The Daily bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Hawaii]) 1882-1895, 1889-11-21


these classes from the election OF the
Supreme Court instead of its APP
pointment by the Crown?
There is room for intelligent dis
cussion of the question raised re-
garding the power TO name the Min
istry. II is question that is given
aptness by generally admitted
weakness in the Constitution. The
discussion between this journal and
correspondent, "BystandCr,
showed the nature of this weakness.
1t amounts to the triple alternative
of a purely personal choice on the
part of the King, the operation of
private and extra constitutional I'M
derstandings between the King and
politicians, or the absurdity of rctir-
ing Ministers appointing their own
successors. There is chance for
wrangle over the point of whether
the first or the last of these modes
is the more consistent with the Con-
stitution, while either of them can
not avoid having its results upset
Immediately by vote of the Legis-
lature. 1t is the clear occasion for
an amendment existing in this mat
ter which brings it within the do
main of practical politics. Another
political platform recently issued
proposed that the Ministry should
be elected by two-thirds vote of the
Legislature-another evidence that
the people are seeking remedy for
an obtrusive difficulty. None of the
methods referred to in the foregoing
sentences are analogous to known
republican or monarchical systems.
The nearest approach to parallel
is our existing system where the
King chooses his own Ministers and
the United States system where the
President selects his own Cabinet.
Ostensibly our system is akin to the
British limited monarchical system,
but according to the strict terms of
| our written Constitution ours has no
| such limitations as theirs. AS there
have been disputes about the nature
of the British system in Cabinet
changes, We quote below from an
official statement of that system as
copied ny New South Wales from
the Mother Country. The quotation
is from "The Wealth and Progress
of New South Wales 1882" Is
sued by the Government of that col
ony, and is as follows:
The Cabinet must be chosen from
-"G) Members of the Legisla-
ture; CD Holding the same poll
teal views, and chosen from the
party possessing a majority in the
House of Commons; (5) Carrying
out concerted policy; (i) Under
q common responsibility, to be sig
nilicd by collective resignation in
the event of Parliamentary censure ;
and 90 acknowledging a common
subordination to one Chief Minis
ter.
The following is so calculated tC
be obstructive to our people that il
is worthy OF being quoted in this
connection. 1t shows how the PEG.
| pie, in conjunction with the posses.
sion of the rules above given, car
control the personnel of their rulers
through their representatives with
out voting them into Office directly
The Imperial rule as to the cir
cumstances under which a Govern
ment is bound TO resign, is rs fol
lows: Censure, involving loss o.
office, rests entirely with the Lower
House, or popular branch of thu
Legislature. Hence directly n Min
istry fails to command a majority o.
the House of Commons it must Civ,
place to another. Want Of conf
dencc in Cabinet may be shown il
three ways; first, by a direct vot'
of ccnsure, or specific declaration
of want OF confidence; secondly, b,
a vote disappearing of some act o
the Government; or, thirdly, by tn
rejection of some important measure
introduced by the Ministry. In an,
of these cases Ministers must eithe
resign or appeal to the country, i
they can get the Sovereign to sane
ton n new election.
1t seems to us that the adoption o
rules, as similar to these as the diff
ferent conditions of the countrie
allow, III or statutes-we shout,
be averse to loading the already pie
thoric Constitution with such detail
would remedy the defect referre'
10 in our fundamental law.
There is not space left for dealing