The sun., 1891-06-03
Why Portugal Can Trouble Europe.

That Portugal, although insignificant In
respect of population and wealth, may give
rise to European complications is plain
enough from Lord SALrsBURY's consent to
give her largo tract OF land north OF the
Zambrsl-a consent prompted by the hope
Of allaying the growing national dislike OF
tho BRAGAEzA dynasty. This concession
can, however, at best only postpone the evil
hour. It Ia impossible for the Lisbon Gov
ernment TO answer tho popular outcry
for nn increased outlay upon pub
lie works, or the demands OF officers
Of the army and navy for better pay.
The whole revenue OF Portugal avail
able for expenditure scarcely exceeds
$35, 600, 900, OF which at least $25. 900. 900 Is
absorbed by the external, Internal. and
floating debt. There Is even reason to be-
lieve that the amount applicable to the lat
ter purpose Is this year inadequate and that
there will be default In the payment of the
next coupons Of tho Portuguese three per
conts. Should such default occur. the
acute financial crisis. which already exists
at Lisbon, will probably be aggravated to
the point OF revolution. It ia. therefore,
quite upon the cards that at any hour the
cable may bear to us the news that the
house OF BRAdANzA has ceased to reign, and
ttat the friends OF progress following the
example OF Brazil, have established Por-
tuguese republic.
The overthrow OF the BRAaANzA dynasty
must have one OF two results. Either the
new Portuguese republic would DO left un-
molested or 1t would be put down by Span.
ish army. In the former event, the triumph
of q republican uprising In Spain could only
be question of q short time and the foun-
dation OF democratic institutions through
out the Iberan peninsula would almost GER
tainly excite q violent movement OF opinion
and aspiration in Italy Austria, and Ger
mauy. and might deal an irreparable blow
to the cause Of monarchy In Europe. As it
happens, however, the Conservatives, under
Scflor CANovAs DEL CASTILLO. are
Just now dominant at Madrid, and they
will doubtless be encouraged or couu-
tenanced by tho Governments OF VI
emma md of Berlin, il not also Of the
Qnirlnnl, IN suppressing the inconvcnient
outbreak Of democracy at Lisbon. 4 large
Spanish force-much stronger than any
which tho Portuguese could oppose TO it
hns already been massed ON the frontier OF
Estremadura and the intention OF Sefior
CANovAs TO occupy Lisbon In case OF
the expulsion OF the BRAoANzAs seems un-
niistakab!e. The Spanish soldiers, however,
could not restore tho deposed dynnsty, for
tho Spanish taxpayer would not tolerate the
maintenance Of all army for that purpose on
Portuguese SOIL The only outcome OF In
tcrpositlon on the part OF Ssflor CANovAs
which the Cortes would brook would be the
definite Incorporation Of Portugal with
Spain, thus placing tho whole Iberian penin-
sua Under single sovereign, as 1t was In
the time of PHILIP II. and PHILIP III.
Such an aggrandlzement OF the Spanish
monarchy would at onco give umbrags to at
least three European powers. France and
Italy would see In 1t the advent OF formld-
able rival in the struggle for ascendancy In
the Mediterranean. To England the loss OF
Lisbon, In which she has found for upward
OF two centuries q port OF repair, would be O
serious disability; the more so as Spain is
s,rc to remain at heart an enemy as long as
Great Britain retains Gibraltar. SO obvious
ly detrimental. indeed to British CONNER
cial interests would be tho transfer Of Lisbon
TO Spanish hands, that. II Mr.. GLADSTONE
we're Prime Minister, Sefor CANovAs would
probably DO notified that an Invasion OF
Portugal would be followed by the appear
ance Of q British fleet In tho Tngns. Nor
is 1t by any means Impossible that Lord
SALIsBURY's failure ta take similar course
might be followed by defeat Of his Gov
ernment n tas House of Commons.