The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1893-12-07
vides that no permit for such cutting shall be
granted to any person by the said commi seioner.

l.
capitol, notice of which shall be given at5least
! sixty days prior to date of the sale in one or |
PRICE Of All timber IT IT snch and
the appraised value Of the same as fixed by the
provisions Of this chapter and approved by the |
commissioner. 's@S ssE5 II
The provisions Of the statutes above
quoted embrace substantially all the
laws bearing upon the questions IN
volved in this case? Sections ~ and
48 Of said chapter 38 as amended
clearly prescribe and define the pow
ers and duties Of the auditor, the con-
dltions under which he may sell such
timber and the mode and manner Of
such sales. The provisions of chapter
269, laws of 1885, above referred to,
do not as is claimed by the defendants,
amend or nullify the provisions Of
cha pier 38 in any respect, but are SIM
ply supplemental thereto, imposing adj
ditional duties upon the auditor in
relation to the subject.
All these provisions of the statute,
must be read and construed together
in order to obtain {. correct under
standing of the powers and duties Of
the commissioner and the questions in
volved herein, and being SO construed
we are of the opinion:
First; That the commissioner can
sell the pine timber of the State only
when it is liable to waste, loss or dam
age, and sale is necessary to protect
the State from loss. -. \.
Second; That the sale must, be made
at public auction and to the highest
bidder. ~.,-
THIRD; That due notice of such sale
must be given in a daily newspaper at
least sixty days prior thereto.
! HO2L7th. That before ar1v sale can ha
made the commissioner must cause the
. timber to be estimated and appraised,
and that such estimate and appraisal
must be submitted to the governor,
treasurer and commissioner, or at least
to q majority of these officials, with a
statement regarding the liability of
the timber to loss or damage, and that
a statement that it is for the interest
of the State, that the timber be sold,
and that such sale is necessary to pro-
tect the State from loss, must be en-
dorsed on the estimate Of said timber
and signed by at least two of said Of
icers officially.
, Unless these conditions and reuuis-
ties are substantially complied with
before the sale is made such sale is I'M
authorized. The evidence in this case
-: clearly shows that not single one of
these essentials was complied with in
making the sale in question, and we
therefore have no hesitancy in saying
that in our opinion the pretended sale
question, was and is absolutely void
and of no effect. r.. . ~-..-..*t
e It was and is the manifest intention
s of the people of this State as expressed
in these several statutes to protect and
: preserve our State lands until they can
= be sold to the best possible advantage,
t and that when the sale is made, either
e of the lands or the timber thereon
= which constitutes a part of the realty.
e that the public shall be fully advised
OF the time, place and manner of sale,
Il in order that all who desire to purchase
e shall have equal opportunity for so do.
r ing, and that there shall be fair and
d open competition at such sale to the
n end that the State may receive the
e highest possible price and the citizens
fully protected as to all their rights il
It the premises. The defendants contend
d that even if the, sale was void in the
It first instance, it has since been ratified
i by the State. We think differently
The constitution and laws of this State
=, define the powers and duties of its ex
- ecutive officers. These laws constitute
v the authority and limit the powers con
r ferred upon these officers, under which
j. they must act in matters of this kind
= No executive officer can legalize hi!
- own unauthorized act, or the unauthor
lied act of another executive officer 81
as to nullify the requirments of a legis
- lative enactment. The State is no
10 bound by an act Of it's officers or ser
y wants made contrary to an express pro
= vision Of the statutes, and such act cal
u only be ratified by the law-makins
~ power OF the State No such ratifica
- ton has been shown in this case Estate
= VS. State Bank OF Missouri As Mo- 52S
le Walker VS.. Governor % Ala. 1l6: Van
- >, Dyke VS.. the State "a Ala. 81; Dala
= field VS.. State of Illinois 26 Wend. 1872
- State of Minnesota VS.. Torint1s q
= MINI. 1872: Dalafeld VS.. State, Enc
Is Hill 49, y - 5
u The claim of the defendants tina
III they are purchasers without notice o
8 any fact that would invalidate the sal,
Is or render the same void cannot aid til,
~ defence. It was clearly their. duty t,
er scrutinize the special and Limited
~ authority, which they are presumed t,
er know the commissioner had. Stat,
Se officers have only such authority as tn
er law-making power of the State confer
- upon uhOu. Lively pciSOu VINO deal
u, with them is charged with lanoWledg,
us as to the extent of such authority, an,
C. the manner in which the same must b
err exercised. If State official in enter
he ing into a contract on behalf of TIL
al State exceeds his statutory authority
O. the person with whom he contracts. Q
er attempts to contract, is conclusivel
Id presumed to have known such fact
is The State occupies the position 6
es principal and cannot be bound by an
Ii contract made by its officers or sci
he wants which they are not authorized t
make.
u These defendants in entering into tn
d. contract in question with the Stat
IT, through the State land commissions
srs did SO at their peril and must b
se deemed to have known that he had ez
ed ceeded his authority as all person
20 must who deal with public agents
is This rule is universal in its applica
,rs tiOn anv 9th or m rht c,,hioot tho NH