Pittsburg dispatch. [volume] (Pittsburg [Pa.]) 1880-1923, 1889-08-11
ESPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE DIsPArcH.l

ESPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE DIsPArCH.l
TRENTON, N. j., August 10.-Judge
Dixon, of the Supreme Court of this State,
has delivered an opinion that is decidedly
of national interest. 1t is probably the first
instance OF a Supreme Court, or any high
court. in this country deciding that a mans
civil rights as set forth in the Constitution
are more important than the common law
rule that no person can be witness in aju-
dicial proceeding who denies that God will
punish perjury. Although Judge Dixon
delivered the opinion, it must be remem-
bered that it was the opinion of the entire
Supreme Court of New Jersey, with the ex-
ception of Judge Depue, of Newark, who
dissenled from the decision of his associates.
The case came before the court In the
shape of an appeal from the Essex County
Court of Common Pleas. That minor tri-
bunal, through Judge Kirkpatrick, re-
fused to allow man to testify on his own
behalf in an action for debt, because of his
denial of punishment for perjury by the
Almighty. He stated that he believed in
the existence of supreme being, and did
not deny future state, but he believed the
penalty prescribed by the State would be
the only punishment he would receive in
case he gave false testimony while under
oath. The witness was deemed incompe-
tent. and because he could not give his evil
dence he lost his suit. 1t was on the appeal
from the decision of the lower court that the
Supreme Court rendered the opinion in
question and overruled the original de-
cision. The following is what Judge Dixon,
speaking for the court, said:
THE SUPREME COURTS OPINION.
Assuming the common law rule to be that no
person can be witness in a judicial proceeding
unless he believes that God will punish perjury,
it becomes necessary to consider the effect Of
that clause in the first article of our State Con-
stitution, which declares that mo person shall
be denied the enjoyment of any civil right
merely on account of his religious principles"
By statute, parties in suits are generally CON-
petent witnesses in their own behalf, and when
the prosecutor rendered himself as a witness in
his own behalf before the Common Pleas his
right to testify would have been conceded had
he believed that God would punish perjury.
His right was denied merely because he did not
SO believe. 1t was not that he did not think
himself bound to tell the truth according to
his oath, but only that he had not an affirmative
faith that the Divine Being would infict some
penalty upon him if he violated his obligation
Two questions, therefore, arise-frst is the
right of party to testify in his own behalf
civil right; second, is the belief of a person as
whether fess God will punish perjury to
ciples. By civil rights 1 understood those
rights which the municipal law will enforce at
the instance OF private individuals, for the pur-
pose of securing to them the enjoyment of their
means of happiness. They are distinguishable
from natural rights which would exist If there
were no municipal law, some of which are abro-
gated by municipal law, while others lie out
side of its scope, and still others are enforcea-
BILE under 1t as civil rights. They are also dis
tinguishable from political rights which are
directly concerned with the institution and ad.
is the right to prosecute and defend actions in
the courts of the Commonwealth according to
the established rules of practice. This propo-
sition is sufficiently vindicated by a reference
to the civil rights cases in the Supreme Court
of the United States, where it is assumed as
true by all the justices of that tribunal.
DEFINING RELIGIOUS BELIEF.
The next question is whether a persons be-
lief as to the punishment of perjury by the
Deity is to be classed among his religious prin-
ious principles are those sentiments concerning
the relations between God and man which may
influence human conduct. Of these, perhaps
the most influential hitherto has been the view
entertained as to the probability that God
would punish vice. A persons sentiments on
that subject must be deemed part of his relig-
iOus principles. 1t is urged that disbelief can
not be called religious principle. Perhaps,
if one denied the existence of a Supreme Be-
ing it might in proper sense be said that he
had no religious principles, because he could |
between God and man, unless a denial of any
such relations might be so denominated. But to |
a person who believes in the existeEce of a |
Supreme Being there pertain necessarily, or at |
least probably, some views with regard to the |
relations between him and us which modify |
the life of the individual. The mere fact that |
in those relations he has discovered no Divine |
purpose of punishment for specific acts does |
not initiate against his possession of religious /
principles, and among them are his belief, his |
disbelief and his doubt concerning those rela-
that when party claims the statutory right to |
testify in his own behalf, he cannot be denied |
On the ground that he does not believe God |
will punish perjury.
It may be suggested that the civil rights pro.
tected by this clause of the Constitution are |
only those which were recognized when the |
Constitution was framed, and that, therefore,
she right of litigant to be a witness for him
self having been created since that time, it is |
not among those thus secured. But it would. / |
,hink, be unreasonably cramping this provision |
.hus to confine it. One of
THE GREATEST CAUSES
which led to the settlement of the American |
colonies was the desire of the immigrants that |
heir Government should not make discrimina- |
ion against them because of their religious |
enets. 1t was not so much that they esteemed |
my particular privilege denied to them as of |
7alue sufficient to warrant their expatriation,
,ut they insisted upon the more general |
doctrine, that their belief or disbelief on |
eligious topics should not debar them from
lights which the laws afforded to
,ther subjects. Even up to the
ime OF the Revolution, this doctrine
lad not broadened out into the principle
which we now consider just; for in the Colonial
Of July l776 equality Of rights
he language being ''that no Protestant inhab-
tants of this colony shall be denied the enjoy
nent of any civil right merely on account of
lis religious principles" But evidently the
ramer5 of that instrument were aiming to
stablish rule of action which would control
he operations of all departments of the gov
rnment that they were forming, and not
merely to guard the rights they had previously
,ossessed. 1t was because those rights had