The National tribune., 1891-04-16


ON the euemy's right flank. When the bridge
at Browns Perry broke on the evening of the
23d and left, contrary 20 his design larger
force I'M lookout Valley than was needed for a
mere demonstration, he promptly recurod 20
his original plan, rather than leave this force
idle
ON the night of the oath, when be saw that
Hookers assault had been successful, and that
Sherman as yet had failed to make any attack
upon the enemy right, he decided 10 adhere
20
HIS ORIGINAL PLAN.
When he wrote 10 Sherman on the night Of
the oath 10 attack az daylight, and that
Thomass attack would be Simultaneous aud
in c0-Opemti0n, the Conioderatcs still had q
force upon the summit OF Lookout, and in the
same order he gave directions for Hooker 30
move mp the valley aud ascend the mountain
by the nearest practicable road.
On tic morning of the 2Jth, when he dis
covered that the enemy during the night bad
evacuated onlgoHt and had concentrated thoir
whole force On Mission Ridge and that there
was no serious obstacle 20 llOnSuT's turning
their left hc wisely decided 30 withhold
Thomas's attack until Hooker should do so,
and until sherman should crush their right
lu fact on the morning 0t the 25th, he WAS
in much bctior condition for the successful
execution ot his plan than when he issued the
order eu the evening of the oath. Hooker had
overcome the chief obstacles Grants line was
now shorter, aud the whole operation would be
more Immediately under his eye There was
therefore the greater certainty that III the
operations on both hHuss should be successful,
they would hc simultaneously successful Three
O'Clock came HHd sherman still making prog
Tess Th0mas was sent 10 the foot Ui the ridge
as a diversion iE his favor,
Had sherman ultimately been successful
Thoma-s troops would have bgea ceusurablc
q rrrrfI s.r
breaking hr center before the fauks were
turned, iaU- giving the enemy chance 10
escape; hnl b WAS they probably only antici-
pRted Grant, orders And tIUs 10 came about
that a butte that was intended 70 he gained by
tumng both lun6s wus actually decided by
breaklng thn center.
And uow wc witness an exhibition Of one Of
the most striking features oi Grsat character.
From the nights oi Orchard Knob he witnesses
has well-laIi plans frustrated, and hls enemy
slipping from ii- grasp through the failure OF
his chosen aua trusted Lieutenant. But he
never utters one word ol complaint lie sup
pressc- Ibis own chagrin and disappointment,
and seek, 90 console sherman fnr the mortifca-
tion that bo must have felt az his own failure.
This is tle message he sent him:
CHAgTANooGA Nov 25 1853.
Mui Gen, MIlIIAM A. SHEEHAN near Chaita-
nouEHI. No duiit you Witnessed tile handsome
InHuuer iu which sHomus 8 troops carried Mission
Ridge iiIis afternoon, aud can feel just pride,
Zoo, lu the rfU tften 10y tlsc forces under your
command Boz taxing. first. much 81 tie same
range 10 hiiis Hnu then n attracting the attention
oi so mans 't the enemy az 10 make IhomHss
part certain uf success. = -
us. GRANT Major General.
This was rot much 10 say, but il was all that
could bC said, and was said with
CONSIDERATION AND KINDNESS
that marks Grants magnanimity IN all his in
feTcOurse with sherman. Can iee just pride
ln taking So much OF the same range Of hills
lall Ot which Was taken on the 24thJ with
"siight skirmi,hng" and mo loss and in
attracting iHe attention Of an enemy he
was sent T. destroy
let us consider for a moment the part as
signed 20 sherman and The mHuuer OF IFS exc
cuLi0n lie was uot merely 70 make an attack
and bring ou a general engagement Hc was
10 deliver a terrific. an irresistible, a crushing
blow. lie was 10 deliver ID where the enemy
was not expecting it and before he bad time TO
prepare go receive ID. Yet hc spent the whole
forenoon 0i the 24tu lutTCucHiUg ByidRehcad
fuT which lIrTc was no usc whatever, consumed
fhree hours in moving bis io3Cc. uHopposcd a
distance nf three miles lett Dayiss Division
posted between himself and tie river as
though afraid Of being cut uf from h.s bridge
Hnd when he found himself confronted with
5.o00 trools uaprepared 10 receive iim, delib
oratcly -al down 20 iutTeHch.
