Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1887-12-29
LOCAL OPTION.
The Wood Local Option Law Sus-
tanned by the Supreme Court.
Elaborate Affirmative Opinion by Chief
Justice Norton, the Entire Bench,
Justic- Sherwood Excepted.
COncurring Therein.

JEFFERSON CITY, NO., Dec. 1e.-The
1ong-looked-for decision in the Grundy
County local option case was rendered to-
day, Chief Justice Norton handing down
the following opinion:
In the Supreme Court of Missouri, October
term 1887. State ex rel, ETC., respondent, VS.:
w. H. Pond ct al, Judges OF the County Court
OF Grundy County. appellants.
1t is admitted that in pursuance OF the pro-
election was held in Trenton, !. town having
more than ,J0I inhabitants, which resulted in
of intoxieating liquors After this result was
ascer5aineG, the relator applied TO the County
Court of Grundy County for license to keep
dram-shop in said town. having fully complied
with the provisions OF what is known in COM
mon parlance the Downing dram-shop law.
The County Court refused to grant the license,
ON the ground that the act OF the Legislature
above quoted forbid the soie OF intoxicating
liquors in said town, majority OF the voters,
at an election held FOR that purpose having
voted against such sale. The reiator there
upon instituted this proceeding by mandamus
TO compel the County Court TO grant him
license. The Circuit Court Lsld the above act
to be unconstitutional and ordered o peremp-
tory writ commanding the County Court to
grant the license, and this is the judgment from
which the respondents have appealed to this
court, and the only question which the appeal
requires to be decided is, whether the said act
is valid or void
No question of more delicacy or importance
ever comes before o court OF last resort than
act passed in due form by the leg iSlative de-
partmeat of the Government. With the policy
of the law. the wisdom or want of it in its en-
actments, we have no concern; that belongs to
the domain of the Legislature. Our business is
10 declare what is the law, and not to make
law. When the constitutioaality of a law is
assailed, before We can assume to declare 1t
void, and thus erase it from the statute book,
Its fnvalidity must be made plainly to ap-
pear" stephens VS. Bank. 40 NO., 800
when courts are called upon to pronounce
quisIte to give it force they approach the Ques-
ton with great caut on, and never declare a
statute void unless in their judgment its nullity
aud invalidity are placed beyond reasonable
doubt No rule of construction is better es-
that acts of the Legislators are presumed to
be constitutional until the contrary is clearly
shown. State ex rel Railroad Company, 4S
Mo-, 1901
''The solution Of such question ought not to
DE made by resort of mere verbal criticisms,
subtle distinctions. abstract reasonings, or nice
differences in the meaning OF words. Estate VS..
In the case last cited the following is approx
.'That the Legislature is peculiarly under the
control of the popular will. 1t is liable to be
errors, therefore, can be quickly cured. The
courts are more remote from the people. If
we, by following our doubts in the absence of
clear convictions, shall abridge the authority
OF the Legislature. there is remedy for six
years. Thus to whatever extent this Court
might denying the r;ghtfu1 authority of
for long period to our feet. 1t is otter and
safer, therefore, that the judiciary, if err it
department of the Government must
slightly oyerstep the limits of Constitu tional
powers, it should be that one whose official
2ile would soonest end. 1t has the least mo-
tive to usurp power not given, and the people
can sooner relieve themselves of its mistakes.
Herein is SUFFICIENT reason that the courts
should never strike down statute unless its
conflict with the Constitution is clear. The
Judiciary ought to accord to the Legislature as
N uo11Id 1aifv
Itself, as honest a desire to obey the ConStitu-
ton, and also high capacity to judge of its
meaning"
Vide also State ex rel. VS.. Laughl1n. IS Mo-,
14T; Philips VS.. Railroad, Sc Mo-, $40; Kelley vs..
-MeekS, ~ Mo-. 401.
