The morning call., 1892-01-18

nortant question General Howard considers
aCgre S,iOn solely from Paclhc Coast
standpoint. On the Atlantic the conditions
would he the same, though, of course, on a
larger scale.
A country situated on the sea, he said,
should have three lines of defense when
receiving an attark from the sea. First, the
navy itself; second, forts, tOrpedoeS and
harbOr-defense vessels fixed and movable,
and after a foreign enemy shall have eStab-
lIShed himself in a harbOr then the third Is
the army proper, with q base in the inte
Tior In our case We are partially supplied
with the first line Of defense, still our navy
is not large enough to protect our vast COM
merce; therefore, II alone could not be con-
sldered as an absolute check TO an enemy
moving against our coast
In the second line we have some good
guns of old pattern mounted at principal
harbOrs, as at San Francisco and San Diego;
q number Of submarine mines that could be
placed in position TO shut out an en-
envy and close the openings TO the har-
b0TS. They would just now be mines that
would explode on contact with vessels and
not by electricity.
Again, we have for sudden use all the
tugs, small yachts and harbUT boats, which,
by a great sacrifice of life and property
giving each a long spar in front and some
dynamite, can be used TO protect the en-
trance to the harbOr These means, with
other aids readily suggested 10 inventive
Drains, might keep OUT tn cuciuN lluu UuL
Pacific Coast harbOrs; that IS, from san
Diego. San Francisco, Columbia River and
Puget Sound.
ONLY TEN THOUSAND.
OF our present regular army probably not
mere than ten thousand troops would be
available, the others being required in the
posts they now occupy 10 protect the peo-
pie from local troubles or foreign attacks.
The States would be speedily called upon
by the President to furnish such number OF
men as would give US a larger army than
the hostile one landed or probably landed
by cur opponent. There would be from
few States welLdulled militia, but they
would be UnacCustomed 10 campaigning and
field service. From other States we would
only expect raw levieS.
At first, then, we would have to suffer the
greatest loss OF valuable lives while Operat-
ing TO COntIne tie enemy within as close
limits as possible, perhaps falling back be-
tore him, until by eQuipping and drilling
these forces, we should be IN sufficient
strength TO give him battle with reasonable
hope f success. Even if We we're defeated
in one OrmOre engagements, our case would
give no dire Encouragement, for the recruit
ing and Increasing OF our army and training
OF the people at a great distance, winch is
possible on account Of the SIC OF our cOuu-
try. would make II certain that we eVentu-
ally would drive out any hostile force that
could probably be landed on our shores.
Our unpTepaTed condition, however, is so
great that IL must cost many precious lives
and millions of dollars in money that could
be saved II we had. as We hope 10 soon
have, the requisite preparation.
SMALL PORTS FIRST.
I assumed San Diego a point TO be at
tackled merely because il Is the southern
most haTbOr Of California and is almost
entirely defenseleSS, giving lngreSS to quite
a rich country. However, any attack on the
Pacific Coast would probably only use such
a harOOr as that for q COaling station, from
which TO send a force upon the larger and
more valuable haT5OT Of San Francisco,
even If the first attack was not aimed di-
Iectly at that city.
Should the attack come upon the Puget
Sound or Columbia River the conditions
would be the same, except that In many re-
speCts this would be more favorable q the
asSailagt than an attack upon either OF the
other two points. there being such guam
tlty CT food aud # transports by horses
ALWAYS 10 be found In the Northwest
a hostile army oyerrunaIng Washington
and Oregon would be very hard TO defeat on
account of the mountainous country SUI
rounding these States. There are great dis
taRceS across arid plains for Us who would
hasten succoT TO compass, and the fact tlat
Within themselves they have no organized
military power that could keep any con-
siderable force from taking possession IS a
strong argument t. hasten every reasonable
provision against such possibilities as any
thoughtful man cannot help contemplating.
II one Should say that we are thus letting
our enemies see our cndit,on on helping
them to methods, the answer Is very direct
ana simple.
lhey-our enemIes-elready know more
than We dream They have sketches OF our
forts and OF our EaTb0rs, aud they know
within reasonable limits about how much
force We have on hand and how soon we
could be made ready for service. They are
watching uur growing navy and they IN
derstanu that, though we are a pe8ce-.Oyiug
people, We are iudOmItabie in war.