Wichita eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1886-1890, 1888-05-27

i-Oi u Lee lines rs ltltf StOOl tllc
night OF July l, when HIS corps and Long
streets, all but one division, had arrived.
1t was this elevation known as the Warfeld
Ridge, which 1t was necessary for Lee to &c
cupy in order to counterbalance the advant-
age that would accrue 10 Meade from the
possession of Round Top, so soon as he dis
covered 1t. All the morning Of the second
day, Wartield Ridge, Little Round Top, and
the EinmitSburg road remained unoccupied
by any force. Gen. SickIes says that he
could not have forestalled Lee on Warfield
Ridge, as he had not troops enough; that he
wrote Meade on the evening Of the first day,
and told him personally as soon as he saw
him-freQuently repeating the warning on the
morning of the second day-that the weak
point in Gettysburg was the Union left, the
ground here described, with its approaches
covered all the way from Lees main
camps. Sickles maintained a skirmish
line along Emmitsturg Ridge, sending
out Berdan's sharpshooters into the
woods beyond the Warfeld Ridge; and
made aware by their reports that Long
street and Hill were massing behind the for
est he finally moved MS whole line forward,
occupying diminishing road with Humph-
reys division as far to the left as Sherfey's
Peach Orchard. His second division, Bir-
ney's, was placed at right angles with this,
its line extending southeast toward Little
Round Top. This YVES, contrary to orders,
but it was plain then, and in the light of
Southern official records appears still palmer
now, that Lee was pushing Longstreets
troops toward this same point at the same
time. Longstreet's critics. headed by Gen.
Pendleton and followed by Lees biographer,
Gen. A. S. Long, of Virginia, assume that
that he did not get tie high ground at the
Peach Orchard first. The Peach Orchard
was Sickles' salient. About o'clock, after
Meade had inspected what Sickles had done
and resolved to hold on to it, Longstreet
made the attack and fought until dark TO
gain the salient The first official criticism
on Sickles came from Gen. Halleck, the
Union general in chief at Washington. In
his official report he says that Sickles, mis-
Meades orders in placing his
lines, committed ian error which nearly
proved fatal in the battle" Gen. Meade did
not break the force OF this censure by any
word of his, but stated III his report that the
Third corps sustained the shock Of vigor-
GUS assault 'most heroically."
Now Cen Sickles claims that his course,
by its very imprudence, saved the two
Round Tops to the Union cause, and through
them saved the battle. In his speech at the
reunion of the Third corps at Gettysburg,
July, 1856, he said: 1.-THE best thing in my
line was the salient position, except the men
who held it. Why's Because it meant fight,
fight right there and then. Lines of battle
are controlled by the contour of the ground
where you must fight unless you can force
your enemy TO come and fight on ground
you choose If | had waited on the line
from the left of the Second corps,
toward Round Top, a line atfording no adj
vantage for defense and none for attack,
the enemy would have seized the Round
Tops without a blow, and the Round Tops
We're the keys of our position. The enemy
would have gained all the commanding
ridge III my front to the Emmitsburg road
for their artillery, the ground Gen. Lee says
be wanted to occupy To enable him TO assaif
Our left 1t is a cardinal maxim in war to
seize the enemy's vantage ground when you
know be means to attack. By helping my
self to the ground he wanted, and covering the
Round Tops, held the enemy until the
Round Tops We're occupied by the Fifth
corps, and until Caldwelrs division of the
Second corps could come into position on the
left. l held the enemy until $1,000 men
were marshaled on our left flank enough to |
hold it and repalse the enemy's assault and |
win the battle.
But my line was q salient, say the critics !
So be it. The enemy found it to Re a wedge, |
q bolt, spear and a thrust" Gen. Long /
street frankly admits that he did not favor I
an assault in force on Meade at any point. !
He asserts that he advised Lee against assail- |
ing Meade, and at the same time he denies |
that he wasted away any time. or was luke /
warm, or lacking in true spirit. He claims, (
and others confirm This claim. that Lee was
acting on the principle of fighting Meade IN .
detail, and that he Gongstreet) was maneuv-
ering so as not to be beaten in detail himself. |
The delay caused by Sickles' watchfuIness
and aggressive movements deferred the Con-
ederate attack some hours, and as Wartield |
Ridge was the first consideration, it cost the
Jonfederates bloody Struggle to secure it.
From here the salient at the Peach Orchard
vas enhladed on two sides at once and ulti-
nately fell, while the effort made to get to
he rear Of 1t led to the discovery of the IN
protected condition OF the Round Tops and
brought on new phase OF the battle.