The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1888-02-19

We are not justified in adding to
statute something that the Legislature
never intended. o. had in contempla-
ton, in enacting the statute.
THE LEGISLATURE HAD THE POWER
10 have said so, but we are not now
considering the power OF toe Legi>ls
ture, we are considering whether
they had exercised that power.
The statute with the interpreta-
ton sought to be placed upon 1t
by the defendant. you'd be clearly re-
troactive. No court will hold a statute
20 be retroactive. and when the Legis-
lature has not said so. and there is no
reason why it should be so, and wnere
tn" statute is easily susceptible of an
other aud reasonable construction. the
general rule, as found in the books, is
even stronger than we have stated. 1t
is laid Gown in Broom Legal Max1ms
that laws should DE construed as pros
pective, and not retrospective, unless
they are expressly made applicable to
past transactions. and to such as are
still pending" Broom Legal Max
inns, p. 81 And Cooley states the doc
trine very definitely as follows: And
it is so"nd rule of construction that
statute should have
PROSPECTIVE OPERATION ONLY,
unless its terms show clearly legisla-
tive intention that it should operate
retrospectively." (Cooley's Const. Lin.
p. 1861. See also Elv VS.. Holton, l5,
n. Y 595; State VS.. Newark, 40 n. ].
L.. 257 and others.
1t being clear, therefore. that the
legislative intent that the amendment
should be retrospective, does ro5 ap-
pear, it is settled by an
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY,
that the enactment of the 18th of
March, 1886, had no retrospective or
retroactive effect, but its operation is
entirely prospective. The we'll
nigh two years that Harris had
neld the Office of county treasurer
could not, therefore, be counted as part
of the two years term OF office provided
for in the amendment. The two years
contemplated in the enactment, were
some two years TO begin at time sub
seqaent to its passage. The amend
ment found Harris IN Office. 1t did not
vacate his office, nor abolish it. The
amendment, if made applicable to him
at all, simply told him that thereafter
he could hold the office for TWO years
The word thereafter" would, of course,
mean after the amendment should go
into effect, which would occur when
there had been publication of the en-
actment. Z omp. Laws, p. rs. Sec. .. J
de would therefore be entitled to hold
inc office under tn amendment, if il
could apply 10 him. for the pcriod nj
two years after publication of the
amendment, and the time of such pub
lication does not appear, nor is il ma
'erlal, as no doubt the publication took
place shortly after its passage, aDd
prior to the general election in August,
1886. But as we have seen that ii the
amendment be at all applicable 10
Harris, he was under it authorized to
HOLD THE OFFICE TWO YEARS
following the enactment, and conse-
quently the election of the defendant to
The Office at the general electio I
in August, 1886, and before
such two years had expired
was unauthorized by law. But the
statute was in no way applicable 10
Harris. He held his office under a
statute which had not been repealed.
nor had it in any manner been mod,
fed, except that the term of office after
its Passage was to be two instead OF
four years, as heretofore. No reference
was made to the cdses OF persons than
III Office. The statute
WAS WHOLLY PROSPECTIVE,
and related TO terms of Office in the
future. People VS.. Haskell, 5 CAL, 357
Cooley's Const. Linn. p. 456 In the
we'll considered case of Peters VS.. Mas
Sey, (33 Graft, 369) the Court of Az
peais, of Virginia. laid down this doc
tTlDe in plain terms, and the contest in
that case, was in some respects, similar
20 that IN the case at bar. Two cases
are referred TO blythe defendant, the OF e
In Texas and The other in California, as
being of a contrary character. The
f., xas case of Wright VS.. Adams, (45
Texas, 134) simply states the rule that
where the duration of the term o. ottic e
is a question of doubt or uncertainty,
the shortest time is to be adopted. 10
the case at bar. the term of Office is not
gu, stion OF such uncertainty or
uouot, as was contemplated in that
case.
THE PRINCIPLE INCULCATED
by that decision was that where the
statute has left blank, unprovided for
BY definite enactment, and there is a
doubt as 10 whom such blank should be
allotted, the rule should be that 1t
should follow the policy of ma ing the
terms of Office
AT THE SHORTEST PERIODS
which the convenience OF the pubic will
permit. 1t cannot, as we lake it, be
made to apply when the term of oriica
is ascertainable from The statute, under
the ordinary rules of construction. Ii
the ordinary rules of construction shall
have been applied, and yet the matter
| is in doubt, the court must resolve that
doubt favor of the people, aud adopt
| that rule that contem plates a reference
of the elect n back to the people at the
shortest periods consistent with the
pubic convenience.
The California case of the People VS..