The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-01-15

LOO mem Osterhaus, Carr and Smith could
have found the enemy knew just where he was.
in fact were under the sound OF bis guns from
the beginning to the close of the battle, could
and should have been vigorously engaged, out
were not Had they all moved forward
and pressed for victory" as ordered by NC
Clernand, there would have been no siege OF
Vicksburg
A very determined effort has been made to
hold General McClernand responsible for the
shortcomings of the three division commanders.
McClernand was a good soldier ambitious lt Is
true. but as brave ae ambitious, full of life ana
vigor tireless worker, very popular with his
command and having the in which ne
fought very much at heart It appears imposs-
ibie that he could have failed in the performance
of any duty required OF him, or in o6eylng any
order from his superior in command. 1t VIII
be remembered that during the siege
OF Vicksburg McClernand relieved
of the command of the Thirteenth Army
Corps After the corps sent to the Gulf de-
partment, McClernand was reinstated. came to
New Orleans and took command of the corps
while riding out with him to visit the camp of
one of the regiments of his command, the battle
of Champions Hill of the subjects OF
conversation l was free in the expression OF
my opinion that the Twelfth (Hoveys) Division
had been compelled to submit to great slaueh-
ter, and one that could have been avoided had
the other three divisions of his corps done their
duty. McClernand said in reply that there was
no reason why Osterhaus. especially, should not
have been as hotly and as closely engaged as
was Hovey, provided the enemy in the same
force was in his front; that he had sent him
(Osterhausl three positive orders to advance
and attack vigorously, but that Osterhaus mad
replied to every order that the enemy was In
such force in his front that ne could not adj
McClernand knew that this excuse was
d valid one. and that Osterhaus was held
back by strong skirmish line with two or three
pieces of artillery. 1 asked him why, under
such circumstances. Osterhaus was not at once
relieved of his command, placed IN arrest ana
court-martialed for disobedience of orders on
the field of battle His reply astonlshed me.
Because everything turned out favorably; had
the battle gone against us, =, Osterhaus would
that time colonel of the Sixsy-ninth
Indiana, of Osterhaus' division, has fire.
quently told me that, from the po-
the rebels Withdrawing troops from their
right, in front of Osterhaus. Carr and Smith, to
reinforce their left, and that in a short time the
whole rebel army appeared to be concentrated
against Hovey, Logan and Crocker; that he no
titled Osterhaus of the condition of affairs, and
begged him to advance and finally, when he be-
came convinced that he determined not to
order attack, he asked permission to advance
with his regiment alone for the purpose of af-
fording some relief to the three divisions that
were being so sore y pressed and that his re-
quest refused. His lieutenant colonel, Grin
Perry, fully corroborates General Bennett IN his
statement.
being actively engaged than Osterhaus, except
that they were a little further away when the
battle commenced and either of them could
have found the place where duty called them, in
much less than four hours. AS to A. j. Smith.
General Grant says in his memoirs that he was
the first to exchange shots with the enemy on
the morning of the 10th. AT about o'clock p
NJ. just as the rebels were being driven from the
field. the three divisions appear to have gotten
to the ground where they should have been
hours before. and where, If they had been, could
have assisted very materially. and no doubt sue
cessfully in cutting off Penn hertons retreat to
Vicksburg, and the probable capture OF his
F. " Greene, lieutenant Of engineers, u. S.
A, in his work on the Mississippi campaign, de-
scribes the situation completely uo-wit; The
rout of Pemberton complete But
if McClernand had acted with the ener-
gy shown by Mcpherson, and the three
division commanders with him. Logan
army would probably have been captured.
Hovey and Loean's divisions brought the
battle by an energetic attack, and when Penn
berton threw his whole force upon them the
three together bore the brunt of the battle. Nc
Clernand had four divisions. more than half of
the army, the middle and Raymond roads
Had he thrown his men in with the vigor dis
played by Hovey and Logan he would have
brushed aside the small force in front of him
and cut off the retreat by the Raymond road to
the ford, in the same manner that Logan cut off
the Clinton road to the bridge. Penn berton
would then have been confronted with superior
forces on three sides, and an impossible stream
on the fourth, and, in the demoraized condition
of his men that evening, he would have had no
option but to surrender"
l agree with him fully, except wherein he
holds McClernand responsible instead of his di-
vision commanders. They not only rallied to
assist in whipping and capturing Pemberton's
army, but permitted the rebel General Loring
to escape with 4, 900 men. If they had captured
him or driven him back. so that he would have
been corralled with the balance of Pemberton's
army. in Vicksbure, and finally captured, it
would have been something to their credit in
connection with Champion's Hill.
The official report of losses is as follows:
Logan 8 division Observation-Disclosures. 4O3
Crockers division Observation-Disclosures. 662
Osterhaus's division ITO