llc bad of the evening Of the 2sth already
Thrown aWDy .ll- opportunity to strike where
lc WAS uBt DEpectCa. aud at au enemy not
prepared 20 receive him. His assault on The
2Jth was characterized with equal timiGity,
3ceblpncs. EHl iudecisioE. review Of the
opera ions 81 our late war shows that assaults
are seldom l eycI successful at o ltss cost than
from ~ 10 45 per cent Cf the assaEiting force.
n commander who has not the haTdiho0d 10
demand aud exact this sacrifice if necessary,
has uu right 90 expect success. y ct We behold
him at noon oi tic 2Jth, with B0t more than
hvc or teu ucr cent. of his assauitug force
disabled sad ouc-lalf Of bis troops not yet in
Gclion, scQuicsoc boz repulse. accept refusal, and
send mp from the ChckamGuEa bills the de-
sTairug cry, Where is Thomasy"
lt is given 20 but icw men 20 be equally
great n al positions and upon all occasions.
Tile following year, as an army commander,
Sherman won. and uescrvcdly won. gTrat fame.
Il As order HUok ON his Atlanta campaign will
deserve to Dee studied when Cesar aud Zun0phon
arc forgotten. Undoubtedly there was a blum
der az Kenesaw, aud i think his own defense
of tia mos, same and impoteut couclu ou."
bat be WHO has not made mistakes has not
made WAT and
TEw MISTAKES
must not De permitted to dim the lustcr Of a
great name.
As % the grade OF The qualities in which he
did exec there can be no doubt. Napoleon
nae many HmlAtht iuhrhNAls, Dnt therC was but
one Napoleon, aud IL s no disparsgemeut 10
his grcatHes- 10 Bay that Mcdonald al Nagram,
or Dayoust 81 soult al Austeriltz, led the
Essault more effectively than Bonaparte HIM
sell might bave done
Since tAu above was written Sherman has
passed away. Amongst al the Generals de.
yeioFed on both sides during the war there
should DIE 40 G.lculty iu assigning him his
true place IiC possessed many 81 the l0ltiest
aud rtre-t attributes oi Rteat commander ia
an eminent degree. In iAe higher branches OF
bis ari. In strategy and lUgistius iu everything
that relates 10 war until the hostile armies
aIe Ted lhto each others presence Sherman
was easily second, Lee himself not excepted
Grant being as easily Ggst. Bat after the
Ermifs arr brought face 70 face when II comes
o. Hr'uaI conflict, iir clash Of arms ID would
DC easy 70 Haluc half q dozen Generals on
GlHef side who iaf cxcr.Ied him.
Hooker i credited with being Of q rash aud
iWHetuau- nature, aud somewhat inclined 10
take tln h.l .H iis teeth. had he accompanied
thr ..rgaifH Corps as 90 one time De was on
thr pou' ol DONG there would probably have
brnHH sensation .H our leiI wing. ID Is said
fiW 90 TIE atti.s %. SamiogH. Arnold, WHO
was iu arfoe aHd without ANY command. sud
denly aIr areG q 0H the Eria and bv sheer
fore, d. W' ar,ua!.y assumed the control and
direction ul thn troops and won the fqht.
Something oi fHc same kind might have Ian.
pcura iu t..I, instance.
Jet us -,5erHlrtra li'tlc further on what MIGHT
hayr been 80 louisville the order relieving
lsosocrus and ass iguiug Thomas 10 the com.
msnd o. thr Army of the Cumberland wa placed
lu the laudsoi Grant aud he was Informed that
fs-fs4rs. fr ar f,Tfs4rf L. ..