The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1891-07-18

ment was strongly urged upon tho newly
organized Administration by prom inent
members OF the old Republican school, who
thought that strict adherence to the policy
OF Mr. LINCOLN and OF Mr.. HAMILTON FISH
In regard to Hayti, should be steadily main
tanned. But 1t was difficult for tho Secretary
OF state to obliterate the effects OF the
course adopted by his predecessor In pass
ing judgment upon any Administration
people arc most easily inclined TO err about
transactions relating to foreign affairs; and
very often their conclusion would be very
different II they knew how much tho policy
they question is but an inevitable outcome
OF the course forced by his own predecessors
upon tho statesman they criticise.
| Under such embarrassing circumstances,
and while Admiral GHERARD1 was still car
rying out Mr.. CLEvELAND's orders In Hay
| tian waters, Mr.. BLAINE proposed to Mr..
| STEPHEN PRESTON. then LEa1T1ME's Min
lister at Washington. the following basis OF
On agreement:
1. The modification Of certain stipulations
| contained in tho treaty OF 1865 between tho
United States and Hayti. They related
mainly to certain arbitrary taxes levied in
Hayti on American merchants.
~
port dues levied on American shipping in
Haytian ports.
III. Inyti to lease to the United States, at
a rental price to be agreed upon, a coaling
station. The location OF said station to be
selected by the United States. The name
! Of the Mole st. Nicolas was not mentioned.
". The Government Of Hayti 10 DO repre-
sented by Minister in Washington. but
1 . skol 49,
! to represent Hsytian interests In other
| countries.
v. LEa1T1MB to be recognized by the
| United States as soon as the actual state OF
! facts in Hayti could be ascertained by Com
missioners to be sent there.
The first two conditions were unobjection-
able. The third, that Of the coaling station,
LEaIT1ME's Minister could not agree to
without bringing about the Immediate down.
fall Of tho President he represented. The
fourth was simply reserved for further con-
| sderation by consent Of both parties. The
| fifth WAS accepted by Mr.. PRESTON. In fact,
no could not deny to the United States the
| right 70 send Commissioners to Hayti II
| tho President wished.
It could not be expected that this result
| would DO acceptable to Mr.. BLAINE The
| most important point related to tho coaling
station; and though the name Of the place to
| be occupied was not mentioned. 1t was we'll
| understood that it was to be the Mole st.
Nicolas. From that spot the United States
could control very important waterway;
| and directly across the channel stretches the
Cuban shore, still under the flag OF Spain.
This attempted negotiation having result
| ed in failure. Mr.. BLAINE was compelled to re-
turn to the policy laid down by his predeces-
sor. We do not know whether he forcsaw
that it was fraught with serious dangers;
for II 1t rendered the downfall OF LEG1T1ME
certain. on the other hand it might have
been foreseen that the agreement entered
into with H1PPoLYTE would necessarily fail
in the end. Indeed, the United States was
thus left to the necessity OF trusting HIPPoL-
YTE. and assuming that as soon as he was
In control OF Port-au-Prince he would sub
NIT to violent criticism. to excited denunci-
atoms. and perhaps expose himself to assas-
tian territory, when he was no longer in
actual need OF the active and immediate
support Of the United States.
The events that followed are merely the
outcome OF the egregious blunders made at
| LIl0 SIdTL ny MI. SLEtEbAND
ton. H1PPoLYTE succeeded in driving
LEG1T1ME out OF the country. He entered
Port-au-Prince surrounded by American
flags. and, as was to be expected he was
profuse in the expressions OF his gratitude
| to the United States. But as soon as he had
become President Of temporarily united
republic. he directed his efforts to defeating
the very agreement he had made beforehand.
Here it Is proper to say that during these
varying transactions Mr.. BLAINE has shown
more patience. more self-control, than might
have been expected on the part Of the most
conservative Secretary OF State. In pres
ence Of such barefaced, unblushing bad
faith toward the United States Mr.. BLAINE,
who might have welded an irresistible
power. has shown that he knew how to re-
strain every untimely impulse.
Now let US examine the situation of
Haytian affairs just as 1t is; and first we
will venture upon asserting the following
propositions:
I. HIPPoLYTB has deceived the United
States. and therefore he cannot be trusted.
II. He cannot find support on the part OF
France. Indeed, it may be asserted, in the
light of recent events, that under no cir
cumstances will France adopt in Hayu a
line of policy In opposition to the views Of
the United States. or course should French
interests suffer In Hayti, they will be pro-
tected by tho French Government; and the
United States will not take issue with France
on such question. But there are to-day
no conflicting purposes between the two
countries. French interests elsewhere are
extensive and important, and they attract
attention and require the employment OF all
the French resources in quarters OF the
world very different from Hayti.
III. According to the best judges In Hay
tian matters. HIPPoLYTE's downfall will take
place within the next few months.
Nv. In view Of this situation. what is the
proper policy for the United States to pur-
sue? Most unquestionably our commercial
and political interests point In the same di-
rection. We ought to save Hayti from n
new civil war, and secure within that
country the maintenance Of peace, or at