Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1890-02-21


ton to be answered is whether the
language uscd in Sections s and 96 Is
to be construed by itself, or with ref
crence to that OF other sections of the
act upon the same subject.
In Section s, the provision with re-
gard to sidewalks is first to construct
and repair and secondly, construc-
ton" These terms are synonymous.
Gurner vs.. Chicago, 10 Illinois, l6J.
People vs.. Brooklyn, u Barbour, iSl.
With regard to streets and alleys,
the power is to "curb, pave, grade,
gravel and gutter" while the special
assessment mentioned is for gravel
ing or paving" The last clause OF
the section, which seems to qualify
all that precedes it, gives to owners OF
abutting property the right to peti-
ton for " such improvement and re-
quircs Il two-thirds vote of the Council
to order it, in the absence of such pc
tition. There would seem to he no
propriety in this rule as to anything
but the construction of sidewalks and
| the graveling of streets, if the Appel
| lees construction of the section were
the correct one.
Again, do the terms gravcling" and
paving" fairly include the other
things, curb" grade and gutter?
We think they do; and this view is
sustained by authority. Dillon on
Municipal Corporations, See. 731, (3d
Ed.) says: The power to pave streets
includes the power to furnish and dc
all that is necessary, usual or fit for
paving" and on this ground it has
been held that the expense of grading
a street preparatory to paving is Incl
dent to paving, and the expense prop
erly included in the assessment; Will
liams VS.. Detroit, 2 Michigan, $50. In
Illinois, the power to pare is held tC
include the power to grade streets
Burnham VS.. Chicago, II Illinois, 496
The power to pave was held to include
the power to curb with stones; Schen
ley VS.. Commonwealth, 36 Pennsylva
MIA State, 20. And so, also, the power
to macdddmizc was held to includ,
trimmiag and guttering: Mcnamara VS.
Estes, 90 Iowa, 246. The definition o
the term pavement" was thus statet
in Burnham VS.. Chicago: "a pave
ment is not limited to uniformly ar
ranged masses of solid material, a:
blocks of wood, brick or stone, but i
may be as well formed of pebbles, o.
gravel, or other hard substances, whicl
will make 4 compact, even, hard wa,
or floor" In criticism of this detini
ton, it may be said that paving" i
the generic term, under which gravel
ing" is the specific; and that while th'
generic includes the specific, rs th'
greater the less, the reverse does no
follow; but the use OF exact terms il
this act is so entirely disregarded, tina
we must have recourse to II telescopi,
rather than a microscopic view OF it
and we therefore hold that to tn,
average reader of all the sections
upon the subject of street improve
ments, it must appear that the intcn
tention of the Legislature was to per
nit the City OF Olympia to Improve
its streets, in any Of the particular
named in section s, with money de
rived from special taxes on abuttin:
property. The system provided fo
making special assessments in Chapter
VIII, starts out in Section 90 Will
permission to the City Council, when
ever it deems it expedient, to "makt
any impr0umeaf OF a street, of the
kind authorized by Section and Other
sections enumerated, to proceed in :
certain way which, according to the
contention of the Appellee, would LEAD
to special assessment for "gravel
ing" but would leave the city, itself
to pay for the grading which must
preccde the graveling, which we dc
not consider to be reasonable inter
pretatiOn of the act.
The judgment of the court below
will be reversed, with instructions tc
the successor OF that court to overrult
the demurrer, and proceed with the
case in accordance with this opinion
costs to the Appellant.
L. i. STILES, Judge.