The National tribune., 1892-08-04

outnumbering forces, were simply incidental
to other matter and ia running commentary,
when more or less latitude is allowable. but all
the same they are justified by the facts. 1t is
clear that only the first part of the above quoted
sentence is stated on the authority Of Gen.
Early, who says in his letter:
~ deem it proper to deny in the most posi-
tive manner ever having made any such state
ment as that attributed to me about his Jack
son's) conduct at Antietam or Sharpsburg,
either verbally, in writing, or in print"
In his Memoir, page GO, Gen. Early says this
in referring to Antietam:
ain the early part Of the day all Gen. Jack
sons troops on the field. except my brigade,
were driven from the field in great disorder,
and Hood had taken their place with his d.
vision"
In the same paragraph he says that only
1.-TWO or three hundred of Jackson's own di-
vision We're rallied by Coils. Grigsby and Stat
ford"
1t is fair to suppose. in the lapse of time, that
he has forgotten what he said in his Memoirs
about Jacksons troops at Antietam. And q
gallant comrade. j. w. Hinkley, of the Sd Wis,
in your last Issue seems to corroborate Gen.
Early as TO Jackson running at Antietam, and
If il was not disgraceful to Jackson to have
most of his own troops run in great disorder
from the field" incapable Of being rallied, it
would be difficult to determine what disgrace
never did much better, not that they were not
as good individually as the best of the Confed-
eracy, but that they were as Jackson made
them by his incompetency to command. The
bulk of them were finally captured at Spottsyl-
vanis by Hancock.
To give single example of Jackson's sad
lack of supervision and control. On May 3,
1862, the socalled Stonewall Brigade numbered
36S1 the morning of Port Republic, June 8,
but 1913, without having been in battle, and
probably numbered less than 800 after being
driven from the field at Port Republic and
stampeded to the mountains in fear of Shields.
With considerable personal knowledge of
Gen. Early professionally in the Valley, j may
say. if he will permit me, that / have pro-
found admiration and respect for his sturdy
character and admirable soldierly qualities.
His fighting at the very portals of Washington,
his terrific battles against Sheridans superior
numbers, the frightful losses he inflicted proved
him very gallant and formidable foe. After
Cedar Creek Sheridan had all the fighting he
cared for made no pursuit. and the campaign
was over, and Early was at liberty to join Lee
without molestation, as the bulk of his COM
mand did. If he had accompanied his COM
mand, and Grant had run away, as Mcclellan
did on hearing Of the nero approach of jack
sons rabble, with the reinforcements Lee had
sent him, it is reasonable to suppose that Jubal
would have been much more highly appreciated
Us thau uc IL.
Jackson's ill conducted demonstration to-
ward Washington, conceived by Lee and under
his orders, was but weak and puerie affair in
comparison, and made with much heavier loss,
for the most part incurred in his frantic races
TO escape from the traps Lincoln had set for
him, into which he had so foolishly walked,
and should not have extricated himself but for
the misconduct of Fremont and Mcdowell.
As SO many. including popular war lee
turers. seem 10 have taken lmboden's Century
article on Jackson for fact, 1t may be said with
perfect safety that it is largely fiction, and in
most matters of any importance is cOntradicted
by the record, he, apparently in great part,
having derived his information from camp and
country-folk gossip and old wives fables.
Neither was he with Jackson in the Valley,
except at Port Republic, where he was in com.
mand of q refractory "jackass battery" not
in action, and seemingly has not SO much even
as consulted Jackson's own reports, not to speak
Of others. The boys of the cavalry were well
acquainted with him in the Valley, and could
not say much to his credit An estimate of the
sort of character he was may be formed from
the following extract from one Of his general
orders:
my purpose is to wage the most active war
fare against our brutal invaders and their
domestic allies, to hang about their camps and
shoot down every sentinel, picket courier, and
wagon-driver we can find; to watch Oppor.
tunities for attacking conveys and wagon
trains, and thus render the country so unsafe
that they will not dare to move, except in
large bodies. Our own Virginia traitors-men
of the Pierpont and Carlisle stamp-will re.
! ceive our special regards appeal to the men