Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1890-12-12
THE SCIENCE OF WAR.

WAE at the best is great evil.
sometimes, however, IT becomee "a
Necessary evil" 1t is interesting to
read the views Of a great leader in
the science OF warfare and We
Iheefore reproduce the following
from WORK 10y Moltke, the greatest
living German general:
Politics" says MolIke, ..use war
rs q means 10 their end. They
exercise 4 decisive influence on
1t from first 10 last, in that,
as circumstances change, they
raise or lower their demands. In
view OF this uncertainty V, strategy
unjust follow the vacilialing goal o:
gaining every possible advantage.
Thus, wnlle quite Independent of
politics in its means, j: bs,t works To-
ward harmony with politics ia it,
ends The next duty is the placing in
the field Of the military force, that is.
the iirst advance OF tue army. In this
the manifold geographical, political
and NATIONAL considerations must be
most painstsk Ing'y studied. One mis-
take in the assembling OF The troops
can hardly be corrected in a whole
campaign.
The first advance, however, can
usually be planned well beforehand,
and be carried out with the desired re-
suits. Entirely different the next
problem OF stra;egy-jhs ops ratiuns
with the forces OF war. Here our pur-
pose is met by the entirely independ-
ant purpose OF The enemy. This
inimical purpose may be confined
within the limits when we are able,
ready, and determined, but cannot be
broken otherwise than through the
power OF battle. Ths mascri.I aud
moral effects OF great battle are so
| comprehensive, however, tina. they
usually create a wholly new situation,
a new basis Of new operations. No
plan Of operations can reach with any
degree Of cer.aInty beyond the tirst
meeting with the enemy. Only lay
men have the conception OF a cam
paigu planned in detail beforehand
and carried TO the end in n logical Sc
quencs from the original thought of |
ID commander.
of course, the commander must |
have his great and dsini.s aims, and |
follow them uusgerved by the incl
dents OF the hour; but the way in
which these aims are to be realized !
can never be determined with certainty |
long in advance. In The course Of n |
campaign the commander is constant
ly required to make decisions on the |
bases OF situations that C iuld MT have |
been foreiold or foreseen. ALI tn.
consecutive ac-s in a war are. there
fore, no. premeditated operations,
out spontaneous ones. /, is 4 mat
ter Of seeing through the clouded /
and uncertain situa'ion NJ given
ims aud place, Of e-timating the
importance OF the known guam
tity, OF guessing closely :he unknown
Quantity. OF resolving promptly on a
line Of action, and Of carrying out
theoretically and unsservingiy this
line Of action. In the problem Of cal
culat:ng the relations of the two great
factors, ones own purpose and the
snerny's purpose, it must Mt be for
sosten that there are other factors
which are fully beyond all powers Of
Estimation, as, for instance, weather.
illness, and railway accidents, misun-
lerstandings and decepIions; IN short,
Ill the occurrences which are a.tribII-
d TO fate, accident or Divine Provi-
lsnoe, and which man neIIher creates
lor controls. Yet war IS not a matter
II blind chance even in these respcc.-.
'There is calculation Of probabili-
ties possible IN these Diet ais. III Al tas
Dsd luck OF the one will 10 balanced
oy the Dad luck OF the other in most
cases, and so the commander, who in
each event does what is good. II not
the best, has fair chance OF reaching ,
uis goal. II is self-evident that for
such affairs mere theoretical knowl-
edge is insufficient, tIat here come
TO free, practical, artistic development
The great qualities OF mind and char
ic.er, schooled, Of course, by military
education and guided by experience.
gathered from the history OF war or
real life. Decisive above all for the {
or \ commander Is na:ura.-
y the result. How much OF the re-
suit is due directly TO him can be de- ;
ermined only with the or attest diff +
,uity. The best man of,en Is wrecked {
IN the irresistible powe. Of circum- '
tances; The man of me ;iocrc ability
5 often lifted high by the same power.
IN the whole, however, fortune flvors T.
My the competent commander. As
in war is uncertain, cx- T
ePting the energy and strength of
he commander, universal premises, :
and systems are quite
siueless TO strategy. The Archduke !
Iarl once called strategy a science, q
nd tactics an art He ascribed TO tue d
ommander-in-chief the science that s
the course of the e
'arlike Undertakings The arr, =
3 said. had only TO execute the :
lans Of strategy. On the con- +
AIRY, General vun. Clausewitz says:
'trategy is the use OF battle for the !,
1ds Of war; In fact, strategy gives !.
cites the means TO strike and tee r
of victory through the II
lrec;ion of the armies and their meet 4
u on the battlefield. On the other Il
aud, she sdap;s herself to the result a
Id builds on IL. In the presence OF y
re tactical victory. strategy suppresses
r demands and accommodates her 4
If 20 the new situation. Strategy is Al
ore than science; it is the applica- d
IN of knowledge TO practical life, the d
'velopmsnt Of the original guiding y
ought, corresponding with the con- :,
anfly changing situation; il is the =,
I OF sction undar the harie<- eo- | =,