New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1890-03-23

nosinc a war between England and two other
Powers, one Of the first class and one las 10 na'Sj
of the third. France and Russia are pfo"apN
the ones thought of. In such case 'he pii'ia"
navy would be no more than equal 10 'nose Vi no
two antagonists and the question is, no" pcs' ooui'
il do its duty in preventing INVASION al" H. d"
the same time, protecting the enormous eA'e""."
lines of British commerce aioat. No"' "s ~ '"'
nucleus of imperial defcnce-the defence OF inc
United Kingdom, that is TO say-there are several
theories. One is that the navy alone must nnuer-
take tho work of preventing invasion. and fhat
consequently il is useless to spend money on
coos+ for,;icafion But Sir Charles shows very
conyincingy that this is a most dangerous poiiVA
For in these days of steam II Is no longer possi"c
70 guarantee the stopping Of a swift 1otlla secretly
nrepared and suddenly launched against the I'M
defended British coast, and If snch an eApeul'ioh
oa nod tho cruisers and actually landed, what
could hinder the fall of London. perhaps of the
Kingdom Some may say, the army pu' III
effect there would be no army. All the aValIao'c
troops would be needed to fill the many depie'e"
carrisons TO hold the coang stations, to reinforce
the Indian army. There would remain pu'
nucleus Of disciplined regulars suflcien' 10 p"sc
a territorial force of volunteers upon. The volun-
,eers are fine body of men, we'll drilled ana in'eiii
gent but have hitherto had no other instruction ia
unon nlaccs chosen beforehand Sir Charles Truly
remarks that battles of position always nave pcch
lost and since between London and the coast 'heie
are no spccialy advantageous dcfensible piaces'
the nrOspect in such case would be dark ior '"o
volunteers.
The necessity of coast fortification thus Is maoc
annarcnt. The principal ports, above all the
navy wards and arscnals. must be protected po'n
bv works. guns and torpcdoes. Even theh 'hc
duties of the feet will be arduous enough LOT u
must first cndcavor reach, fight ana destroy one
encmy's fleet. and meanwhile II must '"Nc
prompt measures for the defence OF us own oo"i-
ing stations and for the protection OF bf''isn
,ommcrce afoat If AT such critical junctuic'
however the feet is charged with thc CONVEY
o,co of carrisons and guns 10 distant coalng sta
tions the duty will obviously interfere with us
moro mnortant functions All such work, there
fore. should nc completed in time OF peace Hii
Charles suorests as a measure of prime impor-
lance the swift seizure and destruction oi '"'
cnemv's coaling stations. There can ne no qUes-
ton of the Importance Of such step, ihas'h"'h
as. provided all the English coaling stations were
strongly held, this would go far toward pa'"'"-
ing commcrce-destroYcrs. FOR the uhc hdS S'"'
by when work OF that kind can DE done ny sill
inn vessels Tbrcc-fourths OF the floating COM
tho percentage of swift merchant steamers Is
steadily increasing Commcrce-dcstroycrs' there-
fore. must be extraordinarily speedy, and must
hurn LARGO quantities Of fuel. which means mat
they can never 90 very far from their base. lie
rehabilitation of the encmy's coaling stations
would in fact he much cheaper than. ana qni'e
az effective as the destruction of the enemy
;ronclads in battle But after all II would not
no an easy enterprise for England as the case
s,ands and here we return 10 solid facts. Inc
inference from all Sir Charles bikes inquiries
and investigations is that if England does gIc''
many things which she has so far lett uh'oNe'
and if her enemies allow her time to repair hei
blundcrs and omissions she may succeed IN MAX
ing a successful defence OF her imperial interests
Euf that unless Sic undertakes the reforms ana
measures Of defence and prccaution here recon-
mended. she will be in pcrilous way "heh Shc
meets her enemies in the gate. Inc vial con
sderation then clearly is this; what reasonable
prospect is there that her statesmen and la"gN-
ers will be wise in time
Judrinr from the past il must be said that
there is not much probability of radical improve
ucnt in Engand's preparations lor u'l'"''
MANY wears have passed since her own
most distinguished military and naval OH
GERS began TO point ont the defects III "'i
armament, and foreign observers and critics
French. German and Russian. have repeatedly
exposed her vnlncrabity. while her own press
has urgently advised the changes which, never
thclcss have not been made. The truth Is 'h"'
,bc twisting system is 50 intrcnched in conscrva-
tive prciudices and selfish interests, ana the lore
If parliamentary influence are so scattered over
an immensty Of imperial affairs that unless ar
Charles bikes recommendation OF the creation
hat N d r..
upon the German model. he adopted. there seems
l,-ic reason 10 expect that any faT-rcachlrg ard
effective measures will be taken Yet, If nothing
i done of the many things which need TO DE
| ACCOMPLISHED in time OF peace, the prosper ioI
| successful defence of the empire in the event OF
war is moor enough. For modern wars are ho'
| like those Of century ago. They are chaf-
| acterizcd by swftness Of movement which leaves
no time for preparation TO an unreadS ROVER,
and every great Power, with the exception OF
| England is and has been pushing its preparations
| for war steadily. 4 few years. perhaps hve. VIII
see Russia quite ready to make her spring upon
| Uerat and Balkh, and when that step IS taken
she will be also prepared for all the ensuing
measures necessary 10 the invasion Of lndla. III
the same way France is rapidly fortifyinG and
manning her coaling stations and her coasts She
he's already in New-Caledonia base for opera
tions against Australia. She is in position "a
seize Singapore the Mauritus, and perhaps Adcn
Meantime the English coang stations which are
most exposed to sudden attack are without means
Of defence even for short time, and their saie'y
would depend entirely upon tie ubiqniiy OF the
navy. which is greatly ovcrburdcned with re-
sponsibility
In a war with France and Russia. as thing
stand the loss Of few coalng stations might
involve Me destruction Of Englands foreign com
mcrcc and the Gripping of large portion OF hel
fleet The dispatch Of troops 10 India would D'
Lindcrcd if not prevented. Strong squadrons o
ironclads would have to be kept in the Channc
10 guard against invasion, and tho loss OF single
naval engagement might AZ any time expose Lon
don 10 capture \ desperate struggle for the pos
session Of India would necessarily form part o