The Seattle post-intelligencer. [volume] (Seattle, Wash. Terr. [Wash.]) 1888-1914, 1890-08-22

similar 10 this. In North Carolina (Souther-
land VS.. Goldsboro; 96 ". c.. 40, and Duke vs.
Brown, i'd. 121l, in Georgia BELL vs.. Americas,
s. T., 612]: and in Mississippi: tHawkins VS.
Carroll county, So Miss, 7s5). The su-
preme courts of those states held that
no less than majority Of all the
persons qualified to vote was suiicient to carry
the several propositions submitted. But in Car
roll county vs. Smith. Ill o. s., $50, the supreme
court of the United Srates reviewed the case of
Hawkins We. Carroll county, and dissented from
and overruied it. The constitution of Missis-
sippi contained provision that the legislature
should authorize no county to aid any railroad
company unless two-thirds of the qualified
voters of such county ct a special
election or regular election to be held therein,
shall assent thereto;" and this language tie
court, in Carroll county VS.. Smith, held to mean
two-thirds of the qualified voters present and
voting at the election in favor of the p.oposi-
ton, as determined BY the official return of the
result, saying: I'm that connection voter fs
one who votes, not one who, although qualified
to vote, does not vote.". This decision of the
supreme court bat followed its earlier decisions
in similar cases, viz: ST. Joseph township VS..
Rogers. 16 Wall, ga, and County of Cars VS..
johnson, 95 u. s., $780, In the last named case
the constitution of Missouri prohibited town.
ships from aiding railroad companies "unIess
two-thirds OF the qualified voters of the
town, at q regular or special election to be held
therein shall assent thereto" which is
identically the same language, slightly trans
posed, as that of the Mississippi constitution.
above quoted. But what was known as the
Township Aid Act of Missouri, approved
March %, 1865, authorized townships to sub
scribe 10 the capital stock of railroad companies
whenever two-thirds of the qualified voters of
the township, voting at an election called for
that purpose, shall vote in favor of the sub.
nd wi ho tod hat fha In
euage of this Township Aid Act''-'voters OF
the township voting" is precisely the same as
that of our constitution, "voters therein vot-
ing" In that case the parties and the court
agreed In constituting the meaning of the legis-
lative provision to be what we hold it to be
here. that the majority meant was majority of
those who voted; but the defendant in error
commended that the constitutional provision re-
quired a majority of all the qualified voters of
the township, bat not successfully, for the court
construed the constitution and the act to mean
the same thing. and said that any other con.
struction would be productive Of the greatest in
convenience, and ought not to be adopted un.
less the legislative will to that effect were
clearly expressed.
In McCrary on Elections, Sec. 17s, Sd Ed, the
general rule is laid down thus: Where q
statute requires question to be decided =
by the votes of the majority of the voters of a
county, this does not require that majority of
all persons In the county, entitled To VOTE shall
actually vote sffirmatively, but only that the
result shall be decided by Q majority OF the
votes"
The plaintiff. by two insufficient paragraphs
OF his complaint, attempted to set forth a second
cause OF action, alleging that the city OF Seattle
was indebted in about the sum of $i00, 000 which
was s1S9. 746 so in excess of the Indebtedness al
lowed 10 be incurred by law, and which excess
was contracted since the act of February 26. 1890
validating certain municipal Indebtedness,
without the assent of tbree-fifths of the voters
of the city. And he further alleged that the
city was attempting to fund the said excess
without vote, and that it would do so unless
restrained. His application for an injunction
upon this statement of facts was refused, and
we think rightly. The complaint was too
vague, containing, as it did, no statement of any
act on the part Of the city's representatives
threatening the alleged funding At the hear
ing in this court the parties, by agreement.
sought to amend the pleading and obtain a con-
struction of the statute above mentioned, but
we must decline to permit the amendment, as,
in our view, it does not come within the rules
which allow amendments in this court We
have looked into the proposed pleading, how
ever, and find it open to the same objection as
its original, viz: That It shows no acts going
to constitute an invasion OF the limits set up
by the funding act. or threat to invade the
same In short, it discloses no real contro-
versy such as appears in the first cause of &C
ton. The THINGS feared may be done or at
tempted, and they may never be. When some
step in their direction is taken 1t will be time
enough to appeal to the courts.
Upon all grounds, therefore, the action Of the
court below in sustaining the demurrer to the
complaint should be sustained, and its judy
ment affirmed; aud it is so ordered. Costs to
the appellee.
Judge Stiles prepared the opinion, all the