Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1893-07-06
WEAK LEVIATHAHs.

Lessons From tho Victoria Disaster That
VIII Have Effect Upon Future Naval
Construction.
New York Tribune, June Goth.
The Victoria disaster will inevitably
have an important bearing upon the
future of naval construction. Until the
details are received in official form and
the causes of the sudden overturn of
the ship are explained, discussion of ex-
pert theories is Improbable. Whether
the maneuvres were rendered dangerous
by new code of signalling, or whether
the disaster was caused by an inexplica-
BILE collapse of steering-gear or machin-
cry, the structural weakness of one bat
tleship and the tremendously destructive
energy of the others ram are facts
which do not require demonstration.
The modern battleship is shown by this
catastrophe to be at once weaker in de-
fensive resources and stronger in Often
sive power than naval designers have
supposed.
In the deliberations of experts at
almost every recent stage of the progress
of naval architecture the first place has
been accorded to the question of armor.
Battleships have been built mainly with
a view to rendering them floating targets
capable of withstanding the heaviest
gun fire. Provided with an armor belt
of great thickness for the defence of
machinery, they have been converted
into floating fortresses with impregnable
redoubts for artillery of the highest
power. While there haye been two
characteristic types of battleship, the
turret-ship with low or moderate free
board at the ends and the barbette ship
with greater freeboard and guns carried
higher above water, it has been impossi-
BILE in either case to adjust the weights
of armor, machinery and guns so as to
avoid "top-heaviness" and to afford pro-
lection below the water line. With
solid steel belt capable of resisting the
impact of shot from 110-ton guns, the
Victoria, like every other battle-ship,
was vulnerable below the armored line
and unprepared for the onset of ram or
submarine torpedo. The longitudinal
compartments were filled with water as
soon as the great rent was made in
her side; an enormous weight was added
to that of guns and armor, and it was on
one side of the ship; the centre OF
gravity was changed, and the great bat
tleship turned turtle and went down
bottom up. That is as Ineligible an
account of the disaster as can be fur
nished from the dispatches. 1t uner-
ringly indicates that the most powerful
vessel Of war is structurally weak when
struck below the belt.
Ii ramming alone could make the rent
in the ships side by which the Victoria
was instantly disabled and destroyed,
there would be less cause for dismay
among naval experts. What happened
| in familiar man@uvre when the ships
were changing column could not be re-
peated in u naval engagement without
| great risk to the ramming ship. If the
| Camperdown had been an enemy, bear
| ing down for deadly conflict at close
| quarters, the Victoria could have beaten
her back with heavy fire, or she could
| have outmaneuvred her and menaced
the assailant with counter attack from
her own ram. Battleships, so long as
they have guns to serve and machinery
in running order, can be expected to
protect themselves against one another;
but they are exposed to other sources OF
danger. The unprotected ships side
below the armor belt cannot resist the
sudden impact Of the torpedo. A rent
made in that quarter by the sting of one
| of these wasps would inevitably have
sent any leviathan of the Mediterranean
fleet to the bottom. Admiral Ammen is
probably right when he asserts that the
accident at Malta last spring, when O.
torpedo-hoat ran into the batilr1.IJ
| Nile, was hardly less significant than
| the Victoria disaster.