The Emporia weekly news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1881-1889, 1888-07-12

ractlce IN the court are officers of the c
curt, and it is not only the privilege. I
'ut il is the duty of this court to see
hat they 50 conduct themselves as to
Justify the confidence of the commH-
lity. We all know that certain general !
.ules of law and practice are estab-
ished. conformity to which is essential
70 the due administration of law, and
10 the good order of society, and yet
that often parties keeping themselves
within those rules and thus safe from
legal condemnation take advantage OF
the ignorance and inexpeTience of
others, and accomplish results. which
however justified by considerations of
public policy. in the individual in
stance. work injustice and wrong. |
Indeed. this lies at the foundation of |
many of the harsh criticisms upon our |
profession, that its members while
keeping within the letter of the law.
violate its spirit and do that which
works injustice and hardship.
Now it is unquestioDably the duty of
this court, as of all other courts, not
withstanding the individual hardship.
to enforce all established rules of stat
ute, common law and practice; but it
does not follow from this that while
we uphold that which is done in ac-
cordance with those rules, we must
either commend or pass unnoticed the
conduct of counsel or party, which,
kept within the letter of the law. of
tends the sense of Justice or trans
crosses the bounds of professional or
gentlemanly conduct. 1t is of course
delicate matter TO criticise or con-
denim the action of client or counsel,
but We should be unworthy of the
trust repOSed in us il at any proper
time we failed to express our clear con-
domination of any conduct which Of
tends the rules of gentlemenly or pro-
fesSional intercourse. We would not
willingly wound, We would not unnec-
eSSariIy offend; but whenever in any
case coming before us there appears
any trespass upon the obligations of
gentlemenly or professional intercourse,
we should be false to our oath and re-
creant to our duty if we failed I'M
l-hesitatingly to condemn, or in extreme
case to disbar.
Pre- Using this, we may say that from
the facts now presented it seems that
the burden of our criticism was pro-
VOked by the failure of counsel to rec
ognize this fact and tender full eX-
PLANTATION of his conduct. 1t seems as
though then and now he thought the
! duty of this court was limited to dis
cussion of the legal rights of the par
ties and the legal effect of the action
of counsel. He placed himself then in
the position of saying, Il admit the
moral faint of my conduct, but IT Is le-
gally defensible, aud therefore it was
the duty of this court To uphold the
conduct and say nothing as to the
moral character" He evidently acted
upon this theory, and, presenting nc
explanation or defense. simply SAID
.sConceding it all to be true, what diff
ference does it maker" AS we have
already said, we conceive 1T to be ouI
duty to go beyond the mere consldera-
ton of the legal result and to critlclse
and condemn, to commend and ap-
prove, according to the moral
character of the act. We did
SO at the time that opinion
was filed, and we have ne
disposition to qualify or limit or with
draw the criticism then placed upon
the conduct of counsel as then dlSclos-
ed. But we take pleasure in saying
that from the representations OF TACT
as no% made by the gentleman and
other parties, it appears that while
not then presented, there were other
facts which Justify or at least palllate
his conduct, which show that he acted
not from mere desire to catch an ad-
Versary in legal trap, but partially
because in ignorance of what opposing
counsel knew, and what he had right
to suppose was known, and partially
| VI Gllo Liz
tender of the case made was received
He was not seeking to take simply a
technical advantage over his adver-
SarV or to deprive him of any just
rights he might have; but reasonably
supposing that his adversary1s cOun.
sci was fully informed of what had
been done and irritated by the manner
in which his tender of the case made
was. received, he simply Withdrew
from the conference, without com
ment, reply or information. As al
these acts are now presented they Ger
tainly do away with the burden OF oul
criticism and condemnation. He was
under no obligation to disclose thai
which he had right to suppose thu
opposing counsel knew, and which ht
had never agreed to state to sucl
counsel; and any gentleman may
withdraw from conversation which il
conducted in disagreeable and often
, sive manner. We gladly make this ex
, PLANTATION, and place it upon the records
of this court. We would not Willingly
do the slightest injustice to any cOun
sci or have any stigma upon his pro
fessional character. As heretOfOr'
said, we think counsel made grave
mistake.
When the case was then before u
he rendered no satisfactory denial O
simply said, ''If it is true, what diff
ference does it make?n Will,
we agree with him, that i
did not avoid the case made, we fei
= compelled to criticiSe and condemn hi
conduct.
Now he comes forward with a state
ment of himself and others, showing
facts which explain his conduct ant
, place it in very different light; and 81
r we set the explanation side by side will
the criticism, and close by saying tina
! the conduct as then charged and unex
3 planned, deserved the criticism theI
/ placed: as now explained by the state
+ ment of himself and others it plact
the matter in very different ligh
and shows that he did not in fact &C
so as to deserve the criticism places
: upon him. With these remarks, W
= leave the case and close the opinion.
Under apologies and explanations
with intercessions of other attorney
+ in Mr.. Cunningham's behalf. it certain
: ly must appear TO even the casual read
+ er that the above is yer
clever job of 'whitewashing;
I and leaves him in the pOsitio
of the boy who was excused, with tn
i injunction that he mustn't do
e again.
n But worse than anything that ha
: been published yet, is the fact that MI
Cunningham got "a tax deed to his cl
ent's land thus doing, himself, Writ
ally and practically, what he was en-
t pluyed to prevent another man froI
5 ,loBg Notwithstanding the tax dee
b was good upon its face, the suprem
court declared it void because it wa
S against public policy for an attorney
RIB his client while pretending TO loo
, alter his interests. 1t appears to u
r that for such acts of right-duwn treact
cry to the interests of client an al
torney should be disbarred. If Ri
f Cunningham had taken tie tax Gel
: tificate and turned it over to his ellen