The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1891-02-19

would resent the impuiatiou that they were
all unfit for such command, and that il had
been found necessary 60 bring an officer
from another part of the country and an
other army 10 do the work which
THEY WERE INCOMPETENT TO DO.
in sllori. that should be much in the situ-
alton of the strange dog, without even the
right to run out Of the village; that the
duty required of me could not be success
fully done or even attempted without we'll
Mich certain disappointment and perhaps
disaster, unless there was the utmost zeal
and fidelity on the part of all concerned /;
that the proposed assignment Of a stranger
10 the command would have precisely the
effect 20 create the opposite condition. With
such a force so constituted, and with such
feeling on the part Of all, j was expected 10
so down to or toward Richmond and seize
and hold the bear by the tail, whilst
Mcclellan beat out Its brains. il be
succeeded in killing the bear, which i
very much doubted, j should be invested
with the tail as my share OF the transaction.
IL on the other hand as was altogether
likely he should fail, the bear would turn
and rcnd me TO pieces, as he could easily do.
In short, IN my view, j was offered the COM
Inand of a forlOrn hope under the most un-
favorable conditions possible for success; and
80 enjoy this distinction i was 10 give up
the command of an army in the West equally
large which / had organized and COM
manded myself from the beginning 10 which
] was greatly attached and which j knew
cherished the same feeling for me, which
had already done great things under my
command, and which was capable OF stll
more distinguished achievements, with
which ] could not bear 10 be disconnected.
All This ] explained fully TO Mr.. Stanton,
and asked him whether he could reasonably
expect me to enthuse over the change he
proposed lor me. Mr.. Stanton listened TO
this statement with attention, bat with more
or less impatience and dissent and when II
WAS made he said that in such times
PERSONAL FEELINGS AND INTERESTS
shoulj not aud could not be permitted to OBJ
trude themselves; that his own office was
not only personally repugnant 10 HIM, but
destructive OF his personal interests, but
that the welfare and success OF the Govern
ment was. IN those unhappy days alone 10
DE considered by every public official.
told him ;hat / was ready, as hoped had
always been, TO make the sacrifice lac de-
manded, but ] begged him 10 consider that
in this case my personal feelings and inter
ests were ineXiricably interviewer with those
OF the Government, and that in my own
opinion both would best be served by my
declining this assignment 10 command. He
remained uneOnvnced, but said he would
see the President again before coming TO a
decision.
told him then that would also see the
President and briefly recapitulate TO him
what ] said. told him, however, that
wished it distinctly understood that how
ever the matter might be decided ] might
safely be counted on TO do my best with
cheerfulress and zeal.
] accordingly called 10 see the President and
had half an hours conversation with him,
which, perhaps, j may recount al some other
time The Secretary Of War also saw him dur
3nR the day, and the result was communicated
90 me the next morning. IL was decided, lor
reasons no doubt satisfactory 20 these high
officials. though not 10 zoe, that was TO remain
IN the East aud
TAKE COMMAND OF TIE ARMY
20 be created by the union Of the three corps
heretoiore mentioned. The order OF the Presi-
dent announcing the creation OF the Army Of
Virginia. and assigning me 10 the command OF
st. Was maar the next day, and az once entered
upon the work OF attempting 10 do what. under
the circumstances and conditions which sur
rounded b., no living man could have accom-
plished DO is not necessary % repeat here that 1
almost immediately after these transactions be-
gan the series OF battles on the Peninsula |
which attended the retreat Of Mcclellan 10 the /
James River aud the abandonment Of all opera
tious, cXrrpt such necessary 70 avoid
the absolute surrender Of our army. i was my
self prcseHt when Gen. Marcy who bad been
sent by Hcl iellan from HarrisOus Landing 20
formulate demands upon the War Department
HFH Il rFsfsf ia
nnless tho large reinforeemeuts demanded by 1
him were sent Immediately TO the James River /
80 might hecOme necessary for Mcclellan 20 /
surrender Isis army 90 the enemy. ] remember /
too, Dir. SiaHtons look Of astOnishment aud |
Indignation when the idea Of surrender was
presented 10 him. What is that you say sir ?
Repeat your remark Mr. Stanton burst forth
with furious gesture and glaring eyes Gen.
Marcy, WHO, perhaps, had only made the state
Bient abodt surrender"
AS kN ADDITIONAL CLUB
with which 10 beat the War Department into
compliance with McClellau's wholly unreason-
able aud quite impossible demands, seemed
c0ufOuHdcd by tho agitated manner and yio-
lent rage oi the Secretary Of War and be-
gan la Stumbling and confused way 10 ex-
plain that hc did not quite mean that the army
might surrender bot only 10 make clear how
great was Tie necessity for more troops on the
Peninsula. aud that matters there were not 10
satisfactory condition. and could not be until
McClel.at'G forces were largely increased. The
very manifest attempt TO bFOwbeat the War
Department into yielding 10 any demand Of
Mcclellan, reasonable OF unreasonable aud
whether be WAS victorious or defeated or 10
shift the blame 0f his failures upon the shoul-
GERS Of tie President aud Secretary because
they were not able as he well knew they were
not % simply his eKtrayagant aud indeed i'm
possible demands was extremely painful 20 me
20 realizs. and made still clearer 10 me the diff
bcult aud dangerous position ] occupied in be-
ing forced even 10 save my own small army
from destruction 10 depend upon the vigorous
and faithful cooperation OF man 10 consti-
tuted aHd
DFyOUKED BY PERSONAL AMBITION,
which be- had not the moral courage 10 crafty.
and who only sought iR others objects upon
whom % saddle failures Of which ne seerned
by nature 10 nave had instructive anticipa-
ti0n before he took the field. One thing WAS
glad, iu view Of The future, 20 observe, and
that was that Gen. Marcy left the Sccretary's
presence with much less appearance Of conf
dencc ln bis ability OF McClellaH's : 10 dominate
thn War department.
The three corps 10 constitute the ARMY of
Virginia were ~ this time moving by nv
orders 10 concentration GA the east side 6f
the Blue Ridge, az such points rs would com
mand The roads 20 GordOusyiIle by the way of
Madison Courthouse and Culpeper. Finding
after an honest letter aud the very indefinite
and uusa, I,iactoTy reply 10 il, that there was
10 hope 0i any effective c0-opsration Of the
Armies " the Potomac and Virginia so long AZ
Nna-N rI.|H |H... Il