The weekly Floridian. [volume] (Tallahassee, Fla.) 1867-19??, 1891-08-29
nd not by specific acts or general bad con

and not by specific acts or general bad con-
duct.
12. If the record in criminal cause pur-
ports to recite the oath as it was in fact
administered to the jury, and such oath
appears to be substantially different from
that prescribed by law, it seems that re-
versal will result; on the contrary, how
ever, if the record does not 80 purport. but
merely imports that the jurors were in fact
sworn, without anything negatlving the
presumption that they were duly sworn,
the entry is sufficient; and it is better
form of entry than one reciting the oath,
however accurately.
IL. A record entry in a capital case
which, after showing that the prisoner
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty,
states: "Whereupon came the following
jurors" (naming them) "who were duly Sc
iected, chosen, empaneled and sworn to
try the issue joined" cannot properly be
construed as purporting or having been
intended to recite the oath prescribed by
the statute for petit jurors in capital causes
which oath is as follows: "You shall we'll
and truly try, and true deliverance make,
between the State of Florida and the pris-
oner st the bar, whom you shall have in
charge. So help you God," but should be
construed as merely importing and in
tended to show that the jurors were in fact
sworn properly, or that the above oath was
administered to them.
S:14. Remarks made by the Judge, in the
course OF a trial, as to the, credibility of
witnesses or the weight of relevant evil
dence, however inadvertently such remarks
may be made, are the subject of exception
and Of assignment as error by the party TO
whom they may seem to be prejudicial,
and are ground for reversing judgment.
The policy OF our jurisprudence is, that the
jury shall decide all such questions, entire
ly liberated from the influence of the i'm
pressions of the judge as to them.
Is Voluntary intoxication, even though
the immediate effect of it is to render the
person unconscious for the time of what
he is doing or temporarily insane, as dis.
tinguished from fixed or settled frenzy or
insanity either permanent or intermittent
resulting from such intOxicatiOn, does not
excuse homicide or any act which in the
absence of such intoXication and uncon-
sciOusness or temporary insanity, the i'm
mediate effect of such intoxication, would
be criminal. This is the general rule az
plicable wherever the voluntary doing of
the wrongful act constitutes the crime or q
particular or specific intent is not an es.
| sentiai or constituent element of the Ofense,
and in all such cases person who is at
the time of the commission of the act un.
conscious or insane as the immediate con-
sequence of voluntary intoxication is liable
in the same manner and to the same de-
gree that he would be If SOBER
| 16. ln cases In which specific or par
ticular intent is an essential or constituent
element of the Oftense, intOxication, though
voluntary, becomes a matter for consider
alton or is relevant evidence, with refer
ence 10 the ability of the accused to form or
entertain such intent. Where pereon is too
intoxicated to entertain or be capable of
forming an essential particular intent, such
intent cannot exist and consequently the
offense of which it is a necessary element
cannot be perpetrated.
| II. Where a premeditated design to
effect the death of the person killed, or
some human being, is essential to the
ofense of murder in the first degree, as 1t
is in this state, intoxication, though
voluntary, is relative evidence to be con.
sidered by the jury as TO its effect upon the
ability OF the accused at time of the killing
| to form or entertain such idesign. If the
iurv find from the evidence that the accused
was 80 much intoxicated as to be inca
pable of forming such design, and yet
that but for such incapacity he would be
guilty Of murder in the first degree, they
cannot find him guilty Of murder in that
degree because such design is an essen
tal element of murder in the first degree
Such intoxication and effect thereof will
not render anything sufficient provocation
to reduce killing TO man slaughter that
| would not be such in the mere absence of
such intoxication and effect; on the con-
trary, as between murder in any degree
below the first and manslaughter, such
lntoxication plays no part. The only
purpose for which il is admissible is to
show an absence of permeditated design
to KILL or that the killing was not murder
in the first degree, and the only effect OF
proof of intoxication rendering the accused
incapable of forming or entertaining such
design will be to reduce the killing to
murder of the second or third degree
according to the circumstances.
18. II one who intends 10 kill another
becomes voluntarily intoxicated for the
purpose of carrying out the intention, the
intoxication will have no effect upon the
act and intent thus carried out.
10 Where in trial for murder in the
first degree it is proper to charge upon
the question of intoxication of the &C.
| cused, the judge should instruct the jury
as to the effect of intoxication to degree
sufficient to render him incapable Of
forming a premeditated design to kill.
90. 1t is improper to charge jury that
the law presumes that a person who is
sober enough to form the intention to
shoot another, and actually does kill him
without justification or excuse, is sober
enough to form premeditated design to
kill the person shot, and that in such
case the person shooting is criminally
liable for his act
81 A charge whose effect would be to
exclude from the consideration Of the jury
material circumstances of the killing
shown by the testimony, is erroneous and
properly refused.
%. In charging upon the right Of self
defense the court should so instruct the
jury as to preserve to the accused the
benefit of reasonable fear of great bod
lily harm as we'll as of death from the de.
ceased.
%. If Judge instructs the jury as to a
majority of them recommending to the
mercy of the court person convicted of
/ a 40 pikoI ofHanca the ft1nctiOn will he hest