The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-12-28

crossed the Potomac ana then DIVIDED
his army in hall. As crowning favor
OF chance, this was made known to
Mcclellan, and even this incalculabe ad-
vantage he frit;ered away and gave Lee forty
| eight hours in which TO call In his scattered
battalons. After Antietam, for six long weeks
of beautiful autumn weather, he fingered on
the north bank of the Potomac, under the con-
| slant pressure of the presidents persuasions,
and afterward, under the lash of his orders and
reproaches, unable to make up his mind TO pur-
sue the enemy so long he could find excuse
for delay in q missing shoe lace or broken linn
Der.
Utterly weary of such military Ham
lie, as Mcclellan, Lincoln, to his delight,
found in Grant not critic full of objec-
tons. but a practical, cooperative mind
tina: found means to carry out Lincoin's
purposes. and executed his designs with
heartiness. hardihood and promptness.
The impression that Grants great COM
mon sense and patriotism made upon Lin
coin at the beginning probably accounted
for the obstinacy with which he resisted
Halleck's efforts to remove Grant before
Vicksburg and replace him with one of
Halleck's military pets.
The truth is that Grant was the greatest
soldier of the war Largely for the same rea-
son that Lincoln was the greatest states
| man of the war, viz: Lincoln was
patriot before he was self-seeking states
| man and Grant was patriot before he was
self-seeking soldier. That explains Lin
coins vast superiority to Seward and
Chase; explains Grants vast superiority
| to Mcclellan, Buell., Hooker and Meade
the superiority OF moral courage. Nc
| Clellan, Buell., Hooker and Meade were all
| loyal men, but they were always wonder
| ing what would become of Mcclellan.
| Buell., Hooker and Meade if the battle
went against them.
Mcclellan, in his published letters to his
wife, writes her from Yorktown before he
has fought battle that he expects to fail
| because he is satisfied 1.-The Black Repub-
| lican administration" does not mean to
| support him, or allow him to succeed.
! That "Black Republican administration"
was Abraham Lincoln, who was the adj
ministration from Sumter to Appomattox
| as emphatically as ever was Andrew jack
| son. The man who rewrote Stewards dis
| patch on the affair of Mason and
| and Hunter, who held his hand in
| emancipation until he was "good and
| ready" who wrote every line of the
order retiring Mcclellan from command
| in order as he said that there should be no
| shade of doubt that the act was one for
which he was responsible, such a master
full man was "the Black Republican adj
mis- ST ho 81
ADMINISTRATION always in all matters of the
| slightest moment, and when Mcclellan in
| his book accuses the administration of
| having ruined him because 1t was deter
| mined that no Democrat should be per-
| mitted to end the war, that awful accusa-
ton is an Indictment of the patriotism,
the purity and the humanity of Abraham
| Lincoln.
Grant was on q higher level of patriotism
than these cheap captains who charged
the administration with the responsibility
| of their defeats. He sought to do the
enemy as much mischief as possible, and
| never considered for a moment whether he
risked the laurels of Donelson at Shiloh,
the laurels of Vicksburg at Chattanooga,
the laurels of Chattanooga at the Wilder
ness. The superiority of Grant is incon-
| testable; no less soldier than the Confed-
crate general, Longstreet, comedies it.
His inferiority of numbers does not ex-
plain the defeat of Lee standing on the de-
Tense, for all the great generals Of his
tory have shown how mere num-
bers were a burden to men who
lacked the genius to handle them.
Napoleon, Frederick and Gustavus
| Adolphus established the art of war by
| proving that a great general won his fame
not by confessing defeat by superior num-
| bers but by detying superior numbers to
| defeat him. From Marathon to Leuthen,
Rossbach and Napoeon's italian cam
| paigns of 1895 the title to superior military
| genius has been the capacity to win the
field by taking the offensive successfully
against a superior enemy; not by stand
ing stiffly on the defensive Bunker Hill
| and New Orleans were brave fights that
reve aled no brains, but Washington s cam
| paigns in the Jerseys and his movement
| on Yorktown stand for military genius,
| Gen. Lee was a man of fine military tai.
|
about him, or he would have beaten Grant
as Napoleon beat double his numbers IN
1876; as Washington circumvented Corn
| wallis.
TO excuse Lees military failure on the
| ground of inferior numbers and still claim
for him military genius is absurd. Men
of military genius establish their reputa-
ton by whipping superior numbers, as
Frederick did at Leuthen. where, with
80. 900 men. he beat a veteran army of
| So.00D commanded by very able soldier:
as Napoleon did in 1895, and as Grant did
when he drove 10000 men, like a wedge,
through Pemberton's line of $4,000. over
whelmed one flank under Joe Johnston at
| Jackson; then whirling on his heel routed
Pemberton's main body, driving Pember-
ton like fugitive fox to his hole at Vicks-
burg, where st his leisure Grant finally
| dug ont and captured the fox.