davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

narrow front gave his superior numbers IN
creased advantages. and that he had a sale
water base Eear at hand. II viii be noted that
he soon complained OF being outuumbered;
that the enemy had all the advantages OF
position and that the roads we're impossible.
In fact everything turped out to be exactly the
reverse OF his representations to the Washing
ton authorities.
For our purpose ii ia not necessary to dis
cuss the advantages or disadvantages OF the
peninsular line. Suffice it to say, the Army OF
the Potomac was debarked at Fortress Monroe
about the lst OF April, 1862. and began Its
march on Richmond on the 4th. In the vicinity
of Yorktown this peninsula between the York
and James rivers - less than SIX miles across.
The enemy. under ]. Bankhead Magruoer, an
old army Officer OF a certain kind of ability.
proceeded TO fort!fy this narrow neck Of land
from river ID river. The rebel ironclad Merri-
rlac prevented the advance Of the Union navy
up the James, and MagrGders batteries at
YORKTOWN stopped Its passage up the YORK.
The siEGE OF YoEKrowN.
On the 9Th the federal advance was stopped.
1t is entirely probable prompt and energetic
attack would have secured Yorktown and
driven Magruder from his entire line, as his
force at first was very small, not more than
IL COO at this date. IL was not made Mcclellan
sent for heavy guns and mortars, and entered
upon regular siege operations Meantime as
eOOu ODltCb OI tne leueTdl cuanSe OF
base was understood at Richmond. and that
there was to be no advance from the direction
OF Washington. the entire confederate army
under Gen. Johnston was transferred to
McClellan's 'front.'
The siege" OF Yorktown lasted precisely one
month, the enemy evacuating on the night of
May 3. retiring up the peninsula. rear guard
holding another line of defenses in front of
Williamsburg. This withdrawal occurred lust
about the time Mcclellan had completed prepa-
rations and got into position to attack. But
there was no haste on the part of the enemy.
Their only reason in the beginning for main
tanning line on the peninsula to gain
time for preparations to defend Richmond
nearer the city. to mobilize new regiments.
and TO bring down from the Eappahannock to
Masruders support Joe Johnston's army. All
this was accomplished in the month gained at
Yorktown, between April 4 and May 4.
The BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
II was no part of Johnston's scheme to
hnger on the peninsula for fight after the
Yorktown line was abandoned; it was then evi.
IDENTIFY policy to retreat as rapidly as possible,
as it permitted the federal fleet to swiftly pass
troops up York river and land them far to the
rear Of the marching confederates, endanger-
ing their escape up the narrow neck. But tho
federal advance under Summer, after their
retreat was discovered, followed so rapidly on
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20


Run calamity. and Mcclellan vas the hero of
the hour. lie assumed command at Washing
ton July q. 1861. only six days after the
defeat. and the glamour surrounding his name
was such. in the gloom occasioned by Bull Run,
% PerIait the young general to at once and
unquestioned assume an air OF reticent patron
HSe and superiority toward both the military
and civil authorities about Washington. The
situation was one of great advantage for the
purpose he had in view. to gain time without
interference from any quarter to organize.
equip and discipline a great army. His success
in the undertaking stamps Mcclellan as one Of
the ablest military organizers OF this or any
other age. He had the faculty without effort
or achievement OF winning and retaining the
confidence Of his officers and soldiers beyond
that of any other soldier Of his generation.
M'cLELLASs PLANS
MeClellan's policy was to avoid all collision
with the enemy until his purpose was accom-
pIished. And Joe Johnston did not interfere
During the fall and winter of 1912 nothing
was done on the Virginia front except TO receive
new troops from the north and organize them
into bri-ades and divisions. There were one
or two uninrortan; affairs like Dranesviile and
Calls EGN: otherwise the winter in Virginia
was unmarried uy inlAtiry events OF any cOnSe-
quence. March /. ls62. some months after he
had assumed command. Mcclellan had accumu-
lated m army % 10000 effective men. In the
west Grant had fought the battle OF Belmont,
captured Fort DonelsOn with 1900 prisoners,
and entirely broken Albert Sidney Johnston's
lines. compelling him to rapidly retreat
into northern Mississippi.
But Mcclellan still maintained his policy Of
addition without divi-iOnJ and silence" lie
gave no sign. He seemed to have no intention
OF taking tae decisive with his great army
The peoPl" OF the north began TO murmur at
this prolonged inactivity, and the President
himself. ever sensitive TO popular pressure,
Was dissatisfied. After much pressure. about
the middle OF March. Mcclellan finally pushed
his columns Ogt toward Bull I.un and Manassas.
only 10 tnl the enemy gone Joe Johnston
had not failed 20 observe the immense force
gathering in his front, AMI as soon as he
detected Indications Of an advance southwark
no immediately withdrew bsliad the Kappa
hammock, not caring 20 risk battle with that
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20
GRAPE

