St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1891-02-13
FORSYTH FLATTERED.
Report of the Inquiry Into the
Battle of Wounded Knee
Creek.
Despite the Opinion Of Gen.
Miles Col. Forsyth Is Com
mended.
Secretary Proctor Warmly
Compliments His Military
Tactics.
The Whole Report a Virtual
Rebuke and Snub to Gen.
Miles.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12.-The secre-
tary of war to-day made public the re-
port of the investigation into the battle
of Wounded Knee Geek. s.. D., Dee. 90
last. particularly with reference to Col.
Forsyth's conduct on that occasion.
The record of the court of inquiry is in
dorsed by Maj. Gen. Miles, under date
of Chicago, Jan. 81. as follows:
"Respectfully forwarded to the adju-
tant general of the army: In disposing
of this matter it has been desired to
treat Col. Forsyth with the utmost con-
sideration. The testimonyellcited shows
the following facts: First, that Col.
Forsyth had received repeated warnings
as to the desperate and deceitful char
acter of Big FoOt's band of Indians, and
repeated orders as to the exercise of
constant vigilance to guard against sur
prise OIL disaster under all circum-
stances. Secondly, that these warnings
and orders were unheeded and disre-
garded by Col. Forsyth. who seemed to
consider an outbreak of the Indians be-
yond the pale of possibility in the pres
ence of the large force of troops at hand.
The disasters that have occurred to our
troops in the past from the desperation
of
The Indian Nature
are known to all who are familiar with
our history. In addition to this, it was
we'll known, and Col. Forsyth had been
warned. that this particular band con
tanned many of the most desperate and
deceitful characters in the Sioux nation.
and that a religious excitement nearly
approaching frenzy had made them
peculiarly dangerous. Under these
circumstances the apparent in
difference and security of the
officer in command of the troops
at Wounded Knee creek is incOmpre-
hensible and ineXcuSable. Thirdly-An
examination of the accompanying map
and testimony shows conclusiYely that
at the beginning of the outbreak not a
single company of the troops was so
disposed as to deliver its fire upon the
warriors without endangering the lives
of some of itSoWn comrades. 1t is, in
fact. difficult to conceive how a worse
disposition of the troops could have been
made. 1t will be noticed that it would
have been perfectly practicable for the
entire command of upwards of 450 men
to have been placed between the war
riorS and the women, with their backs
to the latter and their faces toward the
the warriors, where they might have
used their weapons effectively if re
quired.
The Testimony
goes to show that most of the troops
were forced to withhold their fire, leav-
..,rr NIA 49,. - NlD afF,V, - E.II ....
two companies, until such war
broke through or oyerpowered
the small force directly about them
and reached the camp occupied by
their women and children. The battery
of four HOtchkISs guns had until then
been useless, the friction primers hay-
ing been removed from the guns by
order of the captain commanding the
battery, lest the gunners might, in theiI
excitement. discharge the pieces and
destroy their own comrades. These guns
were now opened upon the Indian
camp, ever at that time placing in peril
Troops G and ID, Seventh cavalry, which
were obliged to retreat for some dis.
lance, owing to the fire from these guns
and from the small arms of other por-
tionS of the command. The fact that q
large number of the LOG warriors were
without firearms when the outbreak oc-
CURED is shown by the evidence that
forty-eight guns had been taken from
the tepeeS, and that
A Personal Search
of twenty or more warriors resulted In
finding them unarmed. This fact. taken
in connection with the extremely inju-
dici0us disposition of the troops and
the large number of casualties among
them, constraius the belief that some of
these casualties were suffered at the
hands of our own men. The
final disposition of the troops
was such at the outset as to
counterfeit in great measure the
immense disparity of strength, and
would have been i~neXcusable in the
face of an armed and desperate foe,
ever had no especial warnings and or
ders been received from higher au-
thority. l can only partially account
for the singular apathy and neg
lect of Col. Forsyth upon the theory
of his Indifference to and contempt for
the repeated and urgent warnings and
orders received by him from the division
commander, or by his incompetence and
entire ineXperience in the responsibility
of exercising command where judgment
and discretion are required. | also for
ward herewith the report of Capt. Frank
d. Baldwin, Fifth infantry, concerning
the finding of the bodies of a party of
women and children about three miles
from the scene of the engagement on
Wounded Knee creek. This report in
dictates the nature of some of the results
of that unfortunate affair, results which
are viewed with the strongest disap-
proYal by the undersigned.
NELSON A. MILES,
Major General, Commanding.
Standing by Forsyth.
Gen. Schofield submitted the case to