The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1887-03-02
GIN. LORD WOLSELEY
MAKES PUBLIC HIS OPINION OF
ROBERT Z. LEE
In an Article In an English Review
And Gives His Views On the
Expected European War.


sine on Gen. Robert E. Lee, speaks
with unbounded enthusiasm oil the
personal character and natural genius
OF that officer. Reference is made in
footnote to the recently published
memoirs Of Gen. Lee, by Gen. Long
and Marcus Wright, bat 1t is in no
sense q review OF that work. Gen.
Lee is given fall credit for the love he
had for the Union, and for the struggle
he went through before finally taking
the decision TO 20 with his own State.
Gen. Wolseley describes how Lee &C.
cepted his commission as
commander in chief OF al
the military forces OF Virginia In
crowded convention OF the most emf
nent men OF the State, and then draws
q parallel between him and the great
Marlborough: "Gen. Lees presence
commanded respect even from stran-
gers by q calm, self possessed dignity,
the like OF which have never seen In
other men. Naturally Of strong pas
sions he kept them under perfect con.
troll by that iron and determined Will
OF which his expression and face gave
evidence. As this tai, handsome SOL
der stood before his Countrymon he
was the picture OF the ideal patriot.
Unconscious and self possessed in his
strength, he INDUCED in no theatrical
display Of feeling. There was in his
face and about him that placid Tesolys
which bespoke great confidence in
pelt and which in his case one knows
not how quickly communicated its
magnetic influence 10 others. He was
then just "a years old, the age oil
NarlbI rough when he destroyed the
French army at Blenheim. In many
ways and on many points these two
great men much resembled each other.
Both were Of a dlgnifed and COM
manding exterior, eminently hand.
some, with q figure tall, graceful and
erect, while q muscular, square built
frame bespoke great activity OF body.
The charm OF manner which l have
mentioned as very winning in Lee
was possessed in the highest degree
By Marlborough. Both, at the
outset OF their great career oil
victory, were regarded as essen
tally national commanders. Both
had married young and were faithful
husbands and devoted fathers. Both
had Ia all their campaigns the same
belief In an ever watchful Providence
in whose hep they trusted implicitly
and for whose interposition they
prayed ut all times. They were gifted
with the same military instinct, the
same genius for war, the power OF las
cinating those with whom they were
associated, the spell which they cas-,
over their soldiers who believed a.
most euperst tiously in their certainty
OF victory. Their contempt OF danger
and their daring courage constitute
parallel that is difficult to equal be-
tween any other two great men o
mod, rn times"
AN ORGANIZER.
Reference Ia made az to how Gen
Lee organized an army OF $4,000 mer
In two months, and as to how In an
other month he had gained gres
victory at Bull Run and driven thu
Northern invaders back across thu
Potomac like herds Of frlghtene,
sheep, his army being supplied will
ammunition and army stores an'
clothing captured there. He tells th
following story: Some time alter
ward, when Gen. Pope and his larg
invading army had been sent bac
hying across the Maryland border,
overheard this conversation between
two Confederats soldiers: Have yo,
heard the news2 Gen. Lee has re
signed Good God was the reply
what forf HE has resigned becsus
he says he cannot feed and supply hi
army any longer now that his com
missary, Gen. Pope, has been re
moved" Mr.. Lincoln had just the
diamisssd Gen. Pope, replacing him b
Gen. Mcclellan"
INEFFICIENT sUBoRDINATEs.
Gen. W seley incidentally expreese
an opinion, when speaking OF Blu
Run, that the Coniederates did nc
follow up their victory there AZ the
should have done. A rapid and da
ing advance would have given theI
possession OF Washington, their emf
nays capital. Political consideration
at Richmond vera allowed to on
weigh the very evident military 81
perience OF Tesping q solid advantas
from this, their first great success
This suggests the general cIiucis
which follows:
"What mo 4 strikes the regular 90
der in these campaigns Of Gen. Lee
l.. ,tank In Nfh tOh hAk
he and his opponents we're ottC
served by their subordinate cor
mander and how badly the staff at
outpost work generally was PERFORM
on both sides. 1t Is most difficult
move, with any effective precisto
young armies constituted as thei
were daring this war. The direclic
and movement OF large bodies
newly .ra sed troops, even when vi
torious, are never easy and often In
possible. Over and over again W
the South apparently within atone
throw OF Independence, as II has bee
many times remarked, when fro
want Of a thoroughly good staff 10
EaniSe the pursuit, the occas on W
lost and the enemy allowed to escaT
Lees combinations to secure victo
were the conceptions of 4 truly gre
Btrategist, and when they had be-
effected his tactics were al
most always everything that could
desired up to the moment OF victor
But there his action seemed to stop al
Eether. Was ever an army 30 he
lessly at the mercy OF another as Il
Of Mcclellan, when he began his
treat 10 Harrison's Landing, after I
seven days' fighting around Rlt
mcnd7 What commander could vi
to havei his foe in tighter place tn
Burnside was in after his disastrC
attack upon Lee at Frederlcksbu
Yet in both instances the Northt
commander got safely away and otl
similar instances could be mention
TIE ethical military student Of I
war, who knows the power that re-
lar troops, well differed and we'll
rected by a thoroughly efficient oil
placed in the hands OF an able gene
and who has acquired an intimate {
complete knowledge Of what these
contending American armies "
d really like, / think, agree that fl
first to last the cooperation OF @
one army corps Of regular troC
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