New-York tribune., 1892-01-10
ENGI4ND'S NILE POLICY.

The death Of the khedive has naturally in
volved revival OF French agitation respecting
English occupation of Egypt So long as Great
Britain is the naval ally of the Geman-Austrlan
coalition on the Continent it has the moral sup
port of the great military Powers and will CON
tinue to exercise political control over the lower
Nile. The immediate recognition of Abbas as
Khcdive indicates the continuance OF English
supremacy. The youth and nexpeilencc oil the
new ruler are convenient prctcXts for justlfying
an indefinite piolongaton of the English occupa-
ton. French jealousy and irritation Will be
manifested afrcSh, but the alliances OF the Con-
rnent virtually determine the future OF Egypt
The reign of Tewfk was conspicuous chlefy
for mi>fortunes wrought by the btunders of Eng
lish diplomacy and administration. Lord Wolse-
ley's campaign ard the occupation OF CAIRO
were necessarily involved by Arabs rebellion
and the necessity CT protecting the Imperial line
If communication with India. Englands inter-
ycntion was justified by the supreme Interests
of Imperial policy. The occupation of Egypt
was not a blundcr. but it was fatal mistake to
send an English army to Cairo under diplo-
matte pledge that it should only be employed
there temporarily. When a civilized Power in
yades a semi civilized country like Egypt 1t
should be prepared to assume the entire re-
sponsibiliy for governing and controlling 1t
nermanently. When France, influenced by
Cleuenccau's humanitarian views, declined 10
ioin in the military occupation, England was left
at liberty TO do the work single-handed Ihe
pledges which Mr.. Gladstone rshly gave 70
France ana Europe were unnecessary, paialyzed
English policy on the Nile and proved source
OF serious diplomatic embarrassment.
There was, however, a more serious bhnder
in English policy. Lower Egypt was the centre
Of vast outlying empire embracing the Nile
Valley as far as the Equatorial lakes. This
empire had been conquered by English soldiers
and administrators like Baker and Gordon IN
the service OF Egypt 1t bore the same relation
to Lower Egypt as the British Empire to Eng
land. When England assumed political control
al Cairo it virtually accepted The responsibility
of governing the Egyptian Soudan. But as soon
rs the Imperial line Of communications with
India was secured by the control of the Suez
Canal responsibility for the outlying empire was
tmorousy evaded then openly dEcalmed and
half -beartedly reaSslmcd under the influence of
English symrathy for Gordon only to be re-
undated after his death There is no chapter
of EnEliSn nlSlOO 81 ulStltuNdDiO uS ''"' ~
Gently compiled from Official records by Major
Wngate under the title of "Mahdsm and the
Egyptian Soudan" 1t shows that force Of
between 80, 900 and 10000 Egyptians garrison
inc the Soudan were left to their fate and that
only few thousands escaped. 1t discloSes also
the murdeOrS slaughter Of tens OF thousands
Of Arabs in campaigns conducted on the sea
board and the upper Nile without any Ineligible
purpose and without useful result.
If Lower Egypt alone be considered, the Eng
Ish occupation has been most helpful in pro
noting financial and administrative reforms and
ameliorating the condition OF the native poplla-
ton. But when the outlying empire OF the
Soudan is surveyed, with the ghastly record OF
the determination of the Egyptian garrsons, the
ruthless slaughter of hordes of Arabs, the aban-
dcnment of Gordon and the surrender OF tho
Nile basin TO religious fanaticism and slave-raid-
ING. it cannot be disputed that Englands Nile
policy has been most disastrous.