, 1892-07-13
PEEEMPTORY WRIT.

LY TEiBUNsI
State OF Washington ex rel. George J..
Hill, plaintiff and relatOr, VS.. l. ]. LIGHT
enberg, Judge Of the superior court Of
King county, respondent. From King
county. Filed July 8, 1892.
The relator brought an action before the
respondent as one Of the judges of the su-
perlor court Of King county against A. B.
Young and Hulda A. Young for the parti-
Jion of certain real estate. The cause pro-
ceeded to hearing before the respondent,
who made certain findings Of fact, and as
conclusion of law he found that The issues
Of facts as to the rights of the plaintiff in
said lands before partlGOn could be had
should be determined by a jury trial
whic the defendants had previously de-
manded.
There are three superior Judges in King
county, and by force ofcertain rules adopt
ed by them, the business Of said court is
parutiOned to them respectively according
TO a certain classification, the criminal
business being assigned to one ofthem, the
civil jury business to another, and the
equity department Of said court was pre-
sided over by the respondent, to whom
was assigned snch business. Upon the
findings and conclusions of law as aforesaid,
respondent made an order transferrn"
saio cause to the civil jury department. 0.
said court for the purpose Of having jury
trial Of the facts, ana the case was trans
ferTed accordingly, and certain issues were
framed and trieO before a Jury, who rem
dered verdict thereon. WhereupOn the
judge who presided over said department
certified said prOcC ,dings to the equity de-
partment for final disposition. The re-
spOndent reIus' | to proceed with said
cause, claiming tIat it having been trans
ferred 10 the civil jurv department to have
the facts determined by jury, it was
pending before the judge who presided
over said department, and that it was his
duty to dispose of the same.
1t is contended by the relator that said
cause was not fully transferred from the
equity to the civil jury department Of said
court. but that there was only partial
transfer thereof for the purpose of having
certain issues Of fact tried by jury. From
the view we take of the cause it Is Unnec-
cessary for us to determine whether the
original transfer was partial or complete
one. The action was Jriable in equity, and
was properly before the judge presiding
over the equity department of said court,
and tile relatOr had a right TO have the
cause fully tried and determined in that
DEPARTMENT Of the court.
f he judge presiding over the equity de-
parGment deemed it advisable to submit
certain questions of fact TO jury he should
have called one for that purpose, and not
have transferred the cause to another
judge in order that such such questions
might be so submitted. The right Of a
judge TO refer questions Of fact in an
equity cause to a jury is well established,
and exists in this state.
In The case of Garsed vs.. Beall ct al, 80
.. 5. 695, it is said:
Equity courts may decide both fact and
law, but they may, if they see fit, refer
doubtful questions Of fact to a jury. Find
ings of the kind, however, are not exclus-
i've, and, if not satisfactory, they NAV be
SET aside or Over-ruled; but if tue hnCing
is satisfactory to the chancellor, the prac-
Te - IL ~. r. i
for decree" Citing Harding VS.. Harding.
IL Wheat. 103. Such findings are regarded
as influential in an appellate court, but
they are not conclusive. And see Watt
vs.. Starke, 101U. S. 247.
The defendants disputed the plaintiffs
title in said action, and demanded trial
by jury as matter of right to determine
that issue. Sec. 0S3 G. P. provides that
where in an action for partition the title is
put In issue the same may be tried in such
suit, and the calling Of jury to try it is
within the discretion of the court, as in
other equity causes.
Upon the trial of an issue of fact in an
equitable action before jury the evidence
introduced should be presei Ted in order
that the same might be sent up on appeal
the same as the other evidence in the case,
to the end that the appellate court may de-
termine as to whether there are good
grounds for setting the verdict aside.
The rules of said court in partitiOning
business between the respective judges
should be upheld as far as possible in or
der to facilitate the orderly and convenient
discharge of the business, and we have no
doubt of the courts authority to classify
and partition 1t as was done. However,
there can be no question Notwithstanding
this, but that each Judge has all the power
that any other Judge of said court has to
try any cause within the Jurisdiction of
said court regardless of said appOrtion-
Epurka 49,. -F -.
stated, the arrangement made with regard
TO the disposition of business should be
recognized as far as acquiesced in by the
court itself. In case any one of said judges
should be disqualified TO try anv particular
case properly triable in his department,
the same could be tried before any other
Judge of said court.
In this case there is DO claim that the
judge who presided over the equiv depart
ment was disqualified TO try the issues in
VOlYed in the cause in question, and his
refusal TO proceed Herewith is placed
solely on the ground that he had lost juris-
dictiOn by reason of his having transferred
the same to the judge who presided over
The civil jury depai 6ment. However this
may be, his order transfer ing said cause
could have nonore force or effect than that
of the order of the judge who presided over
the said jury department in re-tTansferring
the same to the respondent. 1t seems the
relatOr in this case made application to
each Of said Judges to proceed with said
cause to a final determination, and both of
them declined to do so upon the ground
that they had no jurisdiction. The one
claimed the cause was pending in the
equity depart ment, and the other that it
was pending i'll the civil jury department
of said court. Furthermore, it Is equally
clear that the respective judges of these de-
partments would have no right OF author
ity to keep sending this case from one to
the other; and an end must come TO this sort
of proceedings some time.
Consequently we hold that the action
was properly brought before the respOn-
dent who presided over the equity depart
ment of said court, and that the plaintiff
in said action, the relatOr here, had the
right to have said cause proceeded to final
determination in said department; that the
order of the said judge transferring the
same was unauthorized; that although the
plaintiff appeared and participated in the
trial in salu case before the juGge to whom
the same had been transferred, the order
was compulsory one. and we do not hold
him to have been estOpped by such appear
ance, especially as the question Of estOppe
has not Deen raised or urged bv the respOn-
dent and we direct the respondent to pro
ceed to judgment and final determination
Of said cause in his department.
AS TO how far the verdict of the Jug is
to be regarded, we do not say. Unles5 the
RESPONDENT is advised of the evidence in
troouced before the jury he could not well
be in a position TO say whether the verdict
should be followed or noe. 1t may be that
the evidence submitted to him in the first
instance, upon which he made certain
findings of fact were the same OF sub
stantiallv the same, as that introuu uced be-
fore'the jury, and if so he NAV be in po-
sition to determine as to whether such evil
dence will justify him in interfering WITH
the verdict, and as to this we do not de-
eide. He has the right to refer the matter
again to jury if he is not in position to
state whether or not he can dete mine as to
the justice or sufficiency Of the verdict.
Incidantallu IL annears that aid i1ldcra