The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-02-29
THE WRIT DENIED.
methods.


preme Court, yesterday denied the applica-
ton for writ of error in the Coy -Bernhamer
case. His opinion, published in the journal
this morning. will be read with interest by
all who have followed the case through it's
successive stages 1t is an able and exhaust
i've review of the legal aspects of the case,
and will doubtless stand as final declaration
of the law on the questions involved. tire
views every question presented by the al
legged errors, and overrules every point raised
by the defendants counsel 1t is evident
Justice Harlan intended to make bis opinion
final. AT the outset he stated that the record
being now before him he should consider the
alleged grounds of error as fully as if the writ
were granted. He might have denied the
writ in much less time and briefer language,
but he chose to discuss the alleged grounds of
error seri atm and to indicate what his decis-
ion would be If the writ were granted. The
the present application, but practically SO on
all the legal points that could be raised by
any flu ture proceeding
The question of Jurisdiction was first dis
cussed, and this involved an inquiry as to
whether the offense charged in the indictment
was an offense against the United States. On
this point the opinion is especially clear,
strong and impressive. Justice Harlan has
one Of those great legal minds, grounded in
common sense and justice as well as learned
in the law, that does cot stick in the bark but
goes to the heart of things. Before his simple
language and plain exposition of the law the
sophistries of counsel disappeared like mist
before the sun. The labored argument that
the indictment did not charge an offense cog
nizable under the act of Congress or in that
court crumbled to pieces under the appli-
cation of his common sense construction of
the law. At this point he was very impress
i've as to the object of the law, and the power
Of the United States to protect the purity of
the ballot in elections where Congressman are
chosen. The United States did not take
supreme control of these electious, but it
adopted the State laws on the sub
ject, and said in effect whatever
duty the State law requires to be
performed in an election where Congressman
are to be chosen is duty to the United States,
and a violation of any provision of State law
in that behalf is a crime against the United
States cognizable in its courts. Thus, Justice
Harlan found no difficulty in taking jurisdic-
ton under both Sections SSH and 5512 of
for defendants had contended for verbal
construction that would wrest each section
from its context and ignore the spirit and
object of the law. The court reminded them
that the act of Congress was one to preserve
the purity of elections and must be construed
whole and so as to give effect to all its
provisions. This was the substance of his
opinion on this point, stated in language that
was clear and simple, but very conclusive.
It made the question of jurisdiction plain. and
was an impressive assertion of the right of
the United States to punish crimes against
the elective franchise.
Another particularly strong passage was
where the Judge referred to the construction
of defendants counsel that penal statutes
must be construed strictly. He said Justice
Marshall had been quoted on this point, but
he added, not quoted in full He then stated
what Justice Marshall did say. to the effect
that while penal statutes must be strictly con-
strucd according to their meaning, they must
not be so construed as to destroy their mean
ing .1n short, !" said Justice Harlan, 1.-THE
rule of law on this subject is rule OF COM
mon sense. While we are not to resort to any
device or trick in the construction of penal
statutes to convict a defendant. neither are
we to use any device or trick of construction
to acquit. We must construe the law accord
ing to its manifest intent and natural mean
ing We give the substance of the Judges
remarks, perhaps not his words. His brief
treatment of this topic left nothing remain
ing of all that able counsel had said.
The alleged grounds of error were taken up
in order 1t was evident that the court
regarded some of them as little less than
frivolous, but each one accorded all the
merit that belonged to it, and then was gently
but firmly brushed aside. The Judges man.
ner gave the impression that he could over
rule much stronger points just as easily, but as
these little ones were raised they must be
decided. Some of them were so trivial that it
seemed like employing trip-hammer to crush
pea, or training heavy ordinance on
mosquito. but they were disposed of in regular
order On one or two the court fortified
its opinion with some authorities, but for the
most part it was content to inform defend
ants counsel, with the greatest possible
Judicial courtesy, that there nothing in
them-in the alleged errors, we mean.
A gratifying feature Of the opinion is its
very distinct and emphatic approval of every
position and ruling of Judge Woods, and