Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1887-03-05

/ compensation for similar amount and kind of
property. for carrying, storing. forwarding or
| handling the same for shorter than for longer
distance which includes the shorter distance
on any railroad"
| The Reagan bill contained an absolute pro-
hibition against the carriers charging more for
| a short than for a long haul under any circum-
stances whatever; ignoring completely the fact
| that the carrier is entitled TO a reasonable COM
pensation for his services, and that frequently
he might, by reason of competition by water.
or other exigency, be compelled to carry freight
for a long distance for less than a reasonable
compensation and for less than he could rea-
sonably and justly charge for carrying the same
kind of freight a shorter distance 1t ignored
the historical fact that long lines of road reach
! ing from the seacoast to the interior of the
country must carry large portion of the agri-
cultural and mineral products from the more
distant points at less than the average cost of
| transportation on its line, or not carry such
| freight at all.
THE COMMON LAW RULE PRESERVED.
The action of the House OF Representatives
caused a disagreement between it and the Sem
ate, and the matter went to a committee of con-
ference composed of some OF the most eminent
men in Congress. This first section was so mod
flied that, instead of establishing the rule that
under no circumstances should the carrier be
| allowed to charge greater sum for short
| than for long haul, it provided that :" it shall
| be unlawful for any common carrier subject to
/ the provisions of this Act to charge or receive
any greater compensation in the aggregate for
the transportation of passengers or of like kind
of property, under substantially similar circum-
stances and conditions, for shorter than for a
longer distance over the same line etc.
/" Under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions are the words inserted thus bringing
the Act back to the rule of the common law,
that all must be treated substantially alike, the
circumstances being the same.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
| To illustrate: before the construction of the
Central Pacific and Union Pacific roads, or any
of the trunk lines across the State of Iowa,
whereby rail connection was made between the
Atlantic and the Pacific the average rate of
| freight between New York and San Francisco
was about $50 per ton. The rate of freight from
Independence on the Missouri river to Salt Lake
city was about 81 per pound, or $1,000 per ton.
With the completion of the rail line from New
York to San Francisco no material reduction took
1
vantages derived in the commercial intercourse
between the two places being the saving in the
time of transit and the difference between the
dangers by railroad and the perils of navigs-
tion. But the rate of freight between the Mis-
| souri, river and Salt Lake city was reduced from
s., 900 ton to about SEQ
Now, had Congress provided, prior 20 the con
struction of this through line of railroad, that
the common law OF England in relation t0caT
riers should apply to interstate transportation,
we would have had substantially the same pro
visions, viz: That the rates should be just
and reasonable, thatno nvidious discrimination
should be made: and that the carrier should have
no right to charge greater compensation, in the
aggregate, for the transportation of. persons or
property under substantially similar eireum-
stances or conditions for short than for a long
distance. Yet would have pretend
| ed because freight had to be hauled from New
York to San Francisco in competition with the
cheapest transportation in the world, viz that
| by water that therefore the same carrier should
! be compelled to
TAKE FREIGRT ToA NoN-coMPETITIvE POINT AT
II u SAME RATE.
| Ifunder these circumstances through freight
was charged $50 per ton. and freight to Self
Lake City was cb irged $50 per ton the inquiry,
under rational Interpretation of the common
| law rule, at the complaint of the Salt Lake con-
| signee would be as TO whether the cempensa-
| tion charged by the carrier was just or unrea-
| sonable all things considered, ard whether the
carrier by making the discrimination in ques-
| ton, had made an unjust discrimination, or
| given undue or unreasonable preferences or ad-
| vantages to San Francisco as against Salt Lake ;
and the Court in determining this question
could take into consideration all the circur-
| stances and conditions of the traffic. 1t would
have ascertained that nature itself had made a
discrimination between the two places las $50 is
to s. OO) before the era OF railroads, which COM
PEELED person at Salt Lake to pay many times
more for transportation than the person at san
Francisco and so far from the railroad having
made unjust discrimination, or giving undue or
unreasonable preferences, it had equalized the
relative advantages of the two places.
A CASE UNDER PRACTICE OF THE SOUTHERN PA
cIFIc COMPANY.
l may now refer to a traffic in which the
Southern Pacific Company is largely engaged
1t carries sugar from the refineries in San Fran
cisco and delivers it at points on the Missouri
river for about $40 per ton. This is nothing like
reasonable compensation for the service per-
formed when we ignore the circumstances
and conditions under which it is per
formed; but when we consider these
| circumstances and conditions it becomes
a reasonable compensation. 1t is just
about the actual cost of movement excluding
the fixed expenses of the road, and is far below
the average cost of movement but, by trans
porting sugar to the ssouri river at that rate.
larger industries in the city of San Francisco
are promoted, employment is given to thou
sands of people, large shipments of machinery
and other goods are induced, aud numberless
advantages flow to the community which in the
end rebound to the advantage and benefit of the
railroad. The charge made on the same article
to Salt Lake City is S2J 60 per ton, sum greater
than is charged for the greater distance over
the same line. The traffic however, is very
small compared with the through business to
the Missouri river, and the general advantages
derived by the railroad are comparatively little.
The charge to Salt Lake is just and reasonable,
and gives to the railroad company the least
profit at which the service can be rendered. In
my Judgment, there is nothing in Section to
prohibit continuance of this practice, or which
would require the company to surrender bust
ness which it does, not only for less than rea-
sonable compensation but actually below the
average cost of movement, in order to preserve
business at a non-competitiye point now done
at just aad reasonable rates. That which in
lures 10 one cannot be wrong
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULE BY THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Fortunately we are not without authority
upon these points Such has always been the
reasonable construction placed by the common
law Judges upon the rule in question One of
the ablest Judges sitting upon the District Bench
of the United States, long before the passage of
this Act of Congress. construed a much more
stringent provision in the laws of Oregon. The
construction so placed has ever since been acr
quiesced in, and while the authority is not, of
course, IN a strict sense, as binding as would be
the oninion Of the Srnrerne Court of the Inited