davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

saults, the federals began throwing up a sys-
tenn of in,renchments extending from the
Appomattox on the northeast around to the
south OF Petersburg, "enveloping and keeping
a. close as possible to the enemy's line"
In fact the system soon became one Of active,
unceasing extensions TO the left, under cover OF
Notifications. with the expectation Of ulti-
mateiy ontfanking the rebel defenses
while cutting of all the railroads-and reach
ing the river again on the other side of the
town. 1t was also expected that this system Of
extensions would compel Lee in meeting them
to leave many spots in his own lines thiniy
defended. afording opportunity, sooner or
later, for successful attack. And this is exactly
what happened eventually.
The works constructed consisted OF forts,
connected by infantry parapets. On both
fronts these fortified Union lines were also
protected from surprise by siashed timber,
abatis and bitches, and could be successfully
defended by very small number, thus leaving
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

the main force available for attacking weak
and exposed points elsewhere on tho rebel line
or in extending still further around Peters
burg. These lines OF investment had to be
met by defenses equally strong, manned by
watchful defenders. great deal Of prelimi-
nary work had already been done by the con-
federates before the town was attacked.
This work of digging went on industriously
day after day under constant muskctry and
artillery fire. interspersed with many severe
battles and numberless cavalry raids. The
Petersburg and Norfolk road was cut in the
first days operations-in fact 1t had been of no
service to the confe derates for several weeks
previously. Later there occurred an obstinate
contest for the eldon road, running directly
south from Petersburg, but after several
battles Grant established a firm hold on that
line to within three miles Of the city.
In attempting to swing the inve sting lines
from the east around the city toward the west
and northwest q confederate line of fortif-
cations was struck running laterally toward the
southwest. covering the Boydton plank road
well down, and also the South Side railroad, the
last line now in their possession. It was found
impossible to pierce this line, which was gradu-
ally extended across and covered the upper
part Of Hatcher's run, eight or nine miles out
from Petersburg
Every extension toward the west and south
west to outAank and get into the rear OF this
lateral line was obstinately contested by Lee,
and success did not crown Grants efforts until
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
SECTIONAL VIEW OF TIE nrHE

crudest OF tools this clear-headed and enef.
getic volunteer officer and his noble regime No
OF 400 men. doggedly persevered and on the Esd
OF July finished the Job After reaching Q
point exactly under the confederate fort With
the main tunnel lateral galleries we're run 10
the right and left thirty-eight and thirty-seven
azines, each Of which was charged with loo
pounds OF powder. and the mine was ready
for the match. The miners could plainly hear
the confederate soldiers at work in the FORE
overhead. little dreaming of the catastrophe in
store for them. Col peasants SAYS the work
could have been completed In one-third the
time consumed had he been properly supplied
with facilities.
PREPARrSo FOR THE ATTACK
After careful reconnoissances by Meade and
other officers everything on this confederate
front Was pronounced favorable to attack. and
$50 a. m. of July 30 was fixed upon ~ the hour
for springing the mine and striking the pro-
posed blow. Grant had purposely made such
q serious demonstration in the nature of feint
against Richmond with Hsncock's corps and
Sheridan's cavalry on the 9th as to cause Leo
TO withdraw everything from Petersburg 10
defend the capital eXceptth the three divisions OF
Malone, johnson and Hokc. Then Hancock
was secretly and rapidly brought back 10 the
Petersburg front again. Meade sfterward
stated that about $1,000 troops were massed
here TO take advantage Of any success achieved
by Burnsides attack. which proves that be bad
at last some faith in the mine.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

