Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1889-07-03

Z
This action was brought in the district
court OF Anderson county by appellee as
receiver of the International and Great
Northern railroad company, appointed
by a decree of that court, to recover pos
session of the property of that corpora
ton in the hands of appellants as receiv-
ers appointed by a decree of the district
court of Smith county. The case was
submitted below to the judge without
jury, who fled the following as his con-
illusions Of the law and fact:
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.
The facts are of record, and so far as
they affected the rulings made and judg-
ment rendered upon the trial of this
cause, are undisputed 1 shall state only
the facts upon which the judgment is
based
l. It appears from the record that
plaintiff claims title to the possession of
the international and Great Northern
railroad and its properties by virtue of
orders Of the district court of Anderson
eoRnty, appointing and qualifying him
"a receiver of such property.
~ 2. That defendants assert5 right to the
possession of the same property under
prior orders of the district court of Smith
county, constituting them receivers
thereof.
3. 1t appears affirmatively from the
record of the proceedings in the district
court Of Smith county, resulting in the
appointment of defendants, that the
property sought to be placed in their
hands was and is that of a railroad cor
poration organized and acting under the
Of VIII
and is situated in this state, and that at
the time such proceedings were instituted
and when the various appointments of
defendants were made, such corporation
had its principal Office established, not IN
Smith county, but in Anderson county.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
From these facts L conclude, first,
that the district court of Smith county
had not jurisdiction to make the ap-
pointment of receivers, as attempted,
and that its orders, under which de-
PENDANTS claim, are void; and, second,
that the district court of Anderson
county did have jurisdiction to make
the appointment of receiver, and that,
by virtue Of its orders appointing him,
plaintiff was invested with the right to
the possession, control and management
of the property sued for, and is there
fore entitled to recover it from the pos
session of defendants.
If the conclusion of the court below
that the district court of Smith county
did not have jurisdiction to appoint a
receiver of the property of the corpo-
ration be correct, then the judgment
below should be affirmed For if the
appointment be void, the appellants are
in possession of the property without
authority of law and appellee is entitled
to recover it. If on the other hand
the court of Smith county had. author
ity to make appointment then the ap-
pointment of appellants must be held
valid and their possession of the prop
erty legal, and the property must be
considered IN the custody of the court
which appointed them and not subject
to be interfered with by the action of
any court of coordinate jurisdiction
The determination of the question
depends upon the construction of sec
ton - of the act of the Twentieth leg
islature concerning receivers, approved
April 2, 1887. That section reads as fol-
lows:
- If the property sought to be placed
IN the hands of a receiver is a corpora
tion, whose property lies within this
state, or partly within this state, then
a
shall be brought in this state in the
county where the principal Office of said
corporation is located.
The question is: Was it the intention
5ofsthe legislature in the enactment quoted
10 take from all courts in the state the
E(oEse1 TO appoint a receiver of the prop
eTfy of a corporation, except those in
which the principal office Of the company
is situated; or merely to confer upon the
corporation the privilege of having re-
ceivers OF their effects appointed in the
county of their general office. 1t is con-
tended on behalf of the appellee that the
intention was to deny power absolutely
to all but the one court, and it is insisted |
that there are considerations of public |
policy underlying the statute which make |
this intention apparent. 1t is argued |
that in passing the act under consldera- |
ton the legislature had prominently in |
view the appointment of receivers of |
railroad companies, and that the injus-
tice and Inconvenience which had re- |
suited from the appointment of receivers |
of SUCH corporations at places remote |
from their general offices were recognized |
by the legislature and were sought to be /
remedied by the statute. 1t is claimed that |
by the appointment of receivers in the |
COuulN VI Tue SGuGGdl Oluc6 Oh a corpora
ton fraud may be prevented, and that |
the affairs of the corporation will be |
more to the interest of the pub
lie at large. The fallacy of the argu-
ment consists in the assumption of the
premises upon which it is based Does it
tend to prevent fraud, between the man
ayers and lien creditors of 3 railroad
in the appointment of re-
ceiver, to 8 require absolutely that no
court shall appoint him except court of
the county in which the principal office
Of the company is situated? If so how
does it prevent II? If the managing off,
GERS of such 4 corporation and its bond
folders conspire together to- place its
in the hands OF a receiver why
cannot this be as speedily and
accomplished in any one
court as in another? We see moth
ng IN the requirement as to
7enue to prevent such result. Then
again let US ask in what way does pro-
-ision that q receiver shall be appointed
" a court of the county in which the
company s principal Office is located tend
o su0serve the public interest. If the
was, that the receiver should
,e a resident of that county, or should
hide or make his Office in that county.