Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1887-12-29

"The State has the right, in the exercise Of
! its police power, to prohibit the sale OF intox.
| eating liquors without q license. The Incense
fee exacted by the general law regulating
dram-shops is not tax within the meaning OF
pr1yilece of doing thing the doing Of which
| the Legislature has the right to prohloit aito-
gether Such laws are regarded as ponce s reg tbe
prevention of intemperance, pauperlsm ana
crime, and are not regarded as an exercise OF
/ the taxing power. Pursuits that are pernl-
c c or detrimental to public morals may be
! prohibited altogether. or licensed ior COM
| pensation to the public
| egates legislative power has In erect pee ae-
! cided by this Court to be not well taken The
| Judges Of this Court were called upon Tor their
opinion OF the constitutionality OF the town.
| ship organization law, the const1tutionality OF
| was in effect a local law. and delegated to the
people legislative power. Four OF the Judges
! hold it to be constitutional, three OF them CIV
| ing their reasons as follows:
This township organization law contains no
provisions. so far as we are able to see. prohib-
made for the whole State. and by its terms took
effect from its passage. Every County IN the
State may avail itself of the privileges offered
by this law by majority vote of the people. 1t
is left to the opinion of the counties whether
they will organize under the law or not. If
majority vote for it such vote does not create
the law, but places the county SO voting within
its provisions. and the organization then takes
effect, and also the law as it existed before the
vote was taken. The law does not delegate,
was it the intention of the lawmakers to
delegate, legislative authority to the counties
Unless the counties avail themselves of the
right to organize they will remain as they were,
unaffected by any OF the provisions of this stat
ute"
It is argued by counsel that the local option
law under consideration is q delegation of leg
isfatiye power because it can not be made
operative or take effect until majority of the
voters of a county, city or town vote against the
sale of Intoxicating liquors. The same Irgu-
ment would apply against the validity of the
township organization act, the validity of
VI w w me mhprc
of this court, for when it was passed
by the Legislature it did not operate as q law
very terms of the act it could not become
operative in any county until a majority of the
same objections that are made to the local
option law under consideration were made to
an act of the Legislature Chapter AZ General
Statutes, 1861 authorizing any city, town or
village to organize for school purposes, with
SpeciaI priyilegeS.''
The law provided that any Incorporated city
or town in the State might organize under that
chapter, prov ded q majority of qualified voters
at an election which is authorized to be held,
should vote by ballot for the adoption of the
chapter. which contains fifteen sections. 1t
further provided that
1.-THE electors in favor of the adoption of this
chapter shall write upon their ballots School
law" and those opposed thereto should write
on their ballots No school law, the adoption
or rejection OF this cEapter to be determined
by majority of the votes to be cast in the
manner Aforesaid"
The voters of the town of Utica voted at an
ing the law. organized under it's provisions and
elected directors. The right of one OF the
law was unconstitutional in that it u local
law and because it delegated legislative power
to the voters. Both those objections were held
by this court to be not well taken. and the con-
stitutionalitv of the law was affirmed (State
ex rel. VS.. Wilcox. d Mo-, 1881
In the disposition of the objections made to
the law il is said: =
THE Legislature can not propose a law, and
submit it to the people to pass or reject 1t by
general vote. That would be legislation by the
people. But the proposition can not be sue
ceSSfully controverted that q law may be passed
to take effect on the happening of future event,
and the happening OF the contingency af-
ords no additional efficacy to the law, but simply
furnishes the occasion for the exercise of the
power The law is complete and effective when
its enactment. though it may not operate, or Its
influence may not be felt until subject has
arisen upon which it can act. In the case we
are considering the act took effect with the 9TH
err laws contained in the statutes. It was passed
according to the prescribed forms designated
in the Constitution Its enactment did not de-
pend upon any popular vote, but parties to be
affected by it were at liberty to accept the privi
Ieges granted, and incur the burdens and obli-
cations it imposed as their interests or will
should dictate. III they elected not to avail
themselves Of its privileses it did not tn the
actment on the statute book. If they organ
lied under it they were entitled to the benefit
of its provisions but in either event the law re-
fore. for yiaq thfs the laU is objectionable be-
c1mse d.. nds FOR its ctsctsney on the rots Of Ms
plaintiff.
Especial statutes relate to certain individual
| classes or particular localities. Had the act
corporation. it would have been special: but
such is not the case. It is co-eXtensive with the
State. and its influence is felt IN every county
and almost every township 1t is conceded that
it does not include in it's operation every indi-
vidual extend to all the territory, but that
is not required"
have reproduced what is said in the above
case because it is a complete and authoritative
judicial answer rendered by this court to the OBJ
jections made to the local option act under dis
cussion. viz: that it is local law and delegates
legislative functions to the people. The local
option act is complete law, passed by the
Legislature in conformity with the rules pre-
scribed for the enactment of law, and took
Constitution, in ninety days after the
adjournment Of the Legislature. After
the expiration Of that time it author
ICED vote to be taken. not as in the school law
case. whether the law should be adopted or re-
iected. but for against the sale OF intoxicat-
ing the law, or passing the law. was referred to
them. and ..its enactments.' said in the
school law case did not depend upon any popu-
1.-The law is complete and effective when 1t
passes through the forms prescribed for its
| fueS:e be felt until a subject has arisen upon
which it act ri
And there is no presense for saying that the
law is objectfonal because it depends for its
| efficacy on a vote OF the people. >
So in the case of City of st. Louis VS., Alex
| ander, (23 Mo-, 4s3} where, by an act of the
Legislature the locality of subscription to a
| railroad was made to depend on a majority
| vote of the voters of the city. The constitu-
tionality of the law was assaulted on the ground
| that it was delegation of Legislative power
| to the voters: the objec ton was overruled and
| the law sus.ssped.
| So in the ssSe of State VS. Hinder as Mo-,
45D, the act OF March, 1857. provided that the
| municipal corporations of ST. Louis County,
4 whenever authorized by majority OF the legal
4 voters. might grant permission to sell within
the corporate limits on Sunday any refresh-
ments except distilled liquors. Underthis act
| an election was held and majority voted
| in favor of giving the permission: the
| City Council being thus organized passed an
| ordinance accordingly. The law was sustained
! by the Court, notw outstanding the fact that
| operated as a repeal of the general laws for
/ bidding everywhere in the State the sale OF
! fermented liquors on Sunday; and in passing
| on the question it is said:
| "1'he act of the General Assembly did not
| directly repeal the statute making it q mis-
demeanor to sell liquors on Sunday, but II
1 gave to the City of ST. Lou is the power to pass
an ordinance which should have the effect to
, allow the sale of such liquors on Sunday W tn
| in the corporated limits whenever majority
| of the legal voters of the city should authorize
the same to be done; ana when that power mas
been called into exercise, and ordinances
passed in pursuance of such authority gwen.
far and to supercede the previous statutes:
The exercise of the power was mace to depend
upon the consent and authority OF majority
of the legal voters of the city,.
| The case of Lament VS.. Lindell co. Mo. 1891
Is cited in support of REALTORS contention
where it is held that stock law then before
the court for consideration was invalid, be
cause it was o law not enacted by the Legs
lature, but mere proposal 10 s Ine Reop, hy o.
majority vote. The case OF Parker VS.. Conn.,,
(6 Pa. st. 507) since overruled. is IN part re
lied upon for the conclusion announced.
| Whatever of conflict exists between thi:
case and the cases hereinbefore cited shall