The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-01-17

asserting that both France and Austria would
assent to the incorporation OF the province
with Italy. provided the inhabitants Of Lom-
barto- veneta should vote for the change. As
this stipulation gavo the Italians chance TO
pretend that they owed their acquisition 10
| popular VOTE II offered somo salve to the ma
tional vanity which had been almost crushcd
at Custozza and Lissa. SO far as France was
concerned In the peace preliminarles. che got
nothing. Benedict. indeed on July 20 read
| to Bismarck q despatch from Drouyn dc Lhuys
to tho effect that tho French Governments
| sanction Of the Prussian annexations presup-
| posed fair naturalization to France. and
| that Napoleon III. would confer with Prussia
| concerning this matter 80 soon ns his role OF
| mediator should be at an end. Bismarck re-
| piled with ELUSIVE friendlness that he was
ready to consider with the Ambassador tho
proposals that France intended to make.
sBenedctti then suggested that they would
probably relate to certain strips OF territory
on the loft bank OF the Rhine. whoreupon Bis
marck interrupted him by saying: Don't
mako any official announcements OF that kind
to me to-day" and turned to sign the prelImi-
naries
The definite treaties OF peace. however. were
not signed until about two months afterward.
and during tho interim the French Foreign
Offlce mado strenuous endeavors to rehnbil-
tato Napoleon III. in the eyes OF the Tronch
people. As early as Aug Benedict conveyed
to Bismarck tho French demands for conpen-
sation. with request that they should be con-
sldercd' at once. Not for second did Bis
marck entertain the thought OF granting these
demands but II the peace preliminaries were
to form the basis OF a durable peace. It was Of
the utmost Importance to gain timo and post
pono rs long as possible giving offence to tho
French Government Dr.. Won Sybel believes
indeed. that the demands now inconvenienty
pressed by the French Government did not
represent the real wishes OF Napoleon I'LL
On July IL the latter had abandoned every
thought Of annexation. After all It is best"
he said. for France to desire no compensation
for her good Offices" The author OF this his
tory has no doubt that In tho following words
the unfortunate monarch expressed tho in
most conviction Of his heart: 1T would DO q
miserable gain to win little strip Of territory
that would arouse against me tho national
wrath and hatred Of all Germany" This feeling
was consistent with the whole policy Of Ma
poleon I'LL since 1850. with tho support OF
nationalltles struggling for unity. and at the
Same time with the efforts he had constantly
made to draw near to Prussia. 1t would have
been we'll for his dynasty and for his country
had no persisted in such views. In holding
them. however. he stood alone In Paris. All
parties in that city wore as one in demanding
that either Prussias growth and German
unity must be averted. or that In the course Of
the transaction some solid advantage must
accrue to France. About the extent and choice
OF tho French acquisitions there were differ
ences OF opinion. but all agreed that Prussia.
after making her own annexations must offer
to help France to corresponding aggrandtze-
ment For what the Parisians universally pro.
nounced a Legitimate" demand two reasons
wero put forward. One was that without con-
siderable accessions to her territory the safety
OF France would be too seriously endangered |
by German unity. This theory did not testify to |
great national pride. for at that time. as DR.. |
Won Sybel reminds us. France. exclusive Of |
Algeria. contained 390O0.OOO Inhabitants,
whereas Prussia would unite In the North |
German Confederation only 29OOO.OOO.
France had besides In the event Of war, an |
enormous fleet, much greater wealth. and |
moro complete Capitalization. The deduction |
drawn by DR.. Won Sybel Is that German unity
could only become O source OF danger to
France on the assumption that the latter was
intellectually or morally inferior. Tho in
ference seems scarcely fair. since 1t required
no prophet to predict that external pressure
would almost certainly drive the South Ger
man States into the North Germen Confedera-
sAoii' Aho oeaAoA kiouuu vi WHICH france con. !
sdered herself entitled to demand German
soil. was Prussia's supposed obligation to
show gratitude because French policy had not
her from reaping the fruit of her
victories. DR.. Won Sybel contends that upon |
this score England and Russia would have
had an equal and better claim to ces.
sions OF territory. for those powers had
from first to last remained strictly neutral.
AS matter OF fact. France had since the be-
ginning OF June sought to hamper Prussia as
much as possible without exciting open hos
Unity: had on June ii issued letter against
plan Of confederate reform had on tho
day concluded secret compact with
Austria against Prussia and Italy: had on July
) published In tho .Noniten' note declaring
her purpose Of mediation and urging Italy to
desert Prussia. and had finally by her inferno
sition arrested the Prussian march upon VI |
emma and prevented the inclusion of South |
Germany in the new Confederation. Under
these circumstances the author OF this history
repudiates the notion entertained by the Paris.
ans that a cession OF territory on the Rhine
was debt OF gratitude owed by Prussia to
France. and attributes the unjustifled impros.
sion to tho still popular tradition handed down
rom Louis XIV.
".
How little Napoleon III. approved Of the
wishes OF the Parisians Is clear from his re-.
usal to sustain his own Minister for Foreign
Ai1airs. There had been q marked difference
II opinion between Drouyn dc Lhuys and
ouher as to the compass OF the French de-
nnnd. Tho latter thought it should DO con-
lned within moderate limits. since. as he alone
distinctly perceived. there was no means OF on.
orcing It His idea was that for the present
he boundaries OF 1914 LANDAU and saar.
Louis' should DO requested. which would yet
I'D OF tho consequences OF Waterloo. and that
russia should DO invited to advocate Mt the
Hague the cession Of Luxemburg to France.
orouyn do Lhuys. on tho other hand, sec.
'nded by tho Empress. was opposed to half
measures. and on July 20 carried his own
,utline OF compact to Vichy where the
french Emperor was seeking relief for bIs
ciatica and bladder troubles. It ia we'll
'nown that Napoleon III. never had much
'ower OF resisting bodily pain. and that when
'lo was strongly affected In mind and
VII. ~ was While Frustrated by physical an.
,uI Sl that his MiniStar ran Il - ht,,> :. |