the 4;h that the rebel rear was brought to bay
that night and the first important event OF
McCleilan's campaign the battle Of
Williamsburg. which occurred the next day.
Like most of the early Virginia battles of the
federals. this was one mainly Of croJs purposes
aud MISUNDERSTANDING, a small segment Of an
army fighting magnifcently. with the greater
number in the immediate vicinity in ''observa-
ticn." but not firing gun. The troops became
inextricably jamred on the roads; Hooker's
division advancing on the right hand road
from Yorktown, and Smiths on that of the left
from Hampton. actually 'criss-crossed" Smith
getting from left to right and Hooker from
right 10 left, wasting considerable time, though
II does not appear that this Lost time could
have been made particularly available other
wise.
Hooker early In the morning opened the
fight on the federal left with a single division,
which was continued throughout the day, with
varying fortunes, but he finally lost some
ground. Late in the afternoon he was REIN
forced by kearny with two b-igades. who was
by nightfall enabled to retrieve the ground
previously yielded. There was q brilliant
diversion on the right by Hancock's brigade
Of Smiths division. which advanced and occu-
pied two or three redoubts Of the confederates,
who were busy at the other end Of the line
with Hooker Afterward Longstreet, who
seems to have been compelled to turn and
fight by the persistency of the federal pressure,
brought back reinforcements and made a
determined assault on Hancock, who vas
bothering the confederates a good deal. But
hIs brigade not only repealed il with great loss,
but charged in turn and drove them of the
field capturing some prisoners
Hooker had been roughly handled in this
battle before the rest Of the army fairly under
stood what was going on In his Official report
he says history will not be believed when it 10
told" that mis- single division was allowed to
carry on this unequal contest unaided from
morning till night IN the presence Of 5000 Of
their comrades. At Williamsburg Hooker
kearny and Hancock all manifested the traits
which afterward made them famous generals.
There were really two dlstinc. actions, as there
no connection between Hooker and Smith
until Peck with q division closed up the front
between the two roads late in the afternoon.
In fact, the federsls were only fairly ready for
battle when the battle closed There was no
concert of action, although i Is evident Smiths
attack on the right relieved the pressure on
Hooker. and enabled kearnys troops to regain
the lost ground.
The federal loss in this battle was 2. 239-456
killed. l.4l0 wounded and 373 nlissing-out Of
thirty-three regimsnts and six batteries en-
gagged. The confederate loss is officially stated
at 2s5 killed. 9T5 wounded and 297 missing;
confederates. considered the battle q very
aud the result warranted the claim. He csti-
coufederstes and Il, 600 federals.
Gen. McClellan's arrival OH the field after
the nshting was over aroused great en- thusiasm
on the Union side. Had this occurred sig
hours earlier. sugplsnsntsd With rsihteses.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

NAMED on the easterly side, where Gen.
Mcclellan had his headquarters at Gaines
mill. The strength of the confederate army at
this time, according to the nearest contem-
pcraneous return, which was the report of
May p, is stated at SO, 6S8
FAIR OAKS
This was tho situation when the next import
ant event, the battle of Fair Oaks Union
nance. or Seven Pines Confederate name),
occurred. The confederate commander observ-
ing McDowelrs movements toward Richmond,
and perceiving McClellan's weak position
astride the Chickahominy, matured plan for
attacking and destroying the isolated forces Of
Heintzelman and Reyes before they could be
reinforced. This plan Of precipitating the
entire confederate army upon 1000 men was
promising. But there was no surprise at Fair
Oaks. as the first accounts of the battle led the
public to infer. Both Reyes and Heintzelman
suspected from the increased activity Of the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

