The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1888-09-06

reliable am clear that one OF two courses should
be adopted; first, 70 concentrate all our available
forces 10 open communication with Pope second,
70 leave Pope 70 get out Of his scrape and al once use
all cur means TO make the Capital perfectly safe No
middle course VIII now answer. Tell me what you
wish me 10 DO and viii do all in my power to ac-
pis it. wish 10 know v hat my orders AID aJI-
thority ask for nothing. but wlilobey what
ever orders you give. only ask prompt oecis-
ion that ] may At once give the necessary orders.
Il VIII not Go to delay longer.
isigned] Gro. B. McCLELLAy.
Major-General.
A. IIEcoLN, President.
WITH THE SOUND OF BATTLE N HIS EARS.
A strange dispatch this in view of the fact
that for three successive days Mcclellan had
been almost heurly receiving peremptory or
ders 10 send Franklin to the front, and that he
had been reporting almost as often that be was
doing so. 1t nust be borne in mind also that
at the time this telegram was sent, Franklin,
with l.003 men: sumner, with 1900 men,
and Cox, with 5000 men, we're al in and near
Alexandria under NcCelans direct control,
and that he mad positive orders to send them
forward. The sounds of battle we're in bis ears
all the time and shouia Of themselves have
furnished him with reason for hurrylng them
10 the front more imperative than any orders.
As Gen Mcclellan had positively stated
again aud again that Franklin could not move
10 the front because OF want OF transportation,
1t WAS Or course doably jmpraCticahlo for the
sSme reason that both Franklin and Sumner
should 20 forward, and the first part Of this
proposition to the President therefore, could
not have been made Win any purpose Of being
carried ont. The last Of the two suggestions.
viz, TO leave Pope TO get cut of his scrape,"
was therefore the real one. What was the
"scrapc that Pope was TO be left 10 get 0Ut Of?
lie had been for nearly three weeks marching
and fighting almost continuously, fer no other
purpose taau 10 give time for Gen. McClellau's
army 10 assemble at Alexandria and come for
81 E-FT 80
battle at The front Tor three or four successive
days was sounding IN Gen. IcClellau's ears,
and IN answer 10 il he advises that Pope be left
10 get 0ut Of bis scrape" And was Gen. Pope
alone involved IN this scrape so toucl,ingiy
alluded to by Gen. Mcclellan? Were there not
also In this scrape thousands of LOYAL and
gallant soldiers who had been for weeks fight
ing and marching with the sole hope that their
comrades cf the Army Of the Potomac would
come 10 their aid, as they had gone forward 70
aid thcn? How many thousands Of these gal
liant men iic dead on bloody fields, because they
were left 70 get Ont Of their scrape
40 LACK or TRANSPORTATION.
1t is pitifGI to continue this subject further,
but perhaps it may be rs wei to dispose Of Nc
Clellan's equally insiDcere excuses concerning
want OF transportation. The following tele-
gram Of Gen. Halleck very edectualiy disposes
Of them:
WAR DEPARTMENT.
NaSII1N5ToH~ Aug. %. lsi2 $50 2. n.
am by no means satisfied s., itL Gen. Franiziris
march q yesterday, Consd dcring the circuI1-
stances % -iie c.se be very wrong ia stopping
81 AnuaDcaie- Moreover learned last night that
the G aa- minister's Department coa!d have given
hi1 plel.ty @ transportation i he hsd applied for
ii any time since hs arrival at Alexandria lie
knew the importance of Ol]eulng communication
with Gen P9I1es army, and should haye acted
lsisaeal Il. y HAL1EcK.
Genersl-in-Chief
Naj.-Geu. MCCLELLAN Alexandria
But IL addition L. tbis Gen. Mcclellan actually
knew, Uhea be was assigning want Of trans
pOrtati0n as IN excuse for not moving Frank
lin. that there was public transportation AZ his
command. aad yet be did not use il when the
fate Of . essaPaign, i not Of an army, depended
upon his doing 50.
CAH-P MAR AEEzA AEDEIA Aur 81. 1852 1870 a. m
llAJ.-1Ey. HzLLECIZ. GEHEnAL-I,-CH Your
Telegram q 2 rn received. Ever since Gen.
