The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1887-11-03

was called and sworn after all the peremptory
cnaneuges of the defendants had been exhausted.
At the trial the court construed the statute to
mean that although Juror called as a juryman
may have formed an O pinon based upon runor
or npon newspaper statements, but has expressed
noopinion as TO the truth of the newspaper state
meut, he is still qualified juror IL he states
that he can fairly and impartially render YER
a,ss sa thereon IN in accordance wit With the the
shall be satisfied of the truth of such
statement # is not test question whether a
juror will have the opinion which he has formed
from newspapers changed by the evidence, but
whether his verdict will be based only upon the
account which may be here given by witnesses
under OATH Interpreted In this way, the stat
ute Ia not materially different from that of the
Territory of Z tab which we had under consid-
Grafton IN Hopt vs. Utah, supra, and to which
we then gave effect AS that Territorial
starute. passed By Territorial Legislature, for
the government of Territory over which the
United States had exclusive jurisdiction, it came
directly within the operation or Article or the
amendment, which guaranteed to Hopt trial
by an impartial jury. webster VS.. Reid, IL
Howard, 432, 459l No one at that time sug-
gestet doubt of the constitutionality OF the
STATUTE and il was regarded both in the Terrific
rial courts and here as furnishing the proper
rule to be observed by Territorial court in en-
psreiliag an impartial jury in criminal case.
A similar statute was enacted 10 New York May
1872, tActs of 1872 40 9 New York
Michigan, April Is, 1873 Acts of 1873. 1872 Act
III, Howell. and also in Nebraska Comp. Stat.
Nebraska, 1885, p. $685. Criminal Code, 40S). The
was sustained by the Court Of Apneas of that
State in Stoker VS.. The People (53, New York,
164 to I72I decided June TO- 1873, and it has
been acted upon without objection ever since.
So far have been able to discover no
doubt has ever been entertained in Michigan or
Nebraska OF the constitutionality OF the statutes
OF those States. respectively but they have
always been treated by their supreme courts as
valid both under the Constitution of the United
States and under that of the State stephens Vs.
The People, 3S Michigan, 739 TO 745 Ulrch VS..
The People, 80 Michigan, 245; Murphy vs. The
State Is Nebraska. $780, Indeed, the rule of
the statute of Illinois, as it was construed oy the
trial court. is not materially different from that
which has been adopted by the courts in many
OF the States without legislative actions. Com
monwealth vs.. Webster, Cushing, 295; Holt
The People. 13 Michigan, 224; State VS.. Fox,
butcher, 500: Oslander va The Commonwealth,
3 Leigh, $50; State vs.. Ellington, Weden, 81;
Smith Eames, 5 Scam, 81. See also an
elaborate TO this last in 36 A. NJ De-
cember, 52I, where very large number Of au-
tnorities on this subject are cited.
ssWithout pursuing this subject further, it Is
sufficient say that wo agree entirely with the
Supreme Court of Illinois in the opinion that
the statute on its face as construed by the trial
conrt, is not repugnant to Section 9, OF Article
? of the Constitution of that State, which guar
antees to the accused party in every criminal
prosecution speedy trial, by an impartial Jury
of the county or district in which tho oHense Is
alieg ed to have been committed. AS this is
substantially the provision OF the Constitution
Of the United States, on which the petitioners
now rely, it follows that even ii their position
to the operation and effect of that Constitu-
tion is correct. the statute is not open to the
objection which is made against il.
NWe proceed then to consideration OF the
grounds of challenge to the jurors, Denker and
Sanford, to see if in the actual administration
of the rule of the statute by the court the rights
Of the defendants under the Constitution of
the United States were in any way impaired"
The court then gives extracts from the exam
ination of Denker by the defense, and says that
he was challenged for cause by the defend
ants, but before any decision was made thereon
he questioned by the court
and the courts examination is ap-
pended ''The court" it continues, sthere-
upon overruled the challenge but before the
|sssxcs xas accepted aud sworn he was further
1exanined by counsel for the defendants" This i
examination is also reprinted from the record.l
The court then says that the examination OF the
juror by counsel for the defendants closed and
he was examined by the Attorney for tine State,
and citations are given from the questions and
answers in this examination. The opinion con-
Ginues:
ssAt the close of the examination neither party
challenged the juror perempJorily, and he was
accepted and sworn. When this occurred 1t is
not denied that the defendants were still enti-
tied one hundred and forty-three peremptory
challenges, or about that number. When the
juror Sanford was called he was first examined
by the counsel for the defendants. THE exam
ination is here Quotedl. At the close of this
examination on the part of the defendants, the
juror challenged on their behalf for cause,
and the attorney for the State, after is was as
certained that all the peremptory challenges OF
the defendants had been exhausted, took up the
examination of the juror The result OF this
examination is given, as is the ruling OF the
court denying the challenge to overrule for
cause, and stating that tho peremptory chal-
lenees of the defense are exhausted Sanford is
a juror to try the case so far as the defendants
are concerned.1 This accepted by both
parties a true statement of the then condition
of the csse and after some further examination
Of the Juror which ELECTED nothing ,s OF
present inquiry, 20 peremptory challenge
having been intsrposed by the State Sanford
was sworn as juror and the panel was thus
complete This, SO far we have been ad vised,
presents all there is in the record which this
court can consider touching the challenge of
In Reynolds VS.. the United States, SO United
States, 145 to 1885, it was decided by this court
that in order to justify the reversal of the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of |
Utah for refusing to allow a challenge to juror
in criminal cases. the ground that he had |
formed and expressed an opinion as to tie issues
that uron the evidence the court ought to have |
found the juror had formed such opinion that |
he could not in law be deemed impartial The |
case must be in which it is manifest the law |
left nothing to the conscience discretion of the
court. II such is the degree of strictness which |
is required in the ordinary cases of writs from |
one court another in the same general juris-
diction, ought TO be careful that 1t Is not at |
all relaxed in a case like this, whom the ground
relied on for the reversal by this court or a Judg-
ment of the highest court of the State, is that
the error complained of Is so great to amount
in law to a denial by the State of a trial by an
I'm partial jury to one VINO is accused of crime.
We are unhesitasney of the opinion that
such case is disclosed by this record
1--WE come now to consider the objection that
the defendant Spies was compelled by the court
so be a witness against himself. He Voluntarily |
offered himself as witness in his own behalf
and by so doing he became bound to submit
himself to proper cross-examlnation. The
nj he x
amina tion to state whether he had received
certain letter, which was shown purporting to
have been written by Johann Most and ad-
dressed to him, and upon his saving that he
had, the Court allowed the letter TO be read In
evidence against him. This, it is claimed
not proper cross-examnation It is not
tended that the subject to which the cross-ex-
animation related was not pertinent to the issue
to be tried, and whether a cross-examination