News and citizen. [volume] (Morrisville, Vt. ;) 1881-current, 1890-08-28

terval, and Meade's re-enforcements came
to the scene and the crisis of danger on
Cemetery Ridge was over. But the First
Minnesota was gone. Forty -seven men
rallied on the return. Fifty were dead or
diving and three times that number were
wounded. Not one was missing, for never
a soul surrendered, and no man lodged
the ordeal and left the ranks. Forty-seven
heroes marched back to the ridge, and the
blood marks of Confederate shot were the
certificates to account for the absences of
215 brave men left behind.
This loss amounted to 50 per cent. of
those engaged The killed and mortally
wounded numbered 20, or 2S per cent-an
appalling loss when one reflects that the
meaning is that of every five men four
were hit and of every four one was silenced
forever The justification for this sacrifice
is best expressed in the language of him
who was responsible, Gen. Hancock, He
said: 81 ordered those men in there be-
cause | saw that | must gain five minutes
time Re-enforcements were coming on the
run, but / knew that before they could
reach the threatened point the Confeder-
ates, unless checked, would seize the
threatened position. | would have ordered
that regiment in if had known that every
man WOULD DC kliIGO. IL ilttei w NC uCL-SI
and was g:itd to find such gallant body
of men at hand willing to make the ter
rible sacrifice that the occasion demanded"
The only other regiment in the whole
war to reach percentage of loss among
the eighties was the First Texas, Hoods
division, in that terrible ground Of carnage
in front of bunker church, Antietam,
Sept. II, 1862 The situation on the ground
was one of the most trying known to
modern warfare. The Confederates were
on the defensive with inferior numbers.
The odds We're with them If they could
foresee the points of attack. Mcclellan
was moving in two columns, direct i'll front
and flank movement on Lees left, where
Stonewall Jackson had command. Around
bunker church, which stood near turn
pike, was an elevated wooded position
which Mcclellan hoped to seize by com
bined assault from two directions.
On the Confederate front there was
wide, open stretch, with some elevated posi-
tions available for Union cannon if the
Confederates would allow them to remain.
Directly in front of the church, some hun
dred wards distant, was a field of thick
corn and small, detached wood, and on
the Confederate left flank of the corn field
was the best high, open ground for Union
batteries Whoever controlled the corn
field could control the artillery site.
Hoods division advanced from the
woods around bunker church toward
the corn field on the morning of the 18th.
They had occupied the ground the day be-
fore, when the enemy was on one 'front.'
only, the direct one and they advanced
cautiously through the tall corn toward
what was supposed to be the only threat
ened point, and where re-enforcements
were needed for a fight already in progress.
The First Texas was in Wofford's brigade
and was in the center, with two regiments
on either flank. While marching forward
in this manner Col Wofford saw the col
umns of Union troops threatening his left
regiments and ordered che First IeXas to
face to the left and help beat OH the en-
envy. The regiment responded, but in
short time was ordered to move by the