Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20
ARLINGTON, 1862.

ARLINGTON, 1867.
the wounded generals place was filed by R
+ Lee. But this was not the only favorable
result the battle of Fair Oaks had upon the
confederate fortunes. As before remarked, it
completely paralyzed Gen. Mcclellan for .
period Of nearly four weeks, affording the new
confederate commander ample time to collect
large force and consummate his arrange
menta for final and successful assault upon
the Union army. Lee brought down Jackson's
forces from the Shenandoah, body Of troops
from North Carolina and still others from South
Carolina. 1t Is very difficult to 'size up" ex-
actly Lees force when the Seven Days battles
strength covering that date, but from the nom-
inal returns and other sources it appears that
his movable column was over $4,000 strong,
with %, COO men in the Richmond Notifications.
Most southern writer's place his force at be-
tween GO. 900 and 10000 but these estimates are
palpably too low. Gen. Johnston in his Mar
rative" estimates Lees reinforcements after
Fair Oaks ut $4,000 men, which Is doubtless
too high, but it Is clear that superhuman
efforts were made to hurl upon Mcclellan an
irresistible force.
Gen. Lees plan in brief, as stated BY him
self. was to cross the Chickahominy above Nc
Clcllan's right with his main force, sweep down
that stream on the north side, striking the
Union army in flank, melacing its communica-
tions, while Huser and Magrudcr should de-
flank movement (and cover its cxtenD by
noisy demonstrations from that front upon
the federals over the ChickaDominy. McClel-
lans dispatches to Washington show that he
partially penetrated Lees design and was fully
aware Of Jackson's presence in the neiphbor-
hood at least two days before the blow fell
Yet he still declined to concentrate at the real
point Of attack.
McLELLANs POLICY.
"Change Of base" found Judgment in Nc
Clellan's brain prior to Lees attack; certainly
before the result Of that attack could be known
He was in a most gloomy frame of mind, wildly
exaggerated the enemy's strength and antici-
pated defeat. Filled with forebodings Of dis
aster, 1t is not surprising he was averse to ac-
cepting the gage OF battle and failed to avail
himself of the splendid opportunity Lee ten
dered him of fighting strictly defensive bat
tie with his entire available force against a nu-
merically weaker enemy and almost certainly
winning signal victory. He was moro bent
Gu retreat than fighting. On any other hv-
po:hesis 1T Is wholly unaccountable that he
should leave Porters single corps to meet
1000 confederates when it Is remembered the
attack could az well have been met with 90. 600
If fight at all, Mcclellan should have followed
Lees example and put in his whole army
Porter's fight proves conclusively that he could
not have been whipped i'll the splendid position
of Gaines mill-a position from which Porter
for hours. with one-fourth of that army re-
pulsed the charging confederates.
On the 25th Of June, the day before the ball
opened. he telegraphed to Washington that he
and the army would do the best they could
against Leo's 200, 900 men," and that 1.-THE re-
sponsibility for the result" would not rest on
his shoulders unpromising, responding let
ter from the chief general of the republic not
to mention its insubordinate. even insolent.
tone. The wounded President replied to this
dispatch as follows:
WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862
Mai. Gen. Mcclellan:
Your three dispatches Of yesterday in rela-
ton to the affair, ending with the statement
that you completely succeeded in making your
point. are very gratifying.
The later one of G:15 pm, suggesting the
probability of your being overwhelmed by
200 900 and talking Of where the responsibility
belongs. pains me very much | give you all
can and act Oh the presumption that you will
do the best you can with what you have. while
you continue ungenerously think, to assume
that l could give you moro if would. have
omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send
you reiuforcemenss Whenever possibly can.
"a. LINCOLN"
infantry, 5,O35 cffectSe cavalry, 3,197 effective