The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1893-05-05
A PLANT OF SLOW GROWTH.

The success of our country in rapidly
building navy to satisfy the demands OF
our great civil war from 1867 t. 1865 con-
tinues to be ignorantly quoted in disproof
of the necessity OF larger navy than we
have at present. The argu,aeat is that
there is not the slightest ground for beiev-
ing that We shall ever be inv oised in war
with any foreign power Of superior naval
strength. This is q matter If opinion,
but unless We believe that there will never
again be great war in Europe, We may
be certain that the United States cannot
expect to always remain at peace with the
world. A great war in Europe would
probably ultimately involve England, and
if England were involved W. would GER
tainly need large navy - protect our
food export trade with Great Britain from
destruction. 1t is further urged that it is
time enough to create q gress aavy when
war comes; that war found Us without a
navy in April. ISL, but tina. We speedily
constructed and concentrated for effective
work an ample and adequately equipped
fleet.
1t 10 true that the fall Of Sumter found
the United States practically without q
navy. Our great steam frigst"s drew too
much water to enter Southern ports, the
IN ajority Of our vessels were sailing craft,
and We had no ironclads. We had
5000 miles Of sea coast to blockade from
Chesapeake bay 10 the Rio lSrande. When
the war broke out our whols ravy was but
forty-two vessels. 555 guns end 1900 men,
and when the war closed our navy
employed over COO vessels of war
and $1,000 men. These figures are
ignorantly quoted as proof of the rapidity
with which crest navy could be organized
by the United States in event Of war with
a great naval power. These figures are de-
lusive. During the first eight months Of
1861 our navy did nothing haFond the cap
ture Of Hatterss and Port RoyaI. 1t vas
April. 1862. before New Or@eans was cap
tured; it was July, 1868, before Vicksburg
and Port Hudson fell and She Mississippi
was clear to the sea; il YVES August, 1864,
before We forced Mobile bag; it was Janu-
airy. 1865. before Fort Fisher surrendered.
This 10 the record OF our navy during the
war, when We could use wooden gunboats
for much OF our work against an enemy
that had no navy to speak Of.
or course navy intended TO operate in
our rivers and along our seaboard could
be rapidly built, and SO t,r that matter
could ironclads of the neohitor pattern.
but even under these circumstances it was
y full year after Sumter fell before our
navy was large enough ID capture New
Orleans; and Il was three years after
Sumter before our feet VS. strong enough
to force its Way into hahtle bay. and
nearly four years after Snqnier before we
had q navy stroag enough 20 dismount the
batteries of Fort Fisher.
Today We could not repeat thi. rapidity
of construction. for a vessel fit TO en-
counter modern foreigs. warship conld
not lie built, armed and seat into action in
less than a year. and pfohably it would
take two year,, so that ~ event of war
tomorrow We could not W h all our annie
resources build a navy ie sine to resist
attack. and ii We were i.)t able to buv
navy ready male 10 our haSd from some
foreign naval power that Was friendly We
should be hoPelessiy bea:en long before
our new war vessels were ssdy for sea.
We have been ten years building forty
new vessels; Ns ought 10 adept the policy
Of England snd increass eur navy every
year so that sc shall he ABLE to at least
defend our ship yards vi .e we build new
ships Of war.