Perrysburg journal. (Perrysburg, Wood Co., O. [Ohio]) 186?-1965, 1890-11-08
WAR "REMINISCENCES.
PLANS OF LoNGSTREET.

Speech by tho Distinguished Southern
General Mt the Reunion of the Blue and
the Gray, at Knoxville, Tenn.-A Mis-
taISo That Dispolled the Last Chance of
| Confederate Success.
A few days after tho battle of Chicka-
mauga, the President of the Confederate
States visited our army then camped
about Chattanooga holding the Federal
army undcr partial siege. During that
visit Mr.. Davis called the superior Off
GERS of the Confederacy then present to-
gether in council of war to discuss our
affairs, and on one occasion asked our
opinions as to the most promising plan
for further aggressive operations. 1t is
important in this narrative that 1t
should be here explained that prior to
the consultation referred to he called
me alone to meet him, and that this in
terview lasted the greater part of the
day. The point made during our con-
ference that should be noted here is the
opinion expressed by myself, that our
failure to vigorously pursue the Feder-
ais after our success at Chickamauga and
reap the full fruits of our victory dis
PEELED our last and only chance for the
triumph of the Confederate cause
At the meeting first mentioned Mr.
Jefferson Davis inquired for such plans
as his commanding officers might sug-
gest for our future operations.
The plan suggested by myself was
then to withdraw from Chattanooga,
change our base to Rome, Ca, and ad-
vance by Bridgeport and Stevenson,
Ala, and cut the line of Federal sup
plies, etc. Mr.. Davis gave orders for
the execution of that plan, but just then
severe season of rain began, which
continued and rendered the roads very
heavy and very bad. In consequence
thereof our commander abandoned the
proposition and held to his position at
Chattanooga. After some weeks, when
the weather cleared off and furnished
us good roads, camp rumor reached me
that General Bragg contemplated a
movement into East Tennessee against
the Federals about Knoxville, and that
part of nv command had been selected
as a desash mont that was to execute the
plan.
About November 4, Bragg summoned
Generals Hardee, Breckenridge and my
self to his headquarters and announced
his purpose to detach my troops from
Virginia with most of its cavalry into
East Tennessee to attack and drive out
the Fcderals under General Burnsides.
Having outlined his plan, he paused as
If inviting suggestions, when proposed
as means of facilitating his purpose or
amending his plan, that he withdraw
his army from Chattanooga and concen-
trate in strong position behind the
Chickamauga river, and at the same
time withdraw his troops from East
Tennessee to the main force. Then at
the moment of concentration, having all
things in readiness for prompt move
ment detach twenty thousand men into
East Tennessee to march rapidly and
strike promptly so as to finish the work
in time to return or go into Kentucky,
as the Chief might deem best before the
troops of General Grants army, then un-
der orders to reinforce the Federals at
Chattanooga could reach their destina-
tion. As the suggestion failed to meet
the consideration / thought it deserved,
l continued and explained the apparent
danger of sending so small force for
such heavy work and for action that
should be speedy, while our army at
Chattanooga was holding long lines and
attenuated along a grand curve, with
the enemy in the center and within
thirty minutes march of any point OF
our occupation.
The nun ber of Fedaral troops in East
Tennessee our chief reported as $4,000,
and tho force assigned for my opera.
tions against them was estimated at
about 49, 900. insisted that my force
was wholly inadequate to warrant dar-
ing or precipitate battle and that the
procrastination of a prudent campaign
would give time for the arrival of Gen
eral Grants succoring forces, and that
upon his arrival he would march out
two or three columns of attack and feint
and would surely break through ouI
position. Nothing said, however, seem
ed to impress the officers present, so
went over the matter and added that ouI
textbooks at West Point and the aXio-
matte military principles admonished
of the strength of the Federal position
after the arrival of their succoring
forces and the consequent peril of oul
position; that their column could be re
inforced in few minutes, while along
our lines reinforcements from one point
to another might be delayed for many
hours. Our chief apparently thought il
improbable that his line could be
broken, and plainly indicated thai
further discussion of the subject would
be useless. The only favorable com
ment upon my views was from Genera
Hardee, who said: II don't think tina
was bad idea of Longstreets." / was
overruled and orders were issued for thu
movement
While camp was being struck wrote
some of my comrades from the head o
an empty -four barrel in the rain, excus
ing my failure to call and take leave.
/ wrote to General Buckher giving
him my view of the situation, ant
three months atterward he returne'
my letter to me with the following
note:
"MoRRIsTowN, Tenn, Feb. ], lS64-Geperal