Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1890-12-09
CAUSES OF RAILWAY WAR;.

The problem why the periodically estab-
hshed and promptly broken agreements of
railway presidents to maintain rates do not
last any longer, forms the subject of an able
and outspoken article in the Philadelphia
Press. That journal attributes the evanes-
cent character of such agreements to the in
ducements TO cut rates in favor of sub
sidiarv interests in which railway officials
are engaged, so that In the language of our
cotempcrary railroad officials grow rich
on the economics of a salary of S., 900 to
$4,000 annually, when living at the rate of
$4,000 to $4,000 a year." 1t asserts that
railroad agreements will be kept when
railroad management ceases to be vast give
and take" and shows a commendable dis
position to take the lid of, in the following
Outspokea way:
These preferences create the entire system of
commissions under which agents grow rich by
breaking rate sheets. They make the purchas-
ing OF railroad supplies subject of unseemly
jest They I'LL Wall street with stories of the
advantages given to the speculation of railroad
officers in the stock of their own roads. Lastly
and as only small part of the preference and
favoritism given in all other forms, are the
special rates and privileges given shippers by
unGerblling, by false classification, by special
accommodations in cars and facilities by direct
rebates and cuts. and by every form of con-
cession from tavors of millions of dollars down
to pass or cigar. Men at the head of a
labyrinth of preferences, favoritism and
double-dealing like this cannot make agree
ments that will be kept
There is no doubt that this is a very
timely and truthful exposure of some of the
crying abuses in railroad methods, which
bear their full share in producing cut
throat wars, and in plundering that uni
versal victim of all financial manipula-
ton, the common investor. But the es-
teemed Press is in error in regarding these
as the only influences which lead railway
management, in spite of its repeated prom
ises, to engage in throwing away stock
holders money, each for the charitable
object OF infictiag as much loss upon the
other as possible. There are other infu-
euces firmly rooted in the present condi-
tions, which will continue to produce that
effect until they are reformed out of the
system.
One of these influences is the principle OF
imposing on local traffic all the burdens of
fixed charges and profit, and regarding
competitive. traffic as something which it is
profitable to secure at any charges. No
stronger evidence of this false tendency
need be cited than the formal assertion OF
leading advocates of the railway school
that on competitive traffic anything above
the cost Of movement is profit" 1t will be
seen that such theory permits the rail-
way official to cut rates on through traffic
with the doetrinal assurance that he is moi
inficting any loss at all, but earning q
proft-although the profit fails to make an
appearance in the annual statements. Sc
long as competition is wholly excluded from
one portion of the traffic, and therefore con-
centrated with double force on another por.
ton, the tendency to cut rates will be IRE.
sistible. The railway idea of correcting
this unequal operation of competition is tc
abolish it altogether; but the interests Of
the people are likely to interpose the objec.
ton that it can be more equally rectifed
by securing its uniform operation on all
branches of traffic.
Closely connected with this, and probably
exercising a more direct influence in inspir.
ing railway wars, is the hope OF securing BY
means of this attack on the revenue o.
rivals, their adhesion to an agreement which
will inure to the profit of the attacking
party, or serve the great corporate Interest
of securing profits on fictitious capitalize.
tion. 1t is a very superficial view of the