The National tribune., 1889-11-14
STORY OF A ,CANNONEER.
Continued from 1st page.

OlOlbI vi II lOhIN NUN HUlbs
Continued from 1st page.)
about what is usually termed Meade's fall.
ure to make vigorous counter attack after
repulsing Pickett" But / feel that this
| sketch from the standpoint of private SOL
dier would not be complete if neglected to
| say that there was no such discussion among
the hungry, exhausted, battered and man
gled men
WHOSE STRONG ARMS AND STOUT HEARTS
had won the fight. Any person who says
that they were not for the time being per-
fectly satisfied with tie victory as il stood
at sundown on July 3 is either ignorant of
their state of mind OF intent on misrepre-
senting them for purposes of his own.
/ say that there was no disposition on the
| part Of the enlisted men of the Army of the
Potomac to force things after Pickett's re-
pulse. This was not because of any lack of
nerve, but simply because of that most inn
| perative of all reasons for inaction-utter
physical exhaustion. Critics, writing at
great distances from the scene of battle or q
long time after 1t, are apt to forget that SOL
| diers have legs that get tired, backs that
ache, stomachs that get famished and heads
that get sleepy, the same as other men, and
that the capacity of an army is limited by
the average physical endurance of the indi-
vidual soldiers composing it.
After Picketts Division recoiled not more
than three hours of Clear daylight was left.
The troops Immediately available for eoun-
ter attack were those of the Sixth Corps.
They had not fought much in the battles of
the second or third days, and they had had
one night of rest-such as it was-after their
terrific forced march of nearly 40 miles to
reach the field.
As for the other corps, ours (the FIrst) had
been utterly stove to pieces the first day, and
could not at that time muster 5000 muskets
though what was left was in good heart as far
rs being willing" was concerned but COM
plotely worn out physically.
The Third and Fifth Corps were In similar
condition from tho second days battle. The
Second aud Twelfth had borne the brunt of the
third day, the latter In defending Cnlp's Hill
during the forenoon, and tho former in repuls-
ing Pickett in the afternoon so that there was
not much left OF them-at least they were not in
condition for vigorous offensive movement.
The Eleventh Corps had been badly hammer
ed on the first and second days. and was in
such condition that even its own officers de-
clared their distrust of the troops.
Lest this should be disputed, will say that
on the night Of tho second day, after Gen.
Sprigg Carroll had charged in with his brigade
and restored our old line on Won Giisa's aud
Ames's fronts, l was returning from the spring,
near the foot of the hill, where hsd been to
fill the canteens of our gun-squad, and heard
an animated colloquy just to my right. There
was at this point a largo, wide-spreading hard
wood tree standing In tho corner formed by the
stone wall and the rail fence about third of
the way up the slope between the spring and
the Cemetery gate and there was group of off,
GERS under this tree. Ii was 30 dark that
could not distinguish their faces
BUT ONE or THEM WAS GEN. CARROLL,
which ] know from having heard another on
Ger call him by name. The other | could not
identify, but supposed he was n staff officer.
They were evidently very much in earnest.
heard one say: well, can hold this line to-
night as long as necessary; but why In the
name Of Christ don't he got his men into shape
again and got them down kereT He's got all
night to do IL in"
Tho other replied: "Gen. Carroll, our troops
are very much demoralized. They broke
yesterday (tho first day. and again ths even
ing. The General does not feel that ho can de-
pend on them"
Then tho one who had been addressed az Car
roll replied: "-- 49, such u speech as that
Don't talk TO me that way. Tell him 10 bring
bis men back hero and align them on this wall.
They will then be in support Of my brigade
line. Ii he can't inspire them. by ----. i can.
Get them back here. Don't let them cover like
flock of sheep up there behind the upper bat
tories" (Roferring to ours and Stevens's and
Reynolds on tho brow Of the hilL)
Tho officer addressed replied in n low tone.
which could not mako out, TO which Carroll
replied as | thoughtln great wrath:
" Hancock sent me over here 20 restore this
limo. / have done it. But can't bc response
BILE for the whole right center Of the army, with
my little brigade unsupported. n
commander who says he has no confidence in
4 I..t 4. II 4. L
self. Probably your troops reciprocate your
Generals lack OF confidence. Tell him to
either get them back hero on this line or re-
linquish the command"
Then Carroll went on to say that he himself
occupied Il peculiar position; that Hancock
had ordered him over there TO restore the limo,
but had not told him 10 report TO nybody. nor
had he given him any authority in that POSI-
tion. So he said bis brigade was isolated there.
lie had no authority TO assume command on
that part Of the line. "If had auch author
ity," he said with great aud profnne vehemeuce,
ia rcaurrect things here quicker than -
could scorch feather"
There was moro OF tho same sort, but as
knew our gun detachment was waiting for mo
30 come back with their cauteens | could not
stop for any moro Of this
INTERESTING "EkvEs DROPPING"
So trudged on up tho slope, leaving Gen Car.
Stii SuISluH hHh lHt Htltcta Dl tue
Eleventh Corps who were with him by tho big
tree. do not know who they we're No doubt
Gen. Carroll who Is still living. would remem-
ber the circumstance.
Whether he would care 10 say anything about
IL or not Of course ] don't know. But the an
ecdote will serve to illustrate the condition of
tho Eleventh Corps at that time. This anec-
dotc properly belongs 10 the second day. But
/ have reserved IL for the purpose subserv.
ed here. l do not think Gen. Carroll, If his at
tention were called 10 it, would question its
substantial accuracy.
However, "a | said at the start, all the troops
Of the different corps were either butchered up,
like the First. Second, Third, Fifth and Twelfth,
or exhausted by three days and two nights of
constant fighting. or demoralzed, like tho Elev-
| enth, or completely tired out by Il forced march,
| like the Sixth. 1t was said that the seven
Corps Of tho army had on June 80 about $4,000
muskets. But on July 8 after Pickett recoiled,
AIN sure they could not have mustered moro
| than 5000. The statistics show that about
| 1000 had been killed and nearly 20 600 wound.
| ed during the three days. The Sixth Corps
| had lost at least 1900 men from total exhaust.
ion in their frightful forced march from West
minister There never was au army on earth
| in which the losses in such battle, from sick
ness struggling or necessary details TO take
| care of the wounded would not be- equal to one.
| fourth of the gun-shOt Casualties. So | think
| that in the absence OF accurate statistics 10 will
| be within the mark il / say that Meade could