The Emporia weekly news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1881-1889, 1888-06-14

made aware by their reports that Long
street and Hill were massing behind the for
est, he finally moved his whole line forward,
occupying Emmitsburg road with Humph-
rey's division as far to the left Is Sherfey's
Peach Orchard. His second division, Bir-
ney's, was placed at right angles with this,
its line extending southeast toward Little
Round Top. This was contrary to orders,
but it was plain than, and in the light Of
Southern Official records appears still palmer
now, that Lee was pushing Longstreet's
troops toward this same point at the same
time. Longstreet's critics, headed by Gen.
Pendleton and followed by Lees bicgraphef,
Gen. A. s. Long, Of Virginia, assume that
he, LOngstreet, acted contrary to orders in
that he did not get the high ground at the
Peach Orchard first. The Peach Orchard
was SickIes' salient. About 4 O'Clock, after
Meade had inspected what Sickles bad done
and resolved to hold on TO it, Longstreet
made the attack and fought until dark to
gain the salient. The first official criticism
on Sickles came from Gen Halleck, the
Union general in chief at Washington In
his official report he says that SickIes, mis-
interpreting Meade's orders in placing Ais
lines, committed ian error which nearly
proved fatal in the battle" Gen Meade did
not break the force of this censure by any
word of his, but stated in his report that tbs
Third corps sustained the shock Of q vigor.
Gus assault ''most heroically."
Now Gen. Sickles claims that his course,
by its very imprudence, saved the two
Round Tops to the Union cause, and through
them saved the battle. In his speech as the
reunion Of the Third corps at Gettysburg,
July, 1885, he said: 1.-THE best thing in my
line was the salient position, except the men
who held it. Whyl Because it meant fight,
fight right there and then Lines OF battle
are controlled by the contour Of the ground
where you must fight, unless you can force
your enemy to come and fight on ground
you choose. If had waited on the line
extending from the left OF the Second corps,
toward Round Top, q line effording no adj
vantage for defense and none for attack,
the enemy would have seized the Round
Tops without q blow, and the Round Tops
were the keys Of our position. The enemy
would have gained all the commanding
ridge in my front to the Emmitsburg road
for their artillery, the ground Gen Lee says
he wanted to occupy to enable him to assal
our left 1t is a cardinal maxim in war to
seize the enemy's vantage ground when yon
know he means to attack. By helping my
self to the ground he wanted, and covering the
Round Tops, held the enemy until the
Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth
corps, and until CaldwelIs division Of the
! Second corps could come into position on the
left I held the enemy until $1,000 men
were marshaled on our left flank, enough to
hold it and repulse the enemy's assault and
win the battle.
But my line was a salient, say the critics.
| So be it. The enemy found it to be a wedge,
| a bolt, a spear and a thrust" Gen. Long
street frankly admits that he did not favor
| an assault in force on Meade at any point.
he asserts that he advised Lee against assail-
| ing Meade, and at the same time he denies
that he wasted away any time, or was luke
warm, or lacking in true spirit. He claims,
| and others confirm this claim, that Lee was
| acting on the principle Of fighting Meade In
| detail, and that he Nongstreet) was maneuv-
| ering so as not to be beaten in detail himself.
| The delay caused by Sickles' watchfulnesl
and aggressive movements deferred the Con-
| federate attack some hours, and as Warf1eld
| Ridge was the first consideration, it cost the
| Confederates a bloody struggle to secure it.
| From here the salient at the Peach Orchard
was enfiladed on two sides at once and ulti
mately fell, while the effort made to get &c
the rear of it led to the discovery Of the un
protected condition OF the Round Tops, and
brought on a new phase Of the battle.