The National tribune., 1889-05-02

fearing another attack in greater strength on
/ his weakened left, decided. after Consultation
1 with Col. -. that, as Jackson was for the
/ time beaten of, it was expedient and prudent
/ to fall back and unite with the Feinforcements
! coming up, and accordingly gave his orders for
/ the troops down the field TO retire. 1t is no
mere figure Of speech to say that the move
ments back and up the field were made as
handsomely as if on parade. The backward
4 movement being observed by the enemy and
/ after the head Of the column had taken the
road, what was left of the Tigers, with gal
/ lantry seldom paralleled, considering their
/ bloody experience, made another dash for the
guns at the left, supported by Scotts Brigade
! and other troops. The enemy also swarmed
out from other points; even the Stonewall Bri-
! gade took courage and again advanced, but
cautiously, and Ninder opened with some
artillery. The Tigers again got posses
/ sion of the guns and were again driven
! back, only to renew the attack, the guns being
! taken and retaken repeatedly, Candy, Creigh-
/ ton and Dunning defending them; even sponge
/ sticks and clubbed-muskets were used, and
/ pieces Of rocks were hurled and all the artil-
! lery could have been removed, but for the fact
/ that some weak-kneed artillerists, including
an officer or two, rode off on the horses, neces-
stating the abandonment Of four guns.
/ Ii is needless to state that such men have
/ always been inevitable in the most glorious
! bands. Somewhat of confusion also resulted,
at the last, TO the rear, in consequence of the
/ overwhelming odds against them, and num-
Der Of prisoners were taken. As we were leav-
/ ing the field, l had my hat blown of by the
wind OF a cannon-ball, and for few seconds
was partially insensibe, with difficulty keep
ing the saddle, but with no more serious result
than weeks sore head.
THE COLUMN WAS SOON IN ORDER,
with the greater part of the Confederate army
following, considerably elated no doubt, the
cavalry aud the Stouewall Brigade in the lead,
| jackson in person well TO the 'front.' greatly
elated, too; and one more of his staff officers
managed to effect their escape aud return to
their General. Once the cavalry made dash,
/ probably under Jacks0ns orders, and with the
/ expectation of repeating their Front Royal ex-
1 ploit, but Dunning warmed their jackets so
thoroughly that they were not bold enough TO
repeat the experiment. Winder, too, under his
1 chiefs eye, grew a little bold and troublesome,
but being ambushed very eifeetually, he there
| after maintained eminent civI!Ity. i remem-
Der walking my horse along by the side of the
column, and talking to officers and men (Col.
- in command) congratulating them on
their glorious fight and the frightful punish
ment they had given the enemy. Although
they had all stared death in the face, and in
/ spite of the fact that some were wounded and
some limped; that their clothes were riddled
with bullets; that numbers were partially
naked; that they had been soaked in water,
and covered with mud, and lamed by bullets,
stones and fragments of Shells and cut by tlints,
and stung by nettles, and torn by briars, they
were yet unconquered, and moved as defautly
and as well as when they marched up.
Shields hearing of the previous days repulse,
marched all night and when he reached within
about eight miles of the battlefield, with sim
gle brigade, he received, much to his astonish-
ment, the first intimatiOn of the fight from the
rabble of stragglers usual under such circuRl-
stances, in adyance-thoDgh certainly not
numerous IN this case-who, as usual,
represented 8 general rout, and gave
the most gloomy and discouraging side,
10 excuse themselves. These he halted and
put his brigade and artillery into position,
when the main body from the fight marched
up greatly to his satisfaction, in perfect order,
and, under his orders, also halted, and waiting
for his other brigades to come up, all made
ready for battle. Then occurred one of those
remarkable and sudden reYersals Of StOnewall
JacRs0n's action which was peculiarly char
acteristic; the cause ef which is seldom or
never explained, generally attributed to deep
and brilliant, though mysterious strategy, but
which has never been the mark of any great
commander known TO history. Unfortunately
Tor his reputation, on observing Shields's atti-
inde, he turned his back, and began unseemIy
and hasty fight in vulgar fear of him, nu
merically much inferior on his way, toe. to
Swift Run Gap, his natural course TO Rich
mond. And so
SHIELDS, LAUGHING LAST, LAUGHED BEST"
Fremont's promises and intentions were
doubtless always excellent. but these of course,
could not take the place of resolution and Wig
erous execution. which he confounded with
his good intentions lie heard the noise of the
contest, yet il was nearly seven hours after
daylight before he had trayersed about seven
miles, when he reached the nights opposite
Port Republic, and beheld the charred remains
of the bridge. Jackson was then far down the
river, and IRON his information Fremont inn
agined that Shields had been y lin his own
words simply cut to pieces, and that jackson
was following simply to pick up the pieces"
which seems to have caused q sickening and
frightful sensation, from which he never fully
recovered during his military career.
Before the curtain of night fell on that day,
Stouewali Jackson, with his army, could have
been seen passing Port Republic and moving
easteFly toward Brewn's Gap. in the Blue
Ridge, and in the direction of Richmond con-
trary 10 the orders OF Gen. Lee land who was
vebemenuy desiroas, as we know, that Jack
son should strike Shields crushing blow
in an irregular, fragmentary and demoralizing
retreat, in fear Of Shields. Jackson and Charley
! Winder, with what was left of the Stonewall
Brigade, having deemed it expedient for their
! safety to move about 20 miles after the ter
mination of the battle, reaching the summit of
/ the Blue Ridge the same night at midnight !;
! other troops in advance even crossing the
I mountains the same night, and others only
/ reached camp the next morning. Many were
/ without food for a hours, and some for As.
4 The struggling was. of course. enormous, and
their loss in the battle Of Port Republic, in my
/ judgment, and l had no little experience in
such matters, considerably exceeded 200 in
| killed and wounded; their partial returns ad-
mitting about 900. If he were unfit for the
| offensive on the 9th, as he admitted he was his
| condition on the morning of the 10th may be
| imagined; and he is not found offering up any
| thanks to Providence for mercies or fay0rs ex-
tended TO him. Indeed, he had again been
driven from the Valley with frightful loss, and
was utterly powerless for any effective aggres-
I sive action. Jackson preserved total silence as
to his fight. Shields informed the President
Of il, and Mindcr and other Confederates dis
close il ia their reports.
The same evening Jackson was flying east in
apprehension Of Shields, Fremont could have
been seen flying west in mortal dread of Jack
son, and blockading the road after him. IL
fact, for a considerable time thereafter the
President had no little difficulty in keeping
him to the mark, if not of preventing him from
moving back to the Potomac. AS it was, b,
could not be persuaded to hold Harrisonburg
and required urgent pressure to induce him tt
, hold at Mount Jackson, and then wanteC
Shields over to reinforce him. Gen. Car
SchuTz was in camp with him, advising him. ant
shared his fears. The correspondence between
Lincoln and these Generals is interesting bu
, too lengthy TO reproduce here.
And the day of Jackson's flight, Mcdowell
/ h9viur hoard af 0i1r rnnuiea ut ba brid rn 1