New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1893-06-20
PRINCE BISMARCK.
IL.
Ills VIEWS ON P0LlTICS-ON THE ARAlN
CItI-ON SOCIALISM IN GERMANY

but at first they were tllc Poii'i"S vi A''.oAS-
rub. They are quite enough TO occupy me- ne
said. land quite as intractabe as any l have
had to deal with elsewhere. FOR here at Fried
rchsruh we have swans and ducks and rats. who
will not live at peace with each other II left to
themselves. and they give great deal OF
trouble The swans are not on good terms with
the ducks: in fact they want to eat them, or
their Young and the rats are the enemies OF Doth.
It il extremely difficult to construct constitu-
ton under which they can all thrive, or 10 make
them understand what is best Tor eacn -then
after q pause, and with twinkle especially
Tie rats He continued ;" try TO MAKE my
will prevail Il have tiicd that before, In othee
affairs. and sometimes succeeded ana sometlmee
not-but | have to resort, as l did wheh was
Chancellor. 70 all sortsepf devices. They VIII not
do "a I saw merely because l say 50. The swans
have to be kept to themselves by wire renee az
YOU will see. They are the majority out nia!ori-
ties in Germany do not always nave '"eH OWN
way.p This dsquisiton on the politics OF the
swans and ducks proceeded Tor some time with
the utmost gravity. There was no eiiort 10 apply
the allegory closely, or to identity the swans OF
the ducks, still less the rats, WIN any eAis'i"s
political party or group. 1t was, nevertheless, an
aIIeco,v and it was possible to imagine that, II
ono could lool, into the Princes mind, simitudes
n.icht bc discoycrabc.
The Army Bill followed not long after the swans
and ducks. and was discussed with equal gravity.
Prince Hsnarck's opposition to the bill which tle
Emperor deems vital to Germany has never been
a secret and is no secret now. lie gave MS rea-
sons or some of his reasons, for thinking 1t pad
bill in itself The Army, he admitted or indeed
asserted, undoubtedly needs strengthening, put
this bill would do il in the wrong way; or, rather,
il would not strengthen the army, 1t would
weaken il.
You do not want more men. Increasing the
number Of men would mean drawing oil great
many officers to train the new soldiers. ms
would involve the making all at once of many
new and inexperienced officers weakening the
army in one most essential respect. There are not
non-commisSioned officers enough not enough VINO
could drill all these men and perform their pres
cnt duties You cannot create them. Where are they
to come from? Nor, if you had the men and the
officers all ready for the emergency which the
trainers of hi, bI contem. lac. cOud you US, them
for an emergency. When war breaks ont there
will be, az first, perhaps three or iour pattes AZ
difier'n nj points ahoat the same time. Inc resuis
of these battles may decide the campaign, must'
at any rate, have great influence on the fortunes
Of the war They will be- fought, each one OF
item hy perhaps poo, 900 or, at most, a quarter
is TO say, for your own emergency and for whas
is likely 10 be the most critical If not decisive
moment of the conflict, million OF soldiers. You
cannot u.r more PIT reserves, and Tor 1nturs
battles which may or may not have TO be fought.
Hut Won have three millions already. What Is the
use Of another $4,000?
No, what the army wants is more artillery
We won last with France by artillery.
The best artillery will win the next, even moro
certainly. so changed are the conditions OF war;
that, without COMPETENT artillery, the best IN
fantry can 40 more by itself win d battle than
cavalry could Iut III this arm, though We may
e still superior 10 France, We are not superior In
the same proportion that We were In 1870. The
certainty Of victory depends on our maintaining
not merely superiority. bu' considerable supe-
riority That is what a wise bill would aim at.
Iut this is not wise bill. nor the authors Of it
wise The Emperor--" but at that word came
pause. Then he resumed. changing the word;
The Government i weak ana shortsighfed.
l, has made mistake after mistake. 1t has dung
away positions and advantages. not seeming in
the least aware what it doing az the time.
.Iust when il was likely TO be in need of money
il cut of A large source OF revenue by us new
, 'ommprcial Treaties No one had attacked these
revenues Thev were not felt a grievance or
4 burden. and they produced hity millions. Now
thev hape 10 carry the Army Bill finance and all,
Nv threatening the country, by frightening peo-
pie. by prophcsyng war and ruin, and the deleat
OF the Arlny If il be not increased Just as they
propose All this has a bad effect on the MINDS
of the people, and especially If they believe Ns
on the soldiers discourage them, and makes them
doubtful Of themselves. But there is little evil
dcncc thus far that the panic that they have treo
10 breed has really taken root among the soidlerS'
or among the German people. We shall know III
a few weeks what the German people have 70
say 10 this new scheme, and what the fate OF 'he
Army Bill is TO be.
Tile elections? Well, il is very dlf'lcuit 70
sc where Government majority is TO come rom
or how they are 70 govern without MAJORITY
II is true we carried on the government OF Prus-
sia from 1852 to 1866 without budget ana VIII
ont a majority But if | were again III ONCE
which | shall never be, | could not give 10 his
Imperial Majesty the advice which gave 70 the
King of Prussia at that time The CIRCUMSTANCES
are cntirely different, and Germany Is not rus
sia should not do 1t again policy OF 'ha'
kind i not To Ike drawn into precedent.
The remark of De Tocqueyille, In the recently
published Souvenirs, occurred 10 me- nave
ALWAYS noticed that in politics, grave errors are
often due to having TOO good memory.
quoted it. "Yes," said the Prince, mere imita-
ZION does NOT answer No two situations arc
alike, and a man should not copy even himself
lie thought the Socialists more likely to gain
strength in the coming elections than any other
Marty: an opinion | had already heard i'll Berlin
and elsewhere What said on this matter
of elections should. however. be taken with rel.
erencc 10 the date. The conversation occurred
on the 18th of May. lie was OF the same
mind about the Socialists as when himself IN
power The growth OF their numerical power
in the country and in Parliament had not shaken
his conviction of the soundness of his own policy
toward them. lie would have pursued 1t to
the end.
Whereas the Government. by treating
the Socialists as political party, n force IN
the country, to be mot seriously and argued
with instead as of robbers and thieves TO 10
H., I'M soI Inllch fhnir nOMcf