St. Landry democrat., 1888-09-22

uorthward into Lees lines as they stood the
night OF July l, when Hills corps and Long
streets, all but one division, had arrived
1t was this elevation, known as the Warfield
Ridge, which it was necessary for Lee to oc-
cupy in order to counterbalance the advant-
age that would accrue to Meade from the
possession of Round Top, SO soon as he dis
covered it. All the morning Of the second
day. Wartield Ridge, Little Round Top, and
the Emmitsburg road remained unoccupied
by any force. Gen. Sickles says that he
could not have forestalled Lee on Warfield
Ridge, as he had not troops enough; that he
wrote Meade on the evening of the first day,
and told him personally as soon as he saw
hi1,a-frequently repeating the warning on the
morning Of the second day-that the weak
point in Gettysburg was the Union left, the
ground here described, with its approaches
covered all the way from Lees main
camps. Slckles maintained skirnish
line alorg EnmtsI urs Ridge, sending
out Berdan's sharpsnootcrs into the
woods beyond the Warfeld Ridge; and
made aware by their reports that Long
street and Hill were nassing behind the for.
est, he finally moved his whole line forward,
occupying Elnmitsburg road with Humph-
rey S division as far to the left rs Snerfeys
Peach Orchard. His second division, Biz
ney's, was placed at right angles with this,
its line extending southeast toward Little
Round Top. This was contrary to orders,
but it was plain then, and in the light of
Southern official records appears still palmer
now, that Lee was pushing Longstreets
troops toward this same point at the same
time. Longstreet's critics, headed by Gen.
Pendleton and followed by Lees biographer,
Gen. A. s. Long, of Virginia, assume that
he, Longstreet, acted contrary to orders in
that he did not get the high ground Mt the
Peach Orchard first The Peach Orchard
was Sickles' salient About o'clock, after
Meade had inspected what Sickles had done
and resolved to hold on to it, Longstree,i
made the attack and fought until dark to
gain the salient The first official criticism
Oh Sickles came from Gen. ualleck the
Union general in chief at Washington. Il
his official report he says that Siokles, mis-
interpreting Meads's orders in placing his
lines, committed ian error which nearly
proved fatal i'll tho battle" Gen. Meade did
not break the force of this censure by ary
word of his, but stated in his report that the
Third corps sustained the shock of vigor.
GUS assault "most heroically."
Now Gen. Sickles claims that his course.
by its very inlIrudence, saved the two
Round Tops to the Union cause, and through
them saved the battle. In his speech at the
reunion of the Third corps ut Gettysburg,
July, 1856, he said; "Tho best thing in my
line was the salient position, except the men
who held it. Whys Because it meant fight,
fight right there and then. Lines of battle
are controlled by the contour of the ground
where you must fight, unless you can force
your enemy to come and fight On ground
you choose II had waited on the line
extending from the left of the Second corps,
toward Round Top a line afording no adj
vantage for defense and none for attack,
the enemy would have seized the Round
Tops without q blow, and the Round Tops
were the keys of our position. The enemy
would have gained all the commanding
ridge in my front to the Emnitsburg road
for their artillery, the ground Gen. Lee says
he wanted to occupy to enable him to assail
our left. 1t is a cardinal maxim in war to
seize the enemys vantage ground when YOU
know he means to attack. By helping my
self TO the ground he wanted, and covering the
Round Tops, held the enemy until the
Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth
corps, and until Caldwalls division of the
Second corps could come into position on the
left: I held the enemy until $1,000 men