The record-union., 1891-04-12

himself said in one of his vetoes. because
he had not time to examine them They
involved no principle and established no
precedent because no two were alike and
none of them came within general law.
They were clearly and simply cases of
personal appeal by soldiers and widows
Of soldiers for relief, and Congress
thought them worthy.
In 1910 the exciting contest involved
among other things the recreation of a
national bank. Harrison and Tyler were
elected on that issue IN part. But Mr..
Tyler, after the death of General Harri-
son, vetoed the bill, and it could not be
passed over his veto.
1t is fair to say that Mr.. Tyler had be-
fore his election declared against the pol
elected on that issue, we have another
phase OF the veto power turned against
the popular will.
An examination of all the vetoes placed
upon grounds of want of constitutional
power to pass tie bill will show that in
no instance has the final judgment of the
country sustained the vetoes, except two
of Mr.. Madison's, where Congress ex-
tended aid to certain churches. In every
case the objection has been finally over
come by the Judgment of practical
statesmen. This shows the fallibility of
personal Judgment and the greater wis
dom Of the many. It also serves to ad-
exercise Of this high prerogative and sug-
gests that, after all, the judiciary had
better be left to deal with the constitu-
tiopal objections.
General Grants message accompany
ing his approval of the river and harbor
bill, August ID, 1876 presents a curious
phase OF the Executive discretion. He
says: without enumerating, many
appropriations are made for works of
purely private or local interest in NO
sense national. l cannot give my sane
ton to these, and will take care that dur
ing my term of Office no public money
shall be expended upon them"
This is a curiosity in Executive mes
sages. There is flavor Of the military
camp about this blunt avOWal not to do
the very thing the Constitution devoIved
upon him, that is almost groteSque in it's
franknesS. He shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" says the
Constitution, and yet rather than veto
the bill, some features of which he ap-
proved, he boldly signs it and notifies
Congress that certain appropriations he
will take care shall not be executed.
Some day we shall have President
who will veto measure on the ground
of unconstitutionality. Congress will
pass it over the veto. The President will
refuse to execute it because unconsti-
tutiOna1, and therefore void. We may
then hope to have some light. thrown
upon the powers of the President through
court Of impeachment. But the veto
power, and the pardoning power can
never be defined by the courts of law
The President cannot be restrained nor
can he be prohibited by any process
known to the law. The lines of de-
markation must+be drawn by enlightened
public sentiment, and by just percep-
ton Of these great powers on the part of
the President himself.
ThnTa fIlrt han
phase of the veto power. The President
may withhold his approval and retain
the bill ten days Excluding Sundays and
if Congress adjourns during this time the
bill fails. This is called "pocket Veto"
The final session Of each Congress is
always short one. 1t conyenes the first
Monday in December and expires by
dissolution of Congress March 4th, at
noon, following. There are now three
sessions of each Congress. One of these
must terminate on the first Monday of
December preceding the dissolution, and
the last one must terminate at noon,
March 4th, on the day of dissolution.
| There are then ten days at the close of
two sessions, fixed and known, during
which the President is absolute master of
all bills then submitted to HIM and he
need do no more than pocket them and
they are killed.
Whether the section quoted in the early
pages of this discussion is mandatory
upon the President, requiring him in all
cases to return the bill in order that Con-
gress may have an opportunity to pass it,
may admit of question, but all will con-
! cede that he should do this. A proper
recognition OF the dignity and powers of
coordinate branch of government
would impose this duty upon the Presi-
! dent. Fourteen such pocket vetoes only
are found among the legislative archives,
none since Mr.. Buchanan, except 100 by
| Mr.. Cleveland. In every case the PreSi-
| dent except Mr.. Cleveland, sent his OBJ
! jeCtions to the next Congress, and in
nearly every case he stated his inability
! to return the bill in time for action by
| the Congress passing the bill. But if
this power to enforce individual opinion
rests with the President in all cases, why
should he scruple to retain all bills not to
his liking and thus kill them by his
! silence. He is not bound, if he acts as
one of the legislature, to make it possible
! for the bill to pass by returning 1t. He
has all the rights, if his veto is a legisla-
tive act, that member has to defeat the
| measure if he can; and here he has sure
way and need never assign a reason.
! Much, I may say most, Of the import
ant legislation reaches the President
| within these ten fatal days. He holds the
| reigns of Government absolutely during
| this period. If he is to search the many
| bills only to discover encroachments upon
! other coordinate branches of govern
/ ment or to find evidence of finadyertence.
| haste or wicked design, his task is COM
! paratively easy and we may not fear
| abuse of power or miscarriage of legisla-
! ton. But if he is to examine each bill
| upon its dement's, as alegislator must do,
| and satisfy his personal and private
| Judgment of the wisdom of the measure,
| then he becomes not only two-thirds of
| both houses but he resolves himself into
| a committee of one of both houses and is
| Congress itself and may stifie all legisla-
| ton by the simple use of the pigeon
! hole This would be a menace to and
| subsersive of representative government.
| And yet this dilemma is inevitable land
| logical if the drift of public sentiment on
| this subject is right. We must cease to
| look so much to the Executive to save
Us from unwise laws and look moro to
the. personnel of our Legislatures. The
report to the Executive is dangerous and
! fOrbodes greater ills than those we would
| fly from. We must keep clearly defined
| the dividing lines of legislative, execu-
| tive and judicial functions. While the
! Executive stands clothed with power to
| protect itself against encroachments by
! the legislative it must take care not to
| commit the very wrong 1t would prevent
! in others. The Legislature must not
! execute the law; no more must the Exec
utive make it.
''All legislative powers herein granted
| shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a
! Senate and House of Representatives
! (Am. Con-, Art. l., Sec. /.
The executive power shall be vested
| in a President Of the United States of
America" Gam. Con-, Art. H., Sec. /. }
Let us accustom ourselves to observe
these broad lines of distinction and let
each operate in its proper sphere. need
| hardly add that this discussion aDpIieS