New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-01-25

and ramparts in the engagements we have named
above had any training in the use of artillery.
Yet they fired quicker and with better aim than
the professional artilleriss who had had the pfac-
teal experience Of a score of battles IN thc
Peninsula. and, which is most surprising, they
maintained this superiority habitually.
1t was the same thing in the naval actions
But in considering these it is necessary first 10
glance at one cause Of bitter complaint ny the
British Navy at the time. They said that the So
called American frigates were Of 50 heavy
scantling as to be equal to English seventy-fourS
| There was good deal Of truth in the statement.
though it did not lie in the mouth of an enemy
TO urge the fact as grievance. There is nothing
| in international law or in the laws OF war 10
hinder a Government from building heavier vessels
than those of the same nominal class belonging to
| an antagonist. Every nation, on the contrary. Is
| free to build and in scf-defence ought to build.
| the strongest and most formidable ships 1t can;
| and in effect this is what every nation does DO
| But here is another Of those paradoxes OF which
this period is so prolific How came it that While
| incompetence characterized nearly every depart
| ment of the United States Government, the build
ing of our war-ships should have been guided by
SO eminently sound and sagaciOus principle
Perhaps it is useless to put such a question
4
which the creation of the American schooner is
| prominent How was it that pre-emnently
| nautical people like the English failed to design
swift and graceful models for their sailing-ships?
| How was it that even when the Americans had
shown them how 10 build such models. they were
unable even to copy the American schooner? In
time they did learn to initiate the Yankee clipper,
but the schooner remained somehow beyond them.
Mr. Adams has evidently reflected much upon
these questions but he has not succeeded IN
| finding satisfactory answers to them. Then comes
the problem of the superiority of the fire OF the
| American men-of-war's men 10 that of the Eng
lsh. II is. we think conclusively shown in tins
history that the splendid naval successes achieved
| by the American frgates and sloops were due
mainly to this superiority of fire in rapidity and
| precision. Mr.. Adams goes carefully over the
details of each battle. and by counting and COM
| pairing the shotholes and the casualties. arrives
at this conclusion. 1t is observable that the Eng
lsh broadsides generally went too high. After
half an hours engagement the spars and rigging
of the American combatant would be much cut
about but the English ship would have the more
shots in her hull and her cockpit would he fuller
of wounded men. Often the parties 10 these duels
were almost equal in dimensions. armament ana
number of crew; and it was in such instances
that the superiority of the American fire was most
apparent.
Then there is the privatcer question. Here
| the American advantages lay mainly in superior
speed, ease Of handling and audacty The heav!
English cruisers and line-of-batte ships were well
able to blockade ports and imprisOn our irg-
ates, but they could do nothing with the Yankee
privateers Those vesscls-mosty the incompar
able schooner-not only scOureed British commerce,
but invaded British waters, made the English
Channel unsafe, seized their prey under the very
noses of the slow cruisers, sailed boldly into the
middle of fat conveys and cut out prizes in de-
fancc of the accompanying men-ofwar, anS 80
huttered the Volscians that at last marine lnsur-
ance absolutely ceased for a time, even in home
waters. so infested were those narrow seas by the
ubiquitous privatfers In vain the Admiralty
stormcd In vain the furious post-captainS
cruised and watched and threatened and bOastcd
of what they would do when they caught tie
impudent intruders No doubt III the end they
did catch nearly all the prvateers, but these ardy
successes did not and could not compensate foi
the mischief done by the mosquito fleet. This
curious result came about, moreover that whereas
the American frigates and slOOps though often
successful in their encounters with the vessels
of the enemy's navy. yet produced little NOR"
than sentimental effect upon the progress Of
the war; the lightly built and armed prvatccrs
actually producing so near an approximation TO
a blockade of the English and Irish coasts that
the gravcst damage was done to the commerce of
the country, and that the mercantile class was
reused to a lively persuasion that the war must
he brought to end
Nevertheless privatccring did not pay the
long run, and it seems probable that had the
war been protracted it would have been gradually
abandoned. IL was maintained long enough To
produce important and salutary results, and, with
the conduct of the Navy, it rcvoutionzcd English
opinion as TO the American status upon the ocean
| 1t is amusing to read the more less ingenious
excuses invented by English naval officers in
explanation of the Yankee success al sea, bat it
is clear that none Of them were sincerely be-
| lieved by those who advanced them. No doubt
over-conEdence had much TO answer for in the
British defeats. English naval officers had been
bred TO believe so firmly in their imprcscriptlbP
| right to the sovereignty of the seas that the
| belief had grown to an arrogance resembling thai
of Spain in the sixteenth century; ard when they
were made u understand that their invincibiiity
was myth they were no less astOundcd than the
Spanish captains had been by the audacty and
success of the English seamen who challenged
their supremacy The general result Of the Ameri-
| can successes by land and sea was 10 stimulate
| that national pride which, since the beginning
of the century, had been growing weaker every
year, and which, but for the war, might possibly
have fallen into extinction altogether. And if
il be asserted that. assuming national valor 10
he equal on either side, there is no other way OF
accounting for the American superiority in ar,il-
lery practice than by referring it 10 higher
average of intelligence. it will be difficult TO
trovert the position. On what other ground, it
may be urged, can the fact he accounted for that
unframed, undisciplined men were able TO handle
cannons with greater skill than was possessed by
Peninsular veterans? 1t may seem TO SAVIOR of
vanity to adopt such a hypothesis, but the
world since 1912 has had larger opportunities
of observing the advantages of thinking bayo-
nets" and if Mr.. Adams does not venture to sug-
gest this explanation openly, his facts and his
management of them almost exclude any other