Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1890-12-01
NEW Works. GREAT PERIL
Secretary Tracy Pictures the Result OF n
Naval Siege.


Naval Siege.
HOW THE NErRoPoLITAN CITIES MIGHT FALL A
RICH PREY TO A FOREIGN FOE WITH BATTLE
SHIPS - HOW BoMBsHELLs AND STARVATION
WOULD WORK on MASHATTAN ISLAND
Secretary Tracy in his annual report paints a
startling picture of the unreliability of our
seacoast cities in connection with his recon-
mendations for the increase of the navy. He
saws:
The aim Of the Navy Department during
the last year in carrying out the provisions OF
law in reference TO the increase OF the navy
requires little description further than tina,
which has been already given. It is the aim
that was adopted and steadily pursued during
the early years of our naval history-to build
ships of vnrious types for various purposes.
each one Of which should be the best Of her
type in existence. The objects to be attained
in the battle ships in the New York (armoretl
cruiser No. 81. in Ne. 6. in No. IL and in the
torpedo cruiser are distinct and well defined,
and il il believed that: taken as whole, they
point out with a cleaTnCsS tnat cannot be mis-
taken the true policy Of naval construction
which this country should adopt to meet the
demands that exist today. 1t Is safe to say
shat. in the present state OF information on
this subject 10 mis- iake can be made In dupli-
=
In the sca-goiIg cugst-line battle ships the
United States possesses three vessels. which.
though few IN number and of less displacement
than the monsters now building in Europe. are
powerful as any battle ships III the world.
In nv report of Last year L stated that, in my
opinion, twenty ships of this class were re-
qrlired adequately to protect the two coasts of
the United States. Such. however, IL the great
power both offensive and defensive. of the de-
sign evolved during the past year that the de-
f,4ix 70
ure. There Is no d0ubt that twelve such battle
ships as are now in course of construction
would equal in efficiency for our purposes
the 20 that were then contemplated. and with
n suitable proportion of harbor-defense ships.
cruisers ard gun boats would put the coasts of
the United States in position where they
might be free from al anxiety as to the conse-
Quences of attack from abroad
AEMoR AVAILABLE.
II appears that the building of battle ships
will not he DISTRACTED b. the want of armor
As far as other material and the necessary work
thereon are concerned. including design and
construction both of ships and engines the
department was never more favorably situated
for carrying on operations than a. the present
time.
Whatever line of construction Congress
should now deem ii best 10 follow m. the de-
partnlent would draw especial attention to the
necessities of the most vulnerable points along
The coast with view of providing. as Ear
possible. for the protection of the enormous in
terests at stake IN those localities. The stretch
Of coast from Fortress Monroe to Boston con-
tains four large cities. one of them a vast ag-
gregati0n OF cities, the store houses of national
wealth. which today Is entirely accessible to Gn
enemy. The defense of these four commercial
seaports is problem of vital interest to the
whole United States. The states OF 3lassachu-
sets. Connecticut. New York, New jersey.
Pennsylvania. Delaware. Maryland and yir-
ginia are perhaps nearest TO the danger. brit a
danger that threatens the coast and seaports
of these states is n danger to the whole country.
Any measure upon which there localities unite
Congress could not fail 40 adopt.
There Is no other instance in the world a.
the present time of so much wealth in so ex-
posed q situation. To protect il requires a
combination of guns afoar and guns ON land.
Especially at that angie made by the shores of
New England and New Jersey. the junction of
internal and external lines of communication.
where 80 mach of the worlds commerce
centers, should every reasonable precaution be
taken TO prevent the entrance of d hostile force.
The peculiar confGuration OF Long Island
solnd, with the harboTs and bays afrordiny
shelter in its neighborhood. the whole forming
highly advantageous base of operations for u
maritime assailant, ia such that no enemy's
feet should ever be allowed to gain an entrance
therein.
NEW YORK's DANGER.
The harbor of New York at the present time
Is entirely defcnseless. The forts a. the Mar
rows would offer no obstruction to the entrance
Of a feet. Any vessel. whatever her size or
character. armed with the modern eight-inch
guns-which. be i: remembered are far from
being the heaviest guns aAoat-could lie out of
range of the forts and destroy them. As for
Long Island sound. il has 10 forts worthy of
the name, and the entrance to the East river
by that route Is as unobstructed as the Mar
rows Il NAV be said that guns could be
mounted on shore 20 are at such a fleet. The
army Possesses no modern guns for the pur-
pose, and the cast-irOn shell from the guns now
IN Its possession would make no more impress
sion on modern Ironclads than hailstones ON a
roof. 1t is likewise thought by those who are
ignorant Of the actual conditions that tor
pedoes would prevent the entrance of the fleet.
The fact Is We have no torpedOes. Stationary
torpedoes or mines. indeed. We have. or could
make and lay IN abundance. but attacking
fleet could pick them UP or countermine with
out danger To itself. leaving clear path for its
ships vi automobile torpedoes, which, though
not principal means of defense, would vet he
contributing factor. we have not one at the
present time. As for our unprotected cruisers
II they stayed in port. it would only be to become
involved III q general capitalization. There is
nothing. therefore, to prevent the access of q
neet to New York by either the eastern or
the southern entrance.
with neet once in the harbor the conse-
quences would be Of such magnitude that the
country at large could not disregard them.
Inc popular impression is that the danger of q
sea coast city Is danger of bombardment with
ransom as an alternative. II il not regarded as
apressing danger. being opposed to the civil
zed tendencies OF The age. and at the worst a
menace that can be bought off, Leaving out.
however, the possibility, if such a possibility
exists. that "a state at war will forego an over.
wheiniine strategic advantage out Of Difference
TO the civilized tendencies of the age and that
any state or city Is rich enough to pay the $50
Vooooo OF slOoOOOOOO that may be exacted as the
price OF immunity, the dan ger does not stop
mere The terms Of ransom would undoubt-
euiy include the surrender Of al the shipping
naval or mercantile in the port. In the case of
new iork- Il Is hard TO say what limit would be
nxed to ransom. and Brooklyn and Jersey
SiIy WoaId contribute their shares.
STARVED OUT.
But the calamity would not end with the pay
ment OF money and the surrender of ships
An enemys feet once in the waters Of New
York would remain there Commerce would
De annlhliated- Communication would be alb
.oiuteiy cnt of. The ferry boats would cease
70 run; The Brooklyn bridge would be closed
70 tranc as the condition of its preservation
fihahs, tae railroad communications would be
90, ana tne food supply of two and one-half
nniphs OF people would come to an end. Cap
ItaIisls might afford TO pay a ransom but
famine woald sall first on the homes of the
poor Inc ransom paid BY that population
would De anything which il was in their power
70 give anu which the fleet in the harbor would
seespt as the price for its departure.
any one fancies that this is an overdrawn
picture let MIN make "a simple calculation of
sae I nSs I Of food daily required by two and