The Abbeville press and banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, 1891-12-23
BUYERS MUST Be ON GUARD
A STORY OF HOW AN UNFORTUNATE
, LADY LOST THE MOST BEAUTI-
Full HOME IN NINETY-SIX.
The Records of the Court House
Shou2d be Examined Before We
Buy IanG-MOrt@ages and 5udG.
ments May 2EoId u Prior Lien.

The State OF South Carolina, i'll the Suprem
Court, November term. 1891.
c. Aultman L Co., Plaintiffs. Respondent VS.
Matte Utsey, Defendant, Appellant.
Opinion-McIver, \. j.
On the first day of February, 1884, one F. M
Pope, being Indebted ut the time to plaintiff
and others TO a large amount, executed
mortgage on a house and lot, IN the town Q
Ninety-SiX, to one g. w. Connor, to secur
the sum of ten Thousand FIVE hundred dollars
which Conner. in bis testimony, says was in
tended to secure future advances as we'll a.
the amour then really due. The amour
really due on this mortgage 0io-Co
says was paid to him sometime in the wintel
of 1854, though the mortgage was not CANCEL
ed. and still remains of record open and mp
parently unsatiSted. This payment was made
by the sale to Connor Of property other thai
that embraced In the mortgage. On the I'll
OF De cember, 1886, the house and lot abov'
mentioned, which is the subject OF this con
troversy, was conveyed by Pope to Conner by
a deed, in which the consideration reciteo
was the sum Of 5000, which deed seems Il
have been duly recorded though the date o
such record is not given. Sometime in 1887
probably towards the latter part OF that year
l.. Nj. Moore, the brother-!n-law OF w. b. VI
sey, who then resided in Ninety-Six, learning
that Mrs. UtSey, the defendant herein, wht
then lived In Colleton county, desired to buy
the house and lot in question, with q view Il
a return to Ninety-Six where she had former
ly resided. and being requested to see Pope
who was then supposed to be the owner OF the
property, and ascertain at what price the pro
perty could be bought undertook The negotia
ton for the purchase.
Accordingly Moore wrote to Pope, who had
then recently removed to Greenville, asking
the price of the property. Pope replied by the
next mail, saying that the property belonged
to Common, and referring Moore to HIM
Conner, which resulted In an agreement to
sell for the sum OF $3.50. w. B. Utsey, the
husband of the defendant, being Informed OF
this result and being advised to go up on the
following Thursday, which seems to have
been the 18th Of October 1881, did so and there
met Pope instead of Common, who produced
the papers showing the chain OF title, amongst
which were the deed from Pope TO Conner
above mentioned and q deed without warran-
ty from Common to the wife OF Pope, bearing
date that day, In which the consideration re-
cited was the sum OF five thousand dollars,
together with a deed bearing the same date
signed by Mrs. Pope, 10 the defendant in
W hich the consideration recited was the price
agreed upon, $3.50, and upon the delivery of
these deeds to w. b. Utsey, he acting as the
agent Of his wife, settled with Pope by paying
In cash $1,000. Of the price and the balance in
an accepted draft at sixty days.
After the trade was thus consummated Ut
sey delivered the papers TO his attorney for an
examination OF the title who pronounced 1t
the 25th OF February, 1857, the plaintiffs had
q judgment IN their claim against
said Pope, and under the execution Issued to
enforce that judgment, the said house and lot
was levied on by the Sheriff and on the End
Of September, 1889, the same were sold and
bid of by the plaintiffs, who having complied
with the terms Of the sale, received titles
from the Sheriff.
Very soon thereafter this action was com-
lions that the deed from Pope to Conner was
without consideration, and made with intent
TO hinder, delay and detraud the creditors Of
Pope, and that the mortgage, If anything was
aver Hua tharpOn had been n0i6 and EatiS1p6.
and that the deed from Conner to Mrs. Pope
was also without consideration and made
with like intent. demend judgment that the
said deeds be declared fraudulent and void,
and that the same, together with the mort
gage, be cancelled and also for the possession
of the premises.
