Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1889-01-01
THE NATIONAL GUARD.
Lessons I'm the Art OF war-Col. Sige-
lows Explanation of Strategy

INV Vi HtEdttxs
Col. John Bigelow. acknowledgement II the
District national guard, in his lecture o the
officers of the District national guard n the
artof war devoted to the different kinds OF trst-
egy, said that for the purpose OF study SUI segy
may De resolved into the following KINDS lst
Strategy proper or regular strategy wheh
aims at depriying the enemy of his suppha
I'd. Tactical strategy. which aims at oufnu1
bering him on the field of battle. Sd. Polltial
or moral strategy, which aims at disheartenie
his population or body polite. or at erippiar
his government. There was no analogy, H.
said. to strategy in the proper sen.e
in a single combat Generally speal
ing he said, IL is tactics alone that exereises
the brain and sinews of the masters OF the
'.manly art and other modes of seli-defense
The first campaign of Napoleon In Italy lbs
~. he said. was won mainly by tactical
strategy. his second 1S0O) by strategy proper
STRATEGY IN THE REvoLUTIoN.
The strategy of the British in our war OF IN
dependence" he said twas mainly tactical 1t
aimed at separately subjugating the northern
or the New England and the middle states en-
the one hand. and the southern states Oh the
other. The summer and the autumn were The
seasons of activity III the north; the WINTER and
spring in the south. The British general who
could move his troops by sea. might ieaye
either department with only soldiers enough
to act or the defensive when the Nsauer
limited the operations that could pc coluuG'ed
there, and maintain a superiority III the o.ner,
where such superiority was more InlY9i amt
The problem in the north was dVldeu &C
cOrding to a similar plan into the separate sud-
jugation of the New England states OIL The
one hand and the middle states on INT o,ier
In the execution of this sub-plan me hitlsh
with fatal inconsistency. undertook WIN di-
vided forces 10 divide the forces Of the Ariieri-
cans. thus Offering their enemy the 'e! au-
vantage which they - 20 Oo'@in An
army which hadasseml NADIA unGt en-
Burgoyne marched by NJ the 70
the upper Hudson. 10 Il pIa 'toi
Lord HOwe's army froI Ts. lnh uhc-
ton would have enab, seize an noiu
the line of the Huds6 nus eu1 o We"
England from her sISt lces, Vu' eiore
il could be effected Rurgoyuc Was surrounded
ON the heights of Saratoga and his whole army
compelled to surrender. Despite the azure
of this preliminary plan the British turned
their attention to the southern states, "LSre a
strong royalist party still existed. mere
they again gave the Americans Just such
an opportunity as they themselves IN
tended TO seize. Sir Henry Clnton,
the successor to Lord Howe cOmmancer-ln-
chief in America. failed adequately 10 support
the southern army under Corvallis IN eonse-
quence of which the latter intronched himself
IN the lines of Yorktown. sudden march OF
Washington brought him from the Hudson to
the front of this position at a nomentwhen
the French feet held the sea. and the British
army was driven by two weeks bOmhartmen Mt
to a surrender as humiiiaring a. that ofSara-
tOga. Up 10 this time Sir Henry Clinton had
been In the habit of referring To the AMERICAN
commander-in-chicf. in his dispatches, as M.
Washington. Hereafter he referred TO Inn as
General Washington.
TIE WAR OF 1872
The British operations in our war of 1872
were characterized. it should seem. by an equally
injudicious and unllcky division Of forces and
discOnnection of effort. The real stress Of the
war was thrown upon two expeditions directed.
the one against tho north. the other against
the south. force of 5000 Peninsula vete-
rams. which advance along the line of march of
Gen. BurgOyue. 10 the attack of Tlattsburg on
Lake Champlaln. was forced 10 fall back by
the destruction Of the hotilla which accom-
panied II. on which il depended for supplies.
Another force. after making a successful but
PrOtitless raid upon Washington. and being
baffied in a similar attempt upon Baltimore.
was directed upon New Orleans, where il was
repulsed by Gen. Jackson. with the loss of half
of Its numbers
In both the revolutionary war and the war of
ISL our enemies made auxiliary use of political
strategy. While BurgOyne was advancing upon
Chesapeake and marched on Philadelphia, the
temporary capital of the United States and the
seat OF Congress. which Washington after his
unsuccessful defense at Brandywine and bod
but equally unsuccessful attack on his vietors
at Germantown. was forced to abandon The
war Of the revolution. moreover was brought
home TO the American people by the cruel
treatment of prisoners. and those atrocities
which OccaslOned the laundering of Lord Chat
ham : Indignation at the use of the Indian and
his sealpIng- knife as the the allies Of England
against her children. In the war Of 1872 the
British captured Washington and before eyac-
mating the city burned its public buildings to
the ground"
COMBINING DIFFERENT KINDS OF STRATEGY.
1t Is with view to bringing better men than
the enemy's upon the field Of battle. he aid.
that the general practices regular strategy.
He aims at fighting half-fed. hslf-cIotbed.
haIf-armeG men. with men that are well of in
each OF THESE respects. IL Is with a view to
oFtrpOWerIng the enemy before meeting him
that he Practices tactical strategy. Bv the
practice Of political strategy he aims al under
mining the mora! and material suppOrt of the
enemy or at affecting his recall from the war.
these different forms of strategy are not nee
tssarily single in practice: on the CONTRARY
lhey are usually practiced in combination. one
Win another There are few modern cam
PalSns that do not illustrate more than one of
thtM' Nhlle IL II not uncommon for all of them
To be combined in one campaign.
AN ARMY on TIE MARCH.
'oi- Blgeiow then passed to description of
the formation of an army ON the march based
or arranged with regard to a satisfaction of
'le lOAoWlng requirements: l. security: q
'fhclency Of command and administration. 3
mutual support Of the different parts: I. celer-
ltE Of movement He described the snuare
adopted by Napoleon in his Egyptian cam
paign. and the effective formation adopted by
also Of the order followed by 0nr trro,I in a
hostile Indian country. adapted to the ext
Sehcles Of the country and the character of the
enemy The seventh cavalry. Custer's old
he said. has a normal ord of
hiafch Tor the plains. which is a sort of { n
promise between the square and the coluI n