New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1890-01-30
PLANS FOR THE NEW NAVY.
THE REPORT OF THE NAVAL POLICY BOARD
TRANSMITTED To THE SENATE
SECRETARY TRACY THINKS EACH CONGRESS
SHOULD DETERMINE FOR ITSELF THE
NUMBER OF VESSELS TO BE AUTHOR
lied DURING ITS TERN.
Icy TELEGRAPH TO THE rRIDUsE. ]

IBY TELEGRAPH TO THE rRIDUSE.I
Washington jan 29-secretary Tracy transmitted
to the Senate to-day, in response 10 request made
recently, the bulky report Of the Policy Board OF
the Navy Department The plan for new Navy
outlined by Board is already familiar, the details
to the number and kind of vessels recommended 10
be built and their estimated cost, having been given
several in these dispatches An absFac'
Of the armament 10 support scheme OF Naval eA-
pansion so vast scale is given below, however.
and many interesting facts about the needs oil the
Navy are brought out in it, The Secretary also sent
letter, TO accompany the report, In when ne eA-
plains his attitude toward the plans Of the Policy
Board. In this, it will be noticed he gives rather
qualified assent TO the scheme whole; and ne Is
careful to point out that absolute Naval policy
wisely be adopted committing the country to any
definite plan for the future. Each Congress should
be left to deal With the demand for new warships
such demafd arises from time to time. In vic"
Of its bearing the question Of going on at once to the
construction Of neofb battle ships turning TO OTHER
branches of Naval construction, the secretaTys letter
will have general interest. In the main the recon-
mendations Of the recent Department report arc
followed and confirmed. Secretary Tracy expresses
his entire disagreement with the Policy Boards views
as to the inability Of the American foundries and
shipyards, to turn out the largest battleshps The
letter is as follows:
In forwarding this document, the Department.
takes occasion say that while the report is entitled
10 consideration, by OF the high professional
character Of the officers who have signed it, and the
and ability with which the characteristics OF the
proposed vessels have been worked out, there are
numerous points covered in the general field OF dis
cussOn upon which the report must not be under
stood representing the views Of the Navy Depart
ment. In particular, the Department deems i,
necessary TO state that il not only does not share the
doubts and apprehensions Of the Board as to the
ability Of the mechanical industries of the United
States to meet the demands Of Naval con
struction, but after repeated communications and
conferences with leading firms, it is perfectly
satisfied of the capacity of the country 10 complete
the eight battleships the authorization Of which the
Department has recommended at the present session
Upon the further question, what might constitute an
effective Navy for purposes Of defence, the opinion Of
the Department, which IT has no occasion to
modify, thus stated In its annual report
The necessities Of our vulnerable position demand
the immediate creation Of two fleets Of bstue-shps
of which eight should be assigned TO the Pacific and
twelve to the Atlantic and Gulf. They must be the
best Of their class, in armament armor, structural
strength and speed. In addition to the batteships,
the situation OF the country requires al least twenty Vc'
sells for coast and harbor defence They should have
powerful battery and the heaviest Of armOr, combined
with moderate draught. At the present time eight
vessels of this type under construction, five OF
which are reconstructed monitors. The one problem
row before the Government in the matter OF Naval
policy get these forty vessels built at the earliest
possible moment. The steps necessar7 TO their com
pletiOn, namely, legislation, design and construction
cannot take less than five years in the Of each
one. Unless the existing yards, public and private
are enlarged restockcd with plant not more than
eight could be built at one time, apd the construction
Of the Others would have to wait for the launching Of
the first
"'Usng the utmost promptness the ships most
essential effective protection could not be supplied
in less than twelve fifteen years 1t Is
therefore recommended that the construction
Of eight armored vessels be authorized at the coming
session. and that they be Of the type Of battleshps
rather than of coastdeience ships. With the pro
portion of three to battleshp the future
Navy would consist of twenty battle-shlps, twenty
coastdefences and sixty cruisers, or 100 vessels
in all.
"Of the 100 vessels referred TO, fortytwO are now
built or authorized. These include the following
Twenty unarmored vessels eight small iron
vessels of the old Navy, which will probably continue
in service eight coast or harbor defenders and three
battle-ships; total, forty-twO.
ITO bring this force up to the total suggested in
the annual report would require the construction Of
seventeen battle-shps, twelve coast defenders and
tventy-nine unarmOred vessels The cost Of this
programme, covering fifteen years, would involve an
annual appropriation for construction, including also
ordnance of about S0,OOO,OOO, less than half the
amount proposed by Ile programme Vi TIC MCOailH
Board
The Department cannot state too explicitly that
the suggestion for an ultimate force expressed it,
annual report and repeated here is simply general
exposition Of its touching the problem Of Naval
defence considered in its completeness and entirety
This general suggestion not made with any eA-
pectatiOn or desire that the United states should at
this .ime adopt commit itself 10 exactly defined
policy reaching out far into the future: 1t being
oh, 4, vii a-uniu
the number Of vessels to be authorized during It's
term and make il accord with the conditions then
existing.
The actual recommendations Of the Department
were therefore confined to what deemed the urgent
necessity Of the present hour, namely the construc
ton Of as large number Of batte-ships as might be
conveniently undertaken at this time, having IN view
all the circumstances and conditions. This number
il has fixed after careful consideration, at eight. IN
expressing this opinion, which further examination
of the question has strongly confirmed, the Depart
ment conceived it to be its duty 10 set forth the gen
eral conditions Of the problem Of complete Naval
defence; not with view TO engaging the Govern
ment TO a solution fifteen years In advance but In
order TO arrive at an intelligent conclusion TO the
deficiencies IN the existing force and the immediate
steps necessary TO supply these deficiencies
The Policy Board begins its report with the state
ment that a Navy is essential first for waging war,
and secondly for preventing war; and the second
purpose may be far more important than the first
Whatever may be the chances Of war, If the interests
TO be guarded great then the Naval force To be
maintained should also be great. The Isolation and
peculiar geographical situation Of the United states
the lack of colonial enterprise and other matters the
report SAYS would 10 reduce its chances OF war
TO A minimum. But indications are not wanting that
this condition Of things will cease to exist, and
that sharp commercial competitor with other Nations
will result in this country obstructing the interests Of
foreign nations Omitting entirely from consideration
the property along our coasts exposed 10 destruction
the import and export trade Of the United states,
which in case OF war, would be exposed to an
inhalation amounts annually to II 800, 100000. This
does not include the coaswise trade the enormous
industries which would be paralyzed by the effects Of
Ilorkade The United States is safe from military
INVASION and the only fear IS from navles Oi other
countries. ,, Al, .-.t- . -, .,