Morning journal and courier., 1888-02-07
THE ALmsHousR oAsE.


 this city and Waterbury fer a number of months past
 Frederick L.. Dibble vs town of New Ha- ven ct al.-opinion of Supreme court-Par- dee judge.
 At an ad djourned session of the annual town meeting of the town of New Haven, held on Dec. g, 1886, the town determined to con- struct a new almshouse and appointed com mittee, composed of seven inhabitants and the selectmen of the town, to procure plans and make contracts for the building.
 Among other votes the town meeting voted ssthat the plans and specifications for the building be submitted to at least five respon- sible carpenters and five responsible masens of New Haven (and that the unions of the carpenters and masons shall also have the privilege of giving estimates on the above mentioned plans and spscifcations) to secure figures, before the contract is given out, and it shall be given to the lowest responsible bidders"
 The committee advertised for proposals for bids in the five daily newspapers pub lished in New Haven, and several parties in response thereto tendered bids. The major | ity of the committee voted to award the con- ! tract to persons other than the lowest re- ! sponsible bidder. The difference between the 1owsat bid and | the bids of the persons to whom it was voted l to give the contract is over $2, 700. The plaintiff, an inhabitant and taxpayer of the town of New Haven, obtained temporary injunction restraining the selectmsn of the town and the committee of citizens from en- terine into any contract for the construction of an alnshouse, except with the lowest re- sponsible bidder.
 The Superior court made the injunction permanent The town appeals for the fol- lowing among other reasons: l. Because upon the facts found the plaintiff shows title equitable relief by 1nJunct1on
 Because the judgment rendered. depFves; I this the lawful contracts it will enter into for the con-
 3. Because the facts found do not support the judgment rendered. .,
 4. Because the court erred in overruling the claim bowers of tbe comrattee were discretionary powers and not controliable by judicial proceedings
 The case may be stated thus: The town of New Haven desired to purchase an aims house for the purpose of discharging it's gov ernmental duty to care for it's paupers. A and B each owned building adapted to it's needs and each desired to sell. These were precisely alike in material and form and were of equal value. A offered to sell his for a sum less by $2, 700 than the price asked by B. The town in lawful meeting assem- bIed appointed committee of it's citizens as its agents and instructed them to purchase for it's use the building offered by A.
 The committee, in violation of the instruo- tions by the town, has determined and made public declaration of such determination to purchase that offered by at the larger price and was about to make contract for the purchase thereof in the name ot the town.
 The plaintiff, a taxpayer in the town, ob- tained an injunction restraining the select men of the town and the committee from purchasing the building offered by B. The temporary injunction has been made psrma- ment. The town insists that this exercise of the restraining power Of the court is both un- necessary and improper and asks that the de- cree may be annulled.
 In the expenditure of money, in the dis charge of a governmental duty 8 municipal ity is as an individual managing his private affairs. That is, majority of the voters thereon may determine whether it shall per form it's duty as economically as it can or with as large an outlay as it pleases, and the minority in the absence of fraud must submit to the action of the majority, finding it's pro- lection against unnecessary expenditure in the law of self-interest, to which all men are presumed to be in greater or less de- gree obedient; and in making expenditures for such purposes the will of the municipali ty is a law unto itself, as is that of an indi vidual to himeelf, and as little subject to ju dicisl control; and if 1t appoints an agent to make contracts in it's name for such purposes a court has no greater power to restrain that agent than it has to restrain the agent of an
 
 semblea has appointed an agent for the ac- complishment of purpose within it's power, and has placed precise limitations upon him, and he transcends the authority given, it may upon knowledge, when lawfully assem- bled, ratify and adopt his acts against the protest of an individual taxpayer, or against that of minority, and it may ratify and adopt his act otherwise than by such formal vote; as if having knowledge it refrains from disavow- ing it, accepts the beneficial results thereof, appropriates to it's use the property procured thereby, makes partial payments therefor and by other like acts of omission and com mission; and the minority is as helpless to prevent this indirect adoption of an expendi- ture, not originally authorizsd, aS to prevent adoption by express vote; and if in strict ae- cordance with power conferred the agent binds it by his contract it may break the contract, pay the consequent damages, and make the expenditure in another manner to larger amount, and the minority Is likewise powerless to prevent.
 It follows, therefore, that minority can in no case, except in the presence of fraud, either directly by act or vote or indirectly through the restraining power of a court of equity resist the will of the majority.
 In the case before us the municipality placed precise limitations upon it's agent in the appointing vote, of which every person dealing with him was bound to take notice at his peril. If with such notice and knowl- edge anyone undertakes to enter into a con tract with him which the agent is powerless to make, he takes nothing by his action. The municipality is not bound to him; no taxpayer is in danger of loss. and there is no occasion for judicial intervention. But the municipality has long had notice and knowl- edge that it's agent intends to violate it's in structions by buying the most expensive building. If with such knowledge it should remain without act or speech, should accept and use the building, should make payments upon 1t, or in some other form adopt the unauthorized act, it is possible for it to become as firmly bound to pay the larger price as if the agent had been unrestricted from the beginning. This liability thus as- sumed no taxpayer has the right to ask for judicial intervention and every day the muni- cipality either is or is not consenting to every act of it's agents; therefore, on every day one or the other of the above alternatives is in the way of the effort of the individual to con- trol the majority.
 It is suggested that if this be the law the individual may suffer from the indifference of the majority. But that possibility is in- separab1e from membership in the nunici- pality. Presumably it is better that one citi- zen should take that risk than that all should 1Nal ,E %or k6afr