The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1892-12-25

weeks sooner. and advanced against Lee IN
tho Shenandoah Valley. Bet the author ADDS
that this course would have been exactly In
accordance with the expectations and desires
OF tho Confederate commander
Col. Allan does not undertake to 60 iniiy
into tho question Of McClellan's merits "a
commander and Of tho justice Of the treatment
which he received ut the hands OF his Govern
ment. Some things. however. seem clear;
that. for instance. McClellan's organizing
power was great The army OF tho Potomac
was in an i'm portant sense his creation ana It's
devotion to him was proof Of his high capacity
for leadership. Neither Is 1t disputed that ne
was n thoroughly trained soldier: he never
handled his men like tyro or n block head.
On the whole tho author OF this book nc.
0uicsces in the judgment pronounced by Gen.
palfrcy .hat Mcclellan was the ablett COM
mandcr that the army OF the Potomac ever
had. II snot denied on tho other hand mat
McClellan's faults wcro many ana GiarinE
He was slow and cautious to an inordinate de-
gree. lIs lived under n perpetual hallucina-
ton as to the strength Of his enemy. he
based his rlans upon overcstimates "i MS
foes that no other sensible man with reason
able means OF Information would have ae-
ccpted. ,Hc was always seeing difficulties in
his way and he dwolt far more on these than
on tho advantages which might flow from
vigorous and skilful employment OF the i'm
mense resources he had Mt his disposal
Nevertheless. tho authors final word upon
this matter is that tho course OF the Federal
Government toward Mcclellan was unjust
While it is deemed idle to speculate as 10 thc
result OF tho Peninsula campaign had Nc
Clellan been heartily supported. 1t Is pro-
nounced certain that his plans had boon fear
fully disordored by his superiors. After Pore's
woful discontinue. Mcclellan responded
heartily to tho call made upon him in the
midst Of panic and dismaN He restored pub
lie confidence, brought order out OF chaos.
and n two weeks forced tho invading army to
tho south side OF the Potomac. That when
six weeks later h0 had brought his forces to a
high pitch OF efficiency. and had transferred
tho scene OF operations from the Potomac to
the Eappahannock. he should have been de-
poset!. is considered BY tho auth or OF this his
tory unwise and unfair ind not to be ac-
counted for on military reasons alone.
VI.
Socampai:n OF the civil war has been more
| sever.ly criticised than than which eliminated
in the battle OF Fredericksburg. Col. Allan
corsidors the criticism justified. He begins
his ST ric,ures by observing that Burnside de-
,,v,d his crossing of the ltappahannock until
Jo, had collected his whole army in front. He
! thcn selected for crossing the place where his
foo was best prepared to delay and oppose
! linn. Ue lost a dag in laying his pontoons
! He then srent another day in deciding upon a
! plan of action. n matter that ought TO nave
! Leon settled before hc set out. When he had
! ,hrs given Lee full time to concentrate and
,lac, his troops burnside made two front at
! t,cks Mt widely separated points These as
| saul;s were not ronIoined. and they resulted
4, tho separate defeat OF both wings OF his
! army, Franklin's attack was made with too
! small a force was not properly supported. and
! lacked n clearly dcflned aim. sumner 3 assault.
! though not feeble like Franklns. wns badly
| managed. 1t was made by divisions. In sue
! cession each Of which was rent in pieces be-
for, tho next took its place. 1t was all directed
or3;ret n short line OF some 800 or 600 yards.
! which con Stituted one OF tho very strongest
roin. in the Confederate position. The Fed
erals came forward by briGades at intervals Of
! several minutes. and were allowed to halt and
fire livery moment they remained ut a halt
| added heavily to their losses. without produc-
i,,,anv considerable effect upon the Confeder.
! atcs and consequently they were swept away
in detail By a veteran and we'll posted mass o.
rilemen firing a. close quarters. Their only
prospect OF success lay in quick and well
supported dash with the bayoret. Ii is furthol
noted that no attempt was made to aid the
attacl; by diversions to the right or left o
Marye's Hill. Finally. after his first days
failure burnside seemed incapable OF forming
any other plan. He desired to renew tho des
ncrate II ssault OF Marye's Hill. and. when over
ruled in this. could devise no alternative hui
to confess defeat by withdrawing lOc.oO'
brave and well-dsciplined troops from thu
presence of 10000 Confcderntes. 1t is &c
knowledced on tho other hand that the Con
tedcrate commander has not escaped criticism
for his conduct during and after tho engage
mcnt Lees movements. indeed. before tn
} battle the promptness with which he divine'
tho plans OF his opponent and disposed hi
army to Illustrate them. his choice OF position
and his manner OF arranging his troops t.
hold It. are pronounced admirable. Nelthe
can our author SEQ that in the conduct OF tn
baltic itself more than one serious oversight
was committed: this was the failure OF A.
Hill to guard well the gap through whic
, Meade penetrated the Confederate lines. Thi
, mistake was calamity corrected but it cos
many men and might have had serious con
l | sequences but for tho manner in which Jack
sons reserves were niassed close at hand.
is Lees failure. however. to assume the as
gressivo on tho 14th and 10Th OF Dc
ccmbrr that has been denounced a
q grievous fault. 1t has been asserte
by his critics that he lost the or
portunity OF gaining great victory by reI
| nlttlnE BURNSIDE 10 TeCEOSs tHs IN'I
barrn ssed aftor tho first day fight: that II h
Ind thrown his army upon the Federal force
while they were on the south side OF the rvel
crinpled and dispirited. he might have ovel
: whcmed them. by such writer's tho conrs
pursued by I.ee is represented ms failur
to appreciate tho advantage no had gaine'
' and the splendid possibilities within hs reacl
/, With Col. Al'ans refutatlon OF this criticisl
: VIC must take leave OF his book. lilo conceive
y it to be probable that Lee did not recoSnizeti
extont OF the damage he ind inflicted upon IN
y Federal army. SO great was tho ease ana
:, little tho loss with which its attacks had bee
! repulscd. 1t should also be borno in mind TN
he could not know the extent OF the distru
u in Burnside felt by tho Federal army. He III
doubtcdlv expected further offensive ehor
on his adversary part. At the same time
Is acknowledged by our author that owe
:, had Lee known that Burnside would n
again attack. he would not have made
u counter assault upon the Federal army und'
the fire Of the guns on tho Stafford Height
He believed that such an assault would he
y very costly one to his army and OF very douo
. full SUCCESS. For this reason Col. Allan r