The Telegraph-courier. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1888-1946, 1891-06-04
IT'S A DRY" DECISION.
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES LAW MUST
STAND.

Congress in Favor OF the Proh bitOry
States-Interesting Discussion of the
Relative Powers pfthe State ana Federal
Lawmaking Eodies.
The United States Supreme Court has
decided that the original package law
passed by the last Congress was valid
Ind constitutional, and that it went into
effect in all States where prohibitory
avs prevailed without re-enactment by
The States of the laws by which they
forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors
within their boundaries. whether i'm
ported from other States or not. Chief
Justice Fuller rendered the opinion of
The court, and the bench was united in
support of the conclusions at which he
arrived, though Justice Gray announced
that Justices Harlan, Brewer and him
self did not concur in all the reasoning
Of the opinion of the court.
The case upon which the decision was
rendered was that of John M. Wilker~
son, Sheriff of Shawnee County, Kansas,
vs. Charles A. Rahrer, brought here on
appeal from the decision of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the dis
trict of Kansas, against the State.
Rahrer was the original package agent
at Topeka, Kan, of the firm of May
nard, Hopkins & Co. of Kansas City,
Mo. and was arrested the day after the
original package law went into effect.
He claimed that the law was unconstitu-
tional and also that it could not go into
operation until the State had re-enacted
its prohibitory laws.
The court says the power of the State
to impose restraints and burdens upon
persons and property in the promoti On
of the public health. good order and
prosperity is power always belonging
to the States, not surrendered to them
by the General Government, nor directly
restrained by the Constitution of the
United States, and essentially exclusive.
The power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States
when the subjects are national in their
nature, the court says, is also exclusive.
The Constitution does not provide that
interstate commerce shall be free, but
by the grant Of this exclusive power to
regulate it it was left free except as
Congress might undertake to regulate
it. Therefore, it has been determined
in Robbins VS.. Shelby Taxing District
that the failure of Congress to exercise
this exclusive power in any case is an
expression of it's will that the subject
shall be free from restrictions or impos;-
tions upon it by the several States, and
if State law comes in conflict with the
will of Congress the State and Congress
cannot occupy the position of equal OPP
posing sovereignties because the Consti<
tuition declares it's supremacy and that
of laws passed in pursuance thereof.
The court says that intoxicating
liquors are undoubtedly subjects of com
merce, like any other commodity, and
are so recognized, but nevertheless it
has been often held that laws prohibit
ing the manufacture and sale of liquor
within State limits do not necessarily
infringe any constitutional privilege or
immunity, this right being vested, as in
the Mugler case upon the acknowledged
right of the States to control their
purely internal affairs, if in SO doing they
protect the health, morals, and safety
of their people by regulations that do
not interfere with the powers of the
General Government
The present case arises upon the
theory of repugnance between the State
law and interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution, and involves distinc-
tion between the commercial power and
the police power which, though quite
distinguiShable when they do not ap-
proach each other, are sometimes, like
the cOlors, so nearly allied as to perplex
the understanding as the cOlOrs do the
vision.
The court says the Iowa laws held to
be unconstitutional in the Leisy original
package case were enacted in the eXer-
else of the States police power and not
at all as regulations of interstate com"
merce, but as it amounted in effect to a
regulation of such commerce. it was held
that SO long as Congress did not pass
any law to regulate specifically the
traffic between the States in intoxicating
liquors, or act in such way as to allow
State laws to operate upon 1T, Congress
thereby indicated it's will that such COM
merce should be free and untrammeled,
and therefore that the laws of Iowa were
imperative so far "a they amounted
to regulations of foreign or interstate
commerce in inhibiting the reception OF
such articles within the State, or their
sale upon arrival in the form in which
imported. 1t followed as corollary
that, when Congress acted at all, the re-
suit of it's action must be to operate as a
restraint upon that perfect freedom
which it's silence insured. Congress has
now spoken, and declared that imported
liquors shall upon arrival in a State fall
within the category of domestic articles
of similar nature.
Continuing, the Court says
The laws OF Congress did not use terms OF
permission to the State to act, but simply
removed an impeachment to the enforcement
of the State laws in respect to imported
packages in their original condition, created
by the absence of specific utterance or
its part 1t impaired no power to the State
not then possessed, but allowed imported
property to fall at once, upon arrival, within
the local jurisdiction.
The liquor arrived in Kansas prior to the
passage of the act of Congress, but there ii
no question presented of the right of the
importer to withdraw the property from
the State, nor is it perceived that the
Congressional enactment is given ret
respective operation by holding it ap"
plicable to transaction occurring after
it took effect. 1t is not the case OF law
enacted in the unauthorized exercise OF
power exclusively confded to Congress, bu1
of a law which it was competent Tor the
State to pass but which could not operate
upon articles occupying certain SITUATION
until the passage of the act of Congress
That act removes the obstacle, and no ade'
ouate ground is perceived for holding that
a re-enactment of the State law was D.