The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-03-19

eul We ueslEtN " marx VIA ShIN. llunHU nHS
to say about the feasibility Of Napoleon's in
tended invasion Of England and about the i'm
p~ortance Of the battle OF Trafalgar.
or course Napoleon abandoned his plan Of
invading England when he learned that Ad-
miral Villeneuve. instead OF arriving at Brest,
had gone southwark from Coruna to Cadiz.
But had his plan ut any time any chances Of
SUGGEST? To this purely speculative question
Capt. Mahan deems it folly to reply with q
positive assertion. He deems 1t evident. for
instance. that Villeneuve. II. on leaving the
West Indies. he had had with him the Ferrol
squadron. and. still more. II he had been
Joined by Ganteaume twho. in fact. was cooped
up in Drestl. could have steered at once for
the Channel. and. by attending to we'll known
weather conditions. could have entered 1t with
n favorinC wind. sure to carry him to BouloRne.
The difficulty OF efecting such q combination
In the West Indies. which was Napoleon's
favorite project, was owing to the presence Of
British divisions before the hostile ports. and
step by step this circumstance drove the En-
peror back on what he pronounced the worst
eXpedient. q concentration In front OF Brest.
At the critical moment. when this final con.
centration was to be attempted. the British
by q series OF movements which resulted
naturally from their strategic policy. were be-
fore that port In force superior to either Of the
French detachments. seeking there to make 1t
their junction.
Possessing. therefore. at once strategic ad-
vantages and superior force. tho probabilities
favored Great Britain. Nevertheless, in Capt.
Mahan's opinion. there remained to Napoleon
enough chances OF success to forbid US saying
that his enterprise was hopeless. A seaman.
at all events. will scarcely deny that. despite
tho nnni,c - Nalenn - Il khA - - a
British officers. it was possible that some favor
able concurrence Of circu mstances might have
brought forty or moro French ships into the
Channel and given Napoleon the mastery ofthe
straits for the few days he asked. The British
navy. so far rs numbers were concerned. was
not adequate to perfect security. and might
in some conceivable combination OF clrcum-
stances. have been outmanpuvred and over
whelmed at the decisive point.
1t Is well known that OF the thirty three
French and Spanish ships which sailed out Of
Cadiz on Oct. 20. 1905. no fewer than twenty
two were destroyed or taken by the British.
Such was the direct outcome OF Trafalgar. As
regards its indirect and ultimate Significance.
Capt. Mahan quotes with approval the follow
ing paragraph from a recent historian. who
has shown himself exceptionally alive to the
weighty. though silent. influence OF sea
power upon the course OF events. "Traial-
gar" says Fyfre. was not only the greatest
naval victory. it was the greatest and most
momentous victory won either by land or
by sea during the whole OF the reyolu-
~tionary and Napoleonic wars. No victory. and
no series of victories. OF Napoleon produced
the same effect upon Europe. A generation
passed after Trafalgar before France again
seriously threatened England at sea The
prospect OF crushing the British navy. SO long
as England had the means to equip q navy,
vanished. Napoleon henceforth set his hopes
on exhausting Encland's resources by COM
pelilnC every State on the Continent TO exclude
her commerce. Trafalgar forced him to I'm
pose his yoke upon all Europe. or to abandon
the hone OF conauering Great Britain. Nell
sons last triumph left England in such a posi-
tion that no means remained to injure her but
those which must result In the ultimate de-
liverance OF the Continent"
These words are accepted by Cant. Maban
with very slight notifications. He has no
doubt that Trafalgar was the cause OF Napo- |
resolution to crush Great Britain by ex- |
Guiding her from the Continent.
Here. therefore, the story OF the influence of
sea power upon the great conflict rep SEES to
follow the strictly naval events and becomes |
simply with destroying. |
a secondary operation OF maritime |
but exalted in the later years OF
Napoieon's reign to be tho PRINCIPAL II not
the sole means OF action. To this secondary |
two chapters OF the book before
us arc devoted. or these the FIRST deals |
with OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES In tho ordinary
sense OF the words as directed against the
enemy's property on the high seas. The second
begins with the Berlin Decree in 1908. and. |
tracing one by one the steps which carried the
from violence TO violence. shows how
these found their necessary outcome In the
expedition and the fall OF the empire.
thus from the maze OF contemporary
in which thoy arc commonly lost.
these successive acts OF tho French Govern
ment are seen 10 form a logical sequence. con-
nected by one motive and dominated by one
The motive 10 the destruction OF
Great Britain. tho necessity that OF self
preservation. Each nation. unassaila BILE on it's
slement. stood like an impregnable fort
ress that can be brought to surrender only by
Of endurance Napoleon fell