The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-11-09

and warrant the issuance of another
writ and new investigation.
[ do not understand the language
employed in Elk parte Pattison, So Miss,
16l, in reference to the effect under the
statute, of a mistrial on the rights of a
prisoner, as to habeas corpus, to mean
more than that mistrial by a petit
jury, after judgment denying bail, would
be one fact which, in connection with
others occurring after the judgment,
would be sufficient to entitle the prisoner
to a second writ and another investiga-
ton on such new facts; but such new
investigation would not and could not
bring into consideration or rehearing,
facts heard or existing when the judg-
ment was rendered. If more was in
tended to be said, it seems to me to be
incorrect and misleading.
A judgmen: on habeas corpus operates
for and against the prisoner only to the
extent and in the manner allowed by
the statute. If it is in his favor and he
is discharged, with or without bail, he
moy be re-arrested and imprisoned for
the same cause, when indicted therefor
or by court of competent jurisdiction;
for the statute provides that this may
done. If it is against him and he is
denied bail, appeal is his only remedy;
for the statute gives no other to bring
the same matter in question again 1t
is impossible under the statute to give
judgment on habeas cnrpus such recip-
rocal operation for and against the
prisoner, that if he is denied bail before
Indictment and Is afterwards indicted,
he may then annul the judgment against
him by another examination of the
question of his guilt or innocence upon
new writ Without regard to the
statute, the fact of the indictment being
found in such instance would not change
the legal aspects of the case in his favor,
but rather against him.
At common law an adverse Judgment
on habeas corpus was no bar to another
writ, and subject deprived of his
liberty, might resort in turn to every
judge of the realm, and be discharged or
bailed by either one of them wEo
thought proper to do so, notwithstand-
ing each of the other judges may have
decided to the contrary This was the
evil sought to be remedied by 1854 of
the Code. The statute is positive
restriction on the rights of prisoner in
W hdOIho NOl Puo, &c bllSg CAlrlCu
at common law. 1t makes the Judgment
rendered on the trial of any writ of
habeas corpus conclusive and a bar to
another writ in the same cause to bring
the same matter in question again, how
long? Until reversed on appeal.
Another provision of the Code changes
the common law again by making judg-
ments on habeas corpus renewable by
appeal, and confers the right, without
restriction except as to the State, of
appeal to the Supreme Court, on any
party aggrieved by such judgment.
To permit the bar of a judgment on
habeas corpus to be escaped by newly
discovered evidence generally, or such
as would be sufficient for a new trial at
law, or for bill of review in chancery,
would nullify the statute and foster the
very evils it was intended to remedy.
The last clause of 2 1884 of the Code
applies exclusively TO the case where a
person has been discharged on habeas
corpus; and forbids that he shall be
again arrested or confined for the same
cause, until he is indicted or proceeded
against therefor by court of competent
jurisdiction. When this clause of the
of the State, and a person who has been
discharged on habeas corpus, with or
without bail, is afterwards indicted and
re-arrested and confined for the same
offence, it is a Just and necessary con-
struction of the statute that he should
not be denied another writ and a new
investigation on the merits, without
reference to whether the facts on either
- IL IL II L.
barred by the former judgment super
seGed by the action OF the State in his
re-arrest and confinement; for that judy
ment was in his favor and could not be
pleaded in bar against him. The right
to another writ in such case was recog-
nized and not disputed in Ex parte
Bridewell, 81 Miss, III.
In the case at bar the judgment deny
ing appellants bail on their first proceed
ing by habeas corpus, is bar against
them until reversed by appeal, except
upon facts which have occurred since
that judgment was rendered, and His
Honor, the Chief Justice, did not err in
refusing to hear testimony given on the
first trial, and which was in existence
at that time; and / am unable to say
that the newly occurring facts in evil
denee before him was sufficient to justify
or require the relief prayed for.
! vote to affirm the Judgment, not
upon the ground that the prisoners are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged for that question, directly
involved in the first habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, is not now before the court;
but because do not End in the record
sufficient proof of facts arising subse-
quently to the judgment on the first
writ to avoid the bar of that judgment.
MAGISTRATE (sternly, to tramp)-sT The
address vou gave me "a yoUr Mace of real.