The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1887-01-28

Sswar and that such decision OF the political
PPower when rendered, was binding upon every
yshsr department of the government and could
~, he questioned in a judicial tribunal.
In the case OF Mississippi vs. johnson IA Wal
,scs 475)lt was sought to enjoin the President
rf the United States from enforcing the recon
rtruction acts because those acts were said to be
Unconstitutional The court refused to grant
he writ, saying it would be an invasion of the
r;ohts of the executive in the exercise of polit-
sceI mower The same principle is announced in
Georgia VS. Stanton Is Wallace, 50 The ques-
lion il discussed in the case of the State VS. Gov
amor Il butcher, 37l), where it is said:
All the powers conferred by the Constitution upon
che (ioversor political powers. All the duties en-
io;ned are political duties Touching all the powers
Conferred on the executive by the Constitution he
entirely Independent of the control of the Judiciary
Seing responsible to the people alone and liable for
impeachment for misdemeanor in Office.
Political power has been defined in the People
w. Morgan, Doth Illinois, 562, as follows: .'Po-
ltical power is the policy of government or its
administration, and may be exercised either in
eminent, or both" Now, then, the declaration
nv the Speaker of the House. under the Consti-
tution that Robertson was duly elected Lieu
tenant governor, was the exercise of political
mower Yet it is sought in this case to have this
court, in an application of temporary restrain
ing order. revise and overturn that act done in
the exercise of political power by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
Justice Mitchell-This is a case that occurs to
me- Mr.. Attorney general Suppose the Senate
should declare that Colonel Robertson was elected
Lieutenant governor when in truth he was not
and the courts should subsequently declare that
he was, but the Senate should declare that he
was not, and he should then bring mandate
against the auditor to require him to issue
warrant for his pay, he being ready to discharge
his duties, would the determination of the cues
tion by the Senate bind the court so that it could
not look into the case because of no jurisdiction
Mr.. Michener-The determination of the joint
convention would, as expressed through the
Speaker Of the House under the Constitution
That determination would be binding upon the
Auditor Of State, for that is the power which
settles the question as to who is entitled to the
Office. If the Senate undertook to decide for
itself that Robertson was not duly elected Lieu.
tenant governor, that would be a matter which
the Auditor of State would not be called upon
10 recognize, for the reason that such power is
vested, by the Constitution in another tribunal
Justice Mitchell-Of course l only mentioned
the subject to understand what your position is
Now your position IL, that the determination of
shat body is conclusive upon all the other
branches of the government; that il they have
determined that he is rot. then in other way,
he might raise the question: either by mandate
to compel the payment of his salary or any other
way
Mr.. Michener-That decision is binding upon
the court unless it is afterwards reversed by the
means OF the contest which is provided for under
Their on But the constitutional tribunal is the
court OF last resort in such a case.
In the case Of The People VS.. Forquer (Breese,
a04), an Illinois case, there was an application
FOR writ Of mandate upon the Secretary OF
State to compel him to issue commission which
had been signed by one who was claiming to be
Governor OF Illinois, at a time when there was
another claimant to that Office, and in this action
It was sought to settle who was the Governor OF
Illinois. The court held that such question
patf nr ind. 81 60 49,
determination OF the political power alone. TIC
the same effect are Sheridan VS.. Calvin rs ILL.,
237, Dickey vs.. Reed rs H., 261), Harris VS.,
Sehryock (S2 ILL.,. 119), The People vs.. Morgan
100 ILL.,, $751;
The court will not interfere with the exercise
Of legislative power in any way Mr.. High, il
his work on Extraordinary Remedies" Section
l35, summarizes the law this subject and
among other cases, he cites ex parte Echols, Sc
Alabama, 698 In that case the Speaker of the
House decided bill had not passed by two
thirds vote of that branch of the Legislature and
ar action for writ OF mandate was brought tc
compel him to sign the bill as having passed. But
the court held that in deciding whether or not the
bill had passed the Speaker exercised legislative
powers, and that in the performance of that
function he was beyond the control of the courts
of the State, and refused the writ.
IT. should be held that in declaring the re-
suit OF the election of ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, the
Speaker of the House did not perform political
duties, it must necessarily follow that he per
formed legislative duties. He must, in the nat
ure of things perform duties in that respec
either political or legislative, both, for there
may be a min Cling of the two. Ii he performed
legislative functions alone. then he is within the
rule laid down by Mr. High and 10 this Alabams
case, and he is beyond the reach or control o
this court by writ of mandate and therefore by
writ of injunction, for the two actions are CO
relative.
So in the case of tho Des Moines Gas Com
panv VS. The City IF Des Moines. Al Iowa, SOB
1t was sought to enioin the Common Council o
the city from passing certain ordinance, alleg
ing as reason tina. sbe ordinance was beyond
their constitutional powers In passing upoI
that question, the court say:
The General Assembly is a coordinate branch o
the STATE governments, and so is the law making powe
of public and municipal corporations within the pre-
serbed limits. 1t is competent for the judi
diary interfere with legislative of the thar
Che other, but the unconstitutional acts of either MAJ
be annued Certainly the passage of an unconstit,
tional law by the General Assembly cannot be en-
joined. If So under the pretense that any propose
law was of that character. the judiciary could arres
the Wheels of legislation.
In the at bar, it is claimed that there wa
no constitutional election, therefore that TIT
Speaker of the House had no right, under tn
Constitution. TO declare that there was an cleo
ton, and that Robertson had been elected a
that election. Applying the principles of thi
iowa case TO this proposition, we find that II tn
act OF the Speaker the exercise of leglsla
tonal in so far as the question of the election
was concerned, still it is beyond the reach o
the courts Of this State.
Justice Mitchell--That is, if the Legislator
decided that the Constitution authorized tn
election. it is couciusivel
Mr.. Michener-Yes, it is conclusive upon tn
court
To the same effect is Sherlock VS.. Village, 5
Illinois, 1893; and Sheridan Calvin rs Illinois
~. This is upon the principle that the sewers
n M
pendent and co.sovereign, which is the prime
Die recognized in the case OF Smith VS.. Meyers
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
These principles are chrystalized in Article
OF our Constitution, which is, ''rhe powers {
the government are divided into three separat
departments: The legislative, the executive, il
cuding tho administrative, and the judicial; an
no person charged with official duties under on
OF these departments shall exercise any of th
functions Of another, except as in tn
Constitution expressly provided" The questio
as to the distribution OF the powers
Ay,t k~A n int