Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1889-01-15

COUPONS, and yet can rectyer, under the guise
of damages" interest upon such coupons from
the date OF their maturity.
Section 1915 OF the Civil Code provides that
interest Is the compensation allowed by law for
the use. forbearancs and detention of money.
The liability for interest is only incident 10
the principal debt, liability founded either
upon cow ention, or arising by operation of law
In the latter case ii is consequence which the
law visits upon one who is delinquent in
the performance of a moneyed obligation
an incident and result of such delin-
quency. If promissory note designates
the lime for the payment of a fixed amount
without interest, the law allows interest upon
such an amount from the date thus designated.
II the law, however, for any reason, forbade
action on such note upon its maturity. by the
payee against the maker, it is difficult to under
stand how the former could sustain an action to
recover from the maker interest as damages for
the non-payment of such note. And yet the
suppositious case, and that under consideration,
are in principle alike.
To hold that the present action is maintaina-
bic is to assert that the incident may thus be
greater than the principal, and that an action
may be maintained to recover damages for the
breach OF an obligation when none would lie for
its enforcement. The law respects form less than
substance; declares that one shall not gain by
1ndireetion what he may not accomplish by
direction.
There is no magic in the word damages"
that will enable plaintiff to recover interest
upon his matured coupons by christening this
dcllOu as one LOT damages, II II WOulQ fail
action, co a0nline. for the recovery of accrued
interest upon such coupons There is no art or
species OF legal sol Gerry which can thus disguise
the real character or apparent purpose Of this
proceeding, or transmute it from an action for
interest upon coupons into an action for dam
ages for breach of official duty. If it were 9th
wise the plaintiff, under the form of an action
of damages for the non-paymeDt of his coupons
may recover interest at the rate of seven and
ten per cept. per annum thereon from the date
OF their maturity, and yet may not recover the
annum interest upon the bonded debt
The purpose of the legislation previously re-
ferred to prohibiting the bondholder from suing
the city, would be defeated if this contention
question would be valueless to the city, if it did
not protect 1t from suits in the event of its de-
linquency in the payment of its bonded in
debtedness: for 1t is only in the event of such
delinquency that any suit could possibly be
maintained. If payments had been promptly
made by the defendant there could have been
no foundation for an action against it.
But the plaintiffs claim that the liability
herein sought to be enforced is one
accruipg against the defendant subsequently
to the passage of the Act of 1868, would.
of action against the defendant upon the cou-
pons in question because the obligation to paw
the amount of these coupons did not arise until
subsequently 10 the passage OF the Act in cues
ton viz, until the years 1876 and 1877.
The matter or thing" which plaintiff claims
constitutes the defendants liability here was
In no sense, made or entered into, in the Ian
guage of the Act of 1868, after its passage the
bonds in question, with the coupons thereto at
tached, having been issued in the year 1859 In
fIeehlli VS.. Chamberlain, Supra, decided in
september, 1884, 1t was expressly held that
under the Act OF 1868 no action could be main
tanned against the city upon its bonds or cou-
pens. The same result would seem to follow
IN respect to interest claimed upon overdue
coupons.
II this were not So it would still seem that
the present application must be denied for
laches, upon the ground that the relief now
sought by petitioner might have been long since
obtained by him.
His application could have been made for re-
funding in 1864, after the passage of the Fund
ing Act He has, therefore, waited twenty four
years after the privilege was allowed him by
law, and thirteen years after the maturity of his
bonds.
For these reasons the petitioners application
for writ of mandate is denied.