joy, and there would have
been no accession to put the troops In the de-
lenses Of Washington.
| But Generals Mcclellan and Porter not only
| outranksd Pope. but the former had lost his
command and the army he loved so much, and
these things were the Alpha and the Omega OF
| these sad and deplorable proceedings AL
| these things were then known in the War De-
partment, and to them the protests owe Their
origin. The whole peninsular campaign, from
its conception to its ending, was unsatisfactory
| to the President, TO his cabinet and to Mr.
Stanton. the division of the army the siege
the mistakes, the barren victories and the use.
| less slaughter. The endless round Of telegrams
! from its commander, with every variety Of de-
; mand. of reproach and excuses for delays. and
the final disaster sounded the alarm, and the
President realized that his greatest army, the
idol Of his hope, Was passing through thu
shadow Of death.
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