The Emporia weekly news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1881-1889, 1888-06-14

as to show that he did not deem It of great
Importance. So it was occupied by an made
quate force. As our battle progressed,
pushing the Federals from point to point,
subordinate officers and soldiers seeking
shelter, as birds fly to cover In q tempest,
found behind the large powders Of its rock
bound sides not only protection but rallying
points These re-enforcements TO the troops
already there checked our advance on the
right, and some superior officer arriving Just
then, OWNED from effect the cause, and
threw force into Round Top that trans
formed it as if by magic into Gibraltar"
In attacking Sickles' salient at the Peach
Orchard, Lee acted in ignorance Of the real
line of battle opposed to him, for he sup
posed that if Longstreet could turn the posi-
ton on the Emmitsburg road, Meade's left
would be broken. The feat looked easy and
promised great things when accomplished
This gives point to Sickles' quotation from
Lincoln's own lips, that the man who brought
on the battle did great thing. II such
forceful logic is to be considered conclusive,
Sickles has the best Of the argument,
although it leaves the Southern end Of the
question more knotty than ever.
On Longstreet's part the matter rests to
his credit, if Lincoln's view be correct
Longstreet opposed the attack on Sickles.
So, If the position of Sickles In advance In
vited attack and opened battle which
turned out III consequence q OOn10Qe16Do OS-
feat, Longstreet Is exonerated On the part
of Lee the critics OF Longstreet contend that
Lee consistently adhered to his promise; that
is, in attacking Sickles he was simply put
ting himself in Meade's way and inviting at
tack. Sickles on July 2 was between Lee
and Washington, but the remainder Of
Meade's army was not, and the defeat Of
Sickles would open a road to the Union rear
and compel Meade to attack or see Wishing
ton exposed to the Confederates. This was
why Lee in the face OF remonstrsnce and
notwithstanding the fact that Pickett's di-
vision of Longstreets corps was not yet On
the field, pushed Longstreee on to SicklS3
| and the Emmitsburg road The success q
| the attack made Lees situation, which had
heretofore been critical, really favorable,
| and Sickles' defeat and Meade's discontinue
in consequence were q signal triumph for
Lee and his personal policy.
The attack by Longstreet on Sickles was
| to have been sustained by further assaults
| against Cemetery Hill and Cups Hill on
| Meade's right At these points Ewen was
| expected to do the work which he had failed
| to undertake on the previous day. The e.
saults, vigorously made, could have drawn
| Meade's attention from Sickles' battle and %
| favor Longstreet's movement But they
| were delayed so long that Slocum was ena-
bled to send over all but one division Of his
| Twelfth corps, also Sykes Fifth corps, which
belonged to Slocum's right wing, a. support.
while Hancock stripped the center along
! Cemetery Ridge for the same purpose. Not
outstanding all this, Longstreet did the work
assigned him, secured the Peach Orchard and
EmEnitsburg road, and would have gained
the Round Tops and thus destroyed Aeadet
line but for the fresh troops which he ms,