Mohave County miner., 1889-04-27
MILITARY TACTICS.

u
THE CHANGED CONDITIONS or MOD.
ERIN FIELD WARFARE.
Individual Independence, strategy ana
Open Order Front In Battle Required
~ tho New wsspons The Line of
BattlS--Bu Little Slaneuvering.
When weapons were not 20 formidable or
deadly we depended on the united action and
constant cooperation Of large, compact masses
OF men moving ss q unit, seeking to crush
the enemy by their very weight, and giving
10 each other that moral support which rs-
suits from companionship In danger. But
nsw weapons win require lsm attention 70
the discipline OF tho masses and more par
feet discipline for each individual soldier,
who must rely moro upon himself and regard
his weapon rather than bis companions 40
his bsst and surest defense a. well a. tho
means by which he may contribute most 10
the defeat Of the ensniy. He must look less
10 the support OF his friends and moro 70 his
own individual movements and to the judi
cious expenditure OF his ammunition. He
must be taught with moro care to take cover,
10 advance by rushes, 70 practice the princt
Piles Of strategy, while exhibiting the Same
personal bravery as in times past.
The experience OF the United States army
on the plains In the NUMEROUS Indian wasp
has been Of the most practical and trying
kind and peculiarly applicable 10 modern
tacticsl There are no more willy strategfsts
lAl- r A. L.. d
been characterized by great personal shrewd-
ness. warinsss and strategy. In thsm indi-
vidpality IL developed TO the fullest extent
Their movements are quick and FREQ from all
stiffness, while they are celebrated for thar
ambuscades and ruses, their great enduranceS
accurate Workmanship and tho habits Of
taking cover and securing every possible sds
vantage for personal ss1ety. with great brav-
and peculiarities OF Indian warfare with
open order fighting find practical application
| {. modern tactics, and tho army officers who
have fought this foe for many years, learn
Ing all their tricks and checkmeting thera at
their own game, arc well equipped wits
IDEAS that may well be embodied In our new,
ystcm =
A foreign officer who was sent 20 witness
ton at tho Close Of tbs civil war and repork
thereon, declared to his sovereign that he bad
never seen an army so remarkable for 'moraH
discipline" In this he referred 70 the greatd
Intelligence Of the rank and die "a 30 indfi
viduai discipline and independence Many
foreign officers were inclined to criticize the
peculiarities OF our soldiers--their frcsdom!
| Of action, which the foreigner thought too
hv~>r
tho terrible loss Of life inflicted and'the dress
parade precision in masses which. thsy woold
! exhibit whenever IL was applicable only
proycd tho tendency to elect the msthods
best suited to the circumstances and the ma
ture Of the case, to the ground and, ,ths pecu-
liar country In which thsy fought Thsy
were simply practical, and precision OF move
ment was not always possible nor dssirabla4
But today clocklike movements Of masse1
under fire are not permissible. and Il follows
| that the qualities for which our soldiers WORD
| criticised in 1855, as we'll - tboss for which
they were psa$sd, WI b t6s onss rost "a
| be cultivated In ths future. In short, the In
soldises would increase their cficisncy undeT
| the changed conditions Of warfare, and
diminish greatly tho advantage posssssed b3
1
and psrmansncy Of Organization rather thA1
| lty Of their oi6csrs and msn.
The general principles which WIN govern
the new tactics are pgstty well undsfstood
out, under cover Of which the troops were
dsploysd and formed in two ranks for battle,
the skirmisr1D being then withdrawn or re-
4 t..~ - S~kfl
now be changed, and means will be provided
quickly deployed In three lines for battle.
one-hah Of each battalion, viii be thrown
the battle, followed at q distance Of sszfrA4
one-third Of each battalion, while the re-
maining force WIN b hsld several handSsd
yards n rear Of the suppQr5ng lin, uoanqDd
and under covvr II possibie, ready 10 bsde-
| ployed when most needed 70 cover . rstxeat1
| to meet or TO make turning mcvuunt, q
10 5oin the main bciy IN The AnAi rusk ~
| n,en In each OF the three Nns win b asslgue6
| TO small groups, each ,witAth isaAe. whart
movements and dirscticusthsy me 70 folic%s
Individual freedom viii sharsfogs b pwutt
ted with the singls qpslincstioa tket II
groups be kept intact Akfar - possible, raj.
lying or depioying, advancing q ss(ssatinG
together, thus insuring control By the o0leseS
through the group isad~s of Hon-commI.
donsd officers. tst y, 49,
The 6rss6r firing Tine WIN Seldom - vssh.
drawn or received undw Ars, hut wi1 ~
srally rsmsin sud fight 10 the Anlsh, BSls6
resuforesd BY The twolinss in thsssar. An,
| munitioa must thsrsfors be carried n u
largo quantities a. possible and hushands6
with csre. Tho new small cshbsr, high
| powered rifles now being sd0ptsd By forsig1
powsu win enable the man 20 carry many
more rounds Oh ball cartridge than formerly.
ar 4. although the smalier and lighter bullelS
Mill not kill 20 oftsn or produce such ugly
wounds, their incrsassd velocity and greater
range and accuracy win make up somewhat,
and the number OF wounded viii b In
creased Wounded men embarrass the move
ments Of an army moro than the dsad, ans
In short campaigns cripple IL more elect
ually. Men from the supporting lins win BE-
gradually thrown forward into the firing
line 10 take advantage Of any vsakns0 o6
the enemy or TO meet = heavy attack, tho
men always attaching themselves to the
groups q they come up. Whole groups from
The supports win frequently be thrown into
the intervals In the firing lina
Thcro will be little maneuverinG. undsr the
deadly Gre Of modern arms; the lines win be
able to do little more than advance or re-
treat, rally by groups to flre vollsys, or 10
carry somo point Of advantage by Q rushs
Tho reserves win be depended on to meet.