Mower County transcript. [volume] (Lansing, Minn.) 1868-1915, 1887-07-13

sition at Cedar Creek, north Of Stras-
burg, which it oc coupled on the morning
Of the great battle; 81 the Eighth Corps
on the left the Nineteenth in it's rear,
to the right; the Sixth still further to
the right and rear, and the cavalry far
on the right. 81
General Early had been REINFORCED
by both KershaW and Longstreet, and
his numbers almost equaled those OF
our army. He began to take the ofen-.
siye. and some small encounters oc-
CURED. The Sixth Corps had been
started on their way back to the Army
Of the Potomac; but Sheridan became
uneasy at the situation, and ordered.
their recall. His messenger overlook
them near Ashby's Gap Of the Blue
Ridge, and on the 18th they were back
with the army.
In the meantime grave discussion
and difference had arisen between
General Grant, Secretary Stanton, and
General Sheridan, by letter and tele-
graph. Grant thought that Sheridan
might make an advance through the
upper gaps Of the Blue Ridge, toward
Gordpnsyille or Charlottesville; the Sec
rotary Of War thought that the railroad
from Alexandria to sManassas Gap
might be repaired and kept open, and
that Sheridan, supplied in that way,
might hold his position in the Upper
Valley. Sheridan simply knew better.
He had carefully surveyed the ground.
The disastrous experience of General
Hunter, who advanced with an army
far up the valley, the previous spring,
and through the gaps in the mountains
to Lynchburg and then was compelled,
with all his communications cut off,
and Confederate army in his rear, to
retreat through the Kanawha Valley,
by the Ohio River, and the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad, in the meantime
allowing Washington to be almost
captured. ~.s.... 81. .s-.
This experience showed plainly that a
large infantry force could not advance
so far from its base without disaster.
And as to the opening of the railroad,
Sheridan well knew, no man was bet
ter entitled TO know, from the experience
of the last summer, and the fall cam
paign so far, that Mosby would like no
better fun than the cutting of the rail-
road from Alexandria to Manassas, and
the capturing of all the trains that could
be sent over it. f ST.:
Secretary Stanton and General Hal
leck, comfortably oficed at Washing
ton, thought the railroad could be kept
open. ,.%~t: ....s.sz-s
It was ne ther the first nor the last
time that W ashington dictation put the
Union cause in peril. -s
General Sheridan was so positive in
his opinions on the subject that Secre-
tary Stanton at last ordered him to
come to Washington for "a personal
consultation. f. 49,. : +
Sheridan obeyed, very reluctantly.
He seems to have felt that he had no
business away from the army at such a
time. To use a common phrase, some
thing was Sin the air;'' the activity and
the saucy demonstrations in his front
by the enemy he had lately routed as
sured him that this enemy had been
heavily REINFORCED, and was meditating
an attack. In all his extended military
history this man probably never felt so
uneasy as during the four days that he
was away from his army.
But the wishes, not to say the orders,
of the Secretary of War must needs be
respected; and on the 18th of October,
with a strong cavalry escort, Sheridan
started for Washington by way of
Front Royal and Manassas Gap. .
At the former place he was
overtaken by courier from
General Wright who was left
in command of the army, with the
following startling message, which our
Signal Corps men had read from the
flags on the Confederate station on the
summit Of Three Top mountain, which
overlooked all our camps:
s.To Lieutenant General Early:
BE ready to move as soon as my
forces join you, and we will crush
Sheridan. g4zssg-.,. Is, :..,ss.5G
"LoNGsTRET, Lieutenant General. -
If this dispatch was genuine, it was
worth needing; if it was ruse, it still
showed that the enemy meditated mis-
chief. What its real character was has
not been determined to this day. :
That it added to Sheridan's uneasiness
is very certain. He thought of return
ing to camp, and postponing his visit
to Washington to safer time. But he
finally sent word to General Wright to
be watchful and ready. '.H the enemy
should make an ADVANCE" the dispactch
said, II know you will defeat him. I
will bring up all I can, and will be up
on Thursday, if not sooner y
This dispatch was sent back on
Saturday, the 10Th. On Tuesday, the
18th. Sheridan slept at Winchester,
fifteen miles in rear of his army, with
out suspicion of the storm that was
about to burst upon it.
# But on the 10Th he went on with his
cavalry escort to Rectortown, where he