New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-01-16
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
TILE ERENCH IN IRELAND.
The FhENNII IN II'I1'1.'. -. :,
TIE FRENCH INVASION OF IRELAND IN Do. by
Ta1erian Gnbayedof. luustrd'eu '-"'' PIP


q. nAors.ard for assuredly the story of lIumberts
Irish expedtion has been told often before, ana IN
sufficient detail to fix all the pnhcpai 'ac'S' ~ -
however undoubtedly the case that nearly all VINO a'o
written on this any other cplsoue VI INC Il''" Nc
belion OF 1898 have been moved more by parsahohip
than single minded desire 10 set forth the tr'h ana
until Mr. Lecky's recent volumes appeared it might be
asserted that no wholly impartial history OF the re
bellion existed for even Mr. Froude cannot be acqucu
OF strong bias. But while the present writer h'>
evidently sought to give his readers true statement
~ the French INVASION lie also is amcnabe 70 tie
common charge of distortion. Mr.. GTibaycdons ipibc
consists in the notion that General iumbcrt narrowly
missed success and that if this or that incident had not
occurred or had turned ont quite differently. the IN
dependence of Ireland might have been won Now
nothing more misleading than such an idea as this
can well be imagined and it is TO point out
IFS entire fsaciOusncss at the OUTSET The truth when
dominate. the whole case IS that the really formidable
elements of revolt in Ireland had been crushed ont
before umbert made his appearance That he selec'eu
III indeed, there any sclectiOn-for the scene Oh
his landing part of the country which had taken 10
part in the recent rising and the inhabitants of which
we're quite unprepared, either by sentiment or by or
ranization TO cast in their fortunes with him. that
The weakness of his command made the expedition an
assured failure from the beginning; and that 1t was
hopelcssy adviscd feeble and futile. Notwithstanding
the momentary success at Castelar,
one might say. "a said of the charge OF The Light
II was not possible t. forget that TINS ccK
less act Of braggadOcO the part of the Directory ah
the most awful imnlications-not for lumbert ana MS
men, but for the unhappy Irish of ConnauSit ana Lem
scr, who were tempted by this military sns fdtuns
into the deadly quicksands of overt rebellion Hum
bert was able to lead the Irish into danger but he vas
not able TO protect them. Honorable surrender was
the worst the survivors Of the expedition had to appre
hend but the halter, the bullet the sword awaited
the wreched natives who dOnncd French colors or
marched and fought by the side Of the invaders. IL
was a deplorable business throughout. but We cannon
agree with this author that the entire fult of fai uc la
with the Irish The organizers Of revolt in Ireland hid
been imporing French aid for years They had depended
upon promises Of the Directory. and had been as
appointed repeatedly. The Instruction of IDS. Wmch
had been Uuenccd in blood two months before liunbct
landed at Kala, had been based upon the expectation
md assurance OF help from without. and II wa INC
Aon-appcarancc of that help quite As much as the pre-
parednes> Of the Government that lea 10 te qucN COZ
Iapsc Of the rebellion.
Thus X appears that the French alliance proved
hischicvous in every way. Cnfulfed pledges pre-
cipated futile and disastrous rising. Partially ful-
filed pledges resulted in nothing more than the
sacrifice Of hundreds Of Irish lives. which would nave
been saved but for that rash and foolish effort. The
idea of landing in Ireland with a bare thousand
troops. ard expecting 10 overthrow the Governments
which al the time had full 100000 troops under
arms In the country cannot he called a sane one
Mr.. GrtaycdOf says Humbcrt was Cppp>eu ~ i"''''O
troops. That is eXagccratOH hut there certainly
were 100 900 capable of being brought against him.
The question arises next why. after he had fully
realized the imp0S>biy Of recruiting reliable lT>h
force. the French commander did not avoid useless
enusion of blood by surrcncrng his force. seeing tha
the departure Of the fricateS that had brought him
left him no mean, of sailing away. The success at
Castelar,, gained as il Irish militia could
not possibly have dcudcd him ato the belief that hi
little band could make any serious impression upon
the masses which lie knew were aliciGv on the mfrh
10 surround him. II may he suggested that his al
tempt T. establish civil government for Connsncht
while STAYING AT Ca,tlcha" sufficiently bis pro-
found ignorance VI the conditions Of The situation
But even II this be admitted. why was the control Of
the expedition left in such hands, lie had to trust
O. Irish counsels. and he had no advisers but the
most reckless and untruStwoIty dcmaCOgues and scf
seekers lie no doubt greatly embarrassed by
the discovery that religious fanaticsm far more
potent influence than love of country, with the ma
iority Of the Irish he encountered. But it is in
credible that the expedition could have ended in any
other manner. matter what the sentiment OF the
COnnaucht men might have been.
All history emphasizes the fact that enthusiasm
without training, discipline and al adequate armament,
Is invariably useless 10 carry revolt 70 success. In
This case even enthusiasm lacking and the sole
of the Catholic peasants that they OF
fercd opportunity 10 plumber and kill their Pr0teN
tant rcigbOrs. II 10 the enduring honor Of General
lIumbcrt and his cueGants that they set their faces
firmly against this fcrccOu programme. and that they
actually did prevent its adoption. and efec;ually
that, though the sacknG Of PrOtcstnt, house, could
not be prevented in number Of instances, mur-
derous outrage pcrpetatcd within the temporary
Jurisdiction of the French from the beginning TO the
end of the expedition. Perhaps II would have been
impossible for any other than the French officers
to have effected this, for not only were the Irish
Catholics extremely bitter and strongly bent upon
massacre. but unhappily number Of their priests
were daily and hourly employing all their great innu
ence in urging their hafavagc Pensioners u
blood he'd and page. After Castelar, when Hum
bert called away the reserve he had left behind him at
Killald, there remained az headquarters but three
French officers and French rank-and file. Thrsc
three officers, with the noble and chValrOus Cha?O,ta
at their head personally confronted the whole turbu-
lent and nfaIned district aud against tremendous odds
succeeded in ba'f-g the murdcIOus purposes Of the
mob Th, was the redeemng feature Of Hum
bert's expedition, and IL reflects the highest credit
upon the brave and humble soldiers who accomplished
the difficult task.
The Irish militia at Castelar, fully demonstrated the
truth OF the Characterization that they dangerous
TO everybody but the enemy Flying like abject
poltIoOns before the attack OF oneSiNtli their own
number. they never rested until they had put sixty
miles OF territory between themselves and the scce
Of their di,gracefu overthrow; but they too
hurried 10 get TO practise their habtual brutality
upon all defencelcSS persons encountered in their
fight. nor did they omit 10 plumber when opportunity
offered BY all accounts THIS militia was the most IN
Famous inefficient, cruel and lcentouS body that ever
bore arms in soCallcd civilized country. The teSt
nony of Abcrcromhic and CORVALLIS upon this head
Is quite sufficient and fixes the character and quality
Of these runany troops iudclibly. But when even
such troops were assembled by of thousands,
they became formidable TO small hostile forces, and
there were enough Of them 10 have literally eaten
lIumbert and his handful Of men. Had the French
force numbered 10000 $1,000 veterans, the
might have been dnercst, but constituted As il was,
and taking place when il did. there seems room for
doubt that It's consequences TO Ireland were simply
evil