Abilene weekly reflector. [volume] (Abilene, Kan.) 1888-1935, 1893-12-14

When Sherman marched unopposed to
the sea Thomas met the real crisis Of
the movement, first staying Hoods
countcrmarch into Tennessee and then
destroying his army. Thomas never
made an error In either attack or de-
Tense. He was never surprised, never
ordered u reckless assault Nothing
that he originated or executed went the
wrong way.
Let MS see what he advised but
was not allowed TO execute. When
ordered 10 Kentucky in the fall Of
1901 he asked for two hundred thou
sand men with which to ad.
vance into East Tennessee TO occupy
Knoxville, and, ifpossiblc, Chattanooga.
Much has been justly said Of President
Lincoln's capacity in military strategy,
and II will he remembered that in one
of his messages to congress In 1861 he
recommended the advances into East
Tennessee and the building Of Il military
railroad through Kentucky 10 facilitate
the movement IL was Thomas fortune
To be overrulcd In this plan and To be
the kidnapping In retrieving the disas-
tiers that sprung from other and faulty
efforts TO push forward and into the
gulf states, leaving East Tennessee open
to the armies of the enemy.
Through the mountain passes there
Bragg poured into Kentucky, forcing
the retreat Of Buell's army from north
ern Mississippi and Alabama, across
two states, to Louisville. When Bragg
began this march Thomas advised Buell.
TO concentrate ut Sparta, Ia the foot
hills OF East Tennessee, to nip the great
raid in the bud. Ills view was not uc-
ccptcd, and within month Buclrs
army, after n long and stratcgicnlly ig-
nominious retreat was cncamped with
in sight Of its old starting point, the
Ohio river
Here Thomas did max one mistake,
and his only one. lie declined to ne
ccpt the command of the whole army,
assuming that 10 do ~ at that june
turc would he unjust to Buell. as well
as 10 himself IL was n misfortune 10
the nation and To the army Of the cen
ter that Thomas did not relieve Buell.
ns requested by President Lincoln.
Through the aggressive ambition of
other generals, the offer never cnmc TO
him again, though, all the same, he had
to supply the supreme gcneralship Of
that army Mt critical moments. Under
Rosccrans he saved Stone river and
Chickamauga; he held Chattanooga
through u famine period; under Grant
his divisions, moved by n mighty inn
pulse, drove bragg from his intrench.
mcnts, though this was not according
IN l.ruR nj al
man IL was Thomas who destroyed
Hoods army, while sherman was en-.
gagged In leading sixty thousand men
across distant state, where not even
venerable farmer with II ilint-locs ap.
peared 10 block the way. Thomas dc.
clincd the official communicative real
command he could not decline. II
dropped upon his shoulders always In
the pinch Of events and never failed
TO find him standing four square TO all
the winds that blew.
There wat something peculiar in the
relationship between Thomns and the
divisions he commanded so long, known
distinctively as the Army Of the Cum
berland. a calm understanding exist
ed, sense Of deep mutual satisfaction
with each other. The student need
not try 10 find out how II was brought
abOut, for II was not brought about
at all In n similar way the union
loving people Of this country trusted
Lincoln. Tho knowledge Of the
fiber Of the man was intuitional.
Thomas men did not cheer him when
he passed along the road. His com.
posed, firm, manly presence In.
spircd them with the sober dignity OF
the work In hand lie made no flour.
ishes in his orders; while he looked the
thorough soldier he was not the soldier
Of the picture books. Dclibcratcness,
hrnncss. moderation, kindness perfect
steadincss Of nerve wcrc stamped upon
him. His troops settled down TO be
like him. They did not ask 10 know AT
Chicfamanga that nearly half the
army was gone and that their own
lines were doubled back until they re.
semblcd narrow horseshoe; they only
knew that Thomas was there 10 rive
orders and that he would cXtricnte
them when necessary. And he did.
Such general, with such troops,
fashioned by his own personality, may
be trusted 10 fight as long as hundred
of them remain together with arms In
their hands This quiet determine.
tion TO struggle to the last, impene-
trable TO panics, was found in every
army or corps commanded by Thomas
II was the response of manhood TO
manhood, and military writers should
not fail to give IL due consideration
when they deal with the elements Of
the highest gcneralship An army is
the reflex Of the general, and the opin-
Inn m m ftrnrlrmff urrnx M In N,,rn,rr.lI