Omaha daily bee., 1887-07-24
The Franco-German Frontier.

The Franco-German Frontier.
Major Otto Wachs furnishes the Con.
temporary Review with a description of
the defences erected along the boundary
between the two countries, showing
them to be almost impregnable from
either side. The article concluded as
follows: After the military estimate l
have already given of the system of for
titications on the Nosges and IN the for.
est of Agonne, it will probably be agreed
that few of the chances of war lie on the
side of the assaiant. whoever he may be.
He may the rcfore think it best to avoid
this whole line of mound and wall and
cannon, where he might have to wait
long for decisive engagement, and to
carry the battle iuto another field alto
gether. 1t may thus we'll be that. be
cause of these strong positions of the
French and German border, 1t may be
on foreign soil that will be fought this
gigantic conflict of nations just rs
water flows to the lowest level, so do
combitants seek out the easiest battle
ground, because it Is there that the de-
cisive issue which is so earnestly desired
can be soonest and most completely
arrived at. But such ground cannot
be found in the present case
anywhere except on this southern wing
of the German and French lines of forti-
tcation, where Switzerland sits on her
tower or on their northern termination,
where Luxemberg and Belgium extend.
If, then, an inexorable fate should will
that while words are lisping peace, deeds
should mean war, then no one can tell
whether Swiss and Belgium neutrality
will continue to be preserved, or whether
it will not be precisely on these territO-
ries that the iron die will be cast. AS
Switzerland is entrusted with the watch
on the south, so Belgium has to exercise
the watch on the Meuse; and woe to them
if the keys escape from their weak
hands.
AS said before, the southwest corner
of Germany is not very vulnerable from
the side of the upper Rhine. between
Basle and Ncu Breisach; whereas a
on the basis of the Aare valley, and
marching upon Brugg could easily
FORCE THE RHINE,
with Shaffhausen and Stein to reach the
| plains of Engen and Stockach. In this
way the Danube valley could be got at
| without touching the strategic barrier Of
the Black forest. Surprising the French
army TO- be defeated, it would find a
| capital line of defence on the Limmat
and Metli lIne-so well known by
| Massena's operations of 1799-with the
| important stronghold of Zurich, which
latter cuts off the most important lines
of operations. Retreating farther the
army would find on the Aare many use
full points of defense. and the lines and
forts at Montbeliard and Belfort assure
| sufficient protection on the flank.
Finally, the french barrier forts of the
Jura and Rhone passes, as we'll as the
towns of Besancon and Auxonne, turned
into large retrenchment camps, offer
sure places of refuge.
| While France has armed herself with
coat-of mail against Switzerland, the
western border cantons of the latter
| country lie exposed to attack, and their
are, in military point of view, posi-
lively favorable to a hostile invasion. In
| proof of the first part of this assertion l
need only point to her fortified places
and the numerous strategic railways, and
to add that the material for expeditions
mobilization lies everywhere ready in
the French fortresses. If the French
they would not hesitate long in
utilizing the advantages of the situation.
How far they could penetrate
unchecked through Swiss territory with
their forces, before that portion of the
Swiss army that is unattached to for
tresses (ll7,2O0 men), the army of the first
line, the landwehr (S5, 900 mcn) and the
landstrum 100000 mem opposed them, is
doubtful. The Swiss are well disciplined,
reliable, competent soldiers, capoble OF
long marches and good shots (the weapon
of their infantry is the excellent repeater
rifle, model Of 1S1S-S1), and the moral
factors of their military character-such
as their firm determination to maintain
their independence-are in many ways
backed by the nature OF the country itself,
which makes up for the poor capacity of
the Swiss array for the offensive and OBJ
structs the speed OF all hostile operations
And then, besides, no great time would
elapse before the French tricoor found
its progress opposed by the German
coiors, which the Swiss would have sum,
moned to their relief.
Germany has, in the first instance. nc
interest to infringe Swiss neutrality, fol
its natural military object, Paris, lies
OUTSIDE THE LINE
from Basle to Geneva: but if il wished tC
direct its troops to the south OF France il
must undertake siege of LYONS, a place
which was of no military importance in
1870, but is now surrounded BY an en-
trenched camp with circumference OF
: hundreds of kilometers. Farther to the
east or south German army would en-
counter Grenoble, which has been pu
into the same state rs Lyons, and if il
tried a detour on the Jura, that would b,
easily averted by the French army.
In conclusion, let us cast a flying
glance at Belgium, where the question o.
neutrality is at this moment brskly dis
cussed, and where, al any moment wher
the theory of Belgian neutrality il
called to pass into practice, controversie!
invariably arise on all sides as to its na
ture, its existence, and its results; show
ing how fugitive are the ideas Of righ
III our generation.
The position of Belgium offers littl,
analogy to that of Switzerland, for whil,
Switzerland is bounded by four grca
powers, Belgium is bounded by only twt
OF them, and on the west is washed b.,
the sea, and presumably secured by TIN
English and Dutch lleets. While Swlt
zerland has no fortresses. Belgium ha
the great and powerful internationa
tete -pont of Antwerp, whose high i'm
portauce as Il fortIhcation is not to b
mistaken, although its remote situation
impars the strategicai influence on th
Meuse valley. As regards military capa
city, Belgium has "a standing army whlcI
{ is oilicerod by men thoroughly trained L
the modern standard of military require
l kt,L ,, 1t, -