The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-05-04

would have been to Meade's army. Gen.
eral Couch protested in vain. Meade and
Hancock we're in despair at this gross
blunder, Meade saying that If Hooker
thought he could not hold the top OF the
hill, how could he expect to hold the bot
tom when the enemy held the top. Cen
eral Stuart instantly planted his artillery
upon this important ground and pounded
our army, but even then Hooker had two
corps 10000 strong that he could have
flung upon the enemy. but he would not,
though Meade and Reynolds begged him
to do so.
On the morning Of May Sedgwick,
commanding our left wing at Fredericks-
burg, CALAMITY stormed Maryee's Heights,
but in the meantime Lee had attacked
Hooker, who supinely allowed half OF his
army to be worsted while the other half
did not fire shot. By noon Of the Sd Lee
had hammered Hooker into . state Of
complete mental stupefaction. and he de-
tached strong force against Sedgwick,
drove him from Salem Heights, and the
next day forced him to recross the river at
Banks Ford. Hooker, from noon on the
Sd to the night of the 5th, when he with
drew across the river, did no fighting, al
though he had more men with him then
who had not drawn a trigger than there
was in Lees whole army, and he evacu-
ated an impregnable position, leaving
his 1900 killed and wounded,
IA guns and 10000 small arms to the en-
envy. He allowed Sedgwick on the Sd and
4th to be outnumbered, enveloped and
crushed without making an effort at d.
version in his favor. Our total losses were
over 1900, including 5000 in Sedgwick's
corps, and those of the enemy were re-
ported at 1900 1t was a severe and
most inexcusable failure. and no explana-
ton of Hooker's conduct has ever been
given save that he was lacking in that
high moral courage which is not daunted
by unexpected disaster.
The sudden turning of Hooker's right on
the evening of May seems to have de-
stroyed his self-confdence. and in the bat
tie of the next day he fought only half his
army. After but one days serious fight
ing Hooker utterly lost both heart and
head and retreated across the river
when Grant, Sheridan, Hancock,
Humphreys, Couch or Reynolds would
have put in all their troops and in all
human probability restored the day.
Hooker retreated with an Amy as
numerous and in far better fighting shape
than Grant had when after two days of
fearful battle in the Wilderness, he still
pressed forward to meet the enemy. The
disaster to Rockers right. under Howard,
was not as severe as the disaster to Grants
right, under Sedgwick. the evening of the
second day at the Wilderness. Rockers
losses were confined to the Second, Third,
Eleventh and Sixth corps; the Fifth,
Twelfth and First corps had not been en-
gagged. and with the exception of the
Eleventh corps the troops that had fought
were in excellent condition. The story
of Hooker's failure shows that a
man may be able to organize,
equip and discipline an army, to
move it promptly, to manifest superior
strategic and tactical skill in placing his
army face to face with the enemy and yet
lack the moral courage and resolution
necessary to fearlessly put in his men and
fight them for all they are worth. Hooker
was q man of bright parts; he did really
fine bit of difficult military work in plant
ing his army where he did without
molestation in his march. After his
brilliant strategy and rapid marching had
surprised Lee he suddenly became
frightened at tine shadows of his own sue
cess, and threw away his battle when he
had won 80 points out of 100 in the most
difficult part of the game of war. He had
only to stretch forth his hand to grasp the
legitimate points of his good fortune; he
lacked not brains, but force of character.
He was physically a man of splendid
courage, but he was a moral coward, and
illustrated the same moral weakness that
Mcclellan showed at Gaines Mill and An
tietam, and Burnside at Fredericksburg.
If Hooker had fought all his men as boldly
as Sedgwick did his corps, Lee would
have been in q hard spot. but it does not
take great military brain to whip a
superior army when the general of the
superior army retreats with 10000 fine
troops that have not fired a shot. Stone
wall Jackson did not win Charlottesville,
for his attack failed; the hero of the battle
was General J. +. B. Stuart, who succeeded
Jackson, aided by the extraordinary and
unaccountabie conduct of Hooker.
1t is perfectly clear today that McClel-
Ian. Hooker and even Meade were afraid
of Lee, and poor Burnside was afraid of
himself, without reason childishly elated
or childishly depressed. Moral courage
that We call character, and pugnacity,
were wanting at the head of the Army of
the Potomac until Grant took command,
and then with the mere phantom of its
former soul and spirit he hammered his
way to victory. Lee had the moral cour-
age necessary to a great general when,
caught at disadvantage, he boldly took the
offensive at Charlottesville, knocked
Hooker "silly" with one hand while he
BACKED Sedgwick's eyes with the other,
The argument for clemency to anarchists