Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1887-11-10
1--WE DENY THE WRIT"
The Decision of the United
States Supreme Court in
the Anarchist Case.
No Federal Question Involved, and
the Court Unanimous In
This Opinion.
How the News Was Received by the
Condemned Men in the
Chicago Jail.

WASHINGTON, Nov. g.
The SuIrem Court of the United States
yesterday denied the motion for a writ
OF error In tho anarchist cases. The
decision was delivered by Chief Justice Waite
/ aud was that OF the full bench. IL occupied
thirty-seven minutes In rapid reading. When
the justices entered the room Justices Miller
ana Matte sighed deeply a number of times,
and the voice of tho latter trembled for some
minutes alter he began rending. At timos no
ropeatedly faltered, and. going back, re-
read whole sentences. Tie faces of the other
seven Justices were turned 20 the floor during
nearly the entire time of the delivery. Oc-
casonally Justice White took his eyes from the
paper, looked the audience in tho face, and
gave emphasis to points in the decision which
marked tho outline OF his intentions and showed
what had guided the bench in reaching its con-
slusion. Following is the text OF the opinion:
When, as in this case, application is made to
us on the suggestion Of one OF our number to
whom a similar application has been previously
addressed for tho allowance of a writ OF error TO
the highest court OF a state, under Section 700
OF the Revised Statutes, it is our duty to ascer-
tam tam not only whether any question renewable
below, but whether 1t Ia Of a character to JUS
tfy the bringing the judgment here for re-ex-
animation.
In our opinion the writ ought not to be allowed
by the court IL it appears from the face OF the
record that tho decision Of the Federal ques-
ton which is complained OF was so plainly
rlght as not to require argument; and espe-
cially III IL is in accordance with our own we'll
considered judgments in similar cases. That
Commonwealth, Wall, 1928, when the writ was
refused because the questions presented by the
record were mo longer subjects Of discussion"
although II they had been in the opinion of the
conrt open" ii would have been allowed. When
under Section of our Rule motion TO affirm
is united with motion to dismiss, for want of
jurisdiction, the practice has been TO grant the
Utf' etidEpes Ybep- the question on which
cided right that the case ought not to bo held
for further argument Arrowsmith VS.. Har-
moning, 1lS United States, 19l, 195 Church VI.
KelsoV. 12l United States 2R2
The propriety Of adopting similar rule upon
motions in open court for the allowance OF a writ
Is apparent, for certainly wo would not be justi-
fed as n court in sending out a writ to bring up
for review a judgment OF the highest court OF
State, when 1t is apparent on the face OF the rec
ord that IL would be our duty to grant n motion
to affirm soon as it was made in proper form.
In the present case we have had the benefit Of
argument in support OF the application and,
whilo counsel have not deemed it their duty to
go fully into the merits OF the questions in-
volved, they have shown us distinctly what tho
decisions wero of which they complain, and
how the questions arose. In this way we are
able to determine, as a court IN session, whether
tho errors alleged such as to justify US in
bringing the case here for review.
We proceed, then, to consider what the ques-
tons are In which, IL it exists at all. our juris-
diction depends.
The particular provisions Of the Constitution
OF tho United States on which counsel rely are
found in Arts. ~, ", VI, and XIV. Of the
amendments, as follows;
Art ~. The right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizures shall
not be violated.
Art v. No person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself nor be deprived Of life, liberty, or prop
erty without due process Of law.
Art. VI. In all criminal prosecutions the nc
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub
lie trial by an impartial jury Of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have boen COM
mtted, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law.
