The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1890-12-13

Inns other division, with which Slocum
was holding the curve from the swamp
down to Summers line. Feeling himself
overwhelmed Franklin sent to Sumner for
re-enforcements; but later on, when Sum
ner was pressed by Longstreet and Hill,
Franklin returned the borrowed troops
and Slocum loeaci Sumner a brigade.
This left only seven Union brigades at the
swamp holding off Jackson's splendid
army and Huger's column as well.
The afternoon wore away with the heavy
artillery duel across the swamp, and the
sullen roar of the battle between Sumner
and Longstreet reminding US of the dan
gers menacing our line of march. Jack
son stated in his report that the sounds of
battle at Glendale made him 'eager to
press forward, but the marshy character
of the soil, the destruction of the bridge
and the strong position of the enemy de-
Tending the passage prevented"
The artillery firing continued all along
the swamp until late in the evening, and
at the bridge crossing until midnight.
The Confederates made no other attempt
to force the passage, and it was evident
that Jackson's pursuit was foiled. Firing
ceased at Glendale, Longstreet having
penetrated to within range of the road and
then stopped to wait for Jackson to come
up on Summers flank. The day was ended
and the crisis passed, for under cover of
night Sumner and Franklin could hasten
on TO the James. In order TO deceive the
enemy on all sides Franklin ordered few
guns to be fired up to the last moment.
The troops buckled their straps tight TO
prevent the rafting of Announcements when
in motion The same was done with the
teams, and blankets were wrapped around
the wheels OF cannon to ensure silence.
Then all moved on at n snails pace.
found myself sleeping in the line while
standing on my feet, and some portions of
the march, just before daylight, could
never recall.
| We passed so close to Longstreet's pick
cts that we heard their movements, and
could plainly distinguish forms around the
/ fires of his artillery camps. A cough, q
rattle of armor or the neigh of horse
could have betrayed us, and then those
/ guns, ready trained to rake the road
way, would have belched forth grape. But
no alarm was made, and with the coming
of light we took up rapid strides toward
| Malvern Hill. We were not moment toe
soon. Holmes and Magruder had beer
alert and knew McClellan's position. Th'
guns opened before noon, and in a shor
time Longstreet and a. 2. Hill arrived
and bloody work began. Jackson's column
arrived late in the day, and although d
II. Hill fought his division CALAMITY Jack
sons own troops were lite getting int
position and accomplished nothing HI
was almost as effectually barred out her
as he had been the day before at Glendale.
The comments by prominent generals en-
gagged that day on Jackson's failure t.
force the swamp crossing are very de
cided. Franklin admits that Mcclellan
would have been defeated on the 30tl
''had Gen. Jackson done what his grea
reputation seems to make it imperativ
that he should have done"
The Confederate d. H. Hill, who wa
with Jackson at the time, speaks of tn
latter's ''inertness on this OCCASION" ant
says: Had all our troops [Jackson's AM
Hill'sl been at Frayser's farm [Glenda.e
there would have been no Malvern Hill"
That is equal to saying all would hav
ended June 30. LoEgstreet, in his &c
count, complains that of $4,000 Confedel
ates within three miles of him Lone cam
TO his support at Glendale. Jackson,
he wrote, SHOULD have done more tha
be did. If he had been there we woul'
have destroyed or captured Mcclellan
army" Jackson would have been ther
had he not met his peer at White Oal
Swamp. GEORGE l.. KILMER.