The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1893-06-02
THE BRITISH VIEW OF IT.
WHY ENGLAND is UNMINDFUL
OF HAWAII.
English Interests Here Too Small TO
Bother About An Important
Letter.


The unanimity with which all the
leading English journals of every shade
of politics have refused to treat the Ha.
waiian question, from the outbreak of
the trouble down to the present time,
as matter of special British concern,
is very striking. The promptness with
which extreme party journals are wont
tor party purposes to urge intervention
upon foreign minister, even in very
doubtful cases, the heartiness OF sup,
port which energetic action on the part
of minister usually receives from the
press as a whole when British interests
are really believed to be at stake, prove
that the silence or indifference in the
present case is not assumed. In CON
versation with a good many leading
members Of Parliament, | have found
that there is more than indifference
that there is very decided objection
to anything like British interference in
Hawaiian affairs, for the simple reason,
in the first place, that there are no great
British interests to protect either in the
Islands themselves or in the surround.
ing seas. Such as there are were suf,
fiCiently safeguarded under the late
Hawaiian Administration, and would
probably not suffer under any new one.
AT any rate, it would be soon enough
to intervene when they were threatened.
That Britain should covet the Islands
as a naval station is everywhere re-
garded as absurd. Only the existence
of supreme interests leads to the &C
QUESTION and fortidcation of impreg.
nabe positions such as Gibraltar,
Malta, or Alden, and it is universally
recognized that Hawaii can be per
manently a source of naval strength to
any country only if it has an impreg-
nabe port, or, as an alternative, that
the nation possessing it should be pre-
pared to hold the surrounding waters
against all corners. Considering the
slight commercial stake which Britain
has in the central Pacific, a policy look
ing to either of these ends would be
based on manifest folly
There is a secondary and mainly
prospective concern which Britain has
in the Islands, which it may be worth
while to analyze. A good deal of in
terest has been taken in Australia, New
Zealand and Canada of late years in a
scheme fol a cable across the Pacific.
In England, too, its advantages have
been discussed as an alternative to the
lines which now connect Great Britain
with the East and Australasia OF
these latter there are several. Those
chiefly used go by way of Gibraltar,
Malta and the Red sea, or across
Europe and Persia. If the Communi.
cation across Europe we're Interrupted,
the lines now completed around
Africa could be used to make connec-
ton with the far East from Alden.
When an earthquake caused a break
some years since at Penang, the line
across European Russia and Siberia
was used to make connection by way
of China and Singapore with Australia &.
An earthquake break, however, at Ban
joewangi, in Java, has more than once
isolated Australia and New Zealand for
days, and even weeks. As more than
4Iooo a day is spent in communicate
ing between these colonies and Eng
land, the commercial disadvantage of
such a break is considerable. When
war between England and Russia
seemed imminent, few years since, a
disloCation of the line caused some
thing like a war scare in Australia A
great European war would probably
make communication over existing
lines difficult.
Considerations such as these have
turned some attention to the question
of Pacific cable as a means of main.
tanning important imperial connections
during any period Of continental strife.
Mainly, however, it is a matter of com
merCial convenience, as it is believed
that by the new route rates would be
much lower than they now are, and ii
would also be more reliable, as remove
from areas of volcanic activity An
nexations Of small groups Of unim'
portant islands along the prop SEQ
route have been made with a view tC
the ultimate construction of such {
cable. The islands already occupied
are believed to be sufficient for the
purpose. If it were found advisable tC
have station at any of the Sandwich
Islands, it is not thought likely that any
government in control of them woulC
object, any more than Canada objects tC
French or American lines being LANDED
on the coasts of Nova Scotia. Ihi
Geographic interest of Britain in tn,
Sandwich Islands is therefore prospe ct
i've as well as slight. The same ma,
be said of the use of Honolulu as
port of call for the mail steamship lin,
likely to be opened before long between
Vancouver and Australia Any stabl,
and civilized government would give al
the security that British interests re
quire beyond that which the presenc,
of a squadron in the Pacific Away.
inSures.
While, therefore, FIRM their ow'
point of view, people in England looI
with comparative unconcern npon tn,
turn which things may take in HAWAII