Art XIV, Sec. l. No State shall make or en-
Inv Uruh hiQh hal NH ha nriV
or immunities of citizens OF the United States !;
nor shall 0ny state deprive any person OF life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
That the first ten articleG Of amendment were
not intended to limit the powers Of the State
governments in respect TO their own citizens,
but TO operate the National Government
alone, was decided more than half century
ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered
to since. Barron Baltimore, Peters, 2i3,
2i7; Livingston vs.. Moore, idem., 460 $50; Fox
VS.. Ohio S How, 4iO, 43i; Smith vs.. Maryland,
1S How, II, 20; Withers VS.. Buckley, 80 How, 81,
9l; Pervear VS.. The Commonwealth. Wall,
475, 40; Twitchell vs. The Commonwealth,
How, a21, 1926 Justices vs Murray, Wall, 274,
27s; Edwards Elliott, 81 Wall, 532, 557; /;
Walker vs. Sanvinet 92 United States, %;
542, $50; Pearson Vs. Yewdall, 95 United States,
2I, 20G; Davidson vs. New Orleans, 9j United
States, 97, 10l; Kelly VS.. Pittsburg, lO4 United
States 20 Presser Vs. Illinois. 116 United States,
252, 2f5.
though originally the first ten amendments were
adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in
| so far they secure and recognize fundamental
| rights. common law rights Of the man, they
| make them privileges and immunities Of the
man as a citizen of the United States. and can
| rot now bo abridged by State under tho four
| teenth amendment.
In other words, while the ten amendments as
limitations on power only apply to tho Federal
Government, and not to tho States, yet in so
| far they declare or recognize rights of per-
sons, these rights are theirs citizens OF the
United States. and the fourteenth amendmont
| ms to such rights limits state power, as the ten
amendments had limited Federal power.
| 1t is also contended that the provisions of tho
fourteenth amendment, which declares that no
State shall deprive amy person Of life, liberty
or property without due process Of law" imply
that every person charged With crime in State
shall be entitled to q trial by an impartial jury,
| and shall not be compelled to testify against
himself. The objections are in brief. az That
q statute OF this state as construed by the court
deprived the petitioners of trial 10y an impair
| tial jury, and t2) that Spies was compelled to
| 81 ive evidence against himself. Before consid-
/ States has the effect which is claimed, IL Is
| proper to inquire whether the Federal ques-
tions relied on in fact arise ON the face Of this
| record.
THE QUESTION ON THE ILLINOIS STATUTE.
One statute to which objection is piade wao
approved March ~, 1874, and has been in force
siLce July of that year. The complaint is that
the trial court, acting under this statute and in
accordance with its requirements, compelled
the pt titioners, against their will, to submit to
| n trial by jury that was not impartial and
| thus deprived them Of one OF the fundamental
ais hts which thoy had as citizens OF the United
states under the National Constitution; and
that II the sentence Of the court is carried into
| execution they will be deprived Of their lives
| without due process OF law" In Hopt vs.
| Utah. 100 United States 40, il was decided by
| this court that whore n challenge by defend
| ant in criminal action to a Juror for bias,
| actual or implied, is disallowed, and the juror
| Is thereupon peremptorily challenged by tho
| defendant and excused, and nn impartial and
competent juror is obtained in his place no In
| jury is done the defendant IT, until the Jury Is
! completed, no has other peremptory challenges
| which he can use and SC in Hayes vs.. Missouri,
| 100 United States, ~ it was said, ~The right to
challenge IA the right TO reject not to select, a
| juror II from those who remain an impair
| tial jury is obtained the constitutional right
| of the accused is maintained OF tho correct
| ness OF these rulings wo entertain no doubt.
| We are therefore confined in this case TO the
| rulings on the challenges TO the jurors who
| actually sat at tho trial, or these there were
| but two-Theodore Denker, the third juror who
was sworn, and III. Il. Sanford, the last who
| was called and sworn after all the peremptory
| challenges OF the defendants had been ex-
| hausted AT the trial tho court construed the
| statute TO mean that although n juror called
| as n juryman may have formed an opinion
| based upon rumor or upon newspaper state
| ment, but has expressed no opinion as TO the
| truth Of tho newspaper statement, no Is still
qualified Juror II he states that he car
fairly and impartially ronder verdict thereon
I'm accordance with the law and the evidence
| and the Court shall be satisfied OF the truth OF
such statement IL is not q test question
whether Juror will have tho opinion which
he has formed from newspapers changed BY
the evidence, but whether bis verdict Will bt
| based only upon the account which may here
be given by witnesses under oath.
interpreted in this way the statute IL not ma,
/ terially different from that Of the Territory O