The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-20

the Boundaries Of Isolsmia, the other on y,
northwestern face, and vera about leo mile
apart. What was the information and IN
reasoning upon when Mot,R. ,o msps ye \,
scattered, and could not concentrate 81
their fighting strength for some time Il
oonae. even at Olmutz. A larg'
proportion OF the troops were sill
far behind that place, and benedel
had taken no effective steps to close tn
rasses into Silesia against the crown prince
Clam Gallas with one army corps Was la
away. being then in touoh with the hrs
prussian army, against which he had done
nothing to close tho mountain passes IRON,
Saxnny. Moltke consequently determined
to assume the offensive by the INVASION o.
Bolemis, though seriously hampered in his
schemes BY the kings determination not 70
be The drst to actually draw the sword.
What Moltke would have liked from the
frst WAS Il purely offensive campaign
against the Austrian army in Bohemia, but
thu safety of Berlin--an open town--rsn-
,ierea ii necessary to dispose of the Saxoi;
70: cen betora he went for Benedek's array.
An early attack upon Ssxony also enabled
him to forbid to the Austrians the Snxon
pnsses through tho Ertz Gebirge. The
moyeinens al Prince Frederick Charles
acrcss the mountains would. Moltka
calculated, be taken by Benedek "a
intended against Prague, and tend TO
throw him OF his guard As to hia real i'll
tentions--and, in fact, it did SO. The Aus
TRANS were still armed with the nlu2Sle-
loader, whereas the Prussians had the nee
dle-sun, which had proved SO successful in
the Danish wara couple of years before.
Moltka very naturally relied much upon
the tactical advantage it would again give
his army. In fine, the plan was one that
Moitke felt his adve sary would not expect
of itself a great recommendation III It's
favor-and fscts verified tho correctness OF
his assumption.
Withous a doubt, any man so versed in
the science of war, and in all that had been
written upon it from the earliest times by
the greatest generals, must have often at
this time seriously questioned himself as to
what it was possible to do. rs there any
Other way in which these two armies can he
as safely united before the Austlans have
effected their concentration. Ms by at once
r,essiug through the mountain passes IN
front OF them while they are still open. III
order to meet near Gitsohin?' How often
must he havs put this question to himself
and pondered over it, for 1T was then the
great problem before the Prusslans.
As long as armies depended for food and
stores and munitions of war upon carts and
wagons drawn along ordinary country
roads or even great highways. the strategic
plans upon which they moved had to be
framed in acco dancs with the general di-
rection of thoxs routes. The existing lines
of railway similarly influence all plans for
the movement Of armies nowadays, but
they enable much larger armies to be used
now than formerly, aud enable these armies
to be moved much more rapidly. Large
magazines of food and mmunitloa can be
formed at all important functions and
big stations, rendering tina sub
~sistence and supply of AN army
a much easier matter than was the case in
Napoleon's wars. Had there been a railway
to Moscow in 1872, that eamuaign would
not nave ended in French disaster. But
railways can be more easily and far more
quickly destroyed than was the o~ld-pavel
chaussee. Hence the increased sensitive
ness to any attack upon them, and the
large number of men now required for tho
protection Of their bridges, viaducts, and
water tanks. Indeed, their liability to at
tack by ra1ding cavalry, or, az in the Amer
lean civil war, by large forces Of mounted
infantry, ia n new and vital feature in de-
termining the strategy of the day.
The long-headed Moltke had seriously
pondered over all these matters before 1866,
and, without doubt, he had fully grasped
the use made of railways BY the Americans,
both north and south, IN their war. But
not so the Austrian war office. Its generals
were apparently still deep in Jomini to the
exclusion OF all other teaching.
The line of railway upon which the Aus
trian army depended at this time for sup
pllss ran close along the Prussian frontier.
Consequently, the crown princes army in
Silesia not only guarded that province from
any direct attack through the mountains
upon Neisse, but it seriously threatenedtha
line of railway.
it il difficult in an article of this nature
to enter fully into all the points which
must have been present to Moltke's mind
vhsu he resolved to push these two armies
across the mountains independently and at
a great distance apart. In writing tbs his
tory of any war it is difficult to describe all
that was in any generals mind when he de-
termiued upon even the most important
movements. When months or years after
wards he is questioned On the subject he
has very probably forgotten much of it
himself. Nothing therefore is moro rash,
nothing proves moro eonclusiyely that the
critic has himself naver directed the move
ments of an army, than any dogmatic criti-
cism of military operations.
The commander in small as we'll az in
great wars has to resolve quickly from his
own intuition, and the Information before
him, which is always imperfect, and often
erroneous. The orders he gives are meant
to suit what he conceives to be tho particu-
lar position of the moment. A few scraps
of Information, that would tell the civilian
nothing. very often enable tbs skilled gem
sal in his minds eye to picture the veil
before him. and realize, as in a picture, the
condition. the preparedness or otherwise,
of his adversary's army. He does so Just
aa the great naturalist ia able from one
discovered one of some ichthyosaurus to
build up it's whole skeleton, and describe
its appearance.
/ have no intention TO discuss here any
other of Moltke's campaigns. but in the
foregoing remarks Ihope l have said enough
to convince the military student of the wis
dom of all he did in 1865. l hops J have
made plain the soundness OF his strategy
when, on June %, he telegrsphed to Cor
litz and to Neisse, and ordered the two ar
mics, whose headquarters were respectively
at those two places, ito advance into Bohe-
mia, and seek to unite in the neighbo1hood
Of Gitschin.'' All such orders must be
measured and judged, not az if they were
the oracular anunciations of an immutable
law, but AS grave and momentous decisions
given under q certain specific belief in tho
then condition Of affairs, based upon the
information then in the generals possess
sion. When so judged, I believe Moltke's
plan of campaign in 1866 will bear the most
searching scrutiny of all whose intimate
knowledge OF war enables them to rightly
understand the principles of strategy.
In nothing is z little knowledge moro cal
culated to lead u,en aatray than in the
science OF var--the most complicated of all
sciences. 1t will generally be found that
those wllo aga most sweeping, most abso-
lnts in their criticisms of military opera
some axiom enumerated by come great
soldier Of a former generation. They cling
to and repeat that maxim ~ if it we're in
war what TIE ten commandments are in
morals. Hence, in my opinion, much of
the hostile criticism that has been launched
against Moltke 8 strategy IN 1866.
Az stated early in this altiols the present