The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-27
ers and a practical staff to maneuver and

erB n a practical staff to vancouver and
to move large bodies Of troops in presence
of the enemy to the best possible tacti cal
advantage. The objective point of Moltke's
strategy was not the important fortresses or
positions. or even the capital of the enemy,
but the enemy's field armies. Destroy them
first, and the other objects of the war fall
as a matter of course into your possession.
Such was the theory of his strategy. and for
years he had educated men to be the leaders
capable of carrying it out successfully.
No man can be a great general or Or
ganiZer of armies for victory who is always
looking back, content to prepare his army
to meet the tactics Of any previous war, no
matter how recent. The wise general peers
far ahead, we'll into the distance, so that he
may be able to picture mentally what war
will be in the future. He studies not only
the inventions and most recent discoveries
in applied science, and the improvements
in mechanical implements of the day, but he
catches eagerly at those which he sees loom
ing in the distance. He questions him
self how all these can be most usefully en-
listed and most promptly and eficaciously
adopted in his army. He is eager to adopt
new ideas. The man who is now content
to merely drill and train his army for a
system Of warfare even as recent as that
waged in 1870, with the breech-loadin2
epoch, may be an admirable sergeant major
but he is not even a good peace general, and
he can never be q good leader. Th army
upon which he expends so much care and
energy, WHOM tested by actual warfare, will
be found wanting in fighting, efficiency.
adversary in tactical knowledge, and
in the application of modern invon-
tions to ~tactics; and those he COM
mands, the rank and file, a. we'll as the Of
ticers, must be we'll trained in the new sys-
tenn Of tactics he has thus elaborated to
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must train his army, and prepare it tacti-
cally for q warfare to be waged with high
explosives and magazine arms. and in
which balloons, the electric light and Cycles
are made use of. Masses of cavalry, sup
ported by large bodies of mounted infantry
will be in action, and heavily engaged for
days, perhaps for a week or fortnight, be-
fore the main body of the army can reach
the front. Of the two c%ontending forces,
that which has been best practiced at such
work and in night maneuvers, all other
things being equal. will most surely win.
The victories Of Prussia in 1866 and Of
Germany In 1870 were. however, very differ
emit affairs from the victories Of Frederick
the Great.
In these latter the individuality Of the
king-general in command entered ns largely
as that Of Napoleon did at Austerlitz.
Frederick's battles were won by Frederick,
but who could say that K%oniggrata or
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William? Still stranger, who could say
that they we're won by Moltke? And still
more strange, ii would be impossible to say
by what individual general they were won.
IL IN, however, quite certain
that for these Germany is much
indebted to Moltke. He it was
who took care that tho great military ma
chine WAS always In working order, and the
army maintained in tho highest state of
efficiency, the men we'll drilled, and, above
all things, highly trained in all war opera
tione. He tool care that IL was no fuss
aud Feathers and gold lace army, devoted
n,aohine, constructed to perform certain
national work. He did not train 1t with a
view to amuse idle people, but to light for
tile king in defense of his kingdom,
and for the attainment Of the natu-
rnl aspirations Of the great German
rt.oe. When shall we have u similarly
efficient little army, which, az far as ii goes,
ought to DO and can be made the finest