The climax. [volume] (Richmond, Madison County, Ky.) 1887-1897, 1889-12-11
A PERSONAL DEPRESSION.
Faults Of Administration Urged Against
President Davis.

And here the biographer Of Jefferson Da-
Wis is compelled to take notice Of eontro-
versy which went on in quiet way during
the war and more openly afterwards, till it
reached furious climax, and is still waged
with much bitterness. Without indorsing
the harsh philippics of Edwin Pollard and
Gen. Thomas Jordan, or even the milder
criticisms Of Gems. Johnston and Beauregard,
Federal and Confederate may now agree
that President Davis made two serious
should one say fatall-mistakes: the one was
common to him and nearly all ths leaders on
both sides, the other peculiarly his own. 1t
was a manifestation Of that spirit which is
often praised as the quality Of ''always
sticking to ones friends"-a very amiable
quality indeed In a private man, but one
which in a cOmmander-in-chief In time Of
war may be criminal folly. A most I'M
happy instance is thus set forth by Gen
Thomas Jordan, chief of staff to Gen. Beau
regard:
"Alr. Davis had been at West Point, and
subsequently served for several years in the
dragons at a frontier post with Lieut. Nor
thrOp, 70 whom he became attached. The
latter was disabled by an accident, wens to
his home and turned parish doctor. Mr..
Davis became in time a politician Lieut..
Northrop grew so eccentric and full Of mental
crotchets as to be generally regarded In
Charleston as Of unsound intellect and unfit
for the management Of bis own small affairs.
He had not served long enough In the army
10 acquire familiarity With military admins
tratiou; neither had his avocatiOn in Charles
ton brought him in relation with men engaged
I'm large commercial affairs. This man, with
whom Davis had no personal association since
they were cavalry lieutenants together on the
Indian frontier, he did not hesitate 10 make
bis chief OF subsistence, nor scruple TO intrust
With the organization and administration Of
a bureau upon which the very existence IT
the Confederate armies must depend and for
the labors of which 1t is apparent the sound
est practical order Of intellect was essential"
It would be easy to find Confederates Of
high rank and approved judgment In mill
tary affairs who still look upon this appoint
ment and two others as the main causes Of
the downfall of the Confederacy.
WHO FoREsAw A LONG WAR;
As to the other charge so persistently urged,
that Mr. Davis was mot able to compre-
bend the proportions Of the struggle impend-
ing" the obvious answer is, Who vast A
few, a very few, thoughtful men in the north,
who drew their conclusions largely from his
tory, predicted a long and bitter struggle; in
the south it is exceedingly doubtful if there
were fifty men who believed the contest
would outlast year. II there was one who,
from the beginning, anticipated four years
war, he succeeded admirably In coneealing
his views That President Davis, his cabinet
and all his advisers shared the current delu-
sion that the war would be short and its thea
tire confined principally to the coast and the
border between the two sections, is certain.
Such belief was the parent Of many errors.
In the first place, 1t was estimated that the
south had almost arms enough, and the first or
der sent to Europe was for but 10000 Enfield
riflesl Before the blockade could be made
effective it was urged that the Confederate
government should take the cotton and to
bacco, Of which a large stock was still on
hand, issue bonds to pay the owners, export
the stuff to Europe, and make it the basis oi
fund to draw upon The owners generally
were willing, and the effect would have beer
tremendous. At the same time a considera
BILE amount Of foreign exchange In the banks
was offered to the government on favorabl'
terms. Both propositions were rejected Of
/ ignored, and the golden opportunity sooI
/ passed, never to return Il should be noteC
also that the legislation Of the provisional
congress, and Of the first session OF the regu
lar congress at Richmond, shows the SAM
lack Of perception as to the greatness Of tn
impending struggle.
On the Federal side Of the line much Of tn
froth and nonsense about "a short war; wa
swept away by the battle Of Bull Run; tn
rest was done for at Shiloh. After the latte
thoughtful men both north and south mad
up their minds that the issue was to be tena
ciously fought to close. The north ere,
often In expecting great and decisive victo
] ries; the south quite as often in expecting
foreign interference or division In the north
True, Mr. Benjamin at Richmond continue,
1 to promise ''pacihcation in ninety days" lonl
after Mr.. Seward at Washington had cease
to do 50, but he found few echoes.
AN APPALLING DIFFICULTY
The victory Of Bull Run produced grea
exultation IN the south, but appears to hav
had a decidedly sobering effect upon Presi
dent Davis and cabinet. It may now be con
sidered proved that he was IN for aggressiv
action immediately after that battle, bu
yielded TO the adverse opinions Of Johnston
and Beauregard, and thereafter, with rar
exceptions, insisted upon defensive policy
During the long period Of inaction which FOL
lowed be embraced every opportunity TO de
clare his earnest desire Tor peace. he eYel
excited criticism by suggesting conciliator,
measures; for many months all his utter
ances were amplihcations Of that passage i
his first regular message. ''The moment tina
this pretenss OF our subjugation is abandoned
the sword win drop from our grasp and W
shall be ready to enter into treaties Of amt
and friendship
In November, 1851, general election wa
held, and President Davis ard Vice Presiden
Stephens were reelected for the full term @
six years Feb. IS, 1852. the first congress
under the pernlaneus constitution assemble
10 Richmond; on tho cd, President DavI