The intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1887-1891, 1888-01-28

county, is void, upon the ground that
there has been delegation of the leg !
islative power TO the people of the
district or county, who are thereby
authorized to vote, but that they simply
lay down the principle that an acl
which is mere Legislative preparation,
plan, or rejection, Is void on tina
ground. Was, then, the
act i'll question an expression OF the
Legislative will agreeably TO the forms
Of the constitution Did it receive it,
final sanction from that will, or did il,
80 far as the tax is concerned, claim It's
force and efficacy as law from the
votes of the electors of the levee dis
tricl2
"in most of the provisions of the act
it was mandatory. The assessment OF
the tax was positive and unconditional,
and ample provision was made tor It's
collection. The act made provision
for the appointment Of officers charged
with the administration of the fund
arising from the tax, and prescribed
the manner in which that fund was
TO be applied; and by express provis-
ion, the act went into force from the
date of ITS passage. 1t had all the
attributes of a law. The act was
complete, decisive, and final when it
left the hands of the legislature. The
power TO enact a law of necessity
includes the right to determine the
conditions upon which. in given case,
the law is TO come into operation.
Hence, when there has been no attempt
to surrender the Legislative function,
or to associate another power in the
enactment of law, il would, at the
least, he absurd to IhOld that all
act was invalid for the reason that its
operation was to be defeated or sus-
pended by the happening OF the pre-
scribed contingency. The right con-
ferred upon the electors Of the district.
to determine that one of its provisions
should not be carried into effect, was
as clearly ascertained and as much
fixed by the will of the law making
power as any provision contained in
the act. 1t seems, hence. too clear for
controversy, that the act did not dele
gate to the electors the right to pass,
or even approve it. On the contrary,
the vote of a majority against the col
lection of the tax can only be regarded
i'll the nature of a condition subsequent,
which might defeat, but which was
never Intended TO confer upon the act
validity, as an expression of the legis-
tative will. 1t was the act itself which
made the vote and prescribed the con-
sequences to result from ii.
1.-The prOviso to the first section
seems 20 have been misunderstood, as
il was in the argument assumed that
the vote of the majority of the electors
was essential to give effect to the pro-
visions assessing the tax. 1t appears
to us that the clear and manifest mean-
ing of the proviso is exactly the
reverse. A majority of the electors
might defeat the collection OF the tax,
and thus render the act, as TO one Of its
provisions. inoperative; but upon nc
principle of sound logic can il be held
that the majority vote was intended to
give validity as u law to the provisions
by which the tax was assessed. 1t was
designed TO prevent the execution of O
law which, by express declaration, had
previously gone into operation. The
act contains no provision that, If nC
election should be held, ii should in
respect to the tax, be defeated. Il
follows, therefore, with absolute GER
tainty, that it would have remained
valid and imperative, as Il law, if there
had been no election held or no vote
given.'
That case has been cited as announO'
ing principle that upholds the "Wool
Law" With what Justice this claim !.
made can easily be seen.
Bull VS.. Read, Is Graft, Is, held al
act valid which provided Tor system
of tree schools i'll particular aistric
in u county, and the levyiDg of u tsS
and lett it TO majority OF the voters I,
determine whether the act whicl
affected their own private and loca
interests should 90 into effect. But
in that case, those of Rice VS.. Foste
!; and Parker vs.. Com, supra, wa
disapproved. 1t would seem that th
Virginia case might, perhaps, ht
upheld upon considerations heretofore
noticed, and that no necessity existed
tor any view in conflict with the case
cited therein.
Under former charter OF the city ot
Rochester the common council wer,
authorized to grant licenses for the sal
of liquors, and might prohibit thei
Sdio Wv huO anu III pi ieOhhiOHt' -
amendment to the charter the granting
: OF licenses was remilted to the voter
of the city, and if prohibited in thi
way then such sales should be punished
etc. And the amendment was uphel'
for reasons similar to those given il
Com. VS.. Bennett, supra, State vs.
Cooke, "a MINI. 247.
An act conferred power on tn
county judges to grant licenses to sci
liquors, if the majority of the ireemen
at annual town meetings, should b,
their votes 80 determine. Anothe
section of the act imposed penalty TO
) selling without licenses, and the &C
was held valid. The then recent case
OF Rice VS.. Foster and Parker VS.. Com.
, supra, were discussed, and held not t,
apply. kellogg, j =. saying:
WAS not our statute a law i'll itsel
, when passed by the legislature? Ha
it not the force and authority of law in
dependent OF any action of the people
Can it be said that, before it receive
such force, 1t is TO be created ant
established by the people? We al
entirely satisfied that the law of 1876
subject to none of these objections
The law was complete i'll Itself whe
passed by the Legislature, and did no
require the creative power of the peo
pie, or of any body, To give il vitality o
force. The second section of tn
statute imposed penalty upon an,
person who should deal III the sale o
distilled spirituous liquors without
license therefor, AS provided i'll tn
statute. This amounts to 9n implie,
prohibition oi such aalo without
} license (Roby VS.. West, 1 N. Ii
2Sa0 Ii the people had never vote
! upon the question, US provided by tn
statute, tHc only consequence woul
. have been that licenses could not hav
5 been obtained; The statute WOnid haU
l relnaiHed IN force, and consequent
, those who engaged in The traffic woul
incur the penalty imposed by tn
e statute" bancroft vs.. Dumas, 2
| W., 456
In another case III the same state
: wac held TO be competent Tor tn
: legislature 10 prescribe that Law
. should go into effect on the seCOn
e Tuesday in March, 1853, but with
' pruviSu that The meetings OF treeme
. should be held on the second Tuesda
a OF February, 1888, and that the lay
! should take effect in March or Decem
Il ber, lS1a, accordingly as the vot
{ should he "yes or mo Estate vs
I Parker, % VT, 3j7.) Aud il WAS rule
"A that II popular vote was rs valid
, contingency as any oIher. In Wis
Il consln IN acl was held valid whic
: established II board ot public works |
e the city OF milwaukee,, il accepted b
e the legal voters of the city, at an elec
G ZION to lie held, etc. But this WAS $