Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1891-08-21
MOLTKE's HISTORICAL WORK.
His Account Of the War of 1870 Between
France and Russia


The London Times publishes long extracts
from Count Won Moltke's history OF the war of
1870. Count Won Moltke left the manuscript
ready for the press, which is therefore pub
lished before his other posthumous works, al
though it is numbered volume 8. The preface,
signed by Count Won Moltke nephew, explains
the origin Of the work, as already cabled, add
ing that his uncle began to write it in the spring
OF 1877 and worked on it three hours a day at
Creissu. The count returned to Berlin in the
autumn Of 1877 and finished the work in Janu-
airy, 1888, utter which time he never referred
to it.
He intended it as popular account but in
| voluntarily arranged the details in accordance
with his own plan OF campaign. Thus the work
becomes an expression of his opinion of the
events Of the war. The book il written in Moltke
clear, terse and pure style. There are no for
| eign Germanized words in it, and it is GER
| tain to take The foremost rank in the classic
| literature Of the century. The work is further
characteristic of the authors modesty, his own
name being mentioned only twice, once az an
officer Of the king deputed to treat for the sur
render at Sedan, and again as the writer of q
letter infor ming the governor Of Paris of the
| defeat Of Aurelle and the occupation of Or
leans.
| Elsewhere he Is always simply .'chief Of
staff" Seekers of new things will find little to
general staff account which was largely the
| work Of his own hands.
A MAN OF PEACE.
In the introduction the writer remarks:
'Warfare il NO longer question of a small
| professional army. Wars at the present day
| involve whole nations. There is hardly q fam
| lily that does not suffer. The countrys whole
resources are involved and winter offers no
cessation Of hostilities."
He ho hnpo not oh
| inevitable, will, in the interest OF humanity.
become the more rare as it becomes the more
| terrible. Proceeding he.states that it is no
longer the ambition of mOnarchs that en-
dangers peace, but the passions and dissatisfac
tions OF peoples and the strife OF parties Even
the bourses' influence is enough to precipitate
war to protect their interests 1t follows that
parlianlents declare war, the responsibilities
being more easily carried by assembly than
by an individual. Thus the weak government
at the head of our neighboring state must be
regarded as standing menace to peace.
CAUSE OF THE WAR.
He then explains that the war Of 1870 arose
from the weakness of Napoleon and the jealousy
of the French nation at the success of the Prus-
| sian armies. France. he says, demanded re-
venge for Sadowa.
The writer dwells on the systematic organiza-
ton of the German forces contrasted with
the French want OF preparation, the taultiness
and vagueness of the French plans Of mobiliza-
ton and their worse plans OF operation. They
| should, he says have adopted the initiative, but
their points of concentration pointed rather to
defensive than al offensive attitude.
THE PRUssIAN PLAN.
Count Won Moltkes plan was to capture the
capital as more important in France than in
| other countries. In pursuit Of this plan he
aimed to drive the French forces with persist
| ency back from the fertile south into the mar
rover tract north, but, he says it is a delusion
| to suppose that long-laid plans can be carried
out in detail. The first collision upsets them.
| All that the leader OF an army can do is to de-
| eide what is best for an unknown period and
carry out his purpose unfiinchingly.
MARSHAL BAzAINEs CONDUCT
In regard to Bazaine's conduct on August l6
Moltke says he is tempted to fancy that political
reasons alone induced Bazane thus early in the
game to attach himself to Metz. Regarding the
| attack on the French between Gravelotte and St.
Privat Moltke blames himself for delaying the
| attack until late in the day. He notes that the
| siege OF Metz formed no part OF the original
| plan of campaign.
IL regard to Gambetta and Freycinet he says
| France had to pay dearly for their energetic
| but diletsante system Of operations. With rare
strength OF will Gambetta. understood how to
| arm the population, but not how to direct it
against the superior leadership OF the Germans
| He prolonged the struggle at the price Of q
great sacrifice on both Sides"
Count Won Moltke excuses the delay in bonn.
| harding Paris on the ground that it was useless
unless he had command Of all the railways and
waterways to bring up his armies. 1t was also
too risky to attempt to enter Paris at the heels
Of the enemy, which course might have re-
| suited in o repulse.
Count Won Moitke discusses the pros and
cons Of all the difficult situations as he pro-
ceeds. In one place he remarks that theoreti-
cally pursuits should follow directly upon
| victory, but that in practice that course is
hardly ever possible with q fatigued army.
Taken "a q whole, the work IL the most mas
terly precis OF q campaign extant The APP
pendix gives q memorandum Of the councils Of
war held during the campaigns Of 1866 and
1870. much Of which has been published be.
fore.