The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-07-18

s-IsS ~ akranszr VIZ. L1af Whatever liability II
Is under is not present or absolute but future
and contingent only
second-Under its charter OF $50 the CITY Of
1919 naq power 20 widen streets and to con-
aeInn such real estate as might be necessary
Inereior This power was given upon the theory
that IL would be exercised for srecfal benefit az
parueular Localities, and would be paid for BY
property Denented- An required In section f0f
the assessments OF dement's was q part OF the
proceedings for condemnation a. rlecessary as
az any otner part II 10 shown by the record here
tnat there was such assessment in each case OF
condemnation, but thst less than per cent OF
the amount assessed has been paid Win this
isliure 70 collect we have nothing 70 do If the
Guy las taken possession of the condemned
lands, II u Tor the unpaid owners thereof to
pursue such plain remedies as the law provides
.nem; we are OF the opinion that the neglect OF
tne cry does not place their claims in the cate
CORY OF the eity's general Indebtedness The or
derry progress OF business would have reouired
lnat tney ne paid before they surrendered pos
eesslon. out 1t they waived their right 20 pre-
payment, their resort should none the less be to
the sources provided by law for their REIN burse
nenL Inc auty laid upon the city was not
payment OF the awards. but the levy and eollee-
ton OF assessments, and until ft has been fully
moved 10 the performance of that duty and
iaiied therein, there il no liability attaching
II iacGulIough vs.. the mayor OF Brooklyn .
1901.
We therefore conclude that street improve
ment warrants AMI condemnation awards are
lot part of the Indebtedness of the city of Sc
we understand the plesdings, relieves the case
OF any question arising from the claim that the
eitys debt on June !, 1891, exceeded 5 per cent
OF the assessment rolls of 1889 or 1890 The act
OF February /. 1858 page Isl, permitted cities TO
incur Indebtedness without popular vote up TO
per cent OF It's taxable property. Therefore,
under her assessment for 1889 of sl6,oI6 900, the
city OF Seattle could lawfully owe sI60Ie9 and
no more, until the act OF February d. 1880, ex-
tended the limit 70 II per cent, viz. $40 2S.50
But before going further we viii revert 10 the
indebtedness sought to be validated at the cleo
zion OF June l. Il does not clearly appear By the
ordinances that any part OF the sums covered BY
classes ], ?. and was within the / per cent
limit and therefore valid without vote, but the
complaint does show clearly that all OF class /,
and up 70 and including warrant No. 4250 of
class 2, were warrants within the | per cent.
limit, and therefore there was no necessity for
any vote to render them valid indebteness. Or,
In other words warrant No 4,25l, in class ?, was
the hrst warrant which made the city debt more
than sl6o. jog, which was then the lawful limit
That warrant was issued and dated December Z,
1889. Whatever warrants were issued then,
from No. 4.25l. December Z. 1889. TO February %,
$780, were void and expressed no liability OF the
city. And here are presented three material
questions:
L Was the act of February D. 1880 (p 225),
void act by reason Of its having embraced more
than one subject
2 Was it void because it applied only to cities
or towns having corporate existence az the time
OF the adoption OF the constitution
3. Was the first clause of section void because
It imposed an involuntary debt upon cities and
towns to which il applied?
First-we hold that the act really embraced
but one subject, viz: placing cities and towns
upon the level OF the constitution a. regarded
their power to incur Indebtedness. Merely in
cidental 70 this primary object was declars-
ton of what should be considered Indebtedness
within the meaning Of the act and the method
nYQVidinU nr
seeond-Ihe application of the act 20 cities
and towns existing at the adoption of the con-
ment. True, section TO- of article ?, required the
Incorporation, org anzstion and classification OF
cities in proportion to population; but at the
same session of the legislature, by various acts,
this requirement was complied with and the
same authority was conferred upon such
municipal corporations as should be thereafter
organized. At the date OF this act, II must be
remembered, there were no incorporated cities
or towns in the state, except such a. had been
created by specia- laws or charters, and there
| had been no Law under which one could be
| created since the adoption OF the constitution.
