New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-10-18
SYBEL'S GERMAN EMPIRE.
pRELIMINARIEs OF THE AUSTRIAN WAR

The fourth volume Of Sybels history OF the
founding of the German Empire Is occupied WIN
the events which Immediately preceded ana iea
nm IN the war with Austria This war had IN
truth been inevitable for some time and In the
long struggle between the two great fowers %
Germany it was every year becoming cleaier .uaO
diplomacy must before long reach the nmie oi ~.
restraining and delaying capacity. lnoeed' nau ~
not been for the statesmanlike provisions Vi DE
marck the appeal to the sword wouid nave DeeN
taken much earlier, for Austria, less wisely gov
.~nod and moro under the influence of mihtarism,
couid with difficulty be held in hand by the CIVIL
Ministers who were to find later that the army
wes q rash counsellor, and an unstable support III
tho last recourse The old game OF cross-purposes
between Austria, Prussia and the Conieoers'ion
went on. the Schleswig- Holstein problems pro
dacing a prolific crop Of difficulties whicn 'he
nfjnolpal combatants Of course sought 10 turn W
.ho,r oyvn advantage. The historian has found IL
necessary TO devote much space 10 ex'ernai Huio
mean affairs and especially TO those OF itaiS anu
France. For the policy and intentions Oh tnese
: two Governments had the most lmpor'ans ocainis
upon the prospects OF Prussia
Bismarck had no illusions about Austria. lie
knew perfectly well that war was nnaVoidapie,
and he devoted all his energies to securing heipiui
alliances and to manoeuyrinG in such way that
Eurone would rest upon the Vienna Government.
The situation was made more difficult by the
nractcal impossibility of asccrtaining what Louis
Nanoleon meant to do. 1t can now, be perceived
that he was at the time concerned already on the
decline in bodily and mental health All MS lie
he had been schemer but not doer' HIS
favorite occupation had been the eXcogita~on OF
far-reaching and complicated plans OF European
policy But as his mind had not the elasticity or
the retentive capacity requisite for the successful
prosecution of these broad schemes. he was Always
confronted by difficulties which he had overlooKeo
in his planning and in seeking to avoid THESE Cd
stacles he fell into confusion and had TO ABANDON
his nurposes unfulflled. His italian campaign had
revealed to him some at least OF his own i'lii'"
tons The treaty of villa Franche did not represent
his own original intentions, but was forced upon
him nv n situation which, though the direct results
of his nersonal acts he had been unable to 1ofesee
He found himself in O position which compcheu
him 70 disappoint italian hopes and to stop very
far short of the end of his programme whlie, III
stead of Strengthening his Government nc hau eA-
posed it to sharp Suspicion Of feeblencss anu III
cauacity. Still, he could not refrain from inter-
fering in European politics. and the fact that ne
welded the army of France made IT Impossible 10
reckon without him. at the same time that .ne
astutest minds found it hopeless to penetrate his
purposes.
The French Emperor, it was at least under
stood. was interested in promoting dlscord oe-
tween Prussia and Austria. and thus far ne haa
favored the cause of the former and maln'aineu
friendly relations with King William But the
point to be determined was what steps ne wouid
take In case Prussia sought and Obtained MI
offensive and defensive alliance with Italy 10
Prussia such an alliance was of the first conse-
Ifo1v n
Eo~+ IL was certain that the latter would ara
must seize the opportunity Of Prusso-Aus'riah
wor 10 acquire Venetia, and it was equally clear
thar the pledged assurance of such an Italian con-
currence at the critical moment was worth a
hundred thousand men TO Prussia. But wha'
nosition would Louis Napoleon take? IL was
well known that Italy could not move "l,houV
h,s consent and il was shrewdly suspected that
h,s consent would be conditional upon some sacrl-
fee of Italian or other territory. In eheco ho
about this time sounded the Prusslan Ahipass"
dor at Paris upon the possibility OF recllhca-
tion Of the Rhine frontier. 1t was singular
revelation Of political myopia, 1or oy thls 'iine
psmorc,r mad so far developed his general policy
as to make it apparent that Pan-Germanish was
The central idea in 1t, and that consequently any
session of German territory would be anathehla
moranathan in his eyes. Louis Napoleon. one
imogines must have realized even then that no
chanoe in the frontier could so much as be hinted
at IN the hither side of great war, and could
only be effected as the result OF crushing defeat
of Prussia and perhaps of the Lesser States also.
Rut the restless schener on the throne OF
France was perpetually trying rev experiments
and making new combinations, and there Is PROOF
enough that he at no time understood biSihaIch
The latter was however. hammered IN ms APP
breaches to duty by the folly and peiversty OF
General Ia MamOra. the Italian Minister VINO
could not divest himself of suspicion, though the
Berlin Government was always trying TO over
reach that of Florence. and consequently hung
back and procrastinated whenever the PROPOSED
alliance was spoken of. Meanwhile. Scheswig
Holstein spawned new sources Of ill-feeling con-
tinually and these were adroitly cultivated 'y
Bismarck and not 60 craftily dealt with by Aus
tria 80 that the Vienna Government drifted more
and more into the wrong. That always fantastical
and perverse body. the Confederation, played its
usual part in the growing quarrel between the two
great Powers At bottom its course was dictated
by the jealousies and fears of the Lesser States
These were divided in their views and also In
their allegiance. Some apprehended danger TO
themselves from the ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of Prussia
Others suspected Austria Of desire to absorb and
extineuish them. South Germany WAS generally
Austrian in sentiment. Prussia was indeed not
popular anywhere, and particularism' operated to
keep all the Lesser States apart, ard to paralyze
the efforts of the minority who safety and
progress only in united Germany. Austria
finally obtained a dominant voice at Frankfort.
and the consequences were the withdrawal of Prus
sia from the Confederation and her declaration
Of war against Austria and her allies. But before
that point was reached, much remained TO be done.
The financial condition of Austria for some time
had been increasingly serious. National bank
ruptcy was threatened; quack finance made the
situation worse every year; and the rapid growth
OF the deficit naturally reacted upon internal af-
fairs generally, and revived the discomfort of