The Pickens sentinel. [volume] (Pickens, S.C.) 1871-1903, 1893-11-16

powers specially granted can only be
exercised, in the other all Legislative
powers not prescribed" Citing People
vs. Flagg, 46 n. Y, DOL; Page VS. Allen,
SO Pa. St., 33S
Applying the doctrine just quoted,
which must be recognized as sound
doctrine, the uncorstitutionallty of the
DispenSary Act must be made to an.
pear from some limitation contained
In our State Constitution itself upon
the power of the General Assembly to
enact such law.
NO such limitation has been pointe q
out to me nor am l aware of any such
limitation, either express or implied
Even If the power Of the General AS
Sembly to enact the diSpensary law
could be derived only from it's police
power there can be no question that
under that power it would have ample
authority to restrict the sale or traffic
in liquor. The State has frequently
doEe SO in the past by statutes intend
ed to Regulate and restrict the tariff in
liquor without question as to its right
and authority so to do.
This Act declares IN its title that such
is its purpose "An Act to prohibit the
manufacture and SALE" etc. Except as
herein provided" and it's provisions
undertake to accomplish that very
thing by numerous limi cations such as
restricting the places at which liquor
Is to be sold, the hour at which ii Is to
be oSld, the persons to whom it
shall be unlawful to sell liquor, the
character Of the person by whom it Is
to be sold, the not selling on credit the
prohibition as to drinking on the pre-
misses, the limiting the amount to be
sold to purchasers, the written applica-
ton signed by each purchaser and othe:
restrictions that need not be mentioned
here.
1t appears upon the face OF the Dis
pensary Act as it stands upon the stat.
ute book that the purpose and primary
object of those who passed it was to
diminish the sale and consumption of
liquor aud to decrease the evils which
are believed to result from the liquor
traflic for the public good, and l feel
pound TO say from my own observation
that the Act seems to be accomplishing
that heneliceDt object. On this ground
as it appears to me, it is without doubt
a proper exercise of the police power Of
the State. 1t has been learnedly are.
gued to-day that the purpose of the
Act was to raise revenue. But it is to
he collected from the Act itself that
INCREASING of revenue is only incidental
10 the main purpose of the Act
which, as have already held, is to re-
strict aud regulate the sale Of an traffic
IN liquor, and as l understand the
Chester cases eXrel Hoover and ex re-
Groeschels, our Supreme Court has al
ready decided that the Act in q uestion
is an ACT to regulate the sale or liQoor
In theSe Chester cases our Supreme
Court has said: "iIaving reached this
~ no cni2 Il at - IL
penSary ActD being in effect an a ct t ID,
regulate the sail or spirituous liquor
the power to do which is uniyersall'
recognized. 1t is quite clear" etc. II 5
e. Rep. 75e
Most OF the argument against the
conStituiionality of the despentary
ACT maze before me, and | may say,
elsewhere, seems to be directed moe to
the wisdom OF the Act than to the
power of the General Assembly to pass
the Act.
The question is Que of power andnot
OF policy. AS to the " = iom or the un.
wisdom Of Acts Of the General Assem-
Oly the Courts have nothing TO do
Ihat Is question ior the people. 1t is
proYerbial that ours is a Government
or the people, by the people aOd for the
people, and 1t is for the people by the
ballot-box to correct mistakes in legisla,
ton when they are satisfied that such
mistakes have been maize by their rep
rtSen'atlveS, andtnot for the Courts. It
has been argued that the General AS
STmOly has no constitutional right to
appropriate money to engage in buSi-
ness. For all public purposes the power
OF the General Assembly is absolute IN
the absence Of constitutional prOvi
sions. The same authority holds 1.-THE
powers of the Legislature in disposing
OF the revenues of the State and its dis
cretl0n relating to such disposition are
complete aud unlimited in the Absence
OF constitutional provisions" 6 Am
and Eng Encyc of law, 69)
he State IS daily engaged IN the sale
of phosphate rock to Is.dividuals for
revenue. If the State can own phos
ptate territory and sell the rock it can
purchase If necessary other phosphate
territory for the purpose Of traffic in
phosphate. 1t IS without question that
the State owns both real and personal
property, and can dispose of it at will
ihese instances | give to illustrate the
doctrine.
Holding the views have herein an
nounced, L cannot quash the indict
ment. Tne motion to quash is there
fore oVerruled.