The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1888-01-17

provision therein contained, requir-
ing the counter signature Of mep
Der of the Cabinet to any act Of lit
King to give such act effect, only re-
fers to executive acts of the King.
Now, apply our contemporaries
method, admitting that to be sound,
to Article 81, which places the Exeeu-
tive power of the realm. 1t reads:
Article 81. The person Of the King
is inyiolable and sacred. His Minis
tiers are responsible. To the King and
| the Cabinet belongs the Executive
power. All laws that have passed the
| legislature shall require His NIajesty's
signature in order to their validity,
except as provided in Article 4S.
This Article in itself completely
overthrows both the arguments and
the assumptions of the vetOists-
Treated in the same way as our even
ing contemporary has dealt with
Article Al, it returns the irresistible
conclusion that the Bulletin dOgmatist
is wrong-that the veto under our
system is an executive and not leg
islative act. The obvious meaning of
Article 81 is that the signing Of laws
is an executive act, for which the
Ministers must be responsible. Any
other construction put upon it would
of necessity make it ridiculous, as
well as subversive. analOgieally, OF the
principle, that different subjects must
not be mixed in one law. The Bulletin
says: "If the King in his discretion
returns a bill to the Legislature,
Ministers have no responsibility in
the matter" But Article 81 that
prescribes the signing Of laws by TIE
King, implicitly in the exercise Of tie
executive power vested in King and
Cabinet by the same Article, says that
I" His Ministers are responsible"
What is the use of our contemporary
butting its head against the plain
letter of the Constitution?
A contingency that the Bulletin APP
pears to consider calamitous is thus
described: If Ministers were to
counter-sign a message from the
King giving his reasons for refusing
to approve a bill, and if the Legisla-
ture were to pass it Notwithstanding,
the Government would be defeated,
and, under the theory of responsible
government, should resign" And
what of that? No better occasion for
their resignation could well be reach
ed than when they became response
BILE for multiplying the work of the
Legislature, without being able to
present reasons from His Ma
jesty for such serious interference
which would be acceptable to the
representatives of the people. There
are two contingencies when Ministers
are not allowed to vote in the Legis-
lature, one being in the case of
vote of want of confidence and the
other in that of reconsideration OF a
vetoed bill. In the latter case the
inhibition implies nothing unless it
is that the Ministers are to be held
responsible for the exercise of the
veto. With the view of the subject
above presented, the whole ConstitUE
ton harmonizes. As an act fof'r
which the Ministers are to be
held responsible, the veto as pro-
vided for in Article 4S IS
easily seen to be a safeguard against
inadvertent Legislation. After bill
had passed its final stage in the
Legislature, it is not difficult to con
ceiYe of reasons being discovered
why it was inexpedient to put it into
execution as law In such case it
would be for the Ministers to assume
the responsibility of submitting such
reasons to the Legislature If they
were well-grounded and the Legisla-
ture was composed Of reasonable
men, there woald be little fear of the
result to Ministry up to that point
enjoying the confidence Of the House.
And no self-respecting Ministry
would desire to continue in office If
dominated by an unreasonable Legis-