The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-12-25
THE SUN. SUNDAY. DECEMBER Is. 1892.


tion. n the puartermaster's department can
furnish any shoes 1t will he the greatest re-
lief" ,
twas under these circumstances and with
those Vows that Lee headed MS columns
toward LeesburG as soon as he was conN'hru"
OF the retreat Of Pope to WASHINGTON. W.
cannot follow tho authors account OF the SUI.
ceoding operations in detai!-it occupies ~
n,ces OF the booi-but pass Mt once TO MS
,otroa,octiyc comments on the campaign
which ended on tho field OF Antietam or
Sbarpsburr, md which resulted in the retreat
of Leo from Maryland. Col Allan does MOI
concur in the opinion OF Gen. Pehirey 'hn''
tactically. Antictam was drawn ta,'ie' nv
admits that at the centre OF the confederate
limo the Federais had gained and continued ~
hold some ground aud that they also re'ain,u
rossess sion OF the burnside bridge Mt high''a'''
Ho insists, however. that. with these very
,ii,,, oycentiops. the field on which they had
been attacked remained in possession OF the
ronfederates while two thirds OF the Federal
ormy was SO broken and crippled from It's
unsuccessful assaults as to be Virtua'iy nor
do combat Lee had held his srouhu ana
felt confident OF his ability to continue
the contest, for he remained IN pos'!oh
tbe next day. Col. Allan contends there-
for, TINT tnctically Leo had defeated MS an
toconist. This. however. he REGARDS rs aa'-
row
tbnt when we take wider survey the results
n. Antietan seem inderisve. Considered ms
IN ,ttsn,p Mt on tho pnrt OF Mcclellan to turn TO
account tho stroke OF good fortune which hna
revonled to him Lees plans. 1t was n costly
md not very creditable failure far from
crushing Lee In part or altogether. inc reh'
erai army had been so crippled rs 10 w
rendered powerlcss for offence during months
70 come On tho other hand. 1t is coheeoed
that the Cpnfederatcs were SO Rreetiy w
haus,cd by the struggle that Lee was unable
to maintain himself on the north SIDE Of me
Potomac.
Turning from the question OF tactical Of
aciency on tho feld OF brittle to tho antecedent
strntery COL Allan recognizes that Lees con-
duct OF the campaign has been sharply crltI-
cised. He had crossed tho Potomac Win VIC
torious although much worn army. In INC
face of largely superior forces he mad sent mil
of them to invest Harper's Ferry. and thus took
the risk OF an attack OF the whole ledcral
nrmy upon the other half. The rapid advance
q, tho Federal army had placed him in criti-
cal rosition. With heavy loss he had held tho
South Mountain passes barely long enough to
secure tho CAPTURE OF Harper iorry and then
Ind succeeded in coIcentratir. his troops III
time to fight Mcclellan only by exhaustin:
efforts and tho utmost energy. our author
deems it evident. however. that Leo had MT
m;sconcelvrd me task before him. McCle!-
lan's operations Of, the 18th OF September.
no less than tiiose before it. seem to
dem ons. ratio that. but for the chance "hlch
revealed Lees movement to Mcclellan.
Tho former would have carried ont his bold
strategy without serious risk or interruption.
! and voul, have been ready \ few days later
than tho 17th not to receive Int to iraroSc
bnttlc. Leo's plan OF campaign did not con-
fam clnte the defence OF the South Mountain
, masses. He did hold them for day. but that
was done o save McLaws and insure tho ia!l
OF Harper Ferry. Had Earper's Ferry fallen.
| ne he expected, before Mcclellan moved for
! ward to Turner's Gap. tho design of Ice was
TO retire into the Hagerstown Valley and there
concentrate his army Hc wished to draw tue
Federal army rs far as possible from wash
| ington and then lie rurposed to attack Nc
| Clellau at the first favorable opportunity
The despatch captured by the Federal COM
mnpder changed the whole character OF the
campaicn. Leo was thrown upon the defensive.
hut by an unusual display OF boldnesS and
| skill he spatched the flower safety from the
| ne,tle danger. The Federal army was Kept back
| at the South Mountain passes long enough
| to secure the fall OF Harper's Ferry. which
involved tho capture OF 1000 prisoners and
much material OF war. and then the position ut
Antietam Was taken and so held that Lee was
able to bring upon the field his whole force in
the ultimate struggle with Mcclellan. Col
Allan conreives that it is difficult for n com
mandor. always contending against odds
more thoroughly to avoid the charge OF rash
ness. and he points ont that tho great masters
| OF the art OF war are those against whom tins
chnree has Icon most frequently made. Gen
Longstreet has said that Leo should have re-
crossed the Potomac after South Mountain
and before the fall OF IIarper's Terry. an'
should not have fought at Antietam. This. il
our au thor's opinion. would have been t.
yield to his adversary all the moral results o
II victory without n battle. It is nevertheless
admitted that. in the light Of subseGuen
events there is much to BIO said in favor o
, tho course which Longstreet has since advo
Gated.
1t is we'll known that no part OF Mcclellan
management of this campaign has been NOR
J severely censurcd than his failure to renew tn
assault upon the Coniederates on tho 18th O
September 1t is Col. Adams conviction tina
in no case has the Federal commander bee
l moro unjustly criticised We are rcmindo
that McClellan's decision was approved by hi
r principa! subordinates. md that IL was en-
tirely in accordance with the feeling OF SO
I curity entertained By Lec.who all day awate
! without apprehension rcncwnl OF the attack
Q In our authors opinion McClcllan's decision
o was entirely justified by the comparative con
Q dition Of tho two armies. The Federal arm
: had suffered as much in morale rs in me-
n on the lTth lfoosor's and Mansfield
r CORPS and Sed.wick's division were not IN
y condition to attack, as is made plain by Ger
. 3IeudcB report on the state of lockers corp
: on the afternoon OF the 18TH burnside wa
: in no better plight. He felt unable even t
= hold the bridge. which had cost him SO heavil,
!. without re'nforcements Only Porter an
| Il In, I,, TO- bat "