Middletown transcript., 1893-07-15
MIDDLEToWN. DELAWARE, SATURDAY, JULY Is, l89;
There is promptness and lucidity in
the facts tending to ascribe the hard times

There is promptness and lucidity In
the facts tending to ascribe the hard times
to the triumph of the Democratic party,
which does not apply to the effort to ascriPe
it to the passage of the Sherman Law. 1t
is immaterial that the only alternative to
! the passage of the Sherman Law, at the
time it was passed, was the enactment of
the law for the Free Coinage of Silyert
When we inquire of the class who at
Sherman Law, whether the Free Coinage of
Silver, passed in 1892, would have postponed
the panic, they all cry aloud with one voice:
| mo; it would have hastened itl'' If, there
fore, the financial intelligence of the people
| of the United States was at so low an ebb
| that it had to demand either the Sherman
Bill or a Free Silver law, then the Sherman
Bill must be considered as the efficient
agency in postponing the calamity, as we'll
as the chief factor in producing our present
dilemma.
If the Sherman Law were the least of
two evils at the time of its enactment, ii by
no means follows that lame apology will
excuse It's continued existence if it is vicious
in principle, and is doing practical mischief
to-day by causing a withdrawal OF conf
dence from our currercy, an export of gold
or a contraction of credit and crisis.
Nor does it matter that it did not seem to
have these results during the first two years
and four months of It's operation, provided
it was actually producing them at this
moment. And now let us consider its
actual operation. II is asserted that the
purchase and storing of 40 tons Of silver
per month by the Government, the issuing
of Treasury notes in payment for them,
and the redemption Of these Treasury notes
in gold, is indirectly purchase of silver
bullion with gold which stands implicitly
pledged for the redemption of the Govern
ment's legal-tender notes. As the abyss
between gold and silver is one which the
Government cannot bridge over, the issue
of bonds to buy gold, with which to buy
silver, is an attempt to fill up bottomless
chasm from the National Treasury. 1t is
like any other attempt of an exhaustible |
power to satisfy an inexhaustible demand |
This we think is true. But does it necessarily |
follow because the Government is pursuing
a policy which is ruineus to the Treasury, |
therefore general distrust should be felt in
all private enterprises? If third or half |
of all our manufacturing enterprises could
not be successfully continued under tariff |
for revenue only, and if at a popular |
election it has been decided to have tariff |
for revenue only. it is easy to see that such |
an election strikes deadly blow at many |
private enterprises. But a government |
might bankrupt its own treasury; and if |
it stood in no such relation to the people as |
made its promises their money. it would |
not necessarily follow that any pri- |
vate enterprise should also be bankrupt. |
The distrust, therefore. which the Govern
ment,s exhausting process of buying silver
with gold invites must be distrust as to |
whether the Government will or can, con-
with its continued purchases Of
silver with gold at the rate of 140 tons a
month, maintains the parity of greenbacks
and national bank notes with gold. Upon
these rest all our bank deposits, and the
whole money of account on which the
business of the country is transacted. |
The symptom of the supreme crisis would
be the return of gold coin to a premium,
not relatively to silver necessarily. but rela-
lively to the legal tender notes, as it was
from 1862 to 1878. 1t would seem that the
paying out of gold in one in
satiable way @would run it to premium, as
as continually paying it out in
any other Unsuitable way. The subjuga-
ion of the rebellion, if it could not be SUBJ
lued. and the maintenance of the parity of
silver, if the production of silver is always
. be thirty times as abundant as the pro-
luction of gold, are two equally Unsuitable
Obviously. therefore, the con-
inued purchase of silver with gold might
un gold to premium.
Here again, however, we must distinguish
between that distrust of pa ticular policy
IF exigency of government, which expresses
tself by a premium on gold or deprecia-
ion in the selling price of a legal-tender
tote, and distrust of all private business.
During the War, as the distrust toward the
Government deepened. trust in private in
Iustry increased. The higher the premium
IN gold, the greater the confidence of the
business community in its customers and
n the future. Both Henry G. Carey and
len. Benjamin F. Butler went so far as to
ope they would never live to see the
remium disappear from gold. They
hought discredit to the Government actu-
lily conducive to individual prosperity.
wen if the Sherman Law is wrong it does i
ot follow that it tends 10 create the present !
nancial crisis. 1t might clearly give rise i
0 great distrust in the Government without |
reating any distrust ih private business. II