The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1893-11-11
ENGLAND WANTS PEACE
NEW DIrIoM4rrc ASPECT TO TIE
BRAzILIAy sITUATION.
Her Interests are in Danger-situation
Said to be Desperate, and inc Hhd
Thought to be Near

terially changed. The English govern
ment, through its ambassador, mas urged
the United States TO exert It's mediatinS
influence between the conflicting elements
in Brazil in order TO bring to a speedy
close the internal strife which has been
in progress I'm that country Tor some
months. The interest Of England In the
matter is not entirely unseldsh. Her COM
merctal relations with Brazil are too iun-
portant to be sacrificed by continuance
Of n struggle which has already lmperilled
them TO a serious degree. They are too
vast. Also 10 be ieopardized by the POSI-
bility Of civil war which, II the estaO-
li5hment Of monarchy should De ehcouI
aged could not be ayerted. IL Is tnlS
English consideration for the pounds
shiIltugs, aud pence that more than once
has stilled the troubled waters OF the
world and IL is Just now uppermost In
the Brazilian situation. IL has Kept Eng
land free from the intrigues whlch might
heNVe oyeStpFrod the Sew Se9V"0e, a0o'
In this instance coupled with the trm
stand taken by the United States, has
brought to naught the endeavOrs 10 place
an emperor or a king upon Brazilian
throne. 1SOr, no matter what may oncS
have threatened, II is now absolutely GER
tain that all danger 10 Brazil from this
foreign interference has passed away.
with England averse to a continuance OF
1nterneclne strife; with republican france
unwilling TO join I'm any cable, ana WIN
Germany having as much material inter-
osts at stake as Great Britain, there IS
left no support for those who would sac
rfce the republic for the sake Of mon
archical triumph. Portugal would be only
too willing to see its dynasty re-estab-
lished but il lacks money, men, and ships,
and cannot afford practical aid. Austria
f. equally anxious. no doubt 70 see one
Cf her princes established over the great
South American country, but the fate If
MaXimiian has not yet been totally ei-
faced tron the pages az history. Tue
love Of political independence, moreover,
is to-day much more ardent in Brazil
than it was in Mexico thirty years ago
This being the case. il is naturally
eS{ecte4 tSat the end of thS yeVolutiOr-
I'm Brazil IS near al hand. 1t is not ex-
pected that the United States will find 4
necessary 10 commit any overt act TO
bring the trouble 20 a close. it has al
| ready exercised a tremendous moral
Influence, both in refusing 10 recognize
Admiral MellO, tho commander OF the
ihfurgent feet and more especially l..
the rebuke administered 70 Admiral
stanton Tor the faux pas committed
by that officer I'm saluting the rebelllous
admiral The effect Of the action Of the
United States I'm this regard has not be-
gun to be appreciated in this country.
I'M Brazil IL was eagerly accepted as further
proof Of the sympathy Of the United
states and stimulated the people there
to a steadfast unfolding Of the lawful
Cove rnment
It was not the first time that tie
friendliness OF the United States I'm behalf
OF law AMI order in the new republic
had been manifested. The othec instance
is a bit OF unpublished diplomatic his
tory the relation Of which at this time
is 10th appropriate and interesting
when on the third OF November. 1891
Deodore de Fonseca, then president Of
the QgoyIslCnal R9TPfDoneNt %R1ch had
| succeeded the monarchy, dissolved Con-
| gress and proclaimed martial law,
! Brazil was on the verge of a dictator
ship. In the crisis Secretary Blaine
! was appealed TO I'm order tnat INC m
! nuence of the United States might be
! thrown into the balance and order brought
| out Of chaos. Ii was upon MS sug-
gestion that President Harrison cabled
! TO President Fonseca ms regret that the
| Brazilian Congress had been dissolved
! i'm defiance Of the provision Of the constitu-
| ton, and added his hope that the Presi-
| dent might not commit any act which
! would thwart the advancement OF Brazn
toward a real, substantial form OF re-
| publican government The dispatch was
| couched in the most friendly terms
"a If an elder brother had undertaken
| to advise a younger one, but II had It's
| effect. IL convinced Fonseca that the step
| he had taken met with the disapproval
| of the United States, and 1t was the
most potent factor leading to ms reslg-
/ nation, which almost Immediately Iol-
! lowed. Diplomatic history aLoIuS no
more striking evidence Of the influence
| which the United States has over Bra
I'll than this private cablegram, the
wording of which has never been mace
| 1,novyn and the substance Of Whlch -
now published for the first time.
| 1,ba events which have transpfeu III
| u,a4u reuder 1t absolutely certain that
| the great mass Of people are WIN tle
| government OF which President FelNO'o -
the head: 1t is this fact whlch removes I,1S
from the present administrator, VI t.i0
| United States 20y doubt as 10 the IeCu
tnde OF its pufLcse I'm affordihg sympathy
| and moral support to the Peixoto govern
| ment. Admiral MellO has been from the
| beginning a marplOt In the repuDiIc' ~
| was Npon MS advice, "heT. fihhV>SSNeS q
! marine that President Peixoto suffered
| tbe Federal government, though more by
| negative action than by direct lhterler-
ence to acqUiesce in the deposition OF tne
! governors of the States VINO nav NPmelN
| the provisional government Ihat thls
,vqs an error dine has abundantly proven
| II led finally 10 the outbreak in the state
| ~ Rio Grande do sui, a disturbance
! which marked the first chapter OF me
| present revolution. The people OF the
| STATE by their SURFACES restored TO the
| eovernorship Senior Castilhos. a Republl-
| can. and defeated Casper Martins VINO
| was the avOwed candidate or those VINO
| were anxious to see a restoration OF the
| monarchy. Against the advice OF Meilo,
| President Peixoto responded 10 the can OF
| Castilhos for the aid Of the tederdl troops
whereupOn Mello resigned his portIoho'
and gathering around him the dlscon-
| tented element In the navy seized the
| brazilian warships and declared his in
teution of overturning the government.
How little sympathy Mello has obtained
from his own people may be gathered
from the fact that when the Brazilian
Congress adjourned on the 9th OF last
| SeQtepooer x passed & resolution c9lltog
| upon the country 10 stand by President
| Peixoto 10 resist any attempt on the
part OF Mello's forces TO effect landlns
on Brazilian soil, and expressing the
| hove that the eooyt az a few plouters TO
overturn the republic would prove unsuc-
cessful From that day 10 this Mello
has not set foot upon the mainland. he
has, 1t is true. sent some OF his neuten-
! ants 20 establish upon the isIano OF 81.
Catherine a provisional government, but
upon the shore opposite this Island he is
confronted, as. indeed, he is upon the
shores overlooking the bay Of Rio de ia
! nero by the Federal forces, augmented
| by thousands of volunteer militia, who