The Helena independent. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1875-1943, 1891-09-20
the most effective mode

considered the most effective mode
in which two armies can act in concert
and bring about the most telling results,
was that which brought one upon the
enemy's flank end rear, whilst the other
was engaged on the battlefield with that
Konigratz, when Prince Frederick Charles
was in direst distress, suffering heavily, and
yet unable to make INV impression upon
the enemy beyond the Bistrltz,
and when nothing could be seen of
the crown %rrince's army. the king, turning
ters we're going. His answe was: Your
majesty will win to-day not only the battle,
but the campaign"
When Moltke said this to the king his
clear, well-founded calculation of chances
reminds US of the unruf1iable imperturba-
bility of Marlborough, of the almost sooth-
saying prescience OF Napoleon.
There was nothing emotional about him,
no more than there was about Wellington
or Napoleon, although the latter often as
sumed an enthusiasm he did not feel. The
pulse of all strong leaders when in the field
not to be counted or measured by even the
most attentive observer. He is invariably
carefully watched, and his mien s%earchingly
scrutinized by all around him, or
who for even u few moments see
him or are brought in contact
WILL AlLus VU Iuubt0E WLtU HAY D0
in his mind his whole outward bearing
must be that of a successful gambler, and
his face bright with cheerfulness and glee
and confidence OF the man winning on his
side. When Napoleon pretended to carry
his heart upon his coat sleeve, and allow
%onlookers to see into his inner emotions, it
was a carefully prepared bait. 1t was the
birdlime of the willy trapper, and %clevarly
assumed expression of the finished actor,
whose complete knowledge of human nature
enabled him thus to play upon its amiable
weakness.
AS Moltke's critics love to point out, Ma
poleon urged upon his hearers how ex-
tremely difficult it was to place any de-
pendence on schemes which involved the
action of two or more commanders com.
PEELED to act for days Independently, and
without any power of constant and rapid
INSTRUMENTATION. This danger is i'll
tensitied when each of the independent
forces has to look to it's own special bnse
for supplies. Napoleon points out hat an
army SO divided lnys itself open to be
beaten in detail, and that it ought to be 30
beaten if opposed to Il man h knows his
trade. A..
There must always be a great element of
principle--for% principle of strategy it Ger
tMinlv is. Without doubt, Moltke's scheme
upon which the two great Prussian armies
crossed the mountains into Bohemia, in
l666, did violate thAt principle, az that prln-
ciple was understood and applied in the
Napoleonic era. But it cannot be too fire.
quently inserted TINT it is tho great general
who knows when he can afford to operate in
Il, manner entirely opposed to rules which no
had perhaps for years dmned into the heads
of those no wished to instruct in the science
OF war. But many circumstances may CON
duce to render snoh n proceeding not only
safe. but desirable. And If the circum-
stancea in 1866 DO duly studied, it will be
seen this was one of those exceptional oo-
c~asions, and that consequently Moltko did
right. 1t must. however. DO freely
admitted that to have attempted
such an operation before the cleo
trio telegraph was invented would have
been mad %rashness. had the enemy been
commanded by II skilfull stratesist; nay
more, that even in 1866. had tho great
Napoleon commanded the Austrian armies,
tho prussian forces would have been
hurled back into the mountains, defeated
in detail. But then Moltke knew full we'll
that Benedek was no Napoleon. lie cor
rectly estimated him as u commander at his