davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
FIRST BLOWS.

The night of the 9Th passed without alarm.
Only the men on picket seemed to realize that
a terrible struggle was close at hand. Even
Gen. Sherman, notwithstanding the unrest
that had prevailed along the front during the
day, wrote to Gen. Grant: II do not appre-
bend anything like an attack upon our posi-
tion," and Grant on the same day dispatched
Halleck: II have scarcely the faintest idea of
an attack general one) being made upon u.s. :"
Gen. Halleck himself advised Buell. that he
"would leave for Corinth in the beginning of
the coming week."
Among the Confederates, however, all was
activity. Long before the early dawn they
had breakfasted and stripped for the bloody
work of the day. Lines were formed and
advanced and men looked into their comrades
eyes wondering whether they would meet
again around the bivouac fire or I've only
some loved ones memory in a dead soldiers
trench. Aroused by the hum of 10000 men
waking up for battle, ,pickets were thrown
forward from the right Of Gen. Prentiss'
division to ascertain the cause, portion Of
the Twenty-fifth Missouri, and little later
five companies Of the Twenty-drs Missouri,
under Col. Moore, thus having the honor of
firing the first shots that rang up the curtain
On the drama of Shiloh. This detachment
struck battalion of the Third Mississippi,
Major Hardcastle, of Woods brigade, Har-
dee's corps, and the skirmishing that ensued
quickly extended along the front. The entire
Confederate line, two miles in length, now
moved forward, the direction being such as
to bring it first in contact with the right of
Prentiss and the left of Sherman. A broad
gap, more than mile in width, existed be-
tween these two points, and into this the
overpowering. Prentiss' forces fell back in
confusion, leaving their camps in the hands
Of the enemy, and several of the regiments Of
Sherman's left were equally demoralized.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
WAS 1T A SURPRISE?

Whether all this rapid movement SO soon
after tho sounding of the long roll along tho
national front, was surprise, in strictly
military sense, is still among the many con-
troverted questions connected with the battle.
LOSING in his History 0f the Civil War;"
says:
Many of the officers were yet slumberiag.
others were dressing, others were washing or
cooking. Their guns were unloaded and accou.
tremapts strewn around without order. Many Of
the troops were without q sufficient supply of am
muhition, The first intimation that the Confed
crates were close upon them in force was the cry
Of the flying pickets pushing into camp, and the
scream and crash OF shels and the whistle of
balls as they flew on deadly errands through the
tents and the forest 1t was an unexpected as
sault followed by the most fearful results.
Gen. Buell., in his "Shiloh Reviewed" says:
have only 10 remark that each revival of the
question of surprise has placed the fact in q more
glaring light. The enemy was known to be a.
hand, but no adequate steps were taken to ascer-
tain in what force or with what design. The call
to arms blended with the crash of assault, and
when the whole forest on the rising ground in
front flashed with the CLEAN of bayonets. then Gen
Sherman, as he reports, became satisfied for the
first time that the enemy designed determined at
tack.
John S. c. Abbott says:
Officers were awakened by the crash of shot and
shell through their tents, and others were never
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
A RETROSPECT.

