The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-20
enable you to get it, by a roundabout road,
to it's required destination.

to its required destination.
During the Ashantee war, when the tele-
graph lines through Spain were blocked,
that via Constantlnople to London was
open. During the war of 1870, the German
headquarters on the march from Metz to
Sedan daily obtained their news of French
doings from Paris. via London. During
the lie Mans campaign, when direct COM
munication between flank. and flank, seven
miles apart, was impossible, complete and
effective communication WAS established by
telegraphing along a circuitous route 24O
miles long.
When Napoleon inveighed against opera
lions such as that by which the concentra-
sian armies in the northern angle of loz-
e~nged-shaped Bohemia, he never dreamed
of the possibility of being able to main
tain the constant, certain and secure com
munication between the divided forces
that was maintained in 1866 between those
armies. by means of the electric telegraph.
Communication by electric telegraph is a
most powerful strategy which did not ex-
list, was not even dreamed of. in the
Napo!eonic era of war. In discussing the
changes in both strategy III tactics, which
modern inventions have necessitated, the
mind is so full of steam vessels and rail-
ways and improved rifle and field guns,
that we are prone to slur over the inn
portance of the electric telegraph.
In using the n,axims of the great war
lIhSNSlp Va ul0 hAANA
first half of the nineteenth centuries, in any
criticism of recent military operations, tho
rapiditv, certainty, and security with which
messages can be transmitted, orders sent,
and communication between widely-sepa
rated forces maintained, must be reckoned
with. Its great Importance can best be re-
allied by a careful study of Moltke's plan
for the invasion of Bohemia.
The moro that plan is examined, the
sounder IL wiser it appears, though 1t
1-z- A-.~ kN Il - rnl r~SupN NuivN @
ciple to which Napoleon attached the ut
most Importance.
By the promptness with which Moltke
seized the moment when circumstances
/ most favored the passage of the mountains
into Bohemia, he made evident the
him. He was not responsible
| for the dispersion OF the army into
| those two units, SO far removed one from
| the other. That dispersion is an instance
| of where the exigencies of political compll,,
/ cations were allowed to outweigh strategical
| considerations. He had not moved those
| two armies in Saxony and Silesia respect
| lively with a view to the effective invasion of
| Bohemia. They were already in those
provinces, which they occupied not
but to meet the complicated
requirements of the political situation
prior to the declaration OF war, and while
the question of war or peace still hung in
the balance. Inc proDlem petofe Moluhe
was, how he could most safely and most
quickly insure the mutual cooperation OF
those two armies for the purpose Of
giving battle before Austria-the
nnrondv--could concentrate and make
ready for it. He did not, he could not,
eliminate from his scheme all elements Of
danger. What great general has ever been
able to do 30? He adopted the boldest course
open to him, generally the safest III the
end, md fearlessly grasping the nettle dan
ger, crushed its sting by the iirmness OF his
grip.
Why Benedek acted MS he did ls a ques-
ton beyond the scope and question: of this
article. What l wish to discuss hero ~:
| What better course than the plan he adopt
I, ed was open to Moltke ut the beginning or
this ''Seven Weeks War;" when he found
| The Austriuns were concentratin0 ~ NJ
ravia and not in Bohemia? We must not
forget that, as already stated. the Prusatan
J forces had boon and were still oivlusA