The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-06-12
HUSBANDS RIGHTS.
sapreme Court Affirms Judge
Lichtenberg's Decision.
e.ws,oN OF A wlFE's PROPERTY.
levy Thought watermelons Were en
Of whisky-Troubie In 0ettAns
Jurors to TRY stsrk.

AA..A.~a q. .rtst,ed To an interest In his d.
yorced wife's separate property. Wnsis susA
s,s.no.,t,op sha,l appear Just aud equitable 20
Judee Iiebteuberg decided in the divorce esse
m David n. Webster against Sarah A Weps'e.
last summer, and 90 the supreme court nas luss
decided in sfirming Judge L1cntenoefg w
cision. In.
There was about $4,000 worth Of property N.
VOWED in this suit. The title TO the properly
-. =, the wife. but In granting the
husband = divorce Judge Lichtenberg renoeisu
Indictment giving to Webster portion o. .ns
nronerty Sarah Webster appealed TO the 81
nreme court on this point, but the judgment %
the court below was affirmed the opinion %
rendered BY Justice Dunbar, the otnef n's
justices coucurring. and ID as follows:
The main question to be decided in this ,, ease s
involves the construction OF section zoo' VI s'is
code OF Washington, when Is ~ the court
ssSec oOU7 IN granting oivolce. VIZ S soe,y
shall slso make such disposition OF tne PtvPILl,S
81 the parties as shall appear Just ana sq az,
having regard to the Respective Ms 49, ~ Iii iii
parties, ana 70 the condition in which they VIII
s. left by such divorce, and to the pa.ty py
whom the property was acquired, ana 70 .ne
burdens i'm posed upon IL for the penen. ol vac
children and shall make provision LOT as =,
diaushIp. custody, and support aud eaucation Vi
the minor children OF such marriage
Thia statute was passed in 1868, PRIOR 70 tne
psssage OF the community property law, ana mas
ever since been the law OF the territory ana Vi
Il Is contended by appellant that this must be
eonatrued to mean that the court enau make
such division of the joint property OF the parties
o. shall sppear Just ana eqalau ss A not 70 he
considered in making such disposition we are
unable TO see how this construction can DC sus-
tanned by any rule for the Interpretation OF stet
utea The language Of the statute seems 20 pc
plain and unambiguous, and the words must De
aiyen their ordinary meaning. The statute
does not say that the court shall make suen ais,
position OF their joint property, etc, put snan
nertiesa This language is comprehensive; IL Is
An equitable division of the property rights OF
Che PARTIES that the court Is authorized TO make
One statute defines what separate properv =;
who shall have control of separate property,
and who of real property, both separate aud
community: but these statutes relate to prop
srty rights during Overture dnis s.a.u nom n
broken, and the marriage relations dissolved,
that the parties shall bring into court ali their
property, snd . complete showing must oe
Chancellor III that they have, and after an ex-
animation into the whole case he makes an
squftable division. This view is strengthened,
and, II seems 70 me, established beyond contro-
ve1y By the succeeding provision OF the section
Having regard to the respective merits OF the
parties, and to the condition in which they will
Be left by such divorce, and to the party through
whom the property was acquired
rate property, and cannot take ii into account in
making the division, that portion of the statute
which says il shall have regard to the party
through whom the property was acquired 10
equal division of the property, but ''just and
equitable division, and rs no general rule ior
Just and equitable division can be laid down,
out each case must be adjusted according 10 It's
own merits aud the particular circumstances
it, the court investigates all the cir.
cumstances. First, as to who is to blame or, II
neither party is blameless the degree OF blame
10 be attached to the respective parties; second,
who 10 the most proper party the custody OF the
minor children, il any: third, III there Is dispo-
'ition OF the property to be made, the manner IN
mich II was acquired, whether derived princi-
pally from the husband or the wife, or by their
ONT exertions; the condition of the parties as
o age and health, and great many considera-
ions which will necessarily enter into the ais
The .sosrs .as S Spopsr,v o the husband
" wife IL simply circumstance Tor
he court to take into consideration in making
he division. This subject is now regulated
fery largely by statute, and there is grea,
imilarity in the statutes, all of them investing
he court with large discretionary powers. In
owa, under statute substantially like ours,
he court may make such order in respect to the
children and property OF the parties and the
of the wife ~ shall be right and
proper" il is held that when the divorce is in
oSuI Va tAc vile puIt Vi ZIG nusooho
nay be set OFF to her to be held by her in fee
simple. Jolly VS.. Jolly, Iowa, q.
In Kentucky and Alabama the courts have re-
fused TO divide the separate property OF either
Spouse but IN the statutes of each of those states
which give the court substantially the same
discretion that ours does, there is a special pro-
vision, or saving clause, to the effect that
nothing herein contained shall be construed TO
authorize the court TO compel either party TO
diyest himself, or herself, OF the title to real
estate. This very provision Is at least iegisla-
tive recognition that without ii the court would
have power to divert the title. And even these
courts in the exercise of their discretion award
the use oil the separate estate of one spouse to
the other for life
In Alabama the wording OF the statute is:
The court pronouncing a decree shall order
ana decree division of the estate of the parties
In such way as TO it shall seem right, having
Que regard to the rights of each party and their
IL any," with the provision quoted
above. And the supreme court in constituting
this statute in Lavett VS. Lavett, II Alabama,
page 763, says that the estate OF the parties was
The estate held by either husband or wife, or by
hem jointly
We are clearly of the opinion that section 2,oo7
power In its discretion to make division OF the
separate property of the wife or husband. With
his view of the law of the case, aud seeing no
abuse OF discretion by the court in its findings,
Dr. conclusions. we are of the opinion that the
Judgment should be affirmed. The point raised
BY the appellant in regard to the refusal of the
.ourt TO discharge the receiver after the appeal
n this case had been taken We think is not
properly before us, and we have therefore not
it, Judgment OF the lower court is
Affirmed.