The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-07-21
sTosEwALL JACKSON.

Today at Lexington, Va, will be I'M
yelled the monument to Stonewall jack
son; Gen. Early, who commanded
division under Jackson, will deliver eu-
logy of his great corps commander. Stone
wall Jackson deserves to be considered
today without reference TO his cause of
which he was so stout champion; to be
measured simply by his merit as soldier.
As soldier Jackson has been extrava-
gantly euiogized by JEFF Davis, who never
failed to exalt the reputation of his own
personal favorites at the expense of better
men, and in this spirit he called Jackson,
in his speech of May, 1881. "the greatest
hero of the war; the mightiest chieftain of
the Confederate cause"
As matter of fact Jackson performed
no military action that entitled him to the
praise lavished upon him by Davis. 1t
was no great military feat for Jackson,
graduate of West Point, who had seen at
least as much service in Mexico as Grant,
to prevail over the gross military inca
pacity and ignorance of Banks. the military
mediocrity of Fremont and Shields in the
Valley campaign of May, 1862. In the
Peninsula campaign of 1862 Jackson was,
in the pursuit of Mcclellan, ordered by
Lee to Charles City Cross Roads, but he
took the wrong road and reached White
Oak Creek June 30, only to find the bridge
destroyed and his further progress barred
by Franklin's corps. Longstreet and A.
2. Hill were all this day fighting
L.4ki. x.r,el. a
mans corps for the Possession of the
cross roads. Had they succeeded McClel-
lan's army would have been cut in two, as
these roads commanded the only line of
retreat TO James river. Jackson's blunder
separated his principal corps of $4,000 men
from Hill and Longstreet. Jackson could
not take the back track and repair his
blunder in time; he either could not or
thought he could not push forward in face
of Franklin's artillery and infantry, and
his whole corps was as completely para
lyzed TO help Longstreet and Hill or to
hurt Franklin as If they had been tied
hand and foot. His corps was as worth
less TO Lee all day as was that
corps of the French army to Napo-
leon which the day before Waterloo
marched uselessly to and fro between
Ney at Quatre Bras and Napoleon at
Ligny, when its presence would have made
Quatre Bras great victory over yelling
ton or made Ligny as destructive to
Prussia as Jena. The Federals desperately
resisted until nightfall all efforts to capture
the cross roads and then our trains having
all passed and Porter and Reyes corps
having occupied and entrenched Malvern
| Hin our forces under Sumner, Heintzle-
man and Franklin withdrew by night
march and by morning were in position
with Porter and keyes. Lees plan
was admirable; it could not
have failed of success but for
| Jaekson's hlunder. As il was the Federals
barely held their own until nightfall. but
with Jackson's corps in its place the cross
roads would have been lost. and Lees
army would have been thrust like wedge
| between Porter and Keyes at Malvern
Hin. and Sumner. Heintzleman and
| Franklin at Glendale and White Oak
creek. 1t was a splendid opportunity. and
was lost to Lee by Jaekson's failure tn
obey orders through taking another road
than he was instructed.
Iaekson's subsequent military exploits
were such IS any hardy soldier of great
energy, courage and accurate knowledre
of the country can perform under the di.
rection and explicit orders of an able
strategist like Lee. Jackson's corps was
composed very largely Of Virginians, so
that he did no; have 10 so outside of his
own command to find guides who knew
every wood road and bride path. He had
therefore, the chief requisites for 4 sue
oessfal execution Of flank movements in
war, troops that could march fast. fight
well, and knew the country well that was
the scene Of operations.
Jaekson's movements In the second Rull
Run campaign of August, iSSa. in rear ~
Pore would have been fatal to him has he
been opposed by a soldier of good ability
for they were audacious, bat not able ana
nothing saved Jackson from ruin save TIE
miserable MeClelganism that sacrificed
fepe's army to personal dislike and zeal.
oasy OF that vain and tactlsss commander
Lee gained nothing by this wild.roose
raid of JAckSoa's, from which he esranad
by miracle of fortune for Pone was not
obliged 10 give battle August N
and 50 Lees victory was not due
TO anything accomplished by Jack.
sons peTilous movement in Pops's rear.
Isckson's movement on Hsrper's Ferry
would have been fatal 70 Jackson had Nc.
Clelisn acted with a particle Of energy
after the order for Lees march fell into his
hands. Mcclellan acted 50 slowly and
tameiy ueoa the information that he lost