, 1892-06-22
APPEAL

Ter ct ux, relatOrs, VS.. L. ]. Lichtenberg
Juuge, ETC.; from King county. Filed
June 2l, 1892.
The REALTORS presented their complaint to
the defendant herein, and on the ground
that an emergency was made to appear
showing that relief should be granted with
out notice to the other party obtained an
order requiring such adverse party to show
cause on day certain why temporary in
junction should not be granted and that
IN the meantime he be restrained from
dong certain acts mentioned in the order
OF the court. Before hearing was had upon
the application for the temporary iniunc-
ton such proceedings were had in the
cause that the court dismissed the same
for want of jurisdiction of the subject mat
ter. From such judgment of dismissal re-
latOrs sought to prosecute an appeal to this
court. They gave notice of appeal and
asked OF the court an order fixing the
amount of the bond necessary to be filed
on appeal to keep in force the restraining
order heretofore issued. The court de-
clined to make any order fixing the
amount Of such bond, and this proceeding
Is prosecuted by the relators in the name
of the state to compel him to fix the
amount of such bond, and to make an
order continuing in force the restraining
order above mentioned until the determi-
nation OF the appeal. Some technical
objections are made on behalf of the de-
tendant as to the suficiency Of the petition
to authorize this court to grant the relief
prayed for. We shall, however, consider
the case only upon the merits as thew
appear to us from the petition.
The sole question discussed by counsel
IN this regard is as to whether or not a
temporary restraining order of the nature
granted in this case is such a restraining
order or injunction as by the terms of Sec
tion l4O9, Y. r., the party interested is en-
Jltled to have kept in force by the giving
OF bond as provided for in said section,
That the term injunction or restraining
order" as contained in said section, is
broad enough to cover restraining orders of
the kind In question, is conceded. 1t is
claimed, however, on the part of the de-
tendant that when the whole statute law
upon the subject of granGing injunctiOns
ana restraining orders is taken into con-
slderatlOn, together with certain language
used in said section 1409 a more restricted
construction of said words as contained in
said section is required. 1t is cOntended on
the part OF the relatOrs that to give each of
these words any force at all they must be
held not only to cover injunctions tempor-
ary and perpetual, but also restraining
orders Of the kind involved therein. They
say that this kind of restraining order is
the only one mentioned in the chapter
upon the subject of injunctiOns and re-
stra1n1ng orders, and that if the construc-
ton contended for by the defendant is to
prevail there was no reason whatever for
using both the words injunction" and
"restraing order" as the use of the word
injunction" alone would have COM
pletely covered the subject and been all
that was necessary or proper to have been
used. If we are to hold that this kind of an
order is the only one that can properly be
designated a restraining order, there would
be much force in this position of relatOrs
1t seems to US, however, that under the
language of the chapter relating to that
subject there will be no great violence done
to the language used to interpret the words
injunction" and restraining order" as
substantially synonymous, and that the
legislature in speaking of injunctions and
restraining orders meant to use terms
which would make it proper for the court
to put its order in the shape of formal
injunction as known to the common law
1T saw fit to do so, and that if it did not
see tit to 60 into all the fOrmalities re-
CURED by the use Of such a writ it could
accomplish the same purpose by issuing a
simple order restraining the acts COM
planned of. This construction of the chap
ter gets force from the fact that the legisla-
ture ITSELF in the same chapter speaks not
only Of restraining orders but also of tenn
pOrary restraining orders. See section 274.
Ii 1t had been the intention of the leg
lslature to cOntne the designation ire
straining order" to a single class it would
not have been technically correct for it to
have spoken in one section Of restraining
orders, and in other sections of temporary
restraining orders. This circumstance in
itself would not be entitled to great weight
but it is entitled to consideration as tend
ing very strongly to destroy the force of
the contention on the part of the REALTORS
that we must cOnstrue the language of the
legislature so as to give entire and exact
force to each word used in the different
provisions on the subject.
AS we have already said, section 14O9, G,
P, is in terms broad enough to cover the
order in question, and we have also seen
by the language used by the legislature
that it does not necessarily follow that
because the language will admit of GER
tain Interpretation, or even because a GER
tain Interpretation is the reasonable and
logical one, that the legislature must
necessarily have intended it. We must
look to the entire legislation upon the
subject to gather what the intent of the
legislature was in the enactment of any
particular provision. Therefore, to prop
erly interpret section 1909, and determine
whether or not the legislature must be held
to have intended to cover restraining Or
ders of the kind in question by the use of
the language therein used in said section
together with the language Of certain other
sections of the statutes relating to the sub
ject. Section 270, G. P, is as follows:
''No Injunction shall be granted until it
shall appear to the court or judge granting
it that some one or more of the opposite
party concerned has had reasonable notice
of the time and place of making applica-
ton, except that in cases of emergency, to
be shown in the complaint, the court may
grant a restraining order until notice can
be given and hearing had thereon"
While s1409 contains provision that the
restraining order therein referred to shall
remain in force until the appeal is finally
determined. These provisions construed
together tend strongly to show that s1409
does not apply to restraining orders of this
kind. The provisions of 1910 show a clear
intent on the part of the legislature that no
injunction shall be granted without notice
to the adverse party, The only power that
is conferred upon the court by said section
is to grant an order to remain in force long
enough to enable the required notice to be
given. And should the court without
notice grant an order for longer time its
action in so doing would be irregular. So
soon as notice can be given, and an Oppor-
tunity had for the party to present his ap-
plicatiOn for an Injunction, aided bY such
notice, the restraining order granted with
out such notice has served its purpose, and
should if necessary be set aside by the
court. 1t may well be held, how
ever that no action of the court in that re-
gard is required as such order would ex-
pire by its own force as soon as the parties
were before court upon notice of the appli-
cation for an injunction. The only pur-
pose of such restraining order is to keep
things in statu quo until the matter can be
brought regularly before the court. And
whether such order terminates by its own
force or is terminated by order of the court,
the clear intent of the legislature appears
in said section to protect the rights of a
party from other than temporary inter-
ference without first giving him an Oppor-
tunity to be heard The court gets no
jurisdiction in the matter for the purpose
of interfering with the rights of either
party until the giving Of notice as required
by statute.
Concluded on Thursday