The advocate and Topeka tribune., 1893-07-19
NOT GUILTY.
Continued from page 81

It REQUIRES no profound knowledge OF human
nature to know that with ordinary men opin-
ions and prejudices are not amenable to the
power Of the will, however honest the intention
Of the party may be to put them aside. They
are likely to remain In the minds OF the Juror
in spite Of all his efforts to get rid OF them,
warping and giving direction to MS luagmetn1t, "a.
cOlOring the facts as they are developed by the
evidence and exerting an influence, more or
less potent, though 1t be unconsciously to the
juror himself, on the final result OF his dellD-
erations. To cOmpeld person accused Of a crime
to be tried by juror lchO has preJUdced RtS case
is not to give him q fair trial. Nor should de-
fendsnt be compelled to rely, as his security
for the impartiality Of the jurors by whom he
is to be tried, upon the restraining and con-
trolling influence upon the Jurors nina OF MS
oath to render true verdict according to the
law and the evidence. His tmpart1ality should
appear before he Is permitted to take the oath.
II he is not impartial then his oath cannot be
relied upon to make him so. IN % tne terse ana ana
expressive language OF Lord Coke, already
quoted, the juror should stand lndlnerenI as
he stands unSWOrn.
INCOMPETENT BECAUSE NOT IMPARTIAL.
applying the law as here laid down in the
Cronin case to the answers Of the jurors above
given in the present case, it is very apparent
that most Of the jurors were incompetent be-
cause they were not impartial. For nearly all
of them candidly stated that they were preju-
diced against the defendants and believed
them guilty before hearing the evidence, and
the mere fact that the judge succeeded, by
singularly suggestive examination, in getting
them to state that they believed they could
try the case fairly on the evidence did not
make them competent.
at is true that this case was before the su-
preme court, and that court allowed the YER
. 4, olo hot In, t1oo
opinion Of the majority Of the court in the
Cronin case an effort is made to distinguish
that case from this one, but 1t Is evident that
the court did not have the record Of this case
before it when 1t tried to make the distinction,
and the opinion of the minority of the court
in the Cronin case expressly refers to this
case as being exactly like that One 80 far as
relates to the competency Of the jurors. The
answers of the jurors were almost Identical
and the examinations were the same The very
things which the supreme court held to be
fatal errors in the Cronin case constituted the
entire fabric of this case so far as relates to
the competency Of the jury. In fact, the trial
Judge in the Cronin case was guided by the
rule laid down in this case, yet the supreme
court reversed the Cronin case because two OF
the jurors were held to be incompetent, each
having testified that he had read and talked
about the case, and had formed and expressed
an opinion as to the guilt of the defendants;
that he was prejudiced that he believed what
he had read and that his prejudice might in
fiuence his verdict; that his prejudice
amounted to a conviction on the subject OF
the guilt or innocence Of the defendants but
each finally said that he could and would try
the case fairly on the evidence alone, etc.
"A careful comparison Of the examination Of
these two jurors with that Of many Of the
Jurors in this case shows that number OF the
Jurors in this case expressed themselves, If
anything, more strongly against the defend
ants than those two did, and, what Is still
more, one of those summoned, NJ. D. FlaVin, in
this case testified, not only that he had read
and talked about the case and had formed
and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or in
nOcence of the defendants, that he was bitterly
prejudiced, but, further, that he was related to
one of the men who was killed, and that for
that reason he felt more strongly against the
defendants than he otherwise might, yet he
was held to be competent on his mere state
menu Gnab ne Delle'eu Ao COuAu Wy VH0 O@90
fairly on the evidence.
"No matter what the defendants were
charged with, they were entitled to q fair trial,
and no greater danger could possibly threaten
our institutions than to have the courts Of JUS
tice run wild or give way to popular clamor,
and when the trial Judge in the case ruled that
a relative of one Of the men who was killed
was competent juror, and this after the man
had candidly stated that he was deeply preju-
diced, and that his relationship caused him to
feel more strongly than he otherwise might,
and when in scores of instances he ruled that
men who candldly declared that they believed
80 ha hat n