The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1891-05-14

in the statute of Perjury is as de-
finitely established by usage in this
country, not to speak of that of the
rest of the civilized world from anci-
emit times, as is the meaning of the
word witness" in the same statute
and in the other parts OF the Grim
inal code, or the meanings of any Of
the other words above mentioned.
Usage may be resorted to for the
purpose of interpreting words of
statute where their meaning is un-
certain. (Civil Code s. 81
"Where the statute, speaking on
some points, is silent as to others,
usage may we'll supply the defect,
especially il it is not inconsistent
with the statutory directions, where
any are given; or where the statute
uses language of doubtful import,
the acting under it for long course
of years may we'll give an interpreta-
ton to that obscure meaning, and
reduce that uncertainty to q fixed
rule, optimus legis interpres cOnsuetudo
which is sometimes termed contsmpo-
ranea erpositio." lord Broughsm in
!. Magistrates of Dunbar vs.. Duchess
of Roxburghe, 3 Cl. & Fin. 283.
The oath in common use in the
courts of this Kingdom is the one
meant by all of our statutes which
refer to judicial oaths, and is there
by, both by the courts and the sta
tutes, recognized as legal oath.
TO the defendants contention
that the allegation OF the indictment
that the "oath was then and there
required by law, and the requiring
of it was then and there authorized
by law" being stated coniunctively
instead of disjunctively as in the
statute, is bad unless the statutes
show an express mandate to the JUS
tice in question to administer the
oath, we answer that the point is i'm
material; it is sufficient ii, consist
emily with the statute, the oath is
found to be required by law, or the
requiring of it authorized by law.
We therefore override the first
ground of the demurrer.
The second ground is: at does not
appear from said indictment that the
facts or allegations to which, as said
indictment charges, this defendant
falsely swore, as therein set forth,
were material to the issue then
pending, as described in said indict-
ment."
The law in this regard is that the
statements alleged to have been
falsely sworn and thereby constitut-
ing the crime OF perjury must be
alleged to be material to the issue in
which they were given, or they must
appear to be material from the ma
ture of their information. " / do not
mean that the particular fact sworn
to must be Immediately material to
the issue, but that it must have such
a direct and immediate connection
with material fact as to give weight
to the testimony on that point"
Estate v. Hathaway, 2 n. & McC. 118;
10 Am. Dec. $50; 4 Grim. Def. 1861
The indictment alleges that il was
ga material fact to be proved that
said All Wal on, to-wit, the 18th day
of July, 1890, and in the night time
of said day, did unlawfully, wilfully
and maliciously set fire to and burn
the dwelling house Of one Ahung,
situate in Honolulu aforesaid, which
said dwelling house was then and
there occupied by and had as its in
mates said Ahung and others" If
this charge had been proved against
All Wal it would have convicted him
of arson in the first degree. The in
dictment against Angee charges that
in the examination he stated under
oath that Sc he, said Angee, lives in q
house adjoining said Ahung. That
he, said Angee, was at home on the
night of July 18th, 1890; that he,
said Angee, saw fire and ran out;
that he, said Angee, saw said All
Wal standing at the makai Eva gate /;
that the house on fire was the one
nearest to that gate and was Ahung's
house; that the blaze was underneath
the house; that when All Wal saw
him, said Angee, said All Wal ran !;
that the said Angee cried out, All
Wal, you set the house on fire. that
the said All Wal then threw kero-
sene bottle at him, said Angee. which
said bottle hit against the wall and
broke; that said All Wal tried to
open the said gate and run out, but
he, said Angee, ran and seized said
Ali Wal by said All Wai's side; that
An Wal then struck him, said Angee
with knife and knocked him, said
Angee, down, and then he, said All
Wal, escaped. That said house was
then and there occupied by said
Aiming and others" and makes the
following assignments of perjury
Whereas IN truth and in fact
the said All Wal was not on the
night of said July 18th, 1890, stand
ing at said makai Eva gate; thai
said All Wal did not throw a kero
sene bottle at said Angee; that said
Angee did not seize said All Wa
by his, said All Waits, side; tina
said All Wal did not strike sai6
Angee with knife or otherwise
nor did said All Wal knock sait
Angee down, nor did said All Wa
run away from said premises. And
whereas, in truth and in fact, said Al
, Wal was not on said premises at a
during the night of said July 26tl
or morning of July 18th aforesaid
!, and that said All Wal did not 81
! fire to said dwelling house Of Alum
! as aforesaid, all of which the sal
Angee then and there we'll knew"
The sworn statement charged
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