New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-07-19

Mcdowell erred in not bringing forward TO the attack
his entire force OF 81 900 instead Of leaving Is,
600 In reserve too far from the field and strung along
the road back far rs the Potomac almost And be
SIDES these $4,000, Washington swarmed with other
troops Hindsight Is always good ii is now easy to
point out how the campaign should have been conducted
and to find fault. The foregoing. however. are the
commonly accepted facts concerning this battle. and
are sustained by the records, and warranted in
citing them. We know that the Union army was dis
astrously defeated whereas success expected by
Its commanders and by the Government; victory was
entirely probable If the dispositions were properly car
rled out and may say defeat was actually feared by
Beauregsrd
In the life of Lincoln BY Nicolay and Hay the
authors say:
"The Administration was responsible for the for
ward movement, Scott for the combined strategy Of the
two armies Mcdowell for the conduct Of the Bull Run
battle, Patterson for the escape Of Johnston and Fate
for the panic.'
General William T. Sherman said Of Bull Run
1t was the best planned and worst fought battle Of
the war Both armies were fairy defeated
And General Joseph E. Johnston had this to say ::
4" II the tactics Of the Federals had been edunl to
their strategy we should have been defeated
Horace Greeley cannot therefore. be held account
able for the msmanagement previous to the battle.
which caused the delays for the bad generalship
on the field. lie simply responsible for the
premature advance and will now proceed tO show
that 1t was not premature In so far the chances.
the probabilities and relative forces of the two bel
ngerents were concerned Evidence that General
Scott himself really did not consider that IL pre-
mnturely made is found in his previous faith in
entire success. Referring TO McDowels crossing Of
Bull Run, he telegraphed the 2ls 10 General Nc
Clellan in West Virginia In two hours he NC
DOwelp viii turn the Manassas Junction and storm II
to-day with superior fOrce' See Vol . War Records
Clearly, General Scott expected that the rebel army
would be defeated and Manassas Junction Carried not
withstandng the "unprepared7 condition in which
Mcdowell marched. And the old general utterly re-
fused 20 give credence to the first rumors Of Nc
Dowells defeat. In fact, the entire Government was
perfectly sangulne Of success
The result absolutely paralyzlng as may we'll be
conceived. Horace Greeley struck dumb at the
magnitude OF the catastrophe He Immediately
made the scapegoat Of every shortcoming every mis-
take and upon his devoted head everybody OF promir
hence. except Lincoln, shifted all responsibility. He
insuted jeered at by his editorial opponents
and his on TO Richmond made. and has ever
since been. phrase OF contempt and reproach. It
was alleged 10 have been the fatal Of all that
happened on that black Sunday War historians TO
this day take that view Of it, and speak Of it with
contumely and sneers. General Fry saws
"On to Richmond was the cry public sentiment was
irresistible and in response 10 it the army advanced
William SwtntOn remarks:
"PeOpc and rulers swelled the shout Of Onward
to Richmond and beset the leaders OF the
Union troops for forward movement. until the latter
against their better iud gment and with plentiful pro
tests Of the necessities Of further preparation. sent
their army into the world literally before its time and
half made up to seek its fortunes on the battle
field
In a perfect rage Of chagrin and disappointment,
old General scott said in Mr.. Lincolns presence
q" I have tonight this battle against my Judgment.
deserve removal because did not stand mp when the
army not in condition for fighting and resist it to
the last7
IN how much better condition, pray, were the rebels
for fighting?
Edwin NJ. Stanton. July &c. 1861, wrote from
Washington 10 James Buchanan:
The dreadful disaster of sunday can scarcely be
mentioned. The mbecty of this Administration
eliminated in that catastrophe. . While Lin
coin, Scott and the Cabinet disputing who is to
blame, the city is unguarded and the enemy at hand >
1t must be remembered that Stanton was a Demo
craft and the foregoing written before he became
secretary Of War in Mr. Lincolns Cabinet. Others
not less prominent took similar tone. IN truth
things must have had a blue appearance around Wash
ington for the first few days after Bull Run. Mr.
Greeley himself shocked by the defeat and doubtless
greatly agtated by the malignant storm Of reprOaches
aimed at him from all quarters by the military and his
political enemies TO have been cOwed into the
temporary belief that he had committd unparion-
able sin. In letter dated July 30. eight days after
the battle he used the following despairng language
This is my seventh sleepless night-yours, too
doubtless Can the rebels be beaten after
all that has occurred and in view Of the actual state Of
feeling caused by our late awful disasterl
And they cannot be beaenf our recent disaster is
faal-do not fear to sacrifice yourself 10 your coun
try. II the rebels not TO be beaten,
then every drop Of blood henceforth shed in this quar-
rel will be wanonly. wickedly she'd and the guilt will
-
pray you to decide quickly, and let me know nv
duty"
Mr.. Lincoln. although greatly cast down, about
the only public man who preserved his balance and
cused nobody. He Immediately began 10 take
urcs for repairing the disaster.
The object Of this paper by showing the facts and
conditions Of affairs they existed at the time he be-
gan what was sneeringly characterized the onto
Richmond crusade and during the progress Of the
military campaign up TO and including the battle Of
Bull Run. the relative forces Of the cOmbatants month
previous well at the time Of the battle, Is 10 vim
dictate the memory and Judgment Of Horace Greeley.
He was undoubtedly right. and thOss who did then
do condemn him for inspiring what they term an
Npreparcd or premature advance on Richmond are
entirely wrong and totally msapprehend their
The boodshed and the corpses on the field Of bat
tie unnamed The Tribune philosopher his contro-
versia aggressveness left him entirely, and he bowed
INTERESTINGLY the storm Of obloquy raised BY Nc
DOwell's failure. In camer moments, and after the
real situation and facts connected with the battle be-
gan % appear he resumed his original views. In
his newspaper he pointed out many Of the ShOrtcOm-
ings of the military leaders. In the American
Conflict a history which he published Immediately
after the war he saws the causes the loss Of the bat
tie were that spirit Of hesitation Of indecisOn. VI
calculated DELAY, stOlid obstruction. which Guided
our military counses. scattered forces and par
alvzed our efforts second. the fragrant disObedience
and detection Of General Patterson third, the fail
IRE Of General scott 10 send forward a sufficient
force"-therc were 10000 idle troops in Washington.
Mr. Greeley further that week after the Occu
patton of Alexandria and Arlington, viz, Nav "a.
Union army Of 10000 men should have advanced
toward Richmond. lis editorials In favor Of an early
offensive campaign against Richmond Were based on
the sound belief that the Government had at hand
ample resources In and material for successful
movement 49,
The inside history OF the period which IS now with
I'm reach Of all makes it perfectly clear not only that
his Judgment in favor 81 advance early In June was
correct but that victory was easily within reach OF
weeks later. if our forces had been iudciOusy con
ceutrated at the point Of contact which was on the
Richmond line. II Furthermore appears That the
chances Of much better In June than
in July because the relative strength Of the opposing
forces was then much more favorable 10 the Union