St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1889-01-31

object, so far at least as general dam
ages are concerned, is not merely to OBJ
tain redress in the shape of pecuniary
compensation, which is frequently but
secondary consideration, but also,
which is usually of much greater I'M
portance, of vindicating the plalntiits
character by openly challenging his
aceusers to proof of their assertions,
I'd of establishing their falslty, II they
be false. Now, as far as vlndlcatl0n OF
character or reputation is concerned, IL
stands to reason that full and frank
retraction of the false charge, especially
if published as widely and substantially
| to the same readers as was the libel, is
usually, IN fact, more complete redress
| than Judgment for damages. Indeed,
where there has been perfect good falth
and an entire absence of improper
motives in the publication, OF
libel, and no sIe;lal or
pecuninary injury has resulted. an
action for damages, brought after such
a full and frank retraction and apology,
is in majority of cases purely specula-
tive. 1t is also true that re-
traction is not the remedy in the law
guaranteed by the constitution, and IL
the statute proposed to substitute 1t as
a redress for pecuniary Injuries. 1t could
not be sustained. But il there was an
entire absence of either negligence OF
Improper and unjustifable motives, but
on the contrary, perfect good faith on
the part of the publisher of the libel,
and if he has done all that can reason
able be done in redreSsing the
wrong so far as it has affected
party's character, by publishing
full retraction, what principle of
reason OF natural justice is violated by
limiting the recovery of pecuniary dam
ages to the pecuniary Injuries which ne
has received? Or, if good faith can be
shown in mitigation of damages, what
constitutional provision is violated by
permitting it to b proven in connection
with a retraction so as to prevent
altogether the recovery or money
damages for the presumed injuries
to reputation, which are not at all pc
cuniary in their ture, and which nave
already been redreSsed, so far as they
can be, by tire retraction? A court
ought not to declare invalid a solemn
act of a coordinate branch of the gov
eminent exceptin very clear case; and
after all the consideration that we are
able to give to the subject we are I'M
able to say that the legislature has
transcribed its constitutional powers in
imposing these restrictions and llnlta-
tons upon the legal remedy of plalnt-
ifs in actions for libel. or that by so do
ing they have deprived any one of a
certain remedy in the laws for Injuries
or wrongs received by him in his per-
son, plo erty or character.' within the
meaning of the constitution. We have
assumed that under this act a party is
still allowed to recover pecuniary COM
pensation for all injuries pecuniary in
their nature which he may have sus-
tanned by the libel. Section 2, i'll defn-
ing actual damages limits them to
damages in respect to property. buSl-
ness, trade, profession or occupation. 1t
NAV be suggested that there may be
some cases of pecuniary injury which
this would not reach, but we are of the
opinion that by a liberal, but allowable
construction. the definition referred to
may be made to cover all cases of
special damages; and also. we ought to
adopt such construction rather than
hold the act invalid. The next ques-
ton is, whether upon the evidence, the
question should have been submitted to
the Jury whether "the article was pub
lished in good faith, that its falSity was
due to mistake or misapprehensiOn of
the facts" This depends upon what is
meant by the expression ''in good
faith" as used in this connection. We
may assume that the act was designed
to protect honest and careful newspaper
publishers. 1t is not to be presumed
that the legislature intended to make SO
radical a change in the law of libel as
to make mere belief in the truth OF the
article the test of good faith, If so,
they have introduced very, dangerous
principle, which virtually places the
good name and reputation of the citi
/ zen at the mercy of the credulity OF in
difference of every reckless or negli-
gent reporter. If publisher
OF newspaper, for the sake of gratifying
depraved public taste or for the sake of
being considered newsy and "scooping"
other newspapers, should reckleSsly
or even negligently publish piece of
scandal about another without taking
such precautions to verlfyits truth as
would be taken by conscientious and
prudent man under like circumstances,
then he would not be acting in good
faith within the meaning of this statute,
although he may have belief that the
publication is true. In view OF
another trial of this action, it would be
improper to discuss the evidence or
Characterize the conduct of the reporter
who transmitted this article to the de-
PENDANT for publication. All that it is
proper to say is that, applying the law
as we have construed it to the evidence,
we are of opinion that the question of
''good faith'' in publishing the article
should have been submitted to the jury.
Order reversed.
Judge Dickinson adds: II am unable
to concur in that part of this opinion
presented in the third division, holding
that the statute is not in conflict with
section s of article of the constitu-
ton"
The chief justice, being absent during
the argument, took no part in this case.
The supreme court reversed the order
IN the case of The Minneapolis Thresh-
ing Machine Company, appellant, VS.
John A. Davis, respondent. This was
an action to recover installments due on
subscriptions to stock of the plaintiff.
The defendant subscribed for $1,000
worth of the stock, but when
called upon to pay it in, claimed
an oral agreement with the party
soliciting the stock, to the effect that it
was not to be pai,. until certain other
persons had subscribed $1,000 each, and
claimed exemption from assessment on
this ground. The trial court found that
the other parties had never subscribed
to the stock, and decided that the de-
fendant never became subscriber to
the stock. Upon the question of the
competency of such evidence. the case
was carried to the supreme court.which
handed down the following syllabus:
Syllabus-A subscription by num-
Der of persons to the stock of a corpora
ton to be thereafter formed by them
constitutes, first, a contract between
the subscribers themselves to become
stockholders when the corporation is
formed upon the conditions expressed in
this agreement; and. as such. it is bind
ing and irrevocabie from the date of the
subscription; second, it is in the nature
of continuing offer to the proposed