Elmore bulletin. [volume] (Rocky Bar, Idaho) 1889-1906, 1892-01-09
TIE RUSSIAN BEAR.
lNFERloRITY OF THE MuScovTG
AS AN ALLY.

The Great Unknown Quantity I'm Russia
Defensive strength of the Country.
RISKS of "a traaco-Russian Alliance.
military Point OF View.
SO much for France and her army; what is
the Russian situationt Ii was not the French,
but our deplorable military administration
that beat US la the Cr.mca, say the Russian
generals And the scandals revealed during
the Tur,so- Russian war OF lss1-s show that
not much improvement In that quarter had
been made in the q years which separate
sebastopol from flevna, The car is the
sworn enemy of peculation and corruption,
but, alone at the summit of the bureau
cratic pyramid Alexander cannot reach
til. legions Of tiiiMlstcrs who swarm
around it, base He may make examples
of colonies and some OF generals, but abuses
continue IN spite of imperial efforts at their
suppression 1t was ascertained very re-
Gently that in some of the cavalry regiments
neither the men nor the horses receivesi their
proper ralions; the guilty parties are medi-
ta.ing in the Oural over their nisdeuisanors,
but there is no assurance and there can lie
none that, with the same nialadministration,
the imperial troops will not suffer from the
same shortcomings of quartermasters and
commissaries that disgracei the last cam
paign ia Bulgaria. II is a woful pity, too,
I for otherwise Rnssia would be the first of all
military powers She has numbers and she
has quality; her infantry soldier is un-
/ eannle.l; 10 the steaai,nsss Of the German and
the. dash of the (aul he unites the sobriety OF
! the Spaniar,l and the resignation Of the
4 Turk. he is enduring and he is ingenious;
and to these splendid footnlen Russia can
add an indefat igahle aud innumerable cav
ali.y, her sotnas ot CosSacks. these eent8urs
of the stepp,s which. like the hordes of At
tia, can inundate tine territory of her enc
| mics. although the thickly wooded and
marshy frontiers of European Russia are
less appropriate than is commonly imagined
10 the movements and deployment OF
mounted troops.
RrssIAs INFERtoRIrY.
But Russian generals know not the value
of their men. Many OF them learned the
practice of the art of war In Bulgaria. All
are educated officers, bold and brave Their
officers are confident. and inspire confidence
and vet 1t must he admitted that neither
Russian generals nor Russian officers, nor
the Russian stafl poSrcsS the same cohesion
the same science or the same experience as
those of Germany. Ami surprising them e
be their equals, ,npl'o~ing an analogous unit,
OF command. there would still always exist
double inferiOrty arising from de
fe,.tive administration and defective or in
sufficient means of concentration. This las
point. given a general European war, is o
capital Importance, especially for RussiaN
eventual allies.
la France and in Germany the time neces
sary for the mobilization OF l,OOO,OO of mei
can he estimated To within four and twent,
hours In Russia that time is the unknown
quantity of the reioubtable problem, am
without that unknown quantity II y impos
sible to calculate the real value of Rtissla
cooperation How many days may he rt
auired or how many weeks or even months
how many hundred Thousand soldiers ca
: be mustered in the first line, how many i
the second, how many in reserve, nobody ca
answer, for nobody knows how To answer
and only one thing is absolutely certain, an
this the Russian newspapers confess, Rui
sia's mobilization must lie incomparably an
vastly slower than that of either OF he
neighbors Nor could II be- otherwise, wit
! distance infinitely greater, with railway
! less numerous, less well appointed and MAJ
: aged OF which the ma aj0rity have only
single track, and very few have special pla
forms for the emharkation and landing
q horses, troops aud material. These disa,
yantages cannot he contested, aud they aloI
!, are sufficient 10 explain why, in provision
events. the imperial government should ha,
taken those precautions along the frontie
Q which have so exercised the susceptibility
I of Austria Hungary.
q This undeniable inferiofity os Russia
0 especially dangerous To her future allies. 4
: home Russia is safe; shc may be invaded,
r she was by Charles VII and by Napoleo
4 but Rnssias invaders generally fare badl
!. and 10 get out of her vast territory is east
than TO get into it, and what would be q
:. fate of n western ally not prudent enough
+ adjourn its action until Russian mobiliz
8 tion be entirely eompletedi True. Russii
enemies will scarcely allow her allies to sele
their moment.
THE RISKS NOT EQUAL
J. In a Franco-Riissian alliance the risks q
Il not equally shared by both powers. Rus
II can bide her time, but France must bear
n | the hrunt from the outset The gain of I
. first battle would bring the Germans into I
! heart of Champagne; with a second victo
y they might surgeon 90 Paris, while the mort
? ern colossus would scarcely feel the blo'
;. received by her provinces OF Lithuani
d Esthonia and Poland. Every invasion
10 Russia has always ended in disaster 10 :
!, enemy. every Invasion of France has be
q successful Perhaps railways may have Z
n prived Russia of that invulnerability whi
was secured 20 her in former days by