The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-07-03
GETTYSBURG.

Twenty-eight years ago today the three
days fighting at Gettysburg ended in the
decisive repulse of Gen. Lee by the Army
of the Potomac under Gen. Meade; high
time surely to tell the historical truth con-
corning the historical and military conse-
quence of this famous battle. The choice
OF the field was fixed by mere accident, for
neither Lee nor Meade designed to fight at
Gettysburg. Lee, with Harrisburg, Pa,
almost in his grasp, heard that the Army
OF the Potomac was on his track He in
stantly turned about two divisions of HAS
corps, reinforced finally by Ewell's corps,
and struck the advance of the national
army just beyond Gettysburg under Rey-
nolds, consisting of Buford's cavalry, the
First army corps and the Eleventh army
corps. Buford's cavalry had been sent out
to seek the enemy, and Reynolds had
been pushed forward as an infantry sup
port.
The vanguard on both sides suddenly
tumbled into each other, a case of mutual
surprise. Reynolds fell early in the day.
The Union troops here did the most gal
liant lighting of the whole three days bat
tie on our side. but were outnumbered
finally two TO one and forced back through
the town of Gettysburg, losing over 1000
killed, wounded and prisoners, out of 49,
900 men. Lee had won decided victory,
but he threw away Its fruits. At any time
between 3:30p. m. and $50 p. m, he could
have brushed the remnant of Reynolds
column like flies from Cemetery Hill. as
he had 80 900 splendid soldiers under Ewell
to storm position defended by but 5000
men, including but a single brigade that
was intact, but Lee hesitated until Slocum
with the Twelfth corps arrived at $50
p. M, and Sickles came up
with the Third corps just before dark.
General Hancock arrived at n.
m, directed the occupation of Culp's
Hill on our right, Cemetery Ridge,
and Little Round Top, and sent word
to Meade that it was good
position from which to fight a battle.
Lees hesitation to attack. and Hancock's
prompt action saved the field and gave
Meade no choice but to concentrate his
whole army at this point. The record of
the first day was severe Union defeat,
from which. If Lee had acted with his
usual energy, no organized body of Union
troops would have escaped.
On the morning of July "a the Union
lines extended in . horseshoe shane from
Little Round Top on which rested our left
to Culps Hill and Rock Creek on our ex-
treme right. Our center rested on Gene
terry Ridge and Cemetery Hill. The
strength of this admirable defensive po-
Psitou is clear 10 the dullest military eve
and the wonder is not that Gen. Meade
ventured to defend it. but that Lee was
reckless enough TO assault it. Lee had but
| 66,000 men, yet he assaulted veteran
| army OF $500 men in a strong position
| where the possession of the shorter inter
/ Tor line made il impossible to dislodce
Meade by direct attack. Gen. Longstreet
did not fail to point out to Lee that
Meade could shift his troops so
much more rapidly from wing
| to wing than he could that
"whie can get into the Federal line |
cannot stay there" and urged him 10 turn
Us out of our advantage by thanking our
left. lee decided TO attack US on each
! flank, but lost his only chance of success
| by not assaulting our lines early in the
day, before the arrival OF the Fifth corps
| bat he did not deliver his attack until 3
| p m, when the Fifth corps was present TO
save the day. On this second day the
] battle was really won, for at dark Long
/ streets attack on our left had failed. and
/ Ewelrs, on our right, had miscarried, for
Ewell did not attempt 20 get in until Long
/ street was forced to get out
On the morning Of the 81 of July the
Army Of the Potomac had lost $1,000 men
in the two days lighting. but its position
was really stronger than ever. because
MeAde had been compelled to correct his
lines and nrmly held Little Round Ton,