Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1892-02-08

In the Court in General Term this morning
the silver brick case of L. S. ex rel Merrick
ct al agt. Secretary Foster was decided, Jus
tioe James delivering the opinion Of the court
sustaining the demurrer Of the respondent
and refusing the writ
This was petition for Q writ OF mandamus
70 compel the Secretary Of the Treasury to re-
ceive certsin bar Of silver for coinage into
silver dollars The REALTORS claim that they
are entitled to the writ on either Of two
grounds-that it is their right under the Con-
s,ituton 10 have their silver coined and fur
Their that they have tine right under existing
statutes.
GOLD AND SILVER coN.
10 demonstrate that the power OF Congress
TO coin money meant the power TO coin gold and
silver, on the ground that money at the time
tne constitution was adopted meant gold and
SILVER coin. The court conceded at once that
the power to coin money related TO gold and
silver. Ii had 1T the time become colhmon law
that money then meant gold and silver coin.
IL was conceded also that the legislature when
IL received the power to coin money was under
obligations to exercise that power, but whether
1t was obliged to coin gold or silver
under all circumstances-when, for instance.
one or the other metals might have
become unsuitabie-Was not SO clear.
Whatever might be the right of the people 10
have both metals coined the Constitution
contained nothing as to the source from which
the material for coinage should come-whether
money should be coined from bullion brought
by every owner or not They did not find
anything stated or implied in the Constitution
as 70 the source from which the bullion to be
coined should be furnished
THE COMMON LAW NOT A SOURCE OF RIGHT.
The meaning OF terms might be ascertained
by usage, but rights could not be determined
py such method. The common. law is never
a source of right. II was to be referred to- TO
construe the meaning of the language of the
Constitution, but il added nothing to or took
nothing away from that instrument The fact
therefore that it had been the custom under
British law, extended TO the colonies that bull
hon had been received for coinage from private
citizens Tor coinage, established no right. Ii
was only the people of the United States to
whom the obligation could be said to be owing.
The parties TO the obligation would be on the
one hand the legislature. the lawmaker, and on
the other hand the people, whom it repre-
sented. That was only political obligation,
and the court saw way of enforcing that
obllgatlC except by the people in their electoral
capacity. The court saw no way of enforcing
that obligation by judicial procedure. Ii
was not an individual right to be en-
forced fSa BY judicial process. The question
to have this REALTORS bullion coined into
money could be regarded as the REALTORS in
divldual right. the court was of the opinion
that 1t could no.. 1t was a right belonging to
the whole people and was TO be enforced as the
whole people enforced its right against the
legislature. The judicial department of the
government could not invade the political de-
partment unless a remedy was given specifically
to individuals. 1t was claimed a remedy had
been provided to this reator by statute
THE VARIOUS ACTS CONSIDERED.
The remedy sought here was by writ of
mandamus to compel the performance by a
nubllc officer nf dufy L.,
law The Constitution imposed no duty in this
connection upon any officer. 1t stopped with
recognition of the right. 1t was held that
the duty of coming bullion presented for that
purpose had been imposed upon the Secretary
OF the Treasury. The statute of 1887 provided
that silver bullion should be received at the
mint and coined for the benefit of
| the depositor That section was re-
pealed by the act of 1873 which
authorized the coinage of trade dollars. but
dad not provide that 1t should be received as
lawful money. Then came the act of 1878. COM
monty called the Bland act 1t provided that
| there should be coined silver dollars of certain
weight and standard as provided by the statute
OF 1887. The Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized by this act to purchase
not ito receive-silver bullion not less than
S2.0OO.O0O nor more than "a DOC, 00W month
| at the market value. The courts opinion-and
Justice James said he spoke in this only for a
majority of the court-was that the reference
only to the provisions Of the earlier act re-
| lating to the fineness of silver.
As to the contention that the act Of 1873 in
cluded the section of the act of 1887 providing
| that bullion should be received from owners
| for coinage, Justice James said that except as
to the provision relating to the purchase OF
silver, it was an act relating to the standard of
coins and not as to the manner in which silver
should be obtained. They found, however
that the act stated definitely how the silver was
to be obtained-and that was by purchase.
THE DUTY OF THE SECRETARY.
The next question was whether any such duty
as receiving bullion for coinage was i'm
posed on the Secretary of the Treasury. The
act OF 1873 provided that the bullion should be
received at the mint and designated the very
officers who should receive and coin it. 1t was
true these officers were under the supervision
OF the Secretary of the Treasury, but he was
not to receive the bullion. 1t was impossible
to hold that the Secretary OF the Treasury was
charged with this duty. This was duty distinctly
imposed upon other officers, officers who were
to give bond The only duty of the Secretary
OF the Treasury was to see that these officers
performed their duties The court was not
aware OF any case where a writ of mandamus
lies to superior officer to command another
officer to perform duty. The writ, therefore,
could not be against the Secretary of the Treas
ury. 1t was the opinion of the majority of the
court that there is, in the first place, statute
|
coinage of bullion brought by any one for the
purpose, and if there was the duty was i'm
posed upon other officers than the Secretary
OF the Treasury, and therefore the court could
not run against the Secretary of the Treasury.
CHIEF JUSTICE BISGHAMs POSITION.
Chief Justice Bingham said he concurred
with his brethren in that the writ could not
run against the Secretary of the Treasury and
also in regard to the constitutional points He
thought there was no doubt to the construc-
ton Of the act of 1878 and its reference to the
act Of 1887. An ingenious and almost endless
argument might be made on the construction
of these statutes. Looking to the statute alone,
he thought it doubtful what the construction
should be- but looking to other things
which, he thought the court should
consider in determining the effect Of a
statute, he thought they might decide between
one or the other construction. 1t was never
claimed:when the act of 1878 was passed that
the act was to re-establish free coinage. Since
then then there had been a demand on the
part of many, who believe such a thing desir-
able, for the enactment Of law for free COIN
age He did not do it on the theory that the
construction of the act Of 1875 was clear and
demonstrarlve. He thought grave doubt would
rise in the minds of any one who read the statute
as to the intention of Congress.