The Dispatch. [volume] (Provo City, Utah) 1891-1895, 1891-01-28
WHIPS OR ENCEs, WHICH,

attention Of business men accustomed
to consider financial questions cannot
too often be called to the subject. Insur-
ance is an urgently demanded against
this danger as against fire or mob
violence. Insurance perhaps does not
fully express what is needed, since it
implies the distribution of unavoida
bic loss among many sufferers, while
judicious investment for cost defense
will prevent the loss altogether.
The question narrows itself to this:
How is security to be had against an
attack from an armored feet? Per
haps the most natural suggestion is to
meet like with like. The danger
from a hostile fleet Why not meet it
by opposing a fleet of our own? Com
mon sense dictates, do SO by all means.
a certain amount OF money judicious
ly expended in increasing the navy is
money well spent. That branch of the
public service has been allowed to de-
teriorate with as much thoughtlessness
as have been our coast Notifications.
n'st zt the fthe danger now appears to be that
= Sszg 49, $50 far III is
urged by some that navy alone may
safely be trusted to repel naval attacks.
This is not true for many reasons.
Modern ships of war move rapidly and
the ocean is trackless and wide. Our
fleet, without any fault of its own, may
be avoided and the intended blow may
be delivered in its absence. This truth
was practically demonstrated in 1888
by the peace manHuyers of the British
fleet, and the danger cannot be gain
said. The only mode of meeting this
difficulty would be to have fleet equal
to that of the enemy retained in every
port to be defended, which would in
volye an outlay not to be thought of
for moment. Vastly fewer land guns,
with their accessories, will suffice to
bar the entrance of every one of our
chief ports than if mounted Oh ship
board, because they can be much more
perfectly protected and much more ac-
curately served.
Again, ships of war are no longer
moved by the winds of heaven, and we
have not, as has England, coaling
stations distributed over the world.
Our ships will be held to our own
shores. Most of them are of the cruiser
type, designed to destroy commerce,
reconnoiter the enemy and act on the
skirmish line, rather than for heavy
fighting. We must therefore provide
ports of refuge where they cannot be
overwhelmed by superior force, OF they
will be captured or destroyed. Waron
the ocean, as on land, demands secure
bases of operation and supply, and
they can be had only by fortifying the
land approaches of our chief cities.
Still another reason must commend
itself TO practical business men. No
comparison exists between the cost of
the two systems, whether for original
outlay or for maintenance The
Naval Policy Board estimated the first
cost of 4 navy suitable for the needs of
the United States at about $3.50 900 600;
the joint board of army men, navy men
and civilians of 1885 estimated the first
cost Of the land defenses sufficient for
the protection of all our chief ports
at less than S1O0,OOO,OO0. But this
enormous difference in first cost is
small compared with the per
petual difference in the cost
of maintenance. The land defenses
are permanent structures. imperisha-
BILE, and kept in order by their small |
peace garrisons- The life of an un-
sheathed steel hull of the pattern
adopted for our new ships is limited to
about twenty-five years, after which |
extensive and costly repairs become |
necessary. As our own recent expert |
ence has shown, constant repairs are
needed by ship in commission. The |
Boston already shows pits" due to
corrosion of her plates. Naval Con-
suuctor Hichborne stated some
months ago: The condition of the
Dolpban is also somewhat serious; at
about the usual low water line, a
pitted belt varying from three to
eighteen inches in width extends from
the forward to The outer tower. The
holes are from one-sixteenth to three
sixteenths Of an inch in depth, and as
the plates are but seyen-sixteenths of
an inch in thickness this becomes
quite a serious natter
Evidently judicious economy de-
mands that where mobility is not an
essential condition of efficiency, prefer
ence should be given to forms of con-
struction of less perishable nature
than shipping. Finally, guns even on
harbor defense vessels, although little
exposed to the ordinary dangers of the
sea, are much more liable than guns
on land to suffer from the chances of !