The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1887-11-11
DOOMED.

1
| The Supreme Court Refuses to Grant q
| Writ of Error in the Anarchists Case
| Text of the Decision-No Constitutional
| Question Involved - The Only Hope for
/ Them Now Is Conferred in the Prospect
for CIemency by Governor oglesby.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 3-The decision of the
United States Supreme Court upon the
| petition for a writ of error in the case
| of the Chicago Anarchists was announced
| yesterday afternoon by Chief Justice
Waite in a long and carefully prepared
! opinion which occupied thirty-five minutes
in the reading.
This destroys their last chance for
| Judicial interference with the execution of
| the sentence, and their only hope now for
| prolongation of life seems to de-
] pend upon the executive clemency OF
the Governor of Illinois The courtroom
was crowded when the Justices took their
seats few minutes past II o'clock They
appeared unusually solemn and serious
and hush fell over the room, when Chief
| Justice Waite, without moments delay,
| announced that he would read the opinion
| of the court in the matter of an application
| by Spies and others for writ of error
| to the Supreme Court of the State
of Illinois Almost the first SON
| tenoe indicated that the Anarchists appeal
to the court of dernier resort was Intellectual
and that the writ would be denied Chief
Justice Waite, who, it is understood, pre-
| pared the decision, proceeded slowly and
calmly to read the decision, while the audi
ence paid the closest attention to each
| sentence
Following are the main points in the de-
cision:
| When, as in this case application is made to
| us on the suggestion of one of our number to
| whom similar application has been previous
| ly addressed for the allowance of writ
| of error it is our duty to ascertain, not
only whether any question renewable
here was made and decided in the proper
court below, but whether it is of
. character to justify the bringing
the Judgment here for re-examination In
our opinion the writ ought not to be
allowed by the court if it appears from
the face Of the record that the decision of the
Federal question which is complained Of was
| so plainly right as not to require argument. and
especially if it is in accordance With our
own well-consdered judgments in similar
| cases. That is in effect what was done
| in Twitchell VS.. The Commonwealth, Wall.
| 3s3, when the writ was refused because the
questions presented by the record were mo
longer subjects of discussion although if
| they had been in the opinion of the court
open" it would have been allowed.
| In the present case we have had the benefit
| of argument in support of the application and
| while counsel have not deemed it their
duty to go fully into the merits of
| the questions involved they have
| shown US distinctly what the decisions
| were of which they complain, and how
| the questions arose. In this way we are
able to determine, as court In session,
| whether the errors alleged are such as to
| justify US in bringing the case here for
review. We proceed, then, to consider what
| the questions are in which, if it exists at all,
| our jurisdiction depends. The particular pro-
visions of the constitution of the United States
| on which consul rely are found in Articles ",
| V. and XIV of the amendments.
That the first ten articles OF amendment
| were not intended to limit the powers of the
! State governments in respect to their own
| citizens, but to operate ON the National govern
| ment alone, was decided more than half
century ago, ana that decision has been
| steadily adhered to since.
| 1t was contended, however, in argument
that though originally the first ten amend
| ments were adopted as limitations on
| Federal power yet in so far as they secure
| and recognize fundamental rights, COM
mon law rights of the man, they make them
/ privileges and immunities of the man as cit
! izen Of the United States, and can not now be
/ abridged by Ga State under the Fourteenth
Amendment
The objections are in brief ~, That statute
! OF the State as construed by the court de-
| prived the petitioners of trial by an imAhr-
tial jury; and (2), That Spies was com
| PEELED to give evidence against himself. Be
fore considering whether the constitution of
the United States has the effect which is
claimed, it is proper to inquire whether the
| Federal questions relied on in fact
arise on the face of this record One
statute to which objection is made was
approved March H. 1874, and
has been in force since July 1, of that year.
| The complaint is that the trial court acting
under this statute aud in accordance with its re-
| quirements compelled the petitioners, against
| their will, to submit to trial by a Jury
that was not impartial, and thus deprived
| them of one of the fundamental rights which
they had as citizens of the United States un-
| der the National constitution; and that if the
| sentence of the court is carried into execution
they will be deprived of their lives without
| due process of law
In Hopt VS.. Utah, 100 United States 439, it
was decided by this court that, where a chal-
| lenge by a defendant in a criminal action to
juror for bias, actual or implied, is disallowed,
| and the juror is thereupon peremptorily chal-
| lenged by the defendant, and excused
| and an impartial and competent Juror is OBJ
| tanned in his place, no injury is done the de-
| PENDANT if, until the jury is completed, he has
| other peremptory challenges which he can use.
| Or the correctness of this ruling we entertain
| no doubt. 1t is held that both Denker and San
| ford had been properly impanneled, and that the
| fact that the defense had exhausted their per-
emptory challenges when Juror Sanford was
| presented did not come within the rule laid
down in Territorial case, decided by the Su-
preme Court OF the United States, and that,
| therefore, Sanford was competent Juror
The decision then says that the jury law of
! Illinois is similar to the statutes of New York
| Michigan and Nebraska, the constitutionality
| OF which has been sustained in numerous courts
| OF record, and says We agree entirely with
| the Supreme Court of Illinois in the opin--
| ion. that the statute on its face as con-
| strued by the trial court is not repug-
nant to section of article 2 of the con
stitution of that State, which guarantees
to the accused party in every criminal
prosecution speedy trial by an impair
tial jury Of the county or district in which
| the offense is alleged to have been committed.
| AS this is substantially the provision of the
| constitution of the United States on which
the petitioners now rely, it follows that even if
/ their position as to the operation and effect
of that constitution is correct the statute is
not open to the objection which is made against
| it.
| We come now to consider the objection that
the defendant Spies was compelled by the court
to be witness against himself He volun-
tarily offered himself a witness in his own
| behalf, and by so doing he became bound to
| submit himself to proper eross-examina
ton. The complaint is that he was re-
| quired on cross-examination to state
whether he had received certain
letter which was shown, purporting to
have been written by Johann Most and ad-
| dressed to him, and upon his saying that he
| had the Court allowed the letter to be read
| in evidence against HIM. This, it is claimed
| was not proper cross-examination. 1t is not
| contended that the subject to which the cross
examination related was not pertinent to the
issue to be tried, and whether cross-examina-
| ton must be confined to matters pertinent to
the testimony in chief, or may be to the matter
in issue is certainly question of State law in
the courts of the State and not of Federal law.
Something has been said in argument
about an alleged unreasonable search and