davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

were in progress and maturing, for the pur-
pose of holding Lee north Of Richmond. but no
important action occurred after Cold Harbor.
On the 9th an attempt on Petersburg with
cavalry and infantry from Buffers command
under Gilmore failed. and attaching great i'm
portance to the capture of that place. Grant
on the 18th put smiths corps on board trans
ports and dispatched it around by water to
renew the attempt The movement from Cold
Harbor to the James commenced after dark on
the 18th. the advance corps reaching the river
on the 18th, and the second corps, under Ham
cock commenced crossing on the morning Of
the 14th at Wilcox's Landing by ferry boats, to
hurry forward to Smiths assistance in the
attack on Petersburg before Lee could REIN
force it. The whole army was across by the
10th and advancing toward Petersburg, on the
south side Of the Appomattox.
In the operations from May %, when the
Spottsylvania front was abandoned, up to June
Is, when the army was crossing the James,
including the fights on the North Anna, around
Bethesda Church and the battles of Cold
Harbor, covering period OF twenty-four days,
the federal losses were 2, 436 killed, ll,Sl1
wounded and LAT missing. There is no data,
except that already given, from which to esti-
mate the confederate losses during this period
Union reports of captures show their loss in
prisoners to have been somewhat greater than
the federal In many of the engagements they
were the attacking party, as. for instance, Hill
on Warren at North Anna, Early's attack near
Bethesda, and the assaults to retake Old Cold
Harbor on the LIST, besides many other occa-
sions. In these engagements their losses were
equal and In several instances greater than
those OF the federals At the grand assault on
the Sd they were hardly one-qus-ter those Of
Grant. do not estimate their loss in killed
ana wounded during this period at over 5000,
prisoners, 3,0O0-total, 5000.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

This was. in fact a severe battle, and decided
Union victory. The federal loss in this affair
was officially reported at 1876 killed, 1.090
wounded and 249 missing. Ewell's loss must
have been considerably in excess of this as he
attacked in the open and was repulsed Tyler
captured about 500 we'll prisoners besides many
wounded, and claimed TO have buried nearly
200 rebel dead.
This action practically ended the operations
at Spottsylvania. On the night of the goth Han
cocks corps was detached toward Lees right
and rear. in which Grant had two objects, viz
either to tempt the confederate general to at
tack Hancock, under the Misrepresentation that
he was isolated. or TO turn him out of the IN
trenchments and force him to battle in the
open. After giving Hancock fair start all the
other corps followed-frst the fifth. then tho
ninth and lastly the sixth-but not until they
had made menacing demonstrations to detain
Lee.
Only the salient features of the fourteen
days operations in this vicinity have been
touched upon. 1t will be observed that the
Union army was handled with boldness and
confidence unknown in its previous history,
and with a success in the presence of h. f. Lee
which surprised those to whom his name had
been terror for three years. True, hidden
behind breastworks, he had succeeded in
beating off his assailant, but that was barely
all. ALI expectation of outmaneuvering and
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22
Total. -. 2,725 l3.4l3 1

In addition TO the killed and wounded there
were lost ,253 prisoners, bringing the total lost
up to 1S, 391. do not include the cavalry losses
as that arm was operating generally independ-
emily ofthe army.
There are no reports of aggregate confeder-
ate losses in any OF the battles of this campaign
At Spottsylvania they were far less than
Grants. probably not more than one-haf as
many, in killed and wounded, but in prisoners
they were treble, and could hardly have been
less than 5000 men. Surgeon Guild, Lees
medical director, Who as previouslypointed out
always understated their killed and wounded,
furnishes basis for a fair guess on the head of
their losses.
Surgeon Guild reported Ewelrs losses during
the month of May at 4.437. These figures, ac-
cording to the confederate rule laid down by
Lee himself, did not include the slightly
wounded, as do the Union reports. Eweil
reported his losses at Wilderness, where he
suffered lightly compared with Longstreet and
HILL at only 1850. So the difference of 3lS7
must have principally occurred at spottsyl.
vanta, where his losses probably some hat
exceeded the others. And at Spottsylvania he
also lost close upon 4, 500 prisoners, making the
total losses of this single corps at the Wilder
ness and Spottsylvania about Q, 900 men.
1t Is hardly probable that the other corps
lost less than :, 500 each at Spottsylvania which
would give total loss there of over 1000 men
killed and wounded doubtless close approx
nation to the truth. l think the confederate
losses, including prisoners, we're fully $4,000
| men; at Wilderness and Spottsylvania together
$4,000, OF whom 5000 or 20. 600 were wounded.
Lees losses were perhaps 10000 less than
Grants but his greater relative loss in morale
largely overbalanced that advantage.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

