Los Angeles herald., 1890-10-12
Not to Be Placed on Pipes
Supplying Customers.
The Ordinance of the Council
Declared Void.
An Injunction Granted by Superior
Judge Shaw.
1t is Contrary to Law, and Therefore Void,
That Water Meters Be Placed on
!; Water Pipes at the Option Of
the Company.

Judge Shaw yesterday gave very
important decision in matter which
affects both water consumers and the
water companies. 1t is in the suit of
Steward against the Citizens Water
company. The defendant placed
meter on the pipes supplying the plain
tiff, and the corporation claimed that
under city ordinance they had right
to do so. An injunction was applied
for by Mr.. Steward from the superior
court, ,and it was granted on the ground
that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional.
The decision is as follows:
The defendant is corporation en-
gagged in the business of furnishing
water for domestic use to the inhabi-
tants of portion of the city of Los An
geles. The plaintiff is resident of that
portion of the city supplied by the de-
fendant, and is dependent upon the de-
fendant for his water for domestic use.
The defendant has placed a water meter
on the pipes supplying the plaintiff,
and has charged the plaintiff for water
according to the amount used by him
as indicated by the meter, claiming the
right to do 80 by virtue of city Ordi-
nance passed February "a, 1890. The
plaintiff refused to pay the sum charged,
and rendered smaller sum. The sum
rendered was the amount due by the
house rates fixed by the ordinance.
The defendant refused to accept this
sum and threatened to cut off the water.
Thereupon the plaintiff begun this ac-
ton to enjoin the defendant from
cutting off the water from his prem
ises.
The case depends on the validity
and effect OF the ordinance fixing water
rates passed by the city council on Feb
ruary "a, 1890.
This ordinance fixes two rates, one to
be determined by the size of the house
and lawn. and by certain specific
uses, the other by the amount of water
consumed as shown by meter. Con-
cerning the use of meter the ordinance
provides that 'any person or corpora
ton furnishing water to the inhabitants
of the city of Los Angeles shall have the
right, in all cases where there is large
consumption or waste of water, to apply
a meter and collect the following water
rates." and then follows a schedule OF
meter rates.
It is clearly shown by the pleadings
and affidavits in this case that the meter
rates fixed by the ordinance were more
of July and August as the house and
lawn rates. The plaintiffs rate, COM
puted by the house and lawn rate, was
1920 per month, whereas by the meter
rate as fixed by the ordinance it was
$21. .25 for July and $3.50 for August.
It is not shown that there was any waste
of water. There was large consump-
ton of water by the plaintiff, but it does
not appear that the use was any more
than necessary.
The plaintiff claims that the ordinance
is void because the sum to be paid is un-
certain. because the rates fixed are not
equal and uniform, because the meter
rates are unreasonably high, and because
it discriminates between persons, or
gives the company power to discrimi-
nate.
Section of the act of March 7, 1881,
e Deer. codes p. 1877, and section $40 of
the civil code make the following provis-
ions on this subject:
"Sec. 6. Rates for the furnishing of
water shall be equal and uniform.
There shall be no discrimination made
between persons, or between persons
and corporations"
"Sec. $40. All corporations formed
to supply water to cities or towns must
furnish pure, fresh water to the inhab-
itants thereof for family uses, SO long as
the supply permits, at reasonable rates
and without distinction of persons"
That the ordinance is not uncertain
because the meter rates are not the same
as the house rates is settled by the case
of Water Works vs.. San Francisco, 81
CAL, 1856. In that case the court says
"The rates are definitely fixed, and the
f.. 4. Il Il
consumer who has a meter and differ
ent price for one who has none does not
render the ordinance uncertain"
The same case also decides that in a
case like the one under consideration the
courts cannot inquire whether the rates
fixed are reasonable or not. Speaking
of the duty of the board of supervisor
of SaSl Francisco to fix reasonable rates
the court says:
"But the courts cannot, after the
board has fully and fairly investigated
and acted, by fixing what it believes te
be reasonable rates. step in and say it,
action shall be nullifed because the
courts, upon a similar investigation
have come to different conclusion as
to the reasonableness of the rates fixed
There must be actual fraud in fixing th'
rates, or they must be so grossly ant
palpably unjust and unreasonable as tc
amount to the same thing" (ibid p
3O6.)
There is nothing alleged or proven
in this case to show that tn
city council in fixing the rate
acted either unfairly, arbitrarily
or without due investigation. In tn
absence of any showing to the contrary
it may be presumed that the counci
performed its duty and acted upon it
Judgment and discretion after prope
investigation. Unless the contrary
alleged and proven, the court has n
power to revise it's action or declare i
void.
The defendant contends that this cas-
also decides, in effect, that the fixing c
a house rate and meter rate differin
in amount does not make distinction
of persons nor allow discrimination
The case, however, does not decide thi
in terms, nor does it discuss the ques
ton. It simply decides that providing
two different methods of computing
rates does not render the ordinance un
certain. The question whether it al
lowed distinction of persons or dis
elimination bstween persons was no
raised. The ordinance was held void O.
other grounds 80 that the question wa
not necessarilf involved in the decision