The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-01-10

condition, however i 50 great tAas u
must ce-s many precious ives and millions
OF dollars in money that could be saved II
we mad, a. ne hope 10 soon have. the
requisite preparation
Surely We have made great strides n
the asst i've or ten years roNart this prep
arztion 80 far a. the Erst line. our navy. 8
concerned; and sis0 are making far prog
rsss z the second line. Tor example. n
the superb sets OF b~sech-l0ad ug morrars
that cover 4 vide Esid Of approach and far
out; the splendid crcech-iOa1iaE cannon
Of largest range and gresteSs penetrating
rover; IN the sEift and sure torpedo
boats; the formidable coating latterfes:
and sescoast guns which spring I'd Ike
magic, do their work and then Fun 20 n
slant -ssety.
The hn4l means OF defense OF our
country, rae movable military army, 3
n IUss the sane condition as 10 num-
s>rs az II vas twenty years ago: and
the large nufnber Of trained soldiers
that cane QUE y the var OF the rebel
Hon. who were then AVAILABLE have
passed away or are too cd ard .Rnrm 20
tzxe part n any future 1lilItarv opera
tZ0ns. % tA&t We musG begin. should a var
come. az TIE threshold and 20 very slowly
n order 70 prepare sn effective army and
MOBILIZE st.
assumed San Diego point 20 be a.
tackled merely because II 3 the southern
most hsrhor Of California. and is almost
entirely defenseless. giving ingress 10
quite rich country. However. sny at
tack on the Pacific coast would probably
only use such h2rbor as that FOR coal
ing station from which 20 send a force
upon the larger and more valuable harbor
or san Francisco; even IL the firss attack
wa. not aimed directly AZ that city.
Should the attack come OF the Puget
- =. L. -
tlOns would be the same: except that, IN
many respects. this would be more favor
able to the sssaiIant than an attack upon
either OF the other two points, there being
such quantity OF food and Of transports
by horses always 20 oe found IN the North
west.
4 hostile army overrunning Washing
ton and Oregon would De very hard 10
defeat. on account OF the protection Of
the mount2inoQ. country surrounding
these states. There are great distances
across arid plains for rs who would
hasten succor to compass; and the fact
that within themselves they have a.
most no organized military power that
could keep any considerable force from
taking possession IS strong argument 70
hasten every reasonable provision against
such possibilities as any thoughtful man
cannot help contemplating.
The few candid suggestions that have
question are such as | think every man.
every citizen | mean. SHOULD consider, and
such as should be canvassed before the
public, and therefore before the nations OF
the world.
If one should say that We are thus let
ting our enemies see our condition, or
helping them TO methods, the answer is
very direct and simple. They, our enc
mics, already know more than we
dream; they have sketches of our forts
and of our harbors: and they know
within reasonable limits about how much
force we have on hand, and how soon we
could be made ready for service. They
are watching our growing navy, and they
understand that, though We are q peace
loving people, we are indomitable in
war.
Certainly We should not confne our
selves 70 q simple defensive attitude, be-
cause, in case of an outbreak, there will be
blows to give as well as blows 10 take.
ANY small nation would find its own COM
merce soon destroyed, its own seabosrd
blockeded, its own harbors seized and for
tined, and, doubtless before long. q column
like that of General Taylor or OF General
Scott, in the Mexican war, walking step by
step from city 10 city, from siege TO siege,
from battle TO battle, till IL sat down at the
capital, complete master of the said small
nation.
Still it is the earnest purpose of every
good citizen, and certainly of every patri-
otto soldier, 70 prevent war by having
such preparation in all our three lines of
defense that there will be no temptation
10 the folly, the fanaticIsm. the pride or
the ambition of any greedy people on the
globe 70 attack our cities or TO overrun
our domain.
Or if such attempts cannot be hindered
altogether, and war should come upon
US, which We have seen is within the
WI To
have every part Of our nations defenses
abreast of that of every other nation for
the purpose of preventing such losses of
treasure as We have hitherto suffered at
the commencement of each struggle, pro-
ducing widespread impoverishment and
distress. and further, what is OF far greater
Importance, 10 torestall the dreadful waste
OF human life which is directly conse-
quent upon the false theory that each
war is the last one ever 10 he. Very truly
yours, o. o. Howard.
Maior-tieneral u. s. Army.