The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-01-15

more TO the moral snnihiIation Of that OF the
enemy. which enabled Great Britain to assume
the offensive In the Ibcrian Peninsula after the
spanish uprising. an offensive absolutely de-
pendent upon n control OF tho sea. The pres
once OF a British army In Portugal and Spain
Kept fostering an ulcer which drained the re-
sources OF Napoleon's empire. In expoundinC
the causes OF the decudence OF the French
marine the author has a practical rs well as
an historical purpose. Although the circum-
stances under which the process Of
decay began wero undoubtedly exceptional.
the general lesson remains good not
withstanding the changes In the methods OF
naval warfare. To disregard the teachings OF
these pages. to out loose wholly from the
traditions OF tho past. to revolutionize rather
than to reform. to launch out boldly on new and
untried plans. such n tendency undoubtedly
exists In every generation. II Mt the present
day 1t evinces unusual strength this is not to
be wondered at in view OF the change In pro.
pelling force and In the development OF naval
weapons. Capt. Mnhan is not one OF those
who venture to affirm that the days of sail
nave no lesson for the days OF steam. On the
contrary. as he points out. there must always
remain TO be considered questions OF discipline
and organization: OF the adaptation of mems
to ends: OF the recognition not only OF the
possibilities but also Of the limitations i'm
posed upon a calling, upon a military orEani-
cation, by the nature ofthe case. by the element
In which II moves. by the force to which 1t owes
Its motion. by the skill or lack Of skill with
which Its powers are used and its
deficiencies made good. It is. indeed,
only by considering the limitations as we'll
as the possibilities OF any form OF warlike ac-
tivity. whether 1t be a general plan OF action
as. Tor instance. commerce destroying - or
whether 1t be the use OF a particular weapon,
such as the ram-that correct conclusions can
be reached as to the kind Of men In natural ca
pacities In acquired skill. in habits Of thought
and action. who are needed to use such
weapons. The possibilities Of the ram. for
instance. are TO DO found in the conse-
quences OF a successful thrust: its limitations
In the difficulties i.aposed by any lack Of
hardness. speed. or steering qualities In the
chip carrying 1t or by ths skill OF the opponent
In managing his own vessel and the weapons
with which he is provided for counter-offence
III those limitations are carefully considered
there will be little doubt how to answer tho
question as 10 tho chance OF a man. picked up at
random. unframed for such encounters ey-
cept by years OF ordinary seagoing. reaching his
aim when pitted against another who has at
least given thought and had some profess
sional training directed TO the special pur-
pose. Now the one sea weapon OF the period
ofthe French revolution was the gun. the
hand-to-hand fight commonly coming into
play only toward the end OF an action. II
at all. But the gun. considered as a weapon.
cannot be separated from its carriage.
nor this again from the ship which bears It.
The effective use. therefore,. OF a gun required
the cooperation OF q skilful seaman and a
skilul gunner. The ship and its guns to-
gether formed but one weapon, q moving bat
terry which needed quick and delicate hand
ling and accurate direction In all its parts.
This moving battery had to be welded by q
living operator. knit into one by tho depend
enee OF all the parts upon tho head and acting
by a common impulse. These facts are OBJ
vious enough to professional men. but they
are not easily recognized by outsiders. apt to
ignore difficulties Of which thoy have neither
experience nor conception.
The aim OF the British Admiral, Lord Howe,
in the naval campaign in May. 1904. was to
capture the great fleet conveying breadstuffs
from the United States to France. The NOR
chantmen transporting the provisions were to
be protected on tho voyage by French ships OF
war. while their approach to the shores Of Eu-
rope was to be covered by a sortie OF q strong
force from Brest and Rochetort. The convoy
ing squadron OF two ships OF tho line and
three smaller vessels sailed from Brest in
December. 1903. under the command Of Rear
Admiral Van Stabel. and ON Feb. II. 1904. an
chored in Chesapeake Bay. On April IL it
sailed again for France. having under its
charge one hundred and thirty merchant ships
laden with brcadstuffs and West Indian
produce. On April 10 a squadron Of five sixths
Of the line. with some lighter vessels. put
forth from Brest to protect the arrival
nf fha cDpynv md fbio foroo u,o, fo1Ion,od
on May IL by twenty-five ships OF the line I'M
der Rear-Admiral Villarot Joyeuse. On the
British side. what was known as the Channel
fleet. numbering thitty-four ships OF the line
and attended by fifteen frigates and smaller
vessels. sailed from Spithead on May .. 1t had
under its charge 14S sail Of merchantmen
bound to Newfoundland and to the East and
West Indies. Upon arriving of the Lizard
Howe detached eight ships OF the line to &C.
company the convoy. and with the twenty.six
remaining ships proceeded to cruise in the
Bay OF Biscay across the probable track Of the
expected provision feet from America. Some
four hundred miles west OF Ushant, on May %.
Howe came up with the main French fleet Of
war ships under Villaret. After several inde-
cisive encounters and many interesting naval
man9uvres. which are discussed in detail by
Capt. Mnlan. the final battle took place on
June !. In this battle Lord Howe won q
great victory: nevertheless the French Ad-
miral carried out his principal purpose.
which was to assure the safe arrival OF the
provision feet from America. Many years
later Admiral Villaret was Governor OF Mar
Unique. When that island was taken by the
British in 1903 he went to England rs a PAS
senger In a ship commanded by Capt f.. +.
Brenton. This officer. in his naval history.
states that Villaret told him that Tobespierrs's
orders were to 20 to sea. and that n tha con-