The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1889-02-02
THE GOODMAN CASE.
A Verdict OF Guilty and a Sentence Of
Three Years.

ray Ner Ior the State, ana lsep lehman lOr
defendant. Judge DuBose then charged
the Grand Jury as follows:
State vs. Goodman.
Gentlemen Of the Jury-The defendant,
Goodman, is on trial charged in the bill OF
indictment with the crime of obtaining
property by false pretenses with the intent
to delraud. The language OF our code in
defining this oflense is: every person
who by any false pretenses or by any false
token or counterfeit letter with intent to
deiraud another, obtain from any
person any personal property or the
signature OF any person TO any written in
strument, the false making OF which is
forgery, shall, on conviction, be imprisoned
in the penitentiary." The words "false
pretense' include all classes Of pretended
buying, borrowing or hiring, bailment or
deposit, and all cases OF pretended owner
ship where the person obtaining posses.
sion intended at the time he received the
property feloniously TO steal the same.
The words personal property include
money chooses in action, all valuable writ
ten instruments and all other kinds of per-
sonal property. This statute is considered
10 extend 10 every case where party had
obtained property by falsely representing
himself TO be in a situation in which he
was not, or any occurrence which had not
happened TO which persons of ordinary
caution might give credit Hence the
rule may he broadly stated that any de-
signed misrepresentation OF an existing
condition by which o party obtains goods
of another with intent to defraud is guilty
OF false pretense under the statute.
Thus ii it should appear from the
proof in this case that defendant
represented himself as n successful jeweler
doing business in the city OF Memphis,
worth in property $40, 900, and that his
entire Indebtedness would not amount TO
more than 1000 or -, 900, and the truth
appears in evidence that at the time he
was wholly and hopelessly insolvcnt,
which he well knew; and that these rep
reservations were made with the intent TO
Extraordinarily obtain, and he did by these
false representations obtain from the prose-
cutor the goods described in the indictment
then in that event you might be well war
ranted in concluding that the defendant is
before YOU would be authorized in con
vcting defendant OF the false prctense
charged il must appear from the proof
AllAl Ailt ldl7f NlflflNt Nplllt DNNl
event or existing fact, and which event or
fact was that described in the indictment.
II the defendant obtained the goods upon
the false representation that he would pay
for them at some future time, that
itself and alone would not be sufficient to
support the charge in the Indictment. The
false pretenses which are charged are as to
the existing facts stated by defendant, that
he owne at the time he purchased the
goods ol the prosecutor certain property
worth $4,000 and that his Indebtedness
did not amount 10 more than 5000 or
$1,000, and upon this representation he
was given credit. While each OF these
pretenses on which conviction is sought
must be shown 10 be false. II is not
otherwise necessary 10 negative them.
That is 10 say, II any one
proved or shown from the proof
TO be false II il supplied a prepon1erating
motive IN causing the prosecution TO sell
his goods to the defendant, 1t is sufficient
TO support the charge in the indictment.
Il is an essential ingredient OF this ollense
that the prosecutor, alleged TO be de-
lnuded, should have believed the false
representation OF defendant TO be true
that is,as to the value Of defendants prop
erty, or ~ 10 the amount Of his indebted
ncss either or both Of which YOU
may find from the proof 10 have
supplied the motive iorif he knew the pre-
tense to be false he capnot claim that he
was thereby influenced 10 part with his
goods. IL must appear that the falle pre-
tense created the credit on which the goods
were sold before you can bring the case Of
defendant under the statute. And again,
II il appears that the prosecutor 10y the eX-
crcisc Of common prudence and caution
could have thus been enabled TO
have avoided the imposition com
planned Of, then in that event
YOU should acquit the defendant.
hut the common prudence and caution
that the prosecutor should have exercised
on the occasion, should not necessarily
have been such suspicion and disirust rs
to impose upon him the inquiry and in
ycstigaiion into the value Of defendants
property and his solycncy, m to secure
him against the possibility Of imposition.
or that he should at the time have used
such prccaution against deception on his
defendants part ~ only the very cautious
resort to, but there should have been
something in the nature OF the Transaction
To- show that a person Of common pru-
dcncc and caution could not have been
imposed upon thereby. Then In this con
ncriion did the prosecutor at the time aud
before selling the goods 10 defendant, cx-
cicisc common prudence and caution IN
asrrrlaining his defendants financial con-
dltion aud standing You will inquire from
the proof In the case, was this the ordi-
nary mode Of transacting such business?
II this be- true. then did the prosecu-
tor rely upon the truth Of defendants state
menis aud part with his property upon
the faith oi these statements, aud were
the statements, In fact, truo or false and
intended to deceive or not. for upon the
truth or ialsity Of these propositions dc-
Ponds tlc guilt or Innocence ui this de-
icndunL Tho intent 10 dciraud must DO
from al the facts Of the case,
~ such an intention Is necessary 10 the
ollcn-c charged. Whenever q guilty act
IL deliberately performed We may logically
infer a guilty intent. and you may, there
fore, look To any guilty preparation, II
any, II defendant, or other acts from
which IN this case the intent may
be- gathered. A. for instance, II the proof
show that defendant falsely pretended that
be- owned $1,000 In property and owed
debts not amounting 10 more than $1,000.
and thus having ample means with which
IN pay the amount OF Indebtedness, he
thereby obtained credit for goods from the
prosecutor knowing foil we'll NJ the time
be- WIS unable Ia pay for them and meet
other obligation already duo or COM
Ing due. bring n fact then insolycnt,
and short while thereafter his
business was closed by attaching
'icditors, you may look 10 these, or like
circumstances, II any, ~ bearing upon his
intent Ia making such representation. IL