The record-union., 1891-04-12

Kent in his Commentaries, that the power
has not been exercised by the King since
1892 is significant example for us. Pre-
sumably in 300 years much legislation has
been enacted in England which had not
the royal favor, but so long as royal pre-
negatives were untouched the veto was
also unused.
Mr.. Hamilton, in No. 73 of the FEEDER
dItSt, says:
''The primary inducement to confer
ring the power in question upon the Ex-
ecutive is to enable him to defend him
self; the secondary, is to increase the
chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws through
haste, inadvertance or design"
This was the view universally accepted
at the adoption of the Constitution. There
was no suggestion that the President
should in ordinary matters of legislation
interpose his personal and individual
judgment. Yet in practice now it has
come to this.
President Grant in many instances
took up bills for the relief of individuals
and vetoed them, although passed with
deliberatiOn and after full reports and de-
bates. In the case of Nelson Tiffany, n
Union soldier for whose relief Congress
passed a bill, General Grant returned it
with his objections, Notwithstanding
which the House passed the bill again by
IT'S ayes and l no, and the Senate by 40
ayes and no noes.
Mr.. Cleveland returned $50 pension and
relief bills where his private opinion
differed from that of Congress and
pocketed fOrty-seven more, although he
signed many hundreds of similar ones.
Neither of these Presidents acted within
the Interpretation given the Constitution
| by Mr.. Hamilton in these cases.
Mr.. Kent says: 1.-The qualified negative
of the President upon the formulation of
laws is, theoretically at least, soma ad-
ditional security against the passage of
improper laws, through prejudice, or
want of due consideration; but it was
principally intended to give the President
a constitutional weapon to defend the ex-
ecutIve department, as well as the just
balance Of the Constitution against the
Usurpations of the legislative power"
He further says: ITO enact laws is q
transcendent power, and if the body that
possesses it be a full and equal repre-
sentation Of the people, there is danger of
its pressing with destructive weight upon
all the other parts of the machinery of
Government. It has, therefore. been
thought necessary, by the most slzillful
and most experienced artists in the
science of civil polity, that strong barriers
should be erected for the protection and
security of the other necessary powers of
the Government"
All commentators agree with the opin
ion expressed by Mr.. Hamilton and Mr..
Kent
A bill must first go to committee.
Here it has discussion, investigation;
witnesses are brought, evidence taken;
all the departments of Government are
consulted for facts essential to the in
quiry; it is submitted to the House or
Senate and undergoes the fire of open de-
bate. 1t goes to the other House and is
again examined in committee and again
in open session. Notwithstanding all
this 1t may encroach upon some Of the
powers of the executive or judicial
branch of Government. 1t may be bad
! law through the haste, inadvertence or
design of Congress, and the President
should arrest its passage by calling at
tkntion to these objections. But he has
no power under any Interpretation of the
Constitution to resolve himself into
part of the Legislature and undertake to
judge of the wisdom OF the law unless it
| be clearly an encroacbment upon other
powers than those possessed by Congress.
or unless it be bad law passed through
| inadvertence, haste or design. To con-
cede more than this is to erect q branch
Of Congress at the White House. 1t is TO
constitute the President the equivalent Of
two-thirds of both houses of Congress;
it is TO admit that he may, without calling
his action in question, retain every bill
submitted to him during the last ten
days of each session and refuse to ap-
prove or disapprOVe, and thus defeat all
| legislation for that time. The letter of
the Constitution gives this power, but
must it be read literally, or in the light of
! contemporaneous Interpretation and of
! its obvious meaning? How long would
! Congress allow its power to impeach to
remain dormant, if a President were to
announce and act upon the assumption
that his private and personal judgment
must be convinced upon all bills, or he
would veto them?
| The people choose their representatives
to make their laws, and the President to
| execute them. His share in making them
! is so inconsiderable that he is not chosen
| with any reference to law-making ca
| pacity. To assume legislative functions
| as such, which an unrestricted right to
veto all measures implies, would be such
usurpation as would demand his removal
! by the only constitutional method.
! The peril is not an imaginary one. The
tendency Of Executives throughout
| the Union is to assume legislative func-
| tionS, and bring members of legislative
! bodies to realize that measures are far
| from becoming laws when passed by
| both houses.
| The duties of our President are oner-
Gus and multiform. Few men can stand
! the mental and physical strain. Likewise
! the life of a useful Congressman is most
| laborious one. The great mass of the
| work of Congress is distributed among
| many comm 1ttees, whose labors are con-
/ slant and eXhauSting. But where are we
! TO find a mortal man capable of doing all
the executive work Of the President, and
add to it the duty of reviewing all the
| work Of Congress. 1t Is simply prepos-
ferrous and was never intended. But il
our fundamental law empowers him to
pass originally upon all bills, it also de-
/ wolves upon him the duty, and he cannot
lei, Nv 10
tions. Either the country must hold him
responsible for all laws. in which case il
must give him machinery to pass upon
| them equal to that of Congress, or it must
hold Congress responsible and excuse the
| Executive.
But let us keep strictly to the higher
ground that the President passes beyond
his powers when he invokes his private
judgment upon an ordinary measure in
Yolying no infraction of the Constitution,
no encroachment upon the other co-ordi-
nate branches of Government, and
neither haste or inadvertance or bad
motive is TO be imputed TO it. The Presi-
dent may grant pardons and reprieves
except in cases of impeachment. This
power is absolute and in terms unlimited,
and yet general Jail delivery or an in
| discriminate and wholesale exercise of
/ the power would justify Impeachment.
So of the power to return bills with his
objections. He must exercise the power
reasonably and within the lines so clearly
drawn by Mr.. Hamilton.
If it had been intended that this power
should be legislative in its nature and ex-
ercised as such, it is not conceivable that
the trainers of the Constitution would
have given the prodigious advantage to
the President of making his negative
equivalent to an affirmative two-third
of both houses of Congress. Such con-
struction would add immensely to the
already great coercive powers of the