The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-05-04

the religious belief of deceased, as was
shown to the court when 1t had under
consideration the admission of the state
ment of deceased as dying declaration.
The court refused to admit this evil
dence and the defendant excepted.
The jury found the defendant guilty
OF manslaughter, and he was sentenced
TO two years imprisonment in the pen
itentiary. The defendant appealed.
CAMPBELL, J., delivered the opinion of
the Court.
1t is verv questionable whether the
dying declaration" of Brown should
have been admitted as such, and we
would not be understood as approving
the two instructions given for the State
as universally true, aud we are clearly
of the opinion that the court erred In not
permitting the testimony TO show that
Browns religious belief was such as to
detract from the value of his dying dec
larations; but as the verdict is one of
which the appellant cannot complain IN
view of his own testimony, we do not re-
gard the errors rs emitting him TO new
trial. He was examined as a witness
for himself before the committing court
and his testimony there was read in eyi
dence ON his trial in the circuit court.
Although he objected to this, it was
clearly admissible. Where the State
uses one as a witness in the investigation
of criminal charge the evidence thus
obtained may not afterwards be used
against the person giving it. Josephine
q. The STATE, 80 Miss, 613; Jackson q
The State, Sc Miss, 81; Farkas q. Ihc
State, 60 Miss, SAT.
But where the statute makes an &C
cused person competent witness in his
own behalf, and he testifies in the exer-
else of his right, his testimony may at
forwards be used against him.
No right of the appellant was violated
in offering his own version of the rem
counter in which he killed Brown as
evidence against him, and on this evi
dence he was properly convicted, anC
may felicitate himself that he was no
found guilty of murder.
We fail to discover in this case any
particular circumstances making i
proper for the allowance of the release
of the appellant on bail pending his ap
peal. We suppose those circumstance:
were made manifest to the circuit cOur
which admitted him to bail after con
viction. If the peculiar circum stance
in this case consist of what is disclosed
by the affidavit in the record the Law
was violated in admitting him TO bail
That affidavit shows that he had a crol
which needed his attention, and that ht
would be ruined financially by beinj
confined, and desired opportunity u
pursue his industrial vocation, and tina
his wife WAS frail and delicate.
Manifestly, the law does not tolerat
bail after conviction of felony on an,
such ground as this. 1t denies bail to
convicG of felony except in the discrt
ton of court or judge ''to be exercises
with the greatest caution and only whel
the peculiar circumstances of the cas-
render it proper in the opinion of sue
court or Judge" There was nothin
peculiar or exceptional in the case Q
appellant shown by the affidavit referre
to
Imprisonment is doubtless general
inconvenient and undesirable to the pc
son suffering it, and in every case,
may be supposed. that the party woul
like to be with his wife and be permi
ted to pursue his usual business, but tt
statute declares that one convicted {
felony shall not have bail except as
special favor granted by court or judg
not on personal grounds, but under p
culiar circumstances, to be judged of {
matter of sound judicial discretion.
Affirmed.