, 1892-03-24
(Coneluded from Wednegday.l }

HIS lllSSIQus Wy OulQ anyone nave the laTCl
Ihood to say that Edwards, Sullivan anC
Eames, conceding them to be men of com
mon sense, were not able to understand
from this indictment, when they read it
that they were charged with attempt tt
brlbe Leach to move for a resolution to re
consider a certain vote of the board of edu
cation by Offering to pay him five Thousand
dollars We think not, and must, there
fore, conclude, that the Indictment is suf
ficient
1T is also contended by the respondent;
that the state constitution having provided
who shall be the executive officers of this
state, no one is subject to Indictment under
the code for offering to bribe any Other
officer excepting those named. That the
constitution repeals the law as to all execu
tive officers excepting the governor, lieuten.
ant governor, secretary of state, treasurer
auditor, superintendent of public instruc-
ton, and commissioner of public lands. II
this were true we are inclined to think the
Indictment is sufficient to put the defen-
dants upon trialfor a common law offense
Bribery, as defined by the common law. is
the unlawful giving or receiving of any
thing OF value in corrupt payment for an
official act done or to be done. Second
Bishop on criminal law I Ed. IS.
Greenleaf generally dennes bribery as
the receiving or offering of any undue re-
ward by or to any persons whose ordinary
profession or business relates to the ad-
minlstration of public business i'll order to
influence his behavior in forcing or in
ducing him to act contrary to known rules
ofhonesty and integrity. Our statute has
not attempted to define the crime of
bribery. The most that it has done if it
can be said to have legislated upon the
subject atsall, is to assert that certain acts
constitute bribery, and to fix the penalty
for commission of those acts. This STAT
ute has not abrogated or repealed the
common law as to crimes, but on the con-
trary has recognized and adopted them.
Ofcourse, where the crime is defined by
the statute and the punishment fixed, as
many crimes are defined by our laws, such
as murder, larceny, assault and battery
ETC., the common law is abrogated as to
that crime, but such we think was not the
intention Of the legislature with reference
to the crime of bribery.
But it is not necessary for us to decide
this question: as we are of thu opinion that
Leach was an executive officer Of the state.
and that the statute in relation to bribery
Of executive officers was not repealed or alb
Togated by section one of article three of
the constitution. The constitution does
not, IN our opinion, undertake to limit the
executive officers of the state to the
officers mentioned in section one, and
construed III harmony with its other
provisions, especially with section two
OF article n, that 'fall laws now in force in
the Territory Of Washington, which are
not repugnant to this constitution. shall
remain ia force until they expire by their
own limitation, or are altered or repealed
by the legislature, Z it will appear that the
object Of the constitution makers was I'd
classify the executive departments of the
state rather than to exclusively establish
It's executive officers. The language of the
section IS mandatory. 1t says 1.-THE execu-
tive department shall consist u ETC. If the
contention of the respondents is correct
that the intention of the section was to-
limit the executive officers of the state.
their further position that the legislature
can by subsequent enactment increase
those officers, is untenable; for the essence
OF constitutional provision is its Iinita-
ton on the power Of the legislature, and
when the constitutional provision is ex-
elusive In Its nature 1t is supreme, and it is
not within the power of the legislature.
to vacate or alter it. Hence their main con
tentlon would force US to the absurd CON
clusion that the constitution perpetuallv
limits the executive officers of the state to
the officers mentioned in said section. No
known rule of construction will Justify
such conclusion in this case. Section one
of article two of the constitution Of the
United States provides that the executive
power OF the United States shall be vested
IN president of the United States of
America. Section three of article three of
our constitution provides that the supreme
executive power of this state shall be vested
IN the governor but the power conferred on.
the president by the constitution of the
United States. has no qualifications This
language is FULLY as conclusive as the Ian
guage used in section one of article three
ofour constitution, but we think it will
scarcely be contended that the trainers of
that reyered document intended to legis-
late exclusive executive power in the pres
Ident Of the United States, or that they in
tended aught else than that the
president should be the head Of
the executive department. The mem
bers OF this board are certainly public of
feers under any definition that can be
found of the term public officer. The de-
partments OF the government provided for
IN our state constitution, like most state
constitutions, are divided into three gen
eral classiHcetions, VIZ: The executive,
Judicial and legislative. and when an of
fcer is appointed or elected under our sys-
tenn OF government he comes within one Of
these classes. Judicial offices are those
which relate to the administration of ius-
tlce, and the term has meaning So well
and so universally understood that a tech
nlcal definition is entirely unnecessary.
The legislative offices are as well under
stood as relating to the enactment of laws
Hence the members of the school board an
pointed under the provisions of the act of
March 9th, 1890, cannot be construed as
either judicial or legislative officers. Some
thing has been said about ministerial of
fcers. A ministerial officer, as defined by
Bouyier, is one which gives the officer no
power and no charge of the matter to be
determined, but requires him to obey the
mandates OF the superior. Plainly those
officers would not fall within this classifica-
tion, even if the theory of the appellant is
not true, that this designation applies more
properly to a class of acts that may be re-
Of 81,
OF officers, and that the acts of any officers
IN which they have no discretion are minis
terlal. An executive officer, however. is
one whose duties are mainly to cause the
laws to be executed; and this power is es-
pecially conferred upon this board by the
second section OF the act creating them.
1T provides that the administration Of the
common school system shall be entrused to
the state superintendent of public instruc-
ton, and the state board of education, ETC.,
and some other provisions for the
appointment of the board. We think
there is nothing in the contention
of the respondents that the board
having once passed resolution adopting
UNIFORM tystem of school books could
not legally reconsider the vote or rescind
their action, and thatit was not a crime to
offer TO brlbe an officer to do something
which the officer could not legally do.
Ihe case cited to sustain the position,
W., state ex rel Flowers, Board Of Educa-
tlOn, 30 Ohio State 1858, does not seem To
meet the requirements. That case was de.
c1ded on the strength of q special statutory
restriction on the Board of Education
which was as follows: mo text book
shall be changed within three years after
its adoption without the consent of three.
fourths of the members of the Beard of Ed.
ucatlon given at regular meeting" (" ETC..
and the change made by the board in thai
instance had been by a vote Of sly To We