New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-12-04

set forth the fatulty OF the WnOe prOceeuihSe hV"
first to last that the invasion stands out in bold relief
as one Of the most -advised and madly conducted
expeditions that issued in dreadful disaster IN
this case the British Government had not the shadow
OF justification for the invasion of Afghanistah' Inc
war alike unjust and mpolltic; and ID was marked
throughout by almost incredible folly and IniSmahsse
mcnt. II the political officer, Macnaughton' was
mainly accountable for the detention OF the Ehghsh
forces at Cabul, under the delusion that the country
peaceful and consentng to the occupation whereas
In truth the Afghans were seething WIN eNe'emeht
and rapidly gathering to the attack OF the hvaaers
II to the military incapacty of the snperahhua'eu
commander, General Elphinstone, that the complete
hopeessness of the situation after the truth was dis
covered must be attributed The attempt to force shan
Sooiah upon a people who hated and despised him
was an act Of tyranny and oppression peculiarly
offensive to one Of the most hghsprted peoples under
the sun, and il morally certain that the Amccr
thus thrust upon them could only be maintained on
the throne by the foreign bayones that had placed
him there. Everybody but TIE Government realized
that the moment the army was withdrawn Shah 500
jahs brief reign would terminate; but everybody did
not perceive that the longer the army renamed IN
Cabul the harder would ii be for II to get away at ALL
The blind eoncet which has so frequently brought
disaster upon British contributed powerfully in
this case to insure the catastrophe. The Mghans
we're regarded as savages and theil military powers
were sncered at. 1t thought scarcely necessary
10 take any Of the usual military preca tionS in dealing
with them The same spirit which In the preceding
century had led TO BraddoCks defeat in America was
apparent throughout the first Afghan war. But there
was worse than this stupid concet at work. IT, when
the prospect seemed free from peril the political and
military leaders exhibited oNerweenlns confidence
In themselves and the force they controlled, at the
first appearance of danger they manifested an even
more striking want Of Judgment frmness and resolu-
ton. Even after the murder of Macnaughton there
seems TO be no ground for doubling that the army
bay hnan writ row Suc though at
the cost OF some hard fighting and heavy losses But
the commanders and the officers all lost their heads
together. Opportunity after opportunity was suffered
TO pass unutilzed. And when the situation was all
but desperate these men made it quite so by con-
cessons which paralyzed the defensive power of the
troops and threw them, helpless and nearly unarmed,
into the power Of an enemy who had already proved
his treaclery and ptessness. If ever an army was
sacrificed by the insane folly Of It's leaders, this one
was and although MacnaughtOn was the first to fall
victim to his bad Judgment it is difficult TO
feel much sympathy for him when one remembers the
fearful consequences Of his incapacty, and the stub
bOrnness with which he held to his fatal decisions, de-
SPITE protest and remonstrance.
For General EIphinstone more compassion may be
shown for his untness for the work In which he was
engaged probably realized by no one more keenly
than by himself. Age and disease had enfeebed both
his mind and his body. At the moment when the
most energetic measures were demanded he became
incapable of doing or even Of suggesting any course.
lie could only yield to the Afghan terms which
naturally became exacting with every weak con-
cesson. The general result Of all this drifting
and passivity that the English army
was shut up in it's environments, starved
and worried until having already lost all confidence
IN Its leaders, it lost confidence in itself and when
this daplOIable condition had been reached 1t was
literally turned the nfuriatei Afghans,
deprived of nearly all its artillery, without commits
saIiat at the most Indictment period Of the year. to
be escorted" to the frontier. To understand what
followed 1t must always be remembered that three
sourhs OF the British force consisted of Asacs. The
sepoys, accustomed to d tropical climate, shrunk
and wihered under the SHOWS and icy gales OF
Afghanisan. To the effect OF months OF demoralza-
ton In the besisged environments added those
Of bitter weather, and OF want of food and shelter
During the fatal march tents were provided. The
men had to sleep in the They froze to death by
the score. Then, when the passes were reached, the
Afghan mask was thrown OF completely, and the
massacre began. The passes swarmed with the fierce
hill tribes, who commanded the route on both sides.
Some effort made 10 defend themselves by the
doomed troops but it mer,ly prolonged their agony.
Day by day their numbers diminished. There was
no retreat and the advance blocked constantly.
At last thu inevitable end came, and single survivor,
wounded and spent reached Jellaabad with the awful
news.
The defence Of Jalabad was the oneredeemng feature
of this campaign and the decision ohold that place
There were plenty of brave and capable men in the
army but they were in subordinate positions, and their
wiser counsels were overrued Sir George Pollock,
man Of very different cabre from General Elphnstone,
was TO retrieve avenge the massacre and with
the aid of General Mott he inflicted defeat
upon the Afghans. but the nevertheless
failure and the only that could eventually be
taken was retreat from the country In the second
Afghan no such military bundcr occurred but the
cause of the itself hardly more deensble than
that of 1910. one defeat, that Of Maiwand, which
might have been disastrous, gave occasion for that
memorable march by which General Sir Frederick
Roberts retrieved the situation. moving from Cabu to
Candahar at an astonishing pace and crushing AyOub
Khan in the battle Of Candahar. At Cabul the scene
of the murder Of Sir Louis Cavagnari treated
the Bazaar had been in 184o though it is very doubt
full whether the moral effect produced at all likely
TO be enduring. 1t may be said Of this murder that
while it seemed necessary to punish (which done
very imperfectly by hanging a number of the common
people, willie the far guer Sirdars escaped-it never
would have been committed had not the English Gov
eminent repeated its mistake Of interfering in the
affairs Of Afghanisan.
AS 1t was, after having conquered the country and
beaten down all resistance, 1t found itself in sui
fciently embarrassing position. The first war had
taught II the folly Of attempting to force Amer
upon the Afehans yet this precisely what it
could not escape from. IT not TO leave anarchy
behind when 1t evacuated the country. Oddly enough
too il was so constrained to be unable to settle
upon any candidate but Abdurrahman, who was well
known TO have been for yeas profege of Russia.
who had lived among them, who was believed to be
attached to them In various ways, and to be in the
receipt of Russian subsidy. This the man
finally pitched upon TO rule over the "bufer State"
whose special function it to check the Russian
advance toward the Indus. II was certainly strange
conjecture but after all 1t has not turned out badly
Abdunalman proved to be stronger and a crlfter
prince than he previously thought TO be- and he did
not manifest any prediction for Russia. But the
strancest fact Of all that the Afgnns should have
accepted him knOwing-as they could not fail TO
knOw-:hat lie was the nominee Of England. However,
IL was fortunate for the latter that they did for
facilitated the Withdrawal OF the army. The second