Missouri having been secured to the Union,
the principal field of activity was transferred
to Kentucky and Tennessee, and Maj Gen.
Halleck placed in chief command Of all the
armies in the valley Of the Mississippi with
headquarters at St Louis. These included
the army of the Ohio, Gen. Don Carlos Buell.;
the army of the Tennessee, Gen. Grant; the
army of the Mississippi, Gen. Pope, and that
of Gen. s. R. Curtis, in southwestern Mis-
souri,. This was in February, 1862 Gen. w.
II. Sherman was posted at Paducah for the
purpose of facilitating operations on the Ten
nessee and Cumberland rivers, and in the
meantime was organizing out of the new
troops arriving there division for himself
when he should be allowed to take the field
by Gen. Haleck. The latter thus had sub
ject to his general orders an aggregate of
125, 900 men Of all arms
/ The Confederate line OF defense extended
least and west. from Columbus on the Missis-
sippi, to Bowling Green (Forts Donelson and
Henry being near the center.) The depart
ment was under the command of Gen. Albert
Sidney Johnston, distinguished officer of the
old army and a lifelong friend and conf
dante of jefferson Davis. His forces con-
sisted of Al, 600 electives, of whom $4,000 were
with him at Bowling Green; $1,000 under the
bishop general, Leonidas Polk at Columbus
and neghborhood, and the remainder at Forts
Henry and Donelson, Gainesville and else
where under command of Gems. Buckner,
RuShrOd II. Johnson, flllOW ana floyd Inc
capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, having
shattered the Confederate line, the evacuation
of Columbus, Bowling Green and Nashville,
followed and with the fall of Island Number
10, New Madrid, and the opening of the Mis-
sissippi to Fort Pillow, the national authority
was established over the whole Of the state of
Kentucky, and Tennessee became thorough
fare for both army and fleet: 1t was a
splendid series of successes and Grant stepped
at once into national fame
Johnston and Beauregard now retired
southwark it being evident to the military
mind that the Memphis and Charleston rail-
road between Memphis and Chattanooga
would constitute the new line, and that the
concentration Of troops must therefore take
place somewhere in that vicinity. But where?
The answer was a problem to the command
erS on both sides.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

IEN BUELL.. lHS OCLo 0Itsuu
and Buell. met at Sherman's headquarters,
and It was there arranged that the attack
should be begun at daylight. Gen. Lew Wal
! lace occupied the right of line, resting on
Snake creek; Sherman, McClernana and
Hurlbut, with the remnants of Wallace's and
Prentiss' men, were postetbnext from right to
left. while McCook, Crittenden and Nelson,
of Buells army, in the order named, consti-
tutcd tho left wing. The skirmishing began
early, tho advanced outposts Of Mel
son being the first to strike those
Of the enemy The Confederate right
consisted Of Hardee's corps, with Chal-
mer's and Jackson's brigades Of Bragg's
remainder of his command, and Clarke's
division Of Folks corps and Trahue's Ken
lucky brigade. Gen. Breckenridge was on
the left of Hardee. and Gen. Polk fell into
line between Bragg and Breckenridge From
the beginning of the contest the fighting was
ground was lost and won, batteries were
taken and retaken, and Federals and Con-
federates lay side by side in tho dense woods
and muddy fields through which they had
struggled for the possession Of the camps. 1t
was evident long before noon, however, that
the enemy was being pushed steadily back
and the ground conquered by them the day
before, stubbornly surrendered. The
musketry at times surpassed in its volume
and execution anything of the kind yet known
in the war; tents were riddled with bullet
holes; one tree not eighteen inches in
diameter was struck by ninety balls not ten
feet from the ground, and mangled horses,
mutilated men, living and dead, broken gun
carriages and all the nameless debris of bat
tlefield were spread around in appalling con-
fusion. r- 80 t
Seeing his troops beginning to lag, and ex-
hausted regiments dropping out of line,
Beauregard between 2 and 8 o'clock sent
word to his extreme right to retreat in alter.
nate lines. This movement was under the
command of Breckinbridge, and it is conceded
was conducted with steadiness and with no
attempt to follow. Indeed Gen. Grant, in his
report to Halleck, says that his force was
"too much fatigued from two days hard fight
ing and exposure in the open air to drench-
ing rain in the intervening night to pursue
Breckenridge that night
carlped about mile and half from the bat
tlefield, and the next day moved three miles
further to the rear The other commands
with their fragments marched back to their
around Corinth.
In the "Medical and Surgical History Of
the War;" the loss i'm killed, wounded and
missing on the Federal side during the two
days fighting is fixed at 1858. According
TO Beauregard, the aggregate of Confederate
loss was 1868. And SO ended the battle of
Shiloh The flag of the Union floated once more
along the lines from which it had been driven,
and the first foot prints were made in that
wonderful campaign which, beginning at
Donelson, took definite shape at Corinth and
Memphis, recovered the Mississippi from
Vicksburg to New Orleans, chrystalized in
'The March to the Sea-" and eliminated at
Appomattox Court House
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
SHILOH CHURCH.

