Tombstone epitaph., 1890-03-29


 why the same rule should not apply to the construction of the term days when applied to matters to be transacted by legislative assemblies.
 Were we in doubt as to the correct- ness of the above construction what would be the duty of the court in the premises?
 The legislative assembly, CO ordinate branch of the government of the Terri. tory, acting under like solemn obllga- gations and responsibilities with our selves, has passe1 the act the validity of which is in question, which act has been approved by the governor, who has taken like oath to support the Constitution and laws of Congress, and now, are we to declare It invalid? If we beliye that the legislature in attempting to Isgislate after March 2I,t, clearly, palpabIy and plainly violated the fundamental law of the Territory, then most unquestionabIy u IS our duty to so declare. While this IS true, we must bear in mind that among the fundamentals of the law almost is the proposition that we can declare an act void only when it violates the Con- st'tutlon ('r Organic Law) clearly, pal. pably, plainly and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on our mind. 2I Penn. I67.
 In Adams vs. Howe, I4 Mass, ahs. the court says ''we must prem's- that SO much respect is due any legislative act solemnlY passed and admitted into the statute books that court of law which may be called upon to decide its valid ity will pre- ume it to be constitutional until the contrary clearly appears, so that in any case of the kind subst .n. tially doubtful the law will have it's force. The legislature is in the first instance the judge of its own constitutional powers, and it is only when manifest assumption of authority, or misappre- hension of it shall appear, that the judi cial power will refuse to execute it." In Kentucky it has been held that if it be doubtful or questionable whether the legislature has exceeded it's limits the judiciary cannot interfere, though it may not be satisfied that the act is unconsti- tutional.-2 Mon. I75. To the same effect, among others, are the following cases:
 City of Lexington vs. McGuillan's Heirs, g Dana, 5I4. Cooper vs. Tel fair, 4 Dall., I4 Tuler vs. the People, 8 Mch., 333 State vs. Cummings, 36 Mo. 277.
 In view of this we'll settled and recog- nized rule in the foregoing cases, apart from the view we take of the organic law, viz: that the legislature is limited Tn its session to sixty working or legislative days, and not to sixty consecutive days as contended, we would hesitate before holding that the legislature had in this instance Iranscended its powers and vio- lated the fundamental law of the Terri tory, especially when we consider that this in fleet would be to annul many of the laws now in force and thus disturb and unsetIle the public credit, destroy private rights, and bring disaster upon the Territory. From the foregoing con- alterations we hold that the appropria- tion bill passed 5y the 18th legislative assembly, and approved April 10th, 1889, is va'id law, and that the plaintiff is entitled 10 his writ.
 The writ will issue.
 RICHARD E. SLOAN, A. l.,
 JOSEPH H. KIBBEY, A. ].
 A dissenting opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Wright.