The National tribune., 1892-02-18
GETTYSBURG v, vIcKsBURG.
Both Campaigns Worthy Of an Exhaustive Study.

A. Hobbs's article. "Vanquishing Vicksburg,"
in your paper Of Jan. z, is certainly very COM
mendable Such logic and thought applied 10
a campaign makes its study both interesting
and instructive. / venture the assertion that
one will rarely find private soldier in the
ranks Of any European army who is capable Of
analyzing any given military movement. IL
war is a science. it does seem to me that the
private as we'll as tho t6eneTal, should have
some knowledge Of il. An army ,entire) OF
West Point graduates ought surely 10 do better
fighting than recruit volunteers differed by
graduates. Thus il is. rs we think, that Amer
lea can produce a stronger army than any other
nation in the whole world.
As your readers will remember, recently
wrote an article upon the Gettysburg campaign,
but il was by no means exhaustive; no, not
even i'm the detail Of the ground attempted 10
be covered, TO wit, the objective or governing
principle melting 10 action hy Gems. Lee aui
Meade And now Prof Hobbs's article makes
il necessary or, perhaps, more pertincntly, con-
ycnieut for me 10 refer TO another feature Of
the campaign that is, as a general rule almost
entirely OycTl00kCd-that is. its moral effects
upon the vauquEhad army. 10 is clear TO every
thinking mind that dare not TO ask space 20
discuss this By an exhaustive argument.
therefore must only mention the general bear
inps Of this moral principle.
Every General who has commanded largo
volunteer IOltG5 VIII nor lhll 10 give AUl1 ltA-
turo Of the campaign its due weight for they
know that 4 dishc1rtened army is a very unccr-
tain quantity. Patriotism is the leading coho.
sye element in volunteer army, but this is
not all Of il. The intelligence Of the entire
army must be brought 20 bear. also, upon the
subject of fixed hope iIl ultimate success. An
army pulsatcs rs the different coordinate parts
forming one human STRUCTURE. This sentiment
will be moulded in spitepf every obstacle. pro-
r-flnH hn II lent. Ia gnuIifian IN ba
welded by its commandSr
To illustrate, an armyblten retreats, not be-
cause il is really bcateg, but because il from
some cause has come - believe that there is
no hope Of ultimate success. Who has not seen
the very best Of soldiers at certain times re-
fuse To move against what they believed 10 be
imprcgnable fDrces2
Here, again, comes % mind tho fact. we'll
known 10 every soldier, that 10 good fighting
can he done where the soldiers have lost conf
dencc in their leader Then, IL seems TO me.
that every reader can edthat the two essential
agents in solidifying aud eneTgizing an army
are Patriotism aud Hope Destroy either one
Of these and you cut ~ artery that by and
by will cause the ulIimaf death Of an indiyid-
ual army.
But now TO the question at issue: Lees
army was fairly beaten ia an open field fight
at Gettysburg. Pa, by wlEch every hope Of the
campaign $50 far as Lee WIS cOncernedl was de-
stroyed. This, Of itself, k5 Prof Hobbs shows,
did not necessarily dishca4 ten Lees army. No
one can deny that IL had tendency in that di-
rection. But il was cab for each soldier TO
say: "Ycs, we have beei defeated in this cam
paign, but we will ouly come at them again,
by-aud-by."
Antietam was very nearly as disastrous 70
Lees plans as was Gettysburg; aud yet, as
we see, the Army Of Northern Virginia met the
Army Of the Potomac right along aiterward.
So, then, there is a matter still behind the et-
fects Of the battle, that made the campaign so
disastrous TO the cause Of the Confederacy and
the Army Of Northern Virginia. No sooner
was Lee safe from the dangers Of this un-
fortunate campaign than We sec him advising
the Southern COnfedcracy to sue for honor
able terms Of peace. aud cease to shed the blood
Of his fellow soideTy." IL is clear that lie saw
the end. His hope was all gone. lie knew
from that moment that the COufedcTacy was
doomed. Ii Is very true that the NicksbuTg
disaster had something 10 DO in confirming his
judgment, but the loss Uf both Gettysburg
aud NiCEsburg could, OF themselves, never
have wrung from him 50 humiliatiug a con-
fessiOn. Then, what was IL? simply this /:
The campaign into Pennsylvania had educated
the rank aud file OF Lees army. Southern
papers had kept their hopes frightened by
publishing articles 10 the effect that the North
WAS in straiiened circumstances, as much 50
. as the South. The poor soldiers were thus de-
cciyed into q false hope But this very cam
raign opened their eyes 20 SEQ plainly that
these statements were absolutely false. They
saw uumis,asable evidence that our resources
both Of men aud means Of WAT were not at all
disturbed, while theirs were both exhausted.
They saw, too, that our p8pGr currency was al
most as good as gold, while theirs vas almost
worthless.
Now, the soldiers patric ism was not affected
. l~r ffru-u lrs4 AZ.
| He says: "What is the use of further fighting,
/ with the daily risk Of losing my life, when we
4 can plainly see in the end certain defeat"
So his hope being gone lac not only makes
thereafter a weak fight, but deserts his flag ut
the first favorable opportunity, aud never
comes to its support again.
la this respect the Gettysburg campaign is
without an equal iu the matter Of breaking the
/ power Of the south. 10 Tas the thrust shat
cut the jugular vein and let out the hearts
blood. All the rest Of is struggles were merely
I the ilOundcTings OF a dying victim. Analyze
I every act Of the South aftsrwaTd, and you arc
I forced 10 this one conclusion. As have said,
\ the NickshurE campaign aided in this, for il
emphasized the voice Of the said Gettysburg
U campaign.
tnd now one word more and / am done.
/ Prof Hobbs criticiz.s the Federal army for ever
\ allowing Lee 70 invade Maryland and Penn
! syivaHia But, first, eyety military critic, il
seems 10 me, is forced 10 the conclusion that IL
I could not very safely have been prevented,
considering the ppsitoni aud movements OF
I both armies relatively ahh, second, that IA a
/ military or Strategic point Of view II was a
/ wise measure 10 permit him 20 90 as far away
I from his base Of supplies as lGssib.c, be-
] fore giving him battle, laless hs forced 10
aud, third, that IL is a faiE criticism TO assert
| that Gen Meade ought "a have forced Lee 10
! fight another battle at the Potomac River,
! where he lad a very iatthTing opportunity oil
/ utterly destroying Lees duti.o army and thus
/ closing the war then aud tIerc.
il was the one grand opportunity OF Meade,
/ whole military life Gen. Mcclellan wa,
severely ccnsuTcd for not forcing Leo into an.
! other battle after AutiCiam, aud before he
crossed the Potomac into Virginia; and vet we
assert, without fear Of successful contradiction
! that Gen. Mcadcs chauces Of success in this
! line were about four 10 one in favor Of Gen
! Meade rather than Gen. Mcclellan. But this
/ IS what might have and perhaps ought TO have
/ followed rs Legitimate result Of tho Gcttys
! burg campaign, hut which. for some cause, was
/ lost by the Army Of thc Potomac. But the Of
/ feet upon the morale Of the rank and file Of the
! Confederate Army Of Northern Virginia, as wt
/ have cited, as being so disastrous, while 1t wa!
not, IA one sense, tho personal achievement o.
/ the Army Of the Potomac, yet IL was the legiti
mate result Of the military judgment that per
mittcd Gen. Lee 70 penetrate tho North, anC
4 was a distinctive feature of the Gettysburg
| campaign, and is entitled 10 be studied in con
nection Herewith. i. WILLIAMS, Monte
yuma, Ind.
The Farmers Pleasant Life.