The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-12-25


a. made in The Army Of Northern VIRGINIA in |
/. arr. BY WILLIAM ALLAN tHourhton. Minlin |
\ CAY Tho scope Of tho authors opportuni- |
ties OF observation are set forth BY Mr.. John c.
Homes in an introduction to this volume. Col. |
Allan was from the beginning Of the war al |
most constantly at the headquarters OF Lieut.
c en- Jackson. and In January. 1858. was APP
pointed Chief OF Ordnance OF tho Second
Corps Of tho Army OF Northern Virginia He
took part In the Shenandoah Valley campaign
in the spring OF 1862. in tho engagements
which preceded the successful movement
against McClcllans communications in the
early summer Of that year. In the operations Of
jackson against Pope in the month OF August.
in the capture OF Harper's Ferry. in the battle
OF Antietam. and In the maint enance OF tho
lines OF fredericksburg. He was quail
fed to turn his observation to account
by q ten acious memory. a sound judgment on
military matters. and strong love Of truth. It
was his purpose to write tho entire history Of
tho Army Of Northern Virginia. but he only
lived long enough to bring his narrative to the
close OF the year 1883. 1t 10 this installment
OF his projected history which is presented in
tho book before us.
We purpose to sxemplliy tho judicial quality
OF the authors mind ana the weight which
should attach to his opinions. Notwithstanding
the bias inevitably resulting from his sympa-
thies. By marking his comments on McClellan's
plans and the results Of the Seven DAYS Bat
ties on tho Peninsula: his review OF the cam
paign against Pope. his analysis OF the battle
OF Antietam and its outcome. and finally his
discussion OF the battle OF Fredericksburg.
I.
The programme arranged by Gen. Mcclellan
for 1882 is defined by the author in few
rhn oh; iy, mi nj ~ hn Fad nj
campaign was the capture OF Richmond. the
capital OF the Confederacy and seat OF the
most important arsenals and manufactures
for the supply OF tho Southern armies. Gen.
Mcclellan deemed an advance directly against
the army in front OF him unadvisable. because
It would yield his opponent all the advan-
tages OF defensive positions OF his own selec
ton. and would draw tho Federal army into
the interior Of Virginia away from its base
and the reach OF water transportation and
render It dependent upon single line OF rail-
road for supplies. This was the longest and.
As Mcclellan thought. the most difficult way
of attacking Richmond. He proposed instead
. transfer OF the Army OF tho Potomac to the
waters OF the lower Chesapeake and an adj
vance thence against the Confederate capital.
BY means OF the rivers of that region. oil OF
which could be controlled by the Federal
navy. he could place his army within a few
miles OF Richmond and establish n base Of
supplies near ut hand and on deep water The
plan he first suggested was to move his
army to Urbana on the Itappahannock. and to
advance thence by way OF West Point to Rich
mona. In this way ho would turn the Confed-
crate position at Manassas completely. and by
rapid movements might place his army be-
tween the Coniederates and their capital. The
unes pected withdrawal Of the Confederate
commander. Joseph Z. Johnston. from Ma
nnssas to the line OF the Rappahannock frus-
trated this plan and caused its abandonment.
McClellan's second project was to transfer his
army to Fortress Monroe aud march thence up
the peninsula between tho York and tho
James. while the Federal Gunboats controlled
tho rivers and protected his TANKS. The Fed.
eral Cabinet hesitated for n time to approve
this scheme. To them 1t seemed to uncover
Washington. Tho vivid Impression made upon
the minds OF President Lincoln and his advisers
by the first battle OF Manassas had not been ef-
faced. and they were unwilling to place the
great Federal army where 1t would not be d.
recty 10 the path Of q Confederate force ad-
vaucing from the interior OF Virginia. They
yielded at last to McClellan's urgent repre-
sensations. but in doing so imposed the follow
ing conditions: First. that Washington should
be garrsoned and covered BY sufficient forces
to mako it perfectly secure: second. that the
lower Potomac should be freed from Conisd-
crate batteries. and third. that tho Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad should be reopened and
protected. Mcclellan undertook to comply
with these conditions and proceeded to trans.
fer his army to the lower Chesapeake.
Such was the programme. the attempt to ex.
scute which resulted in the Seven Days Bat
ties that will be found described in detail In
some seventy pages OF this book. The con-
duct and tho outcome OF the campaign in the
Peninsula are summed up by Col. Allan on
pages lab $50. 1t is pointed out that the
losses OF the Confederates in the long. OK
hausting struggle known as the Seven Days
Battles were by the officlul reports about TO- 7Ot
men. The Federal loss. according to McCla!
lan's report. was 15.7i5. OF which more thar
10000 were prisoners. wounded and unwound
Cd Gen. Lee also states that flty-two pieces o
artillery and upward OF $4,000 stand OF small
arms were captured. Tho stores OF every de-
scriptlon which fell into the hands OF the Con
fe6er tes were also great in amount and value
Col. Allan submits. however. that the of1icia
statement Of tho losses OF tho Federal arm
conveys but a very Inadequate idea OF the sc
verify OF the defeat it had encountered. As til
Federal army had numbered 1Oo.S25 on Jun
20. and had lost. by tho official reports. oni
1876 In the Seven Days Battles. it shout
have contained 3O.O 900 men on July >. That il
fact. however. nearly half OF this number wer
sick or struggling seems evident from lette
written by Mcclellan to Secretary Stanton o
the day named. in which he expresses doub
whether there were then more than 5000
men with their colors. This acknowledgment
Is cited. in conjunction with other Federal ties
timony as 70 the precipitate character OF tn
retreat OF McClellan's army from Malvern Iii
to Harrison's Bar, to corroborate the assertio
OF Gen. Lee that under ordinary clrcum
stances the Federal army should have bee
destroyed" Col Allan said that prompt infol
nation on the morning Of June 2S as to Nc
Clelun's designs would have enabled Lee
concentrate his army one day sooner on til
south side OF the Chickahominy. and migl
have rend cred the escape OF tho Federal force
far more difficult. He suggests. too. that o
the afternoon OF June 80. had HuGer an
Holmes thrown their divisions against the 81
emy with half the vigor OF Longstreet an
A. P. Hill. or had Jackson. with the ski
and audacity that characterized his vale
campaign. forced Franklin from White Ga
Swamp. that day would have been fatal to I'll
larger portion OF tho Federal army. 1t is fu
Iher noted of Malvern Hill that Gen. Hunte