New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1890-07-24

Question is a fresh illustration Of the progressive
tendencies and the versatile faculties of remark
able Oriental race. II must be said, too, that MI
lnagak writes very correct and clear English ana
that, in fact, his command Of language Is such as
enables him to express himself not very lucldly,
but with vigor. The leading motive OF his DooR
is 10 call attention 10 the destiny Of Japan as the
mistress of the Pacific, and no doubt his patrlo'-
ism is crcdiablc to him. But he evidently does
not perceive that the general European neglect
OF Japan as a probable factor OF Importance III
future Oriental politics is explainaole upon an
other hypothesis than that of ignorance of the
importance of Nippon II may be painful TO inc
pride of this ingenious author as japanese but
il is necessary to point out that if Japan has
hitherto been treated as "quantite negligeable
by European statesmen and diplOmatists, ii is be-
cause that country has as yet shown no such
power from the point of view of militarsm as
would render it indispensable to reckon with her
hereafter II may be admitted that the geo
graphical position of Japan is admirably adapted
10 secure TO that country large share OF Pacllc
commerce 1t may also be conceded that were
she first-class power regards means of offence
and defence she would have To be consulted by
Russia, America and England in any and all cir
cumstances involving questions of the sovereignty
of the Pacific or the establishment and protection
Of lines OF traffic upon that ocean
Mr.. lnagaki states that Japan is rapidly arming
her coasts and constructing or purchasing navy,
and there is no ground for doubt to her ability
TO build forts and buy and make guns and iron
clads. But here, again, ii must be pointed out
that with Oriental races the mere possession of
Western weapons never has been equivalent 10
the acquisition of Western fighting force. Big
guns, strong forts armOred cruisers desirable:
but. after all, their usefulness depends finally
upon the courage energy and endurance of the
men who make of them Now have no
doubt of japanese courage. 1t has been proved
repeatedly, and Ill such way as 20 justify the
presumption that if these people We're agrees
sve as they are peacea0le they could more than
hold their own against any other Eastern race.
But that is not enough at the present day. To
become first-claSS power Japan must be able to
cope with one more Of the Western Powers;
md, without in the least wishing 10 dcpreciate
Japanese ability, il must be generally recognized
that she is as Yet long way from fulfilling this
requirement. 1t results from this condition Of
immaturity and unpreparedness that in the event
of serious international quarrels in about the
Pacific, the position of Japan would resemble that
of Belgium in Europe. She could not, that is to
say, maintein her own neutrality single-handed
and without strong alliances she would be exposed
10 occupation by the first great naval powers that
took the initiative in that direction.
Mr.. InagaH believes that she will have, sooner
or later, 10 choose between England and Russia
and perhaps his forecast is correct. But he is
mistaken in suppOsing that his country could
dictate terms TO either of those powers. is il
at all likely that alliance with China would
strengthen her hand sufficiently 10 make her an i'm
portant factor in the situation. For some time
10 come, no matter how the commerce, industries
and general civilization of Japan advance, her
foreign influence is almost certain TO remain i'll
considerable. Even with all her resources pOpu-
]aton and area, China has never succeeded in
attaining commanding position outside OF Asia,
and the potentiaitieS in her case much greater
than in that of Japan. 1t would be an unfortunate
day for the latter when she was compelled to
make an offensive and defensive alliance with
either England Russia, for in such cases the
weaker partner invariably lies at u disadvantage.
Peace is her only wise policy, and her safest
alliance is that of the United States; for the
latter, alone among the Western Powers, wields
O great and increasing influence abroad. nOtwith-
standing her deficiencies in military and naval
preparations. She only might be able 10 protect
an ally like Japan without even making demon
stration." Yet the strong and great imperial
interests which every year coming 10 centre
more and more in the Pacific liable to force
the japanese into alliances far less conducive to
their security and development
Mr.. Inaeaki has wasted too much space and
labor upon recapitulaton of the Eastern CUES
tion-led, possibly, by its novelty and interest to
himself lie has certainly the full courage of his
opinions, however, for he does not hesitate TO
express surprise that England has not before now
secured a and shorter route TO lnGia by build
ing or helping to build, the Euphrates Valley
Railroad If our author had studied this phase
of the question more carefully ne would have
ascertained that the pros and cons Of the Euphacs
Valley route have been discussed until the subject
is threadbarc and that the reasons which lave
hitherto prevented the construction OF the line are
both military and diplomatic, and apply with
even more force to-day than at any former time.
The Euphratcs Valley Railroad could never be
safe line of communication for any power which
did not control Persia completely within, anu
which was not at the same time prepared to DC
fend that territory against external aggression.
Since the extension of the Russian power in Central
Asia 10 tie Murghab the invasion OF Persia las
become alike easy to the Russians and difficult Of
avoidance by any other power. More than one
army corps would he necessary to protect the
exposed Persian frontier, and the Persian Gun
would also have 10 he thoroughly dominated be-
fore the Euphrates Valley Railroad could be safe
means of conveying troops 10 India in the event
of war: and all these dangers and difficulties are
ouadrupled by the consideration that war with
Russia is probably the sole contingency in which
The reinforcement of the Indian army from Europe
would be required.
japanese Chinese alliance would strengthen
England in the event of a Pacific campaign against
VladivOs,ock though il hOstilitIcs between Russia
and England are deferred another year or two,
Russia will nave completed her steam communlca-
ton with the Pacific, and will be in condition to
meet her enemy then on equal, and perhaps more
tLan equal, terms. But Japan has little, if any
thing to expect from such an alliance, however
unavoidable it might be. Her patriots will do
well 10 pray for the endurance of the present
,eocefuI relations and the continuance of those