, 1892-05-31

Agreements I'm the Sale of the Cow
ernOr SemPIe Property The
Decision of the Lower Court
Affirmed.
TNotice-Au decisions of the supreme
court will appearin The DAILY and WEEK
LY TRIBUNE.
Willard Groves, respondent, VS.. The H. L.
Griffith Reality & Banking company
appellant. No. 334.
The plaintiff in this case alleges that he
was employed by the defendant, Ia corpora
ton, known as The H. L. Griffith Reality
& Banking company to sell certain real
estate in Seattle, known as the Governor
Semple property. "That defendant agreed
with the plaintiff that in case the plaintiff
should sell said property for So 500, $500 of
which was to be paid cash, and 5000 each
year for five years, at per cent. interest,
with mortgage to secure the deferred pay
ments, that would pay to the plaintiff the
sum of 5000 cash, as a commission for his
services IN finding a purchaser for said
property and negotiating sale therefor"
And that in consideration of said agree
ment the plaintiff found purchaser who
was ready and willing to comply with the
terms of sale and take said property, and
offered to pay to defendant the sum of five
hundred dollars, and to execute his prom
issory notes secured by mortgage, etc., and
IL ONOA 6pGGb OA6I6u W comply MlbQ BQe
terms OF the purchase; but the defendant
refused to carry out the terms of the con-
tract; refused to sell the said property to
the purchaser and abandoned the contract
and refused tOpay the plaintiff the said two
hundred dollars which it agreed to pay for
the services rendered: the plaintiffs dam
age IN the sum of two hundred dollars etc.,
etc. The answer alleges that the
agreement between the plaintiff and
defendant was, that if Gov. Semple, the
owner Of said property, would agree to sell
the same, and plaintiff could find a pur-
chaser for the property, ready and willing
to buy the same and comply with the
terms OF the sale as stated above, the
plaintiff should receive the sum of two
hundred dollars commission provided Gov.
Semple would agree to receive for the land
the consideration of $3300C0, and that the
plaintiff knew at the time the contract was
entered into that it all depended upon the
consent of the owner which had not yet
been obtained and that the owner being
applied to refused to sell said land and
that by the terms Of the contract plaintiff
was therefore not entitled to any commits
sion or other compensation. This is denied
by the reply, which challenges the defend
ant at the time of making the agreement,
lnfOrmed' plaintiff that it had already made
arrangements with Gov. Semple by which
said Semple had agreed to sell said property,
and that defendant had full power to close
up said sale. Upon the issues thus made
the parties went to trial; the case was tried
by the judge without the Intervention of
jury, and judgment was given to plaintiff
for the amount asked for.
The main contention here is, that the
evidence does not support the findings.
An appellate court, in law case, will not
usurp the functions of jury, or of judge
acting In the capacity Of a jury, and re-
verse the judgment because the weight of
testimony seems to be on the other side,
or because i'll a case of conflict of testi-
mony the jury believed the testimony of
witnesses that it does not believe. This
doctrine is so elementary and so universally
pronounced by the courts that it would be
idle to enlarge on it, or to discuss it
further. 1t is sufficient to say that the
jury is the judge of the facts. If the testi-
mony on which the judgment is based is
competent, and is legally introduced, and
If conceded to be true would sustain the
Judgment the appellate court will not en-
quire further as to its suficiency. The
question to be answered here is, was there
such testimony introduced in behalf of the
plaintiff in this case2 We think there was.
The point in controversy was whether the
duties deYOlYing upon the agent under the
agreement had been complied with when
the purchaser was found who was ready
and willing to buy the land upon the terms
proposed or whether his CONF pensation de-
pended upon this service and the further
contingency of the consent of the owner of
the land to sell. This, ofcourse, would de-
pend upon the understanding ofthe parties
at the time the agreement was entered into;
and their understanding can be gathered,
primarily, from what was said at the time
of the agreement; and, secondly, by their
actions with reference to the agreement
afterwards