Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1888-08-17

from division of the aggregate by
twelve. the result of chance, but on the
CONTRARY, the result OF the, most accu-
ment to the end of the process. no quantity
which enters into the final result is determined
by resort to chance And they made this
hardly conclusive. 1t proceeds upon the
hypothesis that at the time the Jurors consent
TO be bound by the result of the addition and
DIVISION, 1t IS certain what each juror viii mark
down as his estimate of the damages; hence
this process of finding verdict is as exact as
the science OF mathematics. But the contrary
is Inc TACT. The Jurors consent that their YER
dict shall vary from the abstract rule of Justice
IN that degree that each Juror deyiates from
sound Judgment. All the prejudices, whims
and capF1ces which sway a Juror in his deliber-
atoms are given full play, and they reasonably
affect the final result. Nothing could wei be
more the sport of chance than a conclusion
reached IN this manner" And in a note the
author says; ''Quotient verdiets are frequently
spoken OF as chance verdicts" But if the re-
suit of the method adopted by the jury in that
case was according to "the most accurate of
the final result was determined by result TO
chance, why did the Court say Under the
facts as we have assumed them to be- the YER
dlct Is undoubtedly vicious and ought to be set
aside. 1t was d matter resting in uncertainty
in chance, as to whether the quotient OF the ui-
known sums, when added would be 900 $500,
If the several sums were known before the
agreement to be bound by the quotient the case
WOuIu De Inherent,
1t seems clear that the verdict in this case was
chance verdict within the meaning of Section
657 OF the Code of Civil Procedure that the
aindaVits OF the jurors should be received to
prove the misconduct of the jury; and that the
verdict IN the case should be set aside and a
new trial granted.
But there is another ground upon which a
new trial should be granted the plaintiff must
snow a11rmatlVely want of probable cause for
the malicious prosecution. The defendant tes-
tined at the trial that the plaintiff knocked him
down with his pistol but the plaintiff admits
that he knocked the old man-the defendant
MS pistol: The pistol was found after the diff.
Guilty at the place where the defendant fell and
was picked up.
rms IS circumstance which corroborates
the defendant. The plaintiff does not in his
testimony pretend that he knocked the defend
ant down i'll self-defenSe but he admitted that
he did wrong. The evidence shows that the
plalntln was guilty of gross assault and bat
terry IN knocking the defendant down 1t would
be strange rule of law which would permit
one person to recover damages for prosecution
by another for an assault with deadly weapon
because the prosecutor reduced the charge to
the lower ohense of assault and battery and
dismissed as to the greater offense
IL appears to me from the evidence in this
case that the plaintiff, instead of bringing 2
SUIT Tor damages, should have been satisfied
that he escaped a fine or IMPRISONMENT for the
crime of which the evidence shows him p11iltv
only tall TO show want of probable cause but il
| shows that there was probable cause for the
prosecution, and for this reason a new trial
should be granted. Let an order be entered
granting new trial.
J. w. ARMSTRONG, Judge