The sun., 1893-07-04
How the Victoria Was Lost.

The official story of the disaster of Tripoli
| is at last told, and until detailed investi-
cation Of the affair is held by the court
martial already called at Portsmouth.
nothing further OF consequence Is likely to
be made known as to its main features.
While public judgment upon the COM
manding officer. who Is no longer living to
speak for himself. will neither be hasty nor
harsh. it must be said that all the evidence
tends to the belief that the primary error
which led to the disaster was Vice
Admiral TRYoN's own mistake in ordering
the execution OF man9uvre when
there was not sufficient distance be-
tween the columns to perform 1t. The
two divisions were six cable lengths
apart. AS a cable length Is one-tenth OF
sea mile. or about 60S feet. the distance be-
tween them was about $3.50 feet, or not
quite three-fourths OF statute mile. when
the order was given by Admiral TRYoN
from the Victoria, for the first division to
alter Its course sixteen points to port and
for the second to alter sixteen points to
starboard. Rear Admiral MARKHAM re-
ports that. as he considered the distance in
adequate for the purpose, he indicated from
the Camperdown that the signal was not
understood. but. before he could request an
explanation. was asked by signal from Ad-
miral TRYoN what he was waiting for.
Trusting to his superior. he then obeyed
the order. and the crash followed.
1t may be suggested that the position In
which Admiral MARKHAM is placed does not
make him dsinterested witness as to the
cause Of the disaster. But the testimony
OF the Victorias officers confirms him in the
essential point. Capt. BoURKE, command
ing that vessel. says that when the original
formation in two divisions was ordered. he
and Staff Commander SMITH were in Ad-
miral TRYoN's cabin. The Admiral ex-
planned his proposed maneuvres. and said
the columns were to be six cables apart.
whereupon Commander SMITH suggested
that eight cables would be better and the
Admiral said: "Yes. 1t should be eight
cables" Yet. when the order was issued. it
proved to be six cables. and accordingly
Commander SMITH sent to remind the Ad-
miral that he had decided on eight. but
the answer came to let the distance remain
at six. Lord GUILFoRD. Flag Lieuten-
ant Of tho Victoria. confirms absolutely
this version OF the affair. saying that it
was to him that the Admiral gave direc-
tions to make the distance six cables; that
thereupon Commander SMITH told him that
the Admiral wished the distance to be eight
cables. and not six; finally. that he in
formed the Admiral Of what Commander
SMITH had said. and got for an answer that
the distance was to be six cables.
But was this distance too small for safe
man9uvring? On this point there will be-
first. the testimony Of experts at the court
martial. and then an examination Of The
question whether there was any hesitation
or delay or any other fault Of execution.
the absence Of which might have prevented
the collision. OF this latter. however. there
has hitherto been no indication. and even
II there were such q fault. 1t could hardly
set aside the conclusion that the primary
cause Of the disaster was TRYoN's order.
The question whether anything could
have been done to lessen the magnitude Of
the loss Of life Vill be for investigation by |
itself. The evidence seems to be strong |
that the engines were reversed as soon as !
could have been expected when the collision |
seemed inevitable. Admiral TRYoN's signal !
to the other vessels. which were getting out |
their boats for rescue. simply shows that he |
did not appreciate the peril Of the Victoria. |
and expected to save her. AS to the water |
tight doors. it Is made clear that they had |
been left open on both ships. and that the |
orders to close them were given only Just
before the collision. Whatever was the
degree Of success in executing these orders.
and apart from the question whether the
was not fatal In any case. 1t ap-
pears evident that bulkhead doors should
be kept closed during such man9uvres.
and indeed in all possibilities OF a perilous
collision with ship or shore.