The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1888-02-11
,he f,0o States, and by Union men in

would therefore terminate IT as saie
means for changing the issue. deem IL
fortunate that the last administration Gre
ated the necessity.
For the rest, would simultaneously de-
fend and reinforce all the forts in the
gulf, and have the navy recalled from for
egn stations to be prepared for blockade.
Put tho island Of Key West under martial
law.
This win raise distinctly the question
OF union or disunion. would maintain
every fort and possession in the south.
FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.
1 would demand explanations from
| Spain and France, categorically, at once.
would seek explanations from Great
Britain and Russia, and send agents into
Canada, Mexico and Central America to
rouse vigorous continental spirit OF indie
pendence on this continent against Euro
| pean intervention.
And, II satisfactory explanations are not
received from Spain and France,
Would convene Congress and declare
war against them.
But whatever policy we adopt, there
must be an energetic prosecution of II.
For this purpose IL must DO somebody's
business TO pursue and direct it necessarily.
Either the President must do 1t himself,
and be all the while active in it, or
Devolve ii on some member OF his Cabi-
net Once adopted, debates ON il must
end, and all agree and abide.
1t is not in my special province.
But neither seek TO evade nor assume
responsibility.
The conscientious historian must ask
the reader TO pause and re-rcad this most
remarkable and pregnant document. 1t Is
| n little difficult to imagine what must have
been the feelings OF President, and par
ticularly OF frank, loyal and generous
nature like that of Lincoln, TO receive from
his principal councillor and anticipated
mainstay OF his administration such u
series OF proposals. That he should delegate
his presidential functions and authority;
that he should turn his back upon tho
party which elected him; that no should
| ignore the political battle which had been
] fought and the victory for moral govern
ment which had been won; that he should,
! foreign war; that he should ask his rival 10
rule in his stead-all this might be ro-
mantle craftsmanship, but TO the cool,
logical mind Of the President il must have
brought thoughts excited by no other
event Of his most evcntful life. What was
TO be said in answer The tender OF
| grave issue like this prcsupposcd grave pur-
poses and determinations. Should he by
fitting rebuke break up his scarcely
formed Cabinet and ALLEVIATE the most
powerful leader after himself, who might
perhaps carry with him the organized sup
port OF all the northern States which had
voted for his rival at ChicagoY
The President sent his reply the same
day. lie armed himself with that irresist-
IDLE logic, his faultless tact, his limitless
patience, his kindest but most imperturba-
BILE firmness. Only the "hand OF iron in
the glove Of velvet" could have written the
following answer.
EXECUTIVE MANSION. April 1. lssi.,
Hon. VIM. ". SEWARD
My Dear Sir-Since parting with you I
have been considering your paper dated
this day, and entitled "Some Thoughts for
the Presidents Consideration. The first
proposition in Il il, "First--We are at the
end OF months administration, and yet
without a policy, either domestic or for
eign."
AT the beginning Of that month, In the
inaugural, ] said: THE powers confded 10
me will be used TO hold, occupy and pos
sess the property and places belonging to
the government, and 10 collect the duties
and imposts." This had your distinct APP
proval at the time; and, taken In connec-
ton with tho order Immediately gave
Gen. Scott, directing him 10 employ every
means in his power to strengthen aud hold
the forts, comprises the exact domestic
policy you now urge, with the single ex-
cepton that II does not propose 10 abandon
Fort Sumter.
Again, do not perceive how the rein
forcemont OF Fort Sumter would be done
on slavery or party issue, while that Of
Fort Pickens would bo on moro national
and patriotic one.
The news received yesterday In regard
10 St Domingo certainly brings new item
within the range OF our foreign policy; but
up 10 that time we have been preparing
circulars and instructions 10 ministers and
the like, all in perfect harmony, without
even suggestion that VIC had no foreign
policy. I.
Upon your closing proposition, that
"whatcyer policy we adopt, there must DO
an energetic prosecution OF II,
"for this purpose II must DO somebody's
business TO pursue and direct II inces-
sanity.
EITHER the President must do Il him
self, and be all the xhilo active In H. or
"Dcyolye II ON some member OF his
Cabinet. Once adopted, debates ON II must
end, and all agree and abide" remark
that II this must be done, I must do H.
When general limo OF policy Is adopted, I
apprehend there is no danger OF It's being
changed without good reason OF coniinu-
ing TO be subject Of unnecessary debate;
still, upon points arising In its progress,
wish, and suppose am entitled 10 have,
the advice Of all the Cabinet Your ODE
dent servant, A. LINCOLN.
In this reply not word Ia omitted which
was necessary, and not hint or alluslon
II contained that could be dispensed with.
The answer WINS conclusive and ended the
argument. 50 far M IL IA known, the affair
never reached the knowledge Of any other
member Of the Cabinet, or even the most
intimate Of the Presidents friends; nor
was II probably ever again alluded 10 by
either Lincoln or Seward. Doubtless Il
needed only the Presidents note 10 show
the Secretary OF State how serious fault
he had committed, for all his tircless In
dustry and undivided influence continued
TO be given for four long years 10 his chief,
not only without reserve, but with n sim
cere and devoted personal attachment.
Lincoln, on his part, easily dismissed the
incident from his thought with that grand
and characteristic charity which sought
only 10 cherish the virtues 81 men--which
readily recognized tho strength and ac-
knowledged the services Of his secretary.
| IN ushofn In unael0ahlv Oawe IN hia owu