The National tribune., 1889-04-04

receiving uuqrestionable assurances, seemed
scarcely able 10 persuade himself Of his depart
ure Banks, supported by Shields as he moved,
fell bacl, 10 Strasburg, regretting that the work
in the Valley remained unfinished, indulging
in renewed predictions Of trouble, and taking
regreteul leave of Shields.
As / passed through with the SIX and
wounded on the way to Winchester e was
fortfying. Gen. Lee again called for blow
at Banks whose numbers he said, could not
be so large as had been represented. And
again difficulty arose as to the disposition OF
Eweli's troops, which were needed at Rich
mond by Gen J. e. Johnston, who wrote to
Ewell 4" We want troops here; none, there
fore, must keep away, unless employing
greatly superior force Of the enemy. Gen.
Jackson can observe him Banks and you
come eastward. My general idea is to gather
here all The troops who do not keep away from
MCCleilan's greatly superior forces" Although
Jackson, without Ewel, had about double the
numbers Of Banks. and although Johnston was
50 greatly ontnumbered by Mcclellan VINO
was crawling toward Richmond, Jack
son. shrinking IN fear at the prospect
Of moving against Banks without Ewell,
with odds two 10 one, wrote to Ewell from
Mount Solon: Suspend the execution Of the
order for returning TO the east until l receive
sn answer 10 my telegram. As you are IN the
Valley district. you constitute part OF my COM
lnHuG. HlGUa4 You AGDllAb UAtE-S AAAiSAt-tlL
from those sent from these headquarters, please
advise me Of the same at rs early period
rs practicable. You viii please move your COM
mand so as to encamp between New Market
and Mount Jackson on next Wednesday night
unless you receive orders from superior
officer and OF a date subsequent 10 the 10th IN
stanEn On the 18th he repeated the order
from near Harrisonburg. His overmasterins
fear. then. for himself though so greatly supe-
TiOr IN numbers TO Banks, seems TO have out
weighed in his mind any apprehension for
the safety Of Richmond or Johnston, so greatly
oufnumbercd by Mcclellan, and in his fear, and
on the strength Of his supposed victory al Nc
Doweli, be presumed to run counter to the
needs and advise against the suggestions Of
Johnston probably, unless Lee be excepted,
the best General the South produced. On the
10th he telegTaphed from near New Market to
Gen Lee: / am Of the opinion that an attempt
should be made 70 defeat Banks, but from IN
structions Just received from Gen. Johnston
do not feel at liberty TO make an attack. Please
answer by telegraph at once" Then Lee, dis
tant, and, Of course, with limited knowledge
OF the situation, allowed him 10 avail himself
Of EwelIs troops The two forces amounted 10
sbout 5000 men,
HORSE, FOOT AND ARTILLERY,
the elatternumbering5 80 pieces The object ofthe
movement rs expressed by Lee and echoed by
jackson, was 10 crush Banks drive him be-
youd the Potomac, and prevent him from rein
forcing Mcclellan, who, Lee said, was cali
ing for reinfOrcements." as he learned,
and also 10 call back the Germans from
Frem0nt-n0t with the expectation Of draw
ing back Shields OF other forces east of
the Blue Ridge that were under orders 10
march to swell McClellan's numbers, always
greatly In excess Of his enemy's EXtTaordi-
nary foresight has generally been attributed to
both Lee and Jackson concerning this move
ment, but il is quite safe to assert that the re-
turn of Shields was about TIE very last contin-
gency jackson desired TO meet, not TO speak Of
any other troops TO augment his force. Lee
however, did count on using JacksOn's large
force when be considered the time opportune,
and IN writing TO him at this time he said:
But you viii not in any demonstration you
may make lose sight Of the fact that IT may be-
come necessary 10 come to the support Of Gen.
Johnston, and hold yourself in readiness to do
80 If required"
As his order to Ewell shows, Jackson in
tended moving through Mount Jackson aud
Woodstock directly TO Strasburg, but hearing
OF B2nkss fortifcations- s-insignifcant-and
probably fearing the possibility of Fremont
reaching his rear he deemed it safer TO pro-
coed to Front Royal and from there threaten
Banks's rear. Moving from New Market. he
crossed the Iassanutten and the south fork Of
the Shenandoah into the Luray Valley, with
morning % the 3d. having marched from Nc
Dowell, about 100 miles, in something over
eight d9ys-certainly not extraordinary march
ing il il had been regular, but already COM
plants We're heard OF weary men and unusual
struggling. Banks had with him at Strasburg
10 miles west Of Front Royal as the crow hies}
about GOOD men, including il pieces Of artil-
lery and l,S0Q caValry-detaehments from a
number Of regiments. The men, individually
Of the cavalry were as good and stanch as any
that ever sat a horse. but alarmed. unframed
Gn0 with inexperienced officers. In McCiel-
lau's days too they we're hardly expected TO
do any fighting cavalry, although there was
large body, being mostly made use Of in the
East TO gaard the sacred persons of the big
Generals. It's well known that Gen. Mcclellan,
who had been commanding our armies, had
taken lessons in the art of war with the Brit
Ish and French IN the Crimeau Peninsula, in q
campaign That a distinguished English military
writer has SAID was conducted by +" an army Of
lions led ly jackasses," and which Gen. McCle-
Ian nov, with an army Of lions" too, was imi-
Eating on the Virginia Peninsula, though not
with even IS much resolution or success. As
the wiseacres Of the Crimea, after Nolan's dis
Gstrous but immortal charge with 500 men
against an army, decided that the DAYS for
cavalry, as such, were over, Mcclellan, with
his advisors, including the Bourbon nobility.
arrived al Ike cOnelusioR-that cavalry could
Aot De maze elective IN our army, and Tor this
reason made no attempt 70 make 1t So
IL may be mentioned, too, that some Of Nc
Glellan's apOlOgists have said that We had no
material foT cavalry equal to that Of the " best
blood Of the South a libel. be il said, on the
stalwart farmer lads Of the North, accustomed
70 the use OF firearms and who broke trained
and rode their own horses, which is on a pan
with many Of the antiqUated notions that were
entertained by certain class Of cur officers.
MOST HISTORIANS OF THE NORTH
among them men Of national reputation-ai
well as those Of the South, have seemingly per
mitted their imaginations to have full rein il
writing OF Jacks0n's movements, and seem Il
delight in picturing him as pouncing, sweepin.
and swOOping on the unsuspectiug Banks as al
eagle upon its prey, or else characterizing it rs
military cyclone or whiTlwind. or somethin,
else equally sweeping. Let US continue then
the observation Of the eagles swoop, and in tn
track Of the whirlwind and cyclone. At From
Royal there was a detachment Of Banks's com
mand OF about a regiment with so cavalry ant
two Eiaed guns. After his arrival in the neigh
eorhood the " cyclone consumed good part 0
the day ia taking precautionary measure
against any incGrsIOn on his rear from Bank
along the railroad from Strasburg. and in bring
ing up his forces to contend with the Union regi
ment- Then there was distant and safe dem
onstrstions and threats Of hanking, but with
out avail. Then 10 pieces Of artillery wer
brought up, supported by infantry, and shot
exchanged under Jackson's personal supervis
ION and lac got the worst oFi Chit -