The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1892-06-07
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.

Yesterday the Clerk of Courts received from
the Law Court the following rescripts in cases
pending on the law docket for this district:
. Oscar G. Douglass, administrator, VS.. Mahala
Parker.
Rescrapt. by Judge Walton This is an action
by the administrator of James S. Parker to re-
cover from his widow portion Of the money
that has been paid to her as insurance on the
life of her husband. The plaintiff claims that by
force of the statutes of this State, the premiums
paid by the deceased within three years of his
death belong to the estate as assets for the pay
ment of debts,
This claim cannot be sustained. None of the
money paid to the defendant by the town soci-
cites mentioned in the plaintiffs declaration
can be regarded as assets belonging to the es-
Iate OF her deceased husband. By the terms of
the contracts with the societies, as shown by
the proofs, the insurance money was payable
directly to her, and couldnot have been recov-
cred by the plaintiff from the societies; nor can
h heE portion OF it now be recovered by him from
Judgment for defend ant
Harry Hartwen VS.. California Insurance Com
pany.
Rescript: by, Judge Walton.--The question is
whether the term merchandise" can in any
case. be used to describe property not intended
for sale. We think it can. The word not only
may be, but often is, used as the synonym of
goods. waresiand commodities. 1t is so defined
in Webster's Dictionary. Ifused in an insur-
ance policy to describe the goods of merchant
1t might, perhaps, be very properly limited to
goods intended for sale. If used for the same
purpose to describe the goods of a painter. we
L1lnK IL might De neld to cover property intend
ed for use and nOtfor sale.
In the present case, the plaintiff was not a
merchant He was a house and fresco painter.
He kept nothing for sale except as he first used
it and then charged for it in connection with his
labor. And yet the defendant company issued
TO him an insurance policy on his paints, oils,
yarnish. brushes, and "such other merchan-
dlse'' in the second story of building on Will
Ter street. in Auburn. The evidence shows that
the agent of the company first went and exam
Ined the" property, and then wrote the policy
himself. We think there can be no doubt as to
the sense in which the agent employed the
phrase land such other merchandise" we
think he used it to describe such other articles
OF convenience or necessity as were used by
the plaintiff in his business, and had not already
been specially mentioned; and that he did not
use it in the narrow and technical sense con
tended for in defence. Such in effect was the
decision of the presiding justice before whom
the case was tried in the court below without
the aid OF a jury, and we think his decision was
correct.
Exceptions overruled.
Hiram A. Dow VS.. Portland Steam Packet
Company
Resc,Tpt by Libbey, Although the common
carrier insureS the arrival of the property at the
point OF destination against everything but the
act OF God and the public enemy, yet the condi-
ton in which it shall arrive there must depend
upon the nature of the article to be transported
He does not absolutely warrant live stock
against the consequences of its own vitality.
But when the animal was delivered to him in a
the place OF destination is found to be lame or
diseased, if the carrier would excuse himself
the burden is upon him to prove that the injury
to the animal was from the cause above stated
and without his fault.
Exceptions overruled.