The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1891-09-10
eulgbten me? Let us have light on the sub
ject.-WM. L. sGoRK, Captain, Co. ], 29lh Pa,
Baltimore, Nd.
" The Canuoncor" Replies to Criticisms OF Gen.
Alexander. e. s. A.

Alexander, e. s. A.
EDITOR NATIONAL Tribune: / lave re-
ceiyed a copy Of the Detroit Journal Of Aug. },
! containing au article from Gen. Il. i. Alexan-
/ der, C. $. A.. reviewing some OF my obsorYa-
! tiOns on Gettysburg, and particularly the work
1 of tho Confederate artillery there. OF course
our respective points OF view were SO dii-
feront that there can hardly hs any common
ground OF discussion. Moreover, my comments
\ were merely expressions Of opinion SO Tar as
the logic OF tAc operations was concerned ana
/ hence ofno historical consequence, and probably
] not interesting TO anyone besides myself aud,
may be, 10 q few of my immediate comrades.
With regard 10 the strength ofthe rebel army,
] used ala tho Official Confederate data that
could find hearing on the subject; that is 10
say, the last general field return prior 10 the
/ battle, together with a return Of Rosess d.
vision, dated june 30, and some other irag-
meatary statements %, smaller commands, oth-
cial and otherwise. Gen. Alexander says TINS
/ total is IN excess Of the actual Confederate
strength on the deld. lie says Longstreet's
staff estimated the strength OF their corps at
4 5000 W: and adds, We considered ourselves
little more numerous than lllll or EWel,
4 though ne dbl Hot OysorrS lWJr.'
The italics arc mine. RodCs reported has
4 division az Carlisle little over 5000 strong
June 90 the day before the battle began
4 Hence, If EwCl's Corps was a little less numer-
Of Edward Johnson and Early must have had
! less than 5000 each. A staff officer belonging
/ 10 thr 2Gih u. G, says IN report published IN
+ the Official Records that IIeth's Division went
4 into battle over z 0lO strong Hence, AZ thls
WAS true, the divisions of Anderson aud PEN
! der must have been less than 1900 each, ac-
cordiug 10 Gen. AlrXandcI's estimate. The
General quotes memorandum saying that
4 Pickett had 4,4sl muslsots IN line. lie does
not give the number O: Cgmbataut officers, but
with the proportion usual az that time about
400 would about make his total elective
1900 But i believe al the CunicGCratcs agree
4 that licketts Division. with C0rsc'5 Brigade
absent, WAS the smallest in Lees army;
/ only three .kCmpcr's, Garnetts and ARMS
4 tcadsl being present; whereas some Of their
4 divisions had four hrigadcs and some had I've
on the field.
However, when such nm authority as Gen.
4 AlrNauderudmits Rt the outset that they simply
/ estimated their own corps 90 $1,000, and
did not know " what the actual strength Of
the other two corps was aud when there are no
complete Official data eEtaut, how are we 10
arrive at the exact facts aud what is the use
Of discussion with that end I'M view?
Tho General says that ] spoke Of Picketts
charge as having been delivered "aller 4
O'Clock" j DO not remember that aud have
neither the original TRIBUNE article nor a
/ copy Of the little book by me horc So ] can't
. -
/ il must have been Ia reference to the end aud
! not 10 the beginning OF that remarkable opera
! ti0n. IL BIS probable however, HAT there may
/ have been error as 20 the exact hoar aud min-
/ ute. j have never seen an authoritative CbrO-
4 nolOgy OF events at Gcttyshurg from any
source and ] have known Maior-Generals TO
disagree 70 the extent Of two hours with re-
spcct to some OF the most important and Inter
esliuE points Of time involved. without any
data at hand ! should say that the following
would be about The Chronological order Of
events during the afternoon of July 3, 1853
Opening Of the grand raunouade, l:l5 ?. N.
Appearance Of Iic1ctts column, p. m.
