The Cecil Whig. [volume] (Elkton, Md.) 1841-current, 1893-10-21
NAPOLEON TALKS OF WATERLOO.

lhe following IS an extract from the
hitherto unpublished diary of the Sec
retary of the English admiral who con-
veyed Napoleon Bonaparte to St.
Helena. 1t is printed in the October
Century.
Napoleon said many of his officers
deserted previous to the battle of
Waterloo; and in speaking of the
French nation he SAID that the lower
orders OF the people were the most
sincere, the most firm, and at the same
time the best dispo5tioned in the
world; but IN the proportion as you
rose in class the characters became
the worse, and above the borgeois they
were too tickle and too volatile to be
at all depended on. They had one
principal for today and another for
tomorrow, according to tthe circum-
stances of the moment; and he attri-
buted his Waterloo disasters solely to
the disaffected officers of his army. In
talking of the battle he assured the
admiral he had never for moment
mistook the Prussians for Grouchy's
division, but that he knew early IN the
day that the Prussians were closing on
his flank that this, however, gave him
little or no uneasiness, as he depended
on General Grouchy also closing with
him at the same time, and he had
ordered sufficient force to oppose
the Prusslans, who were in fact already
checked. And he added that he con-
sidered the battle throughout the day
to be very much in his favor, but that
so soon as it was dusk the disaffected
officers promulgated the cry of "Sauve
qui peut y which spread such con-
fusion and alarm throughout his whole
line that it became impossible to coun-
teract it, or to rally his troops, situated
as they were.
But, he said, had it been daylight al =
hour longer, he was positive the resu !.
would have been very different;
further said that had he been alb
when the alarm and confusion fl
took place, to have placed himself il. IS
CONSPICUOUS situation in front, it wo y
have insured the rallying of all
troops around him; but as it
treachery and darkness combined (
| dered bis rum iinevitable. !f
He said that on the iIi0rning af
IS, he did not entertain the most distant
idea that the Duke of Wellington would
have willingly allowed him to have
brought the English army to decisive
battle, and consequently he had been
the more anxious to push on, and if
possible to force it, considering nothing
else could offer him chance of sur
mounting the difficulties with which he
was surrounded ; but, he added, could
he have beaten the English army, he
was positive scarcely one would have
escaped being either killed or taken,
in which case the Prussian army (hav-
ing already been beaten on the I6th)
must have made precipitate retreat, or
most probably would have been dis
persed, and certainly entirely disor-
ganIzed.
1t was his intention then to have
pushed on by forced marches to have
met the Austrians before any junction
could have been made between them
and the Russians, which would have
placed the game In his own hands,
even if hostilities had been obstinately
persevered in; though in the state OF
things he had built on the idea that
victory over the English army in Bel
gum, with its immediate results, would
have been sufficient to have produced
change of administration ID England,
and have afforded him chance OF
concluding an armistice, which he
he said was really his first object, as
he felt that France was not equal to
the efforts she was then making, and it
was perfectly impossible for her to
think of making any adequate resist
ance against the numerous forces OF
the allies, if once united and acting in
concert against him.