The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1890-12-14

second uay OF tettN suurg. July >. 1905, ana
that such an attack ought TO have been
then made, and would have been sue
cessful. Lord wolseley, although not
mentioning Pendleton, holds in general
that, a. Meade's army was not then concen-
trated, the Confcderates could and should
have made strong attack early on the
second day. General LOngstreet replies
that Pendleton's own official report shows
that early on the morning OF the second
day he saw between the Confederate lines
on the Fairfield road and the Emmetts-
burg road 1.-THE enemy's cavalry in
considerable force" while along the latter
road toward the enemy's main position
were bodies Of infantry and artillery. ac-
cOmpanied by their trains.' This report of
the holding Of the Emmettsburg road b,
the Union forces he considers sufficient
answer to General Pondeton's subsequent
criticisms. General IOngstreet adds tina
when he reported TO General Lee, about
O'Clock on the afternoon of July l. the lat
ter announced MS purpose TO give battle the
next day, but went no further in precise
orders, and Indeed at that time one OF
lOngstreers divisions were at Chambers
burr and the other two about twenty miles
away, although sure 10 be up during the
night. On the following day Longstreet's
troops were AT Lees headquarters fora sug-
gested march out OF the enemy's range of
Obsery alton. and were actually under his
immediate command until MS engineer
officer turned them over 70 me, which was
about noon
General Wolseley had said in his article
that those who have most carefully studied
NapoleOn's methods and habits will think,
believe, that Napoleon, IN Lees place.
would have attacked in the early morning
OF July ,. as Lee intended to do" In this
opinion, according TO Longstrect, he j.
wrong again. siuce Napoleon would
rather have seized Cemetery Heights before
twilight had passed away on the evening of
July /.
As to the third days battle, General
Longstreet declares that he had no other
troops that ought to have co-Operated IN
Pickett's charge, and that it would be i'm
putlLg false tactics 10 General Lee TO sup
pose that no desired that the divisions Of Me-
Laws and Hood shou d aid the assaulting col
umn. These divisions were on LOngslreet's
right, and defended his flank and rear. save
those precautions, he says, there would baye
been no AppOmattON, since Gettysburg
would have been the last battle of the war.
and would have ended in the surrounding Of
Lees army and its surrender.
General WOlseley has also criticised
LOngstreet for delay At Chickamauga, de-
claring that this Office was IN command OF
the left wing, with orders from Bragg TO be
gin at daybreak, but did not advance till
noon. LOngstreet replies that the order
was that the right wing should attack hrst.
and that the left should refrain until the
right was in successful progress, and should
then follow the success by a wheel to the
left on his extreme left rs pivot. As the
attack by our right wing was repulsed,
asked for and obtained authority to 90 in
alone. | attacked and broke the enemys
line. and drove back two of General Rose
GRAMS corps
An interesting portion Of General Long
streets reply is that which describes Lees
conferences with him after taking command
of the Army of y rtheru Virginia:
~ few days after his assignment ! was
left as his next in rank, and continued IN
that relative position to the close OF the
war. II was almost a daily habit with me-
after these relations were formed, 10 visit
General Lees headquarters, and al
times several such visits were made IN
daV. On the march he usually rode by my
side, and his camps md bivOuacs were, a.
a rule. very near NINE. When studying an
intricate problem. If he failed To see me he
would send for me. and, after explaining
the prepleNitv. often repeated an express sion
Of his. MY mind has been applied so III
remittngly TO this question that my ideas
are now swinging IN a circle. | sent for you
% know whether YOU can give me lit that
will help me through it,
'.Ii my efforts were not successful, the
conferences convinced him Of disposition
20 cheerfhly give him the benefit of my
mind as well as That of my sword.
"When. on the battlefield, ! presumed 10
lfler from him. il was 10 remind him Of hi
policv previously adopted in calmer mo
ments. ! think that the highest authorize
Will class General Lee as master of the
science of war. lhat he was deeply skilled
IN the art Of war the careful student may
ind occasion 10 doubt.
These assertions were brought out 10y
WOseley's description OF lOngstreet a.
Lees "carping lieutenant and his con
rast Of the latter with Jackson, whom he
quotes as declaring that he would no. |
low Lee blindfOld anywhere The authen-
rcity OF this declaration General
Lpngstreet doubts, adding that Jackson
appeared 10 the best advantage while IN In
denendent command. and that his chardc-
t.ristic qualities seemed crippled under the |
immediate command Of Lee. He tells q |
story of his relations With Jackson, u |
Furnishes second attempt 10 cross the /
RappahannOck, after his defeat at frnder- !
lcksburg. Lee had then been called T. |
Richmond and left LOngstreet in command !
"Tpon receiving Information OF active |
movements By the enemy. General jackson |
reported TO me at headquarters and eX |
dressed the opinion that u meant a move !
traiust our right By crossing the llN6r down 1
,yout Hoop Place, and asked 10 have ms
command ordered down so as to be In post |
ion u dispute ,hc march. nder the I'M |
preston thai he did not hucW the tOpographl-
.al features Of that line, J eAWa'@ed ina !
me narrow meet between the Potomac /
md RappahannOck rivers was So
cut up by overlapping streams l
and ravines as TO render tn |
march imp.acticable at that season (mid- !
winter. and that after crossing the Kappa |
hammock. the mud fats On tie s1uth sue
we're even more serious obstacles. Inc eN- !
PLANTATION failed TO convince bin that ne |
could have misludged the eHemys plans I
and when finally forbidden 70 move hls |
troops he 'carped' out impatlenily; Inc
schOO,r General Burnside had CHOSEN 'he
upper route through the highlands, but even
there he fought the mad 60 formidable that
he was oblige 70 abandon the C4mpe,Sn be-
fore he reached his crossing point"
On the whole this reply 10 the CRITICISMS |
IF General WOlseley does not put Genera
LongstTeot in the most advantageous hGDt'
IL Is much too angry, too vltuperaule, tOO
dlgcursiye. to carry the weight when
cooler and more logical response ,"ighl
have mad, lie slashes at his BRUSH !
critic as "queruiOus.' accuses MN
of "a vicious purpose anu felers 10 me-
own performances against "Genoral Arab, /
so-cailed Pasha." In this he shows de- !
Termination, if put upon the defensive, 10
make II az ieas: defensive with offensive
returns" Probably ike reply Will further
embitter those who endeasOi 20 lay upon
Iongstreet some Of the responsibility iOI
Lees very few failures.
JAPANESE INTERIORS.