The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1890-02-13

when COnlu not De turned bN Sucn an extra
ordinary appeal TO be permitted 10 hold on at
Franklin and gather the full fruits of the vic
tory
Gen. Schofeld's campaign from Pulaski TO
Nashville may be summed up in a single
sentence. lie held on at Duck River when
he should have run away, and he ran away
from Franklin when he should have held
on. Not even the disastrous repuse of Hoods
assault aud the awful slaughter of his battal-
ions could overcome. in Schofeld's mind, his
fear Of a repetition of that critical aud in
structive coujuncture" at Spring Hill. He
insisted on running away from Franklin. and
ingloriOusy surrendered field which his rank
and Gle had so gloriously won, in spite of the
earnest remonstrance OF Gen. Cox, who offered
60 pledge his head that they could hold il.
Gen. Stanley. as shown by the statement of
Capt Mhitesides was with Schofeld at the
house Of DIR. Clide. Having safely brought off
his corps and the army trains from Spring Hill,
when the rear-guard reached the vicinity OF
franklin. and il was generally supposed there
would be no battle that day, he rode into the
town TO take much-needed rest after his
wearing. sleepless labors of the day and night
preceding The orders of Schofeld
HAD SCATTERED HIS CORPS,
sending Moods Division over the river, Kim
balls into line with Cox, the right of the
Tw~h ty-third Corps. and haltng Magners in
front. Under these circumstances no one will
presume 90 say, until we know what passed
privately between Schofield aud Stanley, the
latter was in any way to blame for the need
less sacrifice OF two Of his brigades. When he
was aroused by the sounds Of the battle he
mounted his horse and with the instinct of
the true soldier galloped TO the sound OF the
firing. lie reached the front Just in time TO 80
forward with Opiycke's Brigade. and in the
haud-tO-haHd encounter received a bullet
through the bacl Of his neck. He had his
wound dressed rn the field. and did not go
back until the fighting was over.
Gen. Cox. by his conspicuous personal bravery
in his efforts TO restore the breach and by his
strenuous opposition 10 giving up the field 10 the
enemy. with our dead aud badly wounded COM
rades, did what gallant soldier might 10 atone
for his failure 20 have his front properly cleared
for battle Bat he has fully disclosed his own
responsibility in his persistent claim that he
was IN command OF all the troops in action.
ii Wagner's Division was subject 10 his orders,
out Of his own month he is condemned. In
treating of the affair at Spring Hill, Gen. Cox
has declared that Hood cannot shift the re-
sponsibiluy" on Cheatham for his failure
there, because he was himself present on the
field 10 enforce his orders by direct commands
10 his divisions if Cheatham would not obey
them. But Hood at Spring Hill was not in
position where he could see for himself what
was going on Ia his front.
His knowledge came from the sound OF the
firing he heard, and from the reports made by
his suhordinates. At Franklin, on the other
hand, Gen. Cox plainly saw Hoods army form
ing 10 attack, aud COnrad's Brigade fortifying
10 resist that attack. For two hours he watch
ed these preparations approaching the inevi-
table elimination step by step. He was as
fully informed Of what was coming rs was
Wagner il Wagner was disobeying his orders
IN -emaiuing ont too long. Gen. Cox was
watching him do IT, and took no measures TO
l. a Il
muulcate with Lane and Conrad within five
minutes. if Wagner would not obey an order 10
withdraw. They were both remaining in front
under protest Both would gladly have taken
an order from Gen. Cox 10 retire TO the main
line. By what legeFdemain OF logic then does
Gen. Cox declare that Hood cannot shift the
responsibility" on Cheatham for his failure at
Spring Hill, while he complacently permits
himsefto shili the responsibility on Wagner
for the blnnder at Franklin?
IL would also be interesting TO know on what
theory Of the accountability Of a Commanding
General FOR the exercise Of only reasonable
degree Of vigilance, Srhofeld excuses his gross
negligence. For having received the startling
reports OF Cox aud WagncF<and being within
five minutes ride Of the scehe, with nothing Of
importance 10 detain him. be never stirred to
look into situation which sovitally concerned
the safety of bis army; a situation which in
vOlved faulty disposition Of the troops, for
which be was responsible, SO pSlpable that the
private soldiers we're crying out against it. and
IA their Ignorance on whom specifically to
fssten the blame,
WERE CUEsTSG oUR GENERALS
indiseriminately. All the surroundings called
for the utmost vigilance on the part OF Gen.
SchOheld. lie was closely pressed by an active
aggressive General, who led an army almost
double his own iH numbers aud when he failed
70 give that instant personal attention 10 the
reports Of Cox and Wagner which their i'm
p0rtauce called Tor, was not 5ch0feld guilty Of
q criminal neglect Of his plain dirty as the Com
Dauding GeneTaif
The truth Is the surrounding country was SO
open THAI the two brIgadcs Ia their advanced
position could serve 40 useful purpose as a
corps ol observation, and that position was a
biunder from the beginning. For this blunder
SchObeld alone was responsible. il was his or
der which halted Wagner IN exposure when /
on the march 70 his proper place behind the
breastworks. lie was not only the Command |
Ing General, but was also professional soldier /
1sle action Of Cox and Wagner, both Generals 4
or yolunteeEs.l lpainly shows that being within |
easy communication Of SckOfcd neither Of |
them felt at liberty 10 change his disposition
OF the two briEades without his sanction. IL
il manifest when II 2 O'Clock Cox reported the |
appearance Of Hoods army in plain view and
the disposition u the troops az they then were |
b. a faulty one. He c0Hiented himself with |
making tlat report SchoGeld received IL. as
well a. the more detailed report made by Wag-
ner q little later, with the same stOiidity with
which lie had received the message Of Gen. /
Wilson the day before. informing him that
Hood yas about 70 march past his flank Had
Gen. Cox felt full confidence in his own iudR-
ment, and manifested il by display Of some
enca vigofoag action as 50 notably character.
lied Opdycke's conduct when il was proposed
70 make Of his brigade an additional victim Of
Sch0Geids biuBder, be could have secured the
prompt Withdrawal Of Lane aud Conrad. his
battle front would have been properly cleared
for action, bis corps would have been spared
tue shame Of that disgraceful break, aud. more
than ali, hundreds Of brave Union soldiers
would have been saved from needless death.
wounds OF captivity.
The claim that Wagner was acting under a
Discretionary order may be dismissed as an
after thought. The report Of Gen. ScbOfeld
himself shows he halted Wagner in front 20
Tetard tic euemy's advance" When that Or
der was Issued, Sehofeld was laboring under
the liked deusiOn Hood would not attack in
front d. force. The day before he would not
believe Hood wOuld march past his flank until
that feat was fully accomplished. This bit of
practical experience 50 filled his mind with the
Ranking ldna, that the next day he would be-
Iieve in nothing else Notwithstanding his sub
ordinate's report that Hood was forming ia
plain sight ln front, with the evident inten-
Ton oi attacking with all his force. When we
compare bcbOaeids expectation with Hoods
actual action. there Is d certain grotesaueness
ln his plan 10 Tetard the enemys advance
Hood did 8Ot indulge 10 any Urcl liuiusrv susr