Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1890-04-20

the real facts, that the South Fork dam
could not possibly be broken, and the next
day the tidings came that the South FORK
dam was broken, indeed. There is no argu-
ment strong enough to stand the assault OF
fact. There was school of learned phiios,
ophers who seriously argued that the Wofio
about us is not real; that all sound and color
and shape are in our minds. But they
never actually persuaded anybody. There
were too many hard facts on the other SIDE.
Whatever the metaphysician may say about
the limits of religious thought, the world
does pretty generally believe in an lnhnite
personality whom we call God. And, now
ever ingeniously it may be established by
logic that nobody can really be convinced
of Gods existence, we know better. The iacts
are on our side.
And not only that, but we pass from this
first proposition to a second, and afflrm that
the process by which man is convinced OF
what he cannot comprehend in the spiritual
world is precisely that by which he is con-
vinced OF what he cannot comprehend In
every other domain of thought. Religion
has no monopoly of the incomprehensible.
Mystery is not confined within the limits of
the creed. Everything we see about us
leads away into the infinite. At every step
we tread upon mystery. We ecannot start
4 series OF questions anywhere without get
ting speedily into the regions of the un-
known. 1t takes but a short journey to
land US beyond the circumference. If
we must comprehend" in order to know,
we may as we'll confess that we know moth
ing.
WE MAY KNOW IN PART.
1t is perfectly evident. however, that we
may know something about matters in re-
gard to which we cannot know everything.
l know that grass is green, but I know not
why. 1 know that the wind blows among
the treetops, but I cannot see it,
and 1 know not whence it cometh
nor whittier it goeth. 1 know that
we have just passed throuph strange win
ter, with an Easter day for Christmas, and
dandelions in January, but not a weather
bureau in the world can tell me why. Do
we know nothing about the stones in the
field, because we are ignorant of the origin
of matter? Do we know nothing about the
flowers in the garden, because we are abso-
lutely incapable of comprehending the mys-
terry of lile? Do we know nothing about our
friends, because no mind can know another
mind perfectly?
Our knowledge Of the mysteries Of re-
lision is the same kind of knowledge which
we have of the mysteries of daily life. There
is difference between comprehending and
apprehending. To apprehend is to touch
only one side. Human knowledgeis is mainly
apprehension. Whether it be OF the world
about us or of God above us, it is simply
every day a conviction of the existence of
that which we cannot in any measure COM
prehend.
So far as agnostocism means denial of
the possibility of complete knowledge, we
CT oil ha NlA
agnostic of all books is the Bible. "Canst
thou by searching find out God?" is its con-
slant question, and the answer is always a
negative. "Verily thou art god that
hidest thyself." "Clouds and darkness are
round about him"-and yet nevertheless,
righteousness and judgment are the habita-
ton of his seat. The clouds are thick
enough, and the darkness dense enough, but
they do not hide that. And this most ag-
nostic OF all books is at the same time the
most steadlast in its faith. We cannot know
God, but we can know great deal about
God. We must be OF necessity in a con-
dition OF great ignorance about the first
cause, but we can know enough about it to
be able to make up our minds pretty intelli-
gently whether it is mind or matter.
THE ATHEIST AND THE THEIsT.
So we come to the choice between the first
two answers: Is the first cause, matter en-
dowed with force, or is it mind endowed
with will?
How shall we proceed to decide? Why,
just as we would proceed to decide about
the intellectual ability of man who had
written book-we would study the book;
just as we would proceed to decide about the
mechanical and artistic ability of man
who had built a house-we would look at
the house. 1t is perfectly plain that the
way to find out anything about the first
cause is to study its effects.
The effects OF the first cause are of two
kinds, represented by the first two of the five
facts with which the argument began. The
first cause, whateverit is and however it has
worked, has somehow brought it about that
the world is, and that am. There are ac-
cordingly, two kinds of phenomena to be
examined, one represented by the word
Nature and the other by the word Man.
What kind of cause lies behind these
phenomena; is it matter or is it mind?
Surely, the phenomena can tell u.s. To the
examination of these two kinds of effects we
therefore address ourselves. This examina-
tion will occupy the next two articles.
GEORGE HODGES.