Wichita eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1886-1890, 1888-09-13
FLAMING LITTLE PHIL
THE MAN WHO CAME NEAR SPOIL
ING SHERlDAN'S RIDE

Tells the Confederate Side of the Famous
Double Battlefield of Cedar Creek-Gen.
the Subject.
From the following statement it appears
that had the battle been carried on according
to Gen. Gordon's plan, even Sheridan himself
could not have saved tho day, though she
rode from Winchester, twenty miles away. "
Gen. Gordon has still the look of warrior
who could prove an ugly enemy on the bat
tiefieId, though this chat with him in the
Gettysburg hotel demonstrated his effability
and winning qualities when recounting to a
former foe the strange chain of events OF that
wonderful day on the sinuous banks of Cedar
creek. The old rebel leader was seated at
table between Gen. Daniel Z. Sickles and
Gen Hunt, the well known chief of artillery
of the Army of the Potomac. Responding to
the salutatioa of The Herald representative,
Gen. Gordon opened the way at once for con-
versation.
General, I am told that the splendid bit
of strategy by which we were surprised on
the morning of the 10Th of October is to be
wholly credited to yoGf'
was the conduct of the fight up to a certain
point
"For the time being we wono ne of the great
victories of the war Every detail of the
movement was carefully planned, and for
twelve hours it was supremacy successful /
had gone the day before Oct. IS, to the top
Of what is called Massanutten mountain,
bod ., nti
had taken observations through the field
glasses. There was a magnificent birds eye
view The Shenandoah was the silver bar
between us. On the opposite side of the river
could distinctly sec the red cuffs of the
Artillerists. Why, had so good q view that
could see the sore spots on the horses backs
IN your camp. In front of the Belle Grove
mansion could see members of Sheridan's
staff coming and going / could not imagine
better opportunity for making out an enc
my's position and strength. l could even
count the men who were there. The camp
was spIendidly exposed to me. I marked the
position of the guns and the pickets walking
to and fro. and observed where the cavalry
WAS placed
at flashed upon me Instantly that the ex-
pectation of Gen Sheridan was that we
would attack him on his right, which was
the only place supposed possible for the ad-
vance of any army His left was protected
by the Shenandoah; at this point the noun
tain was very precipitous, and the river ran
around il. There was no road at all, and the
point was guarded only by a mere cavalry
picket. l saw our opportunity in an instant,
and | told the officers present that if Gen.
Early would permit me TO move my corps Il
was thcn commanding Ewell's corps down TO
this point could get around the mountain.
Both sides believed this was impossible, but |
felt sure that it could be done Ny plan was
to dismount our cavalry, attack Sheridan's
cavalry when dismounted, and keep them
from moving. | knew that if we could do
this we would gain great victory"
GEN GoRDoN'S PLAN.
:, ''What were tine details of your plan4r
''There was a back road running from our
position on Fishers hill 10 the Federal right,
where the cavalry was posted. l expected to
deceive the Federals by Lomax's attack. II
would be dark still, and they could not dis
tinguish our dismounted cavalry from in
fantIy and would believe that our main
attack was there on their right. This would
leave us free Go operate around their left"
''How did Gen. Early receive your pro-
posalF'
THE plan was submitted, talked over, and
finally substantially agreed upon. | took
my command, having ordered them TO leave
their canteenS, sabers and everything that
could make a noise behind. ] knew that our
only dependence was i'll absolute secrecy and
in complete surprise. After inspecting
things with my staff l found | could get my
men around the mountain by putting them
in single file. | discovered still another
place where the horses could be led. although
the venture would be exceedingly dangerous
Still, the expedition was essentially one of
great peril, and more or less danger was of
little consequence"
''How is it that the Union scouts had never
discovered this possibility OF turning the left
at Cedar creekl'
''Well, sharp men often leave a loophole in
war, and, besides, Sheridan did not depend
on shutting up this possible path, l suppose"
replied Gen. Gordon.
You must remember, general, that Sheri-
dan had issued orders which, had they been
obeyea by the officer commanding in his alb
sence, would have rendered your surprise i'm
possible"
But taking things as they were, the sur
prise was not only possible but actual, anG
we did what none of your people for g mo-
rlent dreamed OF as possible. Early in the
night l began TO move my men around the
mountain My object was 10 have them
al ready for an attack before daylight
in the morning. The movement took all
night. All through the hours of dark
ness the silent figures moved 10 their
position near the sleeping enemy. An entire
brigaie of cavalry was moved in this wav.
and reached the point in shout one and a half
hours III advance of the men / instructed
the cavalry that as soon as / got resdy to
move they were 20 proceed In my front, rush
across the river, open on the cavalry pickets,
and capture them, if possible Ii they could
not do this, they were TO put their horses 10
full speed. ride right through the federal
camp, firing their pistols to the right and TO
the left as they passed through, and make
directly for Sheridan headquarters and cap
ture him. At that time l did not know that
Sheridan was absent and Wright In COM
mand | had selected his house from the flags
which foated from il, and the couriers who
were constantly going In and out
THROUGH THE FEDERAL CAMP.
'My orders were: 60 right through the
Federal camp with your command before
daylight aud right TO Gen. Sheridan's head
quarters. Capture him. told them not 70
try 10 take any prisoners, not 10 mind any
thing. but every mounted man was TO -presa