The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1891-11-01

the order which I,ad been given to send re-
endorsements from Metz to Strasburg was
counterihanded. aud the troops intended for
that purpose were ordered to proceed from
the Rhine to tho Saar. Tho determination to
invade South Germany was already aban-
doned and although the French feet had
sailed around toward the North Sea and the
Baltic, 1t had not been provided with any
troops. and consequently It's operations were
doomed to be fruitless.
Let us look now at tho widely different
state OF things upon the German side. Won
Moltke affirms that Germany was surprised by
the declaration OF war. but she certainly was
not taken unawares The possibility OF such
an event had been foreseen. and every prepa-
ration had been made to meet 1t. The means
OF mobili.ing the North German army had
been reviewed year by year. In view OF
any possible changes In the military
or political situation, by the general stall in
conjunction with the Ministry OF War. Every
branch OF the administration had been kept
informed Of all 1t ought to know concerning
tho plans Of tho military authorities. The
Berlin Government had likewise come to a
confidential understanding with the South
German States on all important points con-
nected with prospective strategic operations
1t had been conceded that Prussia was not to
BIO reckoned on for tho defence OF any particI-
lar section Of their territory. and 1. had been
decided that tho best way Of protecting South
Germany would be by an incurslon into Als,,ce
across the central part OF the Rhine. which
could lie bucked up by the main force assem-
bled in that quarter. The fact that tho
Governments OF Bavaria. Wurtcmberg.
Badcn. and Hesse. .dcnudinI their own
countries as 1t wc:o. We're ready to
place their coatingents under tho command
OF King William. proved their entire con-
tldcnco in tho Prussinn Generals No sooner
had this understanding. which wls largely the
work OF dlplomatists. been arrived at than tho
other preparations were effected. and he-e. al.
though lie does not claim 1t. should DO rccog-
nizod ono OF Won Moltke's greatcst preliminary
services to Prussia Thu ouicrs for marching,
and for travelling Ivy rail o. boat. were worked
out for oach division OF tho army.togcther with
the most minute directions as to their differ.
ent starting points. the day ami hour nt do
paTturc. tho duration Of the journey. the re-
frcshment stations. and place Of destination.
At the meeting points cantonments wore as
signed to eaci, corps and division. and stores
and magazines were established. The effect
OF these minute and far-siShtcd arrangements
was that when wac was declared il needed
only the ROYAL signature TO set the ontire AN
parutus In motion with undisturbcd precision,
There was absolutely nothing 10 be changed
In the directions originally given: it suf!lcod to
carry out tho p-econcerted plan.
Tho mobilizod forces Of Germany wore d.
vded into three Independent armies. on n ba-
sis worked out by tho General Of the Prus-
sian Staff" that is to sny. by Won Moltke him
self The first army. under Gen. Won Stein
metz, consisted of 60. 600 man. It was ordered
to encamp at Wittnich and form the right
wing The second army, under Prince Freder.
lex Charles, was 131, 900 stron. and consti
tuted the centre. Its mocting point was in the
vicinity of Homburg. We should add That a
reserve of 10000 men was placed before Nav
ence, to reinforce the second army. which wns
thus brought up to tho strength of 1914, 600 men.
The third army, under the Crown Prince OF
Prussia formed the left wing of the German
line. and contained about 10000 soldiers,
The three armies. taken together numbered
1874, 600 mon. Behind these wero still three
corps. comprising 100000 troops, but they
we're not at first included in the disposable
forces. inasnuch as for three weeks tho means
OF railway TRANSPORTATION were fully engaged.
We have only to mention furthor that the
division and the Landwehr
troops were told of to defend the coast That
tho figures here given we're real and not nomi-
nal and correspondcd to speedily Accomplished
facts. is made indsputable when wa learn that
when King William arrived at Maycncc. lust a
after issuing the order for the mobil-
ization of his army, no found 300. 900 men as
sembled on and in front of the Rhine,
Won Motke tells us that in the plan of war
submitted by him and accented by tho King
he had his eve fixed from tho first upon the
capture of the enemy's capital. the possessIon
OF which is OF moro importance in France
than In other countries. On tho way thithor
the hostile forces were to be driven az persist-
emily rs possible back from the fertile SOUTH
ern district into tho narrow tract ON
tho north. Above all, Won Moltkes plon
of tho campaign was based on the
resolve to attack the enemy Mt once
wherever found, and to keen the German
forces so compact that a superior force could
always be brought into the field. Nv what
ever special mems the nims wero to be fuI.
filed was left to the decision OF the hour. only
the advance to tho frontier beinp nreordained
in every detail. It ia indeeb. according To Won