The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1893-09-17
Russia and the Mediterranean.

II 1t DO true that France has agreed to
lease to Russia the port OF Villefranche as
naval station. We have at last solid ground
will cooperate in the event Of European
war. Hitherto no conclusive evidence Of
the existence OF such coalition has been
forthcoming. Undoubtedly the cordial re-
ception OF the French feet at Cronstadt and
the subsequent return visit OF Russian war
vessels have disclosed willingness on the
Cars part to encourage friendly relations
between his subjects and French cit
liens; but there Is wide gap be-
tween such international courtesies and
the conclusion OF definite treaty
Of alliance. II. however. such O country rs
France has been prevailed upon to lot one
OF her harbors pass even temporarily under
foreign control, we may be certain that ad-
equate compensation will be given; and
this can only take the form OF assurances
that Russian armies will support the French
whenever the latter are involved In conflict
with the three central powers. That must
be the consideration for the lease; for. ex-
cept in one improbable contingency France
would have no need Of help from Russia In
the Mediterranean. whereas tho acquisition
OF a naval station In that sea has long been
deemed q matter Of capital Importance to
the Northern Empire.
1t would only be in war with England
which. 30 long as the Liberals are in power
at Westminster may be excluded from the
list Of probabilities-that France could de-
rive any advantage from the presence OF q
Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. In any
international complications to which Eng
land should not be party. France would
be abundantly able to deal with any force
which Italy. Austria. and Germany could
array against her In that quarter. The
threat Of Berlin newspapers that the tenn
porary cession OF French Mediterranean
port to Russia would be followed by the
leasing OF an Italian harbor to Germany
can have no terrors for France. When war
breaks out the Germans will require every
war vessel at their disposal to protect
their own ports in the Baltic and North
seas. Any money. therefore. that might
be expended by the Berlin Govern
ment In eqUipping naval station In Sicily.
or on the Italian peninsula. would be worse
than thrown away. IL 1t were followed by
the diversion Of part Of its naval force
from points where the interests of German
commerce are concentrated. When war
comes. Italy will have to depend on the
assistance OF Austria alone. and no one
imagines that the Italian and Austrian war
ships combined could make head against
the armament that Toulon would be able to
send forth. So far then as France Is con-
cerned. the permanent stationing Of Rus
sian fleet In tho Mediterranean is matter
OF Indifference.
Russia. on the other hand. considers the
acquisition OF "a seaport in the Meditcr-
ranean an Indispensable move in the game,
the prize of which is Constantinople. 1t Is
true that the clause Of the treaty OF Paris
forbiddiDg the Gar to maintain war vessels
In the Black Sea was abroGated during the
Franco-German war. but the strong naval
force since collected there Is still confined
by treaty to that basin. and could not
efectually cooperate with the Cars Baltic
fleet. unless the latter should obtain coal
ing station in the Mediterranean. For a
time the St. Petersburg Government hoped
to acquire one Of the Greek harbors. but
her plans were thwarted at Athens by the
central and western powers, including