Butler citizen. [volume] (Butler, Pa.) 1877-1922, 1887-06-03
NO. 80
Lees Great Expectations.
General John G. Walker in the Century.

General John q. Walker in the Century.]
/ The next day we reached the
neighborhood of Frederick. I went
at once to General Lee, who was
alone. After listening to my report
be said that as / had a divisioa
which would often, perhaps, be or.
dered on detached service, an intelli.
gent performance of my duty might
require knowledge of the ulterior
purposes and objects of the campaign.
Here" said he, tracing with his
finger on a large map, is the line Of
our communications, from Rapidan
Station to Manassas, thence to Fred.
erick. 1t is too near the Potomac,
and is liable to be cut any day by
the enemy's cavalry. I have there
fore given orders to move the line
back into the Valley of Virginia, by
way of Staunton, Harrisonburg, and
Winchester, entering Maryland at
Shepardstown.
wish you to return to the mouth
OF the Monocacy and effectually de-
stroy the aqueduct of the Chesapeake
and Ohio canal. By the time that is
accomplished you will receive orders
to cooperate in the capture of Har.
per's ferry. and you will not return
here, but, after the capture of Har-
per.s Ferry, will rejoin us at Hagers.
town, where the army will be CON.
centrated. Ny information is that
there are between 10000 and $4,000
men at Harper's Ferry, and 5000 at
Martinsburg. The latter may escape
towards Cumberland; but think the
chances are that they will take refuge
at Harper's Ferry and be captured.
besides the men and material of
war which we shall capture at Har-
per's Ferry, the position is necessary
to US, not to garrison and hold, but in
the hands of the enemy it would be
break in our new line of communica-
tions with Richmond.
"a few days. rest at Hagerstown
will be of great service to our men.
Hundreds of them are bare.footed, and
nearly all of them are ragged.
hope to get shoes and clothing for
the most needy. But the best of it
will be that the short delay will en-
able US to get up our stragglers-not
stragglers from striking disposition,
but simply from inability to keep up
with their commands. / believe
there are not less than from eight to
ten thousand of them between here
and Rapidan Station. Besides these,
we shall be able to get large num-
Der of recruits who have been accum.
ulating at Richmond for some weeks.
l have now requested that they be
sent forward to join us. They ought
to reach US at Hsgerstown. We
shall then have q very good army;"
and he smilingly added: Zone that I
think will be able to give good &C.
count of ITSELF"
"In ten days from now," he CON.
tinued, "if the military situation is
then what l confidently expect 1t
to be after the capture of Harper's
Ferry, | shall concentrate the army
at Hagerstown, ,effectually destroy the
Baltimore and Ohio road, and march
to this point" placing his finger at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. "That is
the objective point of the campaign.
You remember, no doubt, the long
bridge of the Pennsylvania railroad,
over the Susquehanna, a few miles
west of Harrisburg. Well, I wish
effectually to destroy that bridge,
which will disable the Pennsylvania
railroad for long time. With the
Baltimore and Ohio in our posses.
sion, and the Pennsylvania railroad
broken up. there will remain to the
enemy but one route of communica-
tion with the West, and that very cir.
cuitous, by way of the Lakes. After
that, | can turn my attention to Phil
adelphia, Baltimore or Washington
as may seem best for our interests"
was very much astonished at this
announcement, and l suppose he OBJ
served it, for he turned to me and
said:
1Ou uOuuIiocc ICSuAu ~ u01oiuouo
to leave Mcclellan practically on my
line of communication. and to march
into the heart of the enemy's coun-
try?" | admitted that such thought
had occurred to me.
care you acquainted with General
Mcclellan ?" be inquired. l replied
that we had served together in the
Mexican war under General Scott,
but that had seen but little Of him
since that time.
"He is an able General, but eau
tious one. His enemies among his
own people think him too much 80.
His army is in q very demoralized
and chaotic condition, and will not be
prepared for offensive operations
or he will not think 1t so-for three
or four weeks. Before that time l
hone to be on the Susuuehanna."