St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1889-06-02
Will GET THEIR MONEY.
Judge Lochren Passes on the Eighth
Ward Case.
CITY TO PAY CONTRACTORS.
A Clear Headed Ruling Upon a Much
Tangled-Up Case Which Probably
Settles It.

case, which allows the city to pay the
contractors or the grading which they
did on the streets of that ward. 1t will
be remembered that when the city had
the work done, certain provisions OF
the charter intended to prevent the in
| curing of Indebtedness beyond prompt
payment were disregarded. This gave
the taxpayer of the ward chance to
dispute the payment of the bills, which
amounted to a good many thousand
| dollars.
Three actions were brought in the
| form of injunctiOns restraining the city
| from paving these bills. These suits
were heard by Judge Hicks at last falls
term of court, and the restraining order
was granted. After this the contractors
| applied to the legislature for relief, and
| it passed an enabling act allowing legal
| izing the claims and authorizing the
| city to pay them.
Another argument was then brought
| up in the district court before the full
bench on the defendants motion to dis
! Hicks, and this decision, signed by
Judge Hicks, is the result of the six
| Judges meditation. The title of the
| case is John T. Blaisdell VS.. City OF
| Minneapolis, and is one of three, but
| this virtually settles the question. The
decision is accurately worded in clear
| and expressive language, and 1t is
| quoted in several places, as the law
| points will be in value in future cases.
1T was hardly disputed that the act
referred to had the effects claimed by
| the defendants if that act was cOnsti-
tutional exercise of legislative author
| ity, but its constitutionality was denied
on several grounds.
"First-It was objected that the act is
| contrary to an amendment to the con-
stitution, prohibiting the enactment OF
| any special or private law for granting
| to any individual, association, or cor
| poration any special or exclusive privi-
Iege, immunity, or franchise"
Judge LOchren held that the act
granted no privilege, immunity or fran
| chise. and that it could not be contended
that the clause would prohibit the leg
| islature from disposing of a claim made
against the state by special act. where
the claim was merely an equitable one.
Scandinavian objection is that be-
| cause the claim in question was, because
| of nom compliance with certain restrict
| i've provisions of the city charter, void
and not enforceable in the courts, the
legislature had no power to validate it.
This objection, the court held, was
and not enforceable, not be-
fraud or illegality OF nature contrary
to good morals; but solely because GER
| tain provisions of the charter intended
| to prevent the mourning of indebted
ness beyond provision for prompt pay
ment had been disregarded. There was
no suggestion of corruption, or that the
city had not had full value for the claims
made upon it. On the contrary, it APP
pears that the city authorities are satis-
| fed of the justice of the claims, and
would have paid them but for the
injunction, which rests only on the
| technical grounds of Noncompliance
with the restrictive provisions OF the
charter. and the question is: Had the
legislature power to set aside and dis
pense with these restrictive provisions
in respect to their clains""
AS to this, the court held that the
provisions existed only as Legislative
enactments; it might have omitted
them from the charter or removed them
at any time, and that the legislature has
supreme control of all public matters;
not Onlv as to the state at large, but as
well any division of it.
The last objection is that the enact
ment in question is unconstitutional as
being an invasion of the judicial depart
ment Of the state government. The po-
sition being that after the claim had
been adjudged by this court to be in
valid and not binding on the city, the
legislature had no power to reverse the
| Judgment and make the claim valid.
The judge thought the argument
seemed plausible, but as applied to the
case was not sound. 1t would be true
as between private individuals or when
decided in favor of an individual
against municipal corporation. ''But
| if judgment be in favor of municipal
corporation. OH grounds purely techni-
cal, defeating claim that is equitable,
| for which the public has had full con-
| sideratiOn, it was not so clear that the
| legislature representing the public may
not enact that the technicality be dis
regarded, validate the claim and require
the municipality to pay it notwithstand-
! ing the judgment. If private person
on bare technlcality should obtain a
Judgment defeating the collection of a
| debt which he equitably and honestly
| owed. there wonld still be moral Obli-
| CATION resting upon him to pay the debt.
l see no good reason why legislature,
representing every part OF the public,
should not in proper case recognize
this moral obligation, and require. or at
least, as in this case, permit munich
pality, its agent, to act upon it.
The act leaves the claim to be passed
on by the city council, but they are
ready to pay the amounts
The question, of course, in this last
action was on the right of the last legis-
lature to pass such an act. The decision
says in closing: I'VE regard it as
valid exercise of legislative power. The
motion is therefore granted, and the in
junction dissolved"
MINNEAPOLIS GLOBULES.