The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-09-20


junction by falling back on Mcclellan
Suppose Grant at the City Point on the
James in response 10 the call for troops to
repu!se Early in July. 1854, had moved as
leisureiy as did Mcclellan, what would
have been the fate of Washington, Balti-
more and Philadelphia The Sixth corps
left City Point the evening OF the 9th of
July and reached Washington the evening
of the 18th. Thirty thousand of the finest
troops Of the Army of the Potomac, under
Sumner and Franklin, that could easily
have been with Pope by August 18th were
held back by Mcclellan on various pre-
texts, and never reached Pope until after
his defeat, which cost Us 1900 men. in
GLIDING Washington's heroic soldier, Gen.
eral Isaac /. Stevens. and General Kearney.
1t was deliberate conspiracy on the part
Of Mcclellan, Franklin and William F.
Smith TO defeat and disgrace Pope. and in
the depression that followed TO whoop
George" back into full command. Nc
Clellan was restored TO command, not
simply because his Democratic military
tools in the army of the Potomac had
turned traitors to Lincoln in order to be
loyal to Mcclellan, but because Mcclellan,
by his Harrison Landing letter against
LIncoln's policy, had become the leader OF
the Democratic party. Nevertheless Nc
Clellan's restoration was the weakest act
OF Lincoln's life, and the country paid
terribly for it in the drawn, barren battle
of Antietam, the bloodiest blunder OF
career of unbroken military failure.
The Antietam campaign on Lees part
was in its conception bold and wise, but
Lee sacrificed the major purpose of this
| well conceived movement for minor OBJ
| iect; he divided his army in order to scoop
up 1900 men at Harper's Ferry. As a
crowning favor of good fortune copy of
Lees order for this dangerous division Of
his army fell into the hands of Mcclellan;
an extraordinary piece of good luck, for
single days march would have thrust an
| army 5000 strong between the wings of
Lees divided army but 5000 strong, but
| even this incalculable advantage Mcclellan
| fritrered away and gave Lee forty
eight hours in which to unite his
| divided army. Lee escaped destruction
| by McClellan's constitutional irresolution
and incapaclty to appreciate the value of
time in war, but Lees blunder forced him
to fight a desperate. bloody and barren
| battle against terrible odds. Jackson only
| reached Lee from Harper's Ferry by a
| forced march the day of the battle. and
| indeed Hills troops did not reach him I'M
til after p. m. With proper promptness
| on the part of General Mcclellan
Antietam need not have been fought at all,
or would have been fought with disparity
of numbers that would have insured an
easy victory and the capture of all Lees
army, but Lee was given time and full OPP
| portunity to take up position that nearly
neutralized the difference in numbers.
With 81 900 men against 40 600 Antietam
was fought so entirely without intelligent
plan and special concert of action that it
stands for nothing but sheer, persistent,
brutal slaughter. Hooker. on our right, at
| o'clock in the morning attacked the enemy
| with furious energy and was 80 severely
| handled that nothing but the timely ar
| rival of Franklin's corps at p. m. saved
| the day. While our right wing under
| Hooker, Sumner and Mansfield was
desperately charging the enemy from 8
| O'Clock to p. m. our center, under Porter,
and our left wing, under Burnside, did
nothing to relieve our right. Then, when
our right had spent its strength in furious
assaults, at 8 p. m. our left under Burnside
attacked the enemy. but by nightfall had
failed to make the enemy bulge and could
barely hold its ground. It was a drawn
battle that cost US 1900 killed and
wounded besides II, 900 prisoners taken by
Jackson at Harper's Ferry. By the next
morning Mcclellan was reinforced by
COUGHS corps. Nevertheless Lee, who
had lost 1900 killed and wounded out
of 1000, and had not been re-
inforced by a single soldier or a
solitary cannon. offered battle the next
| morning with the river behind him, but
with $1,000 reported present for duty, Nc
Clellan declined to fight Lee. who had barely
10000 men left. All the Union corps COM
manders wished to renew the battle at
early dawn, and even General Franklin
urged an attack.
Then followed more than six weeks of
delay and inaetion, Lincoln using per-
suasion and finally orders and reproaches
in vain to make McClellen move on the
enemy. Finally Lincoln, in despair, sat
down and wrote with his own hand the
famous order that ended the military
career of the Cesar of Chlckahominy.