The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1888-01-21
THE PRumA EAoIE CLAUSE.
The Supreme Court construes 1t Ac-
cording to the Constitution and
Extracts all its Teeth in SO Doing.

In the case of State vs. one barrel of bran
dy, C. Fl. Guppy. claimant, which was tried
in the Superior Court of Cumberland county
the presiding judge on the trial instructed
the Jury, as matter of law, that the fact Of
payment of q United States liquor tax, IN
less explained, was conclusive evidence that
the person paying 1t was common seller of
intoxicating liquors. To this instruction, the
defendant excepted, and the case went to
the Supreme Court An opinion has just
been sent down. 1t was drawn by Judge
Walton. and is concurred in by Judges Pc
tiers, Virgin, Libby, Foster and haskell. The
following is the full text:
One of the provisions of the act of 1887,
chapter 140 (amendat0ry of the liquor law,
declares that payment of the United States
special tax as a liquor seller, shall be held 10
be prinld fdcie evidence that the one paying
the tax is a common seller OF intoxicating
liquors. What is the meaning of this pro
vision? Does it impose upon the Court the
duty of instructing the jury as matter OF
law. that proof of such payment will make
it their duty to find the defendant guilty,
whether they believe him to be so or notP 1t
is sufficient answer ito say that jury can
The right of trial by jury is guaranteed by
the Constitution. and it is not within the pro-
vince of the Legislature to enact law which
will destroy or materially impair the right
The very essence of trial by jury" is the
right of each juror to weigh the evidence for
himself, and in the exercise of his own rea-
soning faculties, determine whether or not
the facts involved in the issue are. proved.
And if this right is taken from the juror If
lie is not allowed to weigh the evidence for
himself-is not allowed to use his own rea-
soning faculties, but. on the contrary, is
obliged to accept the evidence at the weight
which others have affixed to it, and to return
and affirm verdict which he does not be-
lieye to be true, or of the truth of which he
has reasonable doubts-then, very clearly,
the substance, the very essence OF trial by
Jury" will be taken away, and its form only
will remain. And If the enactment under
consideration must be construed as having
this effect, then, very clearly, 1t is unc0nstl-
tutional and void.
But we do not think it is necessary so to
construe it. We have many similar statutes,
in some of which the words used are 'sprinlG
fdcie evidence" and in others the words are
that these phrases are intended to convey
the same idea. Thus, the possession OF
dead bird at certain seasons OF the year and
the possession of .mutilated uncooked lob
ster are declared to be prtna ldcte evidence
that the former was unlawfully killed and
that the latter was less than ten and half
inched long when taken; while the posses
sion of salmon less than nine inches IN
length, or of trout less than five inches In
length, is declared to De presanptsSSe evi-
provisions exist with respect to the posses
sion of the carcasses of moose and deer at
those seasons of the year when 1t is unlaw-
full to huut or kill them.
Can il be doubted that these provisions all
mean the same thingp We think not. And
we are not aware that either OF them has
ever been construed as making it obligatory
upon the jury to- find a defendant guilty,
whethether they believe him to be so or not:
They mean that such evidence is competent
and sufficient to justify jury in finding
defendant guilty, provided it does, in fact,
satisfy him of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, ard not otherwise. 1t would not be
just to the. Legislature to suppose
tended to make it obligatory upon the jury
to find defendant guilty, whether they be-
lieve him to be so or not. 1t is we'll settled
rule Of construction that, If statute is sus--
eeptible of two interpretations, and one OF
the interpretations will render the statute
unconstitutional and the other will not, the
latter should be adopted If it be thought
that these statutes, and especially the one
now under consideration, ii construed as
above indicated, add nothing to the weight
of such evidence, it will be well to remem-
Der that declaratory statutes are not uncom-
mon, and are not always useless. They
often serve to remove doubts and to give
certainty and stability to rule of law, which
1t did not before possess, ana tnat, 10 tnese
particulars, the act under consideration may
be regarded as wise and useful enactments
The ruling of the Justice of the Superior
Court not being in harmony with this inter-
probation of the statute, the exceptions must
be sustained and a new trial granted. But
the motion is not properly before us. Mo-
tions for new trials in criminal cases, tried
in either of the Superior Courts are to be
heard and finally determined by the justices
thereof. r. S., chap. n, sec. g. And, al
though this is proceeding against the liquor
case State vs. Robinson, 40 Maine, 285.
Exceptions sustained and new trial
granted.