The National tribune., 1889-03-28

deed, their fears were well-grounded, for
Banks was substantially in the same posi-
tion Sheridan was after his famous victories
In September, 1864, when Grant wrote to
him: Keep on and your good work will
cause the fall Of Richmond" The enemy
was about as much demorahzed, and Shields,
Correctly estimating the numbers and con-
dition Of the enemy,
GRAsPED THE SITUATION,
and at once wrote TO Washington suggesting
q concentration Of the troops within easy
reach and idle and a sweep on Richmond, to
be Joined on the way by the forces in front
OF Washington also stating: There is not
d moment TO lose. A rapid movement Of
this kind on the flank of the rebel army may
help materially TO hasten the defeat of that
army and the overthrow Of the rebel Gov
ernment. am ready to lead or follow"
Were il not for the fact that IN every age
and country the men who have been able to
gTapple successfully with the dangers and
uncertainties Of war have been so rare, 1t
would seem strange that there was such
dearth of men at this time, including the
regulaTly-edUcated officers, who compTe-
hended the military situation or had the
resolution to give practical illustration OF It,
All who give any attention 10 the subject
see il now, Of course, unless a few Of the
regular fossil officers be excepted. The chief
Generals, East and West, seemed cowed and
helpless at the bluff, noise and bluster Of the
South, At a time, too, when the Confederacy
was comparatively weak in troops, resources
and enthusiasm, and acted as If the Presi-
dent was calling upon them to sacrifice
themselves and their magnificent armies IN
an Improbable and hopeless effort, as If
go rvNn
undisciplined troops, and with less numbers,
against the trained legions Of the German
Empire, under the command Of Won MOltke
himself They simply lacked moral courage
and practical ability; underestimated the
courage and intelligence of their own men,
while overawed BY their inOrdinate respect
for the prowess Of the enemy and the talent
of their Generals, and moved, as II were, like
the snail and the oyster, carrying their for
ti6cations on their backs.
BEYOND LINCOLN, GRANT, POPE, AND
SHIELDS,
who recorded themselves at the time, with
perhaps Schenck, Milroy and other lesser
lights, no one seemed competent to solve the
problem. Even Gen. Sherman, who later de-
TelOped military genius Of such a high order,
and whose personal courage was far beyond
question, was honest enough TO write after
wards TO Gen. Grant: Until you won Donel-
son / confess j was almost cowed by the terri
be array Of anarchical elements that presented
themselves at every point: but that admitted
a ray Of light / have followed since" Another,
Gen. Sheridan, whose pugnacity was more pro-
nouDced, and whose genius was fully as de-
cided, wrote concerning an operation in as late
q cay as September, '64, after eli his expert
ence: was a little tinid about this move
ment until the arrival Of Gen. Grant, who in
d0rsed IT,"
Many bloody battles followed IN the Shennn-
dOah TO effect what Shields substantially out
lined, but which was not in fact accomplished
until the Spring Of 1866, under Sheridan. when
the rebellion t0ttered and fell. Shieldss sug-
gestiGl was doubtless eminently feasible, and
should have been adopted, but it was thought
too daring By the military authorities, and
was negatiTed; besides, troops were called for
elsewhere
It is said cowaFdice asks, Is if safer" falters.
hesitates, and LET'S slip the golden opportunity.
Genius and heroism ask, Can it be accom-
plished and moves to victory and glory.
Gen. Mcclellan, the incarnation of medioc-
Tity ard timidity, was then burrowing before
Yorktown with 100000 OF SIS brave men as
ever drew trigger, and had been cropping with
his magnificent army and hesitating before
Magruder wita about 5000 men, and had sent
70 Washington for siege guns lie now
oUTsUMBEEED HIS ENEMY ABOUT TWO TO
ONE
bat to insure his safety in moving. he was call
ing for more men. In Difference to his pre-
snned superior military ability and advice
(which is rocorded). Shields was to be dragged
back, IA a march Of loo miles or over, to Fred
ericksburg, &c join Mcdowell there and go to
his lAcClellan's) aid. Banks was to fall back
to Strasburg and fortify, with view OF hold
ing the Valley, though he was very much ayerse
Il r1n with &aiaIdc
and Indulged ia gloomy forebodings, knowing
Jackson and Ewelfs numbers. In the mean
time Banks and Shields were 20 suspend all
active operations and wait for further orders.
Eweu came 10 Jackson's relief, and the two
were united at Swift Ban Gap. Itsoon became
apparent 10 them that Banks would advance
no farther, and woman, Who went up with
Banks 10 UarTisonburg, carrying the news TO
jackson Of the contemplated reiIOErade move
menJ he began to breathe more 8resiy, and the
uneasiness az Richmond subsidized. jackson
was also being recruited, and Gen. Lee advised
the addition Of Gen. Ed. Johnson's forces
(near StaHnton) with those at the gap, in all
about "a 600 muskets, and sudden aud heavy
bloE" al Banks or the return OF EWell. Jack
son approved Of the concentration, but was al
together disiuclined for a fight witlIsRhat he
called The " Western troops" and persisting in
oTerstating Banks's numbers, which be now
placed at = 900 n his immediate front fas be-
fore stated asoat l2,000), urged the impru-
denCe Of il without large rcinforcements, pre-
1erriDg 10 wait on Providence for something
more favorable To present itself
However, the inactivity Of such large force
IS he had at his disposal did not commend il.
self 10 the minds Of Lee and Johnston: espe-
cislly as they We're so greatly outnumbered at
their own front, and Lee, rcgretting their ina
bilify 70 send reinforcements. again called for
action OF the withdrawal of Ewell In view q
tie lnpr0lability Of a further advance by
Banks jackson even preferred separation from
EEell 10 taking the offensive; but in this di.
lemma Providence seemed TO favor him. Gen
Ml4roy was rccounoitering with a company ot
cavalry and SIX companies OF infantry in the
direction Of Stsunton, about is miles awav
jackson wrote 70 Lee that Edward johnson
informed nim that
MILRoE AID sCHENCK
were advancing from the west on S.auntop
with 8 force Of 1900 men, and proposed thai
he should strike them q blow. Lee repiief
hat being 50 distant be could not Judge OF th,
expediency of such movement, hut consentef
70 il, and advised that Jackson should. on Li
return, bring back Ed. Johnson troops viii
hin and then attack Banks. jackson hopint
that Ice would then DC able 10 reinforce hin
on his retugn- about May took up his raarcl
by cireuiious ronte, 20 avoid the observation
and attentions gf Banks. who, nevertheless in
formed Fremont, commanding the dep9rtD,ep
ln which Aliray was Of his probable desiiua
ton and numbers, almost as c0rrcctly rs If b,
HHnM MnMn