New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1888-01-20
DE LESSEPS.
SOME MEAGRE MEMORIES.

DOME MEAOhE mEMOnAG~'
aEcoLLEOrIoNs OF FORTY YEARS By FEn sI xSl'
nmes In one svo PIP. xiii, 319 vi, 800. d. Apple
ton Co.
These recollections Of NJ de Lesseps keep the
word of promise to our ear, and break IL 10 our
hope They are, indeed, strictly speaking "h"'
they profess to be; but they are not AZ All "'a' VI"
confding reader naturally expects them 70 oe
Had NJ de Lesseps set down what he remembered
of all that he has seen and known and done, there
ere few of his contemporaries whose autobiography
should be more interesting: and there would in
snch a case have been a considerable addltloh W
the worlds stock of information on various moot
questions But the distinguished engineer mas LII
truth given the public in these volumes httic IL
did not possess already and scarcely anything per-
,ai,ing 70 the vie interne7 of the writer Much OF
the matter indeed, is open TO the charge OF pelng
used as padding for 1t has nothing at al
to do with recollections being neither more nor
less than q wamng-up of cold disqulsitions and
essays of a magazinish flavor upon obscure ana
uninteresting matters, concerning which, more
over NJ de Lesseps speaks with no authority
A large part of the first volume is taken up with
a recapltulation of the part taken by the author
In the negotiations preceding the capture of Rome
In ls4s There is nothing new in this M de
Lesseps prints number of official documents and
notes. his object being to vindcate himself from
the charge Of having bungled his mission. But
IL was well enough known, generation ago,
that he was sacrificed to the exigencies OF Louis
Napolcon's pcrfidious Italian policy Lesseps
was charged with mission which, from the first,
was meant to be only a blind. lie was sent to
Rome to placate the Republican element III the
French National Legislature, by offering an APP
pearance of anxiety not TO take unfair advantage
of the weakness of the Romans. and not to do
ANYTHING inmcal TO republican interests generally.
AT this time the Prince President had made up his
mind to extihguIsh the Republic in France, and 1T
was not possible in the nature of things that he
would go out of his way to establish similar
government in Italy. 1t is evident that General
Oudinot possessed much clearer insight to the
situation than Lesseps. The latter, indeed, acted
in evident good faith and when he found that
the commander of the French forces had resolved
to resume the aggressive, he resigned almost Co
incidentally with the receipt of his recall to
Paris lie did no good at Rome, but gave the
Italian Republicans additional ground for exc
Grating French duplicity. lie was, in fact made
n scapegoat of, aud 1t may, perhaps, be thought
that a diplomatst of his experience, who so de-
hbcrately ran his head into net, ought not to
have complained when it drawn tight upon
him. No doubt he badly treated by his Gov
ernment, which neither instructed nor sustained
him from the time he left Paris. But 1t is clear
That vanity had much to do with his acceptance
OF the ambiguous and ill-deined mission, and
though that fact must have increased the poig-
nancy of his suiferings when betrayed ana dellV-
cred over to condemnation by hn d'slngenuous
.upcriors II detrdcts good deal from the sympathy
one would like to feel for the victim.
The rccollectiOns contain great many pages
concerning " The Origin of the Suez Canal" but
they are not particularly interesting save in their
bearing upon the strong opposition NJ. de Lesseps
encountered in England. He endeavors to make
it appear that this opposition was chiefly con-
fined to the Government, and especially to LORD
Palmcrston; but the truth is that all England was
against the Saez Canal, and perhaps mainly be-
cause the protector was Frenchman ana the
belief was common that IL would lnure TO the
advantage of France. The diplomatic premi-
narics, however, prOtracted and tedious ana
there is little about the story of them to arouse
interest at present NJ. de Lesseps tells few
rather pontlesS anecdotes of his intercourse with
the Khodye and gives il to be understood that
his success in obtaining the frman for his enter
prise was due rather to the boldness he displayed
before the Khedive's military staf in leaping his
horse over parapet wall than to the commercial
and financial arguments he advanced on Its behalf
Concerning the Panama Canal, which is a topic
OF very present interest, Nj. de Lesseps offers no
fresh information lie too modesty contents him
self with resume VI the preliminary cOunclIS
and conventions and rather infehctOusly repro
duccs rs initial assurance that the canal would
be open to commerce in 889. He has not a word
to say regarding the work of construction. He
evidently prefers to postpone the publication OF
his recolections on this head, and this deter
mination cannot but be disappointing to the gen
cral public. Ii is TO be feared that when the
history of his last enterprise comes to be written
dspassionatey and without cOncealments the
worlds estimation of the indefatlgabe protector
will undergo serious notifications. Meantime,
however NJ de Lesseps reposes in the knowledge
that the unfortunate holders of the Panama Canal
stock are for the most part ignorant French
peasants farmers, small proprietors, and so forth,
who have no means Of ascertalning the truth
about the great ditch, and who cannot get out
of their investment if they would The rest of
the volumes before is made up of general
articles having virtually nothing TO do with the
authors recollectOns, and which are dragged in
quite irrelevanty In Short the book is decidedly
barren and disappointing. Everything which the
world would like to know, which NJ. de LCsseps
could tell it, has been carefully omitted and in
stead great deal of very stale and undressing
matter has been presented. There is in truth a
suggestion in the composition and naming of the
work of that double-deaing which has been re-
sorted TO so often and so shamelessly by the
author, in his endeavors to obtain fresh capital
for the undertaking, knowledge of whose actual
condition must have precipitated a collapse in
md aoff no