Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1891-04-27
A YANKEE TRICK.


As n soldier under Two RuNein"''
! have fought sepoys, Boers, llo',en
hts. Maoris, Indians, Malays and civll
ifed white men, but for real, downright
fcrocity and dogged perseverance ey'
the medal 10 the Afghans. Such
thing rs cowardicc l. unknown anon.
them. They are ready for fight at
moments notice. and they can stand
the cold steel and grape and oanistel
longer than any white troops ! wa
ever opposed 10. They arc fanatics 70
the last drop Of blood. and when an
enemy fully believes that death on Tho
battlefield means eternal praise for hl'
name and eternal rest for his soul, he
bccomes doubly dangerous
In tho march 20 Cabul, which won
inurcls for tho British arms only that
they might DO covered with the dis
grace Of bad diplomacy, We found the
Afghan on his own soll and on battle
fields Of his own selection, and though
wo could drive him in every instance
each victory cost us some OF the best
blood in the English army.
One Of orr ouiposts, a. tho column
WIS cpcamped In the cooia valley to
recruit Ia sirngth and bring up sup
plies, was nine miles 10 the north,
where Il covered ~ strategic point. \
detachment Of 100 men was kept there
for fifteen days being relieved every
fivc days and went out with the last
detachment We were all infantry,
and We had 100 rounds Of ammunition
for our muskets
The post was not IN tho valley, but
up among tho hills, where Il covered
three different passes, aud Il was ter
ribly lonesome spot II was among
the ruins OF an old temple, and the ilr.t
eompanlc. holding II had used the
great blocIss 81 stone 20 build fort.
This structure was about 100 feet
square, browning step hill, and the
walls were about twelve feet high.
Two side. Of Il were the walls Of the
old temple strengthened a little, and
while II was a rude affair as fort u
was a stout and safe retreat In case Of
n few men being hard pressed.
The blundcrs made In that histofio
campaign are too numerous TO be ~
corded. The most impartial historians
are agreed that incompctency was tho
leading feature. We had been ut the
post two days when the captain In
command took fifty Of the men for
what he called Reconnaissance up ono
Of the passes TO the north Of Us, and at
the same time sent twenty-five mcn on
another fools crrand TO tho east. We
had been put thcrc simply and solely
10 prevent the enemy from coming
down the pass right at our door aud
entering tho valley. What was beyond
us did not mnttcr. There was mutter.
Ing among tho men as they were
marched out, each carrying twenty Eve
rounds Of ammunition. and they called
farewell" 10 the twenty-five Of rs left
behind. Half mn hour after they had
passed ont Of sight we heard sharp ilr.
Ing 10 the norih and east, and not one
single man ever returned TO uG They
were ambushed In the deGlos and
slaughtered, Just rs might haye been
expected.
On this very same day the main army
decided 20 advance. A courier was di,.
patched TO notify an outpost, bat he
ncvor reached u.s. either turning back
through fear or having been picked OF
by some concealed rliienan. About 8
o'clock In the afternoon tho natives ap.
pearcd In large numbers, both above
md below US, and then we knew what
had happened indeed. they tainted
rs with tho humiliation of our com.
rndes, and gave ~ the news that the
main column had moved on aud do
.ertod nA An old sergeant, who had
passed twenty two years In tho service,
was In command Of ~, aud a. soon rs
lic fully realized the disaster which had
come about he called the men together
aud said,
I'VE have no choice In this matter.
A thousand men could not push their
way down Into the valley now TO try
and ovcrtakc the column. We must
rcmain and do what We can"
But what can We DOR asked a cor