The National tribune., 1891-06-25


the 9th Nov, 1863 That was a murderous
hlundcr, hut ! do not know who was response
bic. Reid's history OF Ohio in the War says
Of the 7th Ohio ia this battle: At this point
the gallant Creighton shouted TO his regiment
Boys we are ordered 20 take that hin. ] want
you 10 walk right mp 20 it, We know what
the result was and enough Union troops in
sight 10 have captured the whole rebel army.
" In conclusion, comradc, allow me 10 thank
you for the notice Won have given 10 the cap
turc Of Battery Lady Breckenridge
The above IS the invaluable testimony Of a
clear minded person, who was right in the
thick OF what he describes
] have one more letter equally valuable
with the above. from III. ~. Brandle. Orderly
TO Gen. j. }. oHcrhaus, First Division, Eff
tecnih Corps lie says:
4" i have just read your article in THE Ma
TFONAL TEIBUSE for the third time Captain,
] have always felt sore, or disappointed, over
that fight Lookout Mountain az the way our
division was treated by Gen. Hooker. Now,
we formed The left flank at tho taking of the
mountain; then our division drove the enemy
through Roswell Cap filed left, and then by
the left flank came MP in the rear of the rehs
on Missionary Ridge, while YOU came in front.
The next day our division was in the rear on
the road 10 Riuggold but we only marched
few miies-why, do not know But the next
-
made the attack on Taylors Ridge. If we had
had 100 cavalry We could have captured that
rebel battery IN camp IN RinEgold. Evidently
those two guns all the artillery that was left
10 BraEg's whole army. After the rebs made
the stand. some Of Rockers troops TO which
the eth Ohio belonged, was on our left, and
know equally suffered as ourselves
] will never forget that fight
Now, Captain, you seem 20 blame Gen.
for MT prtf rri flfr rp'C
we were NJ that house you speak of the rail
road depot Gen. Grant came mp and called for
Gen. Hooker who came, when Gen. Grant
said Gen. Hooker, you have broken into my
arrangements. ] did not want you TO bring on
an engagement here. ] wanted TO get behind
them aud capture them Now, Captain,
heard Gen. Grant tell Gen, Hooker that; aud
II Gen. Hooker had done right, Grant would
have captured them.
We turned over to Gen. Hooker one cannon
captured IN rear of Missionary Ridge besides
two stands Of colors; and in his reports aud
nearly All others Of that battle Ostcrhanss old
division is hardly ever named. / guess we
ought not TO complain. My old brigade'S rec
ord is 10 days under Gre in whole or in part,
and that our division never was driven from
line"
The testimony Of this oomrade rs to what
Grant said 10 Hooker is invaluable. We have
now Grants plan, and sec what he attempted
TO DO But there arc certain obvions facts aud
differences which, / think, should be brought
out clearly.
IL is evident that Gen. Grant had not given
orders TO Gen. Hooker not to bring on an en-
gagement, and that Hooker did not know Of
Grants plans else Grant would have used very
different language to him nj the meeting which
our comrade has referred 10. But if Grant
expected intelligent cooperation, he should
necessarily have told Hooker as the COM
mander OF his right wing.
Again, Gen. Hooker was in nowise RESPONSE
bic for the necessity Of the battle M Tavlor's
Gap that morning. That necessity was pro-
duced by the surprise Of the battery the night
before. What eager delight there was on the
part OF our men in that surprise; and yet few
events were more calamitOus; for. IL we were
rightly informed at the time, If that battery
had not been surprised. and SO il the febels had
not been notified that we were across both rivers
and right upon them, Braggs trains would not
have started 10 20 through the Gap that night,
and, just as things stood, the next morning we
should have captured the most Of them.
But though Grant did have the plan he told
10 Hooker that morning, still he was 10 blame
for not making il successful. Had he crowded
his left wing forward under Sherman with all
possible urgency ard had they done as well as
the Sixth Corps did the Summer before in get
ting up 10 Gettysburg, and had all his army
been crowded forward onto Bragg, and been 40
that railroad station two and 0nc-hRlf miles
back, where his stores were, by ; TO 10 o'clock
IN the morning, az believe IL might have been.
he would have made a perfect mess OF Bragg's
army before shutdown, while Sherman would
have got by 10 the other side Of the Gap and
stopt that, and so the whole Of that army would
have been in a sack and would have surren-
dered ri discretion. Ny sense Of the needless
ness OF the calamity Of not capturing Bragg's
army is not diminished by Comrade Brandle's
testimony.-JEssE ii. JoHEs, North Arlington,
Mass.