The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1891-03-12
ADVANCE ON CORINTH.
An Iowa Majors Opinion of Gen. Hallsek.

EDITOR NATIONAL Tribune: / have been
! reading Gen. Pope's War "Reminiscences" with
considerable pleasure, aud one can almost name
the various Generals he writes about by the
! traits Of character he ascribes 20 them. / am
not satisfied, however, with the easy manner
in which he lets Gen. Halleck down in his
management OF the campaign about Corinth,
after the battle OF Shiloh. lie says: Tho
country was fully justified in feeling great dis
satisfaction and disgust at the result Of our
/ operations at Corinth." IL the country was
disguised, how can express the feelings Of the
grand army under the command of Gen. Hal
lcck who were advancing on C0rinth? These
men were the flower Of the Northern aud Bor-
der States, enlisted not from any love Of the
service, but from n spirit Of patriotism aud love
Of the old flag. Many Of them had left homes
where plenty reigned, and probably had never
done a days work in their lives. To be put
20 work cutting down heavy timber and throw
ing up huge intrenchments in inclement
weather, II would be putting il mildly TO say
we were Disguised.
believe that had we not been entirely mex
perenced in the modes Of warfare, the whole
command would have rebelled against such
useless labor. Imagine what would have hap
pcned had the same labor been imposed on US
in 1864 or 1865, under the same circumstances,
OF course; rs / do not mean to imply that the
boys would not throw up iutrenchments when
necessary. Commanding Generals in 1862
could not be expected 60 do rs the same officers
did in ls64 aud 1865. But what excuse can be
offered for General commanding an army, who
was graduate Of West Point, and really a Gen
eral IN 1851, not Captain Lieutenant pro-
NOTED 10 the rank Of General at one jump who
would lead an advance as Halleck did on Cor
inthY Anything that he did not do would
have been preferable 10 what he did do aud
could not under any circumstances have re-
smiled a AS rDftUl- a
have been welcomed by the whole army aud
would no doubt have scattered the army under
Beaureguard. With proper use Of the gallant
cavalry attached TO our army, a capture could
have been effected Of his whole command to-
gether with the supplies accumulated at Cor
inth.
The effect Of this would have been 10 place
our army where il was OH Oct. 3 and 4, 1862.
without campaigning all Summer and fighting
the disastrous battles of Iuka, Jacinto, and
Holly Springs and later the two days fight at
Coriuth, Oct. 3 aud g.
To what can be attributed Halleck's want Of
ability 10 command an army2 His West Point
training, that he had become too old TO throw
of?
The theory Of war as taught at West Point
was useless 90 a man when he really confronted
az enemy in the field. and the only successful
West Pointers were such men as Grant. Sher-
man, Sheridan and Mcpherson, who at once
discarded all they had learned at the Academy
except the drill, aud started out 10 gain expert
ence anew. IL lisa condition aud not a theory
that conironts man when he actually faces
the enemy, and unless he be a man suited 10
command, no amount of education at military
school will save him. He will become a dis
NAL failure, AS did Hallcck.-H NJ. RENDER
DINE, Major 18th Iowa, Carthage Mo.