The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1889-05-25

in which compliance with constitutional
requirements as to assessment was not
shown. AS to lands bought by the State,
the power OF course existed to repeal the
law, since such repeal would not be the
impairment OF the contract OF sale.
II this statute had been pure statute OF
limitations, the next inquiry presented
might be differently answered. That in
quiry is whether 1t was repealed by the
| Code OF 1871, in which the subject OF ac-
| tions was revised and codifed?
The substance OF the first six sections OF
the act Of 1860 is embodied in Section 1853
OF the Code, and that part Of Section OF
said act now under consideration became
part OF Section LOO. The argument has
been made that Section l,709 OF the Code
refers TO sales thereafter TO be made under
the provisions OF the chapter OF which IL is
| part, and that as to sales made under the
act OF 1860, neither the Code nor the act
applies; the Code because il was prospec-
tive in IFS operations and the act because
il has been repealed. But as we have said
the act confers right upon the purchaser
at tax sales. II is not expressly repealed,
and by Section 10 Of the Code it is de-
clared that even where there is repeal by
the Code Of former laws, it ''shall not al
feet any act done, or any cause of action,
or any right accruing or accrued previous
to the time when such repeal shall take
place"
While therefore the formers owners OF
the land might have attacked the title Sc
cured by the State under the sale OF 1867,
within five years from the date OF such
sale, the lapse OF that period OF time made
such title valid against attack based upon
any mere irreguarity in the proceedings
OF sale. In Mayer VS.. PEBBLES, So Miss,
our attention was not called 10 the act now
under consideration, and the validity OF
the title OF the Levee Board springing from
the lapse OF time was not considered.
different conclusion would probably have
been reached, II the statute now under re-
view had been appealed to. Whether the
States title was unimpeachable at the
time OF the sale to the Levee Board Is i'm.
material since ii afterward became so prior
TO the enactment OF the act OF March |,
1875. BY that act the State in effect de.
clared that II would abandon all claim I'M
der pre-existing tax sales, whether made
10 itself or TO one OF the Levee Boards, on
condition that the owners OF or others in
the State, county and levee taxes for the
year 1874, and in default OF such payment
a scheme was provided for a resale OF all
the delinquent lands. In Green VS.. Gibbs,
% Miss, 592, and Bunch VS.. Wollerstein,
81 Miss, SO, 1t is decided that this act in
80 FAR rs IL endeavored to abate the taxes
due to the1.evee Board on land held by it
was unconstitutional as impairng the
rights OF the creditors OF such board But
this was upon the ground that the Levee
Board was the owner Of the lands rs trus-
tee for such creditors. In the case before
us the State and not the Levee Board was
then the owner Of the lands now in con-
troversy, and because it was might abate as
II saw iit ali delinquent taxes
We can perceive no ground for holding
invalid the sale 10 the State under the
abatement net other than that disclosed
by the releases executed TO appellant by
the Auditor, and they cover only portion.
OF the lands. II appears from these re-
leases that appellant in 1883 exhibited 10
the Auditor Of Public Accounts the evil
dence required by section 574 OF the Code
that the taxes for which the lands were
sold had been paid before the day OF sale.
But in 1883 when these releases were made
the State had abandoned her claim derived
from the sale Of 1867, and claimed new
and Independent title under the act OF
March !. 1875. Cochran vs.. Baker, 70
Miss, 2S2.
The releases are evidence OF the fact that
the taxes for the year 1874 had been paid
before the sale under that act, Tor il was
the duty Of the Auditor TO receive evidence
OF that fact. But he had no right 20 re.
quire evidence Of the payment OF the taxes
Tor the year 1865, since they had been
abated and released by the act OF 1875.
Payment OF these taxes proven to have
been made operated not only TO prevent a
sale OF the lands for such taxes. but also to
release to the former owner the title ac-
quired under the sale Of 1867.
Section ga Of the Code speaks OF ere
lease OF the States title in the state OF
the case therein named, but the evidence
required under that section IS that the
taxes had been paid before the sale, in
which case the State would have no title
TO pass by the release, and no title could
OF course pass pass thereby. II is proba-
BILE that appellant intended TO concentrate
in herself both the title OF the Leyee
Board and that derived by the State un.
der the sale OF 1875. But the evidence
she exhibited 10 the Auditor proved that
because the taxes had been paid. and as
We have seen the Lcvce Board acquired
none by is proceeding because the state
then had title 10 the land. The sole valid
tax title 10 the lands described in these re-
leases on the facts shown was that derived
by the State In 1867, and that IL surren-
dcred in consideration OF tho payment Of
the taxes OF 1874
But as 10 eighty acres Of the land not
named in the release IL DOES not appear
that the state has released lis title nc.
quired by the sale under the act OF March
1, 1875. There is no evidence that the
taxes on these had been paid and there is
no other defect suggested rs 10 that sale.
For the error in alording complainants
relief rs 10 this land the decree Is reversed
and cause remanded.
FIRST FIgHT OVER n.