New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-07-29
IRON Output And CONSUMPTION.

The official statistics OF prOducuoh ior 'ne
first half of 1891 just published by the iron
and Steel Association exhibit "a far greater
reaction in this leading branch of our industry
than has ever before occurred" The Official
BULLETIN" uses the language quoted, and pro-
Goods TO show that after the panic OF 1873 the
decrease in production was only q per cent
in three years, but now the decrease from the
first half of 1890 to the first hall
of 1891 is &c per cent. The cause
assigned by "The Bulletin is widespread
financial stringency brought about by over
trading" and particularly English OVERHEAD
inn in South American securities which proved
nearly worthless" But it is only fair to say
that a close examination Of the figures luStlileS
some qualification of this general statement
The production in 1890 exceeded the con-
sumption largely. This is proved by the IN
crease of stocks unsOd III, S43 net tons dur
ing the first half of the year, and 292,74S net
tons during the second half, 50 that the officially
ranorted accumulation OF unS0ld iron reached
6S1 800 net tons December 81, 1890. In adj
djtion TO this there was a further accUmula-
ton in extent not precisely known, OF IRON In
the hands of manufacturers intended for their
own consumption. But during the first half OF
1891 the unS0d stocks officially reported were
reduced 1S6, $50 net tons. Hence the proGGc-
tion of 3,776,556 net tons during the fist half
Of 1891 must be increased by 1850 to de-
termine the consumption, which thus appears
TO have been 1884 net tons. But the
production of 51O7,775 net tons for the first
half of 1890 must be diminished by l11,S43
tons, making the consumption 4,995,932 net
tons. Thus the decrease in quantity. of iron
consumed or taken by the market was about
20 per cent-a sufficiently large decrease for a
single year. it is true.
But the facts show that part of the decrease
in production, at least, was due to the great
over-prOductiOn and accumulation OF stock III
1890. 4 pause, following such state of
things, can hardly be attributed exclusively to
the financial disaster abroad, however severe its
effects in the money market may have been.
Undoubtedly, these disasters had much to do
with the failure of railroad companies to place
bonds for building new lines, for extensions or
renewals and this with the decrease in con-
sumption of iron for rail manufacture. The
official "Bulletn' shows that in the first half
of 1891 there were produced only 579,929 net
tons of steel rails, against 1892, 65S net tons
in the first half Of 1890, and this alone would
account for fully half of the decrease in con-
SUMPTION of pig. But further and large al
lowance must be made for the decrease in pur-
chases of other railroad supplies, and especially
of locomotives, rolling-stock and the like Di-
rectly and indirectly the diminished purchases
of railroad companies may account for three
quarters of the decrease in consumption of pig
iron, but other causes besides the financial re-
vulsion abroad largely affected the purchases
of railroads.
II is not possible that the elections of last fall
were without influence. Those elections placed
the Legislatures of many important States en-
tirely or largely in the hands Of men whose
avowed purpose was intensely hostile to the
corporations. Within the limits of those States
are found lines of many of the most important
railroad companies, and the apprehension of
oppressive legislation or action by State au-
thorites must have operated powerfully to him
der corporations from expanding largely in ex-
tensions Improvements, or additions to their
equipment. Indeed, it is the well-known fact
that sharp reaction in the iron market and
particularly in the demand for Bessemer pig and