Perrysburg journal. (Perrysburg, Wood Co., O. [Ohio]) 186?-1965, 1893-10-28

When Sherman marched unopposed to
the sea Thomas met the real crisis of
the movements, first staying Hoods
countermarch into Tennessee and then
destroying his army. Thomas never
made an error in either attack or de-
fense. He was never surprised, never
ordered reckless assault. Nothing
that he originated or executed went the
wrong way.
Let us see what he advised but
was not allowed to execute. When
ordered to Kentucky in the fall of
1861 he asked for two hundred thou
sand men with which to ad-
vance into East Tennessee to occupy
Knoxville, and, if possible, Chattanooga.
Much has been justly said of President
Lincoln's capacity in military strategy,
and twill be remembered that in one
of his messages to congress in 1861 he
recommended the advance into East
Tennessee and the building of a military
railroad through kentucky to facilitate
the movement. 1t was Thomas fortune
to be overruled in this plan and to be
the handspring in retrieving the disas-
ters that sprung from other and faulty
efforts to push forward and into the
gulf states, leaving East Tennessee open
to the armies of the enemy.
Through the mountain passes there
Bragg poured into Kentucky, forcing
the retreat of Buelrs army from north
ern Mississippi and Alabama, across
two states, to Louisville. When Bragg
began this march Thomas advised Buell.
TO concentrate at Sparta, in the foot
hills of East Tennessee, to nip the great
raid in the bud. His view was not ac-
cepted, and within a month Buell's
army, after long and stratcgically ig
nominious retreat, was encamped with
in sight of its old starting point, the
Ohio river.
Here Thomas did make one mistake,
and his only one. lie declined to ac-
cept the command of the whole army,
assuming that to do so at that juno
ture would be nnjust to Buell. as well
as to himself. 1t was misfortune to
the nation ana to the army of the CEN
ter that Thomas did not relieve Buell.
as requested by President Lincoln.
Through the aggressive ambition of
other generals, the offer never came to
him again, though, all the same, he had
to supply the supreme generalship of
that army at critical moments. Under
Rosecrans The saved Stone river and
Chickamauga; he held Chattanooga
through n famine period; under Grant
his divisions, moved by a mighty inn
: pulse, drsve Bragg from his intrench-
ments, though this was not according
to Grants battle plans; under Sher-
man it was Thomas who destroyed
Hoods army, while Sherman was en-
gagged in leading sixty thousand men
across a distant state, where not even n
venerable farmer with a flint-locls APP
clined the official command-the real
command he could not decline. IL
dropped upon his shoulders always in
the pinch of events, and never failed
to find him standing four square to all
the winds that blew
There wac something peculiar in the
relationship between Thomas and the
divisions he commanded so long, known
. distinctively as the Army OF the Cum
berland. A calm understanding exist
ed, sense of deep mutual satisfaction
with each other. The student need
not try TO find out how it was brought
about, for it was not brought about
at all In similar way the union
loving people of this country trusted
Lincoln. The knowledge of the
fiber of the man was intuitional.
Thomas men did not cheer him when
he passed along the road. His COM
posed, Arm, manly presence in
Bpired them with the sober dignity of
the work in hand. He made no flour
ishes in his orders; while he looked the
thorough soldier he was not the soldier
of the picture books. Deliberateness
6rmness, moderation, kindness, perfect
Bteadiness of nerve were stamped upon
him. His troops settled down to be
like him. They did not ask to know at
Chickamauga that nearly half the
army was gone and that their own
! lines were doubled back until they re-
yembled a narrow horseshoe; they only