Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1887-05-07

When the baseless story that tho President
had prevented the pursuit Of the enemy was
fiiSt ventilated General j. X. Johnston, tho 80
nior cfIicer on that field, November 10, 1861, BY
letter, replied 20 inquiry that the reasons Tor
not advancing were: "The apparent frcshness
OF the United States troops Mt Centreville,
which checked our pursuit; tho strong forces
occupying the works near GEORGETOWN and
Alexandria; the certainty. too, that General
Patterson, II needed. would reach Wash
inpton with his army OF moro than
30.0W eooner than We could. ana Tue
condition and inadequate means OF the army
In ammunition. provisions, and transportation
prevented any serious thoughts OF advancing
against the capitalr General Beauregsru, tho
second In command, has fully stated az the OBJ
siaclo 10 pursuit want Of supplies AMI trans
Jortation. Neither Of them has stated that
which either Of them might: That In tho
night after tho battle inquired what. II any,
orders had been given for pursuit, and nfior
learning mono had been given, and NJ or some
further nquiries, dictated au order Tor General
Fonham 60 moyo forward with his bri-
gaco at the frat dawn Of day. Gene
ial Early. who ] left with his command
on tho extreme left, whom the battle had closed,
has reported that he was instructed by me TO
remain In that position as bost suited Tor pur-
suit. and that no passed. tho night there OK
peciing orders In the morning As those facts
have oil been published, aud were certainty
accessible 10 General Wolseloy, II seems mex
cusablo that he should have preferred TO re-
vamp an exploded scandal by the addition Of
regret among southernors for n blunder OF the
Administration. which II was sufficiently we'll
known tho Administration had never made.
HOT AND COLD.
Blowing hot and cold with the same breath,
General Wolseley next arraigns the Coincide
rate Administration for the defence OF its own
capital. He says Lee was opposed 10 the
final defence Of Richmond that was urged
upon him for political, not military, rea-
sOns II was great strategic error." Here
Is an immense amount OF misstatement Ia
proportion TO the length OF the sentence.
AZ Richmond the Confederacy had its
principal foundry for the casting OF
heavy guns and the manufacture OF
railroad supplies; then there, too, was Its
principal aTmory, nearly oil Of its ma
Chinery for the repair Of small arms
and the preparation Of ammunition both for
artillery and infantry. There were, therefore.
worry imports material considerations In
vOlvcd In maintaining its possession. IL IS
utterly untrue that urged Lee 10 prol0n9 tho
defence Of the capital against his wish aud
judgment He was not OF the retreating order.
nor willing 20 abandon Lower virginia ana
railroad connection with the further South;
hut when convinced that the maintenance OF
his position was q mere question OF time, ana
presumably a short one, the only point 10 be
discussed was when and by what route II
should be abandoned. The time was depend
eni On the condition OF the roads, and was lief.
for his selection, which we hoped he would
have full power 20 make, despite the increasing
pressure Of the siege. The end came sooner
than either OF US expected, and In manner
which prevented the execution OF the move
ment on which We had, after full consultation,
agreed.
The political consideration attaching 70 the
defence of tho capital seemed TO be fully ap-
prcciatcd by General Wolseley when no was
cersuring the Confederacy for having lost, as
he supposed, an opportunity TO capture the
capital OF tho United States; but he nnis 1t
quite reprehensble for the Confederate Gov
an 81 fYg.rf - tNa
enemy 10 capture Richmond. That was the
objective point Of the vast armies launched
from the North, but the conquest Of Virginia
was the first step towards the capture OF Rich
mond, and Lees brilliant campaigns between
tho Potomac and James rivers were for much
more than the moro defence OF q city. When,
by his great strategic movement across the
Potomac, he drew the enemy out OF virginia
and broke up the plans OF campaign Tor which
1t had required much time and treasure 70 pre-
pare, there were higher hopes and grander pur-
ptses than even the defence OF our capital.
with all the political consequences which were
inv olved in its capture.
DRAWING THE ENEMY.
The advantage Of drawing the enemy into
the interior can hardly be claimed by General
Wolseley "a on invention; he may ind 1t stated
in proclamation issued at Danville, Va, after
Tie evacuation OF Richmond, but merely as
circumstance, the value OF which
IL was supposed would be realized by every
one.
