The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1887-05-12

Lee was the chief military hero the
war. But Gen. Sherman is only of one
of the many union generals who are
fighting the war on paper, and we cannot
forget that some of the most distinguished
of those military historians have differed
widely from his estimate of Gen. Grants
strategic capacity.
Passing this point, Gen. Sherman con-
tends that Lee was unheroic and unpatri-
otto in that he first decided to stand by his
state as against the union, although be was
opposed to secession. In discussing this
sumes that secession was a crime no less
than treason. He is probably aware that
greater expounders of the federal con
stitution than himself have differed as to
that question, and that when the govern
ment of the United States had an OPP
portunity to determine it judicially in
the trial of Mr.. Jefferson Davis, the deci
sion was evaded. 1t is true, indeed, that
Gen. Lee did deplore the act of secession,
but it was not for him to oppose his indi-
vidual Judgment to that of four-tifths of
the suffragans of his native state. 1t is
true, also, that he did declare that he
would only draw his sword in defense of
Virginia; but, when Virginia had become
part of the Confederacy, to defend Vir-
GINA was to espouse the Confederate
cause.
In considering Gen. Lees claim to
military pre-eminence, Gen. Sherman con
tents himself with the single contention
that as an aggressive soldier he was not
success. He mentions meme of the brill
liant victories that Lee won over forces
vastly superior in point of number and
equipment. He speaks of Antietam
and Gettysburg, but not the
second battle of Manassas, Frederlcks-
burg, and Charlottesville. Comparing
Lee with Grant, General Sherman awards
the superiority to the latter, because,
while Lee commanded only the army of
Northern Virginia, Grant was commander
in-chief of all the union forces. Cast
ing his thoughts over a continent" says
General Sherman, giving minute instruc-
tions for several distinct armies from the
Potomac to the Rio Grande, himself as
suming the hardest share, he began a
campaign equal in strategy, in logistics,
and in tactics to any of Napoleon, and
grander than any ever contemplated by
England. His personal action in CROSS
ing the Rapidan in the face
of Lees army, fighting him
in the Wilderness, forward by the left
flank to Spottsylvania, to Richmond and
Petersburg was the sublimity of heroism."
Then follows this wonderful anti-climax:
"Of course he had superiority of num-
bers and resources, but nothing like the
disproportion stated by Gen. Wolseley."
The sublimity of heroism is to force the
fighting when you have the superiority of
numbers and resources! Truly, it is easier
to be sublime and heroic than men have
ordinarily supposed. Let US say that
Xerxes reached the sublimity of heroism
at Thermopyl@, and that Leonidas was
not success "as an aggressive soldier"
Gen. Sherman says that the dispropor-
ton between Lees forces and those of
Grant was nothing like that stated by
Gen. Woolsey, but why does he not tell us
precisely what that disproportion was!
Why does he not frankly admit that
Grant began his campaign against Lee
with more than two to one in his favor,
and that he was constantly reinforced
while Lees losses could not be replaced
AS matter of fact, Lees army was worn
away 10y the very attrition of victory, and
Grants sole strategy consisted in losing
two for one. And for that Gen. Sherman
accounts Grant the superior of Marlbor-
ough and Wellington, and the equal of
that Napoleon who was accustomed to
victory against odds, and who with infe-
rior numbers crushed the coalitions OF
immense empires