New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1888-03-07
TIE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

TIE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Secretary Bayard in his budget Of diplomatic
correspondence furnishes conclusive reasons for
the rejection of the treaty. He does this I'M
consciously and without premcditatIon. and for
that reason the proof is more valuable. The
correspondence shows that the Secretary un-
dcrstood the American case. 1t brings out
clearly two fundamental propositions first that
the Treaty of 1918 contained positive guar
antce of the historic rights Of the Americans
10 the dccp-sea fisheries and, with certain
reservations, to the inshore Gshcrlcs and,
second, that the remuneration of fishing rights
within the threc-milc belt did not affect the
commercial privileges which were conferred
by subsequent international action. These
points were urged by the Secretary with incisivc
ygor In his correspondence with the BRUSH
Foreign Office. He demonstrated that the in
hbitory features Of the Treaty OF 1918 are
exhausted when tho taking, drying and curing
of fish are prevented in certain waters, and that
commercial facilities could not with reason be
denied to American fishermen in decp-sca opera
lions. lie even proposed joint commission
to be appointed for the purpose of awarding
damages for illegal seizures and Outrages on
tho Canadian seaboard. No American could
have asked more than this The Secretary S
presentation of the subject in his earliest pro-
posals for new treaty was admirable for in
tclligenco and completeness. He was not igno-
rant of the inherent strength Of the American
case; vet when the Commissioners assembled
In Washington he abandoned the main prin-
cpes for which he had been contending. His
own letters and dispatches relieve him OF tho
suspicion of being too dull to understand the
questions of American rights involved in the
controversy, and convict him of having delib-
crately surrendered his case hen he negotiated
The treaty.
Apologists Of the State Department have
urred that treaty must invariably be COM
promise, since neither Of the contestants will
be willing to make complete surrender. This
was what Secretary Bayard was willing to do
This was an instance in which there could be
no hope Of satisfactory compromise. The
Canadians wanted at the outset free market
for fish, and subsequently commercial reel
procity. The Americans demanded their COM
mercial rights and wparation for past outragcs.
Secretary Bayard could not grant the free mar
ket, and consequently could not expect tho
British Government, as Mr.. Trescot has said
to accept his construction of The Treaty of 1918
modified by the arrangement OF 1880. 1t was
not a case where a fair compromise was possible,
and for this reason the negotiation of the treaty
ought never to have been attempted. Secretary
Bayard entered the council chamber with his
construction Of the Treaty Of 1918 as his whole
stock in trade, and he left it with the principles
for which he had been contcnding formally
abandoned in the XVIII Article.
One can easily fancy Mr.. Chamberlain and
his astutc associates splitting hairs for weeks
over small points of trivial Importance and,
making brave show of resisting the Secretary
in matters relating to delimitation of waters
and Interpretation of the treaty privilege Of
obtaining shelter, repairs, wood and water
They were willing to beguilc poor Mr.. Bayard
into the innocent concet that he was wrestling
from them important concessions; and when
they had satisfied him that no had won most of
his points and that they had been most con-
ciliatory. they cooIly embodied the American
case-the very principles for which he had been
contcnding in his correspondence-in the XVIII
clause and held it in pawn for what they really
wanted-the free market. This seems to be n
reasonable explanation Of the recent diplomatic
farce.