Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1887-01-11

is no other prohibition made. In posi-
tive terms the declaration is that this
shall not be construed as authorizing any
common carrier within the terms OF this
act to charge and receive as great COM
pensation for the shorter as for the
longer distance, but does not in terms
prohibit charging as much for shorter
as for longer distance, but simply with
holds legislative sanction from the
! making of such a charge.
This qualifying clause negatives the
! inference that might be drawn from the
language of the section without these
words, namely: "That an equal charge
for shorter distance is authorized by
inference because only greater charge
is prohibited" This qualification, there
fore, leaves the question of whether an
equal amount can De charged fora shorter
distance to be determined by the pro-
visions of the bill, to which | have al
ready referred requiring all charges to be
reasonable, and forbldding the giving
OF unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular locality. The require
ment of the fourth section then is that
| between shipments of the same kind in
the same direction over the same line, and
made under substantially similar circum-
stances and conditions, a greater sum
shall not be charged for shorter than
for longer haul when the shorter COM
prlses a part of the longer, not
that a higher rate shall be
charged per mile, but that 8
greater aggregate sum shall not
be changed. The limitations placed upon
|this prohibition that is made are very sig
nifcant, and they must not be overlooked.
They require that in determining the
sums that may be charged for the shorter
as compared with the longer distances, the
requirement must be made first between
shipments of a like kind of property; Sec
ond, under substantially similar circum-
stances and conditions; third, over the
same line; fourth, in the same direction;
fifth, when the shorter is included in the
longer distance. When the act is to be
applied in any case to a measure of
charges that may be made for any dis
lance rs compared with longer distance
ali limitations must be taken into account
and they must all apply to the case, not
three or four OF them, but all of them.
The first, fourth and fifth of these limit
atoms do not appear to call for any limit
ations, and he was also able to show that
they were similsr-if that was the word
used, but the words substantially similar
impart enough latitude to comparison to
enable the courts to exercise sound dis
erection and common sense In passing
upon cases thst may arise. So far as any
one railroad is concerned, therefore, the
sum which it may charge for haul from
one end of its railroad to the other end
becomes the maximum amount of
its charges Tor any shorter haul
over that road in the same direction
and under substantially similar circum-
stances end conditions when the shorter
distances is Included within the longer.
But the question which seems to trouble
those who object to the section as it
stands, is whether the maximum thus
fixed is the amount which railroad COM
pGny charges upon shipments originating
at and destined 20 points upon its own
road, or whether the maximum is the
same which it accepts as its share
of the through rate upon ship
ments passing over its road which
originate at or are destined to points
upon another road. 1t seems clear to
me that there can be but one answer to
that. In the first place, the measure of q
charge that may be made for shorter
distance is the same that is charged for j
longer distance over the same line, and
under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions. Rates fixed by railroad
company between points upGn its own
road are clearly rates upon one line,
but the second and third may need some
exp anation. As l understand them, the
words circumstances and conditions"
mean conditions that govern railroad
traffic and circumstances under which
it is transported. To my mind these
words are full of meaning. They COM
prehend all circumstances and conditions
that may justify differences in rates, such
as competition with other railroads and
water routes, the volume and
character of business at diff
ferent points, the difference in
terminal expenses and cost of service in
each case. If the words used were "the
same circumstances and conditions" in
genious railway gentlemen would be able
to show that circumstances and condi-
tons were never exactly the same in any
two cases, and they might not;in the terms
of the bill. The same line or railroad
company can make and control rates upon
its road, and the section says that
in making such rates the short
haul principle shall be OBJ
served. A railroad company cannot
control the rates of the roads of another
company, but when two or more compa-
MES unite in making joint rates over
their respective roads they become, in tie
eye Of this bill, one line, and this section
says that the short haul principle must be
observed in making rates over this line,
two or more roads composing it, being
within the meaning Of the section the
same line, so far as SUCH joint rates are
concerned. The word railroad is used
throughout the bill aud the word
line is used only in this sec
ton. The courts will be bound
to assume that the word line means
something different from the word rail-
road or it would not have en- used. In
this one instance the word railroad would
naturally have been used if something
different had not been intended. The
word line means railroad or combination
of railroads; it means route. Section :
of the bill requires the carriage of
freights to be treated as one
continuous carnage from the place of
shipment to the place of destination and
this could not be done in the
case Of shipments over connecting
roads. If the word used in this
sectinu vos railroad instead nf