The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1888-02-09

necessary to watch our left flask and prevent
movement by the enemy or from which to
make an offensive demonstration" / am at
loss to conceive for what other object any posi-
ton would have been taken. But it never
seemed to have occurred to those at headquar-
tiers that there was any necessity for either of
these objects on the left flank. Gen. Hunt
adds: 4 suppose the occupation of that adj
vanced position compelled the enemy to attack
us, even if they had started to turn our left
flank" There is the whole of it in nutshell;
precisely what Sickles had anticipated, and
what his wise foTethought endeavOred to pro-
vide against. And now in view Of what we
know of the aims and intentions of the enemy,
it would hardly seem necessary to add any
thing more. The complete vindication of
Sickles's action is shown in the light of the
simple fact that his predictions were verified.
The enemy's troops were massed and the battle
fought out upon his position.
Some further light may, however, be shed
upon it by the consideration of few other
facts Gen. Sickles had no position on the left
Of his original line for his artillery, except
where it would be commanded by that of the
enemy on the Emmittsburg road, and where it
was masked by the wooded and rocky ground
in his front, and by the granite knoll and the
Devils Den. These woods and rocks afforded
almost perfect covers for an advancing enemy.
His artillery, placed at the Peach Orchard on
lDG LIiullAt5tUiR GOdus hOIiQ nave GEiftn Oub
the left of our line in Is minutes; whereas by
moving forward we ourselves secured the posi-
ton SO much coveted by the enemy, and should
we be driven from it we could still do what we
afterwards did do-form again upon our first
line. Moreover, we could and did hold the adj
yanced line until Meade, convinced at last,
could bring reinforcements to the exposed loft
flank. Besides, and this is the most vital point
of all, the enemy could have seized Round Tor
atrnaCf nnnhsprvad and Wit cpa really friu q
ashot; and that point once in his possession, the
/ battle was won, our army compelled TO retreat
/ disastrously, and the recognition Of the
CONFEDERATE STATES BY ENGLAND
most undou btedly assured.
Our troops having taken the position before
/ described, we lay awaiting the attack which
we ali knew the enemy must now make. VIZ
/ lay thus from o'clock till nearly 4, when sud
/ denly the oppressive stiffness was broken by
heavy fire Of artillery which was opened upon
/ US. Longstreet had at last got his troops into
! position-HOod on his extreme right, then Ne
1 Laws. and then the five brigades Of Anderson
Division, of Hills Corps, each one of these bri
| gades nearly as large as one Of our divisions
] and making an aggregate Of nearly 5000 men
/ and this entire force was thrown upon the
/ First Division of cur Corps backed by one bri-
/ gade Of the Second Division, an aggregate Of
certainly not more than 5000 men, covering q
/ line mile long. Lee well knew and always
acted upon the military axiom, To be always
strongest at the point of attack" and he now
4 hurled three lines Of battle against our one
thin line Hoods Division extended entirely
beyond and overlapped our left flank, and in q
very little time penetrated between that flank
and Little Round Top. McLaws's Division
Joined Hoods left, Barksdale's Brigade on his
left, and then the FIVE brigades Of Anderson's Di-
| vision-Wilcox's, Wright's Perry's, Posey's and
Mahone's-on the left Of McLaws, extending
around the angle and striking Graham at the
Peach Orchard. Longstreets artillery on
Hauck's Hill and the Emmittsburg road or