New-York tribune., 1888-03-25
A GREAT HISTORY.
KINGLAKRs LAST VOLUME

NJ ia
Of Pessisrs Com mand - the Death o. Lero h~k'sA'
12ne. PIP. 234 Harper Brothera
The reader who has followed MI hingiske
through his elaborate and admirably written history
of that part of the Crimean war which closed
with the death Of Lord Raglan. may ~ times have
waved tmpatient with the authors impcrturoable
and lesurely progress, may have protested mental
ly against the proportions given 10 details; ouS
he can hardly lay down the last volume OF the
work without regretting that the scheme had nos
embraced the entire period of the war. For
though In this age Of steam and electricity the
incentives to haste are so manifold that even In
literature there is tendency to resent tho methods
which ignore economy of time he must indeed be
deficient In taste and Judgment who docs not nnd
q peculiar pleasure In the unhurried manner OF
Mr. Kinglake, In his cautious deliberate and
thorough research and analysis, and In the COM
bined beauty and forcs Of bis style. This style
flexible. vigorous and compact, gives charm TO
the historians work which Is alone sufficient for Its
justification The quality Of his performance,
however, is first rate In other respects and brief
as Is the period covered By his narrative II would
be difficult to Hnd in all literature . more graphic
trustworthy and comprehensive picture Of space
of time, short indeed when measured BY the
calendar, yet packed full Of dramatic and I'M
portant action
The concluding volume Of the history carries
us only from the assumption Of the command OF
the French armies by Pelisser to the death OF
Lord Raglan. In that time the Russian counter
approaches were stormed and carried: the once
baflled Kertchine expedition was renewed and
pushed easily to full success; and that strange
overcasting Of Pelissier's mind occurred, during
which he committed the costly blundsr of assault
Ing the Russian works without first reducing their
fire by vigorous bombardment. Mr.. Kinglake ex-
plains the French commanders strange lapse Of
military Judgment by the theory that his perpetual
struggle with the meddling policy Of Louis Napo-
leon had so rritated the fiery old general as FOR
some days to cloud his intelligence. The explana-
ton is peculiar and may seem improbable. Judged
by his actions, Pelssier the least sensitive OF
men. For months he showed himself capable OF
defying-almost of scornfully defying-his master
according to the law. The mos, direct and positive
orders Of Napoleon ignored by him. Not
only this, but be proceeded deliberately and con-
tinuously to carry forward the policy which he
had been repeatedly prohibited from undertaking' !
and even when in the pursuit Of bis own course
he encountered serious reverses he nevertheless ad-
hered with grim resolution to his plans But II
it may be said that Mr.. Kinglake's theory of
Pelissier's mistakes Of the 7th June fails to ex-
plain those mistakes it must be admitted that no
toward q solution of the mystery. ALI that 10 clear
is that during eight days as Mr. Klnglske points
out, the French commanders hand appeared TO
have lost its cunning, and that while tho palsy
lasted he did strange and deplorabie things
1t may, however, be noted, though the historian
does not remark IT, that Peissier's natural
tendency to cruelty. hideously proved by his
Algerian career counted for much in that sudden
change Of plan which doomed the French and
English troops to expose their lives hopelessly and
uselessly in the attempt to traverse open spaces
IN front of hostile works pouring out, from groat
guns and small arms, Q very fire Of hell" No
man not callous to human suffering, indifferent to
loss Of human life, could have given the order
which, in compelling this lavish waste OF blood,
dciied the soundest maXiIns Of scientific warfare.
II had been agreed over night between the allied
commanders that at break Of day on the 18th
June the siege batteries should ply the Russian
works as furiouslJ possible for two hours, tho
purpose being to break down and destroy tho
aefences which had been repaired during the
dark hours. When the Russian works had thus
been resenced and ruined, the assault by the
troops was to have been delivered, and had this
arrangement been kept to. Sebastopol might have
fallen that day. But through the operation OF
some distracting influence Pelissief was moved to
change his plans on the evo Of action: to do so
without giving Lord Raglan an opportunity of
protest; and to make the change one fatal to the
success of the movement. What he did was to
omit the preliminary bombardment; the result
being that when the troops emerged In the open
they were confronted by forts the ample efficiency
of which had been restored during the night, and
which, in addition to their normal and tremendous
artillery fire. added the searching volleys OF great
masses Of infantry. No troops could win their
way through the circle of fire that surrounded the
Russian works, in fact but this truth was only
ascertained through the reckless sacrifice OF
thousands of lives.
Mr. Kinglake thinks that Lord Raglan was
justified in submitting to Pessier's wanton and
reckless change Of plan, because 1t was necessary
TO keep on good terms with the French commander,
and because his undisciplned temper made 1t
impossible, at such moments, to reason with him,
or TO oppose him at all without risking violent
rupture. On the other hand, 1t seems possible
that firm representation Of the consequences OF
attacking forts which had been put In thorough
state of defence might have recalled
the self-willed Frenchman to reason; i;
and that bad he refused to listen
TO his colleague, the responsibility for any sub
sequent estrangement would have rested on him;
while fearful waste of precious lives would have
been prevented. Had Todlcbcn not been wounded so
opportunely for the Allies, it Is indeed easily
credible that the results of Pelissiers blunder
would have been more farreaching and calamitous
than they were; but with the removal Of the great
engineer from the scene the energy and ability Of
the defence slackencd together and there was no
longer any master mind at hand to take instant
advantage of whatever errors the bcsiegers might
commit.
The sudden death of Lord kaglan was a neavy
and, under existing circumstances, an irreparable
blow 10 the British army. There was no other
English commander who could deal with Pclissicr.
Raglan gone the Frenchman simply took his own
way in everything and the position Of the English
forces became far less dignifcd and influential
All that however is beyond the scope Of Mr.
Kinglakes work, which ends at this critical
inncfnrc II is nndnnhfedlv q remarlah hlA achieye