Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1889-08-11

rope Az JACKsoN's COMMISsARY.
However. on July 81, 1862, A. j. Hills
division was ordered to join jackson. Az
soon 50 Fill joined him mark with what
rapidity he acted On August 9TH he
caught Banks at Cedar Mountain. and once
more showed how q small army may be
superior at the point Of contact 20 the
fractions Of a larger. His superiority was
not great-20, 600 10 II, 900. according to the
best cstimates-but il was sufficient. HIS
own reputation. the confidence OF his
troops, and their war-tricd experience
under him. were elements which added IN
definitely 20 his fighting strength: Inc
widc-swecpinC move round Pope winch fOi-
lowed depended for its success first on
Jackson's faculty for carrying out secret
nanruvre, secondly. on the trained march,
ing rapidity Of his troops, and lastly, on
the fact, which had become apparent tothe
Confederate generals. that the Washington
authorities had so tied Pope 10 post that
il YVES safe TO march around him because
he could not move. II israther remarkable
that IN General POpe's description OF the
campaign he appears 20 treat the loss OF the
stores at Manassas junction as Il tritilng
matter. In tho long run, no doubt, that
loss NAV not have been very important to
the well-supplied northern armies, but
there cen be no question that bOth by us
material and moral effects its enormously
increased the Generalization OF the mon
army after the second defeat at Bull Kun.
Before that battle il exercised most dlsaS-
irons influence by shaking tho confidence
Of men and officers III their COMMANDER
however much Justification he mey nave
for throwing the responsibility for 1t upon
other shoulders In campaign men 90
not nicely argue out questions OF al
stract iustice: 10 IL the broad effects
which tell on the spirit of an army.
There can be no doubt that in fighting
the second Bull Run the successful
raid was worth several thousand men 70
the Confedoratcs from the encouragement
il Afforded them and the depression IT pro-
duced among their opponents. when l
was with General Lees army at Wlnches-
ter, in the autumn of 1862, the soldiers IN
every camp laughingly spoke of Pope as
Stonewall JackSon's COmmiSsary," 80 en-
tirclv had Jackson in tho Pope campaign"
depended upon capturing from that gene
raj every thing ne required for his men
LEE AND MCCLELLAN.
Concerning General Lees first invasion
OF MARYLAND. General WOlsclcy SAYS: Lee
had driven back the Army of the Potomac
and that of Virginia TO the point IRON
which they had started IN the spring and
summer He knew how demoralzed these
armies had become from repeated defeats,
and he was fully aware Of the scar" when
POpe's disasters bad Occasioncd al wash
ington. Mr.. Lincoln was known to be very
nervous for the safety of that capital. Lee
felt that if he could but still further IN
crease this fear of losing Washington he
might so retain tho Federal armies III its
neiChbOrhOOd as 10 free the northern dis
tricts Of VIRGINIA from all hostile occupa-
ton during the autumn. His object Was
to keep McClellan's forces far away from
Richmond until winter had so destroyed
the roads as TO render all field operations
near that city practically Impossible.
Although n vast amount Ofvaluahle equip
ment and military stores had been taken
bv the Army of Northern Virginia from
Pope. it was still very badly supplied
army aud sadly in want of transport.
notwithstanding this fact Lee thought
his best plan to accomplish the end no
had in view was to invade Maryland where
the southern cause had thousands OF SYM
pathizers, and 10y that operation keep
the war mt a distance from Hlchmond.
Lee had, however. it seems TO me, under
estimated the reyiyifying influence which
Mcclellan exerted over the Federal armies
when again placed in actual command
of them; nor did Maryland afford him
the assistance he had expected. lie also
miscalculated the time required Tor the
capture of Harper's Ferry--a miscalcula-
ton which placed him in position Of real
danger. An enterprising commander, not
impressed as Mcclellan always was with
the notion that his enemy was vastly
stronger than he actually was, would then
have pushed Lee worry hard, indeed Nc
Clellan, with Lees plan of campaign IN
his pocket and the large force at his dis
pOsal, was in the position where really
great general would have destroyed an adj
versary who had crossed the Potomac and
distributed his troops as Lees were on the
18th, 14th, 10th, and 16thlof. September.
1862.
THE BATTLE or ANTIETAM.
The battles of South Mountain and An
tietam proved to Lee that his army was not
strong enough to carry out an aggressive
campaign against the now united armies OF
the North From the moment that McClel-
Ian had restored confidence to the north
ern army and, thanks to the captured DIS
patch, had made up his mind to act, 1t was
obviously Lees policy TO avoid fighting as
much as possible and recross into Virginia.
Antietam, though battle unwlttngly
fought by him, was, however, unavoidable.
1t is necessary TO estimate a generals pur-
poses in judging what he has gained OF lost
by a battle That the actual result on the
battlefield was Confederate victory
seems to be little disputed. Lee had gained
what he had hoped TO secure by that bat
tie. which was to make good his repassage
of the Potomac The Confederate army
had won "a battle, but had achieved no
victory, whilst the COnfcderacy had failed
in its intention to carry the war into the
enemy's country. Colonel Kyd Douglas
states the case very fairly when he says:
THE prestige of the day was with Lee,
but when. on the night of the 18th, he re-
crossed into Virginia, he left the prestige
of the result with Mcclellan" page 629. }
LEES ADMIRABLE GENEBALsHIP.
Lees management of the battle against
vastly superior forces was wonderfully sue
cessful. His retreat afterwards was as
wise and necessary as 1t was admirably
conducted 1t is only for school-boys that
retreat under such circumstances can be
said 10 take anything from the prestige of
men like Lee. He was soon to show against
generals who, rs Mcclellan put II, acted
before they were ready" how brilliantly
he could deal with the opportunities VIC
tory gave him, rs well as with circum-
stances which, as in this instance, made
it necessary to prepare the way Tor re
treat.