Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-12-27

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promotion for a young officer in the
Quartermaster's Department whom I die
not know personally. 1t seemed that this
was the chance for the young officer. sug
gested to Stanton that Quartermastel
Blank was reputed to be a very faithful and
efficient officer, and entitled to greater pro-
motion than he had received. Stanton
picked up his pen saying: will give me
great pleasure, sir; what is his name?"
had to answer that could not recall his
name in full, but he took down the officers
rank and last name and assured me that he
would be promptly promoted. L supposed
that change of mood would make him for.
getful of this promise; but the young quar-
termaster wore new epaulettes within ten
days, and won distinction as the chief OF
his department in large independent army
movements in Virginia. 1 never had the
pleasure of meeting the worthy officer who
thus unexpectedly secured his promotion,
and he is doubtless ignorant to this day of
the peculiar way it was accomplished.
McCIeIlan's Telegram to Stanton.
Stanton's hatred for Mcclellan became a
consuming passion before the close of the
Peninsular campaign. When Mcclellan
was before Yorktown, and complaining of
his inadequate forces to march upon Rich
mond, Stanton summed him up in the fol-
lowing expression: "If he (McClellan) had
a million men he would swear the enemy
had two millions, and then he would sit
down in the mud and yell for three
Mcclellan so far forgot himself as to tele-
graph 10 Stanton after the retreat to the
James river: ''1f / save this army now,
will tell you plainly that l owe no thanks
to you or to any other person in Washing
ton. You have done your best TO sacrifice
this army"
Any other President than Lincoln would
have immediately removed Mcclellan of
his command. and Stanton not only would
have relieved him, but dismissed him from
the service. Lincoln exhibited no resent
ment whatever from the ill-advised and in
subordinate telegram from Mcclellan. On
the contrary, he seemed inclined to continue
Mcclellan in command and certainly e1-
hlblted every desire to sustaln hlm TO the
utmost. In letter addressed to the Secre-
tary OF State on the same day that McClel-
lan's telegram was received he expressed
his purpose to call for additional troops,
and said: 81 expect to maintain this contest
until successful, or till die, or am con-
quered, or my term expires, or Congress or
the country forsakes me-
A Secret Conference at West Point.
This was one of the most perplexing sit
uations in which Lincoln was ever placed.
The defeated army would not, in itself, have
been so serious had Lincoln been able to
turn to commanders in which he could i'm
pl:cily confide. He had abundant resources
and could supply all needed additional
troops, but where could he turn for safe ad-
vice? He had lost faith in Mcclellan to a
very large extent. When he counseled
with Stanton he encountered insuperable
hatreds, and he finally, as was his custom,
decided upon his own course of action, and
hurried of to West Point to confer with
General Scott. His visit to West Point
startled the country and quite as much
startled the Cabinet, as not single member
of it had any intimation of his intended
journey. What transpired at the interview
between Lincoln and Scott was never
known to any, so far as l have been able to
learn, and 1 believe that no one has pre-
tended to have had knowledge of it.
1t is enough to know that Pope was sum-
moned to the command of a new army,
called the Army Of Virginia, embracing the
commands of Fremont, Banks and Mellow
ell, and that Halleck was made General
in Chief. The aggressive campaign Of Lee,
resulting in the second battle of Bull Run
and the utter defeat of Pope, brought the
army back into the Washington intrench-
ments in a most demoralized condition. It
was here that Lincoln and Stanton locked
horns again on the question of the restora-
tlon Of Mcclellan to command.
Why Mcclellan Was Retained.
Without consulting either the General in
Chief or his War Minister, Lincoln assigned
Mcclellan to the command of the defenses
of Washington, and as the various COM
nands of Pope's broken and demoralized
army came back into the intrenchments in
utter confusion, they thereby came again
under the command of Mcclellan.
When it was discovered that Mcclellan
was thus practically in command of the
Army Of the Potamac again, Stanton was
aroused to the iercest hostility. He went
so far as to prepare remonStrance to the
President in writing, against McClellan's
in the command of that army or
of any army of the Union. This remon-
STRANGE was not only signed by Stanton but
by Chase, Bates and Smith, with the con-
currence of Wells, who thought it indelicate
for him to sign it. After the paper had been
under Stanton's impetuous lead,
some of the more considerate members of
the Cabinet who had Joined him took pause
to reflect that Lincoln was in the habit of
not only having his own way, but of having
bis own way Of having his own way, and the
protest was never presented. Lincoln knew
great organizing powers and he
knew the army needed first of all a comman-
der who was capable of restoring ii to discip-
lire. To use his own expressive language
about the emergency, he believed that
"there is no one in the army who can COM
mand the Notifications and lick those troops
Of ours into shape one-half as well as he
could" 1t was this conviction that made
Lincoln forget all of McClellan's failings
and restore him to command, and Stanton
was compelled to submit in sullen silence.
Nevar Thought of Retiring Elm.
Notwithstanding the many and often ir-
ritating conflicts that Lincoln had with
Stanton, there never was an hour during
Stanton's term as War Minister that
Lincoln thought of removing him. Indeed,
/ believe that at no period during the war
after Stanton had entered the Cabinet, did
Lincoln feel thas anv other man could fill
Stanton's place with equal usefulness to
the country. He had the most unbounded
faith in Stanton's loyalty and in his public
and private integrity. He was in hearty
sympathy with Stanton's aggressive earnest
ness for the prosecution OF the war, and at
times hesitated. even to the extent of what
he feared was individual injustice, to re-
strain Stanton's violent assaults upon
others.
Soon after the surrender of Lee, Stanton,
severely broken in health by the exacting
duties be had performed, rendered his resig-
nation, believing that his great work was
finished. Lincoln earnestly desired him to
remain and he did so. The assassination of
Lincoln called him to even graver duties
than had before confronted him. His bitter
conflict with johnson and his violent issue
with Sherman stand out as exceptionally in
teresting chapters in the history of the war.
1t was President Johnson's attempted re-
meval of Stanton in violation of the tenure
Of Office act that led to the Presidents i'm
peachment, and Stanton persisted in holding