Wichita eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1886-1890, 1888-09-13
MILITARY TACTICS.
THE CHANGED CONDITIONS OF MOD
ERIN FIELD WARFARE.

ERN FIELD WARFARE.
Individual Independence, Strategy and
Open Order Front In Baltic Required
by the New Weapons - The Line OF
Battle-But Little 3Ianeuverins.
When weapons were not SO formidable or
deadly we depended on the united action and
constant operation of large, compact masses
Of men moving as a unit, seeking to crush
the enemy by their very weight, and giving
to each other that moral support which re-
suits from companionship in danger. But
new weapons will require less attention to
the discipline Of the masses and q more per-
feet discipline for each individual soldier,
who must rely more upon himself and regard
his weapon rather than his companions as
his best and surest defense as well as the
means by which he may contribute most to
the defeat Of the enemy. He must look less
to the support of his friends and more to his
own individual movements and to the judi
cious expenditure of his ammunition. He
must be taught with more care to take cover,
W c'A' oAANS ny AuSAcS, W "a dSbASC VIC pf
piles of strategy, while exhibiting the Same
personal bravery as in times past.
The experience of the United States army
on the plains in the numerous Indian wars
has been Of the most practical and trying
kind and peculiarly applicable to modern
tactics. There are no more willy strategists
than the Indians. Their tactics have always
been characterized by great personal shrewd-
ness, wariness and strategy. In them indi-
viduality is developed to the fullest extent.
Their movements are quick and free from all
stiffness, while they are celebrated for their
ambuscades and ruses, their great endurance,
accurate craftsmanship and the habits Of
taking cover and securing every possible adj
vantage for personal safety, with great brav-
cry at the same time All these principles
and peculiarities Of Indian warfare with
open order fighting find practical application
in modern tactics, and the army officers who
have fought this foe for many years, learn
ing all their tricks and checkmating them at
their own game, are well equipped with
ideas that may well be embodied in our new
system.
A foreign officer who was sent to witness
the grand review of our armies in Washing
ton at the close Of the civil war and report
thereon, declared to his sovereign that he had
never seen an army so remarkable for 'Lnoral
discipline" In this he referred to the great
of the rank and fle-the indi-
vidual discipline and Independence. Many
foreign officers were inclined to criticise the
peculiarities Of our soldiers-their freedom
of action, which the foreigner thought too
mobilize But the bravery they displayed,
the terrible loss of life inflicted and the dress
parade precision in masses which they would
exhibit whenever it was applicable only
proved the tendency to select the methods
best suited to the circumstances and the ma
ture of the case, to the ground aud the pccu-
liar country in which they fought. They
were simply practical, and precision of move
1nent was not always possible nor desirable.
But today clocklike movements Of masses
under fire are not permissible. and it follows
that the qualities for which our soldiers were
in 1865, as well as those for which
they were praised, win be the ones most to
be cultivated in the future In short, the in
dividual intelligence and independence OF our
soldiers would increase their efficiency under
the changed conditions Of warfare, and
diminish greatly the advantage possessed by
foreign armies due alone 70 their perfection
and pernanency Of organization rather than
10 the superior intelligence or strategic abn- |
ity Of their officers and men.
The general principles which will govern
the new tactics are pretty well understood.
On former days the skirmish line was thrown /
put, under cover Of which the troops were I
1eployed and formed in two ranks for battle,
The skrmishers being then withdrawn or re-
placed by the compact line All this will 4
DOW be changed, and means win DO provided .
By which troops in any formation may be
quickly deployed In three lines for battle.
The FIRST line, composed Of from one-third to 4
Jne-half Of each battalion, viii be thrown /
forward, ss was tho Old skirr,ish line, to open
no battle, followed at distance Of several
hundred yards by a supporting Hne Of about
,ne-tbird Of each battalion, while the re-
naming force viii BE- heid several hundred
yards in rear Of the supporting lima massed
md under cover II possible, ready 20 be de-
loyed when most needed to cover q retreat,
o meet or to make turning movement, or
o Join the main body IN the final rush The
nen IN each Of the three lines VIII be assigned
o small groups eseh with its leader, whose
movements and oirscttoustheyars 20 fouo~.
freedom VIII therefore b per.uit-
"a VIA sAv eN]SD AAo&AAA~9eS01 s<AoS txSS
,roups be kept intact a. fAr - podbie, ral-
ying or dspaoying, advancing or sstreae1nx
oestAer, thus fnscring control By ne o!8cers
trough the group leaders Of non-conmis-
toned cheers
ThsArst or firing linz I'm seldom Be With
Irsvn orsreceised under A1e. but VIII cen-
rally remain and fight % tie f1ah, beine
e-eEforosd b. she twolnes n thssear. An
nunitsoa must therefore Be- carrfsd n, -
arge quantities a. possible and hasbanted
nth cara The new EnsH csHher, h.gh
covered r.fes nov bstng adopted BY foreign
o~Cy via enable ths men 70 carzJ many
aoee rounds Of bA0 cxr64egS than furoriy,
nd, although the xu,Aiiar and Nsses< hnllees
III 10. kal 20 often % protn1 Ech uSiy
rounds, their Increased vsooty and grass8
ange and accuracy SU xanks zp sc<.xvea4
nd the number Ct wounded Win b h.
renad. WOUNDED nm AahaGsu.s she mDvD
sns Of en- army nms shAn - desd, ed
. short czmpafgns oiYpe II moro elect
sly. Mao from The UPpossjne aoe vii -
sArcsFr forward Into fhe firing
Ne 20 taks sdvazsAeS q any vsaknsD a