Arizona weekly citizen., 1888-06-16
THE RUSSIAN BEAR.
fNFERloRITY OF THE MUSCovlTE
 AS AN ALLY.

AS AN ALLY.
 The Great Unknown Quantity fin Russia
 Defensive Strength of the Country.
 Risks of a FrsDoo-Russian Alliance.
 Military Point of View.
 So much for France and her army; what is the Russian stuatiOnf IL was not the trench, but our deplorable military adminlsiratlon that beat us in the Crimca- say the Russian generals. And the scandals revealed during the Turco-RuSsian war of lS''-o sho" that not much improvement in that quarter had been made in the 2l years which separate .bastOpol from Plevna. The ear Is the sworn enemy o- peculation and corruption, but. alone at the summit Of the bureau cratic pyramid, Alexander cannot reach the leSions of filiUuste-s who swarm around its base lie may make examples of colonels and some of generals. but abuses continue in spite of imperial efforts at their suppression. 1t was ascertaines very re- gently that in some of the cavalry regiments | neither the men nor the horses receiVel thelr proper raiions; the guilty parties are me,ii- t4iing in the Oural over their misdemeanors, | Jut there is no assurance and there can be | the imperial troops will Lot suffer from the 1 same shortcomings of quartel....lsteEs and | commisSaries that disgrnced the last ca-.i- paigu in Bulgaria. It is a woful pity, toe, | for otherwise Russia would be the iirst of all military powers. She has numbers and she has quality; her infantry soldier Is un- | euualei; to the steadiness of the German and | the dash of the Gaul he unites the sobriety of the Spaniard and the resignation of the | Turk; he is enduring and he IS ingenious; | and to these splendid foOtmen Russia can add an indefatigable and innumerable cav airy. her sotnias of COssacks, these eentaurs of the steppes which, like the hories of At tiIa. can inundate the territory of her enc mics. although the thickly wooded and marshy frontiers of European Russia are less appropriate than is commonly imagined to the movements and deployment of
 mounted troops.
 RUSSIA's INFERIoRITY.
 | But Russian generals know not the value
 of their men Many of them learned the practice of the art of war in Bulgaria All are educated officers, bold and brave. Their officers are confident, and inspire confidence,
 and vet it must be admitted that neither
 Russian generals. nor Russian officers, nor Il fu1Slt-M hlsll Hi,-f-4 A4-I '-AtAN NaA4N'--'
 the same science or the same experience as
 those of Germany. And supposing them to
 be their equals. suppOsing an analogous unity
 of command. there would still always exist . double inferiority-that arising from de fective administration and defective or in | sufficient means of concentration This last point. given a general European war, Is 0f
 capital importance, especially for Russia s
 eventual allies.
 | In France and in Germany the time neces-
 sarv for the mobilization of 100000 Of men can be estimated tO within four and twenty hours In Russia that time is the unknown quantity of the redoubtable problem, and
 without that unknown quantity it Is impos- sible to calculate the real value of Russian | cooperation. How many days may Ice re- , quired or how many weeks or even months how many hundred thousand soldiers can
 be mustered in the first line, how many 1T. the second. how many in reserve, nobody can answer. for nobody knows how to answer, and only one thing is absolutely certain and this the Russian newspapers confess, Rus | sia's mobilization must le incomparably and vastly slower than that of either of her neighbors. Nor could it be otherwise, with distance infinitely greater, with railways | I-Ss numerous. less well appointed and man aged, uf which the majority have only a single track, and very few have special plat ; forms for the embark.ti0n and landing Ot ! horses. troops and material These disad yantages cannot be contested, and they alone ars sufficient 10 explain why, in provision ot ? events, the imperial government should have taken those precautions along the froutleT1 ! | which have so exercised the suscepubiltes l of Austria Hungary
 ! This undeniable inferiority of Russia | ? l esDecially dangerous c. her future allies Al ' bous Russia is safe; she may be invaded, al ? 1 she was by Charles VII and by Napoleon 2 but Russia's invaders generally fare badly and to get out of her vast territory IS easiei ) | than to ge. into it, and ghat would be th' ] | fate of a western ally not prudent enough tS g adjourn is action until Russian mobiliza { ! ton be entirely complefedi True. Russiai 5 enemies will scarcely allow her allies t0 seler !, their moment.
 s THE RISKS NOT EQUAL.
 ? Ina Franco-R Russian alliance the risks an l. not equally shared by 10th powers Russia p can bide her time, but France must bear al d the brunt from the outset. The gain of tE d first battle would bring the Germans into tl D heart of Champagae, with second victor. o they might surge on tO Paris, while the north g ern colossus would scarcely feel the blow r. received by her provinces Of Lithuauia '- Esthonia and Poland. Every invasion O '. Russia has always ended in disaster to th Q enemy; every invasion Of France has bee f successful. Perhaps railways may have de
 prived Russia of that invulnerability whic
 was secured to her fin former days by di.
 tances, and, perhaps, with a railroad at hi disposal, Napoleon might not have bee
 | z ., M.e.rur Dtse fbara something about Russia which cannot b seized upon. She is, as one might say, r species of inorganic being without eithe
 heart or head at which fatal blow could I dealt. She is not possessed of one capital c
 which the capture would conquer a peac, z and with her climate campaigns cannot [ !, indefinitely prolonged. Supposing the ear j. armies to be always defeated, the yictC = would be troubled in gleaning the fruits C = his triumphs. And to what point must a enemy advance before he can force Russi
 to ask for termsi Russia has power of T,
 sistance resulting from her size and from ht structure, but this power of resistance caI not be communicated tO her allies. m
 czar may continue his struggle on the bank v of the Don and the Nolga for months afts any western ally has been obliged to CT
 enough.
 Spite of her millions of soldiers, Russia le strength is, above all, defensive Her a, r. vantages. which in the cOurse of another eel
 tury must make her the mistress of EurUp
 | is in her mass, but in that mas, the cause
 her great superiority in the defense of b,
 soil, is an obstacle to offense. And so 1t h, in been proved by the last great war in whic !. Russia took part. when three campaigns wei [, | needed to crush the Turks in Armenia au TO Bulgaria Without any doubt, united Fran, 8, and Russia. well commanded, could ho le l their own against all the rest ot Europe; b' B. Trace. by her situation. would be the mo ID l exposed. because she Is the most vulnerabi It She must face an enemy on every side, ( |. | every fronticr on sea and on land, in Eurol . and in Africa, and without any certaIn' D. that her distant ally would have tune ns means Co come to her assistance. From ic | military p0lnt of view. all the ndvartaEes lt l a Franco-R Russian alliance will be for RuSsi u ! Gll the dangers would be for ECs-nce.-EaT "a Cor New York TimsS
 m Don't.
 let that cold of yours run on. Yo
 think it is light thing. But It may ID