The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-08-25
The Great Won Moltke's Opinion Of
French Leaders in the
War Of 1870.
His Plan OF Campaign Included the
Capture OF the French
Capital
Oplnisn of Gambstta, With Comment ON
Military Leaders In Rspublics-A
Truce In Chilli.

LONDON, Aug. 24.-The Times publisher a
six. column review containing coDious sx-
stracts from Count Won Moltke'a history of
the war of 1901. In one OF these extracts
Won Moltke describes his plan of cam
paign in the Franco Prussian war, and says
that as he submitted it to the king and it
was accepted. it had its purpose fixed from
tho very first upon the capture of the enc
my's capital, the possession of which is of
more importance to Franco than anything
else. On his way thither the hostile forces
were to be driven psrsistently back from
the fertile southern states into the mar
rover track ON the north. In speak
ing of the generalship OF his adyer-
saries. particularly of Marshal Bazains
and the fortress of Metz, Won Moltke writes
that the whole affair of August 26 can only
be regarded in the light Of parade man
oeuvre. From outside information as to
the voice of the people in Paris it would ap-
pear that Razaine was influenced not only
from military but from political considers
tlons. or a serious blunder of his adver-
saries Won Moltke says: .m
In war the probabilities are alone often
to be reckoned with possibilities. as the
rule is that the enemy will do the right
thing. 1t could not be thought possible
that the French army would leave Paris un-
protected and march by the Belgian from
tier to Metz. Such a move seems strange
and somewhat foolhardv. Still it was
possible, and the chief of staff, recognizing
this fact, worked out scheme of marches
that same day by which three corps of the
army of Mouse, together with two Bavavian
corps, could be brought together in the
uin <f nAnvAl lara this rjrht hark of
the MeuBe within three days.
His opinion OF Gambet!a is ag follows:
Such forces rs the French mustered, ami
mated by the spirit of enthusiastio patriot
ism, would offer protracted resistance if n
strong will put them into motion. Such a
will was found in the person of Gambetta;
and according to the system obtaining
in France, he, as war minister, was in
trusted with the conduct of the operation
and he certainly dared not let the command
public, victorious general at the head of
the army would become dictator in his
stead. Under him WAS another civilian.
De Freyonet, who acted as a sort of chief
Of general staff. +"
France had to pay dearly for their ener-
Retic but dilettante system Of conducting
operations. With rare strength of will and
inmovable fixture of purpose GAmbettn un-
derstood how to arm the whole population
of the country, but not how to direct the
masses thus formed according to one uni
foIm plan, without giving them time
to be converted into troops fit for the
field. Before they had been properly
equipped he hurled thsm, without regard
to consequence and without any general
plan. against the enemy, before whose su-
perior leadership all their bravery and de-
votion were of no avail. He prolonged the
struggle at ths price of great sacrifice to
both sides, without in any way turning tho
tide of fortune in favor of France.