davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21
PERSONALS.

DR.. ]. H. Mallens who has been
i'll with rheumatism for two weeks
past is out again.
JIG. Winter, Esq, and family left
to-day for short recreation at Woo
tan Wells.
Mr.. r. Leasing has gone to Wootan
Wells.
Mrs. w. T. Hoffman and children
accompanied by Miss Birdie Draughan
left to-day for visit to Texarkana.
Manager Henderson is back from
his trip to East Texas.
Col. VIM. Cameron is back from
San Antonio.
We are sorry to learn of the illness
of Miss BERTHE Blanchard.
Miss Jennie Westbrook, the charm.
ing daughter of Mr.. G. A. Westbrook,
of Lorena, is visiting friends in the
city.
Miss Sallie COX leaves TOMORROW
for Hillsboro, on visit to her sister
Miss Lizzie Cox.
The following prominent Wacoites
left via the Cotton Belt for summer
resorts to-day: Mrs. A. d. Storey
Miss Imogene Storey, Mrs. Sam Hunt
and Miss Lillian Hunt for Chicago
Mr.. James Rotan for Charlottesville
Va.
For week past the Juvenile mem
bers of the families of Capt. G. H
Higginson and Mr.. Jno. Tenant have
been rusticating at the pleasant Hill
side farm guests of Mr.. and Mrs. G. G.
Conger. They returned last evening
sunburnedbut happy.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Franklin street is showing com.
mendable signs of progress, and the
Brunswick Hotel is leading the pros
sion and will soon be one Of the lead.
ing hotels of the city, as Mrs. Ed
White has taken charge, she being a
lady of vast experience in the hotel
business.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

He had invited her to table d'hote
dinner, and was nervous about the
claret. "Miss Clarv," he said. "do
you understand French 7" "Not a
word" she replied. Waiter" he said
impressively, "for wine, you may bring
bottle of the rare old vim ordinaire.
New York Sun.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21
Sunday.school Teacher-John

Sunday.school Teacher-Johnnie
you did splendid to-day"
ayes, ma'am."
II wish all the little boys in the
class would study their lessons as you
do. Are you struggling to win the
prize 7"
"Naw. Dad said that he'd gimme
ticket to the next circus if l got of
my lessen without a preak.-Lincoln
Journal.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

as to show the modest observer exact.
ly where the stays begin and where
they end: there is no longer any con-
cealment about the matter. Now, l
think this is mistake.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

One lady says she can do her own
work with quick meal stove with
less labor than she can look after
hired girl and then there Is no steal
age OF wood or victuals, no dirt, no
smoke, no heat, no girl to pay or feed.
WACO CURIOSITY SHOP.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Almost indispensable is the quick
meal. No smoke, dirt or litter, does
the work quicker, cheaper and better
than wood or coal.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

The New York World makes the
statement that twenty-one persons
have been killed and one hundred
and thirty-nine injured by horses and
vehicles driven by reckless drivers In
that CITY from January to June 10.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Insurance men recommend tn,
quick meal Gasoline Stove for sal,
only at the Waco Curiosity Shop.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21
This EnLL.

One Of the best stocks of Furniture,
Stoves, and Household Goods in Waco
will be found at the Waco G. s.,
where they sell woman's greatest
blessing, the quick meal Gasoline
Stove.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

The days OF sweltering over a hot
stove are about numbered. With the
Quick Meal lady can cook and keep
as cool and as nice as in her parlor. 4
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Nicely furnished and we'll ventilated
rooms at the Brunswik Hotel. on
Franklin street. "
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21
JNO. M. COOPER,
Waco Supply Store.