simultaneously the sixth corps moved forward
to the assault on Hsncock's right, and Smith
with the eighteenth corps advanced in the
center. Warren and Burnside, further to the
right, also pushed forward Barlow broke
through the rebel line. captured some
prisoners and three pieces OF artillery, but the
confederates on that front soon rallied and
drove him out. Gibbon pushed forward in
the most determined manner over rough
ground and through a swamp, getting close up,
but failing to penetrate the enemy's line. The
sixth corps captured a line of rifle pits. tut
failed in its assault on the main line beyond.
Smith met the fercest FIRE, but carried tho
first line, losing many men. He could advance
no further. His assault was over ground emf
laded by the rebel fire from the direction of
Wrights front Warren and Burnside both
gained the rife pits innp,e dlately in front. but
we're repulsed at the main line, though Burn
side gained some good ground, and pre-
pairing TO push on again when Grant, perceiv-
ing the futility Of further effort ordered q
cessation Of fighting.
The entire federal line had advanced against
the confederate works, and after q vain
struggle, which did not end until 10 o'clock,
were repulsed all along the line. Barlow's tenn
porary success and Warren's and Burnside's
Operations were the only CLEANS of light on
TINS otherwise dark aud discouraging affair.
This assault was made two days too late. The
early morning of the LIST was the favorable
the only general attack made from the Rapidan
to the James which did not infiict losses on the
enemy to fairly compensate for his own. Lee
had fought careful, defensive battle and won
victory, simply repelling his antagonist, but
he attempted no counter assault. But the
federals were not driven back, though they
bad been repulsed They held their ground
and fortified the line close mp TO that of the
confederates, in some places within fifty yards
Of the enemys.
THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES
Gen. Grant now determined to carry out his
long meditated operation to the south side Of
the James, after destroying the railroads and
rebel lines Of communications north of Rich
mond. For this purpose on the 7th he sent
Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry out
along the Virginia Central railroad to Gordons-
vile, and to Hunter, in the valley, il possible.
Constant skirmishing was kept up along the
Chlckahominy lines while these movements
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

