Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1887-03-21

borough. Both, at the outset OF their
great career of victory, were regarded as
essentially national commanders. Both
had married young, and were faithful hus-
bands and devoted fathers. Both had in
all their campaigns the same belief in an
ever watched providence, IN whose help
they trusted implicitly, snd Tor whose in
terposition they prayed at ali times. They
were gifted with the same military
instinct, the same genius for war. The
power of fascinating those with whom
they were associated, the spell which they
cast over their soldiers, who believed
almost superstlti0uSly IN their certainty
OF victory, their contempt OF Danger, their
daring courage, constitute C. parallel tnat
is difficult TO equal between any other two
great men II modern times.
! From the frs, Lee anticipated long
and bloody struggle, although from the
! bOm0astiC Or&tOry ~ self elected pJIitI-
clans and patriots, the people were led TO
believe that the WnCle business would be
settled in few weeks. This folly led to
d serious evil, namely the enlistment OF
! soldiers Tor only ninety days. Lee, who
understood war. pleaded in favor OF the
engagement being for the term off the
war, bqI Re pleaded in vain. To add to
his military difficulties, the politician in
sisted upon the officers being elected by
| their men. This was q point which, in
| describing to me the constitution Of his
army, Lee most deplOred. When war
bursts upon country unused to tEat
O deal, and therefore unsKilled in prep8r
ing for it, the fTOthy ba35liOg Of p0liti-
clans too often forces the nation into silly
measures to its serious Injury during the
ensuing operations. That no great mill
tary success can be achieved quickly By
an imprOvised army is lesson that, Of all
others, is made most clear Oy the MARIA
tive of the war on both sides. All through
its earlier phases, the press, both north
ern and southern, called loudly, and often
times angrIly, for quick results. 1t is
this Impotence of the people, which the
press is able to emphasize SO strongly,
that drives many weak generals into i'm
mature action. Lee, as well as others at
this time, had to submit to tue sneers
which foolish men circulated widely IN
the daily newspapers. 1t is quite certain
that, under the existing condition OF
things, no Fabius would be tolerated, and
that the far-seeing military policy which
triumphed at Torres VedraS would not be
submitted 10 by the English public of to-
day. Lee was not, however, a man whom
any amount of irresponsible writing
could force beyond the pace he knew TO
be most conducive to ultimate success.
The formation of an army with the
means alone at his disposal was colossal
task. Everything had to be created by
This extraordinary man. The south was
an agricultural, not a manufacturing
country, and the resources of foreign
lands were denied it by the blockade of
its ports maintained by the feet OF the
United States. Lee was a thorough man
of business, quick in decision, yet
methodical in all he did. He knew what
he wanted. He knew what an army
should be, and how it should be organ
lied, both in purely military as well as
10 an administrative sense. In about
two months he had created little army
of 50 900 men, animated by lofty patri
Otism and courage that made them unCOn-
querable by q similarly constituted army.
In another month, this army at Bulls
Run gained q complete victory over the
northern invaders, VINO were driven back
across the Potomac like herds OF fright
ened sheep. AS the Federals ran, they
threw away their arms, and everything,
guns, tents, wagons, ETC., was abandoned
10 the victOrS The arms, ammunition
and equipment then taken were real god
sends to those engaged in the organization
Of the southern armies. Thence forward
q battle to the COnfederateS meant new
supply of everything an army required.
II may be truthfully said, tn u practically
the government at Washington had to
provide and pay for the arms and equip
ments of its enemies as well as for all that
it's own enormous armies required. The
day presented myself in General Lees
camp, as | stood at the door OF his tent
waiting admission, l was amused to tlnd
1t stamped as belonging to 3 colonel Of g
New jersey regiment. | remarked upon
this to General Lee, who laug hingly said:
ayes, think you will find tnat all our
tents, guns, and even the mems pouches,
are similarly marked as having belonged
to the United States army" Some time
afterWard, when General Pope and his
large invading army had been sent back
flying across the Maryland frontier, over
heard this conversation between two
Confederate soldiers: "Hav5 you heard
the news2 Lee has resigned" "Good
c." was the reply. What tor?"
ale has resigned because he says he can
not feed and supply his army any longer,
now that his commlssary, General Pope,
has been removed" Mr.. lincoln had
lust dismissed General Pop :, replacing
him by General Mcclellan.
The ConfederRtes did net follow up
their victory at Bulls Run. A rapid aud
daring advance would have given them
possession of Washington, taeir enemy's
capital Political considerations at Rich
mond were allowed to outw, igh the very
evident military expediency # reRping a
solid advantage from this to If first great
success. Often afterwsrd, y len this at
tempt to alIay the angry fe' ings OF the
north against the act of sect sion had en-
tirely failed, was this action Vt their polit-
ical rulers Iamented by the Confederate
In this article to attempt wen q sketch
of the subsequent military operations is
not to be thought Of. Both sides fought
well, and both have such Il re reason to
be proud of their schlvemen's that they
can now afford to hear the professional
criticisms of their English friends in the
same spirit that we Britishe have learnt |
to read of the many defeats afflicted upon |
our arms by General Wash ngton.
What most strikes the rr,ular soldier |
in these campaigns of Genel / Lee is the
inefficient manner in which 10Th he and |