The Newtown bee., 1891-04-10

above quoted In State VS. Kinkhead, 81 Conn L
49, the defendant was prosecuted under sec-l
ton 1882 OF the general statutes, which for
bids any person licensed to sell liquor to sal
low any minor to loiter on the premises
where such liquors were kept for sale, I" for al
lowing one Dennis Murphy, a minor, to loitel
on the premises where he was licensed to sci
liquor. 1t was confessed that Murphy ha6
been allowed to be in the room where the
liquors were sold. The accused asked thel
court to charge the jury that, if they should
find that the accused honestly believed Muir
ply to be a person over 81 years of age and
had good ground for so believing and acted
on that belief in allowing him to be in his
bar room, he should not be convicted of the
crime charged, though in fact Murphy a
minor. The court declined to give that in
struction, but said to the jury that, if Murphy
was under q years OF age, whatever the be-
liet of the accused was, he was still guilty.
This instruction sustained. In Barnes VS.
the State, ID Conn.,. $685. a like question was
decided in the same way. Barnes was pros
ecuted for selling spirituous liquors to one
Whitney, who was common drunkard. 1t
was held that evidence tending to show that
Barnes did not know Whitney to be a com
mon drunkard was not relevant. Similar de-
cisions have been made in other States. Com
monwealth VS. Emmons, 9S Mass, 6, was a
prosecution under statute which provided
who admits a minor thereto without the writ
ten consent of his parent or guardian shall
that, at the time of the alleged offence, the
supposed minor was almost 90 years old, was
fully grown and did business Independent OF
his parents and the defendant offered evil
dence to show that, when the alleged minor
came to his room, he, the defendant asked
him whether or not he minor, saying
that, if he was, he must not enter and that he
replied that he was of full age. This evidence
was excluded. Exceptions being taken to
the ruling, the Supreme court said 'The evil
dence excluded was immaterial. 1t did not
tend to prove or disprove any essential fact 1t
did not show or have any tendency to show,
either that the alleged minor was of age or
that the defendant did not admit him to the
billiard room kept by him nor was it materi-
al to show that the defendant did not know or
have reason to believe that the alleged minor
was under age. The prohibition of the statute
is absolute. The defendant admitted him to
the room at his peril and is liable to the pen
atty, whether he knew him to be a minor or
not. The offence is of that class where knowl-
gredient in its commission and need not be
proved" Commonwealth VS. BoyntOn, Allen,
$50, was prosecution for selling Intoxicating
liquors in violation of the statute.The defend
and did not believe the liquor he sold to be
Intoxicating. This evidence was rejected. The
court said: at the defendant purpOSely sold
the liquor, which was in fact Intoxicating, he
was bound at his peril to ascertain the nature
prohibited without reference to the intent or
purpose and the party committing it was un-
der no obligation to act in the premises un-
less he knew he could do so lawfully, il he vi
olates the law he incurs the penalty. The
statutory rule that every man is cOnclusiVely
presumed to know the law is sometimes pro
ductlve of hardship in particular cases and
the hardship is no greater when the law i'm
monwealth vs. Farren, Allen ,489 and in Com
monwealth VS. Waite IL Allen, 264, the defennd-
ant in each case was prosecuted for selling
on the ground that he did
not know the milk to be adulterated. 1t was
held in each case that the defendant was, I'M
der the law, guilty; See also Commonwealth
VS. Elwell, > Metcalf 100; Commonwealth VS.
Marsh i'd, 472; Commonwealth VS. Raymond
81 Mass, 500; Commonwealth VS. Wentworth,
1lS i'd, AL. In the case of Commonwealth vs.
Marsh, above cited, Judge Shaw in reply to a
suggestion that, where there is no criminal in
tent, there can be no guilt, said "The prop
OsitiOn stated is undoubtedly correct in a
general sense, but the conclusion drawn from
ever one voluntarily does, he of course in
tends to do. 1.-THE statute has made it Grimm
al to do act under particular ciIcumstan-
ces, the party voluntarily doing that act is
chargcaDle with the criminal intent to do that
act" commonwealth VS. Gray, $50 Mass, 1921.
The same doctrine has been approved and fol
lowed in Rhode Island, in State VS. Smith, 10
Rhode Island, 25S; in Wisconsin,, in State VS.
Hutel "A Wis., 60. In Kentucky, in Ulrich VS.
Commonwealth, Bush 400. Other cases to
the same effect are cited i'll the briefs. The
argument of the defendant is that there can
be no crime without a criminal intent; that
a man cannot be punished as a criminal un-
less his intent is criminal. The argument is
speciOus, but not sound "There is Occa-
sion to impute to the Legislature an intention
to make an act a crime irrespective of the in
tent, for it is competent tor the Legis stature
to imply the intent by making these circum-
stances equivalent thereto. knowingly and
intentionally to break Statute must, think,
from judicial point of view, always be NOR
rally wrong in the absence OF special circun-
stances applicable to the particular instanc G
and excusing the breach OF the law, as, tor in
stance If II municipal regulation be broken to
save lite put out Il fire. But to make it NOR
ally right, some such special matter of excuse
must exist, inSOmuch as the administration
of Justice and, indeed, the foundations of civ
il society rest upon the principle that ODE
dience to the law, whether it be a law APP
proved OF or disprOved OF by the individual,
is the first duty of q citizen. Although prima
facie and, as general rule, there must be a
mind at fault before there can be a crime it
is not an infleXible rule and a statute may
relate to such subject matter and may be so
framed as to make an act criminal whether
there has been any intention to break the law
or otherwise to do wrong or not" The Queen
Tolson, % . B. Div, l72. There is a large
class of criminal statutes, of which the one
now under consideration, as well as those
heretofore referred to, are examples, which
are properly construed as imposing penalty
when the thing is done, no matter how limo
Gently; and, in such case, the substance OF
the statute is that man shall take care that
the statutory direction shall be observed and
that if he fails to do so, he acts at his peril
rection is observed evidences the criminal
intent, or rather supplies it. The Queen VS.
TOlson, supra; The Queen VS. Prince, l.. X. :
c. c., l54
There is no error in the judgment appeal.
ed from. In this opinion the other judges
cOncurred.