Sturgis advertiser. (Sturgis, Dakota [S.D.]) 1887-1???, 1891-05-14

OF the greatest NUMBER requires prOhlb-s
tory law, that law will be enacted and
enforced ais naturally and promptly a.
are the laws against stealing and SNUG
CLING. Until the law il desired and sus-
tanned by such general orcontrolliAg SEN
timent, 1t will be d positive moral dam
age, the constant cause of lies and eva
sIons, and degrading in the estimation of
men to the very conception Of law, which
should ever be held as among things
most sacred.
1t is not the purpose of the present ar
ticle either to- make or to antagonize such
argument, by solely to define the limits
within which the appeal for legal Proii-
bition must be confined. Whether such
appeal is warranted by the condition OF
society to-day is neither affirmed nor de-
MED by this paper. The purpose In hand
is rather, having made the foregoing
definitions, to draw attention to the fact
that the Prohibitionist is out OF his place,
and beside the real question of legal Pro-
hlbition, when he assumes that as civil
measure it is demanded by morality;
when, as a moralist, he propounds such
Prohibition as remedy for the moral
evil of when, as preacher,
he lays it as a religious obligation on the
conscience; or, when, as Christian, he
enters church court and demands for Ii
the religious authority of ecclesiastical
commentator.
This introduces the second aspect OF
prohibition, which the perhaps more FREE
quent argument strives to make the
prominent one, but the utterances OF
which the movement takes to itself
pseudo-religious and moral forms, and
appeals to the religious and moral con-
seriousness of the church and Christians,
Dropping its only valid argument of So
cial expediency, it assumes the dignity
of moral precept, and declares that the
State ought to prohibit the manufacture
and sale of liquor, on strictly moral
grounds that such making and selling
are sinful; that the license system is
wicked in that it draws revenue from
sin. This idea of moral urgency is spok-
EN- or implied in every resort to synods
and conferences on the part of Prohibi-
ton, and to the false principle involved
in it many religious body gives consent
either unwittingly or unwillingly, tor
the fear of being misunderstood or mis-
represented. The usual form of such
deliyerances reasons from the sin of
drunkenness and the drinking habit to
the necessity of civil statute to prevent
it. Thus, whatever force may be sup
posed existent in an ecclesiastical enact
ment to formulate spiritual law Ia
sought in order to ciothe the social expe-
| dent of prohibition with the sanctitias
| of moral precept. 1t is but borrowed
| plumage, not native to the bird which
wears it. A moral precept is an instru-
| naent for the education and strengthen
| ing of the moral man, and as such, it
may, without hesitation, be affirmed that
| prohibition has no standing in the court
of Christian morality. Urged as meas
| ure of the State, orsocial reasons, it may
| be welcomed or tolerated. Preached as
moral dogma, binding on the conscience,
| it is reprehensible as the sin which it
proposes to abolish. This ought to be
self-evldent to every mind and yet, be-
| cause the mind is oppressed by the enor~
| nous evils of intemperance, and at the
| same time drawn by the good which
prohibition promises, the vital distinction
here noted is apt to be lost. The truth of
| this distinction and its importance will
| appear from the following considsra-
\ tions:
/. The logical support of Prohibition rs
moral precept necessarily involves the
assumption OF one of two things either
| that all drinking of intoxican:s and con-
sequently the sale of them is sinful, or
| that an invariable moral law of total ab-
| stinence TO be enforced ON all by con-
| science and both canon and civil law,
grow out of their abuse by some. Both
| of these assumptions are false. As to the
former, it hardly needs to be argued to
| the unbiased mind that both reason and
| Scripture place the marks of sin at ine-
briefly. To be drunken is sin. To drink
with the certainty or probability of
drunkenness is a sin. To drink within
the limits of entire self-control is indif-
| ferent This last is true temperance, with
which firmly observed, so long as mans
/ influence is not taken into account, for
4 the man himself tits as innocent to drink
,Iaas to eat bread. TO sell for such use lnast
i also be Innocent 1t is not necessary to
4 consider here the attempt made TO turn
the position of Scripturai temperance by
the modern Interpretation which sup
| poses the Bible to make mention OF two
| wines. 1T needs but to be set aside for a
| curiosity of exegesis, as grotesque as it is
| unsupported by the vast preponderance
| of scholarship and research. It stands
true that the Bible calls drunkenness q
sin, but not drinking. Hence there in a
false premise in the moral plea for Pro-
/ hibltion, when it says, as in the majority
| of it's utterances, tThou shalt not drink"
This even the moral law cannot say. IL
| is still more impossible for the civil law
/ to saw it for moral reasons. The civil law,
as already shown, may say ft Tor reasons
of social expediency, If public sentiment
shall demand it.
This brings into view that fundamert-
al distinction made by the common law
! and recognized in the Scriptures, between
aaatsns per sc and maluna 0rolaibitum. The
former is wrong because of its intrinsic
nature, and nothing can make 1t right.
The latter is is wrong only because the
law forbids it. The wrong of the former
demands that q law be made to punish lie.
The wrong of the latter has no existence
until the statute is made and the crime
created by the law. The former is funda-
mental in morals. The latter is an sx-
pedient for the State. Both the Bible
and civil law says: aThou shalt not
steal" lit is sin to steal under any cir
cumstances and TO any amount, howeSSr
small. 1t would be asin il the law said
nothing about it. The law says, tsThou
shalt not smuggle." Morality and the
Bible know nothing about The crime oil
smuggling until the civil law defines and
creates it. Then morality and the Bible
make conscience of lie and say, Thou
must obey the law" BY parity OF rea-
soning, the matters OF excess and or In
fiuence aside, there needs prohibitory
statute to make all use Of intoxieaIltsu
sin. The moral argument OF the Prohl-
bitionist puts the cart before the horse,
saving, "Prohibit, because 1T 10 wrong
In reality, only the statute can make u
wrong. No moralist is ever justified In
speaking of q statutory evil as though II
s. were an evil per Sc or, least or all, In argu-
ing for the prohibition of the former on
the ground of the latter's Intrinsic sinful
ness.
The first OF the two assumptions Isl
then, manifest1y false. The other can
fare no better, though more plausible ia
its statement. Its ordinary form oil
| statement is of the nature of d conclu-