The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1888-01-28

that they conspired for the purpose OF inducing
the inspector To surrender his papers. and that
certain acts were done in order accomplish
that purpose. 1t was not necessary, In order
that the offepse be complete, that the purpose
should actually have been accom- pshed 1t was
only necessary that some step be taken by one
or more of the cons pirators for the purpose of
effecting the object: whether successfully taken
wonld be immaterial, only as it might be ma
terial as matter of evidence in the case. And
right here i might say that the evidence in the
case has turned mainly upon the rEutilations,
because when you settle-if you able upon
the evidence TO settie-who were concerned In
the mutilation of these papers. then, Of course.
you know who were concerned IN getting the
inspectors to surrender them. The crime was
complete before the mutlation, but you might
find the most convincing evidence of the crime
in the mutila.on that was sfterward committed.
Now then, it has been remarked before you
that this is new kind of case, az If the ike
had never been beard of before. Conspiracy is
not a kind of crime, and / do not suppose
when counsel spoke of this case as being new
kind of case that they neanrto intimate that a
conspiracy was a thing novel to the law; but 1t
was meant. take it. to indicate that a prose
cution for conspiracy to do this kind OF a thing
was new, as Il there were no precedent Tor IT.
That IS mistake, gentlemen, as l will
more fully explain after while. This kind of
charge. almost iGenticaly has been made before,
prosec uted to the conviction of q defendant, his
case appealed TO the Supreme Court Of the
United states, or taken to that
court, and the rightfulness of the proceed
ure and the jurisdiction of the court
IN sIch fully affirmed Other cases are
found in the reports Of the procedures of dis
trct courts that have not gone to the Supreme
Court; hut that You may fully understand that
the law Ut this is not settled only by this
court. but has been settled by higher authority,
] viii say to YOU that of the justices of the
Supreme Court Of the United states mas nao
under consideration this identical case, that is
the frat indictment that was returned IN TINS
case, and 50 far as the question of jurisdiction
and the right of the court to take cogniZance OF
the case the questions were identical with what
they now, and the same facts embraced IN
the indictment now. but in a little different
form, that Is, embraced IN several counts lnsteao
Of Il single count. in the present indictment
Justice Harlan. of the Supreme Court came In to
the case in this way: Mr. Coy. being one OF the
defendants, in order to get this question be-
before the Circuit Court-we sit here in the
District Court, from which there is a right of
appeal TO the Circuit Court-was surrendered
by his bail and went to jail and then applied OF
the Circuit Courtfor writ of habeas corpns,
setting out that in substance he was unlawfuly
detained in prison. and giving the reasons why.
setting forth these proceedings, and claiming
that they had without jurisdiction; tEat
this court had no right to be prosecuting or en-
PERTAINING this kind of case. Justice harlan,
of the Supreme Bench, heard that application,
and rendered the decision from which will
read some extracts to you. After setting out
the statutory provisions to which l have re-
ferred you and the indictment which was before
him, and also the Indiana statute pertinent to
the subject, the Judge, among other things,
said
Here Judge Woods read from the decision of Jus
tce Harlan delivered in this city in the habeas cor
pus last extracts fully sustaining the
jurisdctio of the federal courts in such cases. and
the Interpretation put by Judge Woods upon the en-
acments of Congress and the statutes of the State
ferred TO- and referring others to the case of
Clarke 100 United States Reports after read
ing which, Judge Woods proceeded:l
This case, ex parte Clarke. is the one to
which / referred while ago as the case involv-
ing the legal principles involved here that had
been tried before and carried to the Supreme
Court OF the United States That case arose in
Cincinnati. a dozen or more years ago, and the
facts substantially about it were that one of the
inspectors permitted his sealed bag to be taken
out of his custody and off to the Seybot
Exchange, some block in Cincinnati, and
there the. tally sheets were altered In respect to
local Offices, just as done in this The
Inspector. Clarke. had nothing to do with the
alterations himself. except the surrender of his
bags; he was careful not to know what was
done with them; and for that offense
he was indicted and found guilty, ad-
judged to suffer the penalty of the
law, and the taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States. That was not n con-
spiracy case; It against the inspector, but it
involved the Interpretation of these laws, and
the Jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States to enforce these laws and 1t is perfectly
plain and clear, as Justice Harlan has decided,
that if the inspector is wrong in surrendering
his papers. and punishable, as Clarke was held
to be. all who conspire to induce him to
violate his duty by surrendering his paper. and
that is the particular charge that we have in
this instance.
Now, then, it is upon that charge that you are
called to investigate the evidence and determine
whether these defendants are guilty not
guilty. These defendants, as in the case OF
every one arraigned for criminal offense. are
presumed to be innocent until they are
proven guilty. That presumption goes with
them until is overcome and blotted out
by the evidence and you not permitted to
find them gullty-it is not permitted in any case
to find one accused of crime guity-until the
evidence establishes his guilt beyond reason
able doubt Now as a rule, on that subject OF
reasonable doubt, am not accustomed to en-
large 90 into definitions. Men of the expert
ence Of those called to act jurors in this court
may ordinarily be trusted TO determine for them
selves what is a reasonable doubt; but much
emphasis has been laid upon that question in
the argument before you, and it becomes proper
that l should instruct you more particularly.
The definition of reasonable doubt" pre-
sened by counsel for defendants, was net strictly
accurate. He introduced into it one element
that does not belong b to It, rsf That dea
had it's origin in this State believe, in the
of Bradley vs.. the State, decided by the Supreme
Court of this State, where it stated there that
there must be such certainty as would justify
TO the mind action not only in matters of import
auce but in those of the highest import involv-
ing dearest interests. Counsel added. with
peated emphasis. that the evidence must be of
such certainty that the juror could Instantly act
upon it in matters OF this kind. There arc no
conditions circumstances upon which juror
rs called to make up his mind instantly about
any question The whole idea of having the
jury in the box is that they shall carefully, dis
passiopaiely and calmly deliberate. and from
testimony-not instantly or hastily-but de-
liberately, make up their minds upon the
question of guilt or innocence. However,
in this there is better definition, in
my judgment, and, indeed, / think the Supreme
Court of Indiana, in "a later decision has
itself approved of better definition of that GER
tainty which ought to prevail in the mind of the
jury in order to meet this requirement. that
shall be reached without reasonable
doubt. 1t is not a mathematical certainty that
Jurors required to come to. If that were so,
criminals would go UNPUBLISHED, of course. be-
cause, / reckon it seldom if ever happens that
any one is arraigned and convicted upon evil
denee which might not be put In doubt by
lecture and by throwing into the case sug-
cestions which were sought from abroad aud
not found in the evidence. When men plead guilty
there is absolute mathematical certainty
that they are guilty; it is often done for pur-
pose Moral certainty is what the jury is
required to reach before they convict. and moral
defined by law writer, approved
by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the volume
which hold in my hand, is AN impression pro-
duced by facts in which reasonable mind feels