The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

northWard into Lees lines as they stood the
night of July ], when Hills corps and Long
streets, all but one division, had arrived
1t was this elevation, known as the Warfield
Ridge, which it was necessary for Lee to oc-
cupy in order to counterbalance the advant-
age that would accrue to Meade from the
possession of Round Top, so soon as he dis
covered it. All the morning of the second
day, Warfeld Ridge, Little Round Top, and
the Emmitsburg road remained unoccupied
by any force. Gen. Sickles says that he
could not have forestalled Lee on Warfied
Ridge, as he had not troops enough; that he
wrote Meade on the evening of the first day,
and told him personally as soon as he saw
him-frequently repeating the warning on the
morning of the second day-that the weak
point in Gettysburg was the Union left, the
ground here described, with it's approaches
covered all the way from Lees main
camps. Sickles maintained skirmsh
line along Emmits urg Ridge, sending
out Berdan's sharpshooters into the
woods beyond the Warfield Ridge; and
made aware by their reports that Long
street and Hill were massing behind the for
est, he finally moved his whole line forward,
occupying Emmitsburg road with Humph-
rey's division as far to the left as Sherfey's
Peach Orchard. His second division. Bir-
ney's, was placed at right angles with this,
its line extending southeast toward Little
Round Top. This was contrary to orders,
but it was plain then, and in the light of
Southern official records appears still palmer
now, that Lee was pushing Longstreets
troops toward this same point at the same
time. Longstreet's critics, headed by Gen.
Pendleton and followed by Lees biographer,
Gen. A. S. Long, of Virginia, assume that
he, Longstreet, acted contrary to orders in
that he did not get the high ground at the
Peach Orchard first. The Peach Orchard
was Sickles' salient. About o'clock, after
Meade had inspected what Sickles had done
and resolved to hold on to it, Longstreet
made the attack and fought until dark to
gain the salient. The first official criticism
ON Sickles came from Gen Halleck. the
Union general in chief at Washington. In
his official report he says that Sickles, mis-
interpreting Meade's orders in placing his
lines, committed ian error which nearly
proved fatal in the battle" Gen. Meade did
not break the force of this censure by airy
word of his, but stated in his report that the
Third corps sustained the shock of a vigor-
GUS assault "most heroically."
NOW Otil. OlCklcS CldlIIlS JldU Ills course,
by its very imprudence, saved the two
Round Tops to the Union cause, and through
them saved the battle. In his speech at the
reunion of the Third corps at Gettysburg,
July, 1886, he said: 1.-The best thing in my
line was the salient position, except the men
who held it. Why! Because it meant fight,
fight right there and then. Lines of battle
are controSed by the contour of the ground
where you must fight, unless you can force
your enemy to come and fight on ground
you choose If 1 had waited on the line
extending from the left of the Second corps,
toward Round Top, line affording no adj
vantage for defense and none for attack,
the enemy would have seized the Round
Tops without blow, and the Round Tops
were the keys of our position. The enemy
would have gained all the commanding
ridge in my front to the Emmitsburg road
for their artillery, the ground Gen. Lee says
he wanted to occupy to enable him to assail
our left. 1t is cardinal maxim in war to
seize the enemy's vantage ground when you
know be means to attack. By helping my
self to the ground he wanted and covering the
Round Tops, | held the enemy until the
Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth
corps. and until Caldwell's division Of the
Second corps could come into position on the
left l held the enemy until $1,000 men