Rock Island daily Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1886-1893, 1888-09-24
MILITARY TACTICS.
THE CHANGED CONDITIONS OF MOD
ERN FIELD WARFARE.

ERN FIELD WARFARE.
Individual Independence, Strategy and
Open Order Front in Battle Required
by the New Weapons - The Line OF
Battle-But Little Maneuvering.
When weapons We're not so formidable or
deadly We depended on the united action and
constant cooperation of large, compact masses
Of men moving as q unit, seeking to crush
the enemy by their very weight, and giving
to each other that moral support which re-
suits from companionship in danger. But |
new weapons will require less attention to |
the discipline of the masses and a more per- |
feet discipline for each individual soldier, |
who must rely more upon himself and regard |
his weapon rather than his companions as |
his best and surest defense as well as the |
means by which he may contribute most to |
the defeat of the enemy. He must look less |
to the support of his friends and more to his |
own individual movements and to tho judi
cious expenditure of his ammunition. He |
must be taught with more care to take cover,
pies of strategy, while exhibiting the same
personal bravery as in times past
The experience of the United States army
on the plains in the numerous Indian wars
has been of the most practical and trying
kind and peculiarly applicable to modern
| tactics There are no more willy strategists
than the Indians. Their tactics have always
been characterized by great personal shrewd-
ness, wariness and strategy. In them indi-
viduality is developed TO the fullest extent
| Their movements are quick and free from all
stiffness, while they are celebrated for their
ambuscades and ruses, their great endurance,
| accurate craftsmanship and the habits of
taking cover and securing every possible ad-
vantage for personal safety with great brav-
cry at the same time All these principles
and peculiarities of Indian warfare with
open order fighting find practical application
| in modern tactics, and the army officers who
have fought this foe for many years, learn
ing all their tricks and checkmating them at
their own game, are well equipped with
ideas that may well be embodied in our new
system.
A foreign officer who was sent to witness
the grand review of our armies in Washing
| ton at the close of the civil war and report
thereon, declared to his sovereign that he bad
never seen an army so remarkable for moral
discipline" In this he referred to the great
intelligence of the rant and file-the ind-
vidual discipline and independence. Many
| foreign officers were inclined to critlcise the
peculiarities Of our soldiers-their freedom
of action, which the foreigner thought too
mobhke. But the bravery they displayed,
the terrible loss of life inflicted and the dress
parade precision in masses which they would
exhibit whenever it was applicable only
proved the tendency to select the methods
best suited to the circumstances and the ma
ture of the case, to the ground and the pecu-
. liar country in which they fought They
were simply practical, and precision of move
nent was not always possible nor desirable.
But today clocklike movements of masses
under fire are not permissible, and it follows
that the qualities for which our soldiers were
criticised in 1865, as well as those for which
they were praised, will be the ones most to
be cultivated in the future. In short, the in
dividual intelligence and independence of our
, soldiers would increase their efficiency under
the changed conditions of warfare, and
diminish greatly the advantage possessed by
foreign armies due alone to their perfection
and perrnanency of organization rather than
to the superior intelligence or strategic abil-
itv of their officers and men.
The general principles which will govern
the new tactics are pretty well understood.
On former days the skirInish line was thrown
out, under cover of which the troC IS were
deploved and formed in two ranks for battle
the skirmishers being then withdrawn or re-
placed by the compact line All this will
J. now be changed, and means will be provided
by which troops in any formation may he
quickly deployed in three lines for battle
: The first line, composed of from one-third tc
one-half of each battalion, will be thrown
| forward rs WAS the old skirmish line, to opeT
the battle, followed at a distance of severa
hundred yards by Il supporting line of about
one-third of each battalion, while the re
naming force will be held several hundred
yards in rear of the supporting line, masset
and under cover il possible, ready to be de
ploved when most needed to cover a retreat
to meet or to make turning movement, o
to Join the main body in the final rush Tn
men in each of the three lines will be assignee
to small groups, each with its leader, who's
movements and directions they are to follow
Individual freedom will therefore be permit
groups be kept intact as far as possible, RAJ
lying or deploying, advancing or retreatin
together, thus insuring control by the officer
through the group leaders of non-commis
stoned officers.
The first or firing line will seldom be witt
drawn or received under fire, but will ger
orally remain and fight to the finish, bein
/ REINFORCED by the two lines in the rear. An
Al. e.. L.,
r. large quantities as possible and husbande
with care The new small caliber, hig
powered rifles now being adopted by foreig
powers will enable the men to carry man
more rounds of ball cartridge than formerly
and, although the smaller and lighter hulle
will not kill so often or produce such ugl
wounds, their increased velocity and greats
range and accuracy will make up somewha
and the number of wounded will be il
creased Wounded men embarrass the NOV
ments of an army more than the dead, an
in short campaigns cripple it more effec
ually. Men from the supporting line will
gradually thrown forward into the firir
line to take advantage of any weakness
- the enemy or to meet a heavy attack, tt
men always attaching themselves to Il
10 groups as they come up. Whole groups fro
the supports will frequently be thrown in
the intervals in the firing line.
There will be little maneuvering under Il
ls deadly fire of modern arms; the lines will
ire able to do little more than advance or I
OF treat, rally by groups to fire volleys, or
rec carry some point of advantage by rus
geo The reserves will be depended on to me
"' emergencies. Flank attacks and turnil
movements will be the rule, and stratel
NO must be practiced more in the future than
md the past, or at least it will have still great
as influence in determining the result of bait
The supports will finally become merged
!. the firing line, giving by their impetus a fc
ward movement to the whole line or enabli
~ it to Withstand the enemy. There will tn
be constant push from the rear under. t
direction of the officers. One side will even
= ually give way, and the time will come VIII
,,r the victors must make a united rush in
more or less compact body or in line
groups.-New York Times
In Chill the paper money is so depreciat
hat h.,f..l Al oh