The prison mirror. [volume] (Stillwater, Minn.) 1887-1894, 1893-05-11

abrOgated in many, perhaps in the ma
jOrity, of the states is that fOrbidding q
person accused of treason from being
represented by counsel. This Is another
instance of how some of the worst feat
ures of the old English common law
have been carelessly or ignOrantly
adopted Trials for high treason and
fraud are of rare occurrence in the
United States, and therefore lawyers
have paid little attention to the statutes
governing them. Where the United
Marshall in the famous Aaron Burr
case would probably govern. But in a
trial for treason against state, in most
cases, if the prosecutor objected to the
accused being represented by counsel,
it would be difficult for the judge to
overrule the objection. The legislators
overlooked this feature, and, in making
the English common law the guide
where no statutes amending it existed,
Endorsed this particular rule.
A still stranger instance of this legiS-
lative carelessneSS came up in England
early in the century and was paralleled
in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania
at even later date AS is we'll known,
the early English law allowed an appeal
to the wager of battell." This fell in
to disuse before the reign Of Elizabeth,
and for centuries was remembered only
as tradition. Suddenly an English court
was made aware that it was as much
law as the most recent act passed by
parliament. A man was accused of
crime and the evidence against him was
overwhelming. "A conviction appeared
inevitable, when to the astonishment of
all he demanded the "wager of battell.'
The judge examined the statutes and
ascertained that he was entitled to this
appeal. He did not carry obedience to
the letter of the law so far as to order
his accuSer to meet him in the lists,
but the prisoner was set free, and after
ward the law was repealed. Similar
appeals were made in the two American
states mentioned, but the judges regard
ed them with more reference to common
sense and modern convictions, as they
themselves admitted, than to the law
itself.
An instance of how strictly is applied
the principle that ignorance of the law
excuses no one was furnished by a
United States court during the war; A
law was passed raising the tax on opium
and limiting it's manufacture. A dealer
in this drug in California was subse-
quently arrested for violating the law.
He proved conclusively that it was
physical impOsSibility for the knowl--
edge of its enactment to have reached
him at the time when the violation took
place, and this was admitted by the dis
trict attorney. But as the law had been
passed at the time in question the &C
cused was conclusively presumed to be-
Informed of it and was sentenced to a
fine and imprisonment for its violation.
1t is hardly necessary to state that both
sentences were stayed.
1t is general suppOsitiOn that cOun-
terfeiting is a crime, but decisions of
United States courts render qualifica-
ton of this belief necessary. About
twenty years ago band of men were.
arrested in New York charged with
counterfeiting. Plates were found in
their possession, as well as eXcellently
executed bank notes, and it was proved
that they had received large sums for
their bogus money. The bank notes
were, however, made in imitation of
those of Brazil. Their attorney relied
upon the statute, arguing that it did not
render criminal the manufacture of
notes counterfeiting those of another
country, if no attempt was made to pass
them on citizens of the United States.
The court sustained this ground.
From the instances given, it is suffi-
GENTLY evident that the presumption
that everyone knows the law is very
violent One.-Chic0gO Herald.
Preaching and Practice.
A convict says he was sent to prison for being
6ich nd no ic LODI fn