Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1889-12-30
CAMPBELL RESTRAINED.
THE FRESNO JUDGE IS REBUKED BY
THE SUPREME COURT.
He Can Take no Further Part in the
Laguna de Tache
Case.

The Supreme Court, sitting in bank in
San Francisco, rendered an exhaustive de-
cision Saturday in the matter OF the ap.
plication of Poly, Hebron & Co, for a
writ of prohibition, restraining Superior
Judge Campbell, of Fresno county, from
taking any part in the proceedings of the
well-known Laguna de Tache rancho case.
The decision grants the writ applied for
and bestows considerable attention to
Judge Campbeli's doings
The original case is still pending in the
Courts, on an application by Poly, He'll
bron & Co for a new trial. Charlotte F.
Clarke ct al. are plaintiffs and the petition
ers defendants. The petition shows that
in 1880 an agreement was entered into by
and between the petitioners and one Jere-
miah Clarke, by which the petitioners
leased from said Clarke for term of years
a certain tract of land in Fresno county,
being part of what was known IS the
Laguna de Tache rancho, and in which
agreement it was provided that the petit
TONERS should have the option during said
lease to purchase, at the price and on the
terms named therein; that the petitioners
took possession of said property under the
lease, and complied with all the terms and
conditions; that the said Charlotte F.
Clarke made application and procured let
tiers of guardianship over the property of
her husband, on the ground of his un-
soundness of mind, and before the expira-
ton of the lease she, as guardian,
brought an action to set aside the
contract, on the ground that Clarke
at the time of its execution was o. unsound
mind. On the trial of the cause before the
respondent, as Judge of the Superior Court
of Fresno county. findings and judgment
were rendered in favor of plaintiffs. A mo-
ton for new trial is now pending, as is
also motion for the appointment of re-
ceiver to take charge of the property. AS
reason why the respondent should be
prohibited from acting further in the cause,
it is alleged in the petition that during the
tendency of the action before him he pur-
chased certificate of purchase for certain
tract of land consisting of 257 acres, which
is part of the land included in petitioners
lease aud contract.
In the respondents answer he denied
that the land purchased by him is part of
the ranch ia litigation, but does not deny
that the parties to the action are claiming
it to be part thereof
The Supreme Court holds that putting
the matter in the most favorable light for
the respondent, the case shows that there
are three parties adversely claiming to be
the owners of a certain tract of land, one of
whom is Judge of the Court, and the
other two adverse litgants before Kim, ask
ing to determine which of them is the
owner. He is called upon by the applics-
ton for receiver. AS he claims part OF
the land, ard asserts that it is not within
the larger tract within dispute, the tempta-
ton TO exclude it in making his order will
at once arise, and if his land Is to
go into the hands of receiver, it must
be of some interest to him who shall
become receiver and take charge of
the land. In its decision the Supreme
Court further says: ut seems to US
that neither argument nor authority is
necessary to show that Judge should b,
prohibited from sitting in cause under
such circumstances. 1t is contended that
our statute only disqualiies Judge where
he has direct interest in the result of the
suit, and that, in this case, Judgment for
or against either of the parties could not
bind the Judge or affect his title to the
land. But we cannot give the statute this
narrow construction. II should be the
duty and the desire of every Judge to
avoid every appearance of bias, prejudice
or Partially, ard to this end he should de-
cline TO sit, and if he does not, should be
prohibited from sitting, in any case in
which his interest would naturally intlu-
ence him one way or the other. II might
become very important to him to have the
land go to one of the claimants rather than
the other. One might be favorable to his
tlaim, and the other not. With one
compromise might be easy, and with the
other, difficult. And aside from what
might influence the Judge under such cir
cumstances, it appears TO us unseemly for
judge 10 sit in an action involving the title
as between the litigants to subject matter
of which he claims to be the sole owner
and must, in the end, litigate as between
himself and the litigant who succeeds to
the property by his judgment"
The opinion is written by Justice Works
aud is concurred in by Justices Sharpstein,
Mcfarland Fox end Patterson