The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1889-01-22

The citation In NUS rs. DCll1ltS,
admits that decree in rem may be
reversed for error on account of in
fancy of the party in interest. The
same case also contains the following
words: mo laches can he imputed to
an infant, and no valid decree can be
awarded against him merely by de-
FAULT
A note to the same case, page 235,
saws, "no decree can be taken against
a minor on his own admissions or
those of his guardian dd Item Except
perhaps, on admissions evidently for
the benefit of the infant
In Hall rs. BuH1Stedd, the allu-
sions to minors liabilities are in the
nature of o5itcr dictd.
In Bedford rs. Wade, the question
was whether the respondent was af-
fected by the statute Of limitations,
she having been beyond the seas dur
ing the time the statute was claimed
to have run. This statute was the
possessory law of the Island of ia
maica 18th Geo. H. The Court said:
at the statute) does not bar legal
remedies, if the parties do not pro-
ceed within a certain time; but it con-
verts a possession for seven years
under Il deed or will, into positive,
absolute title against all the wOrld;'
and on page 80, at is evident that
absence from jamaica contained no
real disability to sue there; and so
many proprietors are at ali times
absent from the Island that the pur-
pose of the Act would have been in
great degree frustrated if the claims of
such absent proprietors could at any
time be made without any limlta-
tions or restriction;n and on page 81,
General words in a statute must
receive general construction unless
YOU can find in the statute itself some
ground for limiting and restraining
their meaning by reasonable construc-
ton, and not by arbitrary addition or
retrenchment. ] can easily refer to
many cases in which such a construc-
ton ought TO take place. One instance
is furnished by the first Statute of
Wills, the 50 Henry VIII, which de-
clares that all and every person or per-
sons may devise their lands by will;
although no explanatory statute had
ever passed, I should have thought
there would have been no difficulty
whatever in holding that this statute
could not have enabled infants and
persons of nOn-sane memory to devise
by will; the obvious intention of the
statute being to make will com
peteut mode of conveying land, it
could not be meant to make those
capable of conveying by will who
were not capable of conveying in any
other way"
This is analogous to the question
raised in the case before the Court, in
which it is fair argument to say that
the Legislature, in passing an act
which would deprive persons of val
liable interests unless there should be
an exercise of vigilance and diligence
in the institution of proceedings re-
curing mature intelligence and eX-
perience, could not have intended
that it should affect minors whose
status in regard TO restraint is set
forth in the same act.
Perhaps the nearest approach to the
position claimed in behalf of the
plaintiff in regard to the liability of
infants is to be found in the case of
Bryan as. KenReH, in which it is laid
down that the statute of Missouri of
March It'll, 1885, which provides that
non-residents of the State may be
proceeded against in equity by publ
cation, includes also nonresident
minors, they not being excepted by
the provisions of the statute; but it
appears from the record of the case,
that under the usual practice of the
courts of chancery, the court had APP
pointed guardian al HtcHl to defend
the suit for the nonresident minors;
so that their position was in fact
better than if they had been adults
This case does not therefore appear to
be an authority for the contention of
plaintiffs counsel.
The case of DenlOrCSt Us. Wy1kOOp
is hardly in point upon this question.
1t came up under the New York
statute of limitation of actions Tor pos
session of real estate, in which it is
enacted that twenty years adverse
possession will bar action unless the
disability of infancy exists, i'll which
case the infant is allowed ten years
after termination OF infancy. The
plaintiff had failed to bring her ac-
ton until the twenty years had eX-
pired and also the ten years after the
end of her minority; the question was
whether or not she was entitled to
twenty years after the expiration of
her minority; the Court very properly
decided that she was not, the statute
having expressly provided for minors
by special allowance of ten years
after removal of disability. The case,
therefore, cannot be said TO be in
point to the issue before this Court.
Chancellor Kent in his opinion in
Den1oreSt Us. WynkOOp referred to the
ancient case of StOlOeU rs. Zouch,
which case contains the following,
"Laches of suit or entry cannot be
imputed to an infant whom God has
not endowed with understanding or
reason, for if he should take an action,
his right and his action might be
such as writ of right, and the like,
which he could not prosecute nor
compel the other party to answer dur
ing his non-age.n (StO1UeU u.s. Touch,
Plowden 364). The case OF Bell rs.
Morrison has only the vaguest and
most general application to the ques-
ton at issue in this case. The law
under consideration in that case was
the statute limiting the time for
bringing actions in assumpsit, and
the question was whether or not the
defendant had taken the case out of
the statute and revived the cause of
action by an acknowledgement or