A Divorce. Or Quick Meal. Gas
oline stove is the cry Of the average
lady of Waco.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Oh, where is the man but six foot high
That gives you Gas(oline) as cheap
as 1? G. l.. GooCH.
Ladies cry for them. The Quick
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

l have opened restaurant In con-
nection with my saloon and am pre-
pared to furnish a good meal at all
hours at Bismarck's.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

A nice, cool dining room, and al
apartments kept in order at the Bruins
wick. ~
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

II you would keep cool take your
drinks at the White Elephant.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

A first-class French cook attends t.
the restaurant ut the Bismarck. \
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Have your moving and packing
done by the Waco G. s.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Rare old whiskles. rich with age,
and the choicest wines are served
over the counter at the White Ele-
phant.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

You can get square meal at any
hour at Bismarck's.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

The choicest drinks, ice cold, are
be found at the White Elephant.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

There is nothing equals the quick
meal Gasoline Stove.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Gasoline Is cheap at Waco Curiosit,
Shop. ~
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Two cents worth of oil will cook q
dinner on the quick meal Gasoline
Stove.
WACO CURIOSITY SHOP.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

Show case wanted at Bismark's.
Waco evening news. (Waco, Tex.) 1888-1889, 1888-07-21

For Sale-A milkshaker at Bis
marck's.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25
80; but on approaching the town,

r";Go; but on approaching the town,
-, } artillery firing was heard For some
- time ! cndeavored, by sending in diff
.reat directions, to find Gen, Reynolds in
order to report to him in person." The re-
port states in brief: That while Gen. Howard
had not gone beyond the town in search Of
his commander, word came at II 80 a. m.
that Reynolds was dead; that at 1890 the
head of the Eleventh corps passed through
the town, and that at that hour also, Gen.
Buford, commanding the cavalry, reported
that new enemy was massing north of
Gettysburg between the Harrisburg and
York roads. This new enemy was Ewells
corps moving west by south, with the view Of
joining the main Confederate army at CASH
town. Maj. e. P. Halstead, an aid to Gen.
Doubleday (who succeeded Reynolds in the
command on the field, asserts, in pamphlet
on the first days battle, "That the Eleventh
corps did not reach the field until 2 D. M;
that it then formed in line of battle at about
right angle to the general line Of the First
corps, but did not connect with its right by
several hundred yards, and both the TANKS
were in the air that is, they did not rest in
defensive position and had no supports).
When Ewell's troops approached from Car
Isle and York, they struck the Eleventh
corps in front and on both TANKS almost at
once, resulting in an easy victory for the
enemy, and giving them possession of Gettys-
burg before the First corps had ceased fight
ing or left its position west Of the Seminary"
Maj. Halstead states the case in its bald
ness, but he is true to the official records.
Howard was acting under the same orders as
was Reynolds, whose corps was in marching
trim soon after daylight on the 1st, obeying
promptly the very spirit Of Meades order,
and this promptness of Reynolds with his
First corps, accounts for the difference be-
tween his arrival at Gettysburg and that of
the Eleventh corps-a difference of some
three or four hours yet both had the same
distance to go!
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

were marshaled on our left flank, enough to
hold it and repulse the enemys assault and
win the battle.
But my line was salient say the critics.
So be it. The enemy found it to be a wedge,
a bolt, spear and a thrust" Gen. Long
street frankly admits that he did not favor
an assault in force on Meade at any point.
He asserts that he advised Lee against assail-
ing Meade, and at the same time he denies
that he wasted away any time, or was luke
warm, or lacking in true spirit. He claims,
and others confirm this claim, that Lee was
acting on the principle OF fighting Meade in
detail, and that he Hongstreet was maneuv-
ering SO as not to be beaten in detail himself
The delay caused by Sickles watchfulness
and aggressive movements deferred the Con-
federate attack some hours, and as Warfield
Ridge was the first consideration, it cost the
Confederates bloody struggle to secure it,
From here the salient at the Peach Orchard
was enfiladed on two sides at once and ulti-
mately fell, while the effort made to get to
the rear of it led to the discovery Of the I'M
protected condition of the Round Tops, and
brought on a new phase Of the battle.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25


