The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1888-02-12
In THE CAMPS OF EUROPE.
oERAEANy's ENORMOUS STRENGTH
ON THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER.
Comparative Strength Of the Armies
Superior Strategical Position of Aus
tria and Germany--Active Prepare
tions Tor Hostiiities.

Washington Correspondence Of the New York Tlib
unc.
AT the request OF the correspondent Of
the Tribune, Mr. Augustus C. Buell., civil
engineer OF this city, furnishes sketch Of
the existing condition Of the Russian army
and its facilities for mobilization upon the
western frontier. Mr.. Buell. returned from
Russia last summer, after spending some
time there in an enterprise which brought
him into contact with engineers Of the inn
pcrial general staff; and having had mill
tary training and experience himself dur
ing the rebellion his observations arc OF in.
terest.
"Without going into tedious detail OF
the organization Of the Russian army"
said Mr.. Buell., sit may be promised that
the active forcein European Russia, which
would he available for immediate mobili-
sation, consists first OF the Imperial guard
aud the corps OF grcnadiers; second, nine
corps d'armee Of troops of the line OF all
arms and third the cossacks Of the Don.
The guard and the grcnndicrs have their
Headquarters at ~. Petersburg, MS does
also the First army corps. The Second
corps is at wilma. The Third corps IL at
Riga. The Sixth corps Is at Warsaw. The
Eighth corps Is at Moscow. The Ninth
corps is at Razan. The Fourth, Fifth and
Seventh corps are respectively in the
Crimea, In Bcssambia Ton the Roumanan
fronticr) and in Nolhyma Ton the Galiciun
froniicr) The strength of the guards and
grenAdicn is calculated 10 he 10000, but il
is not probable that they could take the
field on short notice with more than 10000
chcctives. The strength Of Russian
army corps Is calculated Ia be about IO, 900
of all arms and is organization shows n
somewhat larger proportion Of cavalry and
n smaller proportion III artillery than Is
usual in the armies ~ western
Europe. The force Of hon CoSsacks. which
could be instantly modified for service ON
the western frontier, is calculated 10 bc
10000. In addition to these forces, pro.
yidcd Turkey remained neutral, another
complete army corps could be- made up
from the army Of the Caucasus and brought
into European Russia either by marching
over the mountains to Niadikaykass or in
transports across the Black sea from Batoum
90 Odessa. NV observation WIS that the
army corps arr kept pretty well mp TO the
paper standard IN numbers. The troops
are furloughed good deal when quiet pro.
walls but they seldom or never desert and
can all be recalled To the colors inside Of a
week. Without doubt every one Of
the nine corps In European Russia could
take the field with an effective force OF at
least $4,000. In the event Of war with
Austria aud Germany. the Second corps nj
wilma, the Sixth at Warsaw, and the Sew
enth at Kew might be- considcrcdas within
Immediate striking distance OF the frontier,
and two Of them could be massed ut any
point Of concentration by rail from Wiz
ballen on the north 10 Woloczysk on the
south.
as agains, a combination Of Germany
and Austria, Russian Poland presents the
aspect of huge salient; having no flank
ing positions Of defense; which must be-
defended upon diyerging lines; which may
be attacked by convcuging forces Mt two or
more points; which can only bc reinforced
and provisional from the proper rear, and
In which but little attention has been paid
10 the construction of railways 10 short
and handy cross-lincs oi rar communica-
ton ON the part Of a defensive force. On
the other hand the German railways on
The north and west faces and the Austrian
lines on the south face Of this salient skirt
~ almost entirely within easy marching
distance, while the Russian railroads all
approach il ut right angles, none Of them
skiriing II, ut least not within distances
that would be- deemed practical for par.
allel movements Of troops designed to hold
In check nm invasion oi uncertain object
i've. The sum VI tls. matter Is, In view Of
the respective railway systems OF Russia On
the one hand and Germany aud Austria
ON the other, that the latter possesses
maximum ot avenues OF attack and may
select any one oi n dozen available points
al concentration Tor assault on icini. ~ the
case may he, while the former must opcr.
ate from q single basc, iar In the rear
tWanawl, and upon lines Attending the
minimum Of facility for rapid and easy
conccntraiioi,Spon any given point.
''Thc gcnvl staff has an elaborate thco.
pstical plan OF mobilization by nail, hut Il
has never been tried except In the Turkish
War ten years ago, when the railway sys.
TEN Of Russia Was much lees extensive
than II l. now. Tie experience Of that
war could not ~ tar toward demonstrating
the possibilities OF q conflict with Germany
and Austria, In Poland. A. 10 supplies
and material oi wal, Russia i fall Of them.
Der resources In rrnin, meat, clothing.
horses, arms and munitions arr incNhausii.
HE, and her principal hascs ior the collcc.
ton Of stores am FAR inland. beyond the
reach Of the most daring invader. The
country Immediately bordering ON Ger.
many anil Austria u the poorest and least
produciiyepart 81 the empire In the same
latitude. There would hc no possibility III
large invading iorrc liyingon the country
for any considerable time.
"lndCr these circumstances celebrity
would bc everything IN the Germans anu
Aus,rians. Their facilities Of momliza.
ton, at least thuso oi the Germans. arr too
well known 10 require analysis here. An
officer nl the lrussinn general staff, Won
kchwahach, told me that tie four Gcrmnn
army coJe NJ konigshcw Brombcrg.
foscn and Br,slan, could he concentrated
o. skicmicwicz junction, In the heart o
Poland, aud only siNiy-ihrcc vcr.ts lay
forty-iiyc niles, from Warsaw, bciup
either the Russian army cons NJ n
L-kTT-urg Moscow or Riga could rein
force that place. The Aus,rians, hc said
would bc slower, Int nd least three Austrian
corps could hc within supporting distance
Of the German advance before the Rus
sians could reach the ground In any con
siderable inrp. II NON S,hNahacl h cor
rect, aud there u every reason 10 suppoa
that he h, such movement ~ Il,
intimaied must result In the i'm
mediate capture Of Warsaw, bccau-
the four coris ol which he spoke monl
nj lcast 10000 muskcts with proportional
cavalry and artillery, while The garrison
Of Warsaw aud other Polish towns con
"A a.