Courier Democrat. (Langdon, N.D.) 1891-1920, 1891-06-11
Original Package Decision,


that the original package law passed by
the last congress was valid and constitu
tional, and that it went into effect in all
states where prohibitory laws prevailed
without re-enactment by those states of
laws by which they forbade the sale of
Intoxicating liquors within their bounda-
ries, whether imported from other states
or not. Chief Justice Fuller rendered
the opinion of the court, and the bench
was united in support of the conclusions
to which he arrived at, though Justice
Gray announced that Justices Harlan,
Brewer and himself did not concur in all
the reasoning of opinion of the court.
The case upon which the decision was
rendered was that OF John w. Wilker-
son, sheriff of Shawnee county, Kansas,
appellant, VS.. Charles A. Rahrer, brought
here on appeal from the decision of the
circuit court of the United States for dis
trict of Kansas against the state. Rahrer
was an original package agent at To-
peka, Kas., of the firm of Maynard, Hop
kins & Co., of Kansas City, Mo-, and was
arrested the day after the original pack
age law went into effect. He claimed
the law was unconstitutional, and also
that it could not 60 into operation until
the state had re-enacted its prohibitory
law. The court says the power of a
state to impose restraints and burdens
upon persons and property, in the pro-
motion of public health, good
order and prosperity, is power always
belonging to states, and not surrendered
by them to the general government nor
directly restrained by the constitution of
the United States, and essentially ex-
elusive. The power of congress to regu-
late commerce among the several states,
when the subjects are national in
their nature, it says, is also exclusive.
The constitution does not provide that
interstate commerce shall be free, but by
grant of this exclusive power to regulate
might undertake to regulate it. There
fore it has been determined in the case
of Robbins VS.. Shelby, taxing district,
that the failure Of congress to exercise
this exclusive power in any case is all
expression of its will that the subject
shall be free from restrictions or impo-
sitions upon the several states, and if
state law can be in conflict with the will
OF congress, state and congress cannot
occupy position of equal opposing SOW
ereignty, because the constitution de-
clares it's supremacy, and that of laws
passed in pursuance thereof. That
which is not supreme must yield to that
which is supreme. The court says that
liquors are undoubtedly
subjects of commerce, like any other COM
modify, and are 80 recognized, but new
ertheless it has been often held that laws
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
liquor within state limits does not
necessarily infringe any constitutional
privilege or immunity, this right being
rested, as in Mugler case, upon acknowl-
edged right of states to control their
purely internal affairs, and in so doing
they protect the health. morals and
safety of their people by regulations that
do not interfere with powers of the
general government. Present cases
arises upon the theory of repugnancy
between state law and the interstate
commerce clause of constitutions, and in
wolves distinction between commercial
power and police power, which, though
quite disting1lishable when they do not
approach each other are sometimes, like
colors, so nearly allied as to perplex the
understanding as colors do the vision.
Continuing, the court says: The Iowa
laws held to be un constitutional in the
Leisy original package case, were enact
ed in excess of the state police power and
not at all as the regulations of interstate
commerce, but as it amounted in effect
to the regulation of such commerce it
was held that so long as congress did
not pass any law to regulate specifically
traffic between states on Intoxicating
liquors, or act in such way as to allow
state laws to operate on it, congress
thereby indicated its will that such COM
merce should be free and untrammeled,
and therefore that the laws of Iowa were
imperative in SO far as they amounted
to regulations of foreign or interstate
commerce in inhibiting the reception of
such articles within the state, or their
sale upon their arrival in the form in
which they we're imported. It followed
as corrollarry that when congress acted
at all the result of its action
must be imperative. as restraint upon
that perfect freedom which it's silence
insured. Congress has now spoken and
declared that imported liquors shall
upon arrival in the state fall within the
category of domestic articles of similar
nature. Continuing, the court says:
The law of congress did not allow the
state to act, but simply removed the i'm
pediment to the enforcement of the state
laws in respect to imported packages
in their original condition, created
by the absence of specific ut
terance on it's part. It
impaired no power to state not then
possessed, but allowed imported prop
erty to fall at once upon arrival within
local jurisdiction. Liquor arrived in
Kansas prior to the passage of act of
congress, but there is no question pre-
sented of the right of the importer to
withdraw property from the state, nor is
it perceived that congressional enact
ment is given retroactive operation by
holding it applicable to transaction oc-
curing after 1t took effect. 1t
is not a case of law enacted
in the unauthorized exercise of
power exclusively confded to congress,
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