Arizona weekly enterprise., 1890-04-05

frOntler Tn large measure, were not supposed to be critical in the civiliza- tion and learning as in the older com munities.
 Is it reasonable to suppose that congress, ill passing this fundamental law, which in its operation was to so seriously affect the people in these frontier governments, would use Ian guage of intricate, doubtful, ambiguous or double meaning?
 Rather, is it not more reasonable to suppose that congress intended to use language of the simplest, most certain and unequivocal meaning? And is this not exactly what congress has done? Is there any possible room for construction in determining the true meaning of the phrase, "Shall be limited to sixty days durationf Is it not therefore clear and certain be- yond reasonable doubt, that congress intended to use the above language not simply in a directory, but in mandatory sense? It will be observed that there are two words in this phrase which are controlling and which make it's meaning absolute, viz: the words limited" and duration"
 The word "limited" means narrow restricted. It is synonymous with the word circumscribe; and. that word means to enclose within a certain time, to hem in, to confne, to bound. to limit, to restrict, etc.
 MT. Webster defines the word "dur- ation" to mean the power of endur- ing, continuance in time; the portion of time during which anything exists. Adding the latter definition of the word duration to the phrase it then would read: "Shall be limited to an existence of sixty days" Is it not evident that the great primal purpose of congress was to control within fixed definite limits the sphere of legisla tive action in these territories? And that when the session began, it should continue to exist, to endure, for only sixty days from the day of beginning? Is there any room for construction here? Or rather, can there be but one true construction?
 Is the true meaning of this section at all doubtful? Does 1t not necessari ly mean that, whatever the time fixed by the legislative assembly for the ses- sion to begin, it could not continue to exist, as legal organized body longer than sixty days from said beginning?
 Sixty days of lawful session-sixty days of legal, organized existence, that is all. It means sixty days counting one after another including Sundays, holidays and any days of temporary adjournment. If congress had meant to exclude these days from the limit of sixty days duration, it would have said so.
 How plain the language, how sim pie, how certain the meaning.
 Although adjournments are had, the sessions go on. This is funda- mental. Mr. Blackstone says; "An adjournment is no more than a con tinuance of the session from one day to another as the word itself signifies. !" If Sundays, days of temporary adjourn ment, etc. were not to be counted as days of the session then for those days the session would not endure. Is it not plain, that, if Sundays, holidays and all other days of temporary adjourn ment are not to be counted as parts of the session, the legislature would not be in session during such daNs and that necessarily have to possess the power to hold any number of dis tinct sessions? But congress has only conferred power to hold one session of sixty days duration; how then can 1t hold more than one session? Again, to state It little differently, if Sundays, days of intermediate adjournment, etc., are not included as parts and parcels of the session, the time measure by these days being no parts of such session, the session necessarily ceases for that time; but the only and true meaning Of the language used by con- gress is that, when the session begins, it endures, continues to exist, for sixty days only from said beginning.
 So that it is simply impossible that there could be but one regular legal session of the territorial legislative as sembly; and it is just as impossible that the session could legally exist endure for longer period than sixty days from its beginning. Another and we think potent reason why congress intended by the language used to limit the duration of the ses sion of the legislative assembly tc sixty days from it's beginning is that the history of the times, at and re gently before the passage the Act, wal rife with complaints of extrevagances and reckless expenditure in more thar one of these legislative assemblies, SC
 that construing that in the light O
 surrounding circumstances and con
 temporaneous history, we say that i
 is evident that the purposes of con
 gress was to absolutely control, tC
 circumscribe, to hem in, to restrict
 within definite limits, these Legislative
 assemblies as to the period of thei
 existence; and to fix beyond the lin
 of cavil or discussion the fact that tn
 session could only exist, endure fo
 sixty days from its beginning. Henc
 the days of its possible existence wer
 with unerring certainty numbered. By the violation of the members o the legislative assembly its session
 might die before the expiration of tn
 full number of days; but at all events it could not live, endure beyond them The measure of its existence, the day the hour of dissolution was marke upon the dial-plate in unmistakabl phrase. Hence, we say again, tha
 congress not only used the languag of said section i'll directory, but mor , emphatically in mandatory sense , To us the language used imports n possible discretion as to the limitation of the period, beyond which the SC; f sion cannot exist. It has but one tru f meaning. It means the actual hours r days, weeks, &cy elapsing-the on , after the other-from the time of tn , beginning of the session till sixty day
 of twenty-four hours each have passed
 For obvious reasons the time of b' . ginning was immaterial; but fc equally obvious reasons, the time ( P ending was material. Congress Ina s to pay the bills of expense; whic { could not be affected by the beginnin T of these sessions, but would necessar t ly be seriously affected by their enc . ings-by the periods of their duration e Whilst therefore, it is evident that