The advocate and Topeka tribune., 1892-10-12
MONETARY COMMISSION.
Report Of tho United States Monetary
Commission, Appointed by Act Of Com
gross August 10, 1879.

NO. XVII.
A single standard eventually rujnOuS to
creditors.
1t 10 obvious that a violent contraction
in the volume Of money would prove dis
astrous to all classes of debtors, lnolud-
Ing nations. This would be It's first
effect, lts more immediate result. But
that it would eventuate in great injury
and loss to the creditor classes, ls not less
certain. The cases are isolated and ex-
,0eptlonal In which creditors are secured
by pledges so ample as to be absolutely
insured against loss even when the de-.
probation OF prices is moderate Their
losses would become enormous In such
q depreciation of prices as would result
from contracting metallic money one
half. In the general wreck which would
follow such q contraction, debtors and
creditors would be engulfed in one COM
mon ruin.
As TO many debts, specific pledges do
not exist, as in the conspicuous case OF
national debts, swollen already to such
incredible proportions and still increas-
ing. The English, who, from their pre-
eminence in accumulated capital, own 80
large a proportion Of these debts, do not
conceal their anxietles in respect of this
danger.
The Westminster Review (January
1879 holds that no rise in the prices OF
commodities has resulted from the In
crease Of gold since 1S49, and that the
tendency In that direction has been at
least neutralized by "the increase Of gem |
eral population and wealth, the dSmOne-
tSSGti0n of siIOeT, and the establishment
of gold currencies IN StS stead In SeUerGI
stGtsS." And upon the effect or further |
movements in the direction Of demone-
tizing silver, It says:
One Of the things involved we hold to be the |
probable appreciation OF gold: In other words, |
an Increase Of les purchasing power; and that, |
consequently, unless fresh discoveries are made, |
prices have seen their highest for many q long /
day, and that debts contracted In gold will, by |
reason OF this movement, tend to press more
heavily on the borrowers, and that H tOt be 1CeLL
U this pressure do not become 70 intOerdble as 20
suggest bU lpGv Of solution, something IKE ttt-
UGrSGL reputation.
Inletters published within few months |
the president Of the Liverpool England)
chamber of commerce says of silver de-
monetization:
It will practically beggar all nations that have |
borrowed In silver and have TO pay In gold.
No doubt, II such state OF things were to hap l
pen, some countries would have to pass into
creditors and ultimately matters W0nld settle /
down everywhere, after excessive suffering and 4
confusion, into universal system OF gold pay |
merts; but the necessary result would be that the
metallic basis on which the business Of the world
was done would be immensely reduced. 1t would 1
be as u the mines were shut up for several years.
Instead Of say 400 600 600 Sterling Of gold and
would be 700,000,000 or S00000,O00 sterlngl Of \
gold, and limited amount Of silver as small /
change. Money values would fall greatly; na-
uonal debts, IKE our OWn, would press much /
more heavily, and period OF suffering and con- /
traction Of business Weuld ensue, similar to what
the United states has experienced on coming /
painfully back from Inflated paper toward specie
payments. NodOubt at last the process would
b0 accomplished, and after century or so the
world could trade as well on gold alone as gold
and silver combined. But why have the inter-
mediate chaos II It can be ayolded9
It was this same view which induced
the London Economist, the special organ
of British financial opinion, to advise
(september 2, 1870 this country to adopt
either the double standard or q single
standard Of silver. It then said:
The United States might take the single gold |
standard like ourselves, and this Is what TIL /
very lately, every English economist would have
advised them TO do. The epilS Of this plan had
not then been seen.
And, after pointing out that in the