The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-04-01

There is little room to doubt the sensa-
tional character of the dispatches from
Washington City, representing war as Inn
minent between this country and Italy on
the latter's motion. It is incredible that
the italian government, overwhelmed with
debt which makes it almost impossible
to keep up its peace establishment, could
be so foolhardy as to rush into war with
q power like the United Estates until
every conceivable attempt had been ex-
hausted for reaching an annicable arrange
ment by negotiation or arbitration.
The second report, that the answer of
Governor Nichols, OF Louisiana. TO Seerc-
tary Blaine had been telegraphed to the
Italian government and by them regarded
as our governments ultimatum, is no
more credible than the first. Even If the
receipt of that dispatch had created such
impression, it is hardly within the range
of possibility that any modern European
government would hastily take formal
action because Of such impression. They
would cert ainly await full official commu-
nications through regular channels. The
explanation given for Baron Fava's recall,
which in the first instance was interpreted
by sensational correspondents as equiva-
lent to declaration of war. sustains the
above assumptions.
1t is quite possible that at Florence or
other interior points hot-headed municipal
officers, perhaps connected with or infiu-
enced by the Malta, have assumed to seize
American tourists or residents and pro-
pose to hold them as hostages. But if so,
it can not but operate favorably to our
interests in the pending negotiations con-
corning the New Orleans episode. If this
course has been pursued to any consider
able extent. however disagreeable to the
captive Americans, it must serve as q ma
terial Offset to any claims Italy might have
established against our government because
of the New Orleans affair.
But, while it is highly improbable that
war has been or is likely to be declared, the
sensational announcement may and prob
ably will serve good purpose. For
while there can be no doubt about the ulti-
mate outcome of war between these two
countries, Italy might at the outset put
some Of the chief cities of the Atlantic
seaboard under heavy reprisals. For a few
weeks, perhaps, her navy would sweep our
coasts, and some Of our people might be
made to pay heavy tribute.
These considerations give sharp point to
the preparations which some American
citizens have criticised, looking to the
strengthening Of our coast defenses and
the creation of navy bearing some rea-
sonable relation to the strength and re-
sources Of our country and the enormous
proportions Of our foreign commerce. Not
only in the effect it will produce upon the
public mind in this connection will this
sensation be beneficial. 1t will also
prompt the country to justify the admin
istration in demanding, as an Offset to any
reparation that may be offered for the New
Orleans massacre, that the Italian govern
ment shall take effective measures to pre-
vent further emigration to this country by
that class Of its subjects. The people
pretty generally viii now sustain the adj
ministration in taking a firm stand on the
proposition that if we are to be called upon
to pay for slaughtered Malta, the original
article must be stopped from coming to
provoke our people into such demonstra-
tons.
There will be no war with Italy, but the
scare will do much good
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