New-York tribune., 1891-05-17

part. The neutral Powers, moreover, "eic
ing very solicitous about the independence ol Do %
mark Palmerston threatened to send Dfi.Sn 40,
feet into the Baltic. Napoleon, though at tne
time friendly TO Prussia, was exhibiting resv
lessness which made all his neighbors uneasy lhe
situation. in short, was becoming strained.
bismarck thereupon sent General Manteunel 10
Vienna TO stien the resolution of the Government
and he succeeded in his mission Then the Lonuoh
Conference was proposed by the neutral fo"eiS'
but before il met Bismarck urged the Importance
Of striking another military blow nnd so the DOM
bardment and storming Of the Danish for's aV
Duppel followed, emphasizing the determination ol
the German Powers and exercising the desired
pressure upon the conference. AS to the proceeo-
ings of that body, Sybels account reads ike
comedy From the first there was nothing 10 oe
hoped or expected, and nobody Knew this SO wen
as Bismarck The Danish representatives carried
instructions which made them deaf TO every COM
promise proposition. They soon realized that there
was no longer any hope of interference by any OF
the neutral Powers. Their long reliance upon
the sympathy of England failed them at last But
the Eider-Danish policy was still dominant, and an
arrogant and iniexible face was offered to Europe
One or two short truces resulting in nothing, con-
stituted the whole fruit Of the London Confer
ence, which finally dispersed baffied Bismarck.
vinoed the neutral Powers that Denmark was
wholly in the wrong, and had made assurance
doubly sure that no material aid would be offered
her. The general feeling was that as she had made
her bed so she must lie upon it, and it only re-
manned to play out the last act in the drama.
The occupation of the island of Alsen. which
quickly followed the failure of negotiations,
brought the Danes to their last ditch At last the
people realized the position into which the Elder
Danish party had brought them BY deliberate
adoption of policy Of aggrandzement, founded
on bad faith and sheltered under the plea of a
Jingo patriotism, they had actually lost two
ffths of their territory and population. BY the
systematic oppression of the German element in
the Duchies, moreover, they had kindled so fierce
and enduring a race hatred that no voluntary
union between Schleswig Holstein and Denmark
was longer possible; while coercion had ceased
to be practicable with the complete collapse of the
Danish military arm The Danes had been slow
to learn, but they were quick to act when once
their eyes were opened. The Eider-Danish party
fell at once and its representatives in the Cabinet
were forced to resign new Ministry was ap-
pointed, and negotiations for peace were i'm
mediately opened with the German Powers. At
this point new danger threatened Prussia.
Events had made it apparent that absolute sepa~
ration of the Duchies the sole possible basis
of stable peace But this seemed to involve
the crucial problem of the future government of
the Duches Austria willing that Augusten-
berg should be declared sovereign Duke of
Scheswig- Holstein. Bismarck had quite other
ends in view. but he could not state them TO his
ally at this iuncture. He adroitly postponed
the crisis by suggesting that after peace had been
arranged definitely the Confederate Diet could
enter upon the consideration of all the claims to
the sovereignty Of the Duchies. and that in the
meantime a Joint government by Austria and
Prussia could be maintained.
Sybel makes it perfectly clear, though he does
not say so expressly, that neither Rochberg nor
his successor was any match for the Prussian
Minister. In fact no European statesman Of the
time could cope with him, and Austria, even had
she been better served could not escape the destiny
that was being prepared for her in two ways; both
in the Cabinet and the camp. II may he said
that really cOnsummate statesnlanship wonld have
avoided the war with Austria which was to follow
and grow out of the Schleswig Holstein difficulty.
But that view cannot be maintained. Sooner
later death-grapple between Austria and Prussia
was inevitable. The craftsmanship of Bismarck
is shown in the postponement of the final arbitra-
ment of the sword until his country was fully
prepared for war, and in the accomplishment of
ripeness of her military power, be enlarged her
territory, extended her prosperity, and even en-
ployed her rival as willing If unconscious instru-
ment for these ends. Moreover Bismarck ex-
hibited mastery tact in his choice Of times. No
foreign war was ever forced upon him. He
selected the occasion always himself. He calcu-
lated alliances and the probabilities of outside
interference very closely, and he had to do SO,
being compelled to deal with German cnmites
and jealouses quite as constantly as with external
foes. In the Schleswg- -Holstein affair he appears
at his best. He himself according to Sybel, has
| always been prouder Of what he accomplished then
than of any other event in his life: and he is
represented as saying that it the hardest work
he ever did In truth, he failed in nothing
Every detail Of his complex plan carried out
to the end, precisely as he desired and intended
His diplomacy was as unerring and comprehensive
as Moltke's strategy.
Sybel's luminous presentation Of the Schleswig-
Holstein case may well be studied as capital ex-
ample of the highest kind of modern EUROPEAN
craftsmanship and the more it is examined the
greater must Bismarck's genius appear. Such
difficulty as may be experienced in mastering and
holding the many and entangled threads of the
situation will be more than compensated by the
depth of the insight gained into affairs which TO
this day have not been understood by the greater
part of Europe. rot TO speak of America, which,
! when these events happened, too deeply alb
sorbed in her own life-or-death struggle to pay
much attention to them.
| DAINTTES IN GREEK POETRY