The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-13

conditions of modern inventions and APP
pliances. It is, for example, the able and
thinking soldier alone who can work out in
HIS own mind the effect which the use of
high explosives, smokeless powder. ETC..
will have on the strategy and tactics OF the
future. Moltke was rejected for the high
est position in the Prussiau army because
the king believed him to be the ablest and
best man for tho place, and the English
officer may rest assured that the day is not
far distant when every high position in our
army will be filled upon a similar principle.
And here. if I might venture to advise
young officers, I would beg of them not to
rest contented with simple knowledRe. a
man may be crammed with all that has ever
been written on war, and yet be quite use
less as an officer unless deep thought is
brought to bear upon that stored up knowl-
edge. Moltke thought out for himself and
evolved from his own brain what he CON
cluded would be in the immediate future
the conditions under which nations would
meet in arms. and he carefully prepared his
army organization to meet those new
conditions, and trained the soldiers accord
ingly.
When war came in 1870 the prussian army
WAS in q most efficient state, and tho ar
rangements for a rapid mobilization we're
almost perfect. The French army. on the
other hand, was far behind the age in this
most Important point. As we are so won't
to do at all lines, the French
se'0 form nsr"S ren uN 'D' Their army
had come out of the Crimean war with
great credit because, when compared with
our old fashioned and UNANIMOUSLY trained
army, it seemed to be a really good fighting
machine. 1t had some good leaders. while
almost all of ours and most Of our staff
officers were ignorant of their trade. but
our greatest misfortune then was the entire
absence of any reserve. Our military chiefs
were then taught the lesson that the nation
which embarks in a serious war without. q
strong and efficient reserve to replen lsh
losses in its field army courts disaster. such
az that which befell us in the Crimea.
And vet there are old curiosities among us
who would have us forego our modest army
reserve of about G3,000 men for the pleasure
OF seeing older soldiers in the ranks when
a battalion marches past. The French re-
serve in 1870 was comparatively small and
badly organized.
1t was az old as the days of Marlborough,
of Frederick and of Napoleon. What was
new was the completeness OF the machinery
by means OF which n small pence army full!
OF recruits could be suddenly converted
into u war army Of immense proportlons
with all the partially trained oun soldiers
eliminated and replaced by the reserve sol
diers who had been trained in previous
years. Moltke was among the first to per
ceive that henceforwarl the destinies OF
Europe would nc longer be controlled by
highly drilled standing armies of moderate
proportion and composed of men always
kept with the colors. He also clearly fee
saw that the railroads, the electric tele-
graph and steamships favored the grand Of
fensive strategy of Napoleon, and would, II
the future, enable whole nations to take the
| field to accomplish their national aims ano
aspirations.
1t was very evident to him that the en-
| ployment of these vast armies would gen
| orally minimize the influence and import
ance OF fortresses; that the larger the ma
| tional force in the field the more necessary
it would be to break II ny into severa
armies. each under a more or less indie
pendent commander. He had fully takei
in how much the electric telegraph hat
rendered ali this possible, and how much !
also demanded greater ~pre-arrangement
with n more minute m carefully devised
organization. He saw that the use OF I'M
breech-loading rifle rendered fire discipline
a matter Of u paramount Importance, an
| that it was in fact the death knell Of Fred