Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1889-02-02

NATIONAL GUARD.
Col Bigelow, adjutant general Of the District
national guard, in his last lecture Of instruc-
ton TO the officers Of the national guard took
for his theme 1.-The Strategic Chess-board"
He described and discussed the ordinary OBJ
structions of theater of war. Having defined
strategic points and classified them, the lee
turer said
Geographic strategic points are those points
Of a country that are manifestly adapted to
command important lines of communication
or Of defense. They comprise important har-
bors, functions Of roads, rivers, and railroads
important bridges and passes, fortified places,
DC. As examples in the United States, may be
mentioned Gardeners bay, at the eastern end
OF Long Island. which, according to high mill
tary authority, is the point of the whole coast
and frontier line, best adapted to serve an in
yader as a base Of operations. Albany. at the
junction of the Hudson river with the Erie and
roads running north and south and east and
west. Cairo. at the junction of the Ohio and
Mississippi rivers"
NEW YoRK's MILITARY IMPORTANCE.
Speaking of New York city, Col Bigelow
said: apart from its immense resources in
money and supplies and Of its potent influ-
ence upon the thought and feeling of the coun-
try, it is a point of the highest strategic i'm
portance; this by reason of its magnificent
harbor its admirable land and water commu-
nications, and its commanding location on the
direct line Of invasion between Europe and
the United States. For, assuming the north
ern end of Long Island sound to be closed by
our forts, there is no other place than New
York available to an enemy as a base of opera
tions from GARDENERS bay on the north to Del
aware bay on the south. Hence, with all its
importance as a regular and political strategic
point. New York is most important geograph-
ical strategic point. This distinction would
still pertain to it, though its buildings should
be laid in ashes, its trade and commerce ami
hilated, its population dispersed and all its
accumulated wealth and riches destroyed or
carried away. 1t was mainly as a geographic
cal strategic point that New York was held by
the British during the Revolutionary war.
Albany is not only geographical strategic
point, but also as the capital of the Empire
state political strategic point and as a great
manufacturing center and the location of the
Watervliet arsenal, a regular strategic point.
RICHMOND DURING THE WAR.
The importance of Richmond during the war
was due not only to its being the seat of gov
eminent Of the confederacy. 1t had been the
commercial capital of the south before it be-
came its political capital, and throughout the
war il was a great entrepot for the produce of
the southern states. Ii was the seat of great
tobacco factories. flour mills, and military
workshops of various kinds Its gun foundry
and rolling mills, its factory for field artillery,
its military laboratory, and its workshop for
ammunition and equipments, made it by far
the most important ordnance depot in the
south. Its location at the head of navigation
of the James river and at the junction of five
lines Of railroad made it an important center of
communication, while its importance in these
several respects, together with its excellent
defensive qualities, both natural and artificial,
made 1t an important place of arms. In short,
the strategic character of Richmond was most
complex, being regular, tactical, political, and
geographical
THE OCEAN BARRIER.
The effectiveness of the ocean as a strategic
obstacle" said the lecturer, sis due principally
to the two dificulties-frst. of transporting an
army by sea; second, of landing an army on an
enemy's coast. The difficulty Of transportation
consists Of getting the necessary transports
and in protecting them in transit. The tonnage
to be allowed for man and horse varies in the
main with the length of the voyage. Thus il is
estimated that for voyage Of few hours a
man requires one ton, horse two and half
tons; for a voyage under a week, a man two
tons, horse six tons; for a voyage to any part
Of the world, q man two and half tons, a horse
seven tons. In these calculations are included
arms, ammunition, stores, wheeled vehicles,
for the fighting and regimental trains, together
with provisions and forage-in the case of a
weeks voyage for one month, and in the case
Of long voyage for three months. For a long
voyage a regiment Of infantry requires two
large steamers; division of 10000 men
at least 80, and an army corps of
5000 men at least 1876 large steamers.
1T we examine the navy lists of foreign
powers" says a high British authority, "and
the returns Of large mercantile steamers pres
ent in their ports il will be found. even under
the most favorable conditions, that with the ex-
ception Of Great Britain and perhaps France no
nation has, at any given moment sufficient ton
mage at disposal for the transport across the
seas of $1,000 men" II all the tonnage of
Great Britain were available to her she should
be able to ship for any part of the world an
army Of over half a million men. But scat
tered as her shipping is she could not sud-
denly command any considerable portion of it.
Nor could she ever devote the whole of it to mill
tary use. For being no longer self-supporting
she depends upon a merchant marine for her
food supplies.
GEN. sHERIDAS's OPINION.
Excepting for our ocean commerce and for
our seaboard cities" says Gen. Sheridan, in
his report for 1884, II do not think we should
be much alarmed about the probability of wars
with foreign powers, since it would require
more than a million and half of men to make
a campaign upon land against us. To trans
port from beyond the ocean that number of
soldiers, with all their munitions of war, their
cavalry. artillery and infantry, even if not mo-
Tested by US while in transit, would demand a
large part Of the shipping Of all Europe" The
ability to protect ones transports against the
naval vessels of the enemy would seem to be
an indispensable condition to success in any
maritime expedition. For an army is as help
less on the water as gunbOat would be on dry
land and q single armed cruiser is capable of
sinking q whole feet of unprotected transports
let descents have been successfully executed
In opposition to q considerable naval prepond-
erance. In such cases the weaker naval power
rightly trusted 70 the enemy's being engaged
elsewhere, or apprehending his attack man.
aged to escape detection or elude pursuit
In 1876, when the French attempted to
throw an army into Ireland the most strenuous
efforts were made by the British navy to in
tercept the French feet in its passage Not
withstanding triple floating bulwark, as it
was called-one fleet on the enemy's coast a
second close on their own shore, and third
between the two-the French fleet of A YES
sells, carrying a land force of $4,000 men,
reached Bantry bay in safety. This feet was
eight days on the passage, and three more in
landing the troops. Only one vessel was inter
cepted by the vast naval force which England
had assembled for that express object'-lHal-
The feet which in 1873 carried Napoleon,s
army to Egypt, and which consisted altogether
Of 800 sails slipped out Of the port of Toulon.
past Nelson's heet Of observation with its
10000 troops on board 1t was followed by
Nelson. who thinking correctly that they were
bound for Egypt shaped his course direct for
Alexandria The French having taken cir
cuitous passage Nelson arrived at Alexandra
before them, and not finding them there 20