The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-01-16
A CHAPTER OF WAR HISTOR Y
Lincoln's War Secretary Reveals His
Secret Thoughts to an Old Friend.
His Willingness to Sacrifice Himself for His
Countrywide Quarrel with Mcclellan,
aad the Part Mr.. Lincoln Took IN Ii.

afternoon publishes communication addressed
by the late Edwin NJ. Stanton while acting as
Secretary Of War under President Lincoln, to
his personal friend and confdant, the Rev. Her.
man Dyer 1t is beyond question the mostEm-
portant contribution thus far made to the ltera-
turs Of the great controversy growing out OF the
rernoval Of General Mcclellan from the
command of the Army of the Potomac The
letter is as follows:
Private and Coufdential.l
WAsHINGToN, May 8. 1862.
NJ Rear Friend-Yours of the 10th is welcomed
a. an evidence of the continued regard of one
whose esteem 1 have always been anxious to
possess. / have been very well aware of the
caIumnies busily circulated against me in New
York and elsewhere respecting my relations to
General Mcclellan, but am compelled from pub
lie consid erations TO withhold the proofs that
would stamp the falsehood OF the accusations
and the base motives of the accusePs, who be-
long to two classes FirSt-plunderers. who have
been driven from tha department where they
were gorgiug millions. Second-scheming poll
ticians whose designs ara endangered by an
earnest, resolute, uncompromising prosecution
of this war against rebellion and traitors. A
brief statement of facts. and which can make
to you confdentlay will be sufficient to satisfy
yourself that your confidence in me has not
been MISPLACED.
When / entered the Cabinet I was and for
months had been the sincere and devoted friend
OF General Mcclellan, and to support him and
30 far as l might aid and assist him in bringing
the war to q close was a chief inducement for
me to sacrifice my personal happiness to a sense
Of public duty. / had studied him earnestly,
with anxious desire TO study the military and
patriotic virtue that might save the country,
and If 10 any degree dissaDointed.I hoped on and
waited for the time to develop. L went into the
Cabinet the Goth of January. On the 9th
the President made this war order No. i. rsquir-
ing the Army of the Potomic to move. 1t is
not necessary, or perhaps proper to state all tho
causes which led to that order, but 1t Is enough
TO know that the government was on the verge
or bankruptcy, and at the rate OF expenditure
the armies must move or the government per-
sh. The 22d of February was the day hxed for
the movement, and when it arrived there was
no more sign of movement on the Potomac
Than there had been for three months before:
Many, very many, earnest conversations held
with General Mcclellan, to impress him with
the absolute necessity Of active operations, or
that the government would fall be cause OF for
eign intervention and enormous debt. Between
the 22d OF February and the 9Th of March the
President had again interfered, and move
ment on Winchester and to clear the blockade
of the Potomac was promised, commenced, and
abandoned. The circumstances cannot at pres
ent be revealed. On the 9th day of March the
President again interfered. ordered the Army of
the Potomac to be organized into army corps.
and that operations should commence lmmedl-
ately.
Two lines of operation were opened First
One directly moving on the enemy at Manas-
and forcing him back on Richmond, beating
End destroying him by superior force, and at the
same time keeping the capital secure by being
between it and the enemy. This was the plan
favored by the President.
Second-The other plan was to transfer troops
by water to some point on the lower Chesapeake
md thence advance on Richmond This
General McClellan's plan. The President re-
luctantly yielded his own views, salrhough they
men in the country, and consented that the
General should pursue his OVID plan.
But, by written .e order ne IN
army should NOT be moved without leaving suf
ficient force in and around Washington to make
the capital perfectly secure against all danger.
and that the force required should be determined
by the judgment OF all the commanders of the
army corps. In order to enable Gen. Mcclellan
to devote his whole energy to the movement OF
his whole army, which was quite enough Ito tax
the ability OF the ablest commander in the world,
he was relieved from the charge OF the other
military departments, it being supposed that
their respective commanders were competent TO
direct operations in their own departments To
enable Gen. Mcclellan to transport his force
every means and power of the government was
placed at his disposal and unsparinglv used.
When a part of his force had been transferred
to Fortress Monroe. and the whole of it about to
80 in a few days, information was given to me
by various persons that there was great rea-
son for fear; that no adequate force had been
left to defend the capital IN case OF a sudden
attack; that the enemy might detach large
impossible for General Mcclellan TO render any
assistance Serious alarm was expressed by
many persons and many warnings given me,
which could not neglect. ordered report of
the force left to defend Washington. It
ported by the commander to be less than 1000
raw recruits, with not single organized brigade.
A dash like that made q short time before at
Winchester wonld at any time take the capi-
tai of the Nation. The report of the force
left to defend Washington, and the order Of the
President were referred by me to General
Hitchcock and Adjutant-genera Thomas to re-
port: First. whether the Presidents orders had
been complied with; second, whether the forcs
left to defend the city was sufficient. They
reported in the negative on both sides. These
reports were submitted to the President, who
also consulted General Tottenham, General Tay-
1Nw Mate md Rip1ax Thay
agreed in the opinion that the capital was not
safe. The President then, by & written order,
directed me to retain one of the army corps for
the defense of Washington, either Summers or
McDowell's. AS part of Summers corps had
already embarked, / directed Mcdowell to
main with his command, and the reasons were
approved by the President
Down to this period there had never been
shadow Of difference between General McClel-
Ian and myself. II is true that l thought his
plan of operations Objectionable thu most
pensive the most hazardous and most protract-
ed that could have been chosen. but was not
military man, and while he was in command
would not interfere with his plan. and gave him
every aid to execute it. But when the case as
sumed the form it had done by his disregard of
the Presidents order, and by leaving the CAPT
tai exposed to seizure by the enemy, / was
bound to act even if I had not been required by
The specific written order of the President. VIII
any man question that such was my dutyl
When this order was commu nicated to Gener-
nj Mcclellan. 1t of course provoked his wrath.
and the wrath of his friends directed on me
because was the agent of its execution. II the
force had goneforward as he had designed, I
believe that Washington would this day be in
the hands of the rebels. Down to this point,
moreover there was never the slightest differ
ence between the President and myself But
the friends OF General Mcclellan induced the
President TO modify his order 20 the extent
that Frauklin's division, being part of Mellow
ellis corps, which had been retained, was sent
forward by boat to General Mcclellan. This
was against my judgment because l thought
the whole of Mcdowell should be kent
together, and sent forward by laud on the
shortest route to Richmond, thus aiding
Mcclellan, but at the same time covering and
protecting Washington by keeping between it
and the enemy In this opinion Maior-general
Hitchcock, General Meigs and Adiutans-general
Thomas agreed, but the President was so anx-
ious that Gen. Mcclellan should have cause
or complaint that he ordered the force TO be-
sent by water although that route was then
by the Merrlmac yielded my opin-
Dr. I'd hrtk ha we him