Milford chronicle., 1888-04-27
THE RUSSIAN BEAR.
iNFERIoRITY or THE MuscoWTE
As AN ALLY.


Military Point of View.
So much for France and her army; what
the Russian situationl 1t was not the Frencl
but our deplorable military administratio
that beat US in the Crimea, say the Russia
generals. And the scandals revealed durin
the Turco-Russian war of 1s77-s show tina
not much improvement in that quarter ha
been made in the q years which separat
Sebastopol from Plevna. The car is til
sworn enemy Of peculation and corruption
but, alone at the summit Of the bureau
cratic pyramid, Alexander cannot reac
the legions of flibusters who swarm
around its base. He may make example
of colonies and some Of generals, but abuse
continue in spite Of imperial efforts at thei
suppression. It was ascertained very re
Gently that in some Of the cavalry regiment
neither the men nor the horses received thei
proper rations; the guilty parties are medi
tating in the Oural over their misdemeanors
but there is no assurance and there can b
none that, with the same maladministration
the imperial troops viii not suffer from the
same shortcomings Of quartermasters and
commissaries that disgraeed the last cam
paign in Bulgaria. 1t is a woful pity, too
for otherwise Russia would be the first Of all
military powers. She has numbers and She
has quality; her infantry soldier is un-
equaled 10 the steadiness Of the German and
the dash of the Gaul he unites the sobriety Of
the Spaniard and the resignation Of the
Turk; he is enduring and he is ingenious;
and to these splendid footmen Russia can
add an indefatigable and innumerable cav
airy, her sotnias Of Cossacks, these centaurs
of the steppes which, like the hordes Of At
tia, can inundate the territory Of her enc
A. 1
marshy frontiers of European Russia are
less appropriate than is commonly imagined
to the movements and deployment of
mounted troops
RUssIA's EFERIoRIrY.
But Russian generals know not the value
Of their men. Many of them learned the
practice Of the art Of war in Bulgaria All
are educated officers, bold and brave Their
officers are confident, and inspire confidence,
and yet it must be admitted that neither
Russian generals, nor Russian officers, nor
the Russian staff possess the same cohesion,
tho same science or the same experience as
those OF Germany. And supposing them to
be their equals, snpposing an analogous unity
of command, there would still always exist a
double inferiority--that arising from de-
fective administration af1 defective or in
sufficient means Of concentration. This last
point given a general European war, is Of
capital Importance, especially for Russia's
eventual allies.
In France and in Germany the time neces-
sary for the mobilization of 1,00O 600 Of men
can be estimated to within four and twenty
hours In Russia that time is the unknown
quantity of the redoubtable problem, and
without that unknown quantity it is impos-
sible TO calculate the real value Of Russian
cooperation How many days may be re-
quired or how many weeks or even months;
how many hundred thousand soldiers can
be mustered in the first line, how many in
the second, how many in reserve, nobody can
answer, for nobody knows how to answer,
and only one thing is absolutely certain, and
this. the Russian newspapers confess, Rus
sia's mobilization must be incomparably and
vastly slower than that Of either Of her
neighbors. Nor could it be otherwise, with
distance infinitely greater, with railways
less numerous less well appointed and man
aged, Of which the majority have only a
single track, and very few have special plat |
forms for the enlbarkation and landing of
horses, troops and material These disad-
vantages cannot be contested, and they alone
are sufficient to explain why, in provision of |
events, the imperial government should have |
taken those precautions along tho frontiers |
which have so exercised the susceptibilities /
of Austria-Hungary
This undeniable inferiority of Russia is |
especially dangerous to her future allies. At |
home Russia is safe she may be invaded. as
she was by Charles VII and by Napoleon,
but Russa's invaders generally fare badly,
and to get out Of her vast territory is easier
than to get into it, and what would be the
fate of a western ally not prudent enough to
tion be entirely completedl True Russia's
enemies will scarcely allow her allies to select
their moment.
THE RISKS NOT EQUAL.
In a Franco-Russian alliance the risks are
not equally shered by both powers. Russia
can bide her time, but France must bear all
the brunt from the outset. The gain of the
first battle would bring the Germans into the
heart Of Champagne; with second victory
they might surge on to Paris, while the north
ern colossus would scarcely feel the blows
received by her provinces Of Lithuania,
Esthonia and Poland. Every invasion of
Russia has always ended in disaster to the
enemy; every invasion of France has been
successful Perhaps railways may have de-
prived Russia Of that invulnerability which
was secured to her in former days by dis
tances, and, perhaps, with railroad at his
disposal, Napoleon might not have been
forced to evacuate Moscow. But there is
about Russia which cannot be
seized upon. She is, as one might say, a
species Of inorganic being without either
heart or head at which a fatal blow could be
dealt. She is not possessed Of one capital OF
which the capture would conquer a peace,
and with her climate campaigns cannot be
indefinitely prolonged. Supposing the cars
81 L. IL 4 -
would be troubled IN cleaning the fruits of
his triumphs And to what point must an
enemy advance before he can force Russia
10 ask for termsl Russia has power Of re-
sistance resulting from her size and from her
structure, but this power of resistance can 1
not be communicated to her allies. Tho
car may continue his struggle on the banks {
of the Don and the VOlga for months after ]
any western ally has been obliged to cry
enough.
Spite of her millions Of soldiers Russia,s {
strength is, above all, defensive. Her adj
Vantages, which in the course Of another cen
.ury must make her the mistress Of Europe,
s In her mass, but in that mass, the cause Of
ler great superiority in the defense Of her
Ioil, is an obstacle to offense. And so it has &
leen proved by the last great war in which v
Russia took part, when three campaigns were q
leeded to crush the Turks in Armenia and Fl
WAAAllhaAA1 Aouubt uulleu france e.
md Russia, well commanded, could hold 6,
heir own against all the rest Of Europe; but !,
'race, by her situation, would be the most Il
exposed, because she is the most vulnerable. :.
She must face an enemy on every side, on u
very frontier, on sea and on land, in Europe II
nd IN Africa, and without any certainty is
hat her distant ally would have time or il
means to come to her assistance From a hi
Military point Of view, all the advantages of cl
Franco Russian alliance will be for Russia; =
u the dangers would be for France.-Paris = J.
,or. New York Times IL
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