The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1888-04-24

within the statutory description the
omission of the word ''designedly" is
immaterial, because intent to defraud
implies design.
find in the statute of conspiracy an
other support to the first count-one of
the instances given in section l of the
statute, of what matters and things may
be objects of conspiracy is the following
''To cheat another by means of false
tokens and pretenses." Now the first
count clearly alleges a conspiracy to
cheat the Hawaiian Government of GER
tain of its revenues by false pretenses.
But it is argued by counsel for the de-
PENDANT that the word another" in the
statute of gross cheat may not be held
to apply to the Hawaiian Government
have no difficulty in holding that it
may so apply, under the authority of
chap. l, sec. 6, of the Penal Code. The
Hawaiian Government is representative
of the public or the nation, and the
words have about the same technical
character as the word "King" when
used as the plaintiff in public prosecu-
tons in this country, or the word ''Peo-
pie" as similarly used in the United
States of America.
further objection to the first count
is that the removal of the goods in ques-
ton without paying the duties that were
| due on them, was not cheating the Gov
eminent of it's revenues, as cheating by
our statute is obtaining something by
! false pretenses, ETC., whereas no reve-
nues were obtained from the Govern
ment, none having been collected by it.
1t seems to me that this is going out
side of the count, there being no allega-
| ton which informs the Court of the
manner in which it was intended to
carry out the cheat or whether the in
tention was to deprive the Government
| of revenues already in it's possession or
to prevent it from collecting revenues
due it.
A ground of demurrer is made against
the third count, in that it states that the
defendant conspired with A. B. Hayley
that the defendant should commit an
ofense, and counsel argue that a con-
spiracy of two, that one of them should
commit an offense is not within the
statute The fourth section of the statute
Of conspiracy recites that 1.-The act of
each party to conspiracy in pursuance
thereof is the act of ALL" which seems to
me to be a sufficient answer to that
point.
A further ground of objection against
the third count was that it should have
been alleged that the goods in question
were to have been unlawfully removed
but | find that the statute has been
closely followed in describing the Of
tense.
1t is further argued by counsel for de-
PENDANT that the statute in question is
only intended to refer to goods that have
been Struggled; but the statute is so
general in its statement that it admits
of very wide application, and it seems
to me that where parties are charged
with fraudulently and feloniously con-
spring to remove and deal with dutiable
goods upon which no duties were paid,
or were intended to be paid, there can
be no severity in constituting the law ac-
cording to its obvious meaning. The
exceptional cases referred to by counsel,
when dutiable goods may be legally re-
moved from the Custom House without
the payment of duties, are properly
grounds of defense, if such circumstances
exist.
The second count charges a conspir- |
acy to do what is obviously and directly |
wrongfully injurious to the Hawaiian
Government, in depriving it of certain
of its legal revenues, which are defined |
to be duties upon imported and dutiable |
goods.
1t is urged by defendants counsel that |
no offense is charged here, because it is /
not alleged that what was intended to |
be done was intended to be done wrong |
fully. The answer to this is, that the
statute does not require such allegation,
but sets forth that conspiracy is "ma-
licious or fraudulent combination" and
as the count charges fraudulent combi-
nation it is within the statute: more
over, the second count does not, it APP
pears to me, intend to charge con-
spiracy to commit an ofense, but con-
spiracy to do what is wrongfully injur-
ious to the Hawaiian Government, or as
has been above explained, to commit an
injury for which only a civil action
might lie. According to the latter part of
the statutory description of conspiracy,
the allegations bring the count within
the statute.
The latter part Of the second count is
objected to as vague and indefinite, not
showing whether a statutory offense is
meant, or whether it is merely carry