The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1887-01-13
How Gettysburg Was Lost.

General f. NJ Law, of South Caro- |
lima. writing in the December Century |
of his experiences at Gettysburg. tells of |
a proposition which he made to General
Hood for All attack on the Union left,
and saws: Il found General Hood on
the ridge where his line had been form
ed, communicated to him the informa-
ton [ had obtained, and pointed out
the ease with which a movement by the
right flank might be made. He coin
cided fully in my views, but said that
his orders were positive TO attack in
front, as soon as the left of the corps
should get into position. | therefore
entered Il formal protest against direct
attack, on the grounds: l. That the
great natural strength of the enemy's
position in our front rendered the result
of IL direct assault extremely uncertain.
2 That, even if successful, the victory
would be purchased at too great sacri-
flee of life. and our troops would be in
no condition to improve it. 3. That
front attack was unnecessary, oc-
cupation of Round Top during the
night by moving upon itfrom the south.
and the extension of our right wing
from that point across the enemy's left
and rear, being not only practicable,
but easv. f. That such a movement
would compel change of front on the
part of the enemy, the abandonment of
his strong position on the heights. and
force him to attack us in position.
General Hood called up Captain
Hamilton. of his staff. and requested
me to repeat the protest to him, and the
grounds on which it was made. He
then directed Captain Hamilton to find
General Longstreet as quickly as pos
sible and deliver the protest, and to say
to him that he (Hood indorsed it fully.
Hamilton rode off at once, but in about
ten minutes returned, accompanied by
Il staif-otficer of General Longstreet,
who said to General Hood, in my hear
ing: General Longstreet orders that
YOU begin the attack at once Hood
turned TO me and merely said, You hear
the order?' | ut once moved my brig
ade 10 the assault. l do not know
whether the protest ever reached Cen
eneral Lee. From the brief interval
that elapsed between the time it was
sent TO General Longstreet and the re-
cc.pt of the order to begin the attack. |
am inclined to think it did not. Cen
eral Longstreet has since said that he
repeatedly advised against front at
tack and suggested u movement by our
right flank. He may have thought,
after the rejection of this advice by
General Lee. that it was useless to press
the matter further.
..,Just here the battle of Gettysburg
was lost 10 the Confederate arms. 1t is
useless to speculate upon the turn affairs
might have taken if the Confederate
cavalry had been in communication
with the rest of the army. and if Cen
eral Stuart had kept General Lee in
formed, as he SHOULD have done. of the
movements of the Federal army. In
considering the causes of the Confeder-
ate failure on that particular field, we
must take the situation just as we find
it. And the situation was as follows:
The advance of the two armies en-
countered each other ON the 1st of July.
An engagement ensued in which, the
Confeder;lles were victorious. The
Federal troops retired through Gettys-
burg and took position along the
heights east of the town-a position
which, if properly defended, was prac-
ticalIy inp;egnable to direct attack.
The whole matter then resolves itself
into this: General Lee failed at Gettys.
burg on the I'd and 5rd of July because
he made his attack precisely where his
enemy wanted him 10 make it and was
most fully prepared to receive it. Even
had he succeeded in driving the Federal
army from its strong position by gen.
eral and simultaneous assault along the
whole front (Which was the only pos
sibIc chan,e of success in that dlrec-
tion), he would have found his army in
very much the same condition that
Pyrrhus found his when. after driving
the Romans from the field of 'Asculum,
he exclaimed, Another such victory,
and | am undoner