Santa Fe daily New Mexican. [volume] (Santa Fe, N.M.) 1885-1897, 1890-07-05
By the Insurgent Indians of the PueO-
los in the Year 1880.
Specially prepared for the New Mexican
BY PROF. F, A. BANDELIER,
Member American Archaeological Institute
LCOntinued.l

the people of Santa Fe, and the three
priests with them, had all persisted.
Still Santa Fe was not only not in pos
session OF the insurgents, yet it had not
even been attacked on the 18th of Aug
ust, 1880.
Upon receiving the news Of the up
rising,
THE FIRST STEP TAKEN BY GOV. oTERMIN
was to send the maestro del campo
Francisco Gomez, to the valley of Santa
Cruz with a squad of soldiers, and with
orders to escort the settlers there block
AIDED to the capital. That order was ex-
ecuted on the 18th, and by the 18th
Gomez returned with the rescued party.
He had met with no opposition what
ever. Only between Tesuque and Santa
Fe an Indian was seen and captured.
He staunchly refused to give information
beyond the fact that all the Pueblos were
in arms, and determined upon extermi-
nation of the whites.
On the 18th news came from Cerrillos
that the settlers there were sorely pressed.
At the same time they informed the
governor
at Galisteo, Santo Domingo, and that the
Indians of Galisteo and Pecos, as well as
those OF San Marcos and of the pueblo Of
Chi-gu-may or the Cieneguilla, were pre-
pairing to advance in force upon Santa
Fe. 1t became apparent that the out
break was general, that it had completely
succeeded outside of Santa Fe, and that
soon that town would have to bear the
onslaught of the combined forces of all
the Pueblos together 1t was also as
serted that the Apaches and Navajos had
joined the village Indians.
In regard to these latter point we
may as well state here that it proved
| untrue.
THE APAcHEs AND NAvAJos
did not join the Pueblos in any
numbers. At Jemez, it is said, that they
participated in the murder of Fray Juan
de Jesus, but there is no positive proof Of
it. The fighting and numbering done in
1850 was by the Pueblos alone.
The frame of mind in which
THE INHABITANTS OF SANTA FE
were placed by such intelligence may
be better imagined than told. The
town held at the time about L.
900 people all told, including the
soldiery. TIE total number OF men at
arms was 100, of which five belonged to
the garrison. Through an unfortunate
but inevitable occurrence, that garrison
had some time previous been weakened
by the absence of thirty of its best men.
OEvery three years the king of Spain
10 Io ali of ~
was called the "limosna," that is: The
stipend which formed almost the only
revenue of the priests. 1t way not big
pay. Every priest received $50, every
lay-brother 230 pesos per annum. 1t
was the custom to send body Of picked
men from Santa Fe to Parral in Chi
huahua, to escort the "limosna" safely
through the dangerous regions extending
between these two points. Therefore,
Otermin had dispatched the maestro de
campo, Pedro de Leyba, and thirty
soldiers on this errand. The garrison
was therefore reduced by that murder.
AMMUNITION WAS NOT PLENTIFUL
either. The same convoy that brought the
''limosna" was also to replenish the stores
and bring powder and lead. Well might
Otermin see the outbreak with deep con-
Germ, for he was not able to stand a long
blockade. With little over 100 effective
men he had to protect about 900 non
combatants, his stores were limited, and
the foe was no longer the Indian, on
foot, afraid of the sight of horse, and
armed with bows and arrows alone.
That Indian was in possession of the cat
tie and herds of the country, of the
weapons of the whites he had murdered.
He was an expert horseman, and knew
how to handle musket, sword and a
lance, how to wear armor. The odds, if
prompt relief should fail to appear, were
overwhelmingly in favor OF the rebels
oTERMIN WAS A MAN OF RESOLUTION.
After rescuing the people Of the Canada
of Santa Cruz, he took similar
steps for the safety Of the settlers
at Cerrillos, and succeeded. Thus he
obtained few more able bodied men, but
also number of people more to feed.
The advantage was more than counter
balanced by the disadvantage in case of a
protracted blockade.
The Indians suffered the people of Ger
rillos to remove without opposition. True
it is that the rescuing force consisted of
picked men, and that they were COM
manded by the best officers. An attack
upon them might have proven disastrous
for the Indians. Besides, the latter were
still in the revelry which always follows
upon an Indian success. Plundering
the houses, the performance Of idolatrous
dances in honor of the victory as we'll as
to invoke the fetiches in behalf of the
future success, required some time. And
then, there was no cohesion among
the Pueblos, no organization. Until the
southern villages were agreed upon the
time and manner of attacking Santa Fe,
and the northern villages had given their
fiat, and promise of cooperation nothing
could be done.
IT rs EVEN SURPRISING
how rapid the movements of the rebels
were, taking into,account Indian dilatori-
ness caused by the demands Of Indian
|