The National tribune., 1887-12-22
FIGHTING THEM OVER
What Our Veterans Have 10 Say About
Their Old Campaigns
cHIcKAMAGUA AGAIN.


stecdmar's Division in the Gap There.
TDrroR NATIONAL Tribune: Col. Morton
C. Hunters article in THE NATIONAL IRIB-
uNE of Nov "a. headed "Chickamanga, con-
tnius several errors in regard To the troops be-
longing 60 the Reserve Corps. In giving the
positions Of the different commands of the army
on the mornngof the second day of that battle
fScpt 20 he SAYS Gen. Changers and Gen. Steed-
mans Divisions were in reserve. Gen. Granger
was not a Division commander, but the COM
mandcr OF the Reserve Corps.
Two brigades of Stccdmans Division, COM
manded hy Gen Whitaker and Col. Mitchell,
land which believe were the only troops OF
Changers engaged in the battle OF Chicka-
manua,) were on the morning OF sept. 20 sew
cral miles from the battlefield and arrived
there about O'Clock D. M, at which time they
went into the engagement.
Col Hunter thinks there was no artillery
used In his vicinity on that afternoon; but If
his regiment was stationed next TO The gap
where Stecdmans command fought, il was
very close 10 where artillery was very
diligently used all the afternoon. Gen.
Steedman's command. consisting of the two
brigades above named and Battery Nj, LIST III.
J. A. DIETER known as "Millers Chicago bat
terry, passed over the ground where Thomas
had driven the rebs IN his grand charge in
the forenoon, and marched to the right until
we came 10 the timber where the gap was that
we were to occupy.
This timber, as ] remember IT, was Of large
trees standing rather thin, and with very little
undeIbrush. Here the artillery was placed
between two lines of infantry, and the march
continued. We had gone but short dis
lance before we received the compliments OF
Ionestreet's veterans. They were coming
through the gap, and the frst intimaiion We
had that they were so near was n VOlley from
them, which undoubtedly would have been
very disastrous to as but for the fact that we
we've toward the foot of the slope and the
Johnnies were firing down Hill, and conse-
Qucntly SHOT over us, and did but little dam
age.
Right there occurred general stampede
not as you might suppose, in the direction of
Chattanooga, but the line OF infantry on the
right of the artillery went over the gun Carl
ages, or under them, or any way 10 get through,
and away both lines went up the hill, without
orders. as far as ] know AT any rate, Gen.
Sieclman used some pretty rough language in
trying 10 stop them, but did not succeed until
they had captured two rebel fags and large
number OF prisoners.
While this was transporting the artillery was
put into position, but could not be used, as our
infantry was in its front. The infantry, after
its FIRST brilliant success, was quickly got into
position, with our line firmly established and
the guns OF the 6-gun battery distributed-one
fantry. We were ready none too soon, as our
line was hardly formed before the rebs showed
themselves on top Of the hill, and down they
came with Who0p. But our line was formed
10 stay, aud although the rebs seemed 10 have
all the men, they could use and charged MS re-
peatodly until nearly dark, our infantry never
went back on the record they made at the com
mencoment of the fight.
The gun squads OF the battery had been filed
mp during the campaign by detail from the
18th III. When the guns were fired during
that afternoon they were double shotted with
canister as long as our canister lasted the
cannonecrs would grab the wheels 10 prevent
tic recoil, aud thus save time, until their arms
and shoulders were so skinned and bruised
their numbers being somewhat diminished by
rebel bulets-they were finally forced to change
their tactics.
IN one instance but two men were left TO
man the gun. They moved ii little TO one
side of its original position, so that il would
recol against a tree. They would load il
and train ID mp the hill, aud when the rebs
would put IN an appearance give ii TO them.
They he'd ammunition piled behind tho tree,
aud could make pretty good Time IN reloading.
Some Oi the guns were moved OF the field that
night with two horses only.
The loss of Stcedman's command that after
noon in killed and wounded was over one
third OF its whole number What the rebel
loss IA our front WAS cannot say nut cObSlu-
erng that they charged as repeatedly and in
every assault were badly cut up and driven
back and also that they aid not aud could not
usl artillery IN our front (while our position
was splendid Tor the use Of artillery at Short
rance. must have been immense. Our artil-
lery was used 10 the extent of nearly COO
rounds, from six guns aud large per cent ol
that was canister. We had great advantage in
position fOr accurate firing also, and if our los,
was one-third, thc rebel loss must have been
much greater.
By reference TO my memorandum, made al
the time, l find that Mlllets Chicago battery
ireA-on that afternoon 594 rounds-nearly l0(
rounds 10 each gun. We used all OF the canister
and shTapnc that we had. Oar line-at leas
whore ] Was--was not changed from where /
was GIst established until we left the field al
might and like Col. Hunter when we die
move, although we were badly hurt though
we had thlashca the Tebs bcautfully.-N. l.
BANKS, Millcr's Chicago battery, Hobart, LAX,
Co.. IDd.