Waterbury evening Democrat., 1888-04-11
THE RUSSIAN BEAR.
lNFERIoRITY OF THE MuscoMTe
 AS AN ALLY.

Defensive StrenStn o1 the Country.
 Risks of Franco-Russian Alliance.
 Military Point of View.
 So much for France and her army; what ia the Russian situationa It was not the French, but our deplorable military administration that beat us in the Crimea, say the Russian generals. And the scandals revealed during the Turco- Russian war of 1877-8 show that not much improvement in that quarter had been made in the 21 years which separate Sebastopol from Plevna. The czar is the sworn enemy of peculation and corruption, but. alone at the summit of the bureau cratic pyramid, Alexander cannot reach the legions of flibusters who swarm around its base He may make examples of colonels and some of generals, but abuses continue in spite of imperial efforts at their suppression, It was ascertained very re- gently that in some of the cavalry regiments neither the men nor the horses received their proper rations; the guilty parties are medi- tating in the Oura1 over their misdemeanors, but there is no assurance and there can be none that, with the same maladministration, the imperial troops will not suffer from the same shortcomings of quartermasters and commissaries that disgraced the last cam paign in Bulgaria. It is a woful pity, too, for otherwise Russia would be the first of all military powers She has numbers and she has quality; her infantry soldier is un- equaled; to the steadiness of the German and the dash of the Gaul he unites the sobriety of the Spaniard and the resignation of the Turk; he is enduring and he is ingenious; and to these splendid footmen Russia can add an indefatigable and innumerable cav airy, her sotnias of Cossacks, these centaurs of the steppes which, like the hordes of At tila, can inundate the territory of her enc mics, although the thickly wooded and marshy frontiers of European Russia are less appropriate than is commonly imagined to the movements and deployment of mounted troops.
 RUssIA'S INFERIORrTY.
 But Russian generals know not the value of their men. Many of them learned the practice of the art of war in Bulgaria All are educated officers, bold and brave. Their officers are confident, and inspire confidence, and yet it must be admitted that neither Russian generals, nor Russian officers, nor the Russian staff possess the same cohesion, the same science or the same experience as those of Germany. And supposing them to be their equals, supposing an analogous unity of command there would still always exist a double inferiority-that arising from de- fective administration and defective or in- sufficient means of concentration. This last point, given general European war, is of capital importance, especially for Russia's eventual allies.
 sary for the mobilization of 1000, 900 of men can be estimated to within four and twenty hours In Russia that time is the unknown quantity of the redoubtable problem, and without that unknown quantity it is impos- sible to calculate the real value of Russian cooperation. How many days may be re- quired or how many weeks or even months; how many hundred thousand soldiers can be mustered in the first line, how many in the second, how many in reserve, nobody can answer, for nobody knows how to answer, and only one thing is absolutely certain, and this the Russian newspapers confess, Rus sia's mobilization must be incomparably and vastly slower than that of either of her neighbors. Nor could it be otherwise, with distance infinitely greater, with railways less numerous, less we'll appointed and man. aged, of which the majority have only a single track, and very few have special plat forms for the embarkation and landing of horses, troops and material These disad- vantages cannot be contested, and they alone are sufficient to explain why, in provision of events, the imperial government should have taken those precautions along the frontiers which have so exercised the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary.
 This undeniable inferiority of Russia is especially dangerous to her future allies At home Russia is safe; she may be invaded, as she was by Charles VII and by Napoleon, but Russia's invaders generally fare badly, and to get out of her vast territory is easier than to get into it, and what would be the fate of a western ally not prudent enough to adjourn its action until Russian mobiliza- tion be entirely completed3 True Russia's enemies will scarcely allow her allies to select their moment.
 THE RISKS NOT EQUAL.
 In a Franco-Russian alliance the risks are not equally shared by both powers. Russia can bide her time, but France must bear all the brunt from the outset. The gain of the first battle would bring the Germans into the heart of Champagne; with second victory they might surge on to Paris, while the north ern colossus would scarcely feel the blows received by her provinces of Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland. Every invasion of Russia has always ended in disaster to the enemy; every invasion of France has been successful. Perhaps railways may have de- prived Russia of that invulnerability which was secured to her in former days by dis. tances, and, perhaps, with railroad at his disposal, Napoleon might not have been l forced to evacuate Moscow. But there is something about Russia which cannot be seized upon. She is, as one might say, a species of inorganic being without either heart or head at which a fatal blow could be dealt. She is not possessed of one capital of which the capture would conquer peace, and with her climate campaigns cannot be | indefinitely prolonged. Supposing the czar's | armies to be always defeated, the victor would be troubled in gleaning the fruits of his triumphs And to what point must an enemy advance before he can force Russia to ask for terms? Russia has a power of re. Bistance resulting from her size and from her structure, but this power of resistance can not be communicated to her allies. The car may continue his struggle on the banks of the Don and the Volga for months after any western ally has been obliged to cry enough
 Spite of her millions of soldiers, Russia's strength is, above all, defensive Her ad- vantages, which in the course of another cen. tury must make her the mistress of Europe is i:l her mass, but in that mass. the cause ot her great superiority ill the defense of her soil, is an obstacle to offense. And so it has been proved by the last great war in which Russia took part, when three campaigns were needed to crush the Turks in Armenia and I Bulgaria. Without any doubt, united France l and Russia well commanded. could hold