The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1893-09-13


guments favorable to outright au-
nexation. Other solutions of the
governmental difficulties of that
land have been thoroughly can
vassed, both in Hawaii and the
United States, with the result that
the simplest and fairest and ON all
accounts most satisfactory solution
lies in the annexation Of that coun-
try to the United States under
some territorial form of govern
ment.
The problem is a larger one than
how can the United States under
take to assume responsibility for
the government of Hawaii. In a
sense the die has been cast as to
the obligation of this country to
guarantee to the world d stable
aud measurably efficient govern
ment in Hawaii. When the United
States refused to bind itself by
treaty with France and England
never to take possession of the Ha-
waiian Islands, it assumed in the
premises a peculiar relation to that
insular nationality that has ever
since been fully recognized by the
maritime nations of the world.
That relation has been one of scru-
pulous regard for Hawaiian auton-
omy until its government SHOULD
become so far enfeebled that it
cannot be continued, and the SOW
ereignty of the islands must be
transferred to another power" In
that event, in the words of Seward,
"a lawful and peaceful annexation
of the islands to the United States
is deemed desirable by this govern
ment." European nations have adj
justed themselves to this natural
and inevitable policy of the United
States toward Hawaii, and it has
been the profound expectation of
Hawaiian kings and people, for
fifty years, amply attested in ofli-
cial correspondence, that Hawaii
would eventually find security and
stability only through absorption
into the American Union, her first
and truest friend. The Hawaiian
problem is not then whether the
United States should undertake
large responsibilities in the future
government of Hawaii. Her diplo-
matte history as to Hawaiian
affairs has morally pledged her to
assume that obligation when the
logic of events should require.
The Hawaiian problem is rather
what shall atone to Hawaii first,
to the Pacific commerce of the
United States next, but above all
to the m0mentous interests of civil
ization itself for any failure on the
part of the United States to fulfill
the self-imposing obligation tc
stand sponsor for adequately stable
government in the Hawaiian
islands.
A majority vote, in an electorate
of only eleven thousand, ought moi
to be decisive in an Issue of such
international moment. n few
paltry hundreds of votes have held
the balance in power in elections
in Hawaii for the past five years.
These votes have not represented
the conscience and intelligence OF
native Hawaiians even, but have
stood for a corruptible element, In
different to the well-being of their
own race even, and content to be
manipulated by an interruptions
coterie of irresponsible foreign adj
venturers.
Were this element even to suffer
detriment by high-handed and I'M
lust aggressions on their political
rights and liberties, the issue
would be less clear. But annex,
alton does not propose TO take
away from, but to add to the priv
ileges now enjoyed by the native
race. The Provisional government
in all its legislation, and in the
spirit of its policy as to the future,
is becomingIy solicitous for the
interest of the native race. 1t is
its own proposition to insist on a
guaranty of civil rights for Hawa-
iians under a treaty of annexation
Its policy in planning for the di-
vision of the crown lands into
homesteads, to be freely acquired
by all Hawaiians not now owning
land, not transferable by sale or
mortgage, indicates a considerable
craftsmanship that is truly COM
mendable.
This is noteworthy, when it is
considered that the native Hawai-
ian leaders who oppose annexation
are insincere in that opposition.
Six months ago they were in open
antagonism to the monarchy, and
publicly advocated annexation to
the United States. Should annex
alton come these men will heartily
rejoice in it. Their present opposi-
ton is purely for some imagined
political advantage that may ac-
crue to them personally. 1t is not
sincere, nor actuated by love OF
country, nor by any conviction that
any other solution is eventually
possible. Should annexation fail
under the present auspices, these
men, were they to regain power