The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1887-09-18
De ALSO FOLLOWING copy

~ Representatives, and as each State has its
two vote@in that body, it will be that the
smaller states secured, when they are In united
majority, the practical power of defeating all
Hesitation which was unacceptable to them.
.sWhat has the experience of a century taught
ms on this question: 1t is certainly true that
there have been MANY expressions of iissatis-
faction with the operation Of principle which
-; cas- TO each OF the Blk New England States,
sitnated compactly together, as much power IN
,ha Senate in making laws. in ratifying treaties,
and in confirming or rejecting appointments to
Office as is given to the great State of New
York which. both III population and wealth. ex-
caads all the New England States, aud nearly
- not quite equals Thorn in territory.
.aBut if we are TO form opinion from dem
constructions against or attempts to modify. this
feature Of the Constitution, any feature
,rhich concerns exclusively the functions of the
Senate we shall be compelled say that the
ablest of our public men, and the wisdom of the
Nation are in the main satisfied with the work
OF the convention on this point after hundred
wars of observation. And it is believed that
the existence of important body IL our sys-
tenn of government, not wholly the mere repre-
sentative of population, has exercised q whole
some conservatism on many occasions in our
history.
another feature of the Constitution which
met with earnest opposition was the yesting or
the executive power a single magistrate
While Hamilton would have preferred hered-
itarv monarch. with strong restriction his au-
thority. like that In ENGLAND he soon that
even his great Iuhence could nos carry the con-
vention with him. There were not few mem
bers who preferred in that matter tho system of
a single body las the Congressl III which should
he reposed all the power OF the Nation, or
council, executive committee. appointed by
that body ana responsible TO it. There were
Others who preferred executive council of
several members, not owing its appointment to
Congress-
1t was urged against our Constitution by
many liberty-i loving men, both in the convention
and out of it, that it conferred upon the execu-
tive. single individual, whose election for a
Of four years was carefully removed from
the direct vote Of the people, powers dan gerous
TO the existence of free government 1t was said
that with the appoin tment of ali the officers of
the government, civil and military, the sword
and the purse of the Nation in his hands, the
power to prevent the enactment of laws to which
he did not assent-uness they could be passed
over his objection by vote of two-thirds in each
of the two legislative houses-and the actual
of this power for four years
without interruption, ambitious man,
Of great personal popularity, could es
tahlish his power during his own life
and transmit it to his family a perpetual
dynasty. Perhaps of ali objections made to inn
portant features of the Constitution this one had
more piausbility, and urged with most
force Bnt if the century of our experience has
demonstrated anything, it is the fallacy of this
objection and OF all the reasons urged in its sup
port.
a contrivance to remove the appointment of the
President from the control of popular sutfra 90,
was if it had any merit speedily overcome with
out any infraction of the Constitution by the
democratic tendencies of the people The
electors posing the college, who it was sup
posed would each exercise an independent judy
ment in casting his vote for President soon
came to be elected themselves distinct
pledges made beforehand, that they would vote
for some person designated as popular favorite
for that office. So that at the present time the
electors OF each State in sending to the capital
their votes for President. DO but record the in
struction of majority of the citizens voting IN
that State. The term Of four years for the
presidential Office is now deemed too long by
anyone. while there are many who would desire
that IT should be made longer, say seven or ten
years.
the consent Of the Senate to it's exercise; and
that body has asserted its right of refusing that
assent SO courageously and so freely. that there
can be no real fear of its successful use by the
President in q manner to endanger the liberty
of the country, unless the Senate itself shall be
utterly corrupted. Nor can the means for such
corruption be obtained from the public treasury
until Congress in both branches shall have be-
come degenerate as to consent to such use
Nor have we had in this country any want
or ambitious men, who have earnestly desired
the presidency, or. having II once have longed
for a continuation of it at the end of the lawful
term. And il may be said that it is Utmost a
custom when President has filed biz Office for
one term acceptably, that he IS TO he re elected
m ala rpp21ltcaI party continues to oe popular
hero worship of successful inTi; SHOWN his,ins
and rewarded them By elecLiL. ~ n~asi
nency, In PROOF OF TINS 1t - <only necessary
Harrison, Taylor. and Grant - some of fhem
there has been no want of ambitie T, nov of the
commenting disposition which Is S'fgss epeen-
dered by the use of military power Yet none Of
these men have had more than two terms of the
once. AND though a few years ago enc of the
most largely circulated newspapers of the
United States wrote in its paper day after dav
articles headed Csesarism, charging danger to
the Republic from one of its greatest benefaetors
ana military chiefs. 1t excited no S.stention but
derlslon, and deserved n OTHER
There Is no dangerSTn this country from tho
~ " 81 Ieposoo 1n.pIe presidential office There
from sss& Experience shows, far. far more danger
nlnilism and assassination, than from am
bition in our public servants.
80 far have the incumbents of the presi-
dency, during the hundred years of its history,
been from grasping, or attempting to grasp.
powers not warranted by the Constitution, and
so far from exercising the admitted power of
that office in despotc manner, candid stu
dent of our political history during that time
cannot fail to perceive that no one of the three
great departments Of the goyernmsnt-the
legislative, the executive, and the jndicial-has
been N ore shorn of its just powers or crippled
IN the exercise of them, than the presidency.
I'm regard to the function of appointment to
otiice-perhaps tine most i'm portant of the execu-
tive duties-the spirit of the Constitution
qnires that the President shall exercise freely
his best Judgment and follow its most sincere
conviction IN selecting proper men.
1t is undeniable that for many years past,
oy the gradual growth of custom. 1t has come to
pass that in the nomination of officers by the
President, he has so far submitted to ne gov
erned by the wishes and recommendations of
the two houses OF Congress, that the purpose OF
the Constitution in vesting this power him,
and the right of the public to hold him personal
~ responsible for each and every appointment
he makes is largely defeated. In other words,
the great principle lying at the foundation of all
free governments that the legislative and exec-
utlve departments shall be kept separate, is in
vaded by the participation of members of Con-
gress in the exercise of the appointing
power" .
If experience teach anything the
subject of theories of government, the late civil
war teaches Enthusiastically that those who be-
lleved the source of danger 10 be in the strong
powers of the federal government were in error,
and that those who believed that
such powers were necessary TO its
safe conduct and continued existence
We're in the right. The attempted destruction
OF the Union by eleven States, which were part
OF It, and the apparent temporary success of the
effort, was undoubtedly due To the capacity of
the States under the Constitution for concerted
action, by organized movements, with all the
machinery ready at hand TO raise armies and
establish a central government And the ulti-
mate failure of the attempt is to be
attriDntad with enu:l clearnssS RI