18th OF May he had a severe encounter at New
Market With the confederate general Breckin-
ridge and was easily defeated. Sisei then fell
back II was in this little battle that the cadets
Of the Virginia Military Institute so greatly
distinguished themselves. Gen. Breckenridge
supposIng be had cleared the valley for some
time, now hurrIeily joined the hard pressed
Lee on the North Anna
Gen SIgers management proving unsatisfac-
tory TO Grant. he was superseded on the 2lst BY
Gen DAVID Hunter. West Point graduate and
an oficer Of distinction Gen. Hunter promptly
resumed the offensive on the 26th. Gen. Geo
Crook WAS 20 march from Meadow Bridge. W
Va. TO join his column in the upper valley.
Hunter's movements we're decidedly energetic
On the 5th Of June he met and badly whipped
the eonfederates at Piedmont scattering them
capturing about 1000 and killing their distin-
suirhed commander. Gen. ". Z Jones' The
re1t day Hunter entered stanton without
opposition
Crook. another able and energetic officer,
ioined Hunter on the sth with about 10. 600 men,
in ane condition. after march of $50 miles
On the 10Th the united commands proceeded
toward Lynchburg. which was Hunters OBJ
jeetive. HIS total force was now about IS 600
June IL he entered Lexington. and here the
Onion general committed his one fatal error OF
waiting three days for some OF his raiding cav
airy to come in. Nothing after Piedmont was
in his way; all these movements were weakly
opposed by but small force Of cavalry and
infantry.
ones stated again on the I4th the army
rapidly advanced. arriving before Lynchhurg
on the 18th Bat Hunter Was Just the number
- L. 49, l.. h.. ~ "A Il ipU
y. ne lssn, After making some demonstzs-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
these changes.
GEN. SHERIDAN.

Sheridan, as soon as his cavalry arrived pro-
posed to strike for Winchester, which was the
key Of the lower valley. On tho 10th his
column marched from Halltown. As soon as
this movement began Early Immediately con-
centrated in front of Winchester in line Of bat
tie. But perceiving that the federals had been
largely reinforced he quickly drew further
back toward Strasburg, establishing himself at
the strong position OF Fishers Hill. where he
awaited the arrival Of Andersons division,
which had been sent to him from Petersburg.
Although 1t was uncertain about the reinforce
ments. Sheridan acted with extreme eau
ton; when he became convinced OF Ander-
sons arrival no turned to defensive, as II
was supposed Early was nearly 40, 900 strong,
outnumbering the Union force.
Sheridan retreated down the valley on the
18th and 10th, taking position at BerryvIIle,
ten miles east Of Winchester, at which point
he left strong cavalry force. He eventually
went back to the vicinity Of Charlestown
Sheridan notified Grant that there no rea-
son for alarm. Early moved down to Bunker
Hill on the Martlnsburg pike and sent Iona X 8
cavalry out toward Shep her dstown. A concerted
attack arranged by Early miscarried on the
2lst, Anderson not coming up in time. There
was a sharp action, but nothing serious. That
night sheridan retired again to Halltown-a
strong positlon-where his tanks wero COW
cred. Early made demonstrations but did no.
attack, and then feinting as il to cross the Po-
tomac, finally Withdrew once moro TO the front
OF winchester. IN eApIanauon OF Gil these
moves Sheridan simply wrote Halleck, Il have
thought 1t best to be very prudent"
This game o; seesaw continued until Septem-
Der 10. Early's chief purpose being to keep the
b. j. .. railroad broken and TO detain as many
troops as possible in the valley; Sheridan
warily watching for 'dead sure thing" to
attack. 1t now occurred. Gen. Grant, some
what disconnected by the enerys attitude ana
Sheridan's movements. although ne had or
dered him to act cautiously, by appointment
met him at Charlestown on September II.
After conference he discovered that Sheridan
Was willing enough to tight and that only two
words of instruction were neces-ary-"Go in!'
SherIdan's plan of battle suited him and one of
his own, brought along. was not produced
In fact Sheridan already to bring on
battle when Grant arrived His time had
come. He had learned from Miss Eebecca
Wright of Winchester, on the evening of the
10th, that Anderson's artillery and infantry had
left and promptly made dispositions
to attack. Grants visit came near discomfort
ing his plans as Early at once took the alarm
and concentrated the somewhat scattered divi-
sions of Ramseur. Rodes. Gordon and Brcckia-
ridge across the Bcrryvile pike, two miles to
the east Of Winchester, with the Opequan creek
IN his front.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

25.OOO men 70 meet him, and thense fell back to
his fortified lines between the James and APP
Pomaiiox- This Practically ended the James
river attack on Ri-hmond Beauregard's troops
we're thereafter mainly Withdrawn TO strengthen
Lee and many Of Buffers we're called up to
Grants support.
Another hopeful parsof the spring campaign
was the proposed advance of Gen. Franz Sigel
up the Shenandoah valley. an offensive move
meni which at the same time covered Washing
ton on the west SiGe.'s force was small. On the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