Smith had captured sixteen pieces of artil-
lery, some 400 prisoners and q fortified front
of over two miles. with a loss Of only 700 killed
and wounded, one of the most successful feats
of the entire campaign. There appears to have
been no other defenses between him and Pc
tersburg and the confederate Official records
are conclusive that at the time and for several
hours subsequent to the attack there was not
sufficient force to Withstand his lodgmsnt in
the town and on the river. But, of course, he
did not know this. His soldiers were acting
pecially that of the colored division. The ease
with which they captured in twenty minutes Q
position that Smith himself pronounced
stronger than Missionary Ridge" was proof
Of two things-that the town was weakly de-
Tended aud that they could whip whste yer force
there was in it. Smith says reinforcemeuts
were rapidly coming in from Richmond True,
next morning Beauregard had 10000 fresh
troops IN Petersburg. All the greater reason
for pressing ON that night
Il was mot for want of force that Gen Smith
failed Of the prize. Grant had provided am
pie means. Cen Birney, whose division had
the lead Of Hancock's corps, states that he
reached Gen. Kinks at 6:25, which Kinks cor
then moved In to the left Of Kinks At the lat
TO prevent Birney's throwing out administers
and advancing toward Petersburg Birney
says delay was occssioned BY want Of some
body 70 show him his proper position; he was
from e:26 10 10 pm finding his position IL
sppsafs ffom al this that Hancocks corps vss
up In time. He res certainly there IN season
70 cQntinus shs advance after the line vas
captured or % support an advance on the town.
Ascending - his ewn rsport Gen e11sh
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE NORTH ANNA.
Hanover ferry, taking position on the south
side of the Pamunkey. The cavalry was fol-
lowed by Russelrs division of infantry The
night of the 26th Wright and Warren quietly
withdrew to the north side of the North Anna
and moved down past Burnside and Hancock,
who still faced the enemy. Then Burnside in
turn recrossed, following Wright and Warren
and later Hancock brought up the rear. 1t
was q dangerous but successful operation be-
ing entirely undisturbed by the confede
general. By noon of the 2Sth the federal in
fantry was crossing the Pamunkey and deploy-
ing two miles in front Of Hanover ferry. On
that day Sheridan had a successful cavalry fight
at Hawe's shop with Hampton and Fitz Lee.
Grant was now within eight miles of the spot
where Lee had first attacked Mcclellan in 1862
On the morning of the 9th Lee became
aware OF the new movement Of the federals
down the river on his flank toward his right
rear. He Immediately crossed the South Anna,
marching by Ashland. taking position on the
north side Of the Chickahominy. with his back
to Richmond, where he was developed in line
Of battle on this new front by the evening Of
the 29th. Lee had been reinforced recently by
Picketts four brigades, the brigades of Kem-
per and Hoke and other troops. amounting to
about 5000 men. Grant had also been stead
lily reinforced and on the 3lst Of May, notwith-
standing his losses, the official returns showed
1885 fighting men present for duty, exclusive
OF $500 quartermaster's employees, &C., slow
AOoc
the relative strength Of the two armies had not
materially changed.
CLOSING IN TOWARD RICHMOND.
Several days OF maneuvering now took place,
Grant extending southwark by his left flank,
always closing in toward Richmond, in the en-
deavor to outiank and uncover Lee, and the
latter, always on the alert, meeting the new
federal front by like extensions to the south of
his right flank. About Bethesda Church sew
eral severe engagements took place, the feder-
ais gaining some ground. Warren here repulsed
heavy assault on the 30th. Sheridan attacked
and captured Old Cold Harbor on the 3lst and
held it on the morning of June / against re-
peated infantry assaults until Wright who had
marched all night from the extreme right, ar
rived with the sixth corps when the attempt
to recapture the point was abandoned by the
rebels. Lee marched Anderson's corps to the
right to meet this dangerous movement In
fact, Anderson and Wright were both moving
on parallel lines simultaneously for the same
point. Wright arrived first. as has been stated
Anderson's column was observed early in the
morning passing down in front of Warren and
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

Fortunately for Lee, Anderson concluded or
~as compelled to move about II O'Clock that
night TO escape the smoke and fire OF the burn
ing forest, and used road to the west of that
along which Warren was moving, but in total
marching southwark on the Brock road, only
two or three miles away. Anderson's march
was several miles shorter than warren's. Thus.
when the head Of Wsrren's column, under Gen
Robinson, ellerged from the Wilderness woods
a, Alsop's farm on the morning of the sth, in
stead Of being unopposed. was expected, ex-
eeps by cavalry, perhaps, it met part Of Ander-
sons infantry, just arrived, but already in line
Of battle.
An ACCIDENTAL MOVE.
This appears like wonderful foresight and en-
srsy On Lees part, but, in fact, it was an i'm
portant result secured largely BY accident II
Andsrson had taken advantage Of the latitude
permitted In Lees order Of the 7th, and no.
marched until the morning Of the sth, it is OBJ
vio1s that Warren would have forestalled
him ss 6pottsyivanis many hours, thus plac-
ing the federal army between the con-
fsdssssss and Richmond. and occupying all the
main roads iesding in that direction L, would
have been terrible advantage to such an Off
GO - Grank
Robtnson's attempts TO brush what he sup
possd - b cavaisy-Vhich, In fac. was Ander.
sosS tnfaney-out of his path was repulsed
end the Subsequent attempt Of the entire fifth
corps mss . like fate, but some ground wa,
held and fortified close up to the confederate
Inca In thess operations the Union losse,
wee ssv~e. Gen. Robinson being among the
vo0s4e4 After Warren had passed Hancock
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

