Daily Yellowstone journal., 1891-05-12
A TRICK.

As a so Tier under two governments
1 have fought Sepoys Boers, Hotten-
tots, MaOrs, Indians, Malays and civil
lied white men, but for real, downright
ferocity and logged perseverance, 1 give
the medal TO the AfghaRs. Such a
thing as cowardice is unknown among
them. They are ready for a fight at a
moments notice, and they can stand
the cold steel and grape and canister
longer than any white troops | was
yer opposed 20. They are fanatics TO
the last drop Of blood, and when an
enemy fully believes that death on the
battlefield means eternal praise for his
name and eternal rest for his soul, he
becomes doubly dangerous.
In the march 20 Cabul. which won
laurels for the British arms only that
they might be covered with the dis
grace of bad diplomacy, we found the
Afghan on his own soil and on battle
fields of his Owl selection. and though
We could drive him in every instance,
each victory cost US some of the best
blood in the English army.
One Of our outposts, as the column
was encamped in the COota valley to
recruit its strength and bring up sup
plies, vas nine miles TO the north,
where ii covered a strategic point. A
detachment Of 100 men was kept there
for fifteen days. being relieved every
FIVE days, and ! went out with the last
detachment We were all infantry.
81 49,. L.1 100 --w.-l- II .-.----s.--
for our muskets.
The post was not in the valley, but
up among the hills, where it covered
three different passes, and it was a ter
rbly lonesome spot. IL was among
the ruins of an old temple, and the first
companies holding it had used the
great blocks of stone TO build a fort.
This structure was about 100 feet
square, browning a steep hill, and the
walls we're about twelve feet high.
Two sides Of it were the walls of the
old temple strengthened a little, and
while it was a rude affair as a fort it
was a stout and safe retreat in case of
a few men being hard pressed.
The blunders made in that historic
campaign are too numerous TO be re-
corded The most impartial historians
are agreed that incompetency was the
leading feature. We had been at the
post two days when the captain in
command took fifty of the men for
what he called a reconnaissance up one
of the passes 70 the north of us, and at
the same time sent twenty-five men on
another fools GRAND TO the east. We
had been put there simply and solely
20 prevent the enemy from coming
down the pass right at our door and
entering the valley. What was beyond
us did not matter. There was mutter-
ing among the men as they were
marched out, each carrying twenty-five
rounds of ammunition, and they called
farewell 10 the twenty-five of US left
behind. Half an hour after they had
passed out Of sight We heard sharp fir
ing 10 the north and east, and not one
man ever returned to us. They
were ambushed in the de6les and
slaughtered, just as might have been
expected.
On this very same day the main army
decided TO advance. A courier was dis
patched 10 notify an outpost, bat he
never reached us, either turning back
through fear or having been picked of
by some concealed riheman. About 5
in the afternoon the natives ap-
peared in large numbers, both above
and below us, and then we knew what
had happened; indeed, they tainted
with the humiliation of our COM
and gave Us the news that the
main column had moved on and de-
serted Us. An old sergeant, who had
passed twenty-five years in the service
was in command of us, and as soon as
be fully realized the disaster which had
come about he called the men together
and said;
we have no choice in this matter.
thousand men could not push their