Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1889-08-11
THE LATE CIVIL WAR.
GENERAL woLseLeVs CRITICISMS
-. MILITARY GENIUS OF JACKSON.
How lie Mystined Ills opponents-The
Brilliant Campaigns of the Valley
Opinions of Leo.


English general contributes 90 tho August
number az the North American Rertco an
other 81 his series Of articles on the Amer
ican civil war, in which he pays high
tribute 10 the military genius of stone
wall Jackson. and writes IN an interesting
way of Generals Lee and Mcclellan.
There are some, he says, who think that
war is n game Of pure chance. in which
great leaders form their plans on some I'M
fntelligible inspiration which guides them
rs TO the right course 10 be pursued. that
they draw nothing from the experience OF
earlier wars and that none can tell why
one man succeeds and another fails. Let
those who think thus call 10 mind the
words | have quoted from StOnCwaU
jackson. drawn absolutely and merely
from his knowledge Of war as learned
from the great leaders OF former DAYS.
Then let them Observe how. IN pracuce,
both Lee on the larger and Jackson on the
minor scale applied them. and TO how great
an extent the triumphs of their armies were
due TO the skilful application OF those prin-
Ciplcs. Moreover, since, rs Burns teils US
the best laid schemes 20 mice ana men
gang aft agley," let them noe now "ncn
The men failed. the principles asserted theH
Importance.
JACKSON N THE VALLEY.
In the first place. consider the respective
forces in the Shenandoah Valley and
neighboring departments. Jackson had
an ayailable force at first, in the begin
ming of March. 1852. of about 1000 men.
strengthened at the beginning OF May by
Fwells division, which raised his army
10 nerhaps IA 900 men. According TO the
careful estimate Of the editors mote page
2S5). there were opposed to him IN the VAL
lev "a $40 men. In addition, there were
in the neighboring departments, available
for the march on Richmond, number
Of froOps that brought up their forces 10
On mn A. GtrltpplC
the object desired by the employment OF
Jackson's little army in the Shenandoah
Valley was TO keep occupied and retain
there as large a number OF the Federal
forces as possible. 50 that the nam Con-
fcderate army engaged the decisive issue
AGAINST Mcclellan should have every posi-
Die chance. I'm fact. II was Jachson's rue
10 preyent any reinfOrcemcnts from beng
sent TO Mcclellan and, above all things. To
create an alarm at Washington fol. the safe
ty of that capital.
MYsTFYING THE ENEMY.
In his first action at KernstOwn. when no
was acting purely on the defensive, Jack
sons object was to simply "mystity the
enemy as TO his actual numbers. ms he
accomplished, time after time, by the
choice Of strong positions, where. without
committing himself 10 a decisive action, he
was still able to deal with considerable
portions Of the enomy's forces. In these
operations. therefore, he qualified his gene
raj principle. Ito remain qulescent III
presence OF superior force" by giving bat
lie whenever attacked by fractions of the
Union forces. He succeeded in his larger
purpose, for the alarm he created at
WASHINGTON was sufficient 10 stop any fur-
ther troops being withdrawn from the
Valley, and BankS's corps, then on 10
march to the Potomac. was stopped ana
turned back towards Winchester. his
action at KernstOwn took place on March
- 1862 and 1t was on his arrival at tort
Monroe. on April ID, that General McClei-
Ian received a telegram Withdrawing 0OOO
men from his command. Ii Is therefore
reasonable to conclude that this weaken
inc of the Army Of the Potomac was cOnse-
ouent upon Jacksons demonstration to-
wards Winchester with "A tiny army, whose
yipor caused It's strength 10 be, as usual,
so greatly exaggerated. Thus he mad
already begun "mystitylng and mlslead-
ing" his enemy.
BRILLIANT STRATEGIC MOVES
II is. however. his next moves which Of
ford the most brilliant illustration of his
military principles. His sudden disappear
ance and supposed fight from Port Repub-
lie. allowing despair TO settle on the minds
of all his friends in the Valley. had the re-
suit he intended-that is, their genuine be-
liefs and auxieties at once reached the
enemy. This led TO "a hasty pursuit,
which enabled him to use the very
trains he had collected for a supposed
start for Richmond TO take hum back
in time TO crush the foremost pursuers at
the village of Mcdowell. SO completely,
despite the disparity of numbers between
IA 600 and A. 800 men, had he shown how n
small army NAV destroy large one In de-
tail" that as General Scbenck, who COM
manded against him, tells us, the only
question was. how best TO cXtrlcafe our
selves from this disadvantageousp position III
the presence of force of the enemy large
~ superior IN numbers"
ANOTHER MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE.
Then came another mysterious disap-
pearance. Again with superior numbers he
struck Front Royal. surprised 1t, scattered
the force opposed to him, and then never
let up in the pursuit" as long. as his men
had strength to follow. lie then passed
round the rear of Bankss lntrenchmentS
at Strasburg and struck him IN flank
as he retreated, capturing 5000 men
and enormous quantities of stores, and
creating the widest alarm at Wash
ington. which incidentally multiplied
the effect of his action. Mcdowell, then
onthe march to iOin Mcclellan. was ordered
hack and told to detach 10000 men 10
the Shenandoah Valley. IL was impossible
for jackson so maintain himself long IN
the field with such greatly superior forces
opposed to him. These brilliant successes,
however, appear to me models OF ther
kind. both in conception and III execution.
They should be closely studied by all OIL
GERS who wish to learn the art and science
of war. His action at Cross Keys against
Fremont, by which he kept HIM apart from
Shields, contriying first TO fight fremont's
10 800 men with 1900 in "a favorable posi-
tion and then to crush Shields with 5000
men. was an operation which stamped him
rs a military genius of very hlgh order.
II must be remarked that Mcclellan was
not taken in by these operations. lie saw
through them and understood their OBJ
ject not so, however, those who ruled at
Washington.
THE EFFECT AT WASHINGTON.
Brilliant as these operations were they
would have missed their point and climax
without the sudden transfer of Jackson's
whole force, at the end of them, to JON IN
the attack on the right wing of McClellans
army at Gaines's Mill. These operations
in the Shenandoah Valley not only reduced
TO quiescence and inactivity the greatly su-
perior Federal forces IN that region, but
made MIR. Lincoln feel anxious lest the
capital should be attacked from that quar-
Ter. 10 cover the heavy blows he struck
within the Valley, Jackson had already so
often spread false rumOrs OF an immediate
transfer of his force 10 Richmond that
now, when really about TO move
there. the common rumor Of his IN
tention was not believed. The man.
ner in which he thus mystided his
enemy regarding this most important
movement was IA masterpiece. The one
thing necessary was TO disappear from all
knowledge Of the enemy immediately after
he had delivered his last stunning blows
In the Valley. For some time he left his
cavalry watching the defeated enemy,
whose ignorance Of his whereabouts great
liz increased the alarm at Washington.
The effect of his ably-advised and skill
fully-executed moves is fully acknowledged
by Colonel Irwin. who admits that they
were the cause of McDowelrs forward
movement 10 Join Mcclellan being stopped.
Ii will thus be seen that Jackson's 1900
men had actually paralyzed the $4,000
Federal troops who were available in the
theatre of Lis operations for a march upon