The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1893-01-24

" apprehend It, likewise comedies that
state does rossess the power TO grant the
rights of property and rossessien In such
lands to private parties. but the power
Is stated to be in some way restricted 10
small parcels or where such parcels can
be disposed OF without detriment TO the
public interests In the lands and water
remaining But II is difficult 90 see now
the validity of the exercise OF the power
II the power exists. can depend upon the
size Of the parcel granted. or how. II 1t
be possible to In rginc that the power Is
subject to such n limitation, the present
ca Sc would be affected az the grant In
question, though doubtless a large and
Valuable one. is, relatively to the remain
ing soil and waters. IL not insignificant,
yet certainly, in view Of the purposes to
be effected not unreasonable"
The court lays great stress upon the
fact that the soil claimed under the grant
is almost the whole OF Chicago's Lake
front. which practically places the entire
control Of Chioago's great harbor under
the railroad company. Justice Shiras ad-
uits that this fact contains powerful
reason why the railroad company should
not be allowed to retain this control. But
says he. the same road is open to the pub
lie for securing control Of this property as
is open to II in respect to all other prl-
vate property. II the public needs re-
ouire that the State should own 1t, 1t
can condemn it and pay the railroad COM
rany its value and then exercise I'M
limited control Of II.
The doctrine Of the Dartmouth College
case shat the institution Of the Consutu-
ton of the United States against states
impairing the obligations Of contracts
extended to their own contracts, has al
ways had strong dis<ntients from the
time 1t was announced. Justice Shras
says regarding the support that dissent
may receive from the Lake front case:
The doctrine that a State, b. making
a grant TO a corporation or her own
creation, subjects herself to the restraints
of law judicially interpreted has been
impugned by able political thinkers, who
may, perhaps, find in the decision Of the
court I'm the present case some counte-
nance Of their views. But / am unable 10
suppose that there is any intention on the
part Of this court TO depart from It's doc
trine so often expressed"
We have not the slightest doubt that
each Judge who concurred in theNcourts
opinion would vehementy deny that he
intended by 1t to impugn the doctrine
that a State is bound by her contract.
But logic is logic and the logic of the
case releases a State from all obligation
on any contract whatever. There Is no
logical method for supporting the decision
upon the ground on which the court places
it. consistent with a State being bound
on her contract. If Illinois was not bound
on that contract she is bound on none
She gave what was hers and received con-
sideration for what she gave and now
takes back what she gave, returning
also the consideration paid. When these
Judges pass away and others take their
places, the case must be repudlated ana
overruled or it must and will be carried
to its logical result, and States must be
declared outside of the constitutional in
stitution. If this is what the case really
means no man can foretell what will come
out Of 1t. Thousands of millions or dol
lars now rest on the idea that States
contract cannot be Impaired, all railroad
securities rest on it, If Changers and
Third partyites are to have the field to
themselves in these matters hereafter,
they will reap a harvest, it is true, but
in doing So they may be sowing dragons
teeth, to rise up armed men.
Only seven Judges sat in the case, the
Chief Justice having been counsel in it,
and Justice Blatchford being a stock
holder in the railroad, and the court
divided four to three. The opinion Of the
court was delivered by Mr.. Justice Field
and concurred in by Justices Harlan,
Lamar and Bremen. Mr.. Justice Shiras
delivered the dissenting opinion, con-
CURED in by Justices Gray and Brown.