Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1892-10-13

/
| chancery writ. The use of the former
must be according to the course OF com
mon law courts. The use of the latter,
according TO the course OF courts OF
! equity; in each case subject to statutory
notifications of the practice, which do
not impair the jurisdiction granted. The
common law WritS, as already observed,
imply and define the jurisdiction apur-
| tenant to them, as jurisdictional writs.
/ 1t is otherwise with the writ Of injunc-
! ton. Equity has no jurisdiCtiCnal WritS
/ By the course of courts OF equity, the
! jurisdiction must precede the writ. And
! although the writ is the end of the
! equitable jurisdiction implied, the scope
of the jurisdiction must be sought main
/ ly outside of the writ itself 1t can
issue only after bill or information filed.
And the question still remains, what is
the original equitable jurisdiction CON
ferred on the court, of bills or informal
| tons, dependent upon the use Of the
writ. The grant Of original jurisdiction
| is one entire thing, given in one general
policy, for one general purpose, though
1t may have many objects and many
modes Of execution. SO it is of the APP
pellate power. SO it is of the superin-
tending control. There are three indie
pendent and distinct grants Of jurisdic-
ton, each compact and cOngruous in
itself, each Il uniform group of anaIo-
gOus remedies, though to be exercised
in several ways, by several wits, in
legal and equitable proceedings, on
many objects, in great variety of detail.
The constitution wisely, almost neceS-
sarily, stopped with the general grants
of jurisdiction, carefully distinguished,
and left details to practice and expert
ence." Then, after indicating that the
primary and controlling object of the
trainers of the constitution in giving this
court original jurisdiction over great
public interests" was for greater Sc
curity" and for the better and prompter
and more authoritative protection Of
public interests he said: And,
plainly recognizing the intention of the
constitution to vest in this court one
jurisdiction, by several Writs, to be put
to several uses, for one consistent, con
gruOus, harmonious purpose, we must
look at the writ Of injunction in the
light Of that purpose, and seek its use
in the kindred uses of the other Writs
associated with it. Noscitlr 4 sociis is
au old and safe rule OF construction.
!. peculiarly applicable to this con-
sderdtiOn. Here are several WIits
of defined and certain application
clasSed with one OF vague import. We
are to be guided in the application Of
the uncertain by its certain associates.
The joinder Of the doubtful writ with
the defined Writs operates to interpret
and restrict its use, so as to be accepted
in the sense of it's associates; so that
they and it may harmonic III their use,
for the common purpose for which it
is manifest and they were all given.
And thus, in this use and for this pJu-
pose, the constitution puts the writ Of
injunction to prerOgaJive uses and
makes it quasi prerOgative writ He
then cOntrasted injunction and man
damus and said The latter commands.
The former fOrbids. Where there
is nCn-feaSance, mandamus cOmpels
duty. Where there is malfeaSance, in
junction restraints wrong. And SO near
are the objects of the two Writs, that
there is sometimes doubt which is the
proper one; injunction is frequently
mandatory, and maDdamus sometimes
operates restraint. And it is very
safe to assume that the constitution
gives injunction to restrain excess in
the same class of cases as it gives man
damus to supply defect; the use Of the
one writ or the other in each case
turning solely on the accident of over
action or shortening of the defendant.
And it may be that where defect and
! excess meet in q single case, the court
might meet both, in its discretion, by
one of it's w1its, without being driven
to send out both, tied together with
red tape, for a single purpose.
The prerOgative Wrjts proper can issue
only at the suit of the state, or the
attorney general in the right of the
state; and so it must be with the writ
of injunction, in it's use as a quasi pre-
rOgative writ. All may go on the re-
latiOn of q private person, and may
involve private right" The zone Ell
''OIe general purpose" to be accom-
plished through the zone jurisdiction"
by the five several writs grouped to-
gether in one clause Of the cOnstitu-
ton, as mentioned by the learned Chief
Justice, manifeStly has reference to
judicial questions affecting the sOver-
eighty of the state, its franchises and
nrprOpat iVpS or the lihnrtv of ifs npO-
ple;" for it is only of such. as therein
indicated, that this court takes original
jurisdiction at all. The irresistible
logic of the opinion is to the effect,
that the power to thus issue the i've
writs, thus grouped together, for the
! one purpose named, was by the clause
of the constitution quoted, vested in
this court, absolutely and uncOnditiOn-
ally, and is in no way dependent upon
the volition of the attorney general
or any other official. This is confirm
ed by what he said in State ex rel
Wood V. Baker, quoted above, to the
! effect, that while the legislature might
regulate the mode of procedure in
such cases. they could not defeat nor
| abridge the jurisdiction itself; that the
! appearance in the case by the attorney
! general or his consent, was a mere
| matter of form and not of substance;
and hence could be supplied upon the
! hearing nunc pro tune. Indeed it
| would be a sOlecism to hold, as this
! court frequently has held, in several
| of the cases cited, to the effect, that
| the attorney general has no right or