Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1888-07-03

o1N NOl>Do bIAlOA, fhllADELfulA-
ments of the Union army, that was Ia the
field to watch and oppose him. Until it was
too late, Lee rushed headlong northward on
Pennsylvania soil, wholly unaware that his
antagonist was moving vigorously in the
same direction to intercept his columns.
Blinded by want of knowledge in this re-
spect, he marched his widely scattered corps
into northern territory dangerous distance.
Here, on hostile soil, believing himself safe
from pursuit, he divided his troops into three
bodies, and allowed them to become removed
from each other by more than a days march.
When Lee was abandoning central Vir-
ginia to move north, the Union forces lay
on the Rappahannock line facing southwark,
and threatening to push on to Richmond !;
and as the Confederates sped their way to-
ward Philadelphia and Harrisburg, they
hoped that Hooker would remain there, Lees
skillful lieutenants keeping up the appear
ance of having q southern force in that vi
cinity in order to delude the Union com
mauder as to the real situation But acct
dent enabled Hooker to foil Lee in his calcu-
lations. BY means of lucky captures of dis
patches and incidental cavalry skirmishes,
Hooker gained accurate knowledge that the
main part of the Confederate army had not
Virginia, and was actually approaching the
very gates of great northern cities.
GA receipt of this unexpected but timely
intelligence the whole Army Of the Potomac
turned northward il pursuit. just as the in
valer was prepared to seize his first prize,
Harrisburg; and, had it not been for the
klowlcdge thus accidentally obtained, Lee
woaid have been enabled to strike n heavy
blow before anything could have reached him
IN the way of an opposing force.
l. was throu IA accident also that the Can
Tolerate leader found himself in this emer.
geacy, without any swift moving cavalry to
bring reports of Ilooker's threatening opera
tons in his rear to his headquarters, and
when the situation became suddenly revealed
to him through chance scout, there was no
fling column at his command to fall upon
the advance of the different Union corps, as
taey marched toward him by several distinct
routes For leader like Lee this was an
unusual circumstance.
4 few squadrons Of troopers, with their
horse batteries drawn up on each road, might
have harassed the Union infantry and
DISTRACTED their progress considerably. But
the Army of the Potomac transferred to the
leadership of Meade, as it entered Pennsyl-
wanna June 2S) moved on freely and conf
IDENTIFY into territory practically under the
control of Lees hostile bands Meade did
not encounter SO much as cavalry picket,
and this accident of having no Confed-
crate cavalry in the way explains how 1t
hanpeuCd that when Lee, who had had so
many days the lead of his opponent, had got
ten bis scattered corps into con junction to
meet the foe he saw springing so lightly
across his track-the foe he had so carefully
arranged to mislead and retard, this foe
was actually in his presence in line, ready
for combat.
OF the actual battle field events at Gettys-
burg there are n series Of strange things to
relate. During these three days, of the
warmeSt portion of the year, the unusual
heat was very much mitigated by light
breezes, the sun being frequently yelled by
the clouds; yet not a drop of rain fell till the
afternoon of the 4th. Seventy-six deGs
marked the extreme heat the first day, 81
dogs the ID 81 dogs the Sd The average
for the three entire days was n degs Had
the rain, which fell from the 4th to the 9Th,
come on the 3D. the roads would have been
impossible, the forced marches of the Union
soldiers could not have been made, and the
slopes of the ridges on the field would have
been 50 slippery as to make the scaling Of
them difficult, if not impossible. Had it not
rained on the night of the 18th of June, 1915,
the future of Europe would have been
changed. A few hours of water, more or less,
Frustrated Napoleon at Waterloo; storm
on the LIST or ID of July, 1868, might have
been fatal to Meades army and to the Union.
Again the commanding general OF the
Union advance. Reynolds, VINO had selected
the field and made the plans to fight the
opening battle, iell mortally wounded in the
first hour of conflict, and of the four gen.
erals-Howard, Hancock, Sickles and Slo-
cum-who next made their appearance on the
scene, it so happened that the last one to arrive
was superior i'll authority to the ones lreced-
ing, and by virtue of his rank assumed COM
mand. So there was no permanent director
of affairs until after desperate battle had
been lost, an army crushed and good ground
abandoned. A greater misfortune still, Of
more vital consequence than all, was the fact
that the proper Union commander, Meade,
reached the front more than twelve hours too
late. Gen. Reynolds was killed on the morn
ing of July |, and Gen. Meade did not reach
toe lines of Reynolds defeated troops until
after midnight On the other hand, it
proved circumstance favorable to the
Union cause that chain of natural fortifi-
cations existed at Gettysburg consisting of q
high ridge, terminating at either end in rock
bound crests. well sheltered by woods This
ridge guarded two roads leading from the
south, the Baltimore pike and the Washing
ton road, while it commanded another Wash
ington road, all three roads being routes Of
march for the Union army northward This
strong position was secured. the different
corps commanders marching in in obedience
to orders, but by very narrow margin
To offset this Union advantage the Confed-
crates found curtain of woods around every
important position occupied by themselves,
separated from Meade's line by about one
half to three-quarsers of a mile, which COM
pletely concealed all their movements from
view, affording them an opportunity Of
massing their columns for attack unobserved
by the Union forces on the crests and hills
When Reynolds. with the First corps Of
Meade's army, led the way to Gettysburg, be
did not halt to secure actual possession Of
these natural Notifications on Cemetery
Ridge, that lay close by his line of march,
but pushed on to seize the passes through the
thin strips of surrounding forest, in order to
prevent Lee from getting a Judgment in
them and on the high knobs which they
sheltered. HIS intention was to risk his own
corps, the First, together with Howardb
Eleventh, close at hand, in . desperate effort
to hold the Confederates beyond cannon
range of the high ridge whereon the main
body of the Union army would soon b ex-
posed while forming the infantry and placing
artillery in line for battle The first dayh
conflict at Gettysburg wns rally a sfyn00le