The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1891-08-05

sued at that time. No accident had then i
happened, and no emergency had devel- l
)ped requiring an extra danger signal to be |
used. Who then connected with the pas
senger trains crew was remiss in duty
that might have averted that terrible ca I
lamitY?
Engineer Pendergast must have known that
he was consuming more time than is usually
allowed for stops at regular stations. 1t is true
that he had an accident to his whistle to repair
and it is equally true that Ravenna was the
place to repair it. Not only do the rules of the
company require, but the state law requires,
that engineers shall give an alarm at all street
crossings. He could not have proceeded safely
in conformity with the rules of the law. No
one doubts that he was expeditions; no one can
believe there was criminal intent on the part |
of any one connected with this terribly unfor-
tunate affair. The rules of the company re-
quire that all employees shall be on the alert |
especially when at or near passenger stations. |
Pendergast does not claim that he was on the
alert as he says it belonged to others to guard
the rear end of his train while he was engaged
iu his special work. This excuse does not re-
lease him for not having notified the conductor
of his necessary detention. He allowed his en-
gine to pop steam while standing at a station
in violation of the rules. This prevented him
from nearing Lne warning given Hlul Dy IHc
brakeman to pull out as train was coming
on to them" Had he heard ard pulled his
train around the curve just east of the depot
few hundred feet. the collision could not have
occurred. 1t should be said in extenuation
that the approaching engineer did not sound
his whistle in coming into the Ravenna depot,
and that he had no knowledge of the nearness
of the train until the accident actually oc-
Cured,
Train SO, fast freight, with orders to run 80
miles an hour registered to leave Kent at 2:15,
| four minutes after the registered time of the
passenger train. 1t is claimed by the car in
spector and others that train So left within two
minutes after left. Conductor Young of the
| freight train denies this and says that five or
six minutes elapsed before he left Kent. Other
| testimony is somewhat contradictory as to
time, but it is evident that he left sooner than
| he states. Conductor Young admits that he
violated the rules of the company in register
ing an interval of four minutes instead of five.
| The train ran as indicated by the speed recorder
attached to the caboose, 20 miles an hour for
the first three miles, the fourth mile in 2S min
| utes and the last two miles so miles an hour
and was running the san speed until within
| SO rods of the collision. The watchman at the
C,& P. crossing testifies that at lat point the
trains were not more than mile apart and
that 81 arrived at the crossing between two or
three minutes after train had crossed. He
realized danger for he says, ''he said to himself
this is hell of way to railroad" but gives no
reason why he did not block the freight train
aud thus prevent the collision.
When the freight train passed Morgau's
curve, one mile west of where the accident
occurred. Engineer Holnaan failed to sound
his whistle as the rules require, thus notifying
| no tati a Raven0a of a chm train.
At that curve the semaphore at the station was
in plain sight indicating clear track, yet the
the engineer did not see it. The conductor
says he saw it from his caboose as he rounded
the curve but could not see the red tall lights
of train which indicated danger. The engi-
neer saw fagman Boynton's danger signals
but says he was too late TO stop his train.
It should be remembered that while the sem
aphore at Ravenna station indicated a clear
track, being a white light, the tail lights on
train indicated danger. The semaphore was
seen at one mile distance from the collision, but
the engineer did not observe it until within y
of mile and testiies that without air brake:
: on the cars it was impossible for him to stoI
| the train and avoid the calamity, but with all
brakes he could have prevented it. In view o
. the fact that the train was running at SO grea
a speed and the failure of the engineer TO soun(
: the alarm for approaching station and war;
the brakemen to apply the brakes, and thu
: ! further fact of the conductors failure t.
have his train under control in approaching
station in accordance with the company's rule
, , 1 cannot resist the conclusion that both Con
! ductor Young and Engineer Holman were
: guilty of carelessness and neglect of duty.
Also, Barnard Dyer should have exercised
more vigilance and blocked train 81 at the in
; terlocking station, knowing as he did the close
proximity of the two trains.
cannot close this report without discussing
other facts that enter directly into and are con
nected with this unfortunate calamity. 1t will
: be recognized at that it is of the utmost
i importance that rigid rules be adopted and en-
forced by railroad companies and their employ
s es. 1t is equally important that such rules be
| reasonable and Just, and easily complied with
. | 1t would be grossly uni Just to require engin
| eer to stop a heavily loaded train within a spec
e flied distance, unless he had the necessary ap
pliances to accomplish the purpose. This will
: | apply to conductors as well. The order to ap
e ply brakes would be futile unless there were
t sufficient brakes and proper kind to insure
the object TO be attained. 1t is in evidence tina
t there were no air brakes on 81 except on the
O engine. 1t is also in evidence that some heavy
q freight lrs are equipped with air brakes, anC
= some not. Engineer Holman and other.
f did not hesitate to say that had there been all
= | brakes on So, that calamity could have beer
' road companies or the consignors who frequent
Z ly own the cars containing perishable freight
|. | responsible in a measure, for not having thei
o cars equipped with such appliances as will ena
: BILE train crew to perfectly control the train
r and thus avoid collisions.
r. | cannot but regard the failure to do this as
/. papable omission of duty.
h Again, the rules of the company require tha
q an interval of ten minutes shall intervene be
n tween the leaving of passenger trains from
n station. This seems a wise and Just rule bu
4 | another rule permits a fast freight to follow
" passenger train in five minutes. What possible
. excuse can there be for this, when the freight i
IL permitted to run 80 miles an hour, or the SAINT
+ speed usually made by passenger train This
:, can not be other than reprehensible. If it i:
= proper caution to exact an interval of ten min
g utes between passenger trains equipped with all
. brakes, how much more the necessity for ter
r minutes more between passenger and fls
\ freights of same speed l know it is in evidence
: that 90 per cent. of the best railroads adopt the
five minute rule, but l submit 10 an interested
, public, If it is due caution.
There other factors that conspire to make
u railroad accidents frequent and inevitable
g There is an almost insane desire in the mind:
, of a portion of the travelling public to "ge
g there, regardless of casualties danger. Time
i with such is all important. Accidents are mi.
: nor consideration. 1t is passing strange with
what promptness transportation companies will
come to the rescue and say, 1--WE will get you
:. there for if we don't. our rivals will" The law
of demand and supply is as certain in this as in
commercial affairs. The means are surely and
quickly provided, but the results are often toe
g sadly realized. Has not the time come to cry
halt Should not vigilant press, pulpit and
/ platform demand more moderation and less risk
= to human lives? To whom shall the public
4 look for teachers and leaders in creating in.
tellgent public sentiment that will demand ev.
cry precautionary measure that is practicable tc
, insure public safety in railroad travel If trans
portation companies will not do this Of their
, own accord, let the strong arm of the law be
S invoked in behalf of the public welfare.
In carefully reviewing the voiuminous testi
mony in the sad case under consideration can
5 not believe there was criminal intent or Grim
inal neglect on the part of anyone implicated
. nor can believe but each one thought he was
in the conscientious discharge of his duty
Thoughtlessness. and error ia judgment in not
foreseeing probable danger is the fault rather
than recklessness on the part of anyone Ftuls'
I.c