The morning call., 1891-08-30

please the party and insure harmony among
the factions. 1t was impossible. however,
to Salty tine different wings. There were
number OF men in the party determined to
rule or ruin. Balmaceda Is an even-terl-
pered. broad-minded man of great forbear-
ance, and he acQuleSced in the demands of
the Liberal leaders as long as possible.
When it became evident that to further SUBJ
NIT to Congressional despotism would be
virtually TO abdicate his office serious trouble
began. Congress refused to pass appropri-
alton bills and charged that the President
had candidate to succeed him, whom he
was trying to force upon the country To
settle this difficulty Balmaceda appointed
the gentleman in question t. a Cabinet office,
thus removing him from the list of candi-
dates. Notwithstanding Congress has no
power of impeachment, the majority passed
resolution declaring the Presidents Office
vacant because OF his failure to submit to
Congressional dictation. Then. on January
7th, there came the open rebellion. The op-
position majority in Congress declared it
self the Government, went on board mem
of-war with mutinouS naval officers and
secured the coast for place TO land. With
the navy in state of mutiny it became im-
peratiyely necessary to maintain internal
order at any price. The majority in Con-
gress, having disrupted the Government,
the President was left without one of the
Constitutional branches of the Government.
Because these members of Congress had
themselves violated the constitution, de-
oauched the navy and abandoned their
posts, 1t did not follow that the President
should abandon his. The obligation on
him was greater to remain and protect in
ternal order and the external safety of the
State"
CONSUL FLINT's VIEWS.
- The recently appointed Chilean Consul
General at New York, Charles r. Flint, has
always been warm supporter of Balmaceda
and was unprepared to believe his chief had
been defeated. In an interview he said:
o me 1t hardly seems possible, much less
probable, that President Balnaceda has met
with defeat, because he had every advantage
In his favor from the beginning. His army
was greatly superior in numbers to that of
the insurgents, and he also had practically
an impregnable position. OF course, this is
merely conjecture on my part, because | am
without particulars, but | believe if he had
been defeated it was because something hap
pened for which he was not prepared at the
outset. 1t has been said more or less
and a large number of them NAV
probably have deserted at a critical
moment, and should they have taken
sides with the insurgents, his position would
nave been so weakened, Of course, that an
easy victory over him would have been a
natural result. That is the only reason or
explanation possible for me to offer for his
defeat"
DO you think that this battle will end
the warp"
" do not think so, unless President Bal
maceda and his principal lieutenants are
now prisoners in the hands of the insur-
gents. II that proves 10 be the case the
trouble VIII, l suppose, end where it is.
But II the President succeeded in reaching
Santiago, where he has another large force
OF troops concentrated. the situation viii
be somewhat different"
The ConSul-General states that Balmaceda
Will now concentrate his forces about San
tago, and If he has prestige enough 10 re-
call his troops to his standard he Will still
have larger army. At Santiago the rebel
heet Will be OF no value, and the Government
would still have the advantage. He,-since
the 9th inst, had received no advices from
Santiago.
CHICAGO. Aug. 90. - -Lieutenant-Com-
mander Todd, executive officer of the Uni
ted states cruiser Charleston, who was in
this city to-day, received the news of Bal
maeeda's defeat with some incredulity. He
sad he found il hard to believe that Balma-
ceda was oyerthrown. He knew that when
the Charleston was in Chilean waters
Balmaceda's forces outnumbered those of
the Congressional party two to one
Then, toe, the talk of the strength of
the insurgents navy was largely eXagger-
ated. At the same time, Todd said, people in
Chile could be readily bought, and no
change in the relative strength of the
armies need cause great surprise.