The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1888-02-09

MDE%ZEEN take the opinion of
Ess<=55seey<&S Gen. Lee. He says in
~ Z&ssz~E-e5 his report " 1T was de-
o. [@>-z%)3 termiued to make the
L4<21 49, principal attack on the
-LzzzAaNk5- enemy's left and en-
T'''>'' - 1zsIS deavOr to gain a po-
eifion from which it was thought our artll-
lery could be brought to bear with effect.
In front Of Gen. Longstreet the enemy held
9 position from which, If be could be driven,
II was thought our army could be used to
advantage IN assailing the more elevated
ground beyond" I suppose need hardly say
that this was the position Of Sickles. He states
his plan of battle to be as follows: "Dongstreet
was directed to place the divisions Of McLaws
and Hood TO the right of his line, partially en-
Veloping the enemy's left, which he was to
drive in. Gen. Hill was to threaten the ene-
my's center TO prevent reinforcements being
drawn to either wing and cooperate with his
night division In Longstreet's attack" inns
was Anders0n's Division, which on that day
rendered such efficient service. " Gen. Ewell
WAS instructed TO make simultaneous demon
Etrati0u on the enemy's right, TO be converted
into a real attack should opportunity offer"
Speaking Of his reasons for ordering the at
tack on the third day, and pluming himself
upon his apparent success In securing the COW
eted position, he SAYS: The result OF this
DAYS 1.-THE second operations induced the be-
lief that with proper concert OF action, and
with the increased support that the position
gained on the right would enable the artillery
60 render the assaulting columns, we should
ultimately succeed. 1t was accordingly deter
mined to continue the attack" Further on he
SAYS: "a careful examination of the ground
secured by LoBgstreet, and his batteries placed
IN positions which il was believed would enable
them 10 silence those of the enemy" Such was
Lees estimate Of the value Of this position.
Gen Taylor SAYS: Lee believed that Meade
would fortify his right and direct most Of his
attention to that point and that he Lee would
then, when LOngstreet was all up, attack on
Ee2de's left. Make the main attack fall on the
enemy's left"
Gen Hill states: 1.-THE corps of Gen. Long
street McI1aws's and Hoods DivisioDs) was on
my right, on line nearly at right angles 10
mine. Gen. Longstreet was TO attack the left
flank Of the enemy and sweep down his line,
and ! was directed TO cooperate with hin" "
Gen. A. A. Long, of Lees staff, says: On
reaching Hills position about sunrise Of the
second day, discovered that there had been
considerable accessions to the enemys force On
Cemetery Hill during the night; but it was
CHIEFLY MAssED TO his RIGHT,
leaving most of his center and almost his entire
left autographed" Continuing in his report he
speaks Of comforting with Col. Walker, who
was assisting in placing Lees forces in position,
and says: When calling the attention Of Col.
Walker 70 the importance Of occupying ridge
gpringing obliquely 70 the right of Hills posi-
ton, and extending in a direct line toward
Round Top" This was Sickles's position from
the Peach Orchard to the left, before described.
Going on further he SAYS: "On arriving at the
point where left Walker few hours before
the ridge to which his attention had been
called in the morning was still unoccupied
but as the ground was TO be the position OF
LOugstreet's Corps, and as the withdrawal Of
troops FOR its occupation from the corps already
IN position would change the order of battle
and might produce disastrous consequences by
precipitating the attack before the arrival Of
Longstreet's troops its occupation was there
fore delayed until the occurrence Of that event
Ii was now about 10 O'Clock, and the Federsli
had considerably increased in numbers and ex
tended their left" This was our CORPS taking
Its FIRST position. Proceeding he says: "Whil,
waiting a Federal Sergeant was captured
who was found on examination to belong TO 9
division which had taken up position in the
Peach Orchard al the further end Of the ridge
before mentioned Tt was now apparent thai
the advantage OF position had been lost BIZ de-
lay, and the enemy had been permitted to con
centrate greater part Of his forces. The at
tack was delayed til o'clock in the afternoon
when, after desperate fighting, q position wa
gained which few hours before could have
been occupied without blow" Yes, and IL b,
had waited another half hour Meade would
have given il TO him at the same price; g.
upon his tardy examination Of Sickles's line be
expressed his decided disspproval of It. aud
would have moved him back 20 his original
position had not the battle just then opened.
Gen. Lougstreet IN bis report states: NJ
orders from Gen. Lee were to
EEvELOP THE EEEAF's LEFr
and begin the attack there, following up a
nearly as possible the direction Of the Emmitts
burg road on the enemy's left. was orderet
70 move with the part Of my command tina
was then UP and endeavor 10 gain the Emmitts
burg road" But fearing he was too weak I.
attack he delayed till AlcLaWs's Brigade, which
had been on picket. should arrive. All thes
movements were to be made and position
taken unknown 20 Meade, who was 20 be hood
Winkeo by the demonstration on his right
LOngstreet, continuing, says: +" A delay Of sew
era hours occurred IN the march Of the troops
The cause Of this delay was that we had beef
ordered By Gen. Lee 10 proceed cautiously up0l
the forward movement SO as 70 avoid beint
seen by the enemy. Engineers sent out by tn
Commanding General and myself guided rs b.
road which would have completely disclose.
the move, and some delay occurred in seekin
more concealed route"
Gen. Wilcox says: Wilcox's Brigade reach
&c the woods in which MeI.aws subseuuentl
formed without being seen, but the coilisio
that took place lthe fight with oursharpshoot
ers, before alluded to- made the presence {
the COnfcderstes in il known 10 the enemy
and IL may have been this knowledge tia
caused Sckles 10 advance his line so as TO res
his right along the Emmittsburg pike"
Gen. Hood says: The instructions I II
ceiVed were 10 place nv division across tn
Emmittsburg road form line Of battle, and al
tack" he states that he sent out scouts
reconnoiter our position and received the II
port that their Lourl line rested upon Roun
Top Mountain; that the country was opeI
and that could march through an open WOOD
land pasture around Round Top and assau
the enemy in flank and rear; that their WACO
trains were parked in rear OF their line. an
were badly exposed TO an attack in that dire
ton" Gen. Siekles states that by somebody
blunccT cur cavalry was removed from the le
nauk, and that there was none there on ii
I'd. Hood, continuing, states that he ser
twice and then went himself 10 ask Loni
streets permission to be allowed TO make tn
movement and turn our position, but eac
time was met with the reply, Gen. Lees o
oers arc TO attack up the Enmittsburg road
LongstEcet himself says that he urged Lee
let hlm attempt some such movement RS thi
but was refused. OF course he was. Lee WI
TOO wise General to permit il. II would Ia,
been madness 10 attempt a flank moYemeI
around our lines with the troops Of the Thil
Corps occupying the position they did. Noy
suppose they had not been there; would Il
movements Of the enemy have been observe