Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1891-08-24
NOLTKE'S STORY.
nc OWN VIEWS ON rHE FRANuaPRUSSIlN
WAR.
4 Tremendous Struggle Rsviswsd-ss Thinks That
p,li6c, R,asons Influenced Bazlins-Hs
Blams Himself for Delaying tho At
tack on the French Lines at Gravel
oits Until Late in the Day.

LONDON, August 23.-The Things pub
isbes long extracts from Count Won
Moltke's history Of the war of 1870.
Count Won Moltke left the manuscript
ready for the press, which is, therefore,
published before his other pOsthumOus
works. although it is numbered volume
III. The preface, signed by Count Won
Moltke's nephew, explains the origin OF
the work, adding that his uncle began
10 writeuit in the spring q 1877, and
worked on il three hours a day at
Creisau. The Count returned TO Berlin
IN the autumn OF 1877 and finished the
work in January, 1855, after which
time heneYer referred 70 II.
He intended it as popular account
but invOluntarily arranged the details
I'm accordance with his own plan OF
campaign. Thus the work becomes an
expression OF his opinion OF the events
of the war. The book is written IN
Won M0itke's clear, terse and pure style.
There are no foreign or Germanlzed
words in It, and 1t is certain 20 take the
foremost rank in the classic literature
of the century. The work Is further
characteristic of the authors mOdeSty,
his own name being mentioned only
twice-Once as an officer OF the King
deputed to treat for the surrender at
Sedan, and again as the writer OF let
ter informing the Governor or Paris OF
the defeat OF Aurelle and the occupa-
ton Of Orleans.
Elsewhere ne is always simply 'Chlei
of staff" Seekers Of new things VIII
find little to crafty them. The writer
closely follows the general stat account,
which was largely the work OF his own
hands.
In the introduction the writer re-
marks: warfare is no longer queS-
tiop of small professional army. Wars
at the present day involve whole ma
tions There is hardly a family that
does not suffer. The cOuntry'S whole
resources are involved, and winter offers
no cessation Of hOStilitieS."
He expresses the hope that war, al
though Inevitable, will, in the interest
of humanity, become the more rare as IL
becomes the more terrible, Proceeding,
he states: st is no longer the ambition
of monarchs that endangers peace, but
the passions and diSsatistactiOns OF peo-
ples and the strife Of parties. Even the
bourse's influence is enough to precipi-
tate war TO protect their interests. II
follows that parliaments declare war,
the responsibility being more easily car
ried by an assembly than by an indivld-
nal. Thus the weak government at the
head of our neighboring State must be
regarded as a standing menace to
peace"
He then explains that the war Of 1870
arose from the weakness Of Napoleon
and the jealousy Of the French nations
al the success Of the Prussian armies.
France. he says, demanded revenge for
Sadowa. The writer dwellS on the Sys-
tematic organization of the German
forces as contrasted with the French
want of preparation, faultineSS and
yaqueness Of the French plans OF mobil-
ization md their worst plans OF opera
Of concentrau66 pointed rather TO a
defensive than an offensive attitude.
Count Won Noltke's plan was 70 cap
ture the capital as more important in
France than in other countries. In
pursuit Of this plan he aimed to drive
the French forces with perSiStency back
from the fertile south into the narrower
tract north, but, he says, 10 is a delusion
10 suppose that the lOng-laid plans can
be carried out in detail. The first cOli-
sion upSetS them. All that a leader Of
an army can do is 10 decide what is best
for an unknown period and carry out
his purpose unflinchingly.
I'm regard 10 Bazaine's conduct on
August rs, Won MOltke says he IS
tempted TO fancy that political reasons
alone induced Bazaine thus early in the
game TO attach himself to Metz. Re-
garding the attack on the French be-
tween GravelOtte and st. Privat, Won
MOtke blames himself for delaying the
attack until late in the day. He notes
that the siege of Metz formed no part of
the original plan of campaign.
In regard 20 Gambetta and De Frey
cinet he says: France had TO pay
dearly for their energetic but dilettante
system of operations. With rare
strength Of will Gambetta understood
how to arm the population, but not
how TO direct it against the superior
leadership of the Germans He pro-
longed the struggle at the price Of
great sacrifice on both sides"
Count Won Moltke excuses the delay
i'm bOmbarding Paris on the ground that
IL was useless, unless he had command
of all the railways and waterways to
bring up his armies. IL was also too
risky to attempt to enter Paris at the
heels of the enemy, which course might
have resulted i'm a repulSe.
Count Won Moltke discusses the pros
and cons of all the difficult situations
as he proceeds. In one place he remarks
that theoretically pursuit should follow
directly upon victory, but that In prac-
tice that course is hardly ever possible
with fatigued army.
Taken as a whole the work is the
most mastery precis OF campaign ex-
tant. The appendix gives a memoran-
dun OF the councils Of war held during
the campaign of 1866 and 1870, much of
which has been published before.
ARNFSVTLLE.