, 1888-10-18
SOME PROHIBITION FALLACIEs.

Ing comparison between the apolltlOn
of slavery and the abolition OF intem-
perance. They argue as If the cases
were parallel and conclude that as the
one has been accomplished so the
other can be-.
The fallacy Of their argument con-
sists in the falseness Of the parallel.
The difference between the condition
OF the slave and the condition of the
man who drinks whisky is too obvious
to be mistaken.
H. is in the power of every man to
stop drinking
1t was in the power of no slave to
stop working.
Drinkers can, by their own act and
at their own pleasure free them selves
from the bonds of intemperance.
Slaves could, by no act of their own,
free themselves from the chains OF
bondage.
1t required the Intervention of 9TH
Others to abolish slavery. 1t requires
only the consent OF the dlinker to
abolish intemperance.
Slavery was not abolished by law,
but by war. 1t required war where
in million lives were sacrificed to
rid the land OF slavery. Is it proposed
to abolish intemperance by the sword9
Itwould be as logical to exclaim;
"We abolished slavery, we can abolish
the appetites of men,"
Another fallacy OF the prohibition
reasoning is contained in their favorite
argument, that as other offenses are
made the subject OF legislation, so in
temperance can be abolished by stat
ute.
Laws do not abolish crime. They
punish criminals.
Is it proposed to punish drunkards?
The parallel, to hold good, must be
followed out to its logical end. The
man who steals the horse from the
livery stables is imprisoned, and not
the owner OF the stables.
The prohibtionists allow another
fallacy to mislead them when they de-
clare that a regulation of the liquor
traffic is a recognition Of it, and there.
fore not to be considered, and that IL
cense, high and low, sis vicious in
principle and powerless in remedy"
The law that declares that saloons
shall he closed at certa in hours and on
certain days, that the liquors sold
therein shall be unadulterated, and
that persons OF a certain age shall be
prohibited from entering them, is no
more "a recognition" of the liquor
traffic, than the law declaring certain
breaches of trust to be larceny, is "a
recognition" Of stealing. Laws are
created by almost every legislature
defining new offenses and publishing
them. This has been discovered to
be the practical way Of dealing with
evil. The impractical way is simply
to declare by statute: "There shall
be no evil" Evil is of two
kinds, that which is wrong in itself,
as murder, and that which is declared
to be wrong by law, as failing to keep
up ones fences or work the road 1t
is now proposed to create the ofiense of
"liquor selling" When law is passed
prohibiting the sale of liquor is not
that recognizing" the evil, rs much as
when law is passed declaring that
liquor shall be sold in certain quanti-
ties and to certain persons?
The difference is only one of degree.
Does wise man refuse to regulate
and modify and mitigate an evil,
which he cannot destroy?
The prohibitionists refuse to sane !
ton tax on liquor. Is it wisdom to
refuse to divert, in part, that which is
evil, to good purposes, because it is
evil2 Would you refuse to take money
to build school house which you
knew would otherwise be employed |
by the liquor dealer to replenish his
stock?
When man is fined for assaulting
his neighbor, which is better, to use
the fine to build county bridges or to
declare by statute: "No man shall
beat his neighbor."
Admit drinking to be an unmitiga-
ted evil, can it be abolished by law?
Has it ever beenY Anywhere?
The REVIEW took occasion some
months ago to express its views on