New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1892-04-25
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
OFFENCE OF GREATER BRITAIN.

This volume is sequel TO Sir Charles Dixie
"Probcms of Greater Britain, since IL empna-
sizes one of the central ideas Of that important
work, namely, the necessity OF properly oIsahl"
ing the warlike resources Of the Empire IL con-
tains an Introductory chapter the general
question of the morality of modern warfare TWO
chapters on English naval policy, two on the
defence of India and two on military reforms
While the volume is addressed primarily 10 Eng
lshmen at home and in the colonies, 1t deas
with n variety of subjects in which naval ana
military experts in all countries are Interested an"
contains much information and argument WIG"
may be prcftably studied by Americans Inc
military chapters. and probably the technical po'-
tjons of the chapter the Northwest lIoh'lcr'
hear thc inrprcss of Mr. Wilkinson's hand but the
bulk of the work is written in Sir Charles DllhcS
luminous style, and reveals his skill III poielcS'
his minute and precise knowledge OF the WoI"S
affairs and his enlightened and sagacious patriot
ism. 49,,
This work is based upon the CONVECTION t"''
The maintenance of an adequate and wcl-organlzed
naval and military force is a national necessity
and a national duty Modern war is conceived
Of rs imposed upon States by an irreconcilablc
opposition of purposes 1t only be justified
rs n means TO an end If there he no folly IKE
that % conducting war for its own SAKE IL Is
not less irrational and much more common 10
regard the avoidance Of war as an cnd III lIs'I''
Avoidance of war can be secured ONLY oy COLI
cession or compromise, and where the purpose 10
The maintenance of a fundamental rlShb or 'pc
protection of a vital interest," concession or com
promise is as irrcparablc injury TO the character
Of the nation which agrees 10 IT, a true states
man. according to Sir Charles bikes view' must
recognize the fact that there are other ooJc''s
more desirable than peace, and that peace '"""o'
l.,al, I.nte rs a Sfln
end and he must have positive aims, not seeking
ouarrel for its own sake, but not Shrinking ir'W
resistance whenever the individuality oil inc M
tim or IFS right 10 do it's own work In the world
i threatened With this preliminary concep-
ton If war as conflict ot natiohal
purposcs the author proceeds 10 assume
that EngliShmcn wherever they i've VIII FAY
down their lives to protect English homes uo'h
those of the Old Country and OF the New Eng
lands beyond tie seas" that they VIII hSh' Ill
defence of the work of peace and OF good gov
eminent in India, and that they Will never
abandon without a struggle the comm1nd OF the
sea which alone renders possible thclr trace
their insular security and their Empire.
The first point at which the British Empire Is
REGARDED as vulnerable is in the possession OF the
sea If the navy had no other Junction, thit OF
,ocelIinr any and every attack upon the nations
portance for national defence. The second con-
ceivobe form of attack is an invasion Of British
territory. and this is possible only by sea, except
that If India by Russia or Of Canada by the United
States The British navy, SO long as II can man
tain superiority at sra, is a sufficient protection
AGAINST invasion for every part OF the Empire
except India and Canada. France Is lndlcatcd rs
the only Power which is likely 10 challenge The
naval ascendancy of England; and the author
after assuming in the policies Of France and KnS-
sia the possibility OF conflict with Great hrltaln'
concludes that each Of those Powers has para
mount interest in joining hands with the other
in the attack for TO each of them such ii
combination offers the best chance
OF success II the combined assault were We
torious there would be an end Of the British
Empire India would he lost and the sea power.
which is the life of our Empire, would be broken.
The loss of sea power would leave each OF oar col
onics in position Of isolation. without the guar
antce Of an assured British future 50 long aS
the navy is able TO fulfil its mission, there l.
little probable scope for the army except on the
Indian border, in offensive operations elsewhere
aiming at the protection Of India
In naval war England's first object would be
10 seek tie encmy's feet in the port from when
IL would be likely TO sail, and TO mask or blockade
il there The next Object would be to have a
intercepting and capturing commerce-destroycrH
and keeping watch for them at coaling stations
and neutral points There must also be re-
serve fleet in English waters for emergencies
For the adoption Of this large policy the cAiSlH'
naval force of ENGLAND is described a. iaiIIhe Lar
short of the requirements Of the case. Inc policy
recommended involves force Of na'tIc-Shlp'
numerous enough to carry out the blockadlhe s%'-
ten. and TWO very large fleets Of cruisers one
70 act as scouts and messengers loi
the combatant fleets and the otheF u
undertake the patrOlling Of the ocean. lHc
practicability of carrying cut TINS P'o-"i'n'''
would defend upon rapid mobilization ana '"o
maintenance of cable communication. These con-
di,iors arc discussed and comparison is made
he,,veen the French and English fleets, and the
conclusion is reached that the navy needs 10 he
greatly strengthened and many precautions taken
before the nation can be fully prepared Tor a
wor for the maintenance of its command OF the
sea.
Perhaps the best chapter in the book is that ell
titled The Peace OF India" in which Sir Charles
bikes lucidity of reasoning Is most apparent
He asserts that in India there is no Indian ma
+,on and that the influence Of Western ideas has
permeated only the mere surface OF few points
of contact Moslem and Hindoo, Farscc, Pathan
and Sikh are as distinct as ever. 1t Is the IN
Vulnerable contrasts among the natives them
selves that makes a British administration s'ibe
The supremacy Of the English rests only to a
limited extent upon their own superior force. 1t
is made possible by the divisions among the
natives and is TO great extent moral, resting
upon character and self-cOntidence. For century
the Englishman h2s behaved in India as deml-
god. and the natives acknowledge his oDnlpoience
Any weakening of this feeling of confidence will be
dangerous. But the report has gone forth in India
that there is another race. the Russian, winch
faces British audacity with audacity Of its
own. If this b. true. the English are not the
only demi- gods and for the Indian the test of It's
truth is rather the behavior of the British whom
he can STE than Of the Russians whom he can
not observe. The Penjdch incident raised in the