New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-07-19

this time Pattesous forces in observation along the
portion OF 10000 To 5000. Besides these troops the
tedersls had 1000 men at Fort Monroe under Butler
a considerable force at Baltimore and vicinity, aud
still another at Cumberland June Mcdowell wrote
70 Army headquarters that 1000 infantry. Two DAT
psnies Of cavalry with Of 5000 men. TO be
pushed forward by rail- from Alexandria as needed.
So il appears mat General MeDowel did not consider
the Confederate force in his front at that date very
5etant aaoie' nos that IL was foolany TO attempt W
1t is almost Impossible to fix the exact number Cd
troops available TO scott opposite the rebel front our
ing the first week in june but perfectly satisfied
after careful investigation Of the returns sun III
existence that by June advance could nave oeen
made toward Manassas with force fully ~ large ana,
Tor that matter as well equipped as that Win W baS
been two or three regular batteries short And what
force would BE- hnve then met Even II the Two reoeI
SIX weeks later their total force would not then have
exceeded 5000 or 5000 men But Beauregafu alohe
eond not have opposed the advance with more tlsn
5000. Mark that, $1,000 against 5000. These were
the relative conditions Of the opposing forces at the aa
lnaueurate vigorous operations. .
The true strategy az the outset was 70 do as the
rebels aferward dd; 10 consolidate the two armies
OF Mcdowell and Patterson. But the truth is az that
early date or military authorities were still IN dohot
as to the proper line of operations in the Fast last
Scott thought IL was by way of the Shenandoah valley
and Patterson expressed the official belief that the
great battle of the war would be fought at Harpers
Now let US what the result of the six weeks
further preparations on the part Of General scott,
umns Of Mcdowell and Patterson, we have seen:
amounted 70 $1,000 men. but meanwhile the forces OF
IS 10 say, the relative conditions had changed very
considerably 20 the advantage Of the Confederates.
e1en that Il scott SUITED had Waited three 81 months~sx
m0nths-a year-nO corresponding advantage would
have accrued from his fnespun preparations General
Of & and organization for the better part OF
was again e~StNCd. and what his experience lie
found the confederate army defending the rebel capl-
nothing of the confidence begOtten of successfor
our delay was their success-than 1t was when Nc
Dowells campaign occurred
Like Horace Greeley, think the golden opportunity
in June, 1e61-a month at least before the battle
Of Bull Run was fought-and I am confident future
at the same conclusion. We Outnumbered the Con-
fedeates at least three to along the entire front
then troops were not aborng under the depression
caused by the blunders and defeats Of Big Bethel and
Vienna out Of which trivial events grew and maeni-
batteries and inpregnabe forts that for months after
ward haunted the Union troops. General scott had
faith In the three months troops. and Mcdowell in
dcaes that the efficiency Of many Of these regiments
seriously impaired at Bull Run by the impending
not have been Infinitely wiser have fought them
the beginning or middle instead OF near the end Of
II is true there were many weighty objections be
urged against advance so early as June, as the
but these do not outweigh the arguments IN favor OF
the first date. General Grant held the true heOry-te
more time YOU waste In preparation for attack when
fairly ready the more time your enemy has to meet
L. He always held that the natural disadvantages
equal; that impossible roads. rain-stOrms.
sleet and were as bad for his enemy as for him
self Hence. as he arrived within reach at
DoneIson and again at yclsburg; he stck. and sue
cessfully. IL Is safe 10 assume always that threat
ened enemy will gain rapidly in relative strength.
because hts necessities the more pressing.
boodsSed Mr Greeley Clearly underood these general
principles Of offence and defence furthermore, az the
very beginning he saw clearly the necessities OF the
situatOp, and sence importuned for immediate ana
speedily and surety be brought TO successful issue
And psrccivfnE The relative prepOnderance OF the
Union forces actually In the field. he argued that our
raw and undisciBlined soldiers were more likely TO
stronger al a. iater date. And that is why he made
the country ring.in the spring Of SCI with the Ma
tons War Cry, '0n 70 Richmond
Member Of Board Of Publication. War Records Of
fee.
War Department. Washington, July g. 1891.
since this paper written. have seen, IN the
current number Of 1.-The Century Mogazne" "Creeleys
Estimate OF Lincoln unpublished address lecture,
supposed have been written about three after the
closed never delivered In this long hidden pa
per which Is interesting and instructive one Mr.
Greeley reterates his belief that sstbc advance
on Richmond might have made by the end OF June
1851 100 0C0 strong. which would have resulted In dis
persing the rebel army and and
the Union, but not only leaving slavery intact
but more strongly intrenched than SO IL appears
that after msts Of the had lfted Mr. Greeley
leaned to the opinion that it nterpOsition Of
Providence which caused the miscarriage OF the ION to
Richmond" movement, and prevented Union success at
Bull Run 70 end that slavery might the surely
be DESTROYED and at the time the Union saved.
L. J. p.