New-York tribune., 1891-03-01
THE GERMAN EMPIRE.
PHASES OF THE AuSTRO- -PRUSSIAN STRUG-
GLE

Won Sybels second volume opens with the
revival of the Confederate Diet, which now, as
always, proved instrument IN the hands OF
Au stria whereby she continually sought 10 break
down the prestige and power OF her rival Prussia,
and TO attach herself by ties of interest those
lesser German States whose jealousy of Prussian
supremacy made them willing tools of the House
Of Hapsburg. The high-handed. aggressive pohcy
Of Prince Schwsrzenburg the Austrian Minister
pushed the patience of King Frederick William
hard, but his traditional belief in the necessity
of friendly relations between the two great ter
man Powers restrained him at critical lunctnres'
and caused him 60 bear much which might justly
have been resented The Hessian question now
assumed threatening aspect The ElectOr Oh
Hcsse was a thoroughly unprinciplcd and worth
less man, and he was abetted in his assaults upon
the liberties of his people by Hassenphug, Minis
ter of the same type as his master. The people
of Hesse, however, had fallen upon evil times,
for the Confederate Diet, which had no authority
10 do ANYTHING of the kind, audaciously took upon
itself to discipline the recacirant citizens because
they took their stand upon constitutional rehus
and refused to vote supplies illegally demanded
The action Of the Diet was outrageous, but 'he
Revolution had so terrified the Geriuan rulers,
great and little, that they were ready Tor any
illegal course which promised to put down Demon
strGtions of popular belief
In this case they were actually supporting
monstr0us tyranny and bringing their own Gov-
ernments into contempt by combining 10 deprive
the Hessians of their constitutional rights; out
they thought little of this nor did the obvious
fact that their own constitution gave no warrant
for their action make them pause. Prussia must
share the accountability for this attack upon
IIesse for though she did not interpose, it was
%l,o aoffb fbo SooHn q
guard her own interests, and in the end she
permitted the sO-called punishment" of the Hes
slams 10 proceed unhindered. This punishment
consisted in quartcring troops upon the people In
such numbers as TO ruin those charged with their
support; and as the billcted soldiers received
hints that they might make themselves as obnoA-
ious as possible to their hosts, the general effect
OF the measure nearly equal 10 thai of
foreign invasion Prussia protested against the
marching of the Confederate troops into IlesSe.
mobilized her army. and went very near to war.
though without making il. Manteufel, the PruS-
sian Minister at the time, was not the equal of
Prince Schwarzenburg in craft, and allowed him.
self to be hoodwinked and drawn into humiliat
ing agreement at Omutz, though Frederick
William-almost alone-thought the arrangement
measurably satisfactory. Then followed the Dres-
den Congress. another futile endeavor to invent
"modus vivendi" between the two German Pow
ers. In all these Congresses and Diets the QueS-
tion upon which wreck made the In
ecutive Power of the proposed Confederation
Austria claimed and insisted upon supremacy, and
invariably sought so to arrange the Executive
Council that she could count upon enough votes
of lesser States TO paralyze Prussia. The latter
resolutely refused to accept any such one-sdcd
arrangement and insisted upon absolute equality
with Austria. AS neither would Yield it soon be-
came evident to clear rsighted observers that as
Bismarck put it, the question could only be settled
by blood and iron" 1t was indeed an ire
pressible conflict, engendered by the whole German
political situation, and If it was apparent that
only the arbitrament of the sword could decide
between the two great Powers, it was not less
plain that when that settlement came the hour
would have struck for the downfall of most, if
not ALL of those petty States whose existence had
proved so mischievous; which had only served to
perpetuate an individualism fatal to German unity
and German patriotism, while wasting the in
dustry and energy of their subjects in support
ing crowd OF toy States incapable of sef-defencc
necessarily dependent upon some great Power and
governed with sole reference to the dynastic i'll
terests of feeble. corrupt and absoutist families
The Dresden Congress was a complete fiasco. and
the new Confederate Diet succeeded. beginning its
sessions with the now unhindcred prosecution of
IL. Confederate
Diet however, now appeared great man. Otto
Won Bismarck, and his personality soon impressed
itself upon his colleagues and upon the action of
the body. at the outset of his career Bismarck
had been an ultra-Conservative, and was looked
upon as the representative of feudalism and aris
tOracy. lie was an aristocrat to the last, but in
all other respects he grew, adapting his policy to
the needs Of the hour. Won Sybels analysis of
the statesman's character is fine, but too extended
for quotation here. The occurrence of those
events which led to the Crimean War brought
great embarrassment to the Prussan Government
The Gar Nicholas had behaved in a very high
handed way. threatening Prussia with war unless
she made concessions TO Austria. and in the
Schleswig-ilolstein matter behaving arbitrarily
Austria was anxious to join the Western Powers
in the upon Russia. Her interests in the
Danubian PrncipaliticS in a manner compelled
her to put troops in the field when the Russian
occupation became accomplished fact. She de-
nanded Prussias assistance. France also and
England were urgent in their representations at
Berlin. But if the Prussian King hestated while
IL seemed likely that the would be fought
ont between the Danube ard the Balkans, its
transfer to the Crimea deterVned him to main
tain strict neutrality.
Prussia abused and tauntcd for this rcso-
luton at the time, but Won Sybe showed that it
was a sound policy. II was no business of hers
TO pull chestnuts from the fire for Austria. No
Prussian interests were nenaced by Russian ag-
2ressiOn The Prussan Army might have ex-
baustcd itself in fighting Austrias battles and
according TO all precedcnts Austria would have
taken prompt advantage of this exhaustion TO
thrust down her ally, and il possible, to destroy
her. The truth that Austria could not be
trusted. Her interests were too palpably anti
Prussian. 1t was therefore the part of wisdom
for Prussia To hold alOof; to keep her army and
her treasury intact; to let those fight whose in
terests controlled them; and TO await her own op-
portunity. 1t is possible that temporary loss Of
prestige -r; thus incurred, but certainly no real
loss of power and events ultimately vindcatcd