Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1892-01-10

with larger aggregate loss of killed,
wounded and missing than Grant suffered.
The first reports from the Shiloh battle
field create, profound alarm throughout the
entire country, and the widest e1aggera-
tions were spread in 4 foodtide of vltupera-
tion against Grant. 1t was freely charged
that he had neglected his command because
of destination; that his army had been sur
Yrsed and defeated, and that it was saved
from anuihilation only by the timely ar
rival of Buell..
The few of to-day who can recall the in
famed condition of public sentiment against
Grant caused by the disastrous first day's
battle at Shiloh, viii remember that he was
denounced as incompetent for his command
BY the public journals of all parties in the
North, and with almost entire unanimity by
Senators and Congressman without regard to
political faith. Not only in Washington,
but throughout the loval States, public sem
timent seemed to crystallize into an earnest
demand for Grants dismissal from the
army. His victories of Forts Henry and
Donelson, which had thrilled the country a
short time before, seemed to have been for
gotten, and on every side could be heard
the emphatic denunciatlon of Grant because
Of his alleged reckless exposure of the
army, while Buell. was universally credited
with having saved it.
Lincoln Pressed to Remove Grant.
1t is needless to say that owing to the ex-
cited condition of the public mind most ex-
tTavagant reports gained ready credence,
and Ii was not uncommon to hear Grant de-
nounced OF the streets and in all circles as
untitled by both habit and temperament for
IN important military command. The
clamor for Grants removal, and often for
his summary dismissal, from the army
Eurged against the President from every
side, and be was harshly criticised for not
promptly dismissing Grant, or at least re-
ieving him from the command of his army.
! can recall but a single Republican men,
ber of Congress who boldly defended Grant
Ht that time. Elihu B. Washburne, whose
home was in Galena where Grant had lived
before he went into the army, stood nearly
or quite alone among the members of the
House, in wholly justifying Grant at
Shiloh, while large majority of the Re-
pUblicaCs of Congress were outspoken and
earnest in condemning him.
did not know Grant at that time: had
neither partiality nor prejudice to influence
nv judgment. nor had I any favorite Gen
erai who might be benefited by Grants
overthrow. but l shared the almost uniyer-
sal conviction Of the Presidents friends that
he could not sustain himself if he attempted
20 sustain ant by continuing him in CON-
mand. Looking solely to the interests of
Lincoln, feeling that the tide of popular re-
sentiment was so overwhelming against Grant
that Lincoln must yield to it, had repeated
conferences with some of his closest friends
including SWEET and Lamon, all of whom
agreed that Grant must be removed from his
command and complained of Lincoln for
his manifest injustice to himself by his
failure to act promptly in Grants re-
noval.
So much was Impressed with The import
RDce Of prompt action on the part of the
President after spending day and evening
in Washington, that called on Lincoln at
Il o'clock at night and sat with him alone
until after l o'clock in the morning. lie
was, IS usual, worn out with The days ex-
Rcting duties, but ne did not permit me to
depart Until the Grant matter had been
gone over and many other things relating
10 the war that he wished to discuss L
pressed upon him with ali the earnsstress 1
could command the immediate removal of
Grant as 2n imperious necessity 20 sustain
himself As was his custom, he said but
little, only enough to make me continue the
discussion until it was exhausted. He sat
before the open fire in the old Cabinet room,
most of the time with his feet up on the
high marble mantel, and exhibited unusual
distress at the complicated condition of
military affairs He knew that I had no
ends TO serve in urging Grants removal be-
vouG the single desire TO make him be Just 10
himself, and he listened patiently, occasion
ally throwing out terse suggestions to con-
tinue the conversation until every phase of
the question had been exhausted.
could form no judgment during the con-
ve7satiOn as to what effect nv arguments
had upon HIM beyond the fact that he was
greatly distressed at this new complication
When L had said everything that could be
said from my standpoint, We relapsed into
silence. Lincoln remained silent for what
seemed 10 be very long time. He then
gathered himself up in his chair and said in
q tone of earnestness that 1 shall never
forget: 81 can't spare this man; he
fights"
Lincoln Stood Alone in the Right.
That was all he said but knew that it
was enough, and that Grant was safe in Lin
coins hands against his countless hosts of
enemies. The only one man in all the
nation who had the power to save Grant was
Lincoln, and he had decided to do it He
was not Influenced by any personal partiality |
for Grant for they had never met, but he |
believed just what he said-'T can't spare |
this man; he fights" L knew enough of |
lincoln to know that his decision was final, |
and knew enough OF him also to know that |
he reasoned better on the subject than did /
and that it would be unwise to attempt to |
Unsettle his determination.
The method that Lincoln adopted to
TesCue Grant from the oGium into which he |
had, to very large degree, uniustly fallen,
was one of the bravest and most sagacious |
Nscts Of his administration. Halleck was
Commander of the military division consist
ing OF Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and
possibly other States but he remained at his |
headquarters in ST. Louis until after the |
battle of Shiloh. Lincoln's first move was
70 bring Haileck to the field, where he at
once superseded Grant as commander of the |
army. This relieved public apprehension
ana soon calmed the inflamed public senti
menJ that was ciamoring for Grants dis
missal. Lincoln knew that it would require
time Tor the violent prejudice against Grant
10 perish. and ne calmly waited until it was
sale ior him to give some indication to the
country Of his abiding faith in Grant as a
military commander.
saEscity of Lincoin's Methods.
Halleck reached the armv at Pittsburg
handing on the 11th OF April. four days
after the battle had been fought, and, of
course, his presence on the field at once
made him the commanding officer On tie
S0th Of April when the pnblic mind was
reasonably well prepared to do justice to
Grant, an order was issued assigning him
'ss second IN command under the Major
General commanding the department
THIS was an entirely needless order so far
ns mere military movements were involved,
and II is one Of the very rare cases in the
history Of the war in which such an order
was issued. Only under very special circum-
rranoec co7IG Thare ha oon,Siop Tor