The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-12-25

ton 70 that OF Richmond. It's ADVANCE hhu
been slow but unchecked. and now. with
both the York and james rivers at COM
mand as avenues OF supply. and all its prepara-
tions complete. It was about to strike the final
blow for the capture OF tho Confederate tapi-
tai. What was the result? Eighty thousand
Coniederntes attacked this army OF 100000
mon in its chosen position and drove 1t from
Mechanicsville and Cold Harhor. across the
Chickahominy. and thence to James River
where. half disorganizcd. It sought snfcty from
destruction under cover OF tho ncot OF gun
boats In the river. Here, powerless for offence.
1t was left amid tho swamps and lowlands
under midsummers sun to tho ravares OF
diseases moro depicting than had been the
Confederate arms. Tho so.called aieEc OF
Richmond was ended and few weeks later
Mcclellan was sent for to defend the fortilca-
lions OF Washington against the victorious
advance OF Lee. e., D.
Tho events OF the campaign which Witnessed
tho discontinue OF Pope occupy some sixteen
chapters OF this narrative. few pages. how
ever, su ffice to sum them up. We are reminded
that on Sept. . 1852. when Iope's career as
commander Of tho Army o'Virgnia came to an
end. only about three weeks had elapsed since
Lee had left Richmond with Lopgstreet Tor
the Rapidan. At that time large sections OF
tho State were in possession OF the Fed
erals. and armies aggreSating over loo.ooo
men Including the forces under Mcclellan.
under Pope, and under Burnside, threatened
the Confederate capital. McClellan's army
WAS about to leave Wcstover to unto with
pope and Burnside on the Rappahannock Leo
determined to strike his wcakor adversary.
Pope, before this juncture could DO ELECTED.
Moving with celebrity he designed to cross
tho Rapidan on Aug. -. and strike Fope's
army whls 1t lay between that river anu the
Rappahannock. But tardy transportation ana
n mistake OF his cavalry cost tho Confederate
leader two days. and deprived him OF tne pest
opportupities to effect his purpose The Fed
eral army. when once behind tho Euppahnn-
mock. together with tho uncertain character OF
tho river ITSELF bafiiod Lee for two days more.
Increasing, however. the boldncss OF his STRAIT
Any as difficulties occurred. and ms the union
OF tho two hostile armies into an oNerWhc!m-
ing force in his front became more imminent
he adopted n plan OF cam paEn such as IN Ioi.
Allan's opinion. only masters In tho arr OF war
may hazard. The result proved the sound
Less OF his judgment. He had not been able
to prevent tho junction OF a portion OF Mc,ic'-
lan's troops with those OF POPE. but no had
defeated tho latter General after these re-
endorsements had joined him. while two.thirds
living at Alexandria: the one-third OF
n which had reached Pope was involved
In his disaster. Nor had the Confed-
erato victory been partial one. so
FAR "a the army under Pope was concerned
tho success was far-reachirG and complete.
In ten DAYS that army had been driven from
the Rappabannock to Washington with tho
loss Of half its strength. Its numbers had
dwindled from 10000 to about 10000 mon.
It had lost heavily in killed and wounded.
Some seven thousand unwounded prisoners
had been captured and paroled. Numerous
pieces OF artillery. many thousand small arms.
and quantity OF ammunition had gone to re-
plenish tho scanty ordnance of.the Conted-
crates. Large amounts OF quartermaster.
commissary. and other stores had been ap-
propriated by Jackson's troops. but far
larger quantity had been destroyed. For the
time Pope's army was incapactated for offen-
sive operations That in a week or two a
Federal army under Mcclellan was again able
to take tho field was due to the fact that a
Federal force greater in number than Lees
whole army had not been involved in Pope's
defeat. This force constituted o fresh army,
| into which were incorporated the remnants OF
! Pope's command. 1t is pointed out that among
| the advantages secured by tho Coniederates
| as the result OF this campaign were the re-
|
vicinity OF Richmond to that OF Washington
the recovery OF large part of northern Vir.
cinin with the supplies it contained. and the
| opportunity oftransferrinc the theatre OF wal
from Confederate to Union territory 1t Il
Col. Allan's opinion that when the great dis
pnrity OF force against which Lee had to con
tend is contrasted with the splendid result!
Of tho campaign. there Is no room left for criti
| cism OF the audacious strategy by which
those results were accomplished. The prob
lem presented to the Confederate leader wa
one Of the greatest difficulty. No successful
solution was possible that did not involve i'm
mense risk. 1t Is pronounced an inspiration
OF daring seldom paralleled that conceived
the movement to Pope's rear and cen'do
the most delicate part OF its execution t
Jackson. who was the Ney OF the Confederat
army.
Perhaps the most interesting portion OF thi
volume is that which deals with Lees inva
sion Of Maryland. Twelve chapters are N
lotted to the topic. and this section Of the nal
rative closes with u review OF tho eampnig
and concise summary OF the several move
ments comprised in the battle Of Antietam. c
Sharpsburg. the name preferred by Contede
. ate historians. As regards the programme
tho Confederate commander. we are reminde
: that the discontinue of the army under PoI
and the retreat OF all the Federal forces to I'll
, lines about Washington had brought to LIZ
, the opportunity. and at the same time had in
Y posed upon him tho necessity. OF adopting
new plan OF operations. 1t was impossible Il
, him to inflict serious damage upon the enem
Q | by advancing further in the same direction
r As he said in letter written to President ID
n | Wis on Sept. 3. 1862. he had N intention OF Il
t lacking the Union commander in his fortiac
D tons. and was not prepared to invest ther
t Even had he possessed the neccssa
: munitions. he would have heen unab
o to supply provisions for the troor
il Accordingly. lee turned his eyes to II
n north side OF the Potomac. His views. as S
: forth in the letter Just mentioned. were rs fc
n lows: THE present seems to be tho most pr
= pitious time since the commencement OF Il
: war for the Confederate armvto enter Mar
0 land. Two grand armies Of the United Stat
0 which have been operating in Virginia. thoui
It now combined. are both weakened and demo
s allied. Their new lsvies Of which unde
n stand $4,000 mon have already been posted
d Washington. are not yet organized. and W
l. take some time to prepare for the field. II
Il is ever desired to give material aid to Mar
n In MI MI ofrer h ar an opDortuDitY OF thrown