The legislation OF the session, therefore, taken
| IN pdrf mdterio, was uniform and universal in
| its operation That IL was not all contained in
| one act is not sufficient ground for now making
| II wholly one-sided and unfair, which would be
| the result OF striking out this act.
Third-The frat clause of section provides:
THAT any indebtedness now owing by any city
or town, contracted strictly for municipal pur-
poses, whether the same exceeds the amount
which such city or town was authorized TO con-
tract under its charter or not, is hereby vaIi-
dated, and declared TO be q binding obligation
upon such city or town. when the only ground
of the inyaiidify of such Indebtedness is that il
exceeds the amount authorized by the charter
OF such city or town. And a further clause
provided that there must be a popular vote II
the excess reached beyond H. per cent. Applied
20 Seattle, which on February 20 had warrants
outstanding from No. 4,25l upward, but not be-
yond Ia per cent, the effect OF this section
TO make all these otherwise invalid warrants as
good as those within the limit of per cent. Was
the attempt TO do this a void exercise of legisls
tive powerY Section 9 OF article OF the consti-
tuition provides; "For all corporate purposes
all municipal corporations may be vested
with authority TO assess and collect
II is as follows: "The legislature shall have no
power to impose taxes upon counties, cities,
towns or other municipal corporations, or upon
the Inhabitants or property thereof. for county,
city, town other municipal purposes; but
may by general laws vest in the corporate au-
thorities thereof the power 70 assess and collect
the state OF Illinois in IS4S contained the clause
above quoted from article ia hgc Uerbd; snd in
tnai slSee mere are ElA0y wea-consldeESu cases
which hold that 10 is incompetent for the iegis-
lature 20 directly lay any burden OF taxation for
municipal pur poses upon the cities OF that state
See the People VS.. Mayor, etc, of Chicago, 81.
Ill. II. In other states not having such con-
stitutional provision the power of the leglsia-
ture over municipal corporations has, IN some
cases, been ned 70 DC wei. nign omni potent; as
however, in which such q constitutional ex-
preston occurs as il contained in our article ii
above quoted; ami whatever may be thought
elsewhere OF the Illinois decisions above quoted,
they would seem TO be cogent authority here.
But this is not of original compulSion OF
the city OF Seattle. It's municipal author
tiles, in the strait of an oyerwhelm-
ing public calamity, 10 rebuild ana protect
the city, overstepped the line o. legaliz@d In
debtedness. and for the strictest rnunieipll pur-
poses issued the warrants from December :,
lsss, to February p, $500 value IN goods snd
labor was fully paid for these warrants. and
the holders OF them have at all times bad the
strongest moral claim for their liquidation. Al
ali times from Dece Der :. lSs9, until the pas
sage of this act, the constitutional limit with
out popular vote was L per cent, the nee
essarfly tariy action OF the legislature aloDe de-
laying its extension of the power. Indeed.
under the act OF lsSS 10 ia altogether likely that
a majority vote OF the people Of the city could
have authorized the issuance OF every one Of
the excess warrants. We are, therefore con
strained 70 view this one within the
principle long sustained by the courts that
where q municipal corporation hiss done an act
beyond Its statutory powers. but within the
powers which IL was competent for the legs-
lature TO have conferred upon Il. the act may
to validated by a curative statute. Dillon on
Municipal Corporations. sections 3. Ss4 t4t Ell
and eases cited. We have carefully examined
the Illinois cases cited. viz: Marshall vs. silli-
man, 6l Ill. ID. and the series OF cases follow
ing il IN that state. but especially in view of The
grudging approval of them by the supreme court
of the United States in the Township OF
Elwood vs.. Marcy. 81 L. ;, 2cs, we DO not think
they should be authority here. They were rail-
road sid cases in which there were numerous
nagrsnt irregularities. and the purpose was II
no case municipal. Bnt while the curative acts
of the legislature of Illinois were set aside By
the supreme court of that state and the rule
was upheld hy the supreme court OF the United
States because OF its long prevAlsnca there and
in accordance with the decision of the highest
court from which the case came, the federal