Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1892-04-17

unity of the State. Thus the influence Of
the small States ~ coequal with the large
IN tho contingent mode of election pro-
yioed for by the Constitution would be IN
some degree restored by the proposed
amendment
This Is not q new proposal. II IL similar
70 one made by Senate committee tMr.
Benton, chairman) in 1825-'26. That dis-
pensed with electors. but the people were
20 vote by districts. and the majority IN
the State could not destroy the vote by
districts. The wisest statesmen OF that
day supported II. Macon, Van Buren,
Hugh l.. White, Benton, Findlay OF Penn
sylvania, Hayne OF South Carolina, and
johnson OF Kentucky. McDufie and Ben
ton removed 1T in 1928 and Calhoun and
Benton Ia 1874.
ADVANTAGES SUMMARIZED.
Let me summarize tho advantages OF
some such scheme:
/. 1t insures q more just expression OF
public will by increasing the number OF
local centres OF opinion. IL Is true that IN
each OF these last q majority may constrain
the minority. but by Distribution of power
between these localisms we increase large
" the chance for the minority in the state
10 be heard through some of them. III the
State votes solidly the minority cannot be
heard---its voice Is utterly suppressed. II 1t
votes by districts, and each district voices
Its free sentiment, then diversity of opin-
ion Is expressed and felt through districts
as representatives of local thought and
will.
What monstrous violation of right, that
the sentiment Of half million of voters In
New York be not heard because one more
than o half million think differently How
much more fragrant the violation whom by
the law the half million are compelled IN
eject TO vote tor those whom they really
vote sgainstl Is this fair Is it not
fraudulent expression of popular will? ,
New York in 1884 gave MIR. Cleveland
LOO more votes in a million than 1t gave
Mr.. Blaine. but IL gave him thirty-nx cleo
tors as representing all. In the contem-
poraneous election TO Congress by districts
the delegation was nearly equally divided.
Which best voiced public sentimentf
2. Ii eaualizos the States by giving each
its appropriate numerical strength in ex-
pressing the popular will. Delaware may
give 1000 majority to A and New York DOC
majority TO B-whst is tho result? The pre-
poDderance of popular confidence IN A ex-
pressed by 5000 Delaware men Is over
whelmed by 1000 New Workers, so that as
O result of the superior excellence the law
attributes to a New Yorker over Della
ware man, Il gets S6 electoral votes and
A only three. Aud while by counting the
number of votes in both States A gets
1000 majority of voters. b gets twelve
times as many electoral votes as A. Is this
equality between States? Does 1t no.
make gross Inequality -,
3. II allows every form Of popular will
TO express itself. Divide New York into
thirty-fve districts and there might be "a
farmer" silver man, monometallist, as
we'll as regular Democratic and Republi-
can electors, selected. BY total vote the
plurality voice, though minority, would
sweep the State. General Taylor in 1913
got the whole electoral vote of New York
because Cass and Van Buren, divided the
Democracy, casting together a larger vote
than Tavlor's. The minority gave him the
whole vote.
4. IL will 90 far to prevent the election
of President against the will of O ma
iority of the voters. Why should mi
nority elect President2 And yet rs re-
suit Of the present system Mr.: LINCOLN
was made President with a half million
majority against him, but with 1870 electors
against 1913 for all others, MIR; HAYES be;
came President when Mr.. Tilden bad
$50, 900. popular majority. This system
has resulted generally IN electing NIL
nority President for the last thirty years.
8. IL will prevent large States and evenly
divided States from being so pivotal IN an
election as TO put the eligibility OF their
citizens for the nomination at premium,
and Of the citizens of smaller States ana
of States not so divided at q discount.
Why should New York and Indiana COM
mand nominations for both tickets? Are
no other citizens as fit? The answer Is
the system makes IL so.
G. 1t will prevent bribery and the use OF
the 4" bar'eln 1t is said to carry New
York is TO elect" 1t demands of both
parties 10 pile up their funds for buying
votes, where IL will do the most good. "
The certain and small States on both sides
may be let alone, but pivotal New YORK
must be bought, for the purchase is sue
cess; not 10 do SO is failure. But cut her
up INTO districts and bribery viii cease,
for the temptation il gone 10y reducing the
stake from thirty-tye votes to one.
Z. Organize party conventions on the
same plan, aud the nominations will not
be dictated by the pivotal States. Let the
delegates be elected by districts-not by q
State convention, as Is done IN some, but
not oil the States. The vote IN the NATIONAL
convention would thus be distributed to
collect the sentiment of localisms, and not
consolidated by the suppression OF the
minority by the domination or mo-
lority in State conventions.
8. One other good result will, believe,
follow: Sectionalism viii decrease. In
many States the majority sentiment may
be intensely sectional. but in all OF them
there is o brave minority who are never
heard. If this suppressed voice could
find utterance bv com bining with that IN
other States it would be potential to still
the fierce intersectional strife, modify the
antaeonism Of party conflicts, and bring
into harmonious and patriotic cooperation
estranged and hostile, peoples. ms las
been the result IN the House or Repre-
sentatives where the election of members
by districts has dlffused the will OF the
people of State among its local mueller
and broken the solidity of its majority
sentiment into the wider and better ex-
pressed opinion of Its people in their dis
tricts.
THE EFFECT OF GEgRYNANDING.
In this connection / may advert to al
objection often urged: that the States
would be gerrymandered by the dominant
party in them were this district system
adopted. No doubt this is true; but Will
all this mad-pa purpose to do injustice
look at the result. Few States which
have been evenly divided have been SC
districted as wholly to suppress all repre-
sentation Of its opponents. In ONO tnt
Democrats year ago, and the hepuoii
cans more recently. have gerrymandereC
tuhl Olhlt, Dtt tASlA paw FofN W ~
ponent a considerable proportion OF dis
tricts, none of which could have expressed
their viii under the solid vote. OF tht
whole State. No doubt there wit be abuse
OF power. but no abuse cen produce re
suits so yiolative of right and justice az
the present system, where the. votes Of
millions are never felt or heard because
suppressed by the solidarity OF State
vote in the large States.
Another scheme than the district sys
TEN has been suggested, TO which l neec
only refer. II proposes to pro-rate the
majority and minority vote in
State between the candidates for Presi
dent. 1t is designed thus to conserve thu
minority right. Ny objection TO it is no
on principle, but rather that the mach
merry by which it is 10 be worked may o.
too cumbrous. intricate, and indefinite K
be practicable. We must avoid any scheme
which may bring the presidential success
sion INTO such doubt as TO imperil thu
peace and safety Of our institutions whel
The question comes to be arbitrated. re
cur to the dangers of 1877 with an appre
hension that unless the same be avoided
iu the future the integrity of the Constr
tuition may be jeopardized.
Your request that l should give you m,
views on the questions you have spoken o
u 81 xxFsth n