Wichita eagle., 1890-02-04
AN EMERGENCY RATE.
Its Commercial Value on Kansas Corn
Its Efficacy Doubted.

| hazard one on the emergency rate
now being agitated in Kansas by news
papers, shippers and corn holders.
may be wrong in my conclusions
often am-yet at the same time as hall
or three fourths of the ''stuff' written
from one years beginning to the enc
| influences no one, [ will be with the
majority.
doubt if the low rate on corn will
benefit the man who is intended to be
| benefited by it. think that
an emergency rate" is at best
| but temporary expedlent which will
not reach the disease from which the
west is suffering. The disease demands
constitutional treatment, not specific
nostrums which give an appearance of a
better condition, the temporary effects OF
| which when its influence is over leaves
| the patient in a more enfeebled condition
than before its application.
The disease is not too much corn, but
too few hogs in southwestern Kansas.
| have no knowledge of the rest of
Kansas, but | believe that if we had
hogs enough to eat this fourteen cents
per bushel corn the present price OF hogs
would give the hog raiser more profit
than twenty-five cents per bushel fOr
corn.
The fact is Kansas needs hogs, but the
man who can raise them is not full-hand
ed enough to go at it as business. We
have many good hog raisers, but not
enough. The financial condition of Kan
sas is a debtor condition-we are depend
ents; we need capital and the develop
ment Of the resources of Kansas.
The eleYator capacity of Kansas is as
nothing in comparison with our immense
crop. Ny judgment is that if there
were corn elevators or storage places for
grain at which corn could be stored
and warehouse receipts issued,
on which farmer could borrow
1-3 or 10 cents per bushel, at a
decent rate of interest, we would
not care straw about the ''emergency-
rate" or the present price of corn.
Take Sedgwick county as an example.
If there were $3.50 900 in Wichita to loan
on corn at per cent interest, on six
months OF even one year, secured by
warehouse receipts and insurance poll
cies, the effect would be to carry the
farmer on part of his crop, relieve his
present necessities, hold his corn Oft OF
the market, and give him the benefit OF
the rise in corn.
If the same amount of capital was in
other counties, farmers would be IN bet
ter shape and we could hold this corn
crop. But, says some one, "there is
no capital, etc." We admit it, but assert
that this want of capital is the thing
that has created the demand for the
emergency rate" the thing that proves
that an emergency rate is but an ex-
pedent, and the removal of the cause
for an emergency rate" is the real thing
demanded.
The immensity of this years corn crop
demonstrates that we have neglected to
prepare for such yield of corn, and
this crisis may be the cause Of arousiug
US to the absolute demand on US, and
forcing us to prepare for the future
crops, and the means Of taking care of
them.
Certainly, we hope for the periodical re
cursor of this years corn crop, and yet
in the present financial condition Of
Kansas the recurrence Of the present
corn yield will bring the demand for an
''emergency-rate' on corn. 1t is not a
cut rate on corn we demand, but capital
able and willing to advance margins and
carry corn, and this should be impressed
on our people and local boards of trade.
This may be whimsical, visionary,
chimerical idea, yet it does seem that as
large crops are positive blessings, the in
ability to take advantage of them is our
misfortune, and which misfortune ought
not to again bother us if we are awake
to our interests.
The elevator business in Kansas has
been neglected: once in while the fever
breaks out, then dies down, having pro-
duced no results. If the cry for IAN
emergency rate brings us to a reallza-
ton of one of our greatest needs 1t will
not have been in vain.
Kansas needs capital, which shall
come, not to be loaned on real estate and
notes as a business. but which will occu
DIV field untouched by our money lend
ing class, and which will embark as a
permanent business in handling grain
and storing it and loaning margins on
the warehouse receipts thereby en-
abling the grain raiser to carry his crop
and get the best price for it and prevent
pushing low priced corn on the market
and do away with the demand for ''cut
rates.
The "cut-rate," or 'emergencv-rate,"
has never vet been of any real benefit to
the seller or the railroad carrier. The
carrier loses directly by the low-rate; the
seller usually has to give the cut-rate to
the man who controls the grain market.
The seller of grain does not fix his price.
but is at the mercy Of the grain exchange
at the great grain depots of the world.
Ii the seller fixed the price he would not
need an emergency rate.
Some years ago there was low rate
on lumber to the west, yet 1t only bene-
fitted the dealer at the west end of the
railroad: the man who sold got no better
price, the carrier worked for almost
nothing, the consumer never got
any advantage from the cut, but the
local lumber dealer made all the profit.
On this same principle the only person
who would derive any profit from a ''cut
rate" on corn would be the grain handler
who buys and stores corn until 1t raises
in price or sells at once for the present
price adding the cut rate to his corn and
deducting 1t from the Kansas seller.
The emergency rate advocates proceed
on the theory that the Chicago grain
dealers viii pay .he same price on corn
after the rate goes into effect that is now
paid. This view endowS the Chicago
dealer with q philanthropic character
which he does not possess and which his
most charitable friend will not claim for
him, and which he would be ashamed TO
own TO his confederates on the grain
market.
If through our present weakness the
Chicago grain dealer can reap an addl-
tlonai one. two or three cent profit per
bushel from corn investments, my