Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1892-07-08
THE LAW OF RIOTS.

Decisions OF the Supreme Court as to Thos'
Who TSke Part In Riots-fsight Of Cor
porations to Protect Property by Fore'
| ofArma
Yesterday afternoon at the law library il
the Court House lawyers were engaged il
groups discussing the legal bearings Of thu
Homestead riots. One of them, who claimed
to know wherein the Supreme Court had
decided cases Immediately pertinent to the
present affair, went to the library and un
earthed the following decisions Of the Su'
preme Court: The first decision was by
Justice Clark, and Is found in the Second
Pennsylvania Lar Journal Reports on page
81. It relates to the question as to who are
the rioters, in view OF the law, and is as
follows:
It Is not necessary that any person, in or.
der to bring himself into the perious post
tiot of Rotor, should be q chief actor in the
scene OF outrage, Tho common law. founded
On the teachings OF centuries, holds that ii
any person. seeing others actually engaged
in the riots Joins himself to them and as
eists therein he fs as much a rioter as If he
had first assembled with them Tor that BUR;
pose; faasmuch as he has no pretense that
he came innocently into the company, but
appears CO have Joined himself to them with
an intention of seconding them in the exc.
ecution of their unlawful enterprise. And
1t would be endless, as we'll as superfuous,
to examine whether every particular person
engaged in riot was in truth one of the first
assembly, or had previous knowledge OF
their design. Every person who encourages
or promotes aud takes part in the riots,
whether by words, signs or gestures, or by
wearing the badge or ensign of the rioters,
Is himself TO be considered such, for, In this
crime. all cOncer are nrfn
The second decision, brought down relates
Immediately to the right OF the Carnegie
Steel Company to take into their mill armed
men who are not sworn officers of the law.
This decision was rendered by Justice King,
in the case of the riots Of 1914, and the per-
tinent portion is as follows:
70 the first question proposed the Court
distinctly respond. that the arming OF Q
threatened malicious burning by mob,
founded apprehension or the realty and dan.
ger Of such threats, is NO offense against the
laws OF this Common wealth, but the simple
oa .T Of sa s':r Z ss % .o By & ns com
person, habieatach or property against one
who manifestly intends or endeavors by VIC
lence or surprise to commit q known FELONY,
snd .hs Ps ssSsp FIJI. s 20
involves of necessity, the right to collect
and prepare the means of making such de-
fense effective. To deny the latter, makes
the concession of the former unsubstantial
and illusory. Although there Is a peculiar
sanctity attached to the habitation of q
citizen, and although in defending that
which Is expressly called his castle, he may
20 to great extremities, yet that is not the
only part Of his property he can defend
against q felonious assault. Nor can we
perceive why the same right, which pertains
to individuals, to defend their property SO
assailed, does not extend to properly owned
by corporations ior other lawful asso-
Citations Of citizens. On the contrary, the
law gives to such legal associates the same
rights as those possessed by individuals to
defend their property thus attacked to the
last extremity. The right to prepare for
such attack follows from the right to repel
it. It is vain to say that parties 50 threat
ened By mob ought to depend on the pre-
ventfve Justice Of the Common wealth and
obtain protection by binding the persons so
threatened over to keep the peace. Against
whom, where the wrong Is about being COM
mitted by q mob, is such application to be
nader The name Of the mob fs legion, To
ofer this as the sole protection to individual
or associated properly against threatened
mob destruction would be to surrender the
Innocent and unoffending to the tender mer.
cies OF rioters and incendiaries.