The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-02-02
w. t. BowDRE, Admir-,

E. CARTER, ct al.
Appeal from the Chancery Court of Tu-
MICA county. Hon. J. G. Hall, Chan
cellor.
Craft & Cooper, for the appellant.
| Waddell d Montgomery and J. B.
Perkins, for the appellees.
During the years 1882, 1888 and 1884
one q. b. Robertson was CARRYING on
| the business of merchant in Tunica
county. On Nov. 1, 1888, Robertson's
license for carrying on his business ex-
pired and was not renewed until Feb.
| IL, 1884. On Nov. %, 1888, Ed. Carter
and Martha Turner executed a deed of
trust in favor of Robertson on certain
land and the crop to be grown thereon.
| on condition that the latter was to fur
nish them with supplies and a certain
amount of money at intervals stated in
the deed. Robertson having died. w.
L. Bowdre was appointed administrator:
the sale of land under the deed of
trust was advertised and about to take
place, when Ed. Carter filed thi. bill
praying for perpetual injunction re-
straining the sale on the ground that
Robertson had not complied with CON
tract. Mrs. Turner, as well as Bowdre.
was made a party defendant. Bowdre
answered alleging full compliance with
the contract with complainant, made
his answer cross bill, with Carter and
Mrs. Turner as defendants, and
asked that the injunction in this
case be dissolved, that an account
be taken showing the amount due by
Carter and Mrs. Turner, and that the
land included in the deed of trust be
sold to satisfy the debt. Mrs. Turner
answered the cross bill of defendant, de-
nying that Robertson had performed his
contract and denying liability under the
deed of trust because at the time the
deed was given Robertson did not have
license to do business as required, and
that the deed was void under section
$50, code of 1880. Carter answered BY
adopting the answer of Mrs. Turner.
The chancellor, on final hearing, held
the deed of trust void, dismissed the
cross bill, and made the injunction per-
petual. The defendant appealed.
Some additional facts are stated in
the opinion of the court.
COOPER, c. j., delivered the opinion of
the court.
1t is not controverted that at the time
of the execution of the deed OF trust by
Carter and Mrs. Turner to secure the
advances of money and goods which
Robertson agreed to make, Robertson
was engaged in business as a merchant
without having paid the privilege tax
required by law. The appellant admits
that because OF this default the security
is void in so far as it covers the
price of goods sold. but he contends that
Robertson was at the time of the execu-
ton of the deed, both a money lender
and merchant; that the law requires
merchant to pay a privilege tax, but
none is required by one who il engaged
In lending money, and that, therefore,
the security ought to be held valid as to
the money advanced though invalid as
to the goods Sold Whatever might be |
the law as applied to case in which |
ouch facts existed, it is clear the case
before US does not call upon us to deter |
mine. 1t is Enthusiastically true that the |
dealings between the parties constituted |
but one Transaction, and that one was |
between Robertson as a merchant and |
Carter and Turner as his custom ers.
The money advanced was paid out at
the start in the usual course of business,
and charged on the mercantile books.
There is nothing whatever to distinguish
It from the very common dealings be-
tween country merchant and his pa
irons.
But it is further said that the chan
:elior erred in not rendering personal
decree against the defendants to the
:ross bill for such sums as were due for
Foods sold after the merchant had paid
,is tax, and for the goods sold by the
after he had takea charge
# the estate. The reply to this is that
he chancery court having decreed the
nyaIidity of the security, the enforce
nent of which was the foundation of its
properly desisted from any
urther inquiry. If there is anything
lue on open account from the defend. I
mt to the complainant in the cross bill. /
lis remedy is full at law, and there Is {
10 reason why the court of chancery ]
hould take cognizance of the demand. | j
Finally, the appellant contends that
ince the appellees did not tender the !
nm which is equitably due, the court :
h0uld not have afforded affirmative re- /
ct By decreeing : perpetual injunction 4