The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1887-11-09
1--WE DENY THE WRIT"
The Decision Of the United
States Supreme Court in
the Anarchist Case.
No Federal Question Involved, and
the Court Unanimous In
This Opinion.
How the News Was Received by the
Condemned Men in the
Chicago Jail.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 3

WASHINGTON, Nov. g.
The SUPREME Court OF the United States
yesterday denied the motion for a writ
decision was delivered by Chief Justice Waite
and was that OF the full bench 1t occupied
thlrty-seyen minutes in rapid reading. When
the justices entered the room Justices Miller
and Waite sighed deeply n number OF times
and the voice Of the latter trembled for some
minutes after he began reading. At times lie
T repS Mhni s iaisored and going back re-
seven Justices were turned TO the floor during
nearly the entire time of the delivery Oc-
casionally Justice Waite took his eyes from the
paper, looked the audience in the face, and
gave emphasis To points in the decision which
marked the outline of his intentions and showed
what had guided the bench in reaching its con-
clusion. Following is the text of the opinion:
When, rs in this case, application is made to
us on the suggestion Of one OF our number to
whom similar application has been previously
addressed for the allowance of q writ Of error to
the highest court OF n State. under Section 100
OF the Revised Statutes, il ia our duty to ascer-
tain not only whether any question renewable
here was made aud decided in the proper court
below. but whethor it is Of a character to JUS
tify the bringing the judgment here for re-ex-
animation.
In our opinion the writ ought not to be allowed
by the court IL IL appears from the face of the
record that the decision Of the Federal ques-
tion which Is complained Of was SO plainly
righo as not to require argument; and espe-
cinlly IL it Is in accordance with our own we'll
considered Judgments in similar cases. That
Is in effect what was done in Twitchell VS.. The
commonwealth, Wall, 1913. when the writ was
refused because the questions presented by the
record were mo longer subjects Of discussion. +"
although II they had been in the opinion of the
court open" il would have been allowed When
undes Section of our Rule a motion to affirm
IL united with motion to dismiss, for want of
jurisdiction, the practice has been to grant the
motion to affirm when the question on which
our Jurisdiction depends was so manifestly de-
cided right that tho case ought not to be held
for further argument. Arrowsmith We. Har-
monng, lis United States, 1871, 1876 Church vs.
Kelsey 121 United States, 2S2
The propriety OF adopting n similar rule upon
motions in open court for the allowance of q writ
Is apparent, for certainly would not be justi-
ned as "a court in sending out writ to bring up
tor review a judgment of the highest court of a
State when it 10 apparent ON the face OF the rec.
ord that it would be our duty to grant motion
TO affirm as soon as ii was made IN proper form.
In the present case we have had the benefit Of
argument in support Of the application, and,
while counsel have not deemed it their duty to
go fully into the morris of the questions in
volved, they have shswn us distinctly what the
decisions were of which they complain, and
how the questions arose. In this way are
able to determine. as a court in session, whether
the errors alleged are such as to justify us in
bringing tho case here for review.
We proceed then. to consider what the ques-
lions are In which, If it exists at ALL our iuris-
diction depends.
of the United States on which counsel rely are
found in Arts. w., ", VI, and XIV. Of the
amendments, as follows:
Art. ~. The right OF the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures shall
not be violated
Art V. No person !: shah be compelled
in any criminal case to be a. witness against
himself, nor be deprived Of life, liberty, prop
erty without due process OF law.
Art. vi. In all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ~ y speedy and pub
Lie trial by an impartial Jury NJ the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been COM
mitted, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law.
Art. XIV, Sec. /. No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States
NOR shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty. or property without due process Of law
That the first ten articles Of amendment were
not intended to limit the powers OF the State
governments in respect to their own citizens,
but TO operate on the National Government
alone, was decided more than a half century
ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered
to since. Barron VS.. Baltimore, Peters, DAB,
2i7 Livingston vs.. Moore, idem., 4G9 $50; Fox
VS.. Ohio, How. 40, 43i Smith We. Maryland,
Is How, II, rs; Withers VS.. Buckley, 80 How, 3D.
81 Pervear vs. The Commonwealth. 3 Wall,
475, 419; Twitchell vs. The Commonwealth. 7
How ?2l. 1926; Justices VS. Murray, Q Wall, 274,
27s Edwards vs.. Elliott, 81 Wall $50, 557
Walker Vs. Sanvinet, 92 United States, 80 /;
United States W.. Cruikshank, 90 United States
$40, $50; Pearson vs. Yewdali, S5 United states
pa. 300 Davidson vs.. New Orleans, 9j United
States, 81, 10l; Kelly vs.. Pittsburg, lO4 United
States. 70 Presser vs.. Illinois, ll6 United States,
252, 2e5
1t was contended however, in argument that
though originally the first ten amendments were
adopted as limitations on Federal power. yet in
so far they secure and recognize fundamental
rights. common law rights Of the man, they
make them privileges and immunites of the
man u citizen of the United States, and can
not now be abridged by State under the four
teenth amendment
In other words, while the ten amendments as
limitations on power only apply to the Federal
a. - a.
far AS they declare or recognize rights of per-
sons, these rights are theirs citizens OF the
United States. and the fourteenth amendment
as to such rights limits State power, as the ten
amendments had limited Federal power
1t is also contended that the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment, which declares that no
State shall deprive ANY person Of life, liberty
property without due process OF law, imply
that every person charged with crime in q State
shall be entitled to n trial by an impartial jury
and shall not be compelled to testify against
himself. The objections are in brief ~ That
n statute of this State construed by the court
deprived the petitioners of trial by an Impair
tial jury, and 2) that Spies was compelled to
give evidence against himself. Before consid-
ering whether the Constitution of the United
States has the effect which is claimed it is
proper to inquire -Jhether the Federal ques-
tions relied on in fact arise on the face Of this
record.
THE QUESTION ON THE ILLINOIS STATUTE.
One statute to which objection is made was
approved March ~, 1874, and has been in force
y
the trial court, acting under this statute and in
accordance with its requirements, compelled
the petitioners, against their will, to submit to
a trial by jury that was not impartial, and
thus deprived them of one of tho fundamental
rights which they had as citizens OF the United
States under the National Constitution :. and
that il the sentence of the court is carried into
execution they will be deprived OF their lives
without due process of law" In Hopt vs..
Utah, 100 United States. 439. 1t was decided by
this court that where a challenge by defend
ant in criminal action to juror for bias,
actual or implied, ia disallowed, and the juror
is thereupon peremptorily challenged by the
defendant and excused, and an impartial and
competent Juror Is obtained in his place, no in
jury il done the defendant IT, until the Jury is
completed, he has other peremptory challenges
which he use and 80 in Hayes We. Missouri,
40 United States, n. IL was said, The right to
challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a
Juror II from these who remain an impair
tial sury is obtained the constitutional right
of the accused is maintained" or the correct
moss OF these rulings we entertain no doubt
We are therefore confined in this case to the
rulings on the challenges TO the jurors who
actually sat at the trial. or these there were
but two-Theodore Denker, the third juror who
was sworn. and II. T. Sanford, the last who
was called and sworn after all the peremptory
challenges of the defendants had been ex-
hausted. At the trial the court construed the
as a juryman may have formed an opinion
based upon rumor or upon newspaper state
ment. but has expressed no opinion as to the
truth Of the newspaper statement, he is still
qualified n juror II he states that he can
fasriy and impartaliy render verdict thereon
in accordance with the law and the Evidence,
and the Court shall be satisfied Of the truth Of