New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1892-01-24

oroanization of the forces and the incidents OF
the march He shows that the discipline was
effective that the troops were well iooAcu "i'Vi
and that their temper was excellent p"o he
indicates also that as the expedition prooeeueu
a sense of care amounting. in the case at IcdSD
of General Custer, to apprehension became per-
vasive and conspicuous. This seems TO nave Deen
the atmosphere of the camp on June ~, when
General Custer was ordered to advance with the
9TH Cavalry up the Rosebud River IN pursuit
Of the Indians, whose trail had peehs lo'hu ~
Major Reno a few days before.
At this point began General Clusters lhde-
pendent responsibility so far as his orders lett
him Independent. At this point, therefore, comes
in the question of his obedience IL mas been
charged that he disregarded his instructions.
No: a little popular effect has been produced D!
the declaration of a clergyman at the funeral
services of General Terry that his fatal move
ment was in direct violation OF both oral ana
written orders. and that General Terry had mag
unanimously concealed that fact. AS General Fry
points out, this is not only grave charge against
General Custer, but also an lTnpuaton against
the sodery character Of General Terry ii he
gave his subordinate orders which were ds-
)beycd those orders should be on record. Where
are they? They have been called for, but they
have never been produced. Did General Terry
neglect his duty by SupprcSsing them? The
only orders in evidence are the undisputed writ
ten orders given TO General Custer on June -,
"to proceed ND the Rosebud They set forth
General Terry's "views," to which he desired
General Custer TO conform, unless ne saw - sum-
Gent reason for departing from them AS Ten
ara Fry remarks, he certainly Obeyed the order
TO proceed up the Rosebud, and everything
else was left to his discretion" Where ana
when were these recorded orders OF June ~
superseded by the "orders' the direct viola
ton" of which was fatal to General Custer ana
his men? Nowhere and never" is the only an
swcr which the evidence justliicS. The charge
of disobcdcnce falls to the ground
The military judgment of General Custer has
also been impugned. lndispuably the calcula-
tons upon which he proceeded were erroneous
but that is not the heart of the question The
whole campaign was based upon mlsconcep-
ton for which no single individual was TcSpon-
sible. The number of Indian warriors in the
field was greatly nderstimatcd. The strength
of the ayOwcd " hostilc>' was taken as meas
urc of the difficulty of the problem. II was not
known that they had been heavily reinforced by
ardent fighters who had slipped away from the
agencies. though General Sheridan had received
and forwarded too late some suggestive infoma-
ton on that point. 1t was supposed by General
Terry that Clusters coo troopers would be con
frontcd by force little if al all larger than his
own and General Sherman official report subSe-
quently justified that expectation. 1t IL true
that a. General Custer marched up the Rosebud
,Don his fatal crrand nc found reason almost 70
double that estimate. On the verge of ruin his
Indian scouts scented danger and predicted
trouble and he himself disclosed signs of solicl-
,udc and depression But in reality the hostilcs
numbered at least $500 fighting men. The
military authorities had all been deceived. Per
hapS the facts ought 70 have been asccrtalncd
in some way, but they had not been and pre-
vang ignorance was the main cause OF dsas-
ter. Captain Godfrey cites rs a secondary but
important cause the "panic rOut' OF Major Keno
which enabled the Indiana TO concentrate their
attention on General Custer but General Fry
in his notes is careful 70 give Major Reno al
least the benefit of the doubt, by quoting Gen
eral Shermans official approval of his "braye
and prudent conduct" We need not dwell upon
that point. General Custer and his battalion
terminated General Fry concludes that his
fight twas forced by the situation that "he
showed neither rashncss nor DESPERATION" and
that if he had delayed or avoided battle he
probably "would have been condemned, per-
haps dSgraccd." Captain Godfrey evidently
agrees with General Fry, though he states his
opinion in language somewhat les foriblc.
The conclusions, then, 70 which, it seems 10
us, the sifted evidence now available must I'M
mistakably lead every candid mind are these :
That the massacre of the Little Big Horn was
the consequence of lamcntable error for which
General Custer was not accountable; that he
obeyed implicitly the one positive order which
he received; that he used his large discretion
in strict conformity with the expectations of his
superior and the developing situation, and that
he accepted an agonizng and pitiful fate with
perfect devotion.