Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1889-02-01
SALOON MEN.
License and Bond Of Saloon Men-COn-
stitutiOnality of the Question.
One of the Most Important Opinions That Has
Been Handed Down by the Higher
Courts in Some Time.
Special to the Gazette.

court of appeals in the case Oh Dave
Fahey VS.. the State. 1t treats of the IL
cense and bond of saloon men and the
constitutionality of the question:
Dave Fahey VS.. the State. No. PAS;
appeal from the criminal district court of
Galveston county.
This is a conviction for pursuing and
following the occupation of selling spirit
Gus .vinous and malt liquors in quantities
less than one quart without first having
obtained a license therefor, and without
having paid the tax required by law.
This prosecution is based upon the acts of
March II 1881, and April 4, 1881.
Appellant moved to quash the indict-
ment upon several grounds: /. Because
the laws of March II 1881, and April 4,
1881, levying the occupation tax and pro-
viding for the issuance of a license Is I'M
constitutional and void in this, that said
acts contain more than one subject, to-
wit: the exercise of the police power, and
that Of taxation for general revenue, and
embraces subjects not expressed in the
titles of the bills.
.. Said acts are unconstitutional in this
tax to the state, county and city in adj
vance for the term of one year as con-
dition precedent to the right of pursuing
said occupation, while all others are per-
United to pay quarterly; and are in con-
tiict with, and Tepugnant to sections 10
and - of bill of rights, and 3, article
of the state constitution, and the four
teenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States in this, that they re-
quiTe license of persons pursuing the
occupation Of appellant and the billiard
table keeper, and require none OF per-
sons pursuing any of the occupations
taxed by law, and provide no means for
obtaining a license by such other persons.
First ground: Do the acts of March
II, 1881, and April 4, 1881, contain more
than one subject? If so, they are VOID.
The constitution provides that mo bill
shall contain more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in the title
Art. 8, Sec. 361. In the preceding con-
stitution the word "object" was used in
stead of the word ''subject. -
Judge Bonner in - 81 Tex,
34I observes that cit may be presumed
that the convention had some reason for
substituting a efficient word from that
which had been so long in use in this con-
nection; and that in the light of judicial
expressions, the word "subiect' may
have been thus substituted as less re-
strictive than "object. In the Peo-
pie VS.. Lawrence G36 Barbour, 1921 the
supreme court of New York says: 1t
must not be overlooked that the cOnstitu-
ton demands that the title of an act shall
express the subject, not the object of the
act. 1t is the matter to which the stat
ute relates and with which it deals, and
- n, Sal, e frIl
found in the title. 1t is no constitutional
objection to a statute that its title is
vague or unmeaning as to its purpose, If
it 5e sufficiently distinct as to the matter
10 which it refers.
What then is the subject of the acts of
March II 1881, and April 4 1881? Most
clearly the subject of these acts is the
regulation Of the sale of spirituous ,vinOus
and malt liquor and medicated bitters.
Now, if there be but one subject in the
act, but more than one object, the act
would not be obnoxious to the cOnstitu-
ton.
We could concede for the argument
that the object Of these acts is to regu-
late the sale of these liquors, to collect
revenue and divers other purposes and
objects; still, unless there was more than
one subject in the act, it would be valid
COuSllluIlOuAts
there be more than one subject mentioned
in the acts. If they be german or sub
sidiary TO the main subject; or, if rela-
tive directly or indirectly to the main
subject-have a natural CONNIE ctiOn-and
are not foreign TO the main subject; or,
so long as the provisions are of the same
nature and come legitmately under one
general denomination or subject, we can
not hold the act unconstitutional Gid
dings vs.. San Antonio, a. Texas, 500;
- VS.. Railroad Company, al
Texas, BOG; Austin VS.. Railroad Com
pauy, 10 Texas, 267; Phillip VS. Bridge
Company, = Met. Kentucky, 222; Smith
vs.. Comm, s Bush, Up; State VS..
County Judge, , Iowa, 2S4; Battle VS..
Howard, Is Texas, 345; Murphy VS..
Menard, IL Texas, CTS; Tadlock VS..
Eccles, 20 Texas, 792 We are of the
opinion that these acts do not contain
more than one subject.
Second ground: ''That the acts above |
cited require payment of the tax i'll ad- |
vance for the term Of one year as a con- |
dition precedent to that right of pursuing /
said occupation, while all others are per |
mitted to pay quarterly and hence in /
conflict with and repugnant to sections |
IL and 70 of the bill of rights, and sec |
tons , and Of article s of the state con-
and the fourteenth amendment |
TO the constitution of the United States, |
in this, that they require a license of |
persons pursuing the occupation of ap- /
pellant and OF the billiard table-keeper
and require none of persons pursuing any |
other occupation taxed by law, and pro- |
vide no means for obtaining license for |
such persons. -
Answer to these objections: / The |
confers the power upon the
legislature to impose occupation taxes.
Art. 8, Sec. /. But all occupation |
taxes must be equal and uniform upon
the same class of subjects within the
limits of the authority levying the tax.
Sec. =, Art 5. Upon this occupation
the state tax is the same all over the
state, and if county desires TO impose u
tax upon this occupation it must be
equal and uniform over the county-that
IS, all persons must be required to do and
perform the same things as acts precedent
10 the right to pursue the occupation in
said county and they must pay the same
amount of tax, neither more nor less. So
within the limits of cities and towns.