Arizona weekly enterprise., 1890-04-05
code of 1887.

this session.
 If it be contended that the act of 1880, amending Section 1850, Revised Statutes, is to be construed differently from the provisions of the Organic act of New Mexico on the same sub feet, and that legislative construction upon the latter provision cannot there fore be considered, we find that the first legislative assembly to meet after said act took effect, viz. the eleventh legislative assembly, convened upon the third day of January, 1881, and finally adjourned upon the twelfth day of March following, a total Of sixty nine consecutive days. Deduct ing as before the intervening Sundays, and we find that the assembly was in actual session upon sixty working, or legislative days. Sixty consective days from the beginning of the ses- sion ended with March 3rd. After said date an act was passed fixing the date for the convening of subsequent legislatures. This act was followed and acquiesced in by succeeding assem- plies, until the act of 1887 again changed the date of the beginning of the sessions. Among the other acts was one creating the county of Ora ham, another providing for the issue of bonds and the levy and collection of taxes; others were passed amending the revenue laws and the statute of limitations. During the session the council directly gave its assent to this legislative construction in reject ing a resolution to adjourn at the end of the sixty consecutive days.
 Thus the legislative construction from the beginning has been uniform that the sessions are limited to sixty days of actual session.
 In the case of Moog vs. Randolph CT Ala. 608,) the Supreme Court of Alabama distincly recognizes the rule that the practical construction of the legislature will govern in case of this kind, and gave like construction upon the term "days" in similar provision of the constitution of that state.
 In construing the constitutional pTONlSlOll IIlStI IAlC SSHCldA dooOlhDiy shall not remain in session * longer than fifty days" Justice somer- vile, in that case said: satisfied that fifty days means fifty legislative days, working days, exclusive of the Sundays and other days upon which the Senate and the House concur in refusing to sit by joint resolution of adjournment. This question has been repeatedly considered by the Judiciary committees of the Senate and House ofaRepresentatives, and successive ses- sions of the general assembly since the adoption of the constitution, and their reports concurring ill this view have in each instance been adopted by these bodies, Even if we regard the question as a doubtful one, we would hesitate to depart from the set tied legislative construction of the fundamental law, especially in view of the serious consequences which would necessarily flow from it."
 But aside from the legislative con struetion, we think a consideration Of the subject matter as well as the eyi- dent purpose and intent of the act of 1880, warrants the interpretation we put upon it. Congress certainly con templated that emergencies might arise that would render legislation between fixed dates practically impos- sible. At any rate, that upon Sundays and holidays no legislation would or could be done. If the purpose was to include these, other language more clearly expressing this intent would very probably have been used. A dis tinction should be made between statutes which restrict the number of days upon which acts may be perform ed, and those whichmerely fix the utter for limit of time within which single matter may be transacted. In the former, Sundays and other days when labor or business cannot be transacted are usually excluded; in the latter these are usually included, unless ex pressly excepted.
 Thus it has been held that Sundays not being judicial days, are not to bt considered as days of term of court p Grattan, 924 46 Missouri, IT; 9; J II, 203.
 There appears no good reason wh!
 the same rule should not apply t
 the construction of the term "days
 when applied to matters to be trans
 acted by Legislative Assemblies.
 Were we in doubt as to the COT
 rectness of the above construction
 what would be the duty of the cour
 in the premises? The Legislativ
 Assembly, coordinate branch c
 the government of the Territory, act
 ing under like solemn obligation an,
 responsibilities with ourselves, ha
 passed the act, the validity of whicl
 is in question, which act has beel
 approved by the Governor, who Ina
 taken a like oath to support the Cor
 stitution and the laws of Congress
 and now, are we to declare it invalid
 If we believe that the legislature i
 attempting to legislate after Marc
 2lst clearly, palpably and plainl
 violated the fundamental law of tn
 territory, then most unquestionabl
 it is our duty so to declare. Whil this is true, we must bear in min that among the fundamentals of tn law almost, is the proposition tha : five can declare an act void only whe
 it violates the constitution" Cor orgai : ic law) "clearly, palpably, plainly an . in such q manner as to leave no dout l or hesitation on our minds"
 21 Penn., 162.
 In Adams vs. Howe, IA Mass, 34 the court say five must premise tn; so much respect is due any leglslatiN 1 act solemnly passed and admitte 9 into the statute books that a court law which may be called upon f decide it's validity will presume it - be constitutional until the contral : clearly appears, so that in any case '- the kind substantially doubtful Il t law will have its force. The legi,l 8 ture is in the first instance the judl l. of its own constitutional powers, al
 it is only when a manifest assumpti( 'f of authority or misapprehension of r. shall appear that the judicial pow !, will refuse to execute it." In Ke .s lucky it has been held that if it e doubtful or questionable whether u e legislature has exceeded its linn
 the judiciary cannot interfere, thou! e it may not be satisfied that the 2 l. is constitutional. 2 Mon. IFS.
 AI