The National tribune., 1889-10-17
GEN. MCCLELLAN.
A rinh Corp. Mans Estimate of "LIttlo Ma

Fifth Corps Mans Estimate OF "Litile Mae."
EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: have been
n reader of your valuable paper since April i,
and have seen nothing in its columns up TO date
from any member OF the old Fifth Corps al
though | have dim recollection that served
In an organization for more than three years
under that name. / cannot believe that they
have all forded the Last river aud answered
the last roll-call.
| have been waiting as patiently as ] might
to hear from some Of the old comrades who
we're better fitted TO write than myself, but
have been thus FAR disappointed. Ihaye finally
concluded that | would contribute my mite,
and 10 might be the means Of drawing some
ADLER pen TO the front
/ have recently seon IN your paper some
reference to the ability of Gen. Mcclellan, both
pro aud con, and as IL ID n subject still discussed
10 some extent In this ssrs of the country. aud
as am somewhat In rested In the matter,
propose to give you my views of the campaign
in which took an humble though active part
under that officer. II may be the means oil
drawing out the opinions OF some other mem
beers of the old corps, which Is my principal
object In writing.
Gen. Mcclellan was placed In command OF
the Army of the Potomac in the Fall of 1861,
and spent the Winter In organizing and equip
ping them for active service. In tho Spring oi
1882 he had under bis command the finest body
of soldiers ever raised in this country. Did lac
accomplish anything with itf / claim he did
not and whyy ! must answer. II am truth.
full, that he was incompetent TO command in
tho field aud his caution often so nearly APP
preached eowafdice fnat the terms might be
considered Anonymous. / am aware that
many OF the old soldiers OF the Army of the
Potomac hold different opinions, and they will
have au opportunity 70 express them.
We broke camp in front OF Washington March
10, 1862 and advanced towards Bull Run. with
the expectation Of meeting the Army o!
Northern Virginia on the old battle-ground oil
1861. After the main part Of the army had
reached Fairfax Courthouse and the advance
WAS at Centervile, il was discovered that there
was no rebel force ut Bull Run, nor had there
been for several weeks.
Win some one rise 10 explain why 1t was that
tho Commanding General, with the best spy
system and all the other facilities at his COM
mand for gaining information. did not find out
before putting an army OF l25,0Oo men III mo-
ton where the enemy was 10 be found? This
was the first error Of MeCiellan's campaign, but
it was the forernnner Of a series Of the most
glaring errors that any great commander in
the field ever committed.
Everyone knows that a vast expense attend,
the movement of large bodies OF troops, to say
nothing of the effect such abortivo movements
would have upon the men. The Army Of the
Potomac were under cloud from that day
aud disaster rather than success rested upon
their banners.
When tho General became convinced thai
the Army Of Northern Virginia had vanished
his plans were changed, aud he proposed Il
advance on Richmond by way of the Peninsula
We marched to Alexandria in, think tn,
hardest rain storm / ever saw, and waited ther,
until enough transports could be collected u
take us TO Fortress Monroe. Between Fortress
Monroe and Newmarket we were encampet
for nearly two weeks before tho son to Rich
mond movement commenced.
But ] will reserve the history of the Siege o
Yorktown for tho next paper. should you con
slider this worthy place in your columns-
H. M. JONES, First Brigade, First Division
Fifth Corps, Scott City, Kan.