The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1888-01-20
THE LAST HOPE.


THE LAST HOPE.
We crouched down as well as we could
In the tender while passing Ringgold, that
the enemy might not see our number, and
when beyond the town we arose and
looked about US. The country was mostly
wooded and rough, being much cut up by
the branches of the swollen Chickamauga
creek. We had no fuel, though we might
have taken on a few water soaked fence
rails and broken them to burn; but what
would have been the user Every COM
bustible scrap was carefully gathered up
and thrown into the engine. Worst symp-
tom of all, large pair Of saddle bags,
which we had never seen Andrews with
out from the time of the midnight confer
ence, together with his cap and some
other pieces of clothing that he did not
need for immediate use, were flung re-
morselessly into the furnace. Various
papers went along These were probably
documents that he feared would compro-
mise himself or others in case Of capture.
Such preparations were indeed ominous.
But his next command-the last he ever
gave to us as party-was more dreadful
still, and for the first time that day there
shot pang of mortal terror to my heart.
Not the crash Of the engine down an en-
bankment nor the coming of another
train of the enemy from the north, shut
ting us between two fires, would have
caused such a sense of despair and hope
less misery to steal over me. This was
the order which, as intimated before, our
party, had they been properly organized,
would not have obeyed.
For our situation was still far from des-
perate. Aside from the capture of the
pursuing train, which would now have
been very difficult from the fact that we
had neither fuel for rapid running, nor
the distractions on board that were nee
essary TO place us far enough ahead for
an ambuscade, there was another plan to
which our leader was virtually pledged,
which presented every prospect of saving
our own lives, though it was now too late
to accomplish our original purpose. We
were some five miles beyond Ringgold,
within a mile of Graysville, or nineteen
miles by the longest railway course from
Chattanooga. From that city westward
to Bridgeport was twenty-eight miles fur
Their. But the nearest way to Bridgeport
was not through Chattanooga, but fur
Their south, and by that route it was not
distant more than thirty-five or forty
miles. The direct course was at right
angles with the numerous mountain
ranges which here run almost north and
south, a route over which cavalry could
not be used, and which was known to
more than one of our party. Two COM
rades had pocket compasses which would
have guided US in thick woods or in
cloudy weather by day or night. Now to
have left our train in a body, and without
delaying to seek concealment, to have
struck over the streams and mountains at
right angles, as rapidly as we could go,
would have been our most hopeful
course. Long before night of the
next day we would have been safe
within Mitchel's lines! Why notS How
could the enemy have captured us? II
they sent cavalry, these would necessarily
have made long circuits and have been
obliged to adhere to the lines of the road,
and thus could not nave CUme HetFr
while clinging to the valleys and the
mountain sides. Even in thick woods
they could not have overtaken us. II
they followed us with a strong party on
foot, we fleeing for our. lives, would not
have deserved to escape, if we could not
have held our distance for forty miles OF
more If they had ridden ahead and
raised the whole country for a genera,
man hunt, they would have had only
| twenty-four hours or less to organize it
and no small party then could have ar
rested twenty armed men. In fine, thi:
| plan of escape through a mountainous
and densely wooded country did not ap
pear to me to be more dangerous than {
cavalry dash on the lines of the enemy'i
communications-an every day militar!
affair Even If Mitchell did not prove Il
be In the neighborhood of Bridgeport
when we arrived, we would then havr
been in the loyal mountainous distric
where we would have met as many friends
as foes. All that we needed in the way o
provisions and guides our force woul(
have enabled US to command, and evel
! guns ana ammunition could readily hav
been gathered on our way.
But all these advantages depended o.
| our keeping together under one head. A
army scattered and disorganiZed is lost
and our little army was no exception
The fatal command which Andrews nov
! gave as we were huddled together In tn
wood box of the tender was to jump of
one by one, scatter in the woods, and eac
man strive to make his own way back
| the Union armyl We hesitated, but ha
no concert of action, no leader, no tim
| for council, and the instinct of obedienc
was still strong upon US; but 1t was
fatal order, and led directly to the calam
ties that followed. 1t transformed us /
a moment from a formidable body {
| picked soldiers, ready to fight to death
into scattered mass of fugitive boys, b.
wildered and hopeless in an enemy
country.
Yet no one of us felt like censuring on
leader for this order, which every one q
the moment believed to be q terrible mis-
take. Probably he thought that eac
man Of the party would find relief
being cast entirely on his own resources.
1t must further be remembered, in e1
PLANTATION of this mistaken order, ths
Andrews had slept none the night before
that he had h;scn nearly twenty-four hour
without food. and that he had spent nearl
two days and night in the most exhaus
ing labors, both mental and physical, tbs
| it is possible to conceive. He had seen hi
cherished plans, when on the brink of sui
cess, overthrown by what seemed the II
morselesS hand of destiny. To the man
failures and sorrows of his past life ha
been added the browning misfortune {
this defeat. Perhaps under his calm bro,
he realized this with an intensity
anguish, and felt that the greatest fave
he could do those he had led within sigh
of a horrible death, and into the presenC
of an enraged and triumphant foe, was I
separate them at once from his own dar
and Swallowed destiny. If so, that wa
the most fearful mistake of all; and as thi
order was given, we could almost, as W
looked southwark through the drivin
rain and the storm clouds, behold alread
the dark outline of the Atlanta scaffoldsl
1t was pitifull The General had serve
US well ever since the morning hour
fearful speed and patient waiting, in e1
ulting raptures and in almost despair.
was hard to abandon her now. She wa
substantially uninjured. The engineers
Brown and Knight, had taken good car
| Of her, and with wood and oil in abunC
ance, there would have been no difficult
on her part in completing the run /
Huntsville. She was still jogging alon
at the rate of eight or ten miles an hour
and could maintain that pace q littl
longer. The pursuers had also diminlshe
their speed, so as to just keep us In sight
having apparently no wish TO press upo
what may have seemed to them like
| wounded and dying lion. The comman
to ''jump off and scatter" was repeatet
with the injunction to be quick about II
rs the engineer wished to reverse the en-
| CINE and drive it back upon the enemy
With such a reason there could be n
more hesitation. IL is said that som
three or four had already got of Mt tn
first word of command; but the most O
us had hesitated, not on account of tn
M MI - ba Iyrk L., 81