The morning news. [volume] (Savannah, Ga.) 1887-1900, 1890-12-25
LoNGsrRsEr AND woLsELEY.
The Confederate General Replies to
His British Critic.

His British Critic.
In the December number of Belford's
Magazine Gen. James Longstreet discusses
the remarks which had been made upon his
military career by Gen. Viscount Wolseley.
adjutaat-general of the British army, in the
North american ReUietc for september.
As the criticisms of Gen. Wolseley III that
article related largely 10 the battle OF &c tvs
burg. u this field tle Georgia soldier hrst
directs attention.
Gen. Longstreet SAYS that the contro-
versy about Gettysburg, 50 far as the con-
Tolerate side is concerned, was practically
begun by Gen. Pendle-on, who, several
years after Gen. r. E Lees death, in a
public lecture, announced that Lee had
ordered Longstreet TO attack a. dawn on
III second day of Gettysburg, July ?, 1868,
and that such sa attack Dug c to have been
then ma lie, and would have been successful.
Lord Wolseley, although not mentioning
Peadleron, holds in general at, as Meade's
army was not then concentrated, the con-
federates could and should have made q
strong attack e2ly on the second day.
Gen. I0ngstreet replies that Pendleto S
own official report shows that early on the
morning of the second day he saw between
the confederate lines on the Fairfield road
and the Emmettsburg road 1.-THE enemy's
cavalry in considerable force" while along
the latter road toward the enemy's main
position were bodies of igfantry and ar
tillery acc 3n panied by their trains.n This
report OF the holding of the Emmettsburg
road by the Union forces he considers a
sufficient answer TO Gen. Pendleton's sub
sequent criticisms. Gen. Long,treet adds
that when he reported to Gen. Lea
about 4 o'clock on the afternoon # July |,
the latter announced his purpose t. give
battle the next day, but went no further in
precise orders. Aud, indeed, ct that time
one of LOngstreet's divisions was at
Chambersburg, and the other two about
twenty miles away, although sure to be up
during the night. On the following day
Long streets troops were at Lees head
quarters for a suggested march out of the
enemy's range of observation, and were
actually under his immediate command
until his engineer officer turned them over to
me, which was about noon.n
Gen. Wolseley had said in his article that
"those who lad most carefully studied Ma
poleon's methods and habi will think,
believe, that Napole n, in Lees place, would
have attacked in % elrly morning of July
9, as Lee intended to d1.n In this opinio ;,
according to Longstree., he is wrong
again." since Napoleon would rather have
sized Cemetery Heights before twilight had
passed aw V on the evening of July l.
AS 10 the third days battle, Gen. Long
street declares that he had no other troops
that ought to have cO-operated in Pickstt's
charge, aud that it would be imputing
false tactics" to Gen. Lee to suppose that
he desired That the divisions OF McLaws
and Hood should aid the assaultiag column.
These divisions we're on LongStreets right,
aud defended his flank a d rear. Save for
those precautions, he says, there would have
been no Appomattox, since Gettysburg
would have been the last battle Of the war,
and would have ended in the surrounding OF
Lees army and its rrender
Gen. W olseley had also criticised Long
street for delay at Chickamauga, declaring
that this officer was in command of the
left wing, with orders from Bragg to begin
al davbreak yet did not advance till noon.
Longstreet replies that the order was that
the right wing should at. ack first, aud that
the left should refrain until the right was
in successful progress, aid should then
follow the success by wheel to the left on
his extreme lett as pivot. AS the attack
by our right wing vas repulse I, asked for
and obtained authority to 60 in alone. l
attacked and broke the enemy's line. and
drove back two of Gen. ROsecrans' corps"
An interesting portion of Gen. Long
streets reply is that which describes Lees
conference with him after taking command
Of the Army Of Northern Virginia:
"a few days after his assignment | was
left as his next in rank, and continued in
that relative position to the close of the war.
1t was almost daily habit with me, after
these relations were formed, to visit Gen.
Lees headquarters. and at times several
such visits we're made in a day. On the
march he usually rode by my side, aud his
camps aud bivouacs were, as q rule, very
near mine. When studying an intricate
pro 5lem if he failed to see me he would send
for me, and, after explaining the perplex
ity. often repeated an expression Of his:
My mind has been applied so unremittingly
to this question that my ideas are no v
swinging in circle. sent for you to know
whether you can give me lift that will
help me through it,.
"If my efforts were not successful, the
conferences convinced him of a disposition
to cheerfully give him the benefit of my
mind as well as that OF my sword.
''When on The battlefield | presumed to
differ from him, it was to remind him Of his
policy previously adopted In calmer mo-
ments. think that the highest authorities
will class Gen. Lee as a master of the
fence of war. That he was deeply skilled
III the art of war the careful student may
| find occasion to doubt"
These assertions were brought out by
Wolseley's description of Longstreet as
Lees ''carping lieutenant" and his contrast
of the latter with Jackson, whom he quotes
| as declaring that he would ''follow Lee
this declaration Gen. Longstreet doubts,
| adding that jackson appeared to the best
| advantage while in indie endent com ,nand
| and that his characteristic qualities seemed
| crippled under the immediate command OF
| Lee. He tells a story of his relations with
| jackson, on Burnsides second attempt tC
cross the Rappahannock, after his defeat al
| Fredericksburg. Lee had then been called
to Richmond and had left Longstreet in
| command:
upon receiving information of active
movements by the enemy, Gen. Jackson re.
| ported to me at headquarters and expressed
| the opinion that it meant a move against
our right by crossing the river down about
| Hoop Place, and asked to have his com.
mand ordered down SO as to be in position
| to dispute the march. Under the impre =
| SION that he did not know the Typographical
features of that line. explained that the
narrow neck between the Potomac AID Rap
| pahaunock rivers was so cut up by over
tapping streams and ravines as to render
| the march impraclicable at that season
| (midwinter,, and that after crossing the
Rappahannock the mud flats on the south
! side were even m IRE serious obstacles. The
| explanation fails1 to convince him that ht
could have misiudged tine enemys plans
and when finally forbidden to move lii
troops he carpet out impatiently, "ThC
school!n Gen. Burnside had chosen the
upper route through the highlands, bu
even there he found the mud so formidsbl,