Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1890-10-28
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT.


the other side of the world.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT.
The recent expressions of Senator Ed
munds. at the annual meeting of the Yer
mont Bar Association, upon the original
packages decisions were outspoken and
positive. The Senator pointed out that the
question as to the powers of the States
raised in these decisions would have made
the union impossible, as without these
functions which the States have exercised
for one hundred years, mot single State
would have gone into the Union" He de-
clared his opinion that "the people of the
States should have the charge of the preser-
vatlon of their own autonomy, whether it
relates to traffic in drugs, dynamite or in
toxIcating liquors." each of which would
be impossible under the original package
decision. Either the poisonous drugs, the
explosives or the spurious liquors are
handled in the original packages IN which
they are brought from other States. This
plain speaking makes it pertinent to refer
to another point which has been mentioned
in these columns, but has been otherwise
passed over, namely, that the alleged con-
stitrtional principle on which this decision
is based is entirely product of the imagi-
nation of the courts.
The whole theory of the original package
decision is based upon the assumption that
the constitution forbids any State to regu-
late commerce between itself and another
State; but the fact is that no such prohibit
ton Is to be found in the limitations OF the
powers of States, in the United States Con-
stitution. The whole theory is an inference
that, because Congress is given this power
therefore no State can exercise it, in any
form whatever. But this theory is shown
to be baseless by an examination of other
provisions connected Herewith. In the
same section and by the same enacting
clause, Congress is given power to provide
for naturalization and bankruptcies, to
establish postroads, TO fix the standard of
weights and measures, to provide for
organizing, desciplining and calling out
the militia. Under the same rule of con-
structiou which forbids State to regulate
such inter- Stale commerce as comes within
its territory. it would be forbidden to touch
with its legislation the subjects of bank
rupcv, weights and measures, to build a
postroad or to organize its own militia;
which reduces the entire theory of construc-
tion to an absolute absurdity.
Not only does this appear from the study
of this clause, but when we turn to the
ala If {la
of the powers of individual States we find
there direct evidence that the Constitution
expected the States to exercise local regu-
lation over commerce passing beyond their
borders. We fiud there that mo State shall
lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex-
ports except trhdt may be absolutely neces-
Sary tor exercising lis inspection laaos."
The only possible purpose of inspection
laws is to regulate; and here we have adirect
recognition on the part of the Constitution,
OF powers OF the States, which the Supreme
Court now asserts to be unconstitutional
In other words the decision of the judicial
body appears to have overruIed the written
language of the Constitution itself.
1t is true that there are some powers dele
gated to Congress, such as the coinage of
money and the declaration of war, which
cannot be shared with a subordinate power;
and it is to be recognized that under the
Constitutional provision, if State legisla-
tion should conflict with the Congressional
regulation of any Of these subjects, the
supreme authority rests with the National
Legislature. But that there is anything in
the nature of Interstate commerce which
makes it impossible in the absence of regu-
lation by Congress of any branch of il, for a
State to regulate that which originates or
terminates in its territory, is simply an un
founded theory. 1t was done by the States
without friction for a hundred years; and
the right of the States to exercise exactly
that power which is now denied them, was
affirmed by two leading decisions of the
United States Supreme Court itself, one BY
Taney with regard to this very subject of
the liquor traffic; and in the granger cases
with regard to the regulation of railways.
1t was reserved for the Supreme Court
within the last five years to assert in one
railway case and in one liquor case, that the
States cannot do what they have done with
out interruption Tor century and for con-
sderatiOns which, to use the mildest term,
to overrule both the precedents Of their own
body and the letter OF the Constitution.
1t may be deemed best by some people
that the States shall no longer have power
to regulate the traffic in drugs and liquors,
the handling OF explosives, to provide for
the inspection OF grains, meats or live stock,
or the settling OF bankru ptcies; to build post
roads or to organize their militia. But if
that is best, the wav to amend the Constitu-
ton is not by the decision of the Supreme
Court. Yet these things are all prohibited
to the States by the logical conclusion of the
principle laid down in the original package
decision. The case is an illustration of fol-
lowing out a lire of legal theories, rather
than constitutional principles, which have
led the Supreme Court so far away from Its
legitimate ground, as to produce decisions
that almost raise the doubt whether that
lofty body has read the Constitution that 1t
undertakes to construe.