The defendant, In her answer, denies all the
material allegations in the Complaint, and
that she Is a purchaser for valuable consider.
Without notice.
The case was heard by his Honor Judge
IzIar upon the pleadings, the testimony TAX
sci, who having founda as matter OF fact that
the deeds from Pope to Common and from Con-
nor to Mrs. Pope were not only without con-
but made with intent to hinder,
Judged them fraudulent and void: and hav-I
Ing found that the mortgage had in fact been
directed that the same be so declared
On the record by the Clerk, he held that the
The defendant had such notice as would de-
her plea as purchaser for valuable const-
1eration without notice, and upon that he
that while she did not personally have
such notice, yet she did have constructive no.
lice, through her agents., sufficient to put
Them upon the inquiry, which If followed up
would have led to the discovery Of
;he defeat in the title which she purchased.
nd he therefore overruled that plea. and rem
Tered judgment that the deeds be delivered
up cancelled ana tue mortgage. be mark ed
and directed that the Issue of title
md right Of possession be referred to q jury
Or trial.
From this judgment defendant appeals
the several grounds Set out in the re-
,OId, which raise. substantially, the single
question whether there was error In holding
That defendant had such notice as would de-
her plea OF purchaser for valuable con-
without notice.
TIL plaintiffs also, 10 accordance will the
proper practice, give notice that they propose
than those stated In the decree.
which are likewise set out in the record. But
as we are satisfied that the judgment must
be sustained upon the grounds upon which IL
Is based by the Circuit Judge, II will not be
for US 10 consider any OF those ad:
grounds, some Of which present i'm:
p~ortapt and very interesting questions upon
we would prefer to have the aid Of the
Circuit Judges views, as well as further ar
Of counsel, before undertaking to de-
eide them, especially as IT Is not necessary 10
the decision Of this case. TO do so now.
We will, therefore, confine our attention to
the question raised by counsel for the appel
liant, which is really more q question of IA ct
than Of law, and therefore,, under the well
below should not be disturbed here,
unless II is either without any evidence to
sustain it. or Is manifestly against the weight
OF the evidence.
But it is urged by appellant that ipasmuch
the appeal here does not impute error in
the finding OF any particular TACT, but that
error lies in drawing an unwarranted
from u~ndisputed facts, q question
of law rather than OF fact Is presented.
II 1t could be shown that the law lays down
any particular rule or rules by which to de-
tie. mine what facts are or are not sufficient to
put a person upon inquiry, then there would
We are Informed, no specific rules have been
laid down by which to determine whether
the facts in q given case arc or are not suffi-
cient to put q party upon inquiry.
Indeed. we do not see how 1t would be posi-
Bile to formulate any specific rule OF general
applicability, as it is manifest that each case
must depend largely upon its particular cir
cumstances. The most that can he done Is to
ject and that has been done by Mr.. Justice
MCGOWAN in Black VS.. Childs, II S. G. 312,
probably as well as the nature OF the subject
permits, in the quotation from that case,
made by the Circuit Judge in his decree.
For while 1t is undoubtedly true that there
must appear to be, In the nature Of the case,
such q connection between the facts disclos-
ed and the further facts TO be discovered, that
the former could justly be viewed as furnish
Ing a clue to the latter" yet in everyinstance
1t will always be a question what is the ma
tnre of the case, and whether the facts dis
closed can be regarded as furnishing a clue to
the fact in question.
This view may be illustrated by o case de-
pending upon circumstantial evidence.
While it is true that there are certain well
established general rules in regard to theicon-
sideration OF that kim of testimony, yet af-
ter all, it remains a question OF fact whether,
in a given case, the particular facts proved
warrant the one or the other conclusion.
For example. In The trial OF q criminal
case where clrcumstantial evidence is relied
upon to SHOW the guilt of the accused, and
where no error is imputed TO the Judge in