Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-11-15

before the Southern people believe they
would accept it, and have faith that the
Northern people, however startled at first,
would soon appreciate the wisdom of such .
settlement of the war. One hundred days OF
war would cost us the $500, ,000, 900 would
propose to give for emancipation and re-
stored Republic, not to speak of the price
less sacrifice of life and the additional
sacrifice of property, but were 1 to make
this offer now, it would defeat me lnevita-
bly,, and probably defeat emancipation"
I had no personal knowledge of Lincoln's
purpose to nominate johnson for Vice Pres
ident until the day before the Baltimore
Convention met. He telegraphed me to
visit Washington before attending the con-
vention, and I did so. He opened the con-
versation by advising me to give my vote
and active support to johnson as his asso-
ciate on the ticket. 1t was evident that ne
confidently relied on my willingness to ac-
cept his judgment in the matter. had ex-
pected to support the denomination OF Ham
lin. had little respect for Andrew john
son, and of all the men named for the POSI-
tion, he was the last would have chosen II
1 had been left to the exercise of my own
judgment. 1t is more than probable that l
would have obeyed the wishes OF Lincoln,
and, indeed, conclusive reasons for his re-
quest; but after hearing the arguments
which had led him to the conclusion that
johnson should be nominated as his asso-
ciate, was quite as ready to accept the
wisdom of the proposition as to obey the
wishes of the President.
His Reasons for Wanting johnson.
There was not q trace of bitterness, preju-
dice nor even unfriendliness toward Hamlin
in all that Lincoln said about the Vice
Presidency, and he was careful to say that
he did not desire the nomination of johnson
to crafty any personal preference of his
own. He preferred johnson for two rea-
sons, which he presented with unanswerable
clearness. First, he was the most conspicu-
GUS, most aggressive and the most able Of all
the war Democrats of that time, and was
just in the position to command the largest
measure of sympathy and support from that
very important political element. Dix,
Dickinson, Butler and Holt had made no
such impressive exhibition of their loyalty
as had johnson in Tennessee. He was just
then in the midst of his great work of re-
facilitating his rebellious State and restor-
in it to the Union, and his loyal achieve
ments We're therefore fresh before the peo-
Pile and certain to continue so during the
campaign. Second, the stronger and more
imperative reason was that the great
peril of the Union at that
day was the recognition of the Confed-
eracy by England and France, and every
months delay of the overthrow of the re-
bellious armies increased the danger. EI-
traoldinary efforts had been made by Lin
coin to stimulate the Union sentiment, es-
pecially in England, but with only moder-
ate success, and there was no safety from
one day to another against war with Eng
land and France, that would have been
fatal to the success of the Union cause. The
only possible way to hinder recognition
was to show successful results of the war in
restoring the discovered States to their old
and Lincoln was firmly con-
vinced that by no other method could the
Union sentiment abroad be SO greatly in
spired and strengthened as by the nomina-
tion and election of representative South
ern man to the Vice Presidency from one of
the rebellious States in the very heart of
the Confederacy.
Necessary to Conceal His Movements.
The fact that Lincoln did not make known
to Hamlin and his friends his purpose to
another for Vice President in '64,
does not accuse him of deceit nor insincerity;
and the additional fact that when the con-
vention was in session and he was asked for
o categorical answer as to his position on
the Vice Presidency, he declined to express
his wishes or to avow his interference with
the action of the party, cannot be Justly
construed into political double dealing. 1t
was quite as much necessity for Lincoln to
conceal his movements for the nomination
of johnson as it was, in his judgment, a
for him to nominate a Southern
man and war Democrat, and he simply |
acted with rare sagacity and discretion in
fo nd rit 10 he
the safety of which was paramount
with him.
Hamlin was profoundly grieved over his
defeat, as were his many friends, and had
they seen the hand of Lincoln in it, they
would have resented it with bitterness; but |
Hamliu himself was not fully convinced of /
Lircoln's opposition to his denomination |
until within two years OF his dea b. have |
in nv possession an autograph letter |
from Hamlin to Judge Pettis, of Pennsyl- |
vania, to whom Lincoln had expressed his |
desire for Johnson's nomination on the i
morning of the day the convention met, in |
which he says that he had seen and heard |
statements relating to Lincoln's action in |
the matter, but he did not believe them un-
til the evidence had lately been made con- |
elusive to his mind. In this letter he says: |
Il was really sorry to be disabused. And |
he adds: "Mr. L. (Lincoln) evidently be-
came somewhat alarmed about his reelection,
and changed his position. That is all T
care to say." l have thus the conclusive
evidence from Hamlin himself, that in Sep
tember, 1889, he had full knowledge OF Lin
coins direct intervention to nominate j Ohm
son tor Vice President in "a. Hamlin
gave an earnest support to the ticket, be-
lieving that the supreme sentiment of Re-
had set him aside in the inter-
est of the public welfare. He maintained
his high position in the party for many
years thereafter, filling the office of CoIlec-
tor of Portland and subsequently, returning
to the Senate, where he served until he had
passed the patriarchal age and then volun-
tarily retired to enjoy the calm evening of
well spent life. A. K. MCCLURE
Eye Burnt by Hot Steel.