Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-11-22
BLQNDERS THAT COST.
Won holtke's History Shows How
Many Lives We're Thrown Away
DURING THE THEFRANCO-GERMANWAR
Mistakes Of the Red Prince and the I'm
portance of Caution.
W0LSETEY AFTER THE TRANSLAT0RS

The third and last of Lord Wolseley'
letters, reviewing Won Moltke's book OF
the Franco-German war, secured especiall,
for The DISPATCH, appears below:
In the short space which remains to me
only propose in this article to deal will
the earlier phase of the Franco-Germar
war. l shall en6eayor to select from wha
Won Moltke has written about it, those
comments in which he deals with those de
hatable questions on which the Staff His
tory is silent, or has not ventured to crit
lcise or to pronounce upon authoritatively
At the battle of Mars Ia Tour, as every
military student knows, the Third German
Army Corps under Alvensleben, with two
divisions of cavalry, held the whole French
army at bay. Seven hours of hard fighting
were endured before any assistance arrived.
In the evening, just before dark, Prince
Frederick Charles reached the battlefield
Gnd assumed command. Before that time,
the Tenth Corps had also arrived upon the
ground, and some other slight reinforce
ments had been received, but no more could
be hoped for. All that could now be ex-
pected or desired was to retain the ad-
vsntages already gained. Yet the Red
Prince ordered a general attack upon the
whole French front by the very inferior
force then at his disposal
One of the Mistakes of the War.
This was undoubtedly serious blunder,
and the mode in which Won Molke conveys
to his reader that he thought so, is delicate
but unmistakable. He describes the fearful
losses the German troops had sustained
in officers, men and horses, the exhausted
condition of those who remained, and their
great difficulty in maintaining the fight, and
in holding the French Army where it then
was. He says: ''Jt was not desirable to
challenge the very superior forces of the
enemy by a renewed attack, and when no
further reinforcements were to be hoped for,
TO place in jeopardy the results already
gained at such cost" Nevertheless, about
I P. NJ, an order of the Headquarters (of
the Second Army decreed a renewed and
general advance upon the enemy's position.
He then describes the unfortunate and fruit
less result of this attempt, already so well
known, but not clearly indicated in the
Official History.
Again, further on, hitting the Red Prince
with still more directness, he thus COM
ments upon the movements which immedl-
ately preceded the Battle of Gravelotte:
"As the Commander in Chief of the Second
Army ordered the Twelfth Corps to form
the extreme left of that army, although it
was then on its right, considerable delay
ensued through the crossing of the
columns" The result of this ill-iudged
order was that the Guard Corps was not
able to advance until nearly O'Clock A. M.
This was g serious matter; it had a grave
ii might have been a disastrous--bearing
upon the issue of the battle, fought, as it
was under such peculiar conditions.
Peculiarly of the Battle.
The reader must remember that in this, /
the greatest battle of the war, the greatest /
since the days of Napoleon, both sides
fought with their backs to their enemy's |
country. The German army, moving into |
position from flhe south, had to form line to /
Its right by Successive Army Corps. 1t was i
consequently of the utmost importance that /
this line should be formed with the least
possible loss of time. The orders for this
battle were issued at A. NJ, and it was
light enough to have moved easily at An.
A delay of six most important hours fol-
lowed upon this definite mistake on the
part of Prince Frederick Charles
But if Count Won Moltke is ready to point
out the errors of others, he is equally pre-
pared to find fault with himself He tells
Us it was a mistake on his part to have al
lowed the German 2nd Army Corps, which
only reached the field of battle late in the
evening, to attack when it did. The hour
was too late TO admit of any useful result
from such an attack then, and the services
Of such an Army Corps intact would have
been invaluable the following day.
He does not record with equal clearpess
his opinion upon the causes of the other
disasters which befell the Germans in this
battle. he assumes those causes are now
very generally well known, and he evil
IDENTIFY does not wish to write anything that
might be distastetul in very high quarters.
This is very natural, but when Royal per-
sonages hold commands in the field, they |
must expect to have their conduct and ac-
1ions as closely criticised by those who
write upon the war as would be the doings
OF Generals Smith or Jones. The verses of
the Royal rhymer which will not scan, can
no longer be accepted as poetry.
What Won NIoItke Might Have Told.
There is, however, graphic description
Of the terrible repulse experienced by the
Ninth Corps, with which the battle began.
Besides the battery that was directly at
tackled by the French infantry, he tells us
all the remaining batteries were by 2 p NJ
almost incapable of taking any effective part |
IN the fighting. He is very reticent as to
The causes Of this disaster, and his reticence
on the point is very much to be regretted.
Neither does he tell us anything regarding
the circumstances which led to the retire.
ment OF General Steinmetz 1t is commonly
reported TO have grown out of quarrel be-
tween that gallant old soldier and Prince
Frederick Charles He certainly seems
to lean rather toward the side of General
Steinmetz and against that Of the Prince
Earlier in this work, he notices,
what is well known to all students
Of this war, that during the
which preceded the battle of
Spicheren, SteinmetE had pushed his troops
into much more advanced position than
had been intended for him, and that some
serious overlapping and crossing Of bri-
Eades, etc, was the consequence. Here, in
describing the attack made by the Eighth
Corps from Gravelotte toward ST. Hubert,
ne Quarrics and the Moscow farm, where
such enormous losses were incurred, he cas-
Ially mentions that the attack was ordered
by Steinmetz To him he also attributes
he subsequent advance Of the First Caval-
~ division and four batteries over the very
narrow defle formed by the road as it there
ROSES the Nance Valley. But he almost
IMPLIES that the latter movement, if mis-
AIKEN, as it was certainly unfortunate, was
ret a very natural one under the circum-
tanceS
The Defense Left to Steinmetz.
Taking the Tiew which is implied in Won
dOltkes works as 20 the responsibility for
what happened, any friend of Steinmetz
would be able TO make out a very good case
or him. The orders given to Steinmetz
we're not 10 seriously attack the French left
mil she second army was in o position 70