The Emporia weekly news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1881-1889, 1887-12-01
III.
GEN. Mitchell MAKES WAR WITH AsTRo-
NOMICAL PRECISION.

GEN. mitchell MAKES WAR WITH AsTRo-
NoMIcAL PRECISION.
The promptness and celebrity OF the
movement by which Gen. Mitchell sur
prised the enemy In his front and cleared
the way for still greater enterprises was
hardly, IL at all, eQualed by anything on
the Union side during the whole contest.
Pouring rain, flooded creeks and bridges
swept away did not delay him q moment
beyond his calculations, though they add
ed enormously to the discomforts Of the
army under his command. Probably his
scientific training was to some extent re
sponsible for his appreciation of the value
OF minutes. Astronomers are accustomed
to deal with the thousandth part OF a Sec
ondl and Mitchell, in his backwoods OBJ
servatory; had invented instruments
which made stellar records with more
precision than any astronomer who had
gone before him, and thus won world
wide fame in this department. He car
ried the same qualities into the army
Leaving Shelbyville for a forced march
the morning after the Andrews raid had
started on its perilous way, and in exact
time to secure the largest results from its
co-operation-for its work was also to be
done at a fixed period-he reached the vi
cinity of Huntsville before the enemy had
the slightest intimation of his approach;
light OF the setting moon, he finished his
march in the darkness, and came upon
the sleeping town in the morning twilight,
capturing everything-stores, messages,
locomotives, trains and all the supplies of
the railroad.
This was a glorious triumph, but it was
only the first of the three parts Of which
Mitchels plan consisted, and he at once
entered on the second. Friday, April II
the very day on which we had reached
Marketable arranged ali affairs con-
nected with the railroad management on
q new basis, and started two trains loaded
with troops right into the midst of the
enemy's territory The first went west
ward to possess all the road in that direc-
ton and to open communication with the
armies of Buell. and Grant, then at Pitts
burg landing, which was successfully and
promptly accomplished. The other COM
ndanded by Mitchell in person, started
directly eastward. How far it should go
depended partly on the resistance met, but
still more on the news that might be re-
ceived from the Andrews raiders. The
little division Of Mitchell presented on that
clouded Saturday morning a most active
and imposing spectacle to an eye capable
of embracing it all. Three different rail
road expeditions were rushing forward in
rebel territory for ours was also
launched, and the other two, east and
west, were in full progress-while his re-
endorsements and the regiments which
had been outmarched were closing up on
the central position at Huntsville When
Mitchell halted a short distance from
Bridgeport, Ala, and only about thirty
miles from Chattanooga, he knew that
the greater part of his work was still
undone. The whole north was thrilled
by his success; he was made a
major general and congratulated by the
to Washington; but he knew that the key
of the enemy's position, the grand stra-
tegica1 position of the war, at least in the
west, was still unwon. And he also knew
that whether he could take and hold 1t
depended upon the degree of success with
which we met that day in disabling the
Georgia State and East Tennessee rail-
roads Could he capture Chattanooga at
this early date, that town, which with its
southwark connections afterward cost
scores of thousands of lives and around
which struggled Rosecrans, Thomas,
Grant, Sherman, Bragg, Longstreet,
Johnston, Hood and their brave armies
for two years of deadly conflict? Mitchell
saw the value OF this point, and before
breaking camp at Shelbyville had sent our
party to destroy the bridges on this road
and the Chickamauga bridge on the East
Tennessee road, thus with his own adj
vance from the west cutting of all posi-
BILE succor and leaving Chattanooga, now
denuded OF troops, at his mercy. He had
now halted until he could hear what he
had done.
But one mistake already had been
made. We were to strike the bridges on
Friday, the very day that Mitchell struck
Huntsville. 1t was now Friday evening
and we had done nothing, while Mitchell
was within two hours run of Chattanooga,
with the road open before him, abundance
of rolling stock, and the enemy in panic
IN his front. The cause OF this delay was
that Andrews, reasoning In way that
would have been justified in the case OF
any other Federal general, was assured
that Mitchell would inevitably be delayed
more than one day by such torrents OF
rain as had fallen since we left camp; and
that for US to strike too soon would i'm
pair the value OF our work and might even
call the enemy's attention to Mitchell
| own advance; SO he had sent word to our
different squads that the grand attempt
would be Saturday, the 18th of April, in
stead of Friday. That would yet be in
| full time for Mitchers enterprise, but it
increased our own difficulties and dangers
| in q way that will soon be made plain.
| On our morrow's work, therefore, de
pended the possession of Chattanooga
| and probably the whole after course of the
war in the west. This is an Inference
only; but it rests upon mass of evidence o.
which the reader who has not attentively
studied the subject can scarcely form al
idea