The National tribune., 1890-12-25
REGULAR AND LITTLE MAC.
A Volunteers view Of the PenInsular Campaign.

with four companies Of the I'd Inf Gen. Nc
Clellan appropriated this battalion for his head
quarters camp guard. During the seven days
fight la the retreat from before Richmond, this
battalion used 10 take their places in the line Of
battle, deployed as sldrmishers and fight
through the whole day that is. the Regular
claims 20 have been fighting every day and all
day FOR seven consecutive days
According 10 Gen McClellans statement Of
his organization, the regiments referred 20 were
not Of his headquarters guard. They were Of
/ Mai LCvel's Brigade Gen Syzes's Division.
BY the report Of their brigade commander, they
were engaged Tor only part Of one attcrnooa
/ during the seven days mcntiOncd-June p, o.
/ During the entire seven days the loss OF the
10th Regular lnf. was four killed and IA
wounded
Gen. McClellan's headquarters guard consist
| ed Of the Mcclellan Dragons Sturges's Rifles
4 Oneida New York; Cav, 93d r. Y. Cos. A, j,
/ ii and X ID u. S. Cav. 9Th u. s. Cav, Cos. A
and j., sth II. S. Inf, Cos. L aud q. This little
army probably numbered about 1000 men. OPP
posite their names i'm the returns Of losses for
4 the seven days appear these words NO loss
/ reported" IL shows, rs We have so often heard,
! how careful Mcclellan was Of his men-or at
least, Of himself and speaks volumes for the
/ statement adopted by the Regular: =" In the
strictcst nil italy sense he lMcCiellan) was not
. O fighting General"
ii Is ridiculous 10 call McClellau's stampede
I from Richmond the seven DAYS fight" or, as
I is common, the seven days battles' There
wore hardly three engagements worthy the
name Of battles On the other days there was
hardly more than skirmishing on the part Of
The Union and mainly light On no day was
4 there any serious fighting until the afternoon.
. In the most important Of the engagements, not
/ One-iourth Of the army WAS engaged. Gen.
/ McCleiluus custom was 10 keep rcefOuHhs
az least, Of his army in reserve, and then com
i plain that lac had not men enough; aud has
brave men would whip the enemy az that.
/ Cen Mcclellan, however, in formed the Presi-
/ dent, after reaching the gunhoats, that he had
/ fought his last man, aud that il he could send
/ him even so little as a thousand men speedily,
that they would be Of immense service to him
1 in the great danger he was cncOuntering which
was almost entirely imaginary.
IL the Regular is so inaccurate in matters
/ that should have been within his personal
/ knowledge, what weight can be attached 20 his
statemcutsa as to matters he could know nothing
4 Of personality He is a fair sample Of numerous
4 partisans OF notwithstanding fewer and
I fewer as truth prcvais-who have believed so
many absurd stories circulated in his behalf
even IL they go SO far as 10 make il appear that
one with such a towering intellect as Abraham
4 Lincoln, aud so true patriot, was little better
| than q fool OF a monster of treachery.
The following viii he found substantiated by
the highest authority and so far as the state
F.. meuts OF fact are concerned by the indisputable
evidence contained in the Records, Vols. XII
and NIX, c0ntr8dicting the Regular: "All
! McClellan's corps commanders were good
average soldiers, and would compare favorably
with most Regular officers. One Of them, Por-
Ter, is, by common consent, admitted 10 have
been one Of the ablest and most daring Generals
/ OF the war" Mcclellan was not even a good
1 organizer. He could get his men into white
| cotton gloves, and made has reviews somewhat
/ imposing Probably a majority Of the Regular
officers could have done this much Beyond
this lac was pernicious factor in the army.
