Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-07-16

soon found his command was really only nomi-
nal. In letter as early as November "A, 1862,
Johnston warned the military authorities that
las our troops are now distributed vicksburg
IL in danger" Later, when Grant was closing
his tolls around Pemberton, he pereinptorily
told the government that it must choose be-
tween Mississippiand Tennessee; that both would
probably be lost, but that the one might be
saved by concentrating all their available forces
in its defense. These suggestions were not fol-
lowed. Under Davis obstinate adherence to
the system of diffusion instead of concentra-
ton both were eventually lost.
Pemberton's disastrous vicksburg campaign
followed. Davis, to shift responsibility, was
not slow in ascribing the misfortune mainly to
JOhnston's feeble policy. He endeavors to
leave the impression that Johnstons general
command gave him authority to transfer troops
from one department to another, but, in fact, 1t
appears that Johnston was prevented by the
administration from giving any personal atten-
ton to Vicksburg until ii was too late. And the
presidents telegram to Gov. Pettus is proof Of
his knowledge that the force of Johnston was
inadequate to relieve Pemberton.
1t was to be expected that Pemberton would
attempt to make q scapegoat of Johnston, but
the latter correctly says that Pemberton either
misunderstood or disobeyed all his orders and
wholly misapprehended Grants warfare. The
truth is that Grant outgeneraled them all.
Davis favorite was mere child in this Union
generals hands.
CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS IN THE wssr.
Davis was unfortunate in his western com
manders. Pemberton went the way Of A. s.
Johnston, Beauregard and Van Dorm, losing the
Mississippi his predecessors had lost Ken
lucky and Tennessee. Then he systematically
concentrated under. Bragg in an abortive at
tempt to retrieve affairs ut Chickamauga, but
Immediately afterward the old system of diff
fusion was resumed by sending Longstreet to
Knoxville, affording Grant ample time on exte-
rior lines to swoop down and clean out the last
of the presidents favorites. After this blow
Davis was ready to give Johnston actual COM
mand Of the active western army.
The Richmond authorities desired Johnston
to take the offensive. He insisted on being
largely reinforced for that purpose. and there
was an immediate disagreement rs TO lines and
details. Meanwhile Sherman had completed
his concentration, and the campaign Of 1864
began with his advance southwark. Johnston
impeded Sherman's march, declined to fight
except on his own terms and was gradually
pushed back to Atlanta, in what is generally
admitted to have been mastery retreat. But
Davis was dissatisfied, believing that Johnston
had missed several opportunities to fight sue
cessful general battle. On July II Johnston
was superseded in the command by Hood, who
Immediately fought some disastrous battles I'M
der spur from Richmond, followed by the loss
Of Atlanta. With depleted forces he finally
took the general offensive, and WINS defeated
and practically destroyed at Franklin and be-
fore Nashville. closing the war in the west and
making possible and easy the march through
Georgia and the Carolinas.
NEVER READY FOR ACTION.
In brief, the cause of his removal and the
ground of complaint against Johnston was that
under circumstances would he fight, and
that he did not intend to defend Atlanta. This
is the essential point made in all Davis recita-
tons concerning him in the Bull Run, Peninsu-
lar, Vicksburg and Atlanta campaigns. And, it
must be confessed the official records 60 far
toward corroborating the Presidents estimate
OF his generals character. His argument is that
Johnston, like Mcclellan, was never exactly
ready for action, was always largely outnum-
bered, always wanted re-enforcements, always
exaggerated obstacles and always opposed every
plan proposed by his government.
1t has often occurred to me that had McC1el-
Ian and Johnston been continued in their re-
spective commands the war would have lasted
indefinitely. They were much alike. Both
doubted the capacity and courage of their SOL
diers to overcome given obstacles. Neither be-
leved in the efficacy of fighting Both were
largely endowed with the art of expeditiously
moving an army in retreat from the presence of
the enemy. Neither had any good will toward
or confidence in his government. and both were
"hampered' thereby. 1t is doubtful if either
Johnston. in vindication of his Atlanta cam
paign, says that Sherman was relatively stronger
than Grant over Lee. that his own effective
force was less than $1,000 men and his total
losses less than 10000. Johnston. Hardee and
A. P. Stewart all claim that the fighting spirit
OF the army was not impaired b. the retreat,
and cite the stubborn fights before Atlanta and
at Franklin as proof of it. His ultimate plan
was to fight and crush Sherman, far from his
base in the interior on the first favorable OPP
porturitv. He pertinently observes, that like
himself. Lee was falling back before Grant in
Virginia. vet constantly gaining in military re-
nown, and further that Lee, Bragg and Penn
berton were forgiven faults for which he was
condemned.
He points with telling force to the fact that
a trial OF the cyclone policy of offense against
the federals was Immediately fatal to the OBJ
jects of the campaign and of the war. and ex-
presses the opinion that il either Hardee or
Stewart had been placed in command instead Of
Hood Atlanta would have been saved. Finally
in general, he holds that it was q lack Of states
and not military resources or leader
ship to which the failure of the south is to be
ascribed. 1t wGs not the greater population
and resources of the north that conquered.
Johnston expresses the opinion that at first the
southern was a more effective soldier than the
man of the north by reason of his experience
from youth with firearms and natural aptitude
for the military life. Yet in the very earliest
Dattle5 tNese inexperienced northern soldiers
inflicted the greatest loss their enemy that
occurred during the war on either side.
CONFIRMED BY DAVIS OWN LOGIC
1t is a singular fact that Davis himsel indi-
rectly argues in the same direction. and so does
Mrs Davis, without being aware of it. Military
success is nearly always requisite of successful
revolution, and the south uniformly had that if
we may believe Davis. who does not even admit
that Gettysburg was defeat. The conclusion,
then, is inevitable that it was alone to false
craftsmanship. as Johnston asserts, that the
confederacy owed its downfall. This is point
worth the attention of our race of modern
philosophers.
Hoods book, as well as his final officialreport,
is scathing criticism of Johnston. The report
was probably written under the eye of the presi-
dent He SAYS Johnston employed in the cam
paign over &c, 900 men; that he lost fully 1900
and left the army disheartened and democrat
lied. He states that the two opposing armies
were not greatly unequal The army travelled
by day and labored at night, retreated for sew
enty days without fighting general battle, and
yet lost about One-third its original number.
Davis makes pretty much the same statements
1t is susceptible Of proof that at New Hope
Church Johnston must have had fully 900
men in line or at hand. When Johnston read
Hoods report he notified the adjutant> general
that he would prefer charges against that Off
Ger, but the war ended ere he could execute his
threat.
Dayis indor,ed upoo Iobpsfop'a official 70