Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1887-06-20

other facts. The rigid common Isw rules
are not required, but pleader mus
make known to the court every law and
fact and is not allowed merely to state
the conclusions the pleader deduCes
from them. The petition here fails
to advise the court of the con
tents of the ordinance relied
upon. The exceptions to the petition
were well taken. With view to another
trial we pass upon the following ques-
tiOns. 1t is argued that ordnance los
is implicitly repealed by an ordinance
passed July l, 1878, but both are incOr-
pOrated in q revision of the city ordin-
ances adopted July 81, 1875. and as they
are not necessarily repugnant both must
stand. Since original article 1870 did
not repeal article %, we; do not see that
substituted article 1919 passed in 1850
could have that effect. II is commended
that appellee should not recover
in any event more than 10 per
cent. OF the fines he actually assisted
TO collect, but the words of the ordinance
cannot be limited to mean only those
he collected, unless the literal COnstruC-
ton is repu2nanttO reason and Justice, and
there are several reasons why the City
Council may have intended literal con
stTuCtiCu of the ordinance. The court
below did not err in holding the ordnance
Of full force and effect. For the error
above the judgment is reversed aGd the
cause remanded.
Susan NJ Ragsdale et a.. VS. Nancy
Barnes, from Fannin county; opinion 9y
Gaines, A. J. Appellants sued to
recover two undivided qne-sIYtI IN
terests in lot which was
the community property of their father
and mother. Th4ir mother died in SG&,
aud in the same year the father sold the
lot, and the properly has beer held I'D
versel, by apptlleeS and those she claims
under from that time down TO the com
menCement OF The suit, in 1885 Susan
RagsdaIe was 9 minor until 1868, when
she married, The Judge below concluded
ss a matter OF lsw that Susan was barred
by the statute OF limitations. It is argued
by appellants that the cOYerture of Susan
prevented limitations from running
against her, and that the constitution Of
1869 barred the statute until its adoption.
But it must be borne IN mind that the
statute of limitations was in full force in
1868, and began TO run against her when
she married.
But it there be any doubt about this,
article 32Ol r. S. sets the matter at rest,
for it provides that the statute will begin
to run when adverse possession COM
meGces, unless at the time one is under
the age OF twenty-one, or d emme covert,
and Susan Ragsdale cannot set up cover
ture because the statute only refers 70
those unCer that disability when
the adverse possess ion commences. There
can be no question as TO the right
of the Legislature 10 pass this article.
But we think that neither under the re-
vised statutes nor the previous law can
the disability of appellants CoverLure be
set up against the operation of the stat
ute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.
Leon & II. Blum VS.. K. II. LOoney,
from Taylor county; opinion by Willie,
G. J. This case involves title to land in
Taylor county, which is claimed by ap-
pellants under q headlight certificate
granted to J. Lancaster by g special act
of the Legislature of April 80,
1873, ard which they say was
ratified on March 81. 1883
Appellee claims under location of g valid
certificate made March 2, 1850 The act
of March 81, 1883, yaIidates the act of
1873, April 80, but provided that it should
not apply TO anyone else than soldiers
and heirs, and actual settlers of the state
and their vendees. Appellee claims First
that the act OF April 30, 1873, was UncOn-
SeCOnd-thst appellants must
show That J. Lancaster came with
in the meaning of the statute.
AS to the first objection, the court below
properly held that the act Of April 30,
1873, was validated by the act of 1889, but
that it was incumbent upon appellants to
show that Lancaster came within the pro
viso of the latter act. While the act OF
1873 was unconstitutional, but when the
healing act was passed IN $50 the Legis-
lature had & right to make the grant,
and hence could ratify this one. This
right Of the Legislature was recognized
in Bates vs.. Bacon, l S. W. Rep. 25G.
We think the court was correct in
holding that appellants must prove that
Lancaster came within the prOYiso. The
original grant was void and certificates
granted under them were as so much
blank paper, and the state validated them,
but only in favor Of the parties named in
the prOviso, and il cannot be claimed that
any Ot1er class OF persons could claim
under the healing act. the whole object
of the act was TO benefit those named,
and in order to take advantage OF
it, thrust be shown that the party so
comes within its provisions.
claimant under it must show that ne pos
sesses the proper qualifications, and the
fact that Lancaster was an actual settler
of Texas in 1858, is not sufficient, nor the
act of granting headlight to Lancaster
under the act of 1873, is not sufficient.
The grant was made by cody having
no authority so to do, and none OF the
presumptions of law csn be in
dulged in its favor. The judgment is al
frmed.