The weekly Floridian. [volume] (Tallahassee, Fla.) 1867-19??, 1887-04-14
William D. Chipley. Appellant. Va Wayne z.
Atkinson, Appellee-Escambiasc county.

William D. Chipley, Appellant, va Wayne z.
Atkinson, Appellee-Escambiaeco county.
RANKY, J:
against person who has maliciously procured
the employer to discharge such employee from
employment in which he ID engaged under q
legal contract for certain period. provided
damage result to the employee from such dis
charge
2. An action will also lie where the period for
which the employment Is to continue is not GER
tain, If damage result from the discharge; even
though, from inability 70 ascertain the amount
of The damage, . verdict for nominal damages
only should result
s. The fact that NO contract, nor any legal
right Of the employee as against the employer,
b violated BY the employer, or that no action
employer for such discharge, does not prevent q
recovery against the third person who has
maliciously procured the discharge, and which
discharge would not have occurred but for such
procurement
4. An act done or attempt made by third
party with the malicious intent to procure such
. discharge, but not successful in procuring it.
will not support an action brough. for malicious.
" procuring the discharge. The actual procure
ment Of the discharge Is an essential to such an
action.
s. The declaration alleged in effect that there
was q contract for employment to be continued
foria period of time; Held it was error to charge
the jury that the plaintiff could recover even
though there was no coatract for definite term
of service.
6. An absence from the agreement or con-
tract of service of any stipulation for a certain
amount OF wages or compensation, will not de-
feat recovery. II the value of the compensa-
ton to be paid can be ascertained in any legal
way 1t is sufficient
\ diechar0e nv the eronlovsr "a eaeen,;.l o.,
recovery. If the employee was not discharged,
but voluntarily left the employment on account
Of the conduct Of the party charged with having
procured his discharge. the action can not be
maintained.
g. The speculative profits of Q proposed bust
ness can not be the basis of the assessment of
actual damages Where, however, in q case of
like kind To the one set up in the first count of
the declaration. the defendant knew or believed,
or had reason to believe that the employer had
promised or did actually intend to admit the
plaintiff into partnership with him, the fact of
such promise or intention, may be considered by
the jury In passing upon the motion of the de-
fendant and in fixing exemplary damages
.. One person may withhold . gratuity from,
or may break his contract with, q second person,
for the reason that the second person retains a
third person in his employ or with an interest in
bis business, without giving . right OF action to
the third person. No legal right of the third
person Is violated by the first person, who
simply 90 wilhholds or breaks his contract for
euch reason, nor 10 there any privity of contract
between the first and the third persons The
assumed reason for the Withholding or breach
10 NOT of itself, or with the mere Withholding of
the gratuity or the mere breach of the contract.
ground of action; nor is preof of the mere
Withholding or breach, because of such retention
Of the third person, proof of procurement by
the drst person Of the discharge. 1t 10 permits
sible, however, in an action like this to show
that such withholding or breach was maliciouslv
used BY the first person to procure or persuade
the second 10 discharge the third person.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted.
w. A. Dlount, for Appellant; Liddon &
Garter. J. c. Avery, for Appellee.