The new North-west. [volume] (Deer Lodge, Mont.) 1869-1897, 1888-06-29

0OEs0WdIU 1utO A<eeS lines a. t0oy StOoQ the
night Of July 1, when Hills corps and Long
streets, all but one division, had arrived.
It was this elevation, known as the Warfeld
Ridge, which it was necessary for Lee to oc-
cupy In order to counterbalance the advant-
age that would accrue to Meade from tbs
possession OF Round Top, so soon as he dis-
covered it. All the morning of the second
day, Warfeld Ridge, Little Round Top, and
the Emmitsburg road remained unoccupied
By any force Gen. Sickles says that he
could not have forestalled Lee on Warfleld
Ridge, as he had not troops enough; that he
wrote Meade on the evening Of the first day,
and told him personally as soon as he saw
him-trequently repeating the warning on the
morning of the second day-that the weak
point in Gettysburg was the Union left, the
ground here described, with its approaches
covered all the way from Lees main
camps S1ckles maintained a skirmish
line along Emmitslurg Ridge, sending
out Berdan's sharpshooters into the
woods beyond the Warfeld Ridge; and
made aware by their reports that Long
street and Hill were massing behind the for
est, he finally moved his whole line forward,
occupying Emmitsburg road with Humph-
rey's division as far to the left as Sherfey's
Peach Orchard His second division, Bir-
ney's, was placed at right angles with this,
its line extending southeast toward Little
Round Top. This was contrary to ORDERS
but it was plain then, and in the light Of
Southern official records appears still palmer
now, that Lee was pushing Longstreet's
troops toward this same point at the sane
time. Longstreet's critics, headed by Gen.
Pendleton and followed by Lees biographer,
Gen. A. s. Long, Of Virginia, assume that
he, Longstreet, acted contrary to orders in
that he did not get the high ground at the
Peach Orchard first. The Peach Orchard
was Sickles' salient. About o'clock, after
Meade had inspected what Sickles had done
and resolved to hold on to it, Longstreet
made the attack and fought until dark to
gain the salient. The first official criticism
on Sickles came from Gen. Halleck, the
Union general in chief at Washington. In
his official report he says that Sickles, mis-
interpreting Meade's orders in placing his
lines, committed ian error which nearly
proved fatal in the BATTLE" Gen. Meade did
not break the force of this censure by any
word of his, but stated in his report that the
Third corps sustained the shock Of vigor-
Gus assault 'smost heroically."
Now Gen. Sickles claims that his course,
by its very imprudence, saved the two
Round Tops to the Union cause, and through
them saved the battle. In his speech at tic
reunion Of the Third corps at Gettysburg,
July, 1885, he said: 1.-THE best thing in my
line was the salient position, except the men
who held it. Why? Because it meant fight,
fight right there and then. Lines of battle
are controlled by the contour of the ground
where you must fight, unless you can force
60 Gr,I,k
you choose. II had waited on the line
toward Round Top, a line affording no adj
vantage for defense and none for attack,
the enemy would have seized the Round
were the keys Of our position. The enemy
ridge in my front to the Emmitsburg road
for their artillery, the ground Gen. Leo says
he wanted to occupy to enable him to assail
our left. It is cardinal maxim in war to
seize the enemy's vantage ground when you
know he means to attack. By helping my
self to the ground hc wanted and covering the
Round Tops, held the enemy until the
Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth
corps, and until Caldwell's division of the
Second corps could come into position on the
A6Als \ AACA0 WIG 0AASAA4y 0HOA OVsVSV 4AA1A@
were Marshalcd on our left flank, enough to
hold it and repulse the enemy's assault and
win the battle
But my line was salient, say the critics.
So be it. The enemy found it to be a wedge,
a bolt, spear and thrust" Gen. Long
street frankly admits that he did not favor
an assault in force on Meade at any point.
He asserts that he advised Lee against assail-
ing Meade, and at the same time he denies
that he wasted away any time, or was luke
warm, or lacking in true spirit. He claims,
and others confirm this claim, that Lee was
acting ON the principle of fighting Meade in
detail, and that he Nongstreet was maneuv-
ering so as not to be beaten in detail himself.
The delay caused by Sickles' watchfulness
and aggressive movements deferred the Con-
federate attack some hours, and as Warfeld
Ridge was the first consideration, 1t cost the
Confederates bloody struggle to secure 1t.
From here the salient at the Peach Orchard
was enfiladed on two sides at once and ulti-
mately fell, while the effort made to get to
the rear of it led to the discovery of the un-
protected condition Of the Round Tops, and
brought on a new phase Of tie battle.