The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-01-15

your notice. salutlng you in tho firm expectn-
tion OF a desperate conflict Yours cordially
NJ. W. Ii.
Sea Power In History.
We reviewed at sumo length in these col.
umns the book In which Can't. A. T. MAuAN.
U. 8. N. discussed the influence OF sea power
upon history during the period from 1860 to
z A continuation OF that work is now
presented by the author In two volumes COL
l~ectively entitled. The Influence Of Sea
I",rer Upon tie French Rerolution and En-
pre-. Boston. Littlo. Brown l. Co.. The
epoch covered BY the present narrative begins
In 1893 and ends in 1872. a date mado memoir
able by Napoleon's invasion OF Russia. and
by the outbreak OF war between Great
Britain and the United States. To tho latter
contest Capt. Mahan promises to devote a
special study. We should note at the outset
that in tho book before us and In the preced-
ing work the authors purpose Is to ~analyze the
strategic conduct OF naval campaigns as we'll
as the tactical features Of the various bat
ties In which any clear tactical aim was
exhibited. and ultimately to measure the Of.
feet OF success at sea on tho net outcome OF
international contests. The first volume OF
this history. with which for tho m we
are exclusively concerned. begins with a sur.
vey OF European naviss in 1903 and proceeds
to review In detail the maritime operations OF
the English and French navies In the ca.
libbean. the Atlantic. tho 5"ritish!Channel. and
the Mediterranean. including tho great sea
fight between Lord Howe and Villaret Joyeuse
and the famous battles Of Cape st. Vincent and
OF the Nile. and finally the French expeditions
against ireland. From whatever point OF view.
technical or general. this narrative may be
regarded. 1t will be acknowledged that tho
0Nfhnp ha0 pNipnat n rvnrt al rAr,o rlo bln
interest and abiding value.
What was the condition OF the French and
English navies on Feb. !. 1893. when the
French republic declared war against Great
Bri, In? 1t is customary to say that the COM
pleta overthrow OF the sea power OF France
under the revolution and the empire should
be attributed to tho unwise action OF the
French Governments which succeeded one
another after 1880. 1t was. we are told. be.
cause the Governments 80 faithfully and noe
essarily reflected the social disorder. the crude
and wild habits OF thought which they were
powerless to check. that they were incapable
OF dealing with tho naval necessities OF tho
day. But why were the political and social
conditions which proved SO favorable to the
evolution OF French power on land 30 fatal to
huii'Aiuo cNlClsnCS! Nuys wien TIC army
speedily became so strong. was the navy
SO weak. not merely or chiefly In
quantity but in quality-and that. too. in
days 80 nearly succeeding the prosperous
naval ora OF Louis XVI2 Why should the same
throe which brought forth the magnificent
land forces OF Napoleon have caused the COM
plete dissolution OF the sister service. not only
amid the disorders OF the republic. but also
under the powerful organization Of the en-
pire. According to Capt. Mahan. tho immedi-
ate reason for this difference was that to a
service OF u very special character. involving
special exigencies calling for special aptitudes.
and consequently demanding special knowl-
edge Of its requirements. were applied the
theories Of men ignorant o. those require
ments-msn who did not even believe
In the existence Of special dualiHca-
tions. Entirely without experimental knowl-
edge or any other kind of knowledge OF
tho conditions of sea life, the Legislators OF the
Convention and OF the Directory and OF the
Consulate. were unable to realize the obstacles
to the processes by which they desired to
build UP their navy. and according to which
they proposed to handle II. This was true not
only OF the rude experiments made In the early
days OF the republic: the reproach may as fairly
be addressed to Napoleon himselfthat he had at
the outset scarcely any appreciation Of the fac
tors conditioning efficiency ut sea: nor did he
seemingly ever reach such comprehension OF
them as would enable him to understand why
the French navy failed. 'Disdaining." said Jean
Bon Saint-Andre. tho revolutionary Commits
sioner whose influence on naval organization
was unboundsd. "disdaining through ~calcula-
tion and reflection sKilful evolutions. perhaps
our seamen will think it more lifting and use-
full to try those boarding actions in which tho
Frenchmanw was always incompatible. andthua
astonish Europe 10y new pr0digies OF ralor."
To tho same effect wrote Capt. Chevalier.
Courage and audncity." he said. had be-
come in his NapoIeDn's) eyes the only quail
tiles necessary to our officers Tho Eng
lish." said Napoleon. will become very small
whom France shall have two or three Admirals
willing to die" Upon this conception OF naval
warfare the Inflated Admiral Vilensuys made
the following snt: Since his Majesty
thinks that nothing but sudsoity and resolve
are needed TO succeed In the naval otdcsrs
calling. ! shall lsAvs nothing to be desired"
----
Capt. Mahan traces In detail the steps By
which the fne naval service which had been
created In France und or Louis XVI. was broken
down. and he also examines the ultimate effect
OF maritime incspacity upon the French en-
pirs. The overwhelming destruction OF the
sss-Dowsr OF France and Spain ct Trafalgar was
undoubtedly Q principal factor IA the nnAl re-
suits sttAinsdA t Lsipsis ana a. WAssxlea UVAA