The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-01-10

M FtAEN&-
REAR VIEW OF briggs SCHROEDER RAPID FrsE
GUN.
citizens within her boundaries. Il might
irnprison sailors; catch ap all vessels
within the limits of her jurisdiction and
conhscate their cargoes. II might send
forth its well-equipped national naval
marine run down and seize American
vessels on the high seas. 1t could aggra-
yate this work by issuing letters Of
marque" and authorizing fast steamers to
help themselves TO merchant ships which
are owned and sailed by United States
firms.
The officials of the small nation could
keep up this sort OF warfare for some time,
carefully avoiding direct battle with our
naval squadrons, their success depending
more upon the deetness of their steamers
and ships than upon their ability TO sue
coed In direct naval engagements.
We can conceive that a small navy on
the Pacific coast could make q very large
disturbance. Il could run INTO small
harbors ike that OF San Diego take pos
session and hold on TO the city and the
water, standing on the defensive; and il
could fortIfy and garrison the coast city
thus seized. or make the effort; and
II might even attempt several an
chorages of the coast, say of San
Francisco, for its ironclads. and so
put that city and Oakland under contri-
button. As before intimated, by naval
operations alone q very small nation, rec
ogniZed by other nations in its beIligersnt
or war rights, could effect an incaiculable
AMOUNT OF damage to great nation like
the United States
The seal catching could be stopped and
the enormous Alaska trade rendered of no
value. The lumber business carried on 50
extensively from the Puget sound could
be interrupted and seriously impaired. if
not destroyed. The growing trade of
wheat and other cereals between the Pa
cific coast and the Hawaiian islands,
China and Japan could be checked. d.
minished and perhaps DESTROYED.
The wonderful fishery business-salmon
catching on the lower Columbia, for ex-
ample, which now employs hundreds of
vessels and thousands of men-couId be
alarmingly restricted by hostile squad
rons. Behold such enemies lust outside
the channels and bars and rivers Would
not investors IN that business be likely to
withdraw their capital?
These small suggestions are enough to
enable thinking men TO see the immense
damage that single spark of actual war
coming from any nation, however small.
could effect. No man or set of men could
calculate the immense conhagration that
MALICIOUS
kindling.
Your third question is the most i'm
portant, viz: How could the United
States meet any aggression from abroad ?''
We will consider aggression, in illustra-
ton, from the Pacific coast alone. On the
Atlantic the conditions would be the same,
though, of course, on larger scale
4 country situated on the sea should
have three lines of defense when receiving
an attack from the sea; first. the navy
itself; second, forts, torpedoes and habor-
defense vessels. liked and movable. and
after foreign enemy shall have
established himself In a harbor, then
the third Is the army proper, with
base IN the interior. In our case we
are partially supplied with the first line
OF defense; still our navy is not large
enough 70 protect our vast commerce.
therefore, ii alone could not be considered
as an absolute check TO an enemy moving
against our coast
In the second line We have some good
guns OF old pattern mounted at principal
harbors, as at San Francisco and san
Diego; number of submarine mines that
could be placed In position TO shut out an
enemy and close the openings TO the har-
bors; they would just now be mines that
would explode on contact with the vessels.
and not by electricity. Soon, however, we
look forward to q complete system of
electric cables.
Again, We have for sudden use all the
tugs, small yachts and harbor boats
which, by great sacrifice of life and pror.
erty, giving each a long spar in front and
some dynamite, can be used TO protect the
entrance 10 the harbor. These mean. win
other aids readily suggested 20 inventive
brains might keep out an enemy from our
Pacific coast harbors; that is from sam
Diego, San Francisco, Columbia river and
Puget sound.
But assuming that these should not he
enough, should an army attack fail. and
1uTIher. that one haroor. San Diego. for
instance, should come into full possession
of the enemy; then held srmv womb
have 70 be equipped and organized in order
10 regain that harbor and somehow check
mate the enemy, who, doubtless. en-mv-
Ike, would be attempting to act from this
location as base 10 extend his power.
Assuming san Diego 10 be in the power
OF hostile force, the ultimate direction
IN which that force would act would he
northward, Tor by our DESTROYING the raul
roads in Arizona, and blocking the vast
unsettled country with few railroads IN
Nevada. Its action would then be confined
10 working up the coast toward San Fran
CISCO PROBABLY cttacking San Francisco al
the same time from the sea In such a
contingency the United States would con
centrate troops as rapidly as possible "a
near the front of the enemy's action "a
would be safe; and make rapid rnoveroan.
toward Los Angeles. Probably hoO,eve-
that place would fail into the hands at an
enemy before We could gather there a snf-
nclent number OF troops 10 act against an
invading army; then We might conren-
trate on the line Of the Southern pacis.
railroad south Of San Francisco and tbs
Sacramento valley
Ol our present regular army nrohablv
not more than 10000 troops wonl3 6a
available, the others being REQUIRED in .bs
posts they now occupy 20 project III. neo-
PIE from local troubles or foreign at,scks
Ihe states would &c speedily called rn0-,
ny the president 10 furnish such nunhs-
OF men as would give Us a larger armv
than the hostile one landed. or nrobabis.
landed, by our opponent. There woul5
oe rom few states welt-drilled militia
but they would be unaceustomed 10 cam
pa1gnlng and field service. From other
states We would only expect raw levies
Al hrst, then, We would have 10 suffar
the greatest loss of valuable lives white
operating 10 contine the enemy wirhin "a
close limits as possible; perhans falIing
baex before him, until, by eouinnirg arJ
drilling these forces, We should be in snf-
hcient strength 10 give him battle win
reasonable hone of success. Even II We
were defeated IN one or more enra0arnents
our case would give no dire disconr.sa-
ment. for the recruiting and increasing oF
our army and training of the peonIa a.
great distance, which is possible on ac-
count OF the size of our country voIl5
make II certain that We eventualiv vso,,lJ
orlVe any hostile force that could probably