The Universalist. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1884-1897, 1887-08-13

Absolute go0dness-that is, God
cannot, without ceasing to be good, per-
NIT the existence Of eternal evil, when
he has the power to put an end to it;
and if his power does not extend so far,
he is not omnipotent, and therefore a
lower Being than the conception which
he has given to us of himself. The di-
lemma is plain. If he is good, and does
not put an end to evil, he is evidently
not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent,
and does not put an end to evil, be is
not good. And in the one case or the
other, he is beneath our conception Of
Coda conception which, on the sup
position that there is God who has to
do with us-a Father, as Christ said
he has himself wrought and developed
in us. At every point we are brought
face to face with an absurdity. Again,
absolute love cannot, without ceasing
to be love, have the power to make all
spiritual beings loving, and yet refuse
to exercise that power and not only
refuse to exercise it, but do the very
pposite-hand over millions for end
less time to the embrace of hate; nor
can absolute truth declare that false
hood shall be eternal.
AS to absolute justice, not shred of
it is left, if men have NO capacity for
redemption in the other world. To pun
ish sixty years of sin by infinite pain is
an injustice to which the worst of
earthly tyrants would not stoop; and to
punish sin by binding on men the doom
of everlasting continuance in sin, is so
intolerably absurd now, that the author
of such law would be held on earth to
be unfit to exercise justice over the
meanest of mankind.
Two objections may be made to these
views. First, that they assume that
love, justice, and goodness in man are
the same in kind as they are in God.
Certainly our notions of love, justice,
and goodness must come from God, if
there is God; and, moreover, if they
are not the same in kind as Gods, why
then there can be no argument, nay, no
thinking at all upon the subject of right
and wrong in relation to God. we have
no data.
The second objection is, that if Gods
love and justice, being absolute, con-
strain him to put an end to evil, they
ought to have restrained him from per-
mitting its temporary existence. This
is the old problem of the origin of evil,
and the answer which may be suggested
is this: "That the temporary existence
of evil was necessary in order to have
in the universe humanity, that is, race
of spirits who should conquer goodness
through struggle, and in the struggle
evolve all the special qualities of hui
mainly, make new thing, that is,
in the universe. / hold that for this
purpose -provided all souls are perfect
at last-the result, which contains all
the history, effort, art, law, religion,
knowledge, and progress of man, is
worth, and will be more than worth, all
the suffering and evil man has borne
and done.
And as to the other limb of the OBJ
lection: How does evil exist at all in
universe which has come from an abso-
lutely good God ? How do 1 know
whether evil has any existence at all in
the universe, other than relative ex-
istence 1t may be no more actual
than matter is by many supposed to be.
Indeed, that seems to stand to reason,
if God be absolute.