The prison mirror. [volume] (Stillwater, Minn.) 1887-1894, 1892-12-22

drawn between the armies of the North
and South, in "a. affords us a good par
allel OF what the Continental and Brit
lsh armies were in 1916. The soldiers
OF the South did not have such un-
bounded confidence in success of their
cause that they were very eager to haz-
Zard their lives in the cause, nor did the
soldiers of the Revolution have so firm
a reliance on the outcome of the war
THAT they were over anxious to con-
tmue the struggle when any reverses
occurred The loss to the Continental
aGmy from defeat did not merely con-
siSt of the killed and disabled but from
the large number who deserted through
their loss of hope of final success. In
managing his army. in such manner
as to cause the least Encouragement to
his troops, and never risking an en-
gagement that might prove disastrous
Where there was not reasonable hope
OF vlctory-ln fact, by never commit
ting rash act, and by harassing the
enemy IN every way and exposing his
own men as little as possible Wash
lngtOn showed himself master of the
situation.
Alexander and Hannibal with our
least consideration to the wonderful
progress that has been made in the sci
hSfice OF Waf~ since their -day.~~In my
humble opinion, it was not so much
AleXander's abilities as strategist or
general that enabled him to accomplish
his vast cOnQueStS. | believe he owed
much of his success to the handiwork
and brute strength of his well trained
Greek soldiers. His defeat of Darius
is certainly something astonishing when
we consider the comparative numbers
OF both armies, but the Greeks were
lmmeasurably superior to the Asiatic
soldiers. AS an example of this, we
have the account of XerXeS' invasion
of Greece with an army that numbered
millions, and with this vast host he was
only able to make display of the
weakness of his soldiers. Much of the
success Of ancient generals lay in their
encouragement of their troops by ex-
amples of their own prowess. As to
NapOleOn's claim to be called great
general, is it necessary to go into de-
tails, and recount his extraordinary Ca
reer? TO my mind, Napoleon's feats
are greater by far, than those of Alex
ander. Napoleon by the mere force of
his genius raised himself from an OBJ
scure position to that of an emperor;
and his military victories were achieved
against the combined armies of Eu-
rope, while Alexander, to begin with,
inherited the dOminiOnS of his father,
Philip, and his victories were accom-
plished over armies, though greatly
superior to his own forces, yet they
were much inferior. as soldiers, to his
own. Does history record that Alex
ander met with any great resistance
from the army of Darius, except mere
show of force? On the contrary does
not history tell us that the army of Da-
rius fled before the battle was fairly be-
gun, and were slaughtered while trying
to escape? The most determined resis-
tance Alexander met with in his inva-
sion of Asia. was at the siege of Tyre.
However, he had no opportunity of dis
playing much generalship there. His
fame rests chiefly on his defeat of Da-
rius. In conclusion, let me say think
my friend "Pro ct Con- mistaken, when
he compares ancient and modern war
fare without giving due consideration
to the great change that has taken
place in the science of war. We might
with fairness compare Napoleon and
Wellington, or, Grant and Napoleon,
or, any other generals of modern times.
But think it hardly fair to one or the
other to compare our modern generals