The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1893-10-10
REGISTRATION CASE.
Judge Bartch Decides in Favor of
Thornton.
A Permanent Restraining Order Granted
Mccormick VS.. sadler-The Mining
acknowledgements Entered.

According to the setting, the case OF
r. S. Thornton VS.. j. B. Walden ct. al.
came on yesterday morning at 10 O'Clock
before Judge Bartch. The suit was
brought to have the registrar enjoiued
from striking the plaintiffs name from
the registration list.
There was quite an array of legal tai
ent in the case, the plaintiff being repre-
sented by Judge Powers, Attorneys
Harris. Armstrong and McCallum, whilst
for the defense appeared Judge Judd,
Attorneys LIE Grande Young and W. H.
Dickson.
At the outset Judge Powers interposed
on two points; first, by stating that the
plaintiff was voter in the First precinct,
year, that the registration officer,
in making his rounds, did not find
Thornton; that all the voters who were
discovered had a cross placed opposite
their names, that those who were not
found were not so indicated, were as
sumed to be erased, and their names were
omitted from the new list. That, counsel
claimed, was not an excuse. The statute,
he said, required the registration officer
to erase the name when making his
rounds. No cabalistic sign was sufficient,
the law being that man could go to the
registration Office when the registrars
were sitting, see if his name had been
stricken off and have it replaced If wrong
fully omitted. Secondly, cousel pointed
out that the legislature in 1892
passed an act amending the regis
tration law. SO as to make it applicable
only SO far as house to house canvass
and the erasure OF names were concerned
to theyear1S92. They struck out the words
to the effect that ''it should be done each
year." and amended by substituting
therefor that sit should be done in 1922
Hence counsel insisted that the registra-
ton officers had no authority to make a
house to house canvass or power to erase
any names from the list. All the power
they possessed was to sit together as they
did last week, add new names, make new
lists and hear challenges.
Attorney LIE Grande Young then pro-
ceeded to argue the demurrer to the COM
plain. He insisted that there was a mis-
joinder of parties plaintiff in this case,
and that three or four persons could not
sue together in a joint action for
an alleged individual wrong. done
to each one. Counsel further argued
that the code did not change the rules of
equity in regard 20 that. joint tort
could always be prosecuted in a joint
name, but where it was a case of indi-
vidual wrong application, must be made
individually. Besides, the parties con-
tending had not set forth where they
actually resided in any one case. Coun-
sel quoted largely from authorities. as
did also Attorney Armstrong, whose ar
gument followed that OF Mr.. Young.
Mr.. Armstrong, in his reply, urged
that the statute allowed them to bring
their action in behalf of others as we'll as
the principal plaintiff where all had a
common or general interest, or where the
parties concerned were numerous. As to
the latter, it was not necessary to name
them.
The arguments to the demurrer were
submitted, and his honor took it under
advisement until o'clock, at which time
the court convened after the noon recess,
and Judge Bartch said he did not think
that the matter as to the voters generally
was a sufficient plea under the statute,
and as to that part of the complaint the
demurrer was sustained. As to the plain
tiff in the suit the demurrer would be
overruled.
Attorney LeGrand Young then pro-
ceeded to argue and cite authorities bear
ing upon the main question, and Attorney
Armstrong replied.
JuQSS odItCu, III giving LIS dCC4c4OA
said the material question here was as to
the intention of the egislature-whether
or not it intended to strike out the words
seach year, !" and thereby limit this law
to the one registration. In the construc-
ton of a statute the sections must always
be construed together if possible, so as to
give effect to each section. He thought
the plain inference of the law was that
the registration was directed to be made
in that year and also each sue
ceeding year, in the manner there
in provided; that the words referred
to were included through mad
vertence; that the law in that respect
stood as it did before, and the court so
held. He thought the registrars should
do some affirmative act II regard to these
names as they passed from house to
house, so that there could be no mistake.
His honor was of the opinion that the
registrars did not have the right to strike
the names of voters from the list after
the lists we're made up IN the house to
house to canvass. and he so ruled.
The restraining order. thus was made
permanent as to the plaintiff only.