Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-11-22

reached a position opposite the French
right, which was then believed, at army
headquarters, to be no further north than
Montigny'
Then, again, it must be remembered that,
at noon, General Steinmetz, hearing the
very heavy firing at Verneville, naturally
concluded the Second army had then
reached the French right, and was already
closely engaged with it. He was, however,
warned by the Kings headquarters not to
take this firing of itself US signal for his
attack. But vet, if accused of beginning
his attack on the French left too soon, he
might fairly plead in defence of the hour
when he began it, that his calculations as
| to when the attack on the second army on
| the French right would begin to tell, had
been thrown out six hours by the Prince s
unexpected orders to the Twelfth Corps
Another Mistake of the Crown Prince.
| Won Moltke, however, acquits him of
| blame, and SAYS the French General owed
his escape to the recall, by order of the
Crown Princes headquarters, of the two
cavalry divisions, which had been detailed
| to pursue him. This order of recall had
been issued without due reflection. A re-
| port has been received from Rheims that
the French were there in force, and in over
haste it was accepted as true. This is
had to quickly weigh the value of reports
so received in the field, and to plan opera
tions upon their appreciation and their
reading of them. know of nothing more
difficult in the many responsibilities which
fall to the lot of commander. The great
est GOODNESS of head and clearness of vision,
knowledge of your enemy, and the most
intimate and thorough appreciation of the
topography, is required. So many of even
go. Tofc ~ rfo1
by the circumstantiality of the evidence
forthcoming to prove some report, such
large proportion of officers sent to recon-
noitre and obtain reliable information are
disposed to magnify the forces of the enemy
which they encounter, or see at q distance,
that very judicial mind indeed is required
to duly weigh what they are told, even
upon ''the best authority" And yet sue
cess in war depends very much upon being
able to discover or divine, not only the
enemys actual movements, but his objects,
plans and intentions. Without this gift
for gift it is, no man can ever be successful
as an independent leader in the field.
Caution Characteristic of Won MoIrke.
In the instance referred to, the over-readi-
ness with which this report was believed at
the Grown Princes headquarters, is strik-
ing contrast to the great canton with which
Won Moltke accepted the information he
obtained of MacMahon's Nothernly move
ment towards Metz. 1t was not until his
mind was positively assured about it that he
ordered the great change of direction in the |
march of the German armies which finally |
cut off MaeMahon from Metz, and which |
led to the battle and capitulation of Sedan. |
Won Moltke does not draw attention to |
this contrast, but think we may assume it |
was in his mind when he wrote his story |
In any case, the record of the two different |
modes in which important news and reports
received at headquarters were dealt with,
are very instructive. 1t may possibly sug-
gest to some who have not considered the
point before an explanation, if not de-
fence, of Wellington's very cautious move
ments when he received the first news of
inroad upon the allied armies at
the opening OF the Waterloo campaign.
end, deploring the slipshod manner In
which the translation of this book has been
given to the English and American public.
The mistakes are very numerous, and they
are very perplexing, even to the soldier
we'll acquainted with the history of which
it is meant to be a popular epitome. What
must it be to the uninitiated civilian?
WoLSELEY.