New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1892-05-15

Thomas Y. Crowell 4 Co.
The concluding volume of Sybel's History OF
the Founding of the German Empire describes the
war with Austria which in so short space OF
time, settled the long rivalry between the two great
German Powers eliminated Austrian Influence
from the affairs of Germany and led to the con-
centration which the French war of 1870 was u
complete and consolidate. Austria had been the first
to mobilize bat the Prussan military organization
was so superior that the lost time was soon made
up. From the outset Austria was heavily handi-
capped both by the ineffciency Of her prepare
tons and by the incapacity of her commanders
Benedek, who was placed at the head OF the army,
was an excellent brigade commander, but unfit
TO conduct campaign on his own sole response
bility. This he knew and begged the Emperor
not 10 give him the chief command, frankly de-
claring his incompetency But the Emperor re-
fused 10 change his determination, and Bencdek
submitted to the Imperial will
Unfortunately the Master of the Ordnance tsuch
Benedek's official designation was regarded
with jealousy and dislike by the generals belong
ing to the nobility on the ground that he was n
bourgeois and this feeling often intcrfercd
with the proper execution Of his orders and at a
supreme moment contributed to the fatal defeat
Of the whole Austrian army in Bohemia. Yet.
though Benedek was not the man for the cmer-
gency, II does not appear that Austria had any
better general to put in his place. nor is it prob
able that the war would have ended otherwise
than it did, no matter who had been in supreme
command, for the Prussians had overwhelming
advantages in their weapons, their tactics, and
the great military genius who presided over the
General Staff. Tn. ncedle-gun PLAYED most
important part in the war, but il reinforced by
the new tactics and by the enthusiasm of the
AT rail- nI @bo
liant old King of Prussia; while Bismarck stood
prepared to take advantage of every military sue
cess for diplomatic and political purposes, and to
render every movement in the field as effective
as possible by guarding against all interference
from without
Prussia's Italian alliance threatened TO prove a
burden rather than help, because of the peculiar
poNcy OF La Marmora, who appeared to be reso-
Iutey opposed to any serious collision with the
Austrians and who, after intermnablc delays and
futile marchings backward and forward. Numbered
III the most haplcss fashion upon the enemy in
strength, and sustained fearful beating at Gus
tozza. Sybers account of that battle puts the
Italian commander in a most unfavorable light
lie IL represented having lost his head so COM
pefeiy that he galloped of the field in the middle
OF the fghting, thus practically losing tile battle
since he left no orders and the aides-de-camps did
done and everything be proposed TO do only de-
monstrated his incapacity more clearly: but the
very existence of an Italian army however i'll
directed compelled Austria TO maintain great
force in Italy, and thus diminished the resources
with which she wa to encounter Prussia. The
Iatter made Very few mistakes in the campaign.
In Bohemia and on tie Main the only nshaps arose
from the poor judgment or the e, cessivc in
dependence Of two generals who thought
they knew more than Moltke, and who soon were
made to realize their errors, and suffered punish
mcnt for their carelessness or INSTRUMENTATION
Benedek had made elaborate preparations for
fighting a defensive battle at Koniggratz. The
onf; point he had neglected was a realization of
the enemy's intentions. Moreover he failed TO
perceive how untrustworthy were many Of his
own generals; but this partly arose from his own
military system. 1t was not his practice TO in
form his licutcnants Of the general purpose of the
campaign, nor to leave them any freedom of
action. They were provided with minute instrue-
tons. 20 which they were expected to adhere
rigdly, and this without knowing to what their
movements tended. The Prussian system was the
precise opposite of this. The subordinate COM
manders were kept fully informed of the ulti-
mate purpose of the movements in which they
took part, and they were allowed great latitude
as to the means they should employ to bring
about the desired end The result proved the
superior wisdom of the Prussian system The
Austraans were everywhere out-marched. ont
manocuvred, and out-fought They stood their
ground manfully, but the superior weapons and
"elan" of their opponents carried away the vic.
tory in nearly every engagement. The Austrian
artillery at this period perhaps
better than the Prussan, and it was
served with great energy and pluck
1t tremendously heavy at Koniggratz but it
could not hold the Prussans back long, and yet it
played most important part in the battle
Sybel gives highly lucid and interesting de-
scrption Of this campaign, but the main facts are
SO familiar that il il unnecessary 10 recapituate
them The Austrian defeat at Konigcraz was SO
crushing that further serious resistance became
from that day out OF the question If the 10, 0OO
Austrian troops in Italy could have been brought
home, the war might have at least been prolonged
But that was impossible, though it was attempted
- cedng Vcnctia TO Napoleon. with the under
standing that lie would throw the territory over
10 Italy. But Bismack had already plenty of
warnings against unnecessary DELAY in the negotia-
ton Of peace with Austria The French Emperor,
though he had approved of the Austro-Prussian
war; had not calculated upon such an issue of it.
He had hoped that both the German Powers would
le crippled, but what he saw was Prussia looming
up as u great Power, and threatening, 10 produce a
united Germany The hypothesis that such an
event must be danger to France had been re-
oeved by French statesmen and politicians from
the time Of Louis the Fourteenth. 1t was the
policy Of Drouyn dc Lhuys and Gramont and
Rouher, bur it was not, Sybel aiiirms the belief
Of Napoleon, who Stunned war with his neighbors,
and who thought that peace could be maintained,
with united Germany. But traditions and the
instability of his dynasty were too strong for
him. lie dared not oppose himself to the voice
of the people, dared he let the Austro-Prussan
war close without extracting from ii some honor,
glory profit for France.
He succeeded in getting himself recognized as
mediator between the bclgerents, and this Crati- |
d. L