The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1887-08-28

Thiors presently d.Scrtben ~ tue HheN hrin)
that France ever posses-e'. consisting. NJ III,
end NJ Aprfl. oI t60 OH men md more thar
| 2OM cannon. and e, on NJ the beginning Of tn,
| month. Of 9O.0m mrn and about 3h, cannon
This f.,rrs. II should lie remembered WIN inres
sanity auRrp. nipJ nv the rsturh from German,
| OF the prisoners aiken NJ Scdnn and Metz
| Ciiissret found the resources oI tile Commune
to he The following. EuminHlly Their wa- 4
large number oi National GUARDS. COMPRISING
upOn tnpef lfjODl IN n. but these were utter.
" unorlaniL.d ilI.nrmed. poorly clothed. and
frnm the pplut NJ view ~ miliIar discipline. In
n state Of incuncsivabIe isinoraliza Ion. Oh
cavalry and Held artillery there waa none
the xunners. Of whom there were about
$3.50. refusing TO serve except upon the
rnmpnrts. Or medical service here waH not 4
trace. The so-callcd engineers were without
any special ir lang for their functions. and
the qualifications OF the general slnT were
eSsmuliird in tie member intrusted wi h tho
charge NJ the artillery. who. i~cnnsr he ha'I
been nj ordinary gunner during the siege.
supposed hims,ll fitted for no sipc rntrnLruce
Of that arm II should here To Noted thai very
few cannon Of large calibre were IN the han IL
Of the Commune which WIS accordingly dis
abIsd from Il Ing NJ long range Az for am
munitiun. there WIS next to none for the Rrii H..
iery. which accordingly required the imnl',li.
ate esinb i-hment OF cartri sgr manufactures.
or powder there was plenty. the vnults under he
Trocadero alone coniainingn sufficient supply
for two years ahead. But the magazines were
scattered aud under the control Of sectional
or ward nufhOri les. no that II proved extreme
ly difficult to bring about the Indispensable
concentration In the centre u the town.
The soriie OF April 4 hnd revealed the per.
feet wurthlessness Of these forces. On that
day tho Commune WAS supposed to have not
less thnn GO 900 men on foot. Of whom not
100 wore efficient soldiers. Why MacsiHhon
did not ut thnt lime enter Paris on the heels Of
the breathess fnxiives will DO better under
stood when We hear what the author OF these
memoirs has to say about the renl Iunlity OF
MWNahon's troops. whether officers or mon.
Meanwhile. we proceed to show what Clnssret
4 accomplished by April 80. Instead OF the
chnos which hnd at first confronted him. he
Ind nj lis back on the dute mentioned 4l.5O0
infantry thoroughly organized and equipped.
He had the maj ertals for ri.ing within three
weeks the number. Of this arm to l05O00. OF
cavalry no was still destitute md he had only
just ohtnined authority to transform u part OF
III. al ationary into field artillery. or cOmpe-
tent engineers he had got enough together to
form ten companies Taken altogether. this
seems but nm tnconsiherahle array with which
to meet the assaults OF the rersaillists. but
Cluseret considers that 1t was ample for
defence. though not tor aggression. ard that
this WAS the case his experience up to April 30
seems to prove We should here mention that
the right OF tile defensive line WAS conilded to
D"mbrOwski. the centre un8voidnbly but uu-
luckily to Eudes twho was too late SUPER
seded by La CeciliaL and The left to
WrohlOwski: the two former did not have.
anil In the authors Judgment did not need.
more than l,5OO men apiece. and Eudes
had to content himself with 3.JOO. Az
to the right. We read that "n9ainst Neuily
Mac Mnhon never censed to launch attacks rs
vigorous a. tho vigor OF hi troops permitted
aud that DomhrowskI with his l.3DO men I'M
finchingly witIistoml Lnd,nirnult ~ the head
OF THREE divi Ions, representing twenty to
twenty-five thousand men. farce rec"rniHed
hy the hesieg"rs themselves to he inadequate"
Elsewhere Cluseret says. touching the di-pro.
PARTON Of RESOURCES: Let the reader know.
once for ALL that NJ the most cri teal moments
l never employed more than 6.0tO TO $3.50 men
for the complete defence Of Paris from st.
Denis to Charenton. NV reserves mover we're
drawn on. II they got orders to march. tile
night Of the attack on a great scale up
on Vanves and fssy. Il was nnrey by why
OF prrcauticn. They took no part In til. action.
Military men-I mean. of course. those who
have had trainng-will understand my system
NJ operations. | was commanding National
guards good enough behind u hnrriraie.
tolernblr for the purpose Of carrying posi-
tior. deplorahlc In the open field. and thu. from
n" fault Of theirs. hut from In, oi their officers
hal accordingly reduced my defence To head-
of columns. thus parnlyzing the hume Teal
superiority Of nv adversary. Had not been
arrested or had had surcossors cnrahle Of
u understanding and continuing my tactics. I
would have cut down by one-hn the defenders
nj Paris by substituting machines for men. a
thing WINS In process Of accomplishing. In
that event four or Ave thousand men would
have sunlced for the defence"
What WIS Clnsere' led BY experience 10 think
Of the Fren.h re2ul trmy which the yersnil-
Iists ed from ne second empire-that
regular army which had d sgrareL i'self ut
Sedan and Metz, and. alter guaranteeing Pa Il
10 the Germans, plumrd themselves upOn
at last to wrpst II from Its
rtiznns2 II II well To- let the author de-
rne his Views upon this point. berause
from time to time, In the course OF these vol
ulnes he speaks OF MacAIahnns nttncks
upon the forts Of Issy and Vanves a. serious.
= When ! say serious" he writes. Il moan |
10 speak only Of the artillery: for ns
'Or the fantry. II never oversteppel the lin.
IT, Of u prudent reserve. was expecting every |
moment to have to sustalH u haypnet charge |
rom the chnSsPps u DirL When knew them |
hey were goOl soldiers. equal to any test: ! |
rad commanded them IN the Ctimra and in |
africa II vrung NV heart tn witness the de.
'reriu'le ri he French infantry. could I'M
lerstan thai once wrought IN. they like nll ,
,"wards. would he feroci 'us. There was moth |
ne, absolutely nothing lef, OF the soldier | |
,ad known. Thoy could not oven carry u
vretched trench. To have hold it afterwlrl.
10 nIbt, would have been another matter:
,ut a snl'lier would at 10 ~ have got there. We
ised to Sc there In rhe Crim,l What. | USED
% ask myself. il this the army in wliih
or eighteen yetrs | was an otIicer-tlls
army In which my father and grandfather
hold commands. and Wi rhoy taught me to
Idmir' on trnstf Had the empire '!e'noralized
france tn that Il gree hat Il dd not even leave
b" AtnT tn make sodi RS out on The lack
II Gsnerlls ono could understand, but how
* plan the lack OF soldiers? Mover besore WAS