Franklin received notice that he was to march
from Alexandra be las been endeavoring 10 get
trans soflii,lsi traD ile q SeuarterHlser a, A4eDan-
dra, hui he a= b=e uniformly told THAI i.aere WAS
none di=isgsst5e-
Every rzcrt has been made 10 carry out
your orders promptly The great difficulty seems
10 consist IN ti-z.g L5lat The greater part u trans
uoriaiion ou il.aL at AleyatItr5a and Washington
has been needed for c2rTeat supplies Of the garri-
sons. SIcl D. ttc lstc ~ the case - repre.euted
20 me 10y ;e a.i eT~ and u appears TO De
true. take = f5T ssA7iei that this has not been
Lsisuedl CEoEeE 2. MCCLELLAN.
MajOr-Geucral.
AFRAID 70 Flz,'TCIE WITH ELHyE-E TH0UsASD
-IEE.
It is clear that be thought or affected 70 think
that Is Was better that the army under ny
command sa0ull be defeated if not DESTROYED
thsp hat the gaFris0Hs around Alexandria ard
Washington should be subjected 10 the slightest
Inconvenience. il the Iaidst Of al the pre-
tended apprehension s50cs EraEklin's danger
IN mcEiug - the frout, Iaulss Wagon-train
actually passed Franklin - 4 cane il from the
fed where 1rauKlla was = 70. Much Of the
news trl4Eiin sent - Mcclellan was prob
Ably oflIge1 frcl1 tlss tram, which, il seems
was able = come i.oa the front with safety
ever road gi.ch Mcclellan vas afraid that
franklin sheu-G venture ca wirh II 600 aen.
Hee9 Egt proceed further iu this sorry re-
Cltai. All TIC s0.ces ia and about Alexandria
were Withheld f9r four DAYS from the support
Of my array fighting Lees whole force IN front
q Cente1Tilie y saea grouadiess and trivial
excuse - these.
As 10 the amDunitioa, Gen. Mcclellan saws
IN lbs Telegram from Fort Monroe of the 2Ist,
1852 p, m-- have ample supplies Of am
ElulltlGr tgr infantry and artillery. and viii
have itlP u time can slgpiy any deficiency
that Uay eZlsf ~ Gen. PJgc's army Bat
HLcH efelrs5 t0selE it forward lie replied from
AleEauaE-a: ? kne@ nothing ofthe calibeE CT
fOpcs artillery. All I eaa % is 10 direct nay
ordlance 9.-car 70 Load Z p al the wagons scat
70 him. Sent ~ 8l9zas IL need not BE said
that be coal2 easily have folud ont from lie
Ordnance Department what artillery had
This narration Cf what Gen. Mcclellan did
Is neCe al y .lucl abrilged bul i is practi-
caig has aEa 5-GE-. ard 1f 4 confirms the state
Inc-t iU Als report tla. after nay arrival at
AilEaHl.i4 7 i1t nothing ID gly power uHd5ne
70 iOrHaI1 re-llo-eeasl4tz and supplies 10
Gcn- Pore tE1re S u5 zagre 70 BE- sid, ezceBt
pefnaps- tat d tAls Tel5 rsally al lie could DO
. ls very gata.tu1o-e. 81 every rieEg, that some
o1e else Dad agt been charged with this work
Durlug ilese tArse days. 9th, 25tb and z8th
ci Angus. sEs-t Jg t.aUlzi5u ia marching ErOg
AlcEaadr-a D. AuH2ld.lle SIX milesJ. over
brad iarnpiEc Uu0g5trgg q bv aug obsEacle
Lee marched l-s hole a-sav, cxc-ut Jackson's
Corp iEs.4 Waterloo BRIDGE on the RaBna-
hanuacE, - lie ciEcu.t5ua route of salem aud
Waite ls.1.us. forced tle passage q Thorough
fare Cap. a13 c2n4g On ihe field of Crogeton
fsecoHd .8A Ram where. ca the afternoon ef
tie 25tli-tae talrG aay-Be fought a severe
battle aita t-le troops Ulider nay command
lie distance lhus marched 5y Lees army. iu
the face 81 2 EEatcllui enemy. gas nearly 40
miles. and % fae tl3rd lay oi This march he
fought also ssreEg battle at Gr0vct0n.
Tie movements o. Lees large army and Of
fT2nEill.s Corps during the same thrce DAYS
o. August lc5z, present s contrast 50 violent
g. 10 require 80 comment whatever.
What success could be expected over an act
i've cneflr Wita amy help likely 70 bc given
bT 50 taTC and .lcLfLst 4 friesfG Is r4ot -ss,- "a