The National tribune., 1891-10-22
GETTYS BURG.
The Results that Led 10 This Great Fight.

The Results that Led 10 This Great Fight.
EDrToR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: II has been
said that we are Nation OF soldiers. IL may.
with as much truth be said that all intelligent
survivors Of the war OF the rebellion possess n
sufficient knowledge Of the science OF war 10
become competent officers OF an army. This
is due 10 two causes: First, experience in the
field; secondly, the study Of war literature.
In this latter cause your own paper deserves
much credit.
There has been so much published concern
ing the battle of Gettysburg, that IL seems
almost useless 10 write any more about il.
But since il is conceded that war is a science,
there Is one very important matter that has
been overlooked in the discussions; that is. the
plan or gist Of these military movements that
eliminated i'm this sanguinary battle. No one
who mas any appreciation of real war genius
could he made 70 hclieye that either Gen. Lee or
Gen. Meade would manuver ponderOus army
ana not have some distinctive plan in view.
Both of these leaders are now dead; and III
there be any mystery about their plan or
movements we must figure il out from what
they did respectively.
/ know that il is generally believed that Gen.
Lees objective point was Washington City.
This was his second objective. But IL seems
clear TO my mind that the Federal Army Of the
Potomac was his first objective. His second
Bull Run and Antietam campaigns had clearly
shown him that our inner lines of movement
would always give Us decided advantage over
him in every campaign in which Washington
City was his first objective, so the Gettysburg
campaign had the Army Of the Potomac as its
first objective. But this may Mt first thought
be considered little queer, Lee could have
confronted his antagonist at any time or place
between the Rapidan, in Virginia, aud Gettys-
burg, in Pennsylvania. But il is clear that
Gen. Lee believed il possible TO strike his
enemy in detail by divisions or at least by
corps. To do this he made fent upon Harris
burg, Pa, aud IL seems 10 us proyidential that
il did not succeed The fact is that it would
have succeeded had Lee moved his divisions as
rapidly as he might have done. or If his subor-
dinates had carried out his positive instructions
given on the first days engagement.
His positive orders were. a. DO not bring on
any general engagement until can concentrate
my army there" Had this order been carried
out his army would have been consolidated
while the Federal army would have been scat
tered. No military critic will for one moment
doubt what the result would have been. Lees
plan was very brilliant aud required great
generaship 10 carry IL out. IL was eminently
risky also. But had it been successful Balti-
more and Washington would have been at his
mercy.
think he made great mistake in the dis.
position Of his cavalry. Had he used il be-
tween his own army and that Of his enemy, in
stead Of having il to the east Of his antagonist,
he might have made his ruse on Harrisburg
more complete and at the samo time have held
his infantry divisions more in hand for sudden
operations. But ID has been toleTably well cs-
tablished that Gen. Lees plan never contem-
plated such a disposition Of his cavalry, hut
that il came into that position by some mistake
ia reading cypher order by his subordinate
Gen. Meades plan was 60 force Lee 10 fight
nm "a l.,fH1 "a. I. q Il
was surely deceived by Con Lees tactics;
otherwise we can never account for his having
his divisions so scattered As not 10 be in sup
porting distance Of each other, for, as a matter
Of honest fact, he really made il barely possible
for Lee TO succeed with his plan. Gen. Ieade's
idea WAS that Lee would follow Gen. EUell aud
thus pass on north Of the gap in the mountains
where he SO suddenly emerged upon Gen.
Reynolds on the first day of July. Gen.
Meade's orders 10 his various corps commanders
for July clearly prove that he did not expect
Lee 10 emerge through this pass in the mount
aims. aud this is just what made it possible for
Lee 20 crush his divisions in detail before they
c0nld be supported. Had Gen. Daniel T..
Sickles carried out his orders for July ], then
the battle of Gettysburg on the Cd aud Sd Of
July would never have been fought
In conclusion, wish here b cite one criti.
cism In Gen. Meade's pursuit. When the battle
ended lac had the inner line Of movement by
returning 10 the Potomac on the east side Of
tho mountains instead Of following Lee on the
west side He could thus have forced Lee into
another battle at the crossing OF the Potomac
which would in all probability have utterly
annihilRted his army. lt is clear from the dis
position Of his forces that this Is precisely what
Lee expected Meade TO do, aud WAS greatly re-
jOiced when he found his enemy following in
bis rear. When he wanted time as at Falling
Waters. he made show OF fight. and obtained
IL. But had Meade kept the east side Of the
mountains he could have disputed any cross
ing Of the swollen Potomac, and thus have
crippled aud Inundated Gen. Lee, II not 10
have utterly destroyed his army. Military
science will never warrant following In the
immediate wake Of a retreating army. provided
there are inner parallel lines-J. T. WILLIAMS
Lock Box lG2, Montezuma, Iud.