The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1890-06-12

/ from k0des s Division, about 800 strong, after
their losses of tho first day, and Gordons, from
Early's Division, 1000 strong.
The Twelfth Corps was to some extent aided
by Shaier's Brigade, Third Division. Sixth
Corps but as this command lost only 75 men
IN the whole battle they could not have been
very closely engaged. However, If we add
Shaler's $50 mon TO the $3.50 of the Twelfth
Corps, we shall have 10, ,i49 Union troops against
about IO500 Comfederatcs in the almost sepa.
rate battle of Culps Hill, during the forenoon
OF July g. The losses are stated as follows:
SLaiers Brigade sixth Corpsl l................ IS
l.I57
Johnson's Division, etc.......... ........ SO
1ordOns $50
2.252
! There is no means Of determining the losses
I Of ONelps and Daniels Brigades, of Rodess
/ Division, in this fight as their losses appear in
bulk. including both the first and third days
\ they not having been engaged at all the second
/ day. The result was that Johuson's Division
/ together with its Teinforcemcnts, was rcpulsed
/ from Culp's Hill and compelled 10 abandon its
/ position IN the valley of Rock Creek, which
threatened the extreme right OF our army.
OF course the fighting on any of the occasions
mentioned was not wholly confined 10 the
/ troops named rs being most heavily engaged.
+ My aim Is 10 analyze the battle with respect to
Its most severely contested point al each of the
days and hours referred TO. From these data
u would appear that there was no day hour or
moment from daylight July TO dark July
81, 1863, when more than two-iifths Of the force
OF either army was heavily engaged at the
same time. Ii this is admitted to DC the fact.
aud do not see bow any student Of history can
dispute IL. il must rebound much more TO the
discredit Of Gen. Lee as a tactician than TO the
discTedit OF Gen. Meade.
At that time Lee was at the food TIA de Of his
fame and his army at the pinnacle Of IFS power,
morally, physically and numerically. Tho
Army OF the Potomac was spondingly nj
the cbb OF its fortunes and its General iMcadc)
had not been yet "a week in command OF it.
From the 2lst OF July, 1861 at Bull Run, to the
%, I'd aud ith OF May at Charlottesville il
had met either defeat or check on every field,
Its nearest approach TO victory having been
the drawn battle" Of Autietam In which by
common consent now. IL had enjoyed a numer-
icai advantage OF nearly two to one.
In fact, 80 accustomed had the Lonfederates
become 10 defeating or "stopping" the
Army OF tho Potomac, that they thoHght they
had only TO strike in order TO conquer Aud
we have the unqualified evidence Of Gen.
LOnEsireut 10 the effect that Gen. Lee fully
shared the eoncclt Of his troops. Ny disposition
at all times IS TO put tho highest possible osti-
mate upon the pr0wess Of Loe aud his army,
IN order 10 exalt the glory OF their cOnqueTors,
the Army Of the Potomac Certain ID Is that
any Yankee soldier who attempts 10 belittle
Lee and the Army Of Northern Virginia, must
do 50 At the cost o! furnishing the glory Of APP
pomattOx :,
But strong as this esprit dc corps is with me.
and great as is my admiration for Lee as a
General aud for his troops as fighting soldiers
cannot resist the cOnclus. on that he fought
has battle az Gettysburg in a manner entirely
aN Nrui taf
rnandeT, either then afcrward. Judged by
the fate OF previous encounters the battle of
Gettysburg should have been over at shutdown
July 2, and the Union Army should have been
falling back toward Pipe Creek. / am not Of
those who believe that ii was possible for Lee
10 rOut or drive the Army Of the Potomac un-
der Meade on the soil Of Pennsylvania as he
had driven il under Pope or Hooker at Ma
nassas or Chanceiorsviile Bat he and his men
evidently thought they could aud as we look
back Al IL now. through the calm of q wears IL
seems that each disappointment only served TO
Inspire them 10 more reckless aud absurd dcs-
perstion.
Gettysburg WAS by no means the " Waterloo"
OF our civil war, but II was in many aspects its
LcIpsic decisive as 10 the field ITSELF but
not as TO the struggle as d whole. 1t is true
that rebellion struck its " "high-water mark
where Armigtead fell among the guns of Cush-
ing's Battery Al Of the 4th L. S. Art in Pick
/ etts charge: but IL took a long time for the
| tide 10 reach It's lowest eb0 after that The
War Records are eloquent with statistics TO
! show that the Army Of the Potomac shed more
! blood after Gettysburg than IL bad shed before;
ana anyone who has time or opportunity To
examine the battle records can easily sec that
more men were killed aud wounded between
/ July 3, 1863, and April s., 1865, than between
July Il, 1861, aud July /, 1863
THE ARTILLERY DUEL
This is long dgression. Recurring to the
! battle OF Gettysburg proper, we come 10 the
second epoch Of the third day-that it Is 10 saw,
/ the great artillery duel. AZ an artileryman,
aud duly impressed with the Importance Of that
4 arm Of the service, am yet IN candOr bound 90
admit that artillery duels as a rule produce
more sound aud fury than decisive results and
/ mat would rather take the chances hi a half
hours cannonadc with an enemy Of equal
/ force at fair range than in one blizzard from
/ Infantry close up, which presume is tho
common observation Of artillerymcn The
artillery duel 0f the third day Of Gettysburg
I IL chiefly remarkable as the only really great
exhibition Of strength in that arm Of the sery-
/ ice ever made by the Army Of Northern Yir-
gina. On no other field during the entire
war did Gen. Lee develop force of over 100
/ guns In line or maintain a grand canmonade
! Tor more than an hour. AS a demonstrations
/ or rather rs spectacle, il was superb; but as a
military operation IL was not effective as the
/ sequel showed,
4 II is not possible 10 consider this cannonade
I az having had any effect Oh the fortunes of the
battle, because its destructiyencss was not such
/ as 10 impair the power Of our infantry 10 re.
hlst aud Tepulse the great charge for which il
was designed 10 pave the way, nor did IL cripple
! our own artillery 10 an extent commensurate
with the expenditure Of ammunition on the
! part 0i The enemy--which then and there was
! irTeplaceable Hence ! think IL proper 10 say
that the great cannonade Of July 8 was an
error On the part 0f the Confederate com
mander, because II was the means Of expending
stores which lac could not and never did re.
! place, while ifs effects were not only not
! decisive, but did not even serve to mitigate the
consequences of the total collaBse of that
assault when attempted. Ia this grand artillery
duel the rebels had the advantage In number of
guns actually engaged at any one time but we
were superior in equipment and ia reserves
wheTewith 10 replace our batteries as tbev
might be crippled or exhausted. They also
had the advantage Of position in that the Law of
The ground on their side was such as 10 afford