The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1889-01-31
from any of the men composing it; but it is fair
to suppose that they were

from any of the men composing it; but it is fair
to suppose that they were
LULLED INTO AN UNUSUAL SECURITY
by the report of the previous evening that the
enemy had fallen back, and that there was
consequently no danger to be apprehended.
This suppostion seeing 20 me likely enough.
It certainly goes far toward explaining how
an enemy in force passed and captured strong
and well-connected picket-line of old soldiers
without occasioning alarm, and gave, as first
warning of its presence, a vOlley of musketry
into the main line of unarmed soldiers. Itwas
reported in camp as coming from the enemy
that he first relieved part of our lines by his
own men dressed in our uniform; but have
never been able TO confirm the rumor
The proceedings up to this point were bad
enough for Us, as it gave the enemy, almost
without a struggle. the entire left of our line,
with considerable artillery, not gun of which
had fired shot. But the reserve of this line
was posted a considerable distance in its rear,
where il could be made available as a movable
force, and was well situated to operate upon
any force attempting to turn our left Itwas IN
no way involved in the disaster of the first line,
which was, after ALL but a small part of our
force, being only one weak division, and its
loss was in nowise TO be taken as deciding the
tate of the day.
With the other troops brought up, this sup
porting division was in good position to offer
sturdy battle, with every prospect of repulsing
the enemy; and aided, as it soon would have
been, by the rest ofthe force, the chances were
largely in our favor
Here the battle should have been fought and
won, and long before midday the discounted
enemy should have been driven across Cedar
Creek, stripped of all the captures of his first
attack. But from some unexplainable cause
the troops forming this part of the line would
not stand, but broke under a scattered fire
I1F,,- ,arffcr ntacE
apprehension in raw recruits, much less in old
soldiers like themselves Most officers who
have served through this war have had in
stances Of the same kind in their own expe-
Tience and will readily understand this, though
they may find themselves as much at loss for
a satisfactory explanation of its cause.
1t was
THE BREAKING OF THIS LINE
which involved the necessity of falling back.
A change Of front was necessary, and this must
be made 10 a position which would place our
force between the enemy aud our base. That
there was no intention Of retreating the sci
dieTs who stood fire clearly understood, and
when once brought into the new position, in
the face of the enemy, they were ready to ad-
vance upon him, as was shown by their mag
nifcent attack when ordered forward.
To the Sixth Corps, which it was my honor
to command after the death of that noble sol
der, Sedgwick, to its officers and its men, l
desire to acknowledge the obligation which, in
addition to the many others it has imposed it
laid upon the country by its steadiness, cour-
age and discipline in this important battle.
Without disparagement to the soldierly quail
ties of other organizations concerned, it is but
just to claim for ii large share in the successes
Of the day. Being, from the nature of the
attack upon our lines, somewhat IN the posi-
tion of a reserve force, and therefore fairly to
be called upon to turn the tide of unsuccessful
battle, it came up nobly TO its duty, fully sus-
tanning its former well-earned laurels.
To the commanders, one and all, the full
need Of thanks is due That they bore them
selves bravely is evidenced by the fact that of
the general officers one was killed. five more
or less seriously wounded, and all lost their
horses from the enemy's bullets; while the list
Of casualties viii show that their sub0Tdinates
were in no degree behind them in gallantry
and devotion to duty. In one division there
was but enc field officer for duty when the
battle was over.
WORDS OF PRAISE.
Where ali did so well, it may seem invdious
to attempt to discriminate; but l desire-to call
attention to the division commanders 10 whom
so much of the success of the day was due.
BreYet Maj.Geu. Ricketts, was severely wound
ed early in the action; Brevet Maj.-Gen. Get
ty, subsequently, i'm command of the corps till
it was resumed by me, after the arrival of Maj.
Gen. Sheridan, stoutly contested the enemys
advance, aud gave time thereby for the neces-
sary formations; Brevet Maj. Gen. Wheaton,
who conducted himself gaiantly, and Brig
Gen. Keifer, who was in command of the Third
Division during the entire day (Gen Ricketts,
being first in command of the corps. and sub
sequently taken wounded from the feld.)
To my own staff, also, l was, as usual under
great obligations for important services render
ed, often in circumstances OF the greatest dam
ger. Their names have already been submit
ted TO the War Department, and their merits
acknowledged by the Government.