National Republican., 1888-02-02

act; ard yet the Congress Of lSG0'Gl aim
ply and persIstenuy refused TO pase
any act or to adopt any reso-
luton either to preserve the Union
by peaceful measures or to grant to
the Executive the power Of aggression, or to
increase and define his power OF defense"
"And yet Mr.. Buchanan desired and etroye
to serve his country. He bad asked Con-
gress for those powers necessary TO meet
the Unprecedented condition OF things, but
whose exercise without the action OF Con
gress he deemed impossible. To all OF
treated him with indifference, II not
with contempt" upon one point
he was innexible, and from 1t he never
wavered, and that was his determination
never, under any pressure OF circumstances,
to surrender the forts at Charleston, and to
this resolve he adhered to the last"
Shortly before his death, in August, 1883,
Judge Black, writing In answer TO letter
Of Mr.. jefferson Davis, said "rhe de.
mand for the evacuation OF Fort Sumter
and the surrender into the hands OF South
Carolina was, take 1t all In all, the most
impudent in the history Of the world"
President Lincoln had no sooner taken
his seat than he was beset with the same
difficulties which had caused his prede.
cessor so much concern and trouble.
The Montgomery commissioners, with Asso-
ciate Justice James a. Campbell, Of Ala
bsma, who shortly afterwards resigned
his seat on the Supreme Bench, and many
other pronounced secessionists, were on
hand, all demanding the evacuation OF
Fort Sumter. Justice Campbell, who had
ueed his influence with President Buchanan
10 trying In vain 10 get him to dlsavow
the act Of Major Anderson In removing his
command to Fort sumter, sought stlll, also
"hy hie personal Influence with the new
administration, to bring about peaceful
solution of the difllculties,n and the first
step toward that most desirable end was
they insisted the rellDqushment OF Fort
sumter into the possession OF the Mont.
goRerS government.
"A watlike construction saysGen Craw-
ford) Of the inaugural Of MIR. Lincoln was
placed upon It by the southern element at
Washington On the 18th of March Gen
Beauregard assumed command OF the
troops at Charleston. "Friends at Wash.
ington kept him fully informed Of any pos.
siole movement. ON the same day
Commissioner Crawford reported TO
his government that the selections
made OF the advisers OF the President would
prove beneficial TO the confederate states
and that 1t was the determined purpose OF
the Secretaries OF State and War Seward
and Cameron to accept and maintain a
peace policy" lie deemed It advisable TO
support MIR. Stewards policy Of peace, be.
Nduet Ht ltll NpIH'ltUI IL NOulu lchu 10
"ctment the coDfederacy and put IL be-
yoId the reach OF either his arms or his
diplomacy" son the llth Of March Sena.
tor Wigfall Informed the confederate gen.
eral by tell graph that It was believed AN
deison will be ordered to evacuate Sumter
in five days, and that this was certainly
Informally agreed upon 10 Cabinet Saturday
night Gen. Beauregard thereupon wrote
Maj. Anderson that lie had been informed
that Mr.. Lamon, the authorized agent Of
the President, had. after seeing Mai. Ander-
son, informed GOV. Pickens that the com
mand was to be transferred in few days
to another post. He added that "all that
would be required Of him would be his
word OF honor as an officer and gentleman
that the fort, with Its armament, and all
public property should remain without any
arrangen ents for its destruction; that
company and side arms might be taken,
and the flag saluted."
Maj. Anderson replied that iii he could
| leave the fort only upon such pledge he
would never, so help him God, leave this
fort alive.'n
There were fears that the fort would be
undermined and the New York CumUlcrci0i
| .idceytiScy said, "lf Sumter must be aban-
doned, let II be a shapeless mass Of ruins.n
Commissioner Crawford professed great
impatience at the delay, as did also the au-
thorities at Charleston. Said the former,
"The evacuation OF Sumter is imperative"
Still, Judge Campbell advised patience.
ON the 18th OF March he drew up the fol.
| lowing memorandum, which "receiyed the
approval Of Mr.. Justice Nelson" who,
with him, was striving for peace, "and its
contents having been communicated to the
Secretary Of State, was handed to the COM
missioner, vi o at once advised the authori-
ties at Montgomery
81 feel perfect confidence IN the fact that
-... 81.
| five days, and that this is felt to be a
measure imposing vast responsibility upon
the administration.
81 feel perfect confidence that no meas.
ure changing the existing status Of things
prejudically to the southern confederate
states Is at present contemplated.
81 feel entire confidence that any imme-
diate demand for an answer TO the com
muniCation Of the commissioners will be
productive Of evil and not Of good. dc
not believe that II should be presstd.n
~ earnestly ask for delay until the ef.
feet Of the evacuation OF Fort Sumpter can
be arcertaiued-or al least for few days,
| say ten days"
lion. John Bell, Of Tennessee, we are
told, strongly urged Mr.. Lincoln mot 10
disturb the, confederate states. He had as
sured him that any attempt to collect the
revenue or to interfere wi its government
would he the signal for the secession Of
every border siate.n
"1he reluctance manifested upon the
part Of the committee to yield to any de
lay,n II appears, was "largely assumed, u
as Gen. Craw ford states that Col. Forsyth
one Of the committee, told him in 1870 that
their secret Instructions from Montgomery
were ito play with Mr.. Seward to delay
and gain time until the south was ready. q
On the same day 18th OF March) Presi
dent Lincoln wrote to each of his Cabinet
officers, asking written answer to tn,
following question "Assuming 1t to b,
possible to now provision Fort Sumter
under the circumstances is 1t wise to at
hmpt 1t ~
| Mr. Seward answered by \ long letter
i'1m which make the following extracts
II II were possible W peacefully provision
! ont sumter, OF course should answer tina
II would be both unwlse and innuman not tt
attempt 1t; But the facts Of the case are
known TO be that the attempt must be made
by the employment OF military and marin,
force, which would provoke combat aud
| probably initiate n civil war, which the gov
ernmeDt Of the United states would be com
mitted 10 maintain through all changes I,
some definite conclusion.
| Influenced by these sentiments, have icl
that II iseXCeedingly fortunate that TO Il greu
extent the federal government. occupies thu
far not an aggressive attitude, but praCti1all!
defensive one, while the necessity Tor nc ion
il civil war is to be Initiated falls on lhos
who seek 10 dismemDer and 10 subyert th,
Union.
The policy Of the time, therefore, ha
seemed to me to consist in COnCilintiOn, whiGl
should deny TO dsunonists any new provoca
ton or apparent 0iiense, while II would onNh
the unionlsts IN the slave states TO maintain
with truth ana with effect that the alarm
and hpprehensons put forth by the disunion
lists are grouudless and false,
TIT he indeed true that payiECnl.On is nee
>0ry 10 prevent dlsmembcImeul Of the lnO
and civil war or either Of them, NJ llriOt AN
lover Of humanity could hesitate to slrrcuhc
party for the higher Interests OF country an
humanity.
Partly by design, partly 10y chance, mi
policy has DCgu hitherto pursued by the LAT
administration OF Tie federal gov rnmcni an
ny the. Republican party in It's corp Irete ~
ion. II IS by this policy thus pursued th!nR
that the progress Of iIsmCmOCrneui has bee