The morning call. [volume] (San Francisco [Calif.]) 1878-1895, 1890-10-29
\ VETERANS BIRTHDAY.

The celebration of the birthday of a SOL
der by simultaneous banQuetS at cities so
far apart as New York and Berlin is so IN
usual an event that 1t almost becomes his
torical In fact, Hellmuih, Count Won
Moltke, Field Marshal of the German army,
has made his mark so firmly on the history
of the nineteenth century that everything
which concerns him interests the annalist Of
that century. He has been large part of
the times which the historian will have to
describe.
His biography is familiar to most readers.
Two or three points in it are of especial in
terest. He was what is generally called an
old man before he made his mark. He had
seen some little service in Turkey when he
was 40, and had worked laOorousy in the
staff offices of the Prussian army for the
twenty years ensuing But he was % years
old before he showed, in the Seven Days
War, that he was one of the most consum-
mate captains of the age. He was 20 when
he planned the mastery campaign in
France, which made German victory a
forced conclusion. Some other Generals
have been tardy in developing their quality:
Marlborough was % when he fought the
battle of Blenheim, but we know of no
his art was unknown to his comrades until
after he had passed bis sixtieth year. Won
Mol.ke's life, too, had not been passed in
the practical observation of war. He was
bureau officer, ever busy with charts and
muster-rolls: his chief concern for many
years was with the caliber of rifles and the
fashion Of uniforms. Yet when the time
for action did come no youth was swifter in
movement nor more energetic in carrying
out plan of campaign than he. Years do
not always cool the blood.
Another interesting point is that the key
to Won Moltke's irresistible strategy was the
simple rule which Napoleon always I'M
pressed on his generals, 10 have more men
at tue point Of impact than the enemy could
assemble. This was particularly conspicu-
Gus in the Franco-GeTman war. Wherever
the Germans met the French they were either
two to one or three to two. This was the
fruit, first, of -the compulsory enlistment in
the German army of an enormous proportion
of the able-bodied male citizens of Germany
second, Of an admirable system Of mobiliza-
tion, and third, of carefully prepared sys-
TEN of transportation, which never broke
down. The French never thought Of in
creaSing the strength OF their army; their
cadres showed force which to the Emperor
seemed sufficient; it was only on the field of
battle that 1t was discovered that a large
percentage of the men on the rolls enlisted
on paper only. Again, the French plan of
mobilization was defective; it was found
impossible to concentrate on one spot the
force which the Emperor had. Finally,
the French transportation service was
woefully inefficient. Whole divisions were
kept in the background from the want
of railroads to move them. The Emperor
had reached that point in his career when he
was reluctant to override commerce, indus
try and agriculture on the ground of military
necessity.
He relied on the valor of his troops, and
the reliance was not misplaced. The Ger
man loss at Woerth and GrayelOtte was far
greater than that of the French In other
wars those actions would have been classed
as French victories, and would have been
followed by German retreats. But Won
Moltke had provided so many fighting men
that, notwithstanding their losses, the Ger
mans were stronger after these battles than
they had been before; and they pressed on,
brushing the French before them by sheer
weight of numbers. The same tactics ena-
bled Won Moltke to split the French army,
to shut up oue-half of it in Metz and to
corral the other half at Sedan. Both opera
I tions involved an overwhelming preponder-
ance of numbers. With anything like equal
numbers BaZaine would have cut his way
out of Metz, aud MacMahon would have
given battle in the open. instead Of allowing
himself to be trapped in the cul de sac by the
Meuse. But the Germans were so superior
in numbers everywhere that to fight was to
court defeat.
This strategy was effective, and in war it
is results which count. If ever it falls to our
lot to be engaged in another war it is to be
hoped that its record will not be story of
glorious victories won over superior force.
We ought to make sure of having more men
at the point of collision than the enemy
can muster; ever remembering the adage
that fortune is usually on the side of the
heaviest battalions.