The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1892-07-28

pay and no money to do it with" Our owr
safety depended OH our getting to Lynchburs
as soon as possible, capture the town, destroy
the railroad and canal, and then find our way
back to our base as speedily as possible. If the
enemy shall bo in force when we get there
and our little army, wornout from hard march.
ing, and starved for the lack of food, shall moi
be able to capture the place by direct attack
we cannot stand to invest it and begin siege
| operations. 1t is a forlorn hope, but we go on
Leaving Lexington behind in our track OF
conquest, we march for Buchanan. Here the
James River had to be crossed, which was
done at a ford, and Buchanan was captured.
! The enemy greatly over estimated our forces
AND WOULD NOT STAND.
Passing on we crossed the Blue Ridge, and
dropped down into the Valley above Lynch.
bGrg and fought our way to that city, the OBJ
jective point of our march. We arrived at
| Lynchburg the 10th of June. Up to this time
Gen. Hunter had been very successful. Over
coming all difficulties with comparatively
small force, he had cut his way into Lynch
burg, destroying an immense amount of the
enemy's supplies and manufactures.
On the 10th Gen. Hunter attacked the
rebels in their strong position and the fight
| continued until late at night, and as then
understood, we had driven the enemy back, but
during the night he received reinforcements-
| as we knew from the noise of the incoming
| trains to Lynchburg, which we heard during
all hours of the highland in the morning he
opened on us in very heavy force with fresh
troops from Richmond. Lynchburg, with its
railroad and canal to carry supplies from the
Valley to the rebel army defending Richmond,
was of such Importance that Gen. Lee sent his
entire Second Corps, commanded by Gen.
! Early, over 10000 muskets strong, to the de-
| tense of the former place, and the larger part
! of these troops arrived there before Gen. Hun
| ter did, and the balance came while he was
| there. This corps of reinforcements added to
the robel force already there must have made
| the enemy at least $4,000 strong. They were
right OH their base, fresh with plenty of sup
plies. We, with but little more than half their
number. were
STRIPPED OF ABOUT EVERYTHING,
| except. perhaps, our courage. We were far
from our base. without forage for our animals
without ratioHs for our men, and were without
| ammunition to fight and hold at bay the pow
erful enemy that was confronting us. 1t was
no longer a question to capture Lynchburg
but how to get away from there with whole
skin. know whereof / speak. Our Signal
officers discovered the movement of the heavy
rebel reinforcements Gen. Lee had sent to the
defense of Lynchburg and the Valley, and of
course Gen. Hunter knew of it. 1t was known
that the enemy also moving to position to
get in our rear to cut off our retreat. The con-
dition of our army was critical. The animals,
at least a great number of them, are dead and
dying; large numbers Of the men, unable to
march further, are ready to drop down by the
roadside Hard marching and starvation had
injured the army more than rebel bullets.
There is an end to human endurance and the
end had come to hundreds of poor fellows.
Relative to the rnmor mentioned by Comrade
Mart Howe, that Gen. Crook ask ed permission
of Gen. Hunter to take his division and pro-
7 bx,,x ,,,1,t IL, ~
it was not practicable and might have led to
disaster, and
DISASTER THERE WOULD HAVE RUINED US.
If Gen. Crook ever made such request, Gen.
Hunter in refusing to permit such rashness
only evinced the proper prudence of an able
commander. The men defending the rebel
works at Lynchburg were veterans from Lees
army, and they had won renown upon many
bloody field. They could not be surprised and
stanpeded by night attack. They were too
many, in their well-chosen position. for Gen.
Crook with his little division of some 6,000
men to assail even in daylight. Gen. Crook
was needed to cover the retreat. Not only that,
Gen. Hunter had already burned all the powder
before Lynchburg that he could spare. The
little that remained had to be kept Tor fighting
that might become necessary on the retreat in
falling back TO our base. Ifs" prevented us
from capturing Lynchburg. If we had had
could have captured the place. Being out of
ordnance stores there was no route of return
open to us but by way of the Kanswa.
The morning of June II looked gloomy enough
to the army. During the forenoon there was
some heavy fighting to the left and center of
the line. The enemy must be taken care of
and deceived as to our intention until we could
get ready to leave. In the afternoon the Head
quarter wagons were turned and Gen. Hunter
began to withdraw from the front of Lynch
burg by his transportation moving of first.
THE RETREAT WAS CONTINUED
for four consecutive days and nights, if re-
member correctly. without even making a halt
to eat, sleep or rest. The sufferings of the men
can be better imagined than described. Those
who could get corn parched it and lived on
that. but even corn was about as scarce
everything else. That route had been gone
over 80 often by troops that it was eminently
bare of supplies. and if a crow had undertaken
to fly from Lynchburg to the mouth of the
Gauey he would have had to carry his ra-
tions with him.
No rations were obtained until the 2sth. 1t
was long march to the Kanawha River, and
two large mountain ranges, the Blue Ridge and
Alleganies. had to be crossed. The enemy fol-
lowed sharply as far as Salem They had
found the rear rguard ugly. and decided not to
modest it further, but moved northward TO the
Valley. 1t was mastery retreat, under the
circumstances, though disastrous in result.
Having reached the Kanawha River. Gen
Hunter moved his troops by river and railroad
to Harpcrs Ferry. The difficulty of navigation
by reason of low water and breaks in the rail-
road caused some delay, but the army got there
in time TO take part in the brilliant campaign
in the Valley under Gen. Sheridan (Gen. Hun
ter having been relieved at his own reuuest) |
wherein the rebel army was destroyed.
RELATIVE TO THE RUMoR
mentioned by Comrade Mart Howe that Gen.
Hunter had room " for his refugee negroes |
but no room for his men, there is absolutely
nothing in it. If Gen. Hunter carried with
him on the march an army Of refugee negroes
no one in the Signal Corps saw them and our
positions for observation were supposed to be
as good as any. The truth is that the negroes
with the army belonged there as servants and
cooks of the officers, and they were not in very
large numbers
Gen. Grant, the greatest soldier of modern
times. heartily approves in his Personal
Memoirs" Of the military operations of Gen.
Hunter, his way OF retreat. under the circum-
stance, and commends him to the country for
gallantry. This high authority. together with
Gen. Hunters success. ought to be an answer
to all criticism.
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