Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1889-07-03

| Davidson. 81 Tex, 25l; Kendall vs..
| Hockworth, sc Tex. 499.
The doctrine was again very distinctly
recognized in The State vs.. Snyder, sc
Tex. 687, ] as applied to a statute which
specially provided that suits to set aside
/ certain sales OF school lands should be
brought in the district court of Travis
county. In the opinion in that case the
| present chief justice says: 'District
courts under the constitution having
! jurisdiction over the subject matter OF
such an action, the state, as might any
! other plaintiff might maintain such an
action in any county in the state in so
far as jurisdiction over the subject mat
ter is concerned.
In cases of doubt statutes in pari ma
! terra are TO be construed together. When
| language in a statute has been construed
| by the courts and the same language is
used in a subsequent statute relating to
the same subject matter it is presumed to
have been adopted with the interpreta-
ton precisely placed upon it by judicial
| construction.
In view of the previous decisions of
our courrs upon similar statutes and
these rules of construction, we do not
| hesitate to hold that section Is of the act
of April 3, 1887, was intended to confer
upon corporations the privilege of having
suits for the appointment OF receiv-
ers of their property instituted in the
counties of their principal offices and not
deprive any district court of the power
of making such appointment in the event
the corporation failed to plead its priv
ilege.
1t follows, as we are of opinion, that
the district court of Smith county had
jurisdiction TO appoint the appellants re-
ceivers of the property of the Interna-
tional and Great Northern railroad COM
pany when it made its decree to that
effect.
This view of the case renders it unnec-
essary to pass upon several questions
presented in the briefs and arguments of
counsel. Since we hold that it was not
the intention of the legislature to deprive
the district courts other than those of the
counties in which the corporations of the
state have their principal offices of power
to appoint receivers of their property, it
is not necessary to decide whether the
legislature has the power to take away
that jurisdiction or not. Upon that point
we give no opinion.
Nor do we decide whether or not sec
ton Is was intended to apply to all re-
ceiverships of the property of corpora
tons or only to cases of insolYent cor
porations in which the corporation itself
and all its assets are taken into the hands
of the court for the purpose of winding
up its business.
There is, however, one other question
raised by the appellee which it is neceszs
sary briefly to consider. The history Of
the litigation is as follows: On the 4th
of February, 1889, Jay Gould brought an
action of debt against the internationally
and Great Northern railroad company in
the district court of Smith county for
about the sum of four hundred and fifty
thousand dollars. On the 18th day of
the same month the Missouri, Kansas
and Texas railway company, claiming to
be stockhoider of the former company,
interviewed in the suit and asked the ap-
pointment of receiver. On the same
day j. W Mitchell and Others, claiming
to be creditors, also INTERVIEWED and asked
that a receiver be appointed. On the
10th receivers were appointed upon the
application of the Missouri, Kansas and
Texas company the court being in doubt
as to its power to appoint upon the applica-
ton of the other interVeners. They were,
however, permitted to prosecute their
pleas of intervention in the suit. On March
II, 1889, Gould obtained a judgment
which was declared lien upon the earn
ings of the defendant company. There
upon the intervening corporation i'nme-
diately withdrew its plea of Intervention
and Gould filed a motion that the receiv-
ers be continued, which was granted
The petition asking the appointment of
a receiver was fled in the district court
of Anderson county on March %, 1889.
It is now insisted that when the Missouri,
Kansas and Texas company withdrew its
intervention the receivership was va
Gated, and that the authority of appel
lants therefore dates from q period sub
sequent to the time that the proceedings
were commenced in the Anderson county
district court. 1t is argued that since at the
time the proceedings were instituted I'M
der which appellants hold their appoint
ment, the suit for the appointment of n
receiver had been instituted in the dis
trict court of Anderson county, the
former court had lost its jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the receivershfp
and that therefore appellants appoint
ment is void. We think, however, thatj
the jurisdiction of the Smith couSfts
court dates from the first applieatloHahd
that appellants authority is derived
from the first appointment. The with
drawal of the intervening corporation
from the suit did not vacate the receiver
ship, although the appointment was made
upon its application. Immediately upon
the withdrawal of the plea of interven-
ton, the receivership was continued upon
the application of the plaintiff. Whether
these proceedings were regular or
not we need not determine. Whether
they were erroneous or not, we need not |
determine. They were not void, and |
therefore the possession of appellants of |
the property placed in their hands by the |
order of the court is legal and they can
not be dispossessed at the suit of another |
appointed at a subsequent time |
by another court of coordinate jurisdic-
ton.
In determining this case we have iDdi-
vidually read and considered the uumer-
Gus able arguments of counsel, together
with the elaborate and well considered |
opinion of the learned judge who tried /
the case below, and upon consultation
have arrived at the conclusion that the
law is with appellants, and that the
judgment should be reversed and here
rendered for them. It is accordingly so
R. R. Gaines, Associate JUS
tlce. Opinion delivered June %, 1889.
Clerks office, supreme COURT, Chas.
. ~, -, =