Wood River times. [volume] (Hailey, Idaho) 1882-1915, 1892-03-26

around nlcnmOnO, with Wnlcn ne
seemed to have TO acquaintance. He
appeared to have no idea of the cap
abilities OF transportation by vessels
in smooth water, Grant, in support Of
his obi ction, recalling the fact that
it had taken Mcclellan three months
to move less than $4,000 troops from
Washington to Fortress Monroe.
Butler replied that he would under.
take to transport 10000 men to
Bermuda Hundred aud City Point,
with all their ammunition and sup.
plies, at "a hours notice. This very
thing Butler did later on.
zone thing THAT Grant impressed
upon me-" says Butler: "that | must
be sure to hold City Point in any
event, aud make Bermuda ,mpregna.
BILE; so that If he failed in turning the
left flank of Lee and driving him back
into Richmond, he could march with
his own army across the James, and
join me at City Point.
IL insert his orders. Let them tell
the story of that planned campaign,
which was carried out in every point
by the Army OF the James. and in no
single particular by the Army of the
Potomac, save that they came down
to take advantage Of tie refuge the
famous bottle in which Buffers de-
tractors said he was bottled up. I
we had prepared for them"
Confidential
FORTRESS MONROE, VA,
April 2, 1864.
General:--ln the spring campaign,
which it is desirable shall commence
at as early day as practicable, it is
proposed to have cooperative action
of all the armies in the field, as far as
this object can be accomplished. 1t
will not be possible to unite our
armies into two or three large ones, to
act as SO many units. owing to the
absolute necessity of holding ON to
the territory already taken from the
enemy. But, generally speaking,
concentration can be practically
effected by armies moving to the
interior of the enemy's country from
the territory they have to guard. BY
such movement they interpose them.
selves between the enemy and the
country to be guarded, thereby re-
ducing the numbers necessary to
guard important points, or at leas,
occupy the attention Of a part of the
enemy's force, if no greater object j.
gained. Lees army and Richmond
being the greater objects toward
which our attention must he directed
in the next campaign, it is desirable
to unite all the force we can against
them. The necessity of covering
Washington with the Army of the
Potomac, and Of covering your De-
partmtnt with your army. msk-s i
impossible to unite these forces at the
beginning of any move. propose
therefore, what comes nearest this O
anything that 81 ems practicable. Tn,
Army OF the Potomac will act from it,
present base, Lees army being tn,
objective point. You will collect al
the forces from your command that
can be- spared from garrison duty t
operate on the south side OF jaime,
River, Richmond being your obi ctiv'
point.
When you are notified to NOV,
take City Point with as much force al
possible. Fortifv. or, rather, intrencl
at once, and concentrate all you
troops for the field there as rapidly al
you can.
= =
All the minor details OF your adj
vance are left entirely to your direc
ton. If, however. you think it prac
ticable to cut the railroad abon'
Hicksford about the time of the gen
eral advance, it would be Of immens.
advantage. You will please forward
for my information, at tho earliest
practicable day, all orders, details
and instructions you may give for The
execution of this order.
u. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant General
To Maj. Gen. Is. F. Butter.