The Russellville Democrat., 1891-05-07
A YANKEE TRICK.

As a Soiuief uuuef bWO &OVerlllueut5
 have fought Sepoys, Boers, Hotten-
 tots, Maoris, Indians, Malays and civil
 ized white men, but for real, downright
 ferocity and dogged perseverance give
 the medal to the Afghans. Such a
 thing as cowardice is unknown among
 them. They are ready for fight at a
 moments notice. and they can stand
 the cold steel and grape and canister
 longer than any white troops I was ever opposed to. They are fanatics to
 the last drop of blood, and when an
 enemy fully believes that death on the
 battlefield means eternal praise for his name and eternal rest for his soul, he becomes doubly dangerous
 In the march to Cabul, which won laurels for the British arms only that they might be covered with the dis grace of bad diplomacy, we found the Afghan on his own soil and on battle fields of his own selection, and though we could drive him in every instance, each victory cost us some of the best blood in the English army.
 One of our outposts, as the column was encamped in the Coota valley to recruit it's strength and bring up sup plies, was nine miles to the north, where it covered a strategic point. A detachment of 100 men was kept there for fifteen days, being relieved every five days, and went out with the last detachment We were all infantry, and we had 100 rounds of ammunition for our muskets.
 The post was not in the valley, but up among the hills, where it covered three different passes, and it was ter ribly lonesome spot. It was among the ruins of an old temple, and the first companies holding it had used the great blocks of stone to build a fort. This structure was about 100 feet square, crowning steep hill, and the walls were about twelve feet high. Two sides of it were the walls of the old temple strengthened little, and while it was rude affair as fort it was stout and safe retreat in case of few men being hard pressed.
 The blunders made in that historic campaign are too numerous to be re- corded. The most impartial historians are agreed that incompetency was the leading feature. We had been at the post two days when the captain in command took fifty of the men for what he called a reconnaissance mp one of the passes to the north of us, and at the same time sent twenty-five men on another fools errand to the east We had been put there simply and solely to prevent the enemy from coming down the pass right at our door and entering the valley. What was beyond us did not matter. There was mutter- ing among the men as they were marched out, each carrying twenty-fiv rounds of ammunition, and they called farewell to the twenty-two of us left behind. Half an hour after they had passed out of sight we heard sharp fir ing to the north and east, and not one single man ever returned to us. They were ambushed in the defiles and slaughtered, just as might have been expected.
 On this very same day the main army decided to advance. A courier was dis patched to notify an outpost, but he never reached us, either turning back through fear or having been picked of by some concealed riHeanan. About o'clock in the afternoon the natives ap- peared in large numbers, both above and below us, and then we knew what had happened; indeed, they taunted us with the annihilation of our com rades, and gave us the news that the main column had moved on and de- serted us. An old sergeant, who had passed twenty-two years in the service, was in command of us, and as soon as he fully realized the disaster which had come about he called the men together and said:
 We have no choice in this matter. A thousand men could not push their way down into the valley now to try and overtake the column. We must remain and do what we can"
 But what can we dof" asked cor poral.
 ''Diel" replied the sergeant 'That's what we were sent out here for, any how. We are twenty-two to hundreds and thousands We must kill as many of the devils as we can and then lie down ourselves"
 There wasn't glimmer of hope. We knew the Afghan. In that long and bloody campaign neither side both cred with prisoners. If we captured one, ten, fifty or a hundred it was puff bangl and they were left lying dead as we mar-hed on. If one of our men fell into their hands his head was Topped of or spear sent through him before he could wink twice. They'd have the life of every man, even if they yielded up twenty lives for one. Some would follow on after the col umn, but hordes would be left behind to harass the outposts left along the line of communication.
 It stood us in hand to make good use of the few hours left to us. The Afghans were elated and excited, and showed no disposition to attack that evening, but we knew the morrow would open q siege which might last until there was nd longer a man to de- fend the fort. As there were five days rations for 100 men, the twenty two of us had close upon a months provisionA As for water, there was a spring bub. bling up within the fort, and all the we could make consisted in strengthening the position During