Blackfoot news. (Blackfoot, Idaho) 1891-1902, 1893-12-23


The following is an extract from
the hitherto unpublished diary Of the
secretary of the English admiral who
conveyed Napoleon Bonaparte to St
Helena. IL is printed in the Century:
Napoleon said many of his officers de-
serted previous to the battle of Water
loo; and in speaking Of the French
nation he said that the lower orders
of the people were the most sincere.
the most firm, and at the same time
the best dispositioued in the world;
but in the proportion as you rise the
class their characters became the
worse, and above the bourgeois they
were too hckle and too volatile 70 be
at all depended upon. They had
one principle for to-day and another
for tomorrow, according to the cir
cumstances of the moment; and he at
tributed his Waterloo disasters solely
to the disaffected officers Of his army.
In talking of the battle he assured
the admiral he had never for a mo-
ment mistook the Prussians for
Grouchy's division, but that he knew
early in the day that the Prussians
were closing on his flank; that this.
however, gave him little or no uneasi-
ness, as he depended on General
Grouchy also closing with him at the
same time, and he had ordered a suf-
fcient force TO oppose the Prussians.
who were in fact already checked. And
he added that he considered the battle
throughout the day to be very much
in his favor. but that so soon as il was
dusk the disaffected officers promul-
gated the cry of 'SauVe qui peutg"
which spread such confusion and
alarm throughout the whole line that
II became impossible TO counterfeit It,
or to rally his troops, situated as they
were.
But, he said, had it been daylight
an hour longer, he was positive the
result would have been very different.
he further said that had he been able,
when the alarm and confusion first
took place, tohave placed himself in
conspicuous situation in front, It
would have insured the rallyinQ Of ali
his troops around him; but as ii was.
treachery and darkness combined rem.
dered his ruin inevitable.
He said that on the morning Of
june Is he did not entertain the most
distant idea that the duke of Yelling
ton would have willingly allowed
him to have brought the English
army TO a decisive battle, and couse-
quently he had been the more anxious
10 push on, and II possible to force IL.
considering nothing else could offer
him chance of surmouuting the diff
ficulties with which he was sur
rounded; but, he added, could he have
beaten the English army, he was
positive scarcely any one would have
escaped being either killed or taken.
in which case the Prussian army (bav.
ing already been beaten on the 10TH
must have made precIpitate retreat,
or most probably would have been
and certainly entirely dis
IL was his intention then 10 have
pushed on by forced marches to have
met the Austrians before any junction
could have been made between them
and the Russians, which would have
placed the game in his own hands, /
eVenh fhostilities had been obstinateIy |
perseveEed in; though in the state OF |
things he had built on the idea that a |
victory over the English army in Bel |
GUM, with its Immediate results. /
would have been sufficient TO have /
produced change of administration I
IN England, and have afforded him a
chance OF concluding an armistice.
which he said was really his first
object, as he felt that France was not
equal to the efforts she was then MAX
ng, and it was perfectly impossible
Tor her TO think Of making anv
resistance against the numer-
'us forces OF the allies, If once united
md acting in concert against him.