The Pickens sentinel. [volume] (Pickens, S.C.) 1871-1903, 1893-05-25
TIE BARROOMS MUST GO
THE CHESTER CASES DECIDED IN
FAVOR OF THE EVANS LAW.


Css-s Before 1.-THE Ts xt of the ID sois
lon.
COLUMBIA, S. g., May 16.-The agon,
IS over. The deed is done, and the las
hope of the barkeepers has faded away
What expectations there are in the ru
ture cannot be realized until after the
dispeDsary law goes into operation
that is settled. Few. indeed, will be
the barrooms in the State that will
Supreme Court of the State, the one
place where the liquor men expected to
find comfort, has turned a cold shodl.
der, indeed a very cold shoulder, on the
liquor interest.
By the unanimous opinion OF the
Court the casts of Groeschel and lo-
yer, who petitiOned for madamus to
require the council of Chester to issue
an annual license, were dismissed
The Court, however, only considered
the bill In so far as the constitution
ality Of its passage and of its prohibi-
tiOn of licenses for more than six
months were concerned, but did not
conceive that under the circumstances
1t had any right to go into the consti.
tutionality Of the other provisions of
the Act. To be candid, the fling of
the decision at late hour OF the eve
ming session of the Court was alto.
gethtr unexpected and occasloned
quite stampede of newspaper men
who have been anXiouSly Watching for
this all important document. The fol.
lowing is the text of the decision filed
In the Chester dispensary te't case:
The relator 10y petition in each of the
above entitled proceedings asks that
thlS$ourt will issue a madamus to the
respondent requiring that ii license he
granted to the petitioners respectively
as liquor dealers in the town Of Chester
in this State from the secOud day of
January, 1893, up to and inclusive of
the 31st of December, 1893.
Both petitions being :sed upon facts
Identical in character have been heard
together.
The respondent denies the right OF
each petitioner and traVerSeS some Of
the allegations of fact. Under such
circumstances by an agreement Of
counsel for REALTORS and respondent 1t
was referred to Mr. Thos. $. MOorman
to take testimony as to the facts in dis,
pute. The report Of such testimony
was made to this Court. At the hear.
ing before us the following facts were
disclosed:
In 1888 (2Oth Statutes at Large, 140)
the town council Of Chester we've au.
thoriZed by the General Assembly OF
this State to grant licenses to sell Spir
ituous and intoxicating liquors under
certain restrictions aDd notifications.
Under the general law Of this State
pertaining to such matters no license
could be given for longer period than
one year and not extending beyond the
3lst of December of any year.
On the 22nd of January. 1898, lhe re-
lators, after strict compliance with
all the requirements Of the Statutes of
ces and regulations of Chester, applied
begin the 2nd of January, 1893, and
enGing the 3lst Of December, '93. The
respondent, however, refused to grant a
license beyond June 30, 1893. alleging
as basis for such action OH their part
that the State had passed an Act, aD-
proved December "a, 1892, whereby all
licenses to lie granted by any towns or
cities in this State should cease and
dett rhine on the Both OF June, 1893
providing fines and penalties upon all
persons who shall disregard such l"gs
latlon, and this refusal of Chester with
the above ground therefor was put
upon the minutes of town council
The REALTORS under protest at every
step paid for and took out license un-
til the Both Of JuOe, 1853. but 'nrrv-
ing that they were entitled TO Licenses
up to 3lst OF December have applied
tor writ of maIdamus to force such
license, and allege that the Act of De-
-, ,l
on the following grounds:
Here. Justice Pope relates the tx rIve
constitutional points raised 10y hiajDr
Townsend in his argument, and which
have heretofore teen published. This
was done in rather brief manner, and
included the points as to tue improper
passage OF the bill, and its much dis
cussed readings and wanderings
through the Legislature. In discuss
ing the objtctlon raised by the Attor.
ney General as the right of use of the
name by the Court it is SAID:
We remark that the point raise d BY
the Attorney General js one of serious
coGSe quence to the REALTORS, for it i,
should be determined that only those
are entitled to the use of the States
name who have the consent of the At
torney General for such purpose, Olll
duty might terminate at an early
stage, but u.der the peculiar circum
stances of these petitioners, who have
determined to waive the consideration
OF this objection, Leitker affirming nol
denying the proposition of the After
Rey General, the Court further declare
that 1t Will not undertake to canvass
the question as to the exercise of a dis
cretion by. town council Of Chester, un
der the laws to refuse the application
of petitioners for license. Indeed {
feel that the town council having plcc
ted to place their refusal to grant {
license To the petitioners upon the
grouLd that ihe Act of 1892 forbade
any other license than that grant ed by
them. which ground they placed upon
the minutes OF said council, they art
estopped from raising this additional
ground of refusal. The Court says i
prefers to pass directly and SQUARED,
upon only such as relate Ito ne claims
So up by reIators TO have Licenses is
sued to them, without undertaking t
consider or decide whether the D.Spen
sary Act contains other features no
applicable to these cases in conllc
with the State Constitution. We deSir
to say that our Judgment must be con
eide rod 90 IN fhnea iSSnS and NOR