Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1887-12-29

ours and owing to the importance OF the sub
ject twill be pardonable TO refer, IN detail at
In the case of Fell vs. State az Maryland, 72),
an act of the Legislature was assailed, which is
election to be held in July, 1874. at which the
voters of the several districts in the counties
named should cast ballots For the sale OF
the sale OF spirftuous or fermented LOU ors, !"
and If it should be found by the returns OF the
judges of election and proclamation of the
judges of the Circuit Court that the majority OF
voters IN any district of either Of said counties
had been cast against the sale of spirituous or
fermented liquors. that then it should not be
lawful for any person to sell SpirituouS liquors
in any district of either of said counties
voting by majority against selling the
same under penalty, and it was further pro-
vided that the said act should take effect inn
mediately after it should have been determined
by a majority of the voters in any one or more
or not spirituous or fermented liquors should
not be sold. 1t was held by the court, after an
exhaustive examination of the subject in which
the attention of the court was called to the
same line of authorities C ted to us by counsel
for relator in this case, that the act was consti-
tutional: that it's going into effect, and becom-
ing operative, being made to depend upon the
result of a popular vote, was not a delegation
oflegislative power to the people.
The same question was before the Supreme
Court of Georgia upon like statute in the case
of Caldwell ct al. Barrett ct al. (75 Georgia,
GoD and it was held to be valid.
In the case of Commonwealth VS.. Waller IA
Bush, 2lS kentucky, an act which prohibited
the sale of Intoxicating liquors in the County OF
Built. (which provided that the act shall take
effect whenever it shall be ratified by MAORI
ty of the voters of said county, WAS claimed to
be void, as delegating legislative power The
objection was oyerruled and the act was held
to be valid. it being said by Pryor as the organ
of the Court:
'That when the act passed the Legislature
and was signed by the Executive it then be-
came law, and by reason of the law the peo-
pie interested in its passage we're authorized
to vote for or against its PROF isons; that its
operation is made to depend on the popular
will is part of the law itself. and its going in
to operation on the contingency the people
voted for it, was the legislative on the sub
ject.''
In case of State vs. Moves 10 Foster New
Hampshire, 279), it was held that statute
making bowling alleys in twenty-five rods of a
dwelling nuisances is not unconstitutional nor
will it be, as though the statute is to be in
force only in those towns in which it is adopted
in town meeting.
Court had under consideration an act to prevent
domestic animals from running at large, it is
said:
TT is fairly within the scope of legislative
power to prescribe as one of the conditions
upon which the law, in given case, shall come
into operation or be defeated, that it shall de-
pend on vote Of the people of the locality to
be affected by its provisions.
In Locks Appeal ere Pa. St, 49o, the act
Philadelphia to vote by ballot for license
against license" and provided that
whenever by the returns of the election it
shall appear there is majority against Ii
cense, it shall not be lawful for any license to
issue for the sale OF spirituous, vinous, malt or
other Intoxicating liquors in said ward, with q
section added imposing penalty for thereafter
selling liquors in said ward.
In an elaborate opinion rendered by Judge
Agnew, in which he reviews and overthrowS
the case OF Parker VS.. Commonwealth 6 Barr
507), he affirms the consttutionallty of the law.
the ground upon which it was assaulted being
that it was q delegation of legislative power
In the case of Smith vs.. Jaynesville GIG Wis.,,
29), G. j. Dixon, in discussing this question,
says:
''But it is said that the act is void or at least
SO much of it pertains to the taxation of
shares in National banks because it was sub
united to a vote of the people, provided that
it should take erect only after approval by a
majority of the electors voting on the subject
at the next general election This was no more
on certain future contingency that contiE-
gency being popular vote in its favor"
The consttutionality of local option laws is
discussed in 35 Amr. Decls page 3)7, in q note
to the case OF Commonwealth VS. kImball and
it is said that on review Of the whole QueS-
tion it appears that the great weight of
authority and the better reasons are
in favor of the constitutiona1fry Of those
laws, and as sustaining that view the Court
II Pa. ST.. 49l: State VS.. Common Pleas, Norris
County, 36 N. j., r.; State VS.. Wilcox, ~ Com,
36i: Fell VS.. State, AZ Maryland, r: Anderson
VS. Commonwealth, IS Bush KY. 435; State VS..
