The Hawaiian gazette., 1889-01-22

The citation in Mills rs. Dennis,
admits that decree in rem may be
reversed for error on account of in
fancy of the party in interest. The
same case also contains the following
words: "No laches can he imputed to
an infant, and no valid decree can be
awarded against him merely by de-
| FAULT
A note to the same case, page 235,
says, "no decree can be taken against
a minor on his own admissions or
those of his guardian dd Item Except
perhaps, on admissions evidently for
the benefit of the infant
In Hall as. B,nnstedd, the allu-
sions to minors liabilities are in the
nature of obiter dictd.
In Bedford Us. Wade, the question
was whether the respondent was af-
fected by the statute of limitations,
she having been beyond the seas dur
ing the time the statute was claimed
to have run. This statute was the
| possessory law of the Island of ia
maica 9th Geo. H. The Court said:
at (the statute) does not bar legal
remedies, if the parties do not pro-
| coed within Il certain time; but it con-
verts a possession for seven years
| under deed or will, into positive,
! absolute title against all the world;n
and on page 80, at is evident that
! absence from jamaica contained no
real disability to sue there; and so
many proprietors are at ali times
| absent from the Island that the pur-
pose of the Act would have been in
great degree frustrated if the claims of
| such absent proprietors could at any
time be made without any limita-
| tiOns or restrictiOn;n and on page 81,
General words in statute must
receive q general construction unless
| you can find in the statute itself some
ground for limiting and restraining
their meaning by reasonable construc-
ton, and not by arbitrary addition or
rctrenchment. ! can easily refer to
many cases in which such a construc-
ton ought to take place. One instance
is furnished by the first Statute of
Wills, the 81 Henry Will, which de-
clares that all and every person or per-
| sons may devise their lands by will;
although no explanatory statute had
ever passed, I should have thought
there would have been no difficulty
whatever in holding that this statute
could not have enabled infants and
persons of non-sane memory to devise
by will; the obvious intention of the
statute being to make will com
petent mode of conveying land, it
could not be meant to make those
capable of conveying by will who
were not capable of conveying in any
other way.n
This is analogous to the question
raised in the case before the Court, ia
which it is fair argument to say that
the Legislature, in passing an act
which would deprive persons of val
liable interests unless there should be
an exercise of vigilance and diligence
in the institution of proceedings re-
curing mature intelligence and eX-
that it should affect minors whose
status in regard TO restraint is set
forth in the same act.
Perhaps the nearest approach to the
position claimed in behalf of the
plaintiff in regard to the liability of
infants is to be found in the case of
Bryan as. Kenneth, in which it is laid
down that the statute of Missouri of
March It'll, 1885, which provides that
non-residents of the State may be
proceeded against in equity by publ
cation, includes also nonresident
minors, they not being excepted by
the provisions of the statute; but it
appears from the record of the case,
that under the usual practice of the
courts of cbancery, the court had APP
pointed a guardian al Htem to defend
the suit for the nonresident minors;
SO that their position was in fact
better than if they had been adults.
This case does not therefore appear to
be an authority for the contention of
plaintiffs counsel.
The case of DeDlOreSt u.s. IVyHkOOp
is hardly in point upon this question. |
1t came up under the New York |
statute of limitation of actions for pos
session of real estate, in which it is |
enacted that twenty years adverse |
possession will bar action unless the |
disability of infancy exists, in which |
case the infant is allowed ten years |
after termination OF infancy. The |
plaintiff had failed to bring her ac- |
ton until the twenty years had eX-
pired and also the ten years after the
end of her minority; the question was
whether or not she was entitled to
twenty years after the expiration of !
her minority; the Court very properly
decided that she was not, the statute
having expressly provided for minors
by a special allowance of ten years
after removal of disability. The case,
cannot be said to be in
point to the issue before this Court.
Chancellor Kent in his opinion in
Demorest Us. Wynkoop referred to the
ancient case of StOlOeU as. Couch,
which case contains the following,
"Laches of suit or entry cannot be
imputed to an infant whom God has
not endowed with understanding or
reason, for if he should take an action,
his right and his action might be
such as writ of right, and the like,
which he could not prosecute nor
compel the other party to answer dur
ing his non-age.u (StOweU Us. Touch,
PlOwden 364). The case of Bell u.s.
Morrison has only the vaguest and
most general application to the ques-
ton at issue in this case. The law
under consideration in that case was
the statute limiting the time for
bringing actions in assumpsit, and
the question was whether or not the
defendant had taken the case out of
the statute and revived the cause of
action by an Acknowledgement or
admission of his debt