Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1892-11-24

|
| violence the offense was murder"
| This Is the language of the Chief Justice OF
| the Supreme Court OF this State in his recent
charge te the grand jury upon this subject
| As Is properly stated by him it matters not
who these men were nor whence they came,
whether Pinkerton detectives from Chicago
lawful. And if their landing was resisted
| by physical.force and violence, attended
| with threatening speeches and turbulent
gestures, 1t amounted to riot, and If killing
| occurred in pursuance of q common desfgn n
to accomplish their unlawful purpose the
participants are guilty OF murder.
| You must not be guided by the advice that
| the people on the shore had the right to re-
sist the landing OF the men from the barges
| and to shoot them down If necessary to ac-
| complish their purpose; this Is not law, gen.
| tlemen. 1t is wholly subyersive Of private
| izensnip, and it is in violation of
| every principle OF Justice and humanity.
The Law From the Supreme Court.
You are told that you are not the judges of
the law as well as of the fact. This 6 On tleman
is true, in a certain sense, and the best e1-
PLANTATION of that is to be had in the later
subject, which will read for your instrnc-
tion.
The opinion was to the effect that the
Court should furnish the law and the jury
should apply it to the evidence.
Judge Kennedy continued: have given
you the law of this case as 1 understand it
to be laid down by the Supreme Court of
our own State, and I apprehend the jury
will take 1t from the Court as the best EVIL
dence of the law, In other words they take
the instructions which seem to have been
conveyed in the opinion which have just
| read. Now, as to the present case, if the
| jury are satisfied that there was riot in
existence there on that day, and that the
defendant with others actively participated
in it with the purpose and intent to prevent
| by violence and physical force the men on
the barges from landing and entering the
works or mills of the Carnegie Company on
that T. j. Connors was killed by the act of
violence of the rioters, and that there was q
common purpose or design among the riot
ers to resist and oppose the land
tent of taking life, if necessary,
to accomplish their purpose, then the de-
fendant and all members OF the riotous as
semblage participating in the acts of VIC
lence, although not specifically the parties
to the killing, are guilty or murder of the
first degree; Because there is the specific
the intention should be to take the life of
this deceased Connors, 1t is sufficient if the
intention be to take any life in the accom-
plishment of their unlawful purpose. The
take life constituting murder Of the first
degree is there, ana this intent may
I've inferred from all Cn6 1acCS ana
circumstances in the case. If, however, the
jury are not satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the intention to take life existed
in the minds OF the rioters, in the accom-
plishment of their unlawful purpose, but
are still satisfied that the killing of Connors
was done by violence of the rioters, OF whom
the defendant Critchlow was one, in the
course OF the riot which unquestionably
took place on the day OF the killing, and the
jury should believe that the riot was inau-
surated and existed for the purpose of un-
lawfully by violence preventing these men
on the Darges from landing and entering
the works, and in the contamination Con-
nors was killed, the defendant and all par.
ticfpants are guilty of murder of the second
degree.
Accessibility of Manslaughter.
The malice in law is implied by the illegal
and riotous attack, and even If the killing
was done in the heat of the combat, by rea-
son of the illegal attempt by force to pre-.
vent the landing of the men from the
ment, under such circumstances the law
will not allow the DEFENDANT and his fellow
rioters to protect themselves under the
principle which ordinarily reduces the crime
from murder to manSlaughter.
If, however, the jury, while satisfied that
tho killing was done by the rioters, of whom
the defendant was one in the prosecution of
their unlawful purpose, still are convinced
that there was no malice on the part of the
rioters; that the killing was done in the heat
of the combat and under great provocation,
the crime may be manslaughter and such
may be your verdict: that is, guilty of volun-
tary mansluughter. But if the jury believe
the theory or the defense, as heretofore
stated that he did not participate in the
riot or in the manner as claimed then your
verdict should be not guilty. As TO this de-
fense of alibi, about which promised to say
something, my instructions as to that line
of defense are better expressed in an au-
to-day in your hearing, but which l
desire to read entire and say to
you that these words contain my instruc-
tioas upon that defense, namely, alibi. This
is delenso which, when satisfactorily laid
out, necessarily Overturns the strongest cir
cumstantial evidence. and it is sometimes
the only available defense to an innocent
man. But in every case where the defense
of alibi is resorted to, it should be very
closely scrutiniZed, for the reasons SO fore
IDLY expressed by an eminent judge: alt is a
defense often attempted by contrivance.
subornation or perjury. The proof, therefore,
offered to sustain iJ is to be subjected to a
rigid scrutiny, because, without attempting
to confess or rebut the evidence OF facts
sustained in the charge, it attempts to prove
affirmatively another fact wholly incon-
slstent with it, and this defense is equally
available if satisfactorily established, to
avoid the force of positive as of circumstan-
tial evidence. In the conflict of evidence
whatever tends to support the one tends in
the same degree to rebut and overflow the
other, and it is for the jury to decide where
the truth lies.
The Judges OF the Witnesses.
Now, gentlemen, you will carefully con-
slider all the facts and circumstances of the
case. You will weigh all of the testimony:
you are the sole judges of the credibility
of the witnesses whom you have seen upon
the stand and observe their manner. And
IN case OF contradictory statements from
witnesses you will decide which statements
are true and which witnesses are truthful.
In deciding upon any material part OF the
case it is the duty of the jury TO give the
prisoner the ben eft OF any reasonable doubt
arising out OF the evidence which prevents
them from coming to d satisfactory con-
clusion. But 1t must be q reasonable doubt
fairly arising out of the evidence, not simply
fancied or conjured up; as has been
said, jury must not raise fanciiul
doubt, or ingenious doubt. to escape the
consequences OF an unpleasant verdict. In
making up your verdict you Will CONSIDER
only the facts and circumstances of the case
as developed by the testimony, without re-
gard to what your personal views may be In
relation to the matter, or whether you ap-
prove of the law of the case or not. 1t is
your duty to enforce the law anu suppress
lawlessness. and your verdict must depend
upon the legal evidence uninf1uenced by any
fear, favor, affection, personal inclination,
wishes or symDathies. all OF which must be
laid aside by you. Nor are you to be de-
tered or frightened from doing Your duty
by the consequences OF your verdict? These
consequences are not yours, they, follow the
crime. You do not pronounce the sentence;
that belongs to the Court. You only
find a true and honest verdict The law
has made murder q crime. and you are
sworn to obey and enforce the law. The
duty you have to periocm is a most i'm
portant and solemn one. A human life has
been taken. and 1t is your,duty to determine