Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1890-12-02
THAT INTERSTATE COMMERCE CASE


The decision of the legal points involved
in the case of Charles Counselman, of Chi
cago, who was committed by Judg. Blodgett
for refusing to answer the inquiry of the
Grand jury as to whether he had received
any special rates or rebates from the rail-
roads has a triple interest. Counselman, on
being iuterrogated in an inquiry designed
to detect violations of the law by the North
western railroads, and to apply the penal
provisions Of the act, refused to answer on
the ground that he might criminate himself.
Judge Blodgett held that he was bound to
answer under the provisions of the act; but
the case goes to the United States Supreme
Court as involving a constitutional ques-
ton, and consequently that inquiry is sus-
pended for the next four years, until the
Supreme Court can reach it.
The case is an interesting one as the first
to which public attention has been called in
which there has been any attempt to apply
the penal provisions of the act The law
has been in operation now about four years
and half during which time violations of
its provisions have been notorious and
wanton. But it has taken until the present
time to get to the initiatory steps for punish
ing by the penalty of fine or Imprisonment
the railroad officials who persistently vio-
late the law. The feature of interest pre-
sented in the fact that it has taken four
wears and nalf to get 4 case before Grand
Jury is heightened by the further fact that
the case will lie iallow four years longer un-
Ill the Supreme Court decides the point
raised. So we may hope, about ten years
after the passage of the act, to get prac-
teal test of the question whether railroad
official can be punished for its violation.
The most important phase of the question,
however, is its bearing on the idea urged by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and
sundry railroad magnates that shippers who
solicit or receive special rates or rebates
shall be subject to the penal provisions of
the act equally with railroad officials. As
the law was originally passed it contained
no such provision; but two years later, &C.
cording to our recollection, the Commission
recommended the amendment which SUBJ
jected favored shippers to the penal
ties for its violation. This seemed
fair enough on its face at the
time; but maturer consideration may
put the matter IN a different light In
the first place the shipper occupies differ
ent position from the railroad official. He
is purely private person charged with no
public responsibility; he has received no
charter by virtue of which he is surrounded
with the obligation OF impartiality, nor has
he the power over rates which can be ex-
ercised for injurious discrimination. 1t is
thus doubtful whether there is natural
Justice in subjecting the shipper who re-
ceives a preferential rate to the same
penalty as the railroad official who grants it.
There is further pertinence in the sugges-
ton of the practical effect OF the amendment
contained in this case. If the United States
Supreme Court sustains Counselman's plea
of seIf-crimination as a reason for refusing
to answer, it will be because the law was
changed to make the receiving of special
rates a penal offense. If that amendment
had not been adopted the plea would have
been without basis, simply because under
the common law, as in the natural order of
things, the shipper mas no responsibility for
the rate he obtains.
1t would be remarkable commentary on
his amendment if its first tangible result in
actual practice were to exempt the favorites
of illegal railroad discrimination from the
necessity of testifying as to the violation of
the law.