The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1891-10-16

A Joriiori there Is nothing In the text OF the
documents constituting tho Triple Alliance
that calls for the interposition Of Italy In
case the Gar should avoid levelling any
direct blow at Austria but should move
upon Constsntlnople. No doubt such astep
ON Russla's part would give great umbrage
to the Vienna Government: but BISMARCK
declared in the Reichstag that Germany
would never stir hand or foot to shield Bull
Garia from Russian invasion, and 1t Is not
likely that moro would be done by Germans
for Moslems than for fellow Christians.
There Is. indeed. no ground for believing
that Kaiser WILLIAM II. has departed from
the programme Of his late Chancellor in
this particular. So far. then, as concerns
| the terms OF the convention uniting the
three central powers. there is no reason
why the Car should not try to obtain from
Italy an assurance Of neutrality In tho event
Of his aiming at Constantinople.
| It Is not from Berlin or Vienna, but from
London, that the influence counter to tho
Cars designs proceeds. During the last
session OF Parliament. under pressure from
Mr.. LABouCHERE. It was acknowledged
| by a spokesman Of the Government that
Lord SALISBURY had entered into friendly
understanding with Italy for the purpose
Of maintaining tho status quo In the Medl-
terranean. Obviously the maintenance OF
the status quo would imply the Illustration
Of attempts to eject the English from Egypt
or the Turks from the Dosporus. The In
ference was that tho advance OF Russian
army and Of Russian war ships on Con-
stantinople would be withstood not only by
British ironclads but by the armored fleet
OF Italy. A verbal understanding. how
ever, Is one thing and q formally executed
treaty Is another. To bring about rup-
ture OF the aforesaid agreement In its in
choate stage was undoubtedly the object Of
tho mission Of NJ. DE GIERs. Nor is it for
moment to be supposed that the Cars
representative came empty handed to the
Quirinal It would be easy. on the contrary.
for NJ. DE GIERs to show that Italy had
something to gain from Russian ascend
ancy in the Balkan peninsula. whereas any
further southwark extension OF Austria
would DO fatal to the hopes Of Italian ag-
grandizement on the eastern shore Of the
Adriatic. Russia could offer King Hum
BERT's Government the bride OF Albania,
whose possession would almost certainly
involve the ultimate acquisition Of the Dali
matian and Qlyrian seacoast, II not also Of
the coveted Trieste. The truth. indeed. is
that Italy has pretty well exhausted the
probabilities OF profit from cooperation
with Germany. and that In the interests Of
her national expansion she might now.
were her hands free. be strongly tempted
to combine with France and Russia. As the
heirs Of Rome and Venice. King HUMBERT's
subjects look upon the Adriatio as an Ital-
ian lake. but they can never convert the
historical tradition into present reality so
long as Austria blocks the way.
Italy Is not, however. under the existing
conditions. free agent. By the treaty
with Germany. which forms the ground
work of the Triple Alliance. King HUMBERT
has pledged himself to support Kaiser Will
LIAM II. in case the latter Is assailed at one
and the same time by France and Russia.
Such joint action. however. would expose
the exceptionally long seacoast Of Italy to
attacks from the French navy which the
italian feet. unaided. would be far too weak
to parry. England alone could furnish naval
re6nforcements adequate to the defence Of
italian seaboard cities against French iron
clads. A bird In the hand Is worth two in
the bush, and by covenanting to use an
English feet for tho immediate protection
Of the italian peninsula. Lord SAILS
BURY is able to outbid the Cars
offer OF future accessions east Of the
Adriatic. It Is not difficult. therefore. to de-
fine what answer was made by King Hum
BERT's Prime Minister to NJ. DE GIKRs. How
ever seductive. the Marquis D1 RuDN1
would reply. might be your masters pro-
posals under other circumstances. We are.
as the case stands. bound by treaty to sup
port Germany in certain contingencies.
When those occur. We shall have in
France formidable enemy against whose
preponderance at sea it Is indispensable to
take precautions. There is but one precau-
ton possible. namely. to secure the help
Of England. and In return for that we shall
have to render quid pro quo.
It is clear. however. that IL the Marquis
DI RUDINI had been secretly disposed to
evince toward Germany the same perfidy
with which VICTOR EMMANUEL's Prime Min
lister treated France In 1870. he could easily
have found q pretext for doing 80. He could
have said that tho Italian Government was
not in the least constrained by the Triple
Alliance to oppose the Cars projects
against Constantinople. and that 1t would
have no motive for cooperating with Eng
land in thwarting Russian occupation Of
tho Bosporus II 1t wero privately assured
that 1t would never need the succor Of an
English fleet for the protection Of Its sea-
coast. There is very little doubt that such
an assurance would have been privately
given by the Russian and French Ministers.
and it Ii probable that all France would ask
in return for q secret stipulation not to
attack the Italian seacoast would be an
equally secret agreement that on the
outbreak OF war King HUMBEHT's Govern
ment would proceed 10 the mobilization ofits
army In an extremely slow and lukewarm
way. Thus the promise given by Italy to
Germany might be kept to the ear and bro
ken to the hope: and We may add that In be-
coming the victim OF such treuehery Prus-