The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1887-05-07

foderao oommanderb.
When the baseisss story that the
President had prevented the pursuit
of the enemy was first ventilated,
Gen. J. T.. Johnston, the senior officer
on that field, November 10, 1851, BY
letter, replied TO inquiry, that the
reasons for not advancing were: fhe
spparent freshness Of the United
States troops ct Centreville, which
checked our pursuit; the strong forces
occupying the works near Georgetown
and Alexandria; the certainty, too,
that Gen. Patterson, II needed, would
reach Washington, with his army oil
more than 5000, sooner than we
could, and the condition and inade-
quate means OF the army In ammuni'
don, provisions and transportation,
prevented any serious Thoughts OF ad-
yancing against the capital" Gen.
Besuregard, the second In command,
has fully stated, % the obstacle to
pursuit, want OF supplies and trans
portation. Neither OF them has
stated that which either Of them |
might, that In the night after the
battle, inquired what, II any
orders had been given for pur:.
suit, and after learning none bad
been given, and after some further in.
quiries, dictated an order for Gen.
Bonham to move forward with his
brigade at fret dawn OF day. Gen.
Early, whom left with his command
ON the extreme left, when the battle
bad closed, has reported that be was
instructed by me TO remain In that POI
sition ss best suited for pursuit, and
hat he passed the night there expecting
orders in the morning. As these facts
have all bsen published, and were GER
tainiy accessible TO Gen. Wolseley, 1t
seems inexcusable that he should have
preferred to Tevamp an exploded
scandal by the addition Of regret
among Southerners for a blunder OF
the administration, which 1t was cuff.
GENTLY well known the administration
had never made.
Blowing hot and cold with the same
breath, Gen. Wellesley next arraigns
the Confederate Administration for
the defenseIof its own capital. He
says: "Lee was opposed to the final
defense OF Richmond that was urged
upon him for political, not military
reasons. 1t was great strategic or.
ror." Hero Is an immense amount Of
misstatement In proportion 10 the
length OF the sentence. At Richmond
the Ooniederacy had Its principal
foundry for the casting OF heavy guns
and the manufacture Of railroad sup
plies; then there, too, was Its princi-
pal armory, nearly all OF Its machinery
| A.. ~ a
preparation of ammunition for both
artillery and infantry. There were,
therefore, very important material
considerations involved In maintaining
its possession. 1t Is utterly untrue
, that urged Lee TO prolong the dc.
Tense OF the capital against
: his wish and judgment he
, was not OF the retreatinR
order, nor willing to abandon Lower
| Virginia and railroad connection with
the further South but when convinced
that the maintenance OF his position
was q mere question Of time, and pre-
sumsbly short one, the only point to
be discussed was when and by what
route IL should be abandoned. The time
was dependent on the condition OF the
roads, and was left for his selection,
which we hoped he would have full
power to make, despite the increasing
pressure Of the siege. The end came
sooner than either OF us expected, and
in a manner which prevented the exc
cution OF the movement on which we
had, after full consultation, sgreed.
The political consideration attach
ing TO the defense OF the capital seemed
to be fully appreciated by Gen. Vol
seley when he was censuring the Oon
federscy for having lost, as he sup
: posed, an opportunity to capture the
. capital of the United States; but he
finds II quite reprehensible for the
Confederate G government to oppose the
continued efforts OF its enemy to cap
ture Richmond. That was the OBJ
, jective point Of the vast armies
a launched from the North, but tht
I conquest OF Virginia was the first BteI
+ towards the capture Of Richmond, ant
: Lees brilliant campaigns between thu
= Potomac and James rivers were 70
,- much more than the mere defense o
q a city. When, by his great strsgeti
= movements across the Potomac, b,
}. drew the enemy out Of Virginia an,
d broke up the campaign for which
n had required much time and treasur
n to prepare, there were higher hope
70 and grander purposes than the mer
"a defense of our capital, with all tn
q political consequences which were II
volved In its capture.
n. The advantage OF drawing tn
,e enemy into the interior can hardly
lv claimed by Gen. Wolseley as an IL
ID vention; he may And II stated in
az proclamation issued at Danville, Va
m after the evacuation OF Richmond, bI
IN merely as a compensating circun
n stance, the value OF which 1t was SUI
n. posed would be realized by every on
h. A field marshal OF Prussia lie said
re- have remarked, upon seeing Londol
of that 1t was q fine place for loot"
as hosii force should ever threate
II. the capital of England, by all the tel
der memories which bind me to 1t,
N. hope the then commander OF Ii
N. British forces will not avoid the gre
In. strategic error" OF defending 1t to
ly fuality, by Ietresting before it shou
of be necessary, aud leaving the capt.
m. to the mercy OF the invader.
nd Then, with the conceit which II
-, wise KING of the Jews describes |
adj the most hopeless Of mental cond
he tons, Lord Wolseley censoriousl
,e. criticises the conduct Of both pRrti
re- to the war between the States, al
10 especially the assumed fsilul es Of &c
Lse to reap the fruits Of victory,
follows:
r. "What most strikes tho regular soldier
~ these cAmpAins of Gen. Ice, Is the ineiheie
ihs manner In which both he and his opponer
M were often served by their subord ate col
,Ss mandcrs, and how badly the STAFF and on
~ post work generally was performed on DO
th sides. Over and over again was /
eta South apparently within stones throw
no independence, as Il has been many times
ia marked, when, from want Of athorough
Eeod stat to organize pursuit, the occasi
was lost, and the enemy allowed 10 oscaI
Tn Lees cOmhin ations 10 secure victory We
ad the conceptions Of truly Rroe strategt
Cd and, whom they had been effected, his tact
W. were almost always everything that could
lat desired up 10 tho moment OF victory, ,
he there his action seemed TO stop abrupt
"a Was ever an army 90 hopelessly at the meT
Su Of another rs that Of McClellep whom he |
IN. gan his retreat TO Harrison's Landing al
nd the seven days fighting around kichmon
| What a m AAr NaulN vHtah 10 haVA his