Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

GEN. JOHN GIBBoN OF THE IRON BRIGADE.
maintained their ground with obstinate de-
termination" Gen. Taliaferro mistaken
in surprising the federals to be in immense
and greatly superior force" but correctly
reported II as lone of the most terrific con-
ficts that can be conceived Of" He says that
.'for two hours and half both lines stood I'M
moved neither advancing and neither broken
or yielding" These noble troops could ask
for no higher praise.
The Iron brigade lost s9l men in this action.
which they call the battle of Gainesville. The
confederate loss cannot be exactly stated. but
it was probably somewhat heavier. Gen. EweIl
lost his leg and Taliaferro was also severely
wounded. Col. Edgar O'Connor OF the second
and Major May Of the nineteenth we're killed.:
Col. Cutler of the sixth, Col Robinson, Lieut.
Col. Hamilton and Major Bill OF the seventh
and Major Allen Of the second were wounded.
Several colonies and other confederate field
officers were killed and wounded. 1t was. in
deed, bloody encounter
Even late as Gibbons fight, with ener-
getic action. there still remained time to inter-
pose between Longstreet and Jackson. The
pike at Gainesville toward Groveton could
have been occupied by the divisions of King,
Ricketts,. REYNOLDS, Sykes. Morell. Schenck
Schurz and perhaps 5000 of Banks men dur
ing the night. At daylight on the 29th at
least 40. 900 men could have been hurled upon
Jackson's exposed right flank eight hours be-
fore Longstreets arrival on the scene, with
Pope approaching his left flank from Center
vile with 20 900 more. The result could not
have been doubtful.
ANOTHER MISTAKE.
But for the third great mistake of this short
campaign which now occurred Gen. Pope can
not be held responsible. In the absence OF
Mcdowell, who had begun to understand the
situation more clearly and was at this very
moment consulting with Pope on tho necessity
of holding the pike about Gainesville. the
subordinate generals concluded that their po-
sition Was critical, although Gbbon had held
his ground, ard withdrew after midnight
oward Bristoe and Manassas junction. includ-
ms Ricketts, division, which Mcdowell had
wisely sent during the day 20 Thoroughfare
Gap. thus re;ardng Longstreet's advance
| about eighteen hours. This withdrawal opened
tn road for Longstreet to join Jackson about
nocn on the 29th. though the Pope-Porter con-
troyersy has caused a great dispute as to the
exact hour of Longstrcets arrival on the field
Pope's opportunity TO fight with decisive ad-
vantages was now gone. But jackson did not
owe his escape to his own skill but rather
| to his opponents laundering tactics. Gen.
Pore could now only expect to meet the CON-
bined confederate corps or concentrate behind
Bull run at Centerville heights and await Lees
| attack. But with singular doggedness he still
believed jackson could be caught unsup-
ported. and at daylight on the 29th Sigel and
Reynolds moved to attack him, not the from
vantage ground near Gainesville held the
night before. with the help of King and Rick
ett5, but alone. and along the intrenched posi-
ton of the old railroad cut They failed to
secure any decisive results,