great federal army far from his base. His
total force was less than 50, 200 men. McClel-
Ian then ka4ted-
TO RICHNoSD BIZ WAY OF FORTRESS MONROE.
From the first he was opposed to the advance
on Richmond by the .-eross-count-y" route.
He submitted plan TO the military authorities
for a campaign from Fortress Monroe against
the rebel capital After some hesitation and
good deal Of pickering. Mr. Lincoln. against
his better Judgment. finally consented to the
generals program. only STIMULATING that
Washington should be left perfectly safe. A
council Of generals TO whom the matter was
Submitted decided that a force Of 40 600 men
for this purpose would BE necessary. Mcclellan
ncquiesced u this, aud then began to transfer
bis army by water to Fort Monroe. Before the
change of base complete !: was discovered
that tine commands Mcclellan had designated
90 remain did not make up the stipulated force
Of 40. COO ard the Presiden: issued an order
obtaining AcDo~ells entire corps This EVIL
se-,ly caused some friction between them, but
there ID o." dOubt that the force Mcclellan was
leaving was lar short Of :he number originally
agreed upon.
McCleilans arguments in favor OF the PENN
sular route were that 10 was shorter; that the
Uesds dova thsss vs<s always geed; thss tts
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

maturely sent against the enemy, wholly mad
equate in numbers and unprepared by the
necessary drill and discipline to defeat HIM
and capture Richmond. But to meet what
Scott thought to be the requirements for vic
tory, after many tedious months devoted to
the accumulation and preparation Of a great
army, had Mcclellan succeeded any better than
Mcdowell? His failure somewhat differed in
kind, but In degree its vastness overshsdowed
the Bull Run incident But he had at least
demonstrated that the army as fighting in
strument was equal to the task before 1t: that
all it requiredto put down the rebellion was a
competent general
The first demonstration Of the series Of mill
tary operations called by a misnomer the
Seven Days Battles" because there were
really only three Of sufficient magnitude to be
designated battles, was that against Mechan-
icsville, In front Of Beaver Dam creek, a fed
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

advance. whereupon governmental nerves re-
sumed their equilibrium. Its first steps were
- bring Gen. Geo. Il. Mcclellan from west
Virginia and place him in command OF the
Potomac army. and to abandon Temporarily
Tie offensive against RichmonG- Pull Run fell
like a vet blanket upon the embellishments
vhoOpers. The government entered system
stically and determiredly upon the task OF
putting down the rebellion
The new general could not have been called
10 the command at a more auspicious time for
himself His small victory at Rich Mountain.
West Virginia. was now magnified into a second
Austerlitz by contrast with McDowens Bull
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

Of Morelrs division, and seven batteries Of, ar
tillery-in all about 12.0O0 men. The federal
loss was insigniicant-36l lied. wounded and
missing-as they fought under cover, Aon the
defensive. in q strong position.
The confedcrates engaged were the brigades
OF Field, Fender. Gregg. Archer. Ripley, J. R.
Anderson and Branch. from $1,000 to $1,000
men. They fought in the open, exposed to q
tremendous artillery or musketry fire, ard the
loss must necessarily have been severe, but it
u not officially stated separate from tn Dee Of
the entire campaign. Fender incidentally mem
tions that the sixteenth North Carolina Loaf 200
men under murderous fire" and that other
regiments lost heavily. Gen. Archers ldss wss
PA killed and wounded Gen Field said il WIS
the most obstructive cannonadinR he I'D vet
known" anA that many gallant fellow here
fell" Gen. Ripley aays his loss was .'ex-
tremely severe" The forty-fourth Georgia
lost SSS and the frst North Carolina ia Ii led
and wounded. Gen. Anderson regrets the soss
Of some Of his best officers and many Of the
DsA" Ivo eeafsdssats eelsasb we're kilAsd
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20


enemy on the 29th and S0th, pushing out per-
sistent reconnaissance, that n general attack
was meditated- McClellan's proximity to Rich
mond made an attack imminent at any
moment. No special warning was necessary.
The very nature Of the situation made it i'm
peratiye that his army be concentrated on one
side or the other Of the Chickahominv, ready
to fight. But in tho Williamsburg affair
only a small proportion OF his army was en-
gagged; one-third of ii was permitted to be
whipped before it could be supported by the
balance.
A tremendous rainstorm broke on tho night
Of the S0th, nearly submerging the entire
Chickahominy valley, making the movement
OF troops difficult and that OF artillery almost
impossible. The rebel attack was initiated by
the confederate general d. H. Hill on Casey's
division, in front of the Seven Pines. late in
the forenoon OF Nav 81. Gen. Johnston's
plan was to attack with Longstreet and Hill in
front, with Gen. G. W. Smith we'll around to
the federal right. about and above Fair Oaks
while Gen. Rnger from the south was to come
In on the left and rear, and with rush drive
n xagss' hass in tAs vicinity Of Seven Pima
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

