Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1893-08-22
MR.. McADOO'S IDEAS.
The Lessons to Be Learned From the
Victoria Disaster.
Modern Naval Constructfon Not at
Improvement In Personnel.

Assistant Secretary McAdoo of the Navy
Department has made an interesting con-
tribution to the North American Review
upon the terrors of the Victoria disaster
and several of the points he makes may
naturally be held to forecast the policy Of
the Navy Department. one of these points
Is that the building of frst-class battle
ships viii not be abandoned or even modi-
fed on account of that accident.
No Fault Of Naval Construction.
MIR. McAdoo insists that the loss of the
Victoria does not show modern naval con-
struction to be at fault, and ought not to
lead TO any radical change in the makeup
of the battle ship. Although it is possible
to sink the battle ship. yet it remains the
highest embodiment of naval power. The
ram is a tremendous weapon, and SO is the
torpedo; but the battle snip combines RAM
torpedo, armCr and the fire of prodigious
guns. The gun Is still the first and great
est weapon in warfare. Mr.. McAdoo does
not underrate the ram. and the fact that
II is part of the modern battle ship
SHOWS that IL Is appreciated everywhere;
but he points out that the battle ship may
have skill in maneuver. and the fire of its
guns and torpedoes to oppose to the ram,
as we'll as its own armored PROV. These
views lead to the belief that the present ad-
m.nistration will adhere to the existing
program of construction, which includes
eight first-class battle ships. in addition to
the four now built or building.
Squadron Drills Needed.
Another interesting suggestion made by
Mr.. McAdoo is that the United States navy
needs squadron drills and the practical
maneuvering of fleets. 1t is true that Ad-
miral Tryon. whose fatal order caused the
Victoria disaster. had been famous for his
skill in such drills, and that this very
calamity occurred during the maneuvering
OF his fleet. But what the assistant sec
retary urges is that only through practice
and experience can officers know how to
manage their vessels with safety and skill
when brought together in large numbers
for actual battle. The lack OF these drills
thus far in our service has been due to the
small number of vessels and the need of
scattering them among many stations.
Mr.. McAdoo gives assurance that 'un-
doubtedly this will be changed in the near
future, as new ships are put in commission.
AT any rate, it is to be hoped that our Of
hcerS and men in the future viii have more
frequent opportunity for fleet drill, IL is
the only practical way to acquire great
skill and ability to handle ships in time of
action, ana Is, moreover the surest method
OF acquiring precision In that most nlpor-
tant of things in the navy-the art OF sig
mailing"
Improvement of the Personnel.
Still another need, which Mr.. McAdoo
regards as of special Importance, is the i'm
provement of the personnel Think for
moment" he says, 'of what depends upon
the ability and courage of the man who in
battle stands in small armored tower into
which the light penetrates from mere slit
between the rim and the ROOF, through
which he must see every movement of his
ship. On his intelligence, learning, expert
ence, skill, courage and nerve rest the
safety of the ship and the life of the crew
and the final outcome of the conflict" The
moral which he draws is that officers should
reach the command of ships while they are
still comparatively young. Most of the
commanding officers of our ciy1' war;. he
says. were men under thirty. The age has
been gradually increased until now officers
arriving at command rank are forty-seyen,
forty-eight or forty-nine years of age.
These utterances of a high Official of the
navy indicate that the department will ex
ert its influence in favor of the project Of
more rapid promotion in the navy, which,
in one form or another. has been under con-
sideration by Congress for several years.