Mississippi leader. (Jackson, Miss.) 1892-1895, 1892-11-17
A NEW LIQUOR CASE DECIDED.
supreme Court Decision In the Case of
the Flora W. G. r.U.


VS.. No. 1859.
+. b. PRATT.
Appealed from Circuit Court of Madi-
son county.
WV. POWELL, attorney for appellant;
f. b. PRATT, for appellee.
This was proceeding instituted by
I Capt. b. f. Pratt, an attorney of Can
ton, on behalf of the W. G. I. U. of
Flora, against Bryant Clark, saloon
ist, who sought to obtain license to re-
tail near Flora.
The agreed state of facts before the
Circuit Court showed that neither f.
b. Pratt nor the w. G. Il. U. nor any
one else ever fled counter petition
before the board of supervisors or else
where, or objected in writing before
said board or elsewhere, to the grant
ing of license to Clark; that Pratt was
not and had never been a resident citi-
zen or legal voter in district No. of
Madison county, in which it was sought
to establish the saloon,-but that Mrs.
Gaddis and Mrs. Roland, President and
Secretary of the Flora w. G.. T. u, do
reside in district No. 2. 1t was further
agreed that an election was held in
Madison county in 1886, under Act of
1856, and that said election resulted in
favor of license in said county, and
that other licenses had been granted
in pursuance of said Act and laws not
in conflict Herewith.
The official proceedings of the Board
of Supervisors, show that Pratt appear
ed before that body as a contestant for
the W. c. T. u. and objected that
Clark's petition was defective, in that
he was recommended to be of "0OOd
reputation instead of good moral
character" as the statute expressly pro-
vides, which fact was also pleaded be-
fore the Circuit Court.
Clark's petition was signed by 81 real
estate owners of district No. 2.
On the above showing the Circuit
Court rendered a judgment vacating
Clark's license and an appeal was tax
en- to the Supreme Court.
By Cooper j.:
miss the appeal should have been sus-
tanned in the Court below.
The appeal was not prosecuted by any
qualified voter of the district in which
the business of retailing by Clark had
baop linanCaI on1 II Voc NOT onYnnatont
for any other person so to do. The
purpose of the Act of March II, 1886,
Acts 1886 PIP. 35) was to commit to the
localities affected the question whether
retailing should be licensed or prohib-
tied.
To determine this, elections under
it's provisions and upon the conditions
named therein, were to be held in such
counties as one-tenth of the voters
thereof should petition for, and ma
iority vote of the whole county per-
mitted or prohibited the sale within
the county. If the majority Of all the
electors of a county is in favor Of the
sale of intoxicating liquors, then the
board of supervisors or the municipal
authorities of any incorporated city or
town, upon the petition of twenty-five
real estate owners in the district of the
county, or the municipality as the case
may be, can license one to become a
retailer, unless a counter petition by a
majority of the qualified voters of such
district or municipality is interposed
against such license. The act con-
tains provision that "if such applica-
ton for license be contested, either
party may appeal from the decision of
the Board of Supervisors or municipal
authorities to the Circuit Court, on
giving bond for COSTS"
The party entitled to appeal must be,
we think. some one who, under the law,
may contest before the local authori-
ties the grant of the license, some one
entitled, as of right, to be heard, and
not mere dmicus curi9, whose sug
gestions may be needed or disregarded.
Manifestly no one but a qualified
voter of the district or municipality
can, under the Act of 1886, contest with
the applicant for license. Mr.. Pratt
was not such person, and therefore had
no right to appeal.
The judgment of the Circuit Court
is reversed and the appeal of Mr..
Pratt dismissed at his costs.