A field marshal Of Prussia Is said TO have re-
marked upon seeing London that 1t was n very
fine place for loot II a hostile force should
ever threaten the capital OF England, by all
tho tender memories which bind me 10 II,
hope the then commander Of the British forces
will not avoid the "groat strategic error" OF
defending 1t TO a fnality by retreating before
il LIQUID be necessary, and leaving the capital
10 the mercy Of the invader.
Then, with the conceit which the wise King
Hf.V. lac q
mental conditions, Lord Wolseley GENEROUSLY
crticises the conduct Of both parties 10 the war
between the states. and especially the assumed
failures Of General Lee TO reap the fruits Of
victory. "a follows:
"What most strikes tho regular soldier In
these campaigns Of General Lee is the inef1i-
cient manner in which both he and his OppO-
nents we're often served by their subordinate
CON manders. and how badly the stan and out
post work generally was performed on both
sides. over and over again was the
South apparently within stone'sthrow Of In
dependence as 1t has been many times re-
led. wher, from want Of thoroughly good
staff 10 organize pursuit the occasion was lost,
and the enemy allowed TO escape. Lees COM
hiIations 70 secure victory were the conceptions
OF q truly great strategist, and, when they hal
been effected, his tactics we're almost always
eN cry thing that could he desired up 10 the mo-
mcnt OF victory. but there his action seemed 10
stop abruptly. Was ever au army 80 hopelessly
at The mercy of another a. that OF Mcclellan
when he began his retreat 20 HarrisOn's Land
lug after the seven days fighting around Rich
mOnd? What commander could wish to have
his foe in tighter place than Burnside was
in after his disastrous attack upon Lee at
Fredericksburg. Yet in both instances the
northern commander got safely away, ana
o'her similar instaI ces could be mentioned"
10 this general allegation IL may suffice 10
reply that Leo rarely found fault with his SD
\ ordinaies, and, | believe, was never sur
prised. ard very rarely failed 10 anticipate tho
movements aud purposes OF his o ponent Inc
duties OF rccCnnOi ssance and OutpO5ts, IL must
therefore be concluded, were fairly we'll per-
formed. General WOlscley. having learned
from what lie considered sufficiently good au-
thority. both Federal and Confederate, the
forces on various occasions, deduced tho result
thet the usual numerical disparity In battle
was from about twice 10 three times moro
Federas than there wore Confedcrates en-
gagged" Under these circumstances regu-
lar soldier" might have been expected To find
a better reason than defects Of the stat for al
lowing the larger force 10 escape. a victory
could only have been won by an army one hall
or one third as large as its opponent bringing
its whole force into action. and leaving no fresh
troops in reserve; its men worn out by fatigue,
and its ranks shattered by the casualties OF bat
tie, pursuit could only be practicable in the
case Of an enemy routed and flying in state
OF disOrgRnization.
such was not the condition of either OF the
armies selected for illustration that OF McClcl-
10th had retired and taken strong positions
sdyaniageously covered by artillery, and the
former supported by Gunboats in the James
river
10 those familiar with the facts the blame Of
Lee for allowing Burnside 10 escape from the
tight place " in which he was after the battle
Of Frederick Sburg can only provoke smile:
but for such as may take General Wolseley as
au lhority what he calls tight place" Will be
described.
The town Of Fredericksburg is on the south
side Of the Rappahannock river; wide plain
extends behind the town 20 a commanding
ridge. On this ridge Lees force was adgan-
iageously posted. On the north side Of tho
river, and near 10 IT, is the bold range known
as. he Stafford Heights. Here Burnside had as
sembled his formidable army, while further up
the river was Hooker with another army.
Burnside, after serious opposition, crossed the
river and attacked Lee in position. Notwith-
standing his numerical superiority and the
bravery Of his troops, no was repulsed, and re-
crossed the river on the pOntOOn bridges he
had provided On the heights OF stafford, with
numerous batteries commanding the plain on
tho south side OF the river. the pontoon bridges
ecross which were his own, and an army,
though its Losses were heavy, yet larger than
the force opposed 10 him, his position might
well be called "hght" In different sense from
that which tho censor, in tho guise OF eulogist,
uses the word.
Enough perhaps has been shown 70 answer
the criticism but from the abundance of mate
ria may be drawn tho fact that Hooker's army
was in supporting distance OF Burnside on the
nor IT, and as Lees army was confronting both
10 prevent their advance southwark, he could
not wisely have placed ono wing OF his army
beyond supporting distance OF the other, or
engaged in an enterprise, even II feasible,
which would consequently expose tho country
he was defending.
DARING But NEVER RECKLESS.
Lee was always daring, but never reckless OF