Richmond, or pushed up so close to IL, es-
pecially on the south. % 70 effect . lodgmept
on the James river Immediately below the
c'ty. uncovering it to the cooperation Of the
federal navy, thus opening ep new water base,
from which it would have been impossible 70
dislodge him. But nothing Of this Kind could
be expected Of q commander who from the be-
ginning labored under the absurd hallucina-
ton that be was fighting from l5O, 900 to 200 600
men. SO. instead Of pressing the enemy with
his superior numbers. Mcclellan actually drew
back from the most advanced position. subsidized
into an inert defensive and redoubled his frantic
appeals to Washington for immediate REIN
forcements.
LEE SUCCEEDS JOHNSTON.
Johnston's wound Afforded President Davis
tho opportunity which he no doubt had long
secretly desired The next day after the battle
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

The fourth corps and two brigades Of
Kearny's division Of Observation-Disclosures
being absent at White Oak swamp-alo,e
fought the battle Of Fair Oaks until the arrival
o. Summers troops late in the afternoon.
These unsupported troops were crowded back
during the day perhaps a mile and half. bu:
at ni.htfall the confederate attack was effectu-
ally repulsed. A study Of the official reports
on both sides leads to tho conclusion that if
the operations Of Johnston's other divisions
had been properly timed with the vigorous and
prompt attack OF Gen. Hill on Casey, a disas-
trous defeat of the federals would have been
tho result. Had Longstreet. Smith ard Huser
attacked simultaneously with Hill. Heintzei-
man would have been prevented from support
ing Keyes and both must have been used up
long before Summers arrival from the other
side Of the river. 1t was bad enough as it was
On the 3lst Gen. Johnston was severely
wounded ard the confederate command de-
volved temporarily upon Gen. Gustayus W..
Smith.
THE SECOND DAY.
The next day, June l, the confederates on
the right in front OF Sumner made a serious
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

and 1--WE others wounded The first North
Carolina lost all three OF its field officers. Al
together il appears to have been q nasty fight
for tho attacking confederates. the brigade
commanders generally acknowledging a re-
pulse.
Toward night Loncstrest and ID. H. Hill got
across the Chickshominy and pushed down
their columns TO A. p Hills support The
next morning, June ~. jackson crossed the
Beaver Dam above the federal position and APP
peared upon their right flank. and Mccall, ac-
cording to previous directions. at once aban-
doned the position. falling back upon the main
body OF Porter's corps
GAINES MIL.
After Jackson's arrival the confederate army
vas united and il Swept down the Chickahom-
my" upon the federal right jackson extended
well out TO the left. feeling for the York River
railroad; ID. II. Hill next, with Longs,reet and
A. p. Hill near the river. The federA.s we're
all drawn in and occupied strong position on
a range OF hills near Gaines MILL behind Boat
swains creek. facing in a semi-circle from the
west around TO the east and southwark, with
the creek and deep ravine protecting their
left flank. The troops occupying this position
were Porter's corps, composed Of the divisions
OF Morel, Sykes and Mccall
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20
M'cLELLAN's CHARACTER.

