The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-09-20
ANTfETAM.

Thursday was the twenty-ninth ami
versary Of the great battle Of Antietam.
| It was the elimination of the military
| career of General Mcclellan. In April, 1862,
| General Mcclellan, with splendid army of
over 10000 men halted 80 days before
| Yorktown, where 5000 Confederates, sub
sequently enlarged TO 5000, held long,
| thin line against forces that could have
walked over them by sheer weight of
| numbers had the word been given. At
| Williamsburg May 5, after the leisurely
evacuation OF Yorktown. bloody blunder-
| ing light cost Us 1900 men. At Fair Oaks,
straddling treacherous river flowing
flush with its banks, We were caught at
| gross disadvantage by Joe Johnston, and
lost 5000 men by another bloody blunder.
Then came Gaines Mill. where Porter.
| with our right wing of 5000 men was
| pounded all day long by Lees army of
| 5000, while our left wing 5000 strong,
| did not fire shot or march a rod to re-
| lieye Porter from the weight of Lees as
| sault. Then our defeated army was rolled
| back from Richmond TO the shelter of the
| 5000 killed and wounded in its week Of
battle.
1t was campaign of utter tactical and
| strategic failure that cost the army by bat
| tie and disease a loss of 50 900 men from
| May 20 to July 2, 1862. At this moment, as
| Longstreet points out, Lees good judg-
ment seems to have failed him, for he lost
a great opportunity to capture Washing
ton by turning swiftly on his heel and
rushing his victorious army on Pope be-
fore he could be reinforced from the PEN
insula or anywhere else. To be sure this
would have left the way open to Rich
mond for Mcclellan. if that military
mole and tactical turtle had mus
tered up resolution and energy
enough to have taken it, but
Lee could well afford to lose Rich
mond in exchange for Washington; he
would have sacrificed his castle. but taken
our queen and checkmated Us in the game
by the sacrifice. Lee was repulsed at NAL
vern Hill July 1, 1s62. Giving his troops
week of rest Lee could have struck Pope
with IS 600 men Of all arms by the 18th of
July. Pope then had not more than %, 600
good soldiers Of all arms and they were
poorly commanded. He had not been re-
inforced by the divisions of Reno, Stevens.
Reynolds, Hooker, Kearney and Porter;
he had only Mcdowell, Ricketts,, King,
Banks and SigeL McDowell's troops were
fine soldiers, and his brigades ably off,
cered, but the rest of Pope's command was
of inferior quality. and Lee would surely
have captured Washington the third
week of July had he rushed on Pope.
Washington once taken Philadelphia
and Baltimore would have fallen. Lee
lost his chance; Lincoln, who had a deal
] OF native military sense, perceived the
peril of the situation, with one defeated
army on the James and a weak Union
army before Washington. Lee, standing
at Richmond, could feint with one hand
at Mcclellan and strike Pope a deadly
blow with the other. Lincoln saw that he
could not send Pope to Mcclellan, so on
the Sd of August he ordered Mcclellan to
join Pope. Despite of entreaties, orders
and reproaches, he did not bring his army
to the Potomac in less than three weeks
his FIRST troops under Reynolds Joining
Pope the sd of August. The corps OF
Heintzleman and Porter. about 5000 men.
joined Pope and fought with him until his
defeat, August 30th, 1862. Out of 81 900
veteran troops of McClellan's army
ordered to join Pope August 81, these
were all that reached him by August 30th.
The order TO McClellan's army to ioin
Pope should have been issued the first
week of July, but 1t was not issued until
the first week of August, when Lee, at last
seeing his opportunity when too late. be-
gan 10 move on Pope. On the Sth of
August Lees advance under Jackson
struck Pope's advance under Banks at
Cedar Mountain and defeated il. Then.
as Longstreet points out. Lee committed a
most unaccountable act In sending Jack
son on wild-goose raid in rear of Pope
for Jackson accomplished practically moth
ing and exposed himself to enormous risk.
from which he escaped by q miracle of
good fortune. Lee gained nothing By it.
for Pope was not obliged to give battle
August 50; indeed. his fatal mistake was
in not seeing that his true course was 70
fall back and force 3 junction with Nc
Clellan. Decent knowledge of human
nature should have told Pope that the
chances were ten 10 one that Mcclellan
would not join him if he could help it, so
Lees victory of August 80. lS62, was not
due to anything accomplished by this per
ilous movement of Jackson without sup
port against Pope's rear.
In this second Bull Run campaign it is
difficult 70 see how Lee could have helped
being victorious, since he stood between
two Federal armies, one Of which was not
permitted TO fall back and force . junction
with the other, while the other was oriere,i
to join Pope, but was commanded hy,
Mcclellan, whose idea of loyalty to the
nag did not Include loyalty to Pope. Lees