The National tribune., 1887-01-13

forage was obtained for them. With the
object of procuring supplies five sorties were
made from Cumberland Cap Two Of these
sorties were directed against Baptist Gap, one
against Rogers Gap, one against Big Creek Gap
and the other against Mallace's Cross Roads,
where Gen. Spears surprised and captured
four companies of Confederate cavalry. Col
lisions and sharp encounters with the enemy
occurred at these points DE Courcey's Brl-
gade did not participate in either Of the five
sorties above mentioned. Atone time while
Stevenson invested MOrgan's position In
front. the latter had force Of 1000 troops
engaged in various expeditions against the
enemy or in search Of supplies.
Col. Mundy, with two battaliOns Of cav
airy, and Garrard, with 500 mounted In
fantry, were dispatched TO Lexington 70
assist in opening the route from that place
10 Cumberland Gap. As already stated,
Kirby Smith had advanced toward Lex
ington. He pounced upon Col. Houk, who
was occupying London with battalion of
his regiment-the Sd Tenn. Houk escaped
with some loss to Cumberland Gap. The
other battalion of the Sd Tenn. participated
actively in the engagement at Big Hill.
The supreme question within the Federal
lines at Cumberland Gap was now one OF sub
plete, the garrison was plentiiully supplied
with ammunition, and, in short, the place was
IMPROBABLE AGAINST ATTACK.
No enemy would be rash enough TO assault IT,
But the anxious question was how the garrison
should be subsisted until Kirby Smith should
be driven out of Kentucky. Morgan's only
answer to the grave question was continual
fight with the enemy for food.
On the Sth OF September he sent the brigade
of DE Courcey, with Lamphcres 9TH Mich.
battery, 10 Manchester 80 miles TO the north
ward of Cumberland Gap, and east Of the
principal road TO Lexington. The brigade
started In the evening. in light marching order
leaving all unnecessary luggage behind. The
brigade had with IL train OF more than 100
wagons Of which 80 were loaded with ammu-
milton. After tedious march of nearly three
DAYS the brigade reached Manchester on the
evening OF Sept II. MOrgan's object in sending
DE COurcey forward 10 Manchester was TO re-
duce by 1900 the troops to be fed at the Gap /;
secondly, to gather and send back 10 the Gap as
much forage as could be found, aud, lastly, TO
have an established force and ammunition train
well advanced on theline of retreat should the
evacuation of Cumberland Gap become neces-
sary.
Morgan gained the first and last points
named by this movement, but lost the second.
There was no forage 10 speak Of. The country
around Manchester was sterile and unproduc-
tive and had been already despoled of its scanty
crop. DE Courcey had much difficulty in sub
sisting his own brigade and trains. His men
toasted for days upon pawpaws alone. To add
10 the discomfort of the situation John Nor
Pan's rebel cavalry constantly hoyered near
and harassed DE C0urcey, whose men were
always under arms John Morgan knew Of the
large supply OF ammunition in DE Courcey's
trains and wanted il badly. DE COurcey's
men, however, guarded il closely.
Gen. Morgan continued 30 hope that Kirby
Smith would be defeated and driven from
Kentucky aud his source OF supply reopened
With starvation staring his army in the face
with perhaps the desperate alternatives OF capi-
tulatiOn or evacuation, he continued active