The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1891-11-01

OF fncts but ut tho same time the Field Mar
el,ars private opinion Of their meaning and OF
tito lessons which should be drawn from thon.
The part OF Won Mo!tkc's narrative to which
wc shnil direct particular attention ia that
dealing with tho preparations for war on both
sidos, and We shall only be able to GLANCE our
sorilyAt the battles OF Nouilly. YIonviile. and
Gravolotte, the battle OF Sedan. the irst abor-
two peace negotiation. the capitulation OF Metz.
tho Illustration Of Gambetta's attempt to
organize resistance behind tho Loire. the sur
render Of Paris. and the Anal terms Of peace.
Won Moitko beglno his narrative by pointing
out thot the days are gone BY when for dynns-
tical ends small armies ofprofessional soldiers
went to war to conquer city or province
and then sought winter quarters or made
peace. Tho wars Of the present day call whole
nations to arms, and there Is scarcely family
which does not suffer by thom. Tho entire
financial resources OF the State are appropri-
ated to tho purpose and the different seasons
OF tho ycar have no bearing on the progress OF
hostility. As long as nations continue indo-
pendent Of each other there will be Disagree
ments that can only DO settled by force Of arms:
but in tie interest Of humanity tits to be hoped
that wars will become less frequent as thcy
have become more terrible. Won Moltko OK
pressos u conviction by which loss woll.in-
iormod observers may be surprised,
namely. that generally speaking It is
no longer the ambition OF monarchs
which endangeTs the poace OF tho
world. The causes OF International conflict
arc rather. he thinks. popular passion. the dis
satisfaction Of whole communities with their
internal conditions and affairs. tile strife Of
~ ,ao md No.; k,.;. al A
declaration Of war is, IN Won Moltke's opinion.
more easily elected from q large assembly.
mono Of whose membcrs bears The sole reapon-
sihility eor consequence, than 1t is from q
single man. however oxaltod his position and
however absolute h.s power In other words
a peacO-loying sovereign Is less raro than u
Parliament composed Of wiss men. It Is. in.
decd. roundly asserted by Won Mo!tke that the
great wars witnessed by the present genera
ton havo boon declared against the wish
OF the rclgning power In our days
even the Stock Exchange has acquired
euch influence that it Is ablo to call
armies int, the field merely to protect its in
tercsts- THUS Mexico and Egypt have been
swamped with European nrmtos simply to sat-
isfy the demands Of tlnanciers. In tine. tho
question. rs nation strong enough to make
warp 10 to-day OF less Importance thnn tho
enough to prevent war;" A weak Govorn-
ment must be regarded rs n standing menace
to peace. und 1t was precisely tho weakness Of
tho Napoleonic regime which inGde the war of
1901 unavoidable. Won Moltkes view OF
the bearing Of the internal political situation
OF France on her attitude toward Prussia
Is, now almost universally accepted as cor
rect A Napoleon on tho French throne was
bound to make good his claim to reign by
political and military successes. Only for u
time did tho victories won by French arms in
distant countries reconcile the French people
to tho empire. Tho triumphs OF the Prlssian
armies excited jealousy; they were regarded
as challenge: and tho French demanded re-
venRe for Sadown. The French Emperor was
indeed aware that he was by no means in per-
feet readiness for u great war: nevertheless
the question Of the succession to tho Spanish
throne had to serve as pretext for declaring
1t. The French reserves were called out on
July Is. 1870. and four days later the French
declaration OF war was delivered at Berlin.
IL.
Lot us see now what, according to tho nn-
doubtedly authentic data Mt Won Moltkes dis
posal. were the resources on both sides. First
as to the French forcos: One division was Or
dersd to the Spanish frontier as a corps OF
observation: Paris and Lyons were sufficiently
garrisoned. and such troops as were abso-
lutely necessary were left in Algeria and in
Civita Vecchia. All the other soldiers at the
disposition Of the empire. to wit. 1872 battalions
of infantry. 22O sduadrons OF cavalry. and
artillery men sufficient to handle O24 cannon
in all about 100000 men-composed the
army OF the Rhine. This was divided into
eight corps, which. at any rate In the first In
stance. were to DO directed by one central head.
viz. the Emperor himself. although Marshal
Bazaine was deputed to command the army Us
1t assembled UP to the time OF his sovereigns
arrival Won Moltke seems to have no doubt
that the French were counting on tho ira
ditional discussions OF the German peo-
pic. They hoped by an early victory to reduce
the South Germans to inactivity. or oven to win
them over to their side. 1t was known that
Prussia was powerful antagonist. even whom
isolated. and that her army was more numer-
Gus than that OF the French. but 1t was thought
that this advantage might be couIterbalanced
by rapidity OF action.
The whole French plan OF campaign. in
decl. WAS based on the delivery OF unfore-
seen attacks. Strong foots OF war and
transport ships were intended to be uttl-
fzed to land considerable force in northern
Prussin, and there engage part OF the Prus-
sian troops, while the main BODY OF tno PruS-
sian arny would. it was supposed. await tho
French assault behind the fortresscs on the
Rhine. The French had purposod to cross the
Rhine at once ut and below StrGsburg. thus
avoiding tho great fo.trcsses. md also ut the
start preventing the south German army.
which. 1t WIS expected. would be assigned 70
the dtience OF tho Black Forest. from uniting
with the North Germans TO execute this
plan 1t was imperative to concentrate prompt
" tho main forces OF the French a:!n2
In Alsaer Hallway 0ccomm odaton however.
turned ont u DO so inadequate that in the first
Instance it was only possible ~ carry 100000
,nan to StraohurG: ]5O.0OD had to leave tina
railways near Metz ANA rc,nain thora until
they coul.! he novod Zip. and ilnnllS 10000
men were oncsmpr'l Mt ChGsons ns Reserves.
Tho regiments had marched out ~ quarter,
incomplete rs ~ nuiEhcr-. and ;nslflc.cttly
ecn!l,sd Mnunnhile til, reserve. called ont
to III their plaac had cho!;ud tho railways they
crowded the mii!thr! dcpots and fil!od the
railway stations. Tic rrosrcss OF the reserves
TO thelr destination WAS delayed. for 1t WAS
H.