Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1889-02-26

ESPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE DIsPATCH.I
PHILADELPHIA, February 25.-In the
case of the city of Reading against Savage,
in which the Supreme Court recently re-
versed its own decision and held the act of
May %, 1874, regulating the affairs of cities
of the third class, to be Constitutional, JUS
tice Green this morning delivered the fol-
lowing opinion:
,'In the case of the appeal of the city OF
Scranton School district, 113, p. 176, the
question before Jus was the constitutional
ity of the proviso to the fifth section of the
act of March 18, 1876. That proviso is in
these words: That no city of the third
class, nor any city of less population than
10000 inhabitants, heretofore incorporated,
shall become subject to the foregoing pro-
visions of this act until the same are accept
ed by an ordinance duly passed by major
ity of the members elected to each branch
thereof voting in favor of the same, and ap-
proved by the Mayor.
INTERPRETED LITERALLY.
''In its literal terms this is disabling
and an excluding enactment No city Of
the third class, nor any city of less popula-
ton than 10, 900 inhabitants, previously in
corporated, could become subject to the
provisions of the act until the passage and
approval of an appropriate ordinance, al
though such city might have already
formally accepted the provisions of the act
of May %, 1874, by complying with the re-
quirements of the ffty-seventh section of
that act, and thereby entitled itself to a
place among the cities of the third class.
The, act of 1875, therefore, had
no application to any Of these cities
in the first instance. Hence there
was not and there could not be, any
class of cities covered by the description
contained in the proviso until class was
made up by individual accessions, which,
naturally, would occur, if at all, only in an
isolated and special manner. As to all
those which had been previously incor-
porated, a double acceptance was made nee
essary; first, of the provisions of the act of
1874, under the ffty-seventh section of that
act and second, of the provisions of the act
of 1876, under the proviso of the fifth Sec
ton.
WHAT WAS MEANT.
"The proceedings upon acceptance under
the two acts are quite dissimilar, and, with
out strict conformity to both, no city pre-
viously incorporated could have the bene-
fit of the act Of 1875. Those cities which in
reality did accept both acts would thus, in
fact, become class by themselves, and that
class could only be made up by individual
accessions from time to time; but it might
very easily happen that only a single city,
or at most few, would adopt the double
acceptance made necessary by the act of
1875, and in that event the new class
thus created would be limited to that
one or those few. This result, which
was entirely possible, made the legislation
local, and brought it into conflict with the
seventh section of the third article of the
Constitution. This is what was decided,
and all that was intended to be decided, in
the Scranton School district case.
SIN the present case, the question for de-
cision is upon the effect of the ffty-seventh
section of the act of May %, 1874, P. L., P.
23O The material portion of that section is
in these words:
Any city of the third class, or any city of less
population than 10000 inhabitants heretofore
incorporated may become subject to the pro-
visions of this act governing cities of the third
class to be hereinafter Incorporated; and the
Mayor and Councils of such city may effect the
same by an ordinance thereof duly passed by a
majority of the members elected to each branch
thereof voting in favor of the same.
NO CHANGES MADE.
"This isan enabling, and in no sense dis
abling enactment. The act in its previous
sections had provided for the establishment
of class of cities to be called cities of the
third class and to be thereafter incorporated.
This portion of the act had universal appli-
cation over all parts of the State and is
-