The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1891-10-21

secIlon was 10 carry signals plainly displayed
except the 9th and last section. which. not hav-
ing any signals was to be regarded as the last |
of the excursion trains.
Positive and explicit orders were given by
| the train dispatcher at Meadville, Pa, to all |
freight trains to be on guard and watchful for |
these trains. as they had the exclusive right of
way and to closely observe signals 1t was in |
evidence that section 3 of train IS a west bound
freight train. received positive orders Al Leav-
| ittsburgh to make Ravenna, 6 miles east from
Kent, and remain there on side track until the
variOns sections of the excursion trains includ-
/ ing train 8, svestibuled passenger train, had
left Ravenna. all bound east. The freight train
arrived at Ravenna at II 10 p. m: The passen-
| ger trains including train were expected to
pass RaVenna between 10 and 2 15 a. M, the
time train was due at Ravenna. Sections 2, 8,
q, 5, came in regular order, the first leaving
Kent at II al p. N. Section 6 did not arrive in
Kent in time. a. was expected. to precede train
/ 8. Train left Kent on her regular time, &c
Soon after the 9Th and last section of the excur-
| sion train came and followed train 8.
/ 1t should be remembered that train and the
last section of the excursion trai we've not to
carry signals The crew of the freight train at
Ravenna that were not sleeping, observed tn ese
trains pass them in regular oroer. except that
train was following the 9Th section OF the ex-
curslon train. The Engineer claims that he saw
no signals o. the 9Th section and concluded it
must be the last of the ex ursion trains.
As soon as train had passed him. thinking
he had Alright to the road, he unfortunately
pulled out and met the 9th section at Breakneck
creek. near Kent, and the fatal c5Ilision occur.
red with sad anu fearful results. The night was
exceedingly foggy at the place where the acci-
dent occurred. AID neither engineer could see
but short distance at that point. althou gh the
track was straight for a mile either way from
the fatal place. The headlights when first seen
by the engineers were not more than 400 or 500
feet apart The passenger train was running
rs miles an hour. The freight 10 miles as she
ha1 nearly reached the east Kent yard the place
of her destination.
1he testimony shows most conc usi yeIy that
the railroad authorities made every possible er-
fort Tor the safety OF the excursion trains. Or
deTs were given for each to carry sig lals plain
ly displayed; also. that no passenger train
. should pass telegraph station until the pre-
ceding train had passed the telegraph station
preceding, thus no two trains could possi-
bly, be on the same territory at the same time
Notwithstanding these extra precautions the
terrible calamity happened that resulted in the
death of four human beings and the wounding
OF twenty others Who t. blame? Ger
talnly not the crews of the passenger trains
Certainly not ths railway authorities, who
| SSSAAAASAJ uSSN SfC4y 80 insure SAFE
ty. What then was the cause OF this terrfb,e 6
disaster, and who are to blame for it; and how
) might 1t have been avoided? Evidence shows
: that the engineer and conductor of the freight
train had orders at Leavittsburg and were mott
ned there by the telegraph operator to run to
RaVenna and to reach there in time to meet the
various sections of the excursion train, includ-
ing train 8. and to remain there until all had
passed RaVepna. Evidence also shows that the
telegraph operator there notified them on their
arrival of the expected trains and that the train
dispatcher at Meadville had requested them to
remain near the office at the station, and be on
the alert. When notified the engineer re-
| piled that he had an engine to care for, and at
l once went to his engine. The conductor and
three brakemen went to the caboose The con
ductor and two brakemen testified that they
went to sleep. The other brakeman took little
notice of what transpired although he was
awake. The engineer was alone on his engine
They remained in Ravenna about2L hours be-
fore train passed them. The engineer then
whistled off brakes. and the forward brakeman
went forward and by direction of the engineer
opened the switch and the engineer started his
train on the main track, Rule 119 of the COM
f pans rules requires the conductor to order the
train to move. The conductor positively swears
that he gave no order to move The brakemen
|
! train. where such signals are given. The en-
r gineer insists that he saw one, but whether in
dreamy vision or real, remains to be found out
, That he thought he saw it, 1 have no doubt
Mistaken judgment with fearful results
The conductor offers as an excuse for not Civ
1 ing the signals. although he heard the engin-
eer's whistle. that he had implicit confidence in
the judgment of his engineer. and supposed
? that he knew when to go. and so he perm tilted
-.
manding his efforts to start the train, as was
clearly his duty to do The engineer affirms that
he saw no signals on the fifth section of the
cursion train that preceded train s. and honest
: ly believed that he had the right of way to Kent
cannot impute criminal intent the part of
anyone. but most certainly the conductor of the
, freight train was not only derelict of duty in
permitting his train to move without orders to
do so. The engineer. however honest he may
have been in his intentions. should not have left
without the conductors orders to go. and not
have trusted alone to his own Judgment in the
, premises when the telegraph station was with
, in easy reach. His was no doubt an honest er-
ror in judgment that ali men are liable to make.
|, Had the engineer or conductor gone to the office
for orders or information the accident would
have been avoided. Is there practical remedy
for such accidents? Railway transportation is
engineered. managed and run, and prob4b
ever will be by frail human Judgment that is
liable to err. Doing a double track business on
a single track road, is not only hazardous but
fraught with great danger to human life and
loss of property.
What then does common prudence dictate, as
atleast a partial, if not complete remedy? 1t
may seem presumptuous for me to even suggest
| a remedy in this connection. double track
road weuld certainly prevont head end coIiis-
ions, which now frequent by both passenger
and freight trains, and avoid such terrible ca
| lamities as are TOO frequently experienced. If
| no train was permitted to leave station with
out an order from the train dispatcher. great
responsibility would be taken from the train
| men at least An answer to this will be that it
is not consistent with modern railroading.
After carefully reviewing all the testimony
in the case find that William FL. Maxwell,
travelling engineer Clayton Glass. fireman
and Mrs. Jeanette Dewey. a passenger sever
ally came to their deaths on the morning of Sep
tember go 1891. as the result OF an accident
caused by collision of two trains of cars on
| the New York, Lake Erie and Western railroad
near Kent, O.
1 find that Ernest Biegert conductor of sec
tion of freight train e5. on said railroad guilty
of gross care lessness and neglect OF duty in vi
olating the rules of thu company in allowing
himself to sleep while on duty as conductor of