The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1889-05-02
JUDICIAL BEHESTS.
Abstract of Decisions Rendere,
by the Supreme Court.

The supreme court decided the follow
ing cases yesterday:
w. W. Walling vs. j. W. Hsnning, from
Bexar county. Affirmed. Stayton, j.
Missouri Pacific Railway company vs. A
F. Richmond, from McLennan county.
Reversed and remanded. Stsyton, j.
Terilds Crsvens ct al. vs. N. M. White.
from Fannin county. Reversed and re-
manded. StsytOn, j.
w. F. Garter Va. Samuel Millikin ct al,
from Parker county. Reversed and re-
manded. Stsyton, j.
Senior Little ct al. vs. W. 8. Baker ct al.
from McLennan county. Reversed and
remanded. Henry,J j.
E. Boon VS.. M. E. Miller ct al, from
Jack county. Affirmed. Henry,J j.
Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio
Railway company vs.. Henry j. Ware, from
Kinney county. Affirmed. Gaines, j.
j. M. Hamilton d Co. vs.. William Pres
colt, assignee, from Bexar county.
Reversed and remanded. Gaines, j.
Jane G. Torrey ct al. vs.. W. Cameron d.
90. ct al, from Taylor county. Decree:
If appellees see proper to remit the judg-
ment as to lots % and "a in block z, in the
town of Abilene, the judgment will be
affirmed; otherwise it will be reversed and
remanded. Gaines, j.
In the Richmond case plaintiff sued the
railroad company for damages for pub
fishing his name on black list as rail-
road conductor discharged for careless
ness" Among the exceptions overruled
by the lower court was one which ques-
toned the capacity of corporation to
publish libel and denied appellants re.
sponsibility for damages actual or exem-
plary on account of publication which,
if made by an individual, would be libel
Gus.
Heidi That corporations, like indlvid-
uals, may become liable for damages ex-
emplary in character, the main question
being as to whether they become SO liable
when the wrong committed is such as
would authorize the imposition of such
damages on the guilty agent, or whether
it must be shown that the managing agent
of the company directed the wrongful act
or subsequently ratified it. The evidence
showed that the company was operating
about 5000 miles of railway and had about
$4,000 employees, to whom the list was sent
Heidi That communication made In
good faith in reference to a matter in
which the person communicating has an
interest or the public has an interest is
privileged, if made to another for the
purpose of protecting that interest; and
that communication made in the dis
charge of duty and looking to the pre-
vention of wrong toward another or the
public is so privileged when made in
good faith. Further held, that the court
below should have granted new trial on
the ground that there was no evidence to
show express malice, without which,
under the circumstances of the publica-
ton, the language complained of wac not
actionable, and appellee was not, there
fore, liable to either actual or exemplary
damages. Even if as claimed by ap-
pellee the publication had been placed
in the hands of the agents of other railway
companies without malice, but for the
sole purpose of enabling such agents to
to avoid the employment of unsuitable
persons, whether 30 communicated by re-
quest or not, looking to the public inter
est involved, such publication would not
be actionable. 1t was the duty OF the
agents of the road to place the informa-
ton in the possession of employers of
ra lroad men. Judgment reversed and
cause remanded.
In the Hamilton case, Prescott was
assignee of a firm of which Hamilton d.
Co. were creditors. The latter ran an at
tachment upon the stock Of goods
assigned, and the present suit was brought
against Sheriff Mccall and his sureties for
the value of the goods. The sheriff had
an indemnity bond from appellants, and
asked Judgment gsinst them and their
sureties in the event of judgment against
himself. They filed an answer to plain
tlffs' petition. More than two years after
the filing of the original petition plain
tiff filed supplemental petition replying
to their ans wer, in which he asked judg-
ment directly against them, and to this
supplemental petition they pleaded limi-
tation. The plaintiffs recovered a judg-
ment against the sheriff and his suretles,
and against j. M. Hamilton d. Co. and
their suretles, in which it was ordered that
the execution shonld be levied upon the
property of appellants before proceeding
against that of Mccall and his sureties.
From this judgment j. M. Hamilton d
90. alone appealed.
Appellee confessed error as to the
courts ruling on the question of limita-
tion, and asks that the Judgment, in 80 far
as it is judgment in his favor directly
against appellants, he reversed and rem
dered for them. Appellants, replying by
an amended brief, claim that upon the
confession of error the judgment should
be reversed and remanded as a whole.
Held: When the creditor is brought into
the suit, being primarily liable, he should
ordinarily have management and control
of the defense, including the right to ap-
peal and to set aside the Judgment fol
error whether the sheriff, who is protected
by his bond, appeals or not; and il he re-
verse the judgment obtained by the
plaintiff against him it should be reversed
as whole. For the reasons assigned the
judgment of the court below is set aside
and the cause remsndel for new trial az
to all the defendants.