Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1890-11-13
WAR "REMINISCENCES.
PLANS or LoNesTREET.

Confederate Success.
A few days after the battle of Chicka-
manga, the President Of the Confederate
States visited our army, then camped
about Chattanooga holding the Federal
army under partial siege. During that
visit Mr.. Davis called the superior Off
GERS of the Confederacy then present To-
gether in council Of war to discuss our
affairs, and on one occasion asked our
opinions as TO the most promising plan
for further aggressive operations. II is
important in this narrative that it
should be here explained that prior to
the consultation referred to he called
me alone to meet him. and that this in
terview lasted the greater part Of the
day. The point made during our con-
ference that should be noted here is the
opinion expressed by myself that our
failure to vigorously pursue the FEEDER
ais after our success at Chickamauga and
reap the full fruits Of our victory dis
PEELED our last and only chance for the
triumph of the Confederate cause.
At the meeting first mentioned Mr..
jefferson Davis inquired for such plans
as his commanding officers might sug-
gest for our future operations
The plan suggested by myself was
then to withdraw from Chattanooga,
change our base TO Rome, Ga, and adj
vance by Bridgeport and Stevenson,
Ala, and cut the line Of Federal sup
plies, etc. Mr.. Davis gave orders for
the execution OF that plan but just then
a severe season of rain began, which
continued and rendered the roads very
heavy and very bad In consequence
thereof our commander abandoned the
proposition and held to his position at
Chattanooga. After some weeks, when
the weather cleared off and furnished
us good roads, a camp rumor reached me
that General Bragg contemplated
movement into East Tennessee against
the Federals about Knoxville, and that
part of my command had been selected
as a detachment that was to execute the
plan.
About November 4. Bragg summoned
Generals Hardee, Breckenridge and my
self to his headquarters and announced
his purpose to detach my troops from
Virginia with most of its cavalry into
East Tennessee to attack and drive out
the Federals under General BurnsideS
Having outlined his plan, he paused as
if inviting suggestions. when proposed,
as a means of facilitating his purpose or
amending his plan. that he withdraw
his army from Chattanooga and concen-
trate in a strong position behind the
Chickamauga river, and at the same
time withdraw his troops from East
Tennessee to the main force. Then at
the moment OF concentration, having all
things in readiness for prompt move
ment detach twenty thousand men into
East Tennessee to march rapidly and
strike promptly so as to finish the work
in time to return or go into Kentucky,
as the Chief might deem best before the
troops Of General Grants army, then I'M
der orders to reinforce the Federals at
Chattanooga could reach their destina-
tion. AS the suggestion failed to meet
the consideration | thought it deserved,
continued and explained the apparent
danger of sending so small a force for
such heavy work and for action that
should be speedy, while our army at
was holding long lines and
attenuated along a grand curve, with
the enemy in the center and within
thirty minutes march Of any point OF
our occupation.
The number Of Fedaral troops in East
Tennessee our chief reported as 90, 600,
and the force assigned for my opera
tions against them was estimated at
about Is, 600. | insisted that my force
was wholly inadequate to warrant dar-
ing or precipitate battle and that the
procrastination Of prudent campaign
would give time for the arrival Of Cen
eral Grants succoring forces, and that
upon his arrival he would march out
two or three columns OF attack and feint
and would surely break through our
position. Nothing said, however, SEEM
ed to impress the officers present, so |
went over the matter and added that our
textbooks at West Point and the axio-
matte military principles admonished
Of the strength Of the Federal position
after the arrival of their succoring
forces and the consequent peril of our
position; that their column could be re-
intorced in few minutes. while along
our lines reinforcements from one point
70 another might be delayed for many
hours. Our chief apparently thought it
improbable that his line could be
broken. and plainly indicated that
further discussion OF the subject would
be useless. The only favorable com.
ment upon my views was from General
Hardee, who said: Il don't think that
was bad idea Of Longstreets." was
overruled and orders were issued for the
movement
While camp was being struck | wrote
some of my comrades from the head of
an empty -four barrel in the rain, excus-
ing my failure to call and take leave.
l wrote to General Buckner giving
him my view of the situation, and
three months afterward he returned
my letter to me with the following
note:
"MoRRfsTowN Tenn, Feb ]. 1884 -General:
II seems to me after reading this letter again
that its predictions are so fun yindication OF
the judgment Of your movements then ordered
that ii SHOULD remain in your possession with a