Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1892-09-29
NJ. WEYL'S TON pEDO BOATS.

and heavy heart.
EDGAR L. WAKEMAN.
NJ. WELLS TORPEDO BOATS.
a Question of the Relative Strength of
This Branch In the French and English
Navies.
London Saturday Review
Among the correspondence which
endeayor to enliven this dead season we
cannot rank the controversy conducted
under the heading IN. Weyl's Torpedo
boats" or "French Torpedo boats" as
being of especial interest. The cores
pendent of the Times with the Blue
Squadron has thought it instructive to
insist that he is of the same opinion as
his friend, M. Weyl, the editor of LIE
Yacht, and naval correspondent of vari-
GUS French papers. The two cores
pondents agree in thinking that the pro-
portion of forces between the Red and
the Blue Squadrons does not in the least
represent what the relative strength of
the French and English fleets in the
channel might be in wartime. 1t is
somewhat difficult for us to understand
why anybody should have thought it
worth while to waste time, ink, and
temper in disputing SO self-evident
proposition--anybody, that is, except
the Admiralty, which does seem to wish
the world to believe that the late
man9uvres might be expected to prove
something. The world, by-the-way,
seems to have good natured wish to
meet the Admiralty halfway, if we are
to judge by the weighty sincerity Of
newspaper correspondents, and has been
looking almost pathe.ically for instruc-
ton. We, for our part, expected none
and therefore were not disappointed
when we did not get any. Moreover,
we have lurking suspicion that the
world is much nearer being of our mind
than in agreement With the overwhelm-
ingly nautical, tactical, and strategical
naval correspondents of the daily papers.
Going further, we are inclined to
maintain against the Times cor
respondent and his friend, NJ. Weyl,
that, if the proportion of force between
the Blue and the Red Squadrons had
been all they think it should have been,
the maneuvres would still have neces.
sarily proved exactly nothing at all.
Either of these gentlemen would do
real service If they would explain how
maneuvres can prove whether given
force could or could not prevent another
from going through the North or any
other channel. If the Blue Squadron
had had hundred torpedo boats, and
had got them all around the Red, what
then? Until we know whether in real
war the guns of the battle-ships would
or would not sink three-fourths of the
torpedo boats before they could get
within striking distance, the man9uvres
would still have proved in the fullest
extension of the word nothing. That
being so, what does it signify whether
the proportions of force between the
squadrons represented any probable
proportion in real war or the reverse?
We are not, we presume, going to be
told that it is necessary to hold man1u-
vres to prove that, with decent luck and
q little energy, a force which is watch
ing narrow waters can catch sight of q
larger passing through, or that the
larger can hem the smaller up if it
catches it in corner like Belfast Tough.
Since Jason sailed for the Golden
Fleece there has been no doubt on these
points, and we dare say it was ira
ditional knowledge in his time.
"Another Correspondent" is inclined to
think that the Blue Squadron had quite
torpedo-boats enough, because, among
other reasons. these craft would, in real
war, be liable to be "cut to pieces and
sunk, in place of being humanely put
out of action for few hours"-and
then allowed to play again. Each of
the Blue Squadron's torpedo-boats
counted for several. of course this helps
to add to the unreality of the whole
silly business. Will somebody explain
what would happen in real war if half
the torpedo-boats engaged were sent to
the bottom, and the others, as might
well happen, were glad to escape with
without sinking a single battle-ship?
With what heart would the lucky ones
come on again, or their admiral send
picked officers and men on u succession
of chevauchees dc la mort from which
SO little advantage was to be obtained?
Until we know what the balance of
chances is, there is very little interest in
the dispute whether the French have
more torpedo boats than we or DO. If
one Blake can sink 90 torpedo-boats on
an average, it is better to have two
Blakes than 30 torpedo boats, even
though one torpedo-boat can dispose of
one Blake in favorable circumstances.
The valne of an instrument of war is its
value on the average and not in eXcep-
tional circumstances. We have built
more battle-ships and cruisers than the
French for some years past, and it has
not been proved that this is not the
better policy. As regards the number
of French torpedo-boats, the Times
correspondent, we believe, is right And
so he ought to be. The French have
paid dearly enough for their torpedo
boats, by suspending work on their big
ships in order to build the small, in
Admiral Aube's days When Admiral
Geryais' squadron was at Portsmouth
the torpedo-boats had to be sent into the
dock yard because it was not safe to
keep them out at Spithead in even mod.
erately dirty weather in which Deal
pilot boat or Penzance fishing yawl
would have been at her ease. And
these are the vessels which are to cruise
about from Lorient to Cherbourg in all
weathers.