The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-06-07

WrltG9s GO cluCcISiy ptileNe LLdk luC
whole United States, north and south,
would rejoice to have this army turned
loose on South Carolina. to devsstate that
state in the manner We have done in Geor-
gia, and il would have direct and imme-
diate bearing on your campaign in Vir-
ginia." Ali supplies of food, and all
horses and mules not required for the
army, were ruthlessly destroyed. A great
district upon which Lees troops in Vir-
GINA had long depended for subsistence
and for transport animals, was thus laid
waste. From thenceforward. there was
great difficulty in feeding the men upon
whom the defense of Richmond de-
pended This contributed much towards
the final surrender at Appomattox, when
Lees gallant but starving army, hungry
and without resources but not beaten in
battle, laid down its arms. No army of
sincere patriots, whether mistaken or not
is no concern of the military historian,
that ever surrendered to overwhelming
forces which threatened its destruction by
starvation, has ever deserved better of its
country. Victors in q hundred fights
against vastly superior numbers, the men
Oh 40. army under such conditions have
ever been SO we'll entitled to look their
conquerors in the face with pride. 1t
was an army cut off from all out
side assistance that had successfully
engaged for four years a thorough
ly well supplied enemy with all
Europe to draw upon for men, arms, am
munition, and supplies of every kind. The
struggle ended that April 8, 1865, and
though no battles were either fought or
won during Sherman's march through
Georgia, that daring, well-planned, and
most ably carried out operation con-
tributed very largely to the result
This march had not found favor at
Washington. Mr.. Stanton deemed him.
self a heaven-born strategist, great gen.
eral thrown away and condemned by cruel
fate to sit on stool as head of the war
Office, instead of being in the saddle at the
head of an army in the field. He disliked
Sherman for some reason or other, and
showed it by thwarting his plans when
ever he could do so. Stanton prejudiced
Mr.. Lincoln's mind against Sherman,
and had it not been for General Grants
support of his old colleague on the Missis-
sippi, that celebrated march to the sea
would not have come off when it did;
would, perhaps. never have been under
taken at all. In his letter to congratulate
Sherman upon his success, Grant says:
when apprehensions for your safety
were expressed by the president, / assured
him that with the army you had, and you
in command of it, there was no danger,
but you would strike bottom on salt water
some place; that | would not feel the same
the expedition to any other living COM
mander."
In his memoirs" General Grant writes
as follows: 81 was in favor of Sherman's
plan from the time it was first submitted
to me. My chief of the staff, however, was
very bitterly opposed to it, and as / learnt
subsequently, finding that he could not
at Washington to stop it." The chief of
the staff who could thus work disloyally
behind his own generals back was unit
for his position. He had evidently been
told that no general in face of an active
enemy should divide his force. How, then,
could he approve of general in Sher-
mans position at Atlanta dividing his
hold and fight General Hood, whilst
with the main body he cut
himself adrift from all bases of supplies,
and plunged into the unknown depths Of
Georgia? To him, with his narrow no.
tons of war, it was simply s'wild-goose
chase" but to Sherman and Grant, edu-
Gated and experienced soldiers, it was q
feasible operation, and entirely in accord
ance with the spirit of the science they
had learned as youths, and had now prac-
ticed in earnest for some three years past
General Sherman tells US that up to the
last moment before he started from At
lanta for the sea, he dreaded the receipt of
some order from Washington to forbid the
march. 81 remember well," he writes,
my feeling of uneasiness that something
of the kind might happen, and how free
and glorious / felt when the magic tele-
graph was cut, which prevented the posi-
bility of orders of any kind from the rear
coming to delay or hinder US from fulfill
ing what / knew was comparatively easy
Of execution, etc"
A wise government will always rejoice
that they have wise general in the field
who has the self-conhdence thus to act on
his own responsibility.
Before Sherman reached Savannah, the
Washington politicians had already per-
ceived that the negro was bound to be-
come, in the future, an important factor
in Southern politics. He must have the
vote, and must, therefore, be manipu-
lated for party purposes. Mr.. Stanton
was early in the field on this platform. I"
His sympathy with the negro twas not"
Sherman says, 'of pure humanity, but of
politics" He and his faction, who
had great influence with the president.
strove to impress him with suspicions
of Sherman's loyalty to him, and to his
negro policy. They alleged that he treated
the inevitable Sambo" with undisguised
contempt; that he might have collected
during his march and brought to Savannah
over 5000 slaves, and opened out a road
for Others to follow; 4,.5t :-1z+ead of doing
this. he had driven them RON MS columns.
sf1d hssi even DESTROYED the -5,.ges behind
him to prevent Their following him.
Stanton and his party aad already begun
10 make polil. cal capital out of the negro
question, and Sherman, already disliked.
was 70 be their stalking horse. and TO be
ruined to accomplish their unworthy ends.
Upon reaching the sea coast Sherman
found Savanna strons., held by the Com
federate Genera Hardse Tho refused to
surrender. A siege hecaa,e ecessarv. but
as the population, sfthog; 'uting the
garrison, numbered sc e O. souls. it
was hoped TO reduce il s. BY q alton.
Sherman drew in his he Mig IT and
closer round the place, but Ssrs he e q
able to completely invest ii, Ia zee, fear-
ing to lose his little army, broke = Sue
cessfully on the night of December 40 sud
got safely away. Before starting he set
fire to the dockyard and to all the Comic i
crate gunboats lying there.
At this time General Grant was still II
front of Lees army, against which :
could accomplish nothing in the oteu
field. His war policy had now be. Syne 81
arithmetical calculation. He could afEorc
to lose two of his men for every ore Con-
federate soldier disposed of HIS plan
was, therefore, to engage Lees loops
whenever and wherever he could ind
them. Cut off from all outside help the
Confederacy had to depend upC- IS own
resources in men and warlike ,,ipment.
1t was consequently only mat. of time
when this policy of attriti0t was
bound to win, if the Nortfern peo-
pie would but have patience long enough.
Sherman's position IN South Carp}l a
where he established himself carly IN
January, 1865, made this calculation al
the more certain, and must, it was w.
dent, hasten the end.
After the occupation Of Savannah Shsr-