The Dickinson press. (Dickinson, Stark County, D.T. [i.e. N.D.]) 1883-1927, 1888-07-14

GEN. REYNOLDS STATUE, PHILADELPHIA.
mcnts of the Union army, that was in tho
field to watch and oppose him Until it was
too late Lee rushed headlong northward on
Pennsylvania soil, wholly unaware that his
antagonist was moving vigorously in the
same direction to intercept his columns.
Blinded 10y want of knowledge in this re-
spect, he marched his widely scattered corps
into northern territory dangerous distance.
Here, OH hostile soil, believing himself safe
from pursuit, he divided his troops into three
bodies, and allowed them To become removed
from each other by more than !; day S march.
When Lee was abandoning central Vir-
ginia to move north, the Union forces lay
OIL the Rappahannock line, facing southwark.
and threatening to push OH to Richmond: ::
and as the Confederates sped their way to-
ward Philadelphia and Harrisburg, they
hoped that Hooker woul,lreinain there, Lees
skilful lieutenants keeping up the appear
ance of having a southern force in that vi
cinity in order to dclude tho Union COM
mander as to the real situation. But acci-
dent enabled Hooker to foil Lee in his calcu-
lations. BY means of lucky captures of dis
patches and incidental cavalry skirmislcs,
Hooker gained accurate knowledge that the
main part of the Confederate army had not
tnly vanished from his front, but had left
Virginia, and was actually approaching the
very gates of great northern cities
On receipt of this unexpected but timely
Intelligence the whole Army of the Potomac
turned northward in pursuit, Just as the IN
radcr was prepared to seize his first prize,
Harrisburg: and, had it not been for the
knowledge thus accidentally obtained Lee
Would have been enabled to strike heavy
blow before anything could have reached him
in the way of an opposing force.
1t was through accident also that the Con-
fclcrate leader found himself in this ci.lol..
gnncy, without any swift moving cavalry to
bring reports of Honker's threatening opera
tions i'll his rear to his headquarters. and
when the situation became suddenly revealed
to him through a chance scout, there was no
flying column at his command to fall upon
the advance of the different Union corps as
they marched toward him by several distinct
routes. For a leader like Lee this wa; an
unusual circumstance.
y few squadrons of troopers with their
horse batteries drawn up on each road might
have harasscd the Union infantry and
obstructcl their progress considerably. But
the Army Of the Potomac transferred to the
leadership Of Meade, as it entered Pennsyl-
vania June 2S moved OH freely and conf
IDENTIFY into territory practically under the
control of Lees hostile bands. Meade did
not encounter much as cavalry picket,
and this accident of having no Confed-
crate cavalry i'll thc way explains how it
happened that when Lee, who had had so
man! days the lead of his opponent, had got
ten his scattered corps into conjunction to
meet the foe he saw sprnging so lightly
across his tlack-thc foe he had so carefully
arranged to mislead and rctard, this foe
was actually in his presence, in line, ready
for combat.
OF the actual battle field events ut Gettvs-
burg there are series of strange things to
relate. During these three days. of the
warmcst portion of the year, the unusual
heat was very much mitigatctl by light
breezes, the sun being frequently veiled by
the clouds: Yet not a drop of rain fell till the
afternoon of the 4th. Sevcnty-si dces.
marked the extreme heat the first day, 81
degs. the I'd, 81 degs. the 3D. The average
for the three entire days was II degs. Had
the rain, which fell from the 4th to the 9Th.
come on the I'd. the roads would have been
impossible. the forced marches of the Union
soldiers could not have Leen made. and the
slopes of the ridges on the field would have
them difficult, if not impossible. Had it not
rained OH the night Of the 18th of June, 1915,
the future Of Europe would have been
changed. a few hours of water, more or less,
prostrated Napoleon at Waterloo: storm
on the lst or I'd Of July, 1868, might have
been fatal to Meade's army and to the Union
Again the commanding general of the
Union advance, Reynolds, vino had selected
ka io1I MAJ In fl,a MIA to ffcr,f fha
opening battle, fell mortally wounded in the
first hour of conflict, and of the four gen
erals-Eowargl, Hancock, Sickles and Slo-
cum-who next made their appearance on the
scene, it so happened that the last one to arrive
was superior III authority to the ones preced-
ing. and by virtue of his rank assumed COM
mand. So there was no permanent director
OF affairs until after desperate battle lad
been lest. nn army crushed and good ground
abandoned. y greater misfortune still. Of
more vital consequence than oil, was the fact
that the proper Union commander, Meade,
reached the front more than twelve hours too
late. Gen. Reynolds was killed on the morn
ing of July |. and Gen Meade did not reach
the lines of Reynolds defeated troops until
after midnight. On the other hand, it
proved circumstance favorable to the
Union cause that chain of natural fortiti-
cations existed at Gettysburg. consisting of a
high ridge, terminating at either end in rock
bound crests, well sheltered by woods. This
ridge guarded two roads leading from the
south. the Baltimore pike and the Washing
ton road, whilei it commanded aMots.er WASH
inst"n road, all three roads being routes of
march for the Union army northwarl. This
strong position was secured, the different
corps commanders marching in in obedience
to orders, but by very narrow margin.
TO Offset this Union advantage the Confed-