The Caucasian. (Clinton, N.C.) 188?-1913, 1889-12-12
A PERSONAL DEPRESSION.
Faults OF Administration Urged Agains,
President Davis

-
President Davis
And here the biographer Of Jefferson Dar
Wis is compelled TO take notice Of contro-
versy which went on In a quiet way during
! tie war and more openly Afterwards, till itl
reached furious climax, and is stin waSed
with much bitterness. Without indorsing
the harsh phiippics OF Edwin Pollard and
Gen. Thomas Jordan, or even the milder
criticisms OF Gems. Johnston and Beauregard,
Federal and Confederate may now agree
that President Davis made two serious
; should one say fatala-mistakes: the one was
common to him and nearly all the leaders on
both sides, the other peculiarly his own. II
was a manifestation Of that spirit which is
often praised as the quality of always
sticking to ones friendsn-a very amiable
asality indeed in a private ruan, but one
which in a commander-in-chief In time of
war may be a criminal folly. A most un-
happy instance is thus set forth by Gen
; Tn. mas Jordan, chief OF staff to Gen Beau
regard:
. 'iMr. Davis had been at West Point, and
subsequently served for several years in the
I dragons at frontier post with Lieut. Nor
! throp, to whom ho became attached. The
latter was disabled by an accident, went to
his home and turned parish doctor. Mr.
Davis became in time a politician. Lieut.
( Northrop grew so eccentric and full Of mental
crotchets as to be generally regarded in
Charleston as of unsound intellect and unfit
for the management of his own small affairs
] He had not served long enough in the army
! to acquire familiarity with military admins
4 tration; neither had his avocation in Charles.
ton brought him in relation with men engaged
4 in large commercial affairs. This man, with
/, whom Davis had no personal association since
s they were cavalry lieutenants together ON the
4 Indian frontier, he did not hesitate to make
{ his chief Of subsistence, nor scruple to intrust
{ with the organization and administration Of
"a bureau upon which the very existence of
stha Confederate armies must depend, and for
athe labors Of which it is apparent the sound
fest practical order of intellect was essential" )"
& 1t would be easy to find Confederates Of
5shigh rank and approved Judgment in mill
Etary affairs who still look upon this appoint
ment and two others as the main causes Of
Sthe downfall of the Confederacy.
q WHO FoREsAw LONG WAR;
8 As to the other charge SO persistently urged,
ssthat Mr.. Davis was mot able to comPre-
!. 9.hend the proportions of the struggle impend-
Ring," the obvious answer is, Who was? A
3 few, a very few, thoughtful men In the north,
Il tory, predicted long and bitter struggle; in
& the south it is exceedingly doubtful if there
ss were fifty men who believed the contest
q would outlast year. If there was one who,
q from the beginning, anticipated q four years
= war, he succeeded admirably in concealing
8 his views That President Davis, his cabinet
g and all his advisers shared the current delu-
q sion that the war would be short and its thea
q tire confined principally to the coast and the
q border between the two sections, is certain.
8 Such belief was the parent of many errors.
s. In the first place, it was estimated that the
s. south had almost arms enough, and the first or
g der sent to Europe was for but 10, coo Enfield
"a rifles! Before the blockade could be made
81 effective it was urged that the Confederate
81 government should take the cotton and to
81 bacco, of which a large stock was still OF
I4 hand, issue bonds to pay the owners, expor
q the stuff to Europe and make it the basis o.
s. fund to draw upon The owners generally
81 were willing, and the effect would have beer
q tremendous. At the same time a considera
Is BILE amount of foreign exchange in the banks
q was offered to the government Oh favorable
q terms. Both propositions were rejected o.
3 ignored, and the golden opportunity sool
III passed, never to return. 1t should be noteC
q also that the legislation Of the provisional
II congress, and of the first session of the regu
s lar congress at Richmond, shows the SAM
q lack of perception as to the greatness of tn
e impending struggle.
r. On the Federal side of the line much Of tn
i; froth and nonsense about "a short war" wa
81 swept away by the battle of Bull Run, tn
E. rest was done for at Shiloh. After the latte
g thoughtful men both north and south mad
II up their minds that the issue was to be tena
s. ciously fought to close. The north erret
81 often in expecting great and decisive victo
q ries; the south quite as often in expecting
E foreign interference division In the north
s. True, Mr.. Benjamin at Richmond continued
g to promise Specification In ninety days" Ion,
s after Mr. Seward at Washington had cease.
e to do SO, but he found few echoes.
q AN APPALLING DIFFICULTY.
e The victory of Bull Run produced grea
e exultation in the south, but appears to hav
8 had a decidedly sobering effect upon Presi
g dent Davis and cabinet. It may now be con
s. .dered proved that he was in for aggressiv
s action Immediately after that battle, bu
Z yielded to the adverse opinions of Johnston
s-and Beauresard, and thereafter, with rar
e exceptions, insisted upon defensive policy
b During the long period of inaction which fol
e lowed he embraced every opportunity to de
&. clare his earnest desire for peace. He eve
q excited criticism by suggesting conciliator
& measures; for many months all his utter
e ances were ampliications of that passage i
V his first regular message. THE moment tina
8 this pretense of our subiugation is abandoned
8 the sword will drop from our grasp and W
p shall be ready to enter into treaties Of amit
S and friendship"
ss In November, 1851, general election wa
s. held, and President Davis and Vice Presiden
3 Stephens were reelected for the full term c
six years Feb. 49, 1862, the first congres
d under the permanent constitution assemble
e in Richmond; on the 22d, President Davi
&; was inaugurated, and delivered a CAREFUL
$ prepared message. Disasters had already sc
q in, to continue with scarcely an intermissio
IS for three months Before President Dav
8 was this omnous situation: In all the Coz
S federate states there were not quito 6 6,O0O, ,0(
s white people, among whom the per cent. {
q men capable OF bearing arms was surpri
& ingly small. In the Federal or 'ndherin
Ea states" excluding all the doubtful and di
& puted strip, were at least 1S,000, coo whit
S people, among whom the per cent of adu
&: males was phenonenally. one might say III
g naturally, large
! q By tho census Of 1860 the soutL containe
g. about 20o, 900 more women than men, Il
s. north about 400, 900 more men than womel
so the north could send into the field coo, o.
, men and still have at home percentage
8 men equal to that of the south in peace
81 the enormous immigration of 1S45'6l, co
6 sisting largely of young and strong men, on
g3 per cent had located in the south. Th
& explains the paradox that such states as Ka
. Z sas and Nevada sent a larger per cont.
: z their total population into the field tsan ar
Z state of the south, and yet had many mo
|. d men left at home than older states ever ha'
! 4 during the longest peace. The disparity
s wealth was far greater-by some estima.
] & four times as great. Without accepting
. e strong a statement It may y.t be admittt
2 Z that the Federals were three times as hume
! s Gus and eight times as rich Is the Confede
& ates-
hr 1.-THE LOST CAUSE"
The Confederacy Overthrown-Twenty-
o. Years in Peace.
"a Nevertheless hope aud confidence we
!, 2 strong. President Davis first state pape