Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1887-11-10

IuUu
gave effect. As that.was a Territorial statute
passed by Territorial Legislature for the gov
ernment OF a Territory over which the United
states has exclusive Jurisdiction, II came di-
rectly within the operation Of Article OF the
amendments, which guaranteed TO Hopt trial
by impartial jury. Webster vs.. Reid, IL I, How
ard, 437, 439. No one at that time suggested a
donbt OF the constitutionality OF tho statute,
and IL was regarded, both in the Territorial
courts and hore. as furnishing the proper rulo
TO be observed by Territorial court In impan-
cling an impartial jury in a criminal case.
A similar statute was enac ed in New York
May 3, 1874 Acts OF 1872 @ 475, Q New York
state at-large. second edition, 373 in Michigan,
April Is, 1873 acts of 1673 162 act J17, Howell (;
statute OF 1854. and also in Nebraska compiled
statutes OF Nebraska, 1886. p. 1888, and Criminal
Code OF Nebraska 406. The constitutionalitv Of
the statute OF New York was sustained by the
Court of Appeals OF that State in Stokes vs. the
People, 81 New York, 164 to l72, decided June
10, 1873, and IL has been acted upon without OBJ
lection ever since. 30 far as we have been able
to discover no doubt has ever been entertained
In Michigan or Nebraska OF the constitutionality
OF the statutes of those States respectively, but
they have always been treated by their SUI
preme Courts as valid, both under the Constitu-
tion OF the United States and under that OF the
State. lStephens ys. the People, 38 Michigan,
739 to 745 Ulrch vs. the People, 80 Michigan,
2i5; Murphyvs the State, Is Nebraska, $780,
Indeed, the rule of the statute OF Illinois, as
IL was construed by tho trial court, Is not ma
teTially different from that which has been
without legislative action. lCommonwea tn va.
Webster, Cushing 205: Holt vs.. the People,
l3 Michigan, 224; State Vs. Fox, / butcher, 500 |;
Ostrandef vs. the Commonwealth, 3 Leigh, $50 I;
State vs. Ellington, 2 Wendell, 81 Smith vs..
Eames, Scam, 81. See also an elaborate note
to this last case in 36 A. NJ dec. 521, where n
very large number of authorities ON this Sec
ton are cited Without pursuing this subject
further IL is sufficient to say that we agree en-
trely with the Supreme Court of Illinois In the
opinion that the statute on its face construed
by the trial court is not repuenant TO Section o
OF Article OF the constitution OF that State,
which guarantees to the accused party in every
criminal prosecution a speedy trial by an inn
partial jury Of the county or district In which
the of ense is alleged to have been committed.
As this is substantially the provision of the
Constitution OF the United States, ON which the
petitioners now rely, it follows that oven IL
their position to the operation and effect OF
that Constitution is correct the statute is not
open TO tho objection which is made against it.
THE CHALLENGED JURORS.
We proeeed then to the consideration OF the
grounds OF challenge to the jurors, Denker and
Sanford, TO see II, In the actual administration
of the rule of the statute by the court, the
rights of those defendants under the Constitu-
tion OF the United States were in any way i'm
paired.
ination of Deaker by the defense, and says that
he was challenged for cause by the defendants,
but before any decision was made thereon he
was questioned by tho court and the courts ex-
animation is appendeti ~The court" it contin-
Dcfoft itffersuflR .aRa15llad- challenge, but
further examined by counsel for tie defend-
the record) The court then says that the ex-
animation Of the juror by counsel for the de-
PENDANTS closed and he was examined by the
attorney for the State, and citations are given
from the questions and answers in this exam
ination. The opinion continues
At tho close OF the examination neither party
challenged the Juror peremptorily, and he was
accepted and sworn. When this occurred 1t was
not denied the defendants were still entitled to
LAB psreInptory challenges, or about that num-
Der.
When Juror Sanford was called he was first
examined by counsel for the defendants. lThe
examination Is here quoted) At the close OF this
examination ON the part Of the defendants the
juror was challenged on their behalf for cause,
and the attorney for the State, after it was as
certainod that all the peremptory challenges
of the defendants had been exhausted, took
up the examination Of the juror. The result
of this examination is given. as is the ruling
Of the court denying the challenge to over
rule for cause, and stating that as the peremp-
tory challenges of the defense are exhausted
Sanford is Juror TO try the case, so far as the
defendants are concerned). This was accepted
RS R9t6 6 ths sSaR Sf e tSs Sao staf d
after some further examination of the juror,
which elected nothing of Importance in con-
lenge having been imposed by the State, San
ford was sworn as juror, and the panel was
thus complete.
This, SO far as we have been advised, pro-
sents all there is in the record which this court
can consider touching tho challenge OF these
two jurors by the defendants for cause.
In Reynolds vs. the United States, % U. s..
145 to 156, it was decided by this court that in
order TO Justify the reversal of the judgment OF
the Supreme Court OF the Territory of Utah for
refusing to allow challenge 30 juror in q
criminal case on the ground that he had
formed and expressed an opinion as to the Is
sues to be tried il must be made clearly TO ap-
pear that upon the evidence the court ought to
have found the Juror had formed such an opinion
that he could not in law be deemed impartial.
The case must be one I'm Which It is manifest the
law left nothing to the conscience or discretion
Of the court. II such is the degree of str ctness
which is required in the ordinary cases of writs
from one court to another in the same general
jurisdiction, we ought to be careful that it is
not at all relaxed in a case like this when the
ground relied ON for the reversal by this court of
Judgment of the highest court of the State is
that the error complained OF is so great as to
amount to a denial by the State OF a trial by an
impartial jury to one who Is accused OF crime
We unhesitatingly Of the opinion that no
such case is disclosed by this record.
We come now to consider tho objection that
the defendant Spies was compelled by the court
to be q witness against himself. He voluntarily
offered himself witness in his own behalf,
and by so doing he became bound to submit
himself to proper cross-examination. The
complaint is that he was required on cross-ex-
animation to state whether he had received q
certain letter which was shown. purporting
and addressed to him, and upon his
saying that he had, the court allowed
the letter to be read in evidence against him.
This, it is claimed, was not proper cross-exami-
nation. 1t is not contended that the subject TO
which the cross examination related was not
pertinent to the issue to be tried, and whether q
cross-examination must be confined to matters
pertinent to the testimony In chief, or may be
extended to the matter in issue, is certainly n
question of State law in the courts of the State
and not tho Federal law.
Something has been said In argument about
an alleged unreasonable search and seizure OF
the papers and property of some OF the defend
ants and their use in evidence on the trial OF
the case. Special reference is made in this con-
nection to the letter of Most, about which Spies
was cross-exam ned, but we have not been re-
ferred to any part Of the record in which 1t ap-
pears that objection was made to the
use of the evidence on that account, and
upon this point the Supreme Court of the
State in that part OF its opinion which
has been printed with this motion remarks as
follows; ~,rhe objection that the letter was
obtained from the defendant by an unlawful
seizure 10 made for the first time In this court.
IL was not made on the trial in the court below
Such an objection as this, which is not sug-
gested by the nature of the offered evidence
but depends upon the proof of outside fact,
should have been made on the trial The defense
should have proved that the Most letter was
one of the letters Illegally seized by the police
and should then have moved TO exclude. or op-
posed its admission, on the ground that IL was
obtained by such Illegal seizure. This was
not DONE and, therefore, we cannot consider
the constitutional question supposed to be In
volved."
AT CHICAGO.
How tho Prisoners Received tho News