Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1889-07-10

be said TO have the same opinion as 10 tHe
decision in the TAYLOR case:
HAMPTON, Va, July 6, 1889.
To ne Editor Of me D,sp0tch;
have Just read in your issue Of this date
n very interesting letter from Dir. buford'
Of fAWrcncevllle. Va. suggested by your
0uorv as to the correctness of Judge buu-
tcrs recent decision IN the Taylor case
When ] penned my communication. winch
appeared in the dispatch OF the 81 instant
in response 10 your query above citcn;
intended 20 confne what / wrote 10 me
TAYLOR case and homicldes of Like cha-
racter. Ta,lor's case, as ! understand the
evidence. was q case of wlliul murder by
DoieOn. SOwas ThOrntOn's case, reported IN
q Graft. and II was lay purpose 10 MAINTAIN
that IN such a case there Is no midway
ground between o verdict OF acqultt0l ana
of murder in the first degree. OF course, }
admit that If the poison was ADMINISTERED
through negligence mot wlltullyl the pr
souer could be convicted only of involun-
tary manslauehter: and If innocenily al
ministcred by mistake without negli-
geuce) he would be euiitled tOan acqulital.
But these propositions are not pertinent
20 the case under discussion, and dId
not intend 10 express any OPINION
IN reference 10 them in my letter 10 you.
/ am not, however, prepared 10 "a,
NIT that in any case Of wiiiul
murder bv poison, no matter what
the eXtenuating circumstances. there can
under the law of Virginia be legal YER
diet Of voluntary inanslanghter. My posi-
ton. briefly stated. Is that all murder 10y
poison. when the poison j. Tiliully al
ninstercd. il necessarily murderlnt the hrst
degree: II can be nothing else under the
plain language Of our statute. ms statute
reads as follows: Murder 10y poison,
lying in wait. imprisonment. starving or
any Wilful. deliberate and premedltated
killing. orin the commission of or attempt
to- commit arson. rape robbery, or bur
elarv. is murder Of the first degree
Code. section $685. This statute has
been construed bv our highest court
IN language so clear and emphatic
that 10 my mind there can be no
doubt rs to It's meaning. In Jones,
case First Leigh, page 66Sl Judge DaniGi'
delivering the opinion OF the court, sMb;
Poison NAV reach the life of one or more
no, within the design of him who lays the
bait: living in wait may be with view TO
Great injury, abuse. and bodily harm. with
out the settled purpose 70 Kill: lmprison-
ment, or confinement, or ST rVlne' may DE
to reduce the victim TO the Necessity oil
Welding TO some proposed conditions a.
we'll as a punishment for the failure ~
prompt obedience, WlthoutanY certain ana
nNp0 determination 10 UtStibA lh', anu Aa'N
same NAV be said of malicious or eN-
cessive whipping, beating, or other cruel
torture. In all these enumerated cases the
Leqisint,re has dec'drtd the lar that the per-
petrator sb0H b. held guilty of murder IN
the first degree without further proof that
the death was the ultimate result winch
the will. deliberation. and reconciliation
of the party accused sought"
In Howells case (Z6 Graft, 1861 Judge
fftttr l. ~ af q "a
marking that the offence under consldera-
ton was not committed by poison, lying
in wait, imprisonment or storvlnE," &c.
SAYS; Had Ii been SO committed, 1t would
have been murder in the first degree, whe-
Their there was any actual intent 20 Kill or
not. In other words, although the presence
OF an actual intention 10 Kill would often
exist IN such 4 case. II would not necessarily
constitute an ingredient Of the offence as
il would he no part Of rs detnto1i.
In McDaniefs case "a Virginia, 2s9)
Judge Hinton draws the distinction
between murder 10y any OF the spe-
citic means enumerated i'm the sta
tute and murder under the general
case "wilful. deliberate, and premedl-
tated killing" lie SAYS that all murder
not committed By any Of he specific means er''i-
n.erdted ia the sfdtttt - III law presumed 10
be murder in the second degree. and that
order to elevate it to murder IN the first
degree. must prove that the killing was
"wilful. deliberate and premedltated,'
while on the other hand the BURDENS upon
the accused, if he would reduce the offence
below murder in the second degree, to
show the absence Of malice. &c.
In Puryear's case (S3 Virginia, 81 Judge
Lacy. answering the objection TO the IN
suficiency and uncertainty of the indlct-
ment. after quoting the statute which pro-
yides that Judgment in any criminal case
after verdict shall not be arrested or
reversed upon any exception TO the M
dictmcnt. &C., if the offence be charged
therein with sufficient certainty Tor
Judgment TO be given thereon" &c, SAID:
i II cannot be contendcd that there Is any
uncertainty in the charge in this lndict-
ment. II charges murder by poison,
which, under our statute, Is murder
in the first degree. There Is no I'M
certainty therein. and if the allega-
tions are true the penalty is death" Ihis
decision derives additional force from the
fact that among the objections to tins IN
dictment were that it was not alleged that
the accused knew she had any intention Of
drinking the whiskey or that he admins
tered il. OF that he placed it where he knew
she could get it and drink it, either 10y ac-
cident or design. do not deem 1t neces-
sarv to trespass upon your valuable space
in the further discussion Of this question.
/ think that tho inevitable conclusion from
our statute and the authorities cited is that
murder by poison IS PER Sc murder III the
Arthur S. SEoAR.