Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1891-05-27

inrs of revenge, if any such have beer
nroven or shown by the evidence in TIL:
case: and if the Jury believe from the evi
dence that any witness or witnesses nave
knowingly and wilfully testified falsely al
to any material fact or point In this case
the Jury are at liberty, unless corroooratet
nv other credi ole evidence, to dlsregare
the testimony of such witness or witnesses
in toto
XIV. The jury are instructed that oe1or'
they can find the defendant guilty as charg
ed in the indictment, they must believe from
The evidence, beyond reasonable COuDt
that the killing of Dr. Baird was wiliful
deliberate and premeditated.
XIV. A reasonable doubt is that state OF
the case which after a full comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, bott
for the State and the defendant, leaves tue
minds of the Jury in that condition ina
they can not say that they feel an abiding
faith amounting to a moral certainty, 1foq
the evidence in the case, that the defend
ant is guilty of the charge laid In the IN
dictment If you have such a douot-ll
YOUR conviction of the defendants guilt a:
laid in the Indictment does not amount 10
moral certainty from the evidence IN tnt
case-then the Court instructs you tha
you must acquit the defendant
| y L.
upon the trial of a criminal cause, II rea
sonable doubt of any facts necessary &c
convict the accused is raised in the minds
of the jury by the evidence itself or by the
/ ingenuity of counsel upon any hypothesis
reasonably consistent with the evidence,
that doubt is decisive in favor of the de-
fendant's acquittal.
XVII. A verdict of not guilty means no
more than this: That the guilt Of the ac-
cused has not been demonstrated in the
precise specific and narrow forms pre-
scribed by law. The evidence to convict
the accused must not merely be beyond all
reasonable doubt consistent with the
hypothesis of his guilt, but it must also be
bevond all reasonable doubt inconsistent
with any hypothesis of innocence that can
be reasonably drawn therefrom.
XVIII. The jury are instructed that in
! determining whether or not the defendant
acted in self-defense at the time he shot DR..
| Baird, they will look at all of the evidence 10
the case, as well that which was introduced
! by the State as that which was introduced
! bv the defendant, as well as all the circum-
stances surrounding the defendant at the
shooting, as shown by the evidence.
XIX The jury are instructed that DR.
Garrison the defendant, had right to pass
along any public street or highway in the
I w
Withstanding the fact that DR.. Baird, the
deceased, may have been upon such street
or highway at the same time.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STATE.
Mr.. Howard read the instructions for
the State as follows:
|. The Court instructs the jury that they
are the Judges of the law as well as the
facts in this case and if they can say upon
/ Il, f1A lou, hot Tor.
than the Court itself, they have the right
to do so. But before assuming so solemn
a responsibility they should be assured
that they are not acting from caprice or
prejudice; that they were not controlled by
their will or their wishes, but from deep
and confident conviction that the Court is
wrong and that they are right. Before
saving that upon their oaths it is their duty
to reflect whether from their study and eX-
perience they are better qualified to judge
-of-the law than the Court. If, under all
these circumstances, they are prepared to
say that the Court is wrong in its exposi-
ton of the law, they have that right.
III. The Court instructs the jury that the
rule of law which clothes every person ac-
cused of crime with the presumption of in
nocence, and imposes upon the State the
burden of establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, is not intended to aid
anv one who is in fact guilty of crime TO
escape but is humane provision OF law
intended, far as human agencies can, to
guard against the danger of an innocent
person being uniustly punished.
Ill The Court instructs the jury as
matter of law that in considering the case
they are not to go beyond the evidence to
hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain
such doubts as are merely chmerical or
A a n +
tai must be reasonable. and 1t must arise
from a candid and impartial Investigation OF
all the evidence in the case, and unless 1t is
such that were the same kind OF doubt in
terposed in the graver transactions OF life,
il would cause reasonable and prudent
man TO hesitate and pause, it is insufficient
to authorize verdict of mot guilty"
If. after considering all the evidence, you
can say YOU have an abiding conviction OF
the truth of the charge, you are sallSneu
beyond a reasonable doubt
". The Court further instructs the Jury
rs q matter of law that the doubt which a
iuror is allowed to retain in his own mind
and under the influence of which he should
frame his verdict Of mot guilty." must al
WAYS be reasonable enc. A doubt pro-
duced by undue sensibility in the mind of
any Juror in view of the consequence OF his
verdict, is not a reasonable doubt, and the
iury is not allowed to create sources or ma
terials for doubt by resorting TO trivial
and fanciful supposltions and remote con-
lectures as to possibilities differing from
that established by the evidence You are
not at liberty to disbelieve, as jurors, If
from the evidence you believe as men.
Your oath imposes on you no obligation 10
doubt where no doubt would exist II no
oath had been administered.
Y. The Court instructs the jury that II
they believe from all the evidence that the
defendant, George l. Garrison, used
deadly weapon in such a way as was likely
to produce the death of the deceased
George Baird they may infer from such
use of deadly weapon that it was done
with malice and with intent 10 kill.
VI. Upon the question OF intent, the
Court instructs the jury that the law pre-
sumes a man to intend the reasonable ana
natural consequences of any act intention
allv done; and this presumption of law will
always prevail, unless, from considera-
ton of all the evidence bearing upon the
point. the Jury entertain reasonable
doubt whether such intention did exist.
VII. The Court instructs the jury that in
this case if the prisoner relies upon self
defence to excuse him for killing the de-
ceased with a deadly weapon, the burden
of showing such excuse is on the prisoner
and to avail him he must prove such de-
fence by preponderance of the evidence.
VIII. The jury are instructed, that
while the law requires, in order to consti
tute murder of the first degree, that the
killing shall be willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated, still it does not require that the
willful intent, generalization and deliber-
alton. shall exist for any appreciate
length of time before the crime
sc