The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1892-12-29
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Another Witness as to the Part Taken by
the Third Brigade of the Old Red Star d.

- est the discussion by Comrades Ran
I'LL kin and Hinkley upon the move
ments Of the Cd Mass. and 9th Ind.
regiments, AID incidentally the movements OF
| the Third Brigade of the old Red Star Divis.
| ion at the battle of Gettysburg / trust that
may not be considered an intruder in offering
few facts in this connection as they are re-
membered by an eyewitness and close observer
Of what took place at very critical moment In
! the progress Of that battle. It requires but
casual reading Of the article appearing In
Fighting Them Over to ascertain that comrades
are sometimes liable to write about as they
feel, rather than as they know; and this Is no
more applicable to Comrade Rankin than to
some others whose letters ! have read in the
same department. This is said in no spirit of
severe criticism; for it is proper to suppose that
the feelings engendered by what appears as an
unfriendly criticism running counter to that
feeling of patriotism which swelled the bosom of
every Union soldier on that memorable field,
might lead one to assert quite positively some
things which are only guessed at. bEt guessed
over and over again until they seem real.
Comrade Rankin truly remarks: 1t does
not require any particular ability to sinirch
the good name of q regiment. All that is re-
Report of the Adjutant- General of the State of
Massachusetts,. and do not know what is there
charged as prejudicial to the courage and good
record of the 9th Ind, but l have no need to
consult that report of any other to be informed
as to the record or any regiment in that brave
and iuvincble brigade. In reading carefully
all of Comrade Hinklcys letters upon this mat
ter have failed to detect any purpose on his
part to do the 9th an injury; but there are
some parts of Comrade Rankin's letters which
seem very much like violation of tho very
principle enunciated by him in the above
quotation from his pen. When in former is
sue he charged that the Sd Wis. was $50 yards
to the rear at the time this affair took place,
did it require any particular ability? Aud
did he know it, or did he only guess at iii And
at the close of his last letter. where he again
relegated the same regiment to the rear with
little touch of sarcasm did 1t require any
particular abilty?"
The comrades innocence In all this CORE
spondence is quite apparent when he says.
There was probably not one man in hun
dred of the 9th Ind. who knew what had become
of the Cd Mass after they left their works at G."
(See Comrade Rankin's map in THE NATIONAL
TRIBUNE of Nov. 49, He also states that when
he saw the I'd at + (see same map, he did not
know what regiment it was, and that it was
years afterward, and upon diligent search and
inquiry, that he learned it was the % Mass.
He also says: II supposed the Cd Mass. had
gone directly across the field f" (from CT and
had been driven back before we entered it,"
Again: :" If the ID Mass. had entered the
meadow at the point (C) and time indicated by
Comrade Huxley, it would have been in plain
view of every man in the 9th Ind"
Do the above quotations not sound little
mixed? The comrade knows ~ that the Cd
Mass. was at C. He also knows (?) that his
regiment was in plain view of every man in
the 9th Ind" Yet he and his regiment
always supposed" that the I'd Mass. event
directly across the field and were driven back"
One naturally is led to inquire: Why suppose
a thing for SO many years, when every man"
in his regiment could plainly see that the
thing supposed did not occur? According to
Comrade Rankin's statements the I'd Mass.
might have moved directly across the meadow
from their position at G., and been driven back
again, aud he and his regiment remain ignor-
ant of the fact for many years. He admits
this Yet he says: When / opened this dis.
cussion / knew exactly what l was talking
about"
Comrade Rankin's map is a very bad one
Truly, it was not claimed to be accurate. but
it was intended to approximate correctness
Sufficiently near to convey truthful ideas.
Rock Creek is altogether too near the position
of the troops The troops are not well placed.
The breastworks are altogether wrong. For
example, the works which were advanced
upon by these two regiments, and which were
occupied by US Immediately after their severe
experience are made to begin on Rock Creek,
extending thence about third Of mile west;
then fanking northward a short distance.
These works were built by our men on the Cd
of July. and were made to extend along the
brow of the hill, north and south, about 200
yards from Rock Creek, and facing that creek,
with short flank turn westward along the
meadow. This is exactly at right-angle with
the position of the works as shown On the map
by our comrade. 1t was directly upon this
short flank of works that the Cd Mass. made
its attack, the works being occupied by the
els he piof.f hefor Wa hayt no
Gated them to reinforce Sickles's Corps, which
was meeting with bad luck on the left center.
The 9th Ind. and I'd Mass. occupied pretty
nearly the positions described as A and @ on
the comrades map. The breastworks in ques-
ton. now occupied by the enemy, extending
southwark along the hill, made turn at
near g. The angle in our line at B and Cis all
right, only 1t should be more acute AS the
meadow extended back and westward from
Rock Creek it widened. The Sd Wis. was in line
with the Cd Mass, and to the left of that regi-
ment but the whole line here inclined some
what backward from right angle, and tenn
porary breastworks were built. Our left on
this front were somewhat drawn back, SO as
not to be needlessly exposed in the open
meadow to crossfre from the direction Of
Rock Creek. and to batteries which had taken
position on Wolf Hill, on the opposite side Of
that creek.
l saw the cd Mass go over their works and
start across the little meadow In our 'front.'
taking a direction which brought them bo-
tween US and the enemy. Our boys cried out:
:" See; there goes the 2d!" and this was passed
along. Col. Hawiey commanded US to be
ready, and we expected orders to go in, too
but they did not come. In another instant the
I'd Mass was being cut down in our front like
grass before prairie fire. At about this time
/ saw the 9th Ind. move into the meadow
away TO the right and in the narrow part of
the meadow or swale. 1t was an awful mo-
ment Neither the 2d Mass nor the 9th Ind.
could possibly stand under that murderous
fire. Seconds seemed minutes, and minutes
there longer than 1t takes to tell about il, aud
yet they stayed too long. They had no chance
to fight, even, as the enemy were entirely COW
cred and out of sight The fact is, the 9th
Ind. was overwhelmed with cross fire, and
were Immediately withdrawn. The Cd Mass.
was in 1t longer, but their effort was equally USE
less, and they retired under orders. AS soon
as our front was cleared by the Cd Mass we
opened fro upon the enemy from our breast
works. Capt. Stevenson took Cos. B and +, il
/ remember rightly, Of the Sd Wis, and, max
ing flank movement to the left, threw them
across the swale upon the flank of tho enemy
to aid the Cd Mass. Just about this time, or O
little later, our line advanced with whoop."
seconded by the advance of portion Of Geary's
Division further to the left, when we carried
the works and drove the enemy across the
wooded bottom and beyond Rock Creek, and
the works were ours to keep The enemy
made desperate efforts to retake them during
the forenoon but all in vain, We covered the