Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1891-06-04
IT'S A DRY" DECISION.
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES LAW MUST
STAND.

CHIEF Justice Fuller intorprets the Act or
Congress In Favor OF the Prohibitory
states-Interesting Discussion of the
Relative Powers " the State and Federal
Lawmalsing EOdies.
The United States Supreme Court has
decided that the original-package law
passed by the last Congress was valid
and constitutional, and that IL went into
effect In all States where prohibltory
avs prevailed without re-enactment by
.he States of the laws by which they
forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors
within their boundaries, whether i'm
ported from other States or not. Chief
Justice Fuller rendered the opinion of
she court, and the bench was united I'm
support of the conclusions at which he
arrived, though Justice Gray announced
tl.a y uetfe~s II@.ls>-,- psowcr ~fIu niil-
self did not concur In all the reasoning
Of the opinion OF the court.
The case upon which the decision was
rendered was that of John M. Wilker-
son. Sheriff of Shawnee County, Kansas,
-. Charles A. Rahrer, brought here on
appeal from the decision of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the dis
trict of Kansas, against the State.
Rahrer was the original-package agent
at Topeka, Kan, of the firm OF May
nard. Hopkins 4 Co. of Kansas City,
Mo and was arrested the day after the
| original package law went into effect
| He claimed that the law was unconstitu-
tional and also that il could not go into
operation until the State had re-enacted
| its prohibitory laws.
| The court says the power of the State
| to impose restraints and burdens upon
persons and property in the promoti on
| of the public health. good order and
| prosperity is a Eower always belonging
to the States, not surrendered TO them
by the General Government, nor directly
restrained by the Constitution OF the
United States, and essentially exclusive.
The power of Congress 10 regulate
/ When the subjects are national In their
nature, the court says, is also exclusive.
The Constitution does not provide that
interstate commerce shall be free, but
by the grant of this exclusive power to
regulate it IL was left free except as
Congress might undertake TO regulate
it. Therefore, il has been determined
in Robbins vs. Shelby Taxing District
that the failure of Congress to exercise
this exclusive power in any case is ar
expression OF its will that the subject
shall be tree from restrictions or imposi'
tions upon it by the several States, anC
il State law comes in conflict with the
will of Congress the State and Congress
cannot occupy the position OF equal op
posing sovereignties because the Consti
tuition declares its supremacy and tha
of laws passed in pursuance thereof
The court says that intoxicating
liquors are undoubtedly subjects of com
merce, like any other commodity, anC
are so recognized, but nevertheless il
has been often held that laws prohibit
ing the manufacture and sale OF liquor
within State limits do not necessaril!
infringe any constitutional privilege O.
immunity, this right being vested, as il
the Mugler case, upon the acknowledged
right of the States to control theil
purely internal affairs, if in so doing the.
protect the health, morals, and safet.
of their people by regulations that d'
not interfere with the powers of TIN
General Government.
The present case arises upon tn
theory of repugnance between the Stat
law and interstate commerce clause o
the Constitution, and involves distinc
tion between the commercial power ant
the police power which, though quit
distinguishable when they do not ap
proach each other, are sometimes, lik
the colors, so nearly allied as TO perple
the understanding as the colors do tn
vision.
The court says the Iowa laws held T.
, be unconstitutional ia the Leisy original
package case were enacted in the exeI
else of the States police power and nc
, at all as regulations Of Interstate con
merce, but as il amounted in effect to
regulation of such commerce, IL was hel
that so long as Congress did not pas
any law to regulate specifically tn
traffic between the States in intoxicatin
liquors, or act in such way as to allo'
State laws to operate upon IL, Congress
thereby indicated its will that such com
merce should be free and untrammeled
and therefore that the laws of Iowa wer
imperative so far a they amounte
10 regulations OF foreign or interStat
commerce in inhibiting the reception o
such articles within the State, or thei
! sale upon arrival in the form in whic
. imported. 1t followed as a corollar
that, when Congress acted at all, the re
suit of its action must be to operate as
restraint upon that perfect freedoT
which its silence insured. Congress ma
now spoken, and declared that impOrte
liquors shall upon arrival in a State IA
within the category of domestic article
of a similar nature.
Continuing, the Court says:
The laws OF Congress did not use terms Q
4 - - r
removed an impediment to the enforcement
of the State laws In respect to importe
packages I'm their original condition, create
by the absence of specific utterance o
its part IL impaired no power TO the Stat
not then possessed, but allowed importe
property 10 fall at once, upon arrival, With
the local jurisdiction.
The liquor arrived In Kansas prior to th
passage OF the act OF Congress, but there
| no question presented of the right OF IN
| importer to withdraw the property frol
| the State, nor is IL perceived that tn
Congressional enactment Is given ret
. respective operation by holding IL az
plicable TO transaction occurring aftt
{ il took effect. IL is not the case OF n la
7 | enacted in the unauthorized exercise OF
power exclusively conhded 20 Congress, bu
. | OF a law which it was competent for I'll
state to pass but which could not opera'
upon articles occupying a certain situatio
until the passage OF the act OF Congress
That act removes the obstacle, and no adj
| ouate ground is perceived for holding thu