The record-union., 1891-02-18
WILL THEY AGREE?
The Jury in the Frediani Case Locked
Up All Night.
Judge Catlin Departs From the Old
Rut in Charging the Jury-Close
of the Arguments.


ment for the defense in the Frediani muir
der case yesterday morning, and finished
1t at noon. He made an unusually elo-
quent plea for the acquittal of his aged
client.
District Attorney Ryan made the clos
ing argument for the people in the after
noon. He warned the jury to throw
aside all sentiment and sympathy and do
Rs the law demanded-decide the case
upon the evidence given.
CHARGE TO THE JURY.
Mr.. Ryan concluded his argument at 4
P. NJ, and Judge Catlin proceeded at once
to deliver his charge to the jury. The
Judges remarks were somewhat novel,
inasmuch as he departed from all the
usual formalities and impressiveness re-
sorted to in such cases, and simply gave
the jury a plain statement, in plain Ian
guage, of what their duties were.
"The defendant, Eduardo Frediana, is
charged with the crime of murder, alleged
to have been committed on the 4th day of
November, 1890, in this city, by unlaw-
fully killing, with malice aforethought, t,
one Giuseppe Scatina," began his honor.
''To this charge the defendant has pleaded
not guilty. Our law divides murder into
two kinds, namely: Murder in the first
degree and murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is punishable
by death, or Imprisonment for life. Muir
der in the second degree is punishable by
imprisonment for term not less than ten
years, said term TO be fixed by the court.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice, and is pun
1shable by imprisonment in the State
pyrpaHlnu
to be fixed by the court.
" on may, If the evidence warrants it
under the further instructions which l
will give you, find the defendant guilty
OF either one of the two degrees of muir
der which L have mentioned, or Of man
slaughter or you may find him not guilty.
Murder is the unlawful killing of hui
man being with malice aforethought.
MALICE DESCRIBED.
'Such malice may be express or i'm
piled. It is express when there is mani
Tested deliberate intention unlawfully
to take away the life of a fellow creature.
1t is implied when no considerable prov
ocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.
'All murder which is perpetrated by
wlllful, deliberate and premeditated kill
ing is murder in the first degree; all
other kinds of murder are of the second
degree. But it must be borne in mind
that there must also be malice in the act
in either case. That is to say: There can
be no murder in either the first or second
degree unless the killing is preceded by,
and accompanied with, malice afore-
thought. The expression malice afore-
thought is easily understood. 1t eX-
plains itself It, of course, means an
evil design, wicked and malicious in
tent to injure, previously harbored in the
mind. 1t need not be entertained for
N-,..fI,a r1.a. lou. II Nf
sufficient if it actually exists at the time
have already stated that malice may be
express or implied, and under what cir
cumstances it is express, and under what
circumstances it is implied. Murder in
the second degree is defined by the law,
so far as it applies to this case, to be any
kind of murder, except that which is
perpetrated by willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing. Murder of the
second degree, therefore, is murder with
malice aforethought, but without de-
iberate, premeditated and preconceived
design to kill. Manslaughter is where
the killing is, as l have stated unlawful
but without malice, and where the act is
the voluntary act of the party accused,
upon sudden quarrel or heat of passion
The defendant in this case makes his de-
fense, as you have heard it stated by his
counsel, upon that section of the law
which says that homicide is justifable
when committed by any person in re-
sisting any attempt to murder, or to do
some great bodily injury.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
''The law presumes every person ac-
cused of crime to be innocent, and this
presumption continues during the trial,
and until the presumption is overcome by
evidence which convinceS the minds of
the jurors beyond reasonable doubt 1t
is incumbent on the prosecution to estab-
Iish the guilt of the defendant of some
one of the grades of homicide which I
have described, to the satisfaction of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fail in this, the defendant is
entitled to be acquitted.
In order to convict an accused person
of any crime, the jury must, after fair
and full consideration of all the evidence
be convinced of his guilt beyond q rea-
sonable doubt. You will perceive that
this rule implies that the mind need not
be wholly free from doubt, but it must be
wholly free from all reasonable doubt ::
conJectures which sound exercise of
Judgment at once detects as frivolous !;
theories which the reason easily exposes
as being false; imagined possibilities,
which, upon thoughtful and impair
tial comparison of all the evidence ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the evidence
and to be far-tetched and improbable
should all be disregarded. They do not
amount to that reasonable doubt upon
which the law makes it your duty to
acquit the defendant. But in order to
convict him, the evidence, and that alone
as 1t has been given to you, after full
consideration of all Of it taken together
must produce in your minds strong and
thorough conviction of his guilt of some
one of the degrees of crime of which, un-
der the information he may be convicted.
conviction that is not shaken by rea-
Sonable doubts. a reasonable doubt has
been well described by an eminent Judge
as that state of the case, which, after the
entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the
jury in that condition that they cannot
say that they feel an abiding conviction to
Il moral certainty of the truth of the
charge.
''What is meant by being convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, will not ap-
pear difficult to any man of fair common
sense. Twelve men selected from a large
number by the concurrence of both
parties for their sound qualities as inn
partial and intelligent jurors, and as men
of experience in the affairs of every day
life, cannot fail to distinguish between
what are, and what are not, reasonable
doubts. Any further instruction upon
that subject L do not consider necessary
or useful.
1T is a rule of law, as well as being
good common sense, that man is pre-
sumed tointend the natural consequences
of his voluntary act. Malice, as [ have
said, is an evil intent entertained by one
person against another, and if the defend
ant had an i'll will and evil design towards