Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1887-03-25
"REMINISCENCES OF GEN. MCCLELLAN.
The Comte de Paris on the Chickahominy
Campagn-The Battle of Williams
Observation-Disclosures Discipline.


burg-McCIellan's Discipline.
copyrighted 1887 by 4. II, S. Hamersly.l
FIRST PAPER.
After the battle of the Monitor and the
Merrmac the way was cleared for carry
ing out the plans which Mcclellan had
long been maturing for changing the base
of operations of the army of the Potomac.
The Potomac river became alive with sail
ing and steam craft lighters and trans
ports of all sorts, some receiving soldiers
at Alexandria, some horses at the Wash
ington arsenal, and others loading with
the various materials of war necessary to
the equipment and provisioning of great
army. Mcclellan had stationed himself
at Alexandria in order to give his person
al attention to these operations with all
their immense mass of detail. He was
about to play his trump card. Now that
the armys change of base was no longer
secret for any one, the arrival of the first
of the vessels at Hampton Roads having
revealed to the enemy the proposed point
of debarkation, the success of the enter
prise depended on rapidity of execution.
The satisfaction of beginning the cam
paign at last could not dissipate the grave
preoccupation that possessed the mind of
Mcclellan, as he navigated the broad
waters of the Chesapeake. This preoccu-
patton ought to have had no other cause
than knowledge of the risks he ran in
engaging formidable and able adversary.
Unfortunately it was also caused by
gloomy forebodings of the difficulties like
ly to be thrown in his way, through the
hostility of those whose loyal support he
stood in need of. In regard to this hostili-
ty, of which Mr.. Lincoln was made the
only too willing instrument, he could no
longer deceive himself. Before his depart
ure whole division had been taken from
him and sent to Fremont, and in leaving
behind him McDowell's corps, for which
he had reserved an important role in the
campaign, he could not prevail on himself
not to fear that occasion would be taken
in his absence to divert this corps from its
intended duty, and thus to deprive him of
part of his force absolutely essential to
success. These fears, which he confided
to us at the time, were only too promptly
realized AS at Fairfax Court House, it
was at his first hating place on the Nir-
GINA Peninsula that he learned of the
new attempt aimed at his authority. AS
he had foreseen, the government, forget
ting its promises, and believing, or feign
ing to believe, the safety of the capitol in
sufficiently guaranteed, retained Mellow
ellis corps in the defences of Washington.
Besides. the navy, which should have pre-
cipitated the enemy's retreat by stimuli
taneous menace on his two TANKS, In the
narrow peninsula which separates the
James and York rivers, was paralyzed by
the presence of the Virginia at Norfolk.
The powerfully armed vessels which
should have assembled the two estuarles
were held fast in Hampton Roads The
only gunboats at McClellan's disposition
were too insignificant to be risked before
tie water batteries of Yorktown. De-
prived of the resources he had counted on
to ensure a sudden and brisk attack at
the beginning of his operations, deceived
by the charts and maps, which gave no
adequate idea of the topography of the
region, Mcclellan was Obliged to advance
with extreme caution toward Yorktown, a
position he counted on investing and re-
ducing with as little trouble and loss as
Washington and Rochambeau had done
in the memorable siege which secured to
the United States their independence.
Although in the midst of the general
agitation caused by the news from the
capitol, he preserved his marvellous sang |
trOid, while he pacified some and encour-
aged others, still he was profoundly hurt. |
The same events may produce in different
individuals directly opposite effects, &C
cording to the various temperments of the |
men interested. The i'll disguised hostili- |
ty of his government would have excited
to immediate action, with any resources
at his disposal, passionate, lmperlous.
ambitious nature like that of Bonaparte.
Mcclellan, confident and loyal, was of too
methodical spirit to contend with Sc
cret personal foes and at the same time
fight the public enemy. Thus, when the
head of his column encountered an uneX-
pected obstacle in the boys of Warwick |
Creek, he hesitated. He rested content
with a mere appearance in force before
the glacis of Yorktown. Johnston was |
too able a soldier to deceive himself in re- |
gard to the strategic value of this posi- |
ton he regarded it as only an out post |
made up his mind to abaL don it on the eve
of the day when an enemy should press |
hard enough to make its evacuation peril |
GUS. He wished to impose on the federals |
the fatigue and loss of time incident to
the preparations for long siege, without
giving them the opportunity to reap the
fruits of such an enterprise by deadly |
bombardment or victorious assault. |
Not to speak of Metz or recall souvenirs
too painful for Frenchman, 1t was by
not following the example of Johnston |
that l6 hours later General Osman allow
ed himself to be captured with his army |
at Pevna.
For three weeks the preparations of the |
siege of Yorktown, and the siege itself, |
occupied our whole attention. His mind
once made up, Mcclellan did wonders in
getting ready for the final blow which
should annihilate his adversary. | was
on duty the night of the Sd of May, and
till the following day. We had talked at
length of the surprise held in reserve for
Johnston on the morning of the 9Th and |
had listened to the usual classical yarns of |
the old Mexican campaigners. AT last
wnen every one had gone to sleep, | re
ceived at O'Clock in the morning, des-
patch from General Jameson, command |
ing our out works, and announcing that
the enemy's sentinels had disappeared. |
Shortly thereafter other dispatches con
firmed the news of the evacuation OF York |
town. | awakened the general to inform |
him of the disaster. Nothing had been
prepared for so unexpected an event. 1t |
became necessary to improvise everything. |
This time it was not mere question, as |
in 1881, of receiving long columns of pris- |
oners. 1t was necessary to stir up the |
whole army, and as soon as possible over
take the enemy who had so cleverly stolen !
out of our company.
Mcclellan undertook this new task with
all the vigor and eXactitude of mind