The Universalist. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1884-1897, 1887-10-15

the illustration which he uses in de-
fense of that theology, justifes all that
L said about it.
1 trust it is not necessary for me to
disclaim the intention of making any re-
Elections upon the high moral character
of those of our preachers who hold that
theology, or upon the moral tone of their
preaching as a general rule. They may
reduce sin by their theory to nothing
but an infants cry, but practically they
regard it and treat it quite otherwise,
in obedience to the voice of conscience.
And in the face of this testimony of
every mans conscience, which author
itatively declares that sinners are de-
serving of Gods indignation, all rea-
sonings to the contrary, based upon the
promise of Gods eternal fOreknoWledge,
are vain and delusive. We may expe-
rience an intellectual difficulty in har-
m0nizing Gods foreknowledge Of sin
with his indignation toward the sinner;
but so with certain other truths, as, for
example, divine sovereignty and human
fIee-agency; both of which we accept,
notwithstanding our inability to explain
their consistency. The fact that God
foreknows mans conduct, and fore
knew it all before he made him, is quite
as difficult to reconcile with mans
freedom of will, as it is with Gods in
dignatiOn toward him when he uses his
free-will in an iniquitous manner. But
we need not, therefore, deny either the
one or the other. If we were forced to
deny either Gods foreknowledge or his
indignation toward sinners, we might
better deny the former than the latter
doctrine, for the latter is the more
amply sustained of the two. For the
former, we have the testimony of the
Scriptures, and Of philosophy. For the
latter, we have quite as much Scripture
and philosophy, with the additional
evidence which is furnished by con-
science.
DR.. Crane admits that "When we are
being punished for our sins, it is very
natural for us to think that God is an
cry with u.s." and that the Scriptures
so express the matter but this, he says,
is not strictly true it is simply "our
human reading Of this experience"
How do we know, then, that when,
from Gods favors, we infer that he
loves US, we are not also mistaken ?
May not this. be- simply QUE human
reading of the experience? What reason
is there for suppOsing that the Script
ures are less accurate, or that our nat
ural inference is less reliable, in the one
than in the other case
No doubt, there is danger, as the doc
tor declares, in reading certain human
feelings, usually sinful, into God. But
there is quite as much danger in read
ing certain human feelings which are
not sinful, out of him. If we should
be careful not to impute sinful anger to
God, we should be equally careful not
to teach that he never is angry at all.
To teach that he is lacking in righteous
anger, is to humanize him in as bad
sense as to teach that he harbors un-
righteous anger. In reasoning about
this matter, we need to give heed TO the
poets advice:
"Cleave to the truth-define it well
For fear divine philosophy
Should overshOot the mark, and be
Procuress to the Lords of hell"
A few words more, with reference to
the argument by which the doctor en-
deavors to demonstrate that justice is
simply the form which love takes to-
ward the sinful. He says, 'Justice alb
stractly is fitness or right-what is just,
is fit and right, and what is fit and right
is good. Therefore, justice can only
differ from love in being a form of it"
This is an example of illogical reason
ing, like that which l pointed out in his
previous article. His conclusion is by
no means involved in his premises and
the trouble is that he does not distin-
guish between goodness and love. Had
he said, "What is Just is fC and right
and what is fit and right is good there
fore, justice is good" he would have
made good argument, though not nee
essarily loving argument That which
is good is not always loving, and there
fore, there is no logical connection be-
tween his premises and his conclusion.
The idea of love appears for the first
time in his conclusion. It is in neither
his major nor his minor premise.
Love, TO be sure, is one form of good
ness, but it is far from being the only
form. There ar5 many other good
things besides love. Justice is good
wisdom is good righteous anger is
good and logic is good but it no more
follows that these things are identical,
OF that any of them is simply a form of
love, than that an apple is identical
with, or merely form of, a pear, be-
cause, fOrsoOth, an apple is fruit and a
pear is fruit. may admit, what l
surely would never deny, that "when
you abstract or separate justice from
goodness, you lose your justice, " with