ward johnson. In the meantime, the capture
of courier with a dispatch from Gen. H. w.
Slocum revealed the fact that the Twelfth
corps was at hand, so the advance was not
made. The severest critic of this over eau
ton on Ewell's part is the Confederate Gen.
Longstreet, who says: pursuit, pell nell, is
sometimes justified in mere retreat and is
the accepted principle in a rout. Gen. Early,
in his report of this days work, says: The
enemy had been routed He should there
fore have been followed by everything that
could be thrown upon his heels, not so much
to gain the heights, which were recognized
as the rallying point, but to prevent his raj
lying at all in time to form lines for another
battle. Hays had received orders through
Early from Gen. Ewell to halt with his
brigade) at Gettysburg. But he saw that
the enemy was coming round by the Balti-
more road and were making for the heights
the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or
death. and for the possession of it the battles
of the I'd and Sd were fought"
1t is asserted by some, Gen. Early among
the rest that had "Stonewall" jackson been
in his old place at the head of the corps led
by Ewel at this time, this assault on the hill
would have been made, and, once successful
here. the Coufederates would have been mas
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

III. Oh Une "a 10 take up q position TO cover
the retreat from Gettysburg. At this hour,
if at all, contingencies had developed" for
Sickles was being assailed on both lines at
the salient, and Ewells artillery was thun.
dering against Cemetery and Culp's Hills
Gen. Daniel Butterfeld, Meade's chief Of
staff, testified before the congressional COM
mittee that on the morning of the I'd
Meade instructed him (Butterfield) to study
and mark out the lines of retreat Between
this hour and the meeting of the council Of
the evening came the startling events of the
day, the desperate assaults of Lee, piercing
the lines at the right, center and left. At
the council the majority voted that the army
remain in the position then held, some, how
ever, qualifying their vote by saying that it
remain, providing the ground would admit
of a counter attack Gen. Slocum was the
most warlike and unequivocal, for he said:
"Stay here and fight it out" The effect Of
the vote upon Meade is described by Slocum,
and he gives Meades own words upon the
occasion: "Well, gentlemen the question is
settled. We will remain here, but wish to
say that l consider this no place to fight a
battle"
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25


rection of our deeply lamented commander,
Maj. Gen. Reynolds. We struck the CASH
town (Chambersburg) road about three-quar-
tiers of mile west of Gettysburg at about 10
a. M The right became sharply en-
gagged before the line was formed, 1918 a. m"
Howard reports cat $3.50 a. M, July 1, or
ders were received from headquarters
(Meade) to move the Eleventh corps to with
in supporting distance of the First corps,
which was to move to Gettysburg. l imme-
diately sent an aid-de-camp to Gen. Rey-
nolds to receive his orders" That is, when
Gen. Howard received orders from the gen.
eral in chief in the rear of Taneytown to go
to the aid of Reynolds at Gettysburg at $3.50
in the morning, he did not make move to
execute the order, though he was eleven
miles distant from the point where he was
ordered to reach and join Reynolds In
stead of moving he sent an aid to Reynolds
for further orders the aid mentioned by
him as having met Reynolds. Towards
report continues: cat a. m. orders were
received from him ReynoldS directing the
corps to march to Gettysburg. The column
was at once set in motion, my first division,
Gen. Barlow commanding, following the
First corps by the direct route, my Third,
Gen. Schurz and my Second Gen. Stein
wehr, in the order named taking the route
by Horner's mill The distance by the direct
route was eleven miles, and by the other
thirteen miles. AS soon as the corps was
set in motion pushed on with my staff by
the direct road, and when within two miles
of Gettysburg received word from Gen. Rey-
nolds, pointing out the place where was to
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

side the controversy still awaits the publica-
ton OF Lees private papers. 1t has been in
this case, as in many other important in
stances, appeals to the Lee family have
been met with the response that "Lee's plans
and purposes were kept to himself" This
much, however, is admitted in the matter of
Gettysburg: Lee promised his corps COM
manders campaign of strategy, in which
he would place his army in such a position
as to compel the Union army to fight him, he
keeping on the defensive Meade meant to OBJ
serve similar caution, as his own testimony be-
fore the committee on the conduct of the war
shows. Here, then, were two great captains
confronting each other and awaiting attack
That is to say, neither was committed to a
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

