The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-20
;rue value. That loynl, brave, but unfortu-

true value. That loyal, brave, but unfortu-
nate general SAID OF himself that he was
no strategist. Moltke was we'll aware of
how weak was Benedek's authority, and
how strong was the faction at work against
him in the then unreformed army OF Aus
tria. Plans you would not dare to adopt
against a Wellington, you do not scruple to
put in execution against a Benedek. Jomlni
points out that Napoleon did not hesitate
to play tricks with Mack which he would
not have ventured upon with the Archduke
Charles.
But must we utterly condemn Moltke's
plan, as pedantic critics, crammed with
Jomini, often ask us to do, because it Of
forded openings and chances to his OPP
ponent. l should like to ask them If they
as utterly condemn Wel1ington's plan for
the Waterloo campaign, because Of the
chances it gave his opponent? Napoleon
knew how to take advantages of all such
chances, and in that instance he took them
in, as it were, at a glance, and it did very
nearly destroy the two armies opposed to
him by taking advantage of them.
Over and over again Napoleon's STRATEGY
cal and tactical plans left, open great
chances to his opponents, if they had been
had known how to use them. But the whole
gist of tine matter is in that "if." Napoleon
studied the character and genius of his ad-
versary as closely as he did his maps of the
seat of war. His first thought was, what
will so-and SO do unde these clrcum-
stances?" Jomini impresses upon his rend-
ers. that had the allies at Napoleon's
battle Of Dresden attacked in the man
ner he indicates Ney must have been driven
into the Elbe. If, in the Austerlitz cam
paign, the allies had waited for the Prus-
sian army. and if that army had moved as
quickly as it might have done, it is not
easy TO see how Napoleon could have es-
capped destruction.
These illustrations might be multiplied,
but, after all, war is but q game III which
the calculation OF chances is an important
factor, and in which the general who risks
nothing will very seldom gain much. 1t is,
it always has been, the possibilities against
which afford you the best chances OF VIC
tory.
What wns the great danger of this opera
ton? First--as Napoleon so often pointed
out-that each commander. not knowing
what his colleague was doing some hundred
miles off, would playwright DO forced to
play--for his own hand; that the combined
operation rs planned. would not, or could
not, come of, and that consequently each
of the generals, for tho time commanding
Independently, would be attacked in detail,
as best suited the convenience OF ms concen-
trated adversary. But that danger was
removed in this instance by the fact that
the generals commanding tho two armies
crossing the mountains into Bohemia,
were in constant communication by cleo
trio telegraph with one another back along
their lines of communication to Berlin, and
with the commandet-in chief OF all the ma
tion's armies, who during the operations
remained in that capital. The danger OF
failure in MI suoh complicated schemes,
against which Napoleon enlarged, was in
this case reduced to a minimum, for the
daily movements OF each army were con-
trolltd from Berlin. Neither could possi-
bly, get out OF hand, and both acted ns
much in unison and concert as IL thor
lines of advance hnd been only a couple of
hpura' rid from the other.
Tho power which the electric telegraph
gave Moltka was most important, but the
telegraph ought also to have helped Bene-
aek. With the lines OF telegraphs and rail
ways at his disposal, | do not think he
should have allowed the two distant Prns-
alan armies to CROSS the mountains into Boz
hemia and unite, ns they did. under his
very nose. Had u Napoleon commanded
the Austrian army, tho plan adopted by
Moltke would, in my opinion, have ended in