The western sentinel. [volume] (Winston-Salem, N.C.) 1887-1926, 1889-12-12

a bureau upon which the very existence of
the Confederate armies must depend, and for
the labors of which it is apparent the sound
est practical order of intellect was essential !"
1t would be easy to find Confederates Of
high rank and approved Judgment in mill
tary affairs who still look upon this appoint
ment and two others as the main causes of
the downfall of the Confederacy.
WHO FoREsAw LONG WAR;
As to the other charge SO persistently urged,
that Mr.. Davis was mot able to compre-
hend the proportions of the struggle impend-
ing" the obvious answer is, Who vast A
few, very few, thoughtful men in the north,
who drew their conclusions largely from his
tory, predicted long and bitter struggle; In
the south it is exceedingly doubtful If there
were fifty men who believed the contest
would outlast a year. If there was one who,
from the beginning, anticipated a four years
war, he succeeded admirably in concealing
his views. That President Davis his cabinet
and all his advisers shared the current delu-
sion that the war would be short and its thea
tire confined principally to the coast and the
border between the two sections, is certain
Such belief was the parent of many errors.
In the first place, 1t was estimated that the
south had almost arms enough, and the first or
der sent to Europe was for but 10, 900 Enfield
riflesl Before the blockade could be made
effective it was urged that the Confederate
government should take the cotton and to-
bacco, of which a large stock was still on
hand, issue bonds to pay the owners, export
the stuff to Europe, and make it the basis Of
fund to draw upon The owners generally
were willing, and the effect would have been
tremendous At the same time a considera-
BILE amount Of foreign exchange In the banks
was offered to the government on favorable
terms. Both propositic-s were rejected or
ignored, and the golden opportunity soon
passed, never to return 1t should be noted
also that the legislation of the provisional
congress, and of the first session Of the regu-
lar congress at Richmond, shows tho same
lack of perception as to the greatness OF the
| impending struggle,
On the Federal side of tho line much Of the
| froth and nonsense about "a short war" waa
| swept away by the battle Of Bull Run; the
| rest was done for at Shiloh. After the latter
| thoughtful men both north and south made
| up their minds that tho issue was to be tenar
ciously. fought to a close The north erred
| often in expecting great and decisive victo
| ries; the south quite as often in expecting
| foreign interference or division In the north
| True, Mr.. Benjamin at Richmond continued
to promise ''pacification in ninety days" long
after Mr. Seward at Washington had ceased
| to do SO, but he found few echoes.
AN APPALLING DIFFICULTY.
| The victory of Bull Run produced great
| exultation in the SOUTH but appears to have
had a decidedly sobering effect upon Presi
| dent Davis and cabinet. 1t may now be con
sdered proved that he was in for aggressive
| action Immediately after that battle, bu
yielded to the adverse opinions Of Johnston
and Beauregard, and thereafter, with rar,
exceptions, insisted upon defensive policy
| During the long period of inaction which fol
lowed he embraced every opportunity to de
clare his earnest desire for peace. He ever
excited criticism by suggesting conciliatory
measures; for many months all his utter
ances were amplifications Of that passage II
his first regular message. ''The moment tina
this pretense of our subjugation is abandoned
the sword will drop from our grasp and "
shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity
| and friendship