The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1888-02-09

stances this would seem to have been an nm
fortunate time and place to be making coffee.
1t is perhaps useless now to stop to inquire
whose fault it was that at the crisis of great
battle each corps commander was permitted to
exercise his own judgment as to what move
ments he should make and when he would
make them. The fact remains that the Fifth
Corps did not move till Hoods flank attack
had broken and rolled up Sickless line There
is not a doubt that when it was permitted to
do so it fought bravely and we'll as il always
did, and lost heavily in that terrible melee. !
mean no disparagement of that corps nor have
/ any fault to find with it, but only with who
ever was responsible for its movements. 1t has
always seemed to me to be better generalship
to preserve line intact than to endeavor to
patch it up after its having been disrupted
Hoods line extended beyond Little Round
Top so far TO the left that he struck the base of
Round Top proper, mp the precipitous sides of
which some of his men now began to Chamber.
They had nothing but the nature Of the ground
itself to oppose them, and although it was hard
labor and almost impossible TO accomplish, yet
one of his regiments actually did reach the
top. Col. Oates, with the 18th Ala. achieved
it, and after giving his men some time to get
together and rest, he commenced TO descend the
northern face of the mountain to join in the
attack on Little Round Top, which the rest of
Hoods Division was now engaged in. That
division striking the mountain, advanced along
the base of it, and finding but few troops to
oppose them penetrated to the rear Of our line
thus taking it in reverse. OF course no troops
could stand in such position. Ours did not
and Gen. Ward with his brigade was compelled
! to yield the position they had held so bravely
against the front attack. Hoods left and Nc
Laws now pressing on occupied it, and thus
outfanked DeTrobriand, who in turn was also
| forced back across the Wheatfeld. and the en-
| envy pressing on now struck Graham at the
| Peach Orchard. OF course every effort was
| made by Birney TO sustain this attack, but he
| saw at once he would be overwhelmed. He
| says: My line was 80 long and thin that
was forced 10 send to Gen. Sickles asking for
| more support, as | had no troops in reserve.
! My line was almost a single one, and as the
enemy in the fight attacked any particular
| point had to take regiments from other points
1 to meet their attack" But Sickles had no
troops to give him. He had expected, relying
4 upon the promise of Gen. Meade, that the Fifth
| Corps would secure his flank, and he had placed
the most of his reserves Of the Second Division
! to support Graham at the Peach Orchard He
now sent to Gen. Hancock, on his right, aud
| Gen. Tremane who was then Siekless Chief
! of Staff meeting Cadwell's Division, of Han
! cocks Corps (which was on its way to report
| to Gen. Sykes Of the Fifth Corps, who Gen.
| Hancock says had been ordered to hold Little
| Birney's assistance. Zook replied that he was
under orders to follow his division, but if Ire
maine would give him Sickles's orders he would
draw out of the column. Tremaine replied
General, / do give Gen. Sickless orders y; and
the brave ZoOk, without another word, at once
followed Tremaine who
PLACED HIM IN THE wHEATFIELD,
nearly in the center of Birney's line, where
in a few moments he was mortally wounded
About this time, too, Gen. Sickles himself was
| struck by shell and lost his leg and was car.
! ried from the field.
| The enemy's attack, commencing on our left
and outhanking it, gradually drove back oul
whole line from one position to another as fast
| as the men could be rallied and they lid rally
| for Kearny's old division knew how to fight
| But each position one after the other was lost
| by the overwhelming masses of the enemy
| pressing upon and outhanking 1t, until the
| Peach Orchard was reached, where Graham's
| Brigade now for long time had to bear the
| heaviest brunt of the attack.
Gen. Graham's Brigade having been strength.
! 6ned by three regiments Of the Second Divis
| ion, held the salient of our line and fully alive
to the Importance of the position, manfully
| held his ground but he had been sadly deci
mated by the fire of Longstreet's artillery Oh
| the hill above him. Our men, not having ye
learned what they did later in the war. to coye1
| themselves in an hour with substantial breast
| work, and now assailed in front and on boil
| his TANKS, Barksdale's Brigade and the bri
gades of Anderson's Division striking him 81
simultaneously, Graham was compelled to give
| way, but not till our men had made the enemy
pay dearly for the position. Barksdale wa
| killed, and Wilcox states that his brigade
alone lost 500 men in that charge, and all th,
other rebel leaders state that their loss in meI
and officers was fearful Gen. Graham wa
himself severely wounded and taken prisoner
and nearly all his field officers were either killec
or wounded.
This salient was the one weak spot I,
Sickless line, but it was at the same time tn
important point to be secured and maintained
as is evidenced by the estimation in which i
was held by Gen. Lee and his engineer officers
and it was to secure it that Sickles made hi
forward movement. 1t should either not hay
been occupied at all lin which case there woul,
have been 4 different history of the battle O
Gettysburg 10 be written), or if occupied, /
should have been held by sufficient force +
render it impregnable Sickles should hav
concentrated his whole corps and massed hi
artillery there aud intrenched, and left tn
care of the Round Tops and his own TANKS /
Meade and the Fifth Corps. But, unfortunately
he could not convince Meade that there was an,
need OF vigorous action on that flank, and. com
PEELED to make the best disposition he could. h
fell into the mistake which so many General
both Of our own and other wars in the world