The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1893-02-26
BEAUREGARD WAS RIGHT.

The death of Gen. Beauregard leaves
Longstreet and Early the sole survivors OF
the generals of the Confederate army who
by solid military service deserve to be rated
~ distinguished soldiers. Measured by
his services to the Confederacy at critical
periods in her history. Beauregard ranks
with Lee, Joe Johnston and Longstreet as
q soldier of the very first order of military
talents; measured by his broad grasp Of
the military situation at the South at the
outset of the civil war and his clear,
sound perception of the true mill
tary road to success for the Con-
federacy. Beauregard was tho best mill
tary thinker of the South. 1t was
not his fault that his policy was not
adopted; it was treated with contempt
and thwarted by Jefferson Davis from the
very first. Beauregard's views were not
peculiar to himself: they were shared by
Joe Johnston, by Lee and by Longstreet,
but were constantly overruled by Davis.
Beauregard in the beginning of the war
pointed out to Davis that the military sue
cess of the Confederacy was sure if the
South used its advantage of defending the
short arc of the circle against the armies of
the North holding the longer arc of attack
Beauregard said in substance that while
the North had the most men the South
held the shortest line, and that it could
concentrate or scatter for defense or as
sault quicker than the North; that is.
holding the shortest line sit could get
there first with the most men," which was
the Confederate Gen. Forests famous
definition of the art of war. The North
practically had to march tvo miles to reach
. point, while the South was distant but
one mile; and, as Beauregard argued, the
South, holding the short line, could
strengthen her hand at threatened
points 90 much quicker than the
North that the disparity of num-
bers was more than made up by the
advantage of the situation. Given line
of battle like that at Gettysburg, where
Meade had to march only half . mile to
reinforce threatened point while Lee,
holding the long arc of the circle. had to
march two miles. and Meade was mathe-
matically certain to 'get there first with
the most men," and beat Lee. So the
South, standing on the defensive. holding
the short interior line, could have success
fully resisted the advance of the superior
forces of the North because she "could get
there first with the most men," This
advantage of position Davis threw away
by his suicidal policy Of dispersion instead
of concentration; of offensive instead of
defensive.
. critical rather than an organizing. adj
minlstrative intellect. He had the con-
ceit Of a martinez; had been educated at
West Point, served in the Black Hawk
Indian war; had been distinguished for
gallantry at Buena Vista; had been just
enough of a soldier to spoil him for good
president. Had he been a plain civilian,
like Lincoln, ne would have listened to
the circumstances Of all his best trained
soldiers. like Lee; Beauregard. Johnston
and Longstreet, but he had been a soldier
in his youth and he believed himself a
great war minister, 30 he quarreled with
Joe Johnston and Beauregard, and he
threw Longstreet into utter despair by his
incapacity for his position. Davis ap-
pointed his personal military friends. like
Sidney Johnston, Pemberton and Bragg,
to great commands. and maintained them
after their incapacity was clearly shown.
He spurned the advice of Beauregard and
Johnston after Bull Run, and lost his OPP
portunity to take Washington City; he
spurned Johnston's advice before Vicks.
burg and lost Vicksburg; he spurned
Longstreet's circumstances after Chicka-
manga and lost Chattanooga His persist
ence in keeping Sidney Johnston in a false
position lost Fort Donelson. Gen. Beau
regard, in his military memoirs, says of
Davis:
No people ever warred for Independence with
more relative advantages than the Confederstes
As military question the Confederacy could
not have failed had the South had for president
either military man OF high order or politi-
clan OF the drst class. without military preteu.
sions, such - Howell Cobb.
The South, with ito great natural resources.
its defensive meaus OF mountains, rivers rail.
roads and telegraph, with the immense advant-
age Of the interior lines Of war, would be open
to discredit q . people If it, failure could not
be explained otherwise than by mere material
contrast
The South did not fall crushed by the mere
weight OF the North, but il was nibbled awav AT
all aides and ends. because its executive head
never gathered and welded its great strength
under the ready advantages that greatly reduced
or neutralzed its adversaey's naked, physical
superiority.
The Beauregard policy of concentration,
instead Of the Davis policy of diffusion
and dispersion for defense would have
won the day for the South All that saved
the South from ruin in 1862 was the fact
that Halleck was throwing away the su-
perior military resources of the North in
the same vicious policy Of diffusion and
dispersion with which he replaced the
sound policy of concentration BY which
Grant won Donelson and expelled the
Confederates from Kentucky and Tennes-
see. Nothing saved Vicksburg and Chatta-
nooga to the South save Halleck's execu-
ton Of the Davis policy of diffusion and
dispersion after Corinth instead of that of
concentration before which Vicksburg
would have fallen in June, 1862, and
Chattanooga easily by September.
Beaurcgard believed, with Lonsstreet
and Joe Johnston. that every dron of
blood shed after November p. 1853, when
Bragg was beaten at Chattanooga, was
split in vain. 1t was Beauregard who
the week before Donelson fell, in vain
urge! Sidney Johnston to concentrate his
whole force of q. 900 men at For, DoneIson
and crush Grant, who had but IL 900, be-
In b.