The right of the judiciary 10 declare a statute
void. and to arrest its execution, is one which
In the opinion OF all courts is coupled with re-
sponsib;lities so grave that it is never to be
exercised except in very clear cases.
1.-The party who wishes us to pronounce a
burden OF proving beyond doubt that it is
TSt9te vs. Addington. ~ Mo-. 110)''
tfae above authorities have been rafcrred to
-termining the validity of the law which this
proceeding challenges.
The first ground Of challenge is that the act
In question is not a general but a local SPECIAL
law, and is in that respect violative of article
4, section SO. of the constitution, which among
other things provides
<sThat no local or special law shall be passed
when general law can be made applicable"
We are not left at sea for a rule by which to
determine what is a general and what is spe-
cial or cal law. The distinction between them
has been very clearly drawn by this court in
,rei. VS. Iolie ct al. Il Mo-. 6ss, it is held
That a statute which relates to persons or
ute which relates to particular persons or things
of u class is special
OIn the case of Humes VS.. Pacific Railway Com
pany, 8! Mo-. 231, it is said to be
"a settled rule of construction that legis-
'lative act which applies to and embraces all
persons who are or may come into like stua-
tons and ctrCumStll is not partial
Philips VS.. Railroad, sc No., $40 Is to the same
effect
Vide also Ewing vs. Hoblitzelle S. Mo- 81
Citations from tue highest courts of other
States to the same effect might be added, but
sary simply to fortify rule adopted by this
court to consonant with reason and common
sense.
Under the rule thus laid down the contention
OF the relator that the act in question is local
or special and not u general law, is without
foundation.
The act in question applies to all the counties
in the State, as class. and to all Incorporated
cities or towns, as class. having population
of 500 or more inhabitants. All the counties
of the State and all cities and towns with the
requisite population. by complying with its
terms, may come under its provisions.
This direct question was passed upon by four
OF the judges of this court in 81 Mo-, 297. and
similar law relating to township organization
son given for the conclusion was
THAT every county in the State might avail
itself OF the privilege offered by the law by a
majority vote of it's people
The fact that one or more counties or one or
more cities or towns may, by majority vote,
counties, cities and towns. and other counties,
ecities and towns may not do So does not AFFECT
the rule or furnish test by which to decide
whether the law is local or general, and this
court has never held otherwise.
The next ground upon which the validity OF
the act is assailed is, that it is delegation OF
Legislative power to the people of the counties,
cities and towns of the State.
While the rule that the Legislature is alone
INVESTED with the power to make laws, and that
1t can not delegate to the people the power to
pass a law. does not admit of question or doubt
there is bother rule just firmly and indis
putably established, which Is, that the Legis
iatnre NAV pass a law to take erect or 20 iIte
operation on the happening of future event OIL
contingency, and that such contingency may
ST. Louis VS. Alexander, % Mo-, 4S3; Cooley.
Cons. Linn, third ed, liz, State ex rel. Wilcox
IS No., 465; Township Organization Act, IS Mo.
295; State ex rel. Mayor of ST. Joseph. 81 Mo.
270: State vs. Binder, Is No., Ash State VS.
Winkelmeyer, p Mo-, 103
While this local option act provides that any
county or town or city of the class named may
by majority vote put such county, town OF
city under the operation OF the law. it does mo-
refer to them the question OF passing a law
That the Legislature had already done, and
only called upon them to decide by vott
whether they would accept the provisions of
law regularly enacted by both houses OF tbs
General Assembly ana approved Dy the GOV
ssBy its provisions the law and not the vote
extended its influence over the iocallty Votins
against the sale of intoxicants it was the iaV
that authorized the vote to be taken, and whei
taken the law and not the vote declared the re
suit that should follow the vote. The vote wa
people mot as to the passage Of the Law, bu
whether Intoxicating liquors should d.
sold in their midst; II H., the nm ma'oI no
the vote declared it should not 3.
sold The vote sprang from the law. and MOI
the law from the vote. BY their vote the cleo
l-zl rifS