The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-11-23
THE GERMAN CRISIS.

Chancellor Caprivi declares that on the
passage of the army bill by the reichstag.
before which body it comes tomorrow. de-
ponds the fate of Germany.
1t IS not easy to understand how the
failure of measure, which adds $1,000
to the annual draft of recruits, bringing
the total CONSUMPTION to 2350O0 men an
nually, should be fatal to Germany, so
this remark of Caprivi must be taken as
an expression of strained personal anx-
iesy for the fate of his pet government
measure.
The total peace effective of the German
army under this bill would be about co.,
900 men, which is an enormous draft from
the earning and producing classes of the
empire. The added cost of the army en-
tailed by this bill, all of which must be
raised by taxation or borrowing, is from
$50, 600 to $40, 600, 900. The motive for
this increase of the German army is found
in the excellent condition of the French
army. Here are the official returns of the
military forces of France on November l.,
1890: Regular army and reserve, l,5l0.-
29ti territorial army, 994, 6i5; reserve Of
the territorial, l,226. go; officers, $4,000:
gendarmerie. officers and men, 1900;
total, 1888, 195.
Every intelligent reader Of the history
of the Franco-German war sees that France
was beaten by going recklessly to battle
without preparation against a powerful
enemy perfectly ready for the contest.
Gen. Sheridan, who was an eye witness Of
the great battles of Gravelotte and Sedan,
says that the French fought with great
gallantry; that their musketry and artil-
iery fire were vastly more effective at
Gravelotte than that Sof the Germans, but
their gallant army was wrecked 'in con-
sequence of blundezs without parallel in
history" At Woerth MacMahon &C
cepted battle with the crown prince, pit
ting 5000 men against 175,0o0. Bazaine
made Metz his base and stupidity placed
himself in position to be driven back to It,
when there was no obstacle to his joining
his forces to those of MacM ahon at
Chalons. The third and greatest blunder
of all was MacMahon's move to relieve
Metz by trying to slip 10000 men along
the Belgian frontier.
Bazaine carried $50, 900 men into Metz,
which should have been held, if at all,
with $1,000 men. With the bottling up of
Bazaine at Metz and the capture of Mac
Mahon's army at Sedan. the triumph of
Germany was assured. The French
fought with great gallantry, were we'll
armed and skillful in the use Of their
arms. but they were beaten by the stu
pendous plumbers of Napoleon's military
directory. As it was, if MacMahon had
marched as fast as the German soldiers,
he could have joined Bazaine; if he had
marched as fast as the French soldier ha-
bitually marched under the first Napoleon
he could have given the hand to Bazaine
and saved Metz, Alsace and Lorraine.
Gen. Longstreet agrees with Sheridan
that the capture of 100000 men at Sedan
by 250, 900 and the surrender of 10000 at
Metz were disasters only possible to
grossly incompetent and laundering COM
manders. Sheridan says that Gravelotte
would have been lost to the Germans at
one time had Bazaine possessed the
slightest enterprise or talent.
Now, the German generals today know
all these things; they know that France
has been at work twenty years preparing
the finest army in Europe; they know
that her system of mobilization is
as perfect today as their own; tina,
the Lebel rifle is the best arm in
Europe; that France is covered with en-.
trenched camps; IN a word. that she is
prepared for war; that Germany canno,
hope for such luck and such stupidity as
won Sedan and Metz, and for this reason
because of this tremendous preparation OF
France. the German emperor desires to in.
crease his army to the highest possible
number that his people will bear in time
of peace.
This is why so much hangs on the fate
of the army bill which Bismarck oppose:
as needless.