The Portland daily press., 1887-12-23

that body meant that the particular piece of
prin'd Jfdcie evidence mentioned in the law
under discussion should be sufficient, not
only to authorize jury to return verdict
upon it, but to compel them to, when it
was unexplained. In support of this view
we quoted the opinion of a prominent men,
Der of the legislature. We quoted too the
definition of prima fdcie evidence given by
Judge Whitehouse. namely, that it is evil
dence which unexplained would both author
lie and require jury to return a verdict
upon it; aid also Judge Bonney's ruling In
the Guppy case, which was that the payment
Of a liquor tax, when unexplained
was conclusive evidence that the per-
son paying it was a common seller
Of Intoxicating liquors. This evidence
is certainly sufficient to show that Mr.. Drum
mond's assertion that there was no doubt
as to the construction that should be put
upon the law was incorrect The correct
ness or incorrectness of Mr.. Drummond's
definition of prinaa .facie evidence is ques-
tion which the PRESS has never discussed.
The PRESS has simply contended that this
definition is irreconciable with that of
Judge Bonney and Judge Whitehouse, and
different from what the legislature under
stood it to be.
The PRESS contended also that Judge
Whitehouse did not instruct the jury that
the payment Of liquor tax, unexplained,
was sufficient to authorize them to find a
verdict upon, and that bis language mega
tived any such construction. What he said
was this:.
can only say to you, therefore, that 1t 1.-THE
payment OF Liquor taxi Is a fact for you to con-
slider, aud in connection with the circumstances
surrounding the premises of the defendant, you
Tninds-that it is sufficient But it will lie a fact
for yoil / cannot say that you are required, as
matter OF law, to hold it sufficient
He treated it simply as circumstance
which with other circumstances might be
sufficient.
Thus two of Mr.. Drummond's original as
sumptions, namely, that there was no doubt
as to the construction of the law; and that
| Judge Whitehouse construed it as author
izing the jury to return a verdict upon liquor
tax alone are overthrown.
The question whether Judge Bonney re-
garded the Guppy case as civil or criminal
action in applying the rules of evidence is
collateral and not very important. We gave
some reasons for thinking that he regarded
it as criminal action. One was a decision
of the Supreme Court which held that such
actions, so far as the measure of proof re-
quired, must be treated as criminal. Mr..
Drunmond has shown that that opinion has
since been oyerruled. SO that reason was
not good one. We gave another, which was
that Judge Bonney charged that before the
jury could return verdict against the de-
PENDANT, they must be satisfied beyond area
sondble doubt, that the liquor in question was
intended for unlawful sale. We have invited
Mr.. Drummond to express his opinion of the
value of this reason, but he appears to be re-
luctant to do so.
Mr.. Drummond appears to have changed his
mind and now thinks the PRESS has done
Judge Whitehouse an unintentional injustice
in constituting his ruling as tantamount to a
declaration that the prima .fdcie law is uncon-
stitutional Apparently Judge Whitehouse is
not of that opinion for in reply to direct
question as to the effect of his ruling he said:
IF that law was Intended to compel a jury TO
render verdict of guilty on the evidence OF the
payment of special tax alone, and % acds 50 IN
tended, then pronounced it unconstitutional"