The National tribune., 1889-06-13

After the rebel defeat at Nashville, the
Union forces found over 1000 rebel wounded
still in the town, unable to be moved. The
Federal loss was about third of that of their
foes. Gen. }. ID. Cox states that Hood admit
ted O loss of 6,300, and places the Federal
loss at 1926. Dead and wounded men in
several places filled the shallow bitches and
served as stepping-stones for their COM
rades in later attempts TO scale the works.
So dense was The press, that Col. Stafford
was found dead, sitting up, the dead about
him keeping his body from falling to the
ground The Carter house has been men,
TONED as occupying central position in
the line of defense II was occupied by the
Carter family, who took refuge in the cellar
during the conflict Emerging therefrom
after its cessation, they proceeded to the
works TO endeaFor 10 succor some Of the
wounded, and among the first reached they
found a son Of Mr. Carter, rebel officer who
had commanded a regiment in Bates Di-
vision, mortally wounded, and who died
soon after being carried into his house,
Bate had farther to march to get to bis posi-
tion, and. though he deployed on the way, he
had not reached il when the attack on the
right and in the center began. He had ex-
pected the cavalry, which had not crossed the
Harpeth, to attack on his left, but it did not +;
and right Of Ruger's line it was with less de-
termination than was exhibited by his COM
rades, and the loss was not heavy on either
side
Neither time nor space allotted here viii al
low description Of a tithe of the heroic attack
and desperate defense; that must be left TO
abier pens. 1t snfiices TO say that the
FEDERAL ARMY HAD lost NO GUNsoR CoLoRs,
though it held 30 standards yrested from its
- h-T r+rs s-1-e
have satisfied those foes that by the time Nash
vile was gained by them there would be but
few living TO enjoy the fruits Of victory. BY
II o'clock that night Schofeld was prepared TO
withdraw from the town. but evidently by de-
sign quantity Of hay inside the Union lines
was fired, and its light made any movement
visible to the watchful rebels, and the start
was delayed for an hour.
A strong skirmish-line was left in the works
while the main body was hurried across the
bridges prepared the previous afternoon. As
soon as 1T. with its artillery, and followed BY
the ambulauces, had crossed the planking on
the bridges was torn up, the skirmishers with
drawn and crossed on the planking There
was no tine to bury the dead, but all the
wounded who could be found and could bear
removal were brought off. Gen. Thomas had
during the day. anxiOusly asked, - Can you
hold Hood at franklin for three days?" to
which question Gen. Schofeld had returned
negative reply, and added that he thought best
to take position at Brentwood at once. and, now
the battle was over, the weary columns re-
sumed the retreat, and by morning all the in
fantry with artillery and trains, was safely at
Nashville.
The order detaching Gen. Thomas from his
favOrite command and sending him back to
care for Tennessee was not welcome one and
even after reaching Nashville he cherished a
hope, based probably on an idea that Hoods
fad inv oil ho
up that he would soon be again with his Chief
to share the fortunes of his further movements.
he even wrote on the 18th Of October: Z"
hope TO join you very soon"
But SOLDIERS LIKE HE
cheerfally obey orders. and he set about the
task assigned him in his usual calm, earnest
manner. While Sherman had turned over to
him everything pertaining to that portion of
his command, he had cautioned him that he
would need to concentrate all his forces to beat
the enemy, and that concentration was pushed
as rapidly as possible.
Granger was Withdrawn from Decatur to
Stevenson, the point Of junction of the Nash
vile ~ Chattanooga and Memphis & Charles
ton roads. All the small garrisons between
Stevenson and Murfreesboro, except at the
crossing Of Elk River, were gathered at the
latter place, under command of Gen. Rousseau
Gen Steedman t4A Old Chiekamauga y with
white and one brigade Of colored troops, with
provisional" eommand-c0mposed princi-
Paily of conFalesceHts and furloaghed men cut
of from their commands by the closing Of the
road north OF Atlanta-came from Chatt3- N9ga,
leaving there a garrison of about 1900 men,
Sen. Cooper, who had been left with brigade
at d0hns0nFl4le, was ordered TO Join Sch0feid
at Franklin. aud made the attempt only to find
the enemy between him and the force he was
ordered TO join, and escaping by movement
as perilOns as that at Spring Hill. Steed-
man had been ordered to move prior to the bat
tie OF Franklin, but was halted for day at
CorEan, an the northern base of the mountains
On the Chattanooga road, until ii was certain
what course would be taken by the enemv's
columns. When the battle began he was or
dered 10 move to Nashville at once and reach
co that place On the morning Of Dec. l with
most Of his force; but train containing nor
tion of the colored troops, delayed By derailed
train Of artillery, fell back TO Murfreesboro,
and on the morning Of the I'd found the ene-
my's cavalry, with two batteries, in possession
Of the roads, and after fighting ali day only got
through by breaking into small squads, and
thus avoiding the rebel piekets.
THE ESCAPE FROM CAPTURE BY THE BATTERY
mentioned (Isth Ohio, Capt. Aleshire) was
another Of those singular chances" Of which
this campaign had so many. The train was
thrown from the track about eight miles south
OF Lavergne, at point where the railroad and
pike were less than half a mile apart, but
screened from view by cedar thieket 1t was
about midnight when the writer, with 100 men
from Morgan's Brigade Of colored tro0ps
started from Nashville to its assistance. While
the work of reloading the train was going on
q column Of cavalry, with artillery, could be
plainly beard passing along the pike, and al
though all possible speed was made with the
work, it was nearly daylight Of Dec. when
we started back for Nashville, and before
reached camp, inside our picket-line, the rebe
cavalry had formed across the railroad and
stopped Col. Johnsons train, as above stated
In conversation with Gen. Frank Armstron:
at the Crow Indian Agency in 1887, he statel
that IL was his brigade OF Forests command
and hat had he known Of the battery bein,
there he certainly would have captured It.
The main body Of Smiths command ais
arrived on the lst, and the morning of tn
next day the rebel forces from the hills soutl
OF il saw the desired city before them Bu
their commander was not ready TO assault, ant
his course was not fully decided upon. He hat
sighted the goal Of his hopes, but sight an,
possession We're two widely different things
AZ he was to assault at all, then what was to b
done should be done quickly, for every da,
added 10 his enemy's strength in both me
and foTtibcatiOns. A siege with only fiel
artillery Of light weight and deficient in am
munitigR, and with all the sO-calied besiege
forces with water aud rail communicate
open, and his works armed In many place
with 100 0-p0under guns, was an anomaly; an
he was IN the situation Of the man describe
by the Hebrew King as having