Evening journal., 1888-06-29
TIE RUSSIAN BEAR.
iEFERloRlTY OF THE MUscoWlTE
AS AN ALLY.

rho Great Unknown Quantity in Russia.
Defensive Strength Of the Country.
RIsEs OF a Franco-nussian Alliance.
Military rolnt OF View.
So much for France and her army; what is
she Russian situationi IL was not the French,
but our deplorablo military administration
that beat us in tho Crimea, say the Russian
generals. And the scandals revealed during
the Turco Russian war of 1S77-S show that
not much improvement in that quarter had
been made ia the q years which separate
5ebastopol from Plevna. The car is tho
sworn enemy Of peculation and corruption,
but, alone at tile summit OF the bureau
cratic pyramid, Alexander cannot reach
the lcgions of fibusters who swarm
around its base. He may make examples
Of colonies and some OF generals, but abuses
continue in spite Of imperial Efforts at their
suppression. It was ascertained very rc-
comfy that ia some Of the cavalry regiments
neither the men nor the horses received their
proper raiions; the guilty parties are medi-
tating in the Oural over their msdemeanors,
but there is no assurance and there can be
mono that, with the same maladministration,
4
same shortcomings Of quartermasters and
commissaries that disgraced the last cam
paign in Bulgaria. 1t is a woful pity, too,
4 Tor otherwise Russia would be the first Of all
military powers. She has numbers and she
has quality her infantry soldier is un-
! eqnaled; 70 the steadiness Of the German and
| the dash Of the Gaul he unites the sobriety Of
the Spaniard and the resignation Of the
Turk; he is enduring and he is ingenious;
and TO these splendid footmen Russia can
add an indefatigable and iunumerable cav
airy her sotnias Of Cossacks. these contaurs
Of the Steppes which, like the hordes Of At
tila, can inundate the territory Of her enc
mics, although the thiclkly wooded and
marshy frontiers Of European Russia are
less appropriate than is commonly imagined
to the movements and deployment of
mounted troops.
RUssIA's IEFERIoEITY.
But Russinn generals know not the value
Of their men Many Of them learned the
practice Of the art Of war in Bulgaria All
are educated officers, bold and brave Their
officers are confident, and inspire confidence,
and yet il must be admitted that neither
Russian generals, nor Russian officers nor
the Russian staff possess the same cohesion
the same science or the same experience as
those Of Germany. And supposing them to
be their equals, supposing an analogous unity
OF command, there would still always exist q
double inferiority-that arising from de-
fective administration and defective or in
sufficient means Of concentration. This last
point given general European war, is Of
capital Importance, especially for Russia's
eventual allies.
in France and in Germany the time neces-
sary for the mobilization Of 900, GOO OF men
can DO estimated TO within four and twenty
hours. In Russia that time is the unknown
quantity Of the redoubtable problem, and
without that unknown quantity it is impos-
sible to calculate the real value OF Russian
cooperation. How many days may be re-
quired or how many weeks or even months:
how many hundred thousand soldiers can
be mustered in the FIRST line how many in
tile second, how many in reserve nobody can
answer, for nobody knows how to answer,
and only one thing is absolutely certain, and
this the Russian newspapers confess, Rus
sia's mobilization must be ncomnarablv and
vastly slower than that Of either Of her
neighbors. Nor could it be otherwise. with
distance infinitely greater, with RAILWAYS
less numerous, less well appointed and man
nred. of ~, ne majority have only a
single track, and very few have specia. plat
forms for the embarkaton and landing Of
horses, troops and material. These disad-
vantages cannot be contested, and they alone
are sufficient to explain why, in provision Of
events, the m.,,erial government should have
taken th..sa precautions along the frontiers
:. .nich have so exercised the susceptibilities
Of Austria-Hungary,
Thts ,tnd.vfo1,la tt,farfarff4r - n,,crta 4.
especially dangerous to her future allies. At
homo Russia is safe; she may be invaded, as
she was by Charles VII and by Napoleon,
but Russia's invaders generally fare badly,
and to get ont Of her vast territory is easier
than to get into it, and what would be the
fate Of western ally not prudent enough to
adjourn its action until Russian mobilisa-
tion ba entirely completedi True. Russia's
enemies will scarcely allow her allies to select
their moment
THE RISKS NOT rouAL.
In a Franco-Russian alliance the risks are
not equally shared by both powers Russia
can bids her time, but France must bear all
the brunt from the outset. The gain Of tho
first battle would bring the Germans into the
heart Of Champagne; with a second victory
they might surge on to Paris, wtile thenorth-
fIJl AvllcouA WAuA4 neaANNtA Attt AAe llnMs
received by her provinces of Litkuania,
Esthonia and Poland. Every invasion Of
Russia has always ended il disaster to the
enemy; every invasion Of France has been
successful Perhaps railways may have de-
prived Russia Of that invulnerability which
was secured TO her id former days by dis
tances, and, perhaps, with a railroad at his
/ disposal, Napoleon might not havo been
/ forced TO evacuate Moscow. But there is
something about Russia which cannot be
seized upon She is, as one might say, a
4 species Of inorganic being without either
heart or head at which a fatal blow could be
dealt. She is not possessed Of one capital OF
which the capture would conquer a peace,
and with her climate campaigns cannot DO
indefinitely prolonged Supposing the cars
armies TO be always defeated, the victor
would be troubled IN cleaning the fruits Of
his triumphs. And TO what point must an
enemy advance before he can force Russia
TO ask for termsl Russia has power Of re-
sistanee resulting from her size aud from her
structure but this power Of resistance can
not be communicated to her allies. The
car may continue his struggle on the banks
Of the Don and tho Volga for months after