Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1890-05-14

down bv the great magistrate who presided
over the court for more than a third OF a
century (Chief Justice MarshalD that the
point of time when the prohibition ceases
and the power of the State begins is not the
instant when the article enters the country,
hut when the importer has so acted upon il
that il has become incorporated and mixed
mp with the mass OF property in the country.
which happens when the original package
is no longer such in his hands; that none oi
the evils which proceeded from the feeble.
ness of the Federal Government contributed
luore 10 the great revolution which intro
duced the present system than the deep and
general conviction that commerce ought to
be regulated bv Congress; that the right to
sell any article imported was an lnseDarable
incident to the right to import 1t and that
the principles expoundeG in the case applied
equally to importations from a sister as
from foreign country.
Although the precise question before the
court was not ruled upon in that case, the
Court says it thinks it was virtually involved
in the Brown case and also the Bowman
case, in which an act of the State of Iowa,
fvrbidding common carriers to bring intoxl-
eating LIQUORS into the State without first be-
ing furnished with certificate as prescribed
in the act, was declared invalid because es-
sentially a regulation of commerce among
the States.
RESERVED IN ITS TERMS.
The opinion Of the Court, delivered by
Justice Matthews, and the dissenting opin-
ion, delivered by Justice Harlan, discussed
the question in all its phases, and while the
determination of whether the right of trans
portation of an article of commerce from one
State to another includes by necessary implica-
tion the right OF the consignee to sell II IN un-
broken packages at the place where the trans
portation terminates, was in terms reserved,
yet the argument of the majority conducts IRE
sistibIy to that conclusion. This decision is
quoted at length.
The court then takes up the case of Peirce,
agent. New Hampshire, which has been one OF
the chief authorities of those advocating the
validity of the Iowa statute. The defendant in
this case was fined for selling barrel OF gin
which he had imported from Massachusetts,
and sold contrary to the laws of New Hamp-
shire. In this case Chief Justice Taney held
that the State had the right to make such
law for the protection of its inhabitants. and
that the mere grant of power over interstate
commerce TO the general Government cannot
he construed TO be an absolute prohibition to
the exercise of any power over the same sub
1ect by the States.
But" saws the Court "conceding the weight
properly to be ascribed to the judicial utter
ances Of this eminent jurist, we are constrained
to say that the distinction between subjects IN
respect Of which there can be of necessity only
one system or plan of regulation for the whole
country and subjects local in their nature. and,
80 far as relating to commerce, mere aids rather
than regulation. does not appear to US to have
been sufficiently recognized by him In arriving
at the conclusions announced. That distinction
has been settled by repeated decisions of this
court and cannot longer be regarded as open to
denomination. The authority of Peirce agent.
New Hampshire, in so far as il rests on the
view that the law of New Hampshire was valid
because Congress had made no regulation on
~ y Es.,N - I1I h-.-
distinctly overthrow by numerous cases.
The court quotes from large number of these.
WHEN IT is VOID.
whenever" says the opinion of the Chief
Justice, "a law of State amounts essentially
to regulation of commerce, as it does when it
inhibits, directly or indirectly, the receipt of
an imported commodity, or its disposition be-
fore il has ceased TO become an article of trade
between one State and another, it comes in
conflict with power which, in this particular
has been exclusively in the general Govern
ment, and is. therefore void. Undoubtedly it
is for the legislative branch of the State gov
ernments to determine whether the manuiac-
fure of particular articles of traffic will injuri-
ously affect the public, and it is not for Con-
gress to determine what measures State may
properly adopt as appropriate or needful for
the protection of the public morals, life or
safety, but Notwithstanding it is not vested
with supervisory power over matters Of local
administration, the responsibility is upon Con-
gress, SO far as the regulation of interstate
commerce is concerned to remove the restric-
tion upon the State in dealing with imported
articles which have not been mingled with the
common mass of property therein.
Whatever our individual views may may be
as TO the deleterious qualities of particular ar
ticles we cannot hold that any articles which
Congress recognizes as subjects of Interstate
commerce are not such, or that whatever are
thus recognized can be controlled by State laws
amounting to regul atlons while they retain
a rh 1rap n a firaa
directly dangerous to themselves, the State
may take appropriate measures to guard
against injury before it obtains complete juris-
diction over them.
WHAT IT WOULD CoNCEDE.
To concede to a State the power to exclude,
directly or indirectly articles SO situated, with
out Congressional permission, is to concede to
a majority Of the people of State, represented
in the State Legislature the power to regulate
commercial intercourse between the States by
determining what shall be its subjects. When
that power was distinctly granted to be exer-
cised by the people of the United States, rep
resented in Congress- its possession by the lat
ter was considered essential to that more per
tect union which the constitution was adopted
TO create. Undoubtedly there is difficulty in
drawing the line between the principal powers
of the one government and the commercial
powers of the other but when that line is deter
mined, accommodation to it without serious
Inconvenience may readily be found in a frank
and candid cooperation for the general good.
They 1.-THE importers) had the right to i'm
port this beer into that State, and in the view
which we have expressed. they had the right to
sell il, by which act alone IL would become
mingled in the common mass of property with
in the State. Up TO that point then, we hold
that in the absence of Congressional permis-
sion to do so, the State had no power to inter.
fere by seizure or any other action in prohibi-
tion of Importation and sale by the foreign or
nonresident importer. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed"
THE MINORITY OPINION.
The dissenting opinion of Justices GRAY.
arlan and Brewer, in giving reasons for
cent states the effect of the decision as fol-
the statutes of State, restricting or pro-
ing the sale of Intoxicating liquors within
irritory, are to be held imperative and void
pplied to liquors sent or brought from
her State and sold by the importer in what
called original packages, the consequence
Ist be that an inhabitant of any State may,
ander the preteXt of Interstate commerce and
without license OF supervision of any public au-
tnority, carry or send into and sell in any or all
os the other States Of the Union Intoxicating
liquors of whatever description. in cases or
kegs, or even IN single bottles or TASKS, despite
any legislation Of those States on the subject
and although his own State should be the only
one which had not enacted similar laws"
MADE THE BRIDGE STRONGER.