The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1893-06-29
IN DEFENSE OF LEE.
a Reply to Gen. Longstreet' Ar
ticle in the New Orleans
Tines-Democrat.

thor deserves the thanks OF Gen. Lees
admirers and the impartial student OF
history, was written b. W r. Henry,
Esq, in reply to the criticism OF Gen.
Longstreet, which is published on the
fourth page of the GOLD LEAF this week.
Mr.. Henry communication is taken from
the Ne,es and Obssrvcr and is as follows:
Many thousands Of the boys and girls
OF North Carolina gather thoughts and
facts from your valuable paper that are
to constitute part OF the life OF the COM
ing generation. They should not~ be
misied or imposed upon Thousands Of
your adult readers in this and other
States, and veteran Confederates all
over the South, will be shocked to read
the opinion expressed in the article in
the New Orleans TImeS-D cmocruf, copied
in your paper OF the Dist inst. Your
scrupulOus care in regard to the accuracy
OF matter appearing in YOUR columns is
well known and appreciated by the public.
General LOngstreet in that article ex-
presses opinions that are not sustained
by the voice OF impartial history, nor by
q single one OF his contemporaries SO far
as have been able TO find by ditiment in
vestigatiOn. Please give me space to
present the opposite view, by calling
some OF the great actors and witnesses
OF the war period to the stand.
All North Carolinians have great love
and admiration for the Genera Long
street Of the war. He vas in thair 0rin-
ion second only to Gen Lee after the fall
OF StonewaII Jackson. We thank him
for these splendid words: AZ can truth
fully attest that the Old North State
furnished as brave and gallant troops
as were in the Confederate ranks, and
that is saying as much as can be said for
soldiers But We can not allow the
following statement in his article to go
unchaIlenged Says he:
General Lee displayed his greatest
weakness as q tactical commander at
Gettysburg. The tactics there We're weak,
and fatal to success. His attacks were
made in detail, and not i'll one c0-Ordi-
nete, overwhelming rush as they should
have been. The first collision was an
| unforeseen accident. We failed at Gettys-
burg because we had undertaken too
great q contract and went about it in
the wOrng way" ii his statement is
true il is q blur upon General Lees mill
tary genius, if false, it reflects no credit
upon either Gen. LOngstreet's motive or
intelligence. 1t is not true LongstrCo5
lost the battle Of Gettysburg by not obey
ing Gen. Lees orders. 70 sustain this
statement present part of the article
published i'll the Century NdgiZinc for
1887, which was iii reply to General
Longstreet ) article in Il former number,
III which he expressed substantially the
same sentiments rs those expressed
above:
"General Longstreet would have us
infer that he was not ordered by Gen.
Lee to attack early on the second day;
but that his memory is at fault on this
point has been abundantly shown by
Gems. Eitzhugh Lee, PendIeton. Early.
7 Wilcox and many Others No testimony
on this point is more direct and cOnclu-
sive than that Of Gen. 4. L. Long, mill
| tary secretary to Gen. Lee. He saws ia
| his recently published "Mem0rics Of r.
| Lee" (page 2I7,) that on the evening OF
| the LIST, when Gen. Lee had decided not
! TO renew the attack on Cemetery Hill
that day, he said Gn Longs Drcscnco)
/ 10 LOngstrcot and Hill, Gentlemen, We
! will attack the enemy in the morning as
! early as practicable Long continues:
t In the cOnycroatiO that succeeded he
| (LeC) directed them TO make the neccS-
! sary preparations and be ready for
/ prompt action the next day" Long
! shows plainly that Gen. Lees design
/ was to attack the troops in front before
| the whole Federal army could get up,
| and he describes graphically the impati-
| once Lee showed next morning, as early
| as q. m, at LOngstrcetf5 delay. Gen.
! LOngstrect is wrong too, in giving the
! impression that his divisions were fifteen
! or twenty miles away Oh the night of the
| list, for in his official report he says chat
| McLaWS' division : reached Marsh
| Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, o
| little after dark.
The fact is that Gen. Longstrect,
/ though knowing fully the condition Of
| things Oh the night OF the first, knowing
| that Lee had decided to attack thatpart
OF the Federal army in his front, knowing
| that every hour strengthened Meade and
| diminished the chances Of Confederate
| success, and knowing that his CORPS was
to open The battle and deliver the main
assault, consumed the time from day-
Light to nearly t p. N. Oh July End, in
! moving his troops about four miles.
over no serious obstacles, and in getting
them into battle. Meantime on the Fed
erai side lancOcks corps, which had
camped three miles from Gettysburg,
reached the field by 6 Or q. NJ. Sicllles'
two brigades that had been left at
Emmettsburg came up by 9 q. H.; the
rear OF the Fifth Corps, after q march
OF 81 miles in 80 hours, by . p. IN. Had
LongStreet attacked not later that Q or
10 a. m, as Lee certainly expected,
Sickles' and Hanc0ck's corps would have
been defeated before part OF the F'ifthand
the Sixth Corps arrived. Little Round
Top (Which, as ii was, the Fifth Corps
| barely managed to seize in time) would
| have fallen into Confederate possession;
and even ii nothing more had been done
this would have given the Ge!d to the
| ConIcderatcs, since the Federal line all
the way to Cemetery lii was Untonable
with Round Top in hostile hands
Victory on the third day was for the
| tonfederates far more difficult problem
| than on the second but it was still with
in their reach But one need not be sur
| prlscd at the failure of Pickett's attack
after reading in this article OF the hesita
| ton, the want OF confidence and hearty
cooperation, with which General Long
street directed it. Lee never intended
| that Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble
should fight unsupported by the remain
! der OF the army. lie expected that
| with proper concert Of action = we
should ultimately succeed" Icc's re-
port.) L.ongstreet was directed to use
| his whole corps, and when he felt cnbar-
raised by the Federal forces on or near
the Round Tops he was given a division
and half from \. 7. Hills corps with
| power to call for more General Long
says: The original intention Of Cen
eral Lee was that Picllctt's attack should
be supported by the divisions Of McLaws
and Hood. and General L0ngstrect was
so ordered" C'Memors Of Lee, p. 294
See also statements OF C0lonels Tenable
and Taylor. -Four Years with General
| Lee, page 10S) Lees efforts for q CON
| certed attack were Intellectual. Pickett
was overwhelmed not by troops in front
| but by those on his tanks, esp ecially by
those on his right flank, where Wilcox
was sent forward too late TO be OF use,
and where he was too weak to have
u. - i 1 L