The Big Stone post. (Big Stone Gap, Va.) 1890-1892, 1890-12-19
M0LThE'S STRATEGY.
Explained by IIimscif-i:ow t" Ma>r v..'.

The General Stall in Berlin has .iu>! pln-
lishcd il work by Molikc on "Sira,cs!.'
'.Politics.' says Mollkc. use var ~ =
means to their end. They exercise Il de-
cisiyc influence on it from first 10 last.
in th?t, rs circumstances changc, they
raise or lower their demands. In .cw 81
vacilIating goal OF gaining every possible
advantage Thus. while quite indcpcnd-
ent of politics ia us means, it best works
toward harmony with politics in is ends.
The next duty j. the placing ia ;'c field
of the military force, li:at is. the f,-t adj
vance OF the army lin this the manifold
geographical. political. and national con-
sidcrations must he NEST paiuS kiHgly
studied. One M take in the Assem- IN
Of the troops can hardly he corrected in 4
whole campaign.
"Thc first advance however. can usual
lv be planned we'll beforehand, md he
carried ont Will the desired results. En-
tirely different the next problem q STRAIT
cgy-ihc 0pcrations with The forces ri
war. Here our purpose is met hy Tie
cntircl yinIependcnt purpose Of lAc enc
my This inimical purpose may be con.incd
within limits when we are able. ready. and
determined. but cannot he broken other
wise than through th2 power o hattie.
The malcra! and moral effects OF = great
battle are so comprehensive. however.
that they usually create IL who'll. uc% siiu-
alton. Il new basis OF new operation. No
plan of operations can reach With any
degree ot certainty beyond the iirat rect
a IL. D,,1,. =. Ia.
conception Of II campaign Pla.lncu ia de
tail beforehand and carried to til end IL
Il logical sequence from the cri-iua!
thought ofthe commander.
"Of course. the commander must have
his great and definite aims. and follow
them ulis wcrycd ~ the incident. oi ..ie
hour. but the way in which these ANS are
TO be realized can never be determined
with Certainty long i'll advance. H. the
course OF a. campaign commander *
constantly required TO make decisions on
the bases of situations that could no: have
hccn torctold or ioresccn. All tie con-
sccutive acts in war are, therefore, not
prcmcditatcd operations, but spontaNcJu.
ones. 1t is matter OF seeing through,
the couded and uncertain situation at Il
given time and place, Of estiinating the
Importance of the known quantity, OF
guessing closely the unknown uuauti,v,
Of resolving promptly on line OF action.
and OF CARRYING out cncrgcilcally ana uu-
swervingly this line Of action. IN The
problem Of calculating the relation; az the
two great factors, ones own purpose, il;
must not be forgotten that there are
other factors which are fully beyond .all
powers OF estimation, as, for instance.
weather, illness, and railway accidents.
Misunderstanding and dcceptions: in
short. all the occurrences which are at =
tributed to fate. accident or Divine Prov
idencc, aud which man neither creates
nor controls. Yet war is not matter of
blind chance even in these respects.
.'There is calculation of probabilities
possible in these details, that the bad luck
of the one will be balanced By the bad
luck of the other in most cases, ard so
the commander. who in each event does
what is good, ii moi the best, has Iair
chance of reaching his goal. 1t is self
evident that for such affairs mere thcorct-
ical knowledge is insufficient. that here
come to free, practical, artistic develop
ment the great qualities of mind and
character, schooled of course. b, military
education and guided by experience gath
cred from the history of war or real life.
Decisive above all for the reputation OF a
commander is naturally ne result How
much of the result is due directly to him
can be determined only with the greatest
difficulty. The best man often is wrecked
on the Irresistible power of circumstances
the man of mediocre ability is often lifted
high by the same power. On the whole.
however, fortune favors only the coupe
tent commander. AS everything in war
is uncertain, excepting the energy and