Idaho semi-weekly world. [volume] (Idaho City, Idaho Territory) 1875-1908, 1890-06-03
WHAT is REALITY


Every body knows what reality ls' OF
to vary that phrase when we speak Oh
things acting, what actuality is. VI al
thoughts, or perhaps l should rather
say OF perceptions it is perhaps the
clearest; and vet it is one OF the most
difficult to explain or even express
This simply because it Is SO slmple' II
does not admit of analysis; it has no
elements into which to resolve It, ana
there is no genus or species uhuer
which to place it. The only way OF
showing what it is Is to point to an ex-
ample OF it. We look on the wall OF
the room in which we sit, and know II
to be real. We see that bird flying, and
know it to be an actuality. we are
conscious of ourselves, as in pain, anu
are sure that the pain has an existence
There may be realities which we can
notdiscover;we do not know whether the
planet Jupiter Is inhabited. But there
are things which we do know and know
to be real. 1t is thus we know body as
it is presented to us, with its essen
tial qualities as extended ana
exercising power or properties
Thus In self-consciousness we know
self in its various exercises, say as feel-
ing, knowing, willing. 1t Is thus that
we know the manifestations of body,
such as shape, resistance and in nova
BILE; thus that we know the manifesto
tions of self as desire, affection, resolu-
ton. All these are real, as is also all
that we observe and what we derive
from our observations by logical
process. The qualities which we per-
ceive in ourselves, specially such as
love, benevolence, justice, are actuali-
ties. All these differ from imagina-
tions, say fairy, a ghost, a mermaid;
and commonly the two can be distin-
guished. We call the one real the
other unreal We can not explain or
even understand the facts of which we
are conscious without calling in two
cognitive powers, the external and the
internal senses. These can not be re-
solved into any thing else, say, as is
often attempted into sensations, impress
sions, ideas; for none of these contain
cognition and can not, therefore, give
US knowledge by accumulation or com
bination. Nor can knowledge be drawn
from them by reasoning; for not being
in the premises they can not reach 1t,
except by falling into the acknowl-
edged fallacy of having more in the
conclusion than in the premises. In
acquiring a knowledge OF internal
things, sensations are involved; feel
ings in the organism by all the senses;
hut these not having knowledge can not
give it to us logically. In looking at
the table before us there is the exercise
of coats and humors, of rods and cones
and of the optic nerve but we do not no.
tice these in vision; their existence has
been made known to us by the physiolo-
gist. In hearing, the tympanum, the
hammer, the stirrup and auditory nerve
do not form part of our intuitive knowl-
edge; they are merely the means of
giving an exact field to our perceptions,
but are no part of the reality directly
perceived by us. With these concur
ronces we look Immediately upon the
thing-as we look through perfectly
transparent glass upon the tree without
noticing the medium, / believe we can
determine precisely what we know in
tuitively and directly by the various
senses. The eye gives us colored sur
face, nothing more. Hearing gives q
sound in the ear, from which we argue
a cause which is found by science to be
undulations, In smell we have an affee-
ton of the nostrils. In taste an affec-
ton of the palate. In touch proper, or
feeling, an affection of the part from
which the atferent nerve comes. In the
muscular sense and energy we have re-
sistance offered, implying power. These
are our primary sense cognitions which
are noticed by self-consciousness they
are all real and upon them by legiti-
mate processes we rear other knowl-
edges, also real, as derived from what
is real BY spontaneous cognition, we
know realities without us and within us.
Every man believes that his conscious
self exists, that his body exists, that
other people exist, he believes in what
he eats and drinks. in the staff on which
he leans, and in the ground on which
he strikes it. OF this primary knowl-
edge there are three criteria clear and
decisive. First it is self-evident We
know the object at once on looking at
it. In looking at the table / am sure
there is eolored surface before me.
Being thus self-evident, it is, secondly;
we can not be made to believe other
wise, or that there is no table before
us Thirdly, it is universal, that's held
by all men on the objects being pre-
sented to it. These are the tests of
primary truths, and they sanction the
conviction that we know realities
Rev. DR.. James McCosh, in N. Y. Inde-