Shenandoah herald. [volume] (Woodstock, Va.) 1865-1974, 1889-08-30

been longer thdn, fortunately lot /
jackson, it actually WAS, his mac 4
tivity would doubtless have been /
the subject Of many savage lead |
inc article la these days Of tele- /
graphic daily reports even three +
uneventful weeks the time during ,
which he actually remained qules-
cent-may suffice to damn the fair
est military reputation.
POPE AS JACKsON's COMMIsSARY.
However, on July q, 1862, a. p.
IIilPs division was ordered to iCin
Jackson. AS soon as Hill joined
him mark with what rapidity he
acted On August OH he caught
Banks at Cedar Mountain, and
once more showed how a small ar.
my may be superior at the point Of
contact to the fractions of larger.
His superiority was no. great-2O,-
900 to 1900, according to the best
estimates-but it was sufficient.
His own reputation, the confidence
Of his troops, and their war.tried
experience under him, were ele.
ments which added indefinitely to
his fighting strength. The wide
sweeping move round Pope which
followed depended for its success
first on Jackson's faculty for carry
ing ont a secret manGuvre, second
/ ly, OH the trained marching rapidi-
ty Of his troops, and lastly, on the
fact, which had become apparent
to the Confederate generals, that
the Washington authorities had so
tied Pope 10 n post that it was safe
TO march around HIM because he
could not move. Il is rather re-
markable that IN General POpe's
description OF the campaign he APP
pears to treat the loss of the stores
at Manassas junction az a triiling
matter. I'm the long ran, no doubt
that loss may not have been very
important to the well.snpplied
northern armies, but there can he
no question that both by its mate
rial and moral effects it enormous
" increased the decentralization Of
the Union army after the second
defeat at Bull Run. Before that
battle it exercised a most disas-
trous influence by shaking the con.
fdence of men and officers in their
commander, however much justli-
cation he may have for throwing
the responsibility for it upon other
shou ders. In campaign men do
not nicely argue cut questions Of
abstract Justice it is the broad et-
fects which tell on the spirit OF an
army. There can be no doubt that
in fighting the second Bull Run the
successful raid was worth several
) thousand men to the COnfederates
from the encouragement it Afforded
them and the depression it produc.
ed among their opponent. When /
was with General Lees army at
Winchester, in the autumn Of 1862
the soldiers in every camp laugh.
ingly spoke Of Pope as "Stonwall
Jackson's comwIssary," so entirely
had Jackson in the "Pope cam
paign7 depended upan capturing
from that general everything he re-
quired for his men.
LEE AND M'CLELLAN.
, Concerning General Lees first
invasion OF Maryland, General
Wolseley says Lee had driven back
, the Army of the Potomac and that
f of Virginia to the point from
which they had started in the
: spring and summer. lie knew
! how demorallzed these armies had
| become from repeated defeats, and
, he was fully aware of the scare
which POpe's disasters had occa-
stoned at Washington. Mr.. Lin
coin was known TO be very nervous
tor the safety Of that capital. Lee
felt that ifhe could but still fur.
ther increase tins fear Of losing
Washington he might so retain the
, Federal armies in Its neigbOrhOOd
as 10 free the nOrthern districts of
Virginia from all hostile Occapa-
tion during autumn. His object
was to keep McCIclau's forces far
away from Richmond until winter
had so destroyed the roads as to
render all field operations near that
city practically impossible.
Although vast amount Of valu,
4 able equipment and military stores
: had been taken by the Army OF
Northern Virginia from Pope, il
/. was still badly supplied army and
sadly in want of transport. Not
q wlthstanding this fact Lee thought
! his best plan to accomplish the end
, he had in view was to invade Mary
o land, where the southern cauSe had
r. thousands of sympathizers, and by
Z that operation keep tse war at a
n distance from Richmond. Lee had e,
8 however, it seems to me, underesti-
I mated the revIyiIying influence
which Mcclellan exerted over the
Federal armies when again placed
r in actual command Of them; nor
Y did Maryland afford him the aSsis.
! tance he had expected. He also
I miscalculated the time required for
}. the capture of Harper's Ferry--a
r miscaculation which placed him IN
, q position of real danger. An en-