The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1890-02-13

/ 10 retlfe WITHOUT ngntlng, no matter Wnab bHe
| odds. IL is a burning shame that this gallant
! officer whose fault was an excess of bravery
a bravery which, on other fields, when under
competent direction, made of him splendid sol
dier, and in this instance led to his blind obe-
dience of n bluudering order-it is a burning
! shame that he was punished by being relieved
| of the command Of his division, while the high,
chief criminal was actually rewarded with ex
traordinary promotion. In January, 1865,
Schofield was called East with his corps. He
there improved his opportunity in the vicinity
of headquarters so automatically that in March
following he was advanced from the rank of
Captain in the Regular Army to that OF Briga-
dier- General. TO date Nov. 80, 1864, and was
brevetted Maior-Geueral for gallant and
meritorious services in the battle of Franklin,
Tenn"
Someone has we'll said that the experience Of
ages is boiled down in the worlds proverbs. In
the old adage of Like master, like man." we
can find satisfactory explanation of the meth
DDS made use of by some of Schoficld's subor-
dinates in their efforts 10 falsify history in tho
interest of sell-glorifcation. Their methods
are in perfect accord with the peculiar methods
adopted by Schofeld himself TO secure his own
advancement In an carly stage of the war his
methods had already called out the following
letter Official War Records, Vol Xl1I, page
36S):
PTTTsBURG LANDING, May !, 1862.
To THE PRESIDENT: Gen. Schoield has entire
command of the Missouri militia in the United
States service and of the volunteers in two-thirds
of the State. He has been informed that his Dis
trfct will comprise the entire State soon as Maj
Gen. Curtis moves south. This is more than his
rank entities him to- If he is intriguing for more,
he Is not honest. i would rather resign than to
have him given independent command in my
Department. have yielded much 10 the impor-
tunities of his friends, but they ask still more.
ii. w. HALLEcK,
MajorGeneral
From this letter it would appear that while
his compeers were winning promotion on the
battlefield, Schofeld was placing his depend
ence on the opportunities of friends and on
intrigue which was not honest. The sole
brevet he got throughout the war was given
for the battle of franklin.
THE EXTRAORDINARY PROMOTION
he secured for that battle invites investigation
into the specific acts of Gallantry and merit for
which he claimed it. l will therefore briefly
recapitulate what his acts really were. He
lead the retreat from Spring Hill, and reached
the vicinity of franklin, where the troops
halted, about a. IN. of Nov. 80. He there
turned over to Gen. Cox the important duty of
establishing line of defense, and himself rode
into town 20 look after the bridges and sending
the trains over the river He remained in
town all day, making his headquarters at the
house Of DIR. Cliffe. He was there when ho
sent the fatal order which halted Wagner in
exposure. There he received the ? o'clock report
of Cox, informing him that Hoods army had
appeared Ia plain view. and little later the
report of Wagner detailing what that army was
preparing to do. About this time he wrote the
3 o'clock dispatch to Gen Thomas. informing
the latter that Hood was in his front with
about two corps, and seemed prepared to cross
the river above aud below. In that dispatch
we have the key 10 his conduct. While hun-
dreds of private soldiers who were looking on
had difficulty in divining Hoods actual
I I i
luded himself with the belief that the prepara-
tiOns reported to him as going on in front were
a mere feint. At 4 o'clock he was awakened
from his dcusion by " the cannon's opening
roar" He then hurried precipita,ely-l use
the word adyisedly-not TO. but from the bat
tle6eld, TO the fort beyond the river two miles
by the route q staff officer must ride from
Carter's Hill, where the heart of the business
was AZ the fort he remained mere spectator
Of the fight. So far as bis presence there bad
TO do with the result, he might as well have
been north Of the Ohio River. After his sol
diers had won a notable victory. without "A /
particle OF assistance from him, aud in spite of
his blundcr iB posting two brigades where their |
presence hampered the action of the main body, |
and thereby brought the entire army 10 the |
very verge Of destruction, he took his cue from |
the towards who fled to his side of the river, |
rather than from the brave men who staid in
the fight, and ordered the retreat TO Nashville. /
IL my story is :ruc-and / challange inyesti- |
gation-it must necessarily follow tAat his con |
duct at Franklin deserved censure aud not
promotion; that in securing the promotion ho
must have made use Of methods which will not
bear investigation. and thatA9 was grievous |
wrong inflicted every one Of the many able !
and deserving officers over whose heads he was
jumped.
If my story is true, it must necessarily fol- |
low that the promotion he is now seeking with |
the same arts he so successfully used in 1861 !
cannot be given, not only because he Is per-
sonally unworthy Of that high distinction but
that IL would shamefnlly disparage the services |
Of the illustrious Generals on whom alone it |
has been heretofore conferred
May God forever save our country from the /
ingl0rious time when the example Of gallant |
and meritorious conduct given by Schofield on |
the battlefield Of Franklin. shall be taken as a /
model for imitation on future battiefclds by /
Generals IN the Army Of the United States
The following are tho telegrams which passed /
between Gen. Thomas aud Gen. SchoGeld dur |
ing the battle OF franklin
ITelegraml
FRASKLIS Nov. 20. 1854 IL IN.
Maj Gen. THOMAS. Nashville:
Your dispatch Of 1913 a. m II received. am
satisfied that have heretofore much risk Ia
trying TO hold Hood ia check while so FAR inferior 1
TO him IN both infantry and cavalry. The slightest
mistake on. my part. or failure of "A subordinate i
during the last three days, might have proved /
don't want 10 get into so tight place
again Yet viii cleeriuliy net Ia accordance with
your views of e1pediency " you think important
to hold Hood back az long possible. When you |
get all your troops together. aud the cavalry ia |
effective condition, we can whip Hood easily and |
believe, make the campaign decisive one. Be- /
lore that, the most we do IL 10 husband our /
strength and increase IL a. much possible. fear
the troops which were stationed on the river below
Columbia viii be lost will get my trains out of |
the way soon as possible and watch Hood care |
fully Possibly may be able 10 hold him here. /
but do not expect to be able to do 50 long
tsgnedj J. 81. ScHoPIELD. Major General. |