The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-11-28

war SO long as peace can be maintained
with honor; but the surest way to avoid
war is in time of peace to make such pre-
paration as to demonstrate Enthusiastically
that we are in position to defend ourselves.
nation is never so thoroughly In po-
sition to maintain and preserve peace as
when it is evident to all the world that it
can not be attacked with impunity. Such
q condition adds weight to a remonstrance
against wrong or aggression. and even in
the case of arbitration of disputed ques-
ton 1t Is very likely to have its influence
on the decision of the arbitrators.
We should not be so confident of our
strength. or of our exemption from danger
or attack. as to be unwilling to take
lesson from other nations. II We consider
what they are doing in the way of defense
We shall find that none of the great
powers are remiss in this particular.
England never acquires mile of territory,
whether It be colony, a strategetic post.
or merely q coaling station tor her
fleet. but she Immediately proceeds
to render it as impregnabie as
modern science and engineering
skill can affect. And today. from Ha flax
on the east, TO Esuuimat on the west, she
has encircled our shores or the ocean with
girdle of fortresses that in case of war
would form a circle OF fire and steel.
In 1854 and 1855 Notifications alone pre-
served the arsenal of Cronstadt from be-
ing destroyed. and st. Petersburg from
lying at the mercy of the foe An English
commission appointed to consider the
question of coast defenses for Great Brit
ain, In referring to this fact. said:
We refer to the sea de'enses OF Cronetadt,
where the allied fleets OF England AMI France
were Tor TWO years d -terrci rom max ing an at
tempt either to capture o. IN lard the place, or
to destroy the fleet of Russia. chiefly owing to
the foresight that nation had shown in con-
strue'ing during long peace formidable and
extensive system of fertilization.
Gibraltar, the KEY to the Mediterranean,
has been so fortified by the English that for
four years the combined forces of France
and Spain struggled to take it,
but the English held it and have
held it ever since. That was many years
ago; since then England has been contin-
ually at work strengthening and lmprov-
ing the defenses, and introducing all the
latest inventions and improvements to
render it absolutely impregnable.
Fort Sumter. in the narbor of Charles
ton, was held for four years against all the
fleets of gunboats and warships that we
could send against it. These examples
illustrate how effective land batteries and
Notifications are against naval attacks.
and 1t IS to observed that any
attack that may possibly be maize
upon our country in the future must be
ny naval forces. rs our geographical posi-
ton and numerical strength will always
insure Us immunity from military inya-
sion.
1t coast Notifications were necessary
when sailing vessels were in vogue. and
wind ana weather were potent factors in
their success or failure in an attack, they
are trebly so now, when fleets of sucn pow
ersul vessels as our fathers never dreamed
OF, by the ala OF steam, are rendered inde-
pendent OF such contingencies as elemental
di,turDances may bring about.
Sin in RI ha ha{ I
in any way wish to depreciate the value of
an efhclent navy rs a national defense,
but its chief value lies, in fighting ship
against ship, to drive OIL or destroy an
enemy's fleet before it can attack our
shores. and TO protect our commerce and
Interests abroad. Powerful vessels, butt
especially for harbor defense, are invalu-
able to protect the shipping in our ports.
out when IL comes to fight between
ship, which is floating fort, and fort
on shore. the advantage is with the land
tortihcatlon. On this subject Gen. Flag
Ter. chief of ordnance. in his testimony
before the committee on coast defenses
SAID:
Military men of high repute, whose opinions
are regarded very highly, have stated generally
that tbs 7 Considered one gun in a fertilization
eequiva emit 70 i've afoat Others would make
tle difference very much less.
would only speak OF what think the COM
mittee Will zee. that any gun On shlp-I am
now speaking OF combats between ships and
ioftlhcations--the gun that Is on the snip is In
Trail fertilization. 1t Is q fortifcation which
one shot Can sink. one shot can sink the whole
fortidcation: whereas in our land Notifications
that Is not tie. and constructed Is they will be,
1t will be nearly impossible to destroy
the guns, and they are secure against
such al accident a. l refer to on a ship. You
Will understand that IL Is not to be reasoned
from this that ships are not necessary. They
haye their own duty to perform, and the land
fertilization has its duty TO perform; ut for
q mel. nd barh pr 2 ha, ma,
permanent iortincdtion on land that be sit
uate at point that Will command the channel
or the.wate- that the snip is to occupy has an
immense advantage, because OF its safety against
accident
The board on Qualifications or other de-
lenses appointed under the act of March
3. 1888, recommended for twenty-seven
principal ports OF the United States 500
guns, OF from to l6-inch caliber, and 100
Finch mortars. making total of l299
pieces OF ordnance. The chief Of ordnance
states that OF this number about one-fourth
OF the guns and about one-fifth Of the
mortars VII be required for the defense of
three points only on the Pacific coast.
namely, San Diego, San Francisco and the
mouth OF the Columbia river.
No provision was made in that report for
the defense OF Puget sound, which has be-
come of far greater importance than it was
IN 1882 when the report was made, nor of
Grays uarbor, nor other ports on the Pa
citic coast. At least 5i0 guns and mortars,
according To the later estimate OF the board
OF fortihcation. will be required for the
proper defense of the Paclhc coast AZ the
four principal points named. ut least 300
guns and mortars being required for Pu-
get sound alone.
Gen. Flag er estimates that after de-
Quoting 100 guns which are now under
contract with the Bethlehem company
the Wateryliet factory vii. only be able to
manufacture the balance OF the ], 229 guns
and mortars referred 10 by the year 1875.
Think what may tie the consequences of
this delay of thirteen years!
/; is ev dent from these figures that the
deienses necessary for the safety of our
coasts are not progressing so rapidly as Is
desirable. On this point Gen. Fiagler in
his testimony said: Il think congress
and the country feel that We should 20
faster in the production of guns than we
| are able u do with one factory at Water
viei arsenal, and III my judgment the best
way 10 increase this product would De by
| another gun factory"
Few peOple have an idea Of the time re-
| quired In build guns. The appropriation
! LOT the building of these modern high
! power guns vas made three years ago last
! December. as | understand. There we're
! namely, two >-lnch, two l0-inch, aud one -
+ inch. ASIDE from these there have heen
( only Twelve s-!nch guns turned OUT. This
! - 0iI Ne nave to show rs entirely COM
pe,ai work. Ii is expected that only
J r.ere0 more guns vii be turned out dur
ing the present calendar wear, namely,
- l.