This ridge extended southwark parallel viii
the confederate line Of dctenscs. and was noe
more than q quarter Of q mile away In rear os
the salient blown mp. nthe Union troops had
reached this ridge Lee would have been
forced 10 abandon Petersburg.
The psrspots OF the for, or salient are ersss-
grown, but still In a fair state Of preservation,
though the deep pit In the center, cxcavased
by the explosion. has been partially flled mp
the ground is a small house devoted ex.lu-
sively to u display Of the relics OF the battle.
collected and preserved BY Mr.. Grifhihs-
shattered muskets, swords, bayonets. cantcena,
cannon bAlls and shells OF all sizes. musket
balls. human skulls and bones. pieces OF silver
money and every conceivable kind OF military
equipment nearly all showing bullet markA
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22


In this battle Wallace lost no flags no cam
non and no stores, but the dead and wounded
were left upon the field. Tho manner OF the
fight led him 10 believe that the confederate
casualty list exceeded his own and Gen.
Gordons Official report leaves very little
doubt that Wallace was correct In his first
telegraphic report sent to Washington the
next day. after he had had time to get his
second wind. Wallace stated that he did not
consider himself seriously beaten, and bore
enthusiastic testimony to the bravery OF the
troops But some OF his dispatches on the
night after the battle show that he was some
wha. demoralizod. He retrcated rapidly that
night on Baltimore, entirely wrong as it subse-
quently turned out, as Early was aiming for
Washington and Wallace's business was to keep
between Early and his objective.
THE LOSSES.
Gen. Early vaguely reported his losses in the
battle Of the Monocacy at between COO aud
700" They we're undoubtedly considerably in
excess Of his greatest figure, for Gordon offc-
tally stated his loss alone at 63s killed and
wounded. Gordou's figures do not include
cavalry, nor any Of the losses in Ramseur's
division, which is known to have suffered quite
severely. Between 400 and 500 OF EarIy's
desperately wounded were captured the day
after the battle In Frederick. The Union loss
was l23 killed, sos wounded and $50 missing
some OF the latter undoubtedly killed and
wounded-total l.294. Wallace at first reported
his losses some $50 In excess Of the foregoing
official figures, but many strsgglers reported
in the casualty lists afterward came in. This
fact indicates that waIlace's little army re-
ceived q pretty severe jolt at the Monocacy.
This affair was at first exaggerated into .
great disaster to the Union cause, it being
currently reported that Wallace had bungied
and been completely routed. Something like
panic ensued in Warrington and Baltimore.
careful reading Of the reports on both sides.
While dasc'osing the undonbted fact that
Wallace was defeated. Just ~ clearly leaves the
Impression that the battle, deliberately deter
mined upon, was well planned and we'll fought;
thst the federal general bald his ground
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

Is not allowed to so outside. Wright commands
his own corps; Gilmore has been assigned to
the temporary command of the nineteenth
corps Ord to command the eighth corps and
all other troops in the middle apartment
leaving Wallace to command the city of Balti-
more alone; but there is no head to the whole
and it seems indispensable that you should ap-
point one. Gen. Halleck will not give orders
except as he receives them. The President
will give none. and until You direct =
everything will go on in the depiorable and
fatal way which it has gone on for the past
week"
queer condition Of affairs truly. Grant
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

NEIMPORTANT PART
of Gen. Grants grand
campaign against Rich
mond in 1864 was But
lers movement up the
James river 10 Bermu-
da Hundred. Buffers
operations were at first
very promising, but he
was ultimately repulssd
from the Drewry's Bluff
front By Beauregard,
who had rapidly gath
cred a force of about
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

nearly an entire day and was finally by super
Tor numbers moro crowded than whipped of
the field II II also evident that his retreat
was afterward effected without loss. that no
was not pursued and that Early did not re-
sumo LII, advance on Washington until the
next day. The time saved was more than
worth the battle and defeat It is highly prob
able that but for Wallace's fight at Monocacy
Early would have been enabled to occupy
Washington temporarily, with all the conse-
quences such a calamity implied.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

