The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-05-25
LEES FATAL DECISION,

Councils were held that night in the Con.
federate camps also, but there does not seem
to have been conservative principle present
strong enough to CONTROL for in face of Long
streets renewed opposition, Lee made prepar-
ations for assaulting Meades main line on
Cemetery Ridge the next day. The decision
was in accordance with the spirit of the hour
about Confederate headquarters 1t was said
there that the Union line was made up of
| militia, and that the defeats it had sustained
on the Emmitsburg road and at Culps Hill
that second day. as well as the disaster to the
First and Eleventh corps on the first day,
showed that the army on the heights was a
despicable rabble. Longstreet says he told
Lee that his scouts reportdi that the1v-was
still opportunity to move around to the right
Of Meade's army, and maneuver him into
attacking. Lee, pointing to Cemetery
Hill with his fist" replied: ''The enemy is
there, and am going to strike him." Against
this Longstreet urged his great experience
with soldiers in attack, and said: 1T is my
opinion that no ID 900 men ever arrayed for
battle can take that position" But Long,
street was Immediately ordered to prepare
Pickett's column for the famous attack,
When the the hour came to send the columns
forward, he Nongstreet failed to give the
order in positive terms, and it has been
asserted that his indifference was so con-
spicuous that it affected the men, His own
version, borne out by number of witnesses,
is this: ''Pickett said to me: General, shall
advance" My feelings had so overcome me
that would not speak for fear of betraying
my want of confidence to him. l bowed
affirmation and turned to mount my horse.
Pickett Immediately said 4 shall lead nv
division forward, sir"
Longstreet put in his last reserves, every
thing not already in line of battle, before the
enemy. Longstreet says: "When this charge
Pickett's) had failed expected that of course
the enemy would throw himself against our
shattered ranks and try to crush u.s." Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton writes about this critical
moment as follows: "From the suddenness
of the repulse of the last charge on July 3 it
became necessary for Gen Meade to decide at
once what to do. rode up to him. and after
congratulating him on the splendid conduct
of the army, said: General, will give YOU
a half hour to show yourself great general.
Order the army to advance, while take the
cavalry, get in Lees rear, and we'll finish
this campaign in a week" Gen. John c..
Robinson, who commanded division in the
First CORPS and knew the situation well, told
Meade that Lee should not be allowed to re-
cross the Potomac. On July 5, when it was
evident that Lee was preparing to retreat,
Meade called another council, and submitted
the question of attacking Lee on Seminary
Ridge. The vote was opposed to attack, and
so the ablest soldiers in the army sustained
Meade in holding to the principle laid down
the year before under like circumstances. at
Antietam by Mcclellan. When urged by
Franklin and Slocum at Antietam to order
an assault Mcclellan used the same language
attributed to Meade at Gettysburg, 1--WE have
done well as it is"
The controversies relating to the general
of Lees invasion are too important
to be treated in the limits of this paper. and
do not properly belong to the story of the
battle. The most important one of these re-
ates to the movements of Gen. j. E.B.
Stuart, leader of the Confederate cavalry.
He has been charged with disobedience of
orders, and with going off on a wild raid
around the Union army, and causing great
to Lee by his absence Stuart
was killed in 1854, and never explained his
conduct beyond what was given in his official
report. By this it appears that he used his
customary discretion, and according TO his
champion, Col John s. Mosby, he EFT moro
cavalry with the main column than he took
with him on his raid toward Baltimore. For
some reason the Army of the Potomac got
between Stuart and Lee, md Fitzpatrick,
with the Union cavalry, kept forcing Stuart
further and further from his chief, so
that he did not join theArmy until the morn
ing of the I'd, and then with his men and
horses in jaded condition. 1t was IA cam
paign of mishaps all around, and explanations
that do not explain have been in order ever
since the battle took place. The in, estiga-
lions made by congress and the awards be-
slowed by that body drew the attention Of
men who but for that, would have allowed
their own private views and grievances to
remain in obscurity. p