Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1887-11-07

any of the exceptions stated. The court
did not err in sustaining exceptions to
that portion of appellants plea in recon-
ventions that sought to make G. W.
Goodrich, one of appellee's attorneys, q
party to the suit for the purpose for re-
covering damages, on the ground that
Goodrich advised and directed the
sheriff IN maliciously and wrongfully ex-
ecuting the writ to dispossess Casey.
While Casey may institute his suit for
Damages against all who participated in
causing the damage. it does not neces-
sarily follow that such suit can be main
tanned by way of plea in reconvention.
1t is general rule that demands cannot
be set off, unless they are between par
ties to the same action. Damages occa-
stoned by Goodrich outside his duties as
attorney, cannot be recovered and set of
against claim of Haurick against Casey
for rent. Casey alleged in his answer
that the sheriff refused to give him time
to make replevin bond, threw his house
hold goods out of doors, forced his
daughter out in the rain, and weather
otherwise inciement, and otherwise
maltrested him. TO crafty tn
malice of Haurick, and which acts Hau-
rick ratified and adopted. On motion,
over objections of appellant, this portion
of the answer was stricken out Held:
This was error. The court should have
submitted this SIS question Of fact for the
jury. For this error the cause will DE
reversed and remanded. Msltbie, 2. J.
International and Great Northern Rail-
way Company VS.. T. M. Prince; appeal
from Hays. The facts of this case being
Identical with the case of the Interna-
tiOnal and Great Northern Railway Com
psnY vs.. G. S. Cocke, appeal from Hays,
in which an opinion wss fled on October
%, 1887, reversing and remanding said
cause. For the reasons therein stated
this causesis reversed ndIemanded. Malt
bic, P. J.
John L. Hickman ct al. VS.. Josefa
Stone ct al; appeal from Maverick. De-
murrers were sustained to appellants
petition in the court below, and the case
was dismissed. The petition in brief al
legged for cause OF action as follows:
That appellant, Lucretia Stone Hickman,
and appellee, Josefa Stone, were the
daughters Of William Stone, deceased
Said deceased made will and left his
estate to appellant and appellee and four
minor brothers, each to have one-sixth
Of the estate, except Josefa, who was also
to have the homestead. The will named
Josefa as executriX, and provided That
she should not be required to give bond
as long as she remained widow. That
seid appellant was married to her CO.
plaintiff Hickman before she was twenty
years old, and thzt they both reposed
great confidence IN the said Josefa, and
we're unacquainted with the value Of the
estate. Said estate was ipventoried at
SAL 1000, less than half its value, and that
the same was at this time
worth four times that amount.
That said Josefa well knew the value of
said estate and fraudulently misrepye-
sented to appellant that one sixth Of said
estate, appellants share, wss not worth
much more, If any, than $4,000, and that
said J0sefa induced said Lucretie to sell
her share for the sum Of $1,000 and to
give her deed for the same. That said
Lucretia's share Wes, at the time, worth
five times the sum paid for it. That said
Josefa paid came out Of the income to
which the heirs were Justly entitled.
That said Josefa WAS the natural guardian
of said LuCretis, who was at the time Ct
said sale minor. That said JJsefa be
compelled to render an account OF said
estate. That said deed Of said Lucretis
to said Josefa be cancelled, etc. Held
That under the allegations Of the petition
there were facts stated which il
proven to be true, would have authorized
O cancellation of the deed executed by the
plaintiff to Mrs. Stone, and the court erred
in sustaining the demurrers to the petition
The will provided that the property should
be kept together until the youngest child
becomes of age. To allow appellee to
buv an interest Of one of the minor chill
dren would be to allow her of her own
volition to set aside the plain provisions
OF the will. Reversed and remanded.
M8ltbie, P. J.
Frank W. MobleY ct al VS.. Thomas
Lucas; appeal from Lsmpasas. Suit by
appellant to recover 1876 acres of land
situated near the city of Lampasss. A
lard certificate is only naked right to
acquire land from the state. 1t may be
acquired by contract, but Is not q thing
which may be acquired by limitation.
Such possession Of the certificate as is
shown by the defendants vendors can not
be made assailable under the plea of limi-
being the legal owners OF the certificate,
Wy lAAOA1kahSC i1Ouu tAC OAlsLuHA SLaILCS,
q sale of the certificate by
others, claiming to be the
heirs, could not bring the legal
title under the operation Of the doctrine
Of stale demand. The plaintiffs were not
required to assert their title, or put 1t lii
suit when they already had the title.
Plaintiffs brought their suit before any
rights were required by limitation against
them, within fifteen months after Lucas
went into possession. Under such proof
they were entitled to s judgment, change
able of course, with the value of improve
m~nts placed upon it in good faith by
Lucas, and with other equities if war
rented by the evidence. Reversed and
rsmanded. Collard,J.
Ball, Hutchings & Co. vs.. E M. Col
Inns; appeal from McLenuan. This was
suit of trespess 10 try title brought by sp.
pellee sgsinst appellants. Both parties
deraign title through D o. Warren and
through administrators sales. Verde,
for appellee. The court gave the follow.
ing charge: "The plaintiff, E. M. Collins,
claims to be the owner of the land in con-
troversy, by virtue of probate sale
made under the orders of a probate
court of Leon county, the evidence fur