Audubon County Republican. [volume] (Audubon, Audubon Co., Iowa) 1885-1894, 1889-02-14
ORIGINAL PACKAGES.
The Law of Iowa Prohibits the
Sale Of Liquors in this Way.
So Says the Supreme Court In Case
Appealed from the Superior
Court Of Kcokuk.

tian Hills, ct al, appeal from tho superior
court of Keokuk, Henry Bank, Jr., Judge.
Reversed; opinion by Chief Justice Reed.
This was an action in equity TO enjoin the
defendant from maintaining a nuisance. 1t
is alleged In the petition that the defendant
kept in a designated building in the city of
Keokuk, a place In which he carried on the
business of selling intoxicating liquors In vio-
laton of the laws of the state. At the hear
ing of the case in the superior court at Keo-
kuk the court found that mt the time and In
the place mentioned in the petition, the de-
PENDANT kept certain intoxicating liquors,
consisting of whisky and beer, and that he
was then engaged in tho business of selling
the same; that he purchased said liquors in
the states of Ohio, Illinois and Missouri, and
imported them into this state. The beer
when purchased was put up in bottles and
packed in cases, and the only sales made by
the defendant was by the case. The cases
were not opened, but delivered to the
purchasers in the same condition in which he
received them from the carrier. The whisky
was also put up in bottles; one brand pur-
chased in Ohio was put up In quart bottles,
In each of which was blown the name of the
manufacturer, and each securely sealed with
metallic caps and placed In pasteboard box,
and these were packed in boxes or barrels
| for shipment, and were In that manner
| shipped to the defendant. Another brand,
| purchased In Illinois, was put up In pint bot
| ties, each OF which when filed was securely
| closed and sealed, and these were also paced
| in boxes or barrels for Shipment, and were
received by defendant in that condition. His
| sales of whisky were by the single bottle. On
receiving the barrels and boxes in which the
bottles were packed, he opened the same and
| placed the bottles on the shelves In his store
| and sold the same to his customers In such
| numbers as they required. He did not In
| airy instance open the bottles or sell the
| liquor In quantities less than that con-
| tanned in them. when he made the par
| chases, he intended to sell the liquors In this
| state in the manner pursued by him subse-
| quently, in making the sales. He was not q
registered pharmacist, nor did he have per
init from the board of supervisors to sell In
toxicating liquors for the purposes for which
| such liquors are permitted to be sold by the
statutes of the state. But the purchasers
| bought the liquors intending to use the same
| as a beverage, and that intention was known
| to him when he made the sales. The superior
court held in effect that the transaction OF
! selling the beer in the manner in which II
was done was beyond the power OF the state
to control or prohibit, but was purely mat
ter of commerce between the states, which
could be regulated only by the congress Of
the United States; also, that when tho boxes
and barrels IN which the bottles of whisky
were shipped to and received by defendant
were opened and they were removed there
from, the transaction as matter of inter
state commerce was fully consummated ant
that subsequent dealings with the liquor
were governed by tho statutes o
this state. And the judgmen
rendered was in accordance will
these views. The findings of fact set out il
the Judgment appear to be sustained by thu
evidence. And in our consideration of tn
case it will not be necessary to give much at
tention to the testimony. Both parties ap
pcaled, plaintiffs appeal being first rejected
ID. f. Miller, Sr., j. II. Anderson, ii. Scot
Howell & Son and w. b. Collins for plaintiff
Anderson & Davis and ]. +. Smith for ap
pellees.
THE OPINION.
Reed, c. j. The distinction drawn by tn
superior court between the different transac
lions does not appear to us to rest upon YER
sound legal principle. The liquor was in eac
case put up by the manufacturer or dealer 4
another state with a view to sales in tina
condition. The subsequent packing of tn
bottles in boxes and barrels was mere maj
ter of codyenience In the sale and shipmcn
of the property. When defendant purchases
100 bottles of either beer or whisky, he in ei
; feet purchased that number OF packages G
, the article, and when he sold by the DO
tie, the transaction was of the sam
character. The fact that as a matter {
convenience in handling, during tn
transportation of the property, the bottle
were packed in boxes and barrels can MAX
no difference as to the character in law, {
tho transaction. If he had the right TO brin
the liquor within the state and to sell 1t here
he had the right to adopt such means an
mode of shipment as best suited his CONVEX
fence and interest; for SO far as we are a
advised there is no regulation on the subje'
of either state or national enactment. III
right to buy and sell in such quantities as /
chose is necessarily included in the right
buy and sell in any quantity. The right
bring it within the state by the car load is
certain as the right to bring it in by the sill
gle bottle or other package. If his intere
or convenience would be better served /
, shipping into the state in cars fitted up wit
tanks or other vessels attached to the car
and from which the liquor must be drawn
the end of the voyage, he had the right,
the absence of stationary regulation to ado
that mode of transportation. But In tn
case the liquors on their arrival within Il
state would of necessity be placed
other vessels than those In which thu
were brought within the state. Anoth
result of..the distinction would be that, viii
he had the right to bring them within Il
state for the purpose of selling them her
yet, having brought them here in the exerci
of that right, he had no right to sell them b
cause he had adopted a mode OF transport
ton which, although perfectly lawful, I
quired their removal from the vessels
which they were transported. The unsoun
ness of the attempted distinction is shown
the absurd results to which 1t would lead.
he had the right to sell the liquors in d
state because the transaction of their pu
chase and transportation was one OF nation
rather than state jurisdiction, 1t follo'
necessarily that he had the right to make Il
sales In whatever form and quantity he sa
1T. Any other holding, II seems to us, wou
would lead to results and conclusions whic
owing to their absurdity, would be shockll
alike to legal Judgment and the comm,
sense of mankind.
In our opinion, then, the case turns sole
upon the question whether defendant h
the right, Notwithstanding the statutes Of 4
state, to sell the LIQUORS within the stat
And in considering that question, II is II
portaut TO keep In mind the scope and obje
q of the statutes. For more than thirty yea
the state has sought by legislative ena'
. ments to mitigate the evils of intemperanC
During all that time, however, 1t has regard
: intoxicating liquors as a legitimate article
> commerce, and the legislation has be-
restrictive rather than prohlbitory. The ss
and use of such liquors as a beverage b
been regarded as an evil SO enormous as
demand the exercise of the highest powers
, the state for its SUPPRESSION. At the sar
. time IL has been recognized that the artiC