/ objectionable faults Of his were thinking that
the rebels were superior 20 his own men in
! hghting qualities and teaching his men too
! great respect for the enemy. good organ
/ izer incuiCatos confidence, not fear. 1t was not
! lac who handled his men in his stampede
/ from before Richmond TO the guuboats. At no
! time on the Peninsula was he near enough 10
a battlefield 10 handle his men, or even direct
/ them. ON the two most glorious bRttlehelds
] Porter handled and directed aud Tor the most
eredit,ble things on the Peninsula the country
must thank Porter, the subordinates and the
volunteer soldiers Of all the corps. Even al
/ AHticiam, Mcclellan was too remote 10 direct
/ nteligcntiv; aud in this indecisive battle he
/ Outnumbered the enemy more than two 10 one,
/ aud he was too timid 10 continue the fight TO
4 what should have been crushing victory. He
never had a serious thought Of attacking Rich
mOHd by Petersburg. When proposing 30 re-
move from the protection OF the gunbOats, IL
/ reinforced by 100000 men, IL was north Of the
! James he proposed 10 move. His position in
/ front OF Richmond was Of his own choosing.
lie had entire freedom 0l action on the Pc
ninsula and was not iuterfeTed with from
/ Washington, If he ever was. lie was constantly
urged 10 fight there but without avail. As it
was, he left Washington In the lurch when he
/ fed TO the guub0ats. dis ground before Rich
/ mona was not 50 Ewampy, nor the ChiCka-
1 hOmiuy such AS 10 render movement ia the least
dihcslt. The creek was lOidable at ali points
and the ground was dry aud dusty when be be-
/ gan has Hight not regiment left the South
/ west 20 reinforce Ice in fighting Mcclellan.
4 This was simply a story got up 10 scare Little
/ Mac, sent over 70 him by spies la the guise Of
/ deseriCrs-a very stale device and il did scare
! him terribly. The rebels had evacuated COriuth
! latter shi!Oh) weeks before, and were as much
4 In need o. reiniorcemcnts as Lee. II not more.
After Shields was pulled OF Jackson, to help
/ Mcclellan, jackson was hiding in the mount-
aims for = time apprchensive Of Shields, his
whereabouts unknown, and the Regular who
/ was asst gngd to watch him could not be per-
Euafed 10 stay close enough TO MIN 10 ascertain
when be started with his struggling aud de-
1 mOraiized force 20 join Lee. Little Mac how
ever, expected TO have a visit from JacksOn's
| rabhle because hc was afraid Of everybody.
/ struct,Un 40 Shiloh md even pretending 10 be-
licyc that his true friends Lincoln and Stanton,
were seeking 10 destroy him and his army be-
/ levin asthere was danger nowhere except with
| himself lie ala not send any plans 10 Wash
iuPJon. lie had no plans that anyone ever
heard o., except 10 crawl towards Richmond,
/ with standing orders not 10 bring on a general
1 engagement" under any circumstance, even ID
the army were attacked by Jess than half their
numbers and then, afraid 10 fight a defensive
battle lu an Immensely strong position against
greatly iulcFi0r numbers, lac must run to the
pnub0ais Tor protect On, meanwhile circulating
I Elauderuus reports throughout his army against
the great and patriotic Lincoln and Stanton.
JIG either Grant, Porter Sheridan, Hancock
Thomas Sherman, Logan OF Pope had been in
command Oh June 27 -03. with the privilege
81 lighting on the defensive, behind gigantic
Qualifications, lined with an sorts Of the best
artillery Including siege-guns, Lees much
smaller army, does anyone believe that any oil
them would not have Teigiccd az such au OF
portunity Of striking a drath-bl0W and wei.
coming The enemy 10 hOspitabic graves instead
Of standing lu trcpidatiOa with over 50 900 idle
men and permitting Ice with the bulk Of his
army, 20 attack a single corps unsupported aud
thea heClnR FOR the EuGbJats, overcome by ner.
vous pf0stmtOnH j. h not fair. rather, 10 SUP,
pose that any Of the Generals named wonlI
have Substantially suppressed the rebellion on
that 27tl OF Juucg Instead, McClellaa'g flight
SGT The COufederacy On It's legs aud put rev
heart into lt--demOrali zcd By tho crushing dis
asters in the West. On Mcclellan, due % hi,
vain and feeble nature, must forever rest tht
} ohium ol the subsequent carnage and waste O.
the thousands Of millions which the country