The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1890-08-03

plaineu ol the want vi uisacs
for this purpose. We are not
clusiOn ~ Ia the amount Of scouting
force required. unless We carry ont opera
tons designed "a furnish us with practical
! experience in the matter. Furthermore.
nearly all foreign maritime Powers have
large number OF torpedo boats. II may De-
said that in general the strategic plan OF
these Powers il 20 collect groups Of these
boats at many points on the coast. Lines
along which fleets must act or individual
ships must proceed pass in front OF these
points. II would he highly instructive to
ascertain how FAR of from the bases OF these
otiIlas the lines must be drawn 10 insure
immunity against torpc,lo-boat attack.
\ There j. very common belief that this dis
lance may be- less than one hunoied
miles. The marUuyrrs will give AN OPP
poriunity OF testing the soundness OF tins
belief. Fleets Of the heavier modern ships,
compelled frequently to replenish with coal,
will, OF course. often have 10 anchor, pro-
baby in r0adsteads Offering little natural
defence against attacks by torpedo boats
Operating from comparatively distant bases.
| IL i desirable ID ascertain the most efficient
mode Of protection against thcse-whcther
by active or passive measures and also 10
| form some estimate of the distance from the
| torpcdo-bOat base which would give rcason-
able security tO the anchored ships.
Accordingly the general scheme of ma
nWuyrcs appears to have been designed for
the purpose OF furnishing a practical solu-
ton OF these important problems. The
hostile fleet, under the command OF Vice
| Admiral Sir Michael Iulme-Se, mour, will
| PUT Ia sea as soon a hostilties are officially
declared TO have begun. and take up the
position which may appear To it's com
mander 10 be most suitable for establishing
a h.lI ~
| object Of attack. Twenty-tour hours after
the departure Of the hostile ileet from its
base,the British fleet, under the command
OF \ibe-A dmiral sir George IryOn, will also
put 10 SEA 10 look for the enemy. with the
object either Of engaging and defeating him
or of compelling him To- seek the protection
of his base. such being the general idea,
il will of course. be- necessary To specify
portion Of the seas adjacent 10 the United
Kingdom ~ that occupied by the trade
route 10 be attacked and defended. and ~
the operations are To Lee purely srrategical
and imaginary, 80 far as the actual
course OF trade il concerned. this
portion may be selected not merely
without regard 10 the actual course
of trade, hut 50 rs To avoid the actual
course Of trade as Tar as possible. Further
more. inasmuch rs a hostile ilect establish
"a upon an actual trade route would have
az it, mercy all the maritime trade of the
power opposed 10 it which continued 10 fol-
low that route. the actual capture of mer-
chant vessels following that route becomes
unnecessary for the purpose Of the man1u-
Vres, and will, we understand. iorm no
part OF the operations. All that the hostile
fleet viii be- required 10 ID Will he 10
maintain it, position within De area desig-
mated for attack, while doing its best
10 avoid "a general engagement with the
superior force OF IT, enemy. ana all That the
British fleet will be required 90 do viii be
To find the enemy 10 bring him b. "A general
engagement ii possible and, failing that, To
compel him 10 return into harbOr. II Sir
Michael Culme->eymOur can hold his own
within the designated area without being
brought n "A general engagement or driven
from his cruising ground by the slightly SUI
periOr force of sir George lyon, he viii be-
adudged to have succeeded in his object;
and, cOntrariWisc. sir George InOn VIII
be adjudgCd 10 have succeeded II he can
either BRING his enemy 10 an engagement or
drive him back upon his base. While these
main operations are proceeding, division
OF the supposed enemy's torpedo boats Will
be- stationed with an cscorting cruiser, al
Attorney, and will use that station a. a
base Of operations against the reserve llcct
stationed at Portland, or against any ships
OF tine British fleet that mal navigate the
hannel Attacks on fortified ports VIII,
we believe, form no part Of the proposed
operations, since, the opposing COS being
assumed to be- nearly equal, sucn attacks
would IN actual warfare be- sirategically
impossible. Attacks ON uniOrtihcd coast
towns will also be prohibited, because they
are liable to misconstructon. and could not
affect the general result OF "A war conducted
under the assumed conditions.
II only remains to indicate the limits as
signed by the general scheme of the
manauNrcs 10 the trade route supposed Ia
bee attacked by the hostile llect \ point
tn miles south of the Lizard being taken ~
the starting point, the eastward unit "i
This area runs along the Channel from
point 10 point at distance Of ten miles due
south Oi the Start, Of II. taihcrinCs, OF
Beachy Head. and of Dover. respectively.
In the opposite direction Oi the Atlantic
this eastward limit ram, from the same point
ten miles due south ct the start through
aaOthcr point in - deg. north latitude and
H. deg. 80 min. west longitude, being pro
lOngcd indefinitely in the souihwesterly Iii
rcctiOn. In like manner the westward limit
IT the designated area starts from point
lO mile, due west of the ~cilly Islands and
runs n0rthorly Ia CarnsOre Point, AT the
southwestern corner Of Ireland; IN
-outherly and westerly direction II runs
from the same point. 10 miles due west
of the Scilly Islands, 10 point
no miles due west OF | shant. and thence
through another point IN II degieos noith
latitude aud ~ degrees west Ion itude. IT,
extension in this latter dir, ction being In.
definitely prolonged. I'm all cases the bear
ings given are true bearings and not mag
netic. If any one viii be- at the pains 10
mark out the above limits on "A chart OF the
Western Atlantic, he will find that the
area assigned la the hostile operations Of
Sir Michael Cuimc-SeymOur and the fieet
under his command practically includes The
entrance 10 both the English and the IRISH
Channel and the principal maritime routes
cOnyerging ihcrcupOu. It's indefinite eN-
tension towards The southwark and west
ward might at first sight be- supposed con-
siderably Ia increase the difficulty OF SIR
George TryOn's task Of finding the my
and compelling him 10 abandon his cruising
ground; bat = little consideration Will
show that, tor PRACTICAL purposes,
this indefinite extension Of The area
Of attack in direction which takes
the hostile admiral further and further away
from his base is Of little moment or adNan-
tage. The distance AT which hostile feei
can effectively operate on TRACE route ~
determined IN practice, not by arbitrary
paper limits. but by the very practical con
ditiOns Of coal. endurance and speed, and,
though sir Michael Culme-Seymour - theo-
rrtically free 10 90 a. far as III" Azores II
he chooses. it il probable that these ineNof-
able conditions VIII compel him To coniine
his operations Ia much more northern lati-
tudes.
such is the general scheme Of the ma
nWuyres OF 1870. We shall have further OPP
Dortunties Of commenting on II IN detail
while the operations are In progress, AMI
we content ourselves for the present with
giving general outline and "A description
OF their main purpose and scope. We be-
lieve that the official programme
Of the operations, together with
the rules and conditions 10 be- OBJ
served By opposing ships and ileeis,
will shortly be- made public. But, ~ many
rumours are ail0at, and as much misappr'-
hension. as well as much curiosity, seems
10 exist in many quarters concerning the