Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1891-04-05
-, !. rronl,Ies IN Farther INDIE.

The csIcutts and other dispatches re-
oardinr the massacre Of Ghoofkasin aad tho
disturbed condition Of Manipur are caicu-
lated 10 lead TO confusion in tho pubic
mind unless carefully studied. Inc
names Assam and Maniprr are used IN
tercbsnoeably. A revolt in the one might
,,,ove q serious matter for the time being,
Int trouble In the other will hardly amount
q, rnucb unless Il shall exert Influences not
AZ present to be anticipated. Assam Is
provipce Of British India, with population
81 some two millions and half. Abouttwo
millions of these are Hindus. aquarter OF
million Mahommedans, and the rest. en-
bracrng the hill tribes, cling 70 their aoori-
cinal religions. Assam is notable in the his
tory of farther India for having pers'stentiy
remained outside Of the Mogui Empire ana
antaeonized the Mahommedan policy Oh
India. For years anterior to the first bur
mese war, however, 1t had been the vac,
tim of Burmese encroaohmens ana
AZ the end of that war In 1926
Il was annexed 10 British india-
Manipur is small feudatory province lying
between Assam and Upper Burmah, when
was absorbed by Great Britain in the last
Burmese war, and its southern boundary
merpes. 90 TO speak. into the country OF
number Of independent and unruly hill
ty;bes. As far back as 1762 1t was the
scene of disturbances that caused the
Raish to solicit the good offices OF the
British authorities in India, but the Vice
row has no control over the province. He
simplv has representative at the kaJans
court with nominal power. and the present
trouble seems to have grown out OF pretty
much the same conditions that obtained
IN 1762.
The Assamese proper have, under British
rule. become very quiet and peaceaDie,
and the dispatches from India when sifted
afford no ground for the assumption that
they are in o state of turbulence OF are
disposed to resist the powers that De. 30
far "a known all the conditions in Assam
initiate against the chances OF extensive
revolt there.
Considering, however, the geographical
s;tuation of Manipur, and the fact that it
is within the radius of the disorganizing
influences generated By the events follow
ing the British conquest of Upper Burmah,
Il ia a natural field for intrigue and tribal
conflict, such as recently caused the invo-
cation Of British interference.
After the long record of comparative
content in Assam revolt in the province
might. as above stated, prove serious
matter for the time being for the reason
that it would tend to develop any latent
discontent that may possibly exist IN other
frontier provinces. Russian emissaries'
it goes without saying, would not be
allow to take advantage of this. Yet
we are not, as is the case with
some. disposed to jump to the conclusion
that an Assamese rebellion even OF large
proportions would endanger Great Britain's
grasp upon India. II is true that in o
GREAT measure the former holds her Oriental
Empire by the sword, but as between the
Russian sword and the British sword the
people of India will choose the latter
as the lesser evil. The Princes
know that the overthrow OF British
SWAY in India means Russian ss-
cendancy there. As q consequence, the
LOYALTY of most of them does not seem to
admit of question, and what with their
personal armies. the British troops in
India. the native regiments and the armed
police. the Viceroy has at his disposal a
force capable of dealing srmmarily with
any outbreak. History appears to have
repeated itself in respect OF the .insuf-
fcient force the British had IN Manipur,
but il is likely that il will also repeat itself
in the matter of making the Manipuris
pay dearly for their temerity.
Whether or not the trouble shall extend
to Assam the outcome will probably be
that Manipur will be annexed to British
India. Such contamination is indicated
by the logic of the situation snd of events
| II would constitute the best of security
for the quiet of Assam and Upper Burmah
place the authorities of India in an advan.
tageous position TO cope with the bill
tribes, enhance British prestige in the
race, with Russia to secure foothold
in Thibet, and, last but not least
1t would demonstrate to the Gar at O very
opportune moment that it would not d.
| to stake too much upon diversion on thu
Indian border as q means of rendering
more easy the road to Constantinople
The public will watch the development
| in the Manipur incident with interest, a
they will probably disclose much touch
| ing India's preparations for defence anC
| for the concentration of troops that it ha
been the policy of the Government to keel