The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-01-15

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feet SO discracetully beaten would have In
creased the British triumph: but Jcryis was
net the mat to rlsk q substantial success Sc
curely held for q doubtful further gain. The
victory essential to Grent Britain had been
won and the worthlessness OF tho Spanish
navy had been laid bare. It was enough that
fifteen British ships had dashed into the midst
OF twenty seven enemies. had collared and
dragged out four OF the biggest and severely
handled the rest. With st. Vincent began a
series OF naval achievements which threw the
great deeds Of earlier days into obscurity.
v.
At the battle OF the Milo. which took place on
Aug. ]. 1TnS. the French and English were
equally matched. each having thirteen ships.
but the French Admiral. Brucys, although a
gallant seaman. was no match for Nelson.
either in respect to strategy or tactics. This
battle was one OF the most complete OF naval
victories and among the most decisive In it's
influence on the general course of events. 1t
unQuestionablv caused the collapse Of Bona
parties plans In Egypt and compelled him to
return to France. In this engagement the
French lost no fewer than eleven out OF thir-
teen ships OF the line. and 1t was Nelson's be-
lief that. had lie not been wounded. not a boat
would have escaped. The particular circum-
stance under which the British attack was
undertaken. the admirable skill. as we'll as
conduct. shown by oil the captains. and the
scientific character OF the tactical combina-
ton adopted, unite with the conclusiveness OF
the issue to cast a peculiar lustre upon this
victory Of Nelson's. Lord Howe said to Capt.
Berry that the battle Of tho Nile stood UNI
paralleled and singular in this respect that
every captain distin guished himself" 1t has
been disputed how far Nelson could claim the
credit or the bold manpuvrew whereby the lead
Ing rGiish ship passing inside OF tho French
line disclosed to her successors the open path
through which the operation Of doubling on
the enemy could DO most effectually per-
formed. Into this discussion Capt. MahAn
does not enter. but he deems 1t in entire keep
ing with Nelson's character that after consid-
ing all probable positions and ascertaining
that his Captains understood his views. he
should with generous confidence have left all
the details Of immediate action with them.
With regard to the Battle Of the Nile It has
been said that with better gunnory on the pnrt
OF the French. disaster must have resulted to
the attacking force. To Capt. Mahan. how
over. considering the direction Of the wind
and the method OF Nelson's approach. it
seems probable that even had the French gun
merry been much better than it was. the British
ships would yet have reached the stations
which they took: and once there. the tactical
combination adopted would have given them
the victory. though it might have been more
dearly bought.
VI.
Capt. Mahan devotes the greater part Of o |
chapter to tho Irish expedition OF 17t6. Tho
widespread discomfort in Ireland which was
intensified in the Protestant North was
we'll known to the Directory. with which
through the French Minister at Hamburg |
Irish agents had been in communication as |
carly as April. 1906. Another agent. Wolfe |
Tone. had in tho first months OF the year ar
rived in Paris from the United States with a |
similar mission. Their efforts were seconded
by tho powerful influence OF Gen. Hoche. who
had in other fields OF action shown military
ability Of tho highest order: and who. having
established his claim upon the gratitude OF
his country by the pacllcation Of La Vendee
and Brittany. was now in command Of the army
In that quarter. The proposed invasion
was consequently resolved upon. 1t de-
pended avowedly upon the cooperation
OF the disafrected Inhabitants OF Ire.
land: but Hoche did not make the mistake of
trusting to them for the most serious part Of
the work. No less than 10000 troops were to
be embarked. and. as the General recognized
that the difficulty would by no means be over |
when Ireland was reached-that the British
navy. II successfully eluded by the expedition.
would nevertheless seriously interfere with
subsequent supplies-he insisted upon carry
ing with him as large supplies as possible and
consequently as many ships as could be as
sembled in Brest. Never was an expedition,
destined to encounter extraordinary risks and
to bravo one OF tho stormiest OF seas. moro
favored than this was Mt the outset BY the ole. |
ments and by the mismanagement OF It's en-
emies. For nearly six weeks before 1t sailed
the winds prevailed from tho east. and during
the passage in midwinter fire weather with
favorable winds lasted until the bulk OF
the feet reached the Irish coast Nor
was there encountered m enemy's vessel
to take advantage OF the crowded and
inefficient condition OF the French fleet.
Like Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. though
from other causes. Hoche's ships passed to
their destination unseen by any foe powerful
enough to molest them. 1t was an extraordi- |
nary circumstance that OF the whole large feet
the vessel containing Eocho ana tho French
Admiral was almost alone in her failure to
reach the Irish coast Tho success OF the ex-
petition depended on the ability OF the French
ships to make the thirty miles intervening be-
tween the entrance and tho head OF Bantry
Bay. Cnluckily. when they reached the en-
trance the wind changed and blew of shore.
SO that only a fraction Of the force. unprovided
with artillery. could have been landed. The
>oA'a - wv Voo " oh-
tirely to accident and not to any foresight or
efficiency on the part Of the British navy.
Whatever may be thought OF the French pros
poets OF ultimate SUCCESS in the conquest or
deliverance OF Ireland-a matter o. puro spec
ulation dependent upon many conditions
rather political and economical than military
it cannot be disputed that the French had
succeeded in crossing the sea and almost
reaching their point OF destination not only in
spite OF the British navy. but without even
seeing it. On Dec. II the bulk OF the expedi-
ton was Al the mouth OF Bantry Bay. Not till
tho 22d did Colpoys. commanding the feet de-
tailed to watch of Brest. know that the French
had actually sailed: and then he did not know
In what direction. Bridport at Portsmouth re-
coived the news on the same or. possibly. on
the previous day. Nottill Dec. 81 was 1t known
in London that the enemy had actually ap-
pcared of the Irish coast. and at that time
Eridport's fleet had noteven sailed. Only con.
tinucd bad weather. and that ahead. prevented
tho landing which even tho incompetent