The Daily bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Hawaii]) 1882-1895, 1891-03-27

and Nicaragua in passing from West
tern Europe to New Zealand or ia
pan while to Australia and Southern
China the difference is in favor of
Suez. The route by Suez has also
the advantage of convenient coal sta
tons and much local traffic; and
finally, it has been long established,
and many interests have grown up
around it. Commerce is conserva-
tive, looking always with doubt upon
any suggestion of change.
But there are many features in the
Nicaragua route which will gradu
ally commend themselves with great
force to certain Pacific localities, and
to none more than to Japan.
BY the Suez route, although a ter
minal point, sees between itself and
Europe more than one way station"
whose commerce with Europe over
shadows that Of Japan, India and
Farther India, the East Indies and
Southern China, make up SO large
percentage Of the Suez traffic that
Japan suffers by comparison, and al
though really a terminus, does not
have such corresponding commercial
weight and Importance as a terminus
should pos, ess. This, though per-
haps natural, is not desirable for a
great nation, whose evident destiny
is to become one of the commercial
powers of the world, in virtue of its
admirable maritime location and the
vigor and intelligence of its people.
Japan cannot be satisfied until its
trade is in every sense direct between
its ports and London, Hamburg and
New York, and not simply minor
incident of the ind0-Chinese- Euro.
pean traffic. There must be no ports
or coast intervening between Yoko-
hama and New York, between Kobe
and London, which outweigh or even
approach in Importance the terminal
ports of the route. | think all will
agree with me that this is an essen
tial condition to the development of
great commercial qualities.
With these considerations in our
mind it is easy to perceive that the
Nicaragua Canal offers to Japan the
final solution of the problem. Direct
communication now exists with the
western coast of North America, but
that coast is as yet in its commercial
infancy. The Nicaragua Canal will
provide that direct intercourse be-
tween Yokohama, Kobe, Hakodate,
Nagasaki and Hamburg, London,
New York, New Orleans.
This trade will not be limited in
its powers of expansion as is the
mail steamer and passenger service.
Over this route will pass the princi-
pal heavy exports aud imports to and
from Japan and the Atlantic nations.
By this route the opportunity at
once presents itself to japanese mer-
chants and shipping to start their
own lines of steamers and sailing
ships between Japan and the Atlantic
countries. BY this cheaper route
merchandise will be landed i'll foreign
markets with less burthensome freight
charges, and hence be sold at lower
prices. Thus the demand increases,
and greater areas of Japan are called
into the productive field, while its
industries, responding to the demand,
widen their scope of manufacture.
These healthy influences react upon
each other, and more japanese ship
ping will be needed to transport the
increased amounts of products. But
| need not dwell too long upon the
important results flowing from a
direct, uninterrupted trade commu-
nication between the Japan terminus
and those at New York and Liver
pool, for believe the intelligence of
this audience will quickly perceive
its value for nation like Japan,
which is just beginning to stretch out
its hand to grasp some at least of the
worlds trade.
| will here interrupt the discussion
of the trade conditions in order to
touch upon one feature that we have
not yet considered. 1t is matter
of importance, and is destined in the
future to hold the close attention of
the statesmen of all maritime nations.
This feature is the strategic value of
| the Nicaragua Canal, considered in a
naval and military sense, and as q
direct result its value in the eyes of
politicians and diplomatists. 1t must
appear plain to all present that this
waterway between the oceans will be
the key to power on both sides of the
continent and in both oceans; and
will secure paramount influence to
that nation which shall hold it in time
of war or upon the approach Of war.
In these days of swift war steamers,
a fleet holding the canal could issue
/ from its western entrance, and with
in five days strike blow at any point
of the western coast from Peru to
/ California. If the fleets presence
were needed on the Atlantic side, it
/ could reach in three days the Gulf of
Mexico or the principal channels in
the West Indies, and in four days
could be in a position to fight a bat
tie off the Atlantic coast of the