New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1893-01-22
SEA POWER IN HISTORY.
ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION.

r r c',a, nh, r uahan. T.. : s. In two vol
" nc. 'S0' PIP "'' "
Those who have read Captain Maians book
upon the influence Of sea power on history III
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries VIII
he prepared to expect IN these volumes con-
tinuation Of remarkable interest ana stroh" su3-
.;cetiveness Nor will this anticipation De IN
onv way disappointed, Tor the author has utilized
10 the full rare opportunity for enforcing VIVA.
is really the groundwork of all his historical
works. namely, the great. nay. the vital. I'M
portancc for maritime nations. OF keeping al
WAYS in readiness to protect and defend their
ocean communications The epoch which cap
tain Mahan has now selected for purposes OF
illusration affords more frequent lessons ana en-
amplcs than can be found in any other part OF
modern history. For between 1893 and ISL
the conflict which shook the civilized world lay
between a great land power and a great sea
power, and in the end the latter ovcrran the
former. hy methods which might seem indirect.
but. under the craftsmanship Of Pitt. were re-
ally aimed AT the very heart of the enemy
1t might be an interesting subject OF specu-
Ia,ion what would have happened had tic navy
al France at the opening of the Revolution been
in a soundcr condition But il is evident that
its unsoundncss was mainly attributable 10 the
methods of the Revolution itself. 1t would as q
practical inquiry, he no mote use to Mit such
a question than TO ask what the Revolution would
have effected without the Terror. Lacking that
grim and CHASTITY machinery, the opportunity OF
Napoleon might have been indefinitely delayed:
hut such considerations are idle speculaton The
fact very properly emphasized in this history. Is,
that the Revolution itself destroyed France as
grea sea power. and that it did this by break
ing up discipline in the national navy, by driv-
off
he officers and by putting the control and di-
rcction of the navy into the hands OF incompetent
persons Louis the Sixteenth had brought the
service up to comparatively high state oil
efficiency. The responsibility for its subsequent
wreck cannot be charged upon him. 1t was the
work Of the revolutionary fury, and Of nothing
else.
Captain Mahan shows that tic feet fell under
this mischievOus influence at a very carly stage
of tho Revolution. The movement took the form
OF mob attacks upon naval officers and especially
commanders. The revolutionary impulse was to
attack everything that savorci of oyer-ordshp,
nor did tho frenzicd agitators ever pause to con-
slider how without discipline. naval operations
of any kind could be carried ON. II soon got TO
he an accepted tenet that the conduct of a war
vessel must lie directed by the will OF the crew.
What they voted, the officers must carry out.
If cruise the majority of them desired to 90
into port again, the captain must obey them
There were TO be no punishments-savc and en-
ccpt for the officers themselves Nobody was TO
do any duty unless he wished TO do so Nobody was
TO give orders TO the ii orders were given,
nobody nec1 pay ans attention TO them At the
great backwards and naval stations the people OF
the ports took an active part in the conduct of
naval affairs There was no central authority TO
Interfere with mob caprice or TO check mob
Lotto vrbp
leaders of the Terror thought themselves firmly
fixed in their place, reSolute efforts were made
10 put down this phase of anarchy with the strong
hand and the mob made to feel that ii was
no longer master But for long time the navy
was delivered over to anarchy. and IT. morale
was completely ruined before the reaction oc-
Cured
or course the fact that most of the naval
officers belonged to the nobility, helped TO agra
vate the popular feeling against them, and 50
made the situation worse. The real ana pre-
scrptivc sins of the aristocracy also came to the
front TO plague them and to furnish some shadow
of justification for their ASSISTANTS. But the Tact
remained that these officers We're the only skilled
scamcn in the service of the country: and France
was TO learn, by bitter experience that sailors
cannot be made 70 order, and that training and
knowledge arc essential to their efficiency in a
navy 1t was perhaps fortunate for France at
this time that the English navy was in no very
satisfactory condition. In 1898, indeed, 1t
was badly found, insufficient in numbers,
i-dsdplined and, generally speaking, poorly
differed BIT the good peace-lOver Pitt could
adapt himself to war policy. and he lost no time
in reorganizng and Strengthening the navy in
every possible way.
The result that when war between the two
countries was made inevitable by the arrogant
fla liSh
sea power had already been brought to a state of
preparation which assured it the predomnancc
English Ministers aimed at. 1t has been the OBJ
iect of Captain Mahan in these volumes to SHOW
how in the fierce and stubborn struggle which
ensued, il was the sea power that forced the hand
Of the land power; that compelled the latter to
measures inimical to its true interests; which by
degrees drew an iron grdle round France, crush
ing her foreign commerce, impoverlshing her mer-
chants, draining her resources, and finally starV-
ing her into peace. And but for the genius OF
Napoleon, this result would have been reached
long before. in accordance with Pitts forecast.
What both the Pitts sought, observes the author,
WAS as follows: Each in his day, TO strengthen
his country and TO weaken the enemy, pursued
the same great Tine of policy. which in the onc
ace and in the other fitted the situation of Great
Britain To extend and consolidate her sea
power: TO Law the world under contributions 10
her commerce to control the sea by an all-powcr-
full navy 10 extend her colonial empire by con-
quest, thereby increasing her resources multiply
ing her naval bases. and depriving her enemy
alike of revenues and of points whence he could
trouble English shipping 10 embarrass the great
enemy, France, by Substituting continental allies
such was the policy of both the Pitts: such alike
in the Revolution and in the Seven Years War,
was the policy imposed by a due recognition, not
a., al NTH, - lt lint
Of her position in relation to the general strug-
gle"
In the final chapter of Captain Mahan's second
ynlum;. will be found a fOrcIhlX written and