The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-03-19

During THIS period s.ds II vas enGaiT 4 az In a tne gu At
Sian Sana %. se Gar Saf * he e si mareS to % the RsRidan;
In the operations on the Rappahannosk and
wonderful series .of. battles and marches he.
sspo9tssivs IN sh soI Tild &n6s. sfio sns %5nilasss olss
Harbor. the. passage OF the ,J9mes tho attack
H Weld ioS1f R al resd.sf Peot5ils SIS + and the
Boydton plank road.
Just what Part Humphreys as shie1 r 9l s Wli6
which these operations were conducted or
what influence no had in causing their adop-
nseertaineS. T fse'e ofiiie chd reports are. silent
upon such questions. and Humphreys himself.
Inf n"Isn it Of T. 1s sIi S %Si' iscb L. he s's says sif bs aTss sai M
army. and, intimates. that neither was fully
adopted. \ close reading, OF the text suggests
1He ie'e army tRTou mS " the wilderness on the
first days march. and thus compelled Lee to
g E,ss sq mish n or ih night GIsn not Gtp hars BEEN bssnn "iital fots
and it is, possible that It would not have
brought %yic,orgt to the Union arms; hut how owo
cannot help wishing that the plans had been
arranged and carried out in accordance with
it is worthy OF note that the presence Of
Grant. as the. Lieutenant-G enerai
POTOMAC, without assuming Immediate com
manl Of II. was unfortunate In many respects.
sponsitility. and frequently gave rise ,o de;
lays in tho Transmission and the execution OF
inss 4: io d HasGF!1 and who Il n sSo m,fu MofE them
out, and to a lack Of harmony and coherence
in their execution which was Frequently fatal
kindly, endeavored as, far as possible to give ~
lis orders in general terms Is MNnnddale Leave ave- }hh iss
staff: but. with all their LOYALTY and ability.
the result was in many cases far from salts,
long and unhuDpy yenr. ms they are now re-
corded. there seems to be but little doubt that
sumed IN Immediate command Of the army and
som@ssGs = corps. for which they we're pre-
1t is almost useless to dwell upon the ser
vices OF Humphreys, as chief Of stafr. fer there
Ing upon tho subject It Is known. Of course.
that while the grand and battle tactics Of that
ties were OF the highest order. The dispositions
for both direct and flank movements. for the
e eassa of the he t troops. ' and dn for t the care s" Of shhes sick
was possible to make them Re nir. In - all ! Of these
and 1t is only fair to assume that whatever
was wrong was due to the dual system Of
larly applicable to the failure Of the plan to
both Meade ana ,Hancock are understood to
have claimed that Il they had knoEn that ths
should take Petersburg and, thatthey were eS-
pscted to cooperate with him. Petersburg
would have been taken"
Without dwelling longer upon the interest
ing but obscure relations which eubsisted be-
tween Grant and Meade and between Meade
and Humphreys. it is proper to remark that
Humphreys was the breakwater and protector
Of Meade and OF every officer doing business |
with Meade's headquarters. He was patient
always scrupulously kind and polite. and al
ways ready to listen and explain. In every
personal aspect he was q model chief Of staff.
and made every one. who approached him,
whether officer or private. feel that he had
found a friend in him.
It is an open secret. however. that as the |
campaign approached its final stages. Grant, |
without making, any formal, change in the
faulty organization. assumed day by day q
more direct control over the two armies and
the various corps operating against Lee. Per
his practical suppression. and that he would
have less and less use. for a chief OF staff Of
such ability and distinction as Humphreys, |
Meade availed himself Of Hancock's retire.
ment. on account OF wounds and disability. |
from the command OF the Second Corps. to |
secure the place for Humphreys. and I'LL tho
vacancy on his staff by calling Gen. Alexander
s. Webb to the place.