The sun., 1890-06-08

10 Napoleon to abandon the hope OF invadln
n- England and to break UP his camp at BouoRn
l. 1t was In August, 1905. when Villeneuve.
Of despair OF reaching Brest, turned back to Cad
8. and not In October. whom the French an
Is Spanish fleets were beaten-that the plans
10 Napoleon were irremediablY shattered
y Ono OF the most interesting chapters OF thi
!. book is devoted to the discussion OF the prnc
. pal conditions affecting the sea power OF ma
!. tions. These conditions are geographical
i position. physical conformation uncluding nat
n ural productions and olimate. extent OF terri
. tory. number OF population, character OF tn
a people, and character OF the Government an
national institutions. As regards Reographi
r cal position, the author scarcely needs to poin
out that England possessed IA great advantage
over her chief rival maritime rivals, HOLLAND
= and France in that she was neither forced tc
defend herself by land nor tempted to seek e1 :.
, tension Of territory by land. Hollands strength
was exhausted By the necessity OF defendnl
her land frontier. while the resources
OF France were squandered in a ceaseess
effort to gain accessions Of territory at the ex-
pense OF Germany and Italy. In another par
ticulsr the British Islands had tho advantage
over France. The fact that the latter country
borders on the Mediterranean. as well as on
the ocean. while favorable to the pursuit OF
commerce, has been q source OF military
weakness at sea. The eastern and western
French fleets have only been able to unite after
passing through the Straits OF Gibraltar. and
this passage could seldom be effected without
risking. II not mourning heavy loss. The
author OF this volume thinks that the analo-
gous position OF the United States upon the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans would be either n
source OF great weakness or cause OF enor-
nous expense had We o large sea commerce
| on both coasts.
A consideration OF special interest to Ameri-
cans Is the relation which geographical near
ness to the object OF attack bears to the effec-
tveness OF privateering, or the commerce. de-
stroying operations OF cruisers. Having ports
on the North Sea. the Channel. and the Allan
! tic. and also such havens Of refuge as Marti-
| nique and Guadeoupe in the Caribbean. the
| French cruisers started from points near the
| foci OF English trade. Capt Mahan reminds
US that the necessity OF renewing coal makes
the cruiser even more dependent on its port at
the present day than it was formerly. The
United States have no ports very near the
great avenues OF foreign maritime trade. and
unless she could find bases Of operation In the
ports of an ally. her position would be sineu-
larly disadvantaR0ous for successfully pur-
suing a commerce destroying war. The i'm
portauce OF another matter upon which the
author touches Is likely to be recognized before
many years are over. We refer to the geo.
graphical position OF the United States rela-
lively to Central American canal 1t is GER
tain that along this path a great commerce
will travel. bringing the interest OF the great
European nations into close proximity to our
shores. Our position with reference to this
new route will resemble that OF England to the |
British Channel as that of Italy TO tho Suez |
waterway. Or rather from our coiRn OF van |
tage at Key West we shall be about as near to |
the Trans-Isthmian Canal as the English at |
Cyprus are to Port Said. AS our distance. how |
ever. from the Isthmus. though less than that |
OF the European nations. Is still considerable. |
the author thinks that the United States will |
have to obtain In the Caribbean stations fit for |
contingent or secondary bases OF operations.
AS regards physical conformation. II is mani |
fest that numerous and deep harbors are
sources OF commercial wealth, especially If
they are the outlets OF navigable streams. But
Capt. Mahan points out that by their very ac-
feasibility they become sources OF weakness in
war. II not properly defended. Thus the Dutch.
In 1867. found little difficulty In ascending the
Thames, and burning large fraction of the
English navy within sight OF London. On the
other hand. few years later. the combined
fleets OF England and France. when at
tempting landing In Holland, were
foiled by the difficulties OF the coast as
much q by the valor of the Dutch feet In
1914 the occupation OF the Chesapeake and the
destruction OF Washington taught us how
much danger may be incurred through unde-
Tended waterways. Again. In our civil war,
the feeble defences OF the mouth of the Missis-
sippi and the number OF its subsidiary streams
penetrating the country. made that river
source OF weakness and disaster to the South
ern Confederacy.
As to mere extent of sea coast. tho author
holds that this is source of strength or weak-
ness according as the population ia laroa or
nall. In the war of secession. for eIamnle
.ad the South possessed peop,e as numerous
ls it was warike, and a navy commensprats
to its other resources, the great extent Of it's
sea coast and its numerous inlets wouId have
been elements OF strength. Under such condi-
tions an effective blockade Of the whole South-