Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1891-10-04

| sylvania was the most exposed OF all the
border States, and being the Second State of
the Union in population, wealth and mill
tary power, it was of the utmost Importance
that she should lead in defining the attitude
OF the loyal States.
Sumter was surrendered on Saturday oyen-
ing, the 18th OF April. 1861, and on Monday
morning Governor Curtin and were a the
White House to meet the President and tho
Commander in Chief of the armies ut 10
O'Clock in the morning. had never before
met General Scott. had read of him with
All the enthusiasm of boy, rs he was n
Major General before l was born; had noted
with pride his brilliant campaign in Mexico,
and remembered that he was accepted by
all Americans as the great Captain OF the
age: L assumed, of course, that he was in
falllble in all matters pertaining to war,
and when met him it Was with degree of
reverence that had seldom felt for any
other mortal.
SEVERE IN HIS ETIQUETTE
Scott advanced and was cordially greeted
by Governor Curtin and Introduced to me.
lie was then quite feeble: unable to mount n
horse by reason OF distressing spinal af-
lection, and well remember the punctil-
ious ideas of the old soldier, who refused to
accept either Curtins chair or mine because
there were not three vacant chairs in the
room, although he could not remain stand
ing without suffering agony. We presented
the ludlcrous spectacle of three men stand
liz lOi netTlN nail an HOur, anu one vi bilelu
feeDie In strength and greatly the senior of
the Others in years. simply because there
were not enough chairs for the entire party.
With all his sufferings he was too dignitied
even TO lean against the wall, although it
was evident TO both of us that he was in
great pain from his ceremonial ideas about
accepting the chair OF another.
when We were uShcred into the Presidents
room the practical work of our mission was
soon determined. The question had been
fully considered by the President and the
Secretary OF Warwho was e Pennsylvania;
Governor Curtin speedily perfected
and heartily approved of the programme
they had marked out and we had little to
do beyond informing them how speedily it
wanna responded co the request-of the Gov
ernment will be understood when / state
that in single day bill embracing all the
features desired was passed by both branches
ana approved by Governor Curtin.
THE DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON.
1t was only after the work of ofPennsylvania
had been defined and disposed of that be-
gan TO get some insight into the utterly
hopeless condition of the Government. 1
found General Scott disposed to talk rather
freely about the situation. and l ventured to
question him as to the condition of the capi-
tai and his ability to defend it in case of an
attack by General Beauregard. The answer
to the first question l ventured was very
assuring, coming from one whom 1 supposed
+. "
just nothing at all about it, l asked Gen
eral Scott whether the capital was in
danger. His answer was: "No. sir; the
capital is not in danger; the capital is not
in danger"
knowing that General Scott could not
have n large force at his command; know
ing also that General Beauregard had n for
midable force ut his command at Charles
ton, and that the transportation of m army
from Charleston to Washington would be
the work OF only a few days, for the first
time began to inquir9 in my Own mind
whether this great chieftain was, after all,
equal to the exceptional necessities of the
occasion. l said TO him that if it was a
proper question for him to answer would
like to know how many men he had in
Washington for its defense. His prompt
answer was: Fifteen hundred, sir; 1900
men and two batteries"
then inquired whether Washington Tasa
defensiDle city. This inquiry cast q shadow
over the old veterans face as he answered:
mo, sir: Washington is not q defensible
city" He then seemed to think it necessary
to emphasize his assertions OF the safety of
the capital, and he pointed to the Potomac,
that was visible from the Presidents
window. Said he: "Iou see that vessel?-a
sloop of war, sir; sloop of war" looked
out and saw the vessel, but could not help
thinking, as L looked beyond the Arlington
Heights, that one or two batteries, even of
the ineffective class of those days, would
knock the sloop OF war to pieces in half an
hour.
SCOTT WAS IN HIS DOTAGE.
As Lee, johnson and 4 number of other
able soldiers had left the army but q short
time before, felt some anxiety to know
who were commanding the forces under
General Scott in Washington. He gave me
their names and within three days there
after l saw that two of them had resigned
and were already in Richmond and enlisted
in the Confederate service. My doubts
multiplied, and great idol was shattered
before left the White House that morning.
l could not resist the conviction that Gen
eral Scott was past all usefulness; that he |
had no adequate conception of the contest |
before us, and that he rested in confidence |
in Washington when there was not a soldier |
of average intelligence in that city who did |
not know that Beauregard could capture it |
at any time within week. My anxiety |
deepened with my doubts, and continued |
ing how many men General Beauregard had |
at Charleston. The old chieftain's head |
dropped almost upon his breast at this ques-
tion, and a trace of despair was visible as he |
answered III tremulous tones: General
Beauregard commands more men at Charles
ton than command on the continent east
of the frontier"
asked him how long 1t would require
Beauregard to transport his army to Wash
ington. lie answered that it might he done
in three or four days. l then repeated the
question: General, is not Washington in
great DANGER The old warrior was at once
aroused, straighened himself up in his chair
with a degree of dignity that was crushing,
and answered: mo, sir, the capital can't be
taken; the capital can't be taken, sir"
LINCOLN BEGAN TO DOUBT
President Lincoln listened to the conversa-
tior with evident interest, but said nothing
He sat intently gazing at General Scott, and
whirling his spectacles around in his fingers
When General Scott gave his final answer
that the capital could not be taken, Lincoln,
in his quaint way, said to General Scott: 1t
does seem to me, General, that ii 1 were
Beauregard would take Washington" This
expression from the President electrified
the old war lion again, and he answered with |
increased emphasis: "Alr President, the
capital can't be taken, sir; it can't be taken"
There was but one conclusion that could |
be accepted as the result of this interview,
and that was that the CREST chieftain of two |
wars. and the worshiped captain of the age,
was in his dotage and utterly unequal to the |
great duty OF meeting the impending con-
fiict Governor Curtin and left profoundly 4
impressed with the conviction that the in |
competency of General Scott was one of the |
most serious OF the multiplied Derils which |
then confronted the Republic Ineed not |
repeat how General Scott failed in his early. |
military movements: how lie divided his |
army and permittedthe enemy to unite and |
defeat him at Bull Run; how General Nc |
Clelan, the Young Napoleon of the time was |
called from his victories in Western Eir- |
ginia to take command of the army; how |
that change reinSpired the loyal people of |
the nation in the confidence of speedy vic |
tories and overthrow of the Rebellion: how |
he and his chief soon got to cross purposes, |
and how, after months of quarrel, the old |
chieftain was prevailed upon TO resign his |
place The inside history of his retirement |
has never been written, and it is best that it |
should not. President Lincoln, Secretary |
Cameron and Thomas Scott were the only |
men vino could have given it from per- |
sonal knowledge. They are dead and an in |
teresting chapter of history has perished |
with them.
NOT PREPARED FOR WARS SACRIFICES.
1t must be remembered also that public |
had at that time no conception of |