The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-04-06
Saturday and been entrenched by day

caring for the extreme front line at Shiloni
was surprised in the sense of having
allowed a great army of $1,000 men
to get within less than two mile:
of his lines without detection, and
his denial is only bubble. he
was not surprised in the sense OF moi
having his men under arms; they were
not caught in their tents, or at supper as
were Towards men at Charlottesville
but in the important sense that he was
caught utterly unprepared to fight great
battle, or, in other words, hat Sherman was
completely outgeneraled, there can be nc
question, and General Buell. does but
simple Justice when he places on Sher-
man, to whom this great trust had been
committed by Grant in his necessary
absence, the burden of responsibility for
the disaster of the first day.
We we're saved from the consequences OF
Sherman's negligence by the great natural
strength of the position, which was we'll
wooded and could not be aanked, lying
as it did on the Tennessee river, with
deep impossible creek on either hand.
The Confederates were obliged to attack
our very strong position right in front,
using their army as q battering ram
against wall. With the slightest en-
trenchment and proper protection of our
front line, the position of Pittsburg Land
ing, selected by General Charles +. Smith,
was more impregnable to assault than
Malvern Hill or Maryee's Heights, for it
could not possibly be fianked. By p. m.
Grants forces had been driven back two
miles into the angle between Lick Creek
and the river. Our left was covered by
forty guns; the right rested upon the
creek. At dark one brigade of General
Nelson's division of Buell's army arrived
on our line, fired a single volley, and the
battle was over for the day.
The Confederate attack had spent itself
before Buell. arrived. If General Lew
Wallace, who with 1000 men was only six
miles distant and had been ordered at 8 a.
m. by Grant to the front, had not taken
the wrong road and marched to and fro
uselessly all day until dark, the enemy
would have been beaten by 8 p. m. Had
Wallace taken the road pointed out by
Grant, his 1000 soldiers, all of whom had
seen service at Donelson, would have
struck the enemy at their weakest point
by noon at least. If Buell. had not arrived
the enemy were too much exhausted to
make another assault with any hope of
success, but without Buell's arrival Grant
could not have taken the offensive Monday
morning.
During Sunday night Lew Wallace's
division arrived and 10000 men of Buell's
army. The next day Buell. put in his men
with the GOODNESS, courage and tactical
skill of an able soldier, and after most
bitter and stubborn resistance the enemy
were forced to retreat. The Federal losses
were 1880, including $500 prisoners; the
enemy lost 1859, including $50 prisoners.
Omitting the missing the enemy lost 600
more killed and wounded than we did,
which attests the severity and gallantry of
the fighting on both sides.
Shiloh was as great q victory and far
more important in its consequences than
Gettysburg. Meade finally repulsed Lee,
but lost the most men in killed and
wounded. Grant and Buell. finally re-
pulsed Beauregard, and their losses in
killed and wounded were a little less than
those of the enemy. Meade at Gettysburg
had about 5000 men against Sc, 600 Grant
the first day at Shiloh had about 80, 600
engaged against As, 900, and on the second
had about 5000 against $4,000 The con-
sequence of the loss of Shiloh, had Grant
been routed before dark the first day,
would have been the utter obliteration of
his army; Buell. would have been obliged
to retreat or be beaten in detail; Middle
Tennessee and Nashville would have been
recovered, the loss of Fort Donelson re-
couped and Kentucky reoccupied. Meas
ured by the results that hung on the issue,
Shiloh was one Of the most critical battles
of the war. At Fort Donelson the blow
was struck that broke the grip of the Con-
federates on Kentucky and Tennessee and
sent them to Corinth, Miss, and the
bloody battle of Shiloh secured all the
fruits of Donelson.
While to Sherman and not to Grant is to
be charged the responsibility for the sur
prise OF Sunday morning, nevertheless it
should be remembered that while Sher-
man graduated from West Point three
years before Grant he had never before
seen battle, for he did not serve in
Mexico, nor had he ever seen service in
Indian warfare. He had not learned cam
ton and skill by experience and disaster:
he commanded an army flushed with the
unbroken success that had attended it
from Donelson to the dav of the hattie
and he naturally did not expect that the
broken and dispirited army of Sidney
Johnston could be so largely reinforced
and rapidly reorganized by Beaure.
gard as TO make possible its as
sumption of the offensive Sher-
man was surprised at Shiloh and
quickly driven back, because his line,
were faulty in arrangement, and in extenu.
alton II only can be said that he was the
raw commander of green army that had
grown over-contident from unbroken snc.
cess. 1t was sherman's first surprise and
his last until Joe Johnston surprised him
at Bentonvilie, n. c., in March, 1865, In
1854 when Sherman pushed Joe Johnston
back from Dalton to Atlanta he never
failed to use the ak and spade 70 secure his
line against surprise, and so Grant when
he pushed Lee back from the Rapidan to
the James never forget the lesson Of
shiloh. The spade and the ak were en-.
ployed to make buffer between his
bayone's and those of the enemy.
General Buell. might have easily mad.