New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1892-11-20
GERMAN WAR ALARMS.

The attempt TO create sentiment in favor OF
the new German Army bill by alarmist stories
Of the massng of Russian troops on the frontier
has failed. as might have been expected.
Whether the chief article to that effect which
appeared some days ago in the " Berlin Post"
was or was not inspired by the Government
does not greatly matter. The public pretty
generally believes that it was; but if il was
not, it was, at any rate. approved by the En-
peror and his Chancellor. Years ago, it will
be remembered at q time when Prince Bis
marck wanted certain military legislation
passed an article appeared in the same paper
under the heading "War in Sight" and had
much effect Every one believed that the
great Chancellor had written or dictated it,
but afterward both Prince Bismarck and "The
Post explicitly denied that he had had any
thing to do with il. Now, if these latest
would be war scares have not the success tina:
that had, as indeed they have not, it may be
partly because of the difference between sup
posed inspiration by Count Won Capriyi and
supposed inspiration by Prince Bismarck.
Partly, but not altogether. For second
reason is that the alleged facts are not true
and the German people, who believed them
1t is quite within bounds to say that il all the
troops were actually "massed near the from
tier that have been thus reported in the last
few years, tho whole Russian Army would now
be there. Such is aSsuredly not the case
New battalons are frequently sent thither, it
is true, in order that they may become ia
miliar with what is not unlikely some day to
be their fighting ground. But they merely take
the place of others that are moved away. There
is no reason TO believe that there is or has
lately been, any massing Of Russian troops"
in Poland that would be deemed adequate TO
successful invasion of German territory
A third, and not less potent, reason is that
such movement of Russian troops, if it really
existed, would not be particularly mcnacing.
For further particulars under this head see any
good map of that region. Observe especially
the railroad lines. Those on the Russian side
Of the frontier are few, and they chiefly run at
right angles to the frontier, or nearly So Those
parallel with it are from fifty 10 a hundred
miles away. On the German side they are
many, literally gridroning the country. And
not only are those running to the frontier twice
as numerous as those In Russia. but there are
three or four lines parallel with il and close
TO II. From the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian
Mountains these railroads march with the from
tier, for hundreds of miles within riGe-shot Of
it, ard for hundreds of miles at least three
separate lines within days march of it,
The tremendous significance Of this fact is
not overlooked by the German people, and
should not be overlooked by any student of
the military situation in Europe 1t means that
I. IL
point. or at half dozen points, on the from
tier to move them along the frontier from
one point to another for Purposes OF offence
or defence, would be a slow and difficult task
Germany, on the other hand, can send her
armies to the frontier at twice as many points,
and can move them along it from place to