The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-04-09
WAS VICTORY POSSIBLE?

u
mattox whether Lee would ever have had
to surrender. whether the Confederacy
might not have at least temporarily sue
ceeded in winning its independence had
its administration under Davis been as
able as that of the Union under Lincoln.
At superficial glance it may seem safe
to say that with its inferior numbers
and resources the South would have been
ultimately beaten in any event, but there
is much to be said against this conclusion.
The slaves, the non-combatants, one-third
of the whole, were required to work in the
field without regard to sex, and almost
without regard TO age. The four million
colored non-combatants were equal to
more than three times their number in
the North, age for age and sex for sex, in
supplying food from the soil to support
armies. Women did not work in the fields
in the North, and children attended
school.
The CONSUMPTION acts of the Confed-
eracy were of the most sweeping charac-
ter. The first Confederate conscript law,
enacted in March, 1862, required the serv-
ices of all white males, with few excep-
tons, between the ages of IS and s.. In
February, 1854, the law required the serv-
ices of all white males between IL and 80,
"for the war" while the boys under II and
men past so were organized into regiments
of junior and senior reserves. Even the
"free negroes" and certain number of
slaves were held liable by this law for
the performance of auxiliary military
service
The state of North Carolina alone fur
nished under these CONSUMPTION acts at
least $4,000 men to the armies of the
Confederacy, and the full muster rolls, it
is believed, would swell this number to
10000. The number of men gathered up
by the Confederate CONSUMPTION acts from
first to last was probably not far from
1900
The 100000 of the South were not
fighting for the invasion or conquest of the
100000 of the North; its simple purpose
was to repel invasion and defy conquest,
and this General Beauregard is confident
it might have done long enough to have
wearied the North into a peace, had the
administration of the South under DAVIS
been as wise and statesmanlike as that of
Lincoln. Beauregard argues with great
force that the failure of the South in it's
struggle for independence was due to the
obstinate refusal of Davis as commander
in-chief to adopt true military policy.
The educated soldiers of the South urged
upon Davis that concentration was the
only hope against an enemy of superior
military resources, but Davis insisted on
the policy of diffusion, which placed an in
ferior Confederate force at each separate
point defensively confronting a superior
Federal force, ''our power daily shrinking,
that of the enemy daily increasing, until
the Federal policy of attrition gradually
wore US out"
Beauregard illustrated his policy by his
conduct at the field of Bull Run. where he
massed his army and that of Joe Johns
tons successfully against Mcdowell.
while the Union General Patterson stood
idle with 1900 fine loops. Joe Johnston
did the same thing at Fair Oaks when he
flung superior force on McClellan's left
wing In the same spirit Beauregard
pushed superior force on Grant at Shiloh.
and Bragg. by the Same policy of
concentration, beat Rosecrans at Chicka-
manga. Beauregard insists that but for
Davis fatal policy of diffusion Grants
Vicksburg campaign might have been
turned into fatal disaster. Beauregard in
sists that in military sense the South,
properly handled, could not nave failed,
but that its defeat was due to the fact that
"its executive head, Davis, never gathered
and welded its great strength under the
ready advantages that greatly reduced or
neutralized its adversary's naked, physical
superiority. Passive defensive policy may
make long agony, but can never win a
war"
With the interior lines in its command
the true policy of the inferior force is con-
centration at important points upon the
enemy, for only in this way can the use of
the shortest military line equalize the
offensive power of contending armies
Diffusion was a hopeless policy against the
superior numbers OF the North, while con-
centration of superior forces against i'm
portant points was the true Napoleonic
policy, and always possible so long as the
South held the interior and shortest lines
of movement. Concentration might fail
in execution, but il was the only sound
military policy. while diffusion was I'M
sound military policy that no execution
could lead TO victory.
The superficial superiority of the North
could be seen by the ordinary eye. but to the
vision of superior military minds like Grant
and Sherman, in the beginning it looked
| like very doubtful and desperate con-
| test. Admiral Porter never believed in
| our success. even after Vicksburg. He
was no faint-hearted fighter. but until our
armies captured Atlanta III September,
| 1854, he declares he did not see his way
| clear TO victory. The defensive position
/ of the South gave them the shorter line,
so that with inferior numbers they could
| reinforce their right hand with their left.
/ the West from the East, and vice versa.
more rapidly shan We could; they were
familiar with the field of operations: they
| were better horsemen and more skilled in
| the use of arms than the men of the
North; they were absolutely united, while
al least million of Northern copperhead
| voters were absolutely hostile and wished
! the government defeated, and at least
| another million gave it the half-hearted,
carping, critical, obstructive allegiance
represented by Governor Seymour, of New
|