Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1890-06-27
THE HIGHER COURTS.
synopses Of Decisions Rendered at the Present
Austin Sitting.


Austin Sitting.
Correspondence ofthe Gazette.
AUSTIN. TEX, June 25.-Gulf, Colorado and
Santa Fe Railway Company VS.. J. L. Vaughn;
from Runnels county. Opinion by H urt, J.
Suit for damages to a shipment OF cattle from
Talpa, Tex, 10 Chicago, Ill. The contract of
shipment in evidence contained the following
stipulation: Now in consideration that said
party of the first part will transport for the
party of the second part fourteen carloads of
cattle from Talpa to Fort Worth station, deliver
Jug it at last named station TO its connecting
lines for transportation to Chicago, at the rate
of Sl02 per load from Talpa to Chicago, the
same being special rate, etc.. and it is fur ther
stipulated and agreed between the parties
hereto, that in case the livestock ment Toned
here herein is Ito to be transported over the
road or steamboat company; said party
of the first part shall be released from liability
of every kind after said live stock shall have
left its road, and the party of the second part
hereby SO expressly stipulates and agrees, the
understanding of both parties hereto being that
the party of the first part shall not be held nor
deemed liable for anything beyond the line of
the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe railway COM
pany. excepting to protect the through rate
named herein. The evidence shows that the
cattle were by the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe
railway company safely delivered al Fort Worth
to the Missouri Pacific railway company, and
that the damage occurred on the line of the
latter road. The question properly presented, is
whether under the facts and the contract the
Gulf. COLORADO and santa re railway company is
exempted from liability. The common .
law rule is that when the carrier qr+s
cepts for carnage goods directed to a
destination beyond its own route, it assumes by
the very act of acceptance. IN the absence of
any express contract upon the subject, the
obligation to transport them to the place to
which they may be directed. The principle
which underlies the rule holding the carrier
thus liable, prohibits absolutely limitation,
though made by express contract. The carrier
is held to deliver the goods at the destination
because he SO contracts and because he makes
the contract common carrier Having thus
contracted can he limit his liability The
through bill is an express contract. Is it the
contract OF common carrier? The nature of
the business and not the contract
made regarding the liability determines
the character OF the contracting pareesei'
j. is common carrier. and it follows ine~{Sa-
bly, that the common carrier cannot limit his
liability. Upon this principle rests the rule in
Lawson on carriers 6255, which denies the right
to limit the liability, and the supreme court of
the United States in Bank of Kentucky VS.
Adams Express company 1873 U. s. la ably
maintains this view. In accord with Lawson is
also the opinion of Chief Justice Willie in SO
Tex 1873 ami the point urged that the case is not
applicable is not well taken. 1t Is commended
that common carrier cannot be compelled to
carry beyond its line. Concede this, but the
carrier can make such contract, and If he
does so, he makes it as q common carrier, or
does the insertion Of the limiting clause make
him private carrier We think not. Contrary
to the contents the bill Of ladinR according TO