The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-08-06

in the sum of sl7,sI2 50. and the appellants con-
tend that the city has no power with
out a vote OF authorization TO issue such
bonds, for the reason that when issued they
will constitute evidences of primary indebted
ness OF the city. The ordinance, section 5, pro-
yides: "The principal and interest of such
bonds shall be paid By the city from the pro-
ceeds Of such local assessments, but the city
shall be liable for the payment of both principal
and interest II il fails neg.ects 70 collect said
assessments, or falls negIecfs to collect suff-
Gent 70 pay the principal or interest on said
bonds when they fall due"
FOR the city IL In claimed that the bonds when
issued would not constitute primary indebted
ness Of the corporation for the reason that they
are payable out OF the fund 70 be created UNDER
the terms Of the charter, and that the ordinance
makes the city liable only in case of its failure
or neglect 70 collect the assessment. or 10 col
iect sufficient TO pay the principal and interest
OF the bonds when they fall due. The appellant
must succeed Ia bis contention because the or
dinance does not comply with the charter. The
last clause Of section is: 'And the city shall
be liable for the payment OF both principal and
interest and the council has no power to issue
bond which does not provide for q liability
equal in degree with that provided by the
The main question, however, is whether in
view OF the citys Indebtedness already
exceeding Ia per cent, il issue
bonds without vote OF the people. IL
Is rule established by many authorities that
when municipal corporation is about to order
Improvements Of this class IL may do so with
out making itself primarily liable for the cost
thereof The city OF Seattle has already done so
TO large extent, and this court has held that
the unpaid warrants issued by IL, drawn upon
and payable out OF special assessment funds, do
not constitute part OF its municipal indebted
ness within the meaning of the constitution
(Baker vs.. SeatJie1. bat il is competent for such
a corporation To make itself primarily liable for
such improvements, and 70 make their cost
part OF Its debt In this instance the language
OF the charter ~ too clear for construction IL
Is evident thereirom that its trainers intended
a ~ ats a
provement bonds by pledgng the faith of the
city for their payment in the first instance The
bondholder under this charter need look only
70 the city Tor the payment OF his principal and
interest; the city is TO be his debtor, not the
property within the district, nor the owner of
the land. Upon this point learned counsel cited
us 70 line OF authorities from the state of In
diana, ana sought to rely upon them in support
OF his position, but an examination OF the cases
tails entirely, we think, to uphold him. The
case OF Quill VS.. the city of Indianapolis I24 In
diana 49, s the latest OF the cases cited and we
shall examine that case, as well as the law upcn
which 1t was based, briefly. The constitution
OF that state, article 49, provides: "No political
or municipal corporation in this state shall ever
become Indebted, in any manner or for any pur-
pose, 70 an amount In the aggregate exceeding
two per centum on the value of the taxable
property within such corporation to be ascer-
tanned by the last assessment for state and
county taxes previous TO the mourning of such
Indebtedness; and all bonds or obligations in
excess OF such amount, given by such corpora
ton shall he void
IL was conceded that the bonded indebtedness
OF the city OF indianapolis exceeded the limit
liked by the constitution, aud the question
was whether il could under the act of
March s, 1889, continue 10 issue improvement
bonds, and the court held under the statute
governing the issuance OF the bonds proposed
they would not constitute portion of the city's
indebtedness, but would be valid obligations.
Butturning TO the statute in question we find
that no liability whatever was laid upon the
city even by its failure, negee: refusal to ell
iect the annual instalments, but that the owner
or holder oil the bonds was given the right to
foreclose the lien OF the assessment upon the as
sessed property mortgage would be FORE
closed In any court of competent jurisdiction,
and for that purpose the bonds when issued
were declared 10 transfer to the owner thereof
all the right aud interest OF the city
IN and TO the assessment and the
statute seems to have been to make of
each assessment district a quasi orporation,
whose agent for the making of the improve
ments, the creation of the lien and the issuance
of the bonds the city; but after the issI-
ance OF the bonds the city had no duty to per-
form other than that OF paying over to the bond
holders the money which ii hight receive from
time to time. This it will be seen, is a case
very broadly to be distinguished from the one
at bar. and renders the authority of the Indiana
The case of the United States vs. Fort Scott 90
U. g.. l52, is one where the state of Kansas made
aproyision in the charter OF cities OF the second
class, within which was the city of Fort Scott,
almost Identical with that of the charter of the
city OF Seattle; and il there held that the
liability oil the city was absolute without refer
ence TO the fact that ii was authorized to levy
special assessments for the payment of its i'm
proyement bonds, and intended as fact that
the bonds should be paid out of the assessments
when collected.
Incidental to the further facts OF this case it
appears that the appellant contends thac the
sum oil S9oo.OOD OF bonded indebtedness. which
was incurred by the city of Seattle on the 10Th
day OF August, 1890, for water and sewerage pur-
poses, should in some way affect the question of
me Issuance OF bonds in this case.
la
city was authorized - by the act of
February %. 1880, 10 become indebted for the
purpose of furnishing itself with water and
sewerage ana hight plants in sum equal TO
per cent OF its assessment This s9550d0 being
issued Tor the special purposes under which the
city u authorized by section o. article of the
constitution To become indebted in q sum equal
10 per cent. in addition to per cent of in
debtedness authorized for general purposes is
not TO be considered as constituting a part of
the general indebtedness OF the city, inasmuch
as its assessment in 1890 is shown TO have been
upwards OF 000000, which would allow il A
general Indebtedness OF upwards OF 81 100000,
and specias indebtedness for water, sewers
and lights of as much more.
Again IL is charged that the Broadway i'm
proyement Will exceed an expenditure OF $5
56S.50 for the cost of the improvement at the in
tersection of cross streets, and therefore win
add that much more TO the citys indebtedness
but SO Tar as appears the city may intend to pay
that sum out OF its current revenues, which will
not therefore increase its Indebtedness in a CON
stitutionai sense to that extent Ii so. there il
no objection on that ground TO the improve.
ment
The Judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion. II T. STurS
We concur:
T. J. AEDERs, c. j.
ELMoN ScoTr, j.
K. O. DUSBAR, j.
Judge Jacobs, at the request OF the council.
men, gave general review of the consequences
of the decision and advised that no more grad
ing be done except upon the Immediate nay
tr1a