The National tribune., 1889-11-14


ket5 In line during the evening of July g. This
| i know for the reason that as orr battery was
mainly composed of men detached from these
regiments Mt this time, our communication
| with the brigade was close and intimate in con-
| sequence, and we always knew very nearly
how many men they had after any battle.
So l think it perfectly safe to say, without
| reference to any Of the controversies that have
| taken place since, and speaking from the stand
| point of a man on the spot, that Meade could
not have counted on anything but the Sixth
| Corps for an immediate counter attack or pur-
| suit of Picketts routed division. The Sixth
| Corps could probably have mustered 14,000
muskets that moment. They were az good
| troops as there in the world but in the
| then condition Of the Second, Third and Fifth
| Corps troops, who were nearest them, they could
| hope for little support, and il they had been
| repulsed severely the last reserve of the army
| would have been destroyed. 1t was certain
! that Lee had at least ive divisions on Seminary
| Ridge within assembling distance of any point
| that the Sixth Corps could have attacked in
| following Pickett.
HE WOULD HAVE HAD HOOD AND McLAwa
on his right, and Hills three divisions between
| that point and the town; whilS Rodes, Early
| and Edward Johnson would have prevented
any movement of our troops on the north brow
| of Cemetery Hill to assist in attack.
Aside from all these considerations there Ia
| another fact that l have not seen mentioned in
| any way in the histories or criticisms
1t is this: Lee made his attack with single
| division. Every intelligent soldier in our army
knew this. Vast numbers Of them were acute
| and able enough to know that such an attack
| by single division out Of nine without effect
| i've support, must mean either that it was
| Intended to divert attention from some contem-
| plated attack elsewhere of q moro serious
character, by larger force and better sus-
tanned, or else that old Lee had made blunder.
And Mt that time old Lee was not regarded
| by the Army of the Potomac as q blundering
General.
know that on our part of the line In front
| Of the town we all expected that Pickett's at
tack would be followed by general assault on
the positions at and about the Cemetery by
EwelPs entire corps. which was in the town
and in the fields east OF It, and we could not
| understand why they did not assault in con-
junction with Pickett's attack SO strong was
tho conviction that they would assault our po-
siton that our batteries on that front-ours,
Reyn0ldss and Stevenss-had got out several
rounds of canister and laid them on the ground,
convenient for our Numbers q" as was usual
In cases of expected attack by infantry. It is
natural to suppose that Meade must have been
quite as much mystfed by the peculiar condi-
tions OF Picketts charge, and by the subsequent
inaction of Lees other eight divisions, as the
common soldiers were, since any other cOnclu-
sion would involve less tactical discernment on
Meade's part than was possessed by the average
OF his private soldiers.
If Lee had already made up his mind that
he was beaten. and threw Picketts lone divis-
ion In as forlorn hope to brave the battle out
and mask his purpose to retreat. then Pickett's
charge was a success and q tactical master
| piece. But viewed In any other light. il was
an error; and there was nothing in Lees pre-
vious careor to render such theory tenable on
tho spur OF the moment nor had any previous
| issue OF the battle warranted the supposition
that Lee considered himself
WHIPPED Or INTENDED TO RETIRA
So. under oil tho circumstances, feel justi.
| fed In saying that the men who arc least dis
satisfied with Meade's failure to make coun-
ter attack on the third day are those who had
done the most fighting. And vice-yersa.
About 10 in tho morning Of the 4th Of July
q squad OF which i was one was told OFF 10 20
with a detail to draw rations of food and for
age. This gave me another opportunity to
witness the scenes in the rear of the army but
| although they we're still very horrible, they
were nothing to compare with that dreadful
night of the second day, when we went after
tho ammunition. / particularly noticed on
this trip large numbers of the rebol wounded
who had been brought in during the morning
and were still coming In from the ground over
which Picketts Division had charged, and
which, was told was literally covered with
them, particularly after they began to ascend
tho slope OF our ridge. The appearance of
these men was even more wretehed than that
| OF our own wounded men, they being in almost
every case ragged and dirty in the extreme,
while many OF them were CANT and emaciated
| as If from want Of proper food; but / noticed
| that as a rule they bore their misery with
somewhat greater fortitude than many of our
own men did. ! suppose this was because they
| felt that they would get but little sympathy if
they did make fuss but they certainly got rs
| much Of my sympathy as our own men.
At Gen. Hunts headquarters we found Col.
| Wainwright, who informed the Lieutenant
| that IL would be impossible TO get any new ma
| terial for tho present, but that he would have
tho battery temporarily relieved by another
| from the Reserve IL necessary. So we went
back to our position. Although it was the
| Fourth of july the thought of tho day
| scarcely entered our minds. We all felt that
| we had burned powder enough in the last three
| days To make about so tirst-class Fourths, and
were willing to let IL go Mt that. The remain
| der Of the day was spent in cooking ratious
| grooming the horses fwho had becn sadly neg
| lected since we left Marsh Creek cleaning the
| guns, rearranging the disordered equipment,
and in general getting ready to march, which
| We all expected to do the next day.
DURING THE AFTERNOON
our infantry took possession of Gettysburg
| town, which they found full of the First aud
! Eleventh Corps wounded from tho first days
battle, together with many of tho rebels who
| were too badly hurt to DO removed. Some of
| our Surgeons had remained with our wounded