Wood River times. [volume] (Hailey, Idaho) 1882-1915, 1890-11-12

settled everywhere. in suits in equity
that an appeal from the decision Of
the court denying an application in
an injunction does not operate as an
injunction, a stay of proceedings
pending the appeal. Neither does
an appeal from All order dissolving an
injunction suspend the operation OF
the order so as to en,itle the appl,csn.
to stay the proceedings pending the
appeal as a matter of right, either in
a suit at law or in equity; and it is
quite certain that neither an iniunc.
ton or decree dissolving an injunc>
ton passed in a Circuit Court is re.
versed or nullifi-d by an appeal or
writ of error before the cause is heard
in this court"
But it is claimed, notwithsta ding
these authorities, that for the purpose
OF preserving the statu quo discre.
tlonary power is lodged with the
court to grant such motions as now
asked.
In Hoyey VS.. Mcdonald, 100 U. S.,
l6l, the same court, in referring to
the last case, says: sit was not de-
cided that the court below had no
power, If the purposes Of justice re.
quired it, to order a continuance O!
the statu quo until a decision should
be made by the appellate court, or
until that court should order the con
trary. This power undoubtedly exists
and should always be exercised when
any irremediable injury may result
from the effect of the decree as rem.
dered; but it is discretionary power.
and its exercise or non exercise is not
an appealabIe matter"
Under the authority of this case
from that distinguished court it seems
clear that not outstanding the mum.
erous cases from the highest State
Courts apparently to the contrary, an
|lnferior court may, even when it feels
constrained to refuse an injunction,
still make the necessary order, pend
ing an appeal, to prevent from entire
destruction great waste of the prop.
erty involved in the litigation.
But what is the principle upon
which this equitable rule is based?
What the class of cases in which it
can be Invoked? The answer is found
in the text of the case cited. 1t is
when any irremediable injury may
result from the effect of the decree"
or order made. Before a court would
be justified in so exercising this dis
cretionary unappealabIe power as to
entirely reverse, pending an appeal,
the effect Of an injunction it has
granted or denied, it must he satisfied
that its failure to do so may result in
irreparaole or very great damage and
loss.
Such power is no. one to be lightly
or carelessly exercised at the mere
within Of the Judge, but must be done
only in the exercise of sound dis
cretion.
Are the facts in this case such as
to bring it within the foregoing rule?
The injury antici pated, should this
cause be reversed on appeal, is the
expense to the taxpayers of removing
the records and property from Sho.
shone TO Bellevue and back, and the
Inconvenience to some Of the county
officers and some other matters OF no
great moment. 1t cannot be said
that all the injuries which, tits claimed
by plaintiffs, may result. are OF a very
serious nature-they are not irrepar-
able they do not greatly damage
any one, and they do not bring the
case within the above rule.
As the plaintiffs seem in good faith
to have taken their appeal, which
must soon be heard, it would seem
that it might be better for all, if the
statu QUO could be preserved until
the determination of such appeal.
But do not think that either our
statutes or the authorities justify such
an order in a case like this. Neither
eau see how the rights of either
party can be in the least affected By
the records, archives, etc., either re.
naming at Shoshone or by their re-
moval to Bellevue. The rights OF all
narties must tinally he ad;udicated nv