Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1888-01-23
PRIMA FAcIE EVIDENCE.
The Supreme Court Decide the Clause
in Harmony With the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has just rendered a
decision in the case of State VS.. barrel of
brandy, c. II. Guppy, claimant The ground
taken il precisely the same as has been taken
from the first by Judge W. p. Whitehouse
Of the Superior court of Kennebec county
as was reported in the Journal some time
ago. This case va. tried in the Superior
Court of Cumberland county, the presiding
judge instructing the jury, as a matter of
Law, that the fact of the payment of United
States liquor tax, unless explained, was con-
elusive evidence that the person paying it was
a common seller of intoxicating liquors.
To this instruction the defendant excepted
and the case went to the Supreme Court
An opinion has just been sent down. It was
drawn by Judge Walton, and was concurred
in By Judges Peters, Virgin, Libby, Foster
and Haskell. The following are the facts in
the case
One u the provisions of the act Of 1887,
! chapter 20 (amendatory Of the liquor law g,
/ declares that payment Of the United States
=
be prima facie evidence that the one paying
the tax is a common seller of Intoxicating
| liquors. What is the meaning of this pro-
4 yisionf Does it impose upon the Court the
duty Of instructing the jury as matter of
law, that proof Of such payment viii make
it their duty to find the defendant guilty
| whether they believe him 10 be so or not? IL
! is -ntiicient answer to say that jury can
not be 80 instructed in any criminal case.
The right Of trial by jury is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and it is not within the pro-
vince Of the legislature to enact law which
will destroy or materially impair the right
The very essence Of trial by jury is the
right of each juror TO weigh the evidence for
himself, and in the exercise of his own rea-
,Oning faculties, determine whether or not
the facts involved in the issue are proved
And if this right is taken from the juror--if
he is not allowed TO weigh the evidence for
himself-is not allowed to use his own rea-
sonng faculties, but on the contrary is
Obliged TO accept the evidence at the weight
which others have affixed to it, and to return
and affirm verdict which he does not be-
licye to be true, or of the truth of which he
has reasonable doubts-then, very clearly,
the substance, the very essence of trial by
jury viii be taken away, and its form only
will remain. And If the enactment under
consideration must be construed as having
this effect then, very clearly it is unconstl-
tutonal and void.
But We do not think it is necessary so to
construe it. We have many similar statutes,
in some of which the words used are 'primo
ftcts evidence" and in others the words are
! ''presHmpttre evidence" We cannot doubt
that these phrases are intended to convey
the -amc idea. Thus, the possession of
dead bird at certain seasons of the year and
the possession of mutilatcd uncooked lob
stcr are declared to be prtnta facie evidence
that the former was unlawfully killed and
that the latter was less than ten and a half
inches long when taken; while the posses
sion of a salmon less nine inches in length.
or of trout less the five inches in length, is
declared 10 be Prespmphre evidence that
they were unlawfully taken. Similar pro-
visions exist with respect to the possession of
the careasscs of moose and deer at those
seasons of the year when it is unlaw-
ful to hunt or Kill them.
Can it be doubted that these provisions all
mean the same thing? We think not And
we are not aware that either of them has
ever been construed as making it obligatory
upon the jury to find defendant guilty,
whether they believe him to be so or not
They mean that such evidence is competent
aud sufficient to justify jury in finding a
defendant guilty. provided it does, in fact,
satisfy them of his guilt beyond Il reasonable
doubt aud not otherwise It would not be
Just to the legislature to suppose that by
any of these cnactments. they intcndt to make
it obligatory upon the jury TO find defen-
dant guilty whether they believe him to be so
or not. II is wcll settled rule of construc-
ton that if a statute is susceptible of two
interpretations. and one of the interpretations
will render the statute unconstitutional and
the other will not, the latter should be ad-
opted. II it be thought that these
statutes and especially the one now
under consideration. if construed as above
indicated, add nothing to the weight
of such evidence, it will be well to remember
that declaratory statutes are not uncommon,
and are not always useless. They often
serve to remove doubts aud to give certainty
and stability to n rule of law, which it did
not before possess and that in these par
ticulilrS the act under consideration may be
regarded rs a wise and useful enactment
The ruling of the Justice of the Superior
Court not being in harmony with this inter
probation of the statute. the exceptions must
be sustained and new trial granted. But
the motion is not properly before us. Mo
tons for new trials in criminal cases, tried
in either OF the Superior Courts are to be
heard and finally determined by the justices
thereof Il s. chap. -. see. 50. And, al
though this is proceeding against the liquor
only still it must be regarded As a criminal
case State vs. Robinson, o. Maine, 2s5.
Exceptions sustained and new trial
granted