The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1888-07-13

that the proper Union commander, Meade,
reached the front more than twelve hours too
late. Gen. Reynolds was killed on the morn.
ine Of July !, and Gen. Meade did not reach
the lines of Reynolds defeated troops until
after midnight. On the other hand, II
proved a circumstance favorable TO the
Union cause that chain Of natural FORTH
cations existed at Gettysburg, consisting of a
high ridge, terminating at either end In rock
bound crests, well sheltered by woods. This
ridge guarded two roads leading from the
south, the Baltimore pike and the Washing
ton road, while it commanded another WASH
ington road, all three roads being routes of
march for the Union army nOrthward. This
strong position was secured, the different
corps commanders marching in In obedience
to orders, but by very narrow margin.
TO Offset this Union advantage the Confed-
crates fOunda curtain of woods around every
important position occupied by themselves,
separated from Meades line by about one
half to three-quarters of a mile, which COM
pletely concealed all their movements from
view, affording them an opportunity Of
massing their columns for attack unobserved
by the Union forces ON the crests and hills
When Reynolds, with the First corps of
Meade's army, led the way to Gettysburg, he
did not halt to secure actual possession of
these natural Notifications on Cemetery
Ridge that lay close by his line of march,
but pushed OH to seize the passes through the
thin strips of surrounding forest, in order to
prevent Lee from getting Judgment in
them and on the high knobs which they
sheltered. His intention was to risk his own
corps, the First, together with Towards
a. ut ;,,o <po.
to hold the Confederates beyond cannon
range of the high ridge wherein the main
body Of the Union army would soon be ex-
posed while forming the infantry and placing
artillery in line for BATTLE The first days
conflict at Gettysburg was really struggle
for the possession of one Of these passes
that across Willoughby run and the ridge
east of it on the Chambersburg road, two
miles west by northwest Of Cemetery Hill,
the browning point of Cemetery Ridge.
The Union advance, consisting of Bufords
cavalry, had seized this pass on the night of
June 30 and had planted cannon there to de-
fend it against the Confederates, whom the
scouts announced to be approaching in force
from Chambersburg under A. P. Hill. Lee,
with the corps of Longstreet and Hill, was
west of the Blue Ridge at Chambersburg,
twenty-eight miles from Gettysburg, when
the startling news reached him that the
Army of the Potomac was in Pennsylvania.
At this time Ewell's corps (Confederates)
was at Carlisle and York, thirty miles east
and north of Gettysburg, and Lees orders to
concentrate the three corps-Longstreet's
Hills and Ewel's-brought the two, Long
street and HILL east of the mountain and re-
called Ewell from his threatening position in
front of Harrisburg. Hill led the advance
of the column coming from the mountain
over the Chambersburg road, and fell in
with Buford, when he attempted to cross
Willoughby run on the morning of
the LIST. Two roads cross this run about sixty
rods apart, and between the Chambersburg
pike and the Fairfield road to Hagerstown
the forest is heavy, making it a good place
for surprise. Reynolds came to the front
early, relieving Buford and sending him
northward to meet and hold Ewell at bay
on the Carlisle road, while Doubleday's d.