Arizona republican., 1891-12-17

neIu dDOuJ JHls TenldrhdDle campaign WIS that his lieutenant, Gen. Thomas. with a corps of about 120O0 men under Gen. D. NJ. Stanley, and an indefinite force of mounted and dismounted cavalry, could hold the line of the Tennessee river and keep Hood south of it. He afterward added the Twen- ty-third corps, under Gen. J. NJ. Schofeld, 10000 strong, which he detached from his main army before starting for the sea.
 In point of fact, Hood went around the Union army, supposed to be guarding the southern border of Tennessee, and once across the river made for Columbia, on Duck river, the direct route to Nashville The ever alert Forrest preceded him and was on the point of seizing the crossings of the river when the advance of the Union army under Schofeld, falling back by forced marches upon Nashville, came up to dispute the way. Schofeld held and fortified Columbia.
 Meanwhile, Gen. J. H. Wilson, a cavalry man under Sheridan in Virginia, had reached Tennessee to lead Thomas cav airy. When he reached the front along Duck river he found his troopers coping with Forrest, who was bent on crossing above Columbia, east, to seize roads lead ing to Spring Hill, in Schofeld's rear, so as to cut him off from Nashville. Wilson warned Schofeld to abandon Columbia, and strangely enough drew back his own force by route farther east through Hurts Corners and Mount Carmel, leaving the road open to Forrest to dash on to Spring Hill.
 But Schofeld, for all, had the inside track to the key point, and acting on Will sons warning had sent Gen. Stanley with all speed back from Columbia toward Spring Hill It was the 29th of November, the day of all others in 1864 when, if luck counts at all in war, the Confederacy had a last chance. At noon that day Stanley s men double quicked into Spring Hill and soon began to light with Forests troopers for the mastery. Forrest was beaten and Stanley held the road open.
 Yet Forrest was not Hoods best card in this game. At the head of his leading division, a crack body of men under the intrepid Gen. Cleburne he had crossed Duck river at Huey's, and at noon of that day was marching boldly northwestward to the pike between Columbia and Spring Hill, and between Stanley's isolated divi- sion and Schofield's main force at Colum. bia Moreover, he had left the corps of
 
 front of Columbia to attack Schofeld and push him along the pike into the trap pre- pared for him at Spring Hill At that moment there was nothing to stay the march of Hoods 10000 Confederates on Nashville, Louisville and the north except Stanley's band of 4,O00 men at Spring Hill and a mob of unorganized recruits and convalescents at Nashville with Thomas
 The hope of the west lay with Schofleld, and he was virtually surrounded and cut off at Columbia. Hoods hope-the forlorn chance of the south-lay in placing a wall of bayonets across the pike and shutting Schotield off at Spring Hill, when the Union army in the west would be at his mercy. This was unexpected good fortune for Hood and second only to Sherman's aban- donment of the pursuit. And Sherman's s theories that Hood would follow him to the sea, or that Thomas would hold him south of the Tennesseei Here was a hole in them both as fatal as a rent in a balloon. It was only the turn of hand that Lincoln's fears and Grants final doubts would be justified and Spring Hill come to count for more in history than Gettysburg or Vicksburg. Calling Gems. Cheatham and Cleburne to his side, Hood directed their eyes upon the pike where Schofeld's wagons and their infantry guards were moving from Colum- bia back to Spring Hill. Said he to Cheat ham, General, do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape usi Go with your corps, take possession of that pike at or near Spring Hill. Do this at once"
 His subordinates moved away to obey this command and himself to order up an-