Cook "a Mimi, 247; Boyd VS.. Bryant, 35 Ark,
SO; Bancroft VS.. Dumas, 81 Vt, 45i: Common
wealth VS.. Bennett. los Mass: "a, and 100 Mass,
Noyes, 30 N. H, 279: Railroad Company vs..
Commissioners of Clinton County, Ohio ST.,
az.
On the other side, as being opposed to the
validity of such laws, is cited the case of Rec
VS.. Foster. Ha. CDel.), 479: State VS.. Weir. 3'
Iowa, 1874; ex parte Wall. 4S Cal. 279: Lament,
vs. Lndell, 81 Mo- 1873; Maize VS.. State, Ind,
342; State VS.. Swisher. II Texas. AL.
Ft may be said of the cases last cited that the
ened if not destroyed as authority by the case
of People VS. Nalby 40 Cal. 47s,l and the case
of Maize VS.. State a Ind.,l is not supported by
the subsequent case of Greesch VS.. State A2
Ind, $40.
It is squarely held in the case. of Rice vs..
Foster q Han, 49, DELI in an exhaustive
opinion. that act authorizing the people
to decide whether the license to sell intoxicat-
ing liquors should be permitted, was unconsti-
the distinct ground that the act was delega-
ton of legislative power. Much Of the opinion
IS sss he an s
lodged alone in the Legislature. and that the
power to pass law can not be delegated
to the people. The proposition which this
of government the power and duty of making
laws is cast upon the Legislature, and that
such power can not be delegated except per-
haps to municipal corporations for their local
oyernment-is too clear to admit of dispute.
The disputaols question is not whether the
Legislature can delegate legislative power. for
that Is conceded. but it is whether the Legislafr
ure can pass u law in the mode prescribed by
the Constitution, and complete in all it's parts,
and make the operation or taking effect OF such
law depend upon future event or contingency,
such as majority vote OF the people in the To-
cafitfeS 70 be affected by it.
That the Legislature can do this has been
affirmed not only by this court in the cases
hereinbafore referred to in this opinion. burt
also by other courts of the highest authority.
whose opinions have also been referred to
somewhat in detail, and others simply cited.
The logic of the argument against the valid
ity of the law under consideration if sound
affects the dram-shop law. That act provides
that no person shall sell Intoxicating liquors
taking out license as dram shop keeper.
and it also provides that it shall not be lawful
for the county court of any county, or clerk
thereof in vacation, to grant any license to
keep dram-shop in any city or town contain
ing 800 Inhabitants or more until a majority
OF the tax-paying citizens in the block or square
shall sign a petition asking for such license to
keep dram-shop in such block or square. nor
in any Incorporated town or municipal town
ship, until q majority of both of the assessed
tax-paying citizens therein and in the block Oh
square in which the dram-shop is to be kept
shall sign a petition asking for such license &c
By this act the lawfulness of granting q IL
cense is made to depend on the Will of majority
of the tax paying citizens. expressed tothe court
asking that license be granted. and until that
will be SO expressed, it is unlawful to grant the
license, and when it is so expressed it is made
lawful to grant it, The act prohibits the sale oil
intoxicants in less quantities than one gallon
without license and leaves it to a majority OF
the tax-payers to be affected by its sales to say
whether it shall be lawful to grant the license
And no one since the case of State VS.. Searcy
GO Missouri, 1897 has ever pretended that such
a law was unconstitutional on the ground that
it delegated legislative power to the PEOPLE, OF
on any other ground.
II it is legitimate for the Legislature to give
to the people the right-as is done in the dram
| shop law-to say whether it shall be lawful t.
grant license to sell intoxicants, why is it no,
also legitimate for the Legislature to give them
/ the right to accept the provisions of a Law
which forbids the sale of intoxicants alto
gether.
| It is as much delegation of Legislative
power in the one case as in the other, but &C
| cording to the authorities have hereinbefors
cited it is not delegation of such power IL
l oif case