New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1888-12-18
THE RAILROAD PROBLEM.

commissioner FINK ana MI Cndiie> Il IdhCiS
Adams, in discussing the railroad question,
seem to neglect one Of the first rules Of profit
able debate 1t is of no use to anybody to pro
pose methods which are obviously imprac-
ticable-which the majority of Representatives
in Congress are certain to reject. There is not
the least indication that Representatives are
more willing to legalize or to permit pooling
than they were when the Interstate Act was
framed. Public opinion in the Western and
Southern States is quite as hostile to these
combinations as it ever was. large majority
of members will represent and obey that hos
tile opinion.
1t might be Of more practical utility II dis
tinguished railroad men would carefully con-
slider why this hostile feeling exists, and in
what way if at all, it can be remedied. They
would probably find, if they should turn their
attention to that topic, that the root OF the
evil is the very want Of good faith and busi-
ness integrity which MIR. Adams pronounces
the chief cause of railway mismanagement.
individuals who do not act in good faith with
each other as individuals. who disregard the
rights of stockholders and the interests OF the
public in seeking their private advantage, can
not be transformed in character or motive by
combining together. Such persons will use
their combination for improper purposes. They
will reject all terms of agreement which take 1T
out of their power to plumber stockholders or
the public. The only agreements they will
consent to make are those through which that
power Is perpetuated or increased. Now ii
MIR. Adams is right, if the all-pervading evil is
want of honesty and fidelity in men intrusted
+bor &c toh Ia
that the combinations formed by such men
must be adverse to public interests, and to the
interests of stockholders as well.
MIR. Adams is responsible for this charge, but
it has been made by other railroad men before
him. The statements of these railroad men
and of Mr.. Adams are only too apt to be cred
tied by the public. For the management Of
railroad pools and combinations has not been
calculated, in all cases or even in most cases,
to establish public confidence in the integrity
and good faith of those who take part in them.
Their entire history, In most cases, has been
one of elimination and recrmination; OF COM
pacts openly made only to be secretly broken;
of stock jobbing schemes behind both agree
mentS and disagreementS, Of evasions charged,
evasions proved, oscillations, and new negotia-
tons carefully so shaped that the power to
evade and to deceive should not be taken away.
If the public believes what the railroad men
have been saying, and in many cases proving,
about each other is the public to blame? Mr..
Fink or Mr.. Adams can mention exceptional
cases in which agreements have been honestly
kept. and at the same time have been for the
public benefit But they can mention more
in which the agreements have been adverse to
public interest, and more in which the agree
ments have been made only TO be broken.
Mr.. Adams probably knows that combna-
ton could be formed, even under the law as it
now appears, which would practically take
from managers most Of their power to over
reach and deceive each other. II he chooses,
he can tell why combination Of that nature
does not meet the approval of many managers.
What good would it do in this state Of facts,
to alter the law? After all, the remedy as to
the railroad interest lies with stockholders and
bondholdeIs. They can select different set of
men whenever they choose. If they prefer
men who are SPECTATORS, instead of managers
who rigidly confne themselves to their trusts
which they faithfully discharge, no change of
law will help them. Nor will any change of
law which gives larger power of combination
and pooling to managers Of the Enthusiastically
sort prove of benefit to the public.