The National tribune., 1889-09-05
FIGHTING THEM OVER,
What Our Veterans Have TO Say About
Their Old Campaigns
IN THE VALLEY.
The Campalgn in the SprIng Of 1sOs

hart. prelaced by some general remarks on
Shieds's operations in the Valley. ] served
in his division during its whole existence, and
therefore do not write as an outsider.
First, as TO that officers personal and milf
tary character. He was undoubtedly, man
possessed Of many fne quaities-warm- hearted,
brave and Jealous, but vaingloriOus 10 the last
degree, and incompetent TO conduct independ-
ent operations That he was largely response
bic Tor the mortifying result of the attempt TO
bag jackson, shall endeavor TO show
When Shields's Division reached Front Royal,
after its hurried march from Falmouth, Jack
son wSs still north of Winchester, while Ere
mont was approaching Strasburg from the
west. Instead o. pressing on 20 that place to
Join hands with Fremont Shields halted at
Front Royal This unfortunate delay was
largely due 70 a rumor that Lougstreet was ad-
vancing by the Luray Valley with a large
force and the division posted 10 cover the
approaches from that direction. When Gen.
Mcdowell arrived on the following day, he
gave Shields peremptory orders to push out at
once on the direcU road 10 Strasburg TO inter
cept jackson, who was now rapidly falling
back on that place by the Valley turnpike. 1t
was late in the afternoon before Shields got
ready 70 start. aud then. through some uneX-
planned blunder. took the road 20 Winchester.
By the time this mistake was discovered aud
the column transferred 20 the Strasburg road,
night had fallen. During the evening Bayards
cavalry, that had been pushed towards Stras-
burg. returned and reported that the enemy's
rear had passed that place. Fremont, deceived
by a demonstration made by jackson, occupied
the nights near the town and waited TO be
attacked. After this fascO, Mcdowell. thor
Ougly disguised, determined 10 get his own
corps back to Falmouth, in hopes TO resume the
movement on Richmond. The control OF fur
Their operations against Jackson he turned over
10 Shields. who was allowed 10 use has own dis
erection, except that Mcdowell, as he testiies,
gave him strict orders 20 always keep his
brigades within supporting distance. To the
utter disregard OF this injunction the subse
quent disasters are mainly due. There was a
faint hope that jackson might yet be inter
cepted by a prompt movement across the Shen-
andoah at White House Bridge aud through
the Massauutten Gap, striking the turnpike at
New Market.
The division marched on the following day
with that object. The river when reached
was found 10 he torrent level with its banks.
Although, as DR. Capehart informs us, tinidlty
aud INDIGESTION were Stonewali Jacksons lead
ing characteristics a military commander it
had occurred TO him TO send a party TO burn
the bridge and stop further progress in that
direction
The situation was this: Jackson was on the
turnpike somewhere south OF Strasbnrg and it
was fair TO presume that Fremont was at his
heels III Shields still proposed TO cooperate
namely: TO march At once with his whole force
mp The eastern bank until a crossiug-place was
found. What he did do, after wasting day,
was TO send Carroll with the smallest brigade
MP the river with orders that made no allusion
20 Pert Republic or its bridge The next dag
Tyler was started in the same direction.
Shields with the other two brigades remained
at the White House. held there by some ground
less FUmor. such as detained him few days
before az Front Rnval.
There seems 10 he no sufficient reason why
the whole division was not az Port Republic
bridge on the day that Carroli's Brigade ar
rived there. Had il been there, there would
have been a very different story 10 tell.
As 20 81 hat d ID occur il is by no means so
clear 90 as IL Is 10 Dr. Capehart, that Carroll
should have burned the bridge, orders OF no
orders IN the absence Of exact information
rs 10 Jackson's position and Intentions il was
by no means certain be would continue his re-
treat, VIA Port Republic. The broad turnpike
was behind him, and If hard pressed by Ere
mont be might well hesitate 20 involve his
army ia the dirt roads leading from Cross Keys
70 Port Republic. IL on the other hand,
Shields was coming up with the rest Of his com
maUd rs Carroll bad a right 10 presume he was
o. destroy the bridge would leave Shields for a
second time OUT q the game.
Dr. CapeAart refers 70 several dispatches
from Shields 10 Carroll. Allow me 10 quote
fore tie firing began, happened to be sitting
on log talking with Gen. Carroll. when 2 cou-
rier rode up and gave him a dispatch. The
General read il and handed il 10 me with the
remark. What the devil does the old man
mean by thatF" IL was 70 the effect that on
its receipt Carroll should advance and take up
G strong position near Conrad's Store, hamlet
some 10 miles ia our rear. Shields must have
known when lie wrote it that Carroll was al
ready beyond that point. Ny Interpretation
Of d IS not consistent with the gniieess sim
plicity DT. Capehart ascribes 10 Gen Shields
But these are matters about which there may
well be differences Of opinion. i have now 10
reply 10 assertions Of another sort.
IN az article lately brought 10 my notice.
purportiug 10 describe the iattle Of Port Re-
public, Dr. Czpehart makes the following
statement.
AL the artillery could have been removed
but for the fact that certain weak kneed artil-
ierisis, including an officer or two, rode off on
DE horses. necessitating the abandonment Of
Jour guns"
That paragraph is absolutely and. NAV add.
Nickedly false, for il is both wicked and dis
graceful iOT q soldier 70 publish charges affect
1ng lie honor 81 his comrades unless supported
BY the strongest possible evidence In this
case there il not a semblance o. any. There is
here no question Of exaggeTation; his so-called
fact ls RrOUndIess lalseb00d.
Let me briefly state the circumstances. To
Tepel the assault Of the so-caIled Louisiana
Tigers eight guns We're in position, namely.
four Of Battery T. 4th u. S. Art, Capt. J. r.
Clark, on the extreme left; then u pound
b0WItzer Of Battery J.. lst Ohio l. A.: next.
three pieces Of Battery Ii Of the same regiment
Ender Lay command. All these were within
pistol range Of thick woods, perfectly screening
Tie enemyE approach. Clarks guns we're
placed ln an excavation made IN the hillside
whence, II the flank was turned aud the line
taken in reverse il would be nearly impossible
y eEtricate them. The remaining guns az
Batteries J. and ii were acting with the infau.
try o. the right, as were also the Lieulenants
Of both, leaving Capt. Clark aud myself the
only commissioned officers az the point of at
tack ] mention this to show that III any Off.
GERS rode of on battery horses VIC were the
guilty parties. Iyler's troops made two
charges in the first they Kept too far 10 their
left while ia the wood coming out ia front
instead Of On the flank Of the guns. They were
driven back with canister into the wood
where they rectilcd their direction and re-
ceiyed TeinfOrcements. Ia the second attenpf
they turned the flank aud burst out az tbe
wood among Ciark's guns taking the line In
reverse. One Of my three guns were taken.
owing 10 the horses breaking away with the
Timber, wounded and unmanageable. The left
piece that stood la the road was Withdrawn
under cover Of double charge Of canister fired
INTO inc iaces o. The enemy as they rushed I'D
with yclls 10 take il.
The gallant fight made by Capt. Clark and
MS men u shown Jy the fact that they vere
able 70 e1tricate two Of the four guns from sucI,
miserable hole That II was nat aoro a.,