The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1891-08-31

tho operation In ssixing the Initiative md
throwing down the gauntlet to BALMAcEDA
cannot DO oyerostimatei. At ono stroke tho
Juntn do Gobicrno appeared even to tho adj
hcrents OF tho santiago Government no
longer faction OF mnlcontents who had run
of with tho fleot. but IN aggressive power,
threatening tho chief commercial city Of
tho republic and herewith OF necessity tho
capital itself. In executing this stroke a
skilrnl naval fclnt Mt CoIuinbo. far to the
north, caused the concentration OF large
body OF BAbMAoEpA's troop, there who
wore lett In tho rear when the transports
with tho insurgcnt army passed BY and
probably were unable to tako part In the d.
cisivo struggle around Valparaiso.
Tho landing ut Quintaro Bay, effected un-
der tho guns OF tho insurgent fleet. WAS Q
complete surprise to BALMAcEDA. Skirmish-
crs were promptly sent out TO tho railroad
aud telegraph lines. and the army quickly
moved forward to tbs river kconclEus 'bc,-
tween Quntero Bay and Valparaiso. Bv
that time tho troops from that city aud
irum Santiago had boon hurried forward.
aud tho crossing was disputed; but tho in
surgent fcct. II appears, took position at
tho mouth OF tho river and opened heavy
fire, supported by tho insurgont batteries on
thu right bank severe tn.tle at Concol
resulted III heavy loss to BALMACEDA's
army. Tho aim IT Gen. CANrO was to
rosch the hills behind tho city, where his
artillery could com,naudtt. Tho nlanCouvrcs
for this purp sc. rs he forced his way nearer
TO tho clty, probably lost to sonc extent the
cooperation II the fleet, which couli not
enter the bay on account o. tho fire from tho
forts. Tho citylics on a comparatively level
strip. between tho hills and THO hay. and Its
drfcnccs nro chiefly planned with Wow to
an attack from the soa.
But tho tactics Of Gen. CASro provo,i as
superior to tho Government'sa, his strategy.
and his lines wore ", rkod steadily toward
Fort Callao. At length, on tho 2sth. rs tho
accounts show. BAI.MACEDA ondeavored to
break through tho cneu,y's threatening ros!-
tion which obviously enabled him " keep
open his own communications with the feet.
and yet to break tho railruat between Santi-
ago AMI Valparaiso. In the desperate fight
ing at Placilla that resulted. the modern i'm
proved small arms and artillery which had
been supplied to the Insurgents proved very
destructive, and since DAuNACgDA's forces
also had modern rifles, both sides suffered
greatly. The upshot was the rout Of the
Government troops. and as the dcspatc hcs
have stated, the surrender Of Valparaiso by
its municipal authorities.
While the insurgcnt army possessed a
very great advantage In tho support o, its
feet, effectively handled by Commander
MONT, yet, considering the obstacles It had
TO contend WITH including It's lack Of arms
AMI equipment. until near tho opening OF the
its inferiority in numbers and its
operations against large city in tho Gov.
ernmcnt's own nndisputcd field Of control,
there is no doubt that II was ably Ied. 1t
has boon reported TINT some Of BALMACEpA's
troops. who were Mt hear. with tho rcvolu-
tionists, wont over to them; but his army ap-
pears to have fought bravcly while theirs was
hope. Tho true story Of tho operations,
when its details become better known, will
rrohnbly be that OF a thoroughly planned
pushed rclent'cssly through from
point to point. nnd forming n surpris, to
BALMACEDA and his Generals, who could
only oppose to it husty and makcstift meas
ures, possibly weakened by IL division OF
councils.