The Helena independent., 1890-11-29
HELENA AS A MILITARY POINT.


The threatening nature of the Indian
disturbance over the coming of the al
legged messiah has led to the hurrying of
scattering detachments Of troops from
all over the country to the scene Of dan
ger. The companies from Missoula
passed through Helena yesterday to re-
lisve the command at Fort Keogh,
which, in turn, will relieve another force
further east and so on until the Oh
jective point is reached. This is slow,
cumbersome and expensive plan Of oper-
atoms and the present crisis serves to
call the attention of the government to
the need of large, central military post
at natural distributing point in the
northwest where a considerable force
could be kept in readiness to move at q
moments notice in any direction.
Helena is just such strategic point.
Nearly equi-distant from the Mississippi
river and the coast, now accessible by
three great transcontinental lines Of
railway running east and west, and soon
to be reached by fourth from the
Black Hills across Wyoming, with q
southern outlet to Utah, and with direct
communication northward to the Brit.
ish frontier by the new Gait road-it ls
OF all others the place for the massing
Of troops for quick operations in any
quarter. It not only commands the en-
tire Indian situation, but is the one
point from which our northern frontier
for hundreds OF miles could be quickly
protected from possible British inya
sion.
The time is approaching when thu
government will have to abandon many
Of ito smaller posts, reduce its garrison'
at others and concentrate it's moveabl'
forces at focal points. Look at tn,
present situation. The existing Indiar
troubles are chiefly in the department
of Dakota, which covers vast distric
containing string Of little posts. Thu
department Of the Platte, lying con
tiguous to it, presents similar condi
ton OF affairs. The two department.
united contain total military force o
about 800 men. Deducting the mum
Der on sick leave or detached servic'
and those necessary to guard govern
ment property, or Indians on reserva
tions at various points, and the forc'
available for immediate field duty il
small indeed. 1t is estimated that no
more than 5000 troops could be concen
trated at any point IN these depart
ments in twenty-four hours time, an,
this only under the most favorable con
d,tions. Under the present circun,
stances, with the Indians uneasy an
restless at several agencies simultane
ously, much, even Of that force, coul
not be made available.
It may be urged that when the pre-,
emit crisis is past there will be littl
probability Of any Indian outbreak ths
will call for moro than few companit
Of troops. THIS may be true, but thel
is far stronger reason for concentr'
tion Of military power for the defense {
our northern border against British il
weston. England for years has bee
fortifying her position along the chai
OF great lakes and the Canadian Pacis
il virtually military roadway from Il
lakes to the Pacific by means of whie
troops in any number may be rapid
unobilized.
Our own country, while our ideas a
Ill opposed to large standing arm
must partly meet these preparation
Congress has already appropriat.
money for strengthening our lake d
lenses at few important points.
viii not be long before . movement "
b made toward increasing our regul
army By few thousand men-perhs