The Carbon advocate. [volume] (Lehighton, Pa.) 1872-1924, 1891-12-19
NEW LoNpoN I'M WAR.
The Strategic Value of Connecticut cit.
Ia the Defense of New York

The Strategic Value of Connecticut city
In the Defense of New York,
Navy officers who have studied the
region have often and urgently pressed
upon their department the importance Of
| developing the station at New London
and making it efficient. One must ad-
mire their energy and faithfulness in
continuing to lay before their superiors
the vital importance of strengthening
this strategic base in the outer defense
of New York in the face of long con-
| tinued pigeonholing Of reports. That
their anxiety is not unfouuded becomes
plain when we consider that Great
Britain has a powerful station at Hall
fax, from which, if so disposed, she
could hurl her thunderbolts of maritime
war upon this unprotected spot at very
short notice, precisely as she could
! strike our South Atlantic coast from the
| Bahamas. She may never even wish to
| do either thing, but isn't it rather fool
ish to remain unprepared for the blow
when we have ample resources for es-
/ tablishing guard against it?
| The amount of trade that passes
through Long Island sound coastwise is
hardly conceived of by the majority OF
| citizens. 1t amounts to a great many
| million dollars worth a year, and all
this trade could be paralyzed by quick
stroke from a foreign navy. In 1880 the
| entire munitions of war manufactured
| in the United States amounted to $11,.
100000. OF this total, 50, 100000 worth
was manufactured in Connecticut alone.
A foreign fleet in the sonnd, therefore,
would be able to deprive us Of our main
source of munitions without even at.
tempting to attack New York.
Cut off citys supply Of air and what
would it matter whether that city sur.
rendered or not? Shut OFF from New
York in war time nine elevenths Of the
material it needed for war and it would
be as helpless as a city without air tc
breathe. But this is not all. An enemy
in the sound could cut at New London
and again at New Haven, the chief lines
Of land communication and railroad
transportation between New England
and New York
If Of the loss which would thus be
caused a small percentage were now 10
be promptly applied to building up New
York's outer line of defense, with a
strong navy yard at New London as its
base, the whole cost would be betrayed
in a few years without inconvenience tc
any one. In time Of action, while our
battle ships and cruisers patrolled the
Race or engaged tho enemy, with sup
| port from the forts, our monitors, emerg.
ing from New London, would lurk safe
ly behind Fishers island, prepared to
assist; for there again, on the north face
nature favors us with the sheltered wa
ters Of Hay hgrbor and West harbor. In
case Of injury, vessels could quickly run
into New London, and repair at the navy
yard. Thus, while the surroundings and
I topography are not the same as those OF
the entrance to the Mediterranean, we
should still have what might well be
called IAN American Gibraltar quite
as invulnerable as the stronghold at the
pillars Of Hercules, and much greater in
range.
Boston can be equipped effectually to
defend herself; and Newport also, il
fortified, is in a position to ward off an
enemy But neither Of these, by so do
ing, can help to defend New York. New
| London, on the other hand, if her nat.
ural advantages are utilized, can repel
any attack on New York from the east,
and thereby relieve the metropolis from
dread in that quarter It is well, it is
Indispensable, to protect New York from
assault by way of the Narrows. But
what viii it avail to bar that small trout
door if the broad rear entrance through
/ the sound be left undefeudeds-G p.
Lathrop in Harper's Weekly.