The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1893-12-24
rnr BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

as lucky fighting Irishman- The liter
ary remains were edited by Gen. Ii. G.
Boynton, who seems 10 sympathize with
Piatt's ridiculous view that Lincoln's dis
trust Of Thomas, born virgisian. robbed
Thomas of showing himself the greatest
military genius Of the war; Grant. Sher-
man and Sheridan in their published
works agree abou. Thomas.thst he was an
heroic soldier for defensive work, but alto
gether too slow, too self-distrustful, too
afraid Of responsibility to conduct an Of
fensive campaign, which requires celebrity
in execution and supreme self-conh-
dence. Grant. Sherman and Sheridan
said that Thomas could not con-
duct an offensive campaign like sher-
defensive campaign like Johnston's re-
treat. Concerning the incapacity Of
Thomas to conduct an offensive CAM
paign Grant, on January q. 1885. more
than q month after the battle Of Nash
vile, wrote Sherman that he had decided
10 break up Thomas command because
II did not believe Thomas could be pos
sibly got off before spring. His pursuit
of Hood indicated sluggishness that
satisfied ms he could not conduct one of
your campaigns: he is not good in pur-
suit" On January IS, 1865. Grant writes
Halleck that he has abandoned the plan
Of sending Thomas command against
Selma and Mobile because Thomas is too
ponderous in his preparations and equip
ments to move rapidly through Q country
and live On it," Sherman's dispatches are
quoted to the same effect concerning
Thomas incapacity for an offensive cam
paign. Badesu quotes Grants dispatches
of March. 1855. in which he says: Thomas
is slow beyond all excuse"--referring to
the fact that Thomas failure to execute
his repeated orders had compelled him to
change his plans for the spring campaign
In Tennessee aud North Carolina
At West Point Thomas was a cIassmats
OF Sherman's and was known as ''old
Slow Trot" and was described as almost
too slow to move, too brave to run away.
In Grants Memoirs he expressed the
conviction that Thomas won Nashville not
because OF his incxcussble failure to take
the offensive after the battle of Franklin,
bat in spite of il. On the ID Of December
Hood with 22.o0o men. having lost the
flower OF bis army. 6. 700 men, at Franklin,
confronted Thomas OF Nashville. who had
then over 5000 fine troops. including tho
Fourth corps of the Army of the Cumber-
land, the Twcnty-third army corps of the
Army OF the Ohio. and the First and Third
divisions of the Sixteenth army corps un-
der A. J. Smith. an able soldier who had
distinguished himself in command of the
men at Vieksburg, during the Red river
campaign and In the expulsion Of Gen.
Price from Missouri. Thomas subordi-
mates included such able veteran command
ers as Gen. Schofisld, Gen. Thomas J.
Wood, Gen. ]. Ii. Wilson. Gen. Cox, Gen.
James B. Steedman. Thomas, in spite of
constant urging. did not attack Hoods
shattered army of 22,00o until December
IL. 1854. when Thomas had IS, 600, or 10, 600
more than he wanted to use in the fight.
The criticism OF Grant on Thomas Is
that instead of concentrating his troops
and meeting Hood he spread himself in
the effort to hold too many points and
that his victory was purchased at the
needless sacrifice of railroads and over
s. 90. 600 worth Of material, which by con-
eentration and aggressive action before or
after Franklin ne could have easily saved.
Gen. Cox. who commanded the Twenty
third army corps under Schofeld in this
campaign. entirely sustained Grants con-
clusioa that Thomas erred in Judgment.
Gen. Cox tells the story Of the Nashville
campaign. Cox's book was prepared from
the official archives of the war department:
| his figures Of the strength of Thomas
army are official data and are standard
military authority for the details of the
campaign. Ia his preface Gen. Cox states
that the war department; opened 10 him all
its archives, both Federal and Confederate;
that he has read all the official re-
ports and narratives Of the campaign
published on both sides; that he
submitted his book for revision and exam.
inatson TO both sherman and sehoheld,
and that his figures As to the number OF
soldiers 81 Thomas disposal are officially
correct lie bad the Fourth and the
rweRty-shIEd eorps, Socoo OF the best
soldiers Of SAssm&n's Atlanta army;
/ he had l0ea seasoned soldiers dis
| posed IN detaebments under Rousseau,
| Granger and Steeiman: he had $500 Old
cavalry soldiers who fought - infantry:
| he hsi A. J. Smith With 1890 veterans Of
The Sixteenth army corps and large num-
/ beg % ecnvs.escens veterans returning 10
! their regiments. al good soldiers. With
/ the exception Of A. J. smiths veterans
1 he coaid have concentrated ali these
/ troops and fought Hood With superior
/ numbers st DaeS river and saved his
| railroad and s, 90, GO worth Of material,
/ or, - OTAat expressed il. he Vas finally
/ vseiorsoos. not because Of his delay, bat In
| spite Of Il sn1 It's needless cost 20 him
I sell This is history. ana 10 is not recssed
/ IN aensA Of oea. Thomas Just fame a. a
/ distinguished American soldier. tat IN
disproof % Pis:t's ridiculous claim that
| he WAS The mess brilliant. successful sol.
der ef the w&s and ~ military ssvior Of
/ The nation, Grants dispatches 20 sher-
nAa IA January. isssS prove ths, lie dared
aos trust Thomas - make an offensive
( campaign requiring prompt preparation or
rslersty az movement. aaa fAers5eTs &c al
Sssa2sa ~ ssss1 ~ IAomAs axaay. uxaas