St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1887-11-06
the murdered man so peculiarly re-
vealed therein.
CRUEL WASTE OF A WAR.

CRUEL WASTE OF A WAR.
How Battles Have Been Won by
Strategic Skill and Lost by Lack
of 1t.
1t is well-knOwn fact, says writer
in the New York Post, that for the first
three years of the war of the rebellion
there were more lives lost and property
destroyed from mere ignorance, and
negligence as a result of ignorance,
than from any other cause: officers of
volunteers who had no knowledge of
military duties had, at the beginning,
large responsibilities thrust upon them.
The object of all military training
should be to prepare men for war.
Drill, as means of teaching discipline,
as well as preliminary field movements,
can be taught anywhere-at home, in
the school, the workshop or counting
house. But the underlying elements ON
which the art of war is founded, upon
which the stability of all government
rests, can be learned only by
practical experience. And this is the
experience the national guard wants.
In time of war the guard will become
the regular army, and the volunteers
the reserve. The small regular army
will be only sufficient to furnish high
grade commanders and instructors for
the vast army of the people. Now, war
ingS and principles, rather than the
learning of them. All circumstances of
war must be comprised under three
heads: % the march, (2) the camp, 81
battle. The first and second heads can
be learned in time of peace, butOnly the
second is practiced. The most neceS-
sary and important of all is neglected by
the national guard, except in one or two
instances, as the march of the Twenty
second New York to Peekskill. When
all the circumstances of this march are
known, it cannot be too highly COM
mended. 1t is an example to be fol-
lowed by all the national guard, which
will benefit it to greater extent than
of years drill and camp.
Napoleon defined the ''art of war" to
be the ''art of separating to SubSiSt and
concentrating to tight" and never be-
fore or since has the great science been
so clearly and terSely enunclated. But
this art of separating and concentrating
successfully depends upon the march
ing power of armies. Students of the
military profession ponder over ques-
lions of modern arms and ornaments,
tactics, drill and organization, and are
apt to think less over the greater sub
ject of grand strategy, which, in one
sense, is nothing more or less than the
''art of marching or moving armies"
Undoubtedly the railroad and telegraph
have done much to change the phases of
modern war, and the magazines or re-
peating rifle and powerful cannon have
altered the tactics and order OF battle,
but they have none of them superseded
the fundamental principles which un-
derlie the grand strategy of war. Gen.
Sherman says: 1.-The only change the
breech-loading arms will probably make
in the art and practice of war will be to
increase the amount of ammunition to
be expended, and necessarily to be car
ried along; to still further thin out the
lines of attack, and to reduce battles to
short, quick, decisive conflicts. 1t does
not in the least affect the strategy, or
the necessity for perfect organization,
drill and discipline.
Well organized military railway syS-
TENS may affect the first result of CAM
paign, and render practicable certain
movements impossible without them.
But to that extent only, and no further
will they go, and all the grand opera
lions of war will depend, as they always
have done, on the marching power of
armies. Take, for example, the latest
wars wherein troops of civilized nations
have been engaged. In 1880 Gen.
Roberts marched 10000 men and IS guns
from Kabul to Kandahar, distance of
800 miles. The march was made in
twenty-three days, over the rough roads
and mountain passes of AfghaniStan.
He arrived in time to relieve Kandahar
and defeat AyOub Khan, and thus pre-
serve to England strong natural guard
against Russian intrigue and force of
arms. Had he been day or two later
Kandahar would have fallen. Gen.
Roberts would been defeated, and the
first phase of the coming struggle be-
tween the English and the Russian bear
would have been precipitated. In the
Franco-Prussian war, if Mcmahon
the crown prince of Prussia, he
would have reached Metz in time to re-
lieve it, and the disaster of Sedan would
have been avoided. We all know how
GrOuchy lost Waterloo-by not appear
ing at the time Napoleon calculated;
and how Wellington won it-by the
timely arrival of Butcher, who had
marched in haste at the sound of battle.
And example after example might be
cited to prove that upon the marching
power alone of armies has depended the
fate of battles and nations. 1t is actu-
ally fact that tactics alone, independ-
ent Of questions of superior armament,
quality of troops, etc, has very seldom
decided the success of battle. On the
other hand, many campaigns have been
won, with scarcely gun being fired, by
the strategic marching of armies under
a Skillful general. Often also has the
loss of life Oh march been fully as
great as that caused by battle. Thus
in the winter campaign of 1S77-7S, the
Russians under GurkO lost 1000 men
from freezing in one storm, lasting four
days, through which they marched.
During the same storm the Twenty
fourth Russian division at Shipha pass
lost 5000 men, so per cent. of its
strength, from the same cause. The
terrible losses NapoleOn's army eXpe-
rinced in its retreat from Moscow are
familiar history.
What 1t Costs to Raise a Boy.