The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-01-08
THE DEFENsEs OF PUGET SOUND.

congress afresh to the defenseless condi.
ton of Puget sound. The question of the
Importance of fortifying Puget sound was
fully discussed by General John Gibbon,
U. 5. A., some two years ago in an article
| contributed by him to the Journal Of The
Military Service Institution. General Glib
bon is veteran artillerist of West Point
training. He was assistant instructor OF
| artillery at West Point from 1854 to 1856,
and was for year chief of artillery Of
| General McDowell's corps of the Army OF
the Potomac. His high reputation as an
able artillerist gives exceptional value to
his testimony to the comparative ease
| with which the waters of Puget sound
can be defended by fortifying a few i'm
portant points
General Gibbon regards the south end
| of WILDLY island as suitable place for a
battery. since it has very good command
| over the channel of Possession sound and
to certain extent over the main channel
| admiralty inlet. In the vicinity of the
| junction of these two channels is the
place for the second line OF defenses of the
Sound waters. Works with their rear
we'll protected should be erected at Double
Bluffs. Island No. 2 in Deception pass is
the place for battery, which would COM
pletely command this end of the channel
ana sweep the pass tor two-thirds of its
length. battery upon Deception or
Rock island, directly opposite the mouth
OF the pass, and a battery placed upon an
island near the entrance of the western
and narrowest portion of the pass would
complete the defenses of Deception pass,
which is the only way for ship to enter the
waters of Puget sound, except the main
channel between Point Wilson and Adj
miralty head. The three entrances to
Griffin's bay on the east side of the south
ern side of San Juan island are all easily
defended. With the exception of Deep
ton pass any guns mounted on any of
these islands would serve to defend simply
the group and main land directly behind
them, but would have little or no bearing
upon the defenses of Puget sound waters.
Batteries would be essential on Protection
island, which lies directly in front of the
mouth of Port Discovery, to protect the
entrance to the harbor.
Point Wilson, Admiralty head and Mar
rowstone point command the main en-
trance to Puget sound, here called Admir-
atty inlet, and with heavy riaed guns
placed upon them the entrance could be
we'll defended Batteries on the bluffs at the
opening of Hood canal and at Hoods
head would be necessary to defend Port
Gamble and Port Ludlow. Concerning
the defense of Seattle, General Gibbon
says that the north end of cambridge
island furnishes good defensive position
for the Agate channel, which connects
Port Orchard harbor with the main waters
of Admiralty inlet Turner's point is
easily defended, but heavy guns would
need to be placed on Hazel point to oppose
the passage of hostile fleet up Hood
canal, by which the position between
Admiralty inlet and Hood canal coulG be
turned. In case of failure to defend the
positions on Puget sound north of Tacoma
thus far named, General Gibbon says it
would be useless to attempt the defense of
''the Narrows" near that city. for by SIM
ply entering Commencement bay a hostile
feet, landing force at Tacoma, could eff
fectually flank to the eastward all the
waters of the upper Sound.
General Gibbon IN the following extract
makes it clear that the place. to defend
Portland, Or, is on Puget sound:
The possession of Commencement bay would
not only flank the waters of the upper Sound,
but would give the enemy control of the ter
minus of one great transcontinental railroad at
Tacoma; of another to be completed in the near
future at Seattle; u connection now in course of
construction with the Canada Pacific north
from Seattle, and besides open the route TO the
Columbia river and render the capture OF Port
land possible, thus severing two more of our
railroad links with the East and give possession
of the road south to California In othe words
the failure 10 construct Sound defenses viii
shorten by Just SO much the time allowed us for
gathering force TO resist an enemy's advance
TO the Columbia river.
If the enemy once forces the defenses of
Puget sound and secures a foothold on
Commencement bay he would push down
the line of the railroad from Tacoma to
Portland until he reached the Columbia
river, crossing which on pontoon bridges,
Portland would fall. From Tacoma to
Tenino, a distance of thirty-nine miles,
the march of the enemy could not be dis
puted, but between Tenino and Kalama, a
distance of sixty-siX miles, the country in
cludes numerous places where q small
force could hold in check superior army
for considerable time. At some point
between Freeport and Vancouver, on the
north or south fork of the Lewis river.
would probably be fought a battle that
would decide the fate of Portland,
but the true way for Portland to
make her fight is by thoroughly
fortifying the waters Of Puget sound.
Oregon IS therefore as deeply interested as
Washington in the impregnable fortifca-
ton OF the Sound waters. for q successful
defense of the mouth of the Colunbia
would not protect Portland If the defenses
of the Sound waters were once forced by
the enemy.
The governments plan Of defense IS TO
erect batteries on Wilson's point, Admi-
raltv head and Marrowstone point of not
less than ten rifed guns and from eight to
twelve riaed mortars of the largest caliber
and greatest penetration to each of these
three points, with permanent garrisons OF
not less than two companies of troops at
each place. General Miles recommends
the fertilization also of the other entrance
TO the Sound, Deception pass. OF the
fine natural positions for defending both
entrances 10 the Sound General Miles
saws: