New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-07-19
ION TO RICHMOND ~
THIRTY YEARS AGo-A REVIEW AND A
RETROSPECT.
HORACE GREELEY AND THE BATTLE OF BULL
RUN-wHAT DELAY MEANT AND WHAT
THE RECORDS SHOW.

The RECORDS SHOW.
10 the Editor Of The Tribune
Sir; The celebration Of the semi centennial Of The
Tribune at New-Yok. General Beauregards late book
written to prove that he and not Johnston commanded
INC confederate Army at Bull Run some recent papers
concerning that even-a these have served 10 remind
me OF Horace Greeley's celebrated war cry Of thirty
years ago. "On TO Richmond" for which. after the
FEDERAL defeat and amid the ensuing gloom and chagn.
lie was al least for time, fairly execrated from one
end Of the land TO the other
What survivor of that dav has ,orcotten it7 After
the fall Of SUMTER when the first scare Mt the National
Capt0 had been set at rest by the imposing and rapidly
increasing Grand Army that General Scott
shalng on the south side Of the Potomac and certain
ly as early as June l. Mr. Greeley the most powerful
director Of public opinion on the American Continent.
an intensely earnest honest and loyal man. began stead
lily and perssteDtly to press upon Mr. uncolns Admin
istation the military necessity and political wisdom Of
an immediate advance OF the Union army southwark.
And especially after the rebel capital had been moved
from Montgomery TO Richmond into the very teeth Of
the North 50 TO speak apparently both challenge
and as menace but really from motives Of highest
policy, for eject at home and abroad the great New
York editor made almost daily imperative demands for
immediate offensive operations. The ew-York Trib-
une kept flying at its masthead in large headlines
legend like this:
"The Nations War Crv
Forward TO Richmond Forward TO Richmond
The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet
there on the Goth day Of July. BY that time the
place must be held by the National Army
Many were the editorial variations from this STIR
ring text daily Illuminated to the country through The
Tribune, all breathing the intense patriotism OF their
author. all fairly quvering with anxiety for the visest
policy and best advised action looking to the preser
walton Of the Union. Oracle he had been for
Of the masses Of the people, this Republican editors
appeals and demands soon brought responsive echo
from aIIO lie of0 IN IN
Richmond quoted everywhere: it was, as its
author expected and desired. Immediately effective in
nrousng an irresistible public opinion. Congress and
the country began chafe at military inacon. The
loyal Governors Of the Union said To Mr. Lincoln
We see necessity now. not only for the safety Of
the Government but for the safety of the free border
States for immediate action"
In short not only LOYAL Governors. but the Govern
ment itself the public press, the people and even the
army, all Of whom had at frst-confronted ms they
we're by tremendous difficulties Of political policy and
war-been drifting or less. began to stfen their
spines and 10 cOuntenance the active military
ments advocated BY Greeley. It is true that for
time in the earlier stages OF this fever the commander
| in-chief General Winfield Scott was opposed 10 a
| premature movement on various grounds; among
Others. that he did not believe in a little By
piecemeal7 but wished TO prepare for carrying IL
| from the outset scale commensurate with what
seemed 70 him likely 10 be IT'S ultimate magnitude
West. moving down the Mississippi with the main
Union Army. only defending Washington: and he
actually believed the decisive battle would be fought
at the capture Of New Orleans, which would end the
war (see McDOwells testimony before the Commit
tee on the Conduct Of the War;
But much Of the grand strategy proposed by the
military authorities in the beginning Of the
as is clearly perceived now, crude and faulty and sub
Jet 10 momcntary change Whatever General scott's
original plans were. he certainly changed Them and
ultimately consented TO the advance on Richmond.
which was eventually determined upon. But this
change Of mind DID not until some weeks after
Horace Greeley began his editorial crusade. General
Irwin Mcdowell who had been designated by Scott to
command the active army, at first doubtful as 70
the feasibility Of early movement. He too. had
to be convinced. During the month Of Nav his forces
were rapidly increased by the arrival Of regiments.
and by June l had assumed the proportions Of an
army. And then Mcdowell acqulesced in the On
to Richmond movement so, in response 10 the
imperative demand Of public opinion. organized and
led By Horace Greeley. it resolved that the army
should go forward. premature" OF not.
Plans were submitted by Mcdowell for campaign
against Manassas and Richmond They were con
sidered by the President and the Cabinet in full meet
Ing, at which Generals Scott, Mcdowell and Fremont
were present, and approved without dissenting
voice Much time had been lost and this was so late
as June 90. Mcdowell fearful that he would
have to meet both Beauregard and Johnston, and
doubted II he could beat their combined forces. but he
only stipulated that Patterson should take care Of
Johnston. scott assured him that If Johnston Joined
Beauregard he should have Patterson at his heels
1t Of place 10 note Just here that Scott
himself had originally proposed minor movement
against Manassas about June l, but only as diver
sion in aid of Paterson's advance Harpers Ferry.
which as will presently show, he then considered
the real and main line OF operations
Al the time the plan decided upon viz, June
%. the rebel force in the vicinity OF Manassas was
very weak. but rapidly being augmented so on
July 16 when the longdelayed advance OF Mcdowell
actually occurred. this the military situation
IN the Shenandoah Valley, about fifty miles from
Manassas Junction the effective Confederate force Of
about O.OOO men was commanded by that old fox
Joseph E. Johnston, who had no difficulty In success
fully opposing the dilatory and feeble advance Of
General Robert Patterson. at the head Of a welap-
pointed Union force Of 1900 men. In front OF Wash
ington Mcdowell had 81 ,321 men of all arms, and
fine artillery Beauregard at and in front of Manassas
had not more than $4,000 men, all told, and his vol
unteer artillery greatly inferior 10 that Of his op
ponent The Confederates had no regular troops
whatever whereas Mcdowell had several battalion
of regular infantry and cavalry, besides his artillery
which was almost entirely made up Of regular bat
teries We had the advantage In numbers. We had
the advantage in artillery.
The 9Th OF July the date fixed upon for the
great forward movement It 70 begin from Ar
llngton and Alexandria II actually began the
10th eight DAYS later. Much Of the delay was the
result Of flssy eabOrateness on SCOTS part in prep
aration. Another the Jealousy of old General
Mansfield who held the command in Washington; he
Systematically DELAYED pushing forward newly arrived
regiments 70 the south side long possible. in or
der 10 swell his importance and his command
which had no field Of operations duty except to
drill Mcdowell hampered IN other ways. lie
was really officer Of part. ambitious for active ser
vice: knew clearly what the occasion demanded. but
he was more or less weighted down and overawed BY
his too great respect To- SCOTS and years. and
his pompous dignity. Mcdowell had long been SCOTS
favorite The old leuenantgeneral jealousy dom-
mated everything. General Patterson ordered to
becin active operations contemp0raneously with
Mcdowell in order 20 " take care of Johnston
McDowelrs original general plan faultless.
ca was the changed plan for the immediate battle