The National tribune., 1891-08-27


siona,ysl Jae-on's u GOO
lltUi.- ht Sr. burg aud vicinity ....,....' S,oou
SHNfun "a llurrrls Ferry and vicinity inlay ,,
lo .' 0' 9ao
Mcdowell nj fredericksburg and vicinity. -O,ooo
Total ao0u
with this statement ] now submit my final
prom sed criticism of why ID was possible ior
jackson with u. 600 men 90 march 10 Harper
Ferry and Mannsburg and, without capture,
10 march back again.
But This suuccs iu raid of Jackson is simply
the key that uu locked the secret chamber aud
opeur1 10 view The methods Of men IN au-
thlritv thni HHaIly eliminated Ia the disgrace
ful results aHd The discomfort OF the soldiers OF
the armies # the Shenandoah. For con-
veuicnce } "a % present my criticism undor the
following special headings;
a. The rains and the floods.
2. 81 Alisnuuagement
3. Politics and prejudice.
4. 4.Jelnu-y and general cusscdness
j. TmE RAINS AND THE FLOODS.
II s. true at for period Of 10 days In the
midst of tbis raid the rain fell in torrents,
swelling tae rivulets into creeks tho creeks
into rivers, uud The rivers into seas, washing
away bridges aui rendering marching almost
iinpas inlc; lut the elements do not respect or
show partiaiIy. neilher % individuals nor 10
armies So tie rain fol- upon the Union and
the Confederate the just and the unjust, alike,
hence in tLis there can be no criticism.
.. AIsMkNAGENEST.
To cutcr into full detail OF all that this one
word suggests would require much more time
and space than can be taken in an article lke
this,
have already referred 10 the typographical
position Of Tie Shenandoah Valley aud its re-
lations 10 tie cuntending armies and especially
the Importance oi the Government occupying II
IN iorce. Had those in authority given less i'm
porauoe 20 the Army OF the Potomac and not
haYt concentrated their enerfy aud means
almost wholly o meet the continuous demands
Of tieu. Aicl Iullan-Whosc inactivity seemed to
b. cHT0uIc-iur rcinlorcements; or, in other
words hsi tho authorities placed force Of
50ue9 mcu 40 otguntoH and made that city the
base oi supplies, AS has boeH already indicated,
thereby occupying or destroying the railroads
leading from the South and Southwest which
We're the main arteries for conveying supplies
o. tho C0ulelerats armies in aud around Rish-
moud, such an army woRld have been suth-
cieutIy large to take care OF itself, and could
Bt the same time corporate with the Army OF
the Potomac. This would, Of necessity, have
changed tie position OF tho Confederate front
at Richmond, and perhaps removed the battle
line Farther south. Bat IN place OF this, what
wu- iha policy Gf the authorities at Washington
toward The Shenandoah Nalley2 Why, they
send Gen. BANKS, with $3.50 men, 10 operate
anywhere iTam Winchester 10 HarrisOHburg.
This number OF men was unnecessarily large
for outpost duty, and was entirely too small for
the protection OF the Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road or the Capital of the Nation. This
theory and argument will also apply TO Gen.
Fremont and a force Of 10000 men, who were
supposed o. operate from New Creek on the
Bait more q OHIO Railroad, to Franklin.
Ir IT WAS THE INTENTION
Of rhc authorities to have Banks aud Fremont
advance and ibrm junction at Stauut0n that
would have been idIotic. Even if tausporta-
tiuu. forage. aud ratiOns had been supplied in
abundance Tor the combined forces, would have
ouly fum shed AN afternoon picnic for the Con-
fedeIates who could have beon taken from
their maiu forces b, Richmond for the occasion,
returning 10 their places in line tic following
Gay. d. tNas rrua, wicked idiOtc mi5maHs
aeruent' THAT psced the troops 0f Fremont
Banks, and gel n the field, and they be eX-
pecied h. perform active aud efficient service
without The means Of transportation, wiki but
littIc food lgT man or beast But such were
ihc facts. There was one man and ono Depart
meut however, that was aud is deserving Of
special communication FOR heroic service per-
formed under hc aforementioned conditions.
] Teer 20 Gen. Fremont and bis command. lie
Obrged orders aud his men followed him. But
~ j have already alluded 30 the distress Of has
army % ls not necessary 70 repeat, further
than 10 say chat have not nor could j, draw
fIe pIoiuTU sufficiently STRONG 10 depict tie
distress 81 Those brave men; and yet they
pushed forward and met jackson at Cross Keys,
aud though numbering 1900 when they left
FEN in, l,Jju iell by the WaysiGG-cithur %
20 10 Sic hospitals on TO thoir graves; 20 when
fhey overlook aHd met the enemy Al Cross
Keys 20 severe Had been the march through
IaiH and Storm Nith chill and hunger, that the
nlen WE.e moro It subjects for Inc hospital
than ior the a4iJie.
Frcmo,a EutH before the battle that the
euomF aeHr.y doubled has own command, aud
he F8ueHt Ha from banks. Sigel aud Mcdowell
IU reply o. IBIS letter 10 Gen. Banks 90 VIM
chester taHt be WAS on Tie eve 0l a battle, and
llT lIm Banks Ia push forward with al his
force Banks replied " ! am here without sup
plies 0T tram rHrtaiiCn and am uUanle 90 move
have sent % day a strong detachment Of cav
airy with instructions 10 reach you it possi-
DIE" From Con. Sgel. a Winchester, IN re-
fpousc 10 q similar request sigel writes:
~ AN EXCEEDINGLY SORRY
that ] could not proceed al once to the scene Of
action 10 assist you, bot the troops under nv
command brought from Harpers Ferry could
scarcely rciac. Winchester, aud were in such a
condition that ID Is necessary 10 prepare thom
ioT Field service before they leave this place.
otherwise they would be an incumbrance aud
Dos help o. ygu."
And Fremont fought the desperate battle Of
Gra-s kcys alone with his own command II
viii give particulars Of TIE battle later But
hHFE j not written enough 10 Just ~ me in
handing my ease 10 an impartial jury, aud
utIHE a verdict Of guilty Of count q mis-
management as ChEFgod1
2. P5IITIos AND PREJUDICE.
That The disturbing Influence of politics and
politicians Was exercising baneiul tendency
at tuIs date l-G2 upon the conduct Of the Wal
catugt be denied. This insidious principle
iii found "a lo1gmeut within the Army of the
Potomac and uU,wIthttABding the success on
OF Hlgorir % our armies Of the West. popular
Interest Dad from the bepinung OF thc war
looked i0 The Army Of tho Potomac for the
gr.atD. achievements ln the subluing Of tie
rebellion. This interest Was no doubt iutepsi.
hu4 by reason Ui tho fact that this army had
tlr dua duty ui protecting iis own Capital and
a. tHe saIi.c tlmU seeking 10 possess TIC CAPITAL
OI tae taHiH4,Tacy.
Gru. - "a .o..au had command and whilst thf
Nu.u-m Army was gaining victories at nearly
every point Mcclellan had for over six months
with lle lAesl equipped army Ia the land. re
manned pract oally inactive. This inactiyity
became ihe subject Of controversy In the army
tla- was LnaIy n taken up by the press aud il
C0ngrs. which resulted IA a Mcclellan ant
autl Mcclellan political party, which mate
rally
Departed HIs STANDING
in tha ARMY and challenged the confidence no
posed by boih the President aud Srcretar,