Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1891-04-19
ruropsan war Rumors.

The usual crop Of sprihg war rumors
Gomez from Europe and speculation IS rife
aa 10 Russia's intentions. There appear,
however, 10 be four certain factors IN 'ne
situation. These arc that Russia has near,
| " completed system Of strategic railroad
that will enable her TO concentrate troops
rapidly along the frontiers OF East frus.
ala, Posen, Silesia. and Austria. tnat sue
has ia thorough understanding with France,
that the arsenals of the latter country are
working day and night on the new huSslan
rife, and that the Cars enissaries are
unusually active in the Balkan peninsula
How much headway these emissarles
have made Is indicated by recent events at
BELGRADE and Sofa, and by the Philo-kus-
sian feeling developing in Roumania'
II IL not 10 be wondered at, therefore,
that the parties TO the triple alliance are
restless. Unquestionably Russia Is Del
ter prepared to strike than she has oeen
since the close of the Russo-Turkish war.
Tnouestionably. too, the main forces
within the Cars domains that are I'M
peIl;ne him towards hostilities are grow
ing stronger every day. There IS universal
d;sconteut among the masses. Nihilism IS
gathering courage, and the sullenness OF
the old nobility-the war party--over delay
In affording the only means that promise
them mower and Advancement is increasing.
Yet there Is no reason to suppose that
the restlessness Of the triple alliance comes
from fear of the ultimate results Of war
between these Powers on the one side and
France and Russia on the other. Any dan
ger of the defeat of the triple alliance and
the consequent permanent predominance
of Russian influence in the Balkans and
| at Constantinople means active support Oh
the Dreibund by England. The restless
ness proceeds from the fact that Russia s
tactics are exhausting the sgnatory Pow
ers to the alliance in O measure 1t IS the
| restlessness of uncertainty as 10 whether
TO force the fight now themselves, There
il more immediate danger in THIS perhaps
| than in Russia's preparations, tor there IS
great deal of truth in the assertion that 1t is
| always the unexpected that happens in
Russia. Internal developments cannot
make much Roadway in Italy, Austria,
Hungary, and Germany so long as these
Powers are compelled by the attitude OF
Russia and France 10 maintain their pre-
sent tremendous and expensive arpa-
ments. The people are beginning to Sc
verely feel those burdens, and to the end
of securing contentment at home it may
prove that it will be found policy to change
BIsMARcK's peace alliance to war ALL
ance. Russia is undoubtedly afording
the excuse for such a change, and Hun
gary especially is ready to take advantage
Of it.
That Russia would in inaugurating or pro-
yoking hostilities calculate upon consum-
mating at once her designs upon CONSTANT
nople cannot be reasonably surmised. The
Gear cannot fail to see that the road to the
Bosphorus and Darderelles is too long and
bloody TO be travelled in one war. But
any measure Of success would propitiate
internal elements of danger TO the in
tegrity of the empire, re-establish for
Russia something of the prestige the great
Powers wrenched from her in the Berlin
treaty and place her nearer the goal. The
Dreibund view of the matter is, however,
that crushing defeat of Russia and her
ally would insure the peace OF Europe for
years and render partial disarmament safe'