The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1889-02-17
THE AGONY rs OVER.
The Long Examination Prac.
tically Ended.
ARGUMENTS MADE YESTERDAY
Judge Powers Says tho Confiscation
Law is Un-American and UR-
just-Mr. PickRrd.

Yesterdays proceedings before Elk
aminer Hardness were composed al
most exclusively of the arguments O
counsel, the taking of evidence having
been practically closed.
THE DAT OPENED
with the Introduction by Dyer's coupse
as evidence of an article which appeared
in the Tribune of July 18th, 1888, Civ
ing an account of Receiver Dyer's worl
in seixlng church property and com.
mending hlm and his attorneys fol
their skill, tact and courage in
the performance Of their duties in The
receivers Office.
at this point the evidence came to 8
standstill and, as Dyer's counsel wanted
to hold the case open over Monday in
order to get Mr.. Pickard's testimony
it was agreed that the arguments
should be proceeded with, the under.
standing being that the case should not
close until the testimony of Mr.. Pick
ard was taken.
Judge Marshal
opened the arguments, claiming that
the referee should make q finding In
favor of the prosecution; he claimed
that the evidence showed that the
court had been misled in the compro-
mise on the several pieces of rea, estate
for which the $S4, 666 was taken; these
pieces were the Cannon tract, the
ICONS tuition" lot and the Wells cor
ner. The witnesses for the prosecution
placed the average value of this pro D.
erty at$l83, 200, exclusive of the south
half of the Constitution" lot, and
adding $50 900 for the enhancement of
the value of the Wells corner by the
shoe factory. We think we have a
right to a finding to the effect that
the court had been misled, for it would
be remarkable for them to approve such
an arrangement otherwise.
There is a charge of gross negligence
on the part of the receiver in regard to
certain sheep. He has leased $4,000
sheep to Mr.. Pickard for % cents per
head. The lease is very bad one in
its terms; it is not contract of war
ranty. 1t does not insure that the
number of sheep will be returned. in
case there is a destruction among
them from an unusual cause. In not
providing for this in the lease l think
the receiver mas been guilty of gross
neglgence; the property is to be re-
turned July 1, 1889; that is after the
lessee has received all or the benefits he
returns the sheep before the
end of the year, thus placing
the responsibility of three months
care where no return would be
made. l do not claim bad faith on the
part of the receiver in this, but think
IT WAS GROSS NEGLIGENCE.
When the receiver was appointed in
NoveIn bar, 1857, the fact was before
him that in March, 1887, 1858 goo worth
Of personal property had been trans
erred 10 TIE various Stakes. He knew
hat much of the property was perish
able, yet he made no effort to get it
lntil May, 1888. 1t is no excuse to say
shat he could not find the property. If
be had not the ability to get it, he
should have reported to the court that
some one else could have been ap-
pointed who had the ability. But he
refralned from reasons of a personal
nature. This we consider breach of
duty on the part of the receiver. Later,
be- compromised the $268, 900 for $50 600,
because the defendants said that only
S5e, 900 remained. He made no effert
TO get the property or its value from
the STAKES, or the persons who used it.
There was no announcement to the
court that the $4,000 was accepted in
leu of the 1858 600 which had existed.
We also claim that the charge that
the receiver failed to take property
that belonged to the church has been
proven by abundant evidence, and we
are entitled to finding that there has
been gross negligence on his part in
this respect. 1t is in eviderce that
there was a large amount of property
that the receivers attorneys believed
they could have obtained through the
courts, yet no effort was made to obtain
it. The case was permitted to 60 to
final decree without such an effort
being made. The bill filed in the
original suit alleged that the church
had So 900 600 in property; this was de-
MED by the answer, and was therefore q
material issue. Yet, the case goes to
final decree on statement of facts re :
garding a much smaller amount of
property than was claimed. 1t is said
THERE IS A SAVING CLAUSE
in continuing the receivership. That
simply means that, as there is no one
else to take charge of the property, it
should be left in the custody of the re-
celver until final adjudication. It relates
only to the property already taken. The
receiver cannot bring suit for more
property, because final decree in the
m ain case precludes such action. The
proceeding of the court is a special
and by the appeal to the
Supreme Court the lower court
Is barred from any other original pro-
ceedings. 1 think the permitting of this
case TO go to the final decree under
these circumstances was gross negli-
gence. In every suit in the future that
decree could be pleaded as an adiudica-
ton.
think the receiver is in the nature of
q trustee. 1t is his duty to fully dis
close his services in making a claim for
compensation. The manner in which
he does the work is the basis for the es-
innate of the compensation. The hear.
ing on this subj sct was one sided af-
fair. If the statement of the receiver
any truth as to bis services,
that is fraud practiced on the court
The evidence shows that no adequate
{ forts were made to find the personal
it was surrendered because
the defendants wanted a final decree.
The work was done by the attorneys in