Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1889-07-25
doubtlesu have accomplished had he been

30 foitunate as TO nave inherited an army
trained by the father of Frederick the
Great. But Washington's army was not
Yet we'll trained, and its numerical in
feriority was such that Knyphausen's
division might of itself be regarded ss n
fair match for it. The British movement
was, therefore, we'll considered, and il
was doubtless we'll that Washington did
not return the offensive by crossing the
creek. Moreover. the organization OF his
staff was far from complete. He was
puzzled by conflicting reports as to the
enemy's movements. While considering
the question of throwing his whole force
against Knyphausen, he was stopped by
false report that Oornwallis was not
moving upon his flank. 30 great was
the delay in getting intelligence that
CORVALLIS had accomplished his long
march of is miles, and was approach
ing Birmingham Meeting, before 1t was
weil-kuown where he was. Nevertheless,
his intention of dealing death blow to
the American army was forestalled and
partially checked. Before he had reached
our right wing, Washington had ordered
Sullivan to form new front and ad-
vance toward Birmingham Meeting.
Owing to the imperfect discipline of the
troops, Sullivan executed the movement
rather oiumsily, but enough was accom-
plished to save the army from rout. In
the obstinate and murderous fight which
ensued near Birmingham Meeting be.
tween CORVALLIS and Sullivan, the latter
was at length slowly pushed back in the
direction of Dilworth, 70 save the army
from being broken in two, it was now
necessary for the centre to retreat upon
Chester by way OF Dilworth, and this
movement was accomplished by Greene
with moat conaummate skill. It was now
possible for Kuyphausen to advance ACROSS
Ohadd's Ford against Wayne's position /;
and lie did 30, aided by the right wing of
CORVALLIS division, which, instead of
joining in the oblique pursuit toward
Diiworth, kept straight onward, aud
came down upon Wayne's rear. Nothing
was left for Wayne and Armstrong but to
retreat and join the rest of the army a.
Chester, and so the battle OF Brandywine
came to an end.
This famous battle was admirably con-
Quoted ON both sides. The risk assumed
in the long flanking march of Cornwallis
was fully justified. The poor orgauiza-
tion of the American army was of course
we'll known TO the British commanders,
and they took advantage Of the fact. Had
they been dealing with an organization
as efficient as their own, their course
would have been foolhardy. On the
other hand, when we consider the rela.
five strength OF the two armies, 1t is clear
that the bold move OF Oornwallis ought
not simply to have won the fiald of battle.
1t ought to have annihilated the Ameri
can army, bad not its worst consequences
been averted by Washington's prompt
ness aided by Sullivsn's obstinate bravery
and Greene's mssterly conduct of the re-
treat upon Dilworth. As it was, the
American soldiers came out of the fight
in good order. Nothing could be more
absurd than the careless statement, sc
often made, that the Americans wert
"routsd" nt the Brandywine. Their or
ganization was preserved, and at Chester
next day, they were as ready for fight al
ever. They had exacted from the enemy
round price for the victory. Th'
American loss was little more thar
1000, incurred chiefly in Sullivan's gal
liant struggle; rolls afterwards captured
at Germantown showed that the British
loss considerably exceeded that figure.