The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-10-21

the husband as tenant by curtesy. unon the
osatn OF his wife. nor 10 any estate in dover
aiiotteu 10 the vile, upon the death OF her hus-
band" This provision has been re-enacted as
section 2, Ala OF the code and Is embraced in the
chapter re ating TO the property rights OF mar
24l4, 1892 and 1884, OF the code were in force as
law In Washington territory at the time of the
death oil eomplainant's husband.
Inc statutes referred 10 show that since 1863
ana prior to the death of complainaut's hus
nand, the legislature has, after first amplffying
.ns Avs relating to dover, by gradual and
eliminated all provisions recognizing il al an
existing right, so that, in 1889, the statutes in
force referred to dover only in the sections de-
caring IL abolished. Under existing laws in
stead OF dover, married women have the rights
which the community property law gives, and
tne WIDOW OF every man who dies seized of an
estate OF Inheritance in land in this state with
out having devised the same, is entitled to A
portion thereof as heress. The change is
general No exceptions or saving clauses are TO
De found IN the statutes. The legislature has
exercised TO the full extent it's power to cut of
lays claim to.
An ingenious argument is put forth to the
erect that the case must be determined accord
ing to the law in force at the time of the aliens
ton OF the land, otherwise as the veDdee took
SUBJECT to the right OF dover, and presumably
paid no more for tie land than the value of the
interest therein which was conveyed to him, he
VIII proht by the contract of purchase beyond
that the parties contemplated In making il
The unsoundness of this proposition is
In the false assumption which 1t in
wolves as to the nature of dover,
as II 1t were during the continuance OF the mar
riage adefinite vested right. The vendPe took his
estate subject only to a possibility that In the
future right of dover might accrue. The
title which he bought and paid for was absolute,
except in the contingency that the wife of the
vendor should survive her husband and her
right of dover should not be lawfully barred.
Barring the right by legislative enact
ment no more added to his profit than
would the death OF the complain
ant II it had occurred prior to
her husbands death, a contingency which the
parties should have had in mind. The authori-
ties cited in support of the argument only go
70 the extent of holding that where a right OF
dover has vested, after the property subject to
IL has been conveyed by the husband, the law
IN force at the time of the alienation governs
instead OF the law existing at the time of the
husbands death. They lend but little support
10 the contention that the complainant has ac-
quired right, by force of a law, long after the
repeal OF that law. The same argument stated
in another way would be that, by the hus-
bands alienation of the land before the
right of dover was abolished, the interest of
his wife therein was changed to a vested right,
so that in such land and against his vendee, the
right remains, although ii he had retained the
same land until his death, no such right would
have attached TO il. ! am not able to find any
ground la reason for such distinction. 1t is
my opinion that the complainant has no valid
claim TO or interest in the land described in her
Dill. The demurrer will be sustained and de-
cree dismissing the bill will be entered.