1nt 1Oft. thf Cfatff. thit CotlnfhOn OF 0fbff4.
Mr.. Grifhths Ineligible account Of the ter.
rible struggle that took place here. are vel
worth the journey TO see and hear. And with
OF, going further the sightseer on this spot
con form pretty fair idea OF the character Of
all the Notifications used by both armies and
somewhat OF the desperate nature OF the asht-
ing between them. IL commands o good view
OF many historic positions held by them
during this memorable siege, besides being an
object lesson in itself IL IL unquestionsbly
one OF the most interesting and instructive OF
all the remaining visible landmarks Of the
rebellion.
BuNSrNa THE ,ISH
About week after the regular operations
against the city began Lieut. Col Henry
Peasants OF the forty-eishth Pennsylvania, .
regiment from the mining regions OF that
state, and a mining engineer Of ability himself,
approached Gen. Potter with a proposal 10
mine and blow up confederate redan oppo-
site their position on the line, which afterward
proved 10 be Pegram's salient, defended by
Gen. Eliotts brigade. Tho idea originated
with the private soldiers OF the forty-eighth,
all Practical mining men. To roach the fort it
was necessary TO run underground gallery
or tunnel 81 feet long from point in rear %
the federal intrenched picket line, IN a rayine,
fortunately entirely hidden from the enemy's
observation
After some investigation Gen burnside an
proved the plan submitted and ordered the
work TO be done. Col Peasants commenced
work az noon OF June Is Con Humphreyv
says ITS continuance was subsequently, as
scented to by Gen. Meade" This assent"
could scarcely DO called approval. and indi-
Gated cold faith in the enterprise; In fact, Cot
peasants afterward testified that HIS projeos
was discountenancet and discourse ed in every
possible manner NJ army headquarters. He
received no help fro n anybody. Gen. Meade
and Major Duane, the acting chief engineer,
both agreed that the hing could not be doneu
such q length OF untimbered mine had never
been ercavated In military operations and
could notb DO.
The professional military men Of the army
seem 20 have unitedly cndeavored to sneer and
frown down the enterprise. probably because
It did not originate with them, though Meade
explains that the rebel fort was not proper
point for attack, because IL was commanded ON
both dauks and rear by other rebel vorka
When Peasants applied for the proper instru-
ment TO determine the exact distance 20 the
fort to be mined IL was denied him on some
ground of punctilio, although they had one AZ
headquarters, and Burnside was necessitated
10 send to Washington after one. wheelbar-
rows were not furnished and the dirt had 10
be carried out in cracker boxes, roughly bound
with iron hoops from pork barrels, with hicn.
DRY poles nailed on for handles
But Notwithstanding tho obstructive polio1
Of the regular engineers, from Gen Meado
down, and other impediments to q rapid snA
satisfactory prosecution Of the work, with tho
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

by Meade's direction Burnside's ninth corps
was TO initiate the attack. supported on the
left by Warren, with the 9Th corps; By ords
eighteenth corps on the right, with Hancock
in reserve. Burnside originally designed "
use Fcrrero's division Of negro troops for the
charging column, but Meade overruied thia.
None ofthe other division commander seemed
TO manifest ravepous appetite for the dAo.
gerous honor. and TO settle the question Of
precedence Burnside authorized Gems Lsdns.
Potter and Wilcox to draw lots. II fell upoa
Ledlie and the first division. He vas 10 charge
In columns as soon ne the explosion occurred,
followed by Wilcox on the left and Potter q
the right. Afterward the black troops were -
come up in support of Ledlie. II the defenses
were penetrated, then the troops we're 70 pub
Petersburg. Gen. Meadels dispoaitions for shs
attack appear 70 have been fsultloss; Gen
Grant said they could not have been improved
upon
An imperfect fuse delayed the explosion ovss
an hour. II took place 81 about 40 with Ter.
rife force, completely demolishing the salisuA
blowing up one regiment and part Of snothss
of South Caroline troops and bastery Of A.
plosion was about $50 feet long, 80 lees vide
and perhaps so feet deep. The cir was hllsa
for q minute With the smoke and Tying dsbrig
of all kinda Tho moment the sxplosiou 90
Cured the federal batteries oyensd all aiong
the line 10 reduce the confsosrsts ars - 8
minimum.
The confederstes themselves admit that sho
eruption created the greatest cons4srnsnpo
for time; for Q period variously stasSl ~
participants 81 from thirty minutes V an hosr
they were completely psralysed- ~ nrss sban-,
doning several hundred ysrds Of their WORKS -
each side Of the salienk and also one of thsAl
batteries. But after recoverins thsir eQsv.
librinm the coufsasrs4ss setsd with eoursns
and decision
4 1AnDg ADvANoR
Ledlies advance wss not >nsreetis, hs a.
not form - directed. bat marched forward -
he AAak. he hsad Of M eoiumn "a -
sntsr he disnaasasd fort theagA sn1Irs,y -
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