Tillman's or Briar creek, and runs almost due
north, mile and quarter from the river, di-
viding the table land into two main ridges.
Oak creek is continent of Owl creek, and it
extends half way across the front or south side
Of the battlefield, passing near Shiloh church, a
small log meeting house situated two miles
and a half in southwesterly direction from
Pittsburg Landing For the most part the
land was covered with timber or dense
underground, with here and there open fields
of from twenty to eighty acres.
1t was generally agreed that the position of
the Union army was strong. Guarded on either
flank by impossible streams and morasses, pre-
tected by a succession of ravines and acclivi-
ties, commanded by eminences to the rear,
it seemed safe from attack and easy to defend.
But no earthworks were thrown up or timber
it is still a controverted question whether
the Confederates were expected until they
came
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

uEN. PHENTlSs. Sctctohy h@so itSh..,,
ing at some point on the line, but seldom at al
points at the same time. II was case OF south
ern dash against northern pluck and endurance.
Gen. w. Il. Sherman, in his memoirs, says:
1t was publicly asserted at the north that our
army was taken completely by surprise; that the
rebels caught us In our tents; bayonetted the
men in their beds; that Gen, Grant was drunk;
that Buels opportune arrival saved the Army T. OF
reports were, In measure sustained by the pub
lished opinions Of Gems. Buell., Nelson and others,
who had reached the steamboat landing from the
east just before nightfall when there was large
crowd Of frightened, stampeded men who clam
ored and declared that our army was oil de-
sstroyed and beaten. Personally ! saw Gen:
about 10 a. m on the 9Th, when We We're dcs;
pcrately engaged. But We had then checked
the hcadlong assault Of the enemy and then
held our ground. He told me that on his way up
from CrImp's landing no had ordered Lew Wal
laces division to cross over Snake creek 50 az te
come up on my right. He also came again lust
by the rebels at the iavine neor the steamhoat
landing, which he had repealed by heavy bat
terry collected under Col J. D. Webster and other
over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to
assume the offensive in the morning, saying that
as be had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis
of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and
whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win.
It is undoubtedly true that the attack on
the raw troops produced panic. which more
or less infected other commands, but when the
real death grapple occurred with Veterans
like those Of Wallace, Hurlbut and McCler-
nard, the splendid men from Indiana, ILL
nois, Iowa and elsewhere in the west, who
had been hardened in the service, the des-
perate resistance that was made and the
varying fortunes of the fight demonstrated
that the unexpected assault was not neces-
sarily "a walk over" The broken character
of the ground, the frequently disordered lines
and shifting positions Of the day, make it i'm
possible to present here more than pan
Oramic view of the battle
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

Gen. Breckenridge and Governor Harris, Of
Tennessee, rode to their front and promised
to lead them himself The hitherto reluctant
soldiers, now reused to enthusiasm by such q
distinguished leadership, charged and carried
the slope. But it was at a terrible cost to the
Confederates. After he had passed through
tho ordeal of the charge unhurt, a chance
shot struck Gen. Johnston in the leg, sever
ing an important artery. His clothes were
pierced by missiles, the sole of his boot had
been torn by bullet and his horse shot i'll
four places, but he himself did not know that
he had received a severe wound until Cover
nor Harris seeing him reeling i'll his saddle,
rode up and asked if he was hurt. "Yes,"
was the reply, sand fear MORALLY" The
diving general was removed from his horse,
and there upon the field he had SO nearly won
his spirit passed away. This was about $50
o'clock Gen. Bragg assuming the command,
renewed assaults were now made on the Fed
eral left, the position was finally turned and
in a. couple of hours more the weary rem
nants of the Federal army were under the
shelter of the gunboats and a line of thirty
pieces Of artillery that had been hastily gath
cred by Col Webster, of Gen. Grants staff,
and now constituted, with its slight infantry
support, the only hope of the army.
While the Confederates under Chalmers,
jackson and others, who had closed in around
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

