News and citizen. [volume] (Morrisville, Vt. ;) 1881-current, 1891-01-01

apain the dismal echo fallure! He
wrote. "Under ordinary circumstances the
Federal army should have bn destroyed"
The one day of the seven men Lee had a
chance to destroy the army McClellan-
the decisive day of the campgn ON our SIDE
was June 80, the last day McClellans
march in his change of base On that day
our forces were stretched ong ten miles
of road, the leading columi selzlng stra-
tegic positions on James riv nd lighting
off Confederates bent on thstme purpose,
the center vsarding off pOerful attacks
which threatened to cut e long line in
two, and the rear holdir out against
another powerful force CONG up to catch
our columns between conveying fires.
On that day Lee knew foihe first time
after Mcclellan withdrewrom the lines
before Richmond just whel his opponent
was and how to strike hinlfectually, and
he had his troops well in hid to do it. Yet
the day was to him and tohis lieutenants
one of great humiliation, aIwas wonder
full surprise to the Union sdiers when the
truth became known. Wen Lee found
that Mcclellan had abanhed the upper
Chickahominy and was ming without
secure base anywhere he pinned trap for
him as perfect, owing to thlay of the land
around the Union army asOuld be con-
ceived.
Mcclellan, on leaving thChickahominy
to go toward James riv, had to pass
White Oak Swamp on sgle road, and,
as Lee took good care, he ii but that one
road all the way to the Jars. Beginning
with the point on James rer aimed at by
Mcclellan, HaxaIl's LaiiBg (see dia-
gram), Lee sought to sprd his army like
a net from the James alg the west side
of McClellan's path to tlswamp on the
north, thence around dowthe east side to
the James again to the ad of the net
That head he hoped tolOse by seiZing
commanding ground aNIalvcrn Hill,
above HaNall's. From Ents of vantage
all around this line theeveral Confed
crate corps were to assail icClellan's col
umns, and either drive en- to corner
en- masse or break themtp into weaker
bodies and thus have themt their mercy
Under the circumstances is plain that
McClellan's safety lay in tting his army
together and with Il greaoody, including
troops, artillery and tras to move on
one road. Time was everhing to him.
On the Confederate sideapid movement
was everything, and the dunn depended
upon by Lee to DRAG tlsa lo'e end of the
- - % II,.---4- s--Sy---7z~r4Hr y ol-
Visions peII nell h4to the danger pockets
prepared for them was .Stonewall" Jack
sons. Jackson was following up the Union
army across White Oak Swamp. He had
his own valley army, D II. Hills corps
and "Jeb' Stuart's cavalry. jackson and
Hill, with infantry and artillery-four
large divisions, of not less than 10000 men
kept the direct road and Stuart, with all
his mounted column, moved across coun-
try on Jackson's left flank, to close the
avenues of escape against Mcclellan on
the east. The task of direct pursuit was
assigned to Jackson, because his army had
been nearest to Mcclellan when the move
ment began.
On the morning of June 80 the situation
was one of gravest danger for our disjointed
and unsettled lines. Only one corps out
of five had reached james river, and the
Confederate column of Gen. Holmes, con.
sisting of the garrison troops of Richmond
city, Petersburg, the river batteries and
railway guards, was moving down the
river road to seize Malvern Hill. where
Mcclellan desired to concentrate. The
other Union corps were strung along the
road back toward White Oak Swamp
where the Sixth, under Gen. w. B. Frank