The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-04-15

the Southern states to secede in peace.
Only three days after Lincoln's election
Greeley published an editorial in the
Tribune in which he said: 'tIf the cotton
states shall become satisfied that they
can do better out of the Union than IN
it, we insist on letting them go in peace. !"
Two weeks before Lincoin's Inauguration,
Greeley editorially reiterated this view.
Seward, Chase, Corwin and Charles
Francis Adams were so appalled, by the
thought of civil war that they all became
converts not 10 courageous conservatism,
but to abject cowardice. Seward was so
frightened that as late as March he with
drew his acceptance OF the office Of secre-
tary of state. but was induced by Lincoln
to recall his declination to serve March ..
Taken all in all, Lincoln found his cabi-
net a weakened clump of politicians,
who from roaring radical Republicans had
become contemplate towards at the threat
Of Whit of grapeshot. Lincoln was
genuine conservative, but no coward,
man of honor and inflexible conscience.
Worse than all Lincoln found that not
only was his cabinet instinct with coward
ice, but that General Scott had so little
faith in the capacity of the government to
save the Union by arms that March 3, 1861,
he wrote Lincoln that he would have to
choose between conquering the states by
invading armies, which he deprecated, or
saying to the seeding states. with
Greeley, Hayward sisters, depart in
peace" Lincoln never noticed this letter.
Scott on the 2sth of March advised the
evacuation Of Forts Pickens and Sumter
in order ito soothe and give confidence to
the eight remaining slave-holding states"
Lincoln, with Scott and all his cabinet
against him, had yielded so far as to leave
Sumter to its fate as military necessity,
but Scott's ignoble advice to evacuate Fort
Pickens in order to keep the wavering
states in the Union and coax back those
that had already seeded was an entirely
different counsel, and Lincoln's courage,
common sense and deep loyalty to his
trust revolted at once from this policy of
poltroonery, and he rose to his feet, too
late to save Sumter, but soon enough to
Il
From this time forward Lincoln relied
upon himself, having found out by his
initiatory experience that he could not
safely lean on the senile Scott for military
advice, nor on his cabinet for wise politi-
cal counsels, and when Lincoln heard the
magnificent response of the people to his
proclamation after Sumter, he found out
that he could safely rely on their courage
and pugnacious loyalty. His cabinet and
General Scott might wear the white cock
AIDES of peace in their hats, but the people
rose to their feet, every man with his
hand on his sword hilt, and after that
day Lincoln preferred to trust the people
rather than consult a superannuated SOL
der or a cabinet of cowardly, temporizing
politicians, who did not understand the
people they had presumed to lead all their
lives.
Lincoln's courage is vouched for by
Grant and Sheridan as superior to that of
any man in his cabinet, even when it in
cluded the masterful Stanton. Out of
Difference to Scott and his cabinet Lincoln
once failed to follow the dictates of his
courage and his Judgment, but he never
made that mistake a second time. He
took the people into his confidence rather
than his cabinet, and the people never
gave him cowardly counsel nor lukewarm
support. The first month of Lincoln's
administration was his severest trial, but
it taught him that he must take the
responsibility since his cabinet had neither
courage nor wisdom to impart.
Lincoln was emphatically president
after that; he radically recasts with
his own hand Stewards dispatch
to the British government concerning the
Mason and Slidell affair; he romptly Or
ders Fremont to recall his premature
proclamation Of emancipation; he tells
Horace Greeley in August. 1862. that his
oath of office binds him primarily to pre-
serve and defend and restore the Union,
not to destroy slavery; that his oath of
office forbade him to indulge his primary
abstract judgment on the moral question
of slavery; he writes the order for Nc
Clellan's removal with his own hand; he
forbids Grant to hold any military con-
vention looking to peace with Lee; he for
bids Seward the exercise of any final au-
thority in the Hampton Roads conference;
he three times on his own responsibility
offers the Confederacy peace and payment
for its slaves if it will lay down its
arms; his correspondence with Mcclellan.
Hooker. and especially with Meade. show
how sound his natural military instinct
was; he was n born general; his dispatches
10 Meade between September and Deem
Der 1, 1868. leave that commander without
any reputation for moral courage or mill
tary enterprise and energy. He was
opposed by Greeley, by Wade, Fremont,
Winter Davis. Sumner, Chase, but he
quietly and calmly vanquished them all !;
they stung him sharply and often, but he
endured the pain and brushed away the
wasps at the first opportunity.
Lincoln was often misunderstood by
Stanton and Seward, who had no sense of
humor and couldn't understand that Lin
coin told stories and read Jest books when
his great heart was bowed down, bleeding
and ready to break. They couldn't see what
other men quickly saw. that Lincoln often
smiled to call attention away from the
tear in his eye. Grave he was, for all his
state papers are filled with the melan-
choly eloquence of great Hebrew prophet.
but he had habit of whistling to keep his
courage up in public, while the gloom that
oppressed HIM in private was solemn testi-
mony 70 the depth of his mental suffering
and anxiety.
The last thought of Washington. en-