The Lambertville record. [volume] (Lambertville, N.J.) 1872-1968, 1888-04-11
TIE RUSSIAN BEAR.
INFERIoRlTY OF THE MuscoWTE
AS AN ALLY.

Risks of a Franco-laussian Alliance.
Military Point of View.
So much for France and her army; what is
the Russian situationa 1t was not the French
but our deplorable military administration
that beat us in the Crimea, say the Russian
generals. And the scandals revealed during
the Turco- Russian war of 1878 show that
not much improvement in that quarter had
been made in the 81 years which separate
Sebastopol from Plevna. The car is the
sworn enemy of POPULATION and corruption,
but, alone at the summit of the bureau
cratic pyramid, Alexander cannot reach
the legions Of nlibusters who swarm
around its base. He may make examples
of colonies and some of generals, but abuses
continue In spite of imperial efforts at their
suppression. 1t was ascertained very re-
Gently that In some OF the cavalry regiments
neither the men nor the horses received their
proper rations; the guilty parties are medi-
tating In the Oural over their misdemeanors,
but there Is no assurance and there can be
none that, with the same maladministration,
the imperial troops viii not suffer from the
same shortcomings of quartermasters and
commissaries that disgraced the last cam
paign in Bulgaria 1t is woful pity, too,
for otherwise Russia would be the first of ali
military powers. She has numbers and she
has quality; her infantry soldier is un-
equaled; to the steadiness of the German and
the dash OF the Gaul he unites the sobriety of
the Spaniard and the resignation of the
Turk; he is enduring and he is ingenious;
and to these splendid footmen Russia can
add an interchangeable and innumerable cav
airy, her sotnias of Cossacks, these centaurs
of the steppes which, like the hordes of At
tia, can inundate the territory of her enc
mics, although the thickly wooded and
marshy frontiers Of European Russia are
less appropriate than iscommonly imagined
to the movements and deployment of
mounted troops.
RUssIA's INEERIoRITY.
But Russian generals know not the value
Of their men. Many of them learned the
practice OF the art of war in Bulgaria. All
are educated officers, bold and brave. Their
officers are confident, and inspire confidence,
and yet 1t must be admitted that neither
Russian generals nor Russian officers, nor
the Russian staff possess the same cohesion,
the same science or the same experience as
those Of Germany. And supposing them TO
be their equals, snpposing an analogous unity
of command, there would still always exist
double inferiority-that arising from de-
fective administration and defective or in
sufficient means of concentration This last
point, given a general European war, is of
capital Importance, especially for Russias
eventual allies.
In France and In Germany the time neces-
sary for the mobilization of 1000, 600 of men
can be estimated TO within four and twenty
hours. In Russia that time is the unknown
quantity of the redoubtable problem and
IA
sible to calculate the real value of Russian
cooperation How many days may be re-
quired or how many weeks or even months;
how many hundred thousand soldiers can
be mustered in the first line, how many in
the second, how many In reserve, nobody can
answer, for nobody knows how to answer,
and only one thing Ia absolutely certain, and
this, the Russian newspapers confess, Rus
sia's mobilization must be incomparably and
vastiy slower than that Of either OF her
neighbors. Nor could 1t be otherwise, with
distance infinitely greater, with railways
less Numerous, less well appointed and man
aged, OF which the majority have only
single track, and very few have special plat
forms for the embarkation and landing of
horses, troops and material These disad-
vantages cannot be contested, and they alone
are sufficient to explain why in provision of
events, the imperial government should have
taken those precautions along the frontiers
which have so exercised the susceptibilities
of Austria Hungary.
This undeniable inferiority of Russia is
especially dangerous to her future allies. At
home Russia is safe she may be invaded, as
she was by Charles VII and by Napoleon,
but Russia's invaders generally fare badly,
and to get out Of her vast territory is easier
than to get into 1t, and what would be the
fate Of western ally not prudent enough to
adjourn It's action until Russian mobiliza-
ton be entirely completedi True. Russias
enemies will scarcely allow her allies to select
their moment.
THE RISKS NOT EQUAL.
In Franco-R Russian alliance the risks are
not equally shared by both powers Russia
can bide her time, but France must bear all
the brunt from the outset. The gain OF the
first battle would bring the Germans into the
heart Of Champagne; with a second victory
they might surge on TO Paris, while the north
ern colossus would scarcely feel the blows
received by her provinces of Lithuania,
Esthonia and Poland Every invasion of
Russia has always ended in disaster to the
enemy; every invasion of France has been
successful. Perhaps railways may have de-
was secured to her In former days by dis
tances, and, perhaps, with a railroad at his
disposal, Napoleon might not have been
forced TO evacuate Moscow. But there is
something about Russia which cannot be
seized upon. She is, as one might say, a
species Of inorganic being without either
heart or head at which a fatal blow could be
dealt. She Is not possessed OF one capital of
which the capture would conquer peace,
and with her climate campaigns cannot be
indefinitely prolonged. Surprising the czar's
armies to be always defeated the victor
would be troubled in cleaning the fruits of
his triumphs. And to what point must an
enemy advance before he can force Russia
to ask for terms! Russia has power OF re-
sistance resulting from her size and from her
structure, but this power of resistance can
not be communicated TO her allies. Tho
car may continue his struggle ON the banks
Of the Don and the Volga for months after
any western ally has been obliged to cry
enough.
Spite OF her millions of soldiers, Russia's
strength Is, above all, defensive Her adj
vantages, which in the course of another CEN
fury must make her the mistress OF Europe,
| Is In her mass, but in that mass, the cause OF
| her great superiority In the defense Of her
soil, Is an obstacle to offense. And so ID has
| been proved by the last great war In which
Russia took part, when three campaigns we're
needed TO crush the Turks In Armenia and
Bulgaria. Without any doubt, united France
and Russia, well commanded, could hold
their own against all the rest of Europe; but
Frace, by her situation, would be the most
exposed, because she Is the most vulnerable.
| She must face an enemy on every side, on
every frontier, on sea and on land In Europe
and In Africa and without any certainty
| that her distant ally would have time or
means to come to her assistance. From a
military point Of view, all the advantages Of
| Franco Russian alliance will be for Russia;
all the dangers would be for France.
Cor. New York Times