The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1888-08-09
HENRY GEORGE
Gives Some Sound Advice to
WOrkingmen.
Protection Does Not In
crease Wages.
When Will the American Laborer
Cease Paying Tribute to
Monopolies?

certain commodities will exchange. Hence it
reduces the value of labor just as it increases
the value of commodities.
Imagine a tariff that prevented the coming in
of laborers but placed no restriction on the
coming in of commodities. Would those who
have commodities to sell deem such a tariff Cor
their benefit? Yet to say this would be as
reasonable as to say that a tariff upon commod-
tiles is for the benefit of those who have labor to
sell.
1t is not true that the products of lower priced
labor will drive the products of higher priced
labor out of any market in which they can be
freely sold, since, we have already seen, low
priced labor does not mean cheap production,
and it is the comparative, not the absolute, cost
of production that determines exchanges. And
we have but to look around to see that even in
the same occupation, wages paid for labor
whose products sell freely together, are gen.
orally higher in large cities than in small towns
some districts than in others.
1t is true that there is constant tendency of
all wages to a common level and that this tend
ency arises from competition. But this compe-
tition is not the competition of the goods
market; it Is the competition of the labor mar
ket. The differences between the wages paid
the production of goods that sell freely in the
same market cannot arise from checks
the competition of goods for sale; but
manifestly arises from checks on the COM
petition of labor for employment. As
ployment and employment, or between place
aud place. SO do wages vary. The cost of GY.
ing being greater in large cities than in small
towns, the higher wages in the one are not more
attractive than the lower wages IN the other,
while the differing rates of wages in different
districts are manifestly maintained by the in
ertia and friction which retard the flow of popu-
lation, or by causes, physical or social, which
produce differences in the intensity of coripeti
tion in the labor market.
Trades unions, by checking the competition
of labor, have considerably raised wages in many
occupations, and have even brought about diff.
ferenees between the wages of union ana nom
union men in the same occupation. And what
limits the possibility of thus raising wages is
clearly not the free sale of commodities bat the
difficulty of restricting the competition of labor.
These facts show that what American work
men have to fear is not the sale in our goods
marketof the products of 'tcheap foreign labor,
but the transfereuce to our labor market of that
labor itself. Under the conditions existing over
the greater part of the civilized world, the
minimum OF wages Is fixed by what
economists call STANDARD of eomfort''-
that is to say, the poorer the mode
of life to which the laborers are accustomed the
lower are the wages and the greater is THEFT
ability to compel q reduction in any labor mar.
ket they enter. What, then, shall say of
| that sort of protection of American working
men, which, while imposing duties upon goods,
under the pretense that they made BY
| ''pauper labor" freely admits the "pauper la,
| borer" himself.
1 The meaning of the products of cheap labor
| is a very different thing from the incoming of
| cheap labor. The effect of the is upon the
production of wealth. increasing the aggregate
amount to be distributed; the effect of the other
4 is upon the distribution of wealth, decreasing
the proportion which goes to the working classes.
1 We might permit the free importation of Chinese
commodities without in the slightest degree af-
+! feeting wages; but, under present eondi-
/ tions, the free immigration of Chinese laborers
/ would lessen wages.
Il L .lnr araIn ~
! modern civilization one country of compara-
1 lively high wages and another country of CON-
i paratively low wages. Let as in imagination
bring these countries side by side, separating
them only by a wall which permits the free
Transmission of commodities but is impossible
1 for human beings. Can we imagine, protec-
| ZIONIST notions require, that the high wage coua-
| try would do all the importing aad the low wage
country all the exporting, until the demand for
| labor so lessened in the one country that wages
| would fall to the level of the other? That
/ would be to imagine that the former country
| would go pushing its commodities through
| this wall and getting nothing in return. Clearly
the one country would export no more than II
got return for, aud the other could import nc
more than it gave return for. What would go
| on between the two countries is the exchange OF
their respective productions, and, as previously
pointed out, what commodities passed each way
| in this exchange would be determined, not by
the difference in wages between the two coun
tries, nor Vet by differences between them in
4 cost OF pfOQ uebloH, Dut Dy QIuefSnceS IN edGH
| country in the comparative cost of produeinl
different things. This exchange of commodi
| ties would 60 ON to the mutual advantage oi
| both countries, increasing the amount which
each obtained; but no matter to what dinen
| sious it grew, how could it lessen the demand
l for labor or have any effect In reducing Bagesi
1 Now let US change the supPositiou and i'm
| agine such barrier between the two eountrieI
as would prevent the passage of commodities
| while permitting the free passage of men. No
| goods produced by the lower paid labor of thu
! ore country could now be brought into the other
but wonid this prevent the reduction OF wages
Mauifestly not Employers IN the higher Wags
country, being enabled to get in laborers willing
| to work for less, could quickly lower wages.
What we may thus see by aid of the imagina
| tion accords with what we do see as q matter o
| fact. In spite of the high duties which shut out
| commodities on the pretense OF protecting
American labor, American workmen IL
ali trades are being forced into com
binatIons to protect themselves by check
ing the composition of the labor market. Oul
! protective tariff commodities raises th'
price of commodities but what raisng there Il
] of wages has been accom- plished by trade
| uaions and the Knights of Labor. Break NJ
| these organizations and what would the tariff
! do to prevent the forcing down OF wages in al
| the now organized trades.
A scheme really intended for the protection
I of sorkingmen frcm the competition Of cheal
| labor would not merely prohibit the importa
| ton of cheap labor under contract but woulS
s pr0A1Dlt Tue 1dnufHp 0h any tdDorSr VINO mat
| not sufficient means to raise him above the ne
| cessity Of competing for wages or who did no
| give bonds to join some trades union and abid'
| by its rules. And if, under such a scheme, an
( duties On commodities were imposed the,
| would be imposed in preference such com
| moaities as could be produced with small cap
| itaI not On those which require large capital
that is to say, the effort would be to protect in
| dustries in winch workmen can readily engage
on their own account, rather than those in wnicl
the mere workman can never hope to beeom,
! his owR employer.
1 Our tariff. like all protective tariffs, aims a
] nothing of this kind. 1t shields the employing
| producer from competition, out in no way at
! tempts to lessen competition among those VIII
must sell him their labor; and the industries
aims to protect are those in which the mef
| workman or even the work man with small
; capital, is helpless-those which cannot be cal
ried on without large establishments, cost
machinery, great amounts of capital, or tn
ownership of natural opportunities which bsa
I high price.