The weekly intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1891-1901, 1891-09-26
Headquarters, ID ARMY CORPS,

FIELD BOONE COUNTY j uly 81, 1861.
General Sterling Price. Commanding NJ. S. G..
GENERAL-Pursuan to the plan COM
muncated in my letter of the 9th inst,
! from Camp Hope, in Monroe county, |
made demonstration against the enemy
by an attempt to capture detachment,
which he had sent out against me from
Monroe Station, but unfortunately the
ver-zealous precipitancy of four scouts,
which i had thrown out to obstruct his
movements, in firing upon him, defeated
my plans and enabled him to make good
his retreat and get within his fortitica-
tions, with but the loss OF a single person,
Capt. McAllstcr. After tearing up the
railroad track and the destruction OF two
bridges, endeavored To profit by the ap-
parent enthusiasm which prevailed to
draw some OF the men (who Hooked in great
numbers to my Support), from the too
near proximity of their homes, to more
distant county, in the hope of inducing
them to enroll regularly in the service.
But my efforts We're fruitless and only
thirty five out OF several hundred follow
ed me in movement. which l inaugu-
rated effectively to surprise and capture
Jefferson City. Ascertaining that the SYM
pathy OF the people of Galloway county
was Overwhelmingly southern, left my
little force at Brown Spring, n few miles
from Fulton, and pushed forward, accom-
panied with my personal aids, to the river
opposite Jefferson City, in the hope OF
communicating with friends within that
city and thus gain reliable intelligence.
Upon arriving ut the river, however, j,
found the enemy in force crossing over,
coming i'll pursuit of me.
lost no time in making such prepara-
ton as was possible and successfully am
bushed the advancing force the next morn
ing. The enemy Were commanded by
Col. John Mcneil, and consisted chiefly,
If not entirely, oi Home Guards, organiZ-
ed ut st. Louis. Owing to the raw mate
rial, which constituted my force, | was
unable To intiict any serious punishment
or Jury upon the enemy, the only COM
pCnsation for which is in the fact that
! suffered none from him. AS | intend
ed nothing more than demonstration,
having knowledge OF large force con-
contrating upon me, was quite content
with the result, as | intended scattering
whatever force | might have, within an
hour after the engagement, be the result
as il might. After the affair at Fulton |
withdrew to this place, accompanied by
the members of my immediate staff and
three priVates, to be used as couriers.
From the best information / can give,
the enemy now has an efficient force in
North Missouri, oi between 1900 and
,000 men. OF this force BrigadierG Gen
eral John Pope is in command, with head
quarters at st. Charles. The force is We'll
distributed to prevent organization in the
field. The ultimate destiny of this force
is undoubtedly to reinforce Gen. Lyon at
Springfield before he engages you.
The most valuable service which L can
perform is to hold as much of this force
as possible in North Missouri, until you
shall have met and defeated Lyon. / shall
devote myself exclusively to this object.
know that an ephemeral military repu-
tation might be gained by pretentious
prochmations and irregular vlsltations
upon the enemy. But | have thus far
avoided, and shall continue, if possible,
in f,tft,E To, xrni To t,h
means.
In every instance have advised either
apparent submission or open, organized
resistance in conformity with the require
ments OF the laws of the state. In the
absence of properly organized command,
experience has taught me that / can ac-
complish more through the apprehensions
OF the enemy, than by the display of such
n following as | can temporarily call
together. / shall, therefore, address myself
to the task of making such demonstra
tions as may serve to hold the enemy in
North Missouri, contine his troops within
as strict garrison limits as possible. By
this means hope to protect the persons
and property of our citizens from depreda-
ton. TO accomplish this object shall
resort more to strategy than force, for the |
organization of an adequate regular force, |
in the immediate presence of the enemy, | |
now recognize to be impracticable.
In connection | hope you will excuse |
me II L submit Il lew suggestions upon i
logistics. Although the governor in his |
proclamation calling for $4,000 men, |
atiirms "that the state of Missouri is still |
one of the United States, etc." the events |
of the current month, since the proclama- |
tion Indicates that her relation to the |
union viii be altered, ii it is not, in |
effect, already severed. | may perhaps |
have over estimated, but certainly have
never under estimated the dimensions of |
our present troubles, and ! deem il duty /
To consider the policy of military opera
tions in reference to the possible, if not
probable, necessities of Il long and ex-
hausting war, and the ultimate with
drawal of our STATE from the union. The
political differences between the North
and South can never be settled by de-
lensive war on the part of the South. The
North initiates the war for purpose, and
peace can only be obtained by conquering
it, the one section from the other The
South To prevail must successfully invade
the North and niict such distress as to
compel acquiesccnce to terms, which it
seems moral suasion fails To obtain North
Missouri must form the base for the
of any army into any OF the
western states. 1t is impossible for n
Southern army to bring with it the nee
eSsaTy supplies for such an advance move
ment, and the abundance which is found
in this region should be garnered and
ecOnomiZed for future use North Missouri
maintain herself unsupported
against the Northern states surround
ing her, and any supporting force
cannot be expected To bring with
it from the South adequate supplies.
tiAnra thp inheritance nf In /