Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-10-22

the circumstances, - . favor to him,
resume command and do the best that
hesitation, and without any conditions what
ever, ct once said that would accept the
command and would stake my life that would
save the city. Both the President and Gen.
Halleck again asserted that It was impossible to
save the city, and l repeated my firm convic
ton that could and would save It. They then
left; the Prssident verbally placing me in en-
tire command Of the city and Of the troops fall
ing back upon II from the 'front.' He in
structed me to take steps at once to stop and
collect the stragglers, to place the works IN the
proper state Of defense and to 70 out and take
command Of the army when il approached the
vicinity OF the works; then to put the troops in
the best position for dsfense-committing
everything to my hands. The President left
me with many thanks and showing much feel
ing
Again, in McClellan's "own Story" It Is
stated:
"whiie he was placing the army to meet the
invasion Of Lee be informed Gen. Halleck, on
the Sd Of September, that he would take command
in person If the enemy appeared neor the city,
and that he was then told that his command IN
cluded only the defenses of Washington and
did not extend to any active column that might
be moved out beyond the line Of works. that no
decision had yet been made a. to the COM
mander OF the active army, and that Gen. Hal
leck repeated the Same thing on more than one
to meet Lee; that as the time arrived for the
army to advance and he had received no orders
70 take command OF it, but had been expressly
told that the assignment of q commander had
not been decided, he determined to solve the
question for himself and moved out from WASH
ington, with his staff and personal escort, leav-
ing his card with 'P. P. c." written upon II at
the Presidents house, the war office and Sec
Rotary Stewards house, and went on his way to
the front and fought the battles Of South Noun
thin and Antietam with halter around his
neck; that IL the army had been defeated and he
had survived he would no doubt have been
tried for assuming command without orders,
and that in the then state Of feeling he would
probably have been condemned to death; that
he was fully aware Of the risk he ran but that
the path OF duty was clear and that he tried to
follow it,"
GEN. HALLECK's VERSION.
Referring to this matter, Gen. Halleck
says
"The assignment Of Gen Mcclellan to the
command of the army in the field Just prior to
the MARYLAND campaign made verbally by
the President, at Gen. McClellan's own house,
about O'Clock in the morning (Which, ! think,
WAS September 7, 1862, in my presence. He
said to him: General, you will take command
of the forces in the field Until that moment
did not know who was to take command. will
add that Gen. Mcclellan in virtue of his being
placed in command of the Notifications Of
Washington and of troops for defense within
them, was really in command Of all troops here
ut that time. The question was discussed by
the President for two or three days as to who
should take command Of the troops that were
TO go into the field. The decision was made by
himself and announced to Gen. Mcclellan in
my presence"
WHY LINCOLN TURNED TO " CLELLAN.
The President, seeing the imminent danger
to Washington, and remembering Gen. Nc
Clelans plea for orders. and knowing that he
must rely upon the Army of the Potomac and
the former popular commander of that army to
save the capital, instinctively turned to that
commander, under whom he hoped that great
army would assume new life and power. In
assuming command Gen. Mcclellan displayed
surprising activity, and put the two defeated
armies into fighting condition, made the de-
lenses around Washington secure and sent out
an army 10000 strong to meet Lee. then at the
very gates of the capital. fought the battle Of
the Antietam and saved Washington. From
the moment Popes startling telegram lad been
received until the battle of Antietim had been
won there was nothing but gloom in the Wax
Department. II WAS then evident the Presi-
dent had been fortunate in looking to Gen.
Nc Cleilan to save Washington.
AS then and underst TODD the danger Of
the situation, and as l now look back and re-
call all the surroundings Of that time Of Gen.
Lees march for Washingt Ton, am persuaded
that the President, in his great wisdom, did the
best for the army that was to meet Lee and tho
best for the safety of the capital. Tha. army
was looking for Gen. Mcclellan. Its brilliant
and reliable fighting corps commanders did not
question his right to command. The Army Of
the Potomac had but one idol, and all along its
weary lines that idol received grand ovation.
For thirteen days that army was without
commander, yet moving on to be marshaled in
battle by some persou against marshal match
less and illustrious in battle, who, had he won
again, would have bottled up the army in the
defenses of Washington, and the Federal Union
would have persisted.
Referring to that telegram Of Gen. Mcclellan
1t is important here to state that in answer to
that part in which he says. Il wish to know
what my orders and authority are. l ask for
nothing, but will obey whatever orders you
give. l only ask prompt decision that may
at once give the necessary ORDERS" Mr.. Stanton
on that same dag wrote an order, which was
issued by Gen. Townsend, defining certain COM
mands in Virginia In this order Gen. McClel-
lan's command was stated to be that portion
of the Army Of the Potomac that has not been
sent forward to Gen. Popes command" 1t so
happened at that time that Gen. McClellan's
command was only his personal escort and
staff about one hundred men, his entire army
having been then sent forward to Pope.
WITH THE PRESIDENTS SANCTION
As Mr.. Stanton has been held responsible
and has been severely criticised for the terrible
snubbing directed to Gen. Mcclellan in this
order, wish to state that it was issued with
the knowledge and consent Of the President
and in consultation with him. 1t was that same
order which gave Gen. Hailcck command Of all
the forces as general-in-chief. Mr.. Stanton
never made an order in regard to Gen. Nc
Clellan's command OF any importance that
did not receive the sanction OF the President.
1t was this very order that Mr.. Stanton had in
his mind when, in that cabinet meeting, he told
the President that he had virtually relieved
Gen. Haileck of all responsibility under that
order-which was the Presidents-when he put
Gen. Mcclellan in command of the defenses Of
Washington.
After the lapse of twenty-nine years the
reason why President Lincoln finally removed