Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1889-08-23
StoneVall Jacks0l'S Campaigns.
CRITICISED BY The COMMANDER IN
CHIEF OF The ENGLISH ARMIES.

CRITICISED BY The COMMANDER IN
CHIEF OF The ENGLISH ARMIES.
HOW HE MYSTIFIED HIS OPPONENTS-THE
BRILLIANT CAMPAIGNS OF THE VALLEY
OPINIONS ABOUT LEE AND NJ CLELLAN.
Viscount Wolseley, the distinguished
English General, contributes to the August
number of the North American Review an
other of his series of articles on the Amer
lean civil war, in which he pays high
tribute to the military genius of Stonewall
Jackson, and writes in an interesting way
of Generals Lee and Mcclellan.
There are some, he says, who think that
war is a game OF pure chance, III which
great leaders form their plans on some I'M
Ineligible inspiration which guides them
as to the right course to be pursued, that
they draw nothing from the experience of
earlier wars, and that none can tell why
one man succeeds and another fails. Let
those who think thus call to mind the
words | have quoted from Stonewall Jack
son, drawn absolutely and merely from his
knowledge of war, as learned from the
great leaders of former days. Then let
them observe how, in practice, both Lee
on the larger and Jackson on the minor
scale applied them, and to how great an eX-
tent the triumphs of their armies were due
to the skillful application OF those prln-
cipleS. Moreover, since, as Burns tells US,
the best-laid schemes so mice and men
gang aft agley" let them note how, when
the men failed, the principles asserted
their importance.
JACKSON IN THE VALLEY.
In the first place consider the respective
forces in the Shenandoah Valley and
neighboring departments. Jackson had an
available force at first, i'll the beginning of
March, 1862, of about 5000 men, strength
ened at the beginning OF May by EwelIs
division, which raised his army to perhaps
Il, 900 men. According to the careful esti-
mate of the editors, (note page 1851 there
were opposed to him in the valley "A, $40
men. In addition there were in the neigh
boring departments, available for the
march on Richmond, a number OF troops
that brought up their forces to $4,000 men.
AS a great strategic question, the object
desired by the employment OF jackson
little army in the Shenandoah Valley was
to keep occupied and retain there as large
number of the Federal forces as possible,
SO that the main Confederate army engaged
in the decisive issue against Mcclellan
should have every possible chance. In
fact, it was Jackson's role to prevent any
reinforcementS from being sent to McClel-
Ian, and, above all things, to create al
alarm at Washington for the safety OF thai
capital.
MYsTIFYING THE ENEMY.
In his first action at Kernstown, when he
was acting purely on the defensive, Jack
sons object was to simply ''myStify'' the
enemy as to his actual numbers. This hi
accomplished, time after time, by the
choice of strong positions, where, without
committing himself to a decisive action, hi
was still able to deal with considerable
portions of the eneny'S forces. In these
operations, therefore, he qualified his gen
eral principle, 'tO remain quiescent IL
presence of superior force" by giving
battle whenever attacked by fractions OF
the Union forces. He succeeded in his
larger purpose, for the alarm he created a
Washington was sufficient to stop any
Valley, and Banks corps, then on its
march to the Potomac, was stopped ant
turned back towards Winchester. This &C
ton at KernStoWn took place on March %
1862, and it was on his arrival at For
Monroe, on April 3, that General McClel
Ian received telegram withdrawing
10000 men from his command 1t is, there
FORE reasonable to conclude that this weak
ening of the Army of the Potomac was con
Sequent upon JackSon's demonstration to
wards Winchester with tiny army, WhoS'
vigor caused its strength to be, as usual, 81
greatly exaggerated. Thus he had alread!
begun ''mYStifying and misleading" hi
enemy.
BRILLIANT STRATEGIC MOVES.
1t is, however, his next moves which af
ford the most brilliant illustration of hi
military principles. His sudden disap
pearance and supposed flight from POr
Ronnh1io al n IN In Satt la fin
minds of all his friends in the Valley, hat
the result he intended: that is, their genu
inc beliefs and anXieties at once reached
the enemy. This led to hasty pursuit
which enabled him to use the very train
he had collected for a supposed start TO
Richmond, to take him back in time t.
crush the foremost purSuer at the villag
of Mcdowell. So completely, despite tn
disparity Of numbers between IA, 1000 AM
"A, 500 men, had he shown how "a small
army may destroy a large one in detail
that as General Schenck, who commands
against him, tells us, "the only Question
was, how best to eXtricate ourselves from
this disadyantageons position in the pres
ence of force of the enemy largely Supe
riOr in numbers"
ANOTHER MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE.
Then came another mysterious dlsap
pearance. Again with superior number
he struck Front Royal, surprised it, scat
tered the force opposed to him, and thel
''never let up in the pursuit as long a
| his men had strength to follow. He thel
passed around the rear of Bank S intrencl
ments at Strasburg and struck him in fianl
as he retreate4,. capturing 5000 men an,
ing the widest alarm at Washington
| which intellectually multiplied the etfec
! of his action. Mcdowell, then on tn
| march to join Mcclellan, was Qrdere
| back, and told to datach 10000 men to TIL
Shenandoah Valley. it was impossible
for jackson to maintain himself long i
the field with such greatly superior force
es, however, appear to me models of thei
kind, both in conception and in execution
They should be closely studied by al
| officers who wish to learn the art an
science Of war. His action at Cross Key
| against Fremont, by which he kept hil
apart from Shields eontrlying, first t
fight Fremonts 1880 men with $4,000 in
Shields with 5000 men, was ain 0peratio
which stamped him as a military geniu
of very high order. 1t must he fenarke
that Mcclellan was not taken in by thes
operations. He saw through them and ull
derstood their object; not so, however
| those who ruled at Washington.
THE EFFECT IT WASHINGTON.
Brilliant as these operations Were, the
would have missed their point and china
without the sudden transfer of Jackson
whole force, at the end of them, to join
the attack on the right wingof Mcclellan
army at Gaines Mill. These operations i
the Sheplandoah Valley not only reduce
superior Federal forces n that reai9I,, Ru
| made Mir. Lincoln feel anxious lest til
capital should be attacked from thai" qual
| ter, 70 cover the heavy blows he struc
within the Valley, Jackson had already 5
often spread fa} Sc runners Of an immedlat
transfer of his force to Richin9nd fHat row
when really about to move there, the con
mon rumor OF his intention was not belle,
ed. The manner in which he thus mystifie
his enemy regarding this most importan
movement was masterpiece. The on
| thing necessary was to disappear from al
| kn9Nled1ggEe af The enemy immediately afte
he had deliYerea bis last Spinning blows i
the Valley. For some time JIG left his eaval
~ Watching the defeated enemy, who's
| ignorance, of lis whereabouts greatly il
| creased the alarm at WASHINGTON. Tb