Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

north bank" OF troops because he docs no.
know where Grant n
Ats n IN. Of June IL Lee congratulate,
bsanresard on his victory at Petersburg and
AsAs where Grant Is. At noon he still does not
think IL prudent to draw moro troops 10 the
south side. At $50 he sent the following
order:
Clay Novsr. June II, isss-3:3o D. N.
MAJ Gen W. II. F. Lee, Malvern Hill, via
Meadow Station:
fush after enemy and ondeavor to ascertain
Gen Hill RE Irv
On Information from Beauregard that large
numbers OF Grants men had crossed the James
At 40 p. m-, June II, Lee hesitatiugly ordered
A. +. Kills corps up to Chains Blun AT
lz;jO a N. June Is, Beauregard telegraphed
mat Grant was before Petersburg with his
Whole army. but even this did not satisfy Lee.
last concluded to dispatch mis- army to
tns real point of danger. The first
troops Of the Army of Northern vir-
ginia. kershaw's and Fields divisions,
arrived early on the morning of the 18th and
AZ " 80 Lee himself put IN an appearance.
The reader knows that Grants army had
already been hammering at the gates of Peters
Surg more than two days. and but for the
.ohity and tenacity 81 Beauregard's defense
the town and the confederacy must have been
soss, ~ IL ought to hive been
A COSTLY DELAY
But after so sigrally outgeneraling Lee, why
did not Grant reap the fruits Of his mastery
combinations by capturing the town HIMSELF
1t will not do to lay at poor Smiths door all
the blame for the long siege Of Petersburg.
Grant still had two days margin in which to
effect his object before Lees army interposed
This is a question that perhaps has never been
asked; it is certainly one never satisfactorily
answered True, Beauregard had gathered in
few more troops and was already behind new
breastworks, but the attacking force was now
5000 strong. Smith had carried o strong line
of defenses; why should Grant faiR Even
after Grants arrival there was an unaccount-
able delay, perhaps fatal one. as no general
attack was made until the evening OF the 18TH.
Gen. Butler SAYS Grant failed because the men
would not attack Notifications any more
IL is apparent that at first both Grant and
Meade. Ike Smith. thought part IL not all OF
Leo's army had arrived. Hence the delay; too
much time was wasted in preparation. repeat
ing Smiths chief error. Then too narrow a
front Was covered when the attack was made,
great advantage to Beauregard, defending
many miles OF breastworks with less than
$1,000 men lie says there were several miles
of the defenses without a man III them. II
must have been true. Grants $4,000 men
could have been stretched out with perfect
safety. outasnk.ng Beauregard far to the south
and west. But there was no manenvering. no
feeling for weak spots. as at Spottsyivan1e
After great elaboration, the whole army was
precipi,ated upon one narrow front. and that
front the one OF al others BeaureSard would
have selected
By the evening of the 10th all tic corps were
concentrated 81 Petersburg. On that morning
Birney had assaulted and carried another
redan- At y. II. general attack was made
by the second r:tA and ninth corps. which re-
suited IN earring three more salients and
driving back ths enemy. At dayligh: of the
18th Potters division charged and captured
some saii-nts 81 the left also four guns and
COO prisoners. The WORKOUT confederates
we're found As.sep on their arms. Other
attacks we've unsuccessful and attended with
great loss.
As stated. these operations were mainly TO
the norihsa- --:- east Of the town. and appear
TO have lacked cohesion and vicOr. That night
BeAure--rG v.tS rev 10 an inner and shorter
line. Mt unit. ;he evening OF tie 18th was II
learned csT;a-..y that only Beauregards weak
force vas wIckssSnding the entire army of the
Potomac. A cOlcerted attack was then ordered
for the early morning of the 18th But now It
was too late; Lees army was beginning to
arrive. NOiwi .EstandinG their best efforts to
break through every assault this day OF all the
corps repu.soi Then the long. costly and
destructive siege of Petersburg began.
That which another hours energetic work
would have 50 easily effected on the night of
June Is. or a few hours of judicious deploy-
mont and demonstration 20 the left on the 10th
and 18th. had now resolved itself down into a
tedious job OF many months. The last two
days tactics IN this affair were the most I'M
satisfactory of Grants career. Perhaps the
subsequent time was jud ciOusly and prOfita6ly
expended in gradually but surely exhaasting
the remaining resources Of the south and pre-
pairing the southern mind for the acceptance
Of the final inevitable. Who can say?