The morning call., 1891-11-07
THE DISTURBANCE IN BRAZIL.

Our advices from Brazil come mainly
from irresponsible cores Pc Bdents, and are
not entitled to Implicit confidence. 1t is
difficult to feel sure what is happening in
that distant country. a correspondent
may eXaggeTate or misstate facts without
much risk of detection, and his readers may
thus be led 70 form utterly inaccurate views
Of passing events. 1t is quite impossible TO
determine on The evidence that Is before Us
whether a counter revolution has set in.
with a drift toward a military despotism, or
whether the disturbance is merely one of
tie acc dents which naturally mark the in
;.uEuratIon Of new system of authority.
When the Imperial Government of Dom
Pedro was 0verthrown, just two years ago,
Brazjiians confded supreme power TO Gen
eral Deodoro da Fonseca. He came OF a
distinguished family. OHe of his relatives
had filed high office in the early part Of the
century; another had been distinguished
soldier and Minister of War. DeOd0ro him
self had not only won renown on the field
OF battle. but had attracted attention as far
back As 1881 by the avowal Of decided re-
publican opinions. When the republic was
declared all eyes naturally turned to him,
and his first acts as provisional President
eyinced so much energy and isdom that
A4it RblAArl NGOACc SStlIcu 10 NC IlSllHpu.
No ruler perhaps had a more difficult
task set before him than that which Fon-
SEGA undertook when he accepted the Presi-
dency under the new regime. Discomfort
prevailed throughout the new republic
Brazilans In the south only agreed with
Brazilians in the north on the single propo-
siti0B that the republic should be divided.
he decree of immediate emancipation,
issued by Crown Princess Isabel in Nav,
1883, had exasperated the planters, who
were already in ill-tempeT in consequence
Of repeated failures of the coffee crop. Tn
der the auspices OF Prime Minister PretO a
policy Of financial kite-iying had been in
augurated, and II was charged that a band
OF Spectators, of whom q large number
were foreigners, were bleeding the country
at every pore. Finally between the army
and the rabble chronic hostility prevailed.
In order TO keep the peace, tile troops had
to be quartered in distant provinces and
they chafed at their exile. Ii was these els-
meBts with which the President, Fonseca,
lad TO deal when he assumed the position
If Chief Magistrate.
He had not been in Office many months
when Instructions broke out in several
towns and mutinies in Several regiments.
He acted with hrs usual visor. The mobs
were suppressed. and 2000 men. convicted IF
.laving taken part in the disturbances, were
incareerated In penal settlements. Then
there arose throughout the republic a cry
that FonSeea's Government was postpon-
ing the election of a Constitutional As
sembly in order to retain power. Fonseca
met this danger by assuming dictatorial
powers, and at the same time by fixing
day for the election of an Assembly. The
Assembly met, drafted Constitution and
proceeded 10 make laws. But before MANY
months an antagenism arose between the
body and the President very similar to the
antagonism which led to the overthrow Of
Balmaceda in Chile. The Assembly passed
laws, the President vetoed them; the As
sembly passed them over the veto; the
President ragged and gave ear to the officers
of the army who clamored for coup d'etat
and Brazilian Second of December. Mat
tiers seem now to have eliminated for the
present in dissolution of the Congress and
a declaration of martial law in the towns.
At this distance, and with the scanty in
formation we have, it rs difficult to decide
which party is in the right. Ii, as President
Fonseca says. the Congress passed laws
which were unconstitutional. it was surely
the business of the Judiciary, and not the
Executive. to declare them null and void.
unless the new Constitution, like the un-
written Constitution of England, provides