The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1892-04-06
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

loQay IS the anniversary OF the great
battle of Shiloh, fought April 8 and 4,
1862, between the Union forces under
Grant and Sherman and the Confederates
under Sidney Johnston and Beauregard.
If General Albert Sidney Johnston had
possessed the moral courage, which Long
street justly says is the greatest essential
of great soldier, and the energy of Grant,
he would probably have beaten Grant at
Fort Donelson and saved the Confederacy
the terrible consequences of that great
disaster. On the 5th of February. 1852
Beauregard, in our judgment the ablest
soldier of the Confederacy after Joe john
ston and Lee, urged Johnston to abandon
Bowling Green, Kentucky, concentrate
his whole force at Forts Henry
and Donelson, and thus force Grant
to give battle, with every chance
of success for the Confederate arms,
as Grant would have been outnumbered
ana was too far from Buell. to hope for
assistance, as Buell. had no pontoon train
to cross the Cumberland between Nash
vile and Fort Donelson. Fort Henry fell
February 6. and on the 18th Beauregard
again urged Johnston to concentrate his
whole force at Donelson to beat Grant.
The investment of Donelson began on
February IL and it was surrendered on the
18th. Johnston could have reached Donel-
son with his troops by rail and water by
the 10th at the latest, while BuelPs forces,
with lbs miles of horrible roads before
them, could not have joined Grant before
the 18th. On the 18th Grant had but
1900 men, and was not reinforced until
the evening of that day. Johns
ton on the 10th could have
struck Grants 5000 men with '27,-
900, and that superior force would
have assured victory, saved Donelson and
regained Fort Henry before the possible
advent of Buell.. Johnston's fatal irreso-
luton made Grant daring dash on Fort
Donelson result in great victory. The
5000 prisoners lost were the smallest part
of the disaster. The keystone of the arch
OF his military line of defense was smashed
and Kentucy and Tennessee evacuated,
all because Johnston had not resolution
sound military counsels and fling 1900
men on Grants 5000 when he moved on
Donelson.
The capture of Fort Donelson COM
PEELED Johnston to make tumultuous re-
treat from Nashville, Tenn, to Corinth,
Miss. Recruits began to flock to John
ston's standard and by the 9th of March,
1862, Johnston had 81, 900 men. Beauregard
now urged Johnston to rush his 50, 900
men on Grant, who, as Beauregard knew,
was at Pittsburg Landing, on the Ten
nessee river, with less than 10000 men,
and beat him before Buell. could come up
Johnston earnestly objected. but finally
yielded with reluctance. Had he acted at
once, as Beauregard urged, he could have
struck Grant two days before he did, when
Buell. could not possibly have arrived in
time to save the day.
Johnston, who was personally as gallant
and knightly soldier as ever set squad
ron in the field, was of highly sensi-
tive temperament, and became so broken
hearted by the storm of obloquy poured
upon him by the Southern press and peo-
pie for the terrible disaster at Donelson
and the loss of Tennessee, that he never
manifested a spark of military audacity or
self-confidence from the day he LETT Nash
vile until he fell at Shiloh fairly counting
death like disgraced cavalier on that
bloody field. Johnston was clearly guilty
of military irresolution and want of enter
prise by Beauregard's test imony. Beaure-
gard planned, organized and fought the
Shiloh campaign which was boldly con-
ceived, and so far as Beauregard was con-
cerned, theoretically executed and came
dangerously near wrestling from Grant all
that was won at Donelson. Johnston lost
through his temperamental irresolution
golden hours in which he had grand op-
portunities to have beaten Grant with
superior numbers at Donelson and de-
stroyed him at Shiloh. Sherman, not
Grant, who had gone to meet General
Buell. at Savannah, Tenn. was responsible
for the surprise and consequent dis
astrous result OF the first days fighting.
Sherman, who posted and had charge Of
our extreme front line, neglected all proper
means to make his forces secure and was
responsible for the surprise of our army by
the Confederates at sunrise Sunday morn
ing, April 6. On Saturday the hostile
forces. 5000 strong, arrived and by 4 D, m.
formed in order of battle without let or
hindrance within mile and half of our
unguarded army and burst like storm
upon Sherman the next morning. Sher-
man was mainly responsible for the dis
aster of the first day, since the negligence
or recklessness of his dispositions in his
position Of advanced guard made possible
the surprise of our army. General sher-
man always denied that he was surprised
at Shiloh, but TO Intelligent soldier who
fought on either side denies that Sherman
was justly accused by General Buell.
OF lack of full preparation to fight
4 great battle. Prentjss, who COM
manded our advance division, certainly
was not surprised and in one sense Sher.
man was not, for Prentiss resisted long
enough 70 permit the rest of the troops to
get under arms. but in the sense that
Sherman had not disposed his lines. as he
would or at least ought to have done had
he expected TO fight great battle. Sher-
man unquestionsbly was surprised, and
for this surprise Grant was no more re-
sponsihle than Sheridan was when in his
absence Early routed our army at Cedar
Creek.
No army of 5o,OoO men can arrive and
form, in order Of battls within .v,, ,,.lo. q.
the enemy's lines without detection on