The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-01-15


hearing of Osterhaus. Carr, Smith and Blairs d.
Visions and in plain view of hundreds, if not
thousands, of officers and men of those com
mands, who were looking on and discussing the
chances of Hovey and Logan being whipped.
What excuse could there have been for not
fighting under such circumstances, even without
ordersf What excuse for not attacking .'vigor,
ously and pressing to victory" Soon after III
O'Clock Logan's Division arrived, and promptly
deployed on the right of Hovey, and then
Grant. having every reason to believe that Nc
Clernaud was ready, and occupying the same
relative position to the enemy did Hovey and
Logan, and that the attack would be simultane-
Gus by at least five divisions ordered an advance
along the whole line. From the time the enemy
was discovered in position, to the order of Grant
TO attack, was about two hours. The position
occupied by the enemy was on and to the rear
of the brow of a hill, which was seventy-hve or
one hundred feet above the plain below his
movements were hidden from our view by the
heavy woods which covered tho hillside. whist
all our movements could be observed by them
Whilst our dispositions were being made the
enemy had not been idle. They had been Draw
ing troops from their right to their LETT nanK,
evidently hoping to crush Logan and Hovey. get
to our rear and join Johnston. That movement
was in accordance with Johnstons orders, ana
was the movement Pemberton lad been enoeas-
oring to execute from the first, wnen the plan
deranged by Grants success at Jackson,
and the rapid concentration of q considerable
portion of his army. which was now 1n MS front
and threatening him at Champions Hill
The draft of troops from PembertOnS right
left the enemy very weak at the point where
McClernand should have been with his three
other divisions, and Blairs of the f1fteentn corps
Opposite our left there was but little more than
a vigorous skirmish line, which held them oack
for hours whilst the conflict ragged along the line
or Logan and Hovey'S divisions. and In plain
view of Osterhaus, who was next On the left or
the Twelveth Division. About IL o'clock Gen-
eral Grant gave orders to force the nght doveys
and Logans divisions advanced simultaneously
The Twelfth had moved forward about 800
yards meeting with little resistance, when, sud
denly. two batteries of four and one of three
Nltnxro Flor wnll nf
The division went to the ground as one man,
and remained there until a knowledge was OBJ
tanned of the location of the guns, and nature OF
the ground between the opposing lines; after
brief halt another advance ordered. The
division moved forward in excellent order with
bayonets fixed. When within seventy five yards
of the batteries every gun again opened. and
again the divisions went down. AS soon as the
shower had passed over. the order was Civ en- to
charge, and the division rushed for
ward. So sudden and apparently unex-
pected was the movement that after short,
sharp, hand to hand conflict, the batteries were
in our possession and the whole supporting rebel
force was in rapid retreat. portion OF the capt
ured batteries we're hauled off by hand, and the
remainder were spiked. Eleven guns were capt
ured by Hovey's Division In this charge -Four
of them were taken by the Eleventh Indiana,
Colonel Macauley. and the Twenty Wis
consin, Colonel Gill, three by the Forty-sixth
Indiana, Colonel Bringhurst, and four by the
Twenty fourth Iowa, Colonel Bynam. Soon
after the rebel rspulse, their reinforcements
from the right. which should have been held by
the divisions of Osterhaus, Carr. and Smith, be-
gan to appear heavily before Hovey, and were
concentrated against the lines of Hovey and Lo-
gan. The enemy had been driven six or seven
hundred yards to the rear of their first position,
and here occurred one of the most obstinate and
bloody conflicts of the war. For over one hour
each side took it's turn at driving and being
driven. Seeing that were largely outnum-
bered, and likely to be overwhelmed by the
large rebel renforcements arriving. the writer
who was In command of the First Brigade, sent
messengers to General Hovey asking for assist
ance, and at the same time ordering the capt
ured artillery to be hauled back by hand.
Having driven the enemy before us, captured
their artillery and fought over the same ground
three different times, having been engaged In q
continuous conflict for three hours. our amunl-
ton nearly exhausted, many of the men being
entirely out, having fired eighty rounds and re-
lying what could De gotten from the boxes OF
the dead and wounded, threatened with being
actually overwhelmed by superior numbers, the
division began fall back, at first slowly. and IN
good order. contesting every foot OF the ground,
finally In great confusion, and saved from a gem
eral rout only by the personal exertions of Col;
Slack, commanding the Second Brigade. and
Colonies Bynam, Bringhurst, Splceiy, McLaueh-
lin, Gill; Raynor and others not now remem-
bered, but equally brave. who threw themselves
into the breach encouraging and urging the
brave men to main tain their ground, with assur-
ances of Immediate assistance. At length, hav-
ing reached the point whence the enemy had
first been driven at the opening OF the conflict.
and just as it appeared as though the rebels
would regain all they had lost, we were greeted
by the shouts of the long -lookedfor reinforce
ments and Boomers Brigade, closely followed by
Holiness Brigade, both of Crockers Division.
came up and took position between US and the
enemy The rebel advance was at once checked,
bat for few minutes only. They came down
upon the new line in such numbers that In
very short time the whole line, relnforcementS
and all were forced to give way. Immediately
however, artillery on the right In position
by the foresight of Grant, opened on enfilading
fire upon the advancing masses OF the enemy.
which effecrually checked their progress, turned
the surging tide back upon itself and they soon
gave way and fed in great confusion. leaving
our brave boys in full and uDdsturbed possess
ion of the field.
At the time Hovey's Division was being forced
backed, after the enemy's recovery from their
first repulse General Grant ordered Lo-
gan push his right brigade against
the left flank and of the enemy.
This Third Brigade, commanded by General
Stevenson, advanced rapidly. ran over and capt
ured rebel six-gun battery and swung across
the Vicksburg road. while the other two bril-
gades under Gens. John Z. Smith and NJ. d.
Leggett, passed over the ridge into the valley
beyond and struck the enemy directly on their
left flank In the movement of the Third Bri-
gade to reach Pemberton's rear, Stevenson had
become somewhat detached from the other two
brgades of Logan's Division. General Logan
not aware at the moment that he had pos
session of the Vicksburg road, in the rear of the
enemy. SO he almost immediately withdrew
Stevenson sufficiently to have his b1 igade con-
meet with the others. Immediately upon the
enemy finding that Logan had cut their line of
escape they ceased pressing Hovey and faced
Stevenson was Withdrawn and were vigorously
followed TO the Big Black by Logans Division.
Logan'S Division did not meet the heavy fire
that opposed Hovey's Division, nor the same
logged resistance; the list of casualties shows,
it HAD generally it's own way. The writer is
unable from personal observation, to give full
and detailed account of the part taken by Gen.
Logan and his division In this action, but the
country knows the gallant work there done by
him, and that he and his command covered it
self with glory. If much could be said of all
the division commanders who were upon the
ground there would have been no siege OF Vicks-
burg. 1t is easy to find fault equally
easy to show, after battle, how
different management would have pro-
duced different and more satisfactory results;
but the writer feels that he cannot justly avoid
reference to circumstances and facts that
came near bringing disaster to our arms in this
important battle In my humble opinion the
management of Crocker's Division was not only
bad, bnt inexcusable. 1t was as good a division
in the army. Its presence early IN the
action would have produced great and decisive
results. 1t should have been engaged an hour