The Newberry herald and news. (Newberry, S.C.) 1884-1903, 1893-11-15

Specl1eQ powers only, Willie Iue ldttSA
confers upon the Legislature all legisla
tive powers. In the one case the power
specifically granted can only be eXer-
cise6, in the other alllegislative powers
not prescribed" Citing People vs.
Flagg, 46 n. Y, 40l; Page VS. Allen, So
Pa st, 33S.
Applying the doctrine just quoted,
which must be recognized as sound
doctrine, the unconstitutionality of the
Dispensary Act must be made to appear
from some limitation contained in our
State Constitution itself upon the
power Of the General Assembly to enact
such law.
No such Limitation has been pointed
out to me nor am I aware of any such
Limitation, either express or implied.
Even if the power of the General AS
sembly to enact the dispensary law
could be derived only from its police
power there can be 40 question that
under that power it would have ample
authority to restrict the sale or traffic
in liquor. The State has frequently
done so in the past by statutes Intended
to regulate and restrict the traffic in
liquor without question as to its right
aud authority so to do.
This Act declares in its title thatsuch
is its purpose IAN Act to prohibit the
manufacture and sale," etc, Except as
herein provided" and its provisions
undertake to accomplish that very
thing by numerous limitations such as
restricting the places at which liquor
is to be sold, the hours at which it is to
be sold, the persons to whom it shall be
unlawful to sell liquor, the character Of
the person by whom it is to be sold, the
not selling on credit, the prohibition
as to drinking on the premises, the
limiting the amount to be sold to pur-
chasers, the written application signed
by each purchaser and other restrlc-
tions that need not be mentioned here.
1t Itappears upon the face of the Dis
pensary Act as it stands upon the
statute book that the purpose and pri-
mary object of those who passed IL was
to diminish the sale and consumption
of liquor and 10 decrease the evils which
are believed to result from the liquor
traffic for the public good, and feel
bound tossay from my own observation
that the Act seems to be accomplishing
that benefcent object. On this ground,
as it appears to me, it is without douot
a proper exercise ofthe police power of
the State. It has been learnedly argued
to-day that the purpose of the Act was
to raise revenue. But it is TO be col
lected from the Act itself that the rails
ing of revenue is only incidental to the
main purpose of the Act, which as
have already held, is TO restrict and
regulate the sale Of and traffic in liquor,
and as I understand the Chester cases
ex rel Hoover and ex rel Groeschels,
our Supreme Court has already decided
that the Act in question is an Act to
regulate the sale of liquor.
In these Chester cases our Supreme
Court has said: Having reached this
conclusion, that the said Act, (the Dis
pensary Act,) being. in effect an Act to
regulate the sale of spirituous liquors,
the power to do which is universally
recognized, it il quite clear" etc. II 5.
E. Rep, 1856.
Most of the argument against the
constitutionality of the Dispeusary
Act made before me, and, I may say
elsewhere, seems to be directed more to
the wisdom Of the Act than 20 the
power of the General Assembly to pass
the Act.
The question is one ofpower and not
of policy. AS to the wisdom or the un-
wisdom Of Acts Of the General Assem-
bly, the Courts have nothing todo. That
is q .estion for the people. 1t is pro-
verbal that ours is Government OF
the people, by the people and for the
people, and it is for the people by the
ballot.box to correct mistakes in legisla-
ton when they are satisfied that such
mistakes have been made by their
representatives, and not for the Courts.
1t has been argued that the General
Assembly has no constitutional right
to appropriate money to engage in busi-
ness: For all public purposes the power
of the General Assembly is absolute IN
the absence of Unconstitutional provisions.
The same authority holds "the powers
of the Legislature in disposing Of the
revenues OF the State and its discretion
relating to such disposition are COM
plete and unlimited in the absence of
constitutional provisions" e Am and
Eng Encyc of Law, 69.)
The State is daily engaged IN the sale
of phosphate rock to individuals for
revenue. II. the State can own phos-
pha territory and sell the rock it can
purchase if necessary other phosphate
territory for the purpose of traffic in
phosphate. It is without question that
the State owns both real and personal
property, and can dispose of it at will.
These Instances l give to illustrate the
doctrine.
Holding the views I have herein an
nounced, / cannot quash the indict-
ment. The motion to quash is there
fore oyerruied.