The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1890-12-13

again the dismal echo Failure" He
wrote. "Under ordinary circumstances the
Federal army should have been destroyed"
The one day of the seven when Lee had
chance to destroy the army of Mcclellan
the decisive day of the campaign on our side
was June So the last day of McCiellan's
march in his change of base. On that day
our forces were stretched along ten miles
of road, the leading columns Selling stra-
tegic positions on James river and fighting
off Confederates bent on the same purpose,
the center warding off powerful attacks
which threatened to cut the long line In
two, and the rear holding out against
another powerful force coming up to catch
our columns between converging fires.
On that day Lee knew for the first time
after Mcclellan withdrew from the lines
before Richmond just where his opponent
was and how to strike him effectually, and
he had his troops we'll in hand to do it. Yet
the day was to him and to his lieutenants
one of great humiliation, and was wonder
full surprise to the Union soldiers when the
truth became Known. When Lee found
that Mcclellan had abandoned the upper
Chickahominy and was moving without
secure base anywhere he planned atrap for
him as perfect, owing to the lay of the land
around the Union army, as could be con-
ceived.
Mcclellan, on leaving the Chickahominy
to go toward James river, had to pass
White Oak Swamp on a single road, and,
as Lee took good care, he had but that one
road all the way to the James. Beginning
with the point on James river aimed at by
Mcclellan, Haxall's Landing (see dia-
gram Lee sought to spread his army like
net from The James along the west side
of McClellan's path 30 the swamp on the
north, thence around down the east side to
the James again to the head of the net.
That head he hoped to close by Selling
commanding ground at Malvern Hill,
above HaXall's. From points of vantage
all around this line the several Confed-
crate corps were to assaif McCiellan's col
umns, and either drive them to corner
en- masse or break them up into weaker
bodies and thus have them at their mercy.
Under the circumstances it is plain that
McClellan's safety lay in getting his army
together, and with great body, including
troops, artillery and trains, to move on
one road. Time was everything to him.
On the Confederate side rapid movement
was everything, and the column depended
upon by Lee to drag the loose end of the
net anu 10 IluSNl6 -hCbltllGuS SCdblGTtu III
visions pell nell into thes-danger pockets
prepared for them was ssonewall' Jack
sons. Jackson was following up the Union
army across White Oak Swamp. He had
his own valley army, D. II. Hills corps
and "Jeb'' Stuart's cavalry. Jackson and
Hill, with infantry and artillery-foul
large divisions, of not less than 10000 mer
kept the direct road, and Stuart, with al
his mounted column, moved across coun
try on Jacksons left flank, to close thu
avenues of escape against Mcclellan OF
the east The task OF direct pursuit wa;
assigned to jackson, because his army haC
been nearest to Mcclellan when the move
ment began.
On the morning of June 30 the situation
was one of gravest danger for our disiointeC
and unsettled lines. Only one corps on
of five had reached James river, and TIT
Confederate column of Gen. Holmes, con
sisting of the garrison troops of Richmond
city, Petersburg, the river batteries ant
railway guards, was moving down tn
river road to seize Malvern Hill, wher
Mcclellan desired TO concentrate. Tn
other Union corps were strung along tn
road back toward White Oak Swamp
where the Sixth, under Gen. w. B. Frank