The Greenville times. [volume] (Greenville, Miss.) 1868-1917, 1887-10-15
COMPARISON is ODIOUS."


Gen. LOngstreet says IS to the COM
parative merits of Grant and Lee, that
Grant had the most moral courage.
In tactics the two men were about
equal Lee probably excelled in STRAIT
egy.-Exchange.
This is a most remarkable statement
attributed to Gen. Longstreet If he
made it he proves that his power of
mental analysis does not improve with
age. Hence he has failed to mark that
there is a point where moral courage
stops and want ofmoral consciousness
begins. At the battle of Gettysburg
Gen.Lee lost the superb equipoise which
was wont to inspire his tactics. And
when he was confronted by the dire con-
sequences, surrounded by the wreck Of
the divisions refluent from the assault
on Cemetery Ridge, he rose to the very
height of moral courage. For ignoring
the dilatoriness of Longstreet's move
ments ON the day before, which direct
ed with the celerity which that COM
mander exhibited ON other fields, as at
Fraser's farm, at 2nd Manassas, at the
Wilderness, at Chicsmauga, might
have changed all; overlooking the fatal
supineness of Hill and Ewen ON the
first days battle, be said "it is all my
faultp' In boldness ofconception, in fixed
resolve and tenacity of purpose, Grant
rose to grandeur. But as to moral
courage-ade mortuis nil nisi bonum."
The only occasion on which Gen.
Longstreet ever witnessed fair tactical
test between the two generals was at
the Wilderness. Here Gen. Lee essay
ed bold stratagem, the detour Of
Longstreet around the Federal left,
which was most eflectually met and
nipped by an impetuous and overwhel-
ming assault on his centre. This for
ced an abandonment Of Longstreet's
movement and his rapid divergence to
the point of threatened disaster. So
well timed and perfectly devised were
the Confederate tactics in the compul-
sorry change of plan in the midst of
battle, that Grants weakly followed
success was converted into crushing
defeat which, but for the arrest of the
Confederate onslaught by Longstreet's
wound, would have been signal and
decisive.
From the day ON which the two
armies grappled on the Rapidan to the
brief respite on the Chickahominy, so
days after, there were daily combats
and 8 pitched battles engaging Lees
whole army. In this period Grant had
lost more men than Lee marshaled
against him and had achieved one sue
cess only; the destruction of Gen. Ed
ward Johnson's division. Could there
have been such results, the odds always
over two to one, except Lee were his
master in tactics2 After Cold Harbor,
with full ranks, Grant settled down to
play waiting game behind entrench-
ments; to let famine and exhaustion
and the Generalization consequent
upon the reverses in the Western army,
against which skill and daring were of
no avail do their work. When the
end came Gen. Meade asked Gen. Lee
how many men had manned his lines
during the Petersburg siege. lie was
answered, $4,000 muskets, and exclaim-
ed that he had supposed the strength
was $4,000 at least. When he had taken
his leave Gen. Lee turned to Gen. G. M.
Wilcox and said 81 need not tell you
that had Meade's estimate been cor
rect we would not be here"
AS to strategy, Lee could plan but
only, of either army, Jackson could
direct and execute with that secret
rapidity and desperate venture which
always ensures success and betokens
the very highest order of military
genius. With him at Gettysburg Lees
army would have marched into Wash
ington ON the same day that Grant en-
tered vicksburg no survivor of that
"body of Incompatible infantry" as
the ablest of Northern historians styled
the army of Northern Virginia, but
will 60 to his grave believing this.