Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1889-07-03

appointing appellants.
Looking at the statute from another
standpoint, we do not see a reason why
the legislature may have deemed it proper
TO confer upon railroad companies the
privilege of being proceeded against for
the appointment of receivers of their
property, in the counties of their prinei-
pal offices only. We do not concur in
the proposition, that in fixing the venue
of ordinary suits purpose is manifested
TO disregard their rights or TO embarrass
them in the defense of actions brought
against them. In determining the venue
OF such suits it was the duty of the legis-
lature to consider the rights and inter-
ests of the citizens as well as those of the
companies, and to so frame the law as to
afford the former fair opportunity to
prosecute and maintain their actions,
and in such manner as not
unreasonably to embarrass the
companies in making their defenses.
1t is a necessary incident to the operation
of railroad that claims for injuries to
persons and property for loss and damage
to goods in transit, as well as for many
other wrongs, arise all along its line of
road. These claims are frequently small
in amount. It results from this state of
affairs that if each claimant was required
to bring has suit in the court of the
county where the principal office of the
company is situated, it would in many
cases work practical denial of justice.
The expense of prosecuting their suits in
distant forum would preclude many
poor men with just claims from litigating
their rights; and in cases where the de-
mands were small, would make 1t folly
for those who are pecuniarily able, to
attempt their enforcement in the courts.
The practical result of the statute as it
exists is almost universally to cause the
action to be brought at some place on or
very near the company line where it
may make its defense at comparatively
little expense.
Section q of article 1893 of the Revised
Statutes reads as follows:
''SuIts against any private corpora
ton, association or JOINT stock company
may be commenced in any county in
which the cause of action or a part there
of arose, or in which such corporation,
association or company has an agency or
representative or in which its principal
office is situated. And suits against any
railroad corporation may also be brought
in any county through or INTO which the
railroad of such corporation extends or is
operated. -
1t seems to us thai thus departing from
the general policy of the statute mani
tested by the requirement that gives to
defendant the privilege of being sued in
the county of his residence, the legisla-
ture has carefully weighed the rights of
the railroad companies as well as those
of the citizens and have restricted the
privilege Of the former no further than
the demand of justice required. 1t fol-
lows that in our opinion the assumption
that the legislation upon this
subject manifests an unfriendly
spirit towards corporations cannot
be maintained, and that the argument,
that section l3 of the act of 1887 is to be
construed as if embued with the same
spirit, falls to the ground. We repeat
then, that there does appear a good rea-
son why it may have been thought proper
to restrict the operation of section q of
article 1898, quoted above, and to con-
fer upon corporations the privIlegeaof be-
ing sued for the appointment of receivers
IN the counties of their principal offices
only In such actions the reasons for
extending the venue to other counties no
longer exists. Suits for the appointment
of receivers are from the very nature of
the case infrequent, and the plaintiffs
cute their actions as well IN the proper
court of the county of the defendant IS
principal Office as in any other forum
There being no reason for restricting the
privilege of the defendants in such cases,
there is good reason why there should be
a return to the general policy of the
venue statutes, andsto require, if the de-
PENDANT shall so demand, that suits for
the appointment of a receiver of a corpor-
alton shall be brought only in the county
of its principal office, which, by analogy
of law, is the county of its residence.
Therefore, if we look to the reason and
spirit of the law under consideration,
they would indicate rather that by sec
ton Is the legislature intended to con-
fer a privilege upon defendant, than that
it intended absolutely to deprive any dis
trict court of the state of the power and
jurisdiction to appoint receiver in the
event the defendant waived the question
of venue.
Recurring then to the language of sec
ton 10, if the act stood alone, if there
were no other statues in pari materia, if
there were no authoritative constructions
of similar statutes, and if there were no
restrictions in the way, it
might be held that the construction
claimed by appeIIee Is cortect.
The language ''shan be brought |
in the county where the principal |
office of said corporation is located -
when literally construed, implies, that it
shall not be brought elsewhere. But we |
have had, and still have statutes fixing |
the venue of causes, not less mandatory |
and not less plain in their terms which |
have been construed not to deprive any |
district court of the jurisdiction conferred |
by the constitution, but merely to confer |
4 privilege upon the defendant to confer |
the Jurisdiction to the courts of the |
counties specified in the statute. The |
for appellee with all their in
1ustry and research have cited us to no
case in this court in which a contrary |
ruling has been made.
In De La Vega VS. League, GA Tex.
PA, it is said: ''Our statutes in force at
The time the reconvention was fled pro-
7ided that suits for the recovery of land
should be brought in the county where
he land or a part thereof is situated.
This is one of the exceptions to the gen.
sral rule requiring suits to be brought in
he county of the defendants residence.
This requirement is not matter that
Effects the jurisdiction of the district
courts over the subject matter of con-
-