Arizona weekly enterprise., 1890-04-05

l effect would he to annul many of the laws now in force and thus disturb and unsettle the public credit, destroy private rights and bring disaster upon the Territory.
 From the foregoing considerations we hold that the appropriation bill passed by the Fifteenth Legislative Assembly and approved April 10, 1889, is valid law, aud that the plaintiff is entitled to his writ.
 The writ will issue.
 Kihbey, Justice. concurs and Wright, Chief Justice, files dissenting opinion.
 OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE WRIGHT.
 The court, in the majority opinion, rightly hold that section 1925 of the United States revised statutes, as amended, is mandatory in it's terms but the opinion holds that, when con- gress said, in said section, that the session of the said legislative assem- plies of the various territories should "be limited to sixty days duration" it meant sixty legislative working days, and not sixty consecutive days. We are unable to concur in this view; and we now proceed to analyze this sec- ton, and endeavor tq show that the language employed b$ congress neces- sariilv limits sessions of the territor- ial legislative assemblies to sixty con- secutive days; and therefore that the 10th legislative assembly of this terri tory, having begun its session on the 21st day of January 1889, was not, and could not have been, without the permission of congress, in legal ses- sion on the 10th day of April 1889.
 There is no disputes as to the facts. The said 18th legislative assembly, having begun its regular session at at the time fixed by law, viz: on the 2lst day of January, 1889, sixty con secutive days from that date, expired on the 21st day of March, 1889; and it is admitted that the act in question was passed on the 10th day of April 1889. So that the only and vital question is was said assembly in legal session on the said 10th day of April 1889? Clearly it was not. That as sembly was wholly and simply crea ture of the national legislature.
 
 It was the nursling of congress drawing the milk of it's existence from congressional maternity and living, moving and having it's being in the will of congress, an expressed in the 1 federal statutes. It therefore had no real legal being outside of those statutes. Necessarily it existed, if at all, according to their provisions. To those statutes then, to the expressed will of congress, the creator, must we | look for the definition of the rights and powers of the creature.
 The section of the federal statute, containing the principal and expressed limita ion upon tho. duration of the sessions of ;4rriteriai assemblies, is of course sail se.yion 1852, as amended in 1880; there 'ass other sections of thai statute, hqA ger, which shed light upon the tfs Nneafing of this one. The purpose fthe Intention of the law-maker, is of 1he first import ance. We shall have attained true solution of the main question involv- ed in this case, when we determine correctly, if we may be able to do so, precisely what congress meant by the language it employed ID this section.
 It reads: "The sessT5ns Of legisla- tive assemblies of the several terri tories of the United States shall be limited to sixty days duration." Is the latter clause madatory, or direc tory? The court incidently, says it is mandatory in it's terms: but the con clusion arrived at indicates that dis cretion is implied. We are unable to perceive how this can be; because, if the meaning of this language is clear and indubitable and is mandatory, it admits of but one true construction, being susceptible of but one true meaning. Yet the court says: "It remains for us to determine which of the two views, as to the proper con struction to be placed upon said sec ton, contended for at the hearing of the case, we should adopt, viz: upon the one hand, that the session of the Legislative assembly is limited therein to sixty consecutive days from the day upon which the assembly con venes; or upon the other hand, that the session is limited to sixty legisla- tive working days, exclusive of Sun days, public holidays and days of in
 termediate adjournment"
 ' The decision then construes the language to mean sixty legislative, working days, exclusive of Sundays, holidays and days of intermediate ad-
 journment. It seems to us that if this construction is correct, it makes the language necessarily directory, t and not mandatory For the reason } that sixty legislative, working days f exclusive of Sundays, holidays and : days of intermediate adjournment, l would necessarily make the session s endure longer than sixty consecutive l days; and therefore, as the greater in- l cludes the less, while the session might s endure for seventy or eighty consec- : utive days, counting Sundays and ], other days of intermediate adjourn. ? ment, in order to consume sixty legis l lative working days, the limitation T might also be construed to mean sixty V consecutive days.
 e In other words, the real point ol V difference is: plaintiffs counsel con e tend that the above language is di | rectory only, and admits of discretion e while the defendants counsel and the t friends of the court, contend that it ii n mandatory and admits of no discre ion For it is here to be observed q that the most earnest and strenuou t argument of plan if s learned counsel
 including the very able argument o
 assistant U. 5. attorney general ), Shield, fled herein, were, that the sai( tt languague Is directory, only, So tha e it seems to us to be primarily essen d tial to a satisfactory solution of tn ,f problem in hand, to first determine o absolutely, if possible, whether thi o language is mandatory, or director, V only.
 )f Now at the outset, we say thi le language is clearly mandatory, that d. is really surprising that any one shoul ,e question its true import. It might b i'd observed that no mandatory phrase o n sentence was ever employed that wa it not also, in measure at least, direC CT tory. When God said "Let there b D. light" he both directed and command )e ed -: and the glory and blessing of tha