The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1893-09-02
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER ., 80.
THE VALUE OF COALING STA
TIONS.

lDdl lllG COUNTY NilNh PS''N''N' 49,
most numerous coaling stations, and
the best situated as regards trade
routes, will have a great advantage in a
future war. In this respect" he adds,
"the British empire is without rival D."
Says the New York Sun "The i'm.
portance Of the part thus assigned to
coaling stations in warfare is due, of
course, to the fact that steam has be-
come the great motive power for both
war ships and the mercantile marine
Sailing ships could keep the seas, as
Lord Brassey points out, as long as the
supply of water lasted whereas steam
ships must 90 to port when the coal
gives out, or when the machinery needs
repairs. For this reason the coal en-
durance or radius of action of a modern
cruiser has become prime factor IN
her efficiency and is provided for as
carefully as her speed, her armament,
or her protection against an enemy
fire. In the famous commerce de-
stroyers, the Columbia and Minneapolis,
for example, the fact that either Of
them could go all the way around the
globe without Coaling is as noticeable
an element of efficiency as her high
speed; and it is all the more SO from
our present lack Of coaling stations in
distant waters.
"But the securing of this exceptional
steaming radius is made possible only
by diminishing other features, usually
those of armor and heavy batteries The
fast commerce destroyers are not the
only types of vessels needed for navy
and with battle ships, and indeed with
a great majority of vessels, the problem
of coalng in distant waters is still vital,
while even the Columbias may need to
go to a foreign station for repairs.
Besides, the hulls of steel vessels
rapidly become foul by cruising, es-
pecialy in tropical waters, and this 50
reduces their speed that they must
frequently be locked, scraped and
painted.
"For a long time after steam super
seeded sails the latter were retained as
an auxiliary motive power. But they
have more and more been given up
until nowadays it is the custom, es
peclally with armored cruisers and bat
tie ships, to carry no masts save mill
tary ones for observation and for tops
to mount machine guns. Ship aite
ship of our own new navy is now bull
with little or with no reliance whateve
upon sails. This makes the question
of fuel vastly more important to u
than it was even eight or ten year
ago, when there was still much depend
ence on auxiliary sail power, especial,
for unarmored cruisers.
sit is sometimes urged as an OBJ
lection to the policy Of establishing
coalng stations that they create NOR
points to defend, and thus tend to :
scattering instead of concentration o
resources. However, Lord Brasse
shows that this is not a valid objection
He says that Great Britain's polio
is that of giving to her coallng station
Sufficient defence against one OF tw
hostile cruisers. As long as our nav
is maintained at its proper strength
and is efficiently efficered and manned
it should not be possible for a serlou
expedition to leave the enemy5 POI
without a British fleet being imuc dIatt
ly in pursuit" One reason Why tn
coaling stations can be sufficient y de
Tended in many cases by few gun
ana Suldll SdIlIoOIl 10 luSN al ShSli'.
in sending large fleet to reduce sue
station, would run the risk of usln
the fleet for a minor purpose, and thl
expose himself to attack at a more in
portant point. Hence, ordinarily tn
defensive works need not be vel
elaborate and costly Besides, 1t
just as possible for the country ownir
a station to send fleet to defend it ;
it is for an enemy to send a fleet
attack it. The possession of coalir
stations implies that of considerab
navy, since otherwise they would n
be required In the case of Hawa
as in that of some of the great Brtl'
naval stations, the permanent defenc
should be more elaborate on acCou
not only of the strategic value of Il
islands, but of their commercial in
portance. Ordinarily, however, Il
defence of coaling harbor, as sue
need not be very costly, since there
little for an enemy to take away an
even little to destroy that could not /
4