The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-01-17

decision. II Benedek. instead OF carrying on
the orders OF another. had to frame for himsel
scheme OF strategy or tactics. he was oblige,
TO work his way step by step. sometimes hest
tatfng and giving an ordor ONLY to recall It. q
this Limitation OF his natural talents h
was himself acutely conscious. Ono da!
soon after his appointment to dircc
tho campafgn against Prussia. he cam'
to Count Mensdorir and informed him that Ii,
had Just gone to tho Emperor to beg TO be re
leased from tho supreme command. He hat
told the Emperor, he said. that at the head o
q division he would do what II was possible fo
any man to do but that to lead great army
| into country unknown to him was beyond
| his powers. The Emperor had contradictet
| him, and finally had said that he must acccp
tho post. as there was no other General who
could be appointed in his place. Nothing hat
pnined Benedok more. he said to Mensdorir
than that the Emperor should declare that
Austrn possessed no better General than he.
On paper the army placed in the hands o.
Benedek comprised. including the Saxon
army corps. more than 100000 men. These
were imposing figures. but the commander
| soon discovered ample justification for his
foreboding OF failure. or late yenrs the nnan.
| cinl embarrassment OF tho Austrian empire
had caused Inadequate recruiting and many
leaves OF absence even from tho companies on
peace footing. 80 that when war was threat
ened largo additional levies had to be made In
order to fill out the ranks. Indeed. perhaps
| one-half OF tho Austrian soldiers had scarcely
spent year in service and thus had only
| specifically acquired tho habits OF un-
conditional obedience In military exercise.
There was also notable deficiency Of
capable officers. duo to the lack OF money with
which to obtain competent men. 80 that 1t was
often necessary to put UP with persons OF very
little ability. as. for instance with members Of
the music band. Then, whereas In Prussia
the reserves after having served their three
years term. were at definite intervals recalled
to short seasons Of exercise. Austria had saved
expense In this matter also. 30 that many q
man who had served his time had sunk back
to the stage OF a raw recruit. Besides all this,
tho troops OF Francis Joseph had been drawn
from the very lowest classes Of the population
and to o great extent from races that pos
sessed hardly the rudimonts OF civilization. In
all those respects the Austrian forces were far
below the Prussans. and there was. there
fore. no cause to be surprised at the SUI
periority Of tho Prussian battalions in manGu-
wiring and in solidity Of composition. Bene-
dek did all no could to remedy the obvious
shortcomings. but in the time at his disposal ho
Couiu w ittlo mOIo CLuu CulOrCo with StrlcI-
ness the rules OF tho barracks concerning obe-
dience and cleanliness. 1t was too late to at
tempt tho Introduction OF now tactics in fight
ing. necessary as these were in view of tho
Prussian needle guns. Nor was it only tho de-
sire to bring tho Austrian army up to its nom
inal strength that long detained Benedek in
defensive attitude He found that although
his forces were stationed in the most fruitful
provinces OF Austria, tho commissariat was
30 defIciently organized that on the very first
marches OF any length the soldiers suffered
serious want
We need not repeat tho story OF Denedek's
defeat. duo partly. no doubt, to the severe
discipline and superior armament OF the Prus-
sian forces. but partly also to his own delay in
Moravia. which gave Won Moltko an oppor-
tunity to carry out the strategy which culmi-
mated in the conveyance Of the armies OF the
Crown Prince and Of Prince Frederick Charles
in the nick Of time at KUnigcrltz. All the do
tails OF that epoch-making baltic are ia
miliar. but the diplomatic complications
which followed 1t could not DO made thor
oughly Ineligible until Or. Won Sybel
was permitted to explore the archives
Of Prussia and OF tho smaller German
States and to compare the results OF his re-
searches with data previously furnished in
Franco and Italy. With his help we are able
to deflno what Prussia hoped for at tho out
break Of the war. how much more sho counted
on aitor the victory at K6niggratz. and how
much. notwithstanding the jealousy evinced
by France. Bismarck succeeded in obtaining.
It was most intricate diplomatic drama. in
which Bismarck figured as the chief actor.
and which. Us we now can see. was to bring
about radical trans formation in Europe.
1t is easy to understand why the baltic
OF k6niggratz. or as tho French call 1t,
Sadown, should have provok cd great agitation
In Paris. In the first place. tho pride OF tho
French army resented as an affront tho Prus-
sian victory which manifestly threw Magenta.
Solfcrino and all the military exploits of tho
second empire into tho shade. Nor was the
feeling among the civilian population much
different Tho French people had never felt
any liking for Prussia. and for some time
tho Clericals had denounced the ally
OF Italy: the lnanciers and manufac-
turers had viewed with aversion tho
dlsturber OF European peace. while tho
Radicals ccnsured Bismarcks unconstitu-
tional. arbitrary mode OF Government. Now,
however. oil these elements OF Ill will wcro re-
enforced by tho dlsagreeable consciousness
that suddenly on the very borders OF Franco
had arisen power equal to France. II not SUI
pertor. and. worse than all. upon tho very
ground which had been for two centuries a
field for the efforts of Franco to
acquire position OF leadership in Europe.
II. now. Germany should become united and
powerful. tho species OF hegemony which had
been enjoyed by France since the Grim can war
would DO assailed ut its roots. Napoleon III.
had even more cause than his subjects
to follow the evonts in Bohemia with
keen anxiety. He had reluctantly been led
by Drouyn dc Lhuys and Gramont to conclude
o secret alliance with Austria on the assump-
ton thatthe Austrians Possessed decided mil
itary superiority. Naturally. therefore. oven tho |
first victories Of the Crown Prince filed Ma
polcon with misgvngs and made him begin
to feel unsafe. Still. M to July 4, he believed |
that tho decisive battle would give matters n |
more favorable turn for Austria and for him |
SELF On the day mentioned. however, came
Tho news OF Benedek's complete overthrow at !
k0niggritz. and forthwith Prince Mcttcrnich |
TO the Emperor Napoleon that Ans
tra made the session OF Vcneta stipulated by |
tho secret treaty and desired Franco on |
her pnrt to mediate with Italy SO that