The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1887-08-08
They Are Not Built to Enable the Germans
to Seize Holland, but Are Intended to
Facilitate an Attack Upon France.
A Sunday Riot in the Neighborhood of
Belfast Provoked by 0rangemen.
pudiate Loan Made by Their Predeces-
sors-American Money for China.


He Does Not Contemplate an Attack Upon
Holland, but Has Larger Game in Wow.
Special to the Indianapolis journal
LONDON. Aug. THE sensation caused dur
ing the past few days by reports of Prince Bis
marck's preparations to gobbie up Holland has
been alarming one. but a reaction has al
ready set in. 1t is beginning to be realized that
Bismarck is not in the habit of carrying out his
purposes in quite 30 open-handed and undiplo-
matte fashion. Several other considerations
also advanced to throw doubt upon
the correctness of the theory that Ger
many is the point of absorbing
the country of dykes and inland seas One of
these-perhaps the least weiehty-s that Ger
many has always pursued policy of autonomy.
In forcibly acquiring Alsace-Lorrane she made
citizens of foreign-speaking population, it is
true. but territory had formerly been occu-
pied by German spea kire people, and the dia-
lect there employed is in come portions of the
province almost much German French to-
day. Bismarck himself is what You Americans
might call a crank this subject of autonomy,
and he literally has use for any territory as
part of Germany where the mother tongue is
not spoken. at least where it cannot be sub
stituted for the vernacular The rigorous
enforcement of the use of the German language
in Poland is the outcome of this tendency. and
if it is found impossible to Germanize the people
they are ruthlessly expelled, to be replaced by
German colonists Alsace- Lorraine is also
being re-Germanized fast practicable The
annexation of Holland would graft upon the
German empire a people whom it would be
impossible to Germanize for centuries to como.
though they sprang originally from kindred
stock. No man has more individuality about
him than your Hollander, and, admitting that
the sturdy race could be conquered awed
into submission by their powerful neiehbor,
they would not become amalgamated with the
German people. Holland would have to be ad-
ministered a province, not part of Ger
many. This would introduce discordant ee-
ment in the German empire. whose great source
of strength to-day lies in the homogeneity of its
people and the unity of their aims and efforts.
Another consideration of more or less i'm
portance brought forward is that Bismarck
would not have Holland alone deal with, but
Belgium as well. The interests Of Belgium
would all lie in helping Holland to maintain in
dependence. for if Hollands nationality disap-
peared, Belgium would not long be able to main
tain her footing a separate state. The Bel
gians may not be to-day. as Caesar called them
in his Commentaries. the 'bravest fighters in
Gaul." but they still have some capacity in that
line, or had no longer ago than in $780, az their
independence shows, and they too well salts
fed with their progress under self-eovernment
to consent without struggle to any serious
roachment upon it.
There various other reasons for doubling
that Prince Bismarck is engaged in such a
startling enterprise as the conquest of the
Netherlands, but the most convincing theory
put forth to account for the strategic railways
and military depots which have suddenly
loomed up the Dutch frontier, is that they
are not intended to enable Germany ITO throw
a n I'M nf m lOfa he wall Of Ant
werp at twen:y-fo hours notice." as the Brus-
sells Gazette said Yesterday, but to add to the
upon France This view is strengthened
by the fact that the place chosen
for the concentration of troops is
almost exactly at the point where the dividing
line between Belgium and Holland strikes the
German frontier, and is within reach OF both
Dutch and Belgian lines of railway. which
to be massed at Antwerp but, if necessary, at
The Hague and part also at points the
Franco Belgian frontier. The troops sent to the
seaports could there be quickly transferred to
German men -of-war and hurried through the
channel to menace the ports of the undefended
western and northern frontier of France,
could cooperate with others advanc-
ing on the Franco German frontier
proper, in keeping the French army busy in the
eastern part OF the country. A simultaneous at
tack could therefore be made on three sides of
+ rance a t remarkably short notice, The useful
ness of this arrangement would be equally great
mode of defense in case France should be
the attacking party. Holland and Belgium,
though demurring a matter of course, the |
passage through their territory of large bodies
of alien troops, would doubtless yield to
gent request Germany's part for such
accommodation, rather than run the
risk of having war forced upon
They have no particular affection
for France, and it would be safer for them to
incur her enmty than that of their
erfu eastern neighbor. 1t is altogether likely, |
therefore that in establishing rendezvous for
troops near Maestricht. Prince Bismarck is SIM |
ply adding to his precautions against any poss- |
BILE chance for the success of French attempts at
reven ge, is perfecting plans sweep down |
upon the French at favorable moment and |
place them hors du combat in order that Ger |
man need live no longer in constant apprehen- |
sion of danger from her Gallo foe