The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1890-06-12

posed in open fields and subject TO the effects
OF overshots and ricochets for long distances
in rear of our lines of guns. Still, with all
these advantages of position, which affected
our supporting infantry quite as much as they
did our artillery line, Gen. Lees guns ceased
firing with little or nothing TO show for their
| efforts except hot muzzles aud empty CaissOns
whereas our guns were still able to play destruc-
| lively on his infantry column of attack as soon
rs IL showed its formation within range.
In order to be able to estimate properly the
battlevalue of this celebrated caunonade at
| Gettysburg, have devoted some time TO the
study of similar artillery Combats in tho open
| field elsewhere. | find but thrco apt compari-
! sons. One occurred between 9S French guns
| and l20 Allied guns near tho village of Lieb-
| ertwolkwitz during the battle Of Leipsic; an
other between Ia Prussan and 126 Austrian
| guns at Sadowa the Prussian guns being
| breech-loaders and the Austrian guns muzBle-
| leaders; and the third between 100 German
| guns and la French guns at Roichshonon-all
| breCch- leaders At Liebcrtwolll WITT the French
artillery was overwhelmed and destroyed. At
Sadowa the LA PTussian broeCh leaders drove
the 126 Austrian muzsle leaders out of position
at least drove Off all that they did not de-
stroy. AT ReChshoilon the 100 German guns
| temporarily silenced the 144 French guns but
did not prevent them from working subse-
| quent havoc among the German infantry, who
| charged the position.
History affords many other examples OF artl-
| lery duels a smaller scale, but tho three
| above mentioned are the only ones involving
| nearly or over 100 guns on each side. To me,
as an artileryman, this one effort of the Con-
! iederate artillery nt Gettysburg on grand
! scale has always had an almost melancholy
interest. In subsequent battles often felt like
inqniring what could have become of that
magnificent array of guns which they dCployed
along Seminary Ridge that hot July afternoon
| For Will aver that whereas they showed up
mt least 120 guns in action there, no Federal
soldier ever altCrward saw more than 25 10 30
Confederate guns in action on any one field in
open battle. II always seemed to me that, to
all practical intents aud purposes. the Confed-
crate artillery ceased to exist at Gettysburg as
grand force, and that its subsequent career
was spent in spgsmOdc and abortive efforts in
small detail, alike ineffective and ingl0rious.
In the Gettysburg duel the range was no
where less than 1,5O0 yards, and that only in
the center of the line opposite tho front of
DoGblcday's aud Gibbons Divisions. Else
where il was a mile or more so that only the
Parrott and 3inch rifles could Ice sure of thoir
range; the smoothboro - Founders having to
be served at not less than six degrees elevation
wherever they were used. Hence, all things
considered. it seems safe TO say that the result
OF the second epoch Of the third days bat
tie of Gottysburg-thc artillery duci---was n
NoIita'h"At aaiiAlt, lNiNt tt!uht III IlaHHiiNNt
TO the collapse of Edward Johnsons attack in
tho early morning on the Twelfth Corps at
Culp's Hill, and only prophetic of tho culmi-
mating reverse of Pcketts charge, which
formed the third epoch of that fatoful day
PICKETT's CHARGE.
Picketts Division is stated by tho Confed-
crate returns of June 20 TO have had 6,I1i
present FOR duty equipped 1t is, doubtless.
fair to say that it started on its immortal
charge" with at least $500 rank and file
What its supports and Aankers wero IL Is not
necessary 20 inquire because they did nothing
10 help il while advancing aud little to succor
II while rccoilng. So far as active attack was
concerned, it is perfectly fair to say that Pick.
ctts Division charged the Army Of the Poto-
mac. Other rebel commands made simulin-
neOus threats and demonstrations. hut this was
the only one that came 10 actual contact No
other command Of any weight struck any part
OF our lines at that time or thereafter.
have previously remarked upon the frag-
mentary character of the Confederate tactics
Tp 10 noon on the 3d OF July; demonstrating
that, with nearly 10000 men under his com
maud, than whom no hFaver or more devoted
soldiers never handled musket. Gen Lee. with
nil his genius, had not yet succeeded In bring
ing more than 10000 or $1,000 into action at
any one time in three days battle! Aud
now, at the end, or at least "a the final forlorn
lanches column OF about 6G00 bayouets
against the center of the Army of the Potomac
held by such troops rs G bbon's Division, OF tho
Second Corps. aud DOub.eday's OF the First
with Hancock himself commanding on the
main line of battle !! and those supported by
the Sixth Corps almost intact!
This leads US TO inquire, What are the real
characteristics Of a great Generalp Every SOL
dier OF the Army OF the Potomac will insist
that Lee was one Of the greatest Of Generals
and his army one Of the brayest OF armies IL
for no other reason than TO exalt his own PROV
css rs one Of the conqucrors OF both. But how
are we to reconcile this theory with the now
evident madness of Picketts charge alone, and
as IL turned out, unsupported? Suppose that
the remuantsOf ATmisieads aud Garnett's Bri.
gales had broken through the line of Webb's
Phiiadeiphia Brigade, OF Gibbons Division.
They would only have stumbled upon as many
fresh brgades Of the Sixth Corps And what
earthly show could they have hoped for in their
then necessarily exhausted condition against
such troops as those, who had not as yet pulled
trigger And nobody knew better than the
rebels what kind Of troops the Sixth Corps was
made OF, or how they would bc led and com
manded IN such AN emergency as that
Perhaps no commandcr-Inayb not Gen.
Lee. nor even NapOleOn-could have foresocn
these things. But viewing the situation a
quarter of a century or more afterward IL
bceihb lhcIcuiDlc tnht any 0iheer deserving tho
title Of great General could have expected
Pickctts charge TO succeed. Ny own impress-
ion has always been, and IL has grown upon mo
with increasing study and maturer reflection.
that Gen. Lee could not have put Pickett in as
he did for any other purpose than 10 gain time
! cannot yield the opinion that Lee was a great
GeneIal-one OF the greatest that the world
has seen From this point Of view / assume
that he must have seen before 3 o'clock D. m.
July g. that he had lost the battle, and that
all he could hope 10 do would be TO secure the
retreat Of his army. He had been repulscd at
every point OF hopeful attack. lis force had
been depleted by losses the like Of which he
had never known before Hisammunition was
nearly exhausted. He was far from his base of
supplies But one line OF retreat was open to
him, and 10 make that available he must have
leisure to Withdraw from his positions Of battle.
10 insure this he must make an heroic effort
somewhere 50 brilliant, no matter { abOrtiyc
as 10 strike temporary terror To lis antagonist.
This was certainly the immediate result of
Picketts charge. II Gen. Lee intended II for
that purpose alone it was the act of great
GenGral. If he hoped that IL might succeed 10
WAS the hopo Of mailman For my part |
shall always believe that Pickctts charge was
Lees last resort 10 brave lost battle out"
and the desperate expedient of great General
beaten by circumstances TO make good his
escape from what might otherwise have easily
resulted IN the total wreck of his defeated
army.
do not think that Lees act Of compelIjnp
Picketts charge, under the circumstances. can
be explained on any other hypothesis consist
ent with the rank AZ General which histor-
iaug seem Without excentian In accnrd IA him