South Branch intelligencer. [volume] (Romney, Va. [W. Va.]) 1830-1896, 1889-09-06

Uuyers. they now deal practically
With one, and the diminished con-
sumption caused by the artificial
stimulation Of the price OF refined
sugar. brought about by the trust,
will inevitably affect the value OF the
raw product under the operation Of
the law of demand and supply.
Neither can We approximate the
influence OF the whisky trust on the
prico Of corn. because it is but one
OF many buyers in the home market,
and it consumes too small fraction
OF the entire domestic product tn en-
able IL to dictate prices. It's iufiu.
encs on otherindu.tries will be con-
sdered in another and more impor.
tant relation in my next paper.
But the Standard Oil trust is an
example to our hand. The producer
ofpctroleum cannot, like the foreign
sugar planter, send this product In
differently. aud at the same cost, to
tho European or the American mar.
ket; nor can he, like our farmer, find
numberless other purchasers in the
home market. He Is largely Dope nd
ent-hss been ut times entirely dc.
pendent-on The Standard combina.
tion to buy his crude oil. Has he
shared In the phcnomena al prosperity
Of thst comninstionp Has is ever
paid him fairly remunerative prices
fer that product, which in itself has
turned INFO golden stresmss
On tho contrary, during the hich<
est tides Of its prosperity, his bu>i-
ness has been. vibrating between &C.
tusl loss and lean and beggarly pro-
fits.
TO strike cir was formerly ph rase
implying the cure acquisition Of
great and immediate wealth, but as
the refining business passed into the
grasp Of single combination, the
whole oil producing territory passed
into a state OF chronic oppression
And so 40 are justified in saying
that in it's dealings with those who
produce lis raw material the trust re-
veals itself wherever its power and
tendency can have full play in the
character or true and unmista * able
monopoly.
THE CONSUMERS OF IT'S PRODUCTS.
We may next ask how the trust
has dealt With that larger body, the
general public, vino purchase and
consame its products. This ques-
ton l have already virtually answer
cd in the paper reciting the enormous
profits OF each one Of the combina-
tions invcstigstod-profits SO far IN
excess of the possible returns OF le-
gttimate industry as to imply beyond
question the spolistion of tie con-
sumer by the single or oversLadow.
ing producer in the market. Stress
is constantly-and especially In be.
bali OF the Standard trus.-laid up
on the argument that self interes.
will always prompt seller to cons
tent himself with moderate aud rea
sonable profits in order to secure the
largest range OF customers. and the
public is assured that in this princi.
pie it will md protection against ex .
tortionase charges. But docs any one
argue that self-interest impels the
owner Of a patent upon an article OF
general use or necessity, or even, like
tho Bell telephone, Of general con.
venience, to content himself with
moderate profits in order to incl ease
TO the utmost the number of purchas
! ers. The argument has force only in
respect to articles whose use Is vol.
untary with the people, and which
they must, therefore, be tempted &c
buy. On the other hand, as long as
there is or can be but one seller OF an
article which people are almost OF
actually compelled to buy, that seller
can and will sell at price tina,
brings to him tho largest possible
returns or, in other words, Of mo-
nopoly price. When the patent on
the telephone expires and other man.
ufscturers can supply the market
the public will get telephones much
cheaper. while still paying reasona-
BILE profits TO those who make them.
In the case of the telephone the
law of patents has for q fixed term
entirely obliterated competition; in
the case of trusts their own successful
combination has more or less fully
ND''NSaNHNN NOlhpctlJiOus A5 6HCU
ono OF them controls the sale OF an
article OF general necessity or COM
venience, they have thus one and all
become monopolies, and as a result
VIC see them ail--pstent aud trusis.-
gathering their millions By leaps
and bounds.
TKUsT MAY BILLET ONE CONSUMER
ON ANOTHER.
Let me add, in conclusion. tina, a
trust may not only despoil the
great body Of consumers by its con.
troll of prices, but may impose beav d.
Ter exsc.ions upon part 10 compen.
safe itself for temporary fAvors to
others. The history of the oil trust
shows that II has resOrted TO this
practice, formerly go common With
railroad companies. At the very
time 1t was driving a competitor in
one market TO remedilees bankruptcy
by selling its oils therein at less
than cost, It was recouping It's losses
by advancing the price OF oil In 9th.
or localities where there was no COM
petition. In this way it waged It's
wars and made it's conquests-not at
its own expense. but at the expense