New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-03-29

spendidly Rome was able to put in the field
against him finally no less than 225,000 troops
For years he was hemmed in by four or five armies
at once. For years his own force did not exceed
35, 900 troops Of all arms. The famous Numidlan
horse, his great strength in which did him so
much service in his earlier engagements. had long
since disappeared or been reduced to mere
nothing The Romans on their part had developed
the cavalry greatly. and during the Iatter
years of the invasion were as strong in this force
as Hannibal had been at the outset. But the
Romans never made the use Of their cavalry that
Hannibal had done. The reason was that they
had not the genius. And even after Marcelus
and Nero had shown that it possible TO in
flict defeats upon the rcdoubtablc CarthaGinian-
even when the phaanx was no longer capable of
facing the legion-all shrank from attacking Han
nibal. The dread and anxiety he inspired in his
foes were not however, due solely 10 his fighting
power, though that great; it was his almost
miraculous craft his subtlcty. which his opponents
feared. They never could predict his movements.
They never could even be sure of his position
unless he directly in view. NO man made
such swift and secret marches. No man concealed
his movements so successfully, while spying out
every step OF his adversary. He was full, too OF
cunning devices. He laid traps and ambuscades,
and they Were always successful. The Romans
toward the end learned some of his methods, and
once at least. retaliated them upon him; but they
were slow in appropratng these practices and
clumsy in applying them.
In one point alone does HannibaIs science APP
pear to be at all defective, and that is in the matter
of sieges. Here he seems 10 have recognized an
uncongenial element at all events his want of sue
cess in such operations is so marked and constant
as TO challenge attention In the attempt to re-
Enva hn signal discontinue
1t is true that the odds were enormously against
him. but it was not common with him to accept
defeat. This time he recognized the futilitv Of all
direct efforts to relieve Capna, and for once took
very audacious course though the event proved
that he had already taught Rome TOO much for
his ruSe TO be successful He marched straight
upon Rome. hoping that this movement would
compel one of the beeaguering armies TO raise the
siege and follow him. But the consuls were by
this time educated to an appreciation of his tao
tics and they knew that Rome was strong enough
to defend herself They did not move from be-
fore Capua, cOntcnting themselves with sending
small corps of observation after him. He raidcd
to within three miles of the gates of Rome, re-
fused battle to the city forces. and seeing that
his attempt had failed, withdrew. and left Capua
to her fate This, however was when things were
manifestly drawing toward the end when Han
when it was as much as he could do to subsist his
weakened army and so move it as to avoid being
hemmed in and starved into surrender. Even then
the spirit he impaired to his leves kept them
faithful to his standards. if it could give them
the efficiency of his wornout veterans and though
they were unequal to the Romans they showed
courage and constancy on the field such as no
other commander could have evolved from so poor
material.
When Hasdrubal set ont on his march through
Gaul to join his great brother in Italy, Hannibal
was fairly beaten to st2ndstiu. He had lost
southern Italy. All the towns he had taken in
earlier campaigns had been wrcsted from him. His
allies had deserted him, foreseeing the failure Of
his enterprise. Rome, however, still feared him.
and looked forward with strong apprehension
to the arrival of Hasdrubal. whose ability
greatly overrated. He seems TO have committed
every possible blunder. His whole scheme was
several years too late Had he come after Cannae
his presence might have turned the scale. Now
the opportunity had passed. The capture Of his
dispatches to Hannibal only FASTENED the catas
trophe. But for that lie would have made some
further advance bat with so able man as Nero
on the watch he must have met his fate, if not
on the Metaurus then at some other point, for
| he could not have COPIED with Nero anywhere
| and Hannibal could hardly have ventured to meet
him. The disaster of the Metaurus finished Han
| nibals campaigns in Italy. Thcnceforward escape
| from the country was his sole recourse: and when
Carthage. driven t. the wall, recalled him home,
he showed his genius more in carrying his
| army safely 10 Africa in the teeth Of ovcrwhelm-
| ing Roman forces. both and land. But il was
| still too late. There time. in the face Of
! ScipiOs aggressive warfare. to rcorganiZe the
| Cartbagnan forces and the fatal field Of Zana
| ;l,.l. ,1h
try together. The great captain lived nineteen
years longer and is said (but upon doubtful au-
thority) to have killed himself finally TO escape
threatened surrender to the Romans He fought
no battles after Zama. but by his councils helped
| Carthage while it was possible TO do 50.
| Colonel Dodge has carefully considered the
| Roman charges against Hannibal. namely, those
Of cruelty, avarice and Pune faith He is
enabled 10 demonstrate conclusively that these
| charges are without substantial foundation, and
TO prove that the Carthagmian was really more
humane than his accusers; that he was lavish in
his expenditures for the cause Of his country,
and that his "Pun!ca Eide" was neither more nor
less than superior military science. An interest.
ing comparison between Hannibal and Alexander
follows and excepting in the matter of sicgcs,
the author holds the Carthaginian as superior
TO the Macedonian. His final estimate may be
quoted
Hannibal exceled as n tactician No battle in
history is finer sample of tactics than Cannac
But he was yet greater in logstics and strategy.
No captain ever marched TO and fro among 50
many armies of troops superior 10 his own in
numbers and material as fearlessly and skilfully
as he No nan ever held his own so long or so
ably against such odds. Constantly over-matchcd
by better soldiers led by generals always respect
able often of great ability, he yet delied all their
efforts to drive him out of Italy for half genera
ton Not even Frederick was Outwe2hed as was
Hannibal for though Frcdericks army was
| smaller, it was better than that Of any Of the
allies As soldier, jim the countenancc he
presented TO the stoutest Of foes and in the con-
stancy he exhibited under the bittcres adversely,
| Hannibal stands alone and unenualled. AS n