St. Landry democrat. (Opelousas, La.) 1878-1894, 1887-11-12
BATTLE OF M\IW AND.
TIE VICTORY or ANOUB KHAN
OVER GENERAL. BURROWS.
Over onc-haE of the English Army De
stroyed by the Afghans British Soldiers
Killed by the People of the Villages
Through Which the Retreat was Made.

The recently announced death Of
Ayoub Khan, followed by the statement
that he is still alive and likely to prove
as dangerous an enemy to the Amecr Of
Afghanistan in the future as he has been
in the past, brings to mind some of his
exploits during the war Of lS19-'SO, prior
to the establis hment Of a British en-
bassy at Cabul and subsequent to its
massacre.
He it was who led the Afghan army
engaged at the battle Of MaiWand. an
engagement likely to be long rcmcm-
bered by those yet living who partici-
pated in the conflict and subsequent dis
astrous retreats. 1t may not be uninter-
esting to recount some details of that
affair. Exactly what the results might
have been had the British commander
acted on the defensive it is hard to tell,
but it is certain that by a series OF az
grcssive movements defeat was more
speedily brought about than would
otherwise have been the case.
Brigadier General Burrows was en-
camped with a body of troops, $500
strong, within a comparatively short
distance Of kandahar. 1t had been
rumored for some DAYS during his stay
there that Ayoub Khan, with a strong
force, was in the vicinity. 1t was said
that he had arrived in the GarmaO dis
~ thntcarI Of a lrI-4 n
host of Ghazis or foot soldiers, were
reported to have arrived at GarmaO and
Maiwand The avoWed intention of
Ayoub was to force his way into the AT
gandab valley, entering by the Maiwand
Pass General Burrows had received
special instructions not to let the Al
ghans advance toward GhuZin.
When news came telling of Avoub
khan's approach camp was struck, and
the whole body Of the troops, with bag
gage and ordnance, received instruc-
tions to march toward Maiwand. The
news came on the afternoon of the 26th
of July, 1880 At $50 A. NJ the next day
start was made
The European force consisted Of a
battery of Royal Horse Artillery, 105
strong and ) 6 of the Sixty sixth Regi-
ment of British Infantry, making a total
of 621 Europeans.
The native force consisted Of 16G
cavalry, forty five sappers and miners
and ,213 native infantry making total
of 1884 natives, all belonging to the
Indian standing army and fully trained.
There were thirty-four sick European
soldiers and fifty sick natives with the
baggage-tran.
March was made along the bank of a
dried-up river When within four miles
of Maiwand and at eight miles distance
from their starting point, the rumors of
the Afghan advance were confirmed.
This was three hours after the march
commenced. At 10 A. NJ. reconnais
sance disclosed large mass of the AT
CHAN cavalry moving across the left
front The atmosphere being hazy, very
little could be seen-not enough to show
their real strength
About this time the British advanced
cavalry occupied, without opposition,
the village of Mundabad, three miles to
the southwest of Maiwand. The brig
ade arrived little later and made halt.
A second reconnaissance was then made
from the edge of broad and deep raw
inc Immediately in front of Mundabad,
to the west of that village, and sepa-
rated only by another rayine from
IL, Id no optI,
and northwest by three parallel ranges
of hills. between which are inclosed the
Garmao and Maiwand valleys. Beyond
these valleys are roads leading toward
kandahar and the Upper Argandab.
Ayoub khan,s army could be seen in
distinctly, moving westward toward
Maiwand. The dense haze kept his
battalion almost hidden from view.
1t was afterward held by experienced
commanders during a court of inquiry
that General Burrows ought to have re-
manned where he was, instead of Ven
turing an attack, without prospective
cover, on force the strength of which
had not vet been revealed. Mundabad,
where the first halt was made, was well
fitted for purposes of defense. There
was excellent cover for infantry, good
protection for baggage, and abundance
of water In attempting to justify his
movements the brigadier said he thought
the Afghans had no guns. What reason he
had for so thinking has never been made
clear. To his cost he discovered as mat
tiers developed themselves, that Ayoub
had provided himself with thirty pieces
of artillery.
1t was decided to attack the approach
ing force The impetuosity of an artil-
lery lieutenant caused the attack to be
commenced before the generals plans
had teen carried out. This officer, with
two guns and an escort Of cavalry,
crossed the ravine, advanced at rapid
pace in the direction of the Afghans and
then opened fire on large body of
their cavalry at 1900 yards. The con-
tlict was thus precipitated. An effort
was made to recall the detachment before
fire was opened, but without avail AS
soon as it became known what the lieu
tenant had undertaken, two guns were
sent to support him. Then the infantry
was ordered to advance.
When they reached the plain they
were extended in line. The entire
available force of European infantry
was placed on the right, with two
smooth-bore guns in the centre and $50
e.