Hill was repelled with loss and Warren cap
tured about 500 prisoners. Next day he was
fully deployed and closed up against the left
(western) lateral wing of the confederates,
which extended two miles in a southwest direc.
ton across the Virginia Central railroad to the
Little river, and the crossings Of this stream
well to the west we're held by intrenched
troops.
Wright also crossed at Jericho and moved
In on Warren's right and extending across tine
railroad. Hancock ON the left drove the con-
federates back, capturing the Telegraph road
bridge aud securing some fords, over which he
crossed on the morning of the Oath, and soon
developed the right lateral wing Of Lees army.
extending in q southeasterly direction to SEX.
toms swamp and covering Hanover junction.
Burnside held the north bank ct OK ford. where
be first essayed to cross, but failed. Later :
division Of his troops crossed at Quarles ford.
above, joining on to warren's left dank toward
the river. Another division held position On
the north bank opposite OK ford, and the third
was with Hancock on the left.
Burnside, Warren and Wright made several
attempts 70 carry the western eide Of Lse'e
works, but failed Hancock's efforts on the
other flank we're also futile. No very stronr
attacks we're mads, bat Ne dsnonstrations ".
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

But the rebels quickly rallied even in this des-
perate situation. Troops were rushed in from
all sides, and Hancooks subsequent advance
| stopped, but he repealed every effort to recap
ture the line during the day, and eventually
Lee had to retire to new line further back.
| The musketry firing at this battle of the Bloody
| Angle" throughout the 18th was terrible, act
ually clearing the ground Of underbrush and
even cutting down good-sized saplings.
As usual, the supporting attacks on right and
left amounted to nothing. Warren's was feeble
and easily repulsed, and the same may be said
of Burnsides. on the left, though renewed sew
eral times. 1t was hard, under existing con-
ditions, to get the troops to go up against the
strong confederate intrenchments from which
they had been repulsed so often. 1t is evident,
however, that when Hancock smashed through
Lee was near serious disaster.
On the 18th nothing of moment happened un-
til dark, when Wright and Warren were moved
| to the left OF Burnside, extending the federal
| lines far to the southwark in endeavor to
| outfiank Lee in the direction of Richmond.
| Had this movement been set on foot In support
! OF Burnside and simultaneously with Hancock 8
assault the day before it must have succeeded.
| Now it was made IN the midst OF a tremendous
! rain storm, and was consequently 30 slow as to
give Lee time to meet 1t with like extension on
that 'front.' always closely covered with in
| trenchments.
The armies were now facing each other on en-
I tirely new ground. good deal of desultory
| fighting was constantly going on, but nothing
OF importance occurred during the 14th. 10th
and 10th, except these extensions, but on the
18th Hancock and Wright made night march
back to the old position at the angle, attacking
early on the 18th, hoping to catch the enemy
! mapping. but they were found in position be-
hind the works, as usual, and the Union troops
| were repulsed.
| EwELL's ATTACK.
| And now for the first time in this titanic
struggle Lee took the offensive. On the after
| noon of the 10Th Ewell, who had made con-
| cealed march far around to the federal right
and rear and got upon the Fredericksburg
road with his entire corps, broke into active
| eruption. He struck a division Of new troops
| under Gen. Tyler and a brigade of heavy ar
tillery under Col. Kitching, just up from Fred
ericksburg, equipped as infantry. For short
while Ewell made considerable Roadway, Gre
| ating good deal of confusion among some of
the troops, but, nevertheless met steady resist
| ance from the start. Iyler's dispositions were
excellent for meeting the attack, and his troops
| behaved well. Some Of the second and fifth
corps in the vicinity hurried over to
Tyler's aid, but he had mainly repulsed the con-
federates before they got up
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

