The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1891-06-03
IT'S A DRY DECISION.
ORIGINAL-PACKA LAW MUST
STAND.

thief Justice Fuller Interprets the Act of
congress I'm Favor OF the Prob bitory
notwithstanding Discussion of the
IL .Iative Powers of the State aud Federal
| Lawraking Podies.
| The United States Supreme Court has
| decided that the original package law
passed by the last Congress was valid
| and constitutional, and that 10 went into
| effect i'm all States where prohibitory
laws prevailed without re-enactment by
| the States of the laws by which they
forbade the SAL of intoxicating liquors
within their boundaries, whether i'm
ported from other States or not. Chief
Justice Fuller rendered the opinion of
| the court, and the bench was united in
support of the conclusions at which he
arrived, though Justice Gray announced
that Justices Harlan. Brewer and him
self did not concur in all the reasoning
of the opinion of the court.
The case upon which the decision was
rendered was that OF John NJ. Wilker-
son. Sheriff of Shawnee County. Kansas,
VS.. Charles A. Rahrer, brought here on
appeal from the decision Of the Circuit
Court OF the United States for the dis
trict of Kansas, against the State.
Rahrer was the original package agent
at Topeka, Kan, of the firm of May
nard, Hopkins q Co. of Kansas City,
Mo and was arrested the day after the
Ioriginal-package law went into effect.
| He claimed that the law was unconstitu-
tional and also that it could not go into
operation until the State had re-enacted
| its prohibtory laws.
The court says the power of the State
TO impose restraints and burdens upon
persons and property in the promoti) IN
| Of the public health, good order and
| prosperity Is Il lower always belonging
| TO the States, not surrendered 10 them
| by the General Government, nor directly
restrained by the Constitution Of the
| United States, and essentially exclusive.
The power of Congress 10 regulate
| commerce among the several States
when the subjects are national in their
nature, the court says, is also exclusive.
The Constitution does not provide that
| interstate commerce shall be free, but
! by the grant of this exc .usive power TO
! regulate it it was left free except as
| Congress might undertake 10 regulate
IT, Therefore, it has been determined
| in Robbins VS.. Shelby Taxing District
| that the failure of Congress TO exercise
this exclusive power in any case is an
| expression of its will that the subject
| shall be tree from restrictions or imposi-
| tionS upon IL by the several States and
/ IL State law comes in conflict with the
! will Of Congress the State and Congress
cannot occupy the position Of equal OPP
| posing soveregnties because the Consti-
tut on declares its supremacy and that
OF laws passed in pursuance thereof.
The court says that intoxicating
| liquors are undoubtedly subjects of com
merce, like any other commodity, and
are SO recognized, but nevertheless it
| hac off ho1 +hnt In, |,
| ing the manufacture and sale of liquJr
within State limits do not necessar ly
| infringe any constitutional privilege or
! immunity, this right being veste |, as in
| the Mugler case upon the acknowledged
ght OF the States TO control Their
| pure Y internal affairs if in so doing they
| protect the health, morals, and safety
| of their people by regulations that do
not interfere with the powers of the
General Government
| The present case arises upon the
| theory of repugnance between the State
| law and interstate commerce clause OF
the Con titution, and involves a d.stinc-
| tion between the CONNER cal power and
the police power which, though quite
| distinguishable when they do not APP
proach each other, are sometimes, ike
| the colors, so nearly allied as 10 perpleX
|
vision.
The court says the Iowa laws held to
| be unconstitutional in the Leisy original
| package case were enacted in the eXer-
| else of the States police power and not
at all as regulations of interstate COM
merce, but aS IL amounted in effect TO "a
regulation of such commerce, il was held
! that so long as Congress did not pass
any law to regulate specifically the
traffic between the States in intoxicating
| liquors. or act In such way as TO allow
| State laws TO operate upon IL, Congress
| thereby indicated its WILL that such COM
merye should be free and untrammeled,
! and therefore that the laws of Iowa were
imperative so far "a they amounted
10 regulations OF foreign or interstate
commerce in inhibiting the reception Of
such articles within the State, or their
| sale upon arrival in the form in which
| imported 1t followed as "a corollary
| that, when Congress acted at all, the re-
/ suit OF its action must be TO operate a. d
| restraint upon that perfect freedom
| which its silence insured Congress has
now spoken. and declared that imported
| liquor shall upon arrival in Il State fall
within the category of domestic articles
| of a similar nature.
Continuing, the Court says:
|
| permission to the State to act, but simply
| removed an impeachment to the enforcement
| of the State laws in respect To imported
| packages in their original condition, created
| by the absence OF specific utterance
| its part. 1t impaired no power 10 the State
| not then possessed, but allowed imported
| pr )perty to fall at once, upon arrival, within
| the local jurisdiction.
| The liquor arrived in Kansas prior TO the
| passage of the act Of Congress. but there is
| no question presented of the right OF the
| importer TO withdraw the property from
| the state, nor is it perceived that the
| Congre ssional enactment is given ret
| respective operation by holding IL APP
| plicable to transaction occurring after
| IL took effect. 1t is not the case of law
| enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a
| power exclusively confided 10 Congress, but
! OF law which IL was competent for the
| State to pass but which could not operate
| upon aL:icles occupying certain situation
| until the passage of the act OF Congress