The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-11-25

the South does not feel the same pride in
the flight of Bragg as they do in the heroic
failure and destruction of Pickett's col
umn. Measured by its results Chatta-
nooga was a momentous victory, for 1t
retrieved the great defeat of Rosecrans at
Chickamauga, two months before, and
shattered the power of the Confederacy in
the Mississippi valley. AS Vicksburg
cleared the Mississippi river, so Chatta-
vannah and procured the transfer of Grant
to the Army Of the Potomac, where, as
usual, he pulled the laboring oar of the
war. It was the last battle in which
Grant, Sherman and Sheridan fought to-
gether, and the first battle IN which
Sheridan had fought under Grant, for all
Sheridans previous fighting had been
under Buell. and Rosecrans. Sherman
never fought afterwards under Grant and
Sheridan never fought again except under
Grant.
Chattanooga. like Gettysburg, was fought
by troops from both East and West. At
Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac in-
Guided troops from Ohio, Indiana, Wis
consin, Michigan and Minnesota, while
Grants army at Chattanooga included six
teen New York regiments and batteries,
two from Connecticut two from Massa-
chusetts. two from New Jersey. one from
Maryland, eleven regiments and ten bat
teries from Pennsylvania and an artillery
battalion from Maine. Admiral David D.
Porter said that not until after the victory
at Chattanooga did he feel confident of
the final and complete suppression of the
rebellion. The disaster at Chickamauga was
the fault OF Rosecrans, to whom President
Lincoln wrote number of letters vainly
urging that unready. dilatory hesitating
commander to move on Bragg in April
and May, 1868. while the enemy were oc-
cupied with Hooker in Virginia and Grant
was moving On Vlcksburg. But Rose
Grams was not nearly as responsible for the
disaster as Halfeck, who rejected the adj
vice of Grant after Vicksburg. Grant
agreed with Lincoln that the army liber.
ated by the surrender of Vicksburg should
be sent to Rosecrans, or that Rosecrans
should be relieved by an overland move
ment on Mobile, which would force Bragg
to fall back from Chattanooga to save the
Confederate military depots and arsenals
from capture.
Within thirty days after Vicksburg
Sherman could have easily joined Rose
Grams with 10000 men of Grants army and
made his advance on Bragg and Chat
tanooga irresistible. This is what Lincoln
urged upon Halleck, but Halleck repeated
his old blunder of dispensing our forces,
instead of concentrating them which he
had committed in June 1862, before
Corinth. Miss, when he dispersed
magnificent, victorious army of no.
coo men instead of marching it at
once to Vicksburg, where Farragut was
with his gunboats begging in vain for
$4,000 troops to capture that city. Lin
coin constantly urged from the beginning
of the war the Importance of cooperation
and concentration at the very time when
Grant vainly urged upon Halleck the same
policy upon which Grant acted q month
later in his momentous campaign Of Fort
Donelson. Lincoln and Grant, without
any consultation. by the independent
action of their native strong sense applied
to the military situation. reached the same
conclusion, and Grants first. second and
last great campaigns were conducted in
pursuance of the principles and upon the
lines of operation advocated by Lincoln
from the outset of the war. To Lincoln
was due the policy of concentration that
was finally adopted, and it was Lincoln
who, indignant at the failure of Halleck,
until too late. to concentrate our armies
after Vicksburg, placed Grant in command
at Chattanooga. After Chattanooga there
was an end of Halleck and his policy of
dispersion; Grant was placed in supreme
command; concentration and pressure on
vital points became the policy of the hour
and this concentration crushed the shell
of the Confederacy and forced its conquest.
IMMIGRATION.