The intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1887-1891, 1888-01-21

DDWcI VI every COIllIlOHWCbith, III al
forms OF government: First. They are
to govern by promulgated established
laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rIcn and
poor, tOr the favorte al court and the
countrynau at plough.
Fourthly. The Legislative neither must
nor can transfer the power of making
laws to anybody else, or place it any
where but where the people have"
UOcke ca Civil Govt, Sec l42.)
Guided by these declarations of
principles, principles
everywhere admitted aud nowhere
denied, I will proceed TO discuss the
point in hand in connection with the
authorities cited l. the Wood Law Il
delegation ot the legislative power!
Although the adjudicated cases are
numerous which discuss the question
whether such power has been delegated
i'll given instances, and although the
may seem at first blush
to differ quite widely, yet, when
examined more narrowly, however
much those decisions apparently differ
in most insI ances, there will be found
on the W Iole substantial uniformity.
III D'1iG Vs. FlOiiy IL My OSo, tuS
question presented was whether the
Legislature could invest the
county court with power to suspend,
by order to that effect, the act of 1851,
being empowered 80 to do By the 33rd
section # that act. Aud the power
was den ed and the section mentioned
held mI Unconstitutional and void. In
delivering the opinion of the court,
Gamblej j discussed the subject in Il
very able manner. In the cOurse of
his observations he says:
"The constitution Of each house OF
the general assembly is provided for in
the constitution, the qualification Of the
members, and the electors who choose
them. The mode in which bills shall
be passed and authenticated is also
directed, and the machinery is com
plete for the exercise of the Legislative
power conferred upon the general
assembly. The power thus conferred
is the power to make laws, and the
exercise OF the power is entrusted to
bodies Of men, who are supposed to be
selected by the great body OF the people
entitled to vote, because of their pru-
dence, wisdom and integrity. The
laws to be passed form the rule OF
civil conduct, commanding what i,
right and prohibiting what is wrong
and that rule derives its force from the
fact that it is the will of the whole
people expressed by their authorized
representatives, in the forms provided
by the constitution, and Oh subjects or
questions Oh which the representatives
have been entrusted to act. This
power, thus reaching every citizen, in
every relation and every interest, is TO
be regarded as sacred trust, which is
to be exercised by those to whom il
has been committed, and every citizen
has right to demand that the rule for
his conduct shall be established by
that body in which he, with his other
fellow citizens, has vested the power.
That portions of the people are some.
times organized as municipal corpora
tons. and are intrusted with the power
OF making bylaws and ordinances fOi
the regulation OF their own local and
peculiar interests, and to which theiI
assent il given in the mode provided
by law, does not make an exception tC
the rule that the legislative power
conferred upon the general assembly il
| W uC chGlCl5Cu OS tuhl uouJ, hO
TO be delegated to others. The history
of such corporations, their existenc'
in the country previous to the adoption
OF the constitution, the principle o
presumed consent to ordinances, ,subjec
to the laws OF the state, stands OF
peculiar grounds, and is not part O
the general legislative power which j
commit ed to the general assembly, L
be exc -:ised only by that body"
. The Garned judge then approvingl
, cites the case OF Parker vs. Com,
, Barr, 507, and the principle announce
. therein, to the effect that an act giVin
to the citizeus of certain counties th
. power to decide whether the sale q
vinous or spirituous liquors should b
5 continued within such counties, an
5 imposing penalty tor their sal
where majority OF the votes had bee
} against such sale, was unc0nstitutiona
5 goes on to say:
. "The difference between the statut
. which was before the supreme court {
/ Penusy wanna and that now unde
| consideration is, that the entire &C
there depended, for its force in an
4 county, upon the popular vote bein
' which was not to be binding az
law, W lille the act before us, being
| its OWL terms the expression of tn
c judgmJ Jlt and will of the Legislature
: allows 10y its thirtY-third section, I'll
/ Judgment and will of county court
e set aside that of the legislature all
y adopt q different rule The differen(
9 between tho two acts is more in torI
l. than substance. The question passe
= upon by the voters in Pennsylvan
= was whether a law previously existin:
t which authorized the issuing of licens'
for the sale of liquor, should be SUI
F., pended for year, SO that no licens
= during that time should be issued, an
l. as the majority of voters determined
i the law was or was not in force. Th
Z question in our act, which is to
$ passed upon by the court, is wheth'
> the new act shall be suspended aud Il
t old act revived, and if SO, for how lon
= a period" Then, after noticing til
II decision in Rice vs.. Foster, 4 Ilarr, AZ!
II and stating that the act Was precisel
Y like the Pennsylvania act, and IL
= silnilallreasons held void, he remark.
j. "rhe opinions delivered by the iudg'
1 enter large into the consideration {
= the nat IRE of the powers entrusted
= the legt tslative department, and enfor'
C the duly of the legislature 10 exerci'
, the powers upon their own respons
!, bility. 1t is clearly shown that Il
Il power, thus committed by the peOp
u into the hands of their constitution
y representatives, is not to lac delegate
= to others not trusted by the people; NJ
II is it within the contemplation of Il
i constitution that the rcpresentativ,
t. shall attempt to yield up the power
e any portion OF the people themselves
III In another case in the same volume
l. Gamble, j., clearly points out the di'
=, tinctiOu between acts which may {
may not be referred to pOpult
|, action. He says 1t may be prope
a however, to state, that 1t is not by III
I means clear to the minds Of the cou
q that tie act under consideration,
: or processes to be, u delegation OF legi
: lative power. The establishment OF
1 county lpon the consent of the inhal
- itants to assume the consequent bu
h dens is not like the submission of
: law affecting private rights to the vO
OF the inhabitants of particular Il
= cality to determine whether IL shall
e in force or not" Estate vs.. Scott,
1 Mo-, 52l }
/ In city of st. Louis vs.. Alexande
l. % Mo 4s3, the' constitutionality of
' law authorizing the county court
c ST. LOUIS county TO submit Ia the vote
; OF the county the question OF subscrit
N | .,N,r Of tn Inn nj ofn