The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-10-28

or part thereof lies, against all the property
SUBJECT 10 the lien of his mortgage In the
suLnent II Is admitted that district court IN
usf Ills statute might in one suit decree sale
VI Ano situated partly in two counties, If the
premises he in compact form,
ssansie Iorty-aere tract or any number OF
IegAi SUBDIVISIONS adjoining each other, but
not II the lands in different counties are separsts
tfActs by this rule OF construction a mortgage
upon q strip OF land like the right-of-way OF the
tNortnern Pacific railroad, for instance, extend
ing across the entire territory and embracing
IaIu IN twelve counties, might be subjected TO
sAls under decree in single suit brought in
eIthet OF the counties, and the court authorized
70 render such decree would be without juris-
uiction 10 order sale under a mortgage of q
single acre situated in al adjoining county,
unless the acre touched other land COW
cred by the same mortgage in the
county wherein the court was held. The
authorities cited do not require me to
Holmes va. Taylor, 48 Ind. l69, the mortgage
covered single forty acre tract cut into two
parts by river which formed boundary be-
tween Two counties. 1t was held to be necessary
under the statutes of that state to sell the land
III TWO parcels, and to sell each part in the
county IN which 1t was situated, but the right
70 iortciose the mortgage in one suit, and the
jurisdiction OF the court sitting ia one county
10 render decree and order of sale of the land
IN ooth counties was maintained, and the opin-
!ou uoes not give as reason for so holding that
IL Was water instead OF all intervening tract of
lana which filed the space between the two
parts, or even suggest reason for different
Inc case of ChAdbourne VS.. Gilman, % Iowa,
Isl, was one wherein several mortgages were in
SUIT, each covering land in a single county and
III Is therefore not in point in this case.
IN the case OF Orcutt VS.. Harrison, 81 N. W.,
AZ, the suit was against the executrix of the
mortgagor's Will: the mortgaged premises were
situated IN the county in which the defendant
lved ana IN which the estate was being settled
IN the probate court; the debt secured by the
mortgage was payable in a different county and
the SUIT was brought in the latter county to col
Ieet the DEBT and forecose the mortgage The
only question decided in that case was
, one wnich does not arise in
Is announcer Iowa case later than either of the two
mentioned above aud is ia point The decision
Is TO the effect that under section of the Iowa
cooe providing that suits to foreclose mortgages
must be brought in the county wherein the
mortgaged property some part thereof is
situated, decree of foreclosure aud order of
sale IN suit upon several deeds, each for a
separate tract given as security Tor debt where
da!easa zee OF all the lands by single instru-
inent had been taken by the mortgagor, brought
IN county embracing only lands affected by
one OF the deeds, was valid and binding to
lands ia another county.
The decision in Wood VS.. Mastic, 2 Washing
ton territory, 81, does not bear on the question
at issue TO any greater extent than this: 1t
hOids that foreclosure suits must be brought in
the county or district in which the land or some
part thereof lies. 1t does not intimate that more
than one suit is necessary where several tracts in
different counties are covered by a single mort
gage. hold that in said foreclosure suit the
jurisdiction of the district court at Olympia was
not partial and sufficient merely To afford part
OF the relief to which the MORTGAGE entitled
the plaintiff, but it was complete for all
purposes.
The mortgage given by the complainant was
iorecIosed and the lands in controversy were
sold by proceedings and under process es-
pecially provided by the statutes for such case,
and the sale is not void, because not made sub
teet to redemption, as provided in the chapter
relating 10 sales of real estate under executions;
nor by reason OF non-confOrmity to the pro-
Visions OF that chapter i'll other particulars on
the Part OF the sheriff in executing the process
and making his return. The particular pro-
visions of that chapter invoked are wholly in
applicable TO the case Hayes VS.. Miller, 1
Washington Territory, 1i5: Parker VS.. Dacres,
Washington Territory, ASH
BY the statute the complainant had a right to
redeem the property by paying the mortgage
debt with interest and costs at any time prior TO
the sale. Laws 1873, p 1i9, section 563 And by
the order OF the court the time was extended for
period OF six months from the date of con-
hrmatlon of the SALE lie did not avail himself
OF the right of redemption given to him by law
or the grace extended to him by the court, and
by the sale of the property and lapse of
time, all his rights to, and interest
III the property were extinguished, and the
right OF the purchaser to have valid
deed from the sheriff became absolute. Whether
such deed has or has not been executed and
delivered is question which is not material in
this case, because il does not concern the COM
plainant. He is in no position to litigate with
or sufficency of the instrument which their
grantors accepted from the sheriff as a deed in
compliance with the order Of the court.
decree will be entered in favor of the de-
PENDANTS confirming their title to the land az
against the complainant.