The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-05-29
bismarck.


write down BISMARCK. The author, DIR
PorLTSEY BIGELow, has. 1t seems. very
high opinion of tho young German Empcr'
or and a very low opinion OF the German
ex-Chancellor. Ho has undertaken TO prove
that every public act really performed by
BISMARCK since he became Prime Ministe!
of Prussia thirty years ago has boon Il
bunler. and that all the truly credtaLle
acts imputed to him have been performed
by others.
1t is pointed out. for instance. that BIS.
MAECK failed as an eradicator Of socialism.
He never pretended to be able to eradicate
it. and the sole aim OF his repressive lcgis-
lation was to prevent 1t from spreading
and from exercising formidable influence
in the Rcichstag. 1t is undisputed that
after the passage OF the first Arti-Soclalist
bill the Socialist vote decreased: and al
though 1t afterward recovered considerable
strength the number Of Socialist members
of the imperial Parliament remained insig-
nificant until the general election OF 1890.
when it was known thnt the young En-
peror had set his face against rcprcssive
legislation. and meant to give the Social
Democrats entire liberty Of political action.
1t Is now said that he has changed his mind
on this subject. and Is likely ut any mo-
ment to revert to BIsMARCKs programme.
The assertion that BISMARCK was full
ure as foreign Minister will astound most
persons. aud the mode OF sustaining 1t
adopted by the Contemporaries contributor
Is to pass over all the remarkable achieve
ments of the ex-Chancellors foreign policy
In tho eventful years from 1871 to 1890. and
to hold him blameworthy for the present
menacing attitude OF Russian troops on the
frontier Of Poland. The interchangeable
creator Of the Triple Alliance. which is uni
versally admitted to have been hitherto the
guarantee Of the stability Of Germany and
Of the peace OF Europe. II the bond
uniting the three central powers now seems
less stable than 1t was. let them who
have come after him account for it. 1t was
not in BIsMARoK's time that CRIsPI. the
flrmest friend Of Germany. was thrust out
OF power in Italy. or that LEO XIII. was
goaded into making the most friendly over
lures to the French republic. Never would
BISMARCK have permitted such an idIotic
incident as the visit Of the Empress FRED
ERICK to Paris. an incident which. it Is
known, came within hairs breadth OF
provoking war between Germany and
France. His treatment Of Russia was
judicious and successful commingling OF
frmncss and good will. By convoking the
Congress Of Berlin. he curbed the extrava-
giant pretensions exhibited by the Car at
San Stefano. and compelled ALEXANDER II.
to recognize that Austria and England were
interested no less than Russia In the dis
posal OF the Ottoman assets. On tho
other hand. he was at the utmost
pains TO uphold the traditional friendship
between the IloHESZ0LLERNs and the Ro-
MANOFfs. and he virtually acknowledged
tho moral right of Russia to ascendancy in
part OF the Balkan peninsula by declaring
in the Reichstas that Bulgaria was not
worth the sacrifice OF one POmcraniau
grenadier. SO long as BISMARCK remained
in power. there was no interruption Of tho
cordial relations between Berlin and st.
Petersburg. and only the ordinary garri-
sons were maintained In Russian Poland.
1t is only since his withdrawal to private
life that the relations between the Prussian
and tho Russian courts have become cx-
trcmcly strained. and that huge Russian
army has been concentrated within strik-
ing distance Of the Prussian territory.
A further charge brought against BIS
MARCK IN tho Contemporary Is that no alien
nted the Poles IN Foscn and West Prussia,
whereas the present Emperor is euloglzed
for reversing the policy Of the on Chancellor
In this particular, and .ur proclaiming that
heIccforth there is 10 be one law for the
Poles and for tho Russians. BISMARCK
believed that the timo had come to assimi-
late the Poles. and that the unity and
cohesion OF tho Kingdom wero seriously
Impaired by postponement OF the process.
He. too, believed that there should be ono
law for the Pole and for the Prussian. and
to that end no insisted that all Poles In
Prussan territory should become Prussian
subjects under penalty Of expulsion, il they
we're contumacious on that point. He
.ried to make tho Poles substitute German
or their national language. Just as the
French Government for nearly two ccntu- |
les tried to make the Alsatians speak
French. They who applaud tho large
measure OF success attained in the ono ease,
an scarcely denounce it in the other. As
or BIsMAncK's buying up Polish estates for
government account. and then palceling
hem out to German settlers. his offers
we're eagerly seized by the crippled and
Polish landowners. Could the
iermanization OF the Poles in Prussia, con-
empated by BISMARCK. have been carried
ut. 1t would have removed I'M intolcrablc
horn in tho side OF Russia. for IL is no,ori-
us that every uprising in Russian Poland
as found support among the Poles in the
russian dominions. Tie encouragement
gently afforded by WILLIAM II. to The rnl-
walton OF Polish national sentiment
mong tho Prussian Poles has naturally
reused resentment in st. Petersburg. and
his is one OF the causes OF the great Mill
ary demonstration at Warsaw.
That Germany has become an important
olonial power is VIGOROUSLY due 10 BIS
IARcK. and it Is equally manifest tina; the
cvelopment OF vast colonial Possessions
annot be looked for in single generation.
Is characteristic OF the bias OF the writer
the Contemporary that against the enor-