Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1889-08-23
lllolld.
WAITING TO STRIKE.

when jackson, under circumstances most
trying to an energetic man, strictly adher-
ed to his own principles. Dispatched to
the north to meet the forces which were
gathering under Pope, he had, in conse-
quence of the insutficiency of his force, to
| remain inactive from July y to August 8,
| 1862. These are just the times when every
| newspaper in a democratically- governed
country begins to cry out against the sloth
and inactivity of a general. Nor will any
previous reputation for zeal and activity
save him from such charges. They were
constantly and freely preferred against
| the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula
during his most wise and necessary pauses
in that long contest, and after same OF his
most brilliant victories had shown the
world of what stuff he was made, and had
shown England how entirely she could
trust him. Jackson, however, was strictly
| adhering to his own principle, "Never fight
against heavy odds, if by any possible
maneuvering you can hifl your own force
| on only part, and that the weakest part
of your enemy, and crush it." For the lat
ter purpose it is often necessary to bide
ones time, and to have patience III hiding
it, which is not always easy. In this in
stance the time was entirely independent
of anything that Jackson could do AS Lee
puts it. THE uncertainty that then sur
rounded the designs of Mcclellan rem
dered it inexpedient to reinforce him (Jack
SOM from the army of Richmond" Those
are facts, however, which are seldom taken
into full account in the ranks OF any army,
and very rarely indeed by sensational
newspaper writer's, whO during war, dis
course so learnedly on all that goes on.
Had this time of waiting been longer than,
fortunately for Jackson, it actually was,
his ''inactivity' would doubtless have been
the subject OF many savage leading ar
ticle. In these days of Geographic daily
reports, even three uneventful weeks-the
Il yxrIi v
quiescent-may suffice to damn the falrest
military reputation.
POPE AS JACKsoN's CoAMIssARY.
However, on July 81, 1862. A. P. Hills
division was ordered to join jackson. AS
soon as Hill joined him, mark with what
rapidity he acted On August he caught
Banks at Cedar Mountain, and once more
showed how small army may be superior
at the point Of contact to the fractions of a
larger. His superiority was not great
10000 to II 900, according to the best esti-
mates-but it was sufficient. His own rep
utation, the confidence of his troops, and
their war-tried experience under him,
were elements which added Indefinitely to
his fighting strength. The wide-sweeping
pended for its success, first, on Jacksons
faculty for carrying out secret maneuver,
secondly, on the trained marching rapidity
of his troops. and lastly, on the fact, which
had become apparent to the Confederate
generals, that the Washington authorities
had so tied Pope to a post that it was safe
to march round him because he could not
move. 1t is rather remarkable that, i'll
General Pope's description OF the cam
paign, he appears to treat the loss OF the
stores at Manassas Junction as a trifiing
matter. In the long run, no doubt that
loss may not have been very important to
the well-supplied Northern armies; but
| there can be no question that both by its
material and moral effects it enormously
| increased the decentralization eff the Union
army after the second defeat at Bull Run.
Before that battle it exercised most dis s
astrous influence by shaking the confidence
of men and officers in their commander,
however much justification he may have
for throwing the responsibility for it upon
other shoulders. In a campaign men do
not nicely argue out questions of abstract
| Justice; it is the broad effects which tell on
the spirit Of an army. There can be no
doubt that, in fighting the second Bull
Run, the successful raid was worth several
thousand men to the ConfederateS, from
the encouragement it afforded them and
the depression it produced among their OPP
ponents. When [ was with General Lees
army at Winchester, in the autumn OF 1862,
the soldiers in every camp, laughinsl,y
Commissary," so entirely had jackson in
the "Pope campaign" depended upon cap
turing from that general everything he re-
quired for his men.
LEE AND NJ CLELLAN.
Concerning Gen. Lees first invasion of
| MARYLAND, Gen. WolSeley says Lee had
driven back the Army of the Potomac and
that of Virginia to the point from which
they had started in the spring and summer.
He knew how demoraliZed these armies
had become from repeated defeats, and he
was fully aware of the scare which Pope's
disasters had occaSiOned at Washington.
Nh Lincoln was known to be very nervous
for the safety of that capital Lee felt that
if he could but still further increase this
fear of losing Washington he might so re-
tain the Federal armies i'll its nelghbOrhOOd
as to free the northern districts OF Virginia
from all hostile occupation during the au
tumn. His object was to keep McClellan'S
forces far away from Richmond until win
ter had so destroyed the roads as to render
all field operations near that city practIc-
ally impossible.
Although vast amount of valuable
equipment and military stores had been
taken by the Army of Northern Virginia
from Pope, it was still a very badly
supplied army and sadly in want OF tran
sport. Notwithstanding this fact Lee
thought his best plan to accomplish the
end he had in view was to invade Mary
land, where the Southern cause had thou
sands of sympathizers, and by that opera
ton keep the war at a distance from Rich
mond. Lee had, however, it seems to me,
underestimated the reviyifying influence
which Mcclellan exerted over the Federal
armies when again placed in actual COM
mand of them; nor did Maryland afford
him the assistance he had expected. He
also miscalculated the time required for
the capture of Harper's Ferry-a iniscalcu..
LATHAM which placed him in position of
real danger. An enterprising commander,
o(t 1a11
with the notion that his enemy was vastly
stronger than he actually was, would then
have pushed Les very lard, indeed. Nc
Clellan, with Lees plan of campaign i'll
his pocket and the large force at his dis
posal, was in the position where really
great general would have destroyed an ad-
versary who had crossed the Potomac and
distributed his troops as Lees were on the
10Th, 14th, 10Th and 10th OF September, 1862.
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.
The battles of South Mountain and An
tietam proyed to Lee THAT his army was not
strong enough to carry out an aggressive
campaign against the now united armies OF
the North. From the moment that Nc
Clellan had restored confidence to the
Northern army and, thanks to the captur-
ed dispatch, had made up his mind to act,
it was obviously Lees policy to avoid
fighting as much as possible and recross
into Virginia. Antietam, though battle
unwittingly fought by him, was, however,
unavoidable. 1t is necessary to estimate
generals purposes in judging what he has
gained OF lost by battle. That the actu-
a ! result on the battlefield was Confed
crate victory seems to be little disputed.
Lee had gained What he had hoped to Sc
cure by that battle, which was to make
| good his repassage of the Potomac. The
Confederate army had won a battle, but
had achieved no victory, whilst the Con-
federacy had failed in its intention to car
~ the war into the enemy's country Col
onel Kyd Douglas states the case very
fairly when he SAYS "lAe prestige of to-
day vas With I;ae, but when. On tile night
of the 18TH he recrossed into Virginia, he
left the prestige of the result with McClel-
lam" page $3.50.
LEES ADMIRABLE GENERALSHIP.
Lee management of the battle against
vastly superior forces was wonderfully
successful His retreat afterwards was as
wise and NECESSARY as it was admirably
conducted. 1t is only for schoolhoys that
retreat under such circumstances can be
said to take anything from the prestige Of
men like Lee, He was soon to show, against