The record-union. [volume] (Sacramento, Calif.) 1891-1903, 1893-02-14
Home RULE FOR IRELAND.
coNr1NuEp rRoM r1psr rAeE..

comes clause providing for full revo-
luton of the executive power from the
sovereign upon the Viceroy. Then
comes an important provision for an APP,
preparation for an Executive Committee
by the Privy Council of Ireland. We
propose to make this Executive Council
for ordinary affairs of the Cabinet, Vice
roy.
ut appeared to us highly inconvenient
TO alter the numbers of the legislative
assembly. We therefore leave the num-
Der at 10S, and fl the term at five years.
Next, as to the legislative council,
Gladstone said they came to the conclu-
sion that nominated council would be a
weak council, and therefore proposed to
elect the council. 'How do we difleren-
tate this council for the popular Assem-
ply? We propose to fix the number at
1orty-eight, with an eight years. term OF
Office, the term of the popular assembly
being lesser. The bill must include a
provision for meeting what is called a
deadlock. In case where a bill is adopted
by the assembly more than once, and
where there is an interval oftwo years
between the two adoptions, or dissolu-
non of Parliament, then upon its second
adoption the two assemblies may be re-
CURED to meet and the fate of the bill is
TO be decided in joint assembly. [Cheers. ]
Next, all appeals shall lie to the Privy
Council alone, not TO the Council and
Lords. The Privy Council may try the
invalidity of any Irish act"
Other clauses provide for the security
OF pmnlnn1qntS NJ 4
officers generally. Then there is clause
intended TO correspond with the colonial
validity law, the effect of which is that if
The Irish Legislature should pass any act
IN any way contrary to acts of the Impe-
rial Parliament, such laws shall be good
except i'll so far as it is contrary to an
Imperial enactment
Two Exchequer Judges shall be ap-
pointed under authority of the crown,
mainly for financial business. Beside
the Exchequer Judges, it provides for six
years that all judges shall be appointed
as now. We do not reserve for the I'M
perial Parliament the power to fix emolu-
nents. These will be fixed in Ireland,
and the effect win be to establish joint
control Of these appointments.
The month of September is probably
the most convenient month for the AS
sembly to meet. Therefore a clause pro-
viding that it shall meet on the first
Tuesday in September. Prolonged Irish
cheers.l We propose gradual reduction
and ultimate dissolution or disappear
ance OF the constabulary force with the
discharge of every obligation toward
them, in such way as will not adversely
affect the interests of that honorable force.
During the period of transition they are
To be under the control of the Viceroy. It
is contemplated that they will be re-
placed by force owing its existence to
Irish authorities in local areas.
ION the important subject of the reten-
ton of Irish members in the Imperial
Parliament, there are strong arguments
which may be alleged in defense of the
proposition. Although l do not at all
admit that parliamentary supremacy de-
ponds upon the retention of Irish mem
bers, yet quite admit that the retention
OF members has great practical import
ance, because it exhibits supremacy in
manner Ineligible to the people. Be-
side, it gives Ireland full voice in all Par
@AeN'AiNAAt iiltAtbblS. AIGdT. near
The British budgets will more or less
influence Irish pecuniary balances. 1t
Is therefore desirable, for the purpose of
mitigating any inconvenience which
might thence arise, that ireland should
have something to say about the British
budgets. l know no argument against
the retention of Irish members at West
munster. Their retention involves two
points: First, as to members, and sec
ondly, as to the voting power. Now. as
70 the first question, that of numbers,
The population of Great Britain has in
creased, while Ireland diminished. and
has now reached point that, whereas
formerly entitled to l03 members. it
would, according to the same ratio, now
have eighty. imply that representation
in the House from Ireland would be
composed of eighty Irish gentlemen.
Now comes great difficulty. What
voting power are the eighty members to
have? Ireland is to be represented here
FULLY; that is my first postulate. Nv
second postulate is that Ireland is to he
invested with separate powers, subject.
no doubt, to imperial authority, yet still
with separate powers over Irish affairs.
Then the question before us is that she
now votes so strongly upon matters
purely British. There is reason both
ways. We cannot find absolutely an
accurate line of cleavage between ques-
lions that are imperial and those that are
Irish. Unless the Irish members are
allowed to vote on all British questions.
they must have too little or too much.
We do not see the possibility of exclud-
ing them from one of the highest and
most important functions of the House.
That is determining composition of
executive power. L do not see it possible
to exclude Irish members from voting on
a great subject for want of confidence.
Next, unless the Irish members vote on
all questions, you break parliamentary
tradition.
NOW come reasons against universal
voting powers. 1t would be a great
anomaly if these eighty Irish members
should come here continually to inter-
vene in questions purely and absolutely
British. The whole subject is full of
thorns and brambles, but our object is
the autonomy and self-government of
Ireland in ali matters properly Irish. The
Irish people certainly did not raise the
difficulty of retention of Irish members
in the House. This is secondary mat
ter in their eyes, and ought not to inter-
fere with the principal aim. In the face
of q feeling of uncertainty over questions
of the retention OF the Irish members, we
have affixed to the paragraph concerning
the questions, the words Excepting and
until Parliament shall determine coming