Ing arrived on the, 18th, Gen. Sherman wai
ordered to land at some point below PASSPORT
and cut tho Memphis and Charleston railroad
between Tuscumba and Corinth. Passing
Pittsburg Landing, he learned that on a
former trip up the river Capt. Gwin, Of the
gunboat, found posted there a Confederate
regiment Qhc Eighteenth louisiana, and ac-
cordingly sent word to Gen. Smith that
troops might properly be ordered to that
place.
Returning to headquarters on the night
OF tho 18th, Sherman reported his in
ability to carry out the orders of Gen.
iialleck, whereupon he was instructed by Gen.
smith to "disembark Ills own division and
that OF Gen. Hurlbut, which had also arrived
at Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well
back, and TO leave room for his whole army,
adding that he would soon come up In per-
son and move out in force to make the lodg.
memt on the railroad contemplated by Gen.
lialleck" 1nasinuch as the credit Of choos-
Ing this landing as the most advantageous
position that was offered, belongs. to Con. 9.
i. Smith, 1t may be remarked here that when
he was a commandant Of the military acad-
envy at West Point, Grant and Sherman were
there as cadets. ,.... -
Frequent "Reminiscences now disclosed the
fact that every road and path was occupied
by the encmy's pickets. AS carly as the 10th
Sherman, accompanied by Lieut.. Col. after
ward general MCPHERSON, advanced about
ten miles from the river to a pace near
Monterey on Pea ridge, where he learned
that the trains were bringing large masses Of
men into Corinth, and accordingly wrote to
Gen Grant: 1--WE cannot reach the Memphis
and Charleston railroad without consider
able engagement, which is prohibited by Gen.
Hallecks instructions" He also reported
the he was strongly impressed with the i'm
portance OF the position, both for its land adj
vantages and strategic position. The ground
itself admits Of easy defense by small COM
mand, and yet affords admirable camping
ground for 100000 men," These incidents
may appear Insignificant, but they have an
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
SHILOH.
How the Men of the West Organ
lied for Victory.
STRIKING FIRST BLOWS,
An Impartial Story of One Of the
Decisive Battles of the War.

A Bloody Field-The Desperate Fighting
OF sherman's Men-Prentiss and Wal
lace Hold the Key of the Position
Until One Is Captured and tho Other
KilIed-Death of the Confederate Com
mander-Scenes OF Splendid Murder.
Veterans in Camp and Raw Recruits
Under Fire.-IllinOis, Indiana, Iowa,
Ohio and Michigan Troops Face tho
Best Fighting Material in tho South
west-The Days Results.
Twenty-Five years have rolled by since the
desperate struggle occurred that, on the 9th
and 7th of April 1862, broke down the chief
barrier to the Mississippi valley and paved
the way for the occupation by the national
forces of every important point between
Memphis and New Orleans. Yet even after
this long period, it is still conceded that the
battle of Shiloh, Notwithstanding its far
reaching results, was move upon the mill
tary chess board not contemplated by the
authorities on either side until a very short
time prior to the beginning of the combat
Gen. Sherman says in his memoirs that
"Halleck's intentions were to break up rail-
way communications between the Mississippi
anu 1enIeSSoo TlVeTh. we ulu nOb IOTUlIy
our camps because we had no orders
to do SO, and because such a course
would naturally have made our raw men
timid." Gen. Buell. testifies that "the move
ment of troops up the Tennessee was purely
an expeditionary service, and after some
attempts to debark at other points further |
up the river, Pittsburgh Landing was finally |
chosen as the most eligible for the temporary
object" and, finally, Gen. Beauregard, in a
recent review of the campaign, remarks: ITO
say that any one, including Con. Johnston
could have designated It as the strategic
point of the Shiloh campaign, before the
enemy had given evidence Of any hostile
from or near Pittsburg Landing
on the Tennessee river, Is sheer folly, and
scarcely needs contradiction to be so pro-
1t is also beyond question that there were
inadequate preparations, unnecessary delays,
lost opportunities and sundry other obstacles
to-really decisive success on both sides; and
for quarter Of a century, they have been
themes of recrimination and exculpatory
with no other result than to re-
vive and confirm the memory Of faults.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

Before referring to the above map for moro
exact details Of positions and localities, the
reader will be assisted by bearing in mind the
figure of quadrilateral or parallelogram, the
right side Of which is the Tennessee river
flowing nearly due north, the upper or north
side Owl creek, and the lower or south side
Lick creek, both Of these streams flowing
toward the Tennessee river in a northeasterly
direction, and being from three to five miles
apart. Near their mouth were swamps filled
with backwater from the Tennessee and i'm
passable except where the road crosses them.
The inclosed space was a rolling table land
about 100 feet above the river level, with
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
FACE TO FACE,

