New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1889-05-14
CHTCKAMAUGA.
A NEW HISTORY OF THE BATTLE

General staff In the Imperial Guards OF huS ~.
With Eight Maps svo, PIP. x9'' ""'""s"
gus Printing Co A.,
General John B. Turchin is one Of thoSe
foreign soldiers who put their swords "no 'HS4'
professional knowledge at tho service VI 'n'
Union at the time Of the Rebellion, anu "nO0'
rsllantry and skill were so OFTEN olhunguioneo'
In the Chicksmsuga campaign No commanoo"
Advisable In the division of General Reynolds, and
during thu two days fight IN the ChloEAmauga
Valley he led several desperate ana SUCCESSFUL
charges In the present. volume he has recorded
ro. oniy his personal reoollectens on one OF the
bloodiest battles Of the war; but series OF
careful observations made during tho past twenty
xsa,., and fortified by surveys taken ON the field
of battle together with yeritcations by the AID
at the Official records 1t is @ book written by
professional soldier Of large experience and full
knowledge, and while it is in places liable to
he charged with prepossession or prejudice accord
ing TO the point of view occupied by the reader,
the general accuracy of the details and the general
weight of the criticism must secure it respect
full consideration and cause its really great merits
AZ a historical document 10 be widely recognized.
The first point OF objection likely TO be taken
AGAINST General Turchin's history of Chickamauga
is his view of the relations Of General Rosecrans
IN H. His attitude is that Of stanch advocate
and defender of that commander, and 1t Is apt 10
he complained that in attempting to JUSTIFY 'hls
positon be passes too lightly over events ana dls-
nositions which have been regarded by many mill
tary critics as fatal 10 the theory Of RosecranSs
eanaoity. It Is somewhat curious that General
Turchjn makes no reference to the Comte de Parlss
account of this campaign. Grants opinion nc
mentions only to disparage it. But the Comic dc
Paris has so msrshalled his views as TO constitute
an arraignmenS Of Rosecrans in the ChlcKamaugs
campaign which, whether just or not Is serious
enough to demand specific efutation. There is
certainly In this book no sufficient iusahcauon OF
that SEPARATION of Rosecrans's army which. had
BRAGG been more energetic or had he been better
served by his ieutenants, would almost certainly
have led To the crushing of the three Federal corps
in detail before they could concentrate. 1t IS OF
course no defence If this movement 70 say that
the commander of the Army of the Cumberland
was misled by defective information; that he be-
Beved Bragg to be in full retreat, when IN fact
he was massjng his forces for great attack. IL
s clear that the procuring Of accurate information
Is one of the first duties of commander, and that
failure In this argues TO that extent, want Of COM
potency But no historian of the Chckamauga
campaign, however friendly TO Roseorans, has hith-
.rto escaped the unavoidable logic Of the fact that
several times in the course of those operations I'M
njnent disaster TO the Union arms impended, and
In each case was avoided not by the superior
sagacity and prescience of the Union commander.
but by the sluggishness or want OF judgment Of
the Confederate chief
When Rosecrans discovered the danger into
which he had thrust his separated corps; when,
chat is to say, ne learned that Bragg was cGncen-
trating on Lafayette and that retreat was the last
thing in his mind he set himself promptly 10 con-
centrate his own forces. but in so doing be ahan-
doned perforce the whole plan Of campaign. When
the battle was Joined on the 9th. moreover. Rose
Grams had not completed his dispositions and was
not ready. General Turchn asserts truly that the
two-days' battle was more in the nature of wild
scramble than q military operation that the con-
tending armies fought flcrcely and stubbornly in
the wooded country without any particular OBJ
jective: that Bragg, when his first plan of attGck
proved failure, could think of nothing better
than TO throw his whole force upon Rosecrans in q
kind Of n-fshtIn2 way, and that, conSe-
auently. the battle, though technically drawn
one, was, SO far its practical results are con-
eerned, Union victory. But nothing Of this can
be credited TO Rosecrans He pr0hted by the
errors Of his antagonist, but he did not take ad-
vantage of them, as greater captain would have
done and 1t must be pointed out that when uncx-
pected disaster betell his own army he was by no
means fertile in resources. Thus, when the right
centre was broken on the second day by the irrup-
ton Of Longstreet's corps into the gap made by
Woods untimely movement and rout followed
which for time was believed 10 extend TO and In
clude the left. the conduct Of Rosecrans was, 20
say theleast peculiar. That he was carried bodily
away in the stream Of fugtives may account for
his going as far Rossviue: but why, being there
did he elect to retire still further to Chattanooga
instead of returning to the field concerning the sit
ka II bod info fint,
justifying the conclusion that everything lost.
So far as lie was concerned, everything would
have been lost az that juncture II Thomas, the
Rock of Chickamauga," had not been present to
hear the brunt of the rebel attack. The whole
long heroic fight upon the Horseshoe Ridge that
afternoon, in fact, took place without any initia
tive from the commander-in-chief. Thomas was
virtually in command on the battlefield long
before Rosecrans formally delegated the command
70 him by orders from ROSsvIlle Rosecrans was
of course not responsible for the ambiguity Of the
written order which Wood, seeing its error, never
thcless undertook to carry out. But Rosecrans
was responsible for going into battle without re
serves end therefore for the loss of time In bring
ing up troops TO meet LongStreetS attack
which loss Of time had such seri"uS and nearly
fatal consequences. Again. General TurchlL
fpllv recognizes that the Union rank and file saved
the day in the second battle of Chickamauga. The
prestige and splendid example of Thomas were OF
great influence, no doubt. but Horseshoe Ridge was
held by the determined and indomitabe pluck OF
the American volunteers, who on that occasion
defied apparently overwhelming numbers and were
not discouraged even by the exhaustion Of their
ammunition. What would have happened but
for the critical interposition of Steedmans brigade
and batteries, when the rebels had massed fol-
their last desperate combined assault Of the Ridge
IL is difficult 10 conjecture; but the fact remains
that Chickamauga was emphaticaly soldiers bat
tic from o'clock p m. on the goth until the close
General Turchin points out Braggs mistakes
clearly. The attempt TO conquer the Ridge, hi
says, was wasteful blunder The Federal Dn'
was not only attenuated It was disconnected ant