Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-12-13

pdtnlleu Win ClcmOnt cuonoiPosAoA
Ideas, and instead of delivering to Fremont
the order for his removal, prepared before
he left Washington, he finally decided tt
bring it back with him and so give Fremon,
an opportunity to retrieve himself.
Lincoln, always patient, yielded to Ere
mont's opportunities, and permitted him to
remain in command until October, when he
sent General Curtis in person to deliver the
order of removal with the single condition,
that if Fremont "shall then have, in per
sonal command, fought and won battle, OF
shall then be actually in battle, or shall
then be in the immediate presence of the
enemy in expectation of battle, it is not
to be delivered. but held for further orders. y
As Fremont was not near . battle, he wa,
relieved Of his command
A surreptitious Report on Slavery.
Cameron pressed the slavery issue to the
extent of fragrant outrage upon his chiei
BY recommending the arming of slaves in
his first annual report, without the knowl
edge of the President, and sending it out in
printed form to the postmasters OF the
country for delivery to the newspaper,
after having been presented to Congress.
The slavery question had then become an
important political theme, and politicians
were shaping their lines to get into har-
mony with it In this report Cameron de-
clared in unqualified terms in favor of arm
coln was not only shocked, but greatly
grieved, when he learned the character of
Cameron's recommendation, and he at once
ordered that the copies be recalled by tele-
graph, the report revised, and new edition
printed.
Cameron submitted as gracefully as posi-
Bile, and revised his report limiting his
recommendations about slaves to the sug-
gestion that they should not be returned to
their masters. While this episode did not
produce unfriendly personal relations be-
tween Lincoln and Cameron, it certainly
was severe strain upon Lincoln's trust in
the fidelity of his War Minister but Lin
coin was too wise to put himself in open
antagonism to the antl-slavery sentiment of
the country by removing Cameron for his
offensive and surreptitious anti-slavery re-
port The financial pressure for Cameron S
removal would probably have accomplished
it under any circumstances, and Lincoln
waited more than month alter the furry
over Cameron's report
A Mistake of Nicolay and Hay.
There have been many and conflicting ac-
counts given to the public Of Cameron's re-
tirement from the Lincoln Cabinet, no one
of which is wholly correct, and most of them
are incorrect in vital particulars. Cameron
had verbally assured the President, when
censured by Congress, and again when the
dispute arose over his annual report, that
his resignation was at Lincoln's disposal at
any time, bnt he had no knowledge of Lin
coins purpose to make change in the War
Department until he received Lincoln's let
ter in January, 1852, informing him of the
change In Nicolay and Hays life of Lin
coin (volume 8, page 1881 is given what
purports to be the letter delivered to Cam
eron notifying him of the change. Lincoln
certainly wrote that letter, as his bio
graphers have published it from his manu-
script, but It is not the letter that was
delivered to Comeron. Lincoln sent his
letter to Cameron by Chase,
who met Cameron late in the
evening afrer he had dined with Colonel
Forney, and he deliveredthe letter In entire
ignorance of its contents. I happened to be
spending the evening with Colonel Thomas
A. Scott, then Cameron's Assistant Secre-
tary of War, when Cameron came In near
the midnight hour and exhibited an extra
ordinary degree Of emotion. He laid the
letter down upon Scott's table and invited
us both to read it, saying that it meant per;
sonal as well as political destruction, and
was an irretrievable wrong committed upon
him by the President. We were not then,
md indeed never had been, in political SYM
psthy, but our friendly personal relations
had never been interrupted He appealed
10 me, saying; 'This is not political af-
fair; it means personal degradation, and
while we do not agree politically, you know
would gladly aid you personally if it were
in my power"
Cameron Wept Over His Humiliation.
Cameron was affected even to tears, and
xept bitterly over what he regarded as a
personal affront from Lincoln. remember
cot only the substance of Lincoln's letter,
but its Language almost, if not quite; liter
lily, as follows; 81 have this day nomi-
mated Hon. Edwin M. Stanton to be Secre-
.ary of War and you to be Minister Pleni-
to Russia" Although the mes
,age did not 60 to the Senate that day, it
had been prepared and was sent in pursu-
,nce Of that notice. Colonel Scott who was
. man of great versatility of resources at
,nce suggested that Lincoln did not intend
personal offense to Cameron, and in that 1
FULLY agreed; and it was then and there or
ranged that on the following day Lincoln
should be asked to withdraw the offensive
etter; to permit Cameron to ante-date a
etter of resignation, and for Lincoln to
write a kind acceptance of the same.
rhe letter delivered by Chase was recalled;
/ new correspondence was prepared, and .
month later given to the public.
Cameron had no knowledge or even sus-
oicion of Stantan succeeding him. Chase
md Seward, as well as Cameron, have
,laimed direct or indirect influence in the
election of Stanton, but there was not q
Jingle member of the Cabinet who knew of
Stanton's appointment until Lincoln noti-
led Cameron Of the change. Stanton had
,een in open, malignant opposition to the
only few months before,
,ut he was then the closest friend and per-
onal counselor of General Mcclellan; was
n hearty sympathy with the war; was reso-
utely and aggressively honest, and Lincoln
hose him without consulting any, as far as
have ever been able to learn, unless it was
General Mcclellan. One of the many good
Minister was entire harmony between him
nd the General commanding the armlea
His Subsequent Relations With Lincoln,
Cameron well concealed bis disappoint-
nent at the manner of his retirement from
he Cabinet; wisely maintained personal re-
ations with Lincoln, and when he returned
rom Russia, after less than a year of SER
ice as Minister, he resumed active politi-
al life and was one of the earliest of the
POLITICAL leaders to foresee that the people
Eould force the nomination of Lincoln, re-
ardless of the favor or disfavor of politi.
ianA The early movement in January,
1854, in which Curtin cordially co-operated,
" which the unanimous recommendation
# the Republican members of the PennsyI-
'ania Legislature was given for Lincoln's
was suggested. by Cameron;
nd Lincoln, with q sagacity that never
allied him, took the earliest opportunity to
ttach Cameron to his cause that separation
Fould be impossible.
His first movement in that line was the
cameron mission to Fortress Monroe to ask