Pullman herald. [volume] (Pullman, W.T. [Wash.]) 1888-1989, 1890-05-24
WHAT is REALITY
A simple Thought which, Nevertheless
Is Not Easily Explained.

A simple Thought which, Nevertheless
Is Not Easily Explained
Every body knows what reality Is, or
TO vary that phrase when we speak OF
things acting, what actuality is. Vi all
thoughts, or perhaps l should rather
say of perceptions, 1t is perhaps the
clearest; and yet it is one OF the most
difficult to explain or even express
This simply because 1t is so simple; IL
does not admit of analysis; 1t has no
elements into which to resolve 1t, and
there is no genus or species under
which to place it The only way OF
showing what it is, Is to point to an ex-
ample of it. We look on the wall OF
the room in which we sit, and know IL
to be real. We see that bird flying, ana
know 1t 10 be an actuality. we are
conscious OF ourselves, as in pain, and
are sure that the pain has an existence
There may be realities which we can
not discover;we do not know whether the
planet Jupiter is Inhabited. But there
are things which we do know and know
to be real. 1t is thus we know body as
1t Is presented to US, with its essen
tial qualities as extended and
exercising power or properties
Thus in self-consciousness we know
self in its various exercises, say as feel
ing, knowing, willing. It is thus that
we know the manifestations OF body,
such as shape, resistance and in nova
Bile; thus that we know the manifesto
lions of self, as desire, affection, resolu-
tion. All these are real, rs Is also all
that we observe and what we derive
from our observations by . logical
process. The qualities which we per-
eeive in ourselves, specially such as
love, benevolence, justice, are actuali-
ties. All these differ from magma
lions, say fairy, ghost, mermaid;
and commonly the two can be dtstin.
guished. We call the one real, the
other unreal We can not explain or
even understand the facts Of which we
are conscious without calling in two
cognitive powers, the external and the
internal senses These can not be re-
solved into any thing else, say, as is
often attempted into sensations, impress
sions, ideas; for none of these contain
cognition and can not, therefore, give
US knowledge by accumulation or COM
bination. Nor can knowledge be drawn
from them by reasoning; for not being
in the premises they can not reach 1t,
except by falling into the acknowl-
edged fallacy of having more in the
conclusion than in the premises In
acquiring q knowledge OF internal
things, sensations are involved; feel
ings in the organism by all the senses;
but these not having knowledge can not
give it to US logically. In looking at
the table before US there is the exercise
Of coats and humors, of rods and cones
and of the optic nerve; but we do not no
tice these in vision; their existence has
been made known to US by the physiolo-
gist In hearing, the tympanum, the
hammer, the stirrup and auditory nerve
do not form part Of our intuitive knowl-
edge; they are merely the means OF
giving an exact field to our perceptions,
but are no part of the reality directly
perceived by US. With these concur
rences we look Immediately upon the
thing-as we look through perfectly
transparent glass upon the tree without
noticing the medium. / believe we can
determine precisely what we know In
tuitively and directly by the various
senses. The eye gives US a colored sur
face, nothing more. Hearing gives
sound in the ear, from which we argue
o cause which is found by science to be
undulations. In smell we have an affec-
ton of the nostrils In taste an affec-
ton of the palate. In touch proper, or
feeling, an affection of the part from
which the afferent nerve comes. In the
muscular sense and energy we have re-
sistance offered, implying power. These
are our primary sense oognitions which
are noticed by self-consciousness; they
are all real, and upon them BY legitt-
mate processes we rear other knowl-
edges. also real, as derived from what
is real. By spontaneous cognition, we
know realities without US and within US.
Every man believes that his conscious
self exists, that his body exists, that
other people exist he believes IN what
he eats and drinks, in the staff on which
he leans, and in the ground on which
Ia strikes it OF this primary knowl-
edoe there are three criteria clear and
decisive. First it Is self-evident We
know the object at once on looking at
It. In looking at the table am sure
there is a colored surface before me.
Being thus self-evident it Is, secondly
we can not be made to believe other
wise, or that there is no table before
ms. Thirdly, it is universal, that is held