The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1893-06-29
HOOKER'S ERRORS.
Grave Mistakes which Insured the Result at
Charlottesville.

Dui, III DOiuR %uS OulJ
in that battle, deem it my duty to correct
the impression upon his part that the Sd
Md. was forced by the enemy to retire from
the works held on the Plank road near Fair
view.
1t appears that his statement is based
upon the report of Col n. B. Mclaughlin,
who commanded the LIST Mass, to which the
comrade belonged, who, in his official report,
did not name the right regiment, but gave
the 4th Nd. as the number of the regiment
that had abandoned the works and given
the rebels a chance to enter the lines, by
which they enfiIaded that part held by
Berry's Division.
This report, or a copy of it, was sent to
the Adiutant-General of Massachusetts, and
after the war some of the officers of the 4th
Md. wrote to Gen. Mclaughlin to inform
him that the 4th was not present in that
battle and that ii must be the Sd Md. to
which he referred, and asking him to correct
it with the Acknowledgement. He did not
reply to the communication, and when one
O. their officers spoke to me on the subject
] told him the Sd Md. served under Gen.
Mclaughlin near the close of the war in
his brigade, and that he thought so much
of that regiment that he did not want 10
say anything to reflect upon their reputation
u.
he made his report, the Maryland regiment
(which he had named the 4th) had run
away and let the enemy in upon his flank
not only wish to place Gen. McLaugh-
len in proper light before the 4th Md, but
also to relieve them of any reflection cast
upon them by the official records, which are
not always correct, and am prepared to ex-
plain the conduct of the Sd Md. on that
occasion, which l did to Gen. Doubleday so
satisfactorily that he thought it his duty to
correct the history of Charlottesville which
he had written. In this he had placed the
blame of the defeat of May 3 upon the
right number, at least, of Maryland regi-
ments, and ascribed to the Sd Md. the defeat
on that day, as he had put upon Gen. How
ard the blame Of the rout of the Eleventh
Corps upon the second day.
Learned that Gen. Howard also had writ
zen an article for THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE,
in which he blamed the Sd Md. am not
surprised at his throwing the odium upon
that regiment if it would serve to distract
attention from his "culpable neglect" to
heed the warnings of his superior and fail
ure TO take even the ordinary precautions TO
protect his tanks, which were naked and
exposed
The Sd Nd. is not to be made the scape-
Generals either in command of the Army of
the Potomac or any of its corps. We claim
the right not only to defend the reputation
Of that regiment, but also the privilege of
exposing the errors that led to the most dis
graceful defeat TO which the Army of the
Potomac was ever subjected, and propose to
apply to them the rules Of the Articles of
War, in which they were educated at the
expense of the Government and they had
adopted as a profession.
The first blunder which led to train of
disasters was committed by Gen. Hooker
when he sent out his cavalry on that wild
goose chase after Lees communications, by
which he expected to bag his army, after he
had demolished him by his grand strategy,
which lie boastingly proclaimed when he had
taken up a position in the bushes of the
Wilderness. II reminds one of the old
fable Of skinning the lion before he is taken
By sending his cavalry away Hooker vir-
tuslly put out his own eyes, and CROPPED
around the bushes as q blind man. IF
the axiom that Cavalry are the eyes of an
army" was never demonstrated before then
Hooker did it on that occasion at his own
expense. If he had kept his cavalry with
him, Steuart could never have discovered
the weak and exposed condition of his right
Lee the information which enabled Jackson
70 conceive in his fertile brain the flank
movement that made him illustrious and
Hooker ridiculous as General.
By keeping his cavalry well TO the front
sionewall could not have executed unmo-
Tested the feat Of moving 10000 men across
the front of an army at least $4,000 strong
without being observed until the rear of his
column had passed; for the road he used
would have been in possession of his cav
airy, and that would have prevented the at
tempt Of Jackson TO execute In broad day
light such hazardous movement within
two miles Of Rockers army.
The next blunder was in dividing his
army and moving upon Lee in his position
between Fredericksburg and Chancellors-
vile by two separate columns, thus giving
Lee the advantage of interior position, and
depriying himself Of the advantage Of supe-
Nor numbers, 10 great extent, and enabling
Lee TO meet him at the point of contact
with something like equality of numbers
But the most ridiculous thing in the
whole affair was that of Hooker calling
upon Sedgwick 20 save him from Lee, when
he had taken six corps along with him with
which he was going 10 capture Banks's Ford.
But he ANONYMOUSLY failed, while Sedg-
Lees victorious forces, and drove them be-
fore him until he reached Banks's Ford,
which was Rockers objective point. The
work Of the Sixth Corps is the only brilliant
episode in the whole campaign, and why
they were not routed and captured is the
greatest compliment that could be paid TO
the ability Of Sedgwick, and proof of the
Sighting qualities OF the Sixth Corps.
If Hooker had fought his men and ex-
tended his right flank, he would have &C.
cured the road over which Jackson moved
20 turn his right flank while it might have
been in the air, it would not have gone up
ia balloon as quick as 1t did on the Plank
road, for it is hard to find weaker position
Than that chosen by Hooker for the Third
and Eleventh Corps, as it rested against no
Aatural obstacle TO an advance upon the
tront of the enemy, and was not refused.
Neither was any troops in reserve upon this
The weakest point in his line.
As to Rockers tactics, they were as faulty
as his strategy. After lapsing into spas
sive defense" he made double gap in his
line by sending away the Third Corps On
that fools errand, and Williamss Division,
Of the Twelfth Corps, from their position,
and left Hazel Grove at the mercy of jack
son; which, being the key TO Hooker's posi-
tion, was only saved by Pleasonton with
his cavalry and artillery. They proved to
Jaekgon that IL would not he aafa tn com