FACE ~ FACE.
The relative positions of the two armies at
this time were as follows: Tho Tcderals occu-
pied "a continuous line from Lick creek on
the left, to Owl creek branch Of Snake
creek, on the right, facing nearly south, and
possibly little west" Their first line was
held by Gems Sherman's and Prentiss'
divisions, extending from bridge on Owl
creek to the Lick creek ford. Gen. Sher-
mans first brigade, Col. Mcdowell, formed
the extreme right; his fourth, Col. auckland,
was west of the Shiloh church and rested on
it, and his third, Col. Hildebrand, was east
Of tho church and also rested on it Then be-
gan the line Of Prentiss' division, and after
wards. at long interval, was posted Sher-
mans second brigade, COL Stuart, in close
proximity to Lick creek. About half a
mile in rear of this line was Netherlands
division, somewhat between Sherman and
Prentiss. Hurlbut was massed and in re-
serve to the year and left OF Prentiss, on
the road leading to Hamburg, and mile and
q half behind Stuart The division of G. F.
Smith, now commanded by Gen. w. H. i.
Wallace, was two miles to the rear and sup
porting the right wing Of the army. The
artillery was under the direct command Of
the division commanders. Tho general form
of the line was that of a semi circle, with its
greater arc on the left
The Confederate forces were formed in
three lines of BATTLE The first under command
Of Gen. Hardee, extended somewhat obliquely
over a space of nearly three miles from Owl
creek on their left to Lick creek on their
right The artillery was in the immediate
rear and cavalry protected the TANKS The
Second corps, under Gen. Bragg, was 500
yards to the rear of the First, and arranged
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
CONCENTRATING AT coRIN1H.

In four weeks after the excavations of the
Confederate positions in Tennessee, frag.
nents of commands from Bowling Green, KY,
under Hardee; Columbus, KY, under Polk,
and Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans, un.
der Bragg, with such new levies as could be
hastily raised, were united at or near Corinth
and for the first time organized as an army.
ut was a heterogeneous mass" says Gen.
Bragg, Gin which there was more enthusiasm
than discipline, more capacity than knowl-
smoothbore muskets-many of them with the
old flint and steel-and shotguns of all sizes
and patterns, held place in the same regi-
ments." This force, about 10000 of all arms,
was divi-ed into four corps, respectively com.
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08
M'CLERNAND'S WORK,

In this affair, the Sixth Mississippi alone
lost 800 killed and wounded out of 4.5 men.
Meanwhile, McClernand had rapidly got
under arms and endeavored to support Sher-
mans left, but his third brigade was forced
back with the fugitives from Sherman's now
broken lines, with the loss of six pieces of
artillery. Nor were all of the Confederates
in condition to follow Stragglers were
thronging the captured camps, decimated
commands had retired from action, and the
generals were busy in bringing together their
scattered troops. Beauregard was in COM
mand on the Confederate left and Johnston
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

GEN. LEW WALLACE. cd that large
body Of the enemy, which he supposed to be
Gen. Lew Wallaces division, had appeared
in his front with an apparent purpose to at
tack. Under these circumstances the Con-
federate commanders promptly decided to
assume the aggressive, and before daylight
Bcauegard had drawn up the plan Of march
and battle, and orders were issuedf for for
ward movement 1t was intended to reach
tho enemy's front in time to attacl; on the
morning Of the 9th, but owing to tho heavy
rains that had fallen, together with
tho failure OF one OF the divisions to come
up, tho formation Of the lines was not com
pleted until the afternoon Of that day. Al
though Gen. Johnston's headquarters at this
moment were less than two miles from the
Federal encampmcnt, it does not appear that
tho near presence of his army was even sus.
Dected
The united opinion. [volume] (Bradford, Vt.) 1881-1970, 1887-04-08

in similar order.
The third line was
held by Polk's
corps, and was de-
ployed in columns
of brigade on the
left of the Pitts
burg road, its
front being about
800 yards to the
rear Of Bragg's
left wing. Breck-
inrid 6 e's COM
lnand, in rear of
Bragg's right
wing, occupied q
noSitiOn Somawhat