The sun., 1890-06-08
SOME VIEW BooKS.
The Role OF Naval Pow.r,n H,.tor,

The Role OF Naval Poweri In History.
1t is new point OF view from which Capt A
T. MAHAN OF the United States Navy has un
dertaken to study an interesting period @
modern history Hitherto the bearing OF nave
resources and operations on the course ant
outcome OF international rivalries nnd contest
has been indistinctly or inade1uately indi
Gated. General historians. not being profes
sional seamen, and aware Of their inability
to discuss intellgently naval strategy anC
tactics, have been disposed to treat mari
time encounters In a cursory way, while tn,
eompilers OF naval annals have devoted them
sslves rather to technical exposition and criti
cism than to the demonstration OF the effect o
maritime asoendency on the issue OF wars
Capt Mahan's aim, on the other hand is, az
the title OF his book announces to trace tn.
Influence Of Sea Porer upon Historv, and he has
selected as particularly adapted to his purpose
the period from 1860 TO 1888. which behed the
irretrievable decline OF the Dutch naval power.
the decay followed by vigorous attempts at re-
suscitation OF the French and Spanish navies,
and the gradual advance Of England to pre-
ponderance upon the ocean, The reason as
signed by the author for the limits Of his review
Is that these roughly define tho epoch OF sail
ing ships distinguished from Raleys on the
one hand and from steamships on the other.
Ono cannot but wish, however, that the author
could have found room for preliminary chap
ter on the naval triumphs Of England under
Cromwell, aud also for supplemental chapters
dealing with the exploits of Jervis, Nelson.
and Collingwood. But IL will scarcely be
disputed that within the fold to which
he has chosen to conflne himself. Capt.
Mahan has demonstrated tho important
influence and sometimes decisive weight OF
maritime power in the scale OF war. If he does
not succeed in persuading us that fleets played
q controlling part In the war OF the Spanish
succession. he easily convinces us that to the
temporary preponderance OF the French In the
Chesapeake was due the surrender OF Corn
wallis at Yorktown. We may note. before pass
ing to more congenal duty. that the author
is occasionally guilty OF minor historical
oversight which does not affect, however. the
soundness of his conclusions. For instance.
writing OF tho epoch between 1860 and 1888
he continually speaks OF the Emperor Of Aus
tria. There was Of course. no such parsonage
before 1904. Again. speaking OF the state OF
Europe in 1860. Capt. Mahan says: Prussia,
Is now known, did not exist. The foundations
OF the future kingdom were then being pre-
pared by the Elector OF Brandenburg." or |
course Prussia. as it is known in $780, did not |
then exist. hut the Electors OF Brandenburg |
had been Dukes OF Prussia since 1918.
i.
Before entering on his specific task Capt.
Mahan examines the part played by naval
forces at certain momentous crises In ancient
and medieval times. Tho battle OF Actium, for
instance is commonly regarded as decisive OF
the contest beween Augustus and Antony
Had Antony. however been willing to put
himself at the head OF his land forces. he had
ut least chance OF retrieving his maritime re-
verse. The Importance Of the battle OF Le-
m ha nj haan hut n
short time after what seemed an overwhelm-
ing defeat that the Turks sent forth new
fleet stronger than any naval force which the
Christians could array against them. 1t was
the preponderance OF Venice in tho Adratic
during the sixty years between the fall of Con-
stantinople and the inordinate develops
ment OF the Spanish power that barred
the Ottoman advance into Italy and |
central Europe. There il much, on the
other hand. to be said on behalf OF Capt Ma
hans theory that tho success OF the Romans
in the second Punic war was due in no small
measure to their preponderance at sea- It ia
obvious. indeed. that Hasdrubal whsn he set
forth to relieve his brother Hannibal. would
not have mot disaster on the Metaurus could
he have transported his troops by water IN
stead OF being forced to take the long. circui-
tous. and difficult land route. The author
does not convince US. however, that the part
Of the Mediterranean lying between Carthage
and Tarentum was not sufficiently open to
permit Of Hannbals being repeatedly reen-
forced from Africa. Some reanforcements he |
did gain from that quarter. and that these I
we're not moro adequate to his necessities was I
1ue less to the Roman preponderance at sea v
han to jealousy and incompetence on the J.
part Of Carthacenian officials. 1t is. neverthe-
ess. true. as Capt. Mahan points out. that 1
carthage failing herself to support her Gen .
'ral. Hannibal's base OF operations was the u
military power controlled by his family in =
spain. and that his line OF communication was II
mt by the Roman mastery OF the tract OF sea =
yinR between Italy and Spain. l
To what eXtent can the study OF naval his q
ory in tho epoch Of sailing vessels be made in n
tructive to those who have to reckon with the II
hanged conditions Of maritime warfare in u
nr time? 10 this question Capt. Mahan re- s
lies that we must needs seek the lessons Of p
history in this direction. for the reason that Fl
team navies have as yet made no history e
whose Ieaching can be accepted as distinct and
positive. To the record OF sailing ships we h
must look for experimental knowledge, since I n
his is AS yet unattainablo In the annals OF %
rmored vessels propelled by steam. J.
as. indeed. been argued that for usef /
nalogies we should look, not to bou~ K
xperience OF sailing ships, but to the r! CT s.
Galeys propelled by oars. 1t ie = b
ut that the galley and steamer ha III ii
ION feature in the ability to move j 81 sc.lrec- e
on. independently of the wind TO as the W
ailing ship could follow only q Ite cd num- 81
Or OF courses whom the wind = and had to II
main motioness when it failed. There are N
rotound differences. however. between the p
illey and the steamer. The motive power OF o
10 former when in action. rapidly declines. d.
lmnn strength being Incapable OF long sus-
lining the exhausting efforts demanded. 81
'nseluently. in the case Of the galley. tacu- q
i movements could continue only for lin 10
'd time Again, during the galley period. pl
Iensive weapons we're not only OF short nj
nge. Dut almost wholly confined to OF
md to hand encounter. Capt. Mahan tn
'os not agree with those naval writ III
a who deam n hand- to. hand naIaa auob mn