The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1887-05-08

that Gen. Patterson, II needed, would
reach Washington, with his army OF
more than 5000, sooner than we
could, and the condition and made
quate means Of the army in ammuni-
tion, provisions and transportation,
prevented any serious thoughts Of ad.
vancing against the capital" Gen.
BeaureRard, the second In command,
has fully stated, as the obstacle to
pursuit, q want OF supplies and trans
portation. Neither OF them has
stated that which either OF them
might, that in the night al er the
battle, irquired what, If any
orders had been given for pur-
suit, and after learning none had
been given, and after some further in
quiries, dictated an order for Gen.
Bonham 10 move forward with his
brigade at fret dawn Of day. Gen.
Early, whom l left with his command
on the extreme left, when the battle
had closed, has reported that he was
instructed by me 10 remain in that po.
sition as best suited for pursuit, and
that he passed the nightthere expecting
orders In the morning. AS these facts
have all been published, and were GER
tainly accessible to Gen. Wolseley, 1t
seems inexcusable that he should have
preferred to revamp an exploded
scandal by the addition Cf regret
among Southerners for O blnnder OF
the administration, which it was cuff.
GENTLY well known the administration
had never made.
Blowing hot and cold with the same
breath, Gen. Wolse'ey next arsigns
the Confederate Administration for
the defeLss.of it's own capital. He
says: "Lee was opposed to the final
defense Of Richmond that was urged
upon him for political, not military
reasons. 1t was a great strategic err
roT." Hero is an immense amount Of
misststement in proportion TO the
length OF the sentence. At Richmond
the Confederacy had it's principal
foundry for the casting Of heavy guns
and the manufacture OF railroad sup
plies; then there, too, was it's princi-
pal armory, nearly all OF Its machinery
for the repair OF small arms and the
preparation Of ammunition for both
artillery and infantry. There were,
therefore, very important material
considerations involvedin maintaining
its possession. 1t Is utterly untrue
that / urged Lee to prolong the de-
fence OF the capital against
HIS wish and Judgment He
was not OF the retreatipg
order, nor willing to abandon Lower
Virginia and railroad connection with
the further South; but when convinced
that the maintenance OF his position
was mere question OF time, and pre-
sumably snort one, the only point to
be discussed wos when and by what
route 1t should bs abandoned. The time
was dependent on the condition Of the
roads, and was left for his selection,
which we hoped he would have full
power to make, despite the increasing
pressure CT the siege. The end came
sooner than either OF us expected, AID
In manner which prevented the exc
cution OF the movement on which we
had, after full consultation, sgreed.
The political consideration attach.
ing to the defense OF the capital seemed
to be fully appreciated by Gen. VOL
seley when he was censuring the O n
federacy for having lost, as he sup
posed, an opportunity to capture the
capital Of the United States; bat he
finds II quite reprehensible Tor tue
Con federate Government to oppose the
continued forts of Its enemy 10 co ..
ture Richmond. That was the OBJ
jective point Of the vast armies
launched from the North, but tie
conquest Of Virginia WAS the frat step
towards the capture OF Richmond, end
Lees brilliant campaigns between the
Potomac and James rivers were for
much more than the mere defefss OF
q city. When, by his g,tat strsgetic
movements across the Potomac, be
drew the enemy out OF Virginia and
broke up the campaign for which 1t
had required much time aud treasure
to prepare, there were higher hopes
and grander purposes than the mere
defense of our capital, with all the
political consC quences which were in.
vowed In its capture.
The advantage of drawing the
enemy into the interior can hardly be
claimed by Gen. Wolseley as an in
vention; he mey find il stated n a
proclamation issued ut Dlnville, Va,
after the evacuation Of Richmond, but
merely ss compromising circum-
stance, tho value OF which Il was sup
posed would be rsslizsd by every one.
A field marshal of Prussia is said to
have rems,ke upon seeing London,
that IL was fac place Tor "loct." Ii
hoati Q force should ever threaten
the capital of England, by all the ten
der memories which bind me to il,
hope the then commander Of the
British forces will not avoid the great
strategic error" of defending it to a
tiuality, by etreating before it should
be necessary, and leaving the capital
to the mercy Of the Invader.
Then, with the conceit which the
Wise King Of the Jews describes az
tho most hopeless of mental condi.
tons, Lord Wolseley consciously
criticises the conduct Of both parties
to the war between tie States, and
especially the assumed failu eJ Of Gen.
Lee 10 reap the fruits of victory, as
follows:
"What most strikes tho regular soldier in
these campains of Gen. Lee, is the inefficient
manner la which both he and his o opponents
were ofton served by their subordinate com :
mandcrs. and how badly the staff and out
post work generally was performed on both
sides, Over and ever again was the
South apparently within stones throw of
INDEPENDENCE, as II has been many times re-
marked, when, from want OF a thoroughly
COCA staff TO organize pursuit, the occasion
was lost, and tho enemy allowed TO escape.
Lees combinations to secure victory were
the concept ms of truly crest strategist,
and, when thoy had boen effected, his tactics
were almost always everything that could be-
desired up to tho moment of victory, but
there his action seemed TO stop abruptly.
Was ever an army so hopelessly at the mercy
Of sno hsr as that of MoClellen whoa he be-
gan his retreat TO Hartison's Landing after
the seven days lighting around RiChmond2
What mmandor could wish to have his foe
ina tighter place than Burnside was in
u ter his disastrous attack upon Ice at Fred
ericksburgY Yet In both instances tse
Northern commander got fafely away, and
other, similar instances could DO men
toned"
To this general allegation II may
suffice to reply that Lee rarely found
fault with bis subordinates, and, be.
lieve, WAS never surprised, and very
rarely failed to anticipate the move
g. ard II l..