The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-04-24

| 10. ana think now sorry you would be IL vol
had killed NO." and had tho man set free
Marriott says truly that TO master ones char
acter in this way demonstrates uncommon
strength Of mind
| Nv.
In q chapter OF the sec ond volume the author
after recounting what he had personally wit
messed while one Of Massenas aides DO cam D.
| essays to indicate the chief causes OF the re.
! verses sustained by the French In the Spanish
peninsula He does not blame the Emperor fol
leaving Spain In 1909 In order to meet more
pressing danger in central Europe. but he is
unable to understand why. when peace was
concluded In the north. Napoleon did not see
the importance Of returning to drive tho Eng.
lish from the peninsula To Marriott 1t is most
surprising that with all his genius. Napoleon
should have thought 1t possible to direct from
Paris the movement OF armies five hundred
leagues away in q country where bearers OF
dispatches were liable to be stopped
| by swarms Of insurgents. and therefore Com
manders-in- Chief might be compelled to
remain for months without the usual orders.
IL the Emperor could not tako charge himself
| he should, in Marbots opinion have ntrustetl
| the chief command Of all the armies in the
| peninsula to ono OF his best Marshals with
power large enough to punish disobedience.
Instead OF that he selected for his titular
| lieutenant his brother Joseph, who had no
knowledge OF the art OF war. and became the
plnything Of the Marshals. The truth I'M
doubtedly is that the personal presence Of
Napoleon was indispensable to assure CO.
| operation among the French commanders.
for even when Massena was sent to Spain
with supreme authority. tho other Marshals
refused to obey him.
Tn Mnrhot'a ;udppoan< mn ,,u,n 80 A..
French defeats in Spain which is generally
overlooked was the immense superiority OF the
English infantry as regards accuracy of shoot
ing. The superiority is attributed partly to
their frequent exercise at the targets. and
partly to their formation in two ranks. Mar
bot, In opposition to many other French
officers. maintains that experience shows that
soldiers confined between the first and third
ranks nearly always fire in the air. and that the
third rank men cannot take aim at the enemy,
who is hidden from them by the two ranks in
front. 1t is. on the other hand asserted that
two ranks do not offer sufficient strength to
resist cavalry. but Marriott had observed in
Spain that the English infantry could in a
moment form four deep to receive a charge,
and the French sIuadrons were never able to
catch 1t In two ranks. though. as soon as it had
to fire. 1t quickly resumed that formation,
However this may be. the author of these
memoirs Is convinced that Napoleon would
In the end have established his brother tri-
umphantly on the throne Of Spain II he had
been content to finish this war before going
to Russia. The peninsula received no support
except from England. and England. in spite of
the recent successes OF her army. was 80 ex-
hausted by the incessant demands for men
and money for the peninsula. that the House
OF Commons was on the point Of refusing the
hotI f,r
the moment. however. of the return OF tie
French from Portugal rumors had got about
OF the design formed by Napoleon Of attacking
Russia at home. and so the English Parliament
authorized the continuance Of the war. Mar
bot estimates that in the six years from tho
beginning OF 1903 the French lost In the PENN
sula 100000 men. killed or dead In hospitals,
to which one must add 10000 men lost by
their various allies
Marriott crticises tho various explanations
published in his time Of the failure OF Napo-
Icons Russian campaign. and proceeds to
offer some suggestions Of his own. He con-
siders that the chief cause OF the misfortunes
encountered by the French in Russia was the
mistake into which Napoleon fell when he
thought he could go to war in the north Of
Europe before making an end OF the contest
which he had long been waging in Spain. As
the genuine French troops. when thus divided
between the north and south. were in both
quarters insufficient. the Emperor sought to
make up the deficiency by uniting battalions
Of his allies with them. This. Marriott thinks, |
was like diluting generous wine with dirty wa
ter. The French divisions were deterorated, |
while the allied troops remained as untrust-
worthy as ever. and they it was that during |
the retreat from Moscow threw the Grand |
Army into disorder. Another cause. however, |
no less fatal. In Marbot's opinion. was the |
total want OF organization In the CONQUERED |
country. Instead OF doing AZ he had |
lone in the campaigns OF Austerlitz. Jena. and |
Friedlard. namely establishing In the region
eft behind small corps which would form from
post to post regular communications. and so
secure his rear. Napoleon pushed all his
AVAILABLE forces on to Moscow until between
hat place and tho Niemen there was. with two
not garrison. store or hos
'ital. Two hundred leagues OF country were
hus given over to wandering bands of Cos
'acks. and the result was that the sick and
Wounded when cured could not rejoin. and tho
roops when retreating had no assured supply
u food. even in districts which produced grain
n abundance. To the lack of small garrisons
II the rear was likewise due the fact that out
~
french in the course OF the campaign literally
lot one ever left Russia. for tho reason that no
organization existed for passing them to the
ear. The lack OF interpreters also did tho
'rench more mischief than III ght be supposed.
FOR instance. when Gen. Partouneauy mis-
ook his road on the banks OF the
'eresina. and marched into Wittsensteins
amp. no had with him peasant who, know
ng no French. tried to mako him understand
" signs whose camp 1t was; for lack. how
YER. OF an interpreter he was not understood.
nd the French lost nearly 5000 men. All
his time the Emperor had In his army several
orps OF Polish cavalry. most of whose officers
nd serGesnts could speak both French and
russian very we'll But instead of placing
ONE OF these by the side OF every General and
olonel. they were left with their regiments
larbot insists upon this point. because al
nough the French army is that in which
here is the least knowledge OF foreign Lam
uages. great inconv eniences resultin., from
mis- defect had not led to a correction n, -