Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1887-11-20

deeds in 1878, and the answer alleging a

parol partition in 1877. Held: 1t not
being apparent that said decree, IL erro-
neous, could effect the appellants, it
having been determined in this suit that
they had no interest in the land parti-
toned, We are of opinion that they can
not be heard to complain. 1t is next
asserted that the court erred in not find
| ing that the suit, as against appellant,
was collusive and fraudulent, and brought
and conducted to defeat the collection of
their debt. Held: This was question of
J fact to be determined by the court, and
the finding will not be disturbed, there
being nothing in the record inconsistent
with its truth. There being no error in
the record of which appellants can COM
plain, we are Of the opinion that the
Judgment should be affirmed. Maltbie,
P. J.
Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway
Company vs.. Elias A. Moone; appeal from
Johnson county. The court in it's charge
upon exemplary damages failed to state
that in order to make the defendant liza
| BILE for the malicious acts Of it's employees
the jury must first believe that the mali
| cious acts were authorized by the defen-
dant or that the acts If malicious were
| subsequently ratified and adopted by de-
Of Hays VS.. the International sDd Crest
Northern Railway Company, T46 Tex.
| 272l there has never been G. doubt of the
lew that corporation is no more liable
for the malicious acts Ct It's employe or
servant than an individual would be. The
unauthorized malicious acts of the agent
of corporation will not render
the principal liable for exem-
plary damages unless the same
are ratified by the principal with
| full knowledge of the facts.
Negligence is generally fact to be found
by tine ury. When duty is required by
law the omission of which causes dam
ages for which an action is maintainable,
the omission is negligence, but as to
whether there is negligence in psrticu-
lar case causing injury, should generally
be left to the jury. Contributorv negli-
gence is no exception to the rule. 1t
would have been improper for the court
to have instructed the jury, if they found
the facts assigned IN the special charge
asked by the defendant, that it would be
exoners ed from liability, whether the
existence of such facts constituted negli
gence on the part of the plaintiff and
whether they contributed to the injury
complained of were not questions for the
court to decide; they were questions
that should have been left
| to the Jury, as we'll as the existence of the
| facts themselves. Whist another man
said, who was with plaintiff ten minutes
after the time of the accident, going to
show thai plaintiff heard the whistle or
the ringing of the bell, was hesrsay evil
dence and therefore inadmissable. For
the error found in the charge of the court
upon exemplary damages the Judgment
SHOULD be reversed and the cause remand
ed. Collsrd, ]
Josephine E. Riorden VS.. A. NJ. Britton;
| appeal f:om Mitchell. Suit of tresp6ss
to try title. Twenty-one attachments
were levied upon house, merchandise
and two lots in Colorado City belonging
to Cupps & Co. Appellee levied his at
>achment February 10, 1882, and was the
eighth attachment levied. Appellant
levied his attachment February IA, 1882,
and was the twelfth levied. Appellee's
writ was returned to the District court
of Tarrant county, whence it issued, uu-
til January 2, 1888. Writ No. - issued
from the District court, Mitchell county.
February II, 1882, and was levied On the
| Identical property as that of writ No. g.
The entry and endorsement of levy was
|
the writs abouiE February 20.
The returns were all made by r. Ii
Looney, attorney for plaintiff in writ No.
u, at the request of the officer and in
the order the writs were levied After
indorsing upon writ No. s, the levy on the
merchandise, Looney added: "Also store
house and lots" by direction OF the off
Gers without giving numbers of lots or
| hlOpk Tn 81 no rofurp
day Of the writ and after the deputy who
made the return had gone out OF Office,
the then Sheriff of Mitchell county at the
request of plaintiffs attorney in the wri
No. interlined and gave a full descrip-
ton of the property levied on. The
words added were: "Also house and lots,
being lots Is and II in block IL, in Colo
RADIO, Mitchell county, Tex" Held:
Whatever other acts may be performed
| by the sheriff in making the levy, the in
dorsement upon the execution or
attachment must take place be-
| fore the levy is complete.
The court erred in its finding thst the act
Of the officer in going upon the premises
on nthe morning Of February II, 1882,
and there declaring that he levied the
writ under which appellee claims upon
the property in controversy constituted 8
velld levy. We do not think this reversi-
ole error, however, for it conclusively sp-
pears that the levy was endorsed upon the
writ under which appellee CLAIMS. With
out deciding that the description was suf-
ficient without the amendment, we hold
that under the facts in this case it &C
compllshed all that the most specific de-
scripiion could have done so far as ap-
pellant was concerned. Looney, attor-
ney for plaintiff in writ No. II, knew
that the officer intended the levy to
apply to tbs property in controversy.
Appellants husband was fully notified
the writ had been levied on the property
before he purchased the same No re-
versible error. Affirmed. Acker, j.
Coleman and Davidson vs.. John Col
gate; appeal from Coleman. 1t is well
settled that dispositions will be suppressed
on motion for that purpose, when on
cross examination witness, or party to
8 suit refuses to answer a material ques-
ton. II psrty to suit evades question
intended to discover facts in his knowl-
edge beneficial to his adversary, the rule |
would apply with more force than when
witness had no interest; when party
to suit declines to produce letters or
documents in which his adversary is in |
terested, the deposition should be |
suppressed. The failure of the court to |
=