Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-19

his advance was Immediately successful in
opening up the fords beloG Sudley's and I'M
covering Stone bridge. Slow as he was in
reaching his position. once engaged Hunter
and his column accomplished everything ex-
pected of them.
Meanwhile. let us see what the confederates
were doing to meet the federal advance. The
only advantage that accrued from Tyler's i'll
advised fight of the 18TH was 70 deceive the
confederate commander as to his enemy's
intentions, for the records show that Beaure-
gard not only misunderstood the two days
'inaction after the Blackburn ford affair. but
entirely Inexperienced McDowelrs SUISSE
quent plans. Ipstead of being concentrated at
or near the Stone bridge. the point really
threatened by the government troops, the
confederate forces were mainly i'll front of
Mitchelrs and Blackburn's fords. and below.
but considerably scattered. Indeed, when
hunters attack began Beauregard WAS listen
ing Tor the opening guns of a counter attack
which he had ordered toward Centervie from
point on his right at least five miles from
where Hunter struck his left.
Ii may seem pertinent to ask, il Hunter
accomplished everything expected CT him, why
the movement should be criticised for being
slow. For this reason: The whole confederate
army of the Shenandoah was on the march
from the valley to join Beauregard and time
was everything to the rebel leaders. Gen.
Johnston had arrived with detachment of his
Shenandoah army after the combat of the 18th.
and the balance was hourly expected. 1t was
the loss of time that was fatal to Union
hopes.
An essential point in McDowei's original
design vas to turn the enemy, cut off the rail-
road and other lines of communication with
the Shenandoah, and thus prevent Johnston
from coming to Beauresards support. But
Tor the time lost at Centerville and other
delays, it seems probable that Mcdowell would
have accomplished this object.
THE CONFEDERATE SITUATION.
When Hunters long delayed attack began.
the confederate situation was a most critical
one. Both Johnston and Beauregard realized
this at once. The Ineditated operations against
the federal positions in and around Centerville
were instantly abandoned; Beauregard hurried
off to the point of attack to rally his broken
troops, while Johnston devoted his energies to
bringing up the scattered brigadcs to their
support. The fight that ensued. though not
destructive. was one of the most remarkable Of
the rebellion. 1t can hardly be called "a battle
between two armies; it was rather a series of
Isolated skirmishes by reg mental fronts. Gen.
Sherman said that Bull Run was the best
planned but worst fought battle of the war;
Confederate reports show that the moment
Hunters pressure was felt from above the
entire rebel line under Evans in front of Tyler
was Withdrawn to meet the flank attack. and
even Stone bridge itself left guarded by a
few companies only. But in this crisis when
eagle-eyed action was required, Tyler proved
to be vaciliating and weak, and did not avail
himself OF the easy opening to strike q decisive
blow until after noon, when his real opportu-
nifty had passed away. Instead Of energetcally
pushing directly across to join Hunters ad-
vance. HointZelman followed in the wake OF
that officer, crossing the run mostly at Sudiey's
ford. He closed up as rapidly possible by
this circuitous route and joined in the tight