The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-06-12
NOT THE "HIGH-wATER" MARK.

1 - n
Ex-Governor Beaver. of Pennsylvania,
| in his address at Gettysburg, said:
The "high-water mark" monument receives
| its namefrom the old copse of scrub oak trees
| on Seminary ridge ct Gettysburg, where the
Confederate army began its retreat on that fate
full July 8. 1t was the "high-water mark" OF
the re helliou, and from the moment that Long
street fell back dates the decline of the ConfeC-
crate cause.
This statement that Gettysburg stands
for "the high-water mark of the rebellion"
is not historically true. General Cham
berlain, of Maine, who first used it in
popular lecture, belonged to the Army Of
the Potomac, as did Governor Beaver.
| General Longstreet and all the eminent
Confederate generals who have written on
the subject of the civil war, deny that
Gettysburg was the turning point of the
rebellion.
Gettysburg was severe repulse to Gem
eral Lee-nothing more. Our total losses
were % 800, while Lees were 20,44S, and
General Meade was too much shaken to
dare deliver q counter blow at the enemy.
General Beaver is mistaken in saying that
General Lee began his retreat July 3. On
the contrary, Lee offered Meade battle all
day July as boldly as he did Mcclellan
after Antietam; he retreated without seri-
Gus molestation to Hagerstown and, find
ing the Potomac impossible, he turned
and offered Meade battle at Williamsport
q week after Gettysburg, although Meade
had been reinforced by 10000 veterans,
and Lee had not received a single man
to recoup his losses. Lee recrossed
the Potomac into Virginia at his leisure;
reinforced Bragg with $1,000 men in.Sep-
TENDER, and Meade never struck him aga n
until next May under Grant in the Wild-r-
| ness. Lee had been repulsed and foiled in
his scheme of Northern invasion at Gettys-
burg, just as he had the year before at
Antietam, but he had paralyzed the Army
of the Potomac for the rest of the season,
for the published correspondence between
Lincoln and Meade shows that from the
first week of September until the first of
December Lincoln in vain urged Meade to
move against Lees army, saying to him,
as he had said to Mcclellan and Hooker:
Lees army" Longstreet points out that
Lees army was not badly shattered
for he sent him with 1900 men to Bragg
and won Chickamauga; he forced Meade
back from the Rappahannock to Bull Run
in October, and the next spring this same
Confederate army fought with the military
virility and valor of its best days. so that
~ g II II
months after Gettysburg. looked down on a
far more dreadful repulse to the Army of
the Potomac than Gettysburg was to the
Confederates. The 5000 men sent by Lee
to help Bragg infict terrible defeat on
| Rosecrans September %, 1863, more than
recouped the Confederacy for their repulse
at Gettysburg. 1t looks very much, from
| the fact that from July 4, 1853. to Decem-
| Der of that year Meade never struck Lee,
| that Gettysburg had shattered Meade more
| than it did Lee.
| To call Gettysburg the turning point of
| the rebellion is absurd. The real disasters
| of the rebellion we're not Antietam and
| Gettysburg. where the Union victors lost
| more men and material than the enemy,
| but were Fort Donelson. Vicksburg, Chat
| tanooga. Atlanta and Nashville, which
stood for the loss of military advan-
! tages Of position and situation. General
| Longstreet holds that the real turning
! point Of the war was not Gettysburg, but
| Chattanooga, where the failure of Bragg
| to pursue at once the defeated Federal
army under Rosecrans and to reap the
fruits of his victory "dispelled our last
chance for the triumph of the Confed-
crate cause" Chickamauga was no
mere repulse; it was tremendous
| Union defeat, which cost Us 5000
| killed and wounded and forced
half of our army from the field. Instant
| pursuit would have driven Rosecrans out
OF Chattanooga, the real prize of the battle.
| dispersed and forced his army to surren-
| der or starve on the barren mountains
and left Bragg an open road to the Ohio
| river. Bragg threw away his advantage
! until our army was reinforced and rescued
| from starvation. This renewed our clutch
| on Chattanooga and placed it beyond re-
covery. After the loss of Chattanooga
| had been assured by Bragg's nerlec; 10
| gather up instantly the fruits Of the victory
| OF Chlcksmauea, LonEstreet declares that
he told Jef Davis that she fall of the Con.
| federacy could not be averted. Success
! had been made impossible. and further
| continuance of the war was murder
The surrender of Nicksburs. which BIZ.
sected the Con!ederacy by giving complets
naval control of the Mississippi from Mem
| phis 70 New Orleans; the victory Of Chat
tanoOga n November, 1865. which robbed
RTAgg Of al the fruits OF his great victory
o. Chickamauga were the irremedtable dis
asiers OF that year. In the campaign
east anu west n May, lS64, the real reason
why the Confederacy dsd not display the
offensive and aggressive power Of ISIS
was not because of Gettysburg.
for Lee displayed both offensive
and aggressive power oil summer and
autumn after Gettysburg, bu. it was be-