as to show that he did not deem it of great
importance So it was occupied by an made
quate force. As our battle progressed,
pushing the Federals from point to point,
subordinate officers and soldiers seeking
shelter, as birds fly to cover in a tempest,
found behind the large powders of its rock
bound sides not only protection but rallying
points. These re-enforcements to the troops
already there checked our advance on the
right, and some superior officer arriving just
then, OWNED from effect the cause, and
threw force into Round Top that trans
formed it as if by magic into Gibraltar"
In attacking Sickles salient at the Peach
Orchard, Lee actedSin ignorance of the real
line of battle opposed to him, for he sup
posed that if Longstreet could turn the'pos-
tion on the Emmitsburg road, Meade's left
would be broken. The feat looked easy and
promised great things when accomplished.
This gives point to Siclles' quotation from
Lincoln's own lips, that the man who brought
on the battle did great thing If such
forceful logic is to be considered conclusive,
Sickles has the best of the argument,
although it leaves the Southern end of the
question more knotty than ever.
On Longstreets part the matter rests to
his credit, if Lincon's view be correct.
Longstreet opposed the attack on Sickles
So, if the position of Sickles in advance in
vited attack and opened battle which
turned out in consequence a Confederate de-
feat, Longstreet is exonerated On the part
of Lee the critics of Longstreet contend that
Lee consistently adhered to his promise; that
is, in attacking Sickles he was simply put
ting himself in Meades way and inviting at
tack. Sickles on July2 was between Lee
and Washington, but the remainder of
Meades army was not, and the defeat of
Sickles would open road to the Union rear
and compel Meade to attack or see Washing
ton exposed to the Confederates This was
why Lee, in the face of remonstrance and
Notwithstanding the fact that Pickett's di-
vision of Longstreets corps was not yet on
the field, pushed Longstreet on to Sickles
and the Emmitsburg road The success of
the attack made Lees situation, which had
heretofore been critical, really favorable,
and Sickles' defeat and Meade's discontinue
in consequence were signal triumph for
Lee and his personal policy.
The attack by Longstreet on Sickles was
to have been sustained by further assaults
against Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill on
Meade's right At these points Ewell was
expected to do the work which he had failed |
to undertake on the previous day. The as
saults, vigorously made, could have drawn
Meade's attention from Sickles' battle and so
favor Longstreet's movement. But they
were delayed so long that Slocum was ena-
bled to send over all but one division of his
Twelfth corps, also Sykes Fifth corps, which
belonged to Slocum's right wing, as support
while Hancock stripped the center along
Cemetery Ridge for the same purpose Not
outstanding all this, Longstreet did the work
assigned him, secured the Peach Orchard and
road, and would have gained
the Round Tops and thus destroyed Meade's
line but for the fresh troops which he met
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25
MEADE'S PROPOSED RETREAT AND
PICkETT'S FORLORN HOPE.


Notwithstanding the fact that Lee had
failed in his efforts to completely dislodge
Meade, he had secured a foothold on the right
and disrupted the left of the Union army
This would compel Meade to fight in the
morning, to free himself from Ewells grip,
and it also left the road open on Meade's left
for Lee to move around and get between him
and his chosen battle-ground on Pipe Creek,
and also to secure the roads between him and
Washington. At a council of war held on
the evening of the 3D. Meade submitted the
question to his generals, SIS it advisable for
the army to remain in its present position or
fall back The controverted points are.
whether Meade intended to retreat and
wished his generals to sanction it, or whether
he desired to reuain on the heights. In the
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25


practicable On the southern side the chief
of artillery, Gen. w. N. Pendleton, has for
mally declared that he received orders from
Lee to examine the ground ON Meade's left, in
front of Sickles' Third corps, with the design
of making an attack there early on the I'd,
and this was the attack which, when deliv-
cred, decided the nature Of the battle. Up
to that time Meade might have taken the
offensive, but the onslaught came with such
vigor, bringing with it consequences of such
character, that attack from the Union side
was no longer thought of.
Every great triumph in war or in discov-
cry finds a score of claimants for award and
every failure, every Waterloo must have it's
scapegoat And because Gettysburg was not
final Union victory, Gen. Sickles, who met
the most formidable assault delivered by Lee
on that field, has been severely criticised,
while Gen. Longstreet, who was the assal-
ant, has long been held responsible by the
Confederates for the disasters to the Southern
arms, disasters which date from that attack
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

