The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1893-03-23

Wavre. towards BRUSSELS, aroused
the Emperor's suspicious of Blucher's
move.
Meantime, Marshal Grouchy, with
$4,000 men, had been detailed to
follow the Prussians and keep them
out of the way. He received his in
structions to hang on their rear, to
follow up the victory, and defeat them
again if possible. ssIn the meantime
said Napoleon, 81 am going to fight the
English, if they stand this side OF the
forest of Soignes."
While Napoleon was fighting the
Prussians, Marshal Ney, at Quatre
Bras, was fighting the English, and
trying to take by force a position
which he should have occupied before
the enemy came up. This kept him from
rendering substantial aid to Napoleon
at Ligny, thus putting Butcher for the
time out of the fight. This error of
Marshal Ney's has furnished one Of
the great offs of history. If he had
occupied Quatre Bras on time, if he
had been free to deliver the expected
blow at Ligny, the map of Europe
might now have been different. But
Marshal Ney, through an error or
misunderstanding, changed probable
fact into a conjecture.
Napoleon still had a glorious oppor
tunity. On the morning of the 18th
of June, Wellington was at Quatre
Bras with half his army. Ney was in
front of him with a large force of
troops, comparatively fresh, and in
high spirits. Napoleon was less than
ten miles off, with the flower of-his
army, large part of which had done
but little fighting the day before. Had
he moved to the support of Ney at
daybreak, he would have fallen on
Wellington with an army twice as
large as the latter's, and Waterloo
would never have been fought. But
here again Marshal Ney was at fault.
Furious at what he supposed Napo-
Icons interference with him the day
before in Withdrawing some Of his
troops, he made no effort to notify
him of the presence of half of the
English army in such dangerous
position. Napoleon, worn out with
three days canstant marching and
fighting, rested at Fleurus, ignorant
of the opportunity slipping through
his fingers. Here seems to be the
only evidence that in the Waterloo
campaign, the emperor was not his old
self. Surely the man OF Auterltz
would not have delayed at such
moment. Half the day of the 18th
was thus lost, and when Napoleon
reached Quatre Bras, he found the
English in full retreat, getting out of
the trap in which they had placed
themselves as fast as their legs would
carry them, and Marshal Ney quietly
allowing the performance to go on.
Napoleon saw his lost opportunity.
They have ruined France he said
and from that time on his energy was
that of whirlwind. He Immediately
assumed charge of the pursuit, which
an officer of the Guard afterward
described as ga march which resem-
bled a steeple chase more than the
pursuit of an enemy in retreat" All
the afternoon of the I 9TH it continued,
through torrents of rain, until the
English took position in front of the
forest of Soignes, on the border of
which, on the Brussels road, is the
little village of Waterloo. Here on
the night of the 18th Of June, Napo
leon, in hot pursuit of the fugitives of
Quatre Bras, overlook them.
Meantime, what had become of
Marshal Grouchy and the Prussians?
The latter had done the unexpected
thing, and having abandoned their
base on the Namur road, were in full
march to join Wellington, Marshal
Grouchy in close pursuit. On the
morning of the 18th OF June, memoir
able day, the Prussians were near
Wavre, on the left of the English
army, and Grouchy was in their rear.
The situation had changed, the
instructions which he had received
from the emperor were no longer
binding, and he was at liberty to use
his own Judgment There could no
longer be any doubt of Butchers
purpose. 1t was to reach the English.
1t was Marshal Grouchy's duty to
prevent this. He failed to do so.
And Napoleon was lost. Of all the
controversies of military history, this
question of Grouchy's blunder has been
the most thoroughly discussed. Mr..
Ropes seems to have exhausted it., and
his conclusions appear just. Napoleon
should have known where Butcher
was. 1t is true he endeavored to do
SO on the. evening of the 18th and the
morning of the 18th. But Blucher's
purpose to join Wellington was mani
fest on the night OF the 10th and the
morning of the 18th. AS soon as his
army forsook its base on the Namur
road, his purpose to join Wellington
was obvious. Had Napoleon been in
| ioitl VI tillS DelOIe TIC gave OIOuCHy
his instructions, and it could have been
easily known at that time, Grouchy
would have been at Waterloo instead
of conducting stupid pursuit which
was leading him away from the battle
field. Here was Napoleon's mistake.
But Grouchy is none the less response
ble. As soon as he discovered the di-
recton of the Prussian retreat, he
should have Immediately seen what
Napoleon would have seen, and should
have SO directed his pursuit as to effect
lively check the Prussians, or join the
emperor at Waterloo.
There is not space here to rehearse
that famous battle 1t is already a