Fort Worth gazette. [volume] (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1891-1898, 1892-03-25
SUPREME COURT.
DECISIONS AT THE GALVESTON
SITTING WEDNESDAY,.
A wife's Deed to Her Husband Absolutely
Void Under Certain Circumstances.
Other Cases Decided.
Specialize the Gazette


GALVESTON, TEX, March 23-The follow
ing cases were disposed of upon report Of
the commission of appeals, section ZAP:
Ann NJ. Styles vs.. j. Japhet; error from
Harris county. TrespaSS to try title. All
property acquired by the husband and wife
during marriage, whether the deed be in
the name of the one OF the other, upon a
consideration deemed valuable in law, is
presume to be community property, which
the husband may dispose Of, and pur-
chaser from, or under the husband, may
rely upon this presumption And the fact
that the deed is in the name of the wife
alone, will not of itself give notice of her
separate claim. A deed and its record are
absolutely void when the wife undertook to
convey the land to her husband. and had
not privily acknowledged it, because she had
no authority to make such deed to her hus-
band during Overture, and because of de-
fective acknowledgment. Affirmed. Mari,
j. Hutcheson, Darlington & Sears for APP
pellant. q. P. Hamblen for appellee.
]. R. Bordages VS.. William Higgins and
wife; appeal from Jefferson county. Tres
pass to try title by appellant. Appellant
claims the land Homestead of appellee)
under Judgment of the district court rem
dered in case OF the City of Beaumont vs..
Higgins. This Judgment fixed lien on the
premises for local assessment for side
walk constructed in front Of premises by
the city, and the premises were sold there
under and appellant purchased at execution
sale. This was done IN pursuance TO an
ordinance requiring property owners to
build sidewalks in front of their property,
and in case Of failure the city to do the
work and assess the owner for the cost of
such work, and such assessment to be a
lien on the property. Held: That such as
sessmentS are special taxes for which the
ha he linda INF in
original suit is conclusive OF this question
and is not subject 10 collateral attack as here
attempted. Reversed and remanded. Mari,
J. Douglas 81 Lanier, O'Brien & O'Brien,
for appellant. r. II. Leonard for appellee.
The Texas and Pacific Railway company
vs.. Mrs. Z. L. Collins ct a.. appeal from
Dallas county. John c. Brown as : eceiver
was sued by appellees to recover damages
for injuries resulting in death to the hus-
band of one of the appelleeS. and the
father of the other. The company was
made party after Browns discharge on
ground that earnings had been invested in
betterments, etc. The receiver was not
liable for injury resulting in death. Ap-
pellees could not recover unless receiver
was primarily liable. This was fundamen-
tai error apparent of record. Reversed and
remanded, Mari j. r. S. Lovett for APP
pellant. J. D. Thomas, w. NJ. Grow and
II. G. Robertson for appellee.
The St Louis and San Francisco railway
VS.. a. C. Traweck; appeal from Dallas
county. Appellant, defendant below, at
time it answered fled plea of privilege,
alleging that the cause of action did not
accrue in Dallas, county denying that it had
an agent in said county or that its line of
road entered Dallas county. Citation was
served on an agent if defendant company
who had an ONCE in Dallas. Subdivision
q, of article 119S of Revised Statues provides
that suits against any private corporation
may be commenced in any county when the
cause of action arose, ETC., or in which such
corroration has an agency or representa-
tiYe, etc. Held: Railroad companies are
4fprivate corporations within the mean
ing of the statute referred to, and may be
sued in any county where they have an
agency or representative. Reversed and
remanded on ground of contributory negli-
gence. Opinion by Hobby, P. J. E. D.
Kenna and w. r. Smith for appellant, I.
c. Kearby and J. NJ. Mccoy for appellee