Abilene weekly reflector. [volume] (Abilene, Kan.) 1888-1935, 1891-05-28
CONSTITUTIONAL.
The Prohibition Law Of Kansas So
Held.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The Powers of Complex Government De-
hned-HOw State Laws to Regulate or
Abolish Liquor Traffic Become
Operative.

tlOnal and tnaJ Wnen II WeHJ lnIO CA-
feet prohibitory laws remained in force
without re-enactment
Chief Justice Fuller rendered the
opinion of the court and the bench was
united in support of the conclusions to
which he arrived, though Justice Gray
announced that Justices Harlan,
Brewer and himself did not concur in
all the reasoning of the opinion of the
court
The case upon which the decision
was rendered was that of John NJ. Will
kerson, sheriff of Shawnee county,
Kan, appellant VS.. Charles A. Rohrer,
brought here on appeal from the de-
cision Of the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Kansas. Rohrer
was the original package agent at To-
peka, Kan, of the firm of Maynard,
Hopkins & Co., of Kansas City, Mo-,
and was arrested the day after the
original package law went into
effect. He claimed that the law
was unconstitutional and also
that it could not go into op-
Grafton until the state had re-
enacted its prohibitory law. The
United States circuit court for Kansas
released him on a writ of habeas
corpus The Kansas authorities then
brought the case to the supreme court
ON an appeal The court reverses the
circuit courts decree and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
The court says the power of the state
to impose restraints and burdens upon
persons and property in promotion of
the public health, good order and pros
perity is power always belonging to
the states, not surrendered by them to
the general government nor directly
restrained by the constitution of the
United States and essentially exclusive.
The power of congress to regulate
commerce among the several states
when the subjects are national in their
nature, it says, is also exclusive. The
constitution does not provide that inter-
state commerce shall be free, but by
the grant of this exclusive power to
regulate it, it was left free except as
congress might undertake to regulate
L. Therefore it has been determined,
Robbins VS.. Shelby, taxing district, that
the failure of congress to exercise
this exclusive power in any case is
an expression of its will that the sub
ject shall be free from restrictions or
impositions upon it by the several
states, and If a state law comes in
conflict with the will of congress,
the state and congress cannot occupy
the position Of equal opposing sover-
eighties, because the constitution de-
clares national supremacy and that of
the laws passed in pursuance thereof.
That which is not supreme must yield
to that which is supreme.
The court says that intoxicating
liquors are undoubtedly subjects of
commerce like other commodities and
so recognized, but neverthe less it has
been often held that laws prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of liquor
within state limits do not necessarily
infringe any constitutional privilege or
immunity, this right being rested, as in
the Mugler case, upon the acknowl-
edged right of the states to control their
purely internal affairs and in so doing
protect the health, morals and safety of
their people by regulations that do not
geperal government
The present case arises upon the
theory of repugnancy between the state
laws and the interstate commerce clause
of the constitution and. involves a dis
tinction between the commercial power
and the police power which while quite
distinguishable when they do not ap-
proach each other, are sometimes like
the colors, so nearly allied as to perplex
the understanding as the colors do the
vision.
Continuing, the court says that the
Iowa law held to be unconstitutional in
the Leisy original package case was
enacted in the exercise of the states
police power, and not at all as regula-
ton of interstate commerce, but as it
amounted in effect to a regulation of
such commerce it was held that so long
as congress did not pass any law to
regulate specifically the traffic between
the states on Intoxicating liquors or
act in such way as to allow state laws
to operate upon it, congress thereby in
dicated its will that such commerce
should be free and untrammeled and,
therefore, that the laws of Iowa were
imperative so far as they amounted to
regulations of foreign or interstate
commerce in inhibiting the reception
of such articles within the state or
their sale upon arrival in the form in
which imported. It followed as a
corollary that when congress acted at
all, the result of action must be, to op-
crate as a restraint upon that perfect
freedom which its silence insured. Con-
gress has now spoken and declared that
imported liquors shall, upon arrival In
state, fall within the category of do
mestic articles of similar nature.
Continuing, the court says: 1.-The law
of congress did not use terms of per-
mission Of the state to act, but simply
removed an impediment to the enforce
ment of the state law in repect to i'm
ported packages in their original condi-
ton, created by the absence of a specific
utterance on its part. 1t impaired no
powes to the state not then possessed,
but allowed imported property to
fall at once upon arrival within
the local jurisdiction. The liquor
arrived in Kansas prior to
the passage of the act of congress, but
there is no question presented of the
right of the importer to withdraw the
property from the state, nor is it per-
ceived that the congressional enact
ment is given retrospective operation
by holding it applicable to a transaction
occurring after it took effect 1t is not
the case of law enacted in the unau,
thorized exercise of a power exclusively