The National tribune., 1891-08-27


hence, when those IN authority at Washington,
whose duty il was 10 advance the best interests
at The army in the Shenandoah, were found
prejUdced, and too much absorbed in the Nc
Clellan idea 10 render that hearty assistance
that should have been given. AZ any rate, that
WAS the prevailing opinion Of soldiers Of the
Army Of the Shenandoah.
4. JEALOUSY AND GENERAL CUssEDNEss.
Whilst "iealousy and general cussednoss"
applies TO all in authority who could have rem
deIed aid TO Fremont and Banks but did not,
it is especially intended 10 apply 10 Gen. Nc
Dowell and his command. As has already
been stated, Mcdowell WAS ordered by the
President from fredericksburg at the same
date that Fremont was ordered from franklin,
and both ordered 70 operate toward the same
objeCt-in capturing or driving Jackson from
the Valley. Both had about the same distance
20 march, both were ordered TO operate in the
Shenandoah Valley which was the goographi-
cal territory of Gen. Banks; hut as both these
Generals had been ordered there Cor a special
duty, lt was the most natural thing 10 expect,
and would seem 20 be the plain duty of both
Generals 10 lose sight OF departmental lines
aud technicaiitios and cooperate 20 capture
jackson.
Whom the Presidents orders were received
by Mcdowell his forces were i'm splendid con-
diuon, well clothed, and had an abundance Of
forage aud rations. lie made tardy march,
ana on jane his headquarters were at Front
Royal. Fremont had pushed forward with has
hUpleSs command. and was at this date &C
Mount Jackson. lio was then on the heels Of
Jackson. aud knew he would soon overtako
and engage him whereupon he dispatched
Capt. Howard, of his stan, 10 Mcdowell, detail
ing, in writing. his position aud expectations.
Fremont's Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
who wrote the communication urging Mellow
ell 10 join him without delay, had inadvert-
uutiy made the communication read rs an
order instead Of a request
And here is where my inelegant word,
"CUssEDNEss,"
comes in. Notwithstanding the fact that Nc
D0well had marched bis men Is miles for the
purpose OF capturing Jackson. this is the reply
he sends in tho face OF the enemy TO Fremont:
u beg 10 cali the attention Of your staff
officer to the terms he has employed in his
communication 20 me- making IL IN the nature
Of a positive perempt0ry order rs IL TO me
under your command. Being like yourself,
The commander OF separate, independ-
ont military geographical department. with
certain troops assigned 10 me by the Secretary
OF War, and being here in neighboring de-
paTtment for a special temporary purpose. under
the direct orders and instructions of the PreSi-
dent, i cannot receive orders from an officer
save in the accidental temporary case pro-
yilei for in the ga Article Of War"
infer that this pOnderous literary produc-
tion was not entrusted 10 his Acting Assistant
Adjutant General, Tor il was signed in full
" Irwin Mcdowell, Major General, commanding
Department Of the RappahanuOck." Now, am
j not justified in the us6 Of the words " jealousy
aud cussgdness in their relation TO this trans
scliOn2 and trust tho reader will not be so
yerdaUt as not 10 understand. Let rs reason.
Both Fremont and Mcdowell were MajOr-Gen-
lga
Shenandoah. Fremont had already skirmished
with the enemy, and had sought tho aid OF
Banks SiEel and Mcdowell 10 assist him in the
final attack. Banks aud Sigel could not reach
him, as has been stated. Mcdowell had nOsuch
excuse, but bad be Joined in The attack, and
had success been the result, Fremont would
have been the victor, and would have received
the plaudits aud congratulations Of the country,
az he would have deserved. Mcdowell realized
this
Now, impartial reader, have fairly stated
my case; draw your own conclusions. or this
] am quito sure, Banks did not object that
either Fremont or Mcdowell had crossed over
Imaginary lines aud were within his iurisdic-
ton. Mr.. Lincoln did not object; tie Nation
did not object; there could be no objections,
excep, in the
JEALOUSY or A FEW MEN.
As was anticipated hy Fremont, the clash Of
arms came, and on the sth OF June on the road
leading from HsrsOnburg 10 Port Republic, at
Cross Keys. Fremaats command, alone, met
and engaged Jackson. The Sight began carly
in the day and continues until night, when
both armies biv0uscked Tor the night upon their
arms. Daring the night Fremont received,
through one Of his suOuts, note from Gen
Shields, at Luray, stating that he would have
o strong force 81 Port Republic early on tho
following day. Thiswas welcome news TO Free
mont, Tor that was the very road on which
Jackson would very likely continue his retreat.
Ea.y on tho following morning Fremont
moved forward to renew the attack, when lie
found Jackson had left the field. Continuing
his pursuit, the sound Of artillery was heard Ia
the direction Of Port Republic, ind icat.ug that
Shields had been n time. Fremont therefore
pushed forward, TO find that the enemy had
flown. The following extracts from letters
from Gen. Shields 10 Gen. Fremont, dated
Luray, June II and - viii explain:
Mrj. gen. JoHS c FmaovT: Myadvance guard
driven back on the yIh after "A ranQuIuArv
engagements 81 four hours. ] reinforced !. aud
determined, in connection with you, 20 renew tie
attack next morning. Amer handing the dispatch
% your messenger perrmpioTy order reached me
from Wa aIlugtBA directing me % get my command
together aud relurn AZ once % this point prepare
tory 10 marching 20 fredericksburg. ] never
obsyed order with such reluctance, but 40
option wAs ioiI nae:
mcnL Ia which 4 bear testimony TO the energy
activity, aud ability with which you conducted the
pur-uit The General who led my ndvuuce = SOD
committed two grave errors; 0ne, in not burning
the bridge a. Port Republic; the other, in taking
up an IudrieusIblC position aud whiting until hs
WAS attacked Ia force BY Jackson. lie was COM
PEELED 10 isll back which hc aid Iu good order.
Joined them with TIE main body. aud thuu jackson
tell bHck IA haste. hurried 10 attack him lhe nr xt
day. This nas my proposition 10 your messenger
which he started 20 take 20 you. when pcremp'ury
orders arrived 10 sel out Tor FFederck-burg This
was one OF 20 mistakes 81 the war. Ne ought 10
have ended Jackson 6rst. lie should not have
been left behind n the Valley. Had fallen upon
him next morning he never would have come back
10 this Valley, aud we could have destroyed lAe
railroad AZ MnyuctbDT0 aud GOrdonsviI'e. Gen
Mcdowell knew nothing 81 our situation. lie
acted upon some preC0Hccycd plan " itlout refer
euce 20 tie condition - things in tho Valley.
(.igned) JAHIS Shields Maior-General.
The escape 0f jackson and the Withdrawal
Of Shields ended those proy0kingly- inisman-
aged operations which have digniGed by cali
ing a campaign in the Shenandoah, which gave
opportunity aud justification TO a large body of
1 good soldiers 70 suggest revolt aud also justi-
/ fed me in criticism which might tTuthfully
have boon written in much stronger terms.
lG0 De cO1itiHUedl