The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1891-08-17
lieved that If the original plan had been
carried out it could not possibly have led
to more successful results"

The Atlanta campaign began in the fol-
lowing May. and Thomas was placed in
command of o portion of the army under
Sherman; but he was not permitted to take
part in any of the important operations,
or to exercise bis rare military qualities
with proper effect. 1t is easily suppesable
that his past successes had provoked the
envy of certain parties. and that he was
accordingly kept where he could not repeat
them. He was required to perform service
of an inferior and m~onotonous kind, While
were favored WITH daily chances to
distinguish themselves. His command
was so located that it could not
accomplish any striking result. The most
that it was allowed to do was to guard rail-
way bridges, escort supply trains, and en-
gage in an occasional skirmish. 1t is useless
to say that this was not an Intentional dis
elimination. The standing of Thomas was
such that he should have been given the
foremost place instead of the hindmost enc.
He had done more than any other one off,
Ger in that army, sherman included, to
punish the enemies of the country and TO
promote the suppression of the rebellion;
but that was not considered a good reason
for giving preference to him over others
who had yet to show their capacity.
If the advice of Thomas had been taken
the Atlanta campaign would have been q
very different thing. He recommended that
the bulk of the army be marched rapidly
through Snake Creek Gap, taking possess
sion of the railroad In Johnston's rear at
Resaca, and forcing him to fight under con-
tions that would have involved his utter
ruin. But that plan was too simple and
straightforward for sherman. He preferred
something more elaborate and STRAIT
egical. The opportunity to win a sudden
and conclusive victory by plain and di-
rect means did not tempt him. He had
made up his mind to proceed entirely &C.
cording to the methods of the schoolmas-
90. .-A -4-l1 not q 90 4-r a4ha- an~
R~estion. The consequence was that he did
not get another chance to strike and crush
Johnston's army. He made his way to At
lanta by gradual steps, turning his adver-
sary's petitions from time to time and forc-
ing him to fall back. but never bringing him
to battle. lie did more danklng than had
ever before been done by any army, but it
protited him little OF nothing in the way of
against him. He took Atlanta. but it was
worth nothing to him when he got IT, as the
confederate army was still TO be met and
subdued.
AFTER THE FALL OF ATLANTA.
The evacuation of Atlanta was heralded.
ct the time, as q signal federal gain, but.
as q matter of fact. 1t left Sherman in q
worse situation than he had been at the
beginning of the campaign. His progress
southwark to that point implied q lone and
dangerous lire of communication, with
fully one-third of his army employed in
guarding it. He could not afford to extend
1t any further. The thanking policy had
carried him to his objective point. but now
hat he was there the fact stared him the
face that he had not accomplished any
thing of q vital nature. He had been Op-
Grating against the confederate army for
several mOnths, having it constantly
in his front, but he had not in
flicted any considerable damage upon it.
L IL ..-1I h... ,uh,naa4 - nrxy Aar 80 ,< BOD
been willing to fight; but instead of thus
accommodating him it had only provoked
him by pretending to be ready for a decisive
battle, and then taking itself out of his
way. So far as his facilities for destroying
that enemy were concerned. they had GER
tainly not been improved by this long
journey. From the 4th of May to the I'd of
September he had been operating with an
army of about 100. 600 men-One of the best
armies ever seen in any country-and he
had only succeeded In marching to n place
which was not worth the cost of holding,
and which did not present any advantage
from a military point of view.
1t Is interesting TO read Sherman's letters
to Grant and others at that time. For
nearly q month he tarried there for no
other purpose. apparently, than TO suggest
plans of escape from his EN- barra ssing posi-
ton. Some of these suggestions were very
ingenious, and some were very nearly ri
diculous. While they were being discussed.
Hood moved hiss army to Florence. Ala,
preparatory 10 ~ IuONtIlcuU Ou NdSuNlIl6.
Sherman could not move across the conn
try TO repel this threatened invasion with
out confessing the failure of the Atlanta
campaign and giving up the territory
posed the celebrated march to the sea. Ii
would be possible. he represented, for
Thomas to hold the line Of the Tennessee
river against Hood. while the main army
should proceed through Georgia to Savan-
nah, demonstrating the hollowness of the
Confederacy, and inspiring the North with
perfect confidence in the early success Of
it's armies. Grant did not at first favor
this idea, and the wonder is that he ulti-
metely Endorsed it, when it clearly involved
such q grave risk. 1t placed the federal
gains in the West at the mercy of doubt
full circumstances and might have given TO
the cOnfederates all that they had lost
since the beginning of the war.
SAVED AT NASHVILLE.
The fact that such a result did not ensue
is to be credited principally to Thomas.
He wac the man who took the scattered
forces left behind by Sherman and used
them to the best advantage in resisting the
progress of Hoods army. These scanty files
were pitted against terrible odds, and in the
ordinary course OF things they must have
been beaten. They were beaten. in fact,
up to the time of the battle of Nashville.
That was their last chance Had they been
/ QeIeaGeQ b0ero HOOQ cOul0 nave gone on
practically unopposed to Louisville and
thence to Cincinnati. Thomas appreciated
this danger. and the responsibility of deal
ing with it was one of the most i'm
p0rtant that any commander had to assume
during the war. 1t was PECULIARLY fortu-
nate that a man of ThOmas's temperament
and experience happened to have control
in that critical affair. The authorities in
Washington thought he was too slow and
sent Logan out to supersede him: but be-
fore the latter reached the scene the bat
tie had been fought and the confederate
army practically destroyed. 1t was one of
the great triumphs, like Vicksburg and
Gettysburg. and the glory of it will pre-
serve the fame of Thomas forever.
If Thomas had failed In the work of keep
ing Hood out of Nashville the march to the
sea would have been denounced as a stu
pendOus blnnder. Sherman would have
been obliged to hasten back with his army
for the purpose of preventing the cOnfeder-
ates from invading Ohio, Indiana and ILL.,
nois- The novelty and audacity of the ex-
petition would have counted for nothing
if the troops left behind had come short of
doing what was ex pected of them. 1t was
the fine generalship Of Thomas that made
Sherman's project successful. Any
body could have led an army through
Georgia at that time, but il required first
class ability to cope with Hood in Tonnes
see. The future historian will not fail to
note this important distinction, and to ap-
portion the honor accordingly. Let Sher-
man be credited with all that fairly and
Justly belongs to him, but let it not be for
gotten that the principal exploit of his