The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-12-16
GOOD LUCK IN WAR.

seroay was the anniversary of the
ssl.ie OF Nashville, IN which the Conteder-
zen. Hood was defeated by Gen.
olge ii. Thomas, December Is, 1854, af-
Two days fighting, and his army ut
wrecked in the pursuit which fol-
loved his defeat.
mat Gen. Thomas did not become a
larger figure in the war was due to his
f''uhar temperament; he distrusted his
capacity for superior command; he
sss repeatedly offered large military re-
sr..onsiDiiity by both Stanton and Lincoln
a.e might have succeed Buell., but declined
a'e nonor; he refused to succeed Rose
.aans until he received a peremptory
oiaer. When Sherman started on his
march to the sea he left Thomas
IL supreme command Of the forces TO re-
ssss HOODS invasion of Tennessee Sher-
Aaan says that Thomas as usual tried to
asoid the responsibility; he was given an
ample army, but with characteristic self
uas'rust tor the chief responsibility he
s11anK from the complimentary mark of
oacfman's confidence in his solid quality
as commander. He would have cheer
iaIaiy marched under Sherman, or fought
under anybody else before Nashville, but
ne had a tempermental dislike for superior
responsibility and suffered greatly from
the vice of seIf-distrust.
MS Is the testimony of both Grant and
snerman. Both these great soldiers bear
HIness that Thomas had another serious
oefect. While he was an admirable gen.
eFai In defense or retreat, as at Chicka-
manga; or in delivering a blow from a
fortified position, as at Nashville, he was
soo slow to execute an offensive campaign
oFconduct NapoIeonic pursuit. He was
q large man. slow of speech, cautious;
gwen ample time to make preparation he
did admirably. but he could not gather
himself together quickly Ike Sheridan,
and seize the initiative in an offensive
campaign. Except as subordinate, he
could not be got to move with rapidity or
energy.
Ten. Cox, who commanded the Twenty
third army corps during the Nashville
campaign, has told its story with full
ness and accuracy of detail that has never
been impeached. Gen. Cox says that to
Gen. Schofield's skill and wonderful good
luck chiefly was due the fatal issue of
Hoods advance: that while Thomas was
abrave and stubborn fighter he was slow
beyond all excuse; that his failure to meet
Hood with his whole force before he
crossed Duck river stamps him deficient
in generalship, for when he finally fought
Hood before Nashville he had not a man
more in the fight than he could have OPP
posed TO Hood At Duck river, and thus
saved the destruction of many valuable
military railroads and several millions of
dollars worth of other military property
and supplies. \ man who suffers an
enemy but ii. 900 strong to chase him from
the Alabama line to Nashville when he
has Al, 900 excellent troops to oppose him
Is altogether too slow soldier to be rated
q brilliant commander.
If Schofield had not been far ADLER and
more energetic soldier than Thomas the
fight he made under Thomas orders would
have resulted in his complete destruction.
As it was, Schofield twice only escaped
ruin by the unaccountable neglect of Hood
to strike him in the flank at Columbia and
az Spring Hill. Cox saved the crossings of
Duck river at Columbia, November %, only
by an hour. Losing this. the only line of
communication with Nashville would have
been in the hands of the enemy. and Hood
would have planted his army between
schoiield's $4,000 veterans and Thomas
1900 troops at Nashville. When general
escapes destruction only by an hour of
tine he wins by good luck rather than by
canius or good conduct. As il was,
Cox would have been ruined had not STAN
Len, by a night march, reached Columbia
By O'Clock the morning of the oath and
connected with Cox
This was the first wonderful escape Of
sehofield's army from utter destruction.
Stanley reached Spring Hill Oh the Goth,
hat an hour ahead OF Hoods infantry.
WHY SANKEY'S single division Of 1000 men
vas not overwhelmed before dark by the
tuo divisions in his front, why the Con
tolerate troops did not seize the pike north
a,d south of the town. cut of Scholield's
further retreat and destroy mis- army in de-
tsil the next day, are questions that the
Confederate commanders have never been
asle to answer. Through stupidity or neg
,eet the opportunity Of daylight 10 destroy
Stanley was wasted and opportunity of
s,ykness to seize the pike was thrown
array until it was too late.
At s u. m. Of the 2ath two corps Of
rood's army were IN line of battle facing
IN. Fran kiln pike, bat half mile away.
..a vet our troops were suffered 10 he
si,en..y Withdrawn via this pike right un-
s.r the noses OF the enemy. and Schofield
.xeeond time escaped destruction by
,.sr..1e Of fortune. The next day. No
p.r,her 80, Hood So recklessly attacked
s.ho6eld's iutreuched lines at franklin
ia. he was repulsed with the less Of t. 500
billed and wounded, including six gen
80 ls;lgeti and seven wounded. The cam
,>,;,,, was really lest VIII. this bloody re-
..,sa of Hood 81 Franklin; he had lost
:, snwer Of h:s troops. and lis further
$50, apaInz: Nashville vas madness.
e-,,a luck, not the good generaIshir of
-e.,,,s had saved Schotic}d. and Il Scho-
s.tahsa been beaten, a N al military
...,.s he ought 10 have been. Nashville
.a,,ls have been lost by Thomas lighting
:. ~.,rear with $4,000 men Hoods army Of
!. 40 me,,. when he could have met Hood
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