New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1888-02-21
KINGLAKES CRIMEAN WAR.
NEW LIGHT ON NApoLEoNIsM.

infsrmsn 70 the Fail of Canrobert lime, PIP 1v''
142. Harper b Brsthsra
I.,,d Wellesley writing last year Of the Crimean
War. said: al often hear astcnishment expressed
A. our want OF success in that war; but looking
h.cr "a the events of the winter OF lS54-5o ana
NJ the foil, wing spring. summer and autumn my
sstonishment is that any considerable numocr Oh
Ms survived to return home and tell the story OF
our military inoapacity. This result can only be
.xn,,,ned by the fact that the Russian army was
then in every respect inferior even to ours as
hrhting-mach,ne." In truth OF the $4,000 dis
cipined troops that landed ct Eupator1a, very few
did return They left their bones before Sebasto
mol and in the cemetery at Scutari, and their
places were filled largely by the raw levies which
Lord Raglan declared to be useless for all fighting
purposes and whose want of stamina had so much
to do with that bloody repulse Of the attack on
the Redan which closed the war, so far as Eng
land WAS concerned. In humiliation.
The history over which Mr.. Kingake has spent
90 many years, and the elaboration Of which has
been protracted until the succession of far mghter
struggles has dwarfed the siege Of Sebastopol into
comparative insignifcanoe, remains and will re-
main alike important and interesting not indeed
as a record of English or French glory but as
demonstration how war should not be made NO
where can be there be found more remarkable
narrative Of Governmental Incompetence, official
laundering, red-tape imbecility, exasperatlng and
cruel waste of blood and treasure. The fifth
Amcrican) volume of Mr.. Kingake's work covers
the period from the morrow Of Inkerman TO the
fall OF Canrobeit; that is, from November, 1854,
TO May, 1855. The delay In his work has enabled
him to make use Of the new matter which was
rendered accessible by the fan of the Third Empire,
and while this material has been given to the
French public by NJ. Rousset, the main part Of it
is probably only now disclosed to English and
American readers The new light obtained by the
publication OF the Imperial war archives cannot
be said TO show Louis Napoleon in an attitude at
all difficult to make consist with what is known
Of his character but IL reveals the fact that during
the spring and early summer Of 1855 he was
playing las usual double game, and by meddhng
ignoranty with the conduct of the was
ncutralizing the forts Of the Allies and giving
the Russians 81 snal advantage in the contest
Mr. kinglake is atle to show that the Emperor,
impclltd according to his wont, to seek personal
glory by melodramatic imitation Of the first
Napoleon, conceived the idea of changing the whole
plan Of campaign in the Chersonese, and substitute
ing regular investment for the one-sded I'M
scientific siege then preceding Had the necessary
forces been available, investment failing the
prompt forward movement which should have
followed the Battle of the Alma and for which
Inkcrman furnished second. and equally ne
course. But the Emperor was nc soldier, and
the plan he framed wild, fantastic, and fatally
impossible, involving among other absurdities the
projection of three field armies, French and Eng
lish, on lines separated by difficult mountain
country that neither could have interposcd to
prevent the des ruction of the others in detail.
Imprcticablc rs the plan was however, 1t served
rs the excuse for the mission of General Mel to
General Canrobert's headquarters with instruc-
i H.
mandcrin-chief during three full months in 1855.
The idea that the siege should not be pressed
for the time being; that only a show of active
aggression should be maintained: that In the
meantime large reinforccments should be collected
OF Constantinope, and that the Emperor himself
should presently take command Of these and by
carrying out his plan end the war with o blaze of
glory.
Unfortunately for this programme the Russians
had to be recSoned with, and they had no interest
in waiting game. So while Canrobert under the
pressure of Mel and his Imperial master was hold
ing back much as possible declining all Lord
Raglans propositions for more active siegeworll,
and doing his best to keep every
thing in statu QUO Until the Emperor
ready, the defender OF SebastopOl Colonel Todc-
ben, insisted on taking instant advantage of every
act Of negligence and sloth on the part Of the
Allies. and when they slsckened their approaches
ne promptly reinforced his defence by throwing
out contemporaries which very soon began
10 have the effect Of siege works eveled against
the besicgers. The refusal Of Canrobert to at
tack these audacious Russian works could not
Int exercise q dcmoralzing influence upon the
French troops: aud when, in response to a wild
dispatch from the TuileIieS the French COM
mandcr recalled the expedition against Kertch
after it had actually got in sight Of the enemy,
the eject upon the morale Of the army was most
grave and even alarming Napoleon did not go
out 10 the Crimea. He feared to leave Paris so
long. and probably his apprehensiOns were well
grounded Bat his meddling and muddling had
enabled TOdleben TO strengthen Sebastopol greatly;
had deprived the April bombardment Of all util-
ity; had dcmoralized the troops; and had broken
Canrobert's spirit altogether.
Nobody more astOnisbed and perplexed
than the great Russian engineer who was so mag
nilicruly defending the place. when he saw the
Flagstaff and Garden Batteries reduced to ruins
by the bombardment, the way to the MalakOf
and Rcdan opened by the tremendous fire of the
Allies-and yet no assault delivered II was his
opinion then and always that if the allies had
attacked in force after the final bombardment he
could not have longer held SebastOpol He was
prepared 10 die hard, but he all the contin-
sencies clearly, and man knew better when
che possibilities of defence ended. Anerward.
when the MalakoG fell though the Redan could
not be taken by the English Prince GortchakOf
OF once withdrew from the south side of the har-
Dor There can be doubt that had the
ssult been delivered in Apri! instead Of Septem-
Der the same results would have been attained
with far smaller expenditure Of life. But
Louis Napoleon's vanity blocked the way 10
prompt termination Of the Siege and so Todleben
expecting the attack every day, as he saw the
havoc wrought by the heavy siege guns Of the
in lic haft
ness which let these opportunities pass, but while
wondering, none the less energetcally repaired
the breaches Of the day during the dark hours.
Considering the skill resource, energy and dash
of Todlcben. ard the immense superiority OF war
mat sial in his hands at first General WOseley's