The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-06-07
MARCH TO THE SEA.
Continued from page 9.

Combahee rivers. The distance done each
day was from ten to fifteen miles. His
great danger was, that when he passed
Columbia and pushed further north.
the terrible Lee would pounce down
upon him in superior force, somewhere be-
tween the Great Pedee and Cape Fear
rivers. For Lee to sit still near Richmond
whilst Sherman joined hands with Gen.
eral Grants army, meant the destruction
of his army, and no one understood this
better than the great Southern leader him.
self. From the first, called upon to fight
against largely superior forces, he had
won his most remarkable victory
chiefly through his thorough appreciation
of the advantages of interior lines. No
skill in availing himself of the chances
which central position. between two or
more hostile armies, afforded. That was
now, more than ever, Lees position. Would
he gather up all his available strength,
shake himself clear of Grants army
by his suddenness, secrecy and quickness
of his movements, and swoop down upon
Sherman and utterly destroy him before
Grant could arrive TO his assistance? That
was the great question for Sherman
as he laid his plans for a march
due northward from Savannah. 1t very
evident, from his correspondence at this
time, how constantly this point was in
his mind. In writing to General Grant he
impressed upon him that in the calcula-
tons for his march, northwards he as
sumed that Lee would not be allowed TO
escape for the purpose of crushing him;
that Grant would, in fact, hold on tightly
10 Lees TAIL and force him to face about
and fight before he could reach Sherman's
army. In Grants letters to Sherman he
assures him he will do this. In one he
writes: "Of course ] shall not let Lees
army escape if can help it, and will not
let it go without following to the best of
nv ability"
Although by this time Sherman had
done great things which had spread his
fame lar and near throughout the North
ern states, he still felt no assured conf
dence in his own powers. In writing to
his friend, General Halleck, from Savan-
nah, he says: From you expect full
and frank criticism of my plans for the
errors before it is to late" His was no
ambitious soul, and like General Grant, as
l have already stated, he had at the
outset of the war aspired to no high posi-
ton. As early as August, 1861.
he impressed upon Mr.. Lincoln
his extreme desire TO serve in
a subordinate capacity, and in no
Here was n most successful general, deeply
read in the science of his profession, en-
dowed with that true genius which enables
men TO win battles, expressing diffidence
in his own powers. Mr.. Lincoln's answer
to Sherman upon this occasion is worthy
of record: HE promised me this with
promptness, making the iocular remark
that his chief trouble was to find places for
the too many generals who wanted to be
at the head of affairs, to command armies,
etc."
Columbia was occupied February II,
1865, the enemy having left it to the care
of small body of cavalry. Three days
afterward the march was continued IN
due northerly direction to Winsboro',
from where the army wheeled to the right,
making east for Fayetteville. on the Cape
Fear river. The enemy was bewildered
and at a loss to devise what point Sherman
aimed at. The result of this movement
was the evacuation of Charleston the 18th
and of Wilmington the ODD of February.
General Sherman reached Fayetteville
March II, after a tedious march over ex-
tremely bad country roads. which he had
TO corduroy almost the whole distance to
make them passable for his guns and wag-
ons. On the ed of that month the army
entered Goldsboro' after some heavy
skirmishing. The confederate gener-
al 10 Johnston was again in
command of the forces opposed
to Sherman, q fact which made the latter
much more cautious and circumspect than
he had been previously in his movements.
The result was he lost some good oppor-
tunities of crushing the very inferior forces