NE hlLlAA AM VALUE
Of Petersburg consisted
solely in the railroads
centering there and
thence running To
Richmond. Grants
paramount object was
to cut these railroads
and thus in large mea-
sure stop supplies from
the far south TO the
confederate armies de-
Tending Richmond.
Failing in direct as
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22


the spring of 1865. Several attempts mad
meanwhile to break through the main lines
around Petersburg, and also north Of the
James, were unsuccessful In their main object
Of holding permanently any portion Of lees
lines vital to his position. but nevertheless
some considerable advantages vero gained
The most important Of these emonstrations,
perhaps, was the battle following the mine
explosion on July so, 1854
THE cRArER
The scene Of this disastrous aysir-at Arst
promhing 20 Wells nov known - the Crater
farm owned by Mr.. +. r. Grifaths, . lad Of
thirteen - the time Of the mine explosion and
IN eyewitness Of the Union attack and repulss.
II b about two miles from the heart Of Pstsrs-
burg southsastva 4, and oniy half 70 three
quarters Of . nils beyond Blandford Church
and osnsesry Hfl . high point eemnanding
Pst,rIburg 81 ~ - esunty sslnAabssA
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

9TH THE MILITARY
and political branches
of Union affairs pre-
scented n serious aspect
about the time Early
was threatening Wash
ington. The attack on
Petersburg had settled
down into a mere siege,
the progress and result
OF which we're viewed
by people at the north
with doubt and misgiv-
ing. Early was at the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
SHERIDAN AND EARLY.

The Confederatcs at Last Come to Grief
In the Favorite Field.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
EARLY'S RAID.

The Battle That savci Washington From
Capture.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

nags snd many prisonera All vas now conf
oence and enthusiasm. A victory Wa not only
won. but the presidential election probably
saved Lincoln sent Sheridan the following
dispatch:
Ex.currvs MANSION,
WAsaISaros. Sept 20, 1854
Ma. Gen. Sheridan. Winchester, Va:
nave Just heard Of your great victory. God
bless you all, officers and men. Strohgly in
chned to como up and see you
A. LINCOLN.
AT rIsHER's HILL.
The pursuit Of Early began at daybreak on
the goth. His defeated army was found posted
In strong position at Fishers Hill. where no
immediate effort was made to oislodce him.
Looking the ground over Sheridan concluded
II would be suicidal to attack directly in front
instead he set on foot a turning movement
under Gen. Crook around Earlys left and
rear. Crooks entire corps uas secretly moved
70 the position selected for this attack entirely
unooserved by tho enemy, after two days of
preliminary marching ana maneSverfng,
where ne lay in concealment, while Wright
ana Emory were pushed up to within ZOO
yards of Eariy's fortihed 'front.'. as if intending
an assault Several severe fights occurred
"niie TINS was being accomplished
everything indicated an attack at an en-
treiy different point of the lines from the
io"i VIC, anu Larry was concentrated at the
wrong place when Crooks blow fell. His ad-
vance striking square on their flank and left
rear was complete surprise, as sheridan ex-
pected, creating great confusion and conster-
nation. In the midst Of this Wright and
Emory threw their columns against the rebel
front Crooks movements we're SO rapid that
no time was given the confederates 10 make
new dispositions they were routed in few
minutes and fled up the valley In a panic as
Sheridan says, without the semblance of an
organization, abandoning nearly all their ar
tillery and much other property and NUM-
tions.
As apart and parcel Of the strategy Of this
battle Sheridan had sent his cavalry under
Torbert through the Luray valley to come
upon Early's rear, but Torbert entirely failed
on this occasion to meet the expect atoms Of his
fery chief. Otherwise the plans ct Fishers
Hill were carried out like machine work and
were overwhelmingly successful. 1t is prob
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
TIE NINE BATTLE.
HE MILITARY VALUE

The Famous bat Unsuccessful Attempt at
Petersburg.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
EXECUTIVE MAxsrou.

NAL Gen. Sheridan. Winchester, Va:
have Just heard Of your great victory. God
oiess you all, officers and men. Strodgly in
cined to come up and see you.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

aags snd many prisonera All uas now cont
dence and enthusiasm. A victory vas not only
won. but the presidential election probably
dispatch;
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

Ledlie's advance wss not ~nsreetis, ~ 1l1
not form - directed. bat marched forward b
The AAnk. Ths bad q NJ eoiumn ga n
sntsr he disnanslsd fort theagA snAiss,y -