Jamestown weekly alert. [volume] (Jamestown, Stutsman County, D.T. [N.D.]) 1882-1925, 1891-07-23

$75 was retained by the loan firm as a
compensation or fee for making the loan.
The point in controversy was whether
the transaction comes within the saving
clause of the statute, which provides that
q fee may be retained If the interest and
fee together does not exceed II per cent
per annum. The compensation and in
terest at the rate of per cent for the
time of the note-five years-does not
exceed u per cent aud hence the validi
ty of the note is claimed. The court
holds that, as 1T exceeds the sum Of Il
per cent for the first year, it IS VOID. The
defendant also claimed that the statute
was void by reason of making an excep.
tion in it's operation in favor OF building
and loan associations. This point is over.
ruled by the court. The decision OF
Judge Templeton was against the law,
but by decree Of the supreme court this
is reversed and the action is dismissed.
The practical effect of the law will be to
do away with the fee business in making
loans, which runs up the rate of interest
paid the first year. The following is the
syllabus:
l. Section 4 of chapter 1S4, laws OF
1890, provides that in all loan transac-
tioDs the written contract shall correctly
state the amount received by the Dor.
rover, and the rate of interest to be paid,
and failure so to do renders tho con.
tract usurious and void, except as other
wise in the chapter provided. Section Z
provides that a loan broker OF other per-
son may receive a compensation for pro-
curing a loan when such compensation
and the interest stated in the contract,
together do not exceed II per cent per
annum in the aggregate. In transac-
tion where no middleman was employed
a note was given for s575, due in five
years with per cent interest. The bor-
rover received 500, and no more, $75
being, by agreement, retained for max
ing the loan, and the amount SO retained
added to the Z per cent stated in the
note did not exceed II per cent on $500
for five years. Held, that If the trausac-
ton was usuriOus under section it was
not saved by the provisions of section 7.
2. A public law OF universal interest
to the people Of the state and embracing
all the citizens of the state. or all Of q
certain class, or certain classes of citizens
and not limited to any particular locality,
is 4 general and not Il special law, IS the
term is used in the constitutional inhibi-
against special legislation.
3. A statute that grants no privileges
or immunities except such as would ap-
ply to all citizens under the circumstan-
ces and conditions expressed in the stat
ute, does not violate the constitutional
provisions againt granting special priv
leges and immunities.
4. The constitutional requirement
that all laws Ut a general nature shall
have uniform operation is satisfied il
the benefits and burdens of such law fall
equally upon all members of the class or
classes upon which it does operate.
5. The legislature has the right to
classify persons or subjects for the pur.
poses Of legislation. Such classification
must not be arbitrary, but must be based
upon such differences in situation, con-
dition and purposes between the person
and things included in the class and
those excluded therefrom, as fairly and
naturally suggest the propriety of and
necessity for different or exclusive legis-
lation in the line of the statute in which
the classification appears.
s. The dealings Of building and loan
associations with their own stockholders
differ from ordinary loan transactions to
such an extent as to warrant the legisla-
ture in excepting such associations as to
such dealings from the operation of the
provisions of the general usury law.
Z. In constituting particular section
Of Il statute 1t is the duty of the court to
ascertain the intent of the legislature
and for that purpose it should consider
the entire statute and its general subject
matter, as we'll as all other statutes in
pari pateria. and where the court is sat-
istied that adherence to the strict letter
of the law would defeat the object and
intent of the legislature it is the duty Of
the court to regard the intent even
where to do SO, it is compelled to restrain
the application of the letter.