Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1891-10-21

MAJ. Gen. schofield Submits His Annual Re-
port to the Secretary Of War.

port to the Secretary Of War.
TO AND THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN THE coS-
TEST POINTED oUr-NGrrrrs or GENERAL
INTEREST TO THE ARMY NOTED.
The annual report Of Mai. Gen. John NJ.
schoheld, Commanding che army Of the United
States, to the Secretary of War draws attention
especially to the useful lessons learned by the
army last winter in the campaign against the
Sioux in Dakota He says:
The disturbance was formidable in fact and
threatened to be far more formidable than any
Indian war that had occurred in many years
The orders Of the President were designed to
suppress that trouble promptly and effect
lively as possible. having mainly in view the
protection Of the extended settlements sur
rounding the Sioux reservation against de-
struction BY hostile Indians. The execution Of
those orders involved the concentration OF
nearly one-hak the infantry and cavalry OF the
army and some artillery upon the Sioux reser-
walton, for which purpose il was necessary to
bring troops from nearly all parts Of the conn
Try west Of the Mississippi river. These move
ments we're necessarily attended with great
expense. but happily the result fully justified
the vigor Of the measures adopted. which re-
suited in the suppression Of the uprising with
out loss of life on the part OF peaceful citizens,
though the army suffered considerable loss and
quite o large band OF Indians was destroyed In
conflict with the troops.
THE EXPERIENCE GAINED.
The experience gained in the campaign Of last
winter is VARIABLE. as indicating the possible
extent and the probable limits Of future dam
ger from any uprising Of the Indian tribes. If
IL were true, as was then so generally, believed,
that the Sioux Indians meditated general up
rising. and their plans had been matured and
executed with tho secrecy and energy that
usually characterize Indian movements. il
would have been entirely impossible, with the
troops then located near the Sioux reservation,
though constituting n very large fraction of the
army, to have prevented great loss of life and
property in the surrounding settlements, while
II. As was also believed by many. the uprising
was intended to embrace other warlike tribes in
other parts Of the country. the entire military
force OF the United States would have
been wholly inadequate to prevent great dam
age to the settlements surrounding the reserva-
tons Whatever may be the fact as to those
Indian plans they were, happily, SO far antici-
pated that the Sioux Indians were surrounded
by an effective Gordon of troops before they
were ready for action. while the disaffectionh had
at the time not spread so far among other tribes
rs to become dangerous.
careful consideration OF all the circun-
stances OF this uprising among the Sioux seems
to justify the opinion that no considerable
number of them had seriously intended to en-
gage in hostilities against the United States I'M
less driven to such a course by unbearable
hardship or in self-defense against the military
operations ordered for their subsection. There
Is hence well-grounded belief that, by the
constant exercise Of discretion in the manage
ment OF the Indians, coupled with Justice in all
dealings Of the government with them and the
presence Of a sufficient military force to over
awe the turbulent minority among them, there
need be no serious apprehension OF an ex-
tended uprising OF the Sioux and probably not
Of any other Indian tribe.
1t is also well worthy Of the most serious con-
sideration that by the addition of few thou
sand men to the enlisted strength of the army.
whereby sufficient force might at all times be
stationed in the vicinity Of the great reserva-
tons. the danger of an uprising and resulting
obstruction of frontier settlements would be
entirely removed and the great expense of
transportation of troops from distant parts Of
the country entirely avoided.
ARMY REORGANIZATION.
Under the head Of army reorganization Cen
schofield saws:
Whatever may be the judgment Of Congress
respecting the aggregate strength of the mill
tary force to be maintained in time of peace it
cannot be doubted that the organization Of
that force should be such as to make il most
effective, and at the same time capable of most
ready expansion whenever an increase is de-
cided upon.
The conditions Of modern tactics REQUIRE the
as well for the cavalry and artillery. each
battalion to consist of not more than four COM
panies, troops or batteries. In the artillery the
company organization ought TO be made to
conform to that in the other arms of the serv-
Ice. namely, with one captain and two ieuten-
ants, instead OF three or four lieutenants as
under the present laws. and the necessities of
the seacoast defense of the United States will
speedily require some increase in the aggregate
strength of the artillery. careful estimate
has shown that rag in liam he
present five. will be required for this service
and that such a reorganization will convert
the present five regiments into seven can be
made with very slight increase of expense
there being now in the five regiments almost
the entire number of officers required to prop
srly officer seven regiments.
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The important question OF national defense
the repor. continues, which has been so thor
oughly and publicly discussed in past years, is
now confidently regarded as settled by the
legislative action Of the last two Congresses
The wise policy thus inaugurated will. doubt
less. be steadily pursued until the great sea-
coast harbors are placed in condition to resist
any attack from a foreign enemy.
Satisfactory progress has been made in the
construction Of the gun factory at Watervliet
n u, In the manufacture of type guns Of the
highest qualities and In the manufacture of
service mortars and their emplacement at the
the sea coast. while contracts have been made
for the material necessary for the construction
Of large numbers of guns and mortars and for
the purchase Of completed guns of the highest
type. II viii only require moderate annual
appropriations for the next few years to place
the extended sea coast Of this country in such
condition that no foreign enemy could infiict
upon It any serious loss or damage. When this
10 accomplished the dignifed and lust policy
which this country has adopted toward all
foreign nations may be steadily adhered to
without apprehension OF results unfayorable
either to the welfare or to the honor of this
country.
INDIANS IN THE ARMY.
It "a assumed, a general principle Of mill
tary policy, that all of the permanent inhabi-
tants Of the country, without respect to race
or previous condition, should in time of war
furnish their fair proportion of the military
forces OF the country, and with this end in
view. that al should have representation in the
permanent establishment. IL has also been
demonstrated by experience. as well as by rea-
son. tina: one OF the most effective and most
rapid methods of civiliz;ng the savage tribes of
country and converting them from enemies
Into friends Is to receive n reasonable propor.
ton Of them into the military service of the
country. Although this policy has not vet pro-
crossed very far in its execution. the results
have been entirely satisfactory. and il is recon-
meEded that il be adhered to until the Ameri-
can Indian constitutes due proportion of the
enlisted strength of the army.