Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1890-04-26

reported to them fail to receive consider
alton in the respective houses of con-
gress? Why is it that so many measures
which finally pass are ill-digested and
carelessly drawn and require expensive
litigation to construe their meaning? 1t
is not hard to find an answer when it is
known that more than one-third of the
working hours of the members belonging
to the party which is responsible for the
legislation of the country is devoted to
business entirely foreign to that legis-
lat1on.
The system itself is inherently vicious.
The union in q single person or body of
men of different functions of government
which are distinct in their nature, is evil
dence of low form of political organ
ism. In large community with COM
pleated interests it is only where these
functions are definitely distributed that
we can expect to see them properly per-
formed. 1t is just as inconsistent with
good government for the legislators to
appoint the officers who are to administer
the laws as it would be for judge to I'M
dertake personally the execution of the
process which he issues, or as it would be
for these lawmakers themselves to act as
judges in administering and applying
their own laws. 1t is only where
the legislative, executive and judioia
departments are kept distinct
that we can expect efficient work from
any of them. An encroachment by any
of these departments upon the duties of
the other is manifest usurpation. The
Federal constitution has carefully dis
tributed to each its own powers and du-
ties. The duty Of congress is to make
the laws. The senate, as the adviser of
the president, has qualified right to
pass upon his nominations for certain Of
foes, but to the house of representatives
no such right is given in any form, and
yet we find members of both houses,
in violation of the purposes of the con-
stitution, controlling appointments in
every branch of the public service, and
demanding that their constituents and
political friends shall receive situations,
often as a reward for personal and politi-
cal favors, aud not on account of any
qualifications for public Office. So it has
been common to find these appointees
active In conventions, caucuses and pr1-
maries, working for the interests OF the
particular congressman to whom they
owe their appointments, and often with
out regard for the public welfare; and it
is for this work, or the hope of securing
it in the future, that the appointment is
often given as the reward or the in
centive.
1t is sometimes urged against civil SER
vice reform that the head of each depart
ment and bureau ought to have the Sc
lection of his own subordinstes; but un-
der the patronage system he has no such
selection at all. The men selected are
chosen, not on account of the knowledge
of their fitness possessed by the appoint
ing officer, but because they are recon-
mended by a certain representative or
senator. The head of the department or
bureau feels little responsibility for their
acts. 1t often happens that he is not at
liberty to discharge an inefficient man lest
he offend the congressman whose influence
secured the appointment OF that man.
The congressman, on the other hand,
does not feel the responsibility for these
appointments, for he is not nominally
nor legally the appointing officer. In
many cases it is not known on whose rec
ommendation the appointment is made.
This system "invades the independence
of the executive and makes him less re-
sponsibile for the character of his ap-
pointments. 1t impairs the efficiency of
the legislator by diyerting him from his
proper sphere of duties and involving
him in the intrigues of the aspirants for
office. James A. Garfield, Atlantic
Monthly, July, 1877.
But not only does the patronage system
impair the efficiency of the service, it ac-
tually weakens the party in power. AS
was said in one of the an
swers to the above questions, 'where
ten men apply for an Office, il
is easy to disappoint nine OF them