corps alone drew back in some order, making
stand on Seminary Ridge until the artillery
and ambulances had been withdrawn The
Comte de Paris makes this criticism on How
ards movements: ''Since he declined to oc-
cupy Oak HILL Howard should have brought
back the Eleventh corps to the rear in order
to form strong connection between his left
and the right of the First. y X Conse-
quently it is unjust on the part of Howard,
after having neglected to assume the proper
direction of the First CORPS to have accused
it las he did, in his first dispatch to Meade, of
having allowed its left to be turned, and, by
yielding ground, to have forced the Eleventh
to a premature retreat On the contrary, it
was the disorderly disbanding of this latter
corps, and especially of Schimmelpfennig's
DIVISION which compelled Robinson Second
division, First corps to abandon the position,
which, until then, he had so bravely de-
Tended, thereby involving the loss of Double
days position on Seminary Ridge"
The appearance of Sickles' column march
ing in on the Emmitsburg road late in the
day, had the effect of impressing the Confed-
crates with the strength of the enemy before
them, and had a general moral effect on
affairs after the First and Eleventh corps had
retired to the heights, preventing their tradi-
tional shutdown attack" Sickles had re-
ceived no orders to go to Gettysburg, but
went there from Emmitsburg at the call of
one of Reynolds subordinates after that
general had fallen.
The battle of the first day rendered two
Union corps, the First and Eleventh, temper
arily unfit for action, and cost several thou
sand men. But it placed the army on
Cemetery Ridge.
Right here the southern controversies
begin 1t is asserted that the defeat of the First
and Eleventh corps should have been followed
up by Ewell whose troops were freshest, had
suffered the least, and had moreover gained
foothold at the base of the slope of Cemetery
Hill by following the Eleventh corps into the
town. This hill was the key to the northern
extremity of the ridge and the right of the
Union army during the two days following.
AS soon as Ewell entered the town he re-
ceived orders from Gen. Lee, who now made
the Seminary cupola his observatory, as
Reynolds had done earlier, to press on and
seize Cemetery Hill. The ORDER however,
made it discretionary for Ewell, because Lee,
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25

entry changed anxiety and fear into hopeful
certainty, and decided at once the fate of
Gettysburg. Yet the controversy as to who
the hero was that did this will doubtless 90
down to posterity, for congress honored
Meade for the whole campaign, while it gave
Hancock praise for his brilliant conduct on
the field. Maj Halstead, the only witness of
the meeting of Hancock and Howard thus
describes it,: 81 returned to where Gen. How
ard sat just as that brilliant, dashing SOL
der, Gen. Hancock, the hero of Gettysburg,
approached at swinging gallop, and when
near Gen. Howard, who was then alone, sa-
luted, and with great animation, as if there
were no time for ceremony, said that Gen.
Meade had sent him forward to take COM
mand of the three corps. Gen. Howard
woke up little and replied that he was the
senior. Gen. Hancock said Il am aware of
that, general; but l have written orders in
my pocket, which l will show you if you
wish to see Them Gen. Howard said: NO,
do not doubt your word, Gen. Hancock;
but you can give no orders here while l am
here
"'Very well, Gen. Howard, will second
any order that you have to give, but Gen.
Meade has also directed me to select field
on which to fight this battle in rear of Pipe
creek Then casting one glance from Culp's
Hill to Round Top he continued: But,
think this the strongest position by nature
upon which to fight battle thatI ever saw,
and if it meets your appreciation l will select
this as the battlefield Gen. Howard re-
sponded Il think it a very strong position,
Gen. Hancock, very strong positions |
Very well, sir, I select this as the battD |
field
"Gen. Hancock Immediately turned awat
to rectify our lines, and from that momelf6 |
till the close of the battle he was the nspik,
ing genius"
Meade reports: "About the time of this
withdrawal "A p. M, Howard had just issued