St. Landry democrat., 1888-09-22
LEES FATAL DECISION

Councils were he'd that night in the Con-
federate camps also, but there does not seem
to have been g conservative principle present
strong enough to control; for in face of Lonr-
street. renewed opposition Lee made prepar-
atoms for assaulting Meede's main limo on
Cemetery Ridge the next day. The decision
was i'll accordance with the spirit of the bour.
about Confederate headquarters. 1t was said
there that the Union line was made up OF
militia, and that the defeats it had sustained
on the Emmitsburg road and at Culps Hill
that second day, as we'll as the disaster to the
First and Eleventh corps on the first day.
showed that the army on the heights was a
despicahIe rabble. Longstreet SAYS he told
Lee that bis scouts reported that there was
still opportunity to move around to the right
Of Meade's army, ard rnaneuver him into
attacking. Lee, pointing to Cemetery
Hill with his ''ii;t," replied s'The enemy ia
there, and an going to strike him. Against
this Lonsstreet urged his great experience
with soldiers in attack, and said: 1T is nv
opinion that no 1900 men ever arrayed for
battle can take that position But Long
street was Immediately ordered to prepare
Pic.lett'S column for the famous attack.
When the the hour came to send the columns
forward, he Uongstreetl failed to give the
order in positive terms, and it has been
asserted that his Indifference was SO con-
spicuous that it affected the men His own
version, borne out by number of witnesses.
is this: pickett said to ne: General, shall I
advanced My feelings had so overcome me
that would not speak for fear of betraying
my want Of confidence to him. | bowed
affirmation and turned to mount my horse.
Pickett Immediately said: I shall lead my
division forward, SIR"
Longstreet put in his last reserves, every
thing not already in line OF battle, before the
enemy. Longstreet says: "When this charge
tl.ckett's) had failed expected that of course
the enemy wolll throw hinself against on,
shattered ranks and try to crush u.s." Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton writes about this critical
moment as follows: "Froln the suddenncss
of the Fepulse Of tho last charge on July s it
became necessary for Gen Meade to decide at
once what to 60. | rode up to him. and after
congratulating him on the splendid conduct
OF the army, said: General, | will give you
half hour to show yourself great general.
Order the army to advance, while | take the
cavalry, get in Lees rear, and we'll finish
this campaign in a week" Gen. John c.
Robinson, who commanded division in the
First corps, and knew the situation well, told
Meade that Lee should not be allowed to re-
cross tho Potomac. On July 5, when it was
evident that Lee was preparing to retreat,
Meade called another council, and submitted
the question Of attacking | ee on Seminary
Ridge Tho vote was opposed to attack, and
so tao abIes5 soldiers in the army sustained
Meade in holding to the principle laid down
the year before under like circumstances, ut
Antietam by Mcclellan When urged by
Franklin and Slocum at Antietam to order
an assault Mcclellan used the same language
attributed to Meade at Gettysburg, 1--WE have
done well as it il.
The controversies relating to the general
campaign of Lees invasion are too important
to be treated in the limits of this paper. and
do not properly belong to the story of tho
battle THE most important one of these re-
lates to tho movements OF Gen. j. IT, Is.
Stuart, leader OF the Confederate cavalry.
He has been charged with disobedience OF
orders, and with going off on a wild raid
around the Union army, and causing great
embarrassment to Lee by hisabsence. Stuart
was killed in 1854, and never explained his
conduct beyond what was given in bis official
report By this it appears that he used bis
customary discretion, and according to his
champion, Col. John S. Mosby, he left more
cavalry with the main column than he took
with him on his raid toward Baltimore. For
some reason the Army of the Potomac got
between tuart and Lee, and Fitzpatrick.
with the Union cavalry, kept forcing Stuart
further and further from his chief, SO
that he did not join the army until the morn
ing of the I'll, and then with his men and
horses in a jaded condition. 1t was cam
paign of lnishaps all around, and explanations
that do not explain have been in order ever
since the battle took place. The investiga-
tons made by congress and the awards be-
slowed By that body drew the attention Of
men who, bat for that, would have allowed
their own private views and grievances to
remain in o1scurity.
GEORGE t. KILMER. J