The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1887-09-09
GREAT MILITARY BLUNDERs.
Lcngsfreet Thinks Meade Made One Great
Mistake and Leo Another.


Lcngstreet Thinks Meade Made One Great
Mistake and Lee Another.
Gainesville tGa) Letter ST. Louis Globe Democrat.
Sitting where the breezes blew right from the
Blue Ridge submits across the wide verandas Of
his summer hotel, General Longstreet talked
freely and Interestingly. Upon some OF his con-
versaton he put the Injunction of his publishers.
There were other portions which may be repeat
ed His "reminiscences had turned upon the
mistakes of the war-the military blunders
This remark was offered interrogativey:
General Grant is said to have stated to init
mate friends upon occasion that of all the
mistakes made by the I Mon side. the greatest
WAS at Gettysburg
''It was. came the response, wtbou. mo-
ments hesitation there isn't any doubt of it.,
you mean the mistake was not following
up the victory
1.-The day after the fighting ceasedln
mo On the third day of battle. Meade
shouldn't have waited until the next day. He
shouldn't have waited ten seconds. Pckett's
division had been knocked all to pieces-aimost
wiped out. The same was the case with A. P.
Hills corps, at least two divisions of it.
There were three divisions gone. They left
break in our line of over mile Meade
shouldn't have waited at ALL but should have
thrown his army right in between u.s.
That would have ended the whole thingw
get together. and would have fought the best
were able. But that was what Meade should
have done. Every body in both armies knew the
day before where the attack and the hard fight
ing was to be- Meade knew and prepared for
it, as he says. The plan Of the battle
known to everybody the day before it was
fought. Grant right, think. The greatest
mistake of the that side was in Meade
not making the move have indicated the third
day of the fighting"
Your troops covered the rear on the retreat
from Gettysburg. Generalg"
eyes"
as it true that your ammunition was reduced
to three rounds. and that vigorous pursuit wonld
have destroyed the army before it got to tho
Potomac2'
1--WE had more ammunition than that We
had considerable AMMUNITION. My idea is that
when Meade failed to throw his army in be-
tween forces when Pickett's division was
crushed, the great opportunity was lost"
OF the critical position at Gettysburg and OF
General Meade's mistake General Longstreet
wrote in his Century article of last February as
follows
LAS Picketts division concentrated in making
the final assault. Kemper fell severely wounded
As the division threw itself against the federal
line Garnett fell and expired. The confederate
flag planted in the federal line, and imme-
diately Armstead fell mortally wounded at the
feet of the federal soldiers. The wavering d.
visions then seemed appalled, broke their ranks /
and retired. Immediately the federals swarmed I
around Pickett, attacking all sides. enveloped
and broke his command, having killed and
wounded more than 1000 men in about thirty
minutes They then drove the fragments back
upon our lines As they came back 1 fully ex-
pected to Meade ride to the front and lead
his forces a tremendous counter-charge.
Sending my staff officers to assist in
collecting the fragments of my command.
/ rode to nv line of batteries. knowing
they all had in front of the i'm pending at
tack, resolved to drive 1t back sacrifice my
last gun and man. The federals advanc-
ing line of skirmishers which I thought was
the advance of Their charge. AS soon the line
of skirmishers came within reach of guns
the batteries opened again and their fire seemed
to check at once the threatened advance. After
keeping it up few minutes the line of sk:rmsh-
disappeared and my mind relieved OF
the apprehension that Meade was going to follow
us. Gen. Lee came up troops fall
in a as +
could; begged them to re- form their ranks, and
reorganize their forces, and assisted the staff
officers in bringing them all together again 1t
was then he used the expression that has been
mentioned SO often: 1t was all my fault. get to-
eether and let as do the best we toward
Sd wing that which is left us. >"
What do you put down as the greatest mill
tary mistake made by the confederate side2' was
asked
piled quite promptly.
s.Why7"
s.It was mistake for several reasons was
the answer II couldn't enumerate them
briefly. l should have go into extended
1t would take number Of pages
go over the ground properly. Besides. you
know what told you about the injunction my
publishers have put upon me-.
AS he said this the Generals eyes twink
led.
You will elaborate your view that that CAM
paign was bluuder in your book?"
Yes, shall try to make that plainY
"What should you say was the hardest fight
ing you during the wary"
''At the battle of Gettysburg did what I
consider the hardest fighting the confederate
side. On the other side the hardest fighting
to have seen done. by the federals,
was at Fredericksburg. There was nothing in
my experience which I consider eaualed the
fighting on those two occasions"
On the evening of the first days fighting
when the confederates occupied Seminary Ridge
and the federals concentrated upon Cemetery
and, after studying the situation. Lon gstreet
said to Lse:
IF we could have chosen point to meet our
plans of operation I do not think we could have
found better than that upon which they
are now concen trating All we have to do is to
throw our army around by their left and we
shall interpose between the federal army and
Washington. We can get strong position and
wait. and if they fail TO attack us we shall have
everything in condition to move hack tomorrow
night in the direction of Washington selecting
beforehand a good position into which we can
place troops to receive battle next day.
Finding our object is Washington or that army.
the federas will he to attack When
they attack we shall beat them, we proposed
to do before left fredericksburg. and the
probabilities are that the fruits of our success
will be great"
mo" said General Lee "the enemy is there
and am going to attack him there"
Longstreet says: II suggested that such q
move as | proposed would give control OF
the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore.
and reminded General Lee of our original plans
If we had fallen behind Meade and insisted on
staying between him and Washine tou he would
have been compelled to attack and would have
been badly beaten. General Lee answered,
No; they are there in position, and am going
to whip them or they going TO whip me-
saw he was in no frame Of mind to listen to
further aAgument that time, so l did not push
the no after but determined to renew the sub
Iect the next morning
He did renew the subject on the morning of
the ID but Lee would not consider the PROPOSE.
ton to move to Meade's left and rear. On the
morning of the Sd Lee came him and told
him to renew the attack Cemetery Hill.
Once more, the third time, Lopestreet urged
the movement to Meade 9 left. He saws: II
stated to Gen Lee that had been examining
the ground over to the right, and was much in
,lined think the best thing to move to
The federal left"
s.No,n he said. 81 am going to take them
rhere they on Cemetery Hill. want you
% take Pickett's division and make the attack.
will REINFORCE you by two divisions of the Sd
corps"