Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1890-08-07

1
ties are exhaustingly reviewed in the
cases mentioned as well as in Hall VS..
De CUR, 50 U. S. 4S5; Telegraph Co.
| VS.. Texas, los Z. S. AGO and others.
POWER OF COMMISSION.
| Up to this point the main difficulties
and conflicts in the decisions seems to
have arisen in determining what is inter-
| state commerce. But, when we reach
| the question, how much power can be
conferred upon a commission by the
legislature, and to what extent will its
decisions in fixing freight and passenger
rates be final and conclusive, there is
much difference of opinion, and the de-
cisions of the supreme court of the Uni
ted States again seem to conflict.
In the case of Mum VS.. Illinois, T94 {.
S. 1888 it was decided that the question
as TO what is a reasonable charge for the
transportation of freights aud passen-
gers, is legislative, and not a judicial
question. Chief Justice Waite said: "It
is insisted, however, that the owner of
property. is entitled to reasonable COM
pensation for its use, even though it be
clothed with public interest, and that
what is reasonable, is q judicial, and
not legislative question.
''As has been already shown, the
practice has been otherwise. In coun-
tries where the common law prevailed it
has been customary from time imme-
mortal, for the legislature to declare
what shall be q reasonable compensa-
ton, etc. AT the same term the same
learned judge declared in the case of
PECK VS.. Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Company, [94, U. S. 1881
"Where property has been clothed with
a public interest, the legislature may fix
limit to that which shall in law be rea-
sonable for its use. This limit binds
the courts as well as the people. If it
has been improperly fixed, the legisla-
ture and not the courts must be ap-
pealed to for the change"
The decisions quoted would seem to
establish the right in the legislature and
its instrumentalitles to determine fully
and conclusively the question of what
would be reasonable charges for a COM
mon carrier, but in a recent decision the
same court determines that it is a judi
cial and not q legislative question. In
the case of the Chicago Milwaukee and
St. Paul Railway company VS.. Min
nesota, 134 United States, decided at the
October term, 1899, the legislature had
passed an act regulating common car
power to fix railroad tariffs. The rail-
wav company charged three cents per
gallon for shipping milk in ten-gallon
casks between certain points. The rail-
road and warehouse commission, acting
under the statute, reduced the rate to
two and one-half cents per gallon, which
the railway company refused to comply
with, on the ground that the rate vas
unreasonable. The commission, by the
attorney general of the state, applied to
the supreme court of Minnesota for a
writ of mandamus to force the railway
company to comply with the rate fixed.
An alternative writ was issued and the
railway company filed its return, setting
up, among other things, that the act
was unconstitutional, and also the I'M
reasonableness of the rate and offered
proof upon Its answer, which the SUI
pre- re court refused to hear, and, acting
upon the theory that what was unreas-
enable was legislative aud not a judi
cial question, it granted a peremptory
writ against the company, requiring it
to comply with the rate fixed by the
commission. SO Mime sofa, PSI.
The case was carried by writ of error
to the supreme court of the United
States. Mr.. Justice Blatchford in re-
ferring to the opinion of the state court
says: 'This being the construction of
the statute by which we are bound in
considering the present case, we are of
the opinion that SO construed. it conflicts
with the constitution of the United
States in the particulars complained of
by the railroad company. 1t deprives
the company of its rights to judicial in
vestigation, by due process of law under |
the forms and with the machinery pro-
vided by the wisdom OF successive ages
for the investigation judioially of the |
the truth of q matter in controversy, and |
substitutes therefor, as an absolute |
fnality, the action of q railroad COM |
which in view OF the powers |
to it by the state court, cannot |
be regarded as clothed with judicial |
functions, or possessing the machinery of |
q court of justice. - Id. D. 456 and |
457 Again be says: "In the present |
case, the return alleged that the rate OF
charge fixed by the commission was not
equal or reasonable, and the supreme
court held that the statute deprived the
company of the right to show that judi
cially. The question of the reasonable
ness of rate of charge for transporta-
ton by railroad company, involving as
both as regards the company, and as re-
CARDS the public, is eminently question
for judicial investigation, requiring due
process of law for its determinati ton
If the company is deprived of the
power of charging reasonable rates for
he use OF its property, and such depri-
7atIon takes place in the absence of an
by judicial machinery, 1t is
deprived of the lawful use of its prop
'rty, and thus, in substance and effect,
If the property itself, without due pro-
,ess of law, and in violation of the con-
titution of the United States, and so far
Is it is thus deprived, while other per-
ons are permitted to receive reasonable
Profits upon their invested capital, the
company is deprived of the equal protec-
ion of the laws. Id. page 45S. The
.ause was reversed and remanded for
urther proceedings in accordance with
he opinion.
The court makes no difference in its
opinion to the cases of Mum VS.. ILL
lois, OF Pick VS.. Chicago, supra, but
Justices Bradley, Gray and Lamar dis
ent from the judgment of the court,
md in their dissenting opinion say: cit
practically overrules Mum VS.. Illinois,
4 Q. S. l13, and the several railroad
asses that were decided at the same