, 1891-12-26
THE LAST RESORT.
A QUESTION or AN AGENTS. AU-
THORITY In CONTRACTS.
what the Supreme Court has to
Say OH Damages Incurred ON
AunuiIed Contracts.

what the Supreme Court has to
Say OH Damages Incurred ON
AmnuIIed Contracts.
[Notice-All decisions of the supreme
court will appear in The DAILY ANI
WEEKLY TRIBUNE.l
w. r. Watson, respondent, VS.. Gray s
Harbor Brick Co.., appellant. No. 1874.
This action was brought on an alleged
violation of written contract made by the
plaintiff and one Hamshaw, whom plain.
tiff claims to be general agent Of defend
ant, and as such manager had the author
ity to bind the defendant by his contract
The contract was signed the "Gray's Har-
bor Brick Co., by Il. I. Hamshaw, man.
ager-" The respondent moved the
and affirm the Judgment rendered
in the court below, for the reason that
there is no assignment of errors. The ap-
pellant, however, specified the errors in its
motion for new trial. and cites them in
its brief, though not in very formal way.
This appeal was taken before the law OF
1891 went into effect, and under the provis-
ions ot the law then in force we think is
sufficient, and the motion to dismiss will
be denied. Under the contract the plain
tiff agreed to sink we'll for defendant, for
which service defendant agreed to pay a
stipulated price per foot. Plaintiff alleges
that in view Of the fulfilling Of his contract
he shipped his plant from Walla Walla to
Hoquiam at great expense, to wit: $225,
and was ready and willing to perform his
part Of the contract, but was prevented by
defendant from entering upon the
work under the contracty and by
reason Of the refusal of the defendant to
carry out the work he is damaged in the
said sum of 1925, expense OF moving his
machinery in the sum Of $500, in the loss
II t<1 III
FROM the performance of the contract; and
SIS, loss Of time in making preparation to
do said work. The defendant denied that it
entered into the contract with plaintiff at
ALL and contended on the trial that Ham
shaw was not its agent, and had no authOr-
ity to contract for it.
During the progress Of the trial there
was some testimony showing that plaintiff
was engaged in digging wells for other
parties durino the time that he would have
been engage. in working for defendant
under the contract, if the terms of the con-
tlact had been carried out After the ad-
mission of this testimony the court
made the following statement: Upon
an examination OF the. contract during
the adjournment we have come to the con-
.clusion that this contract is not revocable
at the will Of the defendant; that under its
provisions there is an express agreement
Shat lie shall sink at least one well to the
del,th not to exceed 81 feet. The allega-
tions of the complaint ,oeing that the con-
tract was abrogated by the defendants be-
fore he had commenced any operations on
the sinking of the we'll, it would constitute
a breach Of the contract if proven. The
measure Of damage in that instance is the
amount of the expense necessarily incurred
by the plaintiff III preparing for the work,
and u reasonable allowance for his time in
so doing not exceeding the amount claimed
in his complaint.
Whereupon the plaintiff moved to strike
out all that part Of the testimony of Mr..
Watson which did not relate to the expense
incurred by him in bringing his machin7
erv and expert WOrkmen from Walla
Walla to Gray's Harbor, and other expenses
incurred by MIN at Gray's Harbor, includ-
ing his own time and personal expenses in
preparing to perform the contract. This
was an exclusion Of the testiomy, tending
to show that the plaintiff received continu-
ously a lucrative employment out of which
he realized profit on his arrival at the
place where this contract was to be per-
formed: which motion was sustained by
the court, and objected to by the defend
ant.
Afterward the court instructed the jury
as follows:
the company was bound by the contract in
the manner as stated in the foregoing in
structions, and that the plaintiff made pre-
paration to dOSthe work, and was then pro-
hibited from doing it by the company, they
would be liable to him for his expenses and
Treasona bic compensation for his time lost,
not exceeding the amount claimed III his
complaint
10 which instruction the defendant ex-
cepted.
While the measure of damages seems
largely to have been the bone of contention
at the trial, no authorities are cited by
either appellant, or respondent, on that
question We think there was no error
committed by the court in excluding the
testimony referred to above. We do not
question the general rule that plaintiff can
not recover for avoldable consequences.
This is a natural sequence Of the principle
which confines the damage to direct and
Immediate consequences, and can be plead
ed when the nature Of the case will per-
NIT; for it is not the policy OF the law to
permit man to aggravate his damages
stance, it has been held that where mans
fence has been knocked down, and his
crops exposed to the raYages ofcattle, that
it was his duty to repair the fence as soon
as it came to his notice, and that he could
not recover damages that We're incurred
after that time. This rule is made espe-
cially applicable to actions by employees to
IGCONOE lOI IJOlDC1lebl pSi fAoSt, " fAASt oAA~J
have been dismissed by their employers
without sufficient cause, and prevented
from completing the services according to
the contract. They must seek other em-
ployment, and the amount which they
earn in this way, Or which they might
have earned had they made reasonable ex-
ertions, will be allowed in reduction of the
damages given by their discharge. Sedg-
wick on damages, section 606.
There is a we'll defined distinction drawn
by all the authorities between contracts for
hire. or for personal services, and the con-
tract to do a specific act. In the former
case, if the plaintiff gets employment at
the same wages, it is plain that he is not
damaged, and when he does not, his dam
ages are easily ascertained. In the latter
species Of contract, where the employer re-
fuses to accept Of the services, or to have
the work contracted for performed, or pre-
vents the employee from performing the
same i'll any manner, the usual measure OF
damages. where the contract relates to the
manufacture of an article, or the construc-
ton Of a building, or the performance Of
some other specified act, is the difference
between the price agreed to be paid, and
what it would have cost the employees to
complete it, provided such cost would be
less than. the contract price. Field on Law
of Damages, Section 339.
To be continued.