Morning journal and courier., 1893-04-14
GEMS. MCCLELLAN AND MEADE.

Their Respective Letters After Autfe.
 tam and Gettysburg.
 IFron Colonel McClareNs Address on IAncaan ss
 oonmAnder-in- Chief, at New York, wednes-
 day evsniBgl
 On the 27th of June, 1883, Hooker was relieved from command st his own re- quest, and Meade charged with the re- sponsibility of fighting the decisive battle of the war at Gettysburg. I need not discuss any of the details of that cam psign. The defeat of Lee at Gettysburg decided the issue of the war. Many bloody battles were fought thereafter, but from the 4th of July, 1888, the csuse of the confederscy was lost csuse, and the man who won that battle should have been the ohieftain of the war.
 msy here properly introduce two dis patches received by Lincoln from the bat tlefelds of Antietam and Gettysburs, which, I personally know, did much to make Lincoln distrust the capacity of both Mcclellan and Meade 10 appreciate the great purpose of the war. When Lee had retrested soross the Potomac from Antietan on the 18th of September, 1862, Mcclellan telsgrsphed: ''Onr victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe" Mesde's oongrstulstion to the army on the field of Gettsburg, July {, 1884, closes as follows: "0ur task is not yet accomplished. and the commanding general looks to the army for greater ef- forts 10 drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader" The fact that both these commanders seemed to assume that their great wcrk WAS to drive the enemy from northern soil, i'm pressed Lincoln profoundly. InMr. Hays diary Lincoln Is quoted as saying, upon the receipt of this dispatch: Twill our generals never get that idea ont of their hsAdst The whole country is our soil !" His theory of the war WAS that the enemy could be fought much more advantageous ly on northern soil than in the south, Rs ii enabled concentration of northern forces, and diffused southern forces In maintain ing lines of supply; and before either of these battles were fought he hsd publicly declared his theory that Lees army was the heart of the rebellion and that Rich mond and other important military oen- ters would be vAlueless while Lees army was unbroksn.
 It Is known that Lincoln wsS at first strongly inclined to censure Meade for not fighting another battle at Willismsport. I saw the president soon after that battle, and was amazed at his thorough familiar ity with every highway and mountain pass which the armies had open to them. As 1t was near my own home knew how &C., curate his information WAS, and he suss- tioned me minutely ss to distances and opportunities of the two armies in the race to Willismsport. When I asked him the direct question whether be was not satis- fed with what Meade hsd accomplished, he answered in these words: 'tSow don't misunderstood me about General Meade. am profoundly grateful down to the bot tom of my boots for what he did st Get tysburg, but think If had been General Meade would have fought another bat tle." He WAS extremely careful to avoid injustice to any of his commanders, and after fully considering the whole subject, he excused rather than justified Meade for not delivering battle to Lee st Williams port. Had Meade done so and succeeded he would have been the great general of the war, but there are few generals who would have fought that battle with the forces of both sides nearly equal and Lee entrenched. Had he fought it and failed, he would have been severely censured; but falling to fight he lost his one opportunity to be the Electromagnetic of the war. The great domestic stand by, Df. Bulls Cough Syrup, Is now recognized to be s