Orleans County monitor. [volume] (Barton, Vt.) 1872-1953, 1889-10-21

ssLittle Round Top This, in this
section would only be called hill.
The approach to the top of Little
Round Top from the north, east and
south is gradual, but on the west,
steep, in places almost precipitous.
Further south, 3-4 miles away from
Little Round Top, is Big Round Top,
a hill probably three hundred feet
above the surrounding level. Both OF
these eminences are wooded on the
east,and Big Round Top on all sides.
At the east base and down the sides
of both of the Round Tops the sur
face is uneven, and huge rocks are
piled up and scattered in all dlrec-
tions. At the base of these hills,
small brook, run, as they call 1T out
there, makes out and meanders off
toward the southwest. The country
all about these hills is fairly even,
and admitted of quick, and on ac-
count of groves, concealed movements
of troops. To get fuller under
standing of the position of the two
armies on the second and last day OF
the battle, conceive that the Union
troops occupied as center Cemetery
Hill, facing west and northwest; the
right wing extended eastward mile
and curved round back at the extrem-
ity toward the center of the line. The
south center and left wing of our
lines extended south, almost in
straight line, except where Sickles
advanced TO Big Round Top. The
direction and bend of our lines might
be described with great accuracy by
calling it fish hook. The rebels oc-
cupied line of ridges westward,
known as Seminary Ridge; at the
northeast they ran their line thro' the
town, thence across level stretch,
and then among hills opposite the
town and the barb of the fish hook
line of our forces. The length of
the Union lines was three miles; the
rebel lines on the outer circle were
nearly or quite five miles. The lines
and parallel lines of the two armies
were from a few rods to a mile In
width The above will give some
idea of the great extent of the field
fought over. When it is known that
every rod of our line was assailed, land
much of the ground fought over and
over again, something of the magni-
tude of the battle may be learned.
The rebels suffered somewhat from
the length of these lines and the ne
cessity of exposure while moving to
the front, but they had, ION the whole,
advantages in the nature of the
ground over which they moved their
reinforcing columns back and forth
from wing to wing, and in positions
for artillery which our army did not
possess. The early part of the Sec
ond day was spent by both armies in
preparation for the supreme conflict
Immediately to follow. The sixth
corps of Meade's army and other
forces had not arrived on the second
morning, but came up during the day.
Lees troops were not all at hand, land
neither general seemed anxious to
open the battle. Gen. Sickles, how
ever, of his own accord, pushed out
some of the troops of the third corps
to a position at least half mile in
front of the main and better line oc-
cupied in the the morning. He was
furiously assailed all day by Long
streets corps from the west and the
south, and although frequently rein
| forced, was driven back at nightfall,
himself desperately wounded, to the
original line. The fighting of Sickles'
corps in the "peach orchard" and the
sswheatfeld was terrible for hours, ,and
the losses heavy on both sides. Late
in the afternoon, Ewell, away on the
right, attacked Slocum's column with
desperate energy and gained some
slight advances which took till nine
o'clock the next day to recover.
The second day ended with some
gloom. Sickles had been driven
back; his losses had been heavy and
the rebels had reached some strong
positions close up to our lines on the
side of the Round Tops and on the
left. They had gained, however, no
ground that gave them any strong
advantages and had lost many offic-
ers and men in their violent attempts
to break the lines somewhere. The
third day saw no serious work except
on the right where Geary and Green
defended Ewell till afternoon. 1t
became evident that Lee had been
foiled and that some new movement
was anticipated or in progress. 1t
was discovered that the enemy were
putting in position along our center
and left center line of battles of
nearly two miles in length. 1t proved
that one hundred and fifty guns were
in position. Gen. Hunt on the Union
side found positions for only eighty,
but had in reserve $50 more. The
attack contemplated was the concen-
tration of the fire of the one hundred
and fifty guns upon the left center OF
! the Union army, for such length oi
: time as to destroy or drive from the
! field the artillery and infantry on thai
| portion of the line, when mighty
change was to be made, which should
e pierce the center, cut the Union army