The National tribune., 1887-06-16
CHICK RMAUGA,
A Reply TO Gen. Wiley and De-
lenSe of Gen. Thomas.
By CAPT AMAsA JOHNSON, 9TH IND, PLY,
MOUTH, IND.

or all the great battles OF the late war none
has given rise 10 more controversy and differ
ence OF opinion than Chickamauga Much Ofthis
is owing 10 the night march of Sept. Is to get
the Union troops in position, and 10 the con-
slant severe fighting and changing of br:gades
and divisions from right 10 left from early
morning OF Sept - until the night of the 20th.
Often positions were occupied succcssiyey by
different troops, and owing TO brigades being
detached from their divisions and divisions
from corps aud sent 10 Gen. IhOmass assist
ance, IL became on the Union side more OF
fight by divisions than any Of our most im-
portant battles. In fact division commanders
were largely left to carry out their individual
views, with very little interference from Gems.
RosuCTans or Thomas.
Now, as 10 Gen. Wiley's article in the The
NATIONAL TRIBUNE of May 10. wish TO say,
IN regard 10 his taking the credit for suggest
ing the building OF breastwoTks on the morn
ing of the 20lh, il is the newest thing have
heard on that battle, for he is neither entitled
TO the credit Of first making the suggestion or
first throwing up works, rs l shall prove. was
with Col. Suman, of the 9th Ind, on the morn
ing OF Sept. 20, and Immediately after Gen.
Palmer's Division, TO which we belonged-as
did also Gen. Wiley regiment-ha been placed
in line. We all believed that we would fight
defensive battle, and Col. Suman suggested 10
Gen. Hazen that We could make our position
impregnable in a few minutes with rails and
logs Suman's experience in the Mexican war
and also in West Virginia campaigns had given
him large experience as a soldier. 1 remember
that Hazen at first objected 10 his suggestion,
saying that the enemy's artillery would throw
shells into our works and cause many To be
killed by the rails; but Suman thought differ
emily, and assured Hazen that he would place
the heaviest logs and rails in front and obviate
his objections; Hazen then consented. and the
nsR L. 81, q a.. Al
As we had no intrenching tools we only
built small works of rails and logs, and
Gen. Palmer had these continued along his
entire front. They were also extended so as TO
cover nearly the entire front of the army on
both sides of us. All this was done after day
light the morning Of the Goth. and HaZen. in
his book, entitled "A Narrative OF Military
Service" published in 1855, gives great credit
10 Col. Suman for his suggestion. lie not only
speaks Of it on page %, where he says: AT
daybreak Col. suman, of the 9th Ind, came 10
me and suggested breastwork along our front,
which no one before seemed TO have thought
of" but further says, speaking of cover in
battle: This was our first really useful i'm
prOyised cover of infantry" Again, in his
chapter on the Lessons of the War; page ISL,
Hazen says:
At ChiclSamauga the work Of logs begun after
daylight al the suggestion OF Col. suman. and at
first objected 10 by Johnson, the officer who suf
fered most al Stone River from the want Of such a
defense, had n most important bearing upon the
fortunes OF the day. The little damage done by
pOlk's Corps proves this. With more effective
fighting than the day before, lost only l3 men
against more than 400 the previous day.
At the Reunion of both armies at Chatta-
noogs, Sept. 49, 1851, Gen. Cheathsm, when
visiting the battlefield and speaking of this old
crumbling line proposed by Col. Suman), said:
"Only for this little work we should have
swept you from the field before noon." Gen.
Hazen, replying, said: And do not doubt it,"
Thus we have a distinguished officer on the
Confederate side and one on the Union agree
ing that but for Col. Suman's foresight we
would have been swept from the field. Col.
Suman was one of the best Colonels in Palmer's
Division, rose TO be a Brigadier- General, and
no officer was oftener complimented by his
superiors for gallantry in action.
While the works we built were slight, still
no Confederate army could have captured
them. Gen. Wiley is mistaken when he says
the firing behind these works was not heavy
or terrific" My remembrance is that we never
had heavier musketry firing than we did along
those works up TO ii o'clock in the morning
and find that in Gems. Hazen's and Palmer's
reports. as well as in the Confederate accounts
of the battle, they mention the terrible firing
of that morning which ended with the complete
repulse Of Folks Corps. Ii was this day that
Gen. Palmer distinguished himself for consum-
iudiG anu ln recognition Oh WHICH
he was afterward given command OF the Four
teenth Corps.
Now, as to Gen. Wiley's criticisms on Gen.
Thomas:
i. THAT he failed TO communicate TO his
subordinate commanders or the troops under
him the fact that the battle was defensive
| one" As Gen. Rosecrans was in command the
first day, that could not apply to Thomas; and
the second day, when Thomas commanded, the
I fact that hrea CfkVorlra bpf nd
manned along our entire line showed the battle
was TO be defensive one.
2. That having chosen or been compelled
TO adopt line i'll adapted TO defense he failed
TO strengthen il by any artificial appliances -
Again il must be remembered that Rosecrans
commanded, and that Thomas with his corps
marched all night OF the 18th TO get between
the Confederates and Chattanooga and 10 hold
possession of roads leading 10 that place.
Thomas could not foresee that he would be in
command on the Goth, but when the supreme
command Unexpectedly deyolyed upon him no
General could have done better.
g. That he failed 10 give any directions to
/ his division commanders as 10 what should be
the formation of their troops in line but left
each 10 act on his own judgment. in consequence
OF which interior divisions Of Palmer and John
son were unnecessarily strong" Thomas did
direct each division commander as TO the part
Of the line he should hold, and 10 have gone
further when he had such able and experienced
Generals as Reynolds, Palmer Baird and John
son 10 command his divisions would have been
useless As 10 Palmer being unnecessarily
strong" was close by him much of the time
during the Goth, aud j am certain from his
locks aud what he said that day he would have
given his right arm 10 have had 10000 moro
soldiers, for Palmer not only held his own line
but sent many of his regiments 10 helm other
commands. Gen. Crosses Brigade was ONLY in
reserve a short time In the morning for Palmer
| threw every soldier he had into the battle
Now, as 10 Thomas leaving the field the
night OF the 20th. lie could not have staid
with any prospect OF success Three entire di-
visions were miles away in his rear, with no
certainty Of their coming 10 his assistance. Ills
army lay IN the shape Of a horseshoe with
only one road 10 Rossvlle open. large por-
ton Of his troops were out of ammunition
which lac could not supply and continue in his
position. We must consider the further fact
that brigades aud even regiments had been de-
| tachcd from their commands and placed In
other divisions aud brigades, so that not only
Thomas but even division commanders did not
know the exact force they had. For this rea.
son, If for no other, IL became absolutely neces.
sary 10 fall back 10 Rossville and allow each
regiment 10 rejoin lis brigade and each brigade
its division, and 10 be resupplied with ammu.
milton, which had been exhausted, and also
that the troops might be supplied with rations
Gen Rosccrans is 20 be commended FOR giving
his order 10 fall back 10 RossVille the night OF
the 2Oth, aud Thomas for obeying.
As 70 the morning Of the 2Ist, when we occu.
pied the ridge at Rossyille, we had been fur.
I .l0s.A Inn