The Sunday herald and weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1887-1896, 1887-03-06
McoLELLANs OWN STORY.
PART L

hut happily he is beyond friendship or cnmty,
aud we fear that the editor, w. c. Primo, has cx-
crciscd bad taste that he will regret some OF
these DAYS.
II Is, In short, special pleading extcnding over
DOL pages to try TO convince the world that II, for
the past two decades, has been In error because
II thought Mcclellan was not great general. II
IL a hard task TO do that, and whercforc2 The
world looks only at big results. tits nonsense
to hope that the minutiG of McClcllan's cam
paigps will bc inquired into bv the unprofcs
slonal. He failed on the Peninsula, and that's all
there Is about IT,
Hc succeeded In West Virginia, aud he de-
serves credit therefor, but he had an enormous
prcpondcrancc of force, which has been proven
since 1896; he was called TO Washington after the
Federal dcfeat at Bull Run, and he reOrgauizcd
the disorganizcd army and made Washington
secure, and he deserved credit for that too, and
he has received II. We would not raise feather
against his dues, but when this young man of
c-and-thirty tried to hold back twenty million
impatient people; people who were swctering
under that defeat at Bull Hun; people who were
paying the bills and sending their boys to the
front; people who saw the Confederate flag Haunt
ing within sight of their Executive; people who
Ind forgotten party and thought OF country only:
people who knew he commanded 10000 brave.
Idle men, and who saw handful of gallant Con-
federates down the river blockadng their capt.
tal-we sny when this young man of fivc-and-
thirty fancied he could curb these twenty mil
lion and make them wait his pleasure, he was
the worst mistaken man that over straddlcd
horse, and his big failure began right thcn and
there. To drop nll thought OF party or politics,
to forget whether he was Democrat or Rcpubli-
can, VIC nsk the candid reader IL people ever
was 80 trificd with2
More than once he was ordered to move by
him who had the right to issue such orders; he
fought against such orders and they were with
drawn. He had one plan, the Executive an
other. The Executive wished him to advance to
Ccntcrvillc and fight II out there he wished TO
land at aud march from urbnnna to Richmond
or land on the Peninsula md thence to Rich
mond. The Executive yielded, but, II may be
said, under protest
Before he started for the Peninsula he took his
army In hand and murched TO Centcrvillc. and
the cliagrn and modification felt by the Union
Army when II looked upon the abandoned Con-
/ tolerate works II would be difficult to describe.
There wcrc more than one who rode with him to
Centervillc who noted his nervousness, and there
were more than one right then md there who
saw that he had the bravery of the soldier, but he
lacked the courage of the general
To 20 back little: II has been said that he
wished to organize, arm, and equip his army so
well that IL would move irrcsistibly, aud that Is
why he was constrained not to move, but surely
he must have known that the Confc,lcratcs would
gain quite as much In that regard us could he
during such delay. and many thought his army
was In better condition In October 1851. than II
was In the spring OF ls82
In war IL Is often better to fight and lose than
not to fight at ALL
His delay for months about Washington was u
two-cdgcd blade that moved his army down thus:
It not only wore his gallant men out with camp
cnnui-a thing much to be dreaded-but II kept
them inactive so long that the vim, the push and
dare and the romance which the new recruit feels
h.,n tu
In malingering and remained so during the war.
Another tremendous error, in our humble opin.
ion, he made In the ofrstart; he had mn enormous,
II complicated nn unwieldy stan. To see II on
review. parade, march, II seemed perfectly far
cical. Not only was the commissioned stat SO
large, but Its enlisted men as clerks, orierlcs, and
servants were so numerous that II dhe stat
looked like a brigade of cavalry. What an ex-
ample for him to set to his army! Whnt was tho
rcsult2
With a few creiitable exceptions every major
general and bryadicr general In the Army of
the Potomac followed his example In that regard
aud every colonel, captain, surgeon. quarter
master, and adjutant Ind men detailed rs clerks
cooks, orderlies, servants, ETC., etc, from the
ranks, ind the men detailed were non-com-
batants. 1t will never be known how many men
were thus taken from the ranks who never pulled
trigger In battle, but this fact goes far To
account for the comparatively few men the Army
of the Potomac carried into action MS fighters
Aud after the romance of soldering wore away
II became n trade In that army for many of Its
enlisted men to feel for md to secure "soft
places" 'These he harsh words, my mnstcrs;'
but the truth wrongs no man.
Under pressure-and not by his volition- the
army was ut last taken to the Peninsula, started
on its march to Richmond, and 1t refined up In
front of Yorktown. All this is an old story. We
know now what we did not know then, Us the
rolls are in possession of the Government
Magruder had but eleven Thousand men behind
his long works. They could have been assaulted
successfully. or they could have been turned
with tho assistance of the Navy, and much
precious time might have been saved; but Nc
Clellans education rs an engineer and his OK
perience In the Crimea prompted him to settle
down into siege He appointed one, who wa,
doubtless his abes lieutenant, rs director of tho
siege, and he did his work very well. 1t coult
not have been done better, hut, oh, the physica
labor of that siege as borne by the enlisted mer
was worse than unsuccessful battle could have
been to them. It sapped their energies, and thu
delay It entaed gave the able Confederate leader
ample time to focus his army about Richmond
for the future.
Yorktown evacuated and the army PLUNGED
ahead looking for its opponent to find him a
Williamsburg. The less said of williamsburg
the better. II was n wild and foolish scramble
instead of II BATTLE but that was not Mcclellan
noorI, ended No ,yise,v remained I'm the rcar 4,
nosn., 81, his turn,,y rnrco nm the York. Abou
,h;s time hc ,,oaan to believe and assert that tb
Cnnfa.,ar.,os had ON an orative troops In hI
front and he whis,Icd over the wires for rein
forcomonts n Ia oosv onouyb IN bc wise afte
IN. event. TINT IA hindsiyht A wauon.mnste
o",, s,.nd an Mont 81 Loan or In Relic AIIionc
uor md sco where nm Empcror erred but Tim
s h,ndsigbt tno n 10 n matter of historic accr
,o.w now Tint tho Confederate never had dim
,na Tint mr. anv other cam aiUn mr.; army of ave
y, m, etYectiycs we look in win through thes
m, mn vcs IN And mn ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of this at,
nopdo,,s error. thcrcforc wa ore forced tn belcy
That this work WINS skiI,fully nrodIccd not To 10
tho truth INF IN swindlc tho world into tho bcIie
that hc was n great general. It is hut fair
state that his MINIS ,psrc interfered with by IN
executive. tbat'it was understood that when h
vnt into nosition on the Peninsula with the nrm
he mad in hind that Mcdowell was to marc
from FrodcrckstIrp to ioin him. and that n
(MeD. q, force was about 4I,OOO electives; tina
startled Mt The rcport as To the limited number G
t,oops remain,nu within cnsy call. the Exec,ltiy
wns constrained to hold Mcdowell within cas-