The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1887-11-09

AIOA tHC JuuS uICul VI nav oil dCbAOu LUZ
false imprisonment.
All of Z 1884, except the last part, re-
lates to the effect of the judgment as
against the prisoners, and declares its
effect as bar to proceedings by him.
The last part of the section declares the
effect of such judgment ia his favor as a
protection to him against being after
wards confined for the same cause. So,
now, by virtue of the statute, the indg-
ment on the trial of writ of habeds cor
pus is conclusive until reversed (and
provision is made for an appeal by the
individual decided against, and bars the
person decided against from having
another writ of habeds corpus in the same
cause TO bring the same matter again in
question; and judgment in favor of
the party shields him from being after
wards confined for the same cause by
the order of any magistrate sitting as a
committing court. The bar of the judg.
ment against the prisoner operates
throughout the cause to prevent the
same matter from being again brought
in question at his instance. The judg
ment against him on the trial of the
first writ is continuously and perpetu.
ally, throughout the same cause, conclu-
sive against him as bar to another writ
to contest the same matter involved in
the first trial.
The bar in favor of the prisoner dis
charged on the first trial is operative in
his favor to protect him from being af-
forwards confined for the same cause,
except by court of competent jurisdic.
ton. The English statute and the stat
utes of some of the American States, in
order to prevent vexation by reiterated
commitments for the same offence, pro-
vide that one delivered upon habeas cor
pus shall not again be imprisoned for
the same offense except by the court
having jurisdiction of the cause. Our
statute has exactly this meaning, and
secures immunity from imprisonment
for the same cause except by the proper
court before which the cause is brought t.
These views have been heretofore an
nounced by this court in Ec pdrte Pat
tison, Sc Miss, 16l; Er Parte, Bid,ceH, 81
Miss, III, and Er Parte, Nicholas, 81
Miss, 15S, and are adhered to after
careful denomination of the whole
question.
Newly discovered evidence which
added to the evidence on the first trial,
would vary the case, cannot avoid the
bar of the former judgment. If some
decisive fact, in itself conclusive of the
innocence of the prisoner without re-
gard to the evidence in the first trial
(such as the person charged to have
been killed being produced or
the like), would avoid the bar of the
first Judgment, it is sufficient to say that
is not the case before US. The evil
dence offered here was of the sort which
it was claimed would, when considered
in connection with that taken on the
first trial, show the prisoners to be emit
tied to bail In this case the evidence
given on the first trial was preserved /;
but in many cases, and probably in
most, the evidence heard by the judge
is not written down or preserved, and
even if bill of exceptions is signed
that is for the appellate court only.
How, then, is the second writ of hubeds
corpus to be tried? If before the same
Judge who tried the first, is he to rely
on memory for the evidence? If before
another judge, what then? Are the
witnesses first heard to be again pro.
duced7 or shall their testimony as given
on the first trial be proved by those who
witness necessitate a new investigation
to ascertain if the old and the new tor
gether, show the case to be bailable? To
so hold would nullify the statute. 1t
denies to the prisoner denied bail on
habeas corpus, another writ to try the
same question involved in the first trial
i. e. the right to bail in the then exist
ing state of his case
The nature of the proceeding pre-
cludes the adoption of the rule applica-
BILE to new trials for newly discovered
evidence, and rindicates the conclusion
at which we have arrived.
That the statute makes the judgment
conclusive until reversed, is indisputa-
BILE. There is no precedent for avoiding
| the bar OF judgment, when set up, by
questioning its correctness and produc-
ing evidence to show that different
! judgment should have been given. 1t
was never heard that evidence could be
produced in such case for such purpose.
The only way known to avoid the bar OF
a judgment, is to show it to be void or
that it did not embrace the matter in
VOWED.
In this case the effort to show the for
mer judgment void for fraud was abor-
tive; and, indeed, counsel for the appel
lants disclaim any charge of fraud in
obtaining the judgment.
The former Judgment did embrace
the matter involved in the new writ,
viz: the right to bail on the state of
facts existing when the first writ was
tried.
The propriety of the change of venue
cannot be determined in this proceed
ing. If the law authorizing it was to be
declared unconstitutional, that would
not eject the question Of granting bail I;
but We would not be understood IS sug-
costing doubt of the constitutionalitY
Of the statute on that subject.