The National tribune., 1890-02-06

/
impact Of the rebels. Gen. Cox himself says:
/ The men in the trenches confused by the
! crowd tramping over them, and hearing Wag-
ner's officers calling upon their men to rally at
! the rear, were carried away by the surging
mass and for the length of a regiment on the
! left, and more than that on the right, they fell
/ away from the works." We have two COM
ments to offer on this pitiful excuse by the
commanding General of the Twenty third Corps
! for that bad break in his battle-line. part
/ of his corps did not find il necessary to become
confused by the crowd tramping over them.
/ They submitted to the tramping of the crowd
with the same fortitude with which they re-
! PEELED every assault the rebel army made,
! Another part became so badly confused it
! fell away from the works before the crowd
| reached them. Men by the dozen can be pro-
duccd, as gallant soldiers then, and rs reputable
citizens now as any in this broad land, who will
testify that where they crossed that line 1t was
empty. l will only quote from statement
! furnished by that gallant officer, Col. John q.
! Lane: The right of the Second Brigade was
! refused, and the brigade was not in tho direct
! line of the cncmy's attack. Only the 10th Ind.
/ fired. All the other regiments held their fire.
! When the Third Brigade, TO my left, fell back,
] gave the order for my brigade to retire.
We had much difficulty in getting into tho
works, owing to a heavy line of abatis of locust
boughs through which my line had TO pass.
When we got over the line was empty. My
brigade seized on it; 0pdycke came up on my
left, the line was restored. and Franklin was
won"
While Lanes Brigade was delayed by the
! abats, the rebels had approached within 90
! feet His five regiments, which had held their
! fire, when they reached the breastworks, turn
ed and poured in their first volley at that short
range. It's deadly effects, and the confusion
! and delay which il caused ia the rebel advance,
/ had much TO do with our success in holding the
line. Opdyckes Brigade was posted just in
rear of where the break occurred. Opdyckes
/ Brigade was drawn up Immediately in rear of
| where the break occurred. The circumstances
under which Opdycke took up that position
were perfectly well known to Gen. Cox and
Capt. Schofeld, and yet Cox in his book and
Schofeld in his paper have stated the case in
manner deliberately intended to give the inn
preston 20 the ordinary reader that Opdycke
went into reserve in obedience TO orders. This
is what Opdycke himself had to say on this
point:
My brigade was the rear-guard from Spring
Hill. aud, rs ] was moving on the Columbia
pike came 90 where Lanes and Conrad's Bril-
gadcs were in position, i'll perfect exposure on
the plain. Wagner rode to me aud ordered me
into line with them. ! energetically objected
/ TO having troops out there, where they were in
serious exposure aud where they could aid the
enemy and nobody else Wagner rode on with
me as was urging my objections ttor did not
even halt. and when we reached tho main line
I az CaTtcrs Hin there was no room for more
troops, and so we rode on till we came 10 the
open space, where We had arms stacked. Wag-
ner then Il. e., before arms were stacked said
10 me: Now. Opiycke, fight when and where
you think best. ! may not see you again.
did not see him again, and that was the only
order received till Gen. Cox ordered me TO re-
tire after the battle"
In a letter 10 me, commenting on Gen. Cox's
book when il first came out, Gen. Opdycke
used this vigorous language: 1.-The Twenty
third Corps people have been for nearly 20
years cndeavoring TO close the fatal gap opened
by them, and Cox has, with his pen, hc could
not do IL with the Twenty-third Corps on the
30th OF November 1864. got the thing almost
done without my brigade. He ignores the fact
that a few minutes after my men closed the
gap, he came TO me aud said: Qpdyckc, that
charge saved the day
1T is utterly false 10 say was put in re-
serve, for ] went there myself. without order
or suggestion from anyone. j would have been
out where your brigade was, in useless aud eE-
treme exposure, If had not most energetically
opposed being thus falsely placed. What would
have become OF the Twenty Corps, Scho-
I field Cox, aud all, if had been out with Lane
and Conrad instead Of where ] was
Gen. Thomas, in recommending Opdycke for
I promotion, used the following language: He
I displayed the very highest qualities as com
mander. IL is not saying too much 10 declare
Y that but for the skiiiui dispositions made by
/ Gen. Opdycke lall Of which was done entirely
I on his own judgmentk disaster in
/ stead Of victory would have fallen on Us at
/ Franklin
! Gen Thomas had the best opportunity Of
/ learning the truth 1t is impossible to believe
4 lie would sign bis name 10 such recommcnda-
/ tion without first assuring himself that il con-
/ tanned only the truth. II is certain that scho-
fields order 10 Wagner included the entire
/ division, aud that by the terms OF that order
/ Opdyczes Brigade was consigned 10 the same
/ exposure as the brigadcs OF Lane and Conrad.
] While our Generals were suffering from an
/ excess Of apathy, which was only equaled by
f. that displayed by Hood and his Generals the
day before at Spring Hill, this brilliant, yigi-
. liant Colonel Of volunteers commanding bri-
Rade displayed the military forest ght, and on
his own responsibility 50 placed his brigade
that at the critical moment it saved our army
from destruction. What picture Of incom-
petence, Gtly followed by ingrattude aud mis-
/ representation on the part Of Schoheld aud
Cox, the story Of Col. OPdycke discloses. They
both failed 10 comprehend the situation (;
/ both owe D. 10 his foresight that they now pos
sess any military reputation, and they have
worked together 10 rob bin OF the credit due
for bis unOrdered action. When Opdycke saw
the men Of the Twenty-thrd Corps coming
back be turned TO his brigade 10 give tho order
10 fix bayOHets No order WAS necessary. His
men knew what was 10 be done, and were fix
ing bayOnCts Of their own accord Thank God, +,
there stood brigade not 10 be confused" by
friends trampliHg over it! It was of exactly
the same temper, having been forged in the
same battlc-hres as the Second aud Third Bril-
gades, which had been 50 necdlessly aud cruelty
exposed. AT the command Of Opdycke his
brigade sPrang forward, aud in a desperate
hand to- hand contest ia which OpdycIzc him
SELF after firing all the shots IN hs revolver and
then using IL as a club, broke il over the head
OF a rebel, il restored the break in the line
But not uHaidcd was il done The historian
Of the Both H., one Of Opdyeke's regiments
1 in describing this contest makes this honorable
third Corps, aud Of the broken fragments oi
the brigades Of Lane and Conrad, seeing that
the First Brigade was holding the enemy at bay
FLUNG THEMSELVES ACROSS THE TRACK
Of the rctreating fugitiyes, and alternately
threatened and entTeatcd- their men q
rally and tufn back 10 the support Of Op
dycke. Hastily reforming. they rushed down
tOwhcrc tie First Brigade WAS engaged, firing 81
they ran, and co-Opcratcd with Cpd ycIlc In beat
ing the ezultant enemy back aud recovering
the lost position and pnns"
Why is IL not possible for writers Of th,
Twenty y-third Corps 10 show the same fai
spirit ia speaking Of the Second Division
! Capt. SchOfed, IN his paper, uses this language
7 Wagner was by this time on his horse, idinl
backward aud facing the disorganized brigadcs
. trying As hard as ever man did 10 rally them
4 With terrible Gaths he called them towards
g and shook his broken stick al them Lut hsc