Wessington Springs herald. (Wessington Springs, Aurora County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1891, 1888-10-12

view the principal ones of these los
op n.rtunities.
No three men were ever made more
unlike by nature, each to the other
than George b. Mcclellan, George G.
Made, aud Joseph Hooker. They
were all soldiers by education and train
ing, all loyal and patriotic and each
no doubt intended to do his very best
Yet each missed an opportunity, and
the two former missed two OF them, to
end the war in triumph; or at least to
put it in condition where it must have
been speedily ended.
Between the battle of Fair Oaks aud
the beginning of the Seven Days battle,
it was so plain to the Confederates that
the Union army might march in and
occupy Richmond that they trembled
at the prospect. ] have seen an auto
graph letter from General Joe John
ston, written in 1863 in which he ex-
plicitly states this. And the situation
was we'll known to Mcclellan; but he
doubted, hesitated-and the time
passed.
At Antietam it was plain to the men
in the ranks at sunset that the enemy
was whipped, and that general adj
vance with the reserve thrown in would
drive the enemy into the Potomac, or
compel their surrender. All the Con-
federate writer's agree upon this point.
1t was golden opportunity which Nc
Clellan was never to have again.
The situation at Gettysburg upon the
repulse of Pickett's Division was so
plain that all saw it--all but the Com
manding General There was gap
half mile long IN the hostile lines;
the grand, final effort of the enemy had
met with disastrous repulse; it was the
moment to throw everything forward
in charge that must have been sue
cessful Our army was weary, spent,
cut up-true, but not so badly as the
opposing one. Confederate Generals
grasped the situation and trembled for
the consequences that would follow
counter-attacll. Union Generals saw
it, and urged General Meade to adj
vance everything. He would not. The
prize was permitted to slip away.
| Again, few days later, at Williams
port, on the Potomac, the shattered
army Of Northern Virginia was COM
PEELED to wait days for the water to
subside, that they might cross. An
other battle here should have been
risked. A battle would have been re-
quircd 10 overcome and rout the enemy: :
but there is not reasonable doubt
that such a result would have followed.
Again Meade hesitated, called O coun-
Gil of war-and finally permitted the
enemy to slip away
No such opportunities ever came
again to the Union cause.
Both General Mcclellan and Gen
eral Meade seem to have been OPP
pressed with the weight of their respon-
sibilities. They dared not take small
risk to secure great gain.
Suppose Hooker, at Charlottesville,
had continued his march a few hours
longer, getting out OF the woods, where
he could use his immense army against
the enemy's inferior force; who shall
say that he would not have ended the
war i'll Virginia then and there? What
fatal hesitation and indecision made
him halt there in the woods? It is one
of the mysteries of the war.
Suppose that Lee had assaulted
Cemetery Hill at the close of the first
days fight? Suppose he had not as
saulted it on the third day, but had
fianked it, and compelled Meade to
fight minus that strong position?
Suppose our little Monitor had been
delayed q day getting into the Hamp-
} ton Roads? Suppose the news had
} gone to Europe at that early stage OF
the war that the Confederate NIerrimac
} had sunk and destroyed all our frigates
} and shipping in the Roads, assembled
the Potomac, bombarded Washington
} and put the Government to fight?
All this came uncomfortably near hap.
pening.
There was some good generalship,
there was an immense amount of splen
did fighting during the war; but il
, often looks to us as though we "blun
J dered through. Chicago Ledger.
/