The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1893-03-23
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.
THE STORY OF THE WATER
LOO CAMPAIGN.
An Exhaustive Military Study
by John G. Ropes, Published by
Charles Scribner' Sons.
ATLANTA Constitution.

ATLANTA constitutional
Napoleon entered Paris on his
return from Elba on the goth OF
March, 1915. His whole desire and
interest lay in the direction of peace:
He had a nation to reconstruct and
time was invaluable. What would he
do after his work in France was &C
conplished was the problem. Every
personal interest was a guarantee OF
the sincerity of his pacific oVertures.
But Europe forecast the future by the
past. The allied kings saw the unex-
pected naturalization Of their night
mare-a requickened and rehablll-
tated France, Napoleon once more at
the head of a million Frenchmen, and
the cannon of the grand army thun-
dering at the gates of every capital on
the continent. The die was cast Tor
war, and Napoleon accepted the YER
dict and prepared to meet the emer-
gency.
There was not much time given
him for preparation. Before the sum-
mer had opened the Austrlans had
begun to mobilize on the east. Russia
was fastening to their aid. We'll
lington, at the head Of over a 100, 900
English, with their Belgian, Dutch
and Hanoverian allies, was at Brus-
sells. Butcher, with about the same
number of Prussians and their allies,
was cautioned along the frontier to the
north of the Sambre and Meuse.
There were two lines of conduct
open for Napoleon's choice. One was
to wait for the invasion of France. By
doing SO he would gain several weeks,
and time was precious. The other
was to assume the aggressive and
attack the armies marching against
him before they could unite or make
preconcerted invasion. Napoleon's
genius lay in attack. With charac-
teristic energy he adopted the latter
alternative, and decided to march on
the armies in Belgium before the
Russians and Austrians could unite,
and attack him from the east.
Having made his choice, he at once
put his plan in execution. The army
of Butcher lay scattered along the
French forntier to the north and east
of the Sambre. Its base of supplies
was on the Rhine. The English were
at Brussels, some thirty miles to the
north, with their base Of supplies by
way Of Antwerp and Oslend to the
sea. Both armies lay scattered in
their environments, with their lines Of
communication along the roads from
Charleroi and Ligny to Brussels. If
Butcher were defeated ne would prob
ably retreat on the Rhine to maintain
his base. If Wellington were defeated
he would be forced to retreat on the
sea. Butcher was closer to the French
frontier than the English. 1t was
likely that at the approach of an enc
my he would unite his army more
rapidly than the English would. If be
could be made to give battle before
Wellington came up, he would be
taken at disadvantage. If he re-
fused to give battle, he was forced to
the dangerous alternative of forsaking
his base to join the English, or else
would have to retreat in direction
which would inevitably separate him
from Wellington. TO force him into
this awkward position, crush him and
then deal with the English single
handed was Napoleon's plan.
On the 14th of June the French
army, numbering over one hundred
thousand men, rapidly and secretly
modified in front of Charleroi, on
the Sambre, before the English and
Prussians had discovered that Napoleon
had left Paris. The news that the
French had crossed the frontier
reached Wellington in Brussels while
at a ball, which Byron has made
forever famous. The duke immedi-
ately began to make his tardy arrange
ments to meet them. Meanwhile the
Prussians, taken by surprise, were
falling back and modifying their
forces as rapidly as possible in the
direction of Ligny, on the Namur
road, their base of supplies. Napoleon
followed them closely with his center
and right wings, while Marshal Ney,
| with the left, advanced OF Quatre
Bras at the junction of the Namur-
Brussels roads, 10 cut off the English
advance while Napoleon dealt with
| Butcher
SO far everything had worked just as
the emperor wished, but at Quatre
Bras began the series of blunders which
characterized the whole campaign.
Ney failed to occupy Quatre Bras on
the 18th. On the 10th a force OF
English, through no foresight of Wei
lington's, were in possession, and Ney
failed to drive them out. In the
meantime on the 10th, Napoleon came
Up with the Prussians at Ligny, and,
after hard days fight, put them to
rout. Ney, who was to have come to
the emperor's aid at the critical
moment, and crush the Prussan
right, had all he could do at Quatre
Bras to rectify his error of the day
before, and thus Butcher was saved
from death blow. Still though not
crushed, as Napoleon had wished, he
was disabled. His columns were in
full retreat, and Napoleon was at
liberty to turn his attention to Wei
lington. He supposed that Butcher
had retreated toward Namur. Every
thing indicated that he had done so.
1t was not probable that after receiv-
ing a severe defeat he would forsake
his base-a dangerous move at best
and doubly so in the face of vigilant
foe-and attempt to join Wellington.
But it was possible that he would dc
| NJ Il