This credulity concerning Lees ovcrwheIm-
ing numbers is evidence that Me- lellan wanted
some of the common-sense elements Of a COM
mander. He unfailingly overestimated the
enepy's strength, audacity and powers Of re-
sistance; consequently it was very natural that
he should underrate his own capacity and
means to overcome them. This peculiar weak
ness is demonstrated in his constant appeals
for reinforcements. Remembering Bull Run,
It is an open question il he did not secretly
doubt the staying qualities of the troops, not
withstanding his many glorious tributes on
paper to their bravery and endurance
There is more than hint Of this In his hest
tation to fight all his army simultane ously: IL
appears to have been o moral impossibility for
Mcclellan to do this, dictate Of timidity, not
the result OF bad dispositions. No man knew
better than he now to marshal troops McClel-
Ian pinned his faith on large reserves, to fall
back upon. He was always looking toward the
rear. safe commander, perhaps; q splendid
organizer beyond all doubt, but victory
OF what avail would McDowells additional
$1,000 have been to general who could only
evolve the false tactical policy that pitted
$4,000 against $4,000? II he could not beat
Mag.uders 1000 with 10000, on what theory
couia ne base claim that with only $4,000 he
could capture Richmond defended by Lees
l0o,ooG As 1t was, he always outnumbered
Lee, but yet the confederate general never
failed to have the greater force ct the point OF
contact, which is true generalsh;p. Il is
doubtful II Mcclellan would have been able to
do this with an army of 400. 900 men. = He GER
tainly failed TO avail himself Of his overwhelm-
Ing numbers at Yorktown, at Williamsburg, at
Fair Oaks, Gaines Mill and at Antietam. where
his corps were put in piecemeal.
In short, Mcclellan at the head Of the armv
simply developed the qualities of q highly
trained officer and cultivated little gentle ian |;
he was not u great general ~ his Thousands OF
admirers in and out Of the army vainly but
fondly imagined. He appeared above the
horizon at lucky time. He had the grand
air, accompanied BY mysterious retioence
and Iopooo AZ mann6r vhioh alvavu "a aesilv
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

HE AL LIN G.
catastrophe at Bull
Run momentarIly COW
ed the Washington
government. But al
though it was at first
filed with great apPre-
hcusion il was not
stampeded There we're
hasty and excited con-
situations and many
missivings. but soon it
was perceived tina: the
confederases did not
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

T FAIR OAKS A SEC
ond "On-to-Richmond"
episode had practically
come to an end, and
after Gaines Mill the
retrograde TO the James
was substituted. VIM
field Scott, after his
own disastrous failure
the previous year, as
serted that McDowell's
army, under the high
pressure of public
clamor, had been pre-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

artillery. with SIG guns-total effective, armed
and equipped ready for battle, 100. 233, besides
over 10000 engineers, escorts and quartermas-
ter's guard, &c. No wonder old Horace Greeley
groaned that never before did an army SO
constantly. pressingly need to be reinforced
not by corps: but by leader; not by men,
but by man"
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20
GEN. McCLELLAN's RETREAT,

The Seven Days Batties-The Victory ut
Malvern Hill.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

Yorktown. Williamsburg and Fair oaks-
The Change of Base.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-09-20

Let rs return to the wing above White Oak
swamp, Gen. L. V. Sumner commanding. COM
posed Of his own corps and those OF Heintzel-
and Franklin. the division Of Mccall and other
detachments. which was to destroy all govern
ment property, cover the moving wagon trains
across the swamp and bring up the rear
Sumner had begun the real movement to the
rear on the 18th. abandoning Fair Oaks AZ
daylight Moving east, he stopped at Orchard
station and destroyed the accumulated storea
Then he retired to Aliens farm, taking post
ton across the railroad, facing west Gen.
Magruders forces, which had been covering
Richmond while Lee was out cunning for
Mcclellan. followed Summers withdrawal
closely. There a sharp collision at Aliens
farm, Mag-uder attacking vigorously with
musketry aud artillery, but sumner says hs
finally drove the enemy OF az II O'Clock q m,
having previously repulsed them twice. Ma
gruder reported his entire force mt 1900 in
this engagement Heintzelman's corps wss
near, on the Williamsburg road. but appears %
have taken no part In the battle Of Aliens
farm. Franklin was two miles further back,
north and east OF Savages station. watching
the enemy's efforts 20 recross the Chicks
hominy.
Learning from Franklin about noon that ths
confederates were recrossing from the far side
of the Chickahominy TO JOIN Magruders sd-
vance, Sumner concluded IL was time % con-
centrate aud therefore he fell back on SavHge's
station. Franklin had also drawn back on that
point. HeiRtzeiman ut savages station had
been engaged several hours pushing the artil-
lery and wagon trains across the railroad
track. the last passing at 1880 an, headed
south, and the cars and other property we're
burned by his orders Sumner informed
Heintzelman that . stand was % be made By
the three corps at savage's against Magrudse.
He was directed 10 hold the williamsburg rosd
out Of Richmond running parallel % the rail-
road on the south side. and about half Q mile
from it. opposite Ssvages. The fsderals we're
N line across the railroad, facing vsseRrsnk-