Wessington Springs herald. (Wessington Springs, Aurora County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1891, 1888-10-26

dutnumDeIlnS tii;eE cppoSeo, aAuei
nm enthusiastic and dashing chief.
crossing over the river by mas
terly movements which completely
blinded the enemy as to its intentions,
getting, without opposition, into a po-
sition where Il short half days march
would have compelled battle in the
open country, which by sheer force OF
numbers must have resulted i'll decis-
i've Union victory; then hating in the
woods, by some strange perversity of
Judgment on the part of it's General;
its right attacked in that blind situa-
ton by Stonewall jackson, after one of
his skillful flank marches: the right
driven in, routed. demoralized by this
fierce and sudden onset, which only
just missed the destruction, dispersion
and capture Of the whole army; bloody
and prolonged fighting during the
next two days in this situation, where
no battle could be delivered with adj
vantage; and the final huniliating
withdrawal OF Hooker's great army
over the river again; the whole cam
paign % failure: with nothing to show
tor it but some thousands of killed and
wounded, and another heroic record
made by soldiers @!:n..a desperate valor
and steady courage conid not prevail
over laundering Incompetence Ill high
place.
The blow was staggering one to
the people who upheld the Union
cause, because it was entirely unex-
pected. Every omen of victory had
accompanied the advance. 1T is said
that President Iincoln's wonderful
patience and fortitudc were worse
shaken by the news from Chancellors-
vile than by any other during the war
1t was only an incident, not the bat
tie, chat we set out to describe; but
that incident of sublime devotion to
duty, unsurpassed in tlle long annals of
the war, cannot he properly understood
without some reference to the things
that came before.
It was probably the fault--the great
fault-of "Fighting Joe Hooker" that
he arrested the march Of his army be-
fore it h,d cleared the woods and got
into position to fight with advantage.
But the principal blame of the sur
prise and disaster on the right on the
evening OF May Cd must rest elsewhere.
The commanding General cannot be
everywhere, either personally or 10y his
staff. Something must be left to those
who command with him. In this case
the General commanding on the right
had been warned by him to look to his
flank, as there was no natural obstacle
there to prevent an attack. Nor was
the march of Jackson's twenty-six thou
sandmen secret one. tcould not be,
from the nature of the country The
passing Of large bodies of mon was OBJ
served through openings in the woods,
and they We're known to be parts of the
Confederate army. General Hooker
believed it to be the beginning of re-
treat toward Gordonsyille. Still he
thought it prudent to caution General
Howard to look out for his right and
sent him instructions in writing to that
effect before ten o'clock in the morning.
1t seems almost incredible that a
man high in command, intrusted with
the safety Of the whole right wing of a
large army, should have acted as Cen
eral Howard undoubtedly did at this
time. 1t was not only suspected: it
was known by some of his s,lbordinates
that Jachson's strong columns were
moving into position beyond the woods
on his right. Reconnaissance were
made, prisoners were taken, and horse
man after horseman was dispatched I "
Howard to give him the startling re-
port. All this was known at least two
hours before Jackson's charge; but
this Major General, sitting comfortably
in his tent, refused to believe it. He
knew that the Confederates were re-
treating. He was not going to he
fooled by any sensational reports. He
ms t d the soldiers VINO hastened to
tell Dim the truth, 10y telling them that
they were troubled with their imagina-
lions and fears.