The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1891-08-25

TO be completely reorganized as to SOL
dierly material, pay, equipment and dis
clpline. Out of our total of 8, 334, 900 avail
able for military duty we ought to be
easily able 10 organize sound militia OF
$4,000 excellent men, who because of the
generous support and recognition Of the
general government would feel a strong
patriotic pride in their military service.
Volunteer fire departments are always
worthless compared with a regularly
organized, well equipped and well paid fire
department, and the same results would
follow the elevation of our state militia to
the rank of National Guards, well paid, in
structed, armed and drilled al the expense
OF the general government. Our 10000
state militia, who were also National
Guards, ought TO be and could be picked
men Of military taste, spirit and quality;
men proud 10 be the steel quilts on. the
back of the Federal porcupine in event
OF foreign war or domestic instruction.
The militia in the Pittsburg riot were in
open sympathy with the mob, and in
great cities, like Chicago, st. Louis and
New York, there is, in proportion as the
country is expanding and filling up with
a stream OF immigrants that includes
noxious strain of incendiary blood, neces-
sity for an army, whether state or federal,
that will obey orders. When General
Sheridan was in command in Chicago and
there was serious apprehension OF labor
riots, property-owners were very anxious
10 know how long it would take him TO
get his troops there, showing the prevail
ing distrust felt as TO the capacity OF the
city militia and the police TO act with
promptness and yigor. We have little
confidence that the regular army will be
increased. Every dirty, state supremacy
demagogue, and every industrial anarchist
is prompt to reduce rather than increase
the dignity of the United States army, and
the best hope of the country lies in the
proposed reorganization and elevation of
the state militia to the position of National
Guards, subject to the immediate control
of the government in time of war, in &C.
acknowledgement of which the general gov
eminent can well afford to make handsome
provision for the militia of the state. The
necessity of any army at all being once
admitted, anything short of an army of
first-rate quality, both regular and militia,
is worse than an economic blunder it is a
political and civic crime. This army of
regulars and militia cannot, for its own
good, be too much honored and protected
by the nation. Pride of service, sense of
public regard, social esteem are all that
compensate man for the sacrifice of a
life that must surrender its dearest things
at the sudden call of duty. A soldier can
never win wealth, has but periodical ex-
periences, long separated, of the luxuries
of civilized home and friends, and in
stead of pairing down his pay with a jeal-
Gus eye, we ought to exact a severe
standard of conduct from him, and pay
him enough to support the dignity and de-
cency of life with wife and children. especi-
ally as the emergency of service in war
and the frequent change of station in
peace often compels the maintenance of
separate establishments.
The want of competent officers to
quickly ''set up" our raw volunteers at the
opening day of the war cost US thousands
of lives needlessly lost, cost disastrous de-
lays, cost as millions of wasted treasure.
Between April, 1851, and February, 1862,
the first year of our war was so entirely
absorbed in preparation that Bull Run at
the East and Wilson's Creek at the West
stood for the only engagements of conse-
quence our lack of preparation was so
great that we cannot be said to have been
able To make effective war until the middle
of February, 1862, when Fort Donelson
fell. We are in worse state of prepara-
ton today than in 1861 save in the matter
of money. The veterans of the war for the
Union are long past the extreme limit of
military service, Al, and many of their
sons are past the best military age, be-
tween Is and %. By 1895, when General
Schoiield reaches the age of retirement,
there will not be West Point graduate
left in the active regular army who
commanded even brigade during the
civil war save General Ruger and General
Wesley Merritt. General Miles, who will
naturally suCtStu ptASIdi oChOutlQ III
1895 will be 90 years of age, older than any
man who rose to distinction on either side
was in 1861, and the active list OF the regular
army would contain few field officers OF ex-
perience in civilized, as distinguished from
Indian warfare, young enough to endure a
severe campaign. The record of our great
war on both sides proves conclusively that
the best work of general is done before
80. The only Confederates above h in 1861
who rose to distinction were Lee and Joe
Johnston: the only Union generals past
10 who rose TO distinction were Hum
phreys and Emory, who were 40 in 1861.
We have nothing left of our great war
save its military maps and the memory of
its frighttui experience of blunders that
cost a wanton waste of blood and treasure;
its men and brains are all gone or rapidly
going; in arms, experience; in the quality
and condition of our soldiers, regular and
militia, We are in state of transparent
military weakness that is per-
ennial invitation TO insult and attack.
The situation is one that peculiarly con-
Germs the Pacific coast. for here we are alb
solutely defenseless. There is not yet a
single gun mounted on any OF our ports of
sea coast defense on Puget sound, at the
mouth of the Columbia or at San Fran
cisco that could be fired with safety with