Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-06-06
OLD LICENSES GOOD.
The Bush Liquor Case Decided
Against the District.
A DISSENTING OPINION.
The Views Of the Majority Of the Court Of
Appeals Set Forth in an Elaborate Opin-
fon-Chief Justice Alvey's Views for sus-
tanning the Judgment of the Lower Court.

The liquor licenses issued before March last
under the old law are good until November l..
That is practically what the Court Of Appeals
decided today.
In an opinion delivered by Justice Shepard,
and concurred in by Justice Morris, the court
today sustained the contention made by the
appellant in what is known as the Bush case,
that Judge Miller Of the Police Court had erred
! in refusing to admit evidence liquor license
which had been granted Bush under the license
law in force prior to March 8, 1885, The Bush
case was a test case to settle the question
whether dealer doing business under license
| issued under the old law for the license
year ending November l. 1898, was required
when the new law was enacted to take out a
new license under the new law Judge Miller
held that the new law repealed the old and
annulled licenses issued under il. The
majority Of the Court of Ap-
peas are Of the opposite opinion,
| and by their decision remand the case for
| new trial, holding that Judge Miller erred in
refusing to admit the old license In evidence.
Chief Justice Alvey dissented and delivered an
opinion sustaining the position taken by Judge
Miller.
The Opinion OF the Court.
Following Is the text Of the opinion delivered
by Judge Shepard, in which Judge Morris con-
Cured:
March 8. 1893, Congress passed an act, which
took effect from passage, regulating the sale Of
liquors in the District Of Columbia, and the
manner Of obtaining license therefor.
Before this time the sale of liquors had been
regularly licensed under the provisions Of an
act of the old legislative assembly Of the Dis
trict, enacted August %, 1871.
While the sale Of liquors at wholesale and
retail is fully permitted under each act, the
later one is more stringent in its provisions
with respect to the terms and conditions upon
which licenses may be obtained. as well as the
manner in which the business shall be con-
Quoted.
Among other things the license fee for keep
ing bar room has been raised from $100 to
S400 per year.
By provision Of the old law the license year
was made to terminate November l Of each
year, and each license, no matter when issued,
was made to expire on that day, and had then
to be renewed.
The new law provides that no license shall
issue for a longer period than one year, but
creates no special license year Of its own, I'M
less lnferentially, in the seventeenth section,
hereafter noticed.
Bush had taken out license under the old
law, which, by Its terms, authorized him to keep
bar room until November l, 1893. and con-
tinued the sale Of liquors hereunder without
taking out, or applying for, a license under the
new law.
he was prosecuted in the Police Court of the
District for sales Of liquors proved to have
been made on March H. I893 was convicted.
and has sued out writ of error 10 the Supreme
Court of the District In General Term.
whence It hss besn transferred TO this court by
operation 3ffaw.
Bush did not upon the trial deny the sale of
he hnnnra fha Aafa Oh A,,s~ Ia
to justify under the unexpired license afore-
said. which he offered in evidence.
The court, holding that the new law entirely
repealed the old and abrogated all licenses
issued Hereunder, excluded the license. and
this action, having been duly excepted to. is
assigned as error.
1t not denied by the plaintiff in error that
Congress had the power to annul all existing
license without compensation or rebate to the
licensees, but it is denied that the new law has
this effect. On the contrary, it is claimed that
its provisions expressly recognize the existing
licenses as valid for their unexplred terms.
THE REPEALING CLAUSE.
The repeating clause of the act of March 8.
1898, reads as follows
Sec. 81. That this act shall be in lieu of and
as substitute for all existing laws and regula-
tions in the District of Columbia in relation to
the sale of distilled and fermented LIQUORS in
the said District, and that all laws or parts of
laws inconsistent with this act except such
laws as are applicable to the sale of hquor
within one mile of the Soldiers Home be, and
they are hereby, repealed.
The language OF this clause is peculiar and
renders it apparent that Congress intended this
act rs a complete substitute for all other laws
and regulations upon the subject, and that
thereafter all licenses should be taken out and
all prosecutions maintained under its provisions
alone
tha L. 4
eral policy OF the new law is not different to
that OF the old; it has not in view the suppress
sion OF the sale of liquor any more than the old,
but simply provides more stringent regulations
In the interest of order and decency as well as
considerable Increase in the revenue to be de-
rived therefrom.
The new statute makes no provision whatever
by its terms with respect to the uncxpred Ii
censes issued under the old law and contains
no re ference to them unless it may be found in
the l7th section, which reads as follows:
That all applicants who have had Incense
during the preceding year shall apply for a
renewal of such license on or before November
l OF each license year, and shall be per-
mitted to continue business until license
shall be granted or refused by
the excise board; but in all cases of refusal to
grant license such proportion Of the license fee
as may have become due shall be deducted and
retained from the sum deposited therefor as
the time from the first day of November to the
date Of such refusal bears to the entire license
year, and no other person shall be permitted to
conduct said business until license is issued
therefor"
1t is contended on behalf of the plaintiff in
error that this section refers to the license year
rs created by the old law (Which is in force still
as to some other occu upation), and expressly
recognizes the liquor licenses Hereunder as
continuing in force until November l. 1893
In the view that we have taken Of the case it
is not necessary to decide this question: and
this section is only considered in arriving at
the intention Of Congress as contained in the
whole act.
In constituting statute its subject matter,
reason and effect must all be looked to- and if
its words, taken literally, bear an unreasona BILE
dgnifcation there may be some deviation fro m
the ordinary sense. unless it be plain that su ch
Specification only was intended
THE INTENTION OF CONGRESS-
While it is not within the Judicial power, by
construction. to cure defects which may rem
der laws unjust or even oppressive. if they
clearly exist yet no statute should be so con-
strued as to render it unreasonable or Must
in its operations if there be room for construc-
tiOn at all.
Then, III the absence of any expressed in
tention to abrogate all licenses issued under
the old law, and in the light of the subject mat
ter, reason and spirit of the new law tax en- in
connection also with the ambiguous language
OF the seventeenth section and certain express