defeating the superior federal army In the open
had evidently been put aside, though it is plain
that Lee had confidence he could do that very
thing when he marched on Grant in the VIII
derness. His previous successes in this favor
lite field against large armies gave him ground
for such expectation. But the cyclone tactics
of the confederate leader of 1923 were now
completely reversed. Lee was largely out
numbered, but not SO largely as at Chsncellors-
VILE
1t is not likely that many favorable openings
were afforded by Gen. Grant for promising
attack. but in the numberless movements Of
corps back and forth it seems strange that Lee
did not make an opportunity with his old-time
skill to strike effectively, but the early advance
on Hancock on the Pc and EwelPs feeble effort
Of the 18th were the only variations from the
timid defensive policy which ruled the con-
federate army around Spottsylvania, policy in
marked contrast with the bold advance on May
5, and Longstreets attack on the 9th.
Grants style Of fighting was a new sensation
on this front. The partisans of defunct federal
generals previously cleaned out by Lee, who
prognosticated disaster. were silenced by
Grants advance; opposition journals and the
supporters Of Mcclellan who had declared that
the war was failure spread exaggerated lists
Of killed before the country. and stigmatized
Grant as a cold-blooded butcher. Though
such agencies there was created popular i'm
preston that Grants warfare was utterly de-
void of sense or science; that by mere weight
Of numbers and through sheer stclidity he was
maintaining losing fight; that Gen. Lea
great military genius-was constantly outgen-
eralling him, watchfully biding his time and
from behind impregnable breastworks shoot
ing down the Union troops like pigeons almost
at will, while losing very few himself. Cheap
historians afterward followed these lines.
Many ignorant people are still Of that impress
sion, especially those who have read only the
earlier histories and have depended upon SEN
sational newspaper accounts for their know
ledge Of the war, written before the contem-
poraueous Official reports Of both sides we're
accessible.
Never was there greater mistake. Lee had
previously been lucky In his adversaries; now
he had met one who understood his business;
who like himself knew how to weigh relative
chances; who knew when his army was licked
and also when IL wasn't; who knew how to
spread an army ont and fight it properly, and
who did not lose his head when merely repulsed
and rush away in retreat under the impression
that all was lost. No such series of rapid and
able-even brilliant-maneuvers as those
around Spottsylvania were seen on any other
battlefield of the war. They were skillfully
met; they had 70 be TO save the confsderass
army.
TIE LOSSES ON BOTH sIDRA
Naceanafily Attacking a eovared anarnv ~ the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-22

euit, anu always clear
and positive in his orders and instructions, he
was singularly unlucky throughout in their
execution by subordinates. W. F. Smiths
attack on Petersburg is an illustration of this
fact. Grant clearly understood the vital i'm
portance Of Petersburg to the confederacy,
foresaw the necessity of it's capture, and
evolved an able scheme to effect that purpose
One of the finest movements Of the war was
the withdrawal Of 100 900 men from the very
presence of the opposing army on the Chicka-
hominy and placing them on the south side of
the James-and over 10000 of them at Peters
burg-two days before his able adversary was
aware of the change OF base.
But in spite Of Grants well-laid plans and
the overwhelming means provided to success
fully carry them out they failed. The failure
to capture Petersburg on June Is, 1864, was
one of the mysteries of the war.
Gen. Butler. who commanded on the James
had previously made an effort to take it and
failed. Gen. Gilmore, with about 1000
infantry, accompanied by column of cavalry
under Kautz, on June 9 moved against the
place, which Butler had learned was then gar
risoned by less than 1900 men, but Gillmore's
efforts we're SO feeble that he returned without
even making an attack, being scared of BY
stories that the town was full of troops. Kautz
actually rode into the suburbs, captured a gun
and some prisoners, but being unsupported
had to withdraw. On the 14th Butler relieved
Gilmore from command, and the latter asked
or q court of ing uiry.
GEN. SMITHS EXPEDITION.
As soon as Gen. Grant learned Of GilImore's
miscarriage he Immediately dispatched one of
his most trustworthy generals, with ample
force for the object. to attack and reduce the
town. Gen. Smith had previously been anxious
to undertake and had suggested the enter prise.
In his contemplated move to the south side of
the James Grant doomed it of the utmost i'm
portance to get possession Of Petersburg
After Smith started, to make success doubIy
sure, Grant pushed forward HGncock, another
officer who rarely failed Of success in carrying
out his instructions, with 5000 men, to sup
port him II necessary. While the movement
scross the James was under way Grant him.
self went to Bermuda Hundred to confer With
Buf1er on this subject and 70 concert measures
for energetic operations. Butler vas convinced
there were not moro than 1000 troops defend
ing the town, they mostly militia. Grant ex-
pected the town to be attacked by the evening
Of the l4th.
Lee, presuming that Grant meditatsd an
stack on Richmond from the southeast BE-
tween the Chickahominy and the James, had
crossed the former stream and formed . line
between the two rivers from Malvern HIN 70
White Oak Swamp, scross Gen. Grants path.
Bat Grant had other viswa TIE ofReial GORE
spondsncs Of tie confsdsrates shows eoaelu-
stvsly that Lee nov totally misapprshsadsd
Gen. Grants novsnents, Ter he did ZEE knov