St. Paul daily globe., 1890-01-30
At Present the Chances Of a
! Conflict Are at a Mini
: mum.
Still, This Self, Contained Ma
ton Is Likely to Have
Trouble.
Plans Of the Policy Board for
a Fleet of Battle
Ships.

board on the proposed increase of the
naval establishment. On this report
was based the report on Senator Hale's
bill made by the committee On naval
affairs recently. In its introduction the
board lays down the proposition that a
navy is essential a. for waging war,
and (2) to prevent war; and the second
purpose may be far more important
than the first. A navy which is adj
justed to meet the requirements of the
country in war, will, undoubtedly, be
ample to perform the duty required of
it in time of peace. There is no real
economy in the maintenance of vessels
apparently adapted to the more ecom-
leal performance of the latter duty if
ill-adapted to the former. The United
States, says the board, is self-con-
tanned to greater degree than any
other important nation, and its chances
of war would seem to be at a minimum.
but there are not wanting indications
that this comparative isolation will soon
cease to exist. Among the conditions
suggested as likely to bring about this
change are: Prospective competition
for the ocean carrying trade, and the
construction of an Atlantic and Pacific
ship canal. These changes Will tend to
contribute to the wealth and greatness
of the nation, but they will also bring
responsibilities and
CHANCES OF WAR.
Never in the history of the country
have we been so unprepared as now to
maintain our rights upon the seas or to
defend our own shores. We nave
| navy insignificant in numbers and CON-
posed of vessels incapable of meeting
the great armOred ships of other ma
tionS. Even in the late war it was DOS
sible to improyise fleet of considera-
bic power, but the fighting ships of
to-day demanded such expenditures of
time and such mechanical appliances
that nation without such ships ready
built in time OF war is certain
to suffer defeat. This is the condition
of the United States to-day. The ex-
ports and imports of this country ex-
posed upon the high seas are worth an
nually 81, 00,000,000, and the coastwise
| trade as much more. All of this would
be exposed to destruction in case of
naval war. The cessation of this trade
would paralyZe enormous home indus
tr es. Ii the port of New York alone
were blockaded for three months, it
would produce greater confusion and
loss than the bombardment of the city.
| The only fear that the United States
has is from attack by sea, because the
Atlantic and Pacific furnish an inSur-
| mountable barrier to an invading army.
The problem of supplying a navy of
sufficient magnitude and character to
defend our interests depends on Q) the
naval strength of possible enemies, con-
,Sidering particularly the possibility of
combinations; (2s the proximity of bases
| of coal and ammunition supplies to the
area which we might be called upon to
a 0OI- nr III En1h md ir6 hn yffAY,
of area to be attacked or defended. The
United States should maintain a navy
equal to any other in the world, but for
the fact that our great interests lie in
the western hemisphere, near our bases
of supply, and far removed from the
base of supply of most European ma
tions. The United States, however,
should be able
To DESTROY AT THE OUTBREAK
of war every base of supplies in prox-
Unity to our country which belongs to
the enemy, thus forcing the enemy
back and excluding from the contest all
vessels of limited endurance. This aud
the protection of the conyerging high
ways of our commerce, foreign and
coastwise, would represent the principal
purposes of defense. The board then
gives table of vessels, which,
under these conditions, could act
against US. With our present
naval strength every vessel of
an enemy would be effective against US.
Great Britain, France and Spain will
soon have 115 modern ships, which,
without bases of supply on this side
of the Atlantic, could operate
against US. OF these but seventeen are
battle ships. With their present bases
Of
modern ships. of which fifty-three are
battle ships, which could operate
against this country. The board esti-
mates the alliances with which the
United States could form navy quite
as strong as any that could he formed
agoinst her by any European nation,
but there is an element of uncertainty
in this assumption. The board is of the
opinion that the following vessels
should be added to the United States
navy: Ten battle ships of great coal
endurance. twenty-five battle ships of
limited coal endurance, twenty-four
cruisers OF 1900 tons and over, fifteen
torpedo cruisers of about 900 tons, five
special cruisers for China service OF
about 1,200 tons: twelve rams. three
torpedo depot and artificers ships. 100
first-ciass torpedo boats and numerous
Secondclass torpedo boats carried by
pdGllc VI anu
the larger cruisers and torpedo depot
ships. In general terms the battle ships
of great coal endurance would constl-
tute
THE BASIS OF A FLEET
which might be detached in whole or in
part for distant service and for the pur
pose of cruising against the enemy;
having the power to remain at sea dur
ing long period, and to attack points
on the other side of the Atlantic. 1t is
| absolutely essential to possess this num-
Der of battle ships of such endurance,
the board thinks, because policy of
protection without the power to act
extensively would at the present time
double the force with which the United
States would have to contend. An
enemy knowing it would be possible for
such fleet to appear upon its own
coast would be obliged to assign a SUI
perior force for its protection, thus
greatly diminishing that to be sent
against us. The board has considered
the question of protection for guns and
crews of cruisers, and believes that
within certain limitsl the weight as
signed to such protection is far more
useful than the same weight in addi-
tionai guns. The following summary
gives the distribution of the elements
of the fleet, Including all vessels
built, building, appropriated for
and recommended by the board:
Battle ships of great endurance-thir-
teen vessels of an aggregate tonnage of
120, $50, and total cost of s67, 400 900. Bat
tleships of limited endurance-twenty-
five vessels of an aggregate tonnage of
179, 1900. and total cost of Sll0. 900, 600.
Harbor defense and rams seventeen
vessels of an aggregate tonnage of g.
800, and total cost of 81. SOC, 900. Cruis-
ers of all classes Gneluding gun yes
sells and dispatch boats)-sixty- y-eight
vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 225,-
500, and total cost of S114. .460, ,00O Tor
pedo boats and artifcer ships-three
vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 15,-
600, and cost of SC, 500, 900. Sea-going
torpedo boats-one hundred and one of
an aggregate tonnage of 6,565 and cost
$6. 565. 900. Total cost, $349, SIS, 900, of
which Se7. 965. 600 is already expended or