The National tribune., 1890-01-30

WITHOUT ANY FIGHTING,
when II was halted by Cheatham and trans
| ferred to Cleburnc's right. Had the extension
been made on Clcburnes left. the Second Divs-
ION would have been isolated, and the rotreut of
! the remainder of the army cut Off When the
divisions coming from Duck River marched by
this flank in the night, they could look over in
the open fields To their right and see the rebels
about their campircs; but, save an occasional
shot from a piclct-guard they marched past as
peacefully rs if the enemy were miles away.
Hood states that he knew late in the after
noon, by the sound of the cannonading he had
heard, and by courier from Columbia, that
the main body of Schofelds army was still at
| Duck River. Hood holds Cheatham response
bic for the failure 10 reach the pike, and with
| good reason, so far as the movements before
| night fell were concerned. Hood gave Cheat
| nam explicit orders to seize the pike, and fur
nished him with more than abundant means
for carrying out his orders That Cheatham
! failed to rench tho pike must forever stand %
notable tribute TO the remarkable skill with
| which Gen. Stanley handled his small force
Ills dispositions of the infantry and artillery
| present under his command created, in the
minds of Cheatham and Cleburne tho deluson
! that they were confronted by superior force
! AZ Franklin | asked some prisoners from Gle
! burnes Division why they did not continue
| their movement Mt Spring Hill the evening
| before until they had possession of tho pike
/ and they replied that when they halted it was
! because they believed they had at least the
/ whole Fourth Corps i'll their front, aud they
! needed endorsements Gen Stauley's brainy
| services at Spring Hill were overshadowcd by
| the brutal bloodshed Of franklin next day, aud
! have never received the recognition they de-
served, either officially or at the hands of tho
general public.
We must acknowledge that at Spring Hill
Hood received only u halting, half hearted
| fFnp bis iny V,I IL
fully utilized a small part only of tho valor
which was thrown away on the breastworks of
Franklin, the result would have been far iner-
ent 1t would have been manifest impossi-
biity for tho Second Division alone, however
ably handled, TO make headway against tho
overwhelming numbers which encompassed it.
had Cieburne's attack been Immediately fol-
lowed up with anything like the vigor with
which he fell upon Bradleys Brigade. Hood
was engaged III executing flank movement.
aVOwedIy IN imitation of similar movements
in which he bad participated in Virginia. If
he had received the same cordial, unhcsitating
support which Gen. Lee was accustomed to re-
ceiye from his subordinates. Hoods success mt
Spring Hill would have surpassed the most
famous efforts OF Stonewall jackson or Lee; for
who Will presume 10 describe the full dimcn-
sons OF the disaster had tho Second Division
been wiped out, rs was easily possible, when
the reserve artillery and all the trains would
have been captared and tho retreat OF the
remainder of the army cut of by more than
double its numbers2 We would have had no
franklin and no Nashville, but we might have
had n Southern COufcdcTacy.
Gen. Cox. In bis book on this campaign after
recOunting the movements Of the other divis-
ions OF the army. which were too far away To
have any effect the result at Spring mn,
where the heart Of the business was. and after
relating what took place at Spring Hill. sums mp
by declaring that Hood proved inferior to his
opponent In n strategic contest which has been
generally regarded As one of the most critical
aud instructive coniunctures of the war"
Notwithstanding this approval of Sehofoid's
strategy by 20 high authority many of Ms
who were there will still venture to hold to the
opinion that General of any great strategctic
ability would have shown it by q total avoid
ancs Of that critical aud instructive conjunct-
ure." If 10 IL good strategy for "A General,
having full aud timely notice Of tho proposed
movement, TO permit his adversary TO march
past bis flank with Il superior force, and plant
II IL miles In his rear, within musket shot Of
his line of retreat and take the chances Of that
adversary then
SITTING suPIHELY DowS
and allowing him to creep by in the night
without mOestatiOn, then Schofoi's strategy
at Spring Hill will serve for model. The
danger which confronted his army OH the even
ing Of Nov. ~ was SO grave that IL had passed
beyond the power Of either strategy or tacties
20 save It. At that time the sole desperate de-
pendenee was on the continued almost incredi-
BILE apathy displayed by the enemy. When
We credit our commanding General with the
ability required TO march a column OF troops
after night along plain pike road which was
not seriously obstrncted by the enemy. and
debit him with the strategy" which produced
the critical and instructive conjuncture," we
have stated his account fairly. "AIl's well
that ends we'll" but the country has never yet
appreciated the peril il escaped Mt Spring Hill.
When, late ut night, aud after the arrival Of
the other divisions at Spring Hin, aud SchoGeld
learned that the way was yet open, he took the
Iwenty-third Corps aud started for Franklin,
leaving Stanley with the Fourth Corps and the
trains 10 get on az best they could. Stanley
was authorized, and even urged 10 destroy the
trains, but he brought them all safely away
The movement was so slow on account of mar
row bridge 10 be crossed, which would not
admit of the passage Of more than one wagon
al a time, that day was breaking when the
Second Division, now the rear guard of the
army, finally got away from Spring Hill. On.
dyckes Brigade was the last To leave. and it
covered the rear of our column on tho retreat
TO Franklin. We were immed lately followed
by the leading divisions Of Hoods army, which
kept mp an almost continuous skirmish with
Opdycko's Brigade.
1t was 9 o'clock p. IN of Nov 30 when tho
brigades of Lane and Conrad. which had been
slowly retiring along the Columbia pike to-
ward Franklin, were halted by an order from
Gen. SchOAeld aud filed into the fateful posi-
ton Oh the open plain about 700 yards in front
or the main fortified line, which covered the
town and the bridges over Harpeth River. At
the same time Hoods army appeared in plain
sight In full force marching over the high Hill
which bounded the view 10 the South and be-
gan forming for the attack. 10 was two hours
before the formation was completed and the
assault delivered. At any time during these
two hours an observer standing at almost any
point along the main line between the Column
bia pike and the railroad, look ing down the
pike and on the northern slope of the high
bill already spoken Of, could see Gen Hoods
headquarters established in an open field to the
loft Of the pike, with staff officers galloping TO
and fro carrying orders and reports; could
see through the intervals among the scat
tered trees which partially obstructed this part
of the view, in the open fields at the base Of the
hill, Hoods battalions moving into position ON
the dOuble-quick. In the eager haste 10 com
plete the formation aud get at US; and in the
immediate front could see COnrad's Brigade
digging for their lives to throw up some shelter
against the breaking Of this gathering storm.
And yet those two brigades were held in front
in that open exposure with strong line OF
works In their immediate roar, until they were
driven in by the impact OF Hoods assaulting
army. This shameful blunder cost us at least
1900 Union soldiers, aud but for the indiyld.
ual action Of Col. Emerson Opdycke command
ing the First Brigade, Of the Second Division
who insisted on marching his brigade within
1hs4 nua NJ NlE lRaua