Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-06-11
Trouble Feared in the Michigan
Mining Region.
COLONEL CARR'S EXPEDITION
THE PLAN THAT FAILED.
Introducing Mckinley's Name Helped
Rather Than Hurt Harrison.

/ political moves. From the start the
| question was not how many votes
Mr.. Harrison could win over. but how many he
could hold; it was not question Of whom Mr..
Harrison could defeat, but question OF who
\ could defeat Harrison.
Having all the votes, practically all the
votes, to start with. the administration
forces were the subject Of attack
from first to last, and many terrible raids were
made upon them. Most of the skill and shrewd-
ness, as those terms are understood in politics.
was on the anti-Harrison side. The Harrison
men were the plain and erect element beneath
this upper surface of politics.
LITTLE ENTHUSIASTIC DENOMINATION.
There was little enthusiasm exhibited among
them for their own candidate; therefore it WAS
not to be expected that they would be easily
moved by demonstration Of wild enthusiasm
for the candidate on the other side For long
time their lack of enthusiastic demonstration
left the impression that they were generally
lukewarm in supporting the President.
This, of course. applied to the general run OF
delegates, and not the Indiana delegation. They
appear to have been men who came with def
mite purpose in view, and held steadfastly to
that purpose.
The apparent coldness of verv many Of the
| delegates who had at an earlier stage been
| known to be for Harrison not only deceived
the Blaine people, but also caused the Harrison
] people a lack Of confidence which was not
voiced in their public expressions.
For instance, on Thursday morning, but q
few hours before the market house meeting,
which showed the Harrison force to run up to
| nearly 500, with prospect Of the full number,
which they afterward got. Mr.. New had ex-
pressed the belief that they would not be
able to nominate Mr.. Harrison on the
| first ballot, lacking q few less than
a majority of votes, which he felt
that they could absolutely depend upon. He
knew that the administration had every right
to expect more than 500 votes, yet SO non-com-
initial were some Of the delegates that it was
impossible to tell what reliance could be placed
in them, especially when they we're exposed to
| the arguments Of the most skillful politicians
| who have been leaders in the republican party
WHEN BLAINE RESIGNED.
On the day Of Mr.. Blaines resignation the
crowd at Minneapolis completely lost their
heads and the impressionable men In the Harri-
son ranks gave evidence OF such CONSERVATION
as to give the impression that Mr.. Blaine might
carry the convention with a rush. This situa-
tion was the only thing that put Mr.. Blaine in
the fight fairly, and it opened up with pros
pect Of his nomination, and for some time af-
terward his stock went up rapidly.
The Harrison managers, though they recov-
cred from the shock, were still anxious feeling
that within their own lines they had some
very uncertain clements to deal with-oppo-
ra,,ts N contend aoainet ba u,ara Vx,.r, A..
their equal as the directors of a political ma
chine.
THE n KINLEY MOVEMENT.
1t was when the Harrison people were feeling
thus that the Mckinley move was made by
them, indirectly, for the purpose of gathering
and holding from Blaine votes that they feared
would give him the nomination. The first
move, therefore, toward Mckinley was
made by Harrison people. His selec-
ton as chairman of the Convention was
acquiesced in by the eanti-administration people
with the idea that holding that position would
embarrass his possible candidacy.
When the Blaine people had practically run
their course and began to feel their weakness
they themselves took up the idea of forcing Nc
Kiniey's candidacy, believing he would draw
votes from the Harrison forces.
Mr.. Foraker, however, resisted any move
toward Mckinley which might be serious until
the last day, when it became evident that
desperate game had to be played to win. Then,
when the other Blaine managers assured Gov.
Foraker they had secured enough Of the Har-
rison votes for Mckinley on the condition that
Ohio would support him TO prevent the nomi-
nation Of Harrison on the first ballot, Mr.
Foraker consented, with the result as to Ohio
which WAS shown in the convention
The anti-administration men then appeared
to believe they had made Harrison's defeat on
the first ballot assured. 1t was confidence in
this which led TO the conclusion not TO further
resist the majority report Of the committee on
credentials.
When it was found by the Harrison men that
Ohio was going to vote with practical unan-
unity they were desperately anxious, feeling an
uncertainty which the result of the ballot makes
appear inexpiicabie.
The understanding Of the Blaine people and
the fear Of Mr.. Harrison's friends was that after
the vote of Pennsylvania was passed the anti
administration people had matters fixed for q
general slump of the Harrison forces through
the rest Of the roll call
But while Garrison, PIatt, Quay and the rest
OF uem naQ Deen oolng some very cievcr WORK,
the Harrison people were not idle. The sntsg-
onism between Magee and Quay In Pennsylvs-
mia came iSto play for the benefit Of the Prssi-
dent.
WORK OF MAoKE AND pALzKIL-
Messrs. Magee and Dslzell got to work on the
Pennsylvania delegation and prevented the solid
vote for Mckinley, which was to stampede the
delegates voting afterward.
When it was found on the roll cal that Mich
igan and Ohio bad gone in great force to Mo-
Kinley the result Of the ballot appeared ex-
tremely uncertain. and it was whispered through
the hall that when Pennsylvania did, as was ex-
pected, she would cast nearly Q solid vote for
Mckinley. South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas
would follow with break to the Ohio states
man, and Mr.. ClArkson had counted up enough
Harrison votes below that would 20 TO McKin-
ley to prevent Mr.. Harrison's nomination.
PENNSYLVANIA SAVED TEE Pnxsrpxxr.
But when Pennsylvania wss reached ths vueA |
Of Ar. Aagss bad become apparent Nr.