Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-11-15

Ii was TINS opposition, led by men Of such
sonsummate ability as Wade. Of Ohio, and
Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, that
edmonished Lincoln of the necessity of put
ting himself in the strongest possible atti.
tude for the then admittedly doubtful bat
tle OF '6A The opening of the new year of
'64 called for large drafts of men to fill the
thinned ranks of the Union forces, and there
was powerful undertow of despondency
among the loyal people of the North. The
war was costing S., ,O0O, 600 a. day, and after
years of bloody conflict the end was not in
view. The Republican leaders were di-
vided in councils, and very many of the
sblest of them regarded the defeat of the
party es more than probable. The one man
who fully understood the peril and studied
carefully how to avert it was Abraham
Lincoln.
He Relied on War Democrats.
Lincoln, as was his usual custom, con-
suited with all who came within his reach
and developed his views from time to time
with extreme caution. In the early part of
the year he reached the conclusion that it
would be emiuently wise to nominate q
conspicuous war Democrat for Vice
President along with himsely for President.
a number of prominent men who acted with
the Democratic party in 1860 against
Lincoln's election, but who patriotically
distinction By their heroism. represented
very large class of Democratic voters upon
whom Lincoln felt he must relv for his
reelection. Hamlin had been Democrat,
but he did not come under the class OF war
Democrats; while Butler, Dix, Dickinson,
johnson, Holt and others represented
distinctive and very formidable class of
citizens who, while vet protesting to be
Democrats, were ready to support the war
updar Tiocoln rDti1 II Sbould he succesSfully
terminated by the restoration of the Union.
Lincoln's first selection for Vice Presi-
dent was General Butler. l believe he
reach,3 that conclusion without specially
consulting with any of his friends. As
early as March, 1864, be sent for General
Cameron, to whom he proposed the nomina-
tion of Butler, and that, i assume, was his
first declaration of his purpose to anyone
on the subject. He confded to Cameron
the mission to Fortress Monroe to confer
confdentiallv with Butler. On that jour
nev Cameron was accompanied by ex-Con-
gressman William II. Armstrong, of Penn
sylvaaia, who was first informed of the real
object of Cameron's visit when they were
returning home, and after Butler had de-
clined to permit his name to be considered.
General Butler Declined PeremptoriIy.
Butler was at that time a strong man
in the loval States. He had not achieved
great military success, but his adm :nistra-
ton in New Orleans had made him univer-
sally popular throughout the North, in
which the vindictive vituperation of the
Southern people heaped upon him was an
important factor. Buffers declination was
peremptory, and Cameron returned home
without learning in what direction Lincoln
would be likely to look for q candidate for
Vice President.
In later conference with Cameron, in
which the names of johnson, Dickinson
and DIX were seriously discussed. Lincoln
expressed his preference for johnson, to
which Cameron, with unconcealed reluct-
ance, finally assented. While Lincoln at
that time decided in favor of johnson he did
rot himself regard it as final His extreme
caution AID exceptional sagacity made him
carefully consider all possible weak points
IN johnson : candidacy before he launched
the movement for his nomination. He
summoned General Sickfes to Washington,
sent him to Tennessee on a confidential
mission to examine and make report to
him of the success Of Johnson's administra-
tion as Military Governor That State was
in q revolutionary condition; johnson was
charged with violent and despotic official
acts, and Lincoln meant to know fully
whether johnson might, by reason of his
administration, be vulnerable as a national
candidate. Sickles had no knowledge of
the real purpose of his mission. The ques-
tion of nominating johnson for the Vice
Presidency was never suggested or even in
iimated to Sickles, and he fulfilled his trust
and reported favorably on Johnson's ad-
ninistration without even a suspicion that
he was TO determine the destiny of Andrew
johnson. make him Vice President of the
United States, and thus President
Counting on Insurgent States.
Lincoln's purpose in seeking johnson as
his associate on the national ticket in "a
was much more far reaching than any but
himself at the time supposed. He meant to
guard against possible defeat by getting q
number Of the insurgent States in some sort
Of line to enable their Electoral votes to be
counted If needed. His most promising ex-
pertinent was in Tennessee under the guild |
ance OF johnson, but he obviously intended
that the States OF Louisiana, Arkansas and
West Virginia, with Tennessee, should be
organized with the semblance of full State
hood to make their Electoral votes available
saoEl the national contest be close. Had
he developed this policy to his party or to
Congress it would have been met with posi-
tive and aggressive opposition, but he de-
veloped i in the quietest way possible.
Ills first movement in that line was to
have delegations elected to the National
Convention from the Southern States
named, and when they appeared at the Bal
timore Convention on the 9Th of June the
battle for their admission was led with con-
EUmmaIe skill by the few who understood
Lincoln's policy. Tennessee being in the |
strongest attitude, the delegation from that
State was selected on which to make the
fight. Il was desperately contested because
IL was then well understood to mean the |
nomination Of johnson for Vice President,
but the Tennessee delegates were admitted
by more than q two-thirds vote. With
Tennessee accepted as entitled to represen-
tation, the contest was ended and Louis
lana and Arkansas were given the right of
representation without serious struggle.
Didn't Need Their Votes.
When Congress met again after the cleo
ton il November. and when Lincoln's cleo |
tion BY an overwhelmingly popular as well as |
Electoral vote was assured, the question of |
counting the electoral votes of Louisiana, |
Tennessee ard Arkansas was raised and |
elabOrately discusses in both branches As |
Lincoln had 212 Electoral votes to p for |
Mcclellan, exclusive OF the votes of the |
three insurgent States referred to, there |
was no political necessity to induce Con- |
gress to strain point Tor the acceptance of |
these votes; and joint resolution was |
finally passed declaring that no valid cleo |
tion for Electors of President and Vice |
President of the United States" had been |
held in Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas. |
Lincoln approved the resolution, but took |
occasion by special message to disclalm ap- |
proyal OF The recital of The preamble. Had /
the votes Of these three States been needed 4
20 elect a Republican President. hazard |
little in saying that they would have been |
treated as regular and lawful and counted |
with the approval of both the Senate and |