The weekly register. [volume] (Point Pleasant, Va. [W. Va.]) 1862-1909, 1887-07-27
CoucH VS.. EAsrHAM.-As the


Gently decided by the Supreme
Court of our State, is one which has
excited some interest in our county
where the parties litigant reside, we
have thought it not out of place to
make brief mention of the questions
involved, and to give the public the
points decided by said Court.
The suit was brought FOR The pur-
pose of constructing the first clause
of the last will and testament of
Samuel Couch, deceased. Said
clause devised the farm on which
the testator resided, containing
about $50 acres to his son, Peter S.
Couch, and in order, as he expressed
it, that his two children might be as
near equal as may be, he directed
Peter to pay his sister, Sarah, $4,000;
and he made said sum lien and
charge on said farm until paid. But
in the event that his son Peter
should die, leaving no lawful issue
surviving him, he directed that all
of said real estate should pass to
and vest in his daughter, Sarah F.
Eastman, or her children, if she be
not then living, she or they, paying
to Mary G. Couch, the widow of Pc
ter, if then living, the sum of $4,000.
1t was claimed by the plaintiff
that Peter was not to pay said sum
of $4,000, to his sister Sarah, and
said sum was not to be a lien or
charge upon said land, unless Peter
died leaving lawful issue; and the
Circuit Court of Mason county SO
held.
The Supreme Court in rendering
said decision adjudicated the follow
ing points:
LIST. Where the language of the
testator is plain and his meaning
clear, the courts can do nothing but
carry out the will of the testator, if
it be not inconsistent with some
rule of law.
End. In the Interpretation of a
will the true inquiry is, not what
the testator meant to express, but
what the words used do express.
Sd. When the will affords no sat
isfactory clue to the real intention
of the testator, the court must from
necessity resort to legal presumpt-
ions and rules of construction, but
such rules yield to the intention OF
the testator apparent in the will
and have no application when the
intention thus appears.
4th. To aid in ascertaining the
true construction of the will, evil
dence may be received of any facts
known to the testator which may
reasonably be supposed to have in
fuenced him in the disposition OF
his property; but parol evidence OF
the intention of the testatator is
admissible only in cases where
there is latent ambiguity.
9th. Where testator has the le-
gal right to make will he has the
legal right to make an unequal, IN
just or unreasonable will u0LuntGs
stat pro rdtione.
9th. The rule that where a devisee
whose estate is underlined, is direct
ed to pay the testator's debts or leg
acies, he takes an estate in fee, has
no application where the estate of
the dgYisee is defined and fixed in
the will
9Th, It is an undisputed general
rule that although a legacy vests
where no special intention to the
contrary appears at the death ofthe
testator, it does not begin to carry
interest until year afterwards; but
where the legacy is charged solely
on land or given to a child and
directed to be paid by devisee of
land in order to make the portion
of such child equal that of the
hdevisee of the land, it should bear
interest from the date of the death
of the testator.
The following language is used
in the opinion delivered by the
Supreme Court: "the provision or
SAduSO VI Gu0 VIII HOW unu6f con-
sideration is expressed in plain and
unambiguous terms. The object of
the testator's bounty as we'll as the
subject disposed of, are fully identi-
fed, according to the rules before
stated; it seems to me there is very
little room for any attempt to con-
strue this will, to undertake to do
so can be little more than to repeat
its provisions"
And, again, the court says: "This
is an absolute and unqualified direct
ion to Peter to pay to his sister
100000, without any condition or
contingency of any kind. There is
no word or sentence in the will that
by any just construction can make
the payment of this legacy depend
ent upon the dying of Peter; leav-
/ ing children, &c. The decree of the
circuit court is reversed, the plain
tif7s bill is dismissed, and the 81, 900
directed to be paid by Peter to his
sister is to bear interest from the