Collision with Gihlous Division 2:40 D. m.
General break Of Pic6ctt's force D. IN.
Return Of the remnant TO Seminary Ridge, 4
p. M.
Cessation Of fighting on any part Of the line,
pm.
That is my opinion. Idid not hold horse
timer" on the movement had "A watch, but
to be candid, my attention had been SO much
euErossed by other matters that ] had Jet II
run down, and did not wind 10 up or set IL
right till some time that evening.
lGen. Doubleday, IN his " history OF Gcttys-
burg" says that 40 3 .. m. GEN Hunt or
dered our artillery fire 10 cease aud ho de-
scrihcs tio charge as taking place after that
EDITOR NATIONAL TEIEUSEl
in the course Of my sketch ] yeutured the
charge IN order TO brave a lost battle out and
gain time FOR recovery ana safe retreat"
OF this Gen. Alexander says:
Tic suggestion h. utterly un'ounded. Up 10
that charge the battle had been almost entirely la
our favor. Aud then hc did not retreat even after
the rcpulSe 81 thc charge lie lay there and offered
battle all Il tire 1th. j nave seen many original
ideas advanced on Gctty-buTg before, bat never
one 50 novel AZ that Ice wasn't that kind Of "A
man.
I c,r,,,,t .s,-.., ,r;tl, 81, g., = d.
Use that up 10 that charge the battle had been
almost entirely in their favor" The first days
tight had resulted IN their favor viewed
separately But surely Gen. Alexander can
not maintain that Longstreots failure 10
break our left and seize the Round Tons during
the afternoon Of tho second day was an incl
dent IN their favor" Their defeat and
almost humiliation Of the Third Carps at
the Peach Orchard WAS in their favor" but il
accomplished nothing unless they could drive
the Fifth Corps from Round Ton, which was
the key Of the position at that end Of the
Geld.
lie can hardly hold that the bloody repulse
Of Earlys charge on the north front Of Come
terry Hil az sundoWn on the second day was
IN their favor
And do not see what comfort or reinsurance
they could derive from the defeat Of Edward
JOhns0ns Division and one or two Of Earlv's
Brgadcs by the Twelfth CORPS and q brigade
OF the Sixth GA the east slope OF Culp's Hill
during the forenoon Of the lhlrd day.
All these events must have been known TO
Gen. Lee before Pickett started. That he had
previously planned 10 make tho attacks ON the
third day more nearly simultaneous Is no Gaubt
true, and b. is also probable that the absence
Of counter attack following any Of these re-
/ pulses cmb0ldened Gen. Lee, aud led him 10
1 form a false estimate Of The power ard purposes
/ OF ms adversary point which The friends Of
4 Gen. Meade always insist on as being great
tactical success on his part whereby be en-
+ cOuTagcd Ice 10 keep uu attacking him in
4 strong positions, with an inferior force aud on
a hue Of operations presenting many disaa-
/ vaHtages iu disposition and mauuver
However "a remarked AZ the oHtset, these
things are nothing but personal opinions aud
/ those Of private soldier only II years old at
/ the timci hence hardly worth the paper they
occupy.
/ IN conclusion, Gen. Alexander criticizcs as
! FOR letting them get away after Gcttvsburg.
/ Every fellow must speak for himself about this.
4 For my own part ] was glad 10 see them go. /
would not have laid "a straw in thoir way. And
/ when ] hear any one deuouucing the Army OF
! the Potomac TOR allowing Tho Army Of Northern
] Virginia 10 escape GA that occasion, ! think
] hc belongs 10 that class Of whom Grant said
! that they did not seem 10 got their dandcr up
! TIL after the War, "-AUGUsTUs BUELL., Pitts
4 burg, Pa.
-s T
Dd Gen. FarusHorIh XIII Himsrlrl
EDITOR NATIONAL TmBUsE: Mr.. J. n.
4 .glr nj A, g. q