The National tribune., 1889-05-09


cover Of the tim Der and smoke, made their close
proximity Sc apparent that part Of Morrells
Division gave way, others following, and no
attempt being made TO restore the line, gen
eral retreat was ordered, which was made so
hastily on one part Of the field that y cannon
were abandoned and about $500 men on an
advanced position in the timber, not receiving
the order ia time, were captured
WITH A GENERAL WHO WAS ASLEEP on THE
GROUND.
With the advantage Of the ridge, the obstacles
to overcome the punishment Lee bad received,
attended with considerable decentralization, and
our great strength in magnificent artillery 50
guns, il is not unreasonable TO say that the po-
sitiOn could have been held, even against the
odds and Doubtless the men would have held
It. but for the moral effect Of the retreat the
night before, and that the way for further re-
treat was made so plain and open with the OBJ
vious indecision OF the CommandeT-in- Chief as
TO fighting or retreating. No part Of the line
was driven from the field, nor yet panic-strick-
en-. The men fell back very much as If they
thought they had done as much as was expect
ed OF them. Under the Circumstances, with
the usual exceptions, they fought more heroic
ally than might have been anticipated, but
had they been held 10 theiT work with the
resolution exhibited on some other fields mot
to speak Of decent support from the main body,
and had there seemed j necessity, Lee would
Doubtless have met disaster at the hands Of
about one-lourth Of the army. As 1t was, he
failed for the time 10 follow mp his success Col.
Powell tells as that be slept with his regiment
on the field at P0rters extreme right, where
Jackson had been so much dreaded, IN bllssial
ignorance of the retreat not having received
the order, and expecting to renew the fight IN
the morning. Mcclellan had stood idly by all
the afternoon, with four corps Of upwards OF
5000 men, and gave his to0-loyal friend Porter
no aid OF encouragement that could be called
such, not appearing Oh the field, and deaf TO
his frequent calls for adequate help. Indeed,
he ordered his corps commanders not to pro-
yoke lght with the little force at their 'front.'
and cautioned against general engagement
il is impossible TO disguise the fact that he was
in an ague Of fear nj purely imaginary danger
which naturally infected his corps command
uTs; and even the men ia the ranks showed
Signs OF uusteadiness-little blame 10 them.
The same day, later, Mcclellan Inquired:
lave the gunboats yet arrived ?"
PORTER MADE A BALLOON ASCENSION
the very morning Of the fight. He says he
knew that the rebel camps were deserted very
largely. and that il was known at headquarters.
Yet Mcclellan could not believe his eyes, and
was duped by stale devices and imaginary
danger. is il surprising then that man who
would be led so far astray by his imagination
IN bis sci importance, would imagine that Lin
coin and Stanton cOnspired 10 sacrifice our
gallant army 10 ruin biml
Sen. y. II. Hill SAYS: " be could have captured
the city Richmond with but little loss Of life.
The f0rti6cati0ns around Richmond as that time
were very slight" he could have done better
He could have swept around on Lees flank
"outside Of his notifications = while he had
his hands full with Porter, and anuihilated the
rebel army and ended the war then and there.
The Chickahominy is an insignificant stream,
and perhaps 20 feet wide, and was then ford
able. ana was no obstacle. Certainly Lee did
= !.
ment violated one Of the best-established rules
Of war-a maxim Of Napoleou's: Flank
movements within reach OF an enemy are
rash and iniudicious." Lee, however, in Nc
Clelian's time. always counted moving any
way and anywhere outside of his works with
perfect impunity, with inferior numbers and
was even bold enough TO attack. Mcclellan,
not 10 speak Of attacking, was afraid 10 hold
hls ground at this time behind lortiications.
Porter's loss IN killed was So; il wounded
S,lO9, Out OF, say, y, ,000-scmethiHg more than
double Jaclzson's at Port Republic al the hands
OF 5000 inca. Lees loss probably exceeded
Porter's 50 per cent.
That night the celebrated council of war was
held. he only prominent peTsonages present
were Mcclellan, De JOinyilIe, Porter and
Franklin. They reached the conclusion that
they were nOt safe. and safety being the para
mount object at that timen-not the suppress
sion OF the rebelliOn-they decided to run for
safety 10 the protection Of the gunbOats, with
over 100000 men before greatly inferior num-
bers and throw the blame on the Administra-
tiOns at the same time in the belief that the
movement was one Of extreme hazard. The
same night Mcclellan sent 10 Washington a
lengthy and probably the most mcndaciOus
and inpertinent dispatch ever penned by the
e0mmaEderof OF a great army TO his superior In
connection with his previous dispatches he led
them 10 infer that he had been attacked by
100000 men, including Jackson, If not Beanre-
gard Eith an army from he West. In the
lace Of the fact that upwards Of 1900 of his
men bad not fired a shot, be said "On this
side we repulsed several strong attacks. On
the let bank our men did al that men could
do, but they were overwhelmed BIZ vastly snpe-
riOr numbers after ! brought my last reserves
lnto action. The loss On both is terrible / be-
leFe ii 8ii prove 10 be the most desperate battle
o. the war. The sad remnants of nv men
behave Is men. Ny Regulars were superb
Had / even 10000 fresh troops to use tomorrow
could take Richmond; but ] have not a man
In reserve, and shall be glad to cover nv retreat
and save the material and the personnel OF the
army / know that few thOusasd men would
have changed tais battle frem defeat 10 a vic
tory hIth much more, be wound up: " IL
save this army BOW. i tell you plainly that
owe no thanks 70 You. OF to any other person in
Washington. Aou have done yOnr best to sacri-
Zee thizarmy." We who knew
THE SUPERB REGULARS"
know that they were very far indeed from
being the best fighting men IN the army. After
the faets were known, la the more barbarie
days o. Napoleon, ior ike conduct. be would
doubtless have SHOT Mcclellan without hesifa-
tion. The President told him in reply. among
other things. TO save his army at ali events.
that if be had had drawn battle or a repulse
On account Of not having men enough. that he
was not 20 blame, and that neither was the
Government, for lie had notified them less than
& week before that reinfOrcemeuts were Ieav
ing Richmond TO confront them 1t was in
the nature oi the case. In a postscript he said
Gen. Pope thinks If you fall back it would be
much better to 90 toward York River than
toward the James"
Had he adopted Pope's suggestion he woul5
have received his aid, aEd al the same time
have covered Washington. But lie would have
had 10 cross tie Chickahominy, and il wonId
have involved an immediate fight. He con-
sidered u safer for himself 10 move for the
Runboais on The James although be was Ieay-
ing Washington IN the lurcb, and Lee at liberty
70 move there when il pleased him. take If
and Jet Mcclellan have Richmond Tt Eonld
have been good exchange for the Confederacv
During tic night lie telegTaphed TO Flag officer
6oidsbotough. send some 8aht-draft guuboats
at once up the Chiekahominy as far as possjble
We have met severe repulse today. HAVING
been attacked by greatly superior numbers
and ] am obliged 10 fall back between fbe
Chiekah0miny and the James River" The
next daV Richmond was still oueu Ia hin, .,,5