The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1887-06-07
Supreme Court of the Hawaiian ISL
ands--In Banco. April Term, 1887
Y. ALAU VS.. THos. w. EVERETT AND A.
n. KEPoIKAI.
JUDD c. j., M'CULLY j., PRESTON j., BICEER
TON J. (FoRNANpER j., ABsENT.)

Opinion Of tile Court by BICRERTON j.
This matter comes here on bill of
exceptions to the rulings of Chief JUS
tice Judd during the trial at the Jan
uary term 1887, and to the refusal of
the Chief Justice to grant new trial
on motion by defendant, Kepoikai,
which motion was overruled pro Jorma.
The case of Ami against the same de.
PENDANTS was tried together with this,
on stipulation filed as follows:
at is hereby stipulated and agreed
that the case of Ami VS.. I. w. Ever
EFT and A. N. Kepoikai do stand and
abide by the judgment of the Court in
the case of Y. Alau VS.. T. w. Everett
and A. N. Kepoikai on motion for new
trial and on bill of exceptions and no
other motion for new trial, and bill of
exceptions need be fled in the case of
Ami VS.. Everett and Kepoikai."
The verdict of the jury was in favor
Of defendant as to Everett, who is the
sheriff of Maui, and who executed the
warrant of arrest, and for $500 dam
ages in both cases against defendant,
Kepoikai.
The cause of action was the alleged
false Imprisonment of plaintiff, by his
being arrested at Kahalui, Maui, and
taken to Waikiki, and there placed in
jail for about half All hour, upon a
warrant issued by defendant, Kepoi-
kai, for the alleged contempt of plain
tiff, of an order Of said defendant TACT
ing as a Police Judge of Wailuku).
The order was for the giving of bond
by Alau and Ami in replevin suit,
wherein they were defendants, condi
toned for the production at Court of
the horse which was the subject mat
ter of the suit.
There seems to be no dispute as to
the fact of the order being made,
and the arrest for contempt, and the
incarceration Of plaintiff in the Wal
luku lookup or jail, for the space OF
thirteen to fifteen minutes, until the
fine of S25 each, which defendant, Ke-
poikai, had imposed, was paid by one
Nakookoo, one Of plaintiffs attorneys.
The first question for us to consider
is, did the defendant, Kepoikai, have
authority and jurisdiction to order the
making and filing of said bond.
We think that the order was beyond
his authority and in excess Of his ju
risdiction, and therefore void. The
statute ito regulate the practice in
suits for the recovery of personal prop
erty," Chap. 38 of the laws of 1884,
provides the way in which the plain
tiff in the horse case, could have had
the sheriff take possession of the horse
and deliver to him, bonds etc., being
required, and thereby secure its pro-
duction at the Court on the day of
trial. The plaintiff or his attorney
did not avail himself of this law. If
he had done so, there would have been
no necessity to apply to the Police
Judge to make the order he did. This
statute is very full, and provides every
protection required, both for the plain
tiff and defendant in replevin suits.
We do not say a Police Judge may
not grant continuances on terms, but
in this case the statute controls. And,
further, it was for the jury to find
upon the evidence before it which
was contradictory whether such
terms really were imposed, 1t was
not the province or privilege of the
Court to instruct the jury that such
was the fact, therefore there was no
error. We consider that the whole
wrong arose from an error of judg
ment on the part of the defendant,
Kepoikai.
In the case of I'm re Conn.," Cal,
495, cited by defendendant, We find it
is applicable to cases where Courts
having jurisdiction should issue an
order. In some respects that case sup
ports the position we take in regard
to the authority of inferior Courts of
limited jurisdiction to make and issue
such orders.
It is noticeable that the order made
for the filing of the bond did not limit
or state the time in which the bond
was to be filed; it was indefinite.
There must be some time stated in
which to file bond to enable the par
ties to comply with the order.
The next question is: Is the Ner-
dict excessive in the sense that will
suffice to set it aside.
Section 112S, Compiled Laws, pre-
vides that "in all cases of injury, di-
rect or consequential, to the plaintiff
in person or his wife, child or servant,
or to his or her or their character or
feelings, or to his property, real or
personal, the measure of damages
shall be determined by the jury.
"In actions for personal torts the
law does not attempt to fix any precise
rule for the admeasurement of dam
ages, but from the necessity of the
case leaves their assessment to the
good sense and unbiased judgment of
the jury. Their verdict, as in all other
cases, is subject to review by the Court,
but it viii never be disturbed unless
the damage is SO obviously dispropor-
tionate to the injury proved as to jus