New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1891-03-29
HANNIBAL.
THE STORY OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

Art OF
Down to the Battle of Pydna l69 Il Var ar WITH a37
tailed Account Of the second rune war; nonmvres
charts plans OF battles and tactical mam0euNIes,
cnts Of armor weapons and uniforms. by theodore
Ayrault Dodge. 5vo, PIP. xviii 6o4. Housh'oh'
Mifiiln q Co.
The career of Hannibal is certainly one OF the
most picturesque and interesting in history, anu
the title of the Carthaginian general 10 rank hlsh
among the worlds great captains rests upon un-
improbable evidence. For in this case all the
authorities are hostile to the hero. HIS olograph-
ers are either Roman or wholly dependent upon
Roman testimony: and the man whose hatred to
Rome was the guiding principle of his life was not
likely 20 be overestimated by the people TO whom,
during eighteen years, he was constant source
Of apprehcnsion and anxiety. Yet to his proves
upon Italian fields is doubtless due the measure
of Justice melted out TO him by writers ike LVS
and Polybius: for il was impossible greatly 20
depreciate a captain who, to the knowledge OF al
the world, had held Rome at bay so long, ana
had so often humbled the pride of her legions ana
inflicted upon them the most crushing ueieats'
The Second Punic War is one of the most remark
able on record 1t is not so because llannlDal was
thrown upon his own resources by Carthage, for
many generals have suffered a similar fate; puU
because in that stubborn and protracted conflict
the whole power of Rome was defed by com
mander whose single army was steadily deteriorat-
ing all the time vet who succeeded in avoiding
any crushing or even compromising defeats long
after he had become unable to take the offensive.
Colonel Dodge has brought TO his task very
thorough preparation and equipment. lie mas
been all over the ground of Hannbals Italian
campaigns Polybius and Livy in hand, and has
examined and judged all the disputed questions
b. the combined light of professional knowledge
and geographical investigation. To the ola uls-
pute as to the route taken by Hannibal in crossing
tofn fndx
the basis of the itinerary of Poybus chiefly, has
reached the conclusion that the pass traversed by
the Carthaginian was that of the Little ST. Ber-
nard The argument by which this position is
maintained is ingenious and plausible 1t is made
10 appear more probable, and, above all, more IN
accord with POlybius, than any of the other the
cries; and the consideration that this route woulu
have landed him among friendly tribes on the
Italian side whereas the other would have brought
him out among hostile populations, must be adj
mitted to carry much weight. The final settlement
of such problems, if. indeed at all possible, must,
however, be left to professional acumen. 10 the
general public it will always he more interesting
70 hear of what Hannibal did after he reached Italy
than to discuss the question by what ROAD ne
crossed the mountains to get there. His crossing,
moreover though successful as regards its main
purpose, was clearly attained at very great cost
His losses during the passage were heavy, IN men,
animals and commissariat stores. Nearly one
third of his army sacrificed to the perils OF
the way, and, in effect, the Alps cost him as
much two pitched battles.
The task which Hannibal then undertook was
destined to failure through no fault of his own
In the great struggle between Rome and Carthage
everything played a part and the constitution
Of the Carthaginian State was really what con-
ouered Hannibal and paved the way for the full
fmcnt of Cato's comminatory demand. Breadth
of view, otherwise craftsmanship, was wanting
from first 10 last in the councils of Carthage
RomC had not then grown to her pitch of pride
and power Her bones were yet in the gristle,
so TO speak and powerful and wisely governed
rival might have overthrown her. Hannibal was
the one Carthagnian to perceive clearly that
Rome should he fought, not in Spain, but in Italy
if Hannibals appeals for reinforcements after
Cannae had been responded to-if the Senate had
seconded his splendid generalship by maintaining
his forces in full strength-it is highly probable
that Rome not Carthage, would have been de-
stroyed. As it was, Carthage was no less the
enemy of Hannibal than Rome, and more trcach-
erous enemy, for he depended upon her for help
and she failed him almost uniformly. The con
sequence was that he obliged to change his
policy after the first three years; to exchange
the offensive defensive, and that again for the
purely defensive for he growing weaker con-
\ tinually while Rome was growing stronger.
II Colonel Dodge necessarily pays considerable
attention to the question of formations and tactics
I'm comparing the merits of the legion and the
phalanX he is led TO prefer the former. Yet II
does not appear that the conditions during the
Second Punc War were precisely such as to fur
nish ground for final decision on this point.
When Hannibal had in hand his veteran troops
that is, when he entered 1taly-his phalangial
formation showed itself superior to that Of the
Roman legion whenever the two encountered This
remained true while the African troops of Hanni-
bal lived. When they were all expended and
lis ranks were filled from raw, undscplined 1tal-
ian tribes the question of formation newt
ably subordinated TO that of morale AS all this
time the Roman discipline and military intclli-
gence had been developing-as, in fact, the Roman
captains had been TO school to Hannibal himself
campaign after campaign-the effectiveness of
the legionary formation was of course, greatly
enhanced; but the Carthagnian army ceased in
time 70 he able TO face the legions, because the
whole body had undergone radical change and
deterioration. But for what Colonel Dodge calls
the burning genius" Of Hannibal, feeble an
instrument must have broken in his hands and
left him naked and helpless With his depleted
and demoralizcd army he did wonders, and even
at the last when his weakness known, the
terror of his name was such that the bravest
Roman dared not attempt TO close in upon him.
All this was the result of such campaigning as
has perhaps never been equalled since, as it GER
tainly never was before. For Hannibal united in
himself more great military qualities than any
other captain has possessed. Bolder than the
boldest he was also prudent as the most cautious
lie could carry out Fabian policy, or he could
deliver crushing blows, as at Cannae and THRASH
meme.
He was as great a politician as soldier, in
fact, and all his fighting and marching was directed
to political ends lie has been blamed for not