The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-02-19
CHAMPIONS HILL.


felt deeply interested in reading General
McGinnis's review of the battle of Champions
Hill and all the more so because only short
time before had read in General Grants Mem
oirs his views regarding it. The conclusions
arrived at by these two generals as TO the mis-
takes made and the disobedience of orders in
dulced in on the part of corps or division COM
manders are SO radically different that I re-
read the accounts of both generals, as well as
perused General Grants and General Sherman's
Memoirs in order to obtain more light on the
subject of General Netherlands standing as n
commander and military officer
General McGinnis, in his review, says that
General Grant, upon his arrival on the battle
ground, determined to make no mistake and
directed General Hovey to wait until McCler-
nand with his division of the Thirteenth Corps,
could be communicated with; that at II:3O A.
NJ McClernand, having reported to Grant; was
ordered by Grant to attack the enemy IN force
if opportunity offered; that McClernand did not
receive the order until P. NJ, when Ito use his
own wordsl he gave orders, ito attack the enemy
vigorously and press victory" that, although
General Hovey's and General Loean's divisions
had been engaged in desperate and bloody con-
fct for nearly two hours is plain hearing OF that
part of the army under Generals Osterhaus,
Carr. Smith and Blair, those generals just
named had remained practically idle in disobe-
dience of Netherlands orders
General McGlnniS exclaims: what excuse
for not attacking vigorously and pressing TO
vctory?" Later on in his review General Mo-
Ginnis throws all the blame for this inactivity
upon Generals Osterhaus, Carr and Smith, and
reports General McClernand saying that
Osterhaus would doubt have been court
martialed for disobedience of orders il the battle
had been lost
Before recording General Grants views re-
-
McGinnis if McClernand really gave said order
Ito attack vigorously and press victory" to
said Osterhaus. Carr and Smith. If said officers.
in plain view of the enemy, and knowing that
Hovey and Logan were sorsly pressed, DISC
beyed said order and failed to engage the enemy,
why did not McCleruand then and there relieve
and place them under arrest and either assume
the command himself place other officers in
commando Is it not more rational to believe
that no such order was ever given by McClern-
and, and that Osterhaus. Carr and Smith would
have been liable to be court martia1ed had they
acted without orderSs
But what docs General Grant say concerning
the arrangement of this battle3 On page 5l3 OF
his Memoirs, he writes
McClernand was in person the middle road and
had shorter distance to march to reach the enemys
position than Mcpherson. 1 sent him word by staff
officer to push forward and attack. These orders
were repeated several times without apparently OK
pediting McClernauds advance.
Again. pages SIS and $40 of Grants Memoirs
we read:
The battle of CHAMPIONS Hill lasted about four
hours hard fighting, preceded by two three hours
of hing of which almost rose to the dig
nifty of battle Every man of Hoveys division and of
McPherson's two divisions engaged during the
at all except that described as before Osterhauss
and A j. Smiths divisions had encountered the rebel
advanced pickets early half past z Their posi-
tons were admirable for advancing upon the enemys
line McClernand. with two divisions, was within
few miles of the battlefield long before noon and in
easy hearing. him repeated orders by staff officers
fully competent to explain to him the situation These
directed him to push forward; but he did not come
It is true in front of McClernand there small
force of the enemy and posted in good position behind
ravine obstructing the advance but If he had moved
to the right, by the road my staff officers had fol-
been off. Instead of this he sent orders Hovey.
who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right
the time. To obey the order he would have had to
pull out from the front of the and march back
as far McClernand had to advance TO get into bat
tie, and substantially the rround OF
did not permit Hovey to obey the order Of
his imme date superior.
me that McC1ernand, more than anybody else,
is to blame for the large loss of killed and
wounded in Generals Hovey's and Logan's d.
visions. Had the battle been lost, have
doubt General Grant would have relieved and
court msirtialed him then and there. General.
Grant generously shoulders all the blame for the
ultimate escape OF Penn berton's army, in these
words found on page SIT of his Memoirs:
Up to this time had kept my position near Hovey,
noon moved with part Of nv staff by our right
around, until came up with Logan himself. found
him the road leading down to Baker creek. he
was actually command of the only road over which
the enemy could retreat Hovey, reinforced by two
enemy's left. Croker. with brgades, covering
their left flank McClernand two hours before had
%e s ante
Smiths were confronting the rebel right. Ransom.
teenth corps McPherson's) had the river at
Grand Gulf a few days before and coming upon
had cut off the retreat of the inst at this
iuncture messenger came from Hovey, asking for
ben ave an order to move McPherson n
the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the
rebel line of retreat which was soon taken advantage
Of by the enemy.
Upon careful perusal of General Grants
Memoirs it will be found that Grant did not
have overconfdence in the ability OF
of his command in front of Vicksburg
Tor publishing order in Northern
napers containing statements relative TO achieves
ments of his own corps. not founded on facts
General Sherman, on pages 327 and 1923. Vol I.
IF his memoirs, pronounces the statements
made by McClernand in said order as untrue"
On page 430. Vol /, of Grants Memoirs he
says of McClernand regarding his fitness to take
command of army of 20, 900 men to move
IN Vicksburg:
AS stated. my object in sending Sherman back was
expedited by desire to get him in command of the
forces separated my direct supervision. feared
hat delay might bring McClernand who his sen.
or, and who had authority from the President and
Secretary of War to exercise that particular
nand-and independently doubted McClernands
1CneSS;
sailing him was by giving offense to those
whose authority to command was above both him and
ne.
On page 44O, Vol. I, of General Grants Mem
,irs find:
Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post
md the capture of the garrison McClernand returned
With entire force Napoleon at the mouth of the
Arkansas river. From here | received messages
rom both Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to
and take charge in person, and expressing their
strust of Netherlands ability and fitness for SO i'm
,ortant and intricate expedition.
On next page of same volume ind Grant
20 10 planning of MeClernand because of conduct
on characterization, which conducs
3rans overlooked for the good of the service,
because McClernand belonged to a political par
y which furnished all the opposition there was
% vigorous prosecution of the war for saving
he Union. EwALD OVER.
Wanted the Christians Converted.
Jewish Messenger.