The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-11-09
Chief Justice Cooper's Decision
Against Hamilton and Eubank
Affirmed.

The appeal of Hamilton and Eubank
from the judgment of Chief Justice
Cooper deciding that the REALTORS had
not made out case for a second writ of
hdbeas corpus, resulted in an afirmance
of the Judgment Monday morning.
Judge Campbell read the opinion of the
court, which is lucid Interpretation of
Section 1884 of the Code.
1t will be noticed that the cases in
which a second writ will be allowed are
extremely limited, and this, doubtless,
was intended by the lawmakers.
Judge Arnold delivered a eoncurring
opinion.
The opinion of both Judges follow:
E,r parte, HAMILTON, ct al.
CAMPBELL, j., delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The trial before Chancellor Peyton
was the trial of writ of hdbeds corpus.
Had the Judgment been in favor OF the
prisoners, it would have been conclusive
in their favor, according to the statute,
ard it must, as against them, have its
full effect as a judgment rendered on the
trial of writ of habeas corpus. 1t is
true that Chancellor Peyten, by consent
of all concerned, might have sat as a
substitute for the justice of the peace,
and then his judgment would have had
no greater effect than one by the justice
of the peace would have had, but the
record of the proceeding must govern,
and it shows that the writ of habeas cor
nus was petitioned for and issued and re-
turned and tried as such, and the fact
that the Chancellor announced that he
was examining the case as if he was a
Justice of the peace does not change the
aspect of the case, as made by the rec
ord.
| The second section of can Act to reg
Mate the place of trial of writs of hGbeds
corpus" approved February 16, 1884
! Acts %. IS, made no change in the law
as it existed before. Every judge in
| this State authorized to issue and try
writs of habeas corpus is by the constitu-
| ton and laws, a conseryator OF the
peace, and his plain duty was, before
| the Act of 1884, to hold the party be-
fore him on habeas corpus, if the evidence
showed the party guilty of some crime,
however defective or irregular the pro-
ceedings for his commitment may have
been: and the time never was IN this
State when any judge with an Intelligent
comprehension of his position and duty,
would discharge a party In such case.
| Where, on hdbeas corpus, the view OF the
Judge is restricted to an Inspection OF
| the process by which the person is held,
/ "a - : 4 g. 20 nthnrizo
his detention the only judgment Is
discharge, but where the whole evidence
is heard, in this State, judge who, be
| fore the Act of 1884, would have dis
charged from custody on trial of a writ
of hGbeas corpus one shown by evidence
before him to be guilty of some crime,
would have erred and deserved CEN
sure.
The second section of the Act of 1884
was merely declarative of pre-existing
law.
Section 1884 of the Code is Constitu-
tional. 1t antedates the Constitution,
and has been the law of this State since
1922. The Constitutions of 1882 and
| 1869 were adopted with reference to it,
and no provision of the Constitution is
inconsistent with it. The declaration in
the Bill of Rights against suspension of
the writ of habeds corpus, is not in the
remotest degree iuharmonious with the
statute which does not suspend the priv
ilege of the writ in any way. The whole
purpose of the statute is TO declare the
effect of judgment on the trial of a
writ of hdbeGs corpus as bar to another
writ in the same cause to bring the same
matter in question, and as protection
J to the person discharged against further
confinement for the same cause except
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
But for the statute the judgment for or
against the person on the trial of the
writ of habeas corpus would not be final.
1t could not be appealed from. If it
was for the petitioner it would not pro-
tect him against another arrest and fur
Their confinement. If it was against
him, he could not correct an error by
appealing, but could sue out another
writ before the same or another judge
who might follow the first decision, and
he could get no redress unless he could
find Judge who would discharge him,
and when thus discharged he might
again Immediately be arrested on new
proceedings before any justice Of the
Il peace or other conservator of the peace,
and be again confined in the face of the
former discharge.
To remedy this evil, this statute was
passed. 1t makes the Judgment render
ed on tho trial of writ of hateas corpus
conclusive until reversed and bar to
another hGbcns corpus in the same cause
10 bring the same matter again in ques-
ton. This Is restrictive Of the right Of
4 the individual. He, alone, could have