, 1892-01-08
.MARSTON VS.. HUMES
A PETITION DENIED In 4 KING
COUNTY CASE.
The Petitioners AIIege the Action
of the Judge of the Lower Court
Was i'm Excess of His Jurisdic-
tiOn.

LlOns
Continued from THURSDAYS paper.
1t is doubtless true that these provision
are substantially the same, yet the fact re
mains that the particular clause in our con
stitution as it stands therein has never re
celyed judicial construction. The provis
lon IN question, as contained in section 19
article II. Of our constitution, reads as fol
lows: No bill shall embrace NOR
than one subject, and that shall be ex
pressed in the title.' How shall this pro
vision be interpreted? What shall tn
word subject, as used therein, be held t,
mean? Courts are bound to give such in
depreciation to this provision as will maxi
1t reasonable and at the same time give i
full force. There are two ways in whicl
the words thus used can be interpreted
One is to hold that the word s.subject''is no
capable of furtherreduction the eotheris tt
hold thatit means single subject in NOR
enlarged sense, In which may be included
a large number of sub-subjects. To hole
that the constitution makers intended th,
first Interpretation would be to conyic
them Of an intention to so tie the hands o
the legislature as to make legislation ex
tremely difficult, if not impossible; whilt
the other construction will substantially
subserye the object which they had il
view, and at the same time leave the legis
lature free to legislate in a reasonable man
ner.
I am Of the opinion that the Legislature
must be the Judge of the scope which they
will give to the word subject, and that SC
long as the title embraces but one subject
it is not inimical to such consti
tutlOnal provision, even although
the subject as thus used contains
any number Of subjects. As we have
suggested, any other rule would make
legislation practically impossible. dc
title would be void which provided that
the enactment was to be upon the subject
OF pleading. It will be admitted by almost
every one that that was single subject,
yet IT we cOnstrue the word in its more mar
row sense it contains many subjects. and
the title would be clearly bad, and the
legislature would be driven to enact separ-
ate laws upon the subject of complaints,
answers, replies, etc., etc. If we hold
pleading to be a sufficient Identification
and unification of the subject, it is because
we say the legislature has seen fit to make
that single subject
Again, it would hardly be contended
that it is not competent under the proyis-
Ion IN question for the legislature to enact
as single law code of civil procedure,
and that an act entitled An act to Provide
a Code Of Civil PROCEDURE would be invalid,
yet under this subject innumberable sub
heads and subjects can easily be carved
out. Such title is good because the legisla-
ture has seen fit to take comprehensive
subject which can properly cover all Of
such subjects. If the legislature can thus
by name sufficiently comprehensive en-
brace all the subjects properly relating to
civil procedure, it must follow that by
adopting subject sufficiently general it
can embrace IN one act all the statute law
of the state. In other words, the legisla-
ture may adopt Just as comprehensive a
title as it sees fit, and if such title when
taken by itself relates to unified subject
or object, it is good, however much such
unified subject is capable of division.
have come to this conclusion, not only
from the necessities Of the case as they ap-
pear to me, but from such authorities as I
have been able to find on that subject. Mr..
Cooley, in his admirable work upon consti-
tutional limitations makes use of the fol-
lowing language;
'The generality Of title is no 0 bjection
to it SO long as it is not made cover to
legislation incongruous in ITSELF and which
by no fair intendment can be considered as
having the necessary or proper connection.
The legislature must determine for itself
how broad and comprehensive shall be the
object of statute, and how much particu-
larlty shall be employed in the title in de-
finlng it. Cooley's Const. Lin. p. ia.
Mr.. Justice Reed, in carefully consid-
cred opinion, quotes with approval the fol-
lowing language in referring to the title of
scription of the subject might not with
propriety be more specific it seems to me
is questionEfor the legislature rather than
the courts. The purpose of the sixteenth
section was that neither the members of
the Legislature nor the public should be
nisled by the title, not that the latter
should embody all the distinct provisions
nf l1n 1nto a M 1slaAA
53 Pa. st. 391.
Mr.. Justice Valentine, in passing upon
this question, used the following peril
nent language: sThe subject to be
contained in bill under section 16, article
II. Of the constitution, which provides that
no bill shall contain more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed inits title, }
may be as broad and comprehensive as the
legislature may choose to make 1T. 1t may
include innumerable minor subjects, pro-
vided all these minor subjects are capable
Of being SO combined as to form only one
grand and comprehensive subject, and if
the title to the bill containing this grand
and comprehensive subject is also compre-
henslye enough to include all these minor
subjectsi as lone subject, the bill and
all parts thereof will be valid.n See Di-
vision OF Howard county, Is Kansas 1874.
Quotations OF this kind could be contin-
ued indefinitely. In fact we have been
unable to find a single case which has
sought to interpret the word "subjectu
when used in the way it is in our constitu-
ton in any other than this liberal way.
LII the legislature sought to enact the en-
tire body of the statute law of the state as
one enactment, and to entitle the same
An act to establish code of laws for the
state of Washington such title would
clearly come within the definitions above
quoted, and | can see no reason why it
would not be good. 1t is true that the leg
islature and the public are not informed at
all as to the particular terms of the various
provisions OF law which are intended to be
thereby informed clearly and fully
that the one subject or object of the
act to be enacted hereunder, is the
establishment of an entire code of stat
ute law and are as much advised
of the details, in fact, though perhaps a
little less III theory, as they are by title
to provide code of CivilProcedure. If it is
competent for the legislature to enact this
entire body of laws under single title, il
must follow that an act to revise or re-
enact the same would upon familiar princi
pies be likewise valid: and if the whole act
can be revised or re-enacted under one title
the same can be revised or re-enacted il
part by way of amendments provided The
parts to be amended are specified in The
title. The one object to be accomplished
is to change this single body of laws, ano
whether the changes are few, or many, i
is still one object but if less is sought thar
to re-enact or revise the whole code, tn,
particular parts to be SO revised or amended
must be set out in the title, otherwise th'
subject or object would not be expressed
From reason, and from the necessities o
the case, titles of the kind in question mus
be sustained.
ITO be continued.l
Pronounced Hopeless, YetSaved.
La i II