Durham daily recorder., 1887-05-16
LEE and LONGS IREEI AT GE1TYS-
BURG-HOODS STORMING
COLUMNS.

ID forming any correct judgement
relative to The failure at Gettysburg,
for it cannot be called anything else,
as the Federals never assailed the
confederates /; there are some funda-
mental principles Of the scienceso 81
wa which hustEneverlbe llostsightof.
The first Of these, is the common one
never.to be violated, and that is
nsvsr 10 risk the safety Of The army.
Meade acted on this from 6rst to ia Of,
though there were the most inviting
opportunities to move forward as
Grant did at Donnelson and Shiloh;
and as Wellington did Il Waterloo |;
but only after the arrival Of Butcher.
But At Gettysburg there was no
Grauchy for Lee, each had his last
aYailAble inanson the field.
Lee was entirely ignorant Of the
whereabouts Of Meade who had su-
perseded Hooker; for Stuart, with
more daring than discretioB, had
crossed the Potomac near Washing.
ton, and, after alarming the garrison
there, had made a grand tour around
Meade's army, and, passing near Bal
timore and through Lancaster Penn,
had finally rejoined Lee at Gettys-
burg, but too late" while Jenkins
cavalry vasfnf front Of Harrisburg
The cavalry has properly been called
1.-THE eyes and ears Of an army" and
of which Lee was deprived ut the
most critical period. The engage
ment at Gettysburg was unexpected
to both sides I've know now that
Meade had chosen Pipe Clay Greek
twelve miles in the rear for his battle
groundg
Longstreet commanded the right
corps Of Lees army, and Hood COM
manded the right division--the ex-
treme right flank OF the army, with
the flank exposed to any maneuyer
which the Federals might attempt.
Hood, in his Advance and Retreat
orService in the United States armies"
says that when he moved into posi-
ton, that fronted Round Top. and
was expected under Lees orders to
storm that position. that he at once
told Isongstreet, that il was not only
lmpracticable, but impossible; that
no Zine Of hattie could be moved up
those rock mountain sides without
being, throw int disorder, while it
would be exposed to q most murder
GUS fire Of artillery double-sbotted
with grape and canister, and raked
from everj direction, besides the
deadlier ,musketry fire.
In this, Longstreet entirely con.
CURED, and 50 dispatched to Lee.
Hood proposed q movement to turn
the flank and rear Of the impregnable
position as the only maneuver that
promised success certainly very
hazardous one, as itexposed the flank
Of the army to be turned in case of
failure; but the same difficulty pre-
scented itself In case he was repulsed
in storming Round TOP, il the enemy
should take advantage Of the repulse
to move forward and attempt to as
sail the shattered columns.
After several dispatches back and
forth, Gen. Lee made the order to
Longtreet for Hood TO charge up the
Emmittsburg pike peremptory. Hood
says that, for the only time 10 his life,
he strongly and solemnly protested
against moving his division into in
evitable destruction and useless loss
Fl
Of life. Longstreet replied that Lees
orders were peremptory and must be
obeyed. Hood moved forward to the
execution Of the commands, but 1t
met disaster--as did every attempt
on that field He took ground; but
could not hold IL. Such was the fate
ofevery storming column on that III.
starred Geld. 30 it was with Hoke's
North Carolinians, Hays Louisianans
Picketts Virginians, and Posey's|
and Wrights Georgians. Upon the
repulse Of iPicketts Division, 90
critical was the situation that Lee
himself exerted all bis personal en-