Wichita eagle., 1888-07-01


Geld to watch and oppose him. Until it was
too late, Lee rushed headlong northward on
Pennsylvania soil, wholly unaware that his
antagonist was moving vigorously in the
same direction to intercept his columns.
Blinded by want Of knowledge in this re-
spect, be marched his widely scattered corps
into northern territory a dangerous distance.
Here, on hostile soil, believing himself safe
from pursuit, he divided his troops into three
bodies, and allowed them to become removed
from each other by more than days march.
When Lee was abandoning central Vir-
ginia to move north, the Union forces lay
on the Rappa hammock line, facing southwark,
and threatening to push on to Richmond;
and as tho Confederates sped their way to-
ward Philadelphia and Harrisburg, they
hoped that Hooker would remain there, Lees
sbillful Ieutenants keeping up the appear
ance Of having southern force in that Vi
entity in order to delude the Union COM
mander as to the real situation. But acct
dent enabled Hooker to foil Lee in his calcu-
lations BY means Of lucky captures of dis
patches and incidental cavalry siirmishes,
Hooker gained accurate knowledge that the
main part Of the Confederate army had not
only vanished from his front, but had Left
very gates of great northern cities.
On receipt OF this unexpected but timely
intelligence the whole Army Of the Potomac
turned northward in pursuit. just as the in
vader was prepared to seize his first prize,
Harrisburg; and, had it not been for the
knowledge thus accidentally obtained, Lee
would have been enabled to strike q heavy
blow before anything could have reached him
in the way of an opposing force.
It was through accident also that the Con-
federato leader found himself in this emer-
cency, without any swift moving cavalry to
bring reports of Rockers threatening opera
tons IN his rear to his headquarters, and
when the situation became suddenly revealed
to him through a chance scout, there was no
flying column at his command to fail upon
the advance of the different Union corps, as
they marched toward him by several distinct
routes For a leader like Lee this was an
unusual circumstance.
4 few squadrons of troopers, with their
horse batteries drawn np on each road, might
have harassad the Union infantry and
INSTRUCTED their progress considerably. But
the Army of the Potomac transferred to the
leadership of Meade, as it entered Pennsyl-
vania June 2S) moved on freely and conf
Utltl1 inlD lSIIllti1 FlUttlCdlIS uliIsT Inc
control OF Lees hostile bands Meade did
not encounter 50 much IS Q cavalry picket,
and this accident Of having no Confed-
crate cavalry in the way explains how it
happened that when Lee, who had had so
many days the lead of bisopponent, had got
ten his scattered corps Into conjunction to
meet the foe he saw springing so lightly
across his track-the foe he had so carefully
was actually i'll his presence, in line, ready
for combat.
OF tho actual battle field events at Gettvs-
burg there are a series Of strange things to
relate. During these three days, of tie
warmest portion Of tho year, the unusual
heat wss very much mitiEated by light
breezeS, the sun being frequently yelled by
the clouds. Yet not q drop of rain fell till the
afternoon of the 4th. Seveuty-six degs
marked the extreme heat the first dav, 81
degs, thu 2d. s. dess. the Sd. The average
for the three entire days was :, degS Had
the rain, which fell from the 18th to the 9th,
come on the ID the roads would have been
impossible, the forced marches of the Union
soldiers could not have been made, and the
slopes Of the ridges on the field would have
been SO slippery aS TO make the scaling Of
them difficult, If not impossible Had it not
raiEed on the night Of the 18th Of June, ISIS
the future of Europe would have been
changed. 4 few hours Of water, more or less,
Frustrated Napoleon at Waterloo; storm
On the lst or - Of July. 1853. might have
been fatal % N5ade's army ard 70 the Union.
again the commanding general Of the
Union advance, Reynolds, who had selected
the field and made me plans TO fight the
opening hattie, feil morally wounded in the
FIRST hour Of conflict, and Of the four gen
erals-Howard, Hancock, Sickles ard Slo-
cum-wLo next made their appearance on the
scene, il 50 happened that the last orc 10 arrive
was superior in authority to the ones pre,ei-
ing, and by virtue Of his rank assumed ct'ul-
-nand. So there was no permanent director
OF affairs until after desperate battle Lad
been lost, an army crushed and good ground
abandoned A greater misfortune still, q
more vital canSeg Uence than all, was the lac:
ttlaJ the proper Union commander, Meada.
reached the front more than twelve hours too
late. Gen Re yrolds was killed on the morn
Ing OF Juls :, and Gen Meade did no. reach
the lines Of REYNOLDS defeated troopS until
after midnight On the other hand, it
proved a circumstance favorable 70 the
Union cause that q chain Of natural fort III
cations existed 81 Gettysburg, consisting OF a
high ridge, terminating al either end il rock
bound CreSts. Wei sheltered by woods. This
ridge guarded two roads leading from the
south, the Baltimore pike and the Washing
ton road, while Il commanded another Wash
lngton road, al three roads being routes Of
march for the Union army northward This
81 IL