New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1893-03-26
DODGE'S CAESAR.
THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT
COMMANDER

CAESAR. History OF me Ar OF vi n'p Tn,r,r"
with Detailed Account Of the Sa"rag!s , 81 |a' Of
,S sps c sSs iae @'h as cut.
s sys 1 aa s 'hii"s: sh,on. M% c.
r. was to have been expected that Mr. Dodee
would devote much care and space TO the military
career of Caesar in his fine series OF great COM
manders and he has certainly fulfilled all cApec-
tations in this respect 1t is. of course. not posi-
HE in these DAYS to write about Caesar in cur'orI
manner: the material at the authors hand has 80
accumulated that no matter what aspect oil Cae-
ssr's life may he selected Tor ILLUSTRATION tue
abundance of the available commentaries is
source rather Of embarrassment than OF aio i"e
main authorities upon Caesar are no DOUBT rev In
number. and much less full and in some instances
much lcss Trustworthy, than the world would nave
them, But long series OF specialists, particularly
rs regards the art of war, have thrown hooo Vi
light upon the subject. and after the exhaustive
labors of Storel it might seem almost hopeless to
bring forward any new facts or interences
Mr. Dodge however. has rightly made up MS
mind 20 do his own work in his own way, and he
rrerared himself Tor it by carefully going over the
whole ground Of Caesars campaigns In person
II is needless TO say that such preparation gives
10 his subsequent criticism breadth and an In
tclvence which il would have been Impossible
t. attain in any other way, lnasmuch as oven
sfoaers review Of the military operations OF caesar
Cannot for another mind, nave the hnality oil eer-
tataty As it is Mr.. Dodge has written an ac-
count of the military career OF Caesar which, while
marked by the greatest care AMI penetration erIs
IL ut all in the direction OF what may perhaps pe
thought too stringent and almost melcliess crl'i
cism.
Such o tone, indeed, is not at first rcpellant,
especially to those who remember with what
scanty Judgment non-militaly historians have
q treated Caesar. The general tendency has been
10 ovcrprase all lis military operations. and 10
credit him with an almost infalliblc perception
and insight. Even Monmscn, as MIR. Dodge Oh
serves. has fallen into this temptation, the H.
evitable effect Of which is to discredit the com
hander with all who really understand anything
Of the art of war; and to produce in them the i'm
preston that he is greatly Overrated Such an
impression Is erroneous, no doubt, for the true
greatness of Caesars military genius ought by TINS
time to have passed beyond the possibility of
doubt or dispute. But it is none the less ncces-
nary that all the truth should be told concerning
him and his methods, and that his failures, of
which there not few, should be remem-
bercd with his successes.
d, II would be unjust to Mr.. Dodge 70 convey the
notion that there is anything at all carpng in his
criticism. So far as can be perceived. lie gives
Caesar full credit for his brilliant military tao
tics and his successive victories over great odds
Where, however, he does not appear TO make all
the allowance not merely possible but reasonable
il in regard TO Caesars employment OF what, on
the surface, is apt TO look like inadequate means
at tines But it is surely precisely at this point
that the genius of the great commander is most
strongly in evidence. lie had laborcd with his
legiops until he had created of them specially
powerful instrument, with which he realized that
hn t..1t- nu1n
taken II might be conceded that no other COM
mander of that age could have done with them
what he did; but that is precisely because he was
Caesar, and had no peer in military tact judg-
ment and genius.
There are, however, not a few points in his
career open to expert criticism, and Mr.. Dodge
has in every case found ont the defects in his
NOR. No doubt Caesar learned the art Of war
sometimes in very costly manner for his legions.
Every step in his military education may b. said
10 have been grounded upon some check or re-
verse. BY all these he profted, though it can
not be said that he never committed the same
errors twice. In fact, he did duplicate his false
moves, as the second cOmpaign against Britain
illustrates for example. But in the course Of the
years devoted 10 his training in the field he came
r to learn many things which were for the nlcst
part hidden from his contemporaries lie real
Akcu early the Vial Importance OF SWllt HoNe-
uents in war; and also the equally vital necessity
Of concentrating his forces. And in his skill OF
concentration, perhaps, lay tho secret OF that
ing rashness which impcllcd him 50 frequently to
undertake the most important operations with
seemingly Inadequate and at least inferior, forces
The truth would seem TO be that in all these
cases he manifested snrerlative military judg-
mcnt. lie knew his own troops and of what they
were capable. lie had trained them, and was
familiar with the springs of all their possibilities
sometimes il happened that he ran the thing, rs q
sporting man might Tut il, little too fine; that
he did not allow enough for the resistance OF
tenacity u the enemy; aud that in consequence
the issue remained i'll the balance over long and
endangered his plans. When, however, that hap
pcned, Caesar was always capable of bringing
fresh resources OF his own to the peril, and never
did he fail TO overcome the odds which seemed TO
I've weighing against him and perhaps the point
Of hearing him down. Take the Gallo campaigns
for instance upon which author has these just
observations: Tie GalIc campaigns are Pc
cuiiDrly interesting 10 the military student
Showing how Caesar scho0lcd himself and his
lcgions. He began with but the ordinary mill
tary training small basis OF experience; he
ended as great general, with an experience which
. enabled Inn to rise 20 the most astounding height
His legions commenced green and untricd they
ended as veterans equal TO c0nQuering the world
Each became welded ~ the other that mutual
O. confidence and affection made the army command
ed by Caesar irresistible"
But all this was gained at heavy cost. for it
was impossible that during this period Of school
ing Caesar should not make mistakcs--gravc ones
But all his mistakes bore fruit. and raised the
qualities Of both general and legiors. One can
sec, step by step, how Caesars successes and fail
ures alike produced their effect; how his Unborn
ability came TO the surface how he impressed his
own individuality on whatever he did and how
his intelligence led him TO apply whatever he
learned 10 his future conduct No praise is too
liQiI for the conduct or moIul Qualities of th.