The Ketchum keystone. [volume] (Ketchum, Idaho) 1885-1899, 1891-08-01
Not In Court.
To r. Peeotts, Plaintiff, %. ". II. Watt,
County Treasurer Of Alturas County

To r. Pccotts. Plaintiff, %. n. II. Watt,
County Treasurer Of Alturas County,
es al, D9sndonts.
The plaintiff for himself and other tax
payers Of Alturas county asks the Court to
restrain the defendant, Watt, as treasurer
aforesaid, from paying certain alleged
illegal county warrants allowed by de-
PENDANTS Florence, Weber and Aiken, as
the board Of county commissioners OF said
county, and issued by defendant l. w.
Garrett a. the county auditor and clerk
Of the board of county commissioners.
The complaint alleges in general terms
the inability Of Alturas county to pay
any of the warrants complained of before
two years from time of fling said COM
plant, but AYERS that Watt, as treasurer,
threatens to pay said warrants whenever
he has money IN his hands as treasurer.
The defendants ask that the restraining
order heretofore issued herein be dis
solved, and to deny the plaintiff any or
der in this court, and allege that the mo-
ton is made on the paper on flle IN TINS
court.
They also file demurrer to the COM
plant, alleging all the grounds OF the
statute therefor.
Courts are warned by all the authors
to be extremely careful in granting aid
by injunction, and the supreme court re-
ports of all the states are full of decisions
bearing out the principle that courts OF
equity will not interfere when any other
remedy exists, and unless it is made to
appear to the satisfaction of the Court
that no other remedy exists, and that the
immediate necessity for the relief prayed
for exists.
Vol. l, second edition, of sHigh on
Injunctions," Sec. 10, says:
"Interlocutory injunctions being often
sought for the purpose Of harrassing and
annoying defendants, the utmost care
should DE observed IN the exercise of the
jurisdiction, and the relief should only
be allowed upon clear necessity being
shown of affording immediate protection
to some right or interest of the party
complaining, which otherwise would be
seriously injured or impaired.
Sec -, same author and same volume,
says:
''And it is incumbent upon the party
seeking relief by interlocutory injunction
to show some clear legal or eqitable rights
and a well-grounded apprehension of
immediate injury to their rights. So it is
requisite that a complainant seeking the
aid of court of equity by injunction
shall not have been guilty of laches or
delay in the assertion of his rights, for
while delay may not amount to proof Of
acquiescence in the wrong for which be
seeks redress, it may yet suffice to pre-
vent his obtaining relief by injunction"
1t is hardly necessary to say that the
author above referred to is in the lead of
all others in questions of equity. Scarcely
supreme court decision in any of the
states or territories of the United States
can be found wherein equity is involved
that he is not referred to.
We do not deem it necessary to pass
on any question in this case excepting the
motion Of the defendants to dissolve the
temporary restraining order heretofore
issued in this case, and the only question
presented by the motion is:
: "Does the plaintiff by his pleading or
bring himself within the law
for the interference Of the court by in
Junction.
We think not, as the rights of the par
ties thereto can be determined long be-
fore it Is shown by the complaint that
the plaintiff or parties represented by
him can suffer by the alleged unlawful
acts of the defendants.
The motion to dissolve the restraining
order is sustained.
g. o. SToCKsLAGER, District Judge.