Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1890-01-30

T0o oecretary Oh the navy mas cent W
the esuate the report Of board Of ofofficers
ON the naval policy Of the country. He
takes pains to explain that the report
dOes not express the views Of the navy
department, and he refers to his annual
report - explaining those views. The
report contemplated q navy ofone hum
drsd vessels, of which forty-two are now
built or authorized and the programme
required nine millions year for Is years.
The secretary wisely cautions the sem
ate against committing itself to an
exactly defined policy reaching 80 far
into the future, and he only urges the
building at once Of eight large battle
ships. The policy board goes into an
elaborate consideration Of the necessity
Of strong navy and boldly declares
that although our chances Of war are
now small they may soon be very great.
Sharp commercial competitions will,
they say, result In our obstructing the in
terests Of foreign,nations the completion
Of an Atlantic and Pacific canal will in
crease our ocean carrying trade and will
bring responsibilities and chances Of
war. without considering the property
along the coast exposed to destruction,
our import and export trade SO exposed
rorth q billion and half, and 1t is
early worth while to think about
guarding 1t. The board thereupon re-
commands about two hundred ships, and
Il b worthy Of note that neither they
nor the secretary contemplate the
building Of dynamite cruisers Of the
vesuvius type, the board remarking
that they are Of uncertain use In
naval warfare. This observation may
cause the citizens with no pretensions to
naval wisdom to wonder whether 1t
might not be better to stop worrying
over plans for great navy to be COM
pleted In score Of years. Let us under
take as many ships as we can easily
build at once, and let there be among
them some that will be the equals of
the strongest ships Of foreign powers
either afloat or building. BY the time
another session of Congress comes around
We may have learned by experience or
observation whether the dynamite gun
h worth anything In war. 1t is now of
uncertain use by reason Of its short
range, delicate machinery and other ap-
parent defects but criticisms quite as
grave were advanced against the Moni-
tor, and yet II sent the costly wooden
ffigates Of the great powers to the junk
shop and revolutionized the navies Of
the world. We can not afford TO stop
building ships while we await the
trial Of the Vesuvius, but neither can we
AFFORD to undertake their construction
on gigantic scale, as long as this hurler
Of dynamite by the ton threatens 10 an
nihilate the modern iron-clad as the
Monitor did the wooden navies Of '03.
The plan Of the secretary appears to
meet this reasoning, and we can af-
ford to risk the building of the
eight battle ships. They would
seem very few when scattered
along our immense Atlantic and Pacific
and gulf coast lines or venturing in for
eign seas among the navies of European
powers. They would be highly valued
II England should quarrel with us as
she has with Portugal, and should
threaten to send iron-clads to the Hud.
son, - she did to the Tagus. From
what information has been given to the
public 1t would seem right to secure
Zslinski's dynamite gun for the ex.
clusive use Of this government,
and to guard the invention and
all subsequent improvements with the
greatest care for there is chance tina,
II will be Of incalculable value in war
and 1t would be very sad to find oul
z navy wrecked and our commerce and
coasts ravaged by the triumph Of an
4 American invention. Valuable American
devices have been purchased by foreign
powers and would be used against us Il
occasion arose. Zalinski should be giver
every encouragement to perfect his CUR
and provo its worth for the United
States alone, and meanwhile we car
build some battle ships to serve in the
very probable event Of his failure.