Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-12-31
JUDGE WOODS DEFENSE.

/
JUDGE WOODS DEFENSE.
1t is one of the singular features, of the
day that an appointee for the next to the
highest judicial tribunal in the country
| should find it necessary to publish a de-
| fense of himself against the charge of
having in lower court altered or modified
his judicial action to suit the political exi-
gencies of a President-elect This is
what has been done in the revival of
pamphlet by Judge Woods, in answer to
attacks on him with reference to his two
/ charges to the United States grand jury at
indianapolis shortly after the election of
! 1888
Judge Woods denies the assertion that
he,irst charged the jury that the advice to
commit or attempt bribery was an offense
whether there was any such attempt or
not and then in his second charge
! declared that there must be a proof of at
tempted bribery in order to make the advice
criminal He purposely omitted any ref
erence to the necessity of an overt act to
complete the offe nse, he says, and left the
grand jury uninStructed on this point.
His reason for doing so was that while he
believed that the advice must be followed
by the attempt in order to complete the
offense, he regarded it as a doubtful point,
and asked the opinion of Senator McDon-
aid. The Senator held that under the
plain reading of the statute the advice to
commit or attempt bribery was COM
plete offense of itself, and Judge Woods,
though not convinced, yielded to the doubt
so far as to omit any reference to this
point Subsequently, after correspond
ence with Judge Harlan, who at first took
McDonald's view, and then on further eX-
animation agreed with Judge Woods, the
latter made up his mind that an attemptto
bribe was necessary to complete the crime
of advising and the grand jury, having
asked further instructions, he in the sec
ond charge told them so plainly.
To the other parts of the story-that the
change in his charge was made after Dud-
lev had threatened that if he was prose-
cuted his pockets would be found ''full of
dynamite" and after Quay and Wana-
maker had visited indianapolis to shut off
the prosecution - Judge Woods makes
some inappoSite replies to the effect that
he never saw Quay or Wanamaker, and
that Dudley had no dynamite that he
feared But he asserts that he never re-
ceived an intimation from anyone that a
change in his instructions was desired, and
makes good defense against the tale of
sudden alteration in his position by the
correspondence, which shows that he had
the question under advisement before he
made his first charge, and was considering
during the interval between that and his
second charge.
With this summary of Judge Woods de-
fense, it is necessary to point out its weak
points. The first is as to the assertion that
he did not in his first charge assert that
advice to commit a bribery was complete
offensa, whether the advice was followed
or not The Judge repels certain reports
of his charge as incorrect, but one he ac-
cepts as correct, and in that report the fol-
lowing language is found:
So read this clause makes 1t an offense
for any one to advise another to attempt to |
commit any of the offenses named in this !
section; so that while it is not crime to |
attempt IL is a crime to advise another to |
make the attempt. If A attempts to bribe |
Z, that is no offense under this statute; but |
IL A advises B TO attempt to bribe C, then |
the one who commends or gives this advice |
is an offender under this law: and will say |
there is some wisdom in this provision. |
Judge Woods asserts that this language |
will be recognized by lawyers as not con-
tanning the significance attributed to it.
Scme lawyers may; but the charge was |
not addressed to lawyers. To laymen it |
was said: 1.-The attempt to bribe is not /
crime; the act must be completed by the
commission of the bribery. But the ad-
vice to attempt is a crime" without fur
ther qualification. Even upon close
analysis of the language it does not
appear that the Judge makes out his case.
Upon his own showing in his first charge
he stated distinction in the legal status
of bribery and that of advice to bribe
The attempt to bribe must be followed by
actual commission to make it an offense,
the advice to bribe is an offense in itself.
On this vital point of the Judges defense
the most charitable comment that can be
made is that it is far from convincing.
Beyond this the Judges statement of his
own course does not strike us as exactly
the one which a great and far-seeing
jurist would take. He regarded the point
as doubtful; so doubtful that he suppressed
it in his first charge. He took the views
of other jurists on it Both at first held
the opinion generally attributed to his
first charge; but the Judge succeeded in
converting one of them to his view, which
by no means cleared away the doubtful
ness of the situation. But finally, after
two months interval, he gives the second
in way that prevented the
prosecution and cut off all hope of appeal
1t would seem when Judge has ranked a
law point as so doubtful that he is justi-
fed in suppressing it in one charge, he
would be justified in continuing the sup
preston until his decision of it could be
reviewed by higher court.
No review of the legal questions in
volved in the charges, is necessary, beyond
the citation of mis- first charge and the
language of the statute The whole case,
as presented by the Judge himself, does
not put him in the light of Marshall or
Taney, or even of Strong or Bradley.
THE RULE OF CRIME.
The activity of footpads in the reSi