New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1890-01-23
Tile SANOAN TREATY.

Some of our Democratic contemporaries deny
that the American Commissioners made good
bargain at Berlin. No judgment rs TO the
quality of their work can be sound unless il is
formed with careful regard for the lines along
which the United States was compelled to lay
down Samoan policy. These lines were few
America was one of three Powers having val
liable treaty rights and commercial interests
in Samoa. Our course was 10 be guided, IN the
main, by the value wa set upon those rights
and interests Germany was bent on bccom
ing the owner Of Samoa, either by anncXing
the group or by anneXing its King. In either
event our rights and interests must be lost
The question was, then, what arc they worth
to us?
From the beginning our policy has been ono
Of accrction, not colonization. From our point
of view TO own Samoa was hardly more dcSir
able than TO have another Power own her.
What we did want was TO have an easily ac
ccssblc South Pacific cOaling station. to pro
tcct our citizens in their trading enterprises.
and to keep opon the passage 10 Australia and
into the South Sea Islands. GcrmanyS rights.
and Englands too, were as good rs ours aud
practically as old, and their trade interest,
were in each case larger. In this situation
with Germany seeking supremacy, what were
we 10 do? What could we do? Obvious
". one Of three things: We could re
tire and let Germany take what She want
ed we could attempt to dismiss her and
assume the Supreme control ourselves, or
we could enter into a peaccablc arrangement
with her and England TO retire was TO give
up everything and TO discrcdt our promises to
the Samoans Public sentiment would never
have tolerated that. TO assert our supremacy
was to enter the lists Of cOlOnizing nations and
to invite if not "A war with Germany, surely
bitter feeling of hostility both at Berlin and
| London. Public sentiment would never have
justified this course. The only one left was a
pcaccablo understanding, and this was what
the people called for.
Mr.. Phelps. Mr. Kasson and Mr. Bates were
! not sent to Berlin. then, to take what we want
ed and all we wanted, just that and nothing
less They were sent to talk the matter over
with Prince Bismarck to show him our posi-
ton, to ascertain his and, if possible, to reach
an agreement with him. II is not improbable
that our contemporaries who have been find
ing fault with the Samoan Treaty have failed
TO consider that those who negotiated il were
friendly disputants engaged in an effort to
harmonic conflicting claims without the Sacri-
fee of vital principles on any side No party
to the controversy, then, could be expected to
come from it with the results fully equal TO It's
claims The appeal was to friendship and
reason, not TO passion and force.
The American Commissioners were much
hampcred by our traditional policy not to incur
obligations nor TO seek sovereign rights beyond
our continental borders This not only invited
Germany to inquire eff you don't want this
thing yourself, why do you stand in the way
of our having it?'-a question the answer to
which is very difficult of appreciation by the
European mind-but it also prevented our en-
tcring into that kind of tripartitc control which
would easily have satisfied Germany. This
cardinal principle of our foreign policy is alto
gethcr unique, and its application to the Sa-
moan controversy the American sine qua
non was source of great embarrassment.