The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-02-13
CONCERNING POLICE JUSTICES.
City Cannot Fix Their Compensation
When They Are Justices of the Peace.


City Cannot Fix Their Compensation
When They Are Justices Of the Peace. :.
OLYMPIA, Feb 1.-THE following decis-
ion has been made by the supreme court:
d. A. Mcintosh vs.. Fred Furth ct al.
Appeal from the superior court of Spokane
county.
Opinion by Hon. John p. Hoyt, Judge:
Under its charter the city of Spokane Falls
was authorized to designate one of the justices
of the peace residing therein as police Justice of
said city, and the said justice, when SO .desig-
nated was authorized to try offenders for al
legged violations of the ordinances of said city.
There was provision of said charter which
authorized the city to establish and regulate the
fees and compensation OF its officers except when
otherwise provided.
BY virtue of these provisions one of the de-
PENDANTS had been designated as such police
dered as such justice fixed by a salary of $50
per month, and the sole question argued by
counsel and presented for our determination is
as to the power of said city TO provide this COM
pensation for such services.
If the jurisdiction to perform the acts re-
quired of such officer under said charter is de-
rived primarily from the fact that he has been
designated as police justice. there would be
strong reason for holding that under said pro-
visions of its said charter said city might pro-
vide as compensation therefor the above stated
salary. If, on the other hand, such jurisdiction
arises from the fact that he is a justice OF the
peace then il would be more reasonable to hold
the general provisions of the statute which pro-
vides certain fees for the several acts required
to be performed by such justice of the peace.
Unless the contrary Intention was clear 1t
would be presumed that the legislature in
tended to provide the same compensation for
like acts performed by justices OF peace through
out the state. And we do not think such inten-
ton sufficiently appears in the language OF the
charter of said city, every word in the charter
can be given its full force as we'll by holding
that the above stated provision, allowing the
fv IN " 10 ri Officers
otherwise provided, meant as otherwise pro-
vided by law, as by holding that 1t meant as
otherwise provided in said charter In fact the
words used would be the ordinary ones to ex-
press the former meaning, while the latter would
be much more likely to be expressed by the
limitation, except as otherwise provided herein,
or in this charter.
Plaintiff in error had evidently foreseen that
the main contention must be as to the capacity
in which said officer acted. Hence almost his
entire argument has been TO show that acts re-
Quired OF such officer were non judicial IN their
character. and could therefore be conferred on
other officers than those mentioned IN the or
ganic act as the only ones in whom could be
vested judicial authority
With their contention in this regard we can
not agree, for although there are some authori-
ties 10 the effect that violations of the provis-
ions OF ordinances of cities can be tried by
Others than judicial officers, we think that un-
der the organic act of the territory and the leg
islatiou and practice Hereunder, the proceed
ings had TO punish for violation OF city ordl-
nances were purely judicial as any other pro-
ceGdlnGS before Justices OF the pence.
The provisions of the charter in question tend
strongly to establish such fact. For If the acts
required were non judicial, why was the city
required 10 NIL such place OF police justice py
some one OF the justices of the peace residing
in said city?
We think that every act of such police justice
was the act of a justice OF the peace ana that
the only object or effect of his designation as
such police justice was to provide a single
officer before whom the causes under the city
charter should be brought Without such pro-
visions the business would be divided between
the several justices of the peace residing IN snch
city which would not so well subserye the con
venient and economical administration OF the
affairs OF the city as would single judicial
officer.
Ii follows that the compensation provided by
general statutes applies TO the officer IA 9ues-
ton, and that the ordinance providing Tor
salary therefor is void, and the judgment oil
the lower court must be affirmed, and II will be
so ordered john +. HoYT, j.
We concur: ELAOS ScoTF,
r. l.. STILES,
II. O. DUNBAR