The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-08-03

! oraai e1ceptione MAJOR He would have
been disqualified at common law, and
we have no statute removing such DIS
Qualification. 1t does not matter that
| he had the self-confdence to swear that
| he could try the cause impartially. 1t
was not for him to determine his COM
potency on that point. When the fact
was developed that he was in the EN-
ployment of appellant, the law adJudged
| him incompetent. The law does not
lead jurors into the Temptations OF 8
position where they may secure adyan-
tage to themselves by doing wrong. or
| permit the possibility of the wavering
balance being shaken by self interest.
Hubbard VS.. Rutledge, 81 Miss, -
Black Com, 363. Thompson VS.. Merri-
mae on Juries, sec. 1S5.
The cause assigned for the challenge
of the juror, Young, was without merit.
| That part of sec. 1861, of the Code,
which furnishes cause for challenge to
tales jurors, did not apply to him. He
was not a tales juror, but member OF
the regular panel for the week. \ tales
Juror is one added to deficient panel,
so as to supply the deiciency.-Bouvier's
| Dictionary.
No principles of law are better settled,
than that railroad company carrying
| passengers, in order to afford them OPP
portunity to leave the train at their
| places of destination, is bound to have
| the names of different stations announced
upon the arrival of the train, and then
to stop the train for q sufficient length
of time for the passengers to get off
with safety, and that railroad company
! is liable for the loss or injury which
may result to passenger for a violation
of this duty. Thompson on Car. of
Passengers, 226. r. Il. Co. vs.. Scurr, SO
| Miss, 400. So. +. r. Co. vs. Hendricks,
40 Id, 374.
1t is not pretended that the name of
the station at which Mask was TO get off,
was announced when the train arrived
at thai point. Some of the witnesses
say that the train was stopped, while
others say that it was not, and there is
no explanation why Mask, who left his
seat and went to the platform to get off,
did not do so, if the train was in fact
stopped. In this conflict of testimony,
it was for the jury, and not for the
appellate court, to determine the truth
OF the matter. Nicksburg Bank VS..
Moss, 90 Miss, a.
The circumstances. that as the train
approached the station and its speed
was reduced, Mask, with the view of
getting OFF, left his seat and went to the
rear platform of the passenger car, and
closed the door after him, and that the
conductor afterward went to the front
door or into the coach, and not seeing
Mask or his companion, supposed they
had left the train, and thereupon
ordered the train to move on, do not
relieve the company from liability. 1t
was the duty OF the conductor to know
that he had passengers for that station,
to have the name of the station an
nounced, and TO stop the train. Re
had no right to assume, because he did
not see Mask and his companion in the
passenger coach, that they had leaped,
IN the dark, from the moving train.
Such risk Is not generally taken. Sane
and prudent people do no such thing.
The facts in evidence did not warrant
exemplary damages, and they were not
asked or awarded. Whether the injury
complained of resulted from the failure
of the company to stop It's train, and
what actual damages were proved, were
questions for the jury, and not for this
court to decide. The testimony pro
duced by appellee, on these points, was
| competent, anu We are unable 10 say
that it was not sufficient to justify and
support the verdict.
The action of the court IN regard to
the instructions, is free from error.
The instructions given could not well
have been more favorable to appellant.
The notifications of its second instruc-
ton, in reference to the measure of
images, by inserting "actual" in place
of nominal, was proper. If appellee